

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE EGYPTIAN STATE AND THE MUSLIM
BROTHERHOOD FROM 1952 TO 1970

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SELIN ELDENIZ

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Prof. Dr. Meliha ALTUNIŐIK

Director

I certify that this thesis satisfies all the requirements as a thesis for the degree of Master of Science.

Prof. Dr. Recep Boztemur

Head of Department

This is to certify that we have read this thesis and that in our opinion it is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Science.

Prof. Dr. Recep Boztemur

Supervisor

Examining Committee Members

Prof. Dr. Recep Boztemur

(METU, MES) _____

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Erdođan Yıldırım

(METU, SOC) _____

Assist. Prof. Dr. Selçuk Dursun

(METU, HIST) _____

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Name, Last name: Selin Eldeniz

Signature:

ABSTRACT

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Eldeniz, Selin

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This thesis aims to analyze the relationship between two main inspiration sources of the Arab world, both emerged in Egypt: Gamal Abdel Nasser and the Muslim Brotherhood. The focus is defined as the relationship between the Egyptian state of Nasser's era and the Muslim Brotherhood; hence the time period is determined to be between 1952 and 1970. The reason why I have chosen this subject is that for the Middle East in general, and Egypt in particular, both actors have played a significant role in the path of deposing Western colonialism and engaging with modernism. On the other hand as both sides could provide alternative theories and means of governance against each other, the relationship seems more than interesting; especially regarding region's endeavor of providing a strong response and local alternatives to dominant Western values of modernism, it seems more than worthy to focus on these two main players and their interactions with each other.

Keywords: Egypt, Muslim Brotherhood, Gamal Abdel Nasser, nationalism, politic
Islam

ÖZ

1952-1970 YILLARI ARASINDA MÜSLÜMAN KARDEŞLER ÖRGÜTÜ VE MISIR DEVLETİ ARASINDAKİ İLİŞKİ

Eldeniz, Selin

Yüksek Lisans, Orta Doğu Araştırmaları

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Bu tez her ikisi de Mısır da doğmuş olan, Arap dünyasının iki ana ilham kaynağı arasındaki ilişkiyi analiz etmeyi amaçlamaktadır: Cemal Abdul Nasır ve Müslüman Kardeşler. Odak noktası Nasır dönemi Mısır devleti ve Müslüman Kardeşler olarak tanımlanmış, böylece zaman aralığı 1952-1970 yılları olarak belirlenmiştir. Bu konuyu seçmiş olmamın sebebi, genelde Orta Doğu'da ve özelde Mısır'da her iki aktörün de gerek Batı kolonyalizmini zayıflatmada ve gerekse modernleşmeyle karşı karşıya gelmede mühim rol oynamış olmalarıdır. Diğer yandan, her iki taraf da birbirine karşı alternatif teori ve yönetim araçları geliştirebildiğinden aralarındaki ilişki ilgi çekici olmaktan öteye geçmektedir. Özellikle bölgenin baskın Batı değerleri ve modernizme karşı yerel alternatifler ve etkili bir duruş koyması çabası açısından bu iki temel aktörün ve birbirleriyle etkileşimlerin incelenmesi değerli bir konu olmanın ötesinde görünmektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Mısır, Müslüman Kardeşler, Cemal Abdül Nasır, Milliyetçilik, Politik İslam

This thesis is dedicated to my mother...

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The flow of the Nile provided fertility not only for the soil of Egypt but also for the ideas, way of lives and beliefs of the Egyptians. The first civilizations were born on this soil. The followers of two basic political theories of the Middle East, Arab nationalism and Islamism, which would shape the socio-politic picture of the modern Middle East, co-existed in Egypt.

Throughout the study, the definition of Arab nationalism will be referred to as the endeavor of the Arabic-speaking people for political unity and as for Islamism; the definition of Graham Fuller will be considered once referring to the term:

Consideration of Islam as a body of faith, having something important to say about how politics and society should be ordered in the contemporary Muslim World and seeking to implement this idea in some fashion.¹

After the Egyptians' perception of foreign occupation had converted to deep frustration, a variety of reformist movements emerged as resisting foreign dominance of the Egyptian governance and finance. Some of these movements constructed their ideologies on nationalist motives, inspired mostly by the nation-state building conjecture of the aftermath of the First World War: The most popular and the most beloved of these movements was Saad Zaghloul's Wafd Party, which won a number of elections or was charged by the king to hold the government from 1924 to 1952. On the other hand, there emerged other movements organized against the foreign

¹ Graham E. Fuller, *The Future of Political Islam* (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan: 2004), XI.

dominance, seeking to heal the “illness and backwardness” of the society by reforming the state, the government and the way of lives of the simple citizens in an absolute accordance with Islamic beliefs: The strongest and the most dominant of these movements was the Muslim Brotherhood, the branches of which would expand all over the world and the inspirations of which would give birth to many other Islamist parties or organizations. The Wafd was officially established in 1924, the Muslim Brotherhood was held as an organization in 1928. Both was established against the same enemy, with similar targets; however acquiring different characters by means with which the target would be realized. Between the late 1920s and early 1950s, both the Wafd and the Muslim Brotherhood kept alive in Egyptian political life; however the former lost most of its popularity owing to the cooperation with the occupier or the king and owing to the internal corruption, whereas the latter increased its popularity year by year especially after being named as the brave battalions on the war field in Palestine. Then emerged small groupings within the army ranks in the late 1940s, a considerable number of which were active members or sympathizers of the Muslim Brotherhood, the communist organizations or such like minor organizations: The best organized of all, and the one that managed to fire the 1952 Revolution was the Free Officers, established in 1949. The Free Officers were also against the foreign dominance, and were fired with an enthusiasm of getting rid of all unhealthy aspects of their beloved country, Egypt. This is noteworthy that the Free Officers did not have a certain ideology, and tried to keep distant, maybe not individually but certainly as an organization, with all political actors of the time.

Although the Brotherhood had most of the features of a revolutionary actor, it was not them who lead the revolution in 1952, but the Free Officers. The Brotherhood was popular, was said to have around two million members or sympathizers, was controlling a secret apparatus of its own which worked as armed militia being trained by the army officers of Egypt supported by the Arab League prior to the First Arab-Israeli War; however the Brotherhood lacked an inclusive identity which would ensure a fair political order for the minorities, the seculars nationalists of Egypt. Instead the Free Officers, most of whom were petty bourgeois recruited in the arm in 1936-1939, performed the Revolution. After the Revolution, the leader of the Free Officers, Gamal Abdel Nasser managed to establish legitimacy among most aspects of Egypt and eliminated most of the opposition both with totalitarian activities and populist activities which brought mass public support to the regime.

According to Carrie Rosefsky Wickham, there are three ways for an authoritarian regime to preempt the rise of opposition activism: 1) Disabling the potential agents of mobilization by banning groups that they consider offensive and harassing, arresting, imprisoning, sending to exile, torturing. This was what the new regime did by dissolution of all parties and by banning the Muslim Brotherhood two years later the revolution in Egypt. 2) Controlling potential sites of mobilization by tolerating the existence of an opposition group but systematically limiting its access to the mass public at the end. This was applied by the new regime. 3) Co-opting the targets of mobilization by utilizing state-controlled media, schools, and religious institutions to cultivate support for official policy while simultaneously discrediting

their rivals.² Nasser applied this policy first with the land reform which brought the regime mass support of the peasants, second with the decision to abolish all school fees including the university level and the promise to every university and high-school graduate a government job which provided loyalty of urban lower-middle and middle class youth. Nasser was also controlling the mass media in an indirect way, for instance the column of Mohamed Hassanein Heikal in daily al-Ahram newspaper was said to be the informal announcer and supporter of Nasser's policies. At the end of these policies, Nasser's regime managed even to leave the Muslim Brotherhood out of the game, hence the Brotherhood had to wait till the early 1970s to take their active role in the Egyptian political life back. However, this is to be outlined that the Brotherhood managed to get their dominance back. The answers to how and why will be found in analyzes of the era defined from the Revolution in 1952 to Nasser's death in 1970.

The topic of this thesis is the relationship between the Egyptian state and the Muslim Brotherhood between 1952 and 1970. This thesis aims at analyzing this relationship by focusing mostly on the role of the Muslim Brotherhood in 1952 Revolution, on the eve and during which their activism reached to its zenith. Ironically, the revolution brought the political environment which was about to put an end to the Brotherhood's existence. Hence, this thesis seeks to provide an explanatory framework to the political stance and activity of the Muslim Brotherhood in this essential era of the Egyptian political life; with this aim the historical focus will be targeted to a time period between 1952 and 1970. It is

² Carrie Rosefsky Wickham, *Mobilizing Islam* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), 10.

interesting to study on this period of Egyptian history as this period witnessed the very co-existence of the mother organization of Islamists, the Muslim Brotherhood and Arab nationalist state system under the charismatic leadership of Gamal Abd al-Nasser.

This thesis argues that the role of the Muslim Brotherhood in the Revolution was a supportive role; however it was not a leading role and that the sole leaders of the Revolution were the Free Officers. This thesis considers the following factors as reasons of the leadership of the Free Officers: 1) Egyptians were seeking for a savior who would bring an end to years of foreign domination. As the sentiment of being citizens of a country, which had been humiliated for more than a century, was so deep that defeat in the independence war could neither be accepted nor tolerated. Consequently, this savior was most accredited to be the Egyptian army. 2) The Free Officers were faithful nationalists; however they did not tail any established ideology at the beginning of the revolution. This fact helped the Officers to establish legitimacy for the new regime as nationalism was a very general point of approach which most Egyptians agreed to follow. 3) The Muslim Brothers were strong and were recruiting a variety of Egyptians; however they lacked an inclusive identity. Islamist reformism was not acceptable for the secular nationalists, for the religious minorities of the Orthodox Christian Copts, the small number of the Jews and a few thousands of the Shi'a population. 4) The international conjecture was not convenient for an Islamist-religious governance of Egypt either. Secular supra-national or socialist ideologies emphasizing the equity were fashionable and as neither the people of the Middle East nor others from Europe or Asia had lost their

faith to these ideologies yet, a religious-nationalist organization would not be able to establish legitimacy among millions. Those who seek Islamist solutions would have to wait till the 1970s as following developments occurring in those years provided a suitable ground for such a revival: 1) With dominance of heavy bureaucracy the socialist regimes became totalitarian; hence socialism lost its value for those who were seeking for freedom. 2) Severe polemics between USSR and China divided the leftist movements of both Europe and the Middle East on basic principles of Marxism. This weakened the left and decreased the number of the elites who accredited secular-leftist ideas. 3) During the Cold War, the Western block supported the dictatorial regimes provided that the leftist movements got repressed. Therefore, when Arab socialism failed, secular development theories could not be improved.

The role of the Muslim Brotherhood in the revolution did not go beyond to be a supportive one; however this argument does not deny the very existence and dominance of the movement. The second chapter will study the historical background including the interwar years, Britain's policies in Egypt and Egyptian nationalism with an endeavor to find out how the Brotherhood expanded its political practice and mass support.

In the third chapter, the role of the Muslim Brotherhood in 1952 Revolution will be examined. In this chapter the emergence of the Free Officers, the Brothers' cooperation with the Free Officers, and Command Council of Revolution's consolidation of power will be analyzed.

The forth chapter will examine the confrontation between the Muslim Brotherhood and the Nasser's regime from 1954 to 1970. Here also Nasser's emergence as a leader, repression policies against the Brotherhood, the internal debates over Hudaybi's guidance, and finally the decline of Nasser's power will be analyzed with its reasons and consequences.

In conclusion, collecting all the arguments together, the study will make an assessment on the relationship between the state and the Muslim Brotherhood in the outlined time period, while defining the consequences of this relationship as for the Brotherhood's future role to be played after the 1970s.

CHAPTER 2

HISTORICAL OVERVIEW

Invention of steam engines paved the way to Industrial Revolution of the mid-18th century. This increased the number of the population that contributed to industrial production processes; and consequently the new production relations developed the means of transportation and gave a huge rise to exports from the West Europe to different areas of the world, some of which were the raw material supplier. The need of securing the trade routes through which the raw materials were exported and subsequently imported as finished products; and of opening new markets urged Great Powers rivalry on the Ottoman land which connected Black Sea to the Mediterranean through Bosphorus and the Straits; and India to Europe through Persian Gulf, the Suez and the Mediterranean. The rivalry was later named as the Eastern Question and the then Great Powers were mainly specified as Russia, whose concern was to ensure access to the Black Sea and to the Mediterranean Sea; Austria, whose concerns were intensified on Balkans; Britain, whose main concern was to ensure a safe route to India for its navy and merchant ships across Egypt and the Fertile Crescent (The steamship travel made it faster and safer to transship goods and people³ through this line especially after 1820); and France whose ambitious General, Napoleon was fired with a desire to emulate the conquests of Alexander the

³ Arthur Goldschmidt Jr., *A Concise History of the Middle East* (Colorado: Westview Press, 1983), 140.

Great by leading his army from Egypt through the Fertile Crescent and to Iran, Afghanistan, and what is now Pakistan⁴.

In 1798, Napoleon occupied Egypt with military ambitions advised above and with the aim of threatening the growing British power in India⁵. Napoleon states in *Campagnes d'Egypte et de Syrie, 1798- 1799*, that there were three barriers to French hegemony in the Orient and that any French force would therefore had to fight three wars: one against England, a second against the Ottoman Porte, and a third, the most difficult, against the Muslims.⁶ To achieve the third barrier, Napoleon used Egyptian enmity towards the Mamluks and appealed to the revolutionary idea of equal opportunity for all. With this purpose, on July 2 1798, he rallied to the people in Alexandria that they were the real Muslims.⁷ However, none of the three barriers could be overcome as Napoleon was expelled from Egypt by British and Ottoman powers in 1801. The expedition resulted with Egypt be placed in the core of the Great Powers rivalry in the Middle East.

In 1805, Muhammad Ali (1805-1848), first sent to Egypt to defeat the French, was appointed by the Ottoman Sultan, Selim III, as the governor of Egypt. Muhammad Ali aimed to manage the *de facto* independence of Egypt under his own authoritarian rule which would be constructed by reducing the power of the Mamluks and the ulama: the first was beaten with a massacre in 1811 and the second was

⁴ Ibid., p.147.

⁵ Derek Hopwood, *Egypt: Politics and Society 1945-1990* (London: Routledge, 1993), 9.

⁶ Edward W. Said, *Orientalism*, (London: Penguin Books, 2003), 81.

⁷ Ibid., 82.

weakened by taking away most of the land which was managed as waqfs (Muslim endowments).⁸ To hold the authority at one hand, Muhammad Ali began the modernization process by centralizing the administration, imposing a monopolistic economy, building a strong army and navy, opening the door to a great number of European merchants, introducing new industries and developing the agriculture.⁹ With his development policies, newly constructed irrigation systems made it possible to raise three crops a year in fields that used to produce just once. Egypt became the first Middle Eastern country to make the transition from subsistence agriculture (in which peasants raised essentially the crops they consumed, plus what they had to pay in rent and taxes) to cash crop farming (in which peasants raised crops to sell on the market). This was also an expansion of the fashionable tendency of whom sensed the opportunities, real or perceived, offered by closer integration into world markets by shifting the patterns of production from cultivation of subsistence crops to commodity production for export.¹⁰ Tobacco, sugar, indigo, and long-staple cotton became major Egyptian crops. Using the revenues gained from these developments, Muhammad Ali paid for his ambitious schemes for industrial and military improvement.¹¹ Through his overambitious projects he subjected Egypt to great economic strain and through his financial and agrarian policies he caused the creation of rich landowners, a large bureaucracy and a growing number of foreign

⁸ Goldschmidt Jr., *A Concise History of the Middle East*, 149.

⁹ Christina Phelps Harris, *Nationalism and Revolution in Egypt* (Hyperion Press, 1981), 19.

¹⁰ Sevket Pamuk, *The Ottoman Empire and European Capitalism, 1820-1913* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 3.

¹¹ Goldschmidt Jr., *A Concise History of the Middle East*, 150.

merchants and traders.¹² He gave Egypt its first secular state schools and its first hospitals. And in his desire to import Western knowledge and techniques, he sent 339 Egyptians to European schools and universities. By sending so many young men to study in Europe, and by adopting Bonaparte's printing press, he fostered the creation of a new educated class among the members of which would lay the earliest foundation for modern Egyptian nationalism and for the subsequent reforms brought about in Egyptian society.¹³ Before his death in 1849, he accomplished establishing his dynasty, which would be in rule till 1953, depending itself on agricultural and industrial development, without any money owed to Western governments or investors.

The following three governors put Egypt more and more in debt with Europeans meanwhile taking further modernization steps. Abbas I (1848-1854) gave Britain, who focused on Alexandria-Cairo route in order to shorten the shipment line to India, concession in 1851 for the construction of the first railway of Egypt, which would be completed in 1856. However, Egypt's first getting into debt dated back to Said Pasha's reign, 1854-1863, when the overflowing Nile harmed the crops. He gave concession to Ferdinand de Lesseps for the construction of the Suez Canal. The project of joining the Mediterranean and the Red Sea gave great enthusiasm to France while causing Britain's opposition as the British preferred the railway.¹⁴ The one domestic reform of Said Pasha was recognizing the principle of private

¹² Hopwood, *Egypt: Politics and Society 1945-1990*, 10.

¹³ Harris, *Nationalism and Revolution in Egypt*, 21.

¹⁴ The construction of the 192 km long canal is said to have caused the death of 120,000 Egyptian workers most of whom were working as forced labor.

ownership (1858) which gave right to the Egyptian peasant to own land and to sell, bequeath or mortgage it.¹⁵ Ismail Pasha (1863-1879), the khedive, gave pave to successive reforms that also put Egypt more in debt: The canals, railroads, bridges, telegraph lines, sugar refiners, a deep-water harbor in Alexandria, Port Said were all completed in his reign. His reign coincided with the cotton boom caused by the American Civil War that barred the supply chain from America to Britain. When the cotton boom ended at the end of the war, Ismail's expenditures which were not in balance with the revenues eventually caused financial embarrassment. He sold Egypt's shares, 44% of the total shares, in the Canal Company to the British government in 1875. In 1876, Ismail appealed to the Powers to work out the finances, hence for the first time a gate was opened to the European Powers to interfere in the Egyptian administration with the help of the institution known as the *Caisse de la Dette Publique*. This body was composed of four Commissioners, who were to act as representatives of the bondholders in Egypt, however they were appointed by the chief bondholding countries – France, Italy, Austria and Britain.¹⁶ In 1878, Ismail had to agree to put one British, one French minister to the cabinet what would be named later as Dual Control. This caused a general discontent and anti-foreign feeling. Adding the intensifying impact of arbitrary reductions on their pay, Egyptian army officers ran a serious riot under the leadership of Sharif Pasha. The riot enabled Khedive Ismail to dismiss the foreign ministers, however the action reversed by causing his dismissing by the Sultan, under pressure of the Great Powers

¹⁵ Harris, *Nationalism and Revolution in Egypt*, 26.

¹⁶ Afaf Lutfi Al-Sayyid, *Egypt and Cromer* (New York, Frederic A. Praeger Publishers; 1969), 3.

guarding their investors' interests. Ismail's era is considered by most historians as the constructor of the conditions that would give pave to the improvements determining the Egyptian modern history till the mid of the 20th century during which a tense conflict between Western dominance and Egyptian nationalist resistance took place. In his reign, the first national library, the first national museum and the first school for girls were founded; taxation of land was increased about fifty per cent, the foreign population was increased enormously. When Ismail turned the khedivate over to his son, Tawfiq (1879-1892), and left Egypt in 1879, the state debt stood at 93.000.000 pounds sterling while it had been £ 3 million in 1863.¹⁷

In 1880 Tawfiq negotiated a settlement of the debt, defined in the Law of Liquidation. According to this Law, Egypt's revenue, estimated at £E9 million, was divided into two nearly equal parts, one assigned to the *Caisse* and the other part to the Egyptian government.¹⁸ Dual Control was again established, however with a major difference that the Controllers could now be dismissed only by their Governments. This way of settling Egypt's debts, increased the influx of foreigners into the administration in which the Europeans formed 2% of the total number of employees, while representing 15% of the total cost.¹⁹

The events detailed above matured grave anti-European sentiment and caused the emergence of Egyptian nationalist opposition's first challenge to European

¹⁷ Goldschmidt Jr., *A Concise History of the Middle East*, 163.

¹⁸ Al-Sayyid, *Egypt and Cromer*, 4.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p.5.

domination under Ahmad Urabi's leadership; the challenge which would result with Britain's occupying their country.

2.1. Britain in Egypt from Occupation to Proclamation of Protectorate

During the first quarter of the 19th century, all officials above village headmen were Turks, Circassians or from different ethnicities of Ottoman rule. This ethnicity allocation was valid also for all army officers of high rank and for most junior officers even after Muhammad Ali's recruiting for the first time Egyptian fellahs in the army. The partial replacement of non-Egyptian civil servants and army officers by Arabic-speaking Egyptians was carried on in the 19th century with Said's order that one-third of all officials acting as district officer and one-quarter of those acting as sub-district officer be replaced by Egyptians. Subsequently, the sons of village *shaykhs*, who had been exempt from army service so far, were recruited.²⁰ One of those recruited was Ahmad Urabi who would lead a national movement organized under *al-Hizb al-Watani*, the National Party.

Between 1879 and 1882 the National Party grew from a secret association to a large popular movement²¹ with participation of the constitutionalists, the reformists and the *fallah* army officers. The constitutionalists were wealthy *fallah* officers and Turco-Circassian notables, opposing mainly to the foreign control of the financial management of Egypt. Their main desire was getting Egypt's right to vote her own budget. The Reformers were mainly *fallah* intellectuals, like Muhammad Abduh.

²⁰ Gabriel Baer, *Studies in the Social History of Modern Egypt* (The University of Chicago Press; 1969), 221.

²¹ Harris, *Nationalism and Revolution in Egypt*, 41.

They sought to free Egypt by means of a constitutional government and through reforming Islam by re-formulating its principles. The *fallah* army officers were demanding the replacement of Tawfiq's Ministry for War, a Circassian named Uthman Rifqi, as he was processing a law which would inhibit *fallah* Egyptians from rising from the ranks to become officer, thereby limiting the officer class to the wealthy Turco-Circassian element.

Sharif Pasha, chosen by Urabists formed the new cabinet on September 14, 1881. On January 3, 1882 London Times published a manifesto, written by Abduh and Barudi, which stated the Egyptian nationalists' objects as seeing one day Egypt entirely in Egyptian hand; a fair measure of freedom for the press; the national education for the growth of knowledge among all classes of people.²² Having perceived as the only power capable of protecting their interests, they delegated their demands to the army, which also had a certain demand that the number of the officers be increased to 18.000 again. On January 8, 1881, Britain and France sent their Joint Note as a friendly response to Tawfiq's calls. With the Note, the Powers underlined that they were ready to take any necessary action needed to secure the current order in Egypt; however the Note was perceived by Egyptians as an outside interference. This resulted with the Egyptian notables' gathering around the National Party with increasing numbers. The announcement of the Note coincided with the internal debates occurring within the Assembly on the right to vote on unassigned revenues of the budget; the debates would later give opportunity to the Urabists in

²² Al-Sayyid, *Egypt and Cromer*, 13.

the Assembly to topple Sharif Pasha and to assign Sami al-Barudi as Prime Minister and Urabi as Minister of War.

On June 11, the riots took place in Alexandria, causing both Egyptians and European's death; with varying numbers.²³ British government suspected Urabi while he was suspecting the Khedive for causing the riots. Britain and France, having doubts for each other, could not decide on what action to take first, then they gathered an international conference in Istanbul. Conference opened on June 23, 1882, but without a Turkish envoy.²⁴ The powers agreed here on a Protocol that they would not occupy Egypt. However, being pushed by British investors and with the concerns over the security of the Suez Canal, Britain interfered in by bombarding Alexandria on July 11, 1882. France did not join the attack, the very reason is argued by some authors that the French Parliament had perceived the operation as a Bismarckian plot to lay France open to a surprise attack by German while France's troops were occupied in Egypt.²⁵

Britain justified her action as saving Egyptian people from a military dictator by restoring the order and rightful authority of the Khedive and defeated Urabi in Tel el-Kebir. Urabi and his men got trialed, by using the Ottoman legal code, and were soon sentenced first to death, than to exile on December 3, 1882.²⁶ At the end, all the

²³ From 50 to 75 Europeans are said to have died during the riots.

²⁴ Al-Sayyid, *Egypt and Cromer*, 23.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p.27.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, p.31.

leaders of the Urabi revolt were sent to exile, while the minor characters were mostly sentenced to prison.

The following step that Britain took was excluding French from Egyptian affairs. With this aim, the Entente Cordiale Treaty was concluded in 1904 between Britain and France and the latter recognized Britain's position in Egypt in return for having a free hand over Morocco²⁷.

Denoting some indications of Britain's economy is useful here: In the middle of the 19th century, Britain provided approximately two-thirds of world's all coal production, half of the iron production, half of the commercial cotton production and forty per cent (value measured) of the metallic goods production.²⁸ In 1813, the number of the machine weaving looms in Britain was 2400; it increased to 55.000 in 1829, then to 240.000 in 1850.²⁹ In addition, exports of the locally produced products formed thirteen per cent of all national income at the end of the 18th century, this number increased to twenty two per cent in 1870s.³⁰ Thus, as modern industry became a way of living in Lancashire and that the cotton industry depended almost completely to the imports of the raw materials, it was easy to predict that Britain be concerned of setting an efficient way of working for the Egyptian economy.

²⁷ E.Zeynep Guler, *Arap Milliyetçiliği Mısır ve Nasırcılık (Arab Nationalism Egypt and Naserism)* (İstanbul: Yazılama Yayınevi, 2011), 55.

²⁸ Eric J. Hobsbawm, *Sanayi ve İmparatorluk (Industry and Empire)* (Ankara: Dost Kitabevi, 1998), 123.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, p.59.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, p.125.

Britain appointed three governors with the title of the Consul General: Lord Cromer (1883-1907), who listed the necessary reforms to be taken as arresting the rampant in all government departments, the abolition of the *kurbaj*, the lash and the abolition of the *corvée*, unpaid forced labor³¹. Sir Eldon Gorst (1907-1911), who mainly co-operated with the Khedive Abbas in creating a moderate nationalist opinion³². General Lord Kitchener (1911-1914), who helped to introduce a new constitution in 1913, gave the country some representative institutions locally and nationally with certain powers.³³ During the time period, Egyptian economy depended mostly on agriculture that was dominated with the production of long staple cotton which could always be sold for cash and was so excellent for security of loans or prompt payment of rent.³⁴ The three governors tried hard to secure the smooth export of the cotton staples to Lancashire, regardless of what price it cost to the Egyptian society which lacked an efficient system of education, health and welfare. Thus, cotton production increased from under 3 million *qantars* in the early 1880s to some 7.5 million just before the First World War.³⁵

Turkey declared war against Britain in August, 1914 and immediately after, Britain proclaimed a protectorate over Egypt on December 14, 1914; the action was justified with the concern of losing power of over the country. The following day the

³¹ Al-Sayyid, *Egypt and Cromer*, 85.

³² Hopwood, *Egypt: Politics and Society 1945-1990*, 14.

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ Roger Owen & Sevket Pamuk, *A History of Middle East Economies in the Twentieth Century* (London: I.B. Taurus Publishers, 1998), 31

³⁵ Ibid.

Khedive left Egypt and Husain Kamil was titled as Sultan of Egypt. Proclamation of protectorate was resisted by Egyptian nationalists during the war years, which will be detailed in the following chapter.

2.2. Nationalism and Interwar Years Politics in Egypt

Nationalism, as defined by Adeed Dawisha, is a human solidarity, whose members believe that they form a coherent cultural whole, and who manifest a strong desire for political separateness and sovereignty.³⁶ Some observations regarding the Egyptian case include that nationalism in Egypt was emerged as a resistance to British domination over the country in the late 19th century. Egyptian nationalism, constructed on an Egyptian identity rooted back to Pharaonic era, was mostly shaped by the religious rules and Islamic way of life. The first nationalists of Egypt were mainly concerned with having more power over the state issues and autonomy over the country, however they would be converted to supra-Egyptian nationalists in the 1930s with the impact of the inter-regional aspects like the possibility of a Jewish state being established in Palestine and of the international aspects, most visible during the Great Depression of 1929 that brought economic distress to the country.

It is observed that Islam and nationalism appear to be so closely telescoped to each other in the Middle East. According to Ozdalga, both doctrines claim that a certain cultural community should be congruent with the ruling institution, the state. Therefore, for the *ummah*, the community of Muslim believers, who historically and

³⁶ Adeed Dawisha, *Arab Nationalism in the Twentieth Century* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003), 13.

ideologically are used to imagining themselves as members of an all-embracing political unit, the doctrine of nationalism represents a well-known intellectual and mental form.³⁷ This was also the case for the fathers of Egyptian nationalist theory, Gamal al-Din al-Afghani (1839-1897) and his pupil Muhammad ‘Abduh (1849-1905). They were essentially Islamist reformers who recognized and feared the Christian West, and sought to confront this threat through advocating Islamic reform, resurgence, and unity. Their purpose was to regenerate the stagnant Muslim society, and to educate the people by having them adapt to the ideas and institutions of the modern world.³⁸ Both claimed that it was not Islam per se, but Muslims’ intellectual backwardness, brought about by centuries of subjugation and neglect, as well as the disunity of the Islamic *Umma*, that was responsible for the inferior status of the Muslim world.³⁹ The fundamentals of the Pan-Islamic movement, as taught by Jamal al-Din, included a dual program: the rigorous purification of religious belief and practice and the political union of all Muslims in defense of Islam.⁴⁰ However, with increasing British dominance and its negative economic and politic consequences, the aspect of nationalism got a territorial phase at the very beginning of the 20th century. At that period, pan-Islamic resurgence did not find the number of followers as much as of the territorial nationalists’.

³⁷ Elizabeth Ozdalga, “Islamism and Nationalism as Sister Ideologies”, *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 45, No. 3 (May 2009), 416.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, p.19.

³⁹ *Ibid.*

⁴⁰ Harris, *Nationalism and Revolution in Egypt*, 117.

In addition to economic and socio-political reasons, there occurred individual events giving rise to the nationalist sentiment within Egyptians; one was the Dinshaway incident of June, 1906. This event was brought about when a small party of British officials on a pigeon shoot accidentally shot a peasant woman; which caused tension that led to a flare-up between the villagers and the British. Dinshaway incident was concluded with a trial in which four villagers were condemned to death.⁴¹

Egyptian nationalism took an essential step under the leadership of Mustafa Kamil with the foundation of Nationalist Party (*Hizb al-Watani*) in 1907. In the same year, the People's Party (*Hizb al-Umma*) was founded under Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayyid's leadership, and a prominent member of this party was Sa'd Zaghlul (1860-1927). This was followed by the foundation of the Constitutional Reformers. Four other relatively minor parties were established between 1907 and 1909: The National Free Party, The Party of Nobles, and The Party of Independent Egyptians. All these parties were fundamentally political in their programs; they took social or economic problems quite seriously; they all advocated educational reforms, and most of them demanded representative institutions.⁴² Most party programs, held in this time period, were mainly dealing with the relations with the Ottoman state, and with the approach to the British occupation and to Khedive.⁴³ As an instance, the National Party's program focused on the following points: The autonomy of Egypt (or her internal

⁴¹ Ibid., p. 74.

⁴² Ibid., p.75.

⁴³ Guler, *Arap Milliyetçiliği Mısır ve Nasırcılık* (Arab Nationalism Egypt and Naserizm), 61.

independence) established as in 1840 by the Treaty of London; the institution of representative government; the respect of treaties and financial conventions which bind the Egyptian government to pay its debts; the furtherance and spread of education; the development of agriculture, industry and commerce; the enlightenment of the minds of the Egyptians; and the strengthening of the ties of friendship and of attachment between Egypt and the Ottoman Empire.⁴⁴

During the intellectual-internal party discussions and with the economic strains and social difficulties, the nationalist movement in Egypt came to a mature point on the eve of the First World War and reached to its zenith under Sa'd Zaghlul's leadership once Britain proclaimed protectorate over Egypt and Wilson recognized the proclamation.

Having served as the Minister of Public Instruction in 1906 and as the Minister of Justice in 1910, Zaghlul proved himself both to be a patriot and a nationalist. As soon as the armistice was signed in November, 1918, Zaghlul made his first move for Egypt's independence by calling upon the British High Commissioner, Sir Reginald Wingate, to request permission to lead a nationalist delegation, which would be named later as *al-Wafd al-Misri* (the Egyptian Delegation), to London for discussions with the British Government on the post-war status of Egypt and the issue of complete autonomy.⁴⁵ The request was immediately turned down. *Al-Wafd Al-Misri* consisted of urban notables and professionals, but they were not the only group seeking negotiations with the British; the Palace and the

⁴⁴ Robert G. Landen, *The Emergence of the Modern Middle East* (New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold Company), 115-116.

⁴⁵ Harris, *Nationalism and Revolution in Egypt*, 90.

Prime Minister Husein Rushtu Pasha representing the Turco-Egyptian-Albanian notables were also trying to negotiate. Hence the conflict among these social strata lasted till 1952.⁴⁶

Al-Wafd, as most contemporary post-war nationalists of the countries under colonial rule, was inspired by the US President Woodrow Wilson's 'Fourteen Points', addressed to the American Congress on January 8, 1918. Wilson touched on the issue of colonialism, declaring that the adjustment of all colonial claims would have to consider the interests of the populations concerned. Despite having not explicitly citing the principle of 'self-determination', his wartime rhetoric carried a promise of a new international order which would assure self-determination for all people.⁴⁷ In early 1919, Zaghlul and his friends were busy organizing a forum for public opinion which would unify all Egyptians for independence; this was so effective that the fellaheen joined the urban nationalists, Muslims and Copts stood together in solidarity, even the women of Egypt of all classes joined in public demonstrations.⁴⁸ The British authorities, increasingly anxious on the growing unrest, moved forcefully against al-Wafd and subsequently Zaghlul and several of his confederates were arrested on March 9, 1919. However, this urged a massive wave of strikes and demonstrations all over Egypt in which 800 Egyptians and 60

⁴⁶ Turkkaya Ataov, *Afrika Ulusal Kurtuluş Mücadeleleri* (African National Independence Struggles) (Ankara: AU SBF Yayınları, 1975), 36.

⁴⁷ Erez Manela, "The Wilsonian Moment and the Rise of Anticolonial Nationalism: The Case of Egypt", *Diplomacy & Statecraft*, Vol.12, No.4 (December 2011), p.103.

⁴⁸ Harris, *Nationalism and Revolution in Egypt*, 92.

British soldiers were said to have been killed.⁴⁹ After these demonstrations Zaghlul and his associates were released and allowed to go to Paris, where the Peace Conference would not provide successful results. In the following month, the deepest disappointment was sparked by the American recognition of the protectorate on April 19, 1919. However, the relations between colonizer and colonized were transformed in post-war international conjuncture, eventually Britain had to formulate a unilateral declaration of independence for Egypt on February 28, 1922, though remaining a powerful hand to intervene in case of a 'need' for defense of Egypt against all foreign aggression and interference for the protection of foreign interests and minorities in Egypt. Subsequently, the Sultan took the title of King Fuad and a new constitution was finalized in 1923. The first elections in which Wafd would secure 90 per cent of the votes⁵⁰ were held in September 1923 and February 1924. Finally, the Wafd was founded as a formal political party in 1924.

In November, 1924, Sir Lee Stack, the governor-general of Sudan and commander-in-chief of the Egyptian army, was assassinated in Cairo. Immediately after, Allenby delivered an ultimatum to the Egyptian government: the British required an apology, punishment of the criminals, indemnity of 500.000 pounds, the prohibition of all demonstrations, the withdrawal of all opposition, the withdrawal of all Egyptian officers and troops from Sudan. Hence the representative government in Egypt suffered a set-back before it had a chance to become finally established in the

⁴⁹ Manela, "The Wilsonian Moment and the Rise of Anticolonial Nationalism: The Case of Egypt", 108.

⁵⁰ Harris, *Nationalism and Revolution in Egypt*, 99.

country.⁵¹ The successive governments of Egypt would seek a treaty of alliance with Britain but this objective could not be reached until 1936.

Nationalism had rapidly become a potent force, something that Egyptian entrepreneurs soon became aware, particularly after the formation of the Bank Misr in 1920 with its stated aim of raising Egyptian capital to finance purely Egyptian projects.⁵² One of Britain's strategic actions to disrupt the nationalist units was to concede haute bourgeoisie, some of whom had shares in Bank Misr, a privilege of accepting them as small share holders to foreign companies.⁵³ During the 1920s, governments concerned themselves with three major priorities: providing more money notably for education and for a long-postponed drainage scheme, and maintaining the price of the cotton.⁵⁴ During the 1930s, with the impact of the Great Depression of 1929, the governments were exposed to more pressures, caused by the increase in the customs tariffs, and supplying credits for agriculture, raised locally. The world price of cotton, Egypt's main export, dropped from \$26/*qantar* in 1928 to \$10/*qantar* in 1931. Between 1928 and 1933, the relative value of Egyptian exports is estimated to have declined by one-third.⁵⁵ Many minor and medium manufacturing premises were closed, worker wages were decreased, and the number of

⁵¹ Ibid., p.101.

⁵² Owen & Pamuk, *A History of Middle East Economies in the Twentieth Century*, 36.

⁵³ Ataov, *Afrika Ulusal Kurtuluş Mücadeleleri* (African National Independence Struggles), 40.

⁵⁴ Owen & Pamuk, *A History of Middle East Economies in the Twentieth Century*, 38.

⁵⁵ Israel Gershoni, James P. Jankowski, *Redefining the Egyptian Nation 1930-1945* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 2.

unemployment reach to 300.000.⁵⁶ On the other hand, overpopulation emerged as an essential problem: In 1882, Egypt's population was figured as 6.800.000 persons; in 1917 the figure was 12.700.000 persons, 800.000 of whom were living in Cairo; in 1927 the population increased to 14.217.864 persons and 1.064.567 were living in Cairo.⁵⁷ Meanwhile, something close to a Palace-oriented dictatorship emerged in 1930, when Isma'il Sidqi was appointed prime minister and dismissed the Wafdist-controlled parliament, abrogated the Constitution of 1923 by introducing a more autocratic replacement.⁵⁸

Under the harsh conditions that matured in the circumstances outlined above, the strikes, and the demonstrations increased to a considerable extent during 1935-36. In November 1935, Foreign Secretary Sir Samuel Hoare brought matter to a head with a London speech which joined the Egyptian constitutions of 1923 and 1930 together as unworkable. The protests began in Egyptian University. Cairo had seen nothing like this since 1919.⁵⁹ It was the moment when Egypt's political center of gravity moved out of corridors and parliament onto the street.⁶⁰ There was a violent response by the police to the demonstrations in which several students were killed and hundreds wounded. Further demonstrations erupted in January 1936 and led to

⁵⁶ Ataov, *Afrika Ulusal Kurtuluş Mucadeleleri* (African National Independence Struggles), 41.

⁵⁷ Harris, *Nationalism and Revolution in Egypt*, 106.

⁵⁸ Gershoni, Jankowski, *Redefining the Egyptian Nation 1930-1945*, 2.

⁵⁹ Donald Malcolm Reid, *Cairo University and the Making of Modern Egypt* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 125.

⁶⁰ Anna Alexander, *Nasser His Life and Times* (Cairo: The American University in Cairo Press, 2005), 1.

the dismissal of Prime Minister Tawfiq Nasim Pasha's government.⁶¹ In December, 1935, the 1923 constitution was restored and shortly thereafter the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936 was signed.

Under the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty, Egypt's independence was confirmed and the country entered the League of Nations. The High-Commissioners became simply the British Ambassadors and the British control of the army was relaxed. The officer corps opened to the ordinary citizens – this article opened an essential gate to the impact which could never be predicted at that moment: All members of Free Officers architecting 1952 Revolution were recruited in the army in/after 1936. The 8th article of the Treaty provided British military existence in the Canal Zone; the 11th article gave a bilateral autonomy over Sudan, hence the condition turned back to of Sir Lee Stack's assassination. Last but not least, the Treaty removed the Capitulations.

Some observations include that on the eve of the Second World War, at the very top of society came large landowners, conservative in outlook and inclined to accept British rule if it guaranteed them prosperity and stability; the growing urban middle class such as lawyers, doctors, journalists and officials resented British domination. On the other hand, the peasants had no political voice; the Copts of the towns occupied a large number of government posts and were generally more prosperous than the Muslims and they gradually began to accept the nationalist movement. Although they were noticeably more favorably inclined towards the British; the commercial middle class which was almost entirely foreign—they were

⁶¹ Omnia El Shakry, "Youth as Peril and Promise: The Emergence of Adolescent Psychology in Postwar Egypt", *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 43 (2011), p. 594.

Jews, Syrians, Armenians and Europeans—controlled industry, finance and even some of the smaller trades.⁶²

Consequently, the country was having political, economic, demographic and social difficulties during the first half of the century and as a response, massive demonstrations and grave feeling of disappointment gave rise to nationalist movements and motivations to reach an absolute independence of the country. This would not be easy, especially after the disappointment of the 1936 Treaty. The nationalists came to this point as also indicated with Nasser's own words: "But their agreement, when it came, dealt a severe blow to my expectations."⁶³

2.3. The Emergence of Muslim Brotherhood as a Challenge to British Imperialism

European political, cultural, and economic penetration under the hegemony of the British and the non-native Muhammad Ali dynasty caused a crisis environment in late the 19th and early 20th centuries, consequently nationalism under the leadership of Ahmad Urabi, Mustafa Kamil and Saad Zaghlul and Islamic reformism theorized by Muhammad Abduh and his disciples rose from this environment. However, these intellectual and sociopolitical movements had failed to liberate Egypt from the British yoke, the corrupting cultural and economic influences of the West and the misrule of the Palace and the politicians. On the other hand, the Egyptian leadership failed to synthesize an ideological formula to shape the process of nation-building

⁶² Hopwood, *Egypt: Politics and Society 1945-1990*, 19.

⁶³ Gamal Abdul Nasser, *Egypt's Liberation The Philosophy of the Revolution* (Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1955), 51.

and socio economic development.⁶⁴ An organization which sought to resist the West via strictly obeying the very indigenous aspect of Egypt, Islam was to fill in this space under the leadership of Hasan al-Banna. Al-Banna was born in October 1906, in Mahmudiyya as a disciple of an Azhar University alumni, Shaykh Muhammad ‘Abduh. At the age of twelve, he was enrolled in a primary school where he joined the Society for Moral Behavior, the purpose of which was to sensitize its members to moral offences.⁶⁵ That was followed with his membership to the Society for the Prevention of the Forbidden; the Order of the Hasafiyya Brothers, and the Hasafiyya Society for Charity, where he met with Ahmad al-Sukkari who played an important role in developing the idea of the Society of the Muslim Brotherhood.⁶⁶ At the age of sixteen in 1923, he left the Teacher’s Training School and entered Dar al-‘Ulum in Cairo. Through the years in which al-Banna’s intellectual and emotional apparatus was taking shape, the two continuous influences on his training so far had been classical Islamic learning and the emotional discipline of Sufism.⁶⁷ There was absence of a stable unity in the leadership stemming from the dispute between the Wafd and the constitutionalist parties. There was also a rising tendency, encouraged by the revolt in Turkey under Mustafa Kemal’s leadership, to go for non-Islamic solutions to get rid of British dominance, and an exhaustion of belief in international relations to find a balance of power especially after Wilson had accepted the

⁶⁴ R. Hrair Dekmejian, *Islam in Revolution* (New York: Syracuse University Press, 1985), 80.

⁶⁵ Richard P. Mitchell, *The Society of the Muslim Brothers* (London: Oxford University Press: 1969), 2.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 2.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 3.

protectorate over Egypt, did play an essential role in al-Banna's endeavor of finding a gate in which Egyptians would live an Islamic way of life with sovereignty on their own territory, which had suffered under years of foreign occupation.

Al-Banna graduated from Dar al-'Ulum in 1927, and was immediately assigned to teach Arabic in a primary school in the Suez Canal Zone city of Isma'iliyya in which the European managers of the Suez Canal Company resided in luxurious accommodation while Egyptians lived in miserable dwellings. Al-Banna wanted to awaken the people to the problems existing in Isma'iliyya and to lead a process of reform, in accordance with his vision of Islam.⁶⁸ Through the mosque and the school he familiarized himself with the chief personalities, used also coffee houses to create an audience that would consist mainly of laborers, small merchants and civil servants.⁶⁹ His charisma and his personality was a unique embodiment of a Sufi spiritualist, an Islamist scholar and an activist leader⁷⁰. He supported the creation of the Young Men's Muslim Association in 1927. In March 1928⁷¹, with six followers, Hafiz 'Abd al-Hamid, Ahmad al-Misri, Fu'ad Ibrahim, 'Abd al-Rahman Hasab Allah, Isma'il 'Izz and Zaki al-Mughrabi⁷², he launched the Society of the Muslim Brothers, to be defined as the Brothers, the Brotherhood or the Society from here on. The claim of the Brothers was to give their proud support to the Muslim

⁶⁸ Mohammed Zahid, *The Muslim Brotherhood and Egypt's Succession Crisis* (London: I.B. Tauris Publishers, 2010), 71.

⁶⁹ Mitchell, *The Society of the Muslim Brothers*, 7.

⁷⁰ Dekmejian, *Islam in Revolution*, 80.

⁷¹ The official foundation is accepted by many historians and observers as 1929.

⁷² Harris, *Nationalism and Revolution in Egypt*, 149.

Egyptians who had neither dignity nor sovereignty in the presence of foreign domination.

In the first three years of the life of the Brothers, its primary aim was to enlarge its membership in and around Isma'iliyya.⁷³ This was a difficult task, however the conditions of the time were convenient because the Egyptian people were longing for security, a sense of personal worth and clear answers to what was needed and what must be opposed, a feeling mostly triggered by the British control, the accelerating exodus from countryside to city and the added hardship brought by the depression years of the 1930s.⁷⁴ In addition, the Brotherhood gathered the strength for existence in Egyptian political life and for resistance against the Egyptian status quo by the help of the following aspects: First, the Society maneuvered well in vacuum of legitimacy among the Muslim world which emerged after Turkey abolished the caliphate in 1924; second, the Society took advantage of the rivalry between the Egyptian nationalists politically organized behind Sa'd Zaghlul and the British by getting support from the latter.⁷⁵ Within a couple of years, the branches of the Brotherhood were opened in Isma'iliyya, Port Said and Suez. All new branches were founded on the same pattern: the establishment of the headquarters was followed by the creation of some project or another- a mosque, a school, a club, or a small home industry -which came to serve as a focus for the

⁷³ Mitchell, *The Society of the Muslim Brothers*, 9.

⁷⁴ L. Carl Brown, *Religion and State: The Muslim Approach to Politics* (Columbia University Press, 2000), 144.

⁷⁵ Recep Boztemur, "Mısır'da Halk Hareketleri, Müslüman Kardeşler ve Demokrasinin Geleceği" (Popular Movements, Muslim Brotherhood and the Future of Democracy in Egypt), *Adam Akademi*, Vol.1, No.2 (December 2011), 63.

interest or activities of the community.⁷⁶ Between 1929 and 1932 the movement grew – it had five branch offices by 1930, 15 by 1932 and 300 by 1938.⁷⁷ Thus, in a short period of time, the Brothers significantly increased the number of its branches and membership grew in size with the support of the following three factors: the services they provided to the people, such as education for boys and girls, cheap medical care, financial help; the extensive use of the mosques as the mosques were the only places where the government would permit large congregations to gather; and the charismatic qualities of al-Banna himself.⁷⁸

The structure of the society was constructed upon the following hierarchy: The top position was of the General Guide (*al-murshid al-'amm*), who was both head of the Society and chairman of its two major governing bodies, the General Guidance Council (*maktab al-irshad al-'amm*) and the Consultative Assembly (*al-hay'at al-ta'isiyya*).⁷⁹ The General Guide was to be elected from the Assembly at a meeting attended by no less than four-fifths of its members with three-quarters of those in attendance approving.⁸⁰ The Supreme Guide could be removed at any meeting attended if the action was agreed upon the same rate.⁸¹ The General Guidance Council was stated to be the highest administrative unit of the Society. The number of the members of the Council varied between 12 and 20. A secretary-

⁷⁶ Mitchell, *The Society of the Muslim Brothers*, 9.

⁷⁷ Zahid, *The Muslim Brotherhood and Egypt's Succession Crisis*, 72.

⁷⁸ Ibid.

⁷⁹ Mitchell, *The Society of the Muslim Brothers*, 165.

⁸⁰ Ibid.

⁸¹ Ibid., p. 166.

general, who would be the chief representative in all official, legal and administrative operations, would be elected by the Assembly among the members of the Council.⁸² The Consultative Assembly was described as the general consultative council and the general assembly of the Guidance Council.⁸³ The Assembly was to hold annual meetings during the first month of each Hijra year; its agenda would include the Guidance Council's report on activity for the coming year, the auditor's report for the past year, the budget for the coming year, and the election of the members for seats vacated by the expiration of terms.⁸⁴ These three organs of the organization would meet in Headquarters in Cairo, where the technical operations were also observed. The technical operations led by six committees were directly responsible to the Guidance Council: financial, policy, legal, statistics, services and legal opinions and by ten sections, concerned with the ideology or indoctrination: propagation of the message, labor, peasants, family, students, liaison with the Islamic world, bodily training, professions, press and translation and the Muslim Sisters.⁸⁵ Finally, the field apparatus, consisted of the Administrative Office on the top, followed by the District Office and the Branches, would reach the message of the Council to the operating membership groups.⁸⁶ Each branch was required to follow a strict program of activity which might include the establishment of an evening school to combat illiteracy and give comprehensive lectures on Islam; charitable and social

⁸² Ibid., p. 167.

⁸³ Ibid., p. 165.

⁸⁴ Ibid., p. 168.

⁸⁵ Ibid., p. 170.

⁸⁶ Ibid., p. 176.

welfare work among the sick and the needy; organized physical training to promote the health of the Brothers.⁸⁷ The membership degrees are defined as ‘assistant’; ‘related’; ‘active’ and ‘struggler’.⁸⁸ The revenues of the Society derived primarily from these members’ membership fees, contributions, legacies, and the profits from its enterprises, publications and like.⁸⁹

Hasan al-Banna devoted deep attention to education and to village welfare work. Special committees were set up to establish primary, secondary and technical schools for boys and girls. They also had special technical schools for the workers in industrial centers. A Brotherhood society was founded for the purpose of raising the standard of living in villages throughout Egypt with activities such as feeding the poor on “soup-kitchen” basis, bringing electricity for lighting, collecting alms for the poor, and etc.⁹⁰ Such activities of the Muslim Brothers were varied since one of their objectives was to prove that Muslims could be self-sufficient and could collaborate in raising the standard of living of the whole Islamic community.⁹¹

Al-Banna was transferred to another government school in Cairo in 1934, thus the Society moved to Cairo and steadily spread throughout Egypt. The first members of the Society were humble Egyptians: the lowest workers, the poorer peasants, impoverished students – the undernourished and the underprivileged of all

⁸⁷ Harris, *Nationalism and Revolution in Egypt*, 154.

⁸⁸ Mitchell, *The Society of the Muslim Brothers*, 177.

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 180.

⁹⁰ Harris, *Nationalism and Revolution in Egypt*, 155.

⁹¹ *Ibid.*

classes.⁹² Banna's advocacy of a moral political order rooted in Islamic principles and precepts, mixed with an appeal to Egyptian nationalism, struck a responsive chord in peoples of middle-class and rural backgrounds.⁹³ Among the conflicting ideologies of Egypt, which included Islamic reformism (Muhammad Abduh); Pharaonic nationalism (Taha Husayn); Western liberalism (Nahhas Pasha); Islamic fundamentalism (Hasan al-Banna); right-wing nationalism (Ahmad Husayn), and communism⁹⁴; the Muslim Brotherhood managed to respond to the socio-political problems of some Egyptians. Thereby, in a considerably short time period, the members of the Brotherhood included an extensive number of students from al-Azhar University; civil servants and other white-collar workers; urban laborers; some officers and many soldiers of the Egyptian army; and a large number of the peasantry and even a considerable number of converts from the ranks of the Wafd Party, as well as from the Young Muslim Men's Association and from Young Egypt.⁹⁵

During the influence of the Muslim Men's Association there was return of Islamic sentiments to the center of Egyptian thought in the 1930s and 1940s. Numerous Egyptian authors turned to writing about Muhammad, early Islamic history, and Islamic civilization after 1930. On the other hand, many of the leading periodicals of the period, including some noted for Westernizing and secularist nature of their message in the past, now gave a central place to the publication of

⁹² Ibid., p. 157.

⁹³ Joel Gordon, *Nasser's Blessed Movement* (Cairo: The American University in Cairo Press, 1996), 18.

⁹⁴ Dekmejian, *Islam in Revolution*, 28.

⁹⁵ Harris, *Nationalism and Revolution in Egypt*, 158.

material on Islamic themes.⁹⁶ There appeared biographical studies of the Prophet Muhammad, intellectual production concerned with the history, civilization and, and values of Islam. At that moment, Egyptian periodicals played an essential role in deepening the Islamic orientation. Some of the periodicals are listed as follows: *Al-Manar* of Muhammad Rashid Rida; *al-Fath* of Muhibb al-Din al-Khatib; *Majallat al-Hidaya al-Islamiyya* of the Society of Islamic Guidance; *Majallat al-Shubban al-Muslimin* of the Young Men's Muslim Association; *Nur al-Islam* of al-Azhar with a monthly run of 10.000 copies.⁹⁷ Various periodicals of the Muslim Brotherhood took the place: 1933 - *Majallat al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin* (the Newspaper of the Muslim Brothers); 1938 - *al-Nadhir* (the Warner); *Majallat al-Manar* (the Lighthouse) of Rashid Rida; 1942 – *al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin* (the Muslim Brothers); 1946 – daily published *Jaridat al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin* (the Newspaper of the Muslim Brothers); 1950 – *Minbar al-Sharq* (the Minbar of the East); 1950 – *al-Mabahith* (the Researches) and from 1951 to 1956 *Majallat al-Da'wa* (the Message).⁹⁸

With the onset of the periodicals during that era, the Muslim Brotherhood shared common beliefs with the Muslim reformers on the backwardness of the Muslim societies; meanwhile accepting that Islam's decline began after the first four caliphs. Al-Banna recognized the social need for a reform program, however in contrast to Muhammad Abduh and like-minded modernists; he did not recognize any

⁹⁶ Gershoni, Jankowski, *Redefining the Egyptian Nation 1930-1945*, 55.

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 61.

⁹⁸ Mitchell, *The Society of the Muslim Brothers*, 186.

intellectual necessity for a restatement of Islamic doctrine, he even believed that Islamic modernism had gone too far which would threaten the fundamentals of Islam.⁹⁹ Al-Banna did not maintain his formal links with Sufism after the creation of his own organization but unlike many of his followers, he never violently attacked or lost his faith in the validity of ‘pure’ and ‘true’ Sufism.¹⁰⁰ According to the Brothers’ ideology, there were two kinds of imperialism: ‘external’, the brute force of the occupier and ‘internal’, spread through dejection and moral defeat.¹⁰¹ An Islamist interpretation of nationalism was developed against the threat of ‘imperialism’ and like most of the other Islamist nationalists of his period, al-Banna was against secularly derived territorial nationalism as that would bring disunity to the Muslim world. To this opinion, assuming that man was created in the image of God but was defined by geography or race, modern nationalism thus negated the principles of the unity of humanity and the equality of all before God.¹⁰² In a parallel manner, the rector of al-Azhar, Sheikh Muhammad Mustafa al-Muraghi would declare to an Egyptian newspaper that he had no views on Arab nationalism and that the concept did not interest him at all as Islam did not differentiate between the Arab and non-Arab and that the Muslim Umma was indeed a unity in which ethnicity played no

⁹⁹ Harris, *Nationalism and Revolution in Egypt*, 161.

¹⁰⁰ Mitchell, *The Society of the Muslim Brothers*, 214.

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*, p. 218.

¹⁰² Gershoni, Jankowski, *Redefining the Egyptian Nation 1930-1945*, 81.

part.¹⁰³ Al-Banna's nationalist approach and opinion on Egyptian territorial nationalism can be summarized with his own words quoted by Jankowski as follows: The point of contention between us and them is that we define the limits of patriotism in terms of creed, while they define it according to territorial borders and geographical boundaries. For every region in which there is a Muslim who says "There is no God but God, and Muhammad is His Prophet," is a homeland for us, having its own inviolability and sanctity, and demanding love, sincerity, and striving for the sake of its welfare. All Muslims in these geographical regions are our people and our brothers; we are concerned about them, and we share their feelings and their sensibilities. The advocates of patriotism alone [*al-wataniyya faqat*] are not like this, since nothing matters to them except the affairs of that specific, narrowly delimited region of the earth.¹⁰⁴

The pan-Islamic approach of the Society to the residents of other countries was deepened, now with an Arab motive, with the Arab revolt which took place in Palestine, starting with a general strike in 1936. 1936 is very significant in the Society's history, because the organization evolved from a religious missionary organization to a bold political organization engaged with the affairs of Muslims beyond Egyptian boundaries. Notwithstanding, the demographic changes under way in Palestine not only concerned the Muslim Brotherhood, but also most urban, educated Arabic-speaking people of the Middle East. This issue would unite all the

¹⁰³ Dawisha, *Arab Nationalism in the Twentieth Century*, 84.

¹⁰⁴ Gershoni, Jankowski, *Redefining the Egyptian Nation 1930-1945*, 82.

Arab nationalists, the Islamists and the believers in Greater Syria.¹⁰⁵ The revolt would last for three years, claiming the lives of three thousand Arabs, two thousand Jews and six hundred British.¹⁰⁶ Although being distant from Arab nationalism, Egyptians' attention was moved for the second time beyond the boundaries of their country.¹⁰⁷ Egyptian businessmen were worried that Jewish ascendancy would eventually lead to the establishment of a Jewish state which could become an economic threat to Egypt by forming a physical barrier that, at a minimum, would hinder country's commercial relations with the Near East markets.¹⁰⁸ There was also a fair of foreign intervention in case of unrest against the establishment of a Jewish state. The Jewish agency and Representatives from Arab Governments held a meeting at the St. James Conference of Arab Palestinians in London in 1939 and were unable to reach a concrete solution. This environment provided the convenient conditions for the Society to become involved actively in 'political' issues with a motivation brought upon by the targets that pointed to the fifth conference of the organization in January 1939. Here al-Banna defined the organization as 'a Salafiyya message, a Sunni way, a Sufi truth, a political organization, an athletic group, a cultural-educational union, an economic company and a social idea' as quoted by Mitchell.¹⁰⁹ The Brothers ran campaigns for collecting funds to aid the Palestinian Arabs during the revolt 1936-1939 and were demonstrating and assembling speeches

¹⁰⁵ Dawisha, *Arab Nationalism in the Twentieth Century*, 107.

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 108.

¹⁰⁷ The first was when Syrians launched an uprising against French in 1925.

¹⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 111.

¹⁰⁹ Mitchell, *The Society of the Muslim Brothers*, 14.

on behalf of their cause.¹¹⁰ With an increasing anger against the British, a number of groups appeared in Egypt staging attacks against British military camps between 1937 and 1942.¹¹¹

At the sixth general conference of the Muslim Brothers, held in January 1942, it had been decided that the Society would run candidates in national elections at the right time.¹¹² Nahhas Pasha made a call for new elections in February 1942. Al-Banna declared himself a candidate for a district of Isma'iliyya; however he was soon convinced to withdraw against the following conditions: freedom for the movement to resume full-scale operations; a promise of the government action against the sale of alcoholic drink and against prostitution.¹¹³ Nahhas took precautions for the latter; however this did not hinder his intentions of closing down all branches except for the headquarters of the Society in late 1942.

The unit called 'the special action' or 'special unit' (*al-nizam al-khass*) or 'the secret apparatus' (*al-jihaz al-sirri*) came into existence in late 1942 or early in 1943.¹¹⁴ In February 1945, the Special Unit engaged in its first offensive against British troops and Egyptian Jewish groups for their perceived cooperation with the Zionist movement in Palestine.¹¹⁵ Recognizing the eminent danger, Nuqrashi Pasha, dissolved the organization by proclamation under the martial law which was in force

¹¹⁰ Ibid., p. 16.

¹¹¹ Zahid, *The Muslim Brotherhood and Egypt's Succession Crisis*, 75.

¹¹² Mitchell, *The Society of the Muslim Brothers*, 26.

¹¹³ Ibid., p. 27.

¹¹⁴ Ibid., p. 30.

¹¹⁵ Zahid, *The Muslim Brotherhood and Egypt's Succession Crisis*, 76.

during the War in Palestine. The Muslim Brothers, who were then thought to number nearly two million, were driven underground.¹¹⁶ Nuqrashi paid this action with his life. And seven weeks later, al-Banna was assassinated by ‘some supporters of the government’ or by unidentified people working under the service of the government on February 12, 1949. The time period from al-Banna’s assassination to July Revolution will be analyzed in the following chapter.

2.4. Social Origins of the Muslim Brotherhood

The Muslim Brotherhood was established as a religious organization in 1928 in Isma’iliyya where Hasan al-Banna had a modest conservative upbringing in rural Egypt.¹¹⁷ The Society had tiny connection with Cairo within the first four years; in this time period there were branches along the eastern edge of the Delta in Isma’iliyya, Port Sa’id, Suez, and abu-Suwayr, and on the western edge as far as Shu bra Khit.¹¹⁸ It can be outlined here that the first members and supporters of the Society were mostly the peasants of the Egyptian countryside. At this time, the rural community of Egypt, the *fallahin*, constituted about eighty per cent of the total population.¹¹⁹ The main reason of the poverty and ignorance of the *fallah* was the progressive reduction in the size of the average landholding; a fact being proved by the rate that 7 per cent of the total number of landowners owned about 70 per cent of

¹¹⁶ Harris, *Nationalism and Revolution in Egypt*, 185.

¹¹⁷ Zahid, *The Muslim Brotherhood and Egypt’s Succession Crisis*, 69.

¹¹⁸ Mitchell, *The Society of the Muslim Brothers*, 9.

¹¹⁹ Harris, *Nationalism and Revolution in Egypt*, 107.

the land of Egypt.¹²⁰ The Society is known to provide education and welfare work in the villages. With this purpose, a Brotherhood society was founded aiming to raise the standard of living in villages by establishing model farms, bringing electricity for lighting, helping the orphaned children, building mosques and etc.¹²¹

The Brotherhood's connecting with the working classes would realize once al-Banna was transferred to Cairo in 1934. Here, the Society would organize its own labor unions to compete with the Left¹²² on recruiting working class seeking for a better way of life and reform in Egypt. At the end, the first members of the Society would be humble Egyptians, the lowliest workers, the poorer peasants, improvised students and the underprivileged of all classes.¹²³

The circle of the members enlarged progressively. It is known that the Society had connections with headmen of the villages in rural part and that it recruited elites, educated young students, civil servants, policemen and army officers in urban part of Egypt. The extent of the Brotherhood's connection with the wealthy strata of the Egyptian society can be well proved with the Society's stance supporting limiting the ceiling of the land property to 500 acres whereas the revolutionary regime of the Free Officers intended to keep it 200 acres during the discussions of the land reform.

¹²⁰ Ibid.

¹²¹ Ibid., 155.

¹²² Gordon, *Nasser's Blessed Movement*, 19.

¹²³ Harris, *Nationalism and Revolution in Egypt*, 157.

The regime would also discover the fact that the supporters of the Society were not only the poor peasants, but also the educated urban elite were recruited. Once the Society got re-organized with the help of Qutb's theoretical leadership, the regime perceived the Society again as a potential threat. The discovered assassination attempt to Nasser then provided the reason to launch a second wave of assault against the Brotherhood in 1965. After checking the profiles of the members whom were arrested, the regime recognized that the member portfolio of the Brotherhood had gone too far as most of the arrested members were middle class men including lawyers, scientists, doctors, businessmen, university professors, teachers and students.¹²⁴

Analyzing the time period between 1928 and 1970s, it can be argued that the number and the variety of the social origins of the members increased steadily in time as the Society was talent to respond to the demands of whom were seeking for a solution to the difficulties of his daily life. For instance, when the tight link between the higher education and public employment in Egypt began to loosen in the mid-1970s, the Brotherhood promptly took action by recruiting some of this unemployed educated 'lumpen elite'.¹²⁵

¹²⁴ Recep Boztemur, "De-Radicalization of Political Islam in the Middle East: The Case of the Egyptian Brotherhood", *Journal of Oriental and African Studies*, Vol.12, (2003), 160.

¹²⁵ Wickham, *Mobilizing Islam*, 37.

CHAPTER 3

THE ROLE OF THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD IN JULY REVOLUTION

3.1. Rise of the Free Officers Movement

Analyzing the aftermath of the Second World War, from an international perspective, it became evident that the driving forces were the United States and the Soviet Union. A victorious Britain based her image on an illusionary power which lumbered the conditions for the empire so hard that she had to get her troops out of India, an action which would affect her fate in all colonial lands, including that of Egypt's. The mass stemming from the financial and socio-political consequences of the war gave discontent to the people of the colonials a certain dissatisfaction which would lead them to search for a solution. The solution could either be to topple the statuesque through revolutions, like what happened in Eastern Europe, or to gather the opposition organized as indigenous powers seeking an answer to what was to be done within the frame of the current status quo. From an internal aspect of Egypt, there stood the country in which the hatred towards the foreign occupation was rising day-by-day, the legitimacy of the palace and the leadership of governance was considerably decreased among the minds of its citizens whom had a tendency to go for other groups which positioned themselves apart from the traditional politicians or established political parties.

The following events need to be put forth for further consideration since each played role as an impetus for the emergence of the Free Officers Movement: 1936

Anglo-Egyptian Treaty; British ultimatum of 1942; the economic development during the Second World War; Egypt-Britain negotiations of 1946-47; United Nations Security Council's decree on partition of Palestine in 1947 and 1948 Arab-Israeli War.

As touched on in the previous chapter, The 1936 Anglo-Egyptian Treaty granted Egypt sovereignty over the military, while the British would remain in the country. The treaty, which provided an occupation force of 10,000 men in the Suez Canal Zone, granted Britain the right to reoccupy the country in the event of an international crisis.¹²⁶ This article would be resisted by Egyptian nationalists till the absolute evacuation of the British troops. However, positive feature of the Treaty was that it freed the Egyptian government from previously imposed constraints on the military budget and the number of the Egyptians to be recruited. In 1936 the armed forces consisted of 398 officers and 11,991 noncoms and enlisted men. The numbers soon reached 982 and 20,783, respectively. To bolster the officer corps, the high command doubled the size of the yearly entering class in the military academy from 150 to 300 cadets and shortened the course of study from nearly two years to twelve months.¹²⁷ In particular, the founders of the Free Officers' movement and most of those who composed its inner circle all entered the academy between 1937 and 1939. The second rank of the movement, the bulk of membership, followed them

¹²⁶ Gordon, *Nasser's Blessed Movement*, 41.

¹²⁷ *Ibid.*

in the early 1940s. Of the junior officers who entered the academy prior to 1936, few became involved in political activity.¹²⁸

Britain imposed martial law and reoccupied the country with the outbreak of the war because of a perceived threat from Italian troops in Libya and Farouk's ties to Italian advisors and his sympathy to the advanced German army and the upper technology of the country. After the Prime Minister Ali Mahir of the Sa'idist Party had stated his intention of declaring war on the Axis, the British obtained his dismissal. On 4 February 1942, British tanks surrounded the Abdin Palace in Cairo and King Farouq received an ultimatum from the British ambassador that he must appoint a Wafdist government. The King had to agree on appointing a government of Britain's choice once the Ambassador, accompanied by a party of soldiers and the Commander of British forces in Egypt burst into the palace at around 9 A.M.¹²⁹ Upon the incident, a pro-King cabal of officers, the Iron Guard, emerged among whose prominent members were Captain Mustafa Kamal Sidqi, Anwar Sadat and Kamal al-Din Rifaat. The King, as the injured party and supreme symbol of national sovereignty, grabbed this opportunity to increase his popularity by making visits to the Officer's Club.¹³⁰ There were also reports of meetings in the Officer's Club to consider ways of protesting against the incident, as well as of general unrest and

¹²⁸ Ibid., 42.

¹²⁹ Alexander, *Nasser His Life and Times*, 21.

¹³⁰ P.J. Vatikiotis, *Nasser and His Generation* (London: Croom Helm London, 1978), 102.

dissatisfaction in the officer corps; however stiffened by British support, the new Wafd government threatened courts martial and effected of troublesome officers.¹³¹

Nasser stated his feelings, stemming from the humiliation of the Egyptian dignity, in letter, quoted by Anne Alexander, to an old school friend of his:

As for us, as for the army, this event has been a deep shock; hitherto the officers talked only of enjoyment and pleasure. Now they talk of sacrifice and of defending dignity at the cost of their lives... You see them repenting of not having intervened in spite of their obvious weakness to restore the country's dignity and cleanse its honor in blood. But the future is ours.¹³²

As a result of the apparent British imposition of a Wafd government on the palace, Britain and her Wafdist collaborators earned the resentment of the King and the minority parties as well as widespread hostility of all radical groups, including young army officers.¹³³ Eventually, the Abdin Palace incident gave birth to three essential aspects: The first consequence was that it angered the young army officers; secondly, the ascendance of the palace was discredited among the Egyptians, and finally Wafd lost its mission and charisma of being Egyptian nationalists' defender against Britain as they held a government with the order of Britain herself.

As proved in Abdin Palace incident, on the eve and in the aftermath of the Second World War, the British tried to keep a strong link between the nationalists and the pashas and kings of the Middle East to provide the security of their interest against the Soviet Union while remaining considerable number of troops in major

¹³¹ Ibid., 38.

¹³² Alexander, *Nasser His Life and Times*, 22.

¹³³ Vatikiotis, *Nasser and His Generation*, 90.

cities. There were over 50.000 British troops in Egypt occupying Cairo, Alexandria as well as the Canal Zone.¹³⁴

The profile of the Egyptian economy during and aftermath of the Second World War was as follows: with restrictions on imports during the war, local industries – many still foreign-owned – surged ahead. The influx of troops helped the balance of payments; however just as during World War I, inflation roared ahead at the expense of those on fixed salaries. The cost-of-living index trebled between 1939 and 1945, and then leveled off until 1951.¹³⁵ Once the Second World War was over, Egypt's economy enjoyed a short period of rapid growth, allowing national income to increase by 40 percent between 1945 and 1952.¹³⁶ War-time conditions accelerated urbanization through which several thousand Egyptians would be poured into the cities and drawn into the political life of the country. In such circumstances, the rapid growth of industry attracted peasants of towns, raised the wages of skilled workmen, and stimulated the formation of trade unions. At the height of the war effort, Allied army workshops and services employed over 200.000 Egyptians and through services catering directly for Allied troops, several thousands were employed; however the withdrawal of the bulk of the Allied troops after the war led to an estimated unemployment rate of over 250.000 to which caused much stress and agitation.¹³⁷

¹³⁴ Robert McNamara, *Britain, Nasser and the Balance of Power in the Middle East 1952-1967* (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2003), 16.

¹³⁵ Reid, *Cairo University and the Making of Modern Egypt*, 132.

¹³⁶ Owen & Pamuk, *A History of Middle East Economies in the Twentieth Century*, 128.

¹³⁷ Mitchell, *The Society of the Muslim Brothers*, 35.

In the political life of Egypt, there occurred a deep agitation during 1940s. The actors of this agitation were coming from varying strata of the society, except for the foreign residents, the richer members of the minorities and the Egyptian upper class who were pleased with their life. Many intellectuals, doctors, lawyers and teachers, university students, trained in Europe or in Egypt, searched for a solution to the countries' problems; all options, violent and non-violent, of European or Islamic origin, seemed viable.¹³⁸

The election in 1945 of the Labor government with its professed anti-imperialist leanings encouraged the Egyptians to believe that Britain would change its policy¹³⁹ and that the questions of evacuation and the unity of Egypt and Sudan might be resolved. In an ambitious move, The Wafd submitted a memorandum to the British ambassador in July 1945 seeking a solution for these questions, and the formal note was sent to the British government by Nuqrashi in October 1945. The British answer sent in January 1946 was disappointing as the response noted that it was not convenient to renegotiate both the 1936 Treaty and the evacuation of British troops at the said time. Riots, mostly led by the students of Fu'ad (now Cairo) University, broke out with the motto, "No negotiations without evacuation!" It is observed that university students, divided mainly as the supporters of the Wafd which was in a tactical alliance with the communists, or the Muslim Brothers, which was supported by the National Party and the Young Egypt members, got involved in politics intensively at this time and three features can be listed for the student

¹³⁸ Hopwood, *Egypt: Politics and Society 1945-1990*, 24.

¹³⁹ Ibid.

movement: First, the Muslim Brotherhood proved their drawing power on and off the campus. Second, small communist factions began to make their voice heard. Third, students began reaching out to the trade unions as in the important National Committee of Workers and Students of 1946,¹⁴⁰ which was formed by the Wafd to enlarge the front it commanded.¹⁴¹ The Abbas Bridge incident of February 9, 1946 drove the students to intensely clash with the police, and it further fueled the anti-British sentiment among the resisters. These demonstrations put a great pressure on the government that the new Egyptian Prime Minister, Ismail Sidqi, formed a delegation to enter discussions with the British in Cairo in April 1946. The British side gave positive signs as the British Prime Minister, Clement Attlee, accepted that an alliance between Britain and Egypt should be 'as between two equal partners having interest in common',¹⁴² and that the British troops would evacuate Egyptian cities and bases by September 1949. Finally, it can be argued that although Britain went ahead with evacuations, the negotiations of 1946-47 would not be able to reach a successful settlement between two sides, especially after being distracted by the United Nations Security Council's decree of 1947 on partition of Palestine.

A letter, indicating that the British government favorably viewed the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, was sent by Britain's Foreign Secretary Arthur James Balfour to Baron Walter Rothschild, a leader of the British Jewish community, on November 2, 1917. The letter ignited the

¹⁴⁰ Reid, *Cairo University and the Making of Modern Egypt*, 136.

¹⁴¹ Mitchell, *The Society of the Muslim Brothers*, 45.

¹⁴² Hopwood, *Egypt: Politics and Society 1945-1990*, 26.

Arab-Israeli conflict taking many forms; military, political and economic¹⁴³ and the conflict itself induced an Arab nationalist motivation not only for established and un-established nationalist movements but also for the governments of the region. The Balfour Declaration caused deep concern in Palestine, which would lead to the general strike of 1936 and the Palestinian events of 1936-1939. This time period could be seen as the historical instance, in which, for the first time, the Arab leaderships were to embark on a cooperative effort fueled by a realization of common Arab interests. This was occasioned by the British-sponsored St. James's Conference of Arab Palestinians and the Jewish Agency and Representatives from Arab Governments. The decision of the Arab leaders to meet in Cairo prior to the conference was perhaps the most important by-product of the inter-Arab affairs.¹⁴⁴ The event and the following nationalist aspirations that grew from within the country would lead the Egyptian government, in June 1944, to formally invite the other Arab governments and political leaderships to a conference in Alexandria on the subject of Arab unity and cooperation. At the conclusion of the conference, in which the governments of Egypt, Iraq, Syria, Trans-Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Yemen as well as a representative of the Arab Palestinians were included, the "Alexandria Protocol" was issued and this would be the basis for the establishment of the Arab League in 1945 to be headquartered in Cairo.¹⁴⁵ This unity would be essential for the following years as the "threat of a Jewish state" was about to be realized with Britain's handing

¹⁴³ The advent has called forth many results in the region, however the subject will be dealt only with regard to the aspirations of Egyptian nationalists through this study.

¹⁴⁴ Dawisha, *Arab Nationalism in the Twentieth Century*, 117.

¹⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 123.

over the responsibility for Palestine to the United Nations in February 1947 and General Assembly's partition decree of November 1947. This would result in the declaration of Israeli independence on May 14, 1948, immediately upon which the first Arab-Israeli war began. These incidents would cause Egyptian political aspects as well as the army officers to get political and anger emerged from the feeling of humiliation that Egyptian army was ill equipped and that it was not prepared for such a war at all. Eventually the war in Palestine provided a training ground not only for Egyptian officers and men but also for the paramilitary organizations of the Muslim Brotherhood who fought as volunteers and showed their fighting mettle, for they were fighting for a cause in which they believed and sought death as martyrs to save the Holy Land from the Zionists.¹⁴⁶ It is also observed that the political involvement of many army officers who were later associated with the Free Officer movement occurred within the Brothers-led operations in the Palestine conflict (1947-1949), and those against British in the Suez Canal Zone (1946-1953).¹⁴⁷ The connection between the Free Officers and the Muslim Brothers will be touched on in the following section. Finally, it can be pointed out that the young officers' experiences under fire in Palestine sharpened their focus on the army, their duties as soldiers, and a unique potential for action. Although notions of a political role remained vague, now the army stood at the center of their thinking.¹⁴⁸

¹⁴⁶ Al-Sayyid, *A History of Egypt* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 122.

¹⁴⁷ Vatikiotis, *Nasser and His Generation*, 85.

¹⁴⁸ Gordon, *Nasser's Blessed Movement*, 47.

3.2. The Muslim Brotherhood's Approach to the Free Officers

In the postwar period, cliques of officers attempted a series of political assassinations, and carried out acts of sabotage. Pamphleteering within the ranks provided another outlet for nationalist activity, though the leaflets were directed primarily against unpopular senior officers or against the British military mission, which was accused of providing Egypt with low-quality armaments and minimal training in a deliberate attempt to dominate the Egyptian armed forces. The broader social ideas contained in these leaflets expressed the general reformist outlook prevalent at the time, therefore, Marxists, Muslim Brothers, and their sympathizers could easily support the expressed goals of the clique.¹⁴⁹ With its increasing popularity, the Muslim Brotherhood began recruiting junior officers into its secret organization in the early 1940s.¹⁵⁰ A series of leaflets in the name of "Soldiers of the Free Army" (*Junud al-Jaysh al-Ahrar*) that circulated in 1941 and early 1942 contained clear religious references.¹⁵¹ Five officers who founded the Free Officers' first cell in July 1949, Gamal Abdel Nasser, Abdel Monem Abdel Rauf, Khaled Muhiyeddine, Kamaledine Hussein and Hasan Ibrahim, had been members of the Muslim Brotherhood's Special Unit between 1944 and 1945.¹⁵²

What probably attracted army officers who collaborated with the Brotherhood more than anything else is the existence of a Special Secret Organization (*al-Jihaz*

¹⁴⁹ Gordon, *Nasser's Blessed Movement*, 44.

¹⁵⁰ Ibid.

¹⁵¹ Ibid., s.45.

¹⁵² Zahid, *The Muslim Brotherhood and Egypt's Succession Crisis*, 78.

al-Sirri), which was formed in 1946. In addition, it is probable that officers were active in the Egyptian “underground” after the Second World War and up to the Palestine conflict.¹⁵³ The established parties of the time could not present reliable solutions to liberation of Egyptians from the British dominance. The young officers felt attracted more to the un-established movements like the Young Egypt Society and the Muslim Brotherhood because they were disillusioned that the established ones were cooperating with the occupier. As defined in the previous chapter, the Abdin Palace incident melted the Wafd’s strength and Egyptians’ perception of the Wafdists as the savers of Egyptian nationalist interest. In addition to that effect, the corruption within the Wafd harmed its credibility. With the backing of the palace, Makram ‘Ubayd, the number-two man in the Wafd, published a "Black Book" detailing corruption within the party.¹⁵⁴ Al-Banna took advantage of the corruption, mentioned in this book, to further his organization’s interests by strengthening its image of the defender of the Islamic society in Egypt.

The peak of the Brotherhood’s political power in Egypt was reached when the government used them in Palestine conflict prior to the committal of regular forces in May 1948.¹⁵⁵ On the other hand, the Society had long before become involved in Palestinian affairs when al-Banna’s brother ‘Abd al-Rahman visited Palestine in 1935 and met Haj Amin al-Husayni, mufti of Jerusalem and chairman of the

¹⁵³ Vatikiotis, *Nasser and His Generation*, 89.

¹⁵⁴ Gordon, *Nasser’s Blessed Movement*, 19.

¹⁵⁵ Vatikiotis, *Nasser and His Generation*, 90.

Supreme Muslim Council of that time.¹⁵⁶ Since then, the Brotherhood supported the Palestinians through campaigns in which financial aid was collected. The Arab Higher Committee had requested arms from Egypt and the government rejected the request. However, the Egyptian government then provided arms unofficially by supporting the Brotherhood's militia struggle¹⁵⁷; this was the moment at which the Muslim Brotherhood shone brightly as the brave warriors. In October 1947, al-Banna ordered the branches of the Society to start preparing for jihad; on the 20th, the first battalion went on display.¹⁵⁸ The fighters were financed by the Arab League, trained by volunteers and seconded the Egyptian army officers at Huskstep Camp outside Cairo, and commanded by the Colonel Ahmad Abdul Aziz.¹⁵⁹ It is observed that the Egypt's contribution to the Palestinian struggle was made in 1947-1948 by the Brotherhood.¹⁶⁰

In addition to their increasing charisma through the struggle in Palestine, the Brotherhood dominated the struggle against the regime and the British in Egypt. Their chosen tactics reflected the boycott against British facilities and sporadic guerilla war.¹⁶¹ To actualize the aim of these tactics, the Brotherhood devised a three-fold strategy, consisting of: (1) sabotage; (2) a campaign of religious propaganda to

¹⁵⁶ Mitchell, *The Society of the Muslim Brothers*, 55.

¹⁵⁷ Vatikiotis, *Nasser and His Generation*, 91.

¹⁵⁸ Mitchell, *The Society of the Muslim Brothers*, 56.

¹⁵⁹ Vatikiotis, *Nasser and His Generation*, 86.

¹⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, s.87.

¹⁶¹ *Ibid.*, s.93.

strengthen their ties with village headmen, tribal sheikhs and other local dignitaries; and (3) a campaign to raise money and procure arms ammunition.¹⁶²

In 1944 the Guidance Council authorized the creation of cells in the army and police autonomous from the secret organization; accordingly Hasan al-Banna charged Salah Shadi, a young police officer, with supervising the police cells and delegated the officer cells to Mahmud Labib, a retired major and old warrior from the Ottoman army.¹⁶³ Labib was later chosen by the Council to lead the struggle in Palestine.¹⁶⁴ Under Labib's lead, the Brotherhood spread widely through the officer corps without requiring membership in the Brotherhood as a prerequisite to join the organization. In one of these cells Nasser, Khalid Muhyi al-Din, Kamal al-Din Husayn, 'Abd al-Mun'im 'Abd al-Ra'uf, and several other officers met in one another's homes on a weekly basis from 1945 to 1948.¹⁶⁵ In these meetings, politics and the officers' role in the national liberation struggle was discussed far more than religion. They also circulated pamphlets, some in the name of the "Free Officers" (*Al-Dubat al-Ahrar*), in which they asserted the solidarity of the army with other nationalist forces.¹⁶⁶

On 13 May 1948, two days before the official entry of the Egyptian army into Palestine, the government declared martial law throughout the country.¹⁶⁷ In October,

¹⁶² Ibid.

¹⁶³ Gordon, *Nasser's Blessed Movement*, 45.

¹⁶⁴ Vatikiotis, *Nasser and His Generation*, 86.

¹⁶⁵ Gordon, *Nasser's Blessed Movement*, 45.

¹⁶⁶ Ibid.

¹⁶⁷ Mitchell, *The Society of the Muslim Brothers*, 63.

the government discovered a cache of arms and munitions in Ismailiyya on the estate of Shaykh Muhammad Farghali, the leader of the Brothers' battalions in Palestine. A month later, as a final incident on 15 November thirty-two men were arrested because of being suspected to be in contact with the Brotherhood's secret apparatus.¹⁶⁸ The incident was followed by Nuqrashi's dissolving the organization. Subsequently, the Brotherhood's secret cells in the army were disbanded.¹⁶⁹

After the war in Palestine, many young officers returned back to Egypt, committing themselves to pursuing fundamental changes in the military. For those not committed ideologically to its program, the Muslim Brotherhood had lost much of its appeal in the aftermath of the war. Power struggles within the movement, the reckless adventurism of the secret organization, the cycle of violence preceding and following the Brotherhood's abolition in December 1948, and the leadership vacuum that resulted from al-Banna's death the following February all contributed to a sense of disillusion.¹⁷⁰ Hence, the Brotherhood's organization in the army collapsed. Those officers who remained dedicated to its credo regrouped under different kinds of new leadership. Like the Free Officers, they aided and abetted irregular units carrying out guerilla activities against the British in the Canal Zone during the "popular struggle" in 1951-1952.¹⁷¹

¹⁶⁸ Ibid., 64.

¹⁶⁹ Gordon, *Nasser's Blessed Movement*, 45.

¹⁷⁰ Ibid.

¹⁷¹ Ibid., 46.

3.3. Path to the July Revolution

In 1950, Nahhas, at seventy-one, was back with a Wafdist government; however the Wafd was no longer capable of satisfying the requirements and the needs of the Egyptians. In the conditions of the time in which Egypt had been defeated by Israel and Britain kept troops in the Suez Canal, frustration and opposition was inevitable. Left Wafdist, the Young Egypt, the Muslim Brothers, small Marxist factions, and the clandestine Free Officers, university and secondary students together with the working class all wanted far-reaching change, though they differed on its extent and direction.¹⁷²

The Muslim Brotherhood was the most effective and the most organized of the opposition; however in early 1950, the movement lacked the spirit of solidarity after the founder-leader had been assassinated. In the internal contestation of leadership, Banna's brother, 'Abd al-Rahman al-Banna, and his brother-in-law, 'Abd al-Hakim 'Abdin, both sought to fill his seat. Salih 'Ashmawi, Banna's deputy since 1947 and editor of *Al-Da'wah*, and Sheikh Ahmad Hasan al-Baquri, a former leader of the Brotherhood's student movement whom many believed Banna had chosen as his successor, were considered the leading candidates; however, in the end the four contestants agreed upon selection of a compromise candidate from outside the Guidance Council, Hasan al-Hudaybi.¹⁷³ Hudaybi would accept the leadership provided that his own men got the seats of the Guidance Council. At the end the Brothers whom were once closest to al-Banna found themselves distanced from the

¹⁷² Reid, *Cairo University and the Making of Modern Egypt*, 159.

¹⁷³ Gordon, *Nasser's Blessed Movement*, 29.

inner circle. Hedaybi intended to lead the Society to a more moderate line so that it became more comprehensive. It was clear to the Supreme Guide that the movement was not strong enough to handle such turn over in Egyptian political life. A more comprehensive organization, which would be supported by liberals, conservatives, socialists, Copts and other minorities without hesitation, was needed to topple the statuesque. At the end, it would be proved that this was the main reason why the leader of the revolution was not the Muslim Brotherhood, but a group of young officers from the Egyptian army.

There is little evidence that the Free Officers existed as an organized group until after 1948.¹⁷⁴ The Free Officers, ashamed and bitter soldiers, rose in rebellion to oust "Egyptian traitors" who, by their corruption and self-interest, stood in the same league with the "imperialists."¹⁷⁵ The Free Officers, established in 1949, was one of several conspiratorial groups within the army; among these were Anwar al-Sadat's group that later joined the Free Officers, Mustafa Kemal Sidqi's terrorist organization, and there also existed a large group of officers organized by the Brothers, under Muhammad Labib.¹⁷⁶ This group differed from others in the army in one important respect: the Free Officers remained independent of any particular ideology, party, or leader¹⁷⁷. The only aspect that was commonly shared was anti-

¹⁷⁴ Alexander, *Nasser His Life and Times*, 29.

¹⁷⁵ Gordon, *Nasser's Blessed Movement*, 39.

¹⁷⁶ Dekmejian, *Egypt Under Nasser* (London: University of London Press, 1972), 20.

¹⁷⁷ Gordon, *Nasser's Blessed Movement*, 39.

British nationalism and dissatisfaction with the existing state of affairs.¹⁷⁸ On the other hand, the Officers had strong connections both with the Muslim Brotherhood and the communists; however the relation with the former had larger affects.

The earliest contacts of Hasan al-Banna came as early as 1940, in the person of Anwar al-Sadat, then came the long and dedicated commitment of ‘Abd al-Mun’im ‘Abd al-Ra’uf who would replace Sadat as the liaison man between the officers and the Muslim Brothers once the latter got arrested in 1942. Meanwhile Labib was assisting ‘Abd al-Ra’uf in the task of recruiting the officers.¹⁷⁹ Labib’s most important contact was made in 1944 with Gamal ‘Abd al-Nasser, who would be the leader of the Free Officers once the conditions got matured. The meeting took place on the Tea Island in the Cairo Zoo. Labib is said to have mentioned liberation and the need for the army to begin taking an active part in the affairs of the nation and its future salvation.¹⁸⁰ Labib’s job required diligence; however the charisma and the wide network of the Brotherhood helped him throughout his occasion. For the revolutionaries, the Brotherhood emerged from the war with high prestige, and by adding their presence in Palestine, and becoming the logical associates in the plan for alliance between the army and a ‘people’s’ party.¹⁸¹ On the other hand, some officers got frustrated with enrolling the Brothers’ classes in which they were being

¹⁷⁸ Dekmejian, *Egypt Under Nasser*, 20.

¹⁷⁹ Mitchell, *The Society of the Muslim Brothers*, 97.

¹⁸⁰ Ibid.

¹⁸¹ Ibid., 98.

instructed by civilians;¹⁸² as trained soldiers they knew more about weapons and tactics than their instructors in the Secret Apparatus.¹⁸³

The core of the Free Officers came together in late 1949. The founders all credit Nasser with bringing them together and instigating the formation of a new movement.¹⁸⁴ Nasser turned first to four comrades from his cell in the Muslim Brotherhood: 'Abd al-Mun'im 'Abd al-Ra'uf, Hasan Ibrahim, Khalid Muhyi al-Din, and Kamal al-Din Husayn. The core group quickly expanded to include Baghdadi, 'Amr, and Salah Salim by October 1949. These eight constituted the executive committee, determined that all policy decisions should be put to a vote, and finally elected Nasser as president. With the addition of Gamal Salim and Anwar al-Sadat in the latter half of 1951, the committee expanded to ten members: Nasser, 'Amr, and 'Abd al-Ra'uf (infantry); Ibrahim, Baghdadi, and Gamal Salim (air force); Husayn and Salah Salim (artillery); Khalid Muhyi al-Din (armor); and Sadat (signal corps). Each committee member was responsible for fixing a chain of command to form autonomous cells within his corps.¹⁸⁵ The Free Officers distinguished themselves from other cliques in the army with the unity in the inner core of eleven officers, and with an effective leadership by the chairman of the Executive Committee, Abd al-Nasser. The utilization of cell system, the ability to gather intelligence, and the capacity to move quickly and boldly to preempt the actions of competing groups and

¹⁸² Ibid., 99.

¹⁸³ Alexander, *Nasser His Life and Times*, 31.

¹⁸⁴ Gordon, *Nasser's Blessed Movement*, 47.

¹⁸⁵ Ibid.

the Palace were other aspects contributing to the Free Officer's success of being a well-organized community.¹⁸⁶ It is noteworthy here that an operational command evolved parallel to the executive committee and that by the time of the coup the movement numbered ninety to one hundred officers recruited in every branch of the services except the navy.¹⁸⁷

1951 was the year in which Egypt went through constant demonstrations to which even the impolitic aspects of the society rose up with anti-British motivation. The immediate policies of Britain were even urging: underlining the importance of keeping the Suez Canal open in any conditions during the Cold War, Britain offered a new treaty by which troops would be withdrawn by 1956 if Egypt accepted a number of defense arrangements and agreed to keep the Sudan as a separate issue. However, the offer was totally rejected, both because the withdrawal appeared to be conditional and because of Egyptian insistence on unity with Sudan.¹⁸⁸ As a response, on October 8, the Prime Minister Nahhas Pasha committed Egypt to unilateral abrogation of the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936 and the Sudan Condominium of 1899; the King was then promptly declared as the monarch King of Egypt and Sudan. On the other hand, it is also speculated that Nahhas tried to distract attention from the incompetence and corruption of the government by bringing up the evacuation issue and the problem of Sudan,¹⁸⁹ despite the fact that the new

¹⁸⁶ Dekmejian, *Egypt Under Nasser*, 21.

¹⁸⁷ Gordon, *Nasser's Blessed Movement*, 48.

¹⁸⁸ Hopwood, *Egypt: Politics and Society 1945-1990*, 30.

¹⁸⁹ Al-Sayyid, *A History of Egypt*, 123.

government was popular in the countryside because the Korean war brought a boom in cotton prices.¹⁹⁰

The process through which Egyptian aspects were shaping the politics can be observed by the events in Cairo University where apolitical students occasionally saw the inside of a classroom that semester as students struck, marched and even armed. “Liberation Battalion” drilled on campus. The militant soul was so ingrained that science and pharmacy students are said to have put their knowledge to use in manufacturing explosives and small arms.¹⁹¹ Late in November the University conferred an honorary doctorate on Iranian Prime Minister Musaddiq, who had defied Britain by nationalizing the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company six months before.¹⁹² Anti-British feelings rose to its very zenith and caused the Ministry of Education put its 100-200 British teachers and professors on indefinite leave in late November. On December 9, the government dismissed all British employees.¹⁹³

The Egyptian parliament’s approving the abrogation of the treaty on October 16, 1951 was acclaimed in newspapers, in simple conversations all over the country. Meanwhile Britain strengthened its troop concentrations on the Canal. On the counterpart, the Wafd overlooked the Brotherhood’s and leftists’ militia groups to actively oppose Britain in the Canal Zone. The Wafd allowed the formation of

¹⁹⁰ Hopwood, *Egypt: Politics and Society 1945-1990*, 29.

¹⁹¹ Reid, *Cairo University and the Making of Modern Egypt*, 162.

¹⁹² *Ibid.*, 163.

¹⁹³ *Ibid.*

‘Liberation Battalions’.¹⁹⁴ The Free Officers were also involved, again as armed and trained volunteers for the Liberation Battalions, most of who were from the Brothers. Isma’iliyya was the headquarters of these activities; the chief contact man was the head of the local branch of the Society, Shaykh Muhammad Farghali.¹⁹⁵ Eventually, guerilla war broke out in the Canal Zone between bands of volunteer fighters, the fedayeen and the British Army. The Liberation Battalions launched a series of attacks on British positions and the British responded by occupying Port Said, Isma’iliyya and Suez.¹⁹⁶ Meanwhile, there occurred a political uprising in most major cities that workers from the Canal Zone quit their jobs in a general boycott of foreign companies. This forced the Wafd into promising work for the unemployed in Cairo. The Ismailiyya elementary schools went on strike; transport workers in the major cities walked out, demanding better pay and the nationalizing of the public transport system; textile and pharmacy workers also took action.¹⁹⁷

Ultimately, the Free Officers decided to increase their involvement in politics by putting forward their candidate, General Muhammad Naguib for the Board of the Officer’s Club. The Free Officers defeated the candidates of the King and this brought the officers into direct confrontation with the Palace.¹⁹⁸ Farouq would order the governing board of the Officers Club dissolved on July 16, 1952 and would

¹⁹⁴ Hopwood, *Egypt: Politics and Society 1945-1990*, 30.

¹⁹⁵ Mitchell, *The Society of the Muslim Brothers*, 101.

¹⁹⁶ Alexander, *Nasser His Life and Times*, 37.

¹⁹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁹⁸ Ibid., 38.

replace Muhammad Naguib with his brother 'Ali Naguib. Immediately after this event, the Free Officers acted earlier than they had planned.

In December 1951, British bulldozers and Centurion tanks bulldozed fifty Egyptian mud houses out of the way to open a road for the British army to a water supply.¹⁹⁹ In January 1952, fighting in the Canal Zone reached a very intense level at the top of which the *fedayeen* launched an attack to the British base at Tel al-Kabir. In retaliation, the British chose to attack auxiliary police force which was an easier target than the mobile guerilla units. The Egyptian police, on orders from the minister of the interior, refused to surrender; however they were surrounded by tanks and artillery was used against the building, killing forty Egyptian policemen and wounding seventy before the remainder finally surrendered.²⁰⁰ The following day, 26 January 1952, would be named as “Black Saturday” in Egyptian history. A group of police in Cairo marched to the royal palace protesting the death of their colleagues, thousands of people and university students poured into the streets to join the demonstrations at the end of which the Minister for Social Affairs, Abd al-Fatah Hasan had to make a speech to calm down the crowd. However, people were not satisfied; they called for an absolute boycott of the British, the dispatch of the armed forces to the Canal, and a treaty of friendship with the Soviet Union during a dialogue which is said to have lasted for three hours.²⁰¹ Meanwhile, the feeling of humiliation turned to a grudge with which symbols of royal wealth and colonial

¹⁹⁹ Hopwood, *Egypt: Politics and Society 1945-1990*, 31.

²⁰⁰ Al-Sayyid, *A History of Egypt*, 124.

²⁰¹ Alexander, *Nasser His Life and Times*, 39.

power, the British-owned establishments, clubs, businesses and other belongings to the foreigners were wrecked and burnt. At the end of the day, over 750 establishments were burnt or destroyed; at least thirty people were dead including eleven British and other foreigners and hundreds injured.²⁰² The events were calmed down after the army set its hand. There were rumors that the events had been organized by Ahmad Husain of Misr al-Fatat, and indeed he was later tried for it but the case was shelved when Nasser came to power. Others claimed that the Polish embassy had supplied the sophisticated incendiary materials,²⁰³ however the initiative which organized the events would never be known.

After Black Saturday, the executive committee began to consider its political aims in a broader sphere: by the spring of 1952 the Free Officers began to seriously consider a coup d'etat. The committee created a formal operational command, a separate body charged with responsibility for tactical matters relating to an uprising; the command would be divided into two sectors: Cairo, under the direction of Nasser and Zakariya Muhyi al-Din (infantry), Khalid Muhyi al-Din and Shafi'i (armor), Magdi Hasanayn (supply), and Amin Shakir (signal corps); and al-'Arish, directed by Salah Salim (artillery), Gamal Salim (air force), 'Amr, and Yusuf Siddiq (infantry).²⁰⁴

Nasser was in contact with the Muslim Brotherhood and the DMNL, Democratic Movement for National Liberation. Three names emerge for those who

²⁰² Hopwood, *Egypt: Politics and Society 1945-1990*, 31.

²⁰³ Al-Sayyid, *A History of Egypt*, 124.

²⁰⁴ Gordon, *Nasser's Blessed Movement*, 51.

were likely to be messengers from within the Society of the news that a revolt of army officers was imminent, and that it sought the support of the Brothers: Salah Shadi, the leading member of the Egyptian police in the Society; Hasan al-Ashmawi, a close associate of both Nasser and Hudaybi and the recipient of the arms to be hidden in the estate of his father, Hasan al-Ashmawi, and the third name was ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Sanadi, the head of the secret apparatus.²⁰⁵ . The Muslim Brotherhood and the Free Officers reached a preliminary agreement on the role that the former would play once the day came for the revolution: (1) The members of the Society were to protect the foreigners and foreign establishments (including places of business and diplomacy), of minorities (homes, churches and synagogues), and of strategic centers of communication in the city; (2) the Society would rise the enthusiasm and would fill the streets to ensure the immediate acceptance of the coup; (3) if the police failed to cooperate with the army, the Muslim Brotherhood would dispatch its rovers to fight, and (4) if the movement failed, the Brotherhood would assist in the protection and escape of the Free Officers.²⁰⁶ Therefore, through the whole process there was an absolute secrecy on the connection between the Free Officers and the Muslim Brotherhood to avoid agitating an immediate Western intervention.²⁰⁷

In an attempt to crush the opposition in the army, Farouq dissolved the board of the Officers’ Club on 16 July. On 19 July, Muhammad Naguib heard from one of

²⁰⁵ Mitchell, *The Society of the Muslim Brothers*, 102.

²⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, 103.

²⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, 104.

the cabinet ministers that the government had a list of the leaders of the Free Officers and was planning to arrest them.²⁰⁸ Immediately after, the Free Officers put their plan forward for the night of 22/23 July, although it had been planned for the night of August 2/3 previously.²⁰⁹ Several nights before the coup Nasser informed the Brotherhood contacts of the Free Officers' plans, and asked that they dispatch irregulars to check potential British troop movements along the Suez road, and to safeguard foreign embassies in Cairo. The General Guide Hudaybi consented to these requests.²¹⁰

Muhammad Naguib sat at home throughout the operation on which he is believed to have known a few details. By 3:00 A.M. the officers had secured Cairo, summoned Muhammad Naguib to headquarters, and contacted loyal troops in Alexandria and al-' Arish. In Alexandria, where Farouq summered as routine, Free Officers commanders had been directed not to move until assured of success in Cairo which would come at 7:00 A.M. with Anwar al-Sadat broadcasting the Free Officers' first message to the nation.²¹¹ On 26 July, Farouq would sail to exile, after handing power to his six-month-old son, Prince Ahmad Fu'ad.

²⁰⁸ Alexander, *Nasser His Life and Times*, 41.

²⁰⁹ Ibid.

²¹⁰ Gordon, *Nasser's Blessed Movement*, 54.

²¹¹ Ibid., 52.

3.4. RCC's Consolidation of Power

Immediately after the coup, the Free Officers Executive Committee named itself the Revolutionary Command Council, to be named as RCC hereafter. On the other hand, the junta referred to itself as “the army movement” (*harakat al-jaysh*), “the movement” (*al-harakah*), or the “blessed movement”. Junta members instructed the press not to make any mention of their names and not to print any photos of any except for Naguib.²¹² Muhammad Naguib was chosen by the Free Officers to be the public face of the revolution because as a senior officer in a hierarchical military world, his presence would add weight to their project,²¹³ The general's distinguished performance in the Palestinian war and his known sympathies with the aims of his junior colleagues²¹⁴ spotted Naguib as the right candidate; however he would have to leave after clashing with Nasser in 1954; meanwhile he would become the Prime Minister, War Minister, Commander-in-Chief, Chairman of the RCC in September 1952, and the President the following year.

Although the communists and the Wafdists kept a distance towards the coup, the Muslim Brotherhood was quick to salute the leaders of the revolution. On 26 July, the consultative Assembly of the Society, in extra-ordinary session, drafted and then released on 1 August proceeding expressing their pleasure at the success of “the blessed movement” of the army officers in liberating Egypt.²¹⁵ ‘Abd al-Rahman al-

²¹² Ibid., 62.

²¹³ Alexander, *Nasser His Life and Times*, 44.

²¹⁴ Dekmejian, *Egypt Under Nasser*, 24.

²¹⁵ Mitchell, *The Society of the Muslim Brothers*, 105.

Banna, Hasan al-Banna'a father, is quoted by Mitchell to have made the speech below:

0 ye Brothers, this day your message has come forth. . . . This is a new dawn for you
... and a new day for the nation. Anticipate the dawn, 0 ye Brothers . . . embrace
Naguib and help him with your hearts, your blood, and your wealth. Be his troops . .
²¹⁶

Hasan al-Banna'a father was in fact expressing a widespread view of the Society as the 'inspiration' for the army movement. It was observed also in the books written by members of the Society that the revolution was perceived as the fulfillment of the Brothers' long-awaited goals and the fruit of their painful endeavor.²¹⁷

There was considerable proof that the RCC's intention was to hand the rule over to civil governance as soon as possible. Accordingly, the RCC took decision to ask Ali Mahir, the former Prime Minister, to form a civil cabinet. However, the lack of the harmony between the RCC and the civil cabinet led to his resignation on 7 September 1952. The incoordination between the two sides was a consequence of some of the RCC's radical reform impositions to the cabinet, most of the members of which were conservative civilians.²¹⁸

The new regime quickly legislated measures after getting the rule; the measures were proceedings of the three main reform policies of the RCC to gain the mass public support: 1) The land reform, 2) the abolition of monarchial rule, and 3) the reorganization of the political groups. Indeed, the most essential aspect of the

²¹⁶ Ibid.

²¹⁷ Ibid., 106.

²¹⁸ Dekmejian, *Egypt Under Nasser*, 24.

RCC's social program was land reform, which will be detailed in the following parts of this chapter.

The RCC first handled the short-term reforms which would ensure the sympathy of the public and the continuation of the support of the un-established groups to the revolution: Elimination of the government's summer recess to Alexandria, ending the subsidization of private automobiles for cabinet ministers, and the abolition of the honorific titles bey and pasha, all ordered within the first week after the coup.²¹⁹ Other measures addressed financial inequities against which the government decreed income, profit, and inheritance taxes, pay raises in the military, and 10 to 30 percent decreases in rent.²²⁰ In the following days, the RCC abolished the secret-police section of the ministry on the interior; among the victims of this measure, Muhammad al-Jazzar was the considerable one as he was known with his specialization with the Brothers and with his involvement in al-Banna's assassination.²²¹ The new regime was eager to show its good will to the Brothers, accordingly they promised to investigate the murder of al-Banna. They appointed Rashad Muhanna as one of the three regents of the monarch. In October, they released the political prisoners, most of whom were of the Society; they abolished the student unions in the universities, most of which were organized by either the Wafdist or the communist students.²²² The RCC also tried to respond symbolically

²¹⁹ Gordon, *Nasser's Blessed Movement*, 62.

²²⁰ Ibid.

²²¹ Mitchell, *The Society of the Muslim Brothers*, 106.

²²² Ibid.

to the pronouncements of the Brotherhood that the new regime was needed to be established on the basis of Islam; for instance the popular celebrations on the Prophet's birthday and other religious birthdays were abrogated in December.²²³

The precursor of the new regime's intention of providing the welfare for the long-suffered peasants came with the announcement of the land reform of September 1952. For assistance in drafting a proposal the RCC turned to a young Alexandria University economics professor, Rashad al-Barawi. He argued that an imposed ceiling on landholding would force down the price of land and result in lower agricultural rents. Stability of small owners would insure social stability; at the same time, he stressed the importance of land reform as a means of undercutting the political power of the landed aristocracy by stripping away its economic base. Finally Barawi and the officers settled on a ceiling of two hundred feddans per family.²²⁴ The proposal underscored the difference between the new regime and the failures of the old politicians. Prime Minister Ali Mahir's attempts to restrict the scope of the law were one factor in the conflict which led to his resignation.²²⁵ The land reform appeared to be a radical breakdown with the old regime, as the officers' slogan 'the eradication of feudalism' conjured of images of soviet-style collectivism of agriculture.²²⁶ Moreover, rapid population growth pushed the decision makers for such a reform: by the 1950s, around 16 million people out of Egypt's total population

²²³ Ibid.

²²⁴ Gordon, *Nasser's Blessed Movement*, 62.

²²⁵ Alexander, *Nasser His Life and Times*, 54.

²²⁶ Ibid.

of 22 million were dependent on agriculture; at least 10 percent of Egypt's cultivable land was targeted now for redistribution.²²⁷ Additionally, supporters of land reform had few allies in parliament or at the royal court; meanwhile the Wafd represented the interests of the large landowners, while the royal family held the biggest estates in Egypt.²²⁸ Hedaybi, on the other hand, was also supporting Ali Mahir's proposal of limiting the landownership to 500 *feddans*, not to 200 as the officers recommended.²²⁹ Nonetheless, resistance to land reform would be perceived by the RCC as a resistance to the new regime, the impetus of which would lead the officers to ban all political parties and hold the power in one hand.

3.5. The Dissolution of the Political Parties and the Short-Term Flirtation with the Muslim Brotherhood

During the first six months of their rule, the officers slowly came to see themselves not only as the vanguard of the struggle for national independence but also as legitimate rulers of their country. The moment at which the officers abolished the political parties and assumed direct authority over the country meant the fact that the officers clearly declared their revolution.²³⁰

Interference in the political parties, in fact, was formed first with emphasize on the term, "purification". Between 24 July and 26 July, both Muhammad Naguib and

²²⁷ Ibid.

²²⁸ Ibid., 55.

²²⁹ Mitchell, *The Society of the Muslim Brothers*, 107.

²³⁰ Gordon, *Nasser's Blessed Movement*, 58.

'Ali Mahir admonished the parties to oust corrupt members tainted by affiliation with the old regime.²³¹ However, by eliminating the 'corrupt' members, the old regime's parties would not satisfy the RCC and on September 9, the regime would announce a new party policy. It was simply named as "the Party Reorganization Law". The law defined guidelines for "purification" and gave the government legal authority to intervene in the process. Under the law's terms, all parties were dissolved requiring recertification by the Interior Ministry. As a result, prospective parties were required to file a platform, a list of founding members, and a financial statement by October 7.²³²

The resistance to the Law came mostly from the Wafdist Party as Nahhas was included in the RCC's black list of the corrupt members. The matter not only put the Wafd in a difficult situation before the new regime but also drove infighting between those who back Nahhas and did not accept a step forward without him and the young generation of the party who could leave Nahhas out of the political scene should it be necessary. On September 27 party leaders announced that the Wafd would not apply for recertification. However, on October 6, one day before the deadline for filing, Nahhas relented and 'Abd al-Salam Gum'ah submitted an application to the Interior Ministry on behalf of a new founding committee – Nahhas was listed as the party's honorary president.²³³

²³¹ Ibid., 69.

²³² Ibid., 69.

²³³ Ibid., 73.

By November 8, the government's deadline for rejecting applications, seven parties had been licensed: the Sa'dist, Liberal Constitutionalist, Nationalist, New Nationalist, Wafdist Bloc, Workers, and Daughter of the Nile parties.²³⁴ Three days prior to the deadline the government reneged on its agreement with the Wafd, refusing to accept Nahhas's status as "honorary president" and rejecting the inclusion of another founding member, 'Abd al-Fattah al-Tawil, on grounds of corruption²³⁵; at the end, the case of the Wafd would be taken before the State Council.

On December 10, the government terminated the Constitution with an intention to nominate a committee of fifty experts to draft a new charter that would be submitted to a popular referendum. The constitutional committee of fifty formed on January 13, 1953, consisted of delegates from all the major parties that represented a broad spectrum of the intelligentsia including Egypt's most respected jurists. This included the Wafd, which had five representatives, all friendly to the regime, and the Muslim Brotherhood, which had three delegates.²³⁶

On January 17, the junta decreed the dissolution of all political parties, starting a three-year transitional period during which Muhammad Naguib would be in rule. The Muslim Brotherhood would be kept aside of these developments and be recognized as an organization not a political party.

²³⁴ Ibid., 74.

²³⁵ Ibid.

²³⁶ Ibid., 76.

CHAPTER 4

THE CONFRONTATION BETWEEN THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD AND NASSER'S EGYPT FROM 1954 TO 1970

After emerging as the leader of the Revolution and the new regime, Nasser ensured the legitimacy of his governance by sustaining previously launched populist reforms, came his personal charisma exploded after the Bandung Conference of 1955. Now Nasser had two basic necessities of a leader, a social progress plan and charisma; however a pretentious leader should also have a stable ideology, and this was satisfied after the developments of Bandung. In following days, Nasser became the voice of the non-aligned third world and once nationalizing the Suez Canal after losing his hope of financial aid from the capitalist West, he braced his legitimacy within Egypt as a beloved leader who was backed by millions. Soviet technical and financial support to Aswan Dam brought approach of two states which helped much to shape Nasser's Arab-socialist ideology.

Once securing the mass public support, neither Nasser nor his new regime needed the Muslim Brotherhood. The Assassination attempt of 1954 in Alexandria gave him a valid reason to fight the movement that propagated the mass arrests and an absolute repression over the movement. This policy lasted until 1970, when Nasser died.

4.1. Nasser's Emergence as a Leader and Policy Shifting Towards the Muslim Brotherhood

The political reconstruction started with an enthusiasm: firstly, a Joint Congress was established to avoid any possible clashes between The Revolutionary Command Council and the Council of Ministers. Ali Maher was appointed as the premier of the revolution; though short after he was made to resign as he had rejected the Agrarian Reform. Muhammad Naguib was now appointed as premier. As Nasser would put in 1954 in his book *The Philosophy of the Revolution* with the below statement, the RCC's first intend was to hand the governance to civil authority; though it was not an easy task to accomplish properly:

“The way is that of political and economic freedom, and our role is that of a guardian no more and no less. And our guardianship is only for a specified and limited time.”²³⁷

Once the government annulled the Constitution on December 10, 1952, the intention to nominate a committee of fifty experts to draft a new charter that would be submitted to referendum was also announced. The committee would be formed on January 13, 1953, representing a broad spectrum of the intelligentsia including Egypt's most respected jurists, delegates from all major political parties, and even organizations like the Muslim Brotherhood was represented in the committee by 3 delegates.²³⁸ Although the initiative of the Revolution's intention might have been handing the governance to civil authority, their mistrust to the existing politicians

²³⁷ Nasser, *Egypt's Liberation The Philosophy of the Revolution*, 71.

²³⁸ Gordon, *Nasser's Blessed Movement*, 76.

would hinder their aim as proved on January 17 with the dissolution of all political parties.

The Revolution's initiative's flirtation with the Brotherhood can be densely observed during this transitional period at the end of which Nasser would hold the absolute leadership. There were reasons for both sides to keep close: firstly, the public support behind the Brotherhood would help the leaders of the Revolution to build legitimacy, therefore the RCC was accurate not to bother the Muslim Brotherhood during the process of banning the political parties. Secondly, although the relations were mainly on individual affinity bases and never got a structural shape, the Brotherhood kept being optimistic about the Free Officers' movement from the very beginning. As per the dialogue written in Anwar el-Sadat's autobiography, el-Sadat and Hasan al-Banna discuss the existence of a resistant movement among the army officers, el-Sadat advises that their organization does not follow or serve any particular body or party and that it works for Egypt as a whole, the Supreme Guide appreciates the idea and advises that the cooperation will be sufficient.²³⁹ The optimism retains till early 1954 when the RCC did not need the organization's support anymore. As quoted by Anne Alexander, the immediate actions of the new government had given the Brotherhood such an optimism that the organizations leaders on the Shura Council hailed the success of the officers' 'blessed movement' and even Abd-al-Rahman al-Banna, father of Hasan al-Banna, called on the society to embrace Naguib and help him with their hearts, their blood

²³⁹ el-Sadat, *In Search of Identity An Autobiography*, (Glasgow: William Collins, 1978), 36.

and their wealth.²⁴⁰ At this very first phase, the Guidance Council clarified its support for the army movement in a public statement released August 1. They proposed a new platform on which the new government was to fulfill purging of political parties and the state bureaucracy, the restoration of parliamentary democracy after a constitutional reform, freeing all political prisoners, banning the corrupt party bosses from political life, and taking necessary actions against British occupation.²⁴¹ Vice versa, the new government also supported the Society openly by issuing exceptional pardons to the Brothers' political prisoners, announcing its intention of reopening the case of al-Banna's murder and by supporting the candidates of the Brotherhood in elections to the Cairo University student union.²⁴² The main point that differentiates both sides political stance was the intention of converting Egypt to an Islamic society. Emerged by the government's measures, The Society's optimism towards the RCC was deepened by the intolerance towards the leftists. However, it would be understood soon that the reason laying under the RCC's crushing harshly the strike in Kafr al-Dawwar, or the demonstrations of Alexandria, launched by tens of thousands of textile workers and by tens of students in the university campuses or repressing the trade unions was not stemming from an absolute hatred against the Left, but rather caused by a sense of a threat against their authority without regard for whether it came from the Left or the Right.

²⁴⁰ Alexander, *Nasser His Life and Times*, 56.

²⁴¹ Gordon, *Nasser's Blessed Movement*, 99.

²⁴² *Ibid.*, 101.

Within the same month in which the political parties were banned, the Liberation Rally (*Hai'at al-Tahrir*) was founded to mobilize the popular support.²⁴³ This can be pointed out as the first crack down in flirtation of the RCC and the Brotherhood, as the organization fell in a concern of being made passive and of being melted in the Rally. The tension between the RCC and the Muslim Brotherhood had rose during the dissolution of political parties; although the Brotherhood was defined as a religious movement and was not included in the chart of banned parties, the Movement sensed a threat to their existence. The Liberation Rally was conceived as a replacement for political parties during a 'transitional period' of military rule by the RCC²⁴⁴ However, as a grass-roots political organization the Liberation Rally would not succeed in suppressing its rivals, especially the Wafd and the Brotherhood²⁴⁵, because campuses and factories would remain the key centers of discontent.²⁴⁶

On June 18, the RCC formally abolished the monarchy, declared Egypt as a republic and named Muhammad Naguib president. Hence, the RCC members assumed cabinet portfolios for the first time: Naguib served both as prime minister and the president, Nasser became deputy prime minister and interior minister, Salah Salim minister of national guidance and minister of state for Sudan affairs and Bagdadi war minister.²⁴⁷ Ahmad Hasan al-Baquri, a leading contender for the post of

²⁴³ Ibid., 80.

²⁴⁴ Alexander, *Nasser His Life and Times*, 59.

²⁴⁵ Gordon, *Nasser's Blessed Movement*, 81.

²⁴⁶ Ibid., 82.

²⁴⁷ Ibid., 84.

general guide after al-Banna's murder, was approved as pious endowments and Ahmad Husni, an associate of the Brotherhood was selected as the justice minister.²⁴⁸

On the governance side, Nasser's star started to shine on the public sphere hence drawing a rival to Naguib. The Liberation Rally gave Nasser the first chance to have a public role as secretary-general. However the position in the cabinet gave him the power to negotiate the future of the governance and to carry the argument to the ears and eyes of the public. Nasser used to keep behind the scenes; he was referred to as the power behind the scenes in Cairo, by being mentioned even in an article in *Rose al-Youseff*²⁴⁹. Naguib was the face of the Revolution at the very beginning, however shortly after there was increasing personal conflict between Naguib and Nasser and because the officer's revolution was legitimized among the Egyptians, the public support behind Naguib was not necessary any longer. Hence, Naguib was made to resign. Whether the reason was that Naguib became the symbol of those seeking for parliamentary rule and Nasser the continuation of the military rule or that it was a simple clash of generations, Naguib finally resigned on February 23. Mass public support led by Wafdists, the leftists and the Muslim Brotherhood demanded the reinstatement of Naguib and restoration of the parliament. The RCC could not ignore the public support behind him, and especially the division among the army officers, as a result on February 26, Naguib was placed under house arrest, then soon after he was re-appointed as the President. On 25 March, the RCC lifted the ban on political parties, ended censorship and released the political prisoners; it was then

²⁴⁸ Ibid., 100.

²⁴⁹ Alexander, *Nasser His Life and Times*, 58.

decided that the RCC would hand its powers to a constitutional assemble on July 24 1954. However, things developed differently when Nasser ensured backing of the key sections: A section of the middle class supported Nasser because of the fear to return back into the weak governments of the 1940s; a section of the peasants who had benefited from the land reform, a section of the trade unions, most of the army, the media, the Liberation Rally and even the Muslim Brotherhood, with Hudaybi's instruction the Brotherhood's student members melted away from the protests on the campuses, was now backing Nasser²⁵⁰. Finally, on 17 April 1954 Naguib was made to resign as Prime Minister and Nasser got the seat instead of him.

As previously pointed out, tension increased steadily between the two sides with the following events: 1) During the discussions of the Land Reform, Hudaybi's joining Ali Maher in placing the limit of the landownership to 500 feddans rather than 200 feddans of RCC's argument.²⁵¹ 2) The Guidance Council's decision not to enter the cabinet whereas the RCC requested 3 names to be included in the list of the new cabinet. As the Council did not agree with Hudaybi to enter the government, Shayk Hasan al-Baquri who was already appointed with the previous agreement of Hudaybi and the RCC, was dismissed from the Society.²⁵² Al-Baquri crises showed that the Brotherhood had no real idea about the level of cooperation with the new regime and it also showed that RCC and Hudaybi had fundamentally different views

²⁵⁰ Ibid., 66.

²⁵¹ Mitchell, *The Society of the Muslim Brothers*, 107.

²⁵² Ibid.

of what constituted a just state system.²⁵³ 3) The Society's stance on not to be melted down in Liberation Rally. This showed both sides' mistrust to each other. However, the zenith of the tension and the very break-down of the relations between Nasser and the Muslim Brotherhood caused Nasser's deal with the British for the evacuation of the Canal Zone. The demonstration against the negotiations with the British marched toward the Republican Palace in Abidin with the Brothers pouring in the streets of Cairo, waving napkins stained with blood and chanting slogans against the revolution.²⁵⁴ Despite the resistance rising from different sects of the opposition, the Anglo-Egyptian Evacuation Agreement was signed on October 19; according to the Agreement, the British would evacuate the base in twenty four months while retaining some of their stores and some 1200 civilian experts for a period of seven years. However, the Agreement would de facto be inoperative once Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal Company in 1956. Meanwhile, the clashes between Nasser and the Brotherhood increased day by day and reach to its hysterical zenith on October 26. A week after the agreement was finalized, a member of the group's Secret Apparatus, Mahmud Abd-al-Latif, fired on Nasser while he was giving a speech to celebrate the Evacuation Day²⁵⁵ in al-Manshiah Square, Alexandria. Then came the mass arrests and a dense repression to the Muslim Brotherhood's organization. It can be argued that the widely publicized campaign of repression was conceived to achieve the final repression of any independent political initiative and

²⁵³ Barbara H.E. Zollner, *The Muslim Brotherhood Hasan al-Hudaybi and Ideology* (Oxon: Routledge, 2009), 28.

²⁵⁴ el-Sadat, *In Search of Identity An Autobiography*, 163.

²⁵⁵ Alexander, *Nasser His Life and Times*, 68.

was perceived by large segments of the urban and rural population, quiet independently of their various attitudes about the Brotherhood.²⁵⁶

The regime filled in this space by keeping a close contact with al-Azhar while keeping the latter under strict control. The very zenith of this control took place once the state turned al-Azhar into a government controlled university in 1961.²⁵⁷

4.2. The Muslim Brotherhood under Hedaybi's Guidance

From 8 December 1948, the date on which the government had announced the dissolution of the Brotherhood to 1951 the organization survived in secrecy under the leading circle said to consist of 'Abd al-Hakim 'Abidin (al-Banna's brother-in-law and the Brotherhood's Secretary General), 'Abd al-Rahman al-Banna' (al-Banna's brother), Shaykh Hasan al-Baquri (a respected cleric and a well-known member of the Council), Mustafa Mu'min (the leader of the Brotherhood's students organizations) and Salih al-Ashmawi (the Deputy and the former Head of the Secret Unit).²⁵⁸ It was clear at the time that a new Supreme Guide must be appointed or else the existence of the organization would be under threat. However, as pointed out on the previous pages, according to the constitution of the Society, the General Guide was to be elected from among the Assembly at a meeting attended by no less than four-fifths of its members with three-quarters of those in attendance approving. This was nearly impossible under the mentioned circumstances of secrecy, therefore the

²⁵⁶ Mahmoud Hussein, *Class Conflict in Egypt 1945-1970* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1973), 130.

²⁵⁷ Gabriel R. Warburg, "Islam and politics in Egypt: 1952-80", *Middle Eastern Studies*, 1982, 18:2, 135.

²⁵⁸ Zollner, *The Muslim Brotherhood Hasan al-Hedaybi and Ideology*, 16.

leading group decided to appoint a Supreme Guide, who was to be defined because of the security of the Society against the government's assaults and the violent reputation reasons, from among those whom had not served in the Guidance Council before.²⁵⁹ The election or an appointment of a new Guide would not be possible until after the martial law comes to an end on 1 May 1951. The idea was to find a respected public figure that lacked influence within the Brotherhood as the interim leaders of the organization did not want to give up either the power of the control;²⁶⁰ then came the name of Hudaybi.

Born in 1891, having served in Egyptian judiciary since 1925, and having reached the highest rank by 1940s, Hudaybi was satisfying the Council's needs of appointing a publicly well-respected person. Shortly after he was introduced to Hasan al-Banna, both had a close relation in which Hudaybi assisted al-Banna as a personal advisor;²⁶¹ therefore he was familiar enough with the internal issues of the Society. As a result of this, Hudaybi stood as an appropriate suitor of a Supreme Guide and after some negotiations, Hudaybi accepted the position and resigned from his then current position as a judge and got nominated by the Council as the Guide on 19 October 1951.²⁶²

Hudaybi's most striking step was ordering the dissolution of the Secret Apparatus. The Secret Apparatus was under the order of the Supreme Guide,

²⁵⁹ Ibid., 19.

²⁶⁰ Ibid., 20.

²⁶¹ Ibid., 22.

²⁶² Ibid.

however it was not guaranteed that the Apparatus would be under his control every time. The risk was not in accordance with Hudaybi's moderate approach, but it gave the Guide some enemies and a considerable number of opponents within the organization. The very reason of resisting elimination of the Apparatus was that it was the Secret Apparatus which stood relatively still during the dissolution process started in 1948. Quite a big number of the members considered the Apparatus as a safeguard of the Society, especially during the hard days when the status qua launched harsh assaults on the Organization.

The disintegration of the Society was another matter that Hudaybi had to deal with. Independent from his personality or charisma of leadership, living with the shadow of a super hero, Hasan al-Banna and the very task of satisfying the expectation to fill in the space left once the former was gone left Hudaybi in a difficult situation. In addition to these, his way of living was not appreciated by some of the members: Hudaybi summered in Alexandria, he went swimming, laid on the beach, did not visit the branches in the Upper Egypt in summers during which the distinct was the hottest, did not let al-Bannas's pictures to be displayed in the branches, nor did he accept another title than that of *ra'is 'amm*, rather than *murshid 'amm* which some felt belonged to Hasan al-Banna only.²⁶³

The rumors that the Society had become under Hudaybi 'a movement of words, but not action' started to find a realistic ground within the conditions in which a new power got the executive authority in the country and there stood the very question of how to position the Society vis-à-vis the new governing power. The

²⁶³ Mitchell, *The Society of the Muslim Brothers*, 116.

vacillating stance of the Society was observed in the discussions during the government's order for all political parties to register: Hudaybi argued that the Society was not a political party, whereas the Consultative Assembly decided to register. The discussions was not settled also for the status of the Secret Apparatus; between November 1951 and November 1953 two new leaders were appointed to the Apparatus, however none was able to undermine 'Abd al-Rahman al-Sanadi's control over its members; some members were simply not known, and others remained royal to their older leader.²⁶⁴ Nevertheless, Hudaybi was most likely to hold the general loyalty of the Society as he managed to repress most of the essential attempts to his leadership, such as revising the constitution in terms of the Supreme Guide's term of office. According to the rule the term was lifelong, Hudaybi managed to tackle the opponents' proposal of limiting the term of office to 3 years. He acted promptly after a possible internal assassination was launched and Sayyid Fayiz, then second in command of the Secret Apparatus was killed with a bomb sent in a box. Having been suspected of the guilt, following names were decided for expulsion from the Society: Ahmat Zaki Hasan, Mahmud al-Sabbagh, 'Abd al-Rahman al-Sanadi and Ahmad 'Adil Kamil.²⁶⁵

Regardless of the rumors that he lacked the personal charisma or the power to unite the movement, Hudaybi was taken seriously by both internal powers and the policy makers of the time. 'Abd al-Rahman al-Sanadi, Salih al-Ashmawi and

²⁶⁴ Ibid., 119.

²⁶⁵ Ibid., 122.

Muhammad al-Ghazali superheaded the opposition²⁶⁶, *Majallat al-Da'wa* was identified openly as the voice of anti-Hudaybi forces.²⁶⁷ On 27 and 28 November 1953, a group of Hudaybi's opponents invaded Hudaybi's house; a second group occupied the headquarters in Cairo with an aim of forcing Hudaybi to resign.²⁶⁸ Soon Hudaybi supporters took control over the issue. As a result, twenty-one out of approximately seventy rebels were expelled and the memberships of Salih al-Ashmawi, 'Abd al-'Aziz Jalal and Muhammad al-Ghazali were decided to be terminated.²⁶⁹

Meanwhile, outside policy makers were also approaching Hudaybi, either to evaluate or to manipulate his stance towards to very current event of Egypt: Evacuation of the British forces. In either February or April 1953, the Oriental Counselor of the British Embassy, Trefor Evans received an interview with Hudaybi for the ostensible purpose of sounding him on the forthcoming negotiations for the evacuation of the British forces.²⁷⁰ The British might have sensed the potential conflict between the Society and the government; the picture appeared to the government as the British were in effect of recognizing the views of the Brotherhood and Hudaybi was weakening the hand of the government.²⁷¹ It did not take long the government to take an action to take this very civil power under control. Salah Salim,

²⁶⁶ Zollner, *The Muslim Brotherhood Hasan al-Hudaybi and Ideology*, 23.

²⁶⁷ Mitchell, *The Society of the Muslim Brothers*, 122.

²⁶⁸ Zollner, *The Muslim Brotherhood Hasan al-Hudaybi and Ideology*, 33.

²⁶⁹ Ibid.

²⁷⁰ Mitchell, *The Society of the Muslim Brothers*, 113.

²⁷¹ Ibid., 114.

then minister of national guidance and Sudanese affairs, as well as unofficial spokesman for the RCC on foreign affairs, went to see Hedaybi to question the attitude of the Brothers towards the hostilities with the British before the Egyptian armed forces could be prepared; Hedaybi replied that they would fight for the defense of the welfare of Islam no matter it is in Tunis or in Egypt.²⁷²

During this time, the tension grew steadily between the new government and its opponents, the Muslim Brotherhood, the Leftists and the Wafdists. The ground of the tension was the negotiations with the British for evacuation and the United States for foreign aid. The new government was simply accused of cooperating with the imperialists; however the match lighting the flame was the RCC's removing Naguib, who became a symbol for those seeking parliamentary governance. The streets were occupied with demonstrations during the March crisis and the essential point to be recognized is that the Brotherhood cooperated with the communist DMNL for a short time to oppose the government. In this period, Communists and the Brothers collaborated in distributing each other's leaflets and planned coordinated demonstrations.²⁷³

In the Brotherhood's perception, reaching any kind of agreement with the Britain would link Egypt indirectly to the very alliances it had long refused to enter. Accordingly two documents surfaced: Hedaybi's letter dated July 31 and a pamphlet by his deputy, Khamis Humaydah dated August 2 stating that they had nothing

²⁷² Ibid.

²⁷³ Gordon, *Nasser's Blessed Movement*, 177.

further to discuss with the RCC.²⁷⁴ In late August, in a speech before Liberation Rally members, Nasser for the first time lumped the Brothers together with communists and Zionists in what he called the “destructive opposition.”²⁷⁵ Weeks of the government’s media offensive against the Brotherhood started afterwards and the tension reached its peak on 12 January 1954, during an annual commemoration by the students, led by the Muslim Brothers, for the ‘martyrs’ of the university. During the speech making, an army jeep carrying the government sponsored Liberation Rally and Youth Formations appeared.²⁷⁶ Of course the event ended with injuries and the burning of the jeep. A day after the incident, the cabinet decided to dissolve the Society. In announcements, Hudaybi was targeted by the RCC as opposed to the Society; the reason for the dissolution was announced as destroying Hudaybi and his clique, who were planning to overthrow the present form of the government under the cover of religion.²⁷⁷ Hudaybi was arrested the following day; the number of the Brothers arrested afterwards reached to 450, twenty of which was immediately released.²⁷⁸

Hudaybi reacted by writing an open letter accusing ‘Abd al-Nasser of intending to build up an autocratic regime to Muhammad Naguib, who was then the head of the RCC and the president of the Republic; Naguib retreated the dissolution

²⁷⁴ Ibid.178.

²⁷⁵ Ibid.

²⁷⁶ Mitchell, *The Society of the Muslim Brothers*, 126.

²⁷⁷ Ibid., 127.

²⁷⁸ Ibid.

decision in March 1954.²⁷⁹ The dissolution process divided the General Assembly into two groups: One loyal to Hedaybi, and the other, the spokesman of which was the Deputy *Murshid* ‘Abd al-Qadir ‘Auda, closer to cooperation with Nasser.²⁸⁰

Following a short period of time, *the Manshiyya* incident occurred on October 26. It is noteworthy that the Brotherhood was suffering from a kind of decomposition stemming from the debates among those who support Hedaybi and who do not. The day after the assassination attempt, mobs, composed mainly of members of the government-controlled transport unions, surged from the Cairo railway station and headed to the Muslim Brothers headquarters, keeping shouting against the Society.²⁸¹ On October 29, Nasser advised the following statement that the revolution should not be crippled; and that if it was not possible to proceed white, then they would make it red.²⁸² In the following days, offices and shops owned by Brotherhood sympathizers were attacked in the Canal cities.²⁸³ Hedaybi was arrested on October 30, with many others. ‘People’s Tribunal’ was established by RCC on November 2 to try the members of the Society. The charge was that the leaders of the Society were ‘merchants of religion’ either using their followers for their own advantage or guiding them towards a barbaric ‘religious state’ which would be in alliance with the imperialists and the capitalists.²⁸⁴ The religious authorities, formerly member of

²⁷⁹ Zollner, *The Muslim Brotherhood Hasan al-Hedaybi and Ideology*, 34.

²⁸⁰ Ibid.

²⁸¹ Mitchell, *The Society of the Muslim Brothers*, 151.

²⁸² Ibid., 152.

²⁸³ Gordon, *Nasser’s Blessed Movement*, 183.

²⁸⁴ Mitchell, *The Society of the Muslim Brothers*, 153.

Brotherhood Baquiri and the highest body of Azhar shaykhs all condemned the Society for what they called *'fitna'*.²⁸⁵

Although whom ordered 'Abd al-Latif was never clarified, on December 4, the People's Tribunal handed down the death sentences for Hudaybi, 'Abd al-Latif, 'Abd al-Qadir 'Auda, Yusuf Tal'at, Ibrahim al-Tayyib, Hindawi Duwayr and Muhammad Farghali.²⁸⁶ On December 5, the Society was officially dissolved. On December 7, all death sentences were carried out except for that of Hudaybi.²⁸⁷ Hudaybi was sentenced to life imprisonment on the grounds that he had fallen under the influence of his adviser, but it was later argued that the RCC had avoided his death in order to prevent him from becoming a martyr.²⁸⁸ Within three weeks of the assassination attempt, over one thousand Society members were rounded up, and administrative control over Brotherhood welfare centers was assumed by the Social Affairs Ministry.²⁸⁹ It is noteworthy that from those Brothers who were tried, only twenty-nine were from the armed forces, and those were mostly from the line.²⁹⁰

From the dissolution of December 5 and the long imprisonment sentences, the organization seemed to come to an end. The general feeling of exhaustion would last till 1957 in which the conditions would change.

²⁸⁵ Ibid.

²⁸⁶ Gordon, *Nasser's Blessed Movement*, 183.

²⁸⁷ Zollner, *The Muslim Brotherhood Hasan al-Hudaybi and Ideology*, 38.

²⁸⁸ Gordon, *Nasser's Blessed Movement*, 183.

²⁸⁹ Ibid.

²⁹⁰ Mitchell, *The Society of the Muslim Brothers*, 162.

4.3. The Attenuation of the Muslim Brotherhood and the Rising of Nasser

Once reading the political history of Egypt between 1954 and 1967, we observe the increasing charisma and rising leadership of Nasser not only in the country but also in the Arab world. On the other hand, when we check the activity of the Society, we observe inaction near to silence except for the vitality surging in 1957 or in 1965 in which the then governments moderated the measures taken against the organization.

The time period in which Nasser was the leading figure of Egypt coincides with the increasing effect of the Cold War in the Middle East, especially after the speech of the then US President David Eisenhower on January 5 1957, a speech which would be defined later on as a doctrine named with his name. Questioning the reason of Nasser's success, one can point out that he was able to play between the two super powers of the Cold War and that he was able to call upon the longings of the Arab world such as proud, self-confidence, independence and power.

From 1952 to 1956, the economic role of the state was confined to investment in infrastructure (chiefly in irrigation system) and social services.²⁹¹ Just after the Revolution, the royal family's property was confiscated. The amount, totaled £70 million, was quoted in el-Sadat's autobiography to be spent on the establishment of the rural health centers, hospitals and schools.²⁹² The economic policy debate was

²⁹¹ Khaled Ikram, *The Egyptian Economy, 1952-2000* (Oxon: Routledge, 2006), 2.

²⁹² el-Sadat, *In Search of Identity An Autobiography*, 158.

mostly run on foreign investment.²⁹³ The RCC's expectation of foreign aid was fundamental both for economical and security reasons, therefore the disappointment was extremely deep once the RCC got aware that the US and Britain would not guarantee any aid or arms deal.

Three events in 1955 urged the new regime to step in international arena: 1) Twenty-nine Asian and African countries attended the Bandung Non-Alignment Conference to promote cooperation and to oppose any kind of imperialist intervention. The idea of objecting to take a side in the Cold War would mature in this conference and would later on be called as Non-Alignment Movement. The Conference brought the new regime in Egypt a chance to hear its voice out and Nasser, who appeared with prominent leaders such as Tito and Nehru, a deeper charisma that would strengthen the legitimacy of his leadership. After he turned from Bandung, he was no longer Gamal, even to his closest associates; they now called him "Boss" or "Chief" (*ra'is*).²⁹⁴ 2) Enlarging the secure area of 'friendly' countries through pacts was the mechanism to retain power for both Super Powers in the Cold War. One of those pacts was the Baghdad Pact which was signed by Turkey, Iran, Iraq, Pakistan and the United Kingdom in February. Once proposed, Egypt refused to enter the pact; hence she gave a message that she would not take side in either Block. 3) In February 1955, the need to re-equip Egypt's army was underlined by Israeli raid on the Gaza Strip during which thirty-nine Egyptians and Palestinians died²⁹⁵.

²⁹³ Ikram, *The Egyptian Economy, 1952-2000*, 2.

²⁹⁴ Gordon, *Nasser's Blessed Movement*, 189.

²⁹⁵ Alexander, *Nasser His Life and Times*, 79.

Having a clear idea that they would not be provided weapons by the US, the new regime concluded its first arms deal with the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia in September 1955. The Czech arms deal was read by the States that Egypt was positioning herself close to the East Block.

On 19 July 1956, the US Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, declared that the Egyptian economy was bankrupt and that the US and the International Bank were withdrawing their offer to finance the High Dam.²⁹⁶ This decision was simply taken to counter Nasser's approach to the Soviet Union. In retaliation, Nasser, announced the nationalization of the Suez Canal Company during his speech in al-Manshiyya Square²⁹⁷ on 26 July 1956. This was the very moment Nasser touched the hearts of the Egyptians, even the wind breezing over the Manshiyya Square may have smelt the proud poured from the eyes of the audience.

A simple plan for attacking Egypt was made short after the announcement of nationalization. On 29 October, Israeli troops crossed the border into Egypt. A joint ultimatum requiring both sides withdrawing a distance of ten miles on each side of the Canal by the British and French governments was announced in the afternoon.²⁹⁸ In retaliation to Nasser's not accepting the ultimatum, British and French planes attacked Cairo and the Canal Zone cities on October 30. When British and French bombs put Cairo's radio station out of action, he went to the al-Azhar mosque to

²⁹⁶ el-Sadat, *In Search of Identity An Autobiography*, 174.

²⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, 175.

²⁹⁸ Alexander, *Nasser His Life and Times*, 90.

rally the people that Egypt would defend her country, her history and her future.²⁹⁹ On November 2, the United Nations General Assembly passed a resolution calling for an immediate ceasefire and the withdrawal of Israeli forces to the armistice lines of 1948.³⁰⁰ On November 5, Eisenhower intervened in favor of Egypt.³⁰¹ On November 6, Soviet Premier Bulganin threatened Britain, France and Israel with nuclear rocket attack.³⁰² Soon after, British, French and Israeli troops withdrew from Egypt, leaving a leader the charisma and power of whom was at the very zenith.

Ikram argues that the year of the Suez Canal war was more a turning point for Egypt's economy than was 1952, the year of the Revolution;³⁰³ from 1956 to 1960, the government would move away from relying on the private sector as the main engine of growth, and state intervention would become increasingly important.³⁰⁴

Nasser was the man at the top of everything and he was having his time of leadership at the time. According to Podeh and Winckler, the success of the leader depends on three variables: performance-message, personal qualities, and opportunity to propagate.³⁰⁵ Nasser fulfilled all three: He was using simply daily words on purpose in his speeches in which he touched the very sensitive feelings of

²⁹⁹ Ibid., 93.

³⁰⁰ Ibid., 96.

³⁰¹ el-Sadat, *In Search of Identity An Autobiography*, 179.

³⁰² Alexander, *Nasser His Life and Times*, 96.

³⁰³ Ikram, *The Egyptian Economy, 1952-2000*, 6.

³⁰⁴ Ibid., 5.

³⁰⁵ Elie Podeh, Onn Winckler, *Rethinking Nasserism* (Gainesville: University Press of Florida: 2004), 9.

the Egyptians, such as being proud of his nationality, being proud of a Muslim living in a sovereign country. Egyptians, perhaps for the first time, were listening to a leader, simply not distinctively different from them, a leader who stands extremely powerful and confident. The opportunity was provided internally by the disgust of long-suffered foreign domination, a feeling having especially the masses, which had recently immigrated from rural areas to the major cities, look for a sovereign ideal to rely on. On the other hand, the rivalry of two Super Powers of the Cold War gave Nasser convenient platform to maneuver, to play among both and to reach success internationally which brought his success internally at the end.

At the time on which Nasser reached to the peak of a confidence, his regime loosened the policy of repression against the opponents; hence was included the Muslim Brotherhood in. Some of mostly younger and lower-ranking members of the Society who were not sentenced to long-term imprisonment and those detained without any court were released within 1957/58.³⁰⁶ The *murshid*, Hudaybi was pardoned by Nasser because of his age and poor health, he was then put under house arrest in Alexandria. However, this did not change the fact that the Society was harshly weakened; although the members met from time to time, it is hardly possible to find an organizational work of the Society in this period. There were endeavors to have the Brotherhood survive: The sympathizers and the members abroad financially supported, the women gathered under the Muslim Sisterhood maintained the connections between the ones in the prison and the others, theoretical works were being studied in the prisons and etc. There were also organizational endeavors to

³⁰⁶ Zollner, *The Muslim Brotherhood Hasan al-Hudaybi and Ideology*, 39.

gather the small factions and unmotivated members together such as the one named Organization 65.

A committee of four was founded under Organization 65 to coordinate. The members were ‘Abd al-Fattah Isma’il, Shaykh Muhammad Fathi Rifa’I, ‘Ali al-Ashmawi and Ahmad ‘Abd al-Majid ‘Abd al-Sami.³⁰⁷ Although the works of Qutb composed ideological frame of Organization 65, the administrative committee were in touch with Hudaybi; therefore the Organization did not have a distinctive mission rather did it stick to the aim of holding the Brotherhood together.

The Muslim Sisters, a branch of the Muslim Brotherhood led by Zaynab al-Ghazali, also played an active role during the time period of repression. There can be one clear reason for how these women remained organizational work is that the regime did not consider them as a threat. Hence, the Sisters found a space to act like mediators between prisoners and the Brothers living in hiding. The sisters were mainly involved in fund raising activities and distribution of finances.³⁰⁸

The Brothers imprisoned were, on the other hand, keeping in touch, exchanging ideas which got a tendency to get radicalized. The spiritual leader here was Sayyid Qutb. Sayyid Qutb Ibrahim Husayn Shadhili was born on 9 October 1906 in the village of Musha in the Province of Asyut.³⁰⁹ Witnessing the growth of an active movement for national independence, young Qutb participated in Egyptian intellectual life. His Islamic background and his appreciation of the Qur’an caused

³⁰⁷ Ibid., 40.

³⁰⁸ Ibid., 42.

³⁰⁹ Sayed Khatab, *The Political Thought of Sayyid Qutb* (Oxon: Routledge, 2006), 44.

him to envisage the future life of Egypt from an Islamic perspective and to present a reform ideology based on a new reading of Islamic history³¹⁰ through his definitions of *jahiliyyeh* and sovereignty. It is observed that on his return to Egypt from the States in 1950, Qutb's writings seeking social reform drew the attention of the Muslim Brothers in the army and that he was later linked with the Free Officers. He was appointed as advisor to the RCC, however he left the Free Officers noting that they were not prepared to established an Islamic system.³¹¹ Afterwards, he joined the Muslim Brotherhood and was imprisoned in 1954 with other members. Because of his poor health and old age, he spent most of his time in the prison hospital in Liman al-Turra where he had chance to read and write. Although, there are some discussions that Qutb not only provided radical Islamist ideas, but also composed a threat to relatively weaker stance of Hudaybi and although it is right that a considerable number of the members of the Society followed his ideas eagerly. On the other hand, moderate interpretation was still dominant within the organization and Hudaybi's leadership was never countered seriously during the years of repression.

Egypt would pass through great deal of adventures in a decade: Union with Syria in 1958 under United Arab Republic, dissolution of UAR in 1961, dissolution of Liberation Rally and founding of the Arab Socialist Union in 1962, then following a new path with Arab Socialism from 1962 to the moment al-Sadat got the

³¹⁰ *ibid.*, 58.

³¹¹ *ibid.*, 57.

governance. The Muslim Brotherhood stood mostly as an observer as it was not organized and powerful enough to lead and to affect the policy makers in Egypt.

In July 1965, the second wave of arrests began; the Brotherhood in general and its activist sub-branch Organization 1965 in particular was targeted.³¹² There were several reasons for the arrests: 1) Nasser was obsessed against the opponents of the regime and was concerned with the revival of the Brotherhood with the help of Organization 1965's efforts. 2) Nasser's relationship with the Soviet Union was growing steadily especially after 1962, and not to harm the relationship, an extremely anti-communist movement had to be silenced. 3) Nasser recognized in 1956 how far Israel might go and how the Super Powers and the Western players could include a war with Israel in a scenario at the end of which Egypt would be taken under control; therefore he was getting ready for a prompt Israeli attack by providing new armistice. However without internal security, triumph would hardly be possible.

Some scholars argue that Qutb was released in 1964 to expose the Organization 1965 and to nip the regenerating opposition before that gets too matured and powerful.³¹³

In February 1966, death sentences for Sayyid Qutb, Hasan al-Hudaybi, 'Abd al-Fattah Isma'il and Awash were announced and in August the sentences were executed for all except for Hudaybi.³¹⁴

³¹² Zollner, *The Muslim Brotherhood Hasan al-Hudaybi and Ideology*, 43.

³¹³ *Ibid.*, 44.

³¹⁴ *Ibid.*

That Nasser avoided Hudaybi's death because he did not want the Supreme Guide to become a martyr was discussed among some scholars; however if it was true, then Nasser made a huge mistake by approving Qutb's death sentence. As previously outlined, during the years of repression Hudaybi's leadership was never seriously countered; however he did not have the absolute power of a leader, there were unpleased comments and rumors about his being weak, keeping relations with some ex-politicians and etc. For those, Qutb became the ideological leader; in fact not only for that group but for a great number of the members Qutb's confidence made them believe that the Brotherhood was strong and that the Brotherhood should hold on. After Qutb's death, he became a real hero and meanwhile some of his supporters became much motivated and radicalized in their interpretation of means of struggle. For instance *Tekfir and al-Hicreh* and *Jihad and Jama'at al-Islamiyyeh* emerged as sub-organizations and adopted violence as principle.³¹⁵ Another instance was that the Qutbists took a different path during the discussions on whether to support Nasser in the war against Israel in 1967.

In April 1967, Israel announced a plan to bring the whole of the demilitarized zone between the Syrian and Israeli front lines into cultivation.³¹⁶ Following an Israeli armored tractor's appearance on April 7, the Syrians launched a mortar attack on the Golan Heights. The Israelis hit back and that resulted with the Syrians loses. After getting some reports on Israeli's mobilization from Soviet Ambassador in Cairo, Nasser ordered two battalions set off for Sinai, demanded withdrawal of UN

³¹⁵ Recep Boztemur, "Mısır'da Halk Hareketleri, Musluman Kardeşler ve Demokrasinin Geleceği" (Popular Movements, Muslim Brotherhood and the Future of Democracy in Egypt), 65.

³¹⁶ Alexander, *Nasser His Life and Times*, 133.

forces in the peninsula and on 23 May he ordered the closure of the Gulf of Aqaba to Israeli shipping.³¹⁷ The war was at the door.

On 5 June, ‘Abd al-Hakem Amer’s plane took off for a tour of inspection of Egyptian positions in Sinai, meanwhile the Egyptian gunners were instructed not to open fire while the commander-in-chief was on the air. Just a couple of minutes later, Israeli attack began; thus the Egyptian aircraft was hit on the ground. The following day Israeli troops entered into the Gaza Strip, Bethlehem and Hebron of the West Bank were taken from Jordan. The Israelis were now in the West Bank of the Canal, learning this news caused exhaustion of Nasser’s strength. Most probably, he was feeling as weak as he had never felt, as in his reasoning Israel would reach Eastern Bank. However, Israel never crossed for many reasons such as not taking the risks of landing in a densely populated area.³¹⁸

Short after, Nasser stated to Egyptians that the US wanted to be the sole controller of the world and to rule Egypt into the bargain and that he had to step down and hand the power to his colleague Zakaria Mohieddin as he could not grant the US’ wish.³¹⁹ After hearing the statement, people poured into the street to call Nasser back on duty; Nasser would respond to their wish and would come to the seat; however he would lose his strength, confidence and popularity.

During the days of the War, the division between Qutbists and those who supported Hedaybi was more visible. Three major groups emerged during the

³¹⁷ Ibid., 134.

³¹⁸ el-Sadat, *In Search of Identity An Autobiography*, 217.

³¹⁹ Ibid.

discussion on whether to support Nasser against Israel: First was the Qutbists who denied that it was legitimate to support as he was an illegitimate and a *jahili* leader. The Qutbists did not consider Israel as an immediate enemy, but rather Egypt's leadership.³²⁰ The second group, the followers of Hedaybi, argued that although Nasser's regime had done wrong he was still a Muslim and that he must be supported against a non-Muslim enemy. The third group was consisted of the neutralists taking no side.

From 1967 till his sudden death on 29 September 1970, Nasser remained in power, without strength and having a motivation to take serious political steps or improvements. Anwar al-Sadat succeeded him with an approach that he would put his difference visible. Hence al-Sadat distanced himself from Arab socialism, began to rebuild the relationship with the Muslim Brothers. Accordingly, from 1971 onwards, imprisoned members of the Society were gradually released and in 1975 a general amnesty was issued freeing all members of the Society remaining in prisons.

³²⁰ Zollner, *The Muslim Brotherhood Hasan al-Hedaybi and Ideology*, 46.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

It is observed by a number of scholars that Nasser created a unique way of approach in which the state system, the allocation of welfare, and the columns of the foreign affairs of an Arab state were defined within the content of a certain political stance, Arab socialism. The Muslim Brotherhood is also observed to have followed a certain stance in which features of the state, the tasks and rights of a citizen and the simple rules keeping the daily life in order were defined within Islamic terms. The time period subject to the focus of this thesis witnessed a coincidence for existence of both stances at once and a tension between these two powerful political actors of Egypt. This tension was shaped according to both sides' pragmatic interests and was ranged in a variety of appearances from deliberate cooperation to open assaults.

The contestation had two faces: The first one was between the status quo, Nasser's regime, and the opponent, the Brotherhood. Regardless of the means of repression, this resulted with Nasser's absolute victory. As pointed out through the analyzes of the study, the relations between the Egyptian state and the Society were determined according to both sides' aim of dominating power while getting the maximum advantage by playing through internal and external issues. The relations were constructed on cooperation bases on the eve and at the aftermath of the revolution. However, the cooperation was cut down once the former hold the governance and from that moment on, it was hardly possible to mention about a

relation as what occurred was the Society's weakening by Nasser's harsh suppress and demolition policies.

The second face of the contestation was between two political stances; secular nationalist, Arab socialist theory and politic Islamist theory; however which one reached success in Egypt is debatable. Considering the fact that the social theories claiming to construct an ideal and fair system are emerged from the discussions of the elites of that society, then can Arab socialism of Nasser be determined as a theory? Nasser was an earnest Arab nationalist; he was even considered as the savior of all Arabs at his time.³²¹ However, he was clearly not a theorist, one who reads through his work "the Philosophy of the Revolution" can simply understand that he was firstly an activist and then a politician. Therefore, the path Nasser followed during his reign was mostly drawn according to his political aims and concerns for his personal power at the top of the governance. After getting through the discussions of the scholars working on the region, and the analyzes which have been done through the study it can be outlined that Nasser's Arab socialism was the result of the pragmatist relation between the Egyptian state and the Soviet Union and was more a populist approach to strengthen his leadership and legitimacy of the regime rather than being a social theory. Therefore, one of the results of this thesis is that it was not political Islam which was defeated and substituted during the reign of Nasser; but that it was the Muslim Brotherhood which was silenced and exhausted by harsh repression policies of the state.

³²¹ A. Haluk Ulman, "Orta Doğu Buhranı" (Middle East Crisis), *SBF Dergisi*, 13:4 (1958), 234.

Nasser put six principles in the Charter for National Action in 1962: destruction of imperialism, ending of feudalism, ending monopoly and the domination of capital over the government, establishment of social justice and establishment of a sound democratic system.³²² These principles gave enthusiasm to most Egyptians, as they were ensuring proud, independence and a well-governance. However, especially the 6th principle would not be achieved in Egypt for years because the governance had an obsession of holding the power tight rather than delegating that to the civil society and the citizens.

The regime's paranoia of losing the power and the repression policies launched against the elites would lead the path for revival of the conservative theories in general, and political Islam in particular in Egypt after Nasser was gone. On the convenient ground where secular social theories were not capable of responding to simple Egyptian individual's concerns about handling the outcomes of modernism, increasing credibility of conservative social theories and radicalization of politic Islam were inevitable. Not surprisingly, the Muslim Brotherhood took advantage of the political environment of 1970s and took its place in Egyptian political life once Anwar al-Sadat relaxed the controls over the Society and pardoned most members in 1975.

In conclusion, it can be said that Nasser's state honored the Egyptians with proud, confidence, promises of a fair way of life and most were achieved. However, because of the intolerance against any kind of opposition and alternative ideas, these

³²² Peter Johnson, "*Egypt under Nasser*", Middle East Research and Information Project, (July 1972), 3.

aims could not go beyond being populist policies which at the end, could not fulfill a profound development of the society. The Muslim Brotherhood covered up its power and re-organization shortly after the de-Nasseration policies of al-Sadat came to being. Moreover, it can be claimed that during the assault against the Brotherhood, a number of radical factions appreciating Qutb's teachings emerged within the organization and the influence of Wahhabi strain of Islam infused into the Society with dispersal of some of the members to neighboring countries like Saudi Arabia.³²³

Finally, it is to be pointed out that suppression to any kind of opposition and closing most channels to criticism interrupted the development of the elites. Consequently, this fed the state's tendency for totalitarianism, pushed the society to conservatism and radicalized the political activism in Egypt.

³²³ Youssef H. Aboul-Enein, "Al-Ikhwan Al-Muslimeen: the Muslim Brotherhood", <http://www.ikhwanweb.com/article.php?id=5617&ref=search.php>

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APPENDIX

TEZ FOTOKOPİSİ İZİN FORMU

ENSTİTÜ

Fen Bilimleri Enstitüsü	<input type="checkbox"/>
Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Uygulamalı Matematik Enstitüsü	<input type="checkbox"/>
Enformatik Enstitüsü	<input type="checkbox"/>
Deniz Bilimleri Enstitüsü	<input type="checkbox"/>

YAZARIN

Soyadı : Eldeniz
Adı : Selin
Bölümü : Orta Doğu Araştırmaları

TEZİN ADI (İngilizce) : THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE EGYPTIAN STATE AND THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD FROM 1952 TO 1970

TEZİN TÜRÜ : Yüksek Lisans Doktora

1. Tezimin tamamından kaynak gösterilmek şartıyla fotokopi alınabilir.
2. Tezimin içindekiler sayfası, özet, indeks sayfalarından ve/veya bir bölümünden kaynak gösterilmek şartıyla fotokopi alınabilir.
3. Tezimden bir bir (1) yıl süreyle fotokopi alınamaz.

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