

THE EMERGENCE OF TURKISH NATIONALISM IN THE CYPRUS
CONFLICT;
THE BREAKTHROUGH FROM 1948 TO 1955

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ABSTRACT

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This thesis investigates the construction of the “Turkish side” in the Cyprus conflict in connection with the emergence and rise of Turkish nationalism in the island. In this line, with regard to the development of Turkish Cypriot nationalism and its historical background, this study focuses on the period between 1948 and 1955 in which the political propaganda for making Turkey part of the conflict was carried out by the Turkish nationalist cadres of Cyprus and Turkey. This study attempts to analyze this propaganda by focusing on the newspapers *Halkın Sesi* and *Hürriyet*. In this study, it is assumed that the mentioned period in which the ground for getting Turkey involved in the Cyprus conflict was prepared can reveal the roots of the current relations between Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots. For this aim, this study attempts to specify the positions of the Republic of Turkey and Turkish Cypriots in the historical process of Cyprus politics through an analysis of the nationalist discourse of *Halkın Sesi* and *Hürriyet*.

Keywords: Cyprus conflict, Turkish nationalism, Hürriyet, Halkın Sesi.

ÖZ

KIBRIS MESELESİNDE TÜRK MİLLİYETÇİLİĞİNİN ORTAYA ÇIKIŞI; 1948-1955 YILLARI ARASINDAKİ ATILIM

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Bu çalışma, Kıbrıs meselesinde “Türk tarafının” inşa edilmesi süreci bağlamında Kıbrıs’ta Türk milliyetçiliğinin ortaya çıkışı ve yükselişiyle ilgilenmektedir. Bu doğrultuda, Kıbrıs’ta Türk milliyetçiliğinin gelişim süreci ve tarihsel arka planını göz önünde bulundurarak, 1948 ve 1955 yılları arasındaki döneme odaklanmakta, bu dönemde Türkiye ve Kıbrıs’taki Türk milliyetçisi kadroların Türkiye’yi meselede bir “taraf” hâline getirmeye dönük olarak yürüttükleri siyasî propagandayı incelemektedir. Çalışma, anılan propagandayı, bu propagandanın iki temel yürütücüsü olan *Halkın Sesi* ve *Hürriyet* gazeteleri üzerinden tahlil etmektedir. Bu çalışmada, Türkiye’nin Kıbrıs meselesine dahil olması için gereken zeminin hazırlandığı bu dönemin Türkiye ile Kıbrıslı Türkler arasındaki mevcut ilişkinin köklerini ortaya çıkarabileceği varsayılmaktadır. Bu amaçla, çalışma *Halkın Sesi* ve *Hürriyet* gazetelerinin milliyetçi söylemlerinin çözümlenmesi yoluyla Türkiye Cumhuriyeti ve Kıbrıslı Türkler’in Kıbrıs siyasetinin tarihsel süreci içindeki konumlarını/pozisyonlarını belirginleştirmeye çalışmıştır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Kıbrıs meselesi, Türk milliyetçiliği, Hürriyet, Halkın Sesi.

To my family members and Sinem,

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

In 1955, Turkey participated in the London Conference which was organized by Britain after Greece applied to the United Nations with self-determination request for Cyprus. So, Turkey officially became a side of the dispute from 1955 on. However, the ground for her participation began to be prepared in 1948. As is known, after the World War II, the requests of the Hellenes for *enosis* found a “legitimate” ground with the rise of the “self determination” principle in the world. Additionally, in the “Western” side of the bipolar world, while Britain lost its powerful position, the power of the USA began to increase. In this period, from the point of the US foreign policy, the “independent” and anti-Soviet states under the impact/control of the Western Alliance were more preferable than the politically unstable colonized states.¹ Accordingly, the US “implicitly” encouraged the efforts of the Hellenes for the achievement of *enosis*.² On the other side, in parallel to the “troubles” in the Middle East, Cyprus became important for Britain more than ever. In 1947, Britain, in order to impede the rise of *enosis*, tried to negotiate with the communities on constitutional reforms. However, the attempts of the government came to nothing. So, in 1948, there remained several options for Britain. One of them was to get Turkey involved in the issue and to contribute to the establishment of the “Turkish side” that could be a counterbalance against the Hellenes. In this sense, the Turkish nationalist cadres of the island appeared as an instrument for getting Turkey involved in the issue and struggling with the *enosis* movement through the non-official ways. On the other side, because the *enosis* was perceived as the primary threat against the Turks by

¹ Kızılyürek, N. (2011). *Paşalar Papazlar; Kıbrıs ve Hegemonya*. İstanbul: Kalkedon Yayınları, p. 45.

² Kızılyürek, N. (2011). *Paşalar Papazlar; Kıbrıs ve Hegemonya*. İstanbul: Kalkedon Yayınları, p. 45. & See Gürel, Ş. S. (1985). *Kıbrıs Tarihi (1878-1960) Kolonyalizm, Ulusçuluk ve Uluslararası Politika (Vol.2)*. İstanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, pp. 30, 48-49.

the Turkish nationalists, getting the support of Turkey with the help of the colonial government was desirable for them. In 1948, with the establishment of a commission on the Turkish affairs, the period of collaboration between the Turkish nationalists of Cyprus and the government began. On the other side, the nationalists of Turkey participated in this collaboration, and the propaganda for making Turkey part of the issue was carried out both in Cyprus and Turkey. However, it is required to note that the option of “supporting” the Turkish nationalists of the island was not totally free of risk from the British point of view. The historical background of the Turkish nationalism showed that even if it remained in a compatible position toward the colonial government from time to time, Turkish nationalism had an anti-British “potential” from the beginning of 1930s. Moreover, the Turkish Cypriot nationalists did not bind themselves with only struggling against the *enosis*, and the nationalists did not always remain silent toward all the practices of the colonial government. Accordingly, the alliance between them was a “cautious” one.

This thesis focuses on the period, between 1948 and 1955, in which the ground for interference of Turkey in the Cyprus issue was prepared and the “Turkish side” in the dispute began to take form. Accordingly, in this period, the attempts for getting Turkey involved in the Cyprus dispute became a political project carried out by the Turkish nationalist cadres of Cyprus and Turkey. Additionally, the roots of the perception that Cyprus dispute cannot be resolved without taking the will of Turkey into consideration took place in this period.

The main aim of this thesis is to make an “objective” evaluation on the mentioned period and suggest an alternative perspective in response to two basic and contradictory approaches about it. On one hand, the period is depicted as a period of a “holy alliance” between the Turkish nationalists and Britain.³ Moreover, the

³ See: Kızılyürek, N. (2005). *Milliyetçilik Kışkacında Kıbrıs*. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, pp. 223-244.

political program of the Turkish Cypriot nationalist cadres is reduced to opposing *enosis*, in this approach. On the other hand, the nationalists evaluate the period as a “heroic tale”.⁴ According to this, Turkey was convinced to “protect” the Turkish Cypriots as a result of the unending efforts of the Turkish nationalists, and the Turks of the island were preserved against the oppressions of the colonial administration and Hellenes by these cadres. The first approach underestimates the “potential” of dissidence inherent to the Turkish Cypriot nationalism against the British colonial administration. On the other hand, the nationalists ignore that the attitudes of the nationalist cadres were exaggeratedly submissive toward the colonial administration at times. This study is in search of a “balanced” account of this turning point in modern history of Cyprus by making a detailed and attentive analysis in response to these two opposing poles in Cyprus studies. In parallel, this thesis aims to fill a void in the Cyprus studies in which the period under focus is not adequately emphasized and the materials that can set light to the period are not analyzed in detail.

In order to reach its aims, this thesis focuses on the two newspapers which are the most important components of the mentioned period. The first one is *Halkın Sesi*, which was the newspaper of the Turkish nationalist cadres of the island. The other is *Hürriyet*. *Hürriyet* was the leading newspaper making an intensive propaganda for getting Turkey involved in the Cyprus dispute, in Turkey. Both of them carried out their propaganda through a nationalist rhetoric and discourse. Mainly, they tried to weld the Turks of Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots. By this way, they attempted to give the following message both to the Republic of Turkey and the “Turkish citizens”: Turkish Cypriots are the full members of Turkish nation; so, neither Turkey nor her “citizens” can remain unresponsive toward the fate of

⁴It should be noted that this attitude of the Turkish nationalists is not specifically valid for the period under focus. For instance, Dr. Küçük in his memoirs puts forward only his “sacrifices” for the Turkish community, and his “contentious” stance toward the British colonial government. See: Sayıl, A. (Ed.) (2010). *Dr. Fazıl Küçük’ün Anıları ve Siyasal Örgüt Çalışmaları*. Lefkoşa: Undetermined.

Turkish Cypriots. In this narration, Turks of the island appeared as the “blood-brothers” of Turks of Turkey. So, a sense of “solidarity” and “identity” was tried to be created through a nationalist propaganda. In parallel, it was assumed that both the Turkish Cypriots and the Turks of Turkey were the members of the same nation who were familiar with the emotions and character of each other, even if they had never been in a direct contact: Only being the members of the same “nation” provided this familiarity. This approach brings Anderson’s definition of nation to mind. As is well-known, he says that “[nation] is an imagined political community ... It is imagined because the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion.”⁵ In this context, the newspapers appear as one of the most important components making this community “imaginable”. As Anderson states, the daily consumption of the newspapers seems a “mass ceremony” which is continually repeated. That is to say, the newspapers which are consumed every day in different places convince the members of the nation that they are the parts of the same community subject to the same ceremony:

...the newspaper reader, observing exact replicas of his own paper being consumed by his subway, barbershop, or residential neighbors, is continually reassured that the imagined world is visibly rooted in everyday life. ... Fiction seeps quietly and continuously into reality, creating that remarkable confidence of community in anonymity which is the hallmark of modern nations.⁶

By keeping Anderson’s statement in mind, the role of the newspapers in the nationalist propaganda can be evaluated in the context of Cyprus dispute in two ways. The first is that the newspapers not only create (consolidate?) a sense of “identity” between the members of a nation but they also indoctrinate the “readers”. So, Turkish nationalism in Turkey through the propaganda for

⁵ Anderson, B. (2006). *Imagined Communities*. London: Verso, p. 6.

⁶ *Ibid*, pp. 35-36.

“securing” the Turkish Cypriots gained a new motivation around which the members of the “nation” could mobilize. That is to say, it brought an additional reason for the “Turks” to act with solidarity under the roof of the “Turkish identity”. On the other side, in *Halkın Sesi*, many articles from the press of Turkey were directly quoted and so the readers of it became the members of the mentioned “ceremony”. Moreover, from time to time, it was almost impossible to differentiate *Halkın Sesi* from a daily published in Turkey: From the news to the articles, almost all things published in it were about the events and political developments in Turkey. The language used in the news made such an impression that the readers of *Halkın Sesi* were living in Turkey and they were the citizens of her. For instance, Celâl Bayar was called as “our” president, and Adnan Menderes was called as “our” prime minister... This is one side of the issue.

On the other side, it is possible to say that the Turkish nationalist discourse was established on a “convenient” ground to convince the readers. So, Anderson’s approach is not sufficient to evaluate how the Turkish nationalist propaganda about the Cyprus dispute could find supporters in the island and Turkey. That is to say, even if the newspapers catalyzed the mentioned process, the nationalist discourse was constructed on a pre-existent basis. Here, Smith’s approach can be applied and the Turkish community of the island can be defined as an “*ethnie*” (ethnic community). In Smith’s definition, *ethnie* has some distinctive attributes. These are “a collective proper name, a myth of common ancestry, shared historical memories, one or more differentiating elements of common culture, an association with a specific 'homeland', a sense of solidarity for significant sectors of the population.”⁷ An *ethnie*, in Smith’s approach, is characterized with self-awareness.

⁷ Smith, A. D. (1991). *National Identity*. Harmondsworth: Penguin, p. 21. In another work, Smith defines the *ethnie* as the following: “a named and self-defined human community whose members possess a myth of common ancestry, shared memories, one or more elements of common culture, including a link with a territory, and a measure of solidarity, at least among the upper strata”. See: Smith, A. D. (2009). *Ethno-Symbolism and Nationalism- A cultural approach*. Oxon: Routledge, p. 27.

It means that the members of an ethnic community differentiate themselves from other *ethnies*. The tie between the Turks of Turkey and Turkish Cypriots was established on this ground. It means that, in sight of the nationalist cadres and their followers, the Turkish Cypriots were the members of the Turkish *ethnie* like the Turks of Turkey. This does not mean that there was a blood relation between each other: an *ethnie* is not characterized by the biological and racial characteristics. Smith says that “ethnic attributes [mentioned above] reveal not only their largely cultural and historical content, but also ... their strongly subjective components. Most important, it is myths of common ancestry, not any fact of ancestry (which is usually difficult to ascertain), that are crucial. It is fictive descent and putative ancestry that matters for the sense of ethnic identification.”⁸ In *Halkın Sesi*, it is possible to observe that the relation between the Turkish community and the Turks of Turkey was established through applying the claim that Turks of Turkey and Turkish Cypriots were the descendents of the “common ancestry”. On the other side, the members of an *ethnie* may not reside in the homeland with which they are associated. In Smith’s words: “... Attachments to specific stretches of territory, and to certain places within them, have a mythical and subjective quality. It is the attachments and associations, rather than residence in or possession of the land that matters for ethnic identification. It is where we belong.”⁹ Anatolia had that kind of importance for the Turkish Cypriots. Even if they had never resided in Anatolia, it was the “homeland” of their ancestors and it was the sacred land of “Turkishness”. On the other side, there was an appropriate environment in Turkey for finding supporters to the Cyprus propaganda. As Tachau says, even if pan-Turkism (or Turanism) is not a primary official/political motivation of the

⁸ Smith, A. D. (1991). *National Identity*. Harmondsworth: Penguin, p. 22.

⁹ Ibid, pp. 22-23.

Republic of Turkey, “pan-Turkist sentiment ... has remained in the form of a suffused feeling of kinship and brotherhood with Turks the world over.”¹⁰

This thesis is composed of five chapters including the introduction. In the second chapter, it is aimed to make a “balanced” evaluation of the Turkish Cypriot nationalism and its relation with the British colonial administration. It is claimed that Turkish Cypriot nationalism cannot be reduced to a dissident attitude toward *enosis*. Instead, it should be regarded that, from the beginning of 1930s, it had a political project which attempted to provide an autonomous status for the Turkish community. In line with this objective, the nationalist cadres directly or indirectly struggled with the British colonial administration. Even if it can be said that they took a submissive position before the government from time to time, the Turkish nationalism always harbored a potential of dissidence toward not only the Hellenes but also the colonial government until 1955. Especially, from the beginning of 1950s, the struggle between the government and the nationalists became apparent. On the other side, the aim of this second chapter is to investigate the basis on which the Turkish nationalism was established in the island. In this context, it is claimed that the emergence of Turkish nationalism cannot be evaluated as a completely “artificial” or a “rootless” ideology because the required basis was present in the island for the rise of Turkish nationalism. In line with this claim, the Smithian perspective is followed, and it is claimed that the roots of Turkish Cypriot nationalism take place in the cultural and historical background of the Turkish community. So, the second chapter provides a background for the readers for investigating the period between 1948 and 1955, and it provides a preliminary view on the nature of the “collaboration” between the colonial government and the Turkish nationalists for getting Turkey involved in the Cyprus dispute.

¹⁰ Tachau, F. (1959). “The Face of Turkish Nationalism as Reflected in the Cyprus Dispute.” *Middle East Journal*, 13(3), p. 265-266.

The third chapter focuses on *Halkın Sesi* and its position/role in the period between 1948 and 1955. For this aim, initially, the general features of *Halkın Sesi* and its changing attitudes toward the colonial government are evaluated. Additionally, an introduction about its theses in the context of the Cyprus dispute and its attitude toward status quo is made. Afterward, the nationalist line followed by *Halkın Sesi* is investigated and the nationalist discourse that is applied in its attempt to make Turkey part of the issue is analyzed. Its political stance and the components of its propaganda are handled. Next, *enosis* as it is perceived by *Halkın Sesi* is evaluated, and how this perception shapes the attempts of it to get Turkey involved in the Cyprus dispute is investigated. The last section of this chapter deals with the struggle between the Turkish nationalist cadres in its relation with the attitudes of the parties toward Turkey and the colonial government. For this aim, *İstiklâl* (a Turkish daily published in Cyprus by a nationalist leader Necati Özkan) is analyzed in addition to *Halkın Sesi* because the struggle occurs primarily between the cadres separately organized around these two newspapers.

The fourth chapter of the thesis mainly focuses on *Hürriyet* and its importance in the mentioned process. For this aim, firstly, the changing attitudes of Turkey (from the establishment of the Republic to 1960) toward the Cyprus dispute are analyzed. Next, general features of *Hürriyet* and the conditions that it was born into are detailed. These sections provide the basis for the main section of this chapter in which the role and political stance of *Hürriyet* in its relation with the official attitude toward the Cyprus dispute is evaluated. The main claims of this chapter are mainly based on the discourse analysis of the editorials and the articles of its editor in chief Sedat Simavi. In this chapter, it is argued that even if *Hürriyet* made an intensive propaganda for making Turkey part of the Cyprus dispute, the main actor behind the inclusion of Turkey to the issue was Britain. However, in terms of making the public opinion sensitive to the issue and preparing a suitable ground for Turkey's involvement, *Hürriyet* played highly important role. On the

other side, this chapter tries to show that *Hürriyet*, as being different from *Halkın Sesi*, always remained in a submissive position toward Britain.

At the end of the thesis, a reflection on the current situation in Cyprus and the relation between Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots is suggested at the back of concluding remarks made out of the analysis.

CHAPTER 2

THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF TURKISH NATIONALISM IN CYPRUS

Parallel to the developments in the Ottoman Empire, Turkish nationalism in Cyprus began to emerge in early 20th century, in a later period in comparison to the emergence of Greek nationalism. Turkish nationalism, which became widespread among the masses in times, had initially found supporters among the intellectual circles through the influence of the Young Turks movement.¹¹ At the end of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century, Young Turks were organized in the island and some “pro-Young Turk” newspapers were published by the journalists.¹² In the island, the nationalist approaches, which took shape under the impact of Young Turks, manifested an “Ottoman nationalism” which perceived the “Hellenes” as the “other of the Ottomans”, at first; then, the transition to the “Turkish identity” from the Ottoman one which had the Islamic tones was realized.¹³ Especially the Turkish War of Independence and the establishment of the Republic of Turkey in the following years accelerated this transition. The end of the 1920s was the period in which the Turkish identity became more prominent than the Islamic one, and the Turkish nationalism was used as an influential political instrument for making propaganda by the Turkish Cypriot nationalist leadership. Turkish nationalist propaganda was undertaken by the cadres defining themselves as the Kemalists and led by Necati Özkan, at the end of the 1920s. The Turkish consul, Ali Asaf Güvenir, also backed these

¹¹ Nevzat, A. (2005). *Nationalism Amongst the Turks of Cyprus: The First Wave*, PhD. Thesis. Oulu: Oulu University Press, p. 430.

¹² For further information, see: Nevzat, A. (2005). *Nationalism Amongst the Turks of Cyprus: The First Wave*, PhD. Thesis, Oulu: Oulu University Press, pp. 148-151. & Evre, B. (2004). *Kıbrıs Türk Milliyetçiliği: Oluşumu ve Gelişimi*. Lefkoşa: Işık Kitabevi , pp. 46-48.

¹³ Nevzat, A. (2005). *Nationalism Amongst the Turks of Cyprus: The First Wave*, PhD. Thesis. Oulu: Oulu University Press, pp. 151-152.

cadres.¹⁴ On the other side, *Söz*¹⁵ (a Turkish newspaper) had begun to be published regularly since 1920 by Remzi Okan, and it was economically assisted by the Republic of Turkey directly with the order of Atatürk.¹⁶ *Söz*, beginning from the first years of its publication followed the developments in Turkey and supported the Turkish War of Independence.¹⁷ After the establishment of the Republic of Turkey, it carried out the propaganda for the “exportation” of the Kemalist reforms to Cyprus, and it struggled with the anti-Kemalists (named as *yüzellilikler*) which were exiled from Turkey.¹⁸ The Turkish nationalism, which became widespread through the efforts of the newly emerging Kemalist cadres, had no “comprehensive” project such as struggling against colonialism or establishing a nation state. It can be said that this movement, even if it was absolutely opposed to the *enosis*, was prone to make alliance with the Hellenes of the island when the “common interest” was in question¹⁹; and it was characterized

¹⁴ Dodd, C. (2010). *The History and Politics of the Cyprus Conflict*. Great Britain: Palgrave Macmillan, p. 8. & Kızılyürek, N. (2005). *Milliyetçilik Kışkıracında Kıbrıs*. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, p. 219 & Kızılyürek, N. (2011). *Paşalar Papazlar; Kıbrıs ve Hegemonya*. İstanbul: Kalkedon Yayınları, p. 42.

¹⁵ *Söz* had begun to be published before Necati Özkan became a leader of the Kemalist cadres. It may be required to note that Özkan was not one of the first Kemalists of the island. However, he was one of the first “political” leaders who participated in the politics actively with Kemalist motivations and tried to make propaganda for mobilizing the community.

¹⁶ Uluğ, N. H. (1975). “Gazi’nin Emri”. In Manizade, D. (Ed.) *Kıbrıs Dün Bugün Yarın*. İstanbul: Kıbrıs Türk Kültür Derneği İstanbul Bölgesi Yayınları, p. 15. It is necessary to imply that the mentioned book exaggerates Atatürk’s support to the Turkish Cypriots. Atatürk’s attention to Cyprus should be evaluated within the frame of official attitude of the Republic of Turkey toward the external Turks. It means that the Turkish Cypriots did not have a privileged position, in the sight of Turkey and Atatürk. This will be explained in the relevant chapter.

¹⁷ Özoran, B. R. (1965). “Mustafa Kemal ve Kıbrıs Türkleri.” *Türk Kültürü*, 35, pp. 95-97. Özoran was the daughter of Remzi Okan.

¹⁸ Ünlü, C. (?). *Kıbrıs’ta Basın Olayı (1878-1981)*. Ankara: Basın Yayın Genel Müdürlüğü, p. 56. For further information about *Söz*, the pages between 54 and 63 can be read.

¹⁹ Nevzat, A. (2005). *Nationalism Amongst the Turks of Cyprus: The First Wave*, PhD. Thesis. Oulu: Oulu University Press, p. 358.

with anti-traditionalism and being anti-British.²⁰ Initially, Necati Özkan and the cadres around him had no comprehensive project because the Turkish nationalism in the island lacked the class base which could have carried out a large-scale project.²¹ However, this was not the only reason... Indeed, it would not be realistic to expect the Turkish population, which was not able to achieve its autonomy toward the colonial administration and which was clearly in a minority position in the island, to carry out such kind of political projects alone. As is known, because, in accordance with the “nation system“ (*millet sistemi*), the Muslims under the Ottoman rule were the “dominant nation”, they were directly attached to the central administration or its officials; so, in the case of the withdrawal of the Ottoman system, they lacked autonomous and well-established structures/organizations via which they could carry out political activities.²² Therefore, they were in a vulnerable and unorganized position in the face of the “foreign government” which came after the Ottoman Empire. The same was valid for the Cyprus case.

The attempts of the newly emerging Kemalist cadres were shaped within this context, and the first aim of them was to make the Turks of the island an organized and powerful community. The base on which the requests were established was a nationalist discourse based on the advocacy of the “Turkish identity”. In this discourse, the “Greek identity” appeared as the threat against the survival of the Turks in the island, i. e. as the “other” of the “Turkish national identity”. On the

²⁰ Kızılyürek, N. (2011). *Paşalar Papazlar; Kıbrıs ve Hegemonya*. İstanbul: Kalkedon Yayınları, p. 43.

²¹ Niyazi Kızılyürek claims that because the Turkish Cypriot nationalism was not based on Turkish bourgeoisie, it did not stem from the island’s historical and economical background. In his words, the Turkish nationalism in Cyprus was a “rootless ideology”. See: Kızılyürek, N. (2011). *Paşalar Papazlar; Kıbrıs ve Hegemonya*. İstanbul: Kalkedon Yayınları, pp. 41-42.

²² See: Beckingham, C. F. (1957). “Islam and Turkish Nationalism in Cyprus.” *Die Welt des Islams*, 5 (1/2), p. 72.

other side, the “British colonial administration” was, basically, perceived as a “stranger” to “us”.

The struggle against the “stranger” was generally conducted in an indirect and cautious manner until 1950s. The nationalist cadres which could not directly confront the government contended with the traditional/religious pro-British leadership of Turkish community. In fact, the British colonial administration oppressed the Turkish community through the agency of them and recognized only these cadres. For instance, one of the leading names of the collaborators of the colonial administration, Sir Mehmed Münir, was either the chairman or the member of almost all the official institutions relevant to the Turkish community; so, in almost all the issues about the community, he was taken as the representative of the Turks by the government.²³ For these cadres, which were the “residues” of the Ottoman bureaucracy, making collaboration with the government meant sustaining their authority over the Turks because they had no power to maintain their political and social positions and privileges without allying with the colonial administration.²⁴ On the other side, the struggle against the traditional leadership should not be evaluated only as an “indirect” struggle against the government, it should also be thought as a struggle against the traditionalism which is inherent to Kemalism.²⁵

This first period of the rise of Kemalist nationalism was the period in which the “differences between two communities” were politicized through the ethnic expressions. In other words, although the “differences” were not “discovered” for the first time by the Turks in this period, they became a matter of a political

²³ See: Kızılyürek, N. (2011). *Paşalar Papazlar; Kıbrıs ve Hegemonya*. İstanbul: Kalkedon Yayınları, p. 40.

²⁴ Ibid, pp. 38-39.

²⁵ Ibid, p. 41.

struggle in company with a nationalist discourse.²⁶ The nationalist cadres played a leading role in this process. Through politicizing the “cultural differences” between the communities, they tried to mobilize the Turks of the island in order to obstruct the *enosis* and provide an autonomous status to the Turkish community in face of the British colonial administration. This attitude of them was highly compatible with the Smith’s approach about nationalists. For Smith, the “task” of the nationalists is “to rediscover, select and reinterpret the past or pasts of a given community, reshape its conception of its present state and so help to regenerate the community.”²⁷ In parallel, Smith entitles the nationalists as “political archaeologists” in order to imply the way followed by them in politicizing the communities in a nationalist direction: they “rediscover, select and reinterpret” the past and culture of the communities and draw a frame for “present-day community”.²⁸ Additionally, for Smith, nationalism or nationalist has a political aim: “to unite the community, restore its autonomy and self-expression and, in this way, to prepare it to take its rightful place in the concert of nations.”²⁹ So, it can be said that nationalists establish their political activity on a historical and cultural ground. This approach was also applicable for the Cyprus case.

Even if the transition from the Ottoman identity to the Turkish one realized in parallel to the developments in the Ottoman Empire and the Republic of Turkey, it is possible to say that the Turks (the Muslims) perceived themselves as a community different from the Hellenes.³⁰ The Turks, despite living together with

²⁶ In the 1950s, the politicization of the “differences” became intensified, and the struggle gave way to the clashes between the communities.

²⁷ Smith, A. D. (2009). *Ethno-Symbolism and Nationalism; A cultural approach*. Oxon:Routledge, p. 65.

²⁸ Ibid, pp. 65-66.

²⁹ Ibid, p. 66.

³⁰ In parallel, Nevzat says that “... While at the time of British occupation in 1878, an incipient Turkish national consciousness in Cyprus could barely be discerned even amongst an elite

the Hellenes, refrained from “intermarriages”, and maintained their language.³¹ If we use Smith’s terminology, it can be said that Turks of the island was an “ethnic community” or “*ethnie*”, and they had self-awareness that they were different from their neighbor communities.³² This does not mean that the clash between the Greek and Turkish communities was inevitable. Instead, this means that the rise of nationalisms of the communities were not based on only the “external” factors such as British “divide and rule” policy or the intervention of the Turkish nationalists of Turkey. The same was valid for the Hellenes. After the Byzantine rule in the island, even if Cyprus Church was oppressed and the Hellenes were enserfed under the rule of the Frankish and Venetians, the Hellenic culture did not totally disappear; so, there remained a “potential” for the rise of Greek nationalism in 19th and 20th century.³³ In parallel, for the Hellenes, the “sense of belonging” based on the “cultural background” was not removed. After the establishment of the Ottoman rule, it is known that the oppressions over the Church and the Greeks were eliminated.³⁴ As Hellenes, the Turks were also aware that they form a

intelligentsia, the concept of the nation, at least of the Ottoman nation, had begun to be one to which attachment was being made.” See: Nevzat, A. (2005). *Nationalism Amongst the Turks of Cyprus: The First Wave*, PhD. Thesis. Oulu: Oulu University Press, p. 429.

³¹ Tachau, F. (1959). “The Face of Turkish Nationalism as Reflected in the Cyprus Dispute.” *Middle East Journal*, 13(3), p.262. For a counter-view, see: Pollis, A. (1973). “Intergroup Conflict and British Colonial Policy: The Case of Cyprus.” *Comperative Politics*, 5(4), p. 587. In the mentioned article, Pollis utters that there was a potential in Cyprus for creation of a “Cypriot language” with the integration of Greek and Turkish languages. There is an implication behind this evaluation according to which a common language can contribute to the formation of a common national/Cypriot identity. However, as far as I can see, the evaluation of Pollis is a marginal one because many sources show that even if the communities interacted with each other, both of them more or less preserved their cultural features. On the other side, when we think that the emergence of the Greek nationalism goes back to highly earlier periods than the emergence of Turkish nationalism, we can claim that it is not realistic to hope for creation of a common language and also common national identity for the Turkish Cypriots and Hellenes.

³² See the introduction chapter of the thesis.

³³ Markides, K. C. (1974). “Social Change and the Rise and Decline of Social Movements: The Case of Cyprus.” *American Ethnologist*, 1(2), p. 311.

³⁴ This does not mean that the Greek Cypriots got wide freedoms under the Ottoman rule. This just means that the oppressions over the Orthodox culture were abolished as a result of the defeat of the

separate “cultural and historical” collectivity or grouping.³⁵ In parallel, in the cultural sense, the Turks had different features from the Hellenic culture.³⁶ However, we have to note that this does not mean that there was no interaction between languages and cultures of the communities. On the other side, it is not possible to claim that the relations between them were without clashes or struggles until 1930s. For instance, in the years of the Turkish Independence War, the tension was also high in the island; and because of this, the wagons of the trains that the Turks and Hellenes used were separated from each other till the end of the war.³⁷ In parallel, after the recapture of İzmir (or the Asia Minor Disaster), because the government tried to impede the celebrations, the Turks clashed with the British soldiers. Shortly, even if the development processes of the Turkish and Greek nationalism followed different paths, it can be claimed that not only for the Greek nationalism but also for the Turkish nationalism, there was a “suitable” basis for the emergence and rise of them in the island.

Catholics. Moreover, even if it is true that the feudal regime was demolished by the Ottomans and this provided a “relative” relief for the Cypriots, the masses were living in miserable economic conditions. See: Kızılyürek, N. (2001). *Kıbrıs Sorununda İç ve Dış Etkenler*. Lefkoşa: Işık Kitabevi, pp. 16-29. For further information about the Ottoman period, see: İnalçık, H. (1969), “Ottoman Policy and Administration in Cyprus After the Conquest”, In *The First International Congress of Cypriot Studies Proceedings* (1971). Ankara: Institute For The Study of Turkish Culture, pp. 59-71. & İnalçık, H. (1964), “Kıbrıs’ta Türk İdaresi Altında Nüfus”, In *Kıbrıs ve Türkler*. Ankara: Türk Kültürünü Araştırma Enstitüsü, pp. 27-58. & Ahmet C. Gazioğlu (2000). *Kıbrıs’ta Türkler (1570-1878); 308 Yıllık Türk Dönemine Yeni Bir Bakış*. Lefkoşa: CYREP & Alasya, H. F. (1977). *Kıbrıs Tarihi ve Kıbrıs’ta Türk Eserleri*. Institute for the Study of Turkish Culture, pp. 43-108.

³⁵ See: Smith, A. D. (1991). *National Identity*. Harmondsworth: Penguin, p. 20-21. Because we have to differentiate the *ethnie* from the “race”, it is possible to say that the “Ottoman” identity was closer to refer to an “ethnic community” for the Turkish Cypriots than the Turks of Ottomans living in Anatolia. The reason is that the Turkish Cypriots and the Hellenes were living in a close contact with each other, and being Ottoman differentiates the Turkish Cypriots from the Hellenes. That is to say, even if “being Turk” was not the reference for the Turkish Cypriots, they perceive themselves as a separate collectivity via the Ottoman identity.

³⁶ See Beratlı, N. (2008). *Kıbrıslı Türklerin Kökenleri ve Kıbrıs’ta Bektaşilik*. İstanbul: Kalkedon Yayınları, p. 79-177.

³⁷ Sayıl, A. (Ed.) (2010). *Dr. Fazıl Küçük’ün Anıları ve Siyasal Örgüt Çalışmaları*. Lefkoşa: Undetermined, p. 122.

The first triumph of the Kemalist nationalist cadres toward the pro-British leadership was the 1930 elections made for electing the members of the legislative assembly. The leader of the Kemalists, Necati Özkan, won the elections against the pro-British leader Sir Mehmed Münir, the Turkish delegate of Evkaf. The propaganda carried out during the election campaign was based on the demands for the autonomy of the community in the educational, economical, legal, religious and political domains. These demands were based on the consciousness of being ruled by a “foreign” government. Additionally, they aimed to consolidate the position of the Turkish community in the face of the Hellenes and the colonial administration. The demands can be mentioned under those following titles: the Mufti Office should be revitalized and the Mufti should be elected by the Turkish community; independent Turkish courts should be established; a modern civil code should be enacted as it was in Turkey; Evkaf³⁸ should be detached from the religious affairs and the members of it should be composed of 6 elected Turks and 1 appointed British; the initiative about the educational affairs should be given to the community and a Turkish director should be appointed to the Turkish lycee.³⁹ What should be underlined here is that all the mentioned demands were articulated in a nationalist discourse based on the “Turkish identity”. For instance, after the election triumph of Necati Özkan, the defeat of the old leadership was heralded through the following expressions: “Dear citizen! (...) Now, you are breathing a sigh of relief. (...) [From now on], you will be able to declare and glorify your Turkishness. The [Turkish] flag to which you are committed will wave freely in

³⁸ Evkaf was a charity institution assisting the Muslims of Ottoman Empire by establishing “libraries”, “public schools”, “parks”, “mosques”, “free cooking centers for the poor”, etc... Especially, Evkaf was one the most important issue for the Turkish nationalists because it had a serious economic power with its valuable immovables, and it was being administrated by the pro-British traditional leadership under the control of the colonial government. It was thought that if the economic power of Evkaf could be used properly, it could provide the economical, cultural and educational development of the Turkish community. For further information about Evkaf, see: Dizdar, M. K. (1969), “Cyprus Evkaf”, In *The First International Congress of Cypriot Studies Proceedings* (1971). Ankara: Institute for the Study of Turkish Culture, pp. 207-220.

³⁹ Nevzat, A. (2005). *Nationalism Amongst the Turks of Cyprus: The First Wave*, PhD. Thesis. Oulu: Oulu University Press, pp. 390-393.

the sky and you will effervesce with divine sentiments inherent to it.”⁴⁰ Again in the same newspaper, in an article which advocated that the authority in the educational affairs should be given to the community and the education should be designed according to “the Turkish Great soul”, the following expressions took place:

If we had been an independent nation, if we did not have above our heads a foreign hand that threatened our identity we might think differently [but] we can never afford to forget, the need not to overlook the fact that we live under a foreign administration and that it will not be as loyal and compassionate as that of a mother government.⁴¹

As it is seen, the struggle of the Kemalist cadres was not only a struggle against the *enosis*. At the same time, it was not only a struggle between the Kemalists and pro-British traditional elites.⁴² It means that the Kemalist leadership did not aim to take the place of the traditional leadership and establish an absolute authority over the community. In the case of satisfaction of their demands, both the oppression of the traditional leadership and the indirect domination of the colonial administration over the Turkish community would be diluted, and additionally, the community would gain the autonomous and democratic institutions. For this aim, they attempted to gain the support of the community and mobilize them.⁴³ On the other side, they tried to take the “motherland’s” support. Especially after the World War II, this became one of the most important issues for the nationalist cadres of the island.

The British colonial administration, until the World War II, tried to impede these cadres. Moreover, from time to time, the government complained about them to

⁴⁰ This article was published in *Söz* in 28th October 1930. It can be read in the following source: Birinci, E. (2001). *M. Necati Özkan (1899-1970) Vol.1*. İstanbul: Necati Özkan Vakfı Yayınları, p. 143-145.

⁴¹ Nevzat, A. (2005). *Nationalism Amongst the Turks of Cyprus: The First Wave*, PhD. Thesis. Oulu: Oulu University Press, pp. 391-392.

⁴² *Ibid*, p. 358.

⁴³ *Ibid*.

the Republic of Turkey, and Turkey did not support the Kemalists because she abstained from confronting Britain.⁴⁴ Not only they lacked the support of Turkey, the Hellenes were also not prone to make collaboration with them in any case. So, it is true that the Turkish nationalist movement, which could have become an anti-colonialist one in collaboration with the Greek leadership and community, was stuck in between the demands for the autonomy of the community and propaganda against *enosis*. However, it is not possible to claim that they had no political project.

After the insurrection of the Hellenes in 1931, the Turkish Cypriots and the nationalist leadership, as well as the Hellenes, were subject to the heavy oppressions of the colonial administration. From 1931 to the World War II, the opportunities for carrying out their political activity were reduced. In this period, the legislative assembly was abolished, the use of national and religious symbols and flags were prohibited, the press and postal service became subject to censorship and the educational institutions became totally dependent to the colonial government.⁴⁵ *Söz*, in this period, was one of the newspapers censored by the government. Additionally, the publication of *Halkın Sesi* was suspended in 1943 (for 3 months) as a result of the decision of the colonial authority.⁴⁶ The reason was that Dr. Küçük in one of his articles criticized the colonial government. Despite the obstacles, the rise of Turkish nationalism continued in the island in this period. According to Beckingham, there were two main reasons behind this.⁴⁷

⁴⁴ See: Gürel, Ş. S. (1984). *Kıbrıs Tarihi (1878-1960) Kolonyalizm, Ulusçuluk ve Uluslararası Politika (Vol.1)*. İstanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, pp.183-194.

⁴⁵ Ibid, pp. 141-143.

⁴⁶ Sayıl, A. (Ed.) (2010). *Dr. Fazıl Küçük'ün Anıları ve Siyasal Örgüt Çalışmaları*. Lefkoşa: Undetermined, p. 221.

⁴⁷ Beckingham, C. F. (1957). "Islam and Turkish Nationalism in Cyprus." *Die Welt des Islams*, 5 (1/2), pp. 73-74.

One of them was relevant to the perception of the Turkish community about Turkey, and the second was relevant to the attitude of the colonial authority toward Turkish community. The first component was that: The attempts for the perdurance of the Kemalist reforms were prevailing in Turkey, and the new Kemalist regime became a powerful structure in the Middle East. According to this, in comparison to Greece, there was “stability” in Turkey. Additionally, for Beckingham, the Montreux Convention, signed in 1936, proved that Turkey had a trustable and esteemed position in the international arena. So, in the sight of the Turkish Cypriots, having the Turkish identity became something honorable. On the other side, for Beckingham, the oppressions following the 1931 insurrection caused the Turks to think that the government punished the Turks unjustly as the Turkish Cypriots did not take place in the insurrection. So, being governed by the British government gained a negative content, in the sight of the Turkish Cypriots.

During the years of the World War II, the oppressions over the Turks and Hellenes became less intense. The reason behind this was that after Italy attacked Greece in 1940, the war began to influence the Eastern Mediterranean region, and as a result, Britain was in a need of getting the support of the communities of the island and that of Greece and Turkey, more than ever.⁴⁸ While the World War II was going on, in 1943, Cyprus Turkish Minority Association (Kıbrıs Adası Türk Azınlık Kurumu, KATAK) was founded mainly under the leadership of the Kemalist nationalist cadres of 1930s. Necati Özkan and Dr. Fazıl Küçük were the members of its administrative body. The main importance of KATAK, in the context of the thesis, was that the colonial government, for the first time, gave a green light to the political activities of the Kemalist cadres with the aim of impeding the *enosis* movement. In terms of KATAK and its relation with the government, we can talk about different scenarios. Firstly, according to Kızılyürek, the British colonial administration, in the face of the rising demands for the *enosis* made collaboration

⁴⁸ Gürel, Ş. S. (1985). *Kıbrıs Tarihi (1878-1960) Kolonyalizm, Ulusçuluk ve Uluslararası Politika (Vol.2)*. İstanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, p. 9.

with the Kemalists, and KATAK was founded as a result of its “direct” supports and efforts.⁴⁹ According to him, participation of pro-British Sir Mehmed Münir in the process of its establishment proved this claim. The memoirs of Hikmet Afif Mapolar also supports Kızılyürek: “The governor, asking Sir Münir to come to his office, said that the Turks need to establish a political organization and it is inevitable for them, and he ask [Sir Münir] for his opinion [about the issue]”. For Mapolar, Münir got the message given to him: “His first duty was to defend the country in favor of the British, and the support of the Turkish people was required for this aim.”⁵⁰ It means that the initiative in the process of the establishment of KATAK belonged to the British colonial administration. On the other side, in the monograph about Necati Özkan written by Birinci, another scenario is suggested. According to this, Necati Özkan and his friends took the first steps towards founding the association, and Münir was opposed to this idea; however, with the permission given by the governor, it was established.⁵¹ Şükrü Sina Gürel, on the other hand, says that the official documents are contradicting the claims that KATAK was founded with encouragement and supervision of the British.⁵² However, these different versions do not change the result: the government did not object to the establishment of KATAK; to say the least, it remained silent toward its establishment. Moreover, it is also plausible to claim that the government was pleased with the establishment of such an organization, when we take the international conjuncture into consideration. That is to say, the aims of the Kemalists and the government intersected on a point. However, it is highly

⁴⁹ Kızılyürek, N. (2005). *Milliyetçilik Kısılcacında Kıbrıs*. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, p. 224. & Kızılyürek, N. (2011). *Paşalar Papazlar; Kıbrıs ve Hegemonya*. İstanbul: Kalkedon Yayınları, p. 45.

⁵⁰ Mapolar, H. A. (2002). *Kıbrıs Güncesi 40 Yılın Anıları 1*. Lefkoşa: Galeri Kültür Yayınları, p. 168.

⁵¹ Birinci, E. (2001). *M. Necati Özkan (1899-1970) (Vol.1)*. İstanbul: Necati Özkan Vakfı Yayınları, p. 250-251.

⁵² Gürel, Ş. S. (1985). *Kıbrıs Tarihi (1878-1960) Kolonyalizm, Ulusçuluk ve Uluslararası Politika (Vol.2)*. İstanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, p. 12.

exaggerated to make an inference from here that the nationalists acted under the control of the government and relied on its supports. In fact, KATAK in its first years was seriously supported by people. Mapolar, who voluntarily worked in KATAK as the clerk, said that many villagers were organized under the roof of KATAK, and KATAK was economically assisted by generous donations of the villagers.⁵³ However, because of the strife between the leadership cadres, the organization could not keep its powerful position. Initially, Dr. Küçük resigned from it and founded another political organization with the name Cyprus National Turkish People's Party (Kıbrıs Millî Türk Halk Partisi, KMTHP) in 1944.⁵⁴ Afterward, Necati Özkan resigned and attempted to found a new political party.

In 1948, the attempt of the colonial government to make collaboration with these cadres became more apparent. The main reason behind its attempts was that: after the World War II, the demands for the *enosis* found a highly legitimate basis with the popularization of the self-determination principle in the world, and the demands began to be expressed more decisively by the Greek community and its leaders. Toward these demands, the colonial administration tried to put the Turkish side in place, and in this direction, ally with them against the *enosis* movement. On the other side, the process of making Turkey part of the Cyprus dispute was initiated in this period.

As is well-known, in 1948, the colonial governor Lord Winster encouraged the leaders of the Turkish community to establish the "Commission of the Turkish Affairs" (Türk İşleri Komisyonu) and prepare a report about the Turkish community. The report was parallel to the demands of the nationalists of 1930. The followings were the demands: A civil code should be enacted for the Turkish

⁵³ Mapolar, H. A. (2002). *Kıbrıs Güncesi 40 Yılın Anıları 1*. Lefkoşa: Galeri Kültür Yayınları, p. 177-179.

⁵⁴ Some documents about KMTHP such as its constitution and meeting minutes can be found in the following source: Sayıl, A. (Ed.) (2010). *Dr. Fazıl Küçük'ün Anıları ve Siyasal Örgüt Çalışmaları*. Lefkoşa: Undetermined, pp. 293-335.

community, the Mufti office should be revitalized, the community should have the initiative in the educational affairs, the curriculums of the Turkish schools should be based on the books imported from Turkey, the national days should be celebrated in the Turkish schools...⁵⁵ In the time period between 1949 and 1955-56, the demands were satisfied by the colonial government; however, this was not so easy as it is assumed. The alliance between the nationalists and the government was a “cautious” one because, in the sight of the government, Turkish nationalists were always a “probable” threat as well as an ally. Indeed, in 1950s, the nationalists took an offensive stand against the government as well as the *enosis*. So, the government delayed the legislation of Turkish civil code. It did not allow the community to elect its own Mufti with the point that there were not yet required mechanisms to elect him; so, at first, it appointed a Mufti from Turkey.⁵⁶ The appointed Mufti was forced to return back to Turkey through an influential campaign carried out by *Halkın Sesi* and Dr. Küçük, in the same year that he came to the island, in 1951. Until 1953 the election of a new Mufti was impeded by the government. Besides, administration of Evkaf was not given back to the Turkish community until 1956.⁵⁷ In other words, the demands taking place in the report of the mentioned commission were not delivered so easily. Investigating *Halkın Sesi* since its foundation would show how difficult it was to attain the promises of the report. This required a sustained struggle which proved crucial in both the constitution of Turkish nationalism and its leadership as an agent in the Cyprus dispute and setting the background for the inclusion of Turkey in the case. The next chapter focuses on this significant turning point in the emergence of Turkish Cypriot nationalism.

⁵⁵ Gürel, Ş. S. (1985). *Kıbrıs Tarihi (1878-1960) Kolonyalizm, Ulusçuluk ve Uluslararası Politika (Vol.2)*. İstanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, p. 70.

⁵⁶ However, just in 1930, a Mufti, who was not officially recognized by the government, was elected by the representatives of the community in “National Congress”, established under the leadership of Necati Özkan. So, there was no obstacle before the election of a Mufti.

⁵⁷ For details, see: Dizdar, M. K. (1969), “Cyprus Evkaf”, In *The First International Congress of Cypriot Studies Proceedings* (1971). Ankara: Institute for the Study of Turkish Culture, pp. 207-220.

CHAPTER 3

AN IMPORTANT MOMENT IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF TURKISH NATIONALISM IN CYPRUS AND ITS REFLECTIONS IN *HALKIN SESİ*: 1948-1955

3.1 Introduction

In the previous chapters of the thesis, it was stated that a “cautious alliance” between the Turkish nationalist cadres and the British colonial administration was established as from 1948. This alliance, as was mentioned before, aimed to get the Republic of Turkey to involve with the Cyprus issue and to obstruct the *enosis*. *Halkın Sesi*, a Turkish daily published in Cyprus, was one of the major agents of this project in the period between 1948 and the years 1954-55. Its importance, in the context of the thesis, primarily stems from here. Moreover, *Halkın Sesi* supported the demands advocated by the Kemalists of 1930s and made propaganda for the realization of them. As was stated in the second chapter, these demands were aiming to provide autonomy for the Turkish Cypriot community. The period between 1948 and 1955 was also important for the determination of the leadership which would carry out the “Partition (*Taksim*) Project” in Cyprus after 1955. The struggle was between Dr. Küçük and Necati Özkan.

In this chapter, firstly, *Halkın Sesi* with its general features will be introduced. Next, the nationalist line followed by *Halkın Sesi* and the process in which it endeavored to make Turkey part of the Cyprus dispute will be focused on. Then, the *enosis* as it was perceived by *Halkın Sesi* will be taken into consideration. Under the last subtitle, the struggle between Necati Özkan and Dr. Küçük will be analyzed. For the aims mentioned above, the relevant news and articles published in *Halkın Sesi* will be taken into consideration. In the last part of the chapter, *İstiklâl* (a Turkish daily published by Necati Özkan) will be added to the analysis.

3.2 General Features of *Halkın Sesi*

*Halkın Sesi*⁵⁸ was an important newspaper leading the Turkish nationalist cadres of the island. Dr. Fazıl Küçük, who would be the person addressed by the Republic of Turkey and the British colonial administration as the leader of the Turkish Cypriot community after 1955, was the founder of it. It played an active role in the process of constructing Turkish nationalism in the island. Both in the sense of the date of its foundation and its political stance, it was the successor of the Kemalist/nationalist newspaper *Söz*.⁵⁹ In the first issue, it was claimed that *Halkın Sesi* would be the “dignified and proud Turkish voice” of the Turkish community of the island.⁶⁰ Beginning from the first issue, in the sense of advocating the demands of the Kemalist cadres of 1930s, it followed a consistent political line. In the published articles, it is possible to say that the ethnic expressions were predominant. Its attitude toward the British colonial administration was unstable. First of all, until 1950s, it “generally” abstained from stiff confrontations with the government. However, it cannot be denied that from “time to time” it criticized the government with an offensive manner. For instance, just in the first year of its foundation, in the 1st July 1942, in the editorial, it was stated that the British colonial administration was trying to paralyze the nationality (national identity) of the Turks and to break the ties between them and Turkey off. In addition to this, according to the article, the government was continuously overriding minority rights of the Turks and inhibiting their freedom. It was uttered that the Turks would never relinquish their national identity, and they did not want

⁵⁸ The evaluations made here include the years between 1942 (the year of its foundation) and 1955.

⁵⁹ The publication of *Söz* was suspended after the death of its founder, in 1942.

⁶⁰ Küçük, F. (1942, March 14). Sayın Halkımızın Yüksek Huzurunda. *Halkın Sesi*, p. 1.

to be crushed anymore, but wanted to live as a “sovereign” community.⁶¹ In the 1950s, the language used toward the colonial administration became more and more aggressive. For instance, Yavuz, in the 9th December 1951, wrote that although the Turks remained loyal to the colonial administration, it continued to “befool” the Turkish community, to assault it and violate its rights.⁶² In parallel, Dr. Küçük, in 1952, uttered that obeying the government, persistently encroaching the rights of the Turks, was nothing but “idiocy”, and he directly blamed the government for the “miserable” conditions of the Turks.⁶³ Gradually, allying and compromising with the government got a negative content.

One of the most important features of the newspaper was its ability in making propaganda and organizing the people around various issues. Moreover, it is possible to say that *Halkın Sesi*, being a successful propagator and agitator, resembles the features of an organ of a political organization rather than a daily. The main weapon used in its campaigns and propaganda was the ethnic expressions.

It can be said that one of the major missions of *Halkın Sesi* was to mobilize the Turks of the island. However, it was speaking not only to them but also to the colonial administration and the other actors of the World Politics. From time to time, when it was required to attract the government’s or the world’s attention directly, some articles were published both in Turkish and in English, and the reflections were analyzed in the following days. The article titled as “Let the World Know! Enosis is What They Want” is an example for the latter.⁶⁴ The

⁶¹ Küçük, F. (1942, July 1). Liselerimizin Türk Müdürler Tarafından İdaresini İsteriz. *Halkın Sesi*, p. 1.

⁶² Yavuz (1951, December 9). İngiliz Bayrağı Çekilirken. *Halkın Sesi*, p. 2.

⁶³ Küçük, M. F. (1952, April 17). Adalet Öldü!..., *Halkın Sesi*, p. 1.

⁶⁴ See Editorial, “Let the World Know! Enosis is What They Want”, *Halkın Sesi*, 6 April 1951.

examples which directly spoke to the government are the followings: “Government’s Unjustified Interference in Our Religious Affairs”⁶⁵, “Government’s Unjustified Interference in Our Educational Affairs”⁶⁶, “What is Wrong in Our Elementary Education?”⁶⁷, “Will the Government Compensate the Turkish Community?”⁶⁸ In all these articles, the newspaper requested the government not to interfere the internal affairs of the Turkish community. Additionally, the existing practices of the government were criticized.

The main aim of the newspaper, needless to say, was to obstruct the *enosis*. Its approach, in this context, was the following: The status quo of Cyprus should be kept, or else the island should be annexed to Turkey. It is important to note that the annexation of Cyprus to Turkey was, in fact, more favorable option for *Halkın Sesi*. However, advocating the status quo was the only way to impede the *enosis* without annoying the Republic of Turkey. Indeed, “the Turkish Cypriot community [could not] have an aim different from Turkey”, and as long as Turkey did not “officially” request to annex Cyprus, “the Turkish Cypriots [could not] leave the motherland in a difficult position just for the sake of [their own] aim.”⁶⁹

The general attitude of *Halkın Sesi*, from the foundation of the newspaper to 1955, is summarized above. However, if we focus on the issues published in 1953, we can observe a (so-called) deviation from this attitude. The newspaper, in 1953,

⁶⁵ Government’s Unjustified Interference in Our Religious Affairs [Editorial, *Halkın Sesi*]. (1951, October 24). *Halkın Sesi*, p. 1. The Turkish version of the article was published in 25 October 1951.

⁶⁶ Unjustified Interference in Our Educational Affairs [Editorial, *Halkın Sesi*]. (1951, October 30). *Halkın Sesi*, p. 1. The Turkish version of the article is published in 31 October 1951.

⁶⁷ What is Wrong With Our Elementary Education [Editorial, *Halkın Sesi*]. (1951, November 13). *Halkın Sesi*, p.1. The Turkish version of the article was published in 14 November 1951.

⁶⁸ Will the Government Compensate the Turkish Community? [Editorial, *Halkın Sesi*]. (1952, April 25). *Halkın Sesi*, p. 1. The Turkish version of the article is published in 26 April 1952.

⁶⁹ Yeni Siyasîlerimiz BİRKAÇ SÖZ. (1949, August 18). *Halkın Sesi*, p. 1.

made propaganda for the annexation of Cyprus to the Republic of Turkey. The demands for the annexation were published as the headline⁷⁰, and it was proclaimed that the Turkish Cypriots could not tolerate the colonial administration anymore. Additionally, it was frequently uttered that the colonial administration had oppressed the Turks for years. However, when the mentioned propaganda is attentively examined, it can be seen that *Halkın Sesi* leaves the door open to settle with the government. Rejecting the continuation of the colonial administration, *Halkın Sesi* continued to apply to the government with the autonomy request for the Turkish community. In other words, the propaganda for annexation and the demands for autonomy of the community were combined with each other. This is one side of the issue. On the other side, when we look at the article initiating the annexation campaign, we can say that the campaign was started as parallel to the developments in the Middle East. In the mentioned article, it was said that:

Because of the unstable and complicated situation in the Mediterranean region, the future of Cyprus seems suspicious. Presumably, England is aware that the conditions of the Middle East and Mediterranean are now in a fragile phase. Under the current conditions, it is not possible for England to keep control of the Suez for a long time. Moreover, it is almost certain that administration of Cyprus will change in a distant or a close future.⁷¹

Under these circumstances, according to the article, Cyprus had to be given to the “strong castle of the Middle East”, namely to Turkey. When we combine the mentioned points, I think that the process beginning with 1953 does not refer to a radical change or a real deviation in the attitude of *Halkın Sesi* toward the status quo. On the contrary, with the annexation campaign in 1953, the main attitude of them became clearer: advocating the continuation of the status quo became explicitly “conditional” after 1953. It means that the message given to the colonial administration by *Halkın Sesi* was the following: If you continue to ignore our

⁷⁰ See the following issues of *Halkın Sesi*: 11 April 1953, 16 April 1953, 13 May 1953, 26 April 1953, 30 October 1953 and 22 May 1953.

⁷¹ Kıbrıs'ın Türkiye'ye İadesini İstiyoruz [Editorial, *Halkın Sesi*]. (1953, April 1). *Halkın Sesi*, p. 1.

demands, we will stir up trouble and the alliance between us against the *enosis* will be damaged. So, by looking at the issues of *Halkın Sesi* published in 1953, it is not plausible to claim that the main aim of the newspaper was to organize the Turks for the annexation of Cyprus to Turkey. There is another factor that prevents us from claiming it. From the year of its foundation (1942) on, *Halkın Sesi* treated the Lausanne Treaty as if it is a “heroic epic”.⁷² İnönü, in this narration, was the “hero”, and the 24th July (the date of Lausanne Treaty) was the day of freedom for the Turks.⁷³ Yet more, in 1948 and 1949, the anniversary of the treaty was headlined as something that should be celebrated. In 1953, the year of the annexation campaign, there was no change in the attitude of *Halkın Sesi* toward the treaty.⁷⁴ As is well-known, Lausanne is the treaty by which the borders of the Republic of Turkey were determined to a large extent. Moreover, with signing the Lausanne, Turkey officially accepted that Cyprus would remain under the rule of Britain. Besides, by relying on the Lausanne, Turkey did not “officially” back the Turkish nationalists of the Cyprus before 1955. Thus, when considering its “respectful” attitude toward the Lausanne; we cannot claim that the main aim of *Halkın Sesi* was to provide the annexation of Cyprus to Turkey. An editorial published in 1952 supports the claims mentioned above. In this article, it was accepted that the annexation of Cyprus to Britain was “officially” recognized as a result of the treaty; however, the writer argued that the treaty “guarantees all kinds of religious and national rights of the Turkish Cypriots”.⁷⁵ It means that Lausanne Treaty referred to a legitimate ground for the requests for the national and religious rights of the Turkish Cypriots, on one hand. On the other hand, the

⁷² See: Yavuz. (1942, July 24). 24 Temmuz 1923, Şerefli Bir Yıldönümü. *Halkın Sesi*, p. 1.

⁷³ Ankara’dan Lozan’a Tarihte 24 Temmuz 1923 [Editorial]. (1946, July 24). *Halkın Sesi*, p. 1.

⁷⁴ Yurdakul, T. (1953, July 24). Lozan Barış Antlaşması’nın 30. Yıldönümü. *Halkın Sesi*, p. 1.

⁷⁵ Lozan Anlaşması ve Kıbrıs Türkleri [Editorial, *Halkın Sesi*]. (1952, May 3). *Halkın Sesi*, p. 1.

nationalists were aware that Cyprus could not be annexed to Turkey as long as the treaty is valid.

3.3 The Nationalist Discourse of *Halkın Sesi* in Connection with Its Attitude toward the British Colonial Administration and the Republic of Turkey

In *Halkın Sesi*, the nation was primarily characterized with the nation state and her official ideology. For the Turks, this state was the Republic of Turkey and her ideology was Kemalism. Because the Turkish Cypriots stayed out of the political borders of “the homeland of the Turkishness”, the connection between the “Turkish state” and them was made through the proximity of blood. In this sense, they “acquired” the “natural citizenship” of the Turkish state, even if they did not have an official identity card. So, the Turkish Cypriots became subject to the principles of her constitution, and obedient to her official ideology without any legal obligation. In parallel, the word “Turk” became the synonym of the word “Kemalist”. As it was uttered in *Halkın Sesi*, it was impossible to identify a Turk with an ideology except Kemalism.⁷⁶ In this schema, Mustafa Kemal appeared as a spiritual leader, a prophet and even a divine/godlike figure. In parallel, the Republic of Turkey and Anatolia was named as the “Kaaba of the Turkishness”.⁷⁷ It means that the state with her lands and her ideologue was “divine”. This reminds the approach of Smith according to which the nationalism can be evaluated as a “secular religion”.⁷⁸ Smith says that “as a secular and political form

⁷⁶ See: İŇçiye Dikkat [Editorial]. (1948, June 3). *Halkın Sesi*, p. 1.

⁷⁷ In *Halkın Sesi*, it is possible to find a lot of examples in which the Anatolia is depicted as the “Kaaba of the Turkishness.” In parallel, after the corpse of Atatürk transferred to his mausoleum, *Halkın Sesi* proclaimed that the mausoleum of Atatürk was the “national Kaaba” of the Turks. According to this, in order to fulfill the “national duty”, every Turk has to visit Atatürk’s mausoleum, the national Kaaba, at least once in her/his life. See: Millî Kâbemiz [Editorial]. (1953, November 18). *Halkın Sesi*, p. 1.

⁷⁸ See: Smith, A. D. (2004). *Nationalism; Theory, Ideology, History*. Cambridge: Polity Press, pp. 33-36. & Smith, A. D. (2009). *Ethno-Symbolism and Nationalism; A cultural approach*. Oxon: Routledge, pp. 74-79.

of religion, nationalism elevates the people and citizens as the chief object of worship and ties them to the land of their ancestors and the shrines and landscapes of their saints and heroes.”⁷⁹ In the case of *Halkın Sesi* and its nationalist discourse, “Anatolia” was depicted as a place of worship and the Turks were the believers.

On the other side, Turkish Cypriots had “another” state, of which they had formal citizenship. However, because the state was under the control of the “foreign/non-Turkish” power, the obedience to it was not recognized as something “natural” but conditional and impermanent. In this context, it can be said that the state in Cyprus was secondary for the Turks *vis-à-vis* the “Turkish” state. Especially, the conditionality of the loyalty toward the colonial administration became more and more evident in 1950s. Until the 1950s, *Halkın Sesi*, which “generally” avoided confronting the colonial administration, and criticized it in a moderate manner, called the traditional Turkish leaders to account for the backwardness of the Turkish community. It was claimed that the traditional leadership did not reflect the complaints of the community before the colonial administration. Besides, they tried to conceal them.⁸⁰ However, as was mentioned before, it cannot be claimed that *Halkın Sesi* continually remained in a passive and silent position before the colonial administration. From the beginning of the 1950s on, the attitude toward the government became aggressive step by step, and the articles directly targeting the government started to be published:

We cannot elect the Mufti, he is appointed with his hands and feet chained by the government. We wanted to administrate our own schools; however, the government ... interfered again and it appointed a commission. Our Evkaf affairs are administrated according to old procedures. The government is trying to delude us

⁷⁹ Smith, A. D. (2009). *Ethno-Symbolism and Nationalism; A cultural approach*. Oxon: Routledge, p. 77.

⁸⁰ See: Küçük, F. (1948, June 27). Ekselâns Vali'nin Nutukları Münasebetiyle. *Halkın Sesi*, p. 1.

with the appointment of an unauthorized advisory board. Our civil code has not been enacted for six months; the government withholds even it from us.⁸¹

The offensive attitude toward the government became more and more prevalent especially in the issues published after 1952.

The unfair practices of the government toward the two communities were taking place at the center of the criticisms. *Halkın Sesi* was protesting the insensitivity of the colonial administration toward the demands of Turks for the autonomy of the community. In this context, it was repeatedly claimed that although the government allowed the Hellenes to administrate their own community, it interfered in all of the internal affairs of the Turks, and it did not recognize their rights. In addition to this, in the context of the unfair practices of the government, it was continuously uttered that in terms of the employment in the public offices, the government gave priority to the Hellenes. It is possible to find dozens of articles about this issue. In almost all of these articles, the “Turkishness” and the “ethnic identity” of the community was put forward as the reason of the downtrodden position of the Turks. According to *Halkın Sesi*, the “guilt” of the Turks was to be born as a Turk rather than a Hellene. In other words, the Turks, for *Halkın Sesi*, were facing with unjust practices of the government because of their ethnic identity. This was the reason why the British administrators frustrated the Turks and backed the Hellenes. Yet more, Yavuz in one of his articles claimed that the reason behind the unjust attitudes of the British chiefs toward the Turkish community was the Hellenization of the British officials.⁸² In this schema, the lower education level of the Turks in comparison to Hellenes was never mentioned. So, the following message was given to the Turkish community: We are victimized because we are Turks. Through this way, it was propagandized that

⁸¹ Hükûmetin Takip Etmekte Olduğu İki Tarafı Siyaset [Editorial]. (1950, October 25). *Halkın Sesi*, p. 1.

⁸² Yavuz. (1951, May 4). Ensemize Tokat, Belimize Kakma. *Halkın Sesi*, p. 2.

Turks were sharing the common fate and they had to unite against the unjust practices of the government. In fact, this was highly compatible with the *Halkın Sesi*'s main attempt of mobilizing the national identity.

Consequently, including the periods before 1950s, it can be said that *Halkın Sesi* almost never “unconditionally” and “totally” surrenders to the British colonial administration. However, its loyalty to the motherland was always unconditional: the motherland was the country which the Turks had to accept her as she was. According to this, the sovereign power in the motherland could not be criticized and falsified. The only thing that the Turks of the island had to do is to prove themselves in order to receive her support. In fact, the support of Turkey was required for finding a solution to the Cyprus dispute. Besides, the survival of the Turkish identity in the island depended on the assistance of Turkey. The only way to gain her support was to prove that the Turkish Cypriots were unconditionally loyal to Kemalism. Thus, all the efforts for getting Turkey involved in the Cyprus dispute were the efforts for proving the obedience of the Turkish community to the Republic of Turkey and its official ideology. In its attempt to attract Turkey's attention to the Cyprus dispute, this was the main component of the attitude reflected in the newspaper.

In parallel to this, all the groups coming from Turkey to the island were met with the articles which flattered and praised Kemalism and the Kemalist Republic with the exaggerated expressions. Likewise, when they went back to Turkey, *Halkın Sesi* was always publishing the articles written as the “pledge of allegiance”. In these articles, the writers were requesting the guests to make propaganda of the Turkish Cypriots in all possible scopes in Turkey.

Halkın Sesi perceived the groups coming from Turkey as an important opportunity to make contact with the “motherland”. So, it paid a special attention to convince them that the Turkish Cypriots were the members of the “Turkish nation”. By doing so, it tried to persuade them to deal with the conditions of the Turkish

Cypriots. The first large scale visit to Cyprus from Turkey took place in 1948. Initially, the arrival of the group was publicized with the following words: “We sincerely salute and say welcome to Ataturk’s own children who come from the big city bequeathed by Sultan Mehmed the Conqueror to his brave race.”⁸³ From their arrival to their return, almost all the details about their visits were published in the newspaper. Additionally, different articles were published to attract their attention. When they returned to Turkey, Dr. Küçük penned an extremely “agitative” article: “As soon as you set foot on the safe coasts [of Turkey], send the regards of 80 thousand orphan Turks... And repeat without hesitating: The blood of the Turkish Cypriots is pure and genuine and it is the same as the blood of their brothers/sisters living within the national borders. The essence is identical.”⁸⁴ So, the relationship between Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots, based on the proximity of blood, was tried to be transformed into a “natural alliance” between them. This had been the case, in all visits made to Cyprus from Turkey. Indeed, it can be said that it availed from these visits in the sense of making the visitors sensitive to the issue and making them part of it. For instance, Hasene Ilgaz, the deputy of the Republican People’s Party, published a book detailing the visit and touching upon the Cyprus issue after she went back to Turkey. This book was published by “*Kadın Gazetesi*” (The Newspaper for Women), the owner of which was Iffet Halim Oruz. Oruz was one of the visitors. In parallel to this, the journalist Rakım Çalapala published a series of articles in *Hürriyet* after he returned to Turkey. Another example is the visit of the students of Ankara University in 1950. The group members, when they came back to Turkey, organized a conversation with the Prime Minister Şemsettin Günaltay and the President of the Republic İsmet İnönü. Additionally, they made a conference about

⁸³ İstanbul Öğretmenleri Aramızda [Announcement]. (1948, July 24). *Halkın Sesi*, p. 1. In 1950, when a group of students from Ankara University came to the island, the leading article written about this visit had the following title: “Atatürk’ler İnönü’ler Hoşgeldiniz” (Welcome, Atatürks and İnönüs!). See: Atatürk’ler İnönü’ler Hoşgeldiniz [Editorial]. (1950, February 19). *Halkın Sesi*, p. 1.

⁸⁴ Küçük, F. (1948, August 6). Bizden Ayrılıyorken. *Halkın Sesi*, p. 1.

the Cyprus dispute, in Ankara. In fact, the majority of the first group was mainly composed of the teachers. The members of the second group were the students of the faculty of agriculture. It means that there was no political aim of the mentioned visits. In parallel, almost none of the visitors had political concerns or motivations about the Cyprus dispute. For instance, what is learned from the mentioned book of Hasene Ilgaz is that İffet Halim Oruz was added to the list of the visitors by Ilgaz without notice.⁸⁵ However, all the visitors were encircled by the members of the Turkish community headed up by the nationalist cadres and they became subject to an intensive nationalist propaganda. As a result, step by step, they were attracted to the issue. In this propaganda, the nationalist cadres treated the visitors as if they were the heroes of a victorious army. For instance, one visitor journalist, İffet Halim Oruz, said that “we came to your island as an army of culture; but, you are sending us to the motherland like a national army.”⁸⁶ In parallel, the following words of Ilgaz, indeed, summarize this process:

In all the places that we were taken, we witnessed to the infinite respect of the Turkish people to Atatürk, and their faith and loyalty to İnönü. (...) In every place, ... they talked about independent Turkey which achieved the reforms. They talked about Atatürk, İnönü and about the Turkish army of heroes. They talked about our ancestors, our Turkishness and victories. (...) They rightly demanded a lot of things from us. We as the children of the same race, same blood, same aim and same lands responded them and promised to transmit their demands to the greatest Turk [İnönü] for the survival and development of Turkishness.⁸⁷

When she went back to Turkey, she kept her promise and made a conversation with İnönü, informed him about Cyprus. In 1950, when Ilgaz and Oruz visited Cyprus for the second time, the same process was repeated. They were met as if they were the heroes. Their visits were headlined and their photos were published in the front page of *Halkın Sesi*.

⁸⁵ Ilgaz, H. (1949). *Kıbrıs Notları*. İstanbul: Doğan Kardeş Yayınları, p. 11.

⁸⁶ Ilgaz, H. (1949). *Kıbrıs Notları*. İstanbul: Doğan Kardeş Yayınları, p. 152.

⁸⁷ Ibid, p. 67.

Halkın Sesi did not confine itself with making propaganda to the visitors coming from Turkey to the island. It also played an active role in organizing and propagandizing the visits to Turkey from the island, which aimed to make contact with the official and non-official political circles and to make the “motherland” part of the issue. A clear example can be given from the year 1950. As known, in 1949, Cyprus Church decided to organize a plebiscite ascertaining the demands for the *enosis*. In the same year, Dr. Küçük and the cadres around him organized a demonstration against the plebiscite and the *enosis*. After the demonstration, in 1950, a committee representing the Turkish community was sent to Turkey. *Halkın Sesi*, being careful about the balances between Turkey and Britain, followed the visit step by step, and supported it with the articles published in the newspaper. Dr. Küçük, as being the editor in chief of *Halkın Sesi* and the head of the committee, penned an article about their visit. The article, indeed, was the summary of the way followed by *Halkın Sesi* in getting Turkey involved in the Cyprus dispute: While trying to make Turkey the part of the dispute, it was important not to attract the reaction of the colonial government because Turkey treated the Cyprus issue in a cautious manner. It was important for Turkey not to annoy Britain when the world politics was under fragile conditions. In this sense, Dr. Küçük’s stance was compatible with the attitude of Turkey toward the issue. In the mentioned article, there were two main consistent points. First of all, Britain should be convinced that the committee has no “furtive” aims. The second point, parallel to the first one, is that the visit was not a “political” but an economic and cultural one: “We have no hidden purpose. As we said before, we never acted and will never act out of the frame of the friendship between Turkey and Britain.”⁸⁸ In parallel, the Cyprus Turkish Cultural Association, providing the contact between the committee and the political circles in Turkey, published an announcement after the committee returned to the island, and underlined that the aids from Turkey to Turkish Cypriots, would be provided within the frame of the friendship between

⁸⁸ Küçük, M. F. (1950, January 13). Kıbrıs’tan Ankara’ya. *Halkın Sesi*, p. 1.

Britain and Turkey.⁸⁹ So, the aim of the visits to Turkey was to attract Turkey's attention to the Cyprus dispute without annoying colonial government and without leaving Turkey in a difficult position before Britain.

In addition to all these mentioned above, *Halkın Sesi* was giving message not only to the colonial administration and Turkey but also to the Greek Cypriots. That is, *Halkın Sesi* was trying to add "Turkey" to the "Greek Cypriots versus Turkish Cypriots" equation. By this way, it was attempting to intimidate the Hellenes demanding the *enosis*. For this aim, it was written that the official authorities made conversations with the Turkish Cypriot committee, and they listened to the "complaints" of the Turks of the island. The same attitude can be seen in the published news and articles about the demonstrations about the Cyprus issue made in Turkey. The militarist expressions used in these demonstrations were headlined and the following message was given to the Hellenes: the *enosis* issue is much harder than you suppose. For instance, when the mentioned committee was in Ankara, a demonstration was made. The following words from the speech of an agitator were quoted: "The Turk feeds with the war rather than bread./ In war, face of the Turk is refreshed."⁹⁰ The news about the demonstration was headlined with the similar expressions. The heading of the newspaper dated the 20th January 1950 was the following: "The Youth Once Again Declared that They Will Never Back Down from Cyprus at the Cost of Their Blood". On the following day, a similar heading was used: "The Youth Says 'Lieutenant General Kanath! We are Ready to Make War'". In all the news, the following message was given: the youth in Turkey is ready for a war against the Hellenes.

⁸⁹ See: Kıbrıs Türk Kültür Derneği Yönetim Kurulu. (1950, February 3). Kıbrıs Türk Kültür Derneği'nden Sayın Kıbrıs Türk Halkına [Announcement]. *Halkın Sesi*, p. 1.

⁹⁰ See the issue of *Halkın Sesi* dated 1950, January 20. Likewise, the demonstration dated 1951, February 21 is published in *Halkın Sesi* with putting the following placards forward: "Cyprus is nearer than Korea", "The Turkish bayonet is the best ointment, the most frightening gun!" See: Gülen, A. (1951, March 2). Ankara Mitinginin Tefsilatı: Miting Nasıl Yapıldı ve Gençlik Kıbrıs Hakkındaki Hissiyatını Nasıl Belirtti? *Halkın Sesi*, p. 1, 4.

As a matter of fact, the stance of “the Turkish youth” toward the Cyprus dispute can be seen clearly because they made demonstrations, meetings and they published declarations; however, the official attitude of the Republic of Turkey was ambiguous. It is not possible to infer from the news what the “concrete” results of the conversations made between the ministers and the Turkish Cypriot committees were. Even if the reverse was tried to be claimed, it can be understood that Turkey was not voluntary to become a part of the dispute. Indeed, it is known that even if she did not totally reject concerning with the dispute, she avoided becoming a part of it until 1954-5. For instance, in 1949, the visit of a group of university students from Turkey to Cyprus was obstructed by the official authorities.⁹¹ Again, in 1950, “Kıbrısı Koruma Derneği” (an association founded by the Turkish Cypriots living in Turkey) was obliged to be closed.⁹²

In *Halkın Sesi*, another component of the efforts of making Turkey part of the issue was that it published countless articles speaking directly to the Turkish official authorities. Additionally, through its reporter in Turkey, *Halkın Sesi* tried to ascertain the views of the political organizations about the Cyprus dispute.⁹³ Although there were many articles directly addressed to the Republic of Turkey, we can confine ourselves with two of the examples which were “perfectly”

⁹¹ It can be useful to keep in mind that 1949 is the year in which the demonstrations about the Cyprus issue started to increase. For instance, in the first months of this year, the demonstrations were made in many cities such as Konya, Malatya, Kayseri, Antakya.

⁹² The declaration, written after the abolishment of the association, was published in *Halkın Sesi* on the front page. In the declaration, Turkey was criticized because she impeded the activities of the association for the sake of the friendship between Turkey and Greece. See: Dağılan Kıbrıs'ı Koruma Cemiyeti'nin Neşrettiği Tebliğ [Announcement]. (1951, January 12). *Halkın Sesi*, p. 1.

⁹³ See: Oktay, A. (1949, January 14). Demokrat Parti'nin Kıbrıs Meselesi Hakkındaki Görüşü. *Halkın Sesi*, p. 1. & Oktay, A. (1949, January 15). Kıbrıs Meselesinin Türk Milletvekilleri Arasındaki Akisleri. *Halkın Sesi*, p. 1. & Bağlum, K. (1949, January 29). Millet Partisi Genel Başkanı'nın Kıbrıs Hakkındaki Görüşü. *Halkın Sesi*, p. 1. & Oktay, A. (1949, February 5). Büyük Mütefekkir Samet Ağaoğlu diyor ki: Kıbrıs'ın Bağlanacağı Tek Yer Anadolu Olabilir. *Halkın Sesi*, p. 1.

summarizing the issue. The first one is the open letter written to Celâl Bayar, the president of the Republic of Turkey:

All of us, the youngsters, the olds and the children, are hoping and waiting for the consolation from Çankaya which is under the shadow of the great Atatürk. (...) The hero of the democracy and freedom, the strongest advocate of the human rights Bayar! We rely on you with our body and soul, we beg: Rescue us. We are sure that you will not leave us to the hands of the cruel.⁹⁴

Two days after the publication of this letter, another one was published. The second one addressed Menderes, the prime minister of Turkey. The similar “agitative” expressions were used. *Halkın Sesi* “begged” Menderes not to leave the Turkish Cypriots to the “age-old enemies” of the Turks.⁹⁵ Both of the letters ended with the expressions of unconditional and perpetual loyalty of the Turkish Cypriots to Turkey.

Under the light of the information given above, it can be said that the ground for the involvement of Turkey in the issue was tried to be prepared by *Halkın Sesi*. However, Turkey did not become an active party to the issue until 1955.

3.4 The *Enosis* as It was Perceived by *Halkın Sesi*

The main aim of the process of getting Turkey involved in the Cyprus issue was to obstruct the *enosis*, as was mentioned. So, it is inevitable for us to talk about what the *enosis* means according to *Halkın Sesi*. In other words, the main question of this section is the following one: Although *Halkın Sesi* did not “flatly” object to be ruled by the British colonial administration, why did it oppose to the *enosis*? Before giving an elaborated answer to this question, we have to note that, in the long run, the desire of *Halkın Sesi* was not the perpetuity of the colonial

⁹⁴ Türkiye Cumhurbaşkanı Sayın Celâl Bayar’a Açık Mektup [*Halkın Sesi*]. (1951, March 27). *Halkın Sesi*, p. 1.

⁹⁵ Türkiye Başbakanı Sayın Adnan Menderes’e Açık Mektup [*Halkın Sesi*]. (1951, March 29). *Halkın Sesi*, p. 1.

administration. It means that *Halkın Sesi* advocated that the island should be given back to the original owner, sooner or later. As was mentioned earlier, advocating the status quo was a conjunctural approach for *Halkın Sesi* and it was the “lesser evil”. According to Dr. Küçük, even if it is true that the Cyprus government deprives the Turkish Cypriots of their rights, and administers them as if they are the “slaves”, “it is [also] true that the Cyprus [colonial] government is more sane and humane than the [probable] Greek administration.”⁹⁶

Initially, the *enosis* was perceived as a “threat” by *Halkın Sesi* because Greece was perceived as an adversary. It was frequently reminded that Greece treated the Turks, living in Crete and Western Thrace, in a hostile manner. *Enosis*, in this sense, was considered as a life-threat for the Turkish community. According to *Halkın Sesi*, the Turks living within the borders of Greece were subject to defamation, torture and unfair practices of the government.⁹⁷ In parallel, if the *enosis* was realized, the Turkish Cypriots would be “slaughtered” as the Turks of Crete and Western Thrace.⁹⁸ In order to support this judgment, from time to time, news and articles about the bad conditions of the Turks of the Western Thrace and the oppression they faced with were published in the newspaper. In this context, the national fanaticism of the Hellenes was emphasized, and they were introduced as the categorical sworn enemies of the Turks.⁹⁹ This was one of the dimensions of the opposition of *Halkın Sesi* against the *enosis*. Other than this, for *Halkın Sesi*, the annexation of Cyprus to Greece meant the direct transmission of the political chaos in Greece to the island. According to this, the civil war in Greece would reverberate in Cyprus and the island would turn into a pool of blood. At the end, the victims would be the Turks because whoever would be the winner of this war,

⁹⁶ Küçük, F. (1950, November 23). Macera Peşinde Koşmuyoruz. *Halkın Sesi*, p. 1.

⁹⁷ Yavuz. (1954, January 15). Bize Gene Martaval Okuyorlar. *Halkın Sesi*, p. 2.

⁹⁸ Örek, O. (1949, September 3). Hayatın Değeri. *Halkın Sesi*, p. 1.

⁹⁹ See: Yavuz. (1954, February 3). Dimyat’a Pirince Giderken. *Halkın Sesi*, p. 2.

the loser would be the Turkish community. Accordingly, Turks had no chance of living neither under the power of the fanatic nationalist Church and its supporters nor under the authority of the communists. Moreover, the reflection of the political chaos to the island would cause the consolidation of the communism which had already found many followers. So, strengthening communism would threaten the peace and democracy not only in the island but also in the whole world.

At this point, it is required to evaluate the *Halkın Sesi*'s approach about communism because this was one of the most important elements of the propaganda against *enosis*. Also, it was one of the most influential components of the construction of the “Turkist”/nationalist discourse. Moreover, “the threat of communism” provided a “legitimate base” for the Turkish nationalists in sense of calling Turkey for her intervention in the Cyprus issue.

Communism and “Turkishness” was located in the opposite poles by *Halkın Sesi*. The main reason behind this attitude was that, as it was mentioned before, *Halkın Sesi* perceived the Turkish ethnic identity through the Republic of Turkey and Kemalism. According to its perception, it was impossible to be Turk and the communist at the same time¹⁰⁰: communism was the rejection of the “noble Turkish blood” and the “greatness of Atatürk”¹⁰¹. In fact, the communism was outlawed in the “homeland of the Turkishness”, “because it [was] the biggest enemy of our nationality and religion”¹⁰². According to Mustafa Kemal, it had to

¹⁰⁰ In the editorial dated 3 June 1948, it is said that: “The one, member of the pure Turkish race, cannot be a communist and cannot be identified with different ideologies except Kemalism.”

¹⁰¹ *Kemalizm Nedir?* [Editorial]. (1948, June 9). *Halkın Sesi*, p. 1. In another article, it is said that “Because the Turks of Cyprus are absolutely faithful to the ideals of Atatürk and they are full-blooded Turks, it is impossible for them to be communist. Therefore, if there is someone both a Turk and communist, his/her Turkishness should be questioned.” See: Türk İşçiler Birliği'nin Komünistlerin Elinde Alet Olarak Kalması Şayanı Teessüftür [Editorial]. (1950, August 27). *Halkın Sesi*, p. 1.

¹⁰² Yavuz. (1951, December 15). *Yoldaşların Kirli Tacı*. *Halkın Sesi*, p. 2.

be stamped out; so, eradicating the communism should be recognized as “the primary national duty of the [Kemalists]”.¹⁰³ The communist “Turks”, several in number, were the traitors, and the lackeys of the Hellenes.¹⁰⁴ Moreover, the communists were the degenerated individuals who were not worthy of being part of the motherland and the Turkish community of the island: They put the community to shame. In parallel to this approach, when the visitors came from Turkey to the island, it was tried to be proved that the communism was not something widespread among the Turks, and the communists were only several in number. *Halkın Sesi*, from time to time, “warned” the community for making them wakeful against this “big threat” and advised that the members of the community should disclose and insult the communists. The attitude of *Halkın Sesi* toward communism in connection with Kemalism and the ethnic identity was like that. However, communism, besides its categorical animosity with Kemalism, was evil by definition. Communism, for *Halkın Sesi*, was the struggle of making all the states the servants of Russia. Communist regimes were the regimes of terrorism and the communists were the cruel terrorists: “In their sight, the children, mother, father, brother and sister have no value. They can strangle their own children for the approval of Stalin.”¹⁰⁵ So, in this drawn schema, as long as the propaganda against *enosis* was based on anti-communism, the realization of the *enosis* referred to the domination of the categorical “enemies” of “Turkishness” in the island and a terrorist ideology, which aimed to make the world a battleground, immediately beside Turkey. Therefore, it was impossible for Turkey to ignore the *enosis* and the communism threat inherent to it:

¹⁰³ Yavuz. (1949, March 26). Teraziden Bir Mektup. *Halkın Sesi*, p. 1.

¹⁰⁴ See: Varoğlu, M. (1948, July 10). Türklerde Komünist Var mı? *Halkın Sesi*, p. 1. In the article, Mim Varoğlu says that there is no “Turkish communist” in the island, however, there are several persons, unfortunately, have the name of “Turk”, and they are the “political servants” of the Greek communists. For him, it is not required to recognize them as the members of Turkish race.

¹⁰⁵ Küçük, F. (1948, July 22). Ah Bu Komünizm. *Halkın Sesi*, p. 1.

Cyprus is closer [to Anatolia] than Korea. (...) *Mehmetçik* [the Turkish soldiers], battling against the red imperialism like a hero in Korea which is a distant country, does not allow the same herd of the red monsters [the communists] to slaughter his own blood brothers.¹⁰⁶

Another component of the propaganda against the *enosis* was the bad economic conditions of Greece. According to *Halkın Sesi*, the annexation of Cyprus to Greece, which was economically wretched,¹⁰⁷ would cause spreading the miserable economic conditions to the island; so, the economic situation of Cyprus would deteriorate.¹⁰⁸ Under the current circumstances of Greece, the *enosis* would be nothing but becoming a part of an economic depression.

On the other side, according to *Halkın Sesi*, the political attitude of the Hellenes toward the Turks indicated the “probable” results of the *enosis* and the difficulties that the Turks would face with. It means that, according to *Halkın Sesi*, although the *enosis* had not been realized yet, the Hellenes treated the Turks in an unjust and hostile manner, and they tried to oppress the Turks. For instance, the Turks, living within the borders of the municipalities administrated by the Hellenes, could not benefit from the public services of the municipalities because they were deprived of the services by the Greek mayors.¹⁰⁹ So, if the *enosis* was realized, the Hellenes, who had a hostile attitude toward the Turks, would make use of all possible ways to send the Turks from the island.¹¹⁰

¹⁰⁶ İlhak Kahrolacaktır [Editorial, *Halkın Sesi*]. (1952, February 8). *Halkın Sesi*, p. 1.

¹⁰⁷ Yavuz. (1951, October 7). Başka Gaile Yok! *Halkın Sesi*, p. 2.

¹⁰⁸ Yavuz. (1951, March 24). Tehlikeli Bir Oyun. *Halkın Sesi*, p. 2.

¹⁰⁹ In this particular subject, the articles written by Yavuz can be seen. Yavuz, in many articles of him published in *Halkın Sesi*, argues that the Hellenes of the island act in accordance with their national fanaticism in all spaces of their life without exception.

¹¹⁰ See: Yavuz. (1952, January 25). Ellerin Fırsat Geçerse. *Halkın Sesi*, p. 2. & Yunan Mezaliminin Belirtileri [Editorial, *Halkın Sesi*]. (1952, February 3). *Halkın Sesi*, p. 1.

Still, the propaganda against the *enosis* would find its most ardent cause in the answer to the following question: Who has the right to rule the island? In other words, who is the “original” owner of Cyprus? According to the articles published in *Halkın Sesi*, the island belongs to the Turks and Turkey: “Cyprus is Turk... She is Turk from top to bottom. ... With her history, with her geographical location and her political importance, Cyprus is a valuable part of Turkey... which cannot be abandoned to the foreign hands.”¹¹¹ Because it was conquered by the Turks, it must be ruled by them.¹¹² In parallel to this approach, *Halkın Sesi*, for the first time, headlined the expressions about the conquest of Nicosia in September 9, 1948.¹¹³ The date of it was declared as an important national day. 1953 was the year in which the importance of the “9th September” was underlined more than other years. In September 9, 1953, the newspaper was published colorful which is an exceptional application for *Halkın Sesi*. This attitude was parallel to the change in the attitude of *Halkın Sesi* toward the Cyprus government. The right to rule the island which emerged from the conquest of it, first of all, was invalidating the claims of Hellenes. It was being uttered that while the ancestors of the Turks were martyred for conquering the island, the Hellenes never paid any price for Cyprus.¹¹⁴ Moreover, the Turks ruled the island for 300 years, but the Hellenes never had authority over it. For a long time, the motto “Cyprus is Turk” had been voiced against the Hellenes, but the colonial administration was not the target of it. In other words, the motto was saying that “Cyprus cannot be Greek”, as Kızılyürek states.¹¹⁵ However, in 1950s, in parallel to the change in the attitude of

¹¹¹ Enosis Aleyhtarlığı Davasında Kıbrıs Türklüğü Tam Bir Birlik Hâlinindedir [Editorial]. (1951, March 22). *Halkın Sesi*, p. 1.

¹¹² Küçük, M. F. (1949, September 9). 9 Eylül. *Halkın Sesi*, p. 1.

¹¹³ Nicosia was conquered by the Ottomans in September 1570.

¹¹⁴ Bayraktaroğlu, T. (1954, March 4). Ohi! Kirye Makarios, *Halkın Sesi*, p. 1.

¹¹⁵ Kızılyürek, N. (2005). *Milliyetçilik Kısılcacında Kıbrıs*. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, p. 232.

Halkın Sesi, the claim of “Cyprus is Turk” started to be used against the colonial administration, too. The following expressions quoted from *Halkın Sesi* directly speak to the colonial government:

We came to this land shouting its Turkishness ... as the CONQUERORS. (...) Our ancestors conquered this island through their legendary power...¹¹⁶

[Britain] must leave the lands belonging to another nation [Turks] ... and she must draw back to her own borders. Although they have no right on the island, how can they want to rule Cyprus which was conquered at the expense of the life of the thousands of Turkish martyrs?¹¹⁷

This turn in the Turkish Cypriot nationalist discourse should also be related to the leadership struggle within.

3.5 The Struggle for the Leadership: *Halkın Sesi* versus *İstiklâl* or Dr. Küçük versus Necati Özkan

As stated before, the period between 1948 and 1955 refers not only to the process of involvement of Turkey in the Cyprus dispute, but also to the determination of the Turkish Cypriot leadership. Additionally, for the leaders of the Turkish community, the tradition of relying on the support of Turkey rather than Turkish Cypriot people has started in this period. In this part of the chapter, the struggle between Dr. Küçük and Necati Özkan for the leadership of the Turkish community will be elaborated. However, in order to provide a ground to discuss the issue, I will take the similarities and differences between their political attitudes into consideration. All the analysis will be based on the relevant articles and news published in *Halkın Sesi* and *İstiklâl*.

To begin with, there was no fundamental/irreconcilable difference between them in terms of their political stances and objectives. First of all, both of them could be

¹¹⁶ Türk Kıbrıs'ın Özlemi [Editorial]. (1953, October 30). *Halkın Sesi*, p. 1.

¹¹⁷ Ertem, H. (1953, April 10). İngilizler ve Kıbrıs. *Halkın Sesi*, p. 1.

identified as Kemalist/nationalist and anti-communist, although the ethnic expressions were sharper and anti-communist propaganda was more prevalent in Dr. Küçük's *Halkın Sesi* in comparison to Özkan's *İstiklâl*. The primary aims of both sides were to make propaganda against the *enosis*, and to advocate the autonomy of Turkish Cypriot community. These aims were also parallel to the aims of the Kemalist cadres of 1930s. In the perspectives of both, having the support of Turkey was vital for the resolution of the Cyprus dispute and for the survival of "Turkish identity" in the island.

The first difference between them is seen in their attitude toward the colonial administration. For Necati Özkan and *İstiklâl*, collaborating with the colonial government and the Republic of Turkey were equally important; however, for *Halkın Sesi* and Dr. Küçük, allying with Turkey was more important than the former. The difference between their approaches was mainly based on the different evaluations of the political conjuncture. That is to say, even if both Dr. Küçük and Necati Özkan had the same political aims, the former revised the way/strategy in parallel to the changes in the political atmosphere of the island and the world: the more Britain got into trouble in the Middle East, the more *Halkın Sesi* took an irreconcilable position toward the government. However, from the beginning of publication of *İstiklâl*, Necati Özkan followed a more "moderate line" in his relations with the Cyprus government: It was always important for Necati Özkan not to contradict with Britain. This is the first difference between them.

On the other side, Dr. Küçük acted coordinately with the Turkish Cypriot nationalist cadres of Cyprus Turkish Cultural Association (Kıbrıs Türk Kültür Derneği) settled in Turkey. The contacts between Dr. Küçük and the official and non-official circles in Turkey were made by the agency of them. However, Necati Özkan was alone in his political activities and in his attempts for contacting with Turkey. Additionally, he was in a struggle not only with Dr. Küçük but also with

the mentioned cadres. Özkan and the other writers were publishing articles in *İstiklâl* against them, and *İstiklâl* was rejecting the intervention of the non-official circles from Turkey to the internal affairs of the Turkish community.

The process of the struggle between two leaders was based on defamation, disinformation and denouncement rather than the political arguments. One of the most important components of the struggle was character assassination. For instance, when Necati Özkan talked about his sacrifices for the people, Dr. Küçük wrote about his attempts to sell the cigarettes produced in his factory in the political meetings of Cyprus Turkish Minority Association (KATAK). For Dr. Küçük, Özkan was the politician who transforms his political activities into economic interest.¹¹⁸ On the other side, for instance, Mapolar, being a former friend of him, denigrated Dr. Küçük in his articles.¹¹⁹ Moreover, both sides slandered each other via distorting the articles published in their newspapers. On one side, for *Halkın Sesi*, Necati Özkan was a pro-British politician, and a “servant” of the colonial administration. On the other side, in *İstiklâl*, Dr. Küçük was depicted as a provocateur who was trying to undermine the Colonial administration, and a liar who was trying to persuade the Republic of Turkey to his lies through the agency of his allies in Turkey. Although the expressions were “partially” reflecting the truth, they were exaggerated.

The main argument of the both sides was that they were the real representatives of the Turkish community and they had a great public support behind them. While *İstiklâl* were publishing the names registered in the *İstiklâl* Party, *Halkın Sesi* were publishing the names resigning from it. While one side claimed that hundreds of

¹¹⁸ See: Küçük M. F. (1951, March 3). Muazzam Servetini Sarf Ettüğinden Mısırlıoğlu Müşteki. *Halkın Sesi*, p. 1.

¹¹⁹ See: Mapolar, H. A. (1950, June 28). Bir Geçmişin Acı Hikâyesi I. *İstiklâl*, p. 1. & Mapolar, H. A. (1950, June 29). Bir Geçmişin Acı Hikâyesi II. *İstiklâl*, p. 1, 3. & Mapolar, H. A. (1950, July 1). Bir Geçmişin Acı Hikâyesi III. *İstiklâl*, p. 1, 3. & Mapolar, H. A. (1950, July 2). Bir Geçmişin Acı Hikâyesi IV. *İstiklâl*, p. 1, 3.

people attended their meeting, other side asserted that nobody joined. Each side pursued two main aims in this competition. Initially, both sides were trying to ruin the others' reputation before people and to attract them to the "stronger side". The second aim was to give message to Turkey that they were the representatives of the Turkish community in the Cyprus issue. For instance, in 1949, when Necati Özkan went to Turkey in order to make contact with the official political circles, *Halkın Sesi* claimed that Necati Özkan did not have the authority to represent Turkish community. Besides, the telegrams were sent to Turkey and it was requested that they did not take Necati Özkan seriously.¹²⁰ The Cyprus Turkish Cultural Association was also involved in this issue and it lobbied against Necati Özkan. In this attempt to undermine the efforts of Özkan, the things advocated by him was not important: Necati Özkan had no authority to make contacts in Turkey in the name of the Turkish Cypriots, Turkey should not recognize him as a representative of them, the Turkish community should not believe in his words. The same attitude was valid for *İstiklâl*. When Dr. Küçük and his followers prepared to go to Turkey in 1949, *İstiklâl* made propaganda in order to impede them. Many articles were published in this line.¹²¹ The main expression about the visit was that the group did not have authority to represent the Turkish Cypriots.

Both sides struggled for being approved by Turkey as the leadership of the Turkish Cypriots. In this struggle, as mentioned before, Dr. Küçük was in a more

¹²⁰ See: Kıbrıs Türk Siyasî Kurumlarının Protestosu. (1949, June 8). *Halkın Sesi*, p. 1. For the notification of Cyprus Turkish Cultural Association which states that Necati Özkan does not represent the Turkish Cypriot community, see the issue of *Halkın Sesi* dated 1949, June 9.

¹²¹ See: Mapolar, H. A. (1950, January 8). Temsilî Salâhiyet İddiası. *İstiklâl*, p. 1. & Bizi Temsil Edemezler [Editorial]. (1950, January 10). *İstiklâl*, p. 1 & Varoğlu, M. (1950, January 12). Üçler Ne Yapabilecekler. *İstiklâl*, p. 2. & Mapolar, H. A. (1950, January 14). Hazırlıksız Temaslar. *İstiklâl*, p. 1. After the visit, *İstiklâl* insistently claimed that the visitors became unsuccessful. For some examples, See: Varoğlu, M. (1950, February 3). Neler Getirdiler. *İstiklâl*, p. 2. & Özkan, N. (1950, February 4). Zaman ve Hadiseler Haklı Olduğumuzu İspat Etmiştir. *İstiklâl*, p. 1. & Kim Kimi Avutuyor 1 [Editorial, *İstiklâl*]. (1950, February 14). *İstiklâl*, p. 1. & Kim Kimi Avutuyor 2 [Editorial, *İstiklâl*]. (1950, February 15). *İstiklâl*, p. 1. & Kim Kimi Avutuyor 3 [Editorial, *İstiklâl*]. (1950, February 16). *İstiklâl*, p. 1.

advantageous position because he was supported by the politically active cadres of Cyprus Turkish Cultural Association. Additionally, Dr. Küçük was introducing the support given by the non-official circles as if it was the “official” support of the Republic of Turkey:

The citizen! (...) Be aware that Cyprus [National] Turkish Union Party¹²² is the only party that you have. In the affairs of the community, Ankara and İstanbul will recognize only this party. Be sure that all our requests from Turkey and Cyprus government can be made only by the agency of it.¹²³

In fact, what “İstanbul” and “Ankara” meant were not the official authorities of Turkey but the Cyprus Turkish Cultural Association (Ankara) and Cyprus Schools Alumni Association (Kıbrıs Okullarından Yetişenler Cemiyeti/İstanbul). Cyprus National Turkish Union Party (Kıbrıs Millî Türk Birliği Partisi) was founded through the suggestions and the efforts of these two; and this was not binding for Turkey and the Cyprus government. On the other side, the allies of Dr. Küçük were acting in parallel to him. For instance, after the visit of the delegation led by Dr. Küçük, Cyprus Turkish Cultural Association published a declaration. In this declaration, the list of the official and non-official institutions that the delegates made contact was published; and it was declared that the address, in the affairs of the Turkish community, would be only the Federation of Turkish Cypriot Associations.¹²⁴ According to it, the consensus was achieved on this issue with the ministers of Turkey.

A similar situation was seen in 1952 when the regulations were made in the education law. In 1952, the colonial administration prepared a law draft. According to it, the government would economically support the secondary

¹²² The leader of it was Dr. Küçük.

¹²³ Kıbrıs Millî Türk Birliği [Announcement]. (1949, November 9). *Halkın Sesi*, p. 1.

¹²⁴ See: Kıbrıs Türk Kültür Derneği Yönetim Kurulu. (1950, February 3). Kıbrıs Türk Kültür Derneği'nden Sayın Kıbrıs Türk Halkına. *Halkın Sesi*, p. 1.

schools. Dr. Küçük and *Halkın Sesi* opposed to the draft, and made an intensive propaganda against it. They tried to prevent the secondary schools from accepting it because, for *Halkın Sesi*, the new draft was aiming to control the secondary schools under the guise of economic aids. The newspaper spoke to people as the following: “Dear citizen! New Law for secondary schools is a trap for eradicating your freedom and personality. Warning: Do not walk into the trap!”¹²⁵ As it was mentioned, for *Halkın Sesi*, through this law, the government was trying to enslave the secondary schools: It was a “death-warrant”.¹²⁶ For Necati Özkan and *İstiklâl*, on the contrary, the new law would support the development of the schools; and the government had no hidden aim as enslaving them. The day when the law was declared as a “death-warrant” in *Halkın Sesi*, the title of the editorial of *İstiklâl* was the following: “New Draft will Prevent the Teachers From the Big Injustice”¹²⁷ After the draft passed into law, the commissions of Famagusta and Paphos Secondary Schools rejected to receive economical aid from the government.¹²⁸ Hereupon, Federation of the Turkish Cypriot Organizations, Cyprus National Turkish Union Party and the allies of Dr. Küçük in Turkey went into action. As a result of their efforts, the economic aid was provided from Turkey to the schools that rejected the new law. It was decided that this aid from Turkey would be distributed by the agency of the mentioned Federation.¹²⁹ So, by the efforts of the allies in Turkey, the group led by Dr. Küçük got an advantageous and prestigious position in comparison to *İstiklâl*. First of all, by the aids provided

¹²⁵ *Halkın Sesi*, 26 July 1952.

¹²⁶ Ölüm Fermanı I [Editorial]. (1952, August 6). *Halkın Sesi*, p. 1.

¹²⁷ Özkan, N. (1952, August 6). Yeni Layiha Okul Öğretmenlerini Büyük Haksızlıktan Kurtaracaktır! *İstiklâl*, p. 1.

¹²⁸ *Halkın Sesi* headlines the resolution of the Secondary Schools Commissions of Paphos and Famagusta. According to *Halkın Sesi*, these commissions through rejecting the official aids of the Cyprus Government prevent the national culture of the Turkish community from the government’s attempts for enslaving them. See the issues of 1952, September 21 and 1952, September 23.

¹²⁹ See: (1952, December 19). *Halkın Sesi*.

by Turkey, the schools acting in accordance with *Halkın Sesi* gained a privileged position in the eyes of the “motherland”, and they won her approval. Secondly, because the aids provided from Turkey were distributed through the Federation, it was addressed by Turkey as a political authority in sense of the affairs about the community. In 1953, when the second part of the aids sent to the island, for the second time, the Federation was addressed as the leadership of the Turkish community by the Cyprus Turkish Cultural Association again. This situation displeased Necati Özkan, and he penned different articles criticizing this issue. According to Özkan, the Turkish Cyprus Cultural Association deceived the Republic of Turkey and caused some schools’ to be deprived of economic aids; moreover, the Association had no authority to interfere the educational affairs of Cyprus.¹³⁰ In 1953, Necati Özkan debated with Burhan Işın, the Cyprus consul of Turkey, concerning the mentioned aids. The main reason behind this debate was that Işın, for Özkan, acted in accordance with the Association and the group led by Dr. Küçük. Moreover, according to Özkan, he misinformed Turkey in sense of the educational affairs of the Turkish community. The last frontier opened by Özkan caused the political elimination of him because, by 1953, Özkan had no contact with Turkey; besides, he was in conflict with different cadres which were in contact with the political authorities of Turkey. Additionally, the dispute between Necati Özkan and Burhan Işın was transformed into the “Necati Özkan versus Turkey” equation and Özkan was pushed into the position of being an opponent to the motherland.

3.6. Conclusion

Under the light of the evaluations made above, it can be said that *Halkın Sesi* in its propaganda made for making Turkey part of the issue made use of all possible ways, and followed a balanced line in its attempts. On one side, it acted in

¹³⁰ Özkan, N. (1953, January 20). Anavatan Hakikati Bilmelidir. *İstiklâl*, p. 1.

accordance with the colonial government in the context of getting the Turkey's support; on the other side, it struggled against the government in order to provide autonomy for the Turkish community. At the same time, it carried out a struggle with the other Turkish nationalists for getting the leadership of the community. As a result of *Halkın Sesi's* attempts, the Cyprus dispute, the fate of the Turkish community and its own political future became dependent on the support of Turkey. That is to say, it established its political agenda on the basis of taking Turkey's support, and the mobilization of Turkish Cypriots behind a "national" cause day by day became an effect of it. In a sense, *Halkın Sesi* conducted a double project of generating the active consent of Turkish Cypriots for the emerging nationalist politics and the active support of Turkey in which the former became secondary. It can be said that *Halkın Sesi* succeeded in attracting Turkey's attention to the Cyprus dispute and preparing the ground in Cyprus for the involvement of Turkey. Moreover, *Halkın Sesi* can also be regarded as successful in leading Turkish community towards autonomy by challenging colonial administration.

CHAPTER 4

***HÜRRİYET*: AN IMPORTANT COMPONENT OF THE NATIONALIST PROPAGANDA FOR THE CYPRUS CONFLICT**

4.1 Introduction

In the introduction chapter, it was stated that there were two main agents of the process of taking Turkey into the Cyprus conflict. One of them was, as detailed in the previous chapter, *Halkın Sesi*, and the other one was *Hürriyet*. The newspaper provoked the masses into mobilizing for the Cyprus conflict and more importantly prepared the ground for the official nationalist theses of the state, before Turkey became a part of the conflict. So, it is inevitable for us to focus on it.

In this chapter, *Hürriyet* with the articles published in it will be analyzed, in the context of the mentioned process. For this aim, firstly, the position of Turkey toward the Cyprus dispute, from the establishment of the Republic to 1960, will be analyzed. Next, general features of *Hürriyet* and the conditions it was born into will be detailed. These sections will provide us a ground for making a discussion about the attitude and position of *Hürriyet* toward the Cyprus dispute. The analyses about it will be mainly based on the editorials and the articles of its owner and editor in chief, i. e. Sedat Simavi.

4.2 Changing Attitudes of Turkey toward the Cyprus Conflict

As it is known, Turkey, after the Lausanne Treaty until the mid-1950s, generally remained silent toward the Cyprus dispute and did not develop an official attitude. Initially, it is possible to say that she followed a “peaceful” foreign policy after the mentioned treaty. This was a result of the necessity of a “calm environment” for the consolidation of the new regime¹³¹ and the achievement of the reforms and the

¹³¹ Fırat, M. (2000). Türkiye'nin Kıbrıs Politikaları (1945-1960). *Toplumsal Tarih*, 81, p. 20.

economic development.¹³² In other words, for the survival of the newly established state there should be a “peaceful” atmosphere not only within the borders of the state, but also in other places out of her territories. Moreover, except Mosul and Hatay, Turkey had no objection about its territories determined by the Lausanne Treaty. Yet more, Turkey perceived the dissident states against “Versailles Order” and their “revisionist” foreign policies as a threat against her own territories. This was the reason forced Turkey to strive to establish a “Balkan Pact” in cooperation with Greece and establish relatively good relations with Britain in 1930s although the Mosul issue was resolved in contrary to her will in 1926.¹³³ On the other side, even the Hatay issue could not be resolved before 1939; this did not cause Turkey to pursue an aggressive foreign policy. Under these conditions, even if she was not totally indifferent toward the Cyprus issue, it was not a major component of her foreign policy. That is to say, the developments about the issue were observed by the Republic of Turkey; however, it was highly important for her not to confront Britain.¹³⁴ So, she avoided taking part in the issue.

In the context of Cyprus and the Turkish Cypriots, another reason of the silence of Turkey was that Kemalist nationalism, as being different from Pan-Turkism or Turanism, limited itself with focusing on the “national territories”.¹³⁵ Kemalist nationalism had no political project or aim about the Turks remaining out of her

¹³² Gönübol, M. & Sar, C. (1996). Lausanne’dan Sonra Türk Dış Politikası. In *Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası (1919-1995)*. Ankara: Siyasal Kitabevi, p. 60.

¹³³ Ibid, pp. 99-106, 118-119.

¹³⁴ Gürel, Ş. S. (1984). *Kıbrıs Tarihi (1878-1960) Kolonyalizm, Ulusçuluk ve Uluslararası Politika (Vol.1)*. İstanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, p. 184.

¹³⁵ Kızılyürek, N. (2005). *Milliyetçilik Kıskaçında Kıbrıs*. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, p. 170-171.

political borders, beyond encouraging them to migrate to Anatolia.¹³⁶ This official attitude was valid for Cyprus and Turkish Cypriots.

In the years of the World War II, the main aim of Turkish foreign policy was that: As long as her territories were in safety, Turkey would definitely not enter into the war because she neither laid claim to the lands out of her territories nor had the colonies that she tried to defend.¹³⁷ At the end of the first year of the World War II, through signing an alliance agreement with France and Britain in order to provide the security of the Mediterranean region, Turkey became closer to the Western Bloc than the Axis Alliance, but she mainly kept her impartial position.¹³⁸ On the other side, she was both economically dependent on Germany¹³⁹ and militarily weaker than her. Turkey acted in accordance with the changing conditions and balances of the war and made serious effort to remain out of it under pressures coming from the two sides.¹⁴⁰ Under these circumstances, it was impossible for Turkey to involve with the Cyprus dispute.

After the World War II, the main determinant of the foreign policy of Turkey was the cold war. Turkey totally identified her own “national” interests with the interests of the Western Bloc. In this period, from the perspective of Turkey, it was highly important not to disturb Britain and the US; and her relations with Greece were compatible with this attitude: Turkey abstained from any clashes

¹³⁶ Evre, B. (2004). *Kıbrıs Türk Milliyetçiliği: Oluşumu ve Gelişimi*. Lefkoşa: Işık Kitabevi Yayınları, p.24.

¹³⁷ Koçak, C. (1985). İkinci Dünya Savaşı Yıllarında Cumhuriyetin Barış Politikası. *Yapıt*, 8, p. 19.

¹³⁸ Hatipoğlu, M. M. (1997). *Yakın Tarihte Türkiye ve Yunanistan (1923-1954)*. Ankara: Siyasal Kitabevi, pp. 220-222.

¹³⁹ Fırat, M. (2000). Türkiye'nin Kıbrıs Politikaları (1945-1960). *Toplumsal Tarih*, 81, p. 23.

¹⁴⁰ Koçak, C. (1985). İkinci Dünya Savaşı Yıllarında Cumhuriyetin Barış Politikası. *Yapıt*, 8, p. 26.

between her and Greece; so, Cyprus issue was not one of the determinants of her foreign policy.¹⁴¹

Turkey changed her attitude toward the Cyprus dispute after the application of Greece to the United Nations with self-determination request for Cyprus. Firstly, the following argument was defended: The status quo in Cyprus should be preserved; otherwise the island should be given back to Turkey. In times, this attitude changed and it was advocated that the right of self-determination should be recognized for both communities separately. It meant that Cyprus should be divided into two. This was the basis of the famous “partition thesis” (*taksim tezi*) of Turkey and the Turkish nationalist cadres of Cyprus. At the end of the 1950s, “partition thesis” gave place to advocacy of a “united” Cyprus, i. e. the Republic of Cyprus. As is well-known, in the following years, this approach failed and Cyprus was divided into two. The Republic of Cyprus has maintained its legal position on the Southern Cyprus, and on the Northern part, a “state” which lacked international recognition was established.

4.3 The General Features of *Hürriyet* and Historical Background of Its Foundation

Hürriyet was founded by Sedat Simavi in 1948. The foundation of it should be evaluated in connection with two important developments parallel to each other and the changes in the international political conjuncture. These were the abolition of Turkish Press Association (Türk Basın Birliği) and Turkey’s transition to the multi-party system. The first years of foundation of *Hürriyet* corresponded to the period in which the press in Turkey became “partially” free in comparison to the war years, at least for a short time. In parallel, in this period, the press had a chance to evaluate Cyprus dispute as it will be detailed in the following sections: *Hürriyet*, for instance, advocated the arguments different from the official ones.

¹⁴¹ Fırat, M. (2000). Türkiye’nin Kıbrıs Politikaları (1945-1960). *Toplumsal Tarih*, 81, pp. 23-24.

However, for now, it is sufficient to keep in mind that the approach of it should not be evaluated as an opposition of the “free press” against the government. Rather, it should be evaluated as a different manifestation of a paradigm commonly shared by both the state and *Hürriyet*, that is, as an intervention from within. What these developments provided was a relatively free scope for these kinds of different manifestations. This will be explained later. However, it is required to touch upon the abolition of the Turkish Press Association and Turkey’s transition to the multi-party system, within the context of our issue, first.

To begin with, the Turkish Press Association was an institution, which all the journalists had to be affiliated with in order to get the permission for pursuing their profession: the association had the authority to distribute the yellow press cards, “the only valid document in the sight of the state”, and disentitle the journalists.¹⁴² It was difficult for a journalist to be accepted as a member by the association; however, it was possible to be dismissed through ungrounded reasons.¹⁴³ Because the association was under the control of the government, it was quite difficult for the newspapers to publish critical articles about the practices of the government. Additionally, because it did not represent the organized power of the journalists, it did not deal with the vocational rights of them: the main function of the association was to control whether the journalists were performing their profession in conformity with the government’s will or not.¹⁴⁴ The oppressive nature of the association caused the discontents to come to surface in 1940s. In these years, some journalists went into the effort of organizing the colleagues against the practices of the association and the current administration: The aim was to take the control of it, and to deal with the issues

¹⁴² Faik, B. (2001). *Matbuat Basın Derkeeni... Medya*. İstanbul: Doğan Kitap, p. 61.

¹⁴³ Bil, H. (1976). *Kıbrıs Olayı ve İcyüzü*. İstanbul: İtimat Kitabevi, p. 13.

¹⁴⁴ See Gökman, M. (1970). *Sedat Simavi, Hayatı ve Eserleri*. İstanbul: Apa Ofset Basımevi, s. 59-61.

about social security of the journalists and freedom of the press.¹⁴⁵ Simavi, upon the request of them, led the dissident cadres. First, the control of Istanbul branch, and then the central office of the association were captured via elections. In İstanbul and Ankara, respectively, Sedat Simavi in place of Hakkı Tarık Us and Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın in place of Falih Rıfki Atay were elected. Especially, the overthrow of Falih Rıfki was highly important because he was the editor in chief of a newspaper named *Ulus* which was, as Öymen stated, under the control of Republican People's Party, the party in power.¹⁴⁶ In other words, elimination of Falih Rıfki meant "redemption of the journalism from the tutelage of the authority of Republican People's Party."¹⁴⁷

After the opponent cadres led by Simavi got the authority of the association, they attempted to send Falih Rıfki to the disciplinary committee with claiming that he penned degrading articles about the new executive staff.¹⁴⁸ The meaning of this attempt was that: Falih Rıfki could have been removed from his job by the new administrators through applying to the statute of which they were complaining in the past. On the other side, removal of Falih Rıfki would create an image that the government could not preserve even its own writer. So, as a result of these developments, in 1946, the government abolished the association by enacting law. However, it is required to note that the abolishment of the association cannot be explained only through the dispute mentioned above. In fact, 1946 is the year of Turkey's transition to multi-party system. It means that the Republican People's Party (RPP) was in need of the support of media more than ever; so, the relevant law, abolishing the Turkish Press Association, was one of the laws enacted by

¹⁴⁵ Ibid, p. 60.

¹⁴⁶ Öymen, A. (2010). *Değişim Yılları*. İstanbul: Doğan Kitap, p. 154.

¹⁴⁷ Faik, B. (2001). *Matbuat Basın Derkeken... Medya*. İstanbul: Doğan Kitap, p. 61.

¹⁴⁸ Bil, H. (1976). *Kıbrıs Olayı ve İçyüzü*. İstanbul: İtimat Kitabevi, p. 24.

RPP shortly before the proclamation of the early election, in order to reduce the oppression over the press.¹⁴⁹ In parallel, 50th article of the Press Law which gave authority to the government to abolish the newspapers was repealed.¹⁵⁰

After the abolishment of the Press Association, the cadres headed up by Simavi established the Journalists Association of Turkey (Türkiye Gazeteciler Cemiyeti). Simavi remained as the head of it from 1946 to 1949.¹⁵¹ In the first congress in 1949, even if he elected as the chairman of the association, none of the candidates nominated by him could be elected to the board of directions; so, Simavi resigned from the chairmanship.¹⁵²

On the other side, 1946 was the year of the establishment of Democratic Party, and, as mentioned before, Turkey's transition to the multi-party-regime. Moreover, the World War II had been finished in this period. There were two main reflections of these developments. Firstly, during the war years, because the newspapers were under the strict control of the government, the foreign news and the articles about the foreign policy in parallel to the official attitude were dominant; after the war, domestic news and the articles about the internal policy began to take place in the newspapers¹⁵³. The abolishment of the Press Association and reduction of the oppressions over the newspapers were also influential, as mentioned above. Secondly, political mobilization increased with the establishment of Democratic Party. I will explain the evaluations above.

¹⁴⁹ Topuz, H. (2003). *II. Mahmut'tan Holdinglere Türk Basın Tarihi*. İstanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, pp. 184-185.

¹⁵⁰ Ibid, p. 185.

¹⁵¹ Gökman, M. (1970). *Sedat Simavi, Hayatı ve Eserleri*. İstanbul: Apa Ofset Basımevi, p. 99.

¹⁵² Faik, B. (2001). *Matbuat Basın Derkeen... Medya*. İstanbul: Doğan Kitap, p. 64.

¹⁵³ Öymen, A. (2010). *Değişim Yılları*. İstanbul: Doğan Kitap, p. 159.

During the war years, indeed, the oppressions over the press were incredibly heavy. Hıfzı Topuz narrates those years as the following:

Turkey was out of the war; however, in November 1940, the state of emergency was declared in İstanbul. The government used the unlimited authority until the end of war. The freedom of press was not a matter of discussion in this period. The cabinet, when found it necessary, could close any newspaper, for any period of time. Its decisions were final; neither the parliament nor the council of state could interfere in (or change –R.) the decisions. The press head office informs the newspapers via telephone about the decision. (For instance,) the newspaper has been closed. Afterward, the letters are sent to the prime minister. He is requested to show maturity and forgive the newspaper. One day, an amnesty is granted. It is said to the owner of the newspaper that “You are allowed to [continue to] publish your newspaper. This is the general atmosphere of the mentioned period.”¹⁵⁴

In the mentioned period, all things, from the size of the letters used in the newspaper to the words took place in the news and the subjects taken into consideration, were under the control of the state.¹⁵⁵ After the war, the oppressions were reduced. Secondly, because the internal politics became more diversified, the environment became more suitable to publish different newspapers. In fact, the citizens got involved with the politics more than ever.

Hürriyet was born into these conditions, and in a short time, it became a mass circulation newspaper. The increase in its circulation can be explained with taking two important components into consideration. First of all, as it can be seen in the context of the Cyprus dispute, *Hürriyet* was a daily speaking to and provoking the nationalist sensibilities of the masses.¹⁵⁶ By this way, *Hürriyet* became an important focus of the nationalist sensibilities.

¹⁵⁴ Topuz, H. (2003). *II. Mahmut'tan Holdinglere Türk Basın Tarihi*. İstanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, pp. 169-170.

¹⁵⁵ *Ibid*, pp. 167-168.

¹⁵⁶ See: Hür, A. (2010, July 19). *Hürriyet Formülü: Ege'de ve Kıbrıs'ta Huzuru Boz, Tiraj Al. Taraf*.

On the other side, Simavi was a highly experienced journalist that had worked in the press from the years of the World War I on. So he knew not only what kind of issues should be handled in the newspaper but also which materials should be used in the presentation of them, in order to attract the masses. In almost all the sources written on *Hürriyet*, the following evaluation is made: *Hürriyet*, in the first years of its foundation, attached importance to the visual materials more than other newspapers published in the same years. The newspaper with its photographs and page layout was highly different and attractive, in comparison to others.¹⁵⁷ Yet more, according to Öymen, even the round and small letters (rather than the rigid and big ones) used in its logo made it visually more attractive than the other newspapers.¹⁵⁸ In the press circles, the predominant use of the visual material in *Hürriyet* was considered as something weird, and *Hürriyet* was seriously criticized early on. It was claimed that *Hürriyet* attached importance to the form rather than the content, so it would not survive in the market. In parallel to the criticisms about *Hürriyet*, Bedii Faik, after saying that the design of *Hürriyet* was highly attractive, states that: “The content of *Hürriyet* was conjuring up the silence of a graveyard ..., and we could not find even an article making sound. Everyone with her/his beautiful clothes took place in different parts of its pages, but they were [staying] (...) without making a move...”¹⁵⁹ Although this criticism is exaggerated, one of the reasons behind it is the following: as stated by Öymen, Simavi was originally coming from the magazine publishing, and he carried the features inherent to magazines to the newspaper.¹⁶⁰

¹⁵⁷ Zincirkıran, N. (1994). *Hürriyet ve Simavi İmparatorluğu*. İstanbul: Gençlik Yayınları, pp. 3-4.

¹⁵⁸ Öymen, A. (2010). *Değişim Yılları*. İstanbul: Doğan Kitap, p. 162.

¹⁵⁹ Faik, B. (2001). *Matbuat Basın Derkeken... Medya*. İstanbul: Doğan Kitap, p. 244.

¹⁶⁰ Öymen, A. (2010). *Değişim Yılları*. İstanbul: Doğan Kitap, p. 160.

Another difference of *Hürriyet* was that it was the only newspaper assigning a full page for the sports news.¹⁶¹ *Hürriyet*, for the first time, reached a seriously high circulation through publishing news and interviews with the numerous photographs about the London 1948 Olympics in which the Turkish wrestlers got eleven medals. In the period that the television did not come to Turkey, *Hürriyet* seriously attracted the masses' attention as a result of its visual richness.¹⁶² The circulation of it gradually increased after 1948.

Under the light of the information given above, it can be claimed that the main "target audience" of the newspaper was the masses, rather than the intellectual circles because using the well-selected photographs about different issues provides simple and direct explanations about them. In other words, the visual-based representation of the news makes an "effortless" reception available to the readers. The same attitude can also be seen in Simavi's writings. He wrote very short and simple articles, and did not make an effort to make elaborative analyses. Moreover, this was a conscious attitude: "I am not writing my articles for my friends. My reader is a hawker in Samsun, a station officer in Adana, an officer of the land office in İzmir."¹⁶³ The same attitude was valid for the other articles and news taking place in *Hürriyet*, and as mentioned, it cannot be denied that this feature of it had a serious impact on its circulation.¹⁶⁴

Mass orientation of *Hürriyet* was important in the context of the Cyprus issue because, by this way, the nationalist propaganda about it was carried to the masses. However, it is important to note that, the high circulation is not definitely

¹⁶¹ Güreli, N. (2010). *Dünden Bugüne Babiâli*. İstanbul: Heyamola Yayınları, p. 47.

¹⁶² Zincirkıran, N. (1994). *Hürriyet ve Simavi İmparatorluğu*. İstanbul: Gençlik Yayınları, p. 5.

¹⁶³ Gökman, M. (1970). *Sedat Simavi, Hayatı ve Eserleri*. İstanbul: Apa Ofset Basımevi, p. 81.

¹⁶⁴ Topuz, H. (2003). *II. Mahmut'tan Holdinglere Türk Basın Tarihi*. İstanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, p. 187.

equal to the power of influencing and mobilizing the masses. It means that the effect of Cyprus propaganda of *Hürriyet* cannot be explained only through its circulation. In other words, the relation between the circulation and the power of propaganda should be taken into consideration reciprocally, and as a dynamic and circular process: *Hürriyet* speaks to and provokes the existing nationalist sensitivities, in turn it attracts the readers' attention; and it starts to give direction to these sensitivities.

4.4 The Position of Simavi and *Hürriyet* in the Context of the Cyprus Conflict

It was mentioned that Turkey became a part of the Cyprus dispute in the mid-1950s. In this section, before detailing the role and position of *Hürriyet* and Sedat Simavi, I find it necessary to touch on the process of involving Turkey in the dispute. The following question can be the starting point: What was the reason behind the attempt of Turkey to lay claim to Cyprus and take a position about the issue? Can it be explained through the pressure of public opinion over the government? In my opinion, the answer to this question is negative. It is true that the efforts of *Hürriyet* and the other newspapers were highly influential in sense of creating and molding public opinion about the issue; and until 1954, many demonstrations about the dispute were made by the people and declarations were published in Turkey, as it was in Greece. However, it was Britain which made the Republic of Turkey a party to the dispute. Moreover, the sensitivities of the public opinion were manipulated by the state which acted in accordance with the attitude determined by Britain, after her involvement in the issue. In fact, the "sensitivities" of the people was organized via the non-official channels through using the arguments in conformity with the colonialist Britain. I will explain it after a short parenthesis.

Greece, until 1954, did not carry the issue to the international platform because she tried to resolve it through making bilateral negotiations with Britain; and when she understood that Britain would not accept to settle the issue with Greece, she

applied to the UN with self-determination request for Cyprus in order to force Britain to negotiate with her about the future of the island.¹⁶⁵ This was both because of the “inactivity” of Turkey and the “implicit” support of the US. Even if the US withdrew its support from Greece after Britain was persuaded to pull back from the Suez; it was too late, and the Cyprus dispute became an international issue as a result of the application of Greece to the UN.¹⁶⁶ Britain, in order to evade the probable international pressures, put the Republic of Turkey in place.

When the issue was debated in the UN, Turkey advocated the theses parallel to Britain.¹⁶⁷ Moreover, when the members of a committee representing the Federation of Cyprus Turkish Associations came to Ankara after the application of Greece to the UN, Celâl Bayar, Adnan Menderes and Fuat Köprülü recommended them to support Britain; and, in London and the US, the members advocated that Cyprus had to remain under the rule of Britain.¹⁶⁸ Bayar said to the Turkish Cypriot leaders that “Make request for the continuation of the British rule in the island. Do not give the journalists a clue (about the issue –R.)... Take side with the British, otherwise they will fall.”¹⁶⁹ In the London Conference organized by Britain in order to obscure her responsibilities in the dispute, Turkey again defended the theses highly compatible with Britain. Here, I want to touch on an interesting issue. As stated by Hikmet Bil, when the Cyprus issue was being

¹⁶⁵ Gürel, Ş. S. (1985). *Kıbrıs Tarihi (1878-1960) Kolonyalizm, Ulusçuluk ve Uluslararası Politika*. (Vol. 2). İstanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, p. 92-93.

¹⁶⁶ Gürel, Ş. S. (1985). *Kıbrıs Tarihi (1878-1960) Kolonyalizm, Ulusçuluk ve Uluslararası Politika* (Vol. 2). İstanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, pp. 93-94. The details about the issue can be read from the mentioned source in the pages between 78 and 101.

¹⁶⁷ See Gürel, Ş. S. (1985). *Kıbrıs Tarihi (1878-1960) Kolonyalizm, Ulusçuluk ve Uluslararası Politika*. (Vol. 2). İstanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, pp. 97-100.

¹⁶⁸ Evre, B. (2004). *Kıbrıs Türk Milliyetçiliği: Oluşumu ve Gelişimi*. Lefkoşa: Işık Kitabevi Yayınları, pp. 121-122.

¹⁶⁹ Kızılyürek, N. (2005). *Milliyetçilik Kıskaçında Kıbrıs*. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, p. 234.

debated in the UN, the representative of Turkey, Sarper, read the leaflet prepared by the “Kıbrıs Türktür Komitesi” (the nationalist committee which was advocating the motto “Cyprus is Turk”), almost word by word.¹⁷⁰ It means that the theses officially advocated by Turkey were the theses of the non-official nationalist cadres of that period. On the other side, these were parallel to those of Britain. So, the result which can be inferred from here is the following: Until 1954, the theses of the (so-called) dissident nationalist cadres were highly compatible with the Western paradigm. After 1954, Turkey “adopted” them because it was understood that they were “free of risk” in terms of the relations between Turkey and Britain. Moreover, after 1954, Britain allowed Turkey to advocate these theses in the international arena because she attempted to show that even if she withdrew from Cyprus, the dispute would not be resolved without taking Turkey into consideration. In other words, Britain, by organizing the London Conference, tried to give the following message to the international public opinion: There are two main irreconcilable sides in the Cyprus dispute, and they are Turkey and Greece; so, it is not a problem between the Greek Cypriots and the British colonial administration.¹⁷¹ So, the main reason behind Turkey’s involvement in the issue was the consent of Britain. “Pressure of the public opinion” was not the main motivation. As Tanıl Bora said, the Cyprus dispute as a “national cause” was an “imported product”.¹⁷² However, from 1948 to the mid-1950s, the arguments about the issue were propagandized by the nationalist circles. So, after 1954, the “invisible” alliance between the nationalist cadres and Britain became apparent, and the state participated in this alliance. In other words, the so-called “dangerous” attitude toward the Cyprus dispute abruptly became the official

¹⁷⁰ Bil, H. (1976). *Kıbrıs Olayı ve İçyüzü*. İstanbul: İtimat Kitabevi, p. 106. Bil says that Sarper read the words “the Greek Cypriots” as “the Levantines”. This was the only difference between the mentioned leaflet and Sarper’s speech.

¹⁷¹ Gürel, Ş. S. (1985). *Kıbrıs Tarihi (1878-1960) Kolonyalizm, Ulusçuluk ve Uluslararası Politika*. (Vol.2). İstanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, p. 107.

¹⁷² Bora, T. (1995). Türk milliyetçiliği ve Kıbrıs. *Birikim*, 77, p. 21.

attitude of the state after 1954. From 1954 forward, all the theses about the Cyprus dispute “evolved” in conformity with this alliance. The meaning of the “evolution” is that: from 1955 to 1959, only within four years, three different and seemingly incompatible arguments¹⁷³ were defended by the nationalists and the state. These can be respectively summarized as the following: Firstly, in the years of 1955-56, it was advocated that Cyprus should remain as the colony of Britain; secondly, in 1957-59, the “partition project” was put forward and the demonstrations were made with the famous slogan of “partition or death!”; then, in 1959-60, it was defended that a (so-called) independent republic should be established in Cyprus.¹⁷⁴ The “manoeuvre capacity” of the movements organized from bottom up was not so high; however, it was possible for a state to manipulate the masses through using the available apparatuses, as long as the conditions were convenient. In other words, the masses claiming that “the status quo should be preserved in Cyprus” and finding this claim sufficient to mobilize along the years between 1948 and 1954-55, cannot be organized again and again in different positions. However, if all these positions refer to a paradigm, evolution of them within the same paradigm will not be so difficult as long as it is supported by the state.

With keeping the abovementioned evaluations in mind, we can start to analyze *Hürriyet* in its relation to the Cyprus dispute. In *Hürriyet* and the articles on the Cyprus dispute penned by its editor in chief, the main argument based on a nationalist rhetoric was the following: The status quo in Cyprus should be preserved, i.e. Cyprus should remain as a colony of Britain; otherwise, if there will be a change in the status quo, Britain should give the island back to Turkey. As was mentioned above, this would also be the first official thesis of Turkey before

¹⁷³ It is indubitable that all of the arguments were totally compatible with the paradigm of anti-communist bloc.

¹⁷⁴ See: Fırat, M. (2000). Türkiye'nin Kıbrıs Politikaları (1945-1960). *Toplumsal Tarih*, p. 81.

it evolved to the partition thesis. The first component of the nationalist rhetoric used in Simavi's articles and *Hürriyet* was the following argument/slogan: "Cyprus is Turk." This argument, primarily, meant that "Cyprus cannot be Greek"¹⁷⁵, and it was prone to take steps backward toward Britain. The second component was anti-Hellenism. It means that the language used in the articles about the Cyprus dispute was substantially anti-Hellenic. Another one, in parallel to the international and domestic political conjuncture, was anti-communism. In other words, the Cyprus propaganda of *Hürriyet* was combined with the propaganda of anti-communism. Lastly, it can be said that when making propaganda about the Cyprus dispute, *Hürriyet* regarded the dynamics of the internal politics. In this line, it struggled with Minister of Foreign Affairs Fuat Köprülü when promoting the Prime Minister Adnan Menderes.

4.4.1 "Cyprus is Turk"

In the articles taken place in *Hürriyet*, the main slogan was that "Cyprus is Turk". This slogan was based on the presumption that the Turkish Cypriots and the Turks of Turkey were identical. At the same time, Cyprus was conquered by the Turks. The latter was factual. It means that Cyprus was conquered and ruled by the Ottomans; and the Ottomans gave the island to Britain temporarily: "Cyprus is a Turkish land which is more sacred than the mother's milk, and irrigated by the Turkish blood. Its greens can only be shaded by the Turkish flag."¹⁷⁶ On the other side, in *Hürriyet*, the former argument, according to which the Turks of Cyprus and Turkey are identical, was taking place as a premise. According to this, the Turkish Cypriots were the members of Turkish race. This issue, for *Hürriyet*, was evident: there was no need to prove it or convince the readers. In parallel, Rakım Çalapala, a journalist of *Hürriyet*, dealt with the Cyprus issue in a series of articles

¹⁷⁵ Kızılyürek, N. (2005). *Milliyetçilik Kıskaçında Kıbrıs*. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, p. 232.

¹⁷⁶ Sedat Simavi, "Kıbrıs ve Muhalefet", *Hürriyet*, 13 October 1953.

within the frame of “Turkish Cypriots’ longing for their blood-brothers.” For instance, according to the article of Çalapala titled as “Kıbrıslılar Milliyetlerine Çok Bağlı” (Turkish Cypriots are Very Loyal to Their Nationality), Turkish Cypriots were extremely loyal to the “glorious Turkish flag” and they were crying because they “have stood apart from the motherland like the orphans, for seventy years.”¹⁷⁷

Even if the motto/slogan of “Cyprus is Turk” was the main component of *Hürriyet*’s nationalist discourse, it took a step backward toward Britain: It emerged against the Hellenes and Greece; and it receded toward Britain. The main reason behind this was the pragmatic approach of *Hürriyet*. In other words, the attitude of *Hürriyet* toward the Cyprus dispute was highly compatible with the international conjuncture, and it avoided producing an anti-British discourse. So, the predominant nationalist perspective of its articles did not transform into an anti-colonialist discourse against Britain. Even in the article, in which the “end of colonialism” was proclaimed, the name of Cyprus was not mentioned. Moreover, Britain was not criticized because of the colonialist politics of her; on the contrary, she was congratulated because she noticed that the colonialism could not be resumed anymore.¹⁷⁸ In parallel to this “timid” attitude toward Britain, Cyprus, which was Turk from head to toe and could not be left to Greece, was left to the “courtesy” and “gentlemanliness” of the “British”. The harsh language used against Greece became moderate before Britain. Even if it is stated that Cyprus was given to Britain temporarily and the island “should” be given back to Turkey in the case of a change in status quo, this was not evaluated as a compulsion that Britain “had to” comply with, but as a requirement of the “famous English gentlemanliness” and friendship between Turkey and Britain: “It seems to us that the British can in no way unjustly give the island, which they got temporarily, to

¹⁷⁷ Rakım Çalapala (1948, August 25). Kıbrıslılar Milliyetlerine Çok Bağlı. *Hürriyet*.

¹⁷⁸ Müstemleke Politikasının İflâsı [Editorial, *Hürriyet*]. (1949, April 16). *Hürriyet*, p. 1.

the Greeks. Both the friendship between [Turkey and England], and the English gentlemanliness impede this.”¹⁷⁹ In another article dated 23 October 1948, it said that: “There is a unique owner of Cyprus; and it is England; and England does not have such a rude character to give [Cyprus], which she took as a present from Turks, to Greeks. The famous gentlemanliness of the British impedes this attitude.”¹⁸⁰ In parallel to the quotations given above, Simavi states that when the time is ripe, “we will politely apply to the generosity of the British” for the Cyprus issue.¹⁸¹ He hoped that Britain would show the same complaisant attitude in Cyprus issue as was done in Trieste.¹⁸² So Cyprus, which is “historically”, “ethnically”, “geographically” and “economically” Turk¹⁸³, became subject to the benevolence of Britain. Reading the abovementioned series of the articles of Çalapala, titled as “Kıbrıs Ne Alemde”, the one can see the parallel approaches. Turkish Cypriots, in the words of Çalapala, was “crying” with the words “Motherland, motherland!”¹⁸⁴; however, it was impossible to hear from them even a single negative word against Britain, because “the English proved how good colonialists they [were].”¹⁸⁵ In this period, the same paradoxical attitude can also be seen in the rhetoric applied by other Turkish nationalists. Looking at the Cyprus Declaration of the National Youth Committee dated July 1952, the one can observe the following: Even if it was stated that England was a colonialist state,

¹⁷⁹ Kıbrıs’tan Gelen Telgraf [Editorial, *Hürriyet*]. (1949, December 15). *Hürriyet*, p. 1.

¹⁸⁰ Kıbrıs Türkleri [Editorial, *Hürriyet*]. (1948, October 23). *Hürriyet*, p. 1.

¹⁸¹ Simavi, S. (1951, April 13). Kızkulesini Satan Adam. *Hürriyet*, p. 1.

¹⁸² Simavi, S. (1953, October 10). Trieste ve Kıbrıs. *Hürriyet*, p. 1. Trieste was under the control of American and British Allied Military Government in the years between 1945 and 1954. Simavi’s article underlined the new decision of the US and Britain to give Trieste back to Italy.

¹⁸³ Simavi, S. (1953, September 24). Türk Kıbrıs. *Hürriyet*, p. 1.

¹⁸⁴ Çalapala, R. (1948, August 26). Kralların ve Zenginlerin Sayfiye Yeri. *Hürriyet*.

¹⁸⁵ Çalapala, R. (1948, August 29). Yeşil Adada Köy, Köylü ve Polis. *Hürriyet*.

and Cyprus was under the invasion of it; what was mainly criticized was not the British colonialism but the reckless attitude of Britain toward the Hellenes. In parallel, even if it was claimed that Cyprus was a Turkish land, the primary addressee of this claim was not the British imperialism, but the Greek imperialism which was defined as a “Balkans-style minor imperialism”.¹⁸⁶

In short, *Hürriyet*, which shared the same paradigm with the official politics, had an attitude towards Britain which was compatible with that paradigm. After the World War II, what shaped the foreign policy of Turkey was the “Cold War”, and Turkey took place on the side of Western Bloc against the Soviet Union. Additionally, it was also important for her to take the economic assistance from the US through putting her strategic location forward¹⁸⁷. In this context, the position of *Hürriyet* corresponds with the official position of the state. The need for the “friendship” of the US and Britain was not only the main determinant of the official policy of Turkey, but also that of the attitude of *Hürriyet*. In addition to advocating that Turkey had to remain within the borders of the Western Bloc, Simavi had complained that Turkey was not adequately supported by the US within the frame of the economic assistance which was made to the Allied Powers against the “communism threat”:

We are one of the most appropriate states [to get the economic assistance] in the world. However, we do not know to benefit from this situation. Although we take place in the most dangerous location in Europe, we benefited from the Marshall Plan at the very least. ... No matter what others say, if there is a nation that should benefit most from Marshall Plan, it is the Turkish nation.¹⁸⁸

Italy made a war with America. France, at the first days, fell outside the war. Although this is the situation, they are two of the states that benefited most from the American aids, namely the Marshall Plan. However, they expect us to content

¹⁸⁶ See: Manizade, D. (Ed) (1975). *Kıbrıs: Dün Bugün Yarın*. İstanbul: Kıbrıs Türk Kültür Derneği İstanbul Bölgesi Yayınları, pp. 259-264.

¹⁸⁷ Fırat, M. (2000). Türkiye'nin Kıbrıs Politikaları (1945-1960). *Toplumsal Tarih*, 81, p. 23.

¹⁸⁸ Türkiye'nin Durumu [Editorial, *Hürriyet*]. (1949, February 21). *Hürriyet*, p. 1.

ourselves with the limited economic assistance. ... We will play a role in the forthcoming war or not. To the extent that America attaches importance to [Turkey], she has to consider the development of us.¹⁸⁹

So, according to *Hürriyet*, a wrong was done to Turkey. That is, although she deserved more assistance than the other states, she was supported less than the others: “We do not have even a plate in the banquet of Atlantic Treaty. We are forced to content ourselves with the kitchen crumbs.”¹⁹⁰ However, for *Hürriyet*, Turkey, in many respects, had an indispensable position for both the US and European states:

We can say that, in the sight of America, among European states, Turkey is unquestionably one of the most important ones. The political and geographical position of Turkey entails this. There are so much economic and political ways passing through our lands that neither America nor England can remain indifferent toward them. In contrast to dwindling oil resources in the continent of America, the borders of the strongest state of Asia Minor, namely Turkey, are surrounded with the oil resources. In this respect, the defense of Turkey is vital for America.¹⁹¹

In parallel to the quotations given above, *Hürriyet*, until Turkey was included in the Northern Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), expressed its discontent about the exclusion of Turkey from it. In an editorial, it was said that “the signatories of the Atlantic Treaty left us out of it as though we were an unnecessary guest”, and “this highly troubled the Turks”; moreover, this “broke their faith to the friendships.”¹⁹²

So, the motivations behind *Hürriyet*'s political stance and the state's official attitude were common; however the sides differed from each other in practice. Advocating that Turkey had to remain in the anti-communist bloc, *Hürriyet* did

¹⁸⁹ Amerikan Yardımı [Editorial, *Hürriyet*]. (1949, March 21). *Hürriyet*, p. 1.

¹⁹⁰ Dış Politika [Editorial, *Hürriyet*]. (1950, May 31). *Hürriyet*, p. 1.

¹⁹¹ Amerika ve Türkiye [Editorial, *Hürriyet*]. (1949, May 17). *Hürriyet*, p. 1.

¹⁹² Atlantik Paktı ve Türkiye [Editorial, *Hürriyet*]. (1949, April 30). *Hürriyet*, p. 1.

not evaluate this as a unilateral obligation: The Western World was also in need of collaborating with “us”. Its attitude toward Greece differed from the official attitude, as a result of this perspective. Accordingly, the importance of Turkey for the Western Bloc was not equal to that of Greece: Turkey was more important than her. So, Turkey was not obliged to unconditionally ally with Greece. In parallel, Turkey did not have to keep her silence toward the Cyprus dispute in order not to annoy Greece. In fact, for *Hürriyet*, Turkey, characterized with her heroic history and solidarity between her people, takes place on one side; on the other side, there was Greece with four and a half million population under the miserable conditions of the civil war. Moreover, “although she has been assisted by the British along her history, Greece has been defeated in all wars that she has participated in and has never gotten rid of the misery.”¹⁹³ So, Turkey should not be compared with “powerless Greece that cannot cope with several guerillas.”¹⁹⁴

4.4.2 Anti-Hellenism

Anti-Hellenism was a predominant theme of the editorials of *Hürriyet*. Even if Simavi, in some of his articles, uttered that he was not hostile to the Hellenes, according to him, it was not possible for the Turks to make friends with them as long as the Cyprus dispute between Turkey and Greece was not solved. In many of his articles, he treated the Hellenes in an offensive manner. Additionally, the arguments used against the “Hellenes” and “Greece” were so combined with each other that it was almost impossible to differentiate his approaches toward the “Hellenes” from those toward “Greece”. In other words, in the editorial articles, it was generally possible to use the words the “Hellenes” (or the Greeks) and “Greece” interchangeably. The transitions from Hellenes to Greece and the vice versa was done suddenly. A “negative” feature of one of them proved the

¹⁹³ Atlantik Paktı [Editorial, *Hürriyet*]. (1949, July 30). *Hürriyet*, p. 1.

¹⁹⁴ Avrupa'nın Müdafaası [Editorial, *Hürriyet*]. (1949, August 10). *Hürriyet*, p. 1.

impossibility of striking up a friendship with the other. For instance, after a demonstration about the Cyprus dispute was made in Greece, it is stated that: “Greeks are such a nation that they applaud you strongly, when they think that it is required. Again, when the time is ripe, they know how to yell after you. Those who attempt to cement good relations with Greece should be aware of this reality.”¹⁹⁵ In parallel, after the publication of an offensive article about Turkey in a Greek newspaper, *Hürriyet* assaulted the “Hellenes” with saying that they are “mentally ill” and “deplorable”, and it directly reached an inference about “Greece”: Fortunately, for *Hürriyet*, “God did not create ‘Greece’ as a powerful state; otherwise, the world would become a bloodbath again because of their insatiable passions.”¹⁹⁶ Again, in an article criticizing the foreign policy of Turkey, for instance, it is said that “‘We’ still cannot ‘officially’ run counter to the ‘Hellenes’ who want to appropriate Cyprus.”¹⁹⁷ The official addressees of the states are not the “nations” but the other states; however, it seems that there was no difference between them in the sight of *Hürriyet*. In parallel, for instance, Simavi talked about “France”, “Britain” and other states as if the states were identical with the nations.

This attitude of Simavi and *Hürriyet* stems from their perception about the relationship between the citizen and the state. “The citizen”, in the articles, was the carrier of the official ideology of the state and the member of a homogenous nation which was constructed in accordance with the ethnic identity. In other words, the approach to the issue was sourced from the viewpoint according to which the nation state and the nation are identical. In parallel to this approach, Simavi attached the “Turkish flag” as a logo to the upper left corner of the front page of *Hürriyet* in 1949, and he stated:

¹⁹⁵ Simavi, S. (1952, May 10). Hangimiz Aldanmışız? *Hürriyet*, p. 1.

¹⁹⁶ Yunanlılarla Niçin Dost Olamayız? [Editorial, *Hürriyet*]. (1949, September 17). *Hürriyet*, p. 1.

¹⁹⁷ Dış Politika [Editorial, *Hürriyet*]. (1950, May 31). *Hürriyet*, p. 1.

We are infinitely proud of publishing our daily under the shadow of the Turkish flag. We want all our Turkish citizens around the world to unite under this flag when they take the daily in their hands and to be proud of themselves for being Turks, as we do. This country belongs to the children of Atatürk, and it will live forever with the memory of him, and it will shine like a star in the middle of the world.¹⁹⁸

What followed the attachment of the “Turkish flag” to the front page was the following slogan: “Turkey belongs to the Turks” (Türkiye Türklerindir). Two important points from the quotations given above should be underlined. The first one is about the slogan mentioned above: Perception about the state through the reference of the ethnic origin took place here. The second one is the definition of the country according to which it was the “country of the children of Atatürk”: Kemalism was the official ideology that the “Turkish citizens” have to “obey”. It means that even if the “Turkishness” was a precondition for being a “Turkish citizen”, it was not sufficient. An article dated 1948 supports this evaluation. It was about the Turkish refugees coming to Turkey; and, in this article, it was claimed that they had to be informed about Kemalism before they were settled and they had to accord their attitudes in compatible with it. It was said that “almost all of the refugees are the members of the Turkish race”; however, we have to “educate” these individuals “who will live among us” according to Kemalism, because “they can live freely and happily like all other Turkish citizens only if they think and act within the frame of our national ideology.”¹⁹⁹ The same attitude can be seen in the propaganda against communism. Claiming that the precautions took against the communists should be radicalized, *Hürriyet* took up a position in parallel to the famous nationalist motto “love or leave the country!” (Ya sev ya terk et!). In the article named “Kızıl Cennet”, it was advocated that the communists should not be “fed” in the prisons by the state, but be deported:

¹⁹⁸ Türk Bayrağı [Editorial, *Hürriyet*]. (1949, November 8). *Hürriyet*, p. 1.

¹⁹⁹ Mülteciler [Editorial, *Hürriyet*]. (1948, August 7). *Hürriyet*, p. 1.

“There is no place in these lands for those who are not pleased with ‘us’.”²⁰⁰ In another article dated 7 November 1948, the same idea was repeated: The leftists and rightists should be exiled, because “those who think different from us have no place in our country.”²⁰¹

Another important motive inherent to *Hürriyet*'s nationalist rhetoric used against Hellenes and Greece was the “Asia Minor Disaster”. In the articles, the following expressions were used from time to time: “Greece ... still does not forget the taste of our slap in her face”²⁰²; “It has not been so long ago that the Hellenes were slapped by the Turks”²⁰³; “We, the Turks of Anatolia, know what dirty jobs [the Greeks] could do with the weapons.”²⁰⁴; “Especially our Greek friends are very well aware of the force of the Turkish youth: The youth proved himself/herself at every turn, from Çanakkale to Sakarya.”²⁰⁵. It was highly meaningful to remind the Asia Minor Disaster in response to the claims of Greece on Cyprus. As it is known, the Asia Minor Disaster refers to the triumph of the Independence War, in the history of Turkey. On the other side, in the sight of Greece, it is the biggest strike against the Megali Idea throughout its history. For Kızılyürek, the Asia Minor Disaster “was the defeat of the Megali Idea and the “tragic” realization of it, at the same time: with the population exchange treaty signed between Turkey and Greece, the Hellenes of the Asia Minor and Greece are gathered under a single roof, but they are obliged to leave the Asia Minor behind.”²⁰⁶. Additionally, Asia

²⁰⁰ Kızıl Cennet [Editorial, *Hürriyet*]. (1948, June 4). *Hürriyet*, p. 1.

²⁰¹ Komünistlik ve İrtica [Editorial, *Hürriyet*]. (1948, November 7). *Hürriyet*, p. 1.

²⁰² Yunanlılarla Niçin Dost Olamayız? [Editorial, *Hürriyet*]. (1949, September 17). *Hürriyet*, p. 1.

²⁰³ Simavi, S. (1951, February 25). Yine Türk Kıbrıs. *Hürriyet*, p. 1.

²⁰⁴ Simavi, S. (1952, July 7). Sudan Krallığı ve Kıbrıs. *Hürriyet*, p. 1.

²⁰⁵ Simavi, S. (1953, June 4). Millî Dâvamız. *Hürriyet*, p. 1.

²⁰⁶ Kızılyürek, N. (2005). *Milliyetçilik Kışkacında Kıbrıs*. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, p. 71.

Minor Disaster caused deepening of the political crisis started before the World War I. As is known, before the war, there was a struggle between the supporters of Venizelos and that of the King. After the war, this struggle became sharper; and with the consecutive military coups and changes in regime, the political instability was deepened; at the end, Greece was left alone in the international arena.²⁰⁷

4.4.3 Powerless Greece and Anti-Communism

Anti-Hellenism and “Turkishness of Cyprus” provided a “legitimate” base for the arguments against the *enosis* claims of the Hellenes and Greece. Another component accompanying those mentioned above and compatible with “anti-communism” was the following: Cyprus is a highly important issue that Greece cannot cope with. The primary reason behind this argument was that there was a civil war in Greece: Greece was a politically unstable state which could not maintain the order and safety of the population even within the existing borders and eliminate the “communism threat”; so, the annexation of Cyprus to Greece was unacceptable for both Turkey and the other states: “We cannot leave the Turkish islands to the hands of the government which is not able to sweeping the communists away from its own territories”²⁰⁸ So, according to *Hürriyet*, it was more suitable for Greece to try to deal with the existing miserable conditions and the communism threat than to lay claim to Cyprus.²⁰⁹

In the articles about the issue, “communism threat” was an indirect instrument used against Greece. This argument implied that in case of the defeat of communists, this claim would lose its validity. In other words, communism had not seized the power yet, in Greece. However, when the anti-communist discourse

²⁰⁷ Demirözü, D. (2007). *Savaştan Barışa Giden Yol*. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, pp. 35-36.

²⁰⁸ Türk Adası Kıbrıs [Editorial, *Hürriyet*]. (1948, December 11). *Hürriyet*, p. 1.

²⁰⁹ Simavi, S. (1951, December 11). Yunan İstekleri. *Hürriyet*, p. 1.

was directed to Cyprus, communism became an ideology dominant over the Greek community. I will try to explain this.

As it was mentioned above, *Hürriyet* instrumentalized the civil war occurring in Greece, in order to strengthen its claims against her. Hence, through depicting Greece as a “politically unstable state”, it tried to undermine the claims for the *enosis*. On the other side, looking at the news published about the civil war in *Hürriyet*, the one sees that the government in Greece was actually coping with the communists. The followings are the examples for the titles of relevant news: “The Greek rebels began to escape desperately”²¹⁰; “A leader of the defeated guerillas is executed by hanging by Marcos”²¹¹; “The most important position of the rebels has fallen.”²¹² Additionally, it was stated that, in fact, Greece could stamp the communists out within a week; however, she did not want to put an end to the civil war in order to continue to exploit the economic assistance given by the US because the continuation of the assistance to Greece depended on the existence of a “communism threat” within her borders.²¹³; so Greece used the “communism threat” as a tool for economic interest²¹⁴. On the other hand, “communism”, in Cyprus, had an active and effective position within the Greek community, and the main “perpetrators” behind the *enosis* movement were them:

We know the character of the propaganda made by the communist Greeks in Cyprus: to provoke the Turks who had the fondness and confidence of the British

²¹⁰ (1948, August 18). *Hürriyet*, p. 1.

²¹¹ (1948, October 23). *Hürriyet*, p. 1.

²¹² (1949, August 27). *Hürriyet*, p. 1.

²¹³ Yunanistan ve Amerikan Yardımı [Editorial, *Hürriyet*]. (1949, July 6). *Hürriyet*, p. 1.

²¹⁴ Yunan Silâhları [Editorial, *Hürriyet*]. (1949, July 26). *Hürriyet*, p. 1.

living in the island, and as a result, to persuade them that the island will be left to Greeks.²¹⁵

However, the Turks and Turkey would never fall into this trap and remain unresponsive to their attempts: In fact, “If there is no vehicle for defending Cyprus, we can swim from Anamur to the island, and we cannot leave Cyprus to the red palikars.”²¹⁶

Even Cyprus Orthodox Church, the “sworn enemy” of communism, was not exempt from the “accusation” of “being communist”. The Orthodox religious officials were named as the “red priests”²¹⁷. As Necati Zincirkıran, who was a journalist working in *Hürriyet*, stated in his book on *Hürriyet*, the epithet “red priests” astonished the Archbishop Makarios because he was in a “big struggle with the communists” in Cyprus²¹⁸. In his interview with Makarios, Makarios expressed his astonishment by asking that “Why is the editor in chief of your daily introducing me as the ‘red priest’?”

4.4.4 Inactivity of Turkey in the Cyprus Conflict or Fuat Köprülü as a Scapegoat

As it was mentioned before, *Hürriyet*, which attacked Greece with the articles on the Cyprus dispute, took a moderate position toward Britain. As a parallel attitude, while opposing to the friendship between Greece and Turkey, the newspaper treated the Minister of Foreign Affairs in an offensive manner, but its approach to the Prime Minister Menderes was mild.

²¹⁵ Kıbrıs Türklerinin Cephesi [Editorial, *Hürriyet*]. (1949, September 13). *Hürriyet*, p. 1.

²¹⁶ Milli Davamız: Kıbrıs [Editorial, *Hürriyet*]. (1950, January 17). *Hürriyet*, p. 1.

²¹⁷ See: Simavi, S. (1951, May 9). Kırye Venizelos’a Cevap. *Hürriyet*, p. 1. & Simavi, S. (1951, May 17). Adalarımız. *Hürriyet*, p. 1.

²¹⁸ Zincirkıran, N. (1994). *Hürriyet ve Simavi İmparatorluğu*. İstanbul: Gençlik Yayınları, p. 30.

According to *Hürriyet*, Greece was pampered by Köprülü, and because of his incompetence in the political affairs, Greece got the chance of laying claim to Cyprus. In the article titled as “Yine Türk Kıbrıs”, it is uttered that the Hellenes, which was “slapped” by the Turks just in the recent past, aimed to annex Cyprus to Greece because of Köprülü’s attitudes.²¹⁹ On the other side, the language used toward Menderes was even-tempered and “cautious”. In the context of Cyprus dispute, Menderes was never directly pointed as a target. Instead of directing criticism to Menderes, *Hürriyet* and Simavi impeached the persons around him for misdirecting the prime minister: “The biggest misfortune of Adnan Menderes is inadequacy of the individuals around him. This clever statesman with his capabilities is incomparably superior to his friends who are the members of the cabinet.”²²⁰ In another article criticizing the friendship between Greece and Turkey, Köprülü, rather than Menderes, appeared as the target of the criticism again: “In fact, we are not acting as a professor like [Köprülü], but at the same time, we do not fall into the mistake of leading our prime minister astray in the foreign policy.”²²¹ In parallel, it was said that “... the Cyprus dispute cannot be resolved by deceiving Köprülü. There are the enormous Turkish nation and England behind this issue.”²²² So, the following equation is established: “Turkish nation” takes a parallel position to Britain, and Köprülü takes a stand against the “nation”. In another article, written as an open letter to the Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs Papagos, the “Köprülü versus Turkish nation” equation was established again. Simavi speaks to Papagos with the following words: “In fact, a person named Fuat Köprülü sits in a chair, but we as the ‘Turkish nation’ do not rely upon him. If you want to make friends with the Turks, do not take him

²¹⁹ Simavi, S. (1951, February 25). Yine Türk Kıbrıs. *Hürriyet*, p. 1.

²²⁰ Simavi, S. (1953, May 27). Hükûmet Harcayan Bir Mevzu. *Hürriyet*, p. 1.

²²¹ Simavi, S. (1952, May 10). Hangimiz Aldanmışız? *Hürriyet*, p. 1.

²²² Simavi, S. (1952, July 7). Sudan Krallığı ve Kıbrıs. *Hürriyet*, p. 1.

seriously. He sits in the chair by accident.”²²³ On the other side, Menderes was depicted as a competent politician who could solve the disputes between Greece and Turkey. Before Menderes’s official visit to Greece, Simavi writes that: “In fact, there are so many problems in question between us and the Greeks that, according to us, they can be solved only through the visit of an important person like our Prime Minister.”²²⁴ After the visit, Menderes was depicted as the “conqueror of Greece”²²⁵. However, Hikmet Bil, who accompanied Menderes in the visit, writes that Menderes gave messages of friendship to Greece, and he reminded Menderes about the atrocities of Greece toward the Turks in the Western Thrace and Cyprus. In response, Menderes says him that: “I hear them gnashing the teeth in their smiling mouths. However, Russia is only sixty kilometer away from [here]. This common threat, inevitably, forces us to make friends with [Greece].”²²⁶ It means that there was no difference between the attitudes of Simavi and Menderes toward Greece, in this period.

4.5 Conclusion

As a result, *Hürriyet* took an active role in making the public opinion sensitive to the Cyprus dispute and preparing a ground for the intervention of Turkey in it. Its position toward the issue is a pragmatic one which is compatible not only with the dynamics of the international conjuncture but also with the political conditions of Turkey. That is to say, *Hürriyet* supports the official attitude toward the Western Bloc and it acted in a “careful” manner toward Britain. Moreover, its main concerns were compatible with Turkey in the following sense: For *Hürriyet* it is

²²³ Simavi, S. (1953, July 10). Mareşal Papagos’a Açık Mektup. *Hürriyet*, p. 1.

²²⁴ Simavi, S. (1952, April 16). Başvekilimizin Atina Seyehati. *Hürriyet*, p. 1.

²²⁵ Simavi, S. (1952, May 4). Adnan Menderes’in Muvaffakıyeti. *Hürriyet*, p. 1.

²²⁶ Bil, H. (1976). *Kıbrıs Olayı ve İcyüzü*. İstanbul: İtimat Kitabevi, p. 60-62.

required to take place in the Western Bloc against the Soviet Union and emphasize the strategic location of Turkey to get economic assistance from the US and not to harm the alliance with the West. Still, it has a different approach in sense of the relations between Turkey and Greece. According to *Hürriyet* and Simavi, Turkey had a more advantageous position than Greece and the international conditions did not force Turkey to remain silent toward the Cyprus dispute. On the other side, *Hürriyet* takes into account the dynamics of the internal politics and when struggling with Fuat Köprülü on the official attitude of the state toward the Cyprus issue, it promoted Menderes.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

The main aim of this thesis was to set light to the period between 1948 and 1955, and provide a balanced and objective analysis of the period. In this period, the ground for getting Turkey involved in the Cyprus dispute was prepared both in the island and Turkey by the Turkish nationalist cadres through an intensive propaganda. Additionally, this period corresponded to the emergence of “Turkish side” and “Turkish theses” in the dispute. In order to make healthy evaluations about the period, the thesis focused on the two important agents of the mentioned propaganda. These were *Halkın Sesi* and *Hürriyet*.

Initially, in the second chapter, it was claimed that there was a suitable ground for the rise of Turkish nationalism in the island because the communities perceived themselves as the separate cultural collectivities. The nationalists, beginning from 1930s, politicized the cultural differences between the communities and they established their political agenda on this ground. Accordingly, Turkish nationalism in the island carried out two important and consistent political programs. On one side, they tried to provide an autonomous status for the Turkish community in the face of the Hellenes of the island and the British colonial administration. On the other side, they tried to impede the *enosis* movement. From 1930s to 1940s, the political activity of them was shaped in accordance with these objectives.

In 1940s, with the “tacit” and “cautious” support of the colonial government, making Turkey part of the Cyprus dispute became the main target of Turkish Cypriot nationalists. This was compatible with their other objectives mentioned above. Firstly, if Turkey became a side of the issue, it would be easier for them to obstruct *enosis* because they were in a minority position in the island and they did not have enough power to struggle with the Greek nationalism alone. Secondly, if they gained the support of Turkey, they would have a strong position in sense of

leading the community and carrying out the propaganda for providing the autonomous status for the Turkish Cypriots. Turkey's involvement in the dispute was also desirable for the British colonial government because it tried to balance the *enosis* movement and the "Greek side" of the issue with the establishment of a "Turkish side. So, an alliance was made between the Turkish nationalists and the colonial government in line with the objective of impeding *enosis*. As was mentioned before, the alliance between them became more concrete in the period between 1948 and 1955. However, it was a "cautious" alliance because the potential of the rise of Turkish nationalism against the colonial government was always existent. In fact, in the beginnings of the 1950s, this potential concretely came out. The Turkish nationalist cadres of the island, through regarding the balances of the period, confronted the colonial administration even if they acted in accordance with the government to make Turkey part of the issue. They were aware that the support of Turkey was vital for them. As Britain wanted to maintain its order or impact in the island through the involvement of Turkey in the dispute, they tried to use the "fragile" political conditions in order to gain the autonomous structures for the Turkish community in the island. Revitalization of the Mufti Office, acceptance of a civil code for the Turkish Cypriots and acquisition of the administration of Evkaf should be considered within this frame. These were the "achievements" of the struggle of the nationalists and the Turkish Cypriots with the colonial administration, not the "gifts" given by the colonial government to them. On the other side, *Halkın Sesi* always took a submissive position toward the Republic of Turkey. It created such a perception that Turkey is the ultimate "protector" of the Turkish Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots were the inseparable parts of the Republic of Turkey. In other words, it tried to establish a relationship between the Turkish Cypriots and Turkey through the blood relation between them. By this way, the Turks of the island were attached to the "Turkish state". That is to say, the Republic of Turkey was perceived as the "state of all of the Turks" and it was claimed that Turkish Cypriots should obey the government of Turkey, even if they had no influence and right in its decisions. So, it can be said

that Turkey was perceived as a “protector”, rather than an “ally” of the Turkish Cypriots.

In Turkey, a parallel propaganda for convincing the government of Turkey to intervene in the Cyprus dispute was carried out by the Turkish nationalists. *Hürriyet*, in this attempt, had a leading role. In parallel to *Halkın Sesi*, *Hürriyet* was firstly claiming that the Republic of Turkey should back the Turkish Cypriots in their struggle against the *enosis* movement. The reason was that the Turks of the island were the members of the “Turkish nation”, and Turkey could not remain indifferent toward them. However, it can be said that *Hürriyet* had a different attitude from *Halkın Sesi* toward Britain, and it ignored the tension between the British colonial government and Turkish Cypriots. In this line, *Hürriyet* drew a picture in which the only problem of the Turkish Cypriots was the rise of *enosis* movement, and they had no problem with the colonial government. So, *Hürriyet* made a direct collaboration with the colonial Britain.

The Cyprus propaganda of *Hürriyet* played two important roles in the mentioned period. First, it made the public opinion sensitive to the Cyprus dispute. Second, it impeded the “probable” rise of dissident attitudes toward Britain. So, a ground for the intervention of Turkey in the Cyprus dispute was prepared by *Hürriyet* with a nationalist discourse which had no opposition against the colonialism. That is to say, the prepared ground was safe both for the Republic of Turkey and Britain. As was mentioned, with the “permission” given to Turkey by Britain, Turkey officially became a part of the dispute through participating in the London Conference in 1955. As from that date, the Turkish nationalist cadres of Turkey and the government acted in the same direction.

In 1955, the project carried out by the Turkish nationalists of both Turkey and Cyprus became successful and Turkey became a part of the dispute; however, the period between 1948 and 1955 laid the foundation of the awry relations between the Turkish Cypriots and the Republic of Turkey. As a result of the propaganda of

the nationalists, Turkish Cypriots became an “extension” of the Turks of Anatolia, and Turkey took on the “task” of being the “protector” of the Turkish Cypriots. In 1960, when the Republic of Cyprus was established; Turkey, Greece and Britain became the “guarantors” of the new state, and Turkey was officially authorized to maintain the newly established state of the “Cypriots”. By the Turkish Cypriots, Turkey’s “protectorate” was taken for granted. In parallel, when Turkey occupied the northern parts of Cyprus and divided the island into two, Turkey’s occupation was evaluated as a “rightful” intervention by the Turks of the island, so the intervention was welcome.²²⁷ In the first years of the occupation, the interventionist attitudes of Turkey toward Cyprus and the Turkish community did not face with “serious” reactions.²²⁸ However, after the 1980s, in parallel to the intensification of the direct intervention of Turkey in the internal affairs of them, the reactions started to rise. Especially, the “population transfer” from Anatolia to the northern Cyprus disturbed the “native” population. First of all, with each Anatolian immigrant, even if the booties of the war were stable and the economy was not based on the production, the numbers of the “shareholders” were continually increasing.²²⁹ On the other side, the immigrants were always directed by Turkey and the Turkish nationalists of the island in line with the objective of consolidating the dependency of the northern Cyprus on Turkey. It is strongly believed that, in the elections, they tend to cast their votes in the direction of the

²²⁷ According to the “Treaty of Guarantee” (1959), even if Turkey had the right to take action in Cyprus without taking the approval of the other guarantor states (Article III), her authority was bordered with the attempts of ensuring the maintenance of the Republic of Cyprus and “its independence, territorial integrity, security” and constitution. So, Turkey had no right to act against the “territorial integrity” of the Republic of Cyprus. Moreover, in the second article, it was said that “Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom ... undertake to prohibit, so far as concerns them, any activity aimed at promoting, directly and indirectly, either union of Cyprus with any other State or partition of the Island”. For the full text, see: Joseph, J. S. (1997). *Cyprus: Ethnic Conflict and International Politics*. Great Britain: Macmillan Press, pp. 141-142.

²²⁸ Hasgüler, M. (2007). *Kıbrıs'ta Taksim ve Enosis Politikalarının Sonu*. İstanbul: Alfa Yayınları, p. 260.

²²⁹ Kızılyürek, N. (2005). *Milliyetçilik Kışkacında Kıbrıs*. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, pp. 291-292.

will of Turkey and the nationalist leadership.²³⁰ These developments resulted in the strong criticisms against the Turkish nationalists because the dependency of the Turkish Cypriots and the domination of Turkey over them were established on the basis of their line of politics. It means that the “ethnic ties” upon which the relation between the Turkish Cypriots and Turkey was started to be constructed at the end of the 1940s, turned against the Turkish Cypriots. As a result, against the Turkish nationalism, the “Cypriotism” was started to be underlined by the Turkish Cypriots and it was claimed that the Turkish Cypriots were not an “extension” of the Anatolian Turks. In 1990s, “Cypriotism” created its “other” which was the Turks emigrating from Anatolia; and in the 2000s, in parallel to the discussions on the European Union, the discontents of the Turkish Cypriots became more visible.²³¹ The more the Turkish Cypriots were dominated by Turkey and isolated from the world, the more they attached to the “Cypriotism”. Becoming a member of the European Union was perceived as an opportunity to be free from the dependency on Turkey. Cypriotism is associated with a vision of living peacefully with the Greek Cypriots under the roof of the same state. It was assumed that the “Cypriot” identity would provide the required attachment to the common state of the “Cypriots”. The reactions against Turkey’s domination over the northern Cyprus directed to the Turkish immigrants or settlers of the island, in disguise of Cypriotism.²³² So, the Turkish settlers and immigrants became the “other” of the “Cypriotism” and the Cypriot identity was tried to be established through an

²³⁰ Mete Hatay’s inquiry on the “Turkish settlers” shows that the significant proportion of the votes of the settlers, from 1981 to 2005, went to either the political parties directly founded by them or the other right-wing parties (especially, UBP). The left-wing parties, like CTP, could not gain the supports of them. For details, see: Hatay, M. (2005). *Beyond Numbers; An Inquiry into the Political Integration of the Turkish ‘Settlers’ in Northern Cyprus*. Cyprus: PRIO Cyprus Centre, pp. 23-47, 68.

²³¹ Hasgüler, M. (2009). “Kıbrıslılık Kimliği: Kıbrıslı Türkler ve Kıbrıslı Rumlardaki Farklılaşma.” In Hasgüler, M. (Ed.) *Kıbrıslılık*. İstanbul: Agora Kitaplığı, p. 11.

²³² Hasgüler says that “Cypriotism is a state of patriotism which excludes the laborers and oppressed people coming from Turkey.” See, M. (2009). “Kıbrıslılık Kimliği: Kıbrıslı Türkler ve Kıbrıslı Rumlardaki Farklılaşma.” In Hasgüler, M. (Ed.) *Kıbrıslılık*. İstanbul: Agora Kitaplığı, p. 12.

exclusionist discourse against them.²³³ Today, it is not an exaggeration to say that the same attitude toward the Turkish settlers is valid in Cyprus.

On the other hand, by the nationalist propaganda carried out in the period between 1948 and 1955, the public opinion in Turkey was convinced that Turkey had the right to intervene in the affairs about Cyprus and Turkish Cypriots. In parallel, in this period the Turkish Cypriots were begun to be perceived as the “extension” of the Anatolian Turks. The nationalist discourse attempting to provide “protection” for the Turkish Cypriots against the *enosis*, constructed the belief according to which Turkey was the “ultimate” guardian of them. Today, in Turkey, except a few socialist organizations, this belief is still dominant in the public opinion and political organizations. Moreover, the negative attitudes of the Turkish Cypriots toward the Turkish settlers and immigrants are used against the Turkish Cypriots, and they are depicted as the “traitors” or the “anti-Turks”. By this way, the domination of Turkey over the northern Cyprus is masked and it is propagandized that Turkish Cypriots treat the Turks coming from Anatolia in a hostile manner. So, a struggle between Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots continues upon the disputes about the Turkish settlers.

As a result, today, it is impossible to talk about a “Turkish side” in unity, within the context of the Cyprus dispute. In other words, the “Turkish side” of the Cyprus dispute which was constructed with the efforts of the Turkish nationalist cadres as from the ends of the 1940s, has started to dissolve since the period after 1974. In order to understand the dynamics behind today’s fragmented structure of the Turkish side, it is required to determine the roots of its establishment in the years between 1948 and 1955. Because the Cyprus dispute cannot be resolved without finding a solution to the conflict between the Turkish Cypriots and Turkey, the

²³³ Erhürman, T. (2007). *Kıbrıs'ta Akıl Tutulması; Kıbrıslı Türklerde Modernleşme ve Hukuk*. Lefkoşa: Işık Kitabevi.

nature and historical background of the relation between two sides should be objectively evaluated. This was the main motivation of the thesis.

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APPENDIX



TEZ FOTOKOPİ İZİN FORMU

ENSTİTÜ

Fen Bilimleri Enstitüsü

Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü

Uygulamalı Matematik Enstitüsü

Enformatik Enstitüsü

Deniz Bilimleri Enstitüsü

YAZARIN

Soyadı :

Adı :

Bölümü :

TEZİN ADI (İngilizce):

.....
.....
.....
.....

TEZİN TÜRÜ : Yüksek Lisans

Doktora

1. Tezimin tamamı dünya çapında erişime açılsın ve kaynak gösterilmek şartıyla tezimin bir kısmı veya tamamının fotokopisi alınsın.
2. Tezimin tamamı yalnızca Orta Doğu Teknik Üniversitesi kullanıcılarının erişimine açılsın. (Bu seçenekle tezinizin fotokopisi ya da elektronik kopyası Kütüphane aracılığı ile ODTÜ dışına dağıtılmayacaktır.)
3. Tezim bir (1) yıl süreyle erişime kapalı olsun. (Bu seçenekle tezinizin fotokopisi ya da elektronik kopyası Kütüphane aracılığı ile ODTÜ dışına dağıtılmayacaktır.)

Yazarın imzası

Tarih