SUBORDINATION OF THE ARAB REGIONAL SYSTEM: THE CASES OF
EGYPT & IRAQ

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Approval of the Graduate School of Social Sciences

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ABSTRACT

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EGYPT & IRAQ

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This study attempts to analyze the 'subordination' of the Arab regional system by giving special reference to Egypt and Iraq, as the two most prominent Arab countries that challenged the established Westphalian state system in the Middle East. Through introducing the concept of 'subordination', the research seeks to answer the questions of 'what makes the Middle East different than other regions?' and 'how the Middle East subordinated to the international system?'

The conduct of the thesis is based upon three interrelated discussions; systemic origins of the subordination and its main characteristics, subordination of the Middle East as sub-international regional system, and finally the case studies which testify and approve the validity and implications of the theoretical arguments that presented in the former parts of the thesis. Through the exercise of independent, original, and critical thought, this thesis aims to build on existing knowledge by using already known materials but with a new conceptualizations, design and interpretation.

Key Words: Subordination, Egypt, Iraq

ÖZ

ARAP BÖLGESEL SİSTEMİNİN BAĞIMLILAŞTIRILMASI: MISIR & IRAK

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Bu çalışma, Ortadoğu'da kurulmuş Westphalyan sisteme tehdit oluşturmuş iki önemli Arab ülkesi olan Mısır ve Irak ekseninde Ortadoğu bölgesel sisteminin bağımlılaştırılmasını analiz etmektedir. 'Bağımlılaştırmak' konseptinin tanıştırılması üzerinden, bu çalışma şu soruların yanıtlarını aramaktadır: 'Ortadoğu'yu egemenliğin yerleştirildiği diğer bölgelerden farklı kılan özellikler nelerdir?' 'Ortadoğu uluslararası sisteme siyasi, ekonomik ve kültürel yönden nasıl bağımlı hale getirilmiştir?'

Tezin analizi birbirine ilişkili üç bölüm üzerine kurulmuştur; bağımlılığın sistemik kökleri ve ana karakteristik özellikleri, uluslararası sistemin bir alt bölgesel sistemi olarak Ortadoğu'nun bağımlılaştırılması, ve son olarak önceki bölümlerdeki teorik tartışmaların test edildiği alan çalışması bölümü. Bağımsız, orjinal ve eleştirisel düşünce ışığında, bu tez varolan bilgi ve materyali kullanarak yeni konseptler, dizayn, ve yorumlama ile katkıda bulunmayı amaçlamaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Bağımlılık, Mısır, Irak

To my beloved father

İrfan Işıksal, who is *not* subordinated on his long battle against the cancer...

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION & METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS

1.1 Introduction, Significance, and General Objectives of the Study

On the discussions regarding the Arab regional system, an on-going debate is related to the clash of state based *versus* transnational pan-Arab identity and norms. This debate has significant implications to the regional order and the regional *status quo*. For instance, the division of the Arab Middle East into the different state based actors restricts the formation of the regional hegemon as it contributed to the Western constructed status quo in the region. In consequence, an inevitable clash survives between actors that support pan-Arab unity and those organized themselves with the norms of sovereignty. As Barnett defines it, the Arab states are "caught between Arabism and Westphalia".[1]

At the beginning of the state system in the Middle East, the pan Arabism and sovereignty "coexisted" at the same time. The Arab leaders have to depict their policies and actions as consistent with Arabism's demands because of the artificial borders and the legitimacy problem of the newly established regimes.

However, in terms of ideology the pan-Arabism and the Westphalian state system has an inheriting clash. While sovereignty privileged the role of the state and state based identity, pan-Arabism denies the difference between "domestic" and "international" within the Arab world.

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[1] Barnett, M. N. (1997). "Regional security after the Gulf War". *Political Science Quarterly*. Winter. 111 (4). P.600.

This contradiction between pan-Arabism and Westphalian state system has been instrumentalized by several influential Arab regimes in the past for their political objectives most remarkably by Gamel Abdel Nasser of Egypt and Saddam Hussein of Iraq. Inevitably, these challenges automatically clashed with the established *status quo* in the Middle East. In other words, both countries under their ambitious leadership, have attempted to change the political and geo-strategic limits, space, and balance of the region. Therefore, since Nasser and Saddam Hussein inherently had challenged the Western designed *status quo*, both regimes were *contained* and *subordinated* by necessary means by the international actors through the certain mechanisms of the international order.

Deriving from these statements, this study attempts to examine the subordination of the Arab regional system by giving special reference to Egypt and Iraq. As have stated above, related to any discussion that addressed the challenge of the Middle Eastern regimes to the *status quo* in the contemporary history of the region, Egypt and Iraq are distinct cases in the sense that the leaders of these two countries made the most formidable challenges.

Accordingly, these reasons themselves provide the necessary incentive for the evaluation of this research. One of the academic myths that are left untouched in Middle Eastern studies is the containment and subordination of the challenger regimes in the Middle East. Is there such an invisible hand that intervenes against any challenge that aims to shift the established *status quo* in the region? Is this a simple conspiracy or there are consistent systematic practices and certain empirical evidences on this objective? Accordingly, this is still among the most prominent questions in the region.

Secondly, global modernity's operational procedure is universalization and totality.[2] In this connection, global systemic logic of modernity dictates the

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[2] For instance, *see* Walker, R. J. B. (1988). *One World, Many Worlds: Struggles for a Just World Peace.* Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers. Walker, R.J.B. (1993). *Inside/Outside: International Relations as Political Theory.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

sameness in social, cultural, economic, normative, and political areas along with the dissolution of the difference into the prevailing global Western dominated international order. In other words, an organic constituting totality is consistently re-produced where the particular ideational and cultural formations could not make any difference or resistance.

However, especially post Cold War crises and conflicts made it evident that different cultures and civilizations need to understand, recognize, and compromise with each other's differences more than ever in the contemporary era. In this respect, the analysis of the subordination of the Arab regional system is significant, in terms of demonstrating the 'othering' and 'containment' processes of the region. It is not possible to break the consistent and repeated bargains in the region without clarifying their roots and explaining their working mechanisms. Accordingly, these individual and combined factors make this study a significant and interesting research from both theoretical and empirical perspectives.

At this point, it is worth stressing that this research does not attempt to interpret political standards and subordination of the Middle East simply due to its Muslim identity or different cultural affiliations. It is a fact that some sources of the Euro-scepticism originated from ideological approaches and normative priorities of the traditions varying from conservative-Islamism, pan-Arabism, cultural purism, reversed orientalism, or from similar perceptions and outlooks.

Equally, it is valid to a certain extent that the Arab hermeneutic perspective formed a psyche which treated all kinds of Western involvement in the region with suspicion and conspiracy. In fact, every nationalist discourse believes and promotes its 'uniqueness' and 'unjustness' that a country has encountered throughout its history. The most significant demonstration of this psyche for Arabs is the 'sense of common victimization'.

This study tries to avoid Euro-sceptic and reversed orientalism approaches'. In contrast, it is motivated by the academic inquiries that acknowledge the shortcomings of these perceptions. This belief also encouraged the requirement for

an analytic and systematic research that elaborates the inconsistencies of the Western political standards and practices in the Middle East.

In value, it is argued that there are certain (double) standards and practices that have historical roots from the discursive international system. More significantly, with the demonstration of the two different case studies from two different periods, it is revealed that these practices have some common consistent and continuous patterns.

Following this line of analysis, the main objective of the thesis is to contribute to the Middle Eastern studies that particularly focus on the political subordination of the region, and to demonstrate the problematical state formation and the complications of historically constructed international dichotomies in the region. In this connection, the initial task of this research is to generate an analytical framework that incorporates the key variables to allow systemic analysis. This framework could help contribute in understanding the political realities of the region and the root of the challenges against the regional system.

A secondary aim is to conduct an analytical study that could help to qualify or correct the host of casual misattributions to the Arab Middle East in general. This study also tries to clarify the origins of the taken for granted concepts in relation to the Arab Middle East such as autocracy, the legitimacy problem, and violence. Similarly, one other aim is to underline the contradictions of the discursive mechanisms of the international order in general, and to catalyse these dilemmas into the context of Western/Arab relations in order to provide a better understanding for the complex boundary, legitimacy, and identity problems.

Finally, it is aimed to contribute to the answers of the significant inquiries such as why the existing literature and approaches failed to explain certain aspects of Middle East politics such as transnational and tribal Arab identity? Why the Arab identity and the Arab Middle Eastern culture repeatedly resisted the prevailing political forces?

To sum up, the overall objective is to put forward qualified arguments on stressing the subordination of the region and containment of the challenging regimes to the Western inspired regional order and the *status quo*. Through the exercise of independent, original, and critical thought, the thesis aims to build on existing knowledge by using already known materials, but with new conceptualizations, design, and interpretation. By this way, it aims to make a modest contribution to Middle Eastern studies with inducement and usage of subordination with original interpretation.

The comparable importance and originality of this study derives from the relative absence of the studies that critically interpret the Middle East, from the 'subordination' perspective in the context that is used in this research. Additionally, one other originality of this research is derived from the fact that although there are many individual studies that are addressed to Gamal Abdel Nasser, Arab nationalism and Saddam Hussein, as far as this research is aware, there is not a study that focuses and compares them in terms of their challenge to the regional system.

My interest in developing research on this subject is inspired naturally because of my continuous interest in cultural turn theories and particularly in Critical Theory. This field further motivated me to focus on the international system, problematical nature of order, and its dissemination and application in the non-European world and particularly in the Arab Middle East. In this respect, the limited discussions regarding the nature of international order and negligence of its discursive and dichotomous character attracted me to combine these factors with my already acquired knowledge and experience about Middle East with the endeavour of developing an alternative approach.

As a last emphasis, it is worth stressing that the main motivation behind this endeavour is derived from the conviction that there is enough space in this topic to show evidence of originality and the exercise of independent critical thought. This study has an inter-disciplinary impulse that aims at Middle Eastern studies with the theoretical discussions in relation the patterns of international order. These impulses

generate the space for new conceptualisations, design, and interpretation. In addition, the accountability of the topic with contemporary and challenging issues fits this study with genuine and continuing interest for an enjoyable and creative experience.

1.2 Research Question

The initial premise of this research is in the post Second World Era, the artificially created boundaries and reorganization of the Middle East along with the Westphalian political authority and social structures intrinsically clashes with certain regional realities. This clash gives space for the challenging regimes to change the established *status quo*. In further words, in the post Second World War Era, the reorganization of the political geography, people, political authority, and social structures, along with Western style borders inevitably brought certain reactions that are utilized by the challenging leaders of Egypt and Iraq.

As stated above, this research aims to make a contribution related to the formation and containment of those challenges against the established *status quo*. In this sense, Egypt and Iraq are the unique cases where both countries leadership had formidably attempted to change the political and geo-strategic limits, space, and balance of the region. Nevertheless, as a response and consequence of these challenges, both regimes have been contained and subordinated through the historically conducted set of systematic mechanisms.

Deriving from these points, the main research question of the thesis could be conceptualised as a combination of three interrelated questions: ***"How the challenges against international order have been formed in Nasser's Egypt & Saddam's Iraq? How these challenges have been subordinated? And; what are the consistent and continuous patterns of this subordination?***

In addition to the main research question, the secondary questions may include; what are the origins, methods, and working mechanisms of the discursive mechanisms and subordination that operates in the Middle East? What are the

strengths and weaknesses of Nasser's ideology and Saddam Hussein's challenge to the regional order? What are the similarities and differences between the two challenges? Accordingly, answers to these questions underlie and clarify the extent and nature of the subordination in the region.

1.3 Title and the Key Concepts

For the sake and better understanding of the overall analysis, it is beneficial to explain the title and the key concepts of the thesis, namely the Arab regional system and subordination. This section explains what this research meant by the Arab regional system and subordination that is used throughout the thesis.

1.3.1 Arab Regional System

The 'system analysis' describes conceptual frameworks and methodologies for understanding the operation of political systems.[3] On the other hand, the studies based on regional systems generally focus on specifying the patterns of interaction among units and the relationship between a subsystem and the international system.[4] This study is *not* a 'system analyses' as used in the political science literature. As stated by Robert J. Lieber, system analysis is a set of techniques for systematic analysis that facilitates the organizing of data that possesses no ideal theoretical goals.[5]

In contrast to a set of techniques that possess no theoretical goals, this study focuses on a system that includes an integrated set of concepts, hypotheses, and

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[3] Dougherty, J. E., and Pfaltzgraff, R. L. (1997). *Contending Theories of International Relations. A Comprehensive Survey*. Fourth Edition. New York: Longman. P.101.
Ibid, 101.

[4] Ibid, 115.

[5] Lieber, R. J. (1972). *Theory and World Politics*. Cambridge: Winthrop. P.123. For system analysis *see* also Young, O. R. (1968). *Systems of Political Science*. New Jersey: Prentice Hall, and Banks, M. (1969). "Systems Analysis and the Study of Regions." *International Studies Quarterly*. 13 (4). Pp.345-350.

propositions, that theoretically speaking are widely applicable across the spectrum of the area that is studied.[6]

Related to this point, Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff commented that theorizing based on systems brings two fundamental approaches.[7] The first focus is on actors and the interaction that takes place between them.[8] The second approach provides the framework within which interaction between states occur.[9]

In this research, both approaches are used. While the case studies of Egypt and Iraq refer to the first approach, the usage of the *Arab regional system* refers to the second approach. Thus, the systemic approach attempts to explain with an integrated set of concepts, hypotheses, and propositions how the structures (within which defined actors exist) affect the interactions between the actors (also between regional and external actors) and how the change within this structure is determined.

The term "Middle East" itself is problematic enough that there has been a long debated discussion regarding the starting and ending point of the boundaries in the Middle East. By recognizing this prevailing problem and the facts, this thesis aims to identify certain common characteristics and consistent patterns that make the Arab Middle Eastern countries part of the same regional system.

Instead of treating the Middle East region as entirely unique (especially in terms of emergence of the state system and territorial sovereignty), it is put forward as a general scheme in which the events and processes in the area are analyzed and explained as specific manifestations of a broader principle that operates within the region in a linkage of international processes. In other words, although the Arab regional system is part of the international system, it has its' own regional characteristics.

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[6] Ibid, 123.

[7] Dougherty, J. E., and Pfaltzgraff, R. L. (1997:100).

[8] Ibid.

[9] Ibid.

The political practices of the Arab Middle Eastern states creates this understanding that it is mainly shaped as a response to and in accordance with the similar domestic and international bargaining. Moreover, existence of the similar bargains shape and form an organic unity among the Arab countries within the geographically bound area.

There are some remarkable similarities among the Arab states in the Middle East, such as ties of kinship and tribalism, extended family and relative ties, speaking a common language, intense communication, flow of labour and trade, sharing common historical memories, and "practicing a common way of life expressed in the form of religion and other cultural traits".[10]

Accordingly, these common denominators for the Arab Middle Eastern states are significant because as argued by Robert B. Edgerton there must be good social or cultural reasons "why a long established belief or practice exists and prevails."[11] In this regard, this study argues that the focus should be on society rather than on the meaning "implied by the existence of artificial nation-states created by external powers for their own purposes."[12]

Therefore, the Arab regional system refers to a subsystem with a distinctive characteristic that depends on Arab culture. What explains culture is a complex question that is far beyond the limits of this research. Nevertheless, a consensus in social sciences defines culture as the entire way of life of a society. Thus, societal values, norms, principles, practices, human relationships, symbols, and beliefs are among the determinants of culture. The value of culture is powerful and it should be taken seriously.

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[10] Issawi, C. (1955). "The Bases of Arab Unity". *International Affairs.* 31 (1). January. P.36.

[11] Edgerton, R. (2000). "Traditional Beliefs and Practices: Are Some Better than Others?" In Harrison, L. E., and Huntington, S. P. (eds.) P.128.

[12] Barakat, H. (1993). *The Arab world: Society, Culture, and State.* Berkeley: University of California Press. P.148.

In relation to the Arab Middle Eastern culture, the major sources of reference are the Arab language and Islamic religion. Technically speaking these factors make up the basis of Arab difference and they are still operational despite the existence of different sovereign Arab states. Alternatively, what is unique about the Arab regional system is its distinction from the other regions, is the overlapping roles of the states and transnational characteristics of the Arab identity. As has been witnessed during the recent 'Arab Spring' revolutions, the events in one part of the Middle East have had prompt and surprising consequences in the other parts of the region. It is mainly because of these factors that the interconnection between the Arab states is more than simple geographical proximity.

Accordingly, the commonalities within the Arab Middle Eastern identities (in addition to the existence of the transnational and subnational identities) form a sort of uniqueness for the Arab Middle Eastern regional system. In this sense, in addition to the state (territorial) based identity formations, transnational and subnational identity sources play a significant role in defining the Arab Middle Eastern regional system.

It is mainly due to this reason that Nasser's pan-Arabism challenge and Saddam Hussein's occupation of Kuwait which had caused great concerns for the extra-regional powers on keeping the pre-established *status quo*.

In light of these statements, the Arab Middle Eastern regional system consists of seventeen members of the Arab League (Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Oman, Palestine, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, and Yemen). The constitutional commonality among these actors of the Arab Middle Eastern regional system are evident since the constitutions of the Arab Middle Eastern states, 'nation' is defined as 'Arab' instead of the state base definition only, with the exception of Lebanon.[13]

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[13] Ayubi, N. A.(1995). *Over-stating the Arab State Politics and Society in the Middle East.* London-New York: I.B. Tauris Publishers. P.146.

1.3.2 Subordination

As emphasized by Yin, for the case studies, theory development as part of the design phase is essential.[14] In this research, the term *subordination* is aimed to complete this endeavour.

Literally speaking, subordination refers to secondary, lesser, minor, subsidiary, inferior, lower, controlled, not autonomous etc. Therefore, in general terms, subordination does not refer to a positive meaning.

This research's conceptualization is also in this line of analysis. Subordination simply refers to the situation that derives from international order, which does not allow regional actors to act independent and autonomous. Stating alternatively, the regional actors of the Middle East, as a part of subordinate regional system, are bounded by the bargains of international order that is guided by Western powers. In consequence, there is a 'regional balance of power' strategy that is particularly practiced by the U.S. which prevents any regional hegemony / leader / ideology that endangers the U.S. / Western interests.

As evaluated in the second chapter, discursive mechanisms of international order have a long and well established background and basis. Since the Papal Bulls of the 11th Century, there are two patterns of modern international order that have different and mostly contrasted objectives, normative and institutional arrangements.

The first pattern of order is defining inter-European relations and the second is to define beyond Europe relations. The main pattern of order within the European system which was conducted in the post Peace of Westphalia (1648) era was based upon European states' in respect to each other's territorial sovereignty, equality, and independence. In this connection, the main objective of the inter-European system is to provide interstate justice through promoting tolerance of

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[14] Yin, R. K. (2003). *Case Study Research: Design and Methods.* Third Edition. London: Sage Publications. P.28.

ethnic, cultural, and political differences.[15] In other words, it was sought to develop and pursuit peaceful co-existence between all equal and independent European states. Through these arrangements European rulers encourages avoiding violence through religious, cultural, or ideological reasons.[16] Therefore, participation within the inter-European system was not hierarchical but voluntary.

By contrast to the European society of states inter *allia* principles, the extra European order (the order that was developed by the European countries for regulating their relations with the non-European countries) was constructed for "promoting a particular idea of civilization, transforming 'uncivilized' cultures and social, economic and political systems along the way".[17] In contrast to the European order, extra European order was highly centralized and hierarchical. European/Western states justified their interventions to the extra-European system countries through constructing 'balance of power' for the sake of their own political interests and stability.

The emergence, development, and transformation of this discursive system was simply embedded in the belief that Europeans knew best on how the other states and communities should be organized and restructured towards civilization and progress. Even in contemporary times, it is not hard to see the traces of these perceptions and practices.

Accordingly, these discursive mechanisms are the main source of 'subordination'. The early methods of subordination includes unequal treaties, capitulations, extraterritoriality, and civilization standards, which all have expressed the supremacy of the European political and economic thought, structure, and practices in the Middle East, as elsewhere.

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[15] Keene, E. (2002). *Beyond the Anarchical Society: Grotius, Colonialism and Order in World Politics.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. P. xi.

[16] Ibid, 98.

[17] Jackson, R. H. (1990). *Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations, and the Third World.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. P.54.

In the more contemporary times, although certain discriminatory methods have been abandoned, similar dualistic way of thinking continues in different patterns. The current methods of subordination includes; the use of influential international organizations such as the United Nations Security Council for political decisions and purposes, 'inconsistent' approaches towards the interpretation and regulation of the international law. The establishment of military and economic organizations and pacts which create schism within sub-regional systems, regulation of certain practices for the sake of native population benefit, political and military support for certain 'friendly' regimes, humanitarian intervention, containment of the challenger others, and finally resort to military force in necessary circumstances. As a supportive to this argument, Barbara Roberson made a remarkable statement:[18]

> Actually, the superpowers could not "control" what policies (Arab Middle Eastern) states pursued, but they could impose constraints and costs, construct obstacles, push or draw them into preferred alignments, and channel their activities through the international institutions by which they tried to manage the international system.

At this point, it is vital to conjure the point that there are certain restrictions upon Middle Eastern rulers that may not necessarily be caused by external factors and reasons. As demonstrated in both case studies, for instance, the domestic factor of discrediting the religion for the sake of Arab nationalism, and the schisms between the conservative / revolutionary regimes, and different ethnic groups are also contributed to subordination.

Nevertheless, having said this, these reasons could also be linked directly or indirectly to the external factors in the form of problematic state formation, artificial boundaries, and legitimacy problem that was created by the colonial powers and/or policies that are served for the formulation of the balance of power strategy.

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[18] Roberson, B. A. (2002). "The Impact of the International System on the Middle East". In Hinnebusch, R., and Ehteshami, A. (eds.) *The foreign policies of Middle East States*. Colarado: Lynne Rienner. P.65.

1.4 Methodology

This section of the introduction chapter presents and explains the methodological approach, inquiry, techniques, and considerations used within the research. This research avoids to base its' analysis upon single conceptual approach and methodological inquiry due to the complex nature and scope of the inquiry. Nevertheless, this does not mean that this study is free from all theoretical approaches, methodological inquiries and techniques. Simply stating, this thesis is a case study that is based upon certain methodological techniques and considerations. Deriving from this statement, in the section below, these methodological inquiries are explained.

1.4.1 Theoretical Basis of the Subordination Approach: Post-structural Order, World System Theory & Hegemonic Balance of Power

This section is devoted to explain the theoretical approach of the study. The relevant theoretical approach is significant because it presents the general outlook of the research and explains how the sources and other materials are read and interpreted.

As emphasized above, the "subordination" approach is the main theoretical application of this research. Theoretically speaking, the subordination approach is broadly inspired from the three paradigms: Post-structural order approches, the political version Wallerstein's world system theory, and realist inspired hegemonic balance of power theory.

1.4.1.1 Post-structural Order Paradigm

It was not a long time ago that international order had been critically analyzed and its' dichotomies initiated to be questioned. Especially post-structural order approaches give specific emphasis to Euro-centric and culturally essentialist

nature of the global modernity.[19] By stressing the importance of culture as an important practice on exclusionary functioning of international relations, post-structuralist order approaches explain how the dichotomies are constructed within the international order with different principles and objectives.

In particular to the Middle East, as a revolutionary contribution, Edward Said exposes the links between interests of diplomatic circles, big corporations and academic triangle.[20] According to Edward Said hegemonic regime of global modernity is a result of formed "Othering" process by the patriarchal Euro-centric identification mechanisms. In other words, international relations constitute the practice of 'Othering' where the modern, male, and Western rational subject is privileged and different subject positions are defined as mirror image of the West.[21]

The significance of Edward Said's and other post-structuralist analysis is these patriarchical Euro-centric mechanisms also formed the basis of subordination policies at the state level. The Euro-centric view based their epistemologies on their own practices, their own 'truth' claims, and their own mode of representation on the 'reality'. This leads to the construction of the modern 'Self' as a sovereign subject whose privileged subject-position is produced and re-produced through the process of "Othering" while different identities constructed as its 'Other'.[22]

The dynamics and negative impacts of global modernity are not restricted with producing of Self/Other mechanisms. For instance, Walker stated that in the

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[19] *See* for instance, Keene, E. (2002). *Beyond the Anarchical Society: Grotius, Colonialism and Order in World Politics.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, Grovogui, S. N. (1996). *Sovereigns, Quasi Sovereigns, and Africans: Race and Self-Determination in International Law.* London: University of Minnesota Press, Gong, G. W. (1984). *The Standard of 'Civilization' in International Society.* Oxford: Clarendon Press, Jackson, R. H. (1990). *Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations, and the Third World.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, Said, E. W. (1978). *Orientalism.* New York: Vintage Books, Amin, S. (1989). *Eurocentrism.* London: Zed Books, Tucker, R. W. (1977). *The Inequality of Nations.* New York: Basic Books Publishers, Bartelson, J. (1995). *A Genealogy of Sovereignty.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

[20] Said, E. W. (1978). *Orientalism.* New York: Vintage Books.

[21] Ibid, 128.

[22] Ibid. Also *see* Amin, S. (1989). *Eurocentrism.* London: Zed Books. P.89.

regime of modernity, Western institutions, conceptions, and rationality 'globalized' and complete the world.[23] Moreover, a historically unified single and hegemonic cultural system appeared through the disappearance of the internal contradictions.

For example, the 'Other' groups were destructed, excluded, denied, and marginalised by being defined as irrational, underdeveloped, or belonging to the past. This serves as justification for 'globalization' of privileged, rational, and modern Western identity and concepts over the 'Other' cultures. Eventually, in a historically unified single and hegemonic cultural system, the Western 'Self' has been privileged and named as rational, where its historical development and concepts are defined as progress.[24]

In consequence, as put forward by Edward Said and Samir Amin, once Europeans became conscious of the universal scope of their civilizations and their capacity to conquer and shape the rest of the world among their governing principles, they also granted themselves the right to represent and judge the 'others' particularly the Orient.[25] These orientalist discourses serve as a means of justifying the colonialist and other political measures that justify the Western political and military interventions.

Thus, it would not be wrong to argue that the superiority of the Western institutions, conceptions, and rationality has been maintained through historically unified single and hegemonic politico-cultural system. Stating in different words, in the name of 'political stability', 'totality, and 'universality', the actors that defined as 'Other' are destructed, excluded, denied, and marginalized by being defined as brutal, dangerous, irrational, uncivilized, autocratic etc.

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[23] Walker, R. J. B. (1988:24-26). Also mentioned in Walker, R. J. B. (1993), Chp. 4 and 8.

[24] Ibid.

[25] Amin, S. (1989:101).

As a result, as widely emphasized by post-structuralist order scholars, culture could lead to brute in political, economic and military rationales.[26] Stating alternatively, cultural justifications could form the basis of political power, interference and violence in the Arab Middle East.

To sum up, this research is benefitted from the post-structuralist order theorists' analysis in terms of understanding that *subordination* is a combination of the remnants of old-style European imperialist thinking & orientalism, and newer-style neo-imperialism and American military power. The post-structuralist order approaches inspired the subordination approach by:

i. Examining the unproblematic and taken for granted acceptance of the Euro-centric international order.

ii. Problematic of expansion of the international society into the non-European world, the construction of a hegemonic global political and legal order and creation of 'totality' within this global order. And;

iii. Problematic 'self' and 'other' formations on identity, culture and politics and so called 'responsibility' of European / Western powers to design, correct, and control the 'other' systems.

1.4.1.2 World System Theory

Secondly, this research has adopted the political version of Wallerstein's world system theory. As a member of the critical globalists' school, Immanuel Wallerstein argues that it is necessary to understand in global context within which states interact.[27] In other words for the action of all entities in world politics, the overall structure and working mechanisms of global system initially shall be

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[26] Said, E. W. (1978:7).

[27] See for instance, Wallerstein, I. (1979). *The Capitalist World-Economy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, Wallerstein, I. (1984). *The Politics of World Economy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, Wallerstein, I. (1984). "Patterns and Perspectives of the Capitalist World-Economy". In Viotti, P. R., & Kauppi, M. V. (eds.) (1999). *International Relations Theory: Realism, pluralism, globalism, and beyond.* Third Edition. London: Allyn & Bacon. Pp.369-376. Wallerstein, I. (2004). *World-Sytems Analysis*. London: Duke University Press.

comprehended.[28] In this sense, historical analysis is important in order to follow the continuous patterns of the international system.[29] Stating alternatively, historical analysis is important in order to comprehend how the international system is working and only by tracing the historical evaluation of the system one could understand the current structure.

In accordance with the globalists school, Wallerstein put forwards that particular mechanisms of domination exists that keep the Third World states under control and the interactions between the center and periphery are produced and re-produced by systemic logic. The center (internationally supreme powers) defines the rights, rules and norms of the system and legally guarantees its accumulation. While doing this, the international powers always find collaboraters in the local (regional) subsystems. The center politically and economically supports local collaboraters at all costs and helped them to control their people and country.

In connection with these arguments, this research's subordination theory argues that there is a historically constructed international order that keeps the challenger Middle Eastern regimes under control from the center. While doing this, the international hegemon (the center) collaborates with both the regional and extra-regional countries with the produced and re-produced systemic logic. The center also politically, economically, and diplomatically supports the opponents of the challenger regimes with the purpose of containing these regimes.

1.4.1.3 Hegemonic Balance of Power Paradigm

Finally, hegemonic balance of power is benefitted by this research on forming its' theoretical build up. Basicly speaking, the hegemonic balance of power theory refers to a policy of promoting power equilibrium by the hegemon, on the assumption that 'unbalanced power' is dangerous in a region in terms of endangering the established *status quo*. The hegemonic power played the leading

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[28] Wallerstein, I. (1979:5).

[29] Wallerstein, I. (2004:18).

role on the establishment of the balance of power since it has an obvious interest in maintaining the *status quo*. The hegemon creates balance through the combination of its' dominant military, political, economic, ideological, and cultural forces.[30] It also justify its' position by providing certain political, economic, or military assitance to other regional countries. In other words, while creating a hegemonic balance of power, the hegemon also secured certain regional allies.

In this connection, the hegemon has been repeatedly promoted to maintain the balance of power strategy in the Middle East. In other words, the major powers of international system guide tactical actions that support and legitimise the existing subordinate regional order. In consequence, the political control of the Arab region remained within the great power management that works in favour of legitimising the *status quo* and containing the challenger regimes that could endanger the status quo.

As a result of this balance of power principle, extra-regional powers have maintained balance among the Arab Middle Eastern states through playing one against other, and none of the Arab states could have an ordering or bargaining power over the others. As identified by Lustick, one of the major characteristics of the subordinate Arab regional system is the absence of hegemonic Arab regional power.[31]

In 'regional balance of power' strategy, the revolutionary events, such as wars or ideologies have the potential to change the *status quo* tried to be systematically bargained or contained by the extra regional powers through various methods including military pacts, weapon embargo, aiding of diplomatic and

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[30] Cox, R. W. (1983). "Gramsci, Hegemony, and International Relations Theory: An Essay in Method". *Millenium*. 2. P.171. Cox, R. W. (1981). "Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory". *Millenium*. 10. P.137. Devetak, R. (2001). "Critical Theory". In Burchill, S., and Linklater, A. (eds.) *Theories of International Relations*. Second Edition. London: Mac Millan. P.160.

[31] *See* Lustick, I. S. (1997). "The absence of Middle Eastern great powers: Political "backwardness" in historical perspective". *International Organization*. Autumn. 51 (4). Pp.653-683.

economic isolation, economic sanctions, and even direct military intervention or war as a last but not hesitated resort.

Nevertheless, minor or domestic conflicts (and massacres) that have no importance and do not endanger regional *status quo* go unnoticed. In these conflicts, the external powers did not respond immediately (if not totally ignored) the minor regional conflicts even if these conflicts violated the international law.

Castells discusses the 'balance of power' strategy especially relating to military affairs that could be further illustrative to the research's assumptions.[32] According to Castells, the cruel wars between or within the Third World states are often fought by primitive means that may have lasted several years. These wars and conflicts are almost completely ignored by the influential actors of the international system. Nevertheless, extra regional countries could supply (to regional fighting sides) certain advanced military weapons in order to maintain the balance of power.

For example, the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988) was a bitter war of attrition that involved huge suffering and loss of life. Yet, the dominant extra-regional countries sought to ensure that neither country became too powerful and therefore sought a balance of power between them. Especially Iran's comparative advantage in terms of number of soldiers was balanced by extra-regional countries military and logistic supports to Iraq.

Nevertheless as mentioned above, when a regional war and conflicts affect the interests of the powerful actors that endanger the system and the *status quo,* it shifts from a 'slow-motion' war to an 'instant' one.[33] In that case, since it has been ensured that the outcome of a conflict or a war could shift regional balances of power and a regional hegemon could emerge, external powers do not hesitate to use 'war weapon'. For instance, as elucidated in detail in Chapter Five, when Iraq

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[32] Castells, M. (1996). *The Rise of The Network Society Vol I: The Information Age: Economy, Society and Culture.* Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. P.459.

[33] Ibid, 461.

invaded Kuwait in 1990, it was confronted by 'instant war technology' and was swiftly defeated six months afterwards by the international coalition led by the U.S.

The U.S. willingness to play the role of hegemon in the Middle East stems from the intrinsic importance of the region to the U.S. interests, primarily due to the location of vast oil resources.[34] During the Cold War era, Gamal Abdel Nasser was presenting the most significant regional challenge to the U.S. and it was contained and neutralized after the 1967 War. Similarly, a major manifestation against the U.S. hegemony in the post Cold War era was posed by a defiant Saddam, the U.S. once more demonstrated its willingness to use force to defeat a regional challenger.

1.4.2 Methodological Inquiry: Case Study

In general, case studies are the preferred strategy when "how" or "why" questions are being posed.[35] As a research strategy, the case study aims to contribute to the knowledge of political related phenomena and to understand complex social phenomena.[36] Stating alternatively, the essence of a case study is that it tries to illuminate why and how certain phenomenon were implemented and with what result.

Nevertheless, having said all this, a good case study is difficult to do. A researcher shall consider some significant points for the successful implementation of a case study. In this connection, many research methods experts agree upon the point that the case studies are most useful especially in three cases.[37]

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[34] Miller, B. (2004). "The International System and Regional Balance in the Middle East". In Paul, T.V., Wirtz, J.J. & Fortmann, M. (eds.) *Balance of Power. Theory and Practice in the 21st Century*. Stanford: Stanford University Press. P. 248. Also cited in Jackson, R.J. & Towle, P. (2006). *Temptations of Power. The United States in Global Politics after 9/11*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. P. 26.

[35] Yin, R. K. (2003). *Case Study Research: Design and Methods*. Third Edition. London: Sage Publications. P.1.

[36] Ibid, 1-2.

[37] Ibid, 13.

i.   Where the researcher has little or no control over events.

ii.   When the focus is on a contemporary phenomenon within some real-life context. And;

iii.   When the boundaries between phenomenon and context are   not clearly evident.

Accordingly, three additional categories could be included for the progressive case studies. Firstly, the cases where the boundaries between phenomenon and context may not be adequately embedded in valid theoretical realms, or they are just explained in a historical context, case studies could be quite useful. As also commented by Yin, empirical research advances only when it is accompanied by theory and logical inquiry, and not when it is treated as a mechanistic or data collection endeavour.[38]

Secondly, as mentioned by Robert Stake, what counts as a case can be as flexible as the researcher's definition of the subject.[39] Having said that, researcher's absolute freedom is limited when choosing a case. Stake expressed this assumption progressively by stating that "a case study is not a methodological choice, but a choice of object to be studied".[40]

Finally, the selection of more than one case is a methodological necessity in terms of comparison and contrast. In many instances, a single case may not provide a satisfactory analysis and examination for the theoretical assumptions.

This research is a case study that fulfils all the six main criteria that is mentioned above. First of all, since the analysis of this research is mainly based upon historical analysis, the researcher has no control over the standing events. Nevertheless, the focus is on a relatively contemporary phenomenon that has connections within real-life context.

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[38] Ibid, xv

[39] Stake, R. (1995). *The Art of Case Study Research.* Thousand Oaks, California: Sage. P.4-5.

[40] Ibid, 9.

As a fulfilment of the second set of criteria, this research contention is the boundaries between phenomenon in the Middle East and context is not adequately embedded in valid theoretical realms. Following this weakness, the research aims to put forward qualified theoretical arguments with interdisciplinary impulses with new and original conceptualisations, design and interpretation.

Finally, as stated by Stake, the case studies of this research are not a methodological choice, but a choice of object to be studied. As stated above, the basic premise of this research is the Middle East is organized along Westphalian state based political authorities where Gamal Abdel Nasser and Saddam Hussein brought the most formidable challenges against this new *modus vivendi.*

Therefore, in this sense, these two cases represent the typical and in fact the most representative samples in what they represent as a category of cases. They also match the historical backgrounds. Stating alternatively, these case studies are selected not only because they stand out as the most likely cases, but also they are the only cases that fit with the research inquiry. Egypt and Iraq stand as unique cases simply due to the nature, character, policies, actions, and challenges of their leaders to the regional system.

Finally, the selection of these two cases also satisfies the selection of more than one case as a methodological necessity in terms of comparison and contrast providing satisfactory analysis and examination of the theoretical assumptions that was put forward in the former sections of the thesis.

1.4.3 Methodological Techniques & Considerations

In order to improve the consistency and reliability, the usage of certain methodological techniques are necessary. The *hypothetico-deductive method* is the methodological technique that is used in the totality of the research in terms of development of hypotheses and counter-hypotheses. According to the hypothetico-deductive method, an initial observation is formulated from certain explicit predictions from the text. Then, the hypothesis that runs contrary to this observation

is brought forward. This process followed by an explanation and then the detailed analysis of this counter hypothesis. Next, the new (counter) hypothesis is revised and finalized by contrasting the earliest observation. In the final stage, the counter hypothesis is further tested and deepened through the empirical cases and examples.

Following these footsteps, this research aims to find out certain evidences, which demonstrate how the challenging regimes in the Arab regional system are subordinated. In this regard, the main (counter) hypothesis is put forward against the mainstream approaches that originated from certain explicit theoretically authoritative sources. Then, the original hypothesis that is derived from the main/counter argument is further developed and supported by relative discussions, analysis, examples, and empirical evidences.

The hypothesis of the discursive and subjective international order, which causes *subordination* in the Arab regional system, is the main argument in this research. This hypothesis contradicts with the orthodox/mainstream approaches of patterns of order that has been presented as an initial observation in the thesis. Then, the hypothesis of *subordination* is introduced and evolutionary developed against the mainstream approaches. At the final stage, the original hypothesis of subordination is assessed using specific case studies. In this sense, two case studies (the cases of Gamal Abdel Nasser's Egypt and Saddam Hussein's Iraq) are deployed at the very end of the thesis in order to testify, deepen and support the theoretical assumptions that are put forward within the preceding sections of the thesis.

In accordance with this design, in the case studies it is initially demonstrated that both leaders have challenged the established regional *status quo* and they were *contained* through different strategies.

At this particular instance, the reader may ask or wonder why the quantitative methods have not applied to this study? ***The quantitative research*** method is not applied, simply because it is not functional for the tasks of this study. Dependence on purely quantitative methods may neglect the social, political and

cultural construction of the 'variables'. In other words, accordingly, there are areas of social reality, which quantitative methods or statistics could not measure. The key concepts of this research are among these concepts.

Secondly, accordingly, like philosophy social theories are not set up for coherent and absolute testable theories and methodologies. In this sense, the value of theoretical discussion can barely be judged against a criterion of quantitative testability. Therefore, like in the case of many qualitative studies, the final purpose of this study is *not* to create 'testable' applications but to give an insight for the critical and original analysis.

In consequence, in a theoretically insightful and methodologically rigorous way, this study has adopted and combined post-structural order, political version of the world system theory, and hegemonic balance of power theory within the subordination approach. It also has adopted the hypothetico-deductive method technique within the case study as the methodological tools of this research. Therefore, this study is a qualitative research. As noted by Halfpenny, the qualitative research has certain features such as being soft, flexible, innovative, political, case study, speculative but grounded.[41] Accordingly, this research bears most of these features.

In accordance and addition to the *hypothetico-deductive method*, this study also has some additional methodological considerations. In other words, there are some other common denominators in the methodology. Firstly, in order to improve the consistency and reliability, the thesis is conducted upon the strong basis with thematic and chronological design. In other words, the research aims to provide a thematic analysis and chapters proceed in chronological order. Meticulous consideration has been given to the categorisation and presentation of the topics in order to ensure that the examination operates in a relative manner, and the topic narrowed down suitably. By linking specific research questions to larger theoretical constructions, the particulars of the study serve to illuminate larger issues. Thus, the

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[41] Halfpenny, P. (1979). "The analysis of qualitative data". *Sociological Review.* 27 (4). Pp.799-780.

main objective is to provide both theoretical and empirical contributions through various examples, illustrations, and evidences.

Therefore, the research is narrowed down systematically through both chronological and thematic relevance that goes from general (international) to regional (Arab Regional System) and finally to specific country based (Egypt & Iraq) analysis. For this purpose, the study is divided into two main segments; conceptual basis and case studies.

Chapters Two and Three, which follow the introductory chapter, lays out the conceptual foundations of the analyses that detailed in the rest of the thesis. The conceptual part is based upon two interrelated evolutionary parts: Initially, the analysis of the international origins of subordination provides the theoretical background of the research.

In the second part, the Arab regional system is defined and evaluated in order to demonstrate why Arab regional system is different than the other regional systems. One other aim of this section is to highlight the reasons of why challenges may arise within the Arab regional system against the international order.

The second section, which consists of the case studies, is not only focused on the main empirical cases of subordination, but also testifies the theoretical and empirical conclusions that had put forward within the preceding sections. With this structure, it is aimed to draw out the links among related issues in order to maintain that each sections contribution retains analytical cogency and descriptive relevancy of what comes before and after.

In this research, the primary research sources are academic books and articles. To ensure the validity and reliability, in addition to the academic sources, the qualitative data is also extracted from the official documents, other legal documents and mass media. Needless to say that all of these sources were assessed through a critical reading and evaluation.

As a last word, it is worth stressing that this research tried to give maximum consideration on its' analysis regarding to the 'thin line' between the interpretations

of the events/texts/actions/behaviour that are based on cultural and political values, *versus* Euro sceptic approach. Related to this problem, an author's consideration is equally important on distinguishing the *Eurocentric* approaches from the *Euro sceptic* ones. Again against this academic caution, this research made the maximum effort not to 'mixing' the two.

Moreover, it is a fact that some sources of the Euro-scepticism originated from ideological approaches and normative priorities of traditions varying from conservative-Islamism, pan-Arabism, Arab nationalism, cultural purism, defensive nationalism, or from similar perceptions and outlooks.

This thesis tries to avoid Euro-sceptic and the aforementioned ideological approaches' line of analysis. In contrast, it is motivated by the academic approaches that acknowledge the shortcomings of these perceptions. This belief also encouraged the requirement for an analytic and systematic research that elaborates the inconsistencies within the international order and political and epistemological approaches to the Middle East.

1.5 Structure of the Chapters

This last section of the introduction chapter is designed to explain the logic behind the planning of the chapters including the main topics and order of arguments that are covered within the research.

This research is written from an international-relations perspective. Therefore, it is not a study focusing on the history of the Middle East and does not trace the events in a chronological way beginning to end. Instead, the objective is limited to provide an understanding of the subordination in the Middle East and to provide a basis for further investigation through examining the subordination from different analytical perspectives and case studies. This process scheme may be possible to gain some real, even if not ultimate insights. Therefore, explaining this phenomenon requires an investigation of the context in which events took place in addition to some examination of the historical and structural context.

In this respect, this research attempts to elucidate the interactions between structural and contingent factors. For this purpose, the Chapter Two and the Chapter Three are concerned with describing the nature of those structures. These two chapters deal with historical and contemporary structures of the Middle East and the structural relationship between the Middle East and the international system. On the other hand, the case studies namely the Chapter Four and Five provide descriptive, empirical, and practical data for the field study.

The analysis of the thesis is built upon three interrelated evolutionary parts:

i. The analysis of international origins of subordination

ii. The definition and analysis of the Arab regional system. And,

iii. The case studies of Egypt and Iraq.

The thesis starts from the analysis of the origins and international dimension of subordination. After presenting the shortcomings of the most authoritative approaches of international order, the chapter tries to answer the questions of what are the origins and basis of the subordination and dichotomy within the international order? How this order was expanded into the non-European world? What is the operating mechanism of the dualistic international order? And finally what are the continuous and consistent patterns of the subordinate international order within the contemporary international system? In this way, it is aimed to define and generate the theoretical background and key concepts of the research that are benefited for the rest of the study.

Chapter Three analyses the Arab regional system. In this chapter the main inquiry is to answer the question of what distinguishes the Arab regional system from the other regional systems. This question tries to be answered through the analysis of the dual authority and the transnational identities in the Arab regional system. By this way, it is aimed to demonstrate that why Nasser's and Saddam's regimes challenge formed such a formidable danger for the breaking of the established *status quo* in the Arab regional system.

In the second part of this chapter, the problematic of state formation and other related problems in geographical limits such as legitimacy problem is analyzed in order to underline the vulnerability of the Arab regimes against the challenger regimes.

Chapter Four and Five are the case studies that analyse Egypt and Iraq. Case studies illustrate the arguments that are put forward in the previous parts, and contribute to the enrichment of the study through more detailed analysis. Therefore, they are deployed at the end of the research in order to demonstrate and support the validity of the theoretical arguments that have been presented in the first part of the thesis.

Since the research is conducted upon the basis of both thematic and chronological systematic, Egypt case study came before the Iraq case study because Gamal Abdel Nasser's systemic challenge had arisen before Saddam Hussein's. The intention of this section is *not* to give a detailed historical account of the events in Iraq and Egypt. Instead, being parallel to the objectives of the research, significant historical turning points that become the focus of many controversies and the core problem at the heart of the analysis that is the containment and subordination of these regimes is evaluated. In order to keep subjectivity at the minimum level, this section is widely relied on critically assessed reliable sources and first hand documents such as international agreements, declarations, speeches etc. Both case studies have been formatted upon the similar designs. Initially, the emergence of both leaders' challenged the regional system is examined that is followed by the methods and strategies of their containment and subordination. In this connection, the Egypt chapter ends with the death of Gamel Abdel Nasser in 1970, and the occupation of Iraq and termination of Saddam's regime in 2003.

The thesis is finalized with the conclusion chapter in which the main arguments are summarized and important findings of the research are presented.

CHAPTER II

INTERNATIONAL ORIGINS OF 'SUBORDINATION'

2.1 Introduction

The Chapter Two focuses on the international origins of subordination through historical analysis of patterns of international order in order to provide a background for the theoretical framework of the thesis. Accordingly, the dynamic synthesis that is advocated throughout this research could be further understood if the partial nature of subordination is recognized and incorporated into a more comprehensive account. This would require a rethinking of partial perspectives about the international origins of subordination in general along with its implementation to the Arab Middle East.

This chapter structure is constructed upon chronological order for the purpose of initially conceptualize the origins, and then highlight the 'consistent' and 'continuous' patterns of subordination. For this objective, the initial part of the chapter focuses on formation of dichotomy within international order. Nevertheless, in order to provide a better and critical analysis, the preliminary inquiry is given to the examination of the orthodoxies of the international order and its' shortcomings.

Following the same line of analysis, the third section of the chapter is based upon the expansion of international society and subordination that is chased by the continuation of subordination in new formations in the post Second World War system.

This is followed by the evaluation of the post Cold War and September 11 eras through the 'failed states' and humanitarian intervention' concepts. In this section it is argued that September 11, 2001 attacks reinforced the credibility of the U.S. power, projection, and military involvement in the Middle East on the pretext of war against international terrorism. Stating alternatively, these attacks provided enough excuses for the U.S. to re-load the long desired Cold War norms and principles that once more paved the way for justifying and resorting military measures on interfering to other regimes. The chapter is concluded with the assessment of the nature of international order and subordination.

2.2 Setting the Scene: The shortcomings of the Orthodoxies of International Order

The expansion of international society and the construction of a global political and legal order have achieved considerable attention in the International Relations literature.[1] These mainstream approaches founded upon the principle of states' mutual respect for each other's territorial sovereignty and rough equality in their relations. Nevertheless, the *dualistic* nature of order at the international sphere and the regulation of various political *standards* by the Europeans to the non-Europeans have not given the required consideration, although these are quite significant issues.

For the contemporary times, the English School emerged as the distinctive branch in relation to any discussion addressing the emergence and expansion of the international society of states. In other words, the English school, generally regarded as the main orthodox theory of order that provided the authoritative examination and definition about how the international members could form a society, how this society operates, and functions properly in theoretical realm.

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[1] *See* for instance, Bull, H. (1977). *The Anarchical Society*. London: Macmillan Press, and Bull, H., and Watson, A. (eds.) (1984a). *The Expansion of International Society*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Basically speaking, the English School scholars pursue an evolutionary analysis, which explains the historical process of the gradual dissemination of Westphalian sovereignty into the non-European world. The initial international society named as the Christian international society of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The following international societies named as the European international society of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries,[2] and world (or global) political system of the early twentieth century onwards.[3]

Therefore, Bull and other English School scholars contend that prior to the eighteenth century, no truly 'international' political system existed within which ideas of economic and social justice might be realized. In other words, previous relations between European and non-European states could not be defined within the domain of 'society of states' because there was not 'common'; interests, international institutions, and agreed set of rules between the two sides.[4]

Hedley Bull specifically named the expansion and the domination of the world by the European powers through colonialization process as the first and most important step on expansion of the international society. Bull comments that this step was important because colonialization spread the European states system that promotes 'sovereign equality'. In this sense, Bull explains the reasons of the European 'domination' not only as traditional economic and military supremacy, but also in terms of superiority on commanding intellectual and cultural authority.

Secondly, Bull points out that Japanese campaign against extra-territorial jurisdiction in the 1880s and 1890s, the impact of the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917, the successes of massive nationalist movements in China and in India in the 1920s worked as the real attempts on transformation of the international society on more

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[2] Bull, H. (1977:16).

[3] Ibid, 20.

[4] Bull, H. (1984b). "The emergence of a universal international society". In Bull, H., and Watson, A. (eds.) *The Expansion of International Society*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. P.117.

equal basis.[5] In consequence, being similar to the other English School Scholars, Bull argues that dominance of the European powers last until the Second World War. However, afterwards, Bull contends that a revolt against the Western dominance "became powerful enough to shake the system".[6]

Bull defines the process that paved the way for egalitarian international society of states as linear and evolutionary that composed of five phases. The initial phase refers to the non-European entities struggle for sovereign equality. These states, although have formal independence, sought to overcome their subordinate and inferior status that marked by unequal treaties and extraterritoriality.[7] Bull suggests that Turkey (the Ottoman Empire), Japan, China, Siam, and Persia were examples of this category and accomplished their sovereign equality in the period between the late ninetieth century and before the Second World War.

The other non-European states struggles as anti-colonial revolution and struggle for racial equality are the second and third phases. According to Bull, last two phases on breaking the hegemonic control of Europe and emerging of egalitarian international society is struggle for economic justice and struggle for cultural liberation. As a consequence of all these phases, English School scholars envision that non-European members of the international society became equal partners especially in the post Second World War era where the European powers no longer militarily dominated and colonialized the world.

In summary, Bull and Watson confirm that the global international society of today is a consequence of Europe's impact on the rest of the world. Nevertheless, they argue that in addition to the anti-colonial struggle, the international society has established by dialogue and consent on common rules and institutions for the conduct of their relations, and through recognizing their common interest in

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[5] Ibid, 217-226.

[6] Bull, H. (1984c). "The Revolt Against the West". In Bull, H., and Watson, A. (eds.) *The Expansion of International Society*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. P.217.

[7] Ibid, 220.

maintaining these arrangements.[8] In other words, non-European states become the equal members of the international society by consentfully accepting international society's rules and institutions.

Therefore, similar to the Groatian tradition that emerged in the seventeenth century, both Hedley Bull and Martin Wight assume that patterns of current international order are based upon the society of juristically 'equal' and 'independent' sovereign states. Although both scholars have admitted and emphasized upon certain inequalities during the expansion of the international society, they argue that the globalisation and institutionalisation of the state system made the international order more equal.

Having briefly mentioned the main assumptions of the orthodox understanding of international order, inevitably, there are some shortcomings of these assumptions that need to be evaluated. Detailed identification of the problems that derived from the European state system and the shortcomings of transplantation of a European political and legal order to the non-European world are among the major neglected issues.

More specifically, Hedley Bull, Martin Wight, and other English School scholars have focused and provided a description of one system only; the state system which developed through inter *allia* relations between European rulers. Thus, they provided an evaluation of dissemination of this system to the outer world. They tend to grant this system, as it is the 'only' one with 'common' set of rules, norms and 'goals'. Therefore, supposedly, there is single legal and political order within the international system with one purpose (promote peace, codification of sovereign and individual rights, diplomatic encoding of their relations, etc.)

Among the other major shortcomings, the explanation of international society with major reference to statecraft is not self-explanatory on the formation and exercise of the political standards. The religious and cultural factors that definitely play an important role on formation of the political standards have not

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[8] Bull, H., and Watson, A. (eds.) (1984a:1).

given the required importance. In terms of Middle East for instance, there is no or little doubt that Orientalist approaches with their strong emphasis on cultural inferiority of the Arabs played a major role on colonization and subordination of the region.

The English School scholars also neglected the dependence of the international law to the norms, interests, and particular perceptions of the European culture while focusing on the open ended question of whether is it possible to create international society of states without the domination of the Western culture. Moreover, Bull and other English School scholars neglected double standards on implementation and regulation of the international law. Similarly, the question of how dualism persisted in different forms within the international system since the establishment of the state system left untouched.

Apparently, these principles are suited for the definition and institutionalisation of one sort of order and relationships that is limited to the European actors. It is a fact that post-Westphalian European order was founded upon the principle of states mutual respect for each other's territorial sovereignty. Nevertheless, it is highly questionable whether the pattern of relations between Europeans and non-Europeans was the same. By focusing on the Westphalian principles only, the English School scholars missed out how the international order was emerged, structured, and differentiated between European and non-European entities.

To sum up, Bull's overall analysis in relation to the evolution of international society is very useful and satisfactory on explaining one side of international order. Nevertheless, the duality within the international order has not given the required significance. Due to this reason; origins of duality within the international system, the formation of European hierarchies, the extra territorial measures of the European powers, standards of civilization, and the new and continuous patterns of historically constructed political standards have not given the required emphasis.

Deriving from this shortcoming, this chapter takes off from the historical analysis of the dichotomy in international order in order to clarify and provide an understanding of the historical background of *subordination* that is benefitted in the rest of the thesis as a theoretical framework.

At this point, it is worth stressing that this research has greatly benefited from the theoretical framework that focuses on dualism in international order. In this regard, scholars and their publications such as Edward Keene's *Beyond the Anarchical Society: Grotius, Colonialism and Order in World Politics,* Siba N'zatioula Grovogui's *Sovereigns, Quasi Sovereigns, and Africans*: *Race and Self-Determination in International Law,* and Gerrit Gong's *The Standard of 'Civilization' in International Society* deserved a special emphasis.

2.3 Origins of the Subordination: Formation of Dichotomy within the International Order

Dichotomy within the international order has a long history and strong roots. Then, what are the origins of the dichotomy at the international order? This initial section aims to answer that question by focusing on the origins of the subordination through two significant developments; Universal hierarchical claims of the Catholic Church and the emergence of the European society of states in the post Peace of Westphalia era.

2.3.1 Papal Bulls and Formation of Hierarchies

The concept of 'special regulation' of rules that are applied in European relations with non-Europeans emerged long before the development of the sovereign Westphalian principles in the mid seventeenth century. The Papal interpretations of the Scriptures are the initial source of the modern hierarchical international order. Through ecclesiastic interpretation, the Church defined its' values as 'universal'. These interpretations are significant because they genesis to

constitute international law and the relationship between the European 'self' and non-European 'other'.

In 1302, Pope Boniface VIII declared in *Unam Sanctam* that ultimate sovereignty over both Christian and non-Christian peoples belong to the Church. During the Medieval times, the pope wielded such power that the Roman Catholic Church is presumed the ultimate sovereign, referred as the "power of humankind".[9] This claim of superiority, even over non-Christians, is the origin of the legal basis for the political aspirations of Christian/European supremacy over others.

Until the discovery of the New World, hierarchical order and perception about 'others' were the same. The Catholic Church was at the top of the pyramid succeeded by European monarchs. The 'old world infidels' (primarily Muslims, Chinese, and Indians) are placed above Africans, who are placed at the very bottom of the pyramid (after 1492, the Africans are promoted up one step, with the 'new world infidels' coming last).[10]

The 'old world infidels' had certain rights for owning and ruling their lands as long as they did not engage in war with European powers or prevent European people from conducting their ultimate right of free trade within their territories.[11] The 'new world infidels' however, did not even have these rights.

The papal bulls prompted hierarchical and exploitative relations between Christian subjects and others. They also provided the initial solid base for the discursive structures for European conquest in other parts of the world. European intellectuals supported this process on the basis that their rulers were bringing "the true faith to the native populations".[12] Therefore, Europeans believed that they

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[9] Grovogui, S. N. (1996). *Sovereigns, Quasi Sovereigns, and Africans: Race and Self-Determination in International Law*. London: University of Minnesota Press. P.17.

[10] Ibid.

[11] Abu-Lughod, J. L. (1989). *Before European hegemony: The World System A.D. 1250-1350*. New York: Oxford University Press. P.11.

[12] Grovogui, S. N. (1996:50).

possessed reason, wisdom, and the capacity to carry out this task that resided only in Christianity. In consequence, there was a consensus among the Church and European monarchs on the point that natural and positive rights could not be applicable beyond Europe.

While the competition for new colonial territories was further celebrated the new discursive mechanisms, the dominant Christian attitudes towards non-Christians were remained same. The European powers were competed with each other in order to impose the 'sacred mission' and to extend their sovereignty over the non-European others. Similar to the Catholic Church bulls, the European monarchs were continued to use biblical images in order to justify colonialism. In that sense, there had not been any shift towards the denouncement of non-European's right of sovereignty.

2.3.2 Westphalian Sovereignty and Emergence of European Society of States

In the contemporary world, sovereignty is one of the most important and key concepts in international relations. It is the organizing principle of international politics.[13] From domestic to international politics, sovereignty is a key word. It is a kind of "license from international community to practice as an independent government in a particular territory."[14] It is a private world into which the outside world is not permitted to enter.[15] A *sovereign* is the supreme lawmaking authority, subject to no other.

Westphalian sovereignty generally refers to the well-known principle of 'non-intervention' whereby no other external actor can interfere in the domestic

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[13] *See* Kratochwil, F. (1986). "Of Systems, Boundaries, and Territoriality". *World Politics*. 39 (1). P.27.

[14] Ibid.

[15] Taylor, P. (1999). "The United Nations in the 1990s: Proactive Cosmopolitanism and the Issue of Sovereignty". *Political Studies*. 47 (3). P.538.

affairs of a state. It is this principle that is generally associated with the emergence of the European society of states and patterns of order among them. Therefore, the concept of Westphalian sovereignty is crucially important for understanding the origin and evaluation of the European society of states.

Before the emergence of the modern state system, the concept of a unified Christian Europe had dominated the political life in most parts of Europe.[16] The basis of this Christian unity was relying upon the doctrine of a God-given natural law above mankind. The Church was proclaimed itself as the ultimate authority, covering every aspect of human life from political to religious affairs in a united form. The Pope was given the ultimate right of making new laws and even he had the power of excommunicating or deposing kings.[17] The Catholic Church was the owner of about one-third of Europe's total land.[18]

Since all ethnic, regional, and linguistic differences were covered by the Christian norm, this society was a universal society.[19] During the Medieval period there were no international boundaries or nationalities as we understand in the contemporary meaning. Only orthodox and obedient believers could enjoy the full rights of citizenship."[20]

In symbolic terms, the Protestant challenge and the Peace of Westphalia of 1648 that settled the Thirty Years religious wars is generally regarded as the milestone for the decline of papal ecclesiastical authority and the emergence of

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[16] Archer, C. (2001). *International Organisations.* Third Edition. London: Routledge. P.4. *See* also Bozeman, A. (1960). *Politics and Culture in International History.* Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. P.514, and Davies, N. (1997). *Europe: A History.* London: Pimlico. Pp.7-10.

[17] Roberts, J. M. (1996). A *History of Europe.* Oxford: Helicon. P.88.

[18] De Mesquita, B. B. (2000). "Popes, Kings and Endogenous Institutions: The Concordat of Worms and the Origins of Sovereignty". *International Studies Review* 2 (2). P.99.

[19] Bartelson, J. (1995). *A Genealogy of Sovereignty.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. P.91.

[20] Southern, R. W. (1990). *Western Society and the Church in The Middle Ages.* London: Penguin Books. P.16.

modern state sovereignty. In other words, the Christian unity in medieval Europe (*pax Christiana*) were replaced by European society of 'sovereigns'.

In the Peace of Westphalia, the major European powers (with the notable exception of England) were agreed to abide by the principle of territorial integrity. As progressively defined by Jackson:[21]

> After Westphalia the language of international justification shifted, away from Christian unity and towards international diversity based on a secular society of sovereign states. By the time of the Peace of Utrecht (1712-1713) the rulers of Europe understood each other as essentially self-determining actors, none of which was entitled to dictate others.

Briefly stating, the Westphalian state system was promoted and guided by four main principles:[22]

i. The right of states to define their geographical boundaries (territoriality).

ii. The right of states to have their own forms of government, and the exclusion of external actors from the domestic authority (non-intervention).

iii. The right of states to govern their territories with their own constitution, rules, and principles (secularity). And;

iv. The right of states to conduct relations with other states on equal basis (sovereign equality).

The basis of the European order was initiated as a web of treaty obligations that was reinforced the principle of 'respect for the lawful rights of dynastic rulers'.[23] The major driving force behind the Westpalian system was to promote 'the

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[21] Jackson, R. (1997). "Sovereignty in World Politics: a Glance at the Conceptual and Historical Landscape". *Political Studies*. 47 (3). P. 439.

[22] For detailed examination of this issue; Sørensen, G. (2001). *Changes in Statehood: The Transformation of International Relations*. New York: Palgrave Press, Walker, R.J.B., and Mendlowitz, S. H. (eds.) (1991). *Contending Sovereignties*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Tilly, C. (ed.) (1975). *The formation of national states in Western Europe*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

[23] Keene, E. (2002). *Beyond the Anarchical Society: Grotius, Colonialism and Order in World Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. P.18.

balance of power' among mutually independent sovereign European entities.[24] The balance of power principle's main purpose was to maintain self-help and limit the wars among the European powers. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, it was believed that the main way of avoiding war is prevention of emergence of a European hegemonic power that could dominate others.[25] In other words, it was in common interest of all dynastic rulers to form a sort of balance for their security against a potential hegemon.

Therefore, the balance of power principle was both a psychological and a moral necessity for the promotion of peace and equality among European powers. Koch and Schöell explain this precondition on the formation of the European society of states as:[26]

> The object of this system is to maintain public order, to protect the weak against the strong, to put obstacles in the way of the ambitious projects of conquerors, and to prevent dissensions that might lead to the calamities of war. Uniting the different sovereigns of Europe in a common interest it commits them to sacrificing their individual desires to the general good, and creates, so to speak, one family.

In summary, the Westphalian European system was constructed upon two inter-related sets of purpose; the initial set of purpose was to encourage sovereignty among the European nations and to promote respect for each other's territorial sovereignty, equality, and independence. In other words, the leading purpose of the European system was to promote peaceful co-existence in a multicultural Europe through respecting dynastic rulers' rights to govern their domestic areas with their own will and preference.

The second set of purpose was included the promotion of toleration for cultural and political differences among European nations in order to live together

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[24] *See* Tucker, R. W. (1977). *The Inequality of Nations.* New York: Basic Books Publishers. P.6.

[25] Ibid, 6.

[26] Koch, C.W., and Schoell, F. (1817). *Historie Abrege des Traites de paix, entre les Puissances de l'Europe, depuis la Paix de Westphalie.* Paris : Gide. P.3. Cited and translated in Keene, E. (2002:20).

and peacefully. Stating alternatively, European monarchs were agreed to diminish the risks of conflict among themselves. As a result, the Peace of Westphalia settled the major disputes of European politics. Therefore, the European society of states was *voluntaristic* and *decentralized* which was also serving for the balance of power.

To sum up, in the post Westphalian era, European international system's main objective was to provide interstate justice through promoting the toleration of ethnic, cultural and political differences. For this purpose, certain norms, rules, and institutions were defined in order to construct a new order among European powers. The main operating mechanism of this system was resting upon the norm that states should respect each other's territorial sovereignty, equality and independence. The aim was to develop and pursue the peaceful co-existence between equal and independent European states.

Having said that, what should be emphasized most is the Westphalian principles were conducted to manage the relations between the European authorities only. Only the Christian international society was part of this system and the Westphalian principles did not extend to non-Christian rulers. In other words, European powers did not treat to non-Christians in the way that they dealt with each other.[27] In this sense, the norms and institutions of the extra European system were different than the European system, which became particularly feasible during the expansion of international society.

2.4 'Expansion' of International Society & Subordination

The Peace of Westphalia (1648), the Peace of Utrecht (1713), and the industrial revolution in the eighteenth century further maintained and consolidated the notion of state sovereignty. As an inevitable outcome of these processes, there

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[27] Bull, H. (1984d). "Foreword". In Gong, G. W. *The Standard of 'Civilization' in International Society*. Oxford: Clarendon Press. P.vii.

has been a clash between the Church's and Westphalian principles. Simply stating, scientific knowledge was clashed with religious dogmas.

In consequence, religious zealots were replaced in importance by rationalism and empiricism, which now constituted the main source of knowledge. In other words, instead of religious 'absolute' norms; rationality, reason, and experimentation began to be privileged as a method. In consequence, state-based law and principles were gradually prevailed over the religious dogmas. This era is known as the 'enlightenment' era.

Nevertheless, although the structural basis in Europe began to change since the Peace of Westphalia onwards, the existing hierarchies and patterns of order between Christians and others were not changed. New European sovereign establishments continued ordering mechanisms of the preceding ecclesiastical system. The Church inspired 'universalistic' aspirations were remained for the sovereign establishments in order to 'totalize' cultural, political, and legal systems under the European's hegemony.

Due to this reason, inevitably, the Westphalian international order was driven by military and political considerations. Following the domestic consolidation and recognition of the state's power, the next step was the conquest of 'other' and 'new' lands.

As have emphasised above, the justification of the initial European domination of the external world was based upon fifteenth century papal bulls that introduced the medieval concept of an *imperium mundi* (conquest and cession).[28] In post Westphalian era, the mission of spreading the 'good customs of Christianity' was replaced with the 'salvation of the weak' by the 'chosen strong'. Similarly, the Christian universe of 'Kingdom of Heaven' was succeeded by the 'kingdom of conquest'. In both cases, Europeans feel obligated to maintain the international system and define its rules according to their perceptions. In order to solidify this perception that was built on constructed hierarchies, certain stereotypes were

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[28] Jackson, R. H. (1990:58).

produced against local populations 'in order to prepare public psyche for the crimes that would be committed during the conquest.[29]

Rapid transformations in technology in the nineteenth century were further changed the cultural and economic structures in Europe. In relation with these developments, European intellectuals put forward that there is an unbridgeable gap between Europeans and others and campaigned for abroad conquests. In this era, the 'achievements of white men' were served as evidence of Western racial superiority and the rationale for imperialism.[30] In other words, the driving force behind extraterritorial adventures was the belief of European cultural supremacy and racial superiority.[31]

In consequence, the authoritative myths were supported by the political and philosophical thinking and in return these thoughts were justifying colonialism. In short, science and politics were combined to facilitate colonialism.[32] This condition was further expressed by Doumani with the following words:[33]

> For European, the nineteenth century was the discovery century *par excellence,* for it witnessed the extension of (primarily) British and French economic, political and cultural hegemony over the nonindustrialized world. Yet, the inhabitants of "other" societies rarely occupied a central place in the consciousness of nineteenth-century European historians, whose narratives, instead, were dominated by tales of brave conquests and enlightened rule by Christian males.

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[29] See for instance, Said, E. W. (1978). *Orientalism.* New York: Vintage Books, Miller, C. (1985). *Blank Darkness: Africanist Discourse in French*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. P.28.

[30] Grovogui, S. N. (1996:29).

[31] Ibid, 25.

[32] Fabien, J. (1983). *Time and the Other: How Anthropology Makes Its Objects*. New York: Columbia University Press. P.8.

[33] Doumani, B. (1999). "Rediscovering Ottoman Palestine Writing Palestinan into history". In Pappe, I. (ed.) *The Israel/ Palestine Question Rewriting Histories.* London and New York: Routledge. P.14.

Therefore, even the new enlightenment philosophies did not abandon the Church's hierarchical perception to non-Europeans.[34] This reality finds a clear and well-defined expression in one-scholar words as "the post-Enlightenment interest in evolution did not correct Western perceptions of the other as inferior, but only caused a transmutation of the original ecclesiastical dichotomy of savior/fallen into one of civilized/noncivilized."[35]

It was a fact that the enlightenment philosophers who had raised subtle challenges against the religious dogmas and traditions, failed to expand their criticisms to imperialism, extra-territoriality, discursive European state system and other forms of European oppression such as slavery. In other words, while the Westphalian principles were rapidly broadened and accepted throughout Europe, the majority of politicians, publicist, and even scholars missed out the possibility to extend these rights to non-European world. By this way, through pushing other civilizations to a lower space, the necessary justifications for political, military, and socio-economic practices were constructed.

These quests for material well-being naturally drove the development of the military technology. Creation of steam-powered ships and maxim guns were the end result of these quests. Specifically, since the beginning of the nineteenth century, the European powers were achieved the ultimate military capacity to dictate their political will to the rest of the world.[36] Modern technology, industry, weapons, and medicine were confirmed the European states' advantage over others.

In this connection, during the 'heyday' of colonialism, when the European powers were at the peak of their military power and capabilities, they defined the terms and conditions that should applied to non-European states on their admission

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[34] Sibley, M. Q. (1970). *Political ideas and ideologies: A history of political thought*. New York: Harper and Row. Pp.372-373.

[35] Grovogui S. N. (1996:41).

[36] Gong, G. W. (1984:66).

to the international society of states.[37] In this respect, European powers had both the will and capacity to impose their international patterns of order and 'standards' on the rest of the world.

The initial expansion of the European society of states system beyond Europe occurred either by compulsion or invitation. The invitation was in the cases of; the United States of America (following its military successes in the Spanish-American War in 1898), the Latin American states (as being the countries of European settlers and their descendants), the independent states of the British Empire, and the new states of Eastern Europe that previously had been under the jurisdiction of European states. In the case of invitation, the common point among all these states is they have similar political cultures, and religious, cultural, ethnic, and linguistic bonds with mainland Europe.

The case of compulsion included the cases of the Ottoman Empire, China, and Japan, which historically have their own rules on relationship with Europeans.[38] In contrast to the invited states, these states had to prove their civility and capability. As highlighted by Jackson, many Latin or Eastern European states may have failed and not became the members of international society if there were not double standards.[39]

Therefore, the first universal international society was formed through the coexistence of the European society of states, selected (invited) states, and the non-European states. The accession of the non-European states to the international society however, became possible only after their acceptance of unequal treaties and further political and economic subordination. On the other hand, the regimes that failed from the civilization standards left to the framework of Western colonialism.

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[37] Bull, H. (1984d:vii).

[38] Jackson, R. H. (1990:61).

[39] Ibid, 62.

To epitomize, European measures and standards just served as a legal device to impose European civilization. The requirements for the standards were never clearly defined and different demands of the European powers for civilizational rights made them really difficult, if not impossible, to enforce.[40]

In this era, paradoxically, it was only the military power and capability, rather than any other factor that satisfied the complete 'equal member' status within the international society. In other words, the only alternative way to challenge subordination was resort to military power and refuse to recognise the legal applications of the discursive international system. In this sense, only two non-European powers able to accomplish this. The United States military victory in the Spanish-American War in 1898, and Japan defeat of Russia in 1904-5 War were confirmed their equal membership status within the international society of states.

To sum up, the historical development of the dichotomy and subordination within the international order laid back to twelfth century. Then, two different political and legal systems that solidified in the late seventeenth century effectively operated untill the early twentieth century. One system was regulating inter-European relations and the other beyond Europe relations. Especially by the late nineteenth century, these two distinctive systems were more evident than ever.

The extra-European system was not based on Westphalian principles of order (equality, non-intervention, secularism, and territoriality) but on imperial and colonial systems. Basically speaking, this order composed of two sets of purposes.

The first set of purposes was the achievement of the division of sovereignty across territorial borders and the enforcement of European's individual and property rights. In other words, the main concern was how sovereignty could be divided into the non-European (and uncivilized) world in order to secure European individual's private and property rights. This objective was essential for the primary interest of the European powers beyond Europe that is the maximisation of economic opportunities and control of the trade.

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[40] Ibid, 15.

The second set of purposes was to promote 'civilization' of backward people. In this regard, the development of commercial activities became the integral part of the civilization mission. In contrast to the European system, this arrangement was highly centralized and hierarchical.

Nevertheless, with the beginning of the twentieth century, the impact of positivistic theories made it a necessity to explain and justify ascendancy of Western civilization over others.[41] Constitutionalism was a criterion for many nineteenth century European governments. It was both domestic and international standard. Many European states believed that constitutionalism and rule of law should guide advanced civilizations in their dealings with backward societies.[42] This criterion called by Jackson as "positive sovereignty doctrine". In this way, European powers aimed to legitimise their achievements through formalization of their relations under the international law.

Post First World War developments also brought additional reasons for the positive sovereignty doctrine. With the words of Woodrow Wilson, in the post First World War era "societies had been shaken to its foundations, and people had been awakened to the wrongs that had been done to them".[43] The War has increased the aspirations of colonial people for freedom and racial equality because they have participated to the war in the name of freedom itself. The colonial powers demanded help from the colonialized people in the name of fight against racial discrimination and totalitarianism. In return, they had promised autonomy to colonialized people for their participation to the "war of freedom".[44] Thus, the European powers gave a sort of 'pledge' to the colonialized people.

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[41] Jackson, R. H. (1990:72).

[42] Ibid.

[43] Foley, H. (1929). *Woodrow Wilson's Case for the League o*f Nations. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Pp.164-165.

[44] Grovogui, S. N. (1996:114).

Furthermore, the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia promoted anti-colonial ideology as a supportive of colonialized peoples' political aspirations of self-determination. Lenin was questioning the European colonial powers extra jurisdictional rights and suggesting that self-determination is a universal right and desire for all peoples. In this connection, Lenin had promoted the right of self-determination for colonialized people in order to "overthrow the imperialist order".[45] For this purpose, especially after 1920s, the Soviet Union has sponsored many anti-colonial movements.[46]

Finally, the war deteriorated the ex-national boundaries and loyalties and give rise to new communal, ethnic, and national identities in the Balkans and in Eastern and Central Europe. The emergence of these new national identities provided ideological justifications and psychological foundations for the new post-colonial order.

All these factors made it necessary for the new patterns of international order and political system. The European states had to respond escalating anti-colonial nationalism. At this point, 'trusteeship and mandates system' emerged as the main solution. Once more, the Western powers appointed themselves as advisers and guardians of the other nations.

The idea of 'trusteeship' was adapted from the operating mentality of the British Empire. This mentality rested upon the principle that colonies should held in trust until they were able to govern themselves with 'modern ideas of civilized rule'.[47]

The United States President Woodrow Wilson is generally regarded as the founder of the sacred trust of civilization and trusteeship. The sacred trust of civilization and trusteeship was institutionalized in both the League of Nations and

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[45] Ibid, 116.

[46] Ibid, 136.

[47] Jackson, R. H. (1990:86).

the United Nations. In the League of Nations, the Article 22 of the Covenant included the statement of:

> For the territories inhabited by peoples not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world there should be applied the principle that the well-being and development of such peoples form a sacred trust of civilisation and that securities for the performance of this trust should be embodied in this covenant…the Tutelage of such peoples was entrusted to certain advanced nations and exercised by them as mandatories on behalf of the League.

As in the case of the previously constructed hierarchies, the trusteeship mentality has its own perception of hierarchy. With the words of Ronald Robinson:[48]

> Latin peoples were told to come next, (of Europeans) though far behind. Much lower still stood the vast Oriental communities of Asia and North Africa where progress appeared unfortunately to have been crushed for centuries by military despotisms and smothered under passive religions. Lowest of all stood the "aborigines" whom it was thought had never learned enough social discipline to pass from the family and tribe to the making of the state.

In fact, similar to the Christendom, Westphalian, and colonialism principles, classification, and hierarchy found a place within the League of Nations Covenant. The League of Nations is classified mandates into three categories. It is envisioned that Arabs, Africans, and Pacific islanders need the protection and guidance of civilized European powers.

According to this classification, category "A" mandates included the peoples of the Middle East (Ottoman Arabs) who would be capable of exercise sovereignty 'soon'. Category "B" included the people of sub-Saharan Africa who still required an 'indefinite period' of European tutelage to be 'fit' for sovereignty. The last category responded to the "primitive" peoples of German dependencies of

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[48] Robinson, R. (1961). *Africa and the Victorians: The Official Mind of Imperialism.* London: Macmillan. P.85.

South West Africa, and Pacific peoples who are very likely to exercise sovereignty in centuries, if not forever.[49]

From the Western point of view, the mandate and trusteeship systems reconciled the self-determination demands of the colonial peoples with Western economic, political, and military requirements. On the other hand, however, this proposition also confirmed the historical understanding that non-Western peoples lack the intellectual capacity and cultural foundation to settle down their domestic political problems and, their institutions are less efficient.

Thus, similar to the earlier understandings, the European 'guardianship' was continued under the new name where the improvement of moral and material conditions of the native peoples still defined as an 'obligation'. Stating alternatively, 'trusteeship' of the European powers seems necessary for effective peace keeping among 'barbaric' peoples and tribes.[50] This demonstrates that the idea of trusteeship was still deriving from the belief of 'inferiority' of the non-European peoples.

At this point, it is worth stressing that many colonial governments that established by the democratic European powers were not democratic beyond Europe. As noted by Jackson, double standards and racial discrimination conducted both officially and unofficially.[51] Furthermore, use of force widely resorted beyond the limits, which have not been tolerated in Europe. Additionally, colonial subjects mostly denied important civil liberties. From the economic point of view, although the trusteeship includes economic development promises for the native people, Europeans' welfare did not extend beyond Europe except in places where there were remarkable numbers of European settlers (colons).

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[49] Ibid, 73.

[50] Alexandrowicz, C. H. (1973). *The European-African Confrontation*. Leiden: Sijthoff. Pp.6-7.

[51] Jackson, R. H. (1990:73).

2.5 Post-Second World War System: Continuation of the Standards in new Formations

Being similar to the post First World War era, in the post Second World War Era the European powers were once more challenged with the demands of freedom and self determination of the colonialized people. This time, the pressure on European states was more than ever since many colonialized people participated during the War in the name of freedom, against cruel Nazi regime. The War itself presented by the fight against racial discrimination (that symbolized with Nazism) and totalitarianism (that is symbolized by fascism) by the Allied powers.

Therefore, the European colonial powers had to keep their promises for autonomy to the colonialized people because the defeat of Nazism reinforced the national self-determination demands. In other words, the challenge against Nazi despotism raised theoretical, conceptual, and political basis for self-determination.

Nevertheless, European powers aspirations to keep their hegemony in the non-European world were clashing with the state-system principles of state legitimacy, self-determination, equal representation, and racial equality. Hence, European powers were aiming to preserve the *status quo* within the international system through collective security and promoting Western hegemony through economic and cultural values.

All these factors required the new arrangements and amendments within the international order. In the new system, the United Nations (UN) replaced the League of Nations. Nevertheless, similar to the earlier orders, the spirit of 'equality of nations' was violated in the UN through the establishment of the Security Council.

The resolutions of the Security Council (along with treaties and international conventions) constitute the primary sources of international law. The five permanent members of the Security Council (People's Republic of China, France, Soviet Union, United Kingdom, and United States of America) can veto any decision of the UN.

Again resembling the previous systems, the Security Council reflected the military capabilities to the political system. As such, the permanent powers of the Security Council are the victorious allied powers of the World War Two. At the San Francisco Conference, where the pillars of the UN system have been established, the victorious powers rejected any proposal that did not recognise their specific position.[52] In other words, ambition for 'privilege' that protected by the legal framework is continued under the umbrella of the UN. The only difference, however, was the compulsory inclusion of the Soviet Union[53] and People's Republic of China[54] due to their military power and demographic super power status.

Moreover, the European powers once more maintained their supervisory role in the UN under the trusteeship system. In the founding of the UN, "the doctrine of trusteeship" is institutionalised under the Article 73 of the UN Charter. This article declared that member states have a 'sacred trust of obligation' to promote the peoples who "have not yet attained a full measure of self government" and it is "a sacred trust" to promote "the well-being of the inhabitants of those territories". Therefore, the regulation of standard and trust of civilization kept in practice despite these principles were insulting the representatives of the non-European authorities.

Lastly, it is worth stressing that it was not the willingness, but the incapability of the European powers that was the decisive factor behind the termination of the standard of civilization practices. For instance, while there were twenty-five African-Asian states in the UN in 1955, seventeen new African states joined to the UN in 1960 alone that limited the applicability of standard of

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[52] Ibid, 148.

[53] The Soviet Union has been replaced by the Russian Federation in 1991 due to the collapse of the former.

[54] Republic of China has been replaced by the People's Republic of China as the representative of China within the Security Council in 1971.

civilization. In 1971, over seventy percent of the UN was African and Asian states which made it practically hard for 'civilization' policies to prevail in the UN.

To sum up, in the post Second World War international system, there is assertive 'emphasis' and rhetoric to the equality of states before the 'international law'. Nevertheless, the practical implementation of 'equality' is still problematic. First of all, in the new doctrine equality is granted only to 'states'. In this sense, many 'people' which not able to accomplished and 'promoted' to state status deprived from this rough equality. The UN Charter and related political and juridical dispositions remain silent on the extent and limits of self-determination claims. This makes self-determination right highly political and dependent to major powers consideration.

Secondly, the control of the decision-making organs of the international law continued to privilege certain countries as in the latest case of the Security Council. This subordination became more evident in the cases of apartheid and decolonisation in South Africa where the Western members of the Security Council vetoed many resolutions related to apartheid policies.[55] The U.S. vetoed fifty-one resolutions, nine of them directly related to apartheid policies. The U.K., and in a lesser extent France, vetoed some of these resolutions.

Similarly, the U.S. administration demonstrates its inconsistency in enforcement of the international law and the United Nations Security Council resolutions especially regarding to condemnation of Israeli policies in Palestine. The U.S. rejected and blocked almost all the Security Council resolutions against Israel.

Therefore, a preliminary demonstration of subordination in contemporary terms for the Middle East is the U.S. unconditional and un-questioned political, military, and economic support to Israel. This un-questioned support especially promoted through the Security Council. Through the Security Council, the U.S.

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[55] Grovogui, S. N. (1996:170).

legitimates its Middle East policies, facilitates the expansion of its hegemonic rule, and absorbs the counter ideas in the Middle East through the Security Council.[56]

As an additional empirical evidence for instance, the U.S. manipulated the vulnerable United Nations member states to vote for the Partition Resolution in 1947.[57] As also emphasized above, over the past thirty years, the U.S. has used its veto power to protect its ally Israel and has blocked the enforcement of the United Nations Security Council resolutions that called the withdrawal of Israeli settlements in the occupied territories. These policies constitute a clear clash with the United Nations Security Council resolution of 465 that calls upon all states "not to provide Israel with any assistance to be used specifically in connection with settlements in the occupied territories."[58]

2.6 Post 9/11 Era: 'Failed States', Humanitarian Intervention, and Re-loading of the Cold War Norms and Practices

The final section of the chapter is devoted to examine the continuation of the subordination in the post September 11, 2011 era that constitutes an important turning point for the Middle East and Arab regional system.

There is no doubt that the September 11, 2001 attacks had a deep impact on world politics. On September 11, 2001 four airplanes were hijacked with their passengers. Two of them hit the twin towers in New York, one of them targeted the Pentagon, and the last one crashed on Pennsylvania probably on the way to the White House. As a result, 2,823 people lost their lives.[59]

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[56] For the valuable discussion on role of the international institutions on hegemonic world orders, *see* Cox, R. W. (1981). "Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory." *Millenium*. 10. Pp.127-155, Cox, R. W. (1983). "Gramsci, Hegemony, and International Relations Theory: An Essay in Method." *Millenium*. 2. Pp. 162-175, Cox, R. W. (1992).

[57] Bill, J., and Springborg, R. (1994). *Politics in the Middle East.* New York: Harper Collins Publishers. P.307.

[58] Zunes, S. (2001).

[59] Stevens, D. G. (2003). *Challenges to Peace in the Middle East.* New York: Longman. P. 104.

Explanations and analyses referring to September 11 extend to highly diversified dimensions. Among the different perceptions, it is suggested that September 11, 2001 was an appeal to American values, culture, and the United States hegemony on shaping the rest of the world through its political interest.

On the other hand, some analyses argue that September 11, 2001 attacks not only failed to alter American preponderance of power in the international system, but also reinforced the credibility of the U.S. power, projection, and military involvement abroad.

Leaving aside the speculations related with September 11, 2001 attacks, this research contention is that these attacks provide enough reasons for the U.S. to militarily intervene in the affairs of the other countries that further subordinated the Arab Middle East.

The systemic change at world politics in the post Cold War era made fundamental impact at world politics. The dimension of security issues has been shifted to cover wide variety of humanitarian issues. In this connection, there has been decline in military-security related considerations, industry, and practices. Although societal base establishments such as the EU successfully adapt itself to this systemic change, the security-military policy dominated hegemon, the U.S., could not benefit from this new situation.

In this connection, September 11, 2001 attacks have strengthen the U.S. hard power and created an opportunity for the U.S. to modify the political bargains towards the Arab regional system in the post Cold War era. Stating in other words, the September 11, 2001 attacks paved the way for domination of the Arab Middle East by the U.S. with the Cold War tools and principles on the pretext of war against international terrorism. These tools constituted a similarity between the histrocially builded methods of subordination. Once more, the hegemon tried to achieved its' objectives by all means regardless to the human cost of the 'others'. For this purpose, the hegemon used its political, military and economic forces.

Broadly speaking state power may be disaggregated into two elements as 'hard' (military and resource based) and 'soft' (ideological, normative, organizational and institutional) power.[60] The realist understandings of international relations have been privileged during the Cold War era with its specific emphasis to 'hard' power. In other words, the realist interpretations of international relations that were applied during the Cold War era trust in hard elements while neglecting the soft elements in world politics.

In this connection, the explanatory and practical power of the realist principles relating to Cold War era was hidden in success on reflecting the super powers interest, norms, principles, and practices. In other words, realism and Cold War era were two elements that were mutually constructed and gained strength from each other. The basic reason for this is realist perceptions were guided by obtaining knowledge to expand the subject's control over an objectified environment. Stating alternatively, realism produce assumptions and theory for the purpose of the state for extending its power, security, and control in international system.[61] Since the U.S. and the Soviet Union were the most 'capable' states of the international system, realist norms and principles were suiting best their foreign policy orientations.

Inevitably, international politics is defined as a struggle for power between states where the pursuit of national interest through military means defined as normal, unavoidable, and desirable. It is assured that policy makers always take the most beneficial and rational decisions for their societies. The reflection of these principles finds another interpretation for the super powers of the international system that state does not necessarily obey universal ethical values, but state actions

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[60] For a detailed discussion *see* Nye, J. (2002). *The Paradox of American Power*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Pp. 8-9.

[61] Ashley, R. K. (1981). "Political Realism and Human Interests." *International Studies Quarterly*. 25. P.221.

always have ethical values.[62] In this way, legitimizing certain politico-military practices becomes easier.

Nevertheless, with the termination of the Cold War traditional bi-polar military structure and privileged role of the super powers initiate to decline. This fundamental change at the international system weakened the role of the states and the systems that they relied upon.

Consequently, the agenda of inter-state relationships embedded into a multi-dimensional and multi-natural agenda that states become less concerned with military power. Instead, the agenda of interstate relationships consist of multiple issues that are not arranged in a clear or consistent hierarchy. In this connection, normative considerations and universally binding norms started to gain credit. Thus, it was not an easy task to legitimize certain politico-military practices as it used to be during the Cold War era. Needless to say that these developments put heavy burdens especially on the U.S. as they had the strongest military power and industry.

This is to suggest that international order that privileges the U.S. 'hegemony' was under serious challenge. It was evident that as long as military conflicts continue to generate insecurity, dominant realist rules (that privilege the U.S. hegemony) would re-construct the international system. Robert Cox explained this situation as in order to be a hegemonic power there is a necessity of hegemonic ideology (in addition to military supremacy) and in order to create consent for hegemonic ideology, hegemon implements 'global' norms and ideas.[63] The success of a hegemon is dependent on the acceptance of these universal hegemonic norms and ideas.

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[62] Morgenthau, H. J. (1973). *Politics Among Nations. The struggle for power and Peace.* New York: Alfred A. Knopf. P.5.

[63] For the detailed discussion of hegemony as the production and re-production of world order *see* Cox, R. W. (1981), Cox, R. W. (1983), Cox, R. W. (1986). "Social Forces, States, and World Orders." In Keohane, R. O. (ed.) *Neorealism and Its Critics.* New York: Columbia University Press.

In order to re-construct these ideological values and cultural perceptions, the U.S. uses its unique military power. The power gap between the U.S. and the rest of the world is greatest in the military sphere. Global engagement and intervention in world politics since the Second World War constructs a unique capacity for the U.S. to project military power across the world. Thus, the most effective way to enforce world domination for the U.S. is through the use of its military power.[64] Cottey defined this as "the U.S. must be willing to use that power and constraints on American power and freedom of action should be rejected".[65]

In the light of these evidences, rather than demonstrating vulnerability of the U.S., in contrary, September 11, 2001 attacks has strengthen the U.S. hard power and values. As stated by John Ikenberry historians will remember the global response to 11 September more than those dramatic events themselves "as an opportunity to renew and expand the political bargains on which the current international order rests."[66]

Therefore, September 11, 2001 attacks provided both an excuse and willingness for the U.S. to unilaterally use its military power for political and military control of the Arab regional system especially via on Iraq. For this purpose, the dynamics of the U.S. foreign policy proved its assertiveness to emphasize U.S. military power against real and supposed enemies under the name of "war against international terrorism".[67] In this regard, September 11, 2001 events produced a new willingness and justification to use U.S.'s unique military power.

Having said that, (as realists principles envisioned) having military power was not enough. Also, there should be an intention to use this power. The

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[64] Gökay, B. (2002:65).

[65] Ibid, 15.

[66] Ikenberry, J. G. (2001). "American Grand Strategy in the Age of Terror". *Survival*. Winter. 43 (4). P.22.

[67] For an analysis of US war on terrorism *see* Mahajan, R. (2002). *The New Crusade: America's War on Terrorism*. New York: Monthly Review Press.

Afghanistan War and occupation of Iraq in March 2003 (with the justification of fight against the international terrorism) have demonstrated this intention.

According to Bülent Gökay, another point that inspired re-newed militarism of the U.S. during the Cold War was the aspiration for 'economic control'.[68] Gökay highlights that the expansion of the U.S. hegemonic military control did not start with the attacks of September 11 but had already been in place since 1989.[69] Gökay explains this with the decline of the U.S. economic strength in comparison with the European Union, and East Asian economic group (Japan, China and the Southeast Asian "tigers") since the end of the Cold War.[70] Therefore, the major military interventions of the U.S. since 1989 should be viewed not only as reactions to "ethnic cleansing" or "international terrorism", but also "opportunistic responses to this post-Cold War geopolitical picture".[71]

In consequence, the U.S. military power deployed to shape the political and economic context of world politics. In this connection, in order to "defend the U.S. interests against all these new, and mostly imaginary threats, new hi-tech combat techniques have been developed and employed during the 1990s."[72] Gökay concluded that:[73]

> The U.S. administration sees its military might as a trump card that can be employed to prevail over its rivals in the struggle for political hegemony and resources…powerful geopolitical and geo-economics interests are fuelling the American war drive.

To sum up, in the post Cold War era the U.S. desired to 're-load' the Cold War norms and antagonisms back in order to re-assure its economic control and

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[68] Gökay, B. (2002:65).

[69] Ibid, 61.

[70] Ibid.

[71] Ibid.

[72] Ibid, 53.

[73] Ibid, 60.

political hegemony. Therefore, as it used to be during the Cold War era, the supremacy of hard power systematically resorted into the international relations. Stating alternatively, September 11, 2001 attacks paved the way for the control and *subordination* of the Arab regional system by the U.S. on the pretext of war against international terrorism. For this purpose, (although Al-Qaeda virtually receives no direct support from any Arab Middle Eastern government) the U.S. accused Iraq, Syria, Iran, Sudan, and Libya to be the primary sources of state-sponsored terrorism.

Nevertheless, as in the case of the earlier periods of dualistic international order, the construction of certain concepts and justifications was a necessity. In these new constructions, once more, the responsibility of the West to 'fix' the rest according to the Western idioms emerged as a priority.

In this connection, the conceptions of 'failed states' and 'humanitarian intervention' gained a new importance and application. To be defined as 'successful' or 'failed' state is subjectively determined by the Western states not necessarily depending on the stability of governments in objective components determined by economic and political dynamics. Although there are various definitions, a general and comprehensive definition of a failed state could be summarized as a state that can no longer perform its basic security and development functions, and that has no effective control over its territory and borders that leads to 'humanitarian' implications.[74] Rotberg adds that significant characteristics of failed states also include "tense, deeply conflicted, dangerous, and contested by warring factions."[75]

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[74] Dobbins, J. (2008). *Europe's Role in Nation-Building: From the Balkans to the Congo.* Santa Monica, CA: RAND. P.15. *See* also Rotberg, R. I. (2004). "The Failure and Collapse of Nation-States: Breakdown & Prevention. In Rotberg, R. I. (ed.) *When States Fail: Causes and Consequences.* NJ: Princeton University Press. P.5. Rotberg, R. I. (2005). *State Failure and State Weakness in a Time of Terror.* Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press. P.3.

[75] Rotberg, R. I. (2004:3).

In these situations, a failed state may need a 'humanitarian intervention' which in fact could adversely affect not only a failed state but also the whole region, if not the whole system.

Although failed states and humanitarian intervention are not new concepts, their meaning has gained a new emphasize and implication after the 9/11. It is presented that these concepts have become much more relevant and worrying than ever before although the phenomenon of state failure is not new. Especially since the 9/11 attacks, the U.S. President Bush defined failing states as the new threats to the U.S. security. In response to the 9/11 attacks and their association with failed states, the Bush administration outlined the preventive war doctrine in the *National Security Strategy of the United States* (2002).[76] This doctrine was based on military intervention to the countries that support terrorist organizations that threatened American interests.

Fukuyama even suggests that failed states are viewed as the single most important problem for the international order after 9/11. He claims that "what goes on inside these failed states often matters intensely to the other members of the international system" and in order to prevent future 'threats' it is necessary to intervene and "build peace" within the failed state.[77]

Once more a 'selective approach' is used for the acknowledgement of the failed states. For instance, although many African and Asian states have extreme poverty, famine, and civil wars, they are exempt from this category since they do not possess a real threat to Western intersests. In this respect, failed states that need humanitarian intervention are generally acknowledged within the Muslim countries that have assumed links with the Al Qaida such as Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya, Sudan etc. Francis Fukuyama defined the amalgamation of this threat as: "Radical Islamic

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[76] See the National Security Strategy of the US in 2002. Available at: http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/national/nss-020920.pdf

[77] Fukuyama, F. (2004). *State-Building: Governance and World Order in the 21st Century.* Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. P.95.

terrorism, weapons of mass destruction come together in the accessibility problems caused by poor governance is a serious security dimension added to the load."[78]

Therefore, in accordance with the earlier understandings of the *subordination*, the 'dangers' and 'interventions' are both identified and justified when it threats the interests of the U.S. and so called 'global security' rather than the country at the issue of the sake. It is acknowledged that an international intervention is a necessary policy instrument to maintain order in the international system as a response to the problems derived from the failed states. In other words, by presenting 9/11 as a consequence of a failed state, it is put forward that an international intervention is a necessary policy 'to fix' failed states and maintain order in the international system. In this connection, as a continuing pattern of historical subordination policies, preventing states from 'failing' associated with 'moral' responsibility of the Western states.

2.7 Conclusion: International Order and Subordination

The analysis in this chapter illustrates that the pattern of political and legal order that prevails in Europe was different from the one that was conducted beyond Europe. The origins of the subordination and dualistic international order went back to the papal declarations of the twelfth century in which the Catholic Church declared the ultimate sovereignty over both Christians and non-Christians. The papal bulls constructed the initial hierarchical formation of patterns for the *subordination* at the international order.

In the post-Westphalian era, although the power of the Church had been diminished, Christianity's universalistic aspirations and "white man' burden" were used to promote new justifications for the subordination. Therefore, although the European polity and *inter alia* relations have been changed, there has not been significant changes between the perceptions of the ecclesiastical and state based authorities in their relations with the non-Europeans.

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[78] Fukuyama, F. (2004:96).

In this connection, modern state system operated discursive mechanisms in which the practice of inclusion/exclusion represents its constitutive mode of functioning. The regime of sovereignty is discursively and historically constructed unified system that dictates the way in which certain actors, practices, and concepts privileged over the others. Related to this point, Europeans claimed superiority in terms of civil institutions and a mission to elevate the other cultures.

The international society was initially identified with Christendom and to be European. Then, it expanded to other parts of the world. Nevertheless, non-European entities had to pass certain standards in order to be part of the 'society of states'. The 'civilization' standards were the most explicit ones. The standard of civilization defined the boundaries of the international society in the ninetieth and early twentieth centuries. Through accepting the European political and economic demands, rules, and principles, the non-European nations wish to be 'equal' members of the society of states. For this purpose, they complied with 'unequal treaties', and 'capitulations' along with extraterritorial measures.

In consequence, being the elements of Western political culture and systems of thought, both the standard of civilization and trusteeship mechanisms provided legal justification for the European domination in a variety of hierarchical orders.

To summarize, the evaluation of the discursive international system rests upon five chronological and evolutionary historical phases. The first phase was initiated by the Catholic Church ultimate declaration of sovereignty over the non-Christians in the twelfth century, and construction of initial hierarchies. This phase is significant because it formed the basis of the European international system; achievement of universality/totality that guided by European values, and legalization of this through international agreements.

The second phase was the post Peace of Westphalia (1648) era where *pax Christiana* was replaced by European society of 'sovereigns'. In this era, political principles of inter-European polity emerged and beyond Europe order was

established. This phase however, did not change the existing hierarchies between Christians and the others, but re-design it.

The third phase was the era of colonialism and 'expansion' of international society. In this era, the 'good customs of Christianity' was replaced with the 'salvation of weak'. Similar to the Church's universalist aspirations; cultural, political, and legal systems expanded to the rest of the world in the forms of capitulations and unequal treaties. In this phase, explicit standards were put forward by the European states, such as standard and sacred trust of civilization. Through these standards, Europeans identified it as 'mission' to protect the 'backward peoples' and promote their material, social, cultural and moral improvement.

The fourth phase, which refers to the post Second World War era, was the continuation of standards in new formations such as international organisations. In this new 'egalitarianism', the Western intervention is mainly legitimized in the ground of human rights and democratisation. "Humanitarian intervention" & "failed states" concepts have replaced the earlier concepts of salvation of the weak and white men's burden as new modes of subordination.

The final case which is the post 9/11 era, the Cold War hostilities were re-constructed and others military punished with the new justifications of 'failed staes'. There are some common points in relation the patterns of the discursive system in all five phases. These points could be summarized as:

i. The creation of hierarchies.

ii. The desire and 'responsibility' to 'universalize' the European / Western idioms.

iii. The right to determine other's 'capacity' on sovereignty and 'civilization' status. Stating alternatively, the right to define, impose, and supervise civilization, economic, and political standards of the others.

iv. Military enforcement of these standards in necessary cases, or the willingness to use force when the rights of the Europeans / U.S. denied by the local authorities.

v. The insurance of these standards and practices under the legal framework. And;

vi. The systematic destruction or containment of any challenges against this international order.

In all these historical phases, the 'other' has been excluded, denied, and marginalised by being defined as traditional, irrational, underdeveloped, autocratic, and uncivilized. This serves as justification for privileged, rational, and modern European/Western identity.

What is significant and unfortunate however, as exposed by Edward Said, these perceptions of moral and cultural superiority lead to brute political, economic and military rationales.[79] Stating alternatively, the historically constructed patterns of justifications could form the basis of political power, interference, and violence that is still witnessing today at the international sphere.

In the post Second World War era, juristically speaking, no Western government possessed domestic jurisdiction over other territories. The principle of 'sovereign equality' became the foundation of new egalitarianism that resembles not much difference than the old equality. This principle was approved within the society of states instead of any other alternative in order to avoid further controversy and uncertainty within the international system. In other words, legal sovereign equality was accepted as the easiest principle within the international society even, in practical terms, the states are *unequal* in every other respect.

Accordingly, inequality and subordination is a permanent feature of international society where the Arab Middle East presents a perfect example. The subsequent sections are departed from this central assumption.

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[79] Said, E. W. (1978:7).

CHAPTER III

ARAB REGIONAL SYSTEM

3.1 Introduction

In this chapter, the *Arab regional system* is analyzed. Initially, the Arab regional system is defined in accordance with the discussions related to regional systems. The discussion related with the emergence of state power and problematic state formation in the region is the next. Then, the question of what distinguishes the Arab regional system from the other regional systems is answered with the analysis of the dual authority within the Arab regional system.

The final part analyzed the transnational identities in the Arab regional system by giving special emphasis to the Islamic and tribal identities. This is then followed by the empirical evidences of transnational Arab identity in the Arab regional system.

3.2 Defining the Arab Regional System

Defining a region is not an easy task simply because the intraregional boundaries within a subsystem can also be of bewildering complexity.[1] As a result of this complexity, Archer for instance states that there seems to be no satisfactory definition of a region.[2] Similarly, as also stressed in the introductory chapter, the "Middle East" region itself is problematic enough to be clearly defined. There has

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[1] Tibi, B. (1981). *Arab Nationalism: A Critical Enquiry.* New York: St. Martin's Press. P.41.

[2] Archer, C. (2001). *International Organizations.* Third Edition. London: Routledge. P.46.

been a long debated discussion as to where the boundary of the Middle East starts and where it ends. This could cause shortcomings, imprecise terminology, and imprecise conceptualisation.[3]

By recognizing the fact that delineating a regional system is a difficult task, this section tries to identify certain common characteristics and consistent patterns (which bring similar restrictions, problems, and opportunities) of the regional Arab countries that make them part of the same regional system. For this task, rather than formulating techniques that possess no theoretical goals, the main focus is on the system that includes an integrated set of concepts, hypotheses, and propositions that (theoretically) are widely applicable.

Regions generally have been treated as subsystems of the international system within which the members have certain common characteristics.[4] For instance, Louis Cantori and Steven Spiegel defined the regional systems as two or more proximate and interacting states which have some common ethnic, linguistic, cultural, social, and historical bonds, and "whose sense of identity is sometimes increased by the actions and attitudes of states external to the system".[5]

Thus, members of the region could form a sub-system due to certain factors such as common culture, religion, language, historical background, socio-economic status, and political governing principles (or accepted norms). Similarly, Gregory Gause III noted that geography, self-identification, and common social-historical background are all important elements in delineating a regional system.[6]

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[3] Ismael, T. Y. (1986). *International relations of the contemporary Middle East.* New York: Syracuse University Press. P.5.

[4] Dougherty, J. E., and Pfaltzgraff, R. L. (1997). *Contending Theories of International Relations. A Comprehensive Survey.* Fourth Edition. New York: Longman. P.115.

[5] Cantori, L. J., and Spiegel, S. L. (1970). *The International Politics of Regions: A Comparative Approach.* New Jersey: Prentice-Hall. P.607.
[6] Gause III, F.G. (1999). "Systemic Approaches to Middle East International Relations". *International Studies Review.* Spring. 1 (1). P.24.

Departing from these statements, Cantori and Spiegel's well known conceptualization of a region also suits the Arab Middle East.[7]

> Regions are considered to be areas of the world which contain geographically proximate states forming, in foreign affairs, mutually interrelated units. For each participant, the activities of other members of the region (be they antagonistic or co-operative) are significant determinants of its foreign policy; while particular members of certain regions may have extra regional concerns, their primary involvement in foreign affairs ordinarily lies in the region in which they find themselves.

To sum up the discussion so far, on identifying the regions the authoritative scholars' the most frequently cited criteria could be summarized as:[8]

1. Self-consciousness of members that they constitute a region and perceptions by others that one exists.

2. Geographical propinquity, and regular & intense interactions among members.

3. Evidence of some autonomy and distinctiveness from the global system, so that it "refracts" the power of that system.

4. A high level of political, economic, and cultural affinities among members, and the activities of other have become significant determinants of member's foreign policy.

Accordingly, most of the aforementioned regional criteria and distinctiveness deeply exist in the Arab regional system. In addition to the self-consciousness of constituting a region and geographic proximity, the Arab states also have their own internal dynamics and distinctiveness.

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[7] Cantori, L. J., and Spiegel, S. L. (1970:1). For other detailed discussion and explanation of regional subsystems *see* also Deutsch, K. (1957). *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area.* Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, Kaiser, K. (1968). "The Interaction of Regional Subsystems: Some Preliminary Notes Recurrent Patterns and the Role of Superpowers". *World Politics.* 21 (1). Pp.84-107. Padelford, N. J. (1954). "Regional Organization and the United Nations". *International Organization.* 8 (1). 2-16.

[8] Morgan, P. M. (1997). "Regional security complexes and regional orders". In Lake, D. A., Morgan, P. M. (eds.) *Regional Orders: Building security in a New World.* Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania University Press. P.26.

These distinctiveness could be listed as; common ethnic, cultural, social, and historical bonds, ties of kinship and tribalism, extended family and relative ties, speaking a common language, intense communication, flow of labour, sharing common historical memories, and "practicing a common way of life expressed in the form of religion and other cultural traits".[9]

Furthermore, the Arab League summits and activities, and the activities of other regional Arab organizations have provided regular and intense interactions among the members.[10] As a result, the definitions about the Arab regional system have common emphasis. For instance, Raymond Hinnebusch defined Arab system as "the Arab states, with shared identity, intense interactions, and membership in a regional organization (The Arab League).[11]

What are the other common characteristics and consistent patterns that make the Arab countries a part of the same regional system? First of all, common membership in the Ottoman Empire is significant. As argued by Binder, the legacy of the Ottoman Empire left traces of similar institutions (and similar political attitudes) as patterns of patronage and social networks.[12] Related to this criterion, the influence and legacies of colonialism are also significant for the analysis of the Arab regional system.

Although the distribution of capabilities in economic means is recognizable among the Arab countries (especially between the oil rich and oil less Arab countries), accordingly, economic conditions also constitute common characteristics related to the fact that all of the economies in the region are vulnerable to both regional and extra-regional dynamics.

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[9] Issawi, C. (1955). "The Bases of Arab Unity". *International Affairs.* 31 (1). January. P.36.

[10] For the list of the Arab regional organizations *see* Table 2.1.

[11] Hinnebusch, R., and Ehtashami, A. (eds.) (2002). *The Foreign Policies of Middle East States.* London: Lynne Rienner Publishers. P.28.

[12] *See* Binder, L. (1958). "The Middle East as a Subordinate International System." *World Politics.* 10 (3).

Nevertheless, accordingly, the main source of formation and distinction of the Arab regional system is the commonalities of culture and identity. As identified by Tibi, regional systems are primarily culture areas in which certain languages are predominate, and common culture defines the actions of the regional units in international politics.[13]

Then, what explains and defines culture and identity? Dealing with this complex question is beyond the limits of this research. Nevertheless, certain definitions and clarifications could be put forward. As expressed by Thomas S. Weisner for instance, culture is a mix of shared values, beliefs, and activities organized in daily routines of life. Culture also includes interactional experiences that have emotional meaning.[14]

These definitions among many others suggest that culture provides basic support in different ways to the societal behaviour, evaluation, judgment and actions. Societal values, norms, principles, practices, human relationships, symbols, beliefs, and institutions are among the determinants of culture. Similarly, general consensus on social sciences (that is broadly valid for the Arab Middle East) defines culture as the entire way of life for a society.

Thus, culture as understood in terms of norms and values is constituted by certain shared values and meanings based on identity. In other words, conception of culture as the shared meanings and values operates with the conception of society. Therefore, since the cultural values are powerful, they should be taken seriously. As contented by Migdal, all societies have on going battles about issues on how people

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[13] Tibi, B. (1998). *Conflict and War in the Middle East From Interstate War to New Security.* London: Macmillan. P.35.

[14] Weisner, T. S. (2000). "Culture, Childhood, and Progress in Sub Saharan Africa". In Harrison, L. E., and Huntington, S. P. *Culture Matters: How values shape human progress.* New York: Basic Books. P.142.

should behave and the nature and outcomes of these struggles give societies their distinctive structure and character.[15]

Regarding the Arab Middle Eastern culture, as examined in depth below, the main source of culture is Arab identity and Islam. Supporting this argument, Anthony D. Smith states that the Eastern concept of nationhood is an ethnic one that is based on common culture defined in terms of race, ethnicity, language, religion and tradition.[16] The principal dimensions of Arab nationhood, has been formed as a collective awareness of a common history, religion, a distinctive language, and culture.

Moreover, a principal factor that distinguishes the Arab Middle Eastern regional system from other regional systems is the existence of common transnational and subnational identities in addition to the state (territorial) based identity formations. Stating differently, the commonalities within the Arab Middle Eastern identity and culture, and the existence of the transnational and subnational identities form a sort of uniqueness for the Arab regional system. This trans-nationality is also legally maintained considering that the seventeen constitutions of the Arab states have defined the 'nation' as Arabs (only with the exception of Lebanon).[17]

Deriving from these statements, the Arab regional system used in this study includes the Arab countries that have similar religious, cultural, political, socio-economic, and historical backgrounds. Self-definition and consciousness of common Islamic and Arab identities are also equally important. Therefore, the Arab Middle East is a regional system due to the existence of several common and

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[15] Migdal, J. S. (2001). *State in society: Studying how states and societies transform and constitute one another.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. P.12.

[16] Smith, A.D. (1986). *The Ethnic Origins of Nations.* Oxford: Blackwell Press. P.73.

[17] Ayubi, N. A. (1995). *Over-stating the Arab State Politics and Society in the Middle East.* London-New York: I.B. Tauris Publishers. P.146.

recurring patterns on a regional level.[18] These common patterns form an organic unity in the geographically bound system of interdependent actors.

According to this definition, the Arab regional system consists of seventeen members of the Arab League: Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Oman, Palestine, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, and Yemen.

After having defined the Arab regional system, it is necessary to systematize some common patterns of this system. Accordingly, the countries within the Arab regional system are under the effect of similar external and internal restrictions that drive them to take similar political actions. Theoretically speaking, the Arab regional system is shaped by four interrelated processes.

First of all, the Arab Middle Eastern regional system is part of the international system and it is influenced by the international or systemic dynamics. As noted by Tibi:[19]

> The central assertion of regional subsystem theory is that these partial regions of the international system have their own internal dynamic, although at the same time forming part of the overall systemic configuration of world politics. The dimensions of regional dynamics and of global politics ought to be handled as two mutually related intrinsic levels of analysis, without deriving the one from the other.

Therefore, the Arab regional system could increase its autonomy or become further dependent on the international system in accordance with the systemic developments. For instance, the end of the Cold War and the termination of bi-polar international military structure provided a chance for Saddam Hussein to increase his regional power and dominance through the occupation of Kuwait. Similarly, with the emergence of the state system in the Middle East, pan-Arabism has been weakened due to the systemic bargains.

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[18] Ismael, T. Y. (1986:5).

[19] Tibi, B. (1981:25).

Furthermore, the international system and Arab regional system may (or in a lesser extent may not be) in a state of competition in political, cultural, social, and economic means. This assumption does not necessarily mean that Arab-Islamic culture and Western dominated international system are essentially conflictual.

Secondly, the territorial (state based) identity, norms, and interest serve to restrain change and autonomy within the regional system. The Arab Middle Eastern entities have joined the international system not as Arab nations but as sovereign territorial organizations. As a result, the power of Arab states derives from structural conditions in which the primary function is to reproduce the existing or prevailing order. As analyzed in depth below, this order sometimes clashes with the Arab people's demand and interests and create a dichotomy between ruler's and society's political wills.

Thirdly, once the state system has been established, state power has been the primary dynamic in the Arab regional system. The use of force (against both external and internal threats) turns to normal mode of activity. In consequence, after the consolidation of state power and violence, all the Arab regional actors are guided by the objective of maintaining their survival against real or perceived threats.

Finally, after the establishment of the state system in the Arab Middle East, the fundamental objective of extra regional powers has appeared as the utilization of the balance of power within the region. The purpose of this balance has been to keep the *status quo* in the region and therefore restrain autonomy. For the achievement of this objective, extra regional powers (and particularly the United States) form alliances with comparatively weaker states as a counterbalance against powerful regional states. Related with this point, the lower scaled and internal conflicts are neglected, and only when such conflicts affect the interests of extra-regional powers, there have been direct military and political interventions. The following sections are further elaborated these assumptions.

3.3 Problematic State Formation, Artificial Borders, and Legitimacy Problem

This section analysis is focuses on the problematic state formation, artificial borders and legitimacy problem in order to emphasize and demonstrate that how transnational ideologies and challenging regimes could formidably challenge to the regional *status quo* due to the fragile base of the Arab countries.

3.3.1 Problematic State Formation

As mentioned above, the Arab Middle East is approached as regional system because of the existence of certain common patterns in addition to the commonalities on culture and identity.[20] In regional political systems, there are several constraints that originate without the consent of states. In this connection, in the Arab regional system there are certain external and internal restrictions that drive regional countries to act and regulate similar (limited) political actions. Stating differently, political practices of the Arab states have been shaped as a response to and in accordance with the certain domestic and international bargaining.

The argument of this section is based upon the hypothesis that the problematic state formation makes them vulnerable to extra regional countries in terms of military and political support that further subordinate their status. In this connection, it is also put forward that the Arab countries adherence and resort to state violence has worked against autonomy and cooperation within the region.

Since Arab regional system is a part of the international system, initially it is necessary to evaluate the negative impacts of the problematical state formation in the Arab Middle East. This is initially carried out through two interrelated examination; problem of state and state power.

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[20] Ismael, T. Y. (1986). *International relations of the contemporary Middle East.* New York: Syracuse University Press. P.5.

As discussed in depth in the previous chapter, the state system initially emerged in Europe and then transplanted into the other regions of the world. Before the emergence of the "sovereignty", the concept of a unified Christian Europe dominated the political life in Europe.[21] The basis of this Christian unity was relying upon the doctrine of a God-given natural law above mankind.[22] The Christian unity in medieval Europe (*pax Christiana*) was replaced with sovereign state system. Basically speaking, the Westphalian state system was promoting and guiding by four main principles namely territoriality, non-intervention, sovereign equality and secularity.

In the post 'Peace of Westphalia' (1648) era the idea that promoted and prevailed at the international system was the international system could not exist without the nation states.[23] Sovereignty emerges as the organizing principle of international politics and defined as a private world into which the outside world is not permitted to enter.[24] Regarding to the international system sovereignty becomes the "license from international community to practice as an independent government in a particular territory."[25] As such, even the 2nd Article of the United Nations Charter defines the "matters which are essentially within the jurisdiction of any state" as the privacy of states.[26]

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[21] Archer, C. (2001). *International Organizations*. Third Edition. London: Routledge. P.4. *See* also Bozeman, A. (1960). *Politics and Culture in International History*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. P.514, and Davies, N. (1997). *Europe: A History*. London: Pimlico. Pp.7-10.

[22] Archer, C. (2001:4).

[23] Foucault, M. (1980). *Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972-1977*. New York: Mac Milan. P.131.

[24] Kratochwil, F. (1986). "Of Systems, Boundaries, and Territoriality". *World Politics*. 39 (1). P.27.

[25] Ibid.

[26] Kratochwil, F. (1995). "Sovereignty as *Dominium*: Is There a Right of Humanitarian Intervention?" In Lyons, G. M., and Mastanduno, M. (eds.) *Beyond Westphalia? State Sovereignty and International Intervention*. London: The John Hopkins University Press. P.22.

Therefore, the state constitutes "the sovereign place within which the highest internal laws and policies are enacted and from which strategies toward external states and non-state peoples precede".[27] Connolly added that the state is the site of the "most fundamental division between the "inside" and "outside", "us" and "them", "domestic" and "foreign".[28] In consequence, the state turns to the sphere of citizen entitlements and strategic responses to that.[29]

Thus, the emergence of the state system enabled its rulers to have limitless power in domestic politics and internationally legitimize the tools and practices of the modern state. Ashley progressively summarized this assumption as state became an unproblematic unity and entity whose "existence, boundaries, identifying structures constituencies, legitimations, interests and capacities to make self-regarding decisions can be treated as given". [30]

In the same vein, state privilege is produced by stable identity that is consolidated through a regulated process of repetition and imposition of boundaries that function to construct a demarcation between inside and outside.[31] In other words, through highlighting the division between inside and outside, state's institutional and territorial specificity are confirmed especially through security strategies.

Hence, states are involved not only in geo-political processes, but also in the formation of cultural and economic practices in which boundaries serve to separate "inside" from the "outside", the "self" from the "other" and "domestic" from the "foreign". In consequence, society's historicity has been completely

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[27] Connoly, W. E. (1991). *Identity/Difference: Democratic Negotiations of Political Paradox.* Ithaca: Cornell University Press. P.201.

[28] Ibid.

[29] Ibid.

[30] Ashley, R. K. (1983). "The Poverty of Neo-realism". *International Organizations*. 38. P.238.

[31] Campbell, D. (1992) *Writing Security: US Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity.* Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. P.9.

neglected. In other words, since states are accepted as the essential mode of analysis in modern political systems, they are enabled to create their own history by acting as a spatial organization. Thus, the mode of subjectivity (state) was not naturally dominant but become dominant through time especially by power and certain impositions.

As a result of these processes, states had full control over their societies. As stated by Giddens states not only control natural or allocative resources but also 'authoritative resources' such as control over human activities.[32] Ideological, economic, military, and political power relations constitute socio-spatial and organizational means of social control of people, materials, and territories".[33] As also Mann acknowledges, in political discourse there is a taken for granted premise that state and society act in national and territorial integrity that equates society with nation-state.[34]

This is to suggest that the territorially centralized state becomes the privileged entry into the history of the emergence, development and re-production of modern societies. In this connection, states administer both their societies and territories along with control over societal and economic relations. Eventually, in international relations there is a tendency to accept state as an ontological entity, where it has been used interchangeably with nation, power, and sovereignty.[35]

All these factors end up in a process that ordered the states as the only possible organization in international and regional political systems. The necessity of state is a historical construct through which is commonly and widely believed

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[32] Giddens, A. (1985). *The Nation-state and Violence.* Berkeley: University of California Press. Pp.7-9.

[33] Mann, M. (1986). *The Sources of Social Power.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. P.2.

[34] Ibid, 2-3.

[35] Ferguson, Y. H., and Mansbach, R. W. (1988). *The Elusive Quest: Theory and International Politics.* California: The University of Southern California Press. P.7.

that civilized societies cannot exist without rule-making authority.[36] This led to the establishment of a monopolistic organization that acts with a will to power independently from the society.

A preliminary point that needs to be recognized in this regard is that reinforcing and amplifying privilege of the state is inevitably consolidated by the state power. Tilly points out that the origin of the modern nation-state lies in coercion of both domestic and external subjects that reject its' totality.[37] For instance, threats and dangers are defined and identified by giving rise to particular conceptions of the state as moral and political subject. These leads the state (whose identity is not ontologically given but historically constructed) acting as a supreme sovereign authority.

Inevitably, these principles turn violence into natural, unavoidable and legitimate instrument for the states. States rely upon violence in order to constitute themselves as states. In other words, violence supplies a necessary precondition that there would be no modern state without the supplement of violence. Through this, it becomes easy to legitimize certain politico-military practices that advance national security interests and constitute political identities. In consequence, the definition of state power in a Weberian sense became the only 'legitimate' source of violence in international relations. War between states is defined to be normal and inevitable.

Not only the internal application of state violence, but also inter-state application and evaluation of violence led to the consolidation of the state power. Analysing from the inter-state perspective, with the emergence of the state system violence turned into a condition so that modern states are designed to protect citizens against. This is mainly made possible through the security discourses. In this connection, the special definitions and articulation of threats and dangers played a role in the privileging of state power.

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[36] Mann, M. (1986:195).

[37] Tilly, C. (ed.) (1975:7).

For instance, differences or otherness equate with threat or danger although this is not necessary.[38] All these measures have corroborated with various military, diplomatic and defence practices to secure domestic identity. In other words, certain politico-military practices were legitimized, political identities were constituted, and it became easier to advance national security interests.

Thus, state violence that legitimised to protect society as a shelter from the "outside" violence mostly turns against society. For example, the so-called 'strategic violence' is widely used by the regimes in order to define state boundaries and authority, and punish those who challenge it.

Therefore, the privilege of state power inevitably conducts certain unfair practices for the benefit of the state by punishing its citizens and subordinating societies. This privileged use of legitimate power finds broader acceptance and application in the Arab Middle East as in other newly independent Third World states.

To sum up, the state power is embedded in an autonomous mechanism not necessarily related to the characteristics that it governs. A similar point is also made by Fred Halliday who theorizes that state power refers to a specific set of coercive and administrative institutions distinct from the broader political, social and national context in which it finds itself.[39] This autonomous coercive and administrative mechanism has given a privileged power to the governing regimes against their populations. In other words, the state power and violence led the subordination of societies by their regimes for the sake of regime security and the survival.

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[38] For details *see* Walker, R.J.B. (1988). *One World, Many Worlds: Struggles for a Just World Peace.* Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Walker, R.J.B. (1993). *Inside/Outside: International Relations as Political Theory.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, Walker, R.J.B., and Mendlowitz, S. H. (eds.) (1991). *Contending Sovereignties.* Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Tilly, C. (ed.) (1975).

[39] Halliday, F. (1987). "States and Society in International Relations". *Millenium* 16. P.218.

There is no doubt that these general problems in relation to state and state power played an important role on subordination of the Arab societies to their regimes. During the colonization process, the Western system of sovereignty had been transplanted into the other regions of the world including the Arab Middle East.[40] Following the end of the European colonial rule, the state formation and nation building processes initiated.[41] With the establishment of the state system in the Arab Middle East, territorial based cultural, political, socio-economic and normative superiorities have been maintained over the transnational identities. By this way, the state system and regional status quo have been consolidated and the diffusion of the transnational ideologies and movements has been impeded. Thus, in the post Second World War era the Arab Middle East encountered a systemic change through the creation of newly emerged Arab states, artificial borders, and Israel.

Gregory Gause III rightly and significantly claimed that in the post-Second World War era, the clash and tension between the tradition and Western sovereignty has not been greater anywhere than the Middle East.[42] According to Gause III, "the disjunction between the history of state formation in Europe, out of which sovereign norms emerged, and the realities of domestically weak Third World states has made the Westphalian inheritance problematic in much of the non-European World."[43] A similar point is also made by George Sørensen with the words of: [44]

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[40] Sørensen, G. (1999). "Sovereignty: Change and Continuity in a Fundamental Institution". *Political Studies*. 47 (3). P.595.

[41] Baram, A. (1990). "Territorial Nationalism in the Middle East". *Middle Eastern Studies*. 26 (4). P.426.

[42] Gause III, F.G. (1992). "Sovereignty, statecraft and stability in the Middle East". *Journal of International Affairs*. Winter. 45 (2). P.443.

[43] Ibid.

[44] Sørensen, G. (2001:83).

> Decolonization set up a new framework for the formation of sovereign states. In Europe and elsewhere, modern statehood had emerged out of a long process of violent struggle where stronger rulers swallowed weaker competitors. The normative framework around decolonization, by contrasts, gave the right of independence to ex-colonies, no matter what level of actual weakness of that they displayed.

Supportive to these points Muhammed Ayoob added that the tension between tradition and Westphalian sovereignty is derived from the fact that the Third-World states are expected to accomplish the various phases that together make up the twin process of state-making and nation-building.[45] These processes require the penetration, standardization, participation and redistribution of the Arab societies "simultaneously and within a matter of decades".[46] At this point, it is worth stressing that the transition to the Westphalian state system was (also) very turbulent and conflictual in Europe since there were sixty-seven significant wars in this period (1650-1800).

This significant paradox between sovereignty and sub-state and super-state identities within the Arab Middle East is well explained by Hinnebusch as:[47]

> The consolidation of a system of nation-states in the region is obstructed by the profound flaws originating in its largely external imposition: the resulting often arbitrary borders and ill fit between states and national identities mean that loyalty to the individual states is contested by sub state and suprastate identities. The resultant embedding of the state system in a matrix of fluid multiple identities means that the national interest that realism assumes underlies foreign policy is problematic and contested.

Similarly, Sami Zubaida's rich and complex discussion of the emergence of nation-states in the Middle East points out inherent weaknesses of the Arab

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[45] Ayoob, M. (1993). "Unravelling the Concept: 'National Security' in the Third World". In Korany, B., Noble, P. and Brynen, R. (eds.) *The many faces of national security in the Arab world.* New York: St. Martin's Press. P.33.

[46] Ibid.

[47] Hinnebusch, R. (2002). "Introduction: The Analytical Framework". In Hinnesbusch, R., and Ehtashami, A. (eds.) *The Foreign Policies of Middle East States.* London: Lynne Rienner Publishers. P.7.

regimes in their competition to co-exist in sovereign based international state system. According to Zubaida the notion of a territorial state with "individualized citizenship, secular law and principles of sovereignty is alien to the Muslim mind" and many have believed right from the beginning that this imported model cannot last for long.[48] That is why for instance, Khoury and Kostiner indicate that the 'state' in European definition does not correspond to Middle Eastern realities even in the late twentieth century.[49]

As have emphasized before, with the emergence of the Westphalian state system in the Arab Middle East, the representation of state and its ruler has been institutionalised, where the societies subordinated to this mechanism without their consent. Through the assistance from practices and applications relying on the state system, the Arab regimes subordinated their societies and hindered the way for regional autonomy and co-operation for the sake of their regimes survival.

Complementary to this principle, the main effort of decision makers was to justify the reason of the newly established state. Especially the allured use of privileges of state mechanisms and resorting to 'legitimate' source of violence become integral part of Arab regimes. This situation is explained by Owen as:[50]

> A huge expansion in the power and pervasiveness of the state apparatus is a common feature of the post-independence Middle East. This was largely a result of growth in size of the bureaucracy, the police and the army, as well as, in many cases, the number of public enterprises." Why? "The need to maintain security after the departure of the colonial power; the drive to establish control over the whole of the new national territory; and the desire to use the state to promote large programmes of economic development and social welfare.

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[48] Ibid, 130-131.

[49] Khoury, P. S., and Kostiner, J. (1990). *Tribes and State Formation in the Middle East.* Berkeley, LA: University of California Press. P.2.

[50] Owen, R. (1992). *State, Power and Politics in the making of the Modern Middle East.* London: Routledge. P.32.

In the same vein, a similar point was made by Halim Barakat that modern state armies are designed to serve newly emerged ruling bureaucracy:[51]

> Like their artificial nation-states, modern state armies are the product of fragmentation designed to serve the big bourgeoisie. Such armies, which have existed in the Arab world since the reign of Muhammed Ali, are designed essentially to provide internal security and defend the dominant order and the ruling class. This is almost always done under the guise of defending the country against foreign threats.

Therefore, regardless Islamic culture or legacy of the colonial rule, what is certain for Arab Middle Eastern regimes is with the establishment of the state system, Arab regimes catch the unique chance to put their autocratic discourse into practical applications. For this purpose, they stabilize, destabilize, organize, disorganize, penetrate, dominate, dissolute and weaken their societies.[52]

However, paradoxically, the new *modus vivendi* further increased the insecurity of the Arab regimes instead of defending it. The complications that created by sovereignty led rulers to resort to state violence on greater extent. As Gause III hypothesized:[53]

> The inability of many Third World states to assert their primacy and control over the peoples and territories within their borders, which sovereign recognition both empowers and to some extent assumes, has greatly complicated their security situations. This weakness opens ruling elites to mélange of interrelated security threats: domestic rebellion, ideological challenge from both within and without, foreign meddling in domestic politics and military intervention…While international norms protect them, however, the inability of ruling elites to meet the domestic requisites historically related to the European notion of sovereignty tempts their opponents to disregard these norms in pursuit of strategic or material advantage, placing interest in conflict with norm-governed behaviour.

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[51] Barakat, H. (1993:156).

[52] For details s*ee* Zubaida, S. (1993). *Islam, the people and the state: Political ideas and movements in the Middle East.* London: I.B. Tauris.

[53] Gause III, F.G. (1992:443).

As a result, autocratic and military based regimes emerged systematically within the Arab world through both international and domestic consensus among the ruling regimes. Thus, the consolidation and privileging of state power in the Arab regional system was quite painful. The problematic state formation is compounded by the legitimacy problem that could be defined in terms of the acceptance of the ruled and the rightness of the ruler's superior governing power. Korany, Brynen, and Noble support this argument with the words of:[54]

> Compared to core European countries, periphery ones has neither the resources nor the learning experience to cope with this conflict. The result is a proliferation of conflict processes to other social areas and their extreme politicization as well as the aggravation of the state's deficits both in legitimacy and in development.

To sum up, as also noted by Gregory Gause III, escalation of autocratic regimes made compromise difficult between state based authorities and transnational ideologies.[55] State violence based regulations and practices also have further contributed to the lack of cohesion between the ruling elites and societies in the Arab Middle East. In consequence, the Arab regimes further distanced themselves from their societies and converted into vulnerable position against international powers in order to protect and maintain their regimes. Deriving from this statement, the next section further examines the artificial borders and legitimacy problem in order to further demonstrate the vulnerability of the Middle Eastern regimes against challenging ideologies such as pan-Arabism.

3.3.2 Artificial Borders & Legitimacy Problem

The inevitable result of the problematical state formation in the Arab Middle East is the artificial borders and the legitimacy problem. The Middle East has been divided into nation states irrespective of the traditional, ethnic and

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[54] Korany, B., Brynen, R., and Noble, P. (1993:12).

[55] Gause III, F. G. (1992:442).

religious criteria. As stated by Hossein Razi, the territories of the many states in the Middle East were created according to the needs and perceived interests of the Europeans rather than those of the local populations.[56]

Similarly, Mohammed Ayoob commented that political boundaries in the Middle East were drawn for the purposes of colonial convenience or intra-imperial trade-off.[57] Since the boundaries cut across ethnic, tribal, religious and linguistic ties, it "dismembered established political units, and joined more than one pre-colonial political entity into uneasy administrative unions."[58]

In the same line of analysis, Simon Bromley explains the creation of the state system in the Arab Middle East as follows:[59]

> In the former Arab regions a number of dependent states were created: in Lebanon and Syria by France, and in Iraq, Jordan and Palestine by Britain. The Gulf sheikdoms remained, in effect, British protectorates, and in Saudi Arabia and North Yemen new states developed. Egypt remained under British control and in North Africa French influence persisted.

In consequence, the majority of the local population in the Middle East has no sense of state-based loyalty and the Arab Middle East is marked by "high incongruity between the nation (identity) and the territorial state (sovereignty)."[60] Instead, Arab societies have religious or tribal loyalties that made it quite difficult to understand the reasons for the independent state.

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[56] Razi, H. G. (1990). "Legitimacy, Religion and Nationalism in the Middle East". *The American Political Science Review*. 84 (1). P.82.

[57] Ayoob, M. (1993:34).

[58] Ibid.

[59] Bromley, S. (1995). *Rethinking Middle East Politics.* Austin-Texas: University of Texas Press. P.65.

[60] Hinnebusch, R. (2002). "The Middle East Regional System". In Hinnebusch, R., and Ehteshami, A. (eds.) *The Foreign Policies of Middle East States.* London: Lynne Rienner Publishers. P.29.

Thus, it would not wrong to suggest that one of the major underlying causes of conflict and insecurity in the Arab Middle East is the artificial boundaries remained from the colonial period. For instance, Steinbach commented that the newly established regimes in the Middle East were almost bound to fight with each other.[61] Likely, Ayoob contends that the artificial borders drawn following the Second World War were the "lines of amity" where the dominant colonial powers actively encouraged the violent conflicts.[62] For instance, Bahgat Korany suggests that even the comparatively recent regional conflict of the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988) was a result of border-demarcation problems that remained as a colonial legacy.[63]

Consistent with this view, Ayoob also contends that the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait is also could be linked to the colonial drawn boundaries since Kuwait was part of the Ottoman provenience of Basra that later become the part of modern Iraq.[64] Stating alternatively, even one of the fundamental reason of the occupation of Kuwait by Iraq in 1990 lied back to the state formation and artificial borders in the Middle East. With the words of Ayoob:[65]

The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990 is another, and much more dramatic, demonstration of the same phenomenon, namely that the boundaries that divide Arab states are somehow not fully legitimate and that attempts to unify Arab states even by force will not necessarily be perceived in all parts of the Arab world and by all sections of the populations as illegitimate.

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[61] Steinbach, U. (1981). "Sources of Third World Conflict". *Adelphi Papers.* 166. London. IISS Summer. Pp.20-28.

[62] Ayoob, M. (1993:43).

[63] Korany, B., Noble, P. and Brynen, R. (eds.) (1993). *The Many Faces of National Security in the Arab world.* New York: St. Martin's Press. P.91.

[64] Ayoob, M. (1993:45).

[65] Ibid, 49.

Supportive to this argument Schofield argues that Iraqi claims on Kuwait including the islands of Warba and Bubiyan has an origin, going back to 1970s although ignored by the experts until 1990s.[66]

The inevitable outcome of arbitrary borderlines drawn by the colonial powers and the emergence of artificial nation-states in the Middle East was the legitimacy problem. Many Arab regimes have legitimacy problems "due to the historical pattern of their state-formation.[67] Legitimacy could be simply summarized as the acceptance of the ruled, the rightness of the ruler's superior governing power.[68]

Because of the legitimacy problem, many Arab regimes became vulnerable to the external support for their survival. In other words, paradoxically, for the sake of internal security, the Arab regimes risk their external autonomy. For instance, Malik Mufti argues that there is a direct relationship between the stability of a regime and the search for stronger alliances with or outside of the region. [69] Especially the inability of the ruling elite in the Arab Middle East to consolidate political stability and legitimacy, forced them to form alliances with stronger powers.[70] Hinnebusch defines this situation as "when the primary threat is *internal,* a regime may align with an external power to get resources to contain it."[71]

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[66] For the detailed analysis of the territorial disputes between Kuwait and Iraq *see* Schofield, R. (1993). *Kuwait and Iraq: Historical Claims and Territorial Disputes.* London: The Royal Institute of International Affairs.

[67] Korany, B., Brynen, R. and Noble, P. (1993). "The Analysis of National Security in the Arab Context: Restating the State of the Art". In Korany, B., Brynen, R. and Noble, P. (eds.) P.11.

[68] Sahliyeh, E. (2000). "The Limits of State Power in the Middle East." *Arab Studies Quarterly.* Fall. 22 (1). P.2.

[69] Mufti, M. (1996). *Sovereign Creations.* Ithaca: Cornell University Press. P.4.

[70] Ibid.

[71] Hinnebusch, R. (2002:15).

Similarly, Steven David suggests that Arab states make alliances not only against the external threats but also against the internal threats.[72] David asserts that in the developing world and especially in the Middle East the most frequent threats to the states are internal challenges rather than external threats.[73] Therefore, what is common as a security dilemma of the Arab states is the consolidation of the regime power at the expense of external vulnerability.

To sum up, because of the artificial borders and legitimacy problem, the Arab countries emerged as "institutionally weak, ethnically divided, tethered to authoritarian structures of government, lacking in unity, political legitimacy and tolerance of opposition".[74] As simply but effectively put forward by Findlay, Arab states are weak because they do not have political legitimacy.[75] Similarly, Ayoob puts forward that the crisis of legitimacy creates confusion over security priorities because "the increasing saliency of internal threats to Third-World states/regimes, is a function primarily of the low level of legitimacy enjoyed both by the states and, more particularly, by their regimes."[76]

Waterbury's rich and complex conceptualisation is worth using at this point. According to Waterbury, states in Arab Regional system are 'ends–orientated' since the mission is sacred at the beginning; "anti-imperialism, liberation, socialism and Islamic justice."[77] Waterbury added that these

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[72] David, S. R. (1991). "Explaining Third World Alignment". *World Politics*. 43. P.236.

[73] Ibid.

[74] Deegan, H. (1993). *The Middle East and Problem of Democracy*. Milton Keynes: Open University Press. P.9.

[75] Findlay, A. M. (1994). *The Arab World*. London: Routledge. Pp.65-66.

[76] Ayoob, M. (1993). "Unravelling the Concept: 'National Security' in the Third World". In Korany, B., Noble, P. and Brynen, R. (eds.) *The many faces of national security in the Arab World*. New York: St. Martin's Press. P.53.

[77] Waterbury, J. (1994). "Democracy Without Democrats?: The potential for political liberalization in the Middle East". In Salame, G. (ed.) Democracy without Democrats? The Renewal of Politics in the Muslim World. New York: I. B. Tauris Publishers. P.26.

characteristics were determined at such a level that the questioning of more than these was almost impossible. In other words, Arab states have conducted their legitimacy of a sacred violent mission that the state claims a *telos*.[78]

Waterbury further demonstrates that questioning the ruling regime is to question the very existence of the state in the Arab Regional system. This is due to the already existing problems in geographical limits, as well as the legal justification of the existence of artificial state. Thus, opposition is simply defined as a disorder of civil peace where rulers see their own permanence as essential for the country's survival.

As progressively defined by Halim Barakat:[79]

> Instead of the state serving the people, the people have to serve the state; the state begins to be perceived as needing citizens to govern, rather than as needed by citizens to regulate their affairs. Instead of being protected by the state; citizens are called upon the protect it and have to be protected from it. The subjects become objects, and the objects of governing become subjects... (state) dominates their lives, exercises power over them, and interferes in their private affairs, while proclaiming its own independent existence. Consequently the people stop recognizing the state as their own and political activity becomes a matter of refraining from political activity. The power of the people becomes the power of the state, thus rendering them powerless.

Similar to this point, Thomson commented that:[80]

> Elite nationalists, or middle-class soldier-nationalists, seized their states claiming to represent the general will of the people, while in fact desperately cutting compromises with, or violently excluding, an array of mass movements that had also emerged in the colonial period. While they promised a new era of national progress and democracy, all too often they instead pursued the self-interest of their own ruling class, or became mired in internal rivalries that perpetuated the paternalism and authoritarianism that were the legacies of the colonial civic order.

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[78] Ibid, 33.

[79] Barakat, H. (1993). *The Arab World: Society, Culture, and State.* Berkeley: University of California Press. P.151

[80] Thompson, E. (2000). *Colonial Citizens: Republican Rights, Paternal Privilege, and Gender in French Syria and Lebanon.* New York: Columbia University Press. P.284.

Thus, sovereignty has been significantly important for the new Arab regimes simply because it gives "one unfettered control over their internal affairs, and notably over their own domestic population."[81] In this connection, the newly independent states of the Arab regional system (as other Third World countries) emerged as the "most strident defenders of Westphalian sovereignty in the international order" following the Second World War.[82]

As a result, in accordance with Naeem Inayatullah's convincing definition, the recognition of sovereignty by international society in the Arab Middle East "allows corrupt, irresponsible, and incompetent governments to violate the rights and welfare of their population".[83] Therefore, the absence of democracy and an independent civil society is related to the historical fact that the state is designed to control the society rather than *vice versa*.

In consequence, as stated by Rothstein, transnational ideologies based on Islam and/or Arabism or Pan-Arab nationalism in Arab Middle East stirred a fear among the ruling regimes that other countries might exploit for political openings to affect and undermine their domestic politics.[84] The Arab regimes sought to prevent their societies developing loyalties to ideologies or movements that transcended existing borders.[85] Especially the regimes of Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Yemen blocked most of the civil contacts against the rise of Arabism and Marxist

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[81] Clapham, C. (1999). "Sovereignty and the Third World State". *Political Studies*. 47 (3). P.525.

[82] Ibid, 522.

[83] Inayatullah, N. (1996). "Beyond the sovereignty dilemma: quasi-states as social construct". In Biersteker, T.J., and Weber, C. (eds.) *State Sovereignty as Social Construct.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. P.61.

[84] Rothstein, R. (1997). "Democracy in the Third World: Definitional Dilemmas". In Granham, D., and Tessler, M. (eds.) *Democracy, War, and Peace in the Middle East.* Indiana University Press: Indianapolis. P.71.

[85] Sayigh, Y. (1991). "The Gulf Crisis: Why the Arab Regional Order Failed?". *International Affairs*. 67 (3). P.489.

forms of Arabism that derived from Egypt, Iraq and Syria.[86] Instead, they "constructed strong, centralized state apparatuses and fostered local, country patriotism".[87]

To sum up, as a result of the problematic state formation, legitimacy problem and domestic internal fears, the Arab regimes are not able to conduct reliable, popular and legitimate establishments. In this connection, they became vulnerable against the challenging ideologies and regimes that could destabilize the regional order and *status quo*. Stating alternatively, considering the artificial state boundaries, problematic state formation and legitimacy problem, the Arab states came to the conclusion that only by collaborating with external powers they can maximize their internal stability and create legitimacy at the expense of regional security complexes.

Thus, the subordinate Arab regional system was shaped by the situations characterised by reciprocal effects that are not limited with the regional conditions. In other words, the subordinate Arab regional system was being determined in such a complex relationship that political and military costs always were involved and autonomy was restricted. This constituted an intermediate factor between the power structure of the international system and the political bargaining that took place within the regional sub-system. Consequently, the regional actors were driven to balance against each other.

3.4 Dual Authority within the Arab Regional System: Overlapping Identities, Roles, and Loyalties

After having defined the Arab regional system, systematized some of its common patterns, and analyze the problematic state formation in the region, this section is focuses on the dual authority within the Arab regional system. The main objective of this section is to answer the central questions at the issue of the sake:

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[86] Ibid.

[87] Ibid.

What distinguishes the Arab regional system from the other regional systems and why the challenging regimes may severely threaten the established regional order and *status quo*.

The analysis of this section also has direct connection with the foreign policy orientation and policies of the regional countries. This is due to the fact that foreign policy of the Arab countries concentrated on the distinctive regional characteristics of the Middle East. In other words, each region has its own distinctive features that influence domestic and external policies. As stated by Paul Noble, systemic regional conditions can "either provide a set of opportunities, or, more commonly, serve as a set of constraints, permitting states a certain range of possible action."[88]

As analysed from an historical point of view in the next chapter, it is the expansion of Western Westphalian state-system that brought modern institutions and forms of statehood into the Middle East. Certainly, this transmission has shaped the patterns of behaviour of the Arab countries at both the administrative and foreign policy levels. Fred Halliday asserts that the Middle East has six Third World characteristics in terms of state formation. In other words, Arab countries have many similarities with other Third World countries (and other regional systems). These similarities could be listed as: [89]

1. The Middle East has been subjected to domination of the developed capitalist world through direct colonialism or indirect control.

2. The Middle East has been influenced by direct colonial settlement like other colonised countries.

3. In common with all other post-colonial countries, the state boundaries of the Middle East do not reflect long-established divisions, but decisions of colonial administrations.

[88] Noble, C. P. (1984). "The Arab System: Opportunities, Constraints, and Pressures." In Korani, B. & Dessouki, A. E. H. (eds). *The Foreign Policies of Arab States*. Boulder: Westview Press. P. 41.

[89] Halliday, F. (1996). *Islam and the Myth of Confrontation.* London: I. B. Tauris. Pp.27-29.

4. After their independence, the Middle East countries developed forms of nationalism that underlined their specificity and distinct historical origins. At the same time, they developed economic relations with former colonial powers. Therefore, while rejecting the power of the West in symbolic terms, they were bound to accept such reality in material terms.

5. After their independence, there was a period of unrest and mobilization against the forces of external domination, and against those who have co-operated with them.

6. Finally, after their independence, just like other Third World countries, ruling classes gained prominence, replaced colonialism, and exploited economic resources of their countries. The opposition to ruling elites was subject to repression, massacre, censorship, bribe or demagogy.

However, in addition to these common features, what distinguishes the Arab regional system from other regional system are the dual authority and overlapping identities, roles, and loyalties.

From a theoretical perspective, the international system has a disciplining effect on state formations.[90] Following a typical neo-realist line of understanding, it is clear that *the* system influences actors according to the systemic level principles. In consequence, actors are not permitted to behave according to their domestic perceptions, principles, and essentials. Rather, they are expected to act in line with the systemic realities irrespective of their different values and origins. Thus, the positivist philosophy behind the neo-realist understanding equates very different states such as the United States and Egypt in terms of producing similar structural behaviours.

An analysis from this perspective has important consequences of the Arab regional system. The expansion of Western Westphalian state-system in the Middle East had challenged and changed all traditional forms and domestic cultural and

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[90] Steans, J., and Pettiford, L. (2001). *International Relations: Perspectives and Themes.* London: Longman. Pp.28-29.

regulative essentials like in the other Third World countries. In this way, the modern institutions such as international boundaries, national identities, national military force, police forces, and the Western type of state forms were established *via* colonialism and modernizing national elites.

In consequence, the state, inter-state, and state/society relations are analyzed and conceptualized by Western notions of international relations, such as national interest, state security and survival. This is so because "members of international society are the sovereign states, not their populations."[91] In other words, since the modern international system is composed of sovereign states, traditional analysis regarding states focus on how states act on the basis of mutual interaction on the key principles such as territorial unity, national interest and independence.

Nevertheless, this foreign policy level is misleading in the Arab Middle East. As noted by Tibi, neither internal sovereignty (with its conception of citizenship and national identity and loyalty) nor external sovereignty (with its idea of mutual recognition of boundaries and authority over that territory) has a real counterpart in Arab-Islamic history.[92] Decisions regarding the Arab regional states are made through complex processes that depend on state-society relations.[93] The commons among the sovereign Arab states at societal level have created a system of *dual authority* in the Arab world. This is the case because the Arab regimes

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[91] Mayall, J. (1999). "Sovereignty, Nationalism, and Self-Determination". *Political Studies*. 47 (3). P.476.

[92] Tibi, B. (1990). "The Simultaneity of the Unsimultaneous: Old Tribes and Imposed Nation-States in the Modern Middle East". In Khoury, P. S., and Kostiner, J. (eds.) *Tribes and State Formation in the Middle East.* Berkeley, LA: University of California Press. P.127.

[93] *See* Barnett, M. (1993). "Institutions, Roles, and Disorder: The case of the Arab States Sysytem". *International Studies Quarterley.* 37. Pp.271-296, Barnett, M. N. (1995). "Sovereignty, Nationalism, and Regional Order in the Arab States System". *International Organization.* Summer. 49 (3). Pp.479-510, Barnett, M. N. (1997). "Regional security after the Gulf War". *Political Science Quarterly*. Winter. 111 (4). Pp.597-618; Barnett, M. N. (1998). *Dialogues in Arab Politics*. New York: Columbia University Press, Sayigh, Y. (1991). "The Gulf crisis: Why the Arab regional order failed?" *International Affairs*. 67 (3). Pp.487-507.

should concern themselves with the balance between their domestic leverage and the system level 'realities' in addition to the Arab-level facts.[94]

In other words, unlike many other sovereign states, three different levels shape the Arab state's decision-making process: The systemic level, the nation-state level, and the regional-level. Although the Arab actors have been subordinated to the state system dynamics, in many cases, their regional level considerations, rather than the classical balance between the domestic and international levels, shape the decisions of the Arab leaders. Stating alternatively, the international level and the Arab region refer to different domains because the Arab regimes are not only considered with the systemic and domestic concerns, but also the regional concerns. As Barnett perfectly summarizes, the Arab states are "caught between Arabism and Westphalia".[95]

Therefore, forming a sharp contrast to the classical realist perceptions, the idea of international system is distorted in the Arab world. Michael Barnett defines this situation as an "anarchical Arab society" rather than a perfect realist (state) system.[96] As in the case of the realist state system in which the members are clearly independent from each other, the Arab countries are inter-dependent and reactive to each other policies and actions.

Supportive to this argument, Michael Barnett further argues that Arab leaders occupy the role of not only the agent of a sovereign state, but also an agent of the wider Arab political community.[97] The Arab Middle Eastern states are politically dependent to each other since "Arab states still dwell within a normative structure."[98] Barnett adds that:[99]

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[94] Hinnebusch, R. (2002). "Introduction: The Analytical Framework". In Hinnesbusch, R., and Ehtashami, A. (eds.) P.8.

[95] Barnett, M. N. (1997:600).

[96] Barnett, M. N. (1998:263).

[97] Ibid, 9.

[98] Ibid, 263.

(Arabism) normative constraints explains Arab state behaviour, across states and time periods, that cannot be explained by realist and is unique, when compared with other regional systems: The contemporaneous emphasis on unity and reality of conflict among Arab states, their unwillingness to see Israel as a legitimate member of the system and a possible alliance partner, open interference in the domestic affairs of other states.

Related with this discussion Matar and Hilal explain the overlapping roles and loyalties within the Arab regional system as:[100]

> The ease with which any party can interfere in the affairs of another party, because of the family and tribal ties across geographic borders, because of the availability of the nationalist and unionist incentive, and also because of the weakness of feelings of attachment to the state, a recent phenomenon in the Arab system, and lack of sanctity of those political borders whose history goes back only recently and which were seen from the Arab nationalist view-point as inheritances from the colonial period.

Similarly, Gregory Gause III notes that the interconnection between the Arab states is more than simple geographical proximity because the "events in one part of the Middle East have had surprising and unintended consequences in the other parts of the region".[101] Therefore, when a critic or strategic decision should take (for instance, alliance agreement with ex-regional country) the Arab leaders required the social approval from wider regional Arab community.[102]

The overwhelming of pan-Arab public sphere from the domestic public spheres, that is quite different from European state system, also explained by Lynch with the words of:[103]

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[99] Ibid, 27-29.

[100] Matar, G., and Hilal, A. (1983). *The Arab regional order*. Beirut: Dar al-Mustaqbal. P.62. Citied in Barnett Barnett, M. N. (1998:30).

[101] Gause III, F.G. (1999:11).

[102] Ibid, 32-33.

[103] Lynch, M. (1999). *State Interests and Public Spheres*. New York: Columbia University Press. P.30.

The Arab case offers an important example of an international system in which state borders do not necessarily bind political public spheres. In the traditional understanding of the public sphere as it emerged in Europe, the public sphere was composed of citizens engaged in rational-critical discourse aimed at influencing state policy. In an international context, public discourse aims to affect both state policies and international public opinion. An inter-Arab public sphere has long coexisted with and often overwhelmed domestic public spheres.

Green also confirms that although Arab political elites are committed to their continuing political interests, they still express strong devotion to transnational Arabism.[104] In the same vein, Miller proposes that Arab leaders felt obligated to the common Arab commitments and responsibilities such as the Palestinian issue.[105] As a demonstration of this argument, Egypt lost its pivotal role in the Arab interstate politics due to its withdrawal from the Arab-Israeli confrontation following the Camp David agreement.[106]

Thus, what is the main reason of the dual authority within the Arab regional system? Barnett attributes this characteristic to the co-existence of pan-Arabism and sovereignty at the same time.[107] Because of this "co-existence", Arab states were expected to act "in a manner that was consistent with sovereignty and to recognize their own artificiality and transitory nature".[108] According to Barnett, Arab leaders had "to consider, articulate, and adopt foreign policies that reflected both sets of roles" since "Arab states were embedded in the twin institutions of pan-Arabism and state sovereignty".[109]

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[104] Green, J. G. (1997). "Ideology and Conflict in Arab Politics". *Conflict Resolution in the Arab World: Selected Essays.* P.248.

[105] Miller, A. D. (1986). *The Arab state and the Palestine Question: Between Ideology and Self-Interest.* Boulder: Westview Press. Pp.2-3.

[106] Ismael, T. Y. (1986:56-59). Also in Sayigh, Y. (1991:492).

[107] Barnett, M. N. (1993:290).

[108] Ibid.

[109] Ibid, 284.

At this specific point, the next question at the core of the analysis is why the Arab leaders felt obligated to attach themselves to the pan-Arab ideals even after the emergence of the state system? Stating alternatively, why the Arab regimes were supporting pan-Arab ideals even if this clash with the principles of sovereignty?

The answer of this question lies in the fact that Arab leaders should concern themselves with both the domestic and regional concerns for their legitimacy and stability. As suggested by many scholars, historical evidences suggest that Arab societies were sympathetic to political unification among the Arab states.[110] Stating in different words, state sovereignty in the Arab Middle East and the roles associated with sovereignty were not legitimized by the nation.[111] It is mainly because of this reason that the leaders of the newly established Arab regimes emphasize upon pan-Arabism for their legitimacy and stability.[112] Michael Barnett progressively summarized this situation with the words of "while Arab leaders able to ignore pan-Arabism demand of political unification, they were less successful at resisting its other charges".[113]

Therefore, inevitably, although the Arab states tried to build different (state based) identities, the role of the state contradicted with the role of the nation. Since pan-Arabism has deep connotations for Arab societies, Arab leaders have had

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[110] See for instance, Owen, R. (1992). *State, Power, and Politics in the Making of the Modern Middle East.* New York: Routledge, Barnett, M. N. (1998), Tibi, B. (1981), Khalidi, R. (1991). "Arab Nationalism: Historical Problems in the Literature". *American Historical Review.* 96. Pp.1363-1373. Duri, A. A. (1987). *The Historical Formation of the Arab Nation.* New York: Croom Helm.

[111] Barnett, M. (1993). "Institutions, Roles, and Disorder: The case of the Arab States Sysytem.". *International Studies Quarterley.* 37. P.291.

[112] For the detailed analysis of this assumption *see* Hudson, M. C. (1998). *The Arab Politics: The Search for Legitimacy.* New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

[113] Barnett, M. N. (1993:291).

to "portray their policies and actions as consistent with Arabism's demands".[114] This argument is also supported by Lisa Anderson with the words of:[115]

> The individual states of the Arab World are not congruent with, and cannot wholly appropriate, the powerful nationalism of Arab identity, yet they are equally unable to fully transcend or replace it by cultivating purely local loyalties. Thus, the elites in the region have vacillated between attempts to portray themselves as the vanguard of Arab unity and to rely on provincial identities and loyalties to engender political support.

In consequence, nearly all Arab leaders continued to present their foreign policy in pan-Arab terms after their independence.[116] Although this intention has declined in the post 1967 period in terms of velocity and intensity, Niblock suggests that Arab governments still give attention to the pan-Arab dimension in their external policies.[117] This fact demonstrates that, in addition to sovereignty, domestic and regional forces must also be counted as additional sources for foreign policy in the Arab regional system.[118]

Therefore, the clash between sovereignty and pan-Arabism became inevitable in the Arab regional system. This is due to the fact that Arab states were expected to protect the Arab nation and work towards the political unification while trying to consolidate the sovereignty at the same time. However, pan-Arabism was denying that there is a distinction between the "domestic" and the "international" within the Arab world. The "national interest" was including the complete interest of the Arab nation that diversified in different Arab states. On the other hand, the

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[114] Ibid, 282.

[115] Anderson, L. (1991). "Legitimacy, Identity, and the Writing of History in Libya". In Davies, E., and Gavrielides, N. (eds.) *Statecraft in the Middle East.* Miami: Florida International University Press. P.72.

[116] Barnett, M. N. (1993:284).

[117] Niblock, T. (1998). "Democratization: A theoretical and practical debate". *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*. November. 25 (2). P.223.

[118] Barnett, M. N. (1993:291).

Westphalian sovereignty prohibits the "external" interference to the "internal" affairs.[119]

As a result, this foundational clash between Arabism and Westphalian sovereignty has produced contradictory roles, expectations and guides for the Arab states.[120] It is because of this reason that Gregory Gause III states that, in the post-Second World War era, the clash and tension between the tradition and Western sovereignty has been greatest in the Middle East.[121]

Thus, different interpretation about pan-Arabism created different expectations and conflict in the post-state system era in the Arab regional system. Since the Arab states were weekly organized and have legitimacy problem, Nasser's Egypt emerged as the 'champion' of pan-Arabism and try to use aforementioned dual authority, overlapping roles, and loyalties for its political aspirations.

The political history of the Arab world has left several powerful legacies whose influence on the region is still strong today. These regional forces inevitably have influenced the foreign policies of the Arab states. One of the major political factors in the Middle East is Arab nationalism. The influence of Arab nationalism reached its peak in the mid 1950s and 1960s especially under the charismatic leadership of Gamal Abdel Nasser.

As examined in depth in the Chapter Four, especially Egypt under the leadership of Nasser developed rationalities that made policies and intervention in other Arab states reasonable for the sake of pan-Arabism.

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[119] Owen, R. (1983). "Arab Nationalism, Arab Unity, and Arab Solidarity". In Asad, T., and Owen, R. (eds.) *Sociology of the Developing Societies*. New York: Monthly Review Press. P.20, and Salame, G. (1988). "Inter-Arab Politics: The Return to Geography." In Quandt, W. (ed.) *The Middle East: Ten Years after Camp David*. Washington, DC: Brookings Press. Pp.345-346.

[120] *See* for instance Hudson, M. C. (1998), Ben-Dor, G. (1983). *State and Conflict in the Middle East*. New York: Praeger, and Noble, P. (1984). "The Arab system: Opportunities, Constraints, and Pressures." Pp.41-78. In Korany, B., and Dessouki, A. H. (eds.) *The Foreign Policies of the Arab states*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

[121] Gause III, F.G. (1992:443).

To sum up, visually, after the establishment of the state system and the consolidation of the state power in the Arab Middle East, sovereignty based govering principles seem to achieve the "upper hand" in its competition against pan-Arabism. Especially after the 1967 defeat of the Arabs against Israel, the Arab states respected each other's sovereignty that weakened transnational commitments. As a result, the Arab regimes have come to agree that the security concerns of the Arab states could be different from the security concerns of the Arab nation.

However, even after the establishment of sovereignty, many societal actors accused their governments of betraying Arabism since societal (domestic) expectations were different from state's expectations.[122] As such, attachment to a state as a territorial entity and consolidation of the state system do not preclude opposition to the regime in power.[123] In contrast, transnational and domestic forces continue to demand and expect different roles for the Arab Middle Eastern states. Barnett explains this situation as:[124]

> While the Middle Eastern states have apparently gravitated toward sovereignty to organize their relations, to what extent do societal actors applaud that orientation and attending normative expectations? In other words, while state actors might have a vested interest in sovereignty, do domestic actors offer alternative normative expectations that undermine a regional order premised on sovereignty?

According to Barnett, state sovereignty in the Arab Middle East and the roles associated with sovereignty are not fully legitimized by the societal forces even in the contemporary era.[125] These societal forces believe that state should also reflect the interests of the community and the whole Arab nation. In this

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[122] Barnett, M. N. (1997:615).

[123] Ibid, 601.

[124] Ibid, 615.

[125] Ibid.

connection, as witnessed in almost all the free elections within the Arab world, the society somehow voiced its' reaction to their ruling regimes.

3.5 Transnational Identities in the Arab Regional System

After underlying the dual authority in the Arab Middle East, in this section the transnational identities in the Arab regional system is evaluated. The main objective of this section is to underline the special ideational links and commonalities within the region as a complementary answer to the question that initiated to be responded since the previous section: What makes the Arab regional different and peculiar from to other regional systems?

As stated above, the Arab world has many well-established and traditional 'commons' such as language, religion, identity, and customs. Technically speaking, it is these communalities that make up the basis of Arab difference. These communalities are still operational despite the existence of sovereign Arab states. For instance, as emphasized by Houssein Razi, along with the developing national loyalty, also macro and micro loyalties exist as competing loyalties in the Middle East.[126] Islam, Arabism, ethnic groups, and tribes have long been (and still) important socio-political frames of reference for the Arab world.[127]

In other words, despite the formal realization of Arab states, the Arab Middle Eastern societies have continued their transnational and sub-national loyalty-based relationship with certain traditional forms such as Arabism, religious, and tribal identities. As a result, the considerable population in the Arab Middle East has other loyalties and identities in addition to the state based loyalty. All

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[126] Razi, G. H. (1990). "Legitimacy, Religion, and Nationalism in the Middle East". *American Political Science Review*. 84 (1). P.75.

[127] Eickelman, D. F. (1989). *The Middle East: An Anthropological Approach.* New Jersey: Prentice Hall. Pp.179-227.

these loyalties could be named as "transnational loyalty". Borrowing from Dawisha, a transnational identity could be defined as:[128]

> An awareness of belonging to large group of humanity that stretches across state boundaries and which is supposed to share a common origin, characterized by a name and by common cultural features, and above all by the bounds of the linguistic community.

Deriving from this statement, this section elaborates the transnational identities in the Arab regional system under two main categories; Arabic identity and Islamic identity.

3.5.1 Arabic Identity

As stressed by Barnett, transnational Arabism is equally important as sovereignty in constituting the Arab state system.[129] Islam and Arabism give Arab societies a transnational loyalty and identity in contrast to state based territorial identities because "both Islam and Arabism prioritize loyalty to the Arab or Islamic community (*ummah)* over citizenship of individual states".[130] In consequence, "every Arab country explicitly identifies itself as being either Islamic, Arab (in a transnational sense), or both".[131]

Therefore, what are the main reasons that keep transnationalism alive in the Arab regional system? Accordingly, one of the main reasons is the artificial boundaries and questionable political legitimacy of the Arab Middle Eastern regimes. Lisa Anderson defines this situation as:[132]

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[128] Dawisha, A. (2002). "Footprints in the Sand The Definition and Redefinition of Identity in Iraq's Foreign Policy". In Telhami, S., and Barnett, M. (eds.) *Identity and Foreign Policy in the Middle East.* London: Cornell University Press. P.121.

[129] Ibid, 239.

[130] Hinnesbusch, R., and Ehtashami, A. (eds.) (2002:33).

[131] Green, J. G. (1995). "Gulf Security Without the Gulf States?" *The Harvard Journal of World Affairs.* 4 (1). P.240.

[132] Anderson, L. (1987). "The State in the Middle East and North Africa." *Comparative Politics.* 20 (1). P.3.

Because of the novelty and in some cases the weaknesses of many of the states of the Middle East…the notions of citizenship, patriotism, and love of country which undergird loyalty to the modern state frequently face competing conceptions of identity, loyalty, and legitimacy. Indeed, even state elites often find themselves better served by non-state ideologies…which deny the primacy of the states as the object of fidelity.

This outcome was inevitable for the reason that newly established countries in the Arab Middle East were not reflecting long-standing boundaries and loyalties. The arbitrarily drawn borderlines by the colonial powers and the emergence of artificial nation-states in the Arab Middle East led to the legitimacy problem. Legitimacy simply refers to the acceptance of the ruled, the rightness of the ruler's superior governing power.[133] As a result, transnational identity keeps its influence and consistency throughout the Arab Middle East. Supportive of this argument, Stephan and Robertson emphasize that: [134]

Modern democracies are territorially bounded entities, each of which extends to its citizens a particular set of rights and asks them to meet a particular set of obligations. Democracies are usually abetted by a strong affective attachment to, and identity with, the specific institutions and symbols of the political community within the country's boundaries…In sharp contrast to all this, many contemporary Arab states have relatively new and arbitrary boundaries because they were cut out of the Ottoman Empire, and were afterward occupied and often reconfigured as European colonies. The weakness of their "nation-state" or "state-nation" political identities has been compounded by the widespread use throughout the Middle East and North Africa of Arabic as the dominant language, and especially by attempts to privilege pan-Arabism (and more recently pan-Islamism) as core elements of national identities. Anyone even passingly familiar with the region will note how commonly used is the phrase "the Arab nation *(watan)*.

In consequence, the majority of the local population in the Middle East has no sense of state-based loyalty. As stated by Hinnebusch, the Middle East is marked by "high incongruity between the nation (identity) and the territorial state

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[133] Sahliyeh, E. (2000). "The limits of state power in the Middle East." *Arab Studies Quarterly*. Fall. 22 (4). P.2.

[134] Stephan, A., and Robertson, G. B. (2003). "An 'Arab' More Than 'Muslim' Electoral Gap". *Journal of Democracy*. 14 (3). P.41.

(sovereignty)."[135] Instead, Arab societies have religious or tribal loyalties that make it quite difficult to understand the reasons of the independent state. Michael Hudson has successfully defined this situation as:[136]

> The new sovereign state structures of the Arab world were not congruent with the scope and boundaries of tribal, Islamic, imperial, or feudal domains. While social modernization weakened the old authorities, it did not immediately create authoritative replacements.

Lastly, it should be noted that the "sense of common victimization" is another significant source that tightens the bonds of transnational Arab identity. Hinnebusch reveals that the "sense of common victimization" is very important characteristic of transnational Arab identity. Hinnebusch defines the sense of common victimization with the following words:[137]

> Historical memories of greatness under unity and experience that the Arabs are successful when they act together (e.g. the 1973 war and the use of "oil weapon"), and are readily dominated when divided, keeps Arabism alive. So does the sense of common victimization: The Crusades are part of every school boy or girl's historical world view; the loss of Palestine is seen as a common Arab disaster; the 1967 defeat shamed all Arabs, not just the defeated frontline states. On the other hand, the relative successes in the 1973 war inspired solidarity across the region.

In fact, the sense of common victimization has strengthened the transnational Arab bonds as witnessed after the disastrous 1967 Six Day War defeat of the Arabs. For instance, Hasou noted that after the 1967 War, the radical and conservative states of the Arab world had been reconciliated.[138] As empirical evidences, Nasser's reconciliation with Saudi Arabia and alliance with the

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[135] Hinnebusch, R. (2002:29).

[136] Hudson, M. C. (1998:394).

[137] Hinnesbusch, R., and Ehtashami, A. (2002:29).

[138] Hasou, T. Y. (1985). *The Struggle for the Arab World: Egypt's Nasser and the Arab League.* London: KPI Publishers. P.39.

Jordanian monarch could be demonstrated.[139] In consequence, Saudi Arabia (as the leading conservative Arab regime) assisted Syria and Egypt in their war against Israel in 1973 through the weapon of oil.[140]

In the contemporary era, among the sources of common sense of victimization are the loss of Palestine, and the foreceful immigration of the Palestinians from their homeland (especially after the Arab-Israeli wars of 1948 and 1967). Moreover, Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982 and the Israeli bombardment on a United Nations camp in south Lebanon during the Israeli "Grapes of Wrath" attacks in 1996 were contributed to the common sense of victimization. Furthermore, the Western economic sanctions to Iraq and sufferings of the Iraqi people under the continued U.N. economic sanctions (and the killings of the thousands of Iraqi children because of the embargo), and Israeli aggressions in West Bank and Gaza could be listed as "common traumas" of the Arab nation.[141] These evidences prove that due to the overlapping roles and loyalties, transnational Arabism stays solid at the grassroots (society) level and form an important element in popular political consciousness.[142]

To sum up, since their very admission into modern international system, the Arab states have protected their certain cultural peculiarities.[143] The themes such as Arab identity (transnational Arabism) and Islamic religion have been very influential since the post-colonial era. In consequence, despite the formal (state based) organizations among the Arab states, in practice, Arab societies continue

[139] Ajami, F. (1978/79). "The End of Pan-Arabism". *Foreign Affairs*. Winter. Vol. 69. P.358, and, Ajami, F. (1992). *The Arab Predicament*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. P.8.

[140] Aulas, M., and Aulas, C. (1988). "State and Ideology in Republican Egypt". In Halliday, F., and Alawi, H. (eds.) *State and Ideology in the Middle East and Pakistan*. London: Macmillan. P.150.

[141] Hinnesbusch, R., and Ehtashami, A. (2002:30-31).

[142] Green, J. G. (1997:245).

[143] Telhami, S., and Barnett, M. (2002). "Introduction: Identity and Foreign Policy in the Middle East". In Telhami, S. and Barnett, M. (eds.) *Identity and Foreign Policy in the Middle East*. London: Cornell University Press. P.5.

and protect their transnational or sub-national identities.[144] As elucidated below, continuity of tribal loyalties in the Arab Middle East is also a good sample of this argument.

This has given way to a very important structural result: Although the sovereign Arab states became the members of the modern international system and were bound with the same contemporary principles of other Western states, their "societies" kept acting on the basis of traditional forms of identities and institutions. Stating differently, the re-organization of the Arab world in line with the Western state system principles did not completely annihilate former practices and regulations.

By this way, a dual system has surfaced between the independent Arab states and Arab societies irrespective of their different nationalities. Since the Arab regimes are subordinated their societies and most of the analysis are based upon state based analysis state-society relations remained among the most neglected issues in the literature addressing the Arab Middle East.

Accordingly, the main focus that realizes the Arab sphere should also based on society rather than merely based on the meaning implied by the existence of artificial nation-states. In other words, the new critical analyses and conceptions should be taken into consideration in the Middle East that is based upon society rather than territorial polity. Therefore, the forces of change, political identities, behaviour, and culture should be re-examined in a complex network of relationships.

As stated above, transnationalism survives in the Arab Middle East especially through tribal and Islamic identities. Departing from this statement, the reasons behind consistency and enduring character of the transnational identity in the Arab regional system (that separates it from the Westphalian concept of identity) is additionally elaborated based on the Islamic identity and tribal identity.

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[144] Ehteshami, A., and Hinnebusch, R. (2002:335).

3.5.2 Islamic Identity

One of the main sources of transnational identity in the Middle East that requires a special emphasis is Islamic identity.[145] Islam is a religious understanding of the world and the cosmos, mediated by the concepts of the absolute unity of God and the prophethood of Muhammad. In other words, Prophet Muhammad converted most of the Arab tribes to belief in a single God and his charismatic leadership unified the Arab people.

Islam is a religion that is born within the Arab culture and is a unifying ideology like the Medieval Christianity.[146] The Islamic principles rest upon transnational political loyalty and solidarity since the seventh century. This is due to the Islamic notion of '*ummah*'. Ahsen explains the *ummah* as:[147]

> The Islamic sense of the world and of the role people play in it is inextricably bound up with the community that accepts this sense as part its self-definition. That community, or *ummah,* was formed as a response to the revelation granted to the Prophet Muhammad.

An *ummah* is a community of law and custom, where its members are destined to obey these laws and customs on the bases of brotherhood, equality and equal responsibilities.[148] Thus, it would not be wrong to argue that the identity of Islam throughout the history has been religious since the *ummah*'s basic philosophical and emotional support came from religious faith.[149]

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[145] It is worth stressing that there could be different interpretations and schism within the Islam. Nevertheless, since the main analysis of the thesis is about the Arab regional system, it is put forward that Islamic identity has a uniting political force on gaining culture, identity and perception witihin the Arab nation.

[146] Ismael, J. S. and Ismael, T. Y. (1999). "Globalization and the Arab world in the Middle East politics: Regional dynamics in historical perspective." *Arab Studies Quarterly*. Summer. 21 (3). P.130.

[147] Ahsen, A. (2004). "The concept of the Ummah and its Development in History". *Civilacademy.* 2 (1). P.79.

[148] Ibid, 84.

[149] Ibid, 87.

The Islamic *ummah* has transnational identity because it refers to the political community of Muslims regardless to ethnicity and geography. Islamic *ummah* recognizes no state boundaries, secular law or sovereign principles. With the emergence of *ummah*, Arabs' supreme tribal loyalty has changed to the new and supreme Islamic identity to the exclusion all others (*min dun an-nas*).[150] Thus, *ummah* is trans-national, and as an Islamic ideology, it represents an original synthesis.

In consequence, Islam brought a revolution in Arab society and completely changed the world-view of the Arabs. Martin Kramer defines this reality as Arabs took pride in their genealogies "which linked them to Arabia at the dawn of Islam".[151] This is due to the fact that Prophet Mohammed was an Arab and the holy Quran was revealed in Arabic in the seventh century.[152] This special link between Islam and Arab identity forms a sort of uniqueness and distinctiveness for the Arab world.

A significant point to recognize is that Islamic *ummah* loyalty belongs neither to a monarch or a state but to God's law and responsibility towards God.[153] Ahsen notes that it is because of this central role of the Islamic law (*Shari'ah*) in Muslim society that "both the government and the opposition in Muslim countries endeavour to find legitimacy in the *Shari'ah*".[154] This fact also explains why Hudson argues for instance that political Islam is the common de-nominator and most popularly rooted oppositional force within the Arab world that excludes the agents of an international economy, culture, and security.[155]

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[150] Ibid, 86.

[151] Ibid.

[152] Kramer, M. (1993). "Arab Nationalism: Mistaken Identity". *Daedalus*. Summer. Pp.3-4.

[153] Ahsen, A. (2004:90).

[154] Ibid.

[155] Hudson, M. C. (1994). "Transformations in the Middle East Regional System: The Dialectics of Inclusion and Exclusion". *The Iranian Journal of International Affairs*. Pp.563-564.

In fact, Islam is not only a religion but also the doctrine that encompasses all aspects of life in the Arab Middle East. In other words, Islam in the Arab world differs from religion in Western society because it dominates the daily life through its obligations and it gives transnational loyalty and identity to the Arab societies. Moreover, it is an important part of socialization and it affects personal status in addition to playing a political role. Additionally, Islam also has shaped the political configuration of the region since the post-colonial era especially through maintaining the internal legitimacy. All of the above points make religion and politics inseparable from each other in the Arab Middle East.

From the constitutional point of view, even after the establishment of the state system and sovereignty, Islam has official status in the Arab countries. In all the Arab countries, *Shari'ah* law forms either the basis of the legal system or the civil law is interpreted in accordance with the *Shari'ah* law. This fact contradicts with the secularity principle of the Westphalian state system. The Westphalian state system distorted within the Arab regional system simply because the Westphalian principles eliminated the order of religion, religious orders, codes, and laws (secularity).[156] Zubaida explains this contradiction by drawing on the fact that the notion of territorial state with individualized citizenship, secular law, and principles of sovereignty are alien to the "Muslim mind".[157]

Therefore, it will not be wrong to argue that although the state system has been consolidated and still lasts within the Arab regional system, Islamic identity survives and remains as an important part of politics. Baram provides an explanation to this assumption by stating that Arabs approach negatively to the ancient cultures before Islam by regarding them as *jahiliyya*.[158] According to

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[156] Buzan, B., and Little, R. (1999). "Beyond Westphalia? Capitalism after the Fall." *Review of International Studies*. 25 (5). P.90.

[157] Zubaida, S. (1993). *Islam, the people and the state: Political ideas and movements in the Middle East*. London: I.B. Tauris. Pp.130-131.

[158] Baram, A. (1990). "Territorial Nationalism in the Middle East." *Middle Eastern Studies*. 26 (4). P.426.

Baram when Arabs wish to re-surrect local civilizations that are pre-Islamic and pre-Arab, they are immediately confronted with the problem of a complete linguistico-cultural rupture".[159] Thus, the role of religion within the Arab world should be seen as a unique situation.

Being contrast to this process, the creation of an intimate relationship between society and territorial pre-Islamic history existed outside of the Arab world in the Middle East under the influential leadership, such as Ataturk's Turkey and Muhammad Reza Pahlavi's Iran.[160] These leaders and especially Mustafa Kemal Ataturk based Turkish nationalism on secular foundations and formed a fusion between the people and their land. Baram named this process as modern, European style patriotism.

In consequence, supra-Turkish ideological or emotional attachments that could develop into political communities have been successfully eroded.[161] As put forward by Baram, Ataturk and his disciples were saved from the "most delicate task which faced the contemporary Arab regimes: the difficulty of balancing between local (state-based) and pan-Arab (Arabic/Islamic) elements"[162].

As examined in Chapter Four, this difficulty became visible in Egypt which demonstrated that Islam is among the most fundamental element in the national identity of Arabs and stands as one of the main reasons on the collapse of the Arab nationalist ideology.

To sum up, religion and politics are inseparable from each other in the Arab regional system. The interactive and interconnected nature of religion and politics has remained constant throughout the Arab Middle East. In consequence, Islam with its transnational character remains as the fundamental element in the

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[159] Ibid.

[160] Ibid, 427.

[161] Ibid.

[162] Ibid.

national identity of Arabs and always possesses an important political role in the region.

According to Kepel the main reason for the resurgence of universal religious movements is the perceptions behind the failure of modernism.[163] These religious movements (and especially Islam) explain the failure of modernism with its intrinsic incapability of "creating values" without God.[164] Kepel further suggests that, in contrast to the general negligence of the Arab rulers of the conditions of the daily life; the new wave of Islamists has developed a pragmatic link between ideology and the daily concerns and fears of the people that are alienated and marginalized by the process of modernization. This standpoint also demonstrates that Islamic ideology stand as a strong pillar against modernization and globalization of capitalist values. In other words, theoretically speaking, Islamic ideology insists on political and cultural autonomy of the Islamic culture against the Western-dominated world system and rejects Western penetration.[165]

The successes of Islamic parties in free general elections within the Arab world support this argument. The Islamist party (Front of Islamic Salvation) won the first democratic elections in the Arab World in December, 1991 with a clear victory (fifty six percent) with an aggressive Islamic and Arabic campaign.[166] Hizbullah's election victories in Lebanon and Hamas victory in Palestine also could be approached from the same perspective.

At the contemporary times, the Muslim Brotherhood won electoral victories at both the Egyptian parliamentary election of 2011-2012 along with 2012 Egyptian presidential elections where the leader of the Freedom and Justice Party

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[163] Kepel, G. (1994). *The Revenge of God-The Resurgence of Islam, Christianity and Judaism in the Modern World.* University Park, PA: Pennsylvania University Press.

[164] Ibid, 4.

[165] Hinnesbusch, R., and Ehtashami, A. (2002:33).

[166] For instance, *see* Tlemçani, R. (1990). "Chadli's Perestroika". *Middle East Report.* No.163. March-April.

Mohamed Mursi has chosen as the fifth Egyptian President. Similarly, the Islamist Bloc that led by Salafist Al-Nour Party became the second in the 2011-2012 Egyptian elections with 28% of the votes. One other Islamist Party, the Ennahda Movement, won the 2011 Tunisian Constituent Assembly Election with 40 percent which was the first honest election in the country's history.

As an overall conclusion, what is unique about the Middle East (that separates it from the other regions) is the transnational characteristic of Arab identity, and the overlapping boundaries, loyalties, and roles. These unique characteristics challenge the very core of the (Westphalian) sovereignty in the Middle East. Stating differently, "transnational ideological (standings) challenges sovereignty as the organizing principle of the (Arab) Middle Eastern system and accounts for the uniquesness."[167] Supportive to this argument, the next section examines the empirical evidences of transnational Arab identity in the Middle East.

3.6 Empirical Evidences of Transnational Arab Identity

Having examined the overlapping boundaries, loyalties, roles, and the transnational identities in the Arab Middle East, as a demonstration of these peculiar compositions, this section delves into the empirical evidences of transnational Arab identity as a demonstration of both significant foreign policy applications and mass root connection.

Among many other scholars, Malik Mufti and Baram emphasizes that transnational Arabism has played an important role since the beginning of the state system in the Middle East.[168] For instance, the national flags of all the Arab countries often display all-Arab or all-Islamic symbolism and traditional Arab-Islamic colours (red for Mudar, green for the Prophet's family, black for the

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[167] Gause III, F.G. (1999:22). Also s*ee* Barnett, M. N. (1998), and, Matar, G., and Hilal, A. (1983).

[168] Mufti, M. (1996). *Sovereign Creations.* Ithaca: Cornell University Press. P.2, and Baram, A. (1990:428).

Abbasids).[169] Other Islamic symbols also used such as Prophet's sword and eagle.[170] Additionally, as mentioned above, in all the Arab Middle Eastern countries, 'nation' is defined as Arabs only with the two exceptions of Lebanon and Tunisia.[171]

The most important empirical evidence of transnational Arab identity in the Arab regional system is the Arab-Israeli wars. Since the United Nations resolution on the partition of Palestine and the establishment of Israel on May 15, 1948, the Arab states and Israel have fought four times (1948, 1956, 1967, and 1973).

In 1948, in addition to the Palestinian forces, Jordanian, Egyptian, Syrian, Lebanese and Iraqi troops were involved in the war. In 1967, Jordan, Syria and Egypt fought with Israel, while in 1973 Egypt and Syria were the only nations involved in the war. Although other Arab states were not directly involved in the conflict, they assisted to the warring Arab states in material terms. For instance, Saudi Arabia led the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) imposed oil embargo to the Western states in the aftermath of 1973 Arab-Israeli (Yom Kippur) War.

In addition to the four Arab-Israeli wars, Israel and Arabs states have also confronted in other battlefields. For instance, the "War of Attrition" between Egypt and Israel from 1968 to 1970, and the confrontation of Lebanese, Palestinian, and Syrian forces with the Israeli forces both in the "Operation Litani" in 1978, and in the 1982 Lebanon War.

Related with the Arab-Israeli conflict, another significant empirical evidence of transnational Arab identity could be put forward as the post-peace treaty developments of Egypt after the country had signed a treaty with Israel. The

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[169] Baram, A. (1990:428).

[170] Ibid.

[171] Ayubi, N. A.(1995:146).

signing of the peace treaty at Camp David between Egypt and Israel (on September 17, 1978), and the recognition of Israel by Egypt, resulted with the isolation of Egypt from the Arab world.[172] In 1978, Egypt was expelled from the Arab League and the headquarters of the Arab League moved to Tunisia from Cairo.[173] Additionally, Egypt lost the crucial financial aid from Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states.[174] Furthermore, the President of Egypt (Envar Sadat) was assassinated on October 6, 1981 as a consequence of signing peace treaty with Israel.

The attachment to transnational Arab identity is also validated in the Iran-Iraq War. In the Iran-Iraq War that was the longest war in the contemporary Middle East, the regional Arab countries (whether radical or moderate with the exception of Syria that is explained below) supported Iraq as an Arab country against non-Arab Iran despite the fact that Iraq was the aggressor side.[175] Most importantly, the Gulf States provided great amount of financial aid to Iraq.[176] In other words, although Iraq was the aggressor side, it justified its war and got broad support from the Arab states through its appeal to Arab identity and transnational Arabism.

Moreover, as evaluated above, although the country has been isolated from the Arab world (because of the Camp David peace agreement with Israel), Egypt used the opportunity of Iran-Iraq War in order to return to the Arab political sphere through militarily backing and supporting of Iraq.[177] In other words, if Egypt did not militarily and politically support Iraq in the Iran-Iraq War, it could

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[172] Hinnebusch, R. (2002:119).

[173] Diab, K. A. (1991). "The Ups and Downs of the Arab League". *Geopolitique Review*. Summer. 34. P.28.

[174] Ibid.

[175] Bill, J., and Springborg, R. (1994). *Politics in the Middle East.* New York: Harper Collins Publishers. P.385.

[176] Anderson, L. (1987:129).

[177] Tripp, C. (2002). "The Foreign Policy of Iraq." In Hinnebusch, R., and Ehteshami, A. (eds.) Pp.146-147. Also cited in Green, J. G. (1997:246).

not have returned to the Arab political sphere. Nevertheless, Hinnebusch points out that Egypt's support for (Arab) Iraq only ended the Egyptian isolation by enabling its return to the Arab world, but not as a leading political power.[178]

At this point, it is worth stressing that Syria was the only Arab country that supported Iran during the Iran-Iraq War.[179] This was due to the party based (Ba'th) rivalries between Iraq and Syria that escalated through mutual hatred of Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein and Syrian leader Hafez Al-Assad. Furthermore, the religious and political bonds between Shi'a Iran and Shi'a Alawi minority regime of Assad were also another crucial factor behind Syria'a support of Iran. However, the long-standing hostility between the two countries was not received well by the other Arab countries, and Syria's attitude has been strictly criticized.[180] As a result, Syria's support for a non-Arab state against an Arab country led to its political isolation from the Arab world.[181]

The sending of troops by Morocco's pro-Western ruler (King Hassan the Second) to 1973 Arab-Israeli War, and strong reaction in Maghreb to the 1991 attacks on Iraq are the two complementary examples which demonstrate that the transnational Arab-Islamic identities also remain powerful in the Maghreb region.[182]

Additional significant evidence for trans-nationality in the Arab Middle East is the absence of direct wars between the Arab states. Arab countries have fought their wars against non-Arabic countries (such as Israel, Iran, and extra regional great powers) with the exception of Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.

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[178] Hinnebusch, R. (2002:120).

[179] Butt, G. (1994). *A Rock and a Hard Place: Origins of Arab-Western Conflict in the Middle East.* London: Harper-Collins Publishers. P.171. Also in Tibi, B. (1993). *Conflict and War in the Middle East, 1967-1991: Regional Dynamic and the Superpowers.* London: Macmillan Press. P.41.
[180] Hinnebusch, R. (2002:119).

[181] Baram, A. (1990). "Territorial Nationalism in the Middle East." *Middle Eastern Studies.* 26 (4). P.438.

[182] Hinnebusch, R. (2002:31-32).

As elucidated in depth in Chapter Five, Iraq tried to justify its occupation by claiming that Kuwait was part of the Ottoman province of Basra that later became part of modern Iraq.[183] Nevertheless, even in this occupation, the Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein widely appealed to the pan-Arab and pan-Islamic ideals in order to not reveal this action as a war between two Arab states. Saddam Hussein tried to express this event to the Arab World as an attempt "to redistribute Arab wealth and use it for the benefit of the Arab cause".[184] Additionally, he added that Iraqi attempt was a "pure Islamic purification campaign" against external powers.[185] According to Ben-Zvi, it was due to this concern that the U.S. demanded Israel to follow a 'low profile policy' because Israeli involvement in the second Gulf War could awaken the animosities and tensions related to the Arab-Israeli conflict.[186]

All these events demonstrate that the Arab regional system could produce a norm system for its members. Egypt's peace treaty with Israel and its following isolation within the Arab world, and Iraq's exclusion from the Arab Middle Eastern regional system after its invasion of Kuwait could be demonstrated as the most specific examples.

Finally, there are numerous examples which demonstrate that pan-Arab roles and expectations are embraced by the Arab states even in the contemporary era. These include the creation of an Arab bank, Arab funds, Arab development agencies, Arab summit meetings, and, the functioning of the Arab League.[187]

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[183] Ayoob, M. (1993). "Unravelling the Concept: 'National Security' in the Third World." In Korany, B., Noble, P. and Brynen, R. (eds.) *The many faces of national security in the Arab World.* New York: St. Martin's Press. P.45. Polk, W. R. (2006). *Understanding Iraq*. London: Tauris. P.67.

[184] Baram, A. (1990:443).

[185] Ibid.

[186] Ben-Zvi, A. (1993). "A changing American-Israeli Relationship". In Barzalai, G., Klieman, A., Shidlo, G. (eds.) *The Gulf Crisis and Its Global Aftermath.* London: Routledge. P.180.

[187] Alnasrawi, A. (1991). *Arab Nationalism, Oil, and the Political Economy of Dependency.* London: Greenwood Press. Pp14-22.

Table 3.1 The regional Organizations in the Middle East

Source: Subregional Organizations. UN Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia. 1998.

Name of the Organization	Headquarters	Founded
Arab Academy for Science & Technology (AAST)	Alexandria,	1975
Arab Administrative Development Organization	Cairo, Egypt	1961
Arab Atomic Energy Agency Arab Authority for Agricultural (AAEA)	Tunis, Tunisia	1988
Arab Administrative Agency of Investment & Development (AAAID)	Khartoum, Sudan	1976
Arab Center for the Studies of Arid Zones and Dry Lands (ACSAD)	Damascus, Syria	1971
Arab Federation for Food Industries (AFFD)	Amman, Jordan	1977
Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development (AFESD)	Safat, Kuwait	1968
Arab Industrial Development and Mining Organization (AIDMO)	Rabat, Morocco	1976
Center for Environment and Development for the Arab Region and Europe (CEDARE)	Giza, Egypt	1992
Gulf Organization for Indusuial Consulting (GOIC)	Doha, Qatar	1976
Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)	Riyadh, S.Arabia	1981
Council for Arab Economic Unity (CAEU)	Cairo, Egypt	1957
Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC)	Safau, Kuwait	1968
Islamic Foundation for Science, Technology and Development (IFSTAD)	Jeddah, Saudi Arabia	1979
Arab Labor Organization (ALO)	Cairo, Egypt	1965
Arab Union of Railways (AUR)	Aleppo, Syria	1979
Arab Union of the Manufacturers of Pharmaceuticals and Medical Appliances (AUFAM)	Amman, Jordan	1978
Arab Union of Land Transport (ARULAT)	Amman, Jordan	1978
Arab States Broadcasting Union (ASBU)	Tunis, Tunisia	1969
Arab Satellite Communications Organization (ARABSAT)	Riyadh, Saudi A.	1976
Arab Organization for Agricultural Development (AOAD)	Khartoum, Sudan	1970
Arab Monetary Fund (AMF)	Abu Dhabi, UAE	1976
Arab League Educational, Cultural and Scientific Organization (ALECSO)	Tunis, Tunisia	1964

At this point, it is worth emphasizing that as shown from the figure above, all the regional organizations established in the Middle East by the Arab countries carries the name of "Arab".[188]

Among the various economic examples of transnational Arab identity, Arab countries economic boycott of Israel, and the non-repayable grants & long-term easy loans offered by the rich Gulf States to other Arab countries could be demonstrated. For instance, as a specific example, the United Arab Emirates non-repayable grants to other Arab countries totalled about two billion U.S. dollars in 1999.[189]

Another significant event that demonstrates that transnational bonds and identity is still solid witnessed in the reaction against an advertisement of the U.S. based entertainment company Disney. The UAE led an Arab protest campaign against the Disney because the company allowed Israel to depict Jerusalem as its capital in a cultural exhibition celebrating the new millennium. In response to the call of the UAE, many Arab and Islamic countries threatened to boycott Disney's products.[190] In consequence, the Disney Company had to hold back and promised that it would not carry any reference to Jerusalem as the capital of Israel, and assured Arabs that the entertainment firm would not take a position on the question of Jerusalem.[191]

As one other example, on October 3, 1998 more than eight hundred thousand people gathered in Beirut's downtown area to attend a unique concert, "The Arab Dream".[192] The crowd waived the Palestinian flags as well as pictures of Gamal Abdel Nasser. This unique concert performed by four hundred famous Arab

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[188] *See* Table 2.1.

[189] Comptex News (November 25, 1999).

[190] Ibid.

[191] Xinhua News Agency (December 27, 1999).

[192] United Press International (February 25, 2002).

singers, musicians, and artists from twenty-two different Arab countries as an expression of Arab hopes for unity and solidarity.[193]

The most recent and significant demonstration at this vein that proves not only the transnational identity and bonds, but also the overlapping identities and roles within the Arab world is the *Arab Spring*. The demonstrations and rebellions of Arab people against their autocratic leaders' autocratic rule, corruption, human right violations, and poor economic performance, rapidly diffused within the Arab world.

The protests initiated in Tunisia in December of 2010 and then revolution waved to other Arab countries. In consequence, there have been revolutions in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya where the Presidents of each of the three countries have been expelled and overthrown. Also, there have been major uprisings in Syria, Bahrain, Yemen, Algeria, Iraq, Jordan, Morocco and Saudi Arabia.

Accordingly, these and many other examples demonstrate that despite the Westphalian sovereignty principles, the Arab world is knit together by strong primordial bonds that cannot be erased easily. The Islamic culture, Arab language and ethnicity, common values, norms, and traditions constitute strong primordial bonds that connected the Arab nations. Supportive to this argument Giesen contends that "primordial boundaries cannot be moved socially, and passing them is extremely difficult."[194] Related with this discussion, one other fact that fits in the Arab Middle Eastern realities is the assumption of Anthony D. Smith. According to Smith, the primordial ties have dynamic effect that could last for centuries.[195] As

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[193] Ibid.

[194] Giesen, B. (1998). *Intellectuals and the Nation Collective Identity in a German Axial Age.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. P.27.

[195] Smith, A. D. (1995). *Nations and Nationalism in the Global Era*. Cambridge: Polity Press. P.115.

Robert B. Edgerton hypothesized that there, must be good social or cultural reasons about "why a long established beliefs or practices exists and prevails."[196]

Smith also added that primordial ties revived and appear within the surface when the exact political atmosphere exists.[197] In fact, these empirical evidences also demonstrate that transnational Arabism exists at the grassroots (society) level and reaches to the surface as manifestations of specific concerns. With the words of Jerold Green, "despite the growth over time of individual nationalisms, transnationalism remains an important element in popular political consciousness".[198] Despite the decline of Arab nationalism as a political force, it has continued its existence in different forms. At this specific point, the analysis of David Laitin is worth emphasizing. Laitin argues that:[199]

> (ideological) hegemony does not mean the establishment of a final victory for (an ideology) within set boundaries over a wide range of domains. The battle over the (ideological) definition of a state will never be over…Theories of hegemony or institutionalization must incorporate hypotheses about the seeding and cultivation of contradictory consciousness.

Therefore, as stressed by Green and as examined in the preceding sections, even if the transnational elements did not completely dominate the Arab countries' foreign policy orientations, they idolize the values and ideals that compromise the Arab "identity and responsibilities".[200] Moreover, although it may not be active at all times, the existence of transnational Arab identity is very real and persistent within the Arab world.[201]

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[196] Edgerton, R. (2000). "Traditional Beliefs and Practices: Are Some Better than Others?" In Harrison, L. E., and Huntington, S. P. (eds.) P.129.

[197] Ibid.

[198] Green, J. G. (1997:245).

[199] Ibid.

[200] Ibid, 252.

[201] Ibid, 253.

Stating differently, as an ideology, the trans-national Arab identity has a potential to threat the established status quo if the Arab masses become increasingly cynical about their elites' betrayal of Arabism's collective values, ideals, and qualities. As progressively defined by Green, notwithstanding its passivity, (transnational) Arabism may be "far more politically significant and durable than those activist forms of hegemony which seemed able to accomplish their goals, but only for exceedingly brief periods of time".[202]

To sum up, all these empirical evidences prove that transnational Arabism is not the artificial constriction of a few intellectuals and politicians.[203] As commented by Jawad, it is most likely that pan-Islamism and pan-Arabism, as the main sources of the transnational Arab identity, have had, and will continue to play an important role in the politics of the Middle East.[204] Pan-Arabism can still evoke strong emotions in the Arab world, which means that leaders must take it seriously in conducting their domestic & foreign affairs.

3.7 Conclusion

The Arab regional system has some distinctive features that distinct it apart from the other regional systems. In addition to the geographical propinquity and self-consciousness of members that they constitute a region, and perceptions by other states that this region exists, Arab states have major commonalities in culture and identity. The Arab-Islamic culture has its own distinctive spatial and historical identity in addition to the indigenous cultural patterns.

Additionally, a principal factor that distinguishes the Arab regional system from the other regional systems is the transnational sources of identity that create a system of dual authority between state and nation. Therefore, although the Arab

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[202] Ibid, 254.

[203] Hudson, M. C. (1998:52).

[204] Jawad, H. (1994). *The Middle East in the New World Order*. London: Macmillan. P.157.

regional system is a part of the international system and is influenced by its dynamics, it is evident that since their very admission into the modern international system the Arab states have protected their certain differences, although state-society relations have not always been peaceful.

The nation-state model has been a compulsory model for the Arab countries after their independence, mainly due to the absence of any other respectable model.[205] Nevertheless, the establishment of the state system and sovereignty created serious problems for the newly established Arab states. For instance, the artificial borders caused the legitimacy problem and increased the vulnerability of the Arab states to external support. In this connection, the Arab regimes penetrated, stabilized, destabilized and disorganized their societies. This was due to the fact that the state power has been embedded in an autonomous mechanism that is not necessarily related to the characteristics of the Arab Middle Eastern culture.

The Westphalian state system contributed to this process in the sense that it was not the populations, but the sovereign states that are the members of international society. State system gives limitless control to the central authorities in domestic politics, and internationally legitimizes the tools and practices of the modern state. The Westphalian system and its integral norms and principles constitute the regime's security and survival as the most privileged priority.

In other words, the Arab states (as regional members of the international system) have built their security norms and practices with strict authoritarian measures by taking assistance from the international dynamics that privileged the role of the 'state'. In this connection, the transnational normative and cultural patterns, and possible regional unity against external powers have been sacrificed for the maintenance of allured state control and sovereignty.[206]

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[205] Zubaida, S. (1993:121).

[206] Smith, A. D. (1989). "State-Making and Nation-Building." In Hall, J.A., and Ikenberry, G. J. (eds.) *The State.* Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. P.228.

Nevertheless, the 'success' of sovereignty is achieved at the expense of certain costs. With the consolidation of sovereignty (and its integral norms and principles) the Arab regimes penetrated, stabilized, destabilized and disorganized their societies at the expense of a lack of cohesion between the rulers and societies and regional unity. Even in contemporary era many Arab Middle Eastern regimes are elitist and distant from their people and "unwilling to change and determined to sustain the questionable (and in some cases outright illegitimate) status quo".[207]

As a result of all these processes, the Arab regional system became vulnerable to the political and military penetration of the influential actors of the international system. As defined by Hinnebusch, the Middle East, "once an independent civilization, has been turned into a periphery of the Western-dominated world system".[208] The Arab states emerged as weak and manageable, where the preservation of the *status quo* and the regional balance of power remained an easy task for the extra-regional powers.

It was under these circumstances that Nasser's transnational challenge to the Arab regional system stirred a fear among both the ruling regimes of the conservative regimes and extra regional countries that he might affect and undermine the regional politics.

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[207] Ahrari, M. E. (1996). "Islam as a source of continuity and change in the Middle East". In Ahrari, M. E. (ed.) *Change and Continuity in the Middle East: Conflict Resolution and Prospects for Peace.* P.107.

[208] Hinnebusch, R. (2002:2).

PART TWO: CASE STUDIES

The second part of the thesis is devoted to case studies. Case studies are significant because they illustrate the arguments that put forward in the previous parts, and contribute to the enrichment of the study through more detailed analysis. In other words, the selected case studies are deployed at the end of the research in order to demonstrate and support the validity of the theoretical discussions that have been put forward in the first part of the thesis.

As have mentioned in the introductory chapter, the cases of Gamel Abdel Nasser's Egypt and Saddam Hussein's Iraq represent the most representative samples in what they represent as a category of cases. These two case studies not only stand out as the most likely cases, but also the only cases that fit with the research inquiry. Therefore, Egypt and Iraq stand as unique cases simply due to the nature and character of their leaders and their challenges to the regional system and *status quo*.

One other important implication of selection of these two cases is while Nasser's Egypt represents Cold War subordination; Saddam Hussein's challenge was representing post Cold War containment. Accordingly, this point takes attention to the important theoretical conclusion. Although many scholars have argued that the world had witnessed fundamental systemic change in the post Cold War era, such a change does not made any difference on the historically rooted fundamental discursive understanding of the extra regional great powers; challenger regimes in the Middle East should be contained and subordinated at all costs.

The initial case study elucidates the challenge of Egypt to the regional order under the leadership of Gamal Abdel Nasser. The chapter about Iraq, which is comparatively contemporary challenge, elucidated in Chapter Five.

CHAPTER IV

THE CASE OF EGYPT

4.1 Introduction

The initial case study is Gamal Abdel Nasser's Egypt. Nasser was the first leader in the Arab World that has raised a systematic challenge against the regional order in the post Second World War era.

In order to present this analysis effectively and analytically, the chapter is divided into two main parts. Initially, the origins and impacts of Nasser's challenge are evaluated. In this section, specifically, Nasser's pan-Arabist and positive neutralism ideologies are examined as the prominent dynamic of Nasser's challenge to the regional *status quo* and order.

Needless to say that Nasser's challenge would stay only as rhetoric if his ideology did not find practical implications. Departing from this assumption the next section examines the realization of Nasser's challenge by elucidating his standing against the Baghdad Pact, Soviet arms deal & breaking of Western arm monopoly, Nationalization of the Suez Canal, 'voice of the Arabs' and Iraqi revolution, and finally the establishment of the United Arab Republic (UAR).

Following this line of analysis, the final section focuses on how the international actors and their domestic allies develop and regulate certain political practices in order to contain and subordinate Nasser's challenge. This investigation is carried out through the analysis of the formation of the Baghdad Pact, Suez Canal

War, the Eisenhower Doctrine, the Arab Cold War & Yemen War, and finally 1967 war which was the last nail in the coffin on subordinating Nasser.

4.2 Emerging of Nasser's Challenge

The emergence of Nasser's challenge is evaluated under two categories. The initial part examines the period which paved the way for Nasser's leadership. Here, the factors that enabled him to seize the power and strengths of his domestic rule are evaluated. Following this domestic aspects related analysis, the second part devotes its attention to the regional aspects and strengths of Nasser's challenging ideology, namely pan-Arabism and non-alignment.

4.2.1 Emergence of Authoritarian, Solid, yet Popular Leadership

Gamal Abdel Nasser was born in 1918 in Alexandria. Nasser's strong revolutionary tendencies were evident since his high school years where he was arrested several times for participation in student riots.[1] He participated in many demonstrations which led to violent clashes with Egyptian and British police.[2] Since his teenage years, Nasser had noticed the negative effects of the foreign domination on Egyptians and believed that for the welfare of the Egyptian society, the foreign control should be completely over.

After the high school, he entered into the Egyptian Military Academy and graduated as a second lieutenant in 1938.[3] A few months after graduation, a group of young officers led by Nasser formed a network of cells who called themselves *Al-Dubbat al-Ahrar* (the Free Officers) in 1939.[4]

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[1] Gunther, J. (1959). *Biographical Note: Nasser and Neguib*. Buffalo: Economica Books. P.81.

[2] Dubois, S. G. (1972). *Gamal Abdel Nasser, Son of the Nile*, New York: The Third Press. P.45. Stephens, R. (1971). *Nasser: A Political Biography*. New York: Simons and Schuster. Pp.36-37.

[3] Bill, J. A., & Leiden, C. (1974). *Politics in the Middle East*. Boston: Little & Brown. Pp.216-217.

[4] Wynn, W. (1959). *Nasser of Egypt: The Search for Dignity*. Cambridge: Arlington Books. P.32.

Palestine was an essential element in the political consciousness of the Arab youth and the new generation in the era of decolonization. The establishment of the state of Israel in 1948 and the loss of Palestine provoked a major crisis in the region and heightened concerns about regional weakness and disunity.[5] The crisis led to the widespread belief that the Arab states and elites had failed to defend Palestine mainly because they are too closely identified with the Western powers.

In this connection, the crushing defeat of Egypt along with other Arab countries by Israel in 1948 both discredited and weakened the position of the ruling elites in the Arab world in general. The defeat also demonstrated for many young officers in the Arab world that their regimes were both incompetent and dishonest in their dealings with their people.[6] As a reaction, the most prominent and influential ideologies emerged during this era within the Arab world such as Ba'athist ideology that was formulated by Michel Aflaq. In consequence, governments were overthrown in Syria in 1949, and powerful anti-colonial social forces gain strength in Lebanon, Jordan, and Iraq.

Being similar in the other Arab countries, following the humiliation of Egyptian army in the Palestine War of 1948, Nasser's criticism of the regime had intensified after his return from the War.[7] Nasser's participation to the War greatly influenced his views on Arab nationalism. With the words of Nasser:[8]

> After the siege and battles in Palestine I came home with the whole region in my mind one complete whole...An event may happen in Cairo today; it is repeated in Damascus, Beirut, Amman or any other place tomorrow. This was naturally in conformity with the picture that experience has left within me: One region, the same factors and circumstances, even the same forces opposing them all.

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[5] Sayegh, F. A. (1958). *Arab Unity. Hope and Fulfilment*. New York: The Devin-Adair Company. P.163.

[6] Field, M. (1995). *Inside the Arab World*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. P.3.

[7] Dekmejian, H. R. (1971). *Egypt Under Nasser: A Study in Political Dynamics*. London: University of London Press. P.20.

[8] Nasser, G. A. (1955). *Egypt's Liberation: The Philosophy of the Revolution*. Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press. P.87.

By the end of 1949, the Free Officers association turned into a secret revolutionary organization.[9] Free Officers believed that King Farouk is under influence of the colonial powers. Under this political atmosphere, military officers and intellectuals in Egypt started to search for remedies in order to remove the foreign presence and control from their countries that transformed the political face of the Arab world.[10] In addition to the frustrations of the 1948 War, wide frustration to the corruption and weakness of the Farouk monarchy further guided opposition officers for a revolution.

In October 1951, while still in the faculty of the Army School of Administration, Nasser began distributing a series of newsletters which exposed the names of ministers and officials who had made crucial mistakes on loosing of the Palestinian War especially through buying second hand armaments.[11] These newsletters resulted in an official inquiry into the sale of arms and the dismissal of several ministers.[12]

The Free Officers launched a successful coup on the morning of July 23, 1952 that overthrown the Egyptian monarchy and disposed King Farouk. Within one year, the republic is proclaimed. Gamal Abdel Nasser was a prominent member of the Free Officers that overthrew the Egyptian monarchy.[13] Being relatively unknown to the people, the Free Officers needed a "Front Man" and the highly respected General Mohammed Neguib was declared as the President and Prime Minister. On the other hand, Nasser who was the real powerhouse behind the

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[9] Be'eri, E. (1970). *Army Officers in Arab Politics and Society*. New York: Praeger. Pp.81-82.

[10] Beattie, K. J. (1994). *Egypt During the Nasser Years*. Boulder: Westview Press. P.66.

[11] Be'eri, E. (1970:86). Dubois, S. G. (1972:87).

[12] Ibid.

[13] Dekmejian, H. R. (1971:23-24).

revolution became the chairman of the Revolution Command Committee and the Deputy Prime Minister of Egypt.[14]

In the first two years after the 1952 military coup, Nasser shared the power with an 18 member Revolutionary Command Council (RCC), 12 of whom constituted the executive committee of the Free Officers Organization that initiated the coup. In March 1954, revolutionary wing of the Free Officers under the leadership of Nasser removed the Neguib from the office. Nasser, who emerged as the leader of the group, accumulated the political power to dissolve the RCC.

In January 1956, Nasser announced the formation of a new constitution. In the national plebiscite on June 22, 1956, 99.8% of the 5,508,291 voters accepted the new constitution and 99.9% approved Nasser as Egypt's first elected President.[15] By this way he added more legitimacy to his rule. From that date until his death on September 28, 1970, Nasser remained the undisputed leader of Egypt and the Arab world.

Many scholars argue that the Free Officers do not have any revolutionary political program at the beginning.[16] The main political objectives of the Free Officers seemed to be limited with removal of the British troops from the Egyptian soil and a domestic land reform.

As the realist school progressively puts forward, any regime could not play an important role at the regional and international levels if the domestic politics is fragile. In other words, internally weak regimes could not raise challenge at the systemic level. This rule was also valid in Egypt, as elsewhere. Furthermore, being one of the poorest nations in the world, Egypt had enormous domestic problems. Without oil, having small arable land, and a rapidly growing (600,000 per year) but

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[14] Dubois, S. G. (1972:101), Be'eri, E. (1970:107), Ismael, T. Y. (1977). *The UAR in Africa: Egypt's Policy Under Nasser.* Evanston: Northwestern University Press. P.7., Nutting, A. (1972). *Nasser:* London: E. P. Dutton & Co. P.3.

[15] Hofstadter, D. (ed.) (1973). *Egypt and Nasser.* Volume 1. 1952-1956. New York: Facts of File. P.131.

[16] Beattie, K. J. (1994:66).

mostly illiterate population, Egypt's chance to be regional power was highly limited.[17] Against these two serious bargain, Nasser has to develop effective strategies.[18]

For Nasser, like other Third World countries, Egypt should make a dual revolution. In other words, a revolution is a two-fold process. The first revolution is a political one in terms of fight against the foreign control and occupation on the Egyptian soil (namely British at the beginning). The second revolution is a social one fighting against the oppressing classes and the feudal elements within the society. Nasser believed that Egypt should make both revolutions at the same time.[19]

Therefore, one aim of the Egyptian Revolution was to clean its corrupted past, to end exploitation, and bridge the social classes together.[20] Having political control at the domestic level, Nasser now faced the problem of socio-economic problems. Nasser was well aware that he needs to face with these problems immediately.

This was carried out through social and agrarian reforms. After grabbing the power, Nasser pursued many reforms with the intention of strengthening his domestic rule and legitimacy. As have emphasized above, although some scholars suggest that the Free Officers lack of a clear ideology and a political agenda, accordingly, Nasser had a clear idea of what he wants; destroy the power of monarchy, landlords, foreign influence, and the corruption of political life.[21] In

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[17] Waterbury, J. (1983). *The Egypt of Nasser and Sadat: The Political Economy of Two Regimes.* Princeton: Princeton University Press. P.41.

[18] Binder, L. (1964). *The Ideological Revolution in the Middle Gas*. New York: John Wiley and Sons. Pp.173-174.

[19] Nasser, G. A. (1955:17).

[20] Waterbury, J. (1983:60).

[21] Mansfield, P. (1965). *Nasser's Egypt*. Baltimore: Penguin Books. P.44. Stephens, R. (1971:112).

other words, Nasser had a vision of what kind of society he wishes Egypt to become. The political ideology and social agenda that known as "Nasserism".

For this purpose, domestic control over political life, economy, and the society was necessary in order to change the society in the direction that envisioned by Nasser.

Culturally speaking since Egypt consists of highly homogeneous society (where nearly ninety percent of Egyptians are Sunni Muslims) and the country had no significant sectional, sectarian, racial groups pursuing their own agenda, relatively wealthy landowners were enjoying the opportunities for corruption, privilege, and abuse of power.[22]

According to a British government report of income distribution, before the revolution one percent of the total population earned an income of more than LE 1500, while eighty percent earned less than LE 240.[23] Before the 1952 revolution, the private sector dominated almost every sector of Egypt's economy. The private sector was responsible for 87% of Egypt's economic production and employed 95% of its civil workers.[24]

The main reason of the dominance of the private sector is a small group of people who owned or controlled most of the farmland in Egypt.[25] Stating in numbers, 0.1% of the total number of landowners held nearly 20 percent of the total farmland, and 45 percent of all the cultivated land, while 94 percent held less than

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[22] Mansfield, P. (1980). *The Middle East: A Political and Economic Survey.* Fifth Edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press. P.199. El-Menoufi, K. (1982). "The Orientation of Egyptian Peasants Towards Political Authority Between Continuity and Change." *Middle Eastern Studies* 18 (1). P.84.

[23] Amin, G. A. (1995). *Egypt's Economic Predicament.* London: EJ. Brill. Pp.131-32.

[24] Mohieldin, M. & Nasr, S. (1996). "On Privatization in Egypt: With Reference to the Experience of the Czech Republic and Mexico." In Wadouda, B., & Wahby, A. (eds.) *Privatization in Egypt: the Debate in the People's Assembly.* Cairo: Cairo University Press. Pp.32-33.
Mohieldin and Nasr (1996: 32-33).

[25] Whaba, M. M. (1994). *The Role of the State in the Egyptian Economy: 1945-1981.* Reading: Ithaca Press. P.48.

35 percent.[26] Furthermore, the living conditions of the *fellahin* (Egyptian peasants) were worse off than the peasants of any other country within the Arab world.[27]

Therefore, Egypt before Nasser was suffering from various domestic economic problems. Especially, the income distribution was among the explosive political issues. Between 1945 and 1952, there was a noticeable strike of urban workers and peasants mostly ending in violent confrontations with the police.[28] This situation is well observed by Nasser and he understood that fundamental socio-economic reforms are prerequisite for his political legitimacy.

To epitomize, there was an extreme wealth concentration and inequality in Egypt before 1952 and this monopoly on wealth and power was one of the main causes of the 1952 Coup.[29] In this connection, Nasser's first task was appeared to be breaking the class system on which the society was founded before the revolution, and to induce social mobility to achieve equality in wealth distribution. For this purpose, the reforms initially addressed the most important 'sector' of the Egyptian economy. Land reform was the first act in a radical reshaping of Egypt by Nasser.

Agrarian law reform in September 1952 ordered that no one is permitted to hold more than 200 feddans (one feddan equals 1.037 acres of land) as the limit of land ownership.[30] The excess lands distributed among the poor peasants in plots of 5

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[26] Ibid. El-Menoufi, K. (1982). "The Orientation of Egyptian Peasants Towards Political Authority Between Continuity and Change." *Middle Eastern Studies* 18 (1). P.84.

[27] Wynn, W. (1959:5).

[28] Tignor, R. L. (1984). *State Private Enterprise, and Economic Change in Egypt. 1918-1952.* Princeton: Princeton University Press. P.8.

[29] Vatikiotis, P. J. (1980). *The History of Egypt.* Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press. Pp.390-391.

[30] Hopwood, D. (1982). *Egypt: Politics and Society 1945-1990.* London: Routledge. P.39.

feddan each.[31] The peasants were to pay the price of these lands to the Egyptian treasury over a period of thirty years.[32]

Nasser also nationalized a large number of private enterprises and lands and redistributed them among landless farmers.[33] Furthermore, the exploitation of labour is prohibited.[34] Agricultural ownership was limited by the capacity of the individual to work the land without exploiting the labour of others.[35] By this way, the inequality of land distribution has been terminated and the landed aristocracy was weakened.

The agrarian reform laws of 1952 and 1961 resulted in the complete elimination of the big landowners, and small landholdings increased from 35 percent of the cultivated land in 1952, to 57 percent in 1965.[36] By the end of 1955, the new regime under Nasser was stabilized the Egyptian economy that had initially suffered from the shock of the revolution and it was no longer threatened with collapse.

Nasser was followed economic model of etatism. The word 'etatism' is derived from the French word '*etat*' (state) and refers to the situation in which the state takes an active and permanent role in economic life. Stating alternatively, the state became the major producer and investor. Since 1952, the Egyptian state played a continuous and effective role in both the development process and social welfare programs. In Nasser's etatism state takes an active and permanent part in economic

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[31] Little, T. (1967). *Modern Egypt*. New York: Frederick A. Praeger. P.208.

[32] Ibid.

[33] Ibid.

[34] Wheelock, K. (1960). *Nasser's New Egypt*. New York: Frederick A. Praeger. P.90.

[35] Ibid, 91.

[36] El-Menoufi, K. (1982). "The Orientation of Egyptian Peasants Towards Political Authority Between Continuity and Change." *Middle Eastern Studies* 18 (1). P.84.

affairs and emerged as the major producer and investor. Thus, it dominated all aspects of the economy.[37]

In other words, the state-owned enterprise sector was the central key on achieving the economic development of Nasser's regime.[38] The extensive nationalization allowed the state to dominate the essential economic sectors, including manufacturing, textiles, metals, engineering, external trade, insurance, finance, chemicals and other services.[39] In consequence, the state has been the main actor in Egypt's political and economic development with state-led growth policies.[40]

The large industrial establishments are controlled and managed through three organizations: the Economic Development Organization, the Nasr Organization, and the Misr Organization. After the nationalization of Suez Canal in 1956 (that was followed by the joint British-French-Israeli military attack on Egypt) the properties of all French and British nationals in Egypt were nationalized. In 1957, all foreigners were excluded from the banking & insurance industry and import & export companies.[41]

As a result of these practices, the share of the public sector in gross capital formation increased from 28 percent to 74 percent in the late fifties.[42] In 1960 the Bank Misr Group, which accounted for almost 20 percent of Egyptian industrial output, was taken over by the government.

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[37] Whaba, M. M. (1994:20).

[38] Waterbury, J. (1990). *A Political Economy of the Middle East: State, Class and Economic Development.* Boulder: Westview Press. P.198.

[39] Harik, I. (1997). *Economic Policy Reform in Egypt.* Gainesville: University Press of Florida. P.18. Waterbury, J. (1990:199). Whaba, M. M. (1994:82-83).

[40] Waterbury, J. (1983:134). Harik, I. (1997:1).

[41] Ibid, 328.

[42] Ibid.

With the July 1961 Socialist Laws, the state further assured its dominance over the economy. It nationalized all the banks, all insurance companies, and large industrial, commercial, financial, transport and land reclamation companies in both provinces of the UAR.[43] By 1962, nationalization was extended to cover practically all establishments that employed over ten employees.[44] As a result, in 1965, the public sector had been expanded to its greatest extent where such a growth ratios have never been achieved before.[45]

Nasser mainly tried to serve the interests of the poor and the middle classes as a patron state and established many projects to develop agriculture, industry, health sector and education for this purpose. In this connection, a set of measures introduced that aimed at directly improving the living condition of the majority of the population. These included raising the minimum wage, increasing the rate of investment in agriculture and industry, and reducing the expenses of housing.[46]

Before Nasser, eighty five percent of the Egyptian population was infected with bilharzia, a debilitating disease caused by trematode worms carried by snails in the canals.[47] Two Egyptian children in every four died before reaching the age of five.[48] As a response, Nasser increased the number and quality of hospitals, and provided all the health and social services free for all Egyptian citizens.

Moreover, Nasser expanded the education by making it a social right. Education made available free of charge to everyone including the university

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[43] Baynard, S. (1995). "Arab Republic of Egypt." Pp.303-326. In Long, D. E., & Reich, B. (eds.) *The Government and Politics of the Middle East and North Africa*. Third Edition. Boulder: Westview Press. P.311. *See* also Whaba, M. M. (1994:82-84).

[44] O'Brien, P. (1966). *The Revolution in Egypt's Economic System.* London: Oxford University Press. P.329.

[45] Waterbury, J. (1983:81).

[46] Amin, G. A. (1989). **"**Migration, Inflation and Social Mobility." In Tripp, C., and Owen, R. (eds.) *Egypt under Mubarak.* London: Routledge. Pp.108-109.

[47] Bill, J. A., & Leiden, C. (1974:225).

[48] Dubois, S. G. (1972:49).

education. The educational opportunities also increased with two schools being opened every three days.[49]

To sum up, since the revolution of 1952, Egypt has undergone several radical political and economic transformations where Nasser established a public sector with massive nationalization, and a widespread process of income redistribution accompanied by many social policies.[50] The state allocated funds for the basic needs of its citizens, such as food, housing, transportation, medical care, and education. The social reforms included the free education and health care, building of the schools, clinics, mosques, roads, canal construction or repair, and youth centres subsidies on staple foods, and a guarantee of state jobs for university graduates.[51] Also, as a part of Nasser's policy, Egypt educated thousands of teachers, engineers, doctors, pharmacists, and administrators throughout the 1960s.[52] In short, Nasser provided many social benefits, raised the standard of living and promoted all aspects of people's life.[53]

Following the social and economic revolution, the next move was on industrialization. Nasser always believed in self-sufficient and independent Egypt from both communism and capitalism in economic realms. In this connection, Nasser's primary emphasis focused on industrialization and economic development. This principle was also suitable with Nasser's political standing; creating a strong industry that was mainly dependent on the Egyptian raw materials.

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[49] Mansfield, P. (1976:450).

[50] Oncu, A. Caglar, K., & Ibrahim, S. E. (eds.) (1994). *Developmentalism and Beyond, Society and Politics in Egypt and Turkey.* Cairo: The American University in Cairo Press. Pp.27-29. Mc Dermott, A. (1988). *Egypt from Nasser to Mubarak, a Flawed Revolution.* London: Croom Helm. Pp.78-79. Waterbury, J. (1983:134).

[51] Kerr, M. H., & Yassin, E. S. (eds.) (1982). *Rich and Poor States in the Middle East, Egypt and the New Arab Order.* Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press. P.286.

[52] Mansfield, P. (1976:450). El-Menoufi, K. (1982:89).

[53] Dekmejian, H. R. (1971:125).

By the late 1950s, Nasser's government was in a position to directly or indirectly control almost all the economic activities in the country. State control of the Egyptian economy in this period is closely linked to industrialization. For Nasser, industrialization represented an alternative source of growth at a time when both intensive and extensive expansion of agriculture was becoming very difficult. Moreover, it was an effective way to reduce the economy's vulnerability to the fluctuations of international prices of cotton that was the main source of Egypt's income at that time. In order to stimulate the industry, Nasser took a series of measures. For instance, tariffs on row materials and machinery needed by local manufacturers were lowered while competing imports were subjected to higher tariffs.[54] New firms were also exempted from corporate income taxes for seven years.

The first five year plan (1960 to 1965) witnessed a period of economic stability and the economic apex of the Egyptian economy. Growth rates averaged 7.2%, unemployment was virtually eliminated, and working conditions of the labour class were good. In consequence, the per capita income increased by almost twenty percent.[55]

All these policies initiated the social mobility and started to break down the long prevailing class structure. Per capita increased considerably between 1956 and 1964 as land reform, price and rent controls, food subsidies, and taxation policies improved the overall distribution of wealth. The average Egyptian was healthier and better fed in 1960s than in 1954 and Nasser able to establish a foundation for a modern industrial society.[56]

The last dimension of Nasser's transformation of the Egyptian society was within the political sphere. In fact, through aforementioned socio-economic reforms,

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[54] O' Brien, P. (1966:328).

[55] *See* Whaba, M. M. (1994:85-88).

[56] Mansfield, P. (1976:450).

most political institutions of the pre-1952 era made disfunctional and the new era started. Nasser was well aware that for the complete socio-political change in Egypt, the eradication of the pre-1952 institutions was not enough. Also, there should be new forms of political mobilization and legitimacy.

Political move started with dismantling of the activities of the political parties in order to increase the political durability of political institution as a whole. Indeed, it was the durability of the political institution and sustainable institutionalization that has strengthens Nasser on achieving his goals both internally and externally.

By 1954, all the independent political parties were dissolved. Nasser also restricted the activities of other political organizations, trade unions, and charitable organizations in order to prevent them from evolving as alternative centers of power.[57] Most significantly, Muslim Brotherhood (al- *Ikhwan)* cracked down in 1954 after one of its member attempted to assassinate Nasser. Thousands of Muslim Brotherhood had been arrested and tortured including the Islamist philosopher Sayyid Qutb.[58]

Therefore, the Liberation Rally remained as the only political establishment where only government pre-approved parties and candidates allowed to parliamentary elections.[59] Between 1954 and 1970, Nasser formed three successive political parties in order to build a nationwide institution for prompting popular demands for participation and mobilizing the masses behind the regime: The Liberation Rally, the National Union, and the Arab Socialist Union.

The Liberation Rally was founded in 1954 to fill the political vacuum created with the abolition of all independent political parties. The National Union was formed in 1956 in the aftermath of the Suez War and nationalization of the

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[57] Little, T. (1967:178).

[58] Waterbury, J. (1983:340-341).

[59] Hopwood, D. (1982:39).

economy. The Arab Socialist Union was established in 1961 to mobilize popular support for the regime's takeover of private enterprises. Membership in the Liberation Rally and the National Union was open to all citizens except for those who played major political roles in the pre-1952 regime. In the Arab Socialist Union (ASU), the owners of the nationalized property are also excluded from the membership.

Comparatively speaking, the ASU was the most successful organization on reaching its objectives. Being different from its predecessor parties, the ASU was organized in strict corporatist structure through Nasser's rhetoric of a national alliance of working forces.[60] This alliance included workers, peasants, intellectuals, and the bourgeoisie. In other words, the ASU encompassed the entire society.

The only sector that remained outside the ASU domain was the military. The problem of dealing with the military was among the top domestic priorities of Nasser. Although Nasser had a military background and well aware that the ultimate power center in Egyptian politics is military, he try to rule the country as civilian. After the 1952 military coup, Nasser immediately curbed any future threats from the army. He forced retirements of suspect officers and appointed his trusted fellows.[61] Nevertheless, instead of diminishing the power of the army, he has strengthened the ASU as a "civilian counter to the military."[62]

In consequence, the ASU became not only balance of power against the military, but also a center of power in its own right. It would not be wrong to argue that a more pluralist system might have prevented such a success and preponderance of power. Therefore, in Nasser's Egypt, state power was concentrated in the Presidency, the ASU, and the military rather than concentrating on one main source of power. By this way, the essentially corporatist structure of the ASU not only

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[60] Waterbury, J. (1983:306).

[61] Ibid, 315.

[62] Ibid, 316.

terminated the class conflict but also counterweight the role of the military and mobilized the previously disenfranchised elements of society.[63]

To epitomize, Nasser initially addressed to the basic needs of the population which he defined as 'obligation' to his people. For this purpose, the living standards of the fellaheen has been profoundly changed and Nasser pursued welfare policies aimed at subsidizing the essential needs of the majority of his people including subsidized food, health care, and housing, offered free education up to the university level, and guaranteed employment.[64] These policies not only increased the economic and political opportunities for the lower classes, but also enhance their participation both to the economic and political life of the country.[65]

Stating in different words, Nasser gave dignity and national pride to Egyptians who were under the colonial rule for a long time. He planted the seeds for a modern & industrial society, and transformed people into independent citizens. As a result of all these reforms and policies, Nasser became quite popular among its people.

Naturally, not everyone was supporting Nasser. He was opposed by big landowners, ex bureaucrats, and rural religious functionaries that were benefitting from the previous *status quo*. Especially the ex powerful wealthy landlords were not pleased with land reforms and re-distribution program where they lost a significant portion of their capital and yearly income.

Against this domestic challenge, Nasser tried to form a broad coalition of farmers, workers, and segments of the middle class, including students, intellectuals, and military officials. In particular, Nasser took a support of coalition from three

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[63] Waterbury, J. (1983:311-315).

[64] Ali, A. M. S. (1994). "The International System and State Policies: The case of Egypt" In Oncu, A. Caglar, K., & Ibrahim, S. E. (eds.) *Developmentalism and Beyond, Society and Politics in Egypt and Turkey.* Cairo: The American University in Cairo Press. P.185. Mc Dermott, A. (1988:80-81).

[65] Binder, L. (1978). *In a Moment of Enthusiasm: Political Power and the Second Stratum in Egypt.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press. P.214.

classes; middle class, the urban working class, and the rural poor.[66] Stating alternatively, Nasser had populist political coalition, based on the working and the middle classes. This wide-ranging coalition was the vital mechanism for supporting and legitimating the new regime against old powerful classes such as landlords and upper-class landed bourgeoisie.

To sum up, Nasser has good relationship and communication with the majority of his people. Through the radio and long live speeches, he was constantly explaining governmental affairs in simple and understandable language with humour. At this point it should be emphasized that Nasser refused every popular demand to be President for life, and insisted on a term of no more than six years at a time.[67]

4.2.2 Pan-Arabism & Positive Neutralism as Nasser's Challenging Ideology

In order to be a challenging power at the regional level, initially there should be an independent economy and popular support at home for the domestic legitimacy. Then, an effective transnational ideology and a strong army is required. After elucidating Nasser's successes on the first criteria, this section is focuses on the latter.

President Nasser is generally regarded as the symbol of Arab revolution.[68] There is no doubt that the main strength of Nasser's challenge to the regional system was deriving from his ideology that is Arab nationalism (pan-Arabism)[69] and its dialect.

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[66] Ibid. *See* also Ibrahim, S. E. (1994). "Egypt's Landed Bourgeoisie". Pp.19-43. In Oncu, A. Caglar, K., & Ibrahim, S. E. (eds.) *Developmentalism and Beyond, Society and Politics in Egypt and Turkey.* Cairo: The American University in Cairo Press. P.27.

[67] Nutting, A. (1972:478-479).

[68] James, L. M. (2006). *Nasser at War: Arab Images of the Enemy.* New York: Palgrave. P.ix.

[69] In this study the term of 'Arab nationalism' is used interchangeably with 'pan-Arabism'.

Pan-Arabism (*al-wahda al-arabiya*) basically assumes that Arab peoples are linked by certain linguistic, cultural, historical, and geographical bonds "stretching from the Atlantic shores of Morocco in North Africa to the Persian Gulf shores of the Arabian Peninsula".[70] As an ideology, Arab nationalism has intrinsic strength and appeal on unifying the artificially divided Arab nation by promoting the common ethnic, cultural, national, and linguistic identity of Arabs. As Hinnebusch progressively defined, Arab nationalist believed that "Arabs are people linked by special bonds of language, history and religion, and their political organization should in some way reflect this reality."[71] Thus, Arab-nationalist see Arab unity as an ideal and normal situation considering the cultural and historical grounds. It is assumed that since the seventh century, a common history and a common culture developed among Arabic speaking people.

Therefore, pan Arabism as an ideology rejected the state borderlines and sought the 'nation' as a cultural community. Since the Arab countries are separated by artificial and colonial 'undesirable' boundaries, the primary objective of pan-Arabism emerged to bring the Arab nation to its "natural condition under unitary governance".[72]

Stating alternatively, pan-Arabism envisions a single state for all Arab people (*Qawmiyya)* where the ultimate goal of Arab nationalism could be technically expressed in the forms of to establish a single politically and economically integrated Arab state.

Although Arab nationalism initially emerged as an opposition against the Ottoman Empire for cultural and political autonomy, it turns out to be an anti-European, anti-colonial ideology with the European power's partition and political

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[70] Farah, C. A. (1963). "The Dilemma of Arab Nationalism". *Die Welt des Islam*. P.155.

[71] Hinnebusch, R. (2002). "The Middle East Regional System". In Hinnebusch, R., & Ehteshami, A. (eds.) *The foreign policies of Middle East States.* London: Lynne Rienner Publishers. P.28.

[72] Faksh, M. A. (1993). "Withered Arab Nationalism". *Orbis.* 37 (3). P.426.

hegemony in the Middle East.[73] Especially, the betrayal of the Western powers against the Arabs in the post First World War era, and in 1948 Palestinian War further transformed Arab nationalism against European colonialism and imperialism.[74]

Additionally, as also emphasized by Owen and Freeman, Arab nationalism arose as a result of the desire to throw off imperial control.[75] The Arab nationalism was against the European and the American domination in the region that makes it an anti-colonialist ideology. The U.S.'s strategic alliance and continuous support to Israel also contributed to the strength of Arab nationalism as anti-colonialist ideology. Israel has been perceived as the extension of the American hegemony in the region since its independence.[76] Similarly, the Arab-Israeli conflict and foreign control of Arab resources seemed as the symbols of the injustices that suffered the Arab nation. Thus, the strength of Arab nationalism derives from its anti-imperialist, anti-Zionist and anti-hegemonic motives.

In addition to these factors, three interrelated processes have also contributed to the idea of pan-Arabism and Arab integration. The first process was promoted by the influential writings of Sati' al-Husri and Michel Aflaq asserting that newly independent Arab states have many things in common for their unity. Al Husri and Aflaq named these 'commonalities' as common historical experiences, shared culture, and shared interests.[77] They suggest that if Arab Middle Eastern states unite, they would have a greater collective power in both political and moral

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[73] Ibid, 427.

[74] Kramer, M. (1993). "Arab Nationalism: Mistaken Identity". *Daedalus.* Summer. P.179.

[75] Owen, R. (1992). *State, Power, and Politics in the Making of the Modern Middle East.* New York: Routledge. P.84. Also mentioned in Freeman, M. (1994). "Nationalism". In Foley, M. (ed.) *Ideas that Shape Politics.* Manchester: Manchester University Press. Pp.56-57.

[76] Hudson, M. C. (1996). "To play the hegemon: Fifty years of US policy toward the Middle East". *Middle East Journal.* 50 (3). P.329.

[77] Tibi, B. (1997). *Arab Nationalism: Between Islam and the Nation-State.* Third Edition. New York: St. Martin's Press. P.118.

terms. As a result, moral unity between people and their rulers would make government more legitimate and stable.[78]

The second idea promoted that the Arab unity was the idea of belonging to the "Third World". According to Hourani, the Arab Middle Eastern countries that were colonialized by the Western colonial powers united with the idea of acting together against both the "West" and the "East".[79] The idea that unites the Arab states in the post Second World War era was the belief that for the autonomy of the Arab regional states they have to be uncommitted to either of the two blocs of the international system. It is due to this reason for instance, Iraqis co-operation with the United Kingdom "rendered Iraq vulnerable to Arab nationalists both from the Arab world and Iraq".[80]

The final process that advances pan-Arabism was the idea of Arab socialism. Arab socialism was promoting the common values for the newly independent Arab states. These common values find clear expression in Hourani's definition of "state-ownership and direction of production, equitable distribution of income through taxation and the provision of social services".[81] In this sense, the revolutionary essence of Arab nationalism also forms a challenge to the pro-Western authoritarian regimes and dynastic rules in the Gulf.

Therefore, pan-Arabism is fundamentally challenging to the Westphalian sovereignty and its principles along with the regional order. The call for Arab unity became the political project of uniting the Arab people against Western imperialism and state based conservative regimes.

Pan Arabism political influence peaked and found practical manifestations in the 1950s and 1960s with Nasserism in Egypt and Ba'thism (under the inspiration

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[78] Hourani, A. (1991). *A History of the Arab People.* Cambridge: Harvard/Belknap. P.401.

[79] Ibid.

[80] Ibid.

[81] Ibid.

of Michel Aflaq) in Syria and Iraq, where both movements were appealing to broad masses with their commitment to the idea of establishing a single Arab state.

Nevertheless, Nasser mostly accepted as the most influential Arab leader and the most powerful symbol of pan-Arab nationalism with his aspirations for Arab unity, independence from foreign powers, and greater social justice.[82]

Nasser exposed his ideas and originated his revolutionary ideology in a pamphlet entitled '*The Philosophy of the Revolution*' that published in April 1954. In that pamphlet he outlined the roots of his revolutionary thinking and his vision of Egypt's domestic and foreign policy. The book is significant in terms of serving as a general blueprint for his political goals and ambitions.

The first part of the book describes his search for the roots of the revolution, and in the second part he lists the various courses of action. Nasser put forwards that the goals of Arabism could be achieved only through revolution and struggle.[83] As a member of the new generation of decolonization, the liberation from the West was the central component of the Arab national struggle for him. Nasser believed that for the real and completely independent sovereignty, all the foreign military bases should be eliminated on Arab territory, important industries should be nationalized, and a nonaligned foreign policy shall pursued.

By this way Nasser tried to gradually achieve initially economic growth, social justice, and then Arab unity, liberate Palestine and maintain socio-economic and cultural authenticity and autonomy of the Arab nation. Eventually, Nasser envisioned the disintegration of the artificial borders imposed by the colonial powers and the creation of a single unified Arab state that includes Palestine.

Therefore, especially through emphasis on Arab nationalism, he elevated Egypt to play dominant role within the Arab regional system. In other words, for

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[82] Stephens, R. (1971:567-568).

[83] Farah, C. A. (1963:151).

Nasser, Arab nationalism is the means for Egypt to attain the country's rightful place in the world.[84]

Nasser argues that geographically speaking Egypt occupies a unique position in the Arab world as it constitutes the north-eastern part of Africa and is linked to Asia by the Sinai Peninsula. Egypt forms a natural bridge between the western and eastern sectors of the Arab world. However, being an ancient civilization with historical records dating back to at least five millennia, Egypt was lacking the leadership potential within the Arab world mainly due to British influence. Nevertheless, Egypt should be the defender of the Arab nation because the future of Egypt is linked with the future of the Arab world.[85]

For this purpose, in early 1956, Egypt had adopted a new constitution that emphasized the place of Egypt as part of "a greater Arab nation".[86] By this way, Nasser gave the hints that Egypt has a responsibility to the whole Arab nation on its struggle against imperialists.

The main thrust of Nasser's Arab nationalism stressed the unity of the Arab nation, and the need for solidarity in confronting the problems of the Arab world. For Nasser, the Arab world was not simply consisting of a geographic area as the external powers viewed it. The Arab nation has common interests and security priorities, and the Arabs must be one nation working for its common interests. Nasser defined this with the words of:[87]

> Ages of suffering and hope have finally produced clear objectives for the Arab struggle. These objectives, which are the true expression of Arab consciousness, are freedom, socialism and unity...Freedom today means that of the country and of the citizen. Socialism has become both a means and an end: sufficiency and justice. The road to unity is the popular call for the restoration of the natural order of a single nation.

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[84] Dekmejian, H. R. (1971:50-51).

[85] Nasser, G. A. (1955:15).

[86] Beattie, K. J. (1994:116).

[87] Hourani, A. (1991:409).

Nasser defined Egypt at the centre of three circles; Arab, Africa, and Islam.[88] According to Nasser, Egypt belongs and could play leading role in all these three spheres:[89] Nasser defined these circles as "realities" with deep roots in Egyptians where they cannot either forget or escape.[90]

It would not wrong to suggest that Nasser gave importance to these three circles with this order. Arab circle has the primary importance. Egypt is part of the Arab world with its common culture, history, and experience. Nasser argued that Arab world is searching for a 'hero' and waiting for Egypt to complete this role and lead the Arab world. Stating alternatively, for Nasser, it is Egypt's 'responsibility' to lead the Arab world on breaking the path to freedom through revolution.

African circle comes next. Egypt is part of the destiny of Africa in terms of its struggle with the colonialist powers. Especially after the Bandung Conference, Egypt formulated an effective African policy in connection with the struggle against domination of imperialism.[91] The commitment to Africa was also related with Nasser's ambition for leadership in the Third World.

Finally, Egypt is also of the world of Islam, sharing its history and future. Although Egypt never proclaimed itself an Islamic state and followed a secular path, Nasser respected Islam to support his foreign and domestic policies. In other words, Nasser's emphasis on Islam seems to be foreign policy tool rather than of an ideology. Nasser put Arab nationalism above Islam and thought Islam as to serve Arab nationalism. Nasser did this by reconciling Arab nationalism to "historical" Islam rather than to Islam as revealed in religion.[92]

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[88] Nasser, G. A. (1955:81).

[89] Ibid, 88.

[90] Ibid, 90.

[91] Ismael, T. Y. (1977:34).

[92] Binder, L. (1964). *The Ideological Revolution in the Middle Gas*. New York: John Wiley and Sons. Pp.128-133.

This is to suggest that Nasser has an ideology since the beginning of the Egyptian revolution. Nasser's ideology of Arab Nationalism emerged as a reaction to neo-colonialism & colonial powers, and against religious conservative regimes that Nasser accused to be lackeys of colonialist Westernized elite. For Nasser, as a replacement of imperialism, "neo-colonialism" emerged as a new device and technique by which the West is seeking to continue its hegemony in the region through military bases, alliances, and economic development programs. Nasser demonstrated British occupation of the Suez Canal and French occupation of Algeria as new neo-colonialist practices.

In this connection, Nasser's pan-Arabist ideology was primarily concerned with the political and economic privileges of the former colonial powers in the region and aiming to challenge these systemic inequalities. Nasser claimed that equality is a precondition for development of Arab national identity and unity. For this purpose, Pan-Arabist ideology also contested with the regimes that had political, military, or economic ties to the West.

Nasser argued that formal independence from the colonial rule did not guarantee the full sovereignty of Arab states because the social practices and relations associated with colonialism such as domination, intervention in internal affairs, economic exploitation, racial discrimination etc remained in the international system.[93]

In his speeches and international activities, Nasser demonstrated his understanding of Arab feelings at the time: to be treated as equals, and able to control their own destiny.[94] Nasser declared that the Arabs needed to form a

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[93] Meyer, G. E. (1980). Egypt and the United States: The Normative Years. London: Associated University Press. P.139.

[94] Wynn, W. (1959:205-206).

common front in order to escape from great power domination. With the words of Nasser:[95]

> The people of the area could not defend themselves and their interests against the great powers unless their struggle was unified. The lesson was clear before our eyes. When the Arab countries united, they were always able to face and stop aggression.

Therefore, Nasser believed that for true decolonization and sovereign self-determination, there should be Arab unity in foreign policy. In other words, 'true' sovereignty could not be achieved solely by individual Arab states due to their relative weakness in international politics. Nasser expressed this as:[96]

> One of the fundamental aims of Arab nationalism is independence...freedom to make our own decisions, freedom to keep outside anybody's sphere of influence...I am against the alignment of Arab countries with any big powers. Such an alignment could open the door for the big power to become dominant and to bring back imperialism and colonialism to the Arab lands.

Thus, in order to cope with outside influences in accordance with the interests of Arab nation, there is the necessity of Arab unity to struggle against external powers and destroy the foundations of colonialism.

At this instance, Nasser underlined the role of Israel. For Nasser, Israel is the last bastion of the colonial powers in the region. Nasser believed that main support for Zionism was coming from the British imperialism, and Zionism is dangerous as imperialism. In addition to its expansionist goals, Israel is an imperialist agent and tension creator in the Middle East. In other words, Israel was deliberately created by imperialism to achieve certain goals for imperialism. Nasser argued that Israel was created by the external powers in order to occupy the Arab lands and 1948 victory of Israel would not be possible without the help of the

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[95] Gerges, F. A. (1994). The Superpowers and the Middle East: Regional and International Politics, 1955-1967. Oxford: Westview Press. P.26.

[96] Meyer, G. E. (1980:111).

Western powers.[97] Therefore, Israel played two interrelated goals: an imperialist agent and a regional de-stabilizer.

Nasser also believed that in order to effectively encounter foreigners and Israel in the area, there is a requirement of struggle against the Arab leaders who supported the foreign powers in order to maintain their own power.[98] In other words, Nasser believed that Arab liberation is a part of global anti-imperialist and anti-colonialist struggle. In this structure, the traditional kings were only reinforcing the imperialists' power and therefore they need to be changed.[99] Nasser explained this as:[100]

> (Our) enemies are represented by imperialism, by its lackeys and agents; those who want to subjugate us to the foreigner; traitorous people from among our citizens who work for the foreigner in order to subjugate our country at a cheap price, for purely personal reasons.

To sum up, by combining Egypt's size and strategic importance with his personal charisma, Nasser popularized Arab nationalism by reaching all classes in society. He successfully and effectively articulated the unique relationship between Palestine, imperialism, and Arab unity to the Arab masses and manifested it as the resistance of the Arab people against external interference.

In accordance with his view of international system and pan-Arabism, Nasser's international policy could be labelled as "positive neutralism". From 1954 on, Nasser had established a policy of international neutrality.[101] The underlying idea of positive neutralism is independence from both the East and the West. Thus,

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[97] Little, T. (1967:178).

[98] Ibid.

[99] Stephens, R. (1971:423).

[100] Sharabi, H. (1988). *The Next Arab Decade: Alternative Futures.* Boulder, Co: Westview Press. P.99.

[101] Vatikiotis, P.J. (1978). *Nasser and His Generation*. New York: St. Martin's Press. P.230.

Egypt and Arab countries should not belong to any defence pact, hosted no foreign bases, and linked to neither capitalism nor communism in domestic policy.

Nasser initially followed a path that is independent from the wishes of the Soviet government. In fact, when Nasser holds the power, he hit the communists first. He accused the communists of trying to drive the country in chaos, having support from the Zionists, and being agents of the foreign power that seeking to control Egypt. On May 31, 1954 he had arrested and jailed about 252 members of the Communist Party.[102] After the elimination of the Soviet threat, Nasser addressed his struggle against the Western colonialism.

Nasser's five objectives of the 'positive neutralism' foreign policy could be summarized as.[103]

1. Complete independence and security from foreign powers for the whole Arab region.

2. To end colonialism in the region.

3. To have military power and arms in order to strength Egypt.

4. To provide economic development.

5. Political and economic unity within the Arab world.

Nasser believed that with positive neutralism, Arab countries could complete their revolution without being dependent to capitalist and communist powers. By this way, the realization of the Arab unity could be easier. In other words, once the Arab unity has been achieved, the Arab world would no longer be the playground of the two blocs.[104] Therefore, positive neutralism aimed to pursue independent policy in accordance with the Arab national interest and make pan-Arab aspirations and unity possible. Nasser's idea of positive neutralism movement also included broader national liberation front in Africa and the Third World.

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[102] Little, T. (1967:149).

[103] Binder, L. (1964:242).

[104] Ibid.

Nasser's policies of pan-Arabism and positive neutralism also credited him remarkable domestic popular support. His emergence as a leader of the non-aligned movement after the 1955 Bandung Conference, his refusal to join the Western-oriented Baghdad Pact, and nationalization of the Suez Canal in 1956 repudiated him a distinctive and prestigious image. Needless to say that all these successsses were hints of Nasser's challenge to the regional system and *status quo*.

4.3 Activization & Triumphs of Nasser's Challenge

One of the most complicated debates in international relations is the connection between ideology and foreign policy practices. As such, many regimes contradict with their ideology in terms of practice, some governments' political rhetoric and practice is conflicting, while some regimes rhetoric never comes out as a practice.

In this sense, Nasser's pan-Arabist and positive neutralist ideologies could not be challenging ideologies if Nasser did *not* used them as a political practice and weapon against European domination and challenging against regional *status quo*.

Basically speaking Nasser has two choices. Either to work in accordance with the international order and its powers in a positive (co-operative) way, and remain marginalized at the mercy of the international powers. Or, pursues his revolutionary ideology and challenge against the *status quo*. Nasser opted for the latter one. Nasser's challenge became most visible on; his standing against the Baghdad Pact, breaking of Western arm monopoly, nationalization of the Suez Canal, Iraqi revolution, establishment of the United Arab Republic (UAR), and on Libyan revolution.

4.3.1 Standing against the Baghdad Pact

In May 1953, John Foster Dulles appointed as the Secretary of State in the Eisenhower administration which initiated the new era in the U.S.-Middle East relations. Dulles viewed the world as divided between the East and the West, and

the concept of neutralism was 'immoral' for him.[105] Dulles visioned the Soviet communism as the major security threat in the region. In this respect, he wanted Nasser to follow the U.S. policies, instead of being neutral and independent. Since the main form Western domination in the region was in the shape of defence and alliance pacts, the U.S. administration was hoping that Egypt would be part of it.

For this purpose, Dulles visited Cairo in April 1954 in order to offer Egypt to be part of the Baghdad Pact. During this visit, Nasser resisted the argument put forward by Secretary Dulles that the biggest threat in the Middle East is Communism. Nasser told Dulles that the biggest threat to the region did *not* come from the Soviets. In contrast, Nasser claimed that the major security threat to the Arab countries would come from Israel and Arabs did not need a regional defence arrangement linked to the West.

Stating in other words, Nasser was not worried about the ideological and strategic East-West conflict. His main concern was the legacy of British imperialism, neo-colonialism, American support for Israel, and CIA operations in the Middle East that directly interfered with the domestic affairs of the Arab states. In this condition, struggle against the Soviet Union and ignoring neo-colonialism would mean ignoring the interests of the Arab people. Western priorities over their economic concerns, containment of Soviet communism, and protection of Israel were definitely not among the priorities of Nasser.

Furthermore, Nasser reacted to the formation of the Baghdad Pact by defining it as a Western imperialist plot that undermined Arab nationalism. In other words, Nasser rejected this proposal by declaring that it is incompatible with the principle of sovereignty and self-determination.[106]

In consequence, Nasser led the Arab opposition to the Baghdad Pact by claiming that it not only breaks the Arab League collective defence arrangements,

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[105] Hopwood, D. (1982:339).

[106] Podeh, E. (1993). "The Struggle over Arab Hegemony after the Suez Crisis". *Middle Eastern Studies*. 29 (1). P.125.

but also became the tool of Anglo-American imperialism and aimed to destroy Arab's hopes of unity, integrity and glory.[107] Simply stating, Nasser viewed Baghdad Pact as the vehicle of the Western powers to introduce new forms of imperialism. Nasser opposition to the Pact was also supported by the governments of Syria and Saudi Arabia.

As a result, Nasser rejected the Anglo-American plan of the Middle East defence system. Instead he advocated the creation of strong and independent Arab political entity that could fully control its foreign and domestic policies where Egypt could play a leading role on integrating the Arab nation.

To sum up, Nasser had perceived such alliances as renewed manifestations of the imperialist forces in the region. Therefore, it was not coincidence that Nasser highlightened the importance of the Arab unity and played more active foreign policy towards the Arab world following the Dulles visit to Egypt.

In this connection, Nasser not only reacted against the Baghdad Pact but also challenged it and put his efforts for its collapse. For this purpose, he initially signed the military cooperation and alliance agreement with Syria and Saudi Arabia on March 6, 1955 to form armed forces under a joint command headed by an Egyptian general. This is followed by Egyptian-Syrian Mutual Defence Pact at the same year in October that ordered a unified Egyptian-Syrian command. Although the Egyptian-Syrian-Saudi alliance was not successful on bringing these countries together in military fields, it reached to its main objective that is to prevent Syria from acceding to the Baghdad Pact.

Furthermore, through the radio of 'voice of Arabs' Nasser able to change the political attitudes and choices of the regional Arab countries. For instance, although Jordan intended to join the Pact that could be a catalyst for Lebanese inclusion, Nasser's radio propaganda against Britain and the Baghdad Pact had cancelled this decision.[108] Furthermore, Nasser also able to catalyze the masses for

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[107] Meyer, G. E. (1980:91). Podeh, E. (1993:126).

[108] Love, K. (1969:). *Suez: The Twice Fought War.* New York: McGraw-Hill Company. P.207.

demonstrations in Jordan not only against the Baghdad Pact, but also against King Hussein. As a result, in June 1956, King Hussein dissolved the parliament and in elections that held in October resulted with great victory for pro-Nasser candidates.[109] In consequence, pro-Western regimes of Jordan and Lebanon had refused to join the Baghdad Pact, and Iraq was successfully isolated from the core of the Arab politics.[110]

With all these successful policies, Nasser well responded to Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri's proclamation that the Arab countries had no other alternative but to depend on the West for their security.[111] In fact, apart from Iraq, Nuri and the Western states failed to persuade any other Arab state to accede to the Baghdad Pact and Nasser successfully continued to defy American interference in the region.

4.3.2 Soviet Arms Deal & Breaking of Western Arm Monopoly

A significant consequence of the formation of the Baghdad Pact was the Czech arms deal. As have mentioned above, the modernization of the army was one of the main goals of the Egyptian revolution and among the top priorities of Nasser on reaching his political objectives. It was also essential for a successfull challenge against the Western *subordination*. In other words, army was the key instrument of the Nasser's revolution. He envisions the role for the army as the liberator of Egypt from the imperialist powers and as a catalyser of the pan-Arab revolution under Egyptian leadership.[112] Nasser was well aware that in order to continue his independent standing at the international sphere, and for deterrence against Israel, he also needs to strength his military back-up.

This objective became a necessity following the Israeli attacks against Egypt. Since 1954, Israel was pursing military aggression against Egypt.

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[109] Dawisha, A. (1976). *Egypt in the Arab World*. London: Macmillan. P.14.

[110] Ibid, 14.

[111] Ibid, 12.

[112] Nasser, G. A. (1955:56).

Nevertheless, on February 28, 1955 Israel launched a major aggressive raid on the Egyptian controlled Gaza Strip. The Gaza raid was the first major clash between Egypt and Israel since 1948.

The Gaza raid further deteriorated Egyptian-American relations and increase mistrust of Nasser to the U.S.. After this event it became evident that Nasser required making his army stronger. However, the U.S. sale of arms was conditional to security agreement or joining to the Baghdad Pact that would hinder Egypt's independence. By this way Western states and especially the U.S. continued to frustrate Nasser when they refused to sell the arms that Nasser needed to confront the Israeli threat.

Therefore, it is worth to underline that Nasser contacted to Soviet Bloc only after unsuccessful attempts to purchase arms from the West.[113] At the Cairo meeting it became clear that the West would not supply the weapons that Nasser needed to defend Egypt and the Arab world against Israeli attacks. In other words, Nasser's search for arms deal with the Soviets came right after Israeli attacks in Gaza in February 1955 and Western reluctance to provide modern arms.[114]

The first Asian-African non-aligned movement's summit meeting conference held in Bandung, Indonesia in April 1955, where twenty eight newly independent nations brought together from the two continents.[115] Nasser emerged as the foremost leader of the Arab world and among the three central figures of the conference along with Chou En-Lai of China and Nehru of India.[116] Nasser's brief

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[113] Gerges, F. A. (1994:29). Ashton, N. J. (1996). *Eisenhower, Macmillan and the Problem of Nasser: Anglo-American Relations and Arab Nationalism, 1955-59*. London: Macmillan. P.53.

[114] Dekmejian, H. R. (1971:44). Vatikiotis, P. J. (1984:388).

[115] Hofstadter, D. (ed.) (1973:81).

[116] Vatikiotis, P.J. (1961). *The Egyptian Army in Politics: Pattern for New Nations*. Bloommgton: Indiana University Press. P.384. Dubois, S. G. (1972:152).

stay in Bandung had symbolized emancipation and dignity, and won him popular acclaim as the leader of the Arabs.[117]

During the Bandung conference Nasser approached to the Eastern Bloc through China. At his meeting with the Chinese Premier Chou En-Lai on April 15th, Nasser asked Chou about a possible supply of Chinese arms for Egypt. Chou conveyed Nasser's inquiry to Moscow and on May 19, the Soviet Ambassador to Egypt Daniel Solod told Nasser that the Soviet Union would supply Egypt with arms in exchange for later payment in cotton and rice.[118]

Nasser returned from Bandung Conference as a hero and Egyptians saw him as "Champion of Africa and Asia".[119] On September 27, 1955 Nasser announced that an arms deal with Czechoslovakia had been concluded and the Soviet Union agreed to sell Egypt $250 million worth of modern weaponry to exchange Egyptian cotton and rice:[120]

> We refused to sign any mutual security pact so...we were unable to obtain arms from America...Last week, Egypt signed a commercial agreement with Czechoslovakia for a supply of weapons to her. This agreement stipulates that Egypt shall pay for these weapons with products such as cotton and rice.

With the arms deal Nasser was planning to kill two birds with one stone. First of all, he was determined to obtain Soviet arms that will enable him to face the growing Israeli military threat. Secondly, in cooperating with the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia, Nasser found new and good markets for Egyptian cotton and rice that would help him to carry out his economic plans.

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[117] Lacouture, J. (1970). *The Demigods: Charismatic Leadership in the Third World*. New York: Knopf. P.108.

[118] Scott, L. (1991). *Divided We Stand: Britain, the US and the Suez Crisis*. London: Hodder & Stoughton. Pp.57-58.

[119] Dubois, S. G. (1972). *Gamal Abdel Nasser, Son of the Nile*, New York: The Third Press. P.152.

[120] Finer, H. (1964). *Dulles Over Suez: The Theory and Practice of his Diplomacy.* Chicago: Quadrangle. Goldschmidt Jr., A. (1988). *Modern Egypt*. Boulder: Westview Press. P.28. Goldschmidt Jr., A. (1988). *Modern Egypt*. Boulder: Westview Press. P.103.

To sum up, it was evident that Egypt was militarily inferior to Israel and needs to be better equipped. With the Soviet arms deal, Nasser tried to solve this problem and contribute to the solution of the Palestinian problem in the long run. Stating in different words, Nasser believed that once equipped with modern Soviet arms, the Egyptian armed forces could face Israeli army and force them to consider the Arab demands in Palestine more seriously.

The significance of the Egyptian arms deal was that it broke and puts an end the Western monopoly on arms supply and transfer in the region. Furthermore, it affirmed the sovereign right of regional states to determine the provision of their own security. By this way, for the first time in Arab history an Arab state able to follow an independent Arab policy without pursing the interests of the Western powers. With the words of Dawisha:[121]

> Nasser was portrayed in the region, not only as an Egyptian but also and mainly as an Arab Leader who was struggling to achieve independence for the entire region. The Bandung Conference and the arms deal with Czechoslovakia drove home this image of Nasser in the minds of the peoples of the area.

4.3.3 Nationalization of the Suez Canal

For the economic independence of Egypt, Nasser gave the utmost importance for the construction of the Nile High Dam at Aswan. In other words, the Aswan High Dam was Nasser's main hope for stimulating economic prosperity. As such, he called it "our new pyramid".[122]

The 250 foot high, three mile wide dam was expected to provide ten million kilowatts of electricity which is essential for Egypt's industrialization.[123] It would also increase the cultivable area of Egypt by some two million acres, which refers to thirty percent of the existing cultivated area, and expand Egypt's arable

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[121] Dawisha, A. (1976:12).

[122] Nutting, A. (1972:129).

[123] El-Sabban, G. (1955). "The Aswan High Dam." *Middle Eastern Affairs.* 6. P.387.

land to nine million acres.[124] The dam would also increase the ability that serve to control disastrous water floods.[125]

Therefore, with new arable lands and hydroelectric power, Nasser aiming to expand the agricultural & industrial sectors, and to develop Egypt's economy against dramatically growing population. In October 1954, the Egyptian authorities completed the design of the dam and estimated that the cost would be around one billion U.S. $ that necessitated foreign assistance.[126]

On the other hand, the first objective on Nasser's revolutionary agenda was to put an end to the British military presence in Egypt that is a constant reminder of Britain's imperialist past. In other words, among the most significant concern for Nasser was the continued presence of foreign troops in the region, including the British troops in Suez Canal, Iraq, Jordan, and the Arabian Gulf. He was working on eliminating the British presence initially in his country and then within the Arab world. In Egypt, there were nearly 200,000 troops deployed around the Suez Canal zone within ten airfields and thirty military camps. Thus, British troops on Egyptian territory were seen as a symbol of domination & neo-colonialism, and therefore, Nasser demanded unconditional withdrawal.[127]

One other reason for Nasser's reaction to Britain was due to British support for Israel during the 1948 Palestinian War that not only humiliated the Arabs, but also led the establishment of Jewish state in Palestine in addition to causing hundreds of thousands Palestinian refugees. Therefore, Nasser who had actually involved in the war, held the British responsible for the defeat of Arabs.

Nasser also saw the British as the main obstacle on the improvement of Egypt's socio-economic conditions. Since its occupation of Egypt in 1882, the

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[124] Ibid, 388.

[125] Stephens, R. (1971:172).

[126] Love, K. (1969:301). Lenczowski, G. (1980:528). Stephens, R. (1971:172).

[127] Hahn, T. (1991: 30).

British politically and economically exploited the country.[128] The Suez Canal constituted the main pillar of the neo-colonial exploitation. The Canal had annual revenues of $100 million which Egypt had received $3 million only.[129]

Nasser was demanding the Suez Canal to be given to Egyptians and declared that perpetuation of British and French position in the Suez Canal is incompatible with sovereignty rights that Egypt claims for themselves and, in principle, for all states.[130] Also, the interwar experiences convinced Nasser that anything less than full sovereignty is not sovereignty at all. Nasser initially was willing to solve the problem peacefully. He brought the case to the United Nations several times which had been vetoed by the British and French at the Security Council.

At the meantime, even though Nasser does not have big expectations, he approached to the West for the credit to finance the dam.[131] Interestingly, provoked by an anticipated Russian offer to loan Egypt money to begin the Aswan Dam, the American and British governments and the World Bank offered to finance the project.[132] In June 1956 these three actors had agreed to give $270 million for the finance of the first stage of the Aswan High Dam.

However, following Egypt's formal recognition of the People's Republic of China on July 19, Dulles informed Egypt Ambassador of Washington Hussein that the U.S. and Britain withdrew its offer to fund the construction of the Dam that is followed by the World Bank.[133]

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[128] Vatikiotis, P. J. (1984:169).

[129] Stephens, R. (1971:196).

[130] Piscatori, D. (1990: 134).

[131] The dam was completed in 1970 with more than $300 million in loans from the Soviet Union.

[132] Stephens, R. (1971:172).

[133] Scott, L. (1991:136). Baxter, K., & Akbarzadeh, S. (2008). *US Foreign Policy in the Middle East.* London: Routledge. P.47. Ricker, L. (2001). "The Soviet Union and the Suez Crisis." In Tal, D. (ed.) *The 1956 War: Collusion and Rivalry in the Middle East.* London: Routledge. P.180.

The U.S. also withdrew the American offer due to the assumption that the Soviet Union could not subsidize the large expenditures of the dam because of the backwardness of the Soviet economy and the growing unrest in Eastern Europe.[134]

An important note should underline that the U.S. had not made Israel's recognition of Communist China in January 1950 an issue although it was among the privileged policies of the Eisenhower Administration to prevent recognition of the Communist China.

Since Nasser wanted to be completely independent both from the East and the West, the only option which remained open to Egypt after the withdrawal of the Western financial offer was mobilizing its own resources. This could only be possible through nationalizing the Suez Canal and use the revenue for the construction of the dam.[135]

In consequence, a week later, on July 26, 1956 Nasser announced the nationalization of the Suez Canal in a historical speech in Alexandria:[136]

> One hundred twenty thousand workers died digging the Canal gratis. We dug the Canal with our lives, our skulls, our bones, our blood. Instead of the Canal being dug for Egypt, Egypt became the property of the Canal. The Suez Canal Company became a state within a state, one which humiliated ministers. It is no shame for one to be poor and to borrow in order to build up one's country, what is a shame is to suck the blood of people and usurp their rights. We shall never repeat the past, but shall eliminate the past by regaining our rights in the Suez Canal. This money is ours and this canal belongs to Egypt because it is an Egyptian limited liability company. We shall build the High Dam and we shall gain our usurped rights. The Canal Company annually takes 100 million dollars. Why should not we take it ourselves? Therefore, I have signed today and the government has approved a resolution for the nationalization of the Universal Company of the Suez Maritime Canal.

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[134] Love, K. (1969:317-318).

[135] Lenczowski, G. (1980:529). Stephens, R. (1971:199).

[136] Love, K. (1969: 349-350).

After the nationalization, Nasser also declared that "today, we actually achieve true sovereignty, true dignity and true pride. The Suez Canal Company was a state within a state."[137] Against the popular belief, in fact, Nasser did not confiscate the Anglo-French shares or dismissed the Canal Company officials and employees. Nasser offered compensation for the company and its shareholders according to the present value of the shares on the Paris stock exchange market.[138] Moreover, all officials and employees were asked to remain at their jobs.[139]

The Anglo-Egyptian crisis over the Suez Canal had a major impact on the regional system. By challenging prevailing regional norms and practices of the former colonial powers, Nasser tended to reorganize the super power-regional power relations in the region.

Not surprisingly, British and French response to Nasser's decision was not late. In October 1956, British, French and Israeli forces occupied the Canal Zone. The U.S., however, refused to take part in the operation. Along with rest of the international community, the U.S. administration condemned this action and called for withdrawal. The Suez attack also created sympathy and support for Egypt from all parts of the Arab world including the conservative regimes.

As evaluated in depth below, due to the U.S. and the Soviet's pressure, the British, French, and Israeli forces evacuated the Canal through the signing of the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty. This treaty ended the 78 years of British occupation and rule in Egypt.

To sum up, Nasser has achieved remarkable successes from the Suez crises and afterwards. It boosted his prestige both at home and in the region. The Suez War confirmed Nasser's role as the leader of the Arab liberation, and increased his popularity. He had nationalized the Suez Canal and expelled the British soldiers.

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[137] Khalil, A. (1962:139).

[138] Watt, D. C. (1956). *Britain and the Suez Canal*. London: Royal Institute of Internal Affairs. P.289.

[139] Ibid, 290.

Although his country had been attacked by the co-ordinated military forces of imperial powers that have clear superiority in terms of size and armaments, Nasser able to emerge as the victorious side.

From the domestic perspective, the nationalization of the Suez Canal, and the Suez Canal War further solidified Egyptians' attachment to Nasser until his death.[140] As an inevitable consequence of these events, Nasser enjoyed unchallenged prestige as leader of the Arab world who overthrew the monarchy, nationalized the Suez Canal, built the Aswan Dam and challenged the imperialist powers.

By signing an evacuation treaty Nasser also effectively reduced the British influence in the Middle East. With its withdrawal from the Suez canal, the British lost one of their most significant strategic position in the Middle East. In the post Suez War era, there had been continued sabotage against British installations in Syria and Jordan. The Suez Canal agreement also changed the balance of power between Israel and Arabs in favour of the latter.

The Suez Crisis was the first real challenge of Nasser to the *regional status quo* and the first empirical triumph of Nasser's Arab nationalist philosophy as an organizational and ideological tool.

4.3.4 'Voice of the Arabs' and Iraqi Revolution

On evaluating Nasser's activization of his political ideology as a political challenge, the radio of voice of the Arabs deserves a specific emphasize. In July 1953, Nasser established Radio Cairo's the "voice of the Arabs" (*Sawt Al-Arab*) program that was popular by Nasser's famous long rhetorical speeches.

From that date on, with Nasser's active encouragement, broadcasting in Egypt was developed into the most comprehensive and influential system as a political tool.[141] Following the emergence of Nasser as the undoubted leader of

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[140] Dubois, S. G. (1972:163).

[141] Head, S. (1974). *Broadcasting in Africa* . Philadelphia: Temple University Press. P.17.

Egypt, broadcasting was recognized as a vital political force throughout the Arab world. Then, Nasser used radio as the primary instrument of Egypt's foreign policy and as an effective method on attaining Egyptian foreign policy goals.[142]

The special advantages of radio in the Arab societies enabled broadcasting to play a significant role in the Arab countries. Listening to radio is a habit that had more widespread in the Middle East than any other region.[143] One other advantage of the radio was its access to illiterate masses where the imbalance between literate elite and illiterate masses was its peak in the region[144] As a result, radio played a unique role as the most powerful political weapon during 1950s and 1960s[145].

Nasser realized, long before than many Arab leaders, the potentialities of radio as a weapon of political propaganda in the Arab world. He employed the latest scientific principles of psychological warfare.[146] Nasser used powerful Egyptian radio services to influence the masses and to promote revolution in other Arab countries especially through Radio Cairo's main program the voice of the Arabs. In other words, Radio Cairo played a key role on influencing and mobilizing the masses for pan-Arabist revolution.

With his propaganda campaign, Nasser associated three different enemies that are all connected. Imperialist that denoted with the Western countries particularly the U.S., Britain, and France. Israel as the tool of the imperialists, and reactionaries or lackeys of imperialism, that mostly dedicated to King Saud of Saudi Arabia, King Hussein of Jordan, Said Nuri of Iraq and President Chamoun of Lebanon.

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[142] Ibid, 16.

[143] Dawisha, A. (1976:76).

[144] Ismael, T. Y. (1977:34).

[145] Hale, J. (1975). *Radio Power: Propaganda and International Broadcasting*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press. P.71.

[146] Loya, A. (1962). "Radio Propaganda of the Middle United Arab Republic: An Analysis." *Middle Eastern Affairs* 13 (4). P.171.

According to Nasser it was dynastic rivalries and outside interference that blocked all the efforts to unite the Arab countries.[147] Therefore, the traditional monarchies (reactionaries), imperialists, and also communists defined as enemies that restricting and exploiting people's political will.[148]

In accordance with his philosophy, Nasser's general line of propaganda was an attack on imperialism and colonial administration.[149] Since mid 1950s, Nasser was already supplying guerrilla organizations' arms, money, diplomatic back up, and the necessary training for the North African French controlled territories.[150] Especially he provided assistance to the National Liberation Front (FLN) in Algeria on their war of independence against French and played positive role on independence of Morocco and Tunisia through his massive radio propaganda.[151]

Then, Nasser extended his propaganda to British colonies of Nigeria, Tanzania, Zanzibar, Uganda, and Kenya, Italian colony of Somalia, and Portuguese colonies of Angola and Northern Rhodesia.[152] Radio Cairo's the "voice of free Africa" broadcast in twelve African languages.[153]

Nevertheless, Nasser's main target and success was on mobilizing the Arab masses. The voice of the Arabs called for the Arab unity from Atlantic Ocean to the Arab Gulf. Nasser motivated and gave moral and political support to the Arab

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[147] Little, T. (1967:149-150).

[148] Nasser, G. A. (1955:210-211).

[149] Lengyel, E. (1957). *Egypt's Role in World Affairs*. Washington: Public Affairs Press. Nutting, A. (1972).

[150] Copeland, M. (1969). *The Game of Nations: The Morality of Power*. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson. P.16.

[151] Lengyel, E. (1957:44-46). Stephens, R. (1971:378). Nutting, A. (1972:313).

[152] Lengyel, E. (1957:47).

[153] Green, T. (1972). *The Universal Eye: The World of Television*. New York: Frederick A. Praeger. P.16.

people to contest and get rid of their regimes that are against Arab unity.[154] He justified his intervention in other Arab states for defensive purposes in order to avoid outside domination of the Arab world.[155]

Nasser's propaganda was supporting and provocating Palestinians against Jordanians, the new generation against the old, villagers against city dwellers, and misled, cheated, oppressed, betrayed, and deceived people against their leadership.[156]

In this connection, Nasser disseminated anti-Western propaganda and created unrest in countries whose governments maintained good relations with the West.[157] Nasser named these regimes as "the enemies of Arab unity, stooges of Western imperialism, and friends of Israel."[158] Thus, Nasser supported the political opponents of rival regimes and directed propaganda campaigns against the ruling regimes of the conservative states. In other words, Nasser supported the progressive Arab movements in their struggle against reactionary regimes.

Nasser's propaganda main target and success came through in Iraq. Nasser particularly targeted pro Western Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri Said and Hashemite Kingdom of Iraq. Said was instrumental on formation of the Baghdad Pact and therefore contributed to the increase of Western influence and penetration in the region.

As a response, Nasser promptly reacted against the Baghdad Pact, and expanded Cairo Radio's voice of anti-imperialist to Iraq with 'Free Iraq' program against Nuri regime.[159] By this way, Nasser launched an offensive media campaign

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[154] Dawisha, A. (1976:11).

[155] Jankowski, J. (2002). *Nasser's Egypt, Arab Nationalism, and the United Arab Republic.* London: Lynne Rienner Publishers. P.163.

[156] Loya, A. (1962:106-107).

[157] Nutting, A. (1972:74).

[158] Ibid, 351.

[159] Ibid, 75.

that challenged the legitimacy of the Iraqi monarchy. Voice of the Arabs called Iraqis to revolt against Nuri Said and the monarchy.[160]

External developments in 1955 and 1956 acted as a catalyst for the demands for anti-Western regime. The role played by Nuri on the formation of the Baghdad Pact in February of 1955 despite domestic opposition, was the initial flame that alarmed the opposition.[161] Nasser's nationalization of the Suez Canal on July 26, 1956 also highly contributed to a rise in nationalist sentiments in the Arab world. According to Batutu for instance, the Suez crisis is the most detrimental and motivating factor behind the Iraqi revolution. This is mainly because British-French-Israeli invasion of Egypt made it very difficult for Nuri to justify Iraq's close ties with Britain and Baghdad Pact membership.[162] In consequence, main groups of the revolutionary army groups had merged during the Suez Crisis.

Therefore, the formation of the Baghdad Pact and the Suez Crisis directly fuelled the anti-regime sentiments in Iraq. Although the regime managed to remain in power, this was achieved through mass suppression of the masses and political opposition.

Eventually, Nasser's calling activate revolutionary sentiments that eventually erupted in the Free Officers coup. The military officers were the main political force in Iraq as in the case of many other Arab countries. The army officials were largely shared the sentiments of Iraqi intellectuals with regard to the policies of the Nuri regime. Nuri Said and the Hashemite Monarchy of King Faisal had overthrown on July 14, 1958 by a military coup led by General Abd al-Qarim Qasim.

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[160] Ibid, 76.

[161] Batatu, H. (1979). *The Old Social Classes & The Revolutionary Movement in Iraq*. New York: Princeton University Press. P.766.

[162] Ibid.

Qasim immediately announced Iraq's withdrawal from the Baghdad Pact following the coup, and support for a union more closely aligned to the UAR. The leading members of the royal house, including the king were executed.

As the monarchy was abolished, new regime was established on the basis of republic. Being similar to Egypt's revolution, July 14 Revolution aimed at a radical change in Iraq's social structure by destroying the power of the landed sheikhs and the absentee landlords while enhancing the position of the urban workers, the peasants, and the middle class.

The Iraqi Free Officers executed the revolution in the context of Arab nationalism and unity. In general, the Free Officers opposed Iraq's close ties with the West and wished to replace this policy with positive neutralism.[163] The Qasim regime had declared on the first day of the revolution that it had put an end to the pro-West policies of the previous regime, and Iraq's foreign policy would be based on neutralism. Qasim also reduced the negative trade balance with Western powers, and encouraged trade with neutral countries. Furthermore, a new constitution was drafted identifying Iraq as part of the Arab nation.[164] The overthrown of the Iraqi monarchy could be considered as the most remarkable political triumph of Nasser's the voice of the Arabs broadcasting.

On other significant achievement of Nasser's influence and propaganda was in Jordan. His massive anti-British propaganda brought down the Jordanian government in 1958 and Jordan could not join to the Baghdad Pact.[165] Therefore, Nasser became instrumental in bringing down the Iraqi monarchy, the Syrian, & Iraqi governments, preventing Jordan and Lebanon from joining the Baghdad Pact, and Iraq's decision to withdraw from the Bagdad Pact in March 1959.

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[163] Khadduri, M. (1969). *Republican Iraq*. London: Oxford University Press. Pp.35-36. Batatu, H. (1979:795-796).

[164] Kirmanj, S. (2010). "The Clash of Identities in Iraq." In Baram, A., Rohde, A., Zeidel, R. (eds.) *Iraq between Occupations: Perspectives from 1920 to the Present*. P.48.

[165] Ibid, 77-78.

To sum up, Radio Cairo was employed to influence the masses, to propagate anti-imperialism, to attack Nasser's political opponents in the Arab world, and to promote revolutions in other Arab countries. His influence was impressive at social level as his message could easily penetrate to the daily life. Millions of people were under the influence of his ideas. By this way, Nasser has achieved apparent successes in achieving desired political reactions in Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Iraq, Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, and Yemen during the late 1950s and early 1960s.[166]

4.3.5 Establishment of the United Arab Republic (UAR)

Nasser's political ideology peaked on February 21, 1958 when Syria and Egypt merged politically as a single country into the United Arab Republic (UAR) with Nasser as its first president. The unification was the most significant attempt based on the mutually recognized principle of Arab unity. One month later, Yemen adhered to the union through signing a pact of confederation called the United Arab States. Yemen unified his armed forces and foreign policies with the UAR.[167] There was no doubt that the union was the "fruit of Pan-Arabism".[168]

Once more, it was the external powers interference that put the initial flame on unification. The proclamation of the Eisenhower Doctrine and U.S.'s increased involvement in the region, in addition to the mobilization of the 50,000 Turkish troops along with the Syrian border on October 13, 1957 increased the fears of Western intervention in Syria.

As a response, Nasser sent Egyptian troops to the Syrian port of Latakia to help defend of Syria against any possible Western aggression. This action once more ratified Nasser's leading Arab nationalist figure.

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[166] Nutting, A. (1972:88-89).

[167] Hasou, T. Y. (1985). *The Struggle for the Arab World: Egypt's Nasser and the Arab League.* London: KPI Publishers. P.58.

[168] Ibid.

The formation of the UAR was envisaged as a step towards the unification of all other Arab states and the achievement of Arab unity. In other words, the establishment of the UAR was the first step in creation of broader and united Arab entity. In their joint proclamation, both Syria and Egypt declared that their unity aims the unification of all the Arab peoples.[169] Nasser frequently claimed that Arab unity is the expression of full and equal sovereignty for Arabs in world affairs. Prior the establishment of the UAR, he declared that:[170]

> We shall proceed together brethren, united as one man with one heart in order to achieve the principles of true dignity and true grandeur, and in order to establish throughout the Arab homeland and the Arab nation a true political independence and a true economic independence.

To sum up, the UAR was also a remarkable establishment in terms of achieving the real independence of the Arab nation. With the words of Nasser:[171]

> By Arab nationalism we mean that we should be independent and that independence is boom of our conscience. We should no longer be in servitude to any other country or to imperialism, any more than we should be a part of any sphere of influence. That is what Arab nationalism is: Arab nationalism is union, unity, solidarity, which should be erected on the rights, the interests of the Arabs and not on those of imperialism or spheres of influence That is why, from the very first day of this Revolution, we were led to declare that Arab nationalism constituted the only possible security for an Arab country. We said that the defence of the Arab nationalism should arise out of its own inner being and not from pacts dominated by the Great Powers.

The UAR came to an end in September 1961, when a group of Syrian officers made a military coup and ended the union. Nevertheless although Syria withdrew from the UAR, Nasser kept his popularity and prestige within the Arab world.

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[169] Sayegh, F. A. (1958:190).

[170] Seale, P. (1965). *Struggle for Syria.* London: Oxford University Press. P.261.

[171] Abdel-Malek, A. (1968:258-9).

4.3.6 Nasser's Assistance on Qaddafi's Libyan Revolution

Nasser's last triumph in terms of foreign policy achievement was his assistance to Qaddafi following the Libya Revolution. On September 1, 1969 King Idris is overthrown by a military coup by the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) that led by Colonel Muammar Qaddafi. It is a well known fact that Qaddafi was greatly inspired by Nasser's pan-Arabism and was a big fan of Nasser.[172] RCC modelled the methods of organization, the plans for state control, and even their name from the Free Officers.[173] Qaddafi's first message to Nasser was remarkable in that respect "we made this revolution for him. He can take everything of ours and add it to the rest of the Arab world's resources to be used for the battle."[174]

After having ejected all the Italian, American, and British experts who had served monarchy, foreign assistance was necessary for the survival of the regime after the revolution. At that point Nasser offered the expertise and infrastructural support that Qaddafi needed to be independent from the external control. Teachers, doctors, nurses, engineers, financial experts, advisers in communications, civil aviation, land reclamation, irrigation and oil production experts came from Egypt to Libya. It is estimated that 50,000 Egyptians descended upon Libya in the first year of the revolution.[175]

Nasser also provided security and intelligence help for the safety of Qaddafi's revolution and Egyptian navy units patrol the territorial waters of the Libyan coast.[176] Additionally, Nasser sent 8,000 military officers and advisers to Libya to rebuild the army.[177] As a result of this assistance, Qaddafi able to survive

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[172] Hottinger, A. (1971). "Colonel Qaddafi's pan-Arab Ambitions." Swiss Review of World Affairs. 21 (3). P.22.

[173] Ibid, 23.

[174] Haykal, M. H. (1975). *The Road to Ramadan*. London: Collins Press. P.70. First, 1974, p. 118.

[175] First, R. (1974). *Libya: The Elusive Revolution*. New York: Holmes and Meir. P.117.

[176] Ibid, 118.

[177] Ibid.

against pro-Western military coups and establish a strong regime without being militarily and economically dependent to the West.

To sum up, Nasser inspired Arab nationalists throughout the Middle East by fighting against the British and the French during the Suez Crisis of 1956, guiding anti-imperialist and non-aligned political ideology, and uniting the Arab world politically.[178] His picture appeared in shops, cafes, taxis etc from Cairo to Aleppo.

Egyptians attached themselves to Nasser as their charismatic leader and felt that he was the leader they had been waiting for, who could stand up to the imperialist powers and save Palestine.[179] Nasser's standing against the Baghdad Pact, nationalization of the Suez Canal, and establishment of the United Arab Republic greatly appreciated by the Egyptians and many Arabs living other countries.

Nasser used of Egypt's assets of geographical location, Arab and Islamic identities, and successfully manipulated these determinants with principles based pan-Arabism and anti-imperialism that emerged him as the leader of the Arab revolutionary struggle. He became a real challenge against the *status quo and* established orthodoxies of subordination in the region.

4.4 Containment of Nasser's Challenge

As elucidated above, Western interventions in the Middle East initiated as direct colonial occupation in the late 18th Century, and continued as Mandate system after the First World War. Stating alternatively, there was a high degree of

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[178] Humphreys, R. S. (1999). *Between Memory and Desire: The Middle East in a Troubled Age.* California: University of California Press. P.68.

[179] Dekmejian, H. R. (1971:39).

Western hegemony and interventions in the region over the past two hundred years. This fact is progressively explained by Carl Brown as: [180]

> For roughly the last two centuries the Middle East has been more consistently and more thoroughly ensnarled in great power politics than any other part of the non-Western world. This distinctive political experience continuing from generation to generation has left its mark on Middle Eastern political attitudes and actions. Other parts of the world have been at one time or another more severely buffeted by an imperial power, but no area has remained so unremittingly caught up in multilateral great power politics.

As a continuation of the historically constructed subordination mechanisms, the Western domination took the shape of controlling the area through military pacts and alliance systems along with Western models of statehood in the post Second World War era. The continued presence of the British forces in Egypt, Sudan, Libya, Jordan, Iraq, and the Arabian Peninsula and the continued French colonial control of Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco were bulwarks of the Western domination in the Middle East.

The involvement of Western powers in the region always find justification in the name of Cold War geopolitics, supporting the state of Israel, preserving strategic, political, or economic interests etc.

Subordination policies of the great powers during and after the World War Two were mainly held by the British. Britain's imperialist policies in the 1940s have left a legacy which shaped the perception of the Western presence in the Middle East in the following decade. For instance, in 1941 Britain had deposed Iran's Reza Shah due to his pro-German policies and overthrown the Iraqi Prime Minister Rashid Ali al-Gailani for the same reason. The next year, British tanks had surrounded King Faruq's Palace in Cairo forcing him to appoint pro-British Prime Minister.

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[180] Brown, C. L. (1984). *International Politics and the Middle East: Old Rules, Dangerous Games.* London: I. B. Tauris. P.3.

Similarly, the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC) in Iran was holding the largest oil field and refinery installation in the world. In March 1951, Dr. Mohammed Mossadegh had become the prime minister of Iran and nationalized the AIOC. This cost Mossadegh his office where the British and CIA overthrown him through a coward military intervention in August 1953.[181] Then, the Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlevi came to the throne with an absolute monarchical rule and ruled Iran for 25 years while "loyally working for the U.S. interests in the region".[182]

After the Second World War there was a new candidate for the leadership of the subordination policies. The American interest in the Arab World intensified because of the region's oil reserves, establishment of Israel, and emergence of the Soviet Union as superpower. In this connection, since the late 1940s, the U.S. policy in the Middle East has been designed to protect the U.S. interests that based upon four strategic objectives:

1. Protecting the supply of oil.

2. Prevent the Soviet influence and penetration in the region.

3. Protection of the state of Israel. And,

4. The containment of the challenging regimes that may endanger the *status quo* or aforementioned objectives.

In order to achieve these objectives, the U.S. governments politically, economically, and militarily backed up the pro-Western regimes that were willing to support U.S. interests in the region regardless whether they are repressive or unpopular.

As demonstrated in the previous section, Nasser was a threat to Western states because he developed a very effective means of challenging their policy in the

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[181] Hahn, P. L. (2005). *Crisis and Crossfire: The United States and the Middle East since 1945*. Washington, D.C.: Potomac Books. P.16.

[182] Everest, L. (2004). *Oil, Power, and Empire: Iraq and the U.S. Global Agenda*. Monroe: Common Courage Press. P.60.

region. The Americans and British overestimated Nasser's capacity on challenging their regional policies and that he could access to arms and build the Aswan Dam without the Western assistance.

In this sense, Nasser's policies challenged the regional *status quo* and became the manifestation against a Western presence and dominance in the region. In other words, as the key regional actor, Nasser emerged as the challenger leader not only with his revolutionary ideology, but also his effective political practices. As put forward above, republican Egypt under Nasser's charismatic leadership was posing a threat not only to external powers but also to the traditional pro-Western monarchies in the region including Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Jordan, and Yemen.

As a response, the Eisenhower administration attempted to further increase the American influence in the Middle East. It concentrated on the efforts for containment and subordination of Nasser.[183]

Accordingly, the basis of the formulation of the U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East in the aftermath of the post Second World era still remained today as an integral part of American diplomacy in the region. Therefore, the Middle East in the 1950s reflected a historical continuum where historically constructed *subordination* process carried on with new formulations. Deriving from this statement, the containment of Nasser is elucidated under six subtitles; the Baghdad Pact, Suez Canal War, the Eisenhower Doctrine, the Arab Cold War, Yemen War, and finally 1967 war.

4.4.1 Baghdad Pact

As mentioned earlier, the establishment of the military alliances and pacts is the most essential way of the continuation of the subordination policies. As a continuation of this policy, the Western countries attempted to integrate the region into Western alliance systems since it could not be possible for the Americans and British to control the Arab regional system without a defence organization.

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[183] Ibid, 30.

For this purpose, British and Americans attempted to construct new regional polarization through the establishment of a military pact. The initial structure of the military organization emerged when Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan formed the Northern Tier of the Pact through the promotion of the U.S..

Then, soon after becoming prime minister of Iraq in September 1954, again with the promotion of the U.S. and the Britain, pro Western Nuri Said formed alliance with Turkey on February 24, 1955.[184] By this way Turkey and Iraq created their own nucleus for the pact. Later on Nuri also signed bilateral agreements with Pakistan and the U.S. Finally, with the inclusion of Britain, Pakistan, and Iran they formed an organization known as the Baghdad Pact.[185] Despite the fact that the U.S. never formally joined the Baghdad Pact, it was a strong outside supporter.

As the key Arab country, the inclusion of Egypt to the Pact was crucially important for the U.S. Nasser's charismatic leadership and Egypt's leading position within the Arab world convinced the U.S. administration that if Egypt agreed to join the organization, the other Arab states would follow.[186]

In order to put further pressure and in fact to force Nasser to join the Pact, Israel initiated to launch military attacks on Egypt. On February 28, 1955 Israel launched a major aggressive raid on the Egyptian controlled Gaza Strip and killed thirty eight Egyptians.[187] This raid was the first major violence and worst incident on the Egyptian-Israeli border since 1948.

It was not a coincidence that Israeli attack on Gaza came a few days after the signing of the Turco-Iraqi Pact and aimed to reveal Egypt's military weakness. Nevertheless, neither the U.S. nor Israel were able to prevent Nasser from pursuing his policies or joining to the pact.

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[184] Mansfield, P. (1965:55).

[185] For full text see Hurewitz, D. (1956: 390-392).

[186] Meyer, G. E. (1980:27-29).

[187] Bryson, R. (1986:188). Stephens, R. (1971:152). Sayegh, F. A. (1958:116).

Although the Baghdad Pact was seemingly established against the Soviet expansionism, after Nasser refusal to join the pact, one of the main objectives of the Pact turned to contain Nasser. When the Secretary of State in the Eisenhower Administration John Foster Dulles failed to convince Nasser to join the pact, he diverted the U.S. policy on isolating him. For Dulles, Third World neutralism was only "a transitional stage to communism so Egypt should be isolated from the Arab world."[188] Dulles was so determined about this view despite the fact that Nasser had abolished all the political parties in Egypt including the communist party.

Then, the Baghdat Pact focused primarily on Nasser's Egypt that controlled the Suez Canal and had the most influence within the Arab world. The U.S. administration increased its support to the pro-Western Arab regimes in order to isolate Nasser. For instance, when Nasser refused to join the Baghdad Pact, Eisenhower and Dulles supported Iraq and Saudi Arabia against Egypt.

Moreover, following Nasser's arms deal with the Soviets, Dulles determined to block the deal by force if necessary. For this mission, he initially sent his special representative to Cairo on the announcement of the arms deal in order to submit the U.S. threat. Through this meeting Dulles made it clear that the U.S. would stop all aid and trade to Egypt, break diplomatic relations, and blockage Egypt to prevent the arms transfer.[189]

To sum up, as a continuation of the Western dominance in the region, the Baghdad Pact was established with the claim of defending the Middle East against the Soviet threat. Nevertheless, after Nasser emerged as a regional challenge, most political analysts agree that the establishment of the Baghdad Pact was against Nasser's control and domination of the regional politics.[190] Dulles, Eden, and Nuri

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[188] Noer, T. J. (1989). "New Frontiers and Old Priorities in Africa." In Paterson T. G. (ed). *Kennedy's Quest for Victory: American Foreign Policy, 1961-1963*. New York: Oxford University Press. P. 255.

[189] Aronson, G. (1986). *From Sideshow to Center Stage: U.S. Policy Toward Egypt 1946-1956*. Boulder, Co: Lynne Rienner Publishers. P.142.
[190] Dawisha, A. (1976:81).

attempted to punish Nasser because he did not involve within the Western security systems.

One other purpose of the Baghdad Pact was making Iraq a regional predominant power through British and American military assistance. In other words, the center of political gravity in the region tried to be changed from Cairo to Baghdad.[191] Nevertheless, as elucidated above, despite all the efforts, the Baghdad Pact could not reach its latter objective and no Arab country other than Iraq joined to the organization.

4.4.2 Suez Canal War

In 1869 the Mediterranean and Red Seas were linked by a waterway that connected Asia with Africa. The passage was known as the Suez Canal. The initial importance of the canal was obvious since it shortened the maritime voyage from the Indian Ocean to the Mediterranean Sea by thousands of miles. Ships no longer had the arduous task of navigating around the southern edge of Africa. Furthermore, the transportation distance and costs had reduced considerably.

Soon after its completion, the Suez Canal became lifeline for European countries like Great Britain and France whose economies depended on the trade that passed through the canal. Great Britain was also politically relied on the canal for its colonies around the world. For this purpose, British established and owned the Suez Canal Company that was responsible for the Canal's operations and maintenance.[192] The Suez Canal Company shares mostly owned by the British government and French citizens.[193]

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[191] Nutting, A. (1972:77).

[192] Varble, D. (2003). *The Suez Crisis 1956: Essential Histories.* Elm Court: Osprey Publishing. Pp.11-12.

[193] Watt, D. C. (1956). *Britain and the Suez Canal.* London: Royal Institute of Internal Affairs. P.290.

Nevertheless, the British did not remain with the ownership in the Canal Company but also occupied Egypt in 1882. Even though Egypt declared its independence in 1922, Britain kept the Suez Canal zone under its occupation due to the 1936 Anglo-Egyptian Treaty.

Britain was the largest user of the Canal by far. In 1955, British shipping through the Canal accounted for nearly 30 percent of the tonnage of the 48 nations using the canal.[194] The Britain was entirely dependent upon the canal for the transport of the country's oil imports.[195]

Britain dependence to Middle Eastern oil further increased the significance of the canal. Especially after the Second World War, the importance of the canal continued since it became a base for the cheap Middle Eastern oil. In addition to its strategic location and economic importance, the canal has unique value for British due to its proximity to the oil resources and British bases in the Middle East.

The Suez Canal crises started when Nasser rejected the 1936 Treaty that gave British the ownership and operations along the Suez Canal. Then, Egypt closed the Suez Canal to Israeli vessels, and denied Israeli access to the Gulf of Aqaba from the Red Sea.

Recalling from the Chapter Three, the Western powers never hesitate to resort to force especially when their economic interests are endangered. Considering the sharp decline of the prestige of the British in the region on the era of while Nasser's prestige was raising, the British Prime Minister Anthony Eden was determined to teach Nasser a "lesson".[196]

In order to justify their planned military action against Egypt to other nations, Britain and France initially created a crisis by restricting Egypt's ability to operate the Canal. For this purpose, they offered to the 165 non-Egyptian pilots

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[194] Hofstadter, D. (ed.) (1973:130). Watt, D. C. (1956:130).

[195] Nutting, A. (1972:149).

[196] Abboushi, W. F. (1974). *The Angry Arabs*. Philadelphia: Westminster Press. P.177.

three years salary if they returned home, and threatened them if they continue to remain at their jobs.[197]

Then, France began to transfer large quantities of modern arms to Israel.[198] In fact, France had been supplying Israel with modern arms since early 1950s under the terms of a secret Franco-Israeli arms agreement with the American support and encouragement.[199]

The war erupted on October 29, when Israel initially occupied Gaza and then Sinai Peninsula in order to help Britain to occupy the Suez Canal.[200] The following day, Britain and France announced a pre-arranged twelve hour ultimatum for Nasser to accept their terms. Since they knew that Nasser would not accept their terms, the next day British air force started to bomb Egyptian airfields. On November 5[th,] the Anglo-French forces captured Port Said city at the entrance of the Suez Canal where, mostly civilians, 1,000 Egyptians died in a one day battle.[201] After this incident it became clear that the coalition armies aim to topple Nasser down.

On the other hand, the U.S. administration had condemned this act. On his TV speech, President Eisenhower stated on October 31, that:[202]

> The United States was not consulted in any way about any phase of these actions. Nor were we informed of them in advance. As it is the manifest right of any of these nations to take such decisions and actions, it is likewise our right -if our judgment so dictates- to dissent. We believe these actions to have been taken in error. For we do not accept the use of

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[197] Nutting, A. (1972:157).

[198] Cheryl, R. (1986). *Israel and the American National Interest: A Critical Examination.* Chicago: University of Illinois Press. P.91.

[199] Ibid.

[200] Baxter, K., & Akbarzadeh, S. (2008). *US Foreign Policy in the Middle East.* London: Routledge. P.47.

[201] Stephens, R. (1971). *Nasser: A Political Biography.* New York: Simons and Schuster. P.246.

[202] Finer, H. (1964). *Dulles Over Suez: The Theory and Practice of his Diplomacy.* Chicago: Quadrangle. P.95

force as a wise or proper instrument for the settlement of international disputes...the action taken can scarcely be reconciled with the principles and purposes of the United Nations to which we have all subscribed. And, beyond this, we are forced to doubt that resort to force and war will for long serve the permanent interest of the attacking nations. Now we must look to the future.

The U.S. administration initially submitted the Suez crisis to the UN Security Council on 30 October. The U.S. called for immediate withdraw of the coalition forces behind the established armistice lines and asked from all the member states to refrain from giving any military, economic, or financial assistance to Israel until the acceptance of this proposal. Nevertheless, not surprisingly, the Britain and France vetoed this resolution.

However, the American and Soviet pressure forced Britain and her allies to accept a cease fire and evacuate Egypt. As constituting one of the most significant paradoxes of the Twentieth Century, the U.S. clash with its close allies may seem contradictory. As such, it also contradicts with the *subordination* principle and practices.

Against these odds, this thesis contention is the U.S. reaction and opposition to the Suez War does not contradict with subordination theory and has strong basis and rationality behind it.

First of all, although the U.S. administration was working to solve the problem diplomatically, Britain, France, and Israel resorted to the military solution without respecting the U.S. administration political will. As also understood from the Eisenhower's aforementioned declaration, the U.S. was neither consulted nor informed in advance by this operation. In other words, U.S.'s allies carried out their military aggression without consulting the U.S., and the U.S. administration felt betrayed by its allies. Furthermore, the Britain and France veto of the U.S.'s UN resolution once more irritated the American administration.

Secondly, the Soviet administration showed a stronger reaction to the occupation of the Canal. Soviet Prime Minister Bulganin sent letters to the leaders of Britain, France, Israel, and also to the U.S. warning of the consequences if the

invaders not withdraw from Egypt immediately.[203] The Soviet leader messages included the threat of global war, use of the Soviet strategic rocket strikes against Britain and France; deployment of a volunteer force to aid Egypt, a unilateral Soviet intervention in the Middle East; and an offer of joint Soviet-American intervention under the UN supervision.[204]

It would not be wrong to suggest that the Soviets supported Nasser in order to enhance their prestige both within the Arab and Third World countries, and to divert the world attention from their suppression of Eastern Europe.

Under these circumstances, the U.S. could not let Soviets to intervene either unilaterally or jointly and involved in Middle Eastern affairs. Soviet threat to use nuclear weapons and sending of Soviet volunteers to Egypt in order to stop the aggression in the Suez was not acceptable for the U.S.. In fact, this threat was applicable because the Soviets just crushed the Hungarian revolt in Europe.

Thirdly, one other significant factor that contributed to the American involvement in the Suez was American's concerns over the Arab World and Third World states reactions against Western aggression in Egypt. This is due to the fact that Nasser emerged as a leader in the Non-aligned movement as well as in the Arab World and there have been strong Afro-Asian protests in addition to the intensive Arab hostility and Egyptian military resistance to the occupation forces.

Therefore, the U.S. administration realized that collaboration with the Britain in the Suez crises would burden its relations with the Arab states. The U.S. administration faced intense political pressures from the Arab world due to impression that the European imperial powers waged war and occupied an Arab state. In other words, this attack perceived as an aggression against all the Arabs not only against Egypt.

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[203] Johnson, C. (1986). *Superpower: Comparing American and Soviet Foreign Policy.* New York: St. Martin's Press. P.153.

[204] Ibid.

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In this connection, a parenthesis should be open for the U.S.'s closest ally in the region Saudi Arabia's support for Egypt. As such, King Saud banned oil exports to Britain and France and staged a general mobilization of Saudi forces to demonstrate his solidarity with Nasser.

Then, as being one of the prominent conservative regimes of the Middle East, why Saudi Arabia positioned on the side of Nasser? The main reason of Saudi Arabia's temporary alliance with Nasser was Britain's military action and reoccupation of the Buraymî oasis that belonged to Saudi Arabia. The Saudis attacked to the Americans for their failure to condemn British actions. Therefore, naturally, when Britain attempted to bring Jordan into the alliance, Saudi Arabia acted vigorously against it. This hostility between Britain and Saudi Arabia also influenced American decision on the Suez crisis of 1956. The U.S. administration was well aware that without Saudi's help, they cannot maintain its access on the Middle Eastern oil. On the other hand, the U.S. administration was also aware that King Saud is under increasing threat by renewed labour violence and growing support for Nasser in Saudi Arabia.

Therefore, the U.S. has sort to find out how to preserve access to the petroleum resources that is necessary for Europe while avoiding association with the colonial powers. By this way Eisenhower hoped to increase the country prestige through its anti-colonial stand. In consequence, the U.S. administration began to realize that further deterioration in relations with Egypt will not serve for its interests.

Fourthly, as also related with the third point, the U.S. administration feared from the regional instability that might be caused by the invasion. Especially the possibility that the turmoil caused by the Suez Canal crisis may destabilize pro-Western Iran by the socialist forces concerned the U.S. administration. Iran seems to be the key country that not only served as a buffer zone against the Soviet intrusion into the Middle East, but also possessed half of the world's known oil resources of that time.

Fifthly, the U.S. government was not economically affected by the nationalization of the Suez Canal.[205] The U.S. was not a signatory of the 1888 treaty that invested in the Canal Company.[206] Nevertheless, as mentioned above, the U.S. economy may negatively affected in terms of other Arab countries oil boycott or rising of oil prices. Therefore, the U.S. acted in order to secure a prompt withdrawal of British, French, and Israeli forces from Egypt and quickly open the Suez canal to tanker traffic.

Finally, with its intervention, the U.S. proved its ultimate power in the Middle East and proclaimed the end of the British era. In fact, the U.S. and Britain developed different strategies on preserving the postwar petroleum order. Until that time, the U.S. was refrained to resort direct military force and try to build friendly regimes in the area. On the other hand, Britain reinforced its colonial practices and used direct military force to protect its interests as in the cases of re-occupation of Buraymi and Suez canal. The Suez crisis reflected these divergent approaches.

The US administration was well aware that the British position is rapidly deteriorating in the Middle East and British troops in the area are causing more instability rather than stability for both the region and U.S. interests. Therefore, the U.S. administration was determined to replace the deteriorated British position in the Middle East and prevent the Soviet Union involvement in the area. The Suez crisis confirmed the end of British era in the region.

In consequence, Nasser has achieved a victory in Suez with sacrifices. During the Suez Canal War, the Egyptian army suffered 3,000 casualties and large equipment losses against 200 hundred casualties of the British-Israeli and French soldiers.[207]

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[205] Thomas, H. (1966). *Suez*. New York: Harper. P.49.

[206] Ibid.

[207] Schiff, A. (1974*). History of the Israeli Army, 1870–1974.* New York: Straight Arrow Books. p.70.

4.4.3 Eisenhower Doctrine

Although the U.S. had supported Egypt during the Suez invasion, that temporarily improved the American image among the Arabs, this did not last long. On January 5, 1957 President Eisenhower announced in the American Congress a new U.S. policy for the Middle East that authorized economic and military assistance and the use of U.S. forces to prevent a communist takeover in the Middle East. In other words, the Eisenhower Doctrine asserted that the U.S. had the legitimate right to provide assistance and military forces to any state in the region that threatened by Communism or any other external threat.

Thus, the Eisenhower Doctrine defined international communism as the major threat, and committed to interfere regional countries on the pretext of defending Western interests. This was the apparent or visible aspect of the Eisenhower doctrine. One other visible objective of the Eisenhower Doctrine was to confirm that the U.S. is the new super extra regional power of the region replacing the British.

The invisible or unrevealed objective of the Doctrine was to prevent Nasser and pro-Nasserist forces to fill the power vacuum in the Middle East. In other words, although the Eisenhower Doctrine was seemingly against the Soviet communism, in fact it was aiming to contain Nasser and Arab nationalists. The U.S. administration and especially Dulles portrayed Nasser and his supporters as pro-Soviet puppets and local communists.

Therefore, the American intervention to the Suez Canal did not change the fact that Nasser should be contained. The U.S. continued to support its allies and Israel. The U.S. administration intended to fill the power vacuum and to isolate Nasser and his influence over the rest of the Arab World through the mechanisms associated with the Eisenhower Doctrine. The American Secretary of State Dulles went so far as to publicly challenge Nasser. For instance, prior the announcement of the Eisenhower Doctrine in the congress, Dulles stated that:[208]

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[208] Meyer, G. (1980:29).

Now the thing we are up against is a rather extreme view which the Arab countries in general, and Egypt in particular take on this thing which they call nationalization and sovereignty...countries that have newly won their wings of independence incline toward taking initially an extreme view. They are hypersensitive about this thing. But it is so demonstrable that in the long run it is going to hurt Egypt and the other Arab countries.

For this purpose, the Eisenhower doctrine was specifically aimed to weaken and eliminate the pro-Nasserist Arab nationalists in Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon. Furthermore, the Eisenhower administration directly or indirectly forced the regional Arab countries to join Western sponsored defence plans and organizations against the alleged Soviet threat. While doing so, the U.S. administration had ignored and neglected the real threat to the Arab countries that is Israel. Similarly, the new U.S. policy did not address to the Arab-Israeli conflict which Arabs considered as the central problem in the region.

Consequently, the Eisenhower Doctrine contributed to the regional divisions in the Arab world. While the regimes of Iraq, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Lebanon supported it, revolutionary states of Egypt and Syria naturally opposed it. Following the declaration of the Eisenhower Doctrine, Lebanon, Jordan, and Saudi governments openly declared themselves as allies of the West and condemned Egypt and Syria for allowing Communism to spread in the area.[209]

The initial practical implication of the Eisenhower Doctrine occurred in Jordan and Syria. Both of these countries having strong pro-Nasserite Arab nationalists elements and therefore, should be eliminated.

The first intervention was in Jordan. In Jordan, the political situation had remained unstable since the Suez crisis. On the society level, there was a strong reaction against British and foreign interventions. In consequence, the pro-Nasserite government won the parliamentary elections in October 1956. Then, the new government under the leadership of Prime Minister Suleiman al-Nabulsi quickly signed an agreement that established a joint military command with Egypt and

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[209] Seale, P. (1965). *Struggle for Syria*. London: Oxford University Press. P.56.

Syria. Al-Nabulsi also abrogated the Baghdad Pact and Anglo-Jordanian Treaty, and declared the neutrality of Jordan. Furthermore, he initiated diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union and Republic of China.

The pro-Western King Hussein was not satisfied by his government's pro-liberal and pro-Nasserist attitude. Following, he dismissed his own cabinet accusing them of causing internal instability and spreading communism in the country. In consequence, the Jordanian government was forced to resign on April 10, 1957 and Jordan dragged into the chaos.

There is no need to emphasize that King Hussein did not take this decision by himself without the political, military and economic back up of the U.S. and Britain. Hussein was not strong enough to control the country and asked for American help. American help came in the form of mobilizing units of the Sixth Fleet to the Eastern Mediterranean to suppress the nationalist elements in Jordan. Furthermore, the U.S. administration provided $10 million economic aid under the Eisenhower Doctrine.[210]

Therefore, although there was no external Communist threat and the need for U.S. military intervention, the U.S. government provided military, political, and economic assistance to King Hussein in order to contain pro-Nasserist forces in Jordan through the Eisenhower Doctrine.[211] Then, having the 'Eisenhower protection' the King dealt ruthlessly with the opposition. He declared martial law, deported and imprisoned many political and military opposition leaders.[212]

The second practical implication of the Eisenhower Doctrine seen in the Syrian crises. In the autumn of 1957, the Syrian government strengthened its ties to the Soviet Union after Syrian officials had visited Moscow. On October 10, 1957

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[210] Meo, L. (1965). *Lebanon, Improbable Nation: A Study in Political Development.* Bloomington: Indiana University Press. P.190. Hahn, P. L. (2005:42).

[211] Dann, U. (1981). *King Hussein and the Challenge of Arab Radicalism; Jordan, 1955-1967.* New York: Oxford University Press. Pp.55-67.

[212] Ibid.

the Syrian government announced that Soviet economic and military assistance will increase within the country.

After this declaration, the U.S. administration promptly applied to the Eisenhower Doctrine although the political conditions required implementing it was not ready such as request from the pro-Western government or Syrian potential attack to its neighbours.

The U.S. once more sent the Sixth fleet to the Syrian coast and stepped up arm deliveries to Iraq, Lebanon, and Jordan. The U.S. President Eisenhower publicly called Syrian people to overthrow their government.[213] Then, on October 13, 1957 Turkish-Syrian crisis erupted where the U.S. sent aircrafts to İncirlik airbase in Turkey and 50,000 Turkish soldiers mobilized along the Syrian border.[214]

As also mentioned above, the growing American interventions in the region on the basis of the Eisenhower Doctrine played a major role on constitutional merge of Egypt and Syria under the UAR. Syria was portrayed as a primary threat to her pro-Western neighbours by the U.S. although in fact Syria was threatened by these countries along with the U.S. Therefore, Syria has no choice but to rely on to Nasser and Soviets.

Nasser had strongest influence in Syrian crises. He not only brought the case to the UN but also send Egyptian troops to Syria for protection of the Syrian territories. In consequence, the Eisenhower Doctrine was a complete failure in Syria. The Doctrine also acted as a catalyser of unification of Egypt and Syria. The end-point of Egyptian-Syrian relations was the unification of the two countries on February 1, 1958 under the UAR.

Next anti-Nasserite intervention on the pretext of Eisenhower Doctrine occurred in Lebanon in 1958. Lebanon is a country of different religious groups with contradicting socio-economic privileges. Since its independence in 1946, the

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[213] Gerges, F. A. (1994:86).

[214] Hahn, P. L. (2005:43).

country was founded upon the sectarian political system that based upon the 1943 agreement which is known as the National Pact. According to this consensus, the President would be a Christian Maronite, the prime minister would be a Sunni Muslim, and the speaker of Parliament would be a Shiite. The National Pact bound Lebanon to be neutral in international affairs.

In the mid 1950s, the Lebanese Christian elites who controlled most of the country's economic and political areas concerned with the growing Arab nationalist feelings in the country after the Suez crises. This anxiety has been increased with the formation of the UAR. Then, the pro-Western Christian Maronite President Camille Chamoun decided to re-elect to the office although this constitute a clear clash with the Lebanese constitution that limited the presidency to six years and one term only. This decision aroused nationwide protest especially among Muslims and it gave an opportunity to Chamoun to suppress the Muslim opposition on the pretext of accusing Nasser and Arab nationalist.

Instead of working for a national reconciliation or cooperating with the Arab League, Chamoun asked from the United Nations and the U.S. to interfere to Lebanon.[215] Stating alternatively, although it was against Lebanon's neutrality, the pro-Western Lebanese President called the American forces to the country to implement the Eisenhower Doctrine and to protect Lebanon.[216] American officials assured him that if the UN failed to solve the problem, the U.S. would take the necessary steps to protect Lebanon.[217] Therefore, it would not be wrong to suggest that President Chamoun created conditions for a conflict and asked from the U.S. to intervene in Lebanon.

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[215] Eisenhower, D. D. (1965). *Waging Peace*. 1956-1961. Garden City, NY: Doubleday. P.267. Hahn, P. L. (2005:43).

[216] Meo, L. (1965:188-189).

[217] Ibid, 268.

There is no doubt that the Eisenhower administration would like to see a continuation of the pro-Western Chamoun regime in Lebanon and use this justification to interfere in Lebanese internal affairs.

In consequence, as a response to Chamoun's call, Eisenhower ordered the Sixth Fleet to move to the Eastern Mediterranean and provided military aid to Lebanon.[218] On July 15, 1958 the American Marines landed in Lebanon.[219] The American operation consisted of 9,000 well trained marines, 70 warships, and 400 Air Force planes.[220] At the meantime, on July 17, British forces entered Jordan to protect the Jordanian throne from a possible military coup.[221]

By landing the U.S. Marines in Lebanon, the Eisenhower administration also sent a strong message to Nasser about the decisiveness of the U.S. government on interfering anti-Western regimes in the region. The U.S. forces in Lebanon and the British forces in Jordan stayed in the region for three months. The U.S. soldiers' political and economic aims were not restricted with Lebanon and Jordan. They were also aiming to protect Persian Gulf and Saudi Arabia against any challenge to post-war petroleum order.[222]

Interestingly, the Marines landed unchallenged. In other words, after intervening in Lebanon, the American Marines found no enemy to fight.[223] Although Nasser, Syria, and most of the other Arab countries condemned the American actions, they did not provoke a confrontation. The U.S. administration

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[218] Eisenhower, D. D. (1965:269). Hahn, P. L. (2005:43).

[219] Eisenhower, D. D. (1965:271).

[220] Hughes, J. E. (1963). *The Ordeal of Power: A Political Memoir of the Eisenhower Years.* New York: Athenaeum. P.263.

[221] Ibid.

[222] Little, D. (1996). "His Finest Hour? Eisenhower, Lebanon, and the 1958 Middle East Crisis." *Diplomatic History.* 20 Pp. 27-54.

[223] Hughes, J. E. (1963:263).

discovered that the problem in Lebanon had nothing to do with Nasser or international communism.

In fact, Nasser helped the Americans by contributing to the solution of the problem. With the suggestion of Nasser, the army commander General Faud Shehab elected as the new president and the government re-established according to the National Pact. One other political success of Nasser was the recognition of Lebanon neutrality in foreign affairs and to prevent the adherence of the country to the Eisenhower Doctrine along with removal of all the American forces in Lebanon by October 25, 1958.

The departure of the American forces was also meaning the end of the Eisenhower Doctrine.[224] The Doctrine was a complete failure simply because it was formulized upon the wrong reasons and rationalities. The U.S. administration also ignored the colonial past and sensitiveness of the region to the foreign intervention.

To sum up, the primary objective of the Eisenhower Doctrine was to isolate and contain Nasser and pave the way for the U.S. hegemony as a substitution for the British hegemony. Although the Doctrine partially reached its' objectives on satisfying the latter, the same thing could not be put forward for the former.

The Eisenhower Doctrine was a complete failure in Syria and it acted as a catalyser of unification of Egypt and Syria. Similarly, the U.S. militarily intervened in both Jordan and Lebanon on the grounds that it was defending these countries against external aggression. Nevertheless, the application of the Eisenhower Doctrine especially in Lebanon was the major reason for its demise. Once more the U.S. powers supported an unpopular leader who was discredited by his own people. Therefore, it would not wrong to argue that the Eisenhower Doctrine was counter-productive. It worsened the U.S.-Arab relations and the U.S. administration completely lost its credibility in Egypt, Syria, Iraq, and most segments in Jordan and Lebanon.

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[224] Meo, L. (1965:189).

Nasser played an important role in resisting the implementation of the Eisenhower Doctrine in both Jordan and Syria. He mobilized the Arab nationalist elements in both countries to reject the Doctrine. In consequence, the nationalist forces in Jordan were able to pressure the King Hussein to eliminate the British military base and sign alliance pact with Egypt and Saudi Arabia.

4.4.4 Arab Cold War & Collapse of the United Arab Republic

It is worth stressing that on containment of Nasser's revolutionary ideology and challenge not only extra regional countries and Israel played a role. Although the lion's share should be given to the former, the inter-Arab rivalries were also a significant factor on the containment of Nasser's challenge.

Ideologically speaking, the consolidation of the state power in the Arab Middle East was a big blow for pan-Arabism. Seemingly, for their regime survival, legitimacy, and stability, many Arab leaders were exposing their policies and actions as consistent with pan-Arabism demands.

Nevertheless, while all Arab leaders advocated Arab unity and identified themselves as 'Arab nationalist' they held different interpretations of the political projects associated with Arab nationalism.[225] Stating differently, although Arab regimes are sharing the common identity, they disagreed over the norms, interpretations, and political practices associated with that identity.[226] Simply stating, every Arab leader has different "rhetoric" about the pan-Arabism.

For instance, the King Hussein of Jordan and King Faisal of Saudi Arabia interpreted that pan-Arabism does not clash with sovereignty. Especially the Hashemite regime in Jordan was committed to an Arab kingdom in the Arab Middle

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[225] Barnett, M. N. (1995). "Sovereignty, Nationalism, and Regional Order in the Arab States System." *International Organization.* Summer. 49 (3). P.480.

[226] Barnett, M. N. (1997). "Regional security after the Gulf War". *Political Science Quarterly.* Winter. 111 (4). P.599.

East under the Hashemite rule.[227] King Hussein of Jordan vision that any attachment to local Jordanian identity does not contradict with pan-Arab schemes. For instance, Hashemite pan-Arabism in Jordan developed a local territorial nationalism that would unify Jordanians and Palestinians until the day "when a wider Arab entity would be formed".[228] King Hussein of Jordan with his well known statement claimed that:[229]

> My own concept…is quite different from Nasser's…He believes that Arab nationalism can only be identified by particular brand of Arab unity…I disagree…Arab nationalism can only survive through complete equality.

In consequence, after the consolidation of the state power there have been rivalries and intense competition among the Arab leaders for the achievement of their own "rhetoric" of pan-Arabism.

Nevertheless, the real inter-Arab rivalry was not for the championship of rhetoric of pan-Arabism. When Nasser emerged as the power house of Arab nationalism, Republican Egypt under Nasser's charismatic leadership was posing a threat not only to external powers but also to the traditional dynastic monarchies in the region including King Saud of Saudi Arabia, Hashemite King Faisal of Iraq, Hashemite King Hussein of Jordan, and Imam Ahmad of Yemen.

Nasser's revolutionary ideology was threatening these pro-Western, conservative, and *status quo* oriented regimes. The co-existence of the sovereignty and pan-Arabism at the same time was potentially dangerous especially for the oil rich conservative regimes. Nasser's pan-Arabism regarded as dangerous ideological and political rivals since ruling elites in these countries feared that their rule could be undermined by revolutionary opposition.

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[227] Baram, A. (1990). "Territorial Nationalism in the Middle East". *Middle Eastern Studies*. 26 (4). P.439.

[228] Ibid, 440.

[229] King Hussein. (1962). *Uneasy Lies the Head*. London: Heineman. Also cited in Barnett, M. N. (1997:600).

Inevitably, the intense competition between Nasser and the other Arab leaders substantiated counterproductive attempts by rival states. As have mentioned above through the 'voice of the Arabs' radio, Nasser explicitly calls the society to topple their conservative pro-Western rulers. Furthermore, the charter of the 1962 National Action was declared that Arab unity could only be achieved by exporting Egyptian revolution to all Arab states.

In return, Nasser's ideology was strongly contested by his opponents that fashioned their own interpretation of regional order. Especially Saudi Arabia, as the strongest dynastic country in the region, has shown the most prominent reaction against the pan-Arabism. Saudi King Saud attempted to assassinate Nasser for several times.[230] In the collapse of the UAR, the Saudi King Saud also played a significant role through sponsoring the opposition forces.[231]

In consequence, the Arab world has been divided into two hostile camps. On one side there was 'revolutionary' secular regimes that led by Nasser *versus* 'conservative' regimes led by Saudi Arabia. This struggle is commonly named as "inter-Arab Cold War".[232]

In this competition, the U.S. administration noticed that Saudi Arabia could be built up as the best counter to Nasser as it could be the best ally of the U.S. in the region on securing the post-war petroleum order. The kingdom has an extra advantage on Muslims by being the custodianship of the holy cities.

In this connection, the conservative Arab monarchies allied with the West. As a requirement to be within the Western military and economic alliance system, they allowed foreign military bases on their territory and saw these military pacts

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[230] Hopwood, D. (1982:60).

[231] Hasou, T. Y. (1985.138).

[232] For details s*ee* Kerr, M. (1971). *The Arab Cold War: Gamal Abd al-Nasir and his rivals, 1958-1970.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

necessary for the defence of their sovereignty against the threat of communism and Nasser's pan-Arabist revolutionary policies.[233]

Under these conditions, Syrians felt themselves obligated to unite with Egypt and to form the UAR by fearing from domestic instability and a communist control in their country.[234] Both the army and the political elite were experiencing increased pressure from the communists.[235] Therefore, Syrian leadership supported a union with Nasser mainly due to internal problems. Through the UAR and help of Nasser, the Ba'th party rulers believed that they could strength internal legitimacy and form deterrence against internal and external threats in Syria. [236]

Due to these problems, Nasser was not sympathic and volunteer to the union at the beginning.[237] Nevertheless, the establishment of the Baghdad Pact, proclamation of the Eisenhower Doctrine and increased U.S. involvement in the region, and risk of Western intervention in Syria changed Nasser's mind. Moreover, as also commented by Dann, Nasser feared of clashing with his own 'rhetoric' by refusing the union.[238]

However, Nasser put his conditions for the merge.[239] According to these conditions, the union will not be a federal one as Syrians demanded but a centralized one. The army must renounce its role in Syrian politics before the union, and all political parties must be dissolved. When the Syrian officials accepted these

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[233] Jasse, J. (1989:140).

[234] Cremeans, C. D. (1963). *The Arabs and the World: Nasser's Arab Nationalist Policy.* London: Prager Publishers. P.161.

[235] Palmer, M. (1966). "The United Arab Republic: An Assessment of Its' Failure." *The Middle East Journal.* 20 (1). P.50.

[236] Seale, P. (1965:325).

[237] Ibid.

[238] Dann, U. (1989:78). Also cited in Walt, S. (1990). *The Origin of Alliances.* Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press. P.213.

[239] Palmer, M. (1966). "The United Arab Republic: An Assessment of Its' Failure." *The Middle East Journal.* 20 (1). P.52. Kerr, M. (1971:12-15).

terms and empowered Nasser with full authority, the union established on February 1, 1958 under the name of the United Arab Republic (UAR).

Five weeks after the proclamation of the UAR, Yemen entered into a federation with the establishment of the 'United Arab States' on March 8, 1958. This union agreement however was never properly implemented simply because it was a union between the most revolutionary and one of the most reactionary Arab states. On one hand while the UAR sought to export its revolution and reforms to the conservative Arab countries, the Imam of Yemen was trying to keep the status quo.

On September 28, 1961 a small group of army officers rebelled against Egyptian domination of Syria, occupied the broadcasting station in Damascus, and announced Syria's secession from the UAR.[240] The general consensus on the collapse of the UAR agreed that Syria's internal chaos and Nasser's centralized rule brought the union down.[241] More specifically, Egypt was considered to be superior to Syria due to Nasser's charismatic leadership, Egypt's territorial size and population, and relative political stability. As commented by Kienle, rather than the Arab unity, the UAR was representing the domination of Egypt with the transfer of powers and decision making mechanisms to Nasser.[242] Similarly, Kedourie also stresses that during the UAR Syria became the upper province of Egypt governed by one of Nasser's officers.[243]

In this connection, in the first UAR cabinet only fourteen Syrians were appointed as ministers out of thirty four. Additionally, Syrian army officials were replaced by Egyptian security officials, and Syrian economy was negatively

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[240] Hofstadter, D. (ed.) (1973:82). Palmer, M. (1966:65).

[241] Kerr, M. (1971:29).

[242] Kienle, E. (1995). "Arab unity schemes revisited: Interest, Identity, and Policy in Syria and Egypt". *International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*. 27 (1). P.57.

[243] Kedourie, E. (1992). *Politics in the Middle East.* Oxford: Oxford University Press. P.308.

affected.[244] Nasser also interfered in Syrian internal affairs and attempts to destabilize the Ba'th party.

Therefore, when the political parties dissolved and Syrian politicians left out from participation in the decision making process, they felt isolated from both in the central and regional government.[245] In consequence, Nasser's exploitation of the internal weaknesses of Syria and ignorance of the sensitivity of Syrians resulted with the fragmentation of the UAR.[246] As commented by Cremeans, the military coup of September 28, 1961 that terminated the union was in fact not against the Arab unity but against the Egyptian domination.[247] Cremeans defined this military coup as an act of "true and just unity scheme without giving up Syrian sovereignty".[248]

In addition to Nasser's unwillingness to share power, external factors also highly contributed to the collapse of the UAR.[249] For instance, the proclamation of the UAR feared the Jordanian and Iraqi regimes that their people could turn against their monarchic regimes.[250] As a reaction and response, in 1958 the Hashemite of Kings of Jordan and Iraq promptly formed their own union with the political and economic support of the U.S. that called 'the Arab Federation'. They also declared that they would form a unified military command.[251] With the inclusion of Saudi Arabia, these three countries militarily, politically, and financially supported the opposition networks in Syria.

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[244] Hopwood, D. (1982:60).

[245] Saab, H. (1998). "The Arab Search for a Federal Unity." *World Justice*. December. P.157.

[246] Farah, C. A. (1963:151).

[247] Cremeans, C. D. (1963:171).

[248] Ibid.

[249] Stephens, R. (1971:563).

[250] Kerr, M. (1971:11).

[251] Ibid.

Nasser's independent policies from the Soviets and decline of the Soviet influence on Syria were another factor on dissolution of the UAR. The Soviet Union was Syria's main trading partner & arm seller, and supporter of the Syrian army. Therefore, the Soviets were somehow acting as 'Syria's boss' in the international system. In this regard, the UAR under the charismatic leadership of Nasser was also an obstacle on the Soviet Union's desire to be influential in the region and over the Arab-Israeli conflict.

As a result of combination of these internal and external related factors, the union ended on September 28, 1961. By this way, both the extra regional powers and regional conservative states achieved a big progress on containing Nasser and his revolutionary pan-Arabist ideology.

In this connection, a final note should address Nasser's clash with the Muslim Brotherhood that also weakened his both domestic and regional power.

The Muslim Brotherhood (*al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin*) is Egypt's oldest and largest Islamic organization. It is founded by Hassan al-Banna in 1928. The branches were set up throughout the country and the membership grew rapidly through mosques, schools, and sporting clubs since then.[252] By the late 1940s, the group is believed to have two million followers in Egypt, and its' ideas had spread across the Arab world.[253] Since 1940s, the Brotherhood is a central player on bringing thousands of people into the streets for demonstration especially after the Friday praying.

The initial objective of the group was to spread Islamic values and morals. Nevertheless, the organization involved in politics and fought against British colonial rule during the 1940s and early 1950s. Al-Banna also established a paramilitary wing that involved in bombings and assassinations against British and

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[252] http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-12313405

[253] Ibid.

Jewish. During the 1952 military coup, the Muslim Brotherhood played a supportive role.[254]

With its appeal to the urban proletariat, impoverished students, and the fellahin, the Brotherhood grew to a million members in mid 1950s after the revolution.[255] The organization opposed the secularist nature of Nasser's policies and accused him to be away from the 'true' path of Islam. Nevertheless, when all the political parties were dissolved by the Free Officers in 1954, Muslim Brotherhood escaped from the dissolution and continued its activities by claiming that it is not a political party.[256]

The Brotherhood openly challenged the military regime in January 1954. Following the demonstrations at University of Cairo where the student followers clashed with security forces, the Brotherhood members arrested and the movement banned once and for all on October 29, 1954. Approximately 7,000 members were jailed.[257]

The relationship between Nasser and Muslim Brotherhood has been dramatically altered following a failed assassination attempt to him in Alexandria's Menshieh Square in 1954. The leading members of the organization were accused of carrying out the assassination attempt. It is not evident whether the assassination attempt was undertaken with the Brotherhood's approval or was orchestrated by Nasser as a pretext for crushing of the organization.[258] However, it created the perfect opportunity for Nasser to blame and completely collapse the organization after this incident. In January 1955, six Brotherhood leaders were executed,

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[254] Ibid.

[255] Peretz, D. (1988). *The Middle East Today*. *Fifth Edition*. New York: Praeger. Pp.221-222.

[256] Lenczowski, G. (1980:523). , Vatikiotis, P. J. (1978). *Nasser and His Generation*. New York: St. Martin's Press. Pp.86-87.

[257] Turner, V. (1974). *Dramas, Fields, and Metaphors: Symbolic Action in Human Society*. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press. P.38.

[258] Gordon, J. (1992). *Nasser's Blessed Movement.* Oxford: Oxford University Press. Pp.179-180.

thousands of members were imprisoned and tortured, and many activists fled Egypt which drove the Brotherhood underground.[259]

The relationship between Nasser and Ikhwan completely cracked down in August 1965, when Nasser arrested 400 Muslim Brotherhood members that considered being militants again with the accusation of plotting an assassination against him.[260]

Among the most prominent ideological leaders' of the organization Sayyid Qutb accused of promoting violence against government and sentenced to death.[261] Qutb's stays in prison further radicalized him and provided time to reflect on his belief system, and harden his convictions in the need for action to make Islam a total power.[262] The penalty was carried out on August 29, 1966. Nevertheless, although it is banned, the Muslim brotherhood continues to grow underground.

Instead of Brotherhood and other radical fractions, Nasser supported and tried to control moderate Islamic discourse. The 1961 reform placed Al-Azhar University under the state control and its educational structure, curriculum, and mission have been re-organized. Al-Azhar included into the state's educational system as four secular faculties and new non-religious courses were added to its curriculum.[263]

In consequence, pan-Arabism and Islamism became rival ideologies. The rise of the Muslim Brotherhood, the execution of Sayyid Qutb, and Pan-Arabist regimes' record of brutality against Islamist further widen the gap between the two

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[259] Vatikiotis, P. J. (1984:380-381). Kepel, G. (1985). *Muslim Extremism in Egypt: The Prophet and the Pharoah.* Berkeley: University of California Press. Pp.26-31.

[260] Hanafi, H. (1982). "The Relevance of the Islamic Alternative in Egypt." *Arab Studies Quarterly* 4 (1&2). P.60. Kepel, G. (1985:). Stephens, R. (1971:372).

[261] Kepel, G. (1995). Islamists versus the state in Egypt and Algeria. Daedalus. 124 (3). P.43.

[262] Ibid, 42.

[263] S Skovgaard-Petersen, J. (1997). *Defining Islam for the Egyptian State: Muftis and Fatwas of Dar AI-Ifta*. New York: Brill. P.186.

ideologies. The friction between the Nasserist, and Islamists continued throughout the modern history of the Middle East.

Some scholars put forward that this detente played a major role on both Arab nationalism and Nasser's failures in Yemeni and 1967 wars. For instance, Ajami and Ayubi argue that pan-Arabism has declined against pan-Islamism due to the secular character of Arab nationalism.[264] In other words, the main source of decline behind the pan-Arabism was its clash with the Islamic values and principles. As a corollary of this assumption Ayubi further argues that the main failure behind Arab nationalism was derived from the fact that it was not an original ideology but a reactive doctrine.[265]

4.4.5 Yemen War

The civil war in Yemen intensified the inter-Arab rivalry and suddenly turned the Arab Cold War to a 'hot' one. It also revealed the deep fault lines between Nasser and conservative regimes.

On September 26, 1962 a group of army officers under the leadership of Colonel Abdallah al-Sallal seized power through a military coup, deposed Imam Ahmad and proclaimed the Yemen Arab Republic. This was the first revolutionary movement in the Arabian Peninsula.[266]

It was again Nasser and 'voice of the Arabs' broadcasting that flamed the Yemeni revolution. Since early 1960s, Nasser was calling Arab people for demonstrations, strikes, and riots against their conservative regimes that Nasser defined as 'lackeys' of colonialism. In July 1962, students in Yemen capital of Sana

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[264] See Ajami, F.(1978/79). "The End of Pan-Arabism". *Foreign Affairs*. Winter. Vol. 69, Ajami, F. (1992). *The Arab Predicament.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, and Ayubi, N. A. (1995). *Over-stating the Arab State Politics and Society in the Middle East.* London-New York: I.B. Tauris Publishers.

[265] Ayubi, N. A. (1995). *Over-stating the Arab State Politics and Society in the Middle East.* London-New York: I.B. Tauris Publishers. P.385.

[266] Ibid.

had rioted shouting their support for Nasser that paved the way for the revolution.[267] Moreover, it is a well known fact that Abdallah al-Sallal was inspired by Nasser's book of *Philosophy of the Revolution* when he was plotting the revolt at prison.[268]

In accordance with his revolutionary ideology, Nasser preferred a more progressive regime to replace Imam Ahmed in Yemen. Therefore, he supported revolutionaries against the reactionary Imam regime. The Imam regime of Yemen considered as one of the most backward and dictatorial regimes in the Middle East. Yemen had been isolated from the rest of the world by their conservative Imams and described by many scholars as the most backward country in the world. [269]

One other main reason of Nasser's involvement in Yemen was Saudi role in the collapse of the UAR. Nasser believed that Arab reactionaries played a pivotal role in the dissolution of the UAR. He accused King Saud of paying two million pounds toward financing the secession operation.[270] Therefore, Nasser always wanted to counter the Saudi influence on the Arabian Peninsula. He was frustrated with the idea of a Saudi monopoly on influence in the region and regarded Yemen as the place to challenge to Saudi dominance. The Egyptian presence in Yemen would also protect the Suez Canal from any threat that might come from the southern entrance, as happened during the 1956 Suez Canal War.

Therefore, due to his personal rivalry with King Saud, Nasser had always wanted to counter Saudi influence in the Arab Peninsula, and to end British occupation and its military presence in Aden at the South Arabian Peninsula, as in all Arab lands.[271]

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[267] Kerr, M. H. (1981:25).

[268] Rahmy, A. R. (1983). *The Egyptian policy in Arab World*. Washington: University Press of America. Pp.82-83.

[269] Stephens, R. (1971:384).

[270] Dawisha, A. (1975). "Intervention in the Yemen: An analysis of Egyptian Perceptions and Policies". *The Middle East Journal*. 29 (1). P.47.

[271] Stephens, R. (1971:389).

Furthermore, the Yemeni revolution gave Nasser an opportunity to regain his prestige and Egypt's position in the Arab world that had been lost after the collapse of the UAR in 1961. Therefore, support to Yemeni revolutionaries would enhance the reputation and morale of revolutionary forces in the Arab world.

On the other hand, Saudis saw the Yemeni revolution and the Egyptian presence as a threat to their internal and external affairs. In other words, most of the Arab monarchies regarded Nasser as a potential enemy who was willing to act to destabilize their thrones.[272] Before his death in 1953, King Abd al-Aziz, the founder of the modern Saudi state, gathered his heirs together to warn them of the importance of Yemen to Saudi Arabia's internal security. If any threat might come to Saudi Arabia, he stated, it would come from Yemen.[273]

In 1962, Nasser sent 40,000 Egyptian troops to support the Yemeni Republicans in a civil war along with three hundred primary and secondary school teachers, administrative advisors, and doctors.[274]

In return, King Saud initially sent six Hawker Hunter jets along with eight thousand soldiers, 62 military advisers and cache of rifles by mid November.[275] The Saudis also gave the Yemeni royal family refuge within its borders, supplied large sums of money to buy tribal loyalties and modern weapons, and arranged the transfer of the military supplies on Saudi soil.[276]

The royal forces also backed up by Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and Britain that made the clash between Egypt and two American allies on the Arabian Peninsula. King Hussein shared the Saudis' concerns and viewed the revolution in

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[272] Rahmy, A. R. (1983:106).

[273] Badeep, H. (1986:45).

[274] Rahmy, A. R. (1983:91).

[275] Safran, M. N. (1988). *Saudi Arabia: The Ceaseless Quest for Security.* Ithaca: Cornell University Press. P.99. Dawisha, A. (1975:49).

[276] Rahmy, A. R. (1983:134).

Yemen as a serious threat to its own existence.[277] For this purpose, Jordan and Saudi Arabia concluded the Ta'if Agreement, which provided for a joint Saudi-Jordanian military command.[278]

After the revolution, King Hussein refused to recognize Sallal's regime and gave his support to Imam al-Badr of Yemen as the legitimate ruler. He also supported the Imam's representatives at the UN as elsewhere.[279] King Hussein also worked to prevent many governments in the world to recognize the new republican regime in Yemen. He also supplied royalists by arms and military training, and Amman Radio began to broadcast reports hostile to the revolution and propaganda against Nasser's policies. [280]

In consequence, Yemen turned into the single most important foreign policy issue of Nasser between October 1962 and May 1967. When the Egyptian troops arrived in Yemen in 1962, they had little idea about the nature of the country and its people that led to incorrect evaluations of the operations time, the possible fields of battle, and the attitudes of the local population.[281] Because of the strong resistance from the ex-Imam and his supporters, Nasser was obliged to increase the number of his troops day by day.

Royalists' forces consist of guerrilla forces that avoid direct confrontations with the Egyptian army. In other words, the enemy that the Egyptians faced was not following traditional rules of war. Taking advantage of their knowledge of the geography of Yemen and the nature of its mountains, the Royalists forces conduct their operations from the mountains. However, Egyptian soldiers had not been

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[277] Ibid, 142.

[278] O'Ballance, E. (1971). The War in Yemen. London: Archon Books. P.88.

[279] Schmidt, D. A. (1968). *Yemen: The unknown War*. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston. P.49.

[280] O'Ballance, E. (1971). Schmidt, D. A. (1968:49).

[281] O'Ballance, E. (1971:157).

trained to fight in mountains and they used conventional tactics against a dispersed enemy.[282]

With the increased financial and military help of mainly Saudi Arabia, Jordan, British, and French mercenaries, between January and July 1965, the Royalists re-occupied large areas that had been under the Republicans control. By the summer of 1965, the Egyptian troops had suffered heavy losses in arms, vehicles and men and the Royalists controlled approximately half of the country.[283]

In June 1967, the Six Day War interrupted the Egyptian intervention in Yemen. The war caught Egyptian forces divided between the two threats. A long and costly intervention in Yemen inevitably contributed to Egypt's failure in June 1967 War with Israel.[284] There were about 70,000 Egyptian troops in Yemen by the outbreak of the Six Days War, a number estimated as half of the total Egyptian army.[285] Due to the fight in Yemen, Nasser lost soldiers, equipment, and morale which led to disastrous 1967 War defeat against Israel. In other words, when the 1967 War erupted, Egyptian military force was tired, divided, and not ready for the Israeli military challenge. Thus, the Yemen War left the country defenceless against Israeli attacks in 1967 War.

Egypt had lost more than 10,000 soldiers in Yemen in addition to the considerable economic losses. Therefore, many historians described Yemen by borrowing Nasser's own phrase of "my Vietnam".[286] Egypt's intervention in Yemen was a military and political disaster for Nasser who was anticipated an easy victory.

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[282] Witty, D. M. (2000). "A Regular Army in Counterinsurgency Operation: Egypt in North Yemen, 1962-1967." *The Journal of Military History*. 65 (2). P.418.

[283] O'Ballance, E. (1971:139-140. Witty, D. M. (2000:426).

[284] Butter, D. (1988). "Egypt." In *The Cambridge Encyclopaedia of the Middle East and North Africa*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. P.320.

[285] Witty, D. M. (2000:407).

[286] Rahmy, A. R. (1983:261). *See* also Nutting, A. (1972:383).

In consequence, Nasser support for the newly established Republic of Yemen against the pro-monarchy forces backed by Saudi Arabia brought huge costs to him. Yemen civil war contributed to the collapse of the Egyptian economy and played a major role on Egypt's disastrous defeat to Israel in 1967 War which was the last nail in the coffin on the subordination of Nasser's challenge.

4.4.6 Last Nail in the Coffin: 1967 War and End of Pan-Arabism

By the 1967, Egypt was the only Arab state who could effectively challenge Israel alone. Furthermore, Nasser signed the military alliances agreements with Syria in November 1966 and with long rival Jordan in May 1967.[287]

In this respect, the division within the Arab world and the Yemen War created a perfect opportunity for Israel and the extra regional countries to completely terminate Nasser's political influence.

By early 1967, tensions between the Arabs and Israelis had heightened to new levels. Especially Israeli air battles with Syrian aircraft in April escalated the tensions. On May 18, 1967 with the belief that an Israeli invasion was imminent that is supported by the Soviet intelligence reports, Egyptian forces occupied Sharm el-Shaikh and closed it to Israeli shipping.[288]

In response, Israel launched the first military large scale air attacks to Egypt early on June 5, 1967 that destroyed the Egyptian air force on the ground.[289] In less than three hours, Egypt lost nearly three-fourths of its combat aircraft. This attack demonstrated that Israel has been planned this attack earlier and aided by American intelligence.[290]

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[287] Goldschmidt Jr., A. (1988:256).

[288] Fields, M. (1995). *Inside the Arab World.* Cambridge: Harvard University Press. P.62.

[289] Vatikiotis, P. J. (1984:254). Goldschmidt Jr., A. (1988:256).

[290] Hofstadter, D. (ed.) (1973:29-34).

The next day, Israeli forces occupied the West Bank and East Jerusalem from Jordan, on 9th Israel occupied the Sinai Peninsula and reached to the Suez Canal, and on 10th Israel occupied the Golan Heights from Syria.[291]

June 1967 'Six Day War' defeat was the most devastating event and experience in Nasser's political career. It is mostly accepted as an eternal wound for Nasser's pan-Arabist political ideology. The most immediate effect of the defeat was the discrediting of the Arab nationalist philosophy that had reigned over the region since 1956. The war had demonstrated both the rhetorical and political weaknesses of Nasser's philosophy.

In addition to the military and socio-political effects, the psychological effects are important since it is called *al-nakba* (the disaster) and caused deep philosophical and political re-evaluation of the region.[292]

The war almost completely destroyed the country's military capacity. 1967 War also put to an end to Egypt's leadership role potential because of Egypt's limited economic and financial resources that strained by the War. The War also interrupted Egypt's new period of expansion and industrialization.[293] The closing of the Suez Canal during and after the war, the physical damage to the canal area, the loss of the Sinai oil fields, and the decline in tourism brought by the 1967 war intensified the economic recession.

The extension of the defeat forced President Nasser to announce his resignation on June 9, 1967 on radio and television. He declared that he decided to resign from every post and political role he hosts.[294] After this speech, within a

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[291] Fields, M. (1995:62).

[292] Beattie, K. J. (1994:210).

[293] Mansfield, P. (1965:451).

[294] Hofstadter, D. (ed.) (1973:42).

matter of minutes, thousands of Cairo's citizens headed for Nasser's house calling his name and pleading with him to stay and to lead them.[295]

In response, Nasser cancelled his resignation and declared that he will comply with "the verdict of the people".[296] Vatikiotis noted that this massive demonstration would be surpassed in size and intensity only by one at Nasser's funeral three years later.[297]

Following Nasser decision to stay in power, the catastrophes not stay restricted with the war. Following the 1967 defeat, Israeli air raids in 1969 further escalated the socio-economic crises in Egypt. Half million people had to be evacuated from the Suez Canal area that caused housing and unemployment problems.[298] Accordingly, through these attacks that also continued in 1970, Israel was waging a psychological battle in order to break the spirit of the Nasser's Egyptian people.

Related with the post 1967 developments, Owen sums up the changes within the Arab world and the failure of the Arab nationalism under five different reasons:[299]

1.   The decline of the Egyptian power and prestige as a result of military defeat against Israel in 1967, its poor economic performance, and the death of President Nasser in 1970.

2.   Growing financial influence of Saudi Arabia.

3.   New political importance of Syria after the consolidation of President Assad's regime in the early 1970.

4.   The large increase in the numbers of independent Arab states.

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[295] Nutting, A. (1972:425). Dubois, S. G. (1972:214-217).

[296] Hofstadter, D. (ed.) (1973:42).

[297] Vatikiotis, P. J. (1984:406-407).

[298] Dekmejian, H. R. (1971:116).

[299] Owen, R. (1992:90).

5.   The creation of an ideological vacuum where political Islam became an ideological alternative in the Arab world.

Owen concluded that as a result of these processes new Arab world has emerged where power was very much more diffused and "within which, consequently, it was very much difficult for one leader, or one regime, to exercise influence or control".[300]

To sum up, many scholars consider the 1967 War as the end of pan-Arabism where the leaders start to pursue more pragmatic foreign policies rather than ideological style of leadership.[301] Although practically Nasser's revolutionary ideology continued and he remained highly popular until his death, on September 28, 1970, the 1967 War could be regarded as the most important wound on his containment. With Nasser's death, revolutionary ideology ended, part of Egypt remained under Israeli occupation, and the social revolution had lost its momentum.[302] Therefore, leaving beside the theoretical discussion whether pan-Arabism is really dead or ready to explode as a main source of mass level reaction, accordingly, it was evident that it was the last nail in the coffin on subordination of Egypt as the systemic challenge.

4.5 Conclusion: Subordination of Egypt as the Regional Challenge

Initially the British and then the U.S. designed to engineer a hegemonic order in the Middle East following the Second World War. In this sense, it was not easy to challenge high degree of Western intervention and hegemony in the region that laid back over the past two hundred years.

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[300] Ibid.

[301] As the most known demonstration of this argument see for instance Ajami, F. (1978/79). "The End of Pan-Arabism". *Foreign Affairs*. Winter. Vol. 69. Pp.355-373.

[302] Baker, R. W. (1978). *Egypt's Uncertain Revolution Under Nasser and Sadat.* Cambridge: Harvard University Press. P.122. Andersen, R., Seibert, R. P., & Wagner, J. G. (1982). *Politics and Change in the Middle East: Sources of Conflict and Accommodation*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall. P.182.

Nasser emerged as charismatic and the undisputed leader of the Arab world. For the first time in Arab history an Arab state able to follow an independent Arab policy without pursing the interests of the Western powers. Nasser enjoyed unchallenged prestige as the leader of the Arab world who overthrew the monarchy, nationalized the Suez Canal, built the Aswan Dam, and challenged the imperialist powers.

In terms of foreign policy, Nasser had been working on eliminating the foreign presence initially in his country and then within the Arab world and he has no intention of replacing one foreign presence with another. He demonstrated that his country is neutral and would resist all Western ideologies and influence, including the Soviet Union.

Accordingly, although the American policy makers were well aware of this fact, they continued to conduct one-sided and inconsistent policy in the Middle East. Nasser was a threat to Western states because he developed a very effective means of challenging their policy and *status quo* in the region. Therefore, he required to be contained and subordinated. The political and military costs of the Yemen civil war and the 1967 War defeat finally contained and terminated Nasser's challenge. On the other hand, while Western leaders concentrated on only 'challenging' regimes of the Middle East, they ignored Israel which is the core of the problem for many Arab people.

CHAPTER V

THE CASE OF IRAQ

5.1 Introduction

The last chapter of the thesis is centred on the second case study: Saddam Hussein's systemic challenge and its subordination. In order to present this analysis effectively and analytically, being similar to the earlier case study, the chapter is divided into two main parts: Saddam Hussein and emerging of Iraq's regional challenge, and containment of Saddam's challenge. The analysis ends with the occupation of Iraq and termination of Saddam's regime in 2003.

5.2 Emergence of Saddam Hussein's Challenge

The initial section analyzes the emergence and strengths of Saddam's challenge. Similar to Nasser's Egypt case, the strengths are important on grasping the root, basis, and extent of Saddam Hussein's challenge to the regional order. This is carried through two analyses; consolidation of Saddam's power and realization of Saddam's challenge in the post-Cold War era.

5.2.1 Consolidation of Saddam's Power

Politically speaking, Iraq's potential to play a leadership role in the Middle East and the orientation of its foreign policy to achieve this purpose inspired by many historical factors. Iraqi leaders had always believed that their country had great potential for both economic development and political influence in

comparison with other areas of the Middle East.[1] In earlier times, this potential mainly derives from Iraq's renewable water resources and strategic location. In the contemporary times, the country's potential comes from another crucial resource; oil.

Nevertheless, as witnessed by many similar cases, the oil also has brought its' curse with it. During their rule in the inter-war era, British maintained disunity and chaos in Iraq for more than 30 years. Especially, through the traditional 'divide and rule' colonial policy, British created a vacuum between the political groups and the ethnic minorities. For instance, Kurds in the northern Iraq have been armed and provided support to rebel against the central government. This created a strong hatred among Arabs and Kurds. Furthermore, British also encouraged and financed political assassinations between political leaders of different sects and ethnic groups.[2]

This constant infighting among the ethnic and religious groups allowed British to control Iraq's oil resources. More importantly, thirty years of the British rule constructed a political legacy for the next Iraqi generations where the tools of force and assassination became the main reference on solving political problems.

Iraq has been a target of the United States (U.S.) subordination activities since 1958 following the decline in power for the British. On July 14, 1958 a popular nationalist revolution led by Abdel Karem Qasim overthrew the Hashemite monarchy that had been established by the British in 1921.[3] In this revolution, the King Faisal the Second, and members of the royal family including Crown Prince

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[1] Wells, S. F. Jr., & Bruzonsky, M. A. (1987). *Security in the Middle East*. Boulder, Co: Westview Press. P.9.

[2] Ibid, 11.

[3] Hahn, P. L. (2005). *Crisis and Crossfire: The United States and the Middle East since 1945*. Washington, D.C.: Potomac Books. P.17.

Abdullah along with pro-Western Prime Minister Nuri Said who was serving British imperial interests have been murdered.[4]

Qasim's government played an important role in the establishment of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting countries (OPEC) in 1960 that aimed to resist the power of Western oil monopolies.[5] Qasim tried to challenge the supremacy of the Western oil companies on marketing of the Arab oil. For this purpose, he nationalized the U.S. / British owned Iraqi Petroleum Company under the slogan "Arab oil for the Arabs."[6] Qasim justified his policies with the words of "we are not combating the oil companies for another seven million dinars a year. We are fighting for the industrialization of our republic and an end to our dependence on the sale of crude oil."[7]

Furthermore, he passed the Law No. 80 which seized the land that belonged to British Iraq Petroleum Company and distributed it to Iraqi farmers.[8] Finally, Qasim withdrew Iraq from the pro-Western Baghdad Pact and established friendly relations with the Soviet Union.

Having faced with Nasser inspired political leader in the region, the U.S. administration aimed to subordinate this challenge directly in order to weaken Iraq and control its oil supplies. Shortly after the 1958 revolution, the CIA formed a committee for the assassination of Qasim.[9] In 1963, Qasim and thousands of his supporters were massacred in a bloody CIA backed military coup.[10]

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[4] Munro, A. (2006). *Arab Storm: Politics and Diplomacy behind the Gulf War.* London: Tauris. P.3.

[5] Clark, R. (1994). *The Fire This Time*. New York: Thunder's Mouth Press. P.4. Polk, W. R. (2006). *Understanding Iraq*. London: Tauris. P.126.

[6] Marr, P. (1985). *The Modern History of Iraq*. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press. P.163.

[7] Clark, R. (1994:4).

[8] Marr, P. (1985:164).

[9] Clark, R. (1994:4).

[10] Ibid.

At this point, it is worth stressing that not long before the operation the CIA and British had backed up another military coup against the democratically elected Prime Minister Mossadegh of neighbour Iran in August 1953. Similar to Iraqi case, the main reason behind the 'operation' in Iran was Mossadegh's decision to nationalize and control the oil industry in Iran.

As mentioned above, the thirty year British rule and political turmoil constructed a political legacy for the next Iraqi generations where the tools of force and assassination became the main reference for solving political problems. Especially the July 1958 revolution set a pattern for political turbulence and bloodshed that has characterized the politics of Iraq ever since.[11]

In accordance with this political tradition, Saddam Hussein grabbed the power gradually through widely resorting to violence. It would not be wrong to suggest that Saddam used every possible opportunity in order to advance his career.

In 1959, only a year after Saddam had joined to the Ba'ath party, he made his first attempt to promote himself within the party. On October 7, the Ba'ath organized an unsuccessful attempt to assassinate Qasim. The failure was due to Saddam's political ambition. He fired to Qasim prior to the predetermined time in order to get the full credit for the assassination instead of sharing the glory with his team-mates.[12] However, this premature act not only missed the target but also gave more warning to Qasim than intended, and caused confusion amongst the other members.

When the suicide attempt failed, many Ba'athists including Saddam Hussein went into exile in Syria. There, Saddam met one of the founders and most influential figures of the Arab nationalism, Michael Aflaq, who later appointed as Saddam's political advisor. Then, in February I960, he moved on to Cairo to finish

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[11] Munro, A. (2006:3).

[12] Karsh, E., & Rautsi, I. (1991). *Saddam Hussein: A Political Biography*. New York: The Free Press. P.18.

high school and then to study law. Saddam stayed in Egypt until February 1963 when the Ba'ath Party overthrew Qasim and seized the power.

Following the 1963 coup, Saddam returned to Iraq and worked in underground organization of the party.[13] In terms of political lines and ideology, Saddam supported the Ba'ath Party since the beginning of his political career. The Ba'th Party in Iraq has a complex and ambiguous ideology. As defined by Long and Reich:[14]

> Ba'athism professes to be socialist and pan-Arab and takes a revolutionary approach to foreign policy. Ba'athism ideology, however, is difficult to define in theoretical terms. It is basically an amalgam of anti-imperialist xenophobia, nostalgia for the ancient glory of the Arab empires, and a commitment to redistribution of wealth to benefit the poorer classes.

One reason for this ambiguity was the long lasting friction inside the Ba'ath Party between the *Wahdawiyun* (Unionists) and *Iqlimis* (Provincialists). Unionists were guided by revolutionary pan-Arab ideas while Provincialists advocated Iraqi unity first against Arab Union, and supported friendly relations with the West.[15] The first group was subdivided into three groups: The extreme unionists or Nasirite group, who demanded an immediate merger of Iraq with the United Arab Republic under Nasser's leadership. The second Ba'athist group that supported Arab revolutionary ideas and union, but opposed Nasser's leadership. And a third group led by Naji Talib that advocated revolutionary ideas and support union with Egypt as equal partners, rather than as subordinates.[16]

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[13] Batatu, H. (1979). *The Old Social Classes & The Revolutionary Movement in Iraq*. New York: Princeton University Press. P.78.

[14] Long, D. E., & Reich, B. (eds.) (1995). *The Government and Politics of the Middle East and North Africa*. Third Edition. Boulder: Westview Press. P.123.

[15] Khadduri, M. (1969). *Republican Iraq*. London: Oxford University Press. P.284.

[16] Ibid.

Saddam was a member of the second group that led by Ahmad Hassan al-Bakr and supported by Salih Mahdi Ammash and Hardan al-Tikriti. Until 1963, Saddam was an insignificant member of the Ba'ath Party. Nevertheless, he had a big ambition for power. In less than five years, he had become the second most powerful man in the country after Ahmad Hassan al-Bakr.

Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr became the Prime Minister in 1963, with whom Saddam was related by blood and common tribe (Tikrit).[17] By using these primordial bonds, Saddam quickly had proven himself in the service of Bakr. This was followed by domestic instability and eventually collapse of the Ba'ath regime where there have been fights for power between socialist and conservative fractions of the party. When President Arif seized the supreme power through deposition and jailing of many high-ranking party officials, Saddam filled the vacuum with the help of al-Bakr and Michael Aflaq. In 1964 he was elected to the Iraqi Regional Command and the following year he joined Bakr as Deputy Secretary-General.

One of the turning point in Saddam's political life occurred in 1968 when Saddam participated in a bloodless coup led by Ahmad Hassan al-Bakr against President Arif. After the coup, al-Bakr became the president, prime minister, secretary general of the Ba'ath Party and the chairman of the Revolutionary Comman Council.[18] Then, he appointed Saddam as his deputy and in addition to be deputy chairman of the Ba'athist Revolutionary Command Council.[19]

From 1968 on, Saddam was the real powerhouse and *de facto* leader of Iraqi politics.[20] As a significant attempt, being similar to Nasser's nationalization of the Suez Canal, he nationalized Iraq's single most important asset, the Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC) in order to enable Iraq to control its own natural

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[17] Ibid, 20-21.

[18] Polk, W. R. (2006). *Understanding Iraq*. London: Tauris. P.118.

[19] Batatu, H. (1979:79).

[20] Dawisha, A. (2009). *Iraq: A Political History from Independence to Occupation*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

resources on June 1, 1972.[21] The IPC was composed of some of the world's largest oil companies that have monopoly on oil exploration and production in Iraq including British Petroleum (BP), Shell, Esso, Mobil, and Compagnie Française des Petroles. By this way, Saddam also broke the stubburn policy of the BP which profited more from the fields in Iran and limited the production and further exploration in Iraq.[22]

Saddam was well aware that the IPC intentionally limited the production especially in the Kirkuk field by 50% while exploiting cheaper oil in other areas.[23] Therefore, in order to create a truly independent Iraq, the nationalization of the IPC was a necessity. In consequence, the nationalization of the IPC gave boost to production where Iraq's $1 billion revenues in 1972 reached to $11 billion in 1973 and to $26 billion in 1980.[24]

By this way, again being similar with Nasser's domestic revolution, Saddam played a main role on modernization of the Iraqi economy since early 1970s. In other words, he puts upgrading and modernizing the nation and infrastructure as the top priority. With the new oil revenues and increase in oil prices, Saddam started to provide enormous social services for its people. He supervised the modernization of the countryside, mechanized agriculture and distributed land to peasant farmers.[25] Saddam also initiated compulsory free education, modern public health services, and subsidies to farmers.[26] He diversified

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[21] Polk, W. R. (2006:126).

[22] Ibid.

[23] Ibid, 127.

[24] Ibid.

[25] Batatu, H. (1979:79).

[26] Humphreys, R. S. (1999). *Between Memory and Desire: The Middle East in a Troubled Age.* California: University of California Press. P.78.

the Iraqi economy and strength the country's infrastructure. For instance, electricity was brought to every city.

Being parallel to Nasser, Saddam also nationalized the biggest enterprises in the country. Nevertheless, he offered the greatest economic rewards to enterprise managers and those who successfully supervise them. By this way, he not only increased the productivity but also achieved political support from these managements.

As elucidated above, Saddam was the *de facto* leader of Iraq long before than July 1979 when he finally forced al-Bakr to resign and officially became the president.[27] On July 16, 1979 Bakr announced his resignation due to 'health reasons' and Saddam became the official President on July 22. With a good sense of humour, Khalil commented that it was not clear whether Bakr concerns were for his present or future health should he attempt to remain as the President.[28]

When Saddam grabbed the power, he declared himself as the President of the Republic, chairman of the Council of Ministers, Commander in Chief of the armed forces, and chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council.[29]

Nevertheless, this does not mean that he had absolute autocratic rule and measures at all. Saddam planned a new leadership agenda for him and for Iraq. For this purpose, he established a direct phone line between him and his people for the first time in Iraqi history, which was also unknown in the Arab world.[30] He also opened all city halls to hear out the complaints of the people and to solve them. In

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[27] Marr, P. (2010). "One Iraq or Many: What has happened to Iraqi Identity?" In Baram, A., Rohde, A., Zeidel, R. (eds.) *Iraq between Occupations: Perspectives from 1920 to the Present.* P.30.

[28] Al-Khalil, S. (1989). *Republic of Fear: The Politics of Modern Iraq.* Berkeley: University of California Press. P.70.

[29] Ibid, 110.

[30] Tuama, A. (1983). *Saddam Hussein: The Ideology and Practice.* Baghdad: Hathum Press. P.47. Ostrovsky, V.,& Hoy, C. (1990). *By Way of Deception.* New York: St. Martin's Press. P.39.

this connection, he also established an open complaint hearing against government officials and ministries and had the support of a large portion of his people.[31]

With the assistance of the increasing oil revenues, Saddam began to completely transform Iraq with a boast of a modern infrastructure, good health care, education systems and a comfortable standard of living for most of citizens.[32] In other words, he has addressed the needs of his people in many respects although he has used an authoritarian rule.

To sum up, it would not be wrong to suggest that Saddam had mobilized the masses through many measures. Saddam's leadership lead to modernization and partial self-sufficiency of Iraq without being dependent to external support for survival. He established the best medical and educational systems in the Arab world, which provided free, quality education and medical treatment to all Arabs. He founded a direct phone line between him and his people and heard out the complaints of the people and solves them. Most of these measures were never seen neither in Iraq's nor in Arab world's history before.

In addition to these policies, Saddam also took some measures in order to strengthen his leadership. For instance, he formed his leadership upon the strong kinship group of peasant origin *Tikriti* tribe which firmly controled the ruling Ba'ath Party, the armed forces, and the security agencies. He also created strong inter-security system in order to prevent future military coups with his secret service *mukhabarat*.

Through pan-Arabism, Saddam was able to appeal to large sectors of population. He also extended his alliance with the Sunni population and Christians by employing them in the state bureaucracy. Ba'ath party was established upon secular principles. Co-founder of the party and prominent representative of Arab nationalism Chrisitan Michel Aflaq remained as an effective person and personal

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[31] Entessar, A. (1992). *Kurdish Ethnonationalism*. London: Lynne Rienner Publishers. P.144. Tuama, A. (1983:47). Ostrovsky, V.,& Hoy, C. (1990:39).

[32] Tuama, A. (1983:47).

political advisor of Saddam until his death. Similarly, Christian Tariq Aziz acted as the Foreign Minister and Deputy Prime Minister.

Without any doubt, Saddam's political idol was Gamal Abdel Nasser who inspired millions of Arabs to fight against Western imperialism. Saddam was willing to play a leading role in the Middle East as Nasser's heir, with his economic, military, and human resources. Although Iraq traded with both the East and the West, the country was not in the either camps. Similar to Nasser, Saddam insisted on a non-aligned philosophy with Nasserist motto "neither East nor West".[33]

Being similar to the emergence of Nasser's challenge following the confidence that derived from the domestic support and authoritarian leadership, Saddam was ready for foreign policy endeavours. Indeed, he tried to use every opportunity in order to realize his Arab world leadership ideal through challenging to the regional order and the *status quo*.

5.2.2 Post Cold War Era and Realization of Saddam's Challenge

Since the first half of 1979, Saddam showed its intention to play a leading role within the Arab world by opposing to the Camp David Treaty. The timing was also very suitable for Saddam to emerge as a new Arab leader after the decline of power of Nasser following the 1967 War and his death in 1970.

After the signing of the Camp David agreement and isolation of Egypt from the Arab world, Saddam made his initial attempt for the leadership of the Arab world by posing himself as the defender of Arabism against the Jewish and Iranian threats. Saddam knew that this could only be achieved if the masses participated in its aims. In consequence, being so obsessed with the image of Nasser, the beginning of the Iran-Iraq War was analogous to the Suez Canal incident in 1956 for him.[34]

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[33] Borthwick, B. (1980). *Comparative Politics of the Middle East*. New Jersey: Prentice-Hall. P.74.

[34] Haikal, M. H. (1992). *The Gulf War: Illusion of Force and Victory*. Cairo: Pyramid Center for Translation and Publication. P.162.

However, Saddam's real challenge to the regional system came in the post-Cold War era. With the collapse of the Soviet Union and dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, the bi-polar structure in world politics came to an end. Stating alternatively, the most prominent historical threat and rivalry of the Cold War in the region faded away. Inevitably, there has been a period of uncertainty in the Middle East like elsewhere. As contented by James Rosenau, all the systemic changes are turbulent whether regional or international.[35] The systemic change has been turbulent mainly because of the ambiguity of post-Cold War transition period.

In this connection, as commented by Alain Gersh, Russia was in a weaker position in the Middle East comparative to the Cold War era and the country's financial resources were limited."[36] Therefore, the Russian Federation started to adapt itself to the new conditions of the new world order.[37] This meant that Russia could no longer extend unlimited credit to her allies, nor could supply endless guaranties of arms.[38] Simply stating, the Russian Federation that lacks of strategic interest in the region lead to formulation of a new policy. This policy aims to minimize the negative effects of the regional conflicts on its territory, and optimize the advantages of country's economic ties with the regional states. In other words, it does not want to be involved in the region's domestic problems unrelated to its own interests. [39] To sum up, Russia was no longer in a position to export its ideology, revolution, and communism and challenge against the Western interests.[40]

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[35] For the valuable discussion of turbulent change in world politics *see* Rosenau, J.N., and Czempiel E. O. (eds.) (1992). *Governance without Government: Order and Change in World Politics.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

[36] Gresh, A. (1998). "Russia's Return to the Middle East". *Journal of Palestine Studies*. 28 (1). P.70.

[37] Ibid, 76.

[38] Ibid.

[39] Ibid.

[40] Satanovsky, E. (2005). "The "New Middle East". *International affairs: Russian Journal of World Politics, Diplomacy & International Relations.* 51 (3). P.75.

One major negative implication of the bi-polar international system in regional perspective was the aspiration for regional 'hegemony'. Since the concept of hegemony refers to the superiority in military terms at international politics, the Arab regimes were driven to follow the same path of hegemony in regional politics. In accordance with the prevailing realist principles and international system, Saddam Hussein naturally vision that the regional hegemon defines the rules of the regional order and creates its own *status quo*.

This conviction led the major regional hegemon candidate of the Arab regional system to be involved in the conflict with both regional and ex-regional influential powers. In this context, both the first Gulf War (Iran-Iraq War), and the Second Gulf War (Iraqi occupation of Kuwait and the war between Iraq and Coalition Forces) demonstrated how the international bi-polar system in fact misled Saddam Hussein.

Accordingly, the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq on August 2, 1990 perfectly falls within the aforementioned theoretical framework and *trap*. Saddam Hussein and Iraqi foreign policy makers miscalculated the end of the Cold War and demise of the Soviet Union in regional sphere. Apparently, Saddam misinterpreted the systemic change due to remaining erroneous perception from the Cold War era and assumed that Iraq could replace the bi-polar position of the Soviet Union at regional level.

Saddam was trusting Iraq's military force and wide range of weaponry that made Iraq as the third most powerful force in the world for many experts at that time.[41] In other words, since the militarily super powers regarded as the most capable actors of the international system during the Cold War era, Iraq vision to play the similar role of the super powers at the Arab regional system. For this purpose, although it does not have potential security threat in the region, Iraq

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[41] Mylroie, L. (1993). "Why Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait?". *Orbis*. 37 (1). P. 128.

continued its armament efforts. For instance, Saddam continued to invest in armaments in the period of 1988-1990.[42]

Under this international atmosphere, Saddam's main challenge to the regional system came in 1990, which fastened the process of his containment and subordination. Iraq occupied Kuwait on August 2, 1990 by claiming that Kuwait was part of the Ottoman province of Basra that later became part of modern Iraq.[43] Saddam Hussein main justification for this occupation was presenting it as an attempt "to redistribute Arab wealth and use it for the benefit of the Arab cause".[44] Additionally, he widely emphasized that this attempt is an "Islamization campaign" against external powers and their puppets. Therefore, he tried to escalate tensions and link the occupation with the Arab-Israeli conflict.[45]

To sum up, Saddam possessed a challenge to the regional system through his appeal to the rejection of the influence of Western countries in the Middle East. In this connection, the great majority of Arabs who are felt relatively poor welcomed Saddam's calling for the unification of the Arabs due to the artificial boundaries of the Gulf and the vast and recently inherited wealth of the Gulf regimes.[46]

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[42] El-Solh, R. K. (1992). "The Gulf Crisis and Arab Nationalism". *Peuples Me'deiterrane'ens*. 59. P.229. *See* also Tibi, B. (1993). *Conflict and War in the Middle East, 1967-1991: Regional Dynamic and the Superpowers.* London: Macmillan Press. P.168.

[43] Ayoob, M. (1993). "Unravelling the Concept: 'National Security' in the Third World." In Korany, B., Noble, P. and Brynen, R. (eds.) *The many faces of national security in the Arab World.* New York: St. Martin's Press. P.45.

[44] Baram, A. (1990). "Territorial Nationalism in the Middle East". *Middle Eastern Studies*. 26 (4). P.443.

[45] Ben-Zvi, A. (1993). "A changing American-Israeli Relationship". In Barzalai, G., Klieman, A., Shidlo, G. (eds.) *The Gulf Crisis and Its Global Aftermath.* London: Routledge. P.180. Also *see*Inbar, E. (1993). "Strategic Consequences for Israel" in the same book.

[46] Mansfield, P. (1991). *A History of the Middle East.* New York: Viking Press. P.336. Khalidi, M. (1991). *The Arab World: Political Implication*. London: Oxford University Press.

5.3 Containment of Saddam's Challenge

Having analyzed the emergence of Saddam's power and challenge to the regional *status quo*, it is time to probe in greater detail the containment of Saddam's regime.

Soon after the Iran-Iraq war, the Bush administration noticed Saddam's popularity in the region and his appeal to the Arab masses as the next 'Nasser'. Furthermore, although he was not powerful as Nasser in terms of ideology, Saddam's regime has comparative advantages than Nasser's regime such as military strength and oil that makes him a serious challenge to the U.S. authority in the region. Therefore, initially, partial subordination of Saddam is required which implemented during the Iran-Iraq War through regional balance of power strategy.

Nevertheless, the real turning point and challenge was the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait that altered the regional *status quo* dramatically. Saddam's justifications of this act through referencing for redistribution of the Arab wealth & use it for the benefit of the Arab cause, direct accusation of external powers and their puppets, and linking all these with the Palestinian occupation, alarmed the extra regional countries and the US in particular.[47]

President Bush was naturally concerned with the potential leadership role of Saddam Hussein within the Arab world because of these explicit references and statements. Particularly his reference to Palestine was perceived as direct threat to Israel's security. Furthermore, in addition to threatening the political geography, Saddam was endangering economic interests of the extra regional powers.

Therefore, Saddam was required to be contained and subordinated since his regime was seriously threatening the regional status quo. This had done through five different methods and strategy; military subordination, dual containment, international punishment of the Iraqi people, limiting of Iraq's sovereignty and finally, direct military occupation.

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[47] Ben-Zvi, A. (1993:180).

5.3.1 Regional Balance of Power Strategy: Iran-Iraq War

The Persian Gulf is a region unique in geopolitical terms. It is a home to sixty five percent of the world's proven oil and gas reserves.[48] Since oil has turned to 'lifeblood' of advanced economies, the strategic importance of the region has increased. This naturally increased the big power intervention to promote 'stability' in the region.

Since the British withdrawal from the Persian Gulf in 1971, the U.S. has become increasingly involved in the region and became a regional hegemon. The U.S. increasingly became involved in the area specifically due to the 'holy-trinity' of American interests: Containment of Communism, the free flow of oil, and the preservation of the state of Israel.

As a remarkable statement confirmative to this argument, the U.S. President Jimmy Carter declared on January 23rd 1980 that:[49]

> An attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America, and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force.

As mentioned in the introductory chapter, one of the major tools on subordination of the region is the 'regional balance of power' strategy. In this strategy, extra-regional powers have maintained balance among the Arab Middle Eastern states through playing one against other. As a result of this balance, none of the Arab state could have an ordering or bargaining power over the others.

For instance, as mentioned above, in 1952 the U.S. and British government covertly organized a military coup to overthrow Mohammad Mossadegh following his decision to nationalize the oil companies in Iran. Mossadegh replaced with the Shah and the U.S. provided significant military and economic assistance to the

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[48] Hahn, P. L. (2005:7). Everest, L. (2004). *Oil, Power, and Empire: Iraq and the U.S. Global Agenda*. Monroe: Common Courage Press. P.15.

[49] Myers, H. L. (1997). *The US Policy of Dual Containment toward Iran and Iraq in Theory Practice*. Alabama: Air War University Press. P.1.

Shah, where in return Shah served as a regional proxy for the U.S. In consequence, Iran formed the other part of the U.S. 'twin pillars' policy in the region in addition to Israel.

Nevertheless, the situation changed dramatically in 1979 following an Islamist revolution that Ayatollah Khomeini ousted the Shah and came to power. The revolution ideology had challenged not only the American policies and its support to Israel in the region, but also big American oil companies investments. The 'worst' scenario could give Iran a monopoly of the Middle Eastern oil since even Saudi Arabian oil is produced in the Eastern Shia Province.[50] Furthermore, the Islamic Republic of Iran initiated to perform overtly anti-American policy that initially showed itself in the hostage crises where the American diplomats in the Iranian embassy remained hostage for 444 days.

Therefore, the 'regional balance of power' strategy put into regulation throughout 1980s where the U.S. attempted to maintain a balance of power in the region in order to prevent either Iran or Iraq achieving regional hegemony and endangering the American interests.[51]

For this purpose, as the most effective tool of this strategy, the revolutionary events, such as wars or ideologies that have potential to change the *status quo* tried to be systematically bargained or contained by the extra regional powers. Nevertheless, minor or domestic conflicts (and massacres) that have no importance and do not endanger regional *status quo* go unnoticed.

Accordingly, the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988) could be approached from this perspective. Iran and Iraq represented the most powerful regional 'powers' and the war between these two actors greatly satisfied the extra regional powers of the region. While it was a bitter war of attrition that involved huge suffering and loss of

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[50] Polk, W. R. (2006:133).

[51] Brzezinski, Z., Scowcroft, B., & Murphy, R. (1997). "Differentiated Containment". *Foreign Affairs*. 76 (3). P.22.

life, the dominant extra-regional countries sought to ensure that neither country became too powerful.

Especially Iran's comparative advantage in terms of number of soldiers was balanced by extra-regional countries military and logistic supports to Iraq. More specifically, when the tide of battle turned against Iraq, in addition to military assistance, the U.S. also provided Baghdad intelligence services on Iranian troop movements.[52]

The significant point that needs to be emphasized at this particular instance is it was Iraq's invasion of Iran that triggered the Iran-Iraq War. On September 22, 1980 Saddam Hussein had stroked against Iranian air bases and therefore officially launched the Iran-Iraq War.[53] Relations between the two countries had deteriorated rapidly since the 1979 Revolution in Iran.

However, although there was tension between Iraq and Iran since 1979, a catalyst was still needed to start the war. The U.S. was desperate to get its hostages out of Iran and paid the Iranian government for its actions. Therefore, the U.S. administration filtered misinformation to Iraq that Iran was ready to invade Iraq that eventually initiated the war.[54]

Against the perceived Iranian threat both from the West and the Arab World, in a sense that Ayatollah Khomeini could export the revolution across the Gulf, Saddam Hussein acted promptly. He tried to enhance his leadership role in the Arab World along with reassure the sheikdoms of his protective role.

The U.S. supported the Iraqi attack that took back the control of Shatt-al-Arab waterway. Paradoxically, it was the U.S. government that forced Iraq to share this waterway with Iran only four years earlier. Throughout the war, the Pentagon

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[52] Ibid, 27.

[53] Taylor, A. R. (1982). *The Arab Balance of Power.* Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press. P.92. Kirmanj, S. (2010). "The Clash of Identities in Iraq." In Baram, A., Rohde, A., Zeidel, R. (eds.) *Iraq between Occupations: Perspectives from 1920 to the Present.* P.250.

[54] Archer, J. (1993). *The Sledgehammer and the Ant.* Alpine: Lekker Publishing. P.27.

and the CIA provided Iraq with satellite and intelligence on Iranian forces in addition to the military and economic support. In other words, the U.S. and its allies do their best to help Iraq on the war against Iran.

There is no doubt that Iraq could not have sustained eight years of war with its much larger neighbour without direct and indirect massive assistance from the U.S., Britain, France, West Germany etc. Especially the U.S. increased its aid and assistance to Iraq especially when it appeared Iran might win the war. Saddam expected a quick victory, but the war soon turned against him. By this way, the U.S.' overall objective in the region remained the same. It wanted to weaken the main Gulf states and eventually establish unchallenged power in the region. This overall objective later proved by Iraq's destruction by the U.S. in 1991.

Iraqi attack was serving to U.S. interests in many respects. First of all, Iran that was still holding the U.S. embassy personnel, wounded by this action. Secondly, the U.S. administration hoped that Saddam could serve as a new bulwark against the anti-Western Islamic fundamentalism of Ayatollah Khomeini.[55] Thirdly, the U.S. and its' allies could sell their arms to Iraq more easily. And most importantly, the war was weakening both sides for their subordination. In fact, the U.S. administration did not want either side to win.

Interestingly and significantly, despite his resort to violence and autocratic rule, Saddam did not encounter with any difficulty on getting the Western support during the Iran-Iraq War.[56] In fact, since the formation of the modern Iraq, the Kurdish region has been subjected to underdevelopment, political and cultural repression, and destruction.[57] However, the most disastrous massacres had happened during the Iran-Iraq War. For instance in 1987, the two major Kurdish

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[55] Teicher, H., & Gayle, R. (1993). *Twin Pillars to Desert Storm*. New York: William Morrow and Company. P.1.

[56] Tuama, A. (1983:232).

[57] O'Leary, C. A. (2002). "The Kurds of Iraq. Recent History, Future Prospects". *Middle East Review of International Affairs* 6 (4). P.17.

parties (Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) led by Masoud Barzani and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) led by Jelal Talabani) made an alliance and allowed the Iranian army to enter Kurdish territory.

As a response, in 1988, the central government organized a complex military campaign towards the Kurdish areas that named *Al-Anfal*.[58] The purpose of the campaign was to terminate resistance of the Kurdish groups by any necessary means. Mass executions took place during *Al-Anfal* including the infamous chemical attack on Halabja near Sulaimaniya at North-eastern Iraq on March 16, 1988.[59] During three days, the town were attacked with conventional bombs, artillery fire, and chemicals including mustard & gas. At least five thousand civilians died immediately as a result of the chemical attack and it is estimated that up to 12,000 people died during those three days.[60] Additionally, ten thousand people blinded, maimed, disfigured, severely and irreversibly debilitated injuries.[61] Even today, Halabja still suffer from very high rates of serious diseases such as cancer, neurological disorders, birth defects and miscarriages.[62] Nevertheless, this and similar attacks did not find any criticism by the Western allies of Saddam as in the case of the Iran-Iraq War where Saddam extensively used poison gas in its war against Iran.[63]

However having said this, it is worth stressing that Western support to Saddam was not limitless and aimed to contain Iraq's nuclear capacity. In other

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[58] Al-Khafaji, I. (1999). "The Destruction of Iraqi Kurdistan". *Middle East Report.* October-December. P. 35. Kirmanj, S. (2010:52). Bengio, O. (1999). "Nation Building in Multiethnic Societies: The Case of Iraq. In Ben-Dor, G. (eds.) *Minorities and the State in the Arab World.* Boulder, Co. Lynne Rienner Publishers. P.151.

[59] O'Leary, C. A. (2002:18).

[60] Bureau of Public Affairs. Washington, DC. March 14, 2003.

[61] Ibid.

[62] Ibid.

[63] Dyer, G. (2008). *After Iraq: Where Next for the Middle East?* New Haven: Yale University Press. P.38.

words, although all the Western powers have supported Iraq against Iran during the Iran-Iraq War, the assistance did not extend to cover nuclear capability. Recalling from the Chapter Three, only two extra-European states (USA and Japan) able to become 'equal' members of the international society through their military supremacy. Accordingly, the similar point exists in the case of Iraq where the Western powers would like to advance Iraqi military capabilities only *visa a vis* against Iran but not in terms of nuclear power.

As a demonstration of this argument, Israel took an offence and action against the French supplied nuclear research center in Iraq in 1981 at the core of the Iran-Iraq War.[64] On June 7, 1981 Israel destroyed Osiraq nuclear reactor by arguing that it is on the verge of producing plutonium for weapons.[65] After the attack Israeli Prime Minister Begin strongly made it clear that Jerusalem would prevent its adversaries from developing nuclear wepons.[66] In this way, even Saddam Hussein did not yet develop the nuclear power, any prospects at this vein had been eliminated.

Therefore, one other explanation of the U.S.'s policy during the war was that it wants Saddam to hold Iraq together against Iran, while enabling him to be too strong and independent. With the explanation of a former senior State Department official of the U.S. administration "the U.S. wanted to avoid victory by both sides".[67] This assumption is also confirmed by the ironic words of Henry Kissinger who previously acted as the U.S. National Security Advisor as "too bad they can't both lose.[68]

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[64] Ostrovsky, V.,& Hoy, C. (1990:27).

[65] Baghat, G. (2003). "Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Iraq and Iran. *The Journal of Social, Political and Economic Studies*. Winter. 28 (4). P.425.

[66] Ibid, 427.

[67] Curtiss, R. (1992). "In-House Probe of Reagan, Bush, Saddam Ties, Where's the Beef?" *The Washington Report on Middle East Affairs*. Washington, D.C. P.8.

[68] Anderson, L., & Stansfield, G. (2004). *The Future of Iraq: Dictatorship, Democracy, or Division?* New York: Palgrave Macmillan. P.83. Also in Everest, L. (2002). "Fuelling the Iran-Iraq Slaughter:

5.3.2 Military Subordination of Iraq: Operation Desert Storm

The Iran-Iraq War brought heavy economic burdens for Iraq. With the words of Anderson and Stansfield, "Iraq entered to the war as one of the most stable, modern, and prosperous states in the Middle East but came out as a country in ruins."[69] Iraq wasted its recources that costed about $15 billion every year.[70] At the end of the war, Iraq had around $100 billion debt mostly to the Gulf states.[71] From 1982 on, conservative Gulf states especially Kuwait and Saudi Arabia supported Iraq with financial assistance against Iran due to Arab and religious bonds. Iraq's total war debt to the Gulf countries was estimated to be around $55 billion in 1988.[72] Among this $55 billion, Kuwait alone was holding nearly $35 billion dollars in Iraqi debt. Although no new loans were forthcoming from other states, Kuwait was pressuring for the re-payment of the debt.[73] This situation has negative impact on Iraq's credit standing and curtails its ability to borrow from other sources while the country was racked by inflation crises. Furthermore, it was further estimated that Iraq required another $200 billion to repair the infrastructure that has destructed during the Iran-Iraq War.[74] All these numbers were clearly indicating that Iraq economy was under the constraints of heavy burdens and there is a necessity of prompt measures.

U.S. Weapons of Mass Destruction, Hypocrisy, and so Much More. Z Mag Online. September 5. Available at: www.zmag.org/content/showarticle.cfm?SectionID=158ItemID=2292

[69] Anderson, L., & Stansfield, G. (2004:83).

[70] Polk, W. R. (2006:128).

[71] El-Solh, R. K. (1992:229). *See* also Tibi, B. (1993). *Conflict and War in the Middle East, 1967-1991: Regional Dynamic and the Superpowers.* London: Macmillan Press. P.168. Haikal, M. H. (1992:162). Anderson, L., & Stansfield, G. (2004).

[72] Anderson, L., & Stansfield, G. (2004:83).

[73] Polk, W. R. (2006:136).

[74] Anderson, L., & Stansfield, G. (2004:84).

In 1989 oil was still comprised over 95% of Iraq's export value. Oil production and exportation was the lifeblood of the Iraqi economy. With an output of 3.14 million barrels a day, even one-dollar drop in the price of oil cost Iraq about 1 billion a year in lost revenue.[75]

Saddam had many urgent plans in restarting to re-build the country and oil revenue constituted the main source of financing it. Therefore, Saddam needed to slightly increase the price of the oil. In other words, as the only remedy for economic recovery, Saddam expected an increase in the demand for oil that would enable him to raise the price of oil.

Nevertheless, Kuwaiti government intentionally increased the production and made the market oil abundant. This lowered the price of oil which was against the OPEC regulations. In other words, especially Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates took advantage of the increased demand and produce much beyond their quotas at the expense of other oil producing countries mainly Iraq. The two countries exceeded the quota set by the OPEC by nearly 2 million barrels a day.[76] By this way, Kuwait cheated on its OPEC production quota. In consequence, the price of oil fell from $21 to $11 per barrel in six months in July 1990.[77]

Prior to the Gulf War, Saddam Hussein had warned the Kuwaiti government to stop overproducing oil quotas agreed by the OPEC members. By this way, Iraqi oil would not be further devalued as a result of Kuwaiti and UAE overproduction. Nevertheless, Kuwait refused to abide by agreed production quotas and continue to severely threaten Iraq's vital economic interests. In other words, despite Saddam's warnings, Kuwait knowingly suffered Iraq's economy. Kuwait even dared to steal oil from the Rumailah field which abutted the frontier and try to

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[75] Stansfield, G. (2007). *Iraq: People, History, Politics*. Cambridge: Polity. P.125.

Smith, J. E. (1992). *George Bush's War*. New York: Henry Holt and Company. P.21.

[76] Polk, W. R. (2006:137).

[77] Carlisle, R. P. (2007). *Iraq War*. New York: Facts on File. P.28-29. Polk, W. R. (2006:136).

prevent Iraq from developing an outlet for its production on the Gulf.[78] Saddam directly accused Kuwait to steal more than 2.4 billion from Iraq.[79] Therefore, as the most significant reason, Iraq invaded Kuwait to protect its immediate economic interests.

In addition to the economic problem, there was a political aspect of Iraqi-Kuwait hostility. Kuwait was part of the Ottoman provenience of Basra that later become the part of modern Iraq.[80] Since 1970's Iraq was officially claiming that Kuwait is part of Iraq including the islands of Warba and Bubiyan. In fact, Iraq has occupied Kuwait three times before 1990. The first occupation occurred in 1961, when Britain granted Kuwait independence. Then, Iraq invaded again in 1973 and 1976.[81] In other words, there was an on-going boundary dispute between Iraq and Kuwait since the foundation of Kuwait in 1961. Nevertheless, both experts and other states have repeatedly ignored these on-going claims. The 1990 invasion was the ultimate reflection of Iraq's historical claims on Kuwait. By invading Kuwait, Iraq claimed the illegitimacy of colonial borders.

Under these conditions, there are strong indicators that the U.S. administration misleads Saddam Hussein on the occupation of Kuwait. In fact, until the occupation of Kuwait by Iraq, there have been fundamental shifts in Arab countries security concerns following the end of the Iran-Iraq War. There was an obvious trend where Arab countries were more ready for greater inter-Arab economic co-operations. As emphasized by Korany, Noble and Brynen:[82]

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[78] Polk, W. R. (2006:137). Carlisle, R. P. (2007:28). Stansfield, G. (2007:125).

[79] Carlisle, R. P. (2007:29).

[80] Ayoob, M. (1993:45). Carlisle, R. P. (2007:31).

[81] Ibid.

[82] Korany, B., Noble, P., & Brynen, R. (1993). "An analysis of national security in the Arab Context: Restating the state of the Art". In Korany, B., Noble, P., & Brynen, R. (eds.) *The many faces of national security in the Arab World.* New York: St. Martin's Press. P.298.

The focus of Arab security concerns appeared to shift from military and power issues to economic and internal security concerns (after the Iran-Iraq War). This changing face of national security seemed to presage a significant paradigm shift in the approach to foreign policy and international relations in the Arab world.

Additionally, there have been some successful political attempts to unite the Arab world mainly because of Saddam position in Iran-Iraq War since the early 1980s. For instance, the unification of Arab countries (except Syria) as a supportive to Iraq during the war, the returning of Egypt to the Arab political sphere, and ending of its political isolation (mainly because of Egypt's military assistance to Iraq during the war). Furthermore, Arab unification as a supportive to the Palestinian Intifada movement could be defined as successful political attempts for the Arab unity.

These successes concerned the U.S. President Bush prior to the Gulf crisis. As such, there was a concern that Saddam Hussein's pan-Arabism appeal could "reunite throughout the Arab world and undermine the resolve of America's Arab allies to resist Iraq."[83]

Therefore, the U.S. administration had enough reasons to mislead Saddam. On July 25, 1990 Saddam met with the American Ambassador of Iraq April Glaspie in his presidential office in order to determine Washington's position on dispute with Kuwait. Glaspie assured Saddam that this is an inter-Arab dispute with the words of: "we have no opinion on Arab-Arab conflicts, like your border disagreement with Kuwait...(Secretary of State) James Baker has directed our official spokesman to emphasize this instruction."[84]

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[83] Friedman, T. (1990). *International Herald Tribune*. 23 August.

[84] Fessler, P. (1991). "Glaspie Defends Her Actions, U.S. Policy Before Invasion." *Congressional Quarterly*. March 23. P.759.

Many scholars indicated that in that meeting Glaspie gave Saddam a "green light" to enter Kuwait.[85] Similar claims also voiced by Saudi General Khaled bin Sultan of the Coalition Forces who wrote that "it must be said, that the U.S. never explicitly warned Saddam against the use of force in his dispute with Kuwait."[86] As a supportive to this argument Margaret Tutwiler, the U.S. State Department's Spokeperson, declared on July 24 that since the the U.S. has no defence treaty with Kuwait, it do not have "special defense or security commitments to Kuwait."[87] The same statement was confirmed by John Kelly, the U.S. Assistant Secretary of State to the U.S. House of Representatives, who declared on July 31 that "the U.S. has no defence treaty with Kuwait and no obligation to come to its aid if attacked by Iraq".[88] Furthermore, although the U.S. government watched from the satellites that 30,000 Iraqi soldiers positioned on the Kuwaiti border, it did not show any reaction.[89]

Following these 'green lights', the Iraqi forces quickly captured Kuwait City and the islands of Bubiyan and Warba along with the entire emirate in twelve hours.[90] The Emir of Kuwait fled and Saddam Hussein quickly set up a puppet regime to govern what he referred to as Iraq's 19th province.

As have examined above, the end of the Cold War had created a unique atmosphere for Saddam to use his power to fulfil the power vacuum in the Middle

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[85] Mc Cain, T. A., & Shyles, L. (1994). *The 1,000 Hour War.* Westport: Greenwood Press. P.42. Also stated in Mohamedou, M. (1997). *Iraq and the Second Gulf War: State Building and Regime Security.* Bethesda, MO: Austin and Winfield. P.129.

[86] Bin Sultan, K. (1995). *Desert Warrior.* New York: Harper Collins Publishers. P.162.

[87] Mohamedou, M. (1997:125). *See* also Stansfield, G. (2007:125).

[88] Hiro, D. (1992). *Desert Shield to Desert Storm: The Second Gulf War.* New York: Routledge. Pp.191-192.

[89] Stansfield, G. (2007:125).

[90] Freedman, L., & Karsh, E. (1993). *The Gulf Conflict 1990-1991: Diplomacy and the New World Order.* Princeton: Princeton University Press. P.67.

East. Nevertheless, the Cold War politics illusion of Saddam also brought heavy costs for him. As perfectly stated by Matthews:[91]

> If the decline of Soviet power released the constraints on Iraqi behaviour and encouraged the invasion of Kuwait, it also paradoxically laid the foundation for a united global response to it. If the decline of Soviet power was a key to Iraqi invasion, it was also key to the construction of its defeat.

In accordance with the typical Cold War foreign policy formulations, the U.S. needed a new 'threat scenario' which it could organize military strategy following the demise of the Soviet Union. In November 1989, the Commander of the U.S. Army Forces General Colin Powell presented an outline of this new scenario to the President Bush: "The focus of strategic planning should shift from global war with the Soviet Union to regional encounters with rising Third World Powers.[92]

As emphasized earlier, during the Iran-Iraq War, Iran's comparative advantage in terms of number of soldiers was balanced by extra-regional countries military and logistic support to Iraq. Therefore, being different from the Iran-Iraq War in essence, where balance of power strategy could be implemented, Iraq's occupation of Kuwait was a challenge to the regional *status quo.*

For this reason, Washington expressed no moral outrage at the 1980 Iraqi attack on Iran where Iraq was clearly the aggressor side. However, in contrast to Iran-Iraq War in which over 400,000 Iranians killed, the U.S. showed a strong and brutal reaction to Iraq's relatively bloodless entry into Kuwait ten years later.[93] This is due to Saddam's regional challenge to the Western interests. With the control of Kuwait, Saddam now gained the largest oil reservoir in the world.[94]

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[91] Matthews, K. (1993). *The Gulf Conflict and International Relations.* London: Routledge. P.53.

[92] Klare, M. (1998). "The Rise and Fall of the Rogue Doctrine": The Pentagons Quest for a Post-Cold War Military Strategy. *Middle East Report.* 28 (3). P.13.

[93] Mansfield, P. (1991:316-317).

[94] Dyer, G. (2008:44).

With the end of the Cold War, the containment of Soviet communism is clearly no longer as important for the West. This enabled the U.S. to focus more on other objectives. As long as oil remains a key input to the world economy, maintaining the free flow of oil from the Persian Gulf at reasonable prices continued to be vital interest to the U.S. With the words of Myers:[95]

> While the flow of oil does not now cause the acute concern that it once did, there can still be no major policy decision involving in this region that does not take into account the flow of this vital resource and its importance to the world economy.

Hence, it was not surprising that the U.S. involvement in the region does shift from a 'slow-motion' war to an 'instant' one. It was evident that the outcome of this war would shift regional balances of power and a regional hegemon could emerge. Thus, external powers under the leadership of the U.S. do not hesitate to resort to military action immediately in order to prevent Saddam from succeeding.

The theoretical background for the intervention was also ready and justifiable. As a result of the confidence that is derived from the systemic level victory, Western scholars initiated to claim that political and economic developments inevitably terminated at liberal-capitalist democracy. In other words, being similar to the historically constructed 'standards of civilization' tests, the non-Western World has to follow the Western route of 'modernization' and democratization since the West is loyal to the moral truths that lead to 'success'.

This perception also envisioned that wars and military conflicts within and among the 'democratic' states are defunct act. This principle is further maintained by Doyle's statement of 'democratic states do not go to war with each other'.[96] Nevertheless, the ambiguity of this thesis is deriving from the implicit acknowledgement that democratic states could go to war with 'un-democratic' and 'autocratic' states with the justification of 'humanitarian intervention'. This gave an

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[95] Myers, H. L. (1997:9).

[96] Doyle, M. (1997). *Ways of War and Peace*. New York: W. W. Norton.

unprecedented freedom of action to the U.S. in the Persian Gulf in the post-Cold war era.[97]

In accordance with the on-going subordination principles, the Bush administration initiated to 'construct' justifications for the military operation against Iraq. During the build-up to the war, the Bush administration expressed several different reasons why going to war against Iraq was protecting U.S.'s vital interests.

First of all, being similar to Khomeini a decade before, Saddam initiated to be demonized by the Western media in order to mobilize American public opinion against him. Saddam Hussein is intentionally deployed as the new Hitler.[98] In his speeches and TV appearances, President George Bush used certain adjectives against Saddam including "we're dealing with another Hitler here", "brutal dictator", "the Butcher of Baghdad" etc.[99]

In order to support and solidify this argument, many stories had been fabricated as a justification for war. Among the fabricated stories, the most popular one was the "incubator story." On October 10, 1990 a 15 year old girl made a speech in the U.S. congress and then in the Security Council with tears claiming that she had witnessed Iraqi soldiers taking babies from incubators and left on the cold floor to die. President Bush repeated this in numerous speeches, claiming 312 babies had died this way. After the war however, the story is discredited and it is later revealed that the girl is not an ordinary Kuwaiti citizen but the daughter of the Kuwaiti ambassador to the U.S.[100]

At this stance, it is worth reminding that although the U.S. was well aware of Saddam's atrocities during the Iran-Iraq War, it kept good relations with him. For

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[97] Lake, D. A. (1997). "Regional Security Complexes: A systems approach". In Lake, D. A., and Morgan, P. M. (eds.) *Regional Orders: Building security in a New World.* Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania University Press. P.48.

[98] Archer, J. (1993:24-27). Clark, R. (1994:29).

[99] Archer, J. (1993:24).

[100] Faour, M. (1993). *The Arab World After Desert Storm*. Washington: United States Institute of Peace Press. P.103.

instance, the U.S. administration remained silent to Halapja genocide and destruction of 1,276 Kurdish villages in 1988.[101] Therefore, Saddam's atrocities were not an issue for the U.S. policy makers until Saddam invaded Kuwait.

Another reason given by the Bush administration for justifying military intervention against Iraq was to stop 'aggression' of Saddam. In his opening statement at a White House on November 30, 1990 President Bush declared that "we're in the Gulf because the world must not and cannot reward aggression...We're there because our vital interests are at stake: and we're in the Gulf because of the brutality of Saddam Hussein."

Nevertheless, the driving factor for the U.S. was oil. The Bush administration scared the American people that the U.S. economy would suffer if the Iraqi army would not be defeated. Bush declared this in his speech on September 11, 1990 as "we cannot permit a resource so vital to be dominated by one ruthless man".[102]

In this connection, the Operation Desert Storm created a unique opportunity for the permanent stay of the U.S. forces in the region. Stating in different words, Iraq's invasion of Kuwait gave the Bush administration the opportunity to increase American influence in the Gulf.

For this purpose, the Bush administration also warned Saudi Arabia that the country would be the next target. In order to 'prove' this claim, satellite photos of the Iraqi army in Kuwait showed and interpreted by Dick Cheney as it is ready to attack although these photos showed merely the position of Iraqi units, not their intentions.[103]

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[101] Mokiya, K. (1993). *Cruelty and Silence.* New York: Norton.

[102] Clark, R. (1994:29).

[103] Alexander, G. & Adel, D. (1991). *Unholy Babylon.* New York: St. Martin's Press. P.285. Although King Faud's Saudi scouts that crossed the border into Kuwait returned to the kingdom reported that there is no trace of any Iraqi troops heading toward Saudi Arabia. Woodward, B. (1991). *The Commanders.* New York: Simon & Schuster. Pp.258-259.

In order to get support for its military action, the U.S. administration rewarded the temporary Security Council members of Africa including the Ivory Coast, Ethiopia, and Zaire. Ramsey Clark described the U.S. aid for the UN votes as:[104]

> Ethiopia and Zaire were both provided with new aid packages, World Bank credits, and rearrangements of International Monetary Fund grants or loans after they voted for the resolution (to use force). The Ethiopian government, which the United States knew to be on the verge of defeat by rebels, was given new military aid after years of being denied arms.

Similarly, the Bush administration also cleaned Egypt's $7 billion debt and put pressure on the Gulf States to do the same for the $4 billion debt of Egypt owed to them.[105]

To sum up, in 1990 when Saddam Hussein attempted to achieve regional dominance through invading Kuwait, the U.S. intervened militarily in order to prevent him from succeeding. The justifications of this military act once more connected with the moral and political superiority of the Western values.

In consequence, the response to Iraq's invasion was prompt and decisive. Immediately after the invasion, President Bush banned all the U.S. sales to Iraq and froze Iraqi assets that are followed by the economic embargo. On August 3, the UN Security Council passed the first of many resolutions that ordered a complete Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait.

Then, the preparations for the military operation had started. Between August 2 and November 29, the U.S. stationed 250,000 troops via on Saudi Arabia.[106] On January 13, 1991 the Secretary General of the UN Perez de Cueliar visited Baghdad and met Saddam Hussein before the beginning of the operation. During this meeting, Saddam highlighted the huge American military build-up

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[104] Clark, R. (1994:154).

[105] Atkinson, R. (1993). Crusade: *The Untold Story of the Persian Gulf War*. New York: Houghton Mufflin Company. Pp.104-110.

[106] Freedman, L., & Karsh, E. (1993:94).

surrounding Iraq and argued that there must be a reciprocal agreement for Iraqi pulling out in Kuwait in order to prevent the civil war in Iraq. Furthermore, Saddam linked the Kuwait issue to the Palestinian problem suggested comprehensive solution for the both issues.[107]

Although the Bush administration previously claimed that it had no opinion in Arab-Arab conflicts, the U.S. sent 250,000 troops, 1,000 aircraft and 30 naval ships into that inter-Arab dispute on January 16, 1991. The next day, the first American bombs and missiles struck Baghdad that destroyed Iraq's communications network and air defences.[108] Then, the coalition air raids destroyed much of Iraq's nuclear weapons research programme.[109]

Nevertheless, American activities went well beyond the primary objective of liberating Kuwait. During these raids, Iraq approximately lost seventy percent its troops (340,000 casualties out of estimated 500,000), ninety percent of its tanks (over 4000), and eighty five percent of its armoured personnel carriers (over 3100).[110] Furthermore, 220 Iraqi combat aircraft destroyed or captured (plus 115 fled to Iran) out of a total of 500.[111] By this way, Iraq's potential military threat to Israel or any other country was eliminated.

The 'Operation Desert Storm' lasted a little bit more than a month when Iraq officially announced its withdrawal from Kuwait on February 26, 1991. This duration highlighted one other major dilemma of the Bush administration about construction and exaggeration of Iraqi's military capabilities. In order to convince

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[107] Ibid, 101.

[108] Brune, L. H. (1993). *America and the Iraqi Crisis. 1990-1992: Origins and Aftermath.* Claremont: Regina Books. P.105.

[109] Dunnigan, J. F., & Bay, A. (1992). *From Shield to Storm: High-Tech Weapons. Military Strategy and Coalition Warfare in the Persian Gulf.* New York: William Morrow & Company. P.353.

[110] Dunnigan, J. F., & Bay, A. (1992: 284, 286). Pape, R. A. (1996). *Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War.* Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Pp.242-243.

[111] Ibid.

the American public that Iraq was a 'threat' to their national security, the size and capability of the Iraqi army was greatly exaggerated and it is implied that Saddam's aggression has threatened 'the world'. However, the reality was quite different. As the Commander of the Land Forces, General Norman Schwarzkopf described in his book:[112]

> We played internal look in late July 1990, setting up a mock headquarters complete with computers and communication gear at Eglin Air Force Base in the Florida panhandle. As the exercise got under way, the movements of Iraq's real world ground and air forces eerily paralleled the imaginary scenario in our game. We had envisioned a huge force some 300,000 men, 3,200 tanks, and 640 combat planes which would mass in southern Iraq and attack the Arabian Peninsula. Central Command's much smaller force was supposed to stop the invasion before it seized crucial Saudi oil fields, refineries, and ports. To make the drill more realistic, several weeks in advance I'd asked our message center to start sending a stream of fictional dispatches about military and political developments in Iraq to the headquarters of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine units scheduled to participate. As the war game began, the message center also passed along routine intelligence bulletins about the real Middle East. Those concerning Iraq were so similar to the game dispatches that the message center ended up having to stamp the fictional reports with a prominent disclaimer: "Exercise Only."

Similarly, Saudi Arabia's leading military general, and Commander of the Allied Joint Forces, General Khaled Bin Sultan wrote in his book that:[113]

> I believe the ignorance about how such small Iraqi units were deployed on the ground contributed to the gross overestimate of the size and strength of Iraqi forces in Kuwait. There was a failure to realize that most Iraqi divisions were greatly understrength...My own view, and that of most knowledgeable Arabs, was that Iraq was not nearly as strong as the Americans chose to bill it. During the anxious years of the Iraq-Iran war, when our own security was threatened, it was clear that Iraq had had the greatest difficulty in holding Iran, even though it was lavishly supplied with modem weapons from both East and West, while the Iranians were starved of them. The Iraqis could field many men but, with the exception of some elite units, they had little mobility or fighting spirit, a fact confirmed to my satisfaction by the 100 or so defectors who came over to us even before the start of the air campaign, when the stream turned into a flood. I did not believe Saddam's claim to have mobilized an additional

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[112] Schwarzkopf, N. H. (1992). *It Doesn't Take a Hero*. New York: Linda Grey Bantam Books. P.292.

[113] Bin Sultan, K. (1995:311).

> 19 divisions in a month. He might have given each man a rifle, but that was no way to create a credible fighting force. In sheer numbers, Iraq might have had the "world's fourth largest army," but in efficiency and combat readiness it probably ranked about twentieth.

Similarly, it is understood that although Iraq lacked the essential supply of plutonium, in addition to other things, Bush intentionally exaggerated Iraq's nuclear capability in his speeches and declarations in order to present the country as a 'global' threat.

The Middle East Watch Report that issued in February 1992 wrote that 'Iraq's nuclear power' story was wartime propaganda as were the other stories of mass rape and torture by Iraqi soldiers. The Western intelligence agents produced most of these reports and they were very occasionally accurate.[114]

Over seven years of investigation, the UN inspection teams left no stone unturned in Iraq. Nevertheless, neither nuclear weapons nor weapons of mass destruction factories were discovered. Although the investigation is enriched through satellite facilities, the result did not change. However, despite this fact, the UN embargo continued to be enforced.

At this point, it is worth emphasizing that although it is a well known fact that Israel had hundreds of nuclear warheads and might use them against its Arab neighbours, the U.S. only tried to prevent Iran and Iraq from developing such weapons. The UN never sent nuclear inspection teams to Israel, India, Pakistan, or other countries that apparently had violated the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. While the U.S. and its Western allies have completed the brutal campaign against Iraq's conventional weapons, massive conventional and nuclear weapons that possessed by Israel have been ignored. Needless to say it was the American involvement that plays a vital role on leaving Israel as the only country that has a nuclear power in the region.

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[114] Faour, M. (1993:103).

The main question at the heart of the issue is whether even if Saddam Hussein had accepted to withdraw from Kuwait and agreed to abide by the UN resolution, the war would be stopped? The scale of the bombardments and hitting of the civilian targets prove the opposite.

Following the next 38 days after the initial strikes on January 17, the U.S. fired 284 Navy Tomahawk missiles, and flied 106,000 aircraft sorties against Iraq that dropped over 88,000 tons of bombs.[115] Simply stating, the Operation Desert Storm witnessed the most intensive aerial bombardment ever seen in history.[116]

The economic infrastructure of Iraq, specifically its electrical power plants, water and waste treatment facilities, and agricultural and food processing systems have been intentionally hit.[117] With the words of Clark:[118]

> Iraq's eight major multipurpose dams were repeatedly hit and heavily damaged. This simultaneously wrecked flood control, municipal and industrial water storage, irrigation, and hydroelectric power. Four of Iraq's seven major water-pumping stations were destroyed. Bombs and missiles hit 31 municipal water and sewage facilities; 20 were hit in Baghdad alone. Sewage spilled into the Tigris and out into the streets of Baghdad, adding water-borne diseases to the list of killers. Iraq's agriculture and food-processing, storage and distribution system was attacked directly and systematically...Farmers lost the ability to flood or drain land, cutting food production in half and causing widespread saltwater intrusion in Basra province.

Destruction of this magnitude evidently was far beyond denying Saddam's ability to communicate and re-supply his army. These massive bombings of Iraqi cities and industrial infrastructure caused heavy human, economic, political, and social losses on Iraq beyond the limit. As a result of the heavy and asymmetric

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[115] Brune, L. H. (1993:108). Clark, R. (1994:40), Polk, W. R. (2006:151).

[116] Malore, D. M. (2006). *The International Struggle over Iraq: Politics in the UN Security Council 1980-2005.* Oxford: Oxford University Press. P.128.

[117] Clark, R. (1994:64).

[118] Ibid, 64-65.

bombing, 70 percent of Iraq's infrastructure was destroyed.[119] In total; 134 bridges had destroyed, electricity supply down to 15 percent, 50 percent of the water supply polluted, and 65 percent of the oil refineries bombed and left dysfunctional.[120]

Durant from the Greenpeace reported the organization experts' view in relation to the area after the Operation Desert Storm with the words of: [121]

> This was a lopsided victory hardly or rarely seen before in human combat. This is not 'war' in any previously known sense of the word, it is slaughter...(American) army tries to inflict as many casualties as possible on the enemy while minimizing its own.

The after-effects of the Operation Desert Storm proved how an irreversible damage can be done against a society. For instance, Hawley argues that the U.S. army intentionally attacked on and destroyed Iraq's food production sources and to suffer the Iraqi people for many generations.[122] As a demonstration to this argument, Hawley puts forward the destruction of agricultural irrigation lands in Basra that cannot be farmed anymore because of the high level of lead in the soil, and the destruction of millions of yield trees. He added that hundreds of thousands of acres of grain fields were also destructed in the North and water refinery plants in Baghdad are also intentionally ruined.

Needless to say that most of these and similar reports were not publicized within the American press. None of the UN Resolutions mentioned at all about the destruction of Iraq and its infrastructure. It was secretly approved that the world's sole remaining superpower can kill massively with its advanced technology.

More dramatically, a fact-finding team of Greenpeace report stated that "new technology did not make the U.S. military better at preventing destruction, it

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[119] Jansen, G. (1992). "Proud and Defiant." *Middle East International*. May 15. P.8.

[120] Ibid.

[121] Durrant, D. (1991). *On Impact*. Washington: Greenpeace. P.147.

[122] Hawley, T. M. (1992). *Against the Fires of Hell*. Orlando: Harcourt Press.

just made it more efficient at destruction itself."[123] Most of the dropped bombs were old fashioned conventional bombs where so called 'smart bombs' was constituting 6,250 tons out of 88,500 tons (around seven percent)[124].

Interestingly, even the high tech 'smart bombs' hit the civilian targets. Despite the U.S. claims that the death of civilians and infrastructure kept minimum, smart bombs widely hit civilians and densely populated areas. Furthermore, whether it was accidentally or on purpose, many bombs missed their intended targets. For instance, the U.S. bombardment hit 28 civilian hospitals, 52 community health centers, and 678 schools which meant war crimes. [125]

Needless to say that these acts could have never been morally justified. According to Human Rights and Middle East Watch Reports, the U.S. government broke both the international law that prohibits starvation of the civilian population as a method of warfare, and the U.S. customary law Article 54 which declares that:[126]

1. Starvation of civilians as a method of warfare is prohibited.

2. It is prohibited to attack, destroy, remove, or render useless objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population, such as foodstuffs, agricultural areas for the production of foodstuffs, crops, livestock, drinking water installations and supplies, and irrigation works, for the specific purpose of denying them for their sustenance value to the civilian population or to the adverse Party, whatever the motive, whether in order to starve out civilians, to cause them to move away, or for any other motive.

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[123] Archer, J. (1993:52-61, 82).

[124] Freedman, L., & Karsh, E. (1993:313).

[125] Clark, R. (1994:66).

[126] Ramsey, P. (1991). *War and the Christian Conscience: How Shall Modern war be Conducted Justly?* Durham: Duke University Press. P.57.

As Walzer successfully points out, "the seizure of articles of commerce becomes illegitimate as soon as it ceases to aim at enfeebling the military forces of the enemy and puts immediate pressure on the civilian population."[127]

From August 6, 1990 to March 22, 1991, the U.S. militarily blocked efforts to transport food to Iraq through the Persian Gulf.[128] During the Desert Storm operation, the U.S. tried to stop all food and medicine from entering Iraq, despite the UN authorized such shipments.[129] Many drivers carrying relief supplies were either killed or wounded. There is no doubt that the systematic starvation of civilians under siege was an evident break of just war tradition.

Furthermore, the medical supplies that supposedly should have been exempted from sanctions were blocked too.[130] By December 1990, Iraqi hospitals were experiencing serious shortages on essential medicines like intravenous penicillin, paediatric vaccines, gamma globulin, insulin and potassium chloride.[131]

One other major break of international law and ethics had happened on the final two days of the war when the U.S. army, navy, and air forces attacked the convoys leading to Basra. Most of these people were civilians or soldiers that were given no opportunity to surrender.[132] In other words, on the final days of the war, the American aircraft mounted their attacks for the maximum civilian destruction and the Basra highway turned to 'highway of death'.

To sum up, Iraqis have been punished beyond their daily survival. The destruction of country's infrastructures passed re-repairs level. As emphasized by

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[127] Walzer, M. (1977). *Just and unjust wars: A moral argument with historical illustrations.* New York: Basic Books. P.172.

[128] Ramsey, P. (1991:77).

[129] Archer, J. (1993:52-61, 82).

[130] Ramsey, P. (1991:77).

[131] Ibid.

[132] Freedman, L., & Karsh, E. (1993:403).

Walzer, although Iraq received one of the heaviest bombing in world history, it is "easy enough to imagine the Gulf War without the attack on infrastructural and civilian targets."[133] It is estimated that 200,000 Iraqi soldiers were dead in 1991.[134] However, the actual number of civilians that were killed is still not known.

The only legal and moral basis of continuous bombing of Iraq was to force Saddam to leave Kuwait and prevent him having weapons of mass destruction. Therefore, it was evident that the Bush government acted immorally during its war with Iraq. The U.S. abused its power by destroying a significant proportion of Iraq's economic lifeline, thus worsening the conditions of already desperate civilian Iraqi population.

All these facts naturally bring the question of what was the main intention of the war? The war was not designed to bring democracy to neither Kuwait nor Iraq as Bush's administration claimed. The ultimate aim was to eliminate Iraq as a regional power and contain Saddam's challenge. Nevertheless, the U.S. left Iraq with enough power to enable it to threaten the security of the Gulf region while unable to threaten Israel and American interests. The outcome of this power equation was to leave the Gulf States in need of America's protection, which is financed by the Gulf States themselves.[135]

5.3.3 International Punishment of the Iraqi People: The UN Embargo & Sanctions

Similar to the earlier 'standards of civilization' tests, in the post Second Gulf War era Iraq had to comply with the UN resolutions that have unspoken and unreached specifics. The consequences of economic embargo and isolation became more devastating than the war itself in the post Operation Desert Storm era.

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[133] Ibid.

[134] The London Times March 3, 1991,

[135] Haikal, M. H. (1992:578).

The embargos initially hit the oil industry that is lifeblood of the Iraqi economy. The UN sanctions had seriously crippled the Iraq's economy through banning the sale of oil. By 1995, Iraq had lost $85 billion in oil revenues and additionally $300 million spend to rehabilitate the country's oil industry in 1996.[136]

Because of the all-encompassing embargo, Iraq can no longer use oil revenues to purchase the necessary goods to maintain style of living and people reverted to almost medieval lives.[137] This was due to the fact that the Iraqi economy was dependent on imports. Without the key imports, virtually every major facility from the oil industry to water and sewage networks had been paralyzed.

Furthermore, even the country was suffering from the absence of food and medicine, the embargo and restrictions over sale of Iraqi oil had not been lifted. In this connection, inflation remained as a chronic problem and even the prices of the basic consumer goods increased dramatically. Hyperinflation has had severe economic and demoralizing effects throughout Iraq. For instance, in 1995, the price of wheat had risen by 4,531%, powdered milk by 3,661%, and bread by 2,857%.[138] On the other hand, against these raising prices, real income of state employees declined by 90 percent.[139] For the majority of the people even achievement of basic things was a big success.

On the other hand, although Iraq was under strict oil embargo, the Western countries go unnoticed in smuggling petrol of Iraqi through neighbouring Jordan which made the country one of the 'coupon clippers' although it does not produce any oil.[140] In other words, pro-Western regime of Jordan intentionally allowed to benefit from the Iraqi oil embargo.

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[136] Cordesman, A. H., & Ahmed S. H. (1997). *Iraq: Sanctions and Beyond*. Boulder, Co: Westview Press. P.140.

[137] Borthwick, B. (1980). *Comparative Politics of the Middle East*. New Jersey: Prentice-Hall. P.74.

[138] Cordesman, A. H., & Ahmed S. H. (1997:141).

[139] Anderson, L., & Stansfield, G. (2004:93).

[140] Jansen, G. (1992:8).

Possibly the most dramatic damage of the embargos witnessed at the health sector. The embargo encompasses all medical care equipment. Thousands of children died because of the absence of medicine and water-borne diseases since the embargo blocked many foods, medicines, and a wide variety of chemicals for water purification.[141]

The UNICEF reports estimated that between 1991 and 1998, around 500,000 children under the age five died. These children routinely die from diseases such as cholera and typhoid, which were eradicated before 1990, and are easily preventable by vaccine. Similarly, Ben Meir estimates that nearly 600,000 Iraqi children had died from malnutrition since the end of the second Gulf War while hundreds of thousands left under risk.[142]

The economic embargos naturally brought two major dilemmas. Firstly, the embargo to Iraq was regulated due to the occupation of Kuwait and therefore should have been lifted when the Iraqi occupation ended. In other words, the embargo against Iraq should have been strictly a military one and should have been lifted when Iraq pulled out of Kuwait.

Secondly, even if the embargos continued because of the Saddam's possession of the WMD, then naturally they have to be lifted when it became evident that Saddam do not possess these weapons. However, the U.S. continued to sanctions even though France and Russia were increasingly calling for the sanctions to be lifted once Iraq had fulfilled the UN resolutions in relation to WMD.[143]

Thus, the main question is what was the real reason behind the embargo that led to killing of nearly two million innocent Iraqi people? Economic sanctions caused even greater cost than the brutal military operation itself. The enormous

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[141] Ibid, 9.

[142] Ben-Meir, A. (1996). "The Dual Containment Strategy is no longer Viable". *Middle East Policy.* 4 (3). P.67.

[143] Myers, H. L. (1997:5).

amount of suffering inflicted on nearly every living being in Iraq by the sanctions and economic embargoes.

The number of Iraqis died during and after the Operation Desert Storm was five times greater than the number of casualties in Japan after the attack of two atomic bombs during the Second World War. The UN embargo against Iraq had caused the deaths of almost two million Iraqis since August 1990.[144]

There is more dramatic fact that none of the studies could actually find out the long term effects of the U.S. intervention in Iraq. It has been estimated that because of the lasting effects of the embargo, mostly babies and children, an additional quarter of a million Iraqis have died since the end of Desert Storm until 1993.[145] The figure possibly reached to a million in early 2000.

The fiasco of the U.S. led containment and economic sanctions are perfectly summarized by one scholar as "the continuation of the U.S. policy of containment and the enforcement of the UN sanctions brought the Iraqi people, not their government to their knees".[146] In this vein, Hawley rightfully stated that the Gulf War was not against Saddam Hussein as George Bush and the American administration claimed. Instead, it was targeting the Iraqi people and treated them as if they were not human beings.[147]

The sanctions lasted even though the Western countries were well aware that they were not hurting Saddam or his government but the Iraqi people. Therefore, it would not be wrong to suggest that the embargo was aiming the destruction of a nation and destroy Iraq as a future economic and military Arab-Muslim power. Possibly, the sanctions also aimed to keep pressure on people and to blame the government for its own people's suffering and consequently led them to

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[144] Archer, J. (1993:24).

[145] Ibid, 82.

[146] Ben-Meir, A. (1996:68).

[147] Hawley, T. M. (1992:1).

bring Saddam down. In fact, the extra regional countries also used this card against Saddam especially in Kurdish areas.

5.3.4 Iraq's Limited Sovereignty and Kurdish 'Safe Heaven'

Historically speaking, it is not unfamiliar that Western powers have used and exploit different ethnic groups for their strategic interests. The British regulated 'divide and rule' policy on its colonies and rule these places through creating schism between different local ethnic groups.

As being one of the main pillars of this policy, the weaker ethnic groups have been supported and more power has been given to traditional leaders, chefs, emirs, sheiks, where they are more loyal and dependent to the British. If they react, they changed with more co-operative ones. Simply stating, awards and support is given to these local leaders in return of their loyalty and for the sake of controlling the major ethnic group that could cause setback to the Western powers interests in the region.

In this connection, for decades, the Western and other countries exploited the animosities between the Kurds in the Northern Iraq and the central government in order to minimize Iraq's military and political potential. As mentioned by Ghareeb, CIA memos and cables mentioned in the Pike Report characterized the Kurds as "a uniquely useful tool for weakening our allies' enemies".

It is hard, if not impossible, to estimate the exact number of Kurds living in Iraq. In fact, there are no completely reliable figures available on the total number of Kurds that living not only in Iraq but also in the other Middle Eastern countries (mainly in Turkey, Iran, and Syria).[148] Having said this, the estimated figure is around five million.

What is more agreeable in more or less extent is the existence of Kurdish identity and opposition in Iraq as a solid political force since Iraq's independence.

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[148] Nachmani, A. (2003). *Turkey: Facing a New Millennium*. Manchester: Manchester University Press. P.41.

As this assumption is significant for the sake of analysis, a brief historical review is necessary on comprehending the nature of the Kurdish opposition in Iraq.

From the historical point of view, the Kurdish community was organized as tribes that generally ruled by emirs (leader of an emirate or principality). These tribes had 'de facto independence' from the Ottoman Empire until the sixteenth century.[149]

In the sixteenth century, the Kurdish tribes enforced to subordinate either to Sunni Ottomans or to Shii Iranians and therefore have formed the buffer zone between the two empires.[150] In the post sixteenth century Ottoman rule, still with a certain extent of autonomy, Kurdish areas initiated to be ruled by both emirs and aristocratic Kurdish families, who were holding higher administrative positions within the Ottoman Empire.[151]

To epitomize the discussion so far, historically the Kurdish people organized around feudalistic style structures that still prevail up to date. In other words, Kurds have a very strong identity and it has always been very difficult to assimilate Kurdish groups. They have a strong sense of separate identity. Moreover, their geographical locations that are mainly the highlands and valleys help them to protect their identity. This traditional establishment, which strengthen by tribal bonds, not only motivated by autonomy for Kurdish people but also emerged as a challenger of centralization attempts of the central authority.

British promised independence to the Kurds in the Sevres Treaty. The Sevres Treaty section 3 named a region and envisioned autonomous Kurdistan. Article 62 of the Treaty of Sevres provided for "a scheme of local autonomy for the

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[149] Yeğen, M. (1998). "The Turkish State Discourse and the Exclusion of Kurdish Identity". In Kedourie, S. (ed.) *Turkey: Identity, Democracy, Politics.* London: Frank Cass. P.217. Also, cited in Gökay, B. (2005). "The Kurdish Question in Turkey: Historical Roots, Domestic Concerns, and International Law". In Ghanea, N., and Xanthaki, A. (eds.) *Minorities, Peoples and Self-Determination.* Koninklijke: Brill. P.319, and Izady, M. R. (1992). *The Kurds: A Concise Handbook.* London: Taylor & Francis. P.204.

[150] Izady, M. R. (1992:205).

[151] Gökay, B. (2005:319).

predominantly Kurdish areas." Article 62, and Article 64 allow for a completely independent Kurdistan including the part which is in present day Iraq.[152]

When this promise rejected in practice, the Kurds quickly rebelled against the Iraqi authority since the early 1920s.[153] The most prominent ones were the Sheikh Mahmut Barzinji revolt in 1920s and Mulla Mustafa Barzani revolt in early 1940s.[154] Ever since Iraq became independent in 1932, the Kurds have demanded some form of self-rule in the Kurdish areas with the ultimate aim of an independent Kurdish state.[155]

Nevertheless, the Kurdish opposition was not very organized until 1960s. In 1961, Kurds of northern Iraq led by Mustafa Barzani, leader of the Kurdish Democratic Party, revolted against the government with the demand of more autonomy and a share of the oil revenues. Although the General Qasim put down the Kurdish revolt, fighting between the Iraqi government and the Kurds continued in the later periods.[156] This time Kurdish opposition forces were more organized due to the two parties that have military branches. These parties are Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) led by Masoud Barzani (the son of Mulla Mustafa Barzani of the Barzani tribe) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) that emerged as a splinter group of the KDP in 1969, led by Jelal Talabani.

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[152] http://www.lib.byu.edu/~rdh/wwi/versa/sevres1.html

[153] For the details *see* Ali, O. (1997). "The Kurds and the Lausanne Peace Negotiations". *Middle Eastern Studies* 33 (3). P.521-522. Sluglett, P. (1989) "The Kurds". In Committee Against Repression and for Democratic Rights in Iraq (ed.) *Saddam's Iraq Revolution or Reaction?* London: Zed Books. P.180.

[154] Stansfield, G., Ahmadzadeh, H. (2008). "Kurdish or Kurdistanis? Conceptualising regionalism in the North of Iraq. In Visser, R., & Stansfield, G. (eds.) *An Iraq of Its regions: Cornerstones of a federal democracy?* New York: Colombia University Press. P.124.
[155] Simon, R. S. (1986). *Iraq between the Two World Wars: The Creation and Implementation of a Nationalist Ideology.* New York: Columbia University Press. P.118.

[156] Sluglett, P. (1989:188). Zaher, U. (1990) "Political Developments in Iraq 1963-1980". In Committee Against Repression and for Democratic Rights in Iraq (ed.) *Saddam's Iraq Revolution or Reaction?* London: Zed Books. P.35.

The most serious military challenge occurred in 1987 when the two major Kurdish parties made an alliance. Nevertheless, Saddam brutally oppressed these revolts in 1988 through the infamous Halapja genocide and destruction of 1,276 Kurdish villages.[157]

When the Gulf War ended in February 1991, with unconditional surrender of Saddam Hussein, the Bush administration was confident that there would be an immediate coup to overthrow Saddam Hussein.[158] In order to fasten this process, in concert with British and Saudi Arabian officials, the U.S. officials began to organize Iraqi opposition groups including the exiled groups in London and Syria.[159]

Under the political atmosphere in the post Operation Desert Storm era where the Iraqi army was defeated and mostly destroyed. The Kurds in the north and the Shi'as in the south revolted against Saddam. Shia rebellion was supported probably by foreign countries such as the U.S. and Iran. Kurds and Shi'as openly encouraged by the U.S. President Bush to rise up against Saddam.[160] In fact, the President Bush openly called the Iraqi military and the Iraqi people fall Saddam down.[161] For the U.S. administration, it was a good opportunity to weaken Saddam regime. Shi'as quickly controlled several religious cities such as Najaf and Karbala.

Nevertheless, the revolt was not well planned and lacked a full support from the international community.[162] In consequence, Saddam was able to regain control and crushed the Shi'ia militia in a month.[163]

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[157] Mokiya, K. (1993). *Cruelty and Silence*. New York: Norton.

[158] Entessar, A. (1992). *Kurdish Ethnonationalism*. London: Lynne Rienner Publishers. P.152.

[159] Ibid.

[160] Malore, D. M. (2006:84, 131).

Stansfield, G., Ahmadzadeh, H. (2008:140).

[161] Anderson, L., & Stansfield, G. (2004:87).

[162] Ibid, 88.

Fighting between the regime and the Kurds lasted longer than in the south. The Kurds under the leadership of Masoud Barzani and Jalal Talabani held Kirkuk, (one of Iraq's most important oil production cities) on March 28, 1991. Similar to the Shi'ia groups, the Kurdish groups rose up against the central government and get the control of all the official buildings in Northern Iraq.[164]

The Kurdish case was also different in terms of external help and assistance. Kurds initiated to build a *de facto* government and state, with the help of American soldiers 'Comfort Operations', and the United Nations No-Fly Zone. On April 5, 1991, the Security Council voted on Resolution 688, which set up the 'Safe Haven' for the Kurds in the north of Iraq. In order to limit Saddam's power on Kurdish areas, a "no-fly" zone was established forbidding all Iraqi forces including the flights to pass North of the 36th and south of 32nd parallel.[165] On April 18, 1991 the no fly zone included helicopters and fixed wing aircrafts.[166]

These measures led to the withdrawal of the Iraqi armed forces from the north and establishment of the cease-fire line in October 1991.[167] It is also dictated to the Iraqi government that the American 'Operation Northern Watch' guarded the Kurdish zone from the possible attack of Saddam. By this way Iraq's sovereignty has been seriously paralyzed by the international powers where the central government failed to execute its power on all the territories it claim to have control.

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[163] Lukitz, L. (1995) *Iraq The Search for National Identity*. London: Frank Cass. P.91.

[164] Abd al-Jabbar, F. (1994). "Why the *Intifada* Failed". In Hazelton, F. (ed.). *Iraq Since the Gulf War Prospects for Democracy*. London: Zen Books. P.97. Kirmanj, S. (2010:53).

[165] Tripp, C. (2000). *A History of Iraq*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. P.271. Marr, P. (2010:30).

[166] Gunter, M. M. (1996). "The KDP-PUK Conflict in Northern Iraq." *The Middle East Journal* 50 (2). Spring. P.255.

[167] Tripp, C. (2000). Charles Tripp, *A History of Iraq*, p. 271.

Furthermore, rather than the Iraqi security forces, it was the Kurdish militant groups that controlled the northern boundaries of Iraq.[168]

In consequence, a Kurdish embryonic state emerged with the help of international community after 1991. In other words, the Iraqi 'government' has not been able exert its authority to the northern Kurdish areas since 1991. Especially during the last ten years of Saddam regime, these groups were independent in terms of taxation, legislation, and policing social life. Embryonic Kurdish state had its own government and parliament, courts, and prisons.[169] This is to suggest that Kurdish *de facto* state initiated to be established with its own governmental and judicial structure and independent military force. Moreover, provided by the protection of the U.S. no fly zone, especially the KDP enjoyed numerous economic benefits in the post 1991 era. For instance, the party has accumulated enormous profits by smuggling Iraqi oil into Turkey.

An autonomous regional government established in the Kurdish region in May 1992 following the first election.[170] Then a Kurdish constitution was declared. Carver even commented that these practices made the Kurdish region as a quasi-state.[171] In fact, the Northern Iraq divided into two *de facto* stateless between the KDP and the PUK during the years of 1993-1995 following the heavy military conflict between the two parties.[172] Two governments co-existed with two

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[168] Malanczuk, P. (1991). "The Kurdish Crisis and Allied Intervention in the Aftermath of the Second Gulf War". *EJIL* 2 (2). P.124.

[169] Ah-Din Kakai, F. (1994). "The Kurdish Parliament." In Hazelton, F. (ed.) *Iraq Since the Gulf War Prospects for Democracy.* London: Zen Books. P.118. *See* also Stansfield, G., Ahmadzadeh, H. (2008:124). Romano, D. (2006). *The Kurdish Nationalist Movement: Opportunity, Mobilization and Identity.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. P.201. Mc Kiernan K. (2006). *The Kurds.* New York: St. Martin Press. P.352. Anderson, L., & Stansfield, G. (2004:109).

[170] Stansfield, G., Ahmadzadeh, H. (2008:124). Marr, P. (2004). *The Modern History of Iraq.* Second Edition. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press. P.300.

[171] Carver, N. (2002). "Is Iraq/Kurdistan a State Such That It Can be Said to Operate State Systems and thereby Offer Protection to its 'Citizens'". *International Journal of Refugee Law* 14 (1). P.84.

[172] Stansfield, G. R. V. (2003). "The Kurdish Dilemma: The Golden Era Thretened". In Dodge, T.,& Simon, S. (eds.) *Iraq at the Crossroads: State and Society in the Shadow of Regime Change.* Oxford:

bureaucratic structures, mechanisms, and two sets of military and security forces.[173] The division between the both sides had overcomed and reconciliation compromised only when both Kurdish leaders were forced to do so by the U.S.[174]

Furthermore, Saddam's sovereignty has been widely violated during this era by the neighbouring countries. For instance, Turkish forces intervened and temporarily invaded Northern Iraq in 1995 on the context of fight against the terrorist organization PKK. On the other hand, Iran was also involved in the region by militarily supporting the PUK against its military struggle with the KDP.

In 1996, the southern no-fly zone was expanded north from the 32nd to the 33rd parallel where an Iraqi air force training area, two major air bases and three other military installations were stationed. In consequence, Iraq could not control large areas under its sovereignty. During the same year, Kurdish groups even opened bureaus for Kurdish mission in New York and Brussels with the help of the extra regional powers although they are not recognized by the central authority.[175] By this way, the Kurdish groups have almost completed the realization of a sovereign state but not granted international legal sovereignty that is the recognition by other states.[176]

To sum up, since the establishment of modern Iraq the main fear of the Iraqi ruling elite was Kurdish revolt for their autonomy. These fears were further consolidated by the reality that Kurdish society live in relatively closed societies which ethnic conflict is more likely to manifest in the form of rebellions or civil

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Oxford University Press. Pp.131. Eppel, M. (2010). "Kurdish Leadership in Post-Saddam Iraq: National Challenges and Changing Conditions." In Baram, A., Rohde, A., Zeidel, R. (eds.) *Iraq between Occupations: Perspectives from 1920 to the Present.* P.82. Gunter, M. M. (1999). *The Kurdish Predicement in Iraq.* New York: St. Martin Press. P.73.

[173] Eppel, M. (2010:82).

[174] Ibid.

[175] Al-Khafaji, I. (1996). "The Destruction of Iraqi Kurdistan". *Middle East Report.* October-December. P.35.

[176] Ah-Din Kakai, F. (1994:119).

wars.[177] The Iraqi regime was concerned that this situation could 'internationalise' the ethnic conflict and leads to outside involvement with the justification of protecting the ethnic minority.

In fact, this was exactly what had happened. Saddam's power has been seriously curtailed through the establishment of the Kurdish 'safe heaven' and de facto government & state. Before the latest American military operation, the central government had no capacity to rule a great portion of Iraqi territory due to the international sanctions that is completely unacceptablefor any Western state.

Nevertheless, the most recent and noteworthy blow on containment of Iraq was the occupation of the country by the U.S. It would not be wrong to argue that the U.S. occupation could not be that easy and successful if the majority of the Kurdish groups did not co-operate with the occupation forces.

5.3.5 Dual Containment

In the post second-Gulf War environment, the U.S. was faced with a new situation. When the previous policy of maintain a balance of power strategy between Iran and Iraq is no longer tenable due to both countries hostile policies against the U.S. policies, a new strategy became a necessity. With Iran that continuing to pursue policies hostile to American interests, and having just fought against Iraq, the U.S. was faced with a new situation. For this purpose, the Clinton Administration adopted a policy of 'dual containment' that aimed to isolate both Iran and Iraq from the international community when they came to power in 1992.

In the light of their actions and policies, both states were considered as 'backlash' states and therefore, must be contained. For instance, both states expressed their hostility to Israel that served as a justification for dual containment. In the case of Iraq, dual containment specifically aimed to ouster Saddam Hussein while in Iran the Islamic regime sought to be contained. For this purpose, as

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[177] Gurr, R. T., & Scarritt, J. R. (1989). "Minorities at Risk: A Global Survey". *Human Rights Quarterly*. 11 (3). Pp.380-381.

examined above, initially various cruel economic sanctions were deployed. These economic sanctions were unilateral in the case of Iran while it was multilateral in the case of Iraq.

In accordance with the typical Cold War foreign policy formulations and justifications for the Operation Desert Storm, the underlying premise of the dual containment was that the U.S. and international security is primarily threatened by 'rogue' states in the developing world.[178] The Desert Storm Operation was a reply to counter this threat. It was this 'rogue doctrine' that was endorsed by the American Congress that subsequently provided enough funds to implement the war strategy.[179]

The Clinton Administration has continued to employ the rogue doctrine, albeit in a slightly different guise: The rogue states have now become 'backlash' states. Anthony Lake who was then Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, has outlined the key features of such states as:

> These backlash states have some common characteristics. Ruled by cliques that control power through coercion, they suppress basic human rights and promote radical ideologies. While their political systems may vary, their leaders share a common antipathy toward popular participation that might undermine the existing regimes...they share a siege mentality. Accordingly, they are embarked on ambitious and costly military programs – especially in Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and Missile Delivery Systems (MDS) in a misguided quest for the great equalizer.

According to this definition, Lake listed Cuba, North Korea, Libya, Iran, and Iraq as specific examples of 'backlash' states.[180] He further suggested that the U.S., as the sole superpower, has a responsibility to neutralize, contain, and eventually transform these states into constructive members of the international community.

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[178] Klare, M. (1998:13).

[179] Ibid.

[180] Lake, A. (1994). "Confronting Backlash States". *Foreign Affairs.* 73 (2). Pp.46.

Therefore, certain highlights are worth mentioning since they form the central pillar of the U.S. approach to the 'backlash' states and constitutes strong consistencies with the historical subordination and dualistic international order.

For instance, Lake particularly emphasized that backlash states were breaking basic human rights and control their power with coercion. The double reading of this statement implies that these states failed to form 'civilizational' standards and therefore not capable of ruling their territories. Paradoxically however, these regimes promote 'radical ideologies' and might undermine the existing radical conservative regimes of the Gulf that have similar human rights records and absence of democratic principles.

Second point at this vein is strongly emphasizing upon these states' military capabilities that could 'equalize' the power of the extra regional countries. Therefore, since these states powers are 'misguided' it needs to be contained.

The policy of containing a hostile state is not an alien concept for the U.S. It is usually associated with the American approach toward the Soviet Union during the Cold War. The rationality of containment is progressively summarized by Kennan as:[181]

> The United States has it in its power to increase enormously the strains under which Soviet policy must operate, to force upon the Kremlin a far greater degree of moderation and circumspection than it has had to observe in recent years, and in this way to promote tendencies which must eventually find their outlet in either the break-up or gradual mellowing of Soviet power.

Therefore, the Clinton Administration mentality regarding to containment was simple: If containment were successful against a monolithic superpower in a bi-polar world, it would work more easily with less powerful states in a world where the U.S. remained as the only superpower.

To sum up, the 'rogue' doctrine represents a combination of continuities from the Cold War strategy. The threats have changed; the regional 'backlash' states that included Iran and Iraq represented as the principal threat to both the U.S.

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[181] Kennan, G. (1947). "The sources of Soviet Conduct". *Foreign Affairs.* 25 (4). P.582.

and international security. The strategy of containment however, remained unchanged. The containment of backlash states therefore provided the theoretical rationality of the dual containment.

Both regimes required to be contained because of the policies pursued by their strong leadership and the geo-political challenge that they represent. In other words, the potential capabilities of both countries alarmed the U.S. administration. Both countries are well endowed in natural resources and had considerable economic and military potential to occupy a strategic location and position.

In this connection, there were four major points in terms of foreign policy behaviour that run counter to the U.S. interests. These points could be summarized as:

i.   Opposition against Israel and support for Palestinians.

ii.   Conventional arms build up and attempts to acquire nuclear power and Weapons of Mass Destruction that could change the regional *status quo*.

iii.   Support for regional terrorist organizations that run counter to the U.S. and Israel's interests.

iv.   Subversion of friendly Arab governments and potential threat to regional order.

In consequence, these two backlash states required to be contained in terms of the simultaneous isolation of Iran and Iraq from the international community. Therefore, the question that arose was what exactly dual containment policy involved?

The first point to note is that dual containment is not the same as duplicate containment. The nature of containment differs for each country. Therefore, the broader tools of dual containment must be explained.

In dual containment, the U.S. no longer sought a balance of power between Iran and Iraq. Instead, through the help of regional allies such as Israel, Egypt, Turkey, and the states of the Gulf Co-operation Council, (GCC) the U.S. aimed to

counter both states. The Turkish-Israeli military alliance of that era could be regarded as an obvious tactical value to the U.S. suited to fit at this manner.

As noted by Hubbell, for the containment of the both countries, initially the U.S. expanded its military presence in the region. For this purpose, first of all 20,000 troops were stationed in the Persian Gulf along with pre-positioned equipment that cost $50 billion.[182] In addition, the U.S. Fifth Fleet permanently based in Bahrain. Furthermore, the GCC states have attempted to develop a credible deterrence force, and this has led to huge arms spending on their part, most of which benefitted by the U.S. As a result, through the dual containment policy, the U.S. engaged in much larger unilateral role in managing Gulf affairs.

Secondly, in addition to the political isolation, there were also harsh economic measures as detailed above. Since the end of the second Gulf War, Iraq has been subject to full-scale UN sanctions and an oil embargo. The military containment has followed the economic containment that already has inherited from the Bush administration including the no-fly zones in the Kurdish area of Northern Iraq and Shi'ia dominated Southern Iraq. The Clinton administration tried to contain Saddam while also supporting the Iraqi opposition.[183]

On the other hand, since it was recognized that the containment of Iraq might allow the balance to tip in favour of Iran, the U.S. administration also imposes *unilateral* sanctions on Iran with Israel. In other words, only the U.S. and Israel were willing to economically isolate Iran.

Dual containment was in use for ten years. Having outlined the objectives and methods employed in dual containment; in neither Iran nor Iraq the dual containment has reached its objectives.

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[182] Hubbell, S. (1998). "The Containment Myth: US Middle East Policy in Theory and Practice. *Middle East Report.* 28 (3). P.9.

[183] Donnelly, T. (2004). *Operation Iraqi Freedom. A Strategic Assesment.* Washington D.C.: The AEI Press.

Twelve years after the Gulf War, Saddam Hussein still remained in power in Iraq and there has not been significant change in Iran's foreign policy behaviour *visa vis* region. Saddam Hussein continued to refuse to follow American political objectives and the hope that multilateral sanctions would cripple the regime down and activate a popular uprising has been failed.

Nevertheless, as has elucidated above, not the Saddam regime but the Iraqi people have suffered most from the economic sanctions. These people have not threatened Saddam's hold on power, and even after the two Gulf wars he still maintains sufficient military strength to overrun Kuwait and quell internal opposition.

Since dual containment failed to achieve the required objectives, new (harsher) methods and strategies put into implication to terminate the Saddam's challenge for good. This was the last nail on the Saddam's coffin.

5.3.6: Last Nail in the Coffin: Occupation of Iraq and Termination of Saddam's Regime

As analyzed above, the devastating military defeat by the coalition forces in 1991 and 12 years of heavy economic sanctions imposed by the U.N. completely destroyed Iraq. Nevertheless, despite all these measures and destructions, Saddam Hussein able to survive Operation Desert Storm, domestic rebellions, and sanctions. Furthermore, he was still *not* on the line of the American foreign policy objectives that defined above. Therefore, a final attempt is required to contain and in fact to completely terminate the Saddam's challenge.

After 9/11, the Bush administration offered a number of reasons to justify military action in Iraq. These ranged from the need to bring about regime change to disarming the Iraqi regime of its WMD, fight against international terrorism, to

achieving freedom for the Iraqi people. In 2003, Bush declared in State of the Union that:[184]

> Today, the gravest danger in the war on terror, the gravest danger facing America and the world, is outlaw regimes that seek and possess nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. These regimes could use such weapons for blackmail, terror and mass murder. They could also give or sell those weapons to terrorist allies, who would use them without the least hesitation.'

In his state of the Union speech in January 2003 President Bush once more repetated that Saddam Hussein had biological weapons that enough to kill several million people.[185]

Therefore, in the post 9/11 era, during the months leading up to the invasion of Iraq, Saddam Hussein once more became an imminent threat to the safety and security of the U.S. This time Saddam was presented as the greatest danger to both the U.S. national security and to the world peace. In other words, the issues WMD, international terrorism, rogue states, and anti-democratic regimes were amalgamated into one big homogeneous threat to the security of the American people.

Bush administration successfully gained a wide scale public support for the invasion of Iraq in 2003 by influencing public opinion on Saddam Hussein's threat of the WMD and therefore, the need for war.[186] Public polls demonstrated that Bush made two-thirds of Americans to believe that Iraq already possessed WMD and an

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[184] Dodge, T. (2005). "Iraqi Transitions: From regime change to state collapse." *Third World Quarterly*. 26 (4-5). P.720. Litwak, R. S. (2003). "The new calculus of pre-emption". *Survival*. 44 (4). P.53.

[185] Everest, L. (2004:15).

[186] Schmitt, M. N. (2004). "The Legality of Operation Iraqi Freedom under International Law". *Journal of Military Ethics*. 3 (2). P.87.

overwhelming majority (81 percent) of Americans believed the only solution of this problem is removing Saddam Hussein from the power.[187]

Bush puts forward that in order to avoid catastrophe, the U.S. needed to prevent rogue states (or states at the Axis of Evil) like Iraq that supported terrorism from possessing nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons.[188] It is put forward that Iraq's WMD programs could seriously threaten the entire Middle East and unbalance the region's strategic posture.[189]

As a key member state of the Axis of Evil, the Bush administration also directly linked Saddam Hussein with 9/11 and Al Qaeda, and by this way addressed him as the key target on the 'war on terror'.[190] Interestingly, before 9/11 there had never been any intelligence that linked Iraq with Al Qaeda.[191] Therefore, Bush based his occupation on two main reasoning: Saddam's possession of WMD & and his link with Al Qaeda and 9/11 attacks.

By going to war with Iraq, Bush declared that he would disarm Saddam from the WMD, bring democracy to Iraq and liberate the Iraqi people, and by

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[187] Smidt, C. E. (2005). "Religion and American Attitudes Toward Islam and an Invasion of Iraq". *Sociology of Religion.* 66 (3). P.247. Also in Everts, P., & Isernia, P. (2005). "The Polls-Trends: The War in Iraq." *Public Opinion Quarterly. 69 (2).* Summer. P.266.

[188] For this and similar statements at the smae vein see Bush State of the Union Address speeches of 2002 and 2003, Bush, G. W. (2003). Threats and Responses; Bush's Speech on Iraq: 'Saddam Hussein and His Sons Must Leave." New York: The New York Times Press. Available at: http://query.nytimes.com/search/restricted/article?res=FB0C11F93F550C7B8DDDAA0894DB4044 82. The White House. The National Security Strategy of the United States of America. Washington, September 2002. Available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf.

[189] Bodansky, Y. (2004). *The Secret History of the Iraq War.* New York: Harper Collins. P.7.

[190] Ullman, H. (2006). "Is the US winning or losing the global war on terror and how do we know?" *Australian Journal of International Affairs.* 60 (1). P.32. *See* also Johnson, J. T. (2006). "Humanitarian Intervention after Iraq: Just War and International Law Perspectives." *Journal of Military Ethics.* 5 (2). P.115. Everts, P., & Isernia, P. (2005). "The Polls-Trends: The War in Iraq." *Public Opinion Quarterly. 69 (2).* Summer. Pp.265. Everest, L. (2004:1, 3).

[191] Dyer, G. (2008:51).

eliminating one of the main suppliers of the Al-Qaida, he will restore the peace and security in the region and of the world.[192]

Recalling from the Chapter Two, historical methods of subordination included selectivity on interpretation and regulation of international law. In that sense, without the UN approval, the Bush administration deposition of Saddam Hussein through direct occupation of Iraq initiated on March 20, 2003.

The 2003 invasion of Iraq ended in three weeks on May 1, 2003. The U.S. and British forces played a major role on the occupation with 150.000 and 45.000 soldiers respectively.[193] The KDP also has worked closely with the U.S. led coalition, both militarily and politically. 70,000 militia of the KDP helped to the U.S. forces during the occupation.[194]

The U.S. led coalition forces achieved an easy victory over the ill equipped weak Iraqi army. Heavy bombardment of the U.S. air forces had paralyzed the Iraqi artillery and tanks, and left them ineffective on their attempt of defence. Consequently, the occupation land forces took Baghdad easily without encountering a serious resistance.

Dramatically, being similar to the Operation Desert Storm, during the occupation of Iraq once more the U.S. army hit the civilian targets. Those civilian targets included almost all the economic infrastructure of the Iraqi society, such as clean water systems and water pumping stations, communication and transportation systems, electric power grids, purification plants, and even hospitals.[195] The World

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[192] Zahawit, H. (2007). "Redefining the Laws of Occupation in the Wake of Operation Iraqi "Freedom"." *California Law Review*. Vol. 95. Pp.2297.

[193] *CNN*. February 18, 2003. Available at:
http://www.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/meast/02/18/sprj.irq.deployment/index.html.

[194] Ibid.

[195] Walzer, M. (1977). *Just and unjust wars: A moral argument with historical illustrations.* New York: Basic Books. P.21.

Health Organization has estimated that 150,000 Iraqis lost their lives just because of the coalition forces insurgent military action on the first two weeks only.[196]

On the other hand, as demonstrated from the figure below, Saddam Hussein regime has been subordinated by the U.S. despite the heavy military casualties. These numbers and casualties proved the fact that the containment and subordination of Saddam regime was determined to be achieved at all military and humanistic costs.

After the occupation of Iraq, soon it has been revealed that Saddam did not possess WMD. In fact, months prior to the war, Scott Ritter (the former UN weapons inspector in Iraq) stated that since 1998 Iraq has been fundamentally disarmed where 90-95% of Iraq's WMD capabilities have been verifiably eliminated.[197] This includes all the factories used to produce chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons, and ballistic missiles along with the associated equipment of these factories and the vast majority of the products coming out of these factories.[198]

Ritter added that any remaining biological and chemical weapons were then useless due to their limited lifespan, and the infrastructure needed to develop these weapons could not have been hidden anyway from the satellite or U.S./U.K. flyovers.

The Bush's administration arms inspector Charles Duelfer report on October 6, 2004 concluded that "Saddam Hussein did not produce or possess any weapons of mass destruction fro more than a decade before the U.S. led

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[196] Wages of War – Appendix 1. Survey of reported Iraqi combatant fatalities in the 2003 war | Commonwealth Institute of Cambridge". Comw.org. Available at: http://www.comw.org/pda/0310rm8ap1.html#10.%20Karbala,%20Karbala%20gap,%20and%20north%20to%20Baghdad. Retrieved 2009-09-13.

[197] Pitt, W. R., & Ritter, S. (2002). *War on Iraq: What Team Bush doesn't want you to know*. New York: Context Books. P.28.

[198] Ibid.

invasion".[199] In 2005, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) released a final report confirming that no WMD had been found in Iraq.[200]

Similarly, an explicit connection between Iraq and the 9/11 attacks have never been found.[201] In fact, in February 2002 the American Congress commission that investigates the link between Iraq and 9/11 found not an Iraqi but a Saudi connection.[202] Nevertheless, the Bush administration deleyed the release of the report until the occupation of Iraq with the fear that it could undermine the government's rationale for war.[203] By this way, it is once more confirmed that President Bush and the U.S. administration intentionally mislead both the world and the American public by drawing a link between Saddam Hussein and 9/11 attacks in order to justify the invasion of Iraq as a part of the global war on terror.

Table 5.1 American Military Casualties in Iraq

Source: http://www.antiwar.com/casualties

Date	Total	In Combat
American Deaths		
Since war began (3/19/03):	**4488**	**3532**
Since "Mission Accomplished" (5/1/03) (the list)	**4347**	**3424**
Since Handover (6/29/04):	**3627**	**2899**
Since Obama Inauguration (1/20/09):	**257**	**128**
Since Operation New Dawn:	**68**	**39**
American Wounded	**Official**	**Estimated**
Total Wounded:	**33184**	**Over 100000**

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[199] Polk, W. R. (2006:168).

[200] CIA's final report: No WMD found in Iraq. MSNBC.com. Msnbc.msn.com. April 25, 2005. http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/7634313/. Retrieved 2008-09-01. *See* also Everest, L. (2004:16), El-Shibiny, M. (2010). *Iraq: A Lost War.* New York: Palgrave Macmillan. P.5.

[201] Hahn, P. L. (2005:127). Everest, L. (2004:14).

[202] Everest, L. (2004:15).

[203] Ibid.

All these lead to a paradoxical result. Accordingly, the U.S. occupation of Iraq started after the U.S. authorities became confident that Saddam do not posses WMD. In fact, if Saddam really has the WMD there is no obstacle on him to either use it against the U.S. forces or gives these weapons to his allies or regional terror organizations that are fighting against Israel on the verge of the American occupation. There is no doubt that this could cause unimaginable terror and violence on the U.S. and its allies in the region.

To sum up, once more Iraq had been destructed, occupied, and subordinated with the false claims in producing the WMD and Al Qaeda connection. The similar justification was also used for the Operation Desert Storm in 1991. Even after the occupation, no trace of the WMD had found. Furthermore, the exposition of human right crimes, abuses, and torture against Iraqi civilians and prisoners during the 2003 occupation and afterwards enhances the criticisms against the U.S. in the Middle East and Europe as elsewhere.

The cost of the Iraqi occupation was also quite heavy similar to the 'Operation Desert Storm'. An estimated 700,000 Iraqi civilians (almost 3 percent of the population) and 4,000 Iraqi soldiers lost their lives.[204] The cost of war was over $300 billion where 2.5 million Iraqis had to left their homes for other parts of Iraq and another one and a half million had to fled to neighbouring countries.[205] El-Shibiny has noted that most of these refugees were women and children and many children have been forced to live on the streets since they lost their parents during the war.[206] As commented by James Dobbins, 'humanitarian intervention' to 'humanitarian disaster' because over 4.2 million Iraqis (that refers to more than 16 percent of the Iraqi population) lost their homes and became refugees.[207]

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[204] El-Shibiny, M. (2010:6).

[205] Ibid.

[206] Ibid.

[207] Dobbins, J. (2004). *America's Role in Nation-Building: Germany to Iraq.* Santa Monica, CA: RAND. P.182.

In addition to subordination of Saddam Hussein, the occupation of Iraq was directly related with the control of the Middle Eastern oil. Iraq is the second largest oil producer following Saudi Arabia with 1.8 million barrels per day that could be further increased to 2 million barrels.[208] Furthermore, as revealed by the U.S. Energy Information Administration, Iraq still has one-third of of the world's known oil reserves.[209]

Post 2003 Iraq is completely subordinated country with limited sovereignty. In addition to the presence of foreign civilian and military forces, many American advisors play an important role on ruling of the country. Moreover, beside the Kurdish problem, the Sunni-Shi'ia split is escalated and led to big scaled domestic violence. In the elections after the occupation, ethnic and sectarian schisms became most visible. The elections look like a race between the sects and tribes rather than a nation-wide election.[210] In other words, all politically active groups in Iraq appear to be divided along sectarian or ethnic lines.[211]

Therefore, the American occupation of Iraq had completely reached its objectives in terms of eliminating Saddam's regional challenge and completely subordinate Iraq to not to be a prospect challenger. The central state and rule collapsed and the country was divided between ethnic and sectarian groups. Simply stating, there is severe domestic sovereignty crisis with limited authority of the central government on solving on-going sectarian conflicts. On the other hand, while Kurds act autonomously as a 'statelet' in the Northern Iraq, the Shi'i groups are operating almost independently from the central government under their

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[208] Ibid, 5.

[209] U.S. Energy Information Administration, "Iraq: Country Analaysis Brief". Available at: http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/Iraq/Background.html.

[210] Osnos, E., & McMahon, C. (2005). "Iraq election teeters on cultural split." *Chicago Tribune*, January 24. P.12.

[211] "IGC President Al-Yawir Views Political Process, Violence, Sovereignty in Iraq", Dubai *Al-Arabiyah Television,* 21 May 2004. [FBIS Document Number: FBIS-NES-2004-0521]

religious leaders. This is to suggest that Iraq could be further divided and subordinated by the international actors in the future.

5.4 Conclusion: Subordination of Iraq as the Regional Challenge

For decades, Iraq had been run by totalitarian regimes that are dependent to external support for survival. Saddam's leadership lead to modernization and partial self-sufficiency of Iraq. His appeal to the rejection of the influence of Western countries in the Middle East, artificial boundaries of the Gulf states with their vast recently inherited wealth, and calling for the unification of the Arabs are welcomed by great majority of Arab nation who are felt relatively poor.

The driving rationality behind American foreign policy and its involvement in the Middle East is the control of the flow of oil and to prevent 'challenging regimes' from seizing power in the region. For this purpose, for the sake of contain Iran after the Islamic revolution, the Western world supported and actually guided the Saddam regime against Iran during the Iran-Iraq War. While the U.S. administration had supported Iraq in its aggression against Iran the brutality and violence of Saddam both against Iranian civilians and Kurds went unnoticed.

In the post-Cold war era, the change at the systemic level was turbulent for the Arab Middle East at the initial years because of the ambiguity generated by the absence of the Soviet Union in regional politics. The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait was the corollary of this argument.

Soon after the Iran-Iraq war, the Bush administration noticed Saddam's popularity in the region and his appeal to the Arab masses as the next 'Nasser'. Furthermore, Saddam's regime has comparative advantages than Nasser such as military strength and oil that were seen as a challenge to the U.S. authority in the region.

As a result of partial misleading by the U.S. administration, Saddam occupied Kuwait in 1990. The U.S. reaction was prompt and brutal. Iraq has received one of the heaviest bombing in world history. The U.S. abused its power by destroying a significant proportion of Iraq's economic lifeline, and worsening

the conditions of already desperate civilian Iraqi population. Iraqis have been punished beyond their daily survival and the destruction country's infrastructure passed re-repairs level.

Furthermore, mostly children, hundreds thousands of people lost their lives because of the hunger, malnutrition, and inflectional diseases that could be easily cured if the medicine embargo had not been imposed. The actual number of war dead is still not known. In short, the U.S. policy of containment and the enforcement of the UN sanctions brought the Iraqi people, not their government to their knees. The sanctions lasted even though the Western countries were well aware that the sanctions are not hurting Saddam or his government but Iraqi people. In consequence, Iraq eliminated as a regional power and the country put into the endemic sovereignty crises in the post 1991 era.

However, when Saddam was able to survive from all the political subordination measures including cruel embargos and domestic revolt, and continue to challenge Western interests in the region, a complete dismissal became a necessity. Accordingly, the U.S. occupation of Iraq started after the U.S. authorities became confident that Saddam do not posses WMD.

It is possible to argue that the magnitude of Saddam Hussein's defeat was a final blow to the political language of pan-Arabism and its challenging character. With the demise of Saddam Hussein and neutralization of Iraq, the 'holy-trinity' of the U.S. interests in the region in the post-Cold war era that is containment of the challenging regimes, free flow of oil, and protection of Israel has been secured.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION: SUBORDINATION OF THE ARAB REGIONAL SYSTEM

6.1 Introduction

Accordingly, history and analysis on the subordination of the 'rough' and 'challenger' regimes by the Western powers and European inspired international order is a thrilling topic. The taken for granted concept of Westphalian international order and dissemination of this system to the Middle East has been questioned widely by various scholars. Nevertheless, comparatively speaking, the containment of the challenger regimes and the theoretical embedment of historically constructed subordination remained one of the neglected issues that have not been given enough consideration.

Although there are significant numbers of publications focusing on Gamal Abder Nasser, the contributions generally stay limited with the dimensions Arab nationalism, the foundation of the United Arab Republic, and the failure of both. Similarly, most of the literature focusing on Saddam Hussein concentrate mainly on the Iran-Iraq War, Iraqi occupation of Kuwait, and the cruelty of Saddam's regime leaving aside his systemic challenge and containment.

In this connection, this study is attempted to critically examine the emergence and subordination of systemic challenges in the Middle East through balanced analysis between historical, theoretical, and empirical patterns.

For this purpose, the research is divided into three inter-related evolutionary parts; the analysis of the Arab regional system, international origins of

subordination, and finally the case studies. This structure is aimed to draw out the links among related issues in order to maintain each section contribution retains analytical cogency and descriptive relevancy of what comes before and after.

6.2 Review of the Chapters & Findings

The introductory chapter of the thesis is designed to provide explanation of the title, key concepts, theoretical approach, and methodology that is benefitted throughout the research. *Subordination* that is used throughout the thesis simply refers to the situation that derives from the international order, which does not allow regional actors to act independent and autonomous. Stating alternatively, regional actors of the Middle East, as a part of the subordinate regional system, are bounded by the bargains of the international order that is guided by Western powers.

As a theoretical approach, this research benefits from post-structural order, political version of the world system theory, & hegemonic balance of power paradigms in order to explain exclusionary functioning of the international system that forms the basis of the *subordination*. As perfectly expressed by Edward Said and Samir Amin, once Europeans became conscious of the universal scope of their civilizations and their capacity to conquer and shape the rest of the world, they also granted themselves the right to represent and judge the others, particularly the Orient. These discourses initially serve as a means of justifying the colonialist measures and the subordination of the *challenging regimes.*

In consequence, culture and cultural differences could lead to brutal political, economic and military rationales.[1] Stating alternatively, cultural justifications could form the basis of the political power, interference, and violence in the Arab Middle East. Therefore, it would not be wrong to suggest that subordination is a combination of remnants of old-style European imperialist thinking & orientalism, and newer-style of neo-imperialism and American military

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[1] Said, E. W. (1978). *Orientalism*. New York: Vintage Books. P.7.

power. In this connection, international order is *not a* complete, equal or just system.

In order to explain theoretical basis of the research, the second chapter of the thesis following introduction is elucidated the international origins of subordination. Many orthodox theorist of international order ignore the fact that 'other' pattern of order beyond Europe has been asymmetrically conducted by colonial and imperial systems. The international order that currently prevails has the legacy of both the European and beyond European patterns. In this respect, accordingly, understanding of the beyond European order is crucially important for comprehending of modern international system in general and subordination of the Middle East in particular.

Stating in different words, analysis of the emergence and evaluation of international subordination is essential on emphasizing the elements of continuity and change within the international system and West / Middle East relations.

The foundation of subordination lies back to the Papal bulls of the twelfth century where the basis of hierarchical order between Europeans and the others has been initially formed. The discursive international system became more applicable after the endurance of the Westphalian system and emergence of state sovereignty. Although the structural basis within European Christendom and ecclesiastical system has been changed after the Peace of Westphalia, the existing hierarchies between Christians and the others have not been changed. The Christian universe of "Kingdom of Heaven" succeeded by the modern international state system and has become a 'kingdom of conquest'.

Similar to the Papal bulls, European intellectuals have put forward that there are ungapable differences between Europeans and the others and they campaigned for conquests abroad. The Euro-centric view has based its epistemology on European practices, 'truth' claims, and mode of representation of 'reality'. This reductionist tendency highly contributed to the subordination of the

Arab regional system. The other's values and traditions are viewed as faulty and inferior compared to Western cultural elements.

To sum up, since the twelfth century, Europeans assumed to possess reason, wisdom, and capability to define the international order according to their perceptions. European belief of cultural supremacy and racial superiority made it "white man's burden" to supervise and promote backward people. As progressively defined by Edward Said, colonial powers politically, sociologically, and even 'imaginatively' constructed the other peoples and territories rather than allowing actually for what they are during the post-Enlightenment era.[2]

The concept of sovereign statehood became a 'globally' accepted standard in the post Second World War era. This was the success of Europeans' on totalising the social, cultural, economic, and political areas. The historically constructed European system dictated the way in which certain actors, practices, and concepts privileged over others. The main concepts of European society of states such as sovereignty, nation-state, security, and obedience to the 'international' law become the integral parts of the international system.

Thus, the two orders merged through institutionalisation of sovereignty, which used to be European nations privileged right in the former periods. Nevertheless, this does not necessarily mean that dichotomies within the international system have been completely abolished.

The origins of the subordination are significant because even in contemporary times there is a tendency to ignore certain historical attitudes and practices of the European powers that accordingly lies at the core of the many contemporary problems.

In international relations state is accepted as an ontological entity where it has been used interchangeably with nation, society, power, and sovereignty. States administer both their societies and territories along with control over societal and economic relations. Although it was a new concept, the 'normal' mode of

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[2] Ibid, 3.

subjectivity (state) becomes dominant in the Arab Middle East through time by certain external impositions. During the colonialization process, Western system of sovereignty had transplanted into the other regions of the world including the Arab regional system.

Theoretically speaking, the Westphalian state system is differed from transnational Arab Middle Eastern system due to the division of the Arab nation. With the establishment of the state system, territorial based political, ideational, cultural, socio-economic, and normative superiorities have been maintained over the pre-existing transnational norms, values, and practices. As a result, societies historicity has been completely neglected and brand new concepts have been planted on the Arab Middle East such as international boundaries, national identities, national military force, police forces etc.

Inevitably, the privileging of the state system & power has been problematic and caused negative implications in the Arab regional system that contributed to its *subordination*. All Arab states are affected by similar political bargains and failures that originated from the transformation period to the international state-system. As contented by Gregory Gause III, in the post-Second World War era, the clash and tension between the tradition and Western sovereignty has not been greater anywhere than the Middle East. This is due to the fact that Arab Middle Eastern states were expected to accomplish various phases together such as state-making and nation-building (penetration, standardization, participation, and redistribution) simultaneously and within a matter of decades.

The dramatic result of state formation and privileging of state & sovereignty in the Arab Middle East was artificial borders, legitimacy problem, autocratic regimes, and increased application of state violence. The problematic transformation to the state system, along with already existing problems in geographical limits, and necessity of legal justification of artificial state drives the Arab Middle Eastern rulers to certain similar behaviours that restrict regional unity and pan-Arabism.

Middle Eastern rulers emerged as the most braying defenders of the state system because the Westphalian state system gives 'unfettered' control over their internal affairs and notably over their own domestic population to the ruling elites. Stating alternatively, with the consolidation of the state power, ruling elites have limitless power in domestic politics and internationally legitimize the tools and practices of the modern state.

As a result of this process, the questioning of the ruling regime turns to the questioning the very existence of the state. The Arab Middle Eastern regimes stabilize, destabilize, organize, disorganize, penetrate, dominate, dissolute, and weaken their societies. This leads to a strange paradox which is progressively defined by Halim Barakat with the words of: "the power of the people becomes the power of the state at the expense of rendering them powerless".[3]

Therefore, although the Arab Middle East integrated into the international system as a regional subsystem with its own dynamic of conflict, under the constraints and structural circumstances of international system, it is further driven to military-security based regimes. By this way, structuralism in the Arab regional system established in which its primary function is to reproduce the existing order. In this sense, any kind of challenge that aimed to change the aforementioned *status quo* is *contained* & *subordinated*.

Nevertheless, as elucidated in the third chapter, despite transplantation of Westphalian sovereignty, the Arab world was able to keep many well-established and traditional 'commons' such as the language, religion, identity, and customs. As commented by Edgerton, there must be good social or cultural reasons about "why a long established believes and practices exists and prevails".[4]

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[3] Barakat, H. (1993). *The Arab world: Society, Culture, and State.* Berkeley: University of California Press. P.151.

[4] Edgerton, R. (2000). "Traditional Beliefs and Practices: Are Some Better than Others?" In Harrison, L. E., and Huntington, S. P. (eds.) P.129.

Technically speaking, it is these factors that make up the basis of Arab difference and they are still operational despite the existence of different sovereign Arab states. Stating alternatively, what is astonishingly unique about the Arab regional system that distincts it from other regions is the overlapping roles of regimes and transnational characteristics of Arab identity.

Transnational Arab and Islamic identities are still important socio-political frames of reference for the Arab world. Despite formal realization of sovereignty, the Arab Middle Eastern entities have continued their transnational & sub-national loyalty based relationship with traditional forms. In consequence, there are shifting and overlapping identities & loyalties in the Middle East.

In other words, the commonality among the sovereign Arab states at societal level have created a system of *dual authority* in the Arab world. In this sense, the Arab regimes should concern themselves with the balance between their domestic leverage, and the system level 'realities' in addition to the Arab level facts. Hence, unlike many other sovereign states, three different levels shape the Arab state's decision-making process: The systemic level, the nation-state level, and the regional level.

In consequence, an inevitable clash occurred between transnational *versus* Westphalian principles especially when domestic forces continue to demand and expect different roles than state. In other words, state sovereignty in the Arab Middle East and the roles associated with sovereignty are not fully legitimized by societal forces even in the contemporary era.

It is mainly because of these factors that interconnection between the Arab states is more than simple geographical proximity. The events in one part of the Middle East have had surprising and unintended consequences in other parts of the region as perfectly assured by the recent 'Arab Spring' revolutions. Furthermore, these factors and commonalities also played a major role on escalating the threat of the challenging regimes to the regional order and the *status quo*.

As elucidated in the Chapter Four, it was at this stage where legitimacy problem (the lack of acceptance of the ruled, and the rightness of the ruler's superior governing power) and the lack of cohesion between the elites and societies in the Arab regional system felt most, the Arab nationalism under charismatic leadership of Gamal Abdel Nasser emerged as the strongest political and ideological force. He became a real challenge against the *status quo and* established orthodoxies of subordination in the region.

Nasser had a clear idea of what he wanted both internally and regionally. In the domestic realm to destroy the power of monarchy, landlords, foreign influence, and corruption of political life. Nasser also aimed to break the power of the external powers through breaking the power of wealthy domestic capitalist classes. In this sense, what makes Nasser special in terms of Egyptian politics is his huge efforts on serving the interests of the poor and the middle class. He provided many social benefits, raised the standard of living, and promoted all aspects of people's life in Egypt.

To sum up, Nasser gave dignity and national pride to Egyptians who were under colonial rule for a long time. Domestic control and support over politics and economy also gave change to the society in the direction that was envisioned by Nasser.

Nasser argued that formal independence from colonial rule did not guarantee the full sovereignty of Arab states because the social practices and relations associated with colonialism such as domination, intervention in internal affairs, economic exploitation, racial discrimination etc. remained at the core of the international system. In this connection, Nasser rightly addressed the Arab feelings at that time: to be treated as equals, and be able to control their own destiny.

Nasser popularized Arab nationalism by reaching all classes in society. He successfully and effectively articulated unique relationship between Palestine, imperialism, and Arab unity to the Arab masses and manifested it as resistance of the Arab people against the external interference. Nasser concluded that the remedy

for the plight of the Arabs lay in greater unity, a common struggle against imperialism, and the crushing of the corrupted and selfish regimes.

As an ideology, Nasser's Arab nationalism has intrinsic strength as an appeal on unifying artificially divided Arab nation by promoting the common ethnic, cultural, and linguistic identity of Arabs. Nasser sees Arab unity as an ideal and normal situation considering cultural and historical grounds. Furthermore, Nasser always believed that Arab unity is not only a natural process but also a necessity. According to Nasser, if Arab states unite, they would have a greater collective power in both political and moral terms. In other words, the people of the area could not defend themselves and their interests against the great powers and would always face aggression unless their struggle is unified.

Nasser possessed a challenge to the Western states because he developed a very effective means on challenging their policies in the region. Nasser's policies challenged to the regional *status quo* and became the manifestation against a Western presence and dominance in the region. In other words, as the key regional actor, Nasser emerged as the challenger leader not only with his revolutionary ideology, but also through his effective political practices.

Nasser nationalized the Suez canal, stand against and collapsed the Western based security organization; the Baghdad Pact, ended Western monopoly on arms supply in the region, politically and militarily assisted to the colonized nations independence movements especially in Africa, and played a crucial role on revolutions in Iraq, Syria, and Libya. He especially provided assistance to the National Liberation Front (FLN) in Algeria on their war of independence against French. Also, he played a positive role on the independence of Morocco and Tunisia through his massive radio propaganda. In consequence, Nasser had achieved apparent successes in achieving desired political outcomes in Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Yemen, and finally in Libya.

Through these effective policies, Nasser affirmed sovereign right of regional states to determine the provision of their own security and destiny. By this

way, for the first time in Arab history, an Arab state was able to follow an independent Arab policy without pursing the interests of the Western powers. In consequence, Nasser enjoyed unchallenged prestige as a leader of the Arab world who overthrew the monarchy, nationalized the Suez Canal, built the Aswan Dam and challenged the imperialist powers.

Bearing certain similarities with Nasser, Saddam's leadership also initiated with modernization and partial self-sufficiency of Iraq without being dependent to external support for survival. With assistance of increasing oil revenues, Saddam began to completely transform Iraq with a boast of a modern infrastructure, good health care, education systems and a comfortable standard of living for most of citizens. In other words, he had addressed the needs of his people in many respects although he has an authoritarian rule.

In consequence, Saddam established the best medical and educational systems in the Arab world, along with a direct phone line between him and his people. Most of these measures were never seen neither in Iraq's nor in Arab world's history before.

Without any doubt, Saddam's political idol was Gamal Abdel Nasser who inspired millions of Arabs to fight against Western imperialism. Saddam was willing to play a leading role in the Middle East as Nasser's heir, with his economic, military, and human resources.

Similar to Nasser's challenge, Saddam's appeal to the rejection of the influence of Western countries in the Middle East, artificial boundaries of the Gulf Arabs with their vast recently inherited wealth, and calling for the unification of the Arabs threatening the regional *status quo* and Western interests.

Saddam had justified occupation of Kuwait by combining it with redistribution of the Arab wealth and using it for the benefit of the Arab nation. Along with direct accusation of external powers and their puppets, and linking all these with the Palestinian occupation, he alarmed the extra regional countries and the U.S. in particular on subordination of his regime. More importantly, as oil has

become the 'lifeblood' of advanced economies, the strategic importance of the region is further increased that automatically prompted the extra regional super powers to intervene and to promote 'stability' in the area.

Destruction of Iraq at this magnitude during and after the Operation Desert Storm is evidently far beyond denying Saddam's possession of Weapons of Mass Destruction and re-supply of his army. It could be easy to imagine the Gulf War without the attack on infrastructural and civilian targets. The continuation of the U.S. policy of containment and the enforcement of the UN sanctions brought the Iraqi people, not Saddam's regime, to their knees. Iraqi people were treated as if they were not even human beings. Even still today the total number of civilians that were killed during and after the military operations is not clear. Most dramatically, the number could easily pass the three million civilians, mostly children. By this way, Iraq's potential threat to Israel or against the regional status quo is eliminated.

6.3 Subordination of Nasser & Saddam: The Patterns of Continuity & Change

Before summarizing on subordination of Nasser and Saddam, initially, it is worth reminding to the reader that there are some surprising similarities between the two leaders. First of all, both leaders remained in the shadow at the beginning of their rules as the secret powerhouses of their regimes. Nasser was the vice President and the vice Prime minister behind the President General Mohammed Neguib after the Revolution for two years. Similarly, Saddam acted as the Vice President behind Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr for eleven years before July 1979 when he finally forced al-Bakr to resign and officially became the president. These periods gave both leaders the required time to further observe and comprehend the nature of their societies.

Secondly, both leaders have strengthened their domestic legitimacy before their brave attempts to change the regional *status quo*. Both of them addressed their initial reforms to their most important sectors: Nasser in agriculture and Saddam in the oil industry. In both regimes, the state played the key role on development and

welfare programs and both leaders privatized the biggest enterprises in the country. For that reason, both leaders were able to get the support of lower and middle classes that increased their legitimacy.

Thirdly, another significant factor on their domestic legitimacy, both leaders tried to establish direct and good relationship with their people. Nasser had good relationship and communication with the majority of his people. Through the radio and long live speeches, he was constantly explaining governmental affairs in simple and understandable language with humour. Similarly, Saddam established a direct phone line between him and his people for the first time in Iraqi history, which was also unknown in the Arab world. He opened city halls to hear out the complaints of the people and solve them, and to hear against government officials and ministries.

Fourthly, both leaders distanced themselves from the religious groups and ideology and pursued secular policies. Although this policy helped to the both leaders on uniting different classes and ethnic groups, it also played an important role on their decline. Inheriting power of Arab unity projects was deriving from its reference upon the transnational political loyalty and solidarity. However, with the emergence of state system, Islam subordinated to Arab nationalism for political purposes that lead to an ideological clash between the Islamist and Arab nationalist which further fragmented the region.

Nasser's clash with the Islamists groups played a major role on decline of Arab nationalism and Nasser's failures in Yemeni and 1967 wars. Ajami and Ayubi argue that pan-Arabism has declined against Islamism due to the secular character of Arab nationalism. Similarly, Saddam's clash with the religious groups contributed to formation of religious anti-Saddam Shi'ite and Sunni camps. These camps assisted the occupation forces in 2003 and fragmented Iraq along sectarian and ethnic lines in the post 2003 era.

Finally, the two leaders, both ideologically and militarily clashed with the conservative Arab regimes. Nasser, from the very beginning, and Saddam previous

to occupation of Kuwait, accused the oil rich conservative regimes to be lackeys of extra regional countries. Accordingly, both regimes actual wars with the other Arab regimes put the last nail in their coffin in terms of clashing with their own ideology. These wars weakened their pan-Arab nationalism rhetoric. If Yemen was Nasser's "Vietnam", without any doubt Kuwait was Saddam's "Vietnam".

Having highlighted the similarities, it is worth reminding of certain differences between the two leaders for the sake of the analysis. First of all, Egypt consists of highly homogeneous society and the country had no significant sectional, sectarian, racial groups pursuing their own agenda. In contrast, Iraq is divided along the religious and ethnic lines. In this connection it was Nasser's ideology that acts as the main catalyst behind his success. In other words, Nasser's political success was directly related with his ideology and political practices. On the other hand Saddam owned his political rise and holding of political power mainly to his tribal bonds.

Secondly, although Israel is declared as the main enemy by the both regimes, Saddam never actually confronted with the Israeli forces. On the other hand, Nasser fought with the Israeli forces both in 1956 Suez Canal War and 1967 six days war.

Finally, and accordingly the most importantly, Nasser remained as the undisputed leader of both Egypt and the Arab world until his death despite the disastrous the 1967 War. On the other hand, although Saddam was popular at the beginning of his rule, later on he lost the support of some Kurdish and Shi'ite groups.

This point draws attention to one other significant point. Nasser has remained popular until the end of his life mainly due to his thoughts, ideology, and his consistent policies with his ideology. In other words, the main strength behind Nasser's regional challenge was coming from the 'soft power' that made it long lasting if not eternal.

On the other hand, Saddam does not possess a transnational ideology. As commented by William R. Polk, Saddam's unifying aim was neither organization nor ideology, "he wavered as danger or opportunity demanded between *qawmiyah* and *wataniyah"*.[5] His aim was 'power' itself and he indeed had 'hard power' sources such as military and economic (that is mainly coming from oil revenues) powers. In this sense, Saddam's hard power has been overcomed by stronger hard power and inevitably bounded to fail while Nasser's legacy continued to remain in the region.

As one scholar perfectly stated "the history of the international system is a history of *inequality par excellence*".[6] Although the traditional patterns of inequality in international society are widely challenged today, some patterns continued to exist. In this sense, there are many similarities and some slight changes on subordination of Nasser and Saddam Hussein.

Accordingly, the basis of the formulation of the U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East in the aftermath of the post Second World era, still remained today as an integral part of American diplomacy in the region. The driving rationality behind the American foreign policy in the post Second World War era was based upon control of the flow of oil, containment of Soviet influence, protection of Israel, and to prevent 'challenging regimes' from seizing power in the region and to contain them if they endanger the *status quo* or the aforementioned objectives. Nevertheless, while Western leaders concentrated on only 'challenging' regimes of the Middle East, they ignored Israel which is the core of the problem for many Arab people.

Therefore, the Middle East in the 1950s reflected a historical continuum where historically constructed *subordination* process carried on with new formulations.

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[5] Polk, W. R. (2006). *Understanding Iraq*. London: Tauris. P.119.

[6] Tucker, R. W. (1977). *The Inequality of Nations*. New York: Basic Books Publishers. P.3.

Among the elements of continuity, the intention of extra regional countries was clear in both cases. Initially, both Nasser and Saddam were invited to be within the Western political sphere before they were contained and subordinated. While Nasser completely rejected this approach, Saddam initially seemed to act together with the West on its war against Iran.

Secondly, another similarity is the containment of both regimes on achieving weapons to challenge Western powers. The U.S. and Western countries did their best in order to prevent Nasser to obtain Soviet weapons. Similarly, Saddam was not allowed have nuclear capabilities while Israel's possession of nuclear weapons does not constitute as a problem. As stated earlier, this point is remarkable due to the historical fact that the U.S. and Japan became equal partners of international order due to their military supremacy and victories over the European powers.

Thirdly, both regimes were driven to the battlefield that led to their final subordination. Although it is evident that Arab countries could not solve the Arab-Israeli problem or challenge to the Westphalian system by military means, Gamal Abdel Nasser made this mistake. Although he provoked by the Western powers and Israel in particular, Nasser made crucial mistake of involving in the Yemeni War and attacking to Israel in 1967.

The similar scenario was repeated when Saddam Hussein tried to be regional hegemon through military means by occupying Kuwait. Once more it was demonstrated that the U.S., as the most powerful extra regional power in the post Second World War era would never allow the emergence of a regional military hegemon that could change or challenge established *status quo*. In this connection, systemic elimination of the regional military challenge is another source of continuity of subordination policies.

The containment of Nasser and Saddam in pre and post-Cold War era reached to an important theoretical conclusion. Although many scholars have argued that the international system witnessed a fundamental systemic change in the

post Cold War era, such a change did not make any difference on the historically constructed fundamental understanding of subordination: The challenger regimes in the Middle East should be contained and subordinated at every means and cost. This fact finds clear expression within the 'Defense Planning Guidance that is written by Paul Wolowitz, Lewis Libby, and Zalmay Khalilzad under the direction of Defense Secretary Dick Cheney:[7]

> No rival superpower is allowed to emerge in Western Europe, Asia or the territory of the former Soviet Union and the U.S. (shall) remain the world's predominant power for the indefinite future...(These objectives could be accomplished by) pre-emptively attacking rivals or states seeking Weapons of Mass Destruction, strengthening U.S. control of Persian Gulf oil, and refusing to allow international coalitions or law to inhibit U.S. freedom of action.

6.4 Concluding Remarks, Prospects, & Further Research

It is an unfortunate fact that the *subordination* policies have gained momentum after the September 11, 2001 attacks. 9/11 attacks reinforced the credibility of the U.S. power, projection, and military involvement in the Middle East on the pretext of war against international terrorism. These attacks provided enough excuse for the U.S. to re-load the Cold War norms and principles to the international system that further subordinates the Arab regional system.

Nevertheless, accordingly, no side could benefit from the cycle of revenge that was constructed by military practices. It is highly sceptical whether the re-loading of the Cold War principles could really work in favour of the U.S. 'strategic' interests. The U.S. regional policies further enhance regional antagonisms and widen cultural and ideational differences between the 'East' and the 'West'.

During the Cold War era the Arab 'Other' may not have had considerable impact on Western societies. However, as Wei-Ming correctly points out, the power of the "rest" shall not be neglected even by the West that tries to dominate the rest

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[7] Everest, L. (2004). *Oil, Power, and Empire: Iraq and the U.S. Global Agenda*. Monroe: Common Courage Press. P.4.

by coercion.[8] In the contemporary era, the 'rest' "has fully penetrated the West as a result of multiple migrations: Labor, capital, talent, and religion."[9]

Therefore, this research contention is military and political policies and practices that are 'subordinating' the Arab regional system could make the situation more complex and hard in the long run.

Accordingly, political and administrative weaknesses create an ideological vacuum in the Middle East at the contemporary era if the patterns of subordination continue. There is a possibility that this ideological vacuum could be filled by Islamic movements. This is due to the fact that these movements reject the economic and cultural subordination of the Western-dominated international system and its dynamics. The strong wave of Arab Spring[10] in 2011, and withdrawal of dictators such as Hosni Mubarak of Egypt, Ben Ali of Tunisia and Muammer Kaddafi of Libya supported this argument. The Arab Spring also created space for democratically elected potential challengers to affect the regional *status quo* that could make a deeper and longer lasting impact.

An intrinsic problem of this thesis is the extensive scope of the research. The scope of the literature on the Arab regional system, Arab nationalism, along with on Nasser and Saddam Hussein is extensive. For this reason, some aspects that seem secondary may not be given enough consideration. Accordingly, writing a Ph.D. thesis is an unfinished process. Regardless to the amount of effort, time, and discussion put into the research, there is always something that remains untouched.

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[8] Wei-ming, T. (2000). "Multiple Modernities: A Preliminary Inquiry into the Implications of East Asian Modernity". In Harrison, L. E., and Huntington, S. P. (eds.) *Culture Matters: How values shape human progress.* New York: Basic Books. P.266.

[9] Ibid.

[10] The Arab Spring refers to protests, demonstrations and rebellions of Arab people against their autocratic leaders' autocratic rule, corruption, human right violations, and poor economic performance. The protests initiated in Tunisia in December of 2010 and then revolutionary waved to the other Arab countries. In consequence, there have been revolutions in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya where the Presidents of each three countries expelled and governments overthrown. There also been major uprisings in Syria, Bahrain, Yemen, Algeria, Iraq, Jordan, Morocco and Saudi Arabia.

Additionally, borrowing from the Nietzschean perspectivism, no synthesis can ever be absolute and final, reality is constantly changing, and so there can only be a "dynamic" synthesis that is constantly being reformulated.[11]

Despite these weaknesses and by recognising the complexity of analyzing the Arab regional system, this thesis attempted to provide the core of dynamic synthesis that is constantly being reformulated through the analysis of *subordination*. Furthermore, in addition to the inducement of subordination theory, this research contributed to the literature through comparison and contrast of Nasser and Saddam Hussein in comparative perspective with the new design of 'challenge' *versus* 'containment'.

One other objective of this research is to contribute on qualifying or correcting a host of casual misattributions to the Arab Middle East from the category of errors that was identified within the thesis. Therefore, hopefully, this research could make a modest contribution to the theory, policy, and practices on comprehending the real aspects of the Arab regional system.

Does the end of pan-Arabism and containment of Nasser's and Saddam's challenges means that the region is now completely *subordinated* and is Western inspired Westphalian international order prevails? Will the Arab Spring bring major changes to the region and would be a hope for a change on breaking the *subordination*? What are the other patterns of subordination in different parts of the world? A complementary future research to this study could depart from these central questions and inquiries.

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[11] Nietzsche, F. (1989). *On the genealogy of morals.* New York: T. N. Foulis. P.119.

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APPENDICES

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2010-2012	Girne American U	Asst. Prof. Dr.

PUBLICATIONS

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3. "Comparing Hans Morgenthau and E.H Carr on Evaluation of Power in Realist International Theory". *Text: Journal of International Studies.*5 (1).Summer. 2006. Pp.3-7.

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2. "Dichotomous International Order". *Tenth METU Conference on International Relations: Rethinking International Relations: Theory and Practice.* Ankara: Middle East Technical University. June 15-17, 2011.

3. "Looking Ahead the Missile Defense System: NATO and Russia's Security Dilemma in Georgia, Libya and Beyond." *Tenth METU Conference on International Relations: Rethinking International Relations: Theory and Practice.* Ankara: Middle East Technical University. June 15-17, 2011.

4. "The Contradictory European Union Membership of the Republic of Cyprus and EU-Cyprus Relations". *International Conference: The East Mediterranean and Cyprus: Economic and Political Relations: Cooperation and Integration from Past to Future.*Girne: The American University of Cyprus. 15-16 December, 2010.

5. "The Road to Recognition: The Legal and Political Basis of Turkish Cypriot's Right of Self-Determination and Sovereignty". *First World Turkish Cypriots Congress.*Girne: North Cyprus. November 12-13, 2010.

6. "The Turkish Position on Cyprus: The Elements of Continuity and Change". *Association for Cypriot, Greek, and Turkish Affairs.* London: London School of Economics and Political Science. November 27, 2009.

7. "The Future of Europe from Regional Perspective: Challenges of Mediterranean and Middle East". *Interdisciplinary Postgraduate Conference: The Future of Europe: Identity, History, Politics and Culture.* Birmingham: University of Birmingham. April 19-21, 2007.

8. "Turkish-British relations and Ankara's policy towards Cyprus 1955-60: Historical Experiences and Future Relations". *Britain and Cyprus Conference by Helen Bamber Centre for Rights and Conflict.* London: Kingston University. December 1st, 2006.

9. "The Role of Universities on Emergence of New Discourse on World Politics". *European Union International Youth Activity Conference.* Istanbul: Fatih University. April 14th, 2004.

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HOBBIES

Tennis, Travelling, Basketball, Swimming.

APPENDIX B

TURKISH SUMMARY

Bu çalışma, Ortadoğu'da kurulmuş Westfalyan sisteme ve kurulmuş düzene (*status quo*) tehdit oluşturmuş iki önemli Arap ülkesi olan Mısır ve Irak ekseninde Ortadoğu bölgesel sisteminin bağımlılaştırılmasını analiz etmektedir. Bağımlılaştırmak konseptinin tanıştırılması üzerinden, bu çalışma şu soruların yanıtlarını aramaktadır: 'Ortadoğu'yu egemenliğin yerleştirildiği diğer bölgelerden farklı kılan özellikler nelerdir?' 'Ortadoğu, uluslararası sisteme siyasi, ekonomik, ve kültürel yönlerden nasıl bağımlı hale getirilmiştir?' Ve, kurulan bu düzene en büyük başkaldırıyı (challenge) yapmış iki rejim (Cemal Abdül Nasır liderliğindeki Mısır ve Saddam Hüseyin liderliğindeki Irak) nasıl etkisiz hale getirilmişlerdir.

Tezin analizi birbirine ilişkili üç bölüm üzerine kurulmuştur; bağımlılığın sistemik ve uluslararası kökleri ve ana karakteristik özellikleri, uluslararası sistemin bir alt bölgesel sistemi olarak Ortadoğu'nun bağımlılaştırılması, ve son olarak önceki bölümlerdeki teorik tartışmaların test edildiği alan çalışmaları. Alan çalışmaları Mısır ve Irak olmak üzere iki kısma ayrılmıştır.

Bağımsız, orjinal ve eleştirisel düşünce ışığında, bu tez varolan bilgi ve materyali kullanarak, yeni konseptler, dizayn, ve yorumlama ile literatüre katkıda bulunmayı amaçlamaktadır. Tezin temel argümanı, Ortadoğu'da yerleşik düzeni (*status quo)* tehdit eden reaksyönel rejimlerin, kökleri 11. Yüzyıla dek uzanan sistematik bir anlayış içerisinde eritildiği ve engellendiğidir. Bu çerçeve, Ortadoğu'daki siyasi gerçekleri ve karar alma mekanizmalarının dayanaklarını

anlamada yardımcı olacaktır. Tezin bir diğer hedefi ise, Ortadoğu ile adeta özleştirilen otokrasi, terör, ve şiddet gibi kavramların gerçek oluşum sebeplerini sorgulamaktır. Son olarak, Arap Ortadoğu'sunda meydana gelen olayların neden varolan literatür tarafından tam olarak açıklanamadığı, neden Arap kimliğinin ve kültürünün devamlı olarak hüküm süren siyasi, ekonomik, ve kültürel güçlerle çatıştığı gibi sorular da yanıtlanmaya çalışılmıştır.

Bu çalışmada bağımlı Arap bölgesel sistemi, devlet sisteminin Arap Ortadoğu'sunda ortaya çıkması ile hüküm sürmeye başlayan askeri güvenlik endeksli politikalar, pratikler, ve normlar olarak tanımlanmıştır. Bu politikalar neticesinde Arap toplumları onları yöneten rejimlere, Arap rejimleri ise uluslararsı sistemin güçlü devletlerine askeri, siyasi, ve ekonomik olarak "bağımlı" hale getirilmişlerdir.

Arap bölgesel sistemi ile ilgili tartışmalarda eskiden beri süregelen en önemli konu, devlet endeksli kimlik ve normların Arap milliyetçiliğinin içerdiği kimlik ve normlar ile çatışmasıdır. Bu çatışma neticesinde Arap ülkeleri Westfalya sistemi ve Arap milliyetliçiğinin öne sürdüğü "tek millet" "tek devlet" prensipleri arasında kalmıştır. Arap ülkelerinin bu iki sistem arasında kalmasının en büyük sebebi, Ortadoğu'da kurulan devletlerin yapay olmasından dolayı yaşanılan "meşrutiyet" sorunun Arap yönetimleri tarafından Arap milliyetçiliği ile sağlanmak istenilmesidir. Arap milliyetçiliği ülkeler ötesi (transnational) öğeler taşıdığından Ortadoğu'da kurulan devlet-millet sistemini direk olarak tehdit etmektedir.

Ortadoğu'daki devlet sınırları, Avrupalı koloniyalist güçler tarafından kendi çıkarları doğrultusunda çizilmiştir. Bunun neticesinde, yeni çizilen sınırlar etnik, dini, veya kültürel farklılıklar gözetmediğinden, yönetenlerin yönetme hakkı halk tarafından sorgulanmıştır. Devlet sisteminin Ortadoğu'ya ithal edilmesi ile ortaya çıkan bu meşrutiyet sorununu aşmak için, Arap rejimleri tüm Arap halkının ortak çıkarları doğrultusunda hareket edeceklerini kendi toplumlarına taahhüt etmişlerdir.

Arap ülkelerinin hem Westfalya prensiplerine uymak istemeleri hem de Arap halkının ortak çıkarları doğrultusunda hareket edeceklerini taahhüt etmeleri kaçınılmaz bir çatışmaya neden olmuştur. Bu çatışmanın temel nedeni Westfalya egemenlik sisteminin devlet ve devlet kimliğinin önemini ön plana çıkarırken, Arap milliyetçiliğinin Arap ülkelerinin ayrı kimliklerini tanımaması ve Arap dünyasını bir bütün olarak kabul etmesidir.

Arap milliyetçiliğinin Westfalya egemenlik sistemine karşı yarattığı bu büyük başkaldırı, ortaya çıkan karmaşık durumdan faydalanmak isteyen büyük Arap ülkeleri tarafından kullanılmıştır. Örnek vermek gerekirse, özellikle Cemal Abdül Nasır liderliğindeki Mısır, Arap dünyasını tek devlet, tek bayrak, tek idare altında toplama "söylemiyle" Arap milliyetçiliğinin en büyük savunucusu olmuştur. Ayni şekilde, Irak ve Suriye'de kurulan Baas partileri de benzer söylemleri taşımaktaydı.

Bütün bu paradoksal denklemler sonucunda, Ortadoğu'daki zengin krallıklar (Suudi Arabistan, Kuveyt, Katar, Birleşik Arap Emirlikleri, Bahreyn, Umman) ve ülke nüfusunun yarısından fazlası Filistin'li olan Ürdün, Arap milliyetçiliğine şiddetle karşı çıkmışlar ve devlet kimliklerine daha fazla önem vermişlerdir. Özellikle, 1967 Arap-İsrail Savaşından sonra Arap milliyetçiliği duraklama dönemine girmiş ve Arap liderler kendi ülkelerinin çıkarlarını ortak Arap çıkarlarının önüne koymuşlardır. Bir başka ifade ile 1967 Savaşı pek çok otorite tarafından Arap milliyetçiliğinin sonu olarak değerlendirilimiştir.

Arap milliyetçiliğinin gücünün azalmasında Westfalyan devlet sistemi de önemli ölçüde katkıda bulunmuştur. Westfalyan sistemi Avrupa'dan diğer bölgelere yayılmış ve kolonializim ile birlikte ihraç edilmiş olmasına rağmen, Ortadoğu rejimleri bu sistemin en büyük savunucuları olmuştur. Bunun başlıca nedeni Westfalyan devlet sisteminin halkın değil, yöneticilerin otoritesine temsil hakkı tanımasıdır. Westfalyan devlet sistemi devlet yöneticilerine halklarını kontrol etmek adına sınırsız haklar ve güçler vermektedir.

Bu sorunlara ilaveten, İkinci Dünya Savaşı'ndan sonra oluşan yeni uluslararası sistem, Soğuk Savaş realist paradigmalarının tüm ülkelerde hüküm

sürmesini sağladı. Soğuk Savaş döneminin realist paradigmaları ülkelerin güvenlik önceliği olarak askeri güvenlik konularını ön plana çıkarıyordu. Bir başka ifade ile devlet rejimlerinin güvenliği ve yönetimlerinin devam etmesi diğer tüm konuların önünde yer alıyordu. Bu önceliklerin pekişmesi için de Ortadoğu'daki devlet yönetimleri devlet sisteminin mümükün kıldığı tüm modern araçları ve fırsatları kullandılar. Özellikle eğitim sistemi, bürokrasi, ve askerlik gibi kurumların yardımı ve uluslararası sistemde "tek yasal kuvvet" kabul edilen devlet gücünün kullanılması ile birlikte ülke kimlikleri ve öncelikleri genel Arap öncelikleri ve kimliklerinin önüne geçti.

Ancak, tüm bu araçların kullanılması kaçınılmaz olarak beraberinde bazı olumsuz gelişmeleride getirmiştir. Westfalyan sisteminin Arap bütünlüğünün pahasına yerleşmesi ve güçlenmesi, Arap rejimlerinin kendi toplumlarının kontrolünü tamamıyla ellerine alıp onları zayıf, güçsüz, devlete bağımlı ve organize olmaktan mahrum bırakılmalarını gerektiriyordu. Bunun içinde, Arap yönetimlerinin otokratik bir yapılanma içine girmesi gerekliydi. Bu otokratik yapılanma, devlet yönetimi ile halk arasında olması gereken birlik ve bütünlüğe zarar verdi. Neticede, uluslararası güçlerin Arap bölgesel sistemini "bağımlı" hale getirmeleri kolay bir hale geldi. Sonuç olarak, bir zamanlar "otonom" bir medeniyete sahip olan Ortadoğu, Batılı güçler tarafından kontrol edilen uluslararası sisteme "bağımlı" bir bölgesel sisteme dönüştü.

Bu çalışmanın temel kuramsal temeli 'bağımlılık' (subordination) üzerine dayandırılmıştır. Bu nedenle tezin ikinci bölümünde bağımlılık teorisinin tarihsel ve teorik analizi yapılmıştır. Bu bölümün ilk kısmında, uluslararası düzenin (international order) en otoriter teorisi kabul edilen Hedley Bull önderliğindeki 'İngiliz Okulu'nun (English School) kritik eleştirisi yapılmıştır. İngiliz Okulu teorisyenleri uluslararası sistemi incelerken sanki bu sistem tekmiş gibi sadece bir sistemi incelemiş ve tüm paradigmalarını bu sistem üzerine kurmuşlardır. Bu anlayışa göre uluslararası sistem Avrupa'da doğmuş ve zaman içerisinde diğer bölgelere yayılmıştır.

Ancak uluslararası düzen tek değildir ve çiftbaşlıdır (dualisitc). Avrupa'da doğan ve Westfalyan sistem üzerine kurulan sistem görünen düzendir ve Avrupalı devlet/imparatorlukların kendi arasındaki ilişkileri düzenler. Öte yandan, uluslararası düzenin görülmeyen kısmı Batılı ve Batılı olmayan devlet arasındaki ilişkileri düzenler ve ilk düzenden tamamı ile farklıdır. İlk sistem eşitlik ve gönüllülük esaslarına dayanırken ikincisi baskı ve dayatma esaslarına dayanmaktadır.

Çiftbaşlı uluslararası sistemin kökleri Papa'nın fermanlarına kadar uzanmaktadır. Papa Boniface VIII 1302'de yayınladığı *Unam Sanctam* isimli fermanında kilisenin sadece Hristiyanlar üzerinde değil ayni zamanda Müslimanlar üzerinde de egemenlik ilan etmiştir. Kilisenin orta çağdaki gücü göz önünde bulundurulduğunda Katolik Kilisesinin böyle bir hakka sahip olması doğal görülebilir. Ancak doğal olmayan kısım, ilk defa Kilisenin Hristiyan olmayan 'ötekiler' üzerinde de böyle bir hak iddia etmesidir. Böylelikle Batılı olmayan ulusların öteki ve ikincil görülmesinin de hukuksal zemini hazırlanmıştır.

Yeni kıta keşfedilene kadar Katolik Kilisesinin 'öteki' ye bakış açısı değişmemiştir. Bu bakış açısına göre Kilise bu hiyerarşinin tepesinde yer alırken onu Avrupalı krallar takip etmektedir. Kralların hemen altında 'eski dünya ötekileri' (Müslimanlar, Çinliler ve Hintliler vs.) piramitin en altında ise Afrikalılar yer almaktadır. 1492'de yeni kıtanın keşfi ile birlikte Afrikalılar hiyerarşinin en altından kurtulmuş ve onların yerini yeni dünya yerlileri almıştır.

Eski dünya ötekileri Avrupalı devletlerle savaşa girmemek ve onların ticari faaliyetlerini engellememek şartıyla kendi toprak ve insanlarını yönetme haklarına sahiptir. Ancak, bu haklar topraklarıyla bağı olmayan ilkel yeni dünya yerlileri için geçerli değildir.

Böylelikle, kolonileşmenin altın çağını yaşadığı dönemde, Papa Avrupalı Devletlere diğer toprakları işgal etmeleri için gereken izni vermiştir. Düşündürürcü olan bu izinlerin dinsel ve kültürel temellere dayandırılmış olmasıdır. Kiliseye göre Avrupalı imparatorluklar diğer toprakları kolonileştirerek aslında onlara 'gerçek

doğruyu' ve inancı göstermektedirler. Bir başka ifade ile Hristiyanların dinlerinden kaynaklanan üstünlüklerini diğerlerine göstermeleri ve empoze etmeleri son derece doğaldır.

Sembolik olarak 1648 Westfalya Barışı modern devlet kavramının oluşmasında dönüm noktası kabul edilir. 30 yıl süren din ve mezhep savaşlarını bitiren bu antlaşma sonrasında Avrupalı krallıklar dört ana prensip üzerinde anlaşmışlardır. Bu prensipler:

i. Devletlerin kendi sınırlarını belirleme ve yönetme hakkı.

ii. Devletlerin kendi iç meselelerine başka devletlerin karışmama hakkı.

iii. Devletlerin kendi topraklarını kendi kurallarına göre Kilisenin baskısından ayrı olarak laik bir şekilde yönetme hakkı. Ve;

iv. Devletlerin diğer devletlerle olan ilişkilerini eşit olarak yönetme hakkı olarak özetlenebilir.

Ancak, bu yukarıda belirtilen haklar İngiliz Okulu ve diğer uzmanların iddia ettiğinin tersine sadece Avrupalıların kendi arasındaki ilişkileri organize etmek için düzenlenmiştir. Bir başka ifade ile Avrupalıların kendi arasında uyguladıkları bu prensipler, kendileri ve Avrupalı olmayanlar için geçerli değildir. Avrupalı devletlerin anlaştıkları bu prensipler kendi aralarındaki barış, egemenlik hakları, eşitlik, hoşgörü ve farklılıkların giderilmesi amaçlarını güderken, Avrupalı ve 'diğerleri' arasında ise varolan ilişkileri hiçbir şekilde değiştirmemekteydi. Bir başka ifade ile Avrupalılar, Avrupalı olmayanlara kendi aralarında davrandıkları gibi davranmamış ve gereken saygıyı göstermemişlerdir.

Böylelikle, Katolik kilisesinin gücünün azalması Avrupa içi sistemde bazı temel değişikliklere neden olmuşsa da, Avrupalı ve diğerleri arasındaki ilişkiler ve bakış açısı sabit kalmıştır. Seküler sistemde de 'Öteki' hala daha zayıf görülmekte ve Avrupalıların diğer toprakları kolonileştirmesi kutsal bir yükümlülüğün yanısıra 'beyaz adamın yükü' olarak devam etmiştir. Avrupalılar hala daha diğerlerinin medeni olup olmadıklarını ve kendi kendilerini yönetme hakkı olup olmadıklarını sınama ve karar verme haklarını kendilerineait olarak görmüşleridir.

Birinci Dünya Savaşı sonrasında kurulan uluslararası düzende, ayni daha önceki düzenlerde olduğu gibi, hiyerarşik anlayış değişmemiştir. Örnek vermek gerekirse Milletler Topluluğunda (League of Nations) manda sistemi en önemli ilkelerden biri olarak kabul edilmiştir. Bu sistemde mandalar üç kategoriye ayrılmıştır. A kategorisinde, kendi kendilerini yönetmeye en yakın toplumlar olarak görülen eski Osmanlı İmparatorluğunun parçası olan Arap ülkeleri yer almaktaydı. B kategorisinde hala daha kendi kendini yönetebilme becerisinden uzak olan Afrika toplumları, en altaki C categorisinde ise belkide hiçbir zaman kendi kendilerini yönetme erdemine ve şansına ulaşamayacak olan Pasifik adaları yerlileri yer alıyordu.

İkinci Dünya Savaşı sonrası kurulan uluslararası düzende de hiyeyarşik anlayışta çok bir değişiklik olmamıştır. Savaşın beş galibi yeni kurulan Birleşmiş Milletler çatısı altında kendilerine 'Güvenlik Konseyi' çatısı altında ayrıcalık ve daimi üyelik bahşetmiş, ve devletlerin eşitlik ilkesi bir kez daha ihlal edilmiştir. Buradaki tek fark ise Batılı devletlerin yanısıra (Amerika Birleşik Devletleri, İngiltere, Fransa, Sovyetler Birliği) askeri ve özellikle ekonomik gücünden dolayı Çin Halk Cumhuriyeti'nin, biraz da zorunlu olarak, Milliyetçi Çin'in (Tayvan) yerini geçte olsa 1972'de almasıdır.

Üçüncü ve son bölüm, 11 Eylül 2001 saldırılarının sonrası devam eden uluslararası hakimiyeti analiz etmektedir. Bu bölümde kısaca, 11 Eylül saldırılarının Amerika Birleşik Devletleri'nin Ortadoğu'ya askeri müdahelesine zemin yarattığı ve Batılı güçlerin 'diğerleri' üzerinde kurduğu hegemonyanın tekrar nasıl meşru bir zemin üzerine oturtulmaya çalışıldığı vurgulanmıştır. 11 Eylül saldırıları sonrası diğer ülkelere müdahale tekrar askeri zemine çekilmiş ve bunun meşrulaştırılması adına da 'sınıfda kalmış' ülkeler (failed states) ve 'insani müdahele' (humanitarian intervention) gibi önceden oluşturulumş konseptlere yeni anlamlar yüklenilmiştir. Bunun neticesinde de bu kategorilere giren ülkelere askeri müdahaleler çok daha kolay hale getirilimiştir.

Sonuç olarak, 11. Yüzyıldan beri bazı değişiklikler gösteren uluslararası düzende bazı şeyler pek değişmemiştir. Bütün sistemlerde Avrupalı / Batılı rejimler hiyerarşiler yaratmış, uluslararası düzeni 'bütünleştirmeye' ve domine etmeye çalışmışlar ve bunu bir 'sorumluluk' ve üstünlük olarak görmüşlerdir. Ayrıca 'ötekilerin' kendi kendilerini yönetme ve egemenlik kapasitelerini belirleme hakkını kendilerinde görmüşler ve bunun için onları çeşitli 'sınavlardan' geçirmişlerdir. Batılıların kendilerinin belirlediği bu sınavlardan başarısız olunması veya onların istediği şekilde hareket edilmemesi durumunda ise askeri müdahalelerden esirgenmemiş ve en önemlisi tüm bu çifte standardlar uluslararsı hukuk çerçevesinde ve güvencesinde yapılmaya çalışılmıştır.

İkinci bölümü takip eden üçüncü bölümde öncelikle Arap bölgesel sistemi tanımlanmıştır. Daha sonra, Arap bölgesel sistemini diğer bölgesel sistemlerden ayıran en önemli özellikler ortaya konulmuştur. Bu özellikler arasında Arap bölgesel sistemi içerisinde yer alan ülkelerde otoritenin iç içe geçmiş olması ve İslam ve Arap milliyetçiliği gibi sınırlar üstü (transnational) kimliklerin etkin biçimde devam etmesi gösterilebilir.

Bu bölümde ayrıca Westfalyan devlet sisteminin oluşması ve Arap bölgesel sistem üzerindeki etkileri tartışılmıştır. Özellikle Ortadoğu'daki yapay sınırlar, otokratik yönetimler ve sivil toplumun olmayışının nedenleri sorgulanmış ve bu kavramların Westfalyan sistemi ile olan yakın ilişkisi her açıdan değerlendirilimiştir. Westfalyan sistemin Arap Bölgesel sistemi ile çatışması neticesinde Arap ülkelerindeki Batı yanlısı rejimler, meşrutiyet sorunlarını askeri ve otokratik metodlarla aşmaya çalışmışlardır. Bu önemli gelişme çok önemli bir tespiti de beraberinde getirmiştir. Batılı devletler kendi çıkarları doğrultusunda, gerekirse Ortadoğu halkların pahasına, belli rejimleri desteklemiş ve bu da çift taraflı bir bağımlılık yaratmıştır. Bağımlılığın bir tarafında rejimleri tarafından tüm gücü alınan ve güçsüz ve bağımlı bırakılan Arap toplumları, diğer tarafında ise kendi halklarını yönetme sevdası uğruna uluslararası sistem ve onun ana aktörlerine bağımlı haline gelen Arap rejimleri bulunmaktadır.

Hiç kuşkusuz bu bağımlılık Westfalyan sistemin Ortadoğu'da uygulanmasının yanısıra, yapay sınırlar, meşrutiyet sorunu, iki kutuplu uluslararası sistem ve bölgesel güç müdahaleleri, petrolün etkisi ve önemi, Arap ülkelerinin uluslararası ülkelere olan iktisadi, siyasi ve askeri bağımlılıkları gibi pek çok nedenden kaynaklanmaktadır. Bir başka ifade ile Ortadoğu'nun uluslararası sisteme bağımlı hale getirilmesi tek bir nedene değil birbiriyle ilişkili çok çeşitli nedene dayanmaktadır.

Bütün bu teorik tartışmaların ardından, tezin son bölümü alan çalışmalarını analiz etmektedir. Bu bölümde, daha önceki bölümlerde öne sürülen teorik varsayımların pratik sonuçları incelenmiştir. Bir başka ifade ile son bölümdeki alan çalışmaları, daha önce öne sürülen teorik tartışmaların test edilmesi açısından önemlidir.

İlk alan çalışması Cemal Abdül Nasır'ın Mısır'ını incelemektedir. Hiç kuşkusuz Nasır'ın uluslararası sisteme ve Batılı güçlere baş kaldırışının en büyük nedeni Arap milliyetçiliğine dayanan ideolojisini pratiğe de taşımış olabilmesidir. Bir başka ifade ile Nasır'ın başkaldırışı sadece söylemlerle sınırlı kalmamış ayni zamanda eylemler ve siyasi aktivitelerle de desteklenmiştir.

1918'de İskenderiye'de doğan Nasır'ın 'devrimci' dürtüleri kendini daha lise yıllarında göstermeye başlamıştı. İngiliz koloni yönetimine karşı katıldığı pek çok gösteride tutuklanmış ve yaralanmıştı. Yüzbaşı olarak katıldığı 1948 Filistin Savaşı ise Nasır'ın devrimci fikirlerinin pekişmesi açısından çok büyük önem taşımaktadır. Filistin'deki ağır yenilgi sonrası Nasır Batı yanlısı Arap liderlerinin kendi halklarına nasıl ihanet ettiklerine tanık olmuş ve Batı ve İsrail'e karşı verilecek mücadelenin ancak devrimci Arab rejimlerinin birleşmesi ile kazanılabileceğini görmüştür.

1952 devrimi sonrası, 1956'da Nasır Mısır'ın Cumhurbaşkanı olmuş ve öldüğü tarih olan 1970'e kadar ülkenin tartışmasız lideri olarak kalmıştır. Nasır iktidara gelir gelmez büyük iktisadi devrimler yaparak hüküm süren hakim sınıfın gücünü eritmiştir. Tarım, endüstri, sağlık sektörü, eğitim, yeni iş alanlarının

açılması, vergi ve diğer pek çok alanda yaptığı devrimler sayesinde sadece Mısır halkının güvenini kazanmakla kalmamış aynı zamanda Mısır'lıların hayat standardlarını da yükseltmiştir. Böylelikle gelir seviyesindeki uçurum azalmış ve daha eşitlikçi bir sistem kurulmuştur.

Nasır ülkede gerçekleştirdiği reformlar ve halktan aldığı güven sonrası rotasını dış politikaya ve Batılı güçlerin bölgede kurduğu hegemonya'ya çevirmiştir. Nasır'ın dış politikada takip ettiği siyaset beş ana noktaya dayanıyordu.

1. Arap ülkelerinin tam bağımsızılığını ve güvenliğini sağlamak.
2. Bölgede kolonializmi ve kalıntılarını tamamı ile sona erdirmek.
3. Mısır'ın bağımsız ve güçlü kalabilmesi için ordusunu güçlendirmek.
4. Mısır'ın ekonomik bağımsızlığını sağlamak. Ve son olarak:
5. Arap dünyasında ekonomik ve siyasi bütünlüğü sağlamak.

Bu prensipler doğrultusunda Nasır ilk siyasi zaferini Bağdat Paktına katılmayı red ederek gerçekleştirmiştir. Böylelikle Nasır'ın uluslararası güçlere ve bölgede kurulan *statü quo*'ya başkaldırışı başlamıştır. 1953'de Amerikan Dışişleri bakanı olan John Foster Dulles dünyayı Doğu ve Batı olarak iki kutupa ayırmış ve Mısır'ı da kendi saflarına çekmek için büyük bir uğraşı içerisine girmiştir. Ancak bölgedeki ana tehlike unsurunu Sovyetler yerine İsrail ve kolonialist güçler olarak gören Nasır Batılıların kurduğu bir güvenlik örgütü olan Bağdat Paktına girmemekle kalmamış, bu paktın yıkılması için de büyük bir siyasi ve propaganda savaşına girmiştir. Bunun neticesinde Irak dışında hiçbir Arap ülkesi Bağdat Paktına girmeyerek Nasır büyük bir siyasi başarı elde etmiştir.

Nasır'ın siyasi başarıları bununla da sınırlı değildir. Sovyet Birliği ile yaptığı silah antlaşması neticesinde Batılı güçlerin bölgedeki silah monopolisini kırmış ve daha da önemlisi Suveyş kanalını millileştirmiştir. Özellikle Suveyş Kanalının millileştirilmesi ile Nasır hem Arap ve hem de üçüncü dünya ülkeleri nezlinde büyük bir prestij kazanmakla kalmamış aynı zamanda en büyük hayali olan ve Mısır'ın yeni piramiti olarak tanımladığı Asvan Barajı'nın yapımı için de gerekli

olan kaynağın yaratılmasını sağlamıştır. Bu başarılarla birlikte Nasır'ın Arap dünyasındaki liderliği pekişmiş ve popularitesi her geçen gün artmıştır.

Nasır'ın diğer siyasi başarıları arasında 'Arapların Sesi' radyosu aracılığı ile büyük propaganda zaferleri kazanmış olmasıdır. O zamanların en büyük siyasi gücü olan radyo sayesinde Nasır milyonları harekete geçirmiş ve Cezayir, Fas, ve Tunus'un Fransa'dan bağımsızlıklarını kazanmalarında önemli rol oynamıştır. Ayrıca Irak'daki Batı yanlısı Haşemit krallığı devrilmiş, Lübnan ve Ürdün'de hükümetler değişmiş ve son olarak da Yemen'deki devrim gerçekleşmiştir. Nasır ayrıca Cezayir bağımsızlık savaşı sırasında Cezayir'deki direnişçilere silah ve para yardımı da yapmıştır.

Nasır'ın en büyük siyasi başarısı ise 1958 de Suriye ve Mısır'ın birleşmesi ile kurulan Birleşik Arap Devleti'dir. Bu birleşme Arap milliyetçiliğinin zirvesi olarak kabul edilebilir. Bu birlikteliğin bir başka önemi de diğer Arap ülkelerine örnek teşkil edebilecek olmasıdır. Ayrıca Nasır, 1969'da Muammer Kaddafi tarafından gerçekleştirilen Libya devrimi sırası ve sonrasında Kaddafi rejimine sağladığı destekle onun ayakta kalmasını sağlamıştır.

Nasır'ın tüm bu siyasi başarıları başta Amerika Birleşik Devletleri (ABD) olmak üzere Batılı güçler tarafından engellenmeye çalışılmış ve Nasır sistematik olarak çökertilmiştir. İlk olarak Bağdat Paktının kurulması ile birlikte Nasır Arap dünyasından dışlanmaya çalışılmış ancak bunda başarılı olunamamıştır. Daha sonra Süveyş Kanalının millileştirilmesi ile birlikte İngiliz, Fransız, ve İsrail orduları Mısır'a karşı ortak bir operasyon düzenlemiş ve kanalı yeniden işgal etmişlerdir. Ancak başta petrol üreticisi Arap ülkelerinin tutumu ve Sovyetlerin savaşa katılmasından çekinen ABD'nin ısrarcı tutumu sayesinde bu plan da başarılı olamamıştır.

Nasır'ı engellemeye çalışan bir sonraki hamle Eisenhover Doktrinidir. Bu doktrin sözde Sovyet'lere karşı görünsede esas amaç Nasır'ın siyasi alanını kısıtlamaktır. Bu amaçla ABD hükümeti Nasır yanlısı hükümetleri engellemek

adına Suriye, Lübnan, ve Ürdün'de askeri müdahaleler gerçekleştirmiş ancak Ürdün dışında istenilen sonuçlara ulaşılamamıştır.

Nasır'ın bölgesel başkaldırışı iki savaşla durdurulmuştur. Bunların birincisi Nasır'ın 'Vietnamı' diyebileceğimiz Yemen savaşıdır. Mısır'ı direkt olarak ilgilendirmemesine rağmen Nasır Yemen'deki devrimci güçlere askeri anlamda destek vererek büyük bir stratejik hata yapmıştır. Savaşın uzaması ve Suudi Arabistan, Ürdün ve İngiltere destekli kralcı güçlerin zaman içerisinde kontrolü yeniden ele almasıyla birlikte Nasır'ın ordusu hem çok ciddi maddi manevi kayıplara uğramış hem de 1967 Savaş'ında İsrail ordularına karşı gerekli direnişi gösterememiştir. Neticesinde, 1967 Altı Gün Savaşları ile birlikte Nasır'ın taputundaki son çivi de çakılmıştır.

Tezin beşinci bölümü ikinci alan çalışması olan Saddam Hüseyin'in Irak'ını analiz etmiştir. Mısır bölümünde olduğu gibi bu bölümde de öncelikle Saddam'ın yükselişi, uluslararası sisteme ve bölgesel statü quo ya başkaldırşı daha sonra ise uluslararası güçler tarafından nasıl durdurulduğu ve tamamı ile nasıl imha edildiği anlatılmıştır.

En büyük siyasi idolü Nasır olan Saddam'ın yükselişi pek çok açıdan Nasır'ınkine benzemektedir. Oldukça hırslı bir yapıya sahip olan Saddam Ba'az partisinin önemsiz bir yeraltı üyesiyken, kararlılığı, cesareti, ve en önemlisi şansı ve kan bağı sayesinde kısa zamanda Irak'ın iki numaralı adamı haline gelmiştir. Saddam'ın bu kadar hızlı yükselişinin en önemli nedeni ayni kabileden geldiği (Tikrit-i) Cumhurbaşkanı Ahmet el-Bakır'ın sağ kolu olması ve onunla birlikte her kademede bulunmasıdır. 1968'den beri aslında Irak'ın gizli lideri durumunda bulunan Saddam, 1979'da el-Bakır'ı istifaya zorlamış ve Cumhurbaşkanı olmuştur.

Nasır gibi millileştirmeye büyük önem veren Saddam, ilk olarak ülkenin en büyük gelir kaynağı olan petrol rafinelerini millileştirmiş daha sonra da ne Irak'da ne de Arap dünyasında daha önce görülmemiş reforumlar yapmıştır. Sağlık ve eğitim alanındaki reforumların yanısıra halkın kendine direk olarak ulaşabilmesi için telefon hatları kurdurmuş ve kendi bakanlarının bile şikayet edilebilmesine

olanak sağlamıştır. Dış politikida ise Nasır sonrası dönemde Arap dünyasının liderliğine soyunan Saddam Hüseyin, Batılı ülkelerin desteği ile İran'a saldırmıştır.

Saddam'ın İran'a saldırması aslında Batılı güçlerin bölgesel dengeleri korumak adına yaptıkları bir stratejinin parçasıdır. İran'ın İslamik rejiminin Ortadoğu'da yayılmasını istemeyen Batılı güçler Saddam Hüseyin'i desteklemiş ve askeri, ekonomik ve diplomatik olarak tam destek vermişlerdir. Ayrıca Amerika Birleşik Devletleri bu şekilde İran ile yaşadığı büyükelçilik krizinin bir nevi intikamını almıştır. Ancak burada üzerinde durulması gereken en önemli husus Batılı Güçlerin Saddam'ı desteklemesinin en önemli nedeninin İran'ın bölgede daha güçlü bir güç olarak görünmesi ve Irak'a verilen yardımlarla bu gücün dengede tutulmasıdır. Amerikan bir dışişleri bakanlığı yetkilisinin ifadesi ile "ne yazık ki hiçbir ülkenin bu savaşı kazanmasına izin verilmeyecektir". Böylelikle bu anlamsız savaş dış güçlerin de müdahelesi ile sekiz yıl sürmüştür. Savaş sonunda hiçbir kazanan olmadığı gibi hem Irak hem de İran büyük insani ve maddi kayıplara uğramıştır.

Hiç kuşku yoktur ki Saddam Hüseyin'in siyasi olarak düşüşü Irak'ın Kuveyti işgali ile başlamıştır. O zamana kadar Saddam'ı İran'a karşı destekleyen ve kendi ülkesinde yaptığı pek çok kıyıma sesis kalan Batı dünyası, bu işgalle birlikte bir anda taraf değiştirmiş ve Saddam'ı engellemek adına herşeyi yapmıştır. İran ile yaptığı sekiz yıllık zorlu savaş sonrasında ekonomik olarak çok zor durumda kalan Saddam umudunu petrol fiyatlarındaki yükselişe bağlamış ancak özellikle Kuveyt, Suudi Arabistan, ve Birleşik Arap Emirliklerinin kotalarından fazla üretim yapıp petrol fiyatlarını düşürmeleri ile çok zor durumda kalmıştır. Kuveyti defalarca uyarmasına rağmen istediği sonuca ulaşamayan Saddam, özellikle ABD tarafından kasıtlı olarak yanıltılmasıyla büyük bir stratejik hata yapmış ve Kuveyti 2 Ağustos 1990'da işgal etmiştir.

Saddam'ın bu hamlesi bölgedeki tüm dengeleri değiştirmiş ve Batılı devletler tarafından oluşturulan *status quo* yu tehdit etmiştir. Böylesine ekonomik bir güce sahip olan Saddam'ın bu durumu Arap milliyetçiliği ve Filistin sorunu ile

bağdaştırması ve üstüne üstlük Ortadoğu'daki zengin krallıkları Batılı güçlerin işbirlikçisi ve maşası olarak tanımlaması sonunun başlangıcı olmuştur.

O güne kadar Saddam'ı her koşulda destekleyen ABD önderliğindeki Batı bir anda Saddam'ı 'barbarlaştırmış' ve Irak tarihin gördüğü en ağır bomardımanlardan birine tanık olmuştur. Amerikan hükümeti Saddam'ı kitle imha silahlarına sahip yeni 'Hitler' ilan etmiş ve askeri operasyon çok hızlı bir şekilde başlatılmıştır.

Çok açık ve üzücüdür ki ABD öderliğindeki koalisyon güçlerinin Irak'ı bombalamaları Kuveyti kurtarma bahanesinin çok ötesine geçmiştir. Bu saldırılar sırasında Irak'ın 500,000 kişilik ordusunun yaklaşık 350,000'ni etkisiz hale getirilimiştir. Çok daha dramatik olanı ise özellikle sivillerin hedef alınmasıdır. Bu saldırılar sırasında hastaneler, temiz su istasyonları, elektrik trafoları, köprüler, yollar vs gibi pek çok sivil hedef vurulmuştur. Tam sayısı net olarak bilinmemekle birlikte öldürülen toplam sivil sayısının iki milyonun üzerinde olduğu tahmin edilmektedir.

İlginç olan, tüm aramalara rağmen Irak'ta ne kitle imhasal silahları (Weapons of Mass Destruction) bulunmuş ne de herhangi bir izine rastlanmıştır. Bu gerçekler Saddam'a karşı yapılan operasyonun gerçek niyetinin aslında Kuveyt'i kurtarmaktan çok Saddam'ın bölgesel sisteme başkaldırışını engellemek olduğunu göstermiştir. Çok daha acı ve çarpıcı olan tablo ise vahşice yapılan bu saldırılara rağmen Irak'a uygulanan ekonomik ambargonun tüm acımasızlığı ile devam etmeş olmasıdır. Irak'ta herhangi bir kitle imhasal silahı bulunmamasına ve Irak ordusunun neredeyse tamamına yakın bölümünün imha edilmiş olmasına rağmen başta bebek ve çocukları etkileyen ambargolar, yüzbinlerce masum insanın ölümüne neden olmuştur. Irak'ın bombalanmasında ve ertesinde ölen sivillerin sayısı iki atom bombası atılan Japonya'nın İkinci Dünya Savaşı'ndaki kayıplarının yaklaşık beş katıdır. Ayrıca, ambargonun ve ilaç eksikliğinin getirdiği nedenlerden dolayı çoğu bebek ve çocuk çeyrek milyondan fazla insan hayatını kaybetmiştir. Bu rakamlar,

Irak'a yapılan operasyonun gerçek amacını ve tarih boyunca üretilen bağımlılık politikaları ve uluslararası düzenle olan ilişkisini gözler önüne sermektedir.

Saddamı sınırlandırma çabaları bunlarla da sınırlı kalmamış, 'Çöl Fırtınası' Harekatı sonrası da tüm hızılyla devam etmiştir. İnsanlık dışı ambargoların kayıtsız şartsız devam etmesinin yanısıra, Irak'ın Kuzey'inde Kürtler için 'güvenli cennet' bölgesi oluşturulmuş ve Irak silahlı kuvvetlerinin 32. Paralelin Güneyine geçmeleri yasaklanmıştır. Bu gelişme, Irak'ın Kuzey'inde Kürtlerin yoğun olarak yaşadığı bölgede otonom bir Kürt bölgesinin oluşmasına olanak sağlamıştır. Mayıs 1992'de ilan edilen bölgesel hükümetin ardından Kürtler genel seçim yapmış ve kendi anayasalarını bile ilan etmişlerdir. Böylelikle Irak'ın egemenliği ciddi bir şekilde sınırlandırılmıştır.

Tüm bu etken ve engellemelere rağmen bir şekilde ayakta kalan Saddam Hüseyin'in mezarındaki son çivi 2003 yılında çakılmıştır. Her türlü siyasi ve ekonomik baskıya rağmen hala Batı'nın istediğe çizgiye bir türlü gelemeyen Saddam'ın artık tamamı ile imha edilmesi gerekmekteydi. 11 Eylül saldırıları sonrası İslami terör örgütü El Kayde (Al-Qaide) ile Saddam Hüseyin rejimi arasında ıspatlanmamış bağlantılar üreten Bush yönetimi, yine 12 yıl öncesine benzer iddialar ile Irak'a saldırmıştır. Üretilen senaryolar arasında yine Saddam'ın olmayan kitle imhasal silahları en önemli bahaneler arasında yer almaktaydı.

Sonuçta, Amerikan ve İngiliz askerleri önderliğindeki ve Kürt gruplar tarafından da desteklenen işgal ordusu Irak'ı üç haftalık bir çatışmadan sonra 1 Mayıs 2003'de önemli bir direnişle karşılaşmadan işgal etmiştir. Saddam sonrası Irak neredeyse üç bölgeye bölünmüş ve güç etnik ve dini mezhepler arasında paylaştırılmıştır. Böylelikle Saddam Hüseyin'in bölgesel dengelere başkaldırısı sonlandırılmış ve Irak'ın İsrail veya Batı'nın olası çıkarlarına karşı yapabileceği herhangi bir başkaldırı tamamı ile bitirilmiştir.

Bu çalışma, altıncı bölüm ile sona ermektedir. Bu bölümde tezin sonuçları detaylı bir şekilde özetlenmiş,tezin temel argumanları ve orjinal olarak yaptığı

katkılar ifade edilimiş ve bu çalışmaya tamamlayıcı olarak ilerde yapılabilecek araştırmalar önerilmiştir.

Cemal Abdül Nasır Hüseyin ve Saddam Hüseyin'in gerek siyasi gücü elde etmeleri, gerek Batı'ya ve bölgede oluşturulan statu quo'ya başkaldırmaları ve neticesinde sınırlandırılmaları arasında önemli benzerlikler ve bazı farklılıklar bulunmaktadır.

Her iki liderde siyasi gücü ele geçirmeden önce bir süre arka planda beklemiş ve hem ülke içindeki hem de bölgedeki gelişmeleri takip etmişleridr. Nasır, Cumhurbaşkanı ve Başbakan olan General Muhammet Nagıp'ın arkasında iki yıl başbakan yardımcısı olarak görev yaparken, Saddam Hüseyin Cumhurbaşkanı El-Bakır'ın arkasında onbir yıl Cumhurbaşkanı yardımcısı olarak hizmet etmiştir.

İkinci olarak, iki liderde önceliği ülke içindeki reformlara vermiş ve meşrutiyetlerini güçlendirmeye çalışmışlardır. İki liderde eğitim, sağlık ve altyapı alanlarında büyük yatırımlar yapmış ve gelir eşitsizliğini düzeltmek adına büyük çaba göstermişleridr. Bunun neticesinde özellikle alt ve orta sınıflardan büyük destek görmüşler ve dış politikada daha aktif ve etkin olabilmelerine olanak sağlamışlardır. Bir başka ifade ile iki liderin de Batılı güçlere başkaldırışlarının ön koşulu iç politikada elde ettikleri başarılarıdır.

Üçüncü olarak, her iki liderde kendilerini dini gruplardan ayrı tutmuş ve siyasi ideoloji olarak İslami kesimlerle çatışmışlardır. Zaten temel olarak modern bir ideoloji olan ve laik temellere dayanan Arap milliyetçiliği ile İslam arasında olan doğal çelişki, iki liderin siyasetleri neticesinde daha da derinleşmiştir. Bu noktayla bağlantılı olarak her iki liderde Muhafazakar Arap ülkeleriyle çatışma içine girmişleridr. Ayrıca Saddam Hüseyin Kuveyt ile, Nasır ise Yemen'de Suudi Arabistan ile direk askeri çatışmalara girmişlerdir. Bu çatışmalar her iki liderin de gücünün azalmasında çok önemli rol oynamıştır. Özellikle Nasır'ın Yemen'deki savaşı adeta kendi 'Vietnam'ına dönüşmüş ve 1967 savaşının kaybedilmesinde ana rolü oynamıştır.

Bu benzerliklerin yanısıra iki lider arasında belirli farklılıklar da vardır. Nasır'ın siyasi bir güç olarak yükselmesinde ve başarılı olmasında Arap milliyetçiliği ideolojisinin rolü büyüktür. Bir başka ifade ile Nasır'ın siyasi gücünün temelinde çok güçlü ideolojik bir altyapı bulunmaktadır. Nasır yaptığı fiili icratlar ve bölgesel sisteme karşı gösterdiği başkaldırı sayesinde Arap milliyetçiliği ile tutarlı bir siyaset takip etmeye çalışmıştır.

Öte yandan Saddam'da Arap milliyetçiliğine atıfda bulunsada Nasır kadar başarılı olamamıştır. Bir başka ifade ile Saddam'ın icraatları Nasır'ınkiler kadar güçlü bir felsefi ve ideolojik altyapıya sahip değildir. Saddam Hüseyin'in temel gücü petrol ve silaha,bir başka tanımlama ile sert güce (hard power) dayanmaktadır. Bundan dolayı da özellikle son zamanlarında Saddam Hüseyin ülkesindeki bütünlüğü sağlamada zorluklar çekmiş ve özellikle Kürt ve Şii gruplarla çok sık silahlı mücadeleye girmek zorunda kalmıştır.

Bir diğer önemli farklılık, Nasır liderliğinin ilk gününden son gününe kadar halkının gözünde meşru ve popüler olarak kalabilmiştir. Öte yandan Saddam meşrutiyetini özellikle Kürt gruplara kabul ettirmekte herzaman zorlanmış ve iktidarının özellikle son dönemlerinde Şii gruplarla da arası açılmıştır.

Son ve belkide en önemli farklılık olarak Nasır en büyük düşmanı olarak nitelendirdiği İsrail ile iki kez direkt olarak savaşmış olmasına rağmen Saddam İsrail ile hiçbir zaman direk olarak karşı karşıya gelmemiştir. Bu da özellikle söylem ve pratik olarak iki lider arasında çok önemli bir fark olduğunu göstermektedir. İki lider de söylem olarak İsrail'i pek çok kez hedef gösterip suçlamasına rağmen özellikle Saddam icraat olarak bu konuda çok etkisiz kalmış ve böylelikle meşrutiyet ve sempati toplama konusunda sıkıntılar çekmiştir.

Yinede, iki liderin etkisiz hale getirilmesi arasında çok ilginç ve çarpıcı benzerlikler bulunmaktadır. Her iki lider de ilk olarak Batı'lıların kurduğu güvenlik sistemlerine dahil edilmek istenmiştir. Nasır Bağdat Paktına davet edilmiş ancak kabul etmeyince zorla ikna edilmeye çalışılmıştır. Yine ayni şekilde Saddam

Hüseyin İran'a karşı desteklenilmiş ve kullanılmış ancak daha sonra Kuveyt'i işgal edince Batı'nın bir numaralı düşmanı ilan edilmiştir.

İki lider arasındaki bir başka çarpıcı benzerlik de kazanamayacakları savaşlara yönlendirilmeleridir. Bir başka ifade ile aslında iki liderin de savaş meydanında Batılılara karşı kazanma ihtimalleri hemen hemen hiç yokken, savaşa provoke edilmiş ve her iki lider de bu tuzağa düşmüştür. Sonuç olarak Nasır 1967'deki Altı Gün Savaşları neticesinde siyasi ve askeri gücünü büyük ölçüde yitirirken, yine aynı şekilde Saddam Kuveyti işgal ederek bir bakıma sonunun başlangıcına imza atmıştır. Hem Saddam'ın hem de Nasır'ın siyasi başarılarını askeri yolla elde edebileceklerini düşünmeleri büyük bir tarihsel hatadır.

Özetlemek gerekirse, uluslararası düzenin tarihi mükemmel eşitsizliklere dayanmaktadır. Batılılar 'ötekileri' hiçbir zaman kendileri ile eşit görmemiş ve çıkarlarına ve kurdukları düzeni tehdit eden rejimleri sınırlandırmak ve etkisiz hale getirmek için her yolu denemişlerdir. Bunun için eskiden adil olmayan assimetrik antlaşmalar, Arap ülkelerini bölmek için kurulan askeri paktlar, ekonomik ve siyasi ambargolar, Arap olmayan ülkelere yapılan askeri, ekonomik, ve siyasi yardımlar, muhafazakar rejimlerin desteklenmesi gibi pek çok metod kullanılmıştır.

Tarihsel olarak inşa edilen bu dış politikanın yansımaları Amerikan dış politikasında kendini çok net olarak göstermektedir. Bir başka ifade ile Batılı güçlerin çekiç gücünü ve cezalandırılıcığını günümüzde ABD, İngiltere ve Fransa'nın elinden almıştır. Ne yazık ki 11 Eylül 2001 saldırılarıda bu anlayışa meşrutiyet kazandırmış ve Amerika'nın Ortadoğu'ya müdahalesi daha kanlı ve çıkılmaz bir hal almıştır.

Bu çalışma, yaratılan bu güvensizlik ortamının ve intikamcı kısır döngünün hiçbir tarafa bir fayda sağlamayacağı görüşündedir. Diğer bir ifadeyle, ABD'nin bölgesel politikalarını gözden geçirme zamanı gelmiştir. Günümüzde 'ötekileştirilen' diğerleri artık Batı toplumlarına göç, iş, din, ve kültürel aktivitelerle adeta penetre etmiş durumdadır. Bu da demek oluyor ki Batı ile Doğu'yu kalın

çizgilerle ayırmak artık imkansızlaşmıştır. Böylelikle daha barışçı bir uluslararası düzen için artık ötekinin farklılıkları tanınmalı ve saygı gösterilmelidir.

Peki Arap milliyetçiliği gerçekten ölmüş müdür? Büyük Arap ülkeleri sponsorluğundaki Arap milliyetçiliğinin etkisini kaybetmesi ve egemenliğe dayalı eşitliğin Arap dünyası içinde yayılması, otokratik Arap liderlerin yerini daha ılımlı liderlere bırakması ve en önemlisi artık halkların da demokratik açılımlar için baş kaldırması Soğuk Savaş sonrası oluşabilecek yeni Arap birliği için önemli gelişmelerdir. Arap dünyasındaki güç dengesinin yayılması ile tek bir ülkenin diğerlerini idare ve kontol etmesi imkansız hale gelmiştir.

Günümüzdeki Arap Baharı ve Arap dünyasındaki köklü değişiklikler halkların da artık uluslararası ve toplumsal eşitsizliklere başkaldırı noktasında olduğunu net bir şekilde ortaya koymaktadır. Kaanatimce, artık halklarından kopuk rejimlerin yaşama şansı yoktur. Bu bağlamda Arap milliyetçiliği protestoların ve isyanların teorik zeminini oluşturmada ve gerektiği zaman tabanın önemli bir siyasi referansı olma özelliğiyle önemini halen devam ettirmektedir.

Bu tezin yazılmasındaki en önemli sorun çok geniş bir içeriğe sahip olmasıdır. Cemal Abdül Nasır, Saddam Hüseyin, Arap milliyetçiliği, Arap bölgesel sistemi, ve uluslararası düzen hakkında çok geniş bir literatür bulunmaktadır. Bu soruna rağmen, bu çalışma olabildiğince geniş kaynak kullanılarak Ortadoğu'nun doğru bir şekilde okunabilmesi için teorik bir çerçeve yaratmaya çalışmıştır. Bu çalışmanın inancı odur ki bu teorik çerçeve Ortadoğu'yu anlamaya çalışan alternatif bakış açılarına yol göstermede yardımcı olacaktır.

Nasır sonrası dönemde Arap milliyetçiliği gerçekten tamamı ile sona mı ermiştir? Yeni Arap milliyetçiliği ve Arap bütünlüğü hangi temel prensipler üzerine inşa edilebilir? Arap Baharı bölgeyi bağımlılaştıran sistemleri ortadan kaldırabilecek midir? Dünyanın diğer bölgelerindeki 'bağımlılaştırma' ile Ortadoğu'daki 'bağımlılaştırma' arasında ne tür benzerlikler ve farklılıklar bulunmaktadır? Bu çalışmaya ek olarak yapılacak ileriki çalışmalar bu temel sorunsallar üzerinden incelenebilir.