

PARTICIPATION TO ADMINISTRATION IN CAPITALIST SOCIETY:
THEORETICAL AND POLITICAL LIMITATIONS OF THE 'CRITICAL'
AND 'RADICAL' ADMINISTRATIVE THEORIES

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ABSTRACT

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This thesis aims at critically examining the specific place of the “critical” and “radical” theories within both the theory of public administration and political theory, particularly in terms of the discursive participatory framework they offer. The fundamental question dealt with is whether or not the power and dependence analyses of these approaches (which are treated as ‘marginal’ in the field) is convincing for an egalitarian, comprehensive and socially transformative democratic governance. Since a discussion of this sort essentially problematizes the reduction of political equality to a proceduralist and abstract philosophical equality, not to commit a similar fallacy of “apriorism”, the study incorporates the observations on LA-21 Turkey processes as a local governance program, in terms of a concrete contribution to theoretical discussion. In the light of direct observations, interviews and data obtained from secondary resources regarding the participatory practices, the level of organization and current capacity of political representation are inferred to be also decisive on the capacity to participate, owing this decisiveness substantially to the economic and social resources in the real social formation, hence the conditions of production of local knowledge are consequently identified as far from reflecting a democratic

environment purified from power relations. Highlighting the risk for the notion of self-governance to gain a hegemonic functionality for bourgeoisie democracy concealing and perpetuating social inequalities, the thesis argues for shifting the inquire for the dominant class, from solely political-administrative sphere to civil society, and the maintainable and reproductive conditions and mechanisms of dominance between these two spheres.

Keywords: Critical Theory, Discursive Democracy, Local Governance, Proceduralism, Dominance and Subordination

ÖZ

KAPİTALİST TOPLUMDA YÖNETİME KATILIM: ‘ELEŞTİREL’ VE ‘RADİKAL’ YÖNETİM KURAMLARININ KURAMSAL VE SİYASAL SINIRLILIKLARI

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Bu tez, “eleştirel” ve “radikal” yönetim kuramlarının kamu yönetimi ve siyasal kuram içindeki özgün konumlarını, önerdikleri söylemsel katılım çerçevesi içerisinde eleştirel olarak incelemeyi amaçlamaktadır. Bu paydada ilgilenilen temel sorun, disiplin içerisinde ana akım dışı bilinen bu yaklaşımların ortaya koyduğu güç ve tabiiyet analizlerinin eşitlikçi, kapsayıcı ve toplumsal anlamda dönüştürücü bir demokratik yönetim için gerçekten yeterli olup olmadığıdır. Bu tip bir tartışma siyasal eşitliğin “usulcü” ve soyut bir felsefik eşitliğe indirgenmesini sorunsallaştırdığından, benzer bir “apriorizm”den kaçınmak adına, bir yerel yönetim programı olarak Türkiye YG-21 süreçleri gözlenerek kuramsal tartışmaya somut katkı olarak dâhil edilmiştir. Katılımcı uygulamalara dair birincil gözlem, mülakat ve ikincil kaynaklardan elde edilen veriler doğrultusunda örgütlülük ve mevcut siyasal temsiliyet kapasitesi ile katılım ilişkisinde birinci unsurların belirleyici olduğu, bu belirlenimin büyük ölçüde gerçek toplumsal bütünlükteki ekonomik ve sosyal kaynaklardan miras alındığı, sonuç olarak yerel bilginin üretim koşullarının kuramsal varsayımların aksine güçten arınmış bir demokratik doğayı yansıtmadığı tespit edilmiştir. Öz-yönetim nosyonunun,

burjuva demokrasisi adına toplumsal eşitsizlikleri gizleyen ve sürekli kılan bir hegemonik işlevselliğe indirgenmesi tehlikesine karşı, eleştirel ve radikal bir yönetim kuramının hâkim sınıf arayışının, salt siyasal-yönetmel alandan, sivil toplum, ve bu iki alana özgü tahakkümün süreklilik ve birbirini üretme koşul ve mekanizmalarına yönelmesi gerektiği savunulmaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Eleştirel Kuram, Söylemsel Demokrasi, Yerel Yönetişim, Usulcölük, Tahakküm ve Tabiiyet

to the beautiful memory of my grandmothers

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Common arguments defending that it is through the active citizen involvement, autonomous civil society, free and plural public sphere that modern administration would overcome the legitimacy crisis which has been confronted by liberal democracy following the gradual decline of Welfare State dominance, render a twofold critical movement in the theory of public administration. Both fundamental tendencies in this theoretical movement proceed hand in hand with their counterparts within political science, as all of the relevant discussions tend to flourish around the proposal of a discursive or radical democracy which is set to reformulate the framework of administrative legitimacy associated with political liberalism. What makes them seem to rely on two distinct grounds basically have its roots within the methodological and epistemological backdrops which they broadly draw upon: Critical and postmodern social theories.

However, the term 'critical' does not only refer to the movement drawing from the school of thought identified with [C]ritical Theory, since once the questions on the source of administrative legitimacy are concerned, what comes into prominence is rather the critical congruity of the prescriptive framework of both approaches. For both accounts, indeed, it is common that democratic legitimacy can be ensured only by extending the processes of democratic public discourse into public sphere. Hence, what has been offered is a new conception of public sphere that is developed by the idea of plural/dialogical discourse which is to empower civic action towards democratization of policy making processes. Such democratization for sure brings into the light a principal tension between the notions 'participation' and 'representation' relying on a critical argument that the conventional mechanisms of representative democracy which deal with the legitimacy problem at 'macro/central' level were no longer providing an adequate

condition to convince that administrative policies rely on public consent. That means, legitimacy-ensuring consent could only be realized by direct participation of citizens at 'micro/local' level who were to be affected by those decisions upon public policies.

Consequently, the principles of participation and representation which were used to be organically identical components within the context of modern administration, have now began to address two different courses on behalf of either radical or traditional account of democracy in the era of post-Welfare State in which the 'ballot box' and the 'right to vote' fall short to solve the problem of legitimacy. Over and above, the degree of such tension is stepped up in favour of direct participation insomuch that the form of political participation offered by classical pluralist approach in which central bureaucracy is to be influenced by interest groups in a competitive political atmosphere does not seem to be persuasive, since it meant, in the last instance, to recognize dominant political administration as maintaining the central authority for making the final decision. Equally significant is that basing administrative legitimacy upon public discourse is not the ultimate end of participatory action, but a reflexive transformation of social reality is subsequently yearned for by counterbalancing the oppression exercised by the one-dimensional reason of administrative bureaucracy.¹ Deconcentration of power and neutralization of hierarchical relations between the state/bureaucracy and citizens are indispensable components of such transformation.

However, what is fundamentally at stake in this framework is the taken-for-granted identification of public discourse and democratic legitimacy. There is much implication in such identification that public discourse is dealt with as the

¹ Richard Box, *Critical Social Theory in Public Administration*, Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 2005. David J. Farmer, *The Language of Public Administration: Bureaucracy, Modernity and Postmodernity*, The University of Alabama Press, 1995. O.C. McSwite, *Legitimacy in Public Administration: A Discourse Analysis*, Thousand Oaks: SAGE Publications, 1997. Charles J. Fox and Hugh T. Miller, *Postmodern public administration: toward discourse*, Thousand Oaks, California: Sage Publications, 1996.

unique means of political activity apart from the formal mechanisms of representation. To put it differently, the treatment of the practice of participation implies a ‘value/goal in itself’ framework of democratic legitimacy which leads to carry the risk of formalization, and even reification of the discourse² overlooking the significance of transforming the struggles, resistances and will formations that have been formed within the symbolic ground of discourse into the concrete domains of collective political activity³. Accordingly, basing its power and dependency analysis solely upon the ideal conditions/warrants of public speech, such identification pays scant attention to the internal conditions of discourse formation and production of local knowledge. In both case, the autonomy of the discourse is intended to be preserved by problematically drawing the ‘appropriate’ lines between the state and civil society by calling for the empowerment of civil society so that the oppression by the state and bureaucracy can be opposed through the proper representation of diverse interests in public discourse.

What this thesis seeks to understand is then the bases and limitations of the framework of a radical or discursive democracy offered by an academic movement classified as “critical” in the literature of public administration. The interpretative textual method followed herein requires such inquiry to be focused rather upon the own theoretical premises, postulates and promises of such framework itself. What is substantially problematized is therefore the peculiar view that democratic legitimacy of the decision-making processes of modern administration in a pluralist, or postmodern condition can be ensured to the extent that these processes are set within and spread out from a civil social sphere conceived as both politically and institutionally autonomous of the state and economy. While the framework of public participation is formulated based on the core of such view, social agency of democratic transformation is recognized

² Lisa A. Zanetti, “Advancing Praxis: Connecting Critical Theory with Practice in Public Administration”, *The American Review of Public Administration*, Vol. 27 No. 2, 1997, pp. 157-159.

³ Ülkü Doğanay, *Demokratik Usuller Üzerine Yeniden Düşünmek*, İmge, 2003, p. 310.

within the procedures of public discourse expanding out particularly from the local scale. Moving from this point, questions in a range of variety are concerned relevant: How can participation as a value/goal in itself succeed the decentralization and deconcentration of power needed by administrative legitimacy? Is it possible to conceive of the local scale as a separate realm from the state, in line with the principal identification of democracy with the 'retreat' from the state? How can state as a social relation be alienated from both configuration and practice of local governance? Can the political formation be exempted from the force of objective conditions? How can subjective force of discourse tackle the objective relations of power? Can all the practical forms of dominance, exclusion and inequality in discourse setting ever be convenient to supervise? Is it really possible to reach an 'ideal' condition of will formation which is immune from any 'distortion' that would leave the comprehensiveness of public discourse in question? Does a kind of 'proceduralism' which searches for legitimacy only within the process itself generate a legitimacy problem on its own? Is there no room for doubt for participatory governance to acquire hegemonic functionality within liberal democracy?

It is fair to suggest that for the theoretical movements in discussion which are alleged to have socially transformative capacity, significance of drawing attention to the problematiques generated by the confrontation with those questions lies on a politically responsible, rigorous and careful opposition to the potential abandonment of public participation to illusionary administrative patterns of liberal democracy. It is noteworthy that the subject of the major investigation here is in fact the theory texts associated with the implementation of critical theory in public administration, however the attempts of adapting the postmodern theory will be articulated to the analysis over the severe commonalities of both in the 'critical' formulation of democratic legitimacy, subsequently by asking to what extent they could stand as critical and radical mediums for the democratic transformation needed for a legitimate self-governance. In that respect, given the methodological and epistemological

differences of the backdrops they intend to be built on, the accounts are referred in the thesis as ‘critical’, ‘communicative’, ‘deliberative’ or ‘discourse-based critical’ theory for the former, whereas ‘postmodern’, ‘radical’ or ‘radical discourse’ theory for the latter in an interchangeable manner.

Discussions on the theoretical transposition of the approaches will be made rather in the first and last chapters of the three chapters in which the thesis is organized apart from the introductory and concluding chapters. Chapter 2 will try to elaborate on the historical survey of critical theory in public administration along with the epistemological and philosophical foundations of critical theory. Theoretical attempt to conform critical theory into the field will be substantially differentiated from two ‘critical’ challenges (namely, New Public Management and Management Schools) on both philosophical and ideological ground. Referring to its philosophical and epistemological foundation, critical theory will be potentially differentiated also from other society-centred approaches revolving around pluralism, and, needless to say, from Weberian approaches. As such, the pathway followed herein refers to an attempt of affirmative specification of critical theory by speaking from and within the language immanent in it. Such specification is believed to justify the subject and purpose of this study as it will reveal that critical theory comprises of the theory works that are known as the most radical challenge which still remains marginal in the field even in its current position.⁴ It should be also noted that critical administrative theory draws from the communicative split in the school of thought known as Frankfurt School, so that it bases its prescriptive approach on a communication or discourse-based framework of social action and ethics, whereas epistemological origins of critical theory still remains at play in their critique of the existing social structure. At the end of the chapter there will be a debate on postmodern public administration theory which will argue for the failure of the approach to sidestep from the modernist groundwork in some ways. This is believed to help as a preliminary effort to locate the two approaches in one context over their problematic aspects thereafter.

⁴ Richard Box, 2005, p. 14. Lisa A. Zanetti, 1997, p. 148.

This context basically addresses the common implicit embracement of social inequalities simply as the components of social diversity that is to form what is conceptualized as public energy field⁵. Such embracement proceeds in line with the reduction of the capitalist system to one of the plural spheres specific to (post)modern society, turning out the negligence of critiquing the political economy of the state, local government and commodification of social life while framing public participation in a setting of local governance. Consequently, the backbone of the model of local governance implied in this very context is provided Chapter 2, in terms of its pure conceptual postulates.

The third chapter will be employed to escape a possible aprioristic standpoint while evaluating the concerned approaches mostly over their 'too' philosophical and abstractionist attributions to the political omnipotence of the discourse. For such purpose, an examination of practical implementation of participatory governance was substantially needed, therefore the action plan of Agenda 21 and its practices through city councils carried out as a part of the program of Local Agenda 21 were regarded worth considering as they once provide the participatory networks of governance globally experienced on local scales, relevancy (with the theoretical framework) of which will be tried to be justified in the first section of the chapter. Therefore, participatory governance within the context of Agenda 21 and Local Agenda 21 will be evaluated on two grounds: First is as comprehended in the official documents and texts associated with the program. And second is as reflected on concrete practices, which would open a path to the second and third sections of the chapter.

In these second and third sections, the case of Turkey (whose overall rating is among the top experiences) in Local Agenda processes will be focused on in terms of the relations of power within the procedures and operation of public discourse. The method to be applied here basically relies on the analysis of relevant speech acts gathered from the meetings attended and some

⁵ Charles J. Fox & Hugh T. Miller, 1996, pp. 9-10, pp. 105-109, p. 149.

interviews/conversations conducted in person over the practices of two fundamental city councils in Ankara. Such focus, once the first hand observations and impressions will be supported by other relevant instances derived from secondary resources, may provide a critique on the democratic quality and autonomy of the public sphere that is tried to be constituted upon pure ‘civil’ (and thus democratic) dynamics. As a matter of fact, civil plurality offered by the concerned city councils will be the subject of the last section. It is also pertinent to note that the point in this chapter is not purely what it provides as empirical findings –since there is the risk of ‘overgeneralization’ of specific shortcomings, but rather to what concerns these findings *potentially* draw attention, make one contemplate and question, which would basically refer to the possible limits of the taken-for-granted democratic capacity of the deliberative public discourse and the local scale as its locus.

The last chapter before the concluding chapter is the one that will try to offer a general evaluation of the theoretical and political limits of the discourse theories by referencing to the practical overview. The main arguments of the thesis will be gathered in this chapter. It will try to provide this on two basic sections. The first one will be based on the evaluation of the qualitative findings derived from the previous chapter, so that it can set a link to locate the theories in a common set of shortcomings.⁶ On this basis, the last section will try to develop a critical discussion on the relevant conceptual themes which render these

⁶ Yet, there is certainly a need to clarify the theoretical basis on how the power analysis is made on the findings herein. Since the divisive and contentious issues of local government (mostly finance-related ones) exclude direct citizen involvement, reflections of class-specific exclusion upon participatory practices cannot be provided for this kind of issues. Instead, in cases where the external exclusion is precluded, influential asymmetry within power positions is mostly concerned regarding the indications of social status. However, not to leave these indications self-proclaimed, what can help us in the final analysis to recover the status and class positions with their all complicated mechanisms in a correlative system of social inheritance may be suggested as Bourdieu’s interrelated forms of capital as well as the relational capacity of *habitus* to overcome the dichotomies between objectivism-subjectivism, structure-agency. Nonetheless, such task requires a delicate and careful usage of the term capital. For a detailed debate on the relational character of class formation, see Vefa Saygın Öğütler & Güney Çeğin, *Toplumsal Sınıfların İlişkisel Gerçekliği: Sosyo-Tarihsel Teorinin Sınıfla İmtihanı*, Tan Kitabevi, 2010.

approaches to slide back into the pluralist framework of liberal democracy and thereby falls short to constitute a ‘critical’, ‘radical’ and transformative opposition to bourgeoisie conception of democracy, in contrast with their alleged motivation at the outset. Finally, the Conclusion will summarize what have been concluded and obtained thus far, and will try to offer the hints of how a profound approach to participatory governance can be characterized for a transformative critical theory.

CHAPTER 2

AN EVALUATION ON THE THEORETICAL BASIS: CRITICAL THEORY AND PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

Despite the absence of a long-established, well-developed critical school as a tradition whose theoretical boundaries, engaged intellectuals (as members) and therefore a single definitive manifestation are explicitly specified within the administrative literature, the discipline of public administration has also benefited and still benefits from the abundant inspiration of critical theory on both philosophical and practical course of social science in general. Thereby, some of the theory work being done in the field, particularly in times of the crisis of monistic-centralist administration and subsequent rise of (New) Public Management School, have been attempted to be associated with critical thinking. In this chapter, the debates over critical philosophy will be introduced in two basic grounds: First, intellectual origins and the role of critical thinking in critical philosophy, and second the epistemological and philosophical foundations of what we call as Critical Theory, i.e. Frankfurt Institute for Social Science, which is the fundamental theoretical source inspiring the critical account in the theory of public administration. Before locating the present position of critical theory in the field, a critical discussion over the consecutive ‘critical’ reactions to the 70s administration in crisis will be made in order to historically contextualize and make sense of the adoption of ‘original’ critical theory (that is associated with the Frankfurt School) in public administration. After describing the recent tendency in critical public administration towards a proposal framework of self-governance based on the conceptual tools of communicative/discourse theory, the position of radical discourse theory in this context will be discussed. Concerning the need to make a clear expansion for the critical examination of these two approaches which seemingly rely on different epistemologies, the discussion will be ended by

deriving a common methodological approach to administrative legitimacy in the participative frameworks proposed by both, that is ‘proceduralism’.

2.1. Critical Philosophy in General

2.1.1. Critical Thinking: The role

Not necessarily confined to particular common piece of inspiration from Institute for Social Research (corresponding to the group of intellectuals also known as the Frankfurt School), the thinkers and scholars labelled within the critical approach in public administration, in a rough sense, have a shared view in opposing both to the traditional conceptualization and practice of pure rational(ist) administration and to its wild tendency of ‘marketization’ and ‘non-publicist’ goal orientation in a managerialist fashion. Nevertheless, critical tradition developed in any social science from 20th century onwards has more or less its roots in the heritage of a bulk accumulation of the intellectual literature primarily contributed by the works of Kant (in critical reasoning of pure practical reason), Hegel (in dialectic comprehension of history as the unfolding of reason and freedom⁷), Nietzsche (in rejection of existing norms and values, and re-creation of the self), Marx and Engels (in revealing the factual roots of value and social struggle) and thinkers of Frankfurt School (in interpretation and self-reflexivity). Despite the heterogeneous context regarding the conceptualization of the social reality within such heritage, some epistemological and methodological assessment is commonly shared from which the critical account in public administration also gets benefit. Rejecting the mainstream employment of strict positivist and objectivist detachment of the theory and the object referred by the theory, account of critical thinking, primarily, perceives the critical analysis within the scope of the analysed

⁷ Iain Hampsher-Monk, *A History of Modern Political Thought: Major Political Thinkers from Hobbes to Marx*. Oxford, Blackwell, 1992, p. 479.

object⁸; hence, it can be regarded as a constant seeking for the emancipating reason and knowledge in discovering the validity of the claims for truth in a ‘relational’ manner. This is also what the followers of critical thinking in public administration tend to acquire as a common tendency.

The necessity of such seeking is originated from the basic argument that the norms and values associated with the individual, social knowledge, consciousness and perceptions are shaped by the time and society in which they exist. However, positivism as the most dominant form of ideology and even of mythology immanent in capitalism, teaches people to accept the world ‘as it is’, thus unquestioningly perpetuate it. It relies on a postulate that the world can be perceived without making assumptions about the nature of the phenomena under investigation. Its suggestion that knowledge can simply reflect the world as much as one experiences the world as rational and necessary, leads to the uncritical identification of reality and rationality, deflating attempts to transform it⁹. Instead, the basic aim of critical thinking can be described as making the world and human become conscious of him/herself “awakening him/her out of his/her dream about him/herself”¹⁰, by “*explaining* to his/her the meaning of his/her own actions”¹¹, as developed from Marx’s sociological thought¹². The project of explaining the

⁸ Raymond Geuss, *Eleştirel Teori Habermas ve Frankfurt Okulu*, trans. Ferda Keskin, Ayrıntı, 2002, p. 85.

⁹ Ben Agger, *A Critical Theory of Public Life: Knowledge, Discourse and Politics in an Age of Decline*, The Falmer Press, 1991, p. 24.

¹⁰ Karl Marx, “Marx to Ruge”, *Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher*, 1844, available from http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1843/letters/43_09.htm (accessed on 26.6.2012)

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² Many see the “category of sociological thought” that is derived from Marx’s attribution to critical seeking (the task of “making the human world become conscious of itself”) as the intellectual base developing critical theory. See Burrell G. & Morgan G., 1979, p. 283; quoted in Richard Box, 2005, p. 16. P. Bourdieu, accordingly, defines the task of critical sociological thought with the notes as follows: “*would perhaps not be worth an hour's trouble if it [sociology] solely had as its end the intention of exposing the wires which activate the individuals it observes--if it forgot that it has to do with men, even those who, like puppets, play a game of which they do not know the rules--if, in short, it did not give itself the task of restoring to men the meaning of their actions*” Bourdieu P., ‘*Célibat et Condition Paysanne*’, quoted in Derek Robbins, *The Work of Pierre Bourdieu: recognizing society*, Milton Keynes, 1991, p. 37.

meaning of actions (ideas) to its actors (holders) is conducted based on the task of “historicization” which means contextualizing the actions and ideas, values and motives behind them (which may be ideologically represented as ‘ahistorically’ natural and universal) in terms of their roots in social, economic and political processes, i.e. it “shows the relationships between ideas and theoretical positions and their social environment”¹³. What is seen as the ideological false representation of the “facts” of social life for Marxist view, is considered for Hegelian comprehension of history, as the concealing of reason by “passing phases” which in turn makes “the present” limit the evolution of future freedom. In such view, it is still through the act of critique, the social theory comes to unmask the false appearances of social facts in the present in order to relieve the future freedom of human¹⁴.

In fact, for Marx, the issue of ideological representation of the reality implies an arguably inner-shift in the path of defending the non-autonomy of the consciousness from real life conditions contrary to dominant idealist theses of his time. The shift roughly addresses the conceptual transformation from what Althusser prefers to call it the ‘ideological survivals’¹⁵ of Young Marx¹⁶ before 1845, the “false or missing consciousness” of the real world that is to be apprehended by the metaphor *camera obscura*¹⁷, towards a more profound understanding of consciousness as the consciousness and knowledge of a “reversed-world”¹⁸ with the mediation of *fetishism of commodities*, the term

¹³ Douglas Kellner, *Critical Theory, Marxism, and Modernity*, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989, p. 45.

¹⁴ Robert B. Denhardt, “Toward a Critical Theory of Public Organization”, *Public Administration Review*, Vol. 41, No: 6, 1981, p. 2.

¹⁵ Norman Geras, Althusser’s Marxism: An Assessment, *Western Marxism: A Critical Reader*, edited by New Left Books, 1972, p. 232.

¹⁶ Louis Althusser, *For Marx*, trans. Ben Brewster, New York: Verso, 2005.

¹⁷ Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *German Ideology*, edited by C. J. Arthur, International Publishers Co, 1970, p. 47.

¹⁸ Indeed, in 1843, the period before what Althusser calls epistemological break, Marx uses the term which would be further developed in *Capital*, *reversed-world consciousness*, in his work

developed in *Capital*. What is emphasized here is that the “upside down” reality exists within the material social life itself, despite its appearance as being reversed in the consciousness of human. Knowledge gathered by people is rather of a real world than of an illusory one, yet, such gathering refers to the necessary correspondence of the reversion existing in the world of social practice with the world of consciousness.

Shifting the explanation of the relation between human beings and social reality from the problem of “false-consciousness” to the problem of a necessary cognitive reflection of the false and upside down world, actually, does not challenge the connotation of critical thinking as emancipation from false knowledge, but positively deepens it. That is because; the inevitable alienation of human from the humanly created world which is distorted by the fetishism of ‘seemingly spontaneous’ commodities is the ground that the critical act of ‘emancipation from false knowledge’ should deal with, since the reversion within the social practice is generated by such alienation. Therefore, seeking for the contradictory and distorted reality rather in material social practice than in human consciousness itself is the only possible critical way to perceive the world in order to direct the subjective human will to transform the real life practice which generates the alienation and conceals the true relation of dependency by insinuating as if it is a freely chosen relation.

In Marxist-critical terminology, what is conceptualized as *praxis* on that sense is the dialectical endeavour to transcend the epistemological dichotomy between object and subject and unify the theory and practice by a relational approach towards them in contrast to the conditions in current capitalist society. The subjective course of *praxis* lies upon its direct reference to the actions formed and directed by one’s own self unlike the ones oriented by the powers outside the

entitled “Contribution to the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right; Introduction”, in *On Religion*, ed. & trans. by Saul K. Padover, New York: McGraw-Hill book Company, 1974, p. 41.

predomination of the self¹⁹. By its emphasis on subjective capacity within objective conditions, it underlines the need of subversion of what Marx and Engels defined as ‘limited material mode of activity’²⁰ and the limited social relations arising from it. The struggle for emancipation obstructed by such limited activity and sociality of human capacity should be inevitably conducted on the line of praxis towards human’s recognition of itself within the world it exists in and creates.

Speaking for the field of public administration, the fruits of above mentioned maturation in Marx’s sociological thought can lead us to the idea that for the oppressed and dominated social groups who deprive of the realization of the self, in consideration of reaching the true knowledge of their world, it is obligatory to witness the inner contradictions of such upside down world and their relation with its dynamics that limit the social capacity of human being. The significance of subjective consciousness and the principle participation to the democratic mechanisms which come to set the social rule relies on such obligation. Thereby, moving from the true perception of their position within objective conditions, people ruled by the world from which they are alienated can recognize and anticipate the subjective existence and transformative capacity of themselves. Accordingly, critical theory traces its origins from the need of collective critical thinking in such a world masses are alienated from. The role of critical theory thus lies on its disseminating capacity to arouse the subjective existence of people for critical thinking against the social reproduction of the status quo, as Horkheimer puts the difference between the critical and traditional theory with respect to the extent that they assist or devastate the social reproduction of the whole structure²¹. Since there is the certain tension between human endeavour for the self-emancipation and the objective limitations forced

¹⁹ Martin Jay, *Diyalektik İmgelem: Frankfurt Okulu ve Sosyal Araştırmalar Enstitüsü Tarihi 1923-1950*, trans. Ünsal Oskay, İstanbul: Ara Yayıncılık, 1989, p. 22.

²⁰ Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, 1970, p. 209.

²¹ Göran Therborn, “The Frankfurt School”, *New Left Review*, no. 63, 1970, p. 67.

by social conditions, critical thinking is awaked “by the effort really to transcend the tension and to abolish the opposition between the individual’s purposefulness, spontaneity, and rationality, and those work-process relationships on which society is built”²².

2.1.2. Critical Theory: Epistemological Tracks

Having discussed the intellectual origins and role of critical thinking, for the consideration of the depiction of critical theory as ‘the critical school’ of social science, it would be helpful to clarify the employment of such label for Frankfurt theorists so that we can deepen the course of critical public administration theory.

To begin with the appellation, the original usage developed by Horkheimer and his fellows²³ (Institute for Social Research) was ‘critical social theory’; the phrase Frankfurt School on the other hand was seen as a ‘lighter’ indication which would come to be used later by others, referring to the former period as well. Accordingly, the denomination *Critical Theory* began to be used alternatively to the latter general title after Horkheimer’s whole work (being introduced by him as basing on ‘critical social theory’) was gathered and published in 60s under the label ‘critical theory’²⁴.

Yet, referring them as a ‘theoretical school’ has a risk in itself to sort of reify them as a ‘positive system’ and overlook their sceptic position against

²² Max Horkheimer, “Traditional and Critical Theory” in *Critical Theory: Selected Essays*, trans. Matthew J. O’Connell, Continuum International Publishing Group, 1972, p. 210.

²³ Slater mentions the names of Horkheimer, Adorno, Marcuse and Fromm as having the work most essential in constituting the position of the ‘classic’ school, as well as admitting the influence of the figures in ‘Horkheimer’s team’; namely, F. Pollock, L. Löwenthal and K. A. Wittfogel. The work of W. Benjamin is also highly respected for having great impact on the institute, significantly on Adorno; and of E. Bloch too, despite the lack of their organic association with the institution. Phil Slater, “The Aesthetic Theory of the Frankfurt School”, in *CCCS Selected Working Papers volume 1*, ed. Ann Gray et. al., Routledge, 2007, pp. 185-186.

²⁴ Phil Slater, *Frankfurt okulu: kökeni ve önemi: Marksist bir yaklaşım*, trans. Ahmet Özden, İstanbul: Bilim/Felsefe/Sanat Yayınları, 1989, p. 53.

‘closed-ended’ philosophical systems. Indeed, for my opinion, when Critical Theory is subject of discussion, the label ‘theory’ carries as well a risk similar to the one of postmodern theory since the essential theoretical way and method followed by the founders of Critical Theory is to position themselves by the interminable critique of the traditional theoreticians and intellectual traditions. Equally, in their effort and motive for critical scenting out they carefully avoid denoting a positively formed system consisting of systematic philosophical theses. This shared avoidance in fact invokes the tracks of their imperative method being denoted as open-ended dialectics by Horkheimer²⁵, and negative dialectics by Adorno, both referring to the common perception of history as not a finalized moment whose conflictual dynamics are totally resolved and/or resolvable.

Not giving up the effort of reconciling the term critique with sort of Kantian interest on the possibility of knowledge and reason, thinkers of critical school are somehow inclined to employ such open-ended dialectical comprehension even in approaching the so-called ‘ideational’ components of the social reality. As could be derived from several writings of the fellows, but most explicitly from the particular essays of Marcuse and Horkheimer respectively on historical materialism²⁶ and the introductory comparison of traditional and critical philosophy²⁷ which would be afterwards considered as the manifest of Frankfurt School, the term “critical activity” is rather used according to its meaning within the dialectic critique of political economy, than within idealist critique of pure reason. That being the case, as Slater argues it would not be false to admit that the original formulation addresses a Kantian criticism depending on a Marxist meaning²⁸. Horkheimer clarifies this stating that it is the point of agreement of critical social theory with German Idealism that it attempts to link the seemingly

²⁵ Max Horkheimer, *Between Philosophy and Social Science: Selected Early Writings*, MIT Press, 1995, pp. 209-211.

²⁶ Herbert Marcuse, “The Foundation of Historical Marxism” in *Studies in Critical Philosophy*, trans. Brian Reid, Beacon Press, Boston, 1972.

²⁷ Max Horkheimer, 1972, p. 206.

²⁸ Phil Slater, 1989, p. 54.

irreducible realities, basically the cultural entirety and the intellectual and cognitive creation of people, to human production. However, as will be discussed in more detail in the context of the ‘dilemma’ between subjectivity and objectivity, this linkage is problematized through the alleged autonomy and consciousness of the individual once the ‘production’ of the society is in debate:

“The individual sees himself as passive and dependent, but society, though made up of individuals, is an active subject, even if a nonconscious one and, to that extent, a subject only in an improper sense. This difference in the existence of man and society is an expression of the cleavage which has up to now affected the historical forms of social life. The existence of society has either been founded directly on oppression or been the blind outcome of conflicting forces, but in any event not the result of conscious spontaneity on the part of free individuals (...) In the bourgeois economic mode the activity of society is blind and concrete, that of individuals abstract and conscious.”²⁹

The dialectical method followed by critical theorists on the other hand was a unique one for their time, handling a tough meeting of Hegelian and Marxist dialectics. Such meeting actually refers to the need of transcending the traditional dichotomy (and/or dilemma) of idealism and materialism which can be succeeded thanks to the inseparability of thought and being seen in the philosophy of both Hegel³⁰ and Marx³¹. Yet, what is at stake when this being the case here is consigning the theory into the lap of metaphysics similar to the Hegelian absolute identification of the object and subject. As mentioned earlier, the epistemological position suggesting strict positivist and objectivist detachment of the theory and the object referred by the theory is rejected by the relational account of critical thinking; however there is the question whether handling this by shifting the Hegelian idealist dialectics to a more materialistic position could lead to the

²⁹ Max Horkheimer, 1972, p. 200.

³⁰ For the identification of thought and being, and logic and metaphysics in Hegelian system, see Herbert Marcuse, “Hegel’s First System” in *Reason and Revolution*, trans. Andy Blunden, Ark Paperbacks, 1964.

³¹ “It is true that thought and being are distinct, but at the same time they are in unity with one another” Karl Marx, “Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts” in *Early Writings*, trans. Gregor Benton, London: Penguin Books, 1975, p. 351.

identification of the object and subject. For locating the role and functioning of public administration on the ground of 'is and ought', such epistemological dilemma is also worth to consider since reasoning on the ways to 'the change' for critical public administration also requires a critical analysis on the relation between the 'particular' (individual or citizen) and the 'universal' (structure or administration) accrediting the potentiality of the subjects such as human action, consciousness, autonomy and so forth. In order to evaluate the solution of critical theory for the dilemma between individual and the totality, we shall have a brief look at the further epistemological tracks associated with the institute.

The intellectual tenderness upon the magnitude of the individual and individualism intrinsic in the works of the founder intellectuals of the theory was no doubt under the inspiration of Kant. Putting the emphasis on the individual will, consciousness and moral autonomy, the intellectuals' endeavour to identify the notion 'critique' with the interest on the possibility of reason, limits of claims for truth and knowledge was succeeded through their study on Kant's critical philosophy and its successors in German idealist tradition³². That corresponds to the rejection of deterministic explanation of human action.

However, the dissidence is clear. Rethinking the Kantian formula of the 'end in itself', Horkheimer, similar to the Hegelian critics to Kant's separate portraiture of the normative imperatives and cognitive knowledge of things, finds the antagonisms between practical and pure reason, will and knowledge, a priori and a posteriori, analytical and synthetic propositions, 'is' and 'ought' originally stemming from the extreme dichotomy of phenomenal and noumenal realms basically inadmissible for the reality existing present time³³. It is because for Horkheimer, the duality of duty and utility relying on formerly mentioned Kantian dichotomies is relatively and exceptionally suitable for the social conditions dominating from his time to early 20th Century in which the supreme

³² Max Horkheimer, 1972, pp. 202-210.

³³ Max Horkheimer, *Critique of Instrumental Reason*, trans. M. O'Connell, New York: Continuum, 1974.

irrationalism of external reality makes it almost inevitable to consider self-interest and general ethics, individual morality and public morality as compatible for each other³⁴. Hence, for such critical historical analysis inclined to Kant's philosophy, the absolute distinction between individual and society corresponds to the universalization of a particular premise so that it leads to the admission of the latter extensional dualities as natural and general, and whether or not it is Kant's intention, having the risk to affirm status quo just as any attempt of 'ahistoricization'. The potential passivity and inertia of individual (particular) morality towards electrifying the change of the totality could be comparatively seen easier after Kant's time (especially beginning with 20th century) in which the individual gradually loses his/her autonomy and comes to become the object of the exercise of power relations outside his/her control. Hence, in a time in which there is the urgent historical need of political praxis towards social justice than ever before, reducing the social action to individual's so-called autonomous moral impulse for the absolute Categorical Imperatives through scorning exclusion of political action was, in a sense, to obstruct the dynamics of dominant structure of power.

Indeed, as Horkheimer admits it³⁵, after Kant, the reflection of moral impulse came to be substantially in the form of 'ideological' mercy which tends to consolidate the inferior position of the subject in objective existence. It is the assertion also defended by Adorno's thoughts on tolerance³⁶. For Adorno, tolerance of modern times inherent in bourgeois stands for consolidating the present situation and social position of people because of the fear of dormant positive potentiality they entail. Due to my main subject, this point of insufficiency of particular morality is likewise significant for examining the more loyal follower of Kant's philosophy within critical theory, namely Jurgen

³⁴ Martin Jay, 1989, p. 84.

³⁵ Ibid., pp. 84-85.

³⁶ "[T]he bourgeoisie is, however, tolerant" Theodor W. Adorno, *Minima Moralia: Reflections on a Damaged Life*, trans. E.F.N. Jephcott, Verso, 2006, p. 25.

Habermas, and the works associated with critical theory in public administration under his influence. It is essentially because that the morality of communication field in which the state and bureaucracy is excluded as political and administrative actors, and economic processes and consequences are not taken into consideration relies on the very possibility of Kantian autonomous morality and the dichotomy of particular and totality in that moral sense. Yet, postponing Habermas's theory and proceed with Kant for now, in my opinion, the reason behind the incompatibility of particular morality referred by Categorical Imperatives and general morality represented by the 'external' reality may be his times' relative historical lack of consolidation of the integral capitalism-nation state formation and the 'rational' social orderliness brought by this integrity. Moving from this point of view, one can argue as well that the unity of object and subject in German Idealism after Kant has epistemologically become possible primarily through the alienation of labour power and objectification of the subject, rather than the timeless ontological postulates of Hegelian idealism. However, to the extent that one count on Hegelian endeavour to embed this historically concrete process into metaphysical reality, it would be impractical to critically evaluate the position and relation of the subject within and towards the objective reality.

Moreover, metaphysics comes up with universalistic claims of truth which cannot be acknowledged by critical thinking. Indeed, for Frankfurt thinkers, the foremost distress was rather lying on the attempt of dissolving individualism within the so-called totality of object and subject than Kantian overemphasis of subjectivist moral autonomy³⁷. Accordingly, as Horkheimer argues, philosophical systems which form the 'theory of everything' just as Hegels, at some point, turn out to be a system of "theodicy" which legitimizes the status quo³⁸. Geist, or spirit, in this context, cannot refer to the existence of the final moment of absolute reality succeeding the unification between reason and the matter, and object and subject as well. Hence, there is no such thing as abstract and absolute "Idea" in

³⁷ Martin Jay, 1989, p. 84.

³⁸ Ibid., pp. 76-77.

itself but particular ideas associated with certain socio-economic conditions of certain people. Therefore, Lukac's attribution of Hegelian unification to the 'leading' position of the proletariat is implicitly rejected from such viewpoint.

Then, after putting the bilateral scepticism towards both strictly separating subjectivity from objective reality and on the other hand totalization of them - for the reason of leading to confirm the status quo- we can turn back to the essential question: what is the particular position of Critical School in its epistemological approach towards object and subject?

The answer lies on the unique understanding of materialism and dialectics. The uniqueness here is rejecting both the dichotomy and unification. This stands for so much that it eventually leads one to even the rejection of the dichotomy between the theories of dualism/dichotomy and unification/totality as well. This can be clarified as such: actual materialism for critical theory warrants the unceasing relation between object and subject. I think the key term here is interaction, or relationality. Interaction is concerned as the one between human and the nature in which human has historically an active role on the change of the nature. Therefore, from that viewpoint, neither the materialism cannot be exalted to an epistemology of absolute certainty, nor the dialectics is fetishized as a totally objective process outside human control, which can be both seen in so-called 'vulgar' Marxism and suffer from the fallacy similar to their critique of Idealism³⁹.

In fact, the way dialectic materialism is comprehended as such is not specifically distinct from that of Marx's account, but an interpretation of it. As we know from Marx's critique of both Hegel and Feuerbach, there is the conclusion that consciousness belongs to nothing but human, and existence on the other hand can only be social and conscious. For critical school thinkers too, dialectics refers to a sort of 'scope of interaction/effect' between conscious and existence, subject and object. As Adorno concludes, the accurate epistemology should be deprived

³⁹ Ibid, pp. 85-6.

of the fetishism of knowledge which leads to abstract systemization of the relation between object and subject since the reality can only be found in the mutual and constant force field (*Kraftfeld*) between object and subject, rather than being stuck between static operation of reducing the subject to the object or vice versa⁴⁰. That means the reality can never be certain and absolute and this does not bring about kind of ‘relativism’. As has been mentioned earlier, the unique stance here is the argument towards the possibility of a particular epistemology denying the theoretical dilemmas (such as absolutism/relativism, realism/nominalism) derived from the one between strict separation and total identification of object and subject.

Such viewpoint does not totally reject the elements pointed by these dualisms here, but instead reject the dualisms themselves. This means it both positively encompasses and transcends these so-called ‘bilateral’ accounts. In sum, the relation between object and subject, reason and matter, consciousness and existence implies neither an absolute dilemma nor such unification. They both consist of each other but are not comprehensible by reducing them to each other. It eventually leads us to the essential role of the theory for critical thinkers. The foremost theoretical endeavour primarily for Horkheimer and Adorno was to provide the ‘particular’ elbowroom within the ‘universal’ of which it is a part, thereby dispose of the hegemony conducted by the latter to the former⁴¹. Individual or the social class as the particular here does not have the opportunity to exist besides the social structure as the universal; however still preserves its original existence and capacity to act without being surrendered, thus may force the universal transform in favour of its original interests and choices.

Critical theory applicable in the discipline of public administration should therefore take into consideration the theoretical expansions yielded by such relational epistemology towards the interaction between the object and subject, and possible derivations from the very problem between these two; such as

⁴⁰ Ibid, pp. 106-107.

⁴¹ Besim Dellaloğlu, *Frankfurt Okulu'nda Sanat Ve Toplum*, İstanbul: Say Yayınları, 2007, p. 28.

autonomy of the individual, class and individual consciousness, capacity to act within the system; all leading to the general question of ‘transformation’. Such framework takes its primary objective as the establishment of the forms of life purified from unnecessary domination through entailing both an inquiry into ‘reason’ as well as an examination of ‘domination’ in order to determine what forms of social life embrace or promote highest degree of ‘emancipation’⁴².

Indeed, as one can derive from Marcuse’s writings on the possibility of true happiness⁴³, one would see the need of critical effort of human with/in the nature towards emancipation and self-governing. Marcuse’s emphasis upon the convergence of ‘happiness’ and ‘reason’ through the convergence of the interests of the particular and the universal can as well be considered a brief outline of critical public administration. This is for the reason that all common endeavour is essentially on seeking the praxical and organizational ways to “together but different” living, as in the last instance, public administration does ontologically exist for nothing but the happiness of the ‘people’ in the most general sense. Yet this would not to be taken in a ‘generalist’ sense that connotes totalizing the differences, but rather in a sense of collective and individual happiness in a shared space and time.

2.2. Historical Survey of the Critical Theory in Public Administration

After evaluating the philosophical foundations and epistemological justifications of critical thinking and of its theoretical constitution by the Institute for Social Research, it is now more suitable to collect the piece of influence and fruits of this peculiar theoretical position on the field of public administration.

⁴² Lorne Sossin, The politics of discretion: Toward a critical theory of public administration, *Canadian Public Administration*, Vol. 36, No. 3, 2008, p. 365.

⁴³ Herbert Marcuse, “The Conquest of the Unhappy Consciousness: Repressive Desublimation” in *One-Dimensional Man: Studies in the Ideology of Advanced Industrial Society*, Routledge, 2002.

As stated before, it should be noted that it is not exactly possible to draw the heavy boundaries of critical theory as a 'tradition' in public administration. However, once a common approach and/or a 'defence' is sought in a bundle of affiliated works based on critical seeking, a general academic effort is likely to be extracted, which is essentially exerted for disclosing the ways of basic contradictions within bureaucratic authority and the market dominance over society which both obstruct the whole public to be purified from dominance and able to govern themselves. These contradictions have their very roots in the pure materialist and instrumentalist rationality derived from the strict thematization of Enlightenment cogitation which totalizes the human capability of reasoning, and subsequently veils itself to different validity claims for truth and styles of living.

Therefore, besides revealing the contradictory conditions and dynamics within social dominance, critical public administration theory shall also inquire the lines on which administrative apparatus of the state directly or indirectly gives way, impacts and/or reproduce such dominance with its possible authoritarian faces, so that it can pursue the dormant ways for administrative bodies to make it help to transform the social structure in favour of human emancipation. Such inquiry is cultivated not only through the affluent theoretical heritage of critical account within social philosophy, but also the need of practical reacting and positioning itself against the very relation of capitalist social reality with the state, and with the institutions that constitute the political field and their mediation functionality on permanence of accumulation which finally results with the requirement of modernist organisation of public administration. Unique position of critical theory in public administration is likely to lie on this effort of comprehending public administration with the systemic ground and context it exists in so that public administration is not raised up on an ahistorical level as having been done in traditional and mainstream movements. Besides the critical analysis of present conditions, this comprehension carries also the potentiality of guiding the field of administration to lead it towards a 'better future' project.

Yet, what specific historical incident can be essentially situated as necessitating the redefinition of all customary practices related to the role, content and methodology of the very field of public administration in favour of a future imagination as such?

As was implied earlier, it can be asserted that the process triggering the emergence of critical rising in the field has pronged roots. The former of these is 70's legitimacy problem of monistic administration identified with the era of Welfare State provision. This goes hand in hand with the economic and cultural crisis of nation-states which respectively refer to the congestion of capital accumulation and fostering of cultural monophony described by counter views as being highly 'paternalistic'⁴⁴. The main source of the political and administrative side of the legitimacy crisis is basically the problems within the representative system which primarily points out the reduction of politics to constantly repeating elections and basing its legitimation ground merely on this very practice. In industrial societies, allegedly 'democratic' elections under the subjection of technocratic administrations which are carried out by the "decisionistic"⁴⁵ pattern of political practice come to ground on the guideline of 'acclamation' rather than 'public discussion'⁴⁶, so that public realm of citizenry merely functions to legitimate the rule of those occupying the positions within decision making mechanisms.

According to Charles J. Fox and Hugh T. Miller⁴⁷, such functioning of the "loop model of democracy" makes the ballot box (through which elected officials are rather accountable *to* the public than acting *for* the public) symbolize the

⁴⁴ Joseph M. Schwartz, "Democratic Solidarity and the Crisis of the Welfare State" in *Critical Perspectives on Democracy*, ed. Lyman H. Legters and John P. Burke, Rowman & Littlefield, 1994, p. 87.

⁴⁵ Jurgen Habermas, *Toward a Rational Society: Student Protest, Science and Politics*, trans. Jeremy J. Shapiro, Boston: Beacon Press, 1989, pp. 63-66.

⁴⁶ *Ibid*, p. 67.

⁴⁷ Charles J. Fox and Hugh T. Miller, *Postmodern public administration: toward discourse*, Thousand Oaks, California: Sage Publications, 1996, p.15.

political side of the politics-policy/administration dichotomy. The dichotomy connoted either by being elected or appointed, hence, on the one hand reduces the democratic decision making process to a procedure regulated for approving the ruling elite who are recruited to implement power by taking place of one another, whereas it on the hand leads to the scientization and technization of the administrative field for its being obliged to be the “neutral malleable tool” in order to provide elected officials to have their way. For Habermas, it is one of the ways of legitimizing power, though it does not necessarily mean rationalization contrarily to the claimed, as the legitimate domination of technocratic administration will inevitably deprive any process of democratic decision-making of its object⁴⁸. It would not be false to assume from this view that at least to a certain extent, Habermas explicates the democratic character of decision making as ‘rational’. Yet, before discussing the source and legitimation of such rationality and its identification with the ‘ideal’ procedures for democracy to Habermas, we shall advance with the institutional and structural turnover that comes to arise from the needs of reconstitution in the accumulation regime and thus influences the courses of the mainstream ‘knowledge’ of public administration. A relational discussion of the different responses to the historical crisis in the field would be helpful to better comprehend the historical need for calling for a critical theory of public administration. We can now only put it that the monist character of traditional administrative system and its political ground as classical representative system constitutes the first theme that critical public administration disaccords with as far as emancipation of the people is concerned.

2.2.1. New Public Administration: Critique in favour of ‘social equity’

Meanwhile with the socio-politically disordered atmosphere gradually leading to the crisis of 70’s Western nation states, there was a notable counter

⁴⁸ Jurgen Habermas, 1989, p.68.

movement attracting attention which preferred to name themselves New Public Administration. The origins of the movement can be traced back to 1968, particularly to the Minnowbrook Conference-I held under the leadership of Dwight Waldo. The motivation behind the first gathering was the intention to critically analyse the field and propose ideas for the future of the discipline⁴⁹. The social turbulence rigorously experienced in United States defined by the words of George Frederickson's, one of the main figures of this 'new' perspective, as uncontrollable increasing unemployment, poverty, disease, ignorance and hopelessness whereas there is the unprecedented economic growth⁵⁰ was the general picture that calls for an urgent need of 'social' attribution to the theoretical and practical framework of public administration.

The legitimization of the perspective of New Public Administration can be roughly described by Waldo's current state evaluation of the discipline underlining that neither the study nor the practice of traditional public administration was in strength and conscience to response "in appropriate measure to mounting turbulence and critical problems of the day"⁵¹. In this context, although there are considerable methodological and epistemological divergences as well as different conceptual emphases of social sensitivity between the first two gatherings of Minnowbrook conferences⁵², to say the least, the theoretical form that New Public Administration has acquired grounds on a basis which considers the ideal organisation of the state and public administration as should be

⁴⁹ Rosemary O'Leary, Minnowbrook: Tradition, Idea, Spirit, Event, Challenge, *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory*, 2011, Vol. 21, p. i2.

⁵⁰ George Frederickson, "Toward a New Public Administration", in *Classics of Public Administration*, ed. Jay M. Shafritz and Albert C. Hyde, Belmont, CA: Wadsworth/Thomson Learning, 2004, p. 316.

⁵¹ Quoted in Frank Marini, *Toward a new public administration: The Minnowbrook perspective*, ed. F. Marini, Scranton, PA: Chandler; 1971. p. xiii.

⁵² For detailed critical review on the divergence, see Yılmaz Üstüner, *In Search of an Identity: Considerations on the Theory and The Discipline of Public Administration*, Ph.D. diss., METU, 1992, pp. 124-132.

conducted in favour of social equity⁵³. In simple terms, the perspective additionally attributes to the field the fundamental objective to transform the policies and structures which systematically obstruct social equity. The “relevance” of public administration should be directed towards the contemporary issue and problems within social reality. Therefore, public administration is ontologically a matter of political choice dealing with the questions of the ways and measures of the rule and ‘who are to rule’ in quest for a good public life.

From such attribution to the role and position of public servants and organisations as well as to the theory of the field, it would not be hard to derive that the politics-administration dichotomy for the thinkers of New Public Administration is conceived inaccurate in principle⁵⁴. Administrators cannot be value-neutral (and there is not the one best way) since their position does not refer to that of mere practitioners who are in high focus of the acts within the organisation rather than in public service⁵⁵. Underlining the social and political character of policy issues, critique of Taylor’s scientific management “theory” is at the heart of Waldo’s epistemological positioning of public administration in its relation to the *administrative state* and tenets of scientific management:

“[T]his is perhaps true, but if Taylor could view the literature of public administration since 1915 he would certainly be amazed. For scientific management has not always walked soberly with Science. It has been affected by the American climate of opinion; it has become Democratic, and moral in purpose. It has, both in America and abroad, become a Cause and a Philosophy of Life. It has recently been the philosophy of a ‘business and

⁵³ George Frederickson, 2004, p. 316.

⁵⁴ Dwight Waldo, *The Study of Public Administration*, New York: Random House, 1955, p. 60; Dwight Waldo, *Perspectives on Administration*, University of Alabama Press, 1956, p. 38.

⁵⁵ George Frederickson, 2004, pp. 316-318. Dwight Waldo, *The Administrative State: A Study of the Political Theory of American Public Administration*, New York: The Ronald Press Company, 1948.

technical internationale,” an “Internationale” with its own Utopia to sell.”⁵⁶

Moreover, besides the arguments on the relative ‘practical’ fail and dissolution of the movement⁵⁷, its critical evaluation of the bureaucracy and the practice of pluralism within 60’s American implementation of technocratic administration can be attached to the above-mentioned debates on the representative system. Indeed for Frederickson, similarly to Habermas’s critique on the undemocratic character of the legitimacy ground of welfare bureaucracy, “pluralistic government systematically discriminates in favour of established stable bureaucracies and their specialized minority clientele (...) and against those minorities (...) who lack political and economic resources”⁵⁸. Expanded bureaucracy, despite its neutral appearance, was carrying an ideological disposition being highly inclined to alienation and standardization⁵⁹. Organization of the welfare bureaucracy was under the reflection of the one-sided organization of social wealth. The notion of true democracy was considered necessarily hand in hand with the achievement of true efficiency, which is exposed to deconstruction by Waldo’s employment of critical thinking:

“There is an area of explicit doubt and skepticism about all of these tenets except the first: that true democracy and true efficiency are reconcilable. This is so fundamental that, by definition, it could hardly be denied by an American writer on public administration. But critical thinking has taken place even here, in the form of a broadening or rejection of the original definitions of democracy and efficiency.”

Waldo’s deconstruction of the term efficiency is nevertheless confined to a suggestive socialization of it, rather than ontologically coming to grips with it in a

⁵⁶ Dwight Waldo, 1948, p. 49.

⁵⁷ For a critique of NPA movement from the point of its ineffectiveness, see Rayburn Barton, “The New Public Administration: A Modest Look at the Feasibility of Application”, *Public Administration Quarterly*, Vol. 7 No. 3, 1983.

⁵⁸ George Frederickson, 2004, p. 316.

⁵⁹ Maxwell J. Elden, “Radical Politics and the Future of Public Administration”, in *Public Administration in a Time of Turbulence*, ed. Dwight Waldo, Chandler Publishing, 1971, p. 27.

debate of the position of public bureaucracy in capitalist production and reproduction of the structure. Waldo admits efficiency as a major objective of public administration, yet proposes that it is a matter of quality, and therefore denies its reduction to quantitative and mechanical measurements⁶⁰. He comes up with the term “social efficiency” held in a utilitarian form of *good life*, corresponding to “the greatest happiness of the greatest number”, thus highly charged with emotion, fulfilled with social philosophy.

In order to achieve this in line with the principle social equity, there is another crucial suggestion of the theory NPA (at least among the prevailing themes of first conference), which is the involvement of organization members and citizenry participation in decision making process which is to be provided through the replacement of strict administrative hierarchy in with decentralisation in local units⁶¹. However, it is a noteworthy inference that the thorough and overall framework of the issue that how such principle of participation in favour of social equity could be practically held is lacked in the theoretical works associated with NPA perspective. On a side note, such lack of systemic analysis, a well-established critical methodology and even the ‘unflinching’ rejection of the total structure may be one of the primary reasons of why the theory has failed to have a considerable area of influence.

I think all these shortcomings of the movement have their roots in excluding the question of the form of state, its ideology, economic functions and the position of public administration in the broad picture they generate, while politicizing the field and knowledge of administration. Intertwining the field of administration and politics also requires the questions regarding the *politics* of the political sphere, merely than politics of administration. Indeed, the rejection of the dichotomy of state-administration stems from one of the basic principles of Marx’s critique of political economy, the rejection of separation of the politics

⁶⁰ Dwight Waldo, 1948, p. 197.

⁶¹ George Frederickson, “Minnowbrook II: Changing Epochs of Public Administration”, *Public Administration Review*, Vol. 49 No. 2, 1989, p. 97.

from economic sphere. Rejection of the two alleged dichotomies admits both the administrative and economic functioning of the state; thereby puts forth the relevancy of the administration with economics; i.e. with the mode and relations of production as well as the global functioning of the state itself within this whole structure. However, the notions capitalism and market are not even allowed for a place within the subject indexes of the writings associated with NPA. Social equity is demanded without problematically identifying the integrated structure of its absence.

Nonetheless, it is evident that though the critical thinking of NPA did not have any academic roots to and inspiration from the original Critical Theory, their critique on the dominance of positivist theory of science over administration theory cannot be separated from the critical endeavour in the field, which would be conducted later by explicitly referring to the prosperous accumulation of Critical Theory. Primarily Waldo's attempts to deconstruct, demystify and dereify the myth of science of public administration and to rewrite the theory of public administration through politicizing the knowledge can as well be read as a self-reflexive critical theory of his time in seek for the *humanization* of public organizations which would be urgently called for by Denhardt in 1981⁶². However, this also implies that so little has changed from 1948 to 1981, from 1981 onwards. As will be seen in the following section, seeking the most efficient techniques of management stills prevails in mainstream movements, whereas critical theory stands for as 'marginal' as was used to be, although the successors do not put forward so much 'marginal' critiques on the very nucleus of the inherently capitalist form and positioning of the political and administrative field.

2.2.2. Management Schools: Critique in favour of neoliberal restructuring

⁶² Robert B. Denhardt, 1981.

Having discussed the relatively fragile call for a “social democracy” in the performance and delivery of public services, the most notable answer to the problems which became one with the 70’s crisis of welfare system was from an utterly different wing, the New Right movement and its economically liberal propositions which are totally labelled as neoliberalism. Besides its ideological justification grounded in extra-economic modality like defending socially conservative policies, the intention of this ‘new’ theme was basically to overcome the crisis through flexible accumulation model consolidated by the policies of privatization, subsidiarity and decentralization together with compatible administrative patterns, all suggesting minimal but a regulatory, sturdy state.

The principal motivation behind this break was self-evidently economic. Beginning from the late 60s there was the considerable decline in the growth and productivity of industrialized countries, which came to be analysed as depending on deep-seated organic problems rather than temporary setbacks. High inflation and unemployment rates⁶³ as well as recession were recognized as both the causes and indications of the crisis. It is commonly argued that the inflexibility of Fordist regime of production was the essential structural ground of the inefficiency primarily because of the cost of supply-oriented functioning independently of fluctuating demand. Keynesian welfare system, with its backing up policy system to provide stable market and demand environment for Fordist production, was also accused of inducing the decrease in rate of profit due to its policies of open budget, high public expenditure, and social policy system etc.⁶⁴. The state which was before seen as the focal of social development was now condemned for putting the main obstacle to it by being a burden over the market with its spending and thus hindering the efficient functioning of the market. Moreover, the public sphere, which was claimed to be deprived of the free market qualities and practices that are yearned for; primarily free competition, profit-orientation,

⁶³ Michael J. Piore and Charles F. Sabel, *The Second Industrial Divide: Possibilities For Prosperity*, New York: Basic Books, 1989, p. 18.

⁶⁴ Roger Burrows and Brian Loader, *Towards a Post-fordist Welfare State?*, Routledge, 1994. pp. 95-111.

individual freedom and flexible provisions unique to market conditions, was argued to constitute another problem in terms of social development.

Therefore, economic, political, bureaucratic and social activities ‘should’ operate and be organized within the market as much as possible⁶⁵. Accordingly, neo-liberal economic policies flared out its field of practices among the whole economy as well as labour market. Alternatively to allegedly ‘strict’ functioning of Fordist regime of production, the new structure of production was sought to organized with more flexibility so as to conform with the conjunctural fluctuations primarily through unstandardized employment and working. At its most concrete, in 1989, several definitive description of policy reforms including fiscal policy, public spending, tax reform, interest rates, privatization, financialization were listed by economist John Williamson⁶⁶ to propose a sort of prescription for the “economic health of the nations” suffering from public sector inefficiency. This set of reforms was significant for its being a sort of summary of the free market fundamentalism favoured by neoliberal agenda and grounded its ideological discourse.

Once this structural and ideological turnover gained support from the civil and political sphere, the reflection of it onto the academic field arose as an ‘intellectual wave’ that has come on the scene in a short while. It has gained a ‘legitimate’ argument in intellectual era that the invasive conditions of global capitalism was highly in need of a ‘universal’ paradigm which offers a whole transformation within the public sectors of different countries that were to administratively articulate to global competition in their structural, organizational, personnel systems. Initializing with the implementation of administrative reforms,

⁶⁵ For probably the most programmatic theoretical critique of the welfare economics; see Robert Nozick, *Anarchy, State and Utopia*, Basic Books, 1974. For their influence on Reagan’s administrative policy, George Gilder, *Wealth and Poverty*, ICS Press, 1993; and Charles Murray, *Losing Ground: American Social Policy 1950-80*, Basic Books, 1994 may also be noted.

⁶⁶ Also known as *Washington Consensus*. John Williamson, “What Washington Means by Policy Reform” in *Latin American Adjustment: How Much Has Happened?* ed. John Williamson, Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics, 1990.

the framework has matured its theoretical basis essentially under the labels Public Management and New Public Management⁶⁷ which have constituted the other turning point giving way to counter voices of those who take place at the critical side of the spectrum. Despite the decadal and locational differences of the appellation of Public Management and New Public Management movements⁶⁸, commonly for the well-known advocates of these approaches administrative reforms were to comply with the (neoliberal) transformation of the whole structure, favouring the redefinition of public service by leaving out the social functions from the role of state and ensuring that the rest of public service would function solely regarding to “efficiency” and “effectiveness” so that the functioning of public organizations would approximate the professional ‘management’ of private encounters which stimulates competition, free choice and low transaction costs. Another dimension of the practice of this approximation generally relies on the contractual relation between public organization and server corporation unlike the traditional relations of fiscal and hierarchical monitoring⁶⁹.

Christopher Hood in his article which focuses on doctrinal content of the group of ideas known as New Public Management, introduces the so-called revolutionary design of the school as the marriage of two opposites; as the one partner, new institutional economics built on public choice theory, transactions cost theory and principal-agent theory, whereas the successive waves of business-type ‘managerialism’ in the public sector as the other⁷⁰. What may be misleading in such formulation is the attentive representation of the rising of these theoretical waves as if they are ahistorically constituted by the means of pure theoretical and

⁶⁷ For a critical assessment on the “new”ness of the movement, see Yılmaz Üstüner, Kamu İşletmeciliği Kuramı ve Kamu İşletmeciliği Okulu, *Amme İdaresi Dergisi*, Vol. 33 No. 2, 2000.

⁶⁸ For the capital works in both approaches, see James Perry and Kenneth Kraemer, *Public Management: Public and Private Perspectives*, California: Mayfield Publishing Co., 1983; and Christopher Hood, “A Public Management for All Seasons”, *Public Administration*, Vol. 69, 1991.

⁶⁹ Uğur Ömürganülşen, “Kamu Sektörünün Yönetimi Sorununa Yeni Bir Yaklaşım: Yeni Kamu İşletmeciliği”, in *Çağdaş Kamu Yönetimi-I*, ed. M. Acar and H. Özgür, Ankara: Nobel, 2003.

⁷⁰ Christopher Hood, 1991, pp. 5-6.

ideational contemplation. Nevertheless, due to the doctrinal components that advocate the allocation of traditional bureaucracy into autonomous business-type organizations, the formulation requires also a structural transformation in favour of, what Christopher Pollitt mentions in his overview of “neo-managerialism”⁷¹, a decentralisation and fractionation within the administrative authority of public organizations. On the other hand, due to the organizational diversification between purchasing and exhibition of the public service, client-oriented model in servicing, and need of reduction in costs of services lead to the principles of transparency in resource distribution and organizational accountability.

Therefore, besides the themes efficiency and effectiveness – but being directly subject to them, the managerialist framework implies the overcoming of the “democratic” question in Welfare-type representative practices through setting up its strategy and policies towards the principles transparency and accountability which are hand in hand with the organizational needs of the decentralisation in administrative discretion.

At this point, by overinterpreting the structural transformation in public administration which comes up with the widespread practice of public management provisions, one may get the impression of a dilemma that critical approach, as discussed before, on the one hand sides opposed to the limited comprehension of democratic participation behind traditional monistic administration (i.e. “orthodoxy” formulated by Fox and Miller as the aggregation of the principles set by Wilson, Taylor and Weber⁷²), and on the other, it also directs itself against the fashionable tendency towards the employment of managerialist maxims and organizational formations to public administration which already has come out against the ‘rigid’ and monist administrative patterns of the former.

⁷¹ Christopher Pollitt, “Justification by Works or by Faith: Evaluating the New Public Management”, *Evaluation*, Vol. 1 No. 2, October, 1995, p. 134.

⁷² Charles J. Fox and Hugh T. Miller, 1996, p.3.

However, as can be derived from the writings of critical approach in public administration, the reaction achieves its integrity not from the ‘formal’ transformation that has been exercised within the structure and functioning of public administration, but from the methodological tools and the logic employed in such restructuring. Once the essential motivation of critical school is considered as the pursuit for the possibilities of emancipation unmasking the conditions that hinder it, the position of critical approach here consistently demonstrates the common points of reference which promote obstacles against human freedom in these two seemingly contradictory courses of reaction. If Robert Denhardt’s Habermasian portrayal of the critical concern in the field is held as adequate – which was grounding basically on the critical examination of instrumental reason, of the scientization of political life (the reduction of the public sphere) and of the relation between knowledge and human interests⁷³ – then it would be easier to comprehend the critical review on the ways and conditions of producing knowledge in classical and managerialist paradigms.

As a notable implication of the ‘limitative’ conception of human shared here is that both paradigms intend to ‘dehumanize’ the administrative field and organizations as well as the policy issues to be formulated in those by ‘scientizing’⁷⁴ them as ‘value-free’ and empirical facts of life. It can be clarified that the most conspicuous side of the dehumanizing practice as such that it happens to conceal the truth that all bodies and components related to the phenomenon of administration are socially constructed and only meaningful as long as they are maintained in favour of democratic citizenry and thus of the ontological realization of human being.

Moreover, despite differing postulates and attributing the state different roles vis-a-vis the society and the market, as well as the issue of defining the citizen whether as “client” or “customer”, both classical bureaucracy and public management approaches suggest administrative functioning according to the basis

⁷³ Robert B. Denhardt, 1981, p. 629.

⁷⁴ Ibid, p. 630.

of “science/technology of administration/management” with purposive/technical rationality which overlooks polyphonic and dialogical interactions in pursuing the true way. In this respect, reduction of the public issues to technocratic concerns exists in not only classical perspective which applies so-called one-best-way’ist scientific management but also in public management accounts, and it still generates its unquestionable laws and “authority of knowledge” confirmed with the positivist assurance of the technical professionalization, too similarly to that of Taylorist and Weberian bureaucratic public life. Similarly to Marcuse’s disclosure of Weberian bureaucratic apparatus as ‘reified reason’⁷⁵ in terms of the justification of actions through their reference to scientific administration, such authority of knowledge also provides a preemptable scope of free manoeuvre to the public managers⁷⁶. Predictably this refers to another problem concerning citizen-orientation. As Timney and Kelly claims⁷⁷, enabling public service on the basis of contractual relationship means transferring the implementation process of public policy to private firms. Since the discretion of policy formation and therefore accountability is accessible only to the shareholders rather than to whole citizenry, what Osborne and Gaebler call it⁷⁸ community-owned government does not rely on a truly legitimate base.

⁷⁵ Herbert Marcuse, “Industrialization and Capitalism in the Work of Max Weber”, *Negations: Essays in Critical Theory*, trans. Jeremy J. Shapiro, MayFly, 2009, p. 169.

⁷⁶ Yılmaz Üstüner, 2000, p.25. For the original suggestion of such free ‘management’, see Christopher Pollitt, *Managerialism and the public services: the Anglo-American experience*, Cambridge, MA: Basil Blackwell, 1990, pp. 2-7.

⁷⁷ Mary M. Timney and Terrence P. Kelly, “New public management and the devise of popular sovereignty”, *Administrative Theory & Praxis*, Vol. 22 No. 3, 2000, p.556.

⁷⁸ David Osborne, and Ted Gaebler, *Reinventing Government: How the Entrepreneurial Spirit is Transforming the Public Sector*, Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, quoted in the web page of Restructuring Local Government project, Cornell University: <http://government.cce.cornell.edu/doc/summary.asp?id=osborne1992#community> (accessed on 27.6.2012)

2.2.3. Critical Theory in Public Administration: Critique in favour of ‘emancipation’

The basic dilemma deriving from the debate above in terms of the claims of democracy is that although the advocates of public management schools assert that the perspective endeavours to transform the monist and centralist administrative practices (which “undemocratically” prevail in Welfare era) in favour of the higher standard of accountability and transparency within a kind of *customer-driven* democracy, they, to say the least, fail to ensure the public managers staying equal and non-hierarchical within the monitoring of the public who are affected by their decisions and acts. That is because these privileged managers are designated so as to function proactively within competitive free market conditions⁷⁹ in accordance with the individualist postulates of Public Choice and Methodological Individualism. Indeed, the same scientist logic of managerialism as of orthodox administration, as R.Wettenhall and I. Thynne argue, projects a severely contrast model with participative and democratic administration promoting public passivity and alienation towards policy issues:

“Rarely if ever have governments consulted their electorates about whether to embark on privatization programs or adopt other elements of NPM-type reform. These programs have generally appealed to political and commercial elites, and been introduced by them as *faits accompli* presented to mostly passive publics. Not surprisingly, the novelty and comparative longevity of the British privatization program has attracted some exercises in relevant opinion testing, and one based on several elections following the onset of the Thatcher program (1983-1989) confirmed that public opinion generally accepted the status quo--either nationalization or privatization--on the ownership of industry.”⁸⁰

⁷⁹ Yılmaz Üstüner, 2000, p. 22 and pp. 25-6.

⁸⁰ Roger Wettenhall and Ian Thynne, Public enterprise and privatization in a new century: evolving patterns of governance and public management, *Public Finance and Management*, Winter 2002, p. 7.

In line with the same ground, C. Greve and P. Jespersen explicitly set forth the lack of citizen involvement in NPM stating that “the concepts of citizen, citizens rights and citizen participation are almost non-existent in NPM debates”.⁸¹ Emphasis on citizens’ rights, democratic accountability and transparency in management schools is thereby confined to a *consumerist* course of citizenship which is not equally and –thus- democratically enjoyable by the society as a whole.

What is interesting here is that although the management schools derive their ground of legitimation from the critique of the highly “power-concentrated” structure of classical administration, the issue of neutrality and universality of classical administrative theory which inherently conflicts with popular participation and thus accomplishes such power concentration, comes to be embraced also by C. Hood himself with direct reference to his own works and those of V. Ostrom and R. Thomas. It is possible to read such admission as the very outline of what critical theory oppositely exists for as was previously discussed in detail. To put it more clear, it is possible to illustratively make sense of the role of critical theory as revealing the obscured ways through Hood’s effort to bring the management framework near to the classical ‘reduction of public issues’ by unquestionable laws in the sake of neglecting the New Right’s ideological atmosphere which gives to the successive ways of public management:

“That framework was not, according to NPM’S advocates, a machine exclusively tunable to respond to the demands of the New Right or to any one political party or programme (see, for example, Scott Bushnell and Sallee 1990, p. 162; Treasury and Civil Service Committee 1990, pp. ix, 22, 61). In this respect, NPM followed the claims to universality of traditional Public Administration, which also purported to offer a neutral and all-purpose instrument for realizing

⁸¹ Greve, Carsten, and Peter Kragh Jespersen, “New Public Management and its Critics: Alternative Roads to Flexible Service Delivery to Citizens?” in Luc Rouban (ed.) *Citizens and the New Governance: Beyond New Public Management*, IOS Press, 1999.

whatever goals elected representatives might set (Ostrom 1974; Thomas 1978; Hood 1987).”⁸²

Critical theory in public administration on the other hand, as Richard Box suggests⁸³, conceives of the objectification and neutralization seen in such discourse as a result of the proceeding politics and administration dichotomy which conceals the true normative and political character of administration confining the whole policy process to technical and instrumental rationality. Such attempt of depoliticization of administration through professional control, from the point of critical thinking, implicitly relies on the thesis of the *end of ideology* which is itself now ideological more than ever, calling on the depoliticization of public life as well by reducing the social world to the patterns of cause and effect. The discourse on *elected representatives* (“whatever goals elected representatives might set”) also seems to carry a decisionist and formalist conservatism which encourages alienation, passivity and fatalism towards the rule of “those” (i.e. the others, the political elite) by directing the focus towards the “validity” and “properness” of the decision makers rather than neither the roots of legitimacy grounding their rule nor the content of the decisions.

Remembering the relational epistemology of Critical Theory, the object of knowledge cannot be abstracted from subjective linguistic contextualization, as well as all forms of knowledge are socially constructed. Therefore, a critical account of public administration shall seek for the displacement of the generic, universalist and positivist technique of administration (which prevails in both classical and management approaches) with interpretive, critical and self-reflexive methodological ways which are to be dialogically utilized in a reasonable “authentic discourse”⁸⁴. Once the normative and intersubjective character of administration is recognized, the hierarchy and unequal distribution of public power among administrators and subordinates, bureaucrats and citizens could be

⁸² Christopher Hood, 1991, p. 8.

⁸³ Richard Box, 2005, p. 21.

⁸⁴ Charles J. Fox and Hugh T. Miller, 1996, p. 12 and p. 157.

overcome in favour of the association of participative, interactive and collaborative democratic administration which would serve for the creation of a new critical consciousness among public so that the restrictive conditions that dominate the human reason could be revealed and tackled easier.

Consequently, looking from the holistic analytical tools of critical perspective, although they address to different accumulation regimes in economic sphere and hereby despite their differences in locating the roles of state, in defining the quality and quantity of public sector, both the classical way of administration and managerialist movements are the pragmatic products of strict positivist and 'scientist' face of a peculiar understanding of the acquisitions of modernism. Whether for defeating the dysfunctions and risks threatening the market efficiency, or for the rational functioning of bureaucratic organization (which can be also argued to be heading the same way towards capital flow in the long term), both accounts embrace the performative and problem-solving instrumentality of the "scientific knowledge" which results in disregarding the true needs of the society as a whole.

Nevertheless, to speak of the intellectual role of modernism in such consequential pathway of the mainstream tendency, critical school actually does not reject the rational acquisitions of modernism but some peculiar employment of them. That is to say, critical thinkers approach modernism rather sceptically, than nihilistically. The effort they show in sceptic questioning commonly finds its final gate to the rejection of instrumental reasoning within the issues concerning public. More specifically for our main subject, comprehending public administration in a historical context can lead one to question the 'locus' of public administration within the social system, and theory of it within the literature as well. As much as one rejects the claims of unchangeability of the locus, the focus can as well be moved beyond the effort of producing technical knowledge on possible administrative reforms and procedures to be in line with so-called ultimate goals such as *efficiency*. In such outlook, changes and restructuring attempts in public administration cannot be held as responding normal and neutral

to all social class and groups, since changes make sense only in regard to their integral connections with deeper social conflicts⁸⁵.

Hence, deciphering public organizations as an answer to and an element in social conflict can consolidate our critical outlook suggesting that the social consequences of government procedures are not the accidental spinoffs but integral elements in administrative change. In a conclusion, as far as public administration is contextualized in the larger economic, political and social cycle which it is a part of and dependent on, and as therefore dependency of the analysed object on a historically constituted formation is kept in account, critical theory as Box notes it⁸⁶, can offer the possibilities for a better future.

In the light of these, now the essential question which constitutes the main concern of this study can be raised up: What alternative framework of administration the theorists of critical public administration put forth instead? Along with all this mass of critics above, how they conceptualize their larger project in the field for a “better future”?

The founding thinkers of the school of Critical Theory, as discussed earlier, were highly wary of presenting their work as positive and systematic set of philosophical postulates. Therefore, the way they identify themselves was rather the dialectical critique and questioning of mainstream or earlier intellectual traditions ensuring not to go beyond to engage in empirical frameworks. However, due to the very direct relation of the field to concrete social life, critical account in public administration shall more or less propose an alternative political answer that refers to practical reality. As far as the methodological tools of Critical Theory are intended to be utilized, such answer can be sought in the very essence of democratic legitimation which is to be found within human capability of consenting to taking common decisions in an “authentic discourse” and undistorted deliberation environment of participation. Hence what is critical in the

⁸⁵ Patrick Dunleavy, 1982, pp. 217-8.

⁸⁶ Richard Box, 2005, p. 14.

course of critical public administration lies in here: The theoretical effort of demonstrating the analytical ways and solutions of the methods and feasibility of the whole community articulation to decision making processes through direct and equal participation.

The essential common emphasis of the approaches seeking for critical public administration can be inferred as the foremost need of lending public administration to an environment of deliberation. This is for the very reason that contemporary requisites of democracy equally recognize the plural validity claims and entail the truth to come to light only in a fair and healthy environment of debate. For that reason the alleged legitimation stemmed from the ‘neutral’ specialization and professionalization which lead to taking decisions on behalf of the society cannot be acceptable in terms of its democratic shortcomings.

Basic theoretical ground for providing the affirmed deliberation is explicitly addressed by the writings and theory work of a group of authors from Denhardt’s call for a critical reorganization of public administration (1981) and Dunleavy’s proposal of ‘radical’ public administration (1982)⁸⁷ through those of C. Fox and H. Miller,⁸⁸ R. Box, A. Felts, A. G. Ramos, W. Scott, J. Forester to L. White, Rizzo and Brosnan etc.⁸⁹. As Zanetti admits that the most of the work on critical theory in public administration rely on the critical course later expanded by the “second generation” thinker Jurgen Habermas, the address here can be clarified as the *discourse-based critical theory* and its framework of

⁸⁷ Robert B. Denhardt, “Toward a Critical Theory of Public Organization”, *Public Administration Review*, Vol. 41, No. 6, 1981; and *In the shadow of organization*, Lawrence, KS: Regents Press of Kansas, 1981. Patrick Dunleavy, “Is there a radical approach to public administration?” *Public Administration*, Vol. 60 No.2, 1982.

⁸⁸ What makes Fox and Miller listed in critical theorists is their explicit relying on critical theory of Habermas, albeit they contend a “postmodern” theory of public administration. Indeed, despite evident epistemological differences, postmodernist attempts in public administration can as well be counted within critical account thanks to both their contribution to critical thought in the field and their failure to avoid proposing a “reconstruction” in existing structure. This will be discussed in detail in the section of “Radical Discourse Theory”.

⁸⁹ The number of works adduced by Lisa A. Zanetti, “1997, p. 145; and “Repositioning the Ethical Imperative: Critical Theory, Recht, and Tempered Radicals in Public Service”, *The American Review of Public Administration*, Vol. 34 No. 2, June 2004, p. 148.

communicative action, which is a kind of linguistic interaction set for a rational consensus regulated by the normative principles of certain moral philosophy, that addresses *discourse ethics*. It is notable at this point that, emergence of a third generation of critical theory is widely recognized by some, which is gathered largely around Ben Agger's original proposal of "lifeworld-grounded critical theory"⁹⁰ by which he attempts to conceptualize a Habermasian critical theory confronting the challenges from feminist and postmodernist accounts in order to have a deeper insight to "postmodern capitalism". However, though the problematic condition of postmodernity is relevant for the 'critical' discussion of popular participation to administration, this case is mostly being taken into account rather by "radical discourse theory" which I will discuss later, thus it is for now more reasonable to consult Habermas's theory as the main source of influence for the application of critical theory in public administration.

Popular participation as offered by Habermas's lens of communicative interaction is claimed by Dunleavy⁹¹ to be fulfilled so much that it can transcend the 'revisionist' notion of democracy which lacks the participation of masses. It utilizes the 'pure' communication – the type of human action which brings whole public together and gives it a meaning - as only possible in conditions where a fundamental equality among the participants is ensured unlike the decisionistic patterns of technocratic governments that make power differentials necessarily produce the 'systematically distorted communication' in which common meanings or values of truth necessarily and dramatically vanish. In that respect, the ideal speech situation portrayed by Habermas, conditions of which are ethically regulated on a procedural task, provides mutual understanding and conversing on diverse validity claims of the participants, hence makes the actual social interaction possible. The degree of constructive utilization of the validity claims also determines the extent of social interaction. The whole communicative framework thereby legitimizes itself lying on the argument that neither the

⁹⁰ Ben Agger, *The Discourse of Domination: From the Frankfurt School to Postmodernism*, Northwestern Univ Press, 1992.

⁹¹ Patrick Dunleavy, 1982, pp. 219-220.

classical Welfare-type of bureaucratic system nor the logic and consequences of public managerialist transformation could not constitute a sufficient answer to the crisis of liberal democracy in favour of ‘more’ democracy and bypassing the relations of dominance.

In respect to the elements of the depiction thus far, it is not difficult to infer that critical account in public administration offers a “pure” society-centred theory of state and administration, which is not to argue that it could easily be handled along with other society-centred approaches varying around pluralism. At the very least, critical theory in public administration claims a considerable break with the classical account of pluralism in terms of its locating the state, bureaucracy and the groups of civil interest as well as its comprehension of the institutional means of hierarchy in that respect. It can be argued that civil participation as held in pluralism is present to the extent that citizens organizing within different interest groups could achieve to put the pressure on and influence the politics and policy makers within the political authority and bureaucracy, in favour of the demands they put forth. The system is portrayed as a “balance of power” among overlapping economic, religious, ethnic and geographical groupings, as each of these has some voice in shaping socially binding policies⁹². The logic of such achievement of pluralist participation lies on a competitive (but allegedly fair) struggle between civil groups, reflecting a flavour of the conditions of free market competition⁹³ from which the society as a whole is expected to benefit in the long run. Therefore, while attempting to portray a society-centred framework, the approach takes for granted not only the central position of the state and the public institutions under the control of it, but also the hierarchical structure and practices between and among political and civil actors. However, and indeed, taking into account some of the Marxist and structural elitist critiques, influential theorists of the approach such as Robert Dahl and Charles E. Lindblom

⁹² William E. Connolly, “The Challenge to Pluralist Theory”, in *Pluralism in Political Analysis*, ed. William E. Connolly, Aldine Transaction, 2010, p. 3.

⁹³ Yılmaz Üstüner, Siyasa Oluşturma Sürecinde Ağ Yönetişimi Kuramı, *Amme İdaresi Dergisi*, 2003, Vol. 36, No. 3, pp. 50-51.

consequently made fundamental revisions on their “naive” framework breeding a “neo” composition out of it. In their books *Politics, Economics and Welfare*, the authors admit the very existence of privileged participation and influence of the economic elite over the control of the politics and political-economic techniques of policy making which concern the whole society:

“In our discussion of pluralism we made another error – and it is a continuing error in social science – in regarding businessmen and business groups as playing the same interest-group role as other groups in polyarchal systems, though more powerfully. Businessmen play a distinctive role in polyarchal politics that is qualitatively different from that of any other interest group. It is also much more powerful than an interest-group role.”⁹⁴

Despite the lack of an agreed content of understanding to purely define what is termed as neo-pluralism, this “new” version of pluralism as Dahl and Lindblom formulate it pretty much in line with the notable critiques of the classical theory such as in Connolly and McConnell⁹⁵, seems to follow a more “realist” perspective in approaching to the distribution of power in relations of the state and society, and within the society, no longer considering the state a neutral mediator and umpire between the demands of different pressure groups, but a relatively autonomous actor with its institutions that usually seek for their own sectoral interests which are solely open to the influence of certain business elite. Actually, such realism, even if to a small extent, is likely to approximate the approach to a state-centred theory, neo-Weberianism, which is a revision of Weberian theory of organization and state recognizing the influence of global capitalism on administrative elites and autonomy of the legal state, and accordingly citizens’ necessities and the need of external consultation that are immanent in globalized world.

⁹⁴ Robert A. Dahl, Charles E. Lindblom, *Politics, Economics, and Welfare*, Transaction Books, 2000, p. xi-xii.

⁹⁵ William E. Connolly, 2010. Grant McConnell, Private Power and American Democracy, *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 82, No. 2, 1967.

While arguing for such approximation, I for sure do not address a rapprochement disregarding the substantial divergences between (neo-)pluralism and neo-Weberianism, but simply pointing out that where so-called “society-centered” side of neo-Weberianism tends to shift from an internal orientation (of bureaucratic rules) towards an external orientation (of meeting citizens’ needs and wishes)⁹⁶ verges on the retreat of reviewed pluralism from the “umpire” conception of the state and consolidation of the relatively autonomous position of the state as the central authority in policy making, to the extent that it forges its own sectional interests and is biased towards the influence of the competing groups other than ‘powerful’ economic elite on political and administrative institutions. Nevertheless, neo-Weberianism, still as a state-centred theory, appears not to problematize the lack of an impartial state as well as of a fair interplay and faction of interest groups given the cumulative economic inequalities that “neo-pluralists” indicate as a fundamental problem for equal representation in liberal democracy, therefore it confines the context of its “neo” element, that is basically ‘citizen-orientation’, merely to the “supplementation (not replacement) of the role of representative democracy by a range of devices for consultation with, and the direct representation of, citizens’ views”⁹⁷.

The point of rupture of critical theory from both approaches first and foremost stems from its philosophical and epistemological roots, which provide the theoretical capacity to distinguish between ‘is’ and ‘ought’ as discussed before. Critical and dialectical thought, as discussed in previous sections, postulates its norms of critique based on rational potentials for human happiness and freedom, which are used to negate existing states of affairs that oppress individuals and restrain human freedom and capacity. It assumes the existence of another realm of ideas, images, and imagination that serves as a potential guide for a social transformation that would realize the unrealized potentialities for a

⁹⁶ Christopher Pollitt and Geert Bouckaert, *Public Management Reform: A Comparative Analysis*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004, p. 118.

⁹⁷ *Ibid*, p. 119.

“better life”.⁹⁸ Critical theory in public administration shall hence seek to reveal the conditions that obstruct ‘ought’ in ‘is’, and then contemplate on the practical ways for the change for emancipation. It shall deal with the prevailing relations of power between the state and civil society by not avoiding to take them as *explananda*; instead of taken them for granted as the factual reality explaining the essence of social world, as if the possibilities of the reality are necessarily limited merely to the positivist-empiricist reality, and thus relations of power and dependence themselves do not refer to any causality before themselves.

Provoking the questioning concerning the “decisionist legitimacy” imprudently attributed to top official levels of public administration in which professional public administrators become the central focus of meaningful change (such as redistribution of social wealth with the goal of “social equity”), critical theory aims at generating the conditions in which a fully conscious public enacts change⁹⁹ and becomes the subject of the political action towards that change. In these conditions, as Box notes, public administrators do not strive for greater power, autonomy and recognition but give away knowledge and the power to make decisions to the people who are affected by those decisions. Urging for public consciousness to enact such change is essential for critical theory since little has changed from the times Marcuse wrote for contemporary industrial society that “its productivity is destructive of the free development of human needs and faculties” and the needs of that productivity happens to be the needs of every single individual as “the whole appears to be the very embodiment of Reason”.¹⁰⁰

What is more to the point that the theory should stimulate beyond the question of “administrative legitimacy” through authentic discourse as the outcome of full public consciousness and interaction, since “the partially democratic nature of the capitalist political system allows public access to

⁹⁸ “Introduction to the Second Edition by Douglas Kellner” in Herbert Marcuse, 2002, p. xvii.

⁹⁹ Richard Box, 2005, p. 74.

¹⁰⁰ Herbert Marcuse, 2002, p. xl.

policy”¹⁰¹ and that makes an illusion of democratic legitimacy in formal-legal decision making, yet without justification. Habermas calls attention to that problem of ‘arrayed’ imposition of authority by underlining the impossibility of legitimacy lacking radical type of democracy in modern societies:

“Behind the hackneyed rhetoric, timidity reigns. Even in established democracies, the existing institutions of freedom are no longer above challenge, although here the populations seem to press for more democracy rather than less. I suspect, however, that the unrest has a still deeper source, namely, the sense that in the age of a completely secularized politics, the rule of law cannot be had or maintained without radical democracy.”¹⁰²

However, the fatal problem of the employment of critical theory in the field of public administration discussed thus far presents itself at this very point of locating the alternative. The problem, as this study suggests as its basic thesis, lies on the common overemphasis on pure philosophical foundations offering the dissolution of relations of dominance between administration and public, and among the public as a matter of providing the conditions of ideal speech. In other words, none of the past intellectual works of the thinkers and scholars labelled under ‘critical’ account come to formulate a satisfactorily programmatic composition linked to political action which is able to transcend the individualistic, constructivist and idealist theoretical approach towards the moments and dynamics of the change regarding social reality. Eventually, at the basis where public management breaks down, it appears that the morality of the procedure developed within the theory of communicative action cannot go beyond the micro and local scale failing to touch down the structural essence of dominance over humankind and taking a substantial counter position towards it. Despite its extending body of literature, the unfavourable outcome primarily such

¹⁰¹ Richard Box, 1995, p. 74.

¹⁰² Jurgen Habermas, *Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy*, trans. W. Rehg, The MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1996, p. xlii.

as ‘marginalization’ of the ongoing status of critical account within the field can be followed by Box’s reflexive short notes below:

“In such a field [as public administration], one would think a body of theory that offers critique of public institutions plus a vision of a better future would appeal to writers. Critical theory does these things, but it appears infrequently in the literature of public administration”.¹⁰³

In order to foreground such criticism, now I would like to discuss the discourse-based critical theory and communicative action along with the proceduralist model developed in that framework more detailly in search of the questions such as for what essential characteristic of human capability for *langue*, rational practical discourse could encourage to overcome all objective conflicts and inequalities among individuals and social groups, and in what societal conditions ideal speech that is rationally motivated and purified from dominance could be possible.

2.3. Towards a Discourse-Based Critical Theory

It can be argued that discourse-based critical theory refers to a more decisive separation from so-called “objectivist” explanation of social reality than earlier Frankfurt theorists. Also having been depicted as the second and third generation of Critical School, it provides the epistemological and intellectual foundation for almost all theory work on critical social theory in public administration¹⁰⁴ converging on a communicative agenda elevated by the conceptions such as lifeworld and system, communicative rationality, ideal speech situation, whether implicitly or explicitly. Retreat from Marxist “positivist determinism”, “mechanism”, “laws of motion” is actually explicable on the basis

¹⁰³ Richard Box, 2005, p. 14.

¹⁰⁴ Lisa A. Zanetti, 1997.

of Habermas's attempt of restructuring historical materialism in terms of distinguishing between knowledge gained from causal analysis and knowledge gained from self-reflection and social interaction, albeit, as discussed earlier, Horkheimer, Adorno and Marcuse defended Marx's own *oeuvre* also as an opponent of positivism.¹⁰⁵

Relevancy of discourse theory suggested by this categorical distinction on bilateral types of knowledge with the field of public administration is actually much easier to comprehend than that of classical Marxist causal analysis of the state and bureaucracy. In other words, agendas of social change are limited to the categorical realm of public discourse and self-reflection which includes the scope and role of public administration as well, since it is not impossible to reconcile the alienating "modern administration" with true rational public consensus, unlike the "administrative apparatus" of capitalist state in Marxist terms. Split of discourse-based critical theory from both Marxism and Frankfurt School and its relevancy with public administration then lies on a certain categorization which excludes the transformation of whole technological interaction of human with nature from the realm of knowledge gained from self-reflection and social interaction. For Habermas it was "a heritage of mysticism" that Frankfurt thinkers agreed with early Marx to change not only deliberative processes and social policies but also the social organization of science and technology.¹⁰⁶ His clear rejection of the transformation in our whole technological interaction with nature thus led his theory closer to the seeking of change through the parliamentary social democracy of E. Bernstein (and then of Scandinavians), than through classical Marxist notions of class struggle.

Discourse-based critical theory as such is relevant with the scope of administration not only because of its attributing public administration a role and position for the change, but also of the original quest of critical theory for certain

¹⁰⁵ Ben Agger, 1991, p. 25.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid, p. 26.

rationality other than purposive-instrumental. As aforementioned discussions concerning the democratic shortcomings of both classical administration and its managerial transformation have highly stressed, question of legitimacy happens to be dealt only in regard of interactive public dialogue and action that are ensured to function rationally; thus turning out to be non-hierarchical and critical. Keeping in mind Habermas's words that "the Enlightenment philosophers wanted to utilize this accumulation of specialized culture for the enrichment of everyday life — that is to say, for the rational organization of everyday social life", as David J. Farmer contends, public administration may as well be considered one form of this "rational organization of everyday social life".¹⁰⁷ It therefore should shift its focal point rather to cultivation of a rational public sense towards emancipation from reproduction and legitimization of the state, its ideology and its capitalist adjustments. Relevancy of discourse-based critical theory and the framework of communicative action with the notion of popular participation thereby needs a deeper description as I would like to offer now, inasmuch as Habermas's discursive account of decision making has provided a sort of blueprint to guide the collaboration between citizen and administration.¹⁰⁸

It is clear that discourse-based critical theory has developed a different path from critical theory of the Frankfurt School shifting the ground of critical theory from the philosophy of consciousness to that of communication¹⁰⁹; nonetheless it still shares its aims of emancipation, including the ideal of "praxis" which connects the theory to practice towards transformation of social reality. To speak specifically for Habermas's theoretical concern, it is argued by some even to have a more valuing attitude towards political practice than the first generation of critical theorists, due to their total dismissal of bourgeois philosophy and despair

¹⁰⁷ David John Farmer, *Public Administration in Perspective: Theory and Practice Through Multiple Lenses*, M.E. Sharpe, 2010, p. 79.

¹⁰⁸ Terrence Kelly, Unlocking The Iron cage: Public Administration in the Deliberative Democratic Theory of Jurgen Habermas, *Administration & Society*, Vol. 36, 2004, p. 49.

¹⁰⁹ Ben Agger, 1991, p. 25.

about the capacity of advanced capitalist societies to embrace all tendencies toward the development of critical consciousness¹¹⁰. Social transformation, on the other hand, still requires the withdrawal of the conditions leading to domination and oppress according to discourse account. However, remembering Habermas's attempt of reconstructing historical materialism, from a discourse theory perspective Marxism inaccurately deals with capitalism which is related to human social life by rigid determinist laws of positive science undervaluing the influence of social and intersubjective active interaction of human beings on their life and destiny. From such viewpoint, human beings are capable of reflecting upon their own history, as individuals and members of larger societies; and of using precisely that reflection to change the course of history.¹¹¹ That being the case, discourse-based critical theory has seriously truncated the emancipatory agenda of historical materialism in favour of the paradigm of the notions such as self-reflection, reflexive formation of human agents, communicative interaction, social integration etc. all of which are allegedly neglected by the positivist and objectivist materialism of Marxist theory. All these notions refer to specific qualities of human agents through which they historically reproduce themselves constituting the relations of production, and are not necessarily determined by social labour, mode and/or forces of production. Such breaking with Marxist "determinism" between the forces and relations of production is actually indebted to the fundamental dichotomies and irreducibility of different realms and types of social action, rationality, power and knowledge in Habermas's theory of communicative action, all of which are basically carried out within the tensional relation between system and the lifeworld.

¹¹⁰ Jeff Livesay, Normative Grounding and Praxis: Habermas, Giddens, and a Contradiction within Critical Theory, *Sociological Theory*, vol. 3, 1985, p. 66.

¹¹¹ Anthony Giddens, "Jurgen Habermas" in Quentin Skinner (ed.) *Return of Grand Theory in the Human Sciences*, Cambridge University Press, 1985, p. 125.

2.3.1. In a Quest for the Rationalization of the Life world

The realm of “system” in Habermas’s theory of communicative action refers to the macro structure administrating the society through non-communicative steering mechanisms, money and power, being under the control of state, bureaucracy and market forces through which social interaction of the agents is conducted in instrumental reasoning. Formation of the system and its subsystems originates from the necessities of material production. Its counterbalance is on the other hand, the realm of the lifeworld. Unlike the system, lifeworld refers to the ‘every day’ public sphere of the interactions, face-to-face experiences that are centered on cultures, identities, traditions, understanding, mutual respect and solidarity which is communicatively structured and reproduced by justificatory arguments, expressive speech acts, discussions and deliberations, interpretive and narrative practices, and thus autonomously from the domination of state and economics. Its formation thus originates from the norms of communicative reasoning.¹¹²

The realms of system and the lifeworld are irreducible to each other, since each of them has its own specific sort of logic, action, value and organization. What is described as the crisis of modernism is indeed the fact that institutionalized instruments of power intrinsic to system imposes its own logic of action into the whole organization of social life, eventually culminating with the colonization of the lifeworld.

Idea of the lifeworld requires drawing a heavy line between the state (and all organizations associated with system) and civil society, which will be critically elaborated later on in this study. For now, as an inference it can be argued that the logic of such sphere lies on the premise that the knowledge derived from interpretive analysis can be translated into social action which would intersubjectively create a renewed democratic and collectively autonomous realm.

¹¹² Jürgen Habermas, *The Theory of Communicative Action Volume 2: Lifeworld and System: A Critique of Functionalist Reason*, trans. T. McCarthy, Boston: Beacon Press, 1987, pp. 135-137; 186-190.

For the crisis of modernism does not necessarily entail giving away whole intellectual legacy of it, the solution is derived here from ensuring the full autonomy of such public realm, which is to be consolidated with utmost democratic ethics which goes far from considering politics merely as a question of administration.

Such functioning of social reality relies on two respectively different types of social action; which are “strategic” and “communicative”. Habermas suggests separating these two types of action according to the way in which individual actions are engaged in social patterns of interaction:

“Concepts of social action are distinguished... according to how they specify the goal-directed actions of different participants: as the interlacing of egocentric calculations of utility (whereby the degree of conflict and cooperation varies with the given interest positions) [strategic action]... or as reaching understanding in the sense of a cooperative process of interpretation [communicative action].”¹¹³

Communicative action is therefore oriented toward intersubjective understanding, the coordination of actions through public dialogue, and the socialization of members of the community. Habermas literally defines it as referring to “the interaction of at least two subjects capable of speech and action who establish interpersonal relations (whether by verbal or by extra-verbal means). The actors seek to reach an understanding about the action situation and their plans of action in order to coordinate their actions by way of agreement”¹¹⁴ which is to be guided solely by communicative rationality. Communicative rationality is then, accordingly, at the very root of the unification of subject and object developed in such discourse account of critical theory. It, Habermas clarifies, brings about the connotations grounded entirely on “the central experience of the unconstrained, unifying, consensus-bringing force of

¹¹³ Jurgen Habermas, *The Theory of Communicative Action Volume 1: Reason and the Rationalization of Society*, trans. T. McCarthy, Boston: Beacon Press, 1984, p. 101.

¹¹⁴ Ibid, p. 86.

argumentative speech in which different participants overcome their merely subjective views and, owing to the mutuality of rationally motivated conviction, assure themselves of both the unity of the objective world and the intersubjectivity of their lifeworld.”¹¹⁵. It is thus rooted in the interaction of social life referring to the extent to which communicative action is characterized by the reflective understanding of competent actors.¹¹⁶

Lifeworld, in this context, corresponds to the socially transcendental order in which autonomous “subjects” interact with each other using their communicative rationality for reaching consensus on debatable issues, thereby continuously develop their communicative capability and rationality for realization of themselves. Unlike the “system”, it composes of the mechanisms which social agents utilize to reach for a common conception of life and world according to their intentions, as they do not merely expect success as the outcome of their action. System, on the other hand, cannot influence this autonomous sphere, as it is totally left aside by lifeworld being driven by technocratic reason and strategic/instrumental rationality which are to be employed for the necessities of material production. Hence, people in social interaction in system are not regarded as subjects as in lifeworld, but as things and objects of the system. Rationalization of the lifeworld, then, refers to the gradual rationalization of communicative capability, critical questioning and rational deliberation among public, and thus to the emancipation of the rational potentiality of communicative action which will eventually lead to emancipation of human beings. What is most striking here is that the end of hierarchies of power related to the acts of communication is involved by a rationality of this sort:

“Rationalization here means extirpating those relations of force that are inconspicuously set in the very structure of communication and that prevent conscious settlement of conflicts, and consensual regulation of conflicts by means of

¹¹⁵ Jurgen Habermas, 1984, p. 10.

¹¹⁶ John S. Dryzek, *Discursive Democracy: Politics, Policy, and Political Science*, Cambridge University Press, 1994, p.14.

interpsychic as well as interpersonal communication. Rationalization means overcoming such systematically distorted communication”¹¹⁷

2.3.2. Ideal Speech Situation and Discourse Ethics

Source of the pre-discussed conception of rationality emanates from mutual dialogue and understanding which require the “ideal speech situation”, conditions of that should be “free from deception, self-deception, strategic behaviour and domination through the exercise of power”.¹¹⁸ That being the case, it is notable that the basic logic of discourse-based approach of critical theory originally lies on its assumption on the conditions of an ideal speech situation which is to be intersubjectively formed, relied and thus its respective effort to provide a programmatic framework to dispose of the immanent relations of domination and oppress through and within those conditions.

These ideal conditions of a speech situation should principally ensure that all social participants have communicative competence which means the equal and full capacity to develop and criticize arguments. As Dryzek notes,¹¹⁹ ideal speech situation should not set any limitation to the participant of competent actors so that it would be assured that there will be no force than the force for better argument. In such situation, all parties involved would seek for their personal interests only through an intersubjective discourse in which they listen, understand, criticize and value all of the arguments in order to build or reach an assent, based on a contest for the better arguments with the best information and

¹¹⁷ Jurgen Habermas, “Toward a Reconstruction of Historical Materialism” in his *Communication and The Evolution of Society*, Polity Press, 1992, pp. 119-120.

¹¹⁸ John S. Dryzek, 1994, p. 14.

¹¹⁹ Ibid, p. 15.

reasons.¹²⁰ Ideal conditions of speech should therefore provide the rational and ‘non-coercive’ regulation of the issues deliberated so as to have them comply with common interests and benefits of all parties. Habermas introduces the “universalization principle” of such ideal argumentation as follows: “a contested norm cannot meet the consent of the participants in a practical discourse unless...all affected can *freely* accept the consequences and the side effects that the *general* observance of a controversial norm can be expected to have for the satisfaction of the interests of *each individual*” (emphasis in original).

As a distinct but complementary element to this moral principle, there is the principle of discourse ethics which stipulates “only those norms can claim to be valid that meet (or could meet) with the approval of all affected in their capacity as participants in a practical discourse.”¹²¹ On a side note, high influence of Kantian ethics is obvious here in the sense of generating moral norms from the ground of certain rationality.

Finally, such morally-driven discourse requires five fundamental *presuppositions* of argumentation upon which the universalization principle can be grounded as participants in speech situations all respect:

1. No party affected by what is being discussed should be excluded from the discourse (the requirement for generality)
2. All participants should have equal possibility to present and to criticize validity claims in the process of discourse (autonomy)
3. Participants must be willing and able to empathize with each other’s validity claims (ideal role taking)

¹²⁰ Jurgen Habermas, 1996, p. 228.

¹²¹ Jurgen Habermas, *Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action*, trans. by C. Lenhardt and S. W. Nicholsen, The MIT Press, 1999, p. 93.

4. Existing power differences between participants must be neutralized such that these differences have no effect on the creation of consensus (power neutrality)
5. Participants must openly explain their goals and intentions and in this connection desist from strategic action (transparency)¹²²

These explicit presuppositions make it clear that discursive participation in this model is not a *detached* one since communicative rationality stipulates empathy, power neutralization etc., it is thereby, as Flyvbjerg suggests, far cry from the models of contingent types of bargaining or strategically negotiated compromises between conflicting particular interests.¹²³

Overall, discursive formation of democratic legitimacy is, in the final analysis, constituted through a certain discourse ethics reciprocally shared by the parties, who are to form an unrestricted, rational and enlightened deliberative participation as a regulated exchange of information and reasons, thus contributing to the solution of problems relevant to ‘valid’ issues and deriving the ‘better’ arguments.¹²⁴ Moreover, democratic legitimacy based on such universalist moral justification is also a legitimate community of citizenship. Any association, Habermas notes, constitutes itself as a body of citizens insofar as it institutionalizes such a procedure for the purposes of democratically regulating the conditions of its common life.¹²⁵ The democratic process in these conditions is governed by universal principles of justice that are equally constitutive for every body of citizens. It is clear that deliberative politics does not conceive this body of citizenship on a collectively acting citizenry as in republicanism, but on the institutionalization of the conditions of communication and procedures associated

¹²² Bent Flyvbjerg, *Making Social Science Matter: Why social inquiry fails and how it can succeed again*, Cambridge University Press, 2001, p. 91.

¹²³ *Ibid.*, p. 91.

¹²⁴ Jurgen Habermas, 1996, pp. 222-232, pp. 302-306.

¹²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 306.

with aforementioned discourse ethics¹²⁶ by an effort to weave together republican and liberal views. What is needed to reactivate the process of democratic will-formation is then not the virtues of citizens “but simply morally justified [democratic] procedures”.¹²⁷ In short, the ideal procedure of deliberation and decision making presumes any association as its carrier to the extent that it agrees to regulate the conditions of its common life impartially. What brings legal parties together is, therefore, the linguistic bond that holds together each communication community.

2.3.3. Procedural Source of Legitimacy

It was stated before that critical theory would oppose decisionist legitimation attributed to administrative (or technocratic) authority without questioning democratic legitimacy of the content of decisions. On the other hand, discourse paradigm of critical theory explained up until now, can be argued to be an expression of moral decisionism which traces the legitimacy of decisions within both the proper authority, that is “epistemic authority” to be generated by public itself, and the moral method (process) applied for regulating the normative ground of legitimacy of such authority, which is the rule of universalization principle and the norms of discourse ethics. These two ethical sources of seeking legitimation reveal the proceduralist aspect of the moral decisionism comprehended by discourse version of critical theory.

Procedure applied here basically refers, on macro/practical scale, to the legal institutionalization of the communicative practices, forms and conditions of informal networks of public spheres settled in lifeworld, in simplest terms, it refers to direct participation to politics and administration by means of public deliberation and dialogue. The influence it constitutes as an informal, “more or

¹²⁶ Jurgen Habermas, Three Normative Models of Democracy, *Constellations*, Vol. 1, No. 1, 1994, p. 7.

¹²⁷ Axel Honneth, Democracy as Reflexive Cooperation: John Dewey and the Theory of Democracy Today, *Political Theory*, Vol. 26, No. 6, 1998, p. 763.

less rational” public opinion-formation based on higher-level intersubjectivity, for Habermas, should be transformed into “communicative power” through the channels of political elections; and communicative power is to be again transformed into “administrative power” through legislation.¹²⁸ He clarifies this “ideal” process of institutionalization as follows:¹²⁹

“If we first view this practice as a problem-solving process, then it owes its legitimating force to a democratic procedure intended to guarantee a rational treatment of political questions. The rational acceptability of results achieved in conformity with procedure follows from the institutionalization of interlinked forms of communication that, ideally speaking, ensure that all relevant questions, issues, and contributions are brought up and processed in discourses and negotiations on the basis of the best available information and arguments. This legal institutionalization of specific procedures and conditions of communication is what makes possible the effective utilization of equal communicative freedom and at the same time enjoins the pragmatic, ethical, and moral use of practical reason or, as the case may be, the fair balance of interests.”

That being the case, it is only the procedural conditions of public participation for the democratic genesis of legal statutes which secure the legitimacy of an enacted law, policy or decision. This macro aspect of proceduralism demonstrates the pragmatic/practical process in which procedure is regarded *sine qua non* for democratic legitimacy of political administration.

On micro/theoretical scale, we see rather the very epistemological premises attributed to the defence of proceduralism. That is, proceduralism on the one hand denotes that there can be no substantial content related to ethical principles and thus proposes formalism (not to be confused with formal democracy) *vis-à-vis* substantialism (ideal principles of speech should be

¹²⁸ Jurgen Habermas, 1994, p. 8.

¹²⁹ Jurgen Habermas, 1996, p. 170.

carefully distinguished from the “substantive principles or basic norms, which can only be the subject matter of moral argumentation”¹³⁰); whereas on the other hand it emphasizes that these principles emerge as the fruits of application of universal morality in an intersubjective communication process (“a democratic procedure is fair if and only if the only policies it can result in are reasonably justifiable from the perspectives of all who might be affected by them”), and thus highlights its methodological/procedural aspect. That means, the path discourse ethics follows to achieve this requires two steps. It shall first replace Kant’s ‘categorical imperative’ (“act only according to that maxim by which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law”) by a procedure of moral argumentation, carrying ethical norms from an abstract and universal sphere to intersubjective sphere on the one hand (since it is assumed that anyone affected from a decision or a rule has a say over the formation process of these normative principles). This being the case, ideal speech should not involve any substantive normative principles (such as individual liberty, equal opportunity etc.) beyond what is necessary in terms of the (intersubjectively) “valid” norms of procedure for a fair democratic process. Justice, for instance, lies not on the content of the argumentation or decision but on the fairness of procedure and its implementation. If the procedure is fair thereby the outcome will be just, and legitimate. The proceduralist understanding for Habermas thus “privileges the communicative presuppositions and procedural conditions of democratic opinion and will-formation as the sole source of legitimation”¹³¹ as political legitimation of any decision is achieved if and only if they are the outcomes of fair democratic procedures.

Second, as can easily be anticipated from the first point, discourse ethics shall consider the mutually communicating individuals as the providers of a normative context to aforementioned principles so that categorical imperative can

¹³⁰ Jurgen Habermas, 1999, p. 93.

¹³¹ Jurgen Habermas, 1996, p. 450.

play the huge part of a principle of justification discriminating between valid and invalid norms in terms of their universalizability: what every rational being should be able to will is justified in a moral sense.¹³² Despite the nuance that Kant attempted to derive individual duties from the idea of self-contradiction instead of performative contradiction as in discourse ethics, in any case a non-compliant person would be charged with being “irrational”¹³³, thanks to the rule democratic legitimacy of the procedure.

Procedural deliberative model proposed by discourse-based critical theory, in short, stipulates the very condition that, policies shall be adopted not because the most powerful interests prevail, but citizens decide on their accuracy and validity after listening and criticizing all reasonable validity claims. To remember the moral requirements for the ideal discourse, the significant point matter for deliberation is the conditions how the debate is realized, rather than neither what is discussed nor what decisions are taken, so that the procedure is the mere source of the administrative legitimacy. As a result, there is no substance or essence of the participation, but only the ethical circumscription which is rationally regulated prevails in democratic genesis of administration.

Such procedural conception of democratic process may be argued to develop a sufficient answer to reductionist conceptions of democracy which eliminate the element of democratic legitimacy from power and law, just for it, as Habermas argues, breaks with a holistic model of society centered in the state and claims to be neutral with respect to competing worldviews and forms of life¹³⁴. However, from the outlook of this thesis, proceduralism as such constitutes one of the centre points of critical analysis since it carries the risk of drifting apart from emancipatory agenda which is original to critical theory, to the extent that it

¹³² Jürgen Habermas, 1999, pp. 196-197.

¹³³ Jari Ilmari Niemi, The Foundations of Jürgen Habermas’s Discourse Ethics, *The Journal of Value Inquiry*, Vol. 42, No. 2, 2008, p. 258.

¹³⁴ Jürgen Habermas, 1996, p. 288.

reduces the conditions of power neutralization solely to the compliance with procedure by overemphasising the value of common understanding. It may be anticipated until now that it simply intends to centralize the state and administration for so-called technization/colonization of lifeworld and thus overlook the peculiar integrity of state and society in capitalist social formation. It thus proposes the possibilities of collective communicative rationality by excluding the institutions of state and market forces quiet easily from the sphere of lifeworld, at the expense of passing over mutual extensions of each sphere into each other, most fundamentally in terms of sustainability of power and ideology. Now, after attempting to include the radical theory of administration in such discursive account of proceduralism, I will maintain with questioning the reliability of capitalist system/lifeworld in terms of a domination-free governance and public life.

2.4. Radical Discourse Theory in Public Administration: Modern or Postmodern?

Repercussions of discourse theory on the field of public administration, if any generalization is possible, can be regarded as an ‘ontologically’ sceptic and relativist (anti)theory of administration attempting to build a discourse model of public affairs into a presumed “postmodern” era. Despite the historical overlap with the rise of critical approach regarding the legitimacy question of administration, what makes radical discourse theory “radical” in its label, addresses its distinctive emphasis on the exposition of postmodern conditions and need of *agonistic* discourse, unlike the certain rationality sought by discourse approach of the second and third generation of critical school. Indeed, radical discourse theory in public administration can be argued to refer to just another transpositional form of well-known postmodern critique on “modernist” social sciences. From the formation of the international network of Public

Administration Theory (PAT-Net)¹³⁵ in late 70s through Blacksburg Manifesto of a critical concern for a “legitimate” place for public administration¹³⁶ in the early 80s, similarly as in most disciplines of social sciences, the approach has gained a considerable impact on critical and normative theory of public administration towards 90s and subsequently has begun to be identified as a ‘movement’.

Thus, it is not baffling to see that the rise of radical discourse approach goes hand in hand with the “demise” of metanarratives and the argument “death of the subject” alleged primarily through the pragmatic questioning of “Marxism in crisis” on the one hand, and the significant attack and incremental “victory” of the New Right and its administrative ideology, that is New Public Management, on the other. The last but not the least, complementary elements of this historical framework are present on the social scene: arising subcultures and respective emergence of a variety of social movements; feminist, anti-racist, anti-nuclear, environmentalist and so on, born into a continually industrializing and developing world within which practices of social struggles are gradually getting complex. Such compound setting is argued to lead to an intellectual reflection which defends the idea that the formation of social reality is not depended upon a logic of determinism with admission of some “necessary relations of things” but on the discursive practices swinging in contingency. As such, these discursive practices can then provide a “public energy field” in which both ordinary citizens and new social movements would overcome the oppression in different fields of life, and search for potentially more egalitarian, liberal and democratic societies through the deconstructive and constructive “power” of *agonistic* discourse.

However, with respect to such historical framework inferred for the core of radical discourse, it would be a bit risky not to carefully distinguish those who attempt to theorize public administration based on a timid critique of mainstream

¹³⁵ <http://www.pattheory.org/> (accessed on 26.6.2012)

¹³⁶ Richard C. Box, Dialogue and Administrative Theory & Praxis: Twenty-Five Years of Public Administration Theory, *Administrative Theory & Praxis*, Vol. 27, No. 3, 2005, p. 450.

vision either or not carrying a somewhat postmodernist tie to current condition of social reality, and those who explicitly declare the “leap” to postmodern stage of public administration by proposing a fitting into postmodern conditions through the means of discourse. The latter is literally what I regard as radical discourse account, and rise of it was manifested by O. C. McSwite as discourse movement¹³⁷ which is cultivated for them by the speculation of a theoretical “sea change” occurring in the field that seemed to be supporting a “movement” toward reconceptualising public administration around the core idea of discourse. For both McSwite and Box¹³⁸, the prominent works of the movement are those of Cynthia McSwain and Orion White (individually and writing as O. C. McSwite), of Charles Fox and Hugh Miller, and of David John Farmer, they share much with each other on the purpose of “moving the field past its obsessional identification with rationalism and with technocratic expertise as its *raison d’être*”¹³⁹, albeit having different points of sub-interest. The movement, commonly for its all followers, aims at achieving a total salvation of the theory from “the threat of being completely overtaken by a market-based rational-choice brand of thought” while employing a theoretical path towards radical pluralism which would replace the “value” of discourse with institutional determinism, technocratic empiricism, goal-orientation etc. all of which are associated with modernist fashion of administration and organization.

Nevertheless, breaking with the discourse-based critical theory is a contentious issue for radical discourse in public administration; an issue which would yield one some clues concerning the possible modernist/foundational traces of this very application of discourse theory. That is for the reason that a poststructuralist theory of administration may sound dilemmatic to one who

¹³⁷ O. C. McSwite, On The Discourse Movement – A Self Interview, *Administrative Theory & Praxis*, Vol. 22, No. 1, 2000.

¹³⁸ Ibid. Richard C. Box, Pragmatic Discourse and Administrative Legitimacy, *The American Review of Public Administration*, Vol. 32, No. 1, 2002, p. 22.

¹³⁹ Orion F. White, The Ideology of Technocratic Empiricism and the Discourse Movement in Contemporary Public Administration, *Administration & Society*, Vol. 30, No. 4, 1998, p. 471.

conceive of the phenomenon of administration as the set of rational activity, practice and process as is widespread, given that it is directly related to the instruments needed to achieve the predefined objectives regarding public issues.

It is, on “discourse” level, an issue of either declaring or rejecting an era of postmodern conditions and developing a respective epistemological stance towards it, which draws the very line between critical and radical discourse theories. This line on which epistemological tools are explicitly defined also constitutes the respective approaches towards the social systems immanent in capitalism, in either a ‘modern’ or ‘postmodern’ reality. As Farmer states,¹⁴⁰ critical theorists rather urge a “reconstructive” approach to modernity, rejecting the postmodernist break between modernity and postmodernity. Their engagement with the critique of modernity, especially for the first generation, was conducted in a discussion of the development of new forms of social domination in instrumental rationality and capitalist modernity. Such historically ‘conditional’ critique was eventually furthered by Habermas, who put forth that modernity has not yet played out its hand. However, deconstructive attempt of postmodernists would reject the very idea of social systems and progress in advance, thus reflecting as well on public administration field as a withdrawal from “epistemological assurance” and certainty:

“Thinking about public administration within the mind-set of modernity will be understood as including the search for grounded knowledge, reaping the benefits of reasoning considered to be well founded. Thinking within the mind-set of postmodernity will be seen to include a working out of the radical consequences of abandoning what are considered the false epistemological and other illusions of modernity.”¹⁴¹

¹⁴⁰ David J. Farmer, *The Language of Public Administration: Bureaucracy, Modernity and Postmodernity*, The University of Alabama Press, 1995, p. 6.

¹⁴¹ Ibid, p. 7.

Therefore, moving from poststructuralist epistemology, the well-known argument of “death of the subject” that sets forth such “epistemological illusions” in modernity, brings the theorists of radical discourse to the evaluation that there is no reality but some temporary truths. There is nothing contradictory in such argument. However, the fact that these truths can only be derived in an intersubjective “authentic” discourse environment is the clamp where withdrawal from epistemological assurance is risky to fail, since their framework does not genuinely take into account of the conditions of such environment in terms of inclusionary and exclusionary aspects of domination. Theory of public administration, I believe, cannot be of a pure debate between modernism and postmodernism, as well as structuralism and poststructuralism, insofar as political economic foundations of the state and capitalism are not directly identified and problematized. This would probably not be concerned by postmodernists; however such negligence would not also be realized in consistency as once a model of public governance is proposed and even reified, which appears to deteriorate the alleged “epistemological neutrality”. I would now like to proceed a bit further through such point.

In their book in which they first asserted “postmodern public administration”¹⁴², the ground on which Fox and Miller define their theoretical underpinnings and locate the legitimacy of ‘postmodern’ defence is twofold and interdependent: 1. It is the Western-type “representative democratic accountability feedback loop model” of democracy which simply does not work as it has lost its credibility in democratically responding to postmodern conditions where tendencies towards the fragmentation of more authentic multi cultures and societies of discourse are unneglectably on rise.¹⁴³ 2. It is the postmodern conditions that render the issues of governance, will formation, problem solving,

¹⁴² Charles J. Fox and Hugh T. Miller, 1996.

¹⁴³ Ibid, pp. 6-7.

citizen participation etc. problematic by making particularly salient the thinning of reality and development of *hyperreality*.¹⁴⁴

The argument points out one single problematic situation by addressing two ‘launcher’ subjects (simply; lack of sufficient democracy vs. postmodern conditions). What makes such argument smack of tautology, is basically the portrayal of “postmodern turn” as easily taken for granted without analytically questioning for instance political, economic and ideological dynamics in the very same scheme, that may induce or have impact on the emergence of “those” conditions. Except a fragile addressing on “media-infused” and consumerist triggering of hyperreality of public consciousness, the so-called “turn” is actually not treated as an *explanandum*. As an example which also widely prevails in theorists of radical discourse, no causal (or effective) relation is presumed in advance between the holistic structure that precisely integrates advanced capitalism with the constitutionalist practice of “loop model of democracy”, its ideological functioning within the production of knowledge on public consciousness, and such hyperreality of social world.

For this regard, it is too ironically an ontological assumption associated with modernity, what Derrida calls its procedure as “logocentrism” - which refers to constitution of dualities and then imposing a hierarchy between two sides, which subsequently normalized as truth. The “modern vs. postmodern” contradiction dominant in Fox and Miller¹⁴⁵ seems of a naive logocentric narration since it does not provide any historical explanation regarding such periodization, in their words, a division into eras. It appears to be constructive or reconstructive, rather than deconstructive to explain postmodernity solely through the oppositions of logical categories ascribed to ‘modern’ and leave it as a self-proclaimed conception. Unlike for instance, Frederic Jameson who *historically* approaches to postmodernism identifying as an ideological declaration and

¹⁴⁴ Ibid, pp. 43.

¹⁴⁵ Ibid, p. 43-45.

cultural logic of the conditions of intellectual labour imposed by the late capitalism¹⁴⁶, the periodization of modernity/postmodernity is *implicitly* outlined by Fox and Miller as constituting a necessary leap which has eventually become a *fait accompli*, as if it is a “story” free from explanation, and a “description” free from ideology (since logocentrism is also the reason why and how “sometimes explicitly, but more often *implicitly*, onto-theological foundations are presented as natural laws”¹⁴⁷).

The framework also offered by Fox and Miller, to a certain extent, employs a model of public discourse on a modernist foundation of communication, yet, explicitly for this time. A *public energy field* which is composed of malleable democratic discursive social formations is to be replaced by institutions and bureaucracy as a genuine public sphere, and be achieved by an undistorted authentic discourse which withdraws itself from manipulation and domination, thus provides the generation of intersubjective meanings and truths through free speech and equal opportunity to participate in dialogue.¹⁴⁸ Reliability of the framework is attempted to acquire by directly referencing to Habermas’s communicative theory much discussed before: “Under ‘warrants for discourse’, we propose a model (based on Habermasian ideal speech discourse) by which such formations may be judged as democratic, tending toward democratic”.¹⁴⁹ These warrants are explicated by the authors as sincerity, situation-regarding intentionality, willing attention and substantive contribution,¹⁵⁰ all of which are closely related to the ideal conditions of speech formulated by Habermas, who on the contrary have tried to ‘reconstruct’ modernity through the conception of

¹⁴⁶ Fredric Jameson, *Postmodernism, or, The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism*, Duke University Press, 2003.

¹⁴⁷ James Der Derian, “A Reinterpretation of Realism: Genealogy, Semiology, Dromology”, in James Der Derian (ed.) *International Theory: Critical Investigations*, London: Macmillan, 1995, p. 373.

¹⁴⁸ Charles J. Fox and Hugh T. Miller, 1996, pp. xv, 105-107, 116.

¹⁴⁹ *Ibid*, p. xv.

¹⁵⁰ *Ibid*, pp. 120-127.

lifeworld built by the very acquisitions of modernity and rationality. Fox and Miller, nevertheless, admit that discourse is in nature a rational process, thereby transpose their conception of energy field towards a more Arendtian public sphere and *agonistic discourse* instead,¹⁵¹ denying that ‘consensus’ is the final goal, *telos* of discourse:

“Discourse (...) is intersubjective, contingent, and open ended. I presume all utterances to be contestable, including any agreement that may emerge within the discourse. Consensus, on the other hand, is realized either through brute coercion or strategic exclusion. There is no authoritative final decision in the public discourse; the impulse to place one’s own point of view above the fray is perhaps understandable, but not acceptable. (...) Instead there are a variety of voices and orientations worthy of a listening.”¹⁵²

Although Miller insists on that what makes Habermas’s ideal speech rational is merely its “rational decidability”, the conception of authentic discourse cannot escape rationalism (if not universalism) just by excluding the element of consensus. That is for the very reason that the regulation of whole process of discourse, up till a final goal such as either consensus or discursive will formation is already a matter of rational decidability; a decidability not on arriving at a common truth, but on processing of a fair, egalitarian and free speech. Engaging to those warrants of intersubjective discourse inevitably requires a modernist foundation relying on the substantive values of them, as well as at least a minimum rationality to ‘supervise’ or observe the reliance on the principles. Hence, homogeneity is found on respecting to very formation of validity claims, if not on variety of speeches.

¹⁵¹ “The very teleological form of the project for human emancipation presupposes, as we cannot, some foundational utopian order toward which humanity is inexorably drawn. The corrective to this presumption of metaphysical harmony can be borrowed from Hannah Arendt’s more agonistic theory of discourse” Ibid, p. 119.

¹⁵² Hugh T. Miller, Rational Discourse, Memetics, and the Autonomous Liberal-Humanist Subject, *Administrative Theory & Praxis*, Vol. 22, No.1, 2000, p. 90.

At this very point, it might provide a deeper insight to mention the understanding of those who turn up the level of radical antagonism and poststructuralist depth more than Fox and Miller do. Instead of being seized by the metanarratives and pre-given terms/objectives of public administration, Farmer proposes an “attitude” of *anti-administration* and anti-administrative consciousness, which is roughly based on an antiauthoritarian, anti-hierarchical, and anti-foundationist ground of “creative pluralism”¹⁵³ that would stipulate radical openness in thinking and practice of public administration. The term anti-administration is basically adapted from physics in the sense of the mutual annihilation of anti-matter and normal matter by being totally converted into energy. Farmer offers a parallel thinking for the concern of public administration, stating that we can expect fresh and significant public administration energy from the encounter of anti-administration and administration.¹⁵⁴ Drawing from the critique of paradoxes and blind spots of modernist public administration, he instead constitutes his interpretation of such anti-administration by outlining some analytical components of postmodern thinking which are respectively, the dialect, imagination, deconstruction, deterritorialization and alterity. Replacing these components with the rationalist patterns of modernist public administration through a post-positivist way, according to Farmer, would generate an anti-administrative consciousness that would embrace administrative openness to postmodern plurality of discourses embedded in society.

However, Farmer nevertheless clearly denies that the theory of anti-administration is wedded to a postmodernist perspective stating that he has as well followed up the modernist intellectual context relying on critical theorists such as Marcuse. Anti-administrative consciousness is therefore not the very same as the postmodern consciousness.¹⁵⁵ This makes Farmer’s framework a more consistent

¹⁵³ David J. Farmer, 1995, pp. 33-35.

¹⁵⁴ David J. Farmer, Mapping Anti-Administration: Introduction to the Symposium, *Administrative Theory & Praxis*, Vol. 23, No. 4, 2001, p. 475.

¹⁵⁵ *Ibid*, p. 485.

one when compared to the eclecticism of Fox and Miller, yet, another problem still seems to appear. Anti-administrative consciousness for Farmer ought to get itself radically open to non-dominant discourses of excluded, subordinate, marginalized clients¹⁵⁶, however the framework of anti-administration does not offer an analysis of how it is to be done, except mapping the anti-administrator in a non-bureaucratic, non-systematic and non-mechanical understanding of human spirit. The principle question is how the “alterity” of public can acquire the ability to participate in equal and fair conditions. If the answer would be that equality and fairness indicate substantive and thus foundational contexts, then how could such energy field be constituted by the collision of matter and anti-matter? In an inequality situation witnessing the distribution of power in economic and social forms; matter would empower its normality by *sublating* anti-matter. Thus, instead of a public energy of “alterity”, it would be the “anti-energy” of status quo which reproduces dominance through articulation of the subordinate to discourse of the dominant, or total discrimination of it.

Similarly, without problematizing the role of the political economic foundation and ideology of capitalist state apparatus on the systematic oppression and exclusion of public, as well as without proposing an action plan on the possibilities of public self-governance in these conditions, McSwite¹⁵⁷ is contented solely with a discourse analysis that critically deconstructs “Man of Reason” which dominates administrative field and anchors the ontology of public administration, and eventually proposes “the correct existential stance” of recognizing the other in our subjectivity. The latter refers to some kind of self-reflexivity that rejects the reasoned and planned consequences relying on one sketch of value, since there “what seems to be behind evil most often is certainty, and what produces certainty is the yearning to refer our thoughts and feelings to

¹⁵⁶ Ibid, p. 481.

¹⁵⁷ O.C. McSwite, *Legitimacy in Public Administration: A Discourse Analysis*, Thousand Oaks: SAGE Publications, 1997.

something outside the human realm, either “facts” or “values” or both.”¹⁵⁸ Elevation of (intersubjective) relativism and lack of a so-called “substantialist” action plan leads McSwite to prescribe a “process theory” as a form of collaborative pragmatism that would *eventually* generate a citizen-oriented bureaucracy, face-to-face encounter and the search for agreement between administrators and citizens through local governance instead of acting in line with preconceived roles.

Such collaborative pragmatist model, as what is problematic in broader radical discourse in public administration, does not contrast with a market economy, capitalist state and society, but only with the scientific logic and economic rationality that capitalist reasoning imposes on public administration. Failure of “capitalist democracy” lies on its universal understanding of subjective values: “[T]his is not to say that a capitalist democracy has no values. Indeed, its values are the highest principles of liberalism and justice. (...) What the ideology of democratic capitalism fails to comprehend, though, is that values have no meaning, no grip, in a “universal” context. *They must be grounded in concrete, collective human relationship.*”¹⁵⁹ That means, just as in Habermas’s lifeworld theory, it is quite possible for McSwite to theoretically accord a public discourse setting with/in capitalism, insofar as the dominant ethical theme of “capitalist democracy”, “the greatest degree of gratification at the lowest price”, is ensured to be replaced by the encounter with the “other” so that citizens find the meaning in collaborative action. This evidently requires heavy lines between the market, civil society and state, denying the social formation quality of capitalism which will be analyzed deeper in following chapters.

Process theory employed by McSwite therefore I think is of an evasive mood that tends to avoid answers concerning *praxis*, by “showing that when

¹⁵⁸ Ibid, p. 272.

¹⁵⁹ Ibid, p. 275.

human interaction proceeds properly, a basis for action appears”.¹⁶⁰ However there is no explanation regarding subordinate position of those who are deprived of the forms of capital that would provide their being a part of the interactive discourse setting on a reciprocal basis that stipulates the spirit of *cooperative community, benevolence, and social coherence*¹⁶¹, and thus so-called “proper proceeding”. These being the case for both accounts, for the integrity of the analysis, the reliability of the claims of discourse approaches to participation will now further questioned by referencing to particular experiences of local governance, in quest for a domination-free will formation and public life.

¹⁶⁰ O. C. McSwite, 1997, p. 272.

¹⁶¹ Ibid, p. 16.

CHAPTER 3

PRACTICAL OVERVIEW: EXPERIENCES OF LOCAL GOVERNANCE

3.1. Relevance with the theoretical background

Critical deliberative framework discussed until now, regardless of the nuances it can be formulated theoretically, is in principle a matter of factual practice. This has more than one reason. Firstly, despite the alleged “pessimism” of the first generation of Frankfurt school on political action, as could be recalled, the essential critical goal of social theory is claimed to have a practical intent which would help us to reveal the socially constituted and mutable core of the reality, and then transform it as the expression of an emancipatory vision¹⁶². Proceeding through the discourse-based critical theory, this practical intent is further consolidated in favor of the aim of building an “epistemic authority”¹⁶³ of public, through the *pragmaticist*¹⁶⁴ use of practical reason suggested by Habermas concerning a moral normative foundation for the legitimacy of decision making which could subsequently be applied to everyday public life. Moreover, in order to comprehend the participatory politics and administration -as well as the ‘humanization’ of these- beyond a metaphysical course, any debate over the

¹⁶² Lisa Zanetti, 1997, p. 146.

¹⁶³ Jurgen Habermas, 1999, p. 19.

¹⁶⁴ Pragmatism is the term Habermas uses to distinguish his philosophy of practice from the common understanding of American pragmatism. Richard Ormerod, “The history and ideas of pragmatism”, *Journal of the Operational Research Society*, 2006, Vol. 57 No. 8, p. 894. For me, the basic specificity of “pragmatism” here rests on its deriving its practical intention from seeking for the rationality rather within the inclusive universalist morality which regards central the premise that “all speech acts have their inherent *telos* referring to human communicative competence of mutual understanding”, than in strategic calculation of *pragma* in everyday life.

maxims of deliberative democracy or 'more' democracy in broader sense should take into account the practical implementation and consequences, thus can revise the theoretical postulates.

For such necessity, the main focus of this chapter is to: search out the relevant past and/or present realizations of critical participatory project; examine how much they could meet the framework formulated by critical public administration and finally to demonstrate the components observed in implementations as conflicting with the initial conceptual principles and their dimensions that can analytically be problematized not in the practices themselves but only in the very practical inconvenience of the theoretical assumptions. The base for the analytical problematization herein is then the empirical overview trying to affirm the thesis that communicative proceduralism suggested by (discourse-oriented) critical account of public administration tends to lack the consideration of the 'continuity and reproduction of dominance' peculiar to capitalist social formation, therefore is in practice far from acquiring transformative quality vis-a-vis the status quo, unlike what adherers of critical social theory initially anticipate.

Accordingly, for this study exerts its interest on nothing but the commitments of critical/radical theory utilized in public administration, I would prefer to spot the projects of relatively macro scale of public governance as the focal point. As macro scale, I rather refer to the experiences within the communities extended so much as to ensure that the conflicts among class and particular social interests are present and observable, unlike small groups of homogeneous interests deliberating upon relatively short-term, daily, 'liquid' issues of living and/or administration. Implementation in these communities thus can be conducted in forms such as city councils, citizen commissions or committees, varying to their type of legal standing and scope/kind of motivation

for existence¹⁶⁵. As a matter of course, operation of these is set ‘inside’ the organizational structure of governing body as a formally recognized part of decision making so that they are entirely receptive to citizen self-determination, moreover as Box suggests, is a means for real and lasting citizen control of public decision making¹⁶⁶. Predictably, this preference of focusing on extensive community governance is explicable on the basis that while employing the participatory discourse, critical theory could put forth an emancipatory commitment associated with the whole public sphere, instead of simply a technical proposal, such as benefiting from participation as inner-organizational methods of decision making. Given the objective of theorizing a “better future” rather than “better administration”, practices of macro scale public governance are more suitable and prone to expand out from local implementation to whole public, thus claim to totally alternate the settled, conventional political and administrative systems. Therefore, theory-practice consistency to be questioned here is nothing more than examining the ‘feasibility’ of collective dealienation through the alleged “self-governance” within capitalist social reality where conflicting class interests constantly prevail.

Then, within the framework of this thesis, if the major intention in this part is to contextualize participatory discourse in terms of the postulates of critical theory by relating theoretical base with to the actual practices, the project of Agenda 21 and Local Agenda as its implementation stand as the most relevant networks of governance globally experienced on local scales in which the cases present proper means to re-evaluate the theory.

3.1.1. Agenda 21 as the Plan of Action

¹⁶⁵ For what criteria their existence differ, see Joseph L. Rodgers, *Citizen committees: A guide to their use in local government*, Ballinger Pub. Co, 1977.

¹⁶⁶ Richard Box, *Citizen Governance: Leading American Communities into the 21st Century*, SAGE, 1998, p. 87.

As the plan of action of a fundamental initiative for disseminating the constitution of the participatory mechanisms required by local network governance, Agenda 21 is claimed to be the reflection of a global consensus and political commitment at the highest level¹⁶⁷. Within The United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, having held at Stockholm in 1972¹⁶⁸, and within The United Nations Conference on the Human Settlements (Habitat I) having held at Vancouver in 1976¹⁶⁹, it was considered that there is an urgent need for a common outlook and principles to inspire and guide the people of the global world. Issues of this guidance should have been related to a commonly underlined objective for local governance in both conferences, which is “sustainable development”. The emphasis of national governments as being attributed the primary duty for dealing with these global issues was common for both as well. However, by The United Nations Conference on Environment and Development having held at Rio de Janeiro in 1992 with the participation of 172 governments (with 108 heads of state sent) and 2400 representatives of NGOs¹⁷⁰, two significant declarations were adopted under the titles Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, and Agenda 21. As a general point of reference resulted in these documents (which were in accordance with Brundtland Report, i.e. ‘Our Common Future’ paper released by World Commission on Environment and Development in 1987¹⁷¹) was that the duty of “achieving sustainable

¹⁶⁷ http://www.un.org/esa/dsd/agenda21/res_agenda21_01.shtml (accessed on 26.4.2012)

¹⁶⁸ <http://www.unep.org/Documents.Multilingual/Default.asp?documentid=97&articleid=1503> (accessed on 26.4.2012)

¹⁶⁹ <http://habitat.igc.org/vancouver/van-decl.htm> (accessed on 26.4.2012)

¹⁷⁰ Earth Summit, <http://www.un.org/geninfo/bp/enviro.html> (accessed on 26.4.2012)

¹⁷¹ <http://www.un-documents.net/wced-ocf.htm> (accessed on 26.4.2012) Brundtland Commission offers a “modern definition” of the notion sustainable development in this paper, as “the development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs”. Two key concepts of sustainable development are mentioned in this regard; first, the concept of “needs” in particular the essential needs of the world’s poorest people, to which overriding priority should be given; and secondly, the idea of limitations which is imposed by the state of technology and social organization on the environment’s ability to meet both present and future needs.

development and a higher quality of life for all people”¹⁷² was still primarily of nation states, but now deployed to a structure of multiple subjects, addressed as a global partnership, collaboration and shared susceptibility claiming to embrace all social sections and actors. The partnership was to occur among local governments, NGOs, voluntary and concerned groups of people, national governments and international community which shall cooperate in order to meet the challenges of sustainable development. Yet, the roles to be undertaken were explicitly consigned in a broader manner or civil society, including those of indigenous communities, women, youths, scientists and so on. Expression on the effective participation of civil society is for the reason that the essential task of eradicating poverty as indispensable requirement for sustainable development¹⁷³, as well as dealing with adverse global social and environmental effects such as the problems in human rights, health care, education and environmental protection were argued to be best handled with the encouragement of public awareness and the participation of citizens. General priority pointed out within the texts of Rio Conference and of ensuing summits could then be noted as enhancing the global collaboration processes of policy coordination for determining the technical, fiscal, financial instruments, policies and resources which are feasible to work upon different fields of local projects and programs.

3.1.2. Local Agenda 21 as the Implementation

The vitality of inciting the inspiration towards consensus is also brought along onto the course of Local Agenda, which refers to the participatory multi-segment process of developing and implementing long term action plans and strategies in line with the concerns related to sustainable development on local level as certified in Agenda 21. It was already touched on that the issues

¹⁷² United Nations General Assembly, *Rio Declaration on Environment and Development*, available from <http://www.un.org/documents/ga/conf151/aconf15126-1annex1.htm> (accessed on 06.8.2012).

¹⁷³ Ibid.

explicated in Agenda 21 were concerning the social activities on local scale. Hence local governments are considered as having the centre role for ensuring the participation and cooperation demanded. In that respect, the text of Agenda 21 anticipates the pioneering of local governments all around each country to ensure the partnership with the concerned groups in civil society for determining their own problems and ways of solution, developing programs to form the correct environment of effective public participation for the process of decision-making, planning and implementation. As Chapter 28 of Agenda 21, the section on Local Authorities' Initiatives in Support of Agenda 21, explicitly stipulates¹⁷⁴;

“Each local authority should enter into a dialogue with its citizens, local organizations and private enterprises and adopt “a local Agenda 21”. Through consultation and consensus-building, local authorities would learn from citizens and from local, civic, community, business and industrial organizations and acquire the information needed for formulating the best strategies. The process of consultation would increase household awareness of sustainable development issues. Local authority programmes, policies, laws and regulations to achieve Agenda 21 objectives would be assessed and modified, based on local programmes adopted”.

Local Agenda 21, in that respect, appears as the fundamental provision to be accomplished on micro level actualizing the institutional and conceptual components of the governance avenue proposed by Agenda 21 on macro level. This provision is assured by bringing a formal obligation for the parties, as the 2nd article of the same chapter (#28) stipulates the main objective as “by 1996, most local authorities in each country should have undertaken a consultative process with their populations and achieved a consensus on “a local Agenda 21” for the

¹⁷⁴ http://www.un.org/esa/dsd/agenda21/res_agenda21_28.shtml (accessed on 26.6.2012).

community.”. The other objectives are proposed for the programming of Local Agenda 21 as follows¹⁷⁵:

- By 1993, the international community should have initiated a consultative process aimed at increasing cooperation between local authorities;
- By 1994, representatives of associations of cities and other local authorities should have increased levels of cooperation and coordination with the goal of enhancing the exchange of information and experience among local authorities;
- All local authorities in each country should be encouraged to implement and monitor programmes which aim at ensuring that women and youth are represented in decision-making, planning and implementation processes.

The explicit emphasis on the act of enabling the potential of women and youth among excluded social sectors is consolidated as two chapters, Chapter 24 and Chapter 25, are devoted to the programming of global action towards women and youth respectively. Generally speaking on all of these objectives, it can be argued that the most important and indispensable route drew in Chapter 28 regarding the initiatives of local authorities is that the local authorities are expected to adapt to the process of LA 21 which should have been pioneered by them, and to assess and transpose their programs, policies, laws and regulations in accordance with the explicated objectives of Agenda 21. Public participation and dialogue based on consensus is further underlined as a constitutive feature of local governance within the Activities section (#28.3) of the same chapter, as the adoption of a local agenda is expected to function through deliberation with citizens, local, civic, community organizations and private enterprises. The quality of the process of consultation and consensus-building is regarded as a fundamental component for ensuring the formulation of best strategies by learning from local civil actors as well as increasing household awareness of sustainable development issues.

¹⁷⁵ Ibid.

3.1.3. Evaluation of ‘participation’ as held in Agenda 21 and LA 21

Although the substance or the main objective behind Agenda 21 and its practical projects is seemingly sustainable development which is to meet “the needs of future generations”, for the scope of this study I am specifically concerned with the participation aspect embedded in this grand project and have an elaboration on the reliability of theory and practice in both conceptual and practical level. That is because, though it does not initially claim to bring direct premises related to what the critical approach in public administration seeks for, its promotion of participating on the local level presents a worthy opportunity for comprehending it as a participation promoting activity as formulated in critical theory. Hence, the aim of sustainable development here can be considered with regards to the critical democratic perspective to the extent it ensures democratic comprehensive participation. By the end of this part, I will focus on the practical experiences concerning how this conceptual level meets its premises and to what extent the possible questions stem from the practical negligence of the theory.

Reasoning on conceptual level, it could be derived from the comprehension of local governance by Agenda 21 discussed above, the processes of decision-making aimed at on each level are “bottom-up” (or upward) participatory ones, complying with the ideal practice of governance theory and community-level approaches. Bottom-up participatory approach proposed by Agenda 21 can be understood as both a method and philosophical notion born from the perceived limitations of the top-down approach which is a persistent ideology that has been prevailing since Enlightenment¹⁷⁶. It can reasonably be argued that the mainstream reflection of this scientist and objectivist top-down ideology in the field of administration refers to the ‘experts-promoting’

¹⁷⁶ Julia L Smith, “A critical appreciation of the “bottom-up” approach to sustainable water management: embracing complexity rather than desirability”, *Local Environment: The International Journal of Justice and Sustainability*, 2008, Vol.13, No.4, p. 354.

perspectives of management approaches, in which local human components of administration are presumed as “an obstacle to efficient and rational organization of resource use”¹⁷⁷. As discussed before, while criticizing the exclusionary, unrepresentative, paternalistic and alienating nature of classical administration, management schools confine their approach towards democratic and community-level administration solely to the awareness of social entrepreneurs and customers of public service acting within market conditions. Local governance as pictured in Agenda 21, is on the other hand supposed to proceed in an integrated bottom-up manner. Yet, public participation is not identified in only areas which address “participation as an end”, as participation “as a means” and “a self-generating activity” is also nonexclusively taken into account. That means participation and partnership for more effective implementation of the programmes and projects through active citizen involvement by labor and/or financial or in-kind contributions, as well as the eagerness in taking part in the decision-making process, assuming responsibility rather for self-management itself than helping for predefined implementation can both be desirable¹⁷⁸. In principle, participation conducted “as a means” constitutes not only an instrument for the efficiency of implementation, but also for capacity/responsibility building and empowerment in popular participation, whereas participation conducted “as an end” not only serves for effective administration through assuring the knowledge and needs of the local but also yields the democratic legitimation as self-management. Indeed, the local governance pictured in Agenda 21 provides for both types of participation. As UN-HABITAT (The United Nations Human Settlements Programme) acknowledges,

“on the one hand, citizens are invited to air their opinions in the decision-making process through participation in

¹⁷⁷ Arun Agrawal and Clark C. Gibson, “The role of community in natural resource conservation”, Quoted In: A. Agrawal and C. C. Gibson, eds. *Communities and the environment, ethnicity, gender and the state in community-based conservation*. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2001, p. 4.

¹⁷⁸ UNHABITAT, 2007, *Inclusive and Sustainable Urban Planning: A guide for municipalities*, Volume 1: An introduction to Urban Strategic Planning, p. 16.

consultations, consensus building and self-management in project implementation and management, all of which feature elements of participation as an end. On the other hand, readiness to commit human, material and financial resources for the implementation of some priority projects, and thus participate in some kind of partnership, shows participation as a means to an end. None of these forms is better or more important than the other. They are like two sides of the same coin, the coin being public involvement.”¹⁷⁹

Practical mechanism of such participation contemplated in the scope of LA 21 is based upon citywide platforms such as city councils, working groups, neighborhood assemblies etc. in which other sides outside local government are composed of representatives of different sectors in civil society. Unlike the upper organization level of city councils, participation in working groups and neighborhood assemblies are much more comprehensive insofar as all voluntary members of the community are regarded as eligible to deliberate in meetings without any predetermined borders of formal representation.

On the other hand, what seems at stake for the theory-practice consistency here is that the principle ‘consultancy’ emphasized together with ‘consensus’ for the interaction between local authorities and community actors conceptually comprises a hierarchy between the partners since there appears one centre of authority which is able to consult and organize this consultancy. In this regard, expected practice of such participation converges on classical pluralist democracy rather than on ‘critical’ course of governance theory based on the egalitarian level of partners’ dialogue, as well as the quality of acts in participation process are considered as ‘contributive’ rather than ‘determinant’. Nevertheless, principles behind the procedures regulated in formal texts associated with Agenda 21 eventually rely on a demand that the concessions among all local stakeholders including local government are delegated on equal ground as much as possible. That is because the leading role of local government derives from its compulsory fostering, empowering, enabling, and facilitative quality. That means the centre

¹⁷⁹ Ibid, p. 16.

role of local authorities does not refer to any role and authority of controlling Local Agenda 21. Moreover, the need of a leading role on locality for enabling the projects of sustainable development also constitutes the application of bottom-up method, instead of participation in entirely horizontal conditions for discretion between local authority and civil society; yet in all cases and whatever is aimed from public participatory processes in broader pictures, the objective of “consensus” is claimed to be at the heart of the participation. As portrayed in Agenda 21, the aim of sustainable development can get significance to the extent that it is comprehended along with the notions participatory democracy, human rights, transparency, accountability and other components of local governance, thus all action plannings under the roof of LA 21 also refer to the project of consolidation of local democracy¹⁸⁰. It is mostly argued by the advocates of the transformative potential in Agenda 21, the foundation of sustainability lies on particular premises all of which cherish the universal concept of humanity as well as democratic comprehensiveness in that respect. As P. Selman notes while arguing for the public inclusion of as wide a scope of participation as possible :

-Sustainability policy is fundamentally respectful of the contribution of *all citizens*, regardless of gender, ethnicity or class: it both celebrates *diversity*, and argues that unsustainable practices have tended to feed upon *unequal power relations*.

-Transforming society so that it harmonizes with nature’s dynamics will involve difficult choices and the acceptance of restraints. In order to achieve this, there is the need of a broad *social consensus*, in which the individual interest merges with the collective. This cannot occur without a democracy which emphasizes *effective forms of communicative practice* and *collective deliberation*, and which makes adequate space for modes of *inclusionary argumentation*.

¹⁸⁰ <http://www.habitat.org.tr/gundem21/43-yere1gundem21/48-yere1-gundem.html> (accessed on 26.6.2012)

-The transition to sustainability will be people-intensive, and a heavy reliance will be made on voluntary endeavour in terms of facilitating *debates* and *discourses*, participating in flagship projects and supporting others in the attainment of *liveable* communities. Voisey et al.¹⁸¹, for example, affirm the role of partnerships in LA21 (between local government, central government, other local actors, and local communities) and note the particular promise of these as fundamental sources of local enthusiasm, knowledge and support¹⁸² (emphasis added).

Consequently, it would not be wrong to put that within the “agenda” of Agenda 21, consensus to be reached at both the local and international level evoking the Habermas’s framework of deliberative environment of participation was implied as a prerequisite for achieving sustainable development. In line with this inference, what could also be derived pertaining to our subject is that the initial indications of the model of administration we are discussing up to now sounds suggestive of a practical illustration for what critical course in public administration conceptualizes both methodologically (by its advocating a - seemingly egalitarian- participatory decision making) and structurally (by its setting the scale of the organization on the whole public which could allegiate to flourish so as to compose a ‘lifeworld’). Taking citizen-orientation into its agenda as a *sine qua non*, as well as portraying its interests on the affairs concerning the whole humanity, the governance modelled here, at least on the level of rhetoric, appears to be substitutive for both centralist, monist and hierarchical type of administration, and for the authority of “professional” knowledge and competence promoted by public management to the extent the rhetoric employed on “better future” analogously connotes that of critical theorists’. Moreover, the underlined critique of traditional (so-called ‘unsustainable’) practices of administration on the

¹⁸¹ Tim O’Riordan and Heather Voisey, *The political economy of sustainable development. Environmental Politics* 6, 1997, p. 1–23.

¹⁸² Paul Selman, A sideways look at Local Agenda 21, *Journal of Environmental Policy & Planning*, Vol. 2 No. 1, p. 39-53.

basis of “feeding upon unequal power relations”¹⁸³ coincides well with the constant desire within critical literature towards the neutralization of power relations.

3.2. Evaluation of ‘participation’ as practiced: Impressions and Observations

3.2.1. Overview of Turkey LA 21 Program

The basic incident which accelerated Turkey’s answer to the call of Agenda 21 for local authorities to undertake the required public consensus processes of their own LA 21 was Habitat II Conference held in Istanbul from June 3–14 1996. Beside the consolidation of the principle sustainability, the concepts of equality, livability, citizen consciousness and responsibility are formally recognized as the further requirement for participation in multi-actor governance¹⁸⁴. As one of 85 countries financially and institutionally supported by UNDP, the first noteworthy step taken by Turkey was the initiation of the project for “Promotion and Development of the LA 21s in Turkey” in September of 1997. The project was coordinated with UCLG-MEWA (United Cities and Local Governments, Middle East and West Asia Section, formerly IULA-EMME). Throughout two years it lasted, the plan of promoting the development of a common perspective among various social actors in a public awareness program is settled, as well as the formation of the required institutional network is provided. As a result of the success of the project, UNDP was convinced to maintain its support to Turkey by launching the process as a long-term program.

¹⁸³ Ibid.

¹⁸⁴ Korel Göymen, “Türk Yerel Yönetimlerinde Katılımcılığın Evrimi: Merkezîyetçi Devlette Yönetişim Dinamikleri”, *Amme İdaresi Dergisi*, Vol. 32, No. 4., 1999, p. 77-8.

Having the project of “Promotion and Development” as the first phase of Turkey LA 21 Program, the rest of consecutive phases set for afterwards are as follows¹⁸⁵:

-Phase II: “Implementing Local Agenda 21s in Turkey” Project (January 2000-December 2003). The Project Document was published in the Official Gazette of Turkey dated 22 January 2001 as “International Agreement”.

-Phase III: “Localizing the UN Millennium Development Goals and World Summit of Sustainable Development Plan of Implementation through the Turkey LA-21 Governance Network” Project (May 2004-September 2006). The Project Document was published in the Official Gazette of Turkey dated 12 November 2003 as “International Agreement”.

-Phase IV: “Localizing the UN Millennium Development Goals in Turkey through the LA-21 Governance Network” Project (September 2006-June 2009). The Project Document was published in the Official Gazette of Turkey dated 24 April 2007 as “International Agreement”.

-Phase V: “Training and capacity building for strengthening the City Councils and their functioning as local democratic governance mechanisms” Project (encompassing the period October 2009-March 2011 as the final phase under the Turkey LA-21 Program).

Due to the “global success” of the implementation and coordination of the phases programmed, Turkey LA 21 Program is recognized by UNDP as among the most accomplished practices of participatory-democratic local governance implementations in the world, thus was selected as an example of “best practice”

¹⁸⁵ <http://www.uclg-mewa.org/en/about-us/97-turkiye-yg-21-programi.html> (accessed on 26.6.2012).

to be presented during the UN World Summit for Sustainable Development¹⁸⁶. Complying with Agenda 21, the essential decision making and executing local mechanisms of the program which involves 73 cities are recognized as the local stakeholders that are organized under the facilitation of City Council. City councils are supported by the mechanisms for ‘Special Interest Groups’ such as Women and Youth Councils, Working Groups, Children, Disabled and Elderly Community¹⁸⁷, which is a fact of prompting the dynamics of governance for the active participation of socially excluded groups.

3.2.2. City Councils within the Context of Public Deliberation

City councils established under the Local Agenda 21s in Turkey have gained legal basis by the adoption of the Municipal Law No. 5393 in 2005. Moreover, with the same legislation, establishment of city councils have been made compulsory participative institutions on local level for the municipalities which are not included in the LA 21 program. As a secondary legislation, “The By-laws of the City Council” was published in 2006 by the Ministry of the Interior. Subsequently, due to the Phase V project of Turkey LA 21 Program (“Training and capacity building for strengthening the City Councils and their functioning as local democratic governance mechanisms”) training and capacity building programs and meetings for city councils were held in 2008, the outcome of which brought about the preparation of “City Council Guide”.

Taking into consideration the amendments on the By-laws in 2009 which has dramatically been strengthened democratic capacity of the councils, tracks of the ‘ideal’ picture of the public for deliberative democracy on legal basis can be found within the Article #76 of the Municipal Law. In this respect, the article

¹⁸⁶ Sadun Emrealp, *Turkey LA21 Program: Handbook on Facilitative Information for the Implementation of LA21*, IULA-EMME (UCLG_MEWA), 2005, p. 6.

¹⁸⁷ <http://www.habitatkalkinma.org/tr/html/1121/Turkiye+Yerel+Gundem+21+Programi/> (accessed on 26.6.2012).

considers city councils as the urban means that will seek the following: to develop a city vision and responsible citizenship, protect the urban rights and the rule of law, and implement the principles of sustainable development, responsiveness to environment, mutual social assistance and solidarity, as well as governance norms such as transparency, accountability, subsidiarity and participation. The By-laws of the City Council refers further tasks of the city council that can be directly associated with the requirements of deliberative democracy, putting the emphasis on the consciousness of “common life” lying on democratic active participation and consensus-building:

- Establishment of a *collective wisdom* encompassing the whole city in relation to determining the basic strategies and action plans for the city, as well as in relation to their implementation and monitoring processes,

- Taking *participation and consensus* based upon collective wisdom as a starting point,

- Within the framework of the principle of subsidiarity, *developing participation, democracy and consensus-building*,

- Contributing to the broadening of *democratic participation, development of citizenship rights and the consciousness of living together respectfully*, and adoption of a *multi-partner and multi-actor governance approach* at the local level,

- Increasing the effectiveness of *socially excluded groups*; the children, the youth, the women and the disabled in social life, and ensuring that they take up an *active role* in local decision-making mechanisms,

- Guiding the cities toward sustainable development under the intertwined principles of “*ownership as citizens*”, “*active participation*” and “*partnership in solution*” (emphasis added).

Although the comprehension of democracy in LA 21 program complies with the employment of direct participation equipped with the deliberative philosophy as reflected above, participation on the scale of city council is

considered to be based on “representation” whereas the representatives of related organizations and institutions which can participate are listed by the by-law #8. That means civil membership to any related union, association or foundation is compulsory for those who ask for the representation of their interests on the level of city council. Besides, the by-law #9 defines the organs of the city council by denoting them individually; as the council president, general assembly, executive council, assemblies and working groups. Hence, the only medium for the participants outside the defined institutional representation appears as the assemblies and working groups, which are defined by the by-law#4 as “the common structures formed on voluntary basis for the active role and contribution of various social sectors to the areas of the city council duties lying on the understanding of governance and sustainable development”. In practice, the functioning of the assemblies and working groups rely on the basis that the decisions, determined priorities, proposals, projects, reports, etc. generated by periodic meetings are submitted to and conferred within the city council meeting.

Provided that the formally portrayed responsibilities of the city councils are taken into account, assemblies and working groups are allowed to be formed on any issue and problem for the common public/urban life. Consequently, despite the mentioned formal restrictions on direct participation of ordinary citizens, democratic promises attributed to the functioning of city councils by the same regulations well abide by the governance understanding seen in the texts of Agenda 21. After briefly discovering the discursive tracks of the theory of public deliberation on legal procedures, now finally I would like to maintain with having an analytical glance at the practices of participation on local level.

3.2.3. ‘Deliberative’ Practice in City Councils: Working Groups and Neighbourhood Assemblies Meetings

According to the UNPAN (United Nations Public Administration Network) report which is compiled from the project documents regarding the functioning of city councils in Turkey¹⁸⁸, working groups focusing on priority issues of the respective Local Agenda 21 processes function with the active participation of a wide range of volunteers from different sectors and backgrounds. They tend to be organized around relatively broad topics, splitting amongst themselves in smaller sub-groups on more particular issues. Participation to working groups is either voluntary or by invitation. There is no limit on the participation of the bureaucrats, administrators; technical experts as well as they can be invited by civil participants. Participation within neighbourhood assemblies functions in the very same manner, except organizing rather in terms of neighbourliness than interest themes. Outcome of the deliberations in the forms of analyses, suggestive reports and projects are to be brought to city council to be discussed, although they do not have any legal bindingness. Nevertheless, for being the most direct medium for public participation of concerned groups, practical limits on the effective functioning of formal participation are primarily derived from working groups and neighbourhood assemblies meetings.

The meetings observed in 2012 for this study comprise of the working groups of environment and health; education, culture, art and sports; transportation, traffic and infrastructure; as well as the general assembly of Ankara Metropolitan City Council; on the other hand neighbourhood assemblies of Seyranbağları and Çiğdem, councils of women and youth as well as the executive board of Çankaya City Council. The meetings were attended in person for the purpose of analysing relevant discourses (which also implies accompanying tacit, extra-verbal ones), all of which were collected through direct observation and note-taking. Moreover, interviews were conducted with the secretariat and one member of executive committee of Çankaya City Council, spokesman of Seyranbağları assembly, president of Ankara Metropolitan City

¹⁸⁸ <http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/un/unpan031655.pdf> (accessed on 26.6.2012)

Council as well as many conversations with the participants of the meetings, whereas all findings were processed through a selective attempt in terms of scope and context of the analysis.

Impressions on the democratic comprehensiveness of public deliberations generally have a bilateral concern regarding the references of common problems. One of those is formal shortcomings which generate the direct limits on the possibility of an “ideal speech situation”. These refer to the explicit conditions of how egalitarian the discussion is operated varying within the functioning rules of deliberation, use of space, timing of overall meeting and each speak, sitting order etc. The discussions observed are, in principle, to be organized in a non-hierarchic way as there exists no “director” in charge -which formally complies with the ethical requirements of employing the “communicative action”. However, there are also internal ways and strategies of exclusion which are more vital to focus due to their relation to the very practice of the debate itself, rather than the formal organization of the debate. Since these stem relatively from the implicit communicative extensions of the existing power conflicts in social formation, the limits they generate on a ‘fair’ deliberation have their roots in the predescribed proceduralist consideration of power, i.e. in the participatory theory itself.

My observations on the meetings conceive such extensions of power primarily on the employment and getting benefit of a “legitimate” language. Having access to such speech is observed to be determined generally by class and social status held by the participants. Despite the fact that all the meetings were not homogenously operated, what was the most striking exclusion reference that is generalizable particularly for the debates on infrastructural issues was the expertise rhetoric, i.e. technocratic discourse developed from the technical, scientific and bureaucratic knowledge and experience on the issues, and not only the use of language but also the dominant perception of the gesture, posture, formal wearing etc. that represent a prestigious position is complementary on it.

Such discourse tended to enjoy the privileges to dominate the deliberative processes by fitting into the rationally ‘universalistic’ and ‘objectivist’ communicative norms offered by the discourse ethics and deliberative epistemes of critical theory in public administration. Users of such privileges, basically bureaucrats, technocrats, administrators and in some cases those representing private interest groups and the experts invited by them seemed to gain their position to manipulate the interests and validity claims of the others often by referring to some technical reports which are full of complicated, detailed quantitative data that cannot be ‘legitimately’ dealt with ‘informal’ and ‘personal’ argumentations. Hence, if they came up with a policy plan, an argument or a suggestion by attributing a ‘sterilized’, learnedly dominant and seemingly emotionless -and therefore rationally ‘objective’- style of statement or expression, they were relatively successful to articulate the dominant mode of opinions regarding the acceptance of those.

On the other hand, “ordinary” citizens, but especially those from subaltern mostly seemed fragile and weak to employ a ‘legitimate’ speech while defending their arguments. Unlike, and against the users of prementioned “rationalist” discourse and the claimed “authority of knowledge”, they widely used emotional expressions, personal narrations and personal know-hows (with comparatively a polite and diffident manner) on technically manipulatable issues. Those two types of speech however were not observed to be always in conflict. That is because users of ‘non-privileged’ speech acts were sometimes inclined to approve, or at least not to challenge or question the reliability of the argumentations enjoying the dominant status of technical/objectivist discourse. This sort of ‘passivity’ can be regarded the power of articulation as the deliberation is exposed to closure. Yet, similar cases, as in the discussion on regulation of the particular municipal bus routes in Transportation and Infrastructure Working Group, sometimes witnessed a discursive conflict on the authority of knowledge. Conversation below occurred between an administrator (assistant branch director) (A), two unofficial/civil participants (P1, P2) and the moderator (M) (who is also the president of city

council) upon the information given about the current agenda of subcommittee of Transportation Coordination Centre concerning withdrawal of some bus routes in Dikmen line:

A: So it was planned that passengers of Ulus-Ahmet Haşim line will use only Sokullu-Ulus line, that is No. 154, services of which will be increased.

P1: Dear chief, I'd like to touch upon a point. I know that my parents use that route frequently when they want to go to Kızılay, and heard many times from them that they already wait long enough.

A: They won't be waiting long in this way, they will either use the alternative route or take the public buses by paying, they already pass frequently.

P1: Yes it is okay but this may cause an unjust treatment. Not only my parents but there is a huge elderly population there, I know our municipality has done many things for our elderly people. But this may limit their range of motion. Travelling is one of few ways of enjoying life for them.

A: Mr. H., this line is of 2nd region, they undertake the statistical quota calculation, and reports of the coordination centre demonstrate that there is not sufficient potential of passengers there. This is a simple cost and benefit analysis and EGO is making loss this way.

P1: But I know there is enough. There are also many schools in that line, students also widely use it, and you say that İncirli line will also be articulated to number 154. Will it lift that load? There is the winter cold and summer heat.

M: Of course it will. It will provide more than 70 services per day. If there is any unjust treatment, our friends should have identified it. As long as there is the transfer facility, there will be no unjustness.

P2: Dear president, there are many shortages of bus routes on Eskişehir road having more priority. But we talked to our headman and he directly

submitted a petition to EGO. It is the right way. It seems to me that Dikmen case is going to personal issues.

M: Ok then, we can bring this kind of issues to our elderly working group, if you'd like (joking in a sarcastic tone).

As seen in this example, administrative authority succeeds to articulate also the non-technical discourse of other 'ordinary citizen' simply by basing its argument on a technical ground, i.e. calculation of the benefit solely on statistical data. Any counter view attempting to open a discussion on the meanings associated with "public service/public good", as well as to question the quality/method of such data (such as, does it count only the card swipes and thus exclude the disabled and elderly people –who do not swipe card- in counting? does the limitation of municipality services imply leading people to private bus services which are more expensive and do not have transfer facility? etc.) are exposed to closure in advance.

Yet, there can be mentioned a broader aspect than the conflict of the argumentations based on technical speech and personal subjective testimonies which is in general sustained in favour of the former. This aspect points out not a 'necessary' distinction between technical and personal subjective course, but instead on the material inequality among *all* statements which are in fact normative, regarding the access distances to the universalist rationality as portrayed in the theory of communicative action. That is simply because, as Lynn Sanders argues, some citizens are better than others at articulating their arguments in rational, reasonable terms which make them more likely to be listened to.¹⁸⁹ However, for the purpose of this study, uneven conditions of access to reasonable discourse power is considered relevant to the extent that they are inherited from different social positions occupied in real social structure and already existing political representation, rather than simply being individually contingent. That

¹⁸⁹ Lynn M. Sanders, Against Deliberation, *Political Theory*, Vol. 25, No. 3, 1997, p 348.

relevancy means, since the ethical claims of “ideal speech situation” presume the rational capability of communicative actors to ensure a positive reciprocity between the speech act and the intention of the speaker, “force of the better argument” tends to internally exclude those who are deprived of the sufficient conditions and experiences for a proper political communication within social reality whose formation is *preceding* to such deliberation act. Eventually, besides the quality of contribution, justness and convincingness of their arguments, their speech acts were even not regarded that respectful and considerable in comparison to those of privileged social class and status, as they cannot accomplish the dominant norms of the focus on better argument. The state here does not even make such comparison on the privileges of getting formal access to discourse setting, presuming that even if there is no external exclusion at all; there is the question of inequality in accomplishing those norms at play for the formation of better argument.

These implicit norms which widely concern how is said before what is said, are conceptualized by Iris M. Young as articulateness, dispassionateness, orderliness; all of which devalue the speech of those who make their claims and give reasons through embodied forms of expression, emotion and figurative expressions, yet not in a linear fashion making logical and rational connections explicit¹⁹⁰. As was occasionally observed in the meetings, people speaking with a local or ethnic accent can be also considered within the disadvantageous side of Young’s communicative typology since their speeches were regarded as a status sign. An example of this was witnessed in the Youth Council of Çankaya City Council. The “Eastern” accent of a young man was regarded a distinctive difference when he went up to the bench, as some participants began to give ‘meaningful’, questioning glances to each other.¹⁹¹ In the same meeting, a

¹⁹⁰ Iris M. Young, *Inclusion and Democracy*, Oxford University Press, 2000, p. 57.

¹⁹¹ Indeed, also for Bourdieu, particular accents and intonations are the products of an “articulatory style” which refers one to respective social class, i.e. to the socially structured character of the *habitus* at the level of language. Pierre Bourdieu, *Language and Symbolic Power*, trans. G. Raymond and Matthew Adamson, Polity Press, 1991, p. 17.

relative ‘disengagement’ was overtly observed in the speeches of those who got nervous and under pressure while speaking, who were not able to develop an “impressive” rhetoric probably for having difficulty to convey their knowledge and opinions to speech act in a “linear” fashion, thereby the content of their speeches was put into minor position in attracting the attention. The trouble here is that normative regulation of the ideal speech of discourse-based critical theory does not take into consideration the hierarchies of accessing the social privileges of discourse as they cannot be directly identified by ethico-political tenets of the communicative framework. Sanders exemplifies the ‘authorization’ of these ‘extra-argument’ factors of distorting as follows: “Prejudice and privilege do *not* emerge in deliberative settings as *bad* reasons, and they are *not* countered by good arguments. They are sneaky, invisible and pernicious for that reasonable process”¹⁹² (emphasis added). According to the impressions and observations gathered from the public meetings associated with Ankara LA 21, such explicit/implicit ways of discrediting (in cases where the deliberations were not gotten under control or distorted by the administrative authority) address the domination of ‘rational’, middle-class, sterilized patterns of discourse formation (simply those of prototyped by some as “White Turk”). The counterpart of this in American “pluralism”, according to Sanders’s survey on participatory acts in city council alike citizen juries, is the dominant subtleties of social/cultural forms of capital by white, better-educated people, which maintains the social oppression of systematically and materially disadvantaged groups (mostly racial minorities, poorer people, women etc.).¹⁹³ Linking such common inferences from practical experiences of public deliberation to the theoretical conception of lifeworld in critical theory, in this sense, may lead one to recall the critiques on Habermas’s

¹⁹² Lynn M. Sanders, 1997, p. 353.

¹⁹³ Ibid, pp. 347-348, 362-368.

public sphere for merely reflecting the moral intuitions of the average, male, middle class individual of modern Western society.¹⁹⁴

What would make one neglect the structure of objective relations of dominance in approaching the social conflict between different discourses is the intention to consider discourse formation simply as a technical capacity, which deprives any modality of speech practices of its social context of power and hierarchy. As Bourdieu suggests, technical capacity of discourse formation, as opposed to the common belief, is mostly the social product of statutory capacity which imposes its acquisition through the effect of “statutory attribution”¹⁹⁵ so that maintenance of the existing relations of power is ensured even in patterns of speech acts through social inheritance of class and status positions. That point brings us further for participative inclusion is not at stake only in too implicit processes of discourse formation as such. That is because, not only the patterns of dominant speech, but also the content of arguments is a concern of prevailing power positions, being open to internal exclusion practiced by class and status position. My interview after the assembly meeting with H. T., the spokesman of Seyranbağları Neighbourhood Assembly, discloses the tracks of such tendency immanent in deliberations. The answers given to my questions on the perception of ‘ideal’ deliberation are as follows:

E.G.: How about the debates? You have told that there are no written rules and principles organizing the talk. But it still seems that your discussions function free of any debates or opposite arguments?

¹⁹⁴ See for example, Lisa A. Zanetti, 1997. Nancy Fraser, Rethinking the Public Sphere: A Contribution to the Critique of Actually Existing Democracy, *Social Text*, No. 25/26, 1990. Ruth Wodak, Veronika Koller, “Introduction: Shifting boundaries and emergent public spheres” in R. Wodak, V. Koller (eds.), *Handbook of Communication in the Public Sphere*, Mouton de Gruyter, 2008, p. 2.

¹⁹⁵ Pierre Bourdieu, 1991, p. 69.

H.T.: We do not like having debates with each other, or hurting each other. That is why we did not need any principles on paper. We have face-to-face lives outside, we each of us know of what the other may think.

E.G.: Yet, the introductory paper of your assembly calls for the inhabitants of a region of more than a few neighbourhood sites, including from İncesu, to Kırkkonaklar etc.?

H.T.: Yes, at the outset of this assembly, there were some distinct, “cracked voices” as well. But we have somehow let them out.

E.G.: Why, or on what ground did they annoy you?

H.T.: Well a man comes and, for instance, asks for having a deliberation on the zoning plan of his region to come to be questioned in municipal council.

E.G.: Could not your agenda regard such issues worthy of consideration?

H.T.: No we cannot, I cannot be bothered of the zoning issues of your squatter house. No one is to care about your personal problems, your squatter, are they?

E.G.: So, how could you “get rid of” him, or those like him?

H.T.: For this man, once he came up with this we firstly told him that this is not the place of discussing personal matters. Then as he began to argue with us on the existence of our assembly we kindly urged him to go and solve his problems directly with the municipality. And afterwards he did not happen to appear hereabouts again.¹⁹⁶

As could be derived from the instance, exclusion of people who formally participate with their powerless position in social reality due to the class and/or status their interests lie in, may be practiced by the established dominance through –if not directly- indirectly fashion. In this case, the deliberation in neighbourhood

¹⁹⁶ Personal interview with H. T., April 21, 2012, Seyran Women’s Handcraft Bazaar.

assembly was not distorted by the so-called “systemic” entities; i.e. state, bureaucracy, local authority etc. Indeed, it can even be argued that the participants share a critical, and sometimes opposite consciousness towards the administration in their aim to defend and represent their regional interests. Moreover, according to my conversations with the inhabitants, they share a strict common view that they do not need and thus demand any financial support from the administration as they do not want the monetary content to be included in their collaborative works. Nevertheless, since the civil society, though isolated entirely from the political-administrative sphere, is constantly open to power struggle, even a small-scale neighbourhood assembly as such -which is expected to lie on relatively uniform interests- could tend to assure its homogeneity barely through those implicit protectionist tendencies. This is simple but a striking incident for it can indicate the relevancy of each ‘deliberative’ act of fractioning interests to power struggles, which grow out of their own intrinsic privileged sides, dominance relations and efforts of discursive closures. In this case, although my question intended to address the terms of the “debate” and “argument” in a positive and constructive manner (since any consensus is to pass through these possible debates and arguments) both the spokesman as well as the dominant mood within the assembly are observed to take these terms with a negative connotation and in a way that they can never assume these for themselves. Therefore, one who tended to put forth a viewpoint out of the implicitly established framework was accused of distorting the speech situation so that the naturally economic and social problem he asserted was individualized, isolated and eventually externalized.

Although the issues to be debated are determined in each respective session as the assembly meetings do not rely on a predefined agenda (neither did it on the day I participated), as well as the issue suggested by the slum dweller was in conformity with the objectives of the establishment of neighbourhood assemblies¹⁹⁷, such exclusion points out a -if not written- presettled and

¹⁹⁷ In this context, it may be helpful to remember one of the significant objectives defined for neighbourhood assemblies is the “Contribution to the establishment of a common

prescriptive framework. A similar incident implying such prescription took place in Çiğdem Neighbourhood Assembly as well. A woman, who attended an assembly meeting for the first time on the day I participated, was observed to have difficulty to engage into the conversations probably for her presence was not that welcomed and made feel comfortable by the group of people who know each other individually. Spokeswoman's approach to her was rather confined to if she had a suggestion or not on the relevant subject. Her intention to draw attention to and bring up an issue of a woman she knew, who she alleges to be exposed to physical abuse, was individualized and eventually failed due to being found irrelevant with the general concerns of the neighbourhood as she was suggested to lead it to the women's shelter.

At this very point, it might be helpful to reiterate Bourdieu's conception of symbolic violence which he constructed to explain the tacit imposition of categories of thought and perception upon dominated social agents, which reproduces the hierarchies of power and helps the class-based inequalities of social order seem just¹⁹⁸. In this portrayal, it is noteworthy that my observations on the allegedly egalitarian, fair and comprehensive public talks within the bodies of city councils infer that the exclusion of non-privileged citizens who fail to develop a "legitimate" position and discourse¹⁹⁹ to be a part of the prescriptive framework happens to operate by their exposure to symbolic violence such as by intimidation, disqualification etc.

reason encompassing the whole city in relation to determining the basic strategies and action plans for the city, as well as in relation to their implementation and monitoring processes". <http://www.seyransentmeclisi.org/?Syf=26&Syz=71464&/KENT-KONSEYLER%C4%B0-VE-SEMT-MECL%C4%B0SLER%C4%B0-NED%C4%B0R-?-NE-YAPARLAR?> (accessed on 20.06.2012).

¹⁹⁸ Pierre Bourdieu, *Logic of Practice*, 1990, Stanford University Press, pp.126-134.

¹⁹⁹ For Bourdieu's conception of the competence of legitimate language as a "form of capital", see Pierre Bourdieu, 1991. Pierre Bourdieu & Loic J. D. Wacquant, *An invitation to reflexive sociology*, Cambridge: Polity, 1992. For Bourdieu, what is rare for us is not capacity to speak, which is universal and non-distinctive as a part of our biological heritage, but is the competence of accessing legitimate language which retranslates social distinctions into the specifically symbolic logic of differential deviations. Pierre Bourdieu, 1991, p. 55.

The sense within the findings that have been gathered from Ankara LA 21 experiences can be confirmed also by Doğanay's research on Antalya City Council in 2001, which has employed one of the most comprehensive perspectives on the issue. Significance of the locus and time of this research is twofold; firstly, Antalya City Council is officially regarded among the best practices²⁰⁰, secondly the research period corresponds to the Phase II of Turkey LA 21 program, namely "Implementing Local Agenda 21s in Turkey Project" which was highlighted as a global best practice during the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg²⁰¹. By observing the deliberations in the working groups of "youth and sport", "agricultural lands", "environment", "retired", "women and environment", and "women and politics", inferences of the study generally justify the argument that power positions highly prevail, determined by the criteria such as class, status, gender, experience, age etc. In the meetings where the males, experts, bureaucrats and the aged participants composed the majority, respectively females, non-privileged citizens and younger participants are observed to avoid speaking or got into difficulty (e.g. being interrupted, diffident behaviour etc.).²⁰² "Authority of knowledge" claimed by the experts, technicians and bureaucrats was once again observed as a popular way of exclusion that came into prominence. Since the authority of knowledge was not self-appointed but recognized as a general opinion dominating the discussions, owners of such authority were also prioritized for the right to speak by group moderators, by the statements such as "first of all we are to get the *information* from the officials, and then other members may comment on those".²⁰³ Privileged position of the expertise was occasionally observed to gain an imposing intention which claims a unique "common good" that is scientifically valid. Such tendency

²⁰⁰ <http://www.un.org/ga/Istanbul%2B5/Turkey.pdf> (accessed on 26.6.2012)

²⁰¹ <http://www.undp.org.tr/Gozlem3.aspx?WebSayfaNo=956> (accessed on 26.6.2012)

²⁰² Ülkü Doğanay, 2003, p. 216.

²⁰³ Ibid, pp. 206-7.

stands out in some “technical” cases that, for instance, the academics and engineers in Agricultural Lands’ working group decided on not to overlay the district to the zoning plan and made this decision implemented without taking into account the opposite views of the farmers and headmen who represent the district people. Supporting behaviour of the experts towards the decision taken on behalf of and in spite of the farmers was observed to gain more concreteness in their statements that highlight the superiority of their expertise knowledge and worthlessness of other views:

Expertise A: Our goal was to establish a platform, but headmen did not participate. Their absence is not that important anyway.

Expertise B: Headmen are already against the current plan. They demand construction instead.

Moderator: They were initially with us but somehow have changed their mind.²⁰⁴

It was also observed in the survey that such imposing and monist attitude generated by the expertise discourse appeared to be a part of the identification of these privileged positions with the leading and determinant roles gained in the working group, which was widely introduced as an effective civil society movement by the owners of such privilege. This identification then led them to present their unique viewpoints as if they represent those of whole civil society. That means, civil society was comprehended as an authority that is distinct from and superior to the citizens:

Expertise: Demands of the citizens do not necessarily have to match with the demands of the civil society. Our struggle was not for seizing a plot of land.²⁰⁵

²⁰⁴ Ibid, pp. 209, 210.

²⁰⁵ Ibid, p. 210.

Moreover, it was observed in public deliberations that not only the dominant discourses but also the setting of the agenda often generated a discursive closure of some alternative and critical viewpoints²⁰⁶. In most cases, radical, critical and questioning speeches suggested generally by the individual citizens and headmen were not let to contribute to the formation of a common reason, since administrators and representatives of the institutions were given the right to speak just after such viewpoints in order to “answer” to those “challenger voices”. Distribution of those bilateral roles of ‘questioning’ and ‘responding’ is another element of the prevention of a deliberation on equal levels, since the last word always belongs to one side who tend to closure the issue by the statements such as “thank you”, “we will take that account” etc. Consequently, social and political dimensions of the problems mostly remained out of discussion. In accordance with that, discursive style of the experts and bureaucrats often claimed the impossibilities for non-solved problems and left them out of agenda²⁰⁷. Instead of deliberating on possible solutions for those problems, they chose to use their time to explain the projects and performances of their institutions, by the statements such as “this is our effort”, “we did those”. That constitutes another dimension of the exclusion of alternative possibilities.

The extent of the issues discussed up until now in this part was only pertained to the possible extensions of internal exclusionary practices widely immanent in communicative processes. Significance of dwelling upon internal exclusion, as was discussed in theory section, emanated solely from moving from the limits of the argument that formal compliance with the procedure which is normatively relied on by all parties does not necessarily ensure the democratic (and legitimate) governance per se. Yet it is plausible to say that this significance is relatively a subtle one, when compared to the overt limitations in the face of democratic participation. Because an attempt to focus on the inequities allowed to lead internal exclusion as such, requires at least, for instance, presuming the

²⁰⁶ Ibid, pp. 219-220.

²⁰⁷ Ibid, p. 212.

decisions and proposals taken by the sub-bodies of city council to be put into agenda and evaluated (after being submitted by the level of executive board) in the first consecutive meetings of the municipal council, just as was stipulated by the Article #76 of Municipal Law. At least a reasonable fulfilment of the participatory agenda in line with the guidance on paper is thereby a must to give the pure critique on the limits of public deliberation/internal exclusion a meaning much beyond its examination of conceptual premises.

However, the real practice makes it apparent in many localities of LA 21 practices in Turkey that both the municipal council and mayor is considered the “natural” determining authority on whether or not implementing the “civil” proposals of city council. As a consequence of this arbitrariness, it was observed in the two city councils of Ankara that neither the schedule of the meetings of working groups and assemblies (as well as the periodical intervals of them per annum) nor the preliminary agenda and list of participants of the following meeting is predefined. Worse still, city councils (in general) are not even provided the processes of any kind of supervising and right to information on whether or not their proposals are being taken into account in meetings of municipal councils. Questionnaires conducted among respondent citizens by some empirical researches on certain city councils that are addressed as relatively “promising” experiences also demonstrate that such mystery of ‘influence’ prevails also in a majority of citizens’ perception of the organizational position of city council vis-a-vis the local government.²⁰⁸ According to one of these researches, approximately 15% of the respondents randomly selected from urban centre have an idea about the existence of the concerned city council, whereas only 13% of the respondents sincerely believe that it is through such mechanisms possible to

²⁰⁸ See, for example, Ertuğrul Gündoğan, *Katılımcı demokrasi bağlamında yönetim ve Bağcılar Belediyesi Örneği*, Ph.D. diss., Marmara University, 2007, pp. 262-278 (Appendix 2: Results of Citizen Governance Questionnaire). Fatih Gümüş, *Yönetim Kavramına Eleştirel Bir Yaklaşım ve Tuzla Kent Konseyi Örneği*, M.s. diss., Haliç University, 2009, p. 68. Atilla Göktürk & Yüksel Akkaya “Mersin Örneği ile Yerel Yönetimler, Beklentiler ve ‘Reform’ üzerine Bir Değerlendirme”, in Çanakkale Onsekiz Mart Üniversitesi, *Yerel Yönetimler Kongresi Bildiriler Kitabı*, 2004.

have an impact on municipal policies, albeit 80% of them have the social consciousness towards the vitality of civil participation in urban administration.²⁰⁹ The authorized official in Turkey's case, namely national coordinator of Turkey LA 21 Programme makes a similar criticism which are worth of notice in pointing out that municipalities are rather reluctant to interiorize LA 21 as an indispensable body of the administrative discretion, and thus to implement or reflect the outputs of the participatory process upon their own plans, programs and budgets.²¹⁰ According to him too, not being able to observe any indication on tangible results of the participation often gives rise to citizens' reluctance, lack of interest, optimism and even dedication which initially presented and eventually retreating themselves back.²¹¹

Since the existence of city council is already left desperate to the support of the mayor, both the conviction and motivation of the citizens in involving the participation process, and the prospect of representing an alternative autonomous collective will from administration remains at stake. This, however, does not entitle one to generalize such aspect of functionality problem for all LA 21 processes in Turkey. There are at least a few practices such as Bursa, Antalya, İzmir and İzmit, where the harmony between the traditional political institutions and city councils is claimed to be established so well that the decisions of the latter are entered *de facto* directly onto the agenda of the following meeting of municipal assemblies.²¹²

²⁰⁹ Atilla Göktürk & Yüksel Akkaya, 2004.

²¹⁰ Sadun Emrealp, 2005, p. 59.

²¹¹ Ibid, p. 68.

²¹² Ulaş Bayraktar, "A 'global-down-up' initiative against the 'centers in the periphery': The impact and limitations of the new participatory mechanisms in Turkey", in Jean Benoit Pilet and Kristof Steyvers (eds.) *Towards DIY-Politics: Participatory and direct democracy at the local level in Europe*, 2007.

However, what is problematical at this point is whether or not such harmony between the local government and city council is of a democratic comprehension that allows city council witness the free “energy field” of a plural civil society. If such field lacks, then such harmony may be the very indication of non-autonomy of the council. This is crucial because even the LA 21 practices mentioned among those having such administrative harmony have their share from harsh critiques on the exclusionary aspect of city councils. For instance, according to İzmir Chamber of Environmental Engineers,²¹³ in the city council meeting on “integrated water management” dated on 2008, building of Gördes Dam (which was also preferred by the government) was proposed instead of Çamlı Dam which was to solve the problem of drought in İzmir, and those who have opposite viewpoints are not only left un-consulted, but also not even given an opportunity to pose questions regarding the proposal. The chamber claims that the structure of LA 21 has not a civil character at all, putting forth that the practice is all about a pure illusion as a “loyal instrument” to local government. Similarly, İzmit City Council, which was mentioned among the list of those having the administrative harmony between local government and city council, was also protested by one of the civil stakeholders, Provincial Coordination Committee of the Chamber of Engineers and Architects²¹⁴, on the ground of alleged exclusion:

“As the chambers which constantly take part in the adoption of the projects planned, prepared and completed by the local authorities, we are being invited to the meetings. However, we are being informed only when the projects that are put forth with a *fait accompli* come to a conclusion, and even when they have been implemented. As highlighted by us many times, the deliberation on rhetoric phase was not provided at all, and thus every suggestion that we have directed was perceived as “criticism”.

²¹³ Cited in Argun A. Akdoğan, *Yeni Yerel Yönetim Yasalarında Katılım*, p. 10, available from http://www.yayed.org.tr/resimler/ekler/21fa74b50ba3f7c_ek.pdf?tipi=7&turu=X&sube=0 (accessed on 18.08.2012).

²¹⁴ *Ibid.*

Therefore, it stands as a vital key to make certain the will of civil society draws a breath in the structure of city council which entails an organic break with the municipal authority and thereby enjoys a genuine democratic autonomy to one extent, in advance of an examination on the possible administrative influence of the decisions and proposals taken in city council. In this light, a simple assessment will be made on to what extent the public spheres (in terms of critical theory, moments of the lifeworld) generated by/within the two aforementioned city councils in Ankara are able to ensure a pluralistic character in themselves.

3.3. The “Publicity” Offered by City Councils

Examining the reliability of deliberative practices on city council level shall also take into account the institutional organization of those public spheres of the alleged “lifeworld” generated, which have in fact more than one categories of interaction within the “system”.

It is observed that both the organization and functioning of the two notable city council in Ankara, Çankaya City Council and Ankara City Council (of Metropolitan Municipality), are directly subordinated to their parent municipalities. The subordination thoroughly prevents a pluralist and democratic participation environment pervading on two levels; first of all, ideology of the political party governing that municipality is also ruling the city council in terms of both administrative and “civic” bodies. In this manner, it is noteworthy that the socio-economic and political divergence and polarization condensing in the capital city were correspondingly reflected in the formation of respective civil societies addressed by the city councils, instead of being weakened by the help of the city councils. Secondly, and more significantly to me, the settled bureaucracy, hierarchical power relations, established face-to-face practices and rituals specifically intrinsic to the municipal administration are even more influential

than the dominant political ideology on the concentration of power in participative experiences. Therefore, although the city councils are expected to represent the interests of the civil society vis-a-vis the administration, they tend to serve to reproduce the power relations accumulated in administrative authorities, thanks to the legitimization impact of their own, specific, synthetic societies. My inferences regarding this topic are deduced basically from the meetings of the general assemblies both held on the city council level.

It can be argued that the municipal control over Çankaya City Council was officially initiated with the Elective General Assembly in 2009. Critical views which claim the anti-democratic conduction of the election of the president and executive board as well as the unilateral administration of the city council afterwards are so common that some of the civil organizations which were among the members of Çankaya City Council have chosen to split up in order to form a reactive initiative named Democratic and Free Çankaya Platform of People, arguing for a democratic participation for collective reason²¹⁵. According to those critical views, the first Elective General Assembly was carried out as a pre-accomplished circumstance infringing all the principles and philosophy of governance²¹⁶. The first session of the assembly witnessed “the blind’s leading the blind”, as the mayor self-appointed himself as the president of the city council with approximately 40 votes out of 250 present members who could barely fit into the assembly hall.

In the second session of the meeting, the majority of the participants decided to leave the hall by not accepting that anti-democratic electoral process. The assembly went to the election of the executive board of the city council with 33 candidates of approximately 90 participants remaining in the hall. With the classification of 805 votes for 33 candidates, it was announced in the following

²¹⁵ <http://cankayakentkonseyi.wordpress.com/> (accessed on 18.06.2012).

²¹⁶ <http://cankayakentkonseyi.wordpress.com/2009/10/31/103/> (accessed on 18.06.2012).

day that 9 of them were brought to the board. The striking fact was that it was noticed in the observations made during the elections that some of those nominated were not in the list of the delegates. Moreover, it was realized that one of the 9 “elected” members (who was declared to get 30 votes) was not even nominated for the executive board. It was widely alleged that many of the electoral rules were infringed, such as equal voting, open counting etc. In any condition, it is a fact that, election of the president with a minor vote of approximately 13% and of the executive board with a vote of approximately 16% of 539 participants refers to the clear negligence of the “multi-partner and multi-actor governance” as portrayed. The presidency was taken over by the general secretary of the former executive board with another Elective General Assembly by the end of 2011. My interview with the secretariat of the city council²¹⁷ implies that there is a declining interest of people on the city council which can be paralleled with the declining belief and trust in passing period, as stated that only approximately 100 civil organizations participated in the election in 2011, while it was nearly 350 in 2009. For sure, the seat takeover did not tackle the identification of the city council with the municipality, as well as the perception of the role of the council as a legitimating instrument which has its reference within a specific and uniform “civil society” confined to be applied to political struggle with the rival municipality, instead of being applied to citizen-oriented public service.

Very similar evaluations can be directed to the structuring and functioning of Ankara City Council. According to my observations on the 6th Ordinary General Assembly Meeting of the council held on 27th April 2012, strictly hierarchical relations associated with the municipality (in both institutional and personal terms) continue to prevail within the dominant practices, oppositely to governance principles on paper. The program of the meeting included the election of the assembly members (*Divan Kurulu*) as well as the presentation and voting for the project proposals of working groups. General Assembly is assembled by

²¹⁷ Personal interview with E. E, April 21, 2012, Çankaya City Council.

the representations of the corporations and foundations formally or informally associated with the Metropolitan Municipality. Except those directly proposed by the president (as an aside note, he was also appointed from the Metropolitan Council²¹⁸), proposals determined in working groups are to be accepted by the Executive Board in order to be introduced in General Assembly for submission to the Municipal Council merely as “suggestive opinions”. The sense of hierarchy in these complex institutional mediations reverberates well on the president’s statements that define the city council at the outset as the “*mediator instrument* that brings the *suggestions* of the civil society *up to the level* of the municipality”.

Election of the assembly members was rather carrying the quality of an announcement of the appointed members than of an election, although the election was introduced as one of the fundamental reasons of the gathering. After the president mentioned the names of the candidates easily and quickly, he put the list simply for a formalist voting, and then the list was “accepted”; all of which lasted approximately 10 seconds.

After the election of the assembly, the meeting witnessed the presentation of the proposals by the working groups which are respectively Public Works and Urban Development; Education, Culture, Art and Sports; Disabled; Transport, Traffic and Infrastructure; Family and Children. The lack of working groups/assemblies of Women and Youth which were explicitly prioritized by crucial emphasises in the official documents of both Agenda 21 and LA 21 made more sense as it has been observed that the vast of the majority is composed by the male and aged participants.

All of the presentations except that of the Transport, Traffic and Infrastructure group were made by the experts associated with those working groups, whereas the latter was made by the president himself who should

²¹⁸ Belediye Bülteni, “Kent konseyi olağan genel kurulu yapıldı”, 10 August 2009, <http://www.haberler.genel/2009-08-10/ankara-kent-konseyi-olagan-genel-kurulu-yapildi/> (accessed on 18.06.2012)

probably have considered it more vital. Technical argumentations and expertise rhetoric analysed before were dominant also in each of the presentations. As the technical speech got longer, it was observed to lose interest and attention, the roaring of the crowd got increased and the general atmosphere seemed to await the vote as soon as possible. After each speech, the president, instead of the representation of the working group, declared the proposals of the group and then put all of them to one single vote.

When the turn came to the presentation of the working group of Transport, Traffic and Infrastructure, it became strikingly clear that how the terms city council, civil society, citizen-orientation, governance etc. were comprehended and located in prescriptive administrative practices. The sole agenda topic for the working group was exactly the same with the municipality project concerning the road to pass through the METU campus²¹⁹. While making his presentation by showing up a map with a fairly aggressive sounding, it was conspicuous that the president who is expected to represent the ideas of civil society used the very same arguments with those of Metropolitan Mayor regarding the matter. It was probably the most rigorous moment that the boundaries between Habermas's lifeworld and system were entirely vanished, when he defined the students and people of the university outside the civil society, while referring to his argument "all Ankara people support and demand this project":

"If this is put to the vote, I am sure that if not the METU, Ankara residents demand it. There is a great blockage in Eskişehir Road, there are 200.000 people out there, and in 5 years it will reach to 500.000. We will solve 40% of the traffic problem of Ankara that way. The discretion is yours. Let the members of the executive board explain it to the Rectorate, if they respond negatively then we'll bring it to the agenda of the city council and move it to the press."

²¹⁹ Sol Haber Portalı, "Dev Melih Gökçek Projesi: ODTÜ'den Yol Gececek", 28 July 2011, <http://haber.sol.org.tr/kent-gundemleri/dev-melih-gokcek-projesi-odtu-den-yol-gececek-haberi-44925> (accessed on 20.06.2012)

While applying the term city council as a tool to legitimize the decisions taken by the administration, the president's imputation to the students connotes Eagleton's famous definition of 'ideology' which is that "like halitosis, it is always what the other person has"²²⁰. Actually, the significance of this connotation rather stems from its signaling the overall argument suggested under this subtopic: The 'publicity' offered by both city councils happens to draw the political and institutional boundary between inside and outside, i.e. between "us and them". Those who are outside of the boundary lose their legitimacy to the extent that they distance themselves from where "we" are, the centre which is far from being ideological. Yet, they are excluded at the very beginning of the formation of the specific public sphere associated with the city council, thus lost their legitimacy at the outset. The only issue left is the persuasion of them, or otherwise filing complaint against them, but never deliberating with them on equal ground.

President: Universities are not the places of sabotaging and blocking out the jobs done by the administrations in favour of people. Three or five ideologically-oriented students do not have such right. We, as both the municipality and the city council, are not against the students. We wish them to be dutiful men for the motherland and the nation in the future.

Participant A taking the floor: Dear president, we are very grateful to you. This is a vital issue. Just before coming here, I have watched our honourable mayor speaking on this issue on a television program; he told that the METU people are now softened up. I congratulate you heartily.

President: Thank you. It is not a matter of whether they are softened up, or not. But of that the ideological reaction of three or five students cannot infringe the rights of 400.000 people.

²²⁰ Terry Eagleton, 1991, *Ideology: An Introduction*, Verso, p. 2.

Participant B: Dear president. Do not those partisans of RPP pass by that road? It affects them negatively as well. We may take them to our side.

President: Of course we may, I am not arguing for excluding them.

Participant B: Dear president, I think a relevant project shall also focus on Keçiören, since it tends to suffer from similar problems.

President: Do not hesitate to bring those to the working group. There is not a rule that every suggestion will be rejected. This is why we are formed. We are here for moving the civil society to the municipal council.

Overall, none of the items proposed by the working groups were opened to discussion. All items of the proposals were held in total and put to one vote for each working group, whereas there were no negative votes casted. Besides the fact that there was not deliberation at all, even no one among the participants raised to take the right to speak throughout the meeting, except two highly acclaiming speeches. My observations demonstrate that widespread public views which consider the city councils as the institutional extensions of the municipal administrations do rather rely on concrete facts and impressions, than pure speculations. Indeed, it was already revealed by a study²²¹ that similarly to the majority of the city councils in Turkey, there are explicit organic relations between the Ankara Metropolitan Municipality and Ankara City Council. The city council has its executive board, to a large extent, consisted of the members of the Metropolitan Council and of the NGOs established through the method of “covering” (*hülle*). The same study discovers that 15 out of the other 18 city councils in Ankara are common in having their presidency held either by the mayors, vice mayors or among the members of municipal councils.

²²¹ S. Zafer Şahin, “Kent Konseylerinin Katılımcı Kent Yönetimine Katkıları Üzerine Bir Değerlendirme”, in Bursa Kent Konseyi (ed.) *Kent Konseyleri Sempozyumu Bildiri Kitabı*, Bursa Kent Konseyi Bilimsel Yayınlar Dizisi, 2011, pp. 182-184.

Nevertheless, these explicit relations should not be regarded as the primary source of the non-autonomy of the city councils. Because, even if these intertwined relations between the municipality and the city council are entirely removed on the officials' level, as discussed all the way in this part, there are still the implicit points of linkage which synthetically constitute the uniform and adherent public sphere through corporatist representation and partisan/patronage affiliations. Hence, despite the possible lack of the institutional intersection of the city council and municipality, the public sphere offered by the city council still will not necessarily ensure to correspond to a genuinely civil, pluralist, non-hierarchical and comprehensive society. In all attempts of referring to the *sui generis* society of the city council for the legitimization by the claim that "people demand it", there will still be the vital inquiries on "which society?...whose public?..." questioning the reliability of the city council with regards to the basic principles of democratic participation.

CHAPTER 4

CRITICAL REFLECTION: THEORETICAL AND POLITICAL LIMITS

4.1. General Assessment of Participatory Practices

Participatory practices of local governance that are exemplified up to now can finally be evaluated on two interrelated grounds. First is specifically in terms of the accomplishment of LA 21 program, whereas second is a reconsideration of the theoretical postulates of critical/radical theories regarding local governance, which is to concern practical impressions as well. Hence any overall evaluation, as mentioned earlier, would be meaningful insofar as it has a reference in theoretical shortcomings. Specific source of problems which do not already meet any precondition of theoretical stipulation, in this context, would be considered relevant only as a shortcoming of the ‘universalist’ premises of the theoretical ground.

For an instance of such specificity, the fact that representation on the level of city council asks for a necessary civil membership to any related union, association or foundation has directly a negative impact on individual and popular participation in Turkey, given the state that the proportion of the number of civil associations and membership to any association to overall population in Turkey is respectively, (approximately) 20 times and 4 times less than European average.²²² This is a direct formal limit to comprehensiveness, which exerts its negative effect at most on the representation of already excluded social groups in political and public life.

²²² Sivil Toplum Endeksi Projesi, *Türkiye’de Sivil Toplum: Bir Dönüm Noktası*. Retrieved from <http://www.step.org.tr/print.asp?c=6&s=13&n=69> (accessed 20.06.2012)

As another limitation of examining the power relations within local participation is the lack of binding quality of city councils in Municipal Law, which most effectively prevents councils from being ‘vital’ participative recourses of social classes and constrains them to witness overt hints of class conflict. The fact that certain part of the membership in general assembly is composed of the mayor, municipal council, civilian administration and those chosen by them, as well as the unique basis of the council activities is designed on voluntariness, which is highly impeded by the ‘learned’ demotivation, reluctance or social unconsciousness of the citizens constitute the complementary feature that impedes participatory practices in the councils from being pluralistic. These being the case, observations on micro-scale relations of dominance within two major city council in Ankara somehow, to a certain extent justify the Weberian approaches to local government in the sense that it is the administrative-bureaucratic class which enjoys a great deal of authority in leading the agenda and ‘civil’ opinion within “governance” practices. It is mostly through the means of established hierarchical power relations, face-to-face rituals that such authority is observed to be practiced to exterminate the autonomy of city council, disclosing the influence of sui generis dynamics and value/behavioural systems specific to the administrations of local governments,²²³ which are particularly seen in capturing of the executive boards through favouritism and the NGOs formed by “covering” method. Ideological elements are also at play on leading the discourse setting -to the extent that local governments are regarded as extensions of central political structures. The fundamental problem of autonomy, on the other hand, as discussed in previous topic, rather lies on the formation of “public spheres” compatible to the respective city council, than the administrative subordination of city councils.

In overall context, widespread criticisms on the participatory course of city councils regarding the representation of unorganized segments of society,

²²³ H. Tarık Şengül, *Kentsel Çelişki ve Siyaset: Kapitalist Kentleşme Süreçlerinin Eleştirisi*, İmge Kitabevi, 2009, pp. 156-157.

determination of the participants, fairness in representation (participation), setting of the agenda, limitations on the democratic comprehension of participant actors, privileged positions of the bureaucrats, experts and local capital in leading discussions, external/internal exclusion of marginal groups –especially economically subordinate classes, functioning merely as the instruments to confirm predetermined decisions of the administrations etc. are certainly based on a justified ground.

Although the actions, decisions, and policies of the local government concern the interests of all citizens of the local (whether ‘organised’ or not), representation of unorganized social groups on city council level is obstructed due to the limitation of participation only to “natural memberships” and institutional representation. Individual representation is on the other hand recognized only within the scope of working groups and assemblies, whereas, as the observations imply, it is likely to be dominated by the expertise/bureaucratic-based participation. Discursive patterns of dominant speeches, privileges of interest articulation, symbolic violence etc. are observed to prevail in the meetings appearing congruent with the power positions in ‘real’ social formation of civil society. Thereby, effective representation of the demands of the urban marginal, disadvantaged, subordinated social groups in favour of social equity does not seem having much potential within current structures of so-called local governance, as they are *de facto* excluded or condemned to silence, just as in terms of their representation in municipal council. Even if no limitation is set for the formal participation of all social groups, fairness in representation of diverse class interests is harder to be assured, primarily in technically manipulatable issues. At the very least, without giving too much away, for an instance of the ‘sustainability’ of the privileges from material resources, those (supposedly) who are able to afford to employ a group of expertise will take all the ‘scientific’ advantage of technocratic discourse, whereas those being deprived of such ability will have to ground their counter position only on personal testimonial

argumentations to defend their interests, which may probably compel their participation to result in simply as a *token* activity.²²⁴

It is also pertinent to underline that representation of the alternative also has to deal with the problems of participation in setting of the agenda, which is directly related with the very content of conflicting speech acts. In most cases agenda of the working groups is prepared according to, or in line with that of the municipality. As the “national coordinator” indicates, municipalities embrace a formal and superficial participation in certain (probably ‘smooth’) issues, whereas once the ‘key’ subjects regarding, for instance, urban planning, budgetary, bid-related services are concerned, they tend to tightly close the decision making process to participation²²⁵, meaning that these issues are still being operated at the level of mayor. On the other hand, in cases where the agenda is opened to discussion, once the alternative and critical viewpoints which tend to touch upon the social and political aspects regarding the agenda are set forth, they are often exposed to discursive closure by the bureaucratic dominance practiced through objectivist expertise discourse claiming the impossibility of non-solved problems. However, it is misleading to think that this is a too specific case for Turkey

²²⁴ As a matter of fact, one of the well-known incidents in which such disparity was highly influential to lead participation as a *token* activity was experienced in a case which was in the beginning regarded one of the most prominent “project democracy” in Turkey (namely, Dikmen Valley Project). The project was initiated in 1990 as an urban renewal plan that would be conducted through participatory decision making involving “all relevant actors” in a joint committee, and thus would provide multi-actor, transparent, accountable account in line with governance theory. Korel Göymen, *Türk Yerel Yönetiminde Katılımcılığın Evrimi: Merkeziyetçi Bir Devlette Yönetişim Dinamikleri*, Amme İdaresi Dergisi, Vol. 32, No. 4, 1999, p. 79. It is worth noting however that what is being adduced as participation in present situation is nothing beyond an “informative” (in terms of Arnstein’s famous “ladder of participation”) approach in respective stages of the project, in fact to prevent the opposition of the “beneficiaries” to the project and accomplish the project cheaper by gaining their support (Sherry R. Arnstein, A Ladder of Citizen Participation”, *Journal of the American Institute of Planners*, vol.35, no.4, 1969). Given the problem of great deal of rise in the urban rent, and thus in housing and land values within the area subject to the project after the first stage, information obtained from interviews and questionnaires with beneficiaries demonstrate that the “compromise” in regeneration processes -highlighted as the essential way in Municipal Law- is being practiced through unilaterally imposed contract terms by the municipality. Mustafa Demirci, *Kent Planlamada Uygulama Anlayışına Eleştirel Bir Yaklaşım Dikmen Vadisi Projesi Örneği*, Ph.D. diss., Ankara University, 2004, pp. 283-285. Murat Yaman, *Kentsel Dönüşüm Uygulamaları Ankara Büyükşehir Belediyesi: Dikmen Vadisi 3. Etap Örneği*, Ph.D. diss., Ankara University, 2011, pp. 212-212, p. 233.

²²⁵ Sadun Emrealp, 2005, p. 68.

experience. Similar problems regarding opening up the ‘crucial’ agenda to responsive civil deliberation is identified even in the LA 21 experiences that are acknowledged amongst the most ideal models (e.g. Japan and UK) as the inclusion is claimed to be occasionally confined to the involvement of local bureaucrats and certain privileged groups already influencing the existing administrative structure.²²⁶

Nevertheless, it is apposite to recall that discursive closure is in fact, in part a question of the comprehension of democratic participation by all concerned sides, but mostly by those representing the central and local administration for they hold the “epistemic authority” of the deliberations. In some cases administrators are commonly observed to be unaware even of the basics of the relation between the notions of civil society and democratic governance. So that being the case, the *spectre* of civil society which is neither civil, nor social, but synthetically articulated to administrative will is ironically introduced as an authority that is autonomous from and superior to the social reality of citizens. Other side of this problem is certainly of the consciousness on the part of citizens, which is revealed particularly in the problematique of ‘reifying’ the priorities and intentions of individuals (whether or not towards participating in the process) as if they are totally fixed in themselves and independent of the dynamics of complex micro-politics of knowledge production, i.e. social relations of power concentrated at the local level. As David Mosse argues, “local knowledge” reflects local power.²²⁷ Hence, what makes local knowledge political, is not only its public nature, but also its ‘open-endedness’. Mosse describes the open-ended character of local knowledge in participatory practices exemplifying four dimensions such as; shaping of knowledge by local relations of power, expression

²²⁶ Brendan Barrett and Mikoto Usui, Local Agenda 21 in Japan: Transforming local environmental governance, *Local Environment: The International Journal of Justice and Sustainability*, Vol. 7, No. 1, 2010. Danny Burns, Can Local Democracy Survive Governance?, *Urban Studies*, Vol. 37, No. 5-6, 2000.

²²⁷ David Mosse, “‘People’s Knowledge’, Participation and Patronage: Operations and Representations in Rural Development” in Bill Cooke and Uma Kothari (eds.) *Participation: The New Tyranny*, Zed Books, 2001, p. 19.

of outsider agendas as ‘local knowledge’, local collusion in formation of consensus, direct manipulation of ‘civil’ planning by administrative agents.

Mosse illustrates the influence of outsider agendas and local collusion on determining local interests through an analysis on Participatory Rural Appraisal²²⁸ project conducted in Mekoing Delta of Vietnam for seeking local consensus on the problem of declining soil fertility. The focus of discussion was on the actual uses of trees, and overwhelming part of the farmers, for instance, expressed a strong preference for eucalyptus as timber for housing, albeit they had little knowledge on or no experience of using the species for this purpose. It later came to light that village nursery programme was sponsored by the State Forest Department, which was perceived as strongly favouring this species, and as a consequence villager “needs” were significantly shaped by perceptions of what agency was able to deliver. Therefore, expressed need for eucalyptus, like the demand for soil and water conservation, was in fact a low-risk community strategy for securing known benefits (trees or wages) in short term that might have been ventured by some more complex or differentiated statement of preferences. Moreover, it was demonstrated that local power hierarchies “somehow” intersect with project priorities as a composition of local perspectives and interests which struggle to find a place within the authorizing framework of the project. While expression of “illegitimate” interests get suppressed, just as has been reflected in city council practices, some individuals or groups have the skill or authority to present personal interests in more generally valid terms, while others cannot.²²⁹ Once these “risks” being the case, any attempt of dogmatizing the “civil interests” (as have been seen in the mottos of legitimation like “society demands this”) tends to conceal the political character of social dispositions in

²²⁸ Participatory Rural Appraisal is a method of local governance utilized by non-governmental organizations and other agencies involved in international development. The approach aims to incorporate the knowledge and opinions of rural people in the planning and management of development projects and programmes. What is essential in this approach is an actively involved and empowered local population for successful rural community development. Lambert M. Surhone, *Participatory Rural Appraisal*, VDM Publishing, 2010.

²²⁹ David Mosse, 2001, pp. 20-22.

nature, portraying them as flourishing in a purely autonomous reality from social relations of power and ideological struggles.

What makes participation conducted as a *token* activity relevant with theoretical deadlocks then, as in the discourse approaches that tempt to theorize the model of local governance, is the problem that existing social structure is taken for granted by getting the participatory action almost “dropped in” that structure, and thus falling short to develop a transformative framework for egalitarian and comprehensive popular participation. One of the most extreme examples of such oversight was exposed by Harran’s partnership with the 1st Phase of LA 21 Program. In this case, there was seen no impropriety at all to accord the discourse of “sustainability” which precisely relies on a peculiar evaluation by capitalist-managerialist rationality, to the severe dominance of economic, social and cultural components of the existing feudal structure.²³⁰ Overall, both the approach behind the practical experiences concerned and theoretical tenets of the models that propose local governance based on active participation for the legitimacy-ensuring public consent seem to presuppose a *powerless* social structure the unique question of which is to make certain an ideal speech or discursive will formation compliant with the conceptual principles on paper.

Returning back to the conditions of deliberative participation, all of these shortcomings may in fact address the very absence of ideal speech in problematic practices as formulated at the outset, as well as they may demonstrate that it weakens the analytic reliability of the theories which at most conceptualize ideal speech or discursive will formation to purify the lifeworld from the elements and relations of power specific to system, presuming the autonomy of lifeworld without proceeding on a holistic analysis of the social system as a formation. One may conceivably argue that it goes to extremes and cruel to demonstrate the

²³⁰ Atilla Göktürk, Bugün Gelinek Yerde Kent Konseyleri ve Yerel Gündem 21, *Dosya-08: Yerel Yönetimlere Katılım*, Mimarlar Odası Ankara Şubesi Yayını, Bülten 64, 2008, p. 13-14.

“systemic” logic in local governance simply by addressing the networks of global financial interests which take on the ‘launching’ duty and constitute the formal source of initiative²³¹. Notwithstanding, even the set of simple instances exemplified in previous chapter is beneficial to draw an impression on the increasing impossibility of tackling the involvement of “systemic” interests as the participation scale is expanded and as well as inequalities in technical, political, organizational capability (even if not financial) to participate are treated by the naïve equity of proceduralism. At the very least, a representative bureaucrat, for instance of the *inseparability* of the system, is also individually comprised as a part of the “local knowledge”, whereas he/she employs a technocratic discourse of “we, us” claiming the impossibilities for non-solved problems and always being in defence of his/her institution.

In this regard, although the focus on bureaucracy dominant in local governance yields some incidents that make the dynamics ‘specific’ to administrative class meaningful, class character in administrative class cannot be analysed separately from their both ‘formal’ and ‘functional’ relations with market forces. This can be comprehended only by dealing with local government as an issue of capitalist state, moving beyond the pluralist ‘myopia’ of civil-societarianism. Thinking of the state *as the regulating factor of the global equilibrium of the mode of production as a system*,²³² the need of regulation of the spatial asymmetries created by “uneven development”²³³ in favour of the power bloc in this global equilibrium is what unmasks both the ‘capitalist’ and ‘state’ face of local government. Local government, in this context, corresponds to “government of the local” scale of global functioning of capitalist state. It is the ‘natural’ outcome of this very position that it is always open to the demands of the capital taking on an active responsibility on the transactions for instance regarding

²³¹ For an example of the argument defending that practices associated with LA 21 Project should not be dogmatized in a snap as a pure “neoliberal evil”, see Ulaş Bayraktar, 2007.

²³² Nicos A. Poulantzas, *Political power and social classes*, Verso, 1978, p. 45.

²³³ H. Tarık Şengül, 2009, p. 158-159.

privatization, subcontracting etc. in line with macro policies, which eventually results in an organic collaboration with local bourgeoisie and the articulation of to the very logic of market in production/delivery of the service. This, however, does not necessitate the dependency of local government to central government in a strict functionalist sense of ‘instrumentalism’; on the contrary, local government appears to be as a structure of *social relations* that confront inner divergences, conflicts and possess a relative autonomy.²³⁴ Thanks to this very autonomy and specificity, it can both function as a scale of constituting the factor of cohesion between different levels of relations of production, and reproduce the ideological-hegemonic legitimation of the state relying on a democratic illusion presented by the approaches conceiving the society and market independently of the state. In this regard, the *sui generis* context of the administrative relations in local government that I have before supposed to be explicable on the basis of Weberian approaches to one extent, corresponds only to a facet of these *social relations* on micro scale. Thus, prevention of popular participation to the technical issues regarding the redistribution of resources, as well as utilization of bureaucratic privileges and uneven forms of expression of class differences in both discourse formation and setting of the agenda in seemingly ‘inclusive’ issues may well highlight a class-based social exclusion. That means, to the extent that the exclusionary concentration of power and authority within the patterns of indigenous mechanisms of administrative functioning seems to justify Weberian paradigm at first glance, it also, in the final analysis, needs to be comprehended in terms of the contradictions that are subject to constant class conflict.

Given the purpose of the study, practical overview on the shortcomings of public participation in local governance has hereby helped our endeavour to bring into question primarily the critical administrative theory, and radical discourse theory as a secondary concern. That is because, to reiterate the epistemological disparity of these two, radical theory rightfully rejects the claim of universal capability of communicative rationality to one extent referring to a

²³⁴ Ibid, p. 184-185.

poststructuralist ground which considers the scope of the language as a concrete plane of power struggle given the socio-historical and practical nature of it. The centre of focus where radical discourse theory is included in the debate is rather, as mentioned before, not seeking power relations in discourse, but the lack of a holistic comprehension of the social structure by implying a framework of external relations between the state and civil society, and thus failing to genuinely deal with the questions regarding how comprehensive – if not all discourses can be reconciled- the participative discourse setting can be assured within civil society itself.

As a significant consequence of the critical glance at participatory experiences, it can be drawn that uneven distribution of capital forms manifests itself to a certain extent correlatively with inequalities in economic capital specific to capitalism, and thereby eventually an ultimate inequality is generated within discursive practices in terms of the use of “technology of power”, in a way to be in compliance with respective class positions.²³⁵ Critical theory somehow overlooks this inequality, whereas postmodernists on the contrary admit, yet do not problematize it. However, any theory that calls out a “civil” rise against the systematic distortion of lifeworld should have taken it as its central focus in order to cultivate its transformative content in favour of more egalitarian and comprehensive representation of interests.

On the other hand, since the shortcomings exemplified are processed through a ‘selective’ and limited approach, it evidently does not deny the potentiality of the instances elsewhere that entailed the institutional maturity and capacity as required by the agenda of LA 21. However, notwithstanding the

²³⁵ As can be derived from the usage of extra-economic forms of capital, the notion class here does not refer to a strict sense of ‘objectivism’, but a relational system of social dispositions entailing both subjective and objective components, which may as well lead to different appearances in social and cultural form; put it differently, in “status”. Yet, what renders this framework an integral one is somewhat the pioneering role (inheritance) of economic class in any form of appearance. For this reason, using the term habitus can be conditionally beneficial for its relational context.

widely presumed view that effective accomplishment of the LA 21 brings with it democratic consolidation *a priori*, capacity empowerment and institutional maturity does not necessarily imply or signify “more” democracy, once the setting of democratic participation is critically comprehended in its context of power and dominance by moving beyond the questioning the formal and procedural competence.

In conclusion, having discussed the possible limits of the participatory processes, previous chapter of the thesis has tried to focus upon a practical implementation of local governance parallel to what critical and radical propose as an alternative type of administrative legitimacy. In this light, participatory practices embedded within the grand project of LA 21, although they do not exactly constitute an application that these theories would *directly* refer to, are considered being worth a glance. It is because, as was explained before, they are first thought to have provided active participation for communities of relatively macro scale (at least, on neighbourhood scale). Secondly, albeit the instrumentalization of participation for sustainable development, the affinity formed between sustainable development and participation has precisely highlighted, at least rhetorically, the principles such as overcoming unequal power relations through democratic and equal participation, consensus-building, ownership as citizens, social integration, inclusion of socially excluded groups, effective forms of communicative practice and collective deliberation, inclusionary argumentation etc. all of which are positively associated and congruent with the very logic of critical theory (or approach) in public administration. The main focus of the chapter was examining how much the relevant past/present practices could meet the framework formulated by the critical account as well as demonstrating the limitations that could indeed be problematized rather in practical inconveniences of theoretical assumption. In this regard, within the LA 21 practices both observed and applied as secondary resources (among which Antalya city council, “one of the best practices” is also examined):

1. Indications of “colonization” of lifeworld by the system were observed in all meetings except the minor scale, that is neighbourhood meetings. These latter meetings, probably for the relative independency of the issues deliberated from financial necessities of social living, were having the profile of being equipped with a kind of social integration indeed approximating that of the lifeworld realm. In all other meetings, on the other hand, administrative bodies have constituted the ‘systemic’ involvement in participation actualized within the supposedly lifeworld, either through institutional or individual representation. They have otherwise organized their own synthetic, uniform and adherent public spheres (or lifeworld), as shown in the section “publicity offered by city councils”.
2. In all meeting experiences except the general assemblies of the city councils which require civil membership to participate, external exclusion was attempted to be more or less prevented by ensuring the formal equality for participation, whereas internal exclusion/unequal privileges within discourse formation have been constantly witnessed. The latter was also true even for the neighbourhoods’ which have proceeded entirely autonomously from the system.
3. Instruments of maintaining the exclusion or inequalities in deliberative processes (such as technical modality of knowledge, reasoning, articulation) have been originated rather from the disparity in forms of capital in accessing the “legitimate” speech. As the power positions in real social formation widely prevail, it has been observed not only for the meetings in the context of LA 21, but in much broader sense that the issue of participatory policy making in which rather the financial/technical (thus more divisive, contentious) aspects of administration are set forth in the agenda are always prone to have the risk of being open to continuity and

reproduction of exploitation and oppression. In such cases, participation does not stand for as a tackle to the social hierarchy in political representation, but on the contrary as a new type, state and practice of dominance.

The very aspect of these problems in practice concerning the participative/discursive theories is the decisive presumption as if -particularly- the last point is not worth considering, which brings into question the transformative capacity of the theories. What makes capitalist social reality meaningful as the 'locus' in these theoretical limitations is on the other hand most likely the convenience of the analytical fractions it generates in social formation leading an illusion of discontinuity in terms of power and dominance on different moments of the 'game'.

Now, after discussing practical limitations of the theoretical assumptions thanks to practical impressions and observations, a final integrated approach for both critical and radical discourse theory in public administration can be ultimately employed. This approach first involves an attempt to locate these two theories into one context over their common employment of public discourse setting as a socially constitutive force for administration. Then such context will hopefully provide functionality for a more meticulous critique of the given problematics, so that a basic discussion around a few conceptual themes will be also drawn on in order to lay the groundwork of the theoretical/political problems led by the account of society-centrism originating, as the fundamental problem, from the separation of the political and economic.

4.2. Putting Critical and Radical Theories into One Context

For the overall practical analysis up until now, in regard of promoting ‘practical change’, it is notable that some “poststructuralist” attempt of theorizing public administration should be altered from that which engaged in critical theory. What differentiates the proposals of this poststructuralist alleged “anti-theory” of administration from critical theory is basically their epistemological engagement with radical discourse theory and the method of deconstruction. On the other hand, they all commonly benefit from a critical lens towards scientist reasoning with predetermined legitimacy ground of values, interests and objectives that are prevailing in existing structures, institutions of representative, ballot-box democracy and its unidimensional administration/rational management, and eventually in its authoritarian epistemological setting over whole social reality. Postmodernists are thus *critical* not in the sense of its association with the philosophy of Critical Theory, but of its critique of the dominant figure of “Man of Reason” along with the reject of both aggregation and social contract model, proposing instead a redefinition of public service and development of an alternative orientation in favour of a reflection in human interaction and a radical pluralist democracy with and within public administration.

However, what is suggested for this manner in this study is rather to reconsider critical and radical theories of administration in terms of the strong prescriptive commonalities both frameworks bring about, at the expense of risking the epistemological breaking with, which is I think much less worthy of “overanalysis”. That is because that the epistemological split of radical discourse theory is only considerable for their claim of postmodern conditions and respective deconstructive approach towards sustainability of modernity. Their advocators simply contend that public administration of present-day finds itself in a postmodern stage, thus it is still possible to maintain a democratic administration in postmodernism to the extent that discourse themes of postmodernity are adapted.

On the other hand, in regard of the ontological assumptions of both approaches, it is the argument of “reality is a social construction” that distinguishes discourse theory from critical theory, which distinctively recognizes the objective limits of natural world over human action and thus argues to transform the very essence of human interaction with nature. Despite such differences, however, the intellectual deconstruction of unquestionable facts and values of “scientific” reasoning (for instance, tenets of the myth *homo economicus*) is conducted through a very similar path in both; e.g. critique of “Man of Reason” is quite close to that of instrumental rationality by Habermas, or even to that of first generation, supposing, “one dimensional man” of Marcuse. Both critiques, in this context, provide us a reflexive insight that by denying the privilege of one single perspective, we can as well withdraw from the universalist categories, principles, laws and policies of the prevailing system.

Reflection of such insight on public administration, in practical terms, refers to one common pathway for both discourse-based critical theory and radical discourse theory; that is roughly the intersubjective/collaborative pragmatism of public discourse, whether defined as radical pluralism or deliberation. As an aside side note, if postmodernists did not conclude their deconstructive interpretation somewhat by proposing a practical/pragmatic prescription –which would be more in line with poststructuralist standpoint- it would be quite difficult for one to “deconstruct” their analytical stance. Because, moderate ignorance of postmodernist theorists regarding practical consequences would make decrease the level of possible inconsistency. However, since what makes their outlook postmodernist is largely of their analysis of public administration *in* so-called postmodern conditions, once the proposal is concerned, their theory seems to slide back into the very same framework of “reasoned” modernist adherents of critical theory. Although they suggest to carefully distinguish themselves from the emancipatory agenda of critical theory, there is a concrete alternative they subsequently arrive at; an alternative which by no means compromises with a radicalism that intends to overthrow the existing structure of the state and

administration, and that makes, in empirical terms (if not epistemological), the claims of anti-foundationalism problematic.

This is probably for the very practical nature of administrative realm, since public administration is itself a paradigm case of modernity.²³⁶ Not only Fox and Miller (due to their explicit engagement with Habermas theory), but also other prominent figures of discourse theory, which is likely to stay at play within the schemes of pre-given order, stipulate a “reconstruction” of it, the ultimate goal of which is to form a new governmental legitimacy “by shifting from an emphasis on the public administrator’s role in directing agencies to thinking about how administrators may assist in creating community through collaboration with citizens.”²³⁷ Even within the conditions of anti-administration, hence, administrators are there in “administrative actions”, through “enabler” and “helper” positions:

“Fox and Miller’s administrator is proactive in seeking democratic will formation, Farmer’s “antiadministration” administrator minimizes bureaucratic control and opens governance to the community, McSwite’s administrator avoids acting as a “man of reason,” and Stivers’s administrator is a responsive listener.”²³⁸

In the final analysis, both critical and radical discourse theories can be rethought in one context which addresses both their contribution to critical social theory, and their prescriptive frameworks which conduces to more or less the same practical setting: a discursive form of public administration which embraces the role of citizenship in local governance (“Translating the (postmodern) understanding into a poli-sci based conceptualization, *governance* becomes the

²³⁶ David J. Farmer, 1995, p. 48.

²³⁷ Richard C. Box, 2002, p. 20.

²³⁸ Ibid, 2002, p. 34.

key concept”²³⁹). This requires an analytical perspective transcending the distinct theoretical premises of two account that determine their respective approaches to the issues of consensus; rationalization etc., very similar to the attempt of approximating S. Benhabib’s deliberative democracy to C. Mouffe’s radical democracy.²⁴⁰

At this point, however, we confront the same problem of discourse theory with the limits of proceduralism discussed before in context of critical theory: Although it addresses late capitalism as the ‘launcher’ moment of radical pluralism, it deals with public participation merely as an issue and “problem of administration” without moving beyond through a broader analysis regarding the questions of the class character of the state, administration, public ability for participation on a fair basis, along with economic and social conflicts in capitalist social formation. This limitation brings with it a decisive disinterest on possible concerns about the extent of how comprehensive the participative discourse can be achieved given the dominant relations of power between administration and public and within the public. Although discourse theorists precisely oppose the reduction of democracy to formal procedures,²⁴¹ unique objective of discourse setting which is to occur between administration and public eventually corresponds to a ‘proceduralism’ for administrative legitimacy which is not to get its inside congested by any substantial value. Remembering communicative action theory, Habermas tries to achieve the moral reliability of the procedure through the inspiration from Kantian ethics and speech-act philosophy prominently of

²³⁹ Peter Bogason, Public Administration Under Postmodern Conditions, *Administrative Theory & Praxis*, Vol. 30, No. 3, 2008, p. 360.

²⁴⁰ See, for instance of such attempt, Fahriye Üstüner, Radikal demokrasi: “Liberalizm mi, demokrasi mi? Evet, lütfen!”, *ODTÜ Gelişme Dergisi*, No. 34, 2007.

²⁴¹ Exception here is the state-oriented proposals concerning postmodern conditions, i.e. those somehow suggest administrative legitimacy through a constitutionalist understanding of procedural justice, see, e.g.: Michael W. Spicer, Reconciling Postmodern Public Administration and Constitutionalism: Some Reflections on the Ideas of Stuart Hampshire, *International Journal of Organization Theory and Behavior*, Vol. 13, No. 1, 2010.

Wittgenstein by which the universalism in communicative capability attributed to the very specificity of human being is theoretically ensured.

However, even though they break away from such essentialism and universalism on 'discourse' level, discourse theorists would also presume the precise possibility of an autonomous lifeworld with at least a minimum general capacity for human being to get reliably engaged with public discourse. Although White rejects the "modernist" argument that "relativism logically contradicts itself when it proposes, as a final truth, that there is no truth",²⁴² pragmatist course of thinking of truth offered by discourse theory in the last instance comprises a value of the "good" regarding the morality of "what matters for us as humans", as can be seen in McSwite's subjective association with the term of "*proper* proceeding". Further example can be given again in McSwite's promotion of the governance experience of American pragmatism: "This new form of governance was more administrative or functional than political, more participative than representative".²⁴³ These give rise to essential questions regarding "what proper and improper is/ what such functionality is for" which is at variance with non-centrism.

Similar to the proceduralism problem of critical theory, this failure of escaping centrism, above all, is vital for the consequence that it may as well accord with a participation situation that cannot overcome inequalities and practical forms of symbolic violence in discourse setting, thus the complex networks of the ideological norms/values with infrastructural forms/relations immanent in preceding social formation (which is historically generated) stay as the very essence in such framework. This also has the risk of leading prospective relations of dominance to get cultivated and flourished from the administrative legitimacy guaranteed by such discursive practices. Yet, it needs a bit further critical analysis of the very foundation upon which critical and radical theories

²⁴² Orion F. White, 1998, p. 474.

²⁴³ O. C. McSwite, 1997, p. 16.

tend to give way to peculiar theoretical and political limitations. For this necessity, the analysis will be proceeded through four basic problematiques.

4.2.1. Question of Abstract Subject

In light of the crisis of democratic representation in administration in modern or (if you like) postmodern condition, there is sufficient critical analysis for “what are to be done” in favour of democratic participation. There is however obviously a need to reveal the limits and possible ways for political action towards the social and administrative shift concerned. Yet, in general sense, as maybe one of the demonstrations that this thesis aims to provide, theorists of critical and radical public administration fall short to open a genuine pathway regarding the issues of democratic participation. The fundamental objective shared among the approaches of critical public administration, as repeatedly mentioned earlier, is to eliminate the hierarchical boundaries between administration/government and public, as well as those both within administration and public by generating a ‘social integration’ on the basis of discourse-based critical theory formulates. Social integration as such is sought within the tenets of communicative action in discourse settings. Theorists drawing from radical discourse theory on the other hand distinguish themselves solely by promoting social divergences and conflicts for being in line with the agonistic ‘nature’ of postmodern society. Thereby the need of social integration and consensus is inessential. Nevertheless, equally significant for both accounts is the fact that unequal distribution of authority and power within the multi-combinational relations of the state, administrative apparatus, public organizations, market, civil society and individuals is cultivated by the dominance of instrumental and strategic rationality over the system as well as this expands and pervades into the extent of colonization of the lifeworld. Hence, authentic discourse is commonly referred as the means of transformation.

It is plausible to suggest at this point that one of the essential shortcomings for both accounts which may help to recover the critical analysis up until now is the question of 'subjectivation'. They both fail to move beyond the boundaries of structuring 'theoricism', lacking a call for a particular social subject that would answer the question of 'who', for 'what' reason, are to participate to constitute a transformative public discourse setting. To put it differently, there is no "concrete social agent" identified for undertaking the political action for the social transformation demanded. Unlike critical theorists, postmodernists tend to justify such absence by the "death of modern human subject", however putting forward administrative proposals that underline the principles of a more "democratic", less remote and alienating²⁴⁴ public life necessitates a rupture of certain extent from the (non)explanations based upon 'absolute' contingency.

Regarding the ambiguity in locating the appropriate subject, Fox and Miller²⁴⁵ suggest an abstract notion of "some-talk" which refers to the participation of 'people whoever wants to' into relevant policy networks (for sure, insofar as they accept to rely on the "warrants" for entry into ideal discourse setting), instead of what they call "few-talk" (elite-dominated monologic manipulation) and "many-talk" (anarchic expressionism). They admit it as an 'unsatisfactory' facet that discourse theory relying on such reference on the subject is a "weak" form of democracy, when compared to the communitarian ideal. However, for the same reason for them, discourse theory cannot be accused of forcing people to be free for their own good, thereby the envision of 'democracy of all' is confined to the participation of only those who embrace the *res publica*.²⁴⁶ Other writers of discourse approach either imply this view of "some-talk", or they exceptionally put forward the warrant of those who could

²⁴⁴ David J. Farmer, 1995; Charles J. Fox and Hugh T. Miller, 1996; O.C. McSwite, 1997; Cheryl Simrell King, Talking Beyond the Rational, *The American Review of Public Administration*, Vol. 30, 2000.

²⁴⁵ Charles J. Fox and Hugh T. Miller, 1996, p. 12.

²⁴⁶ Ibid, p. 13.

make substantial contribution to discussion. Both aspects have been indeed involved as a prerequisite in employment of communicative action as explained earlier.

Nevertheless, concerning the ‘practical’ intentions towards discursive will formation, addressing to ‘intentional’ and ‘contributive’ participation does not constitute a real subjectivation because of its lack of any implication regarding the ‘relevant’ social group or class for the struggle against the colonization of public sphere. In fact, the only relevant concrete subject for the transformation in radical account seems to be concerned within the side of administration, i.e. public professionals. According to the discourse-legitimacy model put forth by discourse theorists in public administration, public administrators become the facilitators of meaningful change, yet with minimum formal control. It is the framework of anti-administrative action (interpreter/informative/assisting role of public professionals) along with the set of criteria of ideal/authentic public speech which would purify the lifeworld disposing of strategic/instrumental rationality in its relation to public reality. Unlike legitimacy model, critical theorists first and foremost seek for the creation of conditions in which a fully conscious public enacts change.²⁴⁷ Yet, either by the empowerment role of administrators or by somewhat ways to gain their own consciousness, abstract subjects of collaborative public action towards discourse formation is addressed as the prominent agency in both models.

Practical overview on city councils practices on the other hand has implied that it is not commonly beneficial for all parties of the formal “governance” to form a free and authentic discourse as some precisely enjoy a certain share of the social prevalence of instrumental rationality. If not each citizen suffers from the same degree of negative strain of colonization of the public life, it is pertinent to question who and why to impede for ‘collective’ (intersubjective) discursive action to overcome the dominance. As David Held writes, it is necessary for an

²⁴⁷ Ibid, p. 74.

account such as discourse-based critical theory to identify the subject of emancipation. Yet, any answer to for whom critical theory is addressed, how in any concrete situation it can be applied, who is to be the instigator, promoter, catalyst or agent of such project of social transformation still lacks in the model.²⁴⁸

Implication of abstract subject justified by recognition of social diversity, difference and pluralism in fact acquires a more concrete guise by going hand in hand with a “new” political fashion²⁴⁹ articulated to radical democracy movement of present days; that is the politics of identity and social movements. It is the disjoint relation between state-administration and society which is argued to necessitate recovery of liberal democracy in favour of focusing on the recognition of diverse identities. Yet, patterns of participation to administration offered to distinct identities designated into communicative interaction in place of class movement –which is thought to represent only instrumental action/rationality– seem to be substantially confined to the level of recognition, rather than formulation of the demands based on redistribution of resources.²⁵⁰ An example of this process is that, as we have seen in both formal texts of Agenda 21 and processes of Local Agenda 21, overwhelming emphasis upon women, youth, children and elderly who are defined to constitute the “socially weak” segments are set so as to stipulate the *thematization* of them in particular councils and working groups. Public participation, based on the forms of politics focusing the experience of everyday practice, relatively ‘sloppy’ and temporary types of organization and on the structure of partial demands mostly in terms of seeking

²⁴⁸ David Held, *Introduction to Critical Theory: Horkheimer to Habermas*, Hutchinson & Co. (Publishers) Ltd, 1980, p. 395.

²⁴⁹ Oya Çitçi, Yeni Siyaset: Neoliberalizm ve Post-Modernizmin Siyasal Projesi, *YDÜ Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi*, Vol. 1, No. 2, 2008.

²⁵⁰ H. Tarık Şengül, “Kent Yönetimi ve Katılım Sorunu”, in TMMOB, *Antakya Kent Kurultayı Bildiriler Kitabı*, Detay Yayıncılık, 2004, p. 38.

satisfaction in ‘quality of life’ and moral values²⁵¹ is therefore conceived to no longer generate a severe threat to the existing structure. Consequently, although they represent a common position and interest in capitalist processes of redistribution, and even they owe their identity in a certain part to this position, socio-economically subordinated social groups are redefined in diverse, distinct identities (and thus interests) as well as the demands and interferences they would raise on behalf of this position are reduced to only one of the multiple and plural possible demands. Because, once modern human subject is dead, so is the idea of objective interests.

What is more specifically at stake for our subject can be therefore addressed by the questions as such: How and why shall ‘plural’ social groups and individuals with ‘distinct’ privileges and subjective interests (if not universal and objective, as presumed) be motivated for a common will formation? Even if it is supposed that city council alike participatory platforms of local governance is somehow given a legally binding quality in administrative structure, what would lead structuration of Farmer’s anti-administrative action happen to be developed? Even if anti-administrative imagination was assured towards the ‘recognition’ of social diversities, would such recognition alone accommodate the emancipation of so-called plural identities from their subordinate positions which in fact commonly originate from uneven processes of distribution of economic and political power? What will make the representation of non-dominant discourses of excluded, subordinate, marginalized social groups²⁵² acquire the “technology of power” for fair and reliable participation? Given the fact that it is the market rationality that ingresses into all spheres of the social and individual existence,²⁵³ and capitalist character of the state apparatus that subordinates the courses of

²⁵¹ Oya Çitçi, 2008, p. 22.

²⁵² David J. Farmer, 2001, p. 481.

²⁵³ Richard Box, 2005, p. 19.

public good and reproduction of labour power, how can such public energy field be freely formed in this continually prevailing ingression?

4.2.2. Question of Instrumental Rationality

It is apposite to recall here that both approaches concede it is the non-communicative steering mechanisms of the state, bureaucracy and market forces that preclude the likelihood for the employment of communicative action, formations of authentic discourse, public energy field and thus constructive social coherence/interaction by penetrating into the (potentially free) public sphere, which came to be denoted simply as ‘colonization’. At this point, however, rationality of the state along with its political, administrative and economic apparatuses of domination and that of market system are somehow thought to represent separate logics in disseminating instrumental-technocratic reasoning that lead such penetration, causes of which hence remain ambiguous or ‘contingently unambiguous’, for the sake of retreating from ‘determinism’. Thereby, ‘undesired’ extensions of the economic, political and administrative institutions are problematized if and only if they are considered the peculiar practices of instrumental reasoning, passing over the relations of reproduction between these practices. Structural and ideological functioning of capitalist rationality which constantly reproduce the coherence of social formation as a unique ‘system’ is not involved at all in such framework of explanation concerning the social dominance of one single modality of administrative action and reasoning.

However, it is fair to suggest that social oppression conducted by instrumental-technocratic rationality that is derived from economic and administrative spheres is not historically contingent or circumstantial in market society. It is rather the commodification of labour power and thus of all humane values that leads the forms of *teleological* reasoning and social action (instrumental, technocratic, strategic etc.) to permeate its logic into the public

sphere. It is for that very reason that all types of social relations could have been approached by the so-called objectivist, unidimensional notions of a peculiar understanding of efficiency (what McSwite prefers to sum as “technological control”²⁵⁴), rendering each and every single individual calculable quantitatively over their labour power. This consequently results in the assignment of exchange value in whole corporate-run public sphere which tends to reduce the human components of social life to the factors of production and customer-citizens.

In sum, unlike what followers of both critical and radical discourse theories imply, instrumental rationality and technological control happen to constitute not the cause but the ‘inherent’ outcome of the oppression, which originally lies rather on the relations of commodification (i.e. instrumentalization) of human being, and thus social reality. All the risks and challenges of “decisionist” and non-communicative patterns of prevailing administrative/management authority that lead public of plural identities and interests to be alienated from political life are imputed to the question of instrumental rationality, while the deeply integrated system of organization of market economy which spreads out the social prevalence of such rationality is somehow not taken into account within this ‘critical’ agenda, insofar as the restrictive impacts of it are believed to be kept out of the public energy field which is to provide self-governance. For such viewpoint, unique concern for a legitimate public discourse is sought within administrative side, which is basically the elimination of management ideology. However, there is no discussion of how can public dispose of instrumental-strategic reasoning in itself, which has been seen in the example of city council deliberations as a limiting factor on equal participation.

Backbone for the absence of formulation of a relevant social agent can thus be justified by comprehension of instrumental rationality as a problem ‘in itself’: As long as instrumental types of reasoning are ensured to set aside by the

²⁵⁴ O.C. McSwite, 1997, p. 273.

ethico-political procedures of ideal conditions of public speech/discursive will formation, all social groups and individuals are regarded relevant as they intent to participate in democratically legitimate public policy.

But, how come public administration discourse theorists attribute “discourse” a miraculous autonomy and power of social reconstruction as if it can by itself generate an existence for democratic governance within the very same structure in which such existence already lacks? This seems to be having been made possible and complete by the pluralist foundation that easily evades the systemic unity of market society.

4.2.3. Ontological Discontinuity

One of the significant inferences derived from the critical examination on participatory practices within city councils has been that the distinct positions occupied in the conditions of access to the resources of economic and political power have precisely depicted the unequal distribution of participatory privileges in public governance, which is initially supposed to be open and accessible to everyone. This, in turn, brings into light the need for a rigorous critical approach so as to take into account the systemic unity of relations of power in order to achieve an anti-oppressive analyse of the implicit limits of democratic representation in experiences of public governance. What is more is that these limits have no causal relation whatsoever with the present lack of legal institutionalization of the communicative practices. Because it is always possible for a capitalist state to sneakily separate the informal institutions of the “regulated exchange of public information and reasons”²⁵⁵ from formal ones of existing administrative centre, and subsequently link them in a particular system of representation like the one between local government and “public” participatory platforms like city councils, citizens’ juries, citizen forums etc. all organized at

²⁵⁵ Jurgen Habermas, 1996, p. 305.

local level. Lack of institutional fulfilment of civil participation is therefore only a matter of practice.

However, the risky oversight is the evaluation that neglects the “always already” penetration of communication by power that is to both produce and constrain the truth as Foucault underlines,²⁵⁶ which is however can only be well-comprehended in its specific context of complex relations constituted by social and historical processes. Power in its social and historical context is possible to be identified within distortion of the forms and conditions of informal networks of public spheres settled in lifeworld not only by instrumental action and rationality, but also by the continuing and reproductive asymmetries and inequalities inherent in the system as a unity of social relations, albeit changing forms in its different levels, but still finding correspondence in the practice of political equality. What opens a conceptual pathway to the naivety of the suppositions about “how an emphasis on the micro level of intervention can obscure, and indeed sustain, broader macro-level inequalities and injustice”²⁵⁷ is then a kind of formulated discontinuity lacking such historicity.

This appropriate theoretical strategy refers therefore to the structural detachment of the lifeworld from system which basically comprises of the non-communicative steering mechanisms under the control of state, bureaucracy and market forces. It separates the political and social from economic sphere, while a strategic connection is attempted to be established between the lifeworld (representing the social) and administrative sphere (representing the political) through governance mechanisms of representation which are certain to provide

²⁵⁶ “Each society has its regime of truth, its “general politics” of truth: that is, the types of discourse which it accepts and makes function as true; the mechanisms and instances which enable one to distinguish true and false statements, the means by which each is sanctified; the techniques and procedures accorded value in the acquisition of truth; the status of those who are charged with saying what counts as true” Michel Foucault, *Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews & Other Writings, 1972-1977*, Ed. Gordon; tr. Gordon & al. NY: Pantheon, 1980, p.131.

²⁵⁷ Bill Cooke & Uma Kothari, “The Case for Participation as Tyranny”, in Bill Cooke & Uma Kothari (eds.), 1996, p. 14.

ideal, communicative public discourse settings. Such separation however relies on the presumed discontinuity of the social relations and forms between these spheres in order to guarantee the practical reliability of its procedural scheme of discourse. Moreover, it is indeed an ontological separation too, because it does not limit itself solely with engaging into an institutional (i.e. formal) fraction (which is indeed possible to be demonstrated in empirical reality). To put it different, formal separations in social formation are implied to be carried out on ontological ground thanks to the process of abstraction that renders different social ‘regions’ distinct and detached ‘kinds of being’ from each other. In fact, examining the formal differentiation between the political sphere and civil society on analytical ground is rightfully possible more than ever at the present time, and indeed mostly specific to capitalism, given the purely ‘economic’ modes of appropriation which superseded directly coercive extra-economic modes²⁵⁸ and thus which had provided Marx the very base of his critique of Hegel. However, likelihood of concretizing the analytical distinctions on an ‘organic ontology’ level stems from a pure theoretical and *a prioristic* construction that is dissociated from the real life as having been “not supported by empirical investigation or historical evidence”.²⁵⁹ The core of the point, on the other hand, which critical and radical theories mostly suffer from such construction, is the naive anticipation of termination of the social organization of dominance and coercion simply through a collaborative pragmatism of public discourse –in a word- “governance”, which is set up into the very centre of the inseparable system. This *a priori* basis accounts for the necessary identification of the idea of democracy with the orientation as far as towards public sphere –also an integral part of systemic totality- and more specifically towards to the local scale in the face of political and bureaucratic centre.

²⁵⁸ Ellen Meiksins Wood, *Democracy Against Capitalism: Renewing historical materialism*, Cambridge University Press, 1995, p. 240.

²⁵⁹ Ellen Meiksins Wood, *The Retreat from Class: A ‘New’ True Socialism*, Verso: London and New York, 1998, p. 79.

Indeed, the intellectual foundation upon which critical and radical discourse accounts in public administration tend to trace prevents the question of discontinuity from being a specific part of these accounts, but rather leads them draw near to the typical pluralist fashion. Such foundation of separation between economic/political/social can be found most explicitly (among those offering conceptual inspiration) within Habermas' effort to locate critical theory on a specific backdrop of the compound between two models of American politics, the liberal and republican:

“Discourse theory works instead with the higher-level intersubjectivity of communication processes that flow through both the parliamentary bodies and the informal networks of the public sphere. Within and outside the parliamentary complex, these subjectless forms of communication constitute arenas in which a more or less rational opinion- and will-formation can take place. (...) As in the liberal model, *the boundaries between “state” and “society” are respected*; but in this case, civil society provides the social basis of autonomous public spheres that remain *as distinct from the economic system as from the administration*”²⁶⁰ (emphasis added).

For Habermas's participatory proposal, competing individual interests of the liberal model are to be appeased by the notions of common good, social integration and civic solidarity borrowed from republican model, on the other hand, attempt of generating a “free” and autonomous lifeworld is only made possible through a liberal *cult* of civil society based on a bourgeoisie public sphere. This can be easily recognized as well by his explicit views that profoundly contrast “state-centred” and “society-centred” understandings of politics.²⁶¹ These being the case, constituents of the social continuity and reproduction are detached from each other by being rendered the units of a peculiar “balance” instead:

²⁶⁰ Jurgen Habermas, 1994, p. 8.

²⁶¹ Jurgen Habermas, *ibid.*

“This understanding of democracy suggests a new balance between the three resources of money, administrative power, and solidarity, from which modern societies meet their needs for integration. The normative implications are obvious: the integrative force of “solidarity,” which can no longer be drawn solely from sources of communicative action, should develop through widely expanded and differentiated public spheres as well as through legally institutionalized procedures of democratic deliberation and decision-making. It should gain the strength to hold its own against the two other mechanisms of social integration - money and administrative power”.

It is this emphasis upon the need of expansion of social integration conducted distinctively through collective precision which is tacitly acknowledged also by radical discourse theorists. “Process theory” termed collaborative pragmatism, the discourse prescription of McSwite, is explicitly grounded on the spirit of *cooperative community, benevolence, and social coherence*²⁶² which is to enhance the “civil” level within the social balance of the system. Whatever by the particular notions and conceptual schemes it is manifested, the attempt of achieving such balance between the core components of the spheres of social formation reveals the intention to proceed with a ‘peaceful’ adjustment to the idea and practice of liberal democracy. Communicative action and integrative force of solidarity are designated in the scheme so as to vitiate the coercions of state, bureaucracy and capitalist economy, all of which are meant to be reduced to “one of many spheres in the plural and heterogeneous complexity of modern society”.²⁶³

The overall outline is therefore easy to understand: Since the complexity and discrepancy of modern society have an entirely distinct logic indicating no relation with the objective conditions of social conflict that is generated by the media of “money and administrative power” (as referred), then the only project is

²⁶² O. C. McSwite, 1997, p. 16.

²⁶³ Ellen Meiksins Wood, 1995, p. 242.

to expand the institutional and social influence of solidarity into the public sphere through inter-subjective employment of communicative action. When the ultimate conclusion of this argument is adapted for instance to the pre-discussed case of city councils, the challenges to participation regarding the tight administrative closure of the decision making process to public interests especially on the issues of such as urban planning, budgeting, bid-related services; decisive impact of the preconditions (basically power positions hold pertaining to social class and status) of participation; prevalence of inequalities in economic, social, cultural resources of privileged and dominant discourse formation and so on, must be analyzed in terms of nothing but the matters of inadequate expansion and strength of social solidarity and communicative interaction of social alterities in the face of administrative and economic forces.

This is however a self-styled argument which tends to slide over and indeed to conceal the real substantial problems in systemic totality. As Ellen M. Wood argues,²⁶⁴ denying the totalizing logic of capitalist system inevitably necessitates the convincing demonstration that these other spheres and identities do not come - or not in any significant way - within the determinative force of capitalism, its system of social property relations, its expansionary imperatives, its drive for accumulation, *its commodification of all social life*, its creation of the market as a necessity, a compulsive mechanism of competition and self-sustaining 'growth', and so on. Yet, as a common tendency of critical and radical administrative theories, retreat from the bureaucratic and economic coercion is designated to be possible to the extent that the public sphere is cultivated in favour of discursive will formation. That is for the reason that participatory prescription of these accounts embrace the foundation of contemporary liberal theories of civil society which take for granted the very premise that coercion *in principle* belongs to the state, whereas civil society potentially refers to the realm where freedom and human emancipation is rooted. As a matter of fact, the oppressions which also challenge the likelihood of democratic deliberation would have been treated not as

²⁶⁴ Ibid, p. 246.

a constitutive of civil society, but simply some temporary and alien dysfunctions in it.

Consequently, such treatment, in its comprehension of democratic participation, tends to conceal the possible continuity and reproduction of relations of dominance “which irreducibly constitute civil society, not just as some alien and correctible disorder but as its very essence, the particular structure of domination and coercion that is specific to capitalism as a systemic totality - and which also determines the coercive functions of the state”.²⁶⁵ It is rather this latter point which brings to light the fallacy that distortion of the lifeworld by state apparatus basically represents an “essentially” different order and logic of reality than that by market forces as well as than indigenous social conflicts and oppressions “inherent” in public sphere.

Basing on this fallacy, accounts of critical and postmodern public administration seem to detach the *objective* structures that more or less determine uneven and non-comprehensive conditions (and preconditions) of participation from the *subjective* force of discourse thanks to the conceptual leaps the framework of discontinuity offers. In such framework, discourse is eventually, either through consensus or discursive will formation illustrated by annihilation of matter/anti-matter, extolled to have omnipotence so much as not only it overcomes the limitations set forth by objective structures, but also is able *per se* to reconstruct the objective structures, but most essentially the very realm of politics as well. Politics is therefore reduced merely to public discourse formation which is to tackle the objective limits, conflicting interests and subsequently be purified from the coercion of the system simply by collectively relying on the normative ground of ideal conditions of public speech.

²⁶⁵ Ibid, p. 256.

4.2.4. Question of Legitimacy/Legitimization

As the critique heretofore underlined, the overall significance of setting about exploring the shortcomings of theoretical work based on critical theory/approach in public administration stems from the main “task” of such work. It is the attempt of recovering administrative legitimacy by repoliticization of the public sphere through providing opportunities for citizens to engage in collaborative public discourse, which locates the rationale of critical and radical accounts into one problematique. This being the case, issue of discourse legitimacy constitutes the most concrete (i.e. pertaining to political-administrative outcomes) reflection of the theoretical backdrop which has been critically analysed drawing on the practical limits of public discourse. For the purpose of this study, it is concerned particularly in the sense that there is much at stake for the practice of public participation to be given rein to the articulation of the historical role of liberal democracy in monitoring the excesses of and reinforcing the status quo.

What is crucial about this concern is that the basis of participation in its current form purely reflects a tactful ‘adjustment’ *within* the system in regards to the failure of liberal democracy to profoundly respond to necessities of complex (post)modern society. The ‘need’ to public participation as an administrative pattern then represents a similar facet to that of the political forms of liberal democracy in the face of oppressive political regimes of capitalist system which lack the basics of rule of law, civil liberties, principle of representation etc. Hence, there is a risk that the notion of participation which is indispensable for an ideal type self-governance has been tamed and made submissive being monopolized by the capitalist system. This risk, in turn, brings into light a much more pernicious reflection than has ever been acquired in liberal democracy, which can be followed in the popular consubstantiation of the idea of democracy with this docile and reconciled practice of participation. Just as, for instance, the legitimacy lost in the fascist guise of capitalism has been relieved by liberal democracy and

thus oppression has become less visible; renovation of liberal democracy takes a step further by the image of self-governance and thus alienation would be felt less than ever. In this context, it may be helpful to remember Gramsci's positioning of parliamentary system on a delicate balance between force/consent by these words: "The "normal" exercise of hegemony on the now classical terrain of the parliamentary regime is characterised by the combination of force and consent, which balance each other reciprocally, without force predominating excessively over consent. Indeed, the attempt is always made to ensure that force will appear to be based on the consent of the majority."²⁶⁶ What is to be highlighted as a precisely tricky point here is the wrongness of simply designating parliament as an 'ideological apparatus' of bourgeois power and a mere subjective trick to lull the masses, since the democratic acquisitions of citizenship are not a mere mirage.²⁶⁷

Thereby, it may offer a more reasonable contribution to the framework to comprehend the notion of participation similarly in terms of its peculiar hegemonic functionality and powers, rather than to simplify it through an understanding of mechanic functionality. The most prominent side of this former functionality, in compliance with what critical and radical theorists assert, originates from the belief in a fair game of public participation in which presentation of the social continuity of power and oppression is set aside, influence of dominant social groups is neutralized so that the most comprehensive discourse articulation is formed by the best argument in each discursive will formation. What is however sneaky and indeed dilemmatic in this portrayal for us is partial justification and elements of truth in its supposition in some manner. Indeed, it ought not to be always impossible in particular participatory practices to demonstrate the ideal instances of communicative action collectively relied in a

²⁶⁶ Antonio Gramsci, *Selections from Prison Notebooks*, ed. & trans. Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey N. Smith, International Publishers: New York, 1971, p. 80.

²⁶⁷ Perry Anderson, The Antinomies of Antonio Gramsci, *New Left Review*, No. 100, November-December 1976, p. 20, p. 64.

discourse situation in which even implicit forms of oppression does not prevail, contrary to what we have exemplified before.

Nevertheless, what should be primarily –and persistently- explored in that case is to what extent representations of diverse interests on that specific issue are dispensable or ‘capitulative’ in terms of objective social and class interests of the participants as well as the institutional interests of administrative authority. Answer of this concern may give a clue about the reliability of the transformative capacity potent in that participatory practice. It pertains then to whether or not the participation is able to incorporate substantial principles to make a challenge to status quo by properly neutralizing the relations of hierarchies within the practice. Yet, associating with the substantial principle herein seems incompatible with both the proceduralist model of critical theory and anti-foundationalist understanding of postmodernists.

However, at this juncture a further dilemma for these accounts can be addressed on an aside note. As discussed earlier, the ‘warrants’ of participation process are upheld according to some determined principles such as equality and fairness which also determine the democratic quality of both the participatory practice and decisions taken. Yet, the dilemma is that the predetermination of the principles regarding the procedure is subsequently the indirect determination of the substance, i.e. the form implicitly has a say on the essence. For this reason, the principles of equality and fairness constitute the substance, whereas the intersubjective discourse may as well contradictorily agree on particular decisions which bring unequal and unfair consequences. This in fact indicates the well-known chicken-and-egg situation regarding the normativity within democratic formulation. In sum, proceduralism and anti-foundationalism which consider the participation as a goal and value in itself brings forth an inner dilemma that it may legitimize the opinions and decisions in contrast to its presumed essence.

Such dilemma nonetheless becomes much less of an issue in the face of our current concern here, hegemonic function of participation. The point is that, it would be unfair to assert that participation employed as a new source of administrative legitimacy does not offer any constructiveness for diverse interests, socially excluded groups. At its best, the genuine benefits offered are on the other hand prone to respond rather to temporary, micro-level, relatively ideology-free demands in line with the idea of abstract subject as has been mentioned, than to macro-structural interferences, radical transformative challenges, class based demands, redistribution of resources towards reproduction of labour power (let alone allowing for social organization against prevailing class relations). It is however latent at this very aspect of hegemonic function that one cannot fairly reduce public participation merely to a malleable instrument of dominant class. That is because participation herein stands for as the most unmediated form of administrative practice that brings into doubt the continuity of the very existence of asymmetric power positions in public deliberation.

Therefore, the basis that participatory procedures tend to demand popular consent relies on not offering genuine potentiality for a structural challenge to status quo, but rather daily-based answers seeking to save the day for essentially structural social problems. As a concrete example, task of eradicating poverty has been explicitly addressed by the action plan of Agenda 21 as the most indispensable requirement for sustainable development²⁶⁸. In this regard, city councils are encouraged to take responsibility in terms of social cooperation at their regional level. In accordance with such responsibility, activities on poverty alleviation carried out by city councils such as İzmir, Bursa, Kütahya, Sakarya city councils include programs, projects and campaigns concerning the

²⁶⁸ United Nations General Assembly, *Rio Declaration on Environment and Development*, available from <http://www.un.org/documents/ga/conf151/aconf15126-1annex1.htm> (accessed on 20.08.2012). For a critique of poverty alleviation strategies initiated by the international bodies, see Galip L. Yalman, "Discourse and Practice of Poverty Reduction Strategies: Reflections on the Turkish Case in the 2000s" in İpek Eren Vural (ed.), *Converging Europe: Transformation of Social Policy in the Enlarged European Union and in Turkey*, Ashgate Publishing, 2011.

establishment of groups of social cooperation and solidarity, clothing stores, food banks, stationery equipments for poor students etc.²⁶⁹

What is remarkable herein for the social responsibility shifted to city councils is its notable conformity with the well-known depoliticized approach to poverty and social deterioration peculiar to New Right conservatism, as well as that seen in the self-management of social problems in neoliberal forms of what O'Malley calls as "new prudentialism", a regime of risk management which conceives active citizens to monitor and handle the risks by their area of responsibility.²⁷⁰ Local governance is, in this sense, designated also as a means to engage the public in taking responsibility for their own care and welfare: "In this model the state does not act upon society: it does not provide a service. Instead the state creates a platform or environment in which people take decisions about their lives in a different way".²⁷¹

In this light, it can be argued in one sense that it is an employment of 'ethico-political' technology of advanced liberal governance to re-spatialise the public sphere for governance and construct identities for subjects as citizens organised so as to "put them in their place" - within communities which are constructed as a site of ideal civility and ethical conduct.²⁷² Yet, more significantly, given the poverty alleviation which stipulates an understanding that seeks private proposals for a limited range of public problems, collective demanding for social transformation is ingeniously displaced with social

²⁶⁹ M. Akif Çukurçayır and H. Tuğba Eroğlu, "Kent Yönetiminde Demokratik Bir Açılım Olarak Kent Konseyleri", in Sakarya Üniversitesi, *1. Ulusal Yerel Yönetimler Sempozyumu Bildiriler Kitabı*, Erkam Yayın, 2008, p. 215.

²⁷⁰ Cited in Robert Deuchars, *The International Political Economy of Risk: Rationalism, Calculation, and Power*, Ashgate Publishing, 2004, p. 12.

²⁷¹ Charles Leadbetter, *Personalisation through participation: A new script for public services*, London: Demos, 2004, p. 16; cited in Janet Newman, "Participative governance and the remaking of the public sphere" in J. Newman (ed.) *Remaking Governance: Peoples, Politics And the Public Sphere*, The Polity Press, 2005, p. 123.

²⁷² Janet Newman, 2005, pp. 124-127.

cooperation towards individualized/personalized solutions in respective region. Consequently, once the reality of poverty and inequality is depoliticized and respective ideological language is relegated by a rising moral language, contradictions within the relations of production are rendered to be less visible.

In sum, the trouble lies on the risk of abandoning the notion of public participation to a restricted comprehension of administrative legitimacy by the conventional pluralist course of liberal democracy, which a genuine critical-radical standpoint would by no means collude with. Turning back to the fundamental basis of the command of popular consent in public participation, it can be reiterated that procedures of participatory governance should potentially respond, and indeed responds in part to the demands of public involvement by formal political equality. However such response is barely effective insofar as the capacity of collective interference and action towards social transformation is precisely restricted by external/internal exclusion. To the extent that its operation succeeds to keep this balance properly, it can be suggested that participation, both as a rhetoric and a practice, can achieve a hegemonic functionality. Because, what is essential in functionality of hegemonic power is, as Perry Anderson comments, not simply submission of subordinate majority to an acknowledged ruling class or their acceptance of its legitimacy to rule.²⁷³ Hence, the point in participatory hegemonic modes is rather the new-pluralist claim that ‘different’ domains of the games of the struggle to democratic representation, to a certain extent, does not constitute continuity in terms of dominance inasmuch as the reciprocal ethos of participation is based on “agonistic respect”.²⁷⁴ The belief and discourse to incontrovertible acquisitions of political participation relying on the supposition that social privileges are substantially precluded to lead tyranny is then adequate to reproduce existing relations of power, to the extent the question of legitimacy

²⁷³ Cited in Ellen Wood, 1998, p. 149.

²⁷⁴ Morton Schoolman, “A Pluralist Mind: Agonistic Respect and The Problem of Violence Toward Difference”, in D. Campbell & M. Schoolman (eds.) *The New Pluralism: William Connolly and the Contemporary Global Condition*, Duke University Press, 2008.

happens to be recovered and gets subsequently vaporized in the minds of the popular masses. This reveals the two faces of hegemony: “It is not possible if it is not plausible”.²⁷⁵

If the social and political acquisitions that makes hegemonic function possible constitute the ‘plausible’ face, then the darker side refers to the “dropped in” character of participatory governance (i.e. taking for granted the existing social structure as an impartial backdrop) which draws its theoretical justification from ontological discontinuity. To illustrate the point, as can be commonly derived from the justification of postmodern condition in both Fox and Miller and Farmer, the ontological formation of public energy field does not on rely on a fixed formula, but from what is happening in life. This brings us to that while social diversity and alterity are promoted in the context of anti-matter, inequalities that are effective in economic, political, social and cultural forms have been subject to the same context (as are), legitimacy of which remains at stake for empowering the ‘normality’ of matter through the sublation of anti-matter. Once the identification of local knowledge with intersubjective reality is concerned, paying scant attention to processes of production of local knowledge (which has witnessed in our case the influential relations of clientelism and corporatism, as well as the forms of internal exclusion) has the risk to legitimize dominant interests and even to provide a new modality of control. Such control, as, Dryzek writes, comes not through overt compulsion of any sort, but simply through the basic suppositions about the democratic operation of politics that people come to share which render them compliant subjects of political regimes. In this regard, it can even be argued that the contemporary hegemony of the discourse of democracy refers to the latest phase of governmentality which is prone to constitute its own subjects to behave in discursive forms of discipline and self-

²⁷⁵ Ellen Wood, 1998, p.149.

discipline, and eventually reinforce existing political hierarchies²⁷⁶ through setting out of new technologies of power.²⁷⁷

²⁷⁶ John S. Dryzek, *Deliberative Democracy and Beyond: Liberals, Critics, Contestations*, Oxford University Press, 2000, p. 64.

²⁷⁷ See, Janet Newman, 2005.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

Critical and radical approaches of discursive democracy are substantially shaped by the common argument defending radical transformation of modern administration through a reformulation of democracy which is to be embedded into the public sphere and everyday life. It only stands to reason that such attempts of reformulation occupy an important position among a variety of proposals in the face of the legitimacy of crisis of modern administration beginning with the last quarter of 20th century. What has been fundamentally concerned in this study is the bases and limitations of the peculiar understanding of administrative and democratic legitimacy which defines the domain of social agency of such transformation in the procedures of public discourse expanding out particularly from the local scale. The questions instigating such concern had considerable range of variety: Is identification of political action solely with discursive activity sufficient for decentralization and deconcentration of power necessitated by such legitimacy? Is the dominance of instrumental action/rationality which leads to need for public-oriented legitimacy based on communicative action/rationality to be examined in itself or as an extension of the prevailing relations of production? How can subjective force of discourse tackle the objective relations of power? Is decentralization and deconcentration of power merely a question of retreat from the state and state apparatus? How can state as a social relation be alienated from both configuration and practice of local governance? Even if such alienation is achieved in formal and institutional terms, does this ensure a domination-free will formation and public life? Is there any room for society-centred formulation of administrative legitimacy which does not generate a legitimacy problem on its own?

In the light of these questions, the second chapter has first examined the historical relation between epistemological and philosophical foundations of critical theory and its reflection upon the field of public administration. Critical theory in public administration has been discussed as an attempt of drawing on the very basis of Habermas's conceptual framework of communicative action and ideal conditions of public speech, which has been referred as discourse-based critical theory all along the thesis. Critical approach, as an attempt to adapt Critical Theory into the field of public administration by a discourse-based programmatic framework, tends to conceive of the participatory course as a 'means' to a final end of emancipation and dealienation, in compliance with its historical roots in critical social theory. Proposing the same prescriptive backdrop of legitimacy, theorists of radical approach, on the other hand, differ by their denial of both rational configuration of the discourse, and of instrumentalization of participation to a "grand project", for their partially consistent engagement with postmodern epistemology. However, the debate over the epistemology and ontology of postmodern public administration has tried to provide the conceptual traces regarding the failure of the approach to sidestep from the modernist groundwork in some ways which have been applied by the critical theory as well. This would constitute the backbone of subsequently locating both approaches into one problematical context in line with the main purposes of the study. This backbone has been addressed by the common prescription of local governance.

The third chapter was therefore an attempt to offer an examination of the participatory implementations of a peculiar local governance program, namely LA 21. Relevancy of this program with the theoretical concerns of the thesis was attempted to be justified through linking the hints derived from the official documents of the program and theoretical premises of the approaches in question. Accordingly, first hand observations which were made on the meetings associated with the two city councils in Ankara as within the boundaries of possibility, have been upheld by relevant secondary resources broadly pertaining to Turkey LA 21

process which has been formally rated as one of the most successful experiences among all over the world. The problematiques concerned in this part were varying from the comprehensive quality of public participation in both external (formal presence at the given instance) and internal terms (processes of micro power relations after the formal presence), neutralization of power relations and the limits of formal political equality in participatory practices, possibility of an oppression-free lifeworld/energy field of public discourse through the inclusive quality of the city councils, autonomy of city councils from administrative authority, civil plurality provided by the city councils and administrative influence of the city councils on the agenda of local government. The inferences concerned have intensified around a number of points as follows: both in external and internal sense, social agents of different positions reflect in fact different conditions of access to the participative capacities such as communicative rationality, discursive will formation etc., conditions of which were portrayed by pure conceptual abstractions; both formal exclusion and practical forms of relations of symbolic violence can be articulated to the discourse situation in accordance with respective social class and status positions; technocratic and objective discourse is effective also in participation as in the bureaucracy; the proper public sphere which was assumed to be a complete civil sphere cannot be disassociated from the administrative realm; and what is more, the proper public spheres are even generated by city councils themselves and their dependent and unautonomous participatory practices are presented as the genuine reflection of the will of civil society.

The last chapter has reflected the ultimate effort to critically discuss the theoretically and politically problematic aspects of the theories by drawing on practical overview. Directly evaluating the qualitative findings that the previous chapter has provided, the first section of the chapter was rather of the link to locate the theories in a common set of shortcomings. It has been concluded from the participatory practices that not only participation on city council level, but also on publicly open meetings lack equality, comprehensiveness and fairness in

representation by witnessing the forms and practices of internal exclusion particularly based on the correspondence of social class and status-specific power positions upon discursive setting. Bureaucratic authority of local government on participatory practices was self-evidently prevailed in terms of setting of the agenda, setting of the respective public sphere, institutional control, discursive manipulation and closure by administrators, discretion of implementation and so on. As a final word, the relation between the affiliation to civil organizations and current power/capacity of political representation, and public participation discloses the decisiveness of the former components over participatory capacity in a way to maintain the social asymmetries, though the opposite was assumed. It was touched upon that such steadiness is substantially inherited from the economic and social resources possessed in real social formation, which leads the conditions of production of local knowledge not to reflect a democratic nature purified from the distortion by power. These, in turn, bring into light the argument that configuration and practice of local governance cannot be analysed separately from the systemic totality as production of local knowledge comes to be revealed as a question of relations of power at the local level.

Once the participatory action is left to its own devices by being dropped within the existing social structure, it is thus plausible to suggest that the ‘universalist’ approach of both critical and radical discourse theorists (which is contradictory with postmodernist understanding) relying on an a priori acknowledgment of the identical relation between the idea of democracy and public discourse fails to genuinely problematize the peculiar conditions of public discourse itself. What renders such approach to slide back into pluralist framework of liberal democracy is the implicit taking for granted of the heavy line between state and civil society. This, along with its problematic extensions, has been discussed in more detail over four respective themes that are interrelated to each other: abstract subject, instrumental rationality, ontological discontinuity and legitimacy/legitimation.

Overall, notwithstanding the thorough critique of conventional administrative patterns of liberal democracy on epistemological ground, the concerned approaches, in the final analysis, fall short to constitute a critical and radical backlash and alternative for employing the same groundwork of liberal approach to state civil society relations. In this light, it can be suggested to read their ultimate prescriptive framework as a tactful option of wheel balancing to the system within the system. Albeit not personally the writers and scholars of these accounts whose main objective is mostly to offer a reflexive stance in theory of American public administration, but the very position which stands for the reformulation of administrative legitimacy in participatory governance as such reflects one that may somehow serve to the risk to drag the idea of public participation to a hegemonic functionality.

However, it can also be suggested that the empirical aspect of such framework is open for a further discussion in a sense that one can question the compliance between the contexts of the exclusionary practices conducted by the state and administration, and of those conducted within the civil society itself through power positions. In that respect, what can be further put forward in relevant prospective studies may address the core of this problematic, in which the focus upon the class-related dimension of these two contexts revealing an integrated question of social exclusion will be deepened. By expanding the sphere of empirical researches on governance practices within and beyond Turkey, a discussion on whether the question of ‘whose particular interests the existing inequalities maintained in the processes of participatory governance are in favor of’ refer to the objective conflicts intrinsic to capitalist state/administration and society can be further made. The study at hand which offers a limited and illustrative empirical demonstration of the experiences of local governance can thus be supported by detailed investigation of the democratic and transformative limitations on formally perfect and ideal instances. Selection of -at least- formally egalitarian instances of participation can both escape us from the questions of “sui generis” experiences (as may be raised for the case in Turkey), and provide a

further step towards examining how the status quo reinforces itself within and through popular participation, or of how popular participation can potentially allow for a challenge to the objective essence of the asymmetrical power relation between the dominant and dominated. Finally, the question of how the rhetoric of governance and participation serves to the formation of particular economic and political practices in framework of a power bloc that seems to represent popular interests can be explored in an analytical fashion. To the extent that the outcomes of this attempt takes one to a meaningful point, I believe that such study can help to demystify the pluralist, institutionalist and actor-based accounts of the state-administration which tend to conceal the class nature of the state itself and its role in undertaking of public participation to administration. Overall, bilateral relationality between the spheres of the economic and the political concerning the discourse and exclusionary practices of participatory governance may constitute the point which roughly outlines the skeleton of a given future study in the relevant area.

This study can hence be regarded as a humble remark on the pernicious potentiality of participatory governance to maintain and reinforce existing social and political hierarchies, in the face of the mainstream argument that conceives of the mechanisms of governance as representing a democratizing capacity per se. It can be further suggested in this line that it is vital for critical theory not to abandon the idea of participation to the hegemony of bourgeoisie democracy, yet this would be possible only through a persistent scepticism towards both the macro and micro conditions of participatory practice which requires dealing with the state, local government, market and civil society as integral parts of the unity of internally related social relations. It is necessary for any critical contemplation on the possibility of emancipation through self-governance to abstain from the searching for the public in shifting its ontological basis *purely* to the social, which is provided by the imprecise detachment of social formation. For, as Wood notes, the strategy of dissolving the systemic totality into “an unstructured and undifferentiated plurality of social institutions and relations cannot help but

weaken both the analytic and the normative force of ‘civil society’, its capacity to deal with the limitation and legitimation of power, as well as its usefulness in guiding emancipatory projects.”²⁷⁸

A theoretical formulation of public participation can then be considered substantial inasmuch as it enables and stipulates the potential of struggles of critical standpoints and alternatives in terms of the very essence of social relations, vis-a-vis the factual incoherence of the idea of a genuine democracy and emancipation with the alienating character of capitalist social reality. The ideal of shared critical and reflexive ‘social imagination’ that recalls the comprehension of existing reality only as one among the possibilities (in line with the epistemological perspective shared by both critical and postmodern theories) is a prerequisite for such account. More significantly, once the participatory project is attributed a ‘substantive’ objective that would comply with such imagination (which would however be approached sceptically by postmodernists), social conflicts originating from the rigid diversity of objective interests can be minimized in favour of a more egalitarian, comprehensive and thus democratic participation. At this point it may be pertinent to mention the experience of participatory budgeting started from 1989 in Porto Alegre which adopts redistribution of public resources as its substantive objective to hold up as an example.²⁷⁹ The experience is operated through open public meetings on determining the priorities of public expenditures at the local level. Having underlined its genuine inclusion of socially and economically excluded groups, the participatory experience is argued to reveal the social potential in democratic planning compatible with prior needs of people who are organized simultaneously on geographical and thematic basis so as to encourage moving beyond the technocratic and political boundaries of policy issues and collectively pondering

²⁷⁸ Ellen Meiksins Wood, 1995, p. 247.

²⁷⁹ See Tarso Genro and Ubiratan de Souza, *Porto Alegre: Özgün Bir Belediyecilik Deneyimi*, trans. Bülent Tanatar, Demokrasi Kitaplığı (WALD) / Araştırmalar, Tartışmalar, Deneyimler Dizisi, 1999.

at the urban scale.²⁸⁰ Although the experience is hard to be regarded as constituting the unique prosperous response to the potent representation of dominant class interests at national level,²⁸¹ it is worth noting for its illustrative positioning of public participation against the prevailing severe inequality and oppression, and revealing the transformative potentiality of participation within the politics of emancipation. By shifting its theoretical focus from the tokenist practices of poverty alleviation directly to the objective ground of class relations that generate poverty, critical theory can move beyond the moments of accumulation and continuity of capitalism and thereby can theorize an applicable ideal of democracy based on self-governance. This is also a taking side in political struggle revealing the inherently radical potential of critical theory, as Bourdieu writes, for its effort of uncovering “the social mechanisms which ensure the maintenance of the established order and owe their strictly symbolic efficacy to misrecognition of their logic and effects”.²⁸²

²⁸⁰ Ibid, pp. 47-49.

²⁸¹ Mustafa Bayram Mısıır, “Almanca” Konuşmayı Öğrenmek [review of the book *Porto Alegre: Özgün Bir Belediyecilik Deneyimi* by Tarso Genro and Ubiratan de Souza], *Praksis*, No. 2, 2001, pp. 322-327.

²⁸² Pierre Bourdieu, “The Specificity of the Scientific Field and the Social Conditions of the Progress of Reason”, *Social Science Information*, 1975, Vol. 14, No. 6, p. 36.

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APPENDIX: TEZ FOTOKOPİ İZİN FORMU

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Fen Bilimleri Enstitüsü

Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü

Uygulamalı Matematik Enstitüsü

Enformatik Enstitüsü

Deniz Bilimleri Enstitüsü

YAZARIN

Soyadı : GÜVEN

Adı : ERDEM

Bölümü : SİYASET BİLİMİ VE KAMU YÖNETİMİ

TEZİN ADI (İngilizce) : PARTICIPATION TO ADMINISTRATION IN CAPITALIST SOCIETY: THEORETICAL AND POLITICAL LIMITATIONS OF THE 'CRITICAL' AND 'RADICAL' ADMINISTRATIVE THEORIES

TEZİN TÜRÜ : Yüksek Lisans

Doktora

1. Tezimin tamamı dünya çapında erişime açılsın ve kaynak gösterilmek şartıyla tezimin bir kısmı veya tamamının fotokopisi alınsın.
2. Tezimin tamamı yalnızca Orta Doğu Teknik Üniversitesi kullanıcılarının erişimine açılsın. (Bu seçenekle tezinizin fotokopisi ya da elektronik kopyası Kütüphane aracılığı ile ODTÜ dışına dağıtılmayacaktır.)
3. Tezim bir (1) yıl süreyle erişime kapalı olsun. (Bu seçenekle tezinizin fotokopisi ya da elektronik kopyası Kütüphane aracılığı ile ODTÜ dışına dağıtılmayacaktır.)

Yazarın imzası

Tarih