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JAPAN'S SEARCH FOR ONTOLOGICAL SECURITY  
IN THE POST-COLD WAR PERIOD:  
THE RECONFIGURATION OF TRUSTING RELATIONSHIPS  
IN EAST ASIA

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IN EAST ASIA

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## **ABSTRACT**

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This dissertation aims at exploring and analysing the effects of Japan's trust-based relations in the region of East Asia in the post-Cold War period within the framework of its anti-militaristic state identity and outlook. The main research question is based on how the Japanese policy makers constructed the meaning of the post-Cold War period, opening the ways and ideas to solidify the anti-militaristic state identity and posture. In this sense, Japan provides a significant case study for examining ontological security. The main argument of dissertation is based on building up Japan's ontological security structure in the

regional context. Since the end of the Second World War, Japan has pursued an anti-militaristic state identity and posture. This attitude has been the guiding principle of Tokyo's foreign and security policy. In this dissertation, for the continuance of anti-militaristic identity successfully in the post-Cold War period, Japanese policy decision-makers have both configured and further sustained the country's trust-based relations with neighbouring countries in the region. This dissertation was analysed under the five main headings except the introduction chapter: (1) The historical background telling the story of anti-militaristic identity and posture of Japan, (2) Japan's emerging human security agenda in the Post-Cold War period, (3) Japan's cooperative initiatives at the regional level by focusing in particular on APEC and ARF. (4) Japan's relations with the significant others for its identity preservation. (5) The conclusions.

Keywords: Japan; Ontological Security; East Asia; State Identity

## ÖZ

JAPONYA'NIN SOĞUK SAVAŞ SONRASI  
ONTOLOJİK GÜVENLİK ARAYIŞI:  
DOĞU ASYA'DA  
GÜVEN İLİŞKİLERİNİN YENİDEN YAPILANDIRILMASI

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Bu doktora tez çalışmasında, Japonya'nın, edindiği anti-militarist kimlik çerçevesinde, Doğu Asya'da tesis etmeye çalıştığı güvene dayalı ilişkiler ve bu ilişkilerin Japon dış politikasına yansımaları incelenmiştir. Böylece, bölgesel bir aktör olarak Japonya'nın Soğuk Savaş sonrası dönemde ontolojik güvenlik arayışının yapısal karakterinin daha net anlaşılabilceği düşünülmüştür. Çalışmada temel kurguyu, 1990 sonrası dönemde, Japon siyasi karar alıcıların ülkenin anti-militarist kimlik pekiştirecek fikir ve düşünceleri nasıl inşa ettikleri sorunsalı oluşturmaktadır. Çalışmanın temel argümanı aşağıdaki gibidir: Japonya,

bölgesel düzlemde ontolojik güvenliğini inşa etmek adına, İkinci Dünya Savaşı sonrası dönemde anti-militarist bir kimlik ve duruş sergilemiştir. Bu yaklaşım, Tokyo'nun dış ve güvenlik politika anlayışında yol gösterici bir ilke olmuştur. Soğuk Savaş sonrası dönemde, bu anti-militarist kimlik ve duruşu başarılı bir çerçevede devam ettirebilmek amacı ile, Japon siyasi karar alıcılar bölge ülkeleri ile güvene dayalı ilişkilerini hem yapılandırma yoluna gitmişler, hem de bu ilişkileri güçlendirmeye çalışmışlardır. Bu doktora tez çalışması, giriş bölümü hariç beş ana başlık üzerine detaylandırılmıştır. Birinci ana başlık, tarihsel arka planı incelemeyi amaçlamaktadır. İkinci ana başlık, Japonya'nın 1990'lı yıllarda inşa ettiği insan güvenliği ajandası üzerine kuruludur. Üçüncü ana başlıkta, ekonomik ve güvenlik perspektiflerinden iki temel bölgesel örgütlenmeye (APEC ve ARF) odaklanılarak, Japonya'nın bu bölgesel örgütlenmelere katkıları incelenmiştir. Dördüncü ana başlıkta, Soğuk Savaş sonrası dönemde Japonya'nın, anti-militarist kimliğinin korunmasında önem addettiği üç önemli aktörle olan ilişkileri irdelenmeye çalışılmıştır. Altıncı ana başlık olan sonuç kısmında ise, tez çalışmasının genel sonuçları değerlendirilmiştir. Bu doktora tez çalışması, özetle Japonya'nın anti-militarist kimlik yapılanmasından yola çıkarak, bölgesel düzlemde karşılıklı güven ilişkilerinin inşa edilmesi ve devamı bağlamında Japon devletinin ontolojik güvenlik arayışını irdelemeye çalışmıştır

Anahtar Kelimeler: Japonya; Ontolojik Güvenlik; Doğu Asya; Devlet Kimliği

To my wife and little daughter

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## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
US	United States
ONUMOZ	United Nations Operations in Mozambique
UNAVEM II	United Nations Angola Verification Mission II
UN-AMET	United Nations Mission in East Timor
UNTAC	United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia
ONUSAL	United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador
NGOs	Non-Governmental Organisations
ODA	Official Development Assistance
ILO	International Labour Organisation
IMF	International Monetary Fund
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
MOFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
KANTEI	Soori Daijin Kantei (Prime Minister's Official Residence)
HIV/AIDS	Human Immunodeficiency Virus/Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
JICA	Japan International Cooperation Agency
APEC	Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation
ARF	ASEAN Regional Forum
PRC	People's Republic of China
SEATO	Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation
G-7	Group of Seven
AMF	Asian Monetary Fund
METI	Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry

## **CHAPTER I**

### **INTRODUCTION**

“States are purposive actors with a sense of self and this affects the nature of the international system” (Wendt, 1999, p. 194).

#### **1.1 Introductory Remarks**

Far-reaching changes in global politics have always presented a challenge to leaders and policy makers charged with foreign and security policy agenda. One general illustration is that the emergence of new international threats with the shift of the world scene from bipolarity to unipolarity in the early 1990s has caused new uncertainties and anxieties for states as actors in international relations. This state of uncertainty and anxiety has forced political leaders and state elites to pursue new ideas in their foreign and security policy formulations to assess and respond to new and unfamiliar regional and international threats and to reconfigure their security ontologically.

Evidence discussed later in detail indicates that, in pursuing some critical political and economic strategies throughout the Cold War, Japan

has tried to adapt to this changing cognitive and physical international environment. Doubtlessly, a passive foreign and security policy agenda, including conducting a very limited military role in the international system and following a security alliance strategy with the United States (US), has allowed Japan to become one of the major economic powers in world affairs. Because Japanese foreign-policy makers principally abstained from policies that could negatively affect the country's economic growth and prosperity during the post-war years, the preference given to economic capacity over military goals prevented Japan from becoming a more assertive and active actor in the security sphere of the international system. In the post-Cold War period, substantive steps were taken so that the country could play a more active but submissive role in regional and global security-related issues. Peace-keeping activities under the auspices of the United Nations (UN) and limited support to the US military capability under the US–Japan security relationship were considered important parameters in shaping Japan's post-Cold War foreign and security policy agenda.

Nevertheless, even during the post-Cold War period, the Japanese policy makers and state elites have principally continued to legitimize the country's anti-militaristic outlook and identity, which is reflected in Japan's political and military culture at the regional and international levels. In this framework, the importance given to developing economic capacity over pursuing military goals has still remained paramount, creating opportunities for Japan in regional and global affairs. The Japanese state elites during the post-Cold War period tried to develop foreign and security policy in which Japan's economic power could be used as an instrument to exert influence on regional and global actors in security-related issues. As will be detailed in the following chapters, these policy formulations of emphasizing economic over military issues should be seen as a result of Japan's anti-militaristic state identity, which has predominantly emerged through establishment of basic trust between

Japan and its neighbouring countries in East Asia. To have a stable ontological security, Japan has continually reconfigured its trusting relationships, which are largely a combination of a blurred external environment and consensus among rulers and societal actors.

## **1.2 Conceptual Framework and Assumptions**

The main conceptual framework used in this dissertation is that of *ontological security*, which became increasingly popular in the discipline of international relations in the writings of Jennifer Mitzen and Brent J. Steele in the 2000s. In this dissertation, the concept of ontological security is applied to the case study of Japan by integrating some critical assumptions of positivism and post-positivism to provide a middle ground that brings together ideas and material forces in international relations. It can be assumed that the positivist and post-positivist paradigms not only are mutually exclusive but even reinforce each other, thus laying the foundations for a more thorough understanding. International relations as a discipline in the social sciences has long been dominated by the concept of positivism. In its general sense, positivism refers to a commitment to a unified view of science and adoption of methodologies used in natural sciences to explain the social world.

The concept of positivism is said to incorporate empiricist epistemology in that it combines naturalism and a belief in regularities. Empiricist epistemology is based on the view that the only grounds for the reality are those that rest ultimately on observation. Steve Smith (1996, p. 11) states that the inter-paradigms debate of the 1980s, which contributed to the development of international relations as a discipline within the social sciences, have generally inclined to accept positivist assumptions in explaining the general character of the international structure. He notes that these debates have a narrow viewpoint because all paradigms

(realism, pluralism, and structuralism) have been detailed in light of positivism. According to him, positivism's importance has been used to give international theory a method; as for the subjects to be studied, it posed a limit to scholars because the phenomena that constituted the field of study were predetermined by its empiricist epistemology.<sup>1</sup>

Positivist scholars believe that there is a 'knowable reality' in international relations, which can be revealed through the application of theoretical frameworks. It follows that positivism has a fundamental claim of being 'value-free' and 'objective', hence scientific. In international relations, this stance corresponds to being ideology free. As Nuri Yurdusev (2003, p. 7) writes,

The idea of objectivity, simply stated, refers to the view that knowledge should be attainable and applicable by anyone, anywhere and at any time. Objective knowledge is attainable and applicable by every analyst or scientist because it is inter-subjectively certifiable, 'empirically testable' and independent of individual opinion. The principle of objectivity or objective knowledge is associated with the experimental data or experimental observation.

This empirically gathered and tested knowledge of the facts of the world reflects the outside reality of 'here and now'. With its 'here and now' approach, positivism treats society and its phenomena as though the factors of time and space do not matter. Therefore, the same causes will always correspond to the same results in the present, the past, or the future. It is evident that positivism has a static approach that causes it to be a temporal and a historic. One of the main reasons positivism has long been accepted by international relations scholars is its promise of steady accumulation of objective and, thus, reliable knowledge about how international politics works (Cochran, 2002, p. 525).

Traditionally, international relations theory has been viewed as relating primarily to material interactions among states in the international system, focusing particularly on the analysis of war and peace, conflict and cooperation. Thus, there has long been a tendency in

international relations scholarship to ignore the social aspect of the international structure and of relations among states as actors in it while analysing only their material aspects. This tendency is particularly evident in the assumptions of mainstream or traditional international relations theories.

To illustrate, throughout the Cold War years, this kind of understanding in international relations scholarship was embodied by such political realist scholars as Reinhold Niebuhr, Raymond Aron, Hans Morgenthau, Henry Kissinger, George Kennan, Kenneth Waltz and so on. Most of the political realists argued that the structure of the international system should be analysed without ideological bias and by applying a normative and social scientific methodology, namely positivism (Bell, 2002, pp. 221 - 222). In this context, the classical realist thought, originated as a branch of American social science, focused largely on power and material well-being of states. From this point of view, behaviours of states have been seen as exogenous rather than endogenous.

In the 1990s, post-positivist paradigms started to be used for criticizing the positivist position and its analytical methods and created a new thinking area in the field of international relations. In actual fact, the assumptions and methods characterizing the post-positivist approach derived not from a single, pure theory but from a family of theories, including post-modernism, constructivism, neo-Marxism, feminism, and others (Wendt, 1995, p. 71). From this standpoint, critical scholars, including Robert Cox and such post-structuralists as Richard Ashley and R. B. J. Walker, criticized the realist school understanding and tried to show that it set limits within which thought and reason were applicable in the discipline. Their criticism was primarily directed towards the realism school's failure to account for key factors such as culture, historical contingency, and change (Fierke, 2002, p. 332).

In the words of Molly Cochran (2002, pp. 534 - 535), the logical deduction of post-positivism is based on two arguments. First, the social action is constituted by meanings that social actors give to their actions, and those meanings are conceptualized in ordinary language. Second, an analysis of the social life demands a meta-language that can mediate the various language games that constitute social life. While referring to the concept of meta-language, Cochran points out that international relations theory should have different perspectives of reality, including social relationships and processes related to every dimension of human life and experience.

As a result, the distinct nature of post-positivist epistemology can be framed as a distinction between 'explainers' and 'understanders'. While positivist theories seek to explain reality by emphasizing empiricist observation, in which the analyst is able to detach himself or herself from the analytical process, post-positivist theories appear more concerned with understanding, and the analyst is assumed to be a part of the process. On this issue, Wendt (1998, p. 102) puts forward the following:

Given the interest of positivist international relations scholars in establishing the epistemic authority of their work as Science, this choice leads them to emphasize that the overriding goal of international relations must be Explanation and only Explanation. And given the interest of post-positivist international relations scholars in Understanding, this leads them to reject characterizations of their work as science, and some even to reject the possibility as well of Explanation in social inquiry. The belief that the distinction between Explanation and Understanding is one between science and non-science, in other words, is a recipe for the kind of epistemological 'paradigm wars' that have riven the field in the past decade.

However, as he states further in the same study, the focus should be not on the act of understanding in itself but on the nature of the properties characterizing the objects to be studied. While natural sciences are concerned with physical substances, like genetics, chemistry, or other material structures, social sciences must deal largely with ideas and shared beliefs when analysing, for instance, the state or international society.

Hence, for Wendt, it is not the search for understanding that determines the interest in actors' beliefs but the nature of the phenomena involved. As a consequence, in his opinion 'the third debate' (the epistemological debate) has tended to combine two different issues into a whole: "what things are made of (ontology) and what questions we should ask (part of epistemology)" (Wendt, 1998, p. 103). By separating these two issues, it becomes clear not only that one does not exclude the other but also that they are mutually implicating (Wendt, 1998, pp. 103 - 104). In other words, as assumed in this dissertation, international relations as a discipline in the social sciences should integrate post-positivist paradigms with positivism to create a middle ground by bringing together ideas and material forces.

In his article "Constructing International Politics", while explaining that critical theory is not a single theory, Wendt (1995, pp. 71 - 73) claims that the fundamental structures of international politics are socially constructed, as opposed to the material understanding of realism. According to him, three significant elements determine the social structure of international relations: (1) shared knowledge, (2) material resources, and (3) practices. First, shared knowledge in the social process of international politics constitutes the nature of relations among actors. Wendt argues that these relations, which can be conflictual or cooperative, ultimately depend on the quality of actors' mutual understanding. Second, material capability only acquires meaning within the structure of shared knowledge among states. In fact, whether a given set of resources is perceived as a threat depends on the existence of trust between the parties. Third, social structures appear only in process, within those practices determining the way of bilateral or multilateral relations among actors (Wendt, 1995, pp. 73 - 74).

According to Wendt (1994, p. 385), "(1) States are the principal units of analysis for international political theory, (2) The key structures in

the states system are inter-subjective, rather than material, (3) State identities and interests are in important part constructed by these social structures, rather than given exogenously to the system by human nature or domestic politics." He clearly states that the distribution of material capabilities matters, especially if there is the probability of a significant threat towards the existence of a state in the international system. Nevertheless, the meaning of power, he strongly argues, depends on the underlying structure of shared knowledge. At the centre of the issue is the notion that analysing the social construction of international politics ultimately corresponds to analysing the way in which processes of interaction produce the social structure, whether cooperative or conflictual, determining actors' identities and interests and the relevance of material context (Wendt, 1995, p. 78).

Further, actors' identities and interests are shaped through interaction. As also argued by Mercer (1995, p. 230), identity and interests make sense only in social interaction, not prior to it. Accordingly, it is possible to present such a formulation: States have different identities with varying interests. Therefore, the state is not a given, but is itself a social construct. The ontological security of actors in international relations is also closely related to their self-identities within a social construction. Therefore, the next two sections are briefly devoted to the investigation of ontological security at the actor level.

### **1.2.1 The Concept of Ontological Security: An Introduction**

It is widely acknowledged that in current international relations, the interpretation of states' behaviours in the international system has become an increasingly significant discussion point for the scholars. One reason is that the discussion is originated from the efforts of states to

maintain and improve their physical protection capability to defer physical threats. A number of scholars are concerned with the economic and physical security of states, directly linked to the material capability at the regional and international level. However, along with physical security, states also need to feel ontologically secure (psychological well-being) in their relations with others. That is, states also seek ontological security to protect security of their selves. In this framework, in the following paragraphs, ontological security at the sociological and international relations level is briefly explored.

First used by Ronald David Laing (1960) in psychology and elaborated by Anthony Giddens (1991) in the field of sociology, the concept of ontological security was recently brought to international relations discipline and applied at the state level by Brent J. Steele (2005) and Jennifer Mitzen (2006). Giddens (1991) defines *ontological security* in sociological terms as “a sense of continuity and order in events, including those not directly within the perceptual environment of the individual” (p. 243). Steele (2008, p. 68) and Mitzen (2006) argue that, besides seeking physical security, all actors, including states in the international system, seek ontological security by emphasizing, in particular, the basic needs of actors. According to their point of view, what makes ontological security a basic need is a deep fear of uncertainty, which constitutes a threat towards the actor’s self-identity.


As stated by David A. Baldwin (1997, p. 13), individuals, states and other societal actors have many ideals such as protecting their physical security, economic well-being, and psychological well-being. Physical security in international relations, in this sense, is basically described as the protection of an actor from physical conditions and proceedings that could become the foundation of serious losses and damage such as natural disasters, terrorism and etc. Physical security in international relations matters in the material world of actors. On the other hand, as will be

detailed below, ontological security is connected with the psychological well-being of actors.

At the individual level, ontological security emerges with the conviction that the biographical narrative rests on a strong ground. On this account, by making reference to Giddens's explanations, Catarina Kinwall (2004, p. 746) asserts that, to be ontologically secure, an individual needs a basic trust of other people. Obtaining such trust is required for an individual to maintain a sense of psychological well-being and to avoid existential anxiety. That is, *ontological security* means confidence and trust in reality as it appears to be. In conditions of ontological security, the individual will know how to behave and how to evaluate the possible threats and means to realizing his or her aims. Conversely, ontological insecurity points to a serious inability to discriminate between the dangers to be confronted and those to be ignored. In such a case, an individual will focus on immediate necessities and may not be able to choose the right means to be used to reach his or her goals (Mitzen, 2006, p. 344).

In ontological security, it can be assumed that an important place is occupied by trust and stability relationship, at least at the basic level. The trust and stability exist generally in direct proportion to each other. Trust can help in maintaining a stable environment for actors. Very much in the same way, stability can foster trust. Therefore, the relation between these pairs of factors is of direct proportion: Indeed, a raise in the level of one of them causes an increase in the other, so that a higher level of trust represents a higher level of stability.

**Table 1: Trust–Stability Relationship in Ontological Security**



*Note:* The variables discussed are obviously abstract and cannot be represented by or reduced to precise mathematical data. Consequently, this diagram is intended only as a visual representation of the general relationship between the variables.

According to Giddens (1991, pp. 39 - 40), trust is “a protection against future threat and dangers which allows the individual to sustain hope and courage in the face whatever debilitating circumstances she or he might later confront.” He stresses that society should be conceived as social practices bound in time and space. These social practices are densely interwoven by relations of trust.

Mitzen (2006, pp. 342 - 347) notes that, as a source of regularities in social relationships, trust is only created through routinisation. Given that routines support the development of identity, the individual becomes attached to these routines, whether good or bad, regardless of their content. Individuals thus accomplish ontological security by routinising their relations with significant others.

Ontological security lies at the core of an individual’s own identity and certainty about the social and material worlds appearing before him or her. It creates, in a sense, a shield that protects the self from strong anxiety. With strong ontological security, an individual develops his or her self-identity and, thus, the ability to recognize others’ identities. Moreover, an individual’s self-identity allows him or her to find answers and models to the problems to be tackled in modern life. If answers and models cannot be found to the existing puzzles, then anxiety will occur (Kaspersen, 2000, p. 103) At this point, the term *anxiety* refers to a threat toward identity,

causing cognitive instability of the individual. If an individual cannot find suitable answers to questions regarding acting and being, as argued by Paul Roe (2008, p. 783), he or she will feel ontologically unguarded.

### **1.2.2 The Concept of Ontological Security: Scaling it to the State Level**

Should states pursue a physical security? How do scholars justify the fact that a corporate actor wants or even needs one type of security but not another? To what extent is the basic rational-choice premise that states can be treated as rational actors accepted by international relations scholars? Mitzen (2006, p. 351) contends, in this sense, that states also seek ontological security from a sociological viewpoint. To justify translating this concept from the level of individuals to that of states, she offers three crucial arguments. First, in international relations theory, states are commonly seen as seeking physical security, as though they were human beings in need of protecting their bodies from harmful disruptions. The 'body' of the state in this case is its territory. However, although a human being's body has parts that are essential for its functioning, like a brain and heart, in the case of a state, it is not clear which elements are essentials for its functioning. Alternatively, the state's body can be seen as the sum of its members' bodies. In any case, considering the state as an individual has, for Mitzen, a heuristic value because it helps to explain the way states act in world politics.

Second, according to Mitzen (2006), it can be assumed that states seek ontological security because of their members' need for ontological security. In this respect, she argues that a society needs cognitive stability to secure the identities of individuals, thus fostering their attachment to stable group identities. In fact, a critical element for any society is its distinctiveness with respect to other societies. Such distinctiveness is

maintained by routinising relations with other groups. Such routines support identity coherence and give individuals some ontological security. In other words, by ensuring a sense of group distinctiveness, the state protects the ontological security of its members. Third, considering states as ontological security seekers allows for a sociological explanation of why different decision makers with distinct personalities and orientations living in different times and conditions can produce the same patterns of behaviour. Likewise, most states tend to respect such institutions as diplomacy and international law, largely in a routinised or automatic manner, no matter the type of regime, the characteristics of its leaders, or its position in the balance of power (Mitzen, 2006, pp. 351 - 353).

Furthermore, Steele (2008, p. 68) postulates four sets of factors that play an important role in ontological security-seeking behaviours for states: (1) reflexive and material capabilities, (2) crisis assessment, (3) biographical narrative, and (4) discursive framework by co-actors. Although the context in which such factors appear may vary, Steele argues that all states are confronted with these issues in their search for ontological security.

Contrary to what might seem obvious, Steele (2008, p. 68) points out that states with more material capabilities, for example, great powers, can be "somewhat imprisoned by their ability to influence more outcomes in international politics": As such, material capabilities reduce their level of freedom. In other words, there is an inverse proportion between the material capability of a state and its level of physical and mental power. Moreover, states' reflexive capabilities make them aware that even unintended consequences may change if they act differently, thus increasing anxiety. Less endowed states, instead, have a higher level of freedom in that the reduced number of choices available to them because of their lack of material capabilities lowers their level of anxiety and, thus, in a sense, increases their freedom of action.

According to Steele (2008, pp. 70 - 71), *crisis assessment* refers to the evaluation and construction of events in terms of identity crises during the production and reproduction of identity. In this respect, it is important for actors to succeed in determining the identity costs of implementing or refusing a certain policy.

The biographical narrative, detailed below, is fundamental because it is where agents build up their understandings of social settings and the position of their identities within those settings. Narrative is the kind of discursive consciousness agents use to give meaning to their actions. A biographical narrative is composed by four interrelated processes dealing with the actor's understanding of (1) what provokes or drives events, (2) the meaning of a given event for the actor's identity, (3) the importance of those events to the actor's interests, and (4) the policies to be pursued by the state to realize those interests. Narration, Steele (2008, p. 72) argues, is the most important political act of a state because it determines and explains what the state itself is.

The last factor points to the discourse strategies adopted by co-actors—states or other international entities—that can strategically build up the situation to force a state to take certain actions. To illustrate, members of the international community can jeopardize the ontological security of a state by using language constructed to remind it of its past failure. Here states assume that other states will refrain from committing the same mistakes in the future to avoid the anxiety produced by the outcomes (Steele, 2008, p. 74).

Besides Mitzen's contentions and Steele's postulations, some basic points related to biographical narrative and discourse analysis show that ontological security can also be explained from the perspective of the state. An individual's identity is not constituted by his or her actions but by his or her capacity to maintain a unique narrative or biography about himself or herself. This narrative is not entirely fictive in that it also continually

includes elements taken from external reality. The continuity of the self will, thus, be provided by its biographical narrative, which is, in this sense, closely linked to ontological security. The self-identity construction of the individual, Krolkowski (2008, p. 112) says, should be "routinely created and sustained in the reflexive activities of the individual". Like individuals, Steele (2008, p. 10) argues that states as actors in the international system also behave in terms of identity construction. A state's biographical narrative is composed by specific acts of narration connecting a policy with a description of a state's self. Thus, biographical narrative is the starting point to understand the way in which self-identity limits and allows states' performance of certain acts instead of others.

The identities of states in the international system are built by state agents through biographical narratives. Such narratives are critical to go beyond the spatial level of existence of a state and create a sense of continuity. States have an ontological security because their biographical narratives have been continuously formed by agents in the past, the present, and the future (Steele, 2008, p. 10). Biographical narrative is studied through discourse analysis to explain the meaning of states' acts of narration. Given that actors have to attribute a meaning to their actions to ensure consistency with their identities, state agents must explain and justify the meaning of any policy in relation to such identities (Steele, 2008, p. 11). Thus, Steele (2008, p. 12) posits that discourse analysis has three functions when applied to case studies: (1) It explains the way in which actors link a policy alternative to a particular narrative about identity. (2) It indicates when ideas about identity lead to certain policy choices. (3) It reveals how the actors build up meanings not only of their ideas of state identity but also of identity threats.

Individuals adopt different behaviours toward social and material environments to maintain a solid ground for their identity. Likewise, states as actors in the international system also try to maintain a reliable

environment through their foreign and security policy discourses. This effort is especially seen in the policy formulations state agents carry out. For example, state foreign policy makers play a leading role in identity building by presenting a specific narration connecting a policy with a description of the state's self-identity. The aim of foreign and security policy discourse is to constitute a stable connection between representations of identity and the proposed policy. On the other hand, states have to consider systematically the outside reality to protect themselves from the deep fear of uncertainty, which often threatens their actor self-identity. Because the cognitive order is one established by mind, not a reality, the cognitive order is reflected in discourses only. Because the outside reality is full of events and there is no order in outside reality, it is important to have a conceptual system that simplifies the complex outside reality into a more meaningful and understandable set of patterns or frameworks. In this way, states can carry out the processes of perception, reasoning, and judgment to understand the outside reality.

For states physical security is significant however, comparatively, ontological security is also significant. Steele makes this point for the following reasons: First, through ontological security, it is confirmed that such a state exists in the international system; that is, the state's physical existence is confirmed. Second, ontological security also affirms in which forms a state can perceive itself and want others to perceive it. The identity of states is built up and preserved by using the biographical narrative that vitalizes their routinised foreign policy activities. However, routines can be interrupted when a state's foreign policy activities reflecting its narrative no longer relate to its self-perception. In such a case, the state will seek to re-establish routines that are compatible with its self-identity (Steele, 2008, pp. 2 - 3).

All actors, including states, routinise social interactions to attain ontological security; what varies is their degree of attachment to these

routines. Some actors tend to hold to rigid routines while others behave more flexibly and reflexively. Actors that implement rigid routines are inclined to reproduce behaviours providing them with ontological security, no matter how dangerous these can be to their physical security (Krolikowski, 2008, pp. 112 - 113). Rigid routines, whether inter-subjectively constructed or not, limit a state' capacity for learning. On the other hand, the construction of flexible routines depends on the ability of agents to transform themselves.

At the centre of the issue is the notion of anxiety. In fact, the creation of routines serves the purpose of overcoming the sense of fear, which is felt when limitless possible choices—or, at least, a large number of choices—confront actors. Anxiety arises in relation not to things outside of the actor's control but to those it feels it can act upon. This condition of freedom creates, in the words of Steele (2008), a "dizziness" tackled by establishing routines that bring order and predictability. Nonetheless, if routines are too rigid, the ability to act in response to changing conditions becomes seriously restricted. In addition, Steele (2008, p. 61) notes that fear and anxiety do not necessarily need to be overcome. Admittedly routines are an important driver of the capacity for agency because they protect the actor from dangers emerging in its environment. However, what motivates agents to act is anxiety, which can be reduced through routinisation but never suppressed.

Furthermore, at some point, the institutionalised routines set up by states can be disturbed by so-called "critical situations" or, more precisely, by what agents—policy decision makers—see as critical situations. In particular, the notion of critical situations held by states largely concerned with traditional security (i.e., survival) profoundly differs from that of states largely interested in ontological security. Critical situations are characterized by three conditions: (1) They affect a large number of people. (2) They are largely unpredictable. (3) They catch state agents

unprepared. In other words, critical situations are unforeseen moments of radical change that have an effect on numerous individuals. If a critical situation arises, agents must consider themselves able to react or to transform it into a non-threatening event for their identities. In fact, critical situations represent a threat toward continuity and identity, thereby producing anxiety.<sup>3</sup>

To sum up, applying the ontological security approach to the state level allows prediction of the way in which states with different levels of trust will interact. On the one hand, actors having a high level of trust are able to make more rational decisions and learn from the past while adapting to a changing environment. On the other hand, actors with a low level of trust tend to follow rigid routines to stabilise their interactions, thus having less ability to learn and express creativity. Moreover, they do not engage in activities aimed at reflexive self-monitoring and updating of their biographical narratives (Krolikowski, 2008, p. 115).

In this dissertation, the concept of ontological security is to be used to analyse Japan's post-Cold War trusting relationships with neighbouring countries in East Asia. In this sense, this concept is considered a relevant and pertinent approach to systematically explain the self-identity and posture of Japan in a regional context, as will be detailed in the next section.

### **1.3 Purposes of the Dissertation, Statement of the Problem and Main Argument**

This dissertation aims at exploring and analysing the effects of Japan's trust-based relations in the region of East Asia within the framework of its anti-militaristic state identity. Thus, it offers new insight into Japan's regional and global affairs.

As is well known, during the first half of the twentieth century, the only country to follow the path of industrialisation in Asia was Japan. This industrial pattern, beginning with efforts in 1868, was a synthesis of the indigenous Asian culture and the industrialised economy of the West. In this period, military elites in Japan increasingly gained a respected position and great influence in political affairs. Moreover, this position and control mechanism became the main determinant of Japanese foreign and security policy in the pre-war period. In fact, the policies that took Japan to the Pacific war were largely based on the directives of the Japanese military elites. Japan's pursuit of an aggressive and expansionist foreign and security policy shaped the state identity of Japan on the regional and international stage.

Japan's defeat in World War II had a significant impact on redefining the main parameters of its foreign and security policy during the Cold War years. This defeat, at first, resulted in the Allied occupation of Japan, focused on demilitarising and democratising the country through various political, economic, and social reforms. According to the policies of the Allied forces, Japan would never again menace the peace of the world.

Thus, in the early post-war period, Japan's role in the regional and international system was a product of the political order imposed on it both by the victors and the pragmatic policies of post-war Japanese policy makers. First, in the eyes of the Japanese people, suffering a crushing defeat meant the disappearance of military forces and most militaristic values. Almost all the Japanese people, except the extremists and ultra-nationalists, started to interpret the Allied occupation not as a crisis but rather as a price to be paid for their military expansion during the war. Many also believed that the nation was beginning a new outlook on life and that the country would be a member of the international community again.

In this context, Japan slowly internalised the idea of pacifism, which was embedded in the country's self-identity construction. That is, anti-

militaristic values became a greater part of Japan's character at the state level. These values, which have prevented any possible movement toward revival of militarism in the country and are rigidly expressed in the new constitutional structure of Japan, initially represented the posture of the Japanese state in the international community.

In fact, one of the most prominent features of the new constitution was Article 9, which stated renunciation of war as a means of settling international disputes. This article would become one of the major factors shaping Japan's post-war foreign and security policy. Another significant factor shaping the foreign and security policy agenda of Japan was the military alliance relationship built with the US. The security treaties, signed in 1951 and 1960, were the most significant expressions of the posture and anti-militaristic self-identity of Japan toward the regional and international community. It can be argued that the security alliance with the US was a product of a carefully constructed and brilliantly implemented foreign policy of Japan. Moreover, to emphasize the anti-militaristic identity and posture of the country in the international arena, Japanese policy makers translated the non-militaristic sentiments of the state into various restraining measures, such as the three non-nuclear principles (that Japan would not possess, manufacture, or permit the introduction of nuclear weapons on its territory) and the prohibition on participating in collective defence activities.

From the 1970s on, Japan gradually became one of the leading market economies in the world. In this sense, the Japanese policy makers abstained from policies that could negatively affect the country's economic growth and continued to pursue a foreign policy aimed at protecting their economic interests. However, as asserted by Thomas Berger (1998), the gap between economic and military power lies in the strong anti-militarist sentiments that emerged in Japan in the wake of World War II.

Considering this point of view, the main argument of the dissertation is as follows. To build up its ontological security scheme in the regional context since World War II, Japan has pursued an anti-militaristic state identity and posture. This attitude has been the guiding principle of Tokyo's foreign and security policy. I argue that, to continue this anti-militaristic identity and posture successfully in the post-Cold War period, Japanese policy makers and state elites have both configured and further sustained the country's trust-based relations with neighbouring countries in the region.

The main problem to be discussed in this dissertation is how the Japanese policy makers constructed the meaning of the post-Cold War period, opening the ways and ideas to solidify the anti-militaristic state identity. This main problem is further elaborated with a more specific question. The related question is to what extent the importance given to economic rather than military means in Japanese foreign policy agenda has facilitated the possibility of cooperation among countries in East Asia, which is one of the most dynamic but also volatile regions of the world.

As is well known, the primary aim of the foreign policy of a country in the international system is to guarantee its national security and prosperity. During the Cold War period, Japanese policy makers tried to achieve this basic aim by pursuing some significant pragmatic directions in Japan's foreign and security policy, such as constructing a strategic alliance with the US, avoiding unnecessary regional conflicts with neighbours, and concentrating on economic issues. These initiatives of the Cold War period have been the outstanding features of Japanese foreign and security policy. Of these parameters, Japanese policy makers have given greater importance to strong loyalty to the US alliance. This loyalty has strongly continued even after the 1990s, although the end of the Cold War forced the Japanese state elites to adjust to a new international order.

In the 1990s, Japan, after four decades of strong economic growth, seemed to possess the tools necessary to enhance its own position while remaining aligned with the US. From this point of view, Tokyo would be able to shape its strategic environment from a position of leadership in East Asia without having to remilitarize. At the regional context, new rising actors, like mainland China, and new policy instruments, such as human security agenda and more comprehensive strategic goals, started to shape the new parameters of the Japanese foreign and security policy. While concentrating on the newly emerged issues and opportunities in the region of East Asia, Japanese policy makers always put establishing trusting relationships with neighbours first. In this dissertation, the effect of the trust-based relationships that Japan tried to establish during the process of shaping new orientations in Japanese foreign and security policy is emphasised.

A related question is to what extent the importance given to economic rather than military means in Japanese foreign policy agenda has facilitated the possibility of cooperation among countries in East Asia, which is one of the most dynamic but also volatile regions of the world. The former Japanese Prime Minister, Yoshida Shigeru, believed that, in the pre-war period, the Japanese policy makers mismanaged the country's sources of national strength. In the post-war period, Yoshida closely aligned Tokyo with Washington and ensured that Japan's post-war focus remained on economic development, not re-militarization. Yoshida and other conservative elites saw this pacifism as a means to maximize Japan's national autonomy. This kind of economic nationalism allowed Japan to concentrate on post-war rehabilitation. From the second half of the Cold War years, in spite of being one of the significant market economies in the world, Japan refrained from policy directions affecting the country's economic growth and prosperity in a negative way. During the post-Cold War period, it can be seen from the foreign policy agendas of Japan that the Japanese policy makers have always principally concentrated on the

economic and political rehabilitation of neighbouring countries to foster sustainable political and socio-economic development in the regional context.

In this period, the changing threat perceptions in the international system surely caused the Japanese policy makers to redefine Japan's foreign and security policy parameters. However, these parameters, which are modifications of its alliance strategy with the US and of modest defensive military capabilities, did not go beyond the military restrictions of the constitution and did not reach the level of the pre-war military strategies pursuing aggressive policies in East Asia. Japan always tried to establish its relations with neighbour countries on a sustainable ontological security in the regional context. In this dissertation, answers to these questions are revealed by investigating the dimension of Japan's trust-based relations in East Asia.

#### **1.4 Research Design and Methodology**

No scholarly studies on the anti-militaristic state identity of post-Cold War Japan in the region of East Asia have taken the perspective of ontological security. From this point of view, the dissertation is focused on elaborating the case study of Japan within this relative conceptual framework. A large part of this dissertation has been complemented by research conducted in Tokyo, Japan. Consequently, the main data needed for testing the main argument and answering the primary research question and related sub question were acquired by reviewing the discourse of official publications issued both by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) and the Prime Ministry Office (KANTEI) in Japan. Secondary sources, such as books and articles published in academic journals and newspapers both in English and in Japanese, were used as

supporting background reading and for determining the setting of the dissertation.

To analyse and understand the content of the Japanese foreign and security policy agenda during the post-Cold War period, a limited number of interviews with academics within and outside of Japan were conducted. Interviews with Prof. Dr. Kenji Takita from Chuo University; Prof. Dr. Kazuhiko Okuda from International University of Japan; Assoc. Prof. Dr. Alexander Bukh from Tsukuba University; Assoc. Prof. Dr. Giorgio Shani from International Christian University; Prof. Dr. Karel Von Volferen, Mr. Shunji Yanai, and Prof. Dr. Ian Clark from the University of Southampton; Prof. Dr. Ludger Kuhnhardt from Bonn University; Assoc. Prof. Dr. Jennifer Mitzen from Ohio State University (via the Internet); and Assoc. Prof. Dr. Brent Steele from the University of Kansas (via the Internet) were conducted during researches in Japan, the Netherlands, and Germany.

### **1.5 Literature Review**

As stated above, the dissertation was largely focused on systematically examining and analysing the effects of Japan's trust-based relationships in the regional context in terms of its anti-militaristic state identity. Thus, this dissertation offers a new understanding of Japan's post-Cold War regional and global projects. This dissertation is concentrated on the following primary question: how did the Japanese policy makers construct the meaning of the post-Cold War period, opening the ways and ideas to solidify the anti-militaristic state identity? In this sense, Japan provides a significant case study for examining ontological security.

It is important to review past related works as context for this dissertation. In this framework, the literature on Japan's anti-militaristic

identity and its reflection in the country's foreign and security policy in the regional and international contexts are examined.

A vast amount of written material is available on Japanese foreign and security policy during the post-Cold War period. Moreover, Japanese foreign and security policy has been an attention-grabbing topic with valued comments, drawing deep interest and discussion from various scholars in the area of international relations. The literature has largely focused on the inconsistency between Japan's economic capability and its military power. However, scholars and researchers who study this topic have not focused on the non-militaristic state identity of Japan from the perspective of ontological security, the security of the self.

First of all, concerning the post-war politics of Japan in the international system, Japan's post-war policies have developed in the context of an extremely close relationship with the US. Moreover, earlier studies on the post-war Japanese politics argue that an analyst cannot consider the Japanese post-war foreign and security policy construction without taking into account the US factor, which has often been put at the centre of the analysis. For example, "An Empire in Eclipse", by John Welfield (1988), and "The Yoshida Memoirs: The Story of Japan in Crisis", by Shigeru Yoshida (1962), analysed the subject from this point of view. The book *Japan's Foreign Policy 1945–2003: The Quest for a Proactive Policy* by Kazuhiko Togo (2005) assesses the Japanese foreign policy from several perspectives, and Togo adds his own narratives to diversify the book with a number of case studies. These studies support the conclusion that political and security relations with the US were immensely important factors in determining the Japanese political culture. All these studies assert that the US has attempted to reshape Japan into something more closely resembling its own image.

For example, Thomas Berger (1998), a scholar on Japanese foreign policy with a constructivist perspective, stresses in his book *Cultures of*

*Antimilitarism: National Security in Germany and Japan* the role of collective identity in shaping Japanese foreign and security policy. According to Berger, the gap between economic and military power lies in the strong anti-militarist sentiments that emerged in Japan after the end of the Second World War. He argues that historical culture is the product of events and experiences, such as revolutions, wars, and economic and natural catastrophes. In this sense, the defeat in the Second World War can be said to have caused the dramatic shift in Japan's foreign and security policy culture from aggressive militarism to pacifism. He further argues that the Japanese government translated these anti-militaristic sentiments into various restraining measures, such as the three non-nuclear principles, the prohibition against participating in collective defence, and so on. Akitoshi Miyashita (2006, p. 105), who considers that the argument defended by Thomas Berger is questionable in a comparative context, asks whether a defeat in a major war always make a country anti-militarist. According to Miyashita, such is definitely not the case. If it were, France after the Napoleonic Wars or Germany after the First World War should have become pacifist. He says that the question should be why a defeat in a major war makes some countries anti-militarist but not others. According to him, this question indicates that a historical experience alone is not sufficient to explain the kind of pacifism that emerged in post-war Japan.

A leading expert on Japan, Michael J. Green (2001), in his book *Japan's Reluctant Realism*, provides a good foundation for the study of the Japanese post-Cold War foreign and security policy. Green stresses the US–Japan security alliance, the use of economic tools, and constraints on the use of force. Green further argues that Japan's increasing independence has spurred an emerging strategic view—what he calls *reluctant realism*—that is shaped by a combination of changes in the international environment, insecurity about national power resources, and Japanese aspirations for a national identity that moves beyond the legacy of the Second World War. As a result, he insists that it is time for the US and the

world to recognize Japan as an independent actor in Northeast Asia and to assess Japanese foreign policy on its own terms.

Another important book by Gerald Curtis (1993), *Japan's Foreign Policy After the Cold War: Coping with Change*, analyses Japan's diplomatic style, economic needs, security concerns, and relations with its neighbours. Reinhard Drifte (1998), another leading expert on Japanese foreign policy, in his book *Japan's Foreign Policy for the 21st Century: From Economic Superpower to What Power?*, discusses Japan as increasingly willing to act as a major power, having come to terms with the end of the Cold War. He views Japan's position in the world as having increased to the point that non-action by the Japanese government can have a major effect on other nations.

## **1.6 Outline of the Dissertation**

This dissertation is focused largely on the post-Cold War period of Japan and builds the conceptual framework on the regional context. However, to understand the main reflections of Japan's anti-militaristic identity during the post-Cold War period, it is necessary to examine the historical background. Thus, Japan has strongly engaged itself in anti-militarist ethics and values in the sense that the Japanese policy makers have pursued a foreign and security policy built on a pacifist outlook during the Cold War period. This pacifist outlook, deeply embedded in Japan's state culture, was broadly shared by both the Japanese people and the state elite. On the other hand, throughout the Cold War years, Japan was able to make rational decisions on its foreign policy to show that it had learned from the past, thus rebuilding a moderate portrait in the regional and international society. At this point, Japanese ruling elites have tried to establish the routinised relationships with significant others for the country's self-identity construction so as to give an image of the country

that has pursued peaceful foreign and security policies. In this sense, after drawing a general picture to present the main problem and argument in chapter one, chapter two is devoted to the study of historical conditions and events as well as structural transformation of Japan's state identity during the Cold War era.

The aim of chapter two is to analyse to what extent Japan could establish its *own basic trust mechanism* in the region of East Asia. This chapter provides a general perspective of how Japan's foreign and security policy discourse in the Cold War years has been shaped and how this discourse affected Japan's ontological security.

Chapter three is focused on Japan's positive efforts toward eliminating human security issues in the region of East Asia. Given its anti-militaristic state identity, to create a sustainable cognitive and physical environment at the regional context, it seems indispensable for Japan to follow such a foreign policy agenda. It is largely argued that completely avoiding a fear of uncertainty for a country in a globalized world is almost impossible. For that reason, states are inclined to build a basic trust mechanism in their physical environment to have routinised relationships with others and to foster a feeling of security around them. In this sense, the Japanese policy makers and state elites have built a foreign-policy agenda based on dealing with issues related to human security in East Asia.

Featuring a people-oriented view of human security in its foreign and security policy discourses, Japan recognizes the significance of human beings as well as that of its national security indirectly. In this framework, the concept of human security is thought of by Japanese policy makers as a complementary element to the country's national security. To put it differently, *human security* and *national security* are conceived to be mutually inclusive terms. At this point, the contributions of Japan to human security at the regional context show a positive sum gain, which means they are mutually beneficial for the participants in the relationship, thus

creating a more stable cognitive and physical environment. From this point of view, chapter three is divided into two sections. Section one provides the background of the conceptual framework. In this section, some discussions that shape the framework of the human security concept are presented. Section two of the chapter is focused on discussing challenges and opportunities that Japan has created via its foreign and security policy approaches to human-centred issues and tries to determine how and to what extent Japan contributed to creating a sustainable and peaceful environment in the region of East Asia.

Chapter four begins with background on the regional architecture of East Asia during the Cold War period in terms of bilateralism as opposed to multilateralism. Then, the chapter analyses two regional cooperative initiatives by focusing on the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (the economy perspective) and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Regional Forum (the security perspective) and Japan's position on these significant regional initiatives. Chapter four primarily addresses the following two thematic questions: (1) How does Japan perceive these regional initiatives within its own framework? (2) During the post-Cold War period, were the Japanese policy makers able to manipulate effectively these newly emerging regional economic and security structures for Japan's purposes to alleviate the country's deep fear of uncertainty and anxiety? In chapter four, it is argued that Japan has attached great importance to the formation of economic and security systems, such as the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation and the ASEAN Regional Forum, at the regional level to construct a stable cognitive and physical environment based on multilateral dialogue and cooperation in East Asia. However, considering the facts, this endeavour by Japan was only partially successful because the different economic and political systems in the region.

The importance of the idea of identity in international relations literature is gradually increasing. At present, it has emerged as a concept frequently referred to not only in international relations literature but also in other areas of social sciences. Indisputably, to what extent the identity issue affects and shapes international politics and how actors such as states, international organizations, and institutions perceive the other problem necessitate a detailed research. In this sense, chapter five explores critical relationships between Japan and its significant others at the regional level. It is commonly argued by sociologists that, as a source of regularities in social relationships, trust, which is the backbone of having a solid ontological security for actors, is only created through routinisation. At this point, as mentioned in the conceptual framework section above, like individuals, states accomplish ontological security by routinising their relationships with significant others.

The fifth chapter confines Japan's significant others for the post-Cold War period to three main actors: the US, Korea, and mainland China. The Soviet Union was inarguably a significant other for Japan's self-identity construction during the Cold War years. However, because of such critical factors as the transformation of Japan's political self at the end of the Cold War and the newly emerged Russia as the other in the Japanese identity construction, Russia started to be viewed by the Japanese policy makers as a non-threatening nation toward Japan's ontological security. As a result, a new vision of Russia, based on democracy, market economy, and the rule of law, was referred to as newly born Russia to highlight the difference with the Soviet Union and historical Russia. It can also be argued that, as mentioned by Alexander Bukh (2010), the critical change in Japan's relations with Russia did not bring the socio-cultural construction to an end. In fact, for example, in the Japanese discourse on the territorial dispute, the political and socio-cultural levels have always been intertwined. This issue continues to foster a feeling of insecurity in bilateral relations. Nevertheless, when compared to the post-war years, in

the post-Cold War period, Russia did not have a strong direct effect on Japan's construction of its political identity and of its ontological security.

The US is doubtlessly a significant other for Japan, one that has served as an important counterpart for its state identity-building process. Throughout the Cold War, conservative elites in Japan, like Shigeru Yoshida, Ichiro Hatoyama, and Hayato Ikeda, gave great importance to a strong loyalty to the US alliance system so that Japan could maximize its interests while minimizing its commitments in the international system. The US has been seen by the Japanese policy makers and state elites as the cornerstone of Japan's foreign and security policy. During the Cold War years, almost all of the political and security decisions taken by the Japanese policy makers were shaped under the strong influence of its closest partner, the US, either directly or indirectly. Thus, it cannot be ignored that Japan has confined itself to the national and international interests of the US in Asia and the Pacific region.

In fact, such a framework can be described in terms of Japan-US relations. During World War II, the US was seen by Japan as a great enemy. However, later on, it started to be perceived as the leading power during the occupation period of 1945-1952 and then the most important factor in the economic and political modernisation of post-war Japan. Since the 1970s, Japan's dependency on the US in political and economic matters slowly started to shift toward interdependency, but the military and security matters were always seen by both countries' policy makers as vital components playing the role in determining the level of Japan's dependency on the US.

In essence, the Japanese policy makers had no alternative but to follow the path designated by the US. However, this close alliance mechanism, in a sense, presented Japan a good opportunity for rebuilding its economy. Subsequently, by constructing a strategic alliance policy under the guidance of Yoshida Shigeru, the Japanese policy makers have

generally tried to abstain from policies that could negatively affect the country's economic growth and prosperity. In various ways, it is possible to see this policy orientation pursued by the consecutive Japanese governments, aiming at protecting the country's economic interests in the international arena. Hence, Japan achieved its national wealth by following a kind of economic nationalism constructed during the post-war rehabilitation. In fact, Japan's incomparable incorporation into the American alliance system created this opportunity for the Japanese state elite.

On the other hand, the US followed assertive policy orientations for its national and international interests by establishing military bases in several parts of East Asia, including the Japanese archipelago. In this context, from the perspective of the power politics of the Cold War period, Japan's role in the international society was, in many ways, shaped by the political drives of the US. Washington effectively used Japan as a military base in its containment policy encompassing economic, military, and diplomatic dimensions against the Soviet Union and China. In return, Japan was able to pursue a policy of economic wealth and prosperity for itself.

Stated simply, this short narrative is a general picture of relations between the two countries under the Cold War pressures. In this context, the US was perceived by the Japanese policy makers as the significant other in constructing the country's anti-militaristic self-identity in the international society. After being built, this state identity has been shaped and developed in relation to trust-based relations between Japan and its significant others, such as the US.

In the post-Cold War period, the relations between Japan and the US have increasingly strengthened. No doubt there have also been points when conflicts between the two countries have occurred in their political relations. Nevertheless, Japan has always remained aligned with the US. In this sense, the question of how Japan has shaped its cognitive and physical

environment on the basis of its trusting relationships with the US in the post-Cold War period is analysed in three main stages: (1) the period after the Gulf War of 1990–1991, (2) the new National Defence Program outline of Japan in 1995 and beyond, and (3) the post-9/11 period. All these periods show that, even after the end of the Cold War, the Japanese policy makers have tried to set up a foreign and security policy that does not bring any harm either to the country's anti-militaristic state identity or its trust-based relations with the US. Thus, Japan has largely pursued a balanced policy among its neighbour countries and the US for the sake of not losing its embedded state identity.

Korea as a whole was seen in this dissertation as another significant other for Japan. From the Cold War years to the present, Japan's posture and anti-militaristic state identity in its relations with the Korean Peninsula have been the key factor both in shaping cooperation and stability in East Asia and in building a *basic trust mechanism* between Japan and South Korea. In other words, the anti-militaristic image of Japan has been effective in creating a bond of basic trust between the two countries. Nevertheless, Japan's aggressive policies and activities during the pre-war period have still not been forgotten by the Koreans who witnessed such activities. Although Japan has formally announced that it would not be involved in the old policies and forceful actions, the extent to which Japan has acted upon the decision has not satisfied most of the Korean power elites and public. In this regard, foreign-policy formulations of Japan, in particular the ones directly related to national security issues, have been widely disapproved of by the South Korean state elites. Both countries, however, seem to be faithful in agreeing to the terms that, under all circumstances, bilateral trade and economy will be maintained by mutual trust and faith. This cooperation between the two countries is principally the result of the close borders and cultural proximity and the strategic relationships that each country has with the US. To analyse Korea–Japan trusting relationships at the regional level, this section of chapter five is

divided into three sub-sections. The first sub-section focuses on the history of the countries' relationship. The second sub-section discusses the factors on which the bilateral relations of the two countries are dependent; these factors are *history and identity*, *economic profit*, *the role of the US*, and *the leadership role*. Additionally, the territorial issue between Japan and South Korea is detailed. The third and the final section critically analyses the nuclear and strategic issues of North Korea and Japan's stance on that issue.

Another significant other for the self-identity construction of Japan during the post-Cold War period is mainland China. For many reasons, such as cultural and geographic proximity and economic, political, and security dimensions in their bilateral and multilateral relations, China is regarded by the Japanese ruling elites as a significant other for the country's self-identity construction. In particular, from the 1990s on, the Japanese policy makers have considered China as *a potential enemy* in terms of the country's national security and prosperity and as *an inevitable partner* for maintaining peace and stability in the region of East Asia. China is a potential enemy for Japan for such reasons as its rapid economic growth, its non-transparent military build-ups, and its potential leadership role in East Asia. However, it is also an inevitable partner for Japan. First, with Japan, China has the capacity to struggle with the economic, social, and security issues in East Asia toward a more stable and economically growing region. Because of its huge economy and population, China is a noteworthy trade partner for the Japanese business and government sectors. However, although a basic trust mechanism in mutual relationships was constructed between the two countries during the Cold War years, this trust mechanism could not be enhanced at a satisfactory level or above after the Cold War. Both countries were, in principle, overwhelmed by historic issues originating from the pre-war period. In addition, becoming rival competitors in the economic sphere in the region

has been another problematic area for political relations between Japan and China.

In this section of chapter five, first, to have a clear picture of post-Cold War Sino–Japanese relations at the state level, the historic background of the two countries during the Cold War is briefly summarized. Second, the post-Cold War process is detailed. In this context, their mutual relationship is explored in a threefold analysis along economic, security, and political dimensions.

Chapter six includes some conclusions pertaining to the main argument and question set forth in chapter one. It is important to note that the dissertation fills a gap in the academic literature by explaining Japan's non-militaristic self-identity from the reconfiguration perspective of trusting relationships at the regional level. This study opens the way to further investigation into Japan's political and state identity issues from several viewpoints.

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<sup>1</sup> The term positivism was firstly used by Auguste Comte in the 19<sup>th</sup> century. Auguste Comte's aim was to develop a science of society based on the methods of the natural sciences, namely observation. See, John H. Zammito, *A Nice Derangement of Epistemes: Post-Positivism in the Study of Science from Quine to Latour*, Chicago: The University of Chicago, 2004, pp. 6-7.

<sup>2</sup> Mitzen strongly indicates that, in other words, there seems to be a double standard. Because identity talk feels squishy to some people, however, but press too hard on the concept of physical security and it is pretty squishy itself. Prof. Jennifer Mitzen, The Ohio State University, Department of Political Science, interview by the author, May 10, 2010.

<sup>3</sup> For Steele, anxiety differs from fear in that the first emerges when identity is challenged, while the latter arises when survival is jeopardized and represents a response to a specific threat, to a definite object. See, Brent J. Steele, *Ontological Security in International Relations: Self-identity and the IR State*, London and New York: Routledge, 2008, p. 51.

## **CHAPTER II**

### **HISTORICAL BACKGROUND**

#### **2.1 Introduction**

In Japan, the pre-war and post-war periods were entirely different. During the pre-war period, Japan had followed increasingly militarist and expansionist policies that, at their peak, started to threaten the international system. The end of World War II marked a critical turning point in Japanese foreign and security policy. Following Japan's dramatic defeat in World War II, the significant political and military institutions and values—the political and military system that had taken Japan into the war—were reshaped by the Allied forces led by the US within the framework of a new vision of a post-war international order.

Fundamentally, in the pre-war period, Japan had a militaristic state identity, which increasingly prioritized its aggressive expansionist aims toward the region of East Asia. During the post-war period, a new posture and state identity were imposed on Japan, both by the Allied forces led by the US and by pragmatic Japanese policy makers. These new identity formation and posture were defined on the basis of an anti-militarist outlook, which was swiftly integrated into the country's political structure.

With this change in mind, chapter two presents an analysis of Japan's post-war self-identity and posture in the international system by examining its political and security engagements in terms of ontological security. In this sense, an interpretation of the Cold War facts will help in understanding the essence of Japan's anti-militaristic identity as the main element of its foreign and security policy agenda in the post-Cold War period.

This chapter is structured in two sections. Section one briefly describes the historic background, evaluating the process of how Japan transformed itself from a feudal society into a modern industrial state, ruled principally by the emperor. In this section, how Japan perceived the modernisation process and used it to adapt a militaristic ideology and outlook is introduced. In the second section, Japan's post-war political and security engagements are elaborated in terms of its ontological security, based on trusting relationships with neighbouring countries.

## **2.2 Section One: The Pre-war Period**

As a subject of study, the concept of identity referring directly to a social context built on history and culture, for several years, has attracted the attention of academics, policy makers, and practitioners. Defining the concept of identity in sociological terms, Anthony Smith (2002, p. 30) presents two differing perspectives: modernist and primordialist. He argues that the modernist perspective is based on the idea that nation is not a necessary and natural element existing in the mosaic of events encompassing the history of the world. It is a completely modern phenomenon, the product of modern developments such as capitalism, bureaucracy, and secular pragmatism. According to Smith, concepts such as nations and nationalism arose during the second part of the eighteenth century. On the other hand, he states that the basis of primordialist views

rests on the assumption that ethnic groups and nations are integral parts of the human experience and natural units of history. This view emphasizes that ethnicity is the extension of kinship and kinship is instrumental in achieving collective aims in the struggle for survival. Moreover, according to this view, language, religion, race, ethnicity, and territory are the main principles organizing human groups that are seen as entities having the same aim throughout the history. Therefore, according to this view, there is nothing modern about nationalism (Smith, 2002, pp. 34 - 35). In this chapter, the modernist view is used in explaining Japan's transformation into a modern political unit.

A great many scholars who study Japanese diplomatic history have indicated that the emergence of modern Japan dates back to the Meiji Restoration in 1868.<sup>1</sup> Before the Meiji Restoration, Japan had been divided into various feudal clans. The cultural and territorial identity of Japan was projected only by the ruling elites, and the Japanese people did not yet perceive themselves as a nation (Hall, 1962). In the period before the restoration, Japan had a relatively stable social and political texture, reflecting its own cultural and administrative patterns. In this period, Japan was governed by the feudal lords, known as *Daimyo*, under the leadership of the Tokugawa Shogunate (1603–1868). In this societal and administrative system called *bakuhatsu-taisei*, the *baku* was the military administrative system, and the *han* were the feudal regions controlled by Daimyo. At the outset of the seventeenth century, the Tokugawa Shogunate began a regime isolating Japanese society from the outside world and exercising strict control over the country's economic and political relations. This isolation policy lasted until the mid-nineteenth century.

However, from 1868 on, a rapid modernization process, known as the Meiji Restoration, began. This process was aimed at complete restructuring of the nation's political, economic, and socio-educational institutions to centralize the national government and bring to an end the

feudalistic socio-political system. During this process, Japanese foreign policy began to be shaped.

In fact, the phenomenon of modernisation refers here to a process that brought about global integration based on supposed universal values, comprising material factors such as industrialisation and immaterial factors such as the evolution of a new social order built on industrialisation and Western ideas (Kreutzmann, 1998; Schwenitz, 1970; Blaney & Inayatullah, 2002; Rustow, 1968; Huntington, 1965; Huntington, 1966). Within this phenomenon, political and economic progress came to prominence. More specifically, the concept of political modernisation includes transformation of the political culture in response to changes in the social and physical environment. For example, Samuel Huntington (1965, pp. 386 -387) defines *political modernization* as a multifaceted process involving change in all areas of human thought and activity. According to him, writers on political development indicate the process of modernisation as being closely related to the phenomenon of increasing social political participation. Dean C. Tips (1973, p. 203), on the other hand, deals with the concept of political development by referring, in particular, to Benjamin Schwartz and stating that, although some modernisation is associated with industrialisation or economic development, others define it more broadly to emphasize man's increasing control over his natural and social environment. Thus, the process of political modernisation is a phenomenon that entails constant growth and increased complexity, like a living organism. As will be detailed below, Meiji Japan is a typical example of this process.

In Japan, the stance of the ruling elites toward the modernization process should be understood from this perspective, that is, leading the country to continual development, economically, politically, and militarily (Tojo, 2004, pp. 1 - 5). The main aim of the Meiji political elites was to allow Japan to reach the same status as the Western great powers. To

achieve this aim, it was necessary to break its strong bonds with China, to reorient its cultural and political priorities toward the Western world, and to borrow cultural and political patterns from them.<sup>2</sup> Thus, they abandoned the perception of China as “the middle kingdom” because the Chinese were seen as unable to defend themselves from the colonial powers, as in the case of the Opium Wars of 1839–1842.<sup>3</sup> During this period, catching up with the West while preserving the Asian identity became the guiding principle for the Japanese ruling elites. In particular, a sense of national identity began to form with the institutional and nationalistic policies implemented by the Meiji government (1862–1912) (Kosebalaban, 2008, p. 17). In the early periods of modernisation, the ideological basis of the Meiji government was a theocratic nationalism mixed with Shintoism.<sup>4</sup> In this context, the emperor began to be regarded as a symbol of national unity and a source of shared identity (Dubreil, 1998, p. 118).<sup>5</sup>

Modernisation for the Japanese was much more than a series of incremental adaptations of Western style institutions and technologies. It was, first of all, a struggle to overcome Japan’s Western-defined inferiority and to transform the Japanese society into a modern state. In particular, some Western institutions, including a capitalist market economy and the nation-state system, were considered a necessity for building “a rich nation and a strong army” (Iida, 2002, pp. 4 - 5). In the late nineteenth century, Japan’s accomplishments on the way to modernisation allowed the country to achieve a remarkable position in the international system.

Consequently, Japan colonized Taiwan Island by defeating China in 1895, and first annexed Korea by defeating Russia in 1905 and then colonizing it in 1910. The victory of Japan over Russia dramatically increased the trust of Japanese policy makers for its army and governing strategy. From that time on, Japan tried to establish a great empire in the region of East Asia, excluding the US and European powers, and considered

this exclusion necessary for the peace and stability of the world. In this context, conquering Manchuria was seen as a major milestone in realizing Japan's purposes. In fact, from the first years of the modernisation period to the end of World War II, market concerns related to the economic development were the primary driving force of Japan's expansionist and colonialist foreign policy. As also argued by R. L. Sims (1991), the dramatic transformation of Japan in the nation-state process could be possible only with the economic development of the country. Subsequently, this process gave Japan an understanding of determinants of foreign policy such as military and market concerns.

However, in spite of increasing militarist and expansionist policies, it should be noted that Japan's foreign and security policy discourse was also, in part, characterized by a pacifist approach. One of the leading figures defending the foreign policy based on the pacifist outlook in Japan was Shidehara Kijuro, who became foreign minister twice in the critical periods of 1924–1927 and 1929–1931 (Hata, 1988, pp. 285 - 290). Shidehara emphasized the economic dimension of foreign policy more than the militarist one because he wanted to improve relations with the US, a country with one third of Japan's total trade capacity. Additionally, pressures against China by Japan had created a negative effect on Japan's foreign policy objectives and increased nationalist sentiments in the country, so a more peaceful approach was preferred by the Japanese government in terms of the country's economic interests in the region (Togo, 2005, p. 18).

Another significant approach to foreign policy adopted by Shidehara was based on non-intervention in China's internal affairs. This policy was, in a sense, related to the domestic turbulence between the Communists and the Nationalists in China. However, Shidehara met strong opposition in Japan. In particular, opposition groups in the country forced him to abandon his policies concerning China, and finally, he had to resign

his post in 1927. After that, even though he became the foreign minister in 1929 and again followed a foreign-policy discourse based on a pacifist understanding, he could not effectively prevent Japan from pursuing aggressive and expansionist policies in East Asia.

Rising tension and political unrest in Japan noticeably caused militarist groups to direct their attention to political affairs at the end of the 1920s. A concrete example of this was the Manchurian Incident in 1931. In fact, because Japan wanted to improve its economic conditions but lacked natural resources, Manchuria represented an opportunity both as a market and as a source of such raw materials as coal and steel. This territory had always been seen as a vital factor in Japan's future. Japan's influence over Manchuria increased until it finally occupied it in 1931, thus taking it to war against China in 1937. These priorities in the agenda of Japanese foreign and security policy brought about Japan's involvement in World War II (Dower, 1999).

To catch up with the West and avoid becoming a colony of Western powers, Japan pursued a foreign policy aimed at influencing the region of East Asia and tried to become one of the great powers in the international community. However, it should be noticed that Japan did not have a foreign policy discourse of expansion outside its periphery as France and the US did. Instead, Japan's Asian identity was shaped within the framework of the definition of its interests in the region of East Asia (Kawashima, 2005, pp. 4 - 5).

To sum up, during the first half of the twentieth century, the only country to succeed on the path of industrialisation and modernisation, apart from the US and some Western European countries, was Japan. This industrial pattern, beginning with the efforts in 1868, was developed from a synthesis of the indigenous culture and the industrialised economy of the West. During this period, besides the political elites, the military elites also held a highly respected position. Moreover, from the 1930s to the end of

the Second World War, the military elites gained great influence in political decision making, and this control mechanism became, in a sense, the main determinant of the Japanese foreign and security policy discourse. Thus, those who took the country to war were largely the military elites (Kawashima, 2005, p. 10).

However, in post-war period, as will be detailed below, Japan played a very different role in the international system. In this sense, the following section examines the post-war developments of Japan in terms of its newly formed foreign and security policy agenda, which is basically embedded in an anti-militaristic outlook.

## **2.3 Section Two: The Post-war Period**

### **2.3.1 The Allied Occupation: Democratisation and Demilitarisation of Japan**

After the end of World War II, the US, signing the Charter of the UN in 1945, decided to abandon its traditional isolationist foreign policy, which was the basis of the country's military strategy and political vision toward the international community for more than a century.<sup>6</sup> In the post-war period, the Washington administration did not withdraw into its shell; conversely, it pursued a foreign policy that greatly emphasized its military superiority around the world as a "new" hegemonic power. Its main drive, in this sense, was based on "the question of how should be filled the great political vacuums created by the removal of the hegemonies recently exercised by Germany and Japan over large and important areas of the Northern Hemisphere" (Kennan, 1972, p. 210).

However, that Japan had been defeated in the Pacific War had a substantial effect on the main parameters of its foreign and security

policies. Considering the general picture of the post-war period, it is possible to define Japan's role in the international system as a product of the political order imposed on it by the victors, led by the US, and of pragmatic policies of post-war Japanese political elites. In fact, the pragmatic acceptance of the impositions by the Japanese policy makers led the country to a condition of passivity in international politics. This passivity is generally interpreted by Kenneth B. Pyle as a result of wartime trauma, the unconditional surrender, the refusal of nuclear weapons, and the restraints imposed by the 1947 Constitution (Pyle, 1992, p. 20). All these factors contributed to the shaping of Japan's post-war international role.

The allied occupation of Japan, led by the US, started officially shortly after the Pacific War ended. During the occupation period, Japan lost its foreign and security policy capability entirely. Further, the Japanese society lacked the power or will to resist the coercive policies imposed on them by the occupation authority. In fact, this post-war trauma of the Japanese society was a result of the country's increasing economic and political turmoil as well as the policies of the occupation authority. Being totally demoralized, the Japanese people had no energy to oppose and interrupt the social norms and values established by the Allied forces.

On the other hand, the Japanese military forces lost their credibility because the policies they had followed had taken the country into the failed war. The surrender of Japan, in actual sense, pointed to the disappearance of expansionist policies defended by the militarist authority in Japan during the pre-war period. Suffering a crushing defeat meant the dissolution of military forces and most of the militaristic values (Eiji, 1983, pp. 358 - 359). In fact, a clear majority of the Japanese people started to interpret the Allied occupation not as a crisis but rather as a price to be paid for their military expansion during the war. Many also believed that

the nation was starting afresh and that their country would be a member of the international community again (Gao, 1998, p. 229).

After the dramatic reality of war, many Japanese believed that Japan should pursue peace-loving policies for the future. In this context, Japan slowly internalised the idea of pacifism into its national identity, then imposed it on the main values of the state. In other words, the term *pacifism* became a greater part of Japan's character, both at the national and the state levels, and began to represent the posture of the Japanese people, who refused to accept any possible movement towards the revival of militarism in their country (Takao, 2007, p. 19). Chihiro Hosoya (1974, p. 366) stresses this phenomenon:

Since the war, changes have of course taken place in the system of Japanese foreign policy decision making. Foremost among these changes has been the departure of the military, which had been so much of the Japanese political process of the thirties, as a major force in the determination of foreign policy.

With this aim, some universal values advocated by the occupation forces—such as equality, peace, freedom, and respect for human beings—began to dominate the political discourse in Japan and even became guiding concepts for the foreign and security policy agenda of the country during the post-war period.<sup>7</sup> At this point, it was maintained that, since the Meiji Restoration, the interests of society and individuals had been overshadowed by the idea of the national interest. With post-war democratic reforms, the state's control over civilian life decreased, and the interests of society and individuals became foremost. In particular, during this period, a new constitution was announced as a result of a number of meetings between Tokyo and occupation forces led by General Douglas McArthur as the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers in Japan. One of the most prominent features of the new constitution was Article 9, which stated the renunciation of war as a means of settling international disputes:

Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes.

In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained, the right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.

This article of the Constitution became one of the major factors shaping Japan's post-war foreign and security policy discourse.

### **2.3.2 The Reinterpretation of the Post-war World in Japan: Early Narratives and Memory**

At the end of the 1940s, increasing Cold War tension in Asia and the Pacific region brought about a change in the US foreign policy toward Japan's future. Among the main causes triggering this change in the policy of the US were the occupation of the Korean Peninsula and the breaking out of a civil war in mainland China. As a consequence, while still under occupation, Japan was given crucial importance within the US Cold War strategy for the region of East Asia because of its strategic location and potential role, thus turning it into a key ally of the US (Miyashita, 2002, p. 146).

The question is how the Japanese political elites could respond to this rapidly changing environment and the expectations of the US. The Cold War made Japan strategically important; however, an early engagement in Cold War politics would construct an image of Japan as a rapidly remilitarizing country and defer its necessary economic rehabilitation and the social recovery of the Japanese people. Nevertheless, the political authority in Japan thought that, in an environment characterized by rising tension militarily, it was necessary to guarantee the country's national security and to revitalize its foreign policy capability. In terms of balancing

the relationship between trust and risk, this period during the early Cold War can be seen as one of increasing risks and low trust, causing an unstable environment in the region of East Asia. At that time, trust among newly independent states in the region was at its lowest level while the occupation of the Korean Peninsula and the civil war on the Chinese main continent were also jeopardizing stability.

In the early years of the Cold War, the conservatives in Japan were divided over the post-war internal and external policies of the country. As stated above, during the occupation period, the Japanese policy makers were largely concerned with guaranteeing Japan's national security to protect the country from external attacks under the pacifist Constitution of 1947. The proposal put forward by Ashida Hitoshi, who became Foreign and Prime Minister for a short time, is of crucial importance in this context because it is the first Japanese official request for an American guarantee concerning the national security of Japan during the post-war period. According to him, one of the best ways to guarantee Japan's security was to enter into an agreement with the US, which would act as a security guarantor, and to strengthen domestic security forces. In fact, he considered the right of self-defence of a country to be entirely natural, even if the country had renounced all means of war. Furthermore, the proposal put forth by Ashida stipulated that there should be a limitation on the stationing of the US forces in Japanese territory (Makiko, 2008, pp. 54 - 67). Nevertheless, although he was an important figure in the post-war political landscape of Japan, his short time in government and, more importantly, the international security environment of the post-war period made him less effective in implementing his ideas.<sup>8</sup>

Yoshida Shigeru, succeeding Ashida Hitoshi, did not want to deviate from the basic notion of building an alliance relationship with the US to regain the country's economic independence and welfare. His pragmatic strategy was built on three major points: (1) Japan's economic

rehabilitation should be the prime national goal. Political and economic cooperation with the US was necessary for this purpose. (2) Japan should remain lightly armed and avoid involvement in international political-strategic issues. (3) To gain a long-term guarantee for its own security, Japan should provide military bases for the US Army, Navy, and Air Force. Moreover, right after the end of World War II, because of a severe shortage of materials and skyrocketing inflation, economic survival had become the main priority. The state continued to direct the allocation of resources at the macro-level. At the same time, the whole nation was asked to endure this hardship together. (Soeya, 2008, pp. 6 - 8) The focus of state policy shifted dramatically from *how to confront other countries militarily* to *how to survive economically as a nation* when Japan was isolated from the international market. One of the most striking consequences of nationalism in this period was a strong ambition by the Japanese people to complete post-war reconstruction with their own means (Gao, 1998, p. 229).

Yoshida Shigeru was a major figure in forming the post-war national purpose of Japan by implementing economic rehabilitation and balancing the remilitarization in the country. According to him, history would provide patterns for achieving victory by diplomacy after losing in war. The Cold War situation presented such a chance for progress and advancement for Japan (Pyle, 1992, p. 21).

Nonetheless, hoping to 'reconsider and modify' the peace Constitution of 1947 and to 'rearm' to gain an independent military capability, Hatoyama Ichiro, who became the Prime Minister during the critical period for Japan of 1954–1956, and his Japan Liberal Party strongly opposed the ideas of Yoshida Shigeru. Bai Gao (1998, p. 231) explains the domestic situation in Japan as follows:

In the 1950s, the Japanese were puzzled by the competing interests of a nation torn between an economic agenda, which emphasized economic reconstruction

and a political agenda, which focused on political independence and national pride. The nation was not only divided between conservatives and progressives, but even within the conservative camp political leaders held different perceptions of national interest and policy agendas. Although Prime Minister Shigeru had set the orthodox version of economic nationalism for Japan, it was strongly challenged by two different versions of political nationalism: progressive political nationalism, which advocated a complete neutralization of Japan's position in the cold war situation in order to avoid the dangers of being involved in military confrontation between two blocs, and of becoming a colony of the United States, and conservative political nationalism, which asserted the need for revision of the constitution and full scale rearmament as well as more political independence from the United States in international affairs.

After becoming Prime Minister in 1954, Hatoyama Ichiro tried to recentralize national authority over education and domestic security similar to the pre-war period. However, the conservatives led by Hatoyama could not gain two thirds of the National Diet's members' approval, which is constitutionally required to modify the constitution.<sup>9</sup>

Nevertheless, the basic principles of Yoshida Shigeru became significant in Japan's post-war foreign policy and security culture. Yoshida's pragmatist approach to foreign and security policy had the potential to shake Japan's sense of self for the sake of the more practical aim of economic reconstruction. As argued by Kenneth B. Pyle (2008, p. 240), Yoshida's strategic outlook was initially focused on the timeframe necessary to achieve economic recovery. Nevertheless, this practical approach was adopted and generally embodied in a doctrine by political ruling elites succeeding him.

During this period, within the framework of the US strategic objectives toward the region of East Asia in general and Japan in particular, the US-Japan Security Treaty was signed on September 8, 1951, coming into force simultaneously with the San Francisco Peace Treaty. Thus, the security treaty became the most significant instrument for showing the posture and self-identity of Japan toward the international community, and Japan strengthened its ties with the US and the Western world. In this

sense, it can be argued that the security alliance with the US was a product of carefully constructed and brilliantly implemented foreign policy.

On the other hand, Japan gradually began to establish its own military forces under the name of *Self-Defense Forces*. First, in 1950 the National Police Reserve, consisting of 75.000 men equipped with light weapons, had been established to maintain domestic security. In 1952, after regaining its independence, Japan revised this organization as the National Safety Force, which was expanded to 110.000 men. Finally, in 1954, the Japanese Self-Defense Force was formed for “purely defensive purposes”.

### **2.3.3 From the 1960s to the 1970s: Managing Strategic Dependency on the US**

In 1960, the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the US was signed in Washington.<sup>10</sup> This treaty, together with the security treaty of 1952, constituted an important step in Japanese foreign and security policy discourse. In this context, it was accepted that the military troops of the US would be deployed on the Japanese territories and would protect the Japanese nation against possible threats.

In fact, the peace treaty between Japan and the US and the ensuing events, referred to as *The System of San Francisco* in the article by the same name by Kent Kalder (2004, pp. 136 - 137), essentially represented the political and economic posture of the two countries. Moreover, some actors in the international system started to form groups for the common purpose of maintaining regional and national security, developments that will be detailed in further chapters. This purpose, in a sense, guaranteed the national security of newly independent and weaker states in the region against a possible revival of the Japanese militarism.<sup>11</sup>

Security treaties also made Japan dependent on US policies in terms of security and economic issues.<sup>12</sup> Some argued that this dependency on the US opened the way to criticisms and attacks on the lack of autonomy and independence of Japan (Soeya, 2008). On the other hand, some scholars, like Akitoshi Miyashita, argue that the alliance with the US proved to be beneficial for Japan from at least two perspectives. First, it provided Japan with necessary military protection. Japan had been demilitarized by the occupation forces and had only the national police reserve of 75.000 men when it regained its independence in 1952. The continued presence of American forces in Japan served, first of all, to fill this critical vacuum created by the new Constitution. In addition, this American military protection allowed post-war Japan to stay lightly armed while putting strong efforts and resources into economic recovery. Second, the alliance with the US provided Japan with access to American markets, technology, and foreign aid. These economic opportunities were used to keep Japan from becoming neutral or aligning itself with the communist camp. However, it should be noted that, while alliance relations with the US were helping Japan's economic recovery, this situation was also limiting Japan's post-war foreign policy capability by depriving it of diplomatic freedom. Political ruling elites in Japan were forced to behave in line with the strategy of the US. An example of this constraint can be found in Japan's relations with communist countries. As also detailed in chapter five, Japan was able to start its official diplomatic relations with the Chinese main continent in the 1970s. Because, at that time, the only legitimate country representing the Chinese to the US was Taiwan, Japan's relations with mainland China were also limited. Japan established diplomatic ties with Communist China only after US President Richard Nixon paid a diplomatic visit to the country in 1972.

Another significant example showing the degree of dependency of the Japanese policy makers on the US foreign and security policy issues comes from the region of the Middle East. In spite of all the measures taken

by the Japanese government,<sup>13</sup> the second oil crisis in 1979 not only negatively affected the Japanese economy but also brought about tensions that affected Japan's security alliance with the US. In fact, 15% of Japanese oil imports came from Iran. After the Islamic revolution of 1979 in Iran, a number of events took place, including the breakdown of diplomatic relations between Iran and Israel and the occupation of the Washington embassy in Tehran by Iranian students. Following these events, Washington put an embargo on Iranian oil and wanted Japan to join this sanction against Iran. The Japanese government, in a quandary over whether to choose economic dependence on the Middle East or military dependence on the US, finally decided to follow the policy of Washington (Togo, 2005, p. 302).<sup>14</sup>

As a consequence of re-entry to the world stage in the 1950s, the Japanese economy had depended on such valued resources as petroleum, gas, and coal. In this context, the region of the Middle East had always been on the agenda of the Japanese policy makers. To illustrate, the first oil shock triggered by the Arab–Israeli War of 1973 had a negative effect on Japanese industry, which had gradually come to depend on Middle Eastern oil (Naramoto, 1991, pp. 79 - 88). Because most of the world's crude oil reserves are located in the region of the Middle East, the region has been the key element in global oil trade for decades. Oil reserves have also been the pivotal economic tool for rentier states, which tried to use them to gather support against Israeli and the US policies in relation to the Middle East. The economic sanctions arising from the Arab–Israeli War of 1973, consisting of the embargo of oil shipments to the US and the Netherlands, are an example of this.<sup>15</sup> The embargo and production cutbacks by Arab states had some political motives, such as altering the Israeli policy to return territories captured in the 1967 War, granting the legitimate rights of the Palestinians, and changing the status of Jerusalem. At that time, the US was the only country to have a decisive influence on Israeli policy concerning these issues. Hence, Japan, as a strategic ally of Washington,

was also targeted because of its ability to influence US and Israeli policies (Licklieder, 1988, p. 214). Thus, two of the most significant oil exporting countries—Saudi Arabia and Kuwait—declared Japan a non-friendly country and demanded it (1) break diplomatic relations and economic ties with Israel, (2) provide military assistance to the Arabs, and (3) pressure the US to alter its policy on the Arab–Israeli dispute (Licklieder, 1988, p. 214). On November 22, 1973, as the largest single national oil importer in the world at that time, Japan issued a statement declaring that Israel should withdraw from all of the 1967 territories. (Yorke, 1981, pp. 434 - 435).

Subsequently, on December 25, 1973, Arab states declared Japan a “friendly” country again. Nevertheless, Japanese political authorities did not break diplomatic and economic relations with Israel because of growing global economy phenomena. More importantly, Japan did not supply weapons to Arab countries because, not only did its security alliance with the US not permit doing so, but also Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution of 1947 affirmed the renunciation of war as a means of settling international disputes.<sup>16</sup> Accordingly, the Japanese Self-Defense Forces were constitutionally forbidden to engage in conflicts in any area of the world (Shibata, 2003, pp. 210 - 212).

Japan’s foreign policy concerning the Middle East caused Japanese political elites to depend on the developments of this region.<sup>17</sup> Japan’s mediator role in the region of the Middle East in the 1970s and 1980s has raised a critical question for many scholars who study world politics. The main problem has been whether Japan will pursue power politics to protect its national interests. In this context, Yasusada Yawata argues that the Japanese model emerging during the post-war era avoided any conflict that could have a detrimental effect on its economic position throughout the Cold War (Yawata, 1999, p. 222). In this model, which was the backbone of the US–Japan alliance, the ninth article of the Japanese

Constitution of 1947 has played a key role in that it proclaims the renunciation of war as a sovereign right of the nation and abolishes land, sea, and air forces, as well as other possible means of waging war. Therefore, the consecutive Japanese governments adopted a low-profile stance in their foreign policy discourses both to pursue economic achievement and to eliminate the pre-war militarist image of Japan in the eyes of neighbouring countries.<sup>18</sup>

Between the years from the 1950s to the 1970s, Japanese industrial policy had a nationalist character but not a military focus. Even though some parts of the business world and some politicians asked for rearmament, nationalism was largely seen as a way to foster economic growth, thus increasing national security but not as a step towards military expansion (Gao, 1998, p. 230). In other words, after believing they had succeeded in regaining their economic independence, the Japanese people began to believe that the best way to keep Japan away from its militarist heritage would be to maintain the country's economic prosperity and political stability. This idea is also clearly seen in Prime Minister Hayato Ikeda's discourse: "I will never revise the constitution during my term of office" (Takao, 2007). In this context, Japanese ruling elites tried to interpret the role of the Self-Defense Forces and the troops of the US stationed in Japan in a way that the Japanese people could accept them within the legal framework of the constitution. (Takao, 2007, p. 23).<sup>19</sup>

In the 1960s, in parallel with its economic rehabilitation, Japan tried to increase its efforts toward obtaining a powerful position in the international arena. Within this process, starting with the membership of the UN in 1956, the Japanese policy makers attached special importance to actively attending international political forums as well as economic and social ones. In 1964, for example, Japan was admitted to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. This development clearly indicated that Japan's increasing economic power was beginning to be

accepted by the international community (Drifte, 1991, p. 112). On the other hand, economic growth maintained Japan's domestic political stability and its international competitiveness in the industrial area. In fact, consistently ruling the country throughout the Cold War allowed the Liberal Democratic Party as a whole to concentrate on economic growth and to institutionalize some crucial concepts such as democracy and the rule of law.<sup>20</sup>

#### **2.3.4 From the 1970s to the 1990s: Towards More Independent Regional Role**

Concerning these preceding facts, it is evident that a multitude of factors contributed to shaping Japan's new posture and identity in world politics. Within this complex framework, the Japanese policy makers tried to construct the meaning of this period for themselves, thus opening the way to a change in Japanese state identity. Examining these events from the perspective of ontological security, these new arrangements, such as the peace-based Constitution of 1947 and the security agreements with the US, contributed to creating a 'basic trust mechanism' and routinising relations between the US and Japan, thus beginning to provide a more stable cognitive and physical environment in the region of East Asia, at least as far as Japan is concerned. This stability, in turn, reduced the risk of the rapid emergence of a conflict involving Japan.

Briefly stated, the dramatic defeat in World War II and the ensuing events forced Japan to build a new self-image at the domestic, regional, and global levels. This new state identity and posture toward the international society rested on two main pillars: anti-militarism and a strong focus on economy.<sup>21</sup> In fact, Japan aimed at reassuming a major role in world affairs by revitalizing its economy. Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru strongly emphasized that a defeated nation could reconstruct itself and become a

part of the peace. Thus, the national purpose of Japan, according to Shigeru, would be to contribute to the development of a peaceful environment and to abstain from becoming involved in any armed conflict (Pyle, 2008, p. 227). These anti-militaristic sentiments were later translated into various restraining measures, such as the three non-nuclear principles indicating that Japan would not possess, manufacture, or permit the introduction of nuclear weapons on its territory and the prohibition on participating in collective defence activities (Miyashita, 2006, p. 107). In addition, after the 1970s, despite having become one of the leading global market economies, Japan continued to abstain from policies that could negatively affect the country's growth and to pursue a foreign policy aimed at protecting its economic interests and emphasizing its anti-militarist posture.

However, the credibility of any self-image depends on the creation of a boundary between self and other. Creating this boundary is an active and on-going part of identity formation (Neumann, 1996, p. 167). As will be detailed in chapter five, the US was, doubtlessly, a 'significant other' for Japan, one that served as an important counterpart in its state identity-building process.<sup>22</sup> However, East Asian countries' perceptions of Japan were also crucial to the credibility of Japan's self-image. The question arises as to how East Asian countries perceived and responded to this new self-image of Japan. By concentrating on its economic rehabilitation, Japan brought forth a stable cognitive environment and fostered a feeling of security among states in the region. Its newly constructed anti-militaristic state identity, to some extent, led neighbouring countries gradually to change their perceptions of Japan as a threat to their own identities and security. Furthermore, after regaining its economic capacity, Japan tried to establish a basic trust mechanism by providing Official Development Assistance (ODA) to neighbouring states in the region. Thus, Japan's ODA policy supported the achievement of several foreign policy objectives while being a confidence-building measure, a solution for bilateral

problems, a demonstration of economic power and global leadership, and a way to acquire power and influence in different international organizations (Trinidad, 2007, p. 96).

In addition to its ODA program, in particular from the 1970s on, Japan extended its trade relations and foreign investments to other countries in the region of East Asia. One of the crucial reasons behind Japan's seeking to extend its economic relations and interests is that it is an island country with easy access to other countries with ports (Kosaka, 1977, p. 210). This increase in Japan's trade relations with the countries located in East Asia has generally been considered from the perspective of regionalism by scholars of Asia and the Pacific region. For instance, in 1993, Peter Katzenstein and Martin Rouse (1993, p. 193) stated that the future role of Japan would be strongly affected by political regionalism in Asia and that this kind of regionalism would supplement the US–Japan relationship.

To position itself as a regional economic power, Japan first established a basic consensus between the state and the market, politicians and bureaucrats, and social movements and political organizations in its domestic affairs. This consensus gave the Japanese political system an optimum atmosphere in which to exert its power in external affairs. Post-war Japan always kept its flexibility on foreign-policy formulations on a wide scale, especially as regards its approach to other countries. As Katzenstein and Rouse (1993, p. 194) write:

Japan's vulnerabilities in importing food and raw materials give rise neither to an urge for autarchy nor to a master plan for the world. Japanese policy elites believe firmly that Japan's inherent vulnerabilities can be mitigated through clever maneuvers in markets that cannot be avoided. Thus what matters to the Japanese is the construction of vulnerabilities for other countries in areas of Japanese strength, such as manufacturing and technology.

Consequently, especially after the signing of the 1985 Plaza Accord, Japanese investments in ASEAN nations (the Association of Southeast

Asian Nations) in areas such as technology and electronics grew significantly.<sup>23</sup> In fact, Japan's economic engagement in the region, starting from the early years of the post-war period, began to rise in the 1980s, and Japan gradually increased its influence on these countries (Katzenstein & Rouse, 1993, p. 195).

However, the Asian regionalism implemented by Japan departed from imperialistic policies it had tried to implement in the 1930s and early 1940s. The two most significant departure points, according to Katzenstein and Rouse (1993, p. 214), are the following: (1) the difference between autarchy and direct rule and (2) interdependence and influence over the other.<sup>24</sup> However, as detailed in following chapters, the increase in the degree of economic relationships of ASEAN countries with Japan, which is the basis of Japan's strategy towards East Asia (Morimoto, 2008, p. 26), — that is, the growing intensity of regional economic relations led by Japan— has created a certain anxiety about whether this growing influence and power of Japan in East Asian countries could bring forth any undesirable political consequence, which could make those countries totally dependent on Japan (Katzenstein & Rouse, 1993, p. 213).

From the standpoint of the Japanese policy makers, Japan tried to build a basic trust mechanism at the regional level to guarantee stability, both in terms of foreign relations and its ontological security. To this end, economic aids, as well as economic and technological investments, were conceived as a way to improve and routinise relations with neighbouring countries. By doing so, Japan managed to reconstruct a different and coherent self-image and to project it both inside and outside its borders. In fact, the Japanese policy makers aimed at compensating for military weakness with economic power to enlarge the country's field of responsibility. In this sense, by increasing the degree of influence on neighbouring countries, Japan systematically tried to project, to some

extent, a kind of great regional power image to the international community.

Nevertheless, assuming the role of a great power, even only at the regional level, implies a number of constraints and risks. In fact, the alliance with the US and refraining from sharing the security burden at the regional level gave Japan relative security, both ontologically and physically, but it was bound to limit Japan's aspirations once the country had rebuilt a solid economy. In reality, Japan could legitimately aspire to take on a more active role in the region of East Asia, given the comparative magnitude of its economic capabilities. In this sense, it could, at least in part, revive its pre-war regional strength. However, doing so would mean taking considerable responsibility within its area of influence. Such responsibility would, in turn, increase its level of anxiety, thus having the potential to jeopardize Japan's newly constructed state identity.

In fact, in terms of ontological security, a higher degree of material and reflexive capabilities corresponds to a lower degree of freedom. As mentioned above, great powers like the US in the twentieth century and United Kingdom in the nineteenth century are expected to engage actively in the international system to solve existing problems or to prevent potential ones. However, their vast material capabilities allowed for a large number of choices, each possibly implying unwanted results or side effects. Thus, a great power needs high reflexive capabilities to discern, evaluate, and choose among available options. This responsibility comes at a high price in terms of ontological security because of the anxiety generated by such a heavy responsibility. On the contrary, choosing to remain a less powerful state in terms of material capabilities means being able to exert only a limited influence on other actors and not being expected to make a decisive contribution to solving major problems in military terms. Such a limited possibility of action contributes to fostering ontological security because it reduces anxiety and potential threats to state identity. From this

point of view, a state possessing fewer material capabilities can be said to enjoy a higher level of freedom. In the early post-war period, by not sharing the security burden and giving precedence to economic growth, Japan plausibly enjoyed a high degree of freedom and a low degree of material capabilities. From the 1970s on, instead, the accelerating pace of its economic involvement at the regional level and the assumption of more responsibilities entailed a limitation of its freedom in this sense.

## **2.4 Concluding Remarks**

Throughout the Cold War, the region of East Asia was one of the most turbulent areas, characterized by sudden changes and conflicts. Generally speaking, the aim of Japan was to reduce the intensity of existing security threats in East Asia. To this end, it chose to keep a relatively moderate military capability and a strong relation with the US (Kawasaki, 2001). On the assumption that taking extra security measures would increase risk in the region and bring a serious financial burden on Japan, the alliance with the US can be said to have had a deterrent effect in that it kept the probability of a military campaign against Japan at a relatively low level. At the same time, it presumably boosted trust and stability in Japan's relations with its neighbouring countries because they were assured that Japan's potential military power would be limited within the framework of alliance relations. On the contrary, it is generally argued that, had Japan chosen to heavily remilitarize and project a militarist image and identity, an arms race could have ensued, resulting in a huge financial burden on Japan (Kawasaki, 2001). This situation could then both reduce the pace of economic development and create a state of ontological insecurity. Indeed, a sudden remilitarization would cause a lack of coherence within the newly constructed Japanese state identity.

All the same, although Japan maintained an anti-militarist state image, a closer look at actual data relating to Japan's military spending, in particular from the 1970s on, gives a different perspective that highlights a quandary between identity and reality. Despite having a defensive posture toward the international community, Japan, in fact, does not appear to be a small power in military terms. In fact, it was able to convert itself into a sophisticated military power. J. Lind strongly argues that analysts undervalue Japanese conventional military capability because they are misled by taking into account only "defense spending as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP)" (Lind, 2004, pp. 93 - 95). That about one percent from Japan's GDP is allotted to its military spending apparently shows that Japan is a small-sized military power. Nevertheless, if a state with a huge economy allocates one percent of its GDP for defense spending, it indicates the state has a high-level military capability. On the contrary, countries having relatively small economies with huge military spending as a percentage of their GDPs give the impression of having high military capability, although their actual spending may be rather limited. In 1987, Japan ranked sixth in terms of actual military spending after the Soviet Union, the US, France, the Federal Republic of Germany and Great Britain. Thus, it is evident that the level of GDP allotted to military spending tells only part of the story.

**Table 2: Japanese Defense-Related Expenditures, 1955-1990 (Unit: 100 million)**Source: Christopher W. Hughes, *Japan's Remilitarization*, Routledge, 2009, p. 150.

<i>Fiscal Year</i>	<i>GNP/GDP (original forecast)</i>	<i>Defense-related Expenditures</i>	<i>Ratio of Defense-related expenditures to annual expenditures on General Account</i>	<i>Defense Expenditures in \$ US</i>
<b>1955</b>	75,590	1,349	1,78	<b>N/A</b>
<b>1965</b>	281,600	3,014	1,07	<b>N/A</b>
<b>1975</b>	1,585,000	13,273	0,84	<b>4,484</b>
<b>1985</b>	3,146,000	31,381	0,997	<b>14,189</b>
<b>1986</b>	3,367,000	33,435	0,993	<b>20,930</b>
<b>1987</b>	3,504,000	35,174	1,004	<b>25,420</b>
<b>1988</b>	3,652,000	37,003	1,013	<b>28,850</b>
<b>1989</b>	3,987,000	39,198	1,006	<b>30,090</b>
<b>1990</b>	<b>4,172,000</b>	<b>41,593</b>	<b>0,997</b>	<b>28,122</b>

This evidence indicates that identity is not necessarily a perfect reflection of reality; state-identity building is a process developing within discourse and reflecting itself in biographical narrative. In other words, as individuals adopt different behaviours towards social and material environments to maintain a solid ground for their identity, states also try to maintain a reliable environment through their foreign and security policy discourses. To illustrate, ministries of states related to foreign affairs play a leading role in identity building by presenting a specific narration connecting a policy with a description of state's self-identity. The aim of foreign and security policy discourse here is to constitute a stable connection between representations of identity and the proposed policy. In particular, in the case of Japan, the state-identity building process is marked by major breaking points, by traumatic events that compelled state elites to pursue pragmatic policies and to reshape state identity accordingly.<sup>25</sup> Within this framework, the language used by policy makers

to construct the meaning of events plays a crucial role. At the same time, the discourses elaborated by other states can strategically build up the situation to exert a pressure and compel a state to make certain decisions. For example, after imposing disarmament and offering a security umbrella in the early post-war years, the US gradually pushed Japan toward taking responsibility for its own security and, hence, remilitarizing. In particular, the Nixon Doctrine as a discourse developed at the end of the 1960s, urging Japan to share the security burden, caused the emergence of a contrast between Japanese non-militarist state identity and pressures coming from the international reality (Litwak, 1986, p. 134). Such pressures were particularly relevant as they came from a strategic ally and 'significant other'.<sup>26</sup>

As a result, although continuing to preserve an anti-militarist self-image, from the 1970s, Japan actively sought to expand its military capability again in positive terms. Doing so resulted not only in adopting the National Defense Program Outline and the creation of the US–Japan Defense Cooperation Subcommittee in 1976 but also in drafting the Guidelines for US–Japan Defense Cooperation in 1978. In fact, in parallel with its rapid economic growth, Japan increased its military spending from \$4.4 billion to \$14 billion between 1975 and 1985. This increase was possible despite the one percent GDP upper limit on military spending established by Prime Minister Takeo Miki in 1976 (Moses & Iwami, 2009, p. 75).

To sum up, Yasuo Takao argues that 'pacifism' in the Japanese identity has been a dynamic concept oscillating between retroactive and proactive pacifism. To illustrate, in the early 1960s, the meaning of pacifism for the Japanese people became depoliticized and equivalent to popular prosperity. However, during the 1990s, we meet a different picture of Japan because of a multitude of problems in the world economy affecting the degree of prosperity of the Japanese people and the changing

perception of threats to their national security. As also will be detailed in the following chapters, at that time, the Japanese ruling elites also looked beyond their borders for more recognition from the outside world. To attain this recognition, most of the Japanese people considered a change or revision of Article 9 of the Constitution of 1947 necessary so that Japan could pursue a proactive pacifism. This proactive pacifism means, in the words of Takao, acting in advance to deal with unexpected difficulties and anxieties in the international system. This pacifist understanding based on pro-activism was related to changes in people's state of mind. Various surveys conducted by the Japanese media clearly showed a shift from the existing norms of national security toward a greater emphasis on the significance of Japan's contribution to world peace as a result of the changing structural factors in the international system.<sup>27</sup>

On the other hand, Masahara Matsumura (2008, p. 12) also defines the role of Japan in world politics during the Cold War as a civilian power. In reality, throughout the Cold War period, building a state identity in Japan projected itself as a middle regional power, neither as a great military power nor as a neutral power. Japan realized this basic objective by pursuing not only political strategies—including a limited military role in the international system and a security alliance strategy with the US—but also economic nationalism aimed at post-war rehabilitation throughout the Cold War. Japan's incorporation into the American alliance system, in a sense, created this opportunity for the Japanese ruling elites. At the same time, this role prevented a negative spiralling arms race among countries in the region of East Asia, which could have originated from Japan's possible rearmament.

Thus, in terms of the Japanese foreign and security policies from the perspective of East Asia, the concept of ontological security can be used to explain some aspects of Japanese foreign and security policy toward this region. Japan systematically increased its influence capacity on the region,

especially by using economic means and emphasizing its anti-militaristic posture. This posture allowed it to build up a new self-image after the end of the Second World War and to improve its relations with East Asian nations. However, the sharp growth of Japan's influence and power in this area has brought forth some worries about its political consequences.

In the period taken into account in this chapter, Japan seems to have been able to make rational decisions and to learn from the past, thus transforming its identity and behaviours to adapt to a rapidly changing environment. It was able to modify its biographical narrative and routines and to reshape its relations with both the US and East Asian countries according to the new post-war international order in a relatively short time. In this sense, Japan seemed to present the peculiar characteristics of a state with a relatively basic level of trust during the Cold War period. This departure point composes the subject matter for analysing and understanding Japan's human security approach and its cooperative initiatives at the regional context, which will be detailed in next chapters.

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<sup>1</sup> Some of these articles and books in English are as follows: Kazuhiko Okuda, 'Transnationalism and the Meiji State: On the Questioning of Cultural Borrowing', *Bulletin of the Royal Institute for Inter – Faith Studies*, Volume 3, Number 2, 2001, pp. 25-39; M. William Steele, 'Modernization and Post – Modernization in Japan's 20<sup>th</sup> Century', *Asian Cultural Studies*, Special Issue, Number 6, 1995, pp. 55-63; W. Scott Morton and J. Kenneth Olenik, *Japan: Its Culture and History*, Fourth Edition, New York: McGraw – Hill Publishing, 2005; Conrad Totman, *A History of Japan*, Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2000; W. G. Beasley, *The Japanese Experience: A Short History of Japan*, Berkeley, Los Angeles and California: University of California Press, 1999; Andrew Gordon, *A Modern History of Japan: From Tokugawa Times to the Present*, Second Edition, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008; E. Herbert Norman, *Japan's Emergence as a Modern State, Political and Economic Problems of the Meiji Period*, 60<sup>th</sup> Anniversary Edition, Lawrence T. Woods (ed.), Vancouver and Toronto: UBC Press, 2000.

<sup>2</sup> After the journey of the Iwakura Mission (1871-73), sent abroad by the Meiji government instantly after the Meiji Restoration in order to evaluate the possibilities for a massive cultural borrowing, the Meiji ruling elites started to implement the task of building a state, drafting a constitution, establishing a national education system and rapidly industrializing and militarizing the country. See, Kazuhiko Okuda, 'Transnationalism and the Meiji State: On the Questioning of Cultural Borrowing'.

<sup>3</sup> Since the early years of bilateral relations between Japan and China, a number of institutional and political materials and ideas were transferred from the mainland China to the Japanese archipelago. More concretely, the interaction with China contributed to the formation of cultural, religious and political identities in Japan. For instance, the administration laws during the early years of Tang Dynasty had produced a great prosperity and a functioning administrative system in China. The Japanese experts sent to China with the aim of learning about these innovations found a modern country ruled by a powerful emperor. As a consequence, the Japanese political elite implemented the Taika Reforms (taika no kaishin) in order to import this Chinese system in Japan and to strengthen the unity of the country. See, Wolfram Eberhard, *Uzakdoğu Tarihi*, Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 1986, pp. 37 – 38.

<sup>4</sup> Shintoism is the indigenous religion of Japan, meaning 'the way of the Gods'. For more details, see A. C. Underwood, *Shintoism: the Indigenous Religion of Japan*, Pomona Press, 2008, p. 14.

<sup>5</sup> Since the beginning of the Meiji Restoration, no movement aiming at jeopardizing the unity of the country and inspired by nationalistic sentiments could emerge. In fact, the ethnic minorities living in Japan such as the Ainu in Hokkaido and the Okinawans in the Ryukyu Archipelago were too small to set up an effective nationalistic movement. See, Keiichi Takeuchi, 'Nationalism and Geography in Modern Japan, 1880s to 1920s', *Geography and National Identity*, David Hooson (ed.), The Institute of British Geographers, 1994, p. 105.

<sup>6</sup> The isolationist foreign policy of the United States, based on the question of how it should act toward the European nations, dates back to the early years of the nineteenth century. It is called Monroe Doctrine, originated with the US President James Monroe. For more information, see George Fox Tucker, *The Monroe Doctrine: A*

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*Concise History of Its Origin and Growth*, Lightning Source UK Ltd., 2012, Michael Burgan, *The Monroe Doctrine*, We the People Pub., 2007.

<sup>7</sup> Soon after the acceptance of the new constitution in 1946, the term 'pacifism' embodied in policies of Japan as an antimilitaristic value was firstly used by the Japanese government for maintaining the domestic stability of the country. The main aim was to strengthen the antimilitaristic values in domestic institutions through democratic means in order to maintain the stability and prosperity. See, Yasuo Takao, *Reinventing Japan: From Merchant Nation to Civic Nation*, New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2007, p. 20

<sup>8</sup> Hitoshi Ashida was forty-seventh Japanese Prime Minister and Foreign Minister from March 10, 1948 to October 15, 1948.

<sup>9</sup> At this point, Takao strongly states that the threat perceptions of the Japanese people toward their national security have directly shaped the discussion of whether the constitution should be revised or not. See, Yasuo Takao, *Reinventing Japan: From Merchant Nation to Civic Nation*, p. 22.

<sup>10</sup> That the Japanese ruling elite adopted a decisive approach to the rearrangement of the US-Japan Security Treaty in 1960 caused a great turbulent in Japanese domestic politics. Before it, during the early years of the 1950s, not only the leftists but also the rightists strongly had reacted against the policies of Yoshida Government pursuing close alliance relations with the United States. See, J. A. A. Stockwin, 'Positive Neutrality, The Foreign Policy of the Japanese Socialist Party', *Asian Survey*, Vol. 2, No. 9, 1962, pp. 33-34.

<sup>11</sup> For example, the US signed a mutual defense treaty with the Republic of Philippines in August 1951, a mutual security treaty with South Korea in October 1953, a mutual security treaty with the Republic of Taiwan as well as trilateral security treaty under ANZUS Pact with Australia and New Zealand in September 1951. See, John S. Duffield, 'Asia Pacific Security Institutions in Comparative Perspective', G. John Ikenberry and Michael Mastanduno (eds.), *International Relations Theory and the Asia Pacific*, New York: Columbia University Press, 2003, pp. 246-247.

<sup>12</sup> In the early years of the Cold War, the economic growth of Japan was totally based on aid coming from the US. After adjusting the economic balance toward the international community in the 1960s, Japan was able to show itself in the international economic arena.

<sup>13</sup> After the first oil shock in 1973, the Japanese government took some measures to surmount the oil crisis. Togo indicates these measures taken by the Ministry of International Trade and Industry as follows: (1) Starting a national campaign to consume less electricity and gasoline; (2) Giving a new stimulus to alternative energy resources instead of oil; Exploring non-oil energy sources for electricity production, industrial consumption and household utilities; (3) Expanding oil imports from different areas such as Indonesia, Alaska, Russia, and Mexico; (4) Increasing oil reserves to cope with a possible shortage of oil; (5) Cooperating with oil-consuming countries. See, Kazuhiko Togo, *Japan's Foreign Policy 1945-2003, The Quest for a Proactive Policy*, pp. 292-293.

<sup>14</sup> When examining the postwar history of Japan, it is seen that the Japanese foreign policy was put under the US security umbrella according to the provisions of the Security Treaties of 1951 and 1960. However, Japanese political elites tried to strike a

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balance between their economic and security needs. See, Philip J. Meeks, 'Japan and Global Economic Hegemony', Tsuneo Akaha and Frank Langdon (eds.) *Japan in the Post-hegemonic World*, London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1993, pp. 17-39; the two oil crises that had characterized the Middle East in 1973 and 1980 had affected Japan economically but not militarily. As a matter of fact, Japanese governments attached great importance to the stability in the Middle East, which has perpetually been in turmoil. However, the constitution and also pressures coming from the domestic opposition and Japanese people in the direction of not making the human contribution to other countries didn't permit Japanese policy-makers to take the share of the security burden. See, Kevin Cooney, *Japan's Foreign Policy since 1945*. New York and London: M. E. Sharpe, 2007, p. 30.

<sup>15</sup> Most members of OAPEC (Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries) reduced their total oil exports so that embargoed countries could not simply purchase oil from other importers. These events produced an apparent oil shortage worldwide, which helped OPEC (Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries) to increase the price of oil fourfold in a short time. See, Roy Licklieder, 'The Power of Oil: The Arab Oil Weapon and the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Canada, Japan and the United States', *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 32, No. 2, 1988, p. 206.

<sup>16</sup> R. Shaoul also points out that two primary factors, including the Japanese compliance with Arab economic and business boycott of Israel and the American factor, have determined Japan's Israel policy. See, Raquel Shaoul, 'Japan and Israel: An Evaluation of Relationship-Building in the Context of Japan's Middle East Policy', *Israel Affairs*, Vol. 10, No. 1, 2004, p. 273.

<sup>17</sup> As of 2004, countries from which Japan imports crude oil are as follows: Yemen (0.1%); Iraq (2.2%); Nigeria (2.2%); Oman (2.4%); Indonesia (3.5%); Qatar (9.3%); Iran (15.0%); United Arab Emirates (25.3%); Saudi Arabia (25.9%) and other (5.5%). As also seen from the database, the proportion of the Middle East region is 88.9%. See, "Oil-Agency for Natural Resources and Energy-The Official Website of the Government of Japan."

[http://www.enecho.meti.go.jp/topics/energy-in-japan/energy2006Epdf/p2122\\_energy2006E-9.pdf](http://www.enecho.meti.go.jp/topics/energy-in-japan/energy2006Epdf/p2122_energy2006E-9.pdf) (accessed on January 4, 2009).

<sup>18</sup> When examining the characteristics which determine Japan's traditional foreign policy approach, it is seen that, in particular, Tokyo's isolationist, pragmatic and opportunistic identity commands its foreign policy orientation. In the postwar period, from this view point, on the one hand, the Japanese political authorities pursued a foreign policy refraining from political involvement in terms of military issues. On the other hand, in case of necessity, they didn't refrain from engagement in political matters. See, Bruce Stronach, *Beyond the Rising Sun: Nationalism in Contemporary Japan*, Westport, Connecticut and London: Praeger, 1995, p. 130.

<sup>19</sup> In a survey conducted in 1968, the Japanese were asked the following question: which event do you consider the most important for Japan in the past one hundred years? That two out of three Japanese people answered the Pacific War clearly shows that the dramatic experience of the Second World War remains the most deeply rooted memory among the Japanese people. Asahi Shimbunsha, August 1968, Asahi Shimbun, 20 September 1968. See, Akio Watanabe, 'Japanese Public Opinion and

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Foreign Affairs: 1964-1973', *The Foreign Policy of Modern Japan*, Robert A. Scalapino (ed.), Berkeley, Los Angeles and California: University of California Press, 1977, p. 111.

<sup>20</sup> Japanese ruling elites understood that the economic growth was only possible with the appropriate and effective strategies imposed on policies to be implemented. From this perspective, the dependency of Japan on the economic support of the US was widely accepted by them. Moreover, an alliance relationship with the US was became a necessary tool for them to create an economic miracle and to protect the country from possible threats of the Cold War. Important steps toward the institutionalization of democracy and the rule of law in Japan also consolidated the longevity of LDP in power throughout the Cold War. Zbigniew Brzezinski, *the Fragile Blossom*, New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1972, pp. 18-19.

<sup>21</sup> Thomas Berger, a well – known scholar studying Japanese foreign policy from the perspective of constructivism, stresses the role of collective identity in shaping Japanese foreign and security policy. According to Berger, the gap between economic and military power lies in the strong anti-militarist sentiments that emerged in Japan after the end of the Second World War. He argues that historical culture is the product of events and experiences. In this sense, the defeat in the Second World War can be said to have caused the dramatic shift in Japan's security and foreign policy culture from expansionism and militarism to pacifism. See, Thomas Berger, *Cultures of Antimilitarism: National Security in Germany and Japan*, Baltimore MD: John Hopkins University Press, 1998.

<sup>22</sup> The United States as a significant other for Japan's post-war self – identity building process and preservation will be detailed in Chapter Five.

<sup>23</sup> The purpose of the Plaza Accord was to induce the Exchange market towards the cheaper dollar, so that the US trade deficit could be cut back to decrease Japanese and European surpluses. See., Yoshiyuki Iwamoto, *Japan on the Upswing: Why the Bubble Burst and Japan's Economic Renewal*, Algora Publishing, 2006, p. 64.

<sup>24</sup> As for the term 'interdependency', it implies equality and symmetry between societies. It is considered that the current international system is characterized by growing interdependency, which is mutual responsibility and dependency on others. Advocates of this argument see growing globalization, particularly with international economic interaction. The role of the international institutions and widespread acceptance of a number of operating principles in the international system reinforce the idea that relations are characterized by interdependency. In other words, interdependency refers to situations defined by reciprocal effects among countries or among actors in different countries.

<sup>25</sup> Japan's modernization process starting from second half of nineteenth century on and the dramatic process developing in Japan after the Second World War are concrete two examples of traumatic events in shaping and reshaping of Japan's state identity.

<sup>26</sup> Moreover, other external factors were instrumental in bringing pressure to bear on Japans' self-image. For example, the oil crises of the 1970s exposed Japan's vulnerability as an economic power. See, Valerie Yorke, 'Oil, the Middle East and Japan's Search for Security', *International Affairs*, Vol. 57, No. 3, 1981, pp. 434-435.

<sup>27</sup> In fact, although the majority of the Japanese people considered that Article Nine was a compulsory part of the constitution, they perceived the meaning of this article

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in a different way from what the Allied powers thought. In fact, they were interrogating how they have been victimized by their own military, and were less concerned for atrocities committed in wartime in East Asia and Pacific region, widely created as a result of the expansionist policies implemented by the Japanese militarist regime. See, Yasuo Takao, *Reinventing Japan: From Merchant Nation to Civic Nation*, pp. 20-21.

## **CHAPTER III**

### **JAPAN'S HUMAN SECURITY AGENDA IN A REGIONAL CONTEXT**

#### **3.1 Introduction**

The balanced relationship between the notions of trust and risk refers to a significant issue concerning the degree of perceived ontological security among actors ranging from individuals in society to states in the international community. As noted, trust is a crucial factor in building a more stable cognitive and physical environment for actors because it promotes a feeling of security for the society both at the local and the international levels. On the other hand, a decrease in the level of trust creates a risky environment in terms of the feeling of security, whose degree is determined by involved actors because trust is not a given but is socially and actively obtained.

From the point of view of state-to-state relations, Jan Ruzicka and Nicholas J. Wheeler (2010, p. 71) emphasize that some realist-inspired scholars like John J. Mearsheimer (1994 / 95, p. 11) argue that trust cannot be built in international politics and that any effort on this part would be damaging for individual states. According to these realist-oriented scholars, states always struggle for power because of certain factors such as the biological nature of human beings, the anarchic structure of the

international system, or the intervening variables located at the level of the individual and the state.<sup>1</sup> In situations characterized by a high level of conflict, the possibility of trust and cooperation will decrease while mistrust and fear will prevail, thus creating a security dilemma in the international system. Nevertheless, states must build a less risky environment for the steady development of their cognitive map, ensuring a healthy ontological structure for themselves.

In chapter three, as a sub-argument, it can be added that, as a way of developing a basic trust mechanism among actors in the region of East Asia, Japan has tried to promote its human security agenda in the post-Cold War period, offering a new and comprehensive outlook for both itself and the rest of the region. From this perspective, section one of this chapter includes a brief discussion of the conceptual framework. In this section, some discussions that shape the framework of the concept of human security are introduced. In the following section of the chapter, the evolution, transformation, and consequences of Japan's human security agenda are analysed and described in detail.

### **3.2 Contextualizing the Concept of Human Security in International Relations**

In the field of international relations, the concepts of security and its referent objects have been a controversial area for at least the last two decades. The debate about this issue has, in general, been concentrated on the problem of whether broadening and deepening the agenda of security studies is a proper approach. Throughout the Cold War period, scholars who have held to the realist school of international relations in their studies have viewed the protection of states rather than their citizens as the main referent object of security. However, in a changing world during the post-Cold War period, alternative approaches in international relations

re-theorizing the individual human being as a referent object of security have emerged (Shani, 2007, pp. 1 - 4). For example, some scholars, like Jef Huysmans (1998, p. 227), have begun to consider that new threats, including economic, societal, political, and environmental risks, and new units such as individuals and communities should also be added to the classical dominant military threats. For them, the meaning of security should refer to a wider framework in the sense that it also incorporates human beings as well as the traditional perspective.

On the other hand, the two main subjects of foreign policy agenda of states—economic development and military security—started to be seen as component parts of each other after the end of the Cold War. In fact, this phenomenon was generally connected to political, economic, and technological changes, allowing the global integration and the transformation of world order. The emergence of the concept of human security is also seen as a result of this global integration process (King & Murray, 2001, p. 585). Against this background, the UN has served as an apparatus for evolving and fostering the concept of human security at the international level (Martin & Owen, 2010, p. 212).

### **3.2.1 Narrower and Broader Definitions of Human Security at the International Level**

To be more precise, human security is considered a difficult concept to define because it encompasses all notions of security, ranging from the local to the international levels. This concept, for the first time, appeared in the 1994 *Human Development Report* by the UN Development Program (UNDP). According to the UNDP Report of 1994, two main threats existed to the security of human beings. First, protection from chronic threats, including hunger, disease, and repression (freedom from fear), and second, protection from sudden and harmful disruptions in the patterns of daily

life—whether in homes, in jobs, or in communities (freedom from want) (UNDP, 1994, p. 23).

As determined by the UNDP Report of 1994, the concept of human security is centred on four main ideas. First, human security should be based on a universal concern. In every part of the world, there are innumerable threats growing daily and frequently menacing people. Second, there seems to be a strong bond among the elements of human security; that is, such threats as famine, disease, pollution, terrorism, and ethnic disputes are highly likely to affect the security of human beings everywhere. Third, guaranteeing human security is easier by using early prevention rather than later intervention. Fourth, human security should be people-oriented and focused on issues of how people live in a society and to what extent they have opportunities in their social, economic, and political lives, and so on (UNDP, 1994, pp. 22 - 23). Constructed around these four main ideas, the report identified the following seven elements, which are related to each other and, in a sense, together have formed the concept of human security: (1) economic security, (2) food security, (3) health security, (4) environmental security, (5) personal security, (6) community security, and (7) political security (UNDP, 1994, pp. 24 - 25). Thus, in its broadest sense, human security is grounded on the security of human beings rather than the security of institutions, such as territoriality and state sovereignty.

As is evident in its main ideas and set of elements, the concept of human security in the UNDP Report of 1994 offers a very broad and new approach to security and development at the global level by including hunger, disease, and natural disasters as well as political violence and economic development (Kaldor, 2007, p. 182). This report underscored two important aspects of human security. First, it drew the general framework of the question of what human security should be. Second, to define threats toward human security, it referred to the principles of

*freedom from fear* and *freedom from want* as separate ideas. Nevertheless, regardless of the attention given this report, it has been criticized as not being able to bring about a favourable outcome and find solid ground in the UN system.<sup>2</sup>

Some scholars and policy makers argue that the report elaborated a comprehensive but somewhat ambiguous definition of human security, although this definition has been quoted by a number of scholars in academic papers and by states in their political treatises as well. For example, Roland Paris, who is one of the leading academics on human security issues, states that two main problems in context limit the level of utility of the concept of human security in terms of international relations. First, the UNDP Report of 1994 does not have a clear and precise definition. Human security is definitely about human beings; however, it is still unclear what *human security* means in practice. Second, the existing definition of the UNDP is extremely wide ranging, and at the same time, it is deep and detailed in that it includes everything from physical security to such psychological aspects as happiness. He avers that, by looking at the existing definition of the concept, it is almost impossible to determine what might be excluded from the definition of human security (Paris, 2001, pp. 89 - 90). That is, it is not clear whether in practice it could serve as a road map for states and international organizations.

Furthermore, Alex J. Bellamy and Matt McDonald (2002, p. 376) tried to find a proper answer to the question of what the agenda of human security for states should include. According to them, the framework should be initially people-centred, as also defined in the UNDP report, to give a sense of what is implicated by the phrase "the human security agenda". In other words, the main focus should be based on humans everywhere, who have similar needs and desires. If the security of humans everywhere is addressed, then the question becomes what causes make humans insecure. Bellamy and McDonald assert that the seven elements

mentioned in the UNDP Report of 1994 are seen as a practical starting point because human beings need shelter, health care, sanitation, food, and clothing at the basic level and the ability to participate in collective efforts without persecution. Carolina Thomas (2001, p. 161) shares these points of view while describing the concept of human security in a different way. She characterizes the concept of human security as “a condition of existence in which basic material needs are met, and in which human dignity, including meaningful participation in the life of the community, can be realized. Such human security is indivisible; it cannot be pursued by or for one group at the expense of another.” Therefore, although at the base of human security lies material sufficiency, the nonmaterial dimension of human needs should also be addressed. According to Thomas, to obtain more than physical security for human beings, material sufficiency is a necessary but not sufficient condition.

In practice, some states and academic circles tend to define the concept of human security in a more restricted way. This approach, which has been adopted by some countries, led by the Canadian government, has accepted the narrower definition of human security, stressing the security of the individual in the face of political violence.<sup>3</sup> It also emphasizes the discourse on *freedom from fear* through preventive diplomatic methods or peace-building efforts (Kaldor, 2007, p. 183). According to these countries, a narrower concept of human security is more useful for both pragmatic and methodological reasons. The *2005 Human Security Report: War and Peace in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century* contends that the narrower concept of human security focuses on “violent threats to individuals”. It is considered pragmatic because of its comprehensive approach to global violence. It is also considered methodologically rational because of its utility for policy analyses (Report, 2005, p. VIII).<sup>4</sup> For instance, the former Canadian Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy (2001, pp. 3 - 4) argues that, although the contextual definition of the concept of human security elaborated in the UNDP Report of 1994 could be a useful starting point, its inclusiveness of

different types of human issues makes it problematic as a policy framework. He states that, in the post-Cold War world in which human security came to prominence, such a broad framework averts policy from the original focus of attention.

Thus, states defending the narrower definition of human security by focusing principally on global violence (freedom from fear) are inclined to resolve human security issues in terms of humanitarian intervention and peace-conflict resolutions. In this sense, the concept of humanitarian intervention is, as defined by Mary Kaldor (2007, p. 17), "military intervention in a state, with or without the approval of that state, to prevent genocide, large-scale violations of human rights (including mass starvation) or grave violations of international humanitarian law". However, throughout the Cold War, the principle of non-intervention for states expressed in Article (2) 4 of the UN Charter has been one of the most influential norms among states in international relations. Later, however, the assumption that there should be the right to use force in support of activities with humanitarian objectives has been increasingly accepted by states within the framework of the UN. In this context, the emergence of the global civil society has played a significant role in highlighting the equality of people everywhere irrespective of their ethnic origins.

Another point worthy of consideration is the emphasis on such concepts as human rights and human needs is understood in parallel with the development of human security in the discourses and foreign policy agendas of some states. The development of humanitarian laws and democratic tendencies at the regional and global levels has triggered this phenomenon. From this perspective, it is widely accepted by states that the social and economic factors mentioned above and human rights have a direct effect on peace and security within and among societies at the regional and international levels. Thus, many states like Japan reflect in their policies the fact that investments for social and economic

development are seen as crucial methods for maintaining stability and peace in the international community.

As a result, both viewpoints of human security—that is, the wider and the narrower ones—involve sociological, cultural, and even geo-strategic perspectives. In this way, the emergence of human security is a reflection of transnational norms and values in international relations (Newman, 2001). Moreover, human security has a normative and ethical meaning in the sense that it encompasses both ethical responsibilities for reorienting the security of the individual during transition periods of political communities and humanitarian obligations for states having the capacity to maintain the security of people in insecure areas.

### **3.2.2 The Symbiotic Relationship between Human Security and Ontological Security of States**

Moving to the next step in aligning the concept of human security with the ontological security of states, first, the significance of cognitive environment in this context should be briefly discussed because this idea as an intervening variable lies at the base of the notion of ontological security. Stated simply, *cognitive environment* refers to an environment established in the mind, not in reality. Moreover, as reality is full of events and there is no order in reality, it is important to make a conceptual systematization of the complexity of reality into a more meaningful and understandable set of patterns or frameworks. For that reason, the mental processes of knowing—such as awareness, perception, reasoning, and judgment (decision making)—need an order to understand the reality. In other words, cognitive order is logically connected to the perception and decision-making process of an actor toward others.<sup>5</sup> It can be assumed that, like individual human beings, states as actors in international relations also try to impose a cognitive order on the reality they are

confronted with. More specifically, states have to consider the outward reality systematically to avoid a deep anxiety of uncertainty, which constitutes a threat toward the actor's self-identity. At this point, so as to minimize uncertainties surrounding them, as Mitzen also claimed (2006), states maintain a basic trust mechanism by establishing routines in their relations, both bilaterally and internationally.

Essentially, trust fosters a feeling of security among actors to a certain degree. In this respect, this need for security implies a relatively stable understanding of the actor's own identity (Mitzen, 2006, p. 345). As a source of regularities in relationships among actors, trust is created and sustained through routinisation. By routinising its relationships, the actor will have an ontological security in the society. In a condition of ontological security, the actor will know how to behave and how to evaluate the possible threats and the means to realize its aims. As also elaborated in chapter one, ontological insecurity, by contrast, points to an inability to discriminate between the dangers to be confronted and those to be ignored. In such a case, the actor will focus on immediate necessities and may not be able to choose the right means to be used to reach its goals.

In sum, applying the ontological security approach at the state level allows for predicting how states with different levels of trust will interact. On the one hand, actors having a high level of trust are able to make more rational decisions and to learn from the past while adapting to a changing environment. On the other hand, actors with a low level of trust tend to follow rigid routines stabilizing their interactions, thus presenting a lesser ability to learn and express creativity. Furthermore, they do not engage in activities aimed at reflexive self-monitoring and updating their biographical narratives.

These facts indicate a casual nexus between the two concepts, that is, human security and ontological security, within the international context. To put it differently, a symbiotic relationship between these two

concepts means that, for example, the contribution of an industrialized country to human security refers to a “positive sum gain,” which is mutually beneficial for the participants of the relationship, thus creating a more stable cognitive and physical environment. A degree of ontological security felt at the state level and cognitive and physical order would be an example in the case of Japan, as will be discussed in the following sections.

### **3.3 The Concept of Human Security in Japanese Foreign Policy**

While the international policy environment relatively provides some global opportunities in terms of ideas, products, and services for individual states, it also imposes some constraints, in particular, in reaching a cooperative stance among states. To illustrate, the emergence of new international threats with the shift of the world scene from bipolarity to unipolarity in the early 1990s has caused new uncertainties and anxieties for states as actors in the international system. This state of uncertainty and anxiety has forced political leaders and state elites to pursue new ideas and methods in their foreign and security policies so as to improve assessing and responding to new and unfamiliar threats at the regional and international levels.

Japan is not an exceptional country in this context, and these factors affected the Japanese foreign and security policy priorities on a large scale. In the early post-war years, as noted in the previous chapter, Japan’s role in the international system was seen as a product of the combination of the political order imposed on it by the victors, led by the US, and pragmatic policies adopted by the post-war Japanese ruling elites, led by Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru. After the end of the Cold War period, the Japanese ruling elites tried to expand the country’s positive role in the international arena by creating a more stable cognitive and physical environment. In this international setting, the concept of human security

as an emerging paradigm was seen by them as the gateway by which Japan could positively use its passive image of being “an economic giant but a military dwarf” both by improving mutually close relationships with East Asian countries and by constructing a foreign policy agenda closely associated with the infrastructure of human security.

In fact, since the time that Japan acquired that image, the Japanese foreign policy makers encountered some critics largely on two fronts. The first criticism in domestic politics is generally related to the discussions on the national security of Japan. The second is that, during the post-Cold War period, even liberally oriented politicians in Japan have begun to question the wisdom of ‘one country pacifism’, long pursued by the Japanese ruling elites (Soeya, 2005, p. 104).

The fact that discussions in Japanese politics in terms of the country’s stance toward the international community have largely focused on the functionality of the pacifist foreign policy agenda is significant to understanding the core reasons behind Japan seeking to engage in international security issues, including human security perspectives. Yoshihide Soeya (2005, p. 104) states that, in the early 1990s, Japan’s security profile was conceived as a country exhibiting a characteristic pattern of middle-power diplomacy and using principally economic tools in its foreign relations. During this period, the most striking change in the Japanese foreign policy understanding was its engagement in international peace-keeping operations under the aegis of the UN, evolving with the reinforcement of alliance relationship with the US.

In fact, because of its constitutional restrictions and its anti-militarist state identity and posture, Japan has been reluctant to support the US on the subject of military burden sharing. However, the Gulf War of 1990–1991 became a landmark for Japan in the context of reconsidering the country’s positive role in the international system. As will be detailed in later chapters, after the Gulf War of 1990–1991, Japan started to review

its foreign policy tools based on economic power (Cooney, 2008, p. 38). After the Gulf War, the Japanese government financed the international community with 13 billion US dollars by following its constitution and not sending its Self-Defense Forces abroad. Although the amount contributed by Japan was huge, the members of the international community belittled the Japanese act of not sending troops to the Gulf War to maintain peace. Hence, considering the situation in the international community, the Japanese policy makers tried to improve Japan's relations at the international level. Thus, in 1992, the Japanese government altered its foreign policy capability by passing legislation permitting the Self-Defense Forces to be sent abroad for peace-keeping operations and humanitarian actions of the UN (Chijiwa, 2008, p. 85). Thereafter, the Japanese government made contributions to peace-keeping activities by sending its Self-Defense Forces to Mozambique (ONUMOZ), Rwanda, Angola (UNAVEM II), East Timor (UN-AMET), Cambodia (UNTAC), and El Salvador (ONUSAL). The number of causes increased later, but they have been confined to only logistical support in limited areas (Ho, 2008, pp. 102 - 103).

Apart from policies related to humanitarian intervention during UN peace-keeping operations, the Japanese ruling elites, for the first time, started to consider the concept of human security as an idea for its foreign policy agenda during the Murayama Administration. In terms of social development among societies, Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama implicitly referred to this idea in his speech at the UN General Assembly Special Session of the Diet held in September 1995, where he illustrated the concept of a healthy society as being one in which every citizen should be treated equally. According to Murayama, doing the groundwork for the emergence of more equal societies should be an objective in Japanese politics. That is, Japan should help developing countries create healthy societies and foster equality among their citizens. In previous speeches by Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama, the priority of social development was

also strongly emphasized. For example, at the World Summit for Social Development, held in Copenhagen, Denmark, on March 11, 1995, Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama proposed the following policy objectives regarding the promotion of social development:<sup>6</sup>

[I]n the national policies of every country, the following three areas should be accorded highest priority. *First*, in order to achieve social justice, governments should place emphasis on a human-centered approach to social development. In this context, it is necessary to promote worldwide disarmament and, toward that end, each country should strive to allocate a larger share of its national budget for social development programs. *Second*, governments must focus on developing human resources through education and training. (. . .). *Third*, social development cannot be achieved by governments alone, but requires the active participation of civil society as a whole, including Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs).

In the final part of his speech, Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama enumerated the policies to be pursued by the Japanese government in the area of social development. Accordingly, Japan will focus on the following three areas:<sup>7</sup>

First, Japan gives priority to human centered social development. At present, the share of ODA allocated to this area already exceeds twenty percent of the total of Japan's bilateral ODA. This area will continue to be given highest priority in our ODA policy. Furthermore, developed and developing countries, with the involvement of NGOs, should strengthen cooperation in this area. Close coordination between the UN and its specialized agencies, including the International Labour Organisation (ILO), as well as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and other international organizations is also necessary. Second, Japan is resolved to continue placing priority on the assistance for education and vocational training. Japan's assistance in this area has more than quadrupled during the last ten years. South-south cooperation is effective in this regard in the sense that knowledge and experience of more advanced developing countries could be utilized for the promotion of social development in other developing countries. (. . .). Third, Japan places special importance on the role of women in the development of developing countries, particularly in the area of social development. (. . .). Japan has already been extending its active cooperation for the support of women in developing countries and intends to further strengthen its assistance in this field.

As understood from speeches delivered by the Japanese Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama, Japan has started to place greater emphasis

on human-centred policies in its foreign policy orientations and tried to stimulate other developed countries in this way as well. By engaging itself in human-centred issues, the Japanese government, in a sense, brought its anti-militaristic state identity and posture to the forefront of international society and tried to insert it into a fundamental part of its foreign policy discourse.

On the other hand, as cited in the *1999 Diplomatic Blue Book* of Japan, only in 1998 did the Japanese government explicitly adopt the concept of human security on a full-scale and start to insert specific measures into its foreign policy agenda.<sup>8</sup> Keizo Obuchi, who became Prime Minister in 1998, demonstrated his commitment to improving the idea of human security by emphasizing the need to consider new strategies built on economic development and cooperation.<sup>9</sup> At the Japan–ASEAN Summit Meeting held in Hanoi, Vietnam, in December 1998, Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi offered the following four initiatives for improving Japan–ASEAN cooperation for the next century: (1) Supporting dialogues and cooperation for the 21<sup>st</sup> century, (2) cooperating to address the Asian economic crisis, (3) cooperating to deal with human-security-related issues, and (4) endorsing intellectual dialogues and cultural exchanges. As seen in the third initiative proposed by the Japanese government, human security was, for the first time, incorporated into Japan’s foreign policy agenda. According to the third initiative, Japan decided both to improve cooperation for reinforcing social safety nets in Asia and to form a human-security fund for such issues as environment, drugs, and international organized crimes under the aegis of the UN ((MOFA), 2012).

By referring to the financial crisis of 1997 and such human-related issues as environmental degradation, terrorism, violations of human rights, international organized crimes, illicit drugs, and so on, the *1999 Diplomatic Blue Book* of Japan underscored that the Japanese government has been an active actor for building the social-safety nets necessary in

Asia. To contribute to the elimination of human-security issues or reduce them to a minimum level, the Japanese government officially tried to declaim on various platforms held in the region of East Asia by asserting that Japan has endorsed the human-security concept promoted by the UNDP Human Development Report ((MOFA), 1999; Ho, 2008, p. 103).

Satomi Ho (2008, p. 103) argues that Japan's adopting the concept of human security as one of the main pillars in its foreign policy agenda is both in parallel with its development assistance policy used from the 1970s on and with its non-militaristic state identity and posture acquired throughout the Cold War period. Moreover, she emphasizes the pursuit of Japan's permanent membership on the UN Security Council by using this policy orientation:

Japan was looking for a leading position in the international community during the debate surrounding United Nations reform. Japan hoped to get a permanent seat on the Security Council and needed a good reputation as a promoter of international norms. Human security was considered an ideal political platform from which to realize these political goals.

After the death of Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi, his successor, Yoshiro Mori, stressed the importance of human security at the Millennium Summit of the UN on September 7, 2000.<sup>10</sup> At this summit, by organising his discourse around two main points, he stated that the concept of human security would be one of the main pillars of Japanese foreign policy agenda (Soeya, 2008, p. 110). The first one is the importance of dealing with issues confronting the international community from a human-centred point of view, and the second one is the need to strengthen the functions of the UN in the new century. In his speech, he established a wider definition of the concept of human security by citing, in particular, conflicts, human right violations, poverty, infectious diseases, crime, and environmental destruction that threaten the existence of the international society. Another striking point in the speech delivered by Mori is the intention of the Japanese government to establish an international committee on

human security to develop and heighten the human-centred approach ((MOFA), 2000). This proposal, in a sense, laid the groundwork for the Commission on Human Security established by the UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan and Sadako Ogata, former UN High Commissioner for Refugees in January 2001.<sup>11</sup>

### **3.3.1 Two Main Platforms Backed by Japan to Deal with Human-Security-Related Issues: The Trust Fund for Human Security and the Commission on Human Security**

The Trust Fund for Human Security was established with donations from the Japanese government to the Secretariat of the UN in March 1999. The fund is largely focused on supporting the various projects of the international organizations related to the UN addressing various threats to humans, including poverty, environmental destruction, disputes, land mines, the refugee problem, drugs and HIV/AIDS, and so on.<sup>12</sup> In January 2001, the Commission on Human Security was formed through initiatives by the Japanese government under the leadership of Sadako Ogata and Amartya Sen, Nobel Laureate and Master of Trinity College, Cambridge, to systematically examine the main causes of human insecurity at the global level (Hsien-Li, 2010, p. 110). In addition, the other works of the Commission on Human Security have been addressed (1) promoting public understanding and engagement and supporting human security and its underlying imperatives, (2) developing the concept of human security as an operational tool for policy formulation and implementation, and (3) proposing a concrete program of action to address critical and pervasive threats to human security (Security, 2003).

After its inception in 2001, the Commission on Human Security held five meetings related to human security issues, and finally, in May 2003, the comprehensive report of meetings, including analysis of the current

situation and some solutions for human security, was submitted to Kofi Annan, the UN Secretary General.<sup>13</sup> The prominent points in the reports are as follows:

Policies and institutions must respond to the insecurities caused by political and economic instabilities and conflicts within states in stronger and more integrated ways. (. . .). The focus [to security] must broaden from the state to the security of people—human security. (. . .).

(. . .). Human security means protecting vital freedoms. It means protecting people from critical and pervasive threats and situations, building on their strengths and aspirations. It also means creating systems that give people the building blocks of survival, dignity and livelihood. Human security connects different types of freedoms—freedom from want, freedom from fear and freedom to take action on one's own behalf. To do this, it offers two general strategies; *protection* and *empowerment*. Protection shields people from dangers. It requires concerted effort to develop norms, processes and institutions that systematically address insecurities. Empowerment enables people to develop their potential and become full participants in decision making. Protection and empowerment are mutually reinforcing and both are required in most situations. (. . .).

(. . .). Human security complements state security, further human development and enhances human rights. It complements state security by being people-centered and addressing insecurities that have not been considered as state security threats. (. . .).

"(. . .). The Commission has arrived at policy conclusions in the following areas: (1) protecting people in violent conflict, (2) protecting people from the proliferation of arms, (3) supporting the security of people on the move, (4) establishing human security transition funds for post-conflict situations, (5) encouraging fair trade and markets to benefit the extreme poor, (6) working to provide living standards everywhere, (7) according higher priority to ensuring access to basic health care, (8) developing an efficient and equitable global system for patent rights, (9) empowering all people with universal basic education, (10) clarifying the need for a global human identity while respecting the freedom of individuals to have diverse identities and affiliations. (. . .).

(. . .). For each of these policy conclusions joint efforts are necessary—a network of public, private and civil society actors who can help in the clarification and development of norms, embark on integrated activities and monitor progress and performance.

The report prepared by the Commission on Human Security strongly underscored a comprehensive security approach, ranging from

nation to people and defining the terms *freedom from fear* as referring to immediate physical harm from armed conflicts and *freedom from want* as referring to the structural poverty of developing countries, frequently aggravated by globalization.<sup>14</sup> The Commission on Human Security also emphasized freedom from fear and freedom from want as supplementary parts of each other (Hughes, 2004).

In a short period of time, the Japanese government adopted the Commission on Human Security's policy conclusions and applied them in its newly formed human-security agenda by revising its ODA Charter in 2003. As discussed below, Japan's revision policy for ODA was an outcome of both the government's desire to improve the concept of human security and some pragmatic and strategic reasons, including the country's stability and prosperity (Hsien-Li, 2010, p. 164).<sup>15</sup>

Following the recommendations of the final report of 2003, which explains the main dynamics of and key solutions to human-security issues at the global level, in September of the same year, the Advisory Board on Human Security was set up with the aim of counselling the UN Secretary General on the management of the Trust Fund for Human Security.<sup>16</sup> During the first meeting of the Advisory Board on Human Security, held in New York on September 16–17, 2003, Sadako Ogata, the chair of the board, emphasized the significance of the board for establishing modalities in interpreting the recommendations of the Commission on Human Security in practical policies and actions. Moreover, throughout the meeting, it was asserted that integrating human security into all UN activities and revising the old guidelines of the Trust Fund for Human Security were necessary to better reflect the policy conclusions of the report of 2003. Thus, the board took the following critical points to its agenda to facilitate the activities of the Trust Fund for Human Security: (1) A holistic and integrative approach should be followed; (2) the fund should abstain from replicating existing programs and events; (3) cooperative relations should be built with civil

society and other local partners; and (4) women and children should be given special attention in terms of special needs and vulnerabilities (OCHA, 2003).

The Advisory Board on Human Security preferred the Trust Fund for Human Security to be a key legal instrument for dealing with critical threats to human beings (Hsien-Li, 2010, p. 169). On the other hand, the Trust Fund for Human Security has become a global stage for Japan in which it can play an influential role in contributing to human security as a sustainable approach to peace. Until 2007, Japan was the sole donor financing various projects in the UN system for human-security issues, ranging from employment, migration, conflict, and humanitarian issues to health problems like HIV/AIDS, the basic needs of education, food, and so on (Hsien-Li, 2010, pp. 168 - 169).

### **3.3.2 The Essentials of Japan's ODA Policy in Terms of Human Security**

Japan's continued financial support for other countries until the mid-1950s primarily included financial aid for Myanmar in 1940 and extended money loaned to India in 1958. In 1961, Japan joined with the Development Assistance Committee to serve globally and became a member of the Organization for Economic Cooperation in 1964 for the same reason (Long, 1999, p. 330). The Ministry of International Trade and Industry of Japan stated that there were two basic programs that the Japanese development aid offered, making it an authentic part of the national policy of Japan before 1989. The first assistance emphasised the struggle of the Japanese government to restore the financial bonds between the provinces that were affected as a result of World War II. Another form of aid provided by them was participation in the government's macroeconomic policy of guided capitalism, in which the most capable financial regions were focused on and supported by

providing them assistance with research and development, trade protection, tax credits, and promotion of national savings. The manner of communicating the Japanese trading and foreign financial investment was well coordinated with the aid flows and directly targeted the zones that contained raw materials thought to be well-suited for the economy of Japan. The launches of Japanese products, properties, and services were also couched as aid projects that improvised the financial status of the locals and enhanced the conditions of productivity. Tokyo did not interfere with any of the dealings reflecting any kind of improvements in the political and financial conditions of the countries being provided with aid (Hook & Zhang, 1998, pp. 1053 - 1054).

After the end of the Cold War, with the adoption of the first official aid policy under the ODA Charter in 1992, Japan reshaped its aid policy toward developing and underdeveloped countries by establishing such preconditions as democratisation, human rights, and restraint in military spending.<sup>17</sup> The ODA Charter of 1992 set four priorities, including (1) environmental conservation; (2) promotion of democracy and human rights; (3) restraints on such issues as military expenditures, the development of weapons of mass destruction, and arms transfers; and (4) introduction of a market-oriented economy (Hook & Zhang, 1998, p. 1057). Thus, Japan's ODA policy was aimed at contributing to peace and development, at least at the regional level, and then helping ensure Japan's own security and prosperity. For example, after an easing in the tense relations between China and Japan in 1979, it a long time (1995) before Japan refused to help China financially and declared itself independent of all kinds of loan provision to China because the Chinese were about to perform a nuclear test. It was a historic moment in Japan's relations with China because the Japanese policy makers used to consider the country's relationship with China as an important one (Long, 1999, pp. 333 - 334).

From its inception, the main aim of the ODA Charter of 1992 did not change. In this sense, Japan has considerably promoted the economic development of the region of East Asia via its aid policy ((MOFA), 2003). However, the basic idea of the Japanese aid policy in the 1990s was to enhance the financial conditions, and it did not pay heed to the subjects of humanities, politics, and sociology. Thus, Japanese finance and trade kept shifting within the Pacific Rim region; in other words, it circulated in the developing countries as the Japanese ODA flows stayed interlinked (Hook & Zhang, 1998, p. 1060).


In 2003, the Japanese government revised the general framework of its ODA Charter, which is the basic document of the ODA policy for Japan. The basis of this policy is the desire to improve handling some serious problems that developing countries face. However, it was also essential for Japan to have public support within the country and abroad. Therefore, as well as enhancing the strategic value, flexibility, transparency, and efficiency of ODA, the revision also aimed to encourage wide public participation and to deepen the understanding of Japan's ODA policies both within Japan and abroad.<sup>18</sup>

The objectives of Japan's new ODA policy are largely based on building a peaceful and stable international environment and maintaining the development of the international community. According to Japanese policy makers, doing so would help ensure Japan's own security and prosperity.<sup>19</sup> From the objectives presented in ODA policy of Japan, it is evident that the Japanese government increasingly entertained a wider definition of *human security*, which encompasses the necessary human conditions for a peaceful society, ranging from problems of terrorism, human rights, and democracy to humanitarian problems such as poverty, famine, and natural disasters.<sup>20</sup> To fulfil these objectives at the global level, the Japanese government adopted some basic policies, such as (1) supporting self-help efforts of developing countries, (2) having a human-

security perspective, (3) assuring fairness, (4) using Japan's experience and expertise, and (5) having partnerships and collaboration within the international community.<sup>21</sup>

Japan separates its ODA into two main groups. The first is bilateral aid, by which assistance is given directly to developing countries. The second is multilateral aids, which are maintained through international organizations. As shown in the figure below, the Japan International Cooperation Agency renders bilateral aid in the forms of technical cooperation, Japanese ODA loans, and grand aid (JICA, 2012).

**Table 3: ODA in Japan International Cooperation Agency<sup>22</sup>**  
Source: <http://www.jica.go.jp/english/about/oda/>  
(accessed on June 06, 2012)



Aiming at bringing human security to post-conflict and conflict areas and strengthening the human security of local communities and vulnerable groups through people-centred approach, the activities of Japan International Cooperation Agency have, in general, focused on the countries located in the region of East Asia, such as East Timor, the

Philippines, Indonesia, and Myanmar (Hsien-Li, 2010, pp. 166 - 168). The above information indicates that Tokyo's ODA was helpful towards Southeast Asia. However, such places as Cambodia, Afghanistan, East Timor, and Sri Lanka were provided with protection for human rights by the year 2003 (Er, 2006, p. 149). On January 14, 2002, the Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi delivered a speech "Japan and ASEAN in East Asia: A Sincere and open Partnership", in which he stated (Er, 2006, p. 152),

Factors for instability are also in the region. Japan for many years has been the largest contributor of foreign aid in the world. In Southeast Asia, Japan would like to actively cooperate in reducing poverty and preventing conflicts in such cases as Mindanao, Aceh and East Timor. (. . .). We intend to make an even more active contribution to ensure regional stability here in Southeast Asia.

Japan was unable to show any support for Mindanao because it was busy serving East Timor through peace-keeping and disbursed aid. Tokyo made little headway in addressing the conflict between the central government in Manila and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front, other than Koizumi's intent to engage in peace building and his offer of a US \$400 million aid package to Mindanao. According to Lam Pen Er (2006, p. 152), it was hard for Japan to be able to interrupt the unstoppable political and ethnic conflict between by Manila and its protestors.

Finally, Japanese policy makers refer to the concept of interdependency in the ODA Charter to stress the seriousness of the phenomenon of globalization. In other words, these facts indicate that the Japanese policy makers considered that the post-Cold War international system was highly regarded within the framework of growing interdependency, which means mutual responsibility and dependency on others. Moreover, they were aware of the phenomenon of globalization with economic interaction at the regional and international levels. The term *dependency* is generally used to refer to a country that receives support from another country and is, therefore, bound to and, to some

extent, subject to it. As for the term *interdependency*, many scholars assume that the current international system is characterized by growing interdependency, which includes mutual responsibility and dependency on others. Advocates of this argument refer to growing globalization, particularly with international economic interaction. The role of the international institutions and widespread acceptance of a number of operating principles in the international system reinforce the idea that relations are characterized by interdependency. Thus, *interdependency* refers to situations defined by reciprocal effects among countries or among actors in different countries (Clemens, 2004; Keohane & Nye, 1984). According to the ODA Charter of 2003,

As nations deepen their interdependence, Japan, which enjoys the benefits of international trade and is heavily dependent on the outside world for resources such as energy and food, will proactively contribute to the stability and development of developing countries through its ODA. This correlates closely with assuring Japan's security and prosperity and promoting the welfare of its people. In particular, it is essential that Japan make efforts to enhance economic partnership and vitalize exchange with other Asian countries with which it has particularly close relations.

Generally speaking, throughout four decades, the Japanese ruling elites have tried to construct a regional order based on Asian exceptionalism by pursuing some pragmatic policies under a common set of values rooted in democracy and the rule of law. From this point of view, it could be said that, during the post-Cold War period, Japan has developed a foreign policy agenda in which its economic power has been used as an instrument to exert influence on other international actors in world politics. As discussed in following chapters, this policy formulation can be seen, for example, as a result of an effort to offset the perceived threats from China's growing influence in the region of East Asia. During the Cold War period, the national security of Japan was entrusted to the US, and this trust created significant restraints on Japan's foreign policy agenda. Nevertheless, in the post-Cold War period, Japan's attempts to exert a

positive role in shaping its own periphery have brought the economic dimension to the foreground.

Thus, the consecutive Japanese governments have tried to use official development assistance through its human-security agenda and foreign direct investments as policy tools both to offset expected threats and to build a basic trust mechanism with actors in the region of East Asia. From 1992 on, at the centre of the ODA was the intent of preserving basic human rights and freedoms. In addition to the human-rights perspective, after the revision of the ODA in 2003, its perspective was reformulated by including human-security-related issues at the global and regional levels. The revised version of the ODA in 2003 and Japan's Medium Term Policy on the ODA in 2005 comprehensively explicated how Japan approaches human-security-related issues in terms of the ODA.

### **3.4 Concluding Remarks**

According to Paul M. Evans (2004), human security represents a way to recognize that twenty years of economic growth and state building had done little to eliminate the critical conditions many people were experiencing. Moreover, it underscored the increasing relevance of non-state actors as providers of social services in those cases in which the state was not able to satisfy the needs of its citizens and act as a player in the political arena. In particular, the region of Southeast Asia is a clear example of this problem. In this sense, Japan has made great efforts towards spreading the idea of human security both at the international and regional levels. The principle motivation behind the human-security agenda established by Japanese foreign policy makers has been a strong desire to show Japan as more active in the international arena without undermining its peace-based constitution.

A common phenomenon is that Japan's contribution to human security does not include humanitarian intervention policies. These policies, strongly adopted by the Canadian government, have not been preferred by the Japanese policy makers and are still seen as far from the agenda of Japanese foreign and security policy. In contrast to the Canadian discourse, for example, the concept of human security does not allow for Japan sending its troops to conflict areas because of incompatibility with an interventionist foreign policy based on an understanding of human security that refers to freedom from fear.<sup>23</sup> As detailed in the previous chapter, the historic context of Japan prevents it from engaging in interventionist foreign policies adopted by some countries led by Canada. Briefly, while Canada focuses on a peace-keeping framework of human-security-related issues by pursuing military intervention on humanitarian grounds, Japan builds its human-security agenda principally on development aid. Moreover, Japan is one of the most significant supporters of decisions and initiatives taken by the Commission on Human Security. In this sense, Japan increasingly fosters projects regarding human security under the Trust Fund for Human Security to consolidate peace, justice, and stability processes in the international area.

For the last ten years, the Japanese policy makers have often used the concept of human security and set aside large amounts of economic and human resources to implement their broad version of human security. Such an orientation was strengthened by appointing Sadako Ogata as the President of the Japanese International Cooperation Agency and creating a US \$200 million Trust Fund for Security aimed at fostering human security, especially projects carried out by UN agencies.

In conclusion, for Japan, human security is a way to take a more active role in international security without posing a threat to its alliance relationship with the US and to its constitution. In this sense, Japan uses human security as a foreign policy tool to tackle humanitarian issues at the

global and regional levels. Japan's positive sum gain contribution in the regional context is also seen in its efforts for regional cooperative initiatives, as will be elaborated in the next chapter.

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<sup>1</sup> Schmit shows that "within realism there is a diverse range of explanations to account for this behavior. Moreover, the three varieties of realism each infer different patterns of behavior arising from the struggle for power." Brian C. Schmidt, 'Competing Realist Conceptions of Power', *Millennium-Journal of International Studies*, Vol. 33, No. 3, 2005, p. 545; John M. Hobson, *The State and International Relations*, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000, p. 21; Marc A. Genest, *Conflict and Cooperation: Evolving Theories of International Relations*, Wadsworth: Thompson: 2004, p. 47.

<sup>2</sup> Mary Martin and Taylor Owen try to examine this complication by propounding three problems in the UN's use of the concept. "ambiguity surrounding both the concept and practices of development and human security; the lack of a clear distinction between human rights and human security; and the potential conceptual overstretch of the UN's use of human security." See, Mary Martin and Taylor Owen, 'The Second Generation of Human Security: Lessons from the UN and EU Experience', *International Affairs*, Vol. 86, No.1, 2010, pp. 212-213.

<sup>3</sup> Established with the initiative of the Canadian Government in 1998, the Human security Network comprises Austria, Canada, Chile, Costa Rica, Greece, Ireland, Jordan, Mali, the Netherlands, Norway, Slovenia, the South Africa (observer), Switzerland and Thailand.

<sup>4</sup> It is widely accepted by states in the international system that the development of social and economic phenomena and human rights has a direct impact towards creating peace and security among and within communities. In order to continuously update this aim, many developed and developing countries try to pursue for foreign policy agendas that reflect methods for maintaining the stable cognitive and physical environment. Thus, a stable physical and cognitive environment provides for states opportunities to realize their potential aims. At the same time, taking preventive measures for states also contributes to economically development. Some measures such as the regulation of arms transfers, empowerment of international institutions and international law, peaceful solutions to conflicts should also be considered within the framework of conflict prevention. See, Edward Newman, 'Human Security and Constructivism', *International Studies Perspective*, No. 2, 2001, p. 249.

<sup>5</sup> According to Friedrich Hayek, decision making process can be divided into five stages, including (1) set goals, (2) gather information, (3) structure alternatives, (4) structure decision, (5) make final choice. See, Jürgen Göbel, 'Hayek's Approach to Cognitive and Social Order', *MPRA Paper*, No. 14290, 2009, p 12. <http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/14290/> (accessed on June 04, 2011).

<sup>6</sup> <http://www.un.org/documents> (accessed on July, 04, 2011).

<sup>7</sup> <http://www.un.org/documents> (accessed on July, 04, 2011).

<sup>8</sup> The author states that foreign minister Keizo Obuchi strongly felt the importance of human security as he witnessed for socially vulnerable people, especially receiving the direct hit of the financial crisis in Asia when he visited ASEAN countries in 1997 and 1998. Then he explained that a human-centered approach was necessary. Minami Hiroshi, Ningen no anzen hoshou to nihon gaikou (Human Security and Japanese Diplomacy), *Kokusai Mondai*, No. 545, 2005, p. 46.

<sup>9</sup> Minami Hiroshi, Ningen no anzen hoshou to nihon gaikou, p. 46

<sup>10</sup> "Millennium Development Goal" has various targets related to the development stated in so-called "Millennium Declaration" adopted in the millennium summit where more than 140 countries participated in September, 2000. Yukio Satoo, Nihon no

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kokuren gaikou to ningen no anzenhoshou (Japan's UN Diplomacy and Human Security), *Kokusai Mondai*, No. 533, 2004, pp. 2- 13.

<sup>11</sup> Sadako Ogata has played a critical role as a person introducing 'Obuchi Initiative' to the world scene. See, Yoshihide Soeya, 'Japanese Security Policy in Transition: The Rise of International and Human Security', *Asia-Pacific Review*, Volume 12, Number 1, 2005, p. 111.

<sup>12</sup> Minami Hiroshi, *Ningen no anzen hoshou to nihon gaikou*, p. 48.

<sup>13</sup> These meetings were held in New York, Tokyo, Stockholm, Bangkok and Tokyo respectively.

<sup>14</sup> Minami Hiroshi, *Ningen no anzen hoshou to nihon gaikou*, p. 47.

<sup>15</sup> With the adoption of first formal aid policy under the name of the ODA Charter in 1992, Japan structured its aid policy to developing countries by drawing the framework for preconditions to related countries such as democratization, human rights and restraint in military spending. The ODA Charter of 1992 determined four priorities, including "(1) environmental conservation, (2) the promotion of democracy and human rights, (3) restraints on military expenditures, the development of weapons of mass destruction and arms transfers, (4) the introduction of a market-oriented economy. See, Steven W. Hook and Guang Zhang, 'Japan's Aid Policy Since the Cold War', *Asian Survey*, Vol.38, No. 11, 1998, p. 1057.

<sup>16</sup> The board consisted of the Chair, Sadako Ogata and the following members: Adebayo Adedeji (Former Executive Secretary of UN Economic Commission for Africa), Lakhdar Brahimi (Special Representative of UNSG for Afghanistan), Koichi Haraguchi (then Permanent Representative of Japan to the UN), Sonia Picado (President, Inter-American Institute for Human Rights), Surin Pitsuwan (Former Foreign Minister of Thailand), Iqbal Riza (then Chef de Cabinet of the UN) and Bradford Smith (then Vice President, Ford Foundation). A part of the members was changed according to their official function. The Trust Fund for Human Security: For the "Human Centered" 21st Century, Global Issues Cooperation Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2009, [http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/human\\_secu/t\\_fund21.pdf](http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/human_secu/t_fund21.pdf) (accessed on 05 August 2011).

<sup>17</sup> It is stated that up to the 1980s, the aid program of Japan to developing countries focused basically on two main purposes. The first one was that the development aid was reflecting a policy formulation of Japan to reestablish its severed ties with East Asian countries. The second one was that the aid program of Japan was significant for the country's macro-economic strategy of "guided capitalism" so that the leading sectors could be supported through trade protection, tax credits and so forth. In other words, the development aid program was targeted at complementing Japanese-based foreign investments and trade networks in East Asian countries. See, Steven W. Hook and Guang Zhang, 'Japan's Aid Policy Since the Cold War', *Asian Survey*, Vol.38, No. 11, 1998, pp. 1050-1054.

<sup>18</sup> List 2. The ODA Charter (approved by the Cabinet decision in August 2003), <http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/oda/white/2007/oda2007/html/honpen/hp30400000.htm> (accessed on June 06, 2012).

<sup>19</sup> List 4. List of Current Sector-Specific Initiatives,

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<http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/oda/white/2007/oda2007/html/honpen/hp306000000.htm> (accessed on June 06, 2012).

<sup>20</sup> List 4. List of Current Sector-Specific Initiatives,

<http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/oda/white/2007/oda2007/html/honpen/hp306000000.htm> (accessed on June 06, 2012).

<sup>21</sup> List 2. The ODA Charter (approved by Cabinet decision in August 2003), <http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/oda/white/2007/oda2007/html/honpen/hp304000000.htm> (accessed on June 06, 2012).

<sup>22</sup> This excludes Grand Aid which the Ministry of Foreign Affairs will continue to directly implement for the necessity of diplomatic policy.

<http://www.jica.go.jp/english/about/oda/> (accessed on June 06, 2012).

<sup>23</sup> Assoc. Prof. Dr. Georgio Shani, International Christian University, Department of International Relations, Tokyo, interview by the author, November 06, 2010.

## **CHAPTER IV**

### **JAPAN'S COOPERATIVE INITIATIVES IN A REGIONAL CONTEXT**

#### **4.1 Introduction**

This chapter begins with a brief overview of the regional architecture of East Asia during the Cold War years in terms of bilateralism versus multilateralism. Then, the study presents an analysis of two key regional initiatives by focusing on the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and Japan's stance toward these significant regional initiatives. In this context, the chapter will be guided by the following two thematic questions: (1) How does Japan perceive these regional initiatives within its own framework? (2) Could the consecutive Japanese governments after the end of the Cold War effectively manipulate these newly emerging regional economic and security structures for its own purposes to avoid a deep fear of uncertainty and anxiety?

The sub-argument of this chapter is as follows. Especially within the timeframe studied in this thesis, Japan has attached great importance to the formation of economic and security systems, such as APEC and ARF, from the regional perspective established by dialogue and cooperation to construct a stable cognitive environment in East Asia. However, Japan's

endeavour was only partially successful because of countries having different economic and political systems in the region.

#### **4.2 A Brief Overview of the Regional Architecture in East Asia during the Cold War**

Scholars and experts in political science and international relations generally describe East Asia as one of the most dynamic but volatile regions of the world. The struggle of great powers for the domination of the region; the unsolved religious, ethnic, and cultural problems; and in particular, the on-going but chaotic socio-economic and political transformations of post-war states are some of the reasons researchers cite as to why the region of East Asia has been unstable throughout the years. The region of East Asia is generally divided into two sub-regions, based on geographic distribution, for empirical analysis of the entire region: Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia. Northeast Asia includes such states as Japan, the People's Republic of China (PRC), Taiwan, South Korea (or the Republic of Korea), North Korea (or the Democratic People's Republic of Korea), Russia (in particular Pacific Russia), and Mongolia. Southeast Asia encompasses the Brunei Sultanate, Burma (Myanmar), Cambodia, East Timor, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam. In addition, it is a well-known fact that the US plays a key role as a global actor in the region. Although the US cannot geographically be portrayed as an East Asian power, its dramatic engagement in the complex realities of the region makes it a significant actor in these two sub-regions.

Many local languages are spoken in the region of East Asia, and significant religious rituals reflecting Buddhist teachings, Islam, and Christianity still influence the social life and shape the social structure of the region. For example, Malaysia, Indonesia, and the southern part of the

Philippines are countries where the majority religion is Islam. Similarly, Christianity is found in some parts of South Korea and the Philippines. Buddhism is also practiced in many parts of the region, along with other religions (Hill, 2007, pp. 9 - 10).

A common phenomenon is that, currently, East Asian countries are organized on the basis of the Westphalian model of sovereignty. The transition into this model in the region was realized as a result of commercial contacts of Europeans with Asians. However, it should also be pointed out that almost all the countries in the region were able to gain their independence from European colonial powers after the end of the Second World War. Moreover, broadly speaking, throughout history, the region of East Asia, with different characteristics from Western-oriented states, has developed powerful civilizations within the framework of a monarchic structure. Chinese, Japanese, and to some extent, Indian civilizations are considered typical examples of such structures. In this context, the Chinese and Indian civilizations made great contributions to the cultural development of the Southeast Asian sub-region, as indicated by the original French concept of Indo-china, which reflected these dual effects (Godement, 1997, p. 19).

In the region of East Asia, currently, many different types of political systems and regimes exist, ranging from constitutional monarchies and democratic systems to one-party governments and dictatorships. For example, Japan is both a constitutional monarchy, in which the role of the emperor is limited to a certain degree, and a liberal-democratic political system governed by democratically elected representatives. Within this framework, Article 7 of the Japanese constitution of 1947 clearly enumerates the acts of the emperor in relation to political affairs:

The Emperor shall, with the advice and approval of the Cabinet, perform the following acts in matters of state on behalf of the people: (1) Promulgation of

amendments of the constitution, laws, cabinet orders and treaties. (2) Convocation of the Diet. (3) Dissolution of the House of Representatives. (4) Proclamation of general election of members of the Diet. (5) Attestation of the appointment and dismissal of Ministers of State and other officials as provided by law, and of full powers and credentials of Ambassadors and Ministers. (6) Attestation of general and special amnesty, commutation of punishment, reprieve and restoration of rights. (7) Awarding of honors. (8) Attestation of instruments of ratification and other diplomatic documents as provided by law. (9) Receiving foreign ambassadors and ministers. (10) Performance of ceremonial functions.

On the other hand, the PRC is governed by an authoritarian Communist regime, based on a one-party system, that is, the Communist Party of China. Currently, however, the term *communism* is gradually losing its meaning on the Chinese main continent because its legitimacy in the country was based on nationalism and economic performance. In 1988, Harry Harding, an American political scientist focusing on Chinese politics, emphasized the stance of China toward economic reconstruction, indicating, "for the first time in its history, China is governed by an effective, consolidated government that has identified economic modernization as its highest priority" (Harding, 1988).

In addition to the PRC, North Korea, Vietnam, and Laos have communist governments. North Korea, for example, has an authoritarian regime based on a one-party system referred to as the *Korean Workers' Party*. Although North Korea started to follow a Marxist-Leninist line in its ruling system when it was founded in September 1948, later, this philosophy was transplanted by the *juche* ideology, which has been defined as Kim Il Sung's revolutionary idea and means 'self-reliance'. The idea of *juche*, developed by Kim Il Sun to separate the North Korean regime from other communist regimes such as the Soviet Union and PRC, strongly emphasises an independent and well-organized society, relying on its own reserves and built on a strong military (Kihl, 2006, pp. 8 - 9).

On the other hand, from the late 1980s on, Northeast Asia also witnessed South Korea and Taiwan, adopting liberal democratic values

such as freedom, plurality, and equality, became involved in the processes of democratisation and political modernisation (MacDougall, 2006, p. 19).<sup>1</sup> Moreover, especially in Southeast Asia, several countries have been established democratic principles in the post-war period although in practice these countries have met some difficulties in their enforcement activities. For example, after gaining its independence in 1946, the Philippines started to pursue a democratic model. Malaysia and Singapore are also regimes based on democratic principles although, from time to time, they still exhibit authoritarian features. In Thailand, controlled by a militarist regime throughout the Cold War, authoritarian and democratic tendencies started to coexist. While Burma is governed by a militarist and authoritarian regime, Brunei is ruled by the Sultanate. Thus, the region of East Asia presents a mixture of numerous diverging political systems, from countries adopting democratic and liberal tendencies to those exhibiting communist and authoritarian features (Mason, 2005, pp. 232 - 243).<sup>2</sup>

From the first years of the Cold War to the late 1980s, the security cooperation of states in East Asia has largely been based on bilateral dialogues, aiming generally at solving the existing problems in the style of *ad hoc* diplomacy. These security dialogues in the region of East Asia were largely seen by scholars and politicians as an American hub-and-spokes configuration (Capie, 2004, p. 149), finally creating, in a sense, a dependency on the US for newly independent and weak countries not only in economic terms but also in political and security affairs. From this perspective, once instituted, bilateral relations started to be seen by Washington as its primary framework for security initiatives in East Asia. Thus, dependence on the US has, in large part, confined the security policies and foreign policy options of many East Asian countries. Being different from the post-war multilateral security and political order built in the Euro-Atlantic area, this partially hegemonic order created by Washington in the region around its alliances with Japan, South Korea, and some of the Southeast Asian countries resulted in the development of

bilateralism instead of giving rise to multilateralism (Ikenberry & Tsuchiyama, 2002, pp. 71 - 72).<sup>3</sup>

In this context, Jörn Dosch (2000, p. 87) explains that the main reason Euro–Atlantic area and the region of East Asia have had different discourses and approaches to their security affairs was because of the role played by the US. According to him, Washington has failed to build multilateral institutions and initiatives in the region of East Asia because of a ‘huge asymmetry’ between the US and its newly independent allies. Therefore, in this region, bilateral and multilateral relations became more flexible, allowing the US a greater security-related and economic control over the region’s actors. Similarly, Christopher Hemmer and Peter J. Katzenstein (2008, p. 185) note that, while the US has opted in the North Atlantic area for an institutional form based on multilateral relations, it has preferred to exercise its authority over East Asia on the basis of bilateral relations. According to Hemmer and Katzenstein, this situation is chiefly because Washington perceived these two regions differently:

Perceptions of collective identity played an underappreciated role in this decision. Shaped by racial, historical, political and cultural factors, US policymakers saw their potential European allies as relatively equal members of a shared community. At the beginning of the Cold War, this difference in mutual identification, in combination with material factors and considerations of efficiency, was of critical importance in defining the interests and shaping the choices of US decision makers in Europe and Asia.

In fact, the policy makers in Washington had sought to establish a series of special relationships in East Asia, assuring the key regional players that their relationships with the US were both critical and essential (Mastanduno, 2002, p. 194). As noted previously, bilateralism in terms of a hub-and-spokes configuration has been generally dominated by the alliance relationships between the US and regional actors in East Asia. In addition to bilateral dialogues, however, the region of East Asia saw only two robust developments during the Cold War in terms of regional organizations. One is the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO),

which was founded in September 1954 for the collective defence of Southeast Asia, and is an American devised and led alliance (Lyon, 2008, p. 154). The second is the ASEAN, formed in 1967 by Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand with the general aim of furthering economic growth, peace, and stability in the region.

In fact, SEATO was established through the initiative of Washington to prevent the further spread of communism in the sub-region of Southeast Asia. Reflecting culturally and politically an anti-Communist viewpoint, its members included the Philippines, Thailand, New Zealand, Australia, Pakistan, France, the United Kingdom, and the US. Such participating countries as France and the United Kingdom have had close historic relationships with their old colonies and were interested in security-related and economic matters in the region. New Zealand and Australia were geographically close to the sub-region of Southeast Asia. Pakistan also sought a potential support network in its struggle against India (Security, 2011). However, while the Philippines and Thailand were the only countries in the region to join the organization, other Southeast Asian nations preferred to remain politically and militarily neutral because of the organization's potential engagement in military activities led by the US.<sup>4</sup> Japan also did not engage in the activities of SEATO, largely because of the Ninth Article of the 1947 Japanese Constitution, which would not permit Japan to join in any militarist activity in any area. Thus, it was clearly impossible for Japan to deploy troops to overseas areas in military intervention missions.

The limitation of SEATO has been quite apparent from its inception. Broadly speaking, the standpoint of newly independent Southeast Asian countries toward this new initiative has been one of suspicion, and they were politically unmotivated. Consequently, the reluctance of these countries regarding burden sharing in the use of common military force confined SEATO's effectiveness in terms of dealing with aggression and

subversion in the region (Hess, 1990, p. 286). For that reason, it served a psychological purpose much more than a military one. Therefore, SEATO became a prime example of failure because of difficulties with coordinating military forces among members, as exemplified in the Laotian civil war from 1953–1975.

As opposed to the formation of SEATO, the emergence of ASEAN was directly related to the political conditions that had affected the sub-region of Southeast Asia. In 1963, attempts to found the Malaysia Federation were seen by Indonesia as a sign of the United Kingdom's ongoing activities in the region. After the creation of the Malaysia Federation in 1963, the Indonesian government did not recognize this new regime as an independent authority and supported the separatist movements in the country, causing significant increase in tension and anxiety in the region. Furthermore, after the 1966 military coup in Indonesia, the Suharto regime that took power from Sukarno started to support separatist movements against communism in Southeast Asia and tried to develop its relations with non-Communist countries. This process resulted in changes in the viewpoints of countries toward regional integration. Consequently, in August 1967, ASEAN was founded by Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, the Philippines, and Singapore with the Bangkok Declaration specifically focusing on not only economic development but also close cooperation in the areas of security and politics (Dosch, 2007, p. 1). The Bangkok Declaration initially referred to the matters of economic and cultural cooperation. However, despite that cultural and economic relations became important elements for actors in the region, within the framework of existing conditions, the organization's security and political role could not be denied.

Concerning this general picture, it is interesting to note that one of the most significant barriers to the development of the regional organization in East Asia was the role played by regional actors in their

political modernisation processes. A common phenomenon is that the term *modernisation*, as defined in chapter two, simply refers to a process that has brought about global and regional integration based on supposed universal principles, including material factors such as industrialisation and immaterial factors such as the evolution of a new social order based on industrialisation. To put it differently, during this process, a special relationship between political modernisation and ensuing economic outcomes arose. In the region of East Asia, while some newly independent regional actors rapidly began to pursue liberal political systems and democratisation goals and then to modernise their economies, others' transformation of political culture in response to the changes in the social and physical environment occurred much more slowly. Religious and cultural strife and civil wars also triggered instability in some parts of the region. Overall, until the 1970s, the role of ASEAN in regional security and economic problems became less important because of the lack of solidarity. However, in February 1976, the meeting of ASEAN's heads of governments was seen as a turning point in terms of ASEAN's enhanced role (MacDougall, 2002, p. 117). At this meeting, some substantial objectives and principles were adopted by states to maintain sustainability and political stability in the region. An interpretation of the declaration strongly indicated that the cooperation should be based on "trust and solidarity" (ASEAN, 2012).

### **4.3 Constituting a Shared Knowledge in East Asia: Cooperative Initiatives in the post-Cold War Era**

As in other regions, new security and political parameters that emerged after the end of the Cold War introduced the possibility of cooperation among the countries in the region of East Asia. Doubtless, sustainable political and economic development for a region is only possible in a peaceful and harmonious social environment. However, while

security and economic cooperation offer opportunities for governments to foster mutual trust and responsibility, the existing regional threats and uncertainties also negatively affect the future of a peaceful and stable environment painstakingly built in the region.

A number of scholars argue that, throughout the Cold War period, building a regional community in East Asia was difficult because of such critical reasons as diversified cultural and religious settings, unsolved problems remaining from the past, and differences in economic realms among the countries in the region (Zhao, 2008, p. 95). In fact, as noted above, evidence indicates that the Cold War reality directly shaped the security framework of East Asia, where two great powers—the US and the Soviet Union—tried to pursue their own economic interests and military needs and to spread their own ideologies. Thus, the countries in the region were forced to build their bilateral relations with either the US or the Soviet Union. The security alliance relationship between Japan and the US is a typical example reflecting Washington's hub-and-spokes configuration for the East Asian region. The friendship treaty signed in 1950 between the PRC and the Soviet Union is another example. In this manner, efforts to construct regional initiatives and institutions in East Asia have been significantly influenced by the continuous reconfiguring of the power politics of the great powers since the end of the Second World War to the late 1980s (Zhao, 2008, pp. 99 - 100).

#### **4.3.1 The Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation: An Introduction**

Within the framework of efforts for constructing regional economic cooperation, East Asia and the Pacific countries, at the end of the 1980s, started to explore the possibilities of creating an economic and political zone project. In this sense, APEC, which was founded in late 1989 by Japan, Australia, the US, Canada, New Zealand, South Korea, and six ASEAN

members (Brunei Darussalam, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand), was largely seen as a significant entrepreneurial endeavour for regional economic integration. In this regard, APEC is the first region-wide multilateral discussion forum (Deng, 1997, p. 353).

According to the main statement of APEC (APEC, 2011), it was founded “to build a dynamic and harmonious Asia Pacific community by championing free and open trade and investment, promoting and accelerating regional economic integration, encouraging economic and technical cooperation, enhancing human security and facilitating a favourable and sustainable business environment”. Although APEC is not simply an East Asian-based economic initiative from its inception but encompasses almost all East Asia and the Pacific countries, this cooperative initiative was perceived by the Japanese government as a means of improving and deepening its relations with East Asian nations. In fact, the basis of APEC can be seen in the internal report prepared by the Japanese Ministry of International Trade and Industry in 1988, recommending the idea of forming a regional-level economic cooperative in Asia and the Pacific. The report offered to create ministerial-level formal arrangements for the Japanese government to promote peace and security throughout the region. After a while, this report was conveyed by Japan’s Ministry of International Trade and Industry to eleven Asia and Pacific countries, which became, a year later, the primary members of APEC (Ashizawa, 2008, p. 583).

Before the formation of APEC in 1989, Australian Prime Minister Robert Hawke proposed a discussion forum to promote economic cooperation in the region. However, this proposal revealed a critical difference with the proposal recommended by the Japanese Ministry of International Trade and Industry. According to Japanese officials, the participation of the US in the prospective regional formation was crucial. Therefore, they developed a threefold strategy to bring their proposal into

reality: (1) promulgating the proposal to other potential members, (2) convincing Australia concerning the participation of the US, and (3) endorsing Australia in taking initiatives for regional organization building. In a short while, a consensus was found among the potential members to take initiatives on regional institution building, and the first meeting of APEC was held in Canberra, Australia, on November 6, 1989 (Ashizawa, 2008, p. 583).

In 1991, the PRC became a member of APEC.<sup>5</sup> Mexico and Papua New Guinea joined in 1993, Chile in 1994, and then Peru, Russia, and Vietnam in 1997 (MacDougall, 2006, p. 304). Thus, APEC, which had had only twelve members in 1989, slowly increased its global network in the economic realm (Ravenhill, 2000, p. 320). As the largest three economies in the world, Japan, the PRC, and the US ostensibly increased the importance of APEC in the early 1990s. These actors largely determined the direction of world economy by playing effective roles in APEC's activities during its formative years (Cossa & Khanna, 1997, p. 220).


#### **4.3.1.1 Japan's Possible Leadership Role in APEC**

Japan's increasing efforts to encourage foreign trade and investments and its foreign aid agenda toward the region of East Asia through the ODA had, in a sense, provided a solid ground for regional cooperative initiatives (Maruoka, 1999, pp. 1 - 23). Japan's volume of ODA to ASEAN region countries as a whole had already risen to US \$2.1 billion in 1989, in comparison with US \$700 million 1980. By 1990, Japan became Asia's top trade partner. In terms of foreign direct investment of Japan, its total investment in Asia in 1992 rose to US \$60 billion in comparison to US \$19.5 billion in 1985. Therefore, the evidence indicates that Japan's foreign investment in Asia in general and its economic ties with East Asia in

particular, at least until the end of the Cold War, was quite profitable (Deng, 1997, pp. 354 - 355).

**Table 4: Japan's General Account Budget for Official Development Assistance (1978-1990)**

Source: <http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/oda/shiryo/yosan.html>  
(accessed on February 05, 2012)



Source: <http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/oda/shiryo/yosan.html>  
(accessed on February 05, 2012)

However, Japan's economic presence in Asia, especially in the sub-region of Southeast Asia, unavoidably caused some problems with the US, whose economic ties with Asian countries had been steadily rising in the 1990s. For example, the US has had more direct investment in and foreign trade with APEC countries than with those of the European Union. In 1993, more than 60% of the total trade of the US was with APEC countries while the European zone had only 20% in US total foreign trade volume. To encourage and promote foreign trade and investment activities in the region, the US administration decided to participate enthusiastically in a

multilateral economic forum against the economic expansion of Japan. APEC, in this sense, could be a great opportunity for the US to facilitate its trade and investment growth. For this reason, the US decided to elevate the APEC forum to a series of summit meetings among member countries (Deng, 1997, p. 356).

From this perspective, in 1993, at the first summit meeting in Seattle, Washington, the APEC leaders decided to form a community of Asia Pacific economies on the basis of annual meetings. At this meeting, a vision statement expressing the background of the main purpose for the next meeting in Bogor was issued. The main subjects mentioned in this vision statement are as follows (APEC, 1994): (1) Finding a solution by cooperation among member countries to the challenges in Asia and the Pacific area and the rapidly changing world economy; (2) supporting the open multilateral trading system and an expanding world economy; (3) cutting barriers to the trade and investment to make it possible that goods, services, and capital can flow freely among member economies, and (4) assuring that member countries share the profit of economic growth, improve education and training, and connect member countries' economies through telecommunication and transportation and that they use resources in the region in a sustainable way.

One year later, at the Bogor summit in Indonesia, APEC leaders drew a road map for the future of economic cooperation in the region that would increase the potential for economic growth. According to the Bogor declaration issued in 1994, the liberalisation of trade relations at the international and regional levels was sought by the heads of state and governments of APEC countries. In this context, APEC leaders made a commitment to establishing a zone of free and open trade and investment on the level of industrialized APEC members by 2010 and for other industrializing members by 2020. At this summit, Japan also proposed a threefold process for the maturity of APEC, with the countries

interconnected to each other (Deng, 1997, p. 358): (1) APEC should become an arena of relaxed discussions rather than negotiations. (2) APEC should be a group that opens its door to other nations. (3) APEC should seek to implement a gradual reduction of tariff duties through discussions.

Later in that same year, at the ministerial meeting in Indonesia, the Japanese Deputy Prime Minister Yohei Kono highlighted Japan's commitment to the Bogor Declaration by emphasizing "the importance of further promoting the reduction of barriers to trade and investment to further stimulate the economic dynamism of the Asia Pacific region" and stating that "facilitation and liberalization of trade/investment and economic/technical cooperation for development are two wheels on the same axle to bring about growth and prosperity in the Asia Pacific region" ((MOFA), 1995). At that meeting, Yohei Kono also proposed a concept called *Partners for Progress*, planning a wide network of cooperation among all members in APEC ((MOFA), 1995). This proposal is highly significant for a number of reasons. First, these official statements show the desire of the Japanese government to construct a robust community in the region through which it could directly use its political and economic influence over other members. Second, it could be a great opportunity for East Asian governments to reconsider their trust or distrust of and animosity toward Japan. Consequently, following the Bogor summit, Japan began to see APEC as a discussion and ideas forum moving toward further possible cooperation in the region.<sup>6</sup>

In the early years of APEC, the government, business sector, and academic society in Japan reached a relatively strong consensus on what kind of structure APEC should have. First, it was critical that APEC should be institutionalized step-by-step by paying attention in particular to the heterogeneity of member economies in the region. Therefore, in the formative years, the Asian economies should stay with their natural market mechanisms, not within an institutional and structured framework.

Second, APEC should follow a guiding policy and strategy on open regionalism, which means that liberalisation steps taken within APEC should be unreservedly applied to non-member economies and that APEC should promote anti-discriminatory practices against both its member economies and non-member countries. Third, cooperation in development should be one of the primary items on APEC's future agenda. Trade and investment liberalisation had great significance for APEC members but were not the only focal point because of the shortage of industrial infrastructure in many of those countries (Yamamoto & Kikuchi, 1998, pp. 201 - 202).

Therefore, from the beginning of APEC in 1989, Japan tried to articulate a set of principles and a vision of APEC different from those of the US. As noted previously, while the Japanese officials had always given greater emphasis to APEC having a loose consultative forum centred on consensus to support cooperative initiatives in the region, the US desired a more structured and contractual approach. At the first summit meeting held in Seattle, Washington, in 1993, the Japanese Prime Minister Morihiro Hosokawa underscored the stance of Japan on the development of APEC by saying that "Japan had no desire to see the regional forum institutionalized or turned into a free trading area. (. . .) It is very important that we respect the interests of the developing countries in the Asia Pacific region and heed their opinions and try to promote the activities of APEC step by step" (Deng, 1997, p. 357). However, the Japanese officials measuredly tried to keep Tokyo away from any direct conflict or dispute with Washington. In other words, although Japan covertly tried to play a leadership role in the formation of APEC, it preferred to stay in the background and concentrate only on building its economic network in the region of East Asia without being a competitor or a challenger to the US (Deng, 1997, p. 358).

In fact, in the 1990s, Japan sought a "mediating role" between the maximalist members, defending the argument that APEC should turn into a

structured and negotiating platform, and the minimalist members, advocating that APEC should remain an informal consultative and coordinating body for their member economies. Nevertheless, this role designated for Japan was drastically challenged by its passivity and lack of leadership skills in diplomatic affairs (Deng, 1997, p. 359).

At the Subic summit in the Philippines in 1996, which was another cornerstone in strengthening cooperative economic initiative in the region, the APEC leaders had detailed discussions regarding how member countries comprehend their liberal market goals introduced in the Bogor Declaration. In this framework, the APEC Manila Action Plan was adopted by the leaders of member countries (Cossa & Khanna, 1997, p. 221). Japan underscored this entrepreneurship by stating that APEC had passed into the action phase with the adoption of the Manila Action Plan. According to the Japanese officials, the Manila Action Plan summarized free and open trade and investment and business facilitation steps to be implemented toward realizing Bogor goals and referred, in particular, to the Osaka Action Agenda describing a robust policy dialogue among the member economies ((MOFA), 1996).

#### **4.3.1.2 The Asian Financial Crisis of 1997–1998 and Japan's Leadership Role**

The efforts of Japan concerning the recovering East Asian economies during 1997–1998 are a typical example of Japan's possible leadership role in the region. The Asian financial crisis of 1997 played havoc with economic cooperative initiatives in the region of East Asia. According to Steven Radelet and Jeffrey Sachs (2000, p. 105), the Asian financial crisis, starting in Thailand apparently because of a dramatic drop in the value of the Thai *baht*, Malaysian *ringgit*, Philippine *peso*, and Indonesian *rupiah*, is noteworthy in several respects. First, this crisis hit

the most rapidly developing markets in the world. Second, it was the severest economic catastrophe affecting the developing world since the 1982 debt crisis. Last, it was a financial crisis that could not be anticipated easily. The emerging developments in the economic realm chiefly forced foreign banks to announce short-term loans to countries and foreign investors to remove their capital from the region. At this juncture, economically fragile countries, such as South Korea, Indonesia, and Thailand, were obliged to seek funds for their capital requirements and regain the confidence of foreign investors in the region. Within this context, the IMF imposed some measures, including less government spending and higher interest rates, which meant attracting foreign investors again to the region and stabilizing the regional currencies by applying fiscal discipline. Nevertheless, these structural measures and reforms required by the IMF authorities caused further deterioration of the economic situation in the region and resulted in trade and commerce closures, layoffs, and accelerated capital flight throughout East Asia (Narine, 2003, pp. 67 - 68).

On the other hand, the Asian financial crisis of 1997 also reshaped Japan's economic policy agenda toward the region of East Asia. At the Group of Seven (G7)–IMF meetings held in Hong Kong in September 1997, the Japanese financial officials, led by Japan's Vice Minister of International Affairs, Eisuke Sakakibara, proposed the idea of establishing an Asian Monetary Fund (AMF), amounting to US \$100 billion, of which half of the reserve would come from Japan and the rest from Taiwan, Singapore, Hong Kong, and the PRC. The main purpose was to regulate fiscal and monetary policy in the region of East Asia in the aftermath of the financial crisis as a financial and regional option to the IMF. Shaun Narine indicated that "the proposed AMF would build on Asia's saving surplus, foreign exchange reserves and net-creditor status to finance the debt of the crisis-affected countries." However, although the proposal by Japan somewhat increased hopes of receiving financial help among the economically poor and crisis-

ridden countries of East Asia, the IMF's and Washington's stance toward the creation of the AMF obstructed the preparatory effort by Japan (Lipsey, 2003, p. 93). The US and IMF argued that the establishment of the AMF would create 'moral hazard' problems by securing countries' access to fiscal support. The IMF wanted to preserve its dominant position as the principal international institution responsible for controlling the world economy and the US also did not want to see an institution led by Japan with the capacity to challenge its influence and position in the economic sphere in the region. Furthermore, South Korea and China also supported the stance of Washington concerning creating the AMF because of fear of the regional aspirations of Japan (Narine, 2003, pp. 68 - 69).

Nevertheless, the Japanese government, looking for a way out of this matter financially, provided a huge aid package for rebuilding shattered economies in the region (Beason & Yoshimatsu, 2007, p. 239). In this regard, the Japanese Finance Minister Kiichi Miyazawa prepared a rescue plan for East Asian economies,<sup>7</sup> totalling US \$30 billion, of which US \$15 billion would be made available for the medium-to-long-term financial needs for economic recovery in East Asian countries and another US \$15 billion would be put in a specified position for their possible short-term capital needs during the process of implementing economic reform ((MOFA), 2000). The main aim of this economic initiative by the Japanese government primarily for East Asian economies was to provide some financial assistance until they regained their financial strength. That is, the New Miyazawa Initiative introduced in 1998 by Japan was primarily designed to boost East Asian countries affected by the economic crisis rather than reconfigure the economic structure of the region, as thought by the IMF. The announcement of the initiative made it possible, in part, for Japan to be seen by East Asian countries as an 'accepted economic leader' in the region. Thus, many East Asian countries started to seek support from Japan under the framework of New Miyazawa Initiative. This economic rescue plan prepared by the Japanese government has been

implemented steadily. Various measures taken directly and indirectly were applied within the framework of the New Miyazawa Initiative, including direct official financial assistance through the import-export bank of Japan to international financial markets. These efforts of Japan to rebuild the East Asian economy were also welcomed by the US (Hayashi, 2006, p. 99). More precisely, the US did not oppose this policy decision of Japan toward East Asia because it was preoccupied with financial problems in Latin American countries.

According to the New Miyazawa Initiative, Thailand received US \$1.9 billion in December 1998; Malaysia, US \$1.5 billion in December 1998 and US \$700 million in March 1999; Indonesia, US \$2.4 billion in February 1999; the Philippines, US \$1.6 billion in March 1999; and South Korea, US \$5 billion in January 1999 and US \$1 billion in March 1999 (Hook, et al., 2005, pp. 205 - 206).

#### **4.3.1.3 Concluding Remarks**

To sum up, starting in the US in 1993 and organized among the political leaders of member countries, annual meetings of APEC have contributed to increasing its credibility among the international community. Moreover, these meetings, bringing the leaders of member economies together, have been regularly held by a host country every year: Canada in 1997, Malaysia in 1998, New Zealand in 1999, Brunei in 2000, the PRC in 2001, Mexico in 2002, Thailand in 2003, Chile in 2004, the Republic of Korea in 2005, Vietnam in 2006, Australia in 2007, Peru in 2008, Singapore in 2009, and Japan in 2010. However, in almost all meetings and discussions held in different locations among member economies, although the significance of economic, financial, and technical cooperation in various areas toward sustainable development in an entire region has been emphasized by APEC leaders, implementing proposed

adaptations and reforms within the framework of this cooperation has been very slow.

Currently, the East Asian region has entered a new era in which economic pragmatism is used as principle guide for foreign policy and attempts are made to resolve historical animosities on the basis of goodwill. Today in East Asia, most of the political and security decisions made by states are meaningful in economic terms. That is, economic factors gradually affect the decisions of states concerning political and security spheres and bring about an increase in the phenomenon of interdependency. This fact is seen in the economic network set up throughout the region after the end of the Cold War. For example, from 1994 to 2009, APEC economies' total trade in goods grew at 7.1% per year while intra-APEC trade tripled over the same period. Foreign direct investment within and outside of the APEC region grew 13% per year from 1994 to 2008.

In recent years, economic relations between Japan and the APEC region have also become very large. To demonstrate, 70% of Japan's trade volume is directly related to this region (75% from exports and 66% from imports). To develop the Japanese economy, the Japanese officials say that it is necessary to deepen a collaborative relationship with each economy in the APEC area, which is vital for the growth of the Japanese economy. In particular, they say that it is indispensable to extend the economic assistance of Japan to Asia and the Pacific area in every field. According to them, instead of holding separate meetings, which would be time consuming for nations in the region, the Japanese government should promote efficient cooperation in every field to consolidate the APEC economies ((MOFA), 2011). In other words, the Japanese officials believe that gathering the countries in East Asia and the Pacific into the APEC forum for the purpose of regional economic cooperation would have much better results than holding separate consultations among major actors.

Therefore, it is significant that Japan attends the annual meetings of government leaders within the APEC forum to promote regional cooperation ((MOFA), 2003).

In this sense, at the annual meeting in Yokohoma in November 2010, for example, Japan described how the APEC community should be imagined and understood by member countries, referring in particular to freer and more open trade and investment; better connected supply chains; cheaper, faster, and easier business; and more balanced, inclusive, sustainable, innovative, and secure growth (METI, 2011). From this perspective, the Japanese government has described a well-defined vision of the APEC region. First, the APEC members should become an economically integrated community, striving for stronger and deeper economic integration in terms of liberalising and facilitating trade and investment in the region. Second, APEC should become a robust community, referring in particular to the enhancement of the quality of growth among APEC members to compete in the world economy. Last, APEC should become a secure community, providing the required infrastructure to construct a strengthened economic environment in the region without fear and anxiety (METI, 2011). To sum up, in economic terms, the Japanese policy makers have defended to establish a regional economic network which has been referring to freer and more open trade and investment with both other regional countries and non-regional actors. Thus, it can be said that to sustain the basic trust mechanism constituted in Cold War years between neighbouring countries and Japan, this aim was partly realized. However, to be able understand the whole picture in the region, especially to see Japan's manipulations in regional structures; we need to consider the security perspective of region-based initiatives in East Asia. The following section examines another key regional initiative by focusing on the ASEAN Regional Forum.

**Table 5: List of Participants from Japan, Summit Meeting of APEC Leaders**

Source: [http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/apec/sanka\\_s.html](http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/apec/sanka_s.html)

(accessed on 4 December 2011)

Summit Meeting	Leaders Name
The 18 <sup>th</sup> APEC Economic Leaders' Meeting in 2010 (Yokohama)	Prime Minister Naoto Kan (菅直人総理大臣)
The 17 <sup>th</sup> APEC Economic Leaders' Meeting in 2009 (Singapore)	Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama (鳩山由紀夫総理大臣)
The 16 <sup>th</sup> APEC Economic Leaders' Meeting in 2008 (Lima)	Prime Minister Taro Aso (麻生太郎総理大臣)
The 15 <sup>th</sup> APEC Economic Leaders' Meeting in 2007 (Sydney)	Prime Minister Shinzo Abe (安倍晋三総理大臣)
The 14 <sup>th</sup> APEC Economic Leaders' Meeting in 2006 (Hanoi)	Prime Minister Shinzo Abe (安倍晋三総理大臣)
The 13 <sup>th</sup> APEC Economic Leaders' Meeting in 2005 (Busan)	Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi (小泉純一郎総理大臣)
The 12 <sup>th</sup> APEC Economic Leaders' Meeting in 2004 (Santiago)	Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi (小泉純一郎総理大臣)
The 11 <sup>th</sup> APEC Economic Leaders' Meeting in 2003 (Bangkok)	Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi (小泉純一郎総理大臣)
The 10 <sup>th</sup> APEC Economic Leaders' Meeting in 2002 (Los Cabos)	Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi (小泉純一郎総理大臣)
The 9 <sup>th</sup> APEC Economic Leaders' Meeting in 2001 (Shanghai)	Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi (小泉純一郎総理大臣)
The 8 <sup>th</sup> APEC Economic Leaders' Meeting in 2000 (Bandar Seri Begawan)	Prime Minister Yoshiro Mori (森喜朗総理大臣)
The 7 <sup>th</sup> APEC Economic Leaders' Meeting in 1999 (Auckland)	Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi (小渕恵三総理大臣)
The 6 <sup>th</sup> APEC Economic Leaders' Meeting in 1998 (Kuala Lumpur)	Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi (小渕恵三総理大臣)
The 5 <sup>th</sup> APEC Economic Leaders' Meeting in 1997 (Vancouver)	Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto (橋本龍太郎総理大臣)
The 4 <sup>th</sup> APEC Economic Leaders' Meeting in 1996 (Manila)	Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto (橋本龍太郎総理大臣)
The 3 <sup>th</sup> APEC Economic Leaders' Meeting in 1995 (Osaka)	Prime Minister Murayama Tomiichi (村山富市総理大臣)
The 2 <sup>nd</sup> APEC Economic Leaders' Meeting in 1994 (Jakarta)	Prime Minister Murayama Tomiichi (村山富市総理大臣)
The 1 <sup>st</sup> APEC Economic Leaders' Meeting in 1993 (Seattle)	Prime Minister Morihiro Hosokawa (細川護熙総理大臣)

### **4.3.2 The ASEAN Regional Forum**

#### **4.3.2.1 The Nakayama Proposal and the Establishment of ARF**

As described above, the region of East Asia is one of the most dynamic and divergent regions in the world. Moreover, because almost all of the states located in this region gained their independence during the early Cold War period, it took time for these states to develop political institutions truly based on the rule of law, freedom, and democratic values. In addition, the region of East Asia was exposed to the reality of power politics from the great powers throughout the Cold War: on the one hand, the containment policy of the US to prevent the spread of communist regimes over the region, on the other hand, the active diplomacy against this containment policy pursued by the Soviet Union. In this framework, it became difficult to build a security order based on multilateral dialogue and consensus in the region. Instead, this situation gave rise to establishing a network of bilateral relations.

Even ASEAN, which was established primarily by the efforts of Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Singapore, did not define itself as a security-based enterprise. ASEAN has always supported the principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of its members (Funston, 2000, pp. 2 - 3) and followed a vision for the regional order built on the significance of national sovereignty. ASEAN's institutional priorities and strategic initiatives were largely developed within the framework of its members' national interests. To illustrate, throughout the Cold War period, various ASEAN countries committed themselves to the great powers, such as the US and Great Britain, to protect their national sovereignty (Narine, 2004, p. 437).

The region of East Asia has witnessed significant developments in the field of bilateral security arrangements even after the Cold War. The closure of the US military bases in the Philippines in the early 1990s was

offset with mutual military-support agreements concluded between the US and other countries, such as Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Brunei Darussalam. Similarly, the US and Japan started to take various steps toward an improved relationship, including such promising initiatives as the Tokyo Declaration on the US–Japan Global Partnership in 1992 and the US–Japan Joint Declaration on Security Alliance for the 21<sup>st</sup> Century in 1996. In this period, Vietnam also sought to build a military relationship with the US in the region.

Nevertheless, the details of bilateral relationships created by the US with various countries in the region of East Asia have been less elaborated than those of NATO in the Euro–Atlantic area. In general, states located in the Euro–Atlantic area have been politically more motivated and culturally more homogenous than states in the region of East Asia. This difference has strongly contributed to the development of multilateral and comprehensive security arrangements in the Euro–Atlantic region. Furthermore, in the East Asia region, endeavours to construct multilateral security cooperation were frequently blocked because of countries' substantially different political statuses and economic structures. Long-standing territorial issues and ethnic and religious tensions in East Asia have also negatively influenced efforts to improve cross-border links. Consequently, the political and social instability and the fragile economic structure of East Asia during the Cold War created uncertainty regarding the regional security perspective established with dialogue and cooperation in the mid-1990s.

From this perspective, the first and the most significant security initiative at the regional level is the ASEAN Regional Forum,<sup>8</sup> which was founded in July 1994 and included the six ASEAN members, Japan, South Korea, the US, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, the European Union, China, Russia, Vietnam, Laos, and Papua New Guinea. Later, India in 1996 and North Korea in 2000 were admitted to the forum (Tsunekawa, 2005, p.

111). As noted by Kuniko Ashizawa (2008, pp. 583 - 585), the establishment of the ARF became a critical “breakthrough in the security relations of Asia, where such multilateral arrangements were almost non-existent previously.”

Before the establishment of the ARF in 1994, at the ASEAN Post Ministerial Conference held in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, in 1991, the Japanese Foreign Minister Taro Nakayama had offered a multilateral framework for regional security to initiate a political dialogue among regional actors ((MOFA), 2005). At this point, Paul Midford (2000, pp. 367 - 397) argues that two main reasons could explain the proposal designated by Taro Nakayama. First, with the end of the Cold War, the changing strategic environment in the international arena could force Japan to take more concrete and effective initiatives in the regional-security sphere. Second, Japan came to realize that strong feelings of distrust in East Asia toward Japan’s military past could be reduced only through a multilateral security order built on dialogue and cooperation.

Until the Nakayama proposal, the Japanese government did not explicitly talk about multilateralism or multilateral frameworks at the regional level because it had largely opted for strengthening its bilateral relationship with the US. Attempts at multilateral frameworks were generally seen in Japan as leftist endeavours to weaken the US–Japan relationship (Kawasaki, 1997, p. 486). However, the policies pursued by the Soviet Union/Russia in seeking multilateral dialogues in the early 1990s became very effective at taking this shift of Japan from a passive posture to an active stance on the broader regional perspective (Fukushima, 2011, p. 28). In this sense, April 1991 can be considered a turning point, when Soviet President Gorbachev made an official visit to Tokyo to discuss critical issues between the two countries. During his visit, Gorbachev stressed that Russia was no longer opposed to the US–Japan

alliance. This discourse by Gorbachev changed Japan's view on possible multilateral dialogues in the region (Fukushima, 2011, p. 28).

The proposal by Taro Nakayama characterized Japan's first security enterprise since the end of World War II. However, at first, this proposal was not approved of by the US and the ASEAN countries. Six months later, however, the ASEAN countries started to indicate that establishing a regional security order under the ASEAN Post Ministerial Conference could be constructive in the regional-security dialogue (Ashizawa, 2008, p. 584). Preceding the proposal introduced by the Japanese Foreign Minister, the Institute of Strategic and International Studies of ASEAN had a meeting in Jakarta in June 1991 to consider recommendations to be presented at the next ASEAN summit. At this meeting, the document "An ASEAN Initiative for an Asia-Pacific Political Dialogue", offering to seek the foundation of a multilateral security framework called the *ASEAN Post Ministerial Conference*, was accepted. According to the meeting declaration, ASEAN should be both an original initiator and an active member for keeping peace in the region. The declaration also emphasized that, for a positive dialogue of peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific, the ASEAN Post Ministerial Conference should be held after each Post Ministerial Conference in the region (Fukushima, 2011, p. 28).

After the meeting of the Institute of Strategic and International Studies of ASEAN, the Philippines organized a significant conference entitled "ASEAN and the Asia-Pacific Region: Prospects for Security Cooperation in the 1990s." In this conference, a similar proposal was submitted for improving the function of the ASEAN Post Ministerial Conference, envisioning an exchange of ideas on security issues. ASEAN's position toward building a regional cooperative initiative on security issues, in a sense, resulted from the fear and anxiety regarding possible withdrawal of the US military from the region (Fukushima, 2011, p. 28).

#### **4.3.2.2 The ARF and Japan's Posture toward This Security Initiative**

From its inception, the main purposes of the ARF, which were emphasized in the first ARF Chairman's Statement of 1994, were based on promoting positive dialogue and consultation on political and security problems of common interest and concern and significantly contributing to endeavours with regard to preventive diplomacy and confidence building in Asia and the Pacific region (Forum, 2011). At the ASEAN Ministerial meeting held in 1994, as a general consensus, it was stated that "the ARF could become an effective consultative Asia Pacific Forum for promoting open dialogue on political and security cooperation in the region. In this context, ASEAN should work with its ARF partners to bring about a more predictable and constructive pattern of relations in Asia and the Pacific" (Forum, 2011).

In 1996, the ARF designated four principles for the involvement of related countries. (1) *Commitment*: All participants that would like to join the ARF should closely work to accomplish the ARF's crucial ends. Before becoming a member of the ARF, all new participants should accept and be respectful of the decisions and statements already issued by the ARF. All ASEAN members are natural participants of the ARF. (2) *Relevance*: A new participant should be accepted only when it can be observed that it has an effect on the peace and security of the region. (3) *Gradual*: Efforts should be made to keep the number of participants to a controllable level to guarantee the efficiency of the ARF. (4) *Consultations*: All applications for involvement should be submitted to the chairman of the ARF, who will seek advice from all other ARF participants.

The aforementioned reports and statements clearly emphasized the steps to be taken concerning political and security disputes so that more preventive measures could take place to improve the conditions of the Asia-Pacific region and to have more established and proper relationships between Southeast Asia and the major powers (Gilson, 2007, p. 29).

According to the ASEAN principles, the basis of the ARF has evolved from three stages: preventive diplomacy, confidence building, and the development of mechanisms for conflict resolution. (Gilson, 2007, p. 29).

#### **4.3.2.2.1 Contributions and Expectations of Japan to Preventive Diplomacy in the ARF**

The effect of preventive diplomacy on the issues of security has been discussed by member countries of the ARF as well. In this sense, the ARF is divided into two main divisions: (1) activist countries, such as Japan, Australia, Canada, and the US, and (2) reluctant countries, such as China and most ASEAN countries. (Yuzawa, 2006, p. 789). As one of the activist countries interested in developing preventive diplomacy in the ARF, Japan—along with Australia and the US—keenly argued for the actions the ARF should take to avoid the rising contradictions prevailing in the arms sectors. In the early stages of establishing the ARF, Japan imagined the forum as a tool for preventive diplomacy, such as *ad hoc* meetings, a good offices role for the ARF chair, early warnings, dispatch of special representatives and fact-finding missions, and offering practical solutions to the regional conflicts (Yuzawa, 2006, p. 789). Based on these expectations, the Japanese foreign policy makers demanded that the principles behind preventive diplomacy in the forum should be explained in more depth to give a broader view. Doing so would help the forum to implement the measures of preventive diplomacy in a more efficient way for finding solutions to regional conflicts than with narrow definitions limiting the options. Hence, Japan was interested not only in broadening the outcomes of preventive diplomacy to include intrastate and domestic issues but also in refining the principles of non-interference in the internal affairs of states and state sovereignty (Yuzawa, 2006, p. 789).

Implementing such diplomacy would overcome many of the potential conflicts that could occur in the region. In many areas of Asia and the Pacific region, where typical problems occurred over time, the measures of preventive diplomacy were of no use because they excluded many regional clashes that had been occurring in East Timor and Cambodia. In respect to the non-interference and sovereignty principle that China and some ASEAN countries strongly defended, according to the Japanese policy makers, it was impractical to imagine ARF could interfere in regional disputes without approval of the related states (Yuzawa, 2006, p. 789).

According to the Japanese officials, preventive diplomacy would not cause any harm to state sovereignty or the principle of non-interference in internal affairs if such diplomacy were granted authority by states involved. This idea was practical in the late 1990s, and it received support from some of the ASEAN countries like Thailand and the Philippines that officially were ready to justify the traditional principle of non-interference. Generally, the whole idea of the Japanese officials was to forcefully intervene in issues occurring in Asia and the Pacific region if these matters were affecting the regional security of other countries (Yuzawa, 2006, p. 790).

After the Sixth ARF Ministerial Meeting in 1999, Japan sought ways to break down barriers between the reluctant and activist countries to revive the preventive diplomacy measures. In this sense, the main roles of the ARF chair were listed in Japan's paper regarding good offices and synchronization between the ARF meetings: (1) providing early warning by drawing attention to potential regional disputes and conflicts that might hurt regional stability, (2) convening emergency meetings, (3) issuing statements at the chair's discretion (without the consent of ARF members), (4) facilitating discussion on the building of norms in the ARF, (5) enhancing liaisons with external parties such as international

organizations and Track Two forums, (6) promoting confidence building among ARF members by facilitating information exchange and dialogue, and (7) facilitating discussion among ARF members on potential areas of cooperation (Yuzawa, 2006, p. 794).

According to Takeshi Yuzawa (2006, p. 795), in fact, the actions taken by Japan in promoting the role of the ARF chair were simple and thoughtful, but they were far from what the Japanese policy makers had imagined in earlier years. The simplicity of Japan's proposal showed to what extent the worries of reluctant countries regarding the ARF chair's role in preventive diplomacy had affected the forum's policy-making process.

Despite the limitations, the efforts made by Japan to empower the role of the ARF chair in preventive diplomacy were such that it was acceptable both to the reluctant and activist countries. However, to bring all the parties to consensus was not easy because the aversion of the reluctant countries for the ARF chair's role in preventive diplomacy was much greater than previously thought by the Japanese policy makers. According to the reluctant countries, it was not important to examine the role of the ARF chair's role in preventive diplomacy in detail because the confidence-building measures were the main objectives in the ARF's activities. Another criticism of the reluctant countries was that Japan passed the paper without consulting all parties (Yuzawa, 2006, p. 795).

From beginning of the establishment of the ARF, the three primary topics for the member countries had been the specific measures of Preventive Diplomacy, the incentives and principles of Preventive Diplomacy and structural reform of the ARF. Nevertheless, these discussions were not successful in producing any significant results. Ultimately, in 2001, a working definition of the concept and the principles of preventive diplomacy were accepted by the countries of the ARF. However, because of objections from the reluctant countries, such as China

and some ASEAN members, the idea of preventive diplomacy was unsupported for both intra-state issues and humanitarian problems (Yuzawa, 2006, p. 802).

In fact, preventive diplomacy in the ARF showing no progress largely originated from the anxieties of the reluctant countries regarding the ARF's active involvement in conflict prevention and its operating rules of "consensus decision-making" and maintaining a "pace comfortable to all participants", both of which permit proposals to be straightforwardly vetoed. Many preventive diplomacy proposals made by activist countries were simply dropped or significantly reduced in strength, although these proposals appeared to provide a middle basis (Yuzawa, 2006, p. 803).

The reluctant countries, such as China and some ASEAN members, were concerned that the preventive diplomacy roles in the ARF could impair their sovereignty and cause an intervention in their domestic issues. This perception caused apprehension, given the ethnic and political issues including religious, separatist movements, and territorial problems considered by these countries to be domestic issues. Nevertheless, according to the activist countries, these issues, which have the potential spread throughout the entire region and cause an armed conflict at the regional level, could not simply be confined to the framework of domestic matters because they could create security disorder among the regional actors. Briefly, the preventive diplomacy mechanism, which was strongly defended by activist countries led by Japan, could efficiently respond to potential threats coming from intra-state conflicts and crises in the region (Yuzawa, 2006, p. 803).

#### **4.3.2.2.2 Contributions and Expectations of Japan Concerning Confidence-Building Measures in the ARF**

According to the ASEAN member countries, the launch of the ARF in 1994 was a huge step toward their betterment because the only assembly able to bring all the related and unrelated countries together was the ARF, which was trusted by all (Morada, 2010, p. 15). The growth of the ARF was highly affected by the ASEAN Way, which was an ASEAN-led process for determining norms and principles. In its evolutionary stages, this process was seen as the only reason for less development of the ARF, that is, a low level of institutionalisation, as mentioned above (Morada, 2010, pp. 15 - 16).<sup>9</sup>

On the other hand, as a network at the regional level, the ARF has tried to maintain strong and sustainable relations with the three major powers: the US, the PRC, and Japan. This is an important security objective of the ARF. According to many ASEAN member countries, these three main powers are responsible for maintaining peace and development in the region. In this sense, ASEAN countries clearly know that any up and downs in Northeast Asia would surely affect Southeast Asia, both politically and financially, because of the ASEAN's export-led growth strategy (Morada, 2010, p. 18).

Consequently, from 1994 until 1997, the formative years of the ARF process, the institutional establishment and growth, principles and norms, and confidence-building measures remained the main topics under discussion among the participating countries. Regional security issues were not significantly negotiated during this period.<sup>10</sup>

As Takeshi Yuzawa (2006, pp. 72 - 73) discussed in his outstanding article, Japan had significantly contributed to settling the matters between the reluctant and activist countries during the first five years of development of the ARF. However, it was observed that the interest of the

Japanese policy makers and state elites was shattered because of the unsupportive practices in the forum. It was difficult for Japan to search for middle ground because the Japanese policy makers had difficulty in agreeing with the opinions of the parties and operating rules in the ARF originating from the ASEAN Way.

In fact, the proposal offered by the Japanese Foreign Minister Nakayama and Japan's following efforts in the diplomatic area had resulted in the establishment of the ARF in 1994. Two significant developments caused the shift of Japan's opinion. The first development was Japan's growing ambition to have a more active role in political affairs in East Asia during the 1990s. However, the Japanese policy makers were aware that pursuing such a policy would cause deep scepticism and anxiety among Japan's neighbours, which had been exposed to its aggressive and expansionist policies during the Pacific War. Therefore, multilateral security initiatives were adopted by the Japanese policy makers as a policy tool to restore confidence among its neighbouring countries. The second development was that, after the Cold War, Japan came to believe that the time was ripe for countries in the region to undertake the task of expanding their political and security cooperation. Doing so would also affect the security architecture of the region of East Asia. Thus, the Japanese policy makers adopted a multi-faceted approach that emphasized the four following points: (1) increasing regional financial cooperation, (2) taking preventive measures so that disputes and clashes at the sub-regional level could be controlled, (3) trying to continue with the current security measures between Japan and the US, and (4) strengthening mutual trust and confidence at the regional level (Yuzawa, 2006, p. 73).

In the early 1990s, as mentioned above, Japan's interest in regional multilateralism considerably increased, but other factors were also responsible for this change. Given the immense increase in the PRC's military strength and arms build-up in the region of East Asia, there was a

need to advance a regional security initiative. First, the Japanese policy makers began to work more on the security lines by not only considering the simple military program at the regional level but also endorsing greater transparency in military platforms, strategic ambitions, and the purposes of regional countries under the supervision of the ARF. Second, the ARF could be an operational tool for engaging non-like-minded countries, such as the PRC. According to Japanese officials, the PRC was one of those countries that had to be engaged in the regional disputes because it was seen as being a rising military power in the region that could affect the intra-state relations. Engaging it in a multilateral security framework at a regional level could surely contribute to regional stability and prosperity. The Japanese policy makers also considered that the ARF, as a possible restraining diplomatic setting for the PRC, could initiate and promote policy coordination and cooperation between states at the regional level to control unresolved regional disputes and conflicts (Yuzawa, 2006, pp. 74 - 75).

For the ARF countries, the first step towards security cooperation at the regional level was publicizing mutual confidence-building methods. According to the Japanese policy makers, having a better conversation among the member countries and more confidence-building processes were a necessary starting point because they would lead to enhanced understanding of policies and would result in better preparation of the forum. However, the hopes of the Japanese policy makers began to weaken considering the greater picture of the military in the region in the late 1990s because of the slowed process of multilateral confidence-building measures. Many of the efforts made by the Japanese government to promote confidence-building measures were in vain because of the reluctant countries, which did not show any interest or support in implementing some of the requirements, including the publication of defence white papers, which Japan regarded as the required minimum effort toward enhancing the transparency of each country's defence policy.

The information included in the white papers published by the PRC and some other ASEAN countries was still quite confidential and did not tell the whole story. However, the Japanese foreign ministers repeatedly emphasized following the signed agreement in which implementing confidence-building measures was mentioned and which also indicated the significance of military transparency (Yuzawa, 2006, pp. 77 - 78).

#### **4.3.2.3 Concluding Remarks**

Generally speaking, as Yuzawa (2006, pp. 84 - 86) argued, in a normal context and as a final response to the questions in the introduction section, it may be said that the ARF functions for Japan's security in the following ways. First, Japan values the forum to a certain extent because it helps in reassuring its neighbouring countries. To assure their neighbours in the region of East Asia concerning their upcoming security strategies, the Japanese policy makers developed the region-wide security policy. In this sense, the ARF provided Japan with the most appropriate tool it needed for its security strategy. Second, the diplomatic statements made by the ARF have been well-used by Japanese policy makers as a diplomatic tool to pressure certain countries with the help of global criticism. Third, the Japanese policy makers enjoyed, to a certain extent, their engagement policy under the ARF meetings with the PRC and North Korea. With their engagement policy extended to the PRC, the ARF was able to hold negotiations and meetings between the US and Japan to sort out conflicts. Briefly, the ARF largely became helpful to Japan in refining its diplomatic relationships with other regional actors and paved the way, in a sense, for bilateral meetings at higher levels, like that of foreign ministers, which would not have been possible elsewhere. To illustrate, after North Korea joined the ARF in 2000, the ARF was able to discuss its nuclear dispute in its security-dialogue process. The Japanese and US policy makers were able to gather support from other regional countries to bring international

criticism to bear on North Korea's development of missiles and nuclear weapons. Moreover, as will be detailed in the next chapter, Japan enjoyed support from other regional countries to go against North Korea in the ARF Ministerial Meetings when the mutual relations between North Korea and Japan were disrupted.

Furthermore, the PRC's participation in the diplomatic relationship in a multilateral regional framework is crucial and of high interest to Japan. The PRC's nuclear engagements in the region and military exercises against Taiwan in 1995 and 1996 and the 1992 Territorial Waters Law, which had resulted in the annexation of Senkaku Islands, greatly concerned Japan, making it ontologically insecure about its self-identity. To address its ever-increasing insecurity in ontological terms, since the 1990s, Japan had been searching for new cooperative ways to improve security at the regional level. Japan's participation in and for the ARF is the biggest example of its engagement policy representing its ontological insecurity regionally.

In conclusion, Japan's efforts toward multilateral initiatives such as the APEC and ARF have led to the expansion of the Japanese foreign and security policy agenda. At the same time, it increased opportunities for interaction among the regional countries to a certain degree and contributed to the improvement of confidence building concerning Japan's policies in East Asia, despite Japan's aggressive and expansionist policies during the pre-war period. Confidence building measures in a regional context are of also significance for Japan's identity construction and preservation in its relations with significant others. In this sense, the improvement of Japan's trust-based relations in East Asia constitutes the subject matter of the next chapter.

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<sup>1</sup> In this context, we refer to modernization not simply as a process of progressive transformation, but within the framework of relationships between political modernization and ensuing economic outcomes

<sup>2</sup> An interpretation of the facts indicates that in particular in the first years of the Cold War, the main economic parameters in East Asia give the impression of being more vulnerable than those in Euro-Atlantic area. During this period, newly independent and occupied states were devoid of the mighty political structure and economic prosperity in order to improve the regional dynamism and stability. But, in the ongoing years, the economic transformation of Japan became a robust model for other Asian countries.

<sup>3</sup> For example, the US's bilateral security dialogues in East Asia are as follows: the Philippines in August 1951, Japan in September 1951, South Korea in October 1953, Taiwan in December 1954.

<sup>4</sup> In broad terms, the SEATO's zone of defense was defined as including Cambodia, Laos and South Vietnam. See, Mark T. Berger and Douglas A. Borer, 'Introduction: the Rise of East Asia, Critical Visions of the Pacific Century', Mark T. Berger and Douglas A. Borer (eds.), *The Rise of East Asia: Critical Visions of the Pacific Century*, London and New York: Routledge, 1997, p. 4

<sup>5</sup> Chinese Taipei and Hong Kong China also became members of APEC in 1991.

<sup>6</sup> Japan's APEC agenda was mainly organized by two ministries: the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA). See, Tatsushi Ogita and Daisuke Takoh, *The Making of the Osaka Action Agenda and Japan's Individual Action Plan, The APEC Policy Making Process in Japan Revisited*, IDE APEC Study Center Working Series, No. 7, 1997, pp. 10-22.

[http://www.ide.go.jp/English/Publish/Download/Apec/pdf/1996\\_14.pdf](http://www.ide.go.jp/English/Publish/Download/Apec/pdf/1996_14.pdf) (accessed on May 21, 2012).

<sup>7</sup> Thailand, Indonesia, South Korea, Malaysia and the Philippines are among the countries that Japan intended.

<sup>8</sup> 10 ASEAN members (Brunei Darussalam, Myanmar, Indonesia, Cambodia, Malaysia, Laos, Thailand, Vietnam, Singapore and the Philippines) and ASEAN's ten dialogue partners (the US, Australia, Japan, PRC, the European Union, India, New Zealand, South Korea, Canada and Russia) attended the first meeting of the ARF held in Bangkok, Thailand.

<sup>9</sup> The ASEAN Way consists of the below characteristics: 1- getting Asian solutions for Asian problems, 2-emphasizing on the sovereignty of the state, 3- following non-official increments, 4- through negotiations and joint consensus getting things done without creating differences among employees. See, Yoneji Kuroyanagi, 'Nihon-ASEAN kankei 35 nen no kaiko (ASEAN Way and Its Implications for Japan: An Overview)', *Kaigai Jijo*, Vol. 51, No. 3, 2003, pp. 3 – 7.

<sup>10</sup> By 1998, the focus of the ARF discussions had shifted more to regional security concerns. In this sense, based on the number of mentions/paragraphs in the ARF Chairman's Statements, the main security concerns of the ARF have revolved around non-proliferation and arms control, the Korean Peninsula, the South China Sea dispute, the Asian financial crisis, internal stability of ASEA countries and East Timor and relations among major powers. See, Noel M. Morada, 'The ASEAN Regional Forum:

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Origins and Evolution', *Cooperative Security in the Asia – Pacific*, N. M. Morada & J. Haacke (eds.), London: Routledge, 2010, p. 21.

## **CHAPTER V**

### **SIGNIFICANT OTHERS FOR JAPAN'S IDENTITY PRESERVATION IN THE POST-COLD WAR**

#### **5.1 Introduction**

What is meant by the term “significant other”? The term “significant other” is largely used to explain the concept of “identity” in social sciences such as sociology, psychology, political science and international relations. As mentioned above, in chapter two, identity basically depends on the creation of a boundary between self and other. This boundary creation is an active and ongoing part of identity formation and preservation (Neumann, 1996, p. 167). It is also emphasized that a unit of identity requires some differences. In other words, the process of identification requires a process of distinction (Yurdusev, 2003, p. 75). In this sense, it may be said that the self in a social context cannot be defined without the other. Thus, there is a dynamic relation between the self and other. In international relations, the other refers to the outside world. For example, talking about state identity requires assumptions about the identities of other actors (Bartelson, 1998, p. 317). That is to say, identity is only understood within differences and differences are only understood within identities. This means that something must be different from something

else to be identical with itself (Bartelson, 1998, p. 318). From a sociological point of view, foreign policy represents the main driver of self-identification as it defines the state's self in relation to the outside world. This process implies the identifying "identity" and "otherness", differentiation and the establishment of boundaries with respect to chosen referents (Kassianova, 2001, pp. 821 - 822). In this dissertation, as will be detailed below, Japan's significant others for the post-Cold War period are confined to three main actors: the US, Korea and mainland China.

## **5.2 The US as Significant Other**

### **5.2.1 Introduction**

After the post-war period, the US was seen by the Japanese policy makers as the cornerstone of Japan's foreign policy largely for security reasons. In the Cold War years, the main parameters of Japan's foreign and security policy were significantly shaped under the strong influence of the US. During the Second World War, the US was seen as a great enemy by the Japanese leaders. However, later, it began to be perceived by them as the leading power in the occupation period of 1945–1952 and then the most important factor in the economic and political modernisation of post-war Japan. Since the 1970s, Japan's dependence on the US in political and economic matters slowly began to shift toward interdependence, but the military and security matters have always been seen by both countries as vital components in determining the level of Japan's dependence on the US.

As indicated in chapter two, the pre-war and post-war periods in Japan were completely different from each other. During the pre-war period, the Japanese policy makers had militaristic and expansionist attitudes that eventually threatened the international system. After Japan's defeat in the Pacific War, the total demilitarisation of Japan during the

occupation period was largely led by the US. Furthermore, the occupation authorities intended to transform the political system that had taken Japan into the war by promoting democratic values and the rule of law in the country. Later, within the framework of changing security trends in the region of East Asia, a military alliance system was established between the two countries in the early 1950s. This alliance was later developed and systematized in 1960. After that, nearly all the political and security decisions made by the Japanese political authorities were shaped under the strong influence of its closest partner, the US, either directly or indirectly. Thus, it cannot be ignored that Japan had locked itself into the national and international interests of the US in Asia and the Pacific region.

In essence, the Japanese policy makers had no alternative but to follow the path designated by the US. However, this close alliance, in a sense, presented Japan with a good opportunity to rebuild its economy. Subsequently, by constructing a strategic alliance policy under the guidance of Yoshida Shigeru, the Japanese policy makers generally tried to abstain from policies that could negatively affect the country's economic growth and prosperity. This policy orientation pursued by the consecutive Japanese governments, aimed at protecting the country's economic interests in the international arena, is evident in many ways. Hence, Japan achieved its national wealth by following a kind of economic nationalism constructed on the post-war rehabilitation. In fact, Japan's incorporation into the American alliance system created this opportunity for the Japanese policy makers and state elites.

On the other hand, the US followed assertive policy orientations for its national and international interests by establishing military bases in several parts of East Asia, including the Japanese archipelago. In this context, from the perspective of the power politics of the Cold War period, Japan's role in the international society was in many ways shaped by the political drives of the US. Washington effectively used Japan as a military

base in its containment policy with economic, military, and diplomatic dimensions concerning the Soviet Union and the PRC. In return, Japan was able to pursue a policy of economic wealth and prosperity for itself.

This short narrative is a general picture of relations between the two countries under the Cold War pressure. In this context, the US was perceived by the Japanese policy makers as the significant other in constructing the country's anti-militaristic self-identity toward the international society. After being built, this state identity was shaped and developed in relation to trust-based relations between Japan and the US.

This section of the chapter includes discussion of the three main stages for analysing the effects of Japan's trust-based relations with the US, within the framework of Japan's anti-militaristic state identity, for understanding the extent to which the US has been seen as a significant other for the Japanese policy makers. These stages are described as follows: (1) the period after the Gulf War of 1990–1991, (2) the new National Defense Program outline of Japan in 1995 and beyond, and (3) the post-9/11 period. All these periods illustrate that, even after the end of the Cold War, the Japanese policy makers tried to set up a foreign and security policy that does not bring any harm to the country's anti-militaristic state identity and to its trust-based relations with the US. Thus, Japan has largely pursued a balanced policy with its neighbouring countries and the US to avoid losing its embedded state identity.

### **5.2.2 The Gulf Conflict of 1990–1991 and Beyond**

Unquestionably, the issues of the Gulf War of 1990–1991 and the Iraq War of 2003 illustrate two critical stages in the foreign and security policy agenda of Japan with regard to close partnership with the US during the post-Cold War era. As noted previously, in the Cold War years, the

Japanese policy makers frequently refrained from policies that could have negatively affected the country's economic development and stability. From the 1970s on, even though the US steadily tried to encourage Japan to play a more assertive role in military and security realms, Japan has been very reluctant to support the calls for the US military burden sharing. The Gulf War of 1990–1991, in this sense, is a practical example of this situation.

In general terms, a short analysis of Article 9 of the Japanese constitution gives some clues as to what role Japan should pursue. Aurelia George Mulgan (2000, p. 223) states that Article 9, first, projects for Japan a very limited military capability only for the country's self-defence aims, based on the adoption of completely defence-motivated policies. Moreover, it proscribes the possession of offensive military weapons, including inter-continental ballistic missiles, tactical bombers, and aircraft carriers. In addition, Mulgan emphasizes that the article not only prohibits deployment of the Japanese Self-Defense Forces overseas for combat activities or purposes but also rejects Japan's right to engage in collective self-defence activities in the international arena. These restrictions of Article 9 of the Japanese constitution distinctly emerged during Japan's policy-making process in connection with the Gulf War of 1990–1991. Kazuhiko Togo (2005, pp. 77 - 78) claims, at that point, the Gulf Crisis of 1990–1991 overtly showed the lack of readiness of the Japanese policy makers. According to him, these passive behaviours featuring "the demand for comprehensive peace in 1951, combined with the negation of Self-Defense Forces, the call for the abrogation of the Security Treaty with America and the call for an emotionally rigid implementation of the three non-nuclear principles" in the country put Japan in a narrow position as seen during the Gulf War. In fact, the crisis created a major dilemma for Japan because it forced the state elites in Tokyo to rethink Japan's foreign and security policies and to come to terms for the first time after the

Second World War with its status as a giant economic power with a very limited military capability (Cooney, 2008, p. 38).

Surprisingly, in September 1990, Toshiki Kaifu, the Japanese Prime Minister, frantically struggled in the National Diet to dispatch a peace cooperation team to Saudi Arabia under the auspices of the UN and five airplanes of the Japanese Self-Defense Forces to Iraq for transport operations. Nevertheless, the endeavours of Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu failed (Hein, 2011, p. 138). Accordingly, during the Gulf War crisis the Japanese government made only an economic contribution by offering a large amount of financial aid (Cooney, 2008, p. 39). In fact, the Japanese policy makers attached great importance to stability in the region of the Middle East, primarily because of the country's energy needs. However, the constitutional constraints and pressures from domestic opposition emphasizing that Japan should have a passive and purely non-militaristic stance toward international issues, as well as the Japanese people not wanting to make human contribution to overseas areas, prevented Japan from sharing the US military burden.

As one of the strategic allies of the US, Japan showed a powerful reaction to the Iraqi forces invading Kuwait. Moreover, it decided to impose economic sanctions on the Iraqi and Kuwaiti governments, including "(1) embargo on oil imports from Iraq and Kuwait, (2) embargo on exports to the two countries, (3) adoption of appropriate measures to suspend investments, loans and other capital transactions with the two countries and (4) freezing of economic cooperation with Iraq." For Japan, the need to participate in international missions appeared for the first time during the Gulf War of 1990–1991. Washington insisted that Japan should make a human contribution. Nevertheless, to do so, the Japanese government had to overcome the obstacles created by both Article 9 of its peaceful Constitution and the domestic opposition highlighting that Japan should pursue a passive and purely non-militaristic posture (Cooney,

2008, p. 40). Under these conditions, as has been noted previously, the Japanese government tried to pass a law that would allow the engagement of the Self-Defense Forces in combat activities in the region of the Middle East. However, these plans, which aimed at sending the members of the Japanese Self-Defense Forces overseas, were criticized both by domestic opposition from some Liberal Democratic Party members and by Japan's neighbouring countries.<sup>1</sup> As a result, despite these efforts demonstrating that Japan did not deviate from the line designed by the US, the Japanese government failed in defining its military role in burden sharing toward the international society. In the end, Japan pledged a contribution of US \$13 billion, thus becoming the second largest contributor.<sup>2</sup> However, this contribution did not prevent Japan from being described as a country that has used 'check-book diplomacy' in its international involvement.

After the Gulf War, these events created the background for an in-depth rethinking of the Japanese foreign and security policy. A great debate started about whether Japan should contribute to maintaining the international order and stability. However, the Japanese government, as indicated previously, encountered a number of critics (Kozai, 1999, pp. 35 - 36). These critics focused largely on the fear of re-emerging militarist feelings in Japan and on whether it would be possible to maintain civilian control over the Japanese Self-Defense Forces during humanitarian-centred activities. Moreover, some argued that, by sending the Self-Defense Forces overseas, Article 9 of the Japanese constitution would lose its legal force.

When analysing all considerations related to the foreign and security policy of Japan during the Gulf War, various reasons can be put forward to explain why the Japanese policy makers failed to manage the Gulf crisis and were criticized by most of the international community. Courtney Purrington (1991, pp. 314 - 315), to illustrate, enumerates these reasons as limited bureaucratic control over the decision-making process

during a crisis, the lack of an established system of cooperation within the bureaucracy, and the leadership weakness of Toshiki Kaifu, the Japanese Prime Minister. In fact, one substantial reason that can be added to those mentioned by Purrington (1992, p. 162) is the motivation of the Japanese state not to disrupt its anti-militaristic identity but to emphasise that Japan has always abstained from being a major actor in solving international security matters for the sake of economic gains. However, after the end of the Cold War, changing economic and security relations in the international system could damage the national interests of Japan. That is the concrete reason that the Gulf War of 1990–1991 created a kind of shock on Japan.

Some mainstream scholars who defend the main assumption of neorealism have indicated that the post-Cold War international system would change the position of Japan, in particular in structural terms, with respect to other major powers (Harrison, 2004, pp. 70 - 71). This argumentative and rhetorical approach was partly accepted as correct because the Gulf War of 1990–1991 showed Japan's inability to respond to an international crisis in an effective and timely manner. From this crisis, Tsuneo Akaha contends (1993, pp. 102 - 103), Tokyo learned four significant lessons. First, it understood the necessity of finding a politically sustainable solution for sharing the military burden with the US. In fact, the Gulf War showed that the US could no longer bear the financial costs of such conflicts by itself and that the support of the UN for its initiatives was required. At the same time, this conflict made it clear that the US wanted Japan to play a more pro-active role in its foreign and security policy. Second, the Japanese government realized the need for streamlining its decision-making process to be able address a crisis quickly. Third, it realized the importance of clearly presenting its foreign and security policy to the international community and, in particular, to neighbouring countries. Fourth, the Japanese government understood that it should

make a contribution to the international community commensurate with its economic power.

Within the framework of this perspective, in 1992, the Japanese government was able to pass a bill permitting the Self-Defense Forces to engage in activities in non-combat areas under UN peace-keeping operations.<sup>3</sup> The bill was enacted into law by the National Diet on 15 June 1992 as “The Act on Cooperation for United Nations Peacekeeping Operations and Other Operations” (the so-called International Peace Cooperation Law). The law set out five preconditions for dispatching the Japanese Self-Defense Forces overseas as part of UN peacekeeping operations. First, a ceasefire agreement to be maintained among conflicting parties is necessary. Second, conflicting parties, as well as the territorial states, must have given their permission to deploy the peace-keeping force of the UN and Japan’s involvement in this force. Third, the peace-keeping force of the UN should demonstrate strict impartiality and objectivity among conflicting parties. Fourth, if the above prerequisites are not satisfied by other parts, the Japanese government may withdraw its military forces. Fifth, the use of weapons should be reduced to the minimum necessary to guard the lives of personnel (Hein, 2011, p. 138).

Since that time, the Japanese Self-Defense Forces have participated in a number of operations, including international humanitarian and relief activities (Harrison, 2004, p. 70). The main driving force behind this decision arose from two critical reasons: on the one hand, the complete humiliation experienced as a result of the criticism caused by its so-called check-book diplomacy, and on the other hand, the rising pressure from the US to take a more self-confident role in the international system (Soeya, 2005, p. 105).

In June 1998 and December 2001, International Peace Cooperation Law was amended twice to modify strict conditions regarding the Self-Defense Forces units (Hein, 2011, p. 138). The first amendment was made

within the framework of realizing the aim of Japan's more timely and effective involvement in the endeavours of the UN and the international community toward maintaining international peace and stability. In this sense, in addition to other categories such as UN peace-keeping operations and humanitarian relief operations, a third category—international election observation—was formed. This type of mission allowed Japan to observe elections at the request of the UN and other international organizations. In the second amendment, it became possible for the Japanese Self-Defense Forces to use weapons under the conditions of protecting "individuals who have come under their control." Additionally, the amendment removed the ban on the contribution of the Japanese Self-Defense Forces to core peace-keeping operations, such as monitoring ceasefire agreement, patrolling in buffer zones, and inspecting weapons. These operations had been on hold for Japan since 1992 (Secretariat of the International Peace Cooperation Headquarters, 2012).

### **5.2.3 The New National Defense Program Outline of Japan in 1995 and Beyond**

The end of the Cold War and ensuing developments in the region of East Asia dramatically provoked Japan to recalculate and analyse its security periphery. The most apparent example has been debates over reaffirming the alliance strategy with the US and adopting the new guidelines for mutual defence cooperation (Akaha, 1998, p. 462). After the enactment of the International Peace Cooperation Law in 1992 in the Diet, Japan started to pursue a more active role in security matters in terms of burden sharing with the US, in particular in dispatching the Self-Defense Forces to overseas non-combat areas, such as Cambodia, Mozambique, and so on. These security activities by Japan, under the auspices of the UN, created a sense fear and anxiety in the minds of people in neighbouring countries because no country wanted to imagine again a remilitarised

Japan threatening the fragile stability of the region. Therefore, to help eliminate this fear and revive confidence in the region, the Japanese policy makers projected Japan as an anti-militarist state by underscoring that Japan can, in no circumstances, deviate from its constitutional constraints.

This anxiety among people and state elites in neighbouring countries increased in 1995 again because of debates over national security in Japan. In November 1995, the Japanese government adopted a new National Defense Program Outline so as “to prevent and settle conflicts, to establish a sound basis for security through domestic political stability, to maintain firmly the Japan–US security arrangement and to build up appropriate defence capabilities” ((MOFA), 1996). In the document, the US–Japan Security Treaty was articulated by the Japanese policy makers as a foundational element for the achievement and maintenance of Japan’s security and defence policy (Akaha, 1998, p. 465). The main reference points in the document were based on how Japan can effectively respond to natural disasters and terrorist activities and contribute to constructing a constant security environment via international peace-keeping operations and maintaining international cooperation through international relief activities (Akaha, 1998, p. 465).

Tsuneo Akaha (1998, p. 465) emphasizes that the National Defense Program Outline of 1995 introduced a concise and compact structure for Japan’s defence posture. To illustrate, Ground Self-Defense Forces were reformulated as 160,000 man-powers, including a newly established 15,000 swiftly deployable reservists. Readjustments included the Maritime Self-Defense Forces and Air Self-Defense Forces. Maritime forces were restructured to seven units with twenty one ships, instead of thirty ships, as escort flotillas with an increase in mine-sweeping units from one to two. Additionally, the rearrangement of ground patrol units from sixteen to thirteen units and a reduction of tactical aircraft from nearly 220 to nearly

170 were carried out. Air Self-Defense Forces were also restructured from the present number of about 430 to about 400 aircraft.

In April 1996, during the official visit of US President Bill Clinton to Tokyo, the two leaders, after handling the political and security atmosphere in Asia and the Pacific region and the numerous ways of realising the alliance relationship between the US and Japan, announced the Japan–US Joint Declaration on Security Alliance for the 21<sup>st</sup> Century, emphasizing particularly the two countries' profound cooperation on common values with respect to the maintenance of freedom, the pursuit of democracy, and respect for human rights. During this official visit to Tokyo, the two leaders also stressed the significance of the peace and stability of the region and emphasised working together for security against aggressive activities in the region ((MOFA), 1996). Moreover, according to the two leaders, the existence of the military forces of the US in the region of East Asia is essential and indispensable for protecting peace and stability, and the Japan–US alliance relationship is seen by both countries as a complement to positive engagement by the US in the region of East Asia ((MOFA), 1996).

The two leaders also agreed on the following areas to improve the cooperative relations among them ((MOFA), 2012):

(a) Recognizing that close bilateral defense cooperation is a central element of the Japan–United States Alliance, both governments agreed that continued close consultation is essential. Both governments will further enhance the exchange of information and views on the international situation, in particular the Asia–Pacific region. At the same time, in response to changes which may arise in the international security environment, both governments will continue to consult closely on defense policies and military postures, including the US force structure in Japan, which will best meet their requirements. (b) The Prime Minister and the President agreed to initiate a review of *the 1978 Guidelines for Japan–US Defense Cooperation* to build upon the close working relationship already established between Japan and the United States. The two leaders agreed on the necessity to promote bilateral policy coordination, including studies on bilateral cooperation in dealing with situations that may emerge in the areas surrounding Japan and which will have an important

influence on the peace and security of Japan. (c) The Prime Minister and the President welcomed the April 15, 1996 signature of the Agreement Between the Government of Japan and the Government of the United States of America Concerning Reciprocal Provision of Logistic Support, Supplies and Services Between the Self-Defense Forces of Japan and the Armed Forces of the United States of America, and expressed their hope that this Agreement will further promote the bilateral cooperative relationship. (d) Noting the importance of interoperability in all facets of cooperation between the Self-Defense Forces and the US Forces, the two governments will enhance mutual exchange in the areas of technology and equipment, including bilateral cooperative research and development of equipment such as the support fighter (F-2). (e) The two governments recognized that the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery has important implications for their common security. They will work together to prevent proliferation and will continue to cooperate in the ongoing study on ballistic missile defense.

In September 1997, the Guidelines for Japan–US Cooperation for Defense were adopted. Then in May 1999, in keeping with the aims of the new guidelines, the Law Concerning Measures to Ensure Peace and Security of Japan in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan was approved by the Diet. The guidelines adopted in 1997 set forth some basic premises and ethical values for Japan. According to the first premise, the commitments to the security treaty signed in 1960 between Japan and the US and its connected agreements in addition to the main context of the Japan–US alliance remain unchanged. The second premise directly refers to Japan’s constitutional constraints in terms of its anti-militaristic state identity. Accordingly, Japan can develop policies within the confines of its constitutional restrictions, remaining devoted to its ethical values based on the three non-nuclear principles. According to the third premise, all arrangements and activities by Japan and the US are to be compatible with the main principles of international law, ranging from peaceful settlement of disputes to sovereign equality. The fourth premise stipulates that neither country is bound in relation to certain parliamentary or governmental steps to be taken. However, an efficacious framework for mutual cooperation is to be maintained by both countries in a suitable manner subject to the Guidelines and programs and consistent with laws and regulations adopted by Japan ((MOFA), 1996).

In regard to the Law Concerning Measures to Ensure Peace and Security of Japan in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan, adopted in 1999, an image of the Japanese Self-Defense Forces was formed on the basis of logistic support to the US forces in international security issues, including some funds; transportation and its repair and maintenance; medical services; communications; and airport, seaport, and base operations. In addition, the law made it possible for Japan to attend rescue-and-relief activities largely operated under the Self-Defense Forces (Togo, 2005, p. 82).

The term “surrounding situations” in the law appears disturbingly provocative to some of Japan’s neighbouring countries. Kazuhiko Togo (2005, p. 83), the Director General of the Treaties Bureau at that time, states in his book that the most formidable issue in the legislation process of the law was the notion of surrounding situations because the operative capability of the Japanese Self-Defense Forces is directly related to these surrounding situations that will have an important influence on Japan’s peace and security. In the law, surrounding situations are described in a situational sense not a geographic sense. In this context, the law says, “The concept, situations in areas surrounding Japan, is not geographic but situational. The two governments will make every effort, including diplomatic efforts, to prevent such situations from occurring. When the two governments reach a common assessment of the state of each situation, they will effectively coordinate their activities. In responding to such situations, measures taken may differ depending on circumstances” ((MOFA), 1996).

During the parliamentary debates on the proposed legislation in the Diet, the opposition parties and media argued that the term *surrounding situations* is extremely vague so that the role and activities of the Self-Defense Forces could be magnified by going beyond the scope of the Japan–US Security Treaty. At this point, Togo states that, because the term

*surrounding situations*, used first in the new National Defense Policy Outline in 1995, had overextended the Self-Defense Forces' activities on the basis of multilateral international cooperation, the same term used in this law adopted in 1999 might have deepened the concern of opposition groups (Togo, 2005, p. 83).

According to Togo, one of the central points of the parliamentary debates in the Diet was to make clear the geographic pertinence of the new guidelines for some areas, such as North Korea and Taiwan. The nuclear tests of North Korea in 1993–1994 had created a crisis for Japan's national security and became one of the main reasons behind the enactment of the new Guidelines. On the other hand, the Taiwan Strait crisis of 1995–1996 was another serious issue that was deeply connected to the political climate in the region. Under these circumstances, a statement made by Japan referring directly to any regional connotation could damage a fragile stability in the region. Thus, Togo argues (2005, pp. 83 - 84), the government consciously avoided giving any geographic definition.

#### **5.2.4 The 9/11 Period and Beyond**

At the threshold of twenty-first century, efforts to prevent proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in the regions of East Asia and the Middle East and to fight terrorism both at the national and international levels have been significant subjects strengthening the collaboration between Japan and the US. In this sense, September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks in New York and Washington, DC, (herein after referred to as *9/11*) are identified by International Relations scholars as another critical turning point for the Japanese policy makers.

On September 12, 2001, only a day later, the Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi made an official statement regarding the

terrorist attacks on the US indicating that this incident was a completely unacceptable act of violence (KANTEI, 2012). Within the same day, at the Security Council meeting gathered at the Japanese Prime Minister's Official Residence, Junichiro Koizumi delineated these attacks as a challenge made not only against the US but also against all democratic societies and then stated that Japan would resolutely support the US in terms of essential assistance and cooperation (KANTEI, 2012). After discussing this unexpected security issue in detail, the National Security Council finally decided to follow a policy based on the following six items (KANTEI, 2012):

(1) All relevant ministries will work in concert to take every possible measure in order to get accurate information on the situation including the safety of Japanese nationals concerned and to take all appropriate measures. (2) All possible measures will be put in place to assist Japanese nationals affected. At the same time, the preparations for such measures as the dispatch of a Japan Disaster Relief Team for all those affected will be made, so that actions can be taken promptly if requested. (3) The security of such facilities and establishments related to the United States in Japan will be enhanced, and necessary actions will be taken as appropriate, responding to the prevailing situation. (4) Efforts will be made to provide appropriate information to the people of Japan and to keep the people alert on the situations. (5) Japan will respond in cooperation with the United States and other concerned nations to combat international terrorism. (6) Appropriate measures will be taken to prevent confusion in the economic systems both in Japan and in the rest of the world.

The 9/11 terrorist attacks on the US were a big event in world politics (Katzenstein, 2003, p. 731). Examining the prompt policy activities of Japan in sequence, which are directly related to the terrorist attacks of 9/11, it should be seen that it is a normal policy behaviour for the Japanese government to protect, first, its own citizens in Japan and in the US. However, as indicated in the third and fifth items of the policy, the main reference is made directly to the US, and the general argument is based on finding a clear answer to the question of how Japan can support the US to combat the global terrorism within the framework of its constitutional limits. This issue was also raised at the second press conference by the Japanese Prime Minister held on September 19, 2001, which explains the

basic policy of Japan to take measures in response to immediate terrorist attacks in the US. According to the basic policy adopted by the Japanese government (KANTEI, 2012),

(1) Japan will actively engage itself in the combat against terrorism, which it regards as Japan's own security issue. (2) Japan strongly supports the United States, its ally, and will act in concert with the United States and other countries around the world. (3) Japan will take concrete and effective measures which will clearly demonstrate its firm determination. These measures will be implemented in a swift and comprehensive manner.

During the Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi's visit to the US on September 25, 2001, the two leaders stressed that there should be a concrete cooperation between Japan and the US in diplomatic, economic, and military spheres for fighting international terrorism. In addition, Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi stated the following (KANTEI, 2012):

As an ally of the United States, Japan will spare no efforts in providing utmost assistance and cooperation. We are committed to provide the greatest support possible within a scope that does not constitute an integral part of the use of force. ( . . . ). Japan is eager to fulfill its responsibilities as a member of the international community.

As seen from the policies adopted and followed by Japan to fight international terrorist activities, the 9/11 period profoundly affected the decision-making behaviours of the Japanese policy makers. However, endeavouring not to deviate from the US line concerning specific goals and policies, Japan, at the same time, tried to make a point of not emphasizing its militarist past to the international community (Fujishige, 2008, p. 108). Within this context, a number of laws were enacted in the National Diet, broadly in line with pursuing more active policies in the international arena. The Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law, which was enacted on October 29, 2001, is one of them. The main goal of this enactment was to arrange measures that Japan could carry out in preventing and eliminating international terrorist activities to support a peaceful and prosperous international environment. In fact, the role of this law was to establish a ground for Japan that partly serves the calls by the US for burden sharing

in security matters: (1) Japan can act in assistance of the military activities of the US and other countries so as to eliminate the terrorist activities, thus making the contribution to the achievement of the Charter of the UN. (2) Japan can act in connection with humanitarian activities based on the pertinent resolutions of the UN or its related organizations or the International Organization for Migration (KANTEI, 2012).

The enactment of the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law in November 2001 enabled Japan for the first time to send the Japanese Self-Defense Forces units to overseas combat areas. Thus, Maritime Self-Defense Forces taskforces, in collaboration with Air Self-Defense Forces transport aircraft, were entrusted with the task of conducting fuel supplying and logistical transport and health and maintenance support to the US and other forces deployed in the Indian Ocean and Arabian Sea (Hughes, 2004, pp. 427 - 428).

### **5.2.5 The Iraq War of 2003 and Japan–US Relations**

In 2003, Japan was able to respond more quickly and effectively to the requests from the US for cooperation in the Iraq War than it had during the Gulf War of 1990–1991, although international legitimacy was much lower (Catalinac, 2007, p. 63).

First, several substantial decisions made by the Japanese policy decision makers had been in force for a decade, including the International Peace Cooperation Law of 1992, the Japan–US Guidelines for Defense Cooperation of 1997, the Surrounding Situations Law of 1998, and the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law of 2001. Second, since the end of the Cold War, North Korea was seen as a significant reason for clarifying the Japanese foreign and security policy parameters because North Korea's initiatives in producing nuclear weapons were recognized by the Japanese

policy makers as a real threat against Japan's physical and ontological security. Third, the Japanese political authorities considered cautiously its foreign and security policy orientations, Japanese public opinion, and Japan's relations with other countries (Togo, 2005, p. 308).

Until March 2003, Japan officially supported a peaceful resolution of the Iraqi weapons of mass destruction issue, demanding full cooperation from the Iraqi regime with the UN. Nevertheless, being aware that the US was determined to start a war regardless of Iraq's behaviour, Japan tried to convince the US to obtain a UN resolution rather than acting unilaterally. A UN resolution would also be critical to obtain domestic support for dispatching the Japanese Self-Defense Forces because it would legitimize such action in terms of international responsibilities (Miyagi, 2006, pp. 103 - 104).

When the US announced on 17 March 2003 its intention of starting a war without a UN resolution, Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi expressed his support, and Japan immediately tried to secure a UN resolution on post-war Iraq. In the absence of a UN resolution, the Japanese government could not offer financial and logistical support to the military attack of the US (Miyagi, 2006, p. 104), but it increased its support to the allied forces led by the US in the Indian Ocean. Thanks to special legislation adopted in 2001 by the Japanese government to join the international campaign against terrorism, the members of the Self-Defense Forces had already engaged in operations in the Indian Ocean and Arabian Sea. However, as indicated by Akistoshi Miyashita (2006, p. 2), the Japanese troops could not be involved in combat activities because their intended role was confined to humanitarian aid, building infrastructures, logistical support, and so on.

Contrary to the Gulf War of 1990–1991, the Japanese policy makers hastily formulated and implemented a foreign policy agenda because the US started to prepare the attack on Iraq (Miyagi, 2006, p. 104). After the

war, Japan tried to obtain a UN resolution that would justify the dispatch of the Self-Defense Forces. However, the opposition of public opinion forced the government to focus on rehabilitation and reconstruction of Iraq. In addition, in the donor conference held in Madrid, Spain, 23–24 October 2003, Japan made the second largest financial contribution, after the US (Miyagi, 2006, p. 105).

At the same time, Japan tried to intensify its relations with Arab states to secure its imports of oil from the Middle East and to avoid terrorist attacks. By doing so, Japan distanced itself from the US policies by supporting the road-map plan in the Middle East peace process in opposition to the American support of Jewish settlements in the occupied territories. Moreover, it condemned the killing of the Palestinian leaders perpetrated by Israel and tried to influence Arab governments and public opinion concerning the non-military nature of its intervention (Miyagi, 2006, p. 105).

Japan's political decisions concerning the Iraq War of 2003, according to Yukiko Miyagi, were determined by both international and domestic factors. The two main international factors were Japan's security dependence on the US and its energy dependence on the region of the Middle East. In fact, Japan was characterized as a combination of vast economic resources with a very moderate military capacity. However, after 9/11 an international system based on military power convinced Japan that it was necessary to correct this asymmetry and gain more influence on the global stage without threatening its neighbours. The war in Iraq was seen as a good opportunity to achieve this goal while reinforcing the security alliance with the US (Miyagi, 2006, p. 106). In July 2003, the Law Concerning Special Measures on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance was approved by Japan's Diet. This legislation opened the road to dispatching members of the Japanese Self-Defense Forces to Iraq (Hughes, 2004, p. 428). In fact, Japan's dispatch of the Self-Defense Forces

to Iraq for reconstruction should be considered a way of sustaining the alliance system with the US rather than contributing to UN peace-keeping operations (Pekkanen & Krauss, 2005, p. 436).

The domestic arena in Japan was characterized by opposition between the power elites and policy makers, on the one hand, and the mass public, on the other. The power elites, in general, supported the security alliance with the US and the intervention in Iraq to gain the power and respect that Japan deserved in the international community. Furthermore, a large part of the Japanese business community, in particular those who represented the construction and military industry, though fearing the negative effect of the war, expected important benefits from Japan's participation in the conflict. On the contrary, the Japanese people were, in general, against any military contribution because it could decelerate the economic impetus (Miyagi, 2006, p. 107).

Some scholars argue that the main reason behind these efforts was Japan's changing perception of its national security. On that account, the Iraq War of 2003 showed a shift from Japan's traditional pacifist stance to self-confidence policies in line with the US. In this sense, Japan stepped up efforts to increase its role in security matters in the global arena in proportion to its economic capability without damaging its anti-militaristic self-image (Miyashita, 2006, p. 2).

#### **5.2.6 Concluding Remarks**

As seen above in episodes, the US seems the most significant other for Japan's self-identity construction and preservation even in the post-Cold War period. Reflecting on the facts discussed above, we can conclude that Japan has, first, focused on a policy orientation protecting its economic interests by pursuing a pacifist policy during the Cold War. In this sense,

the Japanese policy makers chose to base their foreign and security policies on US foreign policies and to depend on the US security umbrella. This mechanism between the two countries has been shaped and systemized in relations based on mutual trust. Thus, Japan was able to create its anti-militaristic state identity toward the international society, concentrating largely on its economic prosperity. However, doing so created a dilemma in determining the options of the Japanese foreign and security policies in the sense of whether Japan should pursue more self-confident foreign and security policies in terms of military burden sharing in the international arena.

The Cold War had created a Japanese model of staying away from any conflict that could have a detrimental effect on its economic position. However, during the Gulf War of 1990–1991, the Japanese government was criticized by the international community and its closest ally, the US, for its check-book diplomacy. In response to this international crisis, Japan was just able to offer financial aid, in particular, to maximize its national security. Therefore, shifts in this policy orientation began slowly after the Cold War. In 1992, Japan put into force a law enabling the Japanese Self-Defense Forces to be dispatched overseas. That year can be regarded as a turning point opening the road to other important legislative acts that would enhance relations with the US in the following years. Thus, the Japanese policy makers could consider revising their policies within the framework of the changing balances in the international domain. The 1991 Gulf War and the 2003 Iraq War showed Japan the need to renounce its check-book diplomacy if it was to maintain a strong alliance with the US. In this sense, boosting the country's profile in security matters and dispatching the Japanese Self-Defense Forces overseas were developments resulting from Japan's desire to reinforce its security alliance and trust-based relations with the US. Nonetheless, this reorientation of its foreign and security policies does not mean that Japan turned to pure realism in a security alliance purged of ideal and anti-militaristic values.

## 5.3 Korea as Significant Other

### 5.3.1 Introduction

From the Cold War period to the present, Japan's posture and anti-militaristic state identity in its relations with the Korean Peninsula have been a key factor both in shaping cooperation and stability in East Asia and in building a basic trust mechanism between Japan and South Korea. In other words, the anti-militaristic image of Japan has been effective in creating a bond of basic trust between the two countries. Chapter two described what Japan was like while maintaining a militaristic policy in East Asia. It was determined to attain the objective of East Asia co-prosperity and was likely to attain its goal of expansionism. However, Japan's aggressive policies and activities toward this objective have still not been forgotten by the Koreans, who witnessed such activities. Since the end of World War II, Japan has formally announced that it would not be involved in Cold War policies and forceful actions, but the extent to which Japan has acted on that decision has not satisfied the Korean power elite class and the masses. In this regard, the policies formed by the Japanese government have been widely disapproved of by South Korea. Both countries, however, appear to be faithful in keeping the terms that, under all circumstances, bilateral trade and economy be maintained by a mutual trust and faith. This cooperation between the two countries is due to their close borders and cultural proximity and the strategic relationship that each has with the US.

This section is divided into three sub-sections. The first focuses on the history of the relationship that the countries have had. The second sub-section discusses the factors on which the bilateral relations of the two countries are dependent: *history and identity*, *economic profit*, *the role of the US*, and *the leadership role*. Additionally, the territorial issue between Japan and South Korea is detailed. The third and the final sub-section

critically analyses the nuclear and strategic matters of North Korea and Japan's stance on them.

### **5.3.2 A Short Retrospective Analysis of Japan–Korea Relations till the end of World War II**

Japan has always considered the Korean Peninsula significant, as it has mainland China. The reason is not only geography but also similar traditions and norms. The only border that separates the two countries is water. Having shared the same traditions and norms, the behaviour and mentality of the two nations also seem similar (Lee, 1985, p. 1). Further, before any of the countries came into existence, the native Japanese traced their relations with Asia by reference to Korea.

Earlier, it was noted that the Korean–Japanese relationships have been mandatory. The only country with which Japan had close diplomatic relations during the Tokugawa period, as mentioned by Etsuko Hae Jin Kang (1997, p. 2), was Korea. While comparing Japan–Korea relations with that of Japan–Ming China, Kang indicates that, despite Japan's close relations with China, it was Korea with which Japan had closer relations in the seventeenth century. The reforms in the economic and cultural areas of Japan were largely drawn from the Korean Peninsula's efforts when the Bakufu regime sent missions to the Korean Peninsula (Kang, 1997, p. 3). Kang also states that patterns traced from seventh and eighth century show that Buddhism was inspiring to the Japanese during that era and made its way into Japanese regions (Kang, 1997, p. 3).

As mentioned in chapter two, the Japanese political and feudal system underwent certain reforms in 1868, resulting in Japan's modernisation. Japan first decided to strengthen its armed forces to compete with the modern West. Furthermore, it proved itself to be a

strong military part of Northeast Asia when it defeated China in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895. In this regard, Japan widely influenced Korea and Manchuria (MacDougall, 2006, p. 180). Japan signed an agreement with the Korean government after the Russo–Japanese War of 1904–1905 because, by then, Japan had gained a strong position in the Korean Peninsula. In 1910, Japan added the Korean territory as a subordinate to itself (Scarborough & Cooney, 2008, p. 175). Korea was deliberately subjected to hardship during the era, and as a consequence, Korean relations with Japan are still critically observed by Korean authorities. The cultural and traditional resemblance of the two countries has served to lessen the indignation that Korea felt for Japan. Japan’s colonial rule of Korea is still seen as an unwelcome action by Koreans. Around 246,000 Japanese civil servants ruled 21 million Koreans for ten years from 1935 to 1945. During World War II, it has been reported that some 200,000 Korean women were deliberately forced into sexual slavery by Japanese forces and were called *comfort women*. Although Japan was defeated in the war in 1945, Koreans still feel that they bore hardship because their country was divided into two separate countries in the north and south (MacDougall, 2006, p. 181).

### **5.3.3 Post-War Developments in Japan–Korea Relations**

The post-war developments have somewhat changed the cold relations between Japan and Korea. Along the 38<sup>th</sup> parallel, the Korean Peninsula, before the division, was occupied by the Soviet Union and the US when World War II officially ended. Whereas the northern part was declared formally to be part of the Soviet Union, the southern part began to establish political and diplomatic ties with the US in 1948. In this regard, having established its ties with the international powers, Korea was unlikely to have any stronger relations with Japan in particular.

In 1948, the Korean Peninsula was divided into two distinct states: the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea) and the Republic of Korea (South Korea). However, the two states themselves did not specifically declare that the country was formally divided into two. The US perceived the attack of North Korean forces on the 38<sup>th</sup> parallel as another attempt to expand communism. Based on the Cold War interpretation, the Korean War was as an attempt to give substance to the doctrine of containment as declared by US President Truman (MacDougall, 2006, p. 182).

South Korea was governed by the right wing periodically from 1950 to 1980. During the 1950s, Syngman Rhee was considered a symbol of strength in South Korea. With Japan's continuous efforts to normalize matters, Korea agreed to maintain official relations with Japan in 1965. Although the public in Korea were strongly against maintaining any relations with Japan, Korean President Park Chung Hee went against the people and agreed to negotiate with the Japanese authorities. Doing so led to the settlement that Japan released its hold in colonies across the Southern Peninsula. Moreover, Japan also agreed to assist South Korea by providing funds of up to half a billion dollars for ten years to maintain normal relations with South Korea. However, the matter between North Korea and South Korea never seemed to be settled, and as a result, Japan could not settle matters with North Korea in the way it did with South Korea (Kawashima, 2005, pp. 76 - 77).

Japan's bilateral relations with South Korea had never been easy despite its diplomatic relations with the country. The geographic similarities; the similar matters of the communist bloc including Soviet Union, China, and North Korea; and the shared values based on their relationships with the US made the negotiations and economic dialogue easy (Cha, 1998, p. 69). Victor D. Cha (1998, p. 69) suggests that the material factors alone did not help this bilateral relation reach this point,

but the relationship is strongly affected by such factors as traditions, identity, and behaviours. The immaterial factors drive the political and economic relations of South Korea and Japan. Cha identifies four dimensions that influence their relations: identity, profit, effective nature of the US, and their leadership. I agree with Cha's opinion and have included these dynamics in understanding and clarifying the primary points in the introductory chapter of the thesis.

#### **5.3.3.1 Identity and History**

The relationship between Japan and Korea has always been coloured by their tense past. Therefore, the two countries seem to have grudges in their relations (Park, 2008, p. 15). Cha (1998, pp. 74 - 75) states that Japan's military intrusions in the Korean Peninsula are the primary reason the two countries have not been able to have good and beneficial relations. The bitter memories of the past are a hindrance in maintaining healthy relations between the two countries because they remain in the minds of the masses who do not actually want the relations to be healthier. The stories told by native inhabitants as well as those taught in secondary and higher schools in both Korea and Japan create negative images of the two nations for each other. Particularly in Korea, people consider that, the more a person is a patriot and the more love one has for the country, the more he is likely to have hard feelings for Japan.

As C. Sarah Soh (2008, p. XI) explains the pattern of the story, the Japanese military's use of the comfort women was one of the reasons Korean-Japanese relations have never returned to normal, even after the end of the Cold War. In this regard, tens of thousands of women with different national and ethnic backgrounds were forced into sexual activity during the Pacific War, starting when Japan invaded Manchuria in 1931 and ending in 1945 when Japan was finally defeated (Soh, 2008, p. XII).

The comfort women were brought from Taiwan, Korea, and Japan as well as from some other occupied regions (Togo, 2005, p. 168).

In 1991, a study was conducted on the tragedy of comfort women, and in 1992 and 1993, the results of the research were made public. The scope of the research was then widened to outside the country, and interviews were conducted with the affected persons. When the results of the research were finally made public, the Japanese government declared “heartfelt apology and remorse” to all women who suffered. Japanese Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama began a “Peace, Friendship and Exchange Initiative” in August 1994. Authorities were determined to collect information on the past and had discussions with intellectuals and others (Togo, 2005, p. 168). In the end, the outcome of the research was published by the Asian Women’s Fund, which was started by Japan in 1995. The results were published under the title *Collection of Material relating to the Wartime Comfort Women Issue: Government of Japan Survey*.<sup>4</sup>

Furthermore, in 2001, the publication of Japanese textbooks in which the Korean occupation by Japan and its Colonial rule were described offended Koreans a great deal. As a result, the Korean government, in accordance with public sentiments, cancelled a joint military exercise with Japan and declared that until Japan altered the thirty-five incidents in the book, the military exercise would not be conducted. Moreover, the Korean government called the incidents mentioned “clearly false, obscuring, distorting and misleading”. The textbook was misleading in indicating that, for the peace of the region, the occupation of Korea was necessary while the issue of comfort women was deliberately omitted (Scarborough & Cooney, 2008, pp. 182 - 183).

Despite Japanese efforts, the relationship between Japan and South Korea is no healthier or stronger. Koreans consider their nationalism to be anti-Japan. South Korea, however, seems to be unsatisfied with the attitude of Japan. Although the Japan–US Defense Guidelines have been of much

benefit to Korea, the Koreans are never satisfied. Korea still holds that Japan could still play a better role in safeguarding Korean security. Japan believes it not only contributes to the peace of the region but also has restricted itself from East Asia, so it is still South Korea that is not satisfied and is concerned about reforms to the Japanese military. Considering Korean behaviour today in comparison to the ways in which Korea suffered in the past, Korean behaviour still cannot be questioned. If Koreans were to fully pardon Japan, it is likely that it will have forgotten the sufferings in the past. However, being not satisfied with Japan's behaviour is part of the Korean identity (Cha, 2000, p. 314).

#### **5.3.3.2 Economic Profit**

Among all the East Asian countries, Japan and South Korea share the most similar factors of economy and social and political disparity. Based on the rule of law, the Korean and Japanese economies are market oriented, and both countries are democratic (Park, 2008, pp. 13 - 14). Since the Cold War years, the Japanese economic model has been imitated by South Korea. South Korea followed the model for its economic development, and as a result, today South Korea stands as a competing force against Japan, with its exports giving strong competition to Japanese products. Nevertheless, Japan still has more exports than Korea (Park, 2008, pp. 13 - 14).

Despite similarities in their economic structures, the two countries do not seem to be having better relations in this regard. The two countries have had an opposing relationship from the late 1980s because of economic competition and exporting mechanisms. This competition has created political tensions between the two. Japan's economy clearly affects Korea. Political relations between the two were seriously affected in 2007 when the South Korean trade with Japan rose to US \$30 billion. Having

expertise in automobiles and electronics, Japan stands to dominate the South Korean economy. Japan's influence over South Korea in this regard cannot be denied by anyone. Various corporations have found Japan's parts to be of immense importance, resulting in a trade deficit with Japan (Scarborough & Cooney, 2008, p. 176). Koreans have lately found it nearly impossible to break into Japanese markets, and this is point accounts for grudges in the trade and economic relationships between the two countries (James, 2001, p. 2).

With growth of about 10.7% in 1999 and even better growth in 2000, South Korea saw the greatest economic recovery after the Asian market crisis. Japan and South Korea both played significant roles in the conducting ASEAN+3, in which their major focuses were currency exchanges and monetary cooperation. The main objective of both was to have beneficial monetary cooperation (James, 2001, p. 14).

This important time during the twentieth century was not good for the relationship of the countries. The twenty-first century, however, has provided opportunities for Korea and Japan to cooperate and polish their economic and trade interests. Japan has contributed much in boosting the economy of South Korea and has enacted significant measures to maintain healthy and friendly relations with South Korea. In this way, the efforts have been fruitful, and both the countries are determined to maintain good economic relations for a future that is beneficial for both (Nam, 1983).

#### **5.3.3.3 Role Played by the US**

Without considering the "quasi-alliance"—two states that are not allies using a third party as a mutual ally—, the relationship of Japan and Korea could not be understood, as Victor D. Cha notes (1998, p. 78). While both countries are vulnerable to being ignored, they share a mutual ally to

bring them together for two main reasons. First, both countries share relationships with the US and are greatly dependent on the super power. Whenever the relationship of either one with the US is threatened, questions arise related to Japanese and Korean security, as well as their historic relations and roles played. Second, whenever there is a quasi-alliance, there is a heavy burden on the countries. One of two could fear that the US may back the other in a matter. This triangular relationship among the three forces causes Japan and South Korea to fear the nature of the relationship could be altered at any time, with negative effects (Cha, 1998, p. 78).

Japan and South Korea have felt the anxiety concerning their political and economic conditions, as well as their security. For instance, during the late 1960s because of the Nixon Doctrine and the 1970s because of the Carter Plan, economic agreements were signed between Japan and South Korea. In addition, they have been concerned that the US might desert the one in favour of the other. As mentioned, in 1982 and 1986, when the relationship was hostile because of textbook references and the Yasukuni Shrine visits, fears were strong. However, no major issues arose on the basis of the government (Cha, 1998, pp. 79 - 80).

Concerning the importance of alliance, Cheol Hee Park (2008, p. 21) states that various options are to be considered when identifying the nature of alliance. He argues that the US can either treat both the allies in the same manner, called *symmetrical engagement*, or the US can give more importance to one over the other, called *asymmetrical engagement*. Another option is that the US can go for symmetrical disengagement with both by leaving both the allies or for asymmetrical disengagement by disengaging with one ally first and then slowly and gradually loosening the ties with the other as well. The option that the US uses will have an effect on the Korean–Japanese relationship. Symmetrical engagement will result in some arguments between the two allies, weakening the general

cooperation. Asymmetrical engagement will obviously create conflicts between South Korea and Japan because the one will feel discriminated against. Symmetrical disengagement will result in conflicts because the US holds a vital position in maintaining the relationship of the two countries. Asymmetrical disengagement is likely to prolong the conflicts. Therefore, the US option has an effect on whatever relationship Japan and South Korea have in the future.

To summarize, Japan and South Korea declare their public concerns about each other's military reforms although they share the common fear of North Korea because of its promotion of nuclear weapons. South Korea shows its concerns about the Japanese military, and Japan believes that South Korea is an economic competitor. In addition, Japan considers that giving South Korea central importance can be a hindrance in Japan's leadership role in East Asia (Scarborough & Cooney, 2008, p. 179).

#### **5.3.3.4 Political Leadership Factor**

Victor D. Cha (1998, p. 77) identifies political leadership factor as one of the key issues of the Japan–South Korea relationship. When Syngman Rhee and Yoshida Shigera were the rulers, relationship building between the two countries was next to impossible. Syngman Rhee, the first President of South Korea, was of the opinion that Japan's intrusion into South Korea could never be forgotten and that Japan must pay for it. Japan, on the other hand, considered its intrusion justified and stated that, to maintain its power and to minimize Western influence, the colonial rule was necessary. The change in attitude was noticed during Park Chung Hee's and Sato Eisaku's rule. Park Chung Hee's rule was a military rule beginning in 1961 and began a new basis for the relationship of the two countries. With time, the US started to reduce its aid to South Korea, and at this point, South Korea indicated that more investment and alternative

source were needed to raise capital. In addition to economic reasons, there was a strategic reason for the US pressuring Japan to maintain relations with South Korea. The relationship that was declared to be needed during the Park and Sato governments matched the assertions of the US. Finally, agreeing on the need for a better future, both countries worked for their mutual interests.

While hosting the first summits between Japan and South Korea, Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro and President Chun Doo Hwan aspired to promote bilateral relations leading to trust and commitment between both countries (Cha, 1998, p. 77). The agreement proved to be good in the beginning, but with the passage of time in the Nakasone period, conflicts were raised concerning war duties. In China, as well as South Korea, Nakasone's attendance at the Yasukuni Shrine raised emotions in 1985 (Togo, 2005, p. 165).

The relations of the two countries were immensely affected by a major incident in 1986. Another textbook was approved by the Ministry of Education and Culture and the Screening Council of Japan in May 1986. As expected, South Korea and China were deeply offended and rapidly reacted against the publication. When Prime Minister Nakasone intervened, the Council decided to revise the book (Togo, 2005, p. 165). The personal interest of the Prime Minister in revising the book was appreciated by China and South Korea, but inside Japan it was felt that Japan was yielding to external pressures more than necessary (Togo, 2005, p. 165).

In 1998, South Korean President Kim Dae Jung, for the first time in the history of South Korea, invited the Emperor of Japan to pay a visit to South Korea. In the same year, Japanese Prime Minister Obuchi Keizo expressed his deep apologies for Japan's colonization of Korea during his visit to Korea. This incident created a friendly environment among the two nations and trade and tourism between the two rapidly increased (Scarborough & Cooney, 2008, p. 182).

The Yasukuni Shrine is the place of Japan's dead during the Pacific War and South Korea sees it as the sign of Japan's military actions in Asia. While China and South Korea repeatedly criticized him, Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro did not stop visiting the Shrine on an annual basis. Koizumi, on the other hand, somehow tried to reform the relationships with South Korea. In his trip to Seoul in October 2001, the Japanese ruler not only visited Sadaemun Independence Park but also laid a wreath for Korea's dead from the war. Moreover, Koizumi visited the Korean museum where the pain for those who died of stopping Japan's intervention was commemorated. He also showed his deep emotions for the dead and the pain and torture they had gone through (Scarborough & Cooney, 2008, p. 183).

When Shinzo Abe took over the rule in Japan after Koizumi in September 2006, the entire world was astonished because he visited China and South Korea in October. He showed his opinion that Koizumi's policies not good and that the direction of policies needed to be altered. However, Abe did not begin any new agendas and ideas for the two countries cooperate. Therefore, the opposition and tensions among the two countries were part of that time. In September 2007, when Yasuo Fukuda came to power in place of Abe, it was thought that coordination might increase. This coordination could not happen because South Korean elections were in the limelight. Fukuda, however, went to polish Japan-China relationships to build stronger ties and visited Beijing in December 2007 (Park, 2008, pp. 27 - 28).

On December 19, 2007, when Lee Myung Bak was elected as the President of South Korea, it was hoped that cooperation between the two countries would increase. Fukuda and Lee met on February 25, 2008, and decided that cooperation among the two countries would be the first priority of the two. It was decided that the Free Trade Area talks between the two countries would be restarted. A meeting was again held on April

21, 2008, in Japan, and diplomacy was begun again. Lee further asserted that, if Japan remained honest, the history and the past would not be brought up in Korea. Both countries showed full sincerity and agreed to take steps for the future that would be beneficial for both (Park, 2008, p. 28).

In conclusion, the Korean–Japanese relationship faced many shifts after the Cold War. Whenever the history was considered and the fears of both countries were addressed, there seemed to be tensions between the two countries. The rule of Roh Moo Hyun–Junichiro Koizumi was an example of such a shift. Whenever the history was brought forward, tensions would rise, but otherwise, threats still remained. Abe and Fukuda took further steps to nullify their historical actions, leading to better relationships, but nevertheless, the threats remained. The beginning of the Fukuda period and the entire rule of Kim Dae Jung–Keizo Obuchi exemplified this situation. Even then, the historic controversies always emerged. The Lee Myung Bak rule, on the one hand, tried to focus on diplomatic relations but, on the other hand, had to protest against Japan’s policies, particularly concerning the Liancourt Rocks issue, which will be detailed below. This also seemed to be the case for Kim Dae Jung, who was determined to build a strong relationship with Japan. He had to protest the textbook issue to express the emotions of the public. Therefore, it is a priority of both countries to find areas in which historic issues will not be raised and threats can be addressed (Park, 2008, pp. 28 - 29).

### **5.3.4 The Territorial Issue between Japan and South Korea**

The issue of the Liancourt Rocks, which is expressed as Takeshima (竹島) in Japanese and Tokdo in Korean, is a dramatic territorial dispute between Japan and South Korea, dating from the early periods of the Cold War.<sup>5</sup> Located at the Sea of Japan, the Liancourt Rocks are composed of two

small islets (Nishi-jima [西島] and Higashi-jima [東島] in Japanese and Seodo and Dongdo in Korean) and of several small volcanic rocks and coral reefs. The Liancourt Rocks are positioned approximately 215 km east of South Korea and 250 km west of Japan.

The issue of the Liancourt Rocks has remained a significant and inflammatory element preventing strong bilateral political relations until the present. In the early twentieth century, Japan seized control of the Liancourt Rocks by officially incorporating them into the region of Shimane, Japan. According to the declaration issued by the Japanese government on February 22, 1905, the location of these rocks and their periphery was defined as Takeshima and was included in the jurisdiction of the Oki Islands of Japan (Fern, 2005, p. 78). From 1910 to 1945, the Japanese policy makers increasingly implemented an oppression policy toward Korea by adopting an aggressive and imperialist foreign policy vision for themselves (Sibber, 1997, p. 1665).

In the wake of the San Francisco Peace Treaty in 1951, Korea was recognized by Japan as an independent state in the international system. According to Article 2 of the San Francisco Peace Treaty, Japan renounced all rights, claims, and possessions related to Korea, including Quelpart, Port Hamilton, and the Dagelet Islands. However, there was no reference to the status of the Liancourt Rocks in the peace treaty of San Francisco. After the peace treaty, the Supreme Council of the Allied Powers led by the US left control of the Liancourt Rocks, for a while, to the US Army (Fern, 2005, p. 80).

On January 18, 1952, South Korean President Syngman Rhee put his signature to a controversial declaration determining South Korea's territorial waters. The declaration formed an exclusive fishery zone on the open seas adjacent to the territorial water of South Korea to block fishing operations by Japanese fishermen (Togo, 2005, p. 158). This issue, known

as *Syngman Rhee Line* in Japan and the *Peace Line* in South Korea, heightened the relations between the two countries. In fact, another significant reason behind this tension was that the South Korean government also included the Liancourt Rocks in this exclusive fishery zone. Japan protested this action of South Korea.

In 1965, Japan and South Korea concluded a peace treaty aimed at normalizing mutual diplomatic relations. In this treaty, the status of the Liancourt Rocks was not of concern. Instead, both sides came to an agreement in relation to finding diplomatically a possible peaceful solution of the dispute in the future.

#### **5.3.4.1 The Sovereignty Issue and the Liancourt Rocks**

Throughout history, open water areas and sea lines constituted the basis of communication, bilateral or multilateral trade relations, and food among both individuals and states. Drilling and modern technological innovations in ship building increased the significance of natural resource reserves in open waters, including rich oil and gas. In this framework, some international agreements and organizations, such as the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea of 1982, the International Maritime Organization, and the International Seabed Authority have aimed to control the international usage of seas by establishing the basic principles of exclusive economic zones of states and preventing overexploitation (Fern, 2005, p. 81).

Until today, 158 states and the European Commission have acceded to the UN Convention on the Law of Sea. Japan and South Korea are also among the signatory states. In 1996, both Japan and South Korea specified their own exclusive economic zones, and the area located at Liancourt

Rocks was also included in the two countries' economic territories (Solutions, 2012).

#### **5.3.4.2 Claims of Japan Concerning the Liancourt Rocks**

Claims of Japan concerning the Liancourt Rocks are based on related historic documents and international law. The consecutive Japanese governments, in particular, have pointed out the agreements made between the two countries in the past, the declarations concerning the property of rocks, and the official statements and protests, expressing that the actions of the South Korean government concerning the Liancourt Rocks have not been endorsed by Japan.

First documents substantiating the existence of Japan in this area go back to the 1650s. In addition, the Japanese government submits that Japan's own claims are built on a solid and historic ground by making reference to several documents written in the 1700s. To illustrate, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan points out that the map pictured by Sekisui Nagakubu in 1779 indicates that the area located at the Liancourt Rocks is a natural part of Japan. Moreover, by highlighting the historic documents going back to the 1610s, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan has asserted that the area near the Liancourt Rocks has been used by Japanese fishermen during that time. Besides, it has emphasized that in the Seven-Year War (1563–1570) and the Russo–Japanese War (1904–1905), the Liancourt Rocks was occupied by Japanese forces (Fern, 2005, p. 84).

The most significant phenomenon legitimizing the legal status of Japan on the Liancourt Rocks is its annexation process of the Korean territories between the years 1905 and 1910. According to the declaration proclaimed on February 22, 1905, the Japanese government described this territory as *terra nullius* and officially incorporated it into the region of

Shimane, Japan. Hereafter, the Japanese political authorities declared that the Liancourt Rocks were a natural part of Imperial Japan and officially recorded this territory in the State Land Register for Okinokuni, District 4 (Fern, 2005, p. 85). After Japan's annexation of Korea, the incorporation of the Liancourt Rocks was reported in the newspapers.

After being defeated in World War II, Japan's property rights over the Liancourt Rocks became null and void because of decisions made by the Allied powers, led by the US. In this context, the Supreme Council of the Allied Powers issued Directive No. 677 in January 1946. This directive defined the territorial borders of Japan and excluded the contested territories from this definition. According to Article 3 of the directive, Japan was composed of four main islands (Hokkaido, Honshu, Kyushu, and Shikoku) and many small adjacent islands, such as Tsushima Islands and Ryukyu Islands. In addition, in Article 3 of the directive, some islands, such as the Cheju Island, Izu Islands, Ogasawara Islands, and Takeshima Islands, were listed as territories excluded from the political and administrative authority of Japan. However, in Article 6 of the same directive, being cited in Article 8 of the Potsdam Declaration, it was stated that the related documents referring to the sovereignty of Japan were not a final decision ((MOFA), 2012). In this context, the Japanese policy makers claimed that the Liancourt Rocks belonged to Japan and that the Korean government should return these islands to Japan.

In another directive, No. 1033, issued by the Allied powers in June 1946, it was decided to establish a line called the *MacArthur Line* in the Sea of Japan to determine the areas where the Japanese people were allowed to engage in fishing and whaling. Article 3 of that directive stated that "Japanese vessels or personnel thereof will not approach closer than 12 miles from Takeshima nor have any contact with the said island" ((MOFA), 1946). However, the MacArthur Line defined in this directive did not indicate the ultimate demarcation of borders because it was drawn only by

the occupation authority (Hara, 2001, p. 368). After the San Francisco Peace Treaty went into effect on April 28, 1952, the MacArthur Line, administratively separating the Liancourt Rocks from Japan, was obliterated (Hara, 2001, p. 374). However, on January 18, 1952, South Korean President Syngman Rhee unilaterally proclaimed his line, preventing fishing operations of Japanese fishermen.

#### **5.3.4.3 Claims of South Korea Concerning the Liancourt Rocks**

The claims of South Korea concerning the Liancourt Rocks date back further than those of Japan. According to the Korean government, several records from the eighth century show that in 512 BC, this territory was under the control of the Silla Dynasty of Korea. In addition, South Korea asserts that many maps and documents, also including the map made by Dabuchi Tomohiko, confirm that the Liancourt Rocks belong to South Korea (Fern, 2005, p. 85).

According to South Korea, when this territory came under the rule of the Shimane region in 1905, the Korean state was in a weak position against Imperial Japan. The South Korean government has stated that Korea, which was deprived of tools supporting its security policies at that time, had no ability to protest and no power to struggle against the occupation policies of Japan. In addition, it has been stressed by the South Korean government that, after World War II, Japan returned the Liancourt Rocks by depending on the Cairo Declaration of 1943 and the Potsdam Declaration of 1945. In this sense, the Cairo Declaration of 1943 states the following (Library, 1943):

Japan shall be stripped of all the islands in the Pacific which she has seized or occupied since the beginning of the First World War in 1914, and that all the territories Japan has stolen from the Chinese, such as Manchuria, Formosa, and The Pescadores, shall be restored to the Republic of China. Japan will also be expelled from all other territories which she has taken by violence and greed.

The aforesaid three great powers, mindful of the enslavement of the people of Korea, are determined that in due course Korea shall become free and independent.

Furthermore, according to Directives No. 677 and No. 1033 issued by the Supreme Council of the Allied Powers in 1946, Japan was defined as comprising four main islands and roughly a thousand small adjacent islands. The islands of Ullungdo, Chejudo, and Tokdo (Takeshima) were not included in this definition. In this context, the South Korean administration claimed that the Liancourt Rocks are a part of Korea. Furthermore, the Korean government asserts that the San Francisco Peace Treaty indicates that the Japanese state recognizes the independence of Korea and renounces its claims of right and sovereignty over the territory of Korea, including the islands of Chejudo, Komundo, and Ullungdo. Despite no mention of the Liancourt Rocks, the South Korean government has stated that these islands should also be governed under the rule of Korea (Fern, 2005, p. 86).

After settling a group of Korean citizens on the Liancourt Rocks during the Cold War, the Korean government formed a coast guard unit to protect the territory symbolically. At the same time, the government took steps to provide economic development, such as constructing a port and harbour facilities and providing a potable water supply for the Korean citizens living there. In March 1996, visits of Korean tourists to the islands were permitted (Fern, 2005, p. 86). All of these developments from the Cold War period on have caused serious reactions and protests from consecutive Japanese governments.

As a result, despite strong and ever-increasing financial and economic interdependence between Japan and South Korea, the countries could not succeed in establishing strong and solid bilateral political relations. The common interests and responsibilities concerning US in the region, common concerns against the rise of China, common sanctions against untrustworthy actions, and the nuclear threat of North Korea have

contributed to development of bilateral relations between Japan and South Korea to a certain extent. However, the animosity and historic hostility, remembered by Koreans, within the framework of the occupation policies and militarist aims of Japan on the Korean Peninsula during the pre-war period are the main reason behind the two countries' unstable and unreliable diplomatic relations. There is also no doubt that the two countries' special relationships with the US obviated any serious chances of bilateral relations concerning the Liancourt Rocks. Nevertheless, the issue of the Tokdo/Takeshima Islands remains a critical point for both countries, preventing deeper diplomatic relations between the two countries.

### **5.3.5 The North Korean Nuclear Issue and Japan**

With its economic conditions becoming increasingly unfavourable over the past twenty years or so, coupled with the perceived threat to its national security by the US, North Korea has been inclined toward becoming a nuclear power. On the political front, this situation has led to instability in East Asia, as well tension in world politics as a whole.

The North Korean government adopted a Marxist–Leninist ideology during the initial years of the Cold War to reinforce its rule in the country ( Kihl & Kim, 2006, p. 8). However, in the late 1950s, North Korea began to experience the first signs of an economic depression as China and the Soviet Union reduced a considerable amount of foreign aid they had been sending its way. This depression soon grew in intensity, threatening North Korea's entire existence as a country. This problem paved the way for the North Korean government to move towards an ideology of self-reliance. The Marxist–Leninist outlook was thus replaced by the “Juche Ideology”, a political doctrine built on independence and self-reliance with a fundamental focus on economic issues.<sup>6</sup> It was this realization of self-

sufficiency that, in this context, is sometimes identified as the main cause of North Korea's growing initiative toward becoming a nuclear power.

Thus, the urge to become a nuclear power established its roots strongly in North Korea from the 1970s onwards. However, the Soviet Union convinced North Korea to participate in the nuclear non-proliferation regime in return for the former's assistance in helping the latter achieve its motive. Hence, with the signing of the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) on December 12, 1985, it was posed to the Western world that North Korea did not have the intention of pursuing any aims to acquire nuclear weapons capability. However, complete transparency of its nuclear policies to the Western world was not ensured.

Because of North Korea's evident intentions of becoming a nuclear power, Japan (given its geographic proximity) sees it as a major threat to its national security and stability (Scarborough & Cooney, 2008, p. 172). This fear of a nuclear attack on Japanese territory is often reflected in the foreign policies and activities initiated by Japan toward North Korea (Scarborough & Cooney, 2008, p. 180). Furthermore, North Korea is regarded by Japan as an enemy state considered responsible for such criminal acts as abducting Japanese nationals and holding them in detention against their wishes, causing several Japanese families to suffer (Son, 2010, p. 174).

In the years following South Korea's Nordpolitik and the collapse of the Soviet Union, that is, the early 1990s, Japan sought to revitalize contacts with North Korea. Hence, a delegation from Tokyo to Pyongyang was dispatched in September 1990 (Lee, 2003, p. 67). To counterbalance South Korea's successful Nordpolitik in establishing ties with China and the Soviet Union, North Korea responded quite positively to this delegation, initiating negotiations on establishing bilateral ties and political normalization between Japan and North Korea (Nam & Kim, 2000,

pp. 112 - 113). The declaration signed between Japan and the North Korean Workers Party following the attempts of this delegation included, among other things, a provision that stated that nuclear weapons should altogether be eradicated from the world. This provision shows that Japan's intended gain from the agreement was to remove North Korea's nuclear development from the post-Cold War era. North Korea, on the other hand, used this declaration as a clear-cut opportunity to extract not only an official apology but also sufficient compensation from Japan for all the sufferings caused during the 35 years of its colonial occupation. Furthermore, the losses suffered by North Korea because of Japan's antagonistic policies towards Pyongyang during the 45-year post-war period were also highlighted and due apologies and compensations demanded (Nam & Kim, 2000, p. 113).

Stemming from this declaration, the first round of normalization talks between Japan and North Korea were held in 1991, followed by another seven rounds in the next two years. However, despite all efforts, no concrete conclusion was reached, primarily because of North Korea pursuing its aim of nuclear development (Nam & Kim, 2000, p. 114). These negotiations and talks toward normalization finally reached a deadlock when North Korea officially withdrew itself from the NPT in March 1993, in response to which Japan began imposing sanctions on North Korea and demanded a clarification from Pyongyang on the status of its nuclear development program (Nam & Kim, 2000, p. 114).

For about a year thereafter, Japan remained quite insecure concerning North Korea and did not budge on the imposition of brutal policies like trade sanctions. It was not until mid-1994 that the adverse effects of such policies started taking precedence in rising tension between the two countries. Hence, Japan altered its position, specifically wanting to establish clearly a basic premise upon which its entire foreign policy toward North Korea would be based (Nam & Kim, 2000, pp. 114 - 115). A

grave possibility of impending conflict in the region was thus revealed through this development of increased tension between the countries, later known in historical literature as the *1994 Nuclear Crisis*.<sup>7</sup>

The historic North Korea–Japan summit was held in September 2002. At this summit, held in Pyongyang, Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro and Chairman Kim Yong Il, the heads of state for Japan and North Korea, respectively, officially met in for the very first time since North Korea's liberation (Lee, 2003, p. 88). This meeting was, in effect, a very smart diplomatic move by the Kim Yong Il regime, which was suffering from major energy, food, and foreign-exchange crises and was, indeed, in desperate need of foreign aid at that time. Thus, this attempt toward peaceful negotiation with Japan worked in a two-pronged way to favour North Korea. Not only did it ease tensions between North Korea and Japan, but it also promised much needed foreign aid and economic cooperation from the US (Lee, 2003, p. 89).

Although the summit meetings of 2002 were seen as a start toward North Korea–Japan negotiations in Japan, they were followed by a few adverse developments, specifically, the intensification of the kidnapping issue in Japan and North Korea's undaunted development of its nuclear program. Thus, the subsequent mutual meetings held in Kuala Lumpur proved that further negotiations between the two nations for normalization would remain in deadlock (Lee, 2003, pp. 90 - 91).

The growing threat realized by Japan through North Korea's pursuance of its nuclear program led to the former strengthening its ties with the US to consider possible options for overcoming this threat. One such possibility was launching pre-emptive strikes on North Korea's missile bases, which Japan considered when North Korea tested ballistic missiles in its sea, such as the multi-stage Taepodong-2 in 2006 (Son, 2010, p. 175).

Historically, Japan has faced several threats from North Korea over the years. First, in the 1970s and 1980s, many Japanese nationals were abducted by North Korea. In 1993, the Rodong missiles, with a range extending beyond 625 miles, were tested by North Korea. These missiles were subsequently deployed in 1996 and 1997, posing a direct threat to Japan because it fell within their range. More recently, the multi-stage Taepodong missiles have been tested by North Korea in 1998 and 2006. Despite all reasoning that North Korea may be not be intentionally targeting Japan but an enemy beyond, these violent activities have nonetheless posed increased threats to the national security of Japan. Hence, Japan has identified three main areas in which North Korea threatens its security: abduction of Japanese nationals, testing multi-stage missiles, and dispatching spy ships (Son, 2010, p. 177).

Ever since the testing of the Rodong missile in 1993, North Korean nuclear developments have posed a threat to Japanese security. With a range of up to 1300 km, the inter-mediate Rodong missile can easily reach Japan. The threat has grown even more since the late 1990s because “200 of these missiles” are believed to have been deployed. After testing Taepodong-1, a multi-stage ballistic missile in 1998, North Korea promised the US that it would refrain from any further missile launches. This promise was further endorsed by the signing of the Pyongyang Declaration of 2002. However, this declaration allowed North Korea some undue leverage by making its moratorium conditional on dialogue with outside parties to improve bilateral ties. Thus, if North Korea declared that there was no dialogue, the moratorium would stand null and void (Son, 2010, p. 177).

Despite its Self-Defense Forces of 240,000 soldiers, Japan's Constitution bans the use of military to resolve international disputes. Furthermore, its defence-oriented strategies prevent it from possessing “attack weapons” like missiles and long-range bombers. Lack of weaponry

to use for self-defence against a nuclear equipped force is perhaps the underlying cause behind Japan's growing concerns over its neighbours' military developments because this lack of capable weaponry makes the country more vulnerable (Son, 2010, p. 177). Given the above factors, after 2006, the Japanese government went a step further in establishing its security against the constant threat from its neighbour, North Korea. When the UN convened the Security Council, Japan used its position as a non-permanent member to convince its close friend, the US, as well as the two relatively dominant super powers, Russia and China, to agree to implementing strict Security Council-level sanctions against North Korea (Son, 2010, p. 179).

A resolution advising all countries to avoid sending or transferring missile-related items to North Korea was unanimously passed by the Security Council on 15 July 2006. This resolution, retaining most of the suggestions made in the Japanese draft under consideration of China's possible veto, allowed UN members to impose sanctions against North Korea at their own will. Additional sanctions were imposed on North Korea by Japan on 19 September 2006 concerning business organizations having suspected links with North Korea's missile and nuclear program. These sanctions included a freeze on assets of fifteen manufacturers, trading houses, and other North Korean businesses, as well as a ban on remittances (Son, 2010, p. 179).

Japan, being most vulnerable, decided to take additional actions to counter North Korea's missile tests and to reduce the fear that these tests had instilled in its citizens. Thus, the Japanese government invested its taxpayers' money to provide surveillance satellites and anti-missile batteries. Investing in similar weaponry to attack North Korea, it was logically decided, would have been too difficult to achieve (Son, 2010, p. 181). This mediation undertaken by Japan can conclusively be said to have achieved two goals ensuring its safety and global standing. First, it paved

the way for building Japan's independent defence capability; second, it further strengthened the ties between Japan and the US (Son, 2010, p. 190).

### **5.3.6 Concluding Remarks**

In the protection and continuity of Japan's anti-militaristic state identity, the Korean peninsula as a whole has been seen as a significant other for the Japanese policy makers. To feel ontologically secure itself in a regional context, from the Cold War years on, Japan has tried to establish a basic trust mechanism toward the Korean Peninsula. This has various reasons. The first and the foremost important reason is the geographic, historical and cultural proximity of Japan to the Korean peninsula. As mentioned above briefly, Japan has great cultural and historical ties with the Korean peninsula. During the post-war period, the alliance relationships of the two countries with the US, and the mutual economic ties deriving from this alliance relationships and the geographical proximity have become another important factor for Japan to view the Korean peninsula as a significant other. Moreover, without considering this alliance relationship, it may be said that the post-war relationship of Japan and Korea could not be understood.

Japan has so far succeeded in establishing the mutual basic trust with South Korea to some extent. However, the expansionist policies pursued by Japan in the pre-war period are still a mental hindrance for a full scale trust towards Japan among the South Korean state elites. Moreover, nationalist discourses in both countries also set a barrier for the further development and improvement of the political relations between the two countries. On the other hand, from the Cold War years on, the Japanese policy makers have failed to establish the same level of trust with the Northern regime of the peninsula. The nuclear armament ambitions of

North Korea was seen as the biggest issue for the improvement of the relations between the two countries

To sum up, continuity of the anti-militarist identity of Japan even after the cold war period has depended on the preservation of the relations of Japan with the Korean peninsula as a significant other, based on mutual trust. This discourse of the Japanese policy makers bears significance in both eliminating the uncertainties around Japan and guaranteeing its ontological security.

## **5.4 China as Significant Other**

### **5.4.1 Introduction**

It is well acknowledged that, as a source of regularities in the social relationships, basic trust is created only through routinisation. As detailed in chapter one, like individuals, states also accomplish ontological security by routinising their relations with significant others. In this sense, for many reasons, including the cultural and geographic proximity and economic, political, and security dimensions in bilateral and multilateral relations, mainland China is regarded by the Japanese ruling elites as a significant other in the country's self-identity construction.

In particular, from the 1990s on, Japanese policy makers have considered the PRC both as a potential enemy for its national security and prosperity and as an inevitable partner to maintaining peace, stability, and cooperation in the region of East Asia. As further detailed below, the PRC is a potential enemy for Japan for such reasons as its rapid economic development, its non-transparent military modernisation, and the potential leadership role it has begun to play in East Asia. However, it is also an inevitable partner for Japan. Primarily, with Japan, the PRC has the capacity to struggle with the economic, social, and security issues in East

Asia to create a more stable and economically growing region. Moreover, because of its huge economy and population, the PRC has been a noteworthy trade partner for Japanese business and governmental sectors. However, although a basic trust mechanism in mutual relationships was constructed between the two countries during the Cold War years, this trust mechanism could not be enhanced to a satisfactory level or above after the Cold War. Both countries were, in principle, overwhelmed by the historic issues originating from the pre-war period. In addition, becoming rival competitors in the economic sphere in the region has been another problem area between Japan and the PRC.

In this section, to establish a clear picture of post-Cold War Sino-Japanese relations at the state level, the historical background of two countries during the Cold War will be briefly summarized. Then, the post-Cold War process will be detailed. Mutual relationships will be dealt with in an analysis with economic, security, and political dimensions.

#### **5.4.2 A Short Retrospective Analysis of Sino-Japanese Relations during the Cold War**

The People's Republic of China was established on October 1, 1949, and shortly after its establishment, it declared the following main principle regarding its foreign relations with the international community. The Beijing government was defined as the sole legitimate regime representing the whole of China. Moreover, it was stressed that there has always been only one China and that the Formosa Island was an alienable part of China. Finally, it accentuated that countries willing to have diplomatic relations with the government of the People's Republic of China should show their desire to recognize Beijing as the sole legal government. This declaration of the Beijing government created a major dilemma for the Japanese party elites at that time. Because Formosa Island (Taiwan) was a strategic

location for Japan, some quarters wanted to establish diplomatic ties only with the Republic of China, which was established on Formosa Island. On the other hand, the main arguments of Japanese leftist factions, who wanted to establish a close relationship with the People's Republic of China, were generally based on the moral reasons because of militarist and expansionist activities of Imperial Japan in East Asia during the Pacific War. Yet another group led by Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru, which had the majority in the National Diet, was eager to establish close economic ties only with mainland China largely because of its vast territory and huge population (Tuncoku, 2002, p. 37).

In fact, the Japanese government, headed by Yoshida Shigeru, whose primary intention was to build a vision for the country's economic regrowth and prosperity, decided to open an overseas bureau on Formosa Island with the aim of developing bilateral economic relations. At the same time, if requested by the Beijing government, the Japanese policy makers declared that Japan would open a similar economic initiative in mainland China. With this enterprise, it can be said that Japan tried to create a basic trust system in its newly established economic relations both with the nationalist government in Taipei and the communist government in Beijing.

Nevertheless, this enterprise by Japan disappointed the US. When the US Ambassador, John Foster Dulles, visited Japan in December 1951, he submitted a written report indicating this disappointment. The report stated that the peace treaty could not be endorsed by the American Senate as long as the Japanese government did not show its desire to have diplomatic ties with the nationalist government on Formosa Island (Tuncoku, 2002, p. 38). Thereafter, Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru sent a letter to Ambassador Dulles indicating the following (Yoshida, 1952, pp. 38 - 39):

The Japanese government desires ultimately to have a full measure of political peace and commercial intercourse with China, which is Japan's close neighbor. ( . . . ). At the present time it is, we hope, possible to develop that kind of relationship with the National government of the Republic of China, which has the seat, voice, and vote of China in the United Nations, which exercises actual governmental authority over certain territory, and which maintains diplomatic relations with most of the members of the United Nations. To that end my government on November 17, 1951, established a Japanese Government Overseas Agency in Formosa, with the consent of the National government of China. This is the highest form of relationship with other countries which is now permitted to Japan, pending the coming into force of the multilateral treaty of peace. ( . . . ). My government is prepared as soon as legally possible to conclude with the National government of China, if that government so desires, a treaty which will re-establish normal relations between the two governments in conformity with the principles set out in the multilateral treaty of peace. The terms of such bilateral treaty shall ( . . . ) be applicable to all territories which are now, or which may hereafter be, under the control of the National government of the Republic of China. ( . . . ). As regards the Chinese Communist regime, that regime stands actually condemned by the United Nations of being an aggressor, and in consequence the United Nations has recommended certain measures against that regime ( . . . ). Furthermore, the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance concluded in Moscow in 1950 is virtually a military alliance aimed against Japan. ( . . . ). In view of these considerations, I can assure you that the Japanese government has no intention to conclude a bilateral treaty with the Communist regime in China.

Via this letter, the Japanese government declared its intention to conclude a peace treaty with the nationalist government on Formosa Island. Thus, a peace treaty between Japan and the Republic of China was signed on April 28, 1952, and Japan established an official diplomatic relationship with Taiwan by recognizing the nationalist government as the sole legitimate power representing the whole of China (Hosoya, 1989, p. 20).

The relations between Japan and the PRC were greatly affected by this diplomatic move because the Japanese policy makers did not develop proper political terms with Beijing for manoeuvring. Even the business industry in Japan, higher officials from the Liberal Democratic Party, and the left-wing opposition groups forced the state to engage in political affiliations with Chinese officials by receiving a guide from the US regarding domestic importance in its political context. The business

community in Japan basically forced the government to such action because the businesses wanted to enter the Chinese market with its opportunities for growth and development. Additionally, patriotic Japanese wanted to see Japan free of American domination while political groups supported the step because they were in favour of communism and philosophers encouraged it out of their admiration of Chinese civilization and rich culture (Mendl, 1995, p. 66).

Nevertheless, the Japanese representatives in the UN voted in favour of the US taking custody of the seats in place of China because of the "Yoshida Lines" which made it mandatory to support the US instead of the PRC (Mendl, 1995, p. 66). Using the principle of "separation of politics from economics", Japan, however, extended its business networks toward the PRC, although it had signed a treaty with Taiwan stating that it would not participate in a political relationship with mainland China (MacDougall, 2006, p. 156). Thus, it can be said that Japan and the PRC were linked only economically until the mid-1970s.

From the middle of the Cold War period, according to the Chinese leader Mao Zedung in 1969, Chinese security was under greater threat not from the US but from the Soviet Union. Hence, the PRC and the US grew closer still because of the growing mistrust and abhorrence of the Chinese toward the Soviet Union and the greater cause of their political agenda.<sup>8</sup> The PRC and the US shook hands with each other in 1979 and were able to settle their disputes in the form of a diplomatic relationship after a peace process that was initiated in February 1972. The issue that Taiwan should be in the Chinese district was again mentioned in the joint declaration by US President Richard Nixon and Zhou Enlai on 27 February 1972. In the following years, even though the US guaranteed not to entertain the claim regarding Taiwan being a part of mainland China, this topic did not interfere in the relations between the two countries (Mendl, 1995, p. 66).

Japanese Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei went on a survey of China in September 1972, when another declaration was signed between the PRC and Japan (Mendl, 1995, p. 67). This joint declaration states the following points. (1) The Japanese government would recognize the PRC as the only official and legal government of whole China. (2) Stronger political relations would be seen after 29 of September 1972 as decided by Japan and the PRC. (3) From this date on, all non-normal relations between Chinese and Japanese government would end. (4) Japan agreed to follow the points mentioned in Article 8 of the Potsdam Declaration and respect the claim that the PRC had concerning Taiwan being an alienable state falling under the jurisdiction of the PRC. (5) The Chinese government, for the sake of peaceful terms between the PRC and Japan, decided to end war with Japan. (6) Credit for improvements in the relationship between the PRC and Japan cannot be given to any other country. Both of the countries have no right to rule over the Asia-Pacific states, and likewise, no other country can control these states. (7) Mutual non-aggression, equality and mutual benefit, sovereignty and territorial integrity, and peaceful co-existence and non-interference in each other's internal affairs were the principles the PRC and the Japanese government agreed to follow to a peaceful relationship with each other. (8) A treaty for constant friendship had to be signed between the PRC and Japan to strengthen their terms. (9) To strengthen their relations, the two governments agreed to enter into negotiations regarding such matters as trade, shipping, aviation, and fisheries. ((MOFA), 1972).

On 16 February 1978, the China-Japan Long-Term Trade Agreement was signed (MacDougall, 2006, p. 146; Kawashima, 2005, p. 97). In August of the same year, the Treaty of Peace and Friendship was signed between the PRC and Japan. Thus, the Sino-Japanese trade relationships have grown as a result of the long-term trade agreement. However, Japan's keen interest and determination in this trade was the subject of studies that concluded it had "long-term political interest" more

than any financial interest. In the 1980s, many events indicated that the Sino–Japanese relationships were important politically and culturally. For example, in 1982 and 1986, there were Chinese protests against watered-down accounts in Japanese textbooks of Japanese actions in the Chinese mainland during the Sino–Japanese War of 1937–1945 (MacDougall, 2006, p. 147).

By 1989, the mutual relationships based on both political and economic grounds were highly sensitive between the PRC and Japan. The PRC was, indeed, more important to Japan in terms of its trade transactions than vice versa because 5.3% of Japanese imports depended on the PRC while the PRC accounted for the 3.1% of Japanese exports. Japan's contribution to the PRC's total trade in 1990 was 15.1%. Japan acted as a foreign investor in the Chinese market. Although the investment was a very small amount, it was important to the PRC. Additionally, by 1988, 36.3% of the PRC foreign aid came from Japan (MacDougall, 2006, p. 147).

#### **5.4.3 Post-Cold War Sino–Japanese Relationships**

Japanese Premier Yoshida Shigeru had professed that, one day, the US and Japan would be able to steer the PRC away from depending on the Soviet Union for all its needs. Therefore, during the post-war period, Japan established a positive policy of attachment toward mainland China. The main reason for Japan's policy change was Yoshida Shigeru's strategy (detailed in chapter two). Because of prosperity, growth, and foreign investments, the Beijing government would surely move away from Moscow and towards Japan and the US, according to Yoshida Shigeru. Yoshida Shigeru's theory was based on the fundamental rules of economic self-dependence in the PRC and Japan's own commercial benefits (Green, 2001, p. 77).

However, this was not a complete solution for developing relationships between the PRC and Japan. According to Michael J. Green (2001, pp. 77 - 78), Yoshida's prophesies were partially correct according to the issue. Therefore, much aid, lucrative investments, and large amounts of trade could not protect the Sino-Japanese relationships from the progress of the 1990s. First, the end of the Cold War strained the relationship because both countries were not ultimately united against the Soviet Union. Moreover, Japan's buoyancy and financial stability was damaged because of the setback from the Gulf War of 1990-1991. Finally, the PRC rose in economic and military terms as a determined strength on the Asian horizon. In the following sections, the economic, security, and political dimensions of the mutual relationships will be detailed to analyse the basic-trust mechanism between the two countries built during the Cold War. Thus, the vagueness of the Sino-Japanese relationship will be clarified.

#### **5.4.3.1 Economic Dimension**

The PRC's significance as a security concern, an economic strength, and even as a long-term political partner cannot be ignored by Japan and all of East Asia. Therefore, the importance of the PRC was perceived earlier by the Japanese policy makers, who were responsible for revising the Sino-Japanese association during the post-war era (Hughes, 2009, p. 839).

The Sino-US renewal of a friendly relationship in 1972 removed the principal international hurdles to developing a bilateral relationship. This move also stimulated Japan to speed up its ties with the PRC. Moreover, the Japanese policies were completely transformed in new dimensions toward mainland China because Japanese policy makers were more concerned especially during the post-war period with strengthening ties with reform-minded leaders in the PRC and re-establishing its relations with the PRC as

a core bilateral partner of trade. In this sense, as mentioned previously, Japan started developing its relations with the PRC in the same year, leading the two countries to the 1978 Treaty of Peace and Friendship. Japan and the PRC intentionally abandoned issues of the colonial past and defensive issues concerning the East China Sea and the Senkaku/Diaoyutai islets because it was necessary to develop mutual relationships quickly for their direct mutual political and economic welfare.

Therefore, Japan had the fortitude to maintain a bilateral relationship with its financial strength. In this context, in the early 1980s, Japan became the biggest donor providing official enhancement and guidance to mainland China. Moreover, Japan spent a huge amount of money, 3,133 billion Japanese Yen, granting aid for the purpose of technical cooperation. At the end of the 1980s, Japan was the main investor in and trader with the PRC, and therefore, the METI developed the idea of putting the PRC in Japan's regional production order (Hughes, 2009, pp. 839 - 840).

On the other hand, the grip of Soviet communism, not as strong as it had been, and the Communist Party of China could no longer govern without providing financial benefits and economic success for the people of China. According to Deng Xiaoping, the heart of the problem could be solved by free economy. In this sense, the whole world, from the 1980s to the 1990s, turned its attention toward the PRC for its superb economic growth, which was seen as a miracle in some countries. As soon as the Chinese government implemented its Reform and Opening Policy in 1978, the country moved swiftly in the direction of huge economic success. Due to this action, in the 1980s and 1990s, the annual GDP growth rate was almost 10% and remained constant (Togo, 2005, p. 147).

Because China considered economic reconstruction important during the first half of the 1990s, Japan's cooperation was also important. The foreign policy makers of Japan also viewed the strong and stable

growth of relations with mainland China as necessary for the country's foreign policy objectives. Not only was the stability of East Asia related to this growth, but also the economy of Japan could be sustained through it (Togo, 2005, p. 147).

From 1992 to 1996, within five years, a significant, fast, and stable change was observed in the trade volume between the two countries, which became doubled from US \$30 billion to \$60 billion, truly an impressive growth. During this era, the PRC was the second-best trade partner of Japan (after the US), and Japan was the prime trade partner of the PRC. The trade amount incessantly rose year after year until the last period of the 1990s. In 2002, the trade amount totalled US \$100 billion instead of \$ 60 billion (Togo, 2005, pp. 148 - 149).

As a result, countless numbers of cheap Chinese labourers attracted several Japanese companies to turn to the PRC as their productivity hub. Therefore, the PRC achieved a prime place in the investment of Japanese companies. To illustrate, from 1992 to 2001, every year a stable investment of US \$1 to 2 billion continued without interruption (Togo, 2005, p. 149). However, this growth raised concerned with Japan that it could cause the relationship to become asymmetric with Japan totally depending on the PRC, yet the bilateral economic involvement with mainland China was causing stimulation at inter-governmental levels and for the non-state business sector as well. However, the interference of the PRC in the traditional economic development of ASEAN was seen as a challenge by Japan and paved the way for speedy Chinese inclusion in bilateral Free-Trade Agreements (FTA) (Hughes, 2009, p. 840). Complete attention was given to the economic aspects of regionalism by the Chinese leaders, and they were cordially welcomed by the Southeast Asians. The ASEAN plus Three structure had the support of ten countries of ASEAN, along with the PRC, South Korea, and Japan. Among all of them, the PRC's economy was more influential because the other members were interested

in importing from mainland China; therefore, the PRC's growth was not a threat because it filled their economic needs (Yahuda, 2004, p. 301).

#### **5.4.3.2 Security Dimension**

Japan's relationships with the PRC during the post-Cold War period arose from the apprehensions about China's non-transparent military modernisation and exploration in the region. However, after the Cold War, formation of a stable policy was implemented by the Japanese government "towards China which aimed at integrating China into a rules-based international community because of Beijing's regional power and its potential to cause instability" (Drifte, 2002, p. 32). Notwithstanding, a complete transformation occurred in the 1990s in Japan's view of the policies of the PRC concerning security. According to Reinhard Drifte (2002, p. 33), non-traditional security concerns in addition to traditional security concerns relating to China transformed both domestic and international stances of Japan; thus, China had political and economic growth.

In the 1990s, the rapid growth in the economy; nuclear capability; and intense changes in military, economic, and social perspectives were pressing issues in the literature on the growth of China (Rose, 2010, p. 152). In this sense, the Chinese military supremacy, expendability, and tendency in modernising its military were the only worries for the government of Japan, in addition to China's lack of transparency in reporting expenditures (Rose, 2010, p. 157).

Because of the impetus in the economy, Chinese foreign policy became more self-confident and responsive due to the increase in the Chinese people's inclination regarding a nationalistic sentiment. Therefore, the main powers in the region were perplexed because they were unable

to assess strategic planning for the future. A relevant instance of this problem was the Taiwan Crises in 1995–1996 (Zhao, 2001, p. 668).

To enhance relationships with Tokyo and Washington was not easy for the Beijing government because Taiwan was a point of contention among them (Zhao, 2001, p. 668). Taiwanese President Lee Teng-hui, in May 1995, after receiving a visa from the Washington administration, visited the US to take part in a class at Cornell University, where he delivered a speech during the spring semester (Chapman, 2001, p. 132). Because of this surprising action on the part of the US, the PRC's intentions to reunify with Taiwan became bleak, and it was a setback to China's security policy. It is relevant that Taiwan's closeness with the US blocked the probability of aligning with the PRC. The conflict reached its peak when the first direct presidential election in Taiwan took place on 23 March 1996. The Chinese leadership was displeased with the US and Taiwan, and to show its indignation, on 18 July 1995, the Chinese leadership broadcasted a week-long series of military exercises, and in August, the next round of exercises occurred as a consequence of the US–Taiwan friendship, which was a hurdle to Chinese–Taiwan reunification efforts (Drifte, 2002, p. 64).

All the modernised military war arms were used in these exercises, such as warships and warplanes, and Chinese forces launched missiles near Taiwan's coasts. They fired an M-9 missile (Dongfeng-15) into the East China Sea to the north of Taiwan, but the US government gave no reaction to the missile testing. Before Taiwan's parliamentary election, the PRC launched the third round of military exercises in November 1995. The US, seeing the PRC increasing military movements in the region, deployed a fleet of warships with two aircraft carriers, the largest fleet seen in that area since the Vietnam War. At its peak, the sense was that both sides were trying to impress the other side their determination (Drifte, 2002, pp. 64 - 65).

The aspects of these military exercises showed the people of Japan clearly that the PRC would never hesitate to achieve its goals. In confronting the US presence in Asia, the growing hunger of mainland China to have its power recognized was clearly visible, and the Taiwan Straits Crises of 1995–1996 made the Japanese policy makers aware in this sense (Hughes, 2009, p. 840). The exhibition of forces and power by the US and the PRC was in proximity to Japan's territory, and the conflict could have turned into a bloody war. The Japanese were very concerned about the PRC's growing military strength and its testing missiles, which were arms of mass destruction. Moreover, the Taiwan issue entered into the modification of Sino–Japanese relationships (Drifte, 2002, p. 65).

The Chinese attempt to pressure Taiwan through its missile tests in the Taiwan Strait in March 1996 alerted Japan concerning the Chinese intentions, and the Japanese justified the US involvement in the region, but the other dimension of the PRC's significance as a potential neighbour was also observed. However, in April 1996, the Joint Security Declaration signed by Prime Minister Hashimoto and President Clinton put Japan's bilateral relationships with the PRC in uncertainty. The Joint Declaration was "to promote bilateral policy coordination, including studies on bilateral cooperation in dealing with situations that may emerge in the areas surrounding Japan", and the PRC felt that it interfered in its reunification attempts with Taiwan (Green, 2001, p. 91). The Taiwan Straits events had been the reason for this joint declaration of the US–Japan, from the Chinese perspective. According to the PRC, with the declaration, Japan's position was reworded from the "Far East" to the "Asia–Pacific region", as mentioned in the original 1960 treaty.

The reaction of the PRC was intense because it saw that the Joint Security Declaration was going against the treaty and it raised suspicion about an alliance. Openly, the Beijing government claimed that the Joint Security Declaration was an attempt to hide US–Japan intentions to curtail

Chinese political and economic growth and was a visible sign to steer the PRC away from reunification with Taiwan. If that were not the intent, then Taiwan would not have been part of the agreement. On the other hand, the US and Japan perceived the Joint Security Declaration as status quo and not against Beijing's economic and political expansions (Green, 2001, p. 91).

Many reasons were given to assure the PRC that the new Defence Guidelines and the Security Declaration were not formulated to counter the interests of the PRC; instead, they were designed to serve Chinese interests more significantly in a stable Asia-Pacific region. According to Tokyo and Washington, the regional contingencies that had been addressed in the guidelines' review were within the structure of Japan's Constitution, as well as the current defensive missions of the Japanese Self Defense Forces. Moreover, it was not geographic; instead, the guidelines were in accordance with current circumstances (Green, 2001, p. 91).

The Chinese analytical data found that, since the beginning of the 1990s, Japan's mutual relationships with Taiwan had significantly increased. Before the 1990s, during the Cold War period, Japan-Taiwan intermingling occurred only for economic reasons; however, their interaction in the 1990s had transformed into a political and covertly territorial association. The two countries had developed a close relationship not only among their leaders but also among their people, according to China Rex Li. He points out that various justifications can be provided for the Japan-Taiwan relationship. For instance, Japan is a small country with insufficient markets and lack of natural resources; the survival of Japan's economy relies on the shipping lanes with the Taiwan Straits connecting the area. Furthermore, to achieve a dominant place in Asia-Pacific security, the deep relationship between Taipei and Tokyo would consolidate the position of Japan.

During the Sino-Japanese War in 1894, Taiwan surrendered to Japan before China was conquered. The Japanese occupation in Taiwan

lasted for 50 years. During those years, Beijing claimed, Taiwan had the Japanese nature forced on it. Moreover, even after Japan was forcibly removed from Taiwan in 1945, few Japanese were not willing to admit the Chinese had territorial rights on Taiwan. Consequently, since the 1950s, the relationship between Japan and Taiwan has been based on economic and commercial interests, and several Japanese companies and financial institutions have links in Taiwan and take advantage of the huge market in Taiwan (Li, 2009, p. 129).

However, other factors were teasing Japan apart from Taiwan. According to Rex Li (2009, p. 130), the PRC's analysts for security found that Japan was very worried about the policies and activities of the PRC. Japan was concerned about the way the PRC was equipping its army with modern weapons and nuclear enhancement and about the Chinese defence budget not being transparent. From time to time, the interference of the PRC in regional issues, for instance, in the East China Sea, Taiwan, and the South China Sea, have been troublesome for Japanese defence policy makers.

In the 1990s, the leaders of the PRC revised the strategic policy of the country concerning armament and defence schemas. At the 14<sup>th</sup> National Party Congress in October 1992, the Chinese leaders had stressed defence of territorial sovereignty and military fortification. According to Reinhard Drifte (2002, pp. 40 - 41), all these actions tended to emphasise the importance of 'comprehensive security' or 'comprehensive national strength', terms that were extracted from the comprehensive security policy of Japan. However, in the early 1980s, Deng Xiaoping defended the idea of comprehensive national power. After that time, it became the official approach to Chinese security.

The speed of the country's military growth was simultaneous to the country's economic growth. In 1988–1989, the PRC's official budget grew more than 10% yearly. In 1999, the budget increased to US \$12.6 billion,

and in 1998, the official defence budget was US \$11 billion. Nevertheless, the Chinese government announced in March 2001 a 17.7% increase in the budget for fiscal year 2001 (Ishida, 2006, p. 7). Over the last two decades, it has shown the greatest increase, and the amount of the defence budget grew to US \$17.195 billion.

In 1992, the vice foreign minister of Japan, Kakizawa Koji, cautioned the PRC not to buy Ukrainian-built aircraft. Japan had been more concerned with the PRC's non-transparency and its military explorations since the 1990s, and Japan was anxious about the sharp increase in the Chinese defence budget. Moreover, in 1993, LDP's leading members showed their indignation at the PRC's defence spending for modernisation. The evidence of this activity was presented in 1994 in the 'Higuchi Report', which indirectly discussed Chinese military expansion in all directions. This report was the combined efforts of a special non-governmental advisory panel on defence that was formed under Japanese Prime Minister Hosokawa.

The PRC performed a series of nuclear tests during May and September 1992 and in October 1993. A further series of tests were conducted by the Chinese military in June and October of 1994. However, as mentioned earlier, the mild criticism from the US and Japan was little more than expressing disappointment. In May 1995, further nuclear testing conducted by the PRC was observed as a critical threat. The time was very sensitive when the tests were conducted because global efforts were under way to implement nuclear non-proliferation. The nuclear tests showed a negative aspect of the Chinese growing military budget, and the whole world became concerned about the growing nuclear testing and missile exports of the PRC. Because Japan, at the end of World War II, had been the victim of nuclear bombings in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, nuclear weapons have always been a sensitive issue for the Japanese people and in their domestic politics (Drifte, 2002, pp. 44 - 47).

As a result, Japan and the PRC share differences and similar interests concerning regional security. As the PRC clearly showed, the Japanese strategy on mainland China has two aspects. To constrain Chinese activities without antagonizing the PRC, therefore, a multilateral security structure establishment was feasible and favourable according to what Japan wanted. Though Japan is mistrustful of the economic growth of the PRC in the region, economic cooperation with the PRC is necessary for Japan's own economic growth. The Japanese are uncertain about Chinese intentions; however, the Japanese government believes it can mould Chinese behaviour through dialogue and cooperation. Therefore, Japan has fortified its friendly relationship based on its strategy with the US while engaging the PRC in security dialogues (Li, 2009, p. 131).

On the other hand, as asserted by Thomas J. Christensen (1999, p. 52), Chinese security analysts have worried that Japan might return to its past glory when it was a military power during the first quarter of the twenty first century. Such a Japan would be free of US direction and a significant part of global affairs. In fact, the Chinese intuition of distrust towards Japan is rooted historically. Either a break up of Japan-US coordination or Japan's promotion in that alliance is frightening to the PRC. That feeling is also shared in the Korean Peninsula.

Christensen (1999, pp. 57 - 58) further indicates that many Chinese analysts do not agree with the analysis of some Western experts on Japan, who believe that cultural pacifism after World War II, domestic political constraints, and economic interests will prevent Japan from following such a strategy. According to Christensen, most Chinese analysts assert that, along with the domestic political and economic stability of Japan, the most important dynamic that might preclude Japanese military build-ups is the status of the US-Japan relationship, particularly the security alliance. For the reasons set forth above, most Chinese analysts fear almost any change in the US-Japan alliance.

#### **5.4.3.3 Political Dimension**

Because of the escalating variability of the arrangements in the international system, prospects for the restoration of Sino-Japanese political relations were raised in the early post-Cold War period. The apparent pledge by the Chinese leadership to continue with its program of opportunity for the economy of the whole world and its trying to diminish the anxiety in East Asia concerning the Cold War were in line with softening tension and removing hindrances in the PRC–US interaction, as well as removing the US opposition to the relationship of the PRC and Japan. After the Cold War, the Sino–Japanese economic interdependency grew rapidly with little difficulty (Yu, 2006, pp. 93 – 95). The Japanese government was keenly interested in enhancing economic ties with mainland China, so it kept the Chinese government engaged in dialogue. The purpose of this activity was to integrate the PRC into the international and regional society and clear the path for China to participate in multilateral institutions such as the forums of the APEC and the ARF (Hook, et al., 2005, p. 173).

In August 1991, after the Tiananmen Square incident, the first G-7 leader to visit mainland China was Japanese Prime Minister Toshiku Kaifu. In his address in the PRC, he stressed the significance of the Sino–Japanese relationships as the background for international relations. After that, the Japanese Emperor Akihito and Empress Michiko visited the PRC in October 1992. It was the first visit of such importance since World War II. During his visit, the Japanese Emperor exhibited tremendous grief over the suffering of the Chinese people in World War II because of the involvement of Japan in such an inhumane act. The Hosokawa Administration (1993–1994), which was somewhat free from American influence, developed deep relations with the Chinese government. Prime Minister Hosokawa visited the PRC as the first non-LDP Prime Minister. The Hosokawa Administration was sincerely friendly toward the Beijing government.

During his tenure, he issued an apology for Japan's "war of aggression" in China.<sup>9</sup>

Furthermore, Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama visited China in May 1995. During his visit, he highlighted two dimensions of relations: "future-oriented relations towards the 21<sup>st</sup> century" and "relations aiming for peace and prosperity for the Asia-Pacific region and the world" (Togo, 2005, p. 148). He also stressed in his visit to the PRC that Japan and China were the only two significant countries and that, through mutual understanding and trust, it was their responsibility to provide the people of Asia and the Pacific region with a peaceful atmosphere and economic enrichment ((MOFA), 1995).

Japan's Asianist and developmental norms and interests mean that Japanese policy-making agents clearly want to obviate conflict with the PRC and to encourage the US to persist with these engagement policies. Nevertheless, the strength of its bilateral attachment to the US and Japan's own concerns about the growing power of the PRC provide a strong motivation for cooperating with US policy toward mainland China (Hook, et al., 2005, pp. 173 - 175). Notwithstanding, after the last half of the 1990s, some factors, such as international structural pressures and repetition of old bilateral problems, have made it difficult for the two countries to stand together with equal understanding. The Chinese desire to achieve great economic strength and strong military standing in the region of East Asia was a great source of anxiety for the US. On the other hand, the PRC was worried about the probable help the US would provide for Taiwanese independence and the revival of US authority and control in East Asia. Moreover, the persistent problems that increased in the military, political, and economic dimensions developed a trio of the US, China, and Japan in East Asia for a balanced environment (Hook, et al., 2005, p. 174).

Not only did the triangular structure opening opportunities Japan in terms of its relationship with the PRC, but also it caused some hindrances

for Japan. The improved political position of Japan within the triangular affiliation and the US quarrel with the PRC increased anticipation that Japan could perform an arbitral role between the PRC and the US. However, some side effects of the triangular structure have been difficult for Japanese policy makers to address. The first danger for Japan is that it might face isolation and stand as a weak onlooker or it might be neglected completely in the Sino–American conflict. The second danger is that Japan might become the victim of the contest of strength between the PRC and the US. Japan might have to choose between the PRC and the US, a choice that would involve Japan engaging in military and political conflict in East Asia. That situation would not be acceptable for Japan (Hook, et al., 2005, p. 174).

To some extent, the relationship of the PRC and Japan improved during the visit of the Chinese President Jiang Zemin to Japan in November 1998, which was the only visit in the previous 2000 years by a Chinese head of state. This official visit developed some hopes for reconciliations (Morrison & Baker, 1999, p. 95). The Japan–China Joint Declaration on Building a Partnership of Friendship and Cooperation was issued by the two governments and was considered the second-best bilateral document after the 1972 Joint Communique and the 1978 Treaty of Peace and Friendship. Therefore, the visit of the Chinese President was considered a candle of hope for development. The two sides repeatedly emphasized that they would follow the three documents to solve all problems (Sato, 1999, p. 1). The Japanese government articulated the following passages to reflect the recurring tension between the PRC and Japan ((MOFA), 1998):

The Japanese side observes the 1972 Joint Communique of the Government of Japan and the Government of the People's Republic of China and the 15 August 1995 Statement by former Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama. The Japanese side is keenly conscious of the responsibility for the serious distress and damage that Japan caused to the Chinese people through its aggression against China during a certain period in the past and expressed deep remorse for this. The Chinese side hopes that the Japanese side will learn lessons from the

history and adhere to the path of peace and development. Based on this, both sides will develop long-standing relations of friendship.

Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan had visited Tokyo to discuss issues with his Japanese counterpart. The historic visit of Jiang Zemin occurred after Tang Jiaxuan's visit. To avoid any harm to the relations during the consultations, the Japanese did not mention any historic issue or Taiwan. On the other hand, the Chinese assured Japan that they would not add new issues and promised to forward a positive statement. Notwithstanding, the Japanese Vice Foreign Minister mentioned that he had not been authorized by his superiors to go into delicate issues (Sato, 1999, pp. 5 - 6). Regardless of the apology issues, the two counterparts—Ryutaro Hashimoto and Jiang Zemin—decided to continue a mutual “partnership of friendship and cooperation for peace and development” through high-level engagement between the PRC and Japan by arranging yearly trips for the leaders and establishing on both side at government and non-government levels, such activities as environmental cooperation, youth exchange, and security exchange and dialogue between Tokyo and Beijing (Morrison & Baker, 1999, p. 95).

In fact, the reason the PRC wanted to produce a joint document, according to Kazuo Sato (1999, p. 6), was that the PRC wanted cooperation at the highest level for China and Japan to work together, to help each other not only in broader areas but also in bilateral problems. To stop the downward spiral in its relations with Japan, the PRC wanted to take some corrective measures (Togo, 2005, p. 153). Therefore, it can be said that the visit of Jiang Zemin established both a negative and a positive dimension concerning past and future-oriented relations between the PRC and Japan.

This moderate approach took on a complex dimension during the tenure of Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi. During this period, the economic impetus slowly increased, and the PRC and Japan intensified economic interdependence through investment and increased trade. In the

political arena as well, for example, between April 2002 and September 2004, Japanese Foreign Minister Yoriko Kawaguchi made five formal visits to China to discuss several bilateral issues with senior party members and her Chinese counterpart. However, Koizumi's visit in October 2001 to China was the last visit by a head of government, and since then, no single meeting has been held directly except in some meetings during international conferences. The reasons for such deteriorated relations were principally Koizumi's constant visits to the Yasukuni Shrine, which honours Japan's war dead (Hughes, 2009, p. 843).

The followers of Koizumi were emboldened with varying degrees of revisionist enthusiasm. For example, Abe Shinzo (2005–2006) exhibited a stronger, more cautious involvement in revisionism; therefore, a stronger latent distrust of the PRC surfaced in his era. On the other hand, Fukuda Yasuo (2006–2007) was in favour of revival of bilateral attachment because he had a pro-China approach. The next premier Aso Taro had an intensely revisionist approach and, in the past, had presented China as "a threat" to Japan. All Prime Ministers portrayed the famous public sentiments, which were their slogans during the polls between 1998 and 2005. During that period, the amity of the Japanese public toward the PRC diminished from 70% to 30%. The effect of public feelings has been significantly visible in terms of Sino–Japanese relations (Li, 2009, p. 131).

In October 2006, after the departure of Koizumi, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe made his first visit overseas in his first official trip to Beijing for revitalizing and revising the bilateral dialogue between the two countries. In response, in April 2006, Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jiabao visited Tokyo. In a following trip, Yasuo Fukuda, in December 2007, stressed a similar agenda, and in May 2008, President Hu Jintao visited Japan as a friendly gesture from the PRC. By establishing mutually advantageous relationships, the Japanese policy makers were trying to revitalize bilateral ties with the PRC, along with their own strategic interests. During the visit

of October 2006, Abe proposed his idea for addressing the history issue. Thus, a joint history research committee was formed by Japan and the PRC to counter depoliticising issues of the colonial past and their harm of the bilateral agenda (Li, 2009, p. 131).

Yasuo Fukuda was more resolved to enhance bilateral ties with the PRC. Therefore, before his trip to mainland China in December 2007, he said “spring has come” to exhibit the exact status of Japan and the PRC relations. Fukuda displayed the desire in his speech at Peking University to become a creative partner in common strategic interests and similar beneficial relations. According to him, the relationship of the PRC and Japan should be based on three principles: mutual trust and mutual understanding, advantages through mutual cooperation, and contribution to the global society. Along with history-related issues, Fukuda expressed the need to show “remorse” for “Japanese mistakes” and “adequate respect for the people who suffered”. In his visit to China, he repeated his stance on Taiwanese independence. Fukuda put forward a pledge not to visit the Yasukuni Shrine. Along with his above mentioned remarks, this pledge created a positive atmosphere for bilateral ties (Li, 2009, p. 131).

The previous cabinet’s summit diplomacy was followed successfully by the Taro Aso cabinet (2008–2009). Summit meetings were held with Wen Jiabao and Hu Jintao during Taro Aso’s official trip to mainland China in October 2008. Aso organized a Sino–Japan–Korea summit in Japan, which was the first trilateral summit meeting of the ASEAN+3 in its history. Aso also developed conservative ambitions and followed value-oriented diplomacy with a pro-US approach. Japan used value-oriented diplomacy as a soft balancing technique to counter the rise of the PRC in the region. Moreover, under the banner of the ‘arc of freedom and prosperity’, the Aso Administration tried to establish a cooperative of formal institutions in Central Asia, South Asia, and the Mekong region. It was Japan’s intention to develop a path among all the countries with land

borders to western and southern parts of the PRC. This approach by Taro Aso created a corridor for Japan to move freely and develop links with other countries in the region (Yoshimatsu, 2012, pp. 111 - 112).

#### **5.4.4 Concluding Remarks**

China has been seen by the Japanese policy makers as a significant other in Japan's anti-militaristic identity preservation. As in the case of the Korean peninsula, the geographical, cultural and historical proximity is the most important factor in this. There have been close relations between China and Japan throughout the history. The fact that many cultural and religious aspects of the Japanese culture such as Buddhism and the use of Chinese characters for writing came to Japan from China is an important factor for the profundity of the historical relations between the two countries. Another important reason for Japan to view China as a significant other is the economic and political potential that China possesses in the region. From the Cold War era to day, the political leaders in Japan saw mainland China as a huge market and a possible political stabilizer. The policies ensued by Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru is an example for this.

In the post-Cold War period, China has become both a potential threat and an inevitable partner at the same time for Japan. The political and economic policies of China towards the region of East Asia directly affect the ontological security of Japan in this respect. In this sense, Japan has considered China to be an uncertain rising giant. The Japanese feeling about the future growth of China has been cautious and protective. On the other hand, Chinese political leaders have been more cautious about the policies of the US and the countries supported by the US since the end of the Cold War, and they see most Asian countries as American agents and policy followers, obstacles to China's growth. As a result, evidence

mentioned above indicates that the Sino–Japanese relations range between political and military conflicts and peaceful coexistence spiralling downward into confrontations.

However, to maintain political stability and promote economic growth in the region, it may be said that the PRC and Japan should share their mutual interests in terms of routinised relationships based on mutual trust. Therefore, the two countries should realize that their cooperation in the present and future is inevitable for the future of Asia and the Pacific region. It is also necessary for Japan to have a stable ontological security.

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<sup>1</sup> However, this decision faced a substantial resistance among the general public who was against any deployment of the military, even for peacekeeping operations. See, Yutaka Kawashima, *Japanese Foreign Policy at the Crossroads: Challenges and Options for the Twenty-First Century*, Washington D.C., Brookings Institution Press, 2005, p. 34.

<sup>2</sup> Japan gave \$2.5 billion to the neighboring countries such as Egypt, Turkey, Jordan and Syria, and \$11 billion to the coalition forces. See, Alan Dowty, 'Japan and the Middle East: Signs of Change?', *Middle East Review of International Affairs*, Vol. 4, No. 4, 2000, p. 71

<sup>3</sup> The International Peace Cooperation Law aimed to arrange the domestic institutions for appropriate and quick cooperation with the UN peace keeping and other operations, following the UN resolutions adopted for maintaining international peace and security by utilizing human resources as well as materials. "The Gulf Crisis and Japan's Foreign Policy", <http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/1991/1991-2-2.htm> (accessed on January 2, 2009).

<sup>4</sup> Historical Materials Regarding Comfort Women Issue, <http://www.awf.or.jp/e6/document.html> (accessed on June 04, 2012). The publications and video materials issued by the Asian Women's Fund can be found at (accessed on June 04, 2012).

<sup>5</sup> From the point of view of objectivity, the Takeshima / Tokdo island dispute is used in this dissertation as the Liancourt Rocks dispute.

<sup>6</sup> C. Kenneth Quinones, "Juche's Role in North Korea's Foreign Policy", Tae Hwan Kwak and Seung – Ho Joo (eds.), *North Korea's Foreign Policy under Kim Yong Il: New Perspectives*, Surrey & Burrington: Ashgate, 2009, p. 15; Daniel Schwekendiek has identified Kim Il-Sung's speech, "On Eliminating Dogmatism and Formalism and Establishing Juche in Ideological Work" of 1955 as the first step towards national independence in North Korea, free from Soviet influence. Introducing the concept of Juche in this speech, Kim Il-Sung widely criticized the Koreans for being subservient to the Soviet Administration encouraging them to seek self-reliance. See, Daniel Schwekendiek, *A Socioeconomic History of North Korea*, North Carolina: McFarland & Compant Inc. Publishers, 2011, p. 32

<sup>7</sup> For more information, see Narushige Michishita, 'North Korea's 'first' nuclear diplomacy, 1993–94', *Journal of Strategic Studies*, Vol. 26, No. 4, 2003, pp. 47-82.

<sup>8</sup> The PRC showed acceptance towards the early pro-Soviet dependence due to the economic and military exposure. China was deprived of promoting worldwide socialism even when china was a part of Soviet Union and they had the same concepts, theories and boundaries. Instead of being friendly with their neighbouring countries, Soviet served Chinese as strange relatives and kept tight security from their side and extracted resources from their side. Due to certain reasons such as the American support for Taiwan, US security threat and recovery of Japan were the factors which helped China to maintain its place in the Soviet. See, Brian Ripley, 'China: Defining Its Role in the Global Community', *Foreign Policy in Comparative Perspective: Domestic and International Influences on State Behaviour*, Ryan K.Beasley, JulietKaarbo, Jeffrey S.Lantis, and Michael T.Snarr (eds.), 2002, pp. 124-125.

, edited by Ryan K.Beasley, JulietKaarbo, Jeffrey S.Lantis, and Michael T.Snarr. Washington, DC: CQ Press.

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<sup>9</sup> Japanese policy-making agents are working as averters to prevent tussle with China while hearten the US for continuation of rendezvous policies that have been the improving standard and concern of Japan in Asia. Due to vitality of bilateral affection with US and for the concern of Japan relating to the increasing strength of China, Japan cannot avert relation with China as it has to follow US policies. See, Glenn D. Hook, Julie Gilson et. al, *Japan's International Relations: Politics, Economics and Security*, pp. 173-175.

## **CHAPTER VI**

### **CONCLUSIONS**

This dissertation was aimed at investigating systematically the efforts of Japan toward building and continuing its trust-based relations with neighbouring countries to protect and promote peace and stability in the region of East Asia. In this context, it was argued that for the continuance of Japan's non-militaristic state identity, which is integrated with its foreign and security policy agenda, Japanese policy makers and state elites have continually configured and sustained the country's trust-based relations with neighbouring countries in East Asia. This argument, also detailed in chapter one, was analysed under four main headings: the historical background, Japan's human security approach, cooperative initiatives at the regional context, and Japan's relations with the significant others.

The main question of the dissertation was based on how Japanese policy makers constructed the meaning of the post-Cold War period, opening the ways and ideas to solidify the non-militaristic state identity. In this sense, the concept of ontological security was employed to find the appropriate answers to the main question and the related sub-questions elaborated in this dissertation.

The definition of the concept of ontological security employed in the dissertation included the following characteristics at the state level: the basic trust mechanism, routinisation, cognitive and physical environment, material and reflexive capabilities, and the biographical narrative.

It is assumed that the relationship between the notions of trust and stability in international relations refers to a significant and pragmatic framework. Trust is defined as a critical factor in building a more stable cognitive and physical environment for states as actors in the international system. It promotes a feeling of security and protection for states both at the regional and the international levels. At the basis of that definition is the fact that trust is a social and active phenomenon built by and among actors. The building of trust-based relations among actors prepares a background for the formation of more stable political and economic environment. To put it in a nutshell, the relationship between trust and stability is directly proportional, which means that trust can help in maintaining a stable environment. Stability, in the same way, can foster trust. A raise in the level of one of the terms causes an increase in the other. Indeed, a higher level of trust corresponds to a higher level of stability.

Some realist scholars inspired by Thucydides and Thomas Hobbes argue that it is almost impossible to build a web of relations based on trust among states and that efforts to build trust-based relations would be damaging for individual states. Those who defend this argument cited different factors, such as the biological nature of human beings and the anarchical order of the international system, which always push the individual states into a power struggle. In a situation in which fear and mistrust have become dominant, and which is characterized by a high level of conflict, chances are that trust and cooperation will be reduced. However, as was stated throughout the chapters, the concept of trust is a

significant step to construct a strongly grounded “pragmatic nexus” among states.

In addition to states’ physical security, a stable political and economic environment enables the states to maintain their ontological security as well. At this point, the ontological security is directly linked to a stable physical and cognitive environment. Stability is also significant based on the need to eliminate uncertainty that threatens the identity of states or reduce it to a minimum level. However, like individuals, the radical disengagements (also referred to as critical situations) that cause the institutionalized relations among states to be destroyed, may also give rise to persecutory anxieties with consequences that cannot be foreseen. In this context, since the ability to act is a critical factor on the actors’ own identities, the ability to act becomes seriously restricted because of a deep fear of uncertainty. This unavoidably increases the level of anxiety of states. The term anxiety is essentially an emotional reaction that emerges when the identity is challenged. The state exposed to anxiety is in an insecure position as there is a challenge to its self-identity. At this point, states may lose their ability to act rationally.

Therefore, states should principally build a stable cognitive environment for them to eliminate uncertainties or reduce them to a minimum level. When that happens, states would try to impose a cognitive order on the outside reality they are confronted with. Moreover, states have to systematically consider the outside reality to protect them from the deep fear of uncertainty, which often threatens the actor’s self-identity. Since the cognitive order is the one established by mind not a reality, that cognitive order is reflected in discourses only. As the outside reality is full of events and there is no order in outside reality, it is important to make a conceptual systematization that would simplify the complex outside reality into a more meaningful and understandable set of patterns or frameworks.

In this way, states can carry out the processes of perception, reasoning, and judgment in order to understand the outside reality.

A stable cognitive environment transforms into a modified form through the establishment of a basic trust mechanism. In this sense, states would feel more secured ontologically. Thus, states would know how to evaluate the possible threats and opportunities and how to create a road map to assist states realize their goals. Stated in another way, states will on the one hand systematically carry out the processes of perception, reasoning, and judgment. On the other hand, as previously mentioned, in situations in which the level of anxiety is necessarily high, states cannot discriminate between dangers to be confronted and those to be ignored, which indicates a serious incapability for the states in question. In such a case, states will focus on immediate needs and may not choose the right methods to be used to reach their goals. Reflecting on the facts elaborated in chapters, it can be seen that the current environment of East Asia is still a practical example of this situation.

Anthony Giddens (1991, p. 39), a well-known British scholar, defines the concept of trust as “a protection against future threat and dangers which allows the individual to sustain hope and courage in the face of whatever debilitating circumstances she or he might later confront.” Based on this definition, the concept of trust is also considered an important instrument to reduce the uncertainty to a minimum level in a social and material world built by the states themselves. Consequently, a basic trust mechanism that will be built among states must first and foremost make way for them to have a concrete foundation based on a healthy ontological security. This starting point is vital for states to systematically understand the complex outside reality. A healthy ontological security helps states distinguish between what is more relevant and what is less relevant in their foreign policies. In other words,

a state that has stable ontological security, will know who it is, what it should do, and why it should do so.

In the post-war period, according to Japanese pragmatic policy makers and state elites, achieving trust-based bilateral and multilateral relations in the regional context was only possible by pursuing non-militaristic and peaceful initiatives in Japan's foreign and security policy agenda. East Asia at that time was one of the most chaotic regions in the world, which was described by sudden changes and conflicts. Therefore, taking extra military measures would have increased once again great conflict risk in the region and would have resulted in a serious financial burden for Japan. Moreover, building an alliance relationship with the United States would have had a deterrent effect for the probability of any military campaign against Japan in the region. In this framework, some Japanese conservative and pragmatic politicians, such as Yoshida Shigeru, preferred to follow the US path for rebuilding the country's economy and protecting it from outside attacks. These efforts were seen in the discourses elaborated by Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru in the early 1950s, which were based largely on the economic reconstruction and long-term security guarantee under the US nuclear umbrella.

After the Second World War, Japanese society went through a severe trauma as a result of the country's increasing economic and political chaos. They had no energy to move against the social norms and values established by the occupation authorities. More importantly, the Japanese military forces had lost their credibility because of the policies pursued in the pre-war and war-time periods. The surrender of Japan indicated the disappearance of militarist and expansionist policies defended by the pre-war Japan.

With this background, Japan preferred to keep its military at a very moderate level and to focus on its economic reconstruction by following strong relations with the United States under the US-Japan security

alliance system. In fact, neighbouring countries, such as the PRC and South Korea, in the region also felt assured that the potential military power of Japan would be confined within the boundary of the alliance relationship. As also argued by Chinese analysts, the status of the US-Japan alliance system was seen as the most significant dynamic preventing the military build-up of Japan. Thus, one conclusion was that because the non-militaristic state identity of Japan evolved largely because of the total dependency to the United States in security matters, the alliance system between the two countries contributed, to some extent, to building a basic trust mechanism in Japan's relations with neighbouring countries in East Asia. In opposition to what was expected, if Japan had chosen to remilitarize heavily and to project a militarist image and identity, an arms race could have followed, resulting in a huge financial burden on Japan. This situation could have resulted in a state of ontological insecurity in Japan. A sudden remilitarization would also have caused a lack of coherence within the newly constructed Japanese self-identity.

At the conceptual base, states as actors in the international system try to maintain a reliable cognitive and physical environment through the discourses of their policy makers and state elites. Thus, states are able to create a road map for reaching their goals. The self-identity of states is also seen as a product of a process that emerges within these discourses. In other words, the discourses and policies, which systematically emerge in the processes of perception, reasoning, and judgment of policy makers, are a reflection of state's self-identity in the international arena. In the case of Japan, from the Meiji period on, the state identity building process was marked by major breaking points, by traumatic events that compelled state elites and policy makers to pursue pragmatic policies and to reshape state identity accordingly. In addition, the language used by Japanese policy makers to construct the meaning of events played a crucial role both in the pre-war and post-war periods. In the pre-war period, Japanese policy makers followed more assertive and militarist discourses in their foreign

policies. In the post-war period, being totally demilitarized, Japan preferred to follow constructive and positive policies throughout the region. Moreover, in the post-war period, the discourses elaborated by other states in East Asia strategically helped build up Japan's non-militaristic state identity and stance. This was possible only by exerting pressure and compelling Japan to take certain decisions in a more positive way. To illustrate, given Japan's expansionist and militarist policies on the Korean Peninsula, the harsh discourses of South Korean policy makers on the vague practices of Japan in the security area in the post-war period constrained Japan to largely peaceful purposes in East Asia.

In a nutshell, in the post-war period, Japanese policy makers tried to refrain from policies that could affect the country's economic reconstruction and non-militaristic self-identity negatively. From the 1970s, Japan systematically increased its influence capacity on the region, especially by using economic means and emphasizing its non-militaristic stance, allowing it to build up a new self-image and to improve its relations with neighbouring countries to some extent. In this sense, the preference given to economic capacity over military goals in terms of non-militaristic policies prevented Japan from becoming an assertive and aggressive actor in the international system in the Cold War years.

However, new realities and threat perceptions which that emerged after the Cold War forced Japanese policy makers and state elites to adjust to a new regional and international order. After four decades of strong economic growth, Japan seemed to possess the tools necessary to enhance its own position while remaining aligned with the United States. From this point of view, Tokyo could shape its strategic cognitive and physical environment from a position of leadership in East Asia without having to remilitarize. Thus, new international actors, new policy instruments, and more comprehensive strategic goals began to shape the new parameters of Japan's foreign and security policy. In this sense, as a way of improving the

basic trust mechanism among actors in the region, Japan tried to promote its human security agenda, offering a new and comprehensive outlook for both itself and the rest of the region. The human security outlook of Japan meant “positive sum gain,” which was mutually beneficial for the participants of the relationship, thus creating a more stable cognitive and physical environment. Furthermore, the concept of human security was seen by Japanese policy makers as the gateway through which Japan could positively use its passive image as an economic giant but a military dwarf both by improving mutually close relationships with East Asian countries and by constructing a foreign policy agenda closely associated with the infrastructure of human security. Thus, Japanese policy makers used ODA as an economic tool to contribute to the peace and stability of the region. Japan’s ODA policy was largely based on building a peaceful and stable international environment and maintaining the development of the international community. The principle motivation behind the human security agenda established was a strong desire to show Japan as more active in the international arena without undermining its peace-based constitution. In a few words, for Japan, human security was a way to take a more active role in international security without posing a threat to its alliance relationship with the United States and to its constitution. In this sense, Japan used human security as a foreign policy tool to improve its trust-based relations with neighbouring countries by tackling humanitarian issues in East Asia.

In the post-Cold War period, the changing threat perceptions in the international system caused Japan to redefine its foreign and security policy parameters. Japanese policy makers continued to support the United States in political matters even in this period. Additionally, they tried to diversify the country’s position at the regional level. In this sense, pursuing regional economic and security initiatives was one of the policies followed by Japanese policy makers and state elites after the Cold War.

From the first years of the Cold War to the late 1980s and as seen in the example of the US–Japan alliance system, the cooperative initiatives in East Asia were largely limited to bilateral dialogues aimed generally at solving the existing problems in the style of ad hoc diplomacy. Japanese policy makers did not explicitly discuss cooperative initiatives at the multilateral level in the region until the early 1990s because they had largely opted for strengthening the country's bilateral relationship with the United States. However, the policies pursued by the Soviet Union / Russia in seeking multilateral cooperative initiatives in the early 1990s became very effective at taking this shift of Japan from a passive posture to an active stance on the broader regional perspective.

Japan actively contributed to the development of economic and security initiatives in the region of East Asia to boost its trust-based relations with neighbouring countries and to maintain regional peace and stability. For example, the APEC was perceived by Japan as a means of improving and deepening its relations with East Asian countries. The ARF was another significant initiative based on promoting positive dialogue and consultation on political and security problems in the region. Japan, in general, sought a mediating role in these initiatives. In conclusion, Japan's efforts toward multilateral economic and security initiatives in the post-Cold War period led to the expansion of the Japanese foreign and security policy agenda. At the same time, it increased opportunities for interaction among the regional countries to a certain degree and contributed to the improvement of confidence building concerning Japan's policies in East Asia, despite Japan's aggressive and expansionist policies during the pre-war period.

In the post-Cold War period, Japan tried to routinize relationships with the countries in the region, labelled as "significant other", for its self-identity construction and preservation. These countries included the United States, the PRC, and Korea. It is a well-known fact that the United

States has a key role as a global and hegemonic actor in the region. Although the United States cannot geographically be portrayed as an East Asian power, its dramatic engagement in the complex realities of the region has made it a significant actor in East Asia. After the post-war period, the United States was seen by Japanese policy makers as the cornerstone of Japan's foreign policy largely for security and economic reasons. In the Cold War years, the main parameters of Japan's foreign and security policy were significantly shaped under the influence of the United States.

During the Second World War, the United States was seen as a great enemy by the Japanese leaders. After being defeated in the Pacific War, Japan was totally demilitarized within the context of the occupation policy led by the United States from 1945 to 1952. Therefore, the United States was perceived by Japan as the leading power in the occupation period and then the most important factor in the economic and political modernisation of post-war Japan. This was because during this period, the intent of the US occupation of Japan was to transform the political and military system that had taken Japan into war. However, because changes occurring at the global level required a loyal ally in East Asia, the United States concluded a peace treaty with Japan in 1952. A mutual security treaty between the two countries, signed in the same year, linked Japan to the emerging US alliance system. From that moment on, political and security relations between the two countries gained new momentum and almost all of the political and security decisions taken by Japanese policy makers and state elites were shaped by the influence of the United States, either directly or indirectly. Since the 1970s, Japan's dependence on the United States in political and economic matters has slowly shifted toward interdependence, but the military and security matters have always been seen by both countries as vital components in determining the level of Japan's dependence on the United States.

Relations between Japan and the United States, which are crucial to shaping and determining the main tendencies of Japan's foreign and security policy even today, were developed during the Cold War within the context of the mutual security alliance. Japan's pursuit of this strategy created opportunities to rebuild its economic structure and give an anti-militaristic image and stance toward international society. Accordingly, in the post-war period, the United States was perceived by Japanese policy makers as the most significant other in constructing the country's non-militaristic self-identity toward the international society. After its creation, this state identity was shaped and developed in relation to trust-based relations between Japan and the United States.

In this dissertation, three main stages of mutual relations were analysed to understand the effects of Japan's trust-based relations with the United States within the context of its non-militaristic state identity: (a) the period after the Gulf War of 1990–1991, (b) the new National Defense Program outline of Japan in 1995 and beyond, and (c) the post-9/11 period. All these periods revealed that, even after the end of the Cold War, the Japanese policy makers tried to set up foreign and security policies that did not bring any harm to the country's non-militaristic state identity and to its trust-based relations with the United States. Thus, Japan largely pursued a balanced policy with its neighbouring countries and the United States to avoid losing its embedded state identity.

Some discussion in the literature has begun related to the pursuit by Japan of more militaristic aims to protect its national interests. In fact, having this capability does not necessarily mean that Japan will become a militarist actor in the international system. At this point, developing such a profile should be considered from the context of responding to a changing environment within the framework of developments such as terrorism, the North Korean threat, and so on. Currently, Japan is using its relations with the United States as the core of its foreign and security policy. Some

developments such as the deployment of Self-Defense Forces to overseas countries for humanitarian aims have been the result of the alliance with the United States. However, this does not mean that Japan has deviated from idealist values and directed itself toward a realist approach.

As for Japan–Korea relations, from the Cold War period to the present, Japan’s posture and non-militaristic state identity in its relations with the Korean Peninsula have been key factors both in shaping cooperation and stability in East Asia and in building a basic trust mechanism between Japan and South Korea. In other words, the non-militaristic image of Japan has been effective in creating a bond of basic trust between the two countries. As described in this dissertation, Japan had maintained a militaristic policy in East Asia to attain the objective of East Asia co-prosperity. Japan’s aggressive policies and activities toward this objective have still not been forgotten by the Koreans, who witnessed such activities. Since the end of World War II, although Japan formally announced that it will not be involved in such policies and forceful actions, the extent to which Japan has acted on that decision has not satisfied the Korean power elite class and the masses. In this regard, the policies formed by the Japanese government have been widely disapproved by South Korea. Both countries, however, appear to be faithful in keeping the terms that, under all circumstances, bilateral trade and economy be maintained by a mutual trust and faith. This cooperation between the two countries is due to their close borders and cultural proximity and, most important, the strategic relationship that each has with the United States.

Mainland China was also regarded in this dissertation as Japan’s significant other for building and preserving its state identity and posture and for accomplishing its ontological security in the post-Cold War period. During this period, Japanese policy makers considered the PRC both as a potential enemy for its national security and prosperity and as an inevitable partner to maintain peace, stability, and cooperation in the

region of East Asia. The PRC became a potential enemy for Japan for such reasons as its rapid economic development, its non-transparent military modernisation, and the potential leadership role it began to play in East Asia. However, it was also an inevitable partner for Japan. Primarily, with Japan, the PRC has the capacity to struggle with the economic, social, and security issues in East Asia to create a more stable and economically growing region. Moreover, because of its huge economy and population, the PRC has been a noteworthy trade partner for Japanese business and governmental sectors. However, although a basic trust mechanism in mutual relationships was constructed between the two countries during the Cold War years, this trust mechanism could not be enhanced to a satisfactory level or above after the Cold War. Both countries were, in principle, overwhelmed by the historic issues originating from the pre-war period. In addition, becoming rival competitors in the economic sphere in the region was another problem area between Japan and the PRC.

Briefly, a long history of interaction has been shared and enjoyed by China and Japan against positive and negative backgrounds. Since 1949, the PRC's approach to Japan has been a combination of jealousy, respect, and antagonism. Japan has also considered the PRC to be an uncertain rising power. The Japanese feeling about the future growth of the PRC has been cautious and protective, while Japan has viewed mainland China as an opportunity and a huge market. Therefore, against this background, one could conclude that there is some uncertainty in this relationship.

On the other hand, the PRC has been more cautious about the policies of the United States and the countries supported by the United States since the end of the Cold War. The PRC sees most Asian countries as American agents and policy followers, obstacles to China's growth. Therefore, the evidence mentioned in previous chapters has indicated that Sino-Japanese relations range between political and military conflicts and peaceful coexistence spiralling downward into confrontations. However,

to maintain political stability and promote economic growth in the region, the PRC and Japan must share their mutual interests. Therefore, the two countries must realize that their cooperation in the present and future is inevitable for the future of Asia and the Pacific region.

To summarize, Japan seemed to have made rational decisions and to have learned from the past, thus transforming its identity and behaviours to adapt to a rapidly changing environment. It was able to modify its biographical narrative and routines and to reshape its relations with both the United States and East Asian countries according to the new post-war international order in a relatively short time. In this sense, Japan seemed to present the peculiar characteristics of a state with a relatively basic level of trust during the Cold War period. Thus, my conclusion is that to preserve its non-militaristic self-identity and posture and to feel ontologically secure, Japan should reconfigure and sustain its trust-based relationships in the regional context. This is not a radical disengagement or shift from the main parameters of Japan's non-militaristic identity and stance even in the post-Cold War period. On the contrary, Japan tried to strengthen its non-militaristic position in the region both by seeking cooperative and peaceful relations with significant others and by forming a human-oriented foreign and security policy agenda. Moreover, Japan in the post-Cold War period has taken more responsibilities than ever to form some regional initiatives in economic and security areas. Although the Japanese policy makers did not reach a full consensus on these cooperative initiatives, these various efforts made by Japan should be seen as positive contributions toward strengthening cooperative and trust-based relations in the region of East Asia.

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## **APPENDENCIES**

### **A. SECURITY TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN, SEPTEMBER 8, 1951**

**Source:** [http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th\\_century/japan001.asp](http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/japan001.asp)  
(accessed on January 07, 2011)

#### **ARTICLE I**

Japan grants, and the United States of America accepts, the right, upon the coming into force of the Treaty of Peace and of this Treaty, to dispose United States land, air and sea forces in and about Japan. Such forces may be utilized to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East and to the security of Japan against armed attack from without, including assistance given at the express request of the Japanese Government to put down largescale internal riots and disturbances in Japan, caused through instigation or intervention by an outside power or powers.

#### **ARTICLE II**

During the exercise of the right referred to in Article I, Japan will not grant, without the prior consent of the United States of America, any bases or any rights, powers or authority whatsoever, in or relating to bases or the right of garrison or of maneuver, or transit of ground, air or naval forces to any third power.

### **ARTICLE III**

The conditions which shall govern the disposition of armed forces of the United States of America in and about Japan shall be determined by administrative agreements between the two Governments.

### **ARTICLE IV**

This Treaty shall expire whenever in the opinion of the Governments of the United States of America and Japan there shall have come into force such United Nations arrangements or such alternative individual or collective security dispositions as will satisfactorily provide for the maintenance by the United Nations or otherwise of international peace and security in the Japan Area.

### **ARTICLE V**

This Treaty shall be ratified by the United States of America and Japan and will come into force when instruments of ratification thereof have been exchanged by them at Washington.

**B. TREATY OF MUTUAL COOPERATION AND SECURITY BETWEEN  
JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, JANUARY 19,  
1960**

**Source:** <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/q&a/ref/1.html>  
(accessed on March 06, 2010)

**ARTICLE I**

The Parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, to settle any international disputes in which they may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered and to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations. The Parties will endeavor in concert with other peace-loving countries to strengthen the United Nations so that its mission of maintaining international peace and security may be discharged more effectively.

**ARTICLE II**

The Parties will contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well-being. They will seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies and will encourage economic collaboration between them.

### **ARTICLE III**

The Parties, individually and in cooperation with each other, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid will maintain and develop, subject to their constitutional provisions, their capacities to resist armed attack.

### **ARTICLE IV**

The Parties will consult together from time to time regarding the implementation of this Treaty, and, at the request of either Party, whenever the security of Japan or international peace and security in the Far East is threatened.

### **ARTICLE V**

Each Party recognizes that an armed attack against either Party in the territories under the administration of Japan would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional provisions and processes. Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall be immediately reported to the Security Council of the United Nations in accordance with the provisions of Article 51 of the Charter. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.

### **ARTICLE VI**

For the purpose of contributing to the security of Japan and the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East, the United States of America is granted the use by its land, air and naval forces of facilities and areas in Japan. The use of these facilities and areas as well as the status of United States armed forces in Japan shall be governed by a separate agreement, replacing the Administrative Agreement under Article

III of the Security Treaty between Japan and the United States of America, signed at Tokyo on February 28, 1952, as amended, and by such other arrangements as may be agreed upon.

#### **ARTICLE VII**

This Treaty does not affect and shall not be interpreted as affecting in any way the rights and obligations of the Parties under the Charter of the United Nations or the responsibility of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security.

#### **ARTICLE VIII**

This Treaty shall be ratified by Japan and the United States of America in accordance with their respective constitutional processes and will enter into force on the date on which the instruments of ratification thereof have been exchanged by them in Tokyo.

#### **ARTICLE IX**

The Security Treaty between Japan and the United States of America signed at the city of San Francisco on September 8, 1951 shall expire upon the entering into force of this Treaty.

#### **ARTICLE X**

This Treaty shall remain in force until in the opinion of the Governments of Japan and the United States of America there shall have come into force such United Nations arrangements as will satisfactorily provide for the maintenance of international peace and security in the Japan area. However, after the Treaty has been in force for ten years, either Party may give notice to the other Party of its intention to terminate the Treaty, in which case the Treaty shall terminate one year after such notice has been given.

**C. NATIONAL DEFENSE PROGRAM OUTLINE IN AND AFTER  
FY1996**

**(TENTATIVE UNOFFICIAL TRANSLATION)**

**Source:** <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/q&a/ref/6a.html>  
(accessed on April 07, 2011)

**I. Purpose**

1. In order to preserve its independence and peace, Japan, under its Constitution, has been making efforts to secure stability in the international community through diplomatic activities including efforts to prevent and settle conflicts, to establish a sound basis for security through domestic political stability, to maintain firmly the Japan-U.S. security arrangements and to build up appropriate defense capabilities.
  
2. In 1976, under those policies, Japan formulated the National Defense Program Outline (adopted by the National Defense Council and by the Cabinet on October 29, 1976, hereinafter cited as "the Outline"). "The Outline" was drafted on the premise that the international situation, in which efforts for stabilization were being continued, the international political structure of the surrounding regions and Japan's own domestic situation would not undergo any major changes for some time and judging that the existence of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements would continue to play a major role in maintaining the stability of international relations. Since then, Japan has developed its defense capability according to "the Outline," and the steady defense efforts, in conjunction with the existence of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements and the efforts made to ensure the smooth and effective implementation of these arrangements, have both prevented any suggestions against Japan

and contributed to the maintenance of peace and stability in the surrounding region.

3. Herein, a new set of guidelines for Japan's defense capability is laid forth, taking into consideration that almost two decades have passed since the adoption of "the Outline," that during this time the international situation has undergone significant changes, including the demise of the structure of the military confrontation between the East and the West, led by respectively by the Soviet Union and the United States, brought on by the end of the Cold War, and that expectations for the role of the Self-Defense Forces have been increased in such function as providing aid cases of large-scale disasters and contributing to building a more stable security environment through participation in international peace cooperation activities, in addition to their principle mission of defending Japan.
4. Japan, abiding by its Constitution, following the guidelines set forth herein and paying due attention to enhancing the credibility of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements, will strive to ensure its own national defense and contribute to the peace and stability of the international community by appropriately upgrading, maintaining and operating its capability.

## **II. International Situation**

The following trends in the international situation were considered in the drafting of these new guidelines.

1. With the end of the Cold War, which led to the demise of the structure of military confrontation between East and West, backed by overwhelming military capabilities, the possibility of a global armed conflict has become remote in today's international

community. At the same time, various unresolved territorial issues remain, and confrontations rooted in religious and ethnic differences have emerged more prominently. Complicated and diverse regional conflicts have been taking place. Furthermore, new kinds of dangers, such as the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction including nuclear arms, and of missiles, are on the increase. Thus, unpredictability and uncertainty persist in the international community.

2. On the other hand, as interdependence among nations intensifies, efforts are underway in various areas, such as political and economic spheres, to promote international cooperation and to further stabilize international relations. An emphasis has been placed on preventing destabilizing factors from escalating into serious international problems. In the area of security, continued progress is being made in arms control and disarmament, based on agreements between the United States and Russia and within Europe. Efforts are also being made toward enhancing regional security frameworks, expanding multilateral and bilateral dialogues and promoting the role of the United Nations. Major countries are making active efforts to reorganize and streamline their military capabilities, which used to be aimed at countering large-scale aggression, and taking account of their respective strategic environments, to secure adequate capability to properly respond to regional conflicts and other various situations. These efforts constitute important factors toward the establishment of a more stable security environment, in combination with the initiatives based on international cooperation, including those launched by the United Nations. In this context, the United States, with its great power, continues to play a significant role for world peace and stability.

3. In the surrounding regions of Japan, the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union have brought about a reduction of the military force level and changes in the military posture in Far East Russia. At the same time, there still remain large-scale military capabilities including nuclear arsenals and many countries in the region are expanding or modernizing their military capabilities mainly against the background of their economic development. There remain uncertainty and unpredictability, such as continued tensions on the Korean Peninsula, and a stable security environment has not been fully established. Under these circumstances, the possibility of a situation in this region, which could seriously affect the security of Japan, cannot be excluded. At the same time, various activities are being pursued to deepen cooperative relations among nations and to achieve regional stability, such as promotion of bilateral dialogues and search for a regional security framework.

The close cooperative relationship between Japan and the United States, based on the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements, will help to create a stable security environment, provide the foundation for securing the engagement of the United States and the U.S. military presence which are necessary for peace and stability in this region, and thus will continue to play a key role for the security in this region, and thus will continue to play a key role for the security of Japan, as well as the stability of the international community.

### **III. Security of Japan and Roles of Defense Capabilities**

#### **(Security of Japan and the basic defense policy)**

Japan, under its Constitution, while promoting diplomatic efforts and establishing a sound basis for security through domestic political stability, has moderately built up its defense capability on its own initiative, in

accordance with the fundamental principles of maintaining an exclusively defense-oriented policy, not becoming a military power that might pose a threat to other countries, upholding civilian control, adhering to the three non-nuclear principles, and maintaining firmly the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements. Japan is determined to maintain those basic defense policies.

**(Defense capability as it ought to be)**

1. Japan has built its defense capability in accordance with "the Outline," which incorporates the concept of a basic and standard defense capability, defined as possessing the minimum necessary defense capability for an independent nation so that it would not become a source of instability in the surrounding regions by creating a vacuum of power rather than building a capability directly linked to a military threat to Japan. The defense capability defined in "the Outline" aims to possess the assorted functions required for national defense, while retaining a balanced posture in terms of organization and deployment, including logistical support. This capability was derived from relevant factors such as the strategic environment, geographical characteristics, and other aspects of Japan's position.

It is considered appropriate that Japan continue to adhere fundamentally to this concept of a basic and standard defense capability based on a recognition that various efforts for the stabilization of international relations will continue to be pursued, while there remain uncertainty and unpredictability in the international situation, and that the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements will continue to play a key role for the security of Japan and for the peace and stability in the surrounding regions of Japan.

At the same time, in terms of the defense capability which Japan should maintain, it is necessary to review the specific content so as to seek the

most efficient and appropriate capability, taking into account the reduction of military force level and changes in military posture of some of Japan's neighboring countries following the end of the Cold War, as well as the diversification of situations that should be addressed from the security point of view, including the outbreak of regional conflicts and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. This review also needs to reflect such factors as recent advances in science and technology, a decreasing population of young people and increasingly severe economic and fiscal conditions.

Furthermore, while the principle mission of the Self-Defense Forces continues to be the defense of Japan, the Self-Defense Forces, taking into account changes in domestic and international circumstances and Japan's position in the international society, will also have to be prepared for various situations such as large-scale disasters which can have significant impact on our highly developed and diversified society, and play an appropriate role in a timely manner in the Government's active efforts to establish a more stable security environment.

From this perspective, it is appropriate that Japan's defense capability be restructured, both in scale and functions, by streamlining, making it more efficient and compact, as well as enhancing necessary functions and making qualitative improvements to be able to effectively respond to a variety of situations and simultaneously ensure the appropriate flexibility to smoothly deal with the development of the changing situations.

#### **(Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements)**

2. The security arrangements with the United States are indispensable to Japan's security and will also continue to play a key role in achieving peace and stability in the surrounding regions of Japan and establishing

a more stable security environment.

From this perspective, in order to enhance the credibility of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements and ensure their effective implementation, it is necessary to make efforts (1) to promote exchange of information and policy consultation, (2) to establish an effective posture for cooperation in operational areas including joint studies, exercises and training, as well as enhancement of mutual support in those areas, (3) to enhance broad mutual exchange in the areas of equipment and technology, and (4) to implement various measures to facilitate smooth and effective stationing of U.S. forces in Japan.

Additionally, this close cooperative bilateral relationship based on the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements, facilitates Japanese efforts for peace and stability of the international community, including promotion of regional multilateral security dialogues and cooperation, as well as support for various United Nations activities.

**(Role of defense capability)**

3. The security arrangements with the United States are indispensable to Japan's security and will also continue to play a key role in achieving peace and stability in the surrounding regions of Japan and establishing a more stable security environment.

From this perspective, in order to enhance the credibility of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements and ensure their effective implementation, it is necessary to make efforts (1) to promote exchange of information and policy consultation, (2) to establish an effective posture for cooperation in operational areas including joint studies, exercises and training, as well as enhancement of mutual support in those areas, (3) to enhance broad mutual exchange in the areas of equipment and technology, and (4) to implement various measures to facilitate smooth and effective

stationing of U.S. forces in Japan.

It is necessary that the roles of Japan's defense capability be appropriately fulfilled in the respective areas described below in accordance with the aforementioned concepts.

**(1) National defense**

- a. Prevent aggressions against Japan, together with the Japan-U.S. Arrangements, by possessing a defense capability of an appropriate scale which includes the functions required for defense, consistent with Japan's geographical characteristics, taking account of the military capabilities of neighboring countries, by ensuring a posture to fully utilize the capability and by clearly showing the nation's will to defend their own country.

Against the threat of nuclear weapons, rely on the U.S. nuclear deterrent, while working actively on international efforts for realistic and steady nuclear disarmament aiming at a world free from the nuclear weapons.

- b. Should indirect aggression or any unlawful military activity which might lead to aggression against this nation occur, take immediate responsive action in order to settle the situation at an early stage.

Should indirect aggression occur, take immediate responsive action by conducting an integrated and systematic operation of its defense capabilities, in appropriate cooperation with the United States, in order to repel such aggression at the earliest possible stage.

## **(2) Response to large-scale disasters and other various situations**

- a. In case of large-scale disasters, disasters caused by acts of terrorism or other events which require the protection of lives or assets, and, for example, upon request for assistance from related organizations, taking necessary measures in an appropriate and timely manner, including provision of disaster relief, in close cooperation with the related organizations, thereby contributing to public welfare.
- b. Should a situation arise in the areas surrounding Japan, which will have an important influence on national peace and security, take appropriate response in accordance with the Constitution and relevant laws and regulations, by properly supporting the United Nations activities when needed, and by ensuring the smooth and effective implementation of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements.

## **(3) Contribution to creation of a more stable security environment**

- a. Contribute to efforts for international peace through participation in international peace cooperation activities, and contribute to the promotion of international cooperation through participation in international disaster relief activities.
- b. Continue to promote security dialogues and exchanges among defense authorities to enhance mutual confidence with countries, including neighboring countries.
- c. Cooperate with efforts of the United Nations and other international organizations in the areas of arms control and disarmament for the purpose of preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and missiles, as well as controlling and regulating conventional weapons, including land-mines.

#### **IV. Contents of Japan's Defense Capability**

As the basis for fulfilling the roles for defense capability outlined in section III, the Ground, Maritime and Air Self-Defense Forces will maintain structures as described in paragraph 1, and assume the postures suggested in paragraphs 2 and 3.

##### **1. Ground, Maritime and Air Self-Defense Force structures**

###### **(1) The Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF)**

- a. The GSDF, in order to be capable of rapid and effective systematic defense operations from the outset of aggression in any part of Japan, must deploy its divisions and brigades in a balanced manner that conforms to Japan's geographical and other characteristics.
- b. The GSDF must possess at least functional one unit of each of the various types of forces used mainly for mobile operations.
- c. The GSDF must possess ground-to-air missile units capable of undertaking the air defense of divisions and other units, as well as vital areas.
- d. The GSDF, in order to maintain a high level of proficiency and to rapidly counter aggressions and other situations, must, in principle, staff its units with regular Self-Defense Personnel, while, when organizing, some units may be staffed by Self-Defense Force Reserves personnel capable of being quickly mobilized.

###### **(2) Maritime Self-Defense Forces (MSDF)**

- a. The MSDF must possess one fleet escort force as a mobile operating ship unit in order to quickly respond to aggressive action and such situations at sea. The fleet escort force must be able to maintain at least one escort flotilla on alert at all times.

- b. The MSDF must possess, as ship units assigned to coastal surveillance and defense, at least one escort ship division in each specified sea district.
- c. The MSDF must maintain submarine units, patrol helicopter and minesweeping units, providing the capability for surveillance and defense missions as well as minesweeping important harbors and straits as necessary.
- d. The MSDF must maintain fixed-wing patrol aircraft units to provide a capability for surveillance, patrol and other operations in nearby seas.

### **(3) Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF)**

- a. The ASDF must possess aircraft control and warning units capable of vigilance and surveillance throughout Japanese airspace on a continuous basis, as well as performing warning and control functions as necessary.
- b. The ASDF must possess fighter units and ground-to-air missile units for air defense to provide the capability of maintaining continuous alert, to take immediate and appropriate steps against violations of Japan's territorial airspace and air incursions.
- c. The ASDF must possess units capable of engaging in the interdiction of airborne or amphibious landing invasions and air support for land forces as necessary.
- d. The ASDF must possess units capable of effective operational supports, including air reconnaissance, air transportation and other operations as necessary.

## **2. Necessary postures to be maintained**

In maintaining the following postures, special attention must be paid to achieving joint and integrated operations among each Self-Defense Force through enhancement of the Joint Staff Council's function and promoting

integrated cooperative relationships with related organizations so that the Self-Defense Forces can quickly and effectively carry out their missions.

**(1) Setup for countering aggressions or similar situations**

- a. In the case of direct aggression, the Japan's defense structure must be able to respond immediately in accordance with the type and scale of the aggression, and exert its capability effectively by integrating its assorted defense functions and by maintaining and enhancing the credibility of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements through various bilateral studies, joint exercises and training.
- b. Japan's defense structure must be capable of responding immediately and taking appropriate actions, should an indirect act of aggression or unlawful military action occur.
- c. Japan's defense structure must be capable of taking immediate and appropriate actions to cope with aircraft invading or threatening to invade its territorial airspace.

**(2) Setup of disaster-relief operations**

Japan's defense structure must be capable of taking timely and appropriate disaster relief activities in any area of Japan in response to large-scale disasters or other situations which require protection of lives and assets.

**(3) Setup of international peace cooperation activities and others.**

The Self-Defense Forces must be capable of participating in international peace cooperation activities and international disaster relief activities in a timely and appropriate manner to contribute to the maintenance of peace and stability in the international community.

**(4) Setup of warning, intelligence, and command and communication.**

Japan's defense structure must be capable of conducting warning and surveillance on a continuous basis to detect any changes in circumstances as soon as possible, so as to utilize this information for quick decision-making. It must be capable of high-level intelligence gathering and analysis, including strategic intelligence, through possession of diversified intelligence-gathering means and mechanisms, and highly able intelligence specialists. Additionally, it must possess a sophisticated command and communication capability and be able to quickly and effectively conduct integrated defense operations from a joint perspective.

**(5) Setup of logistic support**

Japan's defense structure must be capable of carrying out necessary functions in each area of logistic support, such as transportation, search and rescue, supply, maintenance and medical and sanitary affairs, so that responses to various situations can be effectively conducted.

**(6) Setup of personnel affairs, and education and training**

Japan's defense structure must be capable of exerting its full potential as an organization by forming an appropriate personnel structure, maintaining strict discipline, and being composed of individuals with high morale and capability and broad perspective. For training personnel, it is necessary to promote personnel exchange programs within the Self-Defense Forces, as well as with other ministries and the private sector. It must be capable of recruiting, treating, educating and training its personnel in appropriate ways, while paying attention to the smooth execution of international peace cooperation activities.

As a result of the revision of the scale and functions of Japan's defense capability, Japan's defense structure must possess adequate flexibility, so

that smooth response can be made to changing situations by maintaining in education and training sections, personnel and equipment which require long training or acquisition time periods and by retaining high readiness Self-Defense Force Reservists.

The specific scales of key organizations and equipment are given in the attachment.

## **V. Points of Note in Upgrading, Maintaining and Operating the Defense Capability**

1. The following points should be noted in upgrading, maintaining and operating the defense capabilities in accordance with the outlines described in section IV including the structure of each of the Self-Defense Forces.

Decisions on the major items in annual defense improvement programs will be submitted to the Security Council.

(1) The upgrading, maintenance and operation of Japan's defense capability will be conducted in harmony with other national policies, taking into account, economic, fiscal and other situations. In light of the increasingly tight fiscal situation, special attention will be given to making appropriate budgetary allocations from a medium-and long-term perspective, so that Japan's defense capability can smoothly and thoroughly carry out its functions as a whole.

(2) Necessary steps will be taken to promote the effective maintenance and improvement, as well as the smooth consolidation and reduction of defense facilities, with the close cooperation of relevant local governments, and to facilitate further harmonization with surrounding areas.

(3) Equipment acquisition programs will be effectively implemented with overall consideration of such factors as speedy emergency resupply, easier education and training requirement and cost effectiveness, including future obligatory expenditures accompanying the introduction of equipment, and with special attention to developing a procurement and supply mechanism which helps reduce procurement costs.

Attention will also be given to maintaining defense production and technology foundations through appropriate promotion of domestic productions.

(4) Efforts will be made to enhance technical research and development that contributes to maintaining and improving the qualitative level of Japan's defense capability to keep up with technological advances.

2. If such as important change of situations occurs in the future that is considered necessary to reexamine Japan's defense capability, another review will be initiated based on the circumstances at that time.

#### D. TEZ FOTOKOPİSİ İZİN FORMU

##### ENSTİTÜ

Fen Bilimleri Enstitüsü

Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü

Uygulamalı Matematik Enstitüsü

Enformatik Enstitüsü

Deniz Bilimleri Enstitüsü

##### YAZARIN

Soyadı : GÖNEN

Adı : HAKAN

Bölümü : ULUSLARARASI İLİŞKİLER BÖLÜMÜ

**TEZİN ADI** (İngilizce) : JAPAN'S SEARCH FOR ONTOLOGICAL SECURITY IN THE POST-COLD WAR PERIOD: THE RECONFIGURATION OF TRUSTING RELATIONSHIPS IN EAST ASIA

**TEZİN TÜRÜ** : Yüksek Lisans

Doktora

1. Tezimin tamamından kaynak gösterilmek şartıyla fotokopi alınabilir.

2. Tezimin içindekiler sayfası, özet, indeks sayfalarından ve/veya bir bölümünden kaynak gösterilmek şartıyla fotokopi alınabilir.

3. Tezimden bir bir (1) yıl süreyle fotokopi alınamaz.

**TEZİN KÜTÜPHANEYE TESLİM TARİHİ:**

## E. CURRICULUM VITAE

### PERSONAL INFORMATION

Surname, Name: Gönen, Hakan  
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### PUBLICATIONS

1. Gönen H., "A Comparative Analysis on the Concepts of State and Security from Neorealism to Post-Classical Realism: Change or Continuity? ", Kara Harp Okulu Bilim Dergisi, 18(1), 121-134 (2008)

## F. TURKISH SUMMARY

Devletlerin siyasi karar alıcılarının, dış politika yapım sürecinde göz önünde bulundurmaları zorunda oldukları önemli olgular, genellikle *uluslararası siyasetteki köklü değişimler* üzerine kuruludur. Tarihten günümüze uluslararası siyasetteki bu değişimler, devletler adına hem bir tehdit hem de bir fırsat olarak değerlendirilmiştir. Bunun yakın tarihteki bir örneğini, 1990'ların başında uluslararası sistemde yaşanan siyasi değişimlerde görmek mümkündür. Bu dönemde, uluslararası sistemin iki kutuplu yapıdan tek kutuplu bir yapıya dönüşmesi, devletler için yeni belirsizlik ve endişeler ortaya çıkarmıştır. Bu belirsizlik ve endişeler, siyasi karar alıcıların devletlerin ontolojik ve fiziksel güvenliklerini korumak amacı ile, yeni dış politika stratejileri kurgulamalarına yol açmıştır.

Japonya da Soğuk Savaş sonrası değişen uluslararası ortama, uyguladığı siyasi ve ekonomik stratejilerle uymaya çalışmıştır. Esasen, Soğuk Savaş döneminde, Japonya'ya *anayasa eksenli* ve ABD ile *güvenlik ittifakı* temelinde biçilen çok sınırlı askerî rol (anti-militarist bir kimlik) ve sonrasında Japon siyasi karar alıcılar tarafından takip edilen ekonomik temelli pragmatik stratejiler (anti-militarist bir duruş), bu ülkeyi uluslararası ekonomik sistemde söz sahibi önemli bir güç haline getirmiştir. Japonya, sahip olduğu bu ekonomik gücü, bölge ülkeleri ile güven ilişkilerinin tesis edilmesi ve korunmasında bir araç olarak kullanmaya çalışmıştır. Diğer bir ifade ile, savaş sonrası dönemde askerî tercihlerden ziyade, uzun dönemli ekonomik kalkınmaya verilen önem, Japonya'ya biçilen anti-militarist kimliğin neticesinde ortaya çıkmıştır. Japonya sahip olduğu bu anti-militarist kimliğini, bölge ülkeleri ile güven ilişkileri tesis etmeye çalışarak desteklemiştir.

Soğuk Savaş sonrası dönemde, uluslararası güvenliğin sağlanmasında Japonya'nın daha aktif bir rol almasını sağlayacak önemli adımlar atılmıştır. Birleşmiş Milletler'in (BM) kontrolündeki barışı-koruma operasyonlarında Japonya'nın icra ettiği sınırlı askerî rol ve BM Güvenlik

Konseyi kararı çıkartılması koşuluyla ABD'ye verilen sınırlı askerî destek, bu dönemde Japon dış ve güvenlik politikasını şekillendiren önemli değişkenler olmuştur. Tüm bu gelişmelere rağmen, Soğuk Savaş sonrası dönemde, Japonya uluslararası ilişkilerin idaresinde sahip olduğu anti-militarist devlet kimliğini ve duruşunu bozmamıştır.

Bu doktora tez çalışmasında, Japonya'nın, edindiği anti-militarist kimlik çerçevesinde, Doğu Asya bölgesinde tesis etmeye çalıştığı güven temelli ilişkiler ve bu ilişkilerin Japon dış politika stratejilerine yansımaları incelenmeye çalışılmıştır. Bu bağlamda, bölgesel bir aktör olarak Japonya'nın Soğuk Savaş sonrası dönemde ontolojik güvenlik arayışının yapısal karakterinin daha net anlaşılabilceği düşünülmüştür.

Çalışmada kullanılan temel kavramsal çerçeve, 2000'li yıllarda Jennifer Mitzen ve Brent Steele tarafından uluslararası ilişkiler literatürüne kazandırılan ontolojik güvenlik kavramıdır. Ontolojik güvenlik kavramının temelinde, aktörler arasında güvene dayalı (trust-based) ilişkiler silsilesi yatar. Bu bağlamda, kısaca ifade etmek gerekirse, uluslararası ilişkilerde güven ve istikrar kavramları arasındaki ilişki önemli, pragmatik bir çerçeveye işaret eder. Güven kavramı, aktörler açısından daha istikrarlı bilişsel ve fiziksel çevrenin inşasında hayati bir etkidir. Bu kavram hem bölgesel hem de uluslararası düzlemde toplumlar için bir güvenlik ve işbirliği duygusunun gelişimine katkıda bulunur. Bunun temelinde ise, güvenin aktörler tarafından inşa edilen sosyal ve aktif bir olgu olması yatar. Aktörler (özellikle, uluslararası ilişkilerde devletler) arasında güvene dayalı ilişkilerin tesisi, daha istikrarlı bir siyasi ve ekonomik ortamın oluşmasının alt yapısını hazırlar, istikrar arttıkça da devletler arasındaki güven ilişkileri daha sağlam bir zemine oturur. Kısacası, sosyal olgularda hiçbirşeyin tek bir faktöre indirgenemeyeceğini de göz önünde tutarak, güven ile istikrar arasında doğru orantılı bir ilişki oldukça fazladır diyebiliriz. Güven arttıkça, istikrar da artacaktır.

İstikrarlı bir siyasi ve ekonomik ortam ise, devletlerin fiziksel güvenliklerinin yanısıra ontolojik güvenliklerini de idame ettirebilmelerini olanaklı kılar. Ontolojik güvenlik bu noktada istikrarlı bilişsel ve fiziksel bir çevre ile doğrudan ilintilidir. İstikrar aynı zamanda devletlerin varlığını / kimliğini tehdit eden belirsizliklerin giderilmesi veya azaltılmasında da önemlidir. Ne var ki, kritik durumlar olarak da ifade edilebilecek ve aktörler arasında kurumsallaşmış ilişkilerin tahrip edilmesine yol açan radikal kopuşlar tıpkı bireylerde olduğu gibi, devletler için de sonuçları öngörülemeyen bir takım büyük belirsizliklere neden olur. Bu bağlamda, eylemde bulanabilme kaabiliyeti aktörlerin kendi kimlikleri açısından hayati bir etken olduğundan, belirsizlik durumu aktörün eylemde bulunabilme kaabiliyetini kısıtlar. Bu durum devletlerin endişe düzeyini ister istemez artırır. Endişe ise aktörün bizatihi kendi kimliğine yönelik bir meydan okuma söz konusu olduğunda ortaya çıkan duygusal bir tepkidir. Endişeye maruz kalan aktör (devlet), kendi öz varlığına bir meydan okuma söz konusu olduğu müddetçe güvensiz bir konumdadır. Bu noktada, devletler rasyonel hareket etme kaabiliyetlerini yitirebilirler.

Bu nedenle, devletler belirsizliklerin giderilmesi veya azaltılması için öncelikle istikrarlı bir bilişsel düzen tertiplemek durumundadırlar. Bu bağlamda, devletler karşılaştıkları dış gerçekliğe bilişsel bir düzen empoze etmeye çalışırlar. Dahası, derin bir belirsizlik endişesinden kaçınmak amacıyla dış gerçekliğin sistematik bir düzen çerçevesinde düşünülmesi zorunludur. Bilişsel düzen gerçeklikte değil, zihinde inşa edilen ve ancak söylemlerle dış dünyaya aksettirilmeye çalışılan bir düzendir. Dış gerçeklik çok sayıda vakıa ile dolu olduğundan ve dış gerçeklikte asli bir düzen sağlanamadığından dış gerçekliğin karmaşasını zihinde daha anlamlı ve anlaşılabilir kalıplara sokmak önemlidir. Böylelikle, dış gerçekliği anlayabilmek için devletler algılama, akıl yürütme ve yargılama süreçlerini gerçekleştirirler.

İstikrarlı bir bilişsel çevre devletler arasında temel bir güven mekanizmasının kurulmasıyla daha nitelikli bir hal alır. Bu bağlamda,

devletler ontolojik manada kendilerini daha güvenli hissederek. Devletler, böylelikle amaçlarını gerçekleştirebilmek adına, olası tehdit ve fırsatları nasıl değerlendirebileceklerini ve buna göre nasıl bir yol haritası çizebileceklerini bileceklerdir. Diğer bir deyişle, algılama, akıl yürütme ve yargılama süreçlerini daha sağlıklı bir şekilde gerçekleştirebileceklerdir. Öte taraftan, endişe düzeyinin ister istemez yüksek olduğu durumlarda, biraz evvel de ifade edildiği gibi, devletler hangi tehlikelere karşı koyacaklarını hangilerini ise göz ardı edeceklerini ayıramama durumuna gelebileceklerdir. Bu durum devlet açısından ciddi bir ehliyetsizliğe işaret eder. Böyle bir durumda, aktör (devlet) yalnızca acil gereksinimlere odaklanacak, dolayısıyla amacına ulaşmada kullanılacak doğru araçları seçemeyebilecektir. Doğu Asya bölgesinin uluslararası sistemi, bunun örneklerini bizlere sunmaktadır.

Ünlü İngiliz düşünür Anthony Giddens güven kavramını olası tehdit ve tehlikelere karşı aktörün umut ve cesaretini devam ettirmesine olanak sağlayan bir tür koruma olarak tanımlar. Bu tanımdan da anlaşıldığı gibi, güven kavramı aktörler tarafından inşa edilen sosyal ve materyal dünyada, belirsizlik kargaşasının azaltılmasında önemli bir araç olarak görülür. Dolayısıyla devletler arasında inşa edilecek temel bir güven mekanizması ilk ve en önce söz konusu devletler için sağlıklı bir bilişsel çevrenin somut bir nitelik kazanmasının yolunu açacaktır. Karmaşık dış gerçekliğin sistematik bir biçimde anlaşılır kılınmasında bu çıkış noktası gereklidir. Sağlıklı bir bilişsel çevre ise, devletlerin uluslararası sistemde amaçlarını nasıl kovalamaları gerektiğini gösteren dış politika formülasyonları inşa etmelerine yardımcı olacaktır. Diğer bir deyişle, her şekilde aktör istikrarlı/sağlıklı bir bilişsel bir çevreye sahip ise, kim olduğunu, neyi, niçin yapacağını bilecektir.

Japonya'nın İkinci Dünya Savaşı'nda mağlup olması, bu ülkenin Soğuk Savaş yıllarındaki dış ve güvenlik politikasının yeni değişkenlerinin belirlenmesinde önemli bir etken olmuştur. Bu mağlubiyet, öncelikle ABD önderliğindeki müttefik kuvvetlerin işgal hareketinin yolunu açmıştır. Bu

işgal hareketi çerçevesinde uygulanan çeşitli reform programları ile, Japonya'nın demokratik bir ülke haline gelmesi ve devlet yapısında var olan askerî unsurlardan arındırılması hedeflenmiştir. İşgal kuvvetlerinin politikalarına göre, Japonya bir daha asla dünya barışını tehdit edemeyecekti.

Bu çerçevede, Japonya'nın savaş sonrası bölgesel ve uluslararası sistemdeki rolü, ittifak kuvvetleri tarafından Japonya'ya empoze edilen siyasal düzenin bir ürünü olarak değerlendirilmiştir. Daha detaylı olarak ifade edileceği üzere, bu gelişmelere iktidardaki Japon siyasi liderlerin pragmatik davranış ve düşüncelerini de eklemek mümkündür. Japon halkının gözünde, ezici bir mağlubiyete maruz kalmak, Japonya'daki askerî güçlerin ve askerî değerlerin çoğunun kaybolması anlamına geliyordu. Bu bağlamda, müttefik işgal hareketi Japon halkı tarafından bir kriz olarak değil, savaş sonrası ödenmesi gereken bir bedel olarak görülmeye başlandı.

İşgal politikaları ile, Japonya'da ülkenin kimlik inşasının temeline yerleşecek barışçıl politikalar (pacifism) fikri içselleştirilmeye başlandı. Diğer bir ifade ile, savaşmama ve ordu bulundurmama üzerine kurulu anti-militarist değerler, devlet düzeyinde Japonya'nın önemli bir parçası haline gelmeye başladı. Ülkenin yeni anayasasında da ifade edilen ve Japonya'da militarizmin yeniden canlanmasına yönelik eylemlerin önüne set çekmeyi amaçlayan bu değerler, uluslararası toplumda Japon devletinin duruşunu temsil etmeye başladı.

Özellikle, anayasanın dokuzuncu maddesine göre, Japonya uluslararası anlaşmazlıkların çözümünde savaşmayı reddeden yeni bir çerçeve üzerine inşa ediliyordu. Bu madde, Japonya'nın İkinci Dünya Savaşı sonrası dış ve güvenlik politikasını şekillendiren önemli faktörlerden biri olmuştur. Japon dış ve güvenlik politika ajandasını şekillendiren diğer önemli bir faktör de ABD ile kurulan güvenlik ittifakı ilişkileridir. 1951 ve 1960 yıllarında imzalanan karşılıklı güvenlik

antlaşmaları, Japonya'nın bölgesel ve uluslararası düzlemde anti-militarist kimliğinin ve duruşunun en önemli dayanakları olarak görülmüştür. Bu anlamda, ABD ile kurulan ittifak antlaşmaları, Japon siyasi karar alıcılar tarafından, çerçevesi dikkatli bir şekilde çizilen ve içeriği ustaca uygulanan bir dış ve güvenlik politikası angajmanıdır, denilebilir. Dahası, uluslararası arenada ülkenin anti-militarist kimliğini ve duruşunu vurgulayabilmek amacı ile, Japon siyasi karar alıcılar devletin anti-militarist hassasiyetlerini çeşitli sınırlandırıcı önlemlerle de desteklemişlerdir. Bunlardan ikisini şu şekilde sıralamak mümkündür: Japonya'nın nükleer silahlara sahip olamayacağı, bunları üretemeyeceği ve bunların ülke topraklarına girmesine izin verilemeyeceği üzerine kurulu Üç Nükleersizlik İlkesi'nin benimsenmesi (three non-nuclear principles), ve kolektif savunma faaliyetlerine katılımın yasaklanması. 1970'li yıllardan itibaren, Japonya dünyanın en önemli pazar ekonomilerinden biri olmuştur. Bu anlamda, Japon siyasi karar alıcılar, ülkenin ekonomik büyümesini ve refahını etkileyebilecek herhangi bir angajmana girmekten kaçınmışlar, daha ziyade, ekonomik çıkarların ön planda olduğu barışçıl bir dış politika takip etmişlerdir.

Sonuç olarak, yukarıdaki tarihsel çerçeve göz önüne alındığında, çalışmanın temel argümanı aşağıdaki gibi detaylandırılmaktadır: Japonya, bölgesel düzlemde ontolojik güvenliğini inşa etmek adına, savaş sonrası dönemde anti-militarist bir kimlik ve duruş sergilemiştir. Bu yaklaşım, Tokyo'nun dış ve güvenlik politika anlayışında yol gösterici bir ilke olmuştur. Soğuk Savaş sonrası dönemde, bu anti-militarist kimlik ve duruşu başarılı bir çerçevede devam ettirebilmek amacı ile, Japon siyasi karar alıcılar bölge ülkeleri ile güvene dayalı ilişkilerini hem yapılandırma yoluna gitmişler, hem de bu ilişkileri güçlendirmeye çalışmışlardır.

Çalışmada tartışılacak temel kurguyu, Soğuk Savaş sonrası dönemde Japon siyasi karar alıcıların ülkenin anti-militarist kimlik ve duruşunu pekiştirecek fikir ve düşünceleri nasıl inşa ettikleri sorunsalı oluşturmaktadır. Bu sorunsal, temel belirleyici bir soru ile de

ayrıntılıdırılmaya çalışılmıştır. Japon dış politika ajandasında askerî yöntemlerin kullanılmasından ziyade ekonomik araçların tercih edilmesi, Doğu Asya bölgesinde devletler arasında işbirliği olasılığını ne derece kolaylaştırmıştır?

Bilindiği üzere, uluslararası sistemde devletlerin dış politikalarının öncelikli amacı uluslarının güvenliğinin ve refahının sağlanması üzerine inşa edilir. Yukarıda da belirtildiği gibi, Japonya bu amaca, ABD ile güvenlik ittifakı çerçevesinde stratejiler geliştirerek, gereksiz bölgesel çatışmalardan kaçınarak ve ekonomik sorunlara odaklanarak ulaşmaya çalışmıştır. Soğuk Savaş döneminin bu inisiyatifleri, Japon dış ve güvenlik politikasının göze çarpan unsurları olmuştur. Japon siyasi karar alıcılar, bu unsurlardan ABD ile ittifak ilişkilerine sadakat derecesinde büyük önem vermişlerdir. Bu sadakat, parametreleri değişse bile, Soğuk Savaş sonrası dönemde de güçlü bir biçimde devam etmiştir.

1990'larda, Japonya bölgesel düzlemde konumunu güçlü kılabilecek gerekli araçlara sahip olduğu imajını vermeye başlamıştır. Bu bakış açısından, Japonya, Doğu Asya bölgesindeki stratejik ortamını ve liderlik vasfını silahlanmaya gerek duymadan yeniden şekillendirebilirdi. Bu bağlamda, Çin Halk Cumhuriyeti (ÇHC) gibi bölgede yükselen yeni aktörler, ve insan güvenliği (human security) gibi ortaya çıkan yeni siyasi enstrümanlar, ve ABD ile ikili ilişkiler bazında kurulacak daha kapsamlı stratejik hedefler, bu dönemde Japon dış ve güvenlik politikasının yeni parametrelerini şekillendirmeye başladı. Japon siyasi karar alıcılar, Doğu Asya bölgesinde yeni ortaya çıkan sorun ve fırsatlara odaklanırken, önceliği komşu ülkelerle güvene dayalı ilişkileri güçlendirmeye vermiştir. Çalışmada, özellikle Japonya'nın bu dönemde yapılandırmaya ve güçlendirmeye çalıştığı güven temelli ilişkilerin dış politikaya yansımaları vurgulanmaya çalışılmıştır.

Soğuk Savaş'ın ilk yıllarında başbakanlık yapan Yoshida Shigeru, savaş öncesi dönemde ülkenin ulusal kaynaklarının yanlış kullanıldığının

altını çizerek, Tokyo'nun Washington ile yakınlaşmasının savaş sonrası dönemde Japonya'nın yeniden silahlanmaya değil, ekonomik sorunlara odaklanmaya imkan sağlayacağını belirtmişti. Yoshida Shigeru ve diğer muhafazakar siyasi karar alıcılar bu barış odaklı pasifist yaklaşımın, ülkenin ulusal bağımsızlığını azami seviyeye çıkartmak için önemli bir araç olduğunu ifade etmişlerdir. Bu ekonomik tabanlı dış politika yaklaşımı, Japonya'ya ülke ekonomisinin rehabilite edilebilmesi için gerekli imkanı sağlamıştır. 1970'lerden itibaren, önemli bir pazar ekonomisi olan Japonya, ülkenin refah ortamını etkileyebilecek politikalardan daima kaçınmıştır. Soğuk Savaş sonrası dönemde, Japon siyasi karar alıcılar, bölgesel düzlemde sürdürülebilir bir siyasi ve sosyo-ekonomik kalkınma sağlayabilmek için, komşu ülkelerin ekonomik ve siyasi düzenlerini iyileştirmeye odaklanmışlardır.

Bu dönemde, uluslararası sistemdeki değişen tehdit algılamaları, elbette Japon siyasi karar alıcıların ülkenin dış ve güvenlik politika parametrelerini yeniden tanımlamalarını gerekli kılmıştır. Ne var ki, daha ziyade ABD ile ittifak ilişkileri çerçevesinde geliştirilen bu parametreler, anayasanın getirdiği askerî sınırlamaların ötesine geçmemiş ve Japonya'nın savaş öncesi dönemde takip ettiği stratejilerle ilişkilendirilmemiştir. Japonya, her zaman, bölgesel düzlemde komşu ülkelerle ilişkilerini sürdürülebilir ve istikrarlı bir ontolojik güvenlik üzerine kurmaya özen göstermiştir.

Bu doktora tez çalışması, ekseriyetle Japonya'nın Soğuk Savaş sonrası dönemdeki dış politika stratejileri üzerine odaklanmış ve yukarıda ifade edilen kavramsal çerçeveyi bölgesel düzlemde açıklamaya çalışmıştır. Ne var ki, Soğuk Savaş sonrası dönemde Japonya'nın anti-militarist kimliğinin ve duruşunun dış politika üzerine temel yansımalarını anlamak için, tarihsel arka planı incelemek gerekmektedir. Sonuç olarak, Japonya geçmişte yaşadığı deneyimleri tekrarlamamak adına, Soğuk Savaş yıllarında daha rasyonel dış politika kararları alabilmiş, böylelikle Doğu Asya bölgesinde daha ılımlı bir portre çizebilmiştir. Bu noktada, barışçıl dış

ve güvenlik politikaları takip eden bir ülke imajı vermek için, Japon siyasi karar alıcılar bölgesel düzlemde önemli aktörlerle rutinize edilmiş ilişkiler kurmaya çalışmışlardır. Bu bağlamda, ikinci bölümde Soğuk Savaş döneminde, Japonya'nın anti-militarist kimliğinin oluşum ve evrimleşme süreci irdelenmeye çalışılmıştır. İkinci bölümün amacı, Japonya'nın Doğu Asya bölgesinde kendi temel güven mekanizmasını ne dereceye kadar kurabildiği üzerine kuruludur. Bu bölümde, Japonya'nın Soğuk Savaş yıllarında dış ve güvenlik politika söylemlerinin nasıl şekillendiği ve bu söylemlerin Japonya'nın ontolojik güvenliğini nasıl etkilediğinin genel bir perspektifi sunulmaya çalışılmıştır.

Üçüncü bölüm, Japonya'nın 1990'larda inşa ettiği insan güvenliği (the human security agenda) ajandası üzerine kuruludur. Anti-militarist bir kimliğe ve duruşa sahip olduğu göz önüne alındığında, Doğu Asya bölgesinde sürdürülebilir bir bilişsel ve fiziksel çevre yaratabilmek amacı ile, Japonya için böyle bir politika takip etmek elzem görülmüştür. Küresel bir dünyada, bir devlet için belirsizlik ortamından tamamen kaçınmak neredeyse imkansızdır. Bu anlamda, devletler bölgesel düzlemde önemli aktörlerle rutinize edilmiş ilişkiler kurmak ve etraflarında güvenli bir ortam inşa etmek için kendi fiziksel çevrelerinde temel bir güven mekanizması inşa etmeye çalışırlar. Japonya, bu anlamda, Doğu Asya bölgesinde insan güvenliği ile ilgili sorunlarla mücadele ederek ve bölgesel işbirliği imkanları yaratarak, bölgede kurmaya çalıştığı güven mekanizmasını yapılandırmaya ve daha ziyade güçlendirmeye çalışmıştır.

İnsan güvenliği kavramını dış politikasında ön plana çıkaran Japonya, bu kavramı dolaylı olarak ulusal güvenliğinin tamamlayıcı bir parçası olarak görmüştür. Bu çerçevede, Japonya'nın bölgesel düzlemde insan güvenliğine katkıları pozitif toplamı bir kazanca atıf yapmıştır. Böylelikle, Doğu Asya'da daha istikrarlı bilişsel ve fiziksel çevrenin yolu açılmaya çalışılmıştır. Bu bağlamda, üçüncü bölüm iki temel kısma ayrılmaktadır. Birinci kısımda, insan güvenliği üzerine yapılan tanımlamalar değerlendirilmiştir. Bu kısımda, insan güvenliği kavramsal

çerçevesini şekillendiren bazı tartışmalar sunulmuştur. İkinci kısımda, Japonya'nın insan güvenliği üzerine dış politika söylemleri incelenmiş ve bu söylemlerin Doğu Asya bölgesinde barışçıl ve sürdürülebilir bir ortam yaratmaya ne derece katkı sağladığı analiz edilmeye çalışılmıştır.

Dördüncü bölümde, ekonomik ve güvenlik perspektiflerinden iki temel bölgesel örgütlenmeye (APEC ve ARF) odaklanılarak, Japonya'nın bu bölgesel örgütlenmelere katkıları incelenmiştir. Bu bölümde iki temel tematik soruya cevap bulunmaya çalışılmıştır. 1. Japonya bu bölgesel örgütlenmeleri kendi bağlamında nasıl algılamıştır? 2. Soğuk Savaş sonrası dönem boyunca, Japon siyasi karar alıcılar bu ekonomik ve güvenlik temelli yapılanmaları, bölgedeki belirsizlik ve endişe ortamını giderebilmek için kendi amaçları çerçevesinde düzenleyebilmişler midir? Bu bölümde, Doğu Asya bölgesinde çok taraflı diyalog ve işbirliği üzerine kurulu istikrarlı bir bilişsel ve fiziksel ortam inşa edebilmek için, Japonya'nın bu bölgesel örgütlenmelere büyük bir önem atfettiği ifade edilmektedir. Fakat, Japonya tarafından gösterilen işbirliği çabaları, bölgedeki farklı ekonomik ve siyasi sistemler yüzünden kısmen başarılı olmuştur.

Beşinci bölümde, Soğuk Savaş sonrası dönemde Japonya'nın anti-militarist kimliğinin korunmasında önem addettiği üç önemli aktörle olan ilişkilerini irdelemeye çalışmıştır. Bu aktörler sırası ile, ABD, Kore Yarımadası ve Çin Halk Cumhuriyeti'dir. Japon siyasi karar alıcılar tarafından, ABD şüphesiz önemli bir aktör olarak görülmüştür. Soğuk Savaş boyunca Japonya'daki muhafazakar elit, ABD ile güvenlik ittifakı çerçevesinde geliştirilen ilişkilere büyük önem vermişti. Japonya, böylelikle ulusal çıkarlarını mümkün mertebe sağlayabilmişti. Dahası, bu dönemde ABD, Japon dış ve güvenlik politikasının çok önemli bir köşe taşı olarak görüldü. Bu bağlamda, Soğuk Savaş yıllarında, Japonya tarafından alınan siyasi ve güvenlik kararlarının hemen hemen tamamı ABD'nin doğrudan yada dolaylı etkisi altında şekillendi.

Basit bir şekilde ifade etmek gerekirse, ABD Japon siyasi karar alıcılar tarafından ülkenin savaş sonrası kimlik inşasında önemli bir aktör olarak görüldü. İnşa edilen bu anti-militarist kimlik, daha sonra Japonya ile ABD arasında güven temelli ilişkiler çerçevesinde şekillendirildi ve geliştirildi. Soğuk Savaş sonrası dönemde iki ülke arasında karşılıklı ilişkiler daha da geliştirildi ve güçlendirildi. Şüphesiz, iki ülke arasında çatışma yaşanan noktalar da olmuştur, fakat Japonya için ABD, her zaman hayati önem taşıyan bir ülke olarak görülmüştür. Bu anlamda, 1990'lardan itibaren Japonya'nın ABD ile güven ilişkileri temelinde karşılıklı ilişkilerini yapılandırması ve güçlendirmesi üç temel evrede irdelenmeye çalışılmıştır. 1- 1990-91 Körfez krizi ve sonrası; 2- 1995'de icra edilen Japon Ulusal Güvenlik Programı ve sonrası; 3- 11 Eylül ve sonrasında yaşanan gelişmeler. Tüm bu dönemler, Japon siyasi karar alıcıların hem ABD ile güvene dayalı ilişkilere hem de ülkenin anti-militarist kimliğine zarar vermeyecek bir dış politika ajandası oluşturmaya çalıştıklarını göstermektedir. Böylelikle, Japonya'nın sahip olduğu anti-militarist kimliği kaybetmemek adına ABD ve komşu ülkelerle bir denge politikası izlediği görülmektedir.

Beşinci bölümde, Kore Yarımadası da Japonya için diğer önemli bir aktör olarak değerlendirilmiştir. Soğuk Savaş yıllarından günümüze, Kore Yarımadası ile ilişkilerinde Japonya'nın anti-militarist kimliği ve duruşu, bölgesel istikrarın ve işbirliğinin şekillenmesinde ve Güney Kore ile Japonya arasında temel bir güven mekanizmasının inşa edilmesinde anahtar bir faktör olmuştur. Ne var ki, Japonya'nın savaş öncesi dönemdeki agresif ve yayılcı politikaları bu deneyimleri yaşayan Korelilerin zihinlerinden hala silinmemiştir. Japonya'nın bu türden girişimlere artık prim vermeyeceğinin resmî olarak açıklamasına karşın, Japonya'nın verdiği bu siyasi kararlar ve uyguladığı politikalar devlet ve halk düzeyinde Korelileri tatmin etmemiştir. Bu bağlamda, Japonya'nın özellikle ulusal güvenlik meselelerini ilgilendiren dış politika formülasyonları, Güney Koreli siyasi karar alıcıların geniş ölçüde eleştirilerine maruz kalmıştır.

Yine de, her iki ülke, ikili ticari ve ekonomik ilişkilerin karşılıklı güven üzerine kurulu bir sadakat çerçevesinde yürütülmesinde hem fikir olmuşlardır. İki ülke arasındaki bu işbirliği, sınırların yakınlığı, kültürel yakınlık, ve en önemlisi de, her iki ülkenin ABD ile sahip olduğu stratejik ilişkilerin sonucu olarak değerlendirilmiştir.

Kore ile Japonya arasındaki güven ilişkilerini bölgesel düzlemde test etmek için, bu kısım üç ana alt bölüme ayrılmıştır. Birinci kısım, Kore Yarımadası ile Japonya arasındaki tarihsel arka planı konu almıştır. İkinci kısım, Güney Kore ile Japonya arasındaki ikili ilişkilerin hangi faktörler çerçevesinde değerlendirildiğini irdelemeye çalışmıştır. Bu faktörler şu şekilde sıralanmaktadır: tarih ve kimlik, ikili ekonomik ilişkilerden sağlanan fayda; ABD'nin rolü ve her iki ülke siyasi liderlerinin ikili ilişkilerde oynadıkları roller ve söylemler. Bu kısımlara ek olarak, Güney Kore ile Japonya arasında yaşanan tartışmalı adalar sorunu da ele alınmıştır. Üçüncü ve son kısımda ise, Kuzey Kore'nin nükleer silahlanma meselesi ve Japonya'nın bu meseleye bakış açısı değerlendirilmeye çalışılmıştır.

Soğuk Savaş sonrası dönemde, Japonya'nın anti-militarist kimliğinin ve duruşunun devamı konusunda önemli rol oynayan bir diğer aktör de ÇHC'dir. Bunun için birçok neden ileri sürülebilir. Kültürel ve coğrafi yakınlık ve, ikili ilişkilerde ön plana çıkan siyasi, güvenlik ve ekonomik boyutlar, ÇHC'nin Japonya tarafından çok önemli bir aktör olarak görülmesini sağlamıştır. Özellikle, 1990'lardan itibaren, Japon siyasi karar alıcılar ülkenin ulusal güvenliği ve refahı açısından ÇHC'ni potansiyel bir düşman olarak görmüşler, fakat aynı zamanda Doğu Asya'da barış ve istikrarın sağlanması konusunda kaçınılmaz bir partner olarak da değerlendirmişlerdir. Hızlı ekonomik büyümesi, şeffaf olmayan bir askerî yapılanması ve Doğu Asya bölgesinde oynamaya çalıştığı potansiyel liderlik rolü gibi nedenlerle ÇHC, Japonya tarafından potansiyel bir düşman olarak addedilmiştir. Fakat, ÇHC aynı zamanda Japonya için kaçınılmaz bir partnerdir de. Öncelikle, ÇHC bölgesel düzlemde ekonomik, sosyal ve

güvenlik sorunlarının çözümünde Japonya için önemli bir partner olarak düşünölmüştür. Büyük ve hızlı gelişen ekonomisi, ve geniş öлке nüfusuyla ÇHC, Japon hükümeti ve iş dünyası açısından dikkat edilmesi gerekli bir aktör olarak değerlendirilmiştir. Ne var ki, iki öлке arasında karşılıklı ilişkiler konusunda temel bir güven mekanizması inşa edilmesine karşın, bu güven mekanizması Soğuk Savaş sonrası dönemde tatmin edici bir düzeye ulaştırılamamıştır. Her iki öлке de temelde savaş öncesi dönemden kaynaklanan tarihsel sorunların altında ezilmiştir. Ayrıca, bölgesel ekonomik düzlemde rekabet halinde olma duygusu, iki öлке arasındaki siyasi ilişkilere yansıyan bir diğer mesele olmuştur. Beşinci bölümün bu kısmında, Çin-Japon ilişkileri bağlamında Soğuk Savaş sonrası yaşanan stratejik gelişmeleri anlamak için, öncelikle iki öлке arasındaki tarihsel arka plana kısaca değinilmiştir. İkinci kısımda, Soğuk Savaş sonrası süreç, karşılıklı ilişkilerin ekonomik, güvenlik, ve siyasal boyutları analiz edilerek detaylandırılmıştır.

Altıncı bölümde tez çalışmasının sonuçları değerlendirilmiştir. Bu doktora tez çalışması, özetle Japonya'nın anti-militarist kimlik yapılanmasından yola çıkarak, bölgesel düzlemde karşılıklı güven ilişkilerinin inşa edilmesi ve devamı bağlamında Japon devletinin ontolojik güvenlik arayışını irdelemeye çalışmıştır.