

**THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN LIBERAL INTELLECTUALS AND
POWER IN THE SEARCH FOR A NEW HEGEMONY DURING AKP
PERIOD IN TURKEY**

**A THESIS SUBMITTED TO
THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
OF
MIDDLE EAST TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY**

BY

DUYGU ERSOY

**IN PARTIAL FULLFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS
FOR
THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
IN
THE DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE
AND PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION**

SEPTEMBER 2012

Approval of the Graduate School of Social Sciences

Prof. Dr. Meliha Altunışık
Director

I certify that this thesis satisfies all the requirements as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

Prof. Dr. Raşit Kaya
Head of Department

This is to certify that we have read this thesis and that in our opinion it is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Fahriye Üstüner
Supervisor

Examining Committee Members

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Fahriye Üstüner (METU, ADM) _____

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Necmi Erdoğan (METU, ADM) _____

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Alev Özkazanç (AU, ADM) _____

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Mustafa Şen (METU, SOC) _____

Assist. Prof. Dr. Canan Aslan Akman (METU, ADM) _____

I hereby declare that all information in this document has been obtained and presented in accordance with academic rules and ethical conduct. I also declare that, as required by these rules and conduct, I have fully cited and referenced all material and results that are not original to this work.

Name, Last name : Duygu Ersoy

Signature :

ABSTRACT

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN LIBERAL INTELLECTUALS AND POWER IN THE SEARCH FOR A NEW HEGEMONY DURING AKP PERIOD IN TURKEY

Ersoy, Duygu

Ph.D., Department of Political Science and Public Administration

Supervisor: Assoc. Prof. Dr. Fahriye Üstüner

September 2012, 243 Pages

This study aims to contribute to the literature on the political role of intellectuals through examining the stance of a specific group with regard to power in the recent moment of Turkish political history. It is the concern of the thesis to identify the reasons behind the constant support of this specific group, namely, the liberal intellectuals to the political power under the AKP period. Depending on Gramsci's theory on intellectuals, it is claimed that this engagement is realized as a result of the fulfillment of the conditions attracting the intellectuals to the intellectual bloc. With regard to these two conditions of attraction, it is argued that the idea of "New Turkey" or "advanced democracy" led to a sense of distinction for these intellectuals as the "actors that are guiding the establishment of this new order" through "encouraging" AKP to challenge the status quo. Fulfilling the second condition of attraction, it is identified that this sense of distinction is confirmed through the novel situation that, in accordance with the transformation of the media sphere, these intellectuals started to maintain key positions in the media as the "public opinion leaders" of the new term.

This sense of distinction served as a source of power for the liberal intellectuals and as a result when the governing party trivialized the existence of a "coalition" between itself and these intellectuals they tried to restore it through retreating from their former demands. In order to understand how it is possible to

further this sense of distinction under these circumstances, the thesis focuses on three moments under AKP rule. The first one is the interval of 2002-2005 in which the relationship between liberal intellectuals and AKP is founded. The second term refers to the moment in which AKP denied the coalition between itself and these intellectuals while the last term corresponds to the attempts of the liberal intellectuals to restore this relationship in the year 2010. The thesis aims to identify, with the changing circumstances of this relationship, how liberals' presentations of the party in power and their self-assessments are constructed in a manner to further the mentioned sense of distinction.

Keywords: Liberal Intellectuals, AKP, Gramsci, Intellectual bloc, Organic Intellectuals

ÖZ

AKP DÖNEMİ TÜRKİYE’İNDE YENİ BİR HEGEMONYA ARAYIŞINDA LİBERAL ENTELEKTÜELLER- İKTİDAR İLİŞKİSİ

Ersoy, Duygu

Doktora, Siyaset Bilimi ve Kamu Yönetimi Bölümü

Tez Yöneticisi: Doç. Dr. Fahriye Üstüner

Eylül 2012, 243 Sayfa

Bu çalışma Türk siyasal tarihinin son döneminde belirli bir grup entelektüelin iktidara karşı duruşlarını inceleyerek entelektüellerin siyasi rolleri üzerine var olan literatüre katkıda bulunmayı amaçlamaktadır. Tezin temel konusu “liberal entelektüeller” olarak adlandırdığımız grubun AKP döneminde iktidarı belirli bir süreklilik içerisinde desteklemesinin ardındaki nedenleri tanımlamaya çalışmaktır. Gramsci’nin entelektüel kuramına dayanarak, iddia edilmektedir ki, bu ilişki entelektüelleri entelektüel bloğa “çeken” koşulların yerine getirilmesinin sonucunda gerçekleşmiştir. Bu çekiciliğin ilk temel koşuluyla ilgili olarak, “Yeni Türkiye” ya da “ileri demokrasi” kavramlarının liberal entelektüellerin kendilerini kurulacak olan düzene rehberlik edecek ve AKP’yi statükoya karşı mücadelesinde yüreklendirecek aktörler olarak sunmalarına olanak sağlayan bir ayrıcalık hissine neden oldukları öne sürülmektedir. Medya alanındaki dönüşümle birlikte liberal entelektüellerin yeni dönemin “kanaat önderleri” olarak elde ettikleri önemli pozisyonlar düşüldüğünde bahsedilen çekiciliğin ikinci koşulunun da yerine getirildiği ve böylelikle ayrıcalık hissini varlığının desteklendiği söylenebilir.

Bu ayrıcalık hissi liberal entelektüeller için bir iktidar kaynağı olmuş ve bunun sonucunda iktidar partisi bu grupla içinde bulunduğu ilişkiyi önemsizleştirdiğinde liberallerin başvurduğu yol demokratikleşme taleplerinden geri adım atarak ilişkiyi tekrar eski günlerine döndürme çabası olmuştur. Bu şartlar

altında liberallerin AKP'ye yönelik desteğinin sürekliliğini anlayabilmek için çalışmada üç momente odaklanmaktadır. Birincisi ilişkinin kurulduğu 2002-2005 aralığıdır. İkinci dönem iktidar partisinin liberal entelektüellerle herhangi bir işbirliğini reddettiği, üçüncü dönemse bu entelektüellerin bahsedilen işbirliğini yeniden kurma çabasına karşılık gelen 2010 yılıdır. Tez, bu ilişkinin değişen koşullarıyla birlikte liberallerin AKP ve kendilik tanımlarının iktidarlarının kaynağı olan ayrıcalık hissini devamını sürdüreceği şekilde nasıl kurgulandığını görmeyi amaçlamaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Liberal Entelektüeller, AKP, Gramsci, Entelektüel Blok, Organik Entelektüeller

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to thank my supervisor Assoc. Prof. Dr. Fahriye Üstüner. She is one of the major figures of my life not only for supervising my thesis but also for constituting the profile of the academician that I would like to be. Every time that I felt that the completion of the thesis is getting more and more distant her discipline, steadiness and calmness inspired and encouraged me to study.

I would like to express my gratitude to Assoc. Prof. Dr. Necmi Erdoğan and Assoc. Prof. Dr. Alev Özkazanç for their valuable advices and insights. They were always very kind to take their time for the thesis.

I am also grateful to my friends in Çankaya University. The breaks we had with Özlem were great source of motivation to keep on and meant a lot to me. Ebru and Heval always made things easier for me at work and provided me with the necessary time to concentrate on my thesis. Bahadır was kind enough to open his precious library to my use. Lastly, Ayşe was my companion during this process and without her encouragement it would not be possible for me to find the necessary energy to complete the thesis.

My friends with whom we started to graduate study always supported me during the painful process of writing. Senem had literally taken care of me especially in the last four months of thesis and due to her presence the worst summer of my life is full of beautiful memories. Özen prevented the last minute break down with her support and Yeliz was always there for me regardless of the km's between us.

My deepest gratitude is for my family who tolerated all my break-downs during the study. This is the opportunity for me to express my appreciation for my grandfather who is always very supportive and encouraging. Special thanks are to my brother who shared his experiences of writing a doctoral thesis with me and always tried to calm me down. Finally, I should admit that during this process I reflected all the suffering I experienced to my dear father and my dear mother. I am indebted to them not only for their support during my doctoral study but also for being always there for me. I feel very lucky to be their daughter and know that there is no possible way of expressing my deepest gratitude for them within the boundaries of the grammar of any language.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PLAGIARISM	iii
ABSTRACT.....	iv
ÖZ	vi
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS	viii
TABLE OF CONTENTS.....	ix
CHAPTER	
1. INTRODUCTION	1
2. PERSPECTIVES ON INTELLECTUALS AND POWER.....	11
2.1 Theories on the Incompatibility of “Power and Intellect”	11
2.2 Intellectuals as the “Functionaries of Superstructure” and Transformism through “New Media”	23
3. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN LIBERAL INTELLECTUALS AND POWER IN THE POST-1980 PERIOD	40
3.1 Rise of the Liberal Intellectuals: ANAP and Second Republicanism.	41
3.2 2nd moment as the Direct Quest for Power: the Case of YDH	50
3.3 On the Possibilities of “New Turkey”: “AKP vs. the Status quo”	54
3.3.1 What is in circulation? Making Sense of the “New Turkey” as the ‘Never Completed Ideal’	58
3.3.2 The Moment of AKP: Rupture or Continuity?	70
3.3.3 The Attraction of AKP for the Liberal Intellectuals	78
4. THE PROLOGUE FOR THE STORY OF CONTINGENT COMPANIONSHIP (2002-2005): THE MOMENT OF ‘HOPE’ AS THE SOURCE OF NOSTALGIA	85
4.1 “The Tutor” and the “Powerless Government” against the Almighty State	86
4.1.1 Novelty of AKP	87
4.1.2 “Government without Power”	90

4.2	Searching for the Universal: Supporting the EU Membership Process as the Major Component of Intellectual Responsibility	100
4.2.1	AKP as the Missing Part of the Puzzle of Turkey’s Route For the EU	101
4.2.2	Cyclical Demands of Democratization: Sacrifices in the Road to the EU	105
4.2.3	Supporting EU as Part of the Intellectual Responsibility.....	110
5.	SECOND TERM (2007-2008): DEBATES ON CIVILIAN CONSTITUTION, HEADSCARF ISSUE AND PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS- LIBERAL INTELLECTUALS’ FALL FROM GRACE...	125
5.1	“Black Front” as the All-mighty Force Embracing the AKP as the ‘Manipulated Government’	133
5.2	The Conditions for the Restoration of the Relationship between Intellectuals and Political Power: EU Process and Civilian Constitution.....	146
6.	REFERENDUM AS THE GATE TO “NEW TURKEY”: THE STAGE OF ACCEPTANCE.....	161
6.1	Constitutional Amendment Package.....	164
6.2	Tutulary Regime as the Excuse for the Deference of the Civil Constitution	170
6.3	Saying “yes”: Political Satisfaction of being the Architect of “New Turkey”	174
6.4	Symptom of Political Sickness: Saying “No”	182
7.	CONCLUSIONS.....	191
	REFERENCES.....	198
	APPENDICES.....	225
	APPENDIX A: TURKISH SUMMARY	225
	APPENDIX B: CURRICULUM VITAE	242
	APPENDIX C: TEZ FOTOKOPİSİ İZİN FORMU	243

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

An examination of the literature on intellectuals manifests the fact that, the word intellectual, by definition, has political connotations. This political quality of the concept is derived from a particular historical incident known as the “Dreyfus Affair”¹ which has been taken into account as introducing the archetype of the boundaries between intellectuals and political power. In accordance with the manner the concept is originated, these boundaries have been referred by very many scholars as the source of their definitions of the “true intellectual”. Thus, it is mostly a shared position in this literature to expect that “true intellectuals” would intervene in the political processes only for the sake of the universal values. In this sense, intellectual responsibility necessitates acting regardless of one’s concerns of personal interest and power. This is to say, it is assumed that intellectual refers to a category that close relations with those who are in power would endanger its essential characteristic of searching for the truth and the universal.

It may be argued that this definition of the “true intellectual” is indicative of other intellectuals that are not actuated by the universal values. Here it is critical to note that another prevalent theme of the literature on intellectuals is the “treason of the clerics” which is the title of one of its major reference books². This is to say, the conceptualization of the intellectual as a privileged and autonomous unit conflicts with the actual behaviors of intellectuals and makes it possible to ask whether it is in fact possible to detach oneself from the power relations. In the thesis, questioning this definition of the “true intellectual”, intellectuals’ involvement in political processes will be studied outside of this paradigm. Here, it should be noted that it is the aim of this study to examine the intellectual as part of the power relations rather than as someone that is capable of isolating itself from the struggle in a society.

¹ See Christophe Charle, “The Intellectuals after the Dreyfus Affair, Uses and Blindness of Historical Memory,” accessed September 05, 2012, <http://www.unc.edu/depts/europe/conferences/ACLS98/charle.html>.

² See Julien Benda, *The Treason of the Intellectuals*. Transl. R. Aldington. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2009.

In the thesis, through this perspective the specific relationship between a certain group of intellectuals and political power in the contemporary moment of Turkish political history is examined. The study inquires into the nature of this relationship from within the very perspective of this group referred as the liberal intellectuals, through engaging in an effort to identify the motives behind their support for the governing party. This attempt would make it possible to associate these motives with a certain version of self-image. In order to understand the determinacy of this self-image for the mentioned relationship it should be noted that last 10 years in Turkey, with the liberal intellectuals' rising visibility in the media field, is characterized by the discussions over the intellectual responsibility. It is already given that the very idea of "treason" is indicative of the responsibility of the intellectuals in the first place defined as to follow what is universal and being detached from the holders of power. However, the object of these discussions, namely the relationship between the liberal intellectuals and political power, is justified through the self-assessment of these intellectuals revolved around this same idea of responsibility. It is argued that this very relationship with the governing party is the means of challenging the status quo as the actual center of power and this is why taking side with it is completely in harmony with the connotations of the term "intellectual".

The context which led to such a redefinition was what they regarded as the rupture of the Turkish political history that is assumed to be started in the 2002 general elections. The elections were marked by the victory of Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi - AKP) which was a brand new actor for the Turkish political system. This victory was accompanied with the changing positions of some of the formerly major parties in politics such as True Path Party (Doğru Yol Partisi- DYP), Motherland Party (Anavatan Partisi – ANAP), Democratic Left Party (Demokratik Sol Parti) DSP, Felicity Party (Saadet Partisi – SP) which stayed below the electoral threshold and consequently outside of the parliament³. Such a change in terms of the conventional actors of the political arena

³ "Sandıkta Tasfiye," accessed September 05, 2012, <http://arsiv.sabah.com.tr/2002/11/04/s1612.html>.; "Türkiye'de Seçimler," accessed September 05, 2012, <http://www.belgenet.com/secim/3kasim.html>.; "Türkiye Geneli Partilerin Kazandıkları Milletvekili Sayıları," accessed September 05, 2012, <http://www.ysk.gov.tr/ysk/docs/2002MilletvekiliSecimi/turkiye/milletvekilisayisi.pdf>.

led some intellectuals to assess this new outlook as the initiation of a process that would transform the established order. According to this understanding, the subject of this transformation would be the victor which cannot be taken into account as another party of the center-right whereas its novelty signifies people's will to change the political system. In this regard, these intellectuals considered the relationship AKP established with the European Union (EU) as the confirmation of this will and the main factor leading them to define the party as the actor of transformation. In accordance with this definition the reforms realized during AKP's term constituted the major justification for the mentioned group of intellectuals to attribute to the party the subject position of "the revolutionary actor" (Altan, Star, 12.01.2008, 10.06.2008, 07.07.2007). Since 2002 elections, the support of this group to AKP which is explained through the party's assumed characteristic of being the bearer of change has become one of the most controversial debates in the intellectual arena. These intellectuals are criticized from very many ideological positions in terms of their close relationship or constant support to the party in power and correlating Turkey's democratization to the extent that AKP has taken in the membership process.⁴

It is already argued that the main concern of the thesis is to identify the motives behind this debated collaboration between the liberal intellectuals and the political power. Under these circumstances, the effects of the intellectuals' self-images as a privileged group that could overcome its particularistic concerns will be

⁴ "Radikal Yazarlarının Kaleminden Liberal Aydınlar," *Radikal*, January 26, 2011, accessed September 05, 2012, available from: [http://www.radikal.com.tr/Radikal.aspx?aType=RadikalDetayV3&ArticleID=1037993&CategoryID=77.](http://www.radikal.com.tr/Radikal.aspx?aType=RadikalDetayV3&ArticleID=1037993&CategoryID=77.;); Z. Özcan, "AK Parti'yle İttifak Sanal, Ayrışma Gerçek!," *Aksiyon*, February 18, 2008. accessed September 05, 2012. available from: <http://www.aksiyon.com.tr/aksiyon/haber-16013-33-ak-partiyle-ittifak-sanal-ayrisma-gercek.html>; D. Sevimay, "Ertuğrul Kürkçü ile Söyleşi: AKP Demokrasiye Gitmek için Bir İmkân Değildir," *bianet.com*, August 18, 2008, accessed September 05, 2012, available from: <http://www.bianet.org/bianet/siyaset/109073-akp-demokrasiye-gitmek-icin-bir-imkan-degildir>; A. Engin, "Aman AKP'ye Zarar Vermesin." February 06, 2012. accessed September 05, 2012, available from: <http://t24.com.tr/yazi/aman-akpye-zarar-vermesin/4601>; Ömer Laçiner, "Devletçi-Milliyetçi Cenah Sözcülerinin Timsah Gözyaşları." *Birikim* 222. (2007 October): 3-7.; Ü. Kurt, "AKP ve Sol-liberal Entelektüeller," *Radikal*. February 15, 2008, accessed September 05, 2012, available from: <http://www.radikal.com.tr/haber.php?haberno=247476&tarih=15/02/2008.>; M. Barlas, "Liberal Düşünceyle AKP'nin Yolları Ayrılmaz ki," *Sabah*, January 31, 2012, accessed September 05, 2012, available from: <http://www.sabah.com.tr/Yazarlar/barlas/2012/01/31/liberal-dusunce-ile-ak-partinin-yollari-ayrilamaz-ki.>; A. Taşgetiren, "Bayramoğlu ve Ötesi," *Bugün*, February 28, 2012 accessed September 05, 2012, available from: <http://gundem.bugun.com.tr/bayramoglu-ve-otesi-185335-makalesi.aspx>.

analyzed in terms of their relationships with the political power. This argument will be developed from within Gramsci's contribution to the sociology of intellectuals setting the conditions of the "attraction" of the traditional intellectuals to the intellectual bloc. According to Gramsci, historical bloc is consolidated through the function that is fulfilled by the intellectuals and the establishment of hegemony depends on the existence of a developed intellectual bloc which necessitates the mentioned "attraction". There are two conditions for appealing the intellectuals of other classes to the intellectual bloc. First one is to provide them with a sense of "dignity" or "distinction" which as a group it would have differently from the figures representing the previous order whereas the second is the necessity of coming up with a technical activity. Thus, the thesis is an attempt to identify the sense of distinction that supporting the AKP would provide with these intellectuals through the fulfillment of these conditions.

Arguing that the constant support of liberal intellectuals to the governing party is the result of the sense of distinction that supporting the AKP provides the liberal intellectuals, defining the components of this "sense" can be taken into account as the major concern of this study. With regard to the first condition of attraction, it is argued that the idea of "New Turkey" or "advanced democracy" associated with the rule of AKP led these intellectuals to view themselves as the actors that are guiding the establishment of the new order through "encouraging" AKP to challenge the status quo. Second condition of attraction is also fulfilled in a way to confirm this sense of distinction with the key positions of the liberal intellectuals in the media sphere. Since it is the case that, as it is argued by Bourdieu, in the contemporary global structure it is the media that dominates all other fields in a way to define what is important and to render power to its figures through the recognition it provided, the position attained in it is a clear source of attraction (1998: 46). Given what Bourdieu calls as the "circular circulation" it may be claimed that the boundaries of what can be talked about in the media is limited. In other words, "it is the information about information that allows you to decide what is important and worth broadcasting comes in large part from other informers" (Bourdieu, 1998: 26) This paves the way for the liberal intellectuals to describe the politics from within a position of rationality which is constructed in opposition to the "rational and sick"

other. This is to say, due to the difficulty of expressing different positions in the media that are out of this “circular circulation”, within the existing boundaries of the realm one needs to emphasize its difference from the others⁵. It is possible to argue that liberal intellectuals’ self-image of being the rational and superior part of Turkish politics acknowledging the “democratizing” potential of the periphery is reproduced by their positions in the media sphere due to this principle of “circular circulation”. In other words, this visibility of the liberal intellectuals rendered it possible for them to come up with a definition of the political realm through a formulation of either/or. Thus, given the perspective that the democratization potential of AKP is inherent to its existence due to being the representative of the periphery, according to the liberal intellectuals the rational political position requires supporting this party despite its deeds which are evaluated by very many groups in the society as on the contrary.

It is possible to argue that such attribution of democratic potential to AKP is the result of evaluating the social change from within the center/periphery paradigm. Looking from the lenses of this paradigm which defines the Turkish political history over the idea of continuity, the term of AKP is associated with the rupture in the existing order. This is to say, the Ottoman Turkish tradition which is characterized by the dominance of the state over society and, accordingly, the repression of the demands of periphery by the interventions of the powerful center, is brought to a halt with AKP since depending on the rising Anatolian capital, periphery is in the process of being constructed as the new center. This would mean the elimination of the gap between the state and society in a way to render it possible to define it as the moment in which the regime gained “authenticity” (Açikel, 2012: 16). Examining the social change through taking into account the state as the only variable, disregards the struggles and conflicts within the society which attributes what is regarded as the periphery a democratizing ethos as a social totality. Moreover, this is synonymous with arguing that challenging the omnipotence of the center, or the tutelary regime would result with the democratization of the republic. In this sense, it is possible to argue that the idea of “democratization as civilianization” is the major justification of

⁵ E. Göker, “Barizin Alimleri: Kanaat Teknisyenliği,” *Birgün*, August 23, 2009, accessed September 09, 2012, http://www.birgun.net/sunday_index.php?news_code=1251028641&year=2009&month=08&day=23.

the constancy of the support of the liberal intellectuals to the governing party over their presentation of the latter as the democratizing actor.

Their consistency to attribute the AKP as the only actor that is capable of the necessary change Turkey needs even at the points when they criticize its policies or when the party is discrediting their support can be considered as indicative of the importance of their concern about maintaining the mentioned “distinction”. Under these circumstances, in a way to further this sense they justified their support with a presentation of the government as a figure that is powerless with regard to the tutelary regime. In this regard it may be argued that the themes of surroundedness and the insecurity of AKP determine the constancy of the support of the liberal intellectuals to the governing party. This is why what they regard as the misdeeds of the party are recognized as AKP’s collaborations with the “established order” while they define them as excusable since they refer to the fluctuations on the way of attaining power or to a defense mechanism serving the purpose of holding a place within the system. Thus, the main concern of these intellectuals is to prevent this “revolutionary” actor from coming close to the establishment (Altan, Star, 10.06.2008) by reason of the pressure of the bureaucratic elite.

It is argued that the responsibility “liberal intellectuals” feel to warn AKP for its deeds breaking its image as “the reformist” and their presentation of these flaws, still, as tolerable due to the party’s disadvantageous position within the system are also related to the privilege, or the “distinction” that their narrations of this relationship provide. In order to understand how it is possible to further this sense of distinction in the changing circumstances, the presentations of AKP in terms of its performance around the themes of ‘EU’, ‘civilian constitution’ and ‘tutelary regime’ will be investigated. At this point, it should be noted that this selection of the themes is derived from the following line of reasoning: It is argued that the “coalition” with AKP provided the liberal intellectuals with a sense of distinction over its potential of guiding the political power which would democratize the republic. This collaboration between the liberal intellectuals and political power cannot be understood without the clarification of the theme of democratization that is derived from the center/periphery paradigm which is summarized as the “democratization as civilianization”. Regarding these notions, a close reading of the columns of the liberal intellectuals

starting with the 2002 elections, rendered it possible to identify the components of such democratization for the liberal intellectuals. The equation set here can be given as the elimination of the tutelary regime as the prerequisite of the democratization. It may be argued that these intellectuals point out the existence of such a regime as the reason of the powerlessness of AKP and comply their coalition with this party as an “intellectual responsibility” of not holding side, rather confronting with the centers of power. However, they argue that this act of confrontation could not be directed only through the inner dynamics of Turkey and AKP could not be the subject of this transformation by itself due to its powerless position with regard to the tutelary regime. At this point, there arises the need of an external power to back up AKP in terms of realizing the transformation of the system. Thus, for these intellectuals, it may be argued that EU constitutes the gateway for AKP to attain power as well as the democratization of Turkey which would render a radical change in the power relations possible. In this sense, it is argued that under the circumstances that AKP gives up the guidance of the EU, it would lose the distinction it had for the Turkish political system and could not accomplish the mentioned transformation due to its powerless position. Moreover, the irreversibility of this transformation could only be realized if the party could lead to a process aiming to make a new, “civilian constitution”. This act would take the power from the traditional actors of the establishment and would clean the political system from the traces of the military coup and the privileges it donated to the bureaucracy

It may be claimed that in correlation with the fluctuations in terms of the relationship between the liberal intellectuals and political power, the emphasis on the components of the democratization of the republic as the elimination of the tutelary regime, EU membership and the civilian constitution is subjected to changes. In order to identify to what extent the contextual differences affected this definition of democratization, the analysis will be built around three time periods. The first period is the source of the enthusiasm of the liberal intellectuals about the reformist character of AKP which corresponds to the interval between the elections in 2002 November and October 2005 as the date of the opening of the negotiations with the European Union. This investigation would give us the opportunity to identify the origins of the distinction that is developed over the discourse of democratization in

the most glorious days of AKP's presentation as the "architect" of the transformation of the political arena. Since it is the aim of the current study to follow the route that the distinction attracting the liberal intellectuals to the intellectual bloc, the last two moments, as the first one, refer to the breaking points for the mentioned relationship. In this sense, remembering that the major requirement of the liberal intellectuals from AKP is a civilian constitution which would cease the 12 September regime and lead to the normalization and democratization of the republic, the last two moments are selected from the ones in which AKP changed its attitude towards the civilian constitution making. AKP's first major attempt in this regard is realized in the year 2007⁶, in which it "appointed" a group of experts who are directed by Ergun Özbudun with the duty of preparing the "civilian constitution". Later, this draft is neglected by AKP which constitutes the first important controversy between this party and intellectuals. Instead, the party, in collaboration with MHP, engaged in some constitutional amendments to abolish the headscarf ban in universities. This attempt was criticized by liberals in terms of isolating the issue whereas it should be solved through the civilian constitution in which rights and liberties would not be hierarchically ordered. Mentioned disagreement between the liberal intellectuals and AKP has been resolved to some extent after the support they gave to the party in terms of the case of closure in the last moment, however which is never comparable to its situation in its most "glorious days". This moment refers to the constitutional amendments in 2010 in which the referendum has been supported by the liberal intellectuals as the founding point of the "Second Republic". With regard to this term, it will be recognized that the liberal intellectuals, keeping in mind the confrontation they had with the governing party which resulted with the latter's announcement of its discontent with this group in 2007, backed down from their "unconditional" demands of civilian constitution due to the inability to realize it under the powerful structure of the tutelary regime. Under such hostile circumstances voting for "yes" in the referendum was given as the only rational political behavior

⁶ This is why, in this text which refers to the study of the period between 2002-2005 the findings will be presented majorly with regard to the themes of "EU" and "Tutelary Regime" rather than "Civilian Constitution".

which would start the process of eliminating the remains of the September 12 regime and would complete the reforms in terms of the establishment of democracy⁷.

The intellectuals the works of whom will be analyzed in this regard are Mehmet Altan, Etyen Mahçupyan, Ali Bayramoğlu and Cengiz Çandar. Before coming up with the justification of such a selection, it should be stated that in accordance with the periodization of the thesis, a textual analysis of the columns of these intellectuals is realized. All the articles of these intellectuals during the intervals of 2002-2005, 2007-2008 and March2010- September 2010 are included in the study as our research material. Involving in such a study and referring to the shared sense of distinction it should be noted that despite the fact that “liberal intellectuals” do not constitute a homogeneous group, their examination under this title is possible due to the similarities of their ideological positions and their common attitude towards power in the three moments that will be studied which are crucial for this title. The major reason behind our selection of these figures is the fact they actively participated in all of the moments that are definitive for the category of “liberal intellectuals” since the appearance of the idea of Second Republicanism” in the Turkish political scene. It is possible to claim that such a selection would render it possible to examine the historical journey of this idea in the manner of questioning whether there exists a relationship between the course of this movement and its eagerness to further or reconstruct the conditions of the mentioned “distinction” during the moment of AKP.

In the thesis, the course of the relationship providing the liberal intellectuals a sense of superiority and what these intellectuals regard as the possible elements that would justify their continuous support through referring to their own storytelling of the AKP’s term will be examined. In accordance with Yıldırım Türker’s statement with regard to the liberal intellectuals claiming that “they supported the AKP that

⁷ See Çandar, C., “12 Eylül’ün Zincirleri Kırıldı,” *Radikal*, September 13, 2010, accessed September 05, 2012, available from: <http://www.radikal.com.tr/Radikal.aspx?aType=RadikalYazar&ArticleID=1018656&Yazar=CENGIZ-CANDAR&CategoryID=98>; M. Altan, “Yeni Dönemin İlk Analizi,” *Star*, September 13, 2010, accessed September 05, 2012, available from: <http://www.stargazete.com/yazar/mehmet-altan/yeni-donemin-ilk-analizi-haber-293563.htm>; A. Bayramoğlu, “Neden Evet?,” *Yeni Şafak*, September 11, 2010, accessed September 05, 2012, <http://yenisafak.com.tr/Yazarlar/?i=23948&y=AliBayramoglu>; E. Mahçupyan, “Efendiler ve Taşralılar,” *Taraf*, August 15, 2010, accessed September 05, 2012, available from: <http://www.taraf.com.tr/etyen-mahcupyan/makale-efendiler-ve-tasralilar.htm>.

they have written themselves”⁸, the part that the concerns of furthering the above mentioned sense of distinction played with regard to the consistency of supporting the party will be identified in a way to reveal the function these intellectuals attributed to themselves in terms of the establishment of hegemony accompanied with the rule of AKP. In this sense through identifying the emphasis of the liberal intellectuals on the idea of novelty and change substantiated in all three moments (Özal period, New Democracy Movement [Yeni Demokrasi Hareketi – YDH] experience and AKP’s term in power) the determinacy of the attraction that the sense of distinction being the new actors of “New Turkey” would bring to the liberal intellectuals for their support of the political power will be confirmed. Regarding this point, it will be argued in the thesis that during the period of AKP in power, depending on their vision of the state-society relations, liberal intellectuals are provided with such sense through the discourse of democratization of the governing party and despite its retreat from this discourse in the following terms, in a way not to lose that distinction, they excused it with an image of the “powerless government” and assign themselves the mission of guiding it in its struggle with the tutelary regime.

⁸ Y. Türker, “Eğreti Aşıklar,” *Radikal*, January 23, 2011, accessed September 05, 2012, <http://www.radikal.com.tr/Radikal.aspx?aType=RadikalEklerDetayV3&ArticleID=1037793&CategoryID=42&Rdkref=11>.

CHAPTER 2

PERSPECTIVES ON INTELLECTUALS AND POWER

1980s constitute a radical break in terms of Turkish political history due to the changes in economic policies in accordance with the integration efforts into the global structure characterized by the rise of new-right. This neoliberal turn complemented and initiated with a military coup, resulted with flaws that undermined the legitimacy of the government of the time which is led by Turgut Özal. In order to overcome this crisis, there arose the need of the party in power for ideological support which would rationalize the efforts of integration and their undesirable consequences. This is the very point that the specific group proclaimed as “liberal intellectuals” come to the scene of Turkish political history as the volunteer and responsible of the given mission of rationalization. Questioning the nature of this appearance of these intellectuals as a group into the mentioned hegemonic crisis, in the thesis, we will bring into consideration the course of this movement regarding its relations with power which took both direct and indirect forms.

Trying to understand the course of this very movement through identifying its positioning with regard to the power structure during the critical moments of Turkish political history, one may argue that, there arises the need of understanding the implications of a possible relationship between the intellectuals and political power in general. In a way to question the legitimization function of the “liberal intellectuals” in terms of the integration efforts of Turkey to global capitalism and the consequent hegemonic crises of the holders of the political power, first of all, the question of “what is the role of the intellectual in a given society?” will be tried to answered.

2.1. Theories on the Incompatibility of “Power and Intellect”

The inspiration point of word intellectual is the process known as “Dreyfus Affair” which resulted with the appearance of the word “intellectual”. Alfred

Dreyfus was a Jewish military officer serving in the French army during 1890s. He was accused of spying for Germany and, as a “traitor”, was sentenced to life imprisonment. Emile Zola stood up for Captain Dreyfus whose conviction was depended on doubtful evidences and wrote his famous letter “J’accuse” in the daily “L’arore” identifying the fact that Dreyfus was chosen as a scapegoat for the failure of France in terms of its relations with Germany. This text was an attempt of revealing the fact that the defeat of France was tried to be explained through the deeds of a single Jew which was a clear case of anti-Semitism. The next day after “J’accuse” was put in circulation, a petition, signed by a group consisted of academicians, students, journalists, artists and writers (approximately 1200 people) supporting Zola and as a result demanding a retrial for Dreyfus, was published in the same newspaper. “This protest, simply called “protest” by the newspapers became “The Protest of the Intellectuals” in an article by Maurice Barres, and this is when the term acquired general currency”⁹. However, in general, given the anti-semitic atmosphere dominating the period, to be an intellectual which was synonymous with being a Dreyfusard, gained pejorative connotations. In this sense, a Dreyfusard was attributed as “a person who pretends to uphold things that the majority of the French refuse”¹⁰. Counterparts of this group within the conservatives which may be categorized as anti-Dreyfusards referred themselves as the “men of letters” rather than as “intellectuals” in a way to confirm these connotations. Their justification for rejecting the title of intellectual depends on the claim that “the state and its major institutions, above all of the army and judiciary, were superior to claims made in the name of such abstract ideals as justice and individual right...social order was higher and morally superior to the injunctions of abstract morality or disinterested thought” (Cosser, 1965: 215). It is this confrontation between these two groups which can be substantiated with the petitions that “men of letters” had signed against the Dreyfusards through condemning them with “disorder, treason, and abstract reasoning”¹¹ and attributing “the intellectual” with the following characteristics:

⁹ Christophe Charle, “The Intellectuals After the Dreyfus Affair, Uses and Blindness of Historical Memory,” accessed September 05, 2012, available from: <http://www.unc.edu/depts/europe/conferences/ACLS98/charle.html>.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ J. Piereson, “The Rise & Fall of the Intellectual,” accessed September 05, 2012, available from: http://www.manhattan-institute.org/html/_the_new_criterion-the_rise_and_fall.html.

They are those who “think otherwise, the disturbers of intellectual peace” (Coser, 1965: x).

It may be argued that a brief look at the origins of the very concept “intellectual” manifests that (in a way to answer the previously asked question of “what is the role of the intellectual in a given society?”) the mentioned role is a political one. In a way to explain the incorporation of the term a political role, Özen argues that “it (Dreyfus Affair) revealed that intellectuals could play a decisive political role by mobilizing public opinion. Thus, with this event the term intellectual gained a political connotation”¹². Depending on this point and given the focus of this study on the relationship between power and intellectuals, rather than involving in an analysis of the intellectual as a person who is engaged in mental activities or as a “man of ideas”, its political implications as someone who carries the authority to intervene in the political processes will be analyzed. It is necessary to identify that, following the connotations of the way the concept originates, as long as the rationale of this intervention is “the universal values of truth, justice, reason” (Özen 2001:2), literature on the sociology of intellectuals, as it will be seen below, categorizes these interveners as the “true” or “real” intellectuals.

Examining the origins of the concept intellectual leads one to come up with a portrait of a person who intervened in politics “to defend a set of principles rather than to gain personal advantage or political power. Theirs was a politics of conscience” (Coser, 1965: 215). Moreover, this intervention stands as a collective act and the word intellectual gains currency as a member of a self-conscious group. According to Charle, Dreyfus affair, besides being the birth place of the concept, is also the clear example of the fact that “intellectuals do not count as a force one by one, they do count collectively, if they associate themselves for a collective action”¹³.

This vision of intellectuals as a self-conscious group, “having interests that distinguish them from other groups in society” (Kurzman and Owens, 2002: 63),

¹² For a detailed analysis and literature review on the political role of the intellectuals see Özen (2001). Özen through referring what she identified as “the main debates” on the issue which she gives as “universalism of the intellectual function”, “representative function of the intellectual” and the “transformative role of the intellectual” categorizes the perspectives on the political role of the intellectuals as the “missionary, radical, critical and local approaches” .

¹³ Christophe Charle, “The Intellectuals After the Dreyfus Affair, Uses and Blindness of Historical Memory,” accessed September 05, 2012, available from: <http://www.unc.edu/depts/europe/conferences/ACLS98/charle.html>

stands as the major premise of the perspective that takes intellectuals into account as a “class-in-itself”¹⁴. Julien Benda’s “Treason of the Clerics” stands as the major work involving such a perspective whereas it is also, as Kurzman and Owens emphasizes, “the founding document” of the sociology of intellectuals. Having in mind the collective action of the intellectuals during “Dreyfus affair” as well as their concerns for attaining the universal principle of “justice” through this intervention, Benda argued that “clerks” can be differentiated from the rest of the people which he identifies as “laymen” on the ground that clerks are the ones to say “my kingdom is not of this world” (Benda, 2009: 43). This is to say, clerks are “those whose activity essentially is not the pursuit of practical aims, all those who seek their joy in the practice of an art or a science or metaphysical speculation, in short in the possession of non- material advantages” (Benda, 2009: 43) whereas the deeds of the laymen are characterized by the aim of obtaining practical and material gains. Therefore, for Benda, the acts and the values of the clerks which are not interrupted by the selfishness of the particular interests would function in the society as a “check upon the realism of the people” (Benda, 2009: 45) whereas the realist passions which are originally held by laymen are the political passions which Benda ordered as “racial passions”, “class passions” and “national passions” (Özen, 2001: 17-20).

According to Benda, starting with the 20th century a process in which the clerks adopt the realism of the laymen rather than being a “check” upon it through the pursuit of universal principles is witnessed. Benda argues that with the development of the technologies of mass communication leading to the diffuse of the political passions more easily than the previous decades, with the change in terms of the status of the clerks within the society¹⁵ and with the rising necessity of involving

¹⁴ For a detailed analysis of the class-in-itself approach see C. Kurzman and L. Owens, “The Sociology of Intellectuals,” *Annual Review of Sociology*, Vol. 28 (2002): 63-90. According to the authors, three major approaches dominate the field of the sociology of intellectuals. These are the class-in-itself approach which is represented, despite the substantial differences in terms of their theoretical and political positions by Julien Benda, New Class theorists and Pierre Bourdieu. The prominent figures of the second approach regard intellectuals as class-bound, namely as representing their “group of origin” who can be given as Antonio Gramsci, Michel Foucault and authenticity theorists. The third approach claims that intellectuals are classless since they are “able to transcend their group of origin to pursue their own ideals” (2002: 63).

¹⁵ In a way to explain the difference in terms of the status of the intellectual in modern society Benda states that “the modern world has made the clerk into a citizen, subject to all the responsibilities of a citizen, and consequently to despise lay passions is far more difficult for him than for his predecessors....If shame is cried upon him because he does not rise superior to social hatreds, he will point out that the day of enlightened patronage is over, that to-day he has to earn his living, and that it is not his fault if he is eager to support the class which takes a pleasure in his productions” (Benda,

in politics for being recognized as an intellectual¹⁶, to live as a “true clerk” in the modern world became impossible. As a result of this process, intellectuals

allowed political commitment to insinuate itself into their understanding of the intellectual as a vocation as such... the ideal of disinterested judgment and faith in the universality of truth: such traditional guiding principles of intellectual life were more and more contemptuously deployed as masks when they were not jettisoned altogether (Kimball, in Benda, 2009: x).

Moreover, it should be noted that the adoption of the political passions by intellectuals resulted with their “perfection”. In this sense, for Benda 20th century is “the era of politics” per se in which the intellectual’s function is reduced to “organizing hatred” constituting the treason of intervening in politics for the sake of particular interests and material gains which are directed by the political passions of class passions, national passions and racial passions. In other words, it may be argued that the incorporation of these political passions by clerks into their activities is the “treason of the intellectuals”. At this point, one should note that although intellectual is a term which is politically loaded as it can be identified from the fact that it is originated from a political affair, the reason of the intervention in politics should not be one of the political passions mentioned above. Rather, for a clerk the very rationale of getting involved in the political processes cannot be any concern other than the pursuit of universal principles¹⁷ (Özen, 2001: 22).

The concerns of particularisms which are summarized by Benda as political passions are needed to be avoided by intellectuals also for Karl Mannheim. However,

2009: 159). Moreover, in terms of the adoption of national passions by the clerks he argues that “the clerk’s new faith is caused by the changes of the nineteenth century, which by giving national groups a consistency hitherto unknown furnishes food to a passion which in many countries before that period could have been little more than potential. Obviously, attachment to the world of spirit alone was easier for those who were capable of it when there were no nations to love” (Benda, 2009: 160).

¹⁶ For Benda one of the concerns leading to change in terms of the attitudes of the clerks to the particularisms is the interest in “fame”. He states that “it may be said to-day that every French writer who desires wide fame (which means every writer endowed with the real temperament of a men of letters) also desires inevitable to play a political part. This desire may arise from other motives. For instance, in Barres and d’Annunzio, from the desire ‘to act’, to be something more than ‘men at a desk’, to lead a life like that of the ‘heroes’ and not like that of ‘scribes’; or, more ingenuinely, as no doubt happened with Rennan when he stood as a Parliamentary candidate, from the idea that he could perform public service ” (2009: 163).

¹⁷ Benda introduces some limits for the intellectual’s involvement in politics even when it is for the “pursuit of universal ideals referring to his experience during the Dreyfus affair. “In the course of the Affair he had protested in the name of ‘truth and justice conceived as abstract values and as being superior to the interests of either place or the moment’. This, though, was the extent of his responsibility. The protest made, it was the duty of the intellectuals to ‘return to their cells, cleaning their spectacles and leaving society to struggle at best it could with the truth’” (Jennings and Kemp-Welch 1997: 11).

according to Mannheim the reason behind this avoidance cannot be explained with the role of the intellectual as the “bearer” of universal principles, rather it is the case that the intellectuals constitute the only stratum that could come up with the perspective of the totality which would be the source of harmony in a given society. Mannheim explains this very capacity of the intellectuals to be the “representatives of the totality” with their “relatively classless” character. Intellectuals “because of their lesser involvement in the economic process, are capable of gaining a total perspective on politics while no other group can” (Heeren, 1971: 5). That is to say, this indirect participation in the production process resulted with the loose bonds with the class they are originated from. Consequently, Mannheim argues that “Benda was mistaken in clinging to the “traditional cult of the exclusively self-oriented, self-sufficient intelligentsia” (Kurzman and Owens, 2002: 67). It is not a class-in-itself with a single interest; rather due to these loose bonds and their relatively classless character, they are socially unattached which enables them to “attach themselves to classes to which they originally did not belong” (2009: 156). This ability of choosing one’s affiliation is gained through the education process which exposed them to “opposing tendencies in social reality” and united them in terms of the commonality of the “educational heritage”. Therefore, according to Mannheim this common heritage gained through education has the function of suppressing “differences of birth, status and occupation”. “Because of this, the intellectuals are able to understand viewpoints other than that of their own stratum of origin; they can see the total situation and create out of it the dynamic mediation of the antagonistic political tendencies” (Heeren, 1971: 5).

Given the fact that intellectuals constitute the only group that has the capability of making sense of the total situation depending on the educational process which endow them with the capacity to surpass the aim of pursuing the interest of the class it originally belongs to, Mannheim argues that the true mission of the intellectuals is to reconcile the particular perspectives into the perspective of totality. For Mannheim since these particular perspectives are composed of complementary positions, the standpoint of the totality would include the interests of the every group in society. However, this inclusion would be realized in a manner of synthesis rather than an act of accumulating the various interests possible. Therefore, it may be argued that intellectuals are expected to construct a perspective that would represent the totality, through bringing the particular and conflicting interests in a given society

together and through reconciling, synthesizing, transcending them. Thus, for Mannheim, intellectual is the agent that would introduce the interest of the whole society benefiting from its socially unattached character whereas the realization of this interest would be the source of the “harmony” in society (Özen, 2001: 25-30).

At this point, it should be noted that, as it is the case with Benda, here again, intellectuals are not actively involved in the process of this realization. Rather, they provide guidance to “the men of power” through coming up with the knowledge of the perspective of the totality, whereas, for Benda this guidance was directed towards the attainment of the universal values. However, it should be noted that the interest or the perspective of the totality is not something fixed; it may be reconstructed through time and depending on the demands of the conjuncture. Mendel explains the relation between the political power and intellectuals through indicating the fact that they are due to their privileged position in terms of the monopoly over the knowledge of the totality may serve as a “utopian force in the first place, but they cease to be one once their utopia is about to become realized, i.e. once the political group they were affiliated to comes into power and the intellectuals are set free (Mendel, 2006: 42). In other words, it may be argued that due to their character of being free-floating, their affiliation with those who hold power is at best temporary. Moreover, within this temporary relationship “the intellectual cannot set political actions or get involved in party politics, but s/he can be a political person by providing the public interpretation of the political process on which its understanding, according to Mannheim, ultimately depends” (Mendel, 2006:42). Thus, the role intellectuals play in terms of their relations with political power can be summarized as being an advisor who tries to “establish reason” within the acts of those holding that power. At this point, one may argue that reading Jean Paul Sartre’s “a Plea for Intellectuals”, makes us question the plausibility of Mannheim’s proposition that what these “analysts”, “judges” and “critics” advices would, in fact, refer to the interest of the totality. In order to decide on the mentioned plausibility, we will, first of all, examine the role Sartre attributes to the educational process in a way to identify whether, as it is defined by Mannheim, education has the function of providing one with the tools to be unattached from the class it is originated and to understand the interests of others. Sartre argues that education through which intellectuals are brought up is determined by the ruling class and as a result it represents their very ideology. In this sense the perspective that is diffused through

this ideology, even if it is presented as depended on universal principles, charge these people to “transfer the values quietly and when it is needed, depending on their technical knowledge, fighting against the rationales and values of all of the other classes” (Sartre, 2000: 21, translation mine). Therefore, considering Sartre’s discussion, one may easily argue that intellectual cannot be the person who gained the perspective of the totality through the tools education provided them (since it is impossible given the ideological character of education). Rather, s/he is the one that becomes aware of the contradiction in the society (which refers to the conflict between classes) through the contradiction s/he experiences between the universality of her/his education and particularity of what is expected from her/him to perform. That is to say, referring to the example Sartre himself set, a doctor works for the cure of a disease which would help all the patients suffering from it regardless of their position in a given society, but this cure would not be made public in a way to benefit a small number of people in the first place since it is the case that the doctor is subjected to the health system dominated by the preferences of the ruling class and consequently, the concerns of profit would determine the future of the research (Sartre, 2000: 26). According to Sartre this doctor suffers from the “unhappy consciousness” in Hegel’s terms whereas it is the motive which makes him an intellectual (Sartre, 2000: 27). That is to say, for Sartre the technician becomes the intellectual at the moment that s/he becomes aware of this contradiction. At this point, it should be noted that this “unhappy consciousness” and the possibility of this awareness render the intellectual a dubious figure in terms of the perspective of the ruling class since this awareness of contradiction positions intellectuals within the side of the working class. Sartre argues that

His (the intellectual’s) principal contradiction impels him to join the movement of the under-privileged classes towards universalization, for fundamentally they are moving towards the same goals as himself, whereas the dominant class reduces him to the rank of a means towards a particular end which is not his own and which, consequently means towards a particular end which is not his own and which, consequently, he is powerless to criticize (Sartre, 1974: 264).

Sartre argues that this situation of being on the same side with this particularity is not “the treason of intellectuals” rather it is the logical outcome of being guided by universality since the representative of the universality is the working class. (Özen, 2001: 52-61)

At this point it is crucial to note that, agreeing with Sartre, for Said also the intellectual should be the one who is aware of the fact that language of universality of the liberal democracy does not necessarily signify a situation that these principles are in use. In this sense, he argues that “everyone today professes a liberal language of equality and harmony for all. The problem for the intellectuals is to bring these notions to bear on actual situations where the gap between the profession of equality and justice, on the one hand, and the rather less edifying reality, on the other, is very great” (Said, 1994: 69). While according to Sartre, revealing the gap or the “unhappiness” that this gap bring within the intellectual could be overcome through aligning with the working class which is the representative of the “true” universality, Said argues that “there is an inherent discrepancy between the powers of large organizations, from governments to corporations, and the relative weakness not just of individuals, but of human beings considered to have subaltern status, minorities, small peoples and states, inferior or lesser cultures and races. There is no question in my mind that the intellectual belongs on the same side with the weak and unrepresented” (Said, 1994: 17).

Edward Said also agrees with Sartre on the ground that a technician or a professional cannot be regarded as an intellectual. He argues that the intellectual has the public role of searching for and then revealing the truth regardless of the consequences of this act for power whereas the technician feels “the inevitable drift towards power and authority in its adherents, towards the requirements and prerogatives of power, and towards being directly employed by it (Said in Özen, 2001: 94). Thus, Said’s vision of intellectual can be summarized “as an exile, a marginal and an amateur that is the author of a language trying to tell the power the truth” (Said: 2009, 15, t.m.). To be an exile refers for Said to the position of “intentionally not belonging” (Said: 2009, 15) which means that this person would be a marginal in the sense that s/he is not supposed to follow the conventional way of things. This independence of the intellectual provides her/him with the chance to question everything regardless of their sanctity and to challenge the status quo. Thus, strictly speaking, according to Edward Said, it is not possible for an intellectual to act as a civil servant that surrenders itself to the political goals of a government or to a corporation (Said, 2002: 85).

This presentation of “true” intellectual as a figure which lacks any quest for power is also emphasized by Chomsky while he is criticizing the intellectuals of the

contemporary society for their service to the powerful. It may be argued that with regard to its positioning within the power structure, Sartre's technician is also at work in terms of Chomsky's conceptualization whereas it is now identified as the "scholar-expert". For Chomsky the "scholar-expert" is a "betrayal" just like the traitor of Benda. The betrayal in this case is to the responsibility of intellectuals which is, according to Chomsky, to tell the truth. It is their responsibility in the sense that given the complex system of ideological propaganda in contemporary societies, they constitute the group who attains the means which would unravel the truth. In this regard, Chomsky states that "for a privileged minority, Western democracy provides the leisure, the facilities, and the training to seek the truth lying hidden behind the veil of distortion and misrepresentation, ideology and class interest"¹⁸. The source of the great betrayal of the intellectuals whom Chomsky calls as "new mandarins" lies at this point. It is the abuse of their privilege over the means of reaching the truth through serving as agents of ideological indoctrination.

At this point, it should be noted that the "betrayal of the new mandarins" is strongly related with the position they obtained in the "postindustrial society". Chomsky argues that according to post-industrialists, the problems of the industrial society are solved to a great extent and as a result within this new phase there is no need for utopias or ideologies that would aim to change the existing order of things. Chomsky cites Daniel Bell who states that "we have in effect already achieved the egalitarian and socially mobile society, which the free-floating intellectuals associated with Marxist tradition have been calling for during the last hundred years"¹⁹. According to Bell, this new society in which ideologies are irrelevant, what are crucial can be ordered as knowledge and information while the industrial society was organized around the principle of manufacturing. "If property was the criterion of membership of the former dominant classes, the new dominant class is defined by knowledge and a certain level of education" (Touraine, 1971: 51). Consequently, one may easily argue that technical experts are the privileged group in society whereas Touraine defines them as "the dominant class". While Daniel Bell relates intellectuals' indifference to the ideologies with the functioning of the system in a

¹⁸ N. Chomsky, "The Responsibility of Intellectuals," 1967, accessed September 05, 2012, available from: <http://www.chomsky.info/articles/19670223.htm>.

¹⁹ See N. Chomsky, "The Menace of Liberal Scholarship," 1969, accessed September 05, 2012, available from: <http://www.chomsky.info/articles/19690102.htm>

harmonious manner thanks to the technical developments, Chomsky argues that this phenomenon should be in accordance with their position in terms of the power structure. In this sense, being close to power is the source of the mentioned betrayal of intellectuals since favoring this accessibility they would tend to disregard the flaws of the existing order. Chomsky states that “having found his position of power, having achieved security and affluence, he (scholar-expert) has no further need for ideologies that look to radical change. The scholar-expert substituted the "free-floating intellectual" who "felt that the wrong values were being honored, and rejected the society," and who has now lost his political role”²⁰. Moreover, contrary to post-industrialists the power these new mandarins obtained does not lead Chomsky to attribute this group as the dominant class in the society since the more significant function of the intelligentsia is ideological control. They are, in Gramsci's phrase, "experts in legitimation". They must ensure that beliefs are properly inculcated, beliefs that serve the interests of those with objective power, based ultimately on control of capital in the state capitalist societies²¹

Regarding all of the notions above, it may be argued that Dreyfus affair is significant for our discussion not only for standing as the inspiration point of the various definitions of what “intellectual” refers to but also for disclosing the fact that grasping political power or being in close collaboration with holders of this power mostly end up with the loss of the major component of the noun intellectual contains. Clemenceau, who was a journalist, the owner of the newspaper publishing “the protest of the intellectuals”, and one of the intellectuals castigating “political men for the errors of their ways...by holding up absolute standards of moral righteousness” (Coser, 1965: 136), after being the minister of interior and then the prime minister abandoned his commitment to those values which can be substantiated with the fact that he “jailed the leaders of the CGT union and ordered that workers be shot at”²². Coser explains this situation with the following statement:

During brief periods of revolutionary exhilaration and upsurge, when everything seems possible... intellectuals succeeded in taking

²⁰ See N. Chomsky, “The Responsibility of Intellectuals,” 1967, accessed September 05, 2012, available from: <http://www.chomsky.info/articles/19670223.htm>

²¹ N. Chomsky, “Intellectuals and the State,” 1977, accessed September 05, 2012, available from: <http://www.ditext.com/chomsky/is.html>

²² Charle, The intellectuals after the Dreyfus Affair, uses and blindness of historical memory. Available from: <http://www.unc.edu/depts/europe/conferences/ACLS98/charle.html>

power. But they failed to hold it when subsequent routinized exigencies brought to the fore political practitioners unhampered by intellect but endowed with the requisite practical skills (Coser, 1965: 138).

These practical skills or, more accurately, practical and particular concerns rather than the concern for the guidance of the universal principles are needed and important for the maintenance of power. Thus, intellectual, even if s/he does not directly take power, as long as s/he is in collaboration with the “men in power” s/he is in great distress of losing the essential characteristic of the intellectual which is to act for the truth and universal (whereas it might be the case that the universal is represented by a particularity).

This view of the “incompatibility between power and intellect” is defended by very many scholars who agreed on the premise that the practical requirements of politics would turn the intellectual into a public servant or a technician who lost or abandoned its capability of independent thinking. Due to the tension between the practical concerns of “men of power” and the impractical nature of being an intellectual, these two groups “have traditionally looked upon each other with a measure of distrust and mutual incomprehension. To be sure, there have been short periods of honeymoon, but no stable union has ever been achieved” (Coser, 1965: 136). This is why Robert K. Merton states that “the union of policy-makers and intellectuals tends to be nasty, brutish and short” (Merton, 1945: 409) As a consequence of the concern of maintaining power which can be realized through dealing with these daily exigencies, there arises the dilemma of the intellectual which can be summarized with either staying as a “detached intellectual” through discarding their quest for power or being an “attached staff” of those in political power. Being attached to the power is the treason of the intellectuals that Benda talks about and which is one of the main themes of the sociology of intellectuals. Charle argues that the disappointment with the Dreyfusards who take power after a short while of the “affair”, as it can be identified with the Clemenceau case mentioned above, resulted with the “the three themes of the treason, perversity and death of the intellectuals, which will be come forth again and again all along the 20th century”²³.

²³ Christophe Charle, “The Intellectuals After the Dreyfus Affair, Uses and Blindness of Historical Memory,” accessed September 05, 2012, available from: <http://www.unc.edu/depts/europe/conferences/ACLS98/charle.html>

2.2. Intellectuals as the “Functionaries of Superstructure” and Transformism through “New Media”

Here, it should be noted that the Dreyfus affair is not only the source of the term “intellectual” or its conceptualization as a group defending universality but also, for Gramsci, the same affair is one of the most clear examples of the class-bound character of intellectuals. According to Gramsci, in the Middle Ages ecclesiastics was the collective organic intellectual of the landed aristocracy and it is the Dreyfus Affair which led the organic intellectuals of bourgeoisie to break this link through defusing the clerical influence within the state apparatus (Portelli, 1982: 108- 109). This struggle between the organic intellectuals of bourgeoisie and aristocracy, for Gramsci, was the sign of the conflict between the old and new hegemonic systems (Portelli, 1982: 110). Referring to this class-bound explanation, it should be noted that his presentation of the relationship between power and intellectuals is not necessarily a process that is “nasty, brutish and short” and it would not neglect the intellectuals’ responsibility to follow what is universal under the circumstances that the class they are organically tied is the proletariat. At this point, referring to Gramsci’s discussion on intellectuals, it may be argued that following political passions, in this case the “particularism” of a class, is not necessarily the case that universality is neglected which would be a definite act of treason in Benda’s terms. Rather, since the particularity of the working class which is the “historically progressive class”, “represents the interests of the whole humanity, since it bears the potentiality of transforming existing power relations” (Özen, 2001: 37), intellectuals’ involvement in politics for the realization of these interests would serve to the aim of pursuing universal principles. Here, it should be remembered that despite constituting the inspiration point for post-Marxism with his theory of hegemony which he developed around his criticism of the economism, “the standard Marxist theses concerning the gradual unfolding of different modes of production, the eventual crisis of capitalism, and the status of the proletariat as the universal class embodying human emancipation ultimately ran through almost all his arguments” (Bellamy, 1997: 29). According to Bellamy, this vision of Gramsci constituted

the basis for his confidence that only a communist society would be able to provide a ‘universally subjective’ and ‘total’ vision of the world, that would be ‘100 per cent homogeneous on the level of

ideology' without the need for either brainwashing, coercion or social engineering of the population (1997: 29).

Thus, it is possible to argue that organic intellectuals of the working class cannot be criticized with their political activity of giving it homogeneity and self-consciousness as a "treason" because of its particularistic nature since it is the universal class per se. Moreover, this privilege of the proletariat challenges the definition of the "true intellectual" claiming that gaining consent of this class renders "telling the truth" a political obligation rather than a moral one as it was the case with Benda (Santucci, 2011: 168- 172). In terms of this understanding, the capability of reaching the knowledge of universality is not a privilege of the intellectuals who are not bound by their class origins whereas "telling the truth" is not "the act of top down enlightenment" (Gerratana in Santucci, 2011: 172). To be more precise, the vision of autonomous and independent intellectuals constituting a class-in-itself is a "social utopia" for Gramsci since it is the fact that

every social group coming into existence on the original terrain of an essential function in the world of production, creates together with itself, organically one or more strata of intellectuals which give it homogeneity and an awareness of its own functions not only in the economic but also in the social and political fields (1999:134).

This class-bound explanation of the position of intellectuals in a given society is the point through which we could understand the differentiation Gramsci put between the organic and traditional intellectuals. While the organic intellectuals are developed from within the ranks of the rising social classes, the traditional intellectuals are the organic intellectuals of the previous economic and social formations. This is to say, the organic intellectuals of the previous formation do not disappear, rather they undertake new functions associated with the senses of independence, impartiality and historical continuity (Ransome, 2010: 241-242). Gramsci identifies this "self-assessment" in which "they put themselves forward as autonomous and independent of the dominant social group" as a form of "social utopia" (Gramsci, 1999: 138)".

Since, as it will be discussed below, for Gramsci, intellectuals constitute the ties cementing the structure and the superstructure as a historical bloc it is possible to argue that an examination of the relationship between the intellectuals and the classes they are tied to organically is indicative of the development of a historical bloc. In other words, realization of a historical bloc which is synonymous with the establishment of hegemony signifies the existence of an intellectual bloc the

investigation of which would help identifying the hegemonic nature of a given system. (Portelli, 1982: 4-6) Here it should be noted that, as it will be examined in detail below, for Gramsci the actuality of the hegemony of a class can be identified with “the attraction” it releases for the intellectuals of other classes whereas this attraction would lead to the establishment of an ideological bloc. Gramsci argues that “the intellectuals of the historically (and concretely) progressive class, in the given conditions, exercise such a power of attraction that, in the last analysis, they end up by subjugating the intellectuals of the other social groups; they thereby create a system of solidarity between all the intellectuals, with bonds of a psychological nature (vanity, etc.) and often of a caste character (technico-juridical, corporate, etc.)” (Gramsci, 1999: 217). He also reserves that under the circumstances that these intellectuals are belonging to the “really progressive class” this situation shows itself as a spontaneous process whereas once this class “exhausted” its function, the ideological bloc starts to lose its coherence in terms of its spontaneous character (Gramsci, 1999: 217). In this regard, the unity of ideological bloc is started to be depended on the realm of political society such as the “police measures” and “coup d’etat” rather than the attraction on the intellectuals of other classes (Gramsci, 1999: 218). According to Gramsci, the very existence of a homogenous and pervasive ideological bloc is indicative of its hegemony, the use of the force in terms of the concerns of maintaining the unity rather than keeping the appeal alive is the signal of the weakness of the hegemony and the possible consequence of the rise of dictatorial tendencies. (Portelli, 1982: 75-76). Here, it should be remembered that hegemony can only be talked about under the circumstances that the relationship

between intellectuals and people-nation, between the leaders and the led, the rulers and the ruled, is provided by an organic cohesion in which feeling- passion becomes understanding and hence knowledge (not mechanically but in a way that is alive), then and only then is the relationship one of representation. Only then can there take place an exchange of individual elements between the rulers and ruled, leaders [dirigenti] and led, and can the shared life be realized which alone is a social force- with the creation of the ‘historical bloc (Gramsci, 1999: 768).

In this regard, Gramsci argues that how the links between the various moments of the historical bloc which is the dialectical relationship between the structures and superstructures is established and how the organic crisis of this bloc is resolved depends on the activities of the intellectuals in the given historical period (Portelli,

1982: 97). In a way to discuss the hegemony that is tried to be established or saved through AKP, then, it may be argued that investigating the course of its relationship with liberal intellectuals is highly critical.

It should be noted that in order to identify this relationship one needs to develop an adequate understanding of the historical bloc which necessitates, first of all, taking into account the complexity of the intellectual bloc. Since in Gramscian terms there is no privilege of the intellectual labor with regard to manual labor, we come across with an “expansion of the concept of intellectuals” (Buci- Glucksmann, 1980: 24). This is to say, “treated on the basis of their social being, their position in the relations of production, intellectuals are located in a certain division of labor, and perform definite functions” (Buci- Glucksmann, 1980: 29) whereas, here, it is the function of organization that Bourdieu talks about. This function of organization can only be properly understood if the relationship between the structure and superstructure is investigated in accordance with Gramsci’s contribution of the mentioned “historical bloc” (Santucci, 2011: 154). This contribution is consequent to Gramsci’s criticism of the economist versions of Marxism in terms of their inadequacy to explain the rise of the fascism in the 1930’s in a way to disappoint the revolutionary movements’ expectations on the inevitability of a socialist revolution. It should be noted that the major idea behind his note “Revolution against Capital” is this understanding which presumes a mechanistic relationship between the structure and superstructure in the manner that the former determines the latter²⁴. In other words, he argues that the structure “does not by itself produce political changes, only set the conditions in which such changes are possible”²⁵. Thus the time of the structure and superstructure is not necessarily the same, as it is the case with the intellectual leadership of the ecclesiastics till the Dreyfus Affair despite the fact that the fundamental class that they are tied organically (landed aristocracy) had lost its ruling position to the bourgeoisie long before (Portelli, 1982: 109). Challenging the orthodox perspective of historical materialism, Gramsci presupposes a dialectical and organic relationship between these two levels whereas the privilege of the structure is limited to “making an array of political choices possible” in the superstructural instance rather than determining its content in its totality (Santucci, 2011:152). Here,

²⁴ See D, Forgacs ed., *Gramsci Kitabı: Seçme Yazılar 1916-1935*, (Ankara: Dipnot, 2010), 39-44

²⁵ “Marxism: Gramsci’s Concept of Hegemony”, accessed September 05, 2012, accessible from <http://survivingbaenglish.wordpress.com/gramsci/>.

using this organic tie between the structures and superstructures in a way to administrate the superstructures that would give homogeneity to the historical bloc is the organization function of the intellectuals we talked about. Thus, for Gramsci it is not possible to identify what intellectual refers to with regard to the intrinsic quality of the thinking activity. Gramsci's famous phrase of "all men are intellectuals, one could therefore say: but not all men have in society the function of intellectuals" (Gramsci, 1999: 140) is completely relevant here. This is to say, every human activity has an intellectual part in it renders it impossible to identify a group that can be categorized as non-intellectuals. In this sense, it may be argued that Gramsci challenges the perspectives that are referred in terms of the discussion on the "incompatibility between power and the intellect" since according to this "extended" definition of intellectuals, it is not possible to talk about them as if they are a group or a class by itself. Here, the function of providing the organic link between the structure and superstructure is realized by the intellectuals who are themselves by definition, in Gramscian terms, organically tied to the essential classes (bourgeoisie and proletariat) in the existing social formation.

At this point, it should be noted in accordance with the function they perform with regard to these ties they have with the fundamental classes, there are basically two groups of intellectuals (traditional intellectuals and organic intellectuals) in a given historical bloc. The effect of the traditional intellectuals within this bloc can be explained with the difference between the timings of the base and the superstructure. This is to say, this group, for Gramsci, is the organic intellectuals of the classes belonging to the previous historical bloc. In accordance with his criticism of economism, Gramsci here argues that the traditional character of this group comes from their ability to present themselves as if they are independent of social classes and as a result capable of referring to a sense of historical continuity (Ransome, 2010: 238-244). Here, Gramsci's presentation of the intellectuals as the intermediaries between the base and superstructure should be taken into account in the sense that they can further their effect for a while after the disintegration of the historical bloc they belong to, through successfully organizing the consent around their intellectual leadership. This is why, the foremost task of a rising class for Gramsci is to assimilate or transform these intellectuals. Here, the major tool to realize this end is the political party of that class which Gramsci defines as the

“collective intellectual”. It is the place where the traditional intellectuals are welded together with the organic intellectuals.

The complexity of Gramsci’s thought, which is mostly disregarded as it is the case with the relationship between the base and superstructure which is a dialectical relationship, should be noted here. Gramscian concepts are intertwined in such a manner that the intellectuals can show both traditional and organic functions whereas a ruling class can both include the traits of leadership and domination at the same time. This is why it is completely relevant here to note that the supremacy of a social group manifests itself in two ways, as “domination” and as “intellectual and moral leadership”. A social group dominates antagonistic groups, which it tends to “liquidate”, or to subjugate perhaps even by armed force; it leads kindred and allied groups (Gramsci, 1999: 212). This is to say, despite the fact that we use the terms of hegemony and dictatorship, as Gramsci did, in accordance with the primacy of the civil society or the political society in a given historical bloc (the extensive use of political society is indicative of dictatorship rather than the hegemony), one should keep in mind the fact that the ruling group even in a hegemonic system could use “constraint” in terms of its relationship with the antagonistic groups.

The fact that the features belonging to hegemony and dictatorship co-exist in such a manner leads us to note that “the split between the hegemony and dictatorship is not schematic” (Portelli, 1982: 78). This vision renders the presentation of a clear-cut distinction between the political society and civil society implausible. Rather, for Gramsci their very unity constitutes the state completing Lenin’s conceptualization of hegemony with the emphasis on its class-based nature and extending the definition of the state as the unification of the political society and civil society (Portelli, 1982: 71). According to this contribution, while the place to confront the ruling class is the civil society, the control of which determines who the hegemonic group is, political society is the point where this hegemony is “armored by coercion”. Thus, the co-existence of the constraint and spontaneity even in a hegemonic system renders it possible for us to conclude that the establishment of an ideological bloc, which is indicative of the existence of a “coherent hegemonic system”, can be used by a class “to function as to dominate not to lead” (Portelli, 1982: 79, t.m.). This function to dominate is crucial for the policy of “transformism” which “comes to the foreground when the ruling class incorporates the intellectuals and the leaders of other social groups in order to eliminate them” (Portelli, 1982: 79, t.m.) Here, the

case of the “Moderates” in Risorgimento²⁶ gives us the possibility to identify the fact that with regard to the policy towards the intellectuals in a given historical formation “transformism” and hegemony can take place at the same time. Transformism constitutes “one of the historical forms of what has already been noted about ‘revolution-restoration’ or ‘passive revolution’” which refers to a process whereby a social group comes to power without rupturing the social fabric (as in France) but rather by adapting to it and gradually modifying it” (Forgacs, 2000: 249). Unlike as it is the case with the situation of dictatorship, here, the ruling group does not have to use the mechanism of political society in a way to eliminate the leadership of the dominated classes. Rather, it is the preference of this class, just like what the Moderates did in Risorgimento, to counteract the sub-classes than to lead them (than to use its hegemony) (Portelli, 1982: 91). Gramsci argues that the Moderates, as the representatives of the Italian bourgeoisie did not want to lead the other classes which would necessitate reconciling their interests and desires with their own interests. This preference rendered them to compensate the non-existence of the leader-led relationship by transforming their intellectuals which would prevent them to develop a sense of self-consciousness. (Portelli, 1982: 80) In other words, “transformism” is a method for benefiting the advantages of hegemony without being harmed by its consequences (more accurately, by not including interests and desires of the dominated classes) (Portelli, 1982: 84). Gramsci substantiates this argument by referring to the two periods of transformism he identifies in the Italian history. The first one belonging to the period between 1860 and 1900 which Gramsci defines as the parliamentary expression of the intellectual, moral and ideological leadership of the Moderates, is characterized by an “individual, molecular and private enterprise” (Gramsci, 1999: p.216). This enterprise manifested itself in the incorporation of the political figures individually from the democratic opposition parties to the conservative-moderate political class (Gramsci, 1999: 213). Second period is determined “as from 1900 onwards”, absorbing the leftists as groups through the new political parties which are established to accept deviationists (Portelli, 1982: 83). Here, the major aim is to break the link between the dominated classes and their intellectuals in a way to prevent any possibility for them to develop counter-

²⁶ For a detailed discussion see R. Bellamy and D. Schecter, *Gramsci and the Italian State*, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1993), 137-163.

hegemony whereas allied groups are also the subject of this “continuous absorption” (Gramsci, 1999: 215).

Gramsci talks about three groups in a historical bloc. They are “the fundamental class that is ruling the hegemonic system, allied groups who are destined to be the social base and the ground to provide the staff for hegemony and lastly, the excluded ones from the hegemony, the subordinate classes (Portelli, 1982:94). Here, it is important to remember that a social group dominates antagonistic groups, which it tends to “liquidate”, or to subjugate perhaps even by armed force; it leads kindred and allied groups” (Gramsci, 1999: 212) disclosing the fact the relationship between hegemony and dictatorship is not schematic. Gramsci argues that the relationship between the allied groups and the ruling group is critical in the sense that being the intellectual “seedbed” for the latter renders the former important for strengthening the hegemony whereas the conformity between the interests of the two is a fundamental factor for the solidity of the hegemony. This conformity manifests itself in Gramsci’s claim that “the rise in the intellectual cadres (teachers, parties, mass media etc.) as well as in the state and corporate bureaucracy and the economical parasitism of these groups provides them with the employment opportunities that are strictly tied to the hegemony of the ruling class” (Portelli, 1982: 93, t.m.)

Here, regarding the fact that hegemony is characterized by the existence of an ideological bloc, it should be noted that this conformity showing itself through the spontaneity²⁷ (referring here to the lack of the need to incorporate constraint such as the police measures) of the extension of the ideological bloc can only be provided under the circumstances that the ruling class has a policy towards intellectuals that is developed around the following two principles: “1. a general conception of life, a philosophy (Gioberti), which offers to its adherents an intellectual “dignity” providing a principle of differentiation from the old ideologies which dominated by coercion, and an element of struggle against them; 2. a scholastic programme, an

²⁷ “This “spontaneity” lasts only as long as the ruling class remains progressive- that is, only as long as it looks beyond its narrow corporate class interests, seeks to advance the whole of society, and continues to expand its presence in the “private” sphere, or, as Gramsci puts it, “continuously enlarg[es] its compass through the continual appropriation of new spheres of industrial-productive activity. If, or when, the ruling class loses its position of leadership in civil society-when, among other things, it ceases to satisfactorily address at least the most pressing needs of the other classes, and its own constituent groups seek to protect only their own immediate and competing (e.g., industrialists versus landowners) corporate interests-its power of attraction disappears, the ideological bloc that held it together disintegrates and “spontaneity” gives way to “constraint” (Buttigieg, 1995: 22).

educative principle and original pedagogy which interests that fraction of the intellectuals which is the most homogeneous and the most numerous (the teachers, from the primary teachers to the university professors), and gives them an activity of their own in the technical field” (Gramsci, 1999: 285). With regard to the description of these two principles it should be noted that Gramsci’s point of reference is the policy of Moderates in the Risorgimento. In a way to understand the ideological leadership of the Moderates, Gramsci argues that they are successful at providing “all the satisfactions for their general needs which can be offered by a government” in the sense that welcoming the “exiled intellectuals and providing a model of what a unified State would do” (Gramsci, 1999: 285). Here, it should be noted that the conditions of providing hegemony over intellectuals can be ordered both economically and ideologically. This is to say, the attraction we mentioned above depends on the possibilities of employment that the hegemony of a class would provide as well as the “dignity” and distinction which would be defined in comparison to the ideology of the previous historical bloc. This is what the Moderates realized by challenging the Jesuitical school and liberalizing the “scholastic activities”. They developed a national philosophy in the educational field which would oppose the ecclesiastical effect and provided a realm of employment for the intellectuals. This is why, Gramsci argues that

Scholastic activity, at all its levels, has an enormous importance (economic as well) for intellectuals of all degrees. And at that time it had an even greater importance than it does today, given the narrowness of the social structures and the few roads open to the initiative of the petite bourgeoisie. (Today, journalism, the political parties, industry, a very extensive State apparatus, etc., have broadened the possibilities of employment to an unheard of extent) (Gramsci, 1999: 284).

Although Gramsci emphasizes that within the context he writes there exists various areas to be employed, it should be noted that, today, the determinacy of the field of media over other fields, as it is mentioned before, renders employment in it most valuable. Despite the fact that Bourdieu is in favor of a position regarding the intellectuals as a class in itself, his argument of fast- thinkers is absolutely relevant here. Bourdieu argues that journalistic field has the dominance among other fields to determine what is in circulation endowing it with an authority to define what has the possibility to turn into common sense. Thus, at this point, in order to figure out the position of these intellectuals with regard the power structure, there arises the need to

identify the space they occupied in the media. In order to reach this aim, now, the privilege of the journalistic field as a source of power to be recognized as a public authority will be examined.

Regarding the concern of taking place in media as the outcome of the middle-class crisis Gramsci talks about, media will be examined as a political field that would lead us to understand the nature of the positioning of the intellectuals since it stands as the determinant of the limits in terms of the circulation of discourses. Media's power to define what is in circulation and as a result what has the possibility to turn into common sense renders it possible for us to understand. It should be noted that this change cannot be explained without referring to the global processes that led to the transformation of the press into the media. What distinguishes this new phase is the fact that the press' distinctive function of releasing information and news are regarded as secondary with regard to its other symbolic functions. All cultural or symbolic production started to be realized and diffused through media in an industrial scale which means that from then on, the field of media has no difference than other realms of economic activity. In this sense, it is justified that the working manner of media should be in conformity with the principles of the market. Thus, in accordance with the policies of new-right presupposing a minimal state, 80s characterized with the privatization of the broadcasting system and its consequent deregulation. Under these circumstances, media became a profitable sphere for investment, whereas the technological renewal requires a substantial amount of capital. Thus, it may be argued that the second feature that distinguishes media from the press is the fact that this requirement brought the owners of big business to the realm as investors which ceased the tradition of the owners that are themselves journalists (Bali: 2002, 20). Concentration and monopolization started to characterize the field which makes it harder for the magazines or newspapers that are targeting a specialized, therefore, limited audience to stay alive. Rather, in accordance with the principles of the market the main aim has been regarded as to be consumed by the most extended number of people possible.

The same processes are also valid for the transformation that is realized in Turkey in terms of the field of media. However, there is a specificity that Raşit Kaya emphasizes which refers to the fact that throughout the history of the Turkish Republic, developments in terms of mass communication always coincide with the periods of crisis (2009: 236). Therefore, it may be argued that the legitimacy crisis of

the Özal government as well as its concern to integrate into the global capitalism which is characterized by the developed information technologies led to the annulment of the state monopoly over broadcasting. As a result, these efforts to develop information technologies rendered media the sector that had been invested the most during the 1980s at the expense of other sectors. Thus, in accordance with the transformation of the ownership structure that has been taken place in the world, technological renewal necessitated the entrance of the big business to the sphere of media. This is why the owners of the media in Turkey are started to be consisted of contractors and banks. In other words, the media field is now dominated by the capital that is accumulated outside of this sphere by the people whose occupations have nothing to do with journalism (Kaya, 2009: 245). As a result of this entrance, the number of the institutions acting in the field multiplied. However this multiplication does not refer to the rise of pluralism in terms of the ability of these institutions to target different views and political positions since high costs of investment and the domination of the big business resulted with the limited numbers of actors as owners of this extensive number of institutions. In other words, Turkish media sphere is also characterized by monopolization. The holdings that dominated the realm of media starting with the 1990's can be ordered as Doğan Group, Çukurova Group, Doğu Group, Turgay Ciner Group, Dinç Bilgin Group, Uzan Group, Erol Aksoy Group, İhlas Holding- Enver Ören Group. At this point it should be noted that with the seizure of the properties of the Dinç Bilgin group by TMSF, the last representative of the owners of the press of the previous period has been eliminated from the scene (Kaya, 2009: 248).

This new model of ownership led to close contacts between the businessmen who owe their capital to their investments in the other spheres of economy and the journalists. In other words, starting with this period during which media became a profitable realm of economic activity, big business has been positioned at a distance within reach of the members of the press. These close contacts resulted with the creation of a self-image by the journalists (or in more accurate terms columnists for our case) as being powerful enough to be a part of the ruling elite (Bali: 2002, 21). Moreover, it should be noted that this relationship between the business and columnists has two sides, in the sense that business also benefits from it. Rıfat Bali reveals the working principles of the mentioned collaboration with the following statement:

Businessmen thanks to the friendly relations they developed with the journalists are positioned as sages. Journalists who resort to the opinion of the businessmen with regard to the economic, political and social incidents were intending to advertise their holdings in a way to render them more prestigious” (Bali, 1999: 49 – t.m.).

The columnists in a way to prove how powerful they are regarding the closeness they share with the business elite, used their columns to write about the trips, dinners etc. they participated with these people whereas this friendship provided them with the opportunity to be visible in the various branches of the same group. For instance, columnists are to be seen as commentators in the TV channels that belong to the media group they take part or that they share the same political position. The recognition they attained through this kind of visibility served not only through being a source of material gains but also through giving the doctrines of these people or their languages the opportunity to enter into circulation.

At this point, it is possible to argue that being in circulation is critical since as Pierre Bourdieu argues “at stake today in local as well as global political struggles is the capacity to impose a way of seeing the world, of making people wear glasses that force them to see the world divided up in certain ways” (1998: 22). Journalistic field has the power to determine what can be seen through these glasses. At this point, it should be noted that starting with the 1980s journalistic products constituted uniformity rather than attaining originality due to the global annulment of the mentality of public broadcasting and the field’s subordination to the demands of the market. That is to say, the concern of reaching the largest audience possible made it necessary for the institutions to cover what is exceptional whereas missing news or information that is important would leave them behind in terms of the competition within the field. This is why “competition for consumers tends to take the form of competition for the newest news” (Bourdieu, 1998: 71). This concern of lagging behind made the actors playing in the realm very attentive to what others consecrated as important information. Bourdieu argues that “it is the information about information that allows you to decide what is important and worth broadcasting comes in large part from other informers” (Bourdieu, 1998: 26). This criterion of what is important results with “the effect of mental closure” in the sense that journalistic products because of the processes of checking one another in a way to deal with the market pressures end up with being almost identical. Bourdieu defines this characteristic of the media field with the phrase “circular circulation”.

One may argue that what takes place in terms of this circular circulation is extremely important since journalistic field, especially through television that has the capability of reaching the largest amount of audience possible, experiences power over the other spheres of cultural and scientific production. Journalists' monopoly over the "large scale informational instruments" and, as a result, their control over "the means of public expression" stands as the major reason behind their power over the given spheres. Bourdieu argues that journalists "control in effect, public existence, one's ability to be recognized as a public figure, obviously critical for politicians and certain intellectuals" (1998: 46). In this sense, what takes place in media or what is subjected to the mentioned circular circulation are definitive for public existence whereas this constitutes a threatening condition for arts and sciences. That is to say, depending on the principles of the market in terms of being an ordinary sphere of economic activity which coerces to obtain the maximum amount of profit (which refers to reaching largest number of audience possible ensuring the largest amount of advertisement revenues), these subjects are taken into consideration only in the manner they would draw audience's attention. Thus, public figures representing these realms are mostly consisted of the heteronomous individuals ["people from the outside who have little authority from the viewpoint of the values specific to the field" (Bourdieu, 1998: 62)] that "have TV value, a journalistic weight that is not commensurate with their particular weight in their particular world" (Bourdieu, 1998: 59).

The reason of the imbalance between the TV value and the amount of capital obtained that is specific to one's respective field can be explained with the fact that the information presented in TV has no possibility of including a well developed analysis. Rather, such an effort would lead to the distraction of the audience which constitutes the very source of the profit. Thus, it may be argued that analysis and discussions taking place in the journalistic field cannot be considered as scientific due to the market pressures which imposes structural limits to what can be expressed. According to Bourdieu, those who speak on TV are not representatives of independent thinking, rather the margins of their speech are depicted by time limits, by the political control as well as by the mechanisms of ownership. To be precise, these people should refer to the "received ideas", formulation of which would not take time and which would not have unexpected consequences that would challenge the interests of the political power or of the owners of media. Bourdieu calls this kind

of thinkers who are always ready to comment regardless of their level of expertise in the subject or the structural limitations that would prevent them from coming up with an adequate analysis of the issue as “fast thinkers”. Thus, one may easily argue that market pressures, especially after the change in terms of the ownership structure of media with the 1980s depending on the elimination of the mentality of public service broadcasting, rendered the journalistic field an arena that is dominated by “fast thinkers” who provided an intellectual confirmation to the mentioned pressures. The fact that it is not possible to come up with a full fledged explanation of an incident on TV due to the given structural limitations, makes us wonder the intention behind these people’s constant participation in the TV sessions as commentators. According to Bourdieu, this situation can be explained with “narcissistic exhibitionism”. That is to say, the major reason behind this participation of these people, who do not have the necessary capital to be accepted as competent by their peers in the specific field they belong to, is to be seen, to be heard, to be recognized as a public figure. As a result, it may be argued that in contemporary societies the discourses that are in circulation through media are “received ideas” which do not necessitate deliberation whereas the intellectuals that are responsible for their release are fast thinkers whose economic capital is superior with regard to their cultural capital.

At this point it may be argued that these thinkers’ willingness to participate in the field of media is part of a struggle to be powerful enough to determine what is in circulation which is a source of recognition as well as a possibility of intrusion into other fields. In accordance with the collaboration between the liberal intellectuals and the political power, it can be talked about another collaboration that takes place between the Islamist media and the liberal intellectuals as the source of distinction. An analysis of the journalistic field in Turkey would make it possible to identify that, in addition to their posts in the “central media”, these intellectuals participate in the institutions of the Islamist media²⁸ to the extent that they mostly write for the group’s

²⁸ These institutions of the Islamist media which are the supporters of the party in power (AKP) can be ordered as STV, Burç FM, Haber 24, Kanal 7, Kanal A, Haber 7, Yeni Şafak, Vakit, Star, Bugün, Aksiyon, Zaman (Kaya, 2009: 248). During the 8 years time we investigated Ali Bayramoğlu wrote only for Yeni Şafak whereas Cengiz Çandar has been the columnist of Yeni Şafak, Dünden Bugüne Tercüman, Radikal and Referans. Moreover, his Referans and Radikal articles are issued synchronously in hurriyet.com.tr. Etyen Mahçupyan wrote for Taraf and Agos whereas Zaman is the institution he writes the most. Lastly, Mehmet Altan was the columnist of Sabah and then Star. He was the editor-in-chief of the latter and has written 8 articles in a week for 5 years.

newspapers, host discussion programs in its TV channels²⁹ or simply serve as the experts that are to be consulted in order to render the incidents of the Turkish political scene understandable. However, it should be noted that their ideologies and origins are mostly different than the other journalists with whom they work in these institutions. According to Raşit Kaya, the reason behind the conservative capital to provide space to these intellectuals is to use them as “display figures” (2009: 248-fn, t.m.) who would provide it with prestige. Rifat Bali explains this point with the aim of releasing the image that democracy is internalized to the extent that the composition of Islamist media is realized in a way to substantiate the development of “the culture of living together”³⁰.

Here, it should be remembered that attaining such critical positions within the media is the first step to hold the distinction Gramsci points out which is the major reason of attraction for the intellectuals of other social groups. Moreover, again, depending on the dynamics of the structure of this field determined by the requirements of market and leading to “the circular circulation”, the frame of what is legitimate or what is meaningful to talk about is agreed on beforehand. Under these circumstances, again in accordance with the fragility of these attained positions in the media with regard to the preferences of “the governing party”³¹ as well as the market pressures, the will to emphasize one’s distinction manifests itself in the eagerness to stick its position, as Emrah Göker notes³², in a way to differentiate itself from “the other” position reaches its peak in the presentation of the other as the irrational choice. The irrationality of such a position is presented in accordance with the idea

²⁹ Mehmet Altan, Eser Karakaş and Şahin Alpay have been hosting the programme “Akıl Defteri” for 6 years in Mehtap TV belonging to the Feza Group which also publishes the newspaper Zaman. Ali Bayramoğlu is the host of the show “Dün ve Bugün” in the TVNET of the Albayrak Group. Cengiz Çandar is announced to host “Çıkış Yolu” a show in TRT Haber with Ergun Babahan and Ekrem Dumanlı

³⁰ R. Bali, “İmkansız Nasıl Mümkün Oldu? İslamcı- Solcu- Liberal İttifakı”, accessed September 05, 2012, available from: http://www.rifatbali.com/images/stories/dokumanlar/islamci_solcu_ittifaki.pdf, p.7

³¹ Within this historical journey, the recent developments such as the termination of the employment of Mehmet Altan by the newspaper Star which he performed as the editor-in-chief due to criticizing the government in an interview with the Fırat News Agency and Mustafa Erdoğan’s dismissal from his post in the same newspaper as well as the expulsion of Ali Akel from Yeni Şafak is indicative of the fact that media in contemporary Turkey is in a process of reorganization around the sensitivities of the governing party.

³² E. Göker, “Barizin Alimleri: Kanaat Teknisyenliği,” *Birgün*, August 23, 2009, accessed September 05, 2012, available from: http://www.birgun.net/sunday_index.php?news_code=1251028641&year=2009&month=08&day=23.

that the founding ideology of the state, namely Kemalism, exhausted its capability of cementing society which renders anyone following this doctrine archaic. Rather it has to be struggled to establish “the New Turkey”. It should be noted that the emphasis around this concept, as will be examined in the following parts of the thesis is important in the sense that being part of this new order would provide these intellectuals with the power to ideologically lead the intellectual field as the “reformists”. The sense of being the new actors of the “New Turkey” can be taken into account as the “dignity” characterized by being distinctive from the previous repressive system which Gramsci talks about as the essential part of a “policy towards intellectuals”. Moreover, it may be argued that the close relationship with the party in power which is justified by the liberal intellectuals in terms of the character of both groups to be the new subjects of New Turkey, in other words, the actors that would establish democracy together is confirmed with the key positions of these intellectuals within the media. Therefore, it is plausible to argue that “the attraction” which would be developed around the two principles we mentioned above (satisfying the ideological and economical needs of the intellectuals in terms of providing dignity and employment) is realized successfully in contemporary Turkey by the governing party.

To sum up, it is argued that, for Gramsci the actuality of the hegemony of a class can be identified with the appeal per se it releases for the intellectuals of other classes whereas this appeal would lead to the establishment of an ideological bloc. Since according to Gramsci the very existence of a homogenous and pervasive ideological bloc is indicative of its hegemony, the use of the force in terms of the concerns of maintaining the unity rather than keeping the appeal alive is the signal of the weakness of the hegemony and the possible consequence of the rise of dictatorial tendencies. (Portelli, 1982: 75-76). Since it is the political party of the hegemonic class where the intellectuals are appealed and where they “can become organic, by becoming a political intellectual” (Buci- Glucksman, p.5) in a way to disclose what constitutes the attraction per se for being part of such transformation and whether it is this appeal that is the theme of the relationship between the liberal intellectuals and power, there arises the need of involving in an historical analysis of the relationship between the rise of AKP and liberal intellectuals. It would be an attempt to understand whether the party has fulfilled its function of establishing hegemony successfully regarding whether “the attraction” is still there. This is to say, in a way

to discuss the hegemony that is tried to be established or saved through AKP, investigating the course of the relationship with liberal intellectuals is highly critical while for our thesis it is important to identify what specific form of “attraction” rendering this relationship possible signifies in the contemporary moment of neo-liberal hegemony carried out by AKP. However, before, it should be noted that the support of the liberal intellectuals of AKP is closely related with the course they have taken in the Turkish political history. Starting from their appearance into the hegemonic crisis of the political power during the Özal period and including the YDH experience it is possible to claim that the liberal intellectuals were attracted always through the very sense of novelty which could be substantiated with the themes of “leaping Turkey forward” and the “New Turkey”, respectively. In the next chapter, in a way to understand why the conditions of establishing the “New Turkey” were given as closest to be realized in the AKP period, the liberal intellectuals’ search for novelty will be examined with reference to the three specific moments of Turkish political history.

CHAPTER 3

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN LIBERAL INTELLECTUALS AND POWER IN THE POST-1980 PERIOD

The aim in this chapter is to come up with a historical analysis of the relationship between liberal intellectuals and political power in a way to identify the context that render the idea of “New Turkey” so appealing. Here, it should be noted that without an historical examination of the course the liberal intellectuals referred in the thesis has taken, it is not possible to identify the implications of the theme of “New Turkey” as the “democratization” of the republic for their self-categorization as “the brain³³” in terms of their “coalition” with AKP.

For the sake of the analysis in which the relationship between this part of the intelligentsia and the political power is tried to be revealed, three moments of Turkish political history definitive for the group attributed as liberal intellectuals will be examined. The first moment refers to their appearance as a thought movement into the hegemonic crises of the political power whereas the second can be represented with the failure of their attempt of forming a political party which signifies a direct quest for power. The last moment, which will be the focus of the present study, may be taken into account as the second experience of ideologically supporting the political power. In this chapter, these moments in a way to understand their consequences affecting liberal intellectuals’ attitude to power in the last moment, namely, three terms AKP has been in power will be examined. In order to realize this aim, the relations between ANAP, YDH, AKP and these intellectuals will be discussed separately through pointing out how they justify and write these moments over their own premises. This would necessitate considering their ideological reference points like Şerif Mardin and İdris Küçükömer. It will be argued that explaining the Turkish political structure over this frame of reference which

³³ Mehmet Altan states in this regard that: “the collaboration between the liberal democrats and AKP is the collaboration between the brain and the body. This is to say, the elimination of this relationship between someone who makes sense of the world and translates it with AKP leads to the actions of a body which does not care about the functions of the brain” (Altan, 2008: 232).

presents the split between the state and society as the major conflict of its history liberal intellectuals come up with the idea that AKP represents a discontinuity in terms of merging the center with periphery. This is why, for liberal intellectuals, being part of the “New Turkey” and establishing the ideological means to protect it against the conventional actors of “old Turkey” is completely in harmony with the intellectual responsibility, that is investigated in the last section, of non-complying with the power (referring to the tutelary regime).

Now, in order to realize this aim, the origins of the liberals’ storytelling of the introduction of the neo-liberal policies in the Turkish political structure which is presented by the liberal intellectuals as the source of the developments paving the way to the establishment of the “New Turkey” will be identified. In this manner, the appearance of liberal intellectuals into the Turkish political scene characterized by their close relations with power due to their function of managing with the hegemonic crisis of the system will be witnessed.

3.1. Rise of the Liberal Intellectuals: ANAP and “Second Republicanism”

Starting with a military coup, 1980’s refer to a radical break in terms of Turkish political history coinciding with the new phase capitalism reached which led an overall change in terms of the emphasis on the conventional way of making politics. In this sense, 80’s is a period characterized by the rise of the “new-right” as a project that incorporates the elements of liberalism and conservatism in a way to overcome the global crisis of capitalism through “rehabilitating” these terms (Bora: 2005, 600). Welfare state as the post-war period’s hegemonic form of government was black-listed as the responsible of this crisis and as a result, the doctrine of new-right constructed itself as the “other” of this concept. Moreover, the hegemony of the new-right was substantiated with the rise of Thatcherism and Reaganism which founded upon the destruction of the remnants of the welfare state through the policies of deregulation intending to remove the restraints for the expansion of the global capital. In terms of this contextual background, it may be argued that what characterizes Turkey during the era of 1980’s can be given as the integration efforts into this global structure referring to a fundamental change regarding its economic program.

The moral outcomes of this neo-liberal turn characterized by the market fetishism through which all social relations are regarded in terms of the market (Özkazanç: 2005, 635) are tried to be reduced through the ideological support of intellectuals who would legitimize the efforts of integration and its consequent flaws. In this sense, it may be argued that this period created its own intellectuals in a way to overcome the crisis of the political power. This constitutes the point where “second republicanism” came to the scene as a thought movement and as the starting point of the course of the liberal intellectuals that is aimed to be analyzed. Thus, it may be argued that considering the close relation of the appearance of these intellectuals to the legitimacy concern of the party in power would be the first step leading us to question their relations with the power structure.

Aside from the mentioned integration efforts of Turkey, the context “second republicanism” was born into was characterized by the attempts of overcoming the “hegemonic crisis... (which) can be traced back to as early as the 1970s, and probably even to the 1960s, during which time rapid capitalist development occurred” (Tünay, 1993: 17). It should be noted that the first step towards the solution of this crisis was the agenda known as the January 24 Decisions which paved the way for the economic reconstruction required by the neo-liberal turn. Tanil Bora ascribes these decisions as “more important than a radical economic prevention package. January 24 has given Turkish economy the way to become a real capitalism and to integrate into the global capitalist economy through getting rid of the statist-protectionist records” (Bora: 2005, 596). Turgut Özal, who would later become the prime minister of Turkish Republic for six years, was appointed by the military which realized the coup of September 12th of 1980 in order to maintain the implementation of this programme. At this point, it is possible to argue that Turkey started its process of becoming a “real” capitalist country under the supervision of the military; therefore the authoritarian elements structuring this process are not unexpected. In other words, neo-liberalism which presumes the minimization of the state’s interference was established through the direct state intervention and through the appointment of a technocrat who would later be the counterpart of Thatcher and Reagan in terms of being the representative figure of the new-right whereas this point is crucial in order to understand the following discussions on democratization and Özal’s position for the “second republicans”. Özkazanç argues that, “in an environment where the military coup repressed the class-based political conflicts, the

elections of November 6 (1983) represent a return of the political struggle to the “state- civil society” axis again” (2012: 109, t.m.). During the organic crisis characterizing the period between 1977-80, the center right parties through articulating with the radical components against “the rising threat of communism” lost their traditional balanced position of belonging to the state tradition and loosen it for the sake of the conservative positions like that of Islamists. According to Özkazanç, the fact that the problem of the maintenance of the state had been solved by the military with the September 12 intervention rendered it possible for Özal to present himself a rather civilian figure despite the apparent approval he took from the interveners. With the help of the media as it will be mentioned below, in accordance with his personal image of being out of the state’s seriousness, he succeeded to diffuse the populist discourse that is established around the contrast on the one hand between bureaucrats, industrialists traditionally protected by the state and on the other hand competitive businessmen and the “ortadirek”. (Özkazanç, 2012: 109-111).

The presentation of the conflict around these terms was the outcome of the hegemonic project of the ANAP that is developed around the synthesis of the “four different political orientations ... namely, the liberals, pan-Turkist extreme right-wing elements, Islamic fundamentalists and social democrats” (Tünay, 1993: 21). This eclecticism would be provided according to Özal through the principle of economism (Özkazanç, 2012: 110). In order to understand how this principle constituted the cement between these tendencies, it should, first of all, be noted that Turgut Özal won the 1983 elections continued to follow the “January 24 Decisions” during his period of prime ministry and, as it is the case with his counterparts, he tried to remove the flaws of the neo-liberal policies by resorting to the unifying power of conservatism. This conservatism was accompanied by the transformed and domesticated versions of nationalism and Islamism around the principle of primacy of market. In other words, it is possible to argue that “economism” of Özal, which may be summarized with the idea that free market economy would consequently bring with itself democratization in the political arena, is the assumption that allows the articulation of various political positions around his programme. Moreover, it may be argued that another indication of this economism is apparent in Özal’s belief that just like the survival of the best products in the market, radical ideas would not get attention and as a result they would lose their threatening potential. (Bora: 2005,

598). Nationalism and Islamism are reconstructed and domesticated to some extent in accordance with this idea and Özal tried to bring the groups belonging to the right in a way to form a balance that would pave the way for the maintenance of the above mentioned articulation and position them at the center of the political spectrum.

With regard to this understanding the frame of politics has been changed or “returned” to the fundamental conflict between state and society which is definitive of the DP period with the elections of 1993. Here, it should be noted that Özal led to the development of this sense of politics through coming up with a balance between the interventionists and the civil society whereas extending the limits of the civil society for the Islamists. Özkazanç argues that it is this balance that determines the scope of the liberal arguments in Turkey with regard to “the fact that the liberal vein talking through the Jacobin state and political freedoms revived within the moment of neo-liberal transformation” (Özkazanç, 2005: 641). This is to say, under the circumstances that the establishment of the free market economy has been forced by the state and with regard to the consequent collaboration between the two the criticisms of the state and of the free-market are limited by each other. This is why, thinking about the Özal period through the duality between state and society is inadequate unless the neoliberal conditions determining its content are taken into account, since they are these very circumstances that render the duality meaningless. The utmost outcome of this collaboration is the determination of the processes of state through the logic of market and the market relations’ attainment of a political character which was indicative of the dependence between the logics of two on each other unlike the manner that it is supposed by the liberals (Özkazanç, 2005: 640-642). This intervened character of the two manifested itself in the establishment of the organic relations between politically dominant groups and that of capital which was indicative of omitting the bureaucratic and legal procedures (Özkazanç, 2005: 638). In other words, the intervention of the state in society was not reduced; rather it is reestablished in a “personalized”, “centralized” and “politicized” manner. However, the consequent rise of the arbitrariness damaged the long-term interests of the bourgeoisie and “corrupted its class character”. All these resulted with the legitimacy crisis of the once the hegemonic project of Özal government whereas, on the other hand, as we will see below, it constituted the ground for the rise of the organic crisis of the system in the 1990s.

The investigation of the legitimacy crisis of the Özal government shows that the balance that he tries to set between state and economy prevailed without being destabilized till Özal's period of presidency which lasts between the years of 1989 and 1993. This period can be attributed with the rise of the nationalism together with Islamism through getting rid of the cement that ties them to the center and therefore, refers to a crisis in terms of the supposed hegemony of the neo-liberalism of Özal. The major determinant of this process is the rising pressure that the Kurdish question created for the political power. It is possible to argue that this question led Özal, who witnessed that fetishism of the market would not let him to overcome the crisis concerning the legitimacy of his rule, to overcome it through bringing up with a project that depends on the "peaceful coexistence of the cultural differences"(Erdoğan, Üstüner: 2005, 658). The intellectual support which would try to solve this crisis through strengthening the political liberalism part of "Özalizm" came from the intellectual movement that refers itself as the "second republicanism".

Up until this point, we tried to come up with an analysis of the contextual developments leading to the rise of Second Republicanism whereas in order to understand the relations between political power and liberal intellectuals we also need to understand the policy of the governing party with regard to intellectuals. Here, it should be noted that Özal maintained the tradition of centre right in terms of holding an anti-intellectualist stand. Yüksel Taşkın argues that two of the most definitive characteristics of centre right are that of pragmatism and not following a clear cut political doctrine unlike as it is the case with the nationalist conservatism. Pointing out the tension between centre right and nationalist conservatism, he argues that "anti-intellectualism is inherent to the former" (2012: 414). The major strategy of centre right in Turkey is to omit the process of justifying their acts with regard to the certain set of principles and in a way to provide the integration with the world capitalism following the "populist discourse of development" (2012: 413). This is why tension between the nationalist conservatism and centre right manifested itself most apparently in the Özal period in accordance with the new phase the global capitalism reached. Under these circumstances "Özal could include in its alliance even the sections that had been close to CHP till the 1980s over the promise of enjoying the benefits of globalization and consumption society" (2012: 416). This is to say, according to Taşkın, the duality between the development and order is resolved by the people in favor of the former since conservative modernization

brings with itself the hope that using their freedom to enterprise and to travel they could change their circumstances. It is this potential that “modernist optimism” has referred whereas the discourse of this alliance was the rationality and economic inevitability and the main channel it was released was the media. Under these circumstances, survival of an intellectual as an affective figure in such hostile circumstances was to “adjust its cultural capital” accordingly which was completely related to the rising power of popular culture in comparison to national culture.

It is no coincidence that Özal period constitutes the point in Turkish political history in which the term “entel” as a humiliation of the intelligentsia comes to the foreground and it is frequently referred. According to Taşkın after the end of the cold war, what takes place in the intellectual realm was the realization of their fear of losing power (etkisizleşme korkusu) of the conventional actors of the realm. Tanıl Bora here argues that restructuration of the media and its pragmatic relations with knowledge render this discourse of “criminalizing” the intellectual activity to rise as a threat to its independence (Bora, 2009: 128). Here the example Taşkın gives is highly explanatory: right before the 1987 general elections Özal states that he would not nominate intellectuals as the candidates for being deputies since they would create controversies and discussions while they need the men only for their number. (This point which will be identified the next section, is the major reason for Cem Boyner- the leader of YDH- of the splits in his party which is mostly referred as an intellectual attempt and AKP’s announcement of the non-existence of any coalition with liberal intellectuals as it is widely thought.)

It may be argued that pragmatism of the relationship with intellectuals that is characteristic of the centre-right in Turkey is apparent in the way that Özal resorted to intellectuals during his presidency which was characterized by the rising Kurdish question as well as the first signals of the hegemonic crisis which would mature in the next half of the 1990s. Here, one may argue that Özal could accomplish to provide the two conditions that Gramsci identifies, as it is identified in the last section, leading to the spontaneous realization of the intellectual bloc of providing a sense of distinction and a technical activity which cannot be though outside of the employment concerns. Under the circumstances characterized by the emphasis on personal relations the attraction is provided through the sense of distinction implying that these intellectuals are different from their predecessors who are beyond time

with the archaic disciplines they follow which were meaningful in the context of cold war.

Mehmet Özgüden, argues that Turgut Özal, in order to take especially leftist intellectuals under control engaged in transformism in a way to break the ties these intellectuals have with the societal parts that are subjected to the disadvantageous consequences of neo-liberalism. This is to say, there are two sides of this transformism: while the intellectuals like to enjoy some power and overcome the trauma of the military coup, Özal government, besides incorporating them in a way to prevent any attempt of establishing counter-hegemony, needed them as well-qualified personnel of the institutions of the neo-liberal hegemony (2007: 94-96, 174-176). Despite the fact that the discussion of the left-liberal position is not the concern of the thesis, still in a way to identify to what extent the quest for power of the intelligentsia determines dynamics of the relationship we investigate, this policy of transformism should be investigated here in the manner that reveals how the intellectual hegemony of the left is replaced by the hegemony of the liberal intellectuals in the contemporary moment of Turkish political history.

Here it should be remembered that Tanıl Bora argues that the intellectual hegemony of the leftists was a phenomenon characterizing the periods of 60's and 70's. "The left, depending on its commitment to the enlightenment tradition, and to Kemalism as its means (in more accurate terms one version of Kemalism) and to the historical legacy of "freedom question", defended being, at least, open to the left as the condition of being an intellectual" (Bora, 2010: 195) whereas the right was also responsible for reproducing the "equation of leftist=intellectual" with a form of anti-intellectualism evolved around the images of the intellectual as "stranger, corrupt, hedonist, irresponsible" (Bora, 2010: 195). Under the circumstances that the intellectual hegemony of their ideas were challenged, the major motivation of the intellectuals for following the route set by the governing party's strategy of transformism was the fear of powerlessness given the fact that the conditions of the otherwise strategy" of the political order (that of "isolation") was unusually strict in comparison to the experiences of the intellectuals in the previous decades (Bora, 2010: 194). Consequently, as Şükrü Argın states, it is possible to argue that with the military coup of 1980, Turkish intelligentsia realized the fact that it was as powerless as the ordinary citizen with regard to the state. Yüksel Taşkın identifies the change after this incident in terms of the quest for power of the intellectuals belonging both

sides of the political spectrum with the statement that the intellectuals lessened their efforts to position themselves within power to the level of trying to find a seat at its table. In other words, the aim of the intellectuals with regard to power turned from seizing it to hanging on to it whereas, under the circumstances of the period starting with the 1980s, the table of the power refers to the media (Taşkın, in Argın, 2009: 110). This can be taken into account as completely related with the Özal's strategy of "carrot and stick" (Özgüden, 2007: 94) with regard to the establishment of the ideological bloc. According to Özgüden this strategy is the major part of his policy towards the intellectuals. He argues that the intellectuals reconciling with the new-right values were rewarded with critical positions in the media, in ANAP and in the leading firms of the monopoly capital (2007: 92) whereas the ones who are challenging the neoliberal policies were left alone "with the heavy circumstances of the 1980s" (2007: 95). In other words, the circumstance of being part of the ideological bloc depended on the internalization of "the new-right values" and following the logic of the time in the manner of developing personal relations. Mehmet Altan substantiates this situation with the attention that his conceptualization of "Second Republicanism" attained. Altan admits that there were the studies of academicians that were critical of Kemalism and the bureaucratic structure of the Turkish state before he made his contribution. He argues that the reason behind the familiarity and the widespread use of the themes of Second Republicanism in public was the fact that Altan had a column in the daily Sabah which was the second most-widely circulated newspaper of the time. It should be noted that Sabah has a special position in terms of its support for Turgut Özal and criticism of the established order. Mehmet Altan explains the success of Sabah with this position which is to say, with its ability to assess the new order correctly and to propagate the values that are associated with the Özal period. (Altan, p.144). As we discussed in the previous chapter, starting with the 80's, media became a profitable sphere of economic activity whereas the technological renewal necessitates a considerable amount of accumulated capital. Therefore, this period is distinguished with the introduction of the businessmen as the owner of the media groups and the end of the era of the press with its owners who are themselves journalists (Bali: 2002, 20). It may be argued that being this close with the big business and holding important positions as columnists in the one of the most important sectors of the economy led these journalists to attribute themselves as powerful enough to be a part

of the ruling elite that is supposed to be constituted of media- business and political power (Bali: 2002, 21). Moreover, belonging to a media group meant to be visible in various branches of the same group (such as hosting a tv program and writing for the newspaper at the same time), therefore gives the doctrines of these people or their languages the opportunity to enter into circulation.

In terms of the rise of the second republicanism, as we mentioned above, which was meant by the Özal part of the relationship we focus on is the legitimization of the neo-liberal transformation of the system. In this sense, the flaws of the process are tried to be managed by the liberal intellectuals attempt to incorporate Özal's economism with that of political liberalism. This was not a case of challenging Özal rather they were positioning themselves as following their route whereas their reservations was the need to transcend him. Since we are investigating the premises of this movement in a separate section, we are not going to discuss on it in detail here. What we focus on for this part is the fact that the liberal intellectuals managed to attain critical positions within the media but they were fragile positions given the determinacy of the personal relations as the logic of the Özal period. Under these circumstances their fear of losing power (*etkisizleşme korkusu* – which refers according to Taşkın the traditional concern of Turkish intelligentsia (2012: 415) turned into reality with Özal's death indicating for these intellectuals the breakdown of the connections with the representatives of political power whereas this break down in addition with the turmoil of the YDH case (as an intellectual movement characterized by the direct quest of power) resulted with an intellectual environment they were isolated. It is possible to search for the traces of this isolation and powerlessness in terms of the coalition with AKP which is characterized by the permanent support of the former, despite AKP's deeds that are challenging the democratization project. Now, in the next section we will try to understand the contribution of their experience with the YDH case to their understanding of "New Turkey" as the justification of their support for AKP.

To sum up, in this section, with regard to the first moment, the context that necessitated the ideological support of this group of intellectuals is tried to be identified. As the result of this analysis it is concluded that anti-intellectualism and pragmatism of the centre-right are major dynamics of the relationship between political power and intellectuals during the Özal period, indicating the well-referred idea that political power's need for rationalization and legitimization does not

necessarily result with a “stable union” between power and intellectuals, rather there could be at best “short periods of honeymoon” which would probably end up with the latter’s loss of the access to the power.

3.2. 2nd moment as the Direct Quest for Power: the Case of YDH

Explaining the motives behind the YDH movement which is mostly referred as an “intellectual project” is significant for our analysis to understand that being in circulation is not by itself sufficient to be recognized as a public figure. This is why after the defeat in the first elections it entered, for which the aim was attaining %45 of the votes, the media support for the party ceased and in consequence to the initiation of the resignations of the intellectuals the party closed itself within one year time. In this section, in order to explain the implications of this point for the prospects of the liberal intellectuals’ effect in the intellectual realm, we will again refer to Gramsci’s presentation of the two conditions that would attract the intellectuals for the realization of the intellectual bloc. As it is mentioned before, Gramsci argues that such attraction should offer a new principle that helps the intellectual to distinguish itself from its previous counterparts and meet its material concerns - mostly depended on the possibilities of employment. Here, it may be argued that despite the excitement YDH created in the intellectual realm, in the limited amount of time of its survival in the politics, it could not succeed to realize the second condition. This is why, it may be argued that the moment of YDH is indicative of the fact that with regard to the relationship between intellectuals and power the fact of constituting the language in circulation is not necessarily a sign of being powerful enough to form a part of the “ruling elite”. “In other words, intellectuals may have the significant function of producing consent in terms of the construction of hegemony and counter-hegemony, but they are capable of realizing this only through positioning themselves in the sphere of power that is created by a social class”³⁴. Bearing in mind this inability of positioning oneself “in the sphere of power that is created by a social class”, in this section we will try to identify the dynamics of the short-term relationship between liberal intellectuals and power which would help us also to understand why the support of the media is temporary

³⁴ Ü. Kurt, “AKP Devletçi-Milliyetçi Cephe ve Sol-liberal Entelektüeller Üzerine,” December 14, 2007, accessed September 05, 2012, <http://www.kuyレル.com/modules/AMS/print.php?storyid=1997>.

for the YDH (Cem Boyner argues that before the elections the media had already retreated its support). Here, it should be noted that engaging in such an analysis would lead us to grasp the implications of the positions of these intellectuals hold in the contemporary moment of Turkish political history and the importance of “protection of the boss” (Türk, 2012: 37).

In order to understand the implications of the YDH experience for the prospects of the liberal intellectuals and their relationship with power, it should, first of all, be clarified that it signifies these intellectuals’ direct quest for power whereas this quest is only understandable given the termination of the protection they had during the Özal period. Before involving in this specificity of New Democracy Movement (YDH) experience, it is crucial to understand its major premises which rendered the ground for this quest possible. Thus, first of all, in a way to disclose the determinacy of the “liberal intellectuals” within this movement, it should be given that this movement was sharing with the second republicans the same concern on the necessity of political liberalism that would lead to the establishment of a hegemonic order through the strategy of inclusion aiming to tame Islamists and Kurds. As it is the case with the ANAP experience, they were planning to address all tendencies in the political arena. In order to provide this aim, the movement included some of the well-known figures of the time even despite the fact that they are belonging to the different poles of the political spectrum. In this sense the motto was to provide a democratic ground even for the ones who want the establishment of Sharia to talk about their position as well as for the supporters of the illegal organization of PKK. In terms of this understanding diverse figures despite their ideological differences came together for YDH including Abdülmelik Fırat, Sedar İlhan, Şerif Mardin, Hüseyin Ergün, Necla Zarakol, Memduh Hacıoğlu, Can Paker, Kemal Anadol. The cement in this case is not only the economism as it is the case with Özal, rather it can be given as agreeing on and announcing the disfunctionality of the institutions of the Turkish republic as well as the possibility of being the founding actors of the “New Turkey” by becoming part of the movement. This emphasis on the republic’s completion of its time and the consequent necessity of advancing into a new phase characterized by the processes of “democratizing the republic” are the major premises of the “second republicanism”. Here, it should be noted that Mehmet Altan, Cengiz Çandar and Etyen Mahçupyan are the major figures and theorists of this movement whereas commonality on the emphasis of the “New Turkey” with their

discourse during AKP's term can be taken into account as holding very many implications. But, before engaging in the explanation of the importance of the concept "New Turkey" with regard to their vision on power the contextual differences between the two moments should be clarified.

It is argued in the previous section that what characterizes the Özal period is the personal relations and informality. Özkazanç argues that once this manner of handling things started to challenge the long-term interests of bourgeoisie, it started to demonstrate the signals of an upcoming organic crisis. It may be argued that this organic crisis was the major justification of the will to establish the "New Turkey" which would be the major cement that would tie various positions in the political spectrum. What would unify these various tendencies in this party was given as the concern for the priority of democracy, the respect for human rights and the need of civilian constitution. The founders of the party, who were representing the above mentioned coalition between the business and media, came together responding the invitation of Cem Boyner who is himself a well-known businessman. This movement which was led by the business and media elites came to the end of its political life after its failure in the elections that it attended in one year's time after its foundation. In this sense, it is possible to conclude that circulation of their language in the media as the dominant way of attributing or evaluating the established order was not in fact referring to their reception by the electorate. Thus, the above mentioned sense of the media elites' vision of being powerful enough to govern the people constituted an illusion.

It is out of our concern to identify the reasons for the failure of the movement since here our major aim is to understand the manner this experience affected the course liberal intellectuals take with regard to their relations with power. However, it is necessary to identify for our purposes that this movement's failure was closely related to the unfortunate context it was born into whereas, as we already noted, it was the same context which rendered the concept of "New Turkey" the opportunity to be politicized and gain currency. Moreover, in a way to support our presentation of Gramsci as the reference point for the two conditions of appealing the intellectuals for the realization of a historical bloc, it may be argued that the idea of the "New Turkey" could not even manage to hold together its founders in the party. Mehmet Altan resigned during the official process of becoming a political party. His motivation behind this decision was his discontent with the manner Cem Boyner led

the movement. He stated that “when you are not coming from the intellectual world, you stay strange from the moral hierarchy of the intellectuals” (Milliyet, 13.09.2004). Cengiz Çandar who was the responsible of the organization of the party was the second to resign with similar reasons calling Boyner as “the killer of hope”. On the other hand, despite these resignations it may be argued that up until the defeat in elections there would not arise any change with regard to the discourse of the party that is developed by these figures. Rather, YDH continued to follow a route which is to a great extent developed by Mehmet Altan. For instance, Hüseyin Avni Ulaş who is a deputy in the first assembly of the Republic belonging to second group trialed in the “independence courts” referred frequently by Mehmet Altan as we have seen during studying his columns. YDH follows Altan’s concern of cherishing the “first democrats of republic” and announces Ulaş as one of its prominent figures (26.02.1995, Milliyet, p. 23).

The resignations of the founders from the party make us think that the ideological unity developed around the need to establish the “New Turkey” was not sufficient to maintain the support or participation of the intellectuals. Despite the fact that they always write about the movement with nostalgia and time to time engage in the plans of reviving the YDH arguing that its premises are still the solution to the problems of Turkey, their experience of the movement was determined by the disagreements on the leadership. Their inability to organize the party in terms of their own vision, in contrast to their self-image of the brain of the movement, led to frustration and to terminate their contribution.

The self-image and in general the image of the intellectual here is powerful enough to be the only actor that would realize such an attempt, as the actual brains and leaders of the potential movement that would establish the New Turkey. To sum up, it may be argued since the second condition Gramsci set is not provided during the YDH experience (which may be explained with the fact that it could not find correspondence in the society and as a result does not belong to a power sphere created by a rising social class³⁵), liberal intellectuals frustrated with their own

³⁵ Here, one may argue that the explanations for the success of AKP and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan are indicative of the failure of YDH and Cem Boyner. One of the criticisms against the party despite its welcoming discourse of all in terms of their disappointment of the political system in Turkey, it could not get organized at the grassroots level. In accordance with Özal’s mentioned association of civil society with the Islamists, Cem Boyner argues that the major deficiency of the movement was its inability to bond with this section of society. Çandar’s resignation from the party, who has ties with

position of not attaining enough power even at the party they themselves founded and with the temporariness of the support the media provided. In the next section, regarding all of the notions above we will try to identify the attraction of the ideological bloc during the third moment we investigate and try to understand the effect of this frustration with the manner they hold their relations with political power.

3.3. On the Possibilities of “New Turkey”: “AKP vs. the Status quo”

It may be argued that engaging in an historical analysis of this relationship is highly critical for understanding the function liberal intellectuals assigned for themselves with regard to AKP’s hegemonic project which depends on the presentation of AKP’s term in power as a rupture for the Turkish political history. In other words, the aim here is to show that the liberal intellectuals’ presentation of AKP as the rupture is the reason behind their attribution it as the actor that is capable and willing to establish the “New Turkey”. This is why, in this section, not only the contextual account of the relationship between AKP and liberal intellectuals will be given but also the analysis of how these intellectuals make sense of this context in a way to construct AKP and themselves as “revolutionary” actors will be engaged in. Moreover, this would lead us to identify that the relationship between this understanding of rupture and that of the “New Turkey” depends in fact on the explanations of the Turkish politics over the duality between state and society. To sum up, this part will be consisted of two interrelated sections in which we will try to make an analysis of the context that AKP has been in power and how liberal intellectuals make sense of this context through making a brief analysis of the theoretical tools they employ rendering AKP’s democratization attempt as the justification of their participation in the ideological bloc.

In the last section we have seen that the Turkish political system in the 1990s was characterized by an organic crisis in which the state has lost “its capability of constituting a strategic ground where the hegemonic strategies articulating the long-term interests of the bourgeoisie with the demands of the depended social classes are developed” (Özkazanç, 2005: 642). Under these circumstances politics has turned

the Islamists and who is a respectable figure for this part of the Turkish society, was detrimental for the possibilities of overcoming this necessity.

into a form of maintaining the power of the governing parties through the use of the public resources in terms of the populist policies resulting with a serious legitimacy crisis in which the conventional political actors failed to attain credibility with regard to the perspectives of the electorates (Özkazanç, 2012: 114). This loss of credibility manifested itself in the polarization of the society around the duality of laicism- anti-laicism as well as the rising Kurdish question in the manner that the extent of this polarization transcended its role of constituting the ground for the competition between the parties. In this regard, the major consequence was the search for a new political center that would realize a “social consensus” spreading the sense of novelty and change whereas the success of this center depended on its ability to implement the program that is ascertained by the historical and contextual conditions (Özkazanç, 2012: 116). According to Özkazanç, this program that would overcome the multi-dimensional crisis of the 90’s was “a neo-liberal globalization program routed towards EU” depending on the “rationalization” of the restructuration process as well as the “consolidation” of the liberal democracy (2012: 116). AKP is born into this context and through adopting this program as the blueprint of its political actions, assumed the role of the new center that the society is in search for.

It may be argued that the results of the general elections in 2002 are closely related with this assumption which is accompanied by the success of AKP to “break up with this corrupt image of the politics in 90’s”. Following the economical crisis of 2001 which deepened the overall discontent in the society, it may be argued that AKP is taken into account as the new actor that managed to create the sense of being the “saver”. In this sense, it may be argued that for understanding to what extent this image is received by the society and making sense of the impact or the enthusiasm AKP created in terms of the “liberal intellectuals” there arises the need to compare the results of the 2002 elections with that of the previous one in a way to make the change of the Turkish political scene visible. The actors of the parliament that succeeded to be voted over the 10% threshold after the 99 elections were DSP (22% of the votes), MHP (17%) FP (15%), ANAP (13%) and DYP (12%)³⁶. For the three year time following these elections Turkey was governed by the coalition of DSP, MHP and ANAP. At this point, arguing that victory of AKP in the 2002 elections signifies a great transformation for the Turkish political system cannot be understood

³⁶ <http://dosyalar.hurriyet.com.tr/hur/turk/99/04/27/dosya/secgenel.htm>, accessed September 05, 2012.

if one disregards the fact that all parts of the coalition stayed below the threshold in these elections. In this case, the parliament constituted by AKP (34.28%) and CHP (19.39 %) ³⁷, and this distribution of the votes was taken into account as the major appearance of the restructuration of the Turkish Politics.

As it will be seen below, this development was critical for the course of the liberal intellectuals. Under the circumstances that they were already in the search of a new center, as it can be identified with regard to their attempts to revive the YDH in the first years of 2000s, the rise of AKP which has influence over the Islamist civil society in a way to render electoral concerns pointless was taken into account as the better alternative. Moreover due to its identification with the periphery, AKP's term was considered as the moment of conjunction between the state and society which is described as the movement of the periphery to the center indicating the rise of the Anatolian bourgeoisie. This moment of the conjunction, for the liberal intellectuals, constituted the establishment of the new political order defined as the "New Turkey". Besides being the enthusiastic candidate for deploying the necessities of the new phase in terms of the neo-liberal restructuration process, according to liberals AKP signifies a rupture in the Turkish political history through challenging "strong state tradition" and, keeping in mind the description of state society relations under this tradition, it was attributed with the values of normalization and democratization of the political system. Here the definition of the "second republicanism" as the democratization of the republic should be remembered in the manner that would clarify the justification of these intellectuals' support for the governing party.

In a way to understand how this idea of democratization became the attraction for these intellectuals to be part of the ideological bloc, one needs to analyze the liberal intellectuals' reading of the republican history leading them to name what we experience now as the "New Turkey". It should be noted that without involving in such an analysis it is not possible to understand what is novel with AKP for liberal intellectuals whereas the equations of AKP as the disadvantaged actor and established order as the power can only be adequately identified from within such an investigation. Before engaging in their reading of Republican history and AKP's respective position in it, it may be argued that mentioned equations with regard to

³⁷ "2002 Genel Seçimleri Türkiye Geneli İllere Göre Oy Dağılımı Tablosu," accessed September 05, 2012, <http://arsiv.ntvmsnbc.com/modules/secim2007/secim2002/>

power are developed from within the paradigm of center-periphery which helps to liberal intellectuals to further a position of being “in opposition but hegemonic”³⁸.

Galip Yalman argues that after the decisions of January 24, a discourse started to determine the intellectual field which is depended on the duality between the state and society. While portraying an everlasting understanding of the state dominating the society and challenging it renders them the position of being “in opposition”, shaping the public opinion through the presentation of the market and civil society as the realm of liberties that is independent from the state constitutes the ground for its hegemonic position (2002: 8). Here, Bora’s statement that “to think that it is degraded is the political capital of AKP” (2009: 129) is completely relevant to understand the possibilities of transforming power over the image of being in opposition while exercising its term in power. This is to say, it may be argued that liberal intellectuals, during the AKP period, also gather power for themselves by their opposition to the state structure of the Kemalist Republic.

Here, in order to examine the conditions leading this idea to stay “in opposition but hegemonic”, it should first be clarified that the hegemony of this discourse cannot be adequately understood without taking into account the rise of the concept of “civil society” in the world starting with the 1980’s. Mehmet Özgüden contextualizes this rise with the collapse of the welfare state and the Soviets and argues that this concept, through all the positive implications it had, served as the “Trojan horse” of the new right (2007:4). This is to say, “the fetishism of the “civil society” is not a coincidence, on the contrary it is the means for the powers of new right to justify their will to abolish all the obstacles to the interests and needs of the global monopoly capital in and through the concept of civil society” (Özgüden, 2007: 4). Under these circumstances the hegemony of this specific presentation of the relations between state and society should be considered with regard to its relation to the integration policies of the bourgeoisie. In this sense, despite the fact that the origins of this perspective has been theorized long ago, its rise as a hegemonic discourse with the 1980s in Turkey cannot be fairly understood unless its relations with this global structure, which we introduced in the previous section, is given full credit. Now, in this section, bearing in mind this context as well as the inner

³⁸ G. Yalman, “Tarihsel Bir Perspektiften Türkiye’de Devlet ve Burjuvazi, Rölativist Bir Paradigma mı Hegemonya Stratejisi mi?,” (Praksis,5, 2002).

developments that Turkish society experienced during AKP's term in power we will try to identify the prospects of the position of "in opposition but hegemonic" in the "New Turkey" while keeping in mind that "New Turkey" is constructed by these intellectuals as an ideal that is so near to grasp but has not been reached yet, or may not be ever reached completely due to the recalcitrant traces of the "ancient regime". In order to understand this transformation and its respective effects on this position, now, we will try to examine its theoretical foundations in a way to identify the parameters of the attraction that the concept of "New Turkey" had for the liberal intellectuals as the supporters of AKP whereas in the following section we will engage in a contextual analysis of the ground fertile for "New Turkey".

3.3.1. What is in circulation? Making Sense of the "New Turkey" as the Never Completed Ideal

Referring to the "in opposition but hegemonic" position of this perspective with the rise of the neo-liberalism in the 1980s should not lead one to disregard the fact that the theoretical origins of the concept dates back to 1960's. Given the fact that liberal intellectuals explain their support for AKP through the theoretical tools provided then by Şerif Mardin and İdris Küçükömer, without engaging in a brief analysis of their theories it is not possible to develop an adequate understanding of the implications of the concept "New Turkey".

It is argued before that the concept of "New Turkey" is highly critical for liberal intellectuals in the sense that it represents a rupture in the Turkish political history which renders them power as the new actors of this new order. Moreover, it should be noted that the criticalness of this rupture is not only related to these new positions rather it depends on its presentation as the first and foremost breaking point (which is not resulted with the restoration of the existing order by the systemic figures such as the military) for a system that is definitive for its continuity. This is the point where we will try to examine the theoretical origins of liberal intellectuals in a way to inform us on the ideological prospects of the explanations of politics in Turkey around the idea of continuity.

Arguing that Turkish politics is characterized by a process of continuity is the necessary outcome of analyzing it through a "uni-dimensional confrontation" (Mardin, 1973: 170). With respect to the authors we will refer to, as it is claimed by

Özgüden, a duality is constructed between the state and society depending on their respective presentations of an almighty state as the source of force and pressure and a “weak civil society” referring to the realm of liberties. The inner conflicts within the latter are considered as secondary with regard to the determinacy of this duality. This is to say, as a result of disregarding the class-bound character of the state and the inequalities pertaining to the civil society, for this perspective, the relationship between state and society becomes the most important and defining term for the Turkish political history. Moreover, rejecting the class-based character of the state renders the relationship between the two an “externality”. This is why, it is not possible to talk about a conflict between the state and civil society whereas the appropriate term to define it is that of a “simple duality”. Thus, under these circumstances the ultimate end of a political project (given the liberal justification stating that the “defeat” of the class based politics is confirmed with the collapse of the Soviets) is identified as to save the civil society from the domination of the state. (Özgüden, 2007: 4-5).

According to this line of reasoning the form of politics which is determined by the primacy of the state over society is not changed at all throughout the “Ottoman-Turkish tradition”. Şerif Mardin gives the most notable account of this perspective through his presentation of the duality between center and periphery as the major confrontation in the Turkish society. According to Mardin, this tradition is characterized by a developed patrimonial bureaucracy impeding the development of the market (Özgüden, 2007: 183) whereas the realization of the market would render the development of civil society possible which would constitute the ground for the establishment of democracy (Özgüden, 2007: 132). Here, it may be argued that Mardin’s explanation of the lack of a strong civil society in Ottoman State is completely related with an orientalist stand which explains the East through its deviance from the West and attributing this deviance as its justification for the lack of the great transformations and revolutions (Güngen, Erten; 2005: 1). For Mardin the historical route that is deviated by this Eastern society as the reason of its undemocratic character is the development of cities and trade under feudalism. The autonomy that the cities attained in the west resulted with a change in the social and political structure in a way to weaken the authority of feudal lords and to strengthen the monarchs who are resorting to this new source of power against the lords. Indebting its power to the urbanites, the monarchies avoided the policies that are

restricting the efficiency of these groups and provided the economical classes autonomy within the state which may be inferred from the concept of civil society “(Mardin, 2010: 13). Therefore, the confrontations characterizing the process in consequence to the collapse of feudalism and to the process of the establishment of the modern state were with “the forces of the periphery: feudal nobility, the cities, the burghers, and later, industrial labor which resulted in the form of compromises. “The consequence of these compromises was that Leviathan and the nation-state were relatively well articulated structures. Each time a compromise or even a one-sided victory was obtained, some integration of the peripheral force into the center was achieved. Thus the feudal estates, or the "privileges," or the workers became integrated into the polity while, at the same time, obtaining some recognition of their autonomous status. (Mardin, 1973: 170). Since it is the case that, for Mardin, with regard to Ottoman State “the major confrontation was unidimensional, always a clash between the center and the periphery”, multiple confrontations that are providing the ground for the rise of a strong civil society such as the “conflicts between state and church, between nation builders and localists, between owners and non-owners of the means of production” (1973: 170) were absent.

Under the circumstances of the lack of a developed market and the determinacy of politics over economy and society, it is not possible to talk about the development of capitalism in the western sense which is driven by the social classes. The maintenance of the patrimonial structure controlling and dominating the economical realm furthered itself by the incentives that are provided by the political power whereas this centralism is the reason behind the lack of the development of the cities and feudalism in the western manner. This is to say, depending on this centrality of the state both economically and politically aiming to control the society renders the rise of the intermediary organizations and the class struggle unlikely. Thus, under these circumstances politics is limited to the struggle between the elites of the center which would not lead any change in the structure of the system due to their benefits from its continuity. Moreover, stating that “the major confrontation is unidimensional – a clash between center and periphery” (Mardin, 1973: 170) renders the conflict within the periphery secondary in a way that diverse groups may be titled under the periphery in terms of their confrontation with the center. In this sense, “for Mardin, the centre-periphery duality remained the basic duality into the Republican period and the lack of integration was not overcome by the implementations based on

the hierarchical logic of integration from above. The secret duality of Turkish politics is claimed to be between the ruled and ruler, those who want to be entrepreneurs and those who do not want to share power with them” (Güngen, Erten: 2005: 3). Thus, it is possible to argue that in accordance with the image of the stagnant East, for Mardin, Turkish political life maintains itself in a vicious circle between the center willing to keep the “unchangeable order” through force who is successful in all its attempts and the victimized and oppressed periphery without being subjected to change (Mardin in Özgüden, 2007: 192).

This formulation between the center and periphery is defined through certain ascriptions in accordance with his positive image of the periphery as the ground for the development of a civil society and the negative presentation of the center as the bureaucratic core defending status quo. In this sense, the incompatibility between the center and periphery is developed in accordance with the liberal conceptualization of state-society distinction. Thus the periphery, in terms of its separation from the “bureaucratic, Kemalist and Jacobin state” refers to the sphere of opposition, victimhood and democracy as against the state. (Özgüden, 2007: 210).

At this point, there arises the need to identify under the circumstances of the lack of a developed civil society in terms of the Ottoman-Turkish tradition, for Mardin what part of the periphery constitutes the ground for the development of democracy. Here, it should be remembered that, depending on the difference between the “social evolutions” (Mardin, 2010: 17) of the West and the Ottoman society, Mardin relates the rise of the concepts of the civil society or civil liberties in the Western society in the 17th – 18th centuries to the developments aiming to justify the privileges taken from the state as the necessary condition of the public life. According to Mardin the motivation behind this literature is to save the society from the power of “the political” (Mardin, 2010: 13) which is not a developed form of thought in Ottoman Empire and even in contemporary Turkey (Mardin, 2010: 14). But still, for Mardin despite these differences in terms of the mentioned “social evolutions” (Mardin, 2010: 17), there is a point in the Turkish social formation which we could find the traces of the civil society in the Western sense which he terms as the “Islamic populism”. The major reason behind this version of Islam to rise as the cement providing the conditions for the development of civil society cannot be grasped in its totality unless it is disregarded that the Ottoman state defined itself through a cultural distinction it had from the periphery. Mardin argues that “the

cultural preeminence” of the center was the outcome of its “compact” structure whereas the heterogeneity of the periphery rendered it unlikely to develop a reaction in the form of a coherent ideology. As a result of acknowledging one’s culturally secondary status, as Mardin argues, “this cultural separation was the most striking feature of its existence on the periphery” (Mardin, 1973: 173) whereas the common response to one’s awareness of belonging to periphery was a discontent with regard to the “officialdom”. Given this discontent and disregarding the economical and social factors deepening the contradiction between the “provincials” and the officials, it may be argued that “the members of the religious establishment who, barring certain exceptions, were closer to the daily life of the lower classes. The religious institution was thus on the border line between the center and the periphery. During modernization, and because of the secularizing policies of the center, it was increasingly identified with the periphery” (Mardin, 1973: 171). However, here, it should be noted that this identification is realized through a certain version of Islam. This is to say, the distinction between the center and periphery was corresponding to the difference between the official and volk Islams whereas the latter is seen by the “officialdom” as “dangerous” and “deviant”. Mardin writes in 1983 that this populism manifests itself, despite the different forms it takes, in the opposition to Ittihad Terakki as well as the support for DP and MSP (in Mardin, 2010: 18) whereas it constitutes a part of “our own tradition of democracy”.

It may be argued that the same emphasis with regard to the democratizing potential of the Islamist population³⁹ as part of “the Eastern- Islamist people front” is also shared by İdris Küçükömer whose work is referred, especially by Mehmet Altan, as the other founding figure of the idea of “Second Republicanism”. This potential is the outcome of the place that one would attain with regard to the frame of reference developed around his conceptualizations of “left side” and “right side”. In accordance with the center-periphery analysis, here also the democratic character of a party is determined through the place it occupied with regard to that structure. Whereas belonging to the “left side” (Eastern-Islamist Front) is an indication of

³⁹ For a discussion on the issue see M. Uyurkulak, “Taşralı, Namuslu ve Yalnız bir Adam: İdris Küçükömer,” accessed September 05, 2012, <http://www.erkansimsek.net/makaledetay.php?id=58>. Uyurkulak argues that the right wing analysis of Küçükömer’s thesis is realized through a culturalist reading in a way to justify the accounts on the duality of center-periphery. However, for Uyurkulak, it should be reserved that based on his Marxist background, Küçükömer developed his analysis on the basis of the determinacy of the economy. According to this presentation, workers attain a primary position in the civil society whereas it is a “sad problem” that the liberal followers of Küçükömer refer basically to the religious sects when they are talking about the civil society.

one's progressive character, it should be noted that what he associates with the left-side has no commonality with the conventional holders of that position. According to Küçükömer, these conventional holders indicate the continuity of the westernist laicist bureaucratic tradition of the Ottoman state in the Republic whereas their position is reactionary due to obstructing the development of the productive forces and of the civil society consequently (Westernist-Secular Front). In order to understand this point, we will take a brief look at Küçükömer's conceptualizations of the left-side and right-side which depends on the two major solutions aiming to "save the Ottoman society" (2007: 13).

The origins of this distinction share commonality with Mardin's explanation of the lack of a developed civil society in terms of the "Ottoman-Turkish tradition". This is to say, Küçükömer agrees with Mardin on the ground that the centralist structure of the state obstructed the development of the autonomous cities as the birthplace of the bourgeoisie. According to Küçükömer, the superstructural institutions which are tried to be realized in Turkish society with the project of westernization are seeded in such process (autonomous cities leading to the conditions for the development of parliament) justifying his claim "Turkey cannot be westernized without being capitalist" (2007: 15 - 37). Moreover, the responsible of this process leading to the lack of a civil society was the Ottoman bureaucracy. Having share from the surplus without owning the means of production was a clear outcome of being on good terms with the Sultan (Küçükömer, 2007: 36) whereas this dependence on Sultan resulted with a competition among these bureaucrats impeding their possibilities of strengthening as a group. Under the circumstances that they could not form a class to attain a share from the surplus product, they obstructed the development of the productive forces even, as it is the case with the "Tanzimat" to the extent of their elimination. Thus, there could not arise a real class movement against the establishment from within the opposite side of these bureaucrats which is the "Eastern-Islamist front". According to Küçükömer, due to these characteristics of the state structure the relations between these two fronts remained at the ideological level in a way to hinder "the identification and solution of the fundamental conflict in the society" (2007: 15). In this sense, the change that takes place starting with the first westernization efforts in the Ottoman state including the modernization process of the Turkish Republic, was in fact a "so-called cultural revolution" (2007, Küçükömer: 83). This is to say, depending on his claim that "Turkey cannot be

westernized without being capitalist”, Küçükömer argues that the institutions that are derived from the west as the means to “save the state” were not and would not be accepted by the large segments of society. This is to say, the project of westernization led the bureaucrats to depart from the values of the people. Under the circumstances that the process of reform or revolution is not depended on the participation of the people, it is destined to be characterized by force and being a top-down process leading to form itself as against the people (Küçükömer, 2007: 82). This formulation leads him to come up with the premise that the conventional holders of the leftist position in Turkey are in fact reactionary due to their defense of a top-down organization of society which is in accordance with their obstruction of the development of the productive forces. Thus, it is expected that as the anti-thesis of the “Westernist-laicist front”, the conventional holders of the rightist position are the progressive part of the society with regard to their social and economic demands aiming to change which would pave the way for the development of the productive forces and challenge the monolithic power structure (Yaman in Küçükömer, 2007: 7)

Regarding the discussion so far it may be argued that Turkish political history is defined both by Mardin and Küçükömer through the confrontation between the state and society despite the difference in their respective theoretical tools. Moreover, it is possible to argue that for the liberal intellectuals’ image of AKP this confrontation or duality constitutes a major part due to being characterized by repetitions. Dinler argues that these repetitions manifest themselves in the state/center’s repression of the reactions of the periphery/society to the pressure implemented by the state (2003: 39). With regard to liberal intellectuals it may be argued that this explanation of Turkish political history over continuity renders them justification in terms of their support to AKP. This is to say, (depending on their announcement of the establishment of the “New Turkey” but keeping in mind that they are presenting it as a not completely fulfilled ideal) liberal intellectuals presentation of AKP as the actor resisting the pressure of the center in a way to break with the vicious cycle in the form of historical repetitions leads them to identify this period of “conjunction between the centre and periphery” with a rupture. Thus, they finally reached to the conditions of announcing the end of the Republic as well the establishment of the “Second Republic” In order to understand this point, the premises of the “Second Republicanism” will be examined which are derived from the given explanation of Turkish political history.

In order to identify the common ground that provides the alliance between the liberal intellectuals and political power, the very premise of this position that leads to number their political project as the “second republicanism” will be referred which can be given as the current inability of the Turkish political system to “reproduce” itself. That is to say, the system’s “anti-democratic” and “unproductive” characteristics, which are explained through the factors that will be discussed below as essential to the establishment of the republic and its political tradition, are responsible for the stagnation of the regime. Keeping in mind the context that this position was brought to the scene of Turkish politics which was shaped by the efforts to integrate into the global capitalist system, stagnation was intolerable. Therefore, the above mentioned characteristics which constitutes the core of the republic should be eliminated immediately which would mean a fresh start, a radical break with the traditional order of things. As a result, the new order would depend on the democratization and productivity whereas democratization is the key concept since Mehmet Altan - the founding father of “second republicanism” refers this project as the democratization of the republic. In addition to the evaluation of democracy by these thinkers as a good in itself, Mehmet Altan’s following argument is enlightening for understanding the efforts of these thinkers to strengthen and legitimate Özal’s economic liberalism through their emphasis on democratization. According to Altan, Turkey can be classified as an agricultural society lagging behind the West which is experiencing the “information society”. The First Republic was not eager to transcend this step towards the information society due to the fact that this form of society constitutes the very conditions for the survival of the ideology of the First Republic. Mehmet Altan refers information society as a formation that is characterized by the incorporation of hi-technology into the production process which breaks the dependence of production on the labor power. This point is important since the exclusion of labor power from the production process would result with a decrease in terms of the rates of profit. Consequently, in order to compensate this loss of profit there arises the need of selling the products in the greatest number possible. For the imperialist system, the crucial point is the fact that the rise of the qualified demand for the products can be guaranteed under the circumstance of political stability which is determined by a democratic system characterized by a strong civil society and reference to human rights. To sum up, it may be argued that for the “Second Republicans” democracy and civil society are

signifying more than some goods in themselves; they are the necessary elements for integration into the global capitalist system⁴⁰.

At this point, it is possible to argue that their severe criticism of the first republic can also be interpreted in terms of the concerns about the mentioned efforts of integration. According to Second Republicans the first republic is identified by the sovereignty of the bureaucracy and military rather than the populace, by the lack of democratic and plural elements, and by the statist economy. Having its origins in Şerif Mardin's discussion of Turkish Political life through the dichotomy of center and periphery, 'Second Republicans' criticism can be summarized as "during the process of the transition from the Ottoman Empire to Turkish Republic, state has kept the society under constant pressure and prevented the development of civil society, market relations and consequently the rise of the bourgeoisie"⁴¹. This sovereignty of "center" over the "periphery" was realized through a Jacobin, positivist and elitist program which disregards the preferences of the groups belonging to the periphery, as if they are the flaws that need to be rehabilitated through a top-down prescription in order for Turkish Modernization project to be successful. It is this vision of modernization that impedes the representation of different identities in the public sphere and which resulted with being attributed as anti-democratic. For Altan, the major reason behind the maintenance of this structure, which is responsible for the underdeveloped character of Turkey, was the privileged position of the bureaucracy as the holder of both the political and economic power. In other words, bureaucracy was very attentive to the possibilities of the strengthening of the civil society since, for instance, clarified distinctions of a class or a well-developed bourgeoisie would threaten its domination over the economy⁴². Therefore, it may be argued that for the integration mentioned above and for realizing a leap towards the information society, this bureaucratic structure and the tutelage of the military should be removed. The political program of second republicanism aims to guide this process through the reconstruction of the state as a technical instrument that is detached from the values, ideologies and as a result its

⁴⁰ M. Altan, "Türkiye'nin Bütün Sorunu Politik Devletten Liberal Devlete Geçememesidir," accessed September 05, 2012, <http://www.ikincicumhuriyet.org/nedir/yeniarayislar.html>.

⁴¹ F. Yaşlı, "Liberal- Muhafazakar Hegemonya ve Merkez-Çevre Paradigması," accessed September 13, 2012, http://www.yenidendeirim.org/resimler/ekler/451041557a22145_ek.pdf.

⁴² M. Altan, "Türkiye'nin Bütün Sorunu Politik Devletten Liberal Devlete Geçememesidir," accessed September 05, 2012, <http://www.ikincicumhuriyet.org/nedir/yeniarayislar.html>.

traditional role of interfering in the economy. The main assumption behind the supposed relationship between the reconstruction of the state as a neutral institution and the consequent democratization can be given as the rationalization function of the competition in the market. That is to say, individual who become a homo economicus with its rational choices in the market would act accordingly in the other spheres of life. In this sense, it is expected from him to welcome the representations of different groups in the political arena as if they are competing in the “market of ideas”.

Under the pressures of integration, the rationalization function of the market, and the hegemonic crisis that the political administration experiences, it is argued that the “First Republic” has reached its limits and has no space to realize its own reproduction. At this point, it may be argued that in accordance with this alteration, the domination of its ideology in the “market of ideas” has come to an end. That is to say, for liberal intellectuals 80s, with the rise of the “second republicanism” as a thought movement, signifies a radical break but this time it is in terms of the intellectual activity. The criticism that is raised by the Second Republicans about the close relationship between the state and Early Republican intellectuals whereas regarding the discussion so far, it may be argued that liberal intellectuals follow the tradition of the Turkish political history that is shaped around the idea of attaining or being close to power. In order to explain this continuity, there arises the need of identifying this tradition in terms of the relationship between “the other” of the liberal intellectuals (referring to the intellectuals of early republican period) and political power. This point would it possible to understand whether liberal intellectuals’ criticism of this group in terms of their relations with state is also relevant for their own position. It is argued that the early-republican periods’ characteristics allowed its intellectuals to name themselves as servants starting with the fact that that the concern of keeping up with the contemporary civilizations leads the modernization project to be established in an urgent manner. This urgency resulted with a pragmatism that evaluates everything in terms of its possible contribution to this process. It may be argued that this is the point where anti-intellectualism comes to the scene of Turkish political history. Therefore, one may easily state that anti-intellectualism that we still witness in contemporary political climate is more than just a result of the alienation of the intellectuals from the society through the respective roles of educator of an unfamiliar doctrine and of the

“ignorant masses”, rather it is the perspective of the holders of political power who need immediate changes and do not have time for contemplation and theory. Çetinsaya explains this feature of Turkish modernization with the following statement: “Life (or the socio-economic processes) has priority over the thought; they are the institutions, not the thoughts that are inspired from the West, that change or shape the ideas” (Çetinsaya in Argin, 2009, 94). Given these circumstances and the lack of importance that is attributed to the theoretical discussions, it is expected that the intellectuals are ascribed limited roles that can be ordered as “epigones, propagandists, commissioned researchers, experts and text writers” (Bora: 2009, 128). This dependency on the political power has been turned into a self-fulfilling prophecy, that is to say, the intellectuals of this era who acted in accordance with the above given roles corresponded to semi-intellectuals “who are mostly journalists with a pedantic style” (Bora:2009, 127). Şerif Mardin also shares this vision claiming that these people may be categorized with the term “literati” rather than intellectual in the sense that “literati is a group in traditional societies who maintains the privilege of knowing, takes the responsibility of transferring the tradition and the function of preserving the established order and addresses to the elite circle that it involves rather than to the public” (Bora, 2009: 880).

The discussion so far on the qualities of the intellectuals of the early-republican era make it possible to conclude that given the conditions of close relations with the ruling elite (or being a part of it), the anti-intellectualist mentality resulted from the need to modernize immediately and the limited role that is assigned to this group, they are attributed as literati or semi-intellectuals rather than intellectuals. Consequently, it may be argued liberal intellectuals follow this tradition of the Turkish political history that is shaped around the idea of attaining or being close to power. In this sense, despite all its criticism of the Early Republican intellectuals as being Jacobins, liberal intellectuals share with its “other” the target audience in the sense that they both talk to the political power. In other words, their primary solution of neutralizing the state for leaping forward to information society, does not necessarily end up with a program that talks directly to the society which means breaking down the image of state as an almighty force does not save this group of intellectuals from the habit of checking their position in relation to political power. As it is discussed previously, they still talk to the power rather than to the society.

It may be argued that the major reason behind the liberal intellectuals' failure to see a contradiction within their own position of criticizing the traditional intellectuals of the republic for their relationship with power while they were also checking their own position with regard to the party in power can be explained with the fact that for these intellectuals the source of power is the tutelary regime rather than AKP. Cengiz Çandar clearly states this position. He argues that:

It is necessary to understand the concept of power correctly. We, as the democratic minds and voices of Turkey, identify the power as the 'tutelary regime' which was consolidated with the military coup of 1980 and was overhauled with the postmodern coup of the February 28th. Others come up with an equation such as power = government of Tayyip Erdoğan. Of course it is the case that Tayyip Erdoğan is hanging on to a side of the power but he is one of the targets of the tutelary regime⁴³.

It may be argued that this presentation of the government as a figure that is powerless with regard to the tutelary regime stands as a source of justification for this position in terms of their collaboration with AKP.

Regarding the discussion above, it is possible for us to argue that hegemonic quality of the liberal intellectuals' presentation depends on its oppositionary position in the "old turkey". This is to say, it is the image of challenging the institutions of the previous order that renders them a powerful position within the ideological bloc. This is why, it may be argued that, they are not willing to acknowledge the powerful position of the AKP which constitutes traditionally the "victim" as the representative of the periphery and, again, this is why they resort to the mentioned "ideology of being alert" in a way to reserve that the "New Turkey" cannot be established completely due to the interventions of the systemic figures of old Turkey. The appeal here is to further their hegemonic position since AKP's discourse of being the victim of the system also benefited the liberal intellectuals providing them the opportunity of attributing themselves as being "in opposition" in a way to release themselves from the discussions on the intellectual responsibility we referred in the previous chapter.

⁴³ C. Çandar, "Evet, Ne Olursa Olsun Türkiye İleri Gidecek," *Radikal*, September 10, 2012, accessed September 5, 2012, <http://www.radikal.com.tr/Default.aspx?aType=RadikalYazarYazisi&ArticleID=1018162&Yazar=CENG%DDZ%20%C7ANDAR&Date=10.09.2010&CategoryID=97>.

3.3.2. The Moment of AKP: Rupture or Continuity?

It is argued that the liberal intellectuals created a self-image as out of the “nasty, brutish and short” relations with political power since they do not regard AKP as the actual holder of power whereas it is defined as the established order. However, it should be noted that under these circumstances the mentioned will to further the position of being in opposition constitutes the weakest point of their discourse since it tries to fulfill the contradictory positions of acknowledging both that AKP is powerful enough to establish the “New Turkey”, and that “New Turkey” is not an ideal that is completely realized which is understood from within the maintenance of the perspective of AKP as the victim. Now the context that leads the idea of “New Turkey” to rise will be examined which would render it possible to make sense of how not being in opposition any more would affect their hegemonic status.

Uzgel in his article “the new actor of neo-liberal transformation” argues that AKP’s historical success cannot be understood sufficiently unless the extraordinary context it was born into is investigated. As we mentioned before, the crisis of global capitalism in the 1970’s resulted with a paradigm shift. Welfare state has been found guilty for the rise of the crisis and the impediments over the capital accumulation were removed in a way to necessitate restructuration of the way how countries maintain their jurisdiction and political structure. The outcomes of these neoliberal processes can be given as the unemployment, corruption, poverty and informality which are intertwined with the policies of assimilation and annihilation were tried to be managed by AKP through the implementation of a policy of “conservative Islamism”. (Bedirhanoglu, 2010: 44). Uzgel argues that in order to understand the transformation during AKP’s term in power, firstly, there arises the need to understand the change the “National Outlook Movement” has been subjected to and, then, how this transformation prepared the ground for the coalition with the liberals in a way to establish the ideological bloc which is led by AKP challenging the founding ideology of the state. Here, it should be noted that the movement of “national outlook” traditionally representing the political Islam is the environment where the leaders of AKP has been formerly attached. The split in the party preparing the conditions for the establishment of the ideological bloc is indicative of a critical change in the discursive level which cannot be understood unless otherwise

the domestic and international developments surrounding this moment are investigated. In order to understand the common ground, in which democratization stands as the “attractive” point for transforming the intellectuals of other groups, leading to the establishment of the ideological bloc, now we will try to examine the historical developments realizing such a bloc.

In order to realize this aim, it should be, first of all, noted that the memorandum of February 28 is the critical point to understand the split in the “national outlook movement” as well as the transformation in the discursive level which can be identified as the moment initiating the incorporation of the concerns about democratization in the political language of the former “national outlookists”. Since it is not the concern of the thesis to present a full- fledged analysis of the rise of the national outlook under the leadership of Necmettin Erbakan taking a term in power in a coalition with DYP, we will limit our analysis to its downfall in a way to lead to the rise of AKP. But still, one needs to identify the fact that the successful organization of the movement especially in the peripheries of the big cities served as a mechanism to lessen the flaws of neo-liberalism for the population of these areas⁴⁴. This is why, RP’s time in power was a clear consequence of its success in the previous local elections whereas, at this point, it is critical to note that one of the key figures of this development was Recep Tayyip Erdoğan who hold the office of İstanbul Municipality and later became the president of AKP. Uzgel, here, identifies two breaking points leading to the memorandum which brought the rise of national outlook in a halt. First of all, during this time in power, RP’s perspective to advance the relations with the Muslim countries challenged the conventional international relations policy characterized by the aim of westernization which was a clear reason of opposition for the traditional elites. Besides, the statements of the mayors of RP were condemned by the laicists as signals of the threat of overthrown the republic has been subjected to. (Uzgel, 2010: 12- 13). Under these circumstances, at the National Security Council’s meeting of 28 February of 1997, the Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan was compelled to sign the memorandum prepared by the military which was a process ended with the reluctant resignation of Erbakan from his post. This constitutes the moment where the reformists within the movement “became

⁴⁴ For a discussion on the “Neoliberal Islamist Municipalism” see A. E. Doğan, “1994’ten Bugüne Neoliberal İslamcı Belediyecilikte Süreklilik ve Değişimler,” *Praksis* 26. (2012):55-75.

insistent for a change in leadership” (Uzgel, 2010: 16) which would later pave the way for transforming themselves in a way to integrate into the globalization process.

Here, it should be noted that this integration which is confirmed with the reduction of the emphasis on nationalism and “fair order” in the discursive level cannot be understood without investigating the course Anatolian capital has taken as the rising class of post-1980 period. İlhan Uzgel describes this rise in accordance with the opportunities Özal’s neoliberal economic policies created for the Islamist movement (2010: 16). In the first phase of this transformation, Islamists tried to fulfill the realms from which the state withdrew (2010: 17) and grew in a way to form their own association of MÜSİAD.

The firms that are represented under the organization of MÜSİAD are relatively new in comparison to their counterparts in the TÜSİAD. They are founded mostly after the 1980 period which is not a coincidence as Buğra argues. Rather their rise at such moment is an apparent result of the global and domestic developments which we mentioned above and which manifests itself in the prevalence of the questions about the prospects of interventionist policies. This is to say, the transformation in the idea of production which can be identified in the introduction of the “flexible production” with its emphasis on decentralization attributed importance to small-scale firms as well as the rise of the “new industrial districts” (Buğra, 1998: 524). MÜSİAD’s major premise was that “its constituency had traditionally received unfair treatment from the state authority in terms of its possibility of access to investment funds and other privileges hitherto allocated mainly to large enterprises situated in big cities” (Buğra, 1998: 525). In accordance with the mentioned global and domestic conjuncture and the policies questioning the state’s intervention in economics, the claims criticizing the collaboration between the state and big business are started to be spoken out by this part of the bourgeoisie that claim to have to no part. Thus, at the political level, it is not unexpected that this organization found its expression in the statements of RP challenging “the legacy of past Republican history” (Buğra, 1998: 525) which was also in a process of acceleration in the history of national outlook. This is why, the increasing importance of MÜSİAD cannot be understood unless the success of RP starting with the local elections of 1994 is given the adequate attention.

This rise came to a halt with the 28 February, which is critical to understand MÜSİAD’s support for AKP. It may be argued that the major motivation behind this

is not to reconcile with the state elites through lessening its Islamist emphasis, rather it is to collaborate with the big business confronting which resulted with their economical loss after the memorandum which Ayşe Buğra defines as the “first round of the struggle for hegemony between two segments of the Turkish bourgeoisie” (1998: 535) since the groups belonging to this section of capital were removed from the public bids by the military. Uzgel argues that this development was a clear sign for this rising part of the bourgeoisie of the necessity to retreat its support from the movement led by Erbakan which was seen as incapable of acting in accordance with the requirements the globalization brings. This is why, “Islamist bourgeoisie located in Anatolia started to search for a movement that would enable integration with the global system, would have less problem with the state apparatus and would not confront the West” (Uzgel, 2010: 18, t.m.) and found it in the reformist section of this movement. Under these circumstances, Uzgel points out that, the rise of AKP could not be understood unless the “demands and expectations” of this class is investigated (Uzgel, 2010: 17-18).

This will on the integration with the global processes resulted consequently with the elimination of the traditional concerns of the movement from the agenda of the reformists. In a way to emphasize its distinction from this tradition, which is not seen any more as a possible candidate for power after the memorandum of 28 February, AKP defined its position in the political spectrum as the heir of center-right and created for itself the brand new category of “conservative democrat”. This is to say, it targeted the electorate which was consisted of former national outlook supporters who are disappointed with the military’s intervention as well as the traditional electorate of the center right the major parties of which were in a process of collapse. (Uzgel, 2010: 21). Moreover, very many authors find the economic reforms AKP realized substantial to understand its continuing success in the last three general elections. In this sense, 2001 crisis constitutes the ground which led to the rise of AKP for power and its maintenance at that position. Öniş argues that this crisis made it difficult for the critics to speak up against the EU process, since membership would bring with itself “material benefits” as well as the social well-being. Moreover, in the same manner “the crisis also strengthened the hand of the IMF itself which was important in terms of breaking down resistance in domestic circles for key reform initiatives such as the regulation of the banking sector through the effective operation of the autonomous regulatory authority for the banking

sector” (Öniş, 2004: 15). Under these circumstances, AKP strictly followed the route set by the former coalition government who recruited Kemal Derviş to overcome the 2001 crisis. This commitment created “confidence” among domestic and international actors. Consequently, it is possible to argue that AKP, with its attempts of privatizations in a way to weaken the effect of state apparatus in the social life and elimination of nationalism from its political program was rendered the formation of a hegemonic bloc between “moderate Islamists”, TÜSİAD and liberal intellectuals (2010: 27). The ground that is provided by the membership process to the EU rendered the formation of such a bloc possible through the economic benefits it provided as well as the ideological confirmation that AKP is now a figure of the system. Moreover, as Saraçoğlu argues, targeting the membership gives also a “universal frame of reference” which provides it with the opportunity to challenge the Kemalist regime which is agreed by the MÜSİAD and TÜSİAD in terms of its unsustainability which is the major reason of the general harmony between AKP and the capital in its totality (Saraçoğlu, 2012: 35)

In accordance with such positioning and categorization, the party tried to establish its definitive character not as Islamism, rather, in a way to underline its difference with the program of “just order” resorted to the themes of democracy and human rights (Uzgel, 2010: 21). Moreover, the novelty of AKP according to this perspective was lying in the fact that it would bring together traditional values such as the family and the tradition with these themes constituting the common ground for the integration with the global processes (Saraçoğlu, 2012: 41).

At this point, Uzgel argues that the emphasis on these themes such as democracy and human rights as well as its reduction of the weight of nationalism in its discourse, AKP was found by the liberal intellectuals as following “an alternative way of modernization”. Moreover, it was thought that, during the first years of AKP’s term in power, such an attitude would be the first attempt to solve Kurdish and Cyprus questions. (Uzgel, 2010: 22-23). “AKP represented the convergence not only between Islam and democracy but also between Islam and neoliberalism” (Uzgel, 2010: 24, t.m.). Liberals and bourgeoisie were in favor of such convergence in the sense that they thought AKP was the only political actor that could lead the process of integration taking into account its challenge of Kemalism which was referred as a statist and nationalist ideology and which is no more acceptable by the globalization process.

One may argue that AKP managed to have the support of the liberals and to further neoliberal processes whereas at the same time its success depends on its self-presentation as the representative of the marginalized groups of periphery. Here, it is a well-referred theme that this success depends on the sectarian networks through which it lessens the effects of neo-liberalism over the subaltern groups in the peripheries of the city. Öniş explains the consequences of this representative relationship over three major arguments. First, it is the case that the AKP has managed to mobilize both the advantageous and disadvantageous groups of neo-liberalism. He argues that the fact that AKP aimed and managed to “cut across class cleavages and appeal to diverse segments of Turkish society using religion as an effective mechanism of mutual trust and bondage” (2004: 6). Secondly, Öniş argues that the record of the predecessors of AKP who held the key municipalities constituted an organizational support and as a result an important point for the success of AKP at the national level. “JDP with its Islamist roots, displayed a high degree of mobilization at the local level and also capitalized on the dense networks of informal relations that helped to mobilize the local community in addressing the problems of poverty and deprivation” (Öniş, 2004: 7). Third explanation can be given as the statement that “the failures of the conventional or established parties of either the center-right or the center-left in achieving sustained and equitable growth, avoiding costly financial crises and tackling the problem of pervasive corruption have also paved the way for the party’s unprecedented electoral success in the recent era” (Öniş, 2004:1). This is to say, “compared to its rivals, the party appeared to be forward-looking and reformist in its approach, aiming to come to grips with the forces of globalization meaning capitalizing on its material benefits whilst aiming to correct some of its negative consequences at the same time” (Öniş, 2004: 4). Thus, the AKP leadership who learnt from the experience of 28 February started to relocate themselves in the center and fill the newly rising gap in the center-right in a way not to create a certain level of discomfort in the conventional elites of the Turkish political system and as a result to be part of it and survive its term in power. This is why, during their first term, they followed a policy that is characterized by the commitment to reforms and IMF programme which created confidence among domestic and foreign investors. According to Bedirhanoğlu, this was also the conscious choice of the party to balance its powerless position with regard to the military (Bedirhanoğlu, 2012: 51).

Bedirhanoglu argues in her article “Türkiye’de Neoliberal Otoriter Devletin AKP’li Yüzü” that AKP represents a continuity in terms of its attempt of reproducing the authoritarian state structure (Bedirhanoglu, 2012: 42). Under these circumstances, Bedirhanoglu argues that the discourse of “opposition but hegemonic” rendered the party a strong political baggage for a while whereas the major premise of this position is the argument that the fundamental conflict in Turkish political history is between the state and society. This perspective of continuity signifies that attraction of liberal intellectuals by the discourse of democratization which would pave the way for the rupture of “New Turkey” as a means of concealment of the fact that the demands of the capital actually determine the limits of the transformation of the state possible. Such perspective refers to the vision of AKP as the “revolutionary actor” signifying a process of discontinuity in Turkish political history as illusionary since its deeds cannot be adequately analyzed unless its role is contextualized under the neoliberal restructuration process. In other words, for Bedirhanoglu it is a-historical to announce AKP as the revolutionary actor with regard to the change it led in terms of the relationship between state and society since this duality itself should be taken into account in accordance with the dynamics of neo-liberalism which would reveal the “mythical” character of its success (Bedirhanoglu, 2010: 43). Otherwise, such an analysis would serve to the restoration of the neo-liberal hegemony to a “new phase” (Özkazanç, 2005: 641).

Pınar Bedirhanoglu identifies the strengthening of the executive branch as a “general reflex of the power” who tries to neutralize the opposition against neo-liberalism depending on the common pattern in Latin America. What is tried to be realized with such policy can be given as to come to grips with the societal opposition in a way to facilitate the implementation of the neoliberal policies whereas the justification of this strength lies somewhere else, which may be defined as the well-referred frame of explanation of the course of the Turkish political history. Here, strengthening executive is presented as crucial for the democratization of Turkey, since it would help to overcome the conflict between state and the society. This is to say, according to this perspective “behind the economical problems and crisis in Turkey, there stand the bureaucratic and authoritarian state structure and the elitist political cadres who are used to manipulate this structure for their particular interests; in order to cease this situation a new restructuration process which would annihilate the opportunities of the state intervention in the economic realm should be

followed” (Bedirhanoglu, 2010: 53). Under these circumstances, despite the fact that AKP’s term in power for Bedirhanoglu refers to the neoliberal authoritarian restructuring of the state in a manner to silence the losers of the neo-liberalism, it is accepted by the liberal intellectuals that a democratically elected government accomplishing to end the dominance of the state elites in the Turkish politics would further the attempts of democratization by itself.

As Devocioğlu suggests, the reason of equating civilianization with democratization is clearly related to a uni-linear understanding of history and modernization in which the anti-democratic incidents such as military coups are outcomes of certain points referring to backwardness over this line. Moreover, this presentation of the military intervention is also mythical especially in terms of its a-historicalness. Deprived of its context determined by the developments that global capitalism goes through, 1980 as well as the later attempts of interventions in politics are told as the deeds of a few greedy actors who are not willing to lose their privileges. Ayşegül Devocioğlu emphasizes this point arguing that such an understanding of mythicizing the interventions in a way to render them as flaws peculiar to Turkish politics is an impediment to the realization of an actual confrontation with the September 12 regime⁴⁵.

In the previous section, the traces of the perspective categorized as the centre-periphery paradigm in the literature on Turkish politics in a way understand how the premise of democratization “attracted” the liberal intellectuals to be part of the ideological bloc at the discursive level. It is argued before that the concept of “New Turkey is highly critical for liberal intellectuals in the sense that it represents a rupture in the Turkish political history which renders them power as the new actors of this new order. Moreover, it should be noted that the criticalness of this rupture is not only related to these new positions rather it depends on its presentation as the first and foremost breaking point (which is not resulted with the restoration of the existing order by the systemic figures such as the military) for a system that is definitive for its continuity. Moreover, in this section, we argued that through identifying the rise of AKP as the volunteer for deploying the program global capitalism imposes, the idea of “New Turkey” that is constructed as the victory of the

⁴⁵ A. Devocioğlu, “Genelkurmay'a suç duyurusu: Dur diyelim tabii ama düşünelim de,” December 21, 2010, accessed September 05, 2012, <http://bianet.org/bianet/siyaset/126734-genelkurmaya-suc-duyurusu-dur-diyelim-tabii-ama-dusunelim-de>.

periphery over the center is deprived of its context. This is why engaging in the association between the periphery as the source of democracy and AKP as its representative and correlating its actions as the necessary course of democratization resulted with a limited agenda of democratization as will be examined in the last moment of AKP's term.

3.3.3. The Attraction of AKP for the Liberal Intellectuals

Liberal intellectuals' presentation of AKP's way of democratization as the attraction leading their support cannot be understood without disregarding the importance of the positions they hold in the media which has the dominance to colonize even the fields of arts and sciences. It is argued that the rules of the journalistic field determine the limits of what can be talked about and the members of this field in a way to emphasize their distinction to lead "the game" "criminalize" the other. Under the circumstances of the AKP period the major factor determining this distinction can be given as the definition of what is to be a democrat.⁴⁶ At this point, there arises the need of making a short summary of the political split created by the concern of democratization, which will be examined in detail in the upcoming chapters.

At this point, first of all, it should be noted that one of the major factors that renders AKP as the actor of transformation and leading the mentioned split to be established around the theme of democratization was the relationship it established with EU. Here it should be noted that these intellectuals are criticized from very many ideological positions in terms of their close relationship or constant support to the party in power and correlating Turkey's democratization to the extent that AKP has taken in the membership process, whereas in the thesis it will be tried to show that it is actually this very correlation they set that consists the premise of their support for this party. In this sense, the aim is to identify the dynamics of this relationship over their discourse of democratization as an excuse to "being close to power" at a rhetorical level (which, as it is examined, is highly critical in terms of the literature on intellectuals). In other words, they present a view of the party in power

⁴⁶ E. Göker, "Barizin Alimleri: Kanaat Teknisyenliği," *Birgün*, August 23, 2009, accessed September 05, 2012, http://www.birgun.net/sunday_index.php?news_code=1251028641&year=2009&month=08&day=23.

as an actor that is the only able subject of the necessary change for the democratization in Turkey. Thus, they present the sound and responsible behavior that an intellectual should follow as to support this party. During the course of the AKP's term in power, the irrationality of "the other's" position is emphasized with being an "interventionist" or an "Ergenekoncu". Not supporting AKP is a clear irrational position for liberal intellectuals since it is synonymous with preferring a system that is shaped by a military intervention to the possibility of democracy. At this point, the fact that despite the vast number of AKP electorate, there are very many groups and political parties in the society belonging to both left and right of the political spectrum opposing the governments of AKP is ignored by liberal intellectuals.

Such homogenization of these groups into one category of "interventionists" serves as the means of pointing out the lack of any meaningful alternative for power as well as the limited nature of what can be talked about in the media. H. Bahadır Türk substantiates this point with the following statement:

AKP's perspective of Ergenekon is, at last, taken into account by the oppositionary and pro-government intellectuals in the exact manner that AKP wants it to be. It is either the case that Ergenekon is the great and eternal source of evil including everything in itself or it is an illusion used for purging the nationalists. Since, it would make it more difficult to take counter- position and would take place out of the existing patterns of discourse (...), it is not very desirable to discuss the possibilities between these two poles (Türk, 2012: 30).

The importance of Ergenekon, is important here in the sense that it is one of the criteria determining what is to be a democrat since being an "ergenekoncu" signifies a position which stands in opposition to the elected government. Regarding this fact, as it is noted by Göker, the core of the struggle between such poles during the AKP's term in power is what it is to be a democrat. In the upcoming chapters all the themes that are prevalently in use in the articles of liberal intellectuals are evaluated with regard to this categorization whereas according to Fethi Açıkel these intellectuals' insistence on the term "New Turkey" connotating the theme of "advanced democracy" constitutes a clear example of this phenomenon. According to Açıkel, this consolidation of the idea of "newness" is indicative of a perspective that sees itself "as the powerful subject of history and the turning point in history as well as part of a history emphasizing the unimportance of the institutional legacy of the previous term (Açıkel, 2012: 14). However, here for Açıkel what is actually new

refers to the rise of the “conservative-Islamist social engineering” (Açıkel, 2012: 14). This is indicative of the “New Turkey”, which is presented as the moment of the Turkish political history in which the distance between the state and society has been overcome. Since with this unification the order has reached its “authenticity”, the discourse of civil society and postmodern pluralism to which the Islamist movement referred frequently during its time in opposition are unsurprisingly renounced (Açıkel, 2012: 16). Rather, despite its criticisms of the modernist, rationalist tradition characterizing the Kemalist project, through taking over the state and its apparatuses, it follows the same route of diffusing “the truth” through these apparatuses which is a project of top-down conservatism. What is realized through this project is the establishment of a majoritarian authoritarian conservatism depending on the identification between the state- society- sect (Açıkel, 2012: 17).

It may be argued liberal intellectuals’ presentation of AKP’s attempt of democratization as the appeal leading their support of this party depending on the claim that there is no other political subject that could lead this process is challenged from time to time, as we will see in the upcoming chapters, with regard to the consequences of the “majoritarian authoritarian conservatism” of the governing party Fethi Açıkel talks about. At such moments of crisis the means to restore this relationship or to re-justify their support can be given as the “ideology to be on alert” (teyakkuz ideolojisi) in Türk’s terms (2012: 30). He argues that it refers to the condition of propagating that the “New Turkey” has been established but at the same time emphasizing that there is still the danger of rise of the remnants of the “old Turkey” in a way to threaten the power of AKP which is a way to refer to the historical “victimhood” (mağduriyet) of the party. According to liberal intellectuals this presence of constant threat explains the fluctuations in the democratization process of the governing party which is presented as an actor trying to survive in the hostile environment characterized by the existence of traditional figures that are not willing to lose the benefits the old Turkey has traditionally provided them. This point is the major justification of the liberal intellectuals to hang on to this party since it gives this group the opportunities of both being on the same side with a democratizing actor and being on the opposition to the power as it is expected in order to be categorized as “true intellectuals” constituting the major subject of the literature on intellectuals.

In a way to question the extend of the democratization attempt of AKP which constitutes the major justification point for the coalition with the liberal intellectuals, Yıldızođlu argues that last 27 years of Turkish political history is a case of passive revolution which has been accelerated with the term of AKP. In this sense, liberal intellectuals' support of this party with the concern of "struggling for democracy" is the consequence of the process of molecular transformism (Yıldızođlu, 2012: 122-123) rather than the position of "true intellectuals" to stand against the actual holders of power. That is to say, in Gramscian terms, with regard to this democratization project what is preferred is not to lead the subordinate classes through incorporating their interests and in this way to prevent being harmed by the consequences of hegemony. This is why, it is not unexpected for the democratization attempt of AKP to be limited in its scope whereas this transformism is facilitated, according to Yıldızođlu, by the liberal intellectuals' reduction of the characteristics of a political movement to AKP and specifically to Erdoğan and Gül. It may be argued that this way of analyzing "from the particular to the total" enables these intellectuals to "believe" that they can direct the hegemonic project of this party through their advices (Yıldızođlu, 2012: 121). In accordance with this position it may be argued that these intellectuals depending on their self-perception as the "brain" of the party in power, thought that they can direct AKP in the manner they want which would be a proper course of democratization. This eagerness to direct was not depending on a day-dream. Solid developments like the transformation of the media and the fact that they attained key positions in it were taken into account as points of reference for the importance they had for the project of "New Turkey". Here, it may be argued that Menderes Çınar's claim on AKP's "addiction to power" is also related to the liberal intellectuals as part of the explanation of the continuity of their support for this party. According to Çınar, with regard to the history of AKP (its background, the way it came to power, its position with regard to military as well as the legal cases of closure) it is possible to identify an overall feeling of loneliness, surroundedness and insecurity. Under the circumstances characterized by these feelings the concern of being as powerful as possible becomes important to protect its conditions of existence and leads to an addiction to power (Çınar, 2012: 23). Although, it is not our concern to discuss the plausibility of this argument, a historical approach to the liberal intellectuals' part in Turkish political history is indicative of these feelings which renders being close to power is something very much more important. At this

point, one specific condition should be remembered: Losing their protection by the political power with Özal's death, these intellectuals experienced a period in which they are isolated and even insulted as being "traitors"⁴⁷. It is possible to search for the traces of this isolation and powerlessness in terms of the reasons of their coalition with AKP characterized by the permanent support of the former despite AKP's deeds challenging the democratization project. Here, it is possible to argue that what Rifat Bali states about the development of the close contacts between the businessmen and the journalists in accordance with the new kind of media ownership during the 90's is also plausible in terms of the relationship between political power and "liberal intellectuals". He argues that these close contacts resulted with the creation of a self-image by the journalists (or in more accurate terms columnists for our case) as being powerful enough to be a part of the ruling elite (Bali: 2002, 21). The columnists in a way to prove how powerful they are regarding the closeness they share with the ruling elite, used their columns to write about the trips, dinners etc. they participated with these people whereas this friendship provided them with the opportunity to be visible in the various branches of the same group. For instance, columnists are to be seen as commentators in the TV channels that belong to the media group they take part. The recognition they attained through this kind of visibility served not only through being a source of material gains but also through giving the doctrines of these people or their languages the opportunity to enter into circulation. To sum up, being part of these rising institutions can be related to these thinkers' willingness to participate in the field of media as part of a struggle of the one who is subjected to a long period of discredit, to be powerful enough to determine what is in circulation which is a source of recognition. Here H. Bahadır Türk's following statement is important to understand this point: "They breathe within the financial chaos of the field in which they exist and gain visibility and inevitably they are seized by the concern of having the boss' protection (selamet). They do not resort that only for money... Sometimes being praised by the power whose protection has been desired is sufficient" (Türk, 2012: 37).

⁴⁷See "İkinci Cumhuriyetçiler Özür Bekliyor", accessed September 05, 2012 http://www.ikincicumhuriyet.org/nedir/ikinci_cum_ozur_bek.html; "Vatan Haini Enflasyonu", accessed September 05, 2012, <http://www.ikincicumhuriyet.org/index.asp?sayfa=medyada-ikincicumhuriyet&icerik=2312>; "II. Cumhuriyet tartışmasında yeni milat: 17 Aralık", accessed September 05, 2012, <http://www.ikincicumhuriyet.org/index.asp?sayfa=medyada-ikincicumhuriyet&icerik=2266>

Here, it should be remembered that it is only with the last term that will be examined that these intellectuals publicly criticize and condemn the party in power with authoritarianism, censorship and nationalism simultaneously with the rising cases of their exclusion from the media which is presented as the source of power in the intellectual arena with its possibility of providing recognition. The correlation between the decline in the AKP's emphasis on democratization and the rising dispensability of the liberal intellectuals in the media can be understood in accordance with Laçiner's statement:

At the moment that Islamism, or in more accurate terms the rising bourgeoisie wearing this ideology, has reached the level it aims to reach, excluding itself from its incidental attachments which are not needed any more, manifests itself in its purest form whereas till that time these attachments served to the struggle leading to this level" (Laçiner, 2012: 4, t.m.).

This is to say, once the hegemony of a rising class is reached, the intellectuals providing its ideological coherence would free their agenda from the concerns which were useful before to gain consent. Laçiner argues that it is this condition that renders the Islamist intellectuals' withdrawal, constituting the organic intellectuals of the rising "conservative- authentic bourgeoisie" (Laçiner, 2012:5), from the platforms focusing on the issues of democracy, freedom as well as the basic rights and liberties possible (Laçiner, 2012: 4). Under these circumstances, emphasis on conservatism is an expected position for these intellectuals whereas their lack of criticism of the party in power is strongly related to their positions in the pro-government media and think thank institutions. Here, Ömer Laçiner criticizes Islamist intellectuals for their close relations and permanent support for power. However, it is possible to argue that despite the fact that the major justification of liberal intellectuals for their support of AKP is its promise of democratization, in correlation with the position of the rising class reaching the level that makes it possible to sacrifice the concerns relating democracy, liberal intellectuals also limit their agenda of democratization, as it will be discussed, to the civilianization. Here, given the fluctuations of the relationship between the liberal intellectuals and AKP which is recently in the phase of "the decline", it should be noted that this limitation is not sufficient enough to preserve their positions in the "pro-government institutions". Rather it is the case that with consolidation of the power of the governing party, in accordance with the removal of the democratic concerns, liberal

intellectuals who established its support over these concerns in the discursive level are also sacrificed by the party in power despite their efforts to limit their agenda. This is why the term Yıldırım Türker uses to describe this relationship as "temporary lovers"⁴⁸ is strongly relevant for our discussion in the sense that it very well puts the attached position of the liberal intellectuals in terms of their coalition with AKP.

This section was an attempt to disclose how the understanding of "New Turkey" characterized by a discourse of democratization constituted the point of "attraction" for the liberal intellectuals in terms of their coalition with the governing party. It is the premise of the present study that, referring to Gramsci's presentation of the conditions for the attraction of intellectuals to the intellectual bloc, liberal intellectuals' participation in this bloc depends on the sense of distinction which is constructed upon being the actors of "New Turkey". This sense is the direct outcome of envisioning the Turkish political history over an idea of continuity which is now brought to a halt by the movement of periphery to the center solidified in the AKP's term in power. This "rupture" is identified by the liberal intellectuals as the democratization of Turkey in which they assigned themselves with the role of accompanying this process. The justification behind the close relations they have with the political power is given through their presentation of AKP as the "powerless government". This is to say, since bureaucratic structure refers to power in the Turkish political system, opposing it and supporting the "powerless government" is the requirement of the "intellectual responsibility" discussed in the 2nd chapter.

⁴⁸ "Eğreti Aşıklar" in Y. Türker, "Tayyip Reloaded," *Radikal* 2, accessed September 05, 2012, <http://www.radikal.com.tr/Radikal.aspx?aType=RadikalEklerDetayV3&ArticleID=1037793&CategoryID>

CHAPTER 4

PROLOGUE FOR THE STORY OF THE CONTINGENT COMPANIONSHIP (2002-2005): THE MOMENT OF ‘HOPE’ AS THE SOURCE OF NOSTALGIA

As it is already noted, in the present study this sense of distinction over the democratization attempt of the “powerless government” will be identified through the examination of the relationship between liberal intellectuals and political power through three periods of AKP’s term. The origins of this sense belong to the interval between 2002- 2005 in which AKP came to the power and completed the political criteria for the membership to EU. The second term starts with the year 2007, in which the upcoming general and presidential elections affected the relationship in a negative way and with the headscarf crisis constituted a major breaking point for the “coalition” of intellectuals and AKP. This was the outcome of the frustration of the intellectuals’ due to AKP’s declaration that there has not been a coalition with liberal intellectuals at all which is solidified over the discussions on civilian constitution. The last period that will be focused on refers to the revival of the attempts of making civilian constitution and thus, to the discussions on the referendum. Now the origins of this relationship will be tried to be stated through the themes identified in the first chapter as the key components of the liberal intellectuals’ understanding of Turkey’s possibilities for “democratization”, namely, tutelary regime, EU and civilian constitution. Here, it should be reminded that for the three terms these themes have different levels of emphasis and with regard to the first term it is not possible to talk about the clarification of the demands on civilian constitution the prerequisites of which (reforms for the membership to EU) have not been realized yet. Since the civilian constitution is taken into account as the completion of the democratization process and the establishment of New Turkey, between the years 2002-2005 the major emphasis is to break the foundations of the tutelary regime through fulfilling the demands of the EU. Now, the first theme of the chapter is the tutelary regime which would make it possible to understand why the democratization is not possible for liberal intellectuals out of this guidance.

4.1. “The Tutor” and the “Powerless Government” against the Almighty State

The concern of identifying the points of attraction for liberal intellectuals leading them to be part of the intellectual bloc with regard to the theme of “tutelary regime” results with, first of all, the necessity to understand the distinction they associated with AKP. This is to say, the origins of the sense of distinction that is tried to be revealed in this study, cannot be examined outside of the collaboration with the architect of the New Turkey as the representative of “rupture” in the Turkish political history. Thus, regarding this point, the major aim of this section can be given as to make sense of the distinction liberals attribute to AKP which is also the source of the distinction they have.

As it is mentioned before, the period between the 2002-2005 is narrated by these intellectuals as the moment that the foundations of the “New Turkey” have been set. Given the fact that the same equation of “the powerless government under the threat of being trapped by the status quo” is at use in all three moments in changing levels (for instance, in the second period, liberal intellectuals attribute some responsibility to the political power for being trapped), the major difference of the term can be given as the only moment that the liberal intellectuals’ self-confidence as the “tutor”, “critical companion” and the “brain” have not been challenged yet by the attitude of the political power. Now, before engaging in a discussion on this attitude, the constructions of the process by the liberal intellectuals will be identified in a way to make it possible to understand the later course of the relationship. Noting that this attempt is not aiming to decide on the plausibility of the perspectives and findings of the liberal intellectuals with regard to the tutelary regime, civilian constitution and EU, rather the major concern is to disclose the effects of these findings in terms of the previously mentioned sense of distinction, firstly, the parameters of the view of rupture will be analyzed. Altan’s analogy of “brain” and “body” can be taken into account here in the reverse manner. The death of the body would signify the death of the brain which is indicative of the construction of a dependent relationship whereas, as it will be identified below, it may be argued that it is the novelty of the AKP that gives life to the “brain”.

4.1.1. Novelty of AKP

Mehmet Altan's first explanation of AKP's victory in the 2002 elections is the fact that as the 2001 economic crisis clarified; the political and economic system in Turkey has come to its limits. It is not possible to maintain same structure with the conventional form of politics and its traditional actors. Thus, the subject position AKP occupied and its consequent deeds are somewhat obligatory in the sense that the global system requires a major transformation (Altan, M., Sabah, 09.11.2002). In this sense, he argues that "the prescriptions that AKP would implement inevitably would lead Turkey to meet the rationalism it shook hands with due to the economic crisis" (Altan, M., Sabah, 09.11.2002) and this would be the opening of a new period. Mahçupyan, at this point, refers to the distinction of AKP which gives it the potential to transform the system towards modernization as the fact that "this time the will to be democratized inside is parallel with the transformation of mentality in the world" (Mahçupyan, Zaman, 07.11.2002).

Regarding these statements it may be argued that AKP stands at the intersection point of the requirements of global capitalism and the Turkish people's will to get rid of the traditional way of politics and the established order of the things. According to liberal intellectuals what takes place is the rise of AKP as "a brand new phenomenon" for the Turkish political scene. As it is mentioned beforehand, this idea of novelty is developed from within the center/periphery paradigm. In accordance with Açıkel's claim that the understanding of the "New Turkey" is developed on the idea of authenticity which is assumed to be realized through the fulfillment of the gap between center and periphery (Açıkel, 2012: 26), Bayramoğlu argues that the entrance of AKP into the political scene is indicative of the transcendence of this duality through the periphery's movement towards center resulting with an irreversible change in terms of these structures which refers to the efforts of constituting a new "center" (Bayramoğlu, Yeni Şafak, 05.11.2002). Moreover through filling the traditional gap between the "the political center and the social center" (Mahçupyan, Zaman, 11.11.2002) which corresponds to a potentiality of constructing "the periphery" as the new political center, AKP eliminates the conditions of being regarded as another party of the center- right⁴⁹. Saraçoğlu argues

⁴⁹ For a discussion on the possibilities of AKP to be defined as Center-right see Ü. Kurt ed. *AKP Yeni Merkez Sağ mı?*, (Dipnot: Ankara, 2009).

in this regard that the difference between AKP and the former center-right parties is the claim of AKP to close the gap between the “millet” and the state whereas the traditional position is to shorten the distance that they have taken already granted which is substantiated with the correspondence between the lifestyle of the leader cadre of the party and the values of the people (Saraçoğlu, 2011:44). The implication of this line of reasoning is the halt to the tradition of “democratization from above”⁵⁰ since AKP’s election is indicative of the demands of the society for the process. Paradoxically, this is also the point through which liberal intellectuals are criticized severely⁵¹. As it will be identified later, they are considered as envisioning a reform process disregarding the mobilization of the people and limiting it to the prescriptions of what are regarded as the certain democratic entities such as the EU. Moreover, according to Açıkel the mentioned idea of authenticity is the major responsible for the elimination of the discourse of democratization by AKP as it will be discussed in the next chapter and which may be summarized as the replacement of the top-down processes of Kemalism with the “conservative-Islamist social engineering” (Açıkel, 2012: 14)

In a way to emphasize its novelty, comparison between AKP and the center-right parties constitutes a common theme for the liberal intellectuals whereas its outcomes can be given as the warnings of the liberal intellectuals to the political power to maintain its originality (confirmed by domestic and international processes). It is reserved that the parties that are traditionally associated with the center-right position end up with moving towards the center and try to benefit its privileges whereas the center tries to further its ideological and political leadership through including and controlling the demands from the periphery. (Mahçupyan, Zaman, 14.11.2002). “Therefore, the position called center-right refers to the

⁵⁰ See Z. Öniş and S. Webb, “Turkey: Democratization and Adjustment From Above,” in Haggard S, Webb S, eds. *Voting for reform: Democracy, Political Liberalization and Economic Adjustment*, (New York: Oxford University Press; 1996). Öniş and Webb argue that transition to democracy, which they identify with the Özal period, is realized through “a small group of technocrats outside the traditional bureaucracy, organized under a strong leader” (1996: 128). This manner of transition characterized by the consolidation of the power of the executive was essential for the initiation of the reform process, however in the long-run it created problems when necessities of democratization are widened. Moreover, they argue that “democratization from above” confirmed the “paternalistic tradition of Turkish government” (1996: 129).

⁵¹ See M. Sever ed., *İkinci cumhuriyet tartışmaları*, (Ankara: Başak Yayınları, 1993), 266, 319-322; İ. Akça, “AKP, Anayasa Değişikliği Referandumu ve Sol: “Yetmez ama Evet”in Açmazları,” *Mesele* 45 (2010 Eylül), 17.

acceptance of Ittihadism and statism by the oppositional periphery which is in fact against the center, through being tamed during the political process” (Mahçupyan, Zaman, 14.11.2002, t.m.). This is why, according to this line of reasoning, the similarity between the election of AKP and the victories of DP in 1950 and ANAP in 1983⁵² in the sense that these three elections are characterized by the reaction to the previous political order cannot explain the victory of the AKP with the decline of the center right parties. Predecessors of AKP, in this regard, could not turn into the actors of change because of their will to align with the center and the belief that existence in the system depends on this alignment whereas regarding international and domestic context and the peaceful abolition of the traditional manner of politics through the 2002 elections, Çandar names AKP’s victory as the “Turkish way of democratic revolution” (Çandar, Yeni Şafak, 06.11.2002) (Çandar, Yeni Şafak, 04.11.2002, Çandar, Yeni Şafak, 05.11.2002).

If AKP is institutionalized in a way to stay at the periphery and construct the new center at this location rather than aligning with the traditional one, this “revolution” would be characterized by the internalization of the mentality of democratization. It should be noted that two previous counterparts of AKP (DP and ANAP) due to the above mentioned process of being tamed lacked such a characteristic. At this point, it should be clarified that the transformation of mentality at the global level, which Mahçupyan gives as the reason of the distinction of AKP, depends on the failure of modernity and the consequent entrance of the centrality of democracy as the new mentality driving the change, to the scene. In accordance with this change, legitimacy of politics is decided in terms of its compatibility with the democratic principles (Mahçupyan, Zaman, 07.11.2002). This is to say, as long as AKP act through the guidance of these principles and would not adopt the centralist ideology it would be the subject that would lead to the transformation of Turkey.

The transformation in the social structure finds its counterpart in the political realm with regard to the construction of AKP’s image as the opponent of the system and the major figure that has the will and legitimacy (depending on its victory in the elections) to transform the established order. Here, the major concern is the possible exercise of some impediments against this transformation by the “state power”

⁵² For an evaluation of the similarities of these elections see “Muhafazakar Demokrat İnkılap: 1946-83 ve Sonunda 3 Kasım,” *Birikim*, (Kasım-Aralık 2002), 10; Ö. Laçiner, “DP, ANAP ve Sonunda AKP,” *Birikim*, (Kasım-Aralık 2002), 11-20.

whereas this process could end up with the “positioning of AKP under the state’s tutelage” (Bayramođlu, Yeni Şafak, 09.11.2002). In the next section, the concerns of the liberal intellectuals with regard to the prospects of “revolution” will be tried to be identified over their conceptualization of AKP as the “powerless government” trying to survive in opposition to the “almighty status quo”.

4.1.2. “Government without Power”

It is argued beforehand that looking from the center/periphery paradigm, liberal intellectuals associated AKP which as the representative of the periphery contains the democratization potential in itself⁵³. This state centric model of democracy, emphasizing the nationalist-militarist structure of the Turkish state characterized by the military interventions which are realized due to the quest of power of certain elites, renders the foremost task with regard to the democratization process as civilizing the regime (Akça, 2010: 16). Moreover, the tutelary regime is so powerful that it is not possible for this process of civilianization to be realized without the participation of an external actor.

Given the discussions above, as it is stated by Altan most clearly, the common theme with regard to the demcoratization is the fact that the contemporary era forces the development of liberalism but the inner dynamics of Turkish republic driven by the bureaucratic forces do not let such a development. The potential for AKP to be the actor to democratize the country in accordance with the requirements of the contemporary era is apparent for Mahçupyan, in terms of the first attempts of self-definition of the party as the “Muslim Democrat”⁵⁴. The selection of the term is crucial in the sense that both words refer to the identities that are out of the center (Mahçupyan, Zaman, 21.11.2002) and their co-existence would threaten the conventional form of politics to a great extent (this point constitutes the source of Mahçupyan’s criticism of “conservative democracy” which is announced later by AKP as its political position). Mahçupyan defines AKP’s position within the system

⁵³ For a criticism of this supposed “democratic ethos” see F. Açıkel, “Merkez- Çevre Paradigması Üzerine Eleştirel Notlar,” *Toplum ve Bilim*, 2006, vol. 105.

⁵⁴ As it will be identified below, this term would be replaced by the self-definition of “conservative democrat” which led Mahçupyan to bring some criticism with regard to the indications of the term in terms of the possibility of an alligment with the center.

as “the opponent” regardless of being “the party in power” (Zaman, 11.11.2002). Before involving in a detailed analysis in terms of this association of representing the periphery with the potentiality of democratizing the country, it is possible to argue that there arises the need of identifying the limits of this potential set by the liberal intellectuals. This is to say, as it will be identified below, with regard to the vast power of the status quo, AKP is vulnerable and has a very limited space to move. This serves as the safety valve of this relationship in the sense that it is constantly emphasized that AKP is not by itself responsible for what is regarded as its misdeeds, which would, as it will be seen in the upcoming chapters, justify their support of AKP regardless of such flaws.

The major incidents of the term, namely the Cyprus issue and the Iraq war, stand for liberal intellectuals as the confirmation of their presentation of the government without power. Here, again, it should be argued that it is not the concern of the thesis to come up with a full-fledged analysis of these incidents rather the aim is to understand how the liberal intellectuals constructed an image of political power over them. Regarding this reservation, first of all, how the liberal intellectuals made sense of the relationship between the bureaucracy and AKP in terms of the Cyprus issue will be investigated.

For liberal intellectuals the intervention of bureaucracy in the Cyprus issue is indicative of the reluctance of the traditional centers of power to open up space in the political realm for the government. This situation is a result of the distinction between the “state power” and “political power” in the sense that the former reserves certain areas, issues and institutions for itself in a way to prevent it from being affected by the latter (Bayramoğlu, Yeni Şafak, 09.01.2003). Altan states with regard to the Cyprus issue, which constitutes the hot topic of the post-election period, AKP from time to time stuck in the middle of the bureaucracy and the requirements of the EU process (Altan, 11.11.2002) whereas for Çandar AKP’s political future depends on its capability of resisting the bureaucracy and the steps it would take especially related to this issue (Çandar, Yeni Şafak, 15.11.2002). This is to say, the policy towards Cyprus constitutes the major gate for the accession to EU whereas Union and the reforms that are issued for membership would be the safeguard of the power of AKP in terms of its contradiction with the bureaucratic forces. Thus, according to such a perspective the results of the 2002 Copenhagen Summit refers to “the worst possible scenario” for Çandar (Çandar, Yeni Şafak, 13.12.2002). He argues that the

reason of the decision of the Council to evaluate Turkey's performance in terms of realizing the Copenhagen Criteria in the December 2004 Summit and then to decide on the date for the opening of negotiations is a clear outcome of Union's dissatisfaction with Turkey's policy in Cyprus. In this sense, it is expected from the AKP government to confront the control of Denктаş and his ideological counterparts in Turkey over the Cyprus issue (Çandar, Yeni Şafak, 14.12.2002). This control and opposition to the Annan Plan prevented the Turks in Cyprus to be the EU citizens on December 13 with the Greek side. Moreover, Çandar argues that Cyprus issue is the last stop that the opponents of EU could sustain and in this sense it has many implications with regard to AKP's political prospects (Çandar, Yeni Şafak 17.12.2002). Five days after the Copenhagen Summit, Ministry of Foreign Affairs released a declaration stating that the decision taken in the summit about Cyprus (which is signed by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Abdullah Gül) would not be recognized legally and politically (Çandar, Yeni Şafak, 19.12.2002). Çandar evaluates this declaration as a clear example of the incapability of AKP to manage bureaucracy whereas in the same manner Bayramoğlu argues that the traditional centers of power are reluctant to open up space in the political realm for the government (Bayramoğlu, Yeni Şafak, 09.01.2003).

Çandar relates the stance of AKP in terms of the Cyprus issue to the prospects of the policy it would follow for Iraq War. He states that it is not plausible to expect AKP to issue a consistent and decisive policy keeping in mind its secondary position with regard to bureaucracy (Çandar, Yeni Şafak, 24.12.2002). The powerlessness of the party averts it from showing a "political will" whereas for Çandar, "the democratization question of Turkey" and what he calls "the AKP question" could only be solved if AKP could accomplish to take over the power (Çandar, Yeni Şafak, 21.12.2002). At this point, it should be remembered that the permit on Turkey's participation in the war was rejected in the parliament despite the fact that AKP has enough deputies to provide its acceptance. Here it is critical to note, despite the fact that the attitudes of the liberal intellectuals towards the war and Turkey's participation in it vary, they all evaluated the process through this powerless image of AKP in comparison to the traditional actors of power. While Mehmet Altan and Cengiz Çandar are criticizing this decision as the incapability of AKP to take over power from the military, Bayramoğlu and Mahcupyan are writing in favor of it as part of the careful policy of detainment. As it is stated above, both positions are

derived from their view of the tutelary regime as the actual source of power which limits the area of movement of the government to a great extent.

In order to identify this commonality, their perspectives will now be examined in a more detailed manner. In terms of the permit Altan and Çandar are critical of what they regard as the indecisiveness of AKP. Altan holds it responsible for the decision of stagnancy which would prevent Turkey to be an effective actor in the region in terms of the forthcoming 50 years. The main premise of these authors with regard to war was the statement that war would inevitably affect Turkey and there is no position that would guarantee it to be out of the war⁵⁵. Therefore, AKP should involve in a political analysis that would arrange being involved in the process in a way to benefit the outcomes of the war without harming the people of Turkey. At this point, AKP has two possibilities; either it would show a distinction and act as a powerful actor through participating in the Iraq war or it will end up just like the conventional actors of the Turkish political scene which disappeared politically in the previous elections. The first possibility is indicative of a true sense of leadership which finds its counterpart in Özal's policy during the Gulf War. According to Çandar, Özal was courageous enough to play big and despite the prevalent propaganda against him, he planned to reserve Turkey a place among the victors which is compatible with the neo-ottomanist vision of Çandar⁵⁶ (Çandar, Yeni Şafak, 20.12.2002). Altan finds the opposition to the permit simply not understandable in the sense that the country is used to war and does not question the inner-war resulting with the 30 thousand deaths. He argues that the lack of a significant movement against war and the difficulties that the small number of anti-war activists faces in Turkey is the reason behind the obscurity in terms of the general attitude towards the war in Iraq (Altan, Sabah, 08.03.2003). Moreover, the indecisiveness of the government led to a power gap which is filled by the military. In this sense, military became the actor in terms of the relations with USA which has

⁵⁵ This is the point which is also emphasized by Özkazanç in terms of her examination of Ertuğrul Özkök's presentation of the Iraq war in his columns (2005:652). Özkazanç argues that his discourse which is a clear example of the intertwined character of the defense of war and market fetishism, manifests itself in the form of a defense for an imperial power politics. This defense is realized through the terms of "reality", "realism", "rationality" which resulted with an attitude of insult for the opponents of the war. Following this line of reasoning, the decision of USA was taken into account as absolute which would be meaningless to question in a way to dissolve his personal responsibility (2005:652).

⁵⁶ For a detailed discussion on this vision see M. Sever ed., "İkinci Cumhuriyet Tartışmaları," (Ankara: Başak Yayınları, 1993), 11, 270-273.

the major consequence of taking control in the Cyprus issue in a way to prevent the membership to the European Union. Military's takeover of the power in terms of this issue resulted with the victory of Rauf Denktaş' position which is supported by the "deep state" (Altan, Sabah, 10.03.2003). Moreover, for Altan this lack of political analysis and the subsequent disagreement within the party is indicative of an inadequate form of leadership (Altan, Sabah, 03.03.2003) whereas for Çandar the indecisiveness cannot be explained with Erdoğan's failure to lead, rather it is the case that he is surrounded by the forces of the state as well as by the disagreements within the leader cadre of the party. Çandar argues that Recep Tayyip Erdoğan was well aware of the fact that staying out of the war would result with the weakening of the relations with the USA which would endanger the prospects of Turkey as an affective global actor. It may be argued that this point constitutes the origins of a theme that prevails all throughout the research which differentiates Recep Tayyip Erdoğan from other members of AKP as being responsible for bringing the party closer to the establishment.

Before the discussions on the permit in the parliament, Çandar, who is convinced that it would be accepted, writes that the permit would serve as a vote of confidence for the government whereas its rejection would refer to AKP's suicide (Çandar, Dünden Bugüne Tercüman, 26.02.2003). In this sense, with the rejection of the permit Çandar condemned the deputies of the AKP as responsible for publicly weakening the government and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan who was in favor of its acceptance. In this sense, it may be argued, for Çandar the attitude of Erdoğan should be definitive for AKP in order for it to serve its expected transformative function as it can be clarified with the fact that the dissent between Abdullah Gül, Bülent Arınç and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan was the major reason for AKP to act as an "effective defense shield" (Çandar, Dünden Bugüne Tercüman, 04.03.2003) of the Saddam regime. This is why, he states that Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's election as a deputy through the renewal of the elections in Siirt which paves the way for his presidency of AKP is critical for the consolidation of his power over the party. He celebrates this development with the phrase "yiğit düştüğü yerden kalkar" referring to the experiences of Erdoğan during the February 28th process. Moreover, "standing up" this way would change the political prospects of AKP in the sense that now it would officially be guided by a figure who represents the move of the periphery towards the center in his very own personality with the implications of his origins in Rize,

Kasımpaşa and Siirt (Çandar, Dünden Bugüne Tercüman, 12.03.2003) whereas the former president of AKP, Abdullah Gül, carries the traces of the “center”, “Ankara” and “status quo”. In this sense, the change in terms of leadership as a result of the renewal of the elections in Siirt, according to Çandar, would open up a process that is directed by more courageous decisions which would be characterized by the efforts to counterbalance the loss resulted with the rejection of the permit. The first major move in terms of this attempt to counterbalance is to bring a new permit to the parliament, however it resulted with the doubling of the powerless position of AKP with regard to bureaucracy. Since this new permit included the dispatch of the Turkish troops into Northern Iraq (Çandar, Dünden Bugüne Tercüman, 21.03.2003), he regards this as a development assigning the “debated” and limited power of government to the military (Çandar, Dünden Bugüne Tercüman, 21.03.2003).

The positions of Mahçupyan and Bayramoğlu in terms of AKP’s attitude towards Iraq war, as it is stated beforehand, is completely different but still depends on the argument of the powerlessness of the party. While Altan and Çandar argue that the will of AKP to “play big” is prevented by the “front of the status quo”, according to this position and as it is stated by Mahçupyan, AKP wants to stay out of the war. Thus, what is seen by Çandar and Altan as “the indecisiveness” or “the lack of an adequate leadership”, is the consequence of the unwillingness of AKP to participate in the war surrounded by the efforts of the front of the status quo to challenge its legitimacy. Mahçupyan’s following statement would be more than useful to understand this position: “AKP government with its deputies and leader never wanted this permit to be accepted and to be directly involved in the Iraq intervention. On the contrary, a loose coalition constituted by the military forces, businessmen and central media supported this intervention” (Mahçupyan, Zaman, 02.03.2003). It is agreed by Mahçupyan and Bayramoğlu that in order to leave AKP alone in a difficult situation, this coalition did not support the intervention in an explicit manner (Yeni Şafak, 02.03.2003). As a result, it would be provided that AKP “would stuck in between the USA and the central elite” and would be responsible for the burdens of the war which would also challenge the Muslim character of the party due to being part of a war against other Muslims (Mahçupyan, 02.03.2003). It may be argued that in addition to the disagreement with the USA in terms of the “negotiations” on the number of soldiers and the extent of the financial support, this situation of being alone in front of the public led AKP to pursue a policy that has

changed from time to time and characterized by the effort of detainment (Yeni Şafak, 19.02.2003).

It is agreed that under such pressure, AKP could not direct the process in terms of its will of not involving in this intervention. According to Mahçupyan, what was regarded as the government's indeterminacy during this process was part of its policy to detain the war. Whereas, for Mahçupyan also, due to being surrounded by the above mentioned coalition which aims to paralyze political processes in Turkey, the best possible alternative was to maintain this policy of detainment (03.03.2003). With regard to such policy, it should be remembered that at first Turkey issued an implication that it would pursue a strategy as if it would lead a campaign against war (28.01.2003, Yeni Şafak, Where will Turkey stand?, 30.01.2003, Yeni Şafak, The meaning of Turkey's resistance). However, later on January 6th Bayramoğlu argues that this policy has been brought into a halt which finds its substantiation in Erdoğan's speech signifying the will of Turkey for taking part in the restructuring of Iraq after a possible intervention. In this sense, Bayramoğlu cites Erdoğan stating that "If Turkey stays out of the equation at the beginning of a military operation; at the end of the operation it may not be possible to be in the position of directing the developments" (07.02.2003, Yeni Şafak, t. m.). Later, with the rejection of the permit in the assembly, despite the opposition of the leader cadre of the party, this policy has been subjected to change once again whereas these fluctuations led the party to be criticized for its indecisiveness and for weakness on the side of the leader. At the end, according to Bayramoğlu the picture was like the following: a government who is not willing to participate in the war but acting in favor of it as a result of not being the only holder of the state power (Yeni Şafak, 25.02.2003, 27.02.2003). This is to say, according to Bayramoğlu, AKP's tendency to act in accordance with the reflexes of the system within the limits of this policy of detainment should be understood through considering the pressure the government faces (Yeni Şafak, 19.02.2003). This is why, right after the rejection of the permit in the parliament, Bayramoğlu congratulates the deputies of AKP for not "falling to the trap" set by the owners of the "state power" (Yeni Şafak, 02.03.2003). This pressure was tried to be exercised in an indirect way due to "the extent of the success" AKP gained in the elections and its consequent legitimacy. He argues that the state's intervention into the politics would now tried to be realized through holding the government under constant control and pressure and consequently limiting its power (Yeni Şafak, 25.02.2002).

This is the framework that the criticism of the government for not developing a detailed analysis of the situation with regard to the developments in world politics is brought out. According to this criticism AKP suffers from the lack of a vision to decide on Turkey's possible participation in the war not only through the course of the relations between Turkey and the USA but also through a detailed examination of the international arena in which EU is a major actor (Yeni Şafak, 20.02.2003). However, all these flaws, namely, the lack of such a vision and fluctuations in terms of the attitude towards participation in the war are understandable for Bayramoğlu (Yeni Şafak, 20.02.2003) since the government is stuck between the requirements of the military, USA, Turkish public and their own electorate. This conjuncture led them to decide in the manner that they did not actually approve (Yeni Şafak, 21.02.2003) which could at best be taken under control through the policy of detainment.

As it is already noted, for Bayramoğlu these difficulties AKP faces in terms of the international conjuncture and the traditional representatives of the state power would not provide the party with a position that is criticism-free. In other words, he agrees with Çandar and Altan on the powerlessness of AKP but he criticizes it for not using its potential to challenge the power relations and for letting the center to deepen its impotence. In this sense, the position AKP tries to preserve for itself is "understandable" but "not acceptable" (Yeni Şafak, 19.03 2003). Bayramoğlu's position with regard to AKP during the process leading to Iraq War can be summarized as being responsible for warning a companion to fight back the "state power" who is in a difficult situation and who has the least part in terms of the actualization of this situation.

To sum up, with regard to the theme of tutelary regime, it is possible to come up with a picture of the party by the liberal intellectuals as the "government without power". This position of powerlessness characterized the policies of Turkey with regard to the Cyprus and Iraq which were seen as possible points and missed opportunities of taking over power from the military. This powerlessness has consequences not only in the domestic level, rather it is the impediment for AKP with regard to its possibilities of being an international power. According to Çandar, Islamist orientation of AKP proving the compatibility of the Islam with democracy in its exercise of the political power would reserve Turkey a major role for the actualization of the "alliance of civilizations" (Çandar, Yeni Şafak, 08.11.2002).

Then, however, in order to attain this role, AKP should be careful not to be trapped by the bureaucracy. This is the common concern of the liberal intellectuals which refers to the idea that AKP is surrounded by the traditional elites and thus, has a minor ground for movement. This could result with the realization of the possibility of “Ankaralılışmak” (Çandar, Yeni Şafak, 09.11.2002) which would lead AKP to lose its distinction or the meaning of its existence and would destine it to end up like DYP and ANAP. For Bayramoğlu, being part of Iraq war, besides the ethical concerns, should be objected from the perspective of democratization. This is to say, under such circumstances the traditional conflict between the “state power” and “political power” would be solved for the sake of the former. Thus, the concern of security would lead the politics to the point of its militarization in a way to problematize the issues of human rights, law and democracy (Bayramoğlu, Yeni Şafak, 04.02.2003). This would inevitably challenge AKP’s mission of “democratization” if AKP acts in a way to adopt the policies of the center and the “reflexes of the system”. This is to say, if it moves towards the center and leave the core of being the opponent aside, AKP would turn into one of the center-right parties whereas center-right is a position that lost its meaning for the Turkish electorate. Therefore, it should maintain its opposition and construct the Turkish politics around this new center whereas, since this necessitates challenging the conventional form of politics, this would go hand in hand with the uneasiness felt by AKP in terms of the urgency to prove itself (Mahçupyan, Zaman, 09.01.2003). Thus, during the first three months of AKP’s term, Mahçupyan states that AKP would experience major difficulties during this course of democratization (Mahçupyan, Zaman, 18.11.2002)

Sharing the same concern regarding the established quality of the tutelary regime, the in-between position of AKP leads Altan to question whether AKP could guide the reform process or not. AKP’s general attitude of checking its position with regard to bureaucracy is a concern for Mehmet Altan, and despite the positive developments such as the second harmonization package (which breaks the politicization of the judiciary through allowing the way to recourse the sentences in a way to provide harmony with the decisions of the European Court of Human Rights) (Altan, Sabah, 25.01.2003), he is highly critical about the party’s performance for the first three months of its time in power, especially in terms of directing the relations with EU and USA (Altan, Sabah, 10.03.2003). AKP could not accomplish the role Altan expected which may be summarized as breaking the dominance of the military

in terms of Turkish politics. Altan, referring to Özal's motto of "civil in politics, liberal in economics, attack in foreign policy" (Altan, Sabah, 06.01.2003), argues that AKP is not feeling confident in those realms due to the dominance of the bureaucracy and its traditional stance. What is critical here is the fact that for Altan this point seems to indicate the position of AKP as the government without power (Altan, Sabah, 10.03.2003). In this sense, one may argue that his criticism of AKP is characterized by a reservation since this powerless image of AKP can be regarded as a justification point for its failures whereas this point implies that AKP needs the consent of the status quo in order to maintain its existence. This is why, according to Altan, AKP can only be criticized on the ground that it does not show the greatest effort to break down this dependency. In other words, Altan evaluates AKP's hesitation in terms of leading Turkey's democratization as the "complicity of victim"⁵⁷ who finds its conditions of existence in the hands of the other.

This idea of the complicity of the victim cannot be taken into account out of the neoliberal populist technique of AKP to depoliticize the people⁵⁸. Yıldırım argues that neoliberal populism is indicative of the commonality of the political parties in terms of the acceptance of neoliberal programme. Under these circumstances, given the centralization and internationalization of the economic decision-making, the political realm is defined through its separation from the economics (Yıldırım, 2010: 83). The independence of neoliberal policies from political processes is realized through its rationalization as if they are merely technical measures referring to the confirmation by the upper councils like IMF (2010: 83). Since there is no difference between the attitudes of the political parties with regard to the neo-liberal policies, AKP depended on the manner of politics that is defined through the confrontation between the bureaucratic elites and the people (Yıldırım, 2010: 85). In accordance with Yıldırım's statement, it may be argued that the constant reference to the

⁵⁷ Despite the fact that Bourdieu resorts to this theme to explain symbolic domination, it may be argued that in terms of intellectuals' view of the relationship between the AKP and establishment its connotations are highly useful also for us. He argues that "acts of symbolic domination which, as seen clearly in the case of masculine domination, are exerted with the objective complicity of the dominated, in that for a certain form of domination to be established, the dominated must apply to the acts of the dominant (and to all of their beings) structures of perception which are the same as those the dominant use to produce those acts" (Bourdieu, 1998: 100).

⁵⁸ For a discussion on the difference between classical populism which renders the participation of the labour to the decision making process depending on its organized character and neoliberal populism which means their exclusion from politics through democratic means see D. Yıldırım, "AKP ve Neoliberal Popülizm", in *AKP Kitabı: Bir Dönüşümün Bilançosu*, ed. Uzgel and Duru, (Phoenix: İstanbul, 2010), 82.

“tutelary regime” which is threatening the political power and which may not be reversed unless there exists the cooperation of the international actors, confirms the exclusion of the people from the decision-making process. This is why, derived from the duality of the center and periphery, the formulation set between the powerful tutelary regime and its antidote EU can be taken into account as limiting the democratization process to civilianization and as a result disregarding the struggles of the people (Akça, 2010:17).

4.2. Searching for the Universal: Supporting the Membership Process as the Major Component of Intellectual Responsibility

It is possible to claim that in terms of the first moment of our analysis, namely the period between 2002-2005, the agreement with the political power with regard to certain issues was reflected as indicative of a democratizing actor searching for the universal which is substantiated with its will to enter the EU. This is to say, construction of the EU by the liberal intellectuals as the upper council representing the rational and universal values constitutes one of the major points that would justify their collaboration with the party in power. At this point, what brings these intellectuals together with AKP can be given as liberal intellectuals’ presentation of the membership as the necessity to be fulfilled in order to be democratized. Thus, there is nothing wrong for identifying oneself with the brain of this body depending on its publicly stated will of following the membership process. At this point, it may be argued that the manner of identifying AKP as the powerless government renders these intellectuals the power to guide them whereas taking the EU as the reference point is the confirmation of their superior position.

When the theme of EU is taken into account, it is possible to argue that the same concern of the “powerless government” prevails in terms of the columns of the intellectuals we refer to. Regarding this relationship between “the front of the status quo” and the government and the primacy of the latter over the former in terms of the decisions that affect the political future of Turkey, the main argument of the liberal intellectuals, as it is stated by Altan, can be given as “it seems like if Turkey would not engage in the EU membership process, it would not be possible for her to be democratized and civilized by its political system at all” (Altan, Sabah, 21.07.2003).

4.2.1. AKP as the Missing Part of the Puzzle of Turkey's Route for the EU

The necessity of an external force to cause a radical change in terms of the existing order can be taken into account as an indicator of how powerful is the tutelary regime. According to Altan, sixth harmonization package should be evaluated as a revolution for the Turkish political system which would not be changed by its own dynamics (Altan, Sabah, 24.05.2003). It is the point that the traditional perspective of the ruling elites about the people had to alter, because the harmonization process imposes the supremacy of the rights of the individual rather than the state. However, under these circumstances AKP is the only actor that could lead this transformation if it follows the necessity to fulfill the requirements of the body politic that is recognized as fully democratic (Altan, Sabah, 23.10.2004). What would provide “the radical change”, according to Bayramoğlu, is therefore the co-existence of the requirements of the global capitalism from Turkey with the inner dynamics of the system whereas this can only be realized through the accompaniment of AKP. This is the point in which the uniqueness of AKP as the actor that has the potential to reach that ending comes to the foreground since according to Bayramoğlu, all the former attempts of democratization suffer from the lack of its social base which he attributes as “liberal ittihadism” (Yeni Şafak, 06.11.2002). Since AKP is the result of the change in terms of the relations between the center and periphery, it signifies a demand of change from the society rather than a prescribed form of change by the front of the status quo. In this regard, Mahçupyan argues that “the very existence of AKP is the reason of the democratization and normalization of Turkey” (Mahçupyan, Zaman, 03.02.2004). This is why Bayramoğlu constantly emphasizes his view that with the rise of the AKP society became part of the politics (Yeni Şafak, 06.12.2003) in the sense that the relationship between “society- democracy, politics and change” is discovered again (Yeni Şafak, 19.09.2003).

The failure of the EU process during the previous periods was the lack of social demand for democratization in the manner it is stated by the very appearance of AKP to the Turkish political scene. Bayramoğlu argues that “the equation stating

Turkey would go towards the radical change and would be transformed via West has never yielded results in the laboratory of history since Tanzimat, on the contrary it encouraged retreating from politics mentally” (19.04.2003, Yeni Şafak, t.m.). This equation rendered the state as the actor of change which resulted with the consolidation of the idea of politics that is determined by the state (Yeni Şafak, 19.04.2003) whereas the official discourse of the institutions of the state, given the long journey of being part of the Europe, is pro-EU. The military which constitutes for Bayramoğlu the major actor of the Turkish political scene seems to include the will of being the member of the Union in terms of its official policy (Bayramoğlu, 16.05.2003). However, this policy can only be evaluated adequately if one would take into account its reservations in terms of the Cyprus and Kurdish question. This is to say, according to Bayramoğlu, the prospects of the EU project of Turkey are dependent on the developments in these areas and as a result could be easily brought to a halt (Yeni Şafak, 16.05.2003). This possibility is completely related with the insecurity of Turkey’s central elite with regard to AKP’s potential success in this regard (Mahçupyan, 18.05.2003). Mahçupyan argues that the issues of EU and Cyprus coincided with the term of this party and despite this elite’s need for AKP to be successful and solve these issues, this success could mean a long term in power for this Islamist party which is a situation that is unbearable for them.

According to Mahçupyan this need to the success of AKP in terms of the mentioned issues is the result of the “spirit of time” which prevents Turkey to turn inside. This is why the membership to the Union and the reform packages cannot be objected by the actors of the established order to a great extent (Zaman, 06.10.2003). To sum up, at the discursive level all the institutions including the military are supporting the membership. Mahçupyan’s argument is that an objection to membership that is justified through the official ideology would render their positions meaningless and nobody could risk this within today’s conjuncture. (Zaman, 06.10.2003) According to Mahçupyan declarations of the military about their pro-EU stance are genuine in the sense that they see with regard to today’s conjuncture Turkish military can reserve an indispensable position for itself only under the circumstances of Turkey’s accession to the Union. Thus, what is left to these actors is to find the way to manage AKP and try to control the transformation of the existing mechanism of power. Mahçupyan states that this leads to the question of “if we are obliged to AKP, which AKP is best for us?” (Zaman, 06.10.2003).

Therefore, he expects that this question would result with the encouragement of AKP to get closer to the center in a manner that it could be constructed as an actor of the establishment. At this point, it may be argued that Mahçupyan comes up with a presentation of AKP that is stuck in between its anti-systemic mentality and the fact that it has to be another actor of the system in order to survive whereas its nationalism and conservatism pave the way for such an inclusion.

The equation that is presented by the liberal intellectuals referring to such an inclusion which means retreating from the democratization project would lead to the consequences of “the increase in the military tutelage over the system, sharpening of the policies towards the Kurdish Question and towards the Islamists, narrowing down the space that is reserved for the political parties and regression in terms of the applications regarding the field of basic rights and liberties from the civil society institutions to individuals” (Yeni Şafak, 16.05.2003). In other words, “it is apparent that under today’s circumstances and in terms of the existing power relations, Turkey who is going away from the adventure of Europe, would fall behind the present democratic structure rather than moving ahead in the field of democracy” (Yeni Şafak, 16.05.2003, t.m.). Thus, the cure that the system needs can be gained by simply copying the legal documents of EU constituting the democratic ground that the European Union countries stand on. In this sense, the civilian constitution can be prepared by the adoption of the draft of the EU constitution. Since Mehmet Altan explains 2nd Republicanism as the democratization of the republic, for him the adoption of the legal documents, their implementation and the consequent membership to the Union would be synonymous with the realization of the 2nd republic. The implications of such a change for Altan can be given as the transition from a statist, militaristic, bureaucratic and centralist structure to a democratic, federalist and liberal one. Therefore, it is the condition of the EU membership that renders AKP’s existence meaningful as the actor of change meaning that this party should not contradict with the union and accept the criticisms as the means to healthy change. In this sense, EU and AKP as the side of the transition should work together against the adversary called bureaucracy as the representative of the traditional mentality of republic preventing the successful implementation of the harmonization laws. (Altan, Sabah, 30.10.2004)

At this point, it is possible to argue that the instable relationship between this party and the union is also indicative of the fact that the perspective of two parties

about the EU process is not the same. The mentalities behind the two contradict to a great extent in the sense that Mehmet Altan is well aware of the fact that the EU mentality is not completely internalized by the AKP whereas the condition for AKP to be taken into account as a government with power is to depend on the EU as its ally. (Altan, Sabah, 18.09.2004) However, Altan meets this position of AKP not through a critical eye, rather with the wish that the reform process would be accompanied by the genuine thoughts of the bearer one day. Moreover, Altan admits that despite the fact that from time to time the laws and regulations that AKP prepares, contradict with the requirements of the EU, he still does not give up supporting the party, because it constitutes, for Altan, the only agent that can drive the membership process even though it sometimes deviates from the route that would provide the membership. This is to say, the EU adventure cannot attain a happy ending if it is pursued through a statist and modernist perspective emphasizing the inevitability of development. Remembering the fact that Turkey's "adventure of Europe" has not been a story of success despite the fact that all the institutions including the military are in favor of it officially, it is argued that in order for the transformation of the system to be realized it should be established legitimately. Thus, AKP as the appearance of the will to change in the society can be regarded as the only actor that would render the EU project "meaningful" (Bayramoğlu, Yeni Şafak, 04.11.2005) in terms of providing a major change in the system depending on its legitimacy. This is why Bayramoğlu celebrates the 7th reform package as a "minor revolution" for the Turkish political system emphasizing the fact that it would weaken the tutelary regime (04.07.2003, 17.07.2003). Thus, the actor of this change, AKP, in terms of its distinctive characteristic of merging outer dynamics (the requirements of global capitalism and the requirements of the EU) with inner dynamics (social demand for change which is embodied in terms of the rise of the AKP) for Bayramoğlu, breaks down the tradition which holds the state as the subject of change (Yeni Şafak, 04.07.2003). Moreover, Altan argues that AKP deserves support as the only agent of this reform process in the sense that EU is the necessary condition also for the penalization and prevention of the abuses like torture and maltreatment. This perspective of being "the necessary condition" depends on Altan's view that the elites ruling the country would not jeopardize their privilege to act out of the legality by themselves. It is the globalization which does not allow anything to be untouched and to be protected as an inner issue (Altan, Sabah, *İşkence*

Sanıđını Kreselleşme Yakalar, 13.03.2004). In this sense, the requirement of EU to respect human rights and the related sanctions it depends its legal structure on challenges the traditional relationship between the rulers and the ruled that would never change if it is left to the inner dynamics of the Turkish political system.

To sum up, with regard to the liberal intellectuals' perspective of the EU, it may be argued that it is presented as the key to every problem of the Turkish society which cannot be solved by itself. The specificity of AKP in terms of the route to EU is the legitimacy it provides to the process. This is to say, the rise of AKP is synonymous with the will to change and this will can only be realized with the guidance of an external actor representing the rational and universal values which cannot be objected publicly by the actors of the "front of the status quo" under the circumstances of the powerful tutelary regime. Here, Gramsci's statement that the policy towards intellectuals should be realized in the manner that it would attract them to the intellectual bloc through "a general conception of life, a philosophy, which offers to its adherents an intellectual "dignity" providing a principle of differentiation from the old ideologies which dominated by coercion, and an element of struggle against them (Gramsci, 1999: 285) is explanatory for the liberal intellectuals' image of the AKP. This is to say, the collaboration with AKP as the only able actor that could challenge the status quo and lead and legitimize the membership process which would be synonymous with the democratization of the Republic gives the liberal intellectuals the sense of distinction as the actors that would lead the establishment of the "New Turkey"

4.2.2. Cyclical Demands of Democratization: Sacrifices in the Road to the EU

As it will be seen with regard to the tension between the liberal intellectuals and political power in the second term, the fact that AKP is regarded as the only democratizing actor that is willing and capable of furthering the membership process, is not to say that the relationship between the two is free from fluctuations. In the first period which is characterized by the self-image of the liberal intellectuals as the "iconoclasts" (Erdoğan, 2009: 117) given the emphasis on the powerfulness of the tutelary regime and the victimhood of the AKP is challenged from time to time by

the party itself. In order to substantiate this challenge, it should be noted that before the local elections in 2004, Altan summarizes AKP's policy towards EU as too careful in terms of the sensitivities of the established order. He argues that despite the fact that the harmonization laws are prepared rapidly, some of the very core issues that are essential to be democratized are not given the necessary attention. Among these can be given, the necessary constitutional changes about the Higher Education Council (Yüksek Öğretim Kurumu- YÖK) issue and the public reform law draft (Altan, Sabah, 22.03.2004). For instance, according to Altan it is critical that the government does not consider the abolishment of YÖK as a possibility and finds a reform concerning its structure as an adequate form of change. Moreover, it does not have any plans of strengthening the local governments as responsible of the areas of education and health care. Despite these shortcomings, during 2004 Mehmet Altan is totally optimistic of the EU's decision on the date of the negotiations that would be given on December. What is not he is totally optimistic about this time is the compatibility between the mentality of AKP and the EU. During this period he has the concern whether such a controversy would prevent the reforms that the membership process requires (Altan, Sabah, 06.09.2004).

One of the major issues signifying such an incompatibility was witnessed during the preparations of the amendments in terms of the Turkish Penal Code in 2004. At first, these amendments are realized in a way to include adultery as a crime and consequently faced reactions from many groups in society. With the decisions of constitutional court in the previous version of the penal code adultery was taken out of the scope of being a crime. Therefore, aside from the feminist groups, opposition parties and socialists, due to the way of including adultery, AKP's attempt of changing the penal code in accordance with the requirements of the EU was subjected to criticism by liberal intellectuals.

Altan argues that this attempt would refer to an intervention of the state to the private sphere and would conflict with the AKP's reforms that try to reregulate the relations between the state and society. Thus, he describes this process as AKP's suicide (Altan, Sabah, 18.09.2004). Bayramoğlu argues that the problem is related with "conservative democracy"⁵⁹ that AKP declares as its political position.

⁵⁹ For a discussion on the term seen S. L. Topçuoğlu, "The conservative-democratic' Identity of the Justice and Development Party in the Turkish Center-Right Tradition", (Master's Thesis, Middle East Technical University, 2006).

Bayramoğlu explains the contradiction inherent in this term with the fact that Turkish conservatism has a “pieced structure” (Bayramoğlu, 31.08.2004). Due to representing the ones belonging to the periphery of the system and consequently in favor of changing it, this position can be regarded as democrat in terms of the political sphere whereas with regard to the individual rights and liberties it is far away from holding a democratic understanding (Bayramoğlu, Yeni Şafak, 07.09.2004). Thus, Bayramoğlu argues, at this point, that the adultery case constitutes a clear example of the incompatibility between conservatism and democracy when the issue is related to the private sphere (Bayramoğlu, Yeni Şafak, 07.09.2004). Due to the fact that this inclusion of adultery as crime would mean the imposition of a specific understanding of morality to the rest of the society without even providing the circumstances of its discussion, it weakens AKP’s self-declaration as democrat. However, this criticism of Mahçupyan should be evaluated through his reservations in terms of the real reasons of AKP to act this way. According to Mahçupyan, the motivation behind the insistence of the adultery issue, even to the extent that it would constitute a crisis with the EU, is to manage the dissatisfaction the AKP leaders believe that their electorate experience in terms of the deadlock about the subjects of İmam Hatips and headscarf (Mahçupyan, Zaman, 26.09.2004). He states that the fact that the government could not realize major developments in terms of these problems leads to the question of “whether AKP has turned into a political means serving the ends of others even in the eyes of its leaders” (26.09.2004, Zaman, t.m.). It may be argued that here again AKP is constructed as a figure that has a limited space to move which is trying to extend it through democratizing the system in the manner that the outer dynamics require. This is to say, EU functions as a mechanism to back up or, in better terms, justify AKP’s existence. Thus, it has to stick to the process for the legitimization of its own survival. This is why Mahçupyan states that the laicists should appreciate AKP’s deeds in a way to attribute this party as the actor that provides the change that is historically associated with this part (laicists) of the society. It should be noted that this statement involves the idea that AKP due to its “insecure” position in the system from time to time comes to a situation that it has to sacrifice its own electorate.

To sum up, for Mahçupyan, the adultery issue is a flaw of the government in terms of its presentation as a democratic figure whereas this flaw cannot be understood without the government’s relatively powerless position with regard to the

“front of the status quo”. Thus, here again the powerlessness of the party to realize the demands of its own electorate led to a psychology to insist on criminalizing adultery in a way to render the understanding of this electorate prevalent. He emphasizes this view through arguing that “these people also deserve freedom” (Zaman, 26.09.2004, t.m.). The discussions on the new version of Turkish Penal Code terminated with the withdrawal of the draft including adultery as crime. Altan describes this development as AKP’s last minute attempt to save its political future. Realization of this draft would make a mistake that would jeopardize the legitimacy of AKP both in national and international levels as a reformist power whereas this reformism for Altan is the only manner that would provide the necessary integration into the world system. However, it should be noted that despite his emphasis on the internalization of the “EU mentality” he does not take the criticism of the other items in the penal code that could also conflict with the democratization process in his agenda. This is to say, he does not involve in a discussion on the articles of the penal code that are highly disputable in terms of freedom of expression such as article 301 and 305. This fact makes us think that the real reason behind Altan’s criticism of the preparation of the penal code is the possibility that the controversy over the adultery issue with the EU authorities would lead to an impediment in terms of the membership process since it may affect the Progress Report that would be released in 5th of October. This report has major significance since it would guide the EU Summit of December 17 which was getting closer. This summit was critical in the sense that the date for the start of the negotiations for membership would be announced by the Union. At this point, Altan’s criticism of the government can be taken into account as depending on the fragility of the conditions and the upcoming timeline for the membership process, rather than a defense of the “human oriented government” in itself which he calls the “EU mentality”. That is to say, under the pressure of the upcoming summit attaining a date for membership negotiations is above everything else, even above the reforms or the aim of the democratization for the sake of which, in fact, he supports the EU process. Given the fact that the discussions with the EU on the penal code has been made around the issue of adultery⁶⁰, as it is the case with the major part of the Turkish media, Mehmet Altan

⁶⁰ European Commissioner of Enlargement Gunter Verheugen stated that in terms of the Turkish Penal Code, they did not intervene except the adultery issue (accessed March 03, 2012, <http://www.abhaber.com/haber.php?id=640>). Verheugen explains the reason for the crisis with the

also sacrificed the freedom of expression by not even mentioning the articles of 301 and 305 whereas Mehmet Altan would later act as a major critic of these items. In this sense, it may be argued that for Altan AKP is committing suicide while trying to include adultery as crime whereas limiting individuals' rights and liberties through freedom of expression would not have such a consequence unless they have been the issue of warnings by the Union⁶¹.

At this point, regarding their attitude towards the adultery issue it may be argued that "liberal intellectuals" identify EU as the guarantor of the AKP government to lead the democratization process in a decent manner, which could otherwise be violated by the nationalist and Islamist concerns of the party. Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's nationalist and anti-EU statements like "We are Turkey and we are Turkish, we make our own decisions" (quoted in Altan, Sabah, 20.09.2004) is indicative for Altan of the power of the groups traditionally associated with "Milli Görüş", the sects and Islamist media within the party (Altan, Sabah, 18-20- 25.09.2004). However, this point of view is already defended by the SP which does not have any major impact for the Turkish political system any more. Therefore, at this point, Altan emphasizes that the source of the legitimacy of AKP is the role it attained to further and to complete the membership process to EU which renders for it the liberals' support highly important. In this sense, not internalizing the mentality that EU stands upon and the primacy of the individual over the state would lead it to lose its difference, or in better terms the meaning of its existence. (Altan, Sabah, 18.09.2004). However, here the discrimination between the articles of the TCK by the liberal intellectuals should be taken into account as a point questioning the liberal intellectuals' internalization of the principles of democracy. This is to say, the silence of these intellectuals in the process leading to the summit with regard to the 301, rather to involve in a discussion on the adultery issue given the EU's warnings in this sense can be taken into account as an indication of the cyclical nature of their demands. Taking the annulment of the 301 in their agenda during the 2007-2008 as

Turkish government as the situation that "such a law would give the impression that Turkey was trying to include an Islamic element into its legal system" (accessed September 13, 2012, <http://arsiv.ntvmsnbc.com/news/286267.asp>) which would create a negative effect in terms of the European public opinion. He summarizes the possibility that the adultery would be included in the penal code as a "disaster" (accessed March 03, 2012, <http://www.eubusiness.com/europe/turkey/040923150946.cd433chc>).

⁶¹ D. Aydın, "Yeni Türk Ceza Kanunu'nun Hazırlanış Süreci", *Ankara Üniversitesi SBF Dergisi*, 2004;59(4): 249-263.

their major concern and reducing this emphasis in 2010, as it will be identified in the following chapters, can be taken into account as a manifestation of conjenctural demands which is also highly relevant with their changing level of self-confidence as the “critical companions” or the “brain” of the governing party.

4.2.3 Supporting EU as Part of the Intellectual Responsibility

In this section the main concern of analysis is, aside from understanding the perspective of the liberal intellectuals with regard to the relationship between the EU and AKP, is to come up with a picture of how these intellectuals regard EU. It is argued beforehand that EU stands as the justification point for the coalition supporting AKP including Islamists, TÜSİAD and liberal intellectuals being the guarantor that AKP which is following the route to membership is a systemic figure (Uzgel, 2010: 27). Aside from validating the AKP’s position in the system, it functioned as the actor according to which AKP’s deeds are rationalized. In order to understand this point, it may be argued that the self-image of the liberal intellectuals necessitate a certain revisit. Here, it is possible to argue that with regard to their relation with AKP, EU membership process is the reference point that guarantees the liberal intellectual a “universal” position. This is to say, what makes it rational for the liberal intellectuals to collaborate with the AKP in the discursive level is the incorporation of EU, as it is also indicated by Saraçoğlu, as the “universal liberal frame of reference” (2011: 35). This is why, liberal intellectuals warn AKP not to leave the reform process which would be irrational and which would also render the relationship between the political power and themselves justifiable at the discursive level. The later nostalgia for this first period is completely related with this rationality of the relationship within the mentioned coalition since it would be referred in the following terms as the justification of its maintenance accompanied by the demands from AKP to turn back to its old days. In the upcoming chapters under the circumstances of the retreat from the reform process, how the liberal intellectuals maintained the sense of distinction will be tried to be analyzed.

Being the reference point for the mentioned self-image, it may be argued that anything that might affect the membership process and lead to the decision of the Union that would be announced on December 17 to be not starting the negotiation

process should be prevented. Mehmet Altan constantly refers to the power of the groups representing the status quo in terms of their possibility to obscure the process through preparing provocations and committing illegal operations. In this sense, according to Altan membership to EU because of constituting “the most revolutionary dynamic” (Altan, Star, 30.04.2007) that would provide change and democratization in Turkey, is always under the threat of the interruption by “the front of the status quo”. Thus, given this importance of being a member of the EU for Altan, he writes very reluctantly and only rarely about the flaws of the process that are created by the Union side. Rather, according to Altan it is the case that the course of membership is subjected to a halt from time to time because of the misdeeds of the mentioned “front of the status quo” and government’s incapability to resist these forces and to their mentality. This is why, despite the controversial issues in terms of the future of the membership it includes, he celebrates the decision taken in the EU Summit of December 17 2004 as the “2nd Republic Day” which refers to the establishment of the Second Republic and the rehabilitation of the idea itself which has been constantly attacked in the intellectual world. (Altan, Sabah, 15.01.2005)

With the “Recommendation of the European Commission on Turkey’s Progress towards accession” that is released with the progress report in 2004 October, European Council declared that “in view of the overall progress of reforms, and provided that Turkey brings into force the outstanding legislation mentioned above, the Commission considers that Turkey sufficiently fulfils the political criteria and recommends that accession negotiations be opened”⁶². In accordance with this recommendation, Council decided to open the negotiations with Turkey which completes the Copenhagen Criteria in legal terms (whereas implementation of these reforms would be under close scrutiny of the council for the realization of the membership) for the date of October 3. However, contrary to Mehmet Altan’s presentation of this decision as the victory of the “Second Republic” and as the major step Turkey has ever taken in terms of its democratization, the reservations included in the decision created some controversies in the media about the uncertainty of the accession. It is declared in the text of the Presidency Conclusions of the Brussels

⁶² “Recommendation of the European Commission on Turkey’s Progress Towards Accession,” accessed September 05, 2012, http://eurlex.europa.eu/smartapi/cgi/sga_doc?smartapi!celexplus!prod!CELEXnumdoc&lg=en&numdoc=504DC0656

European Council that “These negotiations are an open-ended process, the outcome of which cannot be guaranteed beforehand”⁶³. This reservation is accompanied with the principle that “While taking account of all Copenhagen criteria, if the Candidate State is not in a position to assume in full all the obligations of membership it must be ensured that the Candidate State concerned is fully anchored in the European structures through the strongest possible bond⁶⁴”. It is mostly argued that it is not possible to evaluate this offer of “special enhanced relationship” only through the possible failure of Turkey to keep up reforms. At this point the priorities of the member states in terms of the prospects of Turkey’s accession should be taken into account as the reason of the reservations in terms of the course of the negotiations. In order to substantiate this point another line in the text of decision which led to criticisms should be given: “Long transition periods, derogations, specific arrangements or permanent safeguard clauses, i.e. clauses which are permanently available as a basis for safeguard measures, may be considered. The Commission will include these, as appropriate, in its proposals for each framework, for areas such as freedom of movement of persons, structural policies or agriculture”⁶⁵. Kemal Kirişçi finds the term of “permanent safeguards” as related to the attitude of the member states who attribute Turkey as “simply too big, culturally too different (read as: not Christian), and economically too underdeveloped to deserve EU membership. They also add that Turkey is geographically not in Europe and therefore not suited for membership”⁶⁶. This view explains the situation that it is the first time in the EU history that requires some “permanent safeguards” for the future-member states. Despite the fact that freedom of movement stands as a critical issue for the accession processes of all candidates, it is tried to be managed through a transition period which may last up to 7 years. Thus, as Kirişçi argues

⁶³ “Brussels European Council 16/17 December 2004 Presidency Conclusions,” accessed September 05, 2012, http://www.abgs.gov.tr/files/_files/Zirve_Bildirileri/PresConc_17122004.pdf, 2004, p.7

⁶⁴ “Brussels European Council 16/17 December 2004 Presidency Conclusions,” accessed September 05, 2012, http://www.abgs.gov.tr/files/_files/Zirve_Bildirileri/PresConc_17122004.pdf, 2004, p.7

⁶⁵ “Brussels European Council 16/17 December 2004 Presidency Conclusions,” accessed September 05, 2012, http://www.abgs.gov.tr/files/_files/Zirve_Bildirileri/PresConc_17122004.pdf, 2004, p.7

⁶⁶ K. Kirişçi, “The December 2004 European Council Decision on Turkey: Is it an Historic Turning Point?,” accessed September 05, 2012, <http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/2004/issue4/jv8n04a8.html>

In no previous enlargement has there been a member that has been admitted to the EU with permanent safeguards understood to be the denial to enjoy basically the rights, free movement of labor, and the fruits that come with EU membership, structural and agricultural support funds⁶⁷.

Çandar points out the importance of the decision of the December 17 determining October 2005 as the opening date of the negotiations in a way that the reservations of the Union which led many criticisms in the Turkish public (such as the issues of permanent safeguards and the recognition of Cyprus) should be taken into account as negligible. In other words, for Çandar opening of the negotiations render this kind of flaws as details that should not affect what is essential (Dünden Bugüne Tercüman, 19.12.2004). This is to say, the success in terms of the summit is historical in the sense that, Çandar argues that if Turkey was not given the date for the negotiations, the relations with the Union would be damaged irreversibly and in a way to bring to the democratization process into a halt. This would weaken the government and result with the release of “Mamak Criteria” which signifies the possibility of a military intervention (Dünden Bugüne Tercüman, 19.12.2004) whereas the “paradigm shift” in Turkey’s international relations policy led by the AKP government prevented such a development (Çandar, Dünden Bugüne Tercüman, 29.12.2004). This is why, “Recep Tayyip Erdoğan who demonstrated a decisive and successful leadership should be followed firmly” in the road to EU (Çandar, Dünden Bugüne Tercüman, 23.12.2004). For Çandar, it may be argued that the mentality of EU is not internalized by the society despite the legal attempts to meet the Copenhagen Criteria. He expects its internalization with the transformation the negotiations would bring. In this sense, it may be argued that just like Mehmet Altan, Çandar also depends Turkey’s democratization to the outer dynamics due to the fact that the prevalent mentality is not capable of providing the necessary change by itself. This is why Çandar states that December 17 constitutes a milestone for Turkish modernization determining October 2005 as the opening date of the negotiations.

At this point, it is possible to say that Cengiz Çandar and Mehmet Altan share the perspective that is hold by Turkish media in general with regard to the image of the union and Turkey’s relative position in terms of this image. Beybin Kejanlıoğlu and Oğuzhan Taş argue in their article “Presentation of EU-Turkey Relations in

⁶⁷ Ibid.

Turkish Press: 17th December 2004, Brussels Summit” that the news and columns about the summit were mostly suffered from a sense of orientalism. This relationship which has two sides has been subjected to a storytelling from “a European lens” in which EU is constructed as hierarchically above Turkey (Kejanlıoğlu, Taş, 2009: 58) and it refers to the end to reach. Kejanlıoğlu and Taş argues that in terms of this perspective

According to the descriptions in Turkish media, Europe constitutes ‘the modern civilization’. It depends on the enlightenment tradition, it is secular, democratic and it maintains the universal values. In this sense, EU primarily represents an upper level or time forward like a road, aim, renaissance, civilization project, door to EU” (Kejanlıoğlu, Taş, 2009: 56).

Thus, it is possible to argue that, in accordance with such a representation, Mehmet Altan considers the flaws in the accession process as resulted from the unsatisfying performance of Turkey whereas Çandar needs to check the importance of Turkish Prime Minister in terms of the news in the European Channels.

It may be argued that Mehmet Altan’s ignorance of the reservations of the Union in terms of its decision about opening negotiations is indicative of a general attitude towards the course of the membership process. While the European side of the relationship for him represents an advanced democratic entity the line of modernization of which should be followed and a referee that would decide on the quality of the democratization of the candidate, the Turkish side is the one that needs to work a lot to establish the formers’ conditions and at the end of such hard work it would deserve to be graded. In this sense, it is accepted that in order to modernize and to reach the advanced level of development that western states maintain, the unilinear line of progress of the west should be followed. Mehmet Altan, referring to Şerif Mardin and İdris Küçükömer argues that the traditional formation of the relationship between state and society is characterized by the primacy of former over the latter, and he criticizes the Kemalist modernization project due to its quality of being a top-down process. In terms of this line of reasoning, the lack of civil society and the sovereignty of the bureaucratic elites resulted with the situation that the state became the subject of modernization whereas it is the society that occupies the object position. When Altan’s view of the European Union as the model to follow is

examined, the conditions of which should be taken into account as prescriptions that would realize the democratization (which is an aim that Turkey is not capable of attaining by its own dynamics), it is possible to argue that without admitting he offers another version of the top-down reform process. Ayşe Kadioğlu refers to the object position of the citizen in terms of the Kemalist modernization project as not yet individual but a category that is expected to adapt what is modern (2006: 196). At this point, one may argue that despite all his criticisms of the sovereignty of the state over the society, in accordance with the Kemalist understanding Altan fails to attribute the individual as the subject of change. Rather, the inner dynamics of society, due to the prevalence of bureaucracy, are not powerful enough to lead to the necessary change; therefore the society should again “adapt to what is modern” which is a prescription by the “universal”, “democratic” and modern model of the EU. As it will be discussed in the upcoming chapters, the same concern or the limited role assigned to the individual can also be identified in terms of Altan’s silence on the discussions about the AKP’s unwillingness to provide a wide level of participation in terms of the attempts of civilian constitution by AKP.

Regarding all of the notions above one may easily argue that Mehmet Altan also shares with the majority of the Turkish media the orientalist attitude towards the relationship between Turkey and the EU. As it is seen in his obsession with the progress reports and the UN development index, he constantly checks how the reform process has been perceived not only by the union, but by category of the west. Altan’s account of the primacy of the “lens of the Europe”, or the emphasis on the necessity of internalizing it in order to realize the democratization results with focusing on the performance of Turkey rather than its relationship with the EU which he identifies as the wise tutor, whereas this can be taken into account as an one-sided analysis of the accession process.

Constructing EU as the tutor, it may be argued that, renders AKP its student or follower, whereas, as it is mentioned before, this student is incapable of any kind of improvement when he retreats from the guidance of his tutor. Mehmet Altan substantiates this perspective with the statement that “AKP would lose all his power and distinction if it would stop listening to EU’s criticisms which happens to be its most important ally” (Altan, Sabah, 12.03.2005). This is why, Altan always warns AKP to turn back to the track of the union when the incompatibility between its mentality with that of the EU comes to the foreground.

Criticizing Altan for disregarding the dynamics within the EU, he argues that member states should not be taken into account as fixed entities. This is to say, according to Altan, transition to the post-industrial society affects and leads to major transformations within these states. However, in a way to support our criticism, he argues that EU refers to a dynamic that is different than the sum of the interests of its members. Thus, one may argue that, according to Altan, the states could have different priorities about Turkey's membership, however in terms of its legal decisions and mentality EU is fixed and due to the characteristic of being a union it is intolerant to any inconsistency which could lead to its disintegration. Despite this legal assurance, he still advises the Turkish Government to do its homework carefully, since it would increase the support within the Union for Turkey's membership. It may be argued that the major reason behind this advice is the fact that the criticisms of other members could function as a point of justification of the opponents of the EU in the domestic realm (Altan, Sabah, 04.07.2005).

Contrary to Mehmet Altan's claim that the inner dynamics of Turkey are not strong enough to provide the transformation of social structure, thus, for the sake of democratization there arises the necessity to stick to the EU process, Bayramoğlu argues that the change in terms of the power relations through which the traditional elites withdrew from the political arena to some extent is resulted from the power of the society. The difference in terms of this perspective is also visible in Bayramoğlu's presentation of the EU process. Contrary to Mehmet Altan, Bayramoğlu refers to the complexities in terms of the membership process resulting from the inner dynamics of the Union. In this sense, Bayramoğlu states that doing homework in terms of completing the necessary reforms would not automatically result with the accession. He examines the relationship from the side of the EU and finds out that there are other concerns of the union about Turkey's membership that would affect the process such as the doubts about the compatibility of Turkish culture with the European identity. In this sense, Bayramoğlu admits that this process is multi-dimensional and includes more than one actor at the same time which is a position far from representing the union as a fixed entity that would evaluate the development of Turkey with regard to its own advanced or uppermost level of modernization. It may be argued that Bayramoğlu also attributes the Union as a "driving force" for the democratization of Turkey in terms of constituting the guideline and providing legitimacy for reforms in controversial issues.

When the issue of the opponents of EU in the inner realm is investigated, according to Altan, it may be argued that since the accession to the EU would transform the political realm for good, contemporary actors of this realm which have interests in its maintenance would be against this process. Mehmet Altan relates the “systematic increase” in terms of the terrorist attacks with the upcoming date of the negotiations and considers this as an attempt to sabotage the course of membership. The opponents of the EU process both from the Turkish and Kurdish sides that have interests in the maintenance of the status quo were terrified by the fact that accession would solve the problems of the “Turkish citizens with Kurdish origins in terms of their basic rights and liberties through the EU standards” (Altan, Sabah, 16.07.2005). To sum up, for Altan, accession would solve the Kurdish question automatically whereas the target of the terrorist attacks is the possibility of attaining this goal which would render the political careers and profits of both sides meaningless. Thus, the cooperation between these groups which he calls “the terror lobby” provoked terrorism in order not to lose the privileges contemporary form of politics provided them (Altan, Sabah, 16.07.2005). It is expected that, since the measures that would be taken against terrorism would challenge with the democratization process, the relations with the Union would come to a halt. This is why, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s speech in Diyarbakır recognizing the Kurdish question and stressing that the solution to the problem is more democracy, refreshes the expectations of Altan from the AKP government.

At this point, one may wonder what the distinctive characteristic of the reform process for EU which renders it the key to solve all the problems the Turkish society encounters (the standardization that the membership to the EU brings, beside other things would prevent the deaths due to the corrupted nature of building system in cases of flood, earthquake etc.) including the Kurdish question is. For Altan, this point can be explained with the fact that all the other reform processes starting with the Tanzimat were targeting changes in the superstructure and as a result Turkish modernization process is not resulted successfully as it is seen in terms of the fragility of its principles (Altan, Star, 21.02.2007). For Altan the path of this project was to take over the consumption patterns of the modernized countries without the necessary transformation in terms of the mode of production. Therefore, for the most part of Turkey as an “agricultural society”, the reforms of Kemalist project seemed alien. Due to the clarity of the alienated nature of these reforms, there arise the fears

about the maintenance of laicism which stands as one of the major questions of Turkish political system. According to Altan, if modernization project had not disregarded the mode of production prevalent in Turkey and realized its reforms accordingly, laicism would be internalized in the quickest manner and would not remain as mere appearance (Altan, Sabah, 26.09.2005). However, with the accession to the European Union, the mode of production will be subjected to change in the sense that the remains of the agricultural society would be cleaned up paving the way to the post-industrial society (Star, 21.02.2007).

The major threat to this potential of change is AKP's "nationalist and patriarchic reflexes" which it resorts under the circumstances of the pressure of the establishment. Bayramoğlu keeps warning AKP about this issue which would mean the party to lose its distinction to lead the process of change since what renders the party such an actor is its capability to transform the system under the circumstances of this insecurity. What is attributed as AKP's distinction in terms of the Turkish Political Scene is always under the threat of being blurred with regard to its reconciliation with the state in terms of the issues of Kurdish question, Cyprus and EU (Bayramoğlu, 22.04.2003). This concern of reconciliation manifests itself in terms of the term "conservative democracy" which is resorted by AKP in a way to emphasize its willingness to be included in harmony by the system (Mahçupyan, Zaman, 09.02.2004). Mahçupyan's major criticism of AKP is around this self-definition. In the sense that conservatism includes nationalism and patriarchy the democratization it would bring would be limited and would be realized through the road constructed by the pragmatism of the party in power. Since for Mahçupyan it is the case that the duration of AKP's political life is determined by the extent of the difference between the official ideology and that of the party, he is considered with the possibility that whether using conservative in its title, keeping in mind its nationalistic connotations, is part of an effort of clinging to the establishment (Zaman, 25.08.2003). Given these efforts to be included by the system, there are two major weaknesses of AKP in terms of the identity it tries to construct for itself that renders it difficult to attribute the party as democrat. The first one is the theme "millet" which attributes some sense of homogeneity to the society challenging any mentality on the society that claims to be democrat (Zaman, 10.10.2003). The second theme in this regard is pragmatism of AKP. Mahçupyan argues that due to the distance of its Islamist stance to the official ideology, pragmatism, from time to time,

could serve as a way of survival of the party within the system (Mahçupyan, 12.10.2003). However, constant resort to this theme would raise the criticisms on the party's lack of principles and would justify its presentation as incapable of governing the country (Mahçupyan, 12.10.2003). Mahçupyan argues that the emphasis on the "millet", nationalism and pragmatism would bring AKP to the center of Turkish politics whereas "the synthesis" of these themes constitutes the ideological base of the center right tradition of Turkey (Mahçupyan, 13.10.2003). He constantly warns AKP not to become another party of the center right that has lost its meaning with regard to the Turkish electorate as it can be seen from the results of the 2002 elections, since center right in Turkey despite the social base it represents due to this synthesis and the concern of being part of the system could not manage to transform the system, rather contributed to the reproduction of the ideology of the center. Here, accession to EU is valuable in the sense that it could break this mechanism of reproduction. Due to this possibility, Mahçupyan argues that, for the first time in Turkish political history, the connections between the Islamists and nationalism could be weakened in a way to recede them from conservatism whereas this point constitutes the very condition for AKP to lead the democratization of Turkey adequately (Mahçupyan, Zaman, 16.02.2004).

At this point, again, a presentation of AKP as the powerless actor is apparent under the circumstances of the "traps" and hindrances set by the state power whereas EU stands as the guarantee that would save the reform process from these traps as well as the nationalist reflexes of AKP's electorate. Here, it should be noted that, EU is not the only occupier of this position, rather the liberal intellectuals have a faith in the vision of the Prime Minister for the survival of the reform process which is also the ground legitimizing their standing alongside with the political power. The difference between the prime minister and his "nationalist", "statist" ministers is a theme which is at use in all three terms that will be referred. This is to say, whereas it is the case that AKP is the only actor that would guide this process and EU serves as the guarantor of AKP's power since the termination of the process would set the military free to challenge the government's legitimacy, the subject who guides this process is Recep Tayyip Erdoğan rather than the AKP government. In this sense, the power of AKP depends on the quality of the leadership the prime minister pursues which is also accepted by "our European Partners" as it is seen in the equation he sets between the AKP and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan (19.01.2003).

According to Çandar, this image as well as the government's and Tayyip Erdoğan's decisiveness, has rendered Turkey's adventure of EU an irreversible process (Çandar, Dünden Bugüne Tercüman, 17.12.2004). This point is critical in the sense that the personal traits of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan have major significance in terms of the successful maintenance of the relationship with EU. He refers to Erdoğan's decisiveness and states, for instance, that "he roars claiming that torture would be terminated" (Çandar, 26.11.2002). Being from Kasımpaşa is the reason of such a tone whereas he is gifted by God to have the capability of impressing his addressees in a positive manner (Çandar, Yeni Şafak, 11.12.2002). As a result, he argues that, the "non-white Turks" call him Tayyip just like the way Cubans call Fidel implying love and solidarity with the leader (Çandar, Dünden Bugüne Tercüman, 01.02.2003). At this point, Çandar states that he prefers the term "başkan" to call him referring to his period as the mayor of İstanbul which ended with his imprisonment. This is why, he identifies that using the term "başkan" carries the implication of opposing the February 28th. Referring to their personal relations with the Başkan developed through various trips, lunches etc. they attend together, he concludes that he is the first and the only figure since Özal to diffuse hope through challenging the taboos of the establishment (Çandar, 01.02.2003). In this sense, it may be argued that for Çandar, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan by his very presence as a political figure (considering his confrontation with the systemic forces during the February 28th) belongs to the opposition rather than to the power which makes it possible for him to act without reconciling with Ankara.

Attaining such qualities which give him courage and decisiveness, Çandar argues that, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has the major role for the positive outcomes of the summit. Even after the summit, this success could not change his confidence, sobriety and modesty (Çandar, Dünden Bugüne Tercüman, 17.12.2004). Çandar refers to one of the European Newspapers which includes Tayyip Erdoğan's photograph with the Union's flag, emphasizing and even celebrating the extensive size of the portrait (Çandar, Dünden Bugüne Tercüman, 17.12.2004). This point can be taken into account as Çandar's willingness to confirm the importance of the importance of Tayyip Erdoğan by reference to the European view. Here, the analogy in terms of Mehmet Altan's account of the relationship between the Union and Turkey should be remembered. It is argued that the positions Altan set for the two sides of the relationship were that of the tutor and the student. Çandar's account can

also be understood in accordance with this perspective as it can be identified in terms of the following example he gives: the European channel Euronews which reserves at most a few seconds for each news, released a video on Erdoğan as the first news lasting for minutes and with the words “history is being written” (Çandar, Dünden Bugüne Tercüman, 18.12.2004). He adds that since this is the way “our European partners see this day” we can feel the importance it attains (Çandar, Dünden Bugüne Tercüman, 18.12.2004). This importance leads Çandar to present Recep Tayyip Erdoğan as the victor of the “diplomatic warzone” with the crown of this victory on his head (Dünden Bugüne Tercüman, 18.12.2004).

Given the importance Mehmet Altan attributed to the EU as the major transformative power, it should be noted that despite his awareness of the nationalist and statist branch within AKP and the gap between the mentalities of EU and this party, he supports and praises the leader of AKP as long as he provides the necessary changes for the membership. Altan also presents Erdoğan as the responsible of the developments that could not even be dreamed about before (Sabah, 23.10.2004) whereas from time to time he attributes him as the occupier of the subject position that is determined by the actors of the international politics. He states that it is no coincidence that 2002 elections in which AKP was elected as the number one party was an early election. This was related to the former governments’ negative attitude towards the possible intervention of the USA in Iraq. Moreover, Altan argues that USA was concerned about lessening the side-effects of attacking a Muslim country through cooperating a democratic power with Islamist sensitivities and this concern resulted with the visit of the White House by Erdoğan in spite of the fact that he had not attained even the title of deputy yet (Altan, 11.06.2005). Altan states that with this visit it was apparent that USA decided to provide Erdoğan with “the political legitimacy at the global level” (Altan, 11.06.2005). According to Altan, this synthesis between Islam and democracy could only be accomplished by Turkey which would prove the compatibility of being Muslim and being modern through respecting the human rights and the market economy. Such an example with the spiritual privilege of being the last representative of the caliphate would guide the Islam world in a way to terminate the religious conflict over the world (Altan, 08.08.2005). At this point one may argue that this presentation of Erdoğan leaves him with a limited realm of action as a political actor and puts him in a subject position of fulfilling the formerly defined and assigned duty. However, for Altan this

appointment implies an act of being chosen by the international forces which is an indication of distinctive characteristic of the political actor and as a result a success in itself.

Regarding all of the notions above, it may be argued that there exists schizophrenia in terms of Mehmet Altan's image of Erdoğan. He is a great reformist and international actor whereas at the same time he represents a mentality, in this case nationalism that is behind the requirements of the age he belongs to. In order to understand this point, Altan's following statement on Erdoğan will be examined:

There are two Recep Tayyip Erdoğans: The first one is related to the world while the second is engaged in the electorate of AKP... The differences between the Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and AKP leader Recep Tayyip Erdoğan are resulted from the difficulties and the ambiguities of the democratic modernization process. From time to time the prime minister is stuck in between the world and electorate of the party having difficulties in terms of the attempts of transformation (Altan, Sabah, 21.11.2005).

In a way to cope up with this schizophrenic scene, what should be done is defined by Altan as to "critically accompany" the party in this process in a way to strengthen its reforms and lessen its failures (Altan, 21.11.2005). Thus, one may argue that the duty that Altan sets for himself is being such a companion.

This "accompaniment" can be substantiated with Çandar's articles before the summit in which he constantly claims that the group that is against the government would try to present the determination of the opening date for the negotiations as the second half of the 2005 as a defeat. At this point, it should be noted that in a way to be part of the efforts to prevent this possibility, before the summit Cengiz Çandar goes to Brussels, participates in dinners and as a result acts as a lobbyist rather than a journalist. Abant Platform's eight meeting is realized in Brussels just before the week of the Summit in which Cengiz Çandar was one of the speakers. Çandar states that Platform's aim of developing tolerance and dialog is now extended to the relations between Europe and Turkey whereas the talks in its sessions refer to the fact that Turkey is in fact part of the Union.

This is only one example of the functioning of the liberal intellectuals as the lobbyists of the governing party's project of membership. In terms of the close relations with the AKP manifesting itself in their actual accompaniment of the political power during the trips to gain the consent of the international actors, it may be argued that this three year period with the self-image of the confident brain which

is responsible for saving the power from the possible errors required by the “front of the status quo” and its electorate became in later terms as the source of nostalgia for the liberal intellectuals. The distinction of this period can be given as the confirmation of their self-assessment in terms of the realization of the EU reforms which are taken into account as the route for the rational and universal. Moreover, it is possible to argue that the presentation of the “powerless government”, which would also constitute one of their major themes in the following time being, is the ground of their position of being “in opposition but hegemonic”.

Regarding what is claimed so far, one may argue that during the period of 2002-2005 liberal intellectuals regarded the tutelary regime as the source of power whereas AKP attains an impotent position. This is why, they believe that collaboration with the governing party would not challenge their intellectual responsibility. Remembering what is presented in the first chapter as the incompatibility between the power and the intellect and the intellectual’s definition as the “exile”, the claim that their position should be regarded from within this responsibility is justified through a comparison they set with the traditional intelligentsia of the republic. Here, the idea is, as it is defended by Şükrü Arın Turkish Modernization is a state-centered project whereas these intellectuals attribute their position within the project as the “educators” that would provide the cultural accumulation that is necessary for the public to be modernized (2009: 99). This is to say, the close relationship with the state as well as the urgency of modernization which would overcome the lag with the contemporaries position the intellectual as the servant of Turkish modernization (2009: 101). This primacy of the state in a way to determine the role of intellectual for the modernization with the secondary position of an officer or a servant challenged the definition of the intellectual as an “exile” whereas liberal intellectuals reserved their position with regard to the AKP as accompanying and encouraging it to change the center in a way to transform the existing system rather than serving the “state”. The threat that the possibility of such transformation directs to the “front of the status quo” representing the “state” would lead this front to try to paralyze the AKP through including it within the system. Thus, as the brain, “liberal intellectuals” engaged in an effort of protecting “the body” from the tendency of getting closer to the establishment which is directed by its very concerns of survival. However, what is identified throughout the text can be taken into account as indicative of the fact that these intellectuals believe that

complying with this tendency is the actual threat to the party's survival in the sense that such a move would lead it to lose its meaning of existence and render it one of the regular players of the established order in a way to challenge these intellectuals self-image as the "iconoclasts" due to being in a coalition with the party. It may be argued that it is the major concern of the intellectuals to warn AKP with regard to its possible reconciliation with the center, since under these circumstances their coalition with the power would not be explicable through the intellectual responsibility. As it will be identified in the next section, the distinction that is provided with the self-image of being "iconoclasts" is the major reason for the liberal intellectuals to keep the idea of the "powerless government" at use in the following terms even under the circumstances that the governing party announces its position as "the power" and denies the contribution of the liberal intellectuals during the course of attaining this power. The powerless position of AKP with regard to the traditional center and the necessity to take its consent in order to survive in the political arena are taken into account as the conditions of AKP's cooperation with the institutions of tutelary regime rather than a conflict with them. In the second period of the relationship with AKP, the transformation in the image of the party as well as their self-image peaking with the crisis of civilian constitution will be analyzed.

CHAPTER 5

SECOND TERM (2007-2008): DEBATES ON CIVILIAN CONSTITUTION, HEADSCARF ISSUE AND PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS- LIBERAL INTELLECTUALS' FALL FROM GRACE

In the previous chapter, the conceptual scheme of the liberal intellectuals for the first three years of AKP's time in power is tried to be brought out. At the end of this analysis, it is identified that during this term AKP has been constructed by the "liberal intellectuals" as an original, novel actor which has the opportunity to transform the system. Despite the fact that liberal intellectuals accept the argument that AKP represents the same audience with the center right tradition in Turkey, being born into a conjuncture which necessitates integration into the global capitalism prevents it from moving towards the center. This was the major political mistake of its center-right predecessors and renders AKP with the quality of opposition despite being the party in power. Being in opposition manifests itself in the reactions by the traditional figures of the political arena to the power of the party which take the form of impediments providing the maintenance of their privileged position. Under the circumstances of these impediments, AKP is presented as the "powerless government" who is not by itself responsible for the flaws within the existing order. This is the same point where the importance given to the EU by the liberal intellectuals comes to the foreground in the sense that the powerless government could only manage democratization with the help of such an external intervention. Due to the weak inner dynamics as well as the powerful structure of the "status quo", this external force is the guarantee of AKP to maintain itself within the system. It is thought that the pressures from the nationalist electorate of AKP and the pressures from the bureaucratic elite could only be managed through the membership process whereas it is the case that once the reforms are realized "the political regime" would be transformed to the extent that it would signify the foundations of the 2nd Republic.

In this section, it would be recognized that in the second term that will be investigated the liberal intellectuals concluded that the transformation of the system that is tried to be realized with the harmonization laws should then be completed with the establishment of a civilian constitution. This is to say, the major theme of the period is the liberal intellectuals' demand on civilian constitution making, the establishment of which would justify the novelty and reformism of AKP constituting the ground for the sense of "distinction" attracting the liberal intellectuals to the intellectual bloc of AKP. This is why it may be argued that the perspective of the political power with regard to the establishment of the civilian constitution determines the course of the relations that is investigated throughout the thesis. Regarding this argument and given the fact that the project of civilian constitution is brought to a halt by AKP during the term after the elections of July 22, it is possible to claim that it is this moment of the Turkish political history that the liberal intellectuals realized that they are not indispensable for the political power as the "brain" is to the "body". This is the moment it is witnessed that the coalition with the liberal intellectuals is publicly denied by the AKP leader Recep Tayyip Erdoğan himself. At the personal level this announcement created some reactions by the liberal intellectuals but their overall attitude of supporting AKP was not challenged to a great extent. The reason behind the constancy of this support is given again through the idea of "being obliged to AKP" as the sole power that has the capability of representing the front containing the democratization potential whereas idea of the "powerless government" is transformed in a way to incorporate the "ideology of being alert" as it is introduced by H. Bahadır Türk. This is to say, as it is manifested in the crisis with regard to the presidential elections, the front of the status quo is waiting for the possible moments of intervention (Türk, 2012: 37).

It may be argued that this transformation is completely related with the governing party's development of a self-image as the occupier of the position of power. Despite the reluctance of the liberal intellectuals that are referred in the thesis to give up the theme of "powerless government", Ahmet İnsel and Ömer Laçiner announces the victory of AKP in terms of what is regarded as its struggle with the tutelary regime. Ahmet İnsel, referring to an interview done with Recep Tayyip Erdoğan right before the elections of June 12 in which he states that "AKP became both the government and the power", argues that this response indicates the internalization of being in power whereas these elections are the establishment of a

political regime led by the AKP (2011: 11). Moreover, there are critical points that constituted the points of overcoming the “critical threshold” of being this potent actor of the Turkish politics, one of which is clearly the elections in 2007 (2011: 12). Laçiner also identifies that following the elections of July 22 it is no longer possible for the traditional elites to be the alternative of power (2007: 43). This is to say, this moment corresponds to the opportunity AKP provides to the class it represents to establish its hegemony completely (2007: 43). Under these circumstances, Ömer Laçiner’s statement that through reaching the point it wants to attain, Islamist bourgeoisie would engage in an attempt of freeing itself from the “incidental additions” that accompanied it through this process (Laçiner, 2012, p.4) is highly relevant here to understand the transformation of the idea of the “powerless government” to include the “the ideology to be on alert” as well as the liberal intellectuals’ retreat as a response to these developments from their former demands as it will be identified in the next chapter.

In accordance with this presentation of “freeing oneself from the incidental additions”, it may be argued that during the term, newspapers included discussions on the prospects of what is regarded as the “coalition” between the liberal intellectuals and AKP with regard to this fluctuation⁶⁸. As it will be identified below, while some journalists announced that this collaboration is over due to the discontent of the liberal intellectuals with the constitutional changes attempted to annul the ban on turban for the university education, others claimed that such a coalition is no more than a construction of these intellectuals. In terms of the former position İsmet Berkan stands as a clear example⁶⁹. He argues that AKP is not so different than the center-right parties previously governed Turkey whereas its distinction depends on the determinacy of the very support it had from the liberal intellectuals. According to Berkan every conservative party in the history of the Turkish Republic engaged in

⁶⁸ F. Kuru, “Özgürlükçü Köklere Dönüş,” *Yeni Şafak*, February 20, 2008, accessed September 05, 2012, Available from: <http://yenisafak.com.tr/Yazarlar/?i=9432&y=FehmiKuru>.; “Özgürlükçü Ol, Ezber Boz!” Fehmi Kuru'dan Liberalleri Küstüren Erdoğan'a Çağrı!”, February 20, 2008, accessed September 05, 2012, <http://www.medyafaresi.com/haber/11366/guncel-ozgurulukcu-ol-ezber-boz--fehmi-korudanliberalleri-kusturen-erdogana-cagri.html>;; “AK Parti'yle İttifak Sanal, Ayrışma Gerçek!,” *Aksiyon*, February 18, 2008. accessed September 05, 2012. available from: <http://www.aksiyon.com.tr/aksiyon/haber-16013-33-ak-partiyle-ittifak-sanal-ayrisma-gercek.html>

⁶⁹ İ. Berkan, “AKP- Liberaller İttifakının Önemi,” *Radikal*, September 26, 2007, accessed September 09, 2012, available from: <http://www.radikal.com.tr/Radikal.aspx?aType=RadikalYazar&ArticleID=826895&Yazar=%DDSMET%20BERKAN&CategoryID=97>.

relations with the liberal and democratic segments of the society and the collapse of this alliance is indicative of the fact that these parties would experience a process of decay. However, the experience of the February 28 rendered the EU as the possible point of direction for the AKP that would provide their survival in the system whereas this direction constituted for the liberal intellectuals the basis of their support for the party. This is why, the delays or misdeeds in the membership process would jeopardize the relationship AKP have with the liberal intellectuals which is synonymous with jeopardizing its term in power. In a way to conclude that the liberal intellectuals' withdrawal of the support they had for the AKP would mean the party's loss of its power, Berkan argues that "these segments provide the intellectual motivation behind AKP, when you remove the statements of the liberal democrats, AKP has nothing to say"⁷⁰. Thus, remembering the analogy Mehmet Altan set in terms of the relationship between the liberal intellectuals and AKP as the relationship between the brain and body, in this chapter, it would be tried to identify how this distinction which is constructed over the relations in the term of 2002-2005 is denied by the political party as well as the consequences of this denial for the self-image of the liberal intellectuals.

In order to understand the transformation of this relationship has been through, the period in which the end of the coalition between the liberal intellectuals and political power became a common theme in terms of the discussions in the media will be investigated. This period referring to the major fluctuation in the course of this relationship as it is also accepted by these intellectuals included very important events for the Turkish political history. The confrontations with regard to the presidential elections determined the process whereas according to the liberal intellectuals the concerns of AKP regarding these elections were the source of the disagreement or what is regarded in the media as the termination of the "coalition" they had with the political power. Before involving in the liberal intellectuals' perspective on these developments, in a way to contextualize what is regarded as the major confrontation and how it is resulted for these intellectuals, the process should be briefly summarized.

⁷⁰ İ. Berkan, "AKP- Liberaller İttifakının Önemi," *Radikal*, September 26, 2007, accessed September 09, 2012, available from: <http://www.radikal.com.tr/Radikal.aspx?aType=RadikalYazar&ArticleID=826895&Yazar=%DDSMET%20BERKAN&CategoryID=97>.

The year 2007 started with the assassination of Hrant Dink who was an Armenian journalist. Murderer Ogün Samast, was arrested in a short while after the shooting, however, during the course of the trial on the murder it is identified that this was not an individually planned murder, rather it was the case that various figures from the state institutions were incorporated in, or in better terms, led the process⁷¹. Liberal intellectuals evaluated the murder as part of the intervention of the status quo in a way to rise up the nationalistic sentiments obscuring the reform process on the way to the membership to EU⁷². It is argued that the presidency was a position that the front of the status quo would not want to lose to AKP and in this sense there have been controversies in terms of the possible candidacy of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan which are substantiated through the demonstrations called the “Republic Protests”⁷³. At the end of the process characterized by the discussions on the presidency of Erdoğan, he nominated the Minister of Foreign Affairs Abdullah Gül for presidency⁷⁴ and the elections in the parliament resulted with the affirmative 351 votes. However, CHP applied to the Constitutional Court for the annulment of the elections due to the lack of the absolute majority of the 367 votes in the parliament and in the night before the decision of the Court the military declared a memorandum in the website of the Chief of the General Staff indicating its position with regard to the elections⁷⁵. The next day, Court issued that the 351 was

⁷¹“Hrant Dink Cinayeti Kronolojisi, accessed September 05, 2012, <http://www.bianet.org/bianet/siyaset/104254-hrant-dink-cinayeti-kronolojisi>.; “Devlet Ağır Kusuru Kabul Etti, accessed September 05, 2012, <http://www.bianet.org/bianet/insan-haklari/136297-devlet-agir-kusuru-kabul-etti>.; “Bir Şey Yapın ki Katil Devlet Demeyelim,” accessed September 05, 2012, <http://www.bianet.org/bianet/bianet/135837-bir-sey-yapin-ki-katil-devlet-demeyelim>.

⁷² A. Bayramoğlu, “Türkiye'deki Son Gelişmeler,” *Yeni Şafak*, February 07, 2007, accessed September 05, 2012, available from: <http://yenisafak.com.tr/Yazarlar/?i=3730&y=AliBayramoglu>.; “Hrant Bizim Duyarlılığımızdı,” updated June 06., 2007, accessed September 05, 2012, <http://yenisafak.com.tr/Yorum/Default.aspx?t=22.05.2008&i=52391>; M. Altan, “İttihat ve Terakki'nin sonu mu?” *Star*, March 23, 2008, accessed September 05, 2012, available from: <http://www.stargazete.com/politika/yazar/mehmet-altan/ittihat-ve-terakki-nin-sonu-mu-haber-92899.htm>.

⁷³ “Secular Rally Targets Turkish PM,” accessed September 05, 2012, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6554851.stm>; “Ankara'da Tarihi Cumhuriyet Mitingi,” updated April 04, 2007, accessed September 05, 2012, <http://arsiv.ntvmsnbc.com/news/405418.asp>.

⁷⁴ “Aday Gül,” updated April 24, 2007, accessed September 05, 2012, <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/6391764.asp?gid=180>.

⁷⁵ “Genelkurmay'dan Çok Sert Açıklama,” updated April 29, 2007, accessed September 05, 2012, <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/6420961.asp?gid=180>.; “Genelkurmay Geceyarısı Açıklama Yaptı,” updated April 27, 2007, accessed September 05, 2012, <http://www.yenisafak.com.tr/gundem/?t=27.04.2007&q=1&c=1&i=42573&Genelkurmay/geceyar%C>

not adequate for the presidential elections⁷⁶. Under these circumstances the government called for early elections to be realized in the July 22⁷⁷ which was led by a process characterized by the rising number of terrorist attacks. Moreover, as a response to the crisis of the presidential elections, the government issued a bill for the election of the president by the public rather than the parliament. This bill, vetoed by the President Ahmet Necdet Sezer, was presented to the public for a referendum in the October 21 2007⁷⁸. During this process, in a way to determine the course of the relations between the liberal intellectuals and political power to a great extent, the expectations of the civilian constitution, which were flourished with the government's former decision to assign a committee directed by Prof. Ergun Özbudun for the preparation of a draft, were resulted contrary. Agreeing with MHP, the governing party made amendments in terms of the Articles 10 and 42 of the 1982 constitution in a way to provide the students with headscarves to attend university which was banned during the process of February 28. Everything is started with the speech Erdoğan gave in Madrid during the conference of Alliance of Civilizations. He argued that the quality of the turban as a political sign should not be regarded as challenging the necessity to define it as part of the rights and liberties⁷⁹. Within two weeks time after this speech, depending on the demand of MHP, these parties came together in order to make amendments to regulate the dress code in the universities in a way to free the use of turban. The amendments of the article 10 and 42 are

4%B1s%C4%B1/a%C3%A7%C4%B1klama/yapt%C4%B1.; "Gerektiğinde Tavır Koyarız," updated April 28, 2007, accessed September 05, 2012, <http://www.milliyet.com.tr/2007/04/28/siyaset/asiy.html>.

⁷⁶ "Cumhurbaşkanlığı Seçiminin İlk Turu İptal," updated April 03, 2007, accessed September 05, 2012, <http://arsiv.ntvmsnbc.com/news/406859.asp>.

⁷⁷ "Meğer Seçimler Cumhurbaşkanlığı İçinmiş," updated July 25, 2007, accessed September 05, 2012, [http://www.bianet.org/bianet/siyaset/99995-meger-secimler-cumhurbaskanligi-icinmis.](http://www.bianet.org/bianet/siyaset/99995-meger-secimler-cumhurbaskanligi-icinmis;); accessed March 05, 2012, [http://www.stargazete.com/ekonomi/diger-haberler-ekonomi-haber-68793.htm.](http://www.stargazete.com/ekonomi/diger-haberler-ekonomi-haber-68793.htm); "Erken Seçim Kararı İttifakla 22 Temmuz," *Radikal*, May 04, 2007, accessed September 05, 2012, available from: <http://www.radikal.com.tr/haber.php?haberno=220295>.

⁷⁸ "Cumhurbaşkanı Seçimi Referanduma Gidiyor," updated June 15, 2007, accessed September 05, 2012, <http://www.bianet.org/bianet/siyaset/97629-cumhurbaskani-secimi-referanduma-gidiyor>. "Vetolu Anayasa Değişikliği Meclis Gündeminde," updated May 28, 2007, accessed September 05, 2012, [http://www.bianet.org/bianet/siyaset/96695-vetolu-anayasa-degisikligi-meclis-gundeminde.](http://www.bianet.org/bianet/siyaset/96695-vetolu-anayasa-degisikligi-meclis-gundeminde); "Anayasa Değişikliği Referandumu 21 Ekim'de," updated July 05, 2007, accessed September 05, 2012, <http://www.bianet.org/bianet/siyaset/98847-anayasa-degisikligi-referandumu-21-ekimde>.

⁷⁹ "Erdoğan Siyasi Simge Olarak Türbanı Savundu," updated January 26, 2008, accessed September 05, 2012, <http://arsiv.ntvmsnbc.com/news/433224.asp>.

accepted in the parliament during the sessions of February 6 and February 9⁸⁰. Liberal intellectuals, as it will be presented in detail below, reacted claiming that this would postpone the plans on civilian constitution making and they would not accept a hierarchy with regard to the rights and liberties. The maintenance of the article 301 which they find as the reason for Hrant Dink to be targeted by the murderers, the criticisms on which are responded by the political power that it would be regulated with the new constitution, constituted the major point of justification of their attitude towards the amendments on turban. The criticisms of the liberal intellectuals in this regard were not taken seriously by the political power in a way to frustrate these intellectuals' self-image of being the brain or, at least, the critical companion, whereas they regarded Tayyip Erdoğan's taking side with the military with regard to the confrontation the daily "Taraf" had with the Chief of the General Staff as the signs of the reconciliation with the established order⁸¹. At this point, given the lift of the turban ban in the universities by the temporary "coalition" between the AKP and MHP as its major reason, there was opened up a case of closure for the governing party by the Chief Prosecutor of the Supreme Court of Appeals⁸². Despite their rejection, it may be argued that this event constituted the justification point for the liberal intellectuals in the discursive level for supporting the AKP ignoring the announcement of Erdoğan that there has never been existed a coalition between the party and the liberal intellectuals⁸³.

Regarding this brief historical account, as it would also be seen below, the major theme determining the period was that of 'frustration' of the liberal intellectuals in terms of the political power's attitude to them. At this point, Ümit Kurt explains the parameters of this frustration with the fact that the liberals' construction of AKP as the novel actor that would transform the established order is

⁸⁰"TBMM'den Türbana Onay," updated February 09, 2008, accessed September 05, 2012, http://www.bbc.co.uk/turkish/news/story/2008/02/080209_turkey_2update.shtml.

⁸¹"Tehdidi Bırak Hesap Ver," *Taraf*. October 16, 2008. Accessed September 05, 2012, available from: <http://www.taraf.com.tr/haber/tehdidi-birak-hesap-ver.htm>.; "Paşasının Başbakanı," *Taraf*, October 17, 2008, accessed September 05, 2012, available from: <http://taraf.com.tr/haber/pasasinin-basbakani.htm>.

⁸² "Başsavcı, AK Parti'ye Kapatma Davası Açtı," updated March 17, 2008, accessed September 05, 2012, <http://arsiv.ntvmsnbc.com/news/439256.asp>.

⁸³ "Erdoğan için alarm zili çalıyor," updated January 27, 2011, accessed September 05, 2012 <http://haber.mynet.com/erdogan-icin-alarm-zili-caliyor-553186-politika/>.

challenged by the manner it pursued with regard to the article 301 of TCK and turban⁸⁴. According to Kurt, the attitude of AKP in terms of these issues should be taken into account as the traces of the fact that AKP is indeed a party that would like to take part in the establishment. It is not the aim of the party to remove the civil-bureaucratic elite, rather to reach a consensus with them. Under these circumstances it may be argued that what liberal intellectuals define as “ankaralılařmak” which refers to the danger of getting closer with the center in the hostile environment which is set by the status quo, is in fact the major motivation of AKP according to Kurt. This is to say, the party is not subjected to a metamorphism which transforms it from the “revolutionary subject” to a party of the established order, rather, given the mentioned motivation, it has never been that revolutionary.

Since it is the major argument of the thesis that the attraction of the intellectuals to the intellectual bloc is provided through a sense of distinction, it may be argued that the part of this sense that is constituted of the self-image of being powerful enough to direct the governing party is now challenged. This frustration in terms of the self image correlates with the loss of the distinction that is created over the definition of being the new actors of the “New Turkey” as the democratic republic. Under the circumstances that the coalition between this intellectuals and political power is denied by the Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, as it is mentioned below, this sense of distinction is tried to be furthered through transforming the idea of “powerless government” through incorporating the “ideology to be on alert”. In this regard when the themes of civilian constitution, military tutelage and EU are referred, it is possible to argue that the equation in terms of the democratization of Turkey is set as if the political party is the victim of the status quo in terms of being short of realizing its ideals of membership and civilian constitution. The only way to save itself from the tutelary regime is defined by these intellectuals as to follow the EU route more strictly and come up with a civilian constitution that would be the key to all of the major questions of Turkey including the Kurdish question, Alevi’s demands and the turban issue. In order to understand the parameters of this equation which would lead us to identify the frustration that the liberal intellectuals experience which they still explain from within the frame of reference of the inability of the political power to act freely due to the attempts of the

⁸⁴ Ü. Kurt, “AKP ve Sol-liberal Entelektüeller,” *Radikal*. February 15, 2008, accessed [September 05, 2012](http://www.radikal.com.tr/haber.php?haberno=247476&tarih=15/02/2008), available from: <http://www.radikal.com.tr/haber.php?haberno=247476&tarih=15/02/2008>.

traditional elites to regain their previous privileges, the theme of military tutelage would be analyzed first.

5.1. “Black Front” as the All-mighty Force Embracing the AKP as the ‘Manipulated Government’

Examining the historical developments, with regard to how the liberal intellectuals identified the relations they had with the governing party, it should be noted that starting with the assassination of Hrant Dink and during the terrorist attacks leading to the elections, liberal intellectuals come up with an image of the AKP that is tried to be trapped by the status quo. According to this understanding the rising nationalist discourse of Tayyip Erdoğan and the party’s inability to change the article 301 as well as its slowing down of the reform process cannot be evaluated fairly outside of the “survival strategies” of AKP within the system. This is why, it may be argued that the image of the “powerless government” characterizes also this term and the intellectuals’ attitude of excusing what they regard as the misdeeds of the party. This is to say, despite the discussions in the media in terms of the termination of the coalition between the liberals and political power as well as Erdoğan’s own declarations that there has never been existed such a coalition, given the motivation that they have the sense of distinction through this collaboration they tried to pursue it with supporting the party. Pursuing this attitude was characterized by the claim that following the advices of the liberal intellectuals would make it possible for the party to restore its reformist stance. Under these circumstances, what takes place for these intellectuals is the manipulation of the governing party by the status quo in accordance with its survival strategies within the system. In accordance with this point Altan writes that AKP’s performance during the pre-election period is confirming the claims on the plans of the status quo to prevent the elections⁸⁵. Rise of the terrorist attacks is the major justification point of these claims. Given these excuses, it may be argued that the criticisms never went beyond the longing for the former reformist AKP or the nostalgia for its first years in power, the term it is examined in the first chapter of the thesis.

⁸⁵ M. Altan, “Hükümet Yeniden İktidar Oluyor...” June 28, 2010, accessed September 05, 2012, available from: <http://www.moralhaber.net/makale/hukümet-yeniden-iktidar-oluyor/>.

In this section, the transformation that the sense of distinction is going through due to this performance of AKP and its outcomes would be analyzed with regard to what the liberal intellectuals see as the struggle for power between the center and periphery or synonymously between tutelage and democracy. This will be realized over the analysis of the “liberal” perspective with regard to the incidents of the assassination of Hrant Dink, e-memorandum of April 27, “Republic Protests” as well as the Constitutional Court’s case of closure for AKP.

Here, it may be argued that the Dink interrogation became highly determining for the course of the relations the liberal intellectuals hold with the political power in a way to identify that they are not that indispensable for the latter as the “brain” is to the “body”. Since it is not the concern of the present study to reveal the dynamics of the murder of Hrant Dink, the case will be referred only in the sense that it would help to develop an understanding of the course of the mentioned relationship. At this point, it should be noted that the case constitutes the origin of the split between the two parties as it is clearly manifested by Çandar with regard to his summary of the developments affecting this course. According to Çandar the relationship between the liberal intellectuals and AKP is a form of “tacit alliance” which is not unconditional at all (Çandar, Referans, 03.10.2007). He states that the liberals would continue to support the AKP as long as it furthers the processes of “democratization and civilianization” whereas the attitude of the party with regard to the Dink interrogation and article 301 of the TCK constitute the two criteria that would lead them to decide to what extent the party furthers this process. He even warns that if AKP fails to meet the demands of the liberal intellectuals in terms of these two issues, which according to Çandar seems more than possible in the short run, this political alliance would be easily terminated (Çandar, Referans, 03.10.2007). This is to say, the relations which are jeopardized by the nationalist attitude of the AKP, given its calculations regarding the upcoming presidential and general elections as well as by its reluctance in terms of the 301 and vakıflar yasası, may have been restored to some extent with the e-memorandum in the April 27 and the elections of July 22, but still the prospects of the relationship depend on the fulfillment of these two criteria. He states that “we would not guarantee for AKP forever who is becoming a police state in Hrant Dink’s case, not moving for 301 which became the measurement device for the freedom of expression and bowing to the military tutelage in the route for EU” (Çandar, Referans, 03.10.2007). In accordance with this

understanding the major perspective of Çandar with regard to the governing party in terms of its attitude towards the Hrant Dink case is that it is an “affair of honour” for AKP and a turnsole paper for understanding whether AKP has managed to be the actual holder of power (Çandar, Referans, 04.07.2007).

Being the turnsole paper, it may be argued that the Dink case is the source of the first traces of frustration with the political power starting from the moment that government and the president did not attend the funeral as well as the first session of the trial for murder (Çandar, Referans, 25.01.2007, 03.07.2007). Identifying the fact that those who are responsible for Dink’s murder are the officials that are appointed during the AKP’s term in power and the ones that could interrogate this process are removed from their offices again during this term, Altan argues that if the Ministry of Interior Affairs would have functioned adequately, Dink might not be murdered (Altan, Star, 31.01.2007). Behind this statement, there is the sense of Altan that differentiates Erdoğan from the rest of the party in power which is a position that is frequently referred by the liberal intellectuals. He argues that an adequate interrogation of Dink case would make Erdoğan aware of the fact that those who are responsible for the case were more than familiar. In this regard, addressing Erdoğan he states that “it is apparent that in somewhere very close to you, there are some people who are trying to maximize the deep state, while you are trying to minimize it” (Altan, Star, 31.01.2007). This is the point that characterizes Bayramoğlu’s articles during the process after the death of Hrant Dink with the demands of changing the article 301 of TCK. Here, the equation in this sense is set between the good intentions of Prime Minister and his vice Abdullah Gül and the manipulations of some ministers in the government (Bayramoğlu, Yeni Şafak, 15.02.2007). Bayramoğlu refers here to Cemil Çiçek whom he identifies as the right-wing mind of the government. Çiçek is held responsible for the maintenance of the article 301 of TCK since as the Minister of Justice he already made his perspective apparent with the statement of “milleti arkadan hançerliyorlar” he has given with regard to the Armenian Conference. Moreover, he releases a declaration encouraging the prosecutors to act fast with regard to the articles of the TCK regulating the freedom of expression (Bayramoğlu, Yeni Şafak, 20.02.2007). Under these circumstances, Çandar sets the government responsible for not impeding the transformation of this event into a “boomerang of wild racist nationalism” through bringing out more reforms for democracy immediately including the article 301, vakıflar yasası

(Çandar, Referans, 26.01.2007). The reluctance of the government for providing more democracy and not showing enough sensitivity for the interrogation of Dink's assassination are identified by Çandar as the signs of being surrounded by the status quo in accordance with its plans of leading turmoil in the country before the presidential elections (Çandar, Referans, 06.03.2007). This position indicates the fact that the liberal intellectuals identify the flaw of the governing party as to cooperate with the establishment and not being brave enough to challenge it.

With regard to this collaboration, liberal intellectuals associated Dink's assassination as a point that has no reversibility for the Turkish political scene. In this regard the first reaction of these intellectuals, as it is identified above, is to contextualize the murder within the process of the upcoming presidential elections. This is why Çandar questions in his first article after the shooting that there have been speculations that some assassinations would take place in the process leading to the presidential elections and whether this was part of it (Çandar, Referans, 20.01.2007). It may be argued that, as it will be identified below, this reaction is held and furthered by Çandar in the following months whereas the rest of the liberal intellectuals share the same position with him. Mehmet Altan's first reaction to Dink's murder is to evaluate the case under the tradition of Ittihadism. According to this understanding, Dink's assassination was planned in order to impede the processes leading to Turkey's integration with the global system. The aim, in this regard is to provide the conditions for being reacted by the international actors (such as the acceptance of the bill on Armenian genocide by the US parliament) in a way to rise the nationalistic sentiments in the country. Such an environment would cease Turkey's integration efforts which would lead the conventional actors to maintain the status quo and the privileges they have in the existing order (Altan, Star, 20.01.2007-23.01.2007). In this regard he gives three fundamental issues that are manipulated by the "forces of the status quo" in order to prevent Turkey's integration with the world. These are the "Cyprus issue", Kurdish question and Armenian question (Altan, Star, 23.01.2007). The major theme of the liberal intellectuals with regard to Dink case can be identified as an incident targeting the rule of AKP, which is unsurprisingly realized right before the presidential and general elections. This is why they maintain their support for AKP which is surrounded by status quo despite its "irrational" policy which is against its own prospects since the murder was not only targeting Dink but also the AKP.

According to Altan, AKP has to choose between the positions of being the government which does not take action in terms of the annulment or, at least, for the amendment with regard to the article 301 of the TCK in a way to accept its trapped position by the “black front” and being the reformist as it can be identified from its first three years performance. The choice of the latter would mean being with the people who participated in the funeral and would exclude former position. The crowd in the funeral according to Altan was signifying the statement of the public as the citizens of the world rather than the representatives of certain ethnic origins that they are not accepting any more the manipulations with regard to the ethnic identities, rather the focus is being human (Altan, Star, 24.01.2007). If AKP could immediately provide an understanding of the human-oriented government in accordance with the concerns of this crowd, other possible murders, interventions aiming to provide Turkey’s integration into the world would be prevented in advance (Altan, Star, 25.01.2007). In this regard, Çandar calls the society, media and NGOs into action in a way to take the government, political parties and media under pressure for the proper examination of the Dink case (Çandar, Referans, 01.01.2008). This attitude is also visible in his criticism of the TÜSİAD for not showing the same concern it had for the discussions on Turban for the operation of Ergenekon (Çandar, Referans, 25.01.2008)

First reaction of Bayramoğlu to the assassination is no different than Çandar’s in the sense that the media constitutes one of the major associates of the murderers of Dink with regard to its role in preparing the conditions that he became a target. Bayramoğlu argues that even after this death, media continues to serve as a mechanism to target certain figures within the frame of reference of nationalist sentiments. He identifies how the chief editor of the daily Hürriyet, Ertuğrul Özkök, condemns the article of Etyen Mahçupyan as one of the examples of being an “enemy of the Turks” and engage in a comparison of the funerals of the martyrs and Dink in a way to encode Dink with its other, namely the “separatists”, “terrorists” and “traitors” (Bayramoğlu, 01.02.2007) In his first article right after the assassination, Mahçupyan claimed that this is the test of the Turkey with all institutions for its humanitarianism (Mahçupyan, Zaman, 21.01.2007). The discussions on the slogan “we are all Armenians” were considered by Mahçupyan as an extension of the morality of the Republic and consequently of these institutions. He argues that excluding the religion and the associated morality for it from the

public realm the republic experienced the absence of a common moral ground and tried to compensate it with the ideology of nationalism whereas under these circumstances, “citizenship” refers to the manner of thinking and acting in accordance with this ideology. This idea of morality associated with nationalism renders the slogan of “we are all Armenians” disputable for the Turkish society (Mahçupyan, Zaman, 28.01.2007).

According to liberal intellectuals, the polarization in the society with the rising nationalism can only be overcome with the establishment of a social consensus which would also render these disputes meaningless. Under these circumstances, deepening polarization stands as the major justification for the establishment of a new constitution. The crisis with regard to the Presidential elections is indicative of the lack of a social consensus in the manner that the fears about the prospects of the future president who is a member of the AKP or whose wife is wearing turban, render the democratic processes questionable whereas the intervention of the institutions of the established order would be legitimate for some part of the society in this account. Democracy can be sacrificed for some when these fears are the issues. It may be argued that the conceptualization of the “powerless government” determining their discussions on Dink is also confirmed in this period through the internet memorandum during the presidential elections in the parliament as well as the trial of closure. Whereas it may be expected that these developments would solidify the relations between the liberal intellectuals and political power, they could not be effective since the political power’s view of the intellectuals were now public which may be summarized with Tayyip Erdoğan’s statement that “they were detriment for us”. The case of Hrant Dink resulted with a public discussion dominated by nationalist sentiments. The political power, under the circumstances which are also determined by the rising Kurdish question and by its nationalist orientation, did not stand together with these intellectuals who share the commonality of having personal relations with Hrant Dink. This point is meaningful in the sense that Habervaktim, once it is apparent that there has left no relationship between these intellectuals and political power, that they have lost their place near the political power as well as the spot in the airplanes of the politicians, has targeted Bayramoğlu arguing that he has Armenian origins and act in accordance with the

strategy of “ermenicilik”⁸⁶. Here, it may be argued that nationalism rather than the turban as it is tried to be reflected by the liberal intellectuals became the source of the fluctuation in terms of their relationship. Or in other words, the brain was not so decisive for abandoning this relationship whereas the governing party was not depending on it to that extent.

To sum up, the rising nationalism (in the form of “ulusalcılık”) constitutes one of the major concerns of the liberal intellectuals following the death of Dink. According to Bayramoğlu this position is the result of the February 28 process and it is characterized by the emphasis on the “secularism”. With regard to this mentality secularism is not only a reaction against the Islamists, rather it serves as the founder of the “ulusalçı” identity. According to Bayramoğlu the major parts of this identity, keeping the established order and restoring what has been lost led to the evaluation of the developments Turkey experience from within a phobia of the constant threat by the inner and outer enemies. As a result the principle of secularism has been incorporated with the attitudes of opposing EU, concerning about civilianization, distancing with the democratization (Bayramoğlu, Yeni Şafak, 17.02.2007). This point is confirmed in the memorandum in April 27 since it is declared that the Turkish Armed Forces are following the secular concerns with the following words:

The problem that emerged in the presidential election process is focused on arguments over secularism. Turkish Armed Forces are concerned about the recent situation. It should not be forgotten that the Turkish Armed Forces are a party in those arguments, and absolute defender of secularism. Also, the Turkish Armed Forces is definitely opposed to those arguments and negative comments. It will display its attitude and action openly and clearly whenever it is necessary⁸⁷.

Moreover the second major statement of the military in the memorandum was:

Those who are opposed to Great Leader Mustafa Kemal Atatürk's understanding 'How happy is the one who says I am a Turk' are enemies of the Republic of Turkey and will remain so. The Turkish Armed Forces maintain their sound determination to carry out their duties stemming from laws to protect the unchangeable characteristics of the Republic of Turkey. Their loyalty to this determination is absolute⁸⁸.

⁸⁶ E. Gülcan, “Habervaktim Nefret Etme, Ettirme!” updated June 27, 2012, accessed September 05, 2012, <http://bianet.org/bianet/bianet/139359-habervaktim-nefret-etme-ettirme>.

⁸⁷ “Excerpts of Turkish Army Statement,” updated April 28, 2007, accessed September 05, 2012, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6602775.stm>.

The secular and nationalist concerns that are declared with these two statements in the memorandum are taken into account by the liberal intellectuals as the signal of the fact that the military elites are opposing the demands of the Islamists for power. At this point, it may be argued that associating the target of the second statement as the Islamists rather than the nationalist groups such as Kurds is a clear indication of their perspective that the Muslims are moving away from their traditional bonds with Turkish nationalism. Mahçupyan summarizes this process in the manner that the modernization the Islamists experienced led them to be secularized in a way to redefine Islamism that from now on the Muslim identity is started to be accepted by much more people living in the cities rendering them to compose a new category of citizenship. Under these circumstances, the Islamists no longer necessitate the official definition of Turkishness to define themselves⁸⁹.

Here, Saraçoğlu's presentation of the nationalism of AKP is highly relevant which is, as it is mentioned above, refers also to the specificity of the party within the center-right tradition in the manner that leads it to recognize the Kurdish question. He argues that the positioning of AKP in opposition to the Kemalism given its nationalist connotations creates the illusion that AKP cannot be categorized as a nationalist party. This illusion is completely related with the fact that due to its Islamist orientation, the term millet is not defined by AKP through the centrality of ethnicity rather through the "common culture" depending on being Muslims (2011: 46).

Here it may be argued that this illusion which may taken into account as the exclusion of nationalism by the Islamists which is also the ground placing them in opposition to the nationalist (ulusalcı) front is one of the major points that the liberal intellectuals envision as attractive in a way to lead them to participate in the intellectual bloc⁹⁰. According to Mahçupyan, the polls before the elections in July 22 show that the volatility between AKP and MHP depending on the commonality with regard to "being conservatives and belonging to the middle Anatolia" came to a halt.

⁸⁸ Ibid.

⁸⁹ E. Mahçupyan, *Zaman/Yorum*, May 03, 2007, accessed September 05, 2012, available from: <http://www.zaman.com.tr/haber.do?haberno=535040&title=yorum-etyen-mahcupyan-bir-hassasiyet-olarak-darbe-gereksinimi&haberSayfa=0>

⁹⁰ E. Mahçupyan, *Zaman/Yorum*, May 03, 2007, accessed September 05, 2012, available from: <http://www.zaman.com.tr/haber.do?haberno=535040&title=yorum-etyen-mahcupyan-bir-hassasiyet-olarak-darbe-gereksinimi&haberSayfa=0>

As it is given above with reference to Mahçupyan, the experience of the Islamists in the last 10 years of the Turkish Republic is characterized by a process of secularization which led them to redefine themselves as an actor of the global market. According to Mahçupyan, the major consequence of this process is the development of individualization from within the religiousness indicating a distance between the religious sentiments and nationalism in a way to impede the understanding that sees AKP and MHP as alternative to each other⁹¹. At this point, it is plausible to argue that one of the major elements of the frustration of the liberal intellectuals with the political power is this very collaboration given the attraction of the AKP for these intellectuals was its image of the excluding nationalism.

The major premise of the liberal intellectuals with regard to the “Republic Protests” should be taken into account in terms of this view of nationalism. For liberal intellectuals these meetings that are realized in Tandoğan, Çağlayan and Gündoğdu, in the same manner that is declared with the second statement of the e-memorandum, are the incidents in which the emphasis of the nationalist front in terms of owning the republic manifested itself most apparently. In other words, the aim of the meetings is to prevent the presidency of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and in this way to protect the republic from AKP. But Çandar makes a difference between the organizers and participants; while the former refers to the national socialists the latter refers to the people who are genuinely afraid of the prospects of the political regime in terms of the unity of the state as well as the principle of secularism. However, these fears are in vain, they do not have correspondence in real life for Çandar. Since Erdoğan is himself the product of the social mobility that is definitive of the republic, it is not possible for him to constitute a threat to the structure that is responsible for himself. Moreover, any social movement that is lacking a social programme is not meaningful at all, the antidemocratic traces can find a place in it easily (Çandar, Referans, 17.04.2007).

At this point, it should be noted that the prevalent use of the flags by the demonstrators as the statement of representing the nation and owning the state cannot be fairly understood unless these fears are taken into account. The authoritarian tendencies characterizing the meetings are the logical consequence of getting

⁹¹ E. Mahçupyan, *Zaman/ Yorum*, July 05, 2007, accessed September 05, 2012, available from: <http://www.zaman.com.tr/haber.do?haberno=559990&title=yorum-etyen-mahcupyan-akpnin-gizli-ajandasi-belli-oldu&haberSayfa=0>

organized around a threat or a fear. This manner of organization results with a sense of politics that is developed around the communities. Under these circumstances one's political position is a matter of being an insider or an outsider rendering the wills of the people questionable. Following this line of reasoning liberal intellectuals argued that "the political sickness" of secular nationalism is the major motivation of these meetings since it leads people to identify the possible threat from the outsiders as so serious that it would legitimize an anti-democratic intervention of the military institution (Bayramođlu, Yeni Şafak, 09.05.2007).

Çandar argues that, as it is already stated by Bayramođlu, the intervention chronicles published in the Nokta Magazine were referring to the organization of big meetings which would provide the sense that the possible intervention of the military would be legitimate. In a way to substantiate this fact he argues that the institutions organizing the "republic protests" were the same that are planned to be addressed in the "Intervention Chronicles" (Bayramođlu, Yeni Şafak, 15.04.2008). The aim is to get rid of the government of AKP through associating it with a hidden agenda of Shari'a (Çandar, Referans, 16.05.2007) whereas the major threat Turkey is facing is the threat of military intervention for the liberal intellectuals. In this sense, as it is already stated by Bayramođlu, there is no social correspondence of the support for Shari'a. The meetings of Republic were considered by Bayramođlu as one of the instances in which the duality between the center and periphery manifested itself very clearly. The same concern is furthered by Altan arguing that what is signified with the republic protests within the frame of reference of the center/periphery duality is a sense that who is not resembling us is a form of enemy. This frame of reference resulted with an understanding that holds the maintenance of the Kemalist republic primary with regard to the establishment of democracy. This is to say, not having democracy as one of the concerns of these meetings depends on the fact that a claim on democracy would mean the inclusion of the people who are not capable of being citizens the Kemalists. Under these circumstances, being from Kayseri is also an important point for the presidency of Abdullah Gül, since supporting him would refer taking side with the periphery. Altan argues that the people of Kayseri were uncomfortable with the candidacy process since the response of the status quo was implying that under the circumstances and principles of the republic it is not acceptable for someone from Kayseri to claim the highest position in the order. According to Altan this is an appearance of the class conflict through the means of

secularism and Shari'a between the governing elite of the republic who is trying to substitute the bourgeoisie and the poor who are supposed to support labor. While the first group defines itself over the concerns of Kemalism, secularism and republicanism, the latter defines itself over the religious sentiments. The difference between the center and the periphery is also constructed in accordance with the difference between İstanbul and Ankara. While the former is representative of cosmopolitanism, the latter is indicative of monolithism, ego-centrism which identifies what is different from itself as the enemy. The politics of community is not realizable with regard to the hundred years of tradition of İstanbul. Çandar relates the Malatya case with the politics of community which is characterized by intolerance and tries to legitimize which is not included by the "rule of law" (Çandar, Referans, 19.04.2007). This is why, according to Bayramoğlu the meetings in fact are not only related to the turban of the future first lady. Rather the fear which is the motivation of these gatherings is about the periphery's steps towards the center which makes it more visible even in the manner that it governs the center. According to Bayramoğlu the case that the fear resulting from the possible presidency of Tayyip Erdoğan is not understandable since he has already been the prime minister of the republic for four years and has not attempted to establish Shari'a yet, is confirming the existence of the power struggle between the center and the periphery and its manifestation during the "Republic Protests". With regard to these terms, according to Altan what takes place can be summarized as a conflict over the domination leading the dominants of the established order to feel under threat rather than the existence of an actual possibility of Shari'a (Altan, Star, 16.04.2007). According to Altan this understanding of republic in Turkey lacking the emphasis on democracy could not have a perspective of pluralism and toleration for "the other", rather it is stuck into a western manner of consumption which is substantiated as the "proper", true form of life-style. Thus, it is possible that the discontent with the political power could turn into a protest which would be taken into account as legitimizing the deeds of the military. Here, it is completely related to note that, according to Bayramoğlu, the fact that the meetings are examples of using one's right to protest does not render them democratic. Bayramoğlu makes a distinction claiming that the demands of the demonstrators were not willing change rather they were characterized by a policy incorporating rejection, resistance and prevention, these meetings aimed the depoliticization of the political realm (Bayramoğlu, Yeni Şafak, 19.04.2007).

Under these circumstances with regard to the controversies concerning the presidential elections it may be argued that the institution of the presidency, despite its democratic look depending on its election in the parliament, represents the highest institution that the center endows. This is why, the presidential elections in Turkey have always been subjected to crisis which is the result of the contradiction of the political regime to be democratic in its form but authoritarian in content. The system is founded upon the mentality that “those who are appointed” are and should be hierarchically above than “those who are elected” and under these circumstances presidency as the highest institution of the established order, due to the process of the elections in the parliament has been always under the threat of its occupation by the ones who are not accepted as proper citizens of the Republic. According to Mahçupyan, the modernization process of Turkey is realized through an understanding of positivism which rendered an authoritarian version of secularism as the foundation of the proper definition of citizenship. This definition legitimized the bureaucratic elite to exclude the periphery from the politics due to their incapability of being citizens. The elites in order to prevent this understanding from challenging their democratic appearance incorporated the term with what they regarded as “contemporaneousness” which served as the means to make it ideologically possible to exclude certain segments of society from the politics and still be concerned as democratic. Therefore, it may be argued that the reason behind the fact that the discussions on the dressing manner (turban) of the would-be first lady formed great part of the political agenda is this determinacy of the concept of “modernism” or “contemporaneousness” in the Turkish politics which may be translated as the appointed cadres practice of controlling the ones who are chosen⁹².

Regarding the discussion above, it may be argued that according to Mahçupyan Turkey is no way a secular country rather it is characterized by an authoritarian/statist manner of opposing religion and this is why the slogan “Turkey is secular and will remain the same” is a wish in terms of the maintenance of the existing order of things⁹³. It may be argued that whereas it is opposing any position

⁹²E. Mahçupyan, “Rektörler Göreve Öyle mi?” *Zaman/Yorum*, April, 08 2007, accessed September 05, 2012, available from: <http://www.zaman.com.tr/haber.do?haberno=524858&title=rektorler-goreve-oyle-mi-4-okul-bahcesinde-yaramaz-cocuklar&haberSayfa=0>

⁹³E. Mahçupyan, “Bir Hassasiyet Olarak Darbe Gereksinimi,” *Zaman/Yorum*, May, 03, 2007, accessed September 05, 2012, available from:

that is out of the perspective “the republic is under the test of democracy” and all its conventional figures are trying to save themselves from this test. It is trying to save itself from the democratizing demands of the Anatolia.

Regarding what is discussed in the chapter, it is possible to argue that the relationship between the liberal intellectuals and political power which is jeopardized with the Dink interrogation has been restored with the April 27 memorandum, republic protests as well as the closure case. Here, it is the concern of the thesis to identify the motivation of this restoration. It may be argued that in accordance with defining the society over the dichotomy of center and periphery and associating them with tutelage and democracy, as it can be clearly identified from the analysis of the term, liberal intellectuals define the political realm over a confrontation with the nationalists (ulusalcılar). Under these circumstances two positions are recognized in the politics and if one identifies itself through another political standing this still would not challenge this recognition. This is to say, one’s claim to other political standings is positioned by the liberal intellectuals with regard to its closeness to the recognized positions of either the statist nationalist or the liberal democrat. Such limitation of politics renders it possible to ridicule the opponents as it will be identified more clearly in the next chapter. However, it is concluded in this chapter that the context of the presidential elections was extremely available for the liberal intellectuals to state their distinction over the irrationality of the other position while in this regard the republic protests constituted the major justification point. Here, it may be argued that Necmi Erdoğan’s definition of liberal personality is completely relevant to understand this point as well as to make sense of the liberal intellectuals’ constant support for the AKP despite the confrontation they have been through (2009: 117). Erdoğan argues that the liberal reproduces the dichotomies of “us/them”, “either/or” in the manner that it pretends to transcend such dualities while this transcendence is confirmed by its self-image that is characterized by the theme of “iconoclasm”. It may be argued that this “iconoclasm” was depended on the coalition with the AKP since as the representative of the periphery its very existence in the power was challenging the sacredness of the existing order. Moreover, due to defining the political realm over the dichotomy of the rationality and irrationality, being left out of the collaboration with the periphery, there would not be any other

possibility for the liberal intellectual to continue its self-image of distinction. This is why, as it will be identified below, when turban case and the political power's ignorance of the advices and warnings of the liberal intellectuals jeopardized this coalition, liberal intellectuals tried to restore this relationship over the excuses which are regarded as the results of the AKP's survival strategies in the tutelary regime.

5.2. The Conditions for the Restoration of the Relationship between Intellectuals and Political Power: EU Process and Civilian constitution

During the term till the case of closure Çandar states his frustration with the government because of not changing the article 301 of TCK which he finds as the major reason of the process targeted Hrant Dink (Çandar, Referans, 25.01.2007) while Altan anticipates that AKP's retreat from its promises of 301 and EU is apparent in terms of its leaving aside the 9th harmony package depending (Altan, Star, 05.10.2007). The misdeeds of the government with regard to its ignorance of the concerns of the women from cities, its cooperation with the systemic figures in terms of the Şemdinli incident, as well as its unwillingness to protect the Nokta magazine constituted the major reservation points for Altan with regard to his attitude to the government. Thus, it may be argued that the major theme of this process leading to the presidential elections is the "Ankaralılaşmak" of the AKP. Liberal intellectuals are urging it to turn back to its characteristic of being the actor of the "silent revolution" and with regard to these expectations the failure to change the article 301 of TCK stands as the clear sign of the resemblance between the AKP and the other parties (Altan, Star, 15.02.2007). This performance of AKP is taken into account as a form of pragmatism challenging the aim of the establishment of the universal norms of democracy. Given his emphasis on the weakness of the inner dynamics of the Turkish society, for Altan only possible element that would leap the understanding of republicanism to the point of incorporating democratic concerns which would guarantee the position of the political power with regard to the military is the membership to EU (Altan, Star, 30.04.2007) which is the only prescription for salvation.

In order to understand the conditions of the presentation of EU and civilian constitution as the prescription of salvation both for democratization of Turkey and the relationship between the liberal intellectuals and political power, a brief reminder of the responses of these intellectuals to the context is necessary. It may be argued that all the intellectuals were expecting during the process leading to the presidential elections the rise of a crisis. The starting point for this crisis was the murder of Hrant Dink maintaining the argument that he was shot for creating turmoil in the society which would lead to the protection of the presidential post from the periphery. With the rising nationalism and the national independence meetings as well as the frequent presence of the soldiers as commentators in the screen were taken into as part of the plans to create this sense of turmoil. The president Ahmet Necdet Sezer hosts 8 generals in Çankaya and Bayramoğlu identifies this incident as a message to the government with regard to their attitude on the presidential elections. Bayramoğlu warns the government not to leave the ground to the military and oppose it as the only actor that is capable of preventing an attempt of intervention. Moreover, media is also responsible for constituting the ground that would justify such an intervention under the circumstances that the exposure of the “andıç” making a distinction between the members of the press with regard to their credibility to the military. It may be argued that the publications of the Nokta magazine on the “intervention chronicles” which are claimed to belong to former chief of naval forces, confirmed their position with regard to the constant threat of the intervention in Turkey (Bayramoğlu, YeniŞafak, 31.03.2007). The content of the diaries were the two attempts for a coup which are hindered due to the disagreement within the military as well as the disapproval of the international actors (Bayramoğlu, Yeni Şafak, 30.03.2007). This news resulted with the interrogation of Nokta and the termination of its publication. However, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan did not give the reaction that is expected by the liberal intellectuals. With regard to the chronicles Erdoğan calls the prosecutors to interrogate the claims on the intervention whereas Bayramoğlu states that it is also the responsibility of the executive to provide the conditions of this interrogation. This could be started with the Prime minister’s attempt to interrogate the Chief of the General Staff who is himself an official that is responsible to the Prime minister (Bayramoğlu, Yeni Şafak, 05.04.2007).

It may be argued that the reluctance of the political power in this regard is the outcome of being surrounded by the forces of the status quo which is waiting the

suitable time to intervene. This is why, referring to the recent experience of e-memorandum the early-election in the July 22 was taken into account as a referendum between democracy and military tutelage and in this sense signifying the people's decisiveness on their choice with the former. This was also indicating the end point of the Kemalist modernization led by the Jacobins and the start of the democratic modernization characterized by the leadership of the public (Altan, Star, 23.07.2007) which is defined by Mahçupyan as the "self-governance" of the Turkish society⁹⁴. Here, it should be remembered that the memorandum of April 27 resulted with the decisions of early elections in July as well as the constitutional amendment package that is reregulating the process of presidential elections. With regard to this regulation there stands the decision of the constitutional court stating that the majority of 367 deputies should be present in the parliament for the elections to be valid. According to Çandar the aim of the CHP which brought the presidential elections to the Constitutional Court and the Supreme Court constituting the most effective institutions of the bureaucratic front is to deepen the crisis and render it impossible for the election of the president in a way to prevent an early election's possibility of solving crisis (Çandar, Referans, 03.05.2007). In this sense, liberal intellectuals claimed that the results of the elections of July 22 confirmed that not only the Islamists but also the other segments of society who are not associated with this identity were critical of the tutelary regime. This is to say, according to Mahçupyan as a result of the developments leading to the election process such as the e-memorandum and the constitutional court's decision with regard to the annulment of the presidential elections, it is identified by the Turkish population that the real threat is the intervention rather than the Sharia. This is why, the elections were characterized by the behavior of the great part of the secular electorate to position itself near to the opposition to the interventions overcoming their middle position they had with regard to the motto of "neither intervention, not Shari'a"⁹⁵. He

⁹⁴E. Mahçupyan, "Seçim Değil Referandum!" *Zaman/Yorum*, July 19, 2007, accessed September 05, 2012, available from: <http://www.zaman.com.tr/haber.do?haberno=565688&title=yorum-etyen-mahcupyan-secim-degil-referandum&haberSayfa=0>

⁹⁵E. Mahçupyan, "Zihinsel Körlük," *Zaman/Yorum*, August 02, 2007 accessed September 05, available from: <http://www.zaman.com.tr/haber.do?haberno=571383&title=yorum-etyen-mahcupyan-zihinsel-korluk&haberSayfa=0>; E. Mahçupyan, "Henüz Demokrat Olmadık," *Zaman/Yorum*, August 16, 2007, accessed September 05, 2012, <http://www.zaman.com.tr/haber.do?haberno=576668&title=yorum-etyen-mahcupyan-henuz-demokrat-olmadik&haberSayfa=0>

argues that the Armenian community which is traditionally voting for the center right parties would majorly vote for the AKP referring to a first in the history of the community given their concerns for the parties with Islamist orientations. Mahçupyan holds this fact as a clear indication of the situation that AKP is a center-right party and have no secret agenda which is assumed by the center as their justification point for opposing or excluding AKP from the realm of politics through an intervention⁹⁶.

Moreover, the impossibility of proposing such an agenda is the result of, according to Mahçupyan, being the center itself rather than moving towards the center. This is to say, the transformation the Islamists experienced throughout the last 30 years of the Turkish Republic lead them to expand in a way that they are now the center which differentiates AKP from all other political parties depending on its capability of representing the society. With regard to this specific position of AKP in the Turkish political scene, Mahçupyan argues that it has the most extensive potential of democratization since in the long-run it would not try to harmonize with the conventional center which has no correspondence in the societal level. This is to say, under the circumstances that the social center determines the political center rather than the reverse manner characterizing the Turkish political history, there is no possibility of AKP to hold a secret agenda other than to bring out more democracy⁹⁷.

This is not to say AKP is a democratic party rather it is the case that it has the de facto function of democratization due to representing the Islamist front who is willing to be counted as a global actor and has demands in accordance with this will⁹⁸. According to Mahçupyan the change the Islamists have been subjected to in the last ten years stands also the reason for the implausibility of what is termed by Şerif Mardin and what is accepted by the laicists as the “neighborhood pressure”. This immediate acceptance refers, for Mahçupyan, to the attempt of the laicists to

⁹⁶E. Mahçupyan, “Henüz Demokrat Olmadık”, *Zaman/Yorum*, August 16, 2007, Accessed September 05, 2012, Available from: <http://www.zaman.com.tr/haber.do?haberno=576668&title=yorum-etyen-mahcupyan-henuz-demokrat-olmadik&haberSayfa=0>; E. Mahçupyan, “AKP’nin Gizli Ajandası Belli Oldu”, *Zaman/ Yorum*, July 05, 2007, accessed September 05, 2012, available from: <http://www.zaman.com.tr/haber.do?haberno=559990&title=yorum-etyen-mahcupyan-akpnin-gizli-ajandasi-belli-oldu&haberSayfa=0>

⁹⁷E. Mahçupyan, “AKP’nin Gizli Ajandası Belli Oldu”, *Zaman/ Yorum*, July 05, 2007, accessed September 05, 2012, available from: <http://www.zaman.com.tr/haber.do?haberno=559990&title=yorum-etyen-mahcupyan-akpnin-gizli-ajandasi-belli-oldu&haberSayfa=0>

⁹⁸ Ibid.

condemn the change that is brought through this segment of society and signifies being defeated by “the other” manifested in its occupation of the public sphere from which it was formerly excluded. Here, it may be argued that the Islamists are presented as if they did not change at all and still own the neighborhoods the collapse of which the Kemalist regime targeted in order to diffuse its principles and project of modernization. This is a clear example of the Kemalist inability in the form of the “conscious blindness” to recognize the social change that is out of the scope what is drew as the proper manner of development by itself. As a result, according to Mahçupyan, Kemalists due to being afraid of the transformation of “the other”, preferred to view it as a form of stagnancy and used this mentality through the conceptualization of the “neighborhood pressure” under the circumstances that a conservative was elected as the head of the political regime and the conservatives were preparing a new constitution.

In this regard, the turban issue for Mahçupyan is a clear case manifesting the concerns of the Kemalist elites of losing their privileges. This is why the emphasis is again on the incapability of the “immature crowd” which in this case reaches to the point that identifies the periphery as not citizens but as a different category. Mahçupyan argues that since Turkish law formally depends on the international law and there is no statement in the latter that a ban on the turban could be based due to its challenge to the concept of the inalienability of individual rights and liberties, Turkish bureaucracy denied the equal status of the ones with the turban and developed another category of citizenship for them which is different from the rest of the society. As a result, Turkey has ended with a structure whereas in its legal documents there was not a clear-cut statement against turban’s use in the public sphere, practically it was banned as a result of the conviction of the supreme court. Moreover, it is possible to argue that the turban issue functioned as a turnsole paper to identify that most of the secular intellectuals were not democrats at all. These intellectuals are criticized by Mahçupyan for adopting the position of the Kemalists in terms of turban whom they challenge with regard to their attitude on the tutelage of the judiciary.

According to Mahçupyan, this differentiation is the result of the different understandings of democracy by the modernist and post-modernist stands. For modernism a positivist understanding of the development of the society is included depending on a unitary and “true” definition of democracy. On the other hand, for

post-modernism, it is the premise that given our partial understandings of the external life, even if there is a commonality in the society about them, it is not possible to talk about a single truth. Consequently, the perspectives and demands of the positions corresponding to minorities in the society cannot be sacrificed for the sake of the majority's decision. This is why any life choice that is not threatening the others in the society is taken into account as an inviolable right whereas wearing turban cannot be considered outside of the individual rights and freedoms. On the contrary for modernists it is not possible to conclude in the same manner in terms of the usage of turban in the public sphere. The line of reasoning here can be summarized as since laicism is a position enlightening the mind with regard to this positivist understanding, it is taken into account as the prerequisite of being a democrat. As a result, it may be argued that the discussions on turban resulted with a distinction between the modernist intellectuals and democrat intellectuals whereas with regard to the Turkish modernization process being modern and secular is traditionally hold as synonymous with being a democrat⁹⁹.

According to Mahçupyan, the postmodern condition of the globalization challenges the tutelary regime in a way that it has not ever experienced in its history. With regard to this situation, three developments that the global structure provided should be identified. First is the transformation that the conservatives are experienced in accordance with the global processes and their will to attain power. Secondly, the membership process deepened the EU's understanding of Turkey in a way that it realized there is not a threat of Shari'a as it is proposed by the bureaucratic elites in order to justify their intervention in politics. The last development is the differentiation of some segments of the laicist bloc from the rest of it through questioning its understanding of democracy and consequently, composing new relations with the conservatives. Under the circumstances that even the laicists are challenging the possibility of a military intervention, there arose the necessity to develop a source of justification for the intrusion that would maintain the privileges of the bureaucracy. This tried to be realized by the movement of nationalists (ulusalcılık) and the organization of the Ergenekon. It is planned with the operations of the organization nationalist sentiments would risen in a way to provide

⁹⁹ E. Mahçupyan, "Demokrasi ve Demokratlık," *Zaman/ Yorum*, March 17, 2008, accessed September 05, 2012, available from: <http://www.zaman.com.tr/haber.do?haberno=665501&title=yorum-etyen-mahcupyan-demokrasi-ve-demokratlik&haberSayfa=0>

the ground for a possible intervention that would challenge the power of AKP and bring the membership process into a halt. “Republic Protests” should be thought with regard to this frame of reference. This matter of legitimacy is also tried to be managed through the confirmation of the supreme courts which manifested itself in the closure trial for AKP¹⁰⁰.

Under the circumstances that are characterized by the intervention of Ergenekon, Republic protests and constitutional court decisions, for liberal intellectuals it is not possible to define AKP as the party in power. Its restoration of its power (to the extent that it has in the established order) would be realized with the July 22 elections which would constitute the major motivation behind the support of the liberal intellectuals of supporting AKP during this election. In order to substantiate this point Çandar’s presentation of e-memorandum is highly critical. According to Çandar, the April 27 memorandum, despite the difference it has from its previous counterparts with regard to the management of the process, shares the commonality of being a military intervention whereas its results are detrimental with regard to the democratization project of Turkey which is developed around the aim of membership to EU. With this memorandum, Çandar states that, Turkey has lost 10 years and turned into its experience during February 28 period and it is started to be defined again as a country democracy of which is under risk of intervention (Çandar, Referans, 01.05.2007). From now on, AKP is not as powerful as it was before the memorandum which confirms the liberal intellectuals’ perspective on the party as the powerless government. In accordance with this understanding Altan argued after the announcement of the reasoned decision of the closure case in October 24 2008 in the Official Gazette of Turkish Republic that the outcome of the trial process is not closing but wearing out AKP’s power¹⁰¹. The reasoned decision included the statement that the party has become the center of anti-secularist activities whereas its relations with the EU as well as the reforms it realized rendered it possible to decide that these activities did not constitute the necessary justification for the closure of the party. For Altan there is not a conflict between the project of membership to EU and the turban issue which is used as the major reason for the definition of the party as

¹⁰⁰E. Mahçupyan, “Yoksa Darbe Normal mi?,” *Zaman/Yorum*, June 20, 2008, accessed September 05, 2012, available from: <http://www.zaman.com.tr/haber.do?haberno=704385&title=yorum-etyen-mahcupyan-yoksa-darbe-normal-mi2&haberSayfa=2>.

¹⁰¹ M. Altan, “Gerekçeyi Tersten Okumak,” *Star*, October 25, 2008, accessed September 05, 2012, <http://www.mehmetaltan.com/index.asp?sayfa=sureliyayin&icerik=681>.

the center of these activities as long as it is taken into account with regard to the frame of reference of fundamental rights and liberties. Such an understanding would prevent the government to ban some liberties and to let some others and consequently would be a response to the claims associating it with the political Islam. Moreover, case of closure could be evaluated as an opportunity to reconsider its position and to “make a fresh start” in the route that is proposed by the EU which would also provide the conditions that the status quo of Ankara could not intervene in its power¹⁰².

It may be argued that major warning in this regard is AKP’s transformation into a systemic party. For Altan, confirmed by the progress reports of EU, the elements that are referred to justify this position are the constitutional amendments on the articles of 10 and 42 instead of the overall change of the constitution, the stance of the party with regard to the Kurdish question as it can be identified during the process of intervention in the Northern Iraq and in terms of not changing the TMK which stands as an important impediment for the freedom of expression as well as the regulation of the article 301 in a way not to bring a positive difference. Despite the fact that he finds the turban decision of the constitutional court as superseding the limits of its authority, he criticizes the AKP in this regard claiming that the manner it pursued the turban issue provided the status quo with the suitable ground to reestablish itself above the concerns of democracy. There is the little hope for Altan with regard to the AKP’s capability of reversing this process through turning back its reformist character in its first term, unless the EU membership is targeted and followed¹⁰³. This is to say, such an attempt would create the conditions for saving AKP from the tutelage of the “status quo” (Altan, *Star*, 10.06.2010).

The limits of the criticism with regard to the turban issue for Altan is determined by the quality of the main opposition party. He argues that if AKP talks to this party and addresses the forces of the status quo, it is inevitable for Turkey to be democratized. Whereas the problem here is the perspective of the “black front” to maintain the status quo which is characterized by the themes of isolation and closing oneself to the developments over the world and responding such politics would

¹⁰² M. Altan, “Gerekçeyi Tersten Okumak,” *Star*, October 25, 2008, accessed September 05, 2012, <http://www.mehmetaltan.com/index.asp?sayfa=sureliyayin&icerik=681>.

¹⁰³ According to Mehmet Uğur, this possibility is not very likely to be realized given the fact that as long as AKP concluded that it has the necessary support in the local and bureaucratic levels to win the elections, it started to leave its pro-EU allies (2009: 1012).

impoverish also the perspective of the AKP in a way to lower it from the global level to domestic concerns. This war of position prevents AKP from developing an understanding of evaluating the social life through the perspective of fundamental rights and liberties. The consequent political realm is the one in which AİHM decision on the must religious courses for the Alevi citizens is not followed by AKP, the missionaries are murdered in Malatya, certain municipalities ban alcohol from the public sphere, the demands of the women students for wearing turban in universities turns into an constitutional crisis and in which the Directory of the Religious Affairs denounce the flirt, adultery as well as the friendship between the sexes. According to Altan, this political realm can only be fixed with a return to the democratization project targeted through the membership to the EU since this would bring with itself the idea of following the fundamental rights and liberties and prevents AKP from discriminating between certain freedoms: struggling for the one and pressuring the other (Altan, Star, 01.06.2007). The quality of the opposition is determining for the AKP and in this regard the responsibility of the lacking profile of AKP with regard to the rights and liberties cannot be understood unless the participation of the forces of the status quo is taken into account.

Regarding all of the notions above, it may be argued that the perspective of the liberal intellectuals in terms of AKP is the transformation of a reformist figure into a systemic one which they summarize as the process of “Ankaralılışmak”. The hope with the AKP depends on this perspective that it would revitalize its essence of being a revolutionary if it could manage to save itself from the tutelage of the forces of the status quo. All the misdeeds of AKP including its harsh attitude with regard to the May 1st demonstrators cannot be understood without the coalition they had with the “front of the status quo” (Altan, Star, 06.05.2008) which is not unexpected to be maintained till the conclusion of the closure case¹⁰⁴ by the constitutional court.

Moreover, other than the excuses mentioned above, it is possible to defend that personal relations with the important figures of the AKP constitute another major element with regard to the unwillingness of the liberal intellectuals to develop serious criticisms of the AKP. Altan always finds a figure from the AKP in a way to reflect his hopes from the party. The breakfasts, dinners they joined together with

¹⁰⁴ For a discussion on the subject see M. Sevinç, “AKP’nin Kapatılma Davası” in AKP Kitabı: *Bir Dönüşümün Bilançosu*, Uzel and Duru ed., (Phoenix: İstanbul, 2010).

these figures as well as their participation in the global conferences as part of the teams of such figures, namely closeness with the ministers, deputies as well as the prime minister and president constituted a sense of importance which they could not attain since the term of Özal's presidency (Altan, Star, 29.01.2007). Özal stands a major figure for Çandar in this regard. He is the one who is worried about his well-being and provided him with full protection during the times that he was getting threatened. There are other times he states that he has been targeted by various publications but he never got the sense of security which it was the case during Özal period (Çandar, Referans, 03.02.2007). Here, the memories of the February 28 also stand as a commonality with the AKP. Çandar, Altan and Bayramoğlu were all fired from their posts as a result of the andıç and they are severely threatened. Under these circumstances the daily which opened up space for them was Yeni Şafak. Being the victims of the February 28, in this regard can be taken into account as the reason of feeling close to the political power and the Islamist media. This commonality in terms of being the "victims" of the system from time to time leads Altan to refer to the speeches of Ertuğrul Günay and Ali Babacan and argues that he finds consolation in them (Altan, Star, 03.02.2008).

It is also the case with his reference to Erdoğan's speech as the solution to all problems. Erdoğan stated the mission of the politics as meeting the requirements of the public in its totality within the frame of reference of the fundamental rights and liberties. This is the manner that would solve the Alevi and Kurdish questions as well as the turban issue. Right after the confirmation of the rejection of the Alevi's demands for the acceptance of the Cemevi as the place of worshipping from the prime ministry in the court, he finds again the hope in the speech of Erdoğan for the solution of the problem (Altan, Star, 13.01.2008). Alevis apply to the European Court of Human Rights for the exemption of the Alevi students from the must religious classes and the Court decides in favor of this demand whereas it is declared by the Minister of Education that the demand would not have applicability in real life but still Altan tries to gather hope from the speeches of the politicians of AKP. In this regard, when AKP announced its Action plan in the January of 2008, he argues that this plan would revive the reformist, transformist AKP and its implication would be the establishment of the "New Turkey" (Altan, Star, 12.01.2008).

It may be argued that the turban issue has opened a new phase for the relationship between the political power and liberal intellectuals that the former was

publicly announcing that the hopes the latter tried to gather from these speeches were not meant in the manner the liberal intellectuals perceive them. However, despite the fact that it is possible to argue that this moment is characterized by the fluctuations in the mentioned relationship first due to the government's attitude in terms of the Hrant Dink case and secondly in terms of the constitutional amendments regarding turban, still the emphasis is on taking side with the AKP as the only democratizing actor of the political realm (Çandar, Referans, 16.02.2008). As the major component of this fluctuation the consequences of the support of the liberal intellectuals to the declaration of the headscarved women should be examined. The declaration was claiming that the freedoms constitute a whole in the sense that it is not possible to talk about a hierarchy between them. Altan, supporting the declaration argued that the critics of it constituted the soldiers ("kurşun asker korosu") of the political power. He argues that AKP and its supporters have an understanding of freedom that does not accept the independence of the intellectual. In this regard, the aim of democracy should correspond with the limits of the political power otherwise this chorus that is constituted by the supporters of the AKP would attack to the intellectual through the discourse of rights and liberties. Altan is himself aware of the fact that his criticism is a mild one stating the difficulty he experiences to understand this attack (Altan, Star, 18.02.2008). Turban issue is the first major point that liberal intellectuals and political power engaged in a public dispute. It may be argued that the self-image of the liberal intellectuals are characterized by a confidence on the political power's need for them, as it is already noted by Çandar, this is why the response of Erdoğan to Altan is found highly frustrating. Here, Bayramoğlu's claim that they made a coalition with the political power in the July 22 elections against the e-memorandum, however the sense that the political power diffuses is indicating that it is the liberal intellectuals who made a coalition, AKP has no participation in such a collaboration¹⁰⁵.

Here, it may be argued that despite the commonality of this feeling for the liberal intellectuals developed during the discussions on turban, this moment is also characterized by a split with regard to their view of the constitutional amendments. It is noted beforehand that liberal intellectuals were concerned about the method of

¹⁰⁵ R. Çakır, "Yöntem Yanlış Olabilir ama Yasak da Derhal Kalkmalı," *Vatan*, February 10, 2008, accessed September 05, 2012, available from: http://haber.gazetevatan.com/Yontem_yanlis_olabilir_ama_yasak_da_derhal_kalkmali_161212_1/161212/1/Haber#.UFT9rY0f4-1

these amendments rather than their content. All the intellectuals that are referred in the thesis are supporting the abolishment of the ban on the turban (Çandar, Referans, 13.02.2008), however the political power's isolation of the case from other liberties such as the article 301 which the liberal intellectuals are concerned to a great extent and leaving behind the aim of making a civilian constitution (Çandar, Referans, 08.02.2008). Moreover, this is also the point that the split between the liberal intellectuals take place, Bayramoğlu, for instance, keeping his reservation on the method of the amendments (declaring that he would also prefer the issue to be handles through the civilian constitution) argues he would support the lift on this ban regardless of the criticized process. According to Bayramoğlu, this attempt was led by the conjecture whereas it does not mean that AKP acts in accordance with the hierarchy it holds with regard to the rights and liberties¹⁰⁶. Moreover, for Bayramoğlu the humanitarian side of the turban issue is much more important than the flaws of the process of lifting the ban (Bayramoğlu, Yeni Şafak, 20.02.2008). Moreover, as it is mentioned before, one of the main qualities of AKP was taken into account as its distance to nationalism whereas collaboration with the MHP damaged this image to a great extent. Here, it should be noted that the intellectuals are emphasizing that their criticism is at the methodological level. There is still expectation from the party to turn to its first three years in power which is associated with the image of the party as open to manipulations by the front of the status quo. This is why, the collaboration with MHP, as it is confirmed by Altan, is taken into account as a game of this front (Çandar, Referans, 16.02.2008). With the change in the regulation of the YÖK in accordance with these constitutional amendments, it is argued that turban ban is legally documented for the first time (Çandar, Referans, 08.02.2008). In better terms, there was not a clear cut article banning turban beforehand, whereas with these changes it is defined in the sense that the political power retreated to the position of the military. This is taken into account as a sign of the collaboration AKP had from time to time with the systemic actors and the necessity to lower down the expectations from the party with regard to the democratization process of Turkey (Altan, Star, 07.02.2008).

¹⁰⁶R. Çakır, "Yöntem Yanlış Olabilir ama Yasak da Derhal Kalkmalı," *Vatan*, February 10, 2008, accessed September 05, 2012, available from: http://haber.gazetevatan.com/Yontem_yanlis_olabilir_ama_yasak_da_derhal_kalkmali_161212_1/161212/1/Haber#.UFT9rY0f4-1

Here, again, it should be noted that the criticisms of the liberal intellectuals are always accompanied with the excuses for the misdeeds of the AKP as well as the possible conditions of its restoration. This call for reconciliation is the consequence of the understanding of AKP as the representative of the periphery which carries the potential for the democratization of the Republic. It may be argued that, following this state centric view of social change which is referred in the first chapter in detail, Çandar limits the political realm to the opposition between the nationalists representing the center and AKP representing the periphery or between the fascist nationalists and conservatives who are not familiar with democracy (Çandar, Referans, 16.02.2008). Under these circumstances, the proper political behavior of a democrat is to take side with the latter given the above mentioned reason. This is why politics is the either/ or selections of these positions and the most critical move of a liberal with regard to this selection could be not to chose either of them whereas it is not possible for the former position to be taken by a liberal (Çandar, Referans, 16.02.2008). With regard to the turban issue, Çandar responds the criticisms indicating that the liberal intellectuals are “late for realizing the real position of AKP”. He adds that liberals are supporting the AKP around some principles and when these principles are challenged there would not be left any alliance. But, it should be noted that there is a certain reservation in terms of this criticism what Çandar regards as the “unintended consequences”. This is to say, Erdoğan did not plan beforehand to give the statement on the turban during the conference of the Alliance of Civilizations, but due to the concerns of vote for the upcoming elections it accepted to make amendments with the MHP. At this point, it is again possible to argue that the misdeeds of the party are resulted from the other actors’ political behaviors. The status quo including the opposition parties are trapping the AKP whereas its good intentions could not widen the ground that is let for the party to act. Under these circumstances what is expected from the party is not to lose its guidance for democratization which would also constitute the conditions of restoring the alliance between the liberal intellectuals and the political power. These conditions are the immediate preparation of the civilian constitution and return to the EU reforms which had been neglected since 2005.

Aside from the excuses with regard to unintended consequences or the games of the black front, it may be argued that these intellectuals’ unwillingness to retreat from this relationship can be related to their self image. Çandar defines the liberal

democrats as “the public opinion leaders who have influence over the public and to some extent over AKP” (Çandar, Referans, 16.02.2008). In this sense, if AKP has lost the support of the liberals, the “body” would be left without the “brain”. However, the recovery of this alliance is, as it is mentioned above, could be realized as soon as the political party removes the conditions of the split in the first place. For instance, right after the dispute between Mehmet Altan and Prime Minister, Erdoğan participates into a tv interview in which he states the will of the party to reopen the case of Hrant Dink, to make the necessary changes for the article 301 and to provide the law on vakıflar. Çandar evaluates these statements as the sensitivity of Tayyip Erdoğan with regard to the liberal intellectuals whereas it is the case for Çandar that under the circumstances the liberals would have acted differently these messages would not come to the foreground. Çandar argues that this interview shows that despite the weakness of the liberal intellectuals regarding their quantity, they are capable of influencing government depending on their strength in terms of quality (Çandar, Referans, 21.02.2008- 20.02.2008). This reasoning is apparent with regard to Çandar’s reaction to the method of the constitutional amendments. He warned the AKP that it is losing the support of the liberals who are not its “soldiers” (“hazır kıta”) (Çandar, Referans, 16.02.2008) of the political power. According to this perspective, the consequences for AKP to lose this support would be detrimental whereas they did not want to accept that their self-image was conflicting with the political power’s image of them. Liberal intellectuals see themselves as powerful enough to influence the government whereas AKP denied it.

Referring to Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s statement that the liberal intellectuals constituted detriment to the party, there may be talked about a coalition that is furthered by the liberal intellectuals alone. As it is stated in the previous section, this is completely related with the concerns about pursuing the distinction they attained with the rule of the governing party. These concerns are influencing the relationship to the extent that what they regard as the misdeeds for the democratization process are constructed as if they are realized due to the survival strategies of AKP which is victimized by the forces of the status quo. In this sense, it may be argued that once the power of the “black front” is brought to a halt, AKP would easily turn into its reformist essence which is inevitable due to representing the periphery. Up until then there is no other rational political position to follow. This indispensability of

AKP results with the liberal intellectuals' response to being "left"¹⁰⁷ by the political power, as the "incidental additions" (Laçiner, 2012: 4) with the consolidation of AKP's power after the July 22, through stepping back from their demands and further the sense of distinction through coming up with an image of the governing party that is always under threat and necessitating the guidance of the liberal intellectuals. As a part of this response, in the next section, the retreat from the unconditional demands of the civilian constitution standing as the reason of the major confrontation with the political power in terms of the turban issue, to the constitutional amendments is tried to be identified in its relation with the self-image of the liberal intellectuals.

¹⁰⁷ Ü. Kurt, "AKP ve Sol-liberal Entelektüeller," *Radikal*. February 15, 2008, accessed September 05, 2012, available from: <http://www.radikal.com.tr/haber.php?haberno=247476&tarih=15/02/2008>.

CHAPTER 6

REFERENDUM AS THE GATE TO “NEW TURKEY”: THE STAGE OF ACCEPTANCE

It is previously argued that the perspective of the liberal intellectuals regarding the state-society relations resulted with an understanding of “democratization as civilianization”. Moreover, here the reservation of Devocioğlu should be remembered claiming that the “civilian” in this equation refers to what is not militaristic (*askeri olmayan*) in a way to reduce the implications of the civil society to a sphere out of this influence whereas, for Devocioğlu, “civil” in its simplest terms signify what is belonging to society and not to the power (www.bianet.com, 23.04.2010)¹⁰⁸. In terms of the discussions on constitution making it may be argued that this perspective on “civilianization” manifests itself with regard to their identification of the constitution amendment package as the gateway to the end of the tutelary regime. As it will be seen in detail below, all the intellectuals whose work is investigated propagated for the package to be accepted in the referendum through the motivation that it would lead “coming to terms” with the September 12 regime. Thus, the major premise of this perspective was to tolerate certain misdeeds concerning the referendum process given this ultimate goal of “coming to terms”. In this chapter, the traces of this idea of being obliged to AKP as the only capable actor of bringing change despite the deficiencies of the constitutional amendment process is tried to be followed.

Here, it should be remembered that liberal intellectuals describe their major requirement from AKP as a civilian constitution which would cease the 12 September regime and lead to the normalization and democratization of the republic. This is why, the last two moments of our analysis are selected from the ones in which AKP changed its attitude towards the civilian constitution making whereas it is possible to argue that liberal intellectuals also come up with a difference with regard to their priorities during these terms. As it is introduced before, AKP’s first major

¹⁰⁸ A. Devocioğlu, A. “AKP'nin 12 Eylül Anayasası,” updated April 23, 2010, accessed September 05, 2012, <http://bianet.org/bianet/siyaset/121510-akpnin-12-eylul-anayasasi>.

attempt in this regard is realized in the year 2007, in which it “appointed” a group of experts who are directed by Ergun Özbudun with the duty of preparing the “civilian constitution”. Later, this draft is neglected by AKP which constitutes the first important controversy between this party and intellectuals. Instead, the party, in collaboration with MHP, engaged in some constitutional amendments to abolish the headscarf ban in universities. This attempt was criticized by liberals in terms of isolating the issue whereas it should be solved through the civilian constitution in which rights and liberties would not be hierarchically ordered. Mentioned disagreement between the liberal intellectuals and AKP has been resolved to some extent in the last moment (which is never comparable to its situation in its most “glorious days”) during the attempts of constitutional amendments in 2010. The referendum has been supported by the liberal intellectuals as the founding point of the “Second Republic” or, synonymously of “New Turkey” since it is accepted that the new constitution would start the process of eliminating the remains of the 12 September regime and would complete the reforms in terms of the establishment of democracy. This is to say, it is believed that with the acceptance of the package by the public, the part left that should be managed in order to abolish the tutelage would be completed. With the operations of Balyoz and Ergenekon as well as the unsuccessful attempt of the military in the April 29 memorandum examined in the previous chapter, they argued that military’s effect over the politics has been reduced to some extent whereas the amendment package was a challenge to the judiciary which is the other major actor of the tutelary regime. Thus, since the package was prepared against the tutelary regime targeting the existing structure of the supreme courts, the liberal intellectuals declared that they postponed their demands on the civilian constitution to the period following the 2011 general elections. In this section, keeping in mind liberal intellectuals’ perspective on the state-society relations indicating the lack of a developed form of civil society in Turkey and the formulation equating any attempt of relieving “the society from the bonds of the state” with democratization, the reservations of these intellectuals leading them to this deferment will be acknowledged. Here, it should also be clarified that this section is not only an attempt to identify how the liberal intellectuals envision the constitutional amendment package in the 2010 but also a query for understanding in terms of the referendum process how they made sense of their course of the relationship with political power.

As it is put clearly in the first chapter, this relationship with political power is developed around the latter's policy of intellectuals and the attraction "the sense of the distinction" as well as the "technical activity" would provide by belonging to the intellectual bloc. In following parts of the chapter the form this sense of distinction gained during the referendum process will be engaged in, however, with regard to the second condition it should be remembered that these thinkers' willingness to participate in the field of media is part of a struggle to be powerful enough to determine what is in circulation which is a source of recognition. Since "it is the information about information that allows you to decide what is important and worth broadcasting comes in large part from other informers" (Bourdieu, 1998: 26) the criterion of what is important results with "the effect of mental closure" leading us to conclude that the hegemony of a position cannot be fully identified without considering the position its actors maintain in the media. This is why it should be noted here that during the referendum period Cengiz Çandar was writing for Radikal whereas his column were also published in the internet sites of the daily Hürriyet. Besides, he was hosting a TV show in the TVNET. During this period Mehmet Altan was the editor-in-chief of the daily Star whereas he was also the host of a show in the Mehtap TV. Referendum process is the time that Etyen Mahçupyan was a columnist of the newspaper Taraf whereas Ali Bayramoğlu was maintaining his position in Yeni Şafak. Regarding the importance of the recognition media provides and the collaboration between the Islamist media and liberal intellectuals, here, it may be argued that the liberal intellectuals maintained their key positions in both TVs and printed press also in the third term it is investigated. In terms of our argument with regard to the importance of being part of the "circular circulation" constituting the attraction point in order to participate in the intellectual bloc, it may be argued that consequences of the liberal intellectuals' presentations of the positions of "no", "yes" and "boycott" cannot be identified fairly without referring to the place they occupy in the media.

In order to realize this aim, in this chapter, the columns of these four intellectuals will be examined during the process starting with the discussions on the constitutional amendment package ending with the referendum in 2010. The time interval is determined between the March 30 2010 in which the amendment package was presented to the parliament and September 12 2010 as the date of the referendum. Before engaging in such a discussion there arises the need of coming up

with a brief analysis of the amendment package which would provide us with the opportunity to identify the reasons of the liberal intellectuals to declare that they deferred their demands of civilian constitution after the period of the general elections in 2011.

6.1. The Constitutional Amendment Package

For the organizational purposes of the thesis, it should, first of all, be clarified that despite the fact that in the amendment package there exist articles on individual freedoms as well as the economic and social rights¹⁰⁹ (mostly criticized by the trade unions, feminists and socialists), the parts that are redesigning the jurisdiction of the military courts and the constitutional court as well as the organizational structure of the HSYK constitute the major discussion for the liberal intellectuals which render them to identify the challenges to the package with the aim of furthering the tutelage

¹⁰⁹ Article 10 of the 1982 constitution stating “Men and women shall have equal rights. The State has the duty to ensure that this equality is put into practice” is added with the following statements: “Measures taken for this purpose shall not be interpreted as contrary to the principle of equality” and “Measures taken for the children, the elderly and the disabled persons, widow spouses and orphans of persons who died in war or on duty and incapacitated persons and veterans cannot be considered as contrary to the principle of equality”

Article 20 is revised in the manner that: “Everyone shall have the right to obtain information about data concerning him or her, to access to or request the rectification and erasure of these data and to be informed about whether these data are used in conformity with envisaged purposes”.

It is stated in the article 41 that ““Every child has the right to adequate protection and care and the right to have and maintain a personal and direct relation with his/her parents unless it is contrary to his/her high interests”. In a way to eliminate the ban of not leaving the country without fulfilling the civic duties (military service and paying taxes), article 23 is revised in the way that “a citizen’s freedom to leave the country may be restricted only by a court decision based on criminal investigation or prosecution”. (http://www.tepav.org.tr/upload/files/1284468699-0.2010_Proposed_Constitutional_Amendments_to_the_1982_Constitution_of_Turkey.pdf).

The amendments with regard to the labour unions are realized through the articles of 51, 53 and 54. According to these articles “membership in more than one labour union at the same time” would be possible (<http://bianet.org/english/children/121411-constitutional-reform-package-part-1>), moreover, the civil servants would be granted the right of collective bargaining. "Right to Strike and Lockout" is amended in a way that labour unions would not be responsible “for any material damage caused in a work-place where the strike is being held, as a result of deliberately negligent behaviour by the workers and the labour union. Politically motivated strikes and lockouts, solidarity strikes and lockouts, occupation of work premises, labour go-slows, and other forms of obstruction shall not be prohibited any more due to the draft bill” (<http://bianet.org/english/children/121411-constitutional-reform-package-part-1>) (See Akça, 2010:3, for a critical evaluation of these amendments on labour unions)

The article 74 titled as “Right of Petition, Right to Information and Appeal to the Ombudsman” is brought the institution of the “public auditorship” as a “mediator between state and citizens” (http://www.tepav.org.tr/upload/files/1284468699-0.2010_Proposed_Constitutional_Amendments_to_the_1982_Constitution_of_Turkey.pdf)

With the revision of the article 84 titled as the “loss of membership in parliament”, the deputies are recognized the right of staying in the parliament till the end of the term as an independent member when the party s/he is belonging to is closed (http://www.tepav.org.tr/upload/files/1284468699-0.2010_Proposed_Constitutional_Amendments_to_the_1982_Constitution_of_Turkey.pdf).

of the judiciary. One of the most controversial articles constituting the focus in this sense is the article 125 of the 1982 Constitution stating that “the decisions of the Supreme Military Council are outside the scope of judicial review” is revised in the manner that “recourse to judicial review shall be available against all decisions taken by the Supreme Military Council regarding expulsion from the Armed Forces”¹¹⁰ is included in the article. Moreover, article 144 titled as “Supervision of Judges and Public Prosecutors” is revised in the manner that

Supervision, inquiry, inspection and investigation proceedings of judicial services and public prosecutors with regard to their administrative duties shall be carried out by the Ministry of Justice through judiciary inspectors and internal inspectors who are from the profession of judge and public prosecutor. The procedures and principles regarding supervision shall be laid down in law”¹¹¹ .

With regard to the military justice, it is included in the article 145 that “cases regarding crimes against the security of the State, constitutional order and its functioning shall be heard before the civil courts in any event. Non-military personnel shall not be tried in military courts, except war time”¹¹².

The organization of the constitutional court is changed to a great extent. The number of the members has been increased to 17 whereas repealing the substitute membership which is formerly constituted of 4 members. 3 of these members would be selected by the TGNA whereas the rest of the court would be appointed by the President. The duration of the membership would be 12 years and re-election would be out of scope. Another amendment with regard to the constitutional court is the recognition of the individual application to the court under the condition that all other legal procedures are exhausted. In the package, Constitutional Court is also given the jurisdiction to try the Chief of Staff, the Commanders of the Land, Naval and Air Forces and the Commander of the Gendarmerie ¹¹³.

¹¹⁰“Law No 5982 Amending Certain Provisions of the Constitution,” accessed September 05, 2012, http://www.abgs.gov.tr/files/Bas%C4%B1nMusavirlik/haberler/constituional_amendments.pdf., p.16

¹¹¹ Ibid., p.20.

¹¹² Ibid., p.21.

¹¹³“What will the Constitutional Changes Mean for Turkey?”, September 12, 2010, accessed September 05, 2012, [http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/default.aspx?pageid=438&n=what-the-changes-bring-2010-09-12.](http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/default.aspx?pageid=438&n=what-the-changes-bring-2010-09-12;); T. Korkut, Constitutional reform package part 2. <http://bianet.org/english/people/121462-constitutional-reform-package-part-2>.

Another controversial point is the restructuring of the HSYK with the package. The number of its members would be increased to 21 whereas 10 of them would serve as the substitute members.

15 regular and 10 substitute members of the Supreme Council shall be elected by the Court of Cassation, the Council of State, the Justice Academy, regular and administrative judges and public prosecutors of the first degree. The President shall elect 4 members from among senior administrators, practicing lawyers, and university professors in the fields of law¹¹⁴.

Moreover, the decisions of the council with regard to the “prohibition of the pursuit of the profession” are opened to recourse with the draft.

Provisional article 15 of the 1982 Constitution is proposed to be repealed with the draft which constitutes the major justification point for liberal intellectuals’ claim that the amendment package would be the means to come to terms with the September 12 regime. The provisional article was stating that:

No allegation of criminal, financial or legal responsibility shall be made, nor shall an application be filed with a court for this purpose in respect of any decisions or measures whatsoever taken by: the Council of National Security formed under Act No. 2356 which will have exercised legislative and executive power on behalf of the Turkish Nation from 12 September 1980 to the date of the formation of the Bureau of the Turkish Grand National Assembly which is to convene following the first general elections; the governments formed during the term of office of the Council, or the Consultative Assembly which has exercised its functions under Act No. 2485 on the Constituent Assembly. The provisions of the above paragraphs shall also apply in respect of persons who have taken decisions and adopted or implemented measures as part of the implementation of such decisions and measures by the administration or by the competent organs, authorities and officials¹¹⁵

Repealing this article paved the way for trying the generals that are the major actors of the 1980 military coup.

Since throughout the chapter an analysis of the implications of these amendments for the liberal intellectuals will be realized, there is no need for a

¹¹⁴ L. Gönenç, “2010 proposed constitutional amendments to the 1982 Constitution of Turkey,” accessed September 05, 2012, http://www.tepav.org.tr/upload/files/1284468699-0.2010_Proposed_Constitutional_Amendments_to_the_1982_Constitution_of_Turkey.pdf. p.5.

¹¹⁵ “Law no 5982 Amending Certain Provisions of the Constitution,” accessed September 05, 2012, http://www.abgs.gov.tr/files/Bas%C4%B1nMusavirlik/haberler/constituional_amendments.pdf. p.41.

detailed discussion here. But still, in a way to summarize the vision of these intellectuals on these articles, it is important to refer Çandar's following statement:

For my own accord, I support trying the military personnel in the civil courts, not trying the civilians in the military courts, making claims upon being discharged from the military due to the clothing of one's spouse, this is to say opening YAŞ decisions to appeal, removing the HSYK from its existing 5 appointed, narrow structure and half of its members being selected by the judges and prosecutors themselves, having right to make personal applications to the constitutional court, having the institution of ombudsman solving the disputes with the public authority, bettering the life conditions of the 15billions of handicapped people and bringing constitutional assurance for the dominated women in the manner of "positive discrimination". These are the amendments that are to be voted on September 12. In order not to say "YES", I could either be an unconscionable person or someone who lost his psychological well-being or a fanatic whose head is started to be fossilized (Çandar, Radikal, 08.09.2010).

The process leading to the referendum will now be examined briefly in a way to identify the traces of the above given understanding in terms of their responses to the developments with regard to this 8 month interval. The package is first discussed in the Parliamentary Commission of Constitution, then presented to the parliament on March 30 2010 and accepted with the majority of 336 affirmative votes to be presented to the President of the Republic for confirmation¹¹⁶. On May 12, 2010, President Abdullah Gül submitted the package to a plebiscite¹¹⁷ which was realized in 120 days time (September 12 2010) by the decision of the Supreme Electoral Council (YSK)¹¹⁸. This decision of YSK was highly controversial in the sense that a proposal on the reduction of the time period between the submission of a plebiscite and its realization had been recently (March 2010) accepted in the parliament¹¹⁹. This is to say, referendum period was regulated in the manner that the 120 day time between its confirmation by the president and the point it is actually voted has been

¹¹⁶“İşte AK Parti'nin Anayasa Paketi!”, updated March 23, 2010, accessed September 05, 2012, <http://www.cnnturk.com/2010/turkiye/03/22/iste.ak.partinin.anayasa.paketi/568599.0/index.html>.; “Anayasa Paketi İki Madde Eksikle Gül'ün Önünde,” updated May 07, 2010, accessed September 05, 2012, <http://www.bianet.org/bianet/siyaset/121826-anayasa-paketi-iki-madde-eksikle-gulun-onunde>.

¹¹⁷ “Gül Anayasa Paketini Onayladı, Sıra Referandumda,” May 12, 2010, accessed September 05, 2012, <http://www.bianet.org/bianet/siyaset/121936-gul-anayasa-paketini-onayladi-sira-referandumda>.

¹¹⁸ “YSK: Anayasa Referandumunu 12 Eylül'de,” updated May 13, 2012, September 05, 2012, <http://www.bianet.org/bianet/siyaset/121958-ysk-anayasa-referandumunu-12-eylulde>.

¹¹⁹ “Referandum için Süre Kısaldı,” updated March 04, 2010, accessed September 05, 2012 <http://www.bianet.org/bianet/siyaset/120407-referandum-icin-sure-kisaldi>.

shortened to 60 days. Under these circumstances it is expected by AKP for the referendum date to be determined as the July 18th and the contrary decision of the YSK as the 120 days has been taken into account as another indicator of the tutelage of the judiciary since this decision paved the way for the opposition to apply to the Constitutional Court for the annulment of the package as it will be seen in detail below (Çandar, Referans, 15.05.2010, Çandar, Referans, 14.05.2010). Moreover the extension of the time to 120 days would also extend the “calculations” of the “status quo” to reorganize the politics through its plans of provocations as well as the procession of a possible case of closure for the AKP (Çandar, Referans, 14.05.2010).

Another major incident during the process the package was discussed in the parliament was the rejection of the article 8th. It was binding the cases of the closures of the political parties to the confirmation of the TGNA. Despite the fact that the article was criticized by very many people for its exception of the parties that are out of the parliament as well as for not changing the legal ground for the closure¹²⁰, its elimination from the package was presented as a significant halt to the democratization process by the liberal intellectuals. Mehmet Altan evaluates the process as the intervention of Ergenekon as an apparent example of the common emphasis of the liberal intellectuals in this regard¹²¹. Moreover, Çandar condemns the BDP for the elimination of the article which is synonymous with the suicide of this party since its members experienced the processes of closure before. For Çandar, this suicide can be explained with their “remote control” by the Abdullah Öcalan in İmralı and in this regard their inability to attain their age of political maturity whereas, here, the possibility of the existence of the bonds between Silivri and İmralı also stands as an explanation to the opposition to the package (Çandar, Radikal, 08.05.2010). Agreeing with identification of BDP with the lack of political maturity,

¹²⁰ “Gazeteler Anayasa Paketinde İlk Fireyi Nasıl Haberleştirdi?,” updated May 04, 2010, accessed September 05, 2012, <http://www.bianet.org/bianet/siyaset/121765-gazeteler-anayasa-paketinde-ilk-fireyi-nasil-haberlestirdi>.

¹²¹ E. Mahçupyan, “Kişiliksizliğin Siyaseti,” *Taraf*, May 05, 2010, accessed September 05, 2010, available from: <http://www.taraf.com.tr/etyen-mahcupyan/makale-kisiliksizligin-siyaseti.htm>. *Taraf*, May 05, 2010; C. Çandar, “PKK'dan, CHP-MHP'den Ona Buna: ‘Anti-demokrat savaş koalisyonu’.” *Referans*, May 05, 2010, accessed September 05, 2010, available from: <http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/haber.aspx?id=14622883&yazarid=215>.; A. Bayramoğlu, “Kara Koalisyon: 12 AK Partili, BDP, CHP, MHP”, *Yeni Şafak*. May 04, 2010;2012, accessed September 05, 2012, available from: <http://www.yenisafak.com.tr/Yazarlar/?i=22126&y=AliBayramogluBayramoglu>.; “Mehmet Altan: Ergenekon Şahlandı! ,” updated May 04, 2010, accessed September 05, 2012 <http://www.mehmetaltan.com/index.asp?sayfa=roportaj&icerik=1471>.

Mahçupyan argues that the threat of closure is needed for the maintenance of the influence of PKK and Öcalan over the party since under the circumstances of the elimination of this threat the movement would bring up a personality of its own with the new political figures leading this personality (Taraf, 05.05.2010). Bayramoğlu agrees with this perspective attributing the BDP as the part of the “black front” through confirming Şamil Tayyar’s statement that the package is tried to be challenged through the cooperation of the extensions of the Ergenekon in the state and in PKK (Yeni Şafak, 04.05.2010). However, it was arithmetically the case that some members of AKP must have been voted against this article since it could not attain the necessary vote for the referendum which refers to the number of 330 whereas AKP has already had 336 deputies. Whereas Çandar explains this “leakage” with the nationalism of these members willing that it would be possible to close the Kurdish parties (Referans, 05.05.2010), Bayramoğlu restate his definition of the black front as the “12 members of AKP, BDP, CHP and MHP” (Yeni Şafak, 04.05.2010). Being part of this front and not supporting the article 8, on the other hand, these 12 deputies are presented by Mehmet Altan as the members of “other centers” that are disguised in the form of the members of the party (Star, 05.05.2010). This is to say, according to this perspective, mentioned “black front” is so powerful that it gets even into the party which is struggling against that front.

When, how the liberal intellectuals make sense of this process is tried to be analyzed, it may be argued that the course towards the referendum in itself, with the opposition to the article 8 and the controversies on the timing of the actual voting, is presented as a clear case of the vulnerability of the political power of AKP with regard to conventional actors of the establishment. In order to understand the image resorted by the liberal intellectuals referring to AKP’s ongoing struggle with the establishment adequately, it may be argued that there arises the need of identifying how they constructed the conditions of this struggle in a way to attribute which positions are legitimate under these circumstances. This is why, in this section, first of all, an analysis of the manner liberal intellectuals recognize the existing structure of the tutelary regime and then how they made sense of the three positions will be engaged in (“yes”, “no” and “boycott”) regarding the referendum process under these conditions of the tutelary regime which would make it possible to understand their self-image with respect to this moment of Turkish political history. Since they are the supporters of the “yes” position, its attribution by these intellectuals will be given

priority as our first object of analysis in this section. But before, their presentation of the tutelary regime in the year 2010 will be analyzed which led them to defer their demands of civilian constitution to the period after the general elections in 2011.

6.2. Tutelary Regime as the Excuse for the Deference of the Civilian Constitution

It is argued before that the presentations of the liberal intellectuals of the AKP as the unrivaled reformer and architect of “New Turkey” despite its misdeeds that are also creating discontent for these intellectuals were depended on the claim that the party in power is without alternatives for the democratization of Turkey. Keeping in mind the discussion on the relationship between a certain perspective on state-society relations and the identification of democratization with civilianization, it is not unexpected for this section that the supporters of “no” position are defined as the part of the “black front” or the “front of the status quo. This is to say liberal intellectuals come up with an analysis that since AKP is the representative of the periphery in which the seeds of democracy are inherent according to the mentioned perspective on the duality between the center and the periphery, it would be irrational for a democrat to vote for any position rather than “yes” in the referendum. Following the idea of the “democratization as civilianization”, it may be argued that the package which eliminates the “last façade of the military tutelage” through the transformation it brings with regard to the structure of the supreme courts could not be opposed from a sound position. In this sense, the demands of the civilian constitution stating that the package is limited in its scope and this attempt is characterized by the concerns of AKP to further its power over the judiciary but in a way that is above the concerns of democratization (here the concerns of “civilian tutelage” is completely relevant which will be referred frequently when the perspective of these intellectuals with regard to the last break down in terms of their relations with the political power will be taken into account), were criticized and condemned by these intellectuals as the signs of the interests of certain segments of the society in the permanence of the tutelary regime. Out of these concerns, given the existing structure of Turkish politics which is majorly determined by the state elites, it is “irrational” and “sick” not to support the package from a position claiming to be democrat. This is the point in which Tanıl Bora’s presentation of what can be regarded as the liberal

intellectuals' attitude of superiority is completely relevant. Bora argues that liberals are prone to emphasize a sense of superiority despite the fact that they are highly critical of the "positivist social engineering" indicating the Kemalist authoritarianism (Bora, 2010: 62). Under these circumstances, Bora argues that this sense of superiority is accompanied by a drastic discourse which is the consequence of the "mediated responsibility of power" (Bora, 2010: 62). This is why, the discourse with regard to the opponents is realized through an idea of sickness and irrationality. The idea behind this drastic attitude is the fact that we are obliged to the leadership of the AKP for the democratization of Turkey since as the representative of the periphery it is the only force that could challenge the power of the center, whereas all sides of the political spectrum should admit that Turkey's political structure is peculiar in the sense of being a tutelary regime and despite the declaration of the establishment of the "New Turkey" the conventional figures of the "old Turkey" could come back easily to recover their advantageous position.

In order to substantiate why voting for "no" in the referendum or boycotting it is irrational for the liberal intellectuals, first of all, their presentation of the manner that the tutelary regime is shaped in this moment of Turkish political history is tried to be examined. In this sense, it will be started with Bayramoğlu's claim that "it should be accepted that we are not under the circumstances of 2007 July any more. The developments are more complicated, the electorate has more questions in mind in comparison to those days and the conflicts as well as the toughness in the process of change promote suspicions" (Bayramoğlu, Yeni Şafak, 26.08.2010) . This is to say, according to Bayramoğlu it is possible to explain the fact that despite their disagreement on the "turban" issue during the constitutional amendments of 2007 which constituted a major breaking point for their relationship with the political power depending on their demands of the civilian constitution, in this moment the package was welcomed to a great extent regardless of its limited scope, with the consequences of the changing context. This is to say, for Bayramoğlu, "it would of course be more proper to make a new and civilian constitution, however if it is considered that such attempts, as two years ago, would bring political tensions, event systemic crisis, under the political circumstances that total consensus could not be provided such limited attempts should be regarded as important" (Yeni Şafak, 23.03.2010).

It is identified in the previous chapter that the liberal intellectuals transformed their urges to the party in power for not getting into the process of “Ankaralılařmak” into its criticisms for its level of “Ankaralılařmak” with the disagreement on the civilian constitution they had during the period of 2007-2008. İsmet Akça associates this major break down in terms of the relationships between the liberal intellectuals and political power with the fact that following the 2007 elections, which was resulted with the party’s development of a self image as the omnipotent and freeing itself from its “incidental additions”, AKP’s attempt of hegemony has been subjected to major challenges (mostly due to the consequences of the world economic crisis). According to Akça, it is the characteristic of the process that temporary settlement between the different segments of the capital has been subjected to a halt. Moreover it refers to the same period in which the political power’s “openings” with regard to the Kurdish and Alevi issues were short-lived (2010: 11). According to Akça the coalition behind AKP started to be greatly weakened by these events leading to its consequent strategy of referendum. This is to say, referendum was not merely a means of the decision making process, it became a “plebiscite for AKP”. Liberal intellectuals object this view and criticize the opposition for reducing the referendum into the vote of confidence for the governing party whereas their own perspective on the process, as it is identified before, was acknowledging referendum as the possibility of voting for the democratization of Turkey. Here Akça’s claim that this very image of the referendum itself is an attempt to consolidate the hegemony of AKP in the sense that it is subjecting the politics to the limits of the discourse in which AKP is the most powerful. Keeping in mind the arguments introduced in the previous sections signaling the fact that being “in opposition” constitutes the major ground that the party cultivated its power, as Akça also claims, a referendum that is constructed over the dichotomy between the center and periphery targeting the abolition of the remains of the tutelary regime would be more than favorable to refresh its hegemony (Akça, 2010: 11).

Here, in accordance with the relation Bayramođlu set between the changing conditions and the acceptability of the constitutional amendment package, it may be argued that the liberal intellectuals are releasing the view of the referendum as a step necessary for the realization of the more extended aim of the making of civilian constitution. In this regard, for Çandar this step should be taken immediately in a way to determine who is in power in the “New Turkey”. According to Çandar this

question has paralyzed the system in Turkey manifesting itself in the appearances of the conflict between the executive and the constitutional court. This paralysis is the result of the process accelerated with the Constitutional Court decisions before July 2007 elections and could only be solved through the intervention of the public (Çandar, Referans, 09.03.2010). Therefore, up until the next general elections in 2011, the strategy of the political power could not be more than maintaining the “already reached fronts”. Thus, this retreat from the demands of the liberal intellectuals for the establishment of the civilian constitution to the acceptance of the constitutional package is associated with what could be done best in this context.

The polarization of the society was a common theme these intellectuals also use for describing that moment. Under the circumstances of this polarization from which the ruling party is also responsible given the above mentioned instances characterizing the 2007- 2010 period, it would not be very likely for this party to come up with the civilian constitution which is referred as the social contract. Besides, due to the psychological effects of the closure trial belonging to this period, liberal intellectuals argue that AKP tended to come closer with the establishment. This is why, reserving the trials of Ergenekon and Balyoz, the period, as Bayramoğlu notes, did not involve a significant attempt for democratization. But still AKP is the “lesser of the evils” due to representing the periphery as the ground containing the seeds of the possible democratization of Turkey which makes it rational to support its policies including the constitutional amendment package. Moreover, the image of the AKP as the powerless party in power is tried to be revived in a way to confront the criticisms of their retreat from their demands for the civilian constitution. The justification here is the fact that the powerlessness of the party still impedes it to come up with the civilian constitution which leads Çandar to argue that it is not possible to talk about a new constitution in the existing conditions of the Turkish political scene (Referans, 26.03.2010)

In this regard, the demands of new constitution instead of the amendment package released declared in a communiqué signed by more than 200 intellectuals¹²²,

¹²²“Uzlaşmayla Çıksın,” updated March 22, 2010, accessed September 05, 2010, [http://www.milliyet.com.tr/uzlasmayla-ciksin/siyaset/haberdetay/22.03.2010/1214509/default.htm](http://www.milliyet.com.tr/uzlasmayla-ciksin/siyaset/haberdetay/22.03.2010/1214509/default.htm;).; “Eşitlikçi, Özgürlükçü ve Demokratik bir Anayasa!,” accessed September 05, 2012, accessed September 05, 2012, [http://www.anayasa.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=48%3Aetlk-oezguerluekcue-ve-demokratk-br-anayasa&catid=39%3Aamakaleler&Itemid=54&lang=tr](http://www.anayasa.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=48%3Aetlk-oezguerluekcue-ve-demokratk-br-anayasa&catid=39%3Aamakaleler&Itemid=54&lang=tr;).; D.

are condemned by Çandar for their illusory perspective. Çandar stated that their arguments are sound but they act as if they are not living in Turkey rather in the Alice's Adventures in Wonderland whereas this intellectual journey in wonderland leads them to share the same position with CHP and MHP (Referans, 31.03.2010). This point is one of the frequently referred themes of the liberal intellectuals which is restricting the politics into the formula of "either"- "or". The line of reasoning here can be summarized in the following terms: since it is the case that the articles in the package are challenging the tutelage of the judiciary and any improvement in this regard would be better than the existing conditions they should be voted as "yes" and this is why voting against this position is "irrational".

In order to understand the implications of irrationalizing the opponents, it should be remembered that for providing the attraction of the intellectuals to an intellectual bloc, the hegemonic project should give them a sense of dignity or distinction from the previous order. With regard to the referendum process it may be claimed that this sense of distinction from the supporters of MHP and CHP is realized by presenting them as belonging to the "Old Turkey". Moreover, BDP is also defined as the representative of "Kurdish Kemalism" which has its own interests on the maintenance of "old Turkey". Thus, in this section through trying to grasp the liberal intellectuals' justifications with regard to irrationalizing the non-supporters of the "yes" position, the parameters of the distinction that the intellectual bloc led by AKP provided these intellectuals will be tried to be identified.

6.3. Saying "yes": Political Satisfaction of being the Architect of "New Turkey"

A close inspection of the columns by the liberal intellectuals renders it possible for us to identify that, the major theme of the discussions on referendum is its identification as the reference point for the democratization of Turkey. With regard to this understanding the referendum has very many implications other than being the actual voting of the constitutional amendment package which means in Bayramoğlu's terms that "this referendum is never only a referendum" (Yeni Şafak, 30.03.2010). Given the various implications of the referendum for the process of

Sevimay, "Anayasa 'Bugün Yapalım, Yarın Düzeltiriz'le Olmaz," updated March 30, 2010, accessed September 05, 2012.

democratization, in this section what kind of a political position saying “yes” would signify according to the liberal intellectuals in this moment of Turkish political history will be identified.

In order to understand the democratization potential of the referendum, it should, first of all, be grasped that, it is presented as the inclusion of the people in the decision making process which would become the actor of change. Regarding the discussion on the tutelary regime, it is already noted that the system has been stuck due to the conflict between the executive and the constitutional court and it is defended that “existing conditions and balance of power signals the arbitration of the society. Just like the manner the public opinion intervened in the July 2007 elections, the same development can be lived now, it should be lived” (Çandar, Referans, 30.03.2010). Moreover, if it would not “be lived” in the manner that HSYK and the constitutional court remains in their existing structures “the front of ergenekon” would counterattack (Çandar, Referans, 27.08.2010). It may be argued that this is the major justification of their presentation of the plausible behavior of a democrat as to support the amendment package whereas it manifests itself in terms of the definition of the same phenomenon with different terms by the liberal intellectuals. This is to say, AKP is surrounded by a front which has its members in the international arena, in the media, in the military, in the Kurdish movement and in the judiciary. While Bayramoğlu is calling it as the “black front”, Çandar identifies it as the “front of Ergenekon”. Moreover, Mehmet Altan and Etyen Mahçupyan also share the perspective; the same phenomenon is identified by these intellectuals as the front of the status quo.

With regard to the criticisms on the limited agenda of the package and the preference of coming up with a package rather than making a civilian constitution, these definitions show continuity with their attitude of “excuse” with regard to what they themselves see as the misdeeds of the party in power. Here, the reservation is again unlikeliness of challenging the tutelage given its powerful structure and the obligation to fight this front. This is why, a step by step process leading to the establishment of a civilian constitution is preferable and therefore “not unexpected and objectable” (Bayramoğlu, Yeni Şafak, 30.03.2010). This concern which depends on this powerful structure of the “black front” and the consequent threat that it would always try to search for or create opportunities for restoring its previous position in the system reveals itself in terms of Bayramoğlu’s reaction to the President of the

General Staff İlker Başbuğ's speech on the Star TV shortly before his retirement on August 30¹²³. Bayramoğlu evaluated the realization of this interview with the new context that is tried to be established by the "black front" for rupturing the civilianization process. He argues that such a speech could not be done a month before, whereas the rising attacks of PKK rendered an opportunity for the military's attempt to rehabilitate its previous position in the system since its mentality corresponds to the concerns of security correlating with the attacks. Witnessing the emphasis on the "front" against the AKP, it is not unexpected that Bayramoğlu points out also the other contributions of its participants in terms of providing this context. Relating the declarations of former US Ambassador of Turkey Edelman with regard to the Ergenekon trial to the Jewish lobby's concerns about AKP's policies and Turkey's new position in the Middle East and referring to the publications of the Doğan media group for contaminating the case, Bayramoğlu tries to substantiate what he regards as the tacit alliance between media, military, international forces and PKK (Yeni Şafak, 08.07.2010).

For Bayramoğlu, major impediment to the change that is directed by AKP around the principles of democratization and civilization is inherent to the nature of this change. This is to say, since the process of transformation is not started in consequence to a break down such as a military coup etc., AKP has to direct the reform process within the conventional power structure and already existing institutions which can be substantiated by referring to the front above (Yeni Şafak, 30.09.2010). This attempt of transforming the system from within the system brings with itself certain limitations with regard to the reform process as well as it necessitates, from time to time, getting closer with the systemic figures who are already against the very process of change. For liberal intellectuals this is the point where the fluctuations in the reform process (especially on the Kurdish question) or the irregularities in the trials of Ergenekon and KCK could be excused to some extent. In their columns dated back to 2010, it can be identified that such flaws are justified by these intellectuals due to acknowledging the difficulty of maintaining the reform process in such a hostile environment. However, this also constitutes the point where the threat of "Ankaralılılaşmak" is always there. In other words, the

¹²³See "Sözün Bittiği Yerdeyiz..." updated July 06, 2010, accessed September 05, 2012 <http://siyaset.milliyet.com.tr/sozun-bittigi-yerdeyiz-/siyaset/siyasetdetay/06.07.2010/1259717/default.htm>.

relationship with the actors of the existing order should be kept at a certain level that it would be averted from turning into one of them.

One of the most defining indications of not being another actor of the system would manifest itself in terms of regarding ethics in the political arena however during the referendum process liberal intellectuals from time to time expressed their discontent with the irregularities characterizing the trials of Ergenekon and the arrest of Hanefi Avcı violating such concern. For instance, Bayramoğlu, right after the referendum writes that in Turkey with regard to these cases there arises an ethical issue surrounding the realm of politics (Yeni Şafak, 30.09.2010). Three major issues that should be overcome after the referendum, for Bayramoğlu, were the making of the new constitution, Kurdish question and ethics in politics. (Yeni Şafak, 30.09.2010). What is critical here is the fact that, here again, these criticisms and warnings are always accompanied with certain reservations. This is why, Bayramoğlu adds that “this ethical question is not the major axis or the determinant of what Turkey goes through” (Yeni Şafak, 30.09.2010).

This attitude of the liberal intellectuals to “excuse” what they regard as the misdeeds of the ruling party also characterizes their response to the criticisms on the amendment package. It may be argued that the process leading to referendum has been subjected to many discussions by the groups who ideologically differ to a great extent such as feminists, Kurds, socialists, business organizations, trade unions and nationalists. Moreover, it may be argued that they are trying to avoid the criticisms from the Kurdish population with regard to the blindness of the constitutional package in terms of the Kurdish question by claiming that the atmosphere providing the solution of this question would be realized with the acceptance of the package in the referendum (Çandar, Referans, 18.08.2010). This is to say, referendum is a stop or a prerequisite on the way to the preparation of the civilian constitution (Çandar, Referans, 25.08.2010) which would be the solution to the Kurdish question. Liberal intellectuals’ arguments with regard to these discussions are framed by the same reservation that under the existing circumstances of the tutelary regime this amendment itself would be a success story and the deficiencies characterizing the process should be accepted by the critics given this background structure of the Turkish politics. These special conditions render the position taken in the referendum highly critical. This is to say, the amendment package which would be considered as

inadequate also by the liberal intellectuals under different conditions is now associated with as the only condition of consolidating democracy.

The examination of the 8 months time between the proposal's presentation in the parliament and its acceptance in referendum shows the fact that liberal intellectuals are propagating fiercely for the "yes" whereas this attitude reaches its peak right after the referendum day. The shared reaction to the results is its celebration as the substantiate sign of the establishment of "New Turkey". The foundations of "New Turkey", in this regard, is Turkish people's breaking with the "chains of the September 12" referring to the possibility of the realization of their wishes of a democratic country, freedom and the termination of the military tutelage (Çandar, Radikal, 13.09.2010). In the exact same manner, Bayramoğlu identify these results as the Turkish people's statement that it supports the reforms and the reformist party. Moreover, the quantity of the "yes" votes (including the would-be votes of the Kurdish people who were under the pressure of the BDP for boycott) show that more than %60 of the population is pro-reform which signifies the fact that rather than a polarization in the country what characterizes this period is a form of social consensus (Bayramoğlu, Yeni Şafak, 14.09.2010). Thus, the referendum signifies the end of an era which is characterized by the tutelage of bureaucracy over politics as well as the state over society through the general will of the society. However, this is only a point in terms of the long term process of transformation that Turkey experiences which should be taken into account as the fact that the expected fall of the Kemalist regime would not be realized in the short run. This corresponds to Mahçupyan's periodization of the Republic's history around 30 year-intervals: One-party epoch, the term of military interventions and that of the judicial tutelage (Mahçupyan, Taraf, 15.09.2010). Following this line, Mahçupyan argues that, the referendum is the "doorstep" to another interval in which we would "witness the closure of the Kemalist paranthesis" through expiring the judicial tutelage (Mahçupyan, Taraf, 15.09.2010).

This doorstep is a clear indication of the fact that, for Mahçupyan, Kemalist regime with its institutions such as HSYK has lost its legitimacy with regard to the people. In this sense, the transformation Turkey is subjected is irreversible since once a system has lost its legitimacy it could not resist the demands from the society (Taraf, 15.09.2010). Deterioration of the regime is indicative of the fact that the people "discovered a side of the Kemalist ideology insulting them" (Taraf,

15.09.2010) and got bored with it. The referendum, therefore, constitutes a point where this anomaly of being governed by an ideology that humiliates the people is brought to a halt “by the healthy people of this country” (15.09.2010)

Presenting the referendum with its content challenging the tutelage of the judiciary as the doorstep to the democratic Turkey renders the assertion of the opposition parties to reduce the referendum to the vote of confidence for AKP as another common theme. Çandar argues that this point is unhealthy since the change which would be supported under different circumstances is trivialized due to opposing the governing party or Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in the personal level. The meaning of referendum cannot be limited to a confidence vote for the government, rather it would be a statement on the will of the people to promote reforms (Bayramoğlu, Yeni Şafak, 29.03.2010). This is why, for Bayramoğlu, the Dört-yol case as well as the arrestment of the 102 military officers¹²⁴ cannot be fairly understood disregarding the process on referendum. Despite the fact that they insist on not defining the referendum as the confidence vote for the party in power, they emphasize that the referendum would provide legitimacy for the change (Bayramoğlu, Yeni Şafak, 26.08.2010). In Bayramoğlu’s words, “the arbitration of the public” would refresh the process of civilianization which is tried to be brought to a halt by the “black front”. The arrestment of 102 officers a month before the YAŞ and the prevention of their promotions including Hasan Iğsiz assignment as the Commander of Land Forces were major points of conflict determining the period. It is defended that these acts of the “deep state” would be terminated in the process led by the acceptance of the package in the referendum (Altan, Star, 07.09.2010). Altan states that Dört-yol case is an extension of the fact that the ruling parties in Turkey change with the elections whereas the “political regime” stays the same which can be affirmed from the continuous operations of JİTEM. This vicious circle could be brought to a halt under the circumstances that the “political regime” is challenged whereas this is only possible with the making of a civilian constitution (Altan, Star, 07.09.2010). This is to say, the “political atmosphere” making the Ergenekon and Balyoz trials possible would be rendered constant with the referendum leading to the process of the civilian constitution.

¹²⁴ See, “Cumhuriyet Tarihinde İlk,” updated July, 2010, September 05, 2012, <http://www.haberturk.com/gundem/haber/535490-cumhuriyet-tarihinde-ilk>.

Despite their attempt of making it clear that what is voted in the referendum is not the AKP, rather the will of the people to cease the maintenance of the political regime, one of their major emphases with regard to the post-referendum period, under the circumstances that this intervention of the public is resulted with the majority of “yes” votes, AKP would be more than eager to further the change and would keep its energy for reforms leading the campaign for the 2011 elections to be guided by the civilian constitution project. On the contrary, if the majority of the votes would be “no”s, in a way again to define the referendum as a confidence vote for the party in power they refer to the jeopardy of AKP to feel insecure about maintaining its power and target the electorate of MHP with a more nationalist discourse (Çandar, Referans, 07.09.2010). This constitutes another common point of Çandar and Mahçupyan as the emphasis on the detrimental prospects of a possible victory of “no” would lead. Here, intimidating especially the boycotters with the possible loss of enthusiasm of the AKP for democratization is the shared strategy which is also indicative of the fact that how fragile AKP’s leadership in this regard. It should be remembered that they themselves agreed on the fact that the reform process is not internalized by the AKP. As we will see in detail in the last moment, they admit this fact publicly and reconsider their position with regard the power by arguing that since AKP has left the coalition, has get away from the direction of its brain, namely the liberal intellectuals, it is expected . In a way to render themselves an important position, the misdeeds of AKP were the expected consequences of this separation. This is why, in 2010 they were constantly urging about the fragility of the motivation of AKP and the possibility that the victory of “no” would jeopardize the process of democratization and civilianization to a great extent which would mean a restoration for the status quo. The “teyakküz ideology” mentioned in the previous chapter is also at use here, this is to say the eagerness of AKP should not be intervened in a manner to be reduced since it would interrupt the democratization process. Here, it may be argued that the conflicting structure of the idea of “New Turkey” continues to determine their discourse with regard to the referendum. It is argued previously that “New Turkey” is constructed as an ideal that is “so near to hold but which is never complete” in a way to guarantee AKP the position of being “in opposition” which constitutes its political capital as Bora indicates (2009: 129). At this point, it may be argued that the construction of the ideal of New Turkey as if it is too near to grasp renders some form of power to AKP as the bearer of this ideal.

As the referendum date was getting closer and the research on the possible results indicate a clear victory for the “yes”, the liberal intellectuals retreated from their position of attributing the supporters of “no” with perversion, sickness etc. and in accordance with their presentation of AKP as the powerful founder of the “New Turkey”, they started to argue that even if the referendum results with the majority of “no” votes, it would not lead a fundamental change in the democratization direction of Turkey. In this regard Çandar notes that the result of “yes” would not signify the completion of the democratization process rather it is a “sharp turn” for this end (Radikal, 11.09.2010). It would accelerate the process for the making of the civilian constitution and provide the well-being of the upcoming elections since “the synergy” that the majority of the “yes” votes would determine the frame of the campaign around the different projects of political parties with regard to establishing civilian constitution (Çandar, Radikal, 11.09.2010).

The ambivalent nature of these arguments depending on presenting AKP as powerful to be the new actor of the New Turkey but at the same time not powerful enough to make the necessary changes immediately due to the impediments of the conventional figures of the system resulted with an unsteady understanding of the referendum. As a result, sometimes it is presented as critical as what is realized with this referendum is voting for the future of Turkey whereas under the circumstances that it would resulted with the majority of the “no”s it could only slow down the process of democratization, rather than bringing it into a halt (Çandar, Radikal, 11.09.2010).

Keeping the argument in mind that the democratization project of AKP claiming that it would establish the “New Turkey” is the attraction making the liberal intellectuals’ participation in the intellectual bloc possible, one may here easily argue that the referendum is the confirmation they need for the maintenance of the legitimacy of AKP’s reforms. Mehmet Altan argues in this regard that “is not it already the reason for all of us to search for the high percentage of “yes” votes to blow up the September 12 regime in the manner that nobody, including AKP, could turn back and postpone?” (Altan, Star, 02.09.2010). It may be argued that this is an attempt to strengthen AKP’s position with regard to the state elites in an irreversible manner that confronting their attempts of intervention with the legitimacy of the AKP confirmed with the high level of “yes” votes in the referendum which have the implications of challenging the September 12 regime and military tutelage as a step

of democratization, being a doorstep to the solution to the Kurdish question, bringing the operations of the deep state into a halt, preventing the tutelary regime from striking back and thus, which is the only rational behavior.

6.4. Symptom of Political Sickness: Saying “No”

Regarding the discussion above attributing the “yes” position as the only rational way of political behavior, it is not unexpected to see that prospects of saying “no” as its “other” would be associated with irrationality. Here, Çandar’s claim that “the supporters of ‘no’ voted for different reasons and to a great extent with irrational urges” (Radikal, 13.09.2010) and Mahçupyan’s presentation of voting for “no” as “equivalent to saying “I do not want democracy” whereas boycott is a different version of this position” (Taraf, 05.09.2010, t.m) constitute the clear instances of this perspective. Moreover, the referendum also signifies the fact that Turkish society is getting modernized at last. This is also related with the vision that referendum was the key to the solution of most of the problems that Turkish society experiences such as the Kurdish and Alevi question. Associating the continuity of these problems with the political career or identity concerns of the figures representing these movements, he argues that boycotting or voting for “no” is the strategy to further the problem in a way to provide one with the privilege to name oneself in the field of politics (Taraf, 03.09.2010). In this section we will try to identify liberal intellectual’s justification for this attribution of the positions “no” and “boycott” and the consequences of these justification for their self-image. This is to say, in a way to restate our reference to Gramsci with regard to the sense of the distinction with the previous order that would attract the intellectuals to the intellectual bloc, here, we will argue that liberal intellectuals through attributing CHP and MHP as the representatives of the Old Turkey and BDP with the “Kurdish Kemalism”, furthered this sense of distinction. Moreover, identifying oneself with the only rational and democratic position would be taken into account as another source of power for their position as the new actors of “New Turkey”.

In this section, in order to understand the manner the other positions are rendered as irrational, we will follow the traces of how the liberal intellectuals constructed the politics over the equation of either –or . It may be argued that this

construction is the consequence of a certain view on relationship between the state and society. We claimed before that explaining the Turkish political history over the dichotomy of center- periphery resulted with an ahistorical understanding of the military interventions which disregarded the conflicts within the society as well as the effect of the global capitalism over this relation. It may be argued that the columns of the liberal intellectuals during the moment of referendum stand as the clear substantiation of this position. This is to say, we identified in terms of our study of the liberal intellectuals' position during the 8 month time we referred their discussion of the process is characterized by the conflict between the figures of the "Old Turkey" and the "New Turkey". On the one hand, there are the supporters of democracy whereas on the other hand there stands the front of "old Turkey" constituted of MHP, CHP and BDP whereas groups of socialists and feminists are also included in this front. Çandar's association of the political behaviors of Öcalan and the intellectuals who signed a communiqué demanding a new civilian constitution rather than being satisfied with the amendment package can be taken into account as exemplifying this equation. Quoting Öcalan saying that the amendments do not have anything to do with the democratic constitution and the members of BDP should not be concerned about sharing the same position with the CHP and MHP since the frame of politics should be determined by principles (Referans, 05.05.2010) and referring to the demands of civilian constitution in the communiqué, argues that they belong to the same standing with regard to the Turkish political scene. Whereas for the former the rejection of the constitutional package through the referendum was a necessity in terms of the fulfillment of the concerns regarding its political prospects, Çandar argues that for the latter, under the circumstances determined by the tutelary regime, insisting on following principles as it is substantiated with the declared demand of civilian constitution is an indication of political naiveté. Çandar describes this naiveté as a journey in the "Alice's Adventures in Wonderland" (Referans, 31.03.2010) whereas the mentioned difference between the reasons of not supporting the constitutional changes does not change the fact that these intellectuals share the same political position with Abdullah Öcalan and belong to the "black front" (Çandar, Radikal, 05.05.2010). In the section that we will investigate the perspectives of the liberal intellectuals with regard to the "not enough but yes" position, we will further this analysis but for our current purposes it is sufficient to note that various positions are translated by the

liberal intellectuals as parts of either the “yes” or “no” camps which is synonymous with determining one’s position in terms of the democratization of Turkey. This is to say, either one would favor democratization and support the amendments or it would oppose it and cooperate with the conventional figures of the “Old Turkey”.

Here, it may be argued that, the language of the politics is reduced to the extent that it would be easily consumed by the audience of the political realm. Aside from being the ideological consequence of understanding Turkish politics over a state-centered model, here it may be argued that this simplification is in accordance with the prevalence of the fast-thinkers in the field of media which is the major source of recognition and thus power in the contemporary moment of global capitalism as it is mentioned in the first chapter. It may be argued that the perspective on the boycott as not a “mature” political position and as part of the front of “no” substantiates this unwillingness to take the discussion out of the categories determined by the either-or equation of the positions of “yes” and “no”. Consequently, the common attitude with regard to the position of boycott can be given as another form of irrationality whereas the major difference it had with the “no” position is its diffidence. It is also related to the concerns of furthering one’s position in the political system. The ground that makes it possible for “politically immature” BDP to share the same front with MHP and CHP in this sense is determined by these concerns. This is to say, the irrationality of the position stems from the fact that the Kurdish people who suffered greatly by the September 12 regime, as it can be identified with the example of what had been experienced in the Diyarbakır prison, would not support the package the main aim of which is to challenge this regime. This is why, the five conditions presented by BDP to vote for “yes” are taken into account as a consequence of supporting the status quo through acting against the “yes”. These conditions are i. no definition of ethnic citizenship, ii. termination of the operations iii. setting the KCK detainees free iv. lowering the electoral threshold, vi. starting negotiations for the political solution of the Kurdish question which could not be realized in the amount of time that is left for the referendum. Moreover, according to liberal intellectuals these conditions can only be fulfilled in a democratic environment which could be realized with the confirmation of the constitutional amendments in the referendum. For liberal intellectuals this attitude of not supporting the limited agenda of change for the sake of an overall democratic change is a clear indication of the unwillingness of the BDP for

challenging the status quo, since this package is a prerequisite for the establishment of a new, civil, democratic constitution.

Liberal intellectuals, in a way to respond the criticism on the amendment package as not involving any content for the Kurdish question which stands as one of the major public reasons of the boycott, argue that the package is a clear step for the democratization of Turkey and this is why the Kurds would also benefit from the amendments whereas boycotting it with the justification that the package is blind to the Kurdish question is a clear indication of the fact that BDP, unlike what it officially declares, is not targeting to be a “party of Turkey”.

It may be argued that liberal intellectuals condemn the positions of “no” and “boycott” as the symptoms of political sickness whereas, as it is clearly stated by Mahçupyan, boycotters use the ground of referendum to establish an identity for themselves (Taraf, 20.08.2010). Here, it should be noted that boycotters are not the only groups who are in search for an identity during the referendum process. In order to understand this point Mahçupyan’s account of referendum is clearly exemplifying. He argues that the supporters of the yes with reservations who come together under the title of “yes but not enough” are corresponding to a “politically diffident” position whereas the major impetus for this position is again is to differentiate oneself in a way to establish a political identity. Mahçupyan’s reasoning can be summarized as since the governing party itself already accepts that the package is not enough (referring to Erdoğan’s speech), the reason for emphasizing this reservation should be something else (Taraf, 18.08.2010). Under the circumstances that the “no” position is irrational, as it is for Çandar, and refers to either nationalists (ulusalcı) or categorical enemies of AKP, this reservation clearly addresses the boycotters (associated as leftists) with the concern of indicating that they are also leftists. It should be taken into account that this explanation of what we call the “reservation position” (“yes, but not enough”) is indicative of the seeds of a new front for the leftists in Turkey which could only be flourished under the circumstances of democracy that would be realized with the way that referendum would pave. According to Mahçupyan, it should be clarified that in terms of the atmosphere of democratic countries referendum could limit the boundaries of what is political whereas in countries like Turkey (in which the politics is under the cultural tutelage – 22.08.2010) it could lead to the potential of democratization to turn into reality. This is to say, the communities through coming side by side with other groups including

their political adversaries in terms of their votes in the referendum could be subjected to a process of democratization within their own structure.

It is the point where Bayramođlu identifies his objection against the claims of polarization that is developed around the positions of “yes” and “no” arguing that neither the supporters of the former nor the latter are constituting a homogenous whole. Pro-yes position was incorporating various groups who were sharing the attitude of identifying what Turkey witnesses during the AKP’s governing period as the process of change that Turkey has been in great need of for a long time. On the other hand, Bayramođlu argues that the supporters of “no” are again heterogeneous whereas their position depends on the commonality of being against or being afraid of the change which is mostly associated with the possibility of losing their previously advantageous place within the order. Kurds, other than the ones that are organized around saying “yes” or “no” called for the boycott of the referendum and either of these stands could be considered as homogenous (Yeni Şafak, 22.09.2010). “Secularization in the Islamic division, modernization in conservative division, democratization in the secular division are the dominant waves and what takes place is the establishment of a middle class over these waves” (Yeni Şafak, 22.09.2010, t.m). Being part of this rising middle class would bring these divisions in terms of the commonality of being AKP’s electorate, which would keep them in balance with regard to each other and render any fears concerning the rise of conservatism meaningless. Thus, the fears for the prospects of the political order that are depending on the vote the “yes” position got in the elections are implausible for Bayramođlu (Yeni Şafak, 21.09.2010). For him, in a way to exceed the boundaries of criticizing the government the theme is the dictatorship of the majority. AKP is criticized for contenting with an amendment package, its aim of democratization is questioned and denounced for trying to realize an establishment giving it extended powers of legislative and executive which is immune to constitutional inspection. It is expected that with the acceptance of the amendment package the aim of making a new civilian constitution would be out of the agenda of the owners of the political power¹²⁵ whereas Bayramođlu believes that as long as AKP furthers its project of democratization around the new constitution, there is no need to feel threatened

¹²⁵“Anayasa Deđişiklik Paketi Demokratikleşme için İleri bir Adım mı?,” accessed September 05, 2010, <http://www.anayasa.org/images/stories/mtn/anayasa%20degisiklik%20paketi%20ileri%20bir%20adim%20mi%202010%20Aralik.pdf>. Accessed 05.09.2012., p.2

about the high number of the votes for the “yes” position and it is already the case that AKP has no blueprint other than following the reform process (Yeni Şafak, 21.09.2010).

Under these circumstances, stating that it is not reasonable to oppose the betterment depending on the inadequacy of the changes (Bayramoğlu, Yeni Şafak, 22.07.2010), general attitude of the liberal intellectuals can be given as there must be other motivations of this “front” for such an irrational behavior. For Bayramoğlu the motivations behind these criticisms and positioning oneself with the “alliance of no” can be ordered as follows: i. being against AKP, ii. overrating the bargaining value of the package rather than its content, iii. bringing the transformation process Turkey experiences into a halt (Yeni Şafak, 14.07.2010). He argues that all these concerns are indicative of “sickness” (Yeni Şafak, 14.07.2010) setting an equation that the supporters of “hope” said “yes” in the referendum, whereas the promoters of fear and hopelessness constituted the front of “no”. They try to diffuse the fear that AKP and its followers would seize the state (Bayramoğlu, Yeni Şafak, 18.09.2010). This is the point where Bayramoğlu associates this policy with the apartheid regime. Just like the white population in the apartheid they are “racist and intolerant with regard to the blacks’ entrance in the public sphere and having share in power, to make the long story short when their privileges are the case” (Bayramoğlu, Yeni Şafak, 10.09.2010). Therefore, the vote for “no” is another example of politicizing the fears of the conventional holders of power when their monopoly over the system is under threat whereas the majority of the votes of “yes” including the would-be voters within the boycotters substantiates that Turkey has taken a major step in overcoming this mentality (Bayramoğlu, Yeni Şafak, 10.09.2010; Yeni Şafak, 18.09.2010). In accordance with this understanding, also for Çandar the referendum process indicated that the promotion of this fear by this front could not find correspondence in the society, rather it is the case that Turkey is holding side with the idea of change. The mathematical explanation here can be given as the voters who did not say “no” were not constituted of the “supporters of the status quo”, rather they included the boycotters as well as the section who is in favor of the overall change of the constitution. Moreover, most of the people who participated in the boycott decision were under the pressure of the respective party and its armed support. For Çandar these circumstances indicated the fact that the actual supporters of the “change”, “freedom” and “democracy” were corresponding to a larger set than the amount of

the “yes” votes (Radikal, 13.09.2010). In this sense, there is no polarization, rather with the referendum Turkish people has declared it clearly that it wanted “freedom” that would be depended upon the establishment of a new social contract. In Çandar’s terms, this will, in fact, refers to the vision that the interference of military in politics is not acceptable any more. In addition to this, referendum signifies the supreme courts’ loss of their caste structure corresponding to the “civilian façade” of the military tutelage. “The ones like us are happy to walk to the future in the same direction with the people of Turkey. This is a confession” (Çandar, Radikal, 14.09.2010, t.m)

Mahçupyan, as opposed to Çandar, Altan and Bayramoğlu, argues that the probable results of the referendum will lead to the consequence of widening the split and polarization in the society (Mahçupyan, Taraf, 10.09.2010). The traces of such consequence are apparent in the way the campaign for the “no” is directed. He argues that the supporters of the “no” are deceiving the society with regard to the content of the constitutional changes that will be voted in the referendum through constantly saying that these amendments would lead to the domination of the judiciary by the executive in a way to jeopardize the principle of the separation of powers. According to Mahçupyan, the actual outcome of the referendum would be the contrary since it would impede the Minister of Justice from ordering for the interrogation of the prosecutors and judges. Moreover, under the circumstances that the supreme courts are not impartial (which characterizes the last 30 years of Turkish Republic), the independence of the courts resulted with the politicization of the judiciary that can be defined as the tutelage of this branch if one thinks within the dynamics of the Turkish political history. Thus, for Mahçupyan if one has to make a preference between the domination of the judiciary by the executive and the domination of the executive by the judiciary, if the will is the establishment of democracy, the choice should be the latter. His justification depends on the reversibility of the decisions of the executive with the opportunities to protest them in a democracy whereas there would be sanctions to resist the decisions of the judiciary. Thus, with regard to the above given choice, he argues that for the former there are the opportunities to resist if one identifies that it is retreated from democracy whereas under the circumstances of the latter choice one may think itself still in democracy whereas what it actually experiences is a case of retreat. Moreover, what is criticized nowadays as the “civil tutelage” is still preferable to the tutelage of the bureaucracy not only with regard to

the fact that the former is a form of domination that is exercised by the representative of the will of the Turkish people but also in terms of the levels of democracy that their respective ideologies include. He engages in a comparison between the Islam and Kemalism indicating that both are authoritarian ideologies, however still since Islam is a more democratic doctrine than Kemalism, the tutelage of the executive should be preferred to the tutelage of the judiciary.

It may be argued that this position of Mahçupyan is explanatory of his constant support for the governing party even at the times its relationship with the liberal intellectuals came to a halt like the Uludere incident as we will see in the upcoming sections. This is to say, the equation Mahçupyan set for the Turkish political system is an either-or problem which is derived from the perspective of strong-state tradition. This derivation in a way to simplify the dynamics of the political system within such an equation render any possibility of alternative as cannot be translated into the language of the politics. Here, this is why it is important to note that:

AKP's perspective of Ergenekon is, at last, taken into account by the oppositionary and pro-government intellectuals in the exact manner that AKP wants it to be. It is either the case that Ergenekon is the great and eternal source of evil including everything in itself or it is an illusion used for purging the nationalists. Since, it would harden to take counter- position and would take place out of the existing patterns of discourse (...), it is not very desirable to discuss the possibilities between these two poles (Türk, 2012: 30).

This presentation of the Ergenekon trial around two explanatory choices can only be understood with regard to the circular circulation we talked about. The strategy here is to attribute the counter position with irrationality which would decipher supporting AKP as the only sound alternative under the circumstances that other positions are already non-existent or radical in a way that it is not possible to translate them to the given language of politics. This position is understandable through the perspective of the uni-linear line of modernization which portrays the democratization as part of the “inevitable” course of events which will be realized through the subjectivity of the “Sunni Muslims”.

At this point, it should be noted that, in accordance with the perspective of the duality of center-periphery, Mahçupyan argues that since the conservative muslims constitute the largest community in the society, it is not possible for any attempt for democratization to be legitimate under the circumstances that they are excluded from

the system. Consequently, “Turkey could be as free as its muslims are free and its quality is as much as their quality” (Taraf, 11.08.2010). According to Mahçupyan this fact is the major reason behind the positioning with regard to the referendum. While it is the case that AKP, SP and BBP having Islamist orientations are supporting the amendment package, CHP and MHP are opposing it as “the laicist/nationalist coalition of official ideology” (Taraf, 25.07.2010). As it is substantiated with these positioning in fact the referendum has little to do with the content of the amendment package, as it is already known by the supporters of all camps, it is actually a choice between democracy and tutelage (Taraf, 15.08.2010).

Regarding all of the discussions above, it is possible to argue that in accordance with the perspective of the democratization as civilianization and civil society as the periphery referring to the “Islamist-easternist front”, the referendum process is evaluated by the liberal intellectuals through associating voting for “yes” as the only rational position. This association can be taken into account as the sense of distinction that would maintain the attraction of the liberal intellectuals to the intellectual bloc, since being out of this position would refer to political sickness and irrationality. In accordance with this understanding the results of the referendum were defined as the doorstep to the “New Turkey” or to the “Second Republic” which is the outcome of the struggle against the real holders of power and, as a result, challenging the mentality of “the first republic”. Thus, at the end of the third term, we identified that liberal intellectuals preserve the self-image of the “true intellectual” defined through the incompatibility between the power and intellect.

CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSIONS

Turkish political history following the election of AKP in the year 2002 has witnessed a major collaboration between a certain group of intellectuals and this political party. This collaboration became a prevalent discussion in the media and maintains to be so in the following ten years time. The constancy of the support of the liberal intellectuals even when the governing party publicly declares that it is not interested in its maintenance constituted the content of this controversy in the intellectual realm. It is the main concern of this study to identify the motives behind the constancy of this support.

The criticisms on this coalition are developed from within the theme of the “treason of clerics” which is the major focus of the literature on the sociology of intellectuals. It is identified in the thesis that the idea of “treason” depends on the nostalgia on the Dreyfus Affair as a result of which the concept of “intellectual” gained currency. The affair was also important due to presenting the archetype of the boundaries in terms of the relationship between the intellectuals and the political power. In this sense, the results of the affair constituting the origins of the literature on intellectuals, were taken into account as if the intellectuals should involve in political processes only for the sake of the universal values. Involvement in politics aside from such concerns, especially under the circumstances that it takes the form of close relationships with the holders of the political power, is taken into account as the “betrayal” of the intellectual to its reasons of very existence. It may be argued that this proposition of the relations between the intellectuals and power as destined to be “nasty, brutish and short” became a prevalent theme that is referred in order to criticize the participation of intellectuals in politics whereas the intellectuals are also concerned to explicate their position in a given social formation through this premise.

In this regard the discussion on the relationship between the liberal intellectuals and power has no exception. This theme is apparent with regard to the relations between the liberal intellectuals and AKP since the AKP’s victory in 2002 general elections. In accordance with the idea of incompatibility between the power

and intellect, here, it may be argued that the liberal intellectuals are criticized by very many groups in the society. Here, it should be noted that the response of the liberal intellectuals was not a rejection of this incompatibility, rather they challenged the attribution of the government as a possible source of power. This is to say, since it is not the case that AKP was not the actual holder of power, rather what is omnipotent is “the tutelary regime”, holding side and developing close relations with the former is not a challenge to the equation of incompatibility between power and intellect.

Stating the major aim of the study as to identify the motives behind this definition of the liberal intellectuals and the consequent coalition with the governing party, Gramsci’s theory is taken into account as revealing the implications of justifying one’s close relationship with the governing party through the discourse of intellectual responsibility. Explaining these motives through the perspective Gramsci provided challenges the idea of the incompatibility between the power and the intellect since it is already the case that intellectuals have organic ties with the social classes and as a result by definition they are functionaries of some particularisms. Even the intellectuals claiming to be independent, whom Gramsci defines as the “traditional intellectuals”, due to their position of not challenging the order, cannot be defined through the concerns of impartiality. This is to say, since this privileged position of the traditional intellectuals can only be maintained through the survival of the existing system. Under these circumstances these intellectuals’ participation in the political party of a rising class is the moment where they become the organic intellectuals of this class. The conditions of this transformation are determined by Gramsci through the provision of a sense of attraction. In other words, it is the idea of Gramsci that the hegemony of a class can only be provided through the consolidation of an intellectual bloc whereas for this consolidation to be realized there arises the need of attracting the intellectuals of other classes to the bloc. This is why every class in its struggle for hegemony should develop a policy towards intellectuals which would incorporate two conditions. The first condition of this attraction is to provide a distinction, a dignity to the intellectuals which renders them an identity that is other than the previous order whereas the second refers providing the conditions of employment which would be realized from within a “spirit of caste”.

Regarding especially the second condition it may be argued that according to Gramsci what is regarded as the “treason of the intellectuals” is completely related

with the middle classes' concern of employment. Under the circumstances that "all the satisfactions for their general needs" are offered, it is possible to expect that its attraction to the intellectual bloc would be maintained. This point is inspiring to understand the constancy of the support of the liberal intellectuals to the governing party. Here, it should be noted that the study is periodized in accordance with the fluctuations of the relationship between the liberal intellectuals and AKP whereas it may be argued that during neither of these terms that are investigated, these fluctuations are resulted with the breaking down of this support since the conditions of the attraction is tried to be furthered by these intellectuals in the discursive level.

The first condition of the attraction which is the sense of distinction that being transformed into an organic intellectual of the rising capital would provide is understandable only within the frame of reference of a certain version of understanding the social change. This perspective which has dominated the realm of social sciences in Turkey following the 1980 period is derived from the major premises of the center/ periphery paradigm which confirmed its position following the end of the cold war. According to this understanding, Ottoman-Turkish tradition is defined through a sense of continuity. This is to say, the powerful center that is constituted by the military and bureaucratic elites dominates the periphery which is taken into account as if carrying a "democratic ethos" in itself. Turkish political history, in this regard, is summarized through the rise of the periphery with certain demands and its repression by the state which does not want to lose its privileges in the system. This cycled presentation of the Turkish political history which turns to its starting point with the military interventions is taken by the liberal intellectuals as brought to a halt in its last term. This is to say, the rising Anatolian capital and its representative AKP led to a rupture which is indicative of the termination of this cycle, in the sense that the traditional periphery is becoming the center itself through challenging the domination of the bureaucracy. This is the point where AKP's claims on democratizing the republic which is referred through the terms of "advanced democracy" and "New Turkey" (confirming this idea of rupture) rendered the liberal intellectuals with a sense of "distinction" and "dignity" as the actors challenging the status quo and establishing the "New Turkey".

Here the second condition should be taken into account which may be defined as the confirmation of this sense of distinction through maintaining key positions in the media. Referring to Bourdieu, since it is the case that in the contemporary

societies the sphere of media has a dominance over all other spheres being the reference point of what is in circulation and what is important, it is possible to argue that with the rise of AKP to power, their existence both in what they refer as the “central media” and the Islamist media may be translated as an indication of attaining a powerful spot in the intellectual bloc.

Throughout the thesis, it is tried to be identified that the distinction of being the new actors of “New Turkey” which is confirmed with their position in the media, is tried to be pursued through the discourse of democratization even when it is the case that the political party is criticized by very many groups in the society due to what is regarded as its anti-democratic political behavior. Here, it should be noted again that it is not the concern of the thesis to identify whether the performance of the political party is actually democratic or not. Rather, the aim is to identify the content of what liberal intellectuals define as democratization that makes it possible for them to further their distinctive position or, in better terms, self-image under the circumstances that it is denied by the political party. In the thesis, this content is identified as having three components that are EU membership, tutelary regime and the civilian constitution. It is argued that deriving their premises from the center/periphery paradigm the liberal intellectuals came up with an understanding of democratization which may be defined as the democratization as civilianization. The conditions of the realization of this project of democratization can be given in the following line: the tutelary regime is so powerful that it is not possible for AKP to lead the democratization of country by itself, this is why EU as a guide representing the universal values should be followed (this point is also confirming their position of not holding side with the power rather with what is universal), because of viewing “democratization as civilianization” when the 1982 constitution is replaced by a new one it would represent the end of the tutelary regime, the method of the constitution making due to the lack of public participation is not a concern for liberal intellectuals.

It is argued that under the powerful structure of the tutelary regime being alongside with the governing party within the frame of reference of the duality between the center and periphery renders the liberal intellectuals as “iconoclasts” of the old regime, and also supporting the membership process serves as the common ground of the coalition between the liberal intellectuals and power in a way to confirm their rationality. In the thesis it is identified that these intellectuals tried to

maintain the conditions of this distinction under the circumstances that the political power denies this position. Here, it should be remembered that in order to make sense of the insistence for furthering the distinction that is provided by the close relations with AKP, the course of this relationship is tried to be investigated through the moments that are taking into account possible moments of fluctuations. An overall examination of this process resulted with a differentiation of three terms with regard to the form this sense of distinction takes. The interval of 2002-2005 is characterized by the reform process and served as the moment that the sense of distinction is established whereas the second moment of 2007-2008 is taken into account as the term that the political power publicly denied the existence of a coalition between the liberal intellectuals and itself. Regarding this periodization it is argued that the latter is the moment when the distinction is tried to be maintained through the transformation of the idea of “powerless government” in a way to include the “ideology to be on alert”. Lastly, the year 2010 characterized by the discussions on the referendum and civilian constitution making is considered by the liberal intellectuals as the moment in which they tried to save the distinction through backing down from their former demands. It may be argued that insistence on these demands could lead another confrontation as it is the case with the 2007 and under the hostile circumstances of the Turkish political scene it would be irrational to demand other than what can be realized by the AKP. These three terms are also associated with these three themes in the sense that the first moment is characterized by the efforts on membership to EU, the second moment with the April 27 and the closure case is characterized by the powerfulness of the tutelary regime serving as the explanation of the misdeeds of the party in this period, whereas the last one that is developed around the referendum debates is the appearance of how they retreated from their demands on civilian constitution.

This study terminates at a point in which the liberal intellectuals’ self-image is restored to the extent that through identifying their support as making a choice between the democracy and tutelage they furthered the sense of distinction by being the “new actors” of the “New Turkey”. However, when the course of the relationship between the liberal intellectuals and political power is followed after the referendum, it may be talked about the confusion of the former, given the ignorance of the latter in terms of their warnings. This confusion is also related with the major incidents of the period that is leading to the “New Turkey” which makes it harder to support the

governing party due to the arrestments of the journalists and students, the response of the Prime Minister with regard to the Alevi's demands claiming that it is not a religion and Cemevi is not a place of worship, the release of the ones who are responsible of the Bahçelievler massacre, the strike ban against the aviation workers, the prison outbreaks, the direction of the city theatres by the municipality authorities, rejection of the education in mother-tongue. Moreover, the attitude of the governing party is a clear case of discontent for the liberal intellectuals whereas the wish that the party would turn back to its reformist character is still there. Even the position of the government with regard to the killing of the 35 peasants in Uludere by the Turkish Armed Forces which is the major source of the criticism of these intellectuals during this period is developed from within the theme of "Ankaralılařmak" (which as a theme determined the boundaries of "critical companionship", reserving the democratizing potential of AKP under all circumstances that is trapped by the coalition of the international and domestic forces which refers to the Ergenekon). Here, it should be noted that the idea of the powerless government, which served as the major source of distinction in terms of the moments that are investigated so far, is denied by the governing party itself manifesting itself in Çandar's statement that the criticism of Ankaralılařmak stands as the major source of anger and sensitivity of Prime Minister. Given the mentioned connotations of the criticism or in better terms of warnings of Ankaralılařmak, Mehmet Altan argues that even the friendly criticism, (since after the incident Altan argues that it is the government that is also the victim of the Uludere incident) (Altan, Star, 02.01.2012), is not acceptable by the political power.

The prospects of this relationship, given the denial of the Prime Minister, are not indicative of its survival. Mehmet Altan's expulsion from his post in the daily Star known by its pro-government orientation, due to his "friendly criticism" which is the consequence of the critical companionship and his later statements on the existence of a "civilian tutelage" in Turkey can also be indicative of the two conditions of being attracted to the intellectual bloc.

To sum up, it is concluded in the thesis that the liberal intellectuals are attracted to the intellectual bloc through the sense of distinction that AKP's claim of democratization provides which is also confirmed by their perspective of center/periphery leading them to identify AKP with a "democratizing ethos" as the representative of the periphery. The distinction provided by this idea of

democratization is developed around the concepts of tutelary regime, EU and civilian constitution which lead us to claim that democratization is reduced to civilianization which makes excusing what they regard as the misdeeds of the party possible given the hostile circumstances created by the conventional elites who are struggling not to lose their privileges in the system. Thus, according to this understanding, the political demands should be proportional with what is possible under these circumstances whereas asking for more would be a clear sign of irrationality rendering the liberal intellectuals' self-image of "superiority".

REFERENCES

"Erdoğan için Alarm Zili Çalıyor." Updated January 11, 2011. Accessed September 5, 2012. <http://haber.mynet.com/erdogan-icin-alarm-zili-caliyor-553186-politika/>.

"Özgürlükçü Ol, Ezber Boz! Fehmi Koru'dan Liberalleri Küstüren Erdoğan'a Çağrı!" Accessed September 5, 2012. <http://www.medyafaresi.com/haber/11366/guncel-ozgurlukcu-ol-ezber-boz--fehmi-korudan-liberalleri-kusturen-erdogana-cagri.html>.

"19 Ocak 2007'den Bugüne... Hrant Dink Cinayeti Kronolojisi." Accessed September 5, 2012. <http://www.bianet.org/bianet/siyaset/104254-hrant-dink-cinayeti-kronolojisi>,

"2002 Genel Seçimleri Türkiye Geneli İllere Göre Oy Dağılım Tablosu." Accessed September 5, 2012. <http://arsiv.ntvmsnbc.com/modules/secim2007/secim2002/>

Açıkel, F. "Muhafazakar Sosyal Mühendisliğin Yükselişi." *Birikim* 276, 2012, 14-20.

"Aday Gül." Updated April 04, 2007. Accessed September 05, 2012. <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/6391764.asp?gid=180>.

Akça, İ. "AKP, Anayasa Değişikliği Referandumu ve Sol: 'Yetmez ama Evet'in Açmazları." *Mesele* 45 (2010 Eylül).

Aksiyon. "II. Cumhuriyet Tartışmasında Yeni Milat: 17 Aralık." Updated 2005. Accessed September 13, 2012. <http://www.ikincicumhuriyet.org/index.asp?sayfa=medyada-ikinci-cumhuriyet&icerik=2266>.

Altan, M. "12 Eylülcüler Vicdanen çok Zorlanacak." *Star*, September 02, 2009. Accessed September 5, 2012. Available from: <http://www.mehmetaltan.com/index.asp?sayfa=sureliyayin&icerik=1620>.

Altan, M. "AB Komisyon Kararı Duyuldu mu?" *Sabah*, May 04, 2007. Accessed September 05, 2012. Available from: <http://arsiv.sabah.com.tr/2005/07/04/altan.html>.

Altan, M. "AKP Harakiri mi Yapıyor?" *Sabah*, September, 18 2004. Accessed September 05, 2012. Available from: <http://arsiv.sabah.com.tr/2004/09/18/altan.html>.

Altan, M. "AKP Liberal mi?" *Sabah*. 06.01.2003. Accessed September 05, 2012. Available from: <http://arsiv.sabah.com.tr/2003/01/06/s1713.html>.

Altan, M. "AKP ve Radikal Demokratikleşme ihtiyacı." *Sabah*, March 22, 2004. Accessed September 05, 2012. Available from: <http://arsiv.sabah.com.tr/2004/03/22/altan.html>.

Altan, M. "AKP'nin Kent Değerleriyle Sınavı." *Sabah*, September 06, 2004. Accessed September 05, 2012. Available from: <http://arsiv.sabah.com.tr/2004/09/06/altan.html>.

Altan, M. "AKP'nin Ortadoğu Vizyonu Var mı?" *Sabah*, June 06, 2005. Accessed September 05, 2012. Available from: <http://arsiv.sabah.com.tr/2005/06/11/altan.html>.

Altan, M. "Alevi Sorunu Nasıl Çözülür?" *Star*, January 13, 2008. Accessed September 05, 2012. Available from: <http://www.mehmetaltan.com/index.asp?sayfa=sureliyayin&icerik=261>.

Altan, M. "Ankaralılılaşma", *Star*, May, 06 2008. Accessed September 05, 2012. Available from: <http://www.stargazete.com/guncel/yazar/mehmet-altan/ankaralilasma-haber-100613.htm>.

Altan, M. "Askeri Mantık, Liberal Mantık." *Star*, February 15, 2007. Accessed September 05, 2012. Available from: <http://www.stargazete.com/yazar/mehmet-altan/askeri-mantik-liberal-mantik-haber-130431.htm>.

Altan, M. "Biz Anlatmadık ama Borsa Öğretecek..." *Sabah*. September 09, 2004. Accessed September 05, 2012. Available from: <http://arsiv.sabah.com.tr/2004/09/20/altan.html>.

Altan, M. "Bize Devletten Güçlü bir Hükümet Lazım..." *Sabah*. November 11, 2002. Accessed September 05, 2012. Available from: <http://arsiv.sabah.com.tr/2002/11/11/s1105.html>.

Altan, M. "Bülent Arınç'la bir Sabah", *Star*, January 29, 2007. Accessed September 05, 2012. Available from: <http://www.stargazete.com/politika/yazar/mehmet-altan/bulent-arinc-la-bir-sabah-haber-130449.htm>.

Altan, M. "Buyrun İnin..." *Star*, January 31, 2007. Accessed September 05, 2012. Available from: <http://old2.stargazete.com/yazar/mehmet-altan/buyrun-inin-haber-130447.htm>.

Altan, M. "Çekirge Kaç Kere Sıçrar?" *Sabah*, November 09, 2002. Accessed September 05, 2012. Available from: <http://arsiv.sabah.com.tr/2002/11/09/s1708.html>.

Altan, M. "Çene Altı." *Star*, February 07, 2008. Accessed September 05, 2012. Available from: <http://www.mehmetaltan.com/index.asp?sayfa=sureliyayin&icerik=300>.

Altan, M. "Cumhuriyetçilerin anlamadığı..." *Sabah*, October 30, 2004. Accessed September 05, 2012. Available from: <http://arsiv.sabah.com.tr/2004/10/30/altan.html>.

Altan, M. "Demokrasi Tırmanıyor." *Star*, July 23, 2007. Accessed September 05, 2012. Available from: <http://www.stargazete.com/politika/yazar/mehmet-altan/demokrasi-tirmaniyor-haber-130228.htm>.

Altan, M. "Dinde Reform." *Sabah*, August 08, 2005. Accessed September 05, 2012. Available from: <http://arsiv.sabah.com.tr/2005/08/08/altan.html>.

Altan, M. "Dünyalı Türkiye." *Star*, January 24, 2007. Accessed September 05, 2012. Available from: <http://www.stargazete.com/yazar/mehmet-altan/dunyali-turkiye-haber-130455.htm>.

Altan, M. "En Değişimci Dinamik Hangisi?" *Sabah*, October 23, 2004. Accessed September 05, 2012. Available from: <http://arsiv.sabah.com.tr/2004/10/23/yaz71-40-115.html>.

Altan, M. "Ergenekon'un Ağababası." *Star*, June 10, 2010. Accessed September 05, 2012. Available from: <http://www.mehmetaltan.com/index.asp?sayfa=sureliyayin&icerik=1515>.

Altan, M. "Gerekçeyi Tersten Okumak." *Star*, October 25, 2008. Accessed September 05, 2012. Available from: <http://www.mehmetaltan.com/index.asp?sayfa=sureliyayin&icerik=681>.

Altan, M. "Güvenlik mi, Demokratik Güvenlik mi?" *Star*, June 01, 2007. Accessed September 05, 2012. Available from: <http://www.stargazete.com/politika/yazar/mehmet-altan/guvenlik-mi-demokratik-guvenlik-mi-haber-130307.htm>.

Altan, M. "Haftaya Bugün 3 Ekim..." *Sabah*, September 26, 2005. Accessed September 05, 2012. Available from: <http://arsiv.sabah.com.tr/2005/09/26/altan.html>.

Altan, M. "Haydin Cenazeye." *Star*, January 23, 2007. Accessed September 05, 2012. Available from: <http://www.stargazete.com/yazar/mehmet-altan/haydin-cenazeye-haber-130456.htm>.

Altan, M. "Hükümet Yeniden İktidar Oluyor..." *Star*, June 28, 2010. Accessed September 05, 2012. Available from: <http://www.moralhaber.net/makale/hukumet-yeniden-iktidar-oluyor/>.

Altan, M. "Hükümetin Pusulası." *Star*, October 05, 2007. Accessed September 05, 2012. Available from: <http://www.mehmetaltan.com/index.asp?sayfa=sureliyayin&icerik=159>.

Altan, M. "İkinci Cumhuriyet Bayramı." *Sabah*, January 15, 2005. Accessed September 05, 2012. Available from: <http://arsiv.sabah.com.tr/2005/01/15/altan.html>.

Altan, M. "İkinci Cumhuriyetçiler Özür Bekliyor." Accessed September 13, 2012. http://www.ikincicumhuriyet.org/nedir/ikinci_cum_ozur_bek.html.

Altan, M. "İmzamı Attığım Yer." *Star*, February 03, 2008. Accessed September 05, 2012. Available from: <http://www.mehmetaltan.com/index.asp?sayfa=sureliyayin&icerik=291>.

Altan, M. "İşkence Sanığını Küreselleşme Yakalar." *Sabah*. March 13, 2004. Accessed September 05, 2012. Available from: <http://arsiv.sabah.com.tr/2004/03/13/yaz71-40-119-20040301.html>.

Altan, M. "İşte Fark Bu." *Star*, February 02, 2007. Accessed September 05, 2012. Available from: <http://www.stargazete.com/politika/yazar/mehmet-altan/iste-fark-bu-haber-130422.htm>.

Altan, M. "İttihat ve Terakki'nin Sonu Mu?" *Star*, March 23, 2008. Accessed September 05, 2012. Available from: <http://www.stargazete.com/politika/yazar/mehmet-altan/ittihat-ve-terakki-nin-sonu-mu-haber-92899.htm>.

Altan, M. "Kemalist Modernleşmeden Demokratikleşme-ye." *Sabah*, November 21, 2005. Accessed September 05, 2012. Available from: <http://arsiv.sabah.com.tr/2005/11/21/altan.html>.

Altan, M. "Kim Bu AKPliler?" *Star*, May 05, 2010. Accessed September 05, 2012. Available from: <http://www.mehmetaltan.com/index.asp?sayfa=sureliyayin&icerik=1470>.

Altan, M. "Kurşun Asker Korosu..." *Star*, February 18, 2008. Accessed September 05, 2012. Available from: <http://www.mehmetaltan.com/index.asp?sayfa=sureliyayin&icerik=319>.

Altan, M. "Liderlik ve Kararsızlık." *Sabah* March 03, 2003. Accessed September 05, 2012. Available from: <http://arsiv.sabah.com.tr/arsiv/2003/03/03/s1713.html>.

Altan, M. "Medya ve Asker." *Sabah*. March 08, 2003. Accessed September 05, 2012. Available from: <http://arsiv.sabah.com.tr/arsiv/2003/03/08/s1715.html>.

Altan, M. "Ne işi? 'Özel harp' işi." *Star*, September 07, 2010. Accessed September 05, 2012. Available from: <http://www.mehmetaltan.com/index.asp?sayfa=sureliyayin&icerik=1626>.

Altan, M. "Paralel Devlet." *Sabah*, July 21, 2003. Accessed September 05, 2012. Available from: <http://arsiv.sabah.com.tr/2003/07/21/y02.html>.

Altan, M. "Restorasyon Soruları." *Star*, January 12, 2008. Accessed September 05, 2012. Available from: <http://www.mehmetaltan.com/index.asp?sayfa=sureliyayin&icerik=258>.

Altan, M. "Rota Neredeydi Ki?" *Star*, April 04, 2008. Accessed September 05, 2012. Available from: <http://old2.stargazete.com/yazdir/94946>.

Altan, M. "Siyasal Milliyetçiliğin Yeni Kozu..." Updated January 01, 2007. Accessed September 05, 2012. Available from: <http://www.kuyレル.com/modules/AMS/index.php?storytopic=39&start=24>.

Altan, M. "Tehlikede Olan Demokrasi Deęil Mi?" *Star*, April 04, 2007. Accessed September 05, 2012. Available from: <http://www.stargazete.com/yazar/mehmet-altan/tehlkede-olan-demokrasi-degil-mi-haber-130344.htm>.

Altan, M. "Terörü Kim Kışkırtıyor?." *Sabah*, July 16, 2005. Accessed September 05, 2012. Available from: <http://arsiv.sabah.com.tr/2005/07/16/altan.html>.

Altan, M. "Tezkereye Evet, AB'ye Hayır..." *Sabah*, March 10, 2003. Accessed September 05, 2012. Available from: <http://arsiv.sabah.com.tr/arsiv/2003/03/10/s1709.html>.

Altan, M. "Türkiye'nin Bütün Sorunu Politik Devletten Liberal Devlete Geçememesidir." Accessed September 13, 2012. <http://www.ikincicumhuriyet.org/nedir/yeniarayislar.html>.

Altan, M. "Umutları Kezzaplamayın..." *Sabah*, September 25, 2004. Accessed September 05, 2012. Available from: <http://arsiv.sabah.com.tr/2004/09/25/altan.html>.

Altan, M. "Uygulamanın Posteri." *Star*. January 25, 2007. Accessed September 05, 2012. Available from: <http://www.stargazete.com/yazar/mehmet-altan/uygulamanin-posteri-haber-130454.htm>.

Altan, M. "Uyum Devrimi." *Sabah*, May 24, 2003. Accessed September 05, 2012. Available from: <http://arsiv.sabah.com.tr/2003/05/24/s1706.html>.

Altan, M. "Vatandaş Halka Karşı." *Star*, April 16, 2007. Accessed September 05, 2012. Available from: <http://www.stargazete.com/yazar/mehmet-altan/vatandas-halka-karsi-haber-130361.htm>.

Altan, M. "Yargıyı Yargılama İmkânı." *Sabah*. January 25, 2003. Accessed September 05, 2012. Available from: <http://arsiv.sabah.com.tr/arsiv/2003/01/25/s1713.html>.

"Anayasa Deęişikliği Referandumu 21 Ekim'de." Updated July 05, 2007. Accessed September 05, 2012. <http://www.bianet.org/bianet/siyaset/98847-anayasa-degisikligi-referandumu-21-ekimde>.

"Anayasa Deęişiklik Paketi Demokratikleşme için İleri bir Adım mı?" <http://www.anayasa.org/images/stories/mtn/anayasa%20degisiklik%20paketi%20iler%20bir%20adim%20mi%2010%20Aralik.pdf>. Accessed 05.09.2012.

"Anayasa Paketi İki Madde Eksikle Gül'ün Önünde." Updated May 07, 2010. Accessed September 05, 2012. <http://www.bianet.org/bianet/siyaset/121826-anayasa-paketi-iki-madde-eksikle-gulun-onunde>.

"Ankara'da Tarihi Cumhuriyet Mitingi." Updated April 16, 2007. Accessed September 05, 2012. <http://arsiv.ntvmsnbc.com/news/405418.asp>.

Argın, Ş. "Türk Aydınımın Devlet Aşkı ve Aşkın Devlet Anlayışı." In *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce: Dönemler ve Zihniyetler*, Vol 9. İstanbul: İletişim, 2009.

Aydın, D. “Yeni Türk Ceza Kanunu'nun Hazırlanış Süreci.” *Ankara Üniversitesi SBF Dergisi* 59 (4). (2004): 249-263.

Bali, R. “İmkansız Nasıl Mümkün Oldu? İslamcı- Solcu- Liberal İttifakı.” Accessed September 5, 2012. Accessible from: http://www.rifatbali.com/images/stories/dokumanlar/islamci_solcu_ittifaki.pdf

Bali, R. N. *Tarz-ı Hayat'tan Life Style'a: Yeni Seçkinler, Yeni Mekanlar, Yeni Yaşamlar*. İstanbul: İletişim, 2002.

Barlas, M. “Liberal Düşünceyle AKP'nin Yolları Ayrılmaz ki.” *Sabah*, January 31, 2012. Accessed September 05, 2012. Available from: <http://www.sabah.com.tr/Yazarlar/barlas/2012/01/31/liberal-dusunce-ile-ak-partinin-yollari-ayrilamaz-ki>.

“Başbuğ: Herkes Doğru Yerde Bulunmalı.” Updated October 16, 2008. Accessed September 05, 2012. <http://arsiv.ntvmsnbc.com/news/462512.asp>.

“Başsavcı, AK Parti'ye Kapatma Davası Açtı.” Updated March 17, Accessed September 05, 2012. <http://arsiv.ntvmsnbc.com/news/439256.asp>.

Bayramoğlu, A. “301. Maddede Savcılara Sınır Geliyor.” *Yeni Şafak*, February 15, 2007. Accessed September 05, 2012. Available from: <http://yenisafak.com.tr/yazarlar/?i=3845&y=AliBayramoglu>.

Bayramoğlu, A. “AK Parti Türkiye İçin Bir Şanstır.” *Yeni Şafak*, November 06, 2002. Accessed September 05, 2012. Available from: <http://yenisafak.com.tr/arsiv/2002/Kasim/06/abayramoglu.html>.

Bayramoğlu, A. “AKP Değişiyor mu Değiştiriyor mu?.” *Yeni Şafak*, April 22, 2003. Accessed September 05, 2012. Available from: <http://yenisafak.com.tr/arsiv/2003/nisan/22/abayramoglu.html>.

Bayramoğlu, A. “AKP İktidarı: Eleştiriler, Tepkiler...” *Yeni Şafak*, February 21, 2003. Accessed September 05, 2012. Available from: <http://yenisafak.com.tr/arsiv/2003/Subat/21/abayramoglu.html>.

Bayramoğlu, A. “AKP Neyi Temsil Ediyor?” *Yeni Şafak*, November, 2002. Accessed September 05, 2012. Available from: <http://yenisafak.com.tr/arsiv/2002/Kasim/05/abayramoglu.html>.

Bayramoğlu, A. “AKP'nin Siyasi Mantığı...” *Yeni Şafak*, February 20, 2003. Accessed September 05, 2012. Available from: <http://yenisafak.com.tr/arsiv/2003/Subat/20/abayramoglu.html>.

Bayramoğlu, A. “Askerden Diğerlerine: Kara İttifak...” *Yeni Şafak*. July 08, 2010. Accessed September 05, 2012. Available from: <http://yenisafak.com.tr/yazarlar/?t=08.07.2010&y=AliBayramoglu>.

Bayramođlu, A. "Askerî Harcamalar, Sayıştay ve Tartışmalar." *Yeni Şafak*, January 09, 2003. Accessed September 05, 2012. Available from: <http://yenisafak.com.tr/arsiv/2003/Ocak/09/abayramoglu.html>.

Bayramođlu, A. "Ayrılıkçı Rejimin Beyazları ve Hayırcılar." *Yeni Şafak*, September 10, 2010. Accessed September 05, 2012. Available from: <http://www.yenisafak.com.tr/Yazarlar/Default.aspx?i=23931&y=AliBayramoglu>.

Bayramođlu, A. "Başbakan Üzerine Düşeni Yapsın...." *Yeni Şafak*, April 05, 2007. Accessed September 05, 2012. Available from: <http://yenisafak.com.tr/yazarlar/?i=4573&y=AliBayramoglu>.

Bayramođlu, A. "Bir Hafta İçinde Üç İşlem...." *Yeni Şafak*, April 19, 2007. Accessed September 05, 2012. Available from: <http://yenisafak.com.tr/yazarlar/?i=4777&y=AliBayramoglu>.

Bayramođlu, A. "Bölünmüş ya da Büyümüş... 2022'de Türkiye Hangisi Olacak?" *Yeni Şafak*, September 21, 2010. Available from: <http://yenisafak.com.tr/yazarlar/?t=21.09.2010&y=AliBayramoglu>.

Bayramođlu, A. "Bu Tezkere Meclis'ten Geçmez..." *Yeni Şafak*. February 25, 2003. Accessed September 05, 2012. Available from: <http://yenisafak.com.tr/arsiv/2003/Subat/25/abayramoglu.html>.

Bayramođlu, A. "Dananın Kuyruđu Koptu..." *Yeni Şafak*, February 27, 2003. Accessed September 05, 2012. Available from: <http://yenisafak.com.tr/arsiv/2003/Subat/27/abayramoglu.html>.

Bayramođlu, A. "Darbeciler Burada, Peki ya Hukukçular...." *Yeni Şafak*, March 31, 2007. Accessed September 05, 2012. Available from: <http://yenisafak.com.tr/yazarlar/?i=4498&y=AliBayramoglu>.

Bayramođlu, A. "Demokrasinin Zaferi..." *Yeni Şafak*. March 02, 2003. Accessed September 05, 2012. Available from: <http://yenisafak.com.tr/arsiv/2003/Mart/02/abayramoglu.html>.

Bayramođlu, A. "Demokratikleşmede Hedef Bu Kez Yargı...." *Yeni Şafak*, March 23, 2010. Accessed September 05, 2012. Available from: <http://www.yenisafak.com.tr/Yazarlar/?i=21483&y=AliBayramoglu>.

Bayramođlu, A. "Demokratsız Demokrasiyle AB'ye Girmek." *Yeni Şafak*, May 16, 2003. Accessed September 05, 2012. Available from: <http://yenisafak.com.tr/arsiv/2003/Mayis/16/abayramoglu.html>.

Bayramođlu, A. "Dünya Ayakta, Peki Türkiye Ne Yapıyor?." *Yeni Şafak*, February 19, 2003. Accessed September 05, 2012. Available from: <http://yenisafak.com.tr/arsiv/2003/Subat/19/abayramoglu.html>.

Bayramođlu, A. "Evet'le Açılacak Kapılar." *Yeni Şafak*, August 26, 2010. Accessed September 05, 2012. Available from: <http://www.yenisafak.com.tr/Yazarlar/?i=23715&y=AliBayramoglu>.

Bayramođlu, A. "Gerçekten Kutuplaşıyor muyuz?" *Yeni Şafak*, September 22, 2010. Accessed September 05, 2012. Available from: <http://yenisafak.com.tr/Yazarlar/?t=22.09.2010&y=AliBayramoglu>.

Bayramođlu, A. "Hanefi Avcı Neden Tutuklandı?." *Yeni Şafak*, September 30, 2010. Accessed September 05, 2012. Available from: <http://www.yenisafak.com.tr/Yazarlar/Default.aspx?i=24231&y=AliBayramoglu>.

Bayramođlu, A. "Hayır İttifakı ve Hastalıklar..." *Yeni Şafak*, July 14, 2010. Accessed September 05, 2012. Available from: <http://yenisafak.com.tr/Yazarlar/?t=14.07.2010&y=AliBayramoglu>.

Bayramođlui A. "İç ve Dış Dinamikler." *Yeni Şafak*, April 19, 2003. Accessed September 05, 2012. Available from: <http://yenisafak.com.tr/arsiv/2003/Nisan/19/abayramoglu.html>.

Bayramođlu, A. "İçi Yaşlananlar ve Siyasi Hipermetroplar" *Yeni Şafak*, September 18, 2010. Accessed September 05, 2012. Available from: <http://www.yenisafak.com.tr/Yazarlar/Default.aspx?i=24061&y=AliBayramoglu>.

Bayramođlu, A. "Jandarmanın Canlı Hedefleri..." *Yeni Şafak*, July 22, 2010. Accessed September 05, 2012. Available from: <http://www.yenisafak.com.tr/Yazarlar/?i=23257&y=AliBayramoglu>.

Bayramođlu, A. "Kadınlar Bu İşe Ne Diyor?" *Yeni Şafak*, February 20, 2008. Accessed September 05, 2012. Available from: <http://www.yenisafak.com.tr/Yazarlar/?i=9425&y=AliBayramoglu>.

Bayramođlu, A. "Kara Koalisyon: 12 AK Partili, BDP, CHP, MHP..." *Yeni Şafak*, June 04.05.2010. Accessed September 05, 2012 Available from: <http://www.yenisafak.com.tr/Yazarlar/?i=22126&y=AliBayramoglu>.

Bayramođlu, A. "Kasım 2002'den Kasım 2005'e..." *Yeni Şafak*, November 04, 2005. Accessed September 05, 2012. Available from: <http://yenisafak.com.tr/arsiv/2005/Kasim/04/abayramoglu.html>.

Bayramođlu, A. "Kemalizm, AKP ve AB." *Yeni Şafak*, July 04, 2003. Accessed September 05, 2012. Available from: <http://yenisafak.com.tr/arsiv/2003/Temmuz/04/abayramoglu.html>.

Bayramođlu, A. "Keskin Dönüş ve Beyaz Saray Mantığı." *Yeni Şafak*, February 07, 2003. Accessed September 05, 2012. Available from: <http://yenisafak.com.tr/arsiv/2003/Subat/07/abayramoglu.html>.

Bayramođlu, A. “Kimileri İin Kına Zamanı...” *Yeni Őafak*, March 19, 2003. Accessed September 05, 2012. Available from: <http://yenisafak.com.tr/arsiv/2003/Mart/19/abayramoglu.html>.

Bayramođlu, A. “Merkezi Yeniden Tanımlamak.” *Yeni Őafak*, November 09, 2002. Accessed September 05, 2012. Available from: <http://yenisafak.com.tr/arsiv/2002/Kasim/09/abayramoglu.html>.

Bayramođlu, A. “Referandum Olursa.” *Yeni Őafak*, March 30, 2010. Accessed September 05, 2012. Available from: <http://www.yenisafak.com.tr/Yazarlar/?i=21591&y=AliBayramoglu>.

Bayramođlu, A. “Sađlıklı bir Siyasete Dođru...” *Yeni Őafak*, September 19, 2003. Accessed September 05, 2012. Available from: <http://yenisafak.com.tr/arsiv/2003/Eylul/19/abayramoglu.html>.

Bayramođlu, A. “Sandık, Halk, Dođanlar ve Gmlenler...” *Yeni Őafak*, September 14, 2010. Accessed September 05, 2012. Available from: <http://yenisafak.com.tr/Yazarlar/Default.aspx?t=14.09.2010&y=AliBayramoglu>.

Bayramođlu, A. “Savcılarını Kim Ynlendirdi?.” *Yeni Őafak*, February 20, 2007. Accessed September 05, 2012. Available from: <http://yenisafak.com.tr/yazarlar/AliBayramoglu/savcilari-kim-yonlendirdi/3925>.

Bayramođlu, A. “Sivil Askerin Kapıkulu mu?.” *Yeni Őafak*, March 30, 2007. Accessed September 05, 2012. Available from: <http://yenisafak.com.tr/yazarlar/?i=4488&y=AliBayramoglu>.

Bayramođlu, A. “Sivilleşmeye Dođru.” *Yeni Őafak*, July 17, 2003. Accessed September 05, 2012. Available from: <http://yenisafak.com.tr/arsiv/2003/Temmuz/17/abayramoglu.html>.

Bayramođlu, A. “Siyasi Bilano...” *Yeni Őafak*, December 06, 2003. Accessed September 05, 2012. Available from: <http://yenisafak.com.tr/arsiv/2003/Aralik/06/abayramoglu.html>.

Bayramođlu, A. “Tandođan, ađlayan ve Diđer Mitinglere Dair...” *Yeni Őafak*, May 09, 2007. Accessed September 05, 2012. Available from: <http://yenisafak.com.tr/yazarlar/?i=5086&y=AliBayramoglu>.

Bayramođlu, A. “TCK, Muhafazakarlık, Milli Yarar...” *Yeni Őafak*, August 31, 2004. Accessed September 05, 2012. Available from: <http://yenisafak.com.tr/arsiv/2004/Agustos/31/abayramoglu.html>.

Bayramođlu, A. “Tehlike Byyor...” *Yeni Őafak*, February 04, 2003. Accessed September 05, 2012. Available from: <http://yenisafak.com.tr/arsiv/2003/Subat/04/abayramoglu.html>.

Bayramođlu, A. "Türkiye Nerede Duracak?" *Yeni Şafak*, January 28, 2003. Accessed September 05, 2012. Available from: <http://yenisafak.com.tr/arsiv/2003/Ocak/28/abayramoglu.html>.

Bayramođlu, A. "Türkiye'deki Son Gelişmeler." *Yeni Şafak*, February 07, 2007. Accessed September 05, 2012. Available from: <http://yenisafak.com.tr/Yazarlar/?i=3730&y=AliBayramoglu>.

Bayramođlu, A. "Türkiye'nin Direnişinin Anlamı." *Yeni Şafak*, January 30, 2003. Accessed September 05, 2012. Available from: <http://yenisafak.com.tr/arsiv/2003/Ocak/30/abayramoglu.html>.

Bayramođlu, A. "Vampir Henüz Doymadı mı?" *Yeni Şafak*, February 01, 2007. Accessed September 05, 2012. Available from: <http://yenisafak.com.tr/Yazarlar/?i=3636&y=AliBayramoglu>.

Bayramođlu, A. "Yeni Ulusalcılık ile Bildik Milliyetçilik Arasındaki Fark Nedir?" *Yeni Şafak*, February 17, 2007. Accessed September 05, 2012. Available from: <http://yenisafak.com.tr/yazarlar/?i=3877&y=AliBayramoglu>.

Bayramođlu, A. "Zina, Eleştirisi, Yanıt..." *Yeni Şafak*, September 07, 2004. Accessed September 05, 2012. Available from: <http://yenisafak.com.tr/arsiv/2004/Eylul/07/abayramoglu.html>.

Bedirhanoglu, P. "Türkiye'de Neoliberal Otoriter Devletin Yeni Yüzü." In: Uzel and Duru, ed. *AKP kitabı: Bir dönüşümün bilançosu*. ; 2010:40-65.

Bellamy, R. and Schecter D. *Gramsci and the Italian State*. Manchester: Manchester University Press; 1993.

Bellamy, R. "The Intellectual as Social Critic" in *Intellectuals in Politics: From the Dreyfus Affair to Salman Rushdie*, Jennings J, Kemp-Welch A, eds. London: Routledge, 1997.

Benda, J. *The Treason of the Intellectuals*. Transl. R Aldington. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2009.

Berkan, İ. "AKP-liberaller İttifakının Önemi." *Radikal*, September 26, 2007. Accessed September 05, 2012. Available from: <http://www.radikal.com.tr/Radikal.aspx?aType=RadikalYazar&ArticleID=826895&Yazar=%DDSMET%20BERKAN&CategoryID=97>.

Berkan, İ. "Vatan Haini Enflasyonu." Accessed September 13, 2012. <http://www.ikincicumhuriyet.org/index.asp?sayfa=medyada-ikinci-cumhuriyet&icerik=2312>.

"Bir Şey Yapın ki Katil Devlet Demeyelim." Accessed September 05, 2012. <http://www.bianet.org/bianet/bianet/135837-bir-sey-yapin-ki-katil-devlet-demeyelim>.

Bora, T. *Sol, Sinizm, Pragmatizm*. İstanbul: İletişim; 2010.

Bora, T. "Turgut Özal." In: Bora T, Gültekingil M, eds. *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce: Liberalizm*. İstanbul: İletişim; 2005:589-601.

Bora, T. and Cantek, L. "Köşe Yazarlığındaki Değişim ve Politik Düşünce Vasatı." *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce: Dönemler ve Zihniyetler*, Vol 9, İstanbul: İletişim.

Bora, T. "Sol, Liberalizm, Sinizm." *Birikim* 234, Ekim 2008, (pp. 16-25).

Bora, T. "Uzmanlaşma ile Popülarizasyon Arasında Aydın." in *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce: Dönemler ve Zihniyetler*, Vol 9, İstanbul: İletişim.

Bourdieu, P. *On Television*. Transl. P. P. Ferguson. New York: New Press, 1998.

"Brussels European Council 16/17 December 2004 Presidency Conclusions." Accessed September 13, 2012. http://www.abgs.gov.tr/files/_files/Zirve_Bildirileri/PresConc_17122004.pdf.

Buci-Glucksmann, C. *Gramsci and the State*. London: Lawrence and Wishart; 1980.

Buğra, A. "Class, Culture, and State: An Analysis of Interest Representation by Two Turkish Business Associations." *International Journal of Middle East Studies*. 1998; 30(4):521-539.

Buttigieg, J. A. Gramsci on Civil Society. *boundary 2*. 1995;22(3):1-32.

Çakır, R. "Yöntem Yanlış Olabilir Ama Yasak da Derhal Kalkmalı." *Vatan*, February 10, 2008. Accessed September 05, 2012. Available from: http://haber.gazetevatan.com/Yontem_yanlis_olabilir_ama_yasak_da_derhal_kalkmali_161212_1/161212/1/Haber#.UFT9rY0f4-l.

Çandar, C. "Kriz'in Çıkış Yolu ve Türkiye'nin Asıl Çıkmazı...." *Referans*, May 05, 2007. Accessed September 05, 2012. Available from: <http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/haber.aspx?id=6437176&yazarid=215>.

Çandar, C. "'Milliyetçilik-Ulusalcılık'; 'Laiklik-Militarizm'...." *Referans*, April 15, 2008. Accessed September 05, 2012. Available from: <http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/haber.aspx?id=8701430&yazarid=215>.

Çandar, C. "12 Eylül'e Doğru ve Türkiye-Rusya Eksenini." *Referans*, May 14, 2010. Accessed September 05, 2012. Available from: <http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/haber.aspx?id=14720270&yazarid=215>.

Çandar, C. "12 Eylül'ün Zincirleri Kırıldı." *Radikal*, September 13, 2010. Accessed September 05, 2012. Available from: <http://www.radikal.com.tr/Radikal.aspx?aType=RadikalYazar&ArticleID=1018656&Yazar=CENGIZ-CANDAR&CategoryID=98>.

Çandar, C. “2007'de Olmadı, 2008'de Var mısınız.” *Referans*, January 01, 2008. Accessed September 05, 2012. Available from: <http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/haber.aspx?id=7948567&yazarid=215>.

Çandar, C. “ABD'de Kritik Saatler; Türkiye'nin Önünde İki İhtimal.” *Yeni Şafak*, December 11, 2002. Accessed September 05, 2012. Available from: <http://yenisafak.com.tr/arsiv/2002/aralik/11/ccandar.html>.

Çandar, C. “Ak Parti 'İktidar' Olmak Zorunda.” *Yeni Şafak*, December 20, 2002. Accessed September 05, 2012. Available from: <http://yenisafak.com.tr/arsiv/2002/Aralik/20/ccandar.html>.

Çandar, C. “Ak Parti ve “Liberaller”: “Sanal İttifak” Bozuldu mu; Devam mı?.” *Referans*, February 21, 2008. Accessed September 05, 2012. Available from: <http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/haber.aspx?id=8275927&yazarid=215>.

Çandar, C. “Ak Parti, Kıbrıs, AB, vs.” *Dünden Bugüne Tercüman*. 19.01.2003:11.

Çandar, C. “Ak Parti: Kıbrıs Sınavından 'Kıbrıs Tuzağı'na mı?.” *Yeni Şafak*, December 19, 2002. Accessed September 05, 2012. Available from: <http://yenisafak.com.tr/arsiv/2002/Aralik/19/ccandar.html>.

Çandar, C. “Allah'ın Olmayan Sopası.” *Yeni Şafak*, November 04, 2002. Accessed September 05, 2012. Available from: <http://yenisafak.com.tr/arsiv/2002/Kasim/04/ccandar.html>.

Çandar, C. “Ankara'dan Malatya'ya Uzanan Yol...” *Referans*, April 19, 2007. Accessed September 05, 2012. Available from: <http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/haber.aspx?id=6358430&yazarid=215>.

Çandar, C. “ANS-RTE Sorunsalı ve/veya Türkiye'de İktidar Mücadelesi.” *Yeni Şafak*, December 21, 2002. Accessed September 05, 2012. Available from: <http://yenisafak.com.tr/arsiv/2002/Aralik/21/ccandar.html>.

Çandar, C. “Bak, Orada 58'e 42 Yazıyor!” *Radikal*, September 14, 2010. Accessed September 05, 2012. Available from: <http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/haber.aspx?id=15774409&yazarid=215>.

Çandar, C. “Başörtüsünün Gösterdikleri Başörtüsünden Görünenler.” *Referans*, February 16, 2008. Accessed September 05, 2012. Available from: <http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/haber.aspx?id=8243405&yazarid=215>.

Çandar, C. “Başörtüsüyle Örtülemeyen Olgular.” *Referans*, February 08, 2008. Accessed September 05, 2012. Available from: <http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/haber.aspx?id=8189708&yazarid=215>.

Çandar, C. “Bayram'da İyimserlik.” *Radikal*, September 11, 2010. Accessed September 05, 2012. Available from: <http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/haber.aspx?id=15753729&yazarid=215>.

Çandar, C. “Büyük Mitinglerden Büyük Fırsata...” *Referans*, May 16, 2007. Accessed September 05, 2012. Available from: <http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/haber.aspx?id=6522112&yazarid=215>.

Çandar, C. “Cinayet, Emniyet, Empati...” *Referans*, February 03, 2007. Accessed September 05, 2012. Available from: <http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/haber.aspx?id=5885590&yazarid=215>.

Çandar, C. “Ergenekon, Orhan Pamuk, TÜSİAD, vs....” *Referans*, January 25, 2008. Accessed September 05, 2012. Available from: <http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/haber.aspx?id=8097910&yazarid=215>.

Çandar, C. “'Evet' ve 'Hayır' Sonuçları.” *Referans*, September 07, 2010. Accessed September 05, 2012. Available from: http://www.radikalreferansarsivi.com/haber.aspx?HBR_KOD=143581.

Çandar, C. “Evet! Silahlar Sussun Diye...” *Referans*, August 18, 2010. Accessed September 05, 2012. Available from: <http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/haber.aspx?id=15579021&yazarid=215>.

Çandar, C. “Evet, Ne Olursa Olsun Türkiye İleri Gidecek.” *Radikal*, September 10, 2010. Accessed September 05, 2012. Available from: <http://www.radikal.com.tr/Default.aspx?aType=RadikalYazarYazisi&ArticleID=1018162&Yazar=CENG%DDZ%20%C7ANDAR&Date=10.09.2010&CategoryID=97>.

Çandar, C. “Hayal Kırıklığı”. *Referans*, January 25, 2007. Accessed September 05, 2012. Available from: <http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/haber.aspx?id=5834194&yazarid=215>.

Çandar, C. “Hrant Davası ve 301; AKP'ye Kefil Olmak ya da Olmamak...” *Referans*, October 03, 2007. Accessed September 05, 2012. Available from: http://www.radikalreferansarsivi.com/haber.aspx?HBR_KOD=79789, <http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/haber.aspx?id=7408812&yazarid=215>.

Çandar, C. “Hrant Dink Davası: Hükümet ya da “İktidar” Olmak Davası...” *Referans*, July 04, 2007. Accessed September 05, 2012. Available from: <http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/haber.aspx?id=6827042&yazarid=215>.

Çandar, C. “Hrant Dink Öldürüldü Türkiye Vuruldu.” *Referans*, January 20, 2007. Accessed September 05, 2012. Available from: <http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/haber.aspx?id=5835832&yazarid=215>.

Çandar, C. “Hrant Dink'in Öldürülmesinin Sırrı...” *Referans*, March 30, 2010. Accessed September 05, 2012. Available from: <http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/haber.aspx?id=14265724&yazarid=215>.

Çandar, C. “Kalıcı Ateşkesle ve 'Pazarlık'la Yol Almak.” *Referans*, August 25, 2010. Accessed September 05, 2012. Available from: http://www.radikalreferansarsivi.com/haber.aspx?HBR_KOD=143242.

Çandar, C. “Kasım'ı Doğru Anlamak ve Halka Saygılı Olmak...” *Yeni Şafak*, May 06, 2002. Accessed September 05, 2012. Available from: <http://yenisafak.com.tr/arsiv/2002/Kasim/06/ccandar.html>.

Çandar, C. “Kasımpaşa'dan Paris'e Yol Gider...” *Yeni Şafak*, November 26, 2002. Accessed September 05, 2012. Available from: <http://yenisafak.com.tr/arsiv/2002/kasim/26/ccandar.html>.

Çandar, C. “Katharsis' ya da 'Sınav'.” *Referans*, January 26, 2007. Accessed September 05, 2012. Available from: http://www.radikalreferansarsivi.com/haber.aspx?HBR_KOD=57604.

Çandar, C. “Kıbrıs veya Türkiye'ye AB; Ak Parti'ye İktidar Yolu...” *Yeni Şafak*, November 15, 2002. Accessed September 05, 2012. Available from: <http://yenisafak.com.tr/arsiv/2002/Kasim/15/ccandar.html>.

Çandar, C. “Kıbrıs, Kosova ve Tayyip Erdoğan:AB Yol İşaretleri.” *Referans*, February 20, 2008. Accessed September 05, 2012. Available from: <http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/haber.aspx?id=8266840&yazarid=215>.

Çandar, C. “Kıbrıs: Türkiye için AB; Ak Parti için İktidar Sınavı.” *Yeni Şafak*, December 17, 2002. Accessed September 05, 2012. Available from: <http://yenisafak.com.tr/arsiv/2002/Aralik/17/ccandar.html>.

Çandar, C. “Kıbrıs'tan Irak'a: Hayallerden Gerçeklere Dönüş...” *Yeni Şafak*, December 24, 2002. Accessed September 05, 2012. Available from: <http://yenisafak.com.tr/arsiv/2002/Aralik/24/ccandar.html>.

Çandar, C. “Kırılma.” *Referans*, May 08, 2010. Accessed September 05, 2012. Available from: <http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/haber.aspx?id=14659406&yazarid=215>.

Çandar, C. “Kopenhag: Türkiye'nin Yolu Açık.” *Yeni Şafak*, December 14, 2002. Accessed September 05, 2012. Available from: <http://yenisafak.com.tr/arsiv/2002/Aralik/14/ccandar.html>.

Çandar, C. “Korku Cumhuriyetini mi Korumalı; “Demokrasili” Cumhuriyeti mi?” *Referans*, April 18, 2007. Accessed September 05, 2012. Available from: <http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/haber.aspx?id=6350855&yazarid=215>.

Çandar, C. “Merhaba Avrupa Birliği.” *Dünden Bugüne Tercüman*. 17.12.2004:11.

Çandar, C. “Olabilecek En Kötü Sonuç.” *Yeni Şafak*, December 13, 2002. Accessed September 05, 2012. Available from: <http://yenisafak.com.tr/arsiv/2002/Aralik/13/ccandar.html>.

Çandar, C. “Önce “Evet”, Sonra “Barış” Stratejisi...” *Referans*, August 27, 2010. Accessed September 05, 2012. Available from: <http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/haber.aspx?id=15647194&yazarid=215>.

Çandar, C. “PKK'dan, CHP-MHP'den Ona Buna: “Anti-demokrat Savaş Koalisyonu”...” *Referans*, May 05, 2010. Accessed September 05, 2012. Available from: <http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/haber.aspx?id=14622883&yazarid=215>.

Çandar, C. “RTE ve Dış Politika; Kıbrıs ve 'Faux Depart'...” *Yeni Şafak*, February 09, 2002. Accessed September 05, 2012. Available from: <http://yenisafak.com.tr/arsiv/2002/Kasim/09/ccandar.html>.

Çandar, C. “Seçim Depremi ve Artçı Şokları.” *Yeni Şafak*, November 05, 2002. Accessed September 05, 2012. Available from: <http://yenisafak.com.tr/arsiv/2002/Kasim/05/ccandar.html>.

Çandar, C. “Strateji Tartışmak, Kerkük Konuşmak.” *Referans*, February 13, 2008. Accessed September 05, 2012. Available from: <http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/haber.aspx?id=8220108&yazarid=215>.

Çandar, C. “Tandoğan Mitinginin Hatırlattıkları ve Anlattıkları...” *Referans*, April 17, 2007. Accessed September 05, 2012. Available from: <http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/haber.aspx?id=6346579&yazarid=215>.

Çandar, C. “Tarihimizin Büyük Günü.” *Dünden Bugüne Tercüman*. December 18, 2004:11.

Çandar C. “Tayyip veya Başkan ya da Genel Başkan.” *Dünden Bugüne Tercüman*. February 01, 2003:11.

Çandar, C. “Tüm Sorunların Anası.” *Referans*, March, 09 2010. Accessed September 05, 2012. Available from: <http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/haber.aspx?id=14052227&yazarid=215>.

Çandar, C. “Türkiye'nin ‘Sıcak Yaz’ Yürüyüşü...” *Referans*, May 15, 2012. Accessed September 05, 2012. Available from: <http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/haber.aspx?id=14730936&yazarid=215>.

Çandar, C. “Türkiye'nin Ak Parti'li Tarihi Rolü...” *Yeni Şafak*, November 08, 2002. Accessed September 05, 2012. Available from: <http://yenisafak.com.tr/arsiv/2002/Kasim/08/ccandar.html>.

Çandar, C. “Ultra-Milliyetçi Tsunami.” *Referans*, March 03, 2007. Accessed September 05, 2012. Available from: <http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/haber.aspx?id=6068103&yazarid=215>.

Çandar, C. “Ya “Neo-ittihatçılar” Türkiye'yi Batıracak ya da...” *Referans*, March 31, 2010. Accessed September 05, 2012. Available from: <http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/haber.aspx?id=14275630&yazarid=215>.

Çandar, C. “Ya Halk ile Demokrasiye Devam; veya Demokrasiyi İptal Yolları...” *Referans*, May 03, 2007. Accessed September 05, 2012. Available from: <http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/haber.aspx?id=6449242&yazarid=215>.

Çandar, C. “Ya 'Neo-ittihatçılar' Türkiye'yi Batıracak ya da....” *Referans*, March 31, 2010. Accessed September 05, 2012. Available from: http://www.radikalreferansarsivi.com/haber.aspx?HBR_KOD=138364.

Çandar, C. “Yeni Anayasa Değil Bu; ‘Bürokratik Oligarşi’ye Tırpan...” *Referans*, March 26, 2010. Accessed September 05, 2012. Available from: <http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/haber.aspx?id=14221573&yazarid=215>.

Çandar, C. “Evet, Ne Olursa Olsun Türkiye İleri Gidecek.” September 10, 2010, <http://www.radikal.com.tr/Default.aspx?aType=RadikalYazarYazisi&ArticleID=1018162&Yazar=CENG%DDZ%20%C7ANDAR&Date=10.09.2010&CategoryID=97,10.09.2010>.

Charle, C. “The intellectuals After the Dreyfus Affair, Uses and Blindness of Historical Memory.” Accessed September 05, 2012. <http://www.unc.edu/depts/europe/conferences/ACLS98/charle.html>

Chomsky, N. *Intellectuals and the State*, 1977. Accessed September 05, 2012. <http://www.ditext.com/chomsky/is.html>

Chomsky, N. *The Responsibility of Intellectuals*, 1967, Accessed September 05, 2012. <http://www.chomsky.info/articles/19670223.htm>

Chomsky, N. *The Menace of Liberal Scholarship*, 1969, Accessed September 05, 2012. <http://www.chomsky.info/articles/19690102.htm>

Çiğdem, A. “Entelektüeller ve İdeolojiler”, *Modern Türkiye’de Siyasi Düşünce: Dönemler ve Zihniyetler*, Vol 9, İstanbul: İletişim, 2009.

Çınar, M. “AKP'nin Ustalık Döneminde Siyaset.” *Birikim*. 2012; 276 (21):28.

“Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament - Recommendation of the European Commission on Turkey’s Progress Towards Accession.” Accessed September 13, 2012. http://eur-lex.europa.eu/smartapi/cgi/sga_doc?smartapi!celexplus!prod!CELEXnumdoc&lg=en&numdoc=504DC0656.

Coser, L. *Men of Ideas; a Sociologist's View*, New York: Free Press, 1965.

“Cumhurbaşkanı Seçimi Referandumu Gidiyor.” Updated July 15 2007. Accessed September 05, 2012. <http://www.bianet.org/bianet/siyaset/97629-cumhurbaskani-secimi-referandumu-gidiyor>.

“Cumhurbaşkanlığı Seçiminin İlk Turu İptal.” Updated April 03, 2007. Accessed September 05, 2012. <http://arsiv.ntvmsnbc.com/news/406859.asp>.

“Cumhuriyet Tarihinde İlk.” Updated July 24, 2010. Accessed September 05, 2012. <http://www.haberturk.com/gundem/haber/535490-cumhuriyet-tarihinde-ilk>.

Devecioğlu, A. “AKP'nin 12 Eylül Anayasası.” Updated April 23, 2010. Accessed September 09, 2012. <http://bianet.org/bianet/siyaset/121510-akpnin-12-eylul-anayasasi>.

Devecioğlu, A. “Genelkurmay'a Suç Duyurusu: Dur Diyelim Tabii ama Düşünelim de...” Accessed September 05, 2012. <http://bianet.org/bianet/siyaset/126734-genelkurmay-a-suc-duyurusu-dur-diyelim-tabii-ama-dusunelim-de>.

“Devlet ‘Ağır Kusuru’ Kabul Etti.” Accessed September 05, 2012. <http://www.bianet.org/bianet/insan-haklari/136297-devlet-agir-kusuru-kabul-etti>.

Dinler, D. “Türkiye'de Güçlü Devlet Gelenegi Tezinin Eleştirisi.” *Praksis*, 2003; 9: 17-54.

Doğan, A. E. “1994'ten Bugüne Neoliberal İslamcı Belediyecilikte Süreklilik ve Değişimler.” *Praksis*, 2012; 26: 55-75.

Engin A. “Aman AKP'ye Zarar Vermesin.” *t24*, February 06, 2012. Accessed September 05, 2012. Available from: <http://t24.com.tr/yazi/aman-akpye-zarar-vermesin/4601>.

Erdoğan, N and Üstüner F. “1990'larda ‘Siyaset Sonrası’ Söylemler ve Demokrasi. In: Bora T, Gültekingil M, eds. *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce: Liberalizm*. İstanbul: İletişim; 2005: 658-666.

Erdoğan, N. “Liberal Kişilik Nedir? Solla Ne Derdi Vardır?” *Birikim*. 2009; 236/237:117-122.

“Erdoğan Siyasi Simge Olarak Türbanı Savundu.” Updated January 26, 2008. Accessed September 05, 2012. <http://arsiv.ntvmsnbc.com/news/433224.asp>.

“Erken Seçim Kararı İttifakla 22 Temmuz.” *Radikal*, May 04, 2007. Accessed September 05, 2012. Available from: <http://www.radikal.com.tr/haber.php?haberno=220295>.

“Eşitlikçi, Özgürlükçü ve Demokratik bir Anayasa!” Accessed September 05, 2012. http://www.anayasa.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=48%3Aetlkc-oezguerluekcue-ve-demokratk-br-anayasa&catid=39%3Aamakaleler&Itemid=54&lang=tr.

“European Council 16/17 December 2004 Presidency Conclusions.” Accessed September 05, 2012. http://www.abgs.gov.tr/files/_files/Zirve_Bildirileri/PresConc_17122004.pdf

“Excerpts of Turkish Army Statement.” Updated April 04, 2007. Accessed September 05, 2012. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6602775.stm>.

Açikel, F. “Entegratif Toplum ve Muarızları : ‘Merkez-çevre’ Paradigması Üzerine Eleştirel Notlar”, *Toplum ve Bilim*, no.105, 2006, 30-69.

Forgacs, D, ed. *Gramsci Kitabı: Seçme Yazılar 1916-1935*. Ankara: Dipnot; 2010.

Forgacs, D, ed. *Gramsci Reader: Selected Writings 1916-1935*. New York: New York University Press; 2000.

“Gazeteler Anayasa Paketinde İlk Fireyi Nasıl Haberleştirdi?.” Updated May 04, 2010. Accessed September 05, 2012. <http://www.bianet.org/bianet/siyaset/121765-gazeteler-anayasa-paketinde-ilk-fireyi-nasil-haberlestirdi>.

“Genelkurmay Geceyarısı Açıklama Yaptı.” Updated April 27, 2007. Accessed September 05, 2012. <http://www.yenisafak.com.tr/gundem/?t=27.04.2007&q=1&c=1&i=42573&Genelkurmay/geceyar%C4%B1s%C4%B1/a%C3%A7%C4%B1klama/yapt%C4%B1>.

“Genelkurmay'dan Çok Sert Açıklama.” Updated April 29, 2007. Accessed September 05, 2012. <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/6420961.asp?gid=180>.

“Gerektiğinde Tavır Koyarız.” Updated April 28, 2007. Accessed September 05, 2012. <http://www.milliyet.com.tr/2007/04/28/siyaset/asiy.html>.

Göker, E. “Barizin Alimleri: Kanaat Teknisyenliği.” *Birgün*, August 23, 2009. Accessed September 05, 2012. http://www.birgun.net/sunday_index.php?news_code=1251028641&year=2009&month=08&day=23

Gönenç, L. “Proposed Constitutional Amendments to the 1982 Constitution of Turkey.” Accessed September 05, 2012. http://www.tepav.org.tr/upload/files/1284468699-0.2010_Proposed_Constitutional_Amendments_to_the_1982_Constitution_of_Turkey.pdf.

Gramsci, A. *Selections from the prison notebooks*. London: Elecbook; 1999. <http://www.walkingbutterfly.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/12/gramsci-prison-notebooks-voll.pdf>.

“Gül Anayasa Paketini Onayladı, Sıra Referandumda.” Updated may 12, 2010. Accessed September 05, 2012. <http://www.bianet.org/bianet/siyaset/121936-gul-anayasa-paketini-onayladi-sira-referandumda>.

Gülcan, E. “Habervaktim Nefret Etme, Ettirme!” Updated June 27, 2012. Accessed September 05, 2012. <http://bianet.org/bianet/bianet/139359-habervaktim-nefret-etme-ettirme>.

Güngen, A. R. and Erten Ş. “Approaches of Şerif Mardin and Metin Heper on State and Civil Society in Turkey.” *Journal of Historical Studies*. 2005;3: 1-14.

Heeren, J. “Karl Mannheim and the Intellectual Elite”, *The British Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 22, No. 1 (Mar., 1971), pp. 1-15.

“Hrant Bizim Duyarlılığımızdı.” Updated June 26, 2007. Accessed September 05, 2012. <http://yenisafak.com.tr/Yorum/Default.aspx?t=22.05.2008&i=52391>.

<http://dosyalar.hurriyet.com.tr/hur/turk/99/04/27/dosya/secgenel.htm>. Accessed March 03, 2012.

<http://www.abhaber.com/haber.php?id=640>. Accessed March 03, 2012.

<http://www.stargazete.com/ekonomi/diger-haberler-ekonomi-haber-68793.htm>. Accessed May 03, 2012.

“II. Cumhuriyet Tartışmasında Yeni Milat: 17 Aralık.” *Aksiyon*, January 18, 2005.

İnsel, A. “Muktedir Oluşun İfadeleri.” *Birikim* 267, 2011, 11-14.

“İşte AK Parti'nin Anayasa Paketi!” Updated March, 2010. Accessed September 05, 2012. <http://www.cnnturk.com/2010/turkiye/03/22/iste.ak.partinin.anayasa.paketi/568599.0/index.html>.

Kadıoğlu, A. “Citizenship and Participation,” *The CSD Bulletin*, Centre for the Study of Democracy, University of Westminster, 13/2, Summer 2006.

Kaya, R. *İktidar Yumağı: Medya- Sermaye- Devlet*, İstanbul: İmge Kitabevi, 2009.

Kejanlıoğlu, B. and Taş, O. “Türk Basınında AB-Türkiye İlişkilerinin Sunumu: 17 Aralık 2004 Brüksel Zirvesi.” *Kültür ve İletişim*, 12(1), 2009, 39-64.

Kirişçi, K. “The December 2004 European Council Decision on Turkey: Is it an Historic Turning Point?” <http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/2004/issue4/jv8no4a8.html>

Korkut, T. “Constitutional Reform Package Part 1.” Updated April 19, 2010. Accessed September 05, 2012. <http://bianet.org/english/children/121411-constitutional-reform-package-part-1>.

Korkut, T. “Constitutional Reform Package Part 2.” Updated April 21, 2010. Accessed September 05, 2012. <http://bianet.org/english/people/121462-constitutional-reform-package-part-2>.

Koru, F. “Özgürlükçü Köklere Dönüş.” *Yeni Şafak*, February 20, 2008. Available from: <http://yenisafak.com.tr/Yazarlar/?i=9432&y=FehmiKoru>.

Küçükömer, İ. *Düzenin Yabancılaşması: Batılaşma*, İstanbul: Bağlam, 2001.

Kurt, Ü. ed. *AKP Yeni Merkez Sağ mı?* Ankara: Dipnot; 2009.

Kurt, Ü. “AKP ve Sol-liberal Entelektüeller.” *Radikal*, February 15, 2008. Available from: <http://www.radikal.com.tr/haber.php?haberno=247476&tarih=15/02/2008>.

Kurt, Ü. “AKP Devletçi-Milliyetçi Cephe ve Sol-liberal Entelektüeller Üzerine.”
December 14, 2007.
<http://www.kuyレル.com/modules/AMS/print.php?storyid=1997>.

Kurzman, C. and Owens, L. “The Sociology of Intellectuals”, *Annual Review of Sociology*, Vol. 28 (2002), pp. 63-90.

Laçiner, Ö. “Devletçi-milliyetçi Cenah Sözcülerinin Timsah Gözyaşları.” *Birikim* 222, Ekim 2007, 3-7.

Laçiner, Ö. “DP, ANAP ve Sonunda AKP.” *Birikim*, Kasım- Aralık 2002: 11-20.

Laçiner, Ö. “İslamcı Aydınlar ve İktidara İtaat.” *Birikim* 276, 2012, 3-5.

“Law no 5982 Amending Certain Provisions of the Constitution.” Accessed
September 05,
2012.http://www.abgs.gov.tr/files/Bas%C4%B1nMusavirlik/haberler/constituional_a_mendments.pdf.

Mahçupyan, E. “[‘Rektörler Göreve’ Öyle mi? - 4] Okul Bahçesinde Yaramaz Çocuklar!” *Zaman*, April 08, 2007. Accessed September 05, 2012. Available from:
<http://www.zaman.com.tr/haber.do?haberno=524858&title=rektorler-goreve-oyle-mi-4-okul-bahcesinde-yaramaz-cocuklar&haberSayfa=0>.

Mahçupyan, E. [Yorum] Seçim Değil Referandum! *Zaman*, July 19, 2007. Accessed
September 05, 2012. Available from:
<http://www.zaman.com.tr/haber.do?haberno=565688&title=yorum-etyen-mahcupyan-secim-degil-referandum&haberSayfa=0>.

Mahçupyan E. [Yorum] AKP'nin Gizli Ajandası Belli Oldu!. *Zaman*, July 05, 2007.
Accessed September 05, 2012. Available from:
<http://www.zaman.com.tr/haber.do?haberno=559990&title=yorum-etyen-mahcupyan-akpnin-gizli-ajandasi-belli-oldu&haberSayfa=0>.

Mahçupyan, E. [Yorum] Bir Hassasiyet Olarak Darbe Gereksinimi. *Zaman*, May 03, 2007. Accessed
September 05, 2012. Available from:
<http://www.zaman.com.tr/haber.do?haberno=535040&title=yorum-etyen-mahcupyan-bir-hassasiyet-olarak-darbe-gereksinimi&haberSayfa=0>.

Mahçupyan, E. [Yorum] Bir Hassasiyet Olarak Darbe Gereksinimi. *Zaman*, May 03, 2007. Accessed
September 05, 2012. Available from:
<http://www.zaman.com.tr/haber.do?haberno=535040&title=yorum-etyen-mahcupyan-bir-hassasiyet-olarak-darbe-gereksinimi&haberSayfa=0>.

Mahçupyan, E. [Yorum] Demokrasi ve Demokratlık. *Zaman*, March 17, 2008. Accessed
September 05, 2012. Available from:
<http://www.zaman.com.tr/haber.do?haberno=665501&title=yorum-etyen-mahcupyan-demokrasi-ve-demokratlik&haberSayfa=0>.

Mahcupyan, E. [Yorum] Henüz Demokrat Olmadık! *Zaman*, August 16, 2007. Accessed September 05, 2012. Available from: <http://www.zaman.com.tr/haber.do?haberno=576668&title=yorum-etyen-mahcupyan-henuz-demokrat-olmadik&haberSayfa=0>.

Mahcupyan, E. [Yorum] Yoksa Darbe Normal mi?(2). *Zaman*, June 20, 2008. Accessed September 05, 2012. Available from: <http://www.zaman.com.tr/haber.do?haberno=704385&title=yorum-etyen-mahcupyan-yoksa-darbe-normal-mi2&haberSayfa=2>.

Mahcupyan, E. [Yorum] Zihinsel Körlük. *Zaman*, August 02, 2007. Accessed September 05, 2012. Available from: <http://www.zaman.com.tr/haber.do?haberno=571383&title=yorum-etyen-mahcupyan-zihinsel-korluk&haberSayfa=0>.

Mahcupyan, E. "Ahlak." *Zaman*, January 28, 2007. Accessed September 05, 2012. Available from: <http://www.zaman.com.tr/yazar.do?yazino=493191>.

Mahcupyan, E. "Ahmaklar Evi (1)." *Taraf*, August 25, 2010. Accessed September 05, 2012. Available from: <http://www.taraf.com.tr/etyen-mahcupyan/makale-ahmaklar-evi-1.htm>.

Mahcupyan, E. "AKP'nin Aşil Topuğu (1): 'Millet'." *Zaman*, October 10, 2003. Accessed September 05, 2012. Available from: <http://arsiv.zaman.com.tr/2003/10/10/yazarlar/etyenmahcupyan.htm>.

Mahcupyan, E. "AKP'nin Aşil Topuğu (2): Pragmatizm." *Zaman*, October 12, 2003. Accessed September 05, 2012. Available from: <http://arsiv.zaman.com.tr/2003/10/12/yazarlar/etyenmahcupyan.htm>.

Mahcupyan, E. "AKP'nin Muhafazakar Demokrasisi." *Zaman*, February 03, 2004. Accessed September 05, 2012. Available from: <http://www.zaman.com.tr/yazar.do?yazino=10294>.

Mahcupyan, E. "AKP'yi Zorlayan Ne?." *Zaman*, September 26, 2004. Accessed September 05, 2012. Available from: <http://www.zaman.com.tr/yazar.do?yazino=94967>.

Mahcupyan, E. "Birtakım İronik Durumlar." *Zaman*, May 18, 2003. Accessed September 05, 2012. Available from: <http://arsiv.zaman.com.tr/2003/05/18/yazarlar/etyenmahcupyan.htm>.

Mahcupyan, E. "Boykotçular." *Taraf*, August 20, 2010. Accessed September 05, 2012. Available from: <http://www.taraf.com.tr/etyen-mahcupyan/makale-boykotcular.htm>.

Mahcupyan, E. "Boynuz." *Taraf*, August 11, 2010. Accessed September 05, 2012. Available from: <http://www.taraf.com.tr/etyen-mahcupyan/makale-boynuz.htm>.

Mahcupyan, E. "Değişim." *Taraf*, September 15, 2010. Accessed September 05, 2012. Available from: <http://www.taraf.com.tr/etyen-mahcupyan/makale-degisim.htm>.

Mahcupyan, E. "Efendiler ve Taşralılar." *Taraf*, August 15, 2010. Accessed September 05, 2012. Available from: <http://www.taraf.com.tr/etyen-mahcupyan/makale-efendiler-ve-tasralilar.htm>.

Mahcupyan, E. "Evet Ama Yetmez." *Taraf*, August 22, 2010. Accessed September 05, 2012. Available from: <http://www.taraf.com.tr/etyen-mahcupyan/makale-evet-ama-yetmez.htm>.

Mahcupyan, E. "Hazımsızlık." *Zaman*, January 09, 2003. Accessed September 05, 2012. Available from: <http://arsiv.zaman.com.tr/2003/01/09/yazarlar/etyenmahcupyan.htm>.

Mahcupyan, E. "Hrant." *Zaman*, January 21, 2007. Accessed September 05, 2012. Available from: <http://www.zaman.com.tr/yazar.do?yazino=490569>.

Mahcupyan, E. "İttihatçılar ve Muhalifleri." *Zaman*, November 14, 2002. Accessed September 05, 2012. Available from: <http://arsiv.zaman.com.tr/2002/11/14/yazarlar/etyenmahcupyan.htm>.

Mahcupyan, E. "Kendini Rehin Alan Ülke" *Zaman*, March 02, 2003. Accessed September 05, 2012. Available from: <http://arsiv.zaman.com.tr/2003/03/02/yazarlar/etyenmahcupyan.htm>.

Mahcupyan, E. "Kişiliksizliğin Siyaseti." *Taraf*, May 05, 2010. Accessed September 05, 2012. Available from: <http://www.taraf.com.tr/etyen-mahcupyan/makale-kisiliksizligin-siyaseti.htm>.

Mahcupyan, E. "Kokuyor..." *Zaman*, March 03, 2003. Accessed September 05, 2012. Available from: <http://arsiv.zaman.com.tr/2003/03/03/yazarlar/etyenmahcupyan.htm>.

Mahcupyan, E. "Korku ve Nefretin Siyaseti." *Taraf*, September 03, 2010. Accessed September 05, 2012. Available from: <http://www.taraf.com.tr/etyen-mahcupyan/makale-korku-ve-nefretin-siyaseti.htm>.

Mahcupyan, E. "Merkez Sağın Cazibesi." *Zaman*, October 06, 2003. Accessed September 05, 2012. Available from: <http://arsiv.zaman.com.tr/2003/10/06/yazarlar/etyenmahcupyan.htm>.

Mahcupyan, E. "Milliyetçilik, Pragmatizm ve Merkez Sağ." *Zaman*, October 13, 2003. Accessed September 05, 2012. Available from: <http://arsiv.zaman.com.tr/2003/10/13/yazarlar/etyenmahcupyan.htm>.

Mahcupyan, E. "Muhafazakarlık bir Tür Merkez mi?." *Zaman*, August 25, 2003. Accessed September 05, 2012. Available from: <http://arsiv.zaman.com.tr/2003/08/25/yazarlar/etyenmahcupyan.htm>.

Mahcupyan, E. "Müslüman Demokrat Bahsine Giriş." *Zaman*, November 21, 2002. Accessed September 05, 2012. Available from: <http://arsiv.zaman.com.tr/2002/11/21/yazarlar/etyenmahcupyan.htm>.

Mahcupyan, E. "Otoriter Gerçekçilik." *Zaman*, February 16, 2003. Accessed September 05, 2012. Available from: <http://arsiv.zaman.com.tr/2003/02/16/yazarlar/etyenmahcupyan.htm>.

Mahcupyan, E. "Siyasetin Karadeliği: Merkez Sağ." *Zaman*, November 11, 2002. Accessed September 05, 2012. Available from: <http://arsiv.zaman.com.tr/2002/11/11/yazarlar/etyenmahcupyan.htm>.

Mahcupyan, E. "Son Kerte Soruları". *Taraf*, September 10, 2010. Accessed September 05, 2012. Available from: <http://www.taraf.com.tr/etyenmahcupyan/makale-son-kerte-sorulari.htm>.

Mahcupyan, E. "Üslup Değişikliği." *Zaman*, November 07, 2002. Accessed September 05, 2012. Available from: <http://arsiv.zaman.com.tr/2002/11/07/yazarlar/etyenmahcupyan.htm>.

Mahcupyan, E. "Utangaçlar." *Taraf*, August 18, 2010. Accessed September 05, 2012. Available from: <http://www.taraf.com.tr/etyenmahcupyan/makale-utangaclar.htm>.

Mahcupyan, E. "Uygulamanın Ardındaki Derin Niyet." *Zaman*, 18.11 2002. Accessed September 05, 2012. Available from: <http://arsiv.zaman.com.tr/2002/11/18/yazarlar/etyenmahcupyan.htm>.

Mahcupyan, E. "Uyumlu Muhafazakar Demokrasi." *Zaman*, February 09, 2004. Accessed September 05, 2012. Available from: <http://zaman.com.tr/yazar.do?yazino=12491>.

Mahcupyan, E. "Vatandaşlık Referandumu." *Taraf*, September 05, 2010. Accessed September 05, 2012. Available from: <http://www.taraf.com.tr/etyenmahcupyan/makale-vatandaslik-referandumu.htm>.

Mardin, Ş. *Türkiye'de Toplum ve Siyaset*. İstanbul: İletişim; 2010.

Mardin, Ş. (1973) "Center-Periphery Relations: A Key to Turkish Politics?." *Daedalus*, 102: 169-189.

"Marxism: Gramsci's Concept of Hegemony", <http://survivingbaenglish.wordpress.com/gramsci/>

"Meğer Seçimler Cumhurbaşkanlığı İçinmiş." Updated July 25, 2007. Accessed September 05, 2012. <http://www.bianet.org/bianet/siyaset/99995-meger-secimler-cumhurbaskanligi-icinmis>.

“Mehmet Altan: Ergenekon Şahlandı!” Updated May 04, 2010. Accessed September 05, 2012. . <http://www.mehmetaltan.com/index.asp?sayfa=roportaj&icerik=1471>.

Mendel, I. “Mannheim’s Free-Floating Intelligentsia: The Role of Closeness and Distance in the Analysis of Society.” <http://www.sussex.ac.uk/cspt/documents/12-2.pdf>, 2006.

Merton, K. M. “Role of the Intellectual in Public Bureaucracy”, *Social Forces*, Vol. 23, No. 4, May, 1945.

Öniş, Z, and Webb S. “Turkey: Democratization and Adjustment from Above.” In: Haggard S, Webb S, eds. *Voting for reform: Democracy, Political Liberalization and Economic Adjustment*. New York: Oxford University Press; 1996.

Öniş, Z. *The Political Economy of Turkey's Justice and Development Party*. 2004.

Özcan, Z. “AK Parti'yle İttifak Sanal, Ayrışma Gerçek!” *Aksiyon*, February 18, 2008. Available from: <http://www.aksiyon.com.tr/aksiyon/haber-16013-33-ak-partiyle-ittifak-sanal-ayrisma-gercek.html>

Özen, H. “A Critical Review on the Political Role of Intellectuals”, Thesis for the Degree of Master of Science in the Department of Sociology, Ankara, 2001

Özgüden, M. “Türkiye'de Sivil Toplum İdeolojisi: Yeni Sağ, Sol Liberalizm Ve Siyasal İslamcılık Üzerine bir İnceleme.” Phd diss., Ankara Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, 2007.

Özkazanç, A. “Cumhuriyet Döneminde Siyasal Gelişmeler: Tarihsel- sosyolojik bir Değerlendirme.” In: *1920'den Günümüze Türkiye'de Toplumsal Yapı ve Değişim*. Ed. Alpkaya and Duru. Ankara: Phoenix, 2012, 91-128.

Özkazanç, A. “Türkiye'nin Neo-liberal Dönüşümü ve Liberal Düşünce.” In *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasal Düşünce: Liberalizm*. Eds. Bora and Gültekingil. İstanbul: İletişim, 2005.

“Paşasının Başbakanı.” *Taraf*, October 17, 2008. Accessed September 05, 2012. Available from: <http://taraf.com.tr/haber/pasasinin-basbakani.htm>.

Piereson, J. “The Rise & Fall of the Intellectual,” 2006, http://www.manhattan-institute.org/html/_the_new_criterion-the_rise_and_fall.html

Portelli, H. “Gramsci ve Tarihsel Blok”, Çev. Kenan Somer, Savaş Yayınları: Ankara, 1982.

“Radikal Yazarlarının Kalemінде Liberal Aydınlar.” *Radikal*, January 26, 2011. Available from: <http://www.radikal.com.tr/Radikal.aspx?aType=RadikalDetayV3&ArticleID=1037993&CategoryID=77>.

Ransome, P. *Antonio Gramsci: Yeni bir Giriş*. 1st ed. Ankara: Dipnot; 2010.

“Recommendation of the European Commission on Turkey’s Progress Towards Accession.” Accessed September 05, 2012. http://eurlex.europa.eu/smartapi/cgi/sga_doc?smartapi!celexplus!prod!CELEXnumdoc&lg=en&numdoc=504DC0656

“Referandum İçin Süre Kısaldı.” Updated March 04, 2010. Accessed September 05, 2012. <http://www.bianet.org/bianet/siyaset/120407-referandum-icin-sure-kisaldi>.

Said, E. “Yazar ve Entelektüellerin Kamusal Rolü.” *Cogito: Entelektüeller Gerekli mi?*, 31, İstanbul: YKY, Bahar 2002.

Said, E. *Entelektüel: Sürgün, Marjinal, Yabancı*, Çev. Tuncay Birkan, İstanbul: Ayrıntı, 2009.

Said, E. *Representations of the Intellectual*. London: Vintage, 1994.

“Sandıkta Tasfiye.” Accessed September 05, 2012. <http://arsiv.sabah.com.tr/2002/11/04/s1612.html>.

Santucci, A. A. *Gramsci’yi Anlamak*, çev. S. Sezer, İstanbul: Kalkedon, 2011.

Saraçoğlu, C. “İslami-Muhafazakar Milliyetçiliğin Millet Tasarımı: AKP Döneminde Kürt Politikası.” *Praksis*. 2012;26:31-54.

Sartre, J. P. *Aydınlar Üzerine*, Çev. Aysel Bora, İstanbul: Can Yayınları, 2000.

Sartre, J. P. *Between Existentialism and Marxism*, trans. J. Matthews. London: New Left Books, 1974.

“Secular Rally Targets Turkish PM.” Accessed September 05, 2012. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6554851.stm>.

Sever, M. ed. *İkinci Cumhuriyet Tartışmaları*. Ankara: Başak Yayınları; 1993.

Sevinç, M. “AKP’nin Kapatılma Davası” In: Uzel İ, Duru B, eds. *AKP Kitabı: Bir dönüşümün bilançosu*. 2nd ed. Ankara: Phoenix; 2010

Sevimay, D. “Anayasa 'Bugün Yapalım, Yarın Düzeltiriz'le Olmaz” Updated March, 2010. Accessed September 05, 2012. http://www.anayasa.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=70&lang=tr.

Sevimay, D. “Ertuğrul Kürkçü ile Söyleşi: AKP Demokrasiye Gitmek için bir İmkân Değildir.” *bianet.com*, August 18, 2008. Accessed September 05, 2012. Available from: <http://www.bianet.org/bianet/siyaset/109073-akp-demokrasiye-gitmek-icin-bir-imkan-degildir>.

“Sözün Bittiği Yerdeyiz....” Updated July 06, 2010. Accessed September 05, 2012. <http://siyaset.milliyet.com.tr/sozun-bittigi-yerdeyiz-/siyaset/siyasetdetay/06.07.2010/1259717/default.htm>.

Taşgetiren, A. “Bayramoğlu ve Ötesi.” *Bugün*, February 28, 2012. Accessed September 05, 2012. Available from: <http://gundem.bugun.com.tr/bayramoglu-ve-otesi-185335-makalesi.aspx>.

Taşkın, Y. “Türk Sağı ve Aydınlar: Bir Aşk ve Nefret İlişisini Anlamak.” In: Kerestecioğlu İÖ, Öztan GG, eds. *Türk sağı: Mitler, Fetişler, Düşman İmgeleri*. İstanbul: İletişim; 2012:407-421.

“TBMM'den Türbana Onay.” Updated February 09, 2008. Accessed September 05, 2012. http://www.bbc.co.uk/turkish/news/story/2008/02/080209_turkey_2update.shtml.

“Tehdidi Bırak Hesap Ver.” *Taraf*, October 16, 2008. Accessed September 06, 2012. Available from: <http://www.taraf.com.tr/haber/tehdidi-birak-hesap-ver.htm>.

Topçuoğlu, S. L. “‘The Conservative-democratic’ Identity of the Justice and Development Party in the Turkish Center-right Tradition”, Master’s Thesis, Middle East Technical University, 2006.

Touraine, A. *The Post-industrial Society; Tomorrow's Social History: Classes, Conflicts and Culture in the Programmed Society*, Mayhew translation, New York: Random House, 1971.

Tünay, M. “The Turkish New Right’s Attempt to Hegemony.” In Eralp, Tünay and Yeşilada eds., *Political and Socioeconomic Transformation of Turkey*, London: Praeger, 1993

Türk, H. B. “AKP ve Kanaat Teknisyenleri.” *Birikim*, 2012; 276: 29-37.

Türker, Y. “Eğreti Aşıklar.” *Radikal*, January 23, 2011. Available from: <http://www.radikal.com.tr/Radikal.aspx?aType=RadikalEklerDetayV3&ArticleID=1037793&CategoryID=42&Rdkref=11>.

“Türkiye Geneli Partilerin Kazandıkları Milletvekili Sayıları.” Accessed September 05, 2012. <http://www.ysk.gov.tr/ysk/docs/2002MilletvekiliSecimi/turkiye/milletvekilisayisi.pdf>

“Türkiye’de Seçimler.” Accessed September 05, 2012. <http://www.belgenet.com/secim/3kasim.html>.

“Turkish Failure to Enact Penal Reform Could Have Been "Disaster": Verheugen.” Accessed September 13, 2012. <http://www.eubusiness.com/europe/turkey/040923150946.cd433chc>.

Uyurkulak, M. “Taşralı, Namuslu ve Yalnız bir Adam: İdris Küçükömer.” <http://www.erkansimsek.net/makaledetay.php?id=58>

Uzgel, İ. “AKP: Neoliberal Dönüşümün Yeni Aktörü.” In: Uzgel İ, Duru B, eds. *AKP kitabı: Bir dönüşümün bilançosu*. 2nd ed. Ankara: Phoenix; 2010:11-39.

“Uzlaşmayla Çıksın.” Updated March 22, 2010. Accessed September 05, 2012. <http://www.milliyet.com.tr/uzlasmayla-ciksin/siyaset/haberdetay/22.03.2010/1214509/default.htm>.

“Verheugen Slams Plan to Outlaw Adultery.” Accessed September 13, 2012. <http://arsiv.ntvmsnbc.com/news/286267.asp>.

“Vetolu Anayasa Değişikliği Meclis Gündeminde.” Updated May 28, 2007. Accessed September 05, 2012. <http://www.bianet.org/bianet/siyaset/96695-vetolu-anayasa-degisikligi-meclis-gundeminde>.

“What Will the Constitutional Changes Mean for Turkey?” Updated September 12, 2010. Accessed September 05, 2012. <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/default.aspx?pageid=438&n=what-the-changes-bring-2010-09-12>.

Yalman, G. “Tarihsel Bir Perspektiften Türkiye’de Devlet ve Burjuvazi, Rölativist Bir Paradigma mı Hegemonya Stratejisi mi?” *Praksis*,5, 2002.

Yaşlı, F. “Liberal- Muhafazakar Hegemonya ve Merkez-Çevre Paradigması.” Accessed September 13, 2012. http://www.yenidendeirim.org/resimler/ekler/451041557a22145_ek.pdf.

Yetiş, M. “Gramsci ve Aydınlar.” *Mülkiye*. 2002; 26 (236): 217-245, http://www.mulkiyederigi.org/index.php?option=com_rokdownloads&view=file&task=download&id=1206%3Agramsci-ve-aydnlar-yrd-doc-dr&Itemid=63. Accessed 25.05.2009.

Yıldırım, D. “AKP ve Neoliberal Popülizm.” In: Uzgel İ, Duru B, eds. *AKP Kitabı: Bir Dönüşümün Bilançosu*, Phoenix: İstanbul, 2010, p.82.

Yıldızoğlu, E. “AKP ve Liberal Entelektüllerin Yavaş İntiharı.” In: Uzgel İ, Duru B, eds. *AKP kitabı: Bir dönüşümün bilançosu*. 2. baskı ed. Ankara: Phoenix, 2010, 40-65.

“YSK: Anayasa Referandumu 12 Eylül'de.” Updated May 13, 2010. Accessed September 05, 2012. <http://www.bianet.org/bianet/siyaset/121958-ysk-anayasa-referandumu-12-eylulde>.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

TURKISH SUMMARY

Bu tez iktidar aydın ilişkilerini Türkiye tarihinin özgül bir momentine atıfla incelemektedir. Bahsedilen moment içerisinde bir grup entelektüel kamusal alanda önemli ölçüde görünürlük kazanmış ve siyasi iktidar sahiplerini desteklemiştir. Entelektüel kavramının tarihine bakıldığında iktidar sahipleriyle ilişkide olmamanın, eleştirel düşünmenin ve siyasi çıkar elde etmek için hareket etmemenin bu konu üzerine çalışan kuramcılarının tanımlarının ortak paydası oldu iddia edilebilir. Bu bakış açısı entelektüel kavramının gündelik kullanımına da yerleşmiş ve bahsedilen özgül momentte de entelektüel iktidar ilişkilerinin tartışıldığı temel çerçeve haline gelmiştir. Tezde, iktidar aydın ilişkilerine bu perspektifin dışından bakılmakta ve bahsettiğimiz entelektüel grubunun siyasi iktidar sahiplerine desteği bu paradigmanın dışından açıklanmaktadır. Diğer bir deyişle, bu çalışmada entelektüel kavramı, iktidar kavgasının dışında kalan ayrıcalıklı bir figür olarak yaygın kullanımının aksine, iktidar ilişkilerinin kendiliğinden bir parçası olarak ele alınmıştır. Bu bağlamda tezin amacı, bahsettiğimiz özgül ilişkide entelektüellerin kendilerine dair tanımlarının iktidar sahipleriyle olan ilişkilerinde nasıl bir yer tuttuğunu anlamaya çalışmaktır.

Bu çerçeve üzerinden bakılan dönem Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (AKP)'nin iktidara geldiği 2002 genel seçimleri sonrasındır. Türk siyasal hayatında aradan geçen 10 yıllık zaman diliminde görülmüştür ki “liberal entelektüeller” olarak adlandırılan bir grup entelektüel AKP'nin politikasındaki değişimlere rağmen değişmeyen bir siyasal tavırla bu partiyi desteklemişlerdir. Bu entelektüellerin AKP temsilcileriyle sınıfsal ya da ideolojik anlamda herhangi bir ortaklık taşımadıkları düşünüldüğünde, bu desteğin ardındaki nedenlerin incelenmesinin kritik bir önemde olduğu söylenebilir. Çalışmada bu nedenleri açıklayabilmek için sadece evrensel değerlerin peşinden koşması beklenen bir entelektüel imajından değil, yapısı itibarıyla iktidar ilişkilerinin içinde bulunan ve bunlardan azade olamayan bir entelektüel tanımı üzerinden hareket edilmiştir.

Bu noktada Gramsci'nin "geleneksel entelektüeller" kavramına başvurulmuştur. Gramsci entelektüelleri organik entelektüeller ve gelenekselentelektüeller olmak üzere iki kategori altında inceler. Birincisi temel sınıflardan biriyle organik bir ilişkinin varlığına işaret ederken ikincisi bir önceki toplumsal formasyonun toplumsal sınıflarıyla bu türden bir ilişkiyi ifade eder. Bu toplumsal sınıfların yerini başka sınıflara bırakmış olması ve buna rağmen bu entelektüellerin kamusal alanda kendilerine yer bulabilmesi yapı ve üst-yapının "zaman"larının birbirinden farklı olmasına bağlıdır. Diğer bir deyişle yapı ve üst-yapı arasındaki belirlenim ilişkisi eş-zamanlı bir değişimle gösterilemez. Bu nedenle geleneksel entelektüeller, organik olarak bağlı oldukları sınıf toplumsal alanda yerini başka bir sınıfa bıraktığında kamusal alanda etkili olmaya devam edebilirler ve bu organikliğin görünürlüğünü kaybettiği noktada da kendilerini sınıflar üstü ve tarafsız olarak sunabilirler. Gramsci'ye göre bu türden bir tarafsızlık ve süreklilik iddiasının sonucu sınıflar-üstü bir devlet tasarımıdır (bkz. Yetiş, 2002). Böylece, evrenseli arayan bağımsız entelektüel imgesi toplumsal formasyonun sınıfsal karakterinin görünmez kılınmasına ve bunun sonucunda da sistemin bekasına katkıda bulunmaktadır. Gramsci'ye göre bir toplumsal sınıfın egemenliğini sağlaması ancak ve ancak alt-yapı ve üst yapı arasındaki ilişkileri düzenleyen, organize eden aydınların güçlü bir entelektüel blok kurmasıyla mümkündür. Entelektüel bloğun güçlendirilmesi içinse hegemonyaya talip bir toplumsal sınıfın diğer sınıfın aydınlarını, geleneksel aydınları, entelektüel bloğa çekecek bir politika oluşturması gerekmektedir. Bu çekiciliğin iki koşulu vardır. Öncelikle entelektüel bloğa dahil olmak entelektüele önceki düzenin aydınlarından farklı olma ve üstünlük hissi vererek bir çeşit itibar sağlamalıdır. İkinci koşulsu entelektüele tahsis edilecek olan teknik alandır. Bu teknik alan çoğunlukla bir istihdam alanıdır. Gramsci'ye göre bu iki koşulun sağlandığı durumlar geleneksel entelektüellerin yükselen sınıfın organik entelektüellerine dönüştürüldükleri ana karşılık gelir. Bahsedilen sınıfı temsil eden siyasal partiye bu dönüşümün sağlandığı mecradır.

Daha önce de ifade edildiği gibi 2002 sonrası Türkiye'ye baktığımızda liberal entelektüellerle AKP arasında var olduğu iddia edilen ve üzerine çokça konuşulan "işbirliği"nin dönemi tanımlayan önemli ilişkilerden olduğu iddia edilebilir. Tezde, Gramsci'nin hegemonyanın kurulması için entelektüellere yönelik bir politika geliştirilmesinin gerekliliğine dair yaptığı vurguya referansla yukarıda bahsedilen çekiciliğin koşulları bu ilişkinin dinamiklerini açıklamakta kullanılmıştır. Bu

koşulları tespit etmek içinse, liberal entelektüellerin siyasi iktidar sahipleriyle aralarındaki ilişkiyi nasıl kurguladığı incelenmiştir. Bu bağlamda temel tezimiz AKP döneminin Türkiye'nin siyasi tarihinde bir kopuşu temsil ettiği görüşü üzerinden hareket eden liberal entelektüellerin bu partiyi destekleyerek kendilerine yeni kurulmakta olduğunu iddia ettikleri ve “Yeni Türkiye” ya da “İleri Demokrasi” olarak tanımladıkları düzende iktidar sahibi konumlar atfettikleridir. Bu bağlamda, eski anti-demokratik düzenin kendi sınırlarına ulaştığı iddiasındaki liberal entelektüellerin entelektüel bloğa çekimi AKP'nin önceki sistemi demokratikleşme yoluyla dönüştüreceği söylemi üzerinden gerçekleşir. Bahsedilen çekiciliğin entelektüel bloğa katılım anlamında sonuca ulaşmasında bu söylemin gerçek anlamda demokratikleşmeye karşılık gelip gelmediğini anlamaya çalışmak bu çalışmanın kapsamı dışındadır. Tezin asıl amacı, bu demokratikleşme söyleminin AKP'yi destekleyen liberal entelektüellere sağladığı ayrıcalık, üstünlük hissi ve sonu geldiği iddia edilen eski sistemin entelektüellerinden farklı olmanın getirdiği itibardır.

Bu farklı olma ve itibar arayışı liberal entelektüellerin bir grup olarak ortaya çıkışında ve siyasi iktidar sahipleriyle yakınlaşma çabalarında kendini gösterir. Tezde, böyle bir arayışla tanımlanabilen ve bu bağlamda liberal entelektüeller-iktidar ilişkisi için belirleyici olan üç dönemden söz edilebilir. İlk dönem egemenlik krizi yaşayan siyasal iktidarın meşruiyet ihtiyacını liberal entelektüellerin yardımıyla giderme hedefiyle açıklanabilir. Özal dönemi olarak kategorize edeceğimiz bu zaman dilimi liberal entelektüeller tarafından AKP iktidarıyla eşleştirdikleri “Yeni Türkiye”nin oluşumu için temel adımların atıldığı süreç olarak kabul edilmektedir. Özal'ın ölümünden sonra görünürlüklerini zamanla kaybeden liberal entelektüeller iktidardaki değişikliklerin kendi konumlarını da tehlikeye attığını görerek iktidara tutunmaktansa iktidarın kendisine talip olmuşlardır. Yeni Demokrasi Hareketi (YDH) deneyimi bu talebin en net ifadesidir. Tezde köşe yazılarını incelediğimiz Cengiz Çandar, Mehmet Altan ve Etyen Mahçupyan bu partinin kurucuları arasındadır. Bu noktada iki deneyimin ortaklığı liberal entelektüellerin ikisine de katılımının yanı sıra bahsettiğimiz itibar arayışı çerçevesinde açıklanabilecek olan bir “yenilik” vurgusunun varlığıyla tanımlanmaktadır. Bu bağlamda “Yeni Türkiye”nin kuruluş momentini olarak referans verilen Özal döneminin tanımlayıcı sloganı “çağ atlayan Türkiye” iken, YDH sürecinde “yeni Türkiye” kavramı olgunlaşmaya başlamıştır. Bu yenilik vurgusu, yeni dönem kavramsallaştırması bir tespitin ötesinde

aslında gerçekleştirilmesi istenen bir ereğe karşılık gelmektedir. Diğer bir deyişle AKP döneminin incelenmesinde de görüleceği gibi bu üç dönemde de temel vurgunun “yenilik” olması bir tesadüf değil, liberal entelektüellerin kendileri için talep ettikleri iktidar pozisyonuyla oldukça ilgilidir.

Liberal entelektüeller iktidar ilişkisinde üçüncü moment olarak tanımladığımız AKP dönemine geldiğimizde, bu grubun bahsedilen dönemi Cumhuriyet’in demokratikleşmesine en çok yaklaştığımız an olarak savunduklarını görüyoruz. Bu savunu AKP’nin Türk siyasal tarihi için bir kopuş olarak görülmesinin bir sonucudur. 2002 seçimlerinde AKP’nin siyasal alana yeni giren bir aktör olmasına rağmen tek başına iktidar olması ve eş zamanlı olarak merkez-sağ partilerin %10’luk seçim barajı altında kalması liberal entelektüeller tarafından “müesses nizam”ı dönüştürecek yeni bir sürecin başlangıcı olarak değerlendirilmiştir. Bu anlayışa göre, bu dönüşümü yönlendirecek olan AKP’yi merkez sağa ait yeni bir parti olarak değerlendirmek mümkün değildir. AKP’nin yeniliği toplumun siyasal düzeni değiştirmek için sahip olduğu iradenin bir beyanı olmasındadır. 90’larda başlayan organik krizin 2001 yılındaki ekonomik krizle ulaştığı nokta sistemin sınırlarına ulaştığı ve bir kurtarıcıya ihtiyacı olduğu şeklindeki bakış açısının yaygınlaşmasıdır. Yeni bir merkez arayışları liberal entelektüellerin 2000’li yılların başlarında YDH’nın yeniden kurulması için attıkları adımlarda da kendini göstermiştir. Bu girişimin sonuçsuz kalmasını ve liberal entelektüellerin AKP’yi desteklemelerinin nedenlerini anlayabilmek için bu partinin İslamcı sivil toplum üzerindeki nüfuzunun oy oranıyla ilgili kaygıları ortadan kaldırdığını unutmamak gereklidir. Tezde bu nüfuzun, AKP’nin çevrenin gerçek temsilcisi olarak değerlendirilmesine neden olduğu söylenmektedir. Bu bağlamda, AKP dönemi devlet ve toplumun buluştuğu ya da bu ikiliğin arasındaki mesafenin ortadan kalktığı moment olarak okunmuştur. Liberal entelektüellere göre çevrenin merkeze doğru bu hareketi “Yeni Türkiye”nin kuruluş sürecidir. Bu noktada AKP Türk siyasal tarihini çevrenin demokratikleşme taleplerinin merkez tarafından bastırıldığı bir döngü olmaktan çıkararak aktör olarak sunulmaktadır ve böylelikle kendisine “devrimci” sıfatı atfedilmektedir. Bu noktada liberal entelektüellerin 2. Cumhuriyetçiler olarak siyasal sahneye çıkmış oldukları ve 2. Cumhuriyetin cumhuriyetin demokratikleşmesi olarak tanımladığı hatırlanmalıdır.

“Yeni Türkiye” kavramının liberal entelektüeller için oluşturduğu çekiciliği anlamak için ikinci cumhuriyetçiliğin temel tezlerine bakılmış ve bu bakış açısının

yeni tür bir entelektüel etkinliği temellendirmeye imkan tanıdığı iddia edilmiştir. Diğer bir deyişle, “yeni Türkiye” fikrinde tekrar hayat bulan ikinci cumhuriyetçilik düşüncesi aslında cumhuriyetin ve onun kuruluşuna eşlik eden entelektüel etkinlik biçiminin sonunu ilan etmekte ve böylece kendi konuma bir “ayrıcılık” ve itibar hissi atfetmektedir. Bu düşünceye göre, küresel kapitalizmin bütünleşme baskısı, piyasanın rasyonelleştirme işlevi ve siyasal iktidarın hegemonya krizinin bir araya geldiği koşullar altında, birinci cumhuriyet sınırlarına ulaşmıştır ve yeniden-üretimini kendi başına gerçekleştirmesi mümkün değildir. Bu gelişmeyle beraber, birinci cumhuriyetin ideolojisinin, kemalizmin, “fikirler piyasası”nda egemenliği artık son bulmuştur. Bu bağlamda, liberal entelektüeller 80’lerin “2. Cumhuriyetçilerin” de yükselişiyile beraber Türk siyasal tarihinde radikal bir kırılma noktasına karşılık geldiğini öne sürmektedirler. Liberal entelektüellerin bakış açısına göre bu kırılma Türk entelijansiyasının devlete tutunma, kendi konumunu devlete göre belirleme geleneğinin de sonuna işaret etmektedir. Buna göre devletin bir an önce çağdaşlaşma çabası cumhuriyetin kuruluşunda entelektüel etkinliğin ikinci plana atılmasına ve devlet geleneğinin anti-entelektüalizmle karakterize olmasına neden olmuştur. Bu nedenle entelektüeller eleştirel düşünce sorumluluğunu yerine getirememiş ve “epigonlar, propandistler ve uzmanlar” olarak sınırlı rollere sahip olmuşlar ve bu görevlendirilmeye uygun davranmışlardır. Özetle, erken cumhuriyet dönemi aydınlarının nitelikleri, yönetici elite yakın ilişkileri ya da onun bir parçası olmaları göz önüne alındığında, entelektüel sosyolojisinin genel kavramları uyarınca bunların literati ya da yarı-aydın olarak adlandırılabilceği iddia edilmiştir. Bu noktada liberal entelektüellerin kendi konumlarıyla ilişkilendirdikleri ayrıcalık ve kopuş tezlerinin temel dayanağı onların daha önce de belirtildiği üzere devlet-toplum ikiliğine bakış açılarıdır. Devletin toplum üzerindeki tahakkümüne karşı olmak liberal entelektüellerin “muhalif ama hegemonik” pozisyonunun temelini oluşturur. Bu anlamda devlete karşı muhalefette olmak entelektüel sorumluluğunun doğal sonucu olarak yorumlanmaktadır.

Liberal entelektüeller AKP ilişkisine bakıldığında ve bu partinin üyelerinin yeni yönetici elit olarak değerlendirilebileceği düşünüldüğünde, bu iki grup arasındaki yakın ilişkilerin de erken cumhuriyet dönemi entelektüellerinin pratiklerinden çok da farklı olmadığı görülmüştür. Diğer bir deyişle, tezin sonuçlarından biri, liberal entelektüellerin Türk siyasi tarihinde entelektüellerin geleneksel yöntemi olarak değerlendirdikleri ve kendileriyle birlikte bir kopuşa

uğradığını iddia ettikleri devlete yakın olma ve ona tutunma tavrının kendileri tarafından da takip edildiğidir. İki grup değişik aktörlerle konuşmaktadır ama bu aktörlerin iktidar olmak gibi ortak bir özellikleri vardır. Diğer bir deyişle, iki grup da toplum yerine iktidarla konuşmaktadır. Bu noktada iddia edilmektedir ki liberal entelektüellerin kendi konumlarını entelektüel sorumluluğu dahilinde değerlendirmeleri ve erken dönem entelektüellerini eleştirmede herhangi bir çelişki görmemelerinin sebebi AKP hükümetini, daha önce de ifade edildiği gibi, iktidar olarak görmemelerinden kaynaklanmaktadır. İktidar Türkiye Cumhuriyeti tarihinin merkez/çevre paradigması üzerinden incelenmesinin bir sonucu olarak vesayet rejimi olarak tanımlanmaktadır. Vesayet rejimi bu bağlamda Türk siyasi tarihi için bir sürekliliğe işaret eder. AKP'nin desteklenmesiye bu iktidara karşı mücadele eden ve onun demokratikleşmesine yol açacak bir aktörün desteklenmesi demektir, bu nedenle entelektüel sorumluluğuyla çakışır.

Tezde demokratikleşme fikrinin bu grup için oluşturduğu çekiciliği anlamak için liberal entelektüellerin cumhuriyet tarihini nasıl okuduklarına bakılmıştır ve bu okumanın entelektüellere Galip Yalman'a referansla “muhalif ama hegemonik” bir pozisyon kazandırdığına dikkat çekilmiştir. Bu pozisyonun hegemonik karakterini anlamak için 1980 sonrası sivil toplum söyleminin geçirdiği dönüşüme bakılması gerektiği iddia edilmiştir. Refah devletinin ve Sovyetlerin çöküşüyle birlikte gittikçe yükselen “sivil toplum fetişizmi”nin Mehmet Özgüden'e referansla yeni sağ politikaların küresel kapitalin önündeki engellerin kaldırılması için bir aracı oluşturduğu savunulmaktadır. Bu bağlamda, devlet toplum ilişkilerinin bu özgül sunumunun burjuva sınıfının küresel kapitalizmle bütünleşme taleplerinin dışında anlaşılması mümkün değildir. Bu bağlamda “güçlü devlet geleneği tezi” ya da “merkez/çevre” paradigması olarak referans verilebilecek olan bu bakış açısının 1960'larda ortaya çıkmış olmasına rağmen hegemonik hale geldiği noktanın 1980'ler olması oldukça manidardır.

Daha önce de ifade edildiği gibi, AKP'nin demokratikleşme söylemine referansla ve merkez-çevre paradigması üzerinden toplumsal değişimi anlamının bir sonucu olarak liberal entelektüellerin bu partiyi Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'ni demokratikleştirecek tek aktör olarak sundukları iddia edilmiştir. Devlet ve toplumu birbirinden ayrı ve birincisinin ikincisi üzerinde tahakküm kurduğu bir ikilik olarak anlamının bir sonucu olarak, toplumun devletin baskısından kurtulması liberal entelektüellerce demokratikleşme olarak tanımlanmaktadır. Demokratikleşmeye bu

sınırlar çerçevesinde bakmak toplumun kendi içindeki çelişkileri (sınıfsal, etnik, dini vs.) liberal entelektüellerin gündeminde alt sıralarda yer almasına ve nihai hedefin devletin toplum üzerindeki vesayetinin kalkması olarak belirlenmesine neden olmaktadır. Bu noktada unutulmamalıdır ki tezin amacı “Sivilleşme olarak demokratikleşme” diye tanımlanabilecek olan bu bakış açısının kendisini, demokratikleşme açısından eksikliklerini ya da kısıtlı gündemini tartışmak değildir. Daha ziyade, tezin esas sorunsalını bu bakış açısının liberal entelektüellerin kendilik tanımlarında nereye oturduğunu, AKP iktidarının bu bakış açısıyla değerlendirilmesinin bu partiyi desteklemek için nasıl bir temel oluşturduğunu ve son olarak da bu desteğin kendisinin nasıl bir ayrıcalık hissiyle örüldüğünü tartışmak oluşturmaktadır.

Bu kaygılar göz önüne alındığında, AKP'nin demokratikleştirici potansiyelinin liberal entelektüeller için onu desteklemeyi var olan tek rasyonel seçenek haline getirdiği hatırlanmalıdır. Bu rasyonel seçeneği izleyen liberal entelektüeller de böylece kendilerini kurulacak olan “Yeni Türkiye”nin yeni aktörleri olarak tanımlayabilmektedirler. Bu aktörlerin ayrıcalıklı konumu yeni Türkiye'nin kuruculuğunu üstlenen siyasal partiyi demokratikleşme yolunda yöreklendirmelerinden ve ona rehberlik yapmalarından kaynaklanmaktadır. Yeni Türkiye'nin yeni aktörü olarak liberal entelektüellerin görevi vesayet rejimi olarak adlandırılan eski düzenin, Necmi Erdoğan'ın deyimiyle “putkırıcılığı” (bkz. Erdoğan, 2009) yapmaktır. Bu noktada belirtilmelidir ki putkırıcı olmak, AKP cumhuriyeti demokratikleştirebilecek ve böylece “yeni Türkiye'yi” kuracak tek aktör olduğundan, var olan tek rasyonel pozisyona işaret etmenin dışında entelektüel tanımıyla ilgili de imalar içermektedir. Bu noktada, liberal entelektüellerin kendilerini entelektüel sosyolojisinin temel kavramlarıyla tanımladıkları hatırlanmalıdır. Özetin başında da belirtildiği üzere entelektüel tanımının yaygın kullanımı, terimin ortaya çıkış koşullarıyla da ilintili olarak, iktidar ilişkilerinin dışında, evrenselin peşinde ve tikel çıkarlar arayışından azade olarak kurgulanmıştır. Bu kurgu iktidar ve “entelekt” uyuşmazlığı üzerinden geliştirilmiş ve iktidara yakın olmak, onun için mücadele etmek entelektüel nitelikleri yozlaştıran bir tutum olarak neredeyse günlük kullanımın bir parçası haline gelmiştir. Çalışma süresince görüldüğü üzere liberal entelektüeller bu tanımlama dahilinde AKP'nin yanında saf tutmanın entelektüel sorumluluğunun bir parçası olduğunu iddia etmektedirler. Topluma merkez/ çevre paradigmasından bakmanın ve çevreyi demokratikleşme

potansiyeli üzerinden değerlendirmenin bir sonucu olarak iktidarın asıl sahibi vesayet rejimi olarak kurgulanmıştır. Bu şartlar altında AKP'yi desteklemek rasyonel ve evrensel olan değerleri, bu durumda demokratikleşmeyi, izlemenin doğal bir sonucudur. Liberal entelektüellere göre verdikleri destek entelektüel sorumluluğunun bir parçası olarak iktidara evrensel ve rasyonel değerler uğruna meydan okumaktır.

Görüldüğü üzere liberal entelektüeller çevreyi temsil eden, sırf bu nedenle demokratikleştirici bir potansiyele sahip olan ve merkeze karşı mücadele eden bir AKP imajı üzerinden hareket etmektedirler. Bu imajın karşılık geldiği liberal entelektüel profili ise, yukarıda belirtildiği üzere, siyasal alanın tek rasyonel pozisyonuna sahip ve entelektüel sorumluluğuyla hareket eden bir figürdür. Bu rasyonelliğin temeli olarak demokratikleşmenin başlı başına bir amaç olması gösterilmektedir. Daha önce de iddia edildiği gibi bahsedilen demokratikleşme sivilleşmeye karşılık gelmektedir ve AKP demokratikleşme projesini vesayet sisteminin çizdiği sınırlara rağmen gerçekleştirmeye çalışmaktadır. Bu sınırlar dahilinde AKP'nin demokratikleşme adımı üç aşamada kavramsallaştırılmaktadır: Avrupa Birliği'ne üyelik yoluyla bu proje için gerekli alt yapının oluşturulması, askeri vesayete (iktidara) karşı alan açılmaya çalışılması ve bu alanın sivil anayasa ile sabitlenmesi. Bu üç tema aynı zamanda tezin dönemselleştirilmesiyle de eşleşmektedir. İlk dönem Avrupa Birliği'ne üyelik amacı çerçevesinde reformların yapıldığı AKP'nin 2002- 2005 yılları arasındaki dönemine karşılık gelmektedir. Bu moment AKP-liberal entelektüel "işbirliğinin" temellerinin atıldığı ve AKP'yi desteklemenin rasyonel düşüncenin sonucu olduğu iddiasının temellendirildiği döneme tekabül etmektedir. İkinci dönem olarak belirlediğimiz aralıktaysa belirleyici olan 27 Nisan e-muhtırası ve Cumhurbaşkanlığı seçimi sürecinin yol açtığı şekliyle askeri vesayet tartışmalarıdır. Son olarak incelediğimiz dönemse 2010 yılındaki anayasa değişikliği referandumu sürecidir ve dönemi belirleyen ana tema liberal entelektüellerin sivil anayasa taleplerindeki dönüşümdür.

Bu dönemlerin incelenmesi sonucunda görülmüştür ki, zaman zaman heyecanla vesayetin sona erdiği ve "Yeni Türkiye"nin artık kurulduğu iddia edilse de bu iddialar hemen her zaman bir çeşit "teyakkuz ideolojisi" (bkz. Türk, 2012) üzerinden ortaya konmaktadır. Denilebilir ki entelektüel hegemonyanın sürmesi muhalefette olma algısının kaybolmamasına bağlıdır. Diğer bir deyişle AKP'nin muktedir olduğunun kabulü iktidar-entelekt uyumsuzluğu hatırlandığında onunla birlikte hareket etmeyi entelektüel sorumluluğuyla bağdaşmayacak bir eylem haline

getirecektir. Bu nedenle ilk dönemden başlayarak bu grup tarafından AKP “iktidar olmayan hükümet” olarak kurgulanmıştır ve işbirliğinin sağladığı ayrıcalık hissini kaybını engelleyecek şekilde bu kurgu diğer dönemlerde de sürdürülmeye çalışılmıştır. Bu şartlar altında, liberal entelektüellere göre AKP eleştirisi onun iktidarın asıl sahibi olmadığı göz önünde bulundurularak ve bu nedenle bazı eylemleri hoş görerek yapılmalıdır.

Bu noktada Gramsci'nin entelektüel bloğun kurulması için gerekli olduğunu ifade ettiği iki koşul hatırlanmalıdır. Birinci koşul diğer sınıfların entelektüellerine sağlanacak ayrıcalık ve itibar hissiyken ikinci koşul entelektüeller için bir teknik eylem ya da istihdam alanı oluşturmaktır. Diğer bir deyişle Gramsci'ye göre entelektüeller üzerinde hegemonya kurmanın ideolojik ve iktisadi iki yolu vardır. Bu teknik istihdam alanını tanımlayabilmek için Gramsci'nin Risorgimento analizine bakılarak ifade edilmiştir ki İlimlilerin Cizvit okuluna karşı duruşları onlara hem ayrıcalık hissini kaynağı olan ulusal bir felsefe kazandırmış hem de onlar için önemli bir istihdam alanı oluşturmuştur. Gramsci o dönemde milli eğitimin entelektüelleri istihdam edecek bir alan olarak ortaya çıkmasını kendi dönemiyle karşılaştırdığında oldukça kritik bulmaktadır. Gramsci'nin döneminde gazetecilik, siyasi partiler ve devlet bu entelektüelleri istihdam edecek alanlar olarak olgunlaşmışlardır ve Gramsci'ye göre bu alanların yokluğuyla karakterize olan Risorgimento da milli eğitim entelektüellerin ayrıcalık hislerinin devamı için oldukça önemlidir.

Bugüne baktığımızda, Gramsci'nin kendi dönemine referansla söylediği gibi, entelektüellerin istihdam edildiği birçok alanın varlığı kendini göstermektedir ancak tezde bu çokluğun varlığı Bordieu'ya referansla değerlendirilmiş ve medya alanının diğer tüm alanlar üzerindeki egemenliğine işaret edilmiştir. Bu egemenlik medya alanında istihdamı diğer alanlardakine göre daha değerli kılmaktadır. Bourdieu'ya göre gazetecilik alanı diğer alanlarda neyin gündemde olacağını ve common sense'e dönüşeceğini belirleme otoritesine sahiptir. Tam da bu nedenle, çalışmanın temel argümanlarından birisi de entelektüellerin iktidar pozisyonlarını anlamak için, onların medyada işgal ettikleri konumu analiz etmenin büyük önem taşımasıdır. Böylece, günümüzde, kamusal otorite olarak tanınmak için gazetecilik alanının iktidar kaynağı olarak sahip olduğu ayrıcalık Gramsci tarafından entelektüellerin entelektüel bloğa çekimini sağladığı iddia edilen istihdam alanının oluşturulmasında temel koşuldur.

Bu bağlamda söylemin sınırlarını belirleyen medya, tezde, entelektüellerin iktidar ilişkileri dahilinde işgal ettikleri konumu anlamak için siyasal bir alan olarak ele alınmıştır. Medyanın bu müktedir konumu basının medyaya dönüşümü çerçevesinde değerlendirilmiş ve basının bilgi ve haber verme görevleri sembolik işlevlerinin yanında ikincil olarak konumlandığı görülmüştür. Kültürel üretim medya üzerinden gerçekleştiğinden ve yayıldığından bahsedilen dönüşüm sonucunda bu alanın diğer ekonomik alanlardan bir farkı kalmamıştır. Bu nedenle, medya alanının işleyiş şekli piyasanın çalışma ilkeleriyle uyumlu olmak durumundadır. Böylece, iddia edilebilir ki 80'ler minimal devlet argümanı ile yükselen yeni sağ politikaların sonucunda yayıncılık sisteminin özelleşmesi ve deregülasyonu ile karakterize olmuştur. Tüm bu gelişmelerin ışığında medya karlı bir yatırım alanı haline gelmiş ve buna eşlik eden teknolojik yenilenme de büyük miktarda sermayeyi gerektirmiştir. Diğer bir deyişle, 80'ler, büyük sermayenin medya alanına girmesiyle birlikte piyasanın işleyiş mantığıyla ilişkili olarak, medya alanındaki aktörlerin temel amacının mümkün olan en yüksek oranda tüketilmek olarak belirlenmesine neden olmuştur (bkz. Kaya, 2009: 233-262).

İddia edilmektedir ki, medyanın diğer alanlar üzerindeki egemenliği, neyin önemli olduğunu ve kimin kamusal tanınmaya sahip olması gerektiğini bu alanın belirlemesi sonuçlarını doğurur. Çalışmada medyanın bu niteliği değerlendirilmiş ve alanda önemli pozisyonları işgal etmenin entelektüeller için nasıl bir çekicilik oluşturduğu anlaşılmaya çalışılmıştır. Bunun sonucunda, liberal entelektüellerin medyadaki dönüşümle birlikte bu alanda elde ettikleri kilit konumlar incelendiğinde, bu grubun yeni dönemin “kanaat önderleri” olarak işlev görmeye başladıkları söylenmektedir. Bu pozisyonun önemi ekonomik bir alan olarak medyada hakim olan “döngüsel dolaşım” ilkesi dikkate alındığında daha da kritik hale gelmektedir. Medya alanında olabilecek en yüksek sayıda izleyiciye ulaşma kaygısının sonucu bu alanda söylenebileceklerin sınırlandırılmasıdır. Liberal entelektüellerin siyasal alana bakışlarının bu sınırlılık dahilinde değerlendirilmesi gerektiği iddia edilerek, bu sınırlılığın bahsedilen grup gibi medyada önemli konumlarda bulunanları daha da müktedir hale getirdiği savunulmuştur. Liberal entelektüellerin entelektüel bloğa çekimini incelemek bu gruba siyasi iktidar arasındaki ilişkiyle eş zamanlı olarak, İslami medyaya yine bu entelektüeller arasında yakın bir ilişkinin varlığından bahsedilmesini zorunlu kılmaktadır. “Merkez medya”daki konumlarından farklı olarak, liberal entelektüeller İslami medyaya ait önemli gazetelerde yazmakta, bu

gruplara bağı televizyon kanallarında tartışma programlarına ev sahipliği yapmakta ve yine bu kanallarda yorumcu olarak yer almaktadırlar. Liberal entelektüellerin sahip oldukları bu pozisyon ve medya alanında ifade edilebileceklerin sınırlılığı düşünüldüğünde, bu grubun siyasal alanı kendilerinin rasyonelliği temsil ettikleri bir konumdan değerlendirmelerine ve diğer konuların hepsini “irrasyonel ve hastalıklı” bir öteki kategorisine hapsedmelerine imkan tanımaktadır. Medyada “döngüsel dolaşım” ilkesi nedeniyle farklı pozisyonların ifade edilmesinin ihtimal dahilinde olmaması liberal entelektüellerin kendilerini, çevrenin demokratikleştirici güçleriyle birlikte hareket etmelerinin bir sonucu olarak, “ayrıcalıklı, üstün ve rasyonel” aktörler olarak tanımlamalarına olanak sağlamaktadır. Diğer bir deyişle AKP’yi desteklemenin neden olduğu ayrıcalık hissi, medyada sahip olunan pozisyonların merkeziliğiyle pekişmekte ve Gramsci’nin entelektüellerin entelektüel bloğa çekilmesi için gerekli olduğunu söylediği iki koşul da sağlanmaktadır.

Tezde liberal entelektüellerin AKP’yi desteklemesinin ardındaki nedenler entelektüel çekimin iki koşulunun sağlanmasıyla açıklanmaktadır fakat bu koşulların sağlanmasının AKP liberal entelektüeller arasındaki ilişkiyi sorunsuz ve sürekli kılmadığını göstermek ve bunun liberal entelektüellerin kendilik temsilleri açısından etkilerini tartışmak da tezin amaçları arasındadır. Daha önce de belirtildiği gibi, liberal entelektüellerin AKP’ye dair “tarih yazımı” üç tema etrafında ve üç dönem üzerinden değerlendirilmiştir. Avrupa Birliği, vesayet rejimi ve sivil anayasa temaları etrafında tartıştığımız liberal entelektüellerin demokratikleşme perspektifi, AKP’nin izlediği politikalarla zaman zaman çelişkiye düşmektedir. Demek odur ki bu ilişki, koalisyon, işbirliği ya da eklemleme tekdüze bir çizgi üzerinde ilerlememekte daha ziyade dalgalanmalarla karakterize olmaktadır. Bu bağlamda liberal entelektüeller AKP ilişkisinde üç dönem temel önem taşımaktadır. Bunlardan ilki AKP’nin Avrupa Birliği’ne üyelik için yerine getirilmesi gereken siyasi kriterleri tamamladığı dönemdir. Daha önce de ifade edildiği gibi ilişkinin kurulduğu ve liberal entelektüeller için çekiciliğin yukarıda belirtilen iki koşulun sağlanmasıyla oluşturulduğu 2002 -2005 arası bu entelektüellerin kendilik temsillerinin referans noktasını oluşturmaktadır. Daha sonraki dönemlerde liberal entelektüeller 2002-2005 arasını bir nostalji kaynağı olarak hep gündemde tutacaklar ve siyasi iktidara eski reformcu günlerine dönmesi için çağrıda bulunacaklardır. Liberal entelektüellerce bu çağrının yüksek sesle yapıldığı dönem 2007-2008 tarihleri arasına denk gelmektedir. Bu tarihler Türk siyasi tarihinde önemli bir ana karşılık gelmektedir çünkü

cumhurbaşkanlığı seçiminin yarattığı kriz ortamında Genelkurmay tarafından bir e-muhtıra yayınlanmış, erken seçime gidilmiş ve hükümet partisi için kapatma davası açılmıştır. Liberal entelektüel iktidar ilişkisi açısından dönemin en önemli gelişmesi AKP'nin MHP'yle ittifak yaparak anayasanın iki maddesinde değişiklik yapması ve böylece üniversitelerde türbana serbestlik getirilmesidir. AKP 2007 başlarında bir grup hukukçuyu sivil anayasa taslağı için görevlendirmişken ve yeni anayasa yapacağını beyan ederken türban konusu için MHP'yle ittifak yapması ve sivil anayasayla zaten çözülebilecek olan bu konunun özgürlükler arasında bir hiyerarşi varmış gibi öne çıkarılması liberal entelektüellerce eleştirilmiştir. Bu yüksek sesli eleştiriye karşı siyasal iktidarın yanıtı liberal entelektüellerce de varlığına vurgu yapılan hatta beyin- vücut ilişkisi olarak sunulan işbirliğinin önemsizleştirilmesidir. Yönetici partinin bu tutumu liberal entelektüellerin kendilerini yeniden konumlamalarıyla sonuçlanmıştır. Yeni anayasa yapımının bir parçasını oluşturduğu ve bahsettiğimiz itibar hissini de söylemsel düzeyde temelini oluşturan demokratikleşme tasarımı böylelikle vesayet rejiminin sürekliliği üzerinden tekrar kodlanmış ve 2010 yılında yargının konumunu belirleyen anayasal değişiklikler “Yeni Türkiye”nin kuruluş momenti olarak desteklenmiştir. Bu bağlamda unutulmaması gereken liberal entelektüellerin daha önce de birkaç kez kuruluşunu ilan ettikleri “Yeni Türkiye”nin vesayet rejimi tarafından belirlenen koşullar nedeniyle tam anlamıyla gerçekleştirilemediği iddiası, var olan konjonktürde sivil anayasa taleplerinden anayasa değişikliklerine çekilmenin tek rasyonel davranış olduğu ve zaten bu değişikliklerin mevcut şartlarda gerçekleştirilebilecek tek iyileştirme olduğu argümanlarıyla meşruiyet kazandırılmaya çalışıldığıdır. Bu nedenle AKP liberal entelektüeller arasındaki ilişkinin liberallerin perspektifinden değerlendirilmesinde 2010 yılında gerçekleştirilen referandum kritik bir öneme sahiptir ve desteğin tekrar gönül rahatlığıyla kamusal olarak ifade edildiği döneme denk gelir. Özetle, tezde liberal entelektüellerin yönetici partiyi değerlendirme şekli verdikleri desteğin ardında yer alan “itibar” ve “ayrıcılık” hislerinin tatmin edilebilme seviyelerine göre dönemselleştirilmiştir. Diğer bir deyişle çalışmanın temel amaçlarından biri de, AKP'nin kendilerine bakışının değişen sınırları itibariyle, liberal entelektüellerin bu partiyi başlangıçta desteklemelerine neden olan “ayrıcılık” hissini sürdürmenin yollarını nasıl bir tarihsel seyirle aradıklarını göstermektir. Bu bağlamda 2002-2005 yılları arası dönem ayrıcılık hissini kuruluş momenti olarak ele alınırken, 2007-2008 arası bu hissini tehlike altında olduğu aralık olarak

kodlanmış ve son olarak da 2010 yılındaki referandum tartışmalarıyla karakterize olan dönem bu hissi yeniden-kurmanın yollarını gösteren moment olarak kurgulanmıştır.

Daha önce de belirtildiği gibi, bu üç dönemin incelenmesinde görülmüştür ki liberal entelektüellerin kendilerini “putkırıcılar” olarak tanımlamalarına imkan veren ayrıcalık hissi AKP iktidarının Türk siyasi tarihi için bir kopuşa karşılık geldiğine ve böylelikle de yeniliğine dair kurgunun bir sonucudur. Yeni Türkiye’nin esas aktörü olacak, onu kuracak olan çevrenin temsilcisini desteklemek ve böylelikle de asıl iktidar odağı olan vesayet rejimine karşı mücadele etmek liberal entelektüellerin kendilik tanımlarının temelini oluşturmaktadır. Bu şartlar altında liberal entelektüellerin AKP’yle işbirliği içinde oldukları iddiasının bu parti tarafınan sahiplenmiyor görünmesi “Yeni Türkiye”nin yeni aktörleri olarak kurguladıkları pozisyonları için bozucu niteliktedir. Tüm bunlar bahsedilen ilişkinin bir tutunma stratejisi üzerinden anlaşılmasına imkan vermektedir. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan tarafından bu ilişkinin önemsenmediğine dair yapılan açıklamalar, liberal entelektüellerin AKP ile vesayet rejimi karşıtlığı üzerinden kurdukları ortaklık üzerindeki vurguya daha da odaklanmalarına neden olmuştur. Diğer bir deyişle, AKP ve liberal entelektüeller arasındaki ilişkiyi üç dönemde incelememize olanak tanıyan, AKP’nin muktedirliğini ilan edişiyile eş zamanlı gerçekleşen ve partinin liberal entelektüellere karşı tavrındaki değişimle tanımlanabilecek olan dalgalanmalar, ilişkinin restorasyonu için liberallerin kendilerini yeniden konumlandırımlarıyla sonuçlanmıştır.

Liberal entelektüellerle AKP arasındaki ilişkiyi her iki tarafın eşit söz hakkına sahip olduğu ve gönül rızasıyla içinde yer aldığı bir yoldaşlık olarak görmek tezdeki dönemselleştirmenin sonuçları itibariyle pek mümkün gözükmemektedir. Diğer bir deyişle AKP’nin demokratikleşme söylemi ve liberal entelektüellerin merkez/çevre paradigması üzerinden toplumsal değişimi anlama çabaları bir araya geldiğinde, bu entelektüellerin yükselen sınıfın oluşturmaya çalıştığı entelektüel bloğa çekimleri mümkün olmuş ama AKP hegemonyanın nimetlerinden onun zahmetlerine katlanmadan, yani rızası alınan kesimlerin taleplerini içermeye çalışmadan, yararlanma tercihi bu partiyle liberal entelektüeller arasındaki ilişkinin tek taraflı olmasına yol açmıştır. Diğer bir deyişle, liberal entelektüellerin kendilerini bu ilişkinin beyni, AKP’nin “eleştirel yoldaşı” olarak görmelerine rağmen ilişkinin gidişatını belirleyen aslında AKP’nin siyasi davranışdır. 2007-2008 ve 2010’da

görüldüğü üzere bu entelektüellerin talepleri AKP'nin izlediği yola göre şekillenmektedir. AKP için bu entelektüellerin başlangıçtaki desteği, birçok yazar tarafından da kabul edildiği üzere, İslamcı kökenleri nedeniyle ulusal ve uluslararası aktörlerce şüpheyile karşılanan AKP'ye meşruiyet sağlamış ve onun sistem içi bir aktör olarak değerlendirilmesine ön ayak olmuştur. Bu anlayışa göre 2002- 2005 arasında izlenen reform süreci de küresel kapitalizmle bütünleşme yolunda AKP'nin kendisini uluslararası ve ulusal aktörlere kanıtlama çabası olarak görülebilir. AKP'nin kendisini bu dönemde, liberal entelektüellerin de onu tarif ettiği şekliyle, henüz iktidar olamamış hükümet olarak gördüğü söylenebilir, fakat 27 Nisan e-muhtırasına ve cumhurbaşkanlığı seçim krizine bir cevap olarak ülkeyi soktuğu erken seçimin sonuçları itibariyle muktedir olduğunu ilan etmiştir. Bu noktada Ömer Laçiner'in İslamcı entelektüellere referansla kurduğu denklem AKP'nin liberal entelektüellere karşı değişen tutumu için de geçerlidir. Laçiner'e göre yükselen burjuvazinin hegemonyasını kurmasıyla beraber onun ideolojik bütünlüğünden sorumlu olan İslamcı entelektüeller gündemlerinden rıza kazanmak için gerekli olan "arızı eklentileri", bu çerçevede demokrasi ve hak ve özgürlüklerle ilgili noktaları, çıkarmışlardır. Bu akıl yürütmeyi takip ederek muktedir olduğunu hisseden ve liberal entelektüellerin sağladığı meşruiyete artık ihtiyacı olmayan AKP'nin de bu entelektüellerle herhangi bir işbirliğinin varlığını tanıması için nedeni ya da ihtiyacı kalmamıştır. Daha önce de belirtildiği üzere AKP'nin bahsedilen ilişkiyi sahiplenmemesi liberal entelektüellerin bu ilişkiden çekilmeleriyle değil daha ziyade taleplerinden geri adım atmalarıyla sonuçlanmıştır. Liberal entelektüeller Gramsci'nin entelektüellerin çekimini sağlayacak iki koşul olarak ortaya koyduğu itibar hissi ve istihdam alanının sağlanması açısından AKP'nin eski güzel günlerine dönmek istemekte bunu da AKP'nin sistem tarafından esir alınmadıkça kendi yapısı gereği zaten demokratikleştirecek olan potansiyeline atıfla yapmaktadırlar. 2007-2008 dönemindeki sivil anayasa talebinden geri çekilmek ve 2010 yılındaki anayasa değişikliklerini "Yeni Türkiye"nin kuruluş momentini olarak nitelemek de hep bu "iktidar olamayan hükümet" kavramsallaştırması üzerinden mümkün olmuştur.

Unutulmaması gereken nokta AKP'nin muktedir ilan edilmesinin ve böylece Yeni Türkiye'nin artık kurulduğunun iddia edilmesinin liberal entelektüellerin kendi pozisyonlarını entelektüel sorumluluğuyla açıklamalarına engel olacağıdır. Bu bağlamda liberal entelektüellerin bahsedilen itibar hissi için "yeniliğe" ama aynı zamanda "muhalefette" olmaya ihtiyacı vardır. AKP'nin toplumda birçok grup

tarafından anti-demokratik olarak protesto edilen davranışlarını bu partinin doğal olarak demokratikleştirici potansiyeline referansla haklı çıkarabilmenin yolu bu mağduriyet pozisyonunu canlı tutmaktır. Bu nedenle Yeni Türkiye çok yakında olan ama asla elde edilemeyen bir amaç olarak kodlanmıştır. Liberal entelektüellerin AKP'yi destekleyebilmek ve kendilerine Gramsci'nin bahsettiği itibar hissini atfedebilmek için kategorik olarak “Yeni Türkiye'nin” kuruluşunu engelleyen “vesayet rejimine”, “darbecilere” ve “Ergenekonculara” ihtiyacı vardır. Bu nedenle liberal entelektüel pozisyonun karşısında duranlar ideolojik tavırlarına bakılmadan irrasyonellik başlığı altında vesayet rejiminin bir görevlisi haline gelir. Burada tezin iddiası bu kavramların içinin boş olduğu, bu kategorilere karşılık gelen grupların aslında bulunmadığı değil, bu kategorilerin liberal entelektüellerin kendilik tanımlarını oluştururken dayandıkları itibar hissini sürdürmelerinin aracı olmalarıdır.

Bu itibar hissini en önemli dayanaklarından biri, 2002-2005 dönemini de nostaljiyle hatırlamaya neden olan, AKP'nin Avrupa Birliği üyeliği için gerekli reformları yerine getireceği inancıdır. Avrupa Birliği'ne üyelik yönünde irade beyanının AKP'nin demokratikleşme projesinin sağlaması olarak değerlendirilmesinin yanında, evrensel ve rasyonel bir birim olarak Avrupa Birliği'ne referansla siyaset yapılması aynı zamanda liberal entelektüeller için bu partiyi desteklemenin kendisini tek rasyonel pozisyon haline getirmektedir. Bunun diğer bir sonucu da AKP'yi desteklememenin hastalıklı ve arkaik bir tutumun ifadesi olarak sunulmasıdır. 2007-2008 arasındaki dönemde AKP Avrupa Birliği ile ilgili önceliklerini bir kenara bırakmış ve “eleştirel yol arkadaşları” olan liberal entelektüellerin bu konudaki çağrılarını ve eleştirilerini de dikkate almamıştır. AKP'nin liberal entelektüellerle yakın ilişkilerin varlığını sahiplenmemesi de, 2007-2008 döneminin liberal entelektüellerin kendi konumlarına dair bir “hayal kırıklığı”yla şekillendiği ve bunu takip eden süreçte de ilişkinin restorasyonu için “vesayet rejimi” ve “iktidar olamayan hükümet” kavramlarına vurgunun dönüşüme uğradığı bir moment olarak değerlendirilmesine yol açmıştır. Daha önce de belirtildiği üzere AKP'nin liberal entelektüellerce onaylanmayan siyasal eylemleri bu bağlamda açıklanmış ve siyasal sistemin acil ve birincil ihtiyacı vesayet rejiminden kurtulmak olarak kodlanmıştır. Bu noktada “vesayet rejimi” kavramının dönüşümü AKP'nin artık muktedir olduğuna dair beyanları sebebiyle, bir “teyakkuz ideolojisi”nin içerilmesine karşılık gelmektedir. Diğer bir deyişle, liberal entelektüellere göre “Yeni Türkiye'nin kuruluşuna az kalmıştır fakat bu kuruluş

süreci hemen her an tehdit altındadır. İmtiyazlarını kaybetmenin rahatsızlığını yaşayan eski düzenin egemenleri bu yeni oluşuma karşı saldırıya geçebilirler, nitekim bu düşünceye göre Ergenekon ve Balyoz operasyonları bu tehlikenin görünürlüğüne ve yakınlığına en sağlam kanıtı oluşturmaktadır. Referandum sürecinin önemi “Yeni Türkiye”nin bir görünüp bir kaybolan yapısı itibariyle bu itibar hissini sürdürmenin, medyanın var olan yapısı itibariyle de, rasyonel ve irrasyonel olan üzerinden kurulan biz ve onlar ayrımının liberal entelektüeller için ne kadar belirleyici olduğunu ortaya koymasıştır.

Tüm bu tartışmalara bakarak tezin ana sorunsalının Türkiye’de 2002 genel seçimleri sonrasında iktidara gelen AKP’nin aradan geçen 10 yıl sürecince liberal entelektüellerce hangi gerekçelerle desteklendiğini göstermek olduğu söylenebilir. Bu amaçla entelektüellerle iktidar arasındaki ilişki üzerine var olan literatüre odaklanılmış ve Türkiye Cumhuriyeti’nin bu özgül momentinde bu grupla siyasi iktidar sahipleri arasındaki ilişkinin Gramsci’nin entelektüel kuramına referansla bir ayrıcalık ilişkisi olarak kurgulandığı iddia edilmiştir. Diğer bir deyişle liberal entelektüeller yükselen sınıfın entelektüel bloğuna bu sınıfın AKP temsilciliğinde entelektüellere yönelik geliştirdiği politikalar sonucunda kazandıkları “ayrıcalık” ve “itibar” hissi dolayısıyla çekilmişlerdir. Bu çekiciliğin bir yönünü “Yeni Türkiye”nin yeni aktörleri olarak entelektüel alanda kendilerini rasyonellik ve üstünlük pozisyonlarıyla eşleştirmelerinin imkanlarının oluşturduğunu söylemek mümkündür. Diğer yönüyle, medyanın diğer alanlar üzerindeki egemenliği düşünüldüğünde, bu alanda sahip olunan önemli pozisyonlarla açıklanmıştır. İslami medyanın yükselişi ve liberal entelektüellerin bu sermayenin yayın organlarında kendilerine geniş yer bulmaları da bu bağlamda değerlendirilmiştir.

2002-2005 arasındaki dönemde AKP’yi desteklemenin “Yeni Türkiye”nin yeni aktörleri olarak liberal entelektüellere sağladıkları ayrıcalığın bu gruba entelektüel blok içerisinde nasıl bir iktidar pozisyonu kazandırdığı bu çalışmada daha önce açıklanmıştır. Bu bağlamda, AKP’nin tezin yazıldığı anda hala devam etmekte olan 10 yıllık iktidarı düşünüldüğünde bu ilişkinin çeşitli dalgalanmalarla karakterize olduğu, AKP’nin bu ilişkiyi sahiplenmemesine rağmen liberal entelektüellerin AKP tanımlarını ve kendilik tanımlarını verdikleri desteği haklı çıkaracak şekilde yeniden inşa ettikleri iddia edilmiştir. Bu anlamda liberal entelektüellerin iktidarının kaynağı AKP’yi sürekli olarak muhalefette kurgulamaları olarak verilmiştir. Tezde çalışılmayan referandumdan sonraki sürece bakıldığında bu grup entelektüeller için

AKP'yi vesayet sistemine referansla sürekli muhalefet olarak tanımlamanın gittikçe zorlaştığı söylenebilir. Liberal entelektüellerin “sivilleşme olarak demokratikleşme” perspektifi düşünüldüğünde, AKP'nin vesayet rejimini tasfiye ettiğini ilan ettiği koşullarda bu partinin liberal entelektüellerce de anti-demokratik olarak görülen eylemlerde bulunması AKP'yi demokratikleştirici potansiyeline referansla desteklemeyi gittikçe zorlaştırmaktadır. Bu şartlar altında liberal entelektüellerin “muhalif ama hegemonik” pozisyonlarından kaynaklanan ayrıcalık hislerini yakın gelecekte kaybetmelerinin, medyadaki konumlarının tehlike altına girmesiyle de ilişkili olarak, ihtimal dahilinde olduğu söylenebilir. Diğer bir deyişle bu tezde liberal entelektüeller – siyasi iktidar arasındaki ilişkinin kuruluşu, bunun bizzat iktidar tarafından önemsenmeyerek bozulması ve en sonunda da liberal entelektüeller tarafından restorasyonu anlamaya çalışılmıştır. Bu ilişkinin bundan sonraki gelişimi başka bir çalışmanın konusu olmalıdır. Yine de bugünden bakarak, AKP'nin Avrupa Birliği üyeliği için gerekli olan reformları gerçekleştireceğine dair herhangi bir irade beyan etmediği, vesayet rejiminin sona erdiğini ve artık kendisinin muktedir olduğunu ilan ettiği, liberal entelektüellerin medyadaki kilit konumlarını kaybetmeye başladığı koşullarda, diğer bir deyişle Gramsci'nin entelektüellerin çekimi için gerekli olarak sunduğu iki ana şartın artık sağlanmadığı bir siyasal ortamda, iktidar-liberal entelektüel ilişkisinin daha da sorunlu hale gelebileceği ve hatta çözülebileceği iddia edilebilir.

APPENDIX B

CURRICULUM VITAE

PERSONAL INFORMATION

Surname, Name: Ersoy, Duygu
Nationality: Turkish (TC)
Date and Place of Birth: 22 September 1982 , Ankara
Marital Status: Single
Phone: +90 3122402095
email: duygu_ersoy@hotmail.com

EDUCATION

Degree	Institution	Year of Graduation
MS	METU Political Science and Public Administration	2006
BA	BILKENT Political Science and Public Administration	2004
High School	Zonguldak Atatürk Anatolian High School	2000

WORK EXPERIENCE

Year	Place	Enrollment
2012- Present	Bilkent University Department of Political Science	Part-time Instructor
2007-2012	Cankaya University Department of Political Science and International Relations	Doctoral Scholar
2004-2005	Bilkent University Department of Political Science and Public Administration	Research Assistant

FOREIGN LANGUAGES

Advanced English, Intermediate French, Basic German

HONOURS and AWARDS

TÜBİTAK Graduate Study Scholarship

APPENDIX C

TEZ FOTOKOPİSİ İZİN FORMU

ENSTİTÜ

Fen Bilimleri Enstitüsü	<input type="checkbox"/>
Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Uygulamalı Matematik Enstitüsü	<input type="checkbox"/>
Enformatik Enstitüsü	<input type="checkbox"/>
Deniz Bilimleri Enstitüsü	<input type="checkbox"/>

YAZARIN

Soyadı : ERSOY
Adı : DUYGU
Bölümü : SİYASET BİLİMİ VE KAMU YÖNETİMİ

TEZİN ADI (İngilizce) : THE SEARCH FOR A NEW HEGEMONY: THE ENGAGEMENT LIBERAL INTELLECTUAL WITH POWER DURING THE AKP PERIOD IN TURKEY

TEZİN TÜRÜ : Yüksek Lisans Doktora

1. Tezimin tamamından kaynak gösterilmek şartıyla fotokopi alınabilir.
2. Tezimin içindekiler sayfası, özet, indeks sayfalarından ve/veya bir bölümünden kaynak gösterilmek şartıyla fotokopi alınabilir.
3. Tezimden bir bir (1) yıl süreyle fotokopi alınmaz.

TEZİN KÜTÜPHANEYE TESLİM TARİHİ: