

FAITH BASED WELFARE PROVISION IN KONYA

A THESIS SUBMITTED TO  
THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES  
OF  
MIDDLE EAST TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY

BY

MEHMET AKSÜRMEĠİ

IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS  
FOR  
THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF SCIENCE  
IN  
THE DEPARTMENT OF SOCIOLOGY

SEPTEMBER 2012

Approval of the Graduate School of Social Sciences

---

Prof. Dr. Meliha Altunışık  
Director

I certify that this thesis satisfies all the requirements as a thesis for the degree of  
Master of Science/Arts / Doctor of Philosophy.

---

Prof. Dr. Ayşe Saktanber  
Head of Department

This is to certify that we have read this thesis and that in our opinion it is fully  
adequate, in scope and quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Science.

---

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Mustafa Şen  
Supervisor

**Examining Committee Members**

Prof. Dr. Elisabeth M. Özdalga (BILKENT, POLS) \_\_\_\_\_

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Mustafa Şen (METU, SOC) \_\_\_\_\_

Assist. Prof. Dr. F. Umut Beşpınar (METU, SOC) \_\_\_\_\_

**I hereby declare that all information in this document has been obtained and presented in accordance with academic rules and ethical conduct. I also declare that, as required by these rules and conduct, I have fully cited and referenced all material and results that are not original to this work.**

**Name, Last name: Mehmet Aksürmeli**

**Signature :**

## **ABSTRACT**

### **FAITH BASED WELFARE PROVISION IN KONYA**

Aksürmeli, Mehmet  
M.S., Department of Sociology  
Supervisor: Assoc. Prof. Mustafa Şen

September 2012, 85 pages

Religious charity is said to be one of the oldest phenomena which has been present in many societies and social welfare provision is one of the central aspects of religious charity. Although, religiously motivated welfare provision has an older history than nation state based welfare provision, with the advent of the modern welfare state social aid area has been taken -partially or totally- from the religious authorities. However starting with 80s and attracting considerable interest by 90s in contemporary world, religious themes, namely faith based organizations, have been visible again in social aid area. As a form of faith based welfare provision, Faith Based Organization (FBO) is the central concept of this study; particularly Islamist FBOs will be on the focus of this study. In that sense FBOs will be studied as a part in history of Islamist faith based welfare provision in Turkey. The central hypotheses of the thesis, FBOs are organizations fertilized by changing economic and political climate of 70s. Changing state religion relationships has a significant impact on FBO proliferation in Turkey. By combating through poverty FBOs have big problems in terms of financial accountability, permanency, trustworthiness and professionalism.

Keywords: Islamism, faith based organizations, social welfare, religion

## ÖZ

### KONYA'DA İNANÇ TEMELLİ REFAH SAĞLAMA

Aksürmeli, Mehmet  
Yüksek Lisans, Sosyoloji Bölümü  
Tez Yöneticisi: Doç. Dr. Mustafa Şen

Eylül 2012, 85 sayfa

Dini hayırseverliğin birçok toplumda yer alan çok eski olgulardan birisi olduğu söylenir ve toplumsal refahın sağlanması dini hayırseverliğin temel boyutlarından birisidir. Her ne kadar dini gerekçeli refah sağlama milli devlet temelli refah sağlamadan eski bir tarihe sahip olsa da, modern refah devletinin keşfi ile toplumsal yardım alanı –kısmın veya tamamen- dini otoritenin elinden alınmıştır. Ne ki dini temalar, nam-ı diğer inanç temelli organizasyonlar, toplumsal yardım alanında 80'lerden başlayan ve 90'larda oldukça ilgi çeker bir hale geldiler. İnanç temelli refah sağlamanın bir formu olarak İnanç Temelli Organizasyonlar (İTO), özellikle İslamcı İTO'lar, bu çalışmanın merkez kavramıdır. Tezin temel hipotezi, İTO'ların 70'lerin değişen politik ve iktisadi ikliminde yetiştikleridir. Türkiye'de değişen devlet din ilişkisi İTO'ların çoğalmasında önemli bir yere sahiptir. Yoksullukla mücadelede İTO'lar mali hesap verebilirlik, devamlılık, güvenilirlik ve profesyonellik adına ciddi problemlere sahiptir.

Anahtar kelimeler: İslamcılık, inanç temelli organizasyonlar, sosyal refah, din

*Serâb'a...*

## ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to express my sincere thanks and appreciation to Vüs'at O. Bener, Sait Faik, Füzuan, *Foto Muhabiri* Fatih Pınar, *Tanburi* Murat Aydemir, Ingmar Bergman and George Orwell, for their heart to heart talk through their works; to my adviser Mustafa Şen, for his guidance, support and patience throughout my MS study; to my friends Berrak Esen, Ceyda Tırman, Hasan Vursavuş, Oğuz Germi, Ömer İnce, Ömer Faruk Öztürk, Sina Uğurluer and Sinan Özden, for sharing rewarding experiences; to Mehmet Koruk, for listening to me and being a valuable adviser for my carrier; to the members of my committee, Elisabeth Özdalga and Umut Beşpınar, for their time and input; and finally to Latif Selvi and friendly people in Konya.

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

PLAGIARISM.....	iii
ABSTRACT.....	iv
ÖZ.....	v
DEDICATION.....	vi
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS.....	vii
TABLE OF CONTENTS.....	viii
LIST OF TABLES.....	x
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS.....	xi
CHAPTER	
1. INTRODUCTION.....	1
2. ISLAMISM IN TURKEY.....	9
2.1 Foundation of Turkish Republic 1923-1950 .....	12
2.2 The Advent of the Multiparty Democracy1950-1980 .....	15
2.3 Military coup of 1980.....	24
3. FBOs AS WELFARE PROVIDERS.....	33
3.1 Konya .....	33
3.2 FBOs in Konya.....	39
3.2.1 A day in “poor evaluation team”.....	48
3.3 Religion and FBOs .....	51
3.4 Relationships among FBOs, State and the Platform .....	55
3.4.1 FBO – Platform Relationships.....	55
3.4.2 FBO – FBO Relationships.....	57



3.4.3 FBO – State Relationships.....	59
3.5 Main Challenges of FBO Market in Konya .....	61
3.5.1 Permanency, Transparency and Accountability .....	61
3.5.2 Qualification .....	63
3.5.3 Professionalism.....	66
4. CONCLUSION .....	70
REFERENCES.....	74
APPENDICIES .....	79
Appendix A. Interview Questions .....	79
Appendix B. List of the member organizations of the Platform in Konya...81	
Appendix C. Tez Fotokopisi İzin Formu.....	83

## LIST OF TABLES

### TABLES

Table 1: Reasons for NSP Support among Potential NSP Voters.....	23
Table 2: Change in Population of Konya.....	35
Table 3: Number of Organizations in Konya.....	38
Table 4: Religious Education Organizations of Turkey in 1968.....	39
Table 5: Foundation years of FBOs in Konya.....	42
Table 6: Amount of Social Aid and Budget of FBOs in Konya.....	43
Table 7: Social Aid Types of FBOs in Konya.....	45
Table 8: Human Resources of FBOs in Konya.....	68

## **LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS**

RPP	Republican Peoples Party
DP	Democrat Party
NOP	National Order Party
NAP	Nationalist Action Party
JDP	Justice and Development Party
NSP	National Salvation Party
WP	Welfare Party
VP	Virtue Party
FP	Felicity Party
JP	Justice Party
MP	Motherland Party
TIS	Turkish Islamic Synthesis

## CHAPTER 1

### INTRODUCTION

Religious charity is said to be one of the oldest phenomena which has been present in many societies and social welfare provision is one of the central aspects of religious charity. Obviously, religiously motivated welfare provision has an older history than nation state based welfare provision; before modernity, social welfare was mainly provided by churches and other religious authorities, and used as an important power base by them. However, with the advent of the modern welfare state this power has been taken -partially or totally- from the religious authorities. As a form of faith based welfare provision, Faith Based Organization (FBO) is the central concept of this study. Although FBOs can have certain types, the form which this study tries to elucidate is “faith-based charitable organizations” which “mobilize the faithful in support of the poor and other social groups, and which fund or manage programs which tackle poverty and social exclusion.”(Clarke, 2008, p.25). Unlike from religious charitable organizations, Smith and Sosin (2001) are described three main characteristics of FBOs as, (i) dependency on religious entities for resources; (ii) affiliation with and control by a denomination or other religious groups; and (iii) religious culture that creates a niche or space for agencies to pursue their religious values. In that study this definition is accepted on identification of FBOs.

Emergence and increase of FBOs is subjected in different theoretical debates. It can be said that those debates are connected rather than separated. The rise of neo-liberal policies, privatization of religion, changing dimensions of state religion relationships in Turkey and are some fields that subject the rise of FBOs.

The rise of neo-liberal policies is frequently referred to explain the retrenchment of

the welfare states all over the world including Turkey. Parallely, the impacts of neo-liberal policies and increasing poverty are commonly stated in the literature to define increasing number and expanding space for the FBO's. The neo-liberal policies and the increasing mobility of international capital have compelled states to reduce their welfare spending. Neo-liberal policies and structural adjustment policies has caused increasing presence of flexible work, rising unemployment levels, lower pension levels, but nation states increasingly have become more reluctant or unable to heal these wounds. Consequently, the gap has emerged with the withdrawal of the state from welfare provision, and this gap has been filled by civil society, especially FBO's (FACIT, 2007). Attracting considerable interest by 90s, in contemporary world, one of the most interesting definitions of FBO has been made by Bush (2002); "Charities and faith based groups fill needs that no welfare system, no matter how well designed, can possibly fill ... In times of personal crisis, people do not need the rules of a bureaucracy, they need the help of a neighbor" This claim can be read as a powerful and common rationalization rhetoric for supporting faith based welfare support. Moreover, countries, in which welfare provision of state is not well established, have encountered with the increasing and urgent need of welfare provisions with the neo-liberal policy environment, increasing poverty in these societies as an outcome of the economic crises of contemporary era, has opened available space to function. The neo liberal politics also brought its own discourse of poverty into the agenda to justify its policy proposals and its actions, it is the liberal conservative approach to poverty, its basic premises are the de-politicization of poverty, rising moral language in poverty, and denial of social rights perspective (Acar, 2009). Acar argues that liberal-conservative approach to poverty is the dominant approach to poverty in Turkey after 1980s. Acar (2009) claims that to understand FBO welfare provision, we need to examine how liberal-conservative approach to poverty evaluates the social rights discourse. He states that liberal-conservative approach to poverty is the dominant approach to poverty in Turkey after 1980s. "Denying the social rights" and "mobilization of moral responsibility" instead of state provision, have become useful tools to minimize social expenditures of capitalist class; moreover, the

mobilization of the moral responsibility of the average and rich citizens for poverty alleviation prevents the politicization of the existing conflicts between poor and the other segments; this also provides capitalist class “secure conditions for the capitalist accumulation” (Acar, 2009, p. 160). Neo liberal politics also entails a shift in state citizenship relations, and social rights understanding connected to social citizenship. In terms of state-citizen relationship, Dywer (2004, p.4) states that “citizenship is a social status that allows people to make claims in relation to state-organized welfare services” Dywer also argues that particularly social and welfare rights are central to the idea of citizenship; however, which institutions should provide the welfare services and who would benefit from these services are the contentious issues. “Social citizenship” concept telling us the idea that a welfare state citizenship includes a guarantee of a decent standard of living, it represents the connection with citizenship and rights, as Gordon and Fraseer (1992, p. 45-46) argue

"People who enjoy social citizenship get social rights not handouts. They receive aid while maintaining their status as full members of society entitled to equal respect. They share a common set of institutions and services designed for all citizens"

In an environment of decreasing welfare functions of state and increasing involvement of charity organizations for provision of these services, raising questions about transformation of this definition of citizenship and questioning its implications are meaningful. Plant (1998, p.30) says that basically two traditions of citizenship understanding can be identified, the first tradition sees the citizens as individuals who can claim benefits just with having the status of citizenship, however the other defines the citizenship as something achieved by contributing to the society. For the second understanding individuals do not and cannot have a right to use the resources of society without contributing to the society. (as cited in Dywer, 2004, p. 29). Prochaska (2002) defines this ideological conflict as a battle between “collectivists” and “voluntarists”. He says in the period after Second World War this battle won by collectivist and an era of welfare state had begun. As being in the “voluntarist” side he condemns the collectivist tradition and cherishes the

revival of charity today. Prochaska (2006, p.3 as cited in Dinham, 2009, p.121) claims that “charity could only be effectively exercised under the influence of sacred principle”. So this allows us to connect his discussion directly with Faith-Based welfare provision. He presents the idea of welfare provision by the charities (motivated by the religious duties) as empowerment of civil society as a buffer zone between government and citizenry and promotion of moral environment in the society. Also this kind of provision is said to provide a moral training and experience to the citizenry. The charity activity is said to contribute into social integration by addressing the social and individual ills which capitalism creates, by creating personal bonds between the giver and the receiver of assistance. Charitable activity promotes self-help and local independence and offers an alternative to uniform assistance of welfare state, an antidote to standardizing bureaucracy (Prochaska, 2002, p14). Confinement of social citizenship within the boundaries of individual rational action occurs. To sum up, although FBOs are claimed to be more efficient and faster providers of welfare when compared to heavy bureaucratic structures of government institutions and they are said to encourage more active and dutiful citizenship in the form of participation into civil society activities (Karatepe 2011, p.234), by FBO proliferation process citizenship structure based on social rights understanding is becoming eradicated. All of these discussions are a part of rise of neo-liberal politicizes and connected to proliferation of FBO’s in Turkey.

Deprivatization of religion, or in other words, the return of the religion into public space is another debate on literature that tries to define rise of FBOs. Casanova (1994) states that the “deprivatization “ of religion is the case for our contemporary age, religion has become more active in the public stage, religious discourse in general has become more vivid in the conduct of public life and religious institutions started to refuse their confinement into private sphere. The rise of FBO can also be analyzed from this vein, the religious discourse of this organizations emphasis the moral and spiritual side of welfare provision, and they use religious impulses to help the poor. Therefore, social policy has emerged as another sphere

within which religion has gained a new and powerful role in Turkish case.

Another argument explains proliferation of FBO's in Turkey in terms of state-religion relations. Göçmen (2010, p. 195) says that in comparison to the other country cases, Turkey has the highest rise in the number of FBOs in the last decade. She explains this high level of change in the case of Turkey with regard to the partial resolution of the conflicts between religion and state in the last decades. It was after the 1980s that an important shift occurred between state and religion, the military regime has adopted a discourse that combines nationalistic and Islamic elements to cope with the polarization of the country on the left-right axis, the Turkish Islam synthesis has been put forward as the main ideology of the state (Çetinsaya, 1999, p. 350-376). 1997 military intervention was "a short process of stagnation" in terms of conflict resolution between state and religion (Göçmen, 2010, p. 120). However, 1997 was a turning point for FBO's as welfare providers because after military intervention the remaining FBO's had to be careful about their activities. It is claimed that until 1997 these organizations were places for mobilization of political Islam, they mostly dealt with the educational activities like Qur'an courses, sohbet, seminars on Islam, but after 1997 intervention, social provision has emerged as a safe domain for activity (Göçmen, 2010, p.200). In that sense, in Turkey, Deniz Feneri Welfare and Solidarity Association (Deniz Feneri Yardımlasma ve Dayanisma Derneği) is the first widely known social aid provider organization that could be classified as FBO. It has started to service in 1996 as a TV show and then it has evolved to an FBO in 1998. Although it has a just a decade long history, by years, number of FBOs sharply increased. Especially with the help of different legal arrangements<sup>1</sup>, this increase is motivated, truly, boosted. Explaining the rise of FBO's from the perspective of state-religion relations has a central importance for this study. In that sense chapter two to try to answer the question of rise of Islamist welfare provision in terms of state religion relations.

This thesis is concerned with connections of Islamist discourse and the enhanced

---

<sup>1</sup> This arrangements debated under the heading "3.2 FBOs in KONYA"



role of FBOs in poverty alleviation in Turkey. By trying to understand FBOs in Turkey, thesis has been mainly focused to Konya, a city located in central Anatolia. Faith Based Organizations and Social Exclusion in Europe Project<sup>2</sup> showed that Konya is an unexampled city in terms of Islamist FBOs. Mainly two reasons were behind that firstly Konya, with its abundant local sources of Islamist activism, was a unique place to study, and secondly organization of FBOs in Konya was exceptional from other cities. In this respect I have motivated to trace local FBOs in Konya. The city of Konya is identified with its political Islamist identity in contemporary Turkey and it is connoted with ‘religious conservatism’ and ‘fundamentalism’ in contemporary Turkey. Çiçekli (2007, p. 83) identifies four possible reasons for these connotations. Firstly Erbakan, who is the founding leader of political Islam in Turkey, had become parliamentarian from Konya for 27 years. Secondly one of the public meetings organized by MSP had been justified to the 1980 military coup by generals. Thirdly Erbakan’s biggest success in his political life started with winning election of Konya municipality in 1989. Konya municipality under Welfare Party governance had played a successful prior step to win local elections in 1994 and one year after general elections. Lastly multi-member limited liability companies (so called “Islamic Holdings”) have found in late 90s in Konya.

Before field research, I have tried to reach communication information of local FBOs in Konya; however, it was quite challenging because most of organizations’ web site or address information did not classify well. So using snowball technique, I have tried to expand my FBO network in Konya. I have been in Konya for three times and totally 30 days. In my first visit, I had a few contacts and tried to found new contacts. During my second visit to Konya, interestingly, I had come across to a platform that gathers FBOs in Konya. Head of the platform, Latif Selvi, declared

---

<sup>2</sup>Faith Based Organizations and Exclusion in European City (FACIT) is a European Union Seventh Framework Program (FP7) collaborative project which was launched in 2008. FACIT is operated by Seven partners: University of Antwerp as Coordinator (Belgium), Rijksuniversiteit Groningen (The Netherlands), Verwey-Jonker Instituut (The Netherlands), University of Cologne, (Germany) University of Exeter, (United Kingdom) Middle East Technical University, METU (Turkey) Fundación CIEM, (Spain) and Örebro University (Sweden). Additional information can be obtained from the official web site of the project: <http://www.facit.be>

that their platform has not been founded formally yet, and so they are doing this job informally, voluntarily and they have no public face. Although the platform is not a legal or formal unit, Selvi did not refrain to talk about him and its organization. Moreover he provided extensive information and contacts in order to make my research. I have interviewed with Latif Selvi two times, and totally five hours. After interviewed with Selvi, he gave me a list<sup>3</sup> of FBOs in Konya and I have reached other organizations by “greetings of Latif Selvi”. Discussing with my supervisor I have preferred to make interviews with first fifteen largest organizations and then I have focused on six organizations; namely, Ribat, Ravza, Mehir, Kimsev, Şefkat Der, Dost Eli. Although having obvious similarities, I have chosen those organizations because of their originality in terms of their target groups and services. On the other hand for the sake of understanding organizations, I have also attended “poor evaluation team” of an FBO and observed services for a day long in different districts of Konya. On the other hand, I have realized that the platform has close relationships with university. After determined this close relationship, I have also gone to university<sup>4</sup> and made interviews with two professors, one is in sociology department and the other is in faculty of theology. Especially a Professor, from faculty of theology, lends significant insights me in order to understand Konya and its FBOs. All in all, this study is based on 16 in-depth interviews with founder and/or administrative staff (professional and volunteers) of FBOs in Konya that lasts one month among FBOs in Konya. The interviews with the founder and/or administrative staff have each lasted for 1-1.5 hours. Some of them lasted up to 2-3 hours. Tape recording could not be used in any of the interviews because tape recording negatively affects the comfort of the respondent. Hence, several activities of Association have been followed. Formal and informal relationships among FBO-Platform, FBO-FBO, and FBO-State have been identified. A continuous communication has been set with the volunteers, professional staff and consultants. By this effort, it has been aimed that assessing institutional and political conditions under which FBOs have become increasingly

---

<sup>3</sup> Appendix B.

<sup>4</sup> Contact information of university professors also provided by Selvi.

present.

During thesis, FBOs will be studied as a part in history of Islamist faith based welfare provision in Turkey. The central hypotheses of the thesis, FBOs are organizations fertilized by changing economic and political climate of 70s. Changing state religion relationships has a significant impact on FBO proliferation in Turkey. By combating through poverty FBOs have big problems in terms of financial accountability, permanency, trustworthiness and professionalism. In this process research questions will be; what are the break points of history of Islamism that give raise FBOs? What are the former organization types of Islamists before 90s? What are the political and economic conditions give rise to such organization types before 90s? How do FBOs describe their self-identity and their role in struggling against poverty in the past and how is this role likely to develop in the future? How is the organizational structure and leadership? What are the material resources of FBOs? What are the implications of FBOs and what kinds of welfare model do they suggest? What are the possible results of such kinds of welfare model given the political backgrounds? How do they conceptualize poverty, social aid, and welfare provision?

## CHAPTER 2

### ISLAMISM IN TURKEY

During my field research I have frequently met with people who had ties with other Islamist groups or organizations<sup>5</sup>. While my respondents are now holding different positions in Faith Based Organizations (FBOs), most of them had backgrounds on different Islamist institutions. This situation made me to think on the history of Islamism in contemporary Turkey and its connections with FBO proliferation. In order to enhance my vision to my data, I have written this chapter, and aimed to see contemporary history of Islamism in Turkey. Research questions of “What are the break points of history of Islamism that give raise FBOs? What are the former organization types of Islamists before 90s? What are the political and economic conditions give rise to such organization types before 90s?” are intended to answer during this chapter. So while writing this chapter, I have generally focused on organization types of Islamist movements, history of political Islam in Turkey, and the history of different Islamist groups. Furthermore, while trying to portray history of Islamism in Turkey, at the same time, I have also intended to tell the history of political life, bureaucratic changes, competitive ideologies (nationalist and leftists), and states’ position. Because as Tugal (2009, p. 23) mentioned the important thing is the ability to see that “how religion, economic dynamics, political institutions, the state, and civil society work in conjunction with each other”.

During text I used terms of “Islamism” and “Islamist” interchangeably .While I mention Islamist, I do not refer to people who is believer of Islam or practices prayers of Islam regularly. Similar to Adaş (2003, p.26), I use Islamist for people

---

<sup>5</sup> At some cases this tie could be a former membership or being activist of a certain group, but in some cases, founders or workers of an organization could be active members or manager of *cemaats* or political parties.

who use Islam “as a means of identity politics and propagate Islam as an alternative social system, and, hence, articulate their various grievances through an Islamic vocabulary and propose solutions within this framework”.

History of Islamism in Turkey, from last years of Ottoman Empire to nowadays, has a fluctuating story. Within this process it could be seen that Islamism has faced with different challenges and produced different discourses as solution. History of Islamism could be classified as having three rupture<sup>6</sup>. Those are (i) foundation of Turkish Republic (1923), (ii) advent of the multiparty democracy (1950), (iii) military coup of 1980.

Unlike from the end of 19<sup>th</sup> century, 18<sup>th</sup> century was fascinating period of history for Islamism in Ottoman Empire. According to Bernard Lewis (1968, p.407) by the 18<sup>th</sup> century the brotherhoods established their networks fully within Ottoman Empire. Lewis also mention that those brotherhood's close relationship with guilds and corporations and their facility on domination of religious life of merchant class by means of this relationship; furthermore, he mentions,

Though primarily popular movements, they had their adherents and lay brothers in all walks of society, reaching even into the higher ranks of the governing elite (1968, p.407).

However, Islamism in 1860s and 1870s was far away from its brilliance in 18<sup>th</sup> century. Last years of Ottoman Empire was highly chaotic and especially after failures of *Tanzimat* policies intellectuals of time started to think on Islamism and Turkish Nationalism as alternatives of Ottomanism (Çetinsaya, 1999, p.351-355). The young Ottomans, a leading nationalist intellectuals group, constructed the idea of “İttihadı-ı İslam” (Pan Islamism) and tried to achieve an Islamic nationalist ideal (Tunaya, 2007, p. 80).

Islamist of this time generally mostly organized around political parties, journals

---

<sup>6</sup> Although Justice and Development Party years can be accepted as final rupture in this history, it has been preferred to exclude this ongoing duration due to its continuity.

and newspapers, and they brought themselves into existence in all areas of social life (Tunaya, 2007, p. 106). On the beginning of 20<sup>th</sup> century, those organized groups, ideologically intimate to ideologues of Turkism saw no contradiction between nationalism and religion (Çetinsaya, 1999, p.354). It is important to emphasize that within the “synthesis” of that time, religion (and specifically Islam) is viewed behind a modernist paradigm; that is, religion is something has a function in society and absolutely should be separate from politics (Çetinsaya, 1999, p.354). Writings of Ziya Gökalp (1876-1924), a prominent nationalist thinker, may give an insight to understand religious nationalism of his time. Principally, he saw religion as something that has a function in modern society. For him religion is a primary part of Turkish national culture and one of the most important functions of religion is to strengthen Turkish nation (Parla, 1985). Definition of Nation by Gökalp is also parallel, a nation is a group of people who speak a same language, had a same education and are united under same religious and aesthetic ideals (Parla, 1985).

It is also reasonable to mention that Islamist ideas, generally, are based on a historic doctrine, which acknowledges a glorious background; namely, the *asr-i saadet*. According to this belief, during the *asr-i saadet*, transformation of a wild and Bedouin tribe to the world’s most supreme empire had been occurred by guidance of Islam, and in order to turn back to the *asr-i saadet*, Muslims should achieve an “Islamic renaissance” (Tunaya, 2007, p. 1). In this sense, it is clear that Islamists’ ideas are essentialist. History of Islamism in Turkey, from late Ottoman period to nowadays, has traces of this essentialist approach. Although formation of Islamist ideas may have certain reasons, two of the most important challenges to Islamist in Ottoman times, namely industrialization and secularization, were the base of this ideology (Tunaya, 2007, p. 13). While observing technically developed Europe, Ottoman intellectuals hypothesises that ‘due to we are now in the age of nation and science, religion is useless’(Tunaya, 2007, p. 14). Islamists’ answer to these challenges were conceptualizing a ‘real Islam’ and defending that ‘now Muslims are living superstitions, real Islam is a progressive religion and a complete order that make its believers developed’ (Tunaya, 2007, p. 15-18). However it is quite hard to

accept a group of Islamist as representatives of an ‘authentic’ Islam, so I accept Islamist in Turkey as one of the representative among other Muslim groups.

## **2.1 Foundation of Turkish Republic 1923-1950**

Establishment of Turkish Republic could be seen as a break point in history of Islamism. Religion was a uniting and motivating discourse during the War of Independence. Organization of people against invasion forces in Anatolia was placed by religious institutions that had closer relationships with public (Mardin, 2007, p. 30). For instance, the mufti of Isparta had been the leader of resistance forces in Isparta (Mardin, 2007, p. 30). Although religion was a motivator discourse during war, attitudes toward religion gradually change after War of Independence (1919-1922). Acceptance of secularist policies disfavored religious people who had important positions in the War of Independence or first and second parliaments (Mardin, 2007, p. 31). Eligür (2010, p. 45) summarizes this as follows;

During the War of Independence, Atatürk did not declare his real intention of establishing a secular nation-state. Following the establishment of the Turkish Republic, both the Islamic brotherhoods and the communists were suppressed by the Kemalist regime. The creation of a new republic based on the Western state model was a big disappointment for Islamic-oriented people.

Kemalist understanding of nationalism did not see religion as a founding pillar of nation and substituted religion with history and language (Çetinsaya 1999, p.362). In 1929/30, Mustafa Kemal declared that

Some say that ‘unity of religion’ is effective in the formation of a nation. But we see the opposite when we look at the Turkish nation. The Turks had been a great nation before they accepted the religion of the Arabs. ... The Arab’s religion had no impact on the construction of a Turkish nation. On the contrary, it loosened the national ties of Turkish nation; it dulled the national feelings and emotions. (Inan 1969, quoted in Çetinsaya, 1999, p.363)

This change of paradigm toward religion, of course, had reflections in politics. It is possible to see this transition period in daily politics. Constitution of 1924 kept Islam as a state religion, although it abolished caliphate, fez, religious courts and schools. Alphabet revolution in 1928 (changing of alphabet from Arabic letters to Latin ones) and introducing western legal code were also other break offs from religious heritage. Constitution of 1928 has no article about state religion. Furthermore secularization was in party program of Kemalist Republican Party and appeared in amendments on constitution in 1937. Those severe changes in political and social life can be grouped under secularization project of its time. Jose Casanova (2011) mentions model of *laicite* have different implications within different cultures. In Turkish case, he portrays secularization project of state as “take religion into the state rather than pushing religion into the margins”. According to Casanova this caused emergence of *Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı* or The Presidency of Religious Affairs institution, a huge organization that make every *imam*, one who leads the salat prayers in a Mosque, to a civil servant and ,furthermore, employment of civil servants in religious affairs make possible for *laique* state to control the sermon of every Friday (2011). This understanding of *laicite* not just tried to clean effects of religion in state apparatus but also tried to limit effects of religion in daily life (Özdalga, 2006, p.54). Some examples can be prohibition of call for prayers in Arabic and praying in the sacred tombs (*türbe*), strict limitation of religious education, closing of religious orders (Özdalga, 2006, p.55). In this process the *Diyanet* is not just an organizer for *salat* prayers in Friday but beyond that it was the practitioner and announcer of prohibitions produced by state ideology (Özdalga, 2006, p.56). In other words the *Diyanet* has been the sound of official Islam.

It is also critical to mention that examples on regulations of religious life during within those years cannot proof that such implications firstly started in single party rule of Turkish Republic. Some scholars claim that culture of regulating religion is a heritage of the Ottoman Empire and the *Diyanet* is the follower organization to the Ottoman office of *Sheikh ul-Islam* (Rabasa & Larrabee, 2008, p.12). Substitute of



office of *Sheikh ul-Islam* was *Shar'iyya wa Awqaf* Ministry in the new formed Turkish Republic until 1924. And after 1924 ministry position of religious affairs amended and *Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı* or The Presidency of Religious Affairs institution formed. Additionally, Rabasa & Larrabee (2008, p.34) claims that “similar to its Ottoman predecessor, the Kemalist state discouraged the development of autonomous groups outside the control of the state”. They also stress that Kemalist state observed especially religious activity, and less importantly other autonomous activities, as a potential threat to its modernization project and political control (2008, p.34). Furthermore writers mention that quick suppression of such kind of oppositions to regime’s nationalist ideology can be seen as sensitivity of Kemalist state on autonomous activities (2008, p.34). Discouragement on development of autonomous groups also caused to development of alternative ideologies for religion (Şerif, 1993, p. 149). In that sense, rise of religious awareness in 1950s is not “haunting” but continuation of a tradition that could not interfered (Mardin, 2007, p. 31).

By the way some brief information on *Diyanet* can be useful. According to law number 633 (22/06/1965) basic duties of the *Diyanet* are firstly management of affairs related with faith, prayers and ethics of Islam, and secondly enlighten people about religion and administration of mosques<sup>7</sup>. Although those are basic duties, in recent years the *Diyanet* has a growing power on reproduction of religion in daily life. It has an almost three billion Turkish Lira total budget (*Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı*, 2010). One of the popular critiques on the *Diyanet* is its heavily focus on Sunni Islam or in other words its ignorance on other branches of Islam and other religions (Çakır & Bozan, 2005, p. 114). Another critique is on relationship of politics and the *Diyanet*. The head of the institution is assigning by the President of the Republic, and higher level officers are assigning by Council of Ministers (Çakır & Bozan, 2005, p. 117).

What can we say for Islamist movement in Kemalist era? During 1930s and 1940s

---

<sup>7</sup> Today, Turkey has 81,984 mosques (*Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı*, 2010)

let alone permitting any activism, the state abolished fundamental Islamic education by unofficial actors. Moreover transformation of a society that had religious theme to a secular one is not quite easy, and some armed uprisings were seen; Sheikh Said Uprising (1925), Menemen Event (1930), the Grand Mosque Event in Bursa (1933), İskilip Event (1936) (Gözaydın, 2009, s. 26). Such kind of uprisings formed the perception of classifying Naksibendi Brotherhood and Nurcu Movement as in anti-republic front (Mardin, 2007, pp. 32-33). Even if just a bit, some underground Qur'an teaching movements have appeared in Black Sea and Eastern Anatolia; however, Islamists' defeat was obvious, some immigrated to Egypt, some did not go out from his home for 25 years, and some accepted positions in new regime (Çetinsaya, 1999, p.364). However rural population (%80 of total population in 1920-40) has not much affected from Kemalist secularization and nationalism (Çetinsaya, 1999, p.364). Social change and economic modernization of late 40s have unveiled rural population's demands. Vergin states that it is common to see “more traditional and visible Islamic practices” in rural and poorer areas of the country, particularly in the southeast (Vergin 1996, quoted in Rabasa & Larrabee, 2008, p.10). Static mentality of rural population on religion has also fed by lack of official Islam in rural areas (Çetinsaya, 1999, p.364).

## **2.2 The Advent of the Multiparty Democracy 1950-1980**

The advent of the multiparty system brought competitiveness issue into politics and different areas became sources in order to take attention of the voters. In this term Islam has been a key source for some political parties, and on the other hand Islamic brotherhoods (Nakşibendilik, Nurculuk, and Süleymancılık) started to take place in Turkish politics (Toprak, 1981, p.75).

Two major parties of the period were the Democrat Party (DP) and the Republican Peoples Party (RPP). The Democrat Party established in 1946 and held power in

1950 election and was in government until coup of 1960. In this term the party succeeded to be first ranking party in three elections. Main differences of RPP and DP were simply on their attitude toward economics and religion. Whereas the RPP was on the side of statist economic policies and strict secularism, the DP supported liberal economics and loosening secularist policies. (Margulies & Ergin, 1997, pp. 146-147). Although differentiation of two parties mainly themed in that way, differences among two parties were not so stable and clear. Political liberalization climate of first multi-party elections brought certain changes to RPP. Changes done by RPP in policies of religious area are striking. An obvious softening in strict secularism policies can be seen. Seventh congress of RPP (1947) witnesses debates on secularism for the first time and assertion of religion's neglected unitive role (Mardin, 2007, p. 32). For instance, in 1948, pilgrimage to Mecca was allowed, a year later sacred tombs (türbe) reopened, which had been closed down in 1925, religious instruction, which had been withdrawn from the public schools curriculum in 1932, was restored in primary schools in 1949 as an elective course for two hours a week with the prerequisite of a written approval by parents, the Ministry of Education set up the prayer leader and preacher courses and the faculty of divinity was founded at the University of Ankara in 1949 (Eligür, 2010, p. 92). On the other hand state's understanding of nationalism was severely affected during political liberalization process in the introduction of the multiparty democracy affected (Çetinsaya, 1999, p.368). Especially exclusionary manner of Kemalist nationalism to religion was criticized (Çetinsaya, 1999, p.368).

Start of critiques on Kemalist nationalism and emerging of a new Islamic tradition came across. Çetinsaya (1999, p.367, 368) mentions that this newly developed Islamist tradition is critical. For him new tradition's examples are Necip Fazıl (1905-1983) and Nurettin Topçu (1909-1975); people who were neither following traditionalist *ulema* nor modernist Islamic movements' of late Ottoman era. According to Çetinsaya mutual features of Fazıl and Topçu were their education in France, adoption of a western style life, criticism of modernity and embracing an Islamic worldview through the influence of Sufism (Çetinsaya 1999, p.367, 368).

This new tradition has deeply influenced Islamists from 50s to 70s. It is dramatic that starting from 60s *Büyük Doğu* (the Great East), a very prominent journal published and edited by Necip Fazıl, formed main discussion topics of Islamists in 70s and 80s (Özdalga, 2006, p. 91). In other words, the *Büyük Doğu*'s intellectual frame is so similar with journals and newspapers of following the next decades; although this can be a sign of importance of this journal, this situation also can show stagnation of intellectual production in Islamist area (Özdalga, 2006, p. 91). This new group of Islamic intellectuals and nationalist intellectuals were named as “nationalist-conservative” (*milliyetçi muhafazakâr*) or “nationalist-sacredist” (*milliyetçi mukaddesatçı*) (Çetinsaya, 1999, p.368). Çetinsaya classifies common features of this group of intellectuals as; first they have mainly claimed that religion and nationalism have no opposition but they are complementary, second they have claimed that religious amnesia was by product of secular policies of Republic, third youth was in a deep moral degeneration and reconciling them with religion would rescue them, fourth “Communism threat” was a unifying discourse for them, and lastly besides those objections, they have no problem with Kemalism and their attitude was on revising not demolishing (Çetinsaya, 1999, p. 368-371).

This period's most important feature is the fact that Islamists, similar to any ideology, had facility to form political bodies in order to organize and raise their voices. During in the transition to multi-party politics, Islamic themed parties emerged. Eight of twenty-four parties, founded among 1945 and 1950, had obvious references in their party programs to Islamic themes (Toprak, 1981, p.75). Nevertheless, whereas religiosity of the Turkish people, the parties could not find electoral support and banned due to violation of secularization principle (Toprak, 1981, p.75). Şevket Kazan, one of the prominent leaders of National Order Movement, claims that that “the DP period was an era of Quran course and mosque construction. Yet, there was no consciousness of political Islam [at that time]” (Eligür, 2010, p. 52). In that sense it can be concluded as even though long live Islamic parties did not form directly, its possibility emerged and center right parties have been hosting organizations for Islamists. As summarized by Eligür;

Since political parties with Islamic themes were unable to mobilize the electorate against the secular state, the Islamic brotherhoods supported the leading center-right parties – that is, the DP and its successor, the JP – until the formation of Necmettin Erbakan’s political Islamist National Order Party (NOP – Milli Nizam Partisi) in 1970. (2010, s. 56)

As mentioned in previous lines, lack of Islamist parties caused electoral potential’s shift to center right parties. Although DP, as a center right party, perceived as a pro-Islamist party, relationship between DP and religion should be analyzed more carefully. As put brightly by Yavuz (2003, p. 62);

In 1959, for ex-ample, the minister of home affairs used police force to prevent the burial of the most prominent Naksibendi sheik of the period, Süleyman Hilmi Tunahan, in the garden of Istanbul’s Fatih Mosque. In addition, the government did not allow Said Nursi to enter Ankara, although following his death on March 23, 1960; some high-ranking local DP politicians participated in his funeral in Urfa.

And then he concludes that such contradictory policies with religious issues are a sign of that DP is not a pro-Islamic party but a party that co-opt with certain Islamic groups and orders for sake of expansion in its electoral base (2003, p. 62). During this relationship process, time to time, Islamic groups also brought themselves to propaganda arrays of political parties. One of the interesting example is Said Nursi’s, after a long time apolitical life, open call for his followers to vote DP (Eligür, 2010, p. 57).

May 27, 1960 has become beginning of a new era for Turkey. Military coup and amendment of constitution has enabled different ideological groups to begin to sound its voice through its own organizations and first apparent diversifications between Islamists and nationalists emerged on these days (Çetinsaya, 1999, p.370-1). A new generation in Islamists have influenced from Islamic movements in Egypt (Muslim Brotherhood), Syria, Pakistan (The Jamaati Islami of Pakistan) (Çetinsaya, 1999, p.371). They made extensive translations; almost all the books and pamphlets written by the members of the Muslim Brotherhood were translated into Turkish

and widely read in the 1960 (Kara, 1991, quoted in Çetinsaya 1999, p.371). Translated texts understood “Islam as a unique system or ideology” (Çetinsaya, 1999, p.371). Moreover Erkilet (2005, p.695) claim that radical Islamic thought came to Turkey by means of translations. Main problematic of radical Islamic thought were uncovering “essence of religion” against living religion, and defending “authentic Islamic regime” against democracy (Erkilet, 2005, p. 695). However Erkilet (2005, p. 695) criticizes those thoughts due to their artificial status that come from translation. Extensive translation can be considered as the effect of political Islam in the Muslim world to the Turkish Islamists (Eligür, 2010, p. 62). Although there are translations of the leading political Islamists Hassan al-Banna (1906–49), Sayyid Qutb (1906–64), and Abu-l’Ala’ Mawdudi (1903–79) into Turkish, unlike from the leftists and the ultranationalists, the Islamists did not gather around a political party and acted individually until 1970s (Eligür, 2010, p. 62).

Besides having “political opportunities” in the advent of the multiparty political system and 1960 constitution’s liberalization facilities, Islamists also, in the mid-1960s, had certain advantages from Turkey’s pro-US position in the Cold War (approx. 1945-1991) (Yavuz, 2003, p. 34). Especially Kemalist elite’s conceptualization of communism as a security threat led this elite group to think Islamists “as an antidote to the perceived ills created by the Left” (Yavuz, 2003, p. 34). During Cold War Islamists’ pro-US position is obvious. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics acknowledged as godless. An interesting example of Islamists’ alliance with US is in the formation years of the *İlim Yayma Cemiyeti* (Association for the Dissemination of Science). Even though today it is not an appealing association to a wide audience, the *İlim Yayma Cemiyeti* is founded in 1951 and one of the very first organization of the Islamists. After one year of its foundation, this association translated Stephen Vincent Benét’s book, *America*. In the foreword it is declared that “After seeing zeal of our country’s youth for fulfill their education in America, we have decided to translate this book ... we sincerely thank to The American ambassador for convenience provided to translation permissions”

(Özakıncı, 2007, p. 31-32). “Associations for Struggling Against Communism” can be classified as places that worth to question in terms of being a place where brings Islamists and Nationalists together. For instance Fethullah Gülen, the leader of the biggest *Nurcu* group in Turkey, had led opening a branch of the “Association for Struggling Against Communism” at Erzurum in 1962 (Fethullah Gülen Sitesi, 2009)

In the 1950s and 1960s, similar to Islamists, nationalist also actively participated in anti-leftist organizations such as the Association for Struggling Against Communism in Turkey (Komünizmle Mücadele Derneği) (Landau 1995, quoted in Eligür, 2010, p.160). At that time also it could be seen that Nationalist Movement’s discourse was getting closer to Islamism again. A remarkable example of this could be changes in party program of Nationalist Action Party (NAP) between years 1965 to 1972; while in 1965 morality section of party program did not make any reference to Islam, Islamic principles has entered this chapter of program in 1972 (Çetinsaya, 1999, p. 370). Alparslan Türkeş, the leader of Nationalist Action Party,

“to see Islam and Turkishness as separate, and above all, opposing or hostile notions, is harmful to both Turkish nationalism and Islam. ... To accept the real face of Islam and its high principles will provide Turkishness a new strength and impetus” (quoted in Çetinsaya, 1999, p. 372)

The late 1960s and early ‘70s also saw the formation of an long live Islamic party tradition as a separate entity. By the late 1960s, an effort for an Islamist political party has been started by Islamist parliamentarians of Justice Party; Ahmet Tevfik Paksu, Hasan Aksay, Arif Hikmet Güner, and Professor Nevzat Yalçıntaş, chair of the Intellectuals’ Hearth (Eligür, 2010, p. 65). Necmettin Erbakan, who was then general secretary of the Union of Chambers of Commerce and Industry, also joined this group (Eligür, 2010, p. 65). In 1969, Necmettin Erbakan has succeeded to be an independent parliamentarian from the province of Konya (a province in central Anatolia). One year later he established the National Order Party with 17 of his friend who are not parliamentarians. However first Islamist party, similar to former ones, has not lived long and in 1971 has been closed, due to using of religion for political purposes. 1971 is also the start of exhausting story Islamist

parties of Turkey; in other words, the line of NOP (National Order Party), NSP (National Salvation Party), WP (Welfare Party), VP (Virtue Party), FP (Felicity Party) and JDP (Justice and Development Party).

Brotherhoods, which are simply so powerful in Ottoman period and then lose its power by nation state formation process, should be also thought as an actor in those years. According to Yavuz until NOP, first long live party established, brotherhoods were in a phase of development. Yavuz names this phase as “silent transformation”. Yavuz takes attention to a silent transformation of the Naksibendi order between years 1930 and 1960 (2003, p. 139, 140). According to him within the new realities of Turkish Republic, Naksibendi order adjusted itself and applied for positions in the *Diyanet*. He also adds that “these orders took refuge in the mosques and ‘covered’ themselves as the ‘mosque community’”. On the other hand, in Turkey, noticeable influence of the Islamic brotherhoods began in 1960s and 1970s with parallel to rapid urbanization (Eligür, 2010, p. 62). Ideological, financial, and organizational reinforcement of brotherhoods is also in that period (Eligür, 2010, p. 62). Among other brotherhoods, the Naksibendi Brotherhood has an epochal role in political Islam history of Turkey. Last 50 years of Turkish politics has influenced significantly from its movements; NOP established through the promotion and support of Sheikh Mehmet Zahid Kotku, the master of the Naksibendi Brotherhood, by Necmettin Erbakan, and first religious right party NOP evolved through JDP within time (Mardin, 2005, pp. 158-159). Furthermore besides religious right parties, center right party Motherland Party had also close relationship with Naksibendi Brotherhood. (Mardin, 2005, pp. 158-159) Even though NSP had established by promotion and support of Sheikh Mehmet Zahid Kotku, its organization was a coalition of different brotherhoods (Yalçın, 1995, p. 126 & Çakır, 2005, p. 545). This coalition, similar to any coalition, has a power balance in it and time to time sharp contrasts in ideology and practice put the party to its tramp. It is valuable to mention that such kind of sharp ideological difference among Naksibendi brotherhood and Nurcu Movement caused to termination of RPP - NSP coalition (Yalçın, 1995, pp.126-132).



Foundation of first political party also brought first organizational challenges and solutions. It is interesting to see that some similar solutions have been still living among Islamist organizations. For instance, ignorance attitudes of mainstream press toward Islamists directed them to utilization of the opening quickly new branches among Turkey (Eligür, 2010, p. 67). They acknowledged organizational networks as a vital tool for propaganda and in a short period structured their networks in sixty provinces of Turkey (Eligür, 2010, p. 67). Furthermore, establishment of Islamist media considered as a privileged issue for Islamists and the *Milli Gazete* (National Newspaper) started its publication in 1973. “First spirituality and morality” and “Truth has come and falsehood has been vanished” are two slogans of the newspaper (Milli Gazete, 2002). Moreover propaganda type of National Vision Movement, in those years, is also start of an ongoing culture. On the foundation years of National Vision Movement, Necmettin Erbakan had not preferred big propaganda meetings, and preferred small group gatherings, mostly, in houses (Yalçın, 1995, p. 70). Intended attainments of these gatherings were gaining persons not masses. So, generally, such kind of first meetings had been focusing on religion rather than politics (Yalçın, 1995, p. 70). Related with this propaganda type, National Vision Movement were the best technology using political group of its time by using cassette players and cassettes, almost all branch of the party had cassette players (Yalçın, 1995, p. 70). Erbakan’s speeches had been recording on cassettes and sending to followers of movement, and these cassettes were using for propaganda purposes (Yalçın, 1995, p. 70).

In the 1973 general elections, the NSP won 11.8 percent of the votes and forty-eight seats in parliament. This was 3<sup>rd</sup> place after the RPP and the JP. After this election, the NSP became partner of the government with the RPP. This can be considered as the first victory of an Islamist political party. Although Mardin (1998, p. 107) criticized the absence of empirical evidence, it is widely accepted (Margulies & Ergin, 1997, p.148) that electoral support of the MSP has mainly come from small merchants; craftsmen; conservative, deeply religious low income Muslims who live

in underdeveloped parts of Anatolian provinces. Statistics show that the NSP's electoral support base in the 1973 and 1977 general elections was in rural areas; percentages of rural votes in the 1973 and 1977 elections were 67.2 %, 63.2 % respectively (Yavuz, 2003, p. 210). A study on rationalization of behavior of the voters is conducted by Toprak (1981, p. XX).

<b>Table 1: Reasons for NSP Support among Potential NSP Voters, 1973 Election Poll</b>	
<b>Reason</b>	<b>Percentage of Potential NSP Voters</b>
Because it is a religious party	42,5
Because the Justice Party changed its goals and became a party of Freemasons	12,3
Because of Erbakan's leadership	9,4
Because of the influence of close friends or relatives	6,6
Because it expresses the respondent's own political outlook	5,7
Because the Justice Party has failed during its tenure in office	5,7
Because of rising prices	2,8
Do not know	0,9
Other	27,4
Source: Toprak, B. (1981). <i>Islam and Political Development in Turkey</i> . Leiden, The Netherlands: E. J. Brill. page 97	

Although this data shows that religious motivation is an obvious rationalization for voters, Yavuz claims that promise of “rapid industrialization” attracted voters rather than “Islamization” (2003, p. 210).

In the 1977 general elections, the NSP's vote share declined to 8.6 percent. However the party has been among founders of a coalition government with the JP and the NAP, which lasted from July 1977 until January 1978. Even though this two government participation did not give Islamist party a sole government experience, those were chances for staffing in state and making policies to pave the way for next generations (Narlı, 1999, p. 39). For example, in this period the *İmam Hatip* schools (theological high schools) has been accepted, for the first time, as equal to

secondary schools and graduates had gained right to attend universities in subjects rather than theology (Narlı, 1999, p. 39). Furthermore, as claimed by Margulies & Ergin (1997, p. 148), it is important that Islamist politics also expanded religious field in different areas,

While the NSP became the organized Islamist expression of popular discontent, an unofficial Islamist movement also grew alongside it. This movement spread far beyond the party, through unofficial Koran courses, local associations, youth clubs, charitable associations formed around mosques, and a variety of journals. Various religious brotherhoods also flourished in this period.

By the late 1970s, the growing political violence, serious economic and political problems, antagonism between the radical left and radical right led to the third military intervention on September 12, 1980. This was a bloodless coup, led by General Kenan Evren, and political system restructured by a new constitution in 1982.

### **2.3 Military coup of 1980**

The first announcement read in the name of the junta at 04.30 hours on the morning of 12 September 1980. This broadcast was announcing that because of dysfunction of the state organs, the armed forces had taken over political power. Generals' announcement was referring to responsibility of protecting republic on the Law on Internal Service (*İç Hizmet Kanunu*), and 'national unity and cohesion' (*millî birlik ve beraberlik*) were the key terms in the announcement (Zürcher, 2004, p. 278). Ongoing six weeks after the announcement of junta, "11,500 people were arrested; by the end of 1980 the number had grown to 30,000 and after one year 122,600 arrests had been made; by September 1982, two years after the coup, 80,000 were still in prison, 30,000 of them awaiting trial" (Zürcher, 2004, p. 279). Moreover, not only parliamentarians were abolished, but also local administrations (all mayors and municipal councils) were deposed, and by this way National Security Council

headed by the chief of staff, General Kenan Evren, had gathered all power in its hands (Zürcher, 2004, p. 278).

A new constitution prepared and after the referendum, it has accepted by 91.4 % 'yes' vote in 1982. Just after coup, there have been public meetings, organized by generals, in order to increase public support. It is interesting that General Kenan Evren, the leader of the coup, referenced Qur'an verses during his speeches<sup>8</sup>, and furthermore his some popular sayings were "the state and nation cannot exist without religion," "religion safeguards the state and national unity," "secularism does not mean atheism and lack of religion," and "those who are loyal to religion cannot rebel against the state and nation" (Şen, 2010, p. 67).

Military coup of 1980 can be considered as one of the most important rupture in the history of Islamism in Turkey; because, after military intervention Islamist political movements has gained apparent acceleration. Solving sociopolitical clashes of the 1970s was the main motive of coup's leaders, and this motive directed them to pare the working class, trade unions, and highly politicized youth movements in sake of "national unity and solidarity" (Zürcher, 2004, p. XX). Toprak (1990, p. 10) claims, it is paradoxical that while radical right and left loosed power (and depoliticize), Islamists gained more power and became politicized as much as they have never been. This situation is explained by Toprak in the former lines with "new ideological formulation" of state elite's radical secularism after 1980. According to Toprak, within this formulation radical secularism of Kemalist era has exchanged with re-interpretation of Turkish-Islamic history. In other words, "pagan nationalism of Kemalist period" has been incorporated with Islam, and by means of this amalgam, strictly divided ideological groups' formation tried to prevent (1990, p. 10). Some generals, who are in the army during coup, also criticize coup's policies. For instance, General Sabri Yirmibeşoğlu claims that instead of guiding a stable democracy, coup provided political opportunity for Islamist Politics (the Welfare Party) by leading partition of both the center right and center left (Yirmibesoglu,

---

<sup>8</sup> Some of these speeches can be seen on YouTube.

quoted in Eligür, 2010, p. 76). Another retired general, Doğu Silahçioğlu mentions that coup has eliminated the left, strengthens supporters of TIS and depoliticized Turkish society (Sazak interview, quoted in Eligür, 2010, p.76).

On the other hand, Toprak sees those developments in Turkey parallel to global events, and takes attention to new conservatism, engendered after 1980, which makes reference to traditional values against social and political radicalism in 60s and 70s and adds “in essence, the new ideological formulation was based on a concept called ‘The Turkish-Islamic Synthesis ’ (1990, p. 10).

The Turkish-Islamic Synthesis, formulated in the *Aydınlar Ocağı* (the Intellectuals Heart) in 70s, can be considered as a core slogan of the new ideology. The *Aydınlar Ocağı* is founded as a reaction to political instability and violence. It was not a political organization but an intellectual discussion group (Toprak, 1990, pp. 16-17). Right wing intellectuals, politicians, and different groups of people were influenced by the ideology of the *Aydınlar Ocağı* (Zürcher, 2004, p. 288). Influential people from the business world, universities and politics founded this organization in 1971 and “aim was to break the monopoly of left-wing intellectuals on the social, political and cultural debate in Turkey” (Zürcher, 2004, p. 288). Turgut and Korkut Özal brothers, who later had important positions in Turkish politics, were also members of this organization when it has founded (Poulton, 1997, p. 179). Çetinsaya quotes *Aydınlar Ocağı*’s manifesto, namely “National Consensus” (milli mütabakatlar) and summarizes that

They clearly defined nationalism as “national culturalism” and Islam was described as one of the two main elements of Turkish national culture, the other being the Turkish language. “Turkish culture is a triple synthesis of Turk-Islam-West. The first pillar of this trivet is Turkishness, the second is Islam and the third is the West. In this national culture are Turkishness of 2500 years, Islam of 1000 years, and Western values of 150-200 years. Turkish-Islamic synthesis is the permanent essence, the West is the changing part of this culture.” In their gatherings, they openly declared their determination to “continue to march for the sake of Turkish-Islamic ideal.”

Similarly, Zürcher (2004, p. 288) declares that within this synthesis, those are accepted that Islam is the best religion that suits Turks, Turks voluntarily accepted Islam and spread it into Balkans and Anatolia. Being the ‘soldiers of Islam’ is the special mission of the Turks (Zürcher 2004, p. 288). In other words, it is a perfect match between Islam and Turkishness. “Islam is the only religion in which Turkish culture found its best and the most correct expression” (Şen 2010, p. 61).

Acceptance of TIS in the state is also related with positions of supporters of this formulation in state. Besides army’s alignment near TIS, Turgut Özal had been prime minister and the president of republic, and many supporters of the TIS have found positions in state institutions, especially in the Ministries of Interior, Education, Justice, and Culture, by coup’s elimination of the leftist, social democrat, and even left-Kemalist people in state (Şen, 2010, p. 66). “Consequently, it was through the synthesis that Turkish Islamism enjoyed a new period with unimaginable opportunities.” (Şen, 2010, p. 66)

First elections after the coup has been held in 1983 and the Motherland Party won. This party also had achieved to win first position in the election of 1987. The economic and political reforms applied by Prime Minister Turgut Özal in the mid-1980s also has role in the empowerment of Islamic groups; basically, those reforms decreased role of state over economy and areas withdrawn by state filled by a new middle class, famed as the *Anadolu Kaplanları* (Anatolian Tigers) (Rabasa & Larrabee, 2008, pp. 38-39). This new class of entrepreneurs and capitalists, the *Anadolu Kaplanları*, are supporters of religious freedom, liberal economic politics and mainly in the provincial towns of Anatolia, including Denizli, Gaziantep, Konya and Kahramanmaras (Rabasa & Larrabee, 2008, pp. 38-39). They were mainly electoral bases of the Welfare Party and core supporters of the JDP (Rabasa & Larrabee, 2008, pp. 38-39). In contrast to Westernized business elite represented by TUSIAD (The Turkish Businessmen's and Industrialists' Association, founded in 1971) whose members are the chief executives of Turkey's 300 biggest corporations, the *Anadolu Kaplanları* gathered under a pro-Islamist association,

named MUSIAD (Independent Industrialists and Businessmen's Association)<sup>9</sup> (Narlı, 1999, p. 40).

Özal administration's economic and political liberalization policies brought formation of a “religious market” and three major competitive player of this market were Naksibendi orders, the Fethullah Gülen movement and political National Vision Movement of Necmettin Erbakan (Rabasa & Larrabee, 2008, p. 15). Construction of private schools and universities by Islamic groups was introduced under Özal’s more tolerant approach to religion. Moreover Özal’s reforms facilitate Islamist groups, besides different political groups, to access media channels, which meet them with broader audience<sup>10</sup>. (Rabasa & Larrabee, 2008, p. 39)

Until 1990s WP had only limited electoral support, and it can be said that post-coup period and adoption of TIS policies has facilitated WP to grow its grassroots organizational structure (Eligür, 2010, p. 84). At the beginnings of 90s WP has showed its most significant successes; and won local elections in 1994 and one year after general elections. Excellent grassroots organization of the party has an epochal role in this success (Zürcher, 2004, p. 295). Later on this local election success and ability to prevent corruptions in state made RP first party in 1995 general elections (Çakır, Milli Görüş Hareketi, 2005, p. 545). *Adil düzen* (the just order) was the slogan that effectively carried into public by those grassroots organization and six of the 15 largest cities, including Istanbul and Ankara, had taken over by the party (Zürcher, 2004, p. 295). “It was no longer predominantly a party of small businessmen, but had become the voice of the poorest sections of the population in the enormous conurbations as well” (Zürcher, 2004, p. 295).

A close look shows an apparent change in National Vision Movement’s slogans and discourses while becoming mass party. “Morality and spirituality” was the core

---

<sup>9</sup> Although “M” in MUSIAD stands for *Müstakil* (Independent in English), in Turkey it is often said that it stands for *Müslüman* (Muslim in English).

<sup>10</sup> In Turkey state’s monopoly on TV broadcasting has broken in 1989 and first Islam themed channels has established in 1993.

slogan of the NOP and NSP. However starting with the 80s, it can be claimed that Islamic liberalism had been the core strategy of the party (Yalçın, 1995, p. 286). This is the point that the National Movement becomes mass party, rather than doctrine party (Yalçın, 1995, p. 286). Difference between NOP and NSP compare to WP is explained by Çakır as “the most distinct difference is that WP has less emphasis on religious concepts and more on civil society and economic liberalism” (Çakır, 2005, p. 596). Similar to NOP and NSP, WP also outlawed in 1998 and the leader Erbakan was banned on the grounds of violation of the principles of secularism and the law of the political parties. This is the sole example of ban of a first ranking party and its leader in Turkey (Özdalga, 2006, p. 52).

As previously mentioned, Özal administration has enabled formation of a religious market and major players were Naksibendi orders, the Fethullah Gülen movement and political National View. Beginning of 90s witnesses a sharp separation of long live companion, namely Naksibendi brotherhood and National View. Esad Coşan, the groom of the Kotku, has been leader of Naksibendi Brotherhood after death of Sheik Zahid Kotku. However Necmettin Erbakan did not affiliated him as Sheik Kotku (Yalçın, 1995, p. 260). In the 1990, the tension between Coşan and Erbakan emerged obviously after leakage of a secret speech<sup>11</sup> (preach) of Esad Coşan in some journals. Just after leakage, Coşan acknowledged its leakage speech by writing an article<sup>12</sup>. Analyze of this secret speech is critical to see relations of a brotherhood and a political party. In this speech, mainly, Coşan answers the question of “we were supporting NOP NSP tradition and now what should we do?” asked by a devotee of Naksibendi brotherhood. Coşan, during his long answer, mainly claims that Naksibendi brotherhood provided human resource for the political party, supporter of brotherhood gave their votes to the party, before the coup of 1980 Sheikh Kotku wanted Erbakan’s resign from the party (Yalçın, 1995, pp. 260-280). Kotku fiercely goes on his preach by targeting Erbakan;

---

<sup>11</sup> <http://www.n-f-k.com/nfkforum/index.php?/topic/12799-bir-parti-ve-biz-prof-dr-m-esad-cosan/>  
(tabi bunu düzeltmem lazım böyle bir yere referans veremem)

<sup>12</sup> <http://www.iskenderpasa.com/A25FF411-8956-4C62-B528-8824B72EB7DE.aspx>



He says that ‘we are doing jihad’. He says that ‘I am the commander of this jihad’. Dear brothers, is there a war in Turkey now? No. I mean there is no armed conflict, and there are facilities to promote our religion. Jihad can be made against infidels. Did you make jihad against infidels? Did you go to Afghanistan? Did you shoot to enemies in there? You are driving Mercedes in joy. Did you make jihad against infidels? (Yalçın, 1995, p. 269).

Remaining part of the Coşan’s speech explains that such a fierce response had been broke out after rejection of the party to help financially some organizations and waqfs of the Naksibendi brotherhood (Yalçın, 1995, p. 266). Such an event obviously shows the intricate relationship among Islamic groups. It is striking that a Sheikh could have the power to resign a political party leader.

Rising of political Islam in Turkey, apart from the factor of religion itself, can be also explained by specific socio-economic groups and regional factors, as well as crises arising from modernization. Gülalp claims that conditions of globalization has provided the most fertile environment for the development of political Islam in Turkey (2001, p. 435). Before 1980, during the import substitution industry (ISI) times, because of the Islamists groups organized on social base of small independent business, the one who think that political Islam will lose power, predicted that “with further economic development and cultural secularization, its social base of support will wither away” (Gülalp, 2001, p. 436). However, after 1980, economic understanding of Turkey has changed from ISI to export promotion and this has changed power balance in favor of small independent business (Gülalp, 2001, p. 436). Rise of entrepreneurialism encouraged by the global expansion of sweatshops, and political Islam’s social base in Turkey has utilized this effectively (Gülalp, 2001, p. 437).

Developments of small and medium scale manufacturing industries are so rapid in recent years of Turkey. Gülalp quotes a recent survey in in five provincial towns (Denizli, Gaziantep, Konya, Çorum, and Edirne) and presents data that “more than 80 percent of the surveyed firms were established in the post-1980 period, with almost half established after 1990” (2001, p. 437). Such kind of small

manufacturing sector engaged in subcontracted work, and facilitated expansion of informal sector (Gülalp, 2001, p. 441). Rapid urbanization caused urban poverty and provided opportunity for informal sector to find workers (Gülalp, 2001, p. 441). Workers and urban poor, whose real wages steadily decline after 1980, have been affected by the Welfare Party's language that stresses socio-economic justice and equality in poor urban neighborhoods (Gülalp, 2001, p. 441). At that point Gülalp questions how that language is perceived by the Welfare supporters. He quotes a recent survey that the Welfare supporters have not much information about what is party's core slogan "just order", how that "just order" would be established, but they believed that it would achieve to create an "egalitarian" and "nearly socialist" society (2001, p. 441). Gülalp concludes that political and social demands are far beyond than religious demands in Welfare's success (2001, p. 441). He explains that

Filling the void created by the collapse of statism and the ensuing crisis of modernist ideologies that were based on it, such as nationalism and socialism, WP represented a post-nationalist and post-socialist sense of "justice." The Islamic sense of justice was not only manifested in the realm of ideology. More concretely, in the 1980s the functions of the defunct welfare state were taken on by local religious organizations and foundations working to help the poor in urban neighborhoods, thereby contributing to the popularity of the Islamist political movement. This was particularly instrumental in Welfare's success in local elections. (2001, p. 441)

At that point local religious organizations and foundations (in other words FBOs), which are substitute of welfare state, are confronting for the first time in history of Islamism in Turkey. Rabasa and Larrabee claims that limited and declining welfare capacity in post-1980 period caused rise of Islamic foundations for new urban migrants in Turkey (2008, p.19). They define political tradition of Welfare Party-Felicity Party- Justice and Development Party as gifted and active in substitution of welfare state by religious organizations (2008, p.19). Moreover they define these "charitable and social welfare activities" as the basis of party's success at the municipal and national levels (2008, p.19). Follower of the WP tradition JDP has become more entrenched in politics and society, it has also become more capable of

raising charitable funds from like-minded (and some not so like-minded) contributors. (Rabasa & Larrabee, 2008, p. 19)

To sum up, it can be inferred after review of Islamism in Turkey; until late 90s there is no such FBOs which struggle against poverty systematically. There were brotherhoods, small organizations which specialized on construction of mosque or spiritual development of individuals; however there were no systematic, specialized organizations which develop policies on a certain issue. The advent of multi-party democracy brought Islamic themed parties into politics; however, they could not survive long. For 1950-1970 period ‘mosque communities’, as defined by Yavuz (2003), were in their cocoon period. Islamists in the late 60s started to appear in daily life by organizations which specialized on mosque construction and the *İmam Hatip* schools. Especially after the facility to attend universities in any subject rather than theology provided to this theologian high schools, Islamists started to grow their cadres in this schools. However 1980 military coup is the most significant rupture in history of Islamism. On framework of Turkish Islamic synthesis, Islamists had opportunity to have roles in state. Firstly, Islamic liberal Özal and then Erbakan are two major figure of post-1980 period. Starting with Konya municipality in 1994, National Vision Movement has provided their services on theme of substitution of a welfare state, so called ‘Just Order’. In other words political opportunity structures, as defined by Yavuz (2003), created by adverse effects of liberal economic system (export promotion) has been managed well by National Vision Movement. In that sense, Konya, one of the most prominent city of Islamist movements, and its FBOs will be the topic of next chapter. Within those chapter ups and downs of state religion relationships which finally pave the way of FBO provision in Turkey has been the topic. It is obvious that within different periods of time, state’s relationship with religion has severe changing dimensions and that cause certain changes in Islamist organization strategies.

## **CHAPTER 3**

### **FBOs AS WELFARE PROVIDERS**

In that chapter field research in Konya will be detailed and current situation of FBOs in Konya as a shadow state will be exhibited. Research questions of “How do FBOs describe their self-identity and their role in struggling against poverty in the past and how is this role likely to develop in the future, how is the organizational structure and leadership, what are the material resources of FBOs, what are the implications of FBOs and what kinds of welfare model do they suggest” intended to answer during this chapter. The debate will be developed in that line; firstly the city of Konya will be the issue, secondly general features of FBOs in Konya, thirdly religious dimension of FBO provision, fourthly relationship network among FBOs the Platform and the state, fourthly main challenges of FBOs in Konya.

#### **3.1 Konya**

As referred in introduction chapter of the thesis, Konya can be considered as a special case in terms of history of Islamism and FBO proliferation in Turkey. In order to deepen understanding on FBOs in Konya, this section will be concentrated telling Konya in a historical perspective in terms of economic, political, social life.

Konya is the biggest city of the Central Anatolia. The city has 31 districts and 40.249 km<sup>2</sup> acreage. According to population censuses in 2011, the city population is 2.038.555; which 1.527.937 (74,95 %) of them live in urban and 510.618 (25,05 %) of them live in rural. Yearly population growth rate in Konya is 12.2 %. Following table shows change in population between years of 1927 and 2011.

<b>Table 2: Change in Population of Konya</b>					
<b>Year</b>	<b>Population</b>			<b>Proportion in Urban and Rural (%)</b>	
	<b>Total</b>	<b>Urban</b>	<b>Rural</b>	<b>Urban</b>	<b>Rural</b>
<b>1927</b>	504.125	100.946	403.179	20,02	79,98
<b>1935</b>	569.684	114.051	455.633	20,02	79,98
<b>1940</b>	620.936	129.045	491.891	20,78	79,22
<b>1945</b>	661.877	139.877	522.000	21,13	78,87
<b>1950</b>	741.026	157.421	583.605	21,24	78,76
<b>1955</b>	847.723	214.896	632.827	21,35	74,65
<b>1960</b>	982.422	279.878	702.544	28,49	71,51
<b>1965</b>	1.122.622	354.578	768.044	31,58	68,42
<b>1970</b>	1.280.239	455.707	824.532	35,60	64,40
<b>1975</b>	1.422.461	555.172	867.289	39,03	60,97
<b>1980</b>	1.562.139	672.695	889.444	43,06	56,94
<b>1985</b>	1.769.050	852.457	916.593	48,19	51,81
<b>1990</b>	1.750.303	963.128	787.175	55,03	44,97
<b>2000</b>	2.192.166	1.294.817	897.349	59,07	40,93
<b>2007</b>	1.959.082	1.412.343	546.739	72,1	27,9
<b>2008</b>	1.969.868	1.423.546	546.322	72,27	27,73
<b>2009</b>	1.992.675	1.450.682	541.993	72,80	27,20
<b>2010</b>	2.013.845	1.486.653	527.192	73,82	26,17
<b>2011</b>	2.038.555	1.527.937	510.618	74,95	25,05

Source: TUIK, 2011

As can be seen from the table, rural population of the Konya has decreased to 25% from 75% and urban population is at 75% recently. Those ratios are so similar with current average of Turkey.

Main pillars of the economy in Konya have been changed through time. When it was concentrated on agriculture previously, especially after 1980s, it has changed its directions to manufacturing industry. Agriculture has become a main player of the economic life in Konya from the beginning of the Republic of Turkey. Moreover, in the era of mechanization of the agriculture in Konya and the rapid development in agricultural surplus created new rich agriculture class in Konya after 1950 (Sarı, 2010, p. 161). Agriculture based manufacturing and food industry has accelerated its production after mechanization of agriculture (Sarı, 2010, p. 161). This situation caused formation of an organic connection between

industrialists- manufacturers and big farmers (Sarı, 2010, p. 161). Ninety percent of mutual membership among Konya Trade chamber and Konya Industry chamber shows this clearly (Çiçekli, 2007, p. 51). Although agriculture has still a significant place in the economy, main pillar of the economy has shifted to manufacturing industry in contemporary Konya. Historically, beginning of industrialization in Konya came across to era of beginning 50s to late 60s, and after 1950, during Menderes government era, Konya achieved a rapid development process (Sarı, 2010, 157). In 1954, the first sugar factory was established, in 1963 the first cement factory opened, and the first organized industrial zone opened in 1967 (Sarı, 2010, 157). It can be claimed that there is a relation between rise of religious right parties and rapid development of Konya (Sarı, 2010, p.157). As mentioned previously developments of small and medium scale manufacturing industries are so rapid in recent years of Turkey. In a recent research it has been figure that in Konya more than 80 percent of the surveyed firms were established in the post-1980 period, with almost half established after 1990 (Gülalp, 2001, p. 437). In order to portray a recent situation of the economy of Konya, the lists of Istanbul Chamber of Industry, which declare first 500 and first 1000 company in Turkish Economy, can be useful. 7 of the first 500 corporation, and 21 of the first 1000 corporation are from Konya in 2011.

All in all, it can be concluded that “the source of the wealth in Konya comes from the land and the organic connection among tradesmen, big farmer-land owner, and manufacturer are the leading class of the economy in Konya (Sarı, 2010, p. 161)”.

Parliamentarian and local elections also can give an insight to review contemporary history of Konya. In first multiparty elections 16 of total 17 seats of Konya were occupied by the Democrat Party representatives; and one representative was independent candidate in 1950 elections. It is pretty interesting that one of the fifteen parliamentarians of the Turkey Workers Party was elected from Konya in 1965 (Çiçekli, 2007, p. 92). In general elections of 1983, Motherland Party became


the leading party with a 56 % support. Another interesting result is in 1987 general elections. In this election, although banned political actors attended to the election, Motherland Party got 38% of the vote, Social Democrat Coalition 23%, True Path Party 17%, and Welfare Party 15% in Konya. Erbakan, leader of the Welfare party, could not show a significant existence on its first elected place in that election. However two years later Konya municipality gained by Welfare Party, it had been a successful case to win general elections two years after. In 1991 general elections Welfare Party increased its vote share to 33% in Konya, this success continued in local elections as 48% and 41% in 1994 and 1995 respectively. Starting with 1995, remaining elections were gained by representatives of political Islam in Konya; namely, Felicity Party, Justice and Development Party. Beside statistics an informal history of the political life of Konya can be helpful. A professor from faculty of theology summarizes political life of Konya as;

... even the race for political power bases on an Islamic debate in Konya. Regardless of political ideology, if a political party nominates a professor from faculty of theology, the other will also nominate another professor from faculty of theology. If a political party nominates a follower of X brotherhood, the other will also nominate a similar follower of the same brotherhood. This is what the people of Konya want. Moreover this situation was present in old times also. In general the parliamentarians are elected from the local people from a given city; however, it is not the case for Konya. Let me exemplify this, in the case of Konya, the important thing is not where you are from, but whether you are Islamist or not. An example of this situation is Ömer Rıza Doğrul, the husband of Mehmet Akif's daughter. Normally he is from Burdur. But he had very strong Islamist roots, he was a conservative and he had written academic works on Quran. Mehmet Vehbi Çelik can be considered an example of this situation in the beginning of republican era. The most important example is obviously Necmettin Erbakan, he was not from Konya but he can be elected from Konya as a parliamentarian. Why? Because the people of Konya pay Islam considerable importance.

Determining civil society in Konya historically is not easy. Even organization structures and numbers are remarkable; it is so difficult, almost impossible, to find

reliable data<sup>13</sup> about the civil society in Konya. Although contemporary numbers of the organizations can be identified, there is no long range data for NGOs and FBOs of Konya. Number of registered organization to Governorship of Konya and its change are presented as follow

**Table 3: Number of organizations in Konya (2000-2012)**



**Source:** Governorship of Konya, 2012


It is striking that number of the organizations almost doubled after 2002. Possible reasons of this situation are debated on page 66.

Types of organizations are categorized as in the following table by Governorship of Konya.

<sup>13</sup> Similar arguments (Çiçekli, 2007)



**Table 4: Type of organizations in Konya**



Source: Governorship of Konya, 2012

Governorship of Konya does not provide any information about categorization of the table. So in terms of reliability this data is problematic. However it can be seen that religiously motivated organizations are almost half of the whole organizations.

As mentioned, finding data on number of organizations in Konya has been quite challenging for me. And in former lines some data on contemporary situation of organizations has presented in Konya. Study of Yücekök (1971) is the only research that provides data on numbers of religious organizations of Turkey in late 60s. Yücekök (1971, p.149) figures religious education organizations of Turkey in 1968 as;

<b>Table 4: Number of religious education organizations of Turkey in 1968</b>			
<b>City Name</b>	<b>Volunteer Quran Course Number</b>	<b>Imam Preachers School Number</b>	<b>Formal Quran Course Number</b>
Konya	169	3	55
Ankara	117	2	57
İstanbul	107	1	35
İzmir	91	1	29
Total Numbers for Turkey	2510	69	994
<b>Source:</b> Yücekök (1971, p.149)			


Those number shows that Konya has almost largest number of organizations on religious education organizations in the year of 1968. Connotation of Konya with religious symbols is probably also related with historical largest number of organizations.

### **3.2 FBOs in Konya**

This section is going to figure out current situation of FBO market in Konya. However before starting to introduce field research, it should be remembered that FBOs does not form a homogenous whole as can be seen in former lines. Even though “being Muslim” is a common denominator for Islamist FBOs in Konya, they have obviously different identities. In other words, besides parameters like class, gender, education, difference in ideology is also an important pillar for differentiation of Islamist FBOs (Akşit, Serdar, & Tabakoğlu, 2005, p. 664). Differences in interpretation of Islamic discourse cause such diversity. In this context while some Islamist FBOs become advocator of universal human rights, some other try to reproduce daily life in an Islamic way by highlighting values of traditional Turkish society (Akşit, Serdar, & Tabakoğlu, 2005, p. 664). So during the following pages besides pointing to the similarities, the thesis also will intend to reflect diversity among them.

Without exception, operation mechanism of FBOs<sup>14</sup> in Konya flow in this manner; services of an FBO can reach to a needy in two ways, first s/he directly apply to the FBO, and second FBO can detect her/him by its research. If a needy apply for aid, s/he has to sign a protocol that indicates applicant acknowledged that an inquiry can be made about her/him. Such an inquiry consist the Konya Social Tissue Map<sup>15</sup>, district research and visit to needy person's home. In district of needy people, FBO members ask questions to grocers, butchers and neighbors about needy people. Moreover in order to apply for the help of the organization, one should bring a poverty certificate from the neighborhood headperson. When an applicant has been found eligible, the help is transferred through individual visits in the house of the beneficiary or in the offices of the association.

**Table 5: Foundation years of FBOs in Konya**



<sup>14</sup> This operation mechanism can be followed in sub heading “3.2.1 A day in poor evolution team”

<sup>15</sup> This is a poverty database formed by Konya Municipality. It had been costed 2 million TL. Whole FBOs and local administrations are connected to this database. Ideally this system hypothesizes to register each and every social aid. When a poor people get aid, the provider enters this information to this system. By this way it is intended to prevent mutual helps.

As can be seen from the graph 11 of 15 biggest organizations in Konya have been founded after 1990. Basically former researches on FBOs in Turkey classify FBOs in two groups; followers of the traditional tariqat network in shape of waqfs and association, and the other are completely brand new settlements that are independent from traditional networks (Akşit, Serdar, & Tabakoğlu, 2005, p. 665). In that sense only three of respondent FBOs can be classified as follower of traditional tariqat network. Remaining ones are new settlements. Interestingly foundation stories of those organizations are also so similar. Basically organizations founded after 1990 has started by “a group of people” that has certain social awareness. Those “a group of people” generally know each other from a religious tie; same brotherhood, same religious school etc. After completed field I have realized that Ribat has developed a “school” in FBO foundation, because new organizations founded after 1992 have members who have broken up with Ribat, the first organization that is founded after 1980 coup. In a few words, at post-coup period the foundation was a powerful Islamic organization through Turkey. For instance, Ribat, also the name of the journal of organization, is the first Islamist journal in Turkey founded after 1980, its publication center is Konya and it reached an audience of 40.000-50.000 people around Turkey. As I have determined resentful members of Ribat have established FBOs either on the tradition of Ribat or in other sectors in terms of services.

On the other hand, professions of people who are founders or workers of FBOs in Konya have a broad range like civil servant, merchant, religious education teacher, building contractor, industrialist. There were absolutely no people who had specialized on social services. I think that this is the one of the most important proof that shows FBOs in Konya are working and implementing their policies unprofessionally. This situation is one of the biggest challenges for FBOs.

In the following lines, tables will show amount of social aid, social aid type, budget, and human resources of fifteen FBOs in Konya. Representation of data cannot be generalized whole FBOs in Konya; however, lack of official data in FBOs in Turkey

enforced me to give/create some quantitative data<sup>16</sup>. Next two graphs intend to show number of current beneficiaries of the organizations and type of social aid received by them in 2010.

---

<sup>16</sup> I have tried to collect information about “number and name of organizations that perform food banking, number of faith based organizations, income tax discounts that is emerged from donating in food banking organizations” from TUIK, tax offices, governorships, the prime minister’s office; however, it is impossible to see any data. The only exeption was low range data provided by Konya Governorship.

	<b>Name of the FBO</b>	<b>Social Aid Amount</b>	<b>Yearly Budget in 2010 (TL)</b>
1	Hayra Hizmet Vakfi	Monthly food aid to more than 1000 people in 2010	NA
2	Cemiyeti Hayriye Vakfi	Monthly food aid to 1170 people in 2010	750,000
3	Kimse Yok mu (Konya Branch)	Monthly food aid to more than 2000 people in 2010	NA
4	Cansuyu (Konya Branch)	Monthly food aid to 3300 family in 2010	NA
5	Mehir Vakfi	Up to know almost 7500 couple get wedding aid	NA
6	Ribat Eğitim Vakfi	Daily 3500 people uses soup kitchens in 2010	1,500,000
7	İlim Yayma Cemiyeti Konya	Almost 1000 student uses dormitory services and gets scholarships on different amounts in 2010.	NA
8	Dost Eli	In terms of food aid, monthly 4000 people get aid.	4,000,000
9	Kimsev	40 children accommodate in dormitories	NA
10	Şefkat-Der	300 people accommodate in shelters. Up to this time 15,000 people has benefited from services of the organization.	NA
11	Bozkırlılar	Monthly 500 student gets scholarships	60,000
12	İrfan-Der	Monthly 250 student gets scholarships	180,000
13	Büyük Selçuklu Vakfi	Monthly food aid to 1600 people in 2010	300,000
14	Ravza Eğitim Kültür	Daily 2000 people uses soup kitchens in 2010	200,000
15	Türk Anadolu Vakfi	Monthly 150 students get scholarships and there are dormitories.	NA

This table shows only the budget information of that share aforementioned data.

According to this data Dost Eli with 4,000,000TL has the highest budget. Type of raising funds for organization is almost same in all organizations. Their budgets' essential item is personal donating. Islamists name this as alm or zakat, a specific type of alm. Even I have witnessed organizations that make lists of industrialists or shopkeepers and go each of them one by one to ask their alm or zakat. This is not specific to an organization, but it is a common slogan "give your alm or zakat to us, and we will be an effective remedy for the needy". While mentioning budget information, Şefkat Der should be emphasized. Unlike from other organizations they are in a miserable financial situation<sup>17</sup>. Providing "unusual" services cause to very limited donating from moderate Muslims. In other words, unusual aid service could not call the attention of the moderate Muslims. Because of limited budget, they deal often with unpaid bills and other kinds of financial problems. 90% of the budget comes from the donations of the workers of the organization, and the total human resource is five volunteers.

According to my data, social aid types of fifteen FBOs in Konya is distributed as

Food	10
Cloth	9
Heating	9
Cash aid	11
Education aid	13
Health	6
Social exclusion / Human rights	3
Culture (publishing, broadcasting)	9
Religious education	7
Social activities (kurs, panel, sempozyum, ders)	13
Vocational training	3

<sup>17</sup> Diaries of Hayrettin Bulan can be read on organization's web site. <http://www.sefkatder.org/notlar.html>

It is showed that organizations concentrate on aids for food, education, cash aid and social activities. Mainly this can be a sign that FBOs try to prevent first level problems of poverty. In other words FBOs, instead of completely abolish poverty situation of needy, provide services that satisfy urgent needs of poor. Long term struggle with poverty is a complex process and developing projects on that topic require adequate human resources. As I witnessed Dost Eli has most competent human resource in Konya. Head of the organization tells that “Finding educated people in these areas is quite a big challenge for us in Konya; so, we are trying to employ at least university graduates without focusing their subjects”. Unsurprisingly this organization was the only one that develop project for long term struggle with poverty. Their extraordinary project was “organic strawberry cultivation in poor villages”. This project aims to struggle against poverty in the long run. Head of the organization tells their project as

In 2011 *Dost Eli* identified a village that is suitable to strawberry cultivation and cooperating with Provincial Directorate of Agriculture provided necessary equipment and information for strawberry cultivation. 105 families in the village started farming again and their first crops are bought by a company which exports Europe. Moreover the company assured villagers on buying next seasons’ products. By this project with a budget less than 20,000 TL, we have succeeded to transform 105 families to meet their own needs and abolished poverty in that village.

Concentration of aid in certain areas can be caused by state’s implementation of food banking law. In 2004 donors of food banking organizations had gained a big tax allowance. According to this allowance, donation to food banking organizations started 100% tax allowance in income tax. A possible scenario is mentioned presented here (ISMMMO, 2009, p. 79)

Example: There are two taxpayers. They want to make 300,000 TL donations. First person (A) is donating to a food banking organization; and second person (B) is donating another organization that do not providing food banking services. In that case A will benefit from 300,000 TL tax allowance; however, B will gain just 5 percent tax allowance (15,000 TL).

According to research, done by ISMMMO, state causes an unfair situation among



FBOs for collecting donations in Turkey. By providing extra benefits to organizations that offer food banking services, such organizations can collect easier donations than others (ISMMMO, 2009, p. 77).

Social activities done by 13 of 15 FBOs in Konya are also striking. Those activities consists religious panels, religious sempozyum, and kermises. At that point it can be claimed that FBOs try to reproduce daily life in an Islamic way.

Besides this kind of activities, there are also distinctive services provided by FBOs in Konya. I will generally summarize such kind of activities. Mehir foundation has a distinctive place among FBOs in Konya by providing wedding services and academic services. Couples between the ages of 18 and 40 apply to the foundation and the couples meeting the criteria set beforehand get the chance to have their wedding organized and their needed furniture bought. In terms of academic services, the organization is owner of a peer-reviewed journal<sup>18</sup>; namely, Journal of Research in Islamic Law. Another academic service is the FBO's intention to establish a private university. Konya Science and Technology University is the name of this project university. Şefkat Der has a distinctive place with its unconventional services. Sex workers and women victimized by violence are two of main beneficiary group for the organization. According to Bulan this situation was found bizarre by moderate Muslims,

Moderate Muslims are so conservative with customary social aid types. For instance building mosques, schools, fountains are so familiar for a Muslim; however, building a shelter or donating to a shelter is quite far to a moderate Muslim in our daily life. So although everyone tells stories about our target groups, there is almost no one that really cares for them.

Another distinctive service provider is Kimsev. They provide orphan children housing and pay their education expenses in order to fasten their reintegration to the society. They have undertaken the expenses of 40 children in the year of 2008, they give scholarships, provide the children with clothing, etc. Moreover, the

---

<sup>18</sup> <http://www.islamhukuku.com/>

organization arranges some extracurricular activities such as picnics for the children to enjoy themselves.

Dost Eli have also distinctive services. Although main service of the organization is food banking, they have various projects. For instance their main building has a hosting department for companions of poor patients who come to hospitals of Konya from another city. 50 people can accommodate in their place and selection of these people directly made by hospital administrations, organization has no responsibility on selection.

Dost Eli is also consultant organization to other FBOs in nationwide. 55 FBOs in different cities of Turkey enjoy from this service. Dost Eli can guide organizations about bureaucratic process in foundation, transparency, and main operation mechanisms. When I asked the question of “why and how did you start such a service”, they answered that while their organization was founding, other FBOs did not share any information jealously. “We are not jealous about our information. This is a charity job; we should make easier our brothers to open such organizations.”

The scope of the FBOs in Konya, generally, is local. In other words, whole organizations in Konya aim to offer services for Konya. They rarely provide services in national or international level; moreover when they offer such services those are not systematic or continuous. International service is exemplified very frequently as sacrificing animals in Africa. In feast of sacrifice most of the FBOs in Konya collects money in Konya to sacrifice animals in Africa. FBOs claim that distributing meat convert many people to Islam. Although it should be mentioned that animal prices are notably low in Africa relative to Turkey. This is another reason for popularity of this service<sup>19</sup>. A head of the organization tells the process and rationalization of their international service as

Going abroad in order to deliver social aid is a Muslim reflex. In other

---

<sup>19</sup> Some interesting debates on that topic may be seen from this link <http://t24.com.tr/yazi/milli-goruste-hesap-soran-hainlikle-dinsizlikle-suclanir/4957>

countries while providing services we have no separation for non-Muslims. We help anyone who need. You know that *müllef-i kulub*<sup>20</sup> is also a category that Muslims could give their *zakat*. TIKA (Turkey Head of Agency Cooperation and Coordination) buys plane tickets and provide necessary contacts for us in Africa. This makes our job pretty easier.

### 3.2.1 A day in “poor evaluation team”

*Today we are beginning to visit the houses of applicants with the team of "Dost Eli". Dost Eli have two teams of such. Each team consists of two persons; a young man who can drive the car, and another man who is above the age of 60. The man who is above the age of 60 (in their saying 'Hacı amca') means security for the poor people. According to team member, 'Hacı amca' figure give trust to poor woman while her home investigating." Why do not you go with a woman instead of 'Hacı amca'” was my question when I heard this. “It is not suitable in Islamic terms, we cannot form a male female team if they are not married” was the answer. But today just I and the young man would visit the houses. The vehicle is a Fiat commercial car which has just two seats. The automobiles have GPS devices that all the places could be found easily. Before the usage of GPS devices maps were used, and speed of job was slower twice time according to driver.*

*Once we arrived the house of the applicant, firstly the neighbors would be asked about the conditions in which the applicants live. At the first glance, this method seemed to be odd and inoperable; however I have witnessed that every neighbor have provided some information. In addition to neighbors, shopkeepers in the district (the grosser, the butcher ... etc.) are also asked to provide information about the applicants. The information they have provided can be very useful for evaluation team.*

---

<sup>20</sup> *Müellef-i Kulub* refers to non muslim groups and Islamic discourse define themselves as a potential beneficiary from alms to attract the hearts of those who have been inclined toward Islam. Detailed information can be found under heading of “3.3 Religion and FBOs”.

*The first place we have visited is a squatter house with two rooms. A naive woman with two children between the ages of 4 and 5 has opened the door. She has invited us to the room with a stove. We were sitting on cushions because there was almost no furniture in the house. She said that her husband is mentally sick, she has two sons, one of the boys is taken by the parents of her husband claiming that the boy cannot continue his education if he stays with them, "now grandparents do not allow them even to see him". She said her husband works just a few months in a year, "he beats me, he beats his parents, even he broke her mother's arm last month". Although no one asked she gives excessive information about their life... The boy is so shy, his name is Yunus Emre. The house is very clean. The woman has migrated from a village, her mother is dead, and her father is living in the village. Another detail about the house is the broken door of the refrigerator. Woman said that her husband has broken it yesterday during a fight. The organization's volunteer took a glance around the house, and then we have leaved the house. But I was really amazed when we leaved the house because the woman was still saying "I wish I could have offered you some cup of tea and bread."*

*In the second house, we encounter a woman who is older than 60 years old, she says, "I have married", with a smile on her face, revealing that she is proud of herself due to being able to find someone to marry. She adds that she also has returned the green card. She thanks us, and then we leave.*

*When we get in the third house, the organization volunteer got angry and annoyed because he said "this house is richer than my house!" The applicant is a woman; she is receiving the retirement pension of her ex-husband. She owns the house that we were visiting.*

*In fourth house we knocked the door for a long time, the ring was not working, and the house was located in a garden, so we could not make our voice heard. Once we gave up, we have decided to knock the door of the neighbor, she said that family is in a very bad situation, she asked us kindly to retry, she also accompanied us and*

*knock the door, and called the name of the applicant loudly, finally she heard and opened the door. It is a family with two children, one boy and one girl, they are about 4 or 5 years old, the father is schizophrenic and has a medical report stating that he is 90 % incapable of working. For that reason they receive 880 liras for every three month, and except that money they do not have any source of income. They also receive coal aid from municipalities and provincial governorship. The man avoids eye contact while speaking. Only a few words, then he stops to speak. Women say that she cannot work because she must take care of her two children. The house has two small rooms in the upstairs, one bathroom and one kitchen on the ground. Furniture is so limited and cushions are similarly to first house are on the floor. The furniture and the bed in the other room are decrepit. The organization volunteer made a move to check the bathroom of the house, the woman got very surprised and shy, thinking that he violated the privacy of her house, she said “but it is the bathroom..!” After leaving the house the volunteer reported that another schizophrenic man has attacked to other evaluation team volunteers by blaming them peeping to her wife.*

*Lastly we visited a couple, I thought that they are very old, but then I have learned that man is 55 and the woman is 53. This is also a scatter house with so limited furniture, and cushions are on the floor. The man has offered us a cup of coffee several times, because he has begun to experience loss of memory. For this reason he is unable to work. According to woman, once they had saved money to buy a motorcycle but the man had an accident with it, and broke his leg. Woman said that “combined with his memory problem now he does not have a chance to find a job”. They never had a child, so there is no one who supports them financially. There are two rooms and one kitchen in the house. Bathroom is at outside. In one room the couple lives, the other rooms is very shocking to us, it is full of handmade toys, and flowers! The woman explains; “since we could not have a child, we have enjoyed ourselves by making them”. It is not a child room, but it is a place in which an adult can enjoy being a child.*

*We could not find % 50 percent of applicants in their houses. The organization volunteer says that "poor usually do not stay at their homes. They get tired of being at their cold houses in winter; they go to their neighbors or to other facilities such as soup kitchens. Some of them do not stay at home not to encounter with the creditors".*

### **3.3 Religion and FBOs**

To understand the implications of FBO provision, looking into religious discourse that justifies philanthropist arguments, moral references to poverty, and solutions to poverty is helpful. Because the religious discourse of this organizations emphasis the moral and spiritual side of welfare provision, they use religious impulses to help the poor (Clarke & Carey, 2008). Personal donations have a key part in budgets of FBOs in Konya. In essence, those donations are a religious ritual for donors. In other words, although alms cause economic circulation, they are essentially a worshipping activity. So it is vital to understand religious dimension in donating. In this chapter religious literature of donating activities will be shortly reviewed. Islamic discourse about economic system, social aid, private property, accumulation of welfare are quite contentious. Therefore in this chapter there will be no discussion on theoretical concepts but portray of understanding of orthodox Sunni Hanifi Islamic ideology on social aid.

Prosperity and poverty are constant in Islamic discourse. In other words Islam does not idealize a world that has no poverty, or a classless world. Condition of being in prosperity or in poverty is examination for believers<sup>21</sup>. Each condition has certain moral sanctions and if a believer can achieve to behave according to codes, s/he will achieve to receive consent of the God. In terms of the poor, the poverty can be the

---

<sup>21</sup> This is a verse in Quran (8:28) "And know that your properties and your children are but a trial and that Allah has with Him a great reward".

key for eternal happiness. The poverty is also good for poor people if they are patient and do not rebel against God. In other words, “The poor are therefore God’s gift to everybody else” (Çamur, 2004, p.119).

“Protect you against the fire of doomsday, albeit with half a palm” and “the one who sleep full when his neighbor is hungry is not from us” are two sayings of the Prophet Muhammad's that are quite popular among Islamists and they were also widely used by FBOs in Konya. Scarifying animals and alm are two main rituals of Islam in social aid area. Each year sacrificing animal and distributing its meat to needy people is compulsory for rich people and alm is the aid that is made voluntarily or compulsory by believers (Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı, 2009, p.383). For the ones who are in prosperity<sup>22</sup>, donating is an essential ritual. Alm is the concept in Islam for donating. By alms a believer will clean himself/herself and his/her property. Moreover this donating will help to people who are in condition of poverty, and will prevent to growth of the gap between poor and rich.

In this manner alm is a value exchange among poor and rich. Basically five types of alm is mentioned in Islamic discourse; i- zakat, ii- for healthy body, *fitir*, iii- *adak*, for wishes, iv- for substitution in praying, v- voluntary alm (Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı, 2009, p.384)

Zakat (i) is calculated according to property types of a Muslim and its percentage changes between 2.5 to 10 (Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı, 2009, p. 384). Fitir alm (ii) is compulsory one time in a year and the amount is “to afford a daily diet for a needy people”. Adak (iii) is a voluntary alm that is promised to God in case of a wish come to be true. Number (iv) is ransom in case of deficiency of worshipping. Number (v) is totally voluntary donating for the consent of the God. Among alms zakat is the most important one; because of its frequency and amount. Beginning in the first years of Islam, Zekat is a kind of tax that is collected by Islamic state, and an important public income (Dumlu, 2010, p. 99). In its ideal case, in generally,

---

<sup>22</sup> Definition of prosperity is made in Quran detaily.

zakat may be classified as a value transfer from private sphere to public sphere (Dumlu, 2010, p. 108). Possible spending forms of zakat are defined in Quran. "*As-sadaqaat* (here means zakat) *are only for the fuqara* (poor), *and al-masaakin* (the needy) *and those employed to collect* (the funds) *and to attract the hearts of those who have been inclined* (toward Islam), *and (to free) captives, and for those in debt, and for Allah's cause* (i.e. for those fighting in a holy battle) *and for the wayfarer* (a traveler who is cut off from everything); *a duty imposed by Allah.* " (Taubah; 9/60)

On the other hand, it is also important to reveal how organizations conceptualize themselves while getting donations from Muslims. Firstly, generosity of people in the times of the Prophet Muhammad and in the Ottoman Period, secondly proper operating zakat mechanism are the most popular stories which have been told by FBOs before define themselves. As I listened numerous times in different interviews, at the time of Prophet Muhammad, there were no poor people in the society, because of proper operating zakat mechanism. A second commonly told story is about the sadaka stones at the time of Ottoman Empire. Again, because of proper operating zakat mechanisms in Ottoman era, lack of poor people caused Muslim people difficulties to give their zakat and fulfill their obligation to God. In order to overcome this problem, "sadaka stones" invented. In that way the wealthy would leave money to these sadaka stones and the poor would go and get only as much as they need. At that point as mentioned numerous in field research, FBOs classify themselves as "modern sadaka stones". "We are doing this job because of we are Muslims. Our religion command us to behave in such manner" and "Anyone except Muslims cannot do this job as good as Muslims" are also popular Islamic rhetoric in Konya. Besides such a high self-esteem, "help of Allah" is also another topic that FBOs distinguished themselves from secular NGOs. A head of an FBO summarizes this situation as

After years of experience in Muslim community in Konya, I could say that if Allah had not helped us, anyone could not have provided such services. Probably you have also seen that in terms of professionalism, we are in a miserable situation. However Allah helps us. A man can donor one of his two cars after listening a preachment. Pay attention, I do not exemplify very



rich people, people who have ten cars. I mean moderate rich people. A moderate rich people can donor half of its wealth by listening a preachment. I have witnessed this several times. Modern organizations cannot have such members. Modern logic cannot understand our donation rationality. Because they do not understand us, they claim that Arab capital came to Konya. I have never seen money that has been come from Arabia, but I have often seen people who make donation for the sake of Allah. This is what I mean as “help of Allah”.

It should be stressed that facility of using language of religion is a quite big advantage for FBOs in Konya. In this context, funding of an organization is at the same time a worshipping activity. In other words FBOs are standing as objects of worshipping activity; a Muslim performs its religious obligation by donating to an FBO. Furthermore food banking law has to be reviewed. In that manner transparency, professionalism, and qualification of this aids needs to question fairly.

Orthodox Sunni Hanifi Islamic ideology has certain implications that have to be criticized. Obviously, zakat has also other spending forms except from social aid. It can spend for warriors, and propagating Islam. In this sense zakat’s position on struggling against poverty is contraversional. On the other hand popular religious beliefs that justify the existence of poverty are open to the exploitation. The religious discourse of popular Islam enables the presentation of poverty under the guise of a key to eternal happiness. The socio-economic conditions that cause poverty are neglected. As Çamur (2004) argues that poverty in Islam is presented as personal and situational, but not institutional. Poverty is represented as a test for the poor, also a test for the rich individuals sent by God. The focus on moral responsibility of wealth to help the poor contributes to depolitization of poverty issue and undermining the idea of citizenship that makes reference to welfare rights of citizens. Using a discourse that emphasizes moral obligations of average and wealth toward the poor can be related with the increasing number of FBO welfare pro vision. Çamur (2004, p. 53) states that the poverty and the poor are presented as the “objects of aid” given by the rich in the Islamic discourse of TV charity programs namely Deniz Feneri, Kimse Yok mu, and Yolcu (*Deniz Feneri* and *Kimse Yok mu?* are also organized as the form of Faith-Based Organization), which have

religious references. She claims that in this religious discourse philanthropy is a vehicle for the personal salvation of the rich, because giving purifies the wealth. Charity is made by expecting a greater return in the afterlife (Camur, 2004, p.59).

### **3.4 Relationships among FBOs, State and the Platform**

In that section the topic is going to be relationship network among FBOs, the Platform and the state.

#### **3.4.1 FBO – Platform Relationships**

Previously conducted researches about FBOs in Konya (Eligür, 2010; Gocmen, 2010) did not mention anything about the platform. However it cannot be a sign of its uselessness, probably it is because of informal structure of platform other researchers could not reach it. After finished my field research I have concluded that the platform is effectively working and organizing communication among FBOs, local administration, and state.

Latif Selvi introduces himself as the head of *Eğitim Bir Sen* (Union of unity of education) in Konya, member of the *Memur Sen* (confederation of civil servant unions) and shadow head of the platform<sup>23</sup> of non-governmental organizations in Konya (İLKADIM DERGİSİ, 2011). Selvi tells the history of the foundation of platform as

Foundation of the platform mainly has two reasons which are not separate from each other but related. Firstly what we live in Konya during February

---

<sup>23</sup> “Umbrella organization in NGO field” is a relatively new notion in Turkey (buraya almanya’daki kızın tezine referans ver.). TGTV (Türkiye Gonullu Tesekkuller Vakfi) is a national umbrella organization in Turkey. Internationally IDSB (The Union of NGOs of the Islamic World/Islam Dnyasi Sivil Toplum Kuruluslari Birliđi) is an umbrella organization. X Y and Mehir Vakfi are founder organization in this union.

28<sup>24</sup> is main motive to form a platform. Before this platform, there was not a similar umbrella organization that gathers FBOs with a civil intention. There was an umbrella organization, leaded by the *Hayra Hizmet Vakfi*, that try to organize something but in my opinion they were not totally civil, and they were gathering organizations that had representatives in political arena. During February 28 they were highly suppressed by the state, especially military officers. Suppression of state was in type of surveillance of organizations and donors. Donors were queried by state with questions like “why are you donating to these organizations, what is your benefit...” This situation caused to fear of donating, and people started not to help organizations or helping in condition of without registration. Second reason of forming this platform was economic. In times of the February 28 there were many multi-member limited liability companies. State did not legislate necessary laws and clarified positions of such kind of companies. Under the circumstances those companies could not get credits and go public; in other words could not compete with their rivals and went bankrupt. Kombassan is one of the best examples of this situation. Those reasons forced us to form a civil umbrella organization that has a unique voice in 1999.

In here Latif Selvi puts the motive of forming an umbrella organization as “uniting to be a single and more powerful voice”. As mentioned by Selvi, FBOs’ in Konya have felt need for a uniting platform after February 28. This platform now provides a place for FBOs to debate on their contemporary problems and help them to determine long term mission and vision. Because of its informal structure, it has been quite problematic for me to understand relationships among platform and other actors; namely FBOs, local administrations. However it can be said that FBOs in Konya have an effective working umbrella organization.

The platform can play a role as an organizer over new FBOs. In other words, as Selvi mentioned, the platform can give advice to newly founding FBOs about their

---

<sup>24</sup> This date is the abbreviation that stands for anti islamist regulations after National security council in 28 february 1997, so called “post modern coup”.

services and target groups. For instance if the platform determines void in soup kitchen activities, it can advise the newly establishing FBO to play a part in soup kitchen activities. An advising and guiding body is an absolute need for FBOs. Nükte exemplify this as

We are in need of different type of FBOs in Konya. For instance I am a soup kitchen; I cannot take care of everyone's problem. For instance we have met with a needy people who is desperately poor, neurasthenic. He had a heartbreaking story. Although we are a soup kitchen, we tried to help him. We spent extensive time and money but we could not succeed anything. We should have FBOs for such kind of people, FBOs which specialized certain topics.

Selvi mentions that even though it has not a strict schedule member FBOs of the platform gathers regularly monthly. For 8 years the platform arranges a yearly evaluation meeting namely *Ufuk Turu Toplantıları*. *Ufuk Turu Toplantıları* not only gathers Konya FBOs but also may host FBOs nationally and internationally<sup>25</sup>.

### **3.4.2 FBO – FBO Relationships**

FBOs can have good relationship and furthermore cooperation among themselves. *Şefkat Der* have good relation with some other FBOs; these FBOs provide the association with food to be distributed in the shelters for males, for instance. In here we can see an example of clear cooperation.

A distinctive cooperation example can be seen in *Dost Eli*. *Dost Eli* is a consultant organization to other FBOs in nationwide. 55 FBOs from different cities of Turkey enjoy from this service. *Dost Eli* can guide organizations about bureaucratic processes of foundation, transparency, and main operation mechanisms.

Moreover some FBOs can develop relationships internationally with other FBOs. *Mehir Foundation* is one of the founding members of the Union of NGOs of the Islamic World. *Ribat* is also a member of this umbrella organization.

---

<sup>25</sup> For instance this year 100 FBOs from 69 city of Turkey join the meeting.  
[http://www.haberkonya.com/haber/22042/Ufuk\\_Turu\\_Toplantilari\\_basliyor.html](http://www.haberkonya.com/haber/22042/Ufuk_Turu_Toplantilari_basliyor.html)

Although aforementioned examples are positive ones, interestingly, FBOs can offer services which cause conflict among them. For instance Dost Eli organization express clear opposition to soup kitchen services. They are claiming that this service's adverse effects on morality and family institution. The organization hypothesizes that soup kitchen normalize poverty by gathering people together. They claim that, in general, women come to soup kitchens to get food. And those women come with their children. The organization oppose at that point. Their argument is not only the beneficiary women but also their children learn poverty. "Parasitic poor" is their concept in order to define people who get used to its needy situation. In that sense, soup kitchen is a place that eases to the formation of "parasitic poverty". They are also insistent on adverse effects of soup kitchen on family institution. The organization acknowledges "cooking" as a fundamental function in a family and so activates that interrupt "cooking" appear them troubled. Dost Eli advise to provide services that facilitate people to cook in their home.

Professor from Faculty of Theology in Konya may provide important insights on FBO-FBO relationships. When I ask the question of "FBOs in Konya, as I have witnessed, work in a perfect cooperation, what are the reasons of this", his answer;

In my view your hypothesis is false, there is no a perfect cooperation among FBOs. Of course we have the platform and many FBOs in Konya but as referring to my experience for years I can say that there is no absolute cooperation, most of the time an FBO is supporter of only its activities. For instance when I am invited a conference by FBO X, it impossible to see someone there from FBO Y, and vice versa. Then I ask "If I am a valuable preacher for you why cannot you come to other groups' gatherings?" It is like supporting a football team. These FBOs in social aid area have founded in a condition of competition. Once upon a time each Islamic group was trying to have a radio station, similarly now each group is trying to have a FBO in social aid area. This competition is exaggerated so much in many ways. For instance if an FBO does its international social aid to Somalia, others just try to do bigger aids to Somalia. They cannot think to do different type of aid or to a different country.

In that answer, implicit competitiveness among FBOs can be seen.

### **3.4.3 FBO – State Relationships**

General attitude of the FBOs in Konya on state relationship is on behalf of state's organizer and guiding role. They are not willing for state's social aid provider position. Main argument of this opposition is state's incapability while transmitting social aid. Ravza organization states that

“State should be organizer for such kind of jobs; because, any civil servant cannot do these job as devoted as us. You cannot show a counter example for this situation. State cannot feel poverty or develop empathy for needy people.”

On the other hand “ideal” relationship among state and FBOs is developing in Konya according to Ribat,

“Five or six years ago, as if we are fighting against state on social aid area. But now we are cooperating like business partners. If we develop this partnership, we can struggle with poverty properly. State inspection on us is a must for proper service transmitting. “

FBOs can get advice when they start a totally new service for them. For instance, Dost Eli organization, when they are building a dormitory for the people who are accompanying the patients in the hospitals, has worked with the District Health Directorate. Moreover state can grant them land, building etc. For instance the government has granted Kimsev a new piece of land while they are building a new dormitory.

Relationship between university and FBOs can be considered under this heading. FBOs in Konya can receive support from Konya Seljuk University in different subjects. Latif Selvi identifies one of the main problems of the FBOs in Konya as “deprivation academic knowledge”. In order to be more professional and effective they try to have relationships with university. Mr. Selvi exemplified their effort that they have invited a professor from Faculty of law to a seminar about European Union projects, and after this seminar FBOs' prejudice about EU projects abolished. Furthermore I have seen that different FBOs invite academics from Faculty of theology for their programs to different groups of people. It should be noted that

those invitations can be reciprocal. For instance, in my last visit to Konya, I have witnessed that head of a FBO was invited to give a conference to university students about poverty and social aid.

State can also solve a social problem by assigning it to the FBOs. For instance refugees, who come from different countries to Konya, have allocated among FBOs in recent years. In this manner an FBO provide accommodation, food and shelter for a group of people assigned to it by state according to its capacity. All FBOs that I have interviewed are contributed to state in that way. Furthermore Şefkat Der tells that the police can bring homeless people after midnight to their shelters because of state do not have a place for them in Konya.

In order to work effectively, municipality has formed a database among FBOs, local administration and municipality in 2005; namely, Konya Social Tissue Map. I have used program interface in FBOs. By using this map, when an FBO or local administration makes social aid, it input its data to the program which has an interface on internet. Then if a duplicated aid detected for a person, s/he can cut the social aid off.

### **3.5 Main Challenges of FBO Market in Konya**

In this section FBO market in Konya will be analyzed and three main challenges of it will be manifest; namely, (i) permanency, transparency and accountability (ii) qualification, and (iii) professionalism.

#### **3.5.1 Permanency, Transparency and Accountability**

Permanency, transparency and accountability are topics of financial management of an organization. So I will discuss those under this heading.

Because of whole financing of FBO market in Konya is depended on personal donations, those FBOs are quite risky in terms of permanency of their services. Without exception, organizations claims that after paid fixed costs (electricity and water bill, personnel wages ... etc.), they distribute whole donations they get. That means in case of shortage on donations their services can decrease or extinct easily<sup>26</sup>. For instance in one of my visit to a soup kitchen in Konya, I have witnessed that daily meal diet consists from macaroni and rice. When I asked the reason of this small amount, FBO workers said that today they had a problem on getting chicken donation.

Transparency and accountability are also important challenges of such organizations. Low level of state control and considerable tax allowance for donating to these FBOs are the main source of my doubts. As mentioned in previous chapters<sup>27</sup>, In Turkey “food banking” law has brought certain advantages to organizations that provide food banking services. After legislation of this law, FBOs which perform food banking activities has gained a big opportunity to collect funds. In other words, by this law, a Muslim started to gain tax allowance in addition to rewards by God. I have witnessed that an organization had lists of industrialist on

---

<sup>26</sup> Deniz Feneri Association can be an example of this situation. After corruption claims raised and the association prosecuted, donorings to this organization severely declined in 2008.

<sup>27</sup> Under the heading “3.2 FBOs in Konya”



Konya, and they were regularly visiting them in order to collect their alms, zakat. Moreover any organization does not announce its financial tables publicly, and any of them is audited by independent institutions in Konya. On the other hand they do not have to state information about their financial statements legally and this cause accountability problem (ISMMMO, 2009, p. 78). There is no statistic produced by state for FBOs or food banking organizations. An organization can start to food banking with just chancing its “terms of reference”, and for that reason it is impossible to guess about number of food banking organization (ISMMMO, 2009, p. 82). Research estimates that state and private sector forms an 8 billion dollar social aid economy in Turkey (ISMMMO, 2009). 50 percent of Turkish economy is informal recently, and as I witnessed there can be high level of informal sector in social aid economy also. In my field research, after I requested budget information of two organizations, managers asked that “am I asking the formal one or the real one?” There were almost 50% difference between formally declared budget and the real one. Although it is not explicitly expressed, transparency is a hidden nuisance among FBOs in Konya where an implicit competitiveness and complaints exist among FBOs. Interestingly they do not explicitly express their ideas about conflictual issues; however, when my record tape went off or when I finished interview, they give insider information on condition of not recording. For instance one respondent claimed that although Konya municipality has a database for social aid, some organizations skip to enter real donations that they had gathered and use this part to finance themselves informally. Another organization claims that they are the most transparent FBO in Turkey and moreover,

Big FBOs cannot be such a transparent. Because their foundation is not on a professional style, now they are having challenge on transforming themselves to a professional organization. In my opinion this is quite hard for them because of installation cost of such system, and accountability problem of their budget. Two months before a women worker of a big four FBOs of Turkey came to see our system. We had hosted her for a week. While she leaving, she confessed that our system is the ideal one, but they cannot establish such a system for various reasons. It is interesting that she said “first of all I can not acknowledge foundation of this system to my top managers.”

FBOs in Konya are not a monolithic whole in terms of transparency. Dost Eli<sup>28</sup> is a quite transparent organization in Konya. I have visited their main building three times and attended their “poor evaluation team”. They have showed no doubt while opening their doors and documents to me. Then I have realized that this organization is quite sensitive about transparency. In order to increase accountability they have founded a detailed system; namely, barcode system. After accepting a donor, the organization directly sticks barcodes to each and every part of the donated thing. This barcodes contain information about what it is stickled on, who donated it, which get it as aid. For instance if someone donor meat, the organization will stick barcodes to each part of the meat, and even after years they will have information who donated meat and who get it as aid. According to the Mehmet Seer although the system is costly, this is the only way to become transparent. Moreover he tells that an observer has come to see their system from a big faith based organization, which works international level, but after witnessed activities several days observer admitted that their spending cannot be as transparent as Dost Eli.

### **3.5.2 Qualification**

One of the main questions on FBOs in Konya is their qualification for struggling against poverty. The problematic side of FBO provision is its underlying assumptions about poverty and aid receivers. These assumptions usually do not address poverty as a structural problem that should be tackled. I argue that these assumptions and strategies of combating poverty based on these assumptions lack the power of eradicating poverty problem. Under this heading I will question social aid’s quality for long term struggle against poverty and its comprehensiveness.

One problematic side of FBO provision is existence of moral and religious education combined with the welfare provision. As mentioned in former chapters a

---

<sup>28</sup> Organization is trying to be professional in every process. For instance there is a room assigned for visual and video production in order to use in promotion of the Dost Eli in their main building. Two people are working in this department and have equipments of cameras, editing machines, video lights.

big percentage of FBO also provide religious education, lecture, symposium etc. A head of the FBO rationalize such services as

We are trying to be so sensitive while struggling against poverty because this kind of services may damage morality of the society. When a man gets aid for the first time, he will find this odd and will disturb. However when this aid is repeated, he will get used to live with aid and earning bread by the sweat of his brow will be a tough issue for him. Laziness is a widespread problem that we have experienced. We were collecting job announcements from industrialists who help our FBO; however, in the near future we had to quit collecting for two reasons. Firstly it is quite hard to persuade someone to work, and secondly even someone start to work, he does not go on his job regularly. Those poor people, eventually, unskilled workers and will get paid 600-700 TL monthly at least. But they are so reluctant to work. At that point I see a morality problem. Nowadays people hope for help from TV shows, lotteries rather than themselves and God. At that point conferences and symposiums of our organization is vital; because if you look after the inner man of the poor by neglecting feeding his soul, than wildness start.

Besides “Laziness problem” has been told to me in two more FBOs in Konya, another head of an organization tells contents of seminars and rationalization of them as,

Opening a shelter house or soup kitchen is not a remedy, the remedy is educating people. For this reason we are trying to give seminars in different topics like hygiene education, home economics, and basic Islamic principles. We are arranging summer camps for children of the needy peoples. In this summer camps children has different activities including basic Islamic education. Accessing true Islamic education is a must for everyone. I could exemplify that from myself. Once upon a time, we were radicals. But now we are not. I guess main reason is related what we read. At that time we were reading translated books from Egypt and Iran. However now we have an understanding of Islam that is sui generis to Turkish people.

FBO provision with co-existence of religious and moral education is also stated in former studies about FBO field in Turkey (Göçmen 2010, p.202). However, in an environment where the alternative state mechanisms of support have been declining and FBOs becomes the only source of aid, this situation can have risky sides. This can create highly hierarchical relations of dependency between the beneficiaries and

the FBOs, which makes aid receivers more vulnerable. The needy may not reject the surveillance and moral education if the other solution is falling to a worse level of poverty. In the literature, the absence of social citizenship, welfare provision with charity is loaded with negative ideological terms such as “dependency culture” and “moral deprivation of aid receivers” (Gordon & Fraser, 1992, p.46). Some authors claim that non-means tested, universal welfare benefits create a “claiming class”, which has a “dependency culture” (Marsland, 1996, as cited in, Kiby & Kane, 2003, p.103). It is stated that “dependency culture” of aid receivers is also a product of their low moral standards, the solution is a combination of return to high moral standards of the poor and reduction in dependence of state welfare provision (Murrau, 1990, as cited in Kiby & Kane, 2003, p.106). At this point religious and moral education emerges as a solution to “low moral standards of the poor”.

Another problem is violation on basic human rights while delivering services. Field research in Konya shows that the surveillance mechanisms of FBOs particularly problematic. FBOs in Konya visit the home of applicant without appointment; also the worker of the organization is authorized to look different rooms of the house, to check the refrigerator or even to ask neighbors and retailers about the condition of applicant. Checking the bathroom, the sleeping room and the refrigerator are obvious examples of violation of private sphere of applicants. The means testing ways of FBOs make applicants open to stigmatization, and increase social control. In that sense there is a great power at the hands of the FBOs, and this power relation is an opportunity to set a hierarchical relationship between these organizations and aid receivers. Former researches (Aksular, 2008; Göçmen 2010) make a similar point in different field researches about violation of privacy of aid receiver by FBOs. In that sense it can be inferred that this situation can be common among FBOs.


On the other hand comprehensiveness of aid to whole needy is another problem. Gypsy people and sex workers are two vulnerable groups that I could identify.

Although it is strongly stressed that the organizations help the people needing a third person's help without taking their race, religion, language, sect, thought, or ideology into account, it is not always the case. Helping Gyps people is a contentious topic among FBOs in Konya. Some organizations are definitely refusing to help them, and the others are applying strict criteria to help them. When I ask the reason of resistance to help this people, organizations tell basically two reasons. One is exploitation of aid by Gyps people and the second is donors' objection on transmission of zakat to Gyps people. Sex workers have similar connotations with Gyps people. Only Sefkat Der helps them and the organization, as mentioned in former pages, have severe difficulties to provide such services. As mentioned by head of Sefkat Der in former chapters, "Moderate Muslims are so conservative with customary social aid types. For instance building mosques, schools, fountains are so familiar for a Muslim; however, building a shelter or honoring to a shelter is quite far to a moderate Muslim in our daily life."

### **3.5.3 Professionalism**

Unprofessionalism of FBOs can be traced on human resources of the FBOs, decision making structures of FBOs, and transmission of services by FBOs.

**Table 8 - Human resources of FBOs in Konya**



Human resources of FBOs are figured out in the former table. According to this table, only two organizations can employ more than one professional (paid) worker. Seven organizations employ no professional worker and administrate themselves with volunteers. Professions of people who are founders or workers of FBOs in Konya have a broad range like civil servant, merchant, religious education teacher, building contractor, industrialist etc. Except Dost Eli<sup>29</sup>, FBOs' human resource is so weak in Konya. There were absolutely no people who had specialized on social services. At that point it is essential to question human resource of FBOs because providing such services to needy people is a quite backbreaking and stressful job. As I witnessed several times, forming contact with needy people can turn to psychological warfare suddenly. So people can become aggressive easily. Although they have no concrete solution, like hiring social services specialists, Dost Eli is the only organization has identified a "human resource problem". As a solution to this problem they have determined education criteria for their personnel; manager of a department should be at least university graduate and other workers should be at least high school degree. They are the only organization that has a separate department for human resource management.

<sup>29</sup> This is the only organization that has ISO 9001 certificate in Konya

Weakness in human resources severely affects decision making structures of FBOs. In that manner decision making structure of FBOs is another pitfall for professionalism. It can be claimed that each FBO has an authoritarian establishment under a powerful leader<sup>30</sup>. Under this leader there are volunteer workers but not professional ones. Such a management type cause “one man organizations” and this is quite problematic while introducing new services and making decisions about applicants. As admitted by the Latif Selvi in next pages, FBOs provide services so similar to each other due to lack of research and development departments. In other words FBOs simply copy each other’s services and behaviors. On the other hand making decisions about applicants is also processing in an unprofessional way. Such FBO mechanisms that have negative consequences for aid receivers are lack of objective criteria in making decisions about applicants. Each evolution team of FBO consists of ordinary men and their decision could be subjective easily. Similarly Göçmen (2010, p. 199) states that, “a closer look into decision-making mechanisms and the practices of provision reveals the lack of objective eligibility criteria, although there are some codes of conduct defining how all of these steps should be taken, in most of the associations, personal judgments and lack of transparency seem to be the rule”.

It cannot be claimed that FBO side is unaware about their unprofessional operation mechanism. However they differ about evaluation and remedy of this problem. For instance “Help of *Allah*” was solution of a manager as mentioned in “Religion and FBOs heading”. At that point Sefkat Der claims that “empathizing needy people is the most important thing while transmitting social aid”. In this manner Bulan, head of the Sefkat Der, questions sincerity and competency of FBOs and local administrations in social aid,

Local administrations and FBOs do not empathize needy people. They are not providing aid to the one who get aid from another organization. But they never think that how a family makes its living with just an aid.

---

<sup>30</sup> For similar foundings (Akşit, Serdar, & Tabakoğlu, 2005, p. 678).

Municipalities advertise their aids and exaggerate them. Opponents of political parties, who are municipalities have been supporter, critique social aids irresponsibly and undermines contemporary aids. Forlorn people suffer twice from this situation; not only they can get necessary aids but also they are offending by exposing several times in media. In my opinion in order to see real effects of poverty, one should check number of homes that are cut off electricity and water. If a house does not have electricity and water that means that it is in the line of absolute poverty. If a house does not have electricity and water, what can they do with food packages? Poverty is the most important reason for termination of families.

Besides Sefkat Der, Latif Selvi, head of the platform, mentions that “being unprofessional is the essential problem for us” and adds,

Deprivation of academic knowledge is our most important challenge at that moment. Still we are doing, whatever we do, in an unprofessional way. Most of the time we start to provide a service if it crosses our mind or if we see it somewhere else; whereas, discovering world twice is ridiculous. In that manner I extensively stress on people who can guide us, may be university’s academic personnel.



## CHAPTER 4

### CONCLUSION

*Tea ended, and I saw the tramps looking furtively at one another. An unspoken thought was running from man to man—could we possibly make off before the prayers started? Someone stirred in his chair—not getting up actually, but with just a glance at the door, as though half suggesting the idea of departure. The lady quelled him with one look. She said in a more benign tone than ever: ‘I don’t think you need go QUITE yet. The casual ward doesn’t open till six, and we have time to kneel down and say a few words to our Father first. I think we should all feel better after that, shouldn’t we?’*  
**George Orwell, *Down and Out in Paris and London***

During this study, I have look FBO phenomena in terms of changing state-religion relations in Turkey; I have chosen Konya due to its special position in history of contemporary Islamism. Most of the former studies (Acar, 2009; Aksular, 2008, Karatepe, 2011) have focused on changing state-society relations (rise of neoliberal policy environment, retrenchment of welfare state, decline of social citizenship) and organizational structure of FBOs. So I thought that there is a lack of debate on the Islamist roots of welfare provision and constructed my argument from this vein. I agree that the rise of FBOs in Turkey has much to do with the rise of neoliberal policy environment, or retrenchment of welfare state debates; however in explaining the inception and the proliferation of FBOs in Konya, the Islamist ideology and changing state-religion relations must also be referred. Otherwise the analysis would be incomplete.

Former chapters are all for this study to tell about Islamist FBOs, generally founded in 90s, in Konya. It is intended to build a debate that Islamist FBOs are fertilized on the ground of newly identified state religion relationships after 80s in Turkey. This

situation is also parallel to global political and economic changes. It is apparent that those organizations and their platform are the rare examples of Islamist welfare provision in Turkey.

Although their originality, budget size and plenty of beneficiaries; FBOs in Konya have severe problems in terms of financial accountability, qualification and professionalism. Those problems are also important because of identified by mostly FBO workers or founders. In other words, most of the founders and workers of the FBO's also identify those features of local FBOs and see them as a problem. This may show problem's obvious character. On the other hand state incentives are vital for those organizations. Although it is impossible to proof size statistically, tax allowances for donations may be boosted financial sources of those organizations. While state incentives to FBO area continue, it is not far to think that such organizations will go on its facilities. However lack of state incentive may endanger their presence. Weak financial structures of those FBOs are their Achilles hill. An organization that directly distribute whole of its donations will suffer when donations are cut off. In case of a donation problem FBOs may not live even at basic level.

Like mentioned in (Şen, 2007) social welfare based on identity is a tough job. Because standardization of aid and ensuring its comprehensiveness are two related problem for identity based welfare provision. As mentioned by an interviewee

FBOs in social aid area have founded in a condition of competition. Once upon a time each Islamic group was trying to have a radio station, similarly now each group is trying to have a FBO in social aid area.

Unprofessionalism among FBOs<sup>31</sup> can be read together with former paragraph. Without rationality of combating poverty and with a sense of competition among

---

<sup>31</sup> Of course there are FBOs that try to implement professional policies in each steps of aid; like Dost Eli.

Islamic groups to form a social aid provider unit, those FBOs may not carry their services beyond that, except single examples. At least it can be concluded that idealizing Islamist FBOs in Konya and the platform as a substitute of a welfare state is quite hard.

Although data related with gender issue has gathered and analyzed during study, due to study's scope, this topic could not find a separate heading in this study. Family conferences of FBOs and their family ideal, complete men administrative members of organizations, unskilled women workers of FBOs, consisting of poor evaluation team from men instead of women may be some problematic for further researches.

Furthermore comparison of secular NGOs with Islamist FBOs may be topic for further researches. Although it is out of scope in my research, my field research experience<sup>32</sup> showed that secular NGOs<sup>33</sup> may provide more focused services in terms of qualification, they<sup>34</sup> can have more reliable financial management in terms of permanency, and they can have more qualified human resources<sup>35</sup> in terms of professionalism.

Last but not least, it should be mentioned that

Interviews as a source of knowledge limit itself in discourse. Although

---

<sup>32</sup> I have worked as a researcher for one year in FACIT Project ([www.facit.be](http://www.facit.be)). During that year, I made fifty in-depth interviews with different secular NGOs and different FBOs in İstanbul, Eskişehir, Ankara and Konya.

<sup>33</sup> Educational Volunteers of Turkey (TEGV) may be the case for this situation. They provide services only for "supporting the primary education provided by the government".

<sup>34</sup> Turkey Education Association (TEV) may be the case for this situation. Although the organization is based on mainly personal donations like Islamist FBOs, they have finance department and manage their money reasonably.

<sup>35</sup> Association for the Support of Modern Life (CYDD) may be example of this situation. They have a good structure to organize university students who study in education faculties.

respondents are helpful, open and honest; what emerging here is just their stories which reflect their images. What about rest of the picture? (Özdalga, 2006, p.134)

After Deniz Feneri Association case in courts, there is a public debate that question sincerity of the organization. Probably the debate will not last in the short term after the decision of the court, due to huge information pollution about corruption of the first Islamist FBO. This situation give raise the question of “even respondents are helpful, open and honest; may intricate relationships among different agents prevent to know much about FBOs in Konya?”

## REFERENCES

- Açar, O. (2009). *A Critique of Liberal-Conservative Approach to Poverty in Turkey: The Cases of Deniz Feneri Association and Social Assistance and Solidarity General Directorate.* (Master's Thesis). Middle East Technical University, Ankara.
- Adaş, E. B. (2003). *Profit and the Prophet: Culture and Politics of Islamic Entrepreneurs in Turkey.* (Doctoral Dissertation) Urbana, Illinois
- Aksular, A. D. (2008). *Faith Based Organizations in The Struggle Against Poverty Deniz Feneri Welfare and Solidarity Association Sample of Ankara Branch.* (Master's Thesis). Middle East Technical University, Ankara.
- Akşit, B., Serdar, A., & Tabakoğlu, B. (2005). İslami Eğilimli Sivil Toplum Kuruluşları. In Y. Aktay, *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce: İslamcılık* (pp. 664-681). İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları.
- Bush, G. W. (2002). *Remarks on the Welfare Agenda*, 295-329. Washington, DC: Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents.
- Clarke, G. (2008). Faith Based Organizations and International Development: An overview. In G. Clarke, & M. Jennings, *Development, Civil Society and Faith Based Organizations* (pp. 17-45). New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Çamur, Aysel. (2004). *Charity programmes: representation of poverty in Turkish television* (Master's Thesis). Middle East Technical University, Ankara.
- Çakır, R. (2005). Milli Görüş Hareketi. In E. Y. Aktay, *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce: İslamcılık* (pp. 544-575). İstanbul: İletişim.
- Çakır, R., & Bozan, İ. (2005). *Sivil, Şeffaf ve Demokratik bir Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı Mümkün mü?* İstanbul: TESEV Yayınları.
- Casanova, J. (2011, October 18). Secularism and Its Discontents. (E. Andrew-Gee, Interviewer)

- Çetinsaya, G. (1999, July-October). Rethinking nationalism and Islam some preliminary notes on sources of turkish islamic synthesis. *The Muslim World*, 350-376.
- Çiçekli, M. (2007). *Konya Bir Şehrin İki Hikayesi*. Ankara: Dipnot Yayınları.
- Clarke, G. (2008). Faith Basaed Organizations and International Development: An overview. In G. Clarke, & M. Jennings, *Development, Civil Society and Faith Based Organizations* (pp. 17-46). New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Dinham, A. (2009). *Faiths, Public Policy and Civil Society: Problems, Policies, Controversies*. New York : Palgrave Macmillan.
- Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı. (2010). *Faliyet Raporu 2010*. Ankara: Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı Strateji Geliştirme Başkanlığı.
- Dumlu, E. (2010). İslm'in ilk dönemlerindeki Uygulamalar Ekseninde Kamusal Bir Gelir Olarak Zekât. *Atatürk Üniversitesi İlahiyat Fakültesi Dergisi*, 91-116.
- Dwyer, P. (2004). *Understanding Social Citizenship*. Bristol: The policy Press.
- Eligür, B. (2010). *The Mobilization of political Islam in Turkey*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Erkilet, A. (2005). 1990"larda Türkiye'de Radikal İslamcılık. In Y. Aktay, *Moder Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce: İslamcılık* (Vol. VI, pp. 682-697). İstanbul: İletişim.
- Faith Based Organizations and Exclusion in the European City (FACIT) European Union Seventh Framework Program Collaborative Project Proposal (2007)
- Fethullah Gülen Sitesi. (2009, October 2). *Merhum Bekir Berk*. Retrieved January 2012, from Fethullah Gülen: <http://tr.fgulen.com/content/view/15726/13/>

- Gordon, L. & Fraser, N. (1992). Contract vs. Charity: Why is there no Social Citizenship in the United States. *Socialist Review*, 22,45-68.
- Göçmen, Y. İ. (2010). *The Politics of Religiously Motivated Welfare Provision*. (Doctoral Dissertation). Universität zu Köln, Köln.
- Gözyayın, İ. (2009). *Diyanet: Türkiye Cumhuriyet'inde Dinin Tanzimi*. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları.
- Gülalp, H. (2001, August). Globalization and Political Islam: The Social Bases of Turkey's Welfare Party. *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 33(3), 433-448.
- İLKADIM DERGİSİ. (2011, 01 01). *Latif Selvi ile Mülakat*. Retrieved April 1, 2012, from Enderun Eğitim Vakfı: <http://www.enderunegitimvakfi.org/makaleler/latif-selvi-ile-mulakat>
- ISMMMO. (2009). *Sosyalleşemeyen Yardımlar*. İstanbul: İstanbul Serbet Muhasebeciler Mali Müşavirler Odası.
- Karatepe, U. (2011). Sermaye Egemenliğinin İzdüşümü Olarak Dinsel Hayırseverlik. In Y. Bürkev, M. Özüğurlu, Y. Özdek, and E. V. Ergül (Eds.), *Kuramsal ve Tarihsel Boyutlarıyla Hak Mücadeleleri 1*. (207-239). Ankara: Nota Bene Yayınları.
- Lewis, B. (1968). *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*. London: Oxford University Press.
- Mardin, Ş. (1998). *Türkiye'de Din ve Siyaset*. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları.
- Mardin, Ş. (2005). Turkish Islamic Exceptionalism Yesterday and Today: Continuity, Rupture and Reconstruction in Operational Codes. *Turkish Studies*, 6(2), 145-165.
- Mardin, Ş. (2007). *Türkiye'de Din ve Siyaset: Makaleler 3*. İstanbul: İletişim.

- Margulies, R., & Ergin, Y. (1997). The Resurgence of Islam and the Welfare. In J. B. Edited, *Political Islam: Essays from Middle East Report* (pp. 144-153). Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Milli Gazete. (2002, 1 1). *Kurumsal: Milli Gazete*. Retrieved from Milli Gazete: <http://www.milligazete.com.tr/kurumsal>
- Narlı, N. (1999, September). The Rise of the Islamist Movement in Turkey. *Middle East Review of International Affairs*, III(3), 38-48.
- Özakıncı, C. (2007). *İblisin Kiblesi*. İstanbul: Otopsi Yayınları.
- Özdalga, E. (2006). *İslâmcılığın Türkiye Seyri: Sosyolojik Bir Perspektif*. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları.
- Poulton, H. (1997). *Top Hat, Grey Wolf and Crescent: Turkish Nationalism and Turkish Republic*. New York: New York University Press.
- Prochaska, F. (2002). *Schools of Citizenship: Charity and Civic Virtue*. Wiltshire: The Cromwell Press.
- Rabasa, A., & Larrabee, S. F. (2008). *The Rise of Political Islam in Turkey*. Santa Monica: RAND Corporation.
- Sarı, Ö. (2010). *Tourism as a Tool for Development: The Case of Mawlana Tourism in Konya*. (Doctoral Dissertation). Middle East Technical University, Ankara.
- Şen, M. (2007). Kökene Dayalı Yardımlaşma: "Zor İş". In Kollektif, *Yoksulluk Halleri Türkiye'de Kent Yoksulluğunun Toplumsal Görünümleri* (pp. 249-293). İstanbul: İletişim.
- Şen, M. (2010). Transformation of Turkish Islamism and the Rise of the Justice and Development Party. *Turkish Studies*, 11(1), 59-84.
- Şerif, M. (1993). *Din ve İdeoloji: Bütün Eserleri 2*. İstanbul: İletişim.



- Toprak, B. (1981). *Islam and Political Development in Turkey*. Leiden, The Netherlands: E. J. Brill.
- Toprak, B. (1990). Religion as a State Ideology in a Secular Setting: Turkish Islamic Synthesis. in Malcom Waqstaff (ed) *Aspects of Religion in Secular Turkey*, Occasional Paper No.40. University of Durham, Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies
- Tuğal, C. (2009). *Passive Revolution Absorbing the Islamic Challenge to Capitalism*. Stanford, California : Stanford University Press .
- Tuğal, C. (2011). *Pasif Devrim, İslami Muhalefetin Düzenle Bütünleşmesi*. (F. B. Aydar, Trans.) İstanbul: Koç Üniversitesi Yayınları.
- Tunaya, T. Z. (2007). *İslâmcılık Akımı*. İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları.
- Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı (Ed.). (2009). Sadaka. In *İslam Ansiklopedisi* (Vol. 35). İstanbul: Türk Diyanet Vakfı Yayın Matbacılık A.Ş.
- Yalçın, S. (1995). *Hangi Erbakan*. Ankara: Öteki Yayınevi.
- Yavuz, H. (2003). *Islamic Political Identity in Turkey*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Yücekök, A. (1971). *Türkiye'de Örgütlenmiş Dinin Sosyoekonomik Tabanı*. Ankara: Sevinç Matbaası.
- Zürcher, E. J. (2004). *Turkey: A Modern History*. New York: I.B.Tauris & Co Ltd.

## APPENDICIES

### Appendix A. Interview Questions

#### About Organization

- When did the organization establish?
- Who are the founders?
- What are the basic areas that the organization work, and why?
- Who are the workers of the organization? How many of them paid (professional) and how many of them are unpaid (volunteer)?
- What is the number of beneficiaries last year, and is there any change yearly?
- What are the main components of the budget of the organization?
- How do the organization transmits the aid?
- How do you define three main aims of the organization?
- How do you evaluate applicants?

#### Religious Dimension

- How do you define the identity of the organization in terms religion?
- Is there a criteria of religion when recruitment period for the organization?
- Does your services have religious dimensions?
- Do you have relationships with Islamic brotherhoods?

#### Relationship Network

- How do you define the organization's relationships with other Islamist FBOs in Konya?
- How do you define the organization's relationships with secular FBOs in Konya?

- How do you define the organization's relationships with local state institutions in Konya?
- How do you define the organization's relationships with state?
- How do you define the organization's relationships with international bodies and civil society?

## **Appendix B. List of the member organizations of the Platform in Konya**

1. Adaleti Savunanlar Derneđi (ASDER)
2. Ahlak Kùltür ve Çevre Derneđi (AKÇED)
3. Aile Dernekleri Federasyonu
4. Aileyi Destekleme Derneđi
5. Anadolu Aile Derneđi
6. Anadolu Gençlik Derneđi
7. Anadolu İnsani Yardım Derneđi
8. Altınbaşak Derneđi
9. Askon Konya Şubesi
10. Aydınlar Ocađı Konya Şb.
11. BEMDER
12. Betül Hanımlar Derneđi
13. Beyaz Lale Derneđi
14. Beyhekim Sağlık Derneđi
15. Bilgi İletişim Kùltür Araştırma Derneđi (BİLKAD)
16. Bozkırlılar İlim Kùltür Eğt. Vakfı
17. Büyük Anadolu Vakfı
18. Büyük Selçuklu Vakfı
19. ÇABASED
20. Cansuyu Derneđi
21. Çağdaş Aile Derneđi
22. Çıdam Derneđi
23. Çınar Derneđi
24. Demokrat Hanımlar Derneđi
25. Din Görevlileri Derneđi K. Şb.
26. Din Görevlileri Vakfı
27. Eğisteliler Eğit. Yard. Derneđi
28. Eğitim Bir Sen Konya Şubesi
29. Eğitim ve Dayanışma Vakfı (EDAV)
30. Ekonomik ve Sos. Arş. Derneđi
31. Ender Gençlik Derneđi
32. Enderun Vakfı K. Şb.
33. Enderunder
34. Ensar Vakfı K. Şb.
35. Erdemli Gençlik Derneđi
36. ESADER
37. Esnaf ve Sanatkarlar Derneđi
38. Fatih Kùltür ve Eğitim Vakfı
39. Gençleri Evlendirme ve Mehîr Vakfı
40. Gülistan Eğitim Derneđi
41. Halk Eğitim Dayanışma Derneđi (HEDADER)
42. Hayır Kapısı Muhtaçlara Yardım Derneđi
43. Hayra Hizmet Vakfı
44. Hizmet İş Sendikası Konya Şubesi
45. Hukuki Araştırmalar Derneđi K. Şb. (HUDER)

46. Huzur Derneđi
47. İHH Konya Őubesi
48. İHL Okul Aile Birlikleri
49. İlim Yayma Cemiyeti K. Őb.
50. İnsan Hakları ve Mazl. İin Dyn. Derneđi (MAZLUMDER)
51. İnsan Hakları ve Özg. Derneđi
52. İnsani YaŐam Derneđi
53. İrfan Eđit. Yard. Ve Dostluk Derneđi ( İRFANDER)
54. İrŐad ve DayanıŐma Vakfı
55. İsmail Helvacıođlu Vakfı
56. İsmail Kaya Vakfı
57. Kandil Derneđi
58. Kayasu Eđitim Derneđi
59. Kimsesizleri Barındırma Vakfı (KİMSEV)
60. Konevi İlim Kùltùr Vakfı
61. Konya İme Suları Vakfı
62. Memursen Konya İl Temsilciliđi
63. Mevlana Uluslararası Öđrenci Derneđi
64. Muhabbet Hareket İhsan ve Temizlik Derneđi (MUHİT)
65. Mùmeyyiz Arif Efendi Vakfı
66. Mùst. San. Ve İŐ Adm. Derneđi (MÜSİAD)
67. Ravza Eđitim Vakfı
68. Rıza Konevi Vakfı
69. Ribat Eđitim Vakfı
70. Ribat İnsani Yardım Derneđi
71. Saadet Vakfı
72. Safa Vakfı Konya Temsilciliđi
73. Seluklu Genlik Eđitim Derneđi (SEGEDER)
74. Selimiye Vakfı
75. Sevgi Pınarı Derneđi
76. Sosyal AraŐtırma ve DayanıŐma Vakfı (SADAV)
77. Süreyya Yıldızı Derneđi
78. Őems İlim AraŐtırmalar Vakfı
79. Őemsi Tebrizi Derneđi
80. Őefkat Vakfı
81. Őuurlu Öđretmenler Derneđi
82. Tarih Edebiyat Kùltùr Sanat Derneđi (TEKSAD)
83. Teknik Elemanlar Derneđi (TEKDER)
84. Türk Anadolu Vakfı
85. Türk Kùtùphaneciler Derneđi Konya Őubesi
86. Türkiye İmam Hatipliler Vakfı (TİMAV)
87. Türkiye Yazarlar Birliđi K. Őb.
88. Ulemazade Mehmet Olcay Vakfı
89. Vahdet Vakfı K. Temsilciliđi
90. Verenel Derneđi
91. Yakup İnan Vakfı
92. Yeni Asya Vakfı K. Őb.

## 93. Yıldız Hanımlar Derneđi

## Appendix C. Tez Fotokopisi İzin Formu



### TEZ FOTOKOPI İZİN FORMU

#### ENSTİTÜ

Fen Bilimleri Enstitüsü	<input type="checkbox"/>
Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü	<input data-bbox="884 869 956 913" type="checkbox" value="+"/>
Uygulamalı Matematik Enstitüsü	<input type="checkbox"/>
Enformatik Enstitüsü	<input type="checkbox"/>
Deniz Bilimleri Enstitüsü	<input type="checkbox"/>

#### YAZARIN

Soyadı : AKSÜRMEİİ.....  
Adı : MEHMET.....  
Bölümü : SOSYOLOJİ.....

TEZİN ADI (İngilizce) : FAITH BASED WELFARE PROVISION IN KONYA.....

TEZİN TÜRÜ : Yüksek Lisans  Doktora

1. Tezimin tamamı dünya çapında erişime açılsın ve kaynak gösterilmek şartıyla tezimin bir kısmı veya tamamının fotokopisi alınsın.
2. Tezimin tamamı yalnızca Orta Doğu Teknik Üniversitesi kullanıcılarının erişimine açılsın. (Bu seçenekle tezinizin fotokopisi ya da elektronik kopyası Kütüphane aracılığı ile ODTÜ dışına dağıtılmayacaktır.)

3. Tezim bir (1) yıl süreyle erişime kapalı olsun. (Bu seçenekle tezinizin fotokopisi ya da elektronik kopyası Kütüphane aracılığı ile ODTÜ dışına dağıtılmayacaktır.)



Yazarın imzası .....

Tarih .....28.09.12.....