

SPANNING THE GAP: HEIDEGGER'S SOLUTION TO
THE PROBLEM OF TRANSCENDENCE AND HIS CRITIQUE OF MODERN
SUBJECTIVITY

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ABSTRACT

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This study aims at exhibiting the strong correlation between the question of subjectivity and the question of being. If the question of subjectivity is to be formulated in terms of the relation between the inner realm of consciousness and the outer world, then the question will have an epistemological form and becomes the question of the objectivity of our knowledge. In the dissertation, however, it will be claimed with the German philosopher Martin Heidegger that the critical stand taken against the subject-object schema of the Cartesian epistemology must be of an ontological kind, and should criticize the substantial difference between the two realms of being.

In order to fulfill the aforementioned task, Dasein as the entity which is capable of asking the question of being will be claimed to be the ontological condition of possibility for something like subjectivity. By the help of the phenomenological concept of Dasein, we will claim that the most neutral and basic being-in-the-world of human beings is not cognizing or perceiving things, but caring for them.

The last objective we hope to fulfill in this study is to show that the only question of philosophy for Heidegger, i.e., the question of being, can first become comprehensible when the philosopher's investigations of the modern philosophy have been well examined. It is our contention that, unless the dead-ends of the modern philosophy of subjectivity is apprehended well enough, the obligation of asking the question of being as such cannot be felt.

Key Words: Being, Dasein, subject, transcendence, intentionality

ÖZ

YARIĞI KAPATMAK: HEIDEGGER'İN AŞKINLIK PROBLEMİNE ÖNERDİĞİ ÇÖZÜM VE MODERN ÖZNELLİK ELEŞTİRİSİ

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Bu çalışmada özne sorunsalı ile varlık sorusu arasındaki bağıntı ele alınacaktır. Özne sorunsalı olarak betimlenen felsefi problem bilincin içkin alanı ile dış dünya arasındaki ilişki sorusu olarak anlaşıldığında, bu tip bir formülasyonun bilginin nesnellik koşullarını konu edinen epistemolojik bir biçime sahip olduğu sonucunu çıkartmak mümkün görünmektedir. Buna karşın bu çalışmada, Alman filozof Martin Heidegger ile beraber Kartezyen epistemolojinin özne-nesne şemasına karşı takınılacak kritik tavrın ontolojik bir tavır olması gerektiği vurgulanacak, sözkonusu iki varlık alanı arasındaki tözsel farklılık eleştiriye tâbî tutulacaktır.

Yukarıda dile getirilen amacı gerçekleştirmek üzere varlık sorusunu sorabilen tek antite olarak Dasein'in öznelliğin ontolojik koşulu olduğu iddiası savunulacaktır.

Feomenolojik bir kavram olan Dasein yardımıyla insanın dünyadaki en temel ve en yalın varoluşunun bilme ya da algılama değil, ihtimam gösterme olduğu iddiası dile getirilecektir.

Vurgulamak istediğimiz son bir husus da, Heidegger için felsefenin tek sorusu, yani varlık sorusunun gerçek manada kavranabilmesinin önkoşulunu, filozofun modern felsefe araştırmalarının dikkatli bir biçimde incelenmesi olarak dikkate sunmaktır. İnancımız odur ki, modern özne felsefesinin çıkmazları gerçek anlamda kavranmadıkça, varlık sorusunu sormanın önem ve aciliyetini hissetmek dahi olası değildir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Varlık, Dasein, özne, aşkınlık, yönelimsellik

To My Sister

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

WORKS by RENE DESCARTES

PWD I : “*Principles of Philosophy*”, in *The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, vol. I*

PWD II : “*Meditations on First Philosophy*”, in *The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, vol. II*

WORKS by IMMANUEL KANT

Ax/Bx : *Critique of Pure Reason*

JL : *Logic (Jäsche Logic)*

P : *Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics*

TP : *Theoretical Philosophy, 1755-1770*

WORKS by EDMUND HUSSERL

EBA : The Encyclopaedia Britannica Article

Ideas I : *Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology*

IP : *Idea of Phenomenology*

LII : *Logical Investigations Vol I*

LI II : *Logical Investigations Vol II*

PRS : Philosophy as a Rigorous Science

WORKS by MARTIN HEIDEGGER

BPP : *Basic Problems of Phenomenology*

BT : *Being and Time*

ET : *The Essence of Truth: On Plato's Cave Allegory and Theaetetus*

FCM : *Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics*

HCT : *History of the Concept of Time: Prolegomena*

IM : *Introduction to Metaphysics*

IPR : *Introduction to Phenomenological Research*

KPM : *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*

L : *Logic: The Question of Truth*

MFL : *The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic*

N : *Nietzsche, Vol. IV: Nihilism*

OEG : *On the Essence of Grounds*

OET : *On the Essence of Truth*

OHF : *Ontology—The Hermeneutics of Facticity*

PIA : *Phenomenological Interpretations in Connection with Aristotle*

PIKCPR : *Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason*

- WDR : Wilhelm Dilthey's Research and the Struggle for a Historical
Worldview
- WM : What is Metaphysics?
- WT* : *What is a Thing?*
- ZS : Zähringen Seminar

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Since the beginning of modernity inaugurated by Descartes, subject and its relation to the environing world has been the main issue for the philosophers, especially when it comes to the epistemological problem of how to acquire the knowledge of things around us. As a matter of fact, right after the Cartesian motto *cogito, ergo sum* philosophical interest can be said to have shifted its focus, so much so that the problem of knowledge occupied the most important place in most of the great philosophers' agendas. The early modern debate between the rationalists and the empiricists can be given as an example, as the central issue between them was the whereabouts of the source of our knowledge—i.e., whether all that we can be sure of are the innate ideas, or everything which becomes manifest in the cognitive mechanism of the human mind is imported from outside as in the form of sensible data. During this period, no matter they are empiricists or rationalists, all these great thinkers conducted their quarrel on a common ground which was pre-determined or pre-shaped by the basic schema of *ideas in me/ reality outside of me*. Under the influence of Descartes, they can be said to have shared unquestioningly the belief that we, human subjects, have a direct access to our mental states and an indirect one to the so-called outer world. Consequently, the problem of how we can be certain of the adequacy of our mental states to what stands outside became the basic problem of philosophy. From then on, philosophy gained an epistemological hue and the problem of truth started to be examined in terms of the

truth of propositions.

In this dissertation, it will be argued that this epistemological outlook of philosophy is what we owe to the underlying ontological paradigm of Cartesianism which bifurcates *all that is* into two separate realms: “thinking things” and “extended things”. Our contention, which is planned to be based upon the perspective of Heideggerian phenomenology, will be that this ontological differentiation between the two realms of being is a pseudo-separation because “substantiality” is presupposed to be the way of being for both sides of the division. If it is true that after the Cartesian turn in the Western philosophy, human beings’ contact with the world has been conceived to be possible only by means of “mental representations” and the possibility of any direct access to the enviroing world has been lost sight of, then it must be asked how these ideas, so long as they are characterized as entities within the mental sphere, point beyond themselves to the reality outside. This kind of representationalism has a double effect each of which is strongly related to the other: the unique ontological problem of the meaning of being has been abandoned to forgetfulness, and philosophical thinking was reduced to epistemological investigation. The main argument of ours in the present study will be that unless the way of being of the subject pole of the dualist Cartesian ontology has been reappropriated in phenomenological terms, the epistemological gap between man and world, thinking and being, mental and physical, or knowledge and its object will never be bridged in a satisfactory manner and continue to pin philosophy down to where it currently is; i.e., the aporetic ground of competing epistemological theories circling around a wrongly formulated question asking about the correspondence between our beliefs and the intraworldly objects which these beliefs are hoped to be true of. Taking support from early Heidegger’s conception of man, which he calls *Dasein*, we will argue that the epistemological gap can never be bridged unless the representationalism in question has been deconstructed in a legitimate way. Deconstructing representationalism is nothing other than re-

evaluating it in phenomenological terms and laying bare its main ground in such a manner that the basic question of it will be revealed to be ill formulated; ill formulated, because it does not remain loyal to the central ontological paradigm based on the difference it once preached between the thinking thing and the extended thing, that which knows and that which is known. According to us, this is a good start if one wants to understand both the *raison d'être* of transcendental idealism in Kantian and Husserlian sense on the one hand, and that of phenomenology on the other. If we are not misguided from the beginning, “What is the ontological difference between a representation and the thing to which this representation is thought to correspond?” is the only question to be asked in order to comprehend what “transcendental” in transcendental idealism and “intentionality” in phenomenology refer to. According to us, whole of Heideggerian phenomenology, including his question of being, takes its start from such a simple question and develops within the horizon opened up by pressing ahead therefrom. It should be added here that the question, when asked from the perspective of Heideggerian phenomenology, is a rhetorical one, because the label “ontological” cannot be the adjective which can characterize the difference between representations and things. In Heidegger’s phenomenological ontology, indeed, the ontological difference rather is the difference between being of entities and the entities themselves. It should be added that, at least for the early Heidegger, since Dasein is the only entity which understands something like being (*Sein*), one should commit himself to the existential analysis of Dasein, if what one is after is the clarification of the ontological difference between being and entities. However, since the beginning of modern philosophy, the subject as the “thinking thing” (*res cogitans*) has been the placeholder of Dasein.

Thus, the main target of the present study will be to lay bare the necessity of asking the question of being, if we are to have a better understanding of what has hitherto been characterized as “subject” or “subjectivity”. Although it may seem at the first sight to

be in conflict with Heidegger's roadmap as it was drawn in *Being and Time*—investigating Dasein *for the sake of* being as such—the main line of our argumentation will be congruent with him, save our destination will be the man himself. The whole effort of ours will be taking into focus again and again the fact that world-man unity is the original phenomenon when compared with the dualist metaphysical standpoint of Cartesianism, since the act-character of our comportments (*cogitations*) toward the world makes it impossible for us to take into consideration the *thinking* all by itself; i.e., isolated from what it thinks, the world. As a matter of fact, we will claim that Heidegger's conception of Dasein, or being-in-the-world (*in-der-Welt-sein*) as the unified phenomenon is based on a very simple question: if epistemology is the kind of investigation which questions our ways of cognizing things on the one hand, and ontology is the way of questioning which is after the ways cognition-independent things *are* on the other, then it can be asked: Is it possible to taking into account something *barely* existing without paying attention to its being-known, or, is it legitimate to formulate what knowledge is without making an ontological commitment to the thing which is supposed to be known? If we did not misapprehend, the core of phenomenological investigation is the conception of intentionality because by the help of the thesis of the intentionality of consciousness alone the bond between thinking and what is thought, perceiving and what is perceived, representing and what is represented, etc. can be adequately formulated. In other words, if it is beings that we perceive or represent to ourselves, these must be acknowledged to be *the perceived* or *represented beings* lest something like “thing-in-itself” (*Ding an sich*) spellbinds us.

The Achilles heel of the correspondence theory of truth and the consequential characterization of the subject is this: If the order attributed to the things *extra mentem* is nothing other than that of the mental representations in Kantian sense, then, to check whether the proposition in mind is true or not, how could we leave the inner realm which we call the mind? Formulated differently, when it is claimed that the proposition

“The cat is on the mat” is true because it corresponds to the state-of-affairs about which the proposition is, is it contended that after comprehending the meaning of the proposition inside, does the cognizer transgress the limits of his subjective realm and go outside to look what happens on the side of the outer world which is totally independent of the judgment of it? The dilemma issues from the fact that whereas the ontological thinking of the Cartesian dualism imprisons man in a first-person point of view by differentiating it substantially and wholly from the extended things, epistemological way of handling the matter presents it as if the subject is deployed in a third-person viewpoint at the outset, in order that it can grasp what happens outside the order of thoughts in his inner realm of consciousness.

Thus, one of the central aims of ours will be to underline the fact that this dilemma of the epistemological way of thinking we owe to the seemingly insurmountable tendency of “objectifying” which is a second nature for men. It is a widely accepted fact that Heidegger is the philosopher of being and his phenomenological ontology is distinctive in the fact that he reevaluated the ontological status of “the transcendental”, “the condition of possibility” in an original manner. However, the whither of this originality has never been articulated well enough, so that an amateur in philosophy becomes enchanted by how innovative the perspective he is presented with. Heidegger’s way of formulating the question of being *as such* is unique in the history of philosophy, as he forbids any kind of objectification when tackling the question. We can even go so far as to say that the manner of his formulating the question as “What is being?” is nothing but the linguistic compulsion, since the question itself, let alone the answer, can be claimed to be the basis or starting point for every kind of objectifying thinking. So, it can be contended, within the limits of Heideggerian ontology, asking the question of being is but *questioning the very question itself*. For the most part, early Heidegger’s way of formulating the question of being can be explained in terms of his searching after a genuine ground for the objectifying attitude of man or thematizing

tendency of any kind of “what-is” question. Therefore, instead of asking “What is a what-is question?”, he articulates it as follows: “*How* is a what-is question possible?”. This is nothing other than to interrogate the possibility of any type of thematization, so the question concerning thematization cannot be put together like this: “What is objectification?” As to the question of being, since thematization is a special way of “letting-beings-be” by the average understanding of being, the what-is question cannot be said to supply any basis. So, Heidegger focuses not on the question of being, but on the being of the question. But what do all that we said about the originality of the question of being do with the problem of subjectivity?

Subjectivity is a big problem for Heidegger because it cannot be analyzed as a complex substance. Even if its complexity can be acknowledged, substantiality of it is highly suspicious for the philosopher, because when substantialized, subject is deprived of its act-character, finitude, and temporality. According to him the essence of Dasein is but its existence, and existence is nothing other than the continual act of projecting oneself towards one’s future in light of the inherited understanding of being by occupying oneself with the entities within-the-world. Dasein’s understanding of the environmental world and the intraworldly entities along with itself is based upon its average understanding of being. But this average understanding is the sole ground upon which something like the being of entities (*das Sein der Seinden*) first becomes an issue. This is to say that, wherein there is no Dasein, therein it is hardly ever meaningful to ask the question of being. However, Dasein is not the substantial entity of the thinking kind in whose mind there happens to lie the understanding of being. The understanding of being is not an idea which can be differentiated from the other ones and can become discoverable by a certain type of introspection. Instead, it is unthematically and persistently functional in our everlasting interpretation of our world as well as ourselves. Having an understanding of being, factual or historical Dasein has an average understanding of itself and it is especially this open-ended or dynamic

character of such a historical self-understanding which prevents Dasein from having an essence of its own as the anthropologists, biologists, or some philosophers contend to. “Facticity” is the term Heidegger uses in order to underline the “thrownness” (*Geworfenheit*) of human beings into a historical time-place which has its particular hue from the average, everyday (*Alltaeglich*) practices of the historical people belonging to it. From a wider point of view, facticity and historicity present the individual Dasein with the basic understanding of being both of himself and the entities which it encounters in its daily routines. Since the source of its self-understanding is supplied by the historical paradigm in which it finds himself, Dasein can be said to be temporal. It should strongly be emphasized here that this temporality of Dasein is in contrast to the Cartesian subjectivity whose unchanging, atemporal, eternal essence is but thinking.

Apart from the historicity of the understanding of being, there is another framework through which the temporality of Dasein shows up in a different guise. We saw above that Dasein’s essence lies in its existence. This underlines the fact that individual Dasein, though it is bound up with the normalized ways of handling things and the public self-understanding of the historical community it is a part, is in the continuous process of self-defining. On the other hand, while interpreting itself everceasingly, Dasein interprets the things around itself. Its being-alongside the intraworldly entities ontologically different from itself is not the side-by-side-ness of the substantial things; i.e., the “in” of “Dasein in a workshop” is ontologically different in meaning from the “in” of “the car in the garage”. Whereas workshop and the paraphernalia in there *matters* to Dasein in realizing his urgent aims which are for the sake of his well being, the presence of the car does not make a difference for the garage. Since the mattering of the world as a whole to Dasein is determinative in its way of being, Heidegger characterizes the being of Dasein as “care” (*Sorge*). And again, since mattering of the world to Dasein is an unceasing process, Dasein is conceived to be besieged by the

world to the extent that it can hardly ever isolate itself from the world as a separate substance. According to Heidegger, the givenness of human beings by themselves apart from the world is possible only insofar as the man-world union is acknowledged to be the original phenomenon. This union is nothing other than “being-in-the-world” (*in-der-Welt-Sein*) which is another name for Dasein (*being-there*), along with “care” (“*Sorge*”). Heidegger is against evaluating the human beings as thinking substances which can thematize, or objectify themselves as they objectify things, because as the continual-care-for-the-world, Dasein eludes itself. It is so occupied with the world that it is always late to itself. This “being-late-to-itself” is the temporality and finitude of Dasein.

The question of being is tenaciously related with the question of man, because Dasein is always tardy when it comes to objectifying itself. This is to say, it can never capture itself as an act-*ing* being; instead, what it grasps when thematizing itself is the photograph of an entity which act-*ed* in such and such a manner. Because of this self-elusive character of it, Heidegger qualifies Dasein as “ecstatic”; i.e., standing-out. To say that Dasein is being-in-the-world amounts to claiming that it is self-transcendent, or that it for the most part has a stand outside-of-itself. Dasein is not a self-enclosed substance because its way of being is a “pure relation” towards the world. And asking the question of being is nothing other than attempting to “thematize” the un-thematizable; i.e., Dasein as *pure relation* which is *in-between* the subject and the object.

In a nutshell, the aim of the present essay will be to display the reasons why Dasein, as the ecstatic being which primarily and for the most part stands outside of itself towards the world, is the ground of subjectivity and why the question of being is inevitable if we dig deep enough to discover the root of the superstructure of the substantiality attributed to human beings down through the history of Western thinking. Apart from

the ongoing chapter and the last chapter devoted to conclusion, we will try to achieve the task in four chapters.

The second and the third chapters can be thought to be the first part, which is planned to be the propaedeutics for early Heidegger's interpretation of phenomenological thinking and his critique of Husserlian consciousness. Although Husserl chronologically comes after Descartes and Kant, since his way of philosophizing is determinative on young Heidegger, we prefer to take into consideration Heidegger's relation to Husserl at the outset. So, in the second chapter, we will focus on the three basic theses of Husserlian phenomenology which Heidegger acknowledges to have influenced him during the period while he was trying to ripen his own perspective: "Intentionality of consciousness", "categorical intuition", and "the original sense of the a priori". When seen in a unitary fashion, these three theses will be realized to be the building blocks of early Heidegger's way of thinking, whose consummation is but his magnum opus *Being and Time*. Whereas the idea of Dasein as being-in-the-world is based upon the intentionality thesis, the thesis of categorical intuition helps Heidegger realize that being and the rest of the foundational categories are neither subjective nor objective. As a consequence, the a priori ground of the world cannot be encapsulated within the isolated realm of subjectivity. After putting forward Husserl's contribution to Heidegger's early work, in the second part of the second chapter, we will take into consideration the latter's critique of the former, which is based on the idea that although it is a valuable attempt to break up with the Cartesian dualism, Husserlian phenomenology could not avoid being ensnared by thinking in terms of the inner/outer schema, because he did not manage formulating the question of being of the intentional in an appropriate way.

The third chapter will focus on the passage from Husserl's transcendental phenomenology to Heidegger's phenomenological ontology. We will try to lay bare

the reasons why Heidegger formulates his question of being in terms of hermeneutics of Dasein. This clarification, I hope, will pave the way from the transcendental subject of Husserl to the being-in-the-world of Heidegger.

Fourth chapter will make up the historical part of our study. In this chapter, we will concentrate on the problem of the self, or self-consciousness by basing our arguments on Heidegger's interpretation of Descartes' *cogito* argument first. Taking into focus the overlap between Heidegger and some of the thinkers of the analytic tradition guided by Hintikka, we will first of all claim that existence of the self is not a consequence of a syllogism, as Descartes's formulation "I think, therefore I am" can convince us in the first place. On the other hand, if it is to be interpreted as an "intuition" as Hintikka did, we will ask with Heidegger, in what way is this intuition conceived apart from the dualistic schema which is based on the twofold structure comprising of *the intuiting* and *the intuited*? Self-elusive character of human Dasein as the impediment to the self-reflecting subject will first become an issue in this chapter.

Kant will be presented as the grand historical figure of the transcendental tradition, and Heidegger's interpretation of critical philosophy will be the main issue in the second part of the same chapter. First of all, Kantian transcendental idealism will be formulated as a critical attempt towards Cartesian subjectivity as thinking substance. It will be shown that by the negative attitude he displays against the substantial subject of Cartesian ontology in the Paralogisms, Kant takes the first step on the way which ends up with Dasein. Indeed, Heidegger extols Kant as the first philosopher who first recognized temporality and finitude of the subject in the history of philosophy. According to Kant, transcendental unity of apperception, or less clumsily, self-consciousness cannot be grasped as the result of self-observation, or self-objectification. Apperception is possible only as objective unity of apperception, since the identity of the self is nothing other than the unity which accompanies all our

representations as the necessary condition of the synthesis. This is to say that, unless the subject experiences the objects of nature and takes cognizance of them judgmentally, it can hardly ever refer itself as an identical self. Nonetheless, Heidegger does not hesitate charging Kant with being a Cartesian, since he did not manage underscoring the primal role of transcendental imagination as the source of time-determination enough, and subsume it in the B-Deduction to the transcendental apperception.

Heidegger's Kant critique will, we hope, make it clear that his aim is to show that temporality is the very essence of Dasein, rather than being a faculty *belonging* to the transcendental subject. In order to develop this theme, we will go back to *Being and Time* in the fifth chapter and analyze the "care" structure of Dasein as the unity of "existentiality", "facticity", and "falling". Afterwards, we will argue that unless these ontological structures are not exposed to temporal interpretation, the analytic of Dasein remains senseless. Nevertheless, the time Heidegger mentions in order to make sense of Dasein's very ontological structure, care, is not the ordinary conception of time comprising of the unidirectional flow of sequential "now-points". So, by means of what Heidegger calls "world-time", we will derive the ordinary conception of time from "originary temporality" and show that Dasein is not the present-hand-hand entity taking its course *alongside* another on-hand entity; i.e., time. Time is the very structure of Dasein: Dasein is not *in* time. It *is* time.

At the end of this study, we hope that the reader will understand that subject is the derivative form which is ontologically parasitic upon Dasein. Misconceiving itself as the isolated subject is part of the ontological constitution of Dasein which Heidegger calls "falling". The anxious fleeing-in the-face-of-itself in the leveled off understanding of being of the public, as the inauthentic mode of everyday existence, is the stem from which the alienation of Dasein to its *self* emanates. Dasein is the entity

to whose truth something like untruth essentially belongs. Understanding itself as a thing among other things is the basic error Dasein commits itself into, but this error also is the existential consequence of its being as being-in-the-world.

CHAPTER 2

PHENOMENOLOGICAL INTERPRETATION OF SUBJECTIVITY

Phenomenological tradition and its conception of transcendental subjectivity can be applauded as a revolution and a prolific critique of both modern subjectivism of Descartes and transcendental idealism of Kant. For any one of these traditional doctrines, subjectivity is of the central importance. Heideggerian phenomenological critique of Cartesian Ego as the locus of self assuredness, and the Kantian subject as the transcendental unity of apperception can be rooted in his reading of Husserl's *Logical Investigations*. The beginning of his lifelong philosophical interest, i.e. the question of being, can be traced back to the times when he just started to familiarize himself with the Husserlian phenomenological breakthrough. In addition to his lecture courses in 20's and the ripened fruit of his early thought *Being and Time*, the middle and late period of the philosopher after the so-called *Kehre* can be claimed to be under the influence of Husserlian phenomenology. Hence, we think that it is convenient enough to begin the opening chapter of this work with setting forth the phenomenological background of Heidegger.

So, before examining his destructive reading of the two main figures of the subjectivist tradition and his derivation of the question of being therefrom, it is better to focus on his relation with his mentor.

2.1. Heidegger's Debt to Husserl

2.1.1. Intentionality

Intentionality is characterized as the essential, fundamental feature of consciousness by Husserl. According to him, phenomenology can be set off from other disciplines of philosophy by the fact that it qualifies consciousness as *consciousness of something*. When I perceive, I perceive something; when I love, I love something; when I remember, I remember something, etc.

Although this tenet about the wide variety of human experiences would sound like a truism at the first glance, the originality of it becomes obvious at a closer look, when we become capable of appreciating its difference from the dominant role the representationalist theory of consciousness plays on the philosophical scene. What is characteristic for this attitude is that it endorses the ontological view according to which the physical and the psychical separated from each other as two substantially distinct realms of being. From this perspective, experiencing something belonging to the non-mental sphere is possible only insofar as the reality outside becomes represented by ideas, images, mental states, etc. in the inner sphere of consciousness. One of the most obtrusive shortcomings of such an ontological standpoint issues from the fact that it is not capable of explaining the wide variety of conscious acts:

When the mind is taken in the Cartesian or Lockean way, as an enclosed sphere with its circle of ideas, the term “consciousness” is usually considered to be simply equivocal. There are no structural differences within consciousness; there is just awareness, pure and simple. We notice whatever impressions arise in us, and we then arrange them into judgments or propositions that take a stab at declaring what is “out there”. But for phenomenology, intentionality is highly differentiated (Sokolowski 2000, 12).

According to this representationalist approach, every human experience of any object whatsoever necessitates a supplementary mental act towards the intentionally neutral

mental image, in order that the object represented by that mental image can create a structural difference within consciousness in order that the object can become itself *as it is intended*. Put differently, in order to judge, remember, expect, etc. something, that which is intended should be the mental picture of that same thing apprehended by a primary act of indifferent representing, if that thing is to become the object as it is judged, remembered, expected, etc. So, “in the “Cartesian and Lockean way” of conceiving consciousness, the act of directing the mental image toward the object of consciousness is to be accrued to the first act, in which the mental picture of the thing has been fabricated. What Heidegger appreciates in Husserl’s theory of intentional consciousness is the fact that (1) the objects of consciousness are not the mental pictures, ideas, images or representations, but the objects themselves [*Sachen selbst*] as they are intended;¹ and accordingly that (2) there is no need for a secondary act other than the intentional act of consciousness in order that the object becomes the perceived, remembered, judged, aesthetically evaluated object.²

¹ In the Fifth Investigation of the *Logical Investigations*, Husserl criticizes what he calls the “image theory” by grounding the “image-representation” on a mere likeness between the image and the factually existing thing, or the object, of which it is the image: “Resemblance between two objects, however precise, does not make the one be the image of the other” (*LI II*, 594). Ignoring the intentionality of consciousness, the most important mistake of this theory which I termed above “representational theory of consciousness” is to make such an assumption on a weak basis of similarity between the representation and the represented: “*Outside the thing itself is there (or at times there); in consciousness there is an image which does duty for it*” (*LI II*, 593; italics mine). As we will see later, the most austere problems of philosophy emanates from the fact that the two different meanings attributed to the copula “is” has not been cultivated and elucidated enough in order that the ontological difference based on these two different senses could be put forth in a clear and consistent manner, according to Heidegger.

² Husserl’s “breakthrough” can be interpreted in terms of his parting of the ways with Brentano by criticizing the latter’s famous sentence quoted by him in his *Logical Investigations*: “[E]ach intentional experience. . . is either a presentation or based upon underlying presentations” (*LI II*, 598). According to this sentence, there must be an intentionally neutral core of every experience in which what is to be intended should first of all appear to consciousness in a presentative act. For something to be loved, or wished, or judged, etc. the object should be given as an appearance at the outset. This givenness in presentation has nothing to do with the intentional acts for Husserl (although Brentano seems to be

Heidegger starts with underlining the fact that every comportment, every lived-experience [*Erlebnis*] is of the character of “directing-itself-toward” (*HCT*, 29), and this directing-itself-toward of the psychic comportment need not anything on-hand given to it, in order first to become intentional. Put differently, it is not the case that an originally non-intentional consciousness first directs itself when it comes against an object. If this were true, then it should have been confessed that consciousness turns out to be non-intentional whenever a misperception happens and the object we think we intend to is actually not there. Indeed, if intentionality were defined in terms of the relation between a factually existing thing and the mental image we have of the thing outside us, it would have been absurd to talk about intentionality in the absence of one of the relata:

It is not the case that a perception first becomes intentional by having something physical enter into relation with the psychic, and that it would no longer be intentional if this reality did not exist. It is rather the case that perception, correct or deceptive, is in itself intentional. Intentionality is not a property which would accrue to perception and belongs to it in certain instances. As perception, it is *intrinsically intentional*, regardless of whether the perceived is in reality on hand or not. Indeed, it is really only because perception as such is a directing-itself-toward something, because intentionality constitutes the very structure of comportment itself, there can be anything like deceptive perception and hallucination (*HCT*, 31).

So, in Husserlian terminology, wherever and whenever consciousness is at issue, there is something which is other than and intended by this consciousness. That is to say, in order primarily to become what it is, consciousness need not be the consciousness of itself as was manifested in Descartes’ famous motto “*Cogito, ergo sum*.”³ The relation

claiming the opposite). To him, every intentional act like judging, remembering, imagining, etc. should be capable of giving its object immediately; i.e., not by accruing to an underlying act of presentation (*LI II*, §23).

³ The problem of self-consciousness as the primary definition of consciousness will be tackled in the next chapter, along with Heidegger’s critique of it.

between the psychic comportment (*intention*) and what is intended by it (*intentionum*) is so primordial and original that, one cannot describe the relation one by one in isolation. In other words, without applying to the intentionality of any kind of human comportment, it is not possible to have a sound illustration of *what* things are, not to mention the mental representations.

When claiming that even becoming capable of misperception, hallucination and illusion, perception must essentially be directing-itself-toward, what Heidegger does is but reiterating the most important trouble of representationalist account, which was before him formulated by Husserl. According to the latter, the problem pertains to the critique of knowledge and formulated in his 1907 lectures as follows:

What is “placed in question” is knowledge in general. But that is not to deny that there is any knowledge at all—for that would lead to an absurdity. Rather, it is to say that knowledge contains within itself a certain problem, namely, how it is possible for it to achieve what we usually take it to achieve: contact with objectivity (*IP*, 27).

The problem is that, while we have a direct access to the mental phenomena, transcendent reality is not given in absolute evidence. Hence it should be asked: “How can knowledge posit something as existing that is not directly and genuinely given to it?” (*IP*, 28) This is nothing other than the point of departure of the Cartesian philosophy which takes the immanent as indubitable, and the proof of the existence of the outer world deducible from the former. So long as the mental sphere, very much like a closed box, is thought of as substantially distinct from the external world, it is always possible for us to delude ourselves about this outer realm. And if this issue, which is called “the problem of transcendence” or “the riddle of transcendence”, is basically an epistemological problem, then the primary question of phenomenology should be formulated as follows: “How, then, can knowledge be sure of its agreement with the known objects? How can knowledge go beyond itself and reach its objects reliably?” (*IP*, 17)

The main reason why phenomenology is called a “breakthrough” at its rudimentary stage when *Logical Investigations* was published at the beginning of the century can be claimed to be its broadening of the realm of objectivity beyond the sphere of reality. This broadening can be interpreted as an attempt to clarify the Kantian conception of “givenness”: What does it mean to be given to the senses? What is sensuous intuition? In what way can the manifold of sense data be apprehended? In short, what is perception? These are the main issues which Husserl deals with first in his 1900-01 work *Logical Investigations*; the work in which both the theory of intentionality and categorial intuition put forward as an attempt to solve the most important riddle of the theory of knowledge: the problem of transcendence.

In Heidegger’s interpretation of Husserl’s theory of intentionality, there is an unbreakable bond between the character of directing-itself-toward of every mental comportment and the Husserlian famous motto: “To the things themselves!” Things, or matters themselves are neither the things-in-themselves (*Dinge an sich*) nor the mental phenomena corresponding to the on-hand, present objects standing outside of the mental. Rather, they are the objects of consciousness *as* they are *meant, signified, or intended* by that consciousness. Intentionality is not an extra feature that is only afterwards accrued to the mirroring consciousness which merely has the mental representations of things without meaning them. On the contrary, things *are given, or present to, or there for* consciousness only as long as they are meant, or intended by consciousness. What is to be underlined here from the perspective of Heidegger is the fact that the tenet of intentionality hides in itself the potentiality of giving way to a kind of explanation according to which the traditional understanding of the being of man and world as two substantially separate beings is replaced by a paradigm within the limits of which the ontological belonging-together, or the original unity of these two entities can be set forth for the first time. This is to say that, intentionality should not be conceived as a tripartite structure composed of the consciousness-thing, object-

thing, and the relation-thing between them, each of which is acknowledged to be as *real* and *present* as the others.⁴ It is rather the case that something's being *present* as *actually existing* is to be replaced by the terms "the intentional 'relation' to an object is achieved", or "an object is 'intentionally present'" (*LI II*, 558).

There are. . . not two things present in experience, we do not experience the object and beside it the intentional experience directed upon it, there are not even two things present in the sense of a part and a whole which contains it: only one thing is present, the intentional experience, whose essential descriptive character is the intention in question (*LI II*, 558).

Even if we take a step back from these so-called double-layered acts in which intention is appended to the preliminary act of presentation and focus instead on the apparently simpler act of perception, difficulties will not come to an end unless we abandon the image theory of consciousness. As long as perceiving things is explained by the help of intermediary images, it becomes questionable how these psychic entities are further identified. If the answer is by means of some other mental pictures, then there appears the danger of "*regressus in infinitum*" (*LI II*, 594).⁵

If knowledge in general is an apprehension of an object-picture as an immanent

⁴ In § 11 of the 5th Investigation, Husserl warns us against this prejudice as follows: "It is always quite questionable, and frequently misleading, to say that perceived, imagined, asserted or desired objects etc., 'enter consciousness' (or do so in perceptual, presentative fashion etc.), or to say conversely that 'consciousness', 'the ego' enters into this or that sort of relation to them, or to say that such objects 'are taken up into consciousness' in this or that way, or to say, similarly, that intentional experiences 'contain something as their object in themselves' etc. etc. Such expressions promote *two misunderstandings*: first, that we are dealing with a real (*realen*) event or a real (*reales*) relationship, taking place between 'consciousness' or 'the ego', on the one hand, and the thing of which there is consciousness, on the other; secondly, that we are dealing with a relation between two things, both present in equally real fashion (*reell*) in consciousness, an act and an intentional object, or with a sort of box-within-box structure of mental contents" (*LI II*, 557).

⁵ Here, Husserl writes: "Since the interpretation of anything as an image presupposes an object intentionally given to consciousness, we should plainly have a *regressus in infinitum* were we again let this latter object be itself constituted through an image, or to speak seriously of a 'perceptual image' immanent in a simple percept, *by way of which* it refers to the 'thing itself'."

picture of a transcendent thing outside, how then is the transcendent object itself is to be apprehended? If every apprehension of an object is a consciousness of a picture, then for the immanent picture I once again need a picture-thing which depicts the immanent picture for me etc, etc. (*HCT*, 42-43)

Eliminating the additional act accruing to the presentation of the object, theory of intentionality removes the danger of being entrapped by the infinite regress. However, the question remains: If not the replica of the physical thing as a mental image, then what is perceived in the perception of something? Without any prejudice, Heidegger replies:” [T]he chair itself. I see no ‘representations’ of the chair, register no image of the chair, sense no sense of the chair. I simply see *it*—it itself” (*HCT*, 37). This is nothing other than returning back to the things themselves, as we told above. But apart from its being a mental representation, what is the chair as such as long as it is presumed to be the correlate of intentional comportment—i.e., *intentum*?

The chair is something with which we deal in our daily routines. It is sometimes that on which we sit during the time we focus on what is told in the class, sometimes that which we drag aside to make our way, some other time that on which we climb so as to change the bulb. In this sense it is part of the “environment” comprising of the totality of things of use, and perceived by what Heidegger calls “natural perception”. Hence, the chair *itself* as the intentional correlate of daily coping with the environment is called “environmental thing” (*HCT*, 38). Sometimes we may find ourselves in such a situation that we have to perceive the environmental thing as a “natural thing”. In the wartime, say, we may need to chop the table standing in middle of our dining room into pieces in order to heat the dwelling. The same thing being normally perceived as an environmental thing can also be intended as a natural thing. The daily linguistic usage also supports this distinction: we say “I am giving roses”, or “I am giving flowers”; but we do not say “I am giving plants” (*HCT*, 38). Whereas environmental thing is intended on a manipulative basis, natural thing is natural as long as its properties are articulated in an abstractive fashion in assertions. If we increase the level

of generality of the features which characterize the things and “speak of materiality, extension, coloration, local mobility” and the like, we begin to talk about the “thingness of a thing”, or “*thingness* as such” (*HCT*, 39).

Environmental thing, natural thing and thingness as such are *what* are intended in perceptive intentionality and makes up what Heidegger calls “the perceived entity in itself” or “the intentum”. However, in-itself-ness of the perceived entity cannot be apprehended unless the manner in which it is intended is spelled out. Our subject matter now is the “how of being-intended” of intentionality: “The perceived in the strict sense of phenomenology is not the perceived *entity* in itself but the *perceived* entity insofar as it is perceived, *as* it shows itself in concrete perception” (*HCT*, 40).

Having Husserl in mind, Heidegger underlines two different modes of givenness: *bodily-presence* (or, *bodily-givenness*) [*Leibhaftigkeit*] and *self-givenness* (*HCT*, 41). I can imagine, or envisage the Eiffel Tower; in such an imagining it is the tower itself to which I intend, and not the mental picture of it. In this case, Eiffel Tower is said to be self-given, although it is not bodily there. If I have a trip to Paris in order to visit the tower, I place myself before it and perceive it in its bodily presence. In this case, in addition to be self-given, the tower is held to be bodily-given. Hence, most of the things which we perceive in our daily encounters, no matter no matter they are given bodily or not, is acknowledged to be self-given; this is so even in the case of “empty intending” something by just mentioning it, say, during a conversation (*HCT*, 41). In this case, since what is spoken about is neither mentally pictured, nor bodily present, is said to be “intuitively unfulfilled”. Nonetheless, that about which we talk is not the mental representation of the things, but the things themselves. Seeing a picture of something is the last case which Heidegger touches upon (*HCT*, 42). When we see a postcard of the Eiffel Tower, although it is the postcard as an item which is bodily given, that which is self-given is held to be the tower itself as long as we am looking at

the *photograph of something* instead of the picture-thing.

All these ways of givenness are the variations of the degree of *fulfillment* of what is intended by what is intuited in a consequent perceptive act. That which is emptyly meant is intuitively fulfilled by envisaging (imagining) it, fulfilled more by looking at the picture of it, and fulfilled most when it is self given.⁶ Representational theory of consciousness, by overtrusting the representing power of mental pictures, misses the dynamic aspect of the process of simply perceiving something; if a mental picture is to be conceived as a momentary snapshot of that which stands outside of it, how can it become capable of giving the object itself *as a whole*? This is the question which the traditional theories of consciousness attributed to Locke and Hume left unanswered. Husserl is an idealist, partly because even the bodily given object cannot be thought of as the *terminus* for the series of signifying-fulfilling acts. That which is perceived in perception can never be given *all at once* unless the God's eye view is considered.⁷ Human perception is so constructed that, nothing is given to it in an absolute manner. When we see a house, we see it from a perspective, under certain conditions of illumination, etc.; that is to say, "adumbratively" (*LI II*, 762). Although what we perceive is the front façade of the house, we intend the house as a whole in the signifying act. That which is meant in the signifying act includes more when compared

⁶ "*Bodily presence is a superlative mode of self-givenness of an entity*" (*HCT*, 41). However, it should be borne in mind that even in this superlative case, the thing which is given in intuition is not absolutely perceived from all its sides at once. That the expression of which is fulfilled by intuition is not the thing-in-itself: "However adequate a perception may be, the perceived entity always shows itself only in a particular adumbration" (*HCT*, 49).

⁷ "The discussion of possible relationships of fulfillment therefore points to *a goal in which increase of fulfillment terminates, in which the complete and entire intention has reached its fulfillment*, and that not intermediately and partially, but ultimately and finally. The intuitive substance of this last fulfillment is the absolute sum of possible fullness; the intuitive representative is the object itself, as it is in itself. Where a presentative intention has achieved its last fulfillment, the genuine *adaequatio rei et intellectus* has been brought about. *The object is actually 'present' or 'given', and present as just what we have intended it*; no partial intention remains implicit and still lacking fulfillment" (*LI II*, 762).

with what is intuited in the fulfilling act of intuition. As long as we examine the house by tarrying alongside it, we persistently intend the house as a whole, even if what we are given to are just the profiles of it. In complete agreement with Kant, what Husserl reminds us here is the fact that this seemingly simple and straightforward act of perception is a process during which what he calls “part-percepts” representing the different profiles of the object are *synthesized*. It is this synthesis which has insistently been ignored by the traditional theories of mind. Phenomenology, by appreciating the role of synthesis even in simple perception, could manage to depict a picture of consciousness which is by *definition* “directing-itself-toward” to what is outside of itself. Phenomenologically speaking, to claim that consciousness is intentional is to contend that synthesis is not perceived, but just experienced [*erlebt*] during the perception; on the other hand, the object—the house, here— is not experienced but perceived. Identification is the intentional process through which what is meant as a whole is partially verified by the perspectival givenness provided by the intuition. What is there for us is partly present and partly absent for us. When we say that we see the house, even if we are not in a position to see the roof, our intention is said to be directed to the house as a whole including the roof, and the meaning intention directed toward the whole is *fulfilled*, or *realized* by the synthesis of the partially given profiles of the thing in question as the objective correlate of our intentional comportment. So, in mere recognizing of something, the perceptive act is immediately directed toward the thing as a whole as the intentional object, and the identification of the thing itself is a matter of the synthesis which Husserl calls “synthesis of identification” in which what is intended is said to correspond to what is intuited in adumbrative (partial, perspectival) perceptions of it. But are all the elements belonging to more complex intentional acts in which the states of affairs are registered instead of things, fulfilled by the straightforward intuition as well? This is the question which we will tackle in the next section.

2.1.2. Categorical Intuition

We saw above that intentionality is of a great significance for Heidegger in reflecting upon the relation between man and his world. What he refuses by the help of the conception of intentionality which he inherited from his mentor Husserl is that consciousness, or the subject-pole of every experience based on subject-object model of Cartesian philosophy is not a self-enclosed, self-sufficient substance; it is not a *thing* at all. If every consciousness is by definition consciousness of something transcendent to it; in other words, if it is impossible to mention even a speck of conscious experience without an object however momentary it is, then the substantial difference between the *res cogitans* and *res extensa* once preached by Descartes himself and then inherited eagerly by his successors should be reconsidered in a thoughtful manner. Since “to have an object”, be it a physical or a psychical one, is an essential feature included in the definition of conscious experience, then the ontological model based on Cartesian philosophy is to be explored again and the inadequacy of the notion of *substance* which has been developed since the times of early Greek philosophy is to be acknowledged. The necessity of carrying out such a task was tried to be clarified when we mentioned the so called problem of transcendence. The theory of intentionality is one possible answer to the question of transcendence, and the theory of “categorical intuition” is the second, which is to be conceived as complementary for the former.

The problem is this: In addition to experiencing things in a pre-judgmental way—the unexpressed awareness of the existence of the plate on the table, for example—we also expressively intend them by making assertions about them—when, say, we complain about the belated service in the restaurant and tell the waiter “My plate is still empty”. It is clear that whereas the acts in the former case are directed toward things, in the latter case, intentional correlate of the judgmental act is a state-of affairs. Since identifying a state-of-affairs, in addition to apprehending bare names, includes

apprehending the formal, logical words like the copula, this kind of intuition is called “categorial intuition” by Husserl. He states the issue peculiar to categorial intuitions eloquently in the sixth chapter of the Sixth Investigation, called “Sensuous and Categorial Intuitions”, as follows:

In the case of a perceptual statement, not only the inwrought nominal presentations are fulfilled: the whole sense of the statement finds fulfillment through our underlying percept. We say likewise that the whole statement gives utterance to our percept: we do not merely say ‘I see this paper, an inkpot, several books’, and so on, but also ‘I see that the paper has been written on, that there is a bronze inkpot standing here, that several books are lying open’, and so on. If a man thinks the fulfillment of nominal meanings clear enough, we shall ask him how we are to understand the fulfillment of total statements, especially as regards that side of them that stretches beyond their ‘matter’, in this case beyond their nominal terms. What may and can furnish fulfillment for those aspects of meaning which make up propositional form as such, the aspects of ‘*categorial form*’ to which, e.g., the copula belongs? (*LI II*, 773).

When making an assertion about some certain state of affairs, can it be claimed that all the constituent parts of that assertion are fulfilled and verified perceptually? Does every member intended by means of a judgment find its fulfillment or realization in a corresponding intuition? About the forms of judgments like “A is p”, “An A is p”, “This S is p”, “All S are p”, etc. Husserl asks:

Now it is easy to see that *only at the places indicated by letters (variables)* in such “forms of judgment, *can* meanings be put that are themselves fulfilled in perception, whereas it is hopeless, even quite misguided, to look directly perception for what could give fulfillment to our supplementary formal meanings (*LI II*, 779).

The “formal meanings” expressed in judgments are nothing else than the formal words such as ‘the’, ‘a’, ‘some’, ‘many’, ‘few’, ‘all’, ‘this’, ‘and’, ‘or’, ‘which’, etc. (*LI II*, 774). Borrowing Heidegger’s example, when we say that “This chair is yellow and upholstered”, it is clear that what we mean, or intend to in this expression by the words “chair”, “being-*yellow*” and “upholstery” find their corresponding intuitive objects and fulfilled perceptually. But does this also hold good for the remaining constituents of the assertion; namely, the “this”, “is” and “and”? The answer is apparently negative:

I can see the chair, its being-*upholstered* and its being-*yellow* but I shall never in all eternity see the ‘this’, ‘is’, ‘and’ as I see the chair. There is in the full perceptual assertion a *surplus of intentions* whose demonstration cannot be borne by the simple perception of the subject matter (*HCT*, 57-58).

When claiming in a judgment “This chair *is* yellow and upholstered”, we really see or perceive *the fact that the chair is yellow*; that is to say, we see the being-*yellow* of the chair just as much as we can see the chair itself, if the meaning of “to see”, or “to perceive” is extended as to include states-of-affairs, as well as single objects (*LI II*, 780). At the first sight, what we here express with the little word “is” is nothing other than an empty/formal relation of “the being-p of S, of pertinence of the predicate to the subject” (*HCT*, 53-54). Nonetheless, how this emptily signified meaning is fulfilled in an intuition is a question which imposes itself persistently. Do we experience the *being-yellow* of the chair in the same way as we perceive the yellow chair? Asked in the Heideggerian way, can we apprehend the “*being-yellow*” of the chair, as we simply perceive its “*being-yellow*”? (*HCT*, 53-54).⁸ Of course not. Both Husserl and Heidegger agree with Kant upon the fact that being is “*not a predicate or a determination of a thing*” (*TP*, 117-119). In “The Only Possible Argument in Support of a Demonstration of the Existence of God”, when trying to refute the ontological proof suggested by Anselm, Kant objects to the line of reasoning according to which God is the most perfect being; most perfect being cannot have non-existence in its concept; so God exists. Against this kind of proof, Kant claims that existence neither

⁸ As a matter of fact, Heidegger inherits the Husserlian formulation “I can see colour, but not *being-coloured*” (*LI II*, 780) but emphasizes the meaning of the expression by contrasting it with being-*coloured* (being-*yellow*, in Heidegger’s example) as a straightforwardly perceived real feature of the actual object. When we say someone “the chair is *yellow*”, the only thing to do is to check whether it is. Let’s say, the person to whom we claimed that the chair is yellow, after looking at it, denied what we told and claimed that the chair is white. In this case, all that we can do is to repeat our former claim by sliding the emphasis from the word “yellow” to the copula “is”. We will repeat: “The chair *is* yellow”, and by this, we will have meant: “The chair *is really, truly* yellow”. We will get a little bit angry when repeating what we said earlier, because we will be well aware of the fact that there is nothing to be looked at which can verify the expression “is really”, or “is truly”.

extends the concept of a thing when posited, nor lessens it when denied.⁹ Husserl is of the same opinion with Kant when claiming that being is neither a “real internal feature” like shape, intensity, length; nor an “external feature” like being on the left, top, beneath, brighter than, etc. (*LI II*, 780-781).

On the other hand, both Husserl and Heidegger reject the Kantian thesis that basic constituents of any possible experience of an empirical object as in the form of judgment belong to the internal sphere of subjectivity. This is quite reasonable because, as we stated in the previous section, the intentionality of consciousness is the peculiarity of the phenomenological philosophizing. That consciousness is always consciousness of something other than consciousness itself is reemphasized and re-contextualized here: However partial and incomplete the corresponding intuition is—the so-called “adumbrative” or “perspectival” character of givenness to perception—the act of intending something refers that thing always as a whole; in other words, intentional act has always “surplus of meanings”. This is to say that, as we touched upon above, synthesis is not an additional act accruing to the act of presentation through which the object is given in the first place. Because states-of-affairs are more complicated units when compared with the single objects, and the relational/formal elements are acknowledged not to belong to the transcendent reality, they may be said to be located in the inner structure of judgment. But Husserl, in a paragraph quoted also by Heidegger in the *History of the Concept of Time*, objects to this viewpoint in a direct manner:

Not in reflection upon judgments, nor even upon fulfillments of judgments, but in the fulfillments of judgments themselves lies the true source of the concepts State of Affairs

⁹ “Existence is not a predicate at all, nor is the cancellation of existence the negation of a predicate, by means of which something in a thing is cancelled and through which an internal contradiction could arise” (*TP*, 126).

and Being (in the copulative sense). Not in these *acts as objects*, but in *the objects of these acts*, do we have the abstractive basis which enables us to realize the concepts in question. And naturally the appropriate modifications of these acts yield just as good a basis (*LI II*, 783-784 / *HCT*, 59).

Apart from the sense of being (*das Sein*) attributed to the copulative member of the judgment, or assertion (“being-yellow), there happens to be a new sense of it in which it is said that the judged state-of-affairs “really” and “truly” is (*being-yellow*) (*HCT*, 54). Put differently, this conception of “true” in the “truly is” of *being-yellow* is nothing other than the subsistence of identity between what is meant or “*presumed*” and what is intuited (*HCT*, 51). Since categorial intuition pertains to judgments expressed about the states-of-affairs, the ancient problem of “truth” as in the form of “true knowledge” once more becomes an issue.¹⁰ In the end, the question can be formulated as follows: How is the categorial form “being” enunciated in the judgment as in the guise of copula can be said to *correspond to*, or *true of* the “is” binding up the members of the state-of-affairs and making a unity out of them? What is interrogated here is nothing other than the *about-what* of the meaning of “is”; does it have an objective correlate in the sphere of reality, or does it belong to the immanent realm of subjectivity as a category?¹¹ But this is where we come across the gist of the matter for the explication of the phenomenological conceptions of intentionality and categorial intuition, where the notions of *being* and *truth* interfuse. For that reason, it becomes inevitable to ask the question: To what extent can the conception of truth which is inseparable from the notion of “being” and named by Heidegger as the “*truth-relation*”—agreement between what is meant and what is intuited—be distinguished

¹⁰ At the end of the day, the title of the Sixth Investigation in which the concept of categorial intuition used for the first time, is “Elements of a Phenomenological Elucidation of Knowledge”.

¹¹ Although “being” may seem to have a special case among other categorial forms like “the”, “and”, “a”, “with”, etc., it should not be forgotten that what can be claimed of it can also be claimed for the rest, according to both Husserl and Heidegger.

from the notion of truth as is formulated by the correspondence theory; i.e., truth as the possession of judgment which *correspond* to the state-of-affairs about which it is? Nonetheless, trying to answer this question is but to reiterate the steps we made when we expounded the notion of intentionality in the former section. Whereas for the traditional theory there should be an adequation between what is expressed in the judgment and the *transcendently real, actual*, on-hand [*Vorhanden*] object, for its phenomenological counterpart, the truth is simply the correspondence between what is meant and what is intuited both of which are the correlates of the intentional acts (and not in-itself entities).

We have already told above that being and other categorial forms are neither real properties of actual things, nor belong to the subjective sphere of thinking which glue the manifold of sensational data into a structural whole called judgment. The peculiarity of the notion “categorial intuition” lies in the claim that the categorial forms unifying some manifold into a state-of-affairs belong neither to the transcendent reality, nor to the immanent ideality of judgment. Using Sokolowski’s vocabulary, we may be said to have “registered the fact” that the chair is yellow. Nevertheless, we do so not in the same manner as we perceive the chair as a mere thing in a simple, straightforward perception, although from phenomenological point of view intentional acts toward states-of-affairs can also be *intuitively fulfilled*:

Let us call “registration” the intuitive presentation of a categorial object. To register a fact, register a group, or register a relation is a different thing than to think about each of these emptily or signitively. But the fact, or group, or relation is never just what is intuitive, nor just what is emptily meant; *it is that which is the same in both states* (Sokolowski 1974, 32; italics mine).

In Husserlian phenomenology, since states-of-affairs are maintained to be “perceived” or “seen” just as the single objects are, according to what are these two types of

perception differentiated one from another remains to be a question. Husserl's answer is that it is just a matter of the complexity of acts;¹² whereas sensuous perception is carried out by "single-layered", "straightforward" acts, the act structure belonging to categorial intuition is multi-layered and *founded upon* straightforward perceptions. Simple, straightforward perception is therefore characterized as "founding", where the categorial acts are called "founded" acts. Hence, about sensuous perception, Husserl writes:

In the sense of the *narrower, 'sensuous' perception*, an object is directly apprehended or is itself present, if it is set up in an act of perception *in a straightforward (schlichter) manner*. What this means is this: that the object is also an *immediately given object* in the sense that, as *this object perceived with this definite objective content*, it is not *constituted* in relational, connective, or otherwise articulated acts, *acts founded on other acts which bring other objects to perception*. Sensuous objects are present in perception *at a single act-level* (LI II, 787).

The adumbrative, perspectival, or partial character of intuiting something in contrast to the wholeness of meaning or intending, we briefly mentioned above. In order that an object be identified by sensuous perception, it is sufficient that a wide variety of what Husserl calls "part-percepts" are interfused in the immanent sphere of the stream of consciousness. In other words, unless a part-percept ruins the projection of our meaning or intention, the object can be said to be perceived or identified as the object it is. We can see, say, a house from many different angles; we can get into it and examine it from inside; as long as sensuous perception is considered, it does not matter if some of these part-percepts are omitted or some of them added. Even if the roof is not included in the visual scope of ours, we can identify the house as a whole. What is peculiar to this conception of straightforward perception is that in each member of the wide variety of part-percepts—making up a "*continuous perceptual series*"—the same

¹² We should keep in mind that "act simply means *intentional relation*" (HCT, 36).

thing is perceived (*LI II*, 789). “In the case before us perception is merely, as it were, extended”, because however many more part-percepts we add to the series, a new objectivity could not be set up (*LI II*, 790). In other words, part-percepts are not founded upon one another in the phenomenological sense of the term “founding”.

Contrary to the founding, straightforward acts, in founded or categorial acts the part-percepts can be conceived as contributing to the setup of new objectivity and creating a difference in what we normally perceive in the single-layered perception. The state-of-affairs, which make manifest the “subject matter” itself according to one of its properties or relations, is already given with the straightforward perception of the subject matter itself, but “implicitly” (*HCT*, 64). When we see the chair standing in the lecture room by a single-layered act of straightforward sensation, we implicitly become aware of its being yellow. And if we intuit it as something yellow and judge “this chair is yellow”, this act is accepted as the secondary act founded upon the sensuous perception. In this case, the subject matter (the chair) is said to be re-objectified by the help of the *founded/categorial act* whose object is but the state-of-affairs “being yellow of the chair”. In other words, what was implicit in the subject matter itself becomes “explicit” when the categorial act is added upon the former act of sensuous perception. That is to say, a new objectivity is given way to: “[T]hrough this new objectivity of the accentuated state of affairs [being-yellow] the chair becomes expressly visible in what it is” (*HCT*, 64).

It should be borne in mind that it is not the categorial form that we objectify by the categorial intuition, but still the objects themselves, or the “subject matters” in Heidegger’s words. Objectivity is broadened beyond the reality, since the object of a, say, possible cognition becomes manifest as it is accentuated according to one of its properties or relations not because the categorial form is thematized, but because the object itself is re-thematized *by the help of the categorial element*. Einar Øverenget

claims that the theory of categorial intuition is best understood by appealing to Husserl's theory of parts and wholes in the Third Investigation. According to his approach, the correlate of the categorial act is still an object, but not an "individual" one as the real objects are. This is to say that, the correlate of the categorial form, which is neither real nor ideal, can indeed be objectified, albeit not by itself (individually), but along with the subject matter itself. On the other hand, the objectification of a subject matter is nothing other than its being given to consciousness as registered in a state-of-affairs. So, the correlate of the categorial form should be characterized as a "moment" or a "non-independent part" of the whole (state-of-affairs), which means that it cannot be objectified individually (Øverenget 1998, 39). When we say "the chair is yellow", being is indeed not a real property of the chair itself; rather, as the non-real and non-independent moment of the state-of-affairs it makes it possible for the object to be given in its being-yellow (Øverenget 1998, 40). Since the categorial is given objectively only along with the thing itself, the categorial act is said to be a "higher order act" which is "founded on" the single layered act of sensuous perception through which the object is given in the first place. The categorial is, in Heidegger's words, "already coapprehended" along with the object (*HCT*, 67), which means that the realm of objectivity is broadened to the extent that it does not consist of bare reality:

When we say that the relation of state of affairs is ideal and not real, this certainly does not mean. . . that it is not objective or even the least bit less objective than what is given as real. Rather, by way of understanding what is present in categorial intuition, we can come to see that the objectivity of an entity is really not exhausted by this narrow definition of reality, that objectivity in its broadest sense is much richer than the reality of a thing, and what is more, that the reality of a thing is comprehensible in its structure only on the basis of the full objectivity of the simply experienced entity (*HCT*, 66).

Two important conclusions can be drawn from the passage quoted above: (1) objectivity is comprised not only of reality, but also of the categorial form, and (2)

objectivity of a real/individual thing of perception is parasitic upon, or obtained from the more comprehensive objectivity of state-of-affairs. In the first conclusion, Heidegger agrees with Husserl. But the second one is where Heidegger makes a reversal in the order of what Husserl calls “founding” and “founded acts”. According to this reversal, which is known as Heidegger’s “ontological turn” (Kisiel 2002a, 46), the less comprehensive objectivity of the real/perceptual objects is made into a mere abstraction from the phenomenologically more inclusive and original objectivity of the state of affairs.¹³ Indeed, Heidegger is reported in the Zähringen Seminar of 1973 to have claimed that there are two senses of “seeing” or “vision”: “Sensuous vision” and “categorical vision” (ZS 2003, 66). Heidegger puts forward the phenomenological priority of the later upon the former as follows:

When I see this book, I do see a substantial thing, without however seeing the substantiality as I see the book. But it is the substantiality that, in its non-appearance, enables what appear to appear. In this sense, one can even say that it is more apparent than what itself appears (ZS 2003, 67).

Here, substantiality of the substantial thing of perception is the excess which is not real, though objective.¹⁴ In Husserlian phenomenology, we are indebted for this

¹³ Theodore Kisiel describes the “ontological turn” of Heidegger as follows: “That the categorial always has a sensory basis is a traditional thesis stemming from Aristotle. But we have seen that the categorial act is a movement of going beyond the sensory given—a transcending now to be regarded as indigenous to the movement of intentionality—which is directed toward a new objectivity without which the simply given matter could not appear as it is. The founded therefore in its turn founding, inasmuch as the categories are the a priori structure which constitute entities and allow them to be seen in what they are” (Kisiel 2002a, 46).

¹⁴ The changeover in the “sensuous” and “categorial intuition” will become an issue for Heidegger again, when he, in *Being and Time*, claims that the world as a whole is the ontological condition of possibility for the individual entities to be. In the next chapter, we will see how the original disclosure of world is incorporated to the ontological constitution of Dasein which, for this reason, is called being-in-the-world. For now, let’s content ourselves with calling attention to the fact that what Heidegger calls in *Being and Time* the “familiarity with the world”—which is the counterpart of categorial intuition—is existentially prior to perceiving the thing in a sensuous manner. Appealing to the Husserlian terminology of “appresentation” borrowed from *Ideas II*, In Kisiel’s summarizes this as follows: “Husserl’s usage of ‘appresentation’ begins with the overtly phenomenal: the primary presence

surplus to the difference between what is experienced in perception and what is meant or intended in signification. Since every transcendent being owes its transcendence (or “excess of being”, objectivity) to the surplus of meaning accrued to what is contained in the stream of experiences (“hyletic data”, adumbrations), the “ideality” attributed to it as the ideality of the categorial form cannot be come across in the subjective sphere, as it is hoped.¹⁵ Here, Heidegger appreciates Husserl’s anti-Kantianism in that he denies to locate the categorial form in the pure understanding and expands the meaning of intuition from the givenness of sensuous objects to that of categorial ones. However meticulously we examine pure consciousness or transcendental subjectivity, we cannot come across something other than color patches, sensations of tactility, phonetic units, etc (in short, hyletic data); there is neither “substantiality” nor “being” in there. Hence, the question of the whereabouts of the source of the categorial form as the condition of possibility of the coming into appearance of any object transcendent to consciousness, if it is neither in the reality nor in the pure subjectivity, becomes the main question of phenomenology. It is in this sense that the Husserlian innovative conception of

of the front side points to the additional presence of the hidden back sides of a perceived thing, and so ‘appresents’ them; the directly perceived human body ‘appresents’ the person. Generally, the sense intuition appresents, evokes the additional (in this sense secondary) presence of categorial intuition. Thus, when Heidegger states that the world ‘appresents’ world-things, lets them become present, encountered, disclosed, he has inverted the term from a phenomenal to a phenomeno-logical one, from an ontic to an ontological starting point: as it were, a retrieval of the ontological difference from its oblivion. Over and over, he asserts that the ‘primary given’ is the world and not things, that the ‘primary presence’ is meaning and not objects” (Kisiel 1993, 375).

¹⁵ As we will come again in 2.2.3 again, the transcendence of the thing is formulated in the jargon of *Ideas I* as follows: “The perceptual act does not actually contain its object. By virtue of this characteristic, the object is ‘other’ than the act and has a being that is other than the being of the act” (Byers, 2002, 87). The idiom “other than” can easily be replaced by “transcendent to” or “excessive to”. Since the transcendent object is experienced or intuited in “adumbrations”, this kind of intuition is open to “error and deceit”. This is the second index of the transcendent object in contrast to the “immanent object” which “is utterly contemporaneous with the act that perceives it and is utterly self-identical with itself as perceived”, whereby “immanence” means “being without excess beyond givenness” (Byers 2002, 86).

categorial intuition can be said to have inspired Heidegger to claim that the transcendental ground of all empirical experiences of the objects could be searched after in a realm *in between* the transcendental subjectivity and the transcendent world. According to him, the second lesson that is to be learned from Husserl is that a genuine search after the a priori ground of any experience whatsoever demands us to eliminate the two possible alternatives of naïve realism and idealism. By the help of the categorial intuition, we must be awake to the fact that the origin of the a priori is the intentional realm, which is the midway between the pure consciousness and the transcendent reality.

2.1.3. The Original Sense of the A priori

What Heidegger refers to as “*being-yellow*”—in contrast to the “being-yellow”—in the *Prologomena* lectures is nothing other than the “substantiality” of the substantial thing of the Zähringen Seminars, for both correspond to the being of entities [*das Sein des Seinden*] as the condition of possibility of their coming into appearance, or “presencing” [*Anwesen*]. During the lecture course delivered in Freiburg in the winter semester of 1931-2, when examining Plato’s cave allegory, the main interest of Heidegger is no different either: to explicate the meaningful-presencing of the thing and the priority of the categorial intuition over the sensuous intuition. The Husserlian contention that even the categorial forms are subjected to intuition is maintained here by emphasizing the fact that the same holds good for Plato as well, since for the ancient philosopher *idea* or *eidos* is nothing other than “the look [*Anblick*] of something *as* something” (*ET*, 38). Heidegger approves Husserl once again in the person of Plato, because he managed to preserve the ancient sense of “*noein*” as “seeing of the *idea*”, as “the capacity to perceive”:

The seeing of the idea, i.e. the understanding of what-being and how-being, in short of *being*, first allows beings to be recognized *as* the beings they are. We never see beings

with our bodily eyes unless we are also seeing ‘ideas’ (*ET*, 39).

So, without understanding the meaning of substantiality in advance, it would be impossible for us to encounter the substantial entities in our environment, let alone perceiving them. The *presence* of the things for the Greeks is not their mere taking place in space and endurance in time (on-handness) as for the moderns, but rather the meaningful-presencing where “meaningfulness” is the pre-theoretical understanding of the being of entities or the objectivity of objects. Thomas Sheehan claims that Heidegger deliberately misinterprets Aristotelian *ousia* in terms of *parousia*,¹⁶ where the former indicates the “things insofar as they are real, that is, the realness of the real”, the latter refers to “the meaningful insofar as it is meaningful; i.e. the meaningfulness of the meaningful” (Sheehan 2005, 198).¹⁷ This again is a parallel debate in a different guise, which underlines the fact that being-as-intended, or meaningful presence of the categorial intuition is prior to the real being (free from being intended) of the sensuous intuition. Seen from the perspective of phenomenology, in order that the real object can be given to sensuous intuition as the individual thing it is, it should have been understood beforehand as to its what-being and how-being. Although Heidegger at the first sight seems to approve of the Husserlian thesis that “categorial acts constitute new objectivity”, this objectivity, since it means “*letting the entity be seen in its objectivity*”, is prior to the objectivity of the straightforward acts of sensuous perception (*HCT*, 71). This is to say that, the

¹⁶ In *The Essence of Truth*, Heidegger’s tendency of interpreting *ousia* in terms of *parousia* is obvious: “Presence [*Anwesenheit*] for the Greeks is *parousia*, shortened as *ousia*, and means *being*” (*ET*, 38).

¹⁷ Sheehan also writes: “Aristotle’s material object was the real (*to on*), and his formal focus was on the realness of the real, *ousia* understood as independent of the human subject. By contrast, Heidegger’s material object is the meaningful (*to alethes* or *to par-on*), and his formal focus is on the meaningfulness of the meaningful (the *aletheia* of the *alethes*, the *parousia* of the *par-on*) in correlation with human interests and purposes. That is, Heidegger abandons an object-focused theory of being (ousiology as *Seinslehre*) for a correlation-focused theory of meaning (parousiology as *Bedeutungslehre*)—in a word, phenomenology” (Sheehan 2005, 196).

bodily presence of sensory object and its perception in isolation are parasitic upon the meaningful presence of the categorial object (state-of-affairs) and its contextual intuition. As Kisiel puts forward, “the categories are the a priori structures which constitute entities and allow them to be seen in what they are” (Kisiel 2002a, 46), but these categories are not there in the subject; rather, *they are as long as they objectify*. Categories can be acknowledged to be a priori, unless it is forgotten that their mode of being is *constitute-ing what is other than itself, point-ing towards its exterior, creat-ing transcendence [excess, surplus]* rather than stable, in-itself-presence free from any relationality with what it constitutes. If categories are to be acknowledged to be the a priori of any experience whatsoever of the transcendent, then it should be borne in mind that they cannot be objectified in the same way as the transcendent is, because ontologically, they cannot be characterized in terms of self-identity implied by *presence*. According to Heidegger, for the very first time in the history of Western thinking, a totally new kind of a priori comes to the fore with the Husserlian phenomenology. This is the a priori character of the categories of the categorial intuition which cannot be thematized in the naturalistic sense, but always already operative as *world-constituting*. As a matter of fact, what is a priori are not the categories as the formal concepts constitutive of human experience, but rather the categorial, or the *functionality* of the categories. This operability of the categorial of the categorial intuition is what Heidegger later names the “average understanding of being” as the a priori for all human comportments within the world. Kisiel summarizes this in an eloquent way:

Categorial intuition is the simple apprehension of the categorial element operative in our experience, an element in which we live without regarding it thematically. As such, the *categorial* is not yet formulated into categories, but provides the basis for such formulation. We are already caught up in meaning, and only later capture it for ourselves in and through concepts. Thus Heidegger repeatedly tries to point below our conceptual grasping and logical defining to the *horismos* of meaning, which defines the scope as well as the human situation, which is first of all given not through the senses or the intellect but in *actu exercitu* of existence in the world (Kisiel 2002b, 99).

Since the a priori is operative from the outset in our experience, it cannot be understood as a bunch of concept-things lying in the consciousness ready to be manipulated in a relevant occasion. If there is an a priori at all, this a priori should be the *functionality*, or the *operationality* of the category, not the *presence* of it. Kisiel uses the Latin idiom “*actu exercitu*” to underline the fact that what we are after as the a priori is not the abstracted concept statically lying in the mind, but the act-character of it; i.e. category-in-enactment, function-ing category, or the categorial.¹⁸

If a priori is the functionality of the categories over the hyletic/sensational data, it is neither subjective nor objective. The location of the a priori must rather be said to be in between the immanent realm and the transcendent realm; that is, *in the realm of intentionality*. The intentional realm is *held open* as the context of meaning where the being-for-us, or meaningful presence of the things as they are intended first becomes possible. It is not the space of physics, but the topos of meaning which is given way to by the “understanding of being”. Thus, concludes Heidegger, “the a priori phenomenologically understood is not a title for comportment but a *title for being*” (*HCT*, 74).

2.2. Heidegger’s Critique of Husserl

Despite his acknowledgement on every occasion of the great contribution of the above mentioned Husserlian themes to his ontologically motivated phenomenological approach,¹⁹ Heidegger has never hang back from criticizing his mentor on account of

¹⁸ Or, the “schematized category” as we will see in the fourth chapter.

¹⁹ Apart from dedicating *Being and Time* to Husserl and before the publication of the work, during the lecture courses he has delivered in 1920’s, Heidegger did not ignore emphasizing the fact that he is still the student of Husserl: “It almost without saying that even today I still regard myself as a learner in relation to Husserl” (*HCT*, 121).

the fact that he did not remain loyal to his own project of going back to the things themselves,²⁰ because he did not manage to renounce the traditional conception of being as constant presence and formulate the being of the intentional in an ontologically appropriate way. As a matter of fact, Heidegger's criticism of Husserl is directed towards the Husserl of *Ideas I*, the work in which the latter's "transcendental turn" is said to come to fruition by means of the "phenomenological reduction", or "*epoché*" which is for the very first time introduced into phenomenology—this time, "transcendental phenomenology".

2.2.1. The General Thesis of the Natural Attitude

When compared with the initial phase of the phenomenological philosophy as was systematized in the *Logical Investigations*, the innovation put forward in the *Ideas I*—the initiator of the transcendental phenomenology—is the *epoché*, or phenomenological reduction, which for the very first time makes it possible for phenomenology to be qualified as "transcendental idealism". Phenomenological reduction is nothing other than the suspension of judgment which every one of us entertains when we qualify our situation in the world, as well as the others. As a phenomenologist, Husserl thinks that the world, before standing there factually without any human intervention, is given to us through an average, everyday attitude of ours which he calls "natural attitude". Unless this natural attitude and its "general thesis" are suspended by a shift of perspective by the help of *epoché*, it is impossible to step into the phenomenological realm which Husserl thinks to be the pure consciousness and its contents. Let's start with the natural attitude and the general thesis it has.

²⁰ During the 1925 *Prologomena* lecture, in order to emphasize how serious and annihilating the consequences of giving up the ideal of going back to things themselves by failing to investigate the being of consciousness are, Heidegger goes so far as to claim that "in the basic task of determining its ownmost field, therefore, phenomenology is *unphenomenological*" (*HCT*, 128).

Naturality of the natural attitude issues from the fact that it is the point of departure for any and every human being who evaluates his position in the world. It is so natural that any theoretical enterprise, whether scientific or non-scientific, which takes as its issue the position of human beings within the environing natural world should take off from the native land of this prereflective or pretheoretical attitude. The gist of the matter is that, even if Husserl characterizes this basic stance of everyday experience as an “attitude”, nobody is supposed to be aware of the fact that the very existence of the world is not a matter of factual presence (Overgaard 2004, 22). So, in the natural attitude the world stands there for us even if we do not pay attention to it (*Ideas I*, 101).²¹ The things of the natural world are capable of affecting one another in line with the causal laws; i.e., they are spatiotemporal things-in-themselves congruent with the constant natural laws and unaffected by the conscious projection of human beings. The “in-itself” character of the natural world originates from the fact that it is consistently and persistently believed to be there for us even if it is not within our “*field of perception*” (*Ideas I*, 101). In short, the most prominent feature of the natural attitude is the average inclination of human beings to preserve the realistic moment when it comes to the existence of the surrounding world; according to this uninterrogated conviction, the existence of the world is totally *extra mentem*; that is, mind-independent. Besides this, we find ourselves and other Ego-subjects as belonging to the same environing world; the world which is shared by others and to which we human beings also belong as realities (living beings, rational animals) (*Ideas I*, 105). Such a view is so widespread—because prereflectively, or pretheoretically acknowledged—that even the sciences are based upon it as the unquestionably

²¹ So writes Husserl: “I am aware of a world, spread out in space endlessly, and in time becoming and become, without end. I am aware of it, that means, first of all, I discover it immediately intuitively, I experience it. Through sight, touch, hearing, etc., in different ways of sensory perception, corporeal things somehow spatially distributed are *for me simply there*, in verbal or figurative sense “present”, whether or not I pay them special attention by busying myself with them. . .”

accepted metaphysical ground of them.²² In §30 of *Ideas I*, Husserl emphasizes the pre-theoretical character of the general thesis of the natural attitude, which will later on be sharply criticized by Heidegger, as follows:

That which we have submitted towards the characterization of what is given to us from the natural standpoint, and thereby of the natural standpoint itself, was a piece of pure description *prior to all "theory"* (*Ideas I*, 105).

Since the general thesis of the natural attitude is not a theory among rival theories, the suspension of it is not a mere replacement of a theory with a better, explanatorily more powerful theory. On the other hand, the pretheoretical character of the general thesis and “what is given to us from the natural standpoint” is not the bare reality of an on-hand (*Vorhanden*), factual world as it is the case for Descartes. Indeed, Husserlian transcendental idealism, because it suspends the naïve belief in the transcendent world by exercising the phenomenological *epoché*, may seem at the first sight totally in agreement with the Cartesian methodical doubt. However, whereas the Cartesian doubt aims at guaranteeing the existence or reality of the factual, external world, the target of transcendental phenomenology is to lay bare the structures of intentional consciousness which makes possible for us to mention such a transcendent world of the natural attitude in the first place.²³ In other words, where Descartes remains loyal to the *naturalistic* perspective and the method of causal explanation when constructing

²² Dan Zahavi defines the natural attitude and the implicit metaphysical presupposition consisting of it as follows: “What kind of metaphysical assumptions is Husserl referring to? The most fundamental one is our implicit belief in the existence of a mind-, experience, and theory-independent reality. This realistic assumption is so fundamental and deeply rooted that it is not only accepted by the positive sciences, it even permeates our daily pretheoretical life, for which reason Husserl calls it the *natural attitude*” (Zahavi 2003, 44).

²³ In order to emphasize that something like natural attitude is possible only on the ground of the constituting activity of transcendental consciousness, Tonner writes: “Consciousness is the origin of these objectivities. It is by virtue of consciousness’s constituting activity that we can talk about an objective world in the first place and so become immersed in the natural attitude” (Tonner 2010, 82).

the bonds between the world, ideas and God, Husserl prefers the transcendental perspective and seeks to find the a priori ground with the help of the non-causal description of the structures belonging to the stream of pure, intentional consciousness.²⁴ Husserl criticizes Descartes on grounds of the fact that the latter never abandons the natural attitude even when he commits the methodical doubt; putting it differently, throughout his whole philosophical activity, he never stops qualifying the external world as reality and realize that this reality is constituted on an a priori ground which Husserl calls “pure consciousness”.²⁵

I find continually present against me the one spatio-temporal fact-world to which I myself belong, as do all other men found in it and related in the same way to it. This “fact-world”, as the word already tells us, I find *to be out there*, and also *take it as it gives itself to me as something that exists out there*. All doubting and rejecting of the data of the natural world leaves standing the *general thesis of the natural standpoint* (*Ideas I*, 106).

²⁴ For Descartes, the things of the external world are the causes for the ideas in our mind and God is the guarantor which makes us assured of the bond between the causes and the consequences. The picture is totally different for Husserl, who thinks that the transcendental subject *constitutes* the transcendent world: “Whereas naturalism holds that consciousness is a subordinate reality which depends for its existence on certain physical structures, transcendental idealism contends that the entire natural world, including human minds, is nothing but an intentional structure of transcendental consciousness. According to transcendental idealism, the world ontologically depends on transcendental consciousness, which itself exists in absolute independence” (Philippe 1995, 244). It should be noted that the approach overtaken by Philippe here is to be seen as one possible interpretation of Husserlian phenomenology among others, according to which object of any kind is none other than the system of intentional acts (noesis) and the intentional contents (noema). This view is characterized as “ontological reductionism” by David Woodruff Smith, but two other standpoints are also possible. According to what he calls “ontological dependence”, object is ontologically dependent on, rather than identical with, the noetic/noematic structures of pure consciousness. The last alternative called “epistemic” or “intentional perspectivism” implies that objects are *only* known or intended through the system of intentional acts and contents (Smith 1995, 373-375).

²⁵ “Descartes reaches a source which, through the intermediary of many deductions, gives absolutely scientific validity to the existence of the external world, or “transcendent” world, in Husserlian terminology. But in so doing, he presupposed that the notion of the external world, of the transcendent, is intrinsically intelligible and thinkable. Husserl delves deeper into the ego and comes to a source which is intended to eventually validate and explain through intentional analysis the very thinkability of the notion of transcendent which thinkability Descartes takes for granted” (Jean-Marc Laporte, 337).

No doubt, the paragraph quoted above is a direct allusion to Descartes to whom never occurs that the existence of the fact-world is transcendently grounded (or, in Husserl's terms, *constituted*) by the intentional consciousness. Since Descartes presumes the existence of the world as something on-hand, his methodical doubt is confined to a poorly determined conception of "Non-Being" (*Ideas I*, 109). So, contends Husserl, by the help of *epoché* we, rather than omitting the existence of the fact-world, put out of action the ontological commitment asserted by the general thesis of the natural attitude. The general thesis stands as it is but undergoes some modification, "we set it as it were 'out of action', we 'disconnect it', 'bracket it'. It still remains there like the bracketed in the bracket, like the disconnected outside the connexional system" (*Ideas I*, 108).

The reason Husserlian phenomenological bracketing of the natural attitude is to be distinguished from the Cartesian doubt lies basically in the fact that the former opens the path towards transcendental idealism similar to that of Kant. In order to clarify that his position is in no way a kind of skepticism like that of Descartes in *Ideas I*, Husserl feels the need for notifying that by the *epoché*:

[I] do *not*. . . deny this "world", as though I were a sophist, *I do not doubt that it is there* as though I were a sceptic; but I use the "phenomenological" *epoché*, which *completely bars me from using any judgment that concerns spatio-temporal existence* (*Ideas I*, 110-111).

So, instead of overtaking the skeptical standpoint like Descartes, Husserl suspends any judgment laden with ontological commitment about the transcendent reality, or the fact-world. Purging away any claim based on the natural attitude and its naïve belief in the mind-independent, external world, Husserlian *epoché* can be said to be the initiative of the phenomenological philosophy and makes it possible for the phenomenologist to plunge into the stream of lived-experiences (*Erlebnisse*) located in the pure consciousness. Phenomenological reduction is the *sine qua non* element for

every genuine phenomenology as well as transcendental philosophy, since by the help of *epoché* alone it first becomes possible to pass beyond the natural attitude to the transcendental ground of it.

Heidegger criticizes Husserl on similar grounds on which the latter disapproves of Descartes. He first of all denies the fact that “man’s natural manner of experience” can be called an “*attitude (Einstellung)*” (HCT, 113). Since he contends that the most elementary form of man’s being-in-the-world or “natural comportment” cannot be handled in terms of any kind of “belief”²⁶ or deliberately chosen “standpoint”, characterizing the most natural form of human existence as an attitude is a grave mistake for Heidegger.²⁷ Denial of the attitude character of the natural attitude goes hand in hand with two major objections toward Husserlian depiction of it: (1) Natural attitude, as it is portrayed by Husserl, is theory laden, rather than being “prior to all theory” as we quoted from *Ideas* above, and (2) the theory it is laden with is a sort of naturalism.²⁸ In order to emphasize how problematic he finds the point of departure of

²⁶ “Life in the natural attitude is a life in world-belief” (Overgaard 2004, 22).

²⁷ Heidegger’s critical stance toward the attitude character of the most elementary, pretheoretical form of human existence within the world can be compared with the paragraph in *Ideas I*, where Husserl claims that the natural attitude cannot be absurd because something like absurdity is relevant only when we are theorizing, philosophizing (*Ideas I*, 169).

²⁸ Philosophical naturalism should be understood as the radicalization of the general thesis of the natural attitude, according to which the fact-world is claimed to be standing there without our perceiving it. The radicalization lies in the fact that whereas natural attitude is surmountable by phenomenological reduction, philosophical naturalism denies the existence of a transcendental consciousness, or is insistent upon characterizing it as one possible entity among others which can be subsumed under the laws of nature and therefore investigated in terms of natural science. As a matter of fact, Heidegger does not charge Husserl with surrendering such kind of naturalism. Nonetheless, by describing the natural attitude in naturalistic terms, the founder of phenomenology allows the discipline to be infected by naturalism: “Heidegger would claim that, if one has articulated the natural attitude by the existential analysis of our being-in-the-world, revealing existential characteristics [*Existenziale*] such as *Befindlichkeit*, *Verstehen*, *Verfallen*, *Sorge*, and *Sein zum Tode*, which are not contaminated by the scientific view of the world, one will conclude that there is no natural motivation left for Husserl’s turn towards transcendental idealism, and that the epistemological problem of experience Husserl wanted to

the transcendental phenomenology of Husserl, Heidegger writes in the *Prologomena* lectures:

In view of the actual theme of phenomenology . . . we need a reflection on the definition of the starting position in the further development of phenomenology, namely, the definition of the being of consciousness with regard to the way it is given in the natural attitude. . . This primary kind of experience, which provides the basis for every further characterization of consciousness, turns out to be a theoretical kind of experience and not a genuinely natural one, in which what is experienced could give itself in its original sense. Instead, the manner in which what is experienced gives itself here is defined by the feature of an objectivity for a theoretical consideration of nature, and nothing else. It thus follows that the starting point for the elaboration of pure consciousness is a *theoretical* one (*HCT*, 117).

What Heidegger emphasizes about the starting point of Husserlian phenomenology is that he remains within the confines of the natural attitude while he was describing it. Indeed, when elaborating the general thesis of the natural attitude Husserl claims that from the natural standpoint we human beings are real objects among other non-human ones within the fact-world; although we see some of these objects within our natural environment as things of use, we basically perceive them as “material things” (*Ideas I*, 103). Describing natural attitude from within the natural attitude is nothing other than giving consent to the average interpretation of the layman made about the ontological status of himself against his environing, intersubjective world. For Heidegger this is unacceptable, because there is a huge gap between what everyday man *in fact* lives or experiences and what he *thinks* he lives. Since the spoken language is thought to be infected by the grammatical prejudice of the subject/predicate structure because of the traditional metaphysical dichotomies of substance/predicate, inner/outer, immanent/transcendent, etc.; the general thesis of the natural attitude is tainted by the naturalistic theory as its metaphysical ground. In other words, the testimony of the

solve by this transcendental turn is nothing but a symptom of *Verfall*” (Philipse 1995). All this Heideggerian terminology of *Being and Time* will be once more examined in the fifth chapter.

layman as to what he basically experiences in an everyday manner is completely unreliable. So, the interpretation of the everyday attitude of Dasein should be made from without the natural attitude as Heidegger does in *Being and Time*.²⁹ This is quite normal because the terms “natural attitude”, or “everydayness” in Heidegger’s jargon, are philosophical concepts. This is to say that, we are not in a position to bring into our notice that the attitude we have is a natural one when we are immersed in the daily routines of everyday life; on the other hand, as soon as we take an interpretive stand toward the attitude we have, we are no longer in the natural attitude (Overgaard 2004, 19). So, the problem is with the manner of *objectification*. As long as we give consent to the self-interpretation of everyday Dasein about the ontological status of the world and worldly things, including himself, we fail grasping the experience *as it is lived* (*Erlebnis*); what we have instead is the experience *as it is objectified*.³⁰

2.2.2. The Residuum of the Phenomenological Reduction

Objectification is the key term if we would like entirely to understand Heidegger’s claim that Husserl did not remain loyal to his own project of laying out the full ontological structure of intentionality in its a priori. That is to say, Husserl did not manage differentiating the mode of being of transcendental consciousness from that of the transcendent entities of any kind as they are seen from the natural standpoint.

²⁹ “[I]nsofar as he [Heidegger] has distanced himself from the *interpretation* of everyday Dasein [the testimony of *das Man*/layman], Heidegger may be said to describe everyday life from an ‘external’ standpoint” (Overgaard 2004, 21; square brackets mine).

³⁰ So, writes Overgaard, there are two alternatives about a possible interpretation of the natural attitude, the second of which is chosen by Heidegger: “We can either try to be ‘faithful’ to the attitude in question, i.e., try to stick to describing what it experiences in the way it would itself describe/interpret it. Or we can describe it all from a different level, letting the natural interpretation appear as *flawed*, if we—from our present viewpoint, with our present insights—believe that that is what it is” (Overgaard 2004, 20; italics mine). I believe that in the second alternative the natural interpretation is qualified as “flawed”, because it *objectifies* what can in no way be apprehended by objectifying attitude which Heidegger sees as the main prejudice of every theoretically motivated philosophy.

Being-objectifiable, or *objective determinability* is the mode of being of the transcendent entities, which Husserl must have done away with in a deliberate fashion when characterizing pure consciousness as the absolute subject of any experience whatsoever. Indeed, if the transcendental Ego, or the absolute subject of the stream of lived-experiences is to be illustrated as the primordial ground upon which the reality of the fact-world is constituted, then this ground is to be typified as the locus from which any kind of *objectification* first becomes possible. Therefore, this locus itself should be characterized as *non-objectifiable* with regard to its mode of being. This is the basic outline of Heidegger's criticism of Husserl, the transcendental phenomenologist. Let's get into the details now.

Husserl characterized what remains over after we perform the phenomenological reduction in §50 of *Ideas I* as follows:

[I]nstead of living naively in experience (*Erfahrung*), and subjecting what we experience, transcendent nature, to theoretical inquiries, we perform the 'phenomenological reduction'. In other words: instead of *carrying out* the acts proper to the nature-constituting consciousness with its transcendent theses and allowing ourselves to be led by motives that operate therein to still other transcendent theses, and so forth—we set all these theses 'out of action', we take no part in them; we direct the glance of apprehension and theoretical inquiry to *pure consciousness in its absolute being*. It is this which remains as the 'phenomenological residuum' we were in quest of; remains over, we say, although we have 'Suspended' the whole world with all things, living creatures, men, ourselves included (*Ideas I*, 154).

Excluding the "transcendent theses" from our framework while we are in the phenomenological attitude is nothing other than giving up *causal explanation*, as well as *logical argumentation* and *mathematical demonstration*.³¹ This is to say that, as

³¹ According to Husserl, after the *epoché*, in the phenomenological attitude, laying bare the pure consciousness and its correlates is possible only on grounds of "intuition". So, the explanatory methods of both positive sciences and the eidetic sciences like logic and mathematics should be taken aside (*Ideas I*, §§59-60). In *The Encyclopaedia Britannica Article*, a similar remark is made by Husserl: "Instead of a reduction merely to purely psychic subjectivity (the pure minds of human beings in the world), we get a reduction to transcendental subjectivity by means of a methodical epoché regarding the

well as the natural world, both mathematical and logical worlds are constituted by the transcendental consciousness, too.

In this line of argument, psychology as the natural science of consciousness comes to the fore as the main target of Husserl because of its pretension to be the only candidate for the throne of epistemology. The source of this claim lies in the fact that since knowledge is a psychic phenomenon, psychology as the science of mental phenomena should be the only authority to decree what the essence of knowledge and truth is. However, Husserl thinks that, sticking to the natural attitude and under the influence of positive sciences, psychology is prone to think that all its concepts are derived from experience. As early as the *Logos* essay of 1910-1, Husserl writes that psychology of his time adopts the same analysis of experience as physical science, “believing that in this way it is an experimental science of the psychical in fundamentally the same sense as physical science is an experimental science of the physical” (PRS, 97). This argument is highly controversial for Husserl, because the object realms of the physical science and psychology are totally different from each other. Whereas corporeal things of physics are to be characterized as self-identical unities (substances) having “physically real properties” prone to be changed according to causal laws and taking place in one space and one time (PRS, 104) phenomenon of psychology is a transient continuum of the stream of experiences which “comes and goes”; hence, psychic appearance “retains no enduring, identical being that would be *objectively determinable* as such in the sense of natural science, e.g., as objectively divisible into components, ‘analyzable’ in the proper sense” (PRS, 107). Besides, since phenomenon of physics is “appearance”, behind it stands the physical thing itself; as to the psychic phenomenon, it should be acknowledged that there is nothing behind it. Psychic

real world as such and even regarding all ideal objectivities as well (the "world" of number and such like)” (EBA, 97).

phenomenon is “mere appearance” (PRS, 105-106).³²

In Husserlian phenomenology, there is a mediated relationship between the mental phenomena and their objects rather than a direct or causal one as the representationalist theory of consciousness contends. Unless a conscious act (“noesis” or “cogitatio”) is mediated by a meaning, it becomes impossible for it to refer to an object, whether an existing or a non-existing one in the naturalistic sense. As we saw above, Husserl thinks that every conscious act of thinking or *cogitatio* is thinking of, or meaning something. But after the *epoché*, since we suspended every reference to the real, natural world, this “something” cannot be the real/actual object of the transcendent world. So, the intentional correlate of the *cogitatio* is considered to be “the intentional object”³³ of the essentially meaning-conferring act, or, “noema”), as opposed to the “actual object” of the general thesis of the natural attitude (Moran 2000, 158). In contrast to the traditional thesis of representationalism, phenomenology emphasizes the fact that an idea is the idea of something transcendent to the mind, only insofar as it *means* the object thought to be occupying an extra-mental realm. Let’s imagine a mirror and a man standing in front of an apple. Are we allowed to maintain that the mode of being of the apple-image reflected on the mirror is not different from the idea

³² Compare this point with Husserl’s claim in the *Ideas I* that the Kantian *Ding-an-sich*, as the cause of appearances, is not necessary for transcendental idealism. Husserl argues there: “If we can attribute being to the thing-in-itself in a legitimate manner, then it should be confessed that there must be a mentally and perceptually more developed being than us who can perceive it. Nonetheless, that this imaginative perceiver is able to perceive the thing-in-itself does not exclude the fact that thing-in-itself gives itself only by ‘appearances’, if ‘perception’ remains to be what we understand from it. So, to-be-perceived is necessarily excluded from the concept of the thing-in-itself, if it is not to become an appearance” (*Ideas I*, 159).

³³ As early as the Fifth Investigation of the *Logical Investigations*, Husserl gives up the traditional “talk of immanent objectivity”; i.e., the objectivity of mental pictures, images or representations. Refusing to confer objectivity to the mental contents, he begins to use the expression “intentional objects” (*LI II*, 560). Intentional object here is nothing other than the “noema” in the *Ideas I*; that is to say, the intended as it is intended.

which the man entertains in his mind as long as it perceives the apple? The answer of the Husserlian phenomenologist would be a definitive no, because something like a mental-image would not be said to be there in consciousness unless the act of perception *means* (or, *refers*) it to the object standing outside. In other words, the actual apple-thing is unlikely to exist, unless the meaning which constitutes the objectivity of a physical thing of the transcendent world is known in advance (a priori).³⁴ If we go back to the *Logical Investigations* and borrow the terminology used in there, we could say that “the object *that* is intended” in the natural attitude is, as a matter of fact, “the object *as* it is intended”, or noema in the phenomenological or philosophical attitude;³⁵ whereas “the object which is intended” is the *objectively determinable being* of the natural attitude, “the object as it is intended” is the *same* object as it is *meant* in the phenomenological attitude. What is meant in the phenomenological level is the *objectivity of the object* whatever it is (objectivity of the physical objects, mathematical objects, logical objects etc.), and it should be added that in order to be able to present itself to consciousness, the object must have been determined with regard to its objectivity in advance by the transcendental consciousness. Therefore, it can be concluded that phenomenology is the investigation of the meanings, rather than the nature of things. Since the transcendental subject or the pure consciousness is *objectivity-, world-constituting*, then phenomenology, as the

³⁴ If being-there of the actual object is nothing other than the *objectivity* of it, then the task of phenomenology can be summarized as elucidating the meaning of objectivity: “What it means, that objectivity is, and manifests itself cognitively as so being, must precisely become evident purely from consciousness itself, and thereby it must become completely understandable. . . To the extent. . . that every consciousness is ‘consciousness-of’, the essential study of consciousness includes also that of consciousness-meaning and consciousness-objectivity as such” (PRS, 90).

³⁵ “We must distinguish, in relation to the intentional content taken as the object of the act, between *the object as it is intended*, and the *object. . . which* is intended. In each act an object is presented as determined in this or that manner, and as such it may be the target of varying intentions, judgmental, emotional, desiderative etc.” (*LI II*, 578).

science of the immanent realm of consciousness, is not after the objectivity of meanings,³⁶ but the meaning of objectivities of different realms of beings. In light of all these, Husserl declares the task of phenomenological investigation as “the intuition of essences” and characterizes this essential intuition in the *Logos Essay* as follows:

Now, it is of decisive significance that essential intuition is in no way “experience” in the sense of perception, recollection, and equivalent acts; further it is in no way an empirical generalization whose sense it is to posit existentially at the same time the individual being of empirical details. Intuition grasps essence as essential being, and in no way posits being-there. In accord with this, knowledge of essence is by no means matter-of-fact knowledge, including not the slightest shade of affirmation regarding an individual (e.g., natural) being-there. The foundation, or better, the point of departure for an essential intuition (e.g., of the essence of perception, recollection, judgment, etc.) can be a perception of a perception, of a recollection, of a judgment, etc., but it can also be a mere. . . imagination, so long as it is clear, even though obviously as such not an experience, that is, grasps no being-there (PRS, 112).

Intuition here is no other than what is seen by reflection upon pure, immanent consciousness as the transcendental residuum after we exercise the phenomenological reduction and suspend any judgment regarding the existence of any and every transcendent being. Intuition of essences is different from experience (perception, recollection, judging, willing, etc.) of things in that, what is intuited in essential intuition is in no way different from consciousness with regard to its mode being. In other words, “reflection”, as the only way of “seeing” the essential structures of transcendental consciousness, is not “introspection”, because in introspection what is *seen* is somehow separate from, or transcendent to the *act of seeing*.³⁷ Intuition of the

³⁶ That is to say, it should be distinguished from psychology as the science which objectifies the mental states and palms off the transcendental meanings as “immanent objectivities”.

³⁷ For David Cerbone, Daniel Dennett and his “heterophenomenology” can be accounted for as a good example for a possible misunderstanding of the Husserlian phenomenology, which may issue from mistaking reflection for introspection. As Cerbone notes, being skeptical about the possibility of investigating the mental phenomena without objectifying them, Dennett criticizes Husserl’s reflection-based descriptions about the sphere of pure consciousness and charges the latter as occupying himself with “impromptu theorizing”. Dennett thinks that “such theorizing is highly unreliable, because the true

essence of, say, a perception as “the perception of a perception” is possible only from the transcendental standpoint, because in the natural attitude what we perceive is the transcendent object; that is to say, on the non-philosophical, or non-phenomenological level perception is just *lived through* but not perceived. Additionally, determining the essence of an intentional act like perception, judging, imagining, etc. is, on the one hand, elucidating the meaning-conferring capacity of the act (noetic side) in an essential correlation with the objective realm constituted by this act (i.e., meant-objectivity as the noematic correlate). On the other hand, intuition of essences of the acts in question is none other than clarifying the mutual relations between them like the possible unities between “empty intention” and “intuition, “imagination” and “perception”, “concept” and “intuition”, etc. (PRS, 113).³⁸

Meaning-conferring acts as the noetic correlate and the meant-objects as the noematic one (“intentional objects”) are the contents of pure consciousness that are claimed to be laid out by reflection. Phenomenology’s task is to demonstrate the essential interrelatedness of the two by thematizing the pure consciousness without objectifying it in a naturalistic manner. Husserl contends that our naïve consent to the general thesis of the natural attitude is the only obstacle which prevents us from making our theme the pure consciousness in terms of the “pure science”, or the science of all sciences; i.e., phenomenology (PRS, 110):

That the essences can be grasped in essential intuition permit, at least to a very great extent, of being fixed in definitive concepts and thereby affords possibilities of definitive and in their own way absolutely valid *objective* statements, is evident to

objects of such activity are events and processes in the brain, to which outside, expert observers have better access” (Cerbone 2003, 115). For a more extensive study of the same writer on the same issue, see also (Cerbone 2006, 134-177).

³⁸ It must be paid attention to the fact that the concept-pairs are not formed in a contingent manner. Every second of a dual is the fulfilled form of the first.

anyone free of prejudices” (PRS, 111; italics mine).

Nonetheless, Heidegger is not among the ones who were satisfied with the demand of a *novel objectivity* demanded for the transcendental consciousness. According to him, transcendental consciousness cannot be investigated unless it is clarified in terms of its ontological constitution. Should we remain loyal to the basic task of phenomenology as disclosing the basic structures of intentionality, we are to steer clear of the traditional understanding of being as presence-at-hand (*Vorhandenheit*), extantness, or *objective-determinability*. Unless we give up comprehending the act-character of consciousness in its *occurring* “here and now”, rather than in its *having-been-occurred*,³⁹ our aim must be going beyond any and every kind of thinking based on objectification. Heidegger is indeed satisfied with the fact that phenomenology managed to overcome the threat of psychologism by demarcating the ideal being of the judged content from the real being of the judgmental acts. However, he adds, “*the reality of this real aspect of acts is left undetermined*” throughout the phenomenological elucidations of Husserl (*HCT*, 118).

In view of this immanent psychic character we must now ask, what in it do we investigate as its being? This question, what do we investigate in consciousness as its being, is also formulated by Husserl in this way: what in it can we grasp and define, and fix as objective unities?⁴⁰ *Being* for Husserl is nothing other than true being,

³⁹ In *Prologomena* lectures, Heidegger prefers to utilize the terminology of “essence/existence” in order to refer to the act-character of the intentional acts and, with Husserl in his mind, says: “[I]n the consideration and elaboration of pure consciousness, merely the *what-content* is brought to the fore, without any inquiry into the being of the acts in the sense of their existence. . . . From the what I never experience anything about the sense and the manner of the that—at any rate, only that an entity of this what-content (*extension*, for example) can have a certain manner of being” (*HCT*, 110).

⁴⁰ The paragraph Heidegger referring to is as follows: “If the immanently psychical is not nature in itself but respondent of nature, what are we seeking for in it as its ‘being’? If it is not determinable in ‘objective’ identity as the substantial unity of real properties that must be grasped over and over again and be determined and confirmed in accordance with science and experience, if it is not to be withdrawn from the eternal flux, if it is incapable of becoming the object of an intersubjective evaluation—then what is there in it that we can seize upon, determine, and *fix as an objective unity*?” (PRS, 110; italics mine).

objectivity, true for a theoretical scientific knowing. The question of the specific being of consciousness, of lived experiences, is *not* raised here. What is raised is the question of a *distinctive way of being an object for an objective science of consciousness* (HCT, 119).

As it is obvious from the quote above, what Heidegger stubbornly emphasizes about the transcendental phenomenology and the *epoché* is that the realm of transcendental subjectivity—pure consciousness, or transcendental consciousness—was unintentionally characterized in the same way as the real, or objective being; i.e., in traditional ontological terms, *substance*. Heidegger is evidently of the opinion that absolutizing the sphere of consciousness is nothing other than substantializing it. Husserl does this because he could not manage setting aside his fundamental obsession with heightening phenomenology to the level of “pure science” of *the absolute being* of the transcendental consciousness. But what does *absolute being* mean as long as pure consciousness of transcendental phenomenology is considered? Heidegger’s answer is fourfold:

First of all, consciousness is “immanent being” in that, during reflection, the act that is reflected upon is *really* included by the act of reflection. So, immanence is attributed not to the individual acts one by one; instead, it characterizes the relationality of the acts within the same stream of lived-experiences. Insisting upon the fact that the sense of this relation of “being-in-one-another” is not clarified enough (HCT, 103), Heidegger seems implying that it is no different from being-in-one-another of transcendent entities (like pencils in a box, box in a cabinet, cabinet in a room, etc.). So, Husserl is blamed by Heidegger to be confusing the being of consciousness with that of transcendent reality.⁴¹

Secondly, “consciousness is absolute being in the sense of absolute givenness”. During

⁴¹ In the next section, the difference in question will be elucidated more.

reflection, again, within the stream of pure experiences, one act is given to another not indirectly or symbolically as it is thought to be the case with the givenness of transcendent objects,⁴² but “absolutely”. That is to say, the act reflected upon gives itself as it *really* is to the reflecting act. But this information neither helps broaden our understanding with regard to the being of acts; nor does it go further than qualifying an act as “a possible *object* of reflection” (*HCT*, 104).

Consciousness as absolutely given in the sense of “*nulla re indiget ad existendum*” (necessitates nothing in order to be) is the third nuance Heidegger discovers in Husserl’s conception of absolute being. That consciousness is not a real part of nature as naturalists assert, and its emergence and change cannot be explained on transcendent grounds by applying to causality, we already told above. Since consciousness is the only locus according to which every kind of transcendence, including that of nature as well as mathematical and logical entities, is constituted, the being of consciousness is characterized as absolute by Husserl. In other words, consciousness is the rock bottom behind which one cannot go in order to find another consciousness which constitutes the former—of course, if the former is to be qualified as transcendental. This conception is criticized by Heidegger for not being original enough, since it is entrapped by Cartesianism and Kantianism. According to this conception of absolute being, “consciousness is the earlier, the *a priori* in Descartes’ and Kant’s sense” (*HCT*, 106).

Lastly, “consciousness is pure being”. Only the *essence* of consciousness is considered to be relevant while investigating the transcendental subjectivity as the residuum of the *epoché*, and the *existence* of it is not taken into consideration in Husserl’s later

⁴² It should be remembered that, from the viewpoint of representationalism, a transcendent object is given to mind by means of an idea or an image.

phenomenology. Thus, consciousness is characterized as “pure” consciousness not in the sense that it is *not mixed*. Rather, the purity refers to the “mode of being” of consciousness which regards it as an object comprising of an essence *only*, although it is assumed to be a transcendental one. In contrast to this, objects of positive sciences are the essences with existence; they are “actual”. Husserl would object to this criticism by reiterating the fact that he eliminated the danger of attributing any kind of *objectivity* to the transcendental consciousness by means of phenomenological reduction, because after the *epoché*, the kind of objectivity we have to have in mind is totally different from the one applied to by positive sciences of any kind. As we saw above, whereas any science of naïve/pre-phenomenological standpoint qualifies its objects as *mere things* abstracted from the act of consciousness which thematized or objectified them; the object of transcendental phenomenology as the pure science of the absolute realm of intentional consciousness is but the *meaning conferring act/meant object* unity. However, thinks Heidegger, this unity as the “immanent object” of phenomenology could not be distinguished from the “transcendent object” of the positive sciences with regard to its mode of being; i.e., ontologically. Why?

2.2.3. The Difference between the Immanent and the Transcendent

The positive sciences make their research on a pre-determined realm of objects according to a presupposed understanding of objectivity. As we saw above, this kind of objectivity consists in the fact that the spatiotemporal entities outside us are related to one another by causal bonds. So, within the level of understanding asserted by the general thesis of the natural attitude, the reality of the real world is determined in advance by the objectivity of the objects of perception. However, contends Husserl, transcendent, real, spatiotemporal, and causally determinable object which is conceived to be independent of being intended by consciousness is:

. . . *according to its meaning mere intentional being*, a being, therefore, which has the

merely secondary, relative sense of a being *for* consciousness. It is a being which consciousness in its own experiences (*Erfahrungen*) posits, and is, in principle, intuitable and determinable only as the element common to the [harmoniously] motivated appearance-manifolds, but *over and beyond* this, is just nothing at all (*Ideas I*, 153).

As is clear from the paragraph quoted above, objectivity or factuality of the transcendent world of the natural attitude is reduced to meant-objectivity; that is to say, objectivity is possible only in the form of meaning or sense (Farber 1966, 57). So, the real objects which we experience in the natural attitude become the objects which are *meant to be real* as soon as we slide into the philosophical/phenomenological attitude.⁴³ Objectivity is not a real feature shared by the objects of the real world; it cannot be empirically derived by abstraction and generalization as a result of examining the possible objects of the positive sciences. Instead, objectivity belongs to the structure of the intentional consciousness and projected in an a priori manner upon the manifold of appearances as to make them a “unified whole” called object. Since what is directed at from the natural standpoint is not the objectivity but the objects, the phenomenological reduction is inevitable in order to change the focus of attention from experience to the conditions of the possibility of experience. Husserl’s phenomenology is said to be transformed into transcendental idealism after the publication of *Ideas I*, because the being attributed to every kind of transcendent object is reduced to the intentional being of pure, constituting consciousness. In other words, the mode of being of the transcendent world is proved to be the “dependent being”; dependent upon pure consciousness for its constitution. The being of the transcendent world is *relative to* the being of consciousness, which, in its turn, is characterized as *absolute being* since there is no other being on grounds of which it is acknowledged to be constituted.

⁴³ “In a certain sense and with proper care in the use of words we may even say that *all real unities are ‘unities of meaning’*. Unities of meaning presuppose. . . *a sense-giving consciousness*, which, on its side, is absolute and not dependent in its turn on sense bestowed on it from another source” (*Ideas I*, 168).

Husserl's tendency to give primacy to the immanent being of consciousness over the transcendent being of the objective world can be evaluated in terms of his strong Cartesianism. This Cartesianism is obtrusive in the passages in which he qualifies consciousness as "necessary" and the fact-world as "contingent being":

The thesis of my pure Ego and its personal life, which is 'necessary' and plainly indubitable, thus stands as opposed to the thesis of the world which is 'contingent'. All corporeally given thing-like entities can also not be, no corporeally given experiencing can also not be: that is the essential law, which defines this necessity and that contingency (Ideas I, 145).

The necessary being attributed to the inner realm of pure consciousness issues from the fact that the experiences included by the stream of consciousness are given to the reflective gaze of the pure Ego—which is also an experience—not representatively or symbolically. Rather, the experience reflected on is given fully and immediately to the reflecting act as *what it is*. The reflected act and the reflecting act belongs to the same sphere of immanent being as opposed to the perceived objects of the transcendent world, so "the object, the contemplated, and the contemplation are really [*reell*] included in one another. . . This direct inclusion of the apprehended object in the apprehension itself, in the unity of the same reality, is called *immanence*" (*HCT*, 96).

As opposed to the absolute givenness of the experiences to the reflective-phenomenological gaze after the phenomenological reduction, the transcendent objects of the physical world are given perspectively, or "in one of its aspects" (*Ideas I*, 137). When we see a building, we see it from an angle; when we listen to a musical piece, we listen to it from a CD in a room, or in a concert hall, etc. Perception of the transcendent things is always "inadequate" or "imperfect" when compared with the givenness of the immanent experiences to the reflective eye of the phenomenologist (*Ideas I*, 137). Only insofar as these perspectives as the "manifold of appearances" can be synthesized by consciousness in a harmonized fashion, can we mention something like the object of perception as the unity belonging to the transcendent world. So, a

transcendent object is nothing other than the outcome of the *externalizing* function of pure consciousness. This is to say that when we investigate the pure flux of experiences as the immanent sphere of consciousness, we come across neither the things, nor the ideas of them. What we encounter in there are the still meaningless sense data and experiences. However, contrary to what he said before as the absolute givenness of the immanent experiences to reflection, Husserl does not help making a further remark in §44 of the *Ideas I*:

Even an experience (*Erlebnis*) is not, and never is, perceived in its completeness, it cannot be grasped adequately in its full unity. It is essentially something that flows, and starting from the present moment, we can swim after it, our gaze reflectively turned towards it, whilst the stretches we leave in our wake are lost to our perception. Only in the form of *retention* or in the form of *retrospective remembrance* have we any consciousness of what has immediately flowed past us. And in the last resort the whole stream of my experience is a unity of experience, of which it is in principle impossible “swimming with it” to obtain a complete *perceptual grasp*. But this incompleteness or ‘imperfection’ which belongs to the essence of our perception of experience is fundamentally other than that which is of the essence of ‘transcendent’ perception, perception through a presentation that varies perspectively through such a thing as appearance (*Ideas I*, 140; italics mine).

This long paragraph which weirdly remained unnoticed in the secondary literature aiming to achieve a comparative analysis between Husserlian and Heideggerian phenomenologies, can be given as a very good example of Husserl’s failure to derive the difference between the immanent being and the transcendent being in the eyes of Heidegger. As the quote manifests clearly, Husserl seems to be insistent, even when he is talking about the reflective gaze of the phenomenological attitude and the intuition of the essences (act/object unities, or noetic/noematic contents), upon a paradigm according to which “perceptual grasp” plays the central role. The main lines of Heidegger’s criticism of Husserl can be said to be developed on the grounds that the latter stuck to a framework according to which being (*Sein*), whether it is immanent or transcendent, is interpreted in terms of *being-perceived*, or *perceivedness*. Intuition of the essences of the intentional act/object structures (noetic/noematic structures) could

not be phenomenologically differentiated from the natural perception which is based on the similar type of objectification as we normally come across in the natural attitude. Husserl is well aware of the fact that, using the objectification/perception schema, phenomenologist is prone to be entrapped by what is asserted in the general thesis of the natural attitude. However, he surprisingly does not hesitate to pronounce the words like “retention” and “retrospective remembrance” the reckless uses of which may easily give way to a misunderstanding according to which the pure stream of experiences is objectified in the same manner as the “thing-like” objects of the natural attitude. This is exactly what Heidegger contends when claiming that Husserl did not manage tackling the pure consciousness because he could not realize the peculiar way of being of the intentional experiences. According to him, as we mentioned earlier, the father of phenomenology could not help handling the intentional acts within the pure flux of experiences in their *occuredness* since he could not get beyond the horizon of understanding which is based on the seemingly inevitable tendency to *objectify* (methodical, epistemological prejudice) and the corresponding understanding of being as presence-at-hand, occurrentness, or *Vorhandenheit* (as the corresponding ontological prejudice). What must rather be done, for Heidegger, is to find a way to investigate the intentional acts in their *enactment*; i.e., to scrutinize them *without objectifying them*. Therefore, the question “what is the mode of being of that which is likely to be investigated without being objectified?” asserts itself to the phenomenologist as an ineluctable task. This is the reason is why Heidegger is insistent upon the fact that phenomenology is the method of ontology.⁴⁴

⁴⁴ Crowell lucidly summarizes Heidegger’s critique of Husserl’s neglect of the need for a novel ontology: “Heidegger accuses Husserl of foisting on phenomenology the Cartesian demand for a philosophical science based on absolutely certain foundations, when in fact it should be a radically new approach to ontology. Though Husserl does outline certain ontological determinations of consciousness, Heidegger argues that these are not drawn from the ‘being who is intentional’ but from those aspects of

Heidegger's criticism of Husserl is thus based on the fact that the latter could not help *re-objectifying* the pure phenomenological realm as the residuum of the *epoché*, since he could not raise the question of being with regard to the intentional consciousness. Although transcendental subjectivity is claimed to be demarcated from the transcendent entities on grounds of the fact that the former *constitutes* the latter, the sense of the constitution remains vague since the difference between the immanent being attributed to pure consciousness and the transcendent being to objects of the natural attitude (as well as the positive sciences) remains unclarified. As we saw above, Husserl's ultimate aim is to make manifest the intentional character of consciousness and characterize it as "consciousness of something" rather than a substantial unity (*Ideas I*, 119). On the other hand, by isolating the pure consciousness as absolute being from the transcendent world of the natural attitude, Husserl can be said to have blocked the only passage between the consciousness and the world and fallen short of explicating the intentionality in its a priori. Mohanty summarizes the problem in a way so loyal to the spirit of the Heideggerian critique of Husserl that it is worth quoting here:

On the one hand, there is the recognition of consciousness as constituting a self-contained and self-sufficient realm by itself. On the other hand, intentionality is said to be a necessary and universal feature of all consciousness; every consciousness must be of something. This something may, of course, be some other experiential process, as in the case of what Husserl calls 'immanent experiences'. But it is, in most cases, some object. How a self-contained system can get associated with object is thus a problem of major importance in this context... (Mohanty 1954, 343).

If intentional consciousness is to be objectified at all, then this objectification must be *qualitatively different* from the one through which intentional consciousness intends

consciousness that make it suitable to become the object of an epistemologically foundational science" (Crowell 2005, 52-53).

the transcendent objects outside itself.⁴⁵ Again, if this difference is to be truly a *qualitative* difference, then the mode of being of consciousness must be differentiated from that of nature in an ontological way. But Husserl failed to elucidate this difference and went on conceiving the immanent being in terms of a negative characterization; namely, as the *not-really-transcendent* being.⁴⁶ Had Husserl been successful in realizing the ontological peculiarity of what he characterized as the immanent realm, he would not have amputate the existence of the transcendent being by the reduction in order to have access to the isolated realm of transcendental consciousness. So, claims Heidegger, the phenomenological reduction is responsible for the substantiation of the sphere of consciousness, and by this substantiation, the same consciousness is deprived of its intentionality.⁴⁷ The following remark is important:

What more does the reduction accomplish? It disregards not only reality but also any particular individuation of lived experiences. It disregards the fact that the acts are mine or those of any other individual human being and regards them only in their *what*. It regards the what, the structure of the acts, but as a result does not thematize their *way to be*, their being an act as such (*HCT*, 109).

⁴⁵ “If, then, there is a subject which is in no way an object, it is a subject of which we cannot be conscious in the strict sense of the term, since the very preposition ‘of’ would indicate in it an objective relationship” (Lauer 1958, 53). Lauer continues by claiming that this subject, or pure consciousness is what we know while we are occupying ourselves cognitively with the world. But he cannot go further than it is the “pure grammatical subject of the *cogito*” (Lauer 1958, 54).

⁴⁶ Compare this with (Philipse 1995, 264), where he constructs the same argument in the reverse direction: transcendent = not-really-immanent. Whereas this formula underlines the fact that transcendent being cannot be included by the immanent consciousness, our point is that immanent being is defined in terms of transcendent being, because all we can say about the transcendent being is that it is *objectifiable*. Denying objective determinability to the immanent being, which Husserl failed to do, would prevent the equivocal conclusion that immanent being is *not-transcendent* being. The meaning of the ‘not’ here is not clear enough, since the positive qualification of the immanent being is missing.

⁴⁷ “The sense of the reduction involves precisely giving up the ground upon which alone the question of the being of the intentional could be based” (*HCT*, 109).

Heidegger thinks that Husserlian project is destined to failure from the beginning, for by the help reduction, as the essential first move of the phenomenologist, intentional realm of consciousness is cut off from its intentional correlate. That Husserl transfers the object from the transcendent to the immanent realm as in the form of “intentional object” or “noematic correlate” does not change anything in the eyes of Heidegger; he persistently argues against his mentor that this time, the “what-contents” of the structures of the intentional acts (noesis, *cogitatio*) together with what is intended in them as the object, or correlate of these acts (noema, *cogitatum*) are conceived as *standing-there-ready-to-be-discovered*, or present-at-hand as to their mode of being. If transcendental subject is to be elucidated in a phenomenologically appropriate manner, then the intentionality should not be conceived as a property of consciousness as if the later were a substance; instead, it must be remembered that consciousness is nothing other than *intend-ing something*. When stressing the fact that Husserl is interested in but the what-content or the “essence” of consciousness, Heidegger implies that not the act-character (intend-ing), but the abstracted essence of it is given to the look of reflection in the phenomenological attitude. If consciousness is truly intentional, it does not *lie* in a closed, isolated realm; rather, it *is* as long as *it points toward something*. So, the eye of the phenomenologist must turn away from the transcendental consciousness which is *present (vorhanden)* as an absolute, self-enclosed realm to Dasein which *ex-ists* as *pointing-toward, striving-beyond-itself*, or, in Heidegger’s words, “*original transcendence*” or “*disclosedness*.” “Being-in-the-world” is another name for Dasein, which implies that neither the world, nor the subject is ontologically primary over the other; rather, they should be thought of as “equiprimordial” phenomena and the man-world unity (the unity of the intending [act] and the intended [object]) must be conceived as the only phenomenon of phenomenology if phenomenology is to remain loyal to its basic task of elucidating intentionality in it’s a priori. And finally, since the being of this unity is not to be accounted for in terms of

bare presence (Vorhandensein), being (*Sein*) should be seen as the only theme of the phenomenological-ontological investigation. In contrast to the natural objects of the positive sciences and the thing-like entities of the everyday practices, phenomenological ontology must be after the “meaning of being”, if it is supposed to fulfill the task of clarifying the transcendental subjectivity in an appropriate manner.

CHAPTER 3

FROM TRANSCENDENTAL SUBJECT TO DASEIN: RADICALIZATION OF INTENTIONALITY

In the former chapter, we tried to lay bare the intellectual atmosphere of Husserlian phenomenology which nourished Heidegger. Our aim was to keep the balance and to show that Heidegger's appreciation of the basic tenets of Husserlian thinking is no less important than his critical stance against him. In this chapter, we will bring up his attempt to radicalize the idea of transcendental subjectivity and probe into the reasons why he refused to placidly give consent to his mentor's contention that absolute consciousness in its intentional structure is the being of beings, because it is the final ground upon which any attitude, including the natural one, toward the world and other human beings is to be constituted. Regarding the destiny of phenomenological thinking, Heidegger's discontent with Husserl's transcendental arguments can be accounted for as ensuing a revolution, especially when one can clearly see that his conception of Dasein as originally transcendent in its ontological constitution gives way to the question of being, which is the only question for philosophy according to Heidegger. Given that the *Seinsfrage* is the only issue for philosophy and that philosophy is the phenomenological ontology, then we should better start with clarifying what Heidegger means by *phenomenon*, since the phenomenon of phenomenology is but being.

3.1. Enframing Phenomenology as the Method of Ontology

3.1.1. Phenomenological Conception of Phenomenon

In order that we come to a better understanding of what the essence of phenomenology according to Heidegger is and why he so sharply criticized his mentor for falling short of founding the phenomenal basis of transcendental consciousness, we have to focus on §7 of *Being and Time*, in which he lays bare what he understands from what he is after throughout the book; i.e., “the concept of *phenomenon*” of phenomenology. Though what is treated in this paragraph, which was antecedently held in the 1925 lecture *History of the Concept of Time* in a detailed fashion, would seem confusing for the beginner of Heidegger’s thinking at the outset, it should be noted that this is where the gist of the Heideggerian main problematic first comes to be declared. This brief section is so essential that, even the well-equipped, experienced reader can be recommended to read it again and again, in order that what he learned from the philosopher’s whole phenomenological oeuvre can be meaningfully gathered around the germ of his philosophy: i.e., the question of being.

Not surprisingly, Heidegger appeals to the Greek roots of the word *phainomenon* in order that he becomes certain of tracing the right track. He notes that *phainesthai* means “to bring to the light of the day, to put in the light” (*BT*, 54). By an obvious allusion to Plato’s famous allegory in which truth is defined in terms of standing under the sunlight rather than becoming manifest by means of shadows in an half enlightened cave, Heidegger tries to remind us that the primary, original meaning of *phainomenon* is “*that which shows itself in itself*, the manifest” (*BT*, 54). Wherein this definition is given, therein the heart of *Being and Time* and the whole phenomenological project can be said to be hidden, although the significance of what is stated here is not clear at the first sight.

In order to elucidate his understanding of phenomenology as the logic of appearing, Heidegger introduces four kinds of manifestation, which are “semblance”, “appearance”, “mere appearance”, and “*formal* conception of ‘phenomenon’”. When something shows itself as it in fact is not, Heidegger calls this kind of manifestation “seeming”, or “semblance” [*Scheinen*] (*BT*, 51). In this case something passes itself off as something else. “Only what makes a pretense to be manifest can be a semblance. In fact, that is the *sense of semblance: pretension to be manifest but not really being it*” (*HCT*, 81). During a promenade in a forest in the night, one would think that what he saw standing there a hundred meters away from him is just a man, which in fact is a tree. What causes this misperception, whether it is dark, rainy, or foggy that day, does not matter for phenomenology according to Heidegger; instead, the way what shows itself shows itself is the sole concern of the phenomenologist. As long as the intentional lived-experiences are considered, what is taken heed of is not whether what is judged about the state of affairs is in correspondence with this state of affairs, but the *how* of consciousness’ becoming related with the world (*HCT*, 31). It is in this sense that semblance can be accounted for as a legitimate mode of manifestation, rather than the source of a false proposition.

The second meaning attributed to the concept of phenomenon is “appearance” [*Erscheinung*]. In the case of appearance, what manifests itself does so by the mediation of something else which shows itself. In other words, what announces itself [*das Sichmeldende*] remains covered up, unless it is “indicated” by something else which comes into view; i.e., it “ap-pears” or “trans-pears” (Courtine 1992, 75) The relationship between that which indicates by coming into sight and that which is to be announced by the apparition of the former can be thought of as a relationship between the symptoms [*Krankheitserscheinungen*] and the disease whose indications the former are (*BT*, 52). When one is suffering from measles, what the doctor detects when examining the patient is not the illness itself, but the symptoms, like fever and the red

spots on the skin all over the body, which indicate the illness. For this kind of phenomenon, it can easily be stated that what shows up comes into view for the sake of the manifestation of something lurking behind it. Without any trouble, it can be contended that this is nothing other than the “reference” relationship. In other words: “Appearing is an *announcing-itself* [das *Sich-melden*] through something that shows itself” (BT, 53). In sharp contradistinction with semblance, appearing is totally unrelated with misperception, because whereas in semblance what seems shows itself—although in a misleading manner as to give way to illusions—what becomes manifest by appearing becomes manifest only by the mediation of something else which gives itself immediately. Stated differently, in contrast to semblance, or seeming, “appearing is *not-showing itself*” (BT, 52). Clearly, this “not-showing itself” is not *hiding-itself*, instead, giving itself for the sake of something else which stands behind.

[T]he ‘not’ we find here is by no means to be confused with the privative “not” which we used in defining the structure of semblance. What appears does *not* show itself; and anything which thus fails to show itself, is also something which can never seem. All indications, presentations, symptoms, and symbols have this basic structure of appearing, even though they differ among themselves (BT, 52).

During a mountain climb with a group of people, when one comes face to face with a warning sign on which there happens to be drawn a pictorial representation of an avalanche, the last thing what one normally does is to stop there in order to examine the sign-thing—in the end, this is precisely what the sign warns one not to do—but to find out the risk and leave the region as soon as possible. The sign gives itself to the one who encounters it not as a *mere thing*; instead, it becomes encounterable through what it is *not*—the avalanche itself.⁴⁸

⁴⁸ In the First Investigation, Husserl draws attention to a similar point, when he says: “If *A* summons *B* into consciousness, we are not merely simultaneously or successively conscious of both *A* and *B*, but we

When what stands behind the appearance as that which is to become manifest remains hidden to the empirical experience permanently, the “mere appearance” [*blosse Erscheinung*] comes up as the third kind of manifestation (*BT*, 53).⁴⁹ According to Heidegger, the ontic relation between what appears as phenomena and “the real and true entity” hiding behind it as the thing-in-itself makes up the basic framework which has determined the main point of view of “traditional epistemology and metaphysics” for centuries (*HCT*, 83).⁵⁰ In Kant, says Heidegger, the technical term phenomenon is used in such a manner that both appearance and mere appearance can be related with

usually *feel* their connection forcing itself upon us, a connection in which the one points to the other and seems to belong to it” (*LI I*, 274). This is to say that, when someone claims: “I know that someone camped here, *since* I saw the ashes of the campfire”, the seeing of the campfire as the *sign* or *indication* of an uninvited visitor is not a separate act of judgment; i.e., separate from the act by which the reporter concludes the presence of a camper. The minimum condition which makes seeing the remnants possible is to perceive them as *the indicator* of a stopover. Hence, claims Husserl, this is a unitary act of judgment instead of being a sum total of two separate assertions, and the categorial form “since” is to be conceived of as one of the objective correlates of this same judgment: “. . . that certain things *may* or *must* exist, *since* other things have been given. The ‘since’, taken as expressing an objective connection, is the objective correlate of ‘motivation’ taken as a descriptively peculiar way of combining acts of judgment into a single act of judgment” (*LI I*, 270-271).

⁴⁹ Christopher Macann puts forward the distinction between *Erscheinung* and *blosse Erscheinung* in an eloquent way: Whereas the former denotes “a something which *does not* appear”, the latter stands for “a something which *cannot* appear” (Macann 1992, 98). Stated differently, whereas the former can refer to, imply, or stand for something else which does not appear, the latter cannot.

⁵⁰ Although it is especially the Kantian “thing-in-itself” which Heidegger has in mind when talking about the mere appearance, Husserlian “transcendental object” is also worth mentioning here as an example of *blosse Erscheinung*: “What is common to the two is that the reality of the thing has become something purely ideal. The purely ideal character of the thing in itself means, for Kant, that it must be situated in a purely intelligible (i.e., noumenal) realm lying over and beyond that of the sensible (i.e., phenomenal). For Husserl, on the other hand, the ideality of the (transcendental) object means that it does, and can only, make its appearance in and through the phenomenal manifold as a *meaning* posited by intentional consciousness.” So a discrimination should be made between the Kantian *Ding an sich* as an exemplar of “*blosse Erscheinung 1*” and Husserlian *noema* as a pattern of “*blosse Erscheinung 2*” (Macann 1992, 99). It should also be noted that in *Logical Investigations*, this conception of *blosse Erscheinung* can be thought of as akin to “what is meant” in an expression through which the object as a whole is referred to. On the other hand, as was tried to be explained in the former chapter, this empty expression must be fulfilled, or saturated by some intuition which is to remain always partial and perspectival, in order that something like “synthesis of identification” first becomes possible.

it. Whereas the forms of intuition and the categories are, as the a priori structures which make possible the objects of experience just as much as the experience itself, are to be accounted for as “appearance”, the thing-in-itself is the “mere appearance” to the extent that it can in no way be objectified as the conditions of experience are, which can very well be thematized when the empirical investigation of things is superseded by a transcendental one (*BT*, 55). Kantian critical philosophy, as transcendental inquiry, is nothing but a search after the ideal or transcendental conditions of the empirical reality of the objects which are none other than the appearances.

All these tedious analyses are enacted for underscoring the fact that something like an original phenomenon as in the form of the self-manifest is needed in order that the former three can be grounded. Heidegger calls it, in contrast to “the ordinary conception of phenomenon”, “the *formal* conception of phenomenon”, or “the phenomenological conception of phenomenon” (*BT*, 54). About the grounding concept of phenomenon, he writes:

“*Phenomenon*”, the showing-itself-in-itself, signifies a distinctive way in which something can be encountered. “*Appearance*”, on the other hand, means a reference-relationship which is an entity itself, and which is such that what *does the referring* (or the announcing) can fulfill its possible function only if it shows itself in itself and is thus a ‘phenomenon’. Both appearance and semblance are founded upon the phenomenon, though in different ways. The bewildering multiplicity of ‘phenomena’ designated by the words “phenomenon”, “semblance”, “appearance”, “the mere appearance”, cannot be disentangled unless the concept of phenomenon is understood from the beginning as that which shows itself in itself (*BT*, 54).

According to this extremely important paragraph, Heidegger suggests that there should be a unity among the various meanings of phenomenon, and this is nothing other than the self-manifestation, or showing-itself-in-itself. The original meaning of phenomenon which Heideggerian phenomenology seeks after should be defined as the *auto-revealing*, or *self-giving* within the horizon of which both the *seeming-as* of the

semblance and the *with-reference-to* of appearing and mere appearing are derivative modes of manifestation (*HCT*, 82). If Heidegger's philosophy is to be characterized as a genuine ontological investigation, then it should be born in mind that the reason that this is so is nothing other the fact that the philosopher rethinks the relation between man and his world in such an innovative manner that both the Kantian and Husserlian transcendental frameworks are refuted in advance. What seems to be an innovation on Heidegger's side is but iteration; iteration of the Husserlian motto "To the things themselves!" Sticking to the motto except in the singular form, Heidegger directs all of his energy to reconsidering the *original unity* or *primal togetherness* of the human being and his world. It is this primal *belonging-together-ness* of man and his world which deprives ontological investigation of any kind of a pre-determined *with-respect-to*, and debars it from a legitimate explanatory fulcrum that is on-hand. In contradistinction to Husserl's egocentric schema which distinguishes the constituting consciousness from the constituted world, Heideggerian approach reminds us of the fact that what is to be drawn into phenomenological focus is the mutual belongingness of the consciousness and its world. On the other hand, thinking this primal unity is nothing other than trying to direct the phenomenological gaze to the *in-between* of the constituting subject and the constituted object. This amounts to denying both the possibility of investigating the world *with respect to* the pregiven consciousness, or explaining the being of consciousness *in terms of* the reality of the external world. Hence, it can be concluded that both realism and idealism can be regarded as working with the phenomena which can be accounted for in terms of "appearance" and "mere appearance". If Heideggerian phenomenological ontology is to be acknowledged to be the philosophical position *beyond idealism and realism*, then its mode of locating itself vis-à-vis *logos* first becomes an issue.

3.1.2. Positioning *Logos vis-à-vis* the Original Phenomenon

As long as the original phenomenon of phenomenology is determined as the primal unity of man and world, then positioning *logos vis-à-vis* the *Sache selbst* of phenomenological investigation becomes a problem. As shown in the previous chapter, Husserl is charged by Heidegger with sacrificing intentionality for the sake of transcendental consciousness, and hence, being stuck into the confines of traditional philosophizing. The claim that Husserl could not manage thinking out the mode of being of intentionality is supported by his being loyal to the Cartesian way of thinking⁵¹ according to which the vehicle of *logos*—that is, the absolute consciousness, or the transcendental subject—is totally separated from the world which is construed to be constituted by the former. Indeed, Husserl’s insistence upon qualifying pure phenomenology as the “science of all sciences” testifies to the fact that the mode of being of the world is still thought of in terms of the mode of being of the object, that which *stands against* the subject as the receptacle of *logos*.

Contrary to the Husserlian/Cartesian “egology” according to which the thinking subject is encapsulated in itself as a being among other beings which it somehow constitutes, Heidegger emphasizes that that which is to be accounted for as the subject matter of phenomenological thinking is the original worldliness of the human Dasein, or, put differently, the having-already-been-articulated-ness of the entities in the world. Referring to Greek philosophy, especially Aristotle, he qualifies logic and discourse as the pre-objective uncoveredness of the world by means of the pre-thematic

⁵¹ “If one adds intentionality to consciousness, then the intended object still has its place in the immanence of consciousness. In *Being and Time*, on the contrary, the ‘thing’ has its place no longer in consciousness, but *in the world* (which again is itself not immanent to consciousness). Thus, despite intentionality, Husserl remains trapped in immanence—and the consequence of this position are the *Méditations cartésiennes*” (ZS, 70).

understanding of the meaning of being of the entities within the world. Rather than characterizing logic as the form of thinking which has been unquestioningly projected upon the order of things⁵² down through the history of philosophy up until him, Heidegger reminds us of the fact that logic is the primordial articulateness of the world as the meaningful context in which entities are present intelligibly. The “pre-“ in “pre-objective” and “pre-thematic” underlies the a priori character of *logos* and helps us comprehend the fact of prior articulateness of thinking and being. The articulateness of what Heidegger calls “world” as the holistic network of significant relations and equipmental things makes up one certain aspect of the original givenness of the self-manifest according to *Being and Time*. However, this holistic structure which Heidegger calls “world” is not given to the isolated subject as an object. Instead, the entities taking place in this holistic context become what they are only with reference to the human ends predetermined in a historical with-world. “For what it is used”, “with which other equipment it is implemented” and “for the sake of what purpose it will be manipulated” of any equipment is determined in advance with regard to the preset human purposes and these purposes are *already* articulated in advance in the public “discourse” which is determined as the primary sense of *logos* in Greek philosophy. However, purposiveness, being with others in a historical/public with-world, and being in discourse belongs to the essence of human beings, but not in the way some properties are attributable to a substance. At the end of the day, claiming that A as a substance has a certain property B is tantamount to claiming that it can very well exist without that property—if nothing, imaginatively. The innovation of

⁵² So, the projection from words to thoughts and from thoughts to things is explained by Heidegger as follows: “If the proposition is a verbal sequence which requires a combination, then corresponding to the sequence of words there will be a sequence of ideas for which a combination will also be needed. The sequence of ideas corresponding to the verbal sequence is something psychical, present in thinking. And given that in the assertion something is asserted about beings, it follows that some thing or some complex of physical things must correspond to this complex of ideas present in thinking” (*BPP*, 206).

Heidegger's conception of human being lies in his refusal of characterizing it as a worldless subject as the source of formal-logical thinking.

Since the *logos* of phenomenology pertains to pre-propositional truth, Heidegger underscores the fact that in Aristotle, it primarily means "discourse" (*deloun*), "to make manifest what one is 'talking about'" (*BT*, 56). So, *legein* as in the form of discourse has the function of "letting something be seen" to the one who does the talking or to the other party: "this is the structure of *logos* as *apophansis*" (*ibid*). This apophantic character immanent to the essence of *logos* as discourse reminds us of the ontological fact that *being-said* cannot be separated from the mode of being of the entities which we come across in an everyday manner in our enviroing world (*Umwelt*). That is why, in the 1925 lecture course, against the intuition-based Husserlian phenomenology Heidegger writes the following:

It is not so much that we see the objects and things but rather that we first talk about them. To put it more precisely: we do not say what we see, but rather the reverse, we see what *one says* about the matter. This inherently determinate character of the world and its potential apprehension and comprehension through expressness, through already having been spoken and talked over, is basically what must . . . be brought out in the question of the structure of categorial intuition (*HCT*, 56).

By this move, Heidegger can be said to have spanned the distance which the traditional philosophy, by way of the objectifying/thematizing attitude, opened between thinking and the world. *Logos* is now displaced from the detached subject and relocated into the original unity of man and world as in the form of *being-in-the-world*. Since the logic of phenomenology is hereafter to be conceived as intrinsic to the phenomenon of phenomenology, then the original phenomenon of this science is no longer an object for it in the usual sense of the term. Hence, claims Heidegger, phenomenology is not a science among other positive sciences like biology, sociology, psychology, and so forth. So, we should ask, on what legitimizing ground can phenomenology as the science of the self-manifest be characterized so as to deserve the name science, and

what is the task of it.

3.1.3. The Task of Phenomenology

The reason why Heidegger persistently stresses that the phenomenological conception of phenomenon is nothing but “the self-manifest” lies in the fact that being-said, being-thought, and being-articulated-in-language are intrinsic to the essence of the entities which we find in our everyday world. As a matter of fact, not only is the mode of being of the entities other than us, but also our basic comprehension of the ontological constitution of our and other’s selves is subjected to the same conditions as well. So long as *having-already-been-interpreted-ness* belongs to the mode of being of the beings including ourselves, formal logic and language cannot be thought of as the basic instruments by the help of which we attain the inner structure of things or thing-composites. If thoughts and languages are entities alongside other present entities within the world, then it must be claimed that the mode of being of the former should have been understood beforehand as well as the latter, in order that the latter can be represented by the former. Indeed, the whole of what is said, what is thought, and what *is* are the primary concerns of phenomenology as Heidegger claimed in *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*:

It becomes clear from what has been said that we not only require a general delineation of what pertains to the complete concept of logos. . . but that the essential thing is the portrayal of the specific *contextural interconnection* of these phenomena which belong essentially to the whole of the logos. This contexture must not merely come about after the fact by a process of composition under the constraint of things. Instead, this relational whole of word, signification, thinking, what is thought, what *is* must be determined in a primary way beforehand (*BPP*, 207).

It is only as long as we manage thinking this contextural interconnection of world, thinking, and language that we can be said to be prepared enough to come to grips with the things themselves and “to let that which shows itself be seen from itself in the very way in which it shows itself from itself” (*BT*, 58). In other words, rather than

projecting the tripartite formal logical structure comprising of concept, proposition and inference to the ontological constitution of entities including ourselves, we have to conceive the mode of being of entities as has already been articulated in *logos* or discourse. Unless this route is followed, it becomes impossible to apprehend what categorial intuition in Husserlian sense is pregnant to; i.e., the original superimposedness of the categorial forms (or, the ideal forms) on the world of things (or, the real beings). No need to say, any deviation from, or a misunderstanding of this conception of categorial intuition damages fatally our comprehension of intentionality, which, in its turn, naturally results in the total destruction of phenomenology. Since the *Sache selbst* of phenomenology is nothing other than the things *as they are intended*, the very task of phenomenology as the science of all sciences should be determined as examining *how* entities are objectified in order that they become the objects of the positive sciences like biology, theology, etc. Heidegger clarifies this point eloquently:

Phenomenology is *legein ta phainomena = apophainestai ta phainomena*—*letting the manifest in itself be seen from itself*. In the same vein, the maxim of phenomenological research—back to the matters themselves—is basically nothing other than a rendition of the name phenomenology. But this means that phenomenology is essentially distinct from the other names for the sciences—*theology, biology, etc.*—in that it says *nothing about the material content* of the thematic object of this science, but speaks really only—and this emphatically—of the *how*, the way in which something is and has to be thematic in this research! Phenomenology is accordingly a ‘*methodical*’ term, inasmuch as it is only used to designate the mode of experience, apprehension, and determination of that which is thematized in philosophy (*HCT*, 85).

Instead of focusing on the whatness of its object, phenomenology should occupy itself with the ground upon which *quidditas* turns out to be the main ontological framework in terms of which entities become not only the objects of positive sciences, but also the things of perception for the natural attitude. On this point, it can easily be claimed that what Heidegger is searching after is the ground of objectivity, not of the objects themselves. His claim that phenomenology is the method of ontology rather than epistemology makes sense only as long as this point is clarified enough.

We saw in the previous chapter that Heidegger's critique of Husserl centers on the fact that the latter could not manage working out the mode of being of the intentional realm as he promised at the beginning of his career. The gist of this critique is that even though it first ushers an innovative conception of being by way of the notion of intentionality, Husserlian phenomenology could not evade being entrapped by the traditional understanding of being based on whatness, since it could not help handling the absolute consciousness as the object of the phenomenological science. On the contrary, Heidegger thinks that if intentionality is not an extra-feature accrued to the substantial subject, this subject must be characterized as always-already being-in-a-world. This implies that the subject is not a self-sufficient ontological unit encapsulated in itself, but is the openness toward the world and intraworldly entities. Accordingly, phenomenology should be the special reflection upon the method by way of which this peculiar mode of being of the subject which Heidegger calls Dasein is thematized. And only after Dasein is set forth as the entity which is "in truth", "originary transcendence" and "being-in-the-world", being as such (*Sein als solches*) as in the form of *meaning of being* can be shown to be the "self-manifest" which corresponds to what Heidegger calls the "phenomenological conception of phenomenon".

3.2. Dasein's Relation to Truth

Heidegger's endless efforts in a wide variety of texts from the mid-twenties to his death to scrutiny the "essence of truth" mainly concern the ontological conditions which make possible the traditional understanding of the concept, according to which truth is characterized as the value attached to the propositions only. In order that the ontological conception can be distinguished from the epistemological one, and that the difference between the Heideggerian and the traditional conceptions of truth can be elucidated in an understanding fashion, Gelven states the following: "Heidegger is *not*

rendering a criterion of truth; he is interpreting the essence or meaning of truth” (Gelven 1989, 127). He contends that whereas the traditional conceptions consisting of the correspondence, coherence and pragmatic theories of truth search after “under what circumstances something is true”, Heidegger tries to formulate the ontological sense (*Sinn*) of truth (*ibid*).

When interpreting the phenomenon of truth ontologically, Heidegger mainly focuses upon two prejudices in a deconstructive fashion, the first of which claims that truth is the property of propositions, and the second, propositions are the entities inherent in the human mind whose essence lies in its agreement with its object.⁵³ So, unless we remain insensitive to the question of the mode of being of the subject (or, human mind) as the vehicle of assertions, we certainly fall short of formulating the question of truth, let alone answering it. It therefore can be contended that the question of truth can first of all be formulated only insofar as it is asked in terms of the relationship between it and the human subject. Truth can be conceptualized in a perceptive manner only if the subject is understood as the “understanding of truth”. Hence, Heidegger writes in his 1925 *Logic* lectures:

Before the question of *what* truth is, there comes the question of *whether* it is at all. Before sketching out what it is, we have to prove *that* it is. Against this position, we may propose this formal argument: focusing on and discussing the question whether there is truth at all implies that we already have some understanding of truth. We must somehow know what a thing is if we are to decide its being or non-being (*L*, 15).⁵⁴

⁵³ As a matter of fact, Heidegger detects in *Being and Time* three prejudices, the last of which is that Aristotle as the father of logic is the founder of the theory of truth which is based on correspondence (*BT*, 257). However, since it is not our intention to focus upon his interpretation of Aristotle in a detailed fashion, we will content ourselves with underlining the first two, which are more than enough for the purposes of the present section.

⁵⁴ This argument belongs to a context where Heidegger voices his objection against skepticism which denies the idea of truth as a “phantom”. Heidegger criticizes the skeptical attitude by reminding us of the fact that the skeptic must have some certain initial understanding of truth as a measure against which

Despite its seeming simplicity, the paragraph quoted can be conceived as the harbinger of the extremity and fundamentality of what comes next: if the human subject is ontologically to be characterized as the being which has *already* some understanding of truth, then the question of truth as an arduous philosophical problem should be handled in a manner in which some certain critical attitude should be displayed towards the metaphysical understanding of subjectivity of the Western tradition. In the following, we will try to sketch out the main façades of Heidegger's deconstructive reading of the traditional account of truth and will make an effort to elucidate the unbreakable bond between the question of truth and that of subjectivity. Next, Heidegger's critical interpretation of Lotze's claim that the mode of being of propositions is "validity" (*Geltung*) is going to be examined as the ultimate part of the critical analyses of the conception of truth of Heidegger. The last section, therefore, will be devoted to the positive arguments of the philosopher, which claim that the ordinary conception of propositional truth is preceded by something like the primordial truth as in the form of the disclosedness of Dasein; i.e., human subject as it is in the world.

3.2.1. The Traditional Conception of Truth

Heidegger's critique of the traditional conception of truth presents an excellent occasion for us to realize that the question of truth and the question of the being of the subject are intertwined into a single problem. His basic contention is that every dilemma by which we normally entrapped when examining the problem of truth as the subject matter of epistemology issues from the traditional understanding of the mode of being of the propositions along with the human subject as the container of them.

the truth or falsity of the proposition "The idea of truth is a mere phantom" can be decided in a healthy way (*L*, 15-17). For a detailed discussion about Heidegger's refutation of skepticism, see also (Sallis 1994, 381-382).

Unless we refrain from conceptualizing the way of being of the subject in terms of *on-handness*, or *presence*, maintains the philosopher, it becomes impossible for us to unravel the problem of skepticism and penetrate into the depths of the problem of truth in a philosophical manner.

When mentioning the traditional or ordinary account, what Heidegger has in mind is the correspondence (*Angleichung*) theory of truth, rather than the coherence or the pragmatic theories. In congruence with the correspondence theory is the claim that the only locus in which something like truth can be deployed is the proposition or, in Heidegger's terms, the assertion. For example, things to which true propositions correspond can neither be true, nor be false. Thus, writes Heidegger in "On the Essence of Truth":

A statement is true if what it means and says is in accordance with the matter about which the statement is made. Here too we say, 'It is in accord'. Now, though, it is not the matter that is in accord but rather the *propositions* (OET, 119).

As is clear from the above quote, Heidegger is persistent upon the fact that the traditional account whose measure he lays out as "the correspondence of knowledge to the matter", or "*adaequatio rei et intellectus*" (OET, 120) could not help neglecting how it is possible for an ideal being such as proposition to correspond to, say, a thing that is real, as long as the former is conceived to be the self-identical entity "persisting in its own essence" along with the latter (OET, 123). This preponderant conception of truth based on the recited relationship between the two self-imposed beings⁵⁵ (the

⁵⁵ It should be borne in mind that the correspondence theory of truth goes hand in hand with the representationalist theory of mind, both of which belong to the modern-subjectivist period of Western thinking rather than the Ancient philosophy. Barry Allen thinks that what he calls "truth's ontological a priori" is the only measure to be accounted for, if one is to aptly formulate the difference between the conceptions of truth of these traditions. He devises the main dissimilarity as follows: "In modern philosophy, it is not nature or substance but the self-evident sameness of what is and what is affirmed when a subject is reflectively aware of itself as presently feeling, thinking, or apparently perceiving one thing and not another which demonstrates, against all skeptical doubt, the possibility in principle of a

proposition and that about which the proposition is) is called “correctness” (*Richtigkeit*) rather than truth (*Wahrheit*) by Heidegger (OET, 120).

That the proposition is a thing among other things whose mode of being is presence as well as the others is such a sneaky presupposition of the traditional philosophizing, that a vast majority of the Western thinkers up until Heidegger failed to examine it. As a result of this ignorance, which Daniel Dahlstrom calls “logical prejudice”, truth can only be thought of as “the predicates true and false” which are attributable to what is declared by the “claims, assertions, and judgments, that are formed as indicative, declarative sentences” (Dahlstrom 2001, 17). The reason why this is called “logical prejudice” lies in the fact that the only individual science which handles truth as such as its subject matter is logic. On the other hand, the rest of the sciences deal with truth as well, so long and insofar as they occupy themselves with knowledge consisting of true assertions. Nevertheless, these must be said to have “*what-is-true*” as their theme, rather than “*truth of what-is-true*” (*L*, 7).

The dilemma which the traditional account can be conceived to have given way to lies in the fact that logic, as the science of thinking, unquestioningly *objectifies* truth, while at the same time *using* it. This is exactly the point wherein what is explained (*explanandum*) and that by which the former is explained (*explanans*) are interfused in a confusing manner. As long as that by the help of which we become capable of elucidating and clarifying what the essence of truth is can rightly be decided to be true, then to what extent it can be qualified as being *capable* of explaining truth, is a persistent question which we cannot avoid. Hence, there simply is a problem with qualifying the activity of interrogating what truth is, that is to say, logic, as a *science*.

true-making sameness between thought and being” (Allen 1993, 32). For the correlation between the correspondence theory of truth and the representationalist theory of mind, see also (Wrathall 1999, 74).

Heidegger emphasizes this point in his *Logic* as follows:

The act of un-covering things in statements is what is true, and so the truth of theoretical-scientific knowledge has become the basic, original form of truth as such. The truth of [propositional] knowledge attains a universal primacy. To the degree that any other forms of truth enter the field of reflection, they are measured against the standard of the truth of [propositional] cognition and are understood as derived from it, as modifications of it (*L*, 9).

The reproach voiced out in the above quoted paragraph about the scientificity of the truth-investigation does, of course, not issue from a denigrating approach towards the scientific activity itself. Instead, the comportment of the scientific-theoretical attitude is at issue here, and this is nothing other than *objectification*. If the definition of truth is “Truth is the correspondence between *what is* and *what is asserted thereof*”, then it becomes questionable on what basis this proposition is true. Will it be correspondence again? This must, indeed, not be the case. Then it should be admitted that the “with-regard-to-which” of the correspondence relation holding between the two spheres of being has always been neglected when the essence of truth is formulated in a definitional form (*BT*, 258). The emphasis on the ignorance of the with-regard-to-which takes a different shape in *Logic* and enunciated in a question form: “*What is the basis* on which rests what we properly call truth?” (*L*, 7; italics mine). Stated differently, in correspondence to what is the definition of the correspondence theory of truth assured to be true? This is the point where the serpent attempts to bite its own tail. The only exit from out of this dilemma is to deepen the analysis as to give it an ontological hue and interrogating the mode of being of the propositions and that which is objectified by the propositions, as well as the ontological status of the relation between these two. This is exactly what Heidegger does while intermingling the question of truth with the question concerning being as such.

3.2.2. Ontological Interpretation of Proposition: Critique of Lotze

As the one who is especially searching after the essence of truth rather than the criterion by the help of which some sentence becomes true or false, Heidegger can be said to belong to the Kantian transcendental philosophical tradition. This claim can be spelled out, albeit with some reservations,⁵⁶ because it is the transcendental conditions that first make possible something like truth which Heidegger is after. The transcendentalism of Heidegger lies in the fact that he denies to deal with the problem of truth in an epistemological paradigm, according to which both the mode of being of the subject and that of the object are presupposed to be on-handness, or presence.⁵⁷ Instead, in what way the world is given to the subject, or how it is constituted by the subject is the most important question to be replied, in order that something like “transcendental truth” first becomes an issue. This transcendental truth, or the “ontological truth” refers to the conditions by which something like propositional truth initially turns into a concrete possibility as in the form of “ontic truth”.⁵⁸ The reason

⁵⁶ The main differences along with the similarities between Heidegger’s *Daseinsanalytic* and Kant’s transcendental idealism will be discussed in detail in the fourth chapter.

⁵⁷ About the transcendentalism of Heidegger, Paul Gerner writes: “The Heidegger of *Being and Time* is a transcendental philosopher in the sense that he inquires into the conditions of possibility of comportment to entities. His transcendentalism is more radical than Kant and Husserl because he asks: how is comportment to entities—not just *cognitive* comportment but *any* omportment to entities—possible? He seeks to show an understanding of being is a condition of the possibility of the comportment to entities” (Gerner 2002, 27).

⁵⁸ “Ontological” vs. “ontic truth” is a conceptualization which belongs to the *Kantbuch*. There, Heidegger depicts an analogue of the ontological truth as the truth of “transcendental logic”, whereas ontic truth is attributable to the assertions which corresponds to the states of affairs about which they are supposed to be: “Ontic knowledge can be adequate to the essent (to ‘objects’) only if the essent is already manifest beforehand as essent, that is, if the constitution of its being is known. It is to this last knowledge that objects, i.e., their ontic determinability, must conform. The manifestation of the essent (ontic truth) depends upon the revelation of the constitution of the being of the essent (ontological truth). However, ontic knowledge by itself can never conform ‘to’ objects, because without ontological knowledge it cannot have even a possible ‘to what’ [*Wonach*] of the confirmation” (*KPM*, 17-18).

why both Kant and Heidegger are accounted for as the transcendental philosophers lies in the fact that they try to elucidate in what way the object has a meaningful presence, before striving to decide which propositions about the world are true and which are false.⁵⁹ Unless the question of *about-ness*, i.e., how the propositions are *about* the objects to which they are claimed to correspond or fail to do so, is convincingly formulated, as was done by Kant in the “Transcendental Deduction”, the question of truth cannot be perceptively devised, let alone answered.⁶⁰

As the one who belongs to the transcendental philosophical tradition, what Heidegger, following Kant and Husserl, insists upon is that, if something like truth is to be satisfactorily expounded, then the question in what way something can be located against the mind in order that the latter has the true knowledge of the former, should be asked in a resolute manner. If truth belongs to proposition and proposition is the content of what is asserted about an object, then the ontological status of what is known vis-à-vis what knows becomes a trouble for the one who occupies himself with solving the problem of truth. The same can be uttered the other way around as well: Unless the ontological status of the proposition is clarified vis-à-vis the state of affairs about which it is, then the conditions under which alone the former corresponds to the

⁵⁹ Dahlstrom writes: “Kant’s aim is to establish conditions of the possibility of experience, that is, judgments (‘transcendental principles’) that underlie the possibility of truth and falsity. It is obvious that such a judgment in the ‘system of transcendental principles’ cannot be empirically true or false” (Dahlstrom 2001, 422).

⁶⁰ The relation of Heidegger to Kant’s transcendental idealism is set out by Haugeland as follows: “Specifically, Heidegger’s inquiry into the disclosing of being as the condition of the possibility of comportment toward entities as entities is a direct descendant of Kant’s inquiry into the forms of sensibility and understanding as conditions of the possibility of knowledge of objects as objects. In Kantian terms, this could be called the *transcendental* question of the possibility of *objectivity*. In Heideggerian terms, that would become the *existential* question of the possibility of *truth*” (Haugeland 2000, 44). In the following pages, the correlation between Heidegger’s conception of “disclosedness” and propositional truth will be clarified in more exact terms.

latter cannot be uncovered and the nature of truth as a relation remains in darkness forever. Kant's attempt to display the "objective reality" of the categories in the *Critique of Pure Reason* can be accepted as the prototype of unraveling the confusion thereof. The bewilderment of the problem of truth is partly dispelled by Kant, although he remains loyal to the correspondence theory of truth as long as the knowledge of the spatiotemporal, empirical world is considered. Nevertheless, he turns out to have the honor of having been the first one to have asked the truth of this correspondence in the transcendental deduction, and finally, he had to qualify the truth of the knowledge which pertains to the objective validity of the categories as the "transcendental knowledge". Unfortunately, as it did not happen to him to reconsider the mode of being of the categories of understanding other than presence, the giant problem of the truth of transcendental knowledge recurred on a higher level and has occupied the Western thinkers since then.

From 1916, the time he prepared his thesis on Duns Scotus, to the mid-twenties, Heidegger can be said to have occupied himself with the doctrine of the German logician Rudolph Hermann Lotze along with other prominent thinkers, the one who handles the problem of truth in an original way by focusing upon the mode of being of the propositions.⁶¹ Like the Neo-Kantian Emil Lask, another prominent figure in shaping Heidegger's early thought, Lotze can be claimed to have attended to the problem of the chasm between the subjective and objective realms of beings by the

⁶¹ For a brief discussion of how Heidegger's evaluations of Lotze's ontology of propositions has changed from positive to negative ones, see (Martin 2005,123-125). One of Martin's remarks is of such an importance that it may deserve to be quoted here: "In sum, then, we can see here another and deeper sense in which Heidegger's mature projects emerged from his early work on the judgment problem. The question of being (*Seinsfrage*) is the uniting principle that brings together all of Heidegger's writings, early and late. What we have seen here is that this question has its origins and finds its expression in Heidegger's attempt to come to terms with the distinctive ontology of judgment."

help of his concept of “validity” (“*Geltung*”).⁶² Since he, instead of presupposing the ontological statuses of both subject and object poles of the true knowledge as in the form of correspondence, tries to classify the modes of being of different kinds of entities, Lask can be said to have a prominent role in the transcendental investigation of truth in the Kantian sense.⁶³ That is why he may be said to have had an influence upon Heidegger’s inquiry into the truth of truth in its earlier stages, although his doctrine is sharply criticized by the philosopher afterwards for getting stuck in the traditional way of conceiving being.

Chapter 2 of the third book of Lotze’s *Logic* which has the title “The World of Ideas” mainly focuses upon Plato’s doctrine of ideas in a problem sphere where the Heraclitean doctrine that everything is in ceaseless flux and change is examined. This is where Heidegger takes into account the Lotzean claim that the mode of being of the propositions is validity (*L*, 54).

Given that everything in the world is exposed to constant change as Heraclitus

⁶² About the relation by which Lotze can be linked with the Kantian philosophy, Heidegger writes: “[I]nasmuch as validity is . . . understood as objectivity and holding-true-of-something, Lotze’s doctrine of validity gets linked up with Kant” (*L*, 72).

⁶³ The chasm in question is formulated by Crowell as the “two-world” theory and ascribed to the critical philosophy of Kant. According to this conceptualization, the so called chasm is opened up between the metaphysical and the sensible beings. Hermann Lotze is the one who amended the distinction of Kant in a way in which the mode of being of logical beings is contrasted to the former two: “Precise delimitation of the logical categories calls for a distinction that cuts across the traditional distinction between the sensible and the metaphysical. Hermann Lotze has first proposed the necessary distinction. Within the traditional world of the nonsensible there are the “supersensible” beings of metaphysics and the nonsensible *validities* of logic. With this the metaphysical two-world theory gives way to a more fundamental, transcendental duality. Lotze’s ‘liberating and clarifying achievement’ is ‘once again to have conceived the totality of what is at all thinkable in terms of an ultimate duality; in terms, namely, of a gulf between that which is [*Seindem*] and that which holds [*Geltendem*], the realm of beings and the realm of validities. . . between that which *is* and *occurs*, and that which *is valid* without having to *be*’ . . . The distinction essential for transcendental philosophy is not that between physical and metaphysical *existents* (for both are still existents, entities), but that between existents and *validities*” (Crowell 2001, 40-41).

claimed, Lotze agrees with Plato in the fact that there must be something constant in order that something like truth can meaningfully be considered. On the shaky ground of mundane experience of ever changing things, the world of ideas stands steadily. While something black turns into white “and sweet sour, it is not blackness itself which passes into whiteness, nor does sweetness become sourness” (*Lotze* 1884, 435). So, the being of an idea is the unalterable Archimedean point by the help of which something changing can be perceived in its change. This is to say, unless blackness and whiteness are both self identical, immutable ideas, nothing in the world can be observed in its gradual change of color from black to white. That there is change of states on the side of the observable objects in the universe, we owe to the permanent, unchangeable ideas whose mode of being is taken into account by Lotze in a manner noteworthy for Heidegger. The remarkable question here is this:

How precisely are we to conceive colors when they are not seen, or tones and their differences when the former are not heard and the latter not apprehended by comparison? Are we to say that they are nothing or that they do not exist, or are we still to attribute to them some predicate which we can hardly define, some kind of being or reality? (*Lotze* 1884, 437).

We certainly will not acknowledge that they are nothing, as we are capable of mentioning the difference between the idea of color and the idea of tone in a sentence like this: “Color as such is different from sound as such” (*L*, 56). Nor will we accept that they are something, either, at least as long as “something” refers to something which “exist purely for itself” (*Lotze* 1884, 438). Indeed, whenever we realize that our judgment about the state of affairs we encounter in the world is true, alongside this intuition of truth, we overtly note that the proposition under consideration is neither true so long as, or, because we think it; nor is truth a property owned by the real objects standing in front of us. Therefore, a proposition and the truth of it belong neither to the subjective, nor to the objective sphere of beings (*Lotze* 1884, 438). As a matter of fact, they are not even *things* which *are* or *exist*.

As Heidegger clearly states in his *Logic* lectures, Lotze classifies the modes of being of “realities” (or, “actualities”) into four types: a thing is real (or, actual), only insofar as it *is* or “exists”; an event is real so long as it “occurs”; a relation is real whenever it “obtains”. And lastly, “the reality of a proposition means that it *holds* or *is valid* and that its opposite *does not hold*” (Lotze 1884, 439; italics mine). The traditional way of examining truth by scrutinizing under what circumstances a proposition becomes true or false is replaced by Lotze with a more effective method, through which the essence of truth is searched after by asking for the mode of being of the propositions. Since his point of view is based upon emphasizing the question of *aboutness* of the propositions, Lotze can be claimed to be loyal to the Kantian spirit in the transcendental deduction of the categories. On the other hand, he may be said to be in line with the Heideggerian paradigm, because he recognizes the fact that *bare presence* as the mode of being of every kind of entity should be left behind, or overreached, if one wants to investigate the essence of truth and propositions in a satisfactory manner. As a matter of fact, he is convinced that even Plato realized the problem of finding a special term “to express the reality of simple validity as distinguished from the reality of being”, but the only words he could find in the Greek language were *όν* and *ὀβσία* (Lotze 1884, 441).

However, the solution is not that simple to Heidegger’s mind. He reports in the *Logic* lectures that his views about the Lotzean classification of “actuality” or “reality” and his subsumption of “being” in the sense of “out-there-ness” under reality, have completely changed (L, 53). As long as “out-there-ness” is ascribed to the empirically real entities whose mode of being is *bare presence*, as Lotze did, the kind of reality or actuality assigned to the propositions cannot be handled in an original way and have to be dependent upon *presence*, because if propositions are actual, they are actual insofar as they are valid *of entities*. Heidegger the phenomenologist naturally reacts against such a conceptual paradigm, since he is obviously of the opinion that even the bare presence of the entities is to be examined in intentional terms; the empirically real

entities whose mode of being has up till that time been evaluated in terms of *in-itself-ness* should from then on be examined in intentional terms. Indeed, he protests against the Lotzean view that Plato lacks any convenient term other than *οὐσία* in order that the actuality of the propositions can be verbalized distinctively and perceptively, for according to him, “*οὐσία* does not mean substance, thing, something ‘real’ in Lotze’s sense, or ‘entity’” (*L*, 60). The main problem lies in the fact that, whereas for Lotze and his contemporaries ideas at most can correspond to concepts, and propositions as the unity of these concepts to the states of affairs, there is no such a distinction for Plato: “What is essential for Plato is not the concept/judgment distinction, but *λόγος* insofar as it makes something manifest (*λόγος* as *δηλουν*), that is, lets it be seen. And what is sighted is in *λόγος* is the idea” (*ibid*).

This remark is very important, because having missed the authentic meaning of *λόγος* whose mode of being is “making-manifest”, “letting-be-seen”, or “uncovering”, Lotze is claimed by Heidegger to have entrapped by the Cartesian prejudice like most of the Western thinkers and interpreted *truth* as “what keeps itself permanent, the firm point of certitude amid the changing world of representations. . . Truth = permanence = what always is” (*L*, 55). When we define some object red, we can do so because we are capable of transcending the particular red we find in front of us toward a universal content— that is, *redness* —by the help of whose constancy and permanence alone we perceive something red as an empirical object. Like the ideal content redness, propositional content is “understood insofar as it is taken in itself, apart from the changes it can undergo”, too (*L*, 58). No matter it is uttered in English, or German; no matter with what purpose it is said; even no matter it is pronounced or not, propositional content is what it is. If the actuality of propositions is validity, then the truths remain to be valid forever, whether they are thought or not; i.e., “independent of the minds” in which they are thought (*L*, 59). Since he could not characterize validity further than permanence (since he could not clarify the mode of being of propositions

and truth, in Heidegger's terms), Lotze tries to convince the reader of the fact that it is an indefinable, basic concept:

As little as we can say how it happens that anything *is* or *occurs*, so little can we explain how it comes about that a truth has validity; the latter conception has to be regarded as much as the former as ultimate and underivable, a conception of which everyone may know what he means by it, but which cannot be constructed out of any constituent elements which do not already contain it (*Lotze* 1884, 440).

To the question what we have learned from this conception of validity as the mode of being of propositions and truth, Heidegger's answer is simply: "Nothing" (*L*, 65). Despite its promising point of departure, Lotzean approach is capable of analyzing neither the ontological constitution of entities *of which* the propositions are valid, nor the kind of being of the propositions themselves and their relation with the mental acts through which they can be transferred to the intersubjective sphere. Heidegger thinks that, unless the problem of *about-ness* of the propositions is taken into consideration in an ontological investigation, the problem of truth is forsaken and left into darkness. According to him, this is exactly what Lotze did.

3.2.3. Refutation of Psychologism

As a matter of fact, Lotzean theory of truth as the validity of propositions is an attempt towards solving the problem of relativism given way to by the naturalistic account of truth of the time; namely, *psychologism*. According to this theory, which we summarized briefly in the previous chapter, the ground of the truth of propositions is but the regularity and lawfulness of the psychic processes. Since these psychic acts are to be accounted for as nothing other than the natural phenomena themselves, the legitimacy devoted to them issues from the natural law and nothing else. In other words:

[T]he laws are to be sought in the living activity of the very processes of thought. Active thinking is the same as the mental occurrence, the mental reality, that must

produce the laws. But mental reality is the theme of psychology. Therefore, the basic project of logic . . . belongs to the competence of psychology. So psychology is logic's foundational discipline (*L*, 32).

According to the psychologists,⁶⁴ propositions are true not because of the fact that they are in conformity with the basic universal principles of thought and its propositional content, but the other way around; something like truth is merely the regularity attributable to the mental occurrences taking place in the minds of human beings who are certainly to be acknowledged as the natural species along with the plants, animals and non-living entities of any kind. According to psychologism, truth can very well be described solely as a generalization from various acts of judging of individuals which are held to be true by everyone. In other words, it can be accepted as the common property of wide variety of mental events, in which some state of affairs is judged truly in the form of an enunciated assertion. Heidegger charges the psychologists with confusing the act of statement with that which is stated in the act; with conflating the *real* mental occurrence with the *ideal* meaning [*Sinn*] that is to be asserted by the former.⁶⁵ Hence he says in *Logic*: “The judgment's adjudged content, that which is

⁶⁴ John S. Mill, Herbert Spencer, Wilhelm Wundt, Christoph Sigwart, Johann E. Erdmann, and Theodor Lipps are some of the names whom Husserl takes into account as the influential psychologists of his day (*LII*, “Prolegomena to Pure Logic”). The ones who are referred to by Heidegger are the same thinkers.

⁶⁵ So, it can be concluded that whereas in Lotze how actuality of propositional meaning (*Sinn*)—i.e., validity (*Geltung*)—can be combined with the ontologically separate realm of mental acts (individual acts of thinking as empirical happenings) is to be accounted for as the unsolvable problem, for psychologists, in what way ideal, universal validity, other than the natural law, can be ascribed to the propositions is the arduous difficulty. That there is a similar controversy between young Heidegger and the Neokantians is a fact Alfred Denker eloquently underlines in his article “Der Frühe Heidegger und die Logik der Philosophie”: “Die Kluft zwischen Sein und Gelten kann nur überbrückt werden, wenn deutlich gemacht werden kann, wie das menschliche Subject die Kategorien auf das in der sinnlichen Anschauung gegebenen Material anwenden kann. Die Einmaligkeit und Individualität der Bewusstseinsakte muss mit der universalen Gültigkeit des an sich seienden Sinnes in einer lebendigen Einheit zusammengeschlossen werden. Die Möglichkeit dieser Synthese muss im Subject begründet sein. Solange Heidegger mit dem Neokantianismus innerhalb der logischen Sphäre des Geltens und des Seins bleibt, kann dieses Problem nicht gelöst werden. Nur wenn die Perspektive translogisch wird, können wir weiterkommen. Mit Hilfe der Metaphysik als Fundamentalphilosophie des lebendigen Geistes versucht Heidegger, einen Durchbruch in ‘die wahre Wirklichkeit und die wirkliche Wahrheit’ zu

asserted to be true, is not an empirical mental event. It is something non-empirical. It is *ideal being, validity*" (L, 40).

Even the principle of contradiction, the basic principle of logic as the prototype of truth, cannot escape the naturalizing tendency of the psychologists. Quoting John Stuart Mill, Heidegger reports that the basic principle of logic is weirdly founded on a factual ground. For him, claims Heidegger, the same proposition cannot be true and false at the same time, just because the same thing which belongs to the sensible world cannot be predicated with some quality and its negation at the same time (for example, warmth and cold, succession and simultaneity, goodness and badness, etc.).

The basic error of psychologism is that it interprets the principle of contradiction as a statement about empirical mental events and is blind to the real meaning of the principle. The principle asserts something about ideal being, about the possibility and impossibility of truths to have validity when taken together. It intends ideal relations between truths, and not relations of empirical facts and events in nature, be they mental or physical; it can never be a law of nature, a law of real being (L, 40).

If the source of the principle of contradiction is the factual world of empirical beings, then the status attributed to the basic law of thinking is to be reduced to the rank of natural law, which is normally thought to be derived *inductively* as a result of the observations of the real world. This is the basic mistake for Heidegger, since it carries the danger of relativization of the ground of thinking; that is to say, truth. The so called relativization of truth issues from the fact that, by neglecting its eternal, ideal and

forcieren" (*"The cleft between being and validity can be bridged over, only if how the human subject applies the categories to the material given to the sensuous intuition can be thought over articulately. The singularity and individuality of the acts of consciousness must be combined with the universal validity of meaning-in-itself in a lively unity. The possibility of such a synthesis can only be grounded in the subject. So long as Heidegger remains loyal to the neokantianism and tarries within the logical realm of validities and of being, this problem cannot be solved. Headway can be made, only if a trans-logical perspective is chosen. With the help of metaphysics as the fundamental philosophy of living spirit, Heidegger tries a breakthrough by forcing the idea of "the actual truth or the true actuality"*) (Denker 2006, 29; translation mine).

normative essence, it is ascribed to the human kind as a natural species among others. If the basic norm of truth is a natural property belonging to an empirical being, then the destiny of truth should be acknowledged to have been abandoned to the contingency and temporality of the biological constitution of the species which somehow has it.⁶⁶ In other words, unless the psychic and physiological structure of human beings remained as it is now, it would have been impossible to insist on the eternal, untimely character of what we call truth. In this case, the a priori and unconditioned ground of thinking is replaced by a conditioned one, and truth is based on *probability* (L, 40-41). As a consequence of such an argument, it should be confessed that “the same proposition can be true for one species and false for another. But one and the same proposition cannot be both true and false at the same time”, which is, of course, nonsense (L, 38). The reason why truth is what we understand it to be cannot be explained by the prominent mental characteristics of the human brain, or the overall biological constitution of man as a natural species. Heidegger totally agrees with Husserl in the fact that the ideal laws of logic are apprehended by “apodictic insight” and consequentially free from doubt. This freedom from doubt implies that when defining truth, it is not allowed to use such conditional phrases as “*if* humans are the only rational beings in the universe, *then* truth is such and such”, or “*if* the basic constitution of human reasoning remains the same depending on its biological structure in the future, *then* truth...” (L, 41). The conditional basis under question is what makes the psychologistic account of truth a relativistic one, and since this attitude

⁶⁶ In order to underline the temporality and contingency attributed to truth by the psychologists, Husserl writes in the “Prolegomena to Pure Logic” as follows: “Experiences are real particulars, temporally determinate, which come into being and pass away. Truth, however, is ‘eternal’, or, better put, it is an Idea, and so beyond time. It makes no sense to give truth a date in time, nor a duration which extends throughout time. Naturally one says of truth that on occasion ‘it comes to mind’, and is accordingly ‘apprehended’ or ‘experienced by us. But such ‘apprehension’, ‘experiencing’ and ‘coming to consciousness’, are spoken of in quite a different sense in relation to ideal being, from what they have in relation to empirical, individualized being” (LI I, 148).

relativizes the ground of thinking by taking its measure as man, it should be called “anthropologism” (*L*, 38).⁶⁷

Seen from the ontological perspective, the main mistake of the psychologists lies in their misconception of the mode of being of propositions for Heidegger. He agrees both with Husserl and Lotze in the fact that the psychologists wrongly reduced “the ideal being of the judged proposition” to “the empirical being of mind”, or, “supratemporal subsistence of the idea” to “the temporal occurrence of the empirical” (*L*, 42). However, the monstrous gap between these two spheres of being (the empirical being of the acts and the ideal being of the propositions) waits to be bridged in order to give a clear explanation for how something like truth is the most important aspect of our being as humans, and how the propositions are valid of the world of objects.⁶⁸ This is where the question of truth is intermingled with the question of being for Heidegger, and he solves this puzzle by the help of his claim that “Dasein is in truth”. Let’s try to examine this declaration in the following section.

3.2.4. Need for a “Philosophical Logic”

Neither the Lotzean account of truth as validity, nor the psychologistic account as the

⁶⁷ For Husserl’s criticism of psychologism with regard to its relativistic and anthropologistic way of theorizing, see §37 and § 38 of “Prolegomena to Pure Logic”.

⁶⁸ Daniel O. Dahlstrom emphasizes the gap under consideration as follows: “The act of thinking as a real event is so severed from what is thought as something ideal that the question of their relation (‘Is the relation of the ideal to the real a real relation?’) could not be answered, even if the question were at all meaningful. The relation can be construed neither as real nor as ideal, even though concrete thinking and what is concretely thought about are in the end just as actual as the real thinking on the one side and then, separated from it, the ideal as what is thought = what is validating on the other side. If there is no ‘thoughtless thinking’ in the literal sense of the expression, then this relation is, in Lotze’s words if not in his sense, ‘the most living reality’ (*die lebendigste Wirklichkeit*), since both thinking and what is thought are simultaneously real in it. It is, in Heidegger’s view, Husserl’s great service to have taken the decisive step toward clarifying the ‘actuality’, by virtue of his account of intentionality” (Dahlstrom 2001, 46-7).

natural lawfulness and regularity of the empirical acts of thinking can suffice to demonstrate the basic essential traits of the phenomenon. For whereas in the former how the ideal content (or, “propositional content”, or “meaning”) is expressed by the real/empirical being (or, “the act of judging”) is the unsolvable problem, in the latter, how relativism as in the form of anthropologism can be overcome is the arduous aporia. Heidegger states this in *Being and Time* as follows:

According to the general opinion, what is true is knowledge. But knowledge is judging. In judgment one must distinguish between the judging as a *real* psychic process, and that which is judged, as an *ideal* content. It will be said of the latter that it is ‘true’. The real psychological process, however, is either present-at-hand or not. According to this opinion, the ideal content of judgment stands in a relationship of agreement. This relationship thus pertains to a connection between an ideal content of judgment and the real thing as that which is judged *about*. Is this agreement real or ideal in its kind of being, or neither of these? *How are we to take ontologically the relation between an ideal unity and something that is real and present-at-hand?* Such a relation indeed subsists (*besteht*); and in factual judgments it subsists not only as a relation between the content of judgment and the real object, but likewise as a relation between the ideal content and the real act of judgment (*BT*, 259).

As long as the ontological difference between the real and the ideal is conceived in substantial terms, it is possible to relate neither the propositional content with that which is thought *about* as the real object standing outside, nor the act of judging as a mental occurrence with what is thought *in* it. What Heidegger strongly emphasizes is the fact that, once these two realms of being are posited as two separate substances, it would not be likely to consider them as the relata of a cognitive relation, and bridge the gigantic gap between them.

In Heidegger’s view, the problem starts with the widely accepted notion of logic as the *science of all sciences*. Since the time of Aristotle, logic has always been conceived of as the science of the rules of *formal thinking* without any regard to the kind of object subjected to that thought. Since every individual science is a pursuit after knowledge, and knowledge is nothing other than the systematic unity of true propositions, these

empirical sciences can be said to be in need of logic, or, the science of truth as their basis. Regarding the differing object domains, positive sciences may vary methodologically. Nonetheless, this is not tantamount to claiming that they are capable of freeing themselves from the normative basis presented by logic as in the form of the laws of thinking. Although there may be opposed theories skirmishing to explain the same phenomenon within the boundaries of the same scientific discipline, the subject matter of confliction or differentiation cannot be the norms of formal thought; i.e., each competitor, no matter how strong it is regarding its explanatory power, should comply with at least the principle of contradiction in order to become the candidate it is. In 1928 lectures on Leibniz, *Metaphysical Foundations of Logic*, Heidegger especially underlines the argument that the same holds for metaphysics as well. According to this argumentation, as the science of the ontological predicates, or categories of being, metaphysics cannot be exempted from being founded upon logic, either:

The argument says that metaphysics, as philosophical knowledge and as knowing, is a thinking. Thinking presupposes logic, and before one can lay the foundations of metaphysics, logic must be therefore established as the foundation of metaphysics, and not conversely. It is easy to see that this argument can be applied to every science, with the conclusion that logic must provide the presupposition for all sciences (*MFL*, 104).

Here, it should be borne in mind that logic refers to “formal” or “general logic” which “does not attend to the special what and how of that to which thinking relates” (*MFL*, 3). The basic idea inherent in the traditional account considered above is that logic is the discipline by the help of which thinking directs itself towards itself, as if it could be isolated from its object. In other words, instead of occupying itself with judging this or that being, formal logic considers itself with judgment *as such*. Nonetheless, insists Heidegger, formal logic is not capable of isolating the ideal content of judgment from what is judged about as its object. As long as the Husserlian doctrine of intentionality is kept in mind as the best approach toward handling the issue in question, it should be

acknowledged that every “judging” as “an activity of humans” is a “judging-about”, and what logic comes face to face when formulating the rules of thinking is the *judgments about beings*, rather than the *judgment-in-itself* (*MFL*, 100-101). Hence pre-understanding of beings as a whole—or, the pre-given meaning of *being-something*—should precede the lawfulness attributed to formal thinking; that is to say, metaphysics as in the form of ontology—science of *being as such*— must precede general logic.

In his *Logic* lectures, Heidegger declares that what he reacts to as the traditional logic is the one founded by Aristotle and completed by Hegel (*L*, 11). Here, he displays a tendency to disapprove of the fact that this logic, which he calls “scholastic logic” or “*collegium logicum*” has been regularly taught in the universities in order that the students become capable of attaining the idea of certitude and exactitude (*L*, 10). The reason why he does so lies in the fact that he does not find it philosophical enough.⁶⁹ This seemingly rumorous theme is tightly correlated with what we told above, because “being philosophical”, at least in the eyes of Heidegger, necessitates the fact that (1) truth must not be evaluated as a property of propositions, (2) propositions must not be conceived as the ideal content belonging to the immanent sphere of thinking, and (3) thinking, or subjectivity must not be severed from that which is thought about (that is, *the world*). On the other hand, in order to make logic philosophical again, thought should be examined in terms of its intentional correlate from the beginning, rather than in isolation.

“Logic should change; logic should become philosophical” (*MFL*, 5). Heidegger challenges the scholastic logic in this way and sets out the task of his philosophical logic as “really” asking the question of truth (*L*, 14). This amounts to the fact that

⁶⁹ “This so-called ‘scholastic logic’ is not philosophy, and it is not any one of the particular sciences. It is a form of sloth, kept alive by custom and by off-the-record academic arrangements and desires. It is also a fraud” (*L*, 10).

scholastic logic never asked the question in an authentic manner, because it neglected the question of being by presupposing two ontological realms one of which ideal and the other real. Philosophical logic should be constituted as the discipline in which the question of being, or, the question of being of *the relation* between these two substantially separated spheres is asked along with the question concerning truth. And since something like *being of beings* comes to the fore through the understanding of being of Dasein, or, existence, “the battle grows from the soil of this field itself, breaks out from human Dasein as such—specifically because the question of being, the striving for an understanding of being, is the basic determinant of existence” (MFL, 16). If this task is to be straightly fulfilled, “the loyalty the philosophizing individual has to himself” (MFL, 17), his being loyal to his essence, or, his freedom, will play crucial role. Freedom is to be understood in this context as the freedom from the metaphysics of presence. In this case, philosophical logic as in the form of the philosophical research toward the metaphysical foundations of logic turns into the ontological study of the essence of man, because man is the *topos* in which something like truth and being take place. By the help of this reasoning, we can conclude that what is named “philosophical logic” in both 1925 *Logic* lectures and 1928 Leibniz courses is but the “fundamental ontology”, or, *Daseinsanalytik of Being and Time*.

3.2.5. Disclosedness of Dasein as the Primordial Sense of Truth

We saw above that the basic ontological approach attributable to traditional philosophy presupposes that the mode of being of both the real entities and the ideal ones such as propositions is “presence”, or “occurrentness”. Reminding ourselves of the fact that presence, or presence-at-hand (*Vorhandenheit*) is the direct opposite of *the intentional being*, or, “being-towards”, may be useful here in order to understand better why Heidegger is in need of establishing the foundation of the epistemological account of truth by means of underlining the importance of the question of the meaning of being

in terms of the analytic of Dasein as “disclosedness”. But what does “disclosedness” mean?

Let’s start with claiming that the epistemological approach characterizes human beings as closed environments with sensory organs, by means of which they are affected by the data coming from outside. This self-enclosed system is thought to be capable of processing the information *on occasion* and finally gives the outcome as in the form of knowledge. When someone claims that his cat is on the mat, if we do not see the utterer, we conclude that he either physically or imaginarily visualizes the pet where he claims it to be. For both of the situations, we can easily understand the word “visualize” or “see”. Seeing something and giving correct information about it is what we do *occasionally*. It is as if the case that this occasionality belongs to the essence of perception and the communicated sentence as the vehicle of the correct information of that same perception. But perception is a world-connection. As long as man is conceived to be connected with the world in a conscious, perceptual manner only on occasion of the cognitive attitude towards it, the question “what about just beforehand?” imposes itself. Just before the moment of perception, was the one who perceived closed off to the world?⁷⁰ Heidegger seems to be contending that this question has never happened to the epistemological thinkers of the Western philosophical tradition. According to him, perception is not the only world experience and the cognitive attitude is not the basic mode of dwelling in the world. Far from it, human beings are *always and inevitably* in connection with the world; although this continual situation of being in touch with the environmental entities within the world is

⁷⁰ Heidegger’s answer to such a question is like that: “As existing, Dasein never relates only to a particular object; if it relates solely to one object, it does so only in the mode of turning away from other beings that are beforehand and at the same time appearing along with the object” (*MFL*, 138).

modified from time to time, never ceases or comes to an end.⁷¹ Picking out an object and giving information about it by means of an assertion must be conceived of as the result of being absorbed in the nexus of environmental things which somehow matters to the cognizer. And this amounts to the fact that the object of knowledge in question should be qualified as the world element with which Dasein has *already* encountered in a pre-cognitive, pre-predicative manner. This *always-already-experienced-ness* of the thing which belongs to the total nexus of worldly items beforehand of the cognitive encounter, reminds Heidegger, is called “un-coveredness”, “un-veiledness”, or “discoveredness” (*Unverborgenheit*) by the ancient Greeks; i.e. “ἀλήθεια”. ἀλήθεια, as “taking entities out of their hiddenness and letting them be seen in their unhiddenness (their uncoveredness)” (*BT*, 262) is the *non-occasional, inevitable* unveiling of the objects of the meaningful, holistic nexus Heidegger calls “world” and precedes the function of letting-be-seen by means of the categorical propositions (λόγος ἀπόφανσις).

In the *History of the Concept of Time*, Heidegger explains what we called *non-occasionality of truth and knowing* in terms of Dasein’s being already absorbed by its world as follows:

When we ask about the mode of being of knowing itself, then it must be kept in mind from the outset that every act of knowing always already takes place on the basis of the mode of being of Dasein which we call in-being, that is, being-always-already-involved-with-a-world. Knowing is now not a comportment that would be added to an entity which does not yet ‘have’ a world, which is free from any relation to its world. Rather, knowing is always a mode of being of Dasein on the basis of its already being

⁷¹ “When we ask about the mode of being of knowing itself, then it must be kept in mind from the outset that every act of knowing always already takes place on the basis of the mode of being of Dasein which we call in-being, that is, being-always-already-involved-with-a-world. Knowing is now not a comportment that would be added to an entity which does not ‘have’ a world, which is free from any relation to its world. Rather, knowing is always a mode of being of Dasein on the basis of its already being involved with the world” (*HCT*, 161).

involved with the world (*HCT*, 161).

With regard to the quote above, it can be concluded that the epistemic subject of the traditional theories of truth based on correspondence is depicted as the worldless one when compared with Dasein. The so called worldlessness implies the fact that, whenever the subject is not connected with the world of objects—and this must occasionally be the case, since its cognitive contact with the world is occasional, too—it is somehow unplugged, or, totally isolated from its environment and imprisoned in itself. The absurdity of such thesis can be exposed by a more technical question, as well, which also has the function of giving way to a better understanding of what uncovering is: If it is asked whether the ideal, propositional content “S is p” corresponds to “the empirical fact that S is p”, how could the subject transcend the immanent sphere of its representations and acquire the factual outside, in order that he can check out whether his claim is verified by the independent real object? Obviously, such a leaving himself behind is out of question. So, the only alternative which remains is to acknowledge that the fact under question, before it has been pointed out by an assertion, is already discovered beforehand, since the worldly Dasein is always already in contact with the surrounding things in a precognitive manner:

In the entire edifice of knowing based on in-being, it is not the case that with apprehension the subject would somehow first introduce, first produce, its relation of being to the world. Rather, *apprehension is grounded in a prior letting-something-be-seen*. . . Knowing is nothing but a mode of being-in-the-world; specifically, it is *not even a primary* but *a founded mode of being-in-the-world*, a way which is always possible only on the basis of a non-cognitive comportment (*HCT*, 164).

Barely looking at things in an indifferent manner and making statements about them is not the primary encounter of Dasein with the entities. For an entity X, it is rather the case that “making statements about X is only possible on the basis of *having to do with X*” (*MFL*, 126). The cognitive relationship between subject and object is possible only as long as Dasein is in the world, surrounded by the environmental entities; i.e.,

so long as these things matter to Dasein who not occasionally, but continually deals with them in congruence with “the background of shared practices on the basis of which actions and objects make sense” (Dreyfus 1991, 268). And it is this continual always-already-having-to-do-with-things which deserves the name “primordial truth” for Heidegger: “A statement about X is only true because our dealing with that X has already a certain kind of truth” (*MFL*, 127).

Since it has been claimed from the beginning of the Western philosophical tradition that something like truth, or unhiddenness is only so long as man is, it should be clarified what the relation is between man and truth; i.e., how truth is located *in* man:

When we say that the essence of unhiddenness and deconcealment is a human occurrence, that truth is in essence something human, and when one so naturally struggles against the ‘humanization’ of the essence of truth, everything depends on what ‘human’ means here. What concept of ‘human’ does one unreflectively assume? (*ET*, 55)

Of course, the “unreflectively assumed human” which Heidegger takes into account in a critical manner is nothing other than the subject, which stands against its object as the substantial-other of it. Hence, how do the entities stand against (as objects, *Gegenstände*) the subject which knows them is the question, thinks Heidegger, which the traditional thinkers have never become able to ask in an appropriate manner. On the other hand, seen from the *aletheic* conception of truth, the worldly entities which incessantly matter to Dasein are said to be *there* (*Da* of *Da-sein*) by means of the average understanding of being of Dasein. This average understanding is the condition of possibility of all that is, and is called Dasein’s “openness”, or “disclosedness” (*Erschlossenheit*) (*BPP*, 215). It should be added that only with Dasein’s *disclosedness* is the most primordial phenomenon of truth attained. Being of truth is “being-

uncovering”, and being-uncovering is Dasein’s disclosedness.⁷² “Insofar as Dasein *is* its disclosedness essentially, and discloses and uncovers as something disclosed to this extent it is essentially ‘true’. *Dasein is ‘in the truth’*” (BT, 263). But what exactly is this supposed to mean?

In *The Essence of Truth*, Heidegger sets out the same formula by contrasting it with both the Platonic and naturalistic accounts of truth as follows: “Truth is neither somewhere *over* man (as validity in itself), nor is it in man as a psychical subject, but man is ‘*in the truth*’” (ET, 55-56). Defining truth in either of the two ways amounts to Dasein’s giving a definition of itself, as well as its world. However, as it is the entity which cannot be disconnected from its world in order that it becomes an isolated object of theoretical gaze, Dasein should be confessed to be *indefinable*. If definition of something is the piece of information about the *essence* of that thing as long as the same thing is conceived to be isolated from the world in which it is; and if the essence refers to the *potentiality*, or *nature* as the minimum condition of that thing’s being actualized by plunging into the worldly relations back again, then Dasein, since it is incessantly connected with its world, cannot be articulated in a definitional form; i.e., in an assertion. It is not a possible object of scientific investigation:

The proposition that man is the being who exists in the perceiving of being [i.e., *Seinsverstehen*, “understanding of being”] has its own truth, which is quite distinctive and different from such truths as $2 + 1 = 3$, that the weather is good, or that the essence of a table consists in its being an object of use. The truth of the statement about the essence of man can never be scientifically proven. It cannot be established by reference to facts, nor can it be derived from principles in a formal-logical manner. This is not a deficiency, especially when one realizes that what is essential always

⁷² “Analysis of the distinctiveness of Dasein establishes that it *is* the disclosedness (the ‘clearing’) underlying intraworldly encounters. . . The ways in which entities come to be present and fade away, the ways they are hidden and uncovered. . . presuppose the disclosedness of Dasein (or, more precisely, the disclosedness that Dasein *is*). This disclosedness, namely, the ‘there’ of Dasein, is the most original phenomenon of truth” (Dahlstrom 2001, 390).

remains unprovable, or more precisely, lies outside the sphere of provability and unprovability (*ET*, 57).

Were it be a fact among other facts of the world, Dasein could have been defined in terms of its essence by means of statements. As it is the entity in whose openness (or, disclosedness) any kind of entity including itself is uncovered, Dasein cannot be defined in the same way as the rest of the species, although it has a certain average understanding of himself, which is historical and mutable. It is this historical understanding which provides the ground for the sense of being of things, propositions and the relation between them. So, it must be concluded, disclosedness is the condition of possibility of something like uncoveredness of the entities,⁷³ and the truth assigned to the propositions is parasitic upon the primordial truth of disclosedness of Dasein. Put differently, statements can be true or false just because Dasein is the openness towards its world.

Before we close this section devoted to truth, we should briefly summarize one of the most important critiques of Heidegger's characterization of the essence of truth as Dasein's disclosedness, which belongs to the German philosopher Ernst Tugendhat. He first of all remarks that searching after "the first and most original principle", Heidegger's philosophy deserves to be included in the tradition of transcendental philosophy. However, as the basic principle, since he rejects the transcendental subjectivity or transcendental consciousness in Kantian and Husserlian sense of the term respectively, the position of the philosopher should be characterized as "meta-transcendental" (Tugendhat 1992, 79-80). Tugendhat strongly underlines the fact that Heidegger's conception of disclosedness is insufficient to present a criteria by the help

⁷³ So, writes Heidegger in *Being and Time*: "Dasein, as constituted by disclosedness, is essentially in the truth. Disclosed is a kind of being which is essential to Dasein. 'There is' truth only insofar as Dasein is and so long as Dasein is. Entities are uncovered only when Dasein is; and only as long as Dasein is, are they disclosed" (*BT*, 269).

of which we can distinguish the false propositions from the true ones. In 3.1.1, we saw that even “semblance” is a mode of uncovering; that is, *something’s passing itself off as something else*, as a mode of “covering up” (or, falsity). Regarding this, Tugendhat sets out the gist of his critique as follows: “The covering up of the false assertion does not exclude a certain uncovering. But then, in what sense does the false assertion uncover and in what sense does it cover up?” (Tugendhat 1992, 84).

Against this critique, with Daniel O. Dahlstrom and Mark A. Wrathall, it can be recalled that Heidegger’s conception of primordial truth as disclosedness is not a possible substitute of propositional truth, but instead, its condition of possibility (Dahlstrom 2001, 406-407; Wrathall 1999, 84). Wrathall specifies this claim and underlines an additional point: “Disclosedness makes truth possible by making assertions the kind of *things* which can be true” (Wrathall 1999, 81; italics mine). Propositions, in order to be meaningful and capable of being true or false, must satisfy three criteria: (1) they must be about something within the world, (2) they must have determinacy—i.e., they must objectify the uncovered entity by means of one of its properties, and (3) they must be able to communicate (Wrathall 1999, 81-82). Wrathall claims that the things we come against in a practical/holistic context codetermined by our goals and ways of coping with the environment⁷⁴ are articulated in a judgmental form and communicated to the other persons. The givenness of this context “which is always already organized and articulated according to some dominant interpretation of things that holds sway in our local discursive community” is the primordial phenomenon of truth, and is called “hermeneutic salience” by Taylor Carman (Carman 2003, 261). “Hermeneutic salience” is *the truth of being*, and as the expression implies, this is the point we are not allowed to distinguish *λόγος* as proposition from what the

⁷⁴ How such a holistic context of equipmental things is given will be discussed below, when we embark upon depicting the world as the whither of originary transcendence (or, being-in-the-world).

proposition is about. A new characterization of *λόγος* is necessary and this is put forward by Mohanty in a genuine way:

Logos, in its totality, is a complex structure of words, meanings, the referent (what is thought) and what *is*. It is only when one separates them, that one seeks to tie them together by such relations as that of a sign to the signified. Verbal sound is not a sign for a meaning. Nor is the meaning a pointer to what is thought or to what is. There is an identity between these components, an identity which yet shows the differences (Mohanty 1992, 106).

Heidegger's conception of primordial truth as the disclosedness of Dasein can be understood as the disclosedness of being as well, since, as we will see in the following, the disclosedness of being can be referred back to Dasein's understanding of it. Moreover, this understanding of being is the one by the help of which the mode of being of the objective and subjective relata of the cognitive relation, as well as the mode of being of this very relation itself is determined in advance. Since the basic ontological framework of the correspondence theory of truth is presupposed to be *presence*, it can be concluded that there are three different kinds of *things* in a cognitive process, and they are the things known, the thing which knows, and the relation-thing. However, the disclosedness of being is not the same as the uncoveredness of entities, things; the latter is founded upon the former. This is where what-is-meant, what-is-thought, what-is-referred-to and what-is-said come together as Mohanty claims, and Tugendhat's demand for *evidence* for the primordial truth becomes unwarranted. Where truth of being is "a truth that is not of knowledge"⁷⁵ the only task remains is to try to understand Heidegger's peculiar conception of human beings as Dasein which is originally transcendent towards the world.

⁷⁵ Sallis writes: "It is this doubling [of truth as disclosedness and propositional truth] that decisively break the bond of truth to knowledge in its traditional determination as intuition. For disclosedness is a matter neither *of* nor *for* intuition. The originary phenomenon of truth, truth as disclosedness, is a truth that is not of knowledge" (Sallis 1994, 390).

3.3. Originary Transcendence and Being-in-the-World

In *Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, Heidegger writes: “Philosophy must perhaps start from the ‘subject’ and return to the ‘subject’ in its ultimate questions, and yet for all that not pose its questions in a one-sidedly subjectivistic manner” (*BPP*, 155). In the present context, this should be evaluated as thinking the subject in terms of Dasein or disclosedness, rather than a thing among other things. As we saw above, an appropriate way of performing the task set out in the quotation is to claim that “Dasein is in truth”. Overtaking such a philosophical stance is but deconstructing the problem of transcendence and the immanentist characterization of subjectivity as Descartes, Kant and Husserl did. Deconstructing the problem of transcendence is to refuse the paradigm from out of which the epistemological problem of how the subject transcends the limits of its inner sphere and make a contact with the outer/objective world has emanated. Contending that Dasein is in truth is but claiming that its mode of being is “existence”, or “self-transcendence”, rather than substantiality, or presence.

3.3.1. Ontic and Ontological Transcendence

In *Metaphysical Foundations of Logic*, Heidegger emphasizes that starting with the subject-object relation is a dead-end on the way to comprehending the authentic meaning of truth, knowledge and subjectivity. He writes:

When appeal is made to the subject-object relation, especially for characterizing subjectivity, then it must be said that, in this subject-object relation and in appeal to it, something essential is omitted and something crucial has been missed. The characteristics of this “relation-between” are omitted, the very thing to be explained. The genuine concept of subjectivity is lacking, insofar as it gets unnoticed that the “relationship to” belongs to subjectivity (*MFL*, 129).

The ignorance regarding the ontological constitution of the subject-object schema and presupposing the relation as the third thing alongside the relata are endemic to the thinkers of Western philosophy, the three most important modern representatives of

whom are Descartes, Kant, and Husserl. The defect shared by all these three philosophers issues from the fact that they could not help characterizing the subjectivity as the closed off/immanent sphere vis-à-vis the extra-mental/transcendent being. According to Heidegger, this is just because of their misconceiving the meaning of transcendence. In order that he can distinguish his approach from the method of philosophizing of these traditional thinkers, he discriminates his conception of original transcendence as the essence of Dasein from the ontic understanding of the term.

In *On the Essence of Grounds*, he clarifies the meaning of transcendence in general as a “spatial occurrence” “from something to something”. In such an occurrence three components can be made out: Something which transcends (transcending), something which is surpassed, and lastly, “that towards which” of the surpassing (*OEG*, 107). This is the formal structure of what he calls ontic transcendence. He qualifies this common type of transcendence as “ontic”, because all the members of such a relation are *things* which are present-at-hand, and so is the relation itself. That is to say, it has nothing to do with being of the relation itself, since the relation is accounted for as the third thing alongside the subjective and objective relata. This would give way to the danger of infinite regress, because if the relation is to be comprehended as the third thing, then how these three things are interrelated to each other (with two relations between three things, of course) will recur as the persistent question.

Within the limits of the ontic paradigm, the sense of transcendence is determined “in contradistinction to the *immanent*” and “in contradistinction to the *contingent*” (*MFL*, 160). Whereas the former, which interests us more, is called “epistemological transcendence”, the latter is named “theological transcendence” by Heidegger (*MFL*, 161-162).

Theological transcendence is the concept which qualifies the act of surpassing the gap that separates the unconditioned being from the ones that are conditioned. The gap

under question is the one which is opened up between the necessary being and the contingent ones. In terms of Christianity, it is nothing but “the infinite difference of the created from the creator” which is the absolute condition for coming into being of all that is this-worldly. Remembering the formal structure of ontic transcendence we mentioned above, we can say that God is the “towards-which”, this world is that which is surpassed in the surpassing, we persons are the ones who transcend the mundane in order to reach the divine (*MFL*, 162).

On the other hand, in epistemological transcendence it is the world itself as the transcendent other, rather than divinity, which surpasses the limits of the immanent sphere of mind, or consciousness. Through the act of knowing it is man again which is thought to transcend the limited sphere in which he is closed off; so, consciousness as the immanent being is that which is surpassed if something like a cognitive relation with the transcendent world is to be possible at all. Heidegger likens the immanent sphere of mind to a box:

Here the subject is thought of as a sort of box with an interior, with the walls of a box, and with an exterior. Of course the crude view is not put forth that consciousness is in fact a box, but what is essential to analogy and what belongs to the very conception of the transcendent is that a barrier between inner and outer must be crossed. This means that the inner is, first of all, really restricted by the barrier and must first break through it, must first *remove the restrictions* (*MFL*, 160).

Nonetheless, when claiming that perceiving and making assertions about the world are, as cognitive relations, are founded upon the originary transcendence, or disclosedness of Dasein, Heidegger seems to be contending that truth has nothing to do with “removing the restrictions”, because there are no restrictions at all as long as Dasein is understood as being-in-the-world:

When Dasein directs itself towards something and grasps it, it does not somehow first get out of an inner sphere in which it has been proximally encapsulated, but its primary kind of being is such that it is always ‘outside’ alongside entities which it encounters and which belong to a world already discovered. . . And furthermore, the

perceiving of what is known is not a process of returning with one's booty to the 'cabinet' of consciousness after one has gone out and grasped it; even in perceiving, retaining, and preserving, the Dasein which knows *remains outside*, and it does so as *Dasein* (BT, 89).

Dasein "remains outside", because the *there* (Da- of Dasein) essentially belongs to its being. Remaining loyal to the terminology which we have set out above, we can claim that as long as it is the being to which the act of surpassing cannot be accrued afterwards in the same way as an attribute is predicated to a substance which can very well continue to be without the former, "that towards which", or the *there* also belongs essentially to the ontological constitution of Dasein. Hence, claiming that "Dasein transcends towards the world *whenever* it perceives or cognizes it" can be understood as parroting a tautology. In this sense, Dasein is to be understood as the entity whose most important distinguishing ontological characteristic is that *it is outside of itself*; it is being-in-the-world. Being-in-the-world means that Dasein, as the originally transcendent being, "projects a world for itself"; a world, as the semantic *topos* in which entities can be meaningfully present in a holistic structure in which each of them is related with the others by referential bonds. Heidegger especially emphasizes that the projection of the world of Dasein is not an activity which it effects "subsequently and occasionally", but belongs to its ontological constitution. "In this projection the Dasein has always already *stepped out beyond itself*, *ex-sistere*, it is in a world. Consequently, it is never anything like a subjective inner sphere" (BPP, 170).

As we saw in the previous chapter, even if it already taught us that consciousness is always consciousness of something, Husserlian theory of intentionality is evaluated in terms of ontic transcendence, as well. The reason for this is explained by Heidegger as follows: "The insight into intentionality does not go far enough to see that grasping this structure as the essential structure of Dasein must revolutionize the whole concept of human being" (MFL, 133). This is to say that, so long as the subject is illustrated in terms of presence, or on-handness (*Vorhandenheit*), no matter how vehemently it is

argued that it is intentional, the originally transcendent essence or ontological constitution of it is necessarily ignored as Husserl did. His basic mistake, according to Heidegger, lies in the fact that he saw “the basic structure of all intentional relating as *νόησις* [thinking]; thus all intentionality is first a cognitive intending, upon which other modes of active relation to beings are later built” (*MFL*, 134).⁷⁶

We saw above that Dasein is in truth. This means that its relationship with truth is continual, *non-occasional*. And until now it should have been comprehended that Heidegger’s conception of non-occasional truth is the same phenomenon with originary transcendence and being-in-the-world. They are all *existentiale* of Dasein. In other words, they are not the properties somehow annexed to the essence of Dasein, since without them, Dasein cannot exist. However, thinking and knowing are derivative and “deficient” modes of being-in-the-world; i.e., far from being the primordial intentions, they are founded upon the latter. So, when claiming that assertion is parasitic upon the alethic conception of truth as Dasein’s disclosedness, what Heidegger implies is that “the problem of transcendence is not at all identical with the problem of intentionality. As ontic transcendence, the latter is itself only possible on the basis of original transcendence, on the basis of *being-in-the-world*” (*MFL*, 135).

We saw in the second chapter that Heidegger’s ultimate judgment about his mentor is that Husserl did not succeed in going so far as to ask the question of being of the

⁷⁶ Thus, writes Hopkins, about the theoretical approach Husserl displays in his conception of bare looking at the essences (*Wesensschau*): “By merely looking, Husserl’s understanding of intentionality can only grasp the entity which manifests this structure in terms of its discovery as an object with the ontological meaning of presence-at-hand. Its comportmental way to be, in terms of its being-in-a-world already disclosed *in a way phenomenally prior to all ontic discovery*, is thus concealed from its intuitive regard from the start. The proper way of access to Dasein’s existential way to be is thus precluded in advance to the seeing of essences, on the basis of the hidden understanding of all entities in terms of their pure presence-at-hand” (Hopkins 1993, 124).

intentional consciousness. The reason why the central term of his phenomenology, that is, the intentional consciousness is found to be ontically, rather than ontologically, transcendent by Heidegger is clearly set out by Christopher Macann when he reexhibited the formal constitution of the threefold structure of transcendence of *On the Essence of Grounds*. Whereas the answer to the question what surpasses in transcending is “the subject” for Husserl, it is “Dasein” for Heidegger. The “towards which” of the transcending is “the intentional object”, or noema for Husserl, and “world” for Heidegger. Unless the question “what is surpassed in transcending” is replied by both philosophers, the difference between the answers given to these two questions can very well be apprehended as a nominal one (Macann 1992b, 132-133). In fact, it is very far from being so. In Husserlian phenomenology, the limits exceeded by the transcendental subject are the limits of “immanent consciousness” which is likened to a box by Heidegger. On Heidegger’s side, however, “that which is transcended is neither a sphere of immanence nor a gap separating self and other but rather *the whole realm of objectified beings* – which are transcended towards their being” (Macann 1992b, 133; italics mine).

Seen from such a perspective, compared to Husserl’s comprehension of the threefold structure of intentionality as an epistemological mode of encountering the world, Heidegger’s conception seems to be onefold, or monadic, because neither the subjective nor the objective side of transcendence can be thought to *be* without the other. It is unnecessary to add, indeed, the reason for this is that there is nothing to be surpassed between the two, since Dasein is not an isolated thing; it is being-in-the-world, instead. The explanation of Heidegger’s characterization of Husserlian intentionality in terms of ontic, rather than ontological, transcendence is that, intentional relation is between beings (*Seienden*). In this case, as we emphasized above, for the relation itself is a being as well, it must be characterized as an *ontic relation*. On the contrary, as the being which is *outside-of-itself-towards-the-world* (or,

ex-sistence), the mode of being of Dasein cannot be captured in terms of that of things; i.e., “presence-at-hand”, “on-handness”, “occurentness” (*Vorhandenheit*); or, simply, “presence” (*Präsenz*). We dealt with at the beginning of this chapter that “the phenomenon of phenomenology” is that which shows itself from out of itself as it is in itself. Now we begin to understand that by the phenomenological conception of phenomenon is referred to nothing but the unitary phenomenon being-in-the-world, or, the simultaneous disclosedness of “*intentio* and *intentum*” (Hopkins 1993, 117). Since it is monadic, the mechanism of its appearing cannot be through something other which shows itself directly; it is the self manifest. This is to say that, in Heideggerian phenomenology, Dasein and its world mutually constitute each other; in Husserlian phenomenology, in contrast, transcendental subjectivity is the sole ground upon which world is constituted in accordance with the inner structure of immanent consciousness. Whereas in Husserl the directionality of constitution is one way, in Heidegger, it is bidirectional.

3.3.2. “That which is Transcended” in the Originary Transcendence and the Ontological Difference

As a result of our evaluation of Macann’s threefold structure of transcendence, we somehow depicted a misleading picture in which Heidegger’s thought, because of the bidirectionality we attributed to it, seemed to be an immanentist approach, rather than a transcendentalist one. This wrong image we owe to the fact that the third element, that is, “that which is transcended in originary transcendence” was postponed in order to be handled in a separate section. As opposed to Husserl’s theory of transcendental subjectivity, it is not the limits of immanent, pure, and absolute consciousness, but rather, the present-at-hand-entities as a whole which are surpassed and surpassed towards their being (*Sein*). That is to say, transcendence is the movement from the realm of beings as a whole (*Seiende*) towards their being (*Sein der Seienden*) for

Heidegger, and the movement from the immanent sphere of consciousness to the transcendent field of objects for Husserl. The reason why Husserl did not succeed in accomplishing the idea of what Heidegger calls “ontological difference” lies apparently, as we saw in the previous chapter in detail, in his discovery of phenomenological reduction which first appeared in the 1913 text, *Ideas*. Phenomenological reduction, or, *epoche* is the technique through which Dasein is deprived of the world in which it dwells and reduced to an on-hand thing among the rest of the entities within the world; i.e., it is truncated, if we may say so.⁷⁷ By characterizing Dasein as originally transcendent, or being-in-the-world, what Heidegger can be said to have done is to restore the subject back into its original position and render it worldly again (Courtine 1992, 70-71). In this sense, as Jean-François Courtine remarks, as opposed to the method set out in *Being and Time* and in line with the approach displayed in *The History of the Concept of Time* of 1925, Heidegger’s attempt to ask the question of the meaning of being (*Seinsfrage*) can be said to be inspired from its coming to grips with the problem of subjectivity in general, and the intentional consciousness of Husserlian phenomenology in particular:

It is therefore on the basis of the Husserlian conception of phenomenology, while at the same time taking account of the fundamental omission from which it suffers in not elucidating in advance ‘intentional behavior and everything implied by it’, that the question of being make itself known phenomenologically as the question of the being of intentionality and the question of the meaning of being in general (Courtine 1992, 71).

⁷⁷ “Husserl’s specific characterization of being in a primary sense, as what is absolutely given in primary consciousness, is based on an attempt to elaborate, not what ‘to be’ means, but rather what is necessary for consciousness to constitute an ‘absolute science’. For the phenomenologist above all, the failure to raise the question of what ‘to be’ means is of a piece with a failure to unpack what ‘to be’ means in the case of a particular sort of being (*Seiendes*), namely, consciousness, understood as ‘intentionality’. This twin failure is, moreover, the direct result of an infidelity to phenomenology’s most basic principle” (Dahlstrom 1994, 237).

Hence, at least for the Heidegger before *Kehre*, the question of being as such and the question of the being of the intentional are the same questions. The latter is the methodological directive of the former, since even the questionability of the *Seinsfrage* we owe to the fact that Dasein has always already a certain understanding of being and it lives in the “ontological difference” between being and entities.

Being is, as such and its every meaning, the being of beings. Being is different than beings, and only in this difference in general, this possibility of distinction, insures an understanding-of-being. Put another way, in the understanding-of-being this distinction of being from beings is carried out. It is this distinction that makes anything like ontology in the first place. We thus term this distinction that first enables something like an understanding-of-being the *ontological difference* (*MFL*, 152).

One remarkable point should be underlined in the quote above: In a similar way with Husserlian phenomenological principle that consciousness is consciousness of something, Heidegger claims that “being is, as such and its every meaning, the being of beings”. So, it can be concluded, to be enticed by the call of positive/scientific attitude as Husserl was, and consequentially bracketing entities in order that being as such can be *seen* clearly enough as the object of ontological research, is the last thing Heidegger would do. He reminds in *Being and Time* that “the being of entities ‘is’ not itself an entity” and what is therefore to be avoided first of all is to define “entities as entities by tracing them back in their origin to some other entities, as if being had the character of some possible entity” (*BT*, 26).

When Heidegger claims in §7 of *Being Time* that the original conception of phenomenon which it is the task of the phenomenologist to investigate is “self-showing”, he in fact determines phenomenology as the method of ontology. Determining phenomenology as the method of ontology is not a contingent choice for Heidegger, but underscores the fact that there is an essential correlation between the subject matter and the method as long as the hidden potentiality of these philosophical disciplines throughout the history of philosophy is taken into account. In 1927, just

after *Being and Time* is published, Heidegger writes in a lecture course:

Phenomenology is the name for the method of ontology, that is, of scientific philosophy. Rightly conceived, phenomenology is the concept of a method. It is therefore precluded from the start that phenomenology should pronounce any theses about Being which have specific content, thus adopting a so-called standpoint (*BPP*, 20).

Phenomenology is the method of ontology in the same way as observing, calculating, experimenting, surveying, measuring etc. are the methods of the variety of specific sciences ranging from physics to psychology, botany to sociology. Beyond doubt, the methods and searching techniques devised by particular disciplines deserving the name science are predetermined by the nature of the realm of their objects (*BPP*, 13). Botany, for example, cannot use as its method surveying when searching the nature of plants. What discriminates ontology as the science of being from the rest lies in the fact that its object is being as such, or beings as a *whole* (*BPP*, 52). About the object of his ontological inquiry, Heidegger writes in 1935: “We are not interrogating this being or that being, nor all beings, each in turn; instead, we are asking from the start about the whole of what is, or as we say for reasons to be discussed later: beings as a whole and as such” (*IM*, 2-3). According to this task overtaken by any legitimate ontological investigation, being as such, or beings as a whole is the main theme. If beings as a whole is the object of investigation, then does this amount to the fact that all entities investigated by each of these above mentioned positive sciences must be gathered together haphazardly in order to detect some certain characteristic representing the most general feature shared by them? Can it be concluded from the definition of the object of ontological investigation that what the philosopher searches for is but the most general trait belonging to all that *is*? In other words, when we ask what being is, are we asking for the most universal concept?

In *Being and Time*, in order to prevent the reader from ensnaring by such a misunderstanding as to answering such questions in a positive manner, Heidegger calls

attention to three prejudices towards being. According to the first one, “it has been maintained that ‘being’ is the ‘most universal’ concept” (*BT*, 22). I see an apple and I ask: “What is this?” I would presumably be told that it is a fruit. When I ask again what a fruit is, the answer would be that it is a plant; a plant is a biological organism, a biological organism is an animate thing; and lastly, all animate and inanimate things are beings. But what does being mean? Heidegger intervenes here and claims that what being is cannot be comprehended at all unless the class-genus-species hierarchy is given up, because being is not an entity among other entities: “The ‘universality’ of being ‘*transcends*’ any universality of genus” (*BT*, 22). Accordingly, being cannot be deduced from some higher concepts; nor can it be inferred to by the lower ones. So, it is thought that “the concept of ‘being’ is indefinable” (*BT*, 23). This is the second prejudice concerning being. Corresponding to the order of concepts of logic making up the basic structure of human thinking, there stands the order of things. Every entity, no matter it is real or ideal, can be defined according to the place it holds in the hierarchy of other entities, and this hierarchy is predetermined by logic according to the degree of generality, or universality of concepts. If the universality of being exceeds the universality of concept, then being cannot be thought of as a concept. However, this does not preclude the possibility of its being interrogated thanks to the appropriate method supplied by phenomenology. Heidegger expresses the ineliminability of the question of being as follows:

“Being” cannot be derived from higher concepts by definition, nor can it be presented through lower ones. But does this imply that ‘being’ no longer offers a problem? Not at all. We can infer only that ‘being’ cannot have the character of an entity. Thus we cannot apply to being the concept of ‘definition’ as presented in traditional logic, which itself has its foundations in ancient ontology and which, within certain limits, provides a quite justifiable way of defining “entities”. The indefinability of being does not eliminate the question of its meaning; it demands that we look that question *in the face* (*BT*, 23; italics mine).

Nonetheless, the so called “indefinability of being” just refers to the fact that it cannot

be put into words and elucidated by means of linguistic expressions comprising of assertions; not to its being understood in social practices. Although we always use the word “is” in any sentence we utter in the public world in which we inhere, when it comes to giving a definition of it, we become mute. The practical ease of using the word “is” leads the philosophers to the third prejudice, according to which “it is held that ‘being’ is of all concepts the one that is self-evident” (*BT*, 23). If the emphasis upon the self-evident character of the most universal concept which cannot be defined by traditional logical instruments implies the fact that any further attempt to lay it bare as in the form of *ontology of being as such* is futile, Heidegger would protest this. As long as we believe in something like formal language comprising of the traditional logical elements and principles, and contend that this structure is capable of representing the things environing us in the world, there remains no chance to “define” something like being, because the language and the underlying logical forms are related with entities, and not being as such. What Heidegger calls attention here is that that which is *always already understood* are beings as a whole, and this average understanding of being is prior to any kind of theoretical attitude towards the world of entities:

[T]he meaning of being must already be available to us in an understanding of being. Out of this understanding arise both the explicit question of the meaning of being and the tendency that leads us towards its conception. We do not *know* what ‘being’ means. But even if we ask, ‘What is “being”?’ we keep within an understanding of the ‘is’, though we are unable to fix conceptionally what that ‘is’ signifies. We do not know the horizon in terms of which that meaning is to be grasped and fixed. *But this vague average understanding of being is still a Fact* (*BT*, 25).

If we, human beings, are always already capable of understanding the copula ‘is’ even though we are unable to verbalize it,⁷⁸ then what is understood in it should be

⁷⁸ “We always already live in an understanding of the ‘is’ without being able to say more precisely what it actually means” (*HCT*, 144).

understood in a pre-theoretical manner; namely, being as such. Indeed, understanding of being is the basic ground for every human activity, including theory. In the paragraph quoted above, Heidegger deliberately emphasizes that we do not “know” what being means, because prior to knowing something, we must have a pre-cognitive, pre-conceptual understanding of what it means for that same thing *to be*. That is to say, before we become capable of characterizing knowledge in terms of theoretical grasping, we should have a prior understanding of what it means *to be* for both the entities within the world as the objects and us, human beings as the cognizing subjects. After dividing the realm of all that *is* into two spheres in such a way that cognizers are totally separated from that which are to be cognized, it does not make any sense to ask what the meaning of being is, for the division itself becomes the basic ontological understanding of ours without our realizing it.

3.3.3. Existence: “The Who” of Originary Transcendence

Qualifying Dasein as the originally transcendent (or, self-transcendent) being and characterizing it as the entity which is in truth, Heidegger abandoned both idealism and realism as the two rivaling ontological positions. As the self-transcending, Dasein cannot be identified with the transcendental subject of, say, Husserl, which constitutes the transcendent world as the immanent sphere ontologically distinct from the former. Nor is it an entity, being part of the nature, which is present-at-hand alongside the rest of the intraworldly entities. As a matter of fact, it is somehow “alien to nature” (*MFL*, 166). The alienage or otherness first of all issues from the fact that Dasein is the entity, in contradistinction to other entities in the world, which has an understanding of being (*Seinsverständnis*). Thanks to this ontological understanding which is to be accounted for as the essence of Dasein, Dasein is *beyond beings* (*Seiende*). Being-in-a-world, Dasein is said to be comported toward beings, encounters them in this or that way in the “openness” provided by the understanding of being as the unique ontological

essence of itself. Knowing things, coping with them, using them, perceiving them etc. are the ways of encounter which Dasein has with the intraworldly entities. We saw above and in the previous chapter that Husserl, under the influence of the traditional philosophy, regards perceiving and knowing as the most primordial kinds of comportments of human subjects to the intraworldly entities of this or that kind. Heidegger remarks in *The Essence of Truth*, in which he interprets Plato's dialogue *Theaetetus*, that "perception is a receiving *having-before-oneself* of what is given" (ET, 147). In other words, what is perceived is simply *had*; i.e., it is put under a concept, apprehended (*begriffen*), got a grip on and, so to speak, *consumed*. When someone says in a parking lot "The car is red", everybody understands, because they are able to *see* the redness of the car. Nonetheless, nobody can see and grasp the "is", so it remains unseen and unconceptualized in the judgment about the perceived state of affairs. As told above, it is *unsayable*, and as told in the previous chapter, it is "the excess":

We understand the word 'is' ('being'), we know the meaning; but we are unable to say what we 'really' mean by it. We understand it, but we do not *grasp* it. We do not have a *concept* of 'is'. We *understand* 'is' and 'being', but in a *non-conceptual way* (ET, 149).

In this sense, understanding being is not "having it" but "striving for it", because "in its essential nature, striving is such that we strive for what we do *not yet have*" (ET, 147). So, being-in-truth, disclosedness, and self-transcendence of Dasein is reinterpreted by Heidegger during the lecture course on Plato's *Theaetetus* in terms of "the understanding of being as a striving for being, *ἔρως*" (ET, 155). This is to say, as the entity whose mode of being is *transcendence*, the essence of Dasein is *love for being*:

It is being which in all circumstances is already present and *there*, not as a thing or any kind of object, but as that which is striven for in *authentic* striving. Whether we are aware of this or not, it is being that is most primordially and comprehensively held in

striving (*ET*, 156; italics mine).

In contradistinction to “inauthentic striving” whose object is *present there* but *not-yet-had* (*ET*, 152), the object of “authentic striving”, i.e., being, is *there* but not present. As a matter of fact, *there is* an entity, just because being gives (*es gibt*) the *there* (Da) in which the former has a meaningful presence. However, as the condition of possibility (*Möglichkeitsbedingung*) of *presence* (*Praesenz, Anwesenheit, Vorhandenheit*), being as such cannot be present-at-hand. Since it is ridiculous to claim that being as such is one of its modes, that is, presence-at-hand; and insofar as being-an-object requires presence-at-hand as the mode of being of the entity that is to be objectified, philosophy, as the science of being (ontology), must have a method of thematization totally different from that of the positive sciences.⁷⁹ So, phenomenology is the name given to the method, and hence, philosophy, as we told above, is the phenomenological ontology. As opposed to the positive sciences (*Natur- und Kulturwissenschaften*) and worldview philosophy (*Weltanschauungsphilosophie*), phenomenological ontology, rather than “positing” beings, “deals with what every positing of beings. . . must already presuppose essentially” (*BPP*, 12).

If the manner in which being is thematized by phenomenological ontology is not that of the positive sciences, then how will be the first step taken? At the end of the day, even the question “What ‘is’ the meaning of being as such?” implies the fact that the sense of being or ‘is’ is always already understood beforehand (*HCT*, 144). Unless it is phenomenologically clarified on what grounds a question questions something, the meaning of the *Seinsfrage* remains vague. Heidegger carries out this kind of analysis

⁷⁹ In *Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, Heidegger clarifies the distinction between philosophy and sciences/world views as follows: “Philosophy is the theoretical conceptual interpretation of being, of being’s structure and its possibilities. Philosophy is ontological. In contrast, a world-view is a positing of knowledge of beings and a positing attitude toward beings; it is not ontological but ontical” (*BPP*, 11).

by dissecting the formal structure of any question into three component parts: (1) “What is asked for” (*das Erfragte*), (2) “what is asked about” (*das Gefargte*), and finally (3) “what” or who “is interrogated”; or better, the addressee of the question (*das Befargte*) (*HCT*, 144; *BT*, 24). Let’s try to elucidate this threefold organization by giving an example.

Ali asks Ayşe where Mehmet is. Then the question which he asks to Ayşe will be “Where is Mehmet?” So, what is asked about (*das Gefargte*) in the question he directed to her is the whereabouts, or, the spatial location of Mehmet. On the other hand, the reason why he asks the question is, say, that he wants to kill him in the name of revenge. In this case, it would be contended that *what is asked for* in *what is asked about* (*das Erfragte*) on Ali’s side is whether it is time or not to commit the crime he planned to accomplish. Let’s also assume that he asks the question to Ayşe on purpose and not to Nermin, since he is well aware that both presume that he has evil plans about Mehmet at the time being, and very well knows that whereas Ayşe shares his feelings, Nermin is in love with Mehmet. Therefore, he intentionally prefers Ayşe instead of Nermin as the one to whom the question is directed (*das Befargte*).

In a similar fashion it is not likely for Ali to ask Ayşe whether it is time to kill Ali, the question of being is not apt to be asked directly for the reason manifested above—that being is not an entity and hence cannot be objectified. So being must be interrogated in terms of an exemplary entity, because it gives itself not as an object of scientific investigation, but as the being of beings:

If the question of being is to be explicitly formulated and carried through in such a manner as to be completely transparent to itself, then any treatment of it with the elucidations we have given requires us to explain how being is to be looked at, how its meaning is to be understood and conceptually grasped; it requires us to prepare the way for choosing the right entity for our example, and to work out the genuine way of access to it. Looking at something, understanding and conceiving it, choosing, access to it—all these ways of behavior are constitutive for our inquiry, and therefore are

modes of being for those particular entities which we, the inquirers, are ourselves. Thus to work out the question of being adequately, we must make an entity—the inquirer—transparent in his own being. The very asking of this question is an entity’s mode of *being*; and as such it gets its essential character from what is inquired about—namely, being. This entity which each of us is himself and which includes inquiring as one of the possibilities of its being, we shall denote by the term “*Dasein*”. If we are to formulate our question explicitly and transparently, we must first give a proper explication of an entity (*Dasein*), with regard to its being (*BT*, 26-27).

If 2500 year-old Western metaphysical tradition can be characterized as the sign for the fact that it belongs to the essence of human beings something like asking the question of being to which they always already have an answer as in the form of “*average* understanding of being”, then *Dasein* should be chosen as the entity as that to which the question is directed (*das Befragte*). This is but to claim that, for the sake of making headway in the ontological investigation of the meaning of being (*das Erfragte*), what is asked for is the self-understanding of *Dasein* with respect to its mode of being as *the self-transcending-striving-for-being* (*das Gefragte*). “It is peculiar to this entity [*Dasein*] that with and through its being, this being is disclosed to it. *Understanding of being is itself a definite characteristic of Dasein’s being.* *Dasein* is ontically distinctive in that it is ontological” (*BT*, 32). However, claiming that *Dasein*’s being is “an *issue* for it” is not tantamount to maintaining that it is cut off from the world as the solipsistic subject. Whenever *Dasein* has a certain historical self-understanding of itself (man is the thinking animal, free agent, linguistic animal, etc.) it posits itself vis-à-vis the rest of the entities by either separating itself from them, or conceiving itself as being part of them. This ontic difference between the various realms of beings is what is inscribed on the average understanding of being of everyday persons as a result of the active philosophizing of some thinkers born into the scene which is called the history of Western philosophy: “‘History of philosophy’, as it is called, belongs to the concept of philosophy as science, to the concept of phenomenological investigation” (*BPP*, 23), because we have “a very distinctive questioning inasmuch as in the content of the question, in what is asked for, what is

asked for is itself what the questioning itself is” (*HCT*, 147). Why?

In order to give an appropriate answer, let’s dare contributing to Heidegger’s phenomenological analysis of the formal structure of questioning tried to be set forth above. For any questioning, it can be said that it is *questioning-something*. Put differently, every act of asking a question is an *asking-for*. So as to be asked about, the object of questioning should more or less be *there* in front of the questioner; it must be *had* by him *to a certain limited extent*. Had it be *absolutely* given to the questioner in a like manner in which the totality of created beings are given to God, then it must have been acknowledged that there is no need for questioning since not any part or aspect of the object would remain hidden from the purview of the questioner. From a certain angle, one can ask whether the rear front is painted with the same colour as the front façade of an house, because as the physical object it is, an house is given to the perceiver only partially, or, *perpectively*. Being present, or, being intuited of the front façade is the condition of possibility of asking for the colour of the rear front. Whereas what is asked about is *present*, what is asked for is *absent* for the questioner. So, the questioner *makes effort* for what he does *not have yet*. This “making effort” is nothing other than what Heidegger calls “striving” or “originary transcendence”. If we carry the reflection one step further, we can conclude that the history of the ontological theories of the past thinkers plus the scientific/commonsensical understanding of being which is directly, though slowly, affected by the former are the analogues of the façade. And it is this façade which keeps alive the tendency to question the rear front, namely, the meaning of being. However, unlike the façade, the meaning of being, at least as long as direct gazing of the perceptual apprehending is considered, is unattainable. Therefore, Dasein must not be defined as the entity which *effects the questioning*; rather, it *is* the very questioning itself.

The kind of being towards which Dasein comports itself in one way or another, and always does comport itself somehow, we call “*existence*” [*Existenz*]. And because we

cannot define Dasein's essence by citing a "what" of the kind that pertains to a subject matter [ein sachhaltigen Was], and because its essence lies rather in the fact that in each case it has its being to be, and has as its own, we have chosen to designate this entity as "Dasein", a term which is purely an expression of its being [als reiner Seinsausdruck] (*BT*, 32-33).

That in terms of which the ontological constitution of Dasein is examined cannot be *what-ness* (or, *essence*, *quidditas*). We remember from the previous chapter that Heidegger strongly criticizes Husserl for he abandoned the intentional analysis by switching to the transcendental framework of the *Ideen*, in which he examined the noetic-noematic structures of immanent consciousness as if they can be objectified as a "what". For him, the understanding of being Husserl resorts to is nothing other than the one bequeathed by the Greeks. According to this ontological understanding of presence-at-hand, or, "extantness", being is interpreted in terms of the *produced-ness of the product* as the outcome of "the productive comportment". This ontological understanding which had reigned over the history of philosophy since the time of Plato and Aristotle underlines the fact that to be present-at-hand or "to be extant" is to be "finished in *its own self*". On the other hand, "the *being [Sein] that is understood in the productive comportment* is exactly the *being-in-itself of the product*" (*BPP*, 113). Nonetheless, thinks Heidegger, neither "finished-ness" nor "in-itself-ness" are the features attributable to the ontological constitution of Dasein; as the originally transcendent entity which has always an understanding of being for which it continually strives, it should rather be qualified in terms of *un-finished-ness* and *outside-of-itself-ness*.

"As long as Dasein *is* an entity, it has never reached its 'wholeness'. But if it gains such 'wholeness', the gain becomes the utter loss of being-in-the-world" (*BT*, 281). Whenever Dasein is characterized as the entity which has a finished essence of its *own*, the ownness in question becomes the self-enclosedness of the sphere of immanence. In this case, Dasein can be said to be *consumed* to such an extent that its possibilities

comes to an end. That Dasein's potentialities lies hidden in its essence ready to be actualized in its existence could not be an appropriate objection, because the understanding of being based on the essence-existence duality has already been precluded by Heidegger.⁸⁰ Whenever one happens to find oneself in a position to identify oneself, he/she does so necessarily with reference to the world in which he/she dwells. He/she says: "I am a doctor", "I am a mother", "I play football in my spare times", and so on. Being worldly, social and intersubjective, these roles, occupations, activities, habits, etc. prevent Dasein from being characterized as the substantial core of its doings which is totally isolated from its world. The world-relation is so crucial for Dasein's ontological constitution, that it becomes impossible to define as an *indifferent what*:

The structure of being-in-the-world makes manifest the essential peculiarity of Dasein, that it projects a world for itself, and it does this not *subsequently* and *occasionally* but, rather, the projecting of the world belongs to the Dasein's being. In this projection the Dasein has always already *stepped out beyond itself*, ex-sistere, it *is* in a world. Consequently, it is never anything like a subjective inner sphere. The reason why we reserve the concept "existence" for the Dasein's mode of being lies in the fact that being-in-the-world belongs to its being (*BPP*, 170).

Whenever Dasein defines itself in terms of whatness, he does so by appealing to the ontological characteristics which has been called "categories" down through the history of philosophy. These are the *most general notions* which capture the salient traits of everything which are said to be *on hand*. So long as presence-at-hand, or, on-handness is the mode of being of the "intra-worldly" entities, these entities are to be accounted for as finished and in-themselves, because their being is "a matter of

⁸⁰ "[E]ssentia and existentia belong to every being. It is in no way proved and immediately evident that this thesis holds good for *every* being. This question becomes decidable only if it is established beforehand that every being is actual—that the realm of beings actually extant coincide with that of beings generally, that being coincides with actuality, and that every being is constituted by means of a whatness" (*BPP*, 111).

indifference” to them (*BT*, 68). If subjectivity of the subject or selfhood of the self is thought to belong to the class of entities other than Dasein, then the ontological fact that being-in-the-world is not the synonym of intraworldliness is totally ignored. Grounding Dasein is not possible in definitional terms because intraworldliness is issued from the understanding of being of Dasein itself, and Dasein is not a thing among things; rather, it is its “capacity to be”, its potentiality for being. (*Seinkönnen*): “The Dasein exists; that is to say, it is for the sake of its own capacity-to-be-in-the-world” (*BPP*, 170). If it is true that defining something is not possible unless that thing is defined on grounds of a *possible*, historical interpretation of what it means “to be”, then Dasein, as the entity which has the understanding of the meaning of being as such, must be said to be *free from the ground*. Inasmuch as *being-a-what* is the ground upon which we normally *define things according to their objective characteristics*, then Dasein, as the ‘source’⁸¹ of every possible objectivity cannot be objectified in the same manner as the intraworldly objects which are present-at-hand can be. Put in other terms, transcendence of Dasein is its *freedom from whatness*. Dasein *is* free, not because freedom is a property which is attributable to its essence. Since its existence and freedom are one and the same, it should be claimed that *it is freely*, or, *it exists freely*: “Freedom as transcendence. . . is not only a unique ‘kind’ of ground, but the *origin of ground in general. Freedom is freedom for ground*” (*OEG*, 127).

3.3.4. World: “The Whither” of Originary Transcendence

In spite of the apparent success in differentiating his conception of originary

⁸¹ We put the word intentionally in quotation marks in order to prevent the misunderstanding about its being. In ontic understanding the source is conceived as something present-at-hand which lies as the basis for some other thing which is present-at-hand as well. On the other hand, the ‘source’ as the ground of all grounds is the understanding of being of Dasein, and this ontological understanding is not a thing among things.

transcendence from that of Husserlian intentionality, Heidegger keeps worrying about the danger of a misunderstanding: “Inasmuch as Dasein exists qua being-in-the-world, it is already out there with beings; and even this manner of speaking is still imprecise since ‘already out there’ presupposes Dasein is at some point on the inside” (*MFL*, 165). In order to guarantee that the possibility of such a huge mistake is permanently uprooted, in addition to his analysis of ontological transcendence, he comes to grips with scrutinizing the phenomenon of world and tries to clarify the meaning of the “in” of being-in-the-world.

Dasein is not *in* the world as a present-at-hand entity is in another present-at-hand entity. Presence-at-hand, extantness, or on-handness is the way of being attributable to the entities other than Dasein (*BT*, 150). Whereas “being-in” is an “existential” for Dasein (*BT*, 79), these entities are to be accounted for as “worldless”, or, “intra-worldly”. Intra-worldly entities are worldless in the sense that, inasmuch as their whatness is considered, they can be thought, known, or represented without necessarily being located in the world as the total nexus of things, functions and purposes. With respect to their objective characteristics, extant entities can very well be examined in isolation from the world to which they actually belong and the human interests they are subjected to. Hence, for them, it must be claimed that being-in-the-world is not an essential, ontological characteristic; instead, they are to be characterized in terms of *substantiality*: “By substance we can understand nothing other than something which ‘is’ in such a way that it needs no other entity in order to be. Substantiality means *extantness*, being on hand, which as such is in need of no other entity” (*HCT*, 172). So, for the substantial entities other than Dasein, the being-in-one-another can only be evaluated as a *spatial relation*.

On the other hand, the being-in of Dasein does not primarily refer to a spatial relationship. Whenever it does, it does so in a “deficient”, “derivative” sense: “Dasein

itself has a ‘being-in-space’ of its own; but this in turn is possible *only on the basis of being-in-the-world in general*” (BT, 82). Only inasmuch as it is objectified by a positive science and assumed to be a present-at-hand entity among others—for example, as a biological organism, as a primitive tribe, etc.—can it be taken into consideration as the place-holder of a certain spatial location. Dasein is the entity, as being-in-the-world, in whose ontological essence being absorbed by the world is already embedded:

Taking up relationships towards the world is possible only *because* Dasein, as being-in-the-world, is as it is. This state of being does not arise just because some other entity is present-at-hand outside of Dasein and meets up with it. Such an entity can ‘meet up with’ Dasein only insofar as it can, of its own accord, show itself within a world (BT, 84).

The primordial relation of Dasein to its world is not the *factual being-in-one-another* but the other way around; since the mode of Dasein’s being is being-in-the-world, it is *factually* in the world. On the other hand, present-at-hand entities within the world as the space-holders are factually encounterable as the extant entities they are, primarily because to the essence of Dasein’s being something like being-in-the-world belongs:

The statement, “Dasein has, as the basic constitution of its being, a being-in-the-world,” is thus supposed to be a statement of essence. It implies that Dasein “has,” in its essence, something like world, and it does not obtain a world by the fact that it exists, that other beings of its kind and of other kinds are also factually with Dasein (or that is among them). Rather, conversely, Dasein can, in each case, exist as this particular Dasein, insofar as it has, as Dasein as such, something on the order of world (MFL, 170).

So, remarks Heidegger, as the totality of present-at-hand entities each of which takes its place on an indifferent and separate spatial point, even “nature” should be acknowledged to be “encountered within the world” (BT, 92). In this sense, whereas the extant entities are said to be “within-the-world” or “intra-worldly” (*innerweltlich*), Dasein is ontologically characterized as “worldly” (BT, 93). Regarding the world as the totality of extant entities as a whole (or, “nature”) carries us to the “ontic-natural”

concept of the world, the first of the four meanings Heidegger distinguishes attributed to the philosophical concept of *world*. The second meaning attributed to the term is an ontological one, because it refers to the entities of nature as they are compartmented into classes as the object realms of the positive sciences. In this meaning, the world is the “world of a mathematician”, “world of a physicist”, etc. This second sense therefore can be characterized as *regional-ontological*. When the world is understood as the “*wherein* a factual Dasein as such can be said to live”, we have the third sense of the term which qualified by Heidegger “ontic-existential (or human)”. According to this ontic-existential concept, world is the world of fashion, public world, world of a dancer, or “one’s own closest (domestic) environment”. Fourth and last concept of the world is connected with “the basic metaphysical constitution of Dasein” inasmuch as it is qualified as originally transcendent. This “ontological-existential” variation is the ultimate one which Heidegger is after (*BT*, 93; *MFL*, 180).

That this fourfold analysis does not refer to four ontologically separate worlds is obvious enough. As a matter of fact, one of the most prominent aims of Heidegger, when committing himself to such a phenomenological analysis of the worldhood of the world is to repeat his critique of Husserl by emphasizing that his perception-based phenomenology is able only to capture the first two meanings of the world. An attentive gaze would not be troubled in realizing the fact that, whereas the former two conceptions characterize the world as the noematic (objective) correlate of perceptual/theoretical attitude, the latter two set it forth as the objective pole of *existence*. And as we shall see soon, “the whither of transcendence” or “that to which existence intends” is not an object for it, but rather the dwelling or domicile. The aim of Heidegger here can be summarized as positing *the being-in of dwelling pertaining to existence* as the ontological precondition of *the standing-against pertaining to the objects (Gegen-stände) of perception*.

Dwelling is where we live our lives. It is the closest world to Dasein with which it is occupied during its everyday routines. Unlike the traditional conception of world, the world which bestows dwelling is not so removed as to be subjected to theoretical observation. It is first of all “the environment” in which we deal with the intraworldly entities (BT, 94). “The kind of dealing which is closest to us is. . . not a bare perceptual cognition, but rather that kind of concern which manipulates things and puts them to use” (BT, 95). But this manipulating and putting equipments to use, although different from the theoretical attitude based on “just looking”, is not a blind activity. It has its sight and this sight by the instructions of which dealing with the ready-to-hand things first become possible is called by Heidegger “circumspection” (BT, 98). Those entities which are manipulated and put to use, rather than perceived, are called “*equipment*”, and the mode of being of these equipmental things of the circumspective concern is “ready-to-hand” (*Zuhandenheit*) (BT, 97-98) as opposed to the things present-at-hand of the theoretical conduct. The peculiarity which distinguishes a ready-to-hand item from a present-at-hand thing is that whereas the latter is taken into consideration occasionally, the former is manifest continually as long as Dasein is being-in-a-world: “In anything ready-to-hand the world is always ‘there’. Whenever we encounter anything, the world has already been previously discovered, though not thematically” (BT, 114). This claim is strongly correlated with the claim that Dasein is in truth (that its relation with truth is non-occasional, pre-judgmental) since having-always-to-do with the environmental things is amount to their being always already manifest. Insofar as Dasein is in the world, it deals and copes with the environmental items in an uninterrupted way on grounds of the background familiarity with the world. So, as Harrison Hall states: “This familiarity with specific practical environments certainly does not involve explicit mental contents and representations. There are no Husserlian systems of meanings, or *noemata*, that mediate practical expertise” (Hall 2003, 110-111). This is to say that, in Heideggerian ontology the world is *there, disclosed without*

being represented in advance.

In order to clarify this pre-representational givenness, Heidegger claims that world is primarily and for the most part the “work-world”: “The worldhood of the world is rather grounded in the specific work-world” (*HCT*, 194). The reason why environmental world as in the form of work-world is encountered in a pre-representational, pre-judgmental way lies in the fact that *bare presence* is not the mode of being attributable to the tools belonging it; i.e., about a tool, it should be acknowledged that its *being* (*Vorhandensein*) is preceded and ontologically conditioned by its *being-for*, or “in-order-to” (*um...zu*): “The tool has the character of being of ‘in-order-to’” (*HCT*, 191). So, about the items of equipment it cannot be contended that they first of all are present-at-hand and only after are assigned to such and such a function or purpose. “Assignment” or “reference” (*Verweisung*) is the primal ontological characteristic of the ready-to-hand:

Equipment can genuinely show itself only in dealings cut to its own measure (hammering with a hammer, for example); but in such dealings an entity of this kind is not *grasped* thematically as an occurring thing, nor is the equipment-structure known as such even in the using. The hammering does not simply has knowledge about [um] the hammer’s character as equipment, but it has appropriated this equipment in a way which could not possibly be more suitable. In dealings such as this, where something is put to use, our concern subordinates itself to the “in-order-to” which is constitutive for the equipment we are employing at the time; the less we just stare at the hammer thing, and the more we size hold of it and use it, the more primordial does our relationship to it become, and the more unveiledly is it encountered as that which it is—as equipment (*BT*, 98).

Heidegger takes a huge step on this point and declares that the *in-itself-ness* should be attributed to the things of use rather than the objects of theoretical attitude: “*Readiness-at-hand is the way in which entities as they are ‘in themselves’ are defined ontologico-categorially*” (*BT*, 101). Hammer is not the entity as it is in itself when it is examined with respect to its objective properties like its weight, length, hardness, etc. It becomes what it is only in its being used, manipulated; i.e., it becomes the hammer it

is only when “hammering”. During the hammering, not only the hammer-thing, but also the technique by which one practices the hammering is exempted from being taken into consideration; i.e., none of them is represented by the user. Instead, in case of a fluent usage, the hammer gets more and more transparent, “unobtrusive”, and “inconspicuous”. That is to say, the more in-itself the piece of equipment becomes, the more it withdraws: “Concern in a certain sense *looks away from the tool as a thing* (*HCT*, 191; italics mine). Withdrawal or recession is the measure of in-itself-ness. The coming-into-presence of the theoretical object and the consequential obtrusiveness of the thing which is present-at-hand just obliterates the being-in-itself of the entity on hand:

In such privative expressions as “inconspicuousness”, “unobtrusiveness”, and “non-obstinacy”, what we have in view is a positive phenomenal character of the being of that which is proximally ready-to-hand. With these negative prefixes we have in view the character of the ready-to-hand as “holding itself in”; this is what we have our eye upon in the “being-in-itself” of something, though ‘proximally’ we ascribe it to the present-at-hand—to the present-at-hand as that which can thematically be ascertained. As long as we take our orientation primarily and exclusively from the present-at-hand, the ‘in-itself’ can by no means be ontologically clarified (*BT*, 106).

Moreover, some certain piece of equipment does not stand on its own, all by itself; it becomes the tool it is only in a workshop with other equipmental items. Hammer is used with nails, screwdriver with screws, needle with thread, and so on. Besides the functionality or “in-order-to” (hammering for hammer, screwing for screwdriver, etc.), a targetfulness or “towards-which” is also assigned to the ready-to-hand entity. Hammering nails can be towards the aim of building a cottage, screwing planks towards building a bookshelf. All these referential aspects *signify* one another: “The relational totality of this signifying we call ‘*significance*’. This is what makes up the structure of the world—the structure of that wherein Dasein as such already is” (*BT*, 120). The self-signifying character of the holistic structure of the work-world exempts Dasein from representing the individual items contained therein along with the

functions and purposes for which they are used or manipulated. This is nothing but to say that tools ready-to-hand, their functions, and the purposes for which they are put to use are not separate realms of entities which, after being perceived by the user one by one, gathered together to make the holistic structure world. The world is not the *sum total* of its constituent parts, but the other way around; it is only because world is given to Dasein as a whole, the individual items belonging to it can be isolated and objectified all by themselves. In this sense, Dasein's being-in-the-world, or dwelling in a world means being always already "familiar" with it as a whole:

Dasein, in its familiarity with significance, is the ontical condition for the possibility of discovering entities which are encountered in a world with involvement (readiness-to-hand) as their kind of being, and which can thus make themselves known as they are in themselves [in seinem An-sich]. Dasein as such is always something of this sort; along with its being, a context of the ready-to-hand is already essentially discovered: Dasein, insofar as it is, has always submitted itself already to a 'world' which it encounters, and this submission belongs essentially to its being (BT, 121).

In this sense, the being-in of Dasein, which is far from being a spatial containment relation, implies that Dasein *is* its world. The fundamental analysis of the being-in-the-world as the deep ontological structure of originary transcendence, or, Dasein sets it forth that neither Dasein, as an isolated subject, nor the world as the totality of extant entities (that is, "nature") can *be* without each other. Being-in-the-world, being always already familiar with the world, being absorbed by it are the different aspects of the same phenomena and all testify to the fact that the most basic, everyday (*alltaglich*) way of dwelling in the world of human beings cannot be explained by the subject-object, inner-outer, immanent-transcendent schemas as was the case with Husserl's description of the "natural attitude".

Nonetheless, Heidegger's phenomenological analysis of the worldhood of the world would be less valuable, albeit not inoperative, if the way in which the present-at-hand is ontologically derived from the ready-to-hand were not put forward. According to the

philosopher, some certain tool becomes “obtrusive” and “un-ready-to-hand” as soon as the fluent operability of the world, which is but the referential nexus of tools, functions and human ends, is broken down for this or that reason (*BT*, 103). In this case, the piece of equipment under question would be subjected to examination in order to be, say, repaired, and becomes the thematic object of the theoretical attitude. During the examination which focuses on the objective features of the item, the ready-to-hand tool becomes the present-at-hand object submitted to the “bare staring” of the theoretical attitude. This approach is the total inversion of the traditional viewpoint. Whereas for traditional account bare things are assigned some functions and aims in order that they can become the tools of environmental world, from the point of view of Heideggerian phenomenological ontology, the equipmental character of the ready-to-hand things is obliterated with the simultaneous replacement of circumspective concern with the indifferent, examining gaze of the theoretical attitude.

CHAPTER 4

HEIDEGGER'S DECONSTRUCTIVE READING OF THE TRADITIONAL PHILOSOPHY: CARTESIAN AND KANTIAN CONCEPTIONS OF THE SUBJECT

The second main part of *Being and Time*, which has never been written by Heidegger, has planned to be designated as the deconstructive interpretation of Descartes' and Kant's conceptions of subjectivity. According to most of the scholars, with the 1927 lecture courses *Basic Problems of Phenomenology* and the 1929 *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, this task has been accomplished and the temporality of being (*Temporalität*) as the source of something like subjectivity has definitely been set forth.

Our aim in this dissertation is not to take sides in the controversy whether Heideggerian project has been fulfilled by the contributions of the foregoing monographs. Instead, trying to catch sight of the nuances of the Heideggerian reading of Descartes, Kant is enough for our purposes. Following this path, therefore, we will try to set forth the main contours of the Cartesian *cogito* argument as the certain basis of subjectivity in the first part of this chapter, and Kantian criticism of Descartes along with the Heideggerian interpretation of the critical philosophy in the second. Time, or, temporality of the subject will be one of the main focuses of this chapter, which will be developed in the next chapter as the ecstatic-horizonal unity upon which Dasein's

care structure is unfolded. Here, one of the main targets which we have put forward is to display the progress from Descartes to Kant, as a consequence of Kant's attempt to interpret time as one of the faculties of the theoretical subject.

4.1. The Problem of Self in Cartesian Ontology

Among the scholars studying the relevant part of the history of philosophy, it is a widely accepted view that Aristotle, Kant and Husserl are the key figures who had a great influence on young Martin Heidegger, especially in the period during which his thought can mainly be entitled as phenomenological.⁸² Whereas Aristotle could be said to have inspired him in determining the subject matter of philosophy; viz., the question of being as such; Kant should be acknowledged as the one who came into his focus of attention as the first thinker, who took into consideration the notion of temporality in order to make a contribution to deepening the notion of subjectivity by discarding the substantial understanding of it; Husserl could be claimed to have helped him in choosing the appropriate method in handling the ontological question of the meaning of being as such; i.e., phenomenology as the description of the phenomena of any kind. The name of Descartes, however, should be adduced to this picture, if we would like fully to appreciate Heidegger's meticulous effort to deconstruct the tradition of modern

⁸² Besides the books comprising the lecture courses mainly devoted to examining and criticizing the thoughts of these key figures between early and late twenties, Heidegger has given weight to these names in *Being and Time* as well, which should be acknowledged as the outcome of maturation of his thought in his phenomenological period. Thus Steven Galt Crowell writes: "I argue that *Being and Time* takes to fruition Heidegger's early project of combining the 'transcendental' philosophies of Aristotle and Kant by means of Husserlian phenomenology" (Crowell 2001, 7). See also (Sherover 2003a, 115-116), where he writes: "Just because the presence of Kant in almost every chapter of *Being and Time* overlooked, I have, in a rather plodding way, been concerned to cite each of these instances where he makes an appearance. It is perhaps noteworthy that no other philosopher is mentioned as often; only Aristotle is a close 'runner up', with Hegel and Husserl tying, if you will, for a rather distant third place."

philosophy and its conception of subjectivity.

4.1.1. Ego as *Esse Certum*

Although some commentators give the impression to be inclined to account for the importance of Descartes' philosophy for Heidegger in terms of the latter's interest in Husserlian phenomenology,⁸³ this explanation does not any more seem to be convincing enough, after we remind ourselves of the fact that it is primarily the ontological language based on the dualistic schema of Cartesianism that is to be deconstructed if our target is to be determined as attaining an understanding of Dasein. Descartes, with his "method of doubt" and his consequential argument *cogito, ergo sum*, is incontestably the father of the modern period of Western philosophy. With him, the subject becomes the center of philosophical thinking as the "Archimedean point upon which we ground our knowledge" (Bernstein 1983, 16).⁸⁴ Forcing himself to suspect everything he cannot be sure of, Descartes suspends all what he once believed to be true. He might have been perceiving, or experiencing himself to be "sitting by the fire, wearing a winter dresser-gown, holding this piece of paper in my hands, and so on" (*PWD II*, 13) which seemed to him definitely to be the case at the

⁸³ ". . . Descartes appeared for Heidegger in a positively phenomenological light through the intermediary of Husserl. In other words, Husserl's authority especially after the turn of 1907, had invested Descartes with a phenomenological dignity such that all discussion about Descartes reverts to a discussion with Husserl. More precisely, any discussion of those Cartesian themes which Husserl had sanctified was equivalent to a theoretical discussion with Husserl himself" (Marion 2004, 70).

⁸⁴ In the second meditation, Descartes likens his search after an unshakable ground with that of Archimedes as follows: "Anything which admits of the slightest doubt I will set aside just as if I had found it to be wholly false; and I will proceed in this way until I recognize something certain, or, if nothing else, until I at last recognize for certain that there is no certainty. Archimedes used to demand just one firm and immovable point in order to shift the entire earth; so I too can hope for great things if I manage to find just one thing, however slight, that is certain and unshakable" (*PWD II*, 16).

first sight. But the belief that this undeniably is the fact could not have been verified, unless a criterion which separates what is dreamt from what actually is the case has been found; for even if the entire situation he thought he found himself to be in were just a dream, the philosopher would not have realized that. At the end of the day, it is always possible to smarten up and recognize that what we once believed actually to be the case is just a dream. So, concluded Descartes, the beliefs we have of the external world are not justified enough to be qualified as knowledge. Nonetheless, mathematical knowledge seems to be supplying the unshakable ground upon which the whole edifice of knowledge can be erected, “for whether I am awake or asleep, two and three added together are five, and a square has no more than four sides” (*PWD II* 14). On this point, method of doubt reaches a higher level, and Descartes postulates a “malignant demon” by whose deceitful effect upon us, we might wrongly conclude that the result of this mathematical operation is five. Nonetheless, even if I am deceived about that of which I am really sure, it is still clear and distinct that that I might be deceived is possible only insofar as I am a thinking thing.⁸⁵ So, Descartes finalizes his chain of arguments by his famous motto: *Cogito, ergo sum* (I think, therefore I am) (Cottingham 1997, 36-38). I can never be sure whether what I think happens to be true or not, but the fact that I am thinking is indubitable:

⁸⁵ I can be sure that I exist not only in the active case in which *I doubt*, but also in the passive case in which *I am deceived*: “But there is a deceiver of supreme power and cunning who is deliberately and constantly deceiving me. In that case I too undoubtedly exist, if he is deceiving me; and let him deceive me as much as he can, he will never bring it about that I am nothing so long as I think that I am something” (*PWD II*, 17). Janet Broughton stresses this point and labels it the “skeptical scenario”: “Here again Descartes is identifying his existence as a condition that makes methodic doubt possible, but instead of tying his existence to an aspect of his activity of doubting or suspending judgment, he ties it to an aspect of what I have called a skeptical scenario. A skeptical scenario must describe someone who has been caused to have false beliefs. Thus if there were no one in existence to be deceived. . . in the beliefs he holds, the skeptical scenarios could be ruled out as false and would not be *skeptical* scenarios after all, since skeptical scenarios are ones which might, for all I know, be true” (Broughton 1999, 9).

What, I ask, is this 'I' which seems to perceive the wax so distinctly? Surely my awareness of my own self is not merely much truer and more certain than my awareness of the wax, but also much more distinct and evident. For I judge that the wax exists from the fact that I see it, clearly this same fact entails much more evidently that I myself also exist. It is possible that what I see is not really the wax; it is possible that I do not even have the eyes with which I to see anything. But when I see, or I think I see (I am not here distinguishing the two), it is simply not possible that I who am now thinking am not something (*PWD II*, 22).

The idea of the wax in my mind is not as clear and distinct as the idea I have of myself as the one who sees the wax. That which once was thought to be a piece of wax as the thematic object of the perceiving mind as in the form of an idea may be so intermingled with some other ideas without my being aware of it, that it might soon be realized that it *in fact* is a piece of, say, dough. But however far I am from being capable of attaining certitude about the objects of the outer world because of the fallibility of the senses, I cannot deny the existence of myself as the perceiver, even if I am deceived about what I thought I saw. Thus becomes possible the transition from the dubitable sphere of the "I see" to the indubitable realm of the "I think I see":

[In this context] sentire [to sense] is the same as cogitare me sentire [I think that I sense], cogitare [to think] is the same as *cogitare me cogitare* [I think that I think]. Hence, it is apparent that Descartes conceives the cogitare from the outset in this way: it is a peculiar being whose manner of being is in *how it has itself along with* [*Wie des Sich-mit-habens*] [i.e., along with seeing, thinking, imagining, etc.], a being that, in the course of being a certain sort, has itself along at the same time (*IPR*, 192-3).

So, the inner sphere of subjectivity is pinpointed as the site of certitude, the unquestionableness of which issues from the fact that it remains the same (as in the form of *cogito*—I think) in varying acts of the mind like imagination, sensation, expectation, etc. Whereas the latter are to be considered as the thematizing acts whose prominent feature is to objectify, "I think" is to be considered as the ineliminable component which goes alongside with them. So, concludes Heidegger, *ego cogito* is to be thought of as the primitive form of what will later on be qualified as self-consciousness (*IPR*, 193).

The “having-itself-along-with” character peculiar to *cogito* (I think) is in need of further elaboration in order that the main problematic revolves around it can be elucidated some more. Nobody would deny that a wide variety of mental acts are different from the entities to which they are directed. When I imagine the bicycle of mine, the representation I have of it in the form of a mental image is indeed different from the physical object which is acknowledged to be a mind-independent entity. When I judge that something is thus and so, the ontological status attributed to that same thing is for sure independent from the idea of it as it is articulated in a judgmental form. “By the term ‘thought’, I understand everything which we are aware of as happening within us, in so far as we have awareness of it” (*PWD I*, 195). So, that which is qualified as ‘thought’ is to be distinguished from that which is not by its being inside us, so long as we are conscious of it; on the other hand the latter is to be defined as extra-mental, or outside us. This is to say, whereas the bicycle itself is a member of the outer world, the representation of it as in the form of an idea belongs to the inner sphere of the mental; viz., thought. Even if I may be capable of suspending all my beliefs about the extra-mental sphere which Descartes calls outer world, I cannot put into parenthesis and ignore the fact that “I think”.

For example, if I judge that the earth exists from the fact that I touch it or see it, this very fact undoubtedly gives even greater support for the judgment that my mind exists. For it may perhaps be the case that I judge that I am touching the earth even though the earth does not exist at all; but it cannot be that, when I make this judgment, my mind which is making the judging does not exist (*PWD I*, 196).

The degree of certainty attributed to the idea of that about which the judgment is made is less when compared with the certainty accredited to the idea of that which judges. I have the idea of earth; on the other hand I have the idea of myself as the one having the idea of the earth. For the idea of the earth to become a thought, as we saw above, it should be the idea of a conscious being; conscious of itself as having the idea. I can make a mistake and assert that what I touch, or see is earth, where there happens to be

no earth in the universe at all; so the judgment “I see the earth” becomes false. Despite this, the proposition “I think I see the earth” can never be false, because it is absurd to misconceive oneself as thinking, where, in fact, there is by no means any thinking activity happening in me. This is to say that, thinking as activity is necessarily *co-*given with what is thought in it. The privilege deemed suitable for the thinking being, as opposed to the corporeal being, issues from the fact that it does not need to be represented in a higher-order thought other than itself, in order to *be*. Whereas the entities whose mode of being is other than that of thinking are given by the intermediary of thought, thought itself does not call for anything else which might represent it, in order that it is claimed to exist. Hence, whenever I think, the thinking activity under consideration apart from what is thought in it is co-given with its object; it is a *content for itself*: “The sense of the *res cogitans*’ being is determined by this character of being, namely, a proposition with an inherent content” (*IPR*, 197). And this proposition is nothing else than the famous *cogito, ergo sum*. At the first sight, Heidegger seems to be claiming that *cogito, ergo sum* is to be evaluated as an analytic proposition⁸⁶ and that this way of tackling the matter may prevent us from coming across the peculiar mode of being *cogito* has: “The state of affairs [*Sachverhalt*] that enters into the proposition. . .[he who thinks is not able not to exist while he thinks] is determined with respect to its being, not by the *res*, but by the sense of ‘certum’” (*ibid*). But the sense of certitude lies in its being a logical norm whose sole function is

⁸⁶ Giving heed to Descartes’ use of the term “contradiction” in a passage quoted from the *Principles of Philosophy* gives at the first blush the impression that his famous motto is analytic in character: “In rejecting—and even imagining to be false—everything which we can in any way doubt, it is easy for us to suppose that there is no God and no heaven, and that there are no bodies, and that we ourselves have no hands or feet, or indeed any body at all. But we cannot for all that suppose that we, who are having such thoughts, are nothing. For it is a contradiction to suppose that what thinks does not, at the very time when it is thinking, exist. Accordingly, this piece of knowledge—*I am thinking, therefore I exist*—is the first and most certain of all to occur to anyone who philosophizes in an orderly way” (*PWD I*, 194-195).

to regulate the derivation of propositions from some other propositions without being ensnared by contradictions. In this specific sense, certitude is nothing other than valid argumentation. So, in order to specify what this certitude means, we have to ask ourselves whether *cogito, ergo sum* is a judgment which is analytically derived from some certain premises as in the form of valid inference, or not.

4.1.2. The Logical Structure of *Cogito, Ergo Sum*

In order that we become capable of purging away the obscurities inhibiting us from accessing the gist of Heidegger's interpretation of Descartes, we have to pay attention to the logical status of the Cartesian motto *cogito, ergo sum*. Related with what was said above, the question to be asked can be formulated as follows: Does the Heideggerian commentary of the Cartesian motto take a critical stance towards it because the *cogito* argument is based on but the principle of contradiction?

It is one of the most resistant dilemmas in the history of Western philosophy that a judgment is *either* necessarily true but is not capable of giving knowledge, *or* is not necessarily true but gives knowledge. Formulated differently, "no statement can both assert existence and be logically necessary. There are no synthetic *a priori* statements concerning existence" (Peltz 1962, 257). This approach, which incurred a serious criticism at the end of the 18th century by the Kantian Copernican Revolution, assumes that the only necessity which can be accounted for legitimately is the logical necessity. Any statement which pretends to be declaring necessary existence should be deprived of this huge claim, because the realm of the non-mental has, since Plato, been evaluated as the sphere of contingencies. According to this view, knowledge is rendered to be the knowledge of objects standing against the cognizing thought, as long as logic is limited to the internal realm of subjectivity in which nothing but lawfulness and formality of thinking itself is considered. In other words, necessity cannot be attributed to knowledge as the quality of propositional thinking which can be

about the objects in the world, so long as these objects are to be accounted for as *the other* when compared with the thought itself. Consequently, if Descartes is to be accused of blindly sticking the label of necessity on his *cogito* argument, then the argument itself is to be thought of as comprising the two steps of a syllogistic inference which is “composed of a major premise, a minor premise, and a conclusion” (*N IV*, 111). In such a syllogism, whereas “I think” is the minor premise and “I exist” is the conclusion, the missing major premise could be formulated as follows: “He who thinks, exists” (*ibid*). To contend, as Descartes did, that the absolute certainty attributable to the aforementioned proposition is at the same time the assurance of the existence of the self/ego *as a thinking thing*,⁸⁷ is tantamount to presupposing the rule of something in order to prove the existence of that same thing.

Nonetheless, basing his argument on the *Fifth Meditation*, Descartes would object to this critique by claiming that he is already aware of the fact that logical necessity does not entail existential necessity. Remaining loyal to his example, we can say that a mountain cannot be thought or imagined without conjuring up a valley at the same time, and vice versa. On the other hand, that these two terms are related to each other with a bond of necessity to the extent that each contains the other in its definition, does not amount to the fact that a mountain with a valley alongside it necessarily exist; “for my thought does not impose necessity on things” (*PWD II*, 46). Nevertheless, God and the ego appears to be the two exceptional cases to the rule underlined here. God, as the most perfect being, necessarily includes existence in its essence; existence, the lack of necessity of which indeed refers to a kind of imperfection. Of God, Descartes claims:

⁸⁷ “Although they [ones who does not philosophize in an orderly way] may have put the certainty of their own existence before that of anything else, they failed to realize that they should have taken ‘themselves’ in this context to mean their minds alone. They were inclined instead to take ‘themselves’ to mean only their bodies—the bodies which they saw with their eyes and touched with their hands, and to which they incorrectly attributed the power of sense-perception. . .” (*ibid*, 196-197).

“[A]part from God, there is nothing else of which I am capable of thinking such that existence belongs to its essence” (*ibid*, 47). Despite this, Heideggerian interpretation appears to be falsifying this claim and making it hold also for the *ego* by discovering a logical/conceptual bond of necessity between *cogito* and *sum*. Analyticity of the proposition “I think, therefore I am” is questioned here. At the first sight, analyticity of any proposition appears to be issuing from the logical/definitional bond between the subject and predicate terms of a judgment, the latter of which is at least to be included by the former. When we say, as Kant did, “Bachelor is unmarried man”, what we assert is nothing other than the definitional and hence, necessary bond between bachelor and unmarried man; to be bachelor and to be unmarried man are one and the same. Therefore, this proposition is said to be a mere tautology, which gives no knowledge about anything which is thought to be existing apart from the ideal sphere of the mental. On the other hand, what is said of the tautological categorical (“s is p” type) propositions also holds good for the valid inferences, unless irrelevant consequences are derived from the premises.⁸⁸ Hence, derivability of one proposition from another must also be defined as a logical relation, because the truth values of the propositions (whether they really correspond to the states of affairs they claim to correspond) are, to a certain extent, irrelevant here.⁸⁹ However, at a closer inspection

⁸⁸ Relevance is a vitally important criterion for valid syllogisms. In order that an inference can become a valid syllogism, the subject and predicate terms of the conclusion must comprise of the subject and predicate terms of minor and major premises, respectively. This can be clearly demonstrated by appealing to the famous example: All men are mortal (major premise), Socrates is man (minor premise), Socrates is mortal (conclusion).

⁸⁹ In syllogisms, *what* truth value the premisses have is not important as long as the relevance and derivability criteria are satisfied. This is to say, even the inferences in which false conclusions are derived from false premisses are valid. According to this, and the following inference must be acknowledged as a valid syllogism: All animals can speak (major premise), Dogs are animals (minor premise), Dogs can speak (conclusion). On the other hand, *that* each sentence *must have* a truth value is a *sine qua non* feature for any and every valid inference. In other words, derivation is carried out between a proposition and another; not between judgments (which has no truth values).

what is tricky in the *cogito sum* is impossible not to be realized; existence is inseparably bound up with thinking which first appears in the method of doubt as in the form of “I think I doubt”. That is, although it is always reasonable to doubt about everything, the existence of the doubt itself is beyond question; it is the ineliminable factor which makes it possible for me to give myself to myself as a thinking (here, doubting) being (*res cogitans*). But does this self-giving of the *cogito* have anything to do with the validity of the inference *cogito, ergo sum*? Formulated differently, is the certainty concerning the being of *ego* a logical certainty which should be conceived as the certainty of a propositional entailment in a valid syllogism?

Heidegger, declaring that he agrees with most of the commentators on the point that the Cartesian motto is not inferential in character, develops the main lines of his critique on a different path, which problematizes *cogito, sum* from the point of view of the transcendental philosophy; i.e., according to the relation between man and his world. But before getting into the details of his reasoning, it may be helpful to take into account some of the most obtrusive difficulties which would arise from the barely logical commentaries of Descartes’ famous motto, even though they dare not touch upon the transcendental problematic.

One of the most important arguments directed against the pure logicity claims runs as follows: An expression like “I think, therefore I am” is to be characterized as an “indexical expression” because of the pronoun “I”. So, the proposition stated in this expression is either true or false depending on the context in which it is uttered; i.e., depending on the person who utters it and when. Unless “I” is replaced by a proper name, *cogito, ergo sum* is bound to be neither true, nor false. On the other hand, validity of the inferences depends upon the consistency of the propositions which are derivable from one another, and this derivability is possible only insofar as the expressions in question have a truth value; that is, so long as they are propositions. So,

since the Cartesian motto does not seem to have a truth value in light of what was said above, then it could not take place in a valid syllogism as comprising the minor premise and the conclusion of it. Moreover, it is neither analytic nor synthetic, because analyticity and syntheticity can only be applied to the non-indexical sentences (Bar-Hillel 1960, 24).

After summarizing Bar-Hillel's view about the subject matter, Richard W. Peltz suggests a midway solution by first emphasizing the distinction between judgments and propositions. Propositions are what is thought and judged in judgments as mental acts, which are transmitted by sentence tokens (writings, phonemes, gestures, mimics) to the other subjects as addressees. Despite the seemingly unbreakable bond between these two, propositions are accepted to have an independent existence from judgments as far as, say, the Platonic realists are concerned; according to this view, a proposition is either true or false in a necessary fashion no matter if and in what context it is thought or uttered (Peltz 1962, 260). In other words, having a truth value is an ineliminable feature of the propositions and can be said to be peculiar to their modes of being, if we are allowed to appeal to the Heideggerian terminology. According to the widely accepted view, statements of mathematics are analytic propositions which are true or false in a necessary fashion. That they are necessarily true or false means: even if they are not thought or uttered, they do not cease to be either true or false. In other words, mathematical truths are not dependent upon the "pragmatic contexts" for their meaning and truth (Peltz 1962, 258).⁹⁰ But the situation is a little bit more complicated when we turn our gaze from the logical status of mathematical truths to that of the Cartesian argument: "I think therefore I am".

⁹⁰ "Descartes, I suspect, would not say, 'The proposition: the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles, is necessarily true each time that I pronounce it or that I mentally conceive it'" (Peltz 1962, 258).

Peltz argues that in order to examine Descartes' famous motto in appropriate terms, we have to distinguish two components in it: "a sentence token" and "a context". Whereas the sentence token is what is said or thought in the judgment ("I am", *sum* in this case), context is to be thought of as the (or, the set of) condition(s) under which what is thought or uttered by the token is performed. So, it can be claimed, "I am" is neither true nor false, unless the context in which it is thought or uttered is denoted. Accordingly, "I think", as the conditional part of the argument, is to be conceived as the context. Limiting ourselves within this framework, we can make out three sorts of sentences of the type in question: "I am hungry" is the sort which is sometimes true sometimes false depending upon for how long the utterer has not eaten anything. "I am dead" is the second sort of this type which is obviously false whenever it is uttered, since the utterer should be alive in order that he is capable of pronouncing so. As for the third one, Cartesian "I am" is a perfect example, because Descartes underlines the context dependency of the statement as follows: "I am, I exist—that is certain. But for how long? For as long as I am thinking" (*PWD II*, 18). This is amount to claiming that when I am totally deprived of my capability of thinking, I should cease to exist. Remaining in the paradigm Peltz offers, it should be contended that "I am" is necessarily true whenever it is thought or uttered, in contrast to the necessarily true propositions which are true no matter if they are performed through thinking or speaking (Peltz 1962, 259-262). To clarify the difference between the analytic truth pertaining to the context-independent propositions and performative truth peculiar to the context-dependent statements, we can claim that whereas the former are true, the latter are *always* true. And *always* means here, *whenever they are thought*.

In his famous article "Cogito, Ergo Sum: Inference or Performance?", Jaakko Hintikka also denies the inferential character to the *cogito, ergo sum* and writes:

In Descartes' argument the relation of the *cogito* to *sum* is not that of a *premise* to a *conclusion*. Their relation is rather comparable with that of a *process* to its *product*.

The indubitability of my existence results from my thinking of it almost as the sound of music results from playing it or (to use Descartes' own metaphor) light in the sense of illumination (*lux*) results from the presence of a source of light (*lumen*) (Hintikka 1962, 16).

In a manner reminiscent of Peltz's, Hintikka distinguishes "existentially inconsistent statements" of the context-dependent kind from the "existentially inconsistent sentences", which are contradictory no matter who utters it and under what circumstances (context-independent). According to Hintikka, when formulating his famous motto, the source of Descartes' intuition lies in the very fact that he was aware of the existential inconsistency of the statement "I do not exist" (Hintikka 1962, 13-15). One cannot oppose to this argument by claiming that there is a three-stepped syllogism here, the major of its premises should be formulated as follows: "In order to think that he exists, one must exist". Hintikka concludes that Descartes' argument is not to be qualified as an inference but rather as a performance, because the major premise candidate under question cannot turn out to be true, unless it can be proved that every single utterance of *cogito, ergo sum* performed by every individual is true. Nevertheless, there is no way to generalize this first-person experience which is for this very reason to be characterized as an "intellectual intuition".⁹¹ According to us, it is no coincidence that Hintikka did not prefer to use the epithet "existentially contradictory" instead of "existentially inconsistent", because contradiction is the word which is specifically utilized to refer to the mutual exclusiveness of the concepts and propositions in syllogisms; that is, contradiction is a label burdened with logical overtones. So, underlying the performatory character of the *cogito* argument, what Hintikka tries to lay out is the fact that the negation of the argument is not logically

⁹¹ The phrase "intellectual intuition" has an irrational overtone. In order to evade the danger of irrationality (here, illogicality), Hintikka asks in a confirming manner: "But is the word *cogito* perhaps calculated to express the fact that thought is needed for grasping that *sum* is intuitively evident? Was it perhaps an indication of the fact that intuition was not for Descartes an irrational event but an act of thinking mind, an 'intellectual intuition', as it has been aptly expressed?" (Hintikka 1962, 5).

contradictory, but intuitively impermissible.

. . . Descartes' insight is not generalizable. This is of course due to its performatory character. Each of us can formulate "for himself" a sentence in the first person singular that is true and indubitable, namely the Cartesian sentence *ego sum, ego existo*. But since its indubitability is due to a thought-act which each man has to perform himself, there cannot be any general sentence which would be indubitable in the same way without being trivial. The *cogito* insight of each of us is tied to his own case even more closely than Descartes realized (Hintikka 1962, 21).

Therefore, *sum* cannot be conceived as the consequence of a syllogism which is validly derived from the major premise of the generalized form "Everyone who thinks, exists" by the intermediary of the minor premise *cogito*, but the other way around. It is the intimacy of the first-person intuitive experience of my-self as a thinking thing that I owe the certainty of my existence which is, at least grammatically, can be generalized for everyone later on. Hence, it can be concluded that there is nothing logical about the evidence of the *cogito, ergo sum*.

4.1.3. *Cogito Sum* from the Perspective of Transcendental Philosophy

We saw above that Heidegger agrees most of the commentators on the fact that Cartesian argument should not be evaluated in terms of logic. According to him, Descartes' motto is worth examining not because of its contribution to the general logic which, for Kant, has remained unchanged since the time of Aristotle, but because of its innovative attitude towards man and its mode of being which can be qualified as *self-certainty of the ego* given in intuition.

4.1.3.1. Phenomenality of the *Cogito*

Up till now, the problem of the *ego* has been delineated as the problem of how this entity becomes manifest as the center upon which other beings can be grounded as certain. The debate performed about the inferential character of the Cartesian motto showed that the existence of the *ego (sum)* does not owe its certitude to its having been

logically derived from its being thought (*cogito*). We also emphasized that, although he seemed to shape his criticism in the opposite direction, Heidegger is indeed in agreement with most of the commentators in that self certainty of the *ego* is not limited with the logical certainty, or the validity of a syllogism. By and large, he is undoubtedly aware of the fact that existence is not derivable from the logical necessity of the analytic propositions and valid inferences. In his Nietzsche lectures, Heidegger quotes a long passage from the *Principles of Philosophy*:

I have often noticed that philosophers make the mistake of employing logical definitions in an attempt to explain what was already very simple and self-evident; the result is that they only make matters more obscure. And when I said that the proposition *I am thinking, therefore I exist* is the first and most certain of all to occur to anyone who philosophizes in an orderly way, I did not in saying that deny that one must first know what thought, existence and certainty are, and that it is impossible that that which thinks should not exist, and so forth. But because these are very simple notions, and ones which on their own provide us with no knowledge of anything that exists, I did not think they needed to be listed (*PWD I*, 195-196).

If we analyze this paragraph in light of Heidegger's interests, we can enlist the findings as follows:

- (1) *Cogito, ergo sum* is not an expression which can be analyzed logically and examined in terms of inferential validity. Logicians who tend to do this complicate the matter and obscure the intuitional givenness of *cogito sum*, for which Descartes uses the term "self-evidence".
- (2) In order to philosophize "in an orderly way", one must take as his measure and guide the certitude of the *cogito sum*, and build every bit of knowledge thereupon.
- (3) Claiming that *cogito sum* is given intuitionally all at once without being exposed to logical inference is not tantamount to its having a simple structure. In order that it can be given, we must have a pre-understanding of what *thought, existence* and *certitude* mean.

- (4) Considered semantically, aforementioned terms are so simple and atomic that we cannot analyze them further in order to attain their constituent parts.

Summarizing what I listed above, Heidegger writes:

Here Descartes is saying that “logic” and its definitions are not the highest tribunal for clarity and truth. These rest on a different ground—for Descartes, on the ground that is posited through his grounding principle. Above all, priority is given to what is secure and certain, in which the most universal determinations—Being, thinking, truth, and certitude—are of course included (*N IV*, 126).

Underlining Descartes’ emphasis upon the non-logicality of “I think, therefore I am”, Heidegger reduces the formula into *cogito sum*. If this is not an inference, *ergo* can be eliminated, because it is interchangeable with the expressions like “and this implies”, “therein is also posited and presented by representing itself”, and “that of itself already says” (*N IV*, 113). By ruling out the sentence connector *ergo*, what Heidegger, indeed in agreement with Descartes, stresses is the fact that existence of the *ego* cannot be the outcome of a valid syllogism. When we remind ourselves of what was said in *Being and Time* of the logical structure of assertions and the corresponding articulation of the world, we can better come to appreciate the fact that Heidegger traces here a peculiar understanding of being as in the form of the certitude of the *cogito sum*. This understanding of being peculiar to *cogito* is exclusive because it resists yielding the certainty of the existence of the *ego* to the logical articulation.

On the other hand, appealing to what we put forward in the preceding chapter again, we already saw that Heidegger offers phenomenology as the method of ontology, and claimed that the question of being as such along with the peculiar mode of being of any entity can be posed only insofar as the phenomenal basis of that which is questioned is taken into consideration. On that account, rather than *what* of any entity, its *how* of coming into presence and withdrawing into absence is focused on if the investigation in question is to be qualified as an ontological research, rather than an

ontic one. Therefore, from the point of view of Heideggerian phenomenological ontology, the special case of the mode of being of the *cogito* will be concerned only in terms of its phenomenal basis. Within the limits of the transcendental philosophy, the way of being, or the mode of existence of the *cogito* can legitimately be asked without giving up the claim to necessity. The explication of the mode of being of the *cogito* and laying out its phenomenal basis are one and the same: *it is nothing other than the analysis of the how of coming into appearance of the cogito in a necessary fashion.*

Staying loyal to the Heideggerian conception of “phenomenon”, which contrasts it with “semblance” and “appearance” as the self-manifest as we saw in the previous chapter, Michel Henry focuses on the phenomenality of the *cogito* in his “The Soul According to Descartes”. He contends that the Cartesian motto is about the “beginning” and this beginning is nothing other than “Being” by whose essential unfolding beings become manifest in this or that way (Henry 1993, 40). When claiming that “appearing” stands at the beginning as Being before everything which appears, Henry seems to be in agreement with Heidegger, for he apparently claims that unless appearing becomes manifest by itself, not even a single entity can come into appearance (ibid). All entities, however variegated their modes of being may be, can become manifest, or appear as the entities they are, only insofar as the *appearing as such* is self given without any mediation. For Descartes, beginning is being, being is “pure appearing”, and finally pure appearing is *cogito* (Henry 1993, 40-41).

As we stated above, “I think” does not need to be re-presented by the mediation of a higher-rank thought in order to be manifest; conversely, every other entity—*res extensa* in Descartes—come into appearance only by the mediation of thought. So, whereas “knowledge of the soul” must be qualified as the internal knowledge which is immediately taken hold of, knowledge of the body is the “acquired knowledge”: acquired by the mediation of thought as in the form of representations (ideas). As long

as knowledge of the external things is concerned, something like an ek-stasis of thought comes to the fore. This ek-static character belongs to the phenomenological jargon in order to emphasize thought's capacity of becoming *about* the objects whose mode of being is other than thought:

Descartes's radical rejection of these presuppositions of Western philosophy, that is, of ecstatic phenomenality at least in its claim to be originary, finds its positive expression in all of the technical definitions of thought and idea which the philosopher tirelessly and vainly proposes. All of these definitions carry out the theme of immediation, that is, appearing's original appearing to itself in such a way that, by excluding the mediation of *ek-stasis*, it consists in thought's primitive awareness as *the awareness of self in which thought experiences itself as it is* (Henry 1993, 44, italics mine).

In the above paragraph, Henry claims that self-awareness is primitive in that, in order to have the consciousness of itself, it does not need any conceptual mediator. Thought's being and its awareness of itself are one and the same.

"Thought" for Descartes, therefore, does not only mean what it means for us, thought in a kind of external sense, but that by which thought originally arrives within itself and is then found as such to be thought. Now how does thought arrive within itself? For the second time the technical definition of "idea" gives us the answer: it is not by an ek-stasis. On the contrary, the original arrival which traverses all thought and constitutes its essence is not an arrival outside itself, in exteriority, but an arrival of each thought within itself, which returns it upon itself, delivers it to itself, gives it to itself—thus being its auto-revelation, the revelation of thought itself and not of anything else, any alterity, any objectivity whatever (Henry 1993, 44-45).

For Descartes, an idea is a mental, internal being (*res cogitans*), whose most important function is to represent to consciousness outer beings which he generally think to be consisting of physical things (*res corporea*). In other words, thinking being makes manifest to itself the extended being by the intermediary function attributed to the ideas. However, besides revealing the entities whose mode of being is conceived to be different from that of the thinking thing, *res cogitans* is also capable of "auto-revelation", of giving itself to itself. And it is the infallibility of knowledge emanating from this auto-revelation which Descartes characterizes as the ineliminable component

in our total edifice of knowledge even after parenthesizing our former beliefs thoroughly by sticking loyal to the measure of “methodic doubt”. This infallibility of any cognition issuing from the auto-appearing of thought is nothing other than what we, with Descartes indeed, from the beginning of this chapter have labeled as *certum*.

4.1.3.2. Substantiality of the *Ego* and the Mathematical

Although the basic motivation underlying Henry’s article is not to fortify the Cartesian standpoint by emphasizing the self-sufficiency of the *cogito* as long as its phenomenal basis is considered, what he set forth about the self-revealing character of the *cogito* can be evaluated to be measuring up the criteria laid out by Heidegger about the “pure phenomenon”. One may fix upon this point and decide not to go further, if one is convinced about the fact that there is nothing more about the *cogito* worth considering. In this case, it would not be possible to get to the kernel of the matter as it is seen from the perspective of the Heideggerian phenomenology, according to which the Cartesian motto is still problematic despite its virtue of being sensitive enough to the mode of being peculiar to *cogito*.

Heidegger reproaches Descartes for not having questioned the characteristic way of being of the *ego* which first gives itself as in the form of *cogito*. Had Descartes really pondered over the ontological difference between subject and object, he would have realized that certitude in the guise of auto-revelation is not enough by itself, but needs further clarification:

In relation to the character of being of the finding into which the *res cogitans* is taken up, we can thus say that the foundation of being is the *esse certum* [to be certain]. The research tendency is formed from the outset *in such a way that it is not part of its purpose at all to pose a question of being*, to pose it in the sense that the research presents the subject of its inquiry so freely that the subject speaks from the standpoint of its own character of being . . . : being in the sense of *esse certum* (*IPR*, 197).

Against Henry’s emphasis upon the self-revelatory character of *cogito*, the above

paragraph of Heidegger can very well be quoted as a counter argument which claims that the subject was not free enough to speak from “the standpoint of its own character of being”, let alone manifesting itself from out of itself. The important thing which should be underlined here is that, even if its mode of being as *esse certum* had been acknowledged, the last word about the ego would not have been said. Although Descartes sees the self-certainty of the thinking thing as the foundation of any other thing, the kind of certitude peculiar to the self-givenness of the *ego* as *cogito* should be analyzed further in order that we can have a deeper understanding of the difference between the mode of being of subject and that of object. Unless we could discover what lies behind the certitude of the *cogito* and what *in fact* is given in this (quasi-)self-appearing, we might fail to appreciate the weight of Heideggerian criticism of Descartes which is worthy of being credited for its vital contribution to our understanding of modern/subjectivist tradition of philosophy (and world view). In other words, the question of whether there happens to be a genuine “turnabout” from the ancient/medieval tradition to the modern/Cartesian one would be left unanswered, as long as we remain ignorant to the foundation of the certitude as it was interpreted by Descartes (Raffoul 1998, 44).⁹² Hence, the task we have to take over with Heidegger is to try to answer these two questions: *What really is given along with the self-revelation of the cogito, and on what grounds?*

What shows itself along with the *cogito* is, admittedly, what makes itself manifest on the *quasi-ground* comprising of unquestioningly inherited body of presuppositions which has been prevalent down through the whole history of Western philosophy since

⁹² Raffoul writes: “Analyzing. . . the point of departure of modern ontology, namely, ‘a primary orientation toward the subject’. . . Heidegger draws our attention from the outset to the fact that the claimed turnabout of thinking in the primacy accorded to the ‘I’, to the ‘ego’, is not decisive and even that, ‘seen fundamentally in ontological terms, [it] was not a revolution at all’. . . The ‘turnabout’ of the questioning that starts with the ego or the subject, the ‘revolution’ or the ‘*allegedly* critical new beginning’. . . that would occur with Descartes, in fact leaves things ‘as they were previously’” (*ibid*).

the times of Plato and Aristotle. Heidegger thinks that the ground of certitude on which the subjectivity of the subject comes *seemingly* into appearance is the only obstacle on the way to thinking out the mode of being of Dasein on its phenomenal basis. Accordingly, the question of what subject (*ego*) is has not only not answered, but also not asked within the framework of Cartesian ontology whose point of departure was determined as the self-certainty of the *cogito*:

It is no accident that with the advent of the increased and explicit tendency to raise philosophy to the rank of an absolute science in Descartes, a peculiar ambiguity of philosophy simultaneously works itself out in a special way. Descartes' fundamental tendency was to make philosophy into absolute knowledge. Precisely with him we see something remarkable. Here philosophizing begins with *doubt*, and it seems as though everything is put into question. Yet it only seems so. Dasein, the I (the ego), is not put into question at all. This illusion and this ambiguity of a critical stance runs right through the whole of modern philosophy up to the most recent present. It is, at most, a scientifically critical but not a philosophically critical stance. All that is ever put into question—or less still, remains open and is not followed up—is knowledge, consciousness of things, of objects or of subjects as well, and this only so as to reinforce the assuredness that has already been anticipated—yet *Dasein itself is never put into question* (FCM, 20).

“The assuredness that has already been anticipated” is nothing other than the certitude Descartes characterized as the measure of an “absolute science”, and the science in question was nothing other than the mathematical physics of his day. The *ego* of the *cogito*, the “I” of the “I think” could be given, or becomes manifest as the entity it itself is only on the grounds of certainty that is provided by the natural science which has since that time been grounded upon the calculative attitude peculiar to mathematics. Briefly stated, mathematical/calculative attitude is the ground upon which what is given alongside the *cogito* is so given. So, the answer to the second part of our question spawns the condition according to which the first part of it can be replied in an accurate way. In this context, Heidegger thinks that subject cannot “speak from the standpoint of its own”, because the limits of its only possible speech is pre-determined by the ideal of natural sciences and their underlying

mathematical/calculative attitude towards the entities. In order to lay bare the ground upon which what is given alongside the auto-revelation of the *cogito* is so given, we have to focus on Heidegger's interpretation of "the mathematical", because it is especially this adjective which the ground in question is predicated of.

Descartes stands right at the cornerstone where man freed himself "from the Christian revealed truth and church doctrine" and retrieved his dignity back by positing "the kind of certitude . . . in which he becomes certain of himself as the being that thus founds itself on itself" (*N IV*, 97). At the first sight, Heidegger appears to be endorsing the fact that there happened to be a two-directional movement of "liberation" at this historical juncture: "Liberation *from* the revealed certitude of the salvation of individual immortal souls" and "liberation *to* a certitude in which man can by himself be sure of his own definition and task" (*N IV*, 99). At a closer inspection, in the following pages of this chapter, it will be realized that this picture is very far from what Heidegger had in mind, because only a change of location of certitude has taken place during the inauguration of the modern era, rather than our primordial characterization and understanding of it. According to the philosopher, since it misinterpreted the fundamental meaning of the mathematical as it was scrutinized by the Greeks, Cartesian turn was destined to be a quasi-turnabout as long as the destiny of metaphysical thinking was considered. In this modern turnabout, through the very misinterpretation of *ta mathemata*, only the cage into which the philosophical thinking was imprisoned had been renewed, but the conviction remained the same; the so called "liberation" implies a fake-movement toward freedom.

In *What is a Thing?*, Heidegger informs us about the meaning of the Greek term *ta mathemata*: it means "what can be learned and thus, at the same time, what can be taught". Accordingly, the verb *manthanein* is "to learn" and *mathesis* is both "studying, learning", and "doctrine taught" (*WT*, 69). Today, when we are talking

about the mathematical in general, we normally refer to the numbers. However, the situation is totally different for the Greeks. Whereas we characterize the mathematical with what is numerical, they, in a reversed fashion, illustrate numbers by what is mathematical. The essence of the mathematical “is taking cognizance of something, what it takes being something it gives itself from itself, thereby giving to itself what it already has” (WT, 92). So, *ta mathemata* are the things that can be learned and taught, although we already have a preliminary grasp of them.

That of which we have a preliminary grasp is that on whose ground we understand beings, things, or entities. So, the mathematical corresponds to our basic understanding of our environment which is projected onto the world and characterizes it as the world *for us*. What is already known by us in advance is nothing other than the thingness of things, or, being of beings. In a historical era, some certain sort of projection of thingness hold sway and “in this projection is posited that which things are taken as, what and how they are to be evaluated beforehand” (WT, 92). Whereas the things were characterized as having an inner nature and a *telos* in Aristotle’s physics, they began to be qualified as homogeneous bodies interacting with one another on a uniformly gradated space/time plane in the world of, say, Newton. So, the mathematical carries us to “the mathematical project” according to which fundamental propositions by the help of which some certain kind of world experience as in the form of “knowing” first becomes possible.⁹³ In this sense, mathematical thinking is essentially related with *axiomatic thinking*: “As axiomatic, the mathematical project is the anticipation of the essence of things, of bodies; thus the basic blueprint of the structure of everything and its relation to every other thing is sketched in advance” (WT, 92). In such a picture,

⁹³ “The mathematical project (*der mathematische Entwurf*) which Heidegger has in mind is, then, a kind of ground plan or blueprint of the structure of things which is sketched out in advance, which makes possible the first protocol statements of the science. The mathematical project is the kind of surveying or laying out of the horizon within which things may appear” (Fay 1977, 81).

Cartesian project, according to its inner plan, should be evaluated in terms of the mathematical project whose structural axiomatization is guaranteed by the “fundamental proposition” *cogito, ergo sum*. Cartesian motto is nothing other than the basic axiom of Descartes’ metaphysical system, the self-appointedness of which is thought to be issuing from its self-revelatory character. Hence, because of the axiomatic structure it has, Cartesian metaphysics is to be recognized as the prototype of mathematical projection, within the limits of which every entity whose mode of being is other than that of *ego* is entitled to be certain only insofar as it is a clear and distinct representation of the same *ego*. As a result of this, a peculiar type of homogenization was imposed upon a wide variety of beings and they started to be conjectured as substances with measurable properties. Mathematical project of the Greeks turned into something dominated by “numerical measurement” in the age of modern science inaugurated by Descartes:

Because the project establishes a uniformity of all bodies according to relations of space, time, and motion, it also makes possible and requires a universal uniform measure as an essential determinant of things, i.e., *numerical measurement* (WT, 93, italics mine).

This homogenizing of beings can be evaluated both as the result of understanding entities in terms of objects represented by the subjects with the aid of ideas, and as the condition of possibility of measurability/calculability peculiar to mathematical physics in its preliminary stages of development in Descartes’ time. In both cases, world is deprived of its *worldhood* and the circumspective concern as the primordial comportment of Dasein as Being-in-the-world towards the totality of what is ready-to-hand (i.e., region) is replaced by the *mere staring* peculiar to the theoretical attitude towards the homogenized things whose mode of Being, as we have mentioned in the previous chapter, is present-at-hand and no more. As we saw before, present-at-hand is the mode of Being of intraworldly entities (other than Dasein) that are cut off from the links which bind them to the concerned comportment (or, *intentional act*, in

Husserlian terms) of Dasein as Being-in-the-world. As a result of this dispossession, they are abstracted from the equipmental whole by losing their involvement-character, and become mere things geared with calculable, measurable, or gradable properties in conformity with the modern interpretation of the mathematical; that is, *numerical measurement*:

Mathematical knowledge is regarded by Descartes as the one manner of apprehending entities which can always give assurance that their being has been securely grasped. If anything measures up in its own kind of being to the being that is accessible in mathematical knowledge, then it is in the authentic sense. Such entities are those *which always are what they are*. Accordingly, that which can be shown to have the character of something that *constantly remains* (as *remanens capax mutationum*), makes up the real being of those entities of the world which gets experienced. That which enduringly remains, really *is*. This is the sort of thing which mathematics knows (*BT*, 128).

So, we become ready to answer the question which we have formulated above: what is given along with the auto-revelation of *cogito*, and on what grounds? *Mere things* equipped with measurable properties are given along with the *cogitare* (thoughts) of the *cogito*, on the ground of the “care for certainty” indigenous to some certain interpretation of “the mathematical” as in the form of *numerical measurement*. Descartes’ care for the mathematical knowledge and his homogenization of the realm of entities including the human beings are strongly correlated and secures the foundation of his ontology, according to which Being of all entities is but “substantiality” (*BT*, 129).⁹⁴ Mathematical knowledge posits its peculiar understanding of being to the beings in order that these beings can become the possible objects of scientific cognition. True being, as we saw in the paragraph quoted above, is the constant being which makes the entities on which it was projected immune from any

⁹⁴ Heidegger emphasizes the same point in his 1925 Marburg lectures, as well: “Whenever Descartes asks about the Being of an entity, he is asking in the spirit of the tradition, about *substance*. When he speaks of substance, he is speaking mostly in the strict sense of *substantiality*” (*HCT*, 172).

effect capable of modifying them in some certain respects. Heidegger notes that Cartesian ontology of the world is based upon the fact that all the entities included therein (*res corporea*) remain constant as long as their *extensio* is taken to be their “principal attribute”: “[Ex]tension in length, breadth and depth constitutes the nature of corporeal substance” (*PWD I*, 210). However much we extend some body longitudinally, it will respond us by shrinking in breadth, or depth, or both; with however much force we press on it to make it shrink in breadth, it will compensate this shrinkage by stretching in length so as to maintain the total quantity it had (*PWD I*, 215). Heidegger interprets this as follows:

Even in modifications of the shape of the body, its sameness is maintained. And because, according to the ancient concept of being, that truly is which always is, and because *extensio* always remains in every total change, extension is therefore the true and authentic being in the body (*HCT*, 178).

The same also holds good for the other two substances; namely, *res cogitans* and God. There are three substances in Cartesian ontology, all of which are characterized by immutability. For *res cogitans* and *res extensa*, change with respect to their characteristic modes is possible; however, “in the case of God, any variation is impossible”, because there are no modes or qualities in him (*PWD I*, 211). So, as *ens increatum*, God is *ens perfectissimum*. As the creatures of God (*ens creatum*), *res extensa* and *res cogitans* are the “finite substances”. Heidegger thinks that Descartes unquestioningly inherits the ancient understanding of Being which is based on production,⁹⁵ and it is especially this understanding which motivates him in projecting “substantiality” crudely to all entities without any regard to the differences between the modes of being peculiar to them. On the other hand, the scientific ideal of mathematization of the world provides the driving force for homogenizing the realm of

⁹⁵ Analogy is between the pair producer/product and the pair creator/creature.

entities by means of quantification, in order that these entities, as constant substances can become measurable. One of the most obtrusive instances of this ontological understanding based on substantiality is Descartes' equivocal use of the word "is" for both infinite and finite substances, although he seems to have presupposed an infinitely great difference between these two:

A concept is univocal if its meaning content, that is, what it intends, what is addressed by it, is intended in the same sense. When I say, for example, 'God is' and 'the world is', I certainly assert being in both cases but I intend something different thereby and intend the term 'is' in the same sense, univocally; for if that were the case, then I would thereby either intend the creature itself as uncreated or reduce the uncreated being God to creature (*HCT*, 173-174).

Heidegger notes that in the Middle Ages, Schoolmen were in agreement upon the fact that the univocal meaning of the concept of Being (i.e., 'is') is permissible only to the extent that whoever uses it both for God and the created things, uses it in an *analogous fashion*.⁹⁶ He also thinks that "Descartes in this formulation is essentially left behind by the insights of the middle ages", because he does not work out the relationship of *being-created-by* and use the possible consequences of such an investigation to have a deeper understanding of the ontological difference between the creator and the creatures. Instead, he remains within the paradigm opened up by the theoretical attitude of the mathematical natural science, according to which the being of the entities is to be qualified as constant presence, in order that these entities can become measurable. So, Descartes prefers to slide over the univocity of the concept of Being,

⁹⁶ Descartes writes: "In the case of items which we regard as things or modes of things, it is worthwhile examining each of them separately. By substance we can understand nothing other than a thing which exist in such a way as to depend no other thing for its existence. And there is only one substance which can be understood to depend on no other thing whatsoever, namely God. In the case of all other substances, we perceive that they can only exist only with the help of God's concurrence. Hence the term 'substance' does not apply *univocally*, as they say in the Schools, to God and other things; that is, there is no distinctly intelligible meaning of the term which is common to God and his creatures" (*PWD I*, 210).

and goes on to qualify the relationship between the creator and the created as a *mere side-by-sideness* of what is present-at-hand (*HCT*, 174-175). In Heideggerian terminology, this is tantamount to sacrificing the ontological investigation aiming at understanding the “ontological difference” between being and beings for the sake of grounding and fortifying the ontical research which is characteristic of mathematical/natural sciences.

Such lack of concern towards the ontological difference characteristic of Cartesian ontology is conspicuous also in the claim that substances by themselves do not have any effect upon us, but only by means of their respective “outstanding attributes”:

[W]e cannot initially become aware of a substance merely through its being an existing thing, since this alone does not of itself have any effect upon us. We can, however, easily come to know a substance by one of its attributes, in virtue of the common notion that nothingness possesses no attributes, that is to say, no properties or qualities. Thus, if we perceive the presence of some attribute, we can infer that there must also be present an existing thing or substance to which it may be attributed (*PWD I*, 210).

If substance by itself does not have any effect upon us, but only by one or more of its attributes, then asking the question of being and trying to answer it within an adequate ontological framework should *in principal* be impossible. If Descartes is right, then the fundamental ontological project of *existential analytic* and the consequential effort of laying out the temporal horizon of being as it was executed in *Being and Time* should be qualified as a futile enterprise.

As a result of this lack of affectivity peculiar to being, the meaning assigned to the term “substance” is equivocal in Cartesian ontology; Descartes randomly uses it to qualify both the being of entities (i.e., substantiality) and the entities themselves. This interchangeable usage of the term substance in some cases for being and in some other for the things testifies to the fact that Descartes himself is perplexed about the status of the ontological knowledge. Borrowing the Kantian terminology, Cartesian ontology

can be said to be mistaking the empirical knowledge for the transcendental knowledge of the conditions of any theoretical cognition whatsoever:

[I]n this way of defining a substance through some substantial entity, lies the reason why the term “substance” is used in two ways. What is here intended is substantiality; and it gets understood in terms of a characteristic of substance—a characteristic which is itself an entity. Because something ontical is made to underlie the ontological, the expression “*substantia*” functions sometimes with a signification which is ontological, sometimes with one which is ontical, but mostly with one which is hazily ontico-ontological. Behind this slight difference of signification, however, there lies hidden a failure to master the basic problem of being (*BT*, 127).

Within the framework of Cartesian philosophy what is ontical is jumbled together with what is ontological, because Descartes is not sensitive enough to the ontological difference between being and the beings. Since he remained loyal to the contemporary version of the mathematical as in the form of hypothetico-deductive model of natural science, Cartesian conception of being must have been limited with the traditional ontological understanding of substance which is formulated by Heidegger as “constant presence”, or presence-at-hand (*Vorhandenheit*). In the next section, we will see that even the *ego* does not exempt from being understood as a thing, an object, or what is present-at-hand by Descartes, only because of this obstinate point of view implicit in the contemporary tendency of the mathematization of the world by way of *numerical measurement*.

4.1.3.3. Substantiality of the *Ego* and Representedness

We saw above that, because it does not have an inferential structure, *cogito sum* stands as the fundamental proposition of the axiomatic system which is known as Cartesian ontology. Since it is the ineliminable element within the whole bunch of our knowledge even if we decidedly commit ourselves into the “methodic doubt” of the most extreme kind, Cartesian motto corresponds to the basic axiom of the deductive ontology of Descartes. In this section, we will try to focus on this *fundamentality thesis*

more deeply, and attempt to clarify in what way something like *ego* was derived from the *cogito*.

As is widely accepted, putting the subject at the center as the measure of the certitude of every other thing, Cartesianism inaugurates the modern era in Western thinking which is based on but self-certainty. This kind of “subjectivism”, no matter it is tried to be refuted or supported, is effective even today in every kind intellectual occupation ranging from philosophy to positive science, human sciences to literature, etc. This fact is not very hard to realize if one looks around and trace the footprints of the dualistic background of the theoretical attitude towards the world and the intraworldly entities, according to which the inner realm of thinking is sharply separated from the outer realm of empirical beings. Whether it is problematized by philosophy, or it is used as a handy device by the positive sciences, Cartesian metaphysics still holds sway in different guises everywhere.

We mentioned before that there are three substances in the Cartesian ontology, and *res cogitans* as in the form of *cogito* stands at the center as the privileged one. As a matter of fact, God, as the uncreated, should be acknowledged to be the most authentic substance if we once again remind ourselves of the definition of substance which Descartes has mind: “By substance we can understand nothing other than a thing which exist in such a way as to depend on no other thing for its existence” (*PWD I*, 210). Nevertheless the existence of God, like the existence of other intraworldly things, owes its certitude to the certainty of the *ego* as *cogito*. When discussing the phenomenality of the *cogito* in 4.3.1, we tried to lay out the *how* of coming into appearance of the “I think”. In this section, bearing in mind the Heideggerian interpretation, we will aim at canvassing whether what we mentioned earlier about the phenomenal basis of the *cogito* is in line with what is put forward in the definition of substance; that is, whether the autonomy implied in the auto-revelation of the *cogito* is

as same as the self-sufficiency of substance.

Heideggerian interpretation of Cartesian ontology owes its originality not to arguing with Descartes about the certainty of “I”, God, or intraworldly entities together with the outer world in which they are, but to scrutinizing the understanding of being inherent therein. Seen from this perspective, whether I doubt or on the highest level of certainty claim the existence of anything is not a big deal. What matters instead, is the understanding of being projected upon some entity whose existence I can be sure of, or doubt. So, when I say that “I doubt that I exist”, “I doubt that God is”, or, “I doubt that the outer world exist”, what is at issue is not whether the so-called substances in question really are, but rather, *on what grounds I can doubt their existence*. The ontological ground on which it becomes possible to doubt anything consists of the functionally interrelated concepts of *idea*, or *representation*, and *substance* as in the form of *res* (i.e., thing). In order to clarify the implicit understanding of being covertly activating each of these concepts as to make them work in a congruent manner, it is enough to uncover the hidden, underlying presuppositions Descartes unquestioningly inherited from the tradition with the aim of attaining the self-certainty of the *ego*, as it was derived from his motto *cogito, ergo sum*.

In methodic doubt, what is doubted is the *existence* of anything. Whether something is or not *can be* doubted, because existence cannot be experienced by the *res cogitans* directly, but only by the mediation of ideas. Ideas are the mental representations by means of which what exists can be *known* to exist. The vitally important concepts of “knowing” and “being” are intertwined inseparably within the boundaries of the Cartesian ontology, which is for this reason is thought to be dominated by epistemology. According to Descartes, claiming that something surely exists is asserting nothing other than that I certainly know that that same thing exists. Bearing this in mind, Heidegger claims that *cogitare* (thinking) for Descartes is but *thinking*

something; i.e., “representing”:

We translate *cogitare* with “thinking” and thus persuade ourselves that it is now clear what Descartes means by *cogitare*. As if, we immediately knew what “thinking” means. And as if, with our concept of thinking, culled perhaps from some textbook on “logic”, we were already certain of confronting *that which* Descartes wishes to assert in the word *cogitare*. In important passages, Descartes substitutes for *cogitare* the word *percipere* (*per-capio*)—to take possession of a thing, to seize something, in the sense of presenting-to-oneself by way of presenting-before-oneself, *representing* (*N IV*, 104-105).

Re-presenting what is already present before me is what is to be understood from Cartesian usage of the word *cogitare*, and only in this way can one realize how deeply mixed with epistemology is Cartesian ontology. Presence of something is so intertwined with its being represented by the ego, that there happens to remain no room for ontology in the sense Heidegger prefers to interpret the term (phenomenological ontology); representedness becomes the measure of being of entities, and the correspondence between what is present and what is represented (*certitudo*) the only sense attributed to the concept of truth. But there is another problem which, though totally ignored by Descartes, has given way to unsolvable aporias which the next generation would face willingly or unwillingly:

If we understand *cogitare* as representing in the literal sense, then we are already coming closer to the Cartesian conception of *cogitation* and *perception*. Words that end with “-tion” often describe two things that belong together: representation in the sense of “representing”, and representation in the sense of “something represented”. *Perceptio* also has the same ambiguity: *perceptio* has the senses of *percipere* and *perceptum*, the bringing-before-itself and what-is-brought-before-itself and made “visible” in the widest sense. Thus, instead of *perceptio* Descartes often uses the Latin word *idea*, which as a consequence of its use can mean not only what is represented in representing but also the representing itself, the act and its execution (*N IV*, 105).

Though still under the enchantment of Cartesian ideal of subjectivism, Husserl is aware of the fact that, mental acts and their peculiar act qualities (noetic content) together with the objects (noematic content) should be classified as the mental contents. According to the father of phenomenology, it is not the case that the things

around us, in order to be perceived, merely mirrored by the human minds as passive receptors; rather, consciousness is consciousness of something only as long as it is intentional.⁹⁷ But for Descartes, representationalist theory of consciousness holds good.

Representationalism is the *sine qua non* element of the mathematical-deductive system of the Cartesian ontology. When claiming that God would not deceive us about the existence of the outer world, Descartes makes a barely logical move, for it is the concept of God as *ens perfectissimum* which prevents Him from misleading us in our belief in the existence of the *res corporea*. Being a deceiver is to be qualified as a lack, and attributing such a deficiency to God contradicts with his concept according to which he is the most perfect Being.⁹⁸ At the first sight, it seems to be the case that when proving the existence of the outer world, Descartes applies only to the valid syllogism based on the principle of contradiction, and there is no place left for the representationalist approach. But at a closer look, it can easily be realized that the existence of the outer world which can be entrenched only by appealing to the concept of the benevolent God—that is, benevolent to the extent that he does not deceive us—should be insured the way it is, because we know the extra-mental only by means of the mental. That which is secured by God is not the *existing-in-itself* of the *res corporea*, but the congruity between the outer being and the corresponding idea, or the mental representation. In order to scrutinize the logic lying behind the representationalist approach deeper, we can briefly examine Descartes' proof of the existence of God.

⁹⁷ See chapter 2.

⁹⁸ In the fourth Meditation, Descartes writes: “To begin with, I recognize that it is impossible that God should ever deceive me. For in every case of trickery and deception some imperfection is to be found; and although the ability to deceive appears to be an indication of cleverness and power, the will to deceive is undoubtedly evidence of malice and weakness, and so cannot apply to God” (*PWD II*, 37).

Descartes conceives that which is represented in an idea as the cause of the idea itself. Both what is represented (*cogitatum*) and that which represents (*cogitare*) have reality peculiar to each: “formal or actual reality” (*realitas formalis*) for what is represented in the idea and “objective reality” (*realitas objectiva*) for the idea *qua* idea (*PWD II*, 28). In order to prove the existence of God, Descartes inaugurates his chain of arguments by claiming that some certain effect cannot have more reality than its cause. As a fallible, restricted, and finite being, if I have an idea of God as infinite, then this idea cannot contain more objective reality than the degree of formal reality supposed to be attributed to God Himself as the cause of that idea—namely, as a finite being I cannot be the source of the infinite idea. Therefore, there must be an infinite being *at least* as real as the idea of it, and this being is but God.⁹⁹ Here, the logic of representation which underlies the relationship between the *cogitatum* and *cogitare* is not very different from that of the muddy boots to the footprints on the ground. When the layer of mud comprising the first footprint is very thick, we conclude that the boots were very dirty; the thinner the layers are, the more likely it is to think that the boots were contaminated less. But the amount smeared on the boots must be *at least* equal to that which spawns the footprints. In the case of this metaphorical example, how stepping on the ground with muddy boots *caused* the footprints is clear enough. But in the case of the Cartesian representational model of cognizing things, it is far from being comprehensible on what kind of causal mechanism formal reality of the things *extra mentem* (extra-mental) have an influence upon the objective reality of the idea, so that I, as a thinking thing, can perceive the apple tree standing in the garden as an extended

⁹⁹ “[I]t is very evident by the natural light not only that nothing comes from nothing but also that what is more perfect cannot be produced by—that is, cannot have as its efficient and total cause—what is less perfect. Furthermore, we cannot have within us the idea or image of anything without there being somewhere, either within us or outside us, an original which contains in reality all perfections belonging to the idea. And since the supreme perfections of which we have an idea are in no way to be found in us, we rightly conclude that they reside in something distinct from ourselves, namely God. . .” (*PWD I*, 199).

thing. There seems to be no answer available for this question, as long as we remain within the limits of Descartes' epistemology which is founded upon his dualistic ontology. For the transference of reality between two sharply separated realms of being, the basic understanding of Descartes does not seem to be exceeding the fundamental principles which are on charge for the transference of mud as to make up footprints on the ground.

We saw in the above quoted passage of Heidegger that the basic mistake Descartes made is to ignore the difference between representing as an act and that which is represented in that act as in the form of an idea. Ideas or mental images are characterized as the only constituents comprising the *res cogitans*, and the act character of what is mental is excluded, or ignored by Descartes. In 1923/24 Winter Semester in Marburg lectures, Heidegger makes the same point:

[D]escartes *reduces a twofold being to one uniform dimension* within the *res cogitans*: the *esse* of the *cogitare* and the *esse* of the *cogitatum*. Both are one *esse animi* [being of the soul], a being that, as such, is initially independent of the body's being. Descartes reduces [*nivelliert*] the *realitas objectiva* and the *realitas formalis* of the idea itself and this reduction is, of course, possible because the *cogitare qua cogitare* [thinking qua thinking] and the *cogitatum qua cogitatum* [the thought qua thought] are evidently given in the same manner, because they can be identified as something (aliquid) at hand (*IPR*, 107).

Heidegger, as a phenomenologist, criticizes Descartes here because the latter ignores the act of thinking, and reduces the twofold structure of *res cogitans* into a uniform one comprising of thoughts, or ideas alone. In other words, representation is interpreted by Descartes as implying that which is represented in the act of representing (*cogitatum*), and the act itself (*cogitare*) is discounted. Seen from the perspective of Husserlian phenomenology, it can be contended that the essential component of intentionality of consciousness is put out of play by Descartes, and the representationalist model of consciousness prevails only by this kind of reduction or elimination. In the Cartesian model, thoughts *stand there in the receptacle of mental*

being, as the flowers, in an analogous fashion, are there in the vase on the table. Hence the mode of being attributed to the mental representations or thoughts should be *Vorhandenheit*, as it is the case with the way of being of the flowers and the vase. Seen from the perspective of Heideggerian ontology, being of both can be characterized as presence-at-hand and no more, because the mental act which intends them is the *mere staring* of the objectifying/theoretical attitude. Accordingly, the mode of being of the *res corporea* can be characterized as *object-hood*, where the intentional act character (representing, or perceiving) of *res cogitans* is ignored. Being of things is interpreted in terms of represented-ness by Descartes, and the “I” of *cogito* cannot become an exception to this general rule of objectification. But how?

Heidegger charges Descartes with not really pondering over the being of the subject, because while he locates the existence of the *ego* as the condition of possibility of every other thing *extre mentem*, he goes on to examine the same subject in terms of objectification, for he is bound up with the habit of thinking peculiar to representationalism. But the problem is that, the ontological conditions of anything on hand cannot be objectified or thematized in the same sense as the things themselves are. We saw above that, seen from the manner of its coming into appearance, *cogito* (I think) measures up the conditions of “pure phenomenality” as it was characterized in *Being and Time*; namely, self-manifestness, or, in Henry’s terms, “auto-revelation”. Accordingly, the only existential claim plausibly derived from the *cogito* should be something like “Thinking thinks”, “Thinking is”, or “It thinks”.¹⁰⁰ On what grounds Descartes can claim that there happens to be an “I” here which thinks?

There are two tightly interrelated reasons for this. First, Descartes is bound up with the modern interpretation of *ta mathematica* as in the form of scientific/theoretical attitude

¹⁰⁰ Like in the English expression “It rains”, or in the German expression “Es regnet”.

based on numerical measurement, according to which what is objectified can be objectified only as long as it is thought to be a substance geared with attributes which makes it experientible (or, measurable). Second, what becomes experientible in the way we described can be experienced only insofar as it can be articulated in a propositional structure which is called judgment. Since the proposition comprises of the subject term, predicate term and the copula, the *corresponding* reality is conjectured as consisting of the substances and attributes; in what way the copula can bind them together cannot be answered unless we decidedly retreat from the dualistic perspective under consideration.

When claiming that he can doubt about everything but not about the fact that he doubts, what Descartes thinks he has attained is the *ego* as substance, for coming face to face with doubting (or, thinking) *as an act* after parenthesizing everything, he evaluates this mental act as an attribute of a thinking substance. The prejudice is: if there is thinking activity, this activity must belong to a substance as an attribute and the substance in question is but the *ego*. *Cogito* signifies here, as it does for *res corporea*, “I represent. . .” And if we ask about *what cogito* represents, the expression becomes: “I represent *myself*”. But this “myself” is both the subject, and the object of the activity of thinking. Nevertheless, this is not possible. Descartes claims that I can be sure of the fact that I exist, only as long as I am thinking; in other words, whenever I stop thinking (when I am insane, or when I am sleeping without dreaming), the certitude of my existence vanishes. But in the *very moment* in which I think, how can I be able to catch the one who is thinking?

We argued above that *cogito* is the axiom of the mathematical-deductive ontology of Descartes, because it is the authentic phenomenon as in the form of self-appearing which need not to be represented by a higher order thought in order to be experienced; it is in this sense indubitable, ineliminable. Had Descartes left the phenomenon of

cogito where it originally belongs and not objectified it in order to fulfill the requirements of representationalist thinking, then he would have avoided being entrapped by a contradiction which can be summarized as follows:

[I]f doubt disqualifies the relation between every idea (every representation) and its *ideatum* (what is represented), and if the existence of the *ego* or even its performance of thinking constitutes an *ideatum*, then how are we to certify that the representation of that *ideatum* and it alone constitutes an exception to the disqualification of even the most present of things that are evident? In short, if the *cogito, ergo sum* heightens representation, then it too, like all representations, must be vanquished by the blow of doubt. For why should it be certain that I think, that I am, if I also represent these things to myself? (Marion 1993, 56-57).

If in some moment I make introspection and become aware of the fact that I think, or, I am, then *cogito* changes its form and turns into what Heidegger formulates as “*cogito me cogitare*”: I think that I think, or, I represent that I represent. Hence, Cartesian formulation of the basic axiom *cogito sum* is deprived of its self-revealedness because of the dominant representationalism, and the phenomenal basis of the becoming-manifest of the subject gets lost. As a matter of fact, along with the phenomenal basis, the indubitability of the subject, since it is relegated from being the condition of every representation as the most certain being to something represented, is lost as well. If I can doubt about the existence of the outer world just because the only access I have to it is by means of representations, why should I stop doubting about the being of *cogito sum* which becomes manifest and experientiable only by the mediation of ideas? From the point of view of the transcendental philosophy, this can be evaluated as a category mistake, since the condition of possibility of any object whatsoever cannot be cognized in the same way as the objects. In other words, if the condition of possibility of objects is at the same time the condition of possibility of knowledge of these same objects, then the knowledge of the condition should be distinguished, as transcendental knowledge, from the empirical knowledge of things. Seen from the perspective of Heidegger’s fundamental ontology, this way of understanding being in terms of

representedness in the manner ignorant to the *how* of coming into appearance of beings falls short of apprehending the ontological difference between being (as *the* transcendental) and entities (beings, or things—*res*). By inheriting ancient/medieval understanding of being as *hypekeimenon*, or *sub-stratum* and identifying it with the inner sphere of the “I” Descartes inaugurates the modern era in the Western philosophy; nonetheless, this cannot be conceded as a true breakthrough, because substance-based ontological framework could not be replaced by a new one. Before Heidegger, it is first of all Kant which realized the problem in the Cartesian argumentation, and the transcendental turn which he has inaugurated by his critical philosophy makes up a partial answer to the questions posed by Descartes.

4.2. Temporality of Kant’s Transcendental Subject

Since Aristotle, logical necessity has always been conceived as the prototype of necessity and truth. The most important consequence of such an approach is that whereas the analytic judgments are necessarily true, the truth of the assertions which have ontological commitment depends upon the state-of-affairs to which they are thought to correspond. As a matter of fact, the source of such a framework can be traced back to Plato, according to whom the world of ideas is the “true” being when compared with the actual world of ours which can be relegated to the status of the “copy” of the former, because it is the realm of contingency, change, and temporality. The theme which persistently recurs in the long tirades of Socrates is this: We “know” that this or that thing around us is red. But unless already knowing what “redness” is, we would not be capable of identifying the empirical object standing in front of us as a red thing. Therefore, there must be an essential difference between *always-already-knowing* the idea “redness” and *coming-to-realize* or *cognizing* that this particular thing is or is not red. Man cannot be mistaken about the true knowledge of the idea, whereas he can mostly fall into error and make mistakes whilst identifying the things

around him.

Above, we tried to show that the innovation of Cartesian philosophy lies in the fact that he managed to ascend the idea *cogito, sum* to the level of certitude without dissolving it in the logical inference whose major premise is “Whoever thinks, exists”. Descartes can be praised, as Heidegger did, for opening up a novel domain for the foregoing necessary truths, and extended them as to consisting the singular existential statement about the existence of the thinking “I”. It is absurd to reflect on the “I” here and now, whereas at the same time representing it as something non-existing. But by this move, Descartes can be said to have imprisoned the *ego* in the dimensionless now-point and have contributed to the traditional view that where there is timeliness (and change), there the necessary truth is absent, although it is not the logical necessity which he had in mind. In this sense, Kant can be evaluated as one of the most important philosophers of the Western philosophical tradition, because he can be honored to be the first thinker who, by means of the conception of “a priori synthesis”, managed to return the “a priori truths” back to the temporal realm of cognition. With the advent of Kant’s “transcendental logic”, the epistemological truths along with the logical ones have been ascended to the status of necessary truths, although they are inherently existential claims about the temporal world which is called “nature”.¹⁰¹ In this sense Kant can be accepted as the first figure by Heidegger who dared interfusing the theme of temporality with that of necessary truths by means of the “finite” subjects

¹⁰¹ Sherover summarizes Kant’s attempt of extending the necessity of truth from the a-temporal realm of the logical to the temporal realm of the epistemological as follows: “[I]f what is given is, indeed, given through temporal intuition and the legitimate use of thought is the interpretation of intuitive presentation, then a new logic of applicability of thought to temporal objects is required. If all presentations are inherently temporal, then an *a-temporal logic* is distortive and a new *time-forming transcendental logic* is needed. What is requisite is a mode of thought by which we may legitimately apply non-temporal concepts to temporally perceived objects. It is to the clarification of this problem that the Transcendental Logic, which comprises the heart of the Critique, is directed” (Sherover 56-57)

whose cognitions are comprised of “receptivity” as well as “spontaneity”: “The first and only person who has gone any stretch of the way towards investigating the dimension of temporality or has even let himself be drawn hither by the coercion of the phenomena themselves is Kant” (*BT*, 45).

4.2.1. Problem of Transcendence in Critical Philosophy and Kant’s Copernican Revolution

The critical philosophy of Kant is traditionally understood in terms of its mediating role between rationalism—or, in his words, “dogmatism”—and empiricism—which is called by him “skepticism”. Whereas the thinkers of the former position defend the thesis that at least some of our truths are innate or a priori, the contention of those of the latter is that the experience of the empirical world is the only source by means of which human beings have knowledge. The conflict between these two rival doctrines is reconciled by Kant in such a way that, philosophical thinking can be said to have been enriched by a completely novel dimension opened up by what he calls “synthetic a priori judgments”.

Seen individually, both rationalism and empiricism have their own shortages. Whereas empiricist conception of knowledge, since it restricts itself solely with experience, is lacking of the element of necessity and universality, rationalistic conception of knowledge is limited with the “a priori analytic” statements, or, tautologies. According to the rationalists, as well as the empiricists, “synthetic a posteriori” judgments of the empirical world are possible, but they are subjected to the contingency of the world and hence deprived of necessity and universality. So, concludes Kant, unless we manage to liberate ourselves from the paradigm in which the foregoing debate takes place, we must admit that the truths of ours are either incapable of giving knowledge but necessary (rationalism), or, are capable of giving knowledge but contingent

(empiricism). There must be some judgments whose predicate term, despite its contribution to the content of the subject term, should not be conceptually derivable from it. In other words, some statements of ours must be so constituted that, they must be true of the empirical world, albeit in a pre-experiential, a priori (necessary) fashion. These are but the “synthetic a priori” judgments by means of which object-ness of the objects is predetermined in advance of any experience of the world. The discovery of the synthetic a priori judgments on the basis of which establishment of the cognition of nature first becomes possible is called Kant’s “Copernican revolution”, and is justified in *Critique of Pure Reason* as follows:

Hitherto it has been assumed that all our knowledge must conform to objects. But all attempts to extend our knowledge of objects by establishing something in regard to them *a priori*, by means of concepts, have, on this assumption, ended in failure. We must therefore make trial whether we may not have more success in the tasks of metaphysics, if we suppose that objects must conform to our knowledge. This would agree better with what is desired, namely, that it should be possible to have knowledge of objects *a priori*, determining something in regard to them prior to their being given (Bxvi).

The main reason why Kant’s philosophical project is entitled “critical” is the fact that, by determining the epistemic capacities of men in advance, it eliminates the pseudo-objects as incognizable. The long lasting conflicts in the history of metaphysics makes Kant think that, as opposed to the natural sciences and mathematics, the queen of sciences did not register any progress, because the object domain of it has always been comprised of the things-in-themselves rather than phenomena (or, legitimate objects of pure reason; appearances). It is a widespread view among the Kant scholars that by doing away with the things-in-themselves as the illegitimate objects for any scientific activity of cognizing, Kant purges away metaphysics or ontology from the scene of philosophy. According to this prevailing belief, “How are synthetic a priori judgments possible?” is the question on the basis of which the limitations of the human’s capability of knowing the things of nature can be set forth. In this sense, according to

the dominant understanding, critical philosophy of Kant is an epistemological enterprise.

As against the “transcendental realism”, according to which the objects of our knowledge are things-in-themselves, Kant calls his critical philosophy “transcendental idealism”. “Idealism”, because space and time as the conditions for the possibility of the ordering of the objects are in the minds of the subjects, and “transcendental”, because these conditions, rather than derivable from experience, are constitutive of it.¹⁰² According to Kant, as the “forms of sensibility”, neither space nor time is real, let alone the things of nature which are the possible objects of knowledge. Of which we have knowledge are the representations only, whose cognition is dependent upon the rule governed synthesis of the manifold given to sensibility and the source of the rule are the “categories” which are the a priori concepts belonging to the second faculty, “understanding”. From the point of view of the defenders of the epistemological reading of Kant, forms of intuition and understanding are the “epistemic conditions”¹⁰³ on the basis of which objective knowledge first becomes possible. Kant’s

¹⁰² “By *transcendental idealism* I mean the doctrine that appearances are to be regarded as being, one and all, representations only, not things-in-themselves, and that time and space are therefore only sensible forms of intuition, not determinations given as existing by themselves, nor conditions of objects viewed as things-in-themselves. To this idealism there is opposed *transcendental realism* which regards time and space as something given in themselves, independently of our sensibility” (A 369).

¹⁰³ Henry A. Allison calls attention to the contemporary debate between “two-world” or “two-object”, and “one-world” or “two-aspect” readings of Kant. According to the former, things-in-themselves and phenomena are two separate ontological realms, and to the latter, “the distinction pertains to two ways of considering things” (Allison 2006, 112). In order to save the transcendentalism of “transcendental idealism”, Allison seems to contend that the “one-world” or “two-aspect” view should be defended, and the transcendental conditions should be taken in the sense of the “epistemic conditions”, not the ontological ones: “Kant’s idealism is transcendental in the sense that it is grounded in a reflection upon the conditions of the possibility of such cognition. What makes it a form of idealism is the thesis that these conditions, henceforth to be called ‘epistemic conditions’, reflect the structure of the mind rather than the nature of a pre-given reality” (Allison 2006, 115).

“transcendental arguments”¹⁰⁴ in the “Transcendental Deduction” tries to set forth the applicability of the a priori concepts of understanding to the spatiotemporal objects; i.e., that they have “objective validity”. And the whole issue is whether formulating the problem this way would suffice to convince us that Kant’s critical project must be understood as an epistemological enterprise which does away with ontology, if the objects of traditional philosophy before him are to be acknowledged to be the so-called things-in-themselves, as he claimed in the Transcendental Dialectic.

As against the epistemological reading which briefly summarized above, the originality of Heidegger’s reading of Kant can be said to be issuing, before anything else, from the fact that he interprets the first Critique in terms of the ontology of nature:

The positive outcome of Kant’s *Critique of Pure Reason* lies in what it has contributed towards the working out of what belongs to any nature whatsoever, not in a ‘theory’ of knowledge. His transcendental logic is an *a priori* logic for the subject-matter of that area of being called “nature” (*BT*, 31).

The reason for such an ambitious claim lies in the fact that Heidegger, like Husserl

¹⁰⁴ Ralph C. S. Walker states that the “transcendental arguments” in question are the ones like: “There is experience; it is a condition of the possibility of experience that P; therefore, P” (Walker 2006, 238). As against the ones who tend to ignore the transcendental arguments and loosen them into the hypothetical ones, Walker says the following: “Some of those who talk about alternative conceptual schemes are just pointing out that concepts change, and our ways of thinking about the world change with them. Of course that is right. It is also arguable that some of Kant’s key concepts are not, as he thought, indispensable to all thought at all times and at all places. But to admit that is only to say that Kant chose the wrong set of categories, and perhaps that he chose concepts insufficiently fundamental. The concepts of objectivity, or of ‘if... then...’, do seem clearly indispensable. . . There are limits to how different conceptual schemes can be, and transcendental arguments reveal them” (Walker 2006, 259). From the Heideggerian point of view, although Walker can be praised on account of his skeptical attitude towards skepticism of the kind he mentions—i.e., the skepticism towards the transcendentalism of the transcendental arguments—it should be added that it is not a matter of differing paradigms and conceptual schemes on the basis of which we cognize the world. As we saw in the previous chapter, “cognition” is not the most basic mode of being-in-the-world; as we will see in the next chapter, the “existentials” are the ontological concepts by means of which Dasein’s being “familiar with the world” in terms of the world’s mattering to it, are not subjected to change in changing historical conditions.

before him, disregards the thing-in-itself as the dubious “cause” of appearances or phenomena.¹⁰⁵ As we saw in the previous chapter, Heidegger conceives the thing-in-itself in terms of “mere appearance”; i.e., as that which manifests itself by mediation of something else which appears. Indeed, he is totally convinced of the fact that *Ding an sich* of critical philosophy is the deficient form of *Sache selbst* of phenomenology. That is to say, since the “world” is the context of significance, the mode of being of the intraworldly things is meaningful presence; the world is the ontological correlate of intentional consciousness in Husserlian, or, of “situated existence” in Heidegger’s terms.¹⁰⁶ Things themselves, and not things-in-themselves, as the intentional objects of Dasein’s comportments towards the world can be the subject matters of phenomenological ontology. Put differently, “how” of their being manifest in terms of the pretheoretical being-in-the-world of Dasein is the subject matter of what Heidegger calls “fundamental ontology”. According to this view, conceiving the critical project of Kant as an epistemological enterprise is nothing but stumbling into the dualistic ontology of Descartes, only if in a more complicated framework. As long as the “gap” between appearance and thing-in-itself is maintained, it would not be possible to differentiate this gap from that of the Cartesian philosophy which separates the realms

¹⁰⁵ In §43 of *Ideas*, after summarizing the Kantian view that “the thing-in-itself and its in-itselfness is not given to us”, Husserl reemphasizes that as long as consciousness is thought to be intentional, the thing-in-itself must be done away with because it is becomes necessary: “The spatial thing which we see is, despite all its transcendence, perceived, we are consciously aware of it as given in its *embodied form*. We are not given an image or a sign *in its place*. We must not substitute the consciousness of a sign or an image for a perception” (*Ideas I*, 136).

¹⁰⁶ “At this level, the level of the *Ding an sich*, we cannot meaningfully say that entities exist (or do not exist) and will continue to exist (or will not continue to exist) when there is no Dasein. Heidegger rejects the traditional notion of a *Ding an sich*, as did his teacher Husserl, since it did not make sense to speculate about the question of how things are apart from the transcendental framework that is supposed by all questions concerning any thing whatsoever” (Philippe 2007, 187). It should be added that, what Philips calls “transcendental conditions” are not for Heidegger the transcendental conditions of knowledge. As we see below, he charges Kant, as he does Husserl, with getting stuck into the theoretical/scientific paradigm according to which “perception” is the basic mode of being-in-the-world.

of two separate substances; i.e., *res cogitans* and *res extensa*. Unless the conception of “appearance” as the “sign” that stands for the “thing as it is in itself” has been given up, even if we assume that we one day become capable of seeing things-in-themselves, they will continue to be perceived by means of some other appearance and so on, ad infinitum.¹⁰⁷ So Heidegger, for his innovative move of ontologizing Kantian epistemology, owes to the fact that before him, Husserl saw that the beings of phenomenology are the entities as they are intended by intentional consciousness. It is not the *what-ness* of the things-in-themselves, but rather the *how-ness* of the “transcendence” of Dasein as being-in-the-world, that is to be questioned by phenomenology. This is the basic framework from which Heidegger interprets the Copernican revolution of Kant. In his 1929 text *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, in order to emphasize that the critical project is ontology, he quotes the following passage from the first *Critique*:

I entitle *transcendental* all knowledge which is occupied not so much with objects as with the mode of our knowledge of objects insofar as this mode of knowledge is to be possible *a priori*. A system of such concepts might be entitled transcendental philosophy (A11-12).

Whereas the “object” is traditionally interpreted as the thing-in-itself, Heidegger deviates from this commentary and takes it to mean an “entity” (*Seinende*) in contrast to the being of entities (*Sein der Seienden*). In this sense, the objects of transcendental philosophy are not the things of the empirical world, but rather the conditions which

¹⁰⁷ Husserl makes this point in the §52 of *Ideas* as follows: “It can easily be shown that, if the unknown cause we have assumed *exists (ist)* at all, it must be *in principle* perceptible and experiencible, if not by us, at least for other egos who see better and farther than we do. We are not concerned here with any empty, psychological possibility, but with an essential possibility possessing content and validity. Further, we should need to show that the possible perception itself again, and with essential necessity, must be a perception through appearances, and that we have therefore fallen into an inevitable *regressus in infinitum*” (*Ideas I*, 159). See also (Philipse 1995, 272-273), especially where he says: “[I]t is *absurd* to posit things-in-themselves which cannot be perceived in principle, because perception. . . is the final justification of all concepts and existence claims.”

make it possible for these entities to become what they *are*.

Thus, transcendental knowledge does not investigate the entity itself but the possibility of the precursory comprehension of the being of the entity. It concerns reason's passing beyond (transcendence) to the entity so that experience can be rendered adequate to the latter as its possible object (*KPM*, 20).

As we saw in the previous chapter, Dasein is the entity which is originally transcendent, because it is always already in a world which it projects by means of the "understanding of being". Insofar as understanding of being is the essence of Dasein, Dasein is not a thing that can be objectified by anthropology, biology, philosophy, etc. The positive sciences in question can be the sciences they are only as long as a peculiar pre-reflective understanding of being is already operative for them, so that the object domains of the sciences in question are determined in advance. However, the sciences are naïve to the extent that they do not reflect on the ontological ground on which they first become possible. According to Heidegger, this is the job of philosophy, and Kant's transcendental idealism fulfills this task by means of examining the synthetic a priori judgments as the pre-experiential truths which are necessary for the constitution of the entity called "nature". So, critical philosophy of Kant is the ontology of nature, and the transcendental truths derived therefrom are the "ontological knowledge" which are the conditions of possibility of the "ontic truths" of the positive sciences. Heidegger interprets the Copernican revolution in the 1927-8 lecture courses on Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* as follows:

The Copernican Revolution states simply that *ontic knowledge of beings must be guided in advance by ontological knowledge*. Far from resolving the real beings into subjective representations, the Copernican revolution elucidates for the first time the possibility of access to objects themselves (*PIKCPR*, 38).

"Resolving the real objects into subjective representations" presupposes separating the world in advance into two self enclosed realms, one of which is subjective and the other objective. The proponents of the epistemological reading apparently think that

reducing the objective sphere of things-in-themselves to the subjective realm of representations is what Kant did in his first *Critique*. Contrary to this view, thinks Heidegger, Kant's Copernican revolution is an ontological project, because it purports to solve the problem of transcendence by questioning the possibility of synthetic a priori judgments. In Heidegger's eyes, the problem of transcendence recurs in the Kantian philosophy in terms of the connection between the two stems of knowledge (understanding and sensibility) and not in the form of "How does the subject in its knowledge get out to the object?" (L, 261). The problem is not set forth in this manner, because space, as the form of outer sense, belongs to the subject. If the possibility of synthetic a priori judgments is at the same time the possibility of objectivity, then the problem of transcendence, as the movement of going-out-towards, can be rightly formulated without appealing to the "outer" world:

Only when we show the conditions of possibility of the *connection* of those two sets of conditions [understanding and sensibility] have we philosophically conceptualized knowledge, as regards its possibility, from out of the unity of the two stems. Which means: The fundamental task is to interpret the being of this very unity; and in turn: we can meaningfully ask and answer that question only if we first achieve an understanding of being as such (L, 253).

Briefly stated, Heidegger's ontological interpretation of Kant mainly aims at exhibiting the fact that the traditional duality between intuition and understanding, or, sensibility and thinking can be dissolved into an ontological unity between these two stems. In order to carry out this, it is necessary to prove that synthesis is *not* basically the "function" of understanding or "self-identity" of the transcendental subject; instead, it is primarily the time-synthesis which makes possible the self-identity of the subject, or, if we appeal to the Kantian terminology, "transcendental unity of apperception".

4.2.2. Synthesis of the Manifold

When interpreting the first *Critique* in an ontological manner, since his aim is to

examine the mechanism of transcendence rather than the transcendental subject itself, Heidegger tends to overcome the dichotomies between phenomena-noumena, and sensibility-understanding. Nevertheless, overcoming these bifurcations are not tantamount to reducing one side of each duality into the other side by ignoring the mode of being of what is put under question. There is nothing to be surprised about this when we remind ourselves of what we told in the previous chapter about the unitary character of the phenomenon of phenomenology. If what phenomenological ontology is after is being-in-the-world as the original phenomenon which is self-manifest; if it is not “appearance” in the sense of *Erscheinung* but the ontological condition of it; then the substantial difference between the inner realm of subjectivity and the outer world should be deconstructed.¹⁰⁸

In Kant’s critical project, if the subject’s transcendence toward the world in the guise of “objective validity” of synthetic a priori statements is to be possible at all, then the subject pole of the epistemic relation must not be depicted as a self-enclosed realm comprising merely of the discursive faculty (namely, “thinking”), like it has always been done by the tradition. Fortunately, this is not the case with Kant. His critical philosophy is called transcendental idealism, because, as we told above, space and time, as the forms of intuition, are added to the discursive faculty of the subject. Nonetheless, thinks Heidegger, unless the relation between these two stems of

¹⁰⁸ Charles M. Sherover summarizes Heidegger’s relation to Kant as follows: “Kant had, in facing the problem of objectivity provoked by the Copernican revolution, tried to determine the range of the possibility and degree of unity in our knowledge of the things we encounter. In formulating his position he postulated a dually segmented mind (intuition and pure concepts) and two strata of the real (phenomena and noumena). In Heidegger’s reconstruction of the Kantian formulation he has consistently protested these bifurcations and has sought to transmute the Kantian dichotomies into a unified ground. In place of Kant’s two strata of the real, in place of the two independent sources of knowledge within the knowing subject, Heidegger’s aim has been the unification of man with the world as it appears to him, the unification of man’s structure in order to account for the coherence of human experience” (Sherover 2003b, 136).

cognition can be thought in terms other than of side-by-side-ness, no headway can be made about finding an answer to the question of objectivity, or, transcendence. In other words, not the *whereabouts*, but the *how-of-being-related-with-each-other* of the two stems of knowledge, or the “original unity” between them should be taken into account, if the transcendental problematic is wished to be dug enough as to reach the ontological rock bottom.

It is a widely accepted view among the Kant scholars that, understanding is the faculty which provides unity to the “manifold” received by sensibility, and “judgment” is the cognitive act by means of which the unification of the manifold of sense data is represented in a unitary representation. Categories or a priori concepts of understanding are the rules under the government of which the synthesis of the sensible manifold first becomes possible. Kant’s definition of “synthesis” is as follows:

By *synthesis*, in the most general sense, I understand the act of putting different representations together, and of grasping what is manifold in them in one [act of] knowledge. Such a synthesis is *pure*, if the manifold is not empirical but is given *a priori*, as is the manifold in space and time (A77/B103).

One point should be underlined: Synthesis is a conscious act, because as soon as manifold is cognized as a manifold, it stops to be a manifold and becomes unified. So long as it remains to be what it is, manifold cannot be represented or cognized. When we think ourselves in a room which is full of wide variety of items, we may be said to be alongside a manifold, albeit without being aware of it. If we make a judgment about the manifold, then the manifold is unified in a single representation and *in a sense* ceases to be the manifold it is. Let’s think of an apple, an orange, and a banana in a plate. In order to recognize these as a manifold, we must order them on the basis of something else. Being-a-fruit is the unifying representation “on-the-basis-of” or “with-respect-to” which we represent the foregoing manifold in one single representation:

namely, three pieces of fruit. Phenomenologically speaking, it is the fruits themselves which are intended in the judgment about them, and the “basis-on-which” of what is intended (being-fruit) is unthematically experienced in the cognitive act as the condition of it. In the *Logic* lectures, Heidegger claims that “viewing” a manifold in an “ordered” fashion is possible only insofar as that on-the-basis-of-which of the ordering is “pre-viewed” in advance: “Pre-viewing the basis-on-which I order things is constitutive for carrying out the ordering, but in the process it is equally unthematic. The basis on which (say, ‘color’ or ‘material quality’) is certainly ‘in view’, but it is not thematically comprehended” (*L*, 237).

When we turn away from the empirical manifold to the a priori manifold represented by space and time as the forms of intuition, we may better understand why Heidegger occupies himself with the foregoing phenomenological analysis about the “pre-view” of the “basis-on-which” ordering or unifying is effected. As the two stems of knowledge, both intuition and understanding are the representations. By means of space and time which are the receptive faculties, the objects are represented immediately. On the other hand, understanding is the discursive faculty; namely, it is the mediated representation by means of concepts. Since both stems are representations, they both have a unifying function upon the manifold. As the forms of intuition, space and time are co-represented as the “within-which” of the ordering (or, unifying) of the manifold belonging to the represented object itself. This is to say, the unthematic representation of space and time makes it possible for the thematization of the singular object; appealing to the phenomenological jargon, we may say that space and time can only be “experienced”, but not objectified. With reference to Kant’s analyses of space in the “Transcendental Aesthetics”, Heidegger writes:

Spatial relations—the relations of *beside*, *above*, and *in back of*—are not localized “here” or “there.” Space is not just another thing on hand; it is no empirical representation, that is, nothing that can be represented empirically. In order that any

given thing may be able to reveal itself as extended in accordance with definite spatial relationships, it is necessary that space be already manifest before the receptive apprehension of the thing. Space must be represented as that "within which" any actual thing can be encountered. Space is a pure representation, i.e., that which is necessarily represented in advance in finite human cognition (*KPM*, 49).

The same holds good for time, as well; in order that something can be represented in its successive states, time must be pre-given as the "original intuition".

Both space and time are the a priori conditions of the ordering of a manifold by means of which some object is given to the senses.¹⁰⁹ As the formal conditions which make possible the encounter with the objects, space and time are not thematized. In this sense, they are "forms of intuition". On the other hand, time-itself and space-itself can be intuited all by themselves, without any regard to the objects which are represented in them; "we can never represent to ourselves the absence of space, though we can quite well think it as empty of objects" (A24/B39). When space is thematized, it is determined as the object of geometry. Since every limited part of space as in the form of a geometrical figure displays the same characteristics with the space as a whole, the geometrical knowledge, as the intuitive knowledge of one of the forms of sensibility, space, is to be defined as "formal intuition". But there is a problem here. If "pure manifoldness" of space is the object of geometry, then the "knowledge" of it must also be attained by the combinatory act of understanding. If understanding, as the discursive faculty which provides the rule according to which something like synthesis becomes possible in the first place, then the formal intuition of space must belong to the discursive faculty. Nonetheless, this is nothing but to reduce sensibility to

¹⁰⁹ This ordinary definition, when combined with the Heideggerian jargon of "pre-view", takes a form like this: "That space and time are forms of intuiting means that they are primarily ways of determining how intuiting is to occur, namely on the basis of the *non-objectifiable viewing in advance* of what constitutes the purely next to one another, or purely subsequent to one another. These pure intuitions are in themselves a whole and are given as such" (*PIKCPR*, 89; italics mine).

understanding. In order to emphasize once again that this is exactly what he avoids endorsing, Heidegger appeals to the testimony of Kant:

Space, represented as *object* (as we are required to do in geometry), contains more than the mere form of intuition; it also contains the *combination* of the manifold, given according to the mere form of sensibility, in an *intuitive* representation, so that the *form of intuition* gives only a manifold, the *formal intuition* gives unity of representation. In the Aesthetic I have treated this unity as belonging merely to sensibility, simply in order to emphasize that it precedes any concept, although, as a matter of fact, it presupposes a synthesis which does not belong to the senses but through which all concepts of space and time first becomes possible. For since by its means (in that the understanding determines the sensibility) space and time are first *given* as intuitions, the unity of this *a priori* intuition belongs to space and time, and not to the concept of understanding (B161).

In the passage quoted above, Kant clearly states that the *pure manifold* which space, as a “form of intuition”, gives becomes the *unity of representation*, as soon as the form of intuition—here, space—is objectified as a “formal intuition”. This passage, reports Heidegger, is interpreted traditionally in such a way that the source of the unity which is seemingly “given” by the intuition is, in fact, given to it by the understanding. However, warns Heidegger, “the unity in and through which I bring together the spatial constructions and determinations, is itself a kind of space. That is, the limitations of space—points, lines, surface, and such—are themselves space” (*L*, 244). As a matter of fact, the confusion in question issues from the double signification of the word “intuition”; intuition means *the act of intuition*—namely, *intuiting*—on the one hand, and *that which is intuited*, on the other.¹¹⁰ Heidegger calls attention to the fact that the reason why the neo-Kantian philosophers of the Marburg School,

¹¹⁰ In his *Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason*, Heidegger underscores this point as follows: “In the exposition of *space* and *time* as pure *intuitions*, Kant without a doubt understands intuition in the sense of *intendere*, i.e., as the manner of comportment of the mind. But we must ask whether Kant understood and could understand intuition in this sense alone, or whether space and time as intuitions also mean *what is intuited*. Moreover, we must also ask whether this ambiguity is grounded in the matter itself. Finally the question becomes: How can space and time, taken as modes of intuition and as what is intuited in such intuition, mean the same phenomenon?” (*PIKCPR*, 76).

especially Natorp, reduced space and time to the categories lies in their ignorance of the act-character of forms of intuition. Getting stuck to the ontological understanding being as “presence” or “what-ness”, they tended to mistake what is derivative for what is original, and consequentially, characterized in a misleading way the formal intuition as the original space and time (*PIKCPR*, 90-91). It does seem to be the case that categories are functional in the combination of the manifold where the spatial relations of geometry are considered. This, however, does not mean that the represented space—or, formal intuition—is the original phenomenon. It is rather the case that:

. . . *formal* intuition makes space, as the non-objective “that in terms of which” of having a view [or, “the pre-viewed that on-the-basis-of-which” = “form of intuition”], into an explicit object for the first time. The *form* of intuition, i.e., pure intuition as such, as the original one wholeness grounds this objectification (*PIKCPR*, 94).

That is to say, if the unthematic *form* of intuition, as the *act* of unifying the empirical manifold, did not carry in itself “the pre-viewed manifold-ness as such”, then it could not be represented as the *formal* intuition and subjected to the synthesis carried out by the understanding. So, formal intuition is parasitic upon the form of intuition. In other words, the pre-viewed manifold-ness (the pure next-to-each-other, or one-after-another) of the intuition *in actu* is more original than the objective unity of that which is intuited in intuition. The original manifoldness is not ordered first of all when it is objectified by the understanding; instead, it must be acknowledged that the unity belonging to the a priori concepts of understanding first becomes applicable only if “that in terms of which” of the pure manifold belonging to the forms of intuition (namely, *intuit-ing*, and not *what is intuited*) is intuited in advance. Knowledge is *primarily* intuition, because, by means of the “pre-viewed basis-on-which” the manifold is combined, it holds open the “horizon” within which perceptual knowledge becomes possible in the first place.

If intuition, in the sense of intuiting (form of intuition, and not formal intuition), gives

itself to itself as the original manifold it is, then it is “self-affection”. On the other hand, the categories, as the a priori functions of unity belonging to the understanding, needs intuition in order to become effective. Therefore, concludes Heidegger, intuition is as “spontaneous” as understanding, and understanding is as “receptive” as intuition. This phenomenological interpretation aims at deconstructing the groundless duality between intuition and understanding so as to achieve the ontological source from which these two stems of knowledge are emanated. The source in question is nothing other than the “transcendental imagination”.

4.2.3. The Primacy of Time

As against the transcendental realist position according to which space is real as much as the things in it, the transcendental idealism characterizes it, as we saw above, as the “outer sense” by means of which the manifold is ordered *on the basis of* the relations of next-to, behind, in front of, etc. On the other hand, time is called by Kant the “inner sense”, which is in charge of ordering the manifold of representations *in terms of* succession (the “one-after-another”) or simultaneity. However, everything that is perceived as outside us, since perception is a kind of representing, also belongs to the inner sense. Even the axioms of geometry as the science of pure space, are the synthetic a priori judgments, because the imaginative depiction of the figures is a temporal process. It can be added that, as the sequence of now-points, even time itself is conceived in terms of a spatial configuration, when it is imagined as the timeline comprising of the past, present, and future (A33/B50). Therefore, time has a primacy over space; it is the “universal a priori form of all appearances”:

Time is the formal *a priori* condition of all appearances whatsoever. Space, as the pure form of *outer* intuition, is so far limited; it serves as the *a priori* condition only of outer appearances. But since all representations, whether they have for their objects outer things or not, belong, in themselves, as determinations of mind, to our inner state; and since this inner state stands under the formal condition of inner intuition, and so belongs to time, time is an *a priori* condition of all appearances whatsoever

(B50/A34).

Heidegger, although he agrees with Kant about the priority of time over space, totally disagrees with him about the reason why this is so. According to him, Kant's argumentation is based on his equivocal usage of the word "representation". Whereas he argues that "the inner state stands under the formal condition of inner intuition", what he has in mind is the *act of representing*, and not *what is represented in representation*. This way of arguing is not conclusive for Heidegger, because "from the fact that the mental occurs in time there follows absolutely nothing about what is represented mentally" (L, 277). From the temporality of representations, there is no way of inferring the temporality of that of which they are the representations. If what is represented is only "mediately" given, then it should be accepted that Kant is still enchanted by the Cartesian dogma according to which the immediate givenness of the subject to itself is by means of the "act of representing"; i.e., *cogito* ("I think") (L, 278). Heidegger emphasizes that time is not an extant act which *occurs* in the mind of the subject; the priority or universality of it must be characterized in terms of "self-affection". Kant uses this phrase in an interesting passage in the *Transcendental Aesthetics*:

Now that which, as representation, can be antecedent to any and every act of thinking anything, is intuition; and if it contains nothing but relations [i.e., relations of successiveness or simultaneity], it is the form of intuition. Since this form does not represent anything save in so far as something is posited in the mind, it can be nothing but the mode in which the mind is *affected through its own activity* (namely, through this positing of its representation) and so *is affected by itself*; in other words, it is nothing but an inner sense in respect of the form of that sense (B67-68; square brackets and italics mine).

We saw above that time, before being an object for the understanding as *formal intuition*, is the *form of intuition* through which the "that-on-the-basis-of-which" of the ordering of the manifold is pre-viewed. However, what is viewed in the pre-viewing is not the time as an extant entity which is objectified. Instead, time gives itself in its

“enactment”. In the enactment of time, in its temporalizing itself, the mind lets itself be encountered by the objects. This “letting-itself-be-encountered” of the mind (*PIKCPR*, 104) is the opening itself up of the *topos* of objectivity in which the objects first become experiential or cognizable. Heidegger writes:

This unthematic pre-viewing is the mind’s originary act of affecting itself—its self-affectation. In it mind relates itself to an infinite given magnitude: *time*. Time is the way in which the mind lets itself be given anything at all. It is the most original, universal form of how-something-can-be-given; it is the mind’s original, universal self-affectation. As the self’s way of letting itself be *concerned* about anything, it is the ontological condition of the possibility of meeting up with anything (*L*, 280).

As the universal form of intuition, time is viewed in a non-objectified manner; as a matter of fact, its “enactment” and being-pre-viewed are one and the same. By this move, Heidegger dissipates the ambiguity inherent in Kant’s usage of the term “representation” by claiming that it signifies something more primordial than both “representing” and “what is represented”. Time is neither the object which becomes manifest by being acted upon, nor is it the act which shows itself by being applied to some extant mental content. It is rather the case that, *time itself is most authentically represented as long as it makes representation of anything possible*.¹¹¹ This phenomenological analysis of time exhibits it as the *stem* from which something like the “act of representing” and “what is represented in the act” emanate in the first place. The analysis in question should be characterized as “phenomenological”, because Heidegger can be said to achieve the realm of intentionality here. In the unfolding itself of time which is the essence of the mind, the mind becomes ready-to-be-encountered by the objects on a pre-experiential level. And since time is not something

¹¹¹ The foregoing manner of depicting the ontological time can be compared with Heidegger’s analyses of the “readiness-to-hand” in *Being and Time*. Authentic time gives itself not when it is objectified, but in its enactment. Similarly, as we will see in the next chapter, a piece of equipment returns back to *its self* only when it is simply used, and not when it is examined in terms of its objective properties.

ontologically separate from the mind but the essence of it, temporalizing itself of the inner sense is nothing but the affecting-itself of the mind. In affecting itself, the mind can be said to be *towards-itself*. It becomes itself what it is only by being acted upon itself by itself. That which the mind affects is not an extant entity. It *is*, only as long as the mind acts upon. In this sense, by means of the Kantian analysis of time, Heidegger manages to fulfill what is promised in the Husserlian motto: “Consciousness is consciousness of something”. As the essentially temporal being, the mind *is not extant*; rather, it is *directed-toward*, it is *intentional*.

When we remind ourselves of what we told about the “original phenomenon” in the previous chapter, we may claim that the time as the universal form of intuition is the “self-manifest”, because it is that by means of which the mind is the act of “affecting” and “what-is-affected” at the same time. So, temporalizing itself of this original temporality makes it possible for the first time what we called in the third chapter the “disclosedness of Dasein”. In the *auto-affection* of the temporal mind, the “there” of Da-sein (there-being) open up as the realm of objectivity in which the spatiotemporal objects of the positive sciences become encounterable as the entities they are. In order to clarify more the disclosedness as the ontological conception of truth, the combination of the universal intuition with the a priori concepts of understanding, together with the “transcendental unity of apperception” must be further examined.

4.2.4. Transcendental Unity of Apperception

The above analysis of the opening up of the realm of objectivity by means of the auto-affection of the temporal mind is far from being sufficient to explain the story told by Kant himself. Heidegger should come to grips with the theme of the “consciousness of identity” of the subject, which is the prerequisite for the objectivity of the objects. As against the Heideggerian interpretation, Kant lays out in the B-Edition of his *Critique* the “I think” as the most fundamental condition of the objectivity of the objects, or

synthetic a priori judgments: “It must be possible for the ‘I think’ to accompany all my representations; for otherwise something would be represented in me which could not be thought at all, and that is equivalent to saying that the representation would be impossible, or at least would be nothing to me” (B131-132). In order that the manifold of representations can be synthesized in such a fashion that they can become the representations of the objects, the “I” must be conscious of itself as the “identical subject” of the act of combining. Were the “I” not conscious of itself as the owner of the manifold of representations, the representations could not be thought; i.e., they could not be combined together under the rule-governedness of the categories and hence, could not turn out to be the judgments about the objects.¹¹² The unity of consciousness is the condition of possibility of all combining-together of the representations and in this sense, prior to any and every possible empirical unity; “for although the whole of the thought could be divided and distributed among many subjects, the subjective ‘I’ can never be thus divided and distributed, and it is this ‘I’ that we presuppose in all thinking (A354). Since this unity which makes the subject the identical “I” cannot be derived from experience, Kant calls it the “transcendental unity of apperception” or “transcendental unity of self-consciousness” (B132). The reason why this original unity is called transcendental lies in the fact that, whereas it accompanies every representation, it cannot be accompanied by any further representation. In this sense, transcendental apperception is the rock bottom; it is the unobjectifiable ground of any objectification. Since any objectification or cognition is

¹¹² Priest notifies that “having an experience”, rather than “being conscious of having an experience”, is what Kant meant when positing the “I think” as the ultimate condition of the cognition of objects: All experiences are events but not all events are experiences. It is a necessary condition for an event to be an experience that it be ‘had’ or ‘owned’ by a person, not that a person should be conscious of its occurrence. When I am conscious of x, I am having an experience. It is not necessary for me to be conscious of being conscious of x for me to be conscious of x, although this would indeed be sufficient” (Priest 1981, 351). According to Priest, the transcendental unity of apperception is not “actual or occurrent self-consciousness” but a potential one (Priest 1981, 350).

based on the time-synthesis, transcendental subjectivity, as the non-observable ground, is immune from being exposed to the ordering of the universal form of intuition.

As opposed to Heidegger's interpretations based on the self-affectivity of the temporal mind, Kant claims that whenever the mind becomes an object for itself, the "phenomenal self" or the "psychological subject" comes to the fore as an appearance. Transcendental subjectivity cannot appear; it is noumenal. In the "Paralogisms of Pure Reason", Kant charges Descartes and his rational psychology with mistaking the "perception of the self" for the "mere apperception 'I think'" (A342/B401-B401/A343). Transcendental apperception, as the mere form which makes it possible the experience of the objects, *is not existent*. Descartes' mistake lies in the fact that, as we saw above, he hastily jumps onto the substantial "I" as the constant vehicle from the state of mind "I think". From the point of view of Kant, however, the metaphysical claim about the existence of the *ego* is not derivable from the *cogito*, because *cogito* is a mere "formal condition" for our thoughts about objects (A363). As Kant tells in the *Prolegomena*, "I think", instead of referring to the substantial existent which remains constant during the changing states of the mind, has a logical claim that it is the absolute subject of every possible judgment: "Hence although it cannot itself be the predicate of any other thing, just as little can it be a determinate concept of an absolute subject, but as in all the other cases it can only be the referring of inner appearances to their unknown subject" (*P*, 82). The "I think" is nothing but the *addressee* of all the representations, or, in Heidegger's words, "'for-whom-it-is-given' of whatever can be given and thus whatever can be determined". But this "for-whom-it-is-given" is at the same time the "that-which-determines", Heidegger reminds us (*L*, 272).

Referring to Kant's logic lectures—which are known as "*Jäsche Logic*"—especially to where he says "consciousness is a representation that another representation is in me" (*JL*, 37), Heidegger claims that Kant conceives the "I think" in a similar way in which

Descartes thinks *cogito* as “*cogito me cogitare* [‘I think myself thinking’]” (L, 265).¹¹³ This is to say that, maybe not as a *thing* that thinks, but as an *activity* of think-ing, “I think” is extant or present-at-hand in the subject:

[T]he formal structure of the act of combining had to suffice for determining an entity (the I) that has an entirely unique kind of being; and then, throughout the entire treatment, the meaning of the being of this entity is left undetermined—or, what more disastrous, he understands that being in the simple and direct sense of mere presence. Not only does Kant takes over Descartes’ position on the *cogito sum* with its influence on the meaning of *a priori*, but likewise he takes over, as beyond question, the ontological conception of being as the *esse* of *esse creatum*: as mere being-present, mere happening-to-be (L, 273-274).

If the categories are the forms of unifying belonging to the understanding, and the source of these unifying functions is nothing but the “synthetic unity of apperception”, how can these a-temporal concepts act upon the temporal manifold, remains as the question that is to be urgently replied. Heidegger totally agrees with Kant on that, as we saw above, *cogito, ergo sum* is not an inference.¹¹⁴ Since it is not an inference, neither “I think”, nor “I am” are the *judgments* about the *object* “I”: “In this self-comprehension, nothing can be made out as regards its what-content” (L, 270). This is

¹¹³ As opposed to what Heidegger calls attention to, Béatrice Longuenesse thinks that combination of representations and recognition of them under a concept is a necessary and *sufficient* condition for the transcendental unity of apperception. She writes: “When Kant says: ‘The I think must be able to accompany all *my* representations’, what he means is that in order to be mine (that is, to be such that it at least can be recognized, thought as *mine*, what *I* see, hear, imagine, and so on), a representation must be taken up in such a process of combination and comparison, which. . . is also the process in virtue of which the *object* of the representation is *recognizable under a concept*, or thought” (Longuenesse 2008, 15).

¹¹⁴ In the “Paralogisms of Pure Reason”, when critically examining the statement “Soul is *simple* substance”, Kant writes about the Cartesian *cogito* argument the following: “Nor is the simplicity of myself (as soul) really *inferred* from the proposition, ‘I think’; it is already involved in every thought. The proposition ‘*I am simple*’, must be regarded as an immediate expression of apperception, just as what is referred to as the Cartesian inference, *cogito, ergo sum*, is really a tautology, since the *cogito* (*sum cogitans*) asserts my existence immediately. ‘*I am simple*’ means nothing more than that this representation, ‘I’, does not contain in itself the least manifoldness and that is absolute (although merely logical) unity” (A354-355).

exactly the rejection of the Cartesian claim that there stands a substantial “I” as the constant vehicle of changing representations, but it still, as the “logical subject” of every possible judgment which cannot be the predicate of anything, as the “subject of a predicate-less proposition”, “is posited and comprehended in its existence merely as data” (*L*, 271). It is indeed not *some-thing*; it is not determined by means of its *what-content* (because it is not the predicate of a possible judgment); but it is still extant, in a sense similar to Husserl’s conception of intentional consciousness is found to be extant.¹¹⁵ Heidegger writes in *Being and Time*:

Kant’s analysis has two positive aspects. For one thing, he sees the impossibility of ontically reducing the “I” to a substance; for another thing, he holds fast to the “I” as “I think”. Nevertheless he takes this “I” as subject again, and he does so in a sense which is ontologically inappropriate. For the ontological conception of the subject *characterizes not the self-hood of the “I” qua self, but the self-sameness and steadiness of something that is always present-at-hand*. To define the “I” ontologically as “*subject*” means to regard it as something always present-at-hand. The being of the “I” is understood as the reality of the *res cogitans* (*BT*, 367).

If “I think” is the constant core by means of which the (temporal) manifold of intuition is synthesized under the rule governedness of the categories as to make objects possible, then how would the unity ascribed to the “I think” on the one hand, and to the objects on the other, can be distinguished from each other is the question that still needs to be answered.¹¹⁶ In order that this question can be replied in an appropriate

¹¹⁵ Raffoul claims that since the transcendental subject of Kant has self-consciousness only as long as it has the consciousness of objects, it “is no longer a subject that is closed upon itself, but open-to; it is a ‘subject for objects’”. According to Heidegger, thinks Raffoul, Kant’s subject as the “*subjectum*” (*hypokeimenon*) having representations is “an anticipation of intentionality” (Raffoul 1996, 541).

¹¹⁶ Longuenesse summarizes the problem in an eloquent way: “[Kant] reminds us that according to the Transcendental Aesthetic and Analytic, time is *transcendentally ideal*: as a mode of ordering our intuitions, it is a feature of our sensibility. And insofar as it is itself an intuition, it derives its unity from precisely the unifying standpoint, or transcendental unity of apperception whose analytic (conceptual) expression is the proposition ‘I think’, ‘which must be able to accompany all my representations’. This being so, of course what we refer to by ‘I’ has to be one and the same through the whole time of our experience. And of course this identity is prior to and different from the identity of any object

way, and the gap between the thinking and temporally determined objects can be spanned, Heidegger commits himself into analyzing the meaning of the temporality of subject, and this brings him to the conclusion that the ground of subjectivity (knowing and thinking) lies in the care structure. As we shall see in the next chapter,¹¹⁷ on the other hand, the rudimentary conception of the temporal subject whose mode of being is “self-affection” will be the deep ontological meaning of the fact that “Dasein’s being is an issue for it” (i.e., that Dasein is “care”).

4.3. From Knowing to Mattering

In the “Refutation of Idealism” Kant complains that it is the “scandal of philosophy” that until his time, a satisfactory proof of the existence of the world has not been given, and that the existence of the things outside us is accepted on faith. Since he managed to exceed the substantial, self-enclosed *ego* of Descartes by means of the Copernican revolution, he contends that every act of “I think” is necessarily an “I think something”. If it is the objects which must conform to our knowledge rather than the other way around, there is no reason to worry about proving the world and things in it, because the a priori constitution of the cognitive mechanism of the subjects is also the ground of the conditions for being of the entities.

However, it must be acknowledged that it is the objectivity of objects, rather than the existence of things outside us, which is guaranteed by the critical philosophy. This

identifiable and reidentifiable *in* time, although it may readily be mistaken for such an identity” (Longuenesse 2008, 23).

¹¹⁷ We could come to grips with Heidegger’s interpretation of the “Schematism” chapter of the *Analytic of Principles* and his derivation of the *original time* from the “figurative” or “productive synthesis” of the “transcendental imagination” right here. However, since we tried to give a detailed analysis concerning Heidegger’s conception of temporality as the ontological core of Dasein’s being in the next chapter, we did not find it necessary to repeat the same issue, although we think that a comparative study can be made between the methodologies of the *Kantbuch* and *Being and Time*.

brings back Kant where he starts, and despite the distinction between the things-for-us (phenomena) and things-in-themselves (noumenal), he goes so far as to claim in the “Refutation of Idealism” that if there are representations “in us”, there must be something outside us as the “cause” of these representations. But if there are things behind the phenomenal world, these things must be the things-in-themselves and the “causality” ascribed to them is other than that of the a priori concept of the understanding which is validly applied only when the temporal ordering of appearances are considered.

This regress may be said to be issued from the fact that Kant did not managed to think the mode of being of the subjectivity of the subject in an ontologically appropriate way. His conception of the “I think” as the logical subject of all possible judgments, although it is not a self-enclosed substance, cannot be related with the world in a manner such that, the need for a proof of the existence of the world totally disappears. Indeed, Heidegger claims in *Being and Time* that rather than the absence of any proof, it is the demand for a proof which is the true scandal in philosophy. As long as the understanding of being belongs to the existential constitution of Dasein, being (*Sein*) should be acknowledged to be meaning; extantness or presence is the mode which is derivative from this ontological understanding of the meaning of being. So, unless there is Dasein, the entities neither *are* (extant) nor *are not*.

Heidegger’s criticisms of Descartes and Kant issue from the fact that these thinkers evaluated the relation between human beings and the world in cognitive terms. In the next chapter, we will try to show that Dasein is ontologically being-in-the-world; that is to say, to its existential constitution something like being-in-a-world belongs. However, the ontological meaning of this “being-in” is not the spatial inclusion, but existential proximity; i.e., things are *there* for Dasein first of all not because they are known by it, but because they “matter to it”. As the entity which is being-in-the-world,

matter-of-the-environmental-things-of-the-world is the essence of Dasein; Dasein is *care* and the ontological meaning of care is *temporality*.

CHAPTER 5

HEIDEGGER'S CONCEPTION OF DASEIN AS THE GROUND OF SUBJECTIVITY: CARE AND TEMPORALITY

We saw in the previous chapters that the most important figures of the philosophical tradition based on subjectivity fail to bridge the gap opened up between man and his world. As a matter of fact, in spite of their failure in constructing *the in-between* of the two sides of the relationship, it cannot be contended that there is no any philosophical progress from Descartes through Kant to Husserl. The progress in question we owe to the fact that each thinker is one step further than the former in subtilizing the arguments by the help of which the world-relation of man is reconstituted as to provide us novel viewpoints, while at the same time the deepest commonsensical beliefs of ours are not threatened by some kind of sophistry. From the substantial subject of Descartes to Kant's transcendental unity of apperception as the center of the a priori synthesis; and from Kant's to Husserl's transcendental consciousness which is always the consciousness of something, we observed that the objective sphere gets nearer to the subjective one, and finally, the attempt to bridge the gap between these two spheres becomes the effort to diagnose the hiatus immanent to the human consciousness itself. Had Heidegger not taken the stage, everybody, after Husserl, would have been content with the philosophical opinion that human mind is the intentional consciousness whose other, i.e., the object, is immanently present in it. With his conception of being-in-the-world as originary transcendence (or, disclosedness), what Heidegger taught us is that

unless the average understanding of being, i.e., *presence-at-hand* (*Vorhandenheit*) has been abandoned, the philosophical society remains entrapped by the dilemma whether the world belongs to the subject, or the subject to the world. And the most important lesson we learned from him is that the question of the being of this “unitary structure” being-in-the-world is the only way we should follow, in order that we become able to ask the only question of philosophy; that is, the question of being (*Seinsfrage*).

In this final chapter, it will be tried to be displayed that the core ontological structure of Dasein is “care” (“*Sorge*”) and time is not a faculty belonging to the transcendent subject as we saw in the previous chapter on Kant, but rather the horizon upon which the innermost being of Dasein, that is, care, is projected.

5.1. Care as the Totality of Dasein’s Being

That Dasein’s being-in-the-world cannot be apprehended in terms of the spatial relation peculiar to the entities which are present-at-hand becomes more apparent, when Heidegger claims that Dasein’s disclosedness or its originary transcendence is composed of three elements, the totality of which he calls “care” (*Sorge*). Concern when circumspectively dealing with the ready-to-hand entities which are given to Dasein as the holistic nexus of significance, solicitude for others, and attentiveness to its own being (Dasein’s being is an issue for it); all these share the common denominator according to which the deep ontological structure of Dasein is, rather than indifferent presence, *caring-for*. Disposition, understanding and discourse are the three components of the total structure of care, each of which deserves to be examined on its own, although they cannot be separated in existence.

5.1.1. Disposition

We saw earlier that cognitive attitude towards the world is not the one which discloses

it firstly because Dasein is uninterruptedly (i.e., not *occasionally*) in truth. According to the alethic conception of truth of Heidegger, we also saw that propositions are not the primal devices by the help of which something like world is disclosed. It is the other way around: Since the world as a whole is in a pre-judgmental manner is given to Dasein, propositions can be true of the world. But this ontological conception of truth as the non-occasional (or, in Heidegger's terms, "always already") uncoveredness of entities as in the form of Dasein's disclosedness brings to mind the question: In what way these entities are *given* to Dasein, if not by cognition? "Care" is the total, "disposition" (*Befindlichkeit*) is the partial answer to this question.

Since the Macquarrie and Robinson translation of *Befindlichkeit* as "state-of-mind" reminds the reader of the conscious mental states such as feelings which can be reflected on by the one who has them, "disposition" will be preferred here. As William Blattner underlines, *Befinden* is to be thought of as rooted in the reflexive verb "*sich befinden*" which is literally translated as "finding oneself". If we have recourse to his example, a doctor may ask his patient about his *Befinden*, and utters the question "*Wie befinden Sie sich?*" which may be translated as "How do you find yourself?", or, more conveniently, "How are you?" (Blattner 2006, 79). The "how one is", "state", or, in Heidegger's terms, "mood" (*Stimmung*) is asked for in the question: "What we indicate *ontologically* by the term "disposition" is ontically the most familiar and everyday sort of thing; our mood, our being-attuned" (*BT*, 172).

When the reflexive verb "*sich befinden*" is translated as "being-located" or "being-situated", disposition means that Dasein is born into a world which it did not choose. It is, so to say, "thrown" into a family, a language, a socio-cultural and economical class, etc. Put differently, these elements which make up the *identity* of Dasein are not at its disposal but it happens to find itself as the carrier of them: The disclosure of its

“thrownness” (*Geworfenheit*)¹¹⁸ stands for Dasein’s being “to some extent determined by conditions and circumstances beyond its control” (Gelven 1989, 81). On the other hand, when disposition is thought of as the “state” or “state-of-mind”, it refers to the way things matter to Dasein. These entities are, before being the extant objects standing against Dasein as to be purely beheld by it, are the environmental things primarily encountered by means of their being threatening, elating, frightful, etc.:

Existentially, a disposition implies a disclosive submission to the world, out of which we can encounter something that matters to us. Indeed from the ontological point of view we must as a general principle leave the primary discovery of the world to ‘bare mood’. Pure beholding, even if it were to penetrate to the innermost core of the being of something present-at-hand, could never discover anything like that which is threatening (BT, 177).

Unlike the Cartesian and the Kantian subjects, both of which are indifferent to the world against which they stand as the pure observers, Heideggerian Dasein dwells in it *moodwise*. The reason why the existence of the world is a problem for both Descartes and Kant and not for Heidegger can first of all be explained by Dasein’s being thrown into its *there* by means of its dispositions. Since disposition means being-already-situated-in-the-world by means of moods, Heidegger criticizes the demand for the proof of the external world and inverts the Cartesian motto “Cogito, ergo sum” into “Sum, ergo cogito”. If “to be” is “to be in the world” and not “to be thinking”, then presence-at-hand of the world, since it is a derivative mode from the environmental world encountered by Dasein in circumspective concern, need not to be proven. Nor is Dasein’s own self is the immanent being (*res cogitans*) which is directly or immediately accessible to Dasein as the inner object. Dasein’s self is disclosed first all by moods rather than by inner perception or observation. In Heidegger’s words, “only

¹¹⁸ William Blattner defines *Geworfenheit* as follows: “[B]y ‘thrownness Heidegger means that we are ‘subject to’ life, that it ‘burdens’ us in the sense that we cannot extricate ourselves from caring about it. Indeed, at any moment we are always already attuned and disposed in the world” (Blattner 2006, 78).

because the ‘there’ has already been disclosed in a disposition can immanent reflection come across ‘experiences’ at all. The ‘bare mood’ discloses the ‘there’ more primordially, but correspondingly it *closes it off* more stubbornly than any *not-perceiving*” (BT, 175). Self cannot be fully objectified and understood as it is in itself, because it cannot be freed from moods. Objectifying the self by reflection is objectifying it in a mood, and this can be carried out only “by way of a counter mood; we are never free of moods” (BT, 175). This is clearly a criticism directed against the Husserlian epochê as the attempt of bracketing all the world-connections of the transcendental subject, including moods, in order to thematize it as the absolute and immanent being.¹¹⁹ As early as 1923, in the lecture courses *Ontology—The Hermeneutics of Facticity*, Heidegger eloquently sets forth his insight about the non-objectifiability of Dasein as follows:

Dasein is not a “thing” like a piece of wood nor such a thing as plant—nor does it consist of experiences, and still less is it a subject (an ego) standing over against objects (which are not the ego). It is a distinctive being [*Seiendes*] which precisely insofar as it “is there” for itself in an authentic manner is not an object—in formal terms; the toward-which of a being-directed toward it by meaning it. It is an object insofar as it becomes a theme of *observation*, but this says nothing as to whether it must be an object for the kind of experience in which it is *there* for itself and in which analysis of it actualizes itself in an authentic manner (OHF, 37-38).

The disclosedness of the *there* of Dasein, its thrownness (*Geworfenheit*) into its *there* by means of its moods is nothing other than its originary transcendence, or ex-sistence (being-out-of-itself). In this sense, Dasein’s existence, or its “that it is and has to be” (*dass es ist und zu sein hat*) is ontologically different from the presence-at-hand of intraworldly things in that, its self and its world as a whole are simultaneously disclosed by means of dispositions, or moods. This simultaneous disclosure of self and

¹¹⁹ “Heidegger establishes against Husserl the impossibility of taking the subject as an autonomous and isolated starting point for phenomenological analysis. . . It is not possible for it to attain the kind of mood-less state that Husserl thinks the epochê will provide” (Han-Pile 2006, 245).

the world as the thrownness of Dasein to its *there* is called by Heidegger “facticity”. Facticity is the term Heidegger uses to characterize the difference between the self-transcendent character of *existence* and its being absorbed by its world by means of moods from the mode of being of present-at-hand things; i.e., *factuality*: “*Facticity is not the factuality of factum brutum of something present-at-hand, but a characteristic of Dasein’s being. . .*The ‘that it is’ of facticity never becomes something that we can come across by beholding it” (BT, 174). The term is also tightly related with the indefinability of Dasein, or its “in-each-case-mineness” (*Jemeinigkeit*). As a matter of fact this trait of Dasein implies self-transcendence as well, because only the being which has self understanding and is absorbed-by-the-world is self-transcendent, and the self-transcendent being is the one which cannot be objectified (or, in each case mine): “Factual Dasein is always what it is only as one’s own Dasein and never as the Dasein in general of some universal humanity” (PIA, 114).

We saw in the second and fourth chapters that the two most important figures, one of which stands at the beginning and the other at the end of the subjectivist tradition, are both apt to objectify the subject by means of pure beholding. Descartes declares that subject has a direct access to itself, and Husserl makes the addition that the access is possible only by means of phenomenological reduction, so, is not direct or immediate. However, the tendency of objectification of the self is common to both. As we saw earlier, Heidegger blames Descartes for confusing that which thinks with that which is thought; whether “*cogito*” (“I think”) refers to the act of reflection, or that which is reflected upon is not clear. In this sense, it is either the case that the Cartesian self is too evasive that it cannot be given as it is in itself, or that there is something wrong with the method Descartes chooses to apply. On the other hand, Husserl can be asked about the reason which motivates something like the phenomenological reduction. In the uninterrupted flow of daily life, why is one supposed to bracket his natural attitude and put it into question? From Husserl’s side this question is unanswerable. As we saw

in the third chapter, the item of equipment whose mode of being is ready-to-hand obtrudes and loses its transparency only when there happens to be a breakdown of this or that sort. Only by means of such a triggering effect which cuts the fluent flow of dealing with the work at hand does what Husserl calls the natural attitude come to the fore. From the point of view of Heidegger, the shift from the everyday manner of dealing with the tools to their becoming the objects of pure beholding is just a matter of replacement of one mood by another. The work-world in which Dasein does its job becomes threatening, hostile, disappointing, etc. That is to say, Dasein sees the world and experiences himself in it by thematizing neither the one, nor the other; as opposed to the Cartesian/Husserlian subject, Dasein is *there* in a pre-reflective manner.

5.1.2. Understanding

That Dasein is not an extant being among other beings, which somehow understands them by some intellectual operation through which the sensuous data it receives is unified into propositions, is obvious from what we told above.¹²⁰ Beings are there for us not first of all because they are known or perceived, but because they make up the atmosphere in which Dasein *loses itself by means of having moods*. As a matter of fact, the traditional bifurcation between *perceptions* and *values*, or, *cognitions* and *feelings* is not the last word about the subject matter in question. It really is not the case that the broken hammer is perceived first, and then, additionally, lets the user down (lets him have the mood, or feeling of disappointment). To the extent that having the feeling of

¹²⁰ Understanding, for Heidegger, is not the faculty belonging to the one who apprehends something ontologically distinct. Rather, every understanding is a self-understanding of Dasein, so it should be thought of as incorporated to its ontological constitution: “For Heidegger, understanding is the power to grasp one’s own possibilities for being, within the context of the lifeworld in which one exists. It is not a special capacity or gift for feeling into the situation of another person, nor is it the power to grasp the meaning of some ‘expression of life’ on a deeper level. Understanding is conceived not as something to be possessed but rather as a mode or constituent element of being-in-the-world” (Palmer 1969, 131).

disappointment is the perception of the broken hammer, it should also be claimed that the perception of the functionless tool is the tumbling into the mood of desperation. So, “a disposition always has its understanding, even if it merely keeps it suppressed. Understanding has always has its mood” (*BT*, 182).

In *The Essence of Truth*, in a paragraph where he discusses the primordial meaning of perceiving something, Heidegger appeals to a pastoral example about someone in a meadow who is environed by the blue sky above and the lark’s song in his ears. He states that these members of the environing world does not first become encounterable by Dasein as the objects of perception; “we do not occupy ourselves with them *as* beings”. Instead, “we lose ourselves in the blue, in what it gives itself; we follow the song along, we let ourselves *be taken*, as it were, by these beings, such that they *surround us*” (*ET*, 148). Being surrounded by beings as a whole, being affected by them, or, being absorbed by them is the condition of the possibility for perceiving them in the first place. Being-in-a-world is, for Dasein, before everything else, *finding oneself* surrounded by it, and losing itself in it. But this letting-itself-be-taken of Dasein is not *not*-perceiving, either:

This immediate, i.e. self-losing perceiving takes [*nimmt*] and per-ceives [*ver-nimmt*], *in as much as* it lets itself be taken along. In this way it perceives beings, but not in respect of the fact that they *are*. The beings do not stand under this kind of *regard* [*Hinsicht*]. This kind of regard is *lacking*. In immediate perception, beings are perceived, as we say, in a manner which is *non-regarding* [*hinsichtlos*] (*ET*, 149).

Things are perceived, or, cognized in terms of their objective properties only insofar as they are encountered with *regard* to the fact that they *are* (present-at-hand). Understanding the world in this way is parasitic upon the more primordial understanding which Heidegger says an *existentiale* of Dasein (*BT*, 182). Put differently, understanding itself and the world moodwise as a whole is the disclosedness of the *there* of Dasein, and the disclosedness itself, as we saw earlier, is *where* entities shows up in this or that manner. The kind of spatiality implied by the

where is called by Heidegger “existential spatiality” (BT, 171). As opposed to the physical space, the existential space corresponds to “the referential whole” of the environmental things ready-to-hand. In the third chapter, we depicted the significant whole of equipments as the network whose every member is connected to one another by the referential relations of “with-which”, “towards-which”, “for-which” and “in-order-to”. Now we add to this referential whole a last member, by the help of which the environing world of Dasein becomes the holistic structure it is: “the for-the-sake-of-which” (*das Worumwillen*).

That in which it [an entity within-the-world] is involved is the “towards-which” of serviceability, and the “for-which” of usability. With the “towards-which” of serviceability there can again be an involvement: *with* this thing, for instance, which is ready-to-hand, and which we call a “hammer”, there is an involvement in hammering; with hammering, there is an involvement of making something fast; with making something fast, there is an involvement in protection against bad weather; and this protection ‘is’ for the sake of [*um-willen*] providing shelter for Dasein—that is to say, for the sake of possibility of Dasein’s being (BT, 116).

At the first sight, the for-the-sake-of-which can be seen as the ultimate aim which stands at the top of a hierarchy of possible goals and purposes. What differentiates it from what we normally call *aims and purposes* is that they are in principle *non-representable* and *unattainable*. Let’s try to clarify what we mean by these two features we attributed to the for-the-sake-of-which by giving an example.

When someone who got himself busy with building a bookcase says that the hammer he uses at the moment to drive the nails for assembling the parts together is too heavy, the sentence he utters does not mean “The hammer has the property of heaviness”. Instead, the intention of the user is to communicate the fact that the hammer is *too heavy to be lifted*, and unless it is replaced by a lighter one, the work cannot be done. Let’s say, the work that is to be done is constructing a big, useful bookcase as a present which the carpenter would like to give to his beloved daughter in her birthday. Both the design of the finished bookcase and the moment he gratifies his daughter by the

gift can be accounted for as the aims or purposes that can easily be imagined, represented by the man. On the other hand, the moment he gives the present to her daughter not only delights the girl, but also himself, because he defines himself as an excellent father. In Heideggerian language, the carpenter *understands himself as a good parent*, or, he exists *for the sake of being a good father*. Nonetheless, being a good father is neither a representable, nor an attainable aim. It is not representable because it is hard to find a complete, immutable set of essential criteria by the help of which the role of perfect paternity is described. The same reason is valid for the unattainability as well, since being a good father is the role which is to be played by the individual for a whole lifetime. Only after the death of the carpenter it can be decided whether he could succeed to become what he wanted to be.¹²¹

If we appeal here to William Blattner's separation between "state-characteristics" and "ability-characteristics" (Blattner 1999, 34) then what Heidegger means by understanding may have been set forth in more lucid terms. Whereas the carpenter's "being a father" is biologically a fact, this describes him with regard to his being an extant entity, and therefore, is a state characteristic. Being a biological father of someone presents the one who carries the paternal role as *finished, completed, and self-enclosed* phenomenon with regard to his parenthood; that is to say, the carpenter is *objectified* in terms of his being a biological father of someone and becomes a present-at-hand thing *within-the-world*.¹²² This is nothing but the way traditional ontology

¹²¹ "The Unattainability Thesis" belongs to William Blattner and says: "*Dasein's proper ability-characteristics are unattainable*" (Blattner 1999, 82). For the difference between "ability-characteristics" and "state-characteristics", see the paragraph below.

¹²² Whereas having the state-characteristics implies the factuality of the thing them, facticity is the term reserved for Dasein's being; existence should first of all be examined in terms of ability-to-be, or ability characteristics: "Casting myself as a lawyer does not terminate in accomplishment or failure, because it does not terminate. The possibility or role of being a lawyer is not an end-state aimed at by Dasein. Casting myself as a lawyer is something that is always futural with respect to action. Casting myself in a role is not something that I can have behind me and take for granted. I am a lawyer as long as I cast

based on substance-predicate schema characterizes the being of man; within this paradigm the mode of being of Dasein is leveled down to that of bare things that are extant.

On the other hand, “being a good father” is, instead of being a *property* which someone *has*, is the ultimate ideal which someone *strives for*. But the ideal is not the idea of something present-at-hand. “Being a good father” as an ideal of someone *is*, only so long and inasmuch as it is *striven for*, or, *strained at*; it is that *for the sake of which* Dasein *ex-sists*. The for-the-sake-of-which is the “self-determination” (Keller 1999, 143) or *self-understanding of Dasein*, but the *self* that is to be determined or understood is not extant among other intraworldly things which are also extant. The reason why Heidegger avoids using the colloquial jargon and contrives the clumsy term “the for-the-sake-of-which” instead of “ideal”, “ultimate aim”, “purpose”, “*telos*”, etc. lies in the fact that the latter are the nominalizations and names are the names of present-at-hand-things. However, neither the for-the-sake-of-which, nor Dasein which strives for it are present hand. On the contrary, the essence of Dasein is this very *striving-for-the-sake-of*, which is another way of claiming that the essence of Dasein is its existence. As we saw in the third chapter, Dasein is the originally transcendent entity which stands outside of itself. We repeatedly emphasized that Dasein cannot be understood in terms of quiddity (or, *whatness*), and now we come to realize that the mode of being of the entity whose being-in-a-world means striving-for-the-sake-of cannot be *actuality*. If Dasein is the entity whose existence is based on ability characteristics as Blattner eloquently and lucidly formulates,¹²³ then it is what it

myself thus. . . So, the factual (*faktisch*) sense in which I am something, a lawyer or a defeated person, is not the same as the factual sense (*tatsächlich*) sense in which I am so many feet tall, or brown-haired. The senses of ‘being something’ are different” (Blattner 1992, 105).

¹²³ “Dasein is properly only its interpretive, or existential, characteristics and is not conceived properly through its factual characteristics” (Blattner 1999, 36). It should however be added that whenever

is *not yet*; Dasein, which “is constantly ‘more’ than it factually is” (BT, 185), is its “possibilities” (*Seinkönnen*):

When we are talking ontically we sometimes use the expression ‘understanding something’ with the signification of ‘being able to manage something’, ‘being a match for it’, ‘being competent to do something’. In understanding, as an *existentiale*, that which we have competence over is not a “what”, but being as existing. The kind of being which Dasein has, as potentiality-for-being, lies existentially in understanding. Dasein is not something present-at-hand which possesses its competence for something by way of an extra; it is primarily being-possible. Dasein is in every case what it can be, and in the way in which it is its possibility (BT, 183).

We saw in the previous chapter that for Kant, understanding is one of the two faculties belonging to the transcendental subject. The paragraph quoted above can be interpreted as the direct critique of the Kantian claim, because for Heidegger, understanding cannot be accrued to a present-at-hand subject. That is to say, understanding cannot be *had* by Dasein, rather, Dasein exists *understandingly*.¹²⁴

Nonetheless, since the Dasein is out-there, the self-understanding of it can never “first arise from an immanent self-perception, but belongs to the being of the ‘there’, which is essentially understanding” (BT, 184). Dasein, as long as it exists understandingly, “always presses forward into possibilities” which Heidegger calls “*projection*” (BT, 184-185). If we go back to our example, we observe that the carpenter does variety of

Dasein is objectified as a bare thing in terms of its “state-characteristics”, this kind of objectification is possible only on grounds of “ability-characteristics”. This thesis is directly related with the Heideggerian claim that scientific activity is parasitic upon being-in-the-world.

¹²⁴ The relation between existence and understanding is eloquently set forth by Theodore Kisiel as follows: “Like understanding, existence is assumed to be the very being of human being. If understanding at first suggests the initial state in which man finds himself, existence stresses the projective activity of being. Just as understanding is more an understanding that man is rather than has, so likewise, in existence, man *is* his possibility. Accordingly, as a way of existence rather than a mode of knowing, our understanding of what it means to be is never a mere staring at a fixed meaning but the living out of a possibility. In other words, meaning is first ‘performed’ before it is conceptually formed” (Kisiel 2010, 104)

things and presses forward into possibilities presented to him by the world into which he has been thrown in order to fulfill the role of being a good father. Everything he does, if we are allowed to use the Husserlian language, partially *fulfills* the for-the-sake-of-which the representation of which is, as we told above, in principle impossible. The carpenter is always *on the way* to being a good father, and being a good father, far from being an extant idea, is bound to be comprised of what he does in his lifetime. He *is* what he *does*; his understanding of himself is but *acting* and *living in the world*. That is, “Dasein can, proximally and for the most part, understand itself in terms of its world. Or else understanding throws itself primarily into the ‘for-the-sake-of-which’; that is, Dasein exists as itself” (*BT*, 186). The world is first of all, in a pre-judgmental way, discovered as the significant whole of ready-to-hand entities which are involved in the referential nexus by means of reference and assignments.¹²⁵ The for-the-sake-of-which is the ultimate point and cannot be involved by some further *telos*. This is why Heidegger calls it the “ownmost being of Dasein”. The world becomes the “meaningful” whole it is¹²⁶ as the unique dwelling of Dasein on grounds of the fact that Dasein *is* ontologically out-of-itself-towards the for-the-sake-of-which which is

¹²⁵ About the relation between Dasein’s being for the sake of its ownmost possibility and the world toward which it transcends, Sallis writes: “In understanding, Dasein projects itself upon possibilities. It *is* its possibilities—that is, it too is extended, extends itself, beyond itself so as to escape all self-contained positivity. And by its manner of projecting upon them, Dasein lets its possibilities be *as* possibilities, granting them that reserve of absence which prevents it from crystallizing into the sheer presence of a given content. Possibilities disclose significance; and Dasein, projecting upon possibilities, projects also upon significance in such a way as to let it be as such, to let a referential totality take hold, to let a world take shape” (Sallis 2010, 115).

¹²⁶ “Meaningfulness” (*Bedeutsamkeit*) is attributed to the world as long as it is the toward-which of originary transcendence (or, Dasein as being-in-the-world), and words and language can become meaningful on this ground. Richard Palmer sets forth this important point eloquently: “However much words may shape or formulate meaning, they point beyond their own system to a meaningfulness already resident in the relational whole of world. Meaningfulness, then, is not something man gives to an object; it is what an object gives to man through supplying the ontological possibility of words and language” (Palmer 1969, 134). This is to say that, if the world which is *pointed-to* by language were meaningless, language could not be meaningful, either.

unattainable and non-representable:

In being familiar with this significance and previously understanding it, Dasein lets what is ready-to-hand be encountered as discovered in its involvement. In Dasein's being, the context of references and assignments which significance implies is tied up with Dasein's ownmost being—a being which essentially can have no involvement, but which is rather that being *for the sake of which* Dasein itself is as it is (BT, 160).

We saw in the third chapter that the towards-which of transcendence is the world. Now we are coming to realize that that towards which Dasein steps outside of itself is the for-the-sake-of-which. When considering “thrownness”, Heidegger uses the word in a seemingly ambiguous manner. Somewhere he mentions the “*thrownness* of this entity [Dasein] into its ‘there’” (BT, 174; square brackets mine), in another occasion he claims that “Dasein is thrown into the kind of being which we call ‘projecting’” (BT, 185), and somewhere else he contends that “it has in each case already been thrown *into a world*” (BT, 236). Which one of these is true?

As long as Dasein is being-in-the-world, it presses forward into possibilities for the sake of attaining the unattainable role he tailored for himself. But the for-the-sake-of-which is the ultimate meaning which gives unity to the world as the context of references and assignments. If we go back to our example about the carpenter, we may say that his world is *the world of a good father*.¹²⁷ Everything put to use and every act carried out by the carpenter is, whether intentionally or not, for the sake of acquiring the final end by which he understands himself. Nonetheless, neither the means nor the ultimate role he chooses for himself can be said to be free from the the world he finds himself (*sich befinden*) in. On the one hand, being a good father is not a choice indifferently made by the carpenter from a certain set of alternatives. It *matters* to him and this mattering of the social role in question is not something which the carpenter

¹²⁷ This is the “ontic- existentiell (or human)” concept of the world which we examined in the third chapter (see 3.3.4. World: “The Whither” of Originary Transcendence).

can willfully change.¹²⁸ On the other hand, ways of cherishing her daughter are not infinitely many, so, he presses forward to a limited set of possibilities. He thinks that building a bookcase for her daughter as the birthday present is the best way to make her happy because, say, he was grown up in an intellectual social milieu comprising of the persons who takes care of reading very much. The carpenter, although he can be said to be capable of choosing several things during his lifetime, cannot be said to be capable of not choosing to esteem the intellectual way of life. This is his facticity, or, thrownness. This is why Heidegger chooses the term “*thrown possibility*”¹²⁹ (BT, 183) in order to characterize the simultaneous disclosedness of Dasein and its world; disposition and understanding are the primordial sources from which the unitary structure being-in-the-world emanates:

As *existentialia*, disposition and understanding characterize the primordial disclosedness of being-in-the-world. By way of having a mood, Dasein ‘sees’ possibilities, in terms of which it is. In the projective disclosure of these possibilities, it already has a mood in every case. The projection of its ownmost potentiality-for-being has been delivered over to the fact of its thrownness into the ‘there’” (BT, 188).

¹²⁸ This unbreakable bond between projection and thrownness, or, understanding and disposition (attunement) is set into colloquial language by William Blattner as follows: “I cannot make any choice in an unattuned manner; being attuned makes me care about the possibilities and options I have. So, if I choose to make myself cheerful, I do so because making myself cheerful show up for me as desirable in some way. *Making* myself cheerful is a task that can matter to me (in virtue of the way the roles in which it is involved matter to me); *being* cheerful is not an option for me, but an attunement that already structure the way things matter to me” (Blattner, 1992, 110).

¹²⁹ Possibilities to which Dasein projects itself into are not the logical, “free floating” possibilities. As thrown, Dasein finds itself in them as the historical/social world in which it was born into: “[A] central aim of Heidegger’s account of understanding is to show Dasein’s inherence in the world, which is to say that Dasein is not some free-floating spirit that transcends its material situation. As a projection (*Entwurf*, from the German stem ‘to throw’), Dasein finds itself ‘thrown’ into a world, and finds itself as already projected or ‘thrown’ into a situation with concrete possibilities. Possibilities that are concrete (or definite, *besimmte*) differ from purely logical possibilities in that they come with concrete limitations. So Heidegger speaks of these limitations as Dasein’s ‘facticity’, in contradistinction to the other end of fact that he calls ‘factuality’” (Hoy 1993, 179).

5.1.3. Discourse and Language

Disclosedness is the concept which is contrived by Heidegger to emphasize that Dasein and world are equprimordially *there* from the beginning. The *there* can perhaps be thought of as the *topos of significance*, where the entities within-the-world are “not just beings (*to on*) but beings as intelligible (*to alethes*), not ‘what is out there’ but what is meaningfully present (*to paron*) within a human context” (Sheehan 2005, 197). The *there* of Dasein is where the subject-object dichotomy is superseded by the way of thinking in which truth and being are intertwined. The world is, rather than the sum total of meaningless things which are present-at-hand (or, nature), the significant whole comprised of the relations which Heidegger calls reference and assignment. The intraworldly things are given as the total network of ready-to-hand, which is to say that they become significant by referring to each other and by being assigned to some tasks and aims of Dasein. So, it is first of all the beings which are true, rather than the propositions. The world which Dasein is always already familiar with from the outset is an articulated whole, it is meaningful.¹³⁰ That is why we claimed with Heidegger that Dasein’s disclosedness is more originary than the truth of propositions in the third chapter. Disclosedness of the being-in-the-world is the phenomenon of phenomenology and the world in which Dasein *dwells* is discovered from the outset in a way in which there is no need for any *res cogitans*, the transcendental apperception,

¹³⁰ Stephan Käufer contends that the manifestness or uncoveredness of entities in Heidegger has two basic features: they are manifest in a holistic network, and these entities are normative for the judgments about them. The holistic structure displayed by the entities is followed by the holistic structure of propositions. Then he concludes: “So the truth of one assertion is holistically connected to the truth of others, and that just to say that these assertions are inferentially linked. This what Heidegger means by saying that the ontic principle of reason is derived from a metaphysical one. Assertions imply one another not because of features internal to their structure, but because of the structure of Dasein’s understanding of being” (Käufer 2005, 153-154). This is to say that the order of intraworldly things is not the mirror image of the formal-logical thought. Dasein’s non-conceptual understanding of being is the source from which both the order of things and, dependent on this, the rules of inferences are derived.

or the transcendental consciousness. From what Heidegger told, it is possible to conclude that disposition and understanding are both necessary and sufficient enough to set forth the total structure of disclosedness and to get rid of the subject-object schema.

Nonetheless, having moods and self-understanding comes to be insufficient to break the subject-object dichotomy as long as language comes to be seen as the ineluctable part of Dasein's life. If language is the device by which we represent everything to ourselves, would not that which is represented and that which does the representing remain to be ontically distinct and the traditional-dichotomic ontology persist? This must be so, only if language is conceived to be the extant apparatus accrued to Dasein.

In *History of the Concept of Time*, Heidegger calls our attention to the definition of man in ancient Greeks: “a living being capable of discourse” (ζῷον λόγον ἔχον) (*HCT*, 264). He underlines the fact that first of all discourse, not language as the formal structure of discourse, is linked with life. Language is not a thing among other things, it is first of all “discourse” or “talk” which should be evaluated as an existentials of Dasein: “Discourse has its roots in the existential constitution of Dasein” (*BT*, 203). Put differently, linguistic ability is not a possession for Dasein; rather, it must be contended that, as regards its ontological constitution, Dasein exists in discourse. Talking with others about the world is as primordial and essential as the moods and projection for the existential constitution of Dasein. So writes Heidegger: “*Discourse is existentially equiprimordial with disposition and understanding*” (*ibid*). Whereas discourse is one of the ontological moments of Dasein's being-in-the-world, language is an intraworldly entity, because it is the formal structure of what is abstracted from the living speech of living persons. Hence, “*there is language only because there is discourse, and not conversely*” (*HCT*, 265).

As self-articulation of in-being and being-with, speaking is toward the world—

discourse. It expresses itself first and foremost as a speaking concern for a world. This means that *discourse is discourse about something*, such that the *about-which* becomes manifest in the discourse. This becoming manifest of what is under discussion for all that does not need to become known expressly and thematically. Likewise *discoursing about*. . . does not stand primarily in the service of an investigative knowledge. Rather, making manifest through discourse first and foremost has the sense of interpretive presentation of the environment under concern; to begin with, it is not at all tailored to knowledge, research, theoretical propositions, and propositional contexts (*HCT*, 262).

So, it is not the case that Dasein is an isolated subject which somehow has the property of being able to speak. Being-in-discourse is the very essence of Dasein, not something accidentally attached to it afterwards. Instead of claiming that language can *be (extant)* or ready-to-hand, we should perhaps say that Dasein exists *discursively*.

To discourse there belong four components. Firstly, discourse is always discourse *about something*. The mode of being of discourse is *being-about*, not *being-present-at-hand*. What is talked about in a discourse is not a being-within-the-mind, but a being-within-the-world; not the representation or an idea of chair, but the chair *itself* as an entity within the world. Secondly, to the very essence of discourse “the *said* as such” belongs. When it is said “The chair is upholstered”, then what is talked about is the chair, and what is said of what is talked about is the chair’s being-upholstered (*HCT*, 262). That discourse is always “*discourse to others and with others*” is the third ontological characteristic which Heidegger mentions. Discourse has a communicative function; in fact, it is essentially “*communication*” (*HCT*, 263). Last of all, discourse is “*manifestation*”. The interlocutors “are first of all and primarily involved in the same subject matter” that is to be manifested.

To be characterized as the entity which is in-discourse, Dasein need not speak all the time. That being-in-discourse is one of the three existential moments of the disclosedness of Dasein amounts to the fact that, it remains to be so even while it keeps silent: “Keeping silent authentically is possible only in genuine discoursing. To

be able to keep silent, Dasein must have something to say—that is, it must have at its disposal an authentic and rich disclosedness of itself” (*BT*, 208). In a conversation with the others, keeping silent can be an expression of anger, resentment, disagreement, disregard, disdain, etc.

On the other hand, even “hearing” and “hearkening” are the phenomena which are to be accounted for in terms of discourse. From the phenomenal point of view, one hears “what is said and not its being said”, even if one finds himself in a conversation about an incomprehensible issue or in a chat which is carried out in a foreign language (*HCT*, 266). That which is talked about and what is said thereof are what is heard in the conversation, instead of pure noises and sound complexes. What one hears when occupying himself with writing a philosophy article in the study is not a “sonorous complex”, but the sound of a motorcycle or a wagon. As we saw in the second chapter, Heidegger’s phenomenological analysis of hearing reminds what Husserl says about the *hyletic data* which is experienced but not objectified:

It requires a very artificial and complicated frame of mind to ‘hear’ a ‘pure noise’. The fact that motorcycles and wagons are what we proximally hear is the phenomenal evidence that in every case Dasein, as being-in-the-world, already dwells *alongside* what is ready-to-hand within-the-world; it certainly does not dwell proximally alongside ‘sensations’; nor would it first to give shape to the swirl of sensations to provide the springboard from which the subject leaps off and finally arrives at a ‘world’. Dasein, as essentially understanding, is proximally alongside what is understood (*BT*, 207).

So, the world is not to be thought of as the entity which is present-at-hand standing there ready to be discovered by the extant subjects by means of discourse. Dasein does not talk about or understand the *factual* world; being-talked-about and being-always-already-understood are the essential phenomenal characteristics of the entity which we call world. World is not given to Dasein first of all through the bundle of sensational data; it becomes encounterable mainly because it is meaningful depending upon the fact that understanding is an existiale of Dasein which is being-in-the-world.

Charles Guignon contends that, regarding the original meaningfulness of the world in Heideggerian phenomenology, “the constitutive view of language” should be defended against the “instrumentalist view”. According to the instrumentalist view, says Guignon, language can be thought of as a device by the help of which “some prior grasp of the *nonsemantic significance* of the contexts in which we find ourselves” is reappropriated again in a different manner (Guignon 1983, 117). It is only because we master the non-linguistic articulation of the world, can we understand the meaning of the words and sentences, as well as making assertions about the states-of-affairs which we come against in our daily encounters. At the first sight, this approach may very well seem to be congruent with what Heidegger tells about discourse and language. We saw in the third chapter that truth which belongs to the propositions is parasitic upon the truth of disclosedness. Since the world is disclosed *a priori* because it is the significant whole of what is ready-to-hand, we can make meaningful assertions about it by isolating and decontextualizing the items of equipment by means of objectification. The mode of being of the things which become the objects of assertion are but presence-at-hand.¹³¹ So is the ontological status of the assertions. Therefore, as we saw in the third chapter, two extant things cannot be related with one another.

¹³¹ For an opposite view which is against the idea that present-at-hand is the “decontextualized” object, see Robert Brandom’s “Categories in *Being and Time*”, especially where he says: “This sketch of Heidegger’s notion of assertion puts us in a position to understand the category of the present-at-hand. The crucial point to understand here is that the move from equipment ready-to-hand, fraught with socially instituted significances, to objective things present-at-hand, is not one of decontextualization but of *recontextualization*. . . Treating something as present-at-hand is not ignoring its social significance, but attending to a special sort of significance it can have, namely significance for the correctness of assertions about it” (Brandom 1992, 59). This approach can be objected to by claiming that it prevents the term “significance” from being significant. “Significance” is a technical term in Heideggerian phenomenology which is used to refer to the *original intelligibility* of the world as the holistic network of ready-to-hand items, in opposition to the *derivative significance* the propositions have by corresponding to the states of affairs comprising of the present-at-hand entities. The originality of what Heidegger claimed in *Being and Time* about the subject matter may totally disappear, unless the difference we tried to set forth is maintained.

On the other hand, if we acknowledge the “constitutive view” according to which “words and world are seen as interwoven in such a way that to enter into one is simultaneously to master the other” (Guignon 1983, 118), we may perhaps come closer to what Heidegger means by discourse. Dasein is from the beginning in discourse with other Daseins (*Mitdasein*) in a public world, and sees the world in the way what *one* (*das Man*) says about it. “Publicness” of the public world is “averageness” which “primarily controls every way in which the world and Dasein get interpreted” (*BT*, 165).¹³² In everydayness, things show up in the way in which the subject of publicness and averageness, namely, “*the they*”, discourses about them. But the average discourse about the things is the one which lost the contact with the things themselves; it displays the character of “*hearsay*”, and follows “the route of *gossiping and passing the word along*” (*BT*, 212). This type of discourse is called “idle talk” (*Gerede*) by Heidegger and it is accounted for as the point of departure for every Dasein from which there is no escape:

This everyday way in which things have been interpreted is one into which Dasein has grown in the first instance, with never a possibility of extrication. In it, out of it, and against it, all genuine understanding, interpreting, and communicating, all re-discovering and appropriating anew, are performed. . . The dominance of the public in which things have been interpreted has already been decisive even for the possibilities of having a mood—that is, for the basic way in which Dasein lets the world “matter” to it. The “they” prescribes one’s disposition, and determines what and how one ‘sees’ (*BT*, 213).

As Guignon states, Heidegger’s insistence upon the fact that Dasein is being-in-communication-with-others from the beginning as one of the moments of its being-in-the-world can be interpreted as a critique directed to Husserl. Linguistic practices as in

¹³² Back in 1922, in the draft of the book planned to be written on Aristotle, Heidegger writes: “Factual life not only takes itself up and cares for itself as a significant occurrence standing before it and as worldly importance but also speaks the *language* of the world whenever speaking about itself” (PIA, 118).

the form of idle talk is that to which Dasein is thrown, and it cannot be played down and ruled out by the phenomenological *epoché*.¹³³ Only what is in discourse is understood by Dasein, and again, only what is understood can be linguistically articulated. The world about which Dasein talks is not a meaningless aggregate of things; rather, being-said-of, being-talked-about and being-communicated-with-others are the essential elements of the disclosedness of the world. Heidegger's phenomenology can be distinguished from the transcendental phenomenology of Husserl by the fact that it substitutes "understanding" and "interpretation" for phenomenological "description", since the subject matter of phenomenology is not value- and meaning-free *Sache selbst*. For Heidegger, things in themselves are the ones which are led to be involved (or, "*having been assigned or referred*")¹³⁴ in the equipmental networks which are called work-world. Primordial disclosedness of the work-world in which Dasein *dwells circumspectively* is, of course, linguistically articulated. But here, language is not an apparatus by the help of which we *re-present* things. Instead, things *present* themselves in such networks to Dasein to whose circumspection something like *non-objectifying discourse* belongs. The discourse which displays the characteristic of hearsay, rather than objectification and assertion, carries us directly to what Heidegger calls "falling".

¹³³ "[A] key part of Heidegger's break with Husserl consists in the fact that, unlike his teacher, he leaves no room for anything like an unmediated encounter with things themselves. Our access to things, for Heidegger, is always mediated through a world that is shaped in advance by a mess of cultural and historical interpretations, and these interpretations may very well turn out to be linguistically articulated" (Guignon 1983, 117).

¹³⁴ "An entity is discovered when it has been assigned or referred to something, and referred as that entity which *it is*" (BT, 115; italics mine). This is to say that, the hammer becomes the hammer-in-itself only in hammering, and not when it is objectified in terms of its certain characteristics.

5.1.4. Falling and Untruth

We told above that discourse is one of the essential moments of the disclosedness of Dasein which is being-in-the-world. And we also saw that it is above all the living communication between living persons, and its formal structure as the object of logical analysis is derivative therefrom. The uninterrupted communication between the persons living in a society has not mainly the function of pointing, or referring to the entities within the world. What Heidegger calls discourse is more primordial a phenomenon than language as the totality of assertions that have the apophantical function of pointing to the present-at-hand things. Since world is the intelligible whole in which entities can have meaningful presence and “discourse is the articulation of intelligibility” (*BT*, 203-204), then it must be concluded that *constitution of the world* is the basic role discourse happen to have.

The world to whose constitution something like communication belongs is called “*with-world*” (*Mitwelt*) by Heidegger (*BT*, 155). Insofar as world is acknowledged to be the with-world, it should also be accepted that the problem of intersubjectivity, of how the interior of one subject is transmitted to the other is no longer an issue for him: “Communication must be understood in terms of the structure of Dasein as *being with one another*. It is not a matter of transforming information and experiences from the interior of one subject to the interior of the other one” (*HCT*, 263, italics mine). So, being-with-others should be annexed to the ontological constitution of Dasein which is not an isolated subject but being-in-the-world. The other is not someone whom we come against as a present-at-hand entity; nor is he encountered with as a ready-to-hand being within the world which is open to be manipulated by us (*BT*, 154). Their mode of being within-the-world is “*Dasein-with [Mitdasein]*” (*BT*, 155). As well as communication, Dasein comes against the others by means of the ready-to-hand entities within the world. The car parked over there has an owner, the meal one eats in

a restaurant has a cooker, the computer one uses has a producer, etc. The one who stands there by the bakery is not a present-at-hand entity indifferent to his environment, but the baker as the one who has his own world comprising of the equipments he normally uses, along with the aims and targets for the sake of which he occupies himself with the job he has. So, “Dasein in itself is essentially *being-with*”, as long as it is in the world (*BT*, 156).

However, as long as the daily encounters with the ready-to-hand entities within the world are considered, it should be claimed that the distance between Dasein and others tends to obviate. On grounds of the obviation of the differences which are supposed to individuate Dasein, something like being-with-others first becomes possible. Dasein’s self-understanding is leveled down to the average understanding of the public; he is, as it were, taken away by the “they” (*das Man*) who is “the ‘realist subject’ of everydayness” (*BT*, 166). The “they” is the term Heidegger uses to refer to the average ways of coping with the situations and dealings with things in the world. It does not signify a class name, because there corresponds to it nothing present-at-hand. As a matter of fact, it is more like an adverbial expression which defines the *how* of being-in-the-world. The “they” is an *existentiale* which signifies getting lost and being absorbed by the world of everyday Dasein (*BT*, 167).

We take pleasure and enjoy ourselves as *they* [*man*] take pleasure; we read, see, and judge about literature and art as *they* see and judge; likewise we shrink back from the ‘great mass’ as *they* shrink back; we find ‘shocking’ what *they* find shocking. The “they”, which is nothing definite, and which all are, though not as the sum, prescribes the kind of being of everydayness (*BT*, 164).

The unreflective imitation of what one normally does something in the society is the point of departure for Dasein. This is to say that, he does not get acquainted with the things in the world first, and then find the ways of coping with them afterwards. The ways of dealings with things, acting in some certain situations, responding to the needs of others, individuating itself, etc. are inherited to it by the historical society in which it

has been thrown. The entities within the world are not given as the objects present-at-hand, since the distance needed to objectify them is denied from Dasein at the outset. Under the hegemony of the “they” as the subject of everyday averageness, Dasein is “disburdened” of its being; this is to say, it gets hindered from understanding its own being in terms of possibilities (*Seinkönnen*) and urged instead to interpret its ontological constitution in terms of the things which are present-at-hand. This kind of being which belongs to everydayness is called “falling” (*Verfallen*) by Heidegger. In a 1925 lecture course on Dilthey, Heidegger defines falling as follows, without naming it:

Dasein’s circumspection is guided by a type of interpretation that reigns within publicness. Defined by this interpretation, the world is accessible to everyone in an average way. The public character of the ways in which Dasein has been interpreted also defines life in the public arena. Moreover, individual life has the tendency to sink away into this publicness and becomes lost in it. When Dasein speaks about itself, it sees itself as a thing in the world, like other things. Thus life is in the first place reflected upon in terms of concepts of the world and not in terms of concepts that originally belong to it. One finds oneself at first in one’s concerns, in what one does, in one’s career, and so on. The world of concerns yields the initial concept of what Dasein is (WDR, 165).

We saw in the second chapter that Husserl’s description of the “natural attitude” is based on the subject-object schema, according to which human beings understand themselves as the immanent interior deployed against the transcendent outer-world. Now we come to realize that for Heidegger, this basic ontological framework on grounds of which humans interpret their ontological positioning relatively to that of the world is nothing but the leveled down, devious interpretation of their facticity, or thrownness. Fallenness is the inauthentic mode of disclosedness in which Dasein misinterprets both the self “which is in each case mine” and the world by which it is absorbed as the objects of knowledge. Actually, neither its self nor the world in which it dwells can supply Dasein with the distance it needs in order to thematize or objectify them; i.e., its self and its world are so near to it that Dasein cannot intentionally direct

itself toward them in the first place. The original meaning of *Befindlichkeit* as *finding-oneself-moodwise-in-a-world* is spoiled by falling, and the moods become the feelings which are present-at-hand ready to be observed by the reflective gaze of consciousness. On the other hand, fallen Dasein is also liable to water down the other moment of disclosedness as well. Understanding, which existentially is “projecting the possible ways to be” of Dasein (or, potentiality-for-being, *Seinkönnen*), is deteriorated to the extent that as objectified, Dasein itself becomes a self-enclosed, finished, present-at-hand entity alongside the other things. Its self-transcendent, “worldly” character is obviated and it becomes an extant entity among other intraworldly entities.

Falling is incorporated to the existential constitution of disclosedness by Heidegger, because it is the *a priori* “covering-up” of the thrownness and understanding. In falling what is ontically nearest becomes ontologically the farthest, since every ontological approach down through the history of philosophy, under the guidance of the natural languages based on the subject-object schema, has always been tended to ignore the primordial inseparability of Dasein and world. This is why Heidegger thinks that the question of being has long been forgotten since Aristotle and ontology has been replaced by epistemology since the beginning of modern philosophy. From the 1925 lecture course on Dilthey to *Being and Time*, it can be observed that his manner of handling the theme of falling remained essentially the same:

This term [falling] does not express any negative evaluation, but is used to signify that Dasein is proximally and for the most part *alongside* the world of its concern. This “absorption in . . .” [Aufgehen bei . . .] has mostly the character of being-lost in the publicness of the “they”. Dasein has, in the first instance, fallen away [abgefallen] from itself as an authentic potentiality for being its self, and has fallen into the world (*BT*, 220).

“Falling is conceived as a kind of motion” from being one’s self which is existentially “thrown-projection” to the world of “they-self” in which it becomes an extant entity within the world (*BT*, 224). When falling, Dasein can be said to be “alienated” from its

being which is potentiality-for-being (*BT*, 222). It can be contended that by falling, Dasein domesticates its self which is originary transcendence or potentiality-for-being by turning it into a self-enclosed, finished *thing*. Thereby, the self becomes graspable, controllable, and observable. Dasein is disburdened from its freedom for choosing oneself and in this sense, falling is characterized by Heidegger “*tranquillizing*” (*ibid*). Through falling Dasein turns itself into something it is not, and this “not-being-itself” is one of the possible ways to be for Dasein; in fact, it is the one “in which Dasein maintains itself for the most part” (*BT*, 220).

In the third chapter, when mentioning truth, we told that Dasein is in truth because it is the entity in whose disclosedness intraworldly entities become discoverable. Now we will claim with Heidegger that as the being to whose ontological constitution something like falling belongs ontologically, Dasein “covers up” itself by turning it into an epistemological object. Insofar as this tendency is part of Dasein’s being, it must be acknowledged that it is also in “untruth”: “To be closed off and covered up belongs to Dasein’s *facticity*. In its full existential-ontological meaning, the proposition that ‘Dasein is in the truth’ states equiprimordially that ‘Dasein is in untruth’” (*BT*, 265). That Dasein is existentially apt to cover up its being is defined by Heidegger *anxious* “fleeing in the face of itself” (*BT*, 229). The ontological fact that Dasein cannot put up with the self-transcendent constitution of its being as in the form of “potentiality-for-being” is called “anxiety” by Heidegger. Anxiety is the most basic disposition because the inauthentic, everyday existence in which Dasein mostly maintains itself can be explained by this aspect of its ontological-existential constitution. On the other hand, as we will see in the following, this crucial mood of Dasein is also important for examining “the structural whole” of Dasein, although this entity up till now has been set forth as unfinished potentiality-for-being; i.e., originary transcendence, or self-transcendence.

5.2. Anxiety as the Fundamental Mood of Dasein

Anxiety is the fundamental mood of Dasein, because only when oppressed by anxiety can Dasein exceed the average understanding of being as presence and deploy itself in a position where he can testify to the disclosure of being (*Sein*) which is not a being (*Seiende*)—i.e., “no-thing”. Dasein’s cutting itself off from the public world in which it is absorbed is its becoming authentic. In authenticity Dasein, by owning up its own being as potentiality-for-being (or, self-transcendence) first becomes aware of something like ontological difference (the difference between being and beings). This moment of *ontological enlightenment* through which Dasein surpasses the ontological horizon delimited by static presence and makes an advent to “being as such” can be accepted as the “phenomenological reduction” of Heidegger. From the point of view of Dasein, this is possible only as long as it has an authentic relationship with its “death” as “*the possibility of the impossibility of any existence at all*” (*BT*, 307). Let’s examine these issues in detail in order to have a better understanding of the ontological fact that Dasein’s mode of being is *Seinkönnen*.

5.2.1. Anxiety, Nothing, and Phenomenological Reduction

Dasein’s everyday way of being-in-the-world is defined by Heidegger as “Dasein’s absorption” in the world of concern as it is interpreted by the “they”. This absorption shows up as the familiarity with the world through the average, leveled down interpretation of the public. As long and insofar as Dasein yields its innermost self to the “they” and overtakes the “they-self” by forsaking the possibility of individualizing itself, it is “at home” in the world (*BT*, 233); this is the reason why Heidegger is insistent upon the ontological fact that the world is the dwelling for Dasein rather than an object (or, “nature”). Both residing alongside the ready-to-hand entities within the world and being-with-others in a public discourse are the existential constituents of

Dasein's ontological structure which is being-in-the-world. This is to say that, neither the environmental entities which primarily and for the most part become manifest through equipmentality, nor the other people whose mode of being is with-Dasein is originally given to Dasein as the objects of perception. The *proximity* or "de-severance" (*Entfernung*) between Dasein and the envioning entities within the world (including the other Dasein of others) should be examined in terms of "existential space" rather than the "physical space" of the positive sciences. "Circumspective concern" and "*solicitude*" are the two modifications of care (*Sorge*) which is the deep ontological meaning of the existential structure of Dasein (*BT*, 157). If we are allowed to appeal to the Husserlian terminology here, to these two noetic components of the intentional relation, there correspond the two noematic correlates which are, respectively, the equipmental things within the world and the Dasein of others.¹³⁵ They are *there* with Dasein, and the ontological status of the world and Dasein's self is in congruence with the average interpretation of the "they" which is nothing other than the metaphysics of present-at-hand.¹³⁶

¹³⁵ But this is just a terminological similarity. Not *being-conscious-of* but *caring-for* the world is the most basic mode of being-in-the-world. Husserl claims that consciousness is not an entity among other entities; since it is always consciousness of something, it must be examined in terms of intentionality. Heidegger thinks although the Husserlian claim is substantially true of our epistemological compartments, it is far from being sufficient to explain our most basic being-in-the-world. Dasein's being-comported-towards-the-world is fundamentally not a relation based on perception and knowing. Dasein is being-in-the-world, firstly because the world *matters* to it and its being is an issue for it.

¹³⁶ It can be claimed what Heidegger tried to overcome in *Being and Time* is the traditional way of characterizing human beings in terms of substantiality and "personal identity. So, what he calls "metaphysics of presence" can be interpreted as the long and continuous falling of the Western philosophical tradition. Charles Guignon summarizes the basic intention of Heidegger as follows: "From his earliest writings to his last lectures and seminars, Heidegger challenged this traditional way of characterizing human existence. On his view, the substantialist conception of humans is a product of the 'metaphysics of presence', the tendency to think that the *being* of anything has to be conceived in terms of enduring presence. This objectifying outlook underlies our modern conception of ourselves as individuals with a unique subjective standpoint and an inbuilt 'personal identity' enduring through time. And it explains why we are so comfortable thinking ourselves as 'subjects of inwardness', as individual centers of experience and action" (Guignon 2003, 119-120).

Living in the common, average understanding of being based on *presence* is Dasein's falling into the "they" and the world, as long as world is understood in its ontic-existential meaning. Moreover, this is tantamount for Dasein to interpret its being in terms of static presence or substantiality. Hence, while yielding itself to the "they", Dasein at the same time "turns away from itself" and loses the chance of reinterpreting itself in an authentic manner in terms of potentiality-for-being, or thrown-projection (BT, 230). Put differently, falling into the world of the "they" is nothing but the "fleeing of Dasein in the face of itself" (BT, 229). But this "fleeing-in-the-face-of", while ontically covering up, ontologically discloses the fact that as regards its ontological constitution, Dasein is potentiality-for-being or being-outside-of-itself-towards-the-world. Seen from the perspective of semiotics, "fleeing from" can very well be interpreted as a way of referring to something; it is at least as capable of signifying something as pointing something ostensively is:

To be sure, that in the face of which it flees is *not grasped* in thus turning away [Abkehr] in falling; nor is it experienced even in turning thither [Hinkehr]. Rather, in turning away *from* it, it is disclosed 'there'. This existential-ontic turning away, by reason of its character as disclosure, makes it phenomenally possible to grasp existential-ontologically that in the face of which Dasein flees, and to grasp it as such (BT, 229).

One can ask why Heidegger prefers the verb "flee". He chooses this verb because that from which Dasein turns away is "uncanny", "indefinite" and "threatening". "When in falling we flee *into* the 'at-home' of publicness, we flee *in the face of* the 'not-at-home'; that is, we flee in the face of the uncanniness which lies in Dasein" (BT, 234). Inasmuch as something like falling belongs to the existential constitution of the disclosedness of Dasein, so does the fleeing. In falling Dasein is tranquillized. So, being tranquillized in falling belongs to the essence of Dasein. It can again be asked: What is subsided when Dasein is tranquillized in yielding itself to the "they-self"? "Anxiety" (*Angst*) is the answer to this question and it is one of the most important constituents of disclosedness, because it is the most prominent disposition, or mood of

Dasein: “Anxiety is nothing but *the disposition to uncanniness*” (HCT, 291).

In opposition to “fear”, that *in the face of which* Dasein is anxious is neither an intraworldly entity which is ready-to-hand, nor a decontextualized being which is present-at-hand. That in the face of which Dasein has anxiety is simply “no-thing” (BT, 237), but itself; i.e., Dasein as being-in-the-world. When it is asked *about what* Dasein is anxious in the face of itself as being-in-the-world, we get the same answer: being-in-the-world as thrown potentiality-for-being (BT, 233). This is supposed to say that Dasein’s being is an issue for itself and its self which matters to Dasein cannot be explained in terms of static presence. Put negatively, it is not the case that Dasein *is* (present-at-hand) and it is anxious about this self which is extant. It is rather the case that being-anxious is the very being of Dasein, it is its existence. Dasein, since it is thrown projection, is not a thing among other things and for this reason cannot be the object of reflection. That which cannot be objectified cannot be grasped, handled, and obtained by knowledge. If we appeal to the terminology of 1925 Aristotle lecture and put “factual life” in place of Dasein, we may say that factual life is self-reflective in its being; its temporalizing itself (*sich zeitigen*; taking place) is simultaneous with its understanding of itself. In Raffoul’s words, “philosophizing ‘about’. . . life is thus a phenomenon which belongs to life itself” (Raffoul 2008, 75). Put differently, Dasein does not understand its self by reflection; instead, it *exists understandingly*. So, the authentic being of Dasein, unless it is disowned in the average understanding of the “they”, cannot be the object of reflection, but can only be disclosed by means of the disposition called anxiety:

The object of philosophical research is human Dasein insofar as it is interrogated with respect to the character of its being. This basic direction of philosophical questioning is not externally added and attached to the interrogated object, factual life. Rather, it needs to be understood as an explicit taking up of a basic movement of factual life. In this movement, life is in such a way that in the concrete temporalizing of its being, it is anxiously concerned about its being, even when it goes out of its way to avoid itself. A characteristic of the being of factual life is that it finds itself hard to bear. The most

unmistakable manifestation of this is the fact that factual life has the tendency to make easy for itself. In finding itself hard to bear, life *is* difficult in accord with the basic sense of its being, not in the sense of a contingent feature. If it is the case that factual life authentically is what it is in this being-hard and being-difficult, then the genuinely fitting way of gaining access to it and truly safekeeping it can only consist in making itself hard for itself. This is the only duty philosophical research can be required to fulfill, unless of course it wants to miss its object completely (PIA, 113).

What is “difficult” or “hard to bear” is the very being of Dasein which we, in the third chapter, have characterized as being-outside-of-itself (or, self-transcendence) and the reason why Dasein finds itself hard to bear is the fact that its ownmost self is non-objectifiable. “The tendency to make easy for itself” of what is found difficult by Dasein is none other than *falling*, which is the contra-movement to disclosure. However, as we saw above, this contra-movement which ontically covers up ontologically uncovers, since “fleeing in the face of itself” of Dasein is at the same time disclosing itself. Therefore, factual life of Dasein is in untruth, as much as it is in truth.¹³⁷ Explicating Dasein which is simultaneously in truth and untruth is the hardship Heidegger mentions in the quoted paragraph. Traditional ontology based on the metaphysics of presence is far from having an access to the truth of being whose disclosure is possible by means of the understanding of being of Dasein which is both in truth and untruth at the same time.

Being familiar with the world of the “they-self”, or, being lost in it is nothing other than finding-itself in the significance of the ready-to-hand of Dasein. When Dasein is oppressed by anxiety, the significance of the world collapses and the involvement relations shatter. With the advent of the utter “*insignificance*” the existentiell-ontic

¹³⁷ Therefore, in falling, factual life shows itself in retreating from itself and yielding itself to the “they-self” of the public. Agamben sets this point forth in an eloquent manner as follows: “Facticity is the condition of what remains concealed in its opening, of what is exposed by its retreat. From the beginning, facticity is thus characterized by the same co-belonging of concealment and unconcealment that, for Heidegger, marks the experience of the truth of being” (Agamben 2008, 94).

world (one's own world, the public world, the world of a good father, etc.) vanishes and the world in its ontological meaning (world of being-in-the-world), namely, worldhood of the world comes forward (*BT*, 231). In this sense, claims Heidegger, "*the world as such is that in the face of which one has anxiety*" (*ibid*). When we remind ourselves of the fact that Dasein *is* its world because "the worldhood itself is an *existentiale*" (*BT*, 92), then it becomes clear there is not any contradiction here. That in the face of which and about which Dasein is anxious is being-in-the-world, or, worldhood of the world.¹³⁸

We told above that being-in-truth of Dasein is equivalent to the a priori disclosedness of the world by means of the non-conceptual understanding of being, of the meaning of the copula 'is'. When Dasein is captured by the mood of anxiety, the insignificance of the world shows up as the becoming dysfunctional of the copula: "Anxiety robs us of speech. Because beings as a whole slip away, so that just the nothing crowds round, in the face of anxiety all utterance of the 'is' falls silent" (*WM*, 103). These words quoted from the 1929 inaugural lecture course in the Freiburg University makes a great contribution to the arguments of *Being and Time*. Since that in the face of which one

¹³⁸ World is the topos of meaning in which entities can have significant being for Dasein which primarily and for the most part comports itself towards them concernfully. Da-sein projects the "there" as in the form of disclosure (originary truth) and world in its existentiell-ontic sense (the third sense of the world) is the concretization of this "there" in which entities first become encounterable in a pre-objective manner (readiness-to-hand). Whereas primary condition for *being-something* is understanding (projection), anxiety is the way the "nothing" nihilates itself by means of the annihilation of significance and collapse of the world. On the other hand, unless temporalizing itself of understanding is interrupted by anxiety, Dasein cannot come back to its authentic self (possibility) from the they-self (actuality or presence-at-hand). So, in anxiety Dasein lives through an *ontological enlightenment* and owns up its factual self by abandoning extant self of the "they" (i.e., "self" as a thing). Claiming that Dasein is anxious in the face of itself amounts to contenting that it first of all finds out that its "ground" is *nothing*: "It is anxiety that discloses Dasein's *Befindlichkeit*, the ground-state in which Dasein finds itself as unaccountably thrown, so that Dasein, finding no metaphysical ground outside itself, has to be its own ground, has to throw itself into its own grounding. Thus the ground disclosed by anxiety is Dasein itself, its own temporal way of being. As a 'groundless ground', Dasein has to provide a meaning that is not otherwise given" (Fell, 1992, 68).

gets anxious is the Dasein as being-in-the-world, and since Dasein is *no-thing* among intraworldly things but *worldly*, “anxiety reveals the nothing” (ibid).¹³⁹ “The nothing” (*das Nichts*), since it is not a thing among things, cannot be referred to by means words; that is, it cannot be talked about. The only way Dasein comes to terms with the anxiety and the nothing revealed thereby is reticence. Heidegger calls attention to the fact that after being enthralled by anxiety and coming face to face with the fact that the ground of its being is not a thing but transcendence, all Dasein can say “it was nothing” (WM, 103). The nothing is inherent in the ontological constitution of Dasein and Dasein understands, or, strives for being on grounds of the *lack* presented to it by the nothing. The “lack” under question is not the *absence* of something present-at-hand; it rather corresponds to the finitude, or, unfinishedness of Dasein. Since this finitude, or, unfinishedness is the only existential characteristic on account of which Dasein surpasses the beings as a whole, the “nihilating” of the nothing can be accepted as the *absent ground* of Dasein as originary transcendence. Being discloses itself through the understanding of finite Dasein, and this finitude, as the mark of lack, implies the belonging together of being and nothing. So, Heidegger writes: “Being and nothing belong together, not because both. . . agree in their indeterminateness and immediacy, but rather because being itself is essentially finite and reveals itself only in the transcendence of Dasein which is held out into the nothing” (WM, 110). *As the*

¹³⁹ Jean-Luc Marion claims that the 1929 lecture should be accepted as the inception of Heidegger’s *Kehre*, because Dasein is replaced by the theme of “ontological difference” here. According to him, the topic of “nothing” is unrelated with the fact that Dasein is not a thing, because it is self-transcendent thanks to the understanding of being: “What in 1927 *Sein und Zeit* designates (without really attaining it) under the title of “meaning of being” the lecture of 1929 aims at—without including it explicitly—under the name of ‘ontological difference’” (Marion 1998, 74-75). What Dasein comes face to face in anxiety is the ontological difference between being and beings; its coming face to face with itself, Marion seems to think, is secondary. We claim against this warning that Dasein’s authentically encountering itself by means of anxiety is its encountering with being (or, nothing), since originary transcendence is nothing other than the *happening* of ontological difference. Indeed, “the nothing” which Dasein comes face to face in anxiety can very well be interpreted as the counterpart of the analysis of “death” in *Being and Time*. In the following, we will prefer this path.

original phenomenon of phenomenology, the disclosure of the interplay of being and nothing becomes manifest only on the groundless ground called Dasein, the entity which is outside-of-itself with regard the ontological fact that its essence is its existence and its being is an issue for it.

Da-sein means: being held out into the nothing. Holding itself out into the nothing, Dasein is in each case already beyond beings as a whole. This being beyond beings we call “transcendence”. If in the ground of its essence Dasein were not transcending, which now means, if it were not in advance holding itself into the nothing, then it could never be related to beings nor even to itself (WM, 105-106).

In *Being and Time*, Heidegger claims that the “not-at-home” disclosed by the mood of anxiety is “the most primordial phenomenon” and the familiarity with the ontic world of the “they” disclosed by the mood of “tranquillized” being-at-home is derivative from it (BT, 234). This is to say that “constant presence” (*Vorhandenheit*) is the average understanding of being by the help of which Dasein mitigates the anxiety issuing from the fact that its essence is not that of a thing but possibility-for-being (*Seinkönnen*). This analysis can be evaluated in terms of the phenomenological reduction of Heideggerian kind. We saw above that Heidegger criticizes Husserl with not giving the ground upon which something like phenomenological reduction is based. Now we see that anxiety as an existentials for Dasein is the intrinsic ground of the phenomenological reduction, and effecting a reduction to get rid of beings as a whole and arriving the self-manifestation of being by *Daseinsanalytik* belongs to the ontological structure of Dasein. Dasein does this whenever it exists *authentically*, so Heidegger’s phenomenological reduction can be evaluated in terms of the movement from inauthenticity (dis-owning its being) to authenticity (owning up its being); for Heidegger, it can be claimed, phenomenological reduction is the *counter-movement of falling*. Whereas the direction of Husserl’s phenomenological reduction is from the transcendent to immanent being, Heidegger’s is from the entities to their being. In

phenomenological reduction the *happening* of the “ontological difference”¹⁴⁰ between beings and their being manifests itself, and this is nothing other than the disclosure of being by means of the finite ontological understanding of Dasein. Death as the impossibility of Dasein is the most prominent mark of finitude, and strongly correlated with the mood of anxiety as the sole ground of the phenomenological reduction of Heidegger.

5.2.2. Anxiety and Death

We told above that Dasein is the finite or unfinished entity because *that for the sake of which* it exists is unattainable and non-representable. Dasein’s factual life is self-interpretive in that, its being is an issue for it. Under the guidance of the ultimate for-the-sake-of-which Dasein interprets the world which is the significant whole comprised of the ready-to-hand entities and the others. The significance relations which bind together the intraworldly entities are not the inventions of Dasein but

¹⁴⁰ “In the question as to what that which is, is as something that is—what a being is *as a being*—being is treated like a being. Nevertheless, although unsuitably interpreted, it is still made a problem. Somehow the Dasein knows about something like being. Since it exists, the Dasein understands being and comports itself toward beings. The distinction between being and beings *is there [ist da]*, latent in the Dasein and its existence, even if not in explicit awareness. The distinction *is there ist da* [i.e. exists]; that is to say, it has the mode of being of the Dasein: it belongs to existence. Existence means, as it were, ‘to be in performance of this distinction’” (*BPP*, 319). The phrase “ontological difference” is first used in the 1927 lectures *Basic Problems of Phenomenology* and is absent in *Being and Time*. Whether the idea of “ontological difference”, as the difference between beings and their being, is operative in the text of *Being and Time* is a controversial issue. In the section in which he secures the horizon from which the question of the meaning of being can be asked in an appropriate manner (§2. *The Formal Structure of the Question of Being*), Heidegger writes: “In the question which we are to work out, *what is asked about* is being—that which determines entities as entities, that on the basis of which [woraufhin] entities are already understood, however we may discuss them in detail. The being of entities ‘is’ not itself an entity” (*BT*, 25-26). The “not” of “not being an entity of being” carries in itself both the idea of “ontological difference” and the idea of “nothing” (or, “no-thing”). In this sense, staying within the limits of *Being and Time* it can be claimed that “the ontological difference *differentiates*” and “the nothing *nihilates*” in the *there* of Dasein which is ex-istence. It is not necessary to wait for the *Basic Problems of Phenomenology* former and the 1929 inaugural lecture “What is Metaphysics?” for the latter. For a similar claim, see also (Marion 1998, 110-120).

inherited to it by the historical past it has been thrown into. In this meaningful context which is called world, Dasein continually makes choices; it “presses into possibilities” and tries to fulfill its self by fulfilling the ultimate for-the-sake-of-which that is unattainable and non-representable. From where it is thrown, it presses forward into possibilities by “taking a stand on its being”. In this sense, Dasein’s being is *thrown-projection*; it is not a self-enclosed, finished self-identity; i.e., it is not a “whole”. Where Dasein exists, *there* happens the interplay between being and nothing, or, *there* becomes manifest the disclosure of being. *Dasein is anxious in the face of its not being a whole.*

On the other hand, unless its “potentiality-for-being-a-whole” has been taken into consideration, Dasein’s existential constitution cannot be analyzed enough in an authentic manner.¹⁴¹ Thus far, it has tried to be shown that Dasein is care, or thrown-projection. But this only means that the being of Dasein can only be examined in terms of possibility, rather than the actuality of the present-at-hand. Moreover, it has also been demonstrated that the entity, whose essence is pressing-toward-possibilities—or, existence—is finite, or incomplete. “The understanding projects Dasein’s being both upon its ‘for-the-sake-of-which’ and upon significance, as the worldhood of its current world” (*BT*, 185) just because Dasein, with regard to its ownmost being, is incomplete. Heidegger summarizes the problem eloquently in *History of the Concept of Time*:

The being of this entity [Dasein] is care; among other things, care means being out for something; Dasein’s concern includes a concern for its own being. As being out for something, it is out for *what it still is not*. As care, Dasein is essentially *underway*

¹⁴¹ Heidegger determines the task to be fulfilled in the following words: “One thing has become unmistakable: *our existential analysis of Dasein up till now cannot claim to primordiality*. Its fore-having never included more than *inauthentic* being of Dasein, and of Dasein as *less* than a *whole* [*als unganzes*]. If the interpretation of Dasein’s being is to become primordial, as a foundation for working out the basic question of ontology, then it must first have brought to light existentially the being of Dasein in its possibilities of *authenticity* and *totality*” (*BT*, 276).

towards something; in caring it is toward itself as that which it still is not. Its own sense of being is to always have something before itself which it still is not, which is still outstanding. That something is always still outstanding means that the being of Dasein as care, insofar as it is, is *always incomplete*; it still lacks something so long as it is (*HCT*, 308; square brackets mine).

Dasein's meaning-giving activity can be interpreted as the mitigation of anxiety issuing from the "lack" inherent in its being. But this activity is not at the disposal of Dasein. There are two reasons for it: First, the world which is to be made significant by Dasein is *always already* meaningful. As thrown, the factual Dasein finds itself in the familiar world of the "they" in which everything intraworldly has already been articulated in the average understanding of the public. Dasein is tardy, as long as rendering world meaningful is considered. The second reason lies in the fact that "understanding" and "interpretation" are existentials for Dasein. Projecting meaning upon the world is not an additional feature accrued to the essence of Dasein. Put differently, it is not the case that Dasein is present-at-hand first, and then it renders meaningful. Rendering-meaningful belongs to the ontological constitution of it; Dasein exists understandingly. So, when demanding the ontological horizon in which Dasein can display itself in its "wholeness", Heidegger can be said to be demanding *the meaning of meaning*. He underscores the need to secure Dasein in its wholeness, because the entity, whose ontological constitution is based on "something outstanding"—or, "lack"—must have the possibility-to-be-a-whole. Where there is no mention about being a whole, lack loses all its sense. So the question is: *What is that which makes meaning, by the help of which the lack is mitigated, meaningful?* That which makes meaning meaningful is nothing but the *death* of Dasein. Let's see why.

As it is the case with the rest of the existentials which we have mentioned thus far, Heidegger thinks that mortality is not an extant property which is added to an extant subject. Death cannot be characterized as an "occurrence" that stands at the end of the life of Dasein. If death is to be conceived as an existential belonging to the being-in-

the-world as potentiality-for-being, it cannot be thought of in terms of actuality of an event; it rather must be characterized as a possibility, or potentiality. Heidegger refuses to call the decomposition of an extant body of a biological organism as death. According to him, only Dasein dies; animals and plants just “perish” (BT, 284). When death comes, Dasein *is* no more; as long as Dasein exists, death is absent. But is this true? The first sentence, yes. But the latter should be interrogated some more.

In the first antinomy, Kant claims that trying to prove or disprove whether the world has a beginning in time and space is a futile enterprise because neither of the extremes of the series of spatiotemporal events can be the possible object of experience or knowledge. Similarly, Heidegger denies death of the ontological status of a spatiotemporal event which is *terminus ad quem*.

[J]ust as Dasein *is* already its “not-yet”, and is its “not-yet” constantly as long as it is, it *is* already its end too. The “ending” which we have in view when we speak of death, does not signify Dasein’s being-at-an-end [Zu-Ende-sein], but a *being-towards-the-end* [Sein zum Ende] of this entity. Death is a way to be, which Dasein takes over as soon as it is (BT, 289).

The death to which Heidegger claims Dasein is *underway* is not a futural event which Dasein *occasionally* conjures up. “Being-towards-the-end” or “being-towards-death” (*Sein zum Tode*) is definitely not Dasein’s *implicit consciousness* of the fact that it will one day die. When coming face to face with someone else’s death, say, in a funeral, one (*das Man*) says: ““One of these days one will die too, in the end”. Heidegger claims that what is implied by these words is something like this: “But right now it has nothing to do with us” (BT, 297). This “fugitive manner” of speaking belongs to the “they-self” and relegates this most authentic possibility of Dasein to a “case” which just happens to “others” (BT, 298). In falling, Dasein flees in the face of death by ambiguating the phenomenon. Although it is true that someday everybody will die, this kind of truth is evaluated by Heidegger as an everyday platitude. On the other hand, when examined in terms of falling, it really means something. “Someday” dates

the death to an indeterminate future which will never come; “everybody” makes it a public phenomenon which can be shared by communication (here, “idle talk”). In fact, everybody knows that one can at any time die; when death is robbed of its unpredictability of the “any-time”, it ceases to be a possibility and turns out to be actuality (actuality of an event which is present-at-hand). This deprivation of death of its unpredictability is Dasein’s reaction to it in falling, and the name of this reaction is again, anxiety. Dasein is anxious in the face of death means it is the being to whose ontological constitution something like being-towards-death belongs: “Thrownness into death reveals itself to Dasein in a more primordial and impressive manner in disposition which we call ‘anxiety’” (*BT*, 295). Anxiousness in the face of death is anxiousness in the face of “nothing” to the extent that that of which and that about which Dasein is anxious is being-in-the-world as the possibility of “no-longer-being-there” (*Nicht-mehr-Dasein*): “As long as Dasein *is* as an entity, it has never reached its ‘wholeness’. But if it gains such ‘wholeness’, this gain becomes the utter loss of being-in-the-world” (*BT*, 280). Therefore, the authentic meaning of “nothing” is the possibility of being-a-whole of Dasein. Since Dasein *is* this possibility, it is wrong to claim that as long as Dasein exists, death is absent.

Death must be seen as the impossibility of existence, or, the impossibility of the possibilities which understanding projects Dasein into. Since there is nothing beyond the possibility of death, it is called by Heidegger as the “ownmost potentiality-for-being”; it is “a possibility-of-being which Dasein itself has to take over in every case” (*BT*, 294). When examining “understanding” above, we claimed with Heidegger that the “for-the-sake-of-which” is the ultimate significance which signifies every other involvement relation but cannot be referred or assigned to anything else (*BT*, 120). In our example above, being a good father was the ultimate “for-the-sake-of-which”

under the guidance of which Dasein understands and determines the world and itself simultaneously.¹⁴² Now we come to see that the ultimate possibility which cannot be “outstripped” is the Dasein itself. Being a good father is the ultimate role by the performance of which the carpenter understands himself along with his world, and this continual (not occasional) self-determination which is unattainable proves the fact that his being is an issue for him. That in the face of which Dasein gets anxiety and that for the sake of which it exists are one and the same; it is nothing other than the authentic being of Dasein which is potentiality-for-being. But potentiality-for-being makes sense and discloses itself only insofar as Dasein has the possibility of owning up its *ownmost* potentiality-for-being which is death. Dasein’s being is primarily care-for-itself because it is being-towards-death; this means, it concerns the world circumspectively and concerns the others solicitously only so long as it exists for the sake of itself. In colloquial terms, *Dasein’s existence is such that its being is a task for it, and whether it could carry out the task or not is in principle undecidable up until its death.* On the other hand, this undecidability does not prevent the world from being meaningful; instead, it is the condition of possibility for any kind of significance.

If it is true that the *environmentality* or *equipmentality* of the world is the ontological ground upon which the *factuality* of nature as the totality of present-at-hand entities is constructed,¹⁴³ then it must be acknowledged that any understanding, including the

¹⁴² Every encounter with the world and its self of everyday, inauthentic Dasein is possible on grounds of the fact that Dasein is for the sake of itself. Dasein can be “alongside” the entities which are either ready-to-hand or present-at-hand just because of the fact that its ontological constitution is potentiality-for-being which cares for itself—i.e., is for the sake of itself): “Inauthentic *understanding* projects itself upon that which one can concern oneself, or upon what is feasible, urgent, or indispensable in our everyday business. But that which we concern ourselves [i.e., the ready-to-hand of circumspensive concern and the Dasein-with of solicitous concern] *is* as it is *for the sake of* that potentiality-for-being which cares [i.e., Dasein]” (*BT*, 386; italics and square brackets mine).

¹⁴³ “The phenomenal content of these ‘relations’ and ‘relata’—the ‘in-order-to’, the ‘for-the-sake-of’, and the ‘with-which’ of an involvement—is such that they resist any sort of mathematical

scientific cognition, is parasitic upon the ultimate for-the-sake-of-which. Even theoretical knowledge is dependent upon the self-determination or understanding of Dasein which is the only source for any comportment towards the world. On the other hand, understanding as an existentiale is nothing other than being capable of *making choices among possibilities*. Choosing a possibility means losing all the rest of the possibilities.¹⁴⁴ It can be contended that the mood of anxiety belongs to the ontological constitution of Dasein just because it is destined to choose, and hence, to lose. Had Dasein been immortal, losing, and therefore choosing would have been impossible. Choosing or understanding is ontologically grounded upon the death of the entity to whose being being-towards-death belongs. So, it should be contended that Dasein is burdened with making choices as it is destined to die. Rendering-meaningful by making choices, Dasein compensates the “lack” which is inherent to its being because of its mortality. Its ontological *capability*¹⁴⁵ of rendering-meaningful (or, understanding as an existentiale) is based on the fact that to its existential constitution

functionalization; nor are they merely something thought, first posited in an ‘act of thinking’. They are rather relationships in which concerned circumspection as such already dwells. This ‘system of relations’, as something constitutive for worldhood, is so far from volatilizing the being of the ready-to-hand within-the-world, that the worldhood of the world provides the basis on which such entities can for the first time be discovered as they are ‘substantially’ ‘in themselves’. And only if entities within-the-world can be encountered at all, is it possible, in the field of such entities, to make accessible what is just present-at-hand and no more” (BT, 121-122).

¹⁴⁴ Being mortal and being delivered over into possibilities and carrying the burden of choosing itself is included in the ontological constitution of Dasein. Richard Polt sets this point forth eloquently: “If there is an afterlife for us, and if we continue to be Dasein in the afterlife, then we will continue to be faced with death as a possibility, and the Beyond will be a *world*, in the Heideggerian sense. On the other hand, if we become truly immortal in the afterlife, and death is no longer a possibility for us at all, then we will have entered a radically different state of being and no longer be Dasein. An entity whose possibilities always have to remain open, who is guaranteed a future and is essentially impervious to death, is not Dasein. Such an entity would have a fundamentally different way of acting and understanding” (Polt 1999, 87).

¹⁴⁵ It should be borne in mind that the “capability” under question is not a faculty which Dasein *has*; instead, it is the existentiale which Dasein *is*. William Blattner’s useful distinction between the “ability characteristics” and “state characteristics” can be remembered here (for “understanding” see above).

the ontological tendency to balance its not-being-a-whole belongs. When related with the phenomenon of death, the meaning of transcendence can be examined in terms of this *predisposition of Dasein toward compensating its not-being-a-whole*. This is nothing but giving an existentialist hue to Husserl's theory of knowledge based on the schema of "empty intentions" / "fulfilling intuitions". We saw in the second chapter that Husserl refuses to examine the phenomenon of truth by means of correspondence between ideas and the states-of-affairs these ideas are expected to match. Instead, he conceives the truth as an endless process according to which empty expressions are fulfilled by partial intuitions. Expression is empty because the intuition which is expected to correspond it is never capable of giving the object as a whole. Put differently, what is meant in expression has always an "excess" when compared with the "fulfilling sense" of intuition which is always bound to be *partial* and *perspectival*. In a like manner, Heidegger writes in *Being and Time*:

With ripeness, the fruit *fulfills* itself. But is the death at which Dasein arrives, a fulfillment in this sense? With its death, Dasein has indeed 'fulfilled its course'. But in doing so, has it necessarily exhausted its specific possibilities? Rather, are not these precisely what gets taken away from Dasein? Even 'unfulfilled' Dasein ends. On the other hand, so little is it the case that Dasein comes to its ripeness only with death, that Dasein may well have passed its ripeness before the end. For the most part, Dasein ends in unfulfillment, or else by having disintegrated and been used up.

Ending does not necessarily mean fulfilling oneself. It thus becomes more urgent to ask *in what sense, if any, death must be conceived as the ending of Dasein* (BT, 288-289).

Even if it generally dies before fulfilling itself, fulfillment is a persistent issue whenever the death of Dasein is considered, because the life of Dasein is not a fact within-the-world; it is rather factual, that is to say, self-reflective and projective. *The factual life of Dasein is necessarily a life-project*; Dasein is being-towards-death just because of the fact that he projects its being toward possibilities from where it finds itself (*Befindlichkeit*) as thrown into. About the *meaning of life* the inauthentic Dasein

has always an idea, just because factual life of Dasein is always incomplete. Rendering the world meaningful, Dasein renders it *a whole*. It does so on grounds of the anxiety in the face of not-being-a-whole. Factual life of Dasein is incapable of fulfilling the sense Dasein gives to it during the idle talk, because it is always partial based on the fact that Dasein has not yet come to, but towards the end. If Dasein were incapable of detaching itself from the inauthentic mode of existence and the idle talk of the “they”, then it would be capable neither of choosing (or understanding) nor of dying. Only in the authentic mode Dasein can relate itself both to its being (*potentiality-for-being*) and to its death. If understanding is choosing, and choosing is possible only for the entity which is *underway to death*, then death must be that which makes meaning meaningful.

Dasein’s mode of being is transcendence, or, ex-istence, because it *is* for the sake of what it is *not yet* (the “lack”). Dasein *is* what it is *not yet* means its mode of being is “possibility” rather than “actuality”. In other terms, as the being to whose existential constitution something like *not-being-a-whole* belongs, Dasein is ontologically to be distinguished from the rest of the entities other than Dasein by the fact that it *is* the *striving-for-wholeness*. But Dasein’s wholeness is its death. In falling, death is primarily and for the most part disclosed in Dasein’s fleeing in the face of it. Dasein does so by referring to death as a natural event which will one day happen to everyone. By this move it happens to *disown* its own death, and disregards the fact that nobody can die instead of it; i.e., that no one can “*represent*” some other as long as death is considered (*BT*, 283-284). Only when it comes to realize that the death it has to die is its *own* death, Dasein *owns up* its authentic self which is potentiality-for-being (possibility, or, *Seinkönnen*), and not actuality (or, presence-at-hand, or *what-ness*). So, coming to realize it cannot be replaced by anyone else, Dasein gets “individualized” and passes into the authentic existence by cutting itself off from the idle talk of the “they”. That its ontological constitution cannot be examined in terms of *whatness* first

becomes clear to it. In authentic existence, it first become obvious that death, in spite of its unpredictability, is the most “certain” phenomenon and its certainty is beyond the certainty of logical validity and the certainty of the *cogito* which we have mentioned in the fourth chapter:

Holding death for true (death *is* just one’s own) shows another kind of certainty, and is more primordial than any certainty which relates to entities encountered within-the-world, or to formal objects; for it certain of being-in-the-world. As such, holding death for true does not demand just *one* definite kind of behavior of Dasein, but demand Dasein itself in the full authenticity of its existence. In anticipation Dasein can first make certain of its ownmost being in its totality—a totality which is not to be outstripped. Therefore the evidential character which belongs to the immediate givenness of experiences, of the “I”, or of consciousness, must necessarily lag behind the certainty which anticipation includes (*BT*, 309-310).

As we remember, for both Descartes and Husserl, the source of any truth is but the immediate givenness of one’s ego, or consciousness. According to them, ego or consciousness is the immediate being because it is present-at-hand there ready to be discovered by “reflection” without being mediated by anything else. We also remember that Heidegger criticizes both Descartes and Husserl for objectifying the “I” and falling short of asking the question of the mode of being of the subject. Now we see that “anticipation of death” is the source of truth of any kind and more certain than the certainty of the immediate being. It can be contended that “anticipation” as the act is opposed to by Heidegger to “reflection” of Descartes and Husserl in order to emphasize that Dasein’s death is not an object for it: “The ownmost, non-relational possibility, which is not to be outstripped [i.e., death], is *certain*. The way *to be* certain of it is determined by the kind of truth which corresponds to it (disclosedness)” (*BT*, 308). In authentic existence Dasein anticipates its death and through this anticipation the “there” is disclosed as the playground of being.

“Expecting” something and awaiting death are completely distinct phenomena, since death, as the pure possibility, gives Dasein nothing to be actualized. Expecting a

planned wedding, for example, is just “looking-away from the possible” (*BT*, 306) because something unpredictable may always intrude and spoil all the arrangements. However, from the ontical-existential perspective, Dasein is in principle capable of predicting all possible misfortunes and taking precautions. The only possibility it cannot take precautions against is death. Waiting for death has nothing to do with expecting the “actualization of a possibility”; as the pure possibility which cannot be outstripped—i.e., which does not present anything to be actualized—death is “anticipated”:

Being-towards-death is the anticipation of a potentiality-for-being of that kind of entity whose kind of being is anticipation itself. In the anticipatory revealing of this potentiality-for-being, Dasein discloses itself to itself as regards its uttermost possibility. But to project itself to its ownmost potentiality-for-being means to be able to understand itself in the being of the entity so revealed—namely, to exist. Anticipation turns out to be the possibility of understanding one’s *ownmost* and uttermost potentiality-for-being—that is to say, the possibility of *authentic existence* (*BT*, 307).

In anticipation, death becomes so certain that as the *pure possibility*, it cannot be prevented from happening by an actual event. In this sense death is, if we may say so, beyond the certainty supplied by the “causal laws of the universe”.¹⁴⁶ Possibility and actuality are the qualifications which can only be assigned to the natural phenomena subjected to the law of causality. For an actual natural event it can be said that it once was possible, and after becoming actual it gives way to some certain possible events

¹⁴⁶ “If we try to connect (or, worse still, to reduce) the possibility of dying to some *real* necessity produced by the operation of the causal laws in our universe, then we are once again on our way to depriving possibility of its quality of possibility by making it dependent on something foreign and external to it. If it is necessary that I die at some point given certain facts and laws of human biology then, by the same token, I will not die unless and until all the required conditions have actually taken place. But then I can anticipate (at least to some degree) when and why I am likely to die and I can make my plans accordingly. So if death is viewed as occurring due to a real necessity, then death is not always equally possible—and then its character of pure possibility is, once again, glossed over” (Hoffman 1993, 202).

according to the laws of nature. But after death there is “nothing”; it is the impossibility of all possibilities. Authentic existence gives Dasein the chance of realizing the fact that even the natural law is grounded upon the “there” which is opened up by the nihilating of “nothing” intrinsic to its ontological constitution which is being-towards-the-end. Anticipation and anxiety, as the two basic components of the care structure of Dasein, makes it certain that Dasein is not a natural entity among other intraworldly entities and it cannot be *defined* in terms of *whatness*. When authentic, Dasein first comes to recognize that as the “temporal” being, its ground is *no-thing*. Anticipation of death discloses “time” as the very meaning of the care structure of Dasein.

5.3. Temporality as the Meaning of Care

That Dasein is not the finished, self-enclosed substantial subject we hope to have shown above, when we, with Heidegger, tried to analyze its being in terms of care. Now our aim is to characterize time as the *horizon* upon which the care structure of Dasein opens itself up. We will try to argue that Dasein cannot be examined in terms of subjectivity but rather is the ground of it, since something like *self-revelment* is intrinsic to the ontological constitution of Dasein as the entity which is out-of-itself—i.e., originally transcendent.

Unfinishedness, incompleteness, or not-being-a-whole is the basic ontological trait by the help of which Dasein is characterized as being-towards-death, or being-towards-the-end. That Dasein is the entity whose essence is its existence means that, as the entity which exists *for the sake of being a whole*, Dasein is the *movement* from where it has been thrown into to its death. *Mobility* or *movement* is not an extra feature accrued to the essence of the substantial subject, since as the *self-mobilized* entity which is *striving towards being-a-whole*, Dasein is the ground of subjectivity. As long

as cognizing or perceiving (the world) is conceived to be the present-at-hand faculty mounted into the present-at-hand subject, then how this subject could mobilize itself in order to surpass the limits encircling its immanence and take a step into the transcendent outside remains to be a question. However, once it is realized that both perception and knowledge are derivative from the original *movement* belonging to Dasein as the entity which is *out-of-itself-towards-being-a-whole*, then the problem of transcendence would be solved. Nonetheless, with this huge shift of paradigm, there emerges a new question: If mobility is intrinsic to the basic ontological constitution of Dasein, then what will be the ontological status of time which we normally conceive as that by the help of which we *measure* the movement? Is it something outside of Dasein, or something intrinsic to it? If intrinsic, how is it so? These will be the questions we will try to answer in the following.

5.3.1. Ordinary Conception of Time

“Ordinary conception of time” is the characterization of time in terms of presence-at-hand. Both scientific and commonsensical approach to this most intimate phenomenon tend to characterize it as a being alongside beings. Whenever we say, in everyday language, that time passes by, we take it to be the entity alongside other entities within the world and evaluate it in terms of presence. If it is time itself which passes by, does this mean that time is the substantial something to which the property of being-in-motion attributed in this or that way? So long as this substance-attribute paradigm is stuck into, then the problem of transcendence shows up in a different guise, according to which how the static essence of time is to gain existence of its own—here, motion—recurs as the unsolvable difficulty.

Heidegger thinks that the source of the ordinary conception of time is but the definition Aristotle gives of it: “Time is what is counted in connection with motion which is experienced with respect to before and after”. Then he adds: “But what is thus counted

is unveiled as the *nows*. The *nows* themselves, however, can be expressed and understood only in the horizon of earlier and later” (*BPP*, 246). So, time *is* insofar as the *now*-points, which are inherent in it, are counted. That the *now*-points are not simultaneous, or not given all at once in a manner similar to space and spatial locations is the first feature which characterizes the ordinary time; it is “transient”, or it “passes”. The second distinguishing property belonging to the common conception of time is that it is “in the soul”, or subjective. The essence of time is to be conceived as the “internal consciousness” of time, since it is the subject who does the counting in a conscious manner. The third feature is that it is related with “sensibility” in contradistinction to thought. Whereas what is sensible is temporal, what pertains to thought is “atemporal”. Lastly, time is attributed to the this-worldly in opposition to “eternity” or “the heavenly” (*MFL*, 197). These four characteristics plus the Aristotelian definition makes up the essence of the ordinary conception of time.

Since “*nows*” which are counted in the passing through of time are the basic units making up the essence of the ordinary conception, this ordinary conception of time is also called by Heidegger as the “*now-time*”. According to this common conception, “before” and “after”, or earlier” and “later” with regard to which the *now*-points are counted first become comprehensible only as long as they are thought of as “no-longer-now” and “not-yet-now”, respectively; so, for *now-time*, it can be contended that “the *now*-relation is essential for understanding the past and the future” (*L*, 203).

The fundamental confusion belonging to the commonsensical understanding lies in the fact that it asks the questions “what is time?” and, say, “what is table?” in exactly the same manner. Whenever it thematizes time, it does so by representing it as a whole; a whole, which is given *all at once*. Objectification of time sets it forth as a complete phenomenon comprising of the past, present, and future. When time as a whole is brought into the *presence* of consciousness by means of objectification, the future and

past are melted into the now; otherwise, it would not be possible to claim that time can be thematized *as a whole*. The reduction of both past and future to the present, or, “now” can be claimed to be the other reason why Heidegger calls ordinary conception of time “now-time”: “for the ordinary understanding of time, time shows itself as a sequence of ‘nows’ which are *constantly present-at-hand, simultaneously* passing away and coming along. Time is understood as a succession, as a ‘flowing stream’ of ‘nows’, as the ‘course of time’” (BT, 474). The “passing away” of the past and the “coming along” of the future, since the time as a whole is represented at some certain point of time (i.e., “now”), must be “simultaneous” if time is to be objectified in the same manner as a table. It should therefore be acknowledged that the ordinary conception of time is *objectified time*, or, *represented time*. The main problem lies in the fact that the now-points are successive and not simultaneous. So, characterizing time by means of “successiveness” and unquestioningly objectifying it as a whole are two conflicting approaches; re-presenting time is *en-presenting* it, and making time present in this way spoils the essence of it. Therefore, it can be concluded, the ordinary conception of time is self contradictory.

The difficulty which we mentioned about the ordinary concept issues from the fact that the now-points are evaluated in terms of the *substantial units*, the totality of which makes up that which we normally objectify as time. When time is conjectured as the *sum total of substantial points* we call “now”, then the problem of transcendence becomes the issue again, for, in this case, how a substantial unit will be replaced by or added up to another will be the deadlock of inquiry. Nonetheless, Heidegger thinks that all these wrongheaded analyses can hardly be traced back to Aristotle’s examination of time. As a matter of fact, he contends, it was Bergson who misinterpreted the Aristotelian concept of time in terms of “a quantitative *succession* laid out in individual now-points” (L, 207). In *Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, when analyzing the Aristotelian conception of time, in order to emphasize how much

he owes to Aristotle, he writes as follows:

Time is not a manifold of nows thrust together, because at each now every other now already no longer is and because, as we saw earlier, a curious trenching out on both sides into non-being belongs to time. The now is not correlated as a point to a fixed point and it cannot belong to it in that way, because by its essential nature it is both beginning and end. In the now as such there is already present a reference to the no-longer and the not-yet. It has dimension within itself; it stretches out toward a not-yet and no-longer. The not-yet and no-longer are not patched onto the now as foreign but belong to its very content. Because of this *dimensional content* the *now* has within itself the *character of a transition*. The now as such is already in transit (*BPP*, 248).

So, time cannot be characterized as a chain of “fixed”, immobile now-points every one of which takes its place following that which comes before and previous to what comes next. Instead of fixed punctuality, “stretching out within itself” towards the “before” and “after” is better suited when it comes to defining the ontological status of the nows which are but the essence of time (*BPP*, 249). Heidegger seems here to think that, in a manner similar to Dasein’s being, the essence of time as well should be characterized as self-transcendence, or being-out-of-itself. If stabile, immobile punctuality is the index of in-itself-ness of the entity of which it is supposed to be attributed; and if in-itself-ness is the key term when it comes to defining substantiality; then the mode of being of the now-point should be acknowledged to be examined in terms of substantiality. Nevertheless, as long as substantiality is to be accounted for as the being of each individual now, so is *permanence*, because substance is that which remains the same during all change. On the other hand, since permanence is a temporal feature, it cannot be appealed to when examining the essence of time; because only as long as something like time and temporality is understood in advance, permanence can become a sensible concept. Hence, time cannot be characterized in terms of substantiality; it is not an entity within time. So, “the now is itself neither in motion nor at rest: it is not ‘in time’” (*ibid*). Motion is a characteristic of the entities which are in time, but not of the time itself. In Dahlstrom’s words, “the measurement of motion by motion is a way to “tell time”, but not, properly speaking, a definition of time itself

(Dahlstrom 2001, 361).

We occasionally repeated earlier that the basic motivation of Heidegger throughout his career is his opposition to what he calls “metaphysics of presence”. We saw above that he defines traditional ontology in this way because it is incapable of differentiating the being of beings from the entities; i.e., presence-at-hand, or, briefly, presence is the sole meaning which traditional ontology attributes to being as such (*Das Sein*). Now we are coming to realize that the ordinary conception of time is the understanding of time of the metaphysics of presence, because only the changing states of present-at-hand entities can be measured against the constant flow of the punctual now-points which are also present-at-hand. This is nothing other than measuring motion with some other motion—the standard, cyclic motion of sun, for example. Traditional metaphysics falls short of ontologically differentiating time itself from the motion of the intraworldly entities. In this sense, it inadvertently levels down the ontological status of time to that of the entities within the world; i.e., presence-at-hand. Any entity which is acknowledged *to be*, is present *now*; the understanding of being of traditional metaphysics is *actuality*, and something actual is said *to be in the moment*. Metaphysics of presence is incapable of distinguishing the meaning of the “being-in-time” of the now-points and the intraworldly beings, either:

The nows are indeed in a certain sense themselves in time, so far as they constitute time. But motion and moving thing are in time, not in the sense that they belong to time itself, but in the way in which what is counted is in number. The even and odd are in the numbers themselves, but what is counted is also, in a certain way, in the numbers that do the counting. As the counted is in number, so motion is in time. That which is in time, the moving thing. . . is embraced by the counting number. Time does not belongs to motion but *embraces* it. The intratemporality of a being means its *being embraced* by time (now) as number (counted). The factor of. . . being embraced stresses that time does not itself belong among the beings which are *in* time (*BPP*, 252).

This analysis of the Aristotelian conception of time shows that time is the ontological

condition for the beings with respect to their being in motion or rest. As a matter of fact, the essence of time can be explained in terms neither of motion, nor of succession. It is the other way around; ecstatical temporality of Dasein, as the ontological time, is the condition for every entity whether it is present-at-hand, or ready-to-hand. If this point is to be clarified enough, then it is necessary to scrutinize the relationship between time and Dasein.

5.3.2. World-Time

The analysis of world-time as the time of the ready-to-hand entities can be interpreted as the intermediary step from the ordinary conception of time to the ecstatic-horizonal temporality of Dasein.¹⁴⁷ In opposition to the common conception which we set forth above, world-time is the temporality of Dasein insofar as Dasein concerns itself circumspectively with the ready-to-hand entities within-the-world. The ordinary conception of time is distinguished from the world time in that, whereas the former implies the temporality of the objective world, the latter corresponds to that of the world as the significant whole of the equipmental items—which are manipulated without being thematized (*BPP*, 262). World-time is the time of Dasein as long as it comports itself towards the world in a practical, rather than a theoretical manner.¹⁴⁸

¹⁴⁷ As a matter of fact, Heidegger tries two opposing strategies when setting forth the ontological analysis of time. In *Being and Time*, he starts with the ecstatic-horizonal temporality of Dasein (or, care) and ends up with the ordinary conception of time. We preferred the other strategy which has been followed in *Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, and tried to analyze the ordinary conception first. This approach has the advantage of letting the reader see the dead ends in the common conception and supplies him the reasons to dig deeper to arrive at the original phenomenon. We appealed to the same method when we have trying to set forth the Heideggerian analyses of truth (see Chapter 3).

¹⁴⁸ Philip Turetzky sets forth the main idea of Heidegger's conception of world-time in an eloquent fashion as follows: "We comport ourselves toward time in practical orientations. We concern ourselves, for example, with how much time a task takes or how much time remains to do something. Although we do not focus our concern on time, we must reckon with time in order to accomplish tasks. Dasein's primary comportment toward time, then, is to use time in guiding its actions" (Turetzky 1998, 186).

If temporality makes up the primordial meaning of Dasein's being, and if moreover this entity is one for which, in its being, *this very being* is an *issue*, then care must use 'time' and therefore must reckon with 'time'. 'Time reckoning' is developed by Dasein's temporality. The 'time' which is experienced in such reckoning is that phenomenal aspect of temporality which is closest to us. Out of it arises the ordinary everyday understanding of time. And this understanding evolves into the traditional conception of time (*BT*, 278).

"Time-reckoning", which is first introduced in the inaugural 45th section to the second division of *Being and Time*, is the key term when analyzing the world-time as the condition of possibility of the ordinary conception of time. In fact, the phrase "time-reckoning" can be read in opposition to the verb "counting" which takes place in the Aristotelian definition of time according to which "time is what is *counted* in motion". Heidegger's emphasis here is focused on the fact that as opposed to the time of, say, natural sciences, the world time is not *counted* but is to be *reckoned with* as long as Dasein's routine dealings with the environmental entities within the world are considered. As the entity which is being-in-the-world, Dasein is alongside the entities ready-to-hand, absorbed by them. Dealing with the equipmental items which make up a significant whole is not an accidental feature accrued to the substantial essence of Dasein, but the very meaning of the being-in of being-in-the-world. In these dealings Dasein does not additionally thematize time and count it, but rather makes plans, uses some item of equipment to carry out some work, communicates with other people, etc. and does all these with an *implicit* and *non-thematic reference* to time. Indeed, when Dasein looks at the clock, it does so neither with the motivation of ascertaining what the clock it uses looks like, nor with the bare curiosity of learning what time it is. Rather, it uses the clock in order to learn how much time there still is before the end of the boring lecture, how much time it still has before yielding the exam paper, etc.

In ascertaining the time, I am trying to find out how much time there is *till this or that point* so that I may see that I have enough time, so much time, *in order to* finish the subject. I make inquiry of the clock with the aim of determining how much time I still have *to* do this or that. The time I am trying to determine is always "time to", time *in order to* this or that, time that I need *for*, time that I can permit myself *in order to*

accomplish this or that, time that I must take *for* carrying through this or that. Looking at clock roots *in* and springs *out* of a ‘taking time’” (*BPP*, 258).

As we saw earlier, “in-order-to”, “for-that-purpose”, “for-the-sake-of” or “to-that-end” are the assignment relations by the help of which the items in equipmental contexts are let involved in the work that is to be carried out. Now Heidegger claims that primarily and for the most part time is not an object within the world that is objectified by Dasein *for its own sake*, but is appealed to with reference to tasks and targets whose fulfillment is the sole concern of Dasein. Before being a present-at-hand entity within-the-world, time as “time-in-order-to” is the condition for the fact that something like world can show up as the holistic and meaningful context it is. “Taking time” or “time-reckoning” is not an action which Dasein occasionally chooses to commit itself into; rather, every kind of dealing or coping with the environmental world has its condition of possibility in referring to the world-time. Since the relations we mentioned above makes the world significant, we must acknowledge that the first important characteristic of the world-time as “time-in-order-to” is “significance” (*BT*, 467).

When we say “now”, we do not address the entity to which the name “now” is thought to correspond. Now or time is not an extant entity which can be referred to by a simple word (*BPP*, 259). The expression “now” always refers beyond itself and alludes to an event or happening in the world which *matters* of Dasein. The same holds for the futural term “then” and the retrospective expression “at the time”. Neither the one nor the other addresses the extant part of an extant time which is free from the events that are conceived to be filling it as an empty form. Whenever Dasein comports itself circumspectively towards the world, whenever it thinks, communicates with others, makes decisions, etc, it does so with a tacit reference to time by means of these indexes of temporality—i.e., “now”, “then” and “at the time”. In Husserlian terminology, the time indexes are *experienced without being objectified*. Hence, every “now” is “*now, when such and such*”, every “then” is “*then, when*”, and every “at the time” means “*at*

the time when” (BPP, 262). “Datability” is the second feature which belongs to the essence of world-time, and this is so not because something like calendar is part of the daily life of Dasein: “The date itself does not need to be calendrical in the narrower sense. The calendar date is only one particular mode of everyday dating” (*ibid*). Since theoretical observation of the present-at-hand is parasitic upon the circumspective concern with the significant whole of ready-to-hand, “counting” time by means of calendars is derivative from the “time-reckoning”. The fact that Dasein’s taking its time is more primordial than its counting time shows itself in the datability of the world-time.

According to the third distinguishing characteristic belonging to the world-time, the “now” can never be understood as a punctual unit, but as a “span” (BPP, 263). That which is referred to is a happening in the world which matters to Dasein, and this happening takes place in a *period of time*, rather than in a dimensionless moment. When someone says “Now I am studying”, this means that “during” a certain amount of time which started before now, the person is occupied with something and continues to do so “until then”. Every “now”, “then”, and “at-the-time” has the character of duration; each of these time indexes implicitly refer to a “*meanwhile*”. Time is not comprised of the punctual now-points; it is rather the case that the “nows” are stretched-out towards a before and an after:

Not only does the ‘during’ have a span; but every ‘now’, ‘then’, and ‘on that former occasion’ has, with its datability-structure, its own spanned character, with the width of the span varying: ‘now’—in the intermission, while one is eating, in the evening, in summer; ‘then’—at breakfast, when one is taking a climb, and so forth (BT, 462).

Lastly, the fourth feature attributed to the world-time is “publicness”. Time is public, because the meaning of “now” is shared and understood by everyone, no matter different persons date different events with it. However, the “objectivity” of time is not the reason, but the consequence of what Heidegger calls publicness (BPP, 264).

Whereas objective time is related with the ordinary conception of the extant time, publicness of the world-time is thought to be stemming from the fact that to Dasein's ontological constitution something like being-with-others belongs. In *Being and Time*, Heidegger writes about the publicness of the world-time as follows:

The 'now' which anyone expresses is always said in the publicness of being-in-the-world with one another. Thus the time which any Dasein has currently interpreted and expressed has as such already been *given a public character* on the basis of that Dasein's ecstatic being-in-the-world. In so far, then, as everyday concern understands itself in terms of the 'world' of its concern and takes its 'time', it does not know this 'time' *as its own*, but concernfully *utilizes* the time which 'there is' [*es gibt*]¹⁴⁹—the time with which "*they*" reckon. Indeed the publicness of 'time' is all the more compelling, the more *explicitly* factual Dasein *concerns* itself with time in specifically taking it into its reckoning (*BT*, 463-464).

Looking at the clock is not an accidental act which Dasein performs only on occasion; it must rather be acknowledged that Dasein's factual life as a whole is comprised of "taking its time" because its coping with the world which has already been pre-articulated and pre-interpreted by the average understanding of the public—i.e., the "they"—is not free from reckoning with time. Dasein gives responses to some certain situations which it finds itself in, it pursues to accomplish some goals, it communicates with others about the daily issues, etc.; briefly, its factual life or its being-absorbed-by-the-world means none other than interpretively attuning itself of Dasein against the changing situations presented to it by the world in which it finds itself. However, time-reckoning is not an exterior act which accidentally incorporated with the everyday coping-with-the-world of Dasein. Dasein's "regulating itself *according to* time" is but its referring to "now"¹⁴⁹ and every now-saying discloses the world-time in its significance, datability, spannedness, and publicness (*BT*, 469). Put briefly, Dasein's

¹⁴⁹ David Wood summarizes this point lucidly as follows: "Heidegger presses forward his demonstration that our use of simple temporal words has a built-in worldly significance" (Wood 1989, 239).

being-in-the-world is essentially temporal.¹⁵⁰

5.3.3. Temporality of Dasein as the Ground of Subjectivity

Setting forth the world-time as the condition of possibility for the ordinary conception of time is not enough for Heidegger, because the main target is to display the ecstatic temporality as the horizon upon which the care structure of Dasein discloses itself. The temporal analysis of the threefold ontological structure of care—disposition, understanding, and falling—can be compared to Kant’s schematization of the categories as the attempt to reinterpret them in temporal terms. In this sense, a strong parallelism can be established between Kant’s *Critique of Pure Reason* and Heidegger’s *Being and Time*.¹⁵¹ In the first division of *Being and Time* Heidegger phenomenologically displays the basic ontological structure of Dasein in terms of what he calls *existentials*. From the opening sections on, it is on several occasions strongly emphasized that an existential is not a category, because it is not a concept or notion which is conceived to be applied to the present-at-hand things or processes within the world. In other words, existentials are not the descriptive concepts the totality of which makes up the *whatness* or *quiddity* of Dasein. As long as the motto “Dasein’s essence is its existence” guides the existential analysis, it should be emphasized that the ontological traits of Dasein are characterized in terms of its *how-being*.¹⁵² . When

¹⁵⁰ “[T]his significance structure that we are drawn [T] into is nothing other than the world itself. This public world-time is not something in the world, but part of it, it belongs to it. Perhaps the relation could be summed up like this: concern structures the world and is rooted in temporality, and the temporal way it structures the world appears as time” (Wood 1989, 240).

¹⁵¹ This parallelism between Kant and Heidegger has already been examined in the previous chapter.

¹⁵² “All *explicata* to which the analytic of Dasein gives rise are obtained by considering Dasein’s existence-structure. Because Dasein’s characters of being are defined in terms of existentiality, we call them “*existentialia*”. These are to be sharply distinguished from what we call “*categories*”—characteristics of being for entities whose character is not that of Dasein” (*BT*, 70). Theodore Kisiel also emphasizes this point with the following words: “In contrast to the traditional metaphysical categories,

Dasein's mode of being is claimed to be presence-at-hand, then the temporality of Dasein must be acknowledged to be actuality; in this case, Dasein is proved *to be*, only if it is squeezed in a now-point. The reason why Descartes insists upon the fact that the presence-at-hand of the ego is verified as long as it thinks is that the Cartesian understanding of being is presence and its corresponding conception of time is the now-time of the common sense. Kantian and Husserlian solution to the obvious shortcoming of the Cartesian conception of self imprisoned in a dimensionless now-point is the "synthesis of time". According to them, something like consciousness can be possible only as long as the momentary parts of it can be held together by a synthesis which is essential for it. Heidegger's suggestion, on the other hand, is that, since the care structure of Dasein implies the self-transcendence of this entity, the temporality of it should be conceived to be "*the primordial 'outside of itself' in and for itself*" (BT, 377). This is to say that the primordial time of Dasein—i.e., temporality—is outside-of-itself inasmuch as Dasein is self-transcendent. Heidegger therefore calls "the phenomena of the future, the character of having been, and the present, the 'ecstases' of temporality. Temporality is not, prior to this, an entity which thus emerges from *itself*; its essence is a process of temporalizing in the unity of the ecstases" (*ibid*). Ecstatic unity of temporality is the essence of time and hence is the ground upon which something like the ordinary conception of time is established.

The essence-existence duality is not a genuine problem that is to be solved for the Heideggerian existential analysis of Dasein, since Dasein is the entity whose essence is its existence. As we saw in the previous chapters, what Heidegger charges Descartes,

the existentials highlight the 'how' of the execution of life rather than the 'what' of its contents. The aim to conceptualize the human being in the performance of his being as it is lived forward rather than after the fact" (Kisiel 2010, 103). If we are allowed to make a small contribution, we can claim that the existentials are more like the *adverbs* rather than the *adjectives*, because what they qualify is not an actual entity which is extant, but existence or possibility (that is, Dasein as the *performance* of the understanding of being).

Kant, and Husserl with is the fact that they have characterized the essence of human beings in terms of *whatness*, or “essentia”. Cartesian *cogito*, Kantian transcendental subject, and Husserlian transcendental consciousness all suffer from the dilemma which is given way to by the *temporal existence/atemporal essence* duality. For these three philosophers, the subjectivity is either a substance which can naturally be observed by means of reflection—*cogito* of Descartes—or, the self-enclosed realm of immanence which constitutes the empirical world and at the same time can be an object of transcendental investigation—transcendental subject of Kant and transcendental consciousness of Husserl. The subject must be objectified in order to be investigated in terms of its what-ness (or, essence). For anything, to be objectified means to be brought into the *presence* of consciousness as the extant entity which is “finished in *its own self*” (*BPP*, 113). Only the entity which consumed all the possibilities of its own and became completed can be objectified and investigated in terms of quiddity. However, where there is no possibility, there is no temporality. The mode of being of the extant (or, present-at-hand) entity is actuality. Whereas the subject, as the entity which is objectified and defined, is to be analyzed in terms of presence-at-hand, Dasein, as the entity which is potentiality-for-being, must be characterized in terms of possibility:

[E]ssentia and existentia belong to every being. It is in no way proved and immediately evident that this thesis holds good for *every* being. This question becomes decidable only if it is established beforehand that every being is actual—that the realm of beings actually extant coincides with that of beings generally, that being coincides with actuality, and that every being is constituted by means of whatness (*BPP*, 111).

Dasein is the entity which is beyond beings (*Seiende*) toward being (*Sein*); that is, it has in every case an average understanding of being. Understanding of being is the very meaning of the transcendence of Dasein by means of which Dasein surpasses the actuality of things and becomes a pure possibility in its essence. Rather than being an actual entity among other extant things within the world, Dasein *is* what it does, it

exists by pressing forward into the possibilities. Its *self* which Dasein is *for the sake of* is not present-at-hand; instead, Dasein is always on the way towards itself and hence, cannot be a theoretical object for itself. Temporality belongs to Dasein's existential constitution because it is the entity which is being-towards-the-end, and hence, *unfinished*:

We have already intimated that Dasein has a pre-ontological being as its ontical constitutive state. Dasein *is* in such a way to be something which understands something like being. Keeping this interconnection firmly in mind, we shall show that whenever Dasein tacitly understands and interprets something like being, it does so with *time* as its standpoint. Time must be brought to light—and genuinely conceived—as the horizon for all understanding of being and for any way of interpreting it. In order for us to discern this, *time* needs to be *explicated primordially as the horizon for the understanding of being, and in terms of temporality as the being of Dasein, which understands being* (BT, 39).

Every entity within the world can *be* only as long as its meaning of being, which is not an entity, is disclosed beforehand. A table, a book, or a pencil is extant; but extantness, as the mode of being of these beings is not an entity like them. In a practical context, these same entities are ready-to-hand; likewise, readiness-to-hand, as the meaning of being of them, is not an entity within the world, either. But the source of the meaning of being is Dasein's capacity to understand the copula "is". This ontological understanding of being has two characteristics which distinguishes it from the existentiell understanding of the entities or events within the world: (1) It is not at the disposal of Dasein, and (2) it is not occasional. That is to say, existential understanding is not a *faculty* of the present-at-hand subject; rather, this understanding *happens* to Dasein without Dasein's willfully occupying itself with it; i.e., understanding of being is not a matter of *decision* on the side of Dasein. But if Dasein is the entity to whose ontological essence something like understanding of being belongs, then it cannot be present-at-hand among other entities; instead, its mode of being is *existence*. Existence, as "standing-out-of-itself", is the very sense of Dasein's transcendence. As the entity which understands being, Dasein is not a *finished* entity but underway to

itself. In this sense, something like *being-in-motion* happens to belong to the existential structure of Dasein. This *ontological mobility* is nothing other than the temporality of Dasein, by means of which Dasein is said to *exist* as originally transcendent towards the world. Dasein is not *in* time as the other extant entities; nor is time present-at-hand in Dasein. Namely, neither Dasein nor temporality is extant. It is rather the case that existence of Dasein is *temporal*; temporality is that “upon which” the care structure of Dasein is unfolded (*BT*, 371).

Temporality makes possible the unity of existence [understanding], facticity [disposition], and falling, and in this way constitutes primordially the structure of care. The items of care have not been pieced together cumulatively any more than temporality itself has been put together ‘in the course of time’ . . . out of the future, the having been, and the present. Temporality ‘is’ not an *entity* at all. It is not, but it *temporalizes* itself (*BT*, 376-377; square brackets mine).

Heidegger’s aim here is to compel the reader to reconsider the relation between time and Dasein. As we saw above, Dasein is existentially characterized as *thrown-projection*. The meaning of care or transcendence of Dasein is that it is always beyond itself towards the ultimate “for-the-sake-of-which” and it projects itself “towards a *potentiality-for-being for the sake of which*” it exists (*BT*, 381). Dasein’s factual life is lived in such a way that some certain ultimate possibility which Dasein is *not-yet* always guides it. Dasein exists *understandingly*, because as the being which is unfinished (being-towards-death), it already is *what it is not yet*. In this sense, says Heidegger, “Dasein understands itself by way of its ownmost capacity to be, of which it is expectant. In thus comporting toward its ownmost peculiar capacity to be, *it is ahead of itself*” (*BPP*, 265).

Dasein is “ahead-of-itself”, because the ultimate possibility, death, is certain and the sole ground upon which something like “meaningfulness” can be established. Since for the significance of its factual life Dasein owes to its mortality, its “not-yet” (or, death) is always already incorporated to its being. As we saw above, when compared with the

social roles (or, the *possibilities* to choose) which Dasein finds itself absorbed into, the possibility of death is the *authentic possibility* (or, Dasein's ownmost potentiality; unactualizable possibility).¹⁵³ Therefore, it can be claimed, Dasein is being-ahead-of-itself because to its ontological constitution something like being-towards-death belongs. This is to say, only the entity which is capable of dying can be self-transcendent, or being-ahead-of-itself. The "itself" of "being-ahead-of-itself" is nothing but the "they-self" in whose average understanding the mode of Dasein's being, like everything else in the world, is conceived to be actuality or presence-at-hand. It is only by means of "anticipation" of death that Dasein first exists authentically and owns up its ownmost self which is none other than possibility. So, being-ahead-of-itself, the individualized Dasein "comes back to itself" from the "they-self" of the public world:

Expecting [or, "anticipating"] a possibility, I come from this possibility toward that which I myself am. The Dasein, expecting its ability to be, *comes toward itself*. In this coming-toward-itself, expectant of a possibility, the Dasein is *futural* in an original sense. This coming-toward-oneself from one's most peculiar possibility, a coming-toward which is implicit in the Dasein's existence and of which all expecting is a specific mode, is the *primary concept of the future*. This existential concept of the future is the presupposition for the common concept of the future in the sense of the not-yet-now (*BPP*, 265; square brackets mine).

Inasmuch as future is conjectured as a point on the timeline which follows the now-point; as long as it is conceived to be the not-yet-now of the ordinary conception of time which comes after the now, it must be at least *as actual as "now"*. The

¹⁵³ Only the entity whose being is an issue for it can be possible. Of the actual entities within the world, it should be said that they are finished, completed, or extant, because their being is a matter of indifference for them. They are not ahead-of-themselves: "[O]ntologically, being towards one's ownmost potentiality for being means that in each case Dasein is already *ahead* of itself [ihm selbst . . . *vorweg*] in its being. Dasein is always 'beyond itself' ["über sich hinaus"], not as a way of behaving towards other entities which it is *not*, but as being towards the potentiality-for-being which it is itself. This structure of being, which belongs to the essential 'is an issue', we shall denote as Dasein's '*being-ahead-of-itself*'" (*BT*, 236).

commonsense, although not intentionally, understands the now and the future as *simultaneous*, because the schematization of time by means of the timeline is nothing but a spatial configuration. The original phenomenon of the future is rather the pure possibility that cannot be actualized towards which Dasein is always already underway. Dasein is the entity which cannot be defined in terms a *whatness*; therefore it is always *beyond* actuality or extantness and this is the very meaning of its “being-ahead-of-itself”.

Authentic futurity cannot be grasped in terms of the mental states of the purposeful Dasein because it cannot be represented. The represented future cannot be distinguished from the “present” (*Gegenwart*) qualitatively, so of the planned prospects of human beings, it must be said that they are as actual as the things in the world. This is to say that, Dasein owes its futurity not above all to the fact that it makes plans, weights possibilities, prepares itself for the forthcoming events, etc. It is much rather the case that all these conscious activities—or, existentiell possibilities—are grounded on *the existential possibility of Dasein*¹⁵⁴ which is ontologically characterized as ex-sistence, transcendence, out-of-itself-ness, or, “non-identity” (Raffoul 1998, 141). Being self-transcendent, Dasein is being-ahead-of-itself and this implies that it is not identical with itself.

On the other hand, Dasein’s being as care does not solely consist of understanding. As we told above, he finds itself in a world to which it is thrown and hence, it exists moodwise. Namely, givenness of the world to Dasein precedes Dasein’s objectifying it; the pre-given world as the dwelling of Dasein is part of Dasein’s ontological constitution as being-in-the-world, so, is experienced above all in a pre-objective

¹⁵⁴ “The existential possibility of Dasein” can be interpreted here as “the existential possibility which Dasein is”. The *existentiell* possibilities which are the concrete possibilities that can be represented by human beings should be distinguished from the potentiality-for-being of Dasein.

manner which can be called *being-absorbed-of-Dasein by its world*. In this sense, “existentiality is essentially determined by facticity”, because projecting itself into possibilities of Dasein is mutually conditioned¹⁵⁵ by its being attuned to the world to which it has been thrown. Dasein does not choose the world and its identity to which it has been delivered over, but every choice and every attempt of self-determination takes its start from there. In this sense, something like “already-being-in-a-world” must be said to be incorporated to the existential constitution of Dasein by means of which it can be better apprehended that Dasein is *thrown-projection*. Dasein projects itself towards the possibilities from where it has been thrown into, therefore, it is “*ahead-of-itself-already-being-in-a-world*” (BT, 236). The past of Dasein is not a present-at-hand part of a present-at-hand time which is *no longer*; instead, it continues to be effective on Dasein’s existence during the factual life of Dasein.¹⁵⁶ Regarding this, Heidegger emphasizes that Dasein “constantly *is as having been*” (BT, 390). The temporal phenomenon “being-already-in-a-world” is the primordial meaning of what we

¹⁵⁵ The conditioning relation between the past and the future is indeed mutual. One’s future projections also affects the way one interprets his past, just as much as the past determines in advance one’s expectations from the future: “Not that the past is over and done with, a ‘given’ with which we are confronted or which determines what we are. We understand the past through a projection of future with certain concerns, and hence our understanding of our ‘already-having-been’ changes as our understanding of ourselves changes. What matters about the past depends on what matters about the future (White 2005, 99).

¹⁵⁶ The past is not a “past episode” in Dasein’s life. What Heidegger calls *Gewesenheit* cannot be explained in terms of some certain now-point on the timeline which has passed, is no-longer, or is “bygone”. Like the authentic future, it cannot be conceived by means of “now”, if its originality is to be appreciated enough: “So, it becomes clear that the sense in which care is temporal is exotic, to say the least. Existence and projection is not futural by aiming itself at a possible future state of the self, and facticity or disposition is not past by revealing historical episodes or states. They are futural and past, rather, in a *non-successive sense*. They make sense in terms of a future that *never will come to be present* and a past that *never was present*” (Blattner 2005, 315; italics mine). Therefore, inasmuch as the future is not the object of *expectation*, past is not the correlate of *remembrance*. “Retention” or “repetition” of the authentic past and “anticipation” of the ownmost possibility of Dasein cannot be comprehended in terms of the ordinary conception of time as the sum total of the sequence of isolated now-points.

ordinarily call “past” (*Gewesenheit*).

The primary uncoveredness of the world for Dasein is possible only if Dasein is already attuned to it by means of moods. That in the face of which Dasein has a disposition of this or that kind is not an object for Dasein. Dwelling in the world moodwise, or, finding itself in it of Dasein (*Befindlichkeit*) is more primordial than any perceiving, or cognizing the world. Seen from the perspective of the authentic having-been (past), it can better be comprehended why Heidegger claims that his conception of transcendence is a more original phenomenon than Husserl’s intentionality. The cognitive, perceptual toward-ness of intentional consciousness is parasitic upon the originary transcendence of existence, because existence pertains to self-understanding of Dasein by means of projection and such an ontological understanding can never be conceived as free from the moods as we told above. The world to which Dasein is familiar and by which it is absorbed is already disclosed to Dasein, primarily not because of the spatial containment of Dasein in the world. Rather, Dasein’s being-in-the-world is possible only insofar as it is *already* attuned to the world, and this *being-already-attuned* (or, “disposition”) is the authentic having-been of Dasein.

We already know from what we told above that *anxiety* is the primary mood by the means of which Dasein authentically anticipates its death in a manner in which it first realizes the correlation between the significance of the world and mortality: “Anxiety arises out of being-in-the-world as thrown being-towards-death” (*BT*, 395). Dasein is the entity whose being is an issue for it—i.e., it is for the sake of itself. In other words, the mode of being of Dasein is care because its being matters to it. This “mattering-to-itself” of Dasein shows up in the guise of *anticipation* and *anxiety* the totality of which makes Dasein the self-transcendent entity it is. That Dasein *ex-ists* in opposition to the present-at-hand things within the world means that it is the *movement of projection* towards its ownmost potentiality, and this authentic movement is but the *anticipation*

of death. This is the very sense of Dasein's existence, understanding, or futurity as in the form of being-ahead-of-itself. In this sense Dasein *is* what it *is becoming*. On the other hand, seen from the perspective of the authentic having-been, Dasein is anxious in the face of itself, because the ground of its being to which it is thrown is no-thing. In anxiety, the world loses the significance it has and sinks into meaninglessness, because the for-the-sake-of-which dissolves into no-thing—namely, to pure possibility, or, Dasein's most authentic ability-to-be (*Seinkönnen*):

In particular, that in the face of which one has anxiety is not encountered as something definite with which one can concern oneself; the threatening does not come from what is ready-to-hand or present-at-hand, but rather from the fact that neither of these 'says' anything any longer. Environmental entities no longer have any involvement. The world in which I exist has sunk into insignificance; and the world which is thus disclosed is one in which entities can be freed only in the character of having no involvement. Anxiety is anxious in the face of "nothing" of the world (*BT*, 393).

If Dasein's being-for-the-sake-of-itself, as we saw earlier, is the main building stone of the world, then every understanding of the world is the self-understanding of Dasein. When we were setting forth the Heideggerian conception of truth, we have stated that unless the world is already meaningful, or, significant, it cannot be understood in any way at all. In other words, something like bare *factuality*—i.e., the totality of the things which are present-at-hand, or, "nature—can neither be explained, nor cognized or understood. Perception is ontologically preceded by interpretation, because everything *is* only so long as having a "meaningful presence", where "meaning is that wherein the intelligibility of something maintains itself" (*BT*, 193). So, every understanding has as its ground a "fore-structure of understanding" (*BT*, 191). This is to say that, Dasein understands the world just because it has always already a fore-conception about it and itself as being-in-the-world. In this sense, whenever the understanding projects Dasein upon possibilities, this "projection upon future presupposes a retrojection into the past as a necessary condition. The primordial phenomenon and the primordial concept of the *forth-coming* [being-ahead-of-itself] presupposes coming-back to Dasein's having-

been-ness” (Chernyakov 2002, 192). Even “retaining” or “forgetting” the historical pre-understanding is possible on the grounds of the authentic having-been of Dasein which is efficacious as long as Dasein is in-a-world. As we reiterated many times before, Dasein is anxious in the face of its not being a thing; now we claim that it is anxious in the face of the ontological fact that there is no such a thing as “bare presence”; even extantness and presence-at-hand is meaning which is correlated the with the understanding of being. So, understanding or knowing does not have the *factual ground of evidence*; namely, what is *meant cannot be verified by what is extant*. In every understanding, a pre-understanding is “repeated” and Dasein “comes-back-to-itself” from what it tries to apprehend; “repetition” is the temporal meaning of the disposition of anxiety which is the authentic past of Dasein:

[S]ince the Dasein always comports itself more or less explicitly toward a specific capacity-to-be of its own self, since the Dasein always comes-toward-itself from out of a possibility of itself, it therewith also always *comes-back-to* what it has been. Having-been-ness, the past in the existential sense, belongs with equal originality to the future in the original (existential) sense. In one with the future and the present, [the past as] having-been-ness first makes existence possible (*BPP*, 266).

So Dasein’s being, as thrown-projection, is unfolded upon a temporal horizon comprising of an ebb and flow movement between the authentic having-been and authentic future. In addition to these, the “present” (*Gegenwart*), as the third of the three ecstases, still needs to be explained. Whereas the authentic future pertains to understanding and having-been to disposition, the “present” is the meaning of the third structural item of care; namely, “falling” (*BT*, 396-397). When concerning itself circumspectively with the ready-to-hand entities for the sake of fulfilling the role by which it determines itself, Dasein does not come upon the item of equipment first of all as an isolated thing. Rather, the work-world as a whole which Dasein is thrown into should have already been discovered beforehand, in order that some certain equipment can be used for this or that purpose (*BT*, 403-404). Whereas being-already-disclosed-ness of the work-world (or, being-already-in-the-world of Dasein) can be interpreted in

terms of the temporal ecstasis of having-been, the for-the-sake-of-which provides the horizon for the futural ecstasis. Interpreted in terms of the original temporality of Dasein, to be involved in the work-world or to be assigned an in-order-to relation, an item of equipment which is ready-to-hand need not be thematized as an object.

Letting something be involved is implied in the simplest handling of an item of equipment. That which we let it be involved in has the character of a “towards-which” [or, for-which]; with regard to this, the equipment is either usable or in use. The understanding of the “towards-which”—that is, the understanding of what the equipment is involved in—has the temporal structure of awaiting. In awaiting the “towards-which”, concern can at the same time come back by itself to the sort of thing in which it is involved. The *awaiting* of what is involved in, and—together with this awaiting—the *retaining* of that which is thus involved, make possible in its ecstatic unity the specifically manipulative way in which equipment is made present (*BT*, 404).

As we told above, readiness-to-hand is a more primordial way to be for the intraworldly entities when compared with the presence-at-hand. A piece of equipment becomes encounterable as it is in itself only whilst it is handed and directly used. Hammering is called by Heidegger the “in-order-to” of this equipmental thing, and “towards-which” is the work to be carried out. The “in-order-to” is said to be involved in the “towards-which”. In committing itself to the work at hand, Dasein *awaits* the “towards-which” and this is the inauthentic futurity of Dasein. But this everyday futurity is grounded on the authentic futural ecstasis which is given way by the ontological fact that Dasein is for the sake of itself as the being-towards-death. Dasein is capable of awaiting something, because anticipation of death belongs to its existential constitution. In other words, Dasein is the teleological being it is, because ontologically, it is the entity which is towards-its-ownmost-potentiality-for-being. Dasein projects itself towards the possibilities in its concerned dealings with the ready-to-hand items on grounds of the fact that the work-world is disclosed as a whole just from the beginning. The “retention” of the world as a whole and projection towards the future (“awaiting”) mutually condition each other; they are equiprimordial phenomena. Dasein’s “making-present” of the ready-to-hand entities within the world

neither precedes, nor follows the other two ecstases of originary temporality (i.e., awaiting and retaining) because originary temporality is not successive. Successiveness is a feature attributed to the ordinary conception of time, since it is comprised of the isolated now-points. So, it is not the case that Dasein first comes against the isolated items, learn how to use them one by one, and finally manipulate them for this or that purpose. Instead, awaiting and retaining is equiprimordial with making-present, since Dasein “is always also absorbed in the world of its concern” (*BT*, 236-237). Being absorbed in the world of its concern, Dasein falls into the world of the “they” in which the average understanding of being is based on presence-at-hand. The ecstasis of present is dependent upon falling, because the “they” levels down the mode of being of all the entities within the world to “presence”.

By the ecstatical unity of anticipation, retention, and making-present, Heidegger shows that the care structure of Dasein can be mapped onto the original temporality. “The formally existential totality of Dasein’s structural whole [namely, “care”] must therefore be grasped in the following structure: the being of Dasein means ahead-of-itself-being-already-in- (the world) as being-alongside (entities encountered within-the-world)” (*BT*, 237; square brackets, mine).

The irreducibility of the ecstatical temporality of Dasein as the most original conception of time to the now-time of the commonsensical understanding testifies to the fact Dasein is not an extant entity among the other extant entities within-the-world (*innerweltlich*). Ordinary conception of time, as the time of the present-at-hand things, is an abstraction from the world-time of the readiness-to-hand by means of the cancellation of “datability” and “significance”. It is not datable because it can *be* by itself without referring to the worldly events subjected to the human interests; instead, it can be counted, is “enumerable” (Dahlstrom 2001, 380). Besides, it is insignificant, as it is cut off from the “in-order-to” relations which are the ontologically

distinguishing mark of equipmental items; it is neither the “time until such and such”, nor the “time someone has in order to do such and such”. When Dasein “takes its time”, “reckons with time”, it is not the ordinary conception of time which temporalizes itself, but the world-time. The ordinary conception of time is *infinitely expanded* on both sides of the timeline, because significance of the worldly events which Dasein concerns itself with is missing. It is always the, say, five interminable minutes until the end of the boring lecture to which Dasein concernfully directs itself to, not the isolated set of infinitely many nows.¹⁵⁷

On the other hand, world-time is an abstraction from the ecstatical temporality of Dasein, because readiness-to-hand is only a mode of being among other possible modes—like presence-at-hand—all of which are to be evaluated as the offshoots of the structural totality of Dasein, which is care.¹⁵⁸ World-time is “significant” only if Dasein is, with regard to its ontological constitution, “anticipation”; the in-order-to relations are interrelated as to make up the holistic structure *world* only so long as understanding projects Dasein into possibilities. World-time is “spanned” only because factual Dasein is thrown into a world which it “retains” as a whole in order that it becomes capable of encountering the things therein individually. World-time is “datable”, for Dasein is “falling” into the world of its concern which it makes present. And lastly, the “now” of world-time is understood by everyone in the same manner however diversely it is dated by each individual—so, is “public”—only if the now-point is ecstatic; i.e., out-of-itself.

¹⁵⁷ “[I]t is not so much eight o’clock as it is a hangover and the arrival of the shipments that mark the same time for worker and foreman respectively” (Dahlstrom 2001, 366ff).

¹⁵⁸ So, when comparing the world-time with the ecstatical temporality, Blattner writes: “The structural unity of the ecstases of the temporality of circumspective concern is parasitic upon the unity of originary temporality. . . . We can recognize phenomenologically that the now experienced in engaged everyday practice is part of a larger whole, the whole that is the care-structure of Dasein” (Blattner 2005, 321).

In a nutshell, the ecstatic temporality, as the originary conception of time is the authentic time from which both world-time and ordinary conception of time are derived. In its original sense, time is the *meaning* of Dasein's being, not one of the cognitive faculties of it as Kant conceived it to be. But the meaning of Dasein's being, since Dasein is not a present-at-hand entity among others, does not accrued to it as another extant entity, albeit ideal. Dasein's essence is its existence, and existence is self-transcendence; transcendence is here to be interpreted as the *movement of transcending*, rather than a nominalization. If the essence of Dasein is the movement of surpassing-itself towards the possibilities (or, projecting), then the meaning of its being may very well be interpreted as the static *ἀρχή* which manages, forms, and directs the original motion of Dasein. Back in the 1922 short lecture on the "Phenomenological Interpretations in Connection with Aristotle", Heidegger takes note of the fact that the ancient philosopher used the term "definition" in connection with the meaning of motion: "Aristotle comes across the problem of *ὀρισμός* [definition], i.e., the simple explicative definition of an object in the what of its beingness. The object in question here is that phenomenon of motion which Aristotle wishes to explicate" (PIA, 142). Nevertheless, attributing a metaphysical definition as in the form of an immobile principle (and mostly, ideal) to Dasein is to characterize it in terms of the *atemporal essence/temporal existence* duality. But this is exactly what Heidegger does not want to do. So, the "definition" of man of traditional metaphysics turns out to be the "horizon" of ecstatical temporality upon which the care structure of Dasein as the original disclosure, unfolds itself: "That toward which each ecstasis is intrinsically open in a specific way we call the *horizon* of ecstasis" (BPP, 267). Whereas the traditional definition of man is *arche-standing-behind*, the definition of Dasein is the *upon-which* of the unfolding itself of originary transcendence; that is, Dasein.

5.4. Spanning the Gap

The early work of Heidegger, with the centrality of its notions of world and of concerned, non-objectifying and non-thematizing dealings with things, already struck a mighty blow at the idea of an isolated monadic consciousness trying to bridge a gap between its inner sphere of consciousness and the so-called “outside” world, whose ontological status would have to be *secured*. Dasein as being-in-the-world is already “outside” among beings, already dwelling in a realm of sense, understanding itself out of possibilities already projected as its world (Innis 2010, 123).

The quoted passage is an excellent summary regarding the transformation of the epistemological problem of how human beings can be related to the world into the ontological problem of the original transcendence of Dasein which is being-in-the-world. The gap between world and the subject is not bridged, but transferred to somewhere else in the hands of Heidegger. The destination of the transference in question is the deeper ontological ground of being as such, in whose light the possibility of interpreting the being of humans beyond the paradigm of presence-at-hand first becomes feasible. As a matter of fact, though, where Heidegger invites us to, we, to begin with, come to realize that the gap between the subject and the object has never been opened up; it is rather the “ontological difference” between beings and their being that must be interrogated in the first place, if the ontological ground upon which the *pseudo*-rift between *res cogitans* and *res extensa*, the empirical being and the transcendental conditions of possibility of them, the transcendent world and the immanent consciousness is to be discovered. In the leeway of the *happening* of the ontological difference, we can detect the reasons why the epistemological problem of transcendence in the guise of the question of objectivity has since the beginning of modernity occupied the great thinkers of the West. With Heidegger, we learn to watch the play put on the stage of Western metaphysics by the prominent philosophers of the tradition as a tragedy consisting of the quasi answers to the wrongly formulated questions based on the obstinate prejudice of understanding the being-ness of beings in terms of constant presence.

Presence-at-hand or extantness is the mode of being which has held sway upon the metaphysical thinking of the West for over two thousand years, no matter what it is attributed to are the material or ideal beings. Even real things in the Platonic sense like propositions, the occurrent ones as events, and the relations themselves are extant, so long as they are the possible objects of sciences which take them into account in terms of quiddity or what-ness. Keeping all these in view, such a question like this must be asked: So long as the mode of being of “relations” are conceived in terms of extantness (or, presence) how would the problem of transcendence be solved? It seems to be the case that a substance cannot be related with another substance unless a third substance in the guise of “relation” is posited between them. However, this helps intriguing and deferring problem rather than solving it. There cannot be a “gap” between two substances because for at least there to be *two* substances, these substances must be able to be related with each other with regard to their quantity, countability. The subject cannot be thought of as detached from the world which it really is related to, so it must ontologically not be conceived in terms of what-ness, or substantiality. Therefore, thinks Heidegger, Dasein is not the isolated subject which is cut off from the world. The difference, or gap, should be thought to be opened up not between the substantial entities, but between the entities and their being. The issue to be clarified is not the *side-by-side-ness* of the subject and world, but rather the ontological constitution of Dasein as the entity which, by means of the understanding of being, is always already in-a-world: “*The being-present-at-hand-together of the physical and the psychical is completely different ontically and ontologically from the phenomenon of being-in-the-world*” (BT, 248).

Seen from another, albeit similar, perspective, problem of transcendence can be reformulated as follows: How can a being, whose essence is predetermined by *static* substantiality, can be mobilized to such an extent that it becomes capable of relating itself with its outside? We touched upon this problem, when we mentioned above the

rift between immobile essence as in the form of what-ness, and existence as the mobility of the essence. Asked in this way, the problem of transcendence remains once again unanswered, because something like “motion” cannot be derived from the world which is “present-at-hand-together” of the static essences. “Presence” in the phrase “presence-at-hand” temporally implies “actuality”, because according to the traditional ontological view, something *is* only as long as it *is now*. Hence, for the entities which are present-at-hand, the time is dimensionless because it is stuffed in a punctual now. Unless the subject is liberated from the now-point into which it was once squeezed, it can neither have an existence, nor can relate itself to the world. Heidegger’s conception of Dasein as being-in-the-world is the entity to whose ontological constitution something like *existential mobility* belongs. In Thomas Sheehan’s words, when compared with the linear now-time of the common conception, temporality “is the much more original movement constitutive human existence, the movement whereby the domain of intelligibility is opened up” (Sheehan 2010, xvii).

Nominalization of the word “movement” implies the empirical conception of motion which is nothing other than the generalization from the observations of the movement of physical bodies that are congruent with the natural laws of the empirical world. In opposition to the empirical conception, ontological motion which time *is* does not bring to mind an immobile essence which is capable of moving. That is to say, movement *is not*; only the *enactment* is. In a similar manner, temporality of Dasein *temporalizes itself* in opposition to the now-time which is extant. Passing is traditionally conceived to be an accident attributed to the substance which Heidegger calls ordinary time; namely, linear time as the succession of nows *is* (extant) before it *passes*. Put differently, being-extant of the flowing time is ontologically more primordial than the *flowing* which time *is*. Contrary to this common conception, this is the way William James and Henry Bergson sets forth the phenomenon of time. According to them, time as the condition of subjective experience is the pure flow and

not something present-at-hand. The stretch of nows which Bergson calls “dureé” precedes the time which is given *wholesale* as the sum total of punctual nows. Taking departure from such a subjectivistic conception of time, Bergson and James ends up in a position which has its hardships in deriving objective experience from the solipsistic consciousness of time as the lived time (dureé) of an individual. The *Lebensphilosophie* of the foregoing thinkers is exactly not the philosophical position which can be ascribed to Heidegger, either. Heidegger can be said to be after a more primordial standpoint, the one which is exactly beyond static being and pure becoming.

According to Heidegger, neither the time of the vulgar understanding, nor the time of life philosophy as the pure flow of experience can be said to temporalize itself. Unless the paradigm comprising of the substantial subject as the inner realm of experiences vis-à-vis the externalized objective world is abandoned, both being and becoming falls short in explaining the essence of the relation between human beings and time. Heidegger’s conception of Dasein as the self-transcendent entity towards the possibilities cannot be examined in terms of self-identity. The existential constitution of the “there” of Da-sein which is the *topos of original truth as disclosedness* is secured only so long as the continual movement of *giving-way-to-each-other* of disposition, understanding, and falling is maintained. The ontological constitution of Dasein cannot be examined in terms of presence, because presence is only one ecstasis in the threefold unity of the ecstatic-horizontal constitution of the originary temporality as the temporality of care. It should therefore be claimed instead, that Dasein is present only because it makes-present when falling, which itself is possible only with the understanding and disposition. Indeed, anything in the world including Dasein itself *can be present*, only if Dasein projects itself to its ultimate for-the-sake-of-which from where it is thrown into.

Ontologically conceived, the movement of being which *happens* on the playground first opened up by the significant topos which Heidegger calls Da-sein, is the movement between presence and absence. With respect to its care structure, since Dasein is *thrown-projection*, it is what it is *no-longer* and what it is *not-yet*. This is to say, the *absentiality* of Dasein (or, the “no-thing”) is composed of the authentic past and authentic future as the two ekstases of the estatic-horizonal temporality. Falling is the state of Dasein which it owes to its projective and factual character. In falling, when absorbed by the average ontological understanding of the “they”, Dasein, together with the entities in the world, is perceived in terms of static presence and becomes “subject”. So, stabilizing itself in terms of “subjectivity”, depriving itself of the “there” which is the leeway of the ontological movement of being, is just an outcome of its total structure which Heidegger calls care (*Sorge*). That is to say, whereas the static-substantial essence of subjectivity can be explained in terms of care, the care structure cannot be clarified ontologically in terms of static presence. In this sense, it must be admitted that Dasein is the ontological condition for something like subjectivity, and it is not the other way around.

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION

The present study has been written with the motivation of taking a critical stance towards the prevailing manner of philosophizing in which the remnants of Cartesianism are still alive even today. The prominent feature of what we have conceptualized as Cartesianism throughout the work at hand is the obstinate insensibility to thinking the “ontological difference” between the entities and their being. We are convinced with Heidegger that ignoring the task of thinking the ontological difference opens the way to the termination of philosophy. Contemplating the difference is nothing but philosophizing about being as such (*Sein als solches*). Nonetheless, since being cannot be objectified as a being, it should be interrogated by means of the only entity which understands being. The entity to whose essence something like understanding of being belongs is Dasein. Therefore, to analyze Dasein in terms of its existential structure is nothing but to think the ontological difference, which is the only duty for the ones who purport to philosophize. However, since the inauguration of the modern era up until now, man has always been understood in terms of subjectivity. Subjectivity has from the beginning been the concept which stands for the essence of human beings beyond the thick layer of which it could never be dug enough until Heidegger. The widespread resistance to overtake the task of ontological questioning has its roots in the infancy of the modern era of Western philosophy, because the transference of the idea of substantiality to the ontological constitution of

subjectivity, and the consequential centralization of the subject runs into this period. Substantiality, since it is one of the unanalyzable concepts, covered up the possibility of asking the question of man in an adequate manner, although it *seemingly* defined it in its ontological core. The fundamental analysis of the very essence of man remained intact under this adamant stratum of substantiality which brings about the essence of it. Dasein of human beings, as the underlying structure or ontological ground of subjectivity could have never been asked adequately, let alone answered.

Regarding the story briefly summarized above, the aim of the present dissertation has been decided as clarifying this ground which Heidegger calls Dasein in an extensive work by reviewing the oeuvre of early Heidegger and gathering together the prominent analyses of him in one single study. Throughout the work at hand, we have been under the impression that, contrary to the contention of the Heidegger of *Being and Time*, it is not the question of being as such which gives way to the question of man; rather, it is the set of a bunch of problems which were evoked by the understanding of man in terms of subjectivity which gives urgency to the reappropriation the question of being as such. On the other hand, the complaint about the abandonment of the ancient question to forgetfulness in the opening pages of the early Heidegger's final work *Being and Time* gives the impression that the route to be followed takes its departure from the *Seinsfrage*. Nonetheless, after a couple of pages, it is announced by the author that the ontological question will be tried to be answered on a relatively concrete basis and the question of man, or Dasein is brought to the agenda as in the form of "fundamental ontology". Apart from its being the only entity which has an understanding of being, Heidegger does not need to supply any further reasons which convince the reader of the fact that the question of being is to be approached by means of the fundamental ontology as the springboard. Only after a comprehensive examination of the works which preceded the publication of *Being and Time* can the reader come to an understanding that some certain impasse in the metaphysics of

subjectivity may have compelled Heidegger to take the question of being into account. The impasse at issue is nothing other than the unbridgability of the so-called “gap” between the substantial subject and the substantial object.

Far from being a historical fact, this approach we seem to have adopted is just a trajectory that may or may not be preferred by everyone. Alternatively, indeed, a completely non-subjectivistic route could have been taken and the nuances of the only question of philosophy could have been scrutinized under the guidance of the philosopher’s interpretations of the ancient metaphysics. However, this would not be the best way when it is remembered that Heidegger is the philosopher who has prospered on the native land of philosophy upon which, at his time, the logical debate about the status of truth and knowledge held sway between the psychologists, on the one side, and neo-Kantianism and phenomenology, on the other. Both neo-Kantianism and phenomenology are the epistemological standpoints which owe their *raison d’être* to the subjectivistic metaphysics of Kant. As soon as the young Heidegger’s close connections with both of these giant philosophical currents are appreciated enough, it can very well be concluded that the newly blossoming philosophical interests of him must have been fashioned by the dominant subjectivism of the time.

So, regarding all that was said above, this study has been decided to be prepared in order to show that (1) Dasein, as the leeway of the unfolding itself of being, is the ground of subjectivity, and (2) reading *Being and Time* under the supervision of the previous works may be helpful, because the strategy of following Heidegger’s deconstructive reading of the history of the metaphysics of the subject can provide the reader with a well prepared receipt on the way to comprehending the reasons which motivated the question of being.

In order to accomplish the foregoing task, we have in the second chapter tried to depict a picture of Heidegger who took his departure from the pinnacle of modern subjectivist

tradition, which is none other than the phenomenological breakthrough of Husserl. Under the supervision of his mentor, Heidegger may have had a chance to come across the most arduous problems in the most complex format, because Husserl, as the champion of the tenet of intentionality, represents the tradition's most nuanced apprehension of subjectivity. For the Husserlian phenomenology, indeed, it can be claimed that what has provided the deepest insights on the way to the incisive solutions has also given way to the toughest hardships. "Intentionality" and "categorical intuition" along with the later conception of "phenomenological reduction" are the main apparatus which helps Husserl finding an innovative method to examine the subjectivity of the subject, which is called phenomenology. Whereas intentionality, as the "directed-ness" of consciousness to the world, sets forth the impossibility of characterizing the subject in terms of self-enclosed substantiality, or in-itself-ness, categorical intuition helps us understand the fact that the source of the logical/categorical forms is neither objectivity nor subjectivity. Kant's thesis that "being is not a real predicate" is the common concern for both Husserl and Heidegger. That "being" is not a property among many which can be attributed to the objects is approved by both of the thinkers. According to Heidegger, Husserl's important contribution to the Kantian thesis is that, as well as not being an objective predicate, "being" cannot be ascribed to the immanent realm of pure thought, either. In the eyes of the father of phenomenology, the categorical forms, including "being", must be deployed *between the subjective and the objective realms*; they are "world-constituting". The doctrine of categorical intuition overlaps the conception of intentionality, because, unless the logical/categorical forms are the belongings of the substantial subject, the being-on-handness of the latter means nothing. It can be claimed that the originality attributed to Heidegger stems from the fact that he managed to locate himself in a position beyond realism and idealism, and he could do so first of all by the inspiration of the Husserlian conceptions of intentionality and categorical intuition.

Nevertheless, as we have tried to explore in the second part of the second chapter, the subsequently adopted apparatus of Husserl which is nothing other than the so-called “phenomenological reduction” puts him back on a Cartesian route in the eyes of Heidegger. In a manner similar to Kant’s “step-back” in the second edition of the first *Critique*, Husserl renounces the scarcely invaded land of “the intentional” which is the realm of the *in-between*, and feels himself under the obligation of setting forth the pure consciousness as the “pure being”. According to Heidegger, transferring the outer object into the immanent sphere of consciousness will not help, if the “gap” between the subject and the object is still maintained: “Husserl saves the object, but by situating it in the immanence of consciousness” (ZS, 70). This is not eliminating subjectivity in its substantiality, but improving it. Subject becomes the “structure” which is the combination of conscious acts (noesis) and the related objective content (noema). But this relatively more complex structure is itself still the possible object of a science; i.e., phenomenology as the “science of sciences”.

This picture which is hoped to have been set forth at the end of the third chapter is just half of the story, as long as the intellectual background of Heidegger as the philosopher of being is considered. To complete the picture, his radicalization of transcendental phenomenology into the phenomenological ontology must have been examined. This is what we did in the third chapter. Since radicalization of subjectivity means nothing other than to reexamine it in terms of its relation to its world, the problem of truth and transcendence has been chosen as the main themes, the preparatory analyses of which opens for us the path which ends up in Heidegger’s famous conception of *in-der-Welt-Sein* (being-in-the-world). However, before we embarked upon the task at hand, we needed to underscore the importance §7 of *Being and Time* which may very well be evaluated as the heart of the book. According to us, the addressee of the seventh section in which the analyses of both *phenomenon* and *logos* as the constituent parts of the word “phenomenology” carried out is no one other

than Husserl. In this section, Husserl, although his name is not mentioned, is charged with violating the principle once formulated by himself: "To the things themselves!" Heidegger thinks that the thing-itself of phenomenology is at the same time the "phenomenological conception of phenomenology" as in the form of "self-manifest" on whose basis every kind of appearing first becomes possible. We tried to show that the self-manifest is nothing other than being as such (*Sein als solches*) which unfolds itself only on the "disclosedness" of factual being-in-the-world of Dasein itself. The primary aim of ours in this chapter was to defend the thesis that neither the world, nor Dasein can become manifest *in terms* of the other. It is rather the case that the originary phenomenon of phenomenology is the unity consisting of the world and Dasein; the unity which Heidegger calls being-in-the-world. If Dasein, as being-in-the-world, is devoid of any factual ground of evidence which makes the correspondence theory of truth true, then being must have been interfused with truth as the "disclosedness" of Dasein which is being-in-the-world. Dasein is the entity which is in continual contact with the environmental entities, so the intraworldly entities are always already discovered by Dasein in a pre-predicative manner. So, rather than propositions, the primary locus of truth is Dasein, and the correctness of propositions is grounded upon the "clearing" as the originary disclosedness of being-in-the-world. Therefore, rather than bridging the epitemic gap between the extant subject and the extant world, the primary question of philosophy must be formulated as follows: Under what historical conditions and as a consequence of what conceptual movements did the man, as the subject, separated from the world in which he dwells?

With the foregoing question in mind, the fourth chapter of the dissertation was so organized that both Descartes and Kant, as the champions of the metaphysical tradition of subjectivity, have been examined within the framework opened up by Heidegger's interest in them. We preferred to belate this historical part that long, instead of designating it as the opening chapter, because it was the philosophical progress

registered on the side of Heidegger, not of Descartes and Kant, which was of utter importance for our interests. So, with Descartes' *cogito*, we somehow sustained the main theme of the former chapter, and tried to set forth the fact that formal logic is deficient when it comes to the "self-certainty" as the *intuitional ground* of subjectivity. What Heidegger praises as the originality of Descartes is the latter's refusal to submit the evidence supplied by the *cogito sum* to the logical ground of inference. However, what is more important than the innovation of the *cogito* argument in Heidegger's eyes is the ontological blindness Descartes displays right in the face of the discovery belonging to him. Because of the Scholastic baggage along with the recent tendency of the so-called "mathematization" of the world, Descartes gets stuck in the substance metaphysics, and jumps hastily into the conclusion that there must be a bearer of thinking, if there really is thinking at all. According to Heidegger, this is nothing but to ignore the timeliness of the subject and this ignorance Descartes owes to the ontological framework predetermined by atemporal substantiality. In the "Paralogisms of Pure Reason", it is Kant who first draws attention to this problem in Cartesian metaphysics, and by his conception of "synthesis" he succeeds to some extent in emphasizing the temporal aspect of human cognition. But he also recoils in front of his discovery like Descartes did, and instead of underscoring much more the temporality of cognitive synthesis, prefers to put forward the "transcendental unity of apperception" as the essence of subjectivity. If Kant were open minded enough to see the consequences of his findings in the "Schematism" chapter, contends Heidegger, Kant could avoid to be entrapped by the metaphysics of subjectivity—which is exactly what he wishes to, indeed—and discover Dasein as the existential ground of subjectivity.

Although both of Heidegger's most extensive works on Kant were published after the publication of *Being and Time*, it could still be contended that the culmination of his doctrine of temporality takes place in his magnum opus, which is but the horizontal

temporality upon which the care structure of Dasein is unfolded. The 1925 lecture course *Logic: The Question of Truth* may testify to the fact that the Kantian conception of time has been one of the most important issues which occupied Heidegger, the development of which may be thought of as ending up in the ecstatic-horizonal temporality of *Being and Time*. Hence, keeping all these in mind, we thought it would be appropriate to append the last chapter on the care structure and temporality of Dasein to the end of the preceding chapter which closes with the thematic of time. In this concluding chapter, we tried to lay bare the threefold care structure which makes up the essence of Dasein together with the schematization of this structure upon the originary time of Dasein. Our aim was to make the reader convinced of the fact that before being cognitive subjects isolated from the environing world, human beings are the worldly entities all along. The mattering of the world with which they are familiar plus the mattering of their selves to themselves makes it possible for human beings to-be-in-a-world as Daseins. Contrary to God, Dasein is the finite entity because neither the world, nor its self is given to it all at once; namely, absolutely. To claim that the basic ontological core of Dasein is care (*Sorge*) is to contend that its existential constitution consists of the *everlasting striving for overcoming its finitude*. Both “anticipation” as the essence of existence (or, “understanding”) and “retention” as the essence of disposition (or, anxiety), which are the moments of the care structure, may be interpreted in terms of Dasein’s ceaseless battle with the finitude of (its) being. This is to say, to Dasein’s finite essence, something like combating with this finitude and, in a manner reminiscent of the Kantian synthesis, struggling for gathering itself together (“synthesis”) belongs. Heidegger’s conception of ecstatic temporality can be understood as ontological counterpart of Kantian schematism as the synthesis of time. Seen from the perspective of future, Dasein, by means of anticipation of its death, is the endeavor to compensate the “lack” presented to it by the “not-yet”. On the other hand, from the perspective of having-been, Dasein compensates the “lack” issuing

from the “no-longer” by means of “retention” or “repetition” of the possibilities of the past. Temporalizing itself of this twofold structure occasions the “making-present” as the ecstasis of third moment of the care structure, “falling”. Care as the ontological structure of Dasein is not the sum total of its parts understanding, disposition and falling. Likewise, the original temporality of Dasein does not consist of the accruing to one another of the past, present and future. Both the moments of the total structure of care and the ecstases of time *are* as long as they open up, or, unfold onto each other; namely, a moment or an ecstasis cannot *be* all by itself. As the originally transcendent entity, Dasein *is not*, but *ex-ists*; likewise, temporality of Dasein *is not*, but temporalizes itself.

Early Heidegger’s phenomenological ontology can be evaluated as the deconstructive attempt of returning the Western metaphysics of subjectivity back to its origin where the ancient question of “being as such” is the only question of philosophy. During this period the genesis of any philosophical questioning can be traced back to the question of man, because man is the only being who can understand something like being. In this period, the philosopher seems to be content with the fact that the unfolding-itself of being is possible only as long as Dasein of human beings projects this possible understanding towards the world for the sake of holding open the *topos* of significance (“disclosedness”, or, “there” of Da-sein) in which entities can be meaningfully present in the first place. “Mathematical projection of nature” is an example which Heidegger appeals to in order to emphasize the fact that it does not only represent a “paradigm shift” from the Aristotelian to Galileian way of carrying out scientific research, but an ontological transformation according to which the meaning of being of the entities in the world has changed. Understanding of being is something we *live in*, and not a theoretical activity. In fact, science and theory are embedded in being-in-the-world, or, are the modes of existence of factual Dasein. If this is so, philosophy (metaphysics) as phenomenological ontology can be in the service of neither theory, nor science.

Therefore, investigating the existential constitution of Dasein which is the ground of the subject is a totally independent enterprise; i.e., it is not bound up with the *epistemological ideal*, insofar as epistemological ideal is conceived to be the ultimate aim of any intellectual activity.

The prevailing concern for fixing the “human nature” in terms of its cognitive capabilities is strongly related with the *ideal of technical-scientific progress* as the ultimate for-the-sake-of-which of the self-understanding of the modern man. Since the beginning of modern philosophy, the ancient saying “Know thyself” has taken a new form and become something like “Know yourself, so that you can know the world”. So, the modern subjectivist tradition in the history of philosophy can be read as the expression of the basic motivation of man which is nothing other than technical-scientific progress and invasion of nature by means of knowledge. However, seen from the Heideggerian perspective, it is exactly this concern for “certitude” and “progress” which prevents human beings from thinking over the authentic meaning of “knowing-something”. If the metaphysics of subjectivity, as in the form of epistemology, is assumed to be a cognitive activity among others, then it, as the science of knowledge, becomes the intellectual occupation which presupposes what it investigates. Existential analysis of Dasein, as the fundamental ontological substitute of the metaphysics of subjectivity does not try to *know* Dasein by means of the ontological concepts (categories) because the mode of being of Dasein cannot be examined in terms of static presence, or self-identity. Insofar as Dasein is admitted to be the entity which is self-transcendent (non-identical), the method of investigating its basic existential constitution cannot be modeled on a subject-object schema. This is to say, trying to acquire the transcendental knowledge of Dasein is not to reduce its total structure to a couple of present-at-hand properties which are supposed to make up its immutable essence. Dasein is finite, first of all because the understanding of being which it itself *is*, is the only source to which it appeals to, whenever it attempts to define itself in this

or that way. Put differently, Dasein is the entity which is in need of its own preconceptions in order to understand itself. Understanding-itself belongs to the existential constitution of Dasein, before being a theoretical activity ascribed to the indifferent subject detached from the world. The factual life of Dasein is self-reflective; i.e., Dasein exists understandingly. The Kantian claim that metaphysics belongs to the human nature should be interpreted in this way.

Heidegger claims that the existential analysis of Dasein as the laying of the foundation of the metaphysics of subjectivity is a hermeneutical enterprise, because trying to understand the entity to whose ontological constitution something like understanding (of being) belongs is a circular attempt. The circularity in fact stems from the ontological constitution of Dasein itself; i.e., its not being a *thing*. The existential analysis is hermeneutical in that the ontological features attributed to Dasein are “equiprimordial” and does not make sense when they are taken into examination all by themselves; they make up a *whole* in which every part is meaningful so long as it refers to the others. The “existentials” are not the ontological concepts (categories) to which the subject as the *sum total of its properties* comes to correspond. Instead, they are the “formal indicators” (*formale Anzeige*) the reciprocal-referring-to-each-other of which gives the hermeneutical hue to the phenomenological ontology of early Heidegger. If the authentic meaning of metaphysics is conceived as to be consisting of the foregoing hermeneutical aspect, it could better be understood why Heidegger defends the view that philosophy (or, metaphysics of being as in the form of existential analytic) has nothing to do with epistemology.

Lastly, it could be stated that the ontological enterprise of Heidegger is totally free from the scientific idea of *progress*, because it emanates exactly where the understanding of being of the sciences (i.e., “presence”) is questioned, rather than presupposed. Heidegger is the philosopher of what has long been forgotten (being). If

that about which it is tried to be made progress is what is *actual*, or *popular*, then he is the one who overtakes the burden of *conserving* what is left behind, which his metaphysical essence has saddled on him.

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APPENDIX A

TEZ FOTOKOPİSİ İZİN FORMU

ENSTİTÜ

Fen Bilimleri Enstitüsü	<input type="checkbox"/>
Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Uygulamalı Matematik Enstitüsü	<input type="checkbox"/>
Enformatik Enstitüsü	<input type="checkbox"/>
Deniz Bilimleri Enstitüsü	<input type="checkbox"/>

YAZARIN

Soyadı : Günok
Adı : Emrah
Bölümü : Felsefe

TEZİN ADI (İngilizce) : Spanning the Gap: Heidegger's Solution to the Problem of Transcendence and His Critique of Modern Subjectivity

TEZİN TÜRÜ : Yüksek Lisans Doktora

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TEZİN KÜTÜPHANEYE TESLİM TARİHİ:

APPENDIX B

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PUBLICATIONS

Günok, E., “Heidegger Felsefesi bir Özne Felsefesi midir?”, *Baykuş Felsefe Yazıları Dergisi*, Sayı: 7, ss. 43-58, Temmuz 2011.

TRANSLATIONS

Fichte, J.G., “Seçme Mektuplar”, *Alman İdealizmi I: Fichte*, çev. Emrah Günok, haz. Eyüp Ali Kılıçaslan, Güçlü Ateşoğlu, ss. 330-360, Ankara: Doğu Batı Yayınları, Şubat 2006.

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APPENDIX C

TURKISH SUMMARY

Eldeki tezin yazılış amacı, varlığın vuku bulduğu merci olarak Dasein'in, tüm yapma- etme ve bilmelerin faili olarak özne kategorisini öncelediğini; onun ontolojik koşulu olduğunu göstermektir. Bu bir bakıma, her tür insan ediminin daha geniş bir bağlamda tekrar tekrar sorunsallaştırılabileceğini, her daim yeniden anlaşılabilceğini savlayan tarihselci bakış açısının görelileştirici iddialarını yansıtmaktan öteye gitmiyormuş gibi görünebilir. Ne var ki maksadımız, mutlaklık iddiası taşıyan epistemolojik doğruluk teorisini tarihsel anlam kategorisi ile ikâme etmekten ibaret değildir. Heidegger'in 1927 tarihli büyük eseri *Varlık ve Zaman*'ı temel alan bu çalışma, daha çok modern felsefenin ortaya koymuş olduğu öznel/epistemolojik zemini önceleyen varoluşsal/ontolojik bir temele vurgu yapmayı hedeflemekte; insan-dünya ikiliğini mümkün kılan orijinal birliğe dikkat çekmeyi amaçlamaktadır. Söz konusu birlik, kendini ilk olarak dünya-da-olma olarak gösteren Dasein'dan başkası değildir. Gündelik varoluşu içinde Dasein, her tür bilme, algılama ve anlamanın ötesinde ve öncesinde, zaten ve hal-i hazırda dünyaya dönüklüğü ifade eden bir kavramsallaştırmaya karşılık gelmektedir. Dünyanın verililiği, insanın o dünyayı nesne haline getirmesinden öncedir ve hatta bu nesneleştirmenin koşuludur. Teorik tutum olarak adlandırılabilcek olan yaklaşımın temelini meydana getiren ve özne- nesne dikotomisine yaslanan bakış açısı, insanın dünyadaki varoluşunu, dünyaya karşı konumlanışını ontolojik bir tarzda betimlemeye yetecek donanımı sağlamaya muktedir

olmaktan uzaktır.

Heidegger tarafından dünya-da-olma (*In der Welt Sein; being-in-the-world*) terimleri ile ele alınan orijinal birlik, özne-nesne de dâhil olmak üzere, felsefe tarihi boyunca üretilmiş her türlü ikiliğe kaynaklık teşkil etmektedir. Sözkonusu dikotomik düşünme alışkanlığının kökenini görmek için ise eski Yunan düşüncesine uzanmak ve buradaki asıl-görünüm (kopya) ayırımına gözetmek yeterli olacaktır. İçinde yaşadığımız değişken dünyanın aslını teşkil etmekte olan sabit ideler âlemi; ya da değişen görünülerinin sabit kalan, değişmeyen taşıyıcısı olarak töz (*subjectum, hypokymenon*) fikri, modern felsefede kendisini özne olarak ortaya koyacak olan temel ontolojik kategorinin düşünsel arka planını meydana getirmektedir. Değişken görünüm ile mevzubahis görünümün görünümü olduğu şey arasında kurulmuş olduğu varsayılan bağın mesnetsizliğini ifşa etmek; bu sayede de dünya ile bağı bakımından ele alınan özne sorunsalını varlık sorusu ışığında yeniden gündeme getirmek, tezimizde ele almayı vadettiğimiz sorunun çözümüne katkıda bulunmak açısından elzemdir. Kendisi başlı başına töz olan düşünce ya da bilincin ayrı bir töz olarak dünyaya nasıl çıktığını soruşturmakta olan epistemoloji tabanlı felsefe yapma biçimlerinin ontolojik kaynağa rücu etmesini sağlamak, ancak ve ancak yirminci yüzyıl başlarında Heidegger fenomenolojisi ile mümkün olabilmıştır.

Varlık ve Zaman'ın açılış cümleleri Grek düşüncesine ait kadim sorunun, yani varlık sorusunun bugün bir kenara atıldığı, unutulduğuna yönelik bir şikâyetlenmeyi dile getirmektedir. Varlık sorusunun ontik ve ontolojik önceliğini vurgulayan paragraflar da dahil olmak üzere, sözkonusu vazgeçişin gerekçesini teşkil eden temel argümanların hiçbiri, kanımızca, okuyucuyu sorunun önceliği hususunda ikna etmeye yetecek türden değildir. Varlık idrakine sahip olan tek varolan olması bakımından Dasein'in ontolojik sorgulama için başlangıç noktası olarak seçilmiş olması dahi, varlık sorusunun zaruretine kani olmamızı sağlayacak kanıtları sunmaktan uzak

görülmektedir. Peki, okuru varlık soruşturmasının felsefe için olmazsa olmaz bir sorgulama alanına denk düştüğüne inandıracak, kitabın başlangıç cümlelerinin yol açabileceği anlamsızlık duygusunu bertaraf etmeye yarayacak argümanların kaynağına gitmek için hangi yol takip edilecektir?

Yukarıdaki sorunun yanıtı, tezimizin ikinci kısmını oluşturmakta ve eldeki metne biçimini veren temel izleğin ortaya konmasını mümkün kılmaktadır. İddiamız odur ki, *Varlık ve Zaman*'ın ilk satırlarına damgasını vurmuş olan şikâyeti gerçek manada kavrayabilmek, ancak ve ancak filozofun önceki eserlerinde ortaya konulmuş olan özne tartışmaları ve bu tartışmaların aydınlatmaya çalıştığı temel zorluklar gözönüne alındığında anlaşılabilir. Bir diğer deyişle, varlık sorusunun sorulmasına ilişkin zaruretini bir parça olsun hissedilebilmesi için *Varlık ve Zaman* öncesinde yazılmış olan ve Husserl fenomenolojisindeki yönelimsel bilinç (*intentional consciousness*) ya da aşkınsal özne (*transcendental subject*) kavramsallaştırmalarına yönelik Heidegger tarafından yürütülen tartışmayı takip etmek elzemdir. Özne kategorisinin ürettiği açmazlara saplanmamış bir okur için varlık sorusunun aciliyetini kavramak çok da mümkün olmayacaktır.

Tarihsel olarak Descartes ve Kant'tan sonra gelmesine rağmen, Husserl felsefesinin Heidegger düşüncesi bağlamında ilk sıraya yerleştirilmiş olmasının nedeni tam olarak budur. Eldeki çalışmanın Husserl fenomenolojisinin Heideggerci ontoloji üzerindeki etkilerine ayrılmış olan ikinci bölümü, Heidegger'in Husserl'den kopuşunu göstermeyi hedefleyen üçüncü bölümü ile beraber düşünülmelidir. Bu iki bölüm, içsel bağlantıları gözönüne alındığında tezin Heidegger metodolojisini açıklamaya çalışan ilk kısmı olarak algılanabilir. Dördüncü bölüm, fenomenolojik yöntemi ontolojik sorunsalın hizmetine koşmayı başarmış olan Heidegger'in modern özne felsefesine getirdiği eleştirilere ayrılmıştır. Heidegger'in felsefe tarihi okumaları, onun Husserl fenomenolojisi ile etkililişimi kavranmaksızın anlamayacağından, geleneğin en

önemli iki temsilcisi, yani Descartes ve Kant'a getirilen yorumlar için bu bölümü beklemek icap etmiştir. Beşinci ve son bölüm, Heidegger'in özne merkezli Batı metafizik geleneğine en büyük darbeyi indirdiği ve Dasein'in dünya-da-olma olarak açılmış olan özünü ihmam (*Sorge; care*) üzerinden tekrar gündeme getirdiği, zamansallık vurgusunu ön plana çıkarttığı bölüm olarak kurgulanmıştır. Şimdi bu bölümlerde ne yapıldığını tek tek incelemeye çalışalım.

İkinci bölümün içeriği, temel olarak Heidegger'in Husserl düşüncesine olan borcunu ve bu felsefeye getirdiği eleştirileri etraflıca ortaya koyma çabasından mütevellittir. Sözkonusu borç ve eleştirileri özetlemek üzere başvurduğumuz metin, Heidegger'in Husserl felsefesini şümulü bir biçimde ele aldığı, 1925 tarihli *Zaman Kavramının Tarihi* başlıklı ders notlarıdır. Burada dikkatimizden kaçmaması gereken husus şudur ki, Heidegger'in Husserl'e karşı sergilemiş olduğu kritik tavrın kaynağı, tam da onu takdir etmiş olduğu meselelerde aranmalıdır. Bilincin yönelimselliği öğretisi, kategorial sezgi (*categorial intuition*) ve a priori'nin yeni anlamı şeklinde özetlenebilecek üç yenilik, Husserlci fenomenolojinin Batı felsefesine en büyük katkısı olarak anlaşılmakta; ama bu üç büyük yeniliğin, varlık sorusuna kapı aralayacak biçimde mantıksal sınırına dayandırılmamış olması da bu felsefenin en büyük handikapı olarak telâkki edilmektedir.

Hocası Brentano'nun etkisi ile Husserl, felsefe tarihi boyunca bilinç diye nitelenmiş olan yapının özünü yönelimsellik, yani "dair-olma" ilişkisi üzerinden anlamıştır. Descartes'tan beri düşünen töz (*res cogitans*) olarak nitelenegelmiş olan bilincin, karşısında duran ve uzamlı töz (*res extensa*) diye anılan diğer varlık alanı ile münasebeti sorunu, Husserl tarafından "aşkınlık problemi" olarak tanımlanmış; geleneksel felsefe sınırları içinde kaldığı müddetçe bu problemin çözümsüz kalacağına ısrarla vurgu yapılmıştır. Birbirinden tözsel olarak ayrı iki varlık alanının nasıl olup da insan gibi bir varlık üzerinden temasa geçebiliyor olduğu sorunu,

zamanında Descartes'ı da meşgul etmiş bir sorundur. Varolmak için hiçbir şeye ihtiyaç duymayan sınırsızlık alanı olarak töz, değişmezliği ve dönüşmezliği ölçüsünde kendine yeten olarak anlaşıldığı sürece nasıl olup da iki tözden bahsedilebilir sorusu Spinoza felsefesine dahi kapı aralamıştır. Ne var ki, Heidegger'in de ısrarla belirttiği gibi, Husserl'in bu mevzuya bu denli önem atfetmesindeki temel saik ontolojik olmak yerine epistemolojiktir. Gerçekten de, Husserl'in meseleye yaklaşımı şu şekildedir: Zihnindeki fikirler ve bu fikirlerin dair olduğu şey veya şey durumları birbirinden mutlak olarak ayrı iseler, önermelerin ve olguların mütakabiliyetinden müteşekkil doğruluk ve sözkonusu doğruluğun kendisine atfedildiği bilgi nasıl mümkün olacaktır? Soru bu biçimde formüle edildiğinde, bilincin töz terimleri ile anlaşılmış olmasından kaynaklı zorluklar gözardı edilmiş olmakta; problem, objektif bilginin imkânsızlığı düzeyine indirgenmiş olarak ortaya konmaktadır.

Her ne kadar ontolojik boyutu gözden irak tutulmuş olsa da, Husserl'in objektif bilgiyi kurtarmak üzere bilincin yönelimselliğini vurgulamış olması Heidegger açısından olumlu bir adımdır. Artık nesneyi, Descartes'ta olduğu gibi "dışarı"da düşünmek gerekmemekte, bilinç de salt bilinç edimlerinin vuku bulduğu dâhili sfer olmaktan çıkmaktadır. Nesnenin nesneliği (*noema*), değişken bilinç edimlerinin (*noesis*) olmazsa olmaz karşı kutbu olarak bilinç alanına transfer edilmekte; mevzubahis alan bu sayede bilimlerin bilimi ya da epistemoloji olarak fenomenolojinin konusu olan tek tema haline gelmektedir. Noetik ve noematik kutuplar arasındaki ilişkilere dair bilgi fenomenoloji açısından öz bilgisi olarak tasavvur edilmekte, bu tip bir öz bilgisi ise daha önce özne ve nesne olarak düşünülmüş iki karşıt tözselliğin ara alanına dair deneyim öncesi, a priori bir bilgi mahiyeti kazanmaktadır. Nesnellik alanını kuran temel ontolojik mefhumlar, yani kategorilerin ne bir töz olarak öznede, ne de gerçeklik alanı olarak dışarıda olduğunun altını ısrarla çizen Husserl, bunların orada ya da burada statik mevcudiyete sahip olmadıklarını defalarca vurgular. Mantıksal formlar kullanımlarında vardılar; bir diğer deyişle onların edimsellikleri (yani durmaksızın

nesnellik alanını kuruyor olmaları) statik mevcudiyetlerine önceldir.

Heidegger bu hamleyi hâlihazırda yürürlükte olan şey-ontolojisinden bir ara-alan-ontolojisine, ilişkisellik-ontolojisine geçişin ilk adımı olarak kavramaya meyyaldir. Lakin Husserl'in 1907 yılında ilk cildini kaleme aldığı *Fikirler* adlı eserinde ortaya koyduğu Kantçı hamle ve fenomenolojinin bu sayede aşkınsal bir boyut kazanması, onun gözünde, *Mantıksal Araştırmalar*'ın bu üç büyük kazanımından ricat etme anlamına gelecektir. *Fikirler*'in öne sürdüğü yenilik, esas olarak fenomenolojik paranteze alma, indirgeme, ya da *epoche* düşüncesidir. Kendini ve dünyayı ayırık birer töz olarak görmeyi itiyat edinmiş olan öznenin takındığı “doğal tutum” bir anlamda görmezden gelinecek, bu sayede dış dünyanın varlığına ilişkin argümanlar yok sayılacaktır. Zihne aşkın olduğu varsayılan dış dünyanın kuruluşu (*constitution*) temel olarak aşkınsal zihne atfedilecek, bu sayede de anlamın kaynağı olan zihin aşkınlığının anlamının da kaynağı olarak yalnız başına bırakılacak, fenomenolojinin biricik inceleme alanı olarak soyutlanacaktır. Bu noktada Heidegger, Husserl'in Kartezyen düşünce sistematığına bağlı kalmış olduğunun altını çizme ihtiyacı duyar, zira bilinç alanı, aşkınlık üzerinden anlaşılabilir dünyayla kıyaslandığında öznenin erişimine dolaylı bir biçimde açık olan içkinlik alanına karşılık gelmektedir. Sözkonusu alan içkinlik alanı olarak soyutlanmak durumunda kalmıştır, çünkü Husserl fenomenolojiyi bilim idealine bağlı kalarak tanımlamayı sürdürmüştü, yani bilincin nesne haline getirilmeksizin çözümlenemeyeceğine çoktan kani olmuştur. Oysaki, diye düşünür Heidegger, temel parolası Husserl tarafından “Şeylerin kendilerine” biçiminde ifade edilmiş olan fenomenolojik düşünce, nesnesine, yani bilince kendisi olarak yönelecekse, onu olup bitmişliğinde, nesneleşmişliğinde dondurma değil, oluşunda yakalama amacını güdüyor olmalıdır. Aksi takdirde yönelimselliği aşkınsallık uğruna feda etmek ve çelişkiye düşmek Husserl açısından kaçınılmaz olacaktır. Epistemolojik ideale bağlı kalmak ve fenomenolojiyi bilimlerin bilimi olarak düşünme iptilasından yakayı kurtaramamış olmak, Husserl'i kendi projesini kendi elleriyle yıkıma uğratma

noktasına taşımıştır Heidegger'in gözünde. Bir töz olarak düşünce alanından vazgeçilmiştir belki, ama bilinci bilinç edimleri ve bunlara bağlı noematik kutbun kapalı ve kendine yeten alanına hapseden Husserlci fenomenoloji, en az Descartes metafiziği kadar elde-olma (*Vorhandenheit*) ontolojisinin tuzağına düşmekten kurtulamamıştır. Heidegger şuna kesin olarak kanidir ki, yönelimselliği varabileceği son mecraya taşıma aşkınsal bilinci ontolojik sorgulamaya tâbî kılmak, yani özneyi varlık sorusu bakımından tekrar gündeme taşımakla mümkün olabilir. Bu ise, nesne kılınamayacak olanın nasıl olup da düşüncenin konusu haline getirilebileceğini sorgulamak; yani fenomenolojiyi ontolojinin yöntemi olarak görmekle olasıdır.

Bu anlamda Heideggerci fenomenoloji, Husserlci fenomenolojinin, üçüncü bölümün başlığında da belirtildiği üzere, uca götürülmesi olarak anlaşılabilir. *Varlık ve Zaman*'ın 7. paragrafı, orijinal fenomen kavramsallaştırmasını ve sözkonusu nesneleştirme özel mahiyetini sorgu konusu yapması bakımından merkezi konumu haizdir. Heidegger burada fenomen-oloji sözcüğünü görünüm-mantığı olması bakımından çözümlenmeye tâbî tutar ve "görünme"nin türleri üzerinden ayrımlara gider. Bir şey kendini olmadığı bir şey olarak gösterdiğinde dahi, görünüşe çıkma olayı vuku bulmuş olur ve fenomenolojiyi ilgilendiren de tam olarak budur. Bunun yanısıra, bir şeyin ifşası, onun kendini göstermeksizin görünüşe gelen başka bir şey dolayısıyla açığa çıkması anlamına da geliyor olabilir. Husserlci anlamda dış dünya kendini realistlerin düşündüğü gibi direkt olarak ifşa etmektense, aşkınsal bilincin dolayımına maruz kalmış halde verir. Şu halde bilincin kendini dolayısızca ifşa etmesi mümkün müdür? Heidegger açısından bu imkânsızdır, zira boş bilincin salt tefekkür ile keşfedilebilecek hiçbir yanı yoktur. Bilince bakan göz, olsa olsa onu dünya ile kurduğu ilişki üzerinden, dünyaya bulanmış bir biçimde görebilir. Ama bu durumda bile sözkonusu gören gözün görülüp görülemeyeceği tartışma konusu olarak kalmaya devam edecektir. Şu halde görme veya algılama paradigmasını terketme, Husserl'in tuttuğu yoldan sapma vakti gelmiş de geçmiştir.

Husserlci fenomenolojinin temel iddialarından biri de “görünme”nin (*apparition*) görünmeyeceği, zuhur edemeyeceği savıdır. Bunun Kant’taki karşılığı, deneyimin aşkınsal koşulları olan zaman-mekan ve kategorilere ait bilginin ampirik değil, aşkınsal bilgi olduğu uyarısıdır. Bunun Heideggerci yorumu şudur: Herhangi bir varolanın (*Seiende; entity*) o veya bu biçimde görünüme gelmesi, deneyimlenebilir olmasının koşulu, görünmenin zaten ve hâlihazırda zaten idrak edilmiş olmasıdır. Tam olarak onun terimlerine bağlı kalarak ifade edecek olursak, herhangi bir varolanın zuhur etmesinin koşulunu, o varolanın varlığının (*Sein der Seienden; being of entities*) a priori bir tarzda idrak edilmiş olmasında aramak gerekir. Varolanların varlığı dünya-da-olma olarak Dasein’in varlık idraki biçiminde zaten ve halihazırda kendini açıyor olduğu içindir ki, herhangi bir şeyin o şey olarak kavranabilir, algılanabilir, kısacası deneyimlenebilir olduğunu söyleyebiliriz. İnsan-dünya’nın orijinal birlikteliği, yani varoluş (*Existenz; existence*) olarak Dasein varolma olayının vuku buluşundan başka bir şey ifade etmez ve bu birliktelik ya da varlık (*Sein; being*) kendini kendinden gösteren, öz-ifşaat (*self-manifest*) olarak tanımlanan orijinal fenomene karşılık gelir.

İnsan ve dünyanın orijinal birlikteliği, doğruluk mevzuunun gelenekten başka türlü ele alınışını gerekçelendirecek ontolojik zemini sağlamaktadır. Bunun anlamı şudur: İnsan zaten ve hâlihazırda dünyada ise, ya da dünyada olmak onun özüne aitse, önermesel doğruluğu önceleyen ve koşullayan bir doğruluk (*truth*) anlayışına kapı aralamamız gerekecektir. Zira Dasein’in özü onun varoluşudur, yani dünya-da-olma onun statik özüne iliklenmiş arızî bir özellik olarak düşünülemez. Bir başka deyişle, Dasein’in dünyayı düşünce ve önermeler yoluyla keşfi, ayırık gerçeklik alanı olarak düşünülmemesi gereken dünyanın ona zaten ve hâlihazırda verili oluşundan kaynaklı önsel keşfedilmişlik (*disclosedness*) tarafından öncelenmekte ve koşullanmaktadır. Orijinal doğruluk, ya da Türkçe’nin avantajından yararlanacak olursak, hakikat, öznenin içsel alanına aidiyeti imleyen temsil edici işlevi haiz önermelerin, kendilerinden kopuk gerçeklik alanında yer alan şey-durumlarına mütekabiliyetinden

kaynaklı doğruluk kavramsallaştırmasının koşuludur. Bunu şu şekilde de ifade etmek mümkündür: Özne alanına ait önerme karşısında duran nesne ile mütakabiliyet ilişkisine geçebilir, zira öznenin ontolojik koşulu olarak Dasein'in özüne dünya-da-olma ve varlık idraki aittir.

Özü dünya-da-olma, ya da varoluş (*existence*) olan Dasein, varlık idraki sayesinde dünyaya doğrudur, yani aşkındır (*transcendent*). Ne var ki, Dasein'in aşkınlığını onun özüne ait bir yetenek, yapabilirlik, ya da potansiyel olarak kavramak uygun olmayacaktır. Dasein'i önce statik öze sahip edimselleşmemiş bir mevcudiyet olarak telakki edip dünyaya-çıkma, ya da kendi içsel alanını aşma eylemini sözkonusu statik özün edimselleşmesi şeklinde tahayyül etmek, Heidegger'in ortaya koymaya çalıştığı resmi tamamen gözden kaçırmak anlamına gelecektir. Sözkonusu durum, daha ziyade Heidegger tarafından ontik aşkınlık diye nitelenen Husserlci yönelimsellik kavramsallaştırmasının içine düştüğü yanlışlığı betimlemektedir. Eldeki çalışmanın ikinci bölümünde vurgulandığı üzere fenomenolojik indirgeme yöntemi sayesinde kendine kapatılmış ve dünya-sız-laştırılmış olan bilinç, dünyaya çıkışının, yani bir anlam olarak aşkınlığın üretiminin kaynağını kendinde bulmaktadır. Bu ise onun kapalı, kendine yeten bir bitmişlik alanı olarak telakki edilmesine zemin hazırlamış, aşkınlık probleminin çözümüne katkıda bulunmak şöyle dursun, onu daha üst düzeye taşıyıp içinden çıkılması imkânsız bir sorunsala dönüştürmüştür. Heidegger'in görüşü uyarınca sözkonusu indirgeme hamlesi, ontolojik soruyu gündeme taşımak konusundaki aczin de katkısıyla yönelimsellikten feragat anlamına gelmektedir.

Mevcudiyet terimleri ile ifade edilmekte olan aşkınsal bilincin yönelimselliği, Husserl'in aksi yöndeki beyanlarına rağmen statik öze ait potansiyelin edimselleşmesi olarak anlaşılmaktan kurtulamaz. Heidegger'e göre Husserlci bilinç önce *vardır*, sonrasında nesneye yönelmektedir. Hâlbuki o, bilincin yönelimselliğini önceleyen bir varoluş ile sözkonusu varoluşun kendi-dışına-doğruluğuna gönderme yapmak suretiyle

ontik aşkınlığı ontolojik aşkınlık ile temellendirmeyi amaçlamaktadır. Bu sayede Dasein'in özünü *kendilik*, *kendi-olma*, *kendiyle-aynı-kalma* terimleri ile ele almak yerine, bilakis, kendi-dışı(nda)-olma (*being-out-of-itself*) olarak betimlemeyi tercih edecektir. Varlık sorusunu sormaya muktedir tek varolan olarak Dasein'in sözkonusu soruyu sorma konusundaki yetkinliği ile onun kendi-dışı(nda)-oluşu bir ve aynı şeye gönderme yapmaktadır. Varlığı konu edebilen varolan olarak Dasein'in özü bir ucu-açıklık, natamamlık olarak betimlenmekte, bu da ayrıcalıklı konuma sahip bu varolanın ne-lik (*quiddity*, *what-ness*) üzerinden tasvir edilmesine giden yolu tamamen kapatmaktadır. Peki ama *kendisi-olmayan*, *kendi-dışı(nda)-olan* ve eksiklik barındıran bu varoluşu ontolojik soruyu tekrar tekrar gündeme getirmeden ele almanın bir yolu var mıdır? İçkinlik olarak tasavvur edilen özneliğin dışa-doğru-luk olarak betimlenen Dasein'a bağımlı oluşu, varlık sorusunun bir kez daha gündemi işgal edeceği bir ortam hazırlanmaksızın açıklığa kavuşturulabilecek bir mevzu olmaktan uzaktır. Bu anlamda Husserlci fenomenolojinin sahip olduğu epistemolojik eğilim yerini Heideggerci fenomenolojinin ontolojik sorgulama mantığına bırakmalı, Dasein üzerinden kendini açığa vuran varlık hareketinin Husserlci özneliğe zemin sağladığı itiraf edilmelidir. Peki, Husserlci fenomenolojinin ontolojikleştirilmek suretiyle radikalleştirilmesi, Heidegger'in modern felsefe tarihi okumalarında karşılaştığı kendi-lik kavramına getireceği yorumları ne ölçüde ve nasıl etkilemiş olabilir? Tezin dördüncü bölümü bu sorunun yanıtına ayrılmıştır.

Eldeki çalışmanın dördüncü bölümü, kendisini önceleyen ilk iki bölümün sağladığı metodolojik altyapı üzerinden, yani varoluşun aşkınlığı mefhumu akılda tutularak okunmalıdır. Bu bölümün sınırları dahilinde, yönelimsellik kavramsallaştırmasını insan varoluşunun orijinal aşkınlığı düşüncesine taşıyan Heidegger'in, sözkonusu bakış açısını modern felsefe okumalarına nasıl uyguladığı anlaşılmaya çalışılmıştır. Decartes'ta tözsel bir kendilik görünümü arzeden *egonun* Kant'ta tüm tasarımlara eşlik eden aşkınsal bilincin birliğine terfi Heidegger'in mevzubahis döneme yönelmesinin

temel nedenini teşkil etmektedir. Heidegger'in bu iki filozofla girdiği diyalog, Husserl'in yönelimsellik kavramsallaştırmasının büyük etkilerini taşımakta, Descartes'tan Kant'a giden yol, zaman tartışmasının da devreye girmesi sayesinde yönelimsel/fenomenolojik analize davetiye çıkarır görünmektedir.

Bölümün açılış cümlelerinde de belirtilmiş olduğu gibi, Heidegger'in Descartes'a dönüşünün temel nedeni, modern felsefenin babası olarak telakki edilmekte olan bu büyük filozofun şahsında hocası Husserl'i eleştirmektir. Zira Husserl'in *Fikirler* adlı eserinde ilk kez gündeme taşıdığı fenomenolojik indirgeme düşüncesi, aşkınsal bilincin içselliğini vurgulaması bakımından Descartesçı bir adım olarak değerlendirilmektedir. Bu noktada sözkonusu olan, fenomenolojik indirgeme ya da *epoche* düşüncesi ile Descartes'ın metodolojik şüphesi arasındaki bağıntıyı gündeme taşıyıp deşifre etmekten ibarettir. *Meditasyonlar*'da incelikli çözümlemelere tabi tutulmuş olan ünlü *Cogito, ergo sum* (Düşünüyorum, öyleyse varım) önermesinin Heideggerce merkezi önemi haiz olarak gösterilmesi tam da böyle bir tartışma zemininde anlamlı hale gelmektedir.

Descartes düşüncesinde, Tanrı bir yana bırakılacak olursa, temel olarak iki tözden bahsetmek gerekir; düşünen töz ve uzamlı töz. Yaratılmışlar alanında varolduğu iddia edilebilecek herhangi bir şey, mutlak surette sözkonusu tözsellik alanlarından birine dâhil olmak durumundadır. Buna mukabil, uzamlı bir şeyin varlığı, o şeyin varolduğuna dair önermenin doğruluğu nispetince sözkonusu olabileceğinden, düşüncenin, olmazsa olmaz bir aracı olarak ayrıcalıklı bir konuma sahip olduğunu kabul etmek lazım gelecektir. Bir başka deyişle, uzamlı nesnelere toplamı olarak dış dünyanın varlığı her daim şüpheye yer bırakmaktadır, zira sözkonusu dışsallık alanına ulaşabilmek için Kartezyen öznenin elinde temsil edici işlevi haiz fikirlerden başka herhangi bir araç yoktur. Dış dünyanın temsiller aracılığıyla kavranıyor oluşu, temsillerden müteşekkil dolaysızca verili içsellik (*immanence*) alanını, bu temsillerin

temsili olduđu aşkınsal uzamsallık alanının karşı kutbuna yerleştirmeyi gerekmektedir. Descartes felsefesinde düşüncenin düşünülmesi ile onun varolması arasında herhangi bir açıklık, boşluk, ya da mesafe yoktur; edim olarak düşünce ve bu düşüncenin varlığı bir ve aynı şeydir. Buna karşın, dış dünyaya ait herhangi bir nesnenin varolduđuna yönelik iddia, sözkonusu nesnenin zihinsel temsili dolayısıyla anlam kazanabildiđi içindir ki, sözkonusu nesnenin ontolojik durumuna ilişkin şüpheyeye yer bırakmayacak türden bir yaklaşım geliştirmek mümkün olmamaktadır.

Heidegger'in bakış açısından *cogito* argümanının aksadıđı iki yön bulunmaktadır. Bunlardan ilki, aktüel düşünme ediminden yola çıkarak bu edimin bir faili olması gerektiđini savlayan yaklaşımdır. Şüpheyi, söz verdiđi gibi sınırına taşımış olsa, Descartes'ın yapması gereken şey, bir yüklem olarak düşüncenin varlığından bu yüklem taşıyıcısı olarak düşünen tözü (yani *egoyu*) türetmekte sakınım göstermek olmalıdır. Heidegger nazarında filozofun bu denli aceleci davranması, onun öz-varoluş (*essence-existence*) mantığına dayalı Ortaçağ ontolojisine bađlı kalmaya devam etmesidir. Bu, düşüncenin kendini düşünmesi esnasında kendine dolaysızca verili olduđu savı ile de ters düşmektedir ki, sözü edilen aksaklıklardan ikincisi tam olarak bu noktayla ilişki içindedir. Çağının bilim idealini her daim yüceltmış olan Descartes, *cogito* argümanını mümkün kılan içebakış hamlesini algı (*Wahrnehmung; perception*) paradigması içinden değerlendirmekte beis görmemiş, bu sayede de varlığını ispatlamaya çalıştığı “ben”i nesne olarak karşısına koymaya (*Gegenstand; ob-ject*) devam etmiştir. Ne var ki, “karşıya-koyma”, karşıya konulan ve karşıya koyan arasında bir mesafe öngörmektedir. Bu ise, *cogito* argümanının ima ettiđi içkinlik yargısı ile tam bir tezat içindedir.

Kant ve Heidegger, *cogito, ergo sum*'un, mantıksal çıkarım niteliđi arzedenden daha büyük bir argümanın ikinci öncülü ve sonucundan meydana geldiđi yollu görüşü reddetmekte hemfikirdirler. “Düşünüyorum, öyleyse varım” önermesinde “öyleyse”

bağlacı fazladır, zira bu önerme, ilk (büyük) öncülü “Her kim ki düşünüyordur, vardır” olan çıkarımın parçalarını meydana getirmemektedir. Bunun sonucu Heidegger açısından şudur: “Düşünüyorum” ve “varım” birer sezgi olarak değerlendirilmelidir. Bunların varolan iki ayrı şey-durumuna karşılık gelen iki farklı önerme olduklarını söylemek tamamen saçmadır.

Sözkonusu karşı çıkışın Kant’ın kritik felsefesindeki tezahürü, onun özbilinç ve bilinç arasındaki ilişkiyi çok daha akılcı bir biçimde kavrayıp olduğunun göstergesi olarak gündeme gelir. “Düşünüyorum” içinde ifadesini bulan ve “tamalgının aşkınsal birliği” (*transcendental unity of apperception*) olarak ifade edilen özdeşlik (*self-identity*), kendisi zihinsel aktivitenin nesnesi olmaksızın her tür nesneleştirilmenin koşulunu teşkil eder. Tasarımlar çoğulluğunun önerme formunda tek bir tasarım altında birleştirilebilmesinin koşulu, sözkonusu tasarımların “ben”im tasarımlarım olarak bir kez daha düşünülebilmesidir. Aksi takdirde deneyim alanına dair pek çok tasarım düşünülmemiş olacak ve sahipsiz kalacaktır. Bu hamleyle Kant bilincin birliğinin tefekküre konu olamayacağını, onun tam da nesnel dünya deneyimine eşlik etmekle kendini ortaya koyacağını altını çizmiş olur. “Düşünüyorum” diyebilmek için dünyayı düşünmek, nesneyi deneyimlemek yeterlidir filozofa göre. Aşkınsal öznenin kendini kendine ifşa edişi, onun kendisi-olmayana bilişsel bir tarzda yönelmesi ile mümkün hale gelir; fazladan, reflektif bir hamleye ihtiyaç kalmaz.

Bu anlamda Heidegger, Kant felsefesinde fenomenolojik yaklaşımın ilk adımlarını, yani yönelimsellik düşüncesinin tohumlarını görmüştür diye iddia etmekte sakınca yoktur. Zira Descartes’taki “düşünüyorum”, Kant’ta yerini “bir şey düşünüyorum”a bırakmış, özne-dünya bağlılaşıklığı ilk olarak gündeme taşınmıştır. Kant için “ben” düşünen töz olmaktan çıkmış, dünyaya ilişkin her türden yargının, kendisi yüklem olamayacak mutlak/mantıksal öznesine dönüşmüştür. Kant’ın nezdinde Descartes, mantıksal bir varolana gerçeklik katmakla maluldür.

Kritik felsefenin başat özelliği, bu felsefeye aşkınsal idealizm mahiyeti kazandıran Kantçı Copernicus devrimidir. Artık bilgimizin nesneye değil, nesnenin bilgimize uygunluğunu tartışma konusu eden yepyeni bir zemine adım atmış oluruz. Nesnelere toplamı olarak dünyanın kuruluş koşullarını bünyesinde taşıyan ve bu nedenle de aşkınsal olarak nitelenen öznenin algıya konu olamayacağı savı, Kant felsefesinin temelini oluşturmaktadır. “Düşünüyorum”da ifadesini bulan aşkınsal özne nesnelliğin tüm koşullarını içinde barındırdığı içindir ki, kendisi empirik bilgiye konu olamaz. Diğer yandan, dünya içre varlıkların birer bilgi nesnesi olarak tezahür edebilmelerinin olası tüm yollarını tüketmekte olan 12 kategori aşkınsal özneye ait olduğundan, nesnenin bir görünüm olmaktan öteye gitmesi ve kendini kendinde olduğu biçimiyle göstermesi imkânsızdır. Bilgiye konu olanlar, biz onları algılamıyor olsaydık da kendilerinde ne iseler o olan şeyler değil (*Ding an sich; thing in itself*), fenomenler, yani görünümlerdir. Şeylerin kendilerinde oldukları halleriyle bilinemeyeceklerini öne süren tezi sayesinde, Kant’ın ontolojiyi felsefeden dışladığını savunan ve bu nedenle kritik felsefeyi epistemolojik bir öğreti olarak değerlendiren düşünürler, en azından Heidegger’in yaşadığı dönemde ezici bir çoğunluğa sahiptirler. Ne var ki, Heidegger’in bunlardan biri olduğunu söylemek oldukça güçtür.

Heidegger, Kant’ın birinci kritiğini “doğa” diye adlandırılan nesnenin varolma koşullarını çözümleyen bölgesel ontolojik (*regional ontology*) bir teori olarak okuma eğilimindedir, bir epistemoloji olarak değil. Bu noktada şu yorumu yapmak mümkündür: Epistemolojik okuma, özne ve nesneye ait olduğu düşünülen varlık alanlarının ilişkiye girmeye kabil olmakla beraber ayrı oldukları varsayımına dayanmaktadır. Bu yorum, öznenin içkin düzlemini görünüme gelmenin aşkınsal koşulu olarak ön-belirler. Pozitif bilimlerin nesnesi olarak tezahür eden doğa yasallığını saf aklın a priori yapılanmasından aldığı içindir ki, onun kendinde ne ise o oluşu ontolojinin kapsamındadır ve bu suretle de konu dışı bırakılır. Bilgiyi öznellik alanına, kendinde şeyi ise dışarıya, yani özne-dışına yerleştiren epistemolojik

yaklaşım, Kant felsefesini aradaki ilişkinin koşulunu sorgulamakta olan bir düşünce biçimi olarak değerlendirme imkanını tam anlamıyla kapı dışarı etmiş görünür.

Diğer yandan, fenomenolojik bir yorum olarak düşünülmesi gereken Heidegger yorumunda ise Kant, nesnellğin kurucu elemanları olarak telakki edilen kategoriler ve sezgi formlarının ne nesnellik, ne de öznellik alanına ait olduğunu söylemeye oldukça yakın duran bir Kant'tır. Sözkonusu a priori koşullar, herhangi bir doğa nesnesine "var" diyebilmemizin asgari koşullarını meydana getirirler ve sözkonusu nesnelere, fenomenolojik yaklaşım uyarınca zaten birer tezahür olmaktan ileri gidemeleri için de, kritik felsefeyi bilgi nesnesinin ontolojisi olarak düşünmek gerekir. Bu noktada Heidegger'in, tıpkı hocası Husserl gibi, fenomen ve numen (kendinde şey) arasında yapılan ayrıma itiraz ediyor oluşu dikkatlerden kaçmaması gereken, can alıcı bir husustur. Özne ve dünyanın ara alanına karşılık gelen yönelimsellik sferi, Kant tarafından görünüm olarak nitelenen nesnelere kendinde şeyler olmasa bile, şeylerin kendileri (*die Sache selbst; things themselves*) olarak zuhur ettikleri nesnellik ve özneliği önceleyen bölgeye denk düşmektedir. Orijinal *topos* olarak anlaşılması gereken bu ara alan, dünya-da-varlık olarak Dasein kavramsallaştırmasının çağrıştırdığı, özne-nesne ikiliğine kaynaklık eden yönelimsellik (aslında, aşkınlık) alanından başkası değildir. Sözkonusu yönelimsellik alanının Kant felsefesindeki tezahürüne işaret etmek üzere Heidegger, "düşünüyorum"da ifadesini bulan tamalgının aşınsal birliğini Kantçı sentezin koşulu olmaktan çıkarmayı dener. Bu sayede dünyaya birliğini verenin yalıtık bir özne olmadığını göstermeye çalışır.

Aşkınsal öznenin birliğini ve kendiyile özdeşliğini (*self-identity*) deneyim ve deneyim nesnelere koşulu olmaktan menetmek, Heidegger'in gözünde, zamanın sentez için asli önemini vurgulamakla mümkündür. Kant, algının ve bilmenin yargısal olduğunu, her tür yargının ise zaman sentezi sayesinde sahip olması gereken birliğe gelebileceğini savlamıştır. Buna karşıt olarak, Kant öncesi filozoflar için bilme edimi,

zamansal senteze yer bırakmayan bir yansıtma, ya da Platon'un iddia edeceği gibi, hatırlama olayıdır. Kant için sezgide verili olan çokluk (*manifold*), kategorilerin kural koyucu etkinliğinin de yardımıyla öncelik-sonralık ilişkileri açısından eklemenecek biçimde birleştirmeye tâbî tutulur. Nesneye ait kavramın daha genel bir kavram altında tanınması (*recognition*) olarak betimlenebilecek olan yargı bu sayede bilginin koşulu olmuş olur. Ama bu, Heidegger'in gözünde yargıya birliğini veren ilksel kaynağın kavram ve kavrama ait birlik olduğu anlamına gelmez.

Salt Aklın Eleştirisi'nin ilk bölümünü teşkil eden ve zaman ile mekanın birer form olarak çözümlemesine ayrılmış olan Aşkınsal Estetik bölümünde Kant, bu iki görü formunun birliğinden söz etmektedir. Bir tane zaman ve bir tane mekan vardır. Bununla birlikte, bu zaman ve mekandan soyutlama ile elde edilen her bir parça, bütünün tüm özelliklerini bünyesinde barındırmaya devam ediyor olmalıdır. Şu halde, zaman ve mekanın sözkonusu birliği, senteze kavram-öncesi birliğini veren temel kaynak olarak anlaşılabilir durumdadır. Mekanda verili olan her çokluğun, yargıya konu olabilmek için içsel sezginin, yani zamanın da süzgecinden geçmesi zorunlu olduğundan, zamanın birliğini her tür deneyimin koşulu olarak ön plana taşımak icap etmektedir. Sonuç olarak şunu da ilave etmek gerekir ki, fenomenal yönüyle Kantçı özne deneyimlerinin toplamı olmaktan ibaret kaldığı için, zamanın birliğini öznenin koşulu olarak algılamakta sakınca yoktur. Kant felsefesinde zamanın özneye *ait* olduğu açıktır. Ama sözkonusu aidiyetin ontolojik anlamı fenomenolojik açıdan tekrar gündeme getirilmelidir. Bu bizi öznenin zamansallığının sahil anlamına götüreceği gibi, özne sorunsalı ile varlık sorusu arasındaki ilişkiyi Dasein terimleri üzerinden yeniden incelememize zemin hazırlayacaktır.

Kant'tan sözederken gündeme gelmiş olan zamansallık bahsi, tezin beşinci bölümünde, *Varlık ve Zaman*'ın ikinci kısmına atıfla tamamına erdirilmeye çalışılmıştır. Bu bölüm, aynı zamanda bilmenin koşulunun ihtimam (*Sorge; care*)

olduğunu öne süren Heideggerci sava bağlı olarak, öznelğin ontolojik koşulunu varlığın açıldığı merci olmasından ötürü Dasein olarak gösteren final bölümüdür. Sözkonusu bölümde ihtimam yapısının zamansallığı ele alınacak, “ekstatik-ufkî zaman” olarak adlandırılan bu orijinal zaman kavramsallaştırmasının “olağan/bilimsel” zamanı önelediği ileri sürülecektir.

Daha önce varolma kipi varoluş (*existence*) olan Dasein’ın, özü itibariyle dünya-da-olma olarak düşünülmesi gerektiğini belirtmiş olan Heidegger, bu defa Dasein’ın ontolojik bütünlüğünü ihtimam kavramı üzerinden açıklamaya çalışacaktır. Bir-dünya-da-olma, Dasein için mekansal, arızı bir belirlenim olmaktan çok, varoluşsal bir belirlenimdir. Bir başka deyişle, dünya-da-olma, Dasein’ın varoluş olarak tanımlanmış olan özünü ifade eden bir başka tamlamadır. Dasein’ın mekansal olarak dünya-da-olabilmesinin koşulu, onun varoluşsal özü itibariyle dünya-da-olmasında yatmaktadır. Dünya bir mekan, Dasein da sözkonusu mekandan ontolojik olarak ayrı bir töz olarak düşünüldüğünde, dünya ve Dasein arasındaki ilişki özne ile nesnesi arasındaki ilişki olmaktan öteye geçemeyecektir. Sözkonusu ilişkinin ontolojik belirleniminden kaynaklı önceden ele alınmış olan sorunlar bir kez daha hatırlandığında, dünya-da-olma kavramsallaştırmasının düşünen töz ile düşünülen töz arasındaki *mesafeyi* kapatmak üzere gündeme getirilmiş olduğu sonucuna varmak mümkündür. Varlık kipi Dasein olmayan varolanların *dünya-içre* (*innerweltlich; intraworldly*) olduklarını söylemekte sakınca yokken, varoluşu bakımından *kendi-dışı(nda)* (*out-of-itself*) olan Dasein’ın dünya-ya-doğru olduğunun altını çizmek gerekecektir. Dünyadalığın orijinal anlamı, Dasein’ın yabancı olduğu nesnelere toplamına sorgulayıcı bir yaklaşımla yöneliyor olması değildir. Bilakis dünya, nesne olmaktan önce *ikâmetgâh* (*dwelling*) olarak verilir. Kendisine aşinalık bağı ile bağlı olduğu dünyanın bir sakinidir Dasein. Dasein ve dünya arasındaki mesafenin bu biçimde kapatılması, Husserl’in aşkınlık problemi diye nitelenmiş olduğu sorunu temelinden sarsacak, onun yönelimsellik anlayışını orijinal aşkınlık kavramsallaştırması sayesinde ontolojik olarak

temellendirecektir. Ev olarak telakki edilen dünya ile münasebetin, özne-nesne modelinin aksine mesafe-siz-lik üzerinden ele alınması gerektiğini göstermek üzere—ki, bu aynı zamanda Husserlci *noema-noesis* ikiliğini de aşma çabası olarak düşünülmelidir—Dasein’in ontolojik yapısı bulunuş (*Befindlichkeit; disposition*), anlama (*Verstehen; understanding*) ve düşüş (*Verfallen; falling*) sacayağı üzerine kurulu ihtimam yapısı üzerinden incelemeye tâbî tutulacaktır.

Heideggerci *Befindlichkeit* kavramsallaştırmasını Dasein’in kendini bir haletiruhiye içinde bulması (*sich befinden*) olarak anlamak mümkündür. Belli bir modda, belli bir haletiruhiye içerisinde olmak Dasein’in varoluşsal özüne ait bir mesele olarak tasavvur edilmelidir. Burada sözkonusu edilen, elde-mevcut (*vorhanden*) bir varlığın şartlara bağlı keyifli olma ya da olmama hali değildir. Karamsar, üzgün, mutlu ya da endişeli olma gibi psikolojik haller bulunuş kavramı ile anlatılmak istenene karşılık gelmezler. Sözkonusu kavram, Husserl’in nesneleştirme içeren yönelimsellik vurgusuna yapılan atfın ilk dayanağını meydana getirmekte, varoluşun (*Existenz*) ilk elden kendini bir haletiruhiye içinde bulmaktan ibaret olduğunu vurgulamaktadır. Bu noktada altı çizilmesi elzem olan husus şudur ki, Dasein’in her daim ve halihazırda belli bir haletiruhiyeye sahip oluşu, onun aynı zamanda kendini bir dünyada buluşu anlamına da gelmektedir. Dünyanın keşfedilmiş oluşunun orijinal anlamı, izole bir öznenin onu nesneleştirmesi, incelemesi ve algılaması değil, Dasein’in kendini dünyada olmadan kaynaklı belli bir modda bulmuş olmasıdır. Bu anlamda bulunuş kavramsallaştırmasını açımlayan haletiruhiyenin tefekküre, içebakışa konu olmadığını eklemek şarttır. Ontolojik özünün bulunuştan ârî salt/statik mevcudiyet olmaması nedeniyle Heidegger Dasein’in varoluşunu olgusalılık (*factuality*) terimleri ile ele almaktan kaçınır. Ona göre Dasein’in kendine has olgusalılığı faktisite (*facticity*) olarak nitelendirilmelidir. Dasein-dünya bağlaşıklığının ilk aşamasını ifade eden bu kavram, yeri geldikçe atılmışlık (*Geworfenheit; thrownness*) olarak da ifade edilmektedir. Dasein, kendi seçmediği, öngörmediği ve yaratmadığı bir dünyaya atılmış olduğu içindir ki, onun

kendini belli tarihsel/toplumsal koşullar/koşullanmışlıklar içinde bulduğunu söylemek icap eder. En temel bulunuş kipi olarak endişe (*Angst; anxiety*), Dasein'in bir *şey* olmamaktan kaynaklı huzursuzluğunu dile getiren temel/ontolojik bir kavramdır. Bu temel huzursuzluk hali, Dasein'in bitmişlik (*finishedness*) ifade eden kapalı bir alan olmadığının; tanımlanabilecek bir *doğaya* sahip olmaktan uzak oluşunun altını çizer ve orijinal aşkınlığını ön plana çıkartır.

Dünyanın nesne olarak karşıya konması, o dünyadan bağımsız olarak varolabilen bir özneyi gerektirmektedir. Sözkonusu öznenin dünya bağlantısı ise, felsefe tarihi boyunca bilme, algılama ve anlama ışığında incelenegelmıştır. Halbuki Dasein için bulunuştan, yani haletiruhiyeden kopuk bir bilme, anlama sözkonusu olamaz. Dünyayı anlamak, belli bir mod üzerinden dünyanın halihazırda keşfedilmiş, açığa çıkarılmış olmasını gerektirir. Heidegger bilimsel aktivitenin dahi belli bir haletiruhiye içerdiğini vurgularken tam da bunu söylemeye çalışmaktadır.

Ne var ki anlama (*Verstehen; understanding*), varoluşsal çözümleme dahilinde nesnenin kavranması, içselleştirilmesi, bilinmesi manalarına gelmekten önce, Dasein'in kendini anlaması demektir. Sözkonusu kendini anlama, varoluşun belli bir ereksellik sayesinde öz-belirlenim sürecine dönüşmesi olarak düşünülebilir. Dasein'in kendini belli bir nihai erek üzerinden tanımlıyor oluşu dünyadaki nesnelerin belli bir bütünlük oluşturacak biçimde biraraya gelmelerinin, ağ-yapısal bir göndermeler sistemi olarak tezahür edişinin önkoşuludur. Öz-belirlenim olarak anlama kavramını tartışırken Heidegger'in erek (*telos*) sözcüğü yerine "...nin-uğruna" (*Um...zu; for-the-sake-of*) kavramsallaştırmasına başvuruyor olmasının temel nedeni, sözkonusu nihai amacın temsile konu olamayan ve gerçekleştirilemeyen (yani, ulaşılamayan) bir nitelik sergiliyor oluşudur. İyi bir baba olma uğruna yaşamakta olan birinin sözkonusu nihai hedefi tanımlaması ve bu hedefe erişmesi, hedefin niteliği gözönüne alındığında mümkün görünmemektedir. Diğer yandan, herhangi bir erkeğin bir evlada sahip

olması, yani biyolojik anlamda baba olması, o kişinin, sözkonusu özellik bakımından olmuş bitmişliğine, yani tamamlanmışlığına vurgu yapar. İyi bir baba olma ideali Dasein'in faktik varoluşunu açığa vururken, onu belli bir nitelik açısından tamamlanmış olarak gösteren ikinci örnek olgusalılık tınısı taşır.

Ne var ki, iyi bir baba olmanın sözkonusu edilmediği, kutsanmadığı bir dünyada biyolojik anlamda baba olma fenomeninin bir bağlam kazanıp sözkonusu olması olası değildir. Bu noktada Heidegger'in, faktisite vurgusu sayesinde geleneksel ontolojinin bakış açısını tersine çevirdiğine tanıklık ederiz. İyi baba olmak, biyolojik anlamda baba olma *olgusu* üzerinde temellenen, sözkonusu olguyu *değerlendiren* bir duruma gönderme yapmaz. Sözkonusu olan, tam da buna zıt olarak, baba olmanın o ya da bu bağlamda, o ya da bu değerlendirmeler ve anlamlandırmalar ışığında gündeme gelecek bir tezahür olması; olgusalılığı öncelemedir.

Dünyadaki nesnelere için de durum tam olarak budur. Sözkonusu nesnelere salt olgusalılık zemininde, elde-mevcut (*vorhandene; present-at-hand*) nesnelere olarak görünüre gelmelerinden önce, ele-hazır (*zuhandene; ready-to-hand*) varolanlar olarak topyekûn verili olduklarından bahsetmek gerekir. Heidegger için dünya, her şeyden önce iş-dünyasıdır (*Werkwelt; work-world*). Dünyanın iş-dünyası olarak *zaten ve halihazırda* verili oluşunu mümkün kılan başat unsur ise Dasein'in *uğruna olduğu*, erişilemez ve temsile gelmeyen nihai erektir. Sözkonusu uğruna-lık zemininde anlam (*significance*) ve bağlam kazanan şeyler, birbirlerini imlemek ve birbirlerine gönderme yapmak suretiyle belli bir tür ağ yapısı arzeder, böylelikle kendilerini Dasein'a tek tek değil, bütün (*whole*) olarak sunarlar. Çekiç *birlikte kullanılacağı* (*with-which*) çiviye, bu ikisi birbirine çakılacak tahtalara gönderirken, tüm bunlar sonuçta üretilmiş olması beklenen kitaplığa bağlanırlar; sevdiği kızını mutlu etmek üzere ona bir kitaplık yapmakta olan kişi ise hayatına anlam veren, dünyasını iyi bir babanın dünyası olarak her daim bütünleyen nihai ereksellik zemininde, zihinsel temsillerin yardımı

olmaksızın otomatik olarak yaşayıp gitmeye devam eder. Nesneleştirme, sözkonusu dünya bileşenlerinden birinin işlevini kaybetmesi sonucunda gerçekleşir. Herhangi bir alet, sorunsuzca kullanılması esnasında gözden silinip şeffaflaşırken, bozulduğu anda göze batar hale gelir ve kendini içinde yer almakta olduğu bağlamdan sıyrarak ön plana çıkar. Bu durumda sözkonusu alet, nesnel özellikleri bakımından incelemeye tâbî tutulacak elde-mevcut bir varolan haline gelir. Heidegger bu hamle sayesinde Husserl'in fenomenolojik indirgeme yöntemini gerekçelendirmiş, onu sağlam bir zemine oturtmuş olur. Yaşama dünyasının gündelik işleyişinde vuku bulan herhangi bir kırılma, şu ana kadar bahis konusu etmiş olduğumuz ağ yapısını nesne olarak gündeme getirir ve dünyanın nesne haline gelişinin ilk adımını oluşturur.

Bulunuş ve anlama, beraberce Dasein'in ontolojik özünü, yani ihtimamı (*care*) meydana getirirler. Bulunuş, yani kendini bir anlam dünyasında, belli bir haletiruhiye içinde bulma Dasein'in atılmışlığına işaret ederken, *ol-a-bilir-lik* (*Seinkönnen; ability to be*) ya da bitimsiz bir öz-belirlenim süreci olarak anlama Dasein'in kendini sürekli olarak belli bir uğrunaya (*for-the-sake-of*) yansıttığının (*Entwerfen; projection*) altını çizer. Kartezyen öznenin tersine kendini ilk olarak kendinde değil, dünyada bulan Dasein'in "zaten-bir-dünya-da-olan" (*being-already-in-a-world*) olduğunu söylemek gerekir. Anlama açısından bakıldığında ise, her daim henüz olmadığı bir şeyin peşinden koşan, bir başka deyişle, varoluşu doyurulamaz bir ereksellik içeren Dasein'in "kendi-önünde-olan" (*being-ahead-of-itself*) olduğunu vurgulamak icap edecektir. Dasein, içine atılmış olduğu tarihsel anlam dünyasından *itibaren* varolmaya başlayacak, bu varolma her daim bir ereksellik içerecek ve halihazırda içinde bulunulan dünya tarafından koşullandırılacaktır. Diğer yandan, Dasein'in, içine atıldığı, her türlü önsel malzemeyi kendisinden devşirdiği sosyo-kültürel yaşama dünyasını, erekselliğinin açmaya devam ettiği yepyeni ufuklar ışığında yeniden ve yeniden değerlendirme, yapılandırma şansı vardır. "Atılmış-yansıtma" (*thrown-projection*) olarak Dasein, kendine ve kendi özüne katılmış olan dünyasına eş ölçüde

ihtimam gösteren varlık olarak Descartesçı öznenin solipsizminden kaçınmayı başaracak, dünyaya kayıtsızlık ve dünyadan yalıtık olmanın getireceği sorunlara karşı bağımsızlık kazanacaktır.

Tüm bunlar özne ve zaman arasındaki ilişki çerçevesinde ele alınırsa, atılmışlıktaki *zaten* vurgusunun sahil anlamda geçmişe (*Gewesenheit; having-been*), yansıtmadaki *önünde* vurgusunun ise orijinal manada geleceğe (*Zukunft; future*) karşılık geldiği görülecektir. Ne geçmiş artık olup bitmiş olana, ne de gelecek henüz olmamış olana tahvil edilebilir. Zira Dasein aynı anda hem *artık olmuş olduğu*, hem de *henüz olmamış olduğudur*. Daha doğrusu o, bu iki zıt kutup arasında bir gidip gelme hareketinin adıdır.

Geleneksel zaman anlayışı, noktasal şimdilerin toplamından ibaret olduğu için Heidegger tarafından “şimdi-zamanı” (*now-time*) olarak adlandırılmaktadır. Heidegger, “şimdi ve sonraya atıfla deneyimlenen hareket içinde sayılmakta olan” biçimindeki Aristotelesçi tanımı, gündelik zaman kavrayışının temeli olarak değerlendirir. Batı felsefesi geleneği, bu tanımı zamanın geçişi üzerinden anlamış olsa da, şimdi olarak adlandırılan noktaları birbirlerinden yalıtık mevcudiyetler olarak karakterize etme yanılığısından kurtulamamıştır. Şu halde, şimdi-zamanını kendi anlayış ufkunda yeniden düşünmek ve onu tahripkâr (*destructive*) bir okumaya tâbî tutmak gerekecektir. Sözkonusu okumanın sonucunu kısaca özetlemek gerekirse, herşeyden önce zamanın sayılmadığı, onun her türlü deneyimin eşlikçisi olduğunu kabul etmek şarttır. Fenomenolojik açıdan ele alındığında, gündelik deneyim açısından sözkonusu olan dünyadaki nesnelere ve bu nesnelere yönelmiş olan zihin her daim bir zaman-muhasebesi içindedir (*time-reckoning*). Saate baktığımızda görmek istediğimiz ne saatin fiziksel özellikleri, ne de akrep ve yelkovan arasındaki açıdır. Bu eylem gerçekleştirildiğinde bakılan daha çok dersin bitmesine ne kadar kaldığı, toplantıya geç kalınıp kalınmadığı, vesairedir. Dasein’ı ilgilendiren gündelik olaylar ve

olup bitmeler, her daim zamansaldırlar ve bu da zamana ilişkin orijinal deneyimin sayma değil, zaman-muhasebesi olduğunun en açık kanıtıdır. Zaman-muhasebesini temel alan bu zaman, Dasein'ın her şeyden önce dünyaya yönelik varolan olduğunun altını çizdiğinden “dünya zamanı (*world-time*) olarak adlandırılır. Dünya zamanı her daim dünyevi olaylara gönderme yaptığından “tarikhendirilebilir” (*datable*), sözkonusu tarikhendirme olayları Dasein için ehemmiyetli kıldığından “anlamlı” (*significant*), tarikhendirilen olaylar belli bir sürece yayıldığından “yayımlı” (*spanned*), ve içi farklı farklı doldurulsa da şimdi, sonra, önceden gibi zaman bildiren ifadelerin herkes için aynı anlama gelmesi hasebiyle kamusaldir (*public*). Bu tip bir zaman çözümlemesi, zamanın noktasal şimdilerden meydana geldiği görüşünü tamamen dışarıda bırakır. Bunun yerine her bir şimdinin önce ve sonraya atıfla değerlendirilmesi gerekir ki, bu da noktasal şimdi anlayışından elastikiyet kazanmış, önce ve sonraya doğru genişleyen (*stretch*) bir şimdi anlayışına yelken açmakla eşdeğerdir. Basitçe ifade etmek gerekirse, noktasal şimdi, tıpkı Dasein gibi, içe kapalı, yalıtık ve boyutsuz bir yalıtılmışlık üzerinden değil, *kendi-dışına-doğru-olma* üzerinden anlaşılmalıdır. Heidegger cephesinden, Kant'ın zaman kavramını bilimsel zaman kavramıyla, yani sayılabilen noktasal şimdilerin düzgün doğrusal akışıyla sınırlandırmış olması, onun dünyayı ve özneyi yanlış anlamış olduğunun göstergesidir. Dasein'ın orijinal aşkınlığı ile zamansal şimdinin ekstatik (*kendinden-öte-olma*) yapısı arasındaki paralellik, özne ve zaman arasında kurulmaya çalışılan ilişki sorusuna verilmiş en iyi yanıtlardan biridir. Sözkonusu paralellik aslında varlığın hareketinin zamanın ekstatik hareketi ile eşdeğer olduğunun; varlığın açılması ya da zamanın zaman-lama-sının (*sich temporalieren; temporalizing itself*) ise Dasein'ın anlam ufkunda gerçekleştiğinin göstergesi olarak anlaşılmalıdır.

Artık şu ortaya çıkmıştır ki, Husserlci aşkınsal bilincin yönelimselliğine karşı kendini atılmış olduğu noktadan geleceğe ve geleceğinden tekrar geçmişine gönderen Dasein, varlığın hareketi ya da zamanın kendini açıklaması olarak özne

kavramsallaştırmasının onto-lojik zeminini meydana getirmektedir. Peki nedir onu kendisini tanımlanabilir, statik bir ne-lik (*quiddity; what-ness*), yani özne olarak görmeye iten?

Dasein'in ontolojik bütünlüğü olarak ortaya koyduğumuz ihtimam yapısının üçüncü ayağını oluşturan düşüş (*Verfallen; falling*) kavramsallaştırması, yukarıdaki sorunun yanıtına ulaşmak bakımından elimizdeki tek anahtardır. Düşüş, Dasein'in orijinal aşkınlık ya da potansiyel olarak nitelendirilen ontolojik özünü kendindelik, ne-lik, edimsellik (*actuality*) terimlerine indirgeyen, böylelikle de Dasein'i statik öze sahip elde-mevcut bir varolan olarak görmeyi kolaylaştıran varoluşsal hareketin adıdır. Bu noktada Dasein, ortalama varlık anlayışının hüküm sürdüğü onlar (*das Man; the they*) alanında varoluş ya da aşkınlık olarak formüle edilebilecek olan ontolojik özünü unutma eğilimi gösterir. Heidegger'in gayri-sahih (*inauthentic*) olarak adlandırdığı bu varoluş kipi, Dasein'in Onlar'a ait kendiliği (*the they-self*) devraldığı duruma karşılık gelmektedir. Özne, insanın kendini ortalama kamusalığın mevcudiyet temelli varlık anlayışına teslim ettiğinde kendini anlama biçimine karşılık gelmektedir. Söz konusu varlık anlayışı, zamanın mutlak bir şimdi içine hapsedilmesi (ya da, toptan ilga edilmesi), onun dünya-içre şeyler arasında bir şey haline getirilmesi demektir. Oysaki şimdi, ekstatik zamanın momentleri olara geçmiş ve gelecek arasında hüküm sürmekte olan varlık hareketi neticesinde, mevcudiyete-taşıma (*enpresenting*) olarak kendini gösteriyor olmalıdır. Buna karşın geleneksel ontoloji, şimdiyi en baştan merkezi konuma taşımış, bu sayede de geçmiş ve geleceğin sahil anlamlarını gözardı etmeyi kolaylaştıracak bir paradigma yaratmayı başarmıştır.

İnsanın kendini şeyler arasında bir şey olarak görmesi, onun kendisine bir *doğa* atfedebilmesini, bu sayede de kendine mukayyet olabilmesini kolaylaştırır. Kendi-dışı(nda) varlık olarak Dasein endişe halindedir. Bu endişenin bertaraf edilmesi, özne kavramsallaştırmasının getirdiği kapanımı, yani orijinal aşkınlık olarak Dasein'in

ontolojik ucu açıklığının bir yana bırakılması sayesinde mümkündür. Sözkonusu kapanımın dahi kaynağı olarak gösterilebilecek olan Dasein, tam da bu anlamda öznenin ontolojik koşuludur.