

INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL DYNAMICS OF TRANSITION
TO DEMOCRACY IN TURKEY BETWEEN 1945 AND 1950

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ABSTRACT

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The main objective of this thesis is to examine both external and internal dynamics in terms of their preparation for the ways to democratization in Turkey between 1945 and 1950. It was asserted in many academic and nonacademic works that the main influences for democratization of Turkey in this period came from outside as external dynamics. But in this study, it will be argued that while the external dynamics may stimulate different actors for democratization, survival and consolidation of this democratization process requires internal dynamics more than the external ones. In order to check the validity of this argument, the thesis focuses on Turkish democratization period between 1945 and 1950. This historical interval is important; because, although there were some efforts for transition to democratic regime by that time, all those efforts failed due to the unpreparedness of the Turkish rulers, the Turkish people, and also insufficient social, economic and political conditions in the country. Within the five year period between 1945 and 1950, both the internal and the external dynamics which would contribute democratization in Turkey had changed. The new conditions emerging from the WW II and the post war period transformed economic, political, and social structures of the society that changed expectations in the country. All these dynamics playing important roles in the democratization of Turkey will be mentioned in the thesis. The period in the thesis will start with the termination of the WW II and it will end with the general elections held on May 14, 1950.

Keywords: Turkey, Democratization Process, Internal and External Dynamics, Republican People's Party, Democratic Party.

ÖZ

1945 VE 1950 ARASI DÖNEMDE TÜRKİYE'DE DEMOKRASİYE GEÇİŞİN İÇ VE DIŞ DİNAMİKLERİ

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Bu tezin ana amacı Türkiye'nin 1945-1950 arası dönemde demokratikleşme sürecine etki eden iç ve dış dinamikleri incelemektir. Birçok akademik ve akademik olmayan çalışma Türkiye'nin bu dönemdeki demokratikleşmesine daha çok dış dinamiklerin etki ettiğini iddia etti. Fakat bu çalışmada, bir yandan dış dinamiklerin bazı aktörleri uyararak harekete geçirdiği ve bunun da demokratikleşme sürecine katkı verebileceği iddia edilirken, diğer taraftan da başlayan demokratikleşme sürecinin kesintiye uğramaması ve pekişmesi için, daha çok iç dinamiklere ihtiyaç olduğu ileri sürülecektir. İddianın geçerliliğini test etmek için, bu tezde özellikle 1945-1950 arası dönemde Türkiye'nin demokratikleşme sürecine odaklanılacaktır. Bu dönem önemlidir, çünkü bu döneme kadar demokratik sisteme geçiş için bazı denemeler olmasına rağmen bu çabalar, ülkedeki ekonomik, politik, sosyal ve kültürel koşulların yeterli olmamasından dolayı başarısızlıkla sonuçlandı. 1945-1950 arasındaki beş yıllık dönemde Türkiye'de demokratikleşmeye katkı verecek olan hem iç ve hem de dış dinamikler oldukça değişmişti. Tüm dünya siyasetini değiştiren 2. Dünya Savaşı'nda ve sonrasında ortaya çıkan yeni koşullar Türkiye toplumunun ekonomik, siyasal ve sosyal yapılarını dönüştürerek beklentilerin de değişmesine yol açtı. Türkiye'deki demokratikleşme sürecinde önemli rol oynayan tüm bu dinamikler tez içerisinde ele alınacaktır. Çalışılan dönem 2. Dünya Savaşı'nın bitmesiyle başlayıp, 14 Mayıs 1950'deki genel seçimlerle gelen iktidar değişikliği ile son bulacaktır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Türkiye, Demokratikleşme Süreci, İç ve Dış Dinamikler, Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, Demokrat Parti.

To My faithful Wife Eda & my Daughter Dila

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

CUP	Committee of Union and Progress
DP	Democratic Party
DTCF	Dil Tarih ve Coğrafya Fakültesi
ECA	Economic Cooperation Administration
ERP	European Recovery Program
FRP	Free Republican Party
GNP	Gross National Product
GNA	Grand National Assembly
IBRD	International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
ILO	International Labor Organization
IMF	International Monetary Fund
LRP	Liberal Republican Party
METU	Middle East Technical University
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NDL	National Defense Law
NDP	National Development Party
OEEC	Organization of European Economic Cooperation
PRP	Progressive Republican Party
RPP	Republican People's Party
TBMM	Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi
TGNA	Turkish Grand National Assembly
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
US	United States
WW I	World War I
WW II	World War II

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Turkey experienced democratization in different times with the effects of both internal and external dynamics since the establishment of the republican regime in 1923. However while democratization attempts earlier than the 1940s could not achieve the result as much as Turkish rulers expected, the democratization after this period continued more or less parallel to the democratization in the world. The existing widespread dissatisfaction and demands of democratization in the country which overlapped with the conditions of the Second World War (hereafter WW II) and encouraged as well as forced Turkish rulers to meet the demand for democracy; and thus, Turkey took part its place in the new global democracy wave which came with the end of WW II. This thesis keeping in mind this fact aims to examine the democratization process in the second half of the 1940s by questioning the main dynamics of Turkish democratization between 1945 and 1950. The time span covers the period from the end of the WW II to 1950, when a new era in democratization of Turkey began.

In fact Turkey's experiment with democratization, if we put aside the Ottoman experience, started in the 1920s when the Turkish Republic was established. Although there were plans, intents, and some efforts to materialize a democratic regime in Turkey, this could not be achieved due to many obstacles such as a lack of experience; world politics; and domestic social, economic, and political challenges. The paradox of the young Turkey was whether to follow an authoritarian regime in order to impose republican reforms for the sake of the country or to establish a democratic regime requiring longer time to realize such reforms and to be approved by the Turkish people whatever it costs. But this paradox left its place to a preference focusing completely on reforms and formation of new institutions such as modern laws, courts, schools, universities, etc. from above totally. In spite of some short lived attempts, long term democratization started with the end of the war and it was affected both internal and external dynamics. In order to define these dynamics, this thesis is going to follow the roots of these dynamics that some of them came from the pre-war period; and then, pursue the traces of those dynamics on Turkey after the WW II. Before we start to examine these dynamics it will be useful to define what democracy is and what kind of democratization was materialized in Turkey.

By classical definition, democracy is a form of rule. The meaning of the word “democracy” is people’s government constituted by themselves. Interpretation of democracy and its practice are affected from social, economic, cultural, political and historical conditions of societies. Peter Berger describes democracy as a system which guarantees to change the power through free elections.¹ Gencay Şaylan determines four criteria for democracy such as, election-representation principle, importance of human rights, superiority of the law, and pluralism.² Robert Dahl however claims that it is impossible to make a clear definition for democracy. Therefore he prefers to use the term “poliarchy” having a political regime close to the ideal, and means to be governed by many persons.³ According to Dahl, democracy has some essential characteristics; such as, elected deputies; fair and periodic free elections; freedom of speech, alternative sources of information; the right to elect and be elected; organization right for interest groups and for other organizations such as independent associations, independent political parties.⁴ What can be derived from above explanations is the elections secured by law made with the participation of the people and parties are sine qua non for the realization of democracy and they will be the main criteria of this thesis; and also these criteria are going to use to examine the main dynamics of Turkish democratization between 1945 and 1950.

Under the lights of these explanations in this study, the concept of “democracy” will be used in a narrow meaning that is, “democracy” includes a parliament formed by the people’s representatives coming from free, fair and competitive multiparty elections, which are scheduled with determined intervals and secured by judicial guarantee. Even though there were elections within the some intervals, it is difficult to claim that Turkey was ruled with democracy from 1945 to 1950. Turkey’s experience with democracy does not suit the above explanations since Turkey was ruled with the single party regime for a long time.

Turkey was established after the National War for Independence carried out between 1919 and 1922 and republican regime was accepted in 1923. After then, Turkey was ruled under authoritarian single party regime by *Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi* (Republican People’s Party – hereafter RPP) until 1945. The single party rule caused criticisms and it was blamed

¹ Berger, Peter, “Günümüz Dünyasında Demokrasi”, Ed. Atilla Yayla, *Sosyal ve Siyasal Teori: Seçme Yazıları* (Ankara: Siyasal Kitabevi, 1999), pp.31 and 37.

² Şaylan, Gencay, *Demokrasi ve Demokrasi Düşüncesinin Gelişmesi*, Türkiye Ortadoğu Amme İdaresi Enstitüsü (Ankara: Masa Üstü Yayıncılık, 1998), pp.10-11.

³ Dahl, Robert, *Demokrasi Üstüne*, translator: Kadioğlu, Betül (Ankara: Phoenix Yayınevi, 2001), p.94.

⁴ Dahl, Robert, *Dilemmas of Pluralist Democracy*, (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1982), p.11.

of not having democracy. According to Tarık Zafer Tunaya, because of ideological causes, single party regimes don't allow establishment of opposition parties.⁵ Giovanni Sartori, on the other side, argues that a single party regime can have opposition parties as formality.⁶ According to Mete Tunçay, the single party regime practiced by the RPP cannot be called as totalitarian.⁷

Maurice Duverger underlined that Turkish single party regime never used a party doctrine during its ruling period. On the contrary, the RPP did not like single party systems and was even embarrassed of having a single party regime. According to Duverger, for this reason, the RPP had attempted transition to the multiparty system twice in the past.⁸ But these attempts happened in different ways. For example although the *Serbest Cumhuriyet Fırkası* (Free Republican Party-hereafter FRP) in 1930 was a project of the RPP rulers in order to set multiparty system with assumption of being a loyal opposition, *Terakkiperver Cumhuriyet Fırkası* (Progressive Republican Party- hereafter PRP) was not a project of the RPP rule. On the contrary, the PRP had been established by some opponents who were against the RPP rule. Then there was not any attempt to establish an opposition party until 1945 either by the RPP or by any political groups and this was related with the democracy understanding of the RPP rulers principally İsmet İnönü. What was the democratic regime concept in İsmet İnönü's mind? İnönü himself gives the answer as "...The government regime of the state is national sovereignty; that is, it is practiced as democratic regime". He explained this practice with "national sovereignty including both ruling and opposition parties".⁹ Therefore, İnönü's deduction was that democratic regime meant a limited meaning with opposition parties. Indeed, as we will see in the next chapters that the RPP rulers had aimed to create opposition parties being loyal to the ruling party, the RPP.

Was there enough democracy in Turkey when the power changed in 1950? Despite of general elections in 1946, it was difficult to say that there was democracy because of lack of fair and free elections and lack of justice control. Thus, the RPP would be able to keep its

⁵ Tunaya, Tarık Zafer, *Siyasal Kurumlar ve Anayasa Hukuku* (İstanbul: İstanbul Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi Yayınları, 1975), p.406.

⁶ Sartori, Giovanni, *Parties and Party Systems* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1976), p. 227.

⁷ Tunçay, Mete, *T.C.'de Tek-Parti Yönetiminin Kurulması 1923-1931* (İstanbul: Cem Yayınları, 1989), p.13.

⁸ Duverger, Maurice, *Siyasi Partiler*, translator: Özbudun, Ergun (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınları, 1993), pp.335-64.

⁹ Aydemir, Şevket Süreyya, *İkinci Adam 1938-1950*, Cilt II (İstanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 2000), pp.436-7.

power for a while although *Milli Kalkınma Partisi* (National Development Party - hereafter NDP), the first opposition party was established in 1945 and *Demokrat Parti* (Democratic Party - hereafter DP) was established on January 1946. Also, we should remember that established “democracy” in 1945 had very narrow meaning and it had excluded the Left from the newly formed multiparty regime.¹⁰ Yet, as a narrow meaning, at least a power change occurred with the results of May 14, 1950 elections, and this change proves that this was a real attempt for “democracy” in Turkey since it was the first, honest, contested general elections in her history.¹¹ Therefore, to be able to understand democratization in Turkey, it will be necessary to start with the time of the opposition parties at the end of the WW II and end it with the 1950 election which was a corner stone of Turkish democracy history.

1.1. Literature Review

There are many studies about the history of Turkish democratization between 1945 and 1950. In terms of democratization dynamics, we can divide these studies into three main groups. The first group asserts that internal dynamics played more significant role for Turkish democratization. Kemal H. Karpat, for instance, produced a fairly detailed study, *Turkey's Politics* and he claimed at its preface that opposition establishment efforts for transition to the multiparty system, and liberty discussions in 1939 resulting from widespread dissatisfaction in the society stopped because of the WW II; but finally, the transition was realized by internal dynamics.¹² In spite of democratic regime expectations of international arena and contribution of efforts for entering the United Nations (UN),¹³ Karpat argued that internal dynamics played important role for democratization of Turkey because modernization movements made by the RPP rulers had to affect and review ultimately the existent political structure not basing on masses.¹⁴ Şevket Süreyya Aydemir wrote that the dynamics for transition to democracy came from the inside. According to him

¹⁰ Eroğul, Cem, “The Establishment of Multiparty Rule: 1945-71”, in Schick, İrvin C. & Tonak, Ertuğrul Ahmet, *Turkey in Transition* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), p.103.

¹¹ Robinson, Richard D., *The First Turkish Republic* (Massachusetts: Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1963), p.141.

¹² Karpat, Kemal H., *Türk Demokrasi Tarihi, Sosyal-Ekonomik ve Kültürel Temeller* (İstanbul: İstanbul Matbaası, 1967), p.125.

¹³ Ibid., p.126.

¹⁴ Ibid., p.III.

this was an ideal of both Atatürk and İnönü since establishment of the republic.¹⁵ Ergün Özbudun asserts that the potentially democratic character of the RPP rule initiated democratization and transition to democracy.¹⁶ Hikmet Bila claimed that the dynamics of democratization process came basically from internal.¹⁷ Metin Heper analyzing İsmet İnönü in his study, concluded that internal dynamics were dominant for Turkish democratization in the 1940s and he underlined that the most significant dynamic was İnönü.¹⁸

The second group puts forward that particularly external dynamics transformed Turkey's political regime towards democracy. We should remember that even in 1945 the discussions about democratization dynamics had begun with Zekeriya and Sabiha Sertel at *Tan*, and Ahmet Emin Yalman at *Vatan* newspapers. They argued that democratization and political liberalization of Turkey had started due to external dynamics.¹⁹ Even though, Metin Toker gives importance to İnönü factor for democratization, he accepts external dynamics forcing İnönü's decisions.²⁰ Cem Eroğul considers democratization efforts made in Turkey between 1945 and 1950 as "formal democracy" efforts. According to him democratization dynamics basically came from international conditions of post WW II.²¹ Like Eroğul, Feroz Ahmad put weight to external dynamics for Turkish democratization during this period.²² Metin Tamkoç expresses external dynamics for democratization that they were enough coercive to convince realistic practitioner İnönü.²³ According to Cemil Koçak, the pressure coming from democratic west, particularly from the US, was not so intensive because "Cold War" had begun. Therefore, Turkey did not feel increasing request or pressure from the west. However, Turkish rulers had to take the results of this new period including the Soviet

¹⁵ Aydemir, pp.435-7.

¹⁶ Özbudun, Ergun, *Contemporary Turkish Politics: Challenges to Democratic Consolidation* (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000), pp.21, 23-4.

¹⁷ Bila, Hikmet, *CHP Tarihi, 1919-1979* (Ankara: DMS Doruk Matbaacılık Sanayii, 1979), pp.245-7.

¹⁸ Heper, Metin, *İsmet İnönü, Yeni Bir Yorum Denemesi* (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, No: 80, 1999), pp.116-47.

¹⁹ Toker, Metin, *Demokrasimizin İsmet Paşalı Yılları-Tek Partiden Çok Partiye, 1944-1950* (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınları, 1990), p.73; Yalman, Ahmet Emin, *Gördüklerim Geçirdiklerim, 1945-1970*, vol..IV (İstanbul: 1970), p.7.

²⁰ Toker, *ibid.*, p.197.

²¹ Eroğul, Cem, *Demokrat Parti Tarihi ve İdeolojisi* (Ankara: İmge Kitabevi, 1990), pp.17-24.

²² Ahmad, Feroz & Turgay, Bedia, *Türkiye'de Çok Partili Politikanın Açıklamalı Kronolojisi, 1945-1971* (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1976), p.11.

²³ Tamkoç, Metin, *The Warrior Diplomats* (Salt Lake City, University of Utah Press, 1976), p.220.

threat into consideration.²⁴ Mustafa Albayrak gives priority to the external dynamics after specifying internal and external dynamics in this democratization period.²⁵ Ali Gevgilili regarding external dynamics claims that İnönü had to ask for assistance of the west in the post WW II conditions because he could not turn towards the east because of the Soviet demands.²⁶ Çetin Yetkin ranges both internal and external reasons of Turkish democratization at conclusion section of his book, “*Karşıdevrim*”(Anti-Revolution)²⁷ but he claims frequently that external dynamics forced Turkey to make amendments and reforms for Turkish democratization.²⁸ Mahmut Goloğlu sets linkages between external dynamics and transition to multiparty regime in Turkey.²⁹

In addition to these, other social scientists explain Turkish democratization with both internal and external dynamics and they were Tarık Zafer Tunaya,³⁰ Rıfki Salim Burçak,³¹ Hakkı Uyar,³² Şerafettin Turan,³³ Ahmet Demirel,³⁴ Osman Faruk Loğoğlu,³⁵ Ahmet Yeşil,³⁶ Richard D. Robinson,³⁷ Erik J. Zürcher,³⁸ and Bernard Lewis.³⁹

²⁴ Koçak, Cemil, *İkinci Parti, Türkiye’de İki Partili Siyasi Sistemin Kuruluş Yılları, 1945-1950* (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2010), pp.933-5.

²⁵ Albayrak, Mustafa, *Türk Siyasi Tarihinde Demokrat Parti, 1946-1960* (Ankara: Phoneix Yayınevi, 2004), p.41.

²⁶ Gevgilili, Ali, *Yükseliş ve Düşüş* (İstanbul: Bağlam Yayınları, 1987), p.34.

²⁷ Yetkin, Çetin, *Karşıdevrim, 1945-1950* (İstanbul: Otopsi Yayınları, 2003), pp.607-10.

²⁸ Yetkin, Çetin, *Türkiye’de Tek Parti Yönetimi* (İstanbul: Altın Kitaplar Yayınevi, 1983), pp.242-9.

²⁹ Goloğlu, Mahmut, *Milli Şef Dönemi, 1939-1945* (Ankara: Kalite Matbaası, 1974), p.391.

³⁰ Tunaya, Tarık Zafer, *Türkiye’de Siyasi Partiler* (İstanbul: Doğan Kardeşler Yayınları, 1952), p.647.

³¹ Burçak, Salim Rıfki, *Türkiye’de Demokrasiye Geçiş, 1945-1950* (Ankara: Olgaç Yayınevi, 1979), pp.25-50.

³² Uyar, Hakkı, *Tek Parti Dönemi ve Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi*, Boyut Kitapları, İstanbul, 1998, p.195-7.

³³ Turan, Şerafettin, *Türk Devrim Tarihi, Çağdaşlık Yolunda Yeni Türkiye (10 Kasım 1938 - 14 Mayıs 1950)*, 4. Kitap (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1999), p.209.

³⁴ Demirel, Ahmet, *Birinci Mecliste Muhalefet: İkinci Grup* (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1995), pp.608-9.

³⁵ Loğoğlu, Osman Faruk, *İsmet İnönü and the Political Modernization of Turkey, 1945-1965* (Michigan, Princeton University, 1970), pp.87-8.

³⁶ Yeşil, Ahmet, *Türkiye’de Çok Partili Hayata Geçiş* (Ankara: Kültür ve Turizm Bakanlığı Yayınları, 1988), p.19.

³⁷ Robinson, *The First Turkish Republic*, pp.142-3.

³⁸ Zürcher, Erik J., *Turkey A Modern History* (New York: I.B. Tauris and Co Ltd, 1998), pp.214-9.

³⁹ Bernard, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp.303-5.

While preparing this thesis including the literature given above related books, periodicals, online journals, and newspapers at National Library (*Milli Kütüphane*) in Ankara were used. Also, in order to strengthen my thesis, I benefited from statistics and numeric tables mainly from Yahya Sezai Tezel's *Cumhuriyet Döneminin İktisadi Tarihi* (2001) which provides satisfactory economic data. In addition to the books and articles, related cartoons were used as well. The cartoons quoted from Turgut Çeviker's *Karikatürkiye* (2010) are overlapping naturally with the events developing in related period. Indeed, these cartoons have given us very interesting and clear clues to understand the conditions of studied period.

1.2. Composition of the Thesis

This thesis is composed of four chapters in order to make clear the internal and external dynamics. Introduction will be the first chapter to set up a base for this thesis. The second chapter will be about the background of the dynamics of Turkish democratization during the establishment period of the Turkish Republic with references to the political, economic, and social structure. The third chapter will be examining the importance of the WW II for Turkish society. This chapter will also examine particularly the global effects of the war both inside and outside of Turkey.

In the fourth chapter, the thesis is going to deal with the democratization dynamics as external and internal in the aftermaths of the WW II. In addition to continuing effects of the WW II, new emerging effects of the cold war starting just postwar period will be mentioned briefly as well. External dynamics emerging from particularly the economic and the political pressure of the war conditions will be significant subject matter of the fourth chapter. Internal dynamics of Turkish democratization, on the other side, is another important subject matter of this last chapter. It is important to understand "how those domestic and foreign dynamics shaped thoughts and actions of the opponents and then transformed them into a serious opposition under the Democratic Party umbrella". In order to make it easier to comprehend, this thesis will try to explain those dynamics while trying to be loyal to historical chronology of the events in this long period.

CHAPTER 2

TURKEY; PRIOR TO THE WORLD WAR II

2.1. Establishment of Turkey; Political, Economic, and Social Conditions (1920s-1930s)

Modern Turkey was established on the land where once the Ottoman Empire ruled. It was established after the Turkish War for Independence which was carried out by the Turkish Grand National Assembly (hereafter TGNA) formed by the nationalists without any party affiliation between 1920 and 1922. There was no mention of a democratic rule during this period. After being victorious at the end of the Turkish War for Independence and with the signing of the Peace Treaty in Lausanne, discussions started on the political regime in Turkey together with the economic and social measures that were to be followed to establish an independent and modern state.

Turkish national movement against the occupiers, the Allied powers and Greece, was socially conservative. The first separation among the patriots of the Independence War burgeoned firstly in Sivas Congress on September 4, 1919. The most significant opposition group was favoring mandates system for Turkey.⁴⁰ However, Mustafa Kemal, who was the leader of Anatolian movement, was opposed to such opinions; and therefore, he conflicted with the first potential political leaders of the pre-republic.

Following the victory of the Turks, the different sides of coalition put forward their own claims and interests. However, most of their demands were not same with the westernization thoughts of Mustafa Kemal and his friends. Due to these differences, a big schism appeared between coalition partners; and finally, when the demands asking the sultanate were not realized, the coalition resolved quickly.⁴¹ During the War for Independence, there was a loose alliance⁴² between bureaucracy (both military and civilian), peasants, religious representatives, Muslim ethnic minorities (Kurds), new rising bourgeoisie having unionist impetus by, *eşraf* (notables) and landlords.⁴³ Because of the impacts of the

⁴⁰ Refet Pahsa was the well known opposition name that he was defending to accept an American mandate. Bila, Hikmet, *CHP, 1919-2009* (İstanbul: Doğan Kitap Yayıncılık, 2008), pp.18-9.

⁴¹ Oran, p.196.

⁴² Ahmad, Feroz, *The Making of Modern Turkey* (New York: Routledge Publisher, 1999), pp.52-3.

⁴³ Oran, *ibid.*

traditional *eşraf* and the religious representatives, the most of people considered this national struggle as a movement to restore of the Sultan's power.⁴⁴ Before the promulgation of the Republican regime, leading nationalist figures other than Mustafa Kemal were persistent in keeping on Caliphate and Sultanate.⁴⁵ However, after a short time, the republican regime was accepted in Turkey. Ruling the country by a parliament was a tradition inherited from the former state structure.⁴⁶ Even before the establishment of the Turkish Republic, the delegates in both Erzurum and Sivas Congresses were representatives coming from different regions. Their ultimate target was to set a defense front against the Allied occupations since the Ottoman Government was not able to protect the country.⁴⁷ Indeed, as soon as the Ottoman Parliament was closed, Mustafa Kemal together with the nationalists formed the Turkish Grand National Assembly (right after TGNA) in Ankara in order to represent Turkish people legally. But the landlords and notables were supporting the rulers of new republic and kept on their own positions very close to the rulers.⁴⁸ In order to solve leadership problem, Mustafa Kemal aimed to abolish Sultanate in 1922, firstly. Although this was the first achievement of the reformers against the conservatives, the number of supporters of Mustafa Kemal was still minority in the GNA in 1923.⁴⁹ Indeed, during the Independence War, the GNA had a Second Group including mostly the former Unionists having very strong resistance against Mustafa Kemal and his politics.⁵⁰

In fact, the new Turkish State under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal and the nationalist cadre were really vigorous for modernization reforms in socio-cultural life. Doğan Avcıoğlu argued that the Republican rule had to realize those reforms under an authoritarian regime; otherwise, political liberalism might have ended up the whole Republican reform efforts.⁵¹

⁴⁴ Ahmad, *The Making of Modern Turkey*, pp.52-3.

⁴⁵ Rauf Orbay and Refet Bele had told openly their own thoughts about Caliphate and Sultanate to Atatürk. Ahmad, Feroz, *Modern Türkiye'nin Oluşumu*. Translator: Yavuz Alogan (İstanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, 2002), pp.73-4.

⁴⁶ Even though there was a very limited level of political participation in elections, political means such as elections, parties, associations, right of petition, and a legislation parliament made by indirect elections were valuable inheritances from the Ottoman to the new Republic. Öz, Esat, *Tek Parti Yönetimi ve Siyasal Katılım* (Ankara: Gündoğan Yayınları, Ocak 1992), p.151.

⁴⁷ Karpat, *Türk Demokrasi Tarihi*, p.36.

⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁹ Ahmad, *The Making of Modern Turkey*, pp.52-3.

⁵⁰ Oran, p.197.

⁵¹ Avcıoğlu, Doğan, *Türkiye'nin Düzeni-I* (İstanbul: Tekin Yayınevi, 1995), p.507.

Even though these reforms were made with a dazzling speed and radically changed social life in the urban, the reforms could not diffuse to the periphery in the early years. Many reforms were ineffective in the rural areas; and moreover, economic conditions for them had not changed. As a result, the rural masses became potential followers of any opposition movement as experienced in 1924, 1930, and then, 1946.⁵²

In the early decades, the legal foundation of the regime of the Turkish Republic was the 1924 Constitution. Even if the constitution had some limitations, there was no obstacle for the opposite thoughts and political groups.⁵³ Indeed, the RPP rulers made democratization attempts before 1945. However, the process could not realize a free multiparty election system.⁵⁴ Under leadership of Mustafa Kemal, republican rulers were enthusiastic to transform Turkey towards a modern and secular structure. More importantly it was paid efforts to keep the TGNA open and its legislative function during single party regime. They believed that the law and order must rely on the TGNA having deputies elected by people. For this reason, Turkish democracy experience in the early years of the republic had a comparative superiority against undemocratic counterparts in the same period in the world.⁵⁵ Even, while many countries prefer totalitarian and authoritarian regimes in the west, Turkey tried to transit to the multiparty system via Free Republican Party (FRP) in 1930. However, FRP could not survive so long and just three months later, its political life terminated because of some challenges against the FRP founders in the country.

After 1923 Elections, the People's Party consisting of *Anadolu* and *Rumeli Müdafaa-i Hukuk Cemiyetleri* (unions) was established on September 9, 1923. In the same month, Mustafa Kemal was elected as the first president of the People's Party,⁵⁶ İsmet Pasha was appointed as the vice-president and Celal Bey (Bayar) was appointed as the board member of People's Party.⁵⁷ The People's Party became the first ruling party in the GNA and its

⁵² On the other hand, however, while the Second Constitution's rulers held four general multi-party elections between 1908 and 1919 [Tunaya, Tarık Zafer, *Türkiye'de Siyasi Dernekler*, vol.III (İstanbul: Hürriyet Vakfı Yayınları, 1984), p.164], the republican regime could not achieve a general election with an opposition party until 1946.

⁵³ Duverger, p.359.

⁵⁴ Beside of the FRP, there were some other opposition parties; however, they could not survive more than a few months. See, Tunçay, pp.273-82.

⁵⁵ Özbudun, Ergun, *Çağdaş Türk Politikası – Demokratik Pekişmenin Önündeki Engeller* (İstanbul: Doğan Kitap, 2003), p.13.

⁵⁶ Bila, p.36.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, p.37.

rulers declared republic as the first political practice in the country on October 29, 1923. In the new political regime Mustafa Kemal became the President of the state but he did not accept to leave the People's Party even though there was criticism of the opposition.⁵⁸

There were still some unionists having the former military prestige in the assembly. Also there was a widespread discontent among the people against the People's Party but still Mustafa Kemal had fairly much prestige. For this reason, criticisms inclined towards the People's Party and İnönü.⁵⁹ Ten deputies left the party and established the PRP on November 17, 1924. There were well known names in this first opposition party; for example, Rauf Bey, Refet (Bele) Pasha, Cafer Tayyar Pasha, and Hüseyin Cahit. President of the PRP was Kazım (Karabekir) Pasha.⁶⁰ This new opposition party became the center of all opponents such as pro-caliphates, pro-sultanates, and some notables. The other opposition rose from the eastern part of the country and this turned to Sheikh Said Rebellion as the first Kurdish opposition against the new republic. After a short time, the rebellion was under control but a new law, *Takrir-i Sükun*, was enacted and then the PRP was abolished on June 3, 1925.⁶¹ Most of PRP members were excluded from the assembly and particularly after İzmir assassination, the remaining were excluded from the political arena by the Independence Courts.⁶²

While important efforts were paid to solve the political problems in the country in the early years of the republic at the same time there were attempts to organize the economic conditions since the latter both inside and outside forced the RPP rule to control most of means in economy. The governments in the 1920s tried to establish a mixed economy policy to rebuild the country. Particularly the early effects of the "Great Depression" in 1929 caused Turkish rulers to search alternative ways in order to solve economic problems and to avoid from effects of global economic depression. The solution for the crises came with the etatist economy model which had been put into force by many countries in Europe since it was believed that by application of etatist politics, state and nation would get an integrity structure. The Republicans in the 1935 Congress asserted that liberal economy policies were insufficient to solve economic problems of the country. According to them, liberalism was unsuccessful and state economy

⁵⁸ Ibid., pp.39-40.

⁵⁹ Zürcher, Erik J., *Terakkiperver Cumhuriyet Fırkası* (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2003). p.66.

⁶⁰ Bila, p.47.

⁶¹ Ibid.

⁶² Oran, p.197.

must have been placed instead of current liberal policies.⁶³ In this period, state economy politics of communism in the Soviets was successful. In the same period, fascist regime in Italy had also successful statist economy policy. But the Republicans wanted neither communist nor fascist regimes to practice statist economy politics. They argued that a state economy model having nationalist perspective can be a solution against communism and fascism. But it was very difficult to determine the borders between nationalism and fascism. Always, any nationalist regime and its politics might reveal fascist and totalitarian emotions.⁶⁴ Indeed, in this period, some cartoons in newspaper *Akşam* and journal *Akbaba* were clear clues arising totalitarian emotions of the RPP rule having etatist economy politics in the mid 1930s.⁶⁵

The term etatism was used first time by Prime Minister İsmet İnönü on August 30, 1930.⁶⁶ When etatism discussions began in the country, the end of newly established Free Republican Party came.⁶⁷ The Head of FRP, Ali Fethi Okyar, hesitated to confront Mustafa Kemal in political competition.⁶⁸ Because of its attractive peculiarity, the FRP could find many supporters in a short time; but this rapid development of the opposition disturbed the regime. When reactionary groups supported opposition party,⁶⁹ the reflex to protect the regime against the conservatives came to the fore in the state.

⁶³ The Party Program claimed that Marxism putting forward class struggle would be obstructed. Tunaya, *Türkiye'de Siyasi Partiler* (1952), p.571.

⁶⁴ According to new regulations in the 1935 Congress, Party General Secretary became Minister of Internal Affairs and province governors (*vali*) became Province Chief of the RPP. *Ibid.*, p.572.

⁶⁵ Actually, the regime during the RPP rule was not totalitarian, but there were some totalitarian thoughts and emotions among some circles. See the illustration 1; the cartoon reflects radical nationalist and totalitarian emotions in the period. Çeviker, Turgut, *Karikatürkiye* (İstanbul: NTV Yayınları, 2010), p.139; Also see the illustration 2: By this drawing, Necmi Rıza Ayça presents Turkish society as a classless structure and shows again the nationalist and totalitarian emotions after the 1935 Congress of the RPP. *Ibid.*, p.148.

⁶⁶ Göymen, Korel, "Stages of Etatist Development in Turkey", *ODTÜ Gelişme Dergisi*, No: 10, Winter 1976, p.91.

⁶⁷ Three opposition parties were established in 1930; the Free Republican Party was established August 12, 1930 but only three months later, its political life ended on November 17, 1930. The second opposition party was the Turkish Republican Worker and Farmer Party (*Türk Cumhuriyet Amele ve Çiftçi Partisi*). This party was established in Edirne on August 29, 1930 but the government accused of it having socialist program and then this party was closed. The last opposition party in 1930 was the People Republic Party (*Ahali Cumhuriyet Partisi*) established in Adana on September 29, 1930. The party was cancelled by the decision of the Committee of Deputies on December 21, 1930. Tunaya, *ibid.*, pp. 622-38.

⁶⁸ Fethi Okyar wrote a document mentioning about his political doubt that he did not want to confront with Atatürk's political power. For this document, see at Tunaya, *ibid.*, p.635.

⁶⁹ According to the RPP government, the main support for Fethi Okyar and his Party came from reactionary groups. Karpat, *Türk Demokrasi Tarihi*, pp. 62-3.

The achievements against conservatives were rapid in the political scene. However, consolidation of the triumphs against conservatives inside and imperialists outside were very important. According to the rulers of new republic, the consolidation in the country would come with economic achievements. But there was little development in economy. While the economy politics created tension in the country it was not remembered that the crisis originated from the Ottoman past. Economic system in the Ottoman Empire was weak and mostly based on land and agricultural production. The conditions of the economic structure in the early decades of 20th century were more or less the same with the 18th and 19th centuries. In the same way, the economic structure of the Turkish Republic in the early years was not only primitive and rudimentary, but also lacked internal integration.⁷⁰ Agriculture was commonly making for self-consumption and for small local markets. Industrial sector was small scale and made in small workshops by manual labor. Each region and city had different and separate economy qualities, and also every district had to meet their needs from local markets. The service sector, which developed well in the last periods of the Ottoman Empire, especially in transportation, banking and foreign trade, was integrated into Western European economies more than the other sectors of the economy.

The integration of the Ottoman economy to the western economic models was very important for western capitalists and bourgeoisies due to universal interests of capitalism.⁷¹ In order to create suitable climate for adaptation of those economic models, the first requirement was capitalist entrepreneurs. However, there was no private ownership formally until 1858 in the country, and even there was no individualist-materialist view among Muslim Turks historically. On the contrary, habits of Turkish people relied on economic contentment, mass solidarity, and spiritual-religious values. Second, there was not enough capital accumulation in Turkish society to move capitalist emotions and to create consumption demands. Hence, with little capital, native investors could not increase their capitals and develop a supply and demand relationship. When the Turkish Republic was established there were no powerful trade bourgeoisie in the country. Even though the non-Muslim trade bourgeoisie improved, most of them had lost their economic wealth or had to emigrate out of Anatolia during the World War I; the Turkish War for Independence; and

⁷⁰ Şahin, Hüseyin, *Türkiye Ekonomisi* (Bursa: Ezgi Kitabevi, 2000), p.6.

⁷¹ Cem, İsmail, *Türkiye'nin Geri Kalmışlığının Tarihi* (İstanbul: Cem Yayınevi, 1979), p.349.

then, exchange of populations due to Treaty of Lausanne.⁷² Instead of this loss, Muslim-Turks including traders and high educated people immigrated from the Balkans and Crimean. But they could not take place of the immigrants who migrated from Anatolia to abroad. The weakness structure of bourgeoisie having no power and the resistance against the state and bureaucracy became obvious in the early years of the Republic. Bourgeoisie – state (bureaucracy) coalition consolidated in this period. Therefore, it would take decades to see emergence of bourgeoisie as a rival political class.⁷³ In this period, in order to develop bourgeoisie, bureaucracy as a pioneer of nationalist movement supported them.⁷⁴

The Turkish Republic inherited large amount of peasantry from the Ottoman Period. According to the 1927 Census, there was a large illiterate population in the country. Indeed, the percentage of literate population was only 11 %.⁷⁵ The second largest social class was middle class including landlords (or big land owners), businessmen, artisans, traders, civil servants, and intelligentsia. The social structure of Anatolia had changed radically. From 1914 to 1927 population of Anatolia (within the 1923 borders) decreased about 17 % due to wars, immigrations, exchange of populations and death.⁷⁶ Most of non-Muslims of the Ottoman Empire were living especially in cities and they had been working mostly in non-agricultural sectors.⁷⁷ The largest social class in Turkey was peasantry. Indeed, 83 % of total population was peasantry living in more than 40.000 villages in 1945.⁷⁸ Most of them were small villagers having 500 acres land or less.⁷⁹ Cultivable lands were very little because nearly the whole country was unproductive. For this reason, the most important problem for the peasantry was having no enough cultivable lands. The other problem for them was lack of agricultural knowledge, technique and technology.⁸⁰

⁷² Aftermaths of wars, immigrations, and deaths, there remained only 1/8 of total non-Muslim population in the early years of the Turkish Republic. Keyder, p.67.

⁷³ Keyder, pp.67-8.

⁷⁴ Turan, İlder, “Stages of Political Development in the Turkish Republic”, in *Perspectives on Democracy in Turkey*, p.70.

⁷⁵ Ibid., p.101.

⁷⁶ Tezel, pp.97-8.

⁷⁷ Ibid., pp.98-9.

⁷⁸ Karpat, *Türk Demokrasi Tarihi*, pp.90-1.

⁷⁹ According to Karpat, the amount of small peasantry was 99.75 % even though this figure is not reliable. Karpat, *ibid.*; It is clear that the small peasantry was most dominant and widespread among social groups.

⁸⁰ Ibid., pp.92-3.

The other social classes were small. In 1927, while the rate of service sector of the whole workpeople was 10.2 %, it was only 8.9 % in industry sector.⁸¹ The characteristic of this largest social group nearly did not change until 1945. The percentage of the labor was below 10 % of total population.⁸² The labor class had poor peculiarity (small numbers of industrial workplaces and late development of the sector) in industry and this prevented to improve of their labor organizations. Therefore, most of these unions were small scale. In 1925, these organizations were closed by *Takrir-i Sükun* Law. This law prohibited all kinds of labor movement and syndication. In 1933, a new law brought punishment for striking, and then, it was forbidden in 1936.⁸³ Alpaslan Işıklı argues that such prohibitions were basing to *Kemalism* having classless and unprivileged social structure.⁸⁴ This structure of labors did not change until Turkey's membership to the International Labor Organization (ILO) under the umbrella of the United Nations in 1946.⁸⁵ The number of workers increased steadily when the industry evolved. The labor supply came mainly from immigrants or the peasantry who were keeping their relationship with villages in a way.⁸⁶ Developing working class in industry increased their demands in time and they proved their willingness about class organizations as forming hundred of unions after ILO membership in 1946.⁸⁷

By establishment of the Turkish Republic, the rulers did not terminate economic integration with the west. Westernization in the Republican period meant the imitation of western economic structure and institutions. At every period of westernization movements, western economic models and concepts were projected in the Turkish economy-politics.⁸⁸ The year 1923 symbolized a political revolution and a definite break out from the Ottoman Empire. The structure of bureaucratic aristocracy in Turkey diverted from the Ottoman period completely; however, there was still a socio-economic continuity between the

⁸¹ Ibid., p.112.

⁸² Tezel, p.112.

⁸³ Işıklı, Alpaslan, "Ücretli Emek ve Sendikalaşma", Ed. Schick, İrvin C., *Geçiş Sürecinde Türkiye* (İstanbul: Belge Yayınları, 2003), p.331.

⁸⁴ Ibid., p.332.

⁸⁵ Ibid., pp.332-3.

⁸⁶ Karpat, *Türk Demokrasi Tarihi*, p.100.

⁸⁷ Ibid., p.101.

⁸⁸ The terms and economic models in Europe were transferred into the Ottoman economy politics. During *Tanzimat* westernization period, for instance, "free trade" was a widespread economy concept and it offered Turkish rulers. Then, "national economy", "national capitalism", "economic freedom", and "private sector" came as economic models from the west. Cem, *ibid.*, pp.348-9.

Republic and the Empire. For example, the 1923-1929 periods can be seen as the continuation of the previous periods which began after 1908. Even though the Second Constitution's protective and industrialist trend was not carrying on completely, the fundamental understanding of the 1908-1922 and 1923-1929 periods was to create domestic and national bourgeoisie for economic and industrial development.⁸⁹ Actually, new Republic was ambitious to develop its economy and industry by liberal economy-politics. Republican rulers knew that the more economic independence meant the more political independence. Thus, they sought foreign capitals but not giving special privileges to capital lenders.⁹⁰

During the first decade, the regime preferred liberal economy politics. Generally, however, there was not enough private capital in the country.⁹¹ The rulers believed that, application of liberal economy politics would contribute on improvement of private enterprises. In order to facilitate transportation of goods and merchandise, the state decided to nationalize railways. For this aim, the state spent its sources for development of railways and nationalize. Nationalization of railways was made under convenient international conditions.⁹² Doing so, transportation became cheaper for private sector. The state also applied a monopolist policy only in some revenue fields, such as tobacco, match, salt, and alcoholic drinks. Other production fields and attempts were left to the private sector.⁹³ Until 1929, the young Republic could not control its foreign trade, customs, and foreign payments due to Lausanne Treaty stipulations. This unprotected situation of the weak economy structure brought some problems to the fore; such as, lack of capital and insufficient markets.

The state was not able to achieve industrialization in the early years of the republic. The government encouraged foreign investment to develop domestic capitalists. Indeed, in this period, one of third of newly established companies had foreign partners.⁹⁴ Still, they

⁸⁹ Boratav, Korkut, "1908-1980 İktisadi Tarih", in Ed. Akşin, Sina, *Türkiye Tarihi*, vol.IV (İstanbul: Cem Yayınevi, 1997), pp.279-80.

⁹⁰ Ahmad, *Modern Türkiye'nin Oluşumu*, p.116.

⁹¹ National bourgeoisie was not so developed and foreign capital owners were confused whether Turkish revolution was different from Russian communist revolution or not. Also, the rulers of new republic were subtle against economic privileges for foreign investors. Karpat, *Türk Demokrasi Tarihi*, p.78.

⁹² Global crises reduced real values of railways and they became cheaper. Yıldırım, İsmail, "Atatürk Dönemi Demiryolu Politikasına Bir Bakış", *Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi Dergisi*, Sayı 35, Cilt: XII, Temmuz 1996.

⁹³ Şahin, p.47.

⁹⁴ Ahmad, p.118.

could not ensure sufficient capital accumulation for industry sector. Until 1930, capital accumulation of Turkish entrepreneurs did not increase.⁹⁵ In addition to capital insufficiency, substructure of the country was very poor and this was increasing the cost of industrial production. Moreover, the world economic crisis emerging in 1929 was affecting all regions of the world. The Great Depression provided enough reasons to take some new economic measures in Turkey. All above conditions compelled the state to change its economy policies in favor of etatist development model. Also, while almost all capitalist western countries had been affecting negatively from the world economic crisis, Russian economy was not affected so much. The effect of “Great Depression” was very destructive for the countries selling largely unprocessed agricultural and mineral products. Turkey was exporting such goods and due to this peculiarity, Turkish rulers believed that “self-sufficient economy politics” was necessary.⁹⁶ In fact the preference of economy-politics among the RPP cadre was industrial capitalism since the establishment of the Republic.⁹⁷ However, there was still 81 % rural population in agriculture⁹⁸ and the official economy programs of the governments were neglecting these rural masses.⁹⁹ Thus, the RPP practices in economy had created deep dissatisfaction among the large masses and they contributed to improve of opponent thoughts and emotions before the WW II.

The economy politics of the 1930s in Turkey offered to limit and control of foreign trade but at the same time, it did not follow an anti-capitalist policy. On the contrary, while the state was supporting the national economy with infra-structure works and services, it protected national economy completely by customs tariffs, which prepared primary conditions for the development of private enterprises.¹⁰⁰ Industrialist economy politics of the state aimed at transferring agricultural surpluses to industrial sector. In this way, capital accumulation developed in favor of industry sector. In addition to big industrialists, many other groups such as contractors collaborated with the state; small industrialists; and traders

⁹⁵ Karpaz, Kemal H., *The Transition of Turkey's Political Regime to a Multi-Party System*, Ph.D. Thesis, New York University, February, 1957, p.67.

⁹⁶ Robinson, p.116.

⁹⁷ Şahin, p.30.

⁹⁸ Tezel, Yahya Sezai, *Cumhuriyet Döneminin İktisadi Tarihi* (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 2001), p.112.

⁹⁹ Çavdar, Tevfik, *Türkiye'nin Demokrasi Tarihi, 1839-1950* (Ankara: İmge Yayınevi, 1995), p.394.

¹⁰⁰ Sencer, p.179.

benefiting from this new economy politics. Thus, the origins of big capitalists and bourgeois in the future were based on the state adjudications in the 1930s.¹⁰¹

During 1920s and 1930s, it is difficult to mention about big capital owners affecting the Turkish economy and thus, there were no large middle class in the country.¹⁰² When the Turkish Republic was established, there was no powerful trade bourgeoisie. Even though non-Muslim trade bourgeoisie grew enough, most of these groups had been lost due to the WW-I, Turkish Independence War, and the politics about populations' exchange.¹⁰³ Instead of this loss, Muslim-Turks having bourgeoisie population (including traders and high educated people) immigrated from Balkans and Crimean. Yet, they could not heal the weak peculiarity of bourgeoisie. Due to having no resistance against state and bureaucracy, this weak structure of bourgeoisie became obvious in the early years of the republic. Keyder underlines this issue that this state-bourgeoisie combination impeded emergence of powerful and independent bourgeoisie as a rival political class.¹⁰⁴ Therefore, the new emerging domestic bourgeoisie would be able to develop only by bureaucratic support made during this period.¹⁰⁵

The economy-politics of the RPP from 1930 to 1945 led to troubles especially upon rural masses.¹⁰⁶ Particularly after 1935, the price of agricultural products was fixed while the price of industrial and import products increased. This economy policy of the RPP weakened the conditions of the peasantry. In spite of the government's efforts about the Land Reform Law aiming at getting peasants' support, the opposition in the party succeeded in prevention of this law.¹⁰⁷

Social classes were not accepted in the early decades in Turkey. The main cause of this situation was the *halkçılık* (populism) principle. As a principle of the state, "populism" did not consider different classes in the country. Thus, it had caused suppression upon appearance of classes in the society. Populism meant a classless society and it offered a

¹⁰¹ Ibid.

¹⁰² Ibid., p.102.

¹⁰³ In the aftermaths of wars, immigrations, and deaths, only 1/8 of non-Muslim population left in the early years of the Turkish Republic. Keyder, p.67.

¹⁰⁴ Keyder, pp.67-8.

¹⁰⁵ Turan, İter, "Stages of Political Development in the Turkish Republic", in ed. Özbudun, Ergun, *Perspectives on Democracy in Turkey* (Ankara: Sevinç Matbaası, 1988), p.70.

¹⁰⁶ Keyder, Çağlar, "Türkiye Demokrasisinin Ekonomi Politikası", Edt: Irvin C. Schick, E. Ahmet Tonak, *Geçiş Sürecinde Türkiye* (İstanbul: Belge Yayınları, 2003), pp.51-2.

¹⁰⁷ Keyder, ibid., pp.52-3.

society composing various professional groups. This apprehension of the state obstructed establishment of different political parties.¹⁰⁸ Before long, however, social classes became clearer¹⁰⁹ and the state had to loose meaning of populism, and finally, it had to allow different political parties as representative of social classes.¹¹⁰

2.2. Turkey and International Politics in the 1920s and the 1930s

The main target of international relations of Turkey in 1920s and 1930s was to provide continuity of international security which had been got hardly in 1923. The early international relations began with the National War for Independence. Mustafa Kemal got in touch firstly with the Soviets in May 1919. He sent messages to Moscow to tell that the nationalists were to support the Bolshevik actions in Caucasians. The aim of Mustafa Kemal was both to get weapons and international support from the Bolshevik government against the Allied Powers (*İtilaf Devletleri*).¹¹¹ But yet, the Soviets did not accept to make an agreement with Mustafa Kemal until 1921.¹¹² After a time, the Soviets decided to aid Turkish nationalists first against the Allied Powers. Thus, an agreement defining northern-east border of Turkey was signed in Moscow on March 16, 1921.¹¹³ In order to realize ultimate aim, the Soviets supported Turks by giving them weapons, ammunition, and 10.000.000 rubles cash money.¹¹⁴

Meanwhile, Ankara government preferred diplomatic ways to finish the Allied occupation. Meetings were held many times especially after the battles against the Allied troops in Anatolia to talk about the armistice or peace terms. In the meetings the Ankara government used the *Misak-ı Milli* (the National Pact) including Mosul as the basis for all discussions on peace. None of the Allied powers at beginning was ready to accept this including the Greeks. First peace meeting was started after the First Battle of İnönü and the

¹⁰⁸ Karpat, *Türk Demokrasi Tarihi*, p.263.

¹⁰⁹ The social structure split became clear by the Land Reform Law in 1945.

¹¹⁰ On June 5, 1946, the 4919 numbered law was enacted by the RPP allowing to the establishment of associations and political institutions basing on interests of social classes. Karpat, *Türk Demokrasi Tarihi* (See footnote), p.263.

¹¹¹ Hale, William, *Türk Dış Politikası 1774-2000* (İstanbul: Arkeoloji ve Sanat Yayınları, 2003), p.42.

¹¹² Ibid.

¹¹³ Ibid., p.43.

¹¹⁴ Yerasimos, Stefanos, *Türk-Sovyet İlişkileri* (İstanbul: Gözlem Yayınları, 1979), pp.631-6.

representatives of Ankara government met the Allied representatives in London Conference in February-March 1921. The Minister of Foreign Affairs, Bekir Sami, signed an agreement with France and Italy. According to this agreement, Ankara government would give some economic privileges to France and Italy, and thus, they would draw French and Italian troops from Anatolian lands.¹¹⁵ The TGNA did not accept this agreement and forced Bekir Sami to resign. After his resignation, Ankara government tried to separate both France and Italy from the Britain and Greece and finally achieved its goal signed agreements with them. France and Italy would draw their troops from Anatolia and moreover French Army would leave some military equipment and weapons to the Turkish nationalists.¹¹⁶ Only Greece and its supporter England had left back after elimination of the Soviet, French, and Italian threats.

New Minister of Foreign Affairs Yusuf Kemal (Tengirşenk) had been making some meetings in London and Paris to realize an agreement accepting Turkish State in Anatolia with the borders of *Misak-ı Milli*. England, France, and Italy accepted a Turkish state excluding its *Misak-ı Milli* borders. They also gave a memorandum that, nationalist Turks immediately had to accept a ceasefire agreement, and then, sign a piece agreement. After these developments the entente powers would convince Greeks to draw their troops from Anatolia. Ankara rejected this memorandum. In order to gain time, Mustafa Kemal sent Fethi (Okyar) Bey for starting new piece meetings. Indeed, by gaining enough time Turks began a contra attack against to Greek Army in Dumlupınar / Afyon on August 26, 1922. This crucial time presented a very valuable triumph against Greek troops and thus this success gave more strong position to the Turks against Entente States before Lausanne Conference.¹¹⁷ While the Soviets had not been invited to Lausanne Conference, İstanbul Government was invited to the conference together with Ankara government by the Entente States. Ankara asking to be only representative of the Turks in the conference eliminated İstanbul by enacting a new law abolishing the Sultanate on November 1, 1922. Aftermath, Sultan Vahdettin was sent into exile with an English battleship.¹¹⁸ This action just three weeks before Lausanne Conference was important action to finish any expectations to divide the Turkish side and the representative of the Turks was Ankara government. Long last meetings, finally, were ended up with Lausanne Treaty on July 24, 1923.

¹¹⁵ Hale, *ibid.*

¹¹⁶ *Ibid.*, pp.43-4.

¹¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p.44.

¹¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p.45.

In the 1920s, the other important subject matter of Turkey was population exchange and problems of real estate properties with Greeks. When Venizelos came to the power in Greece, political climate softened, and thus, this piece period and good relations between Turkey and Greece continued until Cyprus controversy emerging in the middle of 1950s.¹¹⁹

Between 1923 and 1926, the most important agenda of Turkish foreign politics was the Mosul subject. While England wished Mosul to be part of Iraq, Turkey insisted on *Misak-ı Milli* including Mosul lands. England claimed that without Mosul and oil, Iraq couldn't prosper. London asserted this matter and went before the League of Nations (*Milletler Cemiyeti*) in which Turkey was not a member. Even Turkey objected against such an action and went to International Justice Court (*Milletlerarası Adalet Divanı*), the result did not change and the League of Nations Council decided to give Mosul to Iraq on December 16, 1925.¹²⁰ Yet, Turkey continued its objection and made several meetings with England. Eventually, an agreement was signed in Ankara between England and Turkey in June 5, 1926. According to the agreement 25 % of oil revenue would be paid to Turkey during next 25 years.¹²¹

Because of having no membership to the League of Nations, and due to asking to save peace period, Turkey had to give some compromises to solve problems about population exchange, Mosul matter etc. These bitter experiences directed Turkey to be member of the League of Nations on July 18, 1932.¹²² During 1930s significant threats for its security come from Balkans and Mediterranean Sea. After this membership Turkey felt itself safer. However, when Germany and Japan were removed from the League of Nations in 1933 and Italy in 1935, Turkey lost this advantage.¹²³ Therefore, Turkey aimed to set up a buffer region by a pact in the Balkans. Turkey, Greece, Romania, and Yugoslavia signed the Balkan Pact in February 1934.¹²⁴

Turkey until 1936, could not locate Turkish soldiers around the Straits. The reason of this handicap was the "Straits Agreement" which had been signed by coercion of England in

¹¹⁹ Ibid., pp.51-2.

¹²⁰ Ibid., p.50.

¹²¹ Ibid., p.51.

¹²² Alantar, Özden Zeynep, "Türk Dış Politikasında Milletler Cemiyeti Dönemi", ed. Sönmezoğlu, Faruk, *Türk Dış politikasının Analizi* (İstanbul: Der Yayınları, 1924), pp.113-7.

¹²³ Hale, pp.52-3.

¹²⁴ Ibid., p.53.

1923. This time like Turkey, England asked to review of the Straits Agreement. Apart from Italy, all relevant states were invited to Montreux town in Switzerland and reviewed agreement was signed by them on June 22, 1936.¹²⁵ In 1937, Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Turkey signed an agreement called as the Sadabad Pact. These countries would not attack each other and would not try to change their borders even though the pact did not supply a protection against other attacks coming from the outside.¹²⁶

Turkey's foreign policy was not changed even after Atatürk's death in 1938. İnönü became president and he wanted to get both English and French support by a mutual defense agreement. However, another international question of Turkey was the Hatay issue. This problem was complex but aggressive actions of Germany and Italy helped to solve this question easier. While, Hatay was a dispute matter between France and Turkey, France had allowed Turkish soldiers to enter into Hatay even though Syria objected. Then, Hatay Republic having mostly Sunni Muslim population was established and this independence simplified participation of Hatay into Turkey within the near future. After an agreement including legal withdrawals of both France and Turkey from Hatay, Turkey signed an agreement with France and England on 1 September 1939. According to this agreement, if an attack occurs from any European states to one of them, the other two would help for it.¹²⁷

¹²⁵ Ibid., p.57.

¹²⁶ Ibid., p.55.

¹²⁷ Ibid., pp.60-2.

CHAPTER 3

TURKEY; DURING THE WORLD WAR II

3.1. Turkey and the World War II

Just before the WW II, Turkey had signed friendship agreements with England and France; nevertheless, Turkey did not incline openly towards the Allies during the war. Even though Turkey tried to set a balance between the allied powers and Germany, she became closer to Germany in the early years of the war because of chrome exportation. Therefore, the allied powers were indignant about Turkey's attitude, but yet, they could not abandon Turkey since she was strategically important. Meanwhile, the German troops had occupied the Balkans and settled down there with fifteen ready divisions for mobilization in the region.¹²⁸ Therefore, Turkey tried to keep itself away from the Allies. However, more than this unreliable attitude, the allowance of the Turkish government to the publications applauding Nazi victories in the press aroused hatred feelings among the Allies.¹²⁹ Although these feelings, Turkey was trying to be impartial. In 1944, the allied powers were still striving to convince Turkey to take part in the war. Despite the German troops withdrew from many fronts. Churchill asserted that if Turkey declared war on Germany with the Allies, Nazi troops could not seriously attack her. Otherwise, Turkey would be responsible for its political mistake. Churchill's warning was clear, but İnönü was still insistent on being out of the war.¹³⁰

During the WW II, Turkey was planning to cooperate with the Soviets in order to protect her own sovereignty on the straits. To get political support, Turkey sent her own proposal about future of the Straits to both England and the Soviets.¹³¹ While England replied behalf on Turkish argument, there was no reply from the Soviet front.¹³² By the WW II, İnönü set a balance between the Allies and the Axis powers. When the Allies defeated Germany, İnönü was closer to the winners. However, this time the Soviets came to the fore

¹²⁸ Albayrak, p.35.

¹²⁹ Keyder, p.156.

¹³⁰ Deringil, Selim, *Denge Oyunu* (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yayınları, 1994), p.224.

¹³¹ SSCB Dışişleri Bakanlığı, *İkinci Dünya Savaşı'nda Stalin, Roosevelt ve Churchill'in Türkiye Üzerine Yazışmaları*, trans. Konyar, Levent (İstanbul: Yeni Gün Haber Ajansı Basın ve Yayınevi, 2000), pp.37-8.

¹³² Ibid., pp.39-40.

as the closest threat for Turkey. Turkish rulers were aware of the threat and for this reason they had to move towards the west led by the US. Turkey began to seek for aids especially weapon and military vehicles beside to economic support from western countries.¹³³

The steps for liberalization came after the last conferences met in Yalta to finish the war and to arrange the world in the post-war period. In fact, Yalta Conference would come after a series of conventions in Moscow and Tehran in 1943 and in Dumbarton-Oaks in 1944. The allies underlined that the purpose of the WW II was to establish a democratic world.¹³⁴

Yalta Summit was held on 4-11 February 1945.¹³⁵ Three leaders of the Yalta Summit explained the purpose of the meetings that Nazism and fascism residuals in the rescued nations would be removed and instead of them, suitable democracies would be established.¹³⁶ One of the subject matter in the summit was the Turkish Straits. On the sixth day of the meetings, Stalin expressed the Soviet demands to change the Montreux Agreement, but he did not give any details.¹³⁷ According to Stalin, the Montreux Treaty was outmoded; because when the treaty was signed and Japan had more effective role in the treaty meetings than the Soviets had. He also argued that the Montreux Agreement was invalid because it had been signed under direction of the Association of Nations; however, it was non-existence anymore. Moreover, he said that “according to the treaty, Turkey was able to close the Straits in wartime and even the Straits could be closed in peacetime”. This situation was unacceptable for Moscow.¹³⁸ For above reasons, he was asking to sign a new agreement considering demands of the Soviets.

The Yalta Conference ended with a significant decision that it was a pre-condition for joining into San Francisco Conference. According to the decision, the states which were asking to participate in the United Nations Conference as a founder state must have declared war on the Axis Powers before March 1, 1945.¹³⁹ The decision echoed in Turkey, and it

¹³³ Ibid., pp.47-8.

¹³⁴ Boratav, p.54.

¹³⁵ Petro, Nicolai N. & Rubinstein, Alvin Z., *Russian Foreign Policy* (New York: Longman, Addison-Wesley Educational Publishers Inc., 1997), p.48.

¹³⁶ *Ayın Tarihi*, No: 135, Şubat 1945, pp.292-3.

¹³⁷ Gönübol, Mehmet, et al., *Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası, 1919-1995* (Ankara: Siyasal Kitabevi, 1993), p.184.

¹³⁸ Vâli, Ferenc. A., *The Turkish Straits and Nato* (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1972), p.62.

¹³⁹ Ekinci, Necdet, *Türkiye’de Çok Partili Düzene Geçişte Dış Etkenler* (İstanbul: Toplumsal Dönüşüm Yayınları, 1997), p.61; Turan, *Türk Devrim Tarihi*, pp.138-9;

declared war against Germany and Japan on February 23, 1945.¹⁴⁰ By the war declaration, Turkey got the right to participate in the San Francisco Conference, and shortly after, it was invited officially to the conference on March 5, 1945.¹⁴¹ The conference and its outcomes would be crucial for Turkey because the “Non-aggression Agreement” signed by Turkey and Russia in 1925, was going to expire in November 1945.¹⁴² The Soviets gave a memorandum on March 19, 1945 notifying Turkey that the agreement would not renew because of new conditions.¹⁴³ Moscow desired some changes in status quo including base demands in the Straits; land demands in the eastern border of Turkey; and revision of the Montreux Treaty, before renovation of Turk-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact.¹⁴⁴ The danger was rather close for Turkey, because the Soviets Union in the post-war period was undoubtedly much stronger than it was before the war.¹⁴⁵

The Turkish delegation under the leadership of Hasan Saka went to San Francisco in which the conference began with the participation of 59 countries on April 25, 1945.¹⁴⁶ It was clear that the term “democracy” was going to be a keyword and the main purpose of the conference and also it would aim at the security of democratic states.¹⁴⁷ After many discussions between the US and the Soviets, the United Nations (UN) was established in San Francisco, and like other members, Turkey signed the UN Agreement on June 26, 1945.¹⁴⁸ An important article was published in the *New York Times* on April 29, 1945, and it claimed that “A world established by the Allies without Stalin will be definitely better than a world with Stalin.”¹⁴⁹ Indeed, after such publications, the tension between the US and the Soviets increased progressively. A new era called as “Cold War” basing on clashes between capitalist America and communist Russia was emerging but this subject matter is going to deal with in the third chapter.

¹⁴⁰ Ahmad, *Türkiye’de Çok Partili Politikanın Açıklamalı Kronolojisi (1945-1971)*, p.12.

¹⁴¹ Gönlübol, p.184.

¹⁴² Ülman, Haluk, “Sovyetler Birliği ve Türk Boğazları”, *Forum*, 1 January 1961, V.13, No:161, p.6.

¹⁴³ Ahmad, *ibid.*, p.12 ; Gönlübol, p.191.

¹⁴⁴ Gönlübol, p.185.

¹⁴⁵ Yeşil, p.45.

¹⁴⁶ Aydemir, p.283.

¹⁴⁷ Ekinci, p.61.

¹⁴⁸ Erdoğan, Hikmet, *Türkiye’nin Önemi ve Nato İttifakı* (İstanbul: IQ Kültür Sanat Yayınları, 2004), p.32.

¹⁴⁹ Demirel, Ahmet, *Nihat Erim; Günlükler, 1925-1979* (İstanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları, May 2005), p.35.

3.2. The War Measures Taken at Home during the World War II

The new era would be formed upon a global economic ruin resulted from long and widespread war conditions creating fluctuations and instabilities both in price and supply in the markets. Like in all over the world, as soon as the WW II began the prices of all goods and products increased. Price increase was about 200-300 % annually.¹⁵⁰ Stocking, profiteering, and black marketing were widespread. In order to keep Turkey away from those harmful effects of the WW II, the RPP governments took many precautions. One of them was the “National Defense Law” (*Milli Korunma Kanunu*) 3780 numbered which was enacted by the government on January 18, 1940, and it influenced all layers of the society. The aim of National Defense Law (NDL) was to prevent the country from destructive influences of the war.¹⁵¹

The conditions of the WW II provided some opportunities for not only powerful capitalists, but also for small investors. There occurred highly profitable trades during the war. On the other side, the prices were increasing steadily in the market. To regulate such price increases and also to meet increasing military expenditures, the government began to look for foreign loan but it was not easy. Neither western capitalist states nor socialist Soviets Union could give financial support for Turkey in the wartime. For this reason, the only way was to put “new taxes” inside for solving financial deficits. In order to remove disturbing effects of the NDL and to meet financial necessities of the government, Capital Levy (*Varlık Vergisi*) was passed from the Assembly on November 11, 1942.¹⁵² The Capital Levy aimed at taxing all wealthy groups emerging in the war conditions.¹⁵³ Practice of the law created an unequal situation in the social groups. Especially, non-Muslim trade bourgeois was influenced negatively from the law. Practices of the law disturbed fairly the bourgeoisie but they could not criticize the law openly. These traumatic disturbances were detaching the coalition between bourgeoisie and state.¹⁵⁴

¹⁵⁰ Yetkin, Çetin, *Karşıdevrim 1945-1950*, p.109.

¹⁵¹ Koçak, Cemil, *Türkiye’de Milli Şef Dönemi (1938-1945)*, vol.2 (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1996), p.373.

¹⁵² Koçak, *ibid.*, p.482.

¹⁵³ Bila, p.171.

¹⁵⁴ Keyder, p.159.

Another significant law of the wartime period was the “Land Products Law” enacted on June 4, 1943.¹⁵⁵ By this law, the government aimed at meeting the state’s agrarian need¹⁵⁶ and also taxing wealthy Muslims in agricultural sector. The large landowners were naturally against the law.¹⁵⁷ In addition to large landowners, the small peasantry suffering from heavy taxes was also affected from the law. Tax burden of peasantry increased about 3 %. The new tax was apparently small but its effect on conditions was large. Most of the peasants could not meet their most basic necessities.¹⁵⁸

Consequently, the precautions such as National Defense Law, Capital Levy, and Land Products Law had aimed to prevent black-markets, profiteering, corruption, and inflation. But they did not work; on the contrary, they caused an increase in number of collaborators between wealthy groups and bureaucracy¹⁵⁹ while the poor masses were confronting with scarcity, absence, profiteers, expensiveness, and black markets. Anger of the masses turned to the governments. According to them, the only responsible was the RPP governments. The government warned people frequently that they must not have stockpile because it resulted in inflation and scarcity. However, when Prime Minister Refik Saydam died, many stocked products were found at home. This was not only surprising but also a reality of the war period.¹⁶⁰

The opposition names within the TGNA became clearer in time and their criticisms intensified gradually. Especially in the budget discussions on May 21-29, 1945, Adnan Menderes, Feridun Fikri Düşünsel, Hikmet Bayur, and Emin Sazak mainly voiced the opposition’s thoughts. They criticized high cost of living, state debts, and conditions of low-income groups, profiteering, black-market, injustice and unproductiveness of the tax system.¹⁶¹ Even, Bayur demanded resignation of the government. This kind of criticisms and demands were new in the RPP history. Furthermore, some of them, Celal Bayar, Refik Koraltan, Adnan Menderes and Emin Sazak, described the “Land Reform Law” as a fascist application. When the discussions ended on May 29, Bayar, Menderes, Koraltan, Köprülü,

¹⁵⁵ Ibid., p.521.

¹⁵⁶ Albayrak, p.28.

¹⁵⁷ Yeşil, p.28.

¹⁵⁸ Albayrak, ibid.

¹⁵⁹ Bila, p.183.

¹⁶⁰ Abaoğlu, Nadir Nadi, *Perde Aralığından* (İstanbul: Çağdaş Yayınları, 1991), pp.139-40.

¹⁶¹ Eroğul, p.9.

Sazak, Bayur, and Peker voted against the 1945 Budget.¹⁶² Except Peker, the other budget opponents were to be backbone of the Democrat Party, in the future.¹⁶³

3.3. Economic Challenges in Turkey during the World War II

In spite of efforts of the government, the war hindered economic development and stabilization of the markets. The WW II affected the Turkish people from many aspects. All though the country did not enter the war actively, the Turkish people felt the heaviest pressure of the war in the economic and social life. Therefore, the Turkish people had already become a possible supporter of an opposition movement which was about to explode politically. If they had a chance to participate in free elections, they would change the RPP rule. Why did most of the people not satisfy with the RPP rule? In order to answer this question, we should focus on change of economic conditions and challenges of the Turkish society during the war and then the postwar period.

Between 1932 and 1939, the level of production in industry doubled, and one fourth of this production was made by the state enterprises. However, this situation did not go on. Between 1939 and 1945 the production of manufactured goods decreased sharply¹⁶⁴ even though Turkey carried on the “planned development” projects during the war.¹⁶⁵ On the contrary, the contribution of industrial sector to Gross National Product (GNP), like other sectors, fell down (from 343.5 million TL in 1938-39 to 267 million TL in 1944-45). Towards end of the war, the problem in the economy was not only the lack of industrialization, but also the entire sectors of the economy were still primitive.¹⁶⁶ Table 1 displays the shrinking rate of all sectors in economy.

¹⁶² Bila, p.194; Toker, p.64.

¹⁶³ Çavdar, *Türkiye'nin Demokrasi Tarihi (1839-1950)*, p.409.

¹⁶⁴ Keyder, pp.153-4.

¹⁶⁵ Tezel, p.313.

¹⁶⁶ Şahin, p.6.

Table 1: GNP and the Produces in Different Sectors between 1938 and 1945

	1938-39 TL million	1942-43 TL million	1944-45 TL million	The Change Between 1938-1945
Agriculture	788	735.5	559.5	-29.0
Industry	343.5	311.5	267	-22.3
Other Sectors	843.5	699.5	657.5	-22.1
GNP	1,975	1,746.5	1,484	-24.9
GNP Per Capita (TL)	114.5	95.5	79.4	-30.7

Source: Şahin, Hüseyin, *Türkiye Ekonomisi* (Bursa: Ezgi Kitabevi, 2000), p.79.

Another data is main distribution indicators of the Turkish economy. The relationship between production and price gives us a serious clue that which sectors and who improved their own conditions in the society in the war period. Table 2 displays the change of both production and price indexes for some products and economy data.¹⁶⁷ Striking decreases occurred in wheat production index and real wage index that means both peasantry and fixed salary workers were affected drastically. But wholesale price index increased from 100 to 449 that mean traders and wholesalers benefited from this high inflation.

Table 2: Main Distribution Indicators of Turkey between 1938 and 1945

Main Distribution Indicators		
	1938-39	1944-45
Industry Production Index	100	78
Industry Price Index	100	357
Wheat Production Index	100	63
Wheat Price Index	100	568
Tobacco Production Index	100	105
Tobacco Price Index	100	490
Real Wage Index	100	50
Price Index of Wholesale Goods	100	449
Index of Real National Income	100	75
Cost of Living ¹⁶⁸	100	347

Source: Boratav, Korkut, "1908-1980 İktisadi Tarih", ed. Sina Akşin, *Türkiye Tarihi* (İstanbul: Cem Yayınevi, 1997), vol. IV, p.308.

¹⁶⁷ Boratav, p.308

¹⁶⁸ Figures of cost of living has been cited as approximately from Turan, *Türk Demokrasi Tarihi*, p.100.

It is shown in table 2 that the price indexes increased while the production indexes decreased from 1939 to 1945. This imbalanced situation created great profits for traders. Indeed, there was significant increase in commercial profits both in industrial and agricultural sectors. But this situation was resulted in high inflation. The index changes show and prove that a serious capital change occurred from the hands of workers and peasantry into the hands of the riches (large landowners, wholesalers and industrialists). Even though the single party governments tried to protect the conditions of state officials against inflation effect, however, the real wage index decreased drastically from 100 to 50.¹⁶⁹ The production decrease was not surprise because productive capacity of Anatolian agrarian lands normally depended on fertilizers. Particularly, the decline of importation of nitrogenous fertilizers¹⁷⁰ caused to a serious decrease in wheat production. The fall of wheat production led to bread shortages. The government passed a law restricting bread consumption in 1942. Thus, bread was distributed by “ration cards” in the large cities.¹⁷¹

The war conditions, on the other side, had created many wealthy groups engaging in the profitable fields in trade.¹⁷² At the end of the war, the great majority of the people were still living in agriculture sector, and therefore, the land was still a fundamental economic asset for masses. The high growth rate of the population forced the single party regime to develop a plan extending the cultivation of land. In accordance with the plan, Turkey made such adjustments through limited small-scale agrarian reform.¹⁷³ For a long time, the Turkish economy was characterized by capital shortage that was a reflection of the economic structure of an undeveloped country. During the war, however, important changes took place about the rate of savings and investments.¹⁷⁴ The war conditions accelerated the local economic activities and the rate of capital accumulations. Hikmet Bayur claims that there were 30-40 thousands of the war profiteers in 1945.¹⁷⁵ Even if the masses aware of this situation, capital shortage in the market was impeding to boost of their life standard. The government could not find a way for redistribution of capital. Surprisingly however, there

¹⁶⁹ Boratav, p.309.

¹⁷⁰ UN, *Economic Report*, “Salient Features of the World Economic Situation 1945-47”, Department of Economic Affairs, United Nations (New York: January 1948), p.93.

¹⁷¹ Ergüder, Jülide, “Karneli Yıllar”, *Hürriyet*, Araştırma Dizi Yazısı, 3-4 September 1989.

¹⁷² Turan, *Türk Devrim Tarihi*, p.155.

¹⁷³ UN, *Economic Report*, p.90.

¹⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, p.91.

¹⁷⁵ Karpat, *Türk Demokrasi Tarihi*, p.86.

was a steady acquisition of capital in the private sector, in the same period.¹⁷⁶ Table 3 displays the bank deposits between 1938 and 1948.

Table 3: Private Bank Deposits between 1938 and 1948

Years	1938	1940	1941	1942	1943	1944	1945	1946	1947	1948
Deposits (TL million)	227	274,6	374,9	369,6	420,3	498,4	528,2	607,6	702,8	813

Source: Karpat, Kemal H., *Türk Demokrasi Tarihi* (İstanbul: İstanbul Matbaası, 1967), p.85.

According to table 3, in 1938, the private bank deposit was 227 million TL and it increased to 528.2 million TL in 1945. During this period, if we put aside the amount of bank deposits in 1942, which was lower than the former year, 1941, the private deposits in the banks were steadily increasing. When the war ended, the rapid increase trend continued and it did not stop. The increasing bank deposits show that some groups increased their economic powers during the 1940s. As a result, there were many profiteers, who were richer than the former period by dirty money from the war time; and unavoidably, this situation created wide unhappiness among people.¹⁷⁷ In order to get some measures such as “National Defense Law”, “Capital Levy”, “Land Products Tax” practices, and finally, the collectivization of large private lands by the “Land Reform Law”, the government had increased its intervention upon economy directly in the wartime.

The RPP rule aimed sincerely at stopping speedy capital accumulation occurring in the wrong hands. However, due to special war conditions, the many precautions taken by the government did not work in the right way. Like it was in many times, on the contrary, such precautions helped the rich landlords and trade bourgeoisie to accumulate more money.¹⁷⁸ The impact of the war was so serious that it could have nearly collapsed the Turkish economy. The development of capitalist relations in the Turkish economy paralleled with political changes in the country.¹⁷⁹ Recent economic developments also diminished the

¹⁷⁶ Ibid., p.92.

¹⁷⁷ The impressive cartoon (illustration 3) “Çemberleme” of Cemal Nadir has been attached to the thesis to show the discontent of the people. Also, Altan Öymen narrates the widespread unrest among people in the book, *Değişim Yılları*, by a theatre scene and some dialog between Murtaza (teacher) and Hüsametin (profiteer). Öymen, Altan, *Değişim Yılları* (İstanbul: Doğan Kitap Yayıncılık, 2004), pp.76-8.

¹⁷⁸ Albayrak, p.29.

¹⁷⁹ Tezel, p.322.

applicability of the etatist economy politics of the RPP. Thus, by beginning from 1946, Turkey left the former etatist politics. Instead of a closed and a patronage economy politics, it adopted new liberal economy politics including free imports, foreign aids and credits, and also intensive foreign capital movements.¹⁸⁰ Adjustment for the new conditions came with the Prime Minister Recep Peker on August 14, 1946. He read the government program being full of liberal views. Indeed, before long, restrictions upon importation were going to be removed in August and Turkey was going to join the liberal trade system of the capitalist world with convertible currencies.¹⁸¹

Turkey had to adjust its economy to global economy because she had lost her most important trade partner, Germany, which was the loser of the war. Elimination of Germany created stagnation in foreign trade of Turkey.¹⁸² Therefore, between 1945 and 1950, Turkey chose an economy-politics relying on American aids and credits. However, this time, new relations brought new external pressure for the liberalization of Turkish foreign trade. Consequently, the restrictions upon importation were relieved and imports started to grow more than exports. Finally, Turkey confronted with significant trade deficits from 1945 to 1950 as is shown in table 4 below.

Table 4: Trade Deficits of Turkey between 1945 and 1950

	1945	1950
Export	300 million TL	700 million TL
Import	300 million TL	980 million TL

Source: Tezel, Yahya Sezai, *Cumhuriyet Döneminin İktisadi Tarihi* (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 2001), pp.184-5.

When Turkey gave budget deficits after 1946, the government used debt to meet them. Until 1948, the government tried to compensate its deficits particularly by floating

¹⁸⁰ Makal, Ahmet, *Türkiye’de Çok Partili Dönemde Çalışma İlişkileri, 1946-1963* (Ankara: İmge Kitabevi, 2002), p.46.

¹⁸¹ Tezel, p.185.

¹⁸² Turkish economy was dependent on Germany before the war. In 1939, nearly half of its foreign trade was consisted in Turkish-German trade relationship, and this situation continued more or less during the war, Keyder, p.156; In August 1944, when Turkey stopped its relationships with Germany, who was the largest economy partner. Turkey could not find a market for its goods especially its chromium and agricultural products. Ekinci, pp.200-1.

internal loans; and then, by funds of the Marshall Aid.¹⁸³ But these funds were insufficient and at last these trade deficits forced Ankara government to devalue Turkish Lira in 1946. The 1946 devaluation known as “the September 7 Decisions” was the first in the Turkish economic history. According to the official parity, \$ 1 was equal to 129 *kurus*, but after the devaluation, it became 280 *kurus* (devaluation was about 54.3 %).

There were some other reasons for this devaluation: Firstly, the government thought that domestic prices were higher than world trade prices; therefore, Turkish export commodities and products could not compete with the world products. Secondly, Turkey had stocks of some export goods. By devaluation, it was expected to export those stocks easily. Thirdly, the government aimed to decrease real values of domestic debts. Fourthly, the government decided to participate in IMF; however, if Turkey became an IMF member, then the Turkish government would not be able to make devaluation of Turkish Lira without permission from this international institution. Therefore, the government desired to use devaluation for the last time to balance the Turkish economy before its official IMF membership. Fifthly, the government wanted to increase production capacity of the country. For this purpose, the government would use domestic products instead of imported ones; but at the same time, the government had to remove import restrictions in order to adjust its economic conditions to the international liberal trade system. Thus, the government aimed at limiting excessive demands of import goods by this devaluation.¹⁸⁴

3.4. Political Challenges Created by the War Conditions in Turkey: Passivity of Radical Left and Right Wings

From 1938 to 1950, right and left ideologies tried to expand and find followers through the press. Therefore, the RPP governments would close these publications frequently due to their “hazardous” opinions. For instance, the newspapers *Vatan* 9 times, *Tasvir* 8 times, *Tan* 7 times, and *Cumhuriyet* 5 times were closed down by the Martial Law decisions.¹⁸⁵ The cartoon

¹⁸³ Hershlag, Zvi Yehuda, *Turkey: An Economy in Transition* (The Hague: Uitgeverij Van Keulen, 1958), p.200.

¹⁸⁴ Şahin, pp.105-6.

¹⁸⁵ Turan, *Türk Devrim Tarihi*, p.177.

drawn by Cemal Nadir Güler gives us the apprehension about the period¹⁸⁶ that single party regime was closed to the ideologies coming from right or left sides.

In the first half of the 1930s, the leftists were actually more vivid ideologically in Turkey. Even though the radical left (communists) appeared in the early years of the republic, they were removed from the political scene as an excuse to the Sheikh Said Rebellion. After the rebellion, the leftist movement was suppressed by the republican governments.¹⁸⁷ But soon, in 1932, some leftist writers such as Şevket Süreyya Aydemir, Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoğlu, Vedat Nedim Tör, İsmail Hüsrev Tökin, and Burhan Asaf Belge published the journal “*Kadro*” (cadre) suggesting economic policies within the ideological framework that should have been pursued by the Republican governments.¹⁸⁸ However, *Kadro* was only published for three years from January 1932 to December 1934. The writers of *Kadro* had become a threat for interest groups and the regime. Indeed, interest groups of the state did not tolerate the cadre movement,¹⁸⁹ and finally, its publications ceased. Then, a long silence term began. This period stirred within the WW II but this time ideological publications came from rightists more than leftists.

İnönü and the RPP rulers had allowed nationalist and Turanist publications in the early years of the WW II. This attitude was crucial for the RPP governments because if Germany defeated The Soviets, the Central-Asia Turkism and Turanist issue would have got a very great consideration definitely. For this reason, nationalist-Turanist publications such as *Ergenekon* (end of 1938), *Kopuz* (April 1939), *Bozkurt* (May 1939), *Çınaraltı* (August 1941), *Türk Yurdu* (September 1942), *Millet* (May 1942), *Gökbörü* (November 1942), and *Doğu* (November 1942) were allowed to be published in the early years of the WW II.¹⁹⁰ But then, the state ceased the rightist and Turanist influence when the Soviet army defeated the German troops in front of Stalingrad. There was no reason to keep nationalist-Turanist groups in political scene anymore for the state. On May 19, 1944, İnönü stressed his anti-Turanist views: “My citizens! Be sure that we will defend our country against these new

¹⁸⁶ See the illustration 4. Çeviker, p.187. By this cartoon, Cemal Nadir gives us a clue about the passivity of the right and left thoughts in Turkish political life in the first half of 1940s.

¹⁸⁷ Oran, Baskın, *Atatürk Milliyetçiliği* (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1999), pp.196-8.

¹⁸⁸ Türkeş, Mustafa, “A Patriotic Leftist Development Strategy Proposal in Turkey in the 1930s: The Case of the *Kadro* (cadre) Movement, *Int. J. Middle East Studies*, Number: 33, Cambridge University Press, 2001, pp.92-4.

¹⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, p.107.

¹⁹⁰ Turan, *Türk Devrim Tarihi*, pp.178-9.

depravities (fascist publications)”. Indeed, some operations started and some fascist/Turanist names were arrested.¹⁹¹

After prohibitions of the journals of the nationalist right, the left press owners began to criticize the RPP policy. Hoping to get the DP support, they increased the volume of criticism and even accused the RPP ruling of supporting the right.¹⁹² Similar to rightist journals, the numbers of the left publications having socialist approaches had increased in the wartime. Some of them were *Yurt ve Dünya* (January 1941), *Adımlar* (May 1943), *Görüşler* (November 1945). The editor of the *Yurt ve Dünya* was Behice Boran, associate professor at the Faculty of Language and History-Geography” (*Dil ve Tarih Coğrafya Fakültesi* or DTCF) until November 1942; and then Pertev Boratav, associate professor at the same university took over the editorship of the journal. Also, Niyazi Berkes, Cemil Meriç, Muzaffer Şerif, Orhan Burian, Saffet Korkut, Melih Cevdet Anday, Orhan Kemal, Nusret Hızır, and Halil Vedat Fırat were other writers of the journal. By this cadre, the journal had an academic appearance.¹⁹³ Behice Boran published *Adımlar* after leaving from *Yurt ve Dünya*. Then, Muzaffer Şerif joined in the journal; however, it was closed down one year later.

Another two significant names were Zekeriya and Sabiha Sertel for the leftist publications in this period. Zekeriya Sertel the owner of *Tan* newspaper criticized the single party government and accused the RPP of being a totalitarian regime by an article, on 20 June 1945.¹⁹⁴ Esat Adil, Aziz Nesin, Behice Boran, Adnan Cemgil, Muaffak Şeref, Sabahattin Ali, Tevfik Rüştü Aras (Minister of Foreign Affairs between 1923-1939), and Cami Baykurt (Minister of Internal Affairs from May to July 1920) were other writers of *Tan*.¹⁹⁵ The owner of *Görüşler* Journal was Sabiha Sertel.¹⁹⁶ Publishing of *Görüşler* had coincided with Celal Bayar’s resignation from the RPP to establish a new party in December 1945. The intellectuals called as *Türk Solu* (Turkish Left) were supporting Bayar’s attempts. The Sertels tried to contact Celal Bayar and Marshal Fevzi Çakmak by intermediators of Tevfik Rüştü Aras and Cami Baykurt. The Sertels hoped to establish an anti-fascist front in

¹⁹¹ Mumcu, Uğur, *40’ların Cadı Kazanı* (Ankara: Uğur Mumcu Vakfı Yayınevi, 1997), p.47.

¹⁹² Turan, *ibid.*, p.190.

¹⁹³ *Ibid.*, p.181.

¹⁹⁴ Çavdar, *Türk Demokrasi Tarihi*, p.408.

¹⁹⁵ Mumcu, p.71.

¹⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, pp.71-72.

Görüşler. However, this connection did not realize because Bayar knew that the regime's main fight was based on the struggle with the left.¹⁹⁷

Some intellectuals such as Pertev Boratav, Behice Boran, Niyazi Berkes and Adnan Cemgil, wrote in the *Görüşler*. Meanwhile, a writer list was published in the Journal. Accordingly, besides to Sabiha Sertel, some opponent names had promised to write for the *Görüşler* such as Celal Bayar, Tevfik Rüştü Aras, Fuat Köprülü, Adnan Menderes, and Cami Baykurt.¹⁹⁸ They would write for the journal, however, when it was published, reactions arose immediately. Bayar, Aras, Menderes and Köprülü had to retreat and explain that there was no any relationship with *Görüşler*. Then they ceased sending articles to the journal. These reactions stimulated rightist and nationalist circles against the leftists.¹⁹⁹ Zekeriya Sertel invited in *Tan* on December 2, 1945, all democrats, socialists or communists in order to form a coalition against fascist and reactionary groups in the country.²⁰⁰

On December 3, Sabiha Sertel criticized the RPP in *Tan*, and argued that the RPP was pressurizing the opposition movement. In the same day, Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın, the editor-in-chief of *Tanin*, called patriots to react against *Görüşler* and its leftist provocations. The sub-headline of his writing was "A homeland front is necessary".²⁰¹ The next day, on December 4, a group gathered in front of the *Tan*'s printing house and then they destroyed it. In the same day, the office of *Görüşler* was destroyed too. Because of these attacks, the journal had to stop its publications.²⁰² The "Tan Incident" affected the relationship between the Quartet Motion owners and intellectuals like Baykurt, Aras and the Sertels.²⁰³ The owners of the Motion avoided from two significant tendencies, which were reactionary movements and communism. According to Bayar, İnönü had emphasized in his speech on May 19, 1945 that the former two democracy experiences ended due to their reactionary tendencies. However, the events of *Tan* and *Görüşler* had proved that setting a relationship with communism would be very dangerous for the politicians and intellectuals in Turkish political life.²⁰⁴

¹⁹⁷ Eroğul, p.4.

¹⁹⁸ Toker, p.82.

¹⁹⁹ Turan, *Türk Devrim Tarihi*, pp.182-3.

²⁰⁰ Ibid., pp.190-1.

²⁰¹ Mumcu, p.72.

²⁰² Turan, ibid., p.183;

²⁰³ Gevgilili, ibid., p.41.

²⁰⁴ Toker, pp.80-1.

Meantime, there was a civil war in Greece, where communists were very active. This situation would also affect Turkish left politics and the leftists negatively. The left opposition and its organizations were silenced by arresting a number of leftists and closing down their publications. The socialist parties were closed down on December 10, 1946.²⁰⁵ The *Tan* and *Görüşler* had been destroyed but the government's struggle with the left had not finished yet. The writers of "*Görüşler*" were generally scholars of the DTCF. Therefore, the government began some investigations about the writers of *Tan* and *Görüşler* in the faculty. Sabahattin Ali was the first faculty member removed from the University.²⁰⁶ Investigations continued against other three faculty members, Korkut Boratav, Behice Boran and Niyazi Berkes. Finally, the University Senate dismissed these three professors from the faculty on December 26, 1946.²⁰⁷ Although they were accepted back to the university by the decision of the Interuniversity Committee, accusations about them did not stop in the courts. Finally, the court found them innocent in 1950; however, they had already lost their positions in the university.²⁰⁸

Meanwhile, Sabahattin Ali was killed when he was trying to escape from the country on April 2, 1948.²⁰⁹ Dr. Şefik Hüsnü, the founder of "Turkish Socialist Laborer and Peasant Party" in 1946,²¹⁰ and his colleagues were sentenced to five years in July 1948. Another significant leftist, Mehmet Ali Aybar, (faculty member of İstanbul University and writer of the *Vatan* and the *Gün* in 1946), was removed from the university. He would have published the *Hür* newspaper in February 1947 but it was also closed down by the Martial Law in the same year. Then, Aybar published *Zincirli Hürriyet* in İzmir, but this time his printing house was destroyed. Finally, he was punished to four years in 1949 on a charge of insulting President İnönü.²¹¹ Although there was no law prohibiting socialist parties and publications, they were closed down with accusations of serving for foreign interests.²¹² Under these conditions, socialist parties were not able to find a chance to appear strongly in Turkish political life.

²⁰⁵ Ahmad, *Türkiye'de Çok Partili Politikanın Açıklamalı Kronolojisi, 1945-1971*, p.29.

²⁰⁶ Turan, *Türk Devrim Tarihi*, p.195.

²⁰⁷ Ibid., pp.194-7.

²⁰⁸ Ibid., p.200.

²⁰⁹ Ibid., p.201.

²¹⁰ This Party would be closed in December 1946, Mumcu, p.78.

²¹¹ Turan,ibid., p.201.

²¹² Ahmad, ibid., pp.27-8.

CHAPTER 4

INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL DYNAMICS OF DEMOCRATIZATION IN TURKEY BETWEEN 1945 AND 1950

Transition to democracy in undemocratic countries occurs by adopting some democratic institutions and necessities such as voters, political parties, electoral systems, periodic elections, and judicial control, etc. In the democratization process, there are many ways to set up democratic institutions. Therefore, it would be a mistake to think that every country follows the same pathway for democratization process. Due to having different economic, politic, social, cultural, and international peculiarities of societies, their democratization experiences differ from each other. In fact, the rise of the contemporary democracies was not linear, rather it was like “democratization tides” which began in the 1820s in the United States, and the first wave continued about a century until 1926.²¹³ Expansion of this long democracy wave brought 29 democracies in the world.²¹⁴

In 1922, when Mussolini came to the power in Italy, the first “reverse wave” initiated. By the year 1942, the number of democratic states all over the world reduced to twelve.²¹⁵ Then, a second democratization wave appeared by the triumph of the Allied Powers in the end of the WW II.²¹⁶ The second democracy wave included democratization of the Turkish political system as transition from authoritarian single party to multiparty regime. It is generally accepted that these transitions including Turkish democracy experience came true due to external or global dynamics. However, the study is going to focus and proceed on Turkish democratization case with both external and internal dynamics between 1945 and 1950.

²¹³ Huntington, Samuel P., “Democracy’s Third Wave”, *The Democracy Sourcebook*. Eds. Dahl, Robert; Shapiro, Ian; Cheibub, Jose Antonio (Massachusetts: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2003), p.93.

²¹⁴ Huntington, Samuel P., *Üçüncü Dalga, Yirminci Yüzyıl Sonlarında Demokratlaşma* (Ankara: Yetkin Yayınları, 1996), p.23.

²¹⁵ Ibid.

²¹⁶ Huntington, Samuel P., Democracy’s Third Wave, in Ed. Pridham, Geoffrey, *Transitions to Democracy* (Brookfield: Aldershot, 1995), p.129.

The RPP rulers were quite worried about political chaos during this period. İnönü had to take a step towards democratization.²¹⁷ This step was necessary for many scholars because if İnönü did not liberalize the country economically and politically, Turkey and the RPP power were going to be under bilateral pressure coming from the outside and the inside. According to them, İnönü knew that the regime had to satisfy the democratic alliance outside; however, he also knew that the Turkish people inside had to be satisfied. Therefore, democratization might have saved the country from destructive effects coming from both sides.²¹⁸ Was İnönü really aware of the internal tension created by the war conditions in the country? We should compare İnönü's decision with the decisions of similar rulers outside in the same period in order to answer this question.

The political regimes of Portugal and Spain for example had some resemblances with Turkey's regime in the 1940s. From the establishment of the Turkish Republic in 1923 to general elections in 1950, the Republican People Party (RPP) held an absolute power in the country. During the last five years of this period (1945-1950), Turkey had a multiparty regime but at the same time the RPP power could keep its authoritarian peculiarity until the end of this period. When the result of general elections on May 14, 1950 became clear, the Republicans began to lose their political power. Instead of approximately three decades of RPP power, the DP took over the power peacefully.²¹⁹ In the first half of the 20th century, however, while regime changes of most of European countries had severe fluctuations, these changes occurred generally by a violent way. Actually, the political regimes in the west were a wide variety from monarchy to parliamentary, from authoritarian single party regimes to multiparty democratic ones in the same period. There were some democracy attempts in Europe however some of them in a short time failed and undemocratic regimes appeared. The basic characteristic of this period in the west was having harsh and bloody struggles for power.

The most significant common peculiarity of Portugal, Spain, and Turkey was that they had not participated in the WW II. But at the same time, they were affected massively from the war conditions both economically and politically. Also all of them had

²¹⁷ Ekinci, p.288.

²¹⁸ Yetkin, Çetin, "II. Dünya Savaşı Bitiminde Çok Partili Düzene Geçişte Temeldeki Bozukluk", *Atatürkçü Bilinç*, Akdeniz University, The Research and Practice Center *Journal of Atatürk Principles and Revolution History*, Number: 1, V.1, January 1994, p.4.

²¹⁹ Indeed, the power change in May 1950 became quite peacefully in Turkey. The cartoon of Turhan Selçuk at the illustration 10 shows this moderate transition to democracy.

authoritarian and undemocratic political regimes during the WW II period.²²⁰ As soon as the WW II ended, they desired to be closer to the western states because the west had both economic and industrial superiority. For many countries, having democracy was important; and according to them, the democracy “model” was the United States. Although Turkey was ruled under an authoritarian regime during the war it did not become a fascist and totalitarian regime like in Germany or Italy; and even it did not adapt dictatorship like in

²²⁰ In Portugal, actually, the first republic had been established in 1911, and it continued sixteen years. In this period, there were 9 presidential, 44 governments, 25 uprisings and three temporary dictatorships in the country. Lee, Stephen J., *The European Dictatorships 1918-1945* (London: Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1991), p.221. Under this turmoil conditions, the WW I began and Portugal participated in the Allies in March 1916. Therefore, not only military expenditures increased but also economic problems and conflicts increased in the country too. This chaotic situation continued during a decade. On June 1926, the republican regime in Portugal was destroyed by General Gomas da Costa; and he replaced it with a military dictatorship. In 1928, an economy professor, dr Antonio de Oliveira Salazar became Economy Minister. Then, Salazar became prime minister in 1932 (Lee, *ibid.*, p.222); and he seized all the power and ruled the country as an authoritarian rightist leader even though he never explained himself as a rightist. Derrick, Michael, *The Portugal of Salazar* (London: the Paladin Press, 1938), p.145. He distrusted the parliamentary democracy in Portugal (Derrick, p.147) and ruled the country under a despotic domination from 1933 to 1968 (Lee, pp.222-3). Despite of his despotic rightist rule he avoided to set a firm relationship with fascist Germany or Italy. He always kept the Portugal’s foreign policy away from the fascist line. Michael Derrick asserts that Portugal was not a fascist state because it did not practice etatist and totalitarian policies in the country (Derrick, *ibid.*).

Spain as another despotic country in the 1940s had experienced approximately five hundred coup d’état attempts over the last two centuries. Ucelay, Enric, - Da Cal, “Imagined Memory as the Weight of the Past, Political Transitions in Spain” in ed. Waisman, Carlos H., *Spanish and Latin American Transitions to Democracy* (Portland: Sussex Academic Press, 2005), p.23. The first republic in Spain was established in 1873 but it was short lived. In the WW I, some lands of Spain were invaded by France. This occupation weakened the central rule and caused many revolts. Under these turmoil conditions, General Primo de Rivera controlled the all country and set a military dictatorship until 1930. When Republicans won the elections in 1931, the King Alfonso 18th had to leave Spain. Thereupon, the second republic was established in 1931. Just five years later in 1936, this time, the Leftists won the elections. But nationalist republicans did not want to leave the power. For this reason, the Civil War brought out and continued three years (1936-1939). Actually, the Spanish fascist party was small one in the early 1930s. Wolfson, Robert, *Years of Change: European History 1890-1945* (London: E. Arnold, 1990), p.385. But it developed rapidly and became stronger during the bloody civil war. The Rightists were supporting Franco who projected the whole civil war as against the “Godless left” (Lee, *The European Dictatorships 1918-1945*, pp.236-7). Achievement of Franco came with German and Italian interventions in favor of Franco (Wolfson, *ibid.*). In addition to such foreign support, Franco got domestic support coming from the army and rightist Carlists who were hoping that Franco could restore the monarchy. But in the end, about 250.000 Spanish people died in the civil war (Lee, p.236), and when Franco achieved to control the entire country, he formed dictatorship regime. During the WW II period, Spain was officially neutral. Franco’s dictatorial rule banned political parties other than the official party, Falange. Also labor unions were banned too. Until his death in 1975, he ruled Spain under his authoritarian regime. Finally, 41 years later, new elections were made in the country in 1977. Henceforth, limited democratic regime could be set in Spain. Because, until the late 1980s, Spain’s administration had a dual structure; a civil power on the one hand, and the military one on the other (Ucelay, Enric,-Da Cal, *ibid.*, p.25).

Salazar's Portugal or Franco's Spain. According to Duverger, the Turkish political system was not totalitarian and even it might be accepted as democratic ideologically.²²¹ Indeed, only Turkey transformed its authoritarian single party regime towards democratic one while Portugal and Spain went into regime crisis.

Portugal and Spain tried to save their monarchy regimes. For this reason, there was a power struggle between the monarchy supporters and the opponents. The communist left was generally attached to this power struggle. Moreover, coup d'états and revolts were main characteristic in both countries. The multiparty regime attempts were bloody due to this conflict situation. In Turkey, however, sultanate and caliphate were abolished in the early years of the Republic without bloody struggle or civil war.²²² There was no a legitimacy for monarchy in Turkey. Also, the communist left and its fractions had been suppressed by the RPP since the early years of the Turkish Republic. Because of all these reasons, there was not a chaotic situation during evolution of the single party regime.²²³ Thus, contrary to Portugal and Spain, Turkey changed its regime from the authoritarian single party to the multiparty one peacefully. The reasons of this bloodless regime change are wondered by many authors and they ask how Turkey achieved to realize unproblematically this power change. Why did the RPP submit the power to the opposition (DP) whereas undemocratic and authoritarian regimes in Europe kept the power in their control firmly? In order to find answers to above questions, it is necessary to focus on mainly the external and the internal dynamics of this power change.

4.1. External Dynamics of Transition to Democracy in Turkey

The democratization of the some countries was affected deeply from international developments during the post WW II period. The war economy had created new conditions for the post war period. While some markets were developing such as in the US, the markets of the some other economies collapsed as it occurred in the most of European countries. In this period, three decades later of its establishment, the economic structure of Turkey was still

²²¹ Toprak, Zafer, "Türkiye'de Sol Faşizm ya da Otoriter Modernizm 1923-1946", Osmanlı Bankası Arşiv ve Araştırma Merkezi, 27 May 2006, http://www.obarsiv.com/pdf/cts_0506_zafertoprak.pdf, p.10.

²²² The Sultanate was abolished on 1 November 1922; and then, the Caliphate was abolished in 1924. Karpat, *Türk Demokrasi Tarihi*, p.40, 43.

²²³ Both the RPP rulers and the DP leaders tried to survive multiparty system and they achieved to eliminate radical groups in their own parties. The 35s in the RPP group, under Nihat Erim's leadership, came to the fore and opposed to Peker Government in 1947 while the DP rulers excluded radical wing of the Democratic Party (Kenan Öner and his friends) in 1948.

weak. Therefore, maybe more than other European countries, Turkey needed urgent economic aid. Her security concerns also caused to ask military aid from the west and thus, Turkish politics became more susceptible and exposed to the foreign influences.

During the WW II, the US had increased production of war industry about 170 %. When the war ended, a serious unemployment would have increased quickly because of the slowing down of the industry sector in the US. Before the end of the war, for this reason, the US government was trying to find a new way to keep its high exportation rates.²²⁴ Due to having strong economy and financial conditions, the president of the US, Roosevelt, invited 44 states to sign Bretton Woods Conference. These states approved the conference decisions on July 22, 1944; and according to the agreement, two institutions were established; IMF (International Monetary Fund) and IBRD (International Bank for Reconstruction and Development).²²⁵

In order to become a member of the new order of the western capitalist world, Turkey had to leave its neutral position. Even, Turkey declared war against Germany and Japan to attend San Francisco Conference on April 25, 1945. Two months later, with the signing of the constitution of the United Nations (UN) on June 26, 1945,²²⁶ Turkey took part in the new international body as one of 51 members of the UN.²²⁷ Now, it was impossible to arrange economic relations with foreign states only by bilateral agreements. The first economic arrangement made by the Turkish government on September 6, 1948 to the new international economic structure, indeed, came with a serious devaluation.²²⁸ The devaluation decision and its effects will be mentioned in the further headlines.

During the post WW II period, there emerged two main external dynamics affecting Turkey's politics. Firstly, almost all winners of the war had democratic regimes and they were opposing to undemocratic regimes. Even the Soviets had asked for a more democratic and representative system for Turkey on June 7, 1945.²²⁹ The second important external dynamic was expansionist and aggressive foreign policy of the Soviets. These two main dynamics

²²⁴ Tekeli, İlhan & İlkin, Selim; *Cumhuriyetin Harcı*, İkinci Kitap, Köktenci Modernitenin Ekonomik Politikasının Gelişimi (İstanbul: Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2004), p.365.

²²⁵ Ibid., p.366.

²²⁶ Turan, *Türk Devrim Tarihi, Çağdaşlık Yolunda Yeni Türkiye*, p.149.

²²⁷ Tekeli & İlkin, p.367.

²²⁸ Ibid.

²²⁹ Gevgilili (Bağlam Yayınları, 1987), p.33.

forced Turkey to being closer to the democratic western states and getting support via some democratization actions and pro-western foreign politics. Therefore, it was not surprise for Turkey signing the United Nations Agreement in San Francisco to review its political order in accordance with international political climate. Besides these two main external dynamics, the emergence of the Cold War of course helped for continuity of Turkish democratization process in the late 1940s.

4.1.1. The Expectations of the West from Turkey for Democratization after the WW II

Early post war period had provided Turkey with support of the United States. During the aid discussions in the Congress, however, some American senators were making very harsh criticisms against Turkey because of its political regime. Representative of Ohio, George H. Bender for instance, made a speech emphasizing Turkey's political system:

It will be a hypocrisy act for this House to vote a law, which guarantees the freedom of the press for American newspapers, while we know with an absolute fact that freedom does not exist in Turkey today. The arrogant Turkish military dictatorship is asking money from us with the full knowledge that they intend to violate every provision required by the Congress.²³⁰

Besides the American Congress, the press in the US had focused on Turkey's political regime and Turkey was accused of being an undemocratic country.²³¹ An American committee under leadership of Senator Barkley came to Turkey in order to investigate Turkey's general economic conditions.²³² This situation increased existent pressure on Turkish politicians. On July 7, 1947, Bayar's speech was clear evidence for such above foreign criticisms: "We are living in a new era in which the freedoms guaranteed by the constitutions for the nations being safeguarded in the mutual international obligations."²³³ Turkey, indeed, was under a serious political pressure and difficulty coming from outside. Such criticisms both outside and inside helped the decision for liberalizing the Turkish political system and trying multiparty regime one more time.

²³⁰ Karpat, Kemal H., *Turkey's Politics* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1959), p.189.

²³¹ Ibid.

²³² *Cumhuriyet*, 13 April 1947.

²³³ *Vatan*, July 8, 1948.

To integrate opposition parties and consolidate them into the Turkish political system was crucial in this period. Besides to the foreign demands, the socio-economic problems inside created by the war conditions pushed Turkish politics into a crisis; and thus, it needed to be restored as soon as possible. Therefore, İnönü had to interfere with the political struggle in order to solve the problems between Peker government and the Democrats. During this period internal and external developments affected mutually each other. When İnönü read his well-known declaration on the radio on July 11, 1947, interestingly, the Truman Doctrine was signed by Hasan Saka, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Edwin C. Wilson, the American Ambassador, in Ankara on July 12.²³⁴ According to the doctrine, there was no clear contract and obligation referring to the US responsibility if the Soviets attacked Turkey. Only responsibility of the US was to send weapons and equipment for Turkey.²³⁵ According to Washington, the Truman Doctrine supporting Turkey and Greece militarily was necessary in order to enlarge the western bloc and to stop the expansion of communist Russia. For Turkey, on the other side, the doctrine was necessary because the threatening demands of the Soviets were fairly risky for Turkish sovereignty. There were two main objectives of the doctrine for Turkey: To strengthen of the Turkish armed forces and to provide economic stability in the country.²³⁶

The postwar period in Europe, however, needed much more than Truman Doctrine since survival of the markets in Western Europe needed more extensive and organized aid program. Such an aid project came from General Marshall. His plan suggested a conference to be held in Europe. The conference was convened in Paris by sixteen countries in July 1947²³⁷ and the Organization of European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) was established at the end of the conference. In order to determine the need for exchange and the amount of aid for European countries, a report was prepared; and then, it was approved by the OEEC.²³⁸

²³⁴ Yetkin, *Karşıdevrim*, p.353.

²³⁵ Sander, Oral, *Türk-Amerikan İlişkileri 1947-1964* (Ankara: Sevinç Matbaası, 1979), p.29.

²³⁶ Turan, Şerafettin, *İsmet İnönü, Yaşamı, Dönemi ve Kişiliği* (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınları, 2003), p.270. However, Sander claimed that the aim of the Truman Doctrine was not to protect Turkey's sovereignty but to guarantee the future of Western Europe. Sander, *ibid.*, p.11.

²³⁷ Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, and the United Kingdom.

²³⁸ Ekinci, see footnote 473, p.342.

Then, the Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA) was established on April 3, 1948 as the agency of the United States administering the European Recovery Program (ERP). The purpose of the ECA was to provide financial assistance for the states participating in the ERP. In September 1948, the OEEC submitted a four-year program to the United States. The participant countries of Europe underlined four main purposes in the ERP; increase of production, international financial stability, co-operation in the development and exchange of resources, and finally, a solution to the problem of dollar deficit by expansion of exports.²³⁹ Within the ERP (or informally Marshall Plan) framework,²⁴⁰ the economic aid to Turkey started in 1949. The economic assistance did not mean cash money for Turkey; it was only consisting of agricultural machines and equipment which were to arrive as tractors firstly in İstanbul in May 1949.²⁴¹

After the WW II, the state continued its influence upon economy in Turkey. The “1946 Urgent Industry Plan” was proving the continuation of industry plans of the 1930s. By this plan, the government aimed at continuation of industrial development. However, due to the conditions of the world economy, this plan was abandoned quickly. Then, a new “Economic Development Plan” (Vaner Plan) was prepared in 1947.²⁴² The plan needed foreign financial support but due to the lack of such support, the plan could not be practiced.²⁴³ Because of the post-war conditions in politics, military and economy fields, Turkey had to apply pro-capitalist policies. Pro-western cooperation forced Turkey to integrate into the western institutions.

During the post-WW II period, however, economic development was more important than democracy in any country. Particularly, according to the academic circles in politics and economy, democracy was a secondary or ancillary matter.²⁴⁴ They believed that democracy would come after economic development; otherwise, to establish and protect democracy was highly difficult. After the WW II, Turkey joined in almost every political and economic institutions established by the western bloc in order to take a place in the western camp even

²³⁹ Hershlag, Zvi Yehuda, *Turkey: An Economy In Transition*, pp.202-3.

²⁴⁰ Sander, p.51.

²⁴¹ Robinson, p.139.

²⁴² Zürcher, Erik J., *Turkey A Modern History*, pp.225-6.

²⁴³ Şahin, p.88.

²⁴⁴ Doğan, Adem, “Demokrasi ve Ekonomik Gelişme”, *Erciyes Üniversitesi ve İdari Bilimler Fakültesi Dergisi*, No:25, July-December 2005, p.1.

though she did not attend to the Bretton Woods Conference in 1944²⁴⁵ aiming at setting of international economic order in the post-war period.

By the beginning from 1946, Turkey changed its former closed and patronage economy politics and applied liberal system with free imports, foreign credits and capitals.²⁴⁶ Turkey had to do this change after the WW II because foreign financial resources were very important for the Turkish economy-politics. Indeed, Turkey began to seek foreign debts frequently during this period. The US was the main source of foreign debts. The Turkish markets were opened to the foreign capital with the foreign debts. Turkish rulers aimed to improve of economy by foreign credits and foreign private capital.²⁴⁷ The Prime Minister Peker announced that Turkey would participate in the liberal trade system of the world.²⁴⁸ Indeed, the government took liberal economic measures in 1946 with the “September 7 Decisions”.

4.1.2. The Soviet Expansion as a Threat

The post-war circumstances produced new international problems like the expansionist foreign policy of the Soviets. Especially unacceptable Soviet demands and its aggressive policy forced Turkey to get western support against possible Soviet invasion in the future. While the WW II left many ruined countries, it had produced two dominant states, the US and the Soviets having global influence. They got victory against Germany and this new position gave them a great power and prestige. By this high prestige and self-confidence in Europe, the Red Army pursued the Nazi troops; and even they marched through the lands of Eastern Europe and the Balkans. The Soviets wanted to extend its influence throughout the Mediterranean and the Middle East. Therefore, she had focused on Iran, Greece, and Turkey. These developments pushed Turkey to find serious support from the west but especially from the US.

²⁴⁵ In order to adopt and decide international monetary system another conference met in Bretton Woods on December 27, 1945. Eds. Öcal, Tezer & Oktay, Ertan, *Ekonomi Sözlüğü* (Ankara: Verso Yayınları, 1989) p.45. The Agreement suggested two new international organizations: IMF (International Monetary Fund), and WB (World Bank). Arda, Erhan, *Sosyal Bilimler El Sözlüğü* (İstanbul: Alfa Yayınları, 2003), p.97. For more information, see Çarıklı, Targan Hacım, *Bretton Woods Antlaşması ve Türkiye* (İstanbul: 1947).

²⁴⁶ Makal, p.46.

²⁴⁷ Şahin, p.94.

²⁴⁸ Tezel, p.185.

When the meetings initiated between Turkey and Britain for Turkey's participation into the WW II beside the Allies in the early years of the war, Numan Menemencioğlu had warned England "Turkey is not sure that what the Soviets will do in the post-war period".²⁴⁹ After the triumph of the Soviets against Nazis, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Britain, Anthony Eden, also warned the British government in a cabinet meeting in June 1944 that the Soviet's manner was still uncertain and it was not clear what she would do in the post-war period. Six month later, Joseph Stalin mentioned first time about the Straits question on February 10, 1945, and next month, Moscow notified Turkey about the Soviet demands on March 19, 1945. Turkey was doubtful about the Soviet demands, but yet she sent a proposal to Moscow on April 4, 1945 in order to start mutual negotiations.²⁵⁰ The Soviets refused the Turkish proposal putting forward that current conditions were fairly different from two decades ago.²⁵¹ Before the Potsdam Conference on June 7, 1945, Molotov talked to Selim Sarper, the Turkish Ambassador in Moscow, mentioned the demands of the Soviets. According to Molotov, if Turkey wanted to sign a new agreement, she had to pay a price by three demands of Moscow:

- 1- Kars and Ardahan must be left to the Soviets,
- 2- Some bases in the straits must be given to the Soviets for the common defense,
- 3- Montreux Treaty must be revised in favor of the Soviets.²⁵²

In addition to these demands, the Soviets also put forward Turkish political regime as a problem and she asked more democratic government from Turkey.²⁵³ In the international conferences, the Soviets seemed as if it was not so interested in the Straits.²⁵⁴ Maybe for this reason, the Soviet demands did not stimulate the US and new president, Harry Truman until the end of the conference in San Francisco.²⁵⁵

Before the negotiations of the post-war period, international position of Turkey was quite complex. While western states were cheerful for termination of the war, the Europeans were

²⁴⁹ Tamkoç, p.211.

²⁵⁰ Ahmad, *Türkiye'de Çok Partili Politikanın Açıklamalı Kronolojisi (1945-1971)*, p.12

²⁵¹ Váli, p.62.

²⁵² Gönlübol et al., p.193.

²⁵³ Kirk, George, *Survey of International Affairs the Middle East 1945-1950* (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1954).

²⁵⁴ Tamkoç, p.217.

²⁵⁵ Yetkin, *Türkiye'de Tek Parti Yönetimi* p.239.

aware of the contributions of both the Soviet Army and Soviet people for the Allies' victory. That is, the Soviet Army was a hero and a savior for many Europeans and even for Americans. In addition to the above reasons, because of the ambivalent policy of Turkey during the WW II, it was too difficult to realize a mutual agreement about the Straits. In order to re-evaluate the new conditions and talk about the post-war problems, the Great Powers met in Potsdam, Berlin on July 17, 1945.²⁵⁶ After some discussions about the various problems, they mentioned about the Turkish Straits matter on July 22, 1945. Churchill asked Molotov clearly that what the demands of the Soviets were.²⁵⁷ Molotov's voiced the Soviets' demands as revision of Montreux Treaty; naval bases in the Turkish Straits; and territorial expectations in the eastern north of Anatolia.²⁵⁸

Thus, the policies of the western allies and the Soviets began to separate. The demands of Moscow in the Potsdam Conference had irritated the Anglo-American side. Turkey desired to utilize this political tension between the Soviets and the other winners of the war. Just after the Potsdam Conference, the Turkish government refused the Soviet demands officially on August 4, 1945.²⁵⁹ Just one year later, however, the Soviets gave a memorandum to Turkey on August 7, 1946. Thereupon, Dean Acheson the assistant of the Foreign Secretary of the US warned President Truman, and suggested meeting to determine American policies for this period. Truman arranged a convention at the White House in which Acheson claimed that "If the Soviets invade Turkey, the invasion will spread to Greece. By doing so, the Soviets will dominate the entire region including the Mediterranean and the Middle East. For this reason, the US must move against the Soviets at any cost even if it includes a war."²⁶⁰

At the end of the meeting, Acheson's views were accepted and the US gave a contrary memorandum to the Soviets on August 19, 1945. The US government also suggested Turkey to give a contrary memorandum to the Soviets.²⁶¹ In order to get rid of the Soviet threats, the US and England were the most possible states to get support for Turkey. However, they were being ruled by liberal democracies and the most important stipulations

²⁵⁶ Goloğlu, p.375.

²⁵⁷ Ibid., p.376.

²⁵⁸ The Soviets wished to change of some articles of the Montreux Agreement; and thus, her commercial ships and battleships would be able to pass from the Straits anytime. Gönlübol et al., p.195.

²⁵⁹ Aydemir, p.284.

²⁶⁰ Ibid., pp.205-6.

²⁶¹ Ibid.

of them were economic and political liberalizations.²⁶² England suggested the US that Turkey should have been defended against the Soviets but the US refused it at first and the US rulers claimed that it was still early yet.²⁶³ For this reason, Turkey was worried about the policy of Washington. When Moscow gave the second official memorandum to Turkey on September 24, 1946, this time, the US had to support Turkey explicitly.²⁶⁴

Nevertheless, Turkish rulers had to come up with new foreign policies based on getting the US support. Foreign support was necessary for Turkey even though the Soviets decreased the number of soldiers from 12 million in 1945 to 3 million in the end of 1948.²⁶⁵ But England was too weak to meet Turkey's needs. On the other side, economy sector in the United States was not destroyed. Therefore, the US support was the most possible choice for Turkey.²⁶⁶

Thomas and Frye claimed that it was too difficult to think that American policy emerged from previous American interests in Turkey. According to them, the change was obligatory because the US had to back up Britain, which had to discharge from the region due to her economic problems. The post-war conditions also created a bi-polar world having two hostile regimes as democratic and communist. Therefore, the Anglo-American front could not let the Soviets to move alone in this region.²⁶⁷ In the west of Atlantic, new international conditions forced Truman to explain the United States' interest in the Near East and the Middle East regions as below;²⁶⁸

The Near and the Middle East regions are a competition field among the great powers which are from outside the region. Thus, it is not difficult to envisage that this competition may produce a war. Nevertheless, if we want to save the peace in this important field of the

²⁶² Gevgilili, p.48.

²⁶³ Xydis, Stephen G., "New Light on the Big Three Crises Over Turkey in 1945", *The Middle East Journal*, Autumn 1960, V.14, No.4, p.423.

²⁶⁴ For more information, see Gürün, Kamuran, *Türk-Sovyet İlişkileri 1920-1953* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 1991), pp.276-309.

²⁶⁵ Hobsbawm, Eric, *Kısa 20. Yüzyıl (1914-1991)*, Çev. Yavuz Alogan (İstanbul: Sarmal Yayıncılık, 2003), p.285.

²⁶⁶ Singer, H.W., "U.S. Foreign Investment in Underdeveloped Areas: The Distribution of Gains between Investing and Borrowing Countries", *The American Economic Review*, vol.XL, No: 2, May 1950, pp.482-3.

²⁶⁷ Thomas, Lewis V. & Frye, Richard N., *The United States and Turkey and Iran* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1951) p.143.

²⁶⁸ Ekinci, p.336.

world, we cannot be satisfied only with the development of sovereignty and independence of this area. The peoples of the Near East and the Middle East want to improve their resources and life standards. America will aid them to carry out their desire.²⁶⁹

Truman and American policy makers had concentrated on Turkey because of its geo-strategic nature.²⁷⁰ Truman's speech proved that the policy of the US would change anymore against the Soviets.²⁷¹ The US was discomfort because she had witnessed that while the pressure of Moscow continued upon Turkey, the Red Army occupied Iran in May 1946. Thereupon, the US had to revise its Middle East policy²⁷² and that occupation made her more sensitive about Turkey. Coming of the battleships *Missouri* and *Providence* to the straits became a symbolic event for development of the Turkish-American relationship.²⁷³ The US had to interest not only in Europe but also in the Middle East. There were increasing nationalistic movements against England in the Middle East. Palestine question, for instance, had nationalistic inspirations against imperialist powers and particularly against England. As a result, England was unable to cope with all these problems; and finally, it had to ask for the US support in the region.²⁷⁴

4.1.3. Impact of the “Cold War” on Turkish Democracy (1945-1950)

Aftermath of the use of atomic bomb, Turkey considered the US as undefeatable state. The victory of the Allies had convinced Turkey that superiority of democratic system was definite, and therefore, the best political regime was democracy.²⁷⁵ At the same time, the WW II had produced unchallengeable superpowers which were the United States and the Soviets.²⁷⁶ Therefore, since 1945, the changes in the international politics and especially

²⁶⁹ *Ulus*, 7 April 1946.

²⁷⁰ Öztürk, O. Metin, *Ordu ve Politika* (Ankara: Gündoğan Yayınları, 1993), p.166.

²⁷¹ İkinci, p.337.

²⁷² Turan, *İsmet İnönü*, p.268.

²⁷³ Ahmad, *Türkiye'de Çok Partili Politikanın Açıklamalı Kronolojisi (1945-1971)*, p.18.

²⁷⁴ Yale, William, *The Near East* (New York: The University of Michigan Press, 1958), p.413.

²⁷⁵ Sander, p.18.

²⁷⁶ Hobsbawm, p.278.

aggressive and expansionist foreign politics of the Soviets²⁷⁷ had been disturbing Turkey too much. This disturbance caused a radical change in Turkey's "balance policy", classic foreign policy pursued by İnönü during the war. Efforts of Turkey to find political and economic support made its political regime more exposed to the external dynamics.

When the Turkish delegation under the leadership of Hasan Saka went to San Francisco, it was clear that the term "democracy" would be a keyword in the conference. The main purpose of the conference was security of the democratic states.²⁷⁸ After many discussions and meetings, the UN was established in San Francisco, and like other members, Turkey signed the UN Agreement. Thus, Turkey became one of the founders of the UN and official document of the UN recorded that the member states must have been ruled by elected governments and rulers.²⁷⁹ By the signing of this document, the opposition in Turkey found a lever for its opponent thoughts; and in time, their critics became clearer and more audible.

The most important segment of Turkey's geo-strategic complex was the straits.²⁸⁰ Because of the importance of the Straits, Stalin voiced the existent situation on February 4-11, 1945 as "it was impossible to accept Turkey's hands on the Soviet throat".²⁸¹ In order to get privileges from Turkey, the Soviets tried to leave Turkey alone in the international meetings.²⁸² The rise of Soviet power reduced the Turkish arguments in the negotiations. Nevertheless, Turkey did not hesitate to resist alone against the Soviets, but soon after, Turkey managed to get support from the western powers.²⁸³

The globe was divided into two parts as communist East, led by the Soviets and democratic capitalist West, led by the United States. In time, the division was called as the "cold war". When the US battleships came to İstanbul in April 1946, a new term had begun

²⁷⁷ The Soviets, at the end of the WW II, did not hesitate to take under control of invaded countries after the war, and even though it did not use the Red Army in order to extend her territories under communist domination, there were many ready Soviet troops in the eastern part of Europe, Caucasia, and Iran lands. Hobsbawm, *ibid.*, pp.278-9.

²⁷⁸ Ekinci, p.61.

²⁷⁹ Aykan, p.136.

²⁸⁰ Vâli, p.82.

²⁸¹ Weisband, Edward, 2. *Dünya Savaşı Sırasında İnönü'nün Dış Politikası*. çev. Kayabal, M. Ali (İstanbul: Milliyet Yayınları, 1974), p.377.

²⁸² Albayrak, p.38.

²⁸³ Dodd, Clement Henry, *Democracy and Development in Turkey* (Hull: The Eothen Press, University of Hull, 1979), p.12.

for Turkish foreign policy and Turkey became an open side of the cold war.²⁸⁴ İnönü and the RPP gave anti-communist support for the capitalist west aiming to surround the Soviets, and therefore, İnönü might keep on the authoritarian and single party regime in any case. This was possible because undemocratic regimes might go on due to the cold war conditions.²⁸⁵ Like the authoritarian regimes in Portugal and Spain. Indeed, the new conditions created by the “cold war” had given a chance to survive single party rule and İnönü. But İnönü insisted on democratization efforts to get steady support from the US and its western collaborators.

According to İnönü, getting support of the new emerging democratic and capitalist western bloc was possible with the consolidation of political competition and the liberalization of the country. Turkey, therefore, felt obliged to form such western political institutions.²⁸⁶ Turkey had showed its democracy tendency by the approval of the UN Constitution in the TGNA; and this was a proof that Turkey’s direction was towards democracy.²⁸⁷ As a result, all of these developments in the early years of the cold war made Turkey closer politically to the west. This political proximity of Turkey to the west would affect İnönü’s thoughts and undermined the foundations of the single party regime.

Ernest Bevin, the Foreign Secretary of Britain, informed the US that Great Britain could not longer support both Greece and Turkey. This serious warning affected the foreign policy of Washington.²⁸⁸ The US had to take measures and support the easternmost European countries. In March 1947, President Harry S. Truman announced that the US would support both Greece and Turkey by economic and military aids; and he continued;

The United States has received from the Greek government an urgent appeal for financial and economic assistance... That assistance is imperative if Greece is to survive as a free nation... The existence of the Greece is today under a threat by terrorist activities and several thousands armed Communists, who defy the government’s authority... The US must supply that assistance for Greece... The neighbor of Greece, Turkey, also deserves our attention. For us, the future of

²⁸⁴ Thomas & Frye, p.100.

²⁸⁵ Hobsbawm, p.310.

²⁸⁶ Özbudun, *Perspectives on Democracy in Turkey*, p.71.

²⁸⁷ Makal, pp.45-6.

²⁸⁸ Carr, William., *History: Political and Diplomatic in The Twentieth Century Mind 3: 1945-1965*, eds. Cox, C.B., & Dyson, A.E. (London: Oxford University Press, 1972), p.6.

Turkey as an independent and economically sound state is clearly no less important than the future of Greece.²⁸⁹

According to the Truman's speech, it is not wrong to claim that the purpose of the US was not to impose democracy; the US had actually sought to encircle the Soviets in order to impede the expansionary politics of the Soviet communism. Because of a possible Soviet expansion towards the south, the US felt the need to help for both Greece and Turkey. The way out was found by Truman Doctrine and then succeeded by Marshall Plan.²⁹⁰ After the announcement of Marshall Plan, the separation between the capitalist west and the communist Soviet became clearer. The plan turned into an instrument of the "cold war".²⁹¹ When the Congress explained that America would step in order to block the Soviet effect and its expansion, which was appeared directly as in the case of Turkey and indirectly as in Greece with the Communist movement, the earliest signal of the cold war appeared.²⁹² Actually, the Soviets could not so effective indirectly upon Turkish politics by ideological thoughts because of having no advanced industry and well organized workers contributing the leftist groups in Turkey. Also, the literacy rate was very low; and moreover, the RPP rule had suppressed the radical left wing of the political life in the country.

In spring of 1945, some difficulties resulting from the post-war conflicts caused disputes among the Allies. After Yalta Conference, the relations deteriorated between the western democracies and the USSR. In fact, in order to solve the problems, they had to talk upon them with each other. However, Stalin was reluctant to compromise; in contrast, he defended Russian aggressive policy as a "speed fight" and argued that "whoever occupies a region, he also imposes on his own social system. Everyone imposes his own system as far as his army can reach."²⁹³

²⁸⁹ Mee Jr, Charles L., *Meeting at Potsdam* (London: WCI, Andre Deutsch Ltd., 1975), p.310.

²⁹⁰ Lichtheim, George, *Europe in the Twentieth Century* (London: Sphere Books Ltd, 1974), p.352.

²⁹¹ Wilkinson, James & Hugbes, H. Stuart, *Contemporary Europe* (New Jersey: Pearson Education Inc., 2004), p.415.

²⁹² Lichtheim, p.353. Since 1944, Greece was under a civil war between the Republicans and the Communists. On the other side, there was no a real communist threat in Turkey. In addition to İsmet İnönü's unstable foreign politics, this peculiarity of Turkish politics forced the Soviets for direct action (including territorial demands and keeping under control the Bosphorus by military naval bases) against Turkey.

²⁹³ Petro & Rubinstein, p.53.

After Nazi defeat, the Soviet Army followed the German troops throughout the lands of Eastern Europe and it entered Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria, but the Red Army did not evacuate the lands of these countries. Following the Soviet control, communist governments were established in these Balkan states. Therefore, the eastern south of Europe (Greece and Turkey) was the only obstacle to the spread of communism to the Mediterranean and the Middle East. The communists in Greece were fairly influential and they had supported mobilization of the Red Army towards the Eastern Europe.²⁹⁴ Under these circumstances, Greece could have easily occupied by the Red Army. In addition, the Soviet impact was not only in the west of Turkey, another conflict consolidating the cold war took place in the east of Turkey. In March 1946, the Soviets invaded the northern part of Iran and this event affected the US foreign politics and contributed to increase the geostrategic importance of Turkey.²⁹⁵ All above actions of Moscow had resulted in emerging of the hostile emotions against the Soviets among the public union of the west.

The reasons of the cold war were various but as well as the foreign policy of the capitalist US, the foreign policy of the communist Soviets contributed to the spread of the cold war. The Soviet troops had invaded most of countries of the Eastern Europe and forced them to form communist regimes. In addition to above developments, Moscow was reluctant to withdraw the Red Army from the lands of Iran. Stalin had also over-eager to control Germany. There was also serious Soviet assistance for communist rebels in Greece. Whenever the Moscow's demands on the Turkish lands and her straits began to circulate, Washington was alerted immediately and it recognized the geostrategic importance of Turkey and its straits.²⁹⁶ Turkey was already asking for help to form close relationship with the US.²⁹⁷

Some developments would help for getting closer the relationship between Washington and Ankara: When the Soviets formed "*Kominform*" in October 1947, the communist rulers published a declaration that the main purpose of the *Kominform* was to struggle with the western regimes and to destroy them. The western states perceived this declaration as a communist attack to the democratic states. The Soviet declaration created a great anxiety among

²⁹⁴ Yale, p.413.

²⁹⁵ Turan, *İsmet İnönü*, p.268.

²⁹⁶ Vâli, pp.69-70.

²⁹⁷ Tamkoç, p.219.

the western countries because the Soviets had still 200 military divisions in Europe.²⁹⁸ In addition to above events, the vetoes of Moscow government impeded to develop a co-operation within the United Nations.²⁹⁹ Finally, all these developments resulted in establishment of a new international organization in Europe. On March 17, 1948, England, France, Netherlands, Belgium and Luxemburg signed “Brussels Agreement” unifying their powers against a possible attack of the Soviets.

The five signatories of the agreement invited Denmark, Ireland, Italy, Norway and Sweden to sign a new agreement establishing European Council on May 5, 1949.³⁰⁰ Turkey was not invited at first but three months later, she was invited to the organization and approved by the European Council on August 8, 1949.³⁰¹ Nevertheless, the participation in the council as a member did not dispel the Soviet threat for Turkey.³⁰² For this reason, Ankara government would ask to be a member of the North Atlantic Pact, which was going to be established soon.³⁰³ Without the US, however, this European bloc would be weak, for this reason, the US was invited to the new bloc.³⁰⁴ Finally, the last and the most powerful international body, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), was established by eleven signatory states; the United States, England, France, Canada, Belgium, Holland, Norway, Portugal, Italy, Island, and Luxemburg in Washington on April 4, 1949.³⁰⁵

The establishment of NATO attracted Turkey’s attention because not only she was still under a Soviet threat, but also, Turkish rulers thought that if Turkey remained out of NATO, the US might have decreased or terminated the Marshall Aid.³⁰⁶ Due to the isolation from NATO membership, the reactions to the establishment of NATO in Turkey were generally negative. With the exception of the US, the other members did not want to extend the borders of NATO towards the Mediterranean. In spite of this opposition, just before the

²⁹⁸ Gönlübol et al., p.223.

²⁹⁹ The USSR had vetoed 30 times the decisions of the Security Council in the United Nations until 1949. Gönlübol et al., p.224.

³⁰⁰ Ibid., p.226.

³⁰¹ Ahmad, *Türkiye’de Çok Partili Politikanın Açıklamalı Kronolojisi (1945-1971)*, p.56.

³⁰² Gönlübol et al., p.227.

³⁰³ Bağcı, Hüseyin, *Demokrat Parti Dönemi Dış Politikası* (Ankara: İmge Kitabevi, 1990), p.15.

³⁰⁴ Gönlübol et al., p.224.

³⁰⁵ Ibid., p.225.

³⁰⁶ Ibid.

general elections, Turkey applied officially for NATO membership in May 1950,³⁰⁷ and finally, it was admitted to NATO membership under the cold war conditions.

4.2. Internal Dynamics of Transition to Democracy in Turkey

The WW II began with the invasion of the Rhine region by German troops violating the Versailles Agreement. Many people estimated that the war would end within a few months. Contrary to the expectations, the war lasted six years. Like the other countries, this long and widespread war affected Turkey and its economy, society, and politics. As long as the WW II continued, economically unsatisfied groups increased. The main instruments of these groups were political and economic demands. By boosting of these demands, opponent names began to visible and organize. The organizing opposition persisted specifically on free and fair elections while it was uttering economic matters and poor economic conditions of the people. But actually, internal dynamics of this period were not independent from the past. Therefore, we had to turn back to the former period of the republic.

In the early years of the republic, the state suffered from lack of economic infrastructure. There were no sufficient roads for transportation of agricultural products into the national markets. Instead of roads, to make railways disturbed majority of the producers, because they were asking to connect their products with the capitalist centers.³⁰⁸ In May 1931, the 3rd Congress of the RPP accepted “etatism” as official principal of the state. When the etatist economy politics were practiced by İnönü and his circle, Celal Bayar criticized the etatist policies, and defended some privileges for private sector.³⁰⁹ Under these debates Bayar was appointed as Economy Minister by Mustafa Kemal in 1932.³¹⁰

İsmet İnönü had been struggling with *İş Bankası* group under Celal Bayar’s management for a long time. Celal Bayar criticized continuously economy policy of the prime minister, İnönü.³¹¹ From 1932 to 1937, many disputes appeared between the Minister of Economy (Bayar) and the Prime Minister (İnönü). Mostly, however, Atatürk supported

³⁰⁷ Gönlübol, p.228.

³⁰⁸ Kinross, p.518.

³⁰⁹ Tekeli & İlkin, p.229.

³¹⁰ Koçak, *ibid.*, p.37.

³¹¹ Uran, Hilmi, *Hatıralarım* (Ankara: Ayyıldız Matbaası, 1959), p.289.

Celal Bayar and many problems were solved behalf of Bayar.³¹² Even such these interventions made by Atatürk were so frequent and directly that the disagreements turned into an open dispute between Atatürk and İnönü. Finally, İsmet İnönü was dismissed, and instead of him, Celal Bayar was appointed to the Prime Ministry by Atatürk in 1937.

The economy views of Atatürk and Bayar were similar and pragmatic. Because of this similarity Atatürk supported Bayar's economy views.³¹³ Even though Bayar expressed that interest of the state was more important than personal interests, he also underlined that the state must realize its economy policy as giving priority to the private sector.³¹⁴ In the end of this struggle between economy views of İnönü and Bayar, İsmet İnönü lost the position of the Vice Presidency of the RPP which was under his control since 1923.³¹⁵ İnönü was aware of Mustafa Kemal's support to the views of Bayar and he said that "Atatürk was a supporter of liberal economy policies from the establishment of Turkey to the end of his life."³¹⁶ Celal Bayar was also aware of Atatürk's support for liberal policies and he claimed that "Atatürk moved away from narrow etatism but İsmet Pasha had been stuck narrow etatism."³¹⁷ Indeed, Atatürk and other rulers had not described in detail the concept of "etatism". For this reason, "etatism" had different meanings in different minds of the RPP rulers.³¹⁸

When İnönü became president on November 11, 1938, he appointed Bayar as prime minister. Bayar declared that the government would support private entrepreneurs and private industrial investments³¹⁹ even though he did not make significant changes in economic bureaucracy.³²⁰ Approximately two months later, İnönü dismissed Şükrü Kesebir, the economy minister of Bayar cabinet. Like this intervention, İnönü intervened frequently to the Bayar and his government. Bayar was fairly disturbed from this situation; and just

³¹² Ibid., p.45.

³¹³ Şahingiray, Özel, *Celal Bayar'ın Söylev ve Demeçleri 1920-1953, Ekonomik Konulara Dair* (İstanbul: İş Bankası Yayınları, 1999), p.15.

³¹⁴ Şahingiray, ibid., pp.212-3.

³¹⁵ Koçak, ibid., p.78.

³¹⁶ Ibid., p.40.

³¹⁷ Wanderlippe, John M., *The Politics of Turkish Democracy, İsmet İnönü and Formation of Multi-party System, 1938-1950* (New York: State University of New York Press, 2005), p.24.

³¹⁸ Koçak, ibid., pp.39-40.

³¹⁹ Ibid., p.84.

³²⁰ Ibid., pp.134-5.

three months later, he had to resign from the government.³²¹ In fact, the fundamental problem was that the liberal economy policy of Bayar, and therefore, the President did not want liberal economy policies controlling the Turkish economy.³²²

Another difference between Bayar and İnönü can be seen with the usage of the word (or as a reference) of “Atatürk” during their official speeches. When we focused on Bayar’s speeches made between 1939 and 1950 and on İnönü’s opening speeches of the TGNA in the same period, it is seen that while Bayar was mentioning about Atatürk frequently,³²³ İnönü never mentioned.³²⁴ As a result, we can claim that Bayar’s views of economic policy were closer to Atatürk’s views than İnönü’s views. According to me, the opinion differences between İnönü and Bayar about economic policies made them the leaders of the distal poles of the political struggle during the post war period. All these arguments about the economic model and management brought a separation within the RPP and created an internal dynamic for the transition to democracy after 1945.

4.2.1. The Roots of Separation in the Republican People Party

The first separation in the Republican People’s Party started in the mid of the 1920s as it was mentioned in the Chapter II. Economy politics and secularist policies of the RPP created tensions within the RPP at first. In time, the ties between the landlords, the notables and the liberals with the RPP loosened. Until the different ideas appeared within the RPP starting from the mid 1920s onward Mustafa Kemal Atatürk seemed as a representative of the national ideas. He always pointed out the freedom of the nation instead of the personal freedom. According to him, the national sovereignty was represented in the TGNA by the deputies elected by the nation itself. This thought was widespread in the early years of the republic.³²⁵ Nevertheless, two opposition parties were established in the same period but they were short-lived. Both of the opposition parties in the early period had achieved a quick

³²¹ Ibid., p.224.

³²² Ibid., pp.189-90.

³²³ Şahingiray, Özel, *Celal Bayar’ın Söylev ve Demeçleri (1946-1950)*, Demokrat Parti’nin Kuruluşundan İktidara Kadar Politik Konuşmalar (Ankara: Doğu Limited Ortaklığı Matbaası, 1954); Şahingiray, Özel, *Celal Bayar’ın Söylev ve Demeçleri (1920-1953)*.

³²⁴ *İsmet İnönü’nün TBMM’deki Konuşmaları 1920-1973* (Ankara: TBMM Kültür, Sanat ve Yayın Kurulu Yayınları, 1993), Cilt-II, p.1-89.

³²⁵ Aykan, p.135.

feedback and a serious support from the large masses; however, they could not achieve to survive more than few months. They could not be long-lasting, but why? Even though the republican rulers kept in their mind of multiparty as a desire,³²⁶ their main fear was cessation of the republican reforms.

The hesitation of the rulers continued 23 years and it resulted in increase of the pressure gradually on the people during the single party period. This hesitation about the opposition or the fear of cessation of the reforms made the republican rulers mostly authoritarian. Time to time, however, the Turkish rulers during the first half of the 20th century tried to soften the regime. They were aware of political appearance of the country both inside and outside. Mustafa Kemal in April 1930, for example, said that "... We seem as a dictatorial regime both inside and outside even though we have a parliament... However, I don't want to leave despotism as legacy to the nation."³²⁷ Indeed, the Free Republican Party was established only a few months later of this statement of Mustafa Kemal. After this unsuccessful attempt, the RPP rulers did not stop democratization efforts. Just after Atatürk's death, this time, İnönü tried to liberalize the regime and established the "Independent Group" (*Müstakil Grup*) within the RPP. With this group, İnönü aimed to establish the core of opposition within the assembly.³²⁸ Like Atatürk, İnönü asked for democratization of the regime with a loyal party. He shared this plan with his friends.³²⁹

Turkish democracy attempt including free multiparty elections was materialized just after the WW II. But this time, contrary to the former attempts in 1924 and 1930, İnönü was very delicate and sensitive to save the new opposition party and the multiparty regime. The clear signals for transition to the multiparty regime came with his popular "speech for youth" on May 19, 1945.

The political administration of our country will continue to improve in every directions of the public rule established by the Republic. When the troubles emerging from the war conditions disappeared, the democracy principles will dominate more extensively in political field of the country.³³⁰

³²⁶ Aydemir, p.435-6.

³²⁷ Aykan, ibid.

³²⁸ Tanilli, Server, *Nasıl Bir Demokrasi Arzuluyoruz?* (İstanbul: Adam Yayınları, 2004), p.49.

³²⁹ Aykan, ibid.

³³⁰ Toker, p.58.

İnönü also declared in the TGNA on November 1, 1945 that “Turkey’s only necessity was an opposition party”.³³¹ But he intended that the new opposition party must have been formed in the TGNA, and its deputies must have come from the RPP. Yet, the answer of the question “what dynamics did change İnönü’s political attitude about multiparty regime transition?” is not clear. Were the internal dynamics effective or not upon İnönü’s decision? We can put forward that İnönü was not aware enough of the internal dynamics. Because İnönü believed in 1945 that he could have continued his power until end of his life or when democratization was begun, he could have ceased the process whenever he asked.³³²

The politicians of the period believed that there was only external pressure for democratization³³³ even though they did not express such thoughts frequently. Meanwhile, however, there were increasing opponent thoughts and developing unsatisfied masses in the society. Not only İnönü and other republican rulers, but also Bayar, Menderes, and the other democrats were not so aware of the role of the internal dynamics upon democratization in Turkey.

Yet, they had come forward in the republican history with the contribution of the post war conditions; and they became significant figures of the internal dynamics. According to Murat Metinsoy, the difficulties and conditions of the every day life of the people in the wartime had contributed to create unorganized opposition in the society.³³⁴ Therefore, the elites of the political and business classes could not be the only subjects of the 1945-50 periods.³³⁵ Although the existence of the unorganized opposition, they could not trigger off democratization process. The decisions and policies of the elites both in the power and in the opposition were much more determinative than the demands of the people. Therefore, emerging of the opposition affecting politics of the RPP rulers was dependant on attitudes of the political elites having various linkages with the interest groups and with the ordinary people. Yet, it is not wrong to claim that widespread dissatisfaction among people ultimately contributed, activated, and motivated opponent thoughts of political elites to expose support

³³¹ Some writers emphasized this speech as a milestone for Turkish democratization. Giritlioğlu, Fahir, *Türk Siyasi Tarihinde Cumhuriyet Halk Partisinin Mevkii* (Ankara: Ayyıldız Matbaası, 1965), p.164.

³³² Toker, pp.93-4.

³³³ Ibid., p.74.

³³⁴ Metinsoy, Murat, *İkinci Dünya Savaşında Türkiye, Savaş ve Gündelik Yaşam* (İstanbul: Homer Kitabevi, 2007), pp.38-9.

³³⁵ Ibid., pp.15-46.

for reorganization of new coalition including various opponents and new interest groups. Such internal dynamics in Turkey contributed to create serious opposition in the assembly; and ultimately, the representatives of the opposition found enough support from the people. İnönü without dispute was the most significant figure of the period after Atatürk. However, İnönü was not aware of domestic economic transformations and their political reflections. Dissolving coalition between bureaucracy and bourgeoisie had become real dangerous for İnönü and the RPP power. Since they had no enough experience to make an election survey, the Republicans were not sufficiently aware of this dissolution.

Main disturbances of İnönü and the other republican rulers about domestic matters were resulted from illegal profits and incomes of some groups. However, such groups had found chance to increase their profits during the war by contribution of the policy of the RPP. The economically unsatisfied masses still did not revolt against the RPP governments. Thus, İnönü did not realize that he was losing his power. He believed that he might bring or remove democracy whenever he asked. We should keep in mind that İnönü had warned and explained his own thoughts “if democracy disturb the regime we can take a break for a while for democracy attempt.”³³⁶ When he decided to transit to multiparty regime, he definitely expected that the RPP rule would have continued its power for a while.

4.2.2. Crisis in Economy and Rising Opposition During and After the WW II

Because of having no enough roads and trade linkages between producers and market, domestic production for market remained rudimentary. Thus, the Turkish economy was mainly dependent on import products until the WW II.³³⁷ For this reason, there was a scarcity almost for all products during the war. Some shrewd traders began to make stock; and thus, prices were folded and also black-market spread rapidly in the country. Stockpiling and black-market were easy ways to make money in a short time. The rulers were quite upset from this situation. Therefore, they aimed to put a strict control upon economy. But this time, these controls increased unrest in the Turkish society.³³⁸

³³⁶ Toker, pp.93-4.

³³⁷ Çavdar, Tefik, *Türkiye Ekonomisinin Tarihi 1900-1960* (Ankara: İmge Kitabevi, 2002), p.297.

³³⁸ Mardin, Şerif, *Din ve İdeoloji* (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2001), p.146.

The Ottoman Empire had inherited large amount of peasantry to Turkey and according to the results of 1927 Census, the percentage of literate population was 11 %.³³⁹ The rate of this largest social group nearly did not change until 1945. Indeed, 83 % of total population was peasantry living in more than 40.000 villages in 1945.³⁴⁰

From the early years of the republic there were two main problems for the peasantry. Firstly, there was cultivable land scarcity; and secondly, lack of agricultural knowledge and technology.³⁴¹ Therefore, the life standard of these masses stayed low during the war. Also, the Turkish Grain Board had become a big burden for villagers³⁴² because they had to sell their agricultural products to the board under market prices. But the prices of processed agricultural products such as bread had increased steadily. The extreme price gap between producers and consumers created high profits for some groups; but also, it created high inflation and high cost of living affecting mostly the largest group, peasantry.

When the war conditions folded inflation and cost of living, Peker government had to take some economic measurements called as “September 7 Decisions” in 1946. The aim of these decisions was adjustment of internal prices to the world prices and doing so, adaptation of the domestic economy to the international economic conditions of the world.³⁴³ For this purpose, Turkish Lira was devalued and the value of dollar increased more than 100 %.³⁴⁴ The result of the devaluation deeply affected people. While the wages and the salaries remained stable, the prices increased. As a result, the gap among different social groups increased. The living standards of low-income groups further deteriorated. Consequently, the existing reaction against to the RPP government increased.³⁴⁵

The DP strongly criticized the devaluation decision in 1946 and asserted that the devaluation was a mistake because internal prices of the products would anyway increase because there was a large demand for Turkish products in the international markets. This high demand would increase the export of domestic products causing price increase inside. The supplies of the goods could not meet the domestic demands; and therefore, the

³³⁹ Ibid., p.101.

³⁴⁰ Karpat, *Türk Demokrasi Tarihi*, pp.90-1.

³⁴¹ Ibid., pp.92-3.

³⁴² Ibid., p.94.

³⁴³ Tezel, p.25.

³⁴⁴ Yeşil, p.80.

³⁴⁵ Karpat, *Türk Demokrasi Tarihi*, p.174.

government could not prevent price increases.³⁴⁶ As expected, the devaluation decreased import rates and increased export rates. However, this time, the lack of goods caused extra price increase in the country. These circumstances created an extensive social disturbance among the people. The devaluation created new profiteers and speculators and resulted in a higher cost of living.

4.2.3. The Measures to Absorb the Tension in the Country; Land Reform Law

The rich were anxious about the laws, which were intervening to their incomes and private properties, such as the National Defense Law and the Capital Levy. Practicing methods of these laws had increased the tension and fueled opponent thoughts against the government. The RPP rule decided to lower this tension by taking some measures. The Land Reform Law was one of these measurements especially to win the sympathy of the people especially in the rural. Such measurements aimed at destroying semi-feudal relations between large landowners and the peasantry.

But to abolish this semi-feudal structure was very difficult because there were close relationships between the single party governments and the large landowners who supported the Republican reforms in return for their local interests.

Even if it was very difficult to destroy totally the landowners' power in rural, to minimize it was possible. The attempts of re-distribution of the land, however, failed in a way.³⁴⁷ The last land reform law granting agricultural lands to the landless peasants, started with the draft legislation in the TGNA on May 14, 1945. After heated debates, the 4753 numbered "Land Reform Law" (*Çiftiçiyi Topraklandırma Kanunu*) was enacted on June 11, 1945.³⁴⁸ This time, the government seemed to be likely to change the land regime totally, but this attempt fairly disturbed all large landowners. For instance, landlord Emin Sazak, the republican deputy of Eskişehir, called this law as "wealth animosity". Main objection of the landowners was to the 17th item of the law aiming to collectivize non-cultivating lands of the large landowners.³⁴⁹ With this law, the government aimed to materialize some demands of rural masses and hoped to lessen dissatisfaction among the peasantry. But the law could not

³⁴⁶ Yeşil, p.81.

³⁴⁷ Çavdar, *Türkiye Ekonomisinin Tarihi, 1900-1960* (2003), p.182.

³⁴⁸ Karpat, *ibid.*, p.107.

³⁴⁹ Turan, *ibid.*, p.172.

change the land regime; because the supports for the peasants such as credit facilities, agricultural education, seeds, machineries, equipments, and fertilizers were insufficient.

The radical wing of the RPP under the leadership of Recep Peker sincerely asked to restrict the power of landowners. For this purpose, they utilized from the Land Reform Law.³⁵⁰ The criticisms concerning the “Land Reform Law” focused particularly on two main issues; first, minimizing of the lands would decrease agricultural production; and second, with this law the RPP government violated to private property, which was under guaranteed of the constitution.³⁵¹ Even though it seemed as a social reform at the beginning, it produced an open opposition against the RPP rule.³⁵² The government aimed at breaking peasant-landlord linkage in rural but the law faced with a serious resistance contributing to establishment of an opposition party.

4.2.4. Crystallizing of Opposition Iceberg; Emerging of the Democratic Party

Prolonged discussions about the Land Reform Law in the TGNA stimulated potential opponents, and thus, the early opposition appeared in the party when San Francisco Conference was going on. Tevfik Rüştü Aras, the former Minister of Foreign Affairs, had invited three opponent deputies of the RPP, Adnan Menderes, Fuat Köprülü and Emin Sazak to resist national chief regime of İsmet İnönü. After a short period, Refik Koraltan and Celal Bayar joined in their meetings at Aras’ home.³⁵³ On June 7, 1945, Bayar, Menderes, Köprülü, and Koraltan together gave a motion to the Chair of the RPP Group while the most controversial articles (17th and 21st) of the Land Reform Law were discussing in the TGNA. Because of four signatures, it was called as the “Quartet Motion”.³⁵⁴ The signatories of the proposal asked some democratic changes within the RPP.³⁵⁵

The Quartet claimed that both the constitution and the attempts of Atatürk had a democratic character. They also accepted that some political restrictions were necessary in the constitution because of the war conditions. But now, they asked for new adjustments

³⁵⁰ Ahmad, *Modern Türkiye'nin Oluşumu*, p.126.

³⁵¹ Ibid.

³⁵² Karpat, *The Transition of Turkey's Political Regime to a Multi-Party System*, p.83.

³⁵³ Albayrak, p.43.

³⁵⁴ For full text of the Four Proposal see: Yeşil, EK-1, pp.156-8.

³⁵⁵ Loğoğlu, p.90.

because the war was over and also they argued that both intellectuals and peasants were ready for transition to a multiparty regime.³⁵⁶ It should be pointed out that the Quartet Motion did not mention any foreign pressure upon Turkish political regime or any Soviet threat. By the Quartet Motion, they summarized their demands as follows:

1- Restoration of the power of TGNA having control mechanisms over the government as a reflection of national sovereignty,

2- Constitutional rights for the citizens,

3- Democratic arrangements for all party works.³⁵⁷

Even if there was no direct reference to the external pressure or demand, the Quartet claimed that these adjustments were necessary; otherwise, Turkey would not be called as a “democratic state”.³⁵⁸ When the demands of the Quartet emerged, İnönü asked them to leave the party and to struggle with the RPP by setting up an opposition party.³⁵⁹ Actually, when the motion was given, some hearsay had appeared in the press about establishment of an opposition party and these rumors focused especially on the owners of the motion.³⁶⁰

On June 12, 1945, after a long discussion, the motion was rejected.³⁶¹ The rejection exposed the opposition in the party³⁶² and stimulated establishment of an opposition party. According to İnönü, Bayar should be the leader of the opposition; because he believed that Bayar was loyal to the regime and its reforms. For this reason, İnönü had insisted on Bayar to form an opposition party during this period.³⁶³ After rejection of the motion, the Quartet asserted that their aim was to realize a reform inside of the RPP. But Ahmet Hamdi Başar working on the DP Program claimed that “... my encouragements and contacts with the

³⁵⁶ Karpat, Turkey’s Politics, p.145.

³⁵⁷ Goloğlu, p.367.

³⁵⁸ Loğoğlu, p.90

³⁵⁹ Toker, p.69.

³⁶⁰ Nadi, Nadir, “Türk Halkçılığında Gelişme Yolu”, *Cumhuriyet*, 9 June 1945; Ekrem Uşaklıgil, “İkinci Bir Parti Yapılabilir mi?”, *Son Posta*, 9 June 1945; Z.T. Ebuziyya, “İkinci Partiye İlk Adım”, *Tasvir*, 8 June 1945.

³⁶¹ Loğoğlu, *ibid.*

³⁶² Koçak, *Türkiye’de Milli Şef Dönemi (1938-1945)*, Vol.2, p.558.

³⁶³ Toker, *ibid.*

Quartet for establishment of a new party began after İnönü's speech on May 19, 1945."³⁶⁴ Therefore, it is not wrong to say that before the motion, the Quartet had begun to make brain storm for establishment of an opposition party.

However, businessman Nuri Demirağ and colleagues established the first opposition party before the Quartet in 1945. The National Development Party (NDP) as the first opposition party of the multiparty period was against the etatist politics of the republican rulers and regarded the RPP as pro-Russia party. In addition, the NDP oriented its foreign politics to realize an Islamic Union.³⁶⁵ However, the fourth article of the program claimed that the party was revolutionist and it damned dangerous thoughts such as religious, communist or Bolshevik ideologies. The NDP program also emphasized that the main principle of the party was to adapt all innovations to the "Ghazi Revolution".³⁶⁶ At first, the NDP movement attracted the public attention; however, it faded in a short time. The NDP had no concrete and detailed program. Also, the masses were suspicious either the NDP was right opposition for them or not. Therefore, neither Nuri Demirağ nor other founders of the NDP became attractive for the masses. Yet, we can claim that the establishment of NDP was important because it became an indicator for the opponents in the TGNA who would establish another opposition party soon.³⁶⁷

Menderes and Köprülü began to write some critical articles in *Vatan* and *Tan*. In a short time, their criticisms turned into an open opposition against the government.³⁶⁸ Finally, the RPP management expelled them from the party. Thereupon, Koraltan criticized the policy of the RPP management in *Vatan* and he claimed that the dismissals were illegal to the party regulations.³⁶⁹ Soon after, he was expelled from the RPP too.³⁷⁰ The thoughts about establishment of a new opposition party under Bayar's leadership had spread all over the country.³⁷¹ According to Bayar, these dismissals had been resulted from undemocratic character of the press law. Therefore, he asked an amendment about the Press Law which

³⁶⁴ Aydemir, p.444.

³⁶⁵ Tunaya, Tarık Zafer, *Türkiye'de Siyasi Partiler*, p.639.

³⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, p.638.

³⁶⁷ Loğoğlu, pp.91-2.

³⁶⁸ Ekinci, p.303.

³⁶⁹ Eroğul, p.31.

³⁷⁰ Karpat, *Turkey's Politics*, p.146.

³⁷¹ Ahmad, *Modern Türkiye'nin Oluşumu*, p.126.

was restricting the freedom of speech, but the RPP rejected his demand.³⁷² Thereupon, he resigned from the party membership on December 3, 1945.³⁷³ According to some Republicans, there was sound democracy in the country. Nadir Nadi, for instance, argued that the opposition in Turkey always objected the Republican reforms and they had no principle and also the aim of the leaders of the opposition was only to get power via the unsatisfied masses.³⁷⁴ According to the Kemalists, there was the best democracy in Turkey; and the Kemalist constitution provided its citizens with any kind of freedom. If there were some restrictions, they had caused from the war conditions.³⁷⁵ However, the owners of the motion could not see such democracy. Therefore, they underlined democratic rights in the motion.

The motion caused to crystallize the deep separation in the RPP. Indeed, five months later, the signatories of the Quartet Motion had to sever their ways from the RPP. But the day after the resignation of Bayar, İnönü had invited him to talk about establishment of a new party. Before official establishment of the Democratic Party, Bayar took the party program to İnönü for consultation.³⁷⁶ After approval of the Party Program by İnönü, the DP applied to the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and then, it was formed officially on January 7, 1946. There was no important difference between the party programs of the DP and the RPP.³⁷⁷ Like the former attempt in 1930, the opposition party was established within the TGNA as requested by the RPP rulers.³⁷⁸ But this time, İnönü would save the new opposition unlike the former opposition parties; and even, he asked from the RPP organs that the RPP should have helped for the DP development.³⁷⁹ Indeed, in this period, İnönü was in a hurry to show and to prove the western powers that democracy was really improving in Turkey. He thought that with the democratization attempts Turkey could get the US support against the Soviets.

³⁷² Ibid., pp.146-7.

³⁷³ Loğoğlu, p.91.

³⁷⁴ *Ayın Tarihi*, June 1945, No: 139, pp.66-7.

³⁷⁵ Ibid., pp.68-9.

³⁷⁶ Timur, *Türkiye’de Çok Partili Hayata Geçiş* (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1991), p.16.

³⁷⁷ Sadak, Necmettin, *Akşam*, 9 January 1946, cited from Ahmad, *Türkiye’de Çok Partili Politikanın Açıklamalı Kronolojisi, 1945-1971*, pp.16-7. The DP Program based on two fundamental principles: democracy in politics and liberalism in economy. By these peculiarities, the DP was alike the Liberal Republican Party (LRP) of the 1930s, Turan, *Türk Devrim Tarihi*, p.221.

³⁷⁸ Yeşil, p.53.

³⁷⁹ Bila, p.214.

The DP Program stressed the principles of democracy, freedom, and liberalism. Therefore, while the first article of the program mentioned democracy, the seventh article was clear promise for almost all disturbed groups, which might vote for the DP.³⁸⁰ The first four articles of the DP program had emphasized “democracy” concept and relationships between democracy and state.³⁸¹ “Democracy” and “freedom” perceptions of the party were affected mainly by their secularism understanding. While the 14th article of the DP program considered secularism as separating state and religion matters, it was suggesting establishment of religious schools and training of religious officials.³⁸² On the other side, the RPP was considering secularism as an instrument to adopt and adjust all kinds of laws, orders and procedures from the viewpoint of contemporary science, techniques and world’s necessities. For Republicans, religion must be apart from the state and world issues; because the RPP admitted this understanding of secularism as a fundamental requirement for improvement of Turkish nation.³⁸³

The DP program aimed at limitation of the state interventions upon economy. Even the state must have aid for development of the private sector.³⁸⁴ That is, the DP’s economy politics was based on individual interests while the RPP’s reflection was based on public interest. Apart from party programs, there was another difference between DP and RPP. In terms of their member qualities, there were clear differences between them. The professional roots of the RPP were mostly coming from bureaucrats. On the other side, the DP founders both in province and town organizations were coming from different roots but yet the largest professional group of the DP was the merchants.³⁸⁵

Due to many similarities between party programs, most of people did not consider the DP as a real opposition party for a long time. The DP movement seemed as a fake opposition just like the Free Republican Party in 1930. The good relationship between the DP and the RPP in the early weeks of the DP establishment caused a bias as “contractual party”.³⁸⁶ For

³⁸⁰ Ibid., p.33; and also see footnote 26.

³⁸¹ See, “Demokrat Parti Programı”, Umumi Prensipler, Tunaya, *Türkiye’de Siyasi Partiler*, p.662.

³⁸² Tunaya, *ibid.*, p.663.

³⁸³ For the RPP Program, see Tunaya, *ibid.*, p.586.

³⁸⁴ Albayrak, p.70.

³⁸⁵ In the 1946 general elections, the social backgrounds of the 250 DP candidates for deputy were 52 lawyers, 41 landowners, 40 doctors, 39 businessmen, 15 retired generals, 14 engineers, 13 teachers, and the remainder of other professions. Karpat, *Turkey’s Politics*, p.163.

³⁸⁶ Karpat, *Turkey’s Politics*, p.152.

this reason, at first, the DP branches could not develop fast enough. The Republicans were relying on themselves and they evaluated the delay of DP development as normal. According to them, because of the long period of single party regime, the RPP had taken roots in the society.³⁸⁷ However, three months later, the DP began to expand suddenly. The DP was expanding because people began to believe that it was a real opposition party. The people had no sufficient knowledge about the party, but the unsatisfied groups believed that if an opposition party wins the elections, the RPP rule would be removed from the power.³⁸⁸ In the beginning, establishment of the DP organizations came across with some difficulties created by the republican governors. This brought about many complaints and the DP centre took these complaints to the Ministry of Internal Affairs, but yet, the complaints did not stop.³⁸⁹ Bayar was claiming that the Republican governors were threatening the supporters of the DP.³⁹⁰

As a result, the Democrats had many enthusiastic supporters coming from all sections of the society forcing the DP into a political struggle with the RPP.³⁹¹ There was no official publication organ of the DP. Celal Bayar sent a circular to the party organizations in April 7, 1946 and informed them that the DP recommended *Hürses* and *Vatan* newspapers for the party members and followers.³⁹²

The DP opposition mainly concentrated on determined matters, such as undemocratic laws, cost of living, lack of freedom, abuses of the republican officials. Because of the RPP's absolute power in the country, the DP accused the republicans for all the problems of the single party period.³⁹³ By the establishment of Democratic Party, İnönü had realized his thought being a steady opposition party formed by the TGNA members. Even though many other parties were established besides the DP, all of them could not be organized in the entire country.³⁹⁴

³⁸⁷ Ibid., pp.152-3.

³⁸⁸ The masses asked to remove the RPP rule because there were many complaints about the 27 year's single party regime. See at the illustration 5 that Celal Bayar is turning back to Ankara from an Anatolian trip with too much complaints drawn by Ramiz Gökçe, *Mizah*, 29 January 1946, No: 21, p.1. Cited from Çeviker, *ibid.*, p.197.

³⁸⁹ Fersoy, Orhan Cemal, *Bir Devre Adını Veren Başbakan Adnan Menderes* (İstanbul: Garanti Matbaası, 1971), p.125.

³⁹⁰ Bayar, Celal, *Başvekilim Adnan Menderes*, ed. Bozdağ, İsmet (İstanbul: Baha Matbaası, 1969), p.51.

³⁹¹ Karpat, *The Transition of Turkey's Political Regime to a Multi-Party System*, p.151.

³⁹² Şahingiray, Celal Bayar'ın Söylev ve Demeçleri (1946-1950), Demokrat Parti'nin Kuruluşundan İktidara Kadar Politik Konuşmalar (Ankara: Doğuş Limited Ortaklığı Matbaası, 1954), p.433.

³⁹³ Karpat, *Turkey's Politics*, p.166.

³⁹⁴ Turan, *Türk Devrim Tarihi*, p.225.

4.2.5. İsmet İnönü, as a Mediator Curbing Political Tension and the July 12 Declaration

Just seven months later of the DP establishment, the general elections were held in July 1946 by the decision of the government. The DP claimed that the decision of early election aimed at preventing the DP development. However, İnönü replied this assertion that internal and external political obligations forced the RPP to make early elections.³⁹⁵ On June 16, 1946, the Democrats met for the decision and they wanted to boycott the early elections in the next month,³⁹⁶ but the local organizations and representatives of the provinces were very enthusiastic for attending to the elections, and finally, the DP decided to participate in the general elections.³⁹⁷ Besides the demands of the DP branches, the Democrats were under pressure of the republican rulers. There were serious warnings made by Nihat Erim and İnönü.³⁹⁸ The DP rulers had to take into consideration those demands and warnings.³⁹⁹ They had to do it, because the RPP was still absolute political power and İnönü was still the most significant figure in the country. Also the Democrats asked to be in the assembly in order to express the views of the DP. Moreover, if the DP remained out of the TGNA, it would be difficult to reach both the people and the press to convince them.

The election system, however, had been determined as “open vote” and “secret counting” by the 24th article of the law 4918.⁴⁰⁰ When the general elections were held on July 21, 1946, the DP participated in the elections for 47 provinces with only 273 candidates.⁴⁰¹ Actually, total number of the candidates in the elections should have been 465, but having no enough time to organize in all cities prevented full participation of the Democrats. The result of the elections was officially announced on July 24, 1946. The rate of participation was 75 percent.⁴⁰² According to the official results, the RPP got 395 seats while the DP got only 64, and independent candidates got 6 seats. However, more than results, the method of the elections and some republicans’ practices were controversial.

³⁹⁵ Toker, p.107.

³⁹⁶ Karpat, *Turkey's Politics*, p.160.

³⁹⁷ *Cumhuriyet, Vatan, Ulus*, June 19, 1946.

³⁹⁸ Erim, Nihat, “Demokrasi Gaye midir, Vasıta mıdır?” *Ulus*, May 30, 1946.

³⁹⁹ *Cumhuriyet*, 17 June 1946.

⁴⁰⁰ Albayrak, p.84.

⁴⁰¹ Turan, *Türk Devrim Tarihi*, p.230.

⁴⁰² Loğoğlu, p.115.

The new assembly met on August 5, 1946. İnönü was re-elected president, and Kazım Karabekir became chairman of the TGNA. President İnönü appointed Peker to form new government.⁴⁰³ In fact, Peker was undeclared leader of the authoritarian wing of the RPP.⁴⁰⁴ Although İnönü had already eliminated him from the party ranks in the last party convention, Peker was still strong in the party. Therefore, he aimed to wear out Peker by appointment him as prime minister on August 5, 1946. Next day, Peker established his cabinet.⁴⁰⁵ There were many expectations from Peker government and many problems to be solved.⁴⁰⁶ Peker was known as vigorous supporter of the single party regime and he did not hesitate to use force for solution of political problems.⁴⁰⁷ Appointment of him disturbed both the democrats and the moderate republicans because he was advocating slow transition to the multiparty regime.⁴⁰⁸

The most prominent action of Peker government became “September 7 Decisions”. But the measurements did not work well and resulted in high inflation. The DP utilized from this situation and criticized the economy politics of the RPP. Peker government reacted against this opposition with antidemocratic Press Law, and threatened the opposition with the courts of Independence (*İstiklal Mahkemeleri*).⁴⁰⁹ When Peker attacked Menderes criticizing actions of the RPP government, the democrats boycotted him and even they left the assembly. Nine days later, the democrats came back to the assembly by İnönü’s mediation. However, the assembly could not still work properly because of the existing political tension. It was clear that the government under Peker’s leadership could not work effectively.⁴¹⁰ In this turmoil, while İnönü powered his position, Peker’s prestige declined in the party.

In those days, the DP Convention assembled on the first anniversary of its establishment in January 1947. Celal Bayar made a speech in the convention and underlined three necessities for democratic development; antidemocratic articles of the constitution

⁴⁰³ Ahmad, *Türkiye’de Çok Partili Politikanın Açıklamalı Kronolojisi, 1945-1971*, p.24.

⁴⁰⁴ Loğoğlu, p.116.

⁴⁰⁵ Ahmad, *ibid.*

⁴⁰⁶ Cemal Nadir drew successfully the difficulty of Peker government and the expectations coming from all unsatisfied sections of the society. See, the illustration 6.

⁴⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, p.170.

⁴⁰⁸ Karpat, *ibid.*

⁴⁰⁹ Timur, pp.56-7.

⁴¹⁰ Aydemir, p.458.

must be removed; a new democratic election law guaranteeing citizen's vote must be issued; and the Presidency and the Party Chairman posts must have been separated from each other.⁴¹¹ At the end of the convention a report was prepared. In addition to three basic demands mentioned above, new liberal economic policies and neutrality of the governors were asked from the government.⁴¹² The Democrats warned the RPP government with the fact that they must have accepted these demands; otherwise, the DP would abandon the assembly.⁴¹³ Whereas some newspapers supported this policy of the DP, it was criticized severely by the RPP rule and pro-republican press.⁴¹⁴

The *muhtar* (village headman) elections in the villages were held on February 16, 1947.⁴¹⁵ Because of the political tension,⁴¹⁶ some tragic events occurred in the *muhtar* elections between not only the Democrats and the Republicans, but also between the gendarmerie and the people.⁴¹⁷ There were totally 79 events in the villages where seven people died and 167 people were wounded and almost all these events had occurred in the rural.⁴¹⁸ According to Bayar and Menderes, the only responsible of these events was the government because the republican governors had interfered with the elections on behalf of the republican candidates.⁴¹⁹ Increasing complaints about the republican officials forced Hilmi Uran, the Secretary General of the RPP, to say that the elections should have repeated honestly.⁴²⁰ Nevertheless, the Democrats continued assertion that there was still political pressure upon people, and still, there was no a fair election law. In order to keep the government under pressure, they decided to boycott the by-elections in 1947.⁴²¹ Thereupon,

⁴¹¹ Turan, *Türk Devrim Tarihi*, p.238.

⁴¹² Loğoğlu, p.117.

⁴¹³ Eroğul, "The Establishment of Multiparty Rule: 1945-71", in Schick & Tonak, *Turkey in Transition*, pp.49-50.

⁴¹⁴ Erim, Nihat, "Demokrat Parti Kurultayı Dağıldıktan Sonra", *Ulus*, January 12, 1947, Yalçın, Hüseyin Cahit, "Cumhurbaşkanlığı ve Parti Başkanlığı", *Tanin*, January 14, 1947.

⁴¹⁵ The village headman elections in the villages were held in 35 528 villages. While RPP won in 30,133; DP won in 1,225 and the independents in 1,960 villages. See footnote, Karpat, *Turkey's Politics*, p.183.

⁴¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p.183.

⁴¹⁷ Burçak, pp.255-6.

⁴¹⁸ Albayrak, pp.113-4.

⁴¹⁹ *Vatan*, March 1, and 7, 1947.

⁴²⁰ Karpat, *ibid.*, p.186.

⁴²¹ Tanyelli, Halit, & Topsakaloğlu, Adnan, *İzahlı Demokrat Parti Kronolojisi (1945-1950)*, vol.1 (İstanbul: İstanbul Matbaası, 1958), p.72.

the government warned to the Democrats and Prime Minister Peker threatened the DP with the Courts of Independence if they persist on their boycott decision.⁴²² The political tension had increased between the democrats and the republicans. The DP did not participate in by-elections being held under these circumstances on April 6, 1947. The rate of participation was too low. According to the RPP, the participation was 58 % whereas the DP claimed that it was only 10 %.⁴²³

The political tension between two parties did not calm down after the elections. On the contrary, with the rejection of the DP proposal demanding new election law, the tension increased in time. Thus, the DP decided not to participate in the forthcoming elections of *muhtars* on May 30, 1947.⁴²⁴ Like the former one, the participation in these elections was too low. Thereupon, Falih Rifkî Atay claimed that the DP sabotaged the elections.⁴²⁵

Bayar and other democrats were discontent with the governments' attitudes. Their basic demands were removing of the Martial Law, use of the Public Houses, election security, unbiased radio broadcast, and impartiality of the officials. According to Bayar, these demands were necessary for a sound multiparty system. Recep Peker, however, refused them and he underlined that even if the existing laws were anti-democratic they were still necessary for Turkey.⁴²⁶ After these explanations of Peker, we can argue that there was no serious pressure coming from democratic western states upon the government for transition to democracy. Peker had also claimed that there was no any pressure upon the Democrats. According to him, the DP had a reactionary opposition method and this method should have been abandoned immediately by the Democrats.⁴²⁷

On the other side, Bayar accused Peker of having political reactionary and reactionary policies preventing democratization efforts.⁴²⁸ Because of the speeches of some democrats in the meetings, the government had reacted and sent a Premiership Note (*Başbakanlık Tezkeresi*) asking the removal of their deputy immunities for Menderes, Köprülü, Sazak, and Aldoğan. Then, the relations between Peker government and the DP were fairly upset. Some

⁴²² *Cumhuriyet*, April 2, 1947.

⁴²³ Albayrak, p.115.

⁴²⁴ Ahmad, *Türkiye'de Çok Partili Politikanın Açıklamalı Kronolojisi, 1945-1971*, p.33.

⁴²⁵ Albayrak, p.117.

⁴²⁶ Karpat, *Turkey's Politics*, p.162.

⁴²⁷ Toker, p.188.

⁴²⁸ *Vatan*, July 8, 1947.

politicians, such as Emin Sazak and Mümtaz Ökmen and also some businessmen, such as Vehbi Koç and Üzeyir Avunduk attempted to calm political tension down,⁴²⁹ but they could not achieve it. During June of 1947, İnönü had to make a series of interviews with Peker and Bayar.⁴³⁰

The purpose of İnönü was to mediate informally between the government and the opposition; however, Peker insisted on that the government would not change its politics.⁴³¹ However, the DP did not abandon its demands. But İnönü had given a clue that the politics of Peker government had to change.⁴³² Soon after, İnönü gave a declaration to come an agreement for both sides. He prepared a formal declaration and read it on the radio in the evening of July 11, and then it was published in the press on July 12, 1947.⁴³³ In this declaration, İnönü obviously gave an open support to the opposition by saying that; “An opposition party using legal and not revolutionary methods must enjoy the same privileges as the ruling party. On this ground, I consider myself as the head of the state, equally responsible for both parties...”⁴³⁴

The moderates both in the DP and the RPP welcomed the “12 July Declaration” with great satisfaction.⁴³⁵ By the declaration, the RPP side had to accept the equality of the DP in politics.⁴³⁶ While İnönü claimed that he was impartial for the both parties, he defended the DP against Peker government.⁴³⁷ The result of the declaration was significant; it was disadvantageous for the extremists in both parties, but at the same time, the relationships between the DP and the RPP got better.⁴³⁸ The democrats asked for the resignation of Peker because the declaration had proved his partiality.⁴³⁹ Only two months later, Peker resigned due

⁴²⁹ Toker, p.185.

⁴³⁰ Ibid., pp.181-9. In those days, political tension between DP and RPP was very high and Ramiz Gökçe drew this tension efficiently by a cartoon (see the illustration 7). Çeviker, p.205.

⁴³¹ Loğoğlu, p.119.

⁴³² Bayar, *Başvekilim Adnan Menderes*, p.79.

⁴³³ Ahmad, *Türkiye'de Çok Partili Politikanın Açıklamalı Kronolojisi, 1945-1971*, p.34. For full text of the July 12 Declaration, see at *Aydın Tarihi*, 164, July 1947, pp. 14-6.

⁴³⁴ *Aydın Tarihi*, July 1947, pp.15-6.

⁴³⁵ *Vatan*, 13 July 1947.

⁴³⁶ Yeşil, p.95.

⁴³⁷ Turan, *Türk Devrim Tarihi*, pp.247-8.

⁴³⁸ Uyar, p.201.

⁴³⁹ In Bayar's Erzurum speech, *Vatan*, October 5-6, 1947.

to political pressure coming from the democrats and the moderate republicans supported by İnönü. Another significant result of the declaration emerged in the DP front. In fact, up to then, the Democrats seemed as in a unity and solidarity against the RPP government. However, after Peker's resignation, the DP political struggle lost its motive character. Soon after, some cliques and personal differences began to appear in the DP. The most well known clique was Kenan Öner group. The extremists represented under Öner leadership in the DP were expelled from the party and also other some opponent democrat deputies had resigned from the party. Thus, the number of democrat seats in the assembly reduced to thirty-one.⁴⁴⁰

4.2.6. The Effects of Media and Journalists on the Transition to Democracy in Turkey

The press was under control of the RPP rule during the single party period. The ruling party was providing them with paper, machines, and other some necessities. In this period, the press was not allowed to criticize the government's policies. The press had to support the governments' decisions.⁴⁴¹ From 1945 to 1950 the press had got stronger and also there was fairly vivid press when compared to the former periods.⁴⁴²

Prior to İnönü's speech on May 19, 1945, the newspapers had mentioned from multiparty system.⁴⁴³ In time, the articles mentioning about democracy increased.⁴⁴⁴ Also the government was not using frequently the 50th article of the press law to restrict the newspapers.⁴⁴⁵ Towards the end of the war, when the allies' victory became clear, some newspapers such as *Tan*, *Vatan*, and *Tasvir* began to criticize the single party rule openly. They supported establishment of a new party; and some journalists criticized not only the RPP rule, but also President İnönü until the "July 12 Declaration". Then, criticisms in the press on İnönü were directed towards other republicans and party-state identity of the RPP.⁴⁴⁶

⁴⁴⁰ Karpat, *Türk Demokrasi Tarihi*, p.189.

⁴⁴¹ Gürkan, Nilgün, *Türkiye'de Demokrasiye Geçişte Basın* (İstanbul: İletişim yayımları, 1998), p.14, 34.

⁴⁴² Koloğlu, Orhan, *Türkiye'de Basın* (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1992), p.70.

⁴⁴³ Sertel, Zekeriya, "Dünyanın gidişini anlamak için harpten önceki dünya görüşümüzü değiştirmeliyiz", *Tan*, August 14, 1943; Yalman, Ahmet Emin, "İttifakla rey vermek hükümete yardım değildir", *Vatan*, November 15, 1943; Sertel, Sabiha, "Demokraside halkın murakabesi şarttır"; Sertel, Sabiha, *Tan*, November 28, 1943; "Dünya halkçı demokrasiye gidiyor", *Tan*, November 29, 1943.

⁴⁴⁴ Gürkan, p.53.

⁴⁴⁵ Toker, p.27.

⁴⁴⁶ Gürkan, p.464.

Actually, there were mainly two main divergent groups in the press; pro-opposition and pro-power press. Ahmet Emin Yalman, the owner of *Vatan*, and Zekeriya-Sabiha Sertels, the owners of *Tan* were at the opposition wing and both of these groups supported the democrats. After “the Quartet Motion”, some Republican deputies such as Fevzi Lütfü Karaosmanoğlu, Adnan Menderes and Fuat Köprülü, began to criticize the RPP rule.⁴⁴⁷ The opponent writers gathered mainly in *Vatan* and *Tan*. Fuat Köprülü, for instance, wrote in *Vatan* and argued with Falih Rıfki Atay upon democracy.⁴⁴⁸ The opponents pointed out the international democratic climate and they claimed that political liberalization was essential.⁴⁴⁹

On the other side, the newspapers *Akşam* and *Ulus* were supporting the RPP rule. In fact, *Ulus* was the official publication of the RPP and the most well known writer of it was Falih Rıfki Atay.⁴⁵⁰ Also, *Akşam* was always praising the RPP rule. In addition to these newspapers, some Republican deputies who were the owners of big newspapers, such as Yunus Nadi’s *Cumhuriyet*, Asım Us’ *Vakit*, and Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın’s *Tanin* were supporters of the RPP.⁴⁵¹ The aim of the opposition press was to remove the single party regime by settling of democracy in the country.⁴⁵² Zekeriya Sertel and Ahmet Emin Yalman were the most prominent journalists, who were opposing the National Chief and the RPP rule.⁴⁵³ During this struggle, the leftists were exposed to the attacks of the RPP power because of the international political conditions. Indeed, the Republicans accused them of being communist and Soviet followers. The printing house and the printing machines of the Sertels were destroyed by some attacks called as *Tan* Incidence.⁴⁵⁴ Like the Sertels, Cami Baykurt’s *Yeni Dünya*, and its press machineries were also damaged completely in the same events. Even though the events meant an open attack against the press, other newspapers and journalists did not criticize those aggressions seriously.⁴⁵⁵

⁴⁴⁷ Ahmad, *Türkiye’de Çok Partili Politikanın Açıklamalı Kronolojisi* p.15.

⁴⁴⁸ Köprülü, Fuat, “Açık Konuşalım”, *Vatan*, August 25, 1945; “Sırça Köşkte Oturanlar”, Atay, Falih Rıfki, *Ulus*, September 2, 1945; *Vatan*, September 11-12, 1945.

⁴⁴⁹ Koçak, Cemil, “Siyasal Tarih (1923-1950)”, ed. Sina Akşin, *Çağdaş Türkiye 1908-1980* vol.4, p.138.

⁴⁵⁰ Köseoğlu, Talat, *Demokrasi Davalarımız* (İstanbul: 1962), p.229.

⁴⁵¹ İskit, Servet, *Türkiye’de Matbuat Idareleri ve Politikaları* (İstanbul: 1943), pp. 332-4.

⁴⁵² Gürkan, p.467.

⁴⁵³ Berkes, Niyazi, *Unutulan Yıllar* (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1997), pp. 351-2.

⁴⁵⁴ Turan, *Türk Devrim Tarihi*, pp.190-1.

⁴⁵⁵ Berkes, p.355; But Russia defined these actions as antagonism against Russia. Ahmad, *Türkiye’de Çok Partili Politikanın Açıklamalı Kronolojisi* ibid., p.16.

After the general elections in 1946, Celal Bayar made a speech and accused the RPP of illegal actions and of pressure upon citizens. His claims were published at three newspapers, *Yeni Sabah*, *Gerçek*, and *Tanin* on July 25, 1946.⁴⁵⁶ In spite of the fact that three of them published the same statement, the authorities closed down only the newspapers *Yeni Sabah*, and *Gerçek* by using the Martial Law while *Tanin*, pro-government newspaper, continued its publications.⁴⁵⁷ Yet, after removal of the 50th article of the Press Law on June 13, 1946,⁴⁵⁸ the press would play a significant role in Turkish politics and attracted the attention of the public for the political struggle in the interval of 1946-1950.⁴⁵⁹

4.3. Political Liberalization Towards 1950

After some conflicts with İnönü, Peker had to resign from the government;⁴⁶⁰ and most of his adherents were removed from the party administration.⁴⁶¹ After withdrawal of the extremists, the moderates took advantage in the party.⁴⁶² Hasan Saka signing San Francisco Charter as the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Turkey in 1945 established a new cabinet on September 10, 1947.⁴⁶³

The Saka government tried to lessen the DP opposition by some liberalization attempts in the government program. The new program underlined that the main purpose of the government was to ensure political security in the country because it was considered as a basic issue of a democratic regime.⁴⁶⁴ Before he read the government program in the assembly, Saka sent a copy of the new government program to the DP in order to be examined.⁴⁶⁵ Saka government declared liberal and moderate policies and all these acts were lessened the DP criticisms. These political liberalizations however, did not include the thoughts of radical left

⁴⁵⁶ *Yeni Sabah*, July 25, 1946.

⁴⁵⁷ Karpat, *Turkey's Politics*, p.165.

⁴⁵⁸ Ahmad, *Türkiye'de Çok Partili Politikanın Açıklamalı Kronolojisi*, p.21.

⁴⁵⁹ Karpat, *ibid.*, p.333.

⁴⁶⁰ Karpat, *Türk Demokrasi Tarihi*, p.175.

⁴⁶¹ Albayrak, p.126.

⁴⁶² Toker, p.215.

⁴⁶³ Ahmad, *ibid.*, pp.35-6.

⁴⁶⁴ *Aydın Tarihi*, October 1947, No:167, pp.16-7.

⁴⁶⁵ Turan, *Türk Devrim Tarihi*, p.249.

and right.⁴⁶⁶ When the RPP convention assembled on November 17, 1947, the republican rulers tried to create a new legal and political identity for the RPP. For this purpose, the party program and the party constitution were negotiated during the convention.⁴⁶⁷

The discussions focused on party organization, the RPP functions, cultural matters, etatism, and religious education in the schools.⁴⁶⁸ İnönü was criticized bitterly in the convention.⁴⁶⁹ The convention became the most authorized organ.⁴⁷⁰ In the convention, Party Charter changed, and thus, the state accepted social classes.⁴⁷¹ At the end of the Convention, İnönü was elected as Chairman of the party by 595 votes while there were only 25 votes for Peker.⁴⁷² With the result of this election in the party, the Peker era was over in Turkish political arena.

The new government removed the Martial Law lasting for seven years on December 22, 1947.⁴⁷³ Then, a new election law demanded by the DP for a long time was prepared on January 14, 1948.⁴⁷⁴ Although new draft law offered “secret ballot-open count”, the Democrats were not satisfied with this draft. Their additional demand was to guarantee the whole elections under the supervision of the judiciary control,⁴⁷⁵ otherwise, the DP would not participate in the 1948 by-elections.

On June 8, 1948, the first Saka Cabinet resigned and next day the second one was established.⁴⁷⁶ However, this amendment did not change the policy of the DP opposition. Moreover, the DP boycotted the elections on October 17, 1948.⁴⁷⁷ Because of the boycott, turnout was low for by-elections; the participation was about 21 % in İstanbul and 40 % in

⁴⁶⁶ Bila, p.117.

⁴⁶⁷ Yeşil, p.101.

⁴⁶⁸ Karpat, *Türk Demokrasi Tarihi*, p.181.

⁴⁶⁹ Bila, p.224.

⁴⁷⁰ Turan, *İsmet İnönü*, p.299.

⁴⁷¹ Mim Uykusuz criticized the social class understanding of the RPP by a cartoon. See the illustration 8.

⁴⁷² Giritlioğlu, p.216.

⁴⁷³ Ahmad, *Türkiye'de Çok Partili Politikanın Açıklamalı Kronolojisi*, pp.38-9.

⁴⁷⁴ Bila, p.232.

⁴⁷⁵ *Vatan*, May 16-17, 1948.

⁴⁷⁶ Ahmad, *ibid.*, p.42.

⁴⁷⁷ Eroğul, “The Establishment of Multiparty Rule: 1945-71”, in Schick & Tonak, p.106.

the country.⁴⁷⁸ Seven months later, however, the second Saka Cabinet was resigned too. The reasons of the resignation were mainly economic problems.⁴⁷⁹

Cem Erođul claimed that “the power” actually had become an irresistible burden for the RPP governments. Indeed, when the prime ministry was offered to four republican deputies,⁴⁸⁰ they did not accept this heavy duty. Finally, Őemsettin Gnaltay accepted the prime ministry, and then, he formed the government on January 16, 1949. Gnaltay had a pious, but moderate personality; and thus, his cabinet comprised moderate names of the RPP.⁴⁸¹ The most well known figure among them was Nihat Erim, who was the leader of moderates called as “the 35s”.⁴⁸² The Program of the Gnaltay cabinet was fairly liberal and he believed that the future of the country depended on the establishment of a sound democracy. According to him, free discussion, freedom of press and free elections were fundamental requirements of a democratic system.⁴⁸³ Economic liberalism and encouraging of private sector were the chief principles in the program of Gnaltay. His program also softened the secularism principle of the state.⁴⁸⁴

Gnaltay government decided to work on a new election law having judiciary control.⁴⁸⁵ The Independence Courts established in 1922 were officially removed on May 4, 1949.⁴⁸⁶ Although the commission under the leadership of Nihat Erim delayed the works of new election law,⁴⁸⁷ the government made some other changes in order to get people’s support. On September 25, 1949, the government made a decision that elections were going to be held by majority system instead of proportional representation to provide political

⁴⁷⁸ Karpat, *Turkey’s Politics*, p.226.

⁴⁷⁹ Golođlu, p.241.

⁴⁸⁰ These four Republican deputies were Hilmi Uran, Necmeddin Sadak, Fuat Sirmen, Nurullah Smer. Erođul, *ibid.*, p.72.

⁴⁸¹ Ahmad, *ibid.*, p.51.

⁴⁸² The 35s supporting by İnon was known as young and moderate group. This group had prominent names such as Ali Fuat Cebesoy, Hamdullah Suphi Tanrıover, Memduh Őevket Esendal and Nihat Erim. Uyar, p.353.

⁴⁸³ Karpat, *Turkey’s Politics*, p.231; Őeviker, p.210).

⁴⁸⁴ Timur, p.90.

⁴⁸⁵ Yalman, *Grdklerimiz ve Geirdiklerimiz, 1945-1970*, Volume: IV (İstanbul: 1970). p.161.

⁴⁸⁶ *Ayn Tarihi*, May 1949, No:186, p.16; Ahmad, *ibid.*, p.54.

⁴⁸⁷ *Cumhuriyet*, May 14, 1949.

stability.⁴⁸⁸ Such above liberalization efforts were accepted as requirements of democracy.⁴⁸⁹ The new election law having secret ballot and open count principles and accepting judiciary guarantee in the elections as a supreme authority was enacted on February 16, 1950.⁴⁹⁰ Finally, the law closing dervish lodges and *zaviyes* was removed on March 1, 1950.⁴⁹¹

Günaltay pursued concessive politics in favor of large landowners in rural. Up to then, the Village Institutes had already been worn out by many accusations. At first, the Village Institutes were charged with being pro-axis ideology until 1944. However, when Turanism and Turkism movements were silenced, this time, they were blamed of being home for communists.⁴⁹² When Günaltay appointed Cavit Oral, a large landowner, to the Ministry of Agriculture, the RPP policy resisting against rural landlords came to the end.⁴⁹³ Namely, this appointment had terminated the reform efforts in villages. Indeed, the 17th article of the Land Law was crucial, but minister Oral changed it on March 27, 1950; and thus, the law lost its essence.⁴⁹⁴ Finally, in April 1950, the RPP announced an election declaration resembling to any liberal party's program in many aspects.⁴⁹⁵

4.4. Power Change in Turkey: General Elections of 1950

Many people saw the RPP as the reason of economic problems which had basically emerged from the war conditions. While the masses were accusing of the RPP rule, they admitted the DP like a savior because of its liberal promises. Moreover, merchants and bourgeoisie emerging under extraordinary war conditions wanted to use their capitals more effectively. Just few years ago, the RPP power had tried to capture the capital and profit of the rich with the some laws such as “Capital Levy”, “National Defense Law”, and “Land Reform Law”. Yet, the new rich achieved to accumulate capital during the war. But now, in the

⁴⁸⁸ Ahmad, *Türkiye'de Çok Partili Politikanın Açıklamalı Kronolojisi*, p.57.

⁴⁸⁹ All liberalizations and political amendments were evaluated as the requirements of democracy. Ramiz Gökçe expressed this approach with a cartoon. See the illustration 9.

⁴⁹⁰ Eroğul, p.81; Ahmad, *ibid.*, pp.61-2.

⁴⁹¹ Ahmad, *ibid.*, p.62. These religious bodies were closed down with the Takrir-i Sükun Law on November 30, 1925, Karpat, *Türk Demokrasi Tarihi*, p.52.

⁴⁹² Türkoğlu, Pakize, *Tonguç ve Enstitüleri* (İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası KültürYayımları, 2000), p.555.

⁴⁹³ Cavit Oral was a large landowner and he was against to the Land Reform Law.

⁴⁹⁴ Aydemir, p.350.

⁴⁹⁵ The Election Report of the RPP, *Ayın Tarihi*, May 1950, no: 198, pp.51-2.

postwar period, accumulated capital should have been anchored into the safer fields. Money should have been invested in more liberal economic environment instead of etatist one. Indeed, the RPP had limited newborn bourgeoisie in the country.⁴⁹⁶ Therefore, it was difficult to get bourgeoisie's support even if the Prime Minister Günaltay liberalizes the economy.

Did all liberalization efforts of Günaltay in politics and economy convince the voters? Did that liberalization efforts work in the 1950 elections? Actually, Günaltay cabinet had achieved to soften political tension and liberalize the press and economy. However, there was no enough time to convince the masses and to get positive feedback in the general elections. The general elections were held on May 14, 1950. The DP gained 53.59 % vote and 408 deputies while the RPP gained 39.98 % vote and 69 deputies.⁴⁹⁷ The disproportion between the vote rates and the deputy numbers resulted from the new majority election system.

The 1950 elections were important in the Republican history because people had voted freely first time for their own future.⁴⁹⁸ Furthermore, the rate of participation of the General Elections declared on May 25, 1950 was very high (it was officially 88.88 %).⁴⁹⁹ The result of the elections for the Republicans was totally disappointing. Even İnönü couldn't be elected from Ankar; but still because of the election law,⁵⁰⁰ he was elected as deputy from Malatya. But his position changed in the country; he lost the presidency post and only stayed as the head of new opposition party, the RPP.⁵⁰¹ With the 1950 elections, Turkey did an important achievement as changing the regime peacefully and more importantly; the first time, the change of the power took place in accordance with the free choice of the people.⁵⁰²

⁴⁹⁶ Tanilli, p.51.

⁴⁹⁷ Timur, p.93; *Aydın Tarihi*, May 1950, No: 198, p.12.

⁴⁹⁸ Yeşil, p.135.

⁴⁹⁹ *Cumhuriyet*, May 26, 1950.

⁵⁰⁰ Notables of the parties could be candidate from two distinct regions. Turan, *İsmet İnönü*, pp.308-9.

⁵⁰¹ Karpat, *Turkey's Politics*, p.242.

⁵⁰² Karpat, *ibid.*

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

The transition to democracy after the WW II in Turkey has been studied many times. Therefore, dynamics of democratization in this period may be thought as a repetition making it paradoxically difficult for a master thesis. The high volume of studies analyzing democratization dynamics in Turkey, unavoidably, has created a handicap for this thesis. However, working upon this period repeatedly may give us the chance for re-evaluation of the same historical period; and may help for us to develop new outcomes for the Turkish democratization dynamics between 1945 and 1950. By this study, it has been shown that internal or external democratization dynamics of Turkey cannot outstrip of each other. The topics of this thesis aimed to point out almost entire external dynamics affecting Turkish democratization process together with their linkages, interactions, and the internal dynamics. Thus, to analyze the decision of democracy transition in the minds of the decision makers became easier.

The external dynamics emerging from the conditions of the WW II created quick and profound impacts on the Turkish economy and politics. Internal dynamics, on the other side, come from generally long-term cultural, political, but especially from the economic backgrounds of the societies. Delayed economic liberalization impeded quick capital accumulations in Turkey; and therefore, this situation created weak bourgeoisie. Besides this bourgeoisie, the gentry, and the landlords had to develop their relationships with the bureaucracy who had real authority during the authoritarian single party period. Due to this peculiarity of the newborn Turkish bourgeoisie, their dissent peculiarity delayed until the Land Reform Law on May 14, 1945. But it is well known that the RPP power had lost its supporters during the WW II and the interest groups separated from the power and they formed a new coalition under the DP umbrella. The DP was giving hope for not only newborn rich but also for the large poor masses in the post war period. All of these developments left the RPP's authoritarian regime under pressure. Initially, the pressure coming from the bottom was not clear. But in time, they became visible in the TGNA via the deputies even if this pressure did not articulate in the street so much.

Opposition movements in the young Turkey had inherited opponent thoughts mostly from pre-republican period. Therefore, the historical tracts of Turkish democratization extends to the early years of the 19th century. From the early years of the 19th century to the Kemalist reforms, all reforms and developments contributed to the formation of the opposition. In the first decade of the Republic of Turkey, the RPP rule had consolidated its power in a short time. Meantime, however, Turkish rulers had to solve the first multiparty venture made by the Progressive Republican Party (PRP) which had threatened the RPP power. The Sheikh Said Rebellion helped for closing down the PRP in 1925. The second opposition party attempt came with establishment of the Free Republican Party (FRP) in 1930. This multiparty attempt failed too in a few months because of accumulation of uncontrolled people and radical opponent groups inside of the FRP.

Due to all modernization reforms and attempts, some scholars claim that the Turkish Republic was essentially democratic in the early years. According to them, Turkey had accepted democracy idea of democratic western states. The most powerful proof for them is the 1924 constitution. Indeed, there was no law preventing the establishment of an opposition party. They also claimed that the single party regime attempted to form multiparty regime. Hamza Eroğlu, for instance, claimed that the fundamental aim of the Turkish reforms was establishment of democracy and democratic regime. In spite of such claims, however, Turkey continued its political regime as an authoritarian single party regime until the end of the WW II; and the RPP kept its dominant party position until 1950. But yet, it may be argued that the founders of the Turkish Republic had democratic thoughts and projects, however, existing conditions and their motivations for quick modernization of the country forced them into authoritarian politics and applications. As mentioned above, there were some opponent attempts against authoritarian, centralist, and guardianship rulers of the RPP. But such opposition movements were fairly weak and could not find a basement because of having no legal canals to set strong linkages between other opponents and the people.

By the establishment of Independent Group just before the WW II, the republican rulers aimed to create an opposition formation but under the RPP control. This development actually should not be underestimated because while the totalitarian regimes in Europe were on rise in the same period, the Independent Group within the RPP achieved to survive in the TGNA until end of the war. The group could not improve the opposition thoughts because of the war conditions stimulating the power with totalitarian thoughts and ideas. Thus, the

war lasting six years presented the RPP much power in the one hand, but it boosted weak trade bourgeoisie and landowners against the single party regime on the other hand.

We can argue with this study that internal and external dynamics of democratization, actually, differ from each other in terms of their peculiarities. While internal dynamics are usually older and more deeply rooted, external dynamics come out mostly with an acute way. Turkish democratization case, for instance, encountered with the external dynamics acutely emerging from the war and post war conditions. Two winners of the war, the United States as the leader of the democracy front and the Soviets ruled by communism. When their influence in world politics increased just after WW II, this situation brought exactly new external dynamics for Turkey. Also, it can be said that if the Axis Powers (Germany, Italy and Japan) had won the war; democratization in Turkey most likely would have been delayed. Therefore, their defeat created unexpected result for Turkish political regime.

President İnönü tried to keep Turkey outside of the war; and thus, İnönü hesitated to give an open support for both combatants. Turkey tried to remain neutral during the war; therefore, İnönü's efforts did work to lessen the pressure coming from the western allies upon Turkey to join into the war. By using of the "balance policy", he achieved ultimately to keep the country out of the war having brutal and destructive effects. Relatively less destructive effects of the war, however, came indirectly to Turkey and they helped to revive of internal dynamics playing to an accelerant role for democratization and liberalization of the country. With the contribution of these dynamics, as soon as the WW II ended, Turkish rulers felt that they had to realize a quick transition towards multiparty system.

When the first spark came from outside, there was a lot of straw inside to fire all home. That is external dynamics stimulated internal dynamics to change the regime in Turkey. The discussions starting with the Land Reform Law exposed the opponents within the RPP and prepared the conditions of the establishment of an opposition party. One of the most important external dynamics was the Soviet threat which played an accelerant role for democratization process in Turkey. Yes, there was an explicit Soviet threat and there were ready troops of the Red Army in the lands of Eastern Europe, the Caucasus, and Iran when the war ended. But at the same time, western bloc had been divided into two parts. Turkey took advantage of this dualist formation of the winners and asked for the support of the democracy front of the west to get rid of the Soviet threat. After a short hesitation, the capitalist west under the US leadership was ready to help for Turkey against the communist

Soviets. Thus, while the US would save its interests in the region, Turkey would find a seat besides the western bloc to protect herself anyway.

At this point, there is a basic question; “why did İnönü or Turkish rulers prefer to adopt a multiparty regime?” In the other words, “would have the western bloc left Turkey alone against the Soviet troops if Turkey’s regime continued as single party in the post WW II period?” The answer is ‘they would have not left Turkey alone’. Having democratic regime was not so important for the capitalist west; because they preferred that having anticommunist regime was more important than having democracy one for them.

All in all, we can summarize the thesis by four main dynamics. Firstly, the pressure coming from the west lead by the US was not pure democratization demands. The target of that pressure was not enforcement democracy for undemocratic states. In contrast to such belief, the US had planned to circle the communist Soviets to keep away it from the oil lands and the Mediterranean region. Hence forth, the regime of the countries circling and preventing the communist Soviet spreading was not so important for the US and its western partners. That is, if there were no sufficient internal dynamics, Turkey might continue its authoritarian single party regime in spite of the Soviet threat. Like Turkey, indeed, there were some other countries such as Salazar’s Portugal and Franco’s Spain having authoritarian regimes in the same period. While their undemocratic and authoritarian regimes continued, Turkey shifted towards democratic regime just after the WW II with the contribution of the internal dynamics.

Secondly, another significant dynamic was İsmet İnönü. He provoked establishment of an opposition party emerging from the TGNA seats in the post war period. By establishment of the opposition party, he planned to get a supra-party position. Actually, he was expecting to win the elections in 1950. If he knew that the RPP would lose the elections on May 14, 1950; he could have changed the law about presidency,⁵⁰³ and he might have asked to get deputy nomination from both the RPP and the DP. Because of his absolute political power in the 1940s, he could take such privilege from the parties as a precaution. Indeed, while he was the only leader of the RPP, the founders of the DP are still in need of İnönü’s political support against the Republicans. What was the aim of İnönü with the

⁵⁰³ In the third chapter of the 1924 Constitution, the article 31 defined the presidency and limited its official duration with the only one election term. Presidential task could last until next presidency election which is made by new deputies of the TGNA coming from the general elections of the new term.

<http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/anayasa/anayasa24.htm>.

liberalization attempts in politics? İnönü aimed at a steady transition to the western bloc excluding the Soviet threat. Such external dynamics or threats had stimulated İnönü; and then, he had to rush to materialize democratization to find a sound seat within the western bloc as soon as possible. İnönü's choice, therefore, was basing on pragmatic reasons.


Thirdly, social divergences among the classes were quite obvious in the post war period. While the WW II weakened the economic conditions of the masses, it brought new profit and interests for some groups. By the development of these groups, existing coalitions began to be dissolved. The basic coalition between bureaucracy and bourgeoisie ruptured. This separation brought new partners coming from the RPP trunk for the bourgeoisie. The new partners would become representatives of the new bourgeoisie in political arenas. The demand of landowners and bourgeoisie coincided with the demands of the masses for the first time in political history of the country. Their goals were more liberalization of both in politics and economy. Once upon a time, there was a novice bourgeoisie under state control, but now developing bourgeoisie was aspiring to control the state management.

Fourthly, the post WW II period had witnessed quite dissatisfied masses but they were not organized by any patriot class or bourgeoisie. On the other side, bourgeoisie was still weak to challenge the RPP power openly. Therefore, unorganized masses were not aware of their own power. Until the elections in 1950, they could not find a chance to vote freely and to check feedback of the majority. The masses were waiting for a suitable condition to create a political earthquake resulting in a power change.

To sum it up, İnönü had asked to create a loyal opposition like the former attempt with the Free Republican Party. In order to materialize this goal, the first precondition was that opposition must have emerged from the ruling party, namely, the RPP inside. Thus, he was fairly careful about the roots of opposition party. In order to create such a hybrid opposition party, İnönü benefited from international turmoil of the post war period. Increasing of the Soviet threat for Turkey, however, caused to out of control. During this process, external dynamics triggered democracy process; and then, internal dynamics forced İnönü to continue and complete the democratization process with the 1950 General Elections.

ILLUSTRATIONS


Illustration 1: The 10th Anniversary March (*Onuncu Yıl Marşı*)



Source: Çeviker, Turgut, *Karikatürkiye* (İstanbul: NTV Yayınları, 2010), p.139.

The 10th Anniversary March strongly emphasizes the Turkishness.


Illustration 2: Perspective of the State in the 1930s



Source: Çeviker, p.148.

--- We are an unprivileged and classless unitary mass!

Illustration 3: Situation of the People during the WW II



Source: Güler, Cemal Nadir, *Amcabey*, 26 February 1944, Number: 65, pp.6-7, (cited from Çeviker, Turgut, *Karikatürkiye*, NTV Yayınları, 2010).

Cemal Nadir Gives the people situation in the country during the WW II as wrapped around by abusers.


Illustration 4: Ideological Perception of the State



Source: Nadir, Cemal, *Cumhuriyet*, 10 March 1944, p.1.

Kemalism closed to the other ideologies became the main ideological view of the state during the 1940s. Cemal Nadir gives the state's efforts with the expression of that "The light and fresh air coming from the door is enough for us..!"


Illustration 5: Opposition Leader, Celal Bayar, and Demands of the People



Source: Çeviker, p.197.

When the DP was established, there were many complaints helping for Bayar to criticize the RPP rule going on more than two decades. Ramiz Gökçe drew widespread dissatisfaction with a smart expression that “Friendship and love documents” are carrying off to Ankara by Celal Bayar.

Illustration 6: Consultation..! *



Konsültasyon!..

("konsültasyon": Bir hastalığa birkaç uzman doktorun birlikte tanı koyması.
Başbakan Recep Peker hükümeti, 14 Ağustos'ta güvenoyu alıyor.)

Cemal Nadir Güler, *Cumhuriyet*, 19.9.1946, s. 4


199

Source: Çeviker, p.199.

Ruling of Turkey in the post WW II was quite difficult. All these expectations of different groups in the Turkish society were drawn by Cemal Nadir with an impressive and creative cartoon, "Consultation", at *Cumhuriyet* in September 1946.

* Consultation: Putting diagnose for a disease by together with some specialist doctors. Prime Minister Recep Peker is asking vote of confidence.

Illustration 7: We are Brothers Anymore



Source: Çeviker, p.205.

Menderes made a speech in İzmir to lessen the tension between the RPP and the DP. Despite the peaceful wishes, the tension was very high between two parties. Ramiz expressed brilliantly the situation with above cartoon and below dialog.

--- "We should be brothers anymore..."

--- "Yes, like Habil and Kabil!"


Illustration 8: Hierarchy of the RPP



Source: Çeviker, p.208.

According to Uykusuz, the class hierarchy of the RPP puts the people in the bottom of society.


Illustration 9: Repairs in the RPP



Source: Çeviker, p.210.

Ramiz Gökçe regards political liberalizations made by the Prime Minister, Şemsettin Günaltay, as repair of democracy.

Illustration 10: Relay Race



Source: Çeviker, p.218.

The main difference of democracy transition of Turkey from other transitions was that 27 year authoritarian regime gave the power peacefully to the opposition party. After the General Elections on May 14, 1950, Turhan Selçuk expressed this power change like a Relay Race.

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APPENDIX

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