

CONSTRUCTING LOCAL MASCULINITIES: A CASE STUDY FROM
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ABSTRACT

CONSTRUCTING LOCAL MASCULINITIES: A CASE STUDY FROM TRABZON, TURKEY

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This thesis investigates the social construction of masculinities in Trabzon, with a (pro)feminist approach. This study is based on the assumption that masculinities are socially and contextually constructed grounding on the local dynamics. In order to examine that, I identified and focused on three trajectories in Trabzon that have largely affected the social construction of masculinities in the last two decades. Those are the men's emotional and sexual lives, men's families and the domestic lives and rightist politics and football fanaticism of Trabzonspor. In order to investigate the social construction of masculinities in the city, a qualitative field research, based on feminist methodology was conducted. The field research was conducted between August 2010 and October 2011 by making interviews with men from different social milieu, in Trabzon city centre. This study presents that the men's experiences of three trajectories noted above contributed the construction of conservative and patriarchal masculinities in Trabzon.

Keywords: Masculinities, Patriarchy, Feminism, Trabzon, Turkey

ÖZ

ERKEKLİKLERİN YERELDEKİ İNŞASI: TRABZON, TÜRKİYE ÖRNEĞİ

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Bu tez Trabzon'da erkekliklerin toplumsal inşasını (pro)feminist bir yaklaşımla incelemektedir. Çalışmanın temel varsayımı, erkekliklerin yerel dinamiklere dayanarak toplumsal yollardan kuruluyor oluşudur. Bunu incelemek için, Trabzon'da erkekliklerin inşasını son dönemde en çok etkileyen üç izlek ortaya konulmuştur. Bunlar, erkeklerin duyguları ve cinsel yaşamları, erkeklerin aileleri ve ev içi yaşamları, ve sağ siyasetler ve Trabzonspor fanatizmidir. Kentte erkekliklerin toplumsal inşasını incelemek için, feminist metodolojiyi temel alan nitel bir alan araştırması gerçekleştirilmiştir. Alan araştırması, Ağustos 2010 ile Ekim 2011 arasında Trabzon şehir merkezinde farklı toplumsal çevrelerden erkeklerle görüşülerek gerçekleştirilmiştir. Bu çalışma erkeklerin yukarıda anılan üç izleğe dair deneyimlerinin muhafazakar ve ataerkil erkekliklerin inşasına katkıda bulunduğunu ortaya koymaktadır.

Anahtar sözcükler: Erkeklikler, Ataerkillik, Feminizm, Trabzon, Türkiye

to Nihan...

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*“all along this path I tread
my heart betrays my weary head
with nothing but my love to save
from the cradle to the grave”¹*

This thesis is an outcome of my ongoing personal struggle and studies on patriarchal men and masculinities for quite a long time. This has been a challenging, tough, labouring, yet instructive path. Many people have left their mark throughout my journey. I am grateful for all of them. Nevertheless, I feel obliged to express my appreciation for a number of people in my doctoral studies, who all have precious places in my life and my academic journey.

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¹ Eric Clapton, from the album *From the Cradle* (released in 1994 by Reprise Records).

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AP	Adalet Partisi (Justice Party)
AKP	Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (Justice and Development Party)
BBP	Büyük Birlik Partisi (Great Unity Party)
CHP	Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (Republican People's Party)
DP	Demokrat Parti (Democrat Party)
DYP	Doğru Yol Partisi (Right Way Party)
KESK	Kamu Emekçileri Sendikaları Konfederasyonu (Trade Union Confederation Of Public Employees)
KTÜ	Karadeniz Teknik Üniversitesi (Karadeniz Technical University)
MB	Mehmet Bozok
MHP	Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi (Nationalist Movement Party)
MSP	Milliyetçi Selamet Partisi (Nationalist Salvation Party)
PKK	Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan (Kurdistan Workers Party)
RP	Refah Partisi (Welfare Party)
SP	Saadet Partisi (Felicity Party)
TAYAD	Tutuklu Hükümlü Aileleri Yakınları Derneği (Association of Families and Friends of Detainee and Sentenced People)
TurkStat	Turkish Statistical Institute (Türkiye İstatistik Kurumu)

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

“In Şalpazarı, they put the women’s identification cards in a lace case and give it to their husbands when they marry.”

(Ertuğrul, an architect aged 60)

Patriarchy has hazardous impacts on the lives of the women, the queer people and the men. It is like an incubus which moulds, restrains, harms and destroys the lives of all the human beings. Although those cannot be compared to the sufferings of the women and the queer people, the men become dominant actors in the society in exchange of the troubles of the women and the queer people. Moreover, in order to obtain that role, they internalize being homophobic, militaristic, oppressive, violent, dominant, powerful, conservative, and emotionless actors.

My constant personal conflicts with the oppressive gender identity masculinities (which all the men, including me, are a complicit part of it) led me to question and investigate patriarchy and patriarchal masculinities. My meeting with feminism and gender studies literature contributed me to explore myself and the oppression that all the men, the women and the queer people are a part and agents of. In a similar vein to the feminist motto “personal is political”, I believe that critically understanding men and masculinities and exposing how they are constructed and experienced would contribute the struggle towards the overcome patriarchy, and less suffering women, men and queer people.

Men and masculinities have been considered as an area of study within the social sciences since the late 1970's. More than a decade earlier, feminism had begun challenging the capitalist and patriarchal society and the patriarchal bias in the academia. The (pro)feminist and (pro)queer men's response to this process from the academia of the social sciences was the establishment of the field masculinity studies. The (pro)feminist scholars began to critically investigate "men" and "masculinities" within a distinct¹ field of study, which would later be called as "masculinity studies"². This field emerged as a result of the endeavour to make criticisms of patriarchal and hegemonic forms of men and masculinities, contributing and supporting the critical struggles such as queer, post-modern, post-colonial and anti-capitalist, and above all feminist theories and movements. Understanding men and masculinities, provide a more holistic understanding of the capitalist patriarchal gender order, which are the primary agents. Masculinity studies have been developed by the contribution of the theories and studies of scholars such as Raewyn Connell (1987; 2000; 2005), Jeff Hearn (1987; 1992; 2004; 2008), Michael Kimmell (1987; 1994; 1998), and Michael Messner (1997; 2001).

Making criticisms of masculinities would present both how the masculinities are constructed and how they become the oppressive actors of patriarchal society and how they experience it. Critically understanding men and masculinities would provide the grounds for the change of men, masculinity and patriarchy. Since its beginning, masculinity studies considered men and masculinities as social, historical and cultural constructions, rather than

¹ As Gutmann (1997, p. 385) and Hearn (2004, pp. 49-50) point, previously much of the literature in social sciences, from social and cultural anthropology to history, economics and sociology, had been largely about men speaking in the name of the entire society.

² Or how Hearn calls this (pro)feminist and (pro)queer field "critical studies on men" (2004).

essential, timeless, stable, undifferentiated and unchangeable entities. Therefore, rather than regarding men and masculinities like a uniform and monolithic bloc, masculinity studies investigated them like a sutured identity whose cement is patriarchy.

Amongst the theories, Connell's theory, which is widely known for its key concepts "hegemonic masculinity" and "masculinities", became the trademark of the field (1987; 2005). Beginning from the mid 1980's, Connell presented that masculinity is a differentiating and changing identity. Investigating the construction of masculinity, she presented a quadripartite structural model³, focusing on the men's differentiation of access to patriarchal power. However, her explanatory theory predominantly focuses on the dynamics of the masculinities of the developed and industrialized societies, leaving limited space to the regional and local masculinities. Here, in this thesis critically considering Connell's theory, it is proposed that the regional and local masculinities are contextually constructed.

The theoretical emphasis of this thesis is that the men and the masculinities are constructs of particular social, cultural, historical and economic conditions, which are the outcomes of the capitalist patriarchal gender order. There is a mutual relationship between masculinities and capitalist patriarchy: as well as being produced by capitalist patriarchy, masculinities constantly reproduce it. In this vein, investigating only the structural determinants which construct male domination is insufficient to understand how the masculinities are constructed. The impacts of the capitalist patriarchal conditions in particular historical and social contexts construct different masculinities in local levels. Therefore, in order to understand the

³ This model consists of structures of "labour/production", "power", "cathexis" and lately added "symbolisation" (1987; 2002; 2005).

social construction of masculinities, the impact of these contexts must also be investigated. This thesis investigates the construction of masculinities in the context of Trabzon in the last two decades, moulded with conservatism, nationalism and patriarchy.

Trabzon is a city that is located in the Eastern Black Sea coast of Turkey, known for its people who act to be quite patriarchal and quite conservative. This city is the *de facto* centre of the region⁴, despite the high rates of unemployment, and lack of job opportunities. The city had inhabited many ethnic groups such as the Lazs, Pontus Greeks, Armenians as well as the Turkish people. Especially in the last three decades, Trabzon became a national (and even international) hot issue, with a number of social and historical incidents, in which the men and the *masculinities* in the city have been the primary agents. Firstly, in relation to its strong nationalist, Islamist and conservative background, Trabzon has been the hotbed of rightist uprisings, such as the lynchings in 2005 against TAYAD members, being the hometown of the murderers of Hrant Dink, the Priest Santoro murder. Secondly, after the dissolution of USSR and the Eastern Block and the opening of Georgia – Turkey Border in 1988, Trabzon has been one of the centres of sex trade with Natashas. This ongoing sex trade involved oppression, subordination and exploitation of the local women from Trabzon as well as the migrant prostitutes in the city. Thirdly, Trabzon is the city of Trabzonspor, which is the first Süper Lig champion coming from a city outside of Istanbul, repeating that success six times between 1975 and 1984. Since then, Trabzon became synonymous with Trabzonspor that is one of the major sources of (micronationalist) pride, and whose

⁴ For more than a decade, Trabzon endeavours to be considered as a metropolitan city. See <http://bianet.org/bianet/ekonomi/9654-buyuksehir-yolunda-ilk-adim>, retrieved, 18th March 2012.

grandstands reflect the rightist spirit in the city, such as the massively worn white beret of Hrant Dink's murderer Ogün Samast. On the other hand, despite Halil İbrahim Dinçdağ, the first open gay football referee of Turkey, was originated from this city, Trabzon is a city in which the queer people experience severe subordination and oppression, being forced to a total invisibility.

All these historical incidents contributed the consolidation of the rightist and patriarchal imagery of the city. From the sex trade with Natashas, to the football fanaticism of Trabzon, and from the prevalent oppression and subordination of women and the queer people, the primary agents have been the men and the masculinities in the city, who like to narrate themselves as idiosyncratic actors, emphasising clichéd character qualities such as “feverish”, “aggressive”, “manly”, “tough”, “irrational”, “sexually-demanding”, “easy-going”, “brave”, “religious” and “nationalist”. These common narratives present the existence of a patriarchal and public masculinity, which was a product of the historical conditions (of particularly the last two decades), which participated in lynchings and rightist uprisings, which was feverish, violent and irrational to start a fight anytime against any issue, which presented a male bravado, which massively supported and became fanatics of the football club Trabzonspor, which was quite nationalistic and conservative, and which oppressed and subordinated the women in the private and the public spheres.

This thesis investigates the construction of masculinities in Trabzon, based on the findings of the qualitative field research in the city, conducted between August 2010 and October 2012. The field research was conducted in the central district of Trabzon, by making face to face interviews with forty three interviews, of which twenty eight of them were in depth interviews, with adult men from the city, who call themselves “Trabzon erkekleri”

(Trabzon men). The sample of the research consists of men from various classes and occupations. Amongst the respondents, there were teachers, businessmen, a minibus driver, Imams, retired men, a waiter, a fisherman, lawyers, shopkeepers, workers, and unemployed men. Majority of these respondents were found randomly, by meeting them, and asking if I could make an interview on “Trabzon erkekligi” (Trabzon masculinity). I asked questions to them on a wide range of issues from their perception of masculinity, to their relations with their spouses and their children, and from Trabzonspor to the Natashas. The field research was ended when the responses began to repeat and reach a saturation, presenting an overall pattern on the construction of masculinities in Trabzon. Considering the dynamics of the city, In order to investigate the masculinities in Trabzon, I have focused on the family lives, emotional and sexual lives, and rightism and football fanaticism, the three trajectories that construct them.

I adopted feminist methodology in this thesis. This methodology aims to critically investigate the patriarchal relations of oppression and subordination of women and the queer people. However, unlike a conventional feminist research, in which both the researcher and the participants are the women and which typically requires the establishment of empathy between the researcher and the participant(s) and which aims to establish mutual consciousness rising and empowerment, since both of the sides in this research were men, the primary aim was understanding towards making a criticism of patriarchal masculinities in Trabzon. Therefore, in the field research I listened to the words of masculinities in Trabzon, keeping in mind that those were performative narratives through which they constructed themselves.

This thesis is composed of seven chapters. In the second chapter of the thesis, I am going to discuss the theories on men and masculinities. I am

going to begin with how the masculinity studies emerged. In that part, I shall focus on the impact of feminism on men, masculinities and the studies on those issues. I shall present that feminism has been quite influential in the development of the field. Afterwards, I am going to discuss the (pro)feminist studies in masculinity studies literature. Initially, I am going to consider the studies on men and masculinities in the world and then in Turkey. In the following sections, I shall discuss Connell's theory: firstly I am going to introduce this theory, after that I shall discuss the major challenges to this theory and lastly I am going to present an assessment of her theory. In the last section of this chapter, I am going to introduce the three trajectories on studying men and masculinities in Trabzon: (1) *cathexis*, in other words emotional and sexual lives, (2) *the families and domestic lives*, and (3) *rightism and football fanaticism*.

The third chapter of this thesis focuses on background and methodology of this study. In the first section of this chapter, I am going to introduce Trabzon. I shall present the significance of studying Trabzon. Afterwards, I am going to consider the three breakpoints in the close history of the city, the economic collapse and unemployment, the rise of conservatism, nationalism and Islamism and then the opening of the Georgia-Turkey border. In the second section of this chapter, I am going to discuss the methodology of this thesis. Firstly, I shall consider feminist methodology and its possibilities for studying men and masculinities. Afterwards, I shall present the story of this study and the field research. During the interviews, although the respondents spoke lengthily on performative narratives of masculinities, they initially presented politically correct and cliché answers to questions on gender equality and masculinities. The last section of this chapter considers these politically correct narratives.

In the following three chapters I present and discuss the findings of the field research. In chapter four, I investigate the cathectic organization of the masculinities in Trabzon. The masculinities in Trabzon construct themselves through a number of cliché character qualities. I begin the chapter by examining those qualities. In the next section, I consider the emotional lives and the interpersonal relations of masculinities: The masculinities Trabzon describe themselves as emotional actors, emphasising a number of manly emotions that support the patriarchal masculinities; on the other hand, the men largely experience homosocial relations in which they reproduce the patriarchal traits of their masculinities. In the following section, I investigate the sexualities of the masculinities in Trabzon that are experienced as a double burden on women, considering their relationships with Natashas and their spouses, the local women from Trabzon. And in the last section of this chapter, I investigate the exclusion and oppression of the queer people, which is an issue that creates a homophobic environment in Trabzon.

In the next chapter, chapter five, I investigate the families and the domestic lives of masculinities in Trabzon. Almost all the respondents emphasised that the family was their most valuable thing. This chapter initially considers this central position of family in the city, and its impacts on men and masculinities. At the same time, the masculinities consider the family as the source of their power, authority and superior position in the society. The next two sections of this chapter I discuss the patriarchal relations in family focusing on the gendered division of labour and then the decision making and fatherhood. The centrality of male dominated family and fatherhood contribute the construction of a masculinity supported by the traditional and conservative values.

In chapter six, I investigate the impact of rightist politics and football fanaticism on the construction of masculinities in Trabzon. The city came forward in the last decades with its rightist qualities. Those qualities create traditionally laden and conservative masculinities that are apt to participate the rightist uprisings in the city. The section two of this chapter investigates that. On the other hand, Trabzon is a city known for its devoted fanaticism of Trabzonspor. The actors of Trabzonspor fanaticism, who predominantly use rightist slogans and symbols, are the masculinities in the city. The following section of this chapter considers the relations between football fanaticism, rightist politics and masculinities in Trabzon. This thesis ends with the concluding chapter.

CHAPTER 2

THEORETICAL DISCUSSION AND LITERATURE REVIEW

ON

STUDYING MEN AND MASCULINITIES

2.1 INTRODUCTION

The term “masculinity studies” denotes feminist and profeminist studies on men and masculinities. Studying patriarchal relations by focusing on men and masculinities is a relatively new field of inquiry in social sciences. Despite its significance for critically understanding the construction of patriarchal social order by its primary agents, investigating men and masculinities had long been ignored. Since much of previous social scientific inquiry merely concentrated on the study of men by generalizing them to all of the society or investigated gender mainly focusing on women (and later queer people) in gender studies, not more than a few studies investigated men and masculinities before the late 1970’s (Carrigan, Connell and Lee, 1985). From second half of the 1980’s, “masculinity studies”, the feminist and profeminist studies on men and masculinities, began to be established and developed as an interdisciplinary field. However, the emergence of masculinity studies had not been unproblematic.

Men's initial responses to the rise of second wave feminism in the 1960's and 1970's had not been totally positive or supportive in the Western world, especially in Britain and the US, where the second wave feminism had emerged. Majority of men and masculinities, tended to be reactive to the women's struggle of emancipation (Clatterbaugh, 1990; Messner, 1997). Feminism had raised women's claims that challenged and inevitably conflicted with the primary agents of patriarchy and began to shake men's privileged lives. However, in the radical spirit of that period, a number of more sensitive men from the academia and the social movements began to question men's position in capitalist patriarchal¹ gender order. The studies on masculinities developed as a consequence of these challenging relations between men, feminism and social sciences in general (Ashe, 2007; Bozok, 2009b; Clatterbaugh, 1990; Digby, 1998; Gardiner (ed.), 2002a; Gardiner, 2005; Messner, 1997; Murphy (ed.), 2004).

In the last three decades, masculinity studies developed as an interdisciplinary field with detailed studies and theories that critically investigate men and masculinities as primary agents of men's dominance. In masculinity studies, men and masculinities are problematized as socially constructed gender categories. For this reason, in order to understand men and masculinities, it is generally assumed that the studies on this field must explore how different social relations construct these phenomena in different contexts across time and space. An investigation of the different dynamics that construct masculinities is going to expand our knowledge on

¹ I am using the concept "capitalist patriarchy" following socialist feminist ideas, emphasising the mutual dependence and dialectical relationship between class-based capitalist oppression and the gender-based patriarchal oppression. As Eisenstein emphasises, this relationship is based on the interrelatedness of capitalist class structure and male supremacy (1990, p. 114). Here I am going to employ a broader conceptualization of the interrelatedness of these structures, covering the realms of family, the street, the sexuality, the private, the public, the reproduction, the production, the state and the ideology.

patriarchal gender relations, presenting how those relations are constructed by its primary agents.

In this chapter, I am going to present a theoretical discussion on studying men and masculinities. To begin with, I am going to consider the relation between the debates on men, masculinities and feminist theory. After that, I am going to discuss the (pro)feminist theories on men and masculinities, especially focusing on Connell's theory on masculinities.

2.2 MEN, MASCULINITY AND FEMINIST THEORY

The social science practice, until the rise of second wave feminism in the 1960's, has been quite uncritical to the patriarchal character of gender relations. Because of gender blindness and misogyny, the oppression and subordination of women had been neglected. This changed with the development of feminism. Feminist theory gained a significant success in critically understanding the patriarchal gender relations that oppress and subordinate women, especially from the second half of the twentieth century (Tong, 2009). Since feminism essentially emerged and established itself as a social movement that aimed to overcome the oppression and subordination of women, it always had organic relations with political activism. Therefore, feminism unites the agendas of women's movement and scientific theory and methodology (Abbott, Wallace and Tyler, 2005). In this course, feminism developed by feeding from the necessities of actual actors who experience and struggle for their own social problems as well as merely theoretical dynamics of social scientists. The strength of feminism increased via this organic relationship.

Beginning from the second half of the twentieth century, feminist theory enriched the social science inquiry in gender relations, with the strengthening of the second wave approaches such as liberal, radical, Marxist, socialist and psychoanalytic feminisms, and afterwards, third wave approaches such as postmodern and poststructuralist feminisms (Donovan, 2001; Tong, 2009). They emphasized the significance of previously much under-investigated issues, especially “personal” and “subjective” knowledge of women (Harding, 2004; Smith, 2004), sexuality (MacKinnon, 1993), performativity (Butler, 1999), and embodiment (Bartky, 1993). In order to reach gender equality and to liberate women and in order to reconstruct scientific theory from women’s side, these feminist schools developed their original problematics. Feminism became the most encompassing and most detailed critical theory on patriarchal gender relations. The agendas of feminism, as a scientific theory and a social movement, principally aimed the emancipation of women. Therefore feminism primarily focused on studying women’s problems in problematizing gender relations rather than focusing on men and masculinities (Hearn and Collinson, 1994, p. 102).

In the same period, the strengthening of second wave feminism had shaken men and men’s position in society in the West, especially beginning from the 1960’s. Feminism not only interrogated gender, but also struggled to transform the gender order. This struggle for women’s emancipation and empowerment threatened the superior position of men in the society. Therefore, initial responses of men in the face of feminism have been reactionary, rather than supportive. Many of these reactions have been antifeminist and misogynist, while a few were critical toward patriarchy but uncritical toward women’s subordination, while some of them raised the

rights of queer² people, and while some of them critical to women's oppression and subordination and criticised patriarchal men and masculinities. Approaches and politics on men and masculinities emerged from these different responses.

There are a number of significant assessments about politics, theories and studies on men and masculinities, which consider the field by focusing on different aspects, such as those presented by Carrigan, Connell and Lee (1985), Clatterbaugh (1990), Guttman (1997), Messner (1997), Ashe (2007), Whitehead (2007), in chronological order. Three commonly referred studies that give a more all-inclusive impression of approaches on men and masculinities are especially notable.

The first one of these studies is the pioneering article of Carrigan, Connell and Lee (1985), titled "Towards a New Sociology of Masculinity". This article is quite significant, since it constitutes a break between previous studies on men and the newly forming masculinity studies. This article manifests the establishment of the field by initially presenting some of the essential concepts like "hegemonic masculinity"³ and "masculinities"⁴.

The second study is Clatterbaugh's (1990) early study on the approaches on the then newly forming studies on masculinity. In Clatterbaugh's study, there are six-perspectives in the field, which are (1) "the conservative

² I am using queer in its widest sense, encompassing all non-heteronormative gender categories.

³ The concept "hegemonic masculinity" denotes a type of masculinity that embodies the most suitable elements that enable to establish hegemony over women and the various subordinated masculinities, in a gender order (see Carrigan, Connell and Lee, 1985; Connell, 1987; 2000; 2005).

⁴ The concept "masculinities" denotes the plurality of different constructions of masculinity. In Connell's theory, this differentiation arises from the different masculinities' varying accesses to the patriarchal power (see Connell, 1987; 2000; 2005).

perspective” whose antifeminist supporters argue that men’s traditional gender roles must not be changed, either with a biological or a moral justification; (2) “men’s rights perspective” which aim to struggle to recover the men’s losses (the “rights”), like legislative rights on divorce against the gains of feminism; (3) “the spiritual perspective”, also known as “mythopoetic men’s movement”, which supports that men should go back to the nature of masculinity, emancipating themselves from the mental slavery of women; (4) “the socialist feminist perspective” that emphasises that men should get rid of the alienation of capitalist patriarchy; (5) “the group specific perspective” that centres around a variety of particular experiences, demands and dynamics of different men like, homosexuals, Latino or Jewish men; and (6) “the profeminist perspective”, the men who criticise patriarchy and aim to develop a critique of masculinity (Clatterbaugh, 1990).

The third study I am going to discuss here is Messner’s (1997) study on the masculinity politics. Messner focuses on men’s movements in the US, and categorizes those under four primary groups. These are (1) *the essentialist retreats*, the mythopoeic men’s movement and the Christian Promise Keepers, (2) *the men’s liberation and men’s rights movements*, (3) *the profeminist men’s engagements* as the socialist and radical feminist men, (4) *sexual and racial identity politics*, the gay male liberation and racialized masculinity politics.

Here, I am offering to consider major approaches on masculinity under four groups, according to their different responses to patriarchy. The positions of these approaches in face of patriarchy shape their evaluations on men and masculinities. These approaches either approve and make an appraisal of patriarchal masculinities, or criticise harmful effects of patriarchy merely focusing on men, or rather make a critique of men and masculinities as the dominant actors of patriarchal relations, or concentrate on queer

masculinities in patriarchal relations. From these standpoints, emerge four approaches on masculinities, that are (1) the *masculinist* perspectives, (2) the *men's liberation* approach, (3) the *queer* masculinity approaches and (4) the *(pro)feminist* approaches.

The first approach *masculinism* encompasses all the male-biased, patriarchal, antifeminist and antiqueer approaches justified either scientifically⁵ or morally such as monotheist religious ideas or mythopoeic⁶ approaches⁷. This approach is currently advocated by authors such as Farrell (1975; 1990; 2001), and his followers who aim to challenge feminist theory by trying to form a “men's studies”. Contrary to (pro)feminist “masculinity studies”, the field of “men's studies” is patriarchal, antifeminist, antiqueer and male biased and positions itself as the adversary of feminist studies. As Whitehead points, the antifeminist field of “men's studies” has not been a successful scientific attempt as “masculinity studies” (2007, p. 55). The second approach, *men's liberation* criticises the harmful effects of patriarchy on men and aims to liberate men. However, it remains indifferent to feminism, and the oppression and subordination of women and queer people by men. This perspective is advocated by popular authors like Goldberg (1996). Third approach *queer* masculinity emphasises the queer quality of gender and call attention to sexual differences. In close contact with queer theory, the theorists on queer masculinity, such as Weeks (2005; 2007), criticised the heteronormativity and struggled for queer men's rights. Finally, the *(pro)feminist* approaches, which this thesis is based on, present and construct themselves as the allies of feminism. The

⁵Such as sex-role approach of Parsons (Whitehead, 2007, pp. 18-19) or sociobiology of Wilson (Whitehead, 2007, pp. 11, 43).

⁶ For example, see Bly, 2004.

⁷ For a broader discussion on masculinism, see Brittan, 1989; Blais and Dupuis-Déri, 2012.

(pro)feminist scholars, who developed the field of masculinity studies, aim to broaden the range of feminist studies by making criticisms of patriarchal masculinities.

The (pro)feminist approaches consider men and masculinities as the primary agents of patriarchy. Hence, they critically investigate issues such as how the men actively construct patriarchal relations, how men become patriarchal actors, how they make their subjectivities as patriarchal men, and how they experience patriarchal masculinities. The (pro)feminist scholars established the interdisciplinary field “masculinity studies” beginning from the 1980’s. This approach opened a new field for the critical inquiry of men and masculinities and broadened the scope of the investigations of patriarchy.

As distinguished (pro)feminist scholars such as Connell (1987; 2000; 2005), Hearn (1997; 2004; 2008), Kimmell (1998), Mac an Ghail (1997) and Morgan (1992) emphasise, the theoretical significance of masculinity studies comes from that potential of underinvestigated criticisms of men and masculinities, rather than competing with feminist studies. Learning and taking heart from the experiences of feminist studies, the (pro)feminist scholars in masculinity studies formed its research agendas and critically investigated how men construct patriarchal relations, as actions of men, ideology of masculinity, construction of male identities, subjective experiences of manhood, the emotions of manhood and the practices of masculinity. In a manner based on feminist practices the (pro)feminist men self-reflexively criticise themselves as well as the other men. As Hearn and Morgan manifest, “men’s critique of men, ourselves is to be developed in the light of feminism. This critique needs to be anti-sexist, anti-patriarchal, pro-feminist, and gay affirmative” (1990, p. 204). These ideas have been the grounds of masculinity studies.

On the other hand, developing the debates on men and masculinities, Connell and her colleagues presented that masculinities are social constructs. They are outcomes of historical, social and cultural relations. Following these arguments in masculinity studies, is going to investigate the social construction of Trabzon grounding on (pro)feminist approaches. In the following section, I am going to discuss major (pro)feminist theories on men and masculinity.

2.3 THEORIZING MEN AND MASCULINITIES FROM A (PRO)FEMINIST PERSPECTIVE

2.3.1 The Studies on Men And Masculinities In The World

The (pro)feminist studies began to develop in the western academia as a result of the need to criticise the patriarchal men and masculinities, from the 1980's. Grounding on the developments of feminist theories, the field of masculinity studies formed its own problematics and theories and with the establishment of the field, many comprehensive studies have been published on men and masculinities⁸. Since its beginning, this field bears a historically, socially and culturally particularistic character. Connell's pluralistic, differentiable and (so that) changeable notion of "masculinities", the dominant paradigm of the field, reflects this (1987; 2005). In this field, masculinities are largely accepted as the outcomes of particular social, cultural and historical circumstances. They present significant differences across time, space and cultures. Throughout the development of this field,

⁸ see the "Men's Bibliography" available at the web site XY Online <http://mensbiblio.xyonline.net>, retrieved 26th February 2012.

the studies and theoretical approaches reflect the constructive aspects of men and masculinities especially in the western societies.

The issues which the masculinity studies centre upon, are investigated by focusing on issues such as emotions and men's sexualities (Seidler, 2006b), men's friendships (Walker, 2004) homophobia and transphobia (Kimmel, 1994), sports (Parker, 1997), men's socialization (Gilmore, 1990), fathering (Tolson, 2006), violence (Hearn, 2006), representations of men (Hatty, 2006), private and public masculinities (Hearn, 1992), men's power (Kaufman, 1994) and men's hegemony (Hearn, 2004; Connell, 1987; 2005). The issues mentioned above⁹ are considered as the constructive elements of masculinities, men's dominance and men's hegemony. In order to understand and undermine men and masculinities, the constructive elements of masculinities, which differentiate due to the social conditions must be criticised.

2.3.2 The Studies on Men and Masculinities in Turkey

Grounding on from the rising impact of feminism on daily life and the academia similar to the West, the debates on patriarchal masculinities began in Turkey in the 1980's. However, the development and the increase of the studies on masculinity took place not before the second half of the 1990's. As well as the original studies on masculinities in this country, there have been translations of major studies, theses and the popular science books on masculinity. Although the studies on men and masculinities began to present a significant progress with the 2000's, we can neither speak

⁹ I am going to discuss these directions below in detail.

about a field of masculinity studies, nor an elaborated original theory on masculinities in Turkey yet.

The initial studies on masculinity in Turkey might be dated back to Kadiyoti's studies (1988; 1996) in the late 1980's. Although she was not studying masculinity *per se*, in her article "Bargaining with Patriarchy", Kadiyoti brought an explanation on masculinities in Turkey and the dynamics of patriarchy by focusing on women's relations with their adult sons. However, we may clearly maintain that until the second half of the 1990's, this field has been pretty empty, dominated by popular science books, such as the books of Atabek (2002), Goldberg (1994) and Gratch (2002). In 1998, the translation of Connell's *Gender and Power*, one of the groundbreaking studies in masculinity studies literature was published in Turkish (see Connell, 1998b). The publication of this masterpiece consolidated the ground for development of theories and empirical researches on men and masculinities in Turkey.

From the early 1990's, theses were written, studies were published and original studies on men and masculinities began to emerge in Turkey. The main issues investigated in these studies include issues such as representations of masculinity in media (Demez, 2004; 2005; Kılıçbay, 1999; Umut, 2007), TV and cinema (Arslan, 2005), queer masculinities (Ural, 2010), male honour (Sungur, 2011), men's sexualities (Özbay, 2005), men's emotional lives (Sarı, 2004), masculine desire (Demren, 2007), men's socialization (Bozok, 2005), men's sports (Hacısoftaoğlu Közleme, 2012), men's spaces (Kızıllan, 2009), representations of masculinities in Turkish politics (S. Akyüz, 2012; Bilgin, 2004), masculinities in Turkish modernity (Sancar, 2012) and men's responses to feminism (Akis, 2007) have been studied in these theses.

In this vein, especially with the second half of the first decade of the 2000's, the social consciousness and interest on masculinities began to increase. During this process, the prestigious social science journal *Toplum ve Bilim* (2004) published a special issue on masculinities, and *Cogito* published an issue on feminism (2009) and another issue on queer theory (2011), expanding and developing the debates. The studies that investigate masculinities in Turkey, particularly considering the social and cultural conditions of this country began to be published. In the last years, significant studies such as those written by Saraçgil's study on masculinities in Turkish literature (2005), Selek's invaluable research on masculinities and compulsory military service (2008), Ergun's study on the interactions between Turkish politics and masculinities in Turkish novels (2009), Sancar's detailed study on masculinities in Ankara (2009), Akgül's study on militarism and masculinities (2011), Atay's article collection on masculinities in popular culture (2012) and edited volumes such as those by Mutluer (2008), Güner and Varol (2010) and İ. Erdoğan (2011) were published. Considering masculinities in the social conditions of Turkey is the most prominent character of these studies. The ground, which the studies on masculinities are primarily developed on, and which this thesis is going to be based on are the (pro)feminist theories on men and masculinities. This thesis is going to expand the (pro)feminist debates on the construction of the masculinities in Trabzon, in Eastern Black Sea Region, and in Turkey, and to an extent in the underdeveloped settings of the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East.

2.3.3 (Pro)feminist Debates on Men and Masculinities: Connell and Others

The (pro)feminist approaches critically consider men's position in patriarchal relations. Since the beginning, masculinity studies predominantly have a social constructionist character. In this field, masculinities are conceived as socially constructed phenomena. Kahn emphasises that these constructionist approaches address patriarchal power, while rejecting the essentialist understandings of gender roles (2009, p. 232). He argues that, in the constructionist approaches, the general assumption is that "through our own experiences we essentially *construct*¹⁰ realities in which we live. To understand where masculinity "comes from" in this perspective, we must study the processes in which the humans engage to define, explain, and then react to what masculinity is assumed to be" (p. 151). In a similar manner, Hearn stresses that

"Masculinities do not exist in socio-cultural vacuums but are constructed within specific institutional settings. They vary and change across time (history) and space (culture), within societies and through life courses and biographies." (2007, p. 391)

Therefore, the researchers in the masculinity studies focused on the social relations, social contexts, social institutions and spaces in problematizing masculinities, such as emotions, family, (reel) politics, sexuality, sports, economic relations and representations. Those are the grounds which masculinities and accordingly patriarchal relations are constructed. In a similar manner, masculinity studies bear a historically, socially and culturally particularistic character, because primary aim of the field is to present that current masculinities are differentiable and therefore

¹⁰My emphasis.

changeable entities. The (pro)feminist approaches and the empirical research on men and masculinities have been developed on these bases¹¹.

On the other hand, in his review article "Trafficking in Men: The Anthropology of Masculinity", Gutmann stresses that, "there are at least four distinct ways which anthropologists define and use the concept of masculinity" (1997, pp. 385). He adds that the applications of the concept might be categorized under four meanings, "male identity", "manhood", "manliness", and "men's roles", which form different directions of research in social anthropology (1997, pp. 385-387). These four directions and categories, which Gutmann points, are for making a categorization on the previous research than presenting a new theory. Hence, we may state that Gutmann's emphases are based on the operationalization of the concept "masculinity". They can be traced in many studies on men and masculinities. The (pro)feminist studies on men and masculinities developed mainly in terms of these four pathways.

On the other hand, in the debates on masculinity, the existence of patriarchal roles and norms that construct and shape masculinity are often emphasised. In the constructionist approach, men and masculinities are placed within a network of norms and roles. These norms and roles mould masculinity in historical, cultural, social, psychological and psychoanalytical terms. For instance, Doyle points that in historical perspective, we can speak about male gender roles in the west such as "the epic male", "the spiritual male", "the chivalric male", "the renaissance male", "the bourgeois male", and more currently "the breadwinner male" (1995, pp. 24-42). There are many other categorizations on patriarchal imperatives of masculinities.

¹¹ Many of the often-quoted edited volumes in masculinity studies such as those by Brod and Kaufman (1994), Whitehead and Barrett (2001), Kimmel and Messner (2004), Kimmel, Hearn and Connell (2005), Whitehead (2006) reflect that tendency.

One of the significant and often cited examples on the imperatives of masculinities is presented by Brannon in the late 1970's (Badinter, 1995; Doyle, 1995). As cited in Badinter, Brannon proposes four imperatives of patriarchal masculinities (1995, p. 130). Badinter outlines and explains them as follows:

“First and foremost is: *no sissy stuff*¹² (nothing effeminate). Even though we now know that men have the same emotional needs as women, the stereotyped male role requires that a man make certain sacrifices and mutilate part of his humanity. Since a man –a real man- is one who is pure of all femininity, he is being asked to abandon a part of himself.

Next, the real male is *a big wheel* (a bigshot, an important person). He must be superior to others. Masculinity is measured by success, power and admiration he wins.

The third imperative –that he must be *a sturdy oak*- means that he must be independent and rely on himself alone. This one has been superbly illustrated by Kipling's famous poem *If*- which sings the praises of male impassivity: a man must never show emotion or attachment, signs of female weakness.

The last imperative –*Give 'em hell*- insists on a man's obligation to be stronger than others, even violent, if necessary. He must put on a display of boldness, even aggressivity, and show that he is ready to run all the risks, even when reason and fear would suggest that he should not.” (ibid.)

Those imperatives present moral codes for masculinity, which the men are expected to comply with and construct their lives accordingly. Badinter precisely points that “the man who obeys these four imperatives is the supermale who for a long time has been the idol of the crowds.” (ibid.). Brannon's model reflects the individual yet all-powerful patriarchal man of Western societies.

¹²Original emphases.

Another cluster of norms of masculinity, whose qualities recall the masculinities in Trabzon, was proposed by Gilmore. In his famous cross-cultural study *Manhood in the Making*, deriving his data from numerous anthropological studies on masculinity, Gilmore points that there are four moral imperatives of masculinity in the societies around the Mediterranean Sea (1990). These imperatives are (1) impregnating one's wife, (2) provisioning dependants, (3) protecting family and (4) personal autonomy (pp. 48-49). He continues as follows: "These criteria demand assertiveness and resolve. All must be performed relentlessly in the loyal service of the "collective identities" of the self." (p. 48). Those moral obligations construct the qualities of the masculinities of the region. Contrary to the all-powerful individual man of the west, the men of the developing circum-Mediterranean¹³ contexts have closer relations with their families and the other people. Gilmore's emphasis is especially significant since he places the individual men as a part of the relational and collective whole. We see more elaborated theoretical discussions of similar issues put forward by Brannon (as cited in Badinter 1995), Gilmore (1990) and Gutmann (1997), in masculinity studies.

In the short history of masculinity studies, since the early 1980's, there have not been many theories developed. Moreover, (if we exclude the traces of antifeminist and non-feminist theories like functionalism of Parsons, Freudian and Jungian psychoanalysis or Watson's sociobiology) we can state that, there have not been many (pro)feminist theories on men and masculinity rather there have been theoretical debates and approaches

¹³ Gilmore's cross-cultural study considers a wide region covering lands from Andalusia, Crete, Sicily, Balkans, and Turkey as "circum-Mediterranean". That is a problematic definition because of the great variation of cultures existing in that area. However, excluding the "circum-Mediterranean", this analysis is quite explanatory in the context of contemporary Eastern Black Sea Region.

(Badinter, 1995; Carrigan, Connell and Lee, 1985; Connell and Messerschmidt, 2005; Clatterbaugh, 1990; Doyle, 1995; Whitehead, 2007). Masculinity studies aims to understand men's position in the overall capitalist patriarchal gender order as well as how they contribute to reproduce it and how the men construct themselves as patriarchal actors. Therefore, we have to emphasise that, the theoretical originality of masculinity studies comes from focusing on this interrelatedness of structure and the agents, rather than sticking to either of them. In the last three decades of the masculinity studies, Connell's theory, usually known with its two central concepts as "hegemonic masculinity" and/or "masculinities" has been the dominant paradigm. Many of the other debates and approaches have merely been contributions or responses to the Connell's influential ideas.

Amongst the other debates, Hearn's argument on using "hegemony of men" instead of "hegemonic masculinity" in masculinity studies (Hearn, 2004), Kimmel's debate on the relation between homophobia and masculinities (Kimmel, 1994), Messner's Wetherell and Edley's psycho-discursive approach (Edley and Wetherell, 1997; 2001; Wetherell and Edley, 1999), Bourdieu's "masculine domination" (Bourdieu, 1995) and his successor Coles' idea of "mosaic masculinities" (Coles, 2007; 2008) became influential as well as Connell's theory. These approaches and numerous detailed empirical researches have contributed masculinity studies. These studies brought new insights to this field. Since none of them –with the exception of Hearn's studies to a certain extent- places masculinity in the wider network of patriarchal relations and/or provides a comprehensive understanding of men and masculinities, they have not been as influential as Connell's oeuvre. Moreover, Connell brings explanations to how men construct masculinities and how men's hegemony is constantly reproduced

over women, and the queer and the so-called less-manly men. Below, I am going to discuss Connell's theory on masculinities.

2.3.4 Connell's Theory On Masculinities

Australian sociologist Connell presents an all-inclusive theory on masculinities. Connell developed her theory from 1980's to the 2000's. Hearn points, Connell presented her approach on men and masculinities initially in 1983 (2004, p. 56). Major cornerstones of Connell's formulation of her theory are her article with Carrigan and Lee "Towards a New Sociology of Masculinity" (Carrigan, Connell and Lee, 1985), that manifested the beginning of masculinity studies, Connell's two famous studies *Gender and Power: Society, the Person and Sexual Politics* (1987) and *Masculinities* (2005[1995]). Later, with Messerschmidt, Connell reformulated her theory replying the major challenges in "Hegemonic Masculinity: Rethinking the Concept." (Connell and Messerschmidt, 2005). It is influenced from a wide range of sources from feminism to psychoanalysis, from Lévi-Strauss to Giddens, and from Piaget to Bourdieu and Chomsky. More significantly, Connell derived her approach on power relations from the works of Gramsci (Connell, 1987).

Connell's theory not only discusses masculinity as a plain gender category, rather it places it within a complex interplay of social, cultural and historical relations that reproduce and benefit from patriarchy. In *Masculinities*, Connell states that "masculinities are configurations of practice structured by gender relations. They are inherently historical and their making and remaking is a political process affecting the balance of interests in society and the direction of social change" (2005, p. 44). Masculinities are men's actions, thought, discourse and embodiment as well as individual and

collective identities. Connell emphasises that masculinities are collective phenomena; they “are defined collectively in culture” (2000, p. 11). The social constructions of masculinities, as well as the functioning of men’s hegemony have got a historical character. Particular historical and cultural conditions construct different masculinities and their strategies for forming men’s hegemony.

Connell states that “gender is a way, which social practice is ordered” (2005, p. 71). In this social area, masculinity and femininity exist relationally. Criticising the previous “essentialist”, “positivist”, “normative” and “semiotic” definitions¹⁴ (2005, pp. 67-71) of the concept “masculinity”, she maintains:

“Rather than attempting to define masculinity as an object (a natural character type, a behavioural average, a norm), we need to focus on the processes and relationships through which men and women conduct gendered lives. “Masculinity”, to the extent the term can be briefly defined at all, is simultaneously a place in gender relations, the practices through which men and women engage that place in gender, and the effects of these practices in bodily experience, personality and culture.” (2005, p. 71)

Emphasising the differences between men, in their access to patriarchal power, and the cultural diversities, Connell developed the pluralistic concept “masculinities”, dismissing with the universalist and essentialist concept “masculinity” (Carrigan, Connell and Lee, 1985; Connell 1987; 2005). Having a (pro)feminist and (pro)queer standpoint, Connell endeavours to present the conditions and possibilities of men’s change through a radical gender equality. She searches for the differences

¹⁴ Connell criticises perspectives like sex role paradigm, orthodox psychoanalysis, “categorical approaches” within feminism, normative approaches and semiotic approaches, as well as the antifeminist ideas of masculinist movements (Carrigan, Connell and Lee, 1985; Connell, 1987; 2005).

between men and their perception and construction of masculinities for a number of reasons. Firstly, Connell emphasises the construction of different strategies of men's dominance, rather than coercion and force, in other words, she seeks for the different men's particularistic strategies for the establishment of men's dominance and men's hegemony. Correspondingly, there is neither a universal patriarchy, nor a single and universal masculinity; but rather there are diverse masculinities. Secondly, starting from the points noted above, she emphasises the differences between different men's access to patriarchal power, differences and diversities between the social constructions of masculinities. Thirdly, following the crisis (to refuse patriarchy) tendencies amongst the men, Connell tries to present the dynamics of why and how *some* men might protest, criticise and undermine patriarchy (and to develop these tendencies).

This theory opens the investigation of diversities between masculinities such as the upper class heterosexual masculinities and working class masculinities, or the homosexual masculinities (Connell, 2005, pp. 76-81), or Jewish masculinities (Brod, 1994) and Muslim masculinities (Ouzgane, 2006). As Hearn and Collinson point, "masculinities may thus be understood as representations of particular locations within one or more social divisions." (1994, p. 109).

These social positions of masculinities are located at both discursive as well as material levels. At the discursive level, masculinities exist in spoken language, narratives, and representations of men. On the other hand, at the material level, masculinities exist amongst the actually living individual men, and men within groups and social relations, such as classes, political organizations, families, friendships and sports teams. Connell's concept "masculinities" involve both of these two levels (and beyond). In other words, nourishing from both the microsociological and the

macrosociological theories, Connell aims to present an encompassing theory that integrates the social construction of masculinities at every possible subjective and structural level. The nature of this theory involves the constant interplay of these diverse levels of theoretical abstraction, rather than sticking on either of them. Hence it provides understanding both how capitalist patriarchal relations construct masculinities and how individual masculinities got affected from the overall capitalist patriarchal relations.

The differences and diversities between men and masculinities in Connell's theory are cultural as well as well as class-based, structural as well as subjective, and historical as well as discursive. This conceptualization of men and masculinity is based on investigating the structural dynamics of the social construction of masculinity. Thus, she searches for the structural dynamics that construct differences and diversities between masculinities, considering masculinity and feminity as a part of "gender order" that presents historical specificities (Connell, 1987, pp. 119-163).

Since she seeks for a more elaborated theory of patriarchal relations (Connell, 1987, pp. 54-64; 2005, p. 76), Connell's primary focus is investigating men's differential access to patriarchal power (and how these processes are constructed by masculinities), rather than directly focusing on theoretical base for cross-cultural analyses of different strategies which different masculinities (of different cultural, social, class and historical locations) construct their hegemony. Although she places considerable emphasis on the significance of these differences and diversities in many writings, she takes contemporary *Western* culture¹⁵ as a given and

¹⁵ For example in *Masculinities* (2005), where she broadly investigates the diversities between different men, Connell focuses on masculinities in Australia.

theorizes the diversities between the masculinities and more significantly, their differential access to already existing male dominance in *western* societies, formulating her distinguished theory on “hegemonic masculinity” (Connell, 2005, p. 77; Hearn, 2007, p. 393). Having been influenced from Gramsci’s conceptualization of “hegemony” and adapting it to gender, Connell uses the concept “hegemonic masculinity”, as an ideal form of masculinity, which is influential on the construction of other masculinities. Hegemonic masculinity establishes its hegemony on other masculinities, which Connell categorizes as “subordinate masculinity”, “complicit masculinity” and “marginal masculinities” (2005, pp. 76-81) and “emphasised femininity” (1987, pp. 183-188). Here, rather than focusing on the differences between men’s access to patriarchal power in a given society and culture as Connell does in *Masculinities*, I am going to broaden Connell’s debate on the construction of masculinities.

In this thesis, following Connell’s approach, men and masculinities are going to be considered as two gender categories, two sides of the same coin, within patriarchal relations. Heterosexual men and masculinities are going to be considered as the primary agents of patriarchy. Hearn and Collinson argue:

“...So how does one relate men to masculinities and vice versa? One powerful way is to see men as existing and persisting in the material bases of society, in relation to social relations of production and reproduction; in comparison masculinities exist and persist as ideology, often in their surface form in terms of elements of production and reproduction. (Hearn, 1987, p. 98). Particular masculinities are not fixed formulas but rather they are combinations of actions and signs, part powerful, part arbitrary, performed in reaction and relation to complex material relations and emotional demands; they signify that this is man.” (1994, p. 104.)

Accordingly, the concept “masculinity” emphasises what men, as individual and collective agents, think and do to construct themselves, to be socially accepted men and this process has got a contingent¹⁶ character. These practices in current gender regime construct patriarchal masculinities. They have both material bases (such as practices, actions, classes, patriarchal power, and embodiment) as well as discursive bases (such as patriarchal discourses, expressions and representations). Masculinities reproduce patriarchy, via discourses and practices. Therefore masculinities are active agents of patriarchy rather than simple gender categories or representations. Following Connell, I am going to use the concept “masculinities”, emphasising the diversities between the construction and experiences of masculinities.

Connell presents a structural model on the construction of masculinities. Her theory considers masculinity as a gender configuration, comprised of four structures (Connell, 1987; 2000; 2005). These structures construct men’s power and men’s identity. Below, I am going to consider Connell’s structural approach on masculinities.

2.3.4.1 Gender Order, Gender Regime and Connell’s Structural Model for Investigating the Construction of Masculinities

Beginning from *Gender and Power* (1987), Connell discusses gender relations in terms of two concepts “gender order” and “gender regimes”. The initial concept “gender order” implies historically particular organization of gender relations, within a particular time and space of an entire society

¹⁶ I am using “contingency” in the way Laclau and Mouffe uses it, emphasising the contextual and continuous formation and construction of the subjects (2008).

(1987, p. 98-99). On the other hand, “gender regime”, in Connell’s theory, implies the historically particular organization of gender relations, in an institutional setting (1987, p. 99). As well as the global gender order at a particular period in history, a particular society has a gender regime, that organizes the gender relations. Although Connell does not emphasise explicitly, she speaks about the contemporary capitalist patriarchy¹⁷. The patriarchal power relations in contemporary global capitalism form the current gender regime. On the other hand the primary institutions which Connell emphasises that the gender regimes shape are “the family”, “the state” and “the street” (Connell, 1987, pp. 119-142). Gender regimes influence both the private and the public spheres. These gender regimes reflect constitutive structures that mould them. Connell considers gender as a “structuring social practice” (2005, p. 73, 75), constituted via structures, that are inherent in every gender relation, including masculinities and feminities, as well as heterosexual men’s hegemony over women and the queer people. We find these organizing principles in the structural model that Connell presents.

Connell presents her structural model for understanding the construction and the organization of the gender relations in *Gender and Power* (1987) and in *Masculinities* (2005, pp. 73-75). Connell emphasises that gender must be considered as consisting of “configuring practices”, challenging the “static” quality of the term “configuration”. (2005, p. 72). In other words, she conceptualizes gender as a continuously constructed phenomenon. In Connell’s theory, all gender relations, embracing masculinities and feminities, are constructed by primarily three structures. In her theory, these

¹⁷ In Connell’s more recent studies, the direction she proposes for masculinity studies is the investigation of gender relations at global capitalism, such as global business masculinities (see Connell, 1998a).

structures¹⁸ are “production/labour”, “power” and “cathexis” and the lately-added structure “symbolisation”¹⁹ (1987; 2000; 2005).

Connell’s first structure *production/labour* implies the gender division of labour and the relations of production that exist in the gender order. In Connell’s approach, in the contemporary societies, the production/labour structure is intrinsically shaped by patriarchal and capitalist relations. Connell states “a capitalist economy working through a gender division of labour is necessarily a gendered accumulation process” (2005, p. 74). The production/labour relations affect the private as well as the public spheres. On the other hand, Connell uses “labour” in *Gender and Power* (1987) and “production” in *Masculinities* (2005) almost synonymously and in a supplementary manner. “Labour” as patriarchal gender division of labour and “production relations” as the men’s control over women’s production point to an identical fact: the control of women’s and queer people’s productive labour by heterosexual men. This might be either the dominance of global capitalism on working class women, or men’s control of women working in the fields. This structure involves exploitation of women’s labour in wage labour, as well as domestic labour (1987, p. 106-107) Connell’s primary aim is emphasising the significance of the impact of the (global capitalist) organization of the relations of production on gender relations, rather than providing an original theory of global capitalism (1987, p. 104). However, she precisely points to the constructive impact of production and/or labour relations on masculinities, as a structural force.

¹⁸ The sequence and of these structures does not have a particular significance in Connell’s theory. Here, I am following the more explanatory sequence in *Gender and Power* (1987).

¹⁹ Connell adds this fourth structure in *The Men and The Boys*, which was initially published in 2000, after keeping a tripartite model from 1985 to 2000.

On the other hand, Connell's second structure *power* implies the broader sphere of patriarchal gender relations of male dominance and men's hegemony. Connell emphasises, this structure points the "overall subordination of women and dominance of men", in other words "patriarchy" (2005, p. 74). Connell's understanding of patriarchal power relations is broad: it embraces coercion, as well as oppression and subordination, showing consent to men's domination as well as violence to women and the queer people. Connell also emphasises the significance of the role of the patriarchal ideology, and the strategies for the establishment of hegemony in power structure (1987, p.110). They affect men's heroism in warfare and political activism as well as the patriarchal ideology on the conservative organization of family. The means of patriarchal power in Connell's theory cover a wide range of feminist theories on patriarchal power relations. Connell argues that in the centre of "core" power structure of gender, there are four components in the advanced capitalist countries:

...(a) the hierarchies and work-forces of institutionalized violence – military and paramilitary forces, police, prison systems; (b) the hierarchy and labour force of heavy industry (for example, steel and oil companies) and the hierarchy of high technology industry (computers, aerospace); (c) the planning and control machinery of the central state; and (d) working-class milieu that emphasise physical toughness and men's association with machinery". (1987, p. 109)

As Connell emphasises, this model for the core gender power structure is for *advanced capitalist* countries, rather than underdeveloped and/or developing countries. From that point, it can be inferred that Connell presumes, in underdeveloped/developing countries, the core elements of patriarchal power structures differentiate as well. This is also evident in Connell's overall emphasis on the differentiation of the social construction of masculinities in diverse social and cultural settings.

The third structure *cathexis*, a concept that Connell borrowed from Freud, implies the relations of sexual and emotional attachment, as “heterosexual and homosexual desire” (2005, p. 74). Connell states that “the practices that shape and realize desire are an aspect of gender order” (p. 74). Cathexis indicates to every emotional and sexual attachment and practices, experienced by the actors. The sexual relationships and emotional attachment to the partners and the friends of the actors shape the cathexis structure. Connell generalizes Freud’s concept “cathexis” which points to “a psychic charge or instinctual energy being attached to a mental object”, to “emotionally charged social relations with “objects” (i.e. other people) in the real world” and considers cathexis as a part of social relations rather than a function of libido (1987, p. 112). At the same time, following Freud, Connell embraces the possible ambivalence, covering the hostile as well as the affectionate character of cathexis. Connell states “the social pattern of desire is a joint system of prohibition and incitement” (1987, p. 112). Sexual prohibitions, as well as the partner choice, homophobia and heterosexual relations of love are considered in cathexis. Broadly, Connell uses cathexis to denote the two-sided sexual and emotional dimension of gendered human interaction.

The fourth, the last and the most recent structure of Connell’s model “symbolism” implies the symbolic dimension of gender relations (2000, p. 26). According to Connell, “The symbolic structures called into play in communication –grammatical and syntactic rules, visual and sound vocabularies etc.- are important sites of gender practice. For instance, we often understand gender differences through symbolic oppositions rather than through images of gradation, and this reinforces belief in gender dichotomy.” (ibid p. 26). Connell emphasises that in the contemporary world, gender relations are presented in a symbolic way, such as media

representations, language, films, TV programs, dress, body culture, mimicry, gesture, make up and so on (ibid. p. 26, 27, 43). However, Connell does not develop the discussion on this fourth structure in her later studies, such as in her review and reformulation article “Hegemonic Masculinity: Rethinking the Concept” (Connell and Messerschmidt, 2005). In *Masculinities*, she considers four types of masculinities. In other words, “hegemonic masculinity”, “subordinate masculinity”, “complicit masculinity” and “marginal masculinity” in their relations to these structures (2005). As well as being constructed by them, masculinities constantly reproduce these structures; and in this way, they re-establish men’s dominance by utilizing these structures.

Connell maintains “gender relations are a major component of social structure as a whole” (2005, p. 76). *Production/labour, power and cathexis (and symbolism)* the structures that shape gender relations, are dialectically interrelated. None of them can operate without the others. She maintains that “none of the three structures can be independent of the others. The structure of cathexis in some respects reflects inequalities of power; the division of labour partly reflects patterns of cathexis, and so on” (1987, p. 116). In other words, Connell points the existence of each structure within the others. The interrelatedness of these four structures forms a composition that constructs gender relations.

On the other hand, as noted above, Connell traces and investigates the gender relations in the gender regime of three institutions, the family, the state and the street, focusing on the historical and social context of Australia, through the three inherently existing structures that construct and mould gender relations (1987, pp. 119-142). This analysis of the three institutions provides a pathway for the further investigation of studies on gender, such as the construction of masculinities stressing that gender

relations shape every institution and every social relation (p. 120), Connell emphasises that she is well aware of the formative impact of gender relations in every sphere (ibid.). On the other hand, she concisely considers the family, the state and the street for understanding the institutionalization of gender, since she claims these institutions present condensed cases²⁰ (ibid.). Since Connell's general point is to present an outline for further research on gender and masculinities, she considers the family, the state and the street. She also emphasises in other societies (than the western cases she considers) both the composition and the contents of these structures might be different (p. 120).

2.3.4.2 Connell's Theory on Masculinities: Primary Challenges and Responses

Connell's theory on gender in general and her theory on masculinities in particular present a significant framework for investigating the social construction of masculinities. The impact of Connell on gender studies primarily owes to her theory on "hegemonic masculinity", for emphasising the differential access of different groups of men to patriarchal power. At

²⁰ For example, the family, in Australia is shaped by patriarchal and conservative ideology (1987, pp. 121-125). It involves a gendered division of labour, in which women work at home for their husbands without being formally paid. They nurture children, cook dishes, do the cleaning and care for the elderly. The women provide the reproduction of their husbands. Moreover, they offer sexual partnership to them. The sexuality within family involves men's dominance, since predominantly it serves for the satisfaction of men, rather than women. The men control the family, by means of already existing patriarchal power. The men's role in this picture is provisioning the dependents, their wives and their children. In other words the patriarchal gender order places men in a breadwinner role, while positioning the women in the cage of home. This control existed with the exception of some particular periods sharing their power with their wives, like the post-Second World War period in the 1950's, which their power had temporarily corroded. This is the situation in the western families from the early 19th century to the late 1970's, which feminist movement began to shake the conservative family structure.

the same time, the conceptualization of “masculinities” has been groundbreaking in the studies on men, emphasising the plurality and differentiation of the social constructions of being man, and opening many paths for further studies.

Connell’s model of understanding masculinities has not been free of criticism. Since its initial formulation in 1985 (Carrigan, Connell and Lee, 1985), it has been criticised from many aspects. Twenty years after that, in 2005, with Messerschmidt, Connell reconsidered these criticisms and replied to them in an article titled “Hegemonic Masculinity: Rethinking the Concept” (Connell and Messerschmidt, 2005). Reviewing and re-expressing the bases of Connell’s theory, the authors evaluate the existing studies on masculinities, evaluating the application of this theory in other locations ranging from Latin America to Japan, and fields of research from media representations to education. Most of these criticisms challenge Connell’s ideas on hegemonic masculinity, than the other aspects of her theorizing. In their response article, Connell and Messerschmidt consider the criticisms under five subject headings, (1) the concept of masculinity, (2) the ambiguity and overlap of hegemonic masculinity, (3) the problem of reification (4) the masculine subject and (5) the pattern of gender relations (Connell and Messerschmidt, 2005, pp. 836-845).

Connell and Messerschmidt consider the first group of criticisms under “the underlying concept of masculinity” (ibid. 836-837). These criticisms emphasise the ambiguity of the concept “masculinity”. They come from two approaches: (a) “realist”, such as the criticisms of Collinson and Hearn (1994), who also criticise the blurred and uncertain character of this concept for weakly understanding patriarchal power relations; and (b) “poststructuralist” such as those of Petersen (2003) who criticise the concept for essentialism and leading to a false image of unity moreover,

some authors of this group, such as Whitehead (2007) criticise Connell for not developing a poststructuralist tool for investigating discursive construction of masculinities (Connell and Messerschmidt, p. 836). Connell and Messerschmidt's overall reply is that these criticisms from two wings are inaccurate. They claim that the vast literature around the notion of masculinity is far from being blurred and this literature covers poststructuralist issues as well.

On the other hand, Connell and Messerschmidt discuss the second group of criticisms as "the ambiguity and overlap" (2005, p. 838-839). This criticism that comes primarily from Donaldson, (1993) emphasises that which group of men or who represents hegemonic masculinity is ambiguous. Connell and Messerschmidt's reply is that gender relations' are by nature ambiguous and they add that since hegemonic masculinity is a representation, a masculinity ideal, rather than a material masculinity. The authors add that hegemonic masculinity is neither transhistorical, nor static; rather it varies across time and space (2005, pp. 838-839).

Connell and Messerschmidt consider the third group of criticisms under "the problem of reification" (pp. 839-841). Holter criticises Connell for reifying gender relations and offers emphasising patriarchy; she argues that overall exploitation of women cannot be subordinated to mere hegemony of men (as cited in Connell and Messerschmidt, 2005, p. 839). Connell and Messerschmidt approve Holter and stress that these points should be emphasised more on the research on masculinities (Connell and Messerschmidt, 2005, p. 839).

The fourth group of criticisms addressed to Connell's ideas which she discusses with Messerschmidt is grouped under "the masculine subject" (ibid. pp. 841-843). For example, authors such as Wetherell and Edley

(1999), criticise the subject position of men in Connell's theory from the perspective of discursive psychology. They claim that hegemonic masculinity cannot properly represent the masculine subject and claim that men usually adopt the norms and values of hegemonic masculinity strategically, in particular circumstances. On the other hand, Connell and Messerschmidt emphasise that "'masculinity' does not represent a certain type of man but rather a way that men position themselves through discursive practices" (Connell and Messerschmidt, 2005, p. 841). Connell and Messerschmidt's reply to these two points is that discursive practices emphasise symbolic aspect of masculinities, rather than presenting a multidimensional analysis of gender such as the concept "hegemonic masculinity" does (ibid. p 842).

The final group of criticisms which Connell and Messerschmidt discuss is considered under "the pattern of gender relations" (ibid. pp. 844-845). Authors such as Bourdieu (2001) and Demetriou (2001) propose newer formulations for the functioning of gender relations. For instance Bourdieu investigates masculinity, applying his theory to masculinity, emphasising "masculine domination". In his controversial study *La Domination Masculine, (Masculine Domination)* Bourdieu does not directly criticise the already-existing gender order, in which men dominate women, and merely focuses on the functioning of "masculine domination" in the legitimation of social order (Öztimur, 2007, pp. 594-598). On the other hand, Demetriou criticises hegemonic masculinity, by dividing it into two, as internal (the power relations between men) and external (the power relations between the women and the men) hegemony. In that criticism, Demetriou also offers hybridization of gender relations, by emphasising the hybrid character of the relations between heterosexual and gay men in constant processes of appropriation, negotiation and reconfiguration. Connell and

Messerschmidt's reply to Bourdieu is that it is a revitalization of crude functionalism (2005, p. 844). On the other hand, their reply to Demetriou's criticism is that hybridization, by itself, is hegemonic and there is a vast plurality between masculinities and even the hegemonic masculinity of different locations (p. 850).

After the publication of "Hegemonic Masculinity: Rethinking the Concept", amongst other criticisms and contributions, two of them, are particularly remarkable. The initial contribution that comes from Coles embraces Connell's theory on hegemonic masculinity and makes a Bourdieusian contribution to it (2007; 2008). Grounding on Bourdieu's ideas on field, Coles offers the concept "mosaic masculinity" to Connell's four-type masculinity model. Coles' "mosaic masculinity" is a type of dominant masculinity that resides in the field of dominant masculinity, but that does not totally accept the standards of hegemonic masculinity, reformulating its own hybrid dominant standards (2008, p. 237-240). Coles states that "this form of masculinity is like a mosaic that incompatible pieces or fragments that do not easily fit together are placed to form a coherent pattern" (p. 238). Despite Coles' primary aim is to stress the multitude of dominant masculinities (compared to single hegemonic category of Connell), his emphasis on the fragmented yet coherent character of masculinities is significant.

On the other hand, the second contribution comes from Hearn (2004). Hearn, who has a more Marxist feminist tendency, considers men as a class-like group (Hearn, 1987; 1997; 2004; Hearn and Collinson, 1994). Similar to class interests, Hearn considers men as a hegemonic group that tries to establish their constant hegemony and impose their interests on women. In addition to that Hearn tries to strengthen the emphasis on the oppression and subordination of women as a group. As a result, Hearn

shifts the emphasis from “hegemonic masculinity” that focuses on men’s differentiation of access to patriarchal power to “hegemony of men”, considering men as a hegemonic bloc in the face of women (2004).

Connell’s theory on masculinities, with its three primary structures, presents a significant starting point for the investigation of masculinities. Labour/production, power and cathexis, the structures Connell presents, affect the construction of masculinities, yet they do not overdetermine them. In the social construction of masculinities, local dynamics affect masculinities as well as these constructive structures. In particular contexts, cultural, historical and economic dynamics bear their stamp, having different influences on masculinities²¹. On the other hand, the constructive components of masculinities encompass institutions, relations and historical incidents²².

Here, masculinity is going to be conceptualized as a baggage, containing particular contextual tools and strategies for the establishment of men’s hegemony. There is a complex dialectical relationship between these tools and men and masculinities. Men and masculinities carry these baggages, being agents of patriarchy, use the tools inside them and get shaped while using them. These historically, socially and culturally variable tools differentiate across different situations and spaces. The baggage of tools and strategies include social institutions, as well as the structural

²¹ For example, the “macho” masculinities of Mexico City, which Gutmann (1996) investigates present an aggressive, yet child caring patriarchal masculinity, that contrasts with the distant fathers of the circum-Mediterranean societies Gilmore discusses (1990). In some contexts, current economic order might have more impact on masculinities (Morgan, 2005), while in some cases the impact of race might be greater (Marriott, 2006) and in some cases, religion might have more significance (Gerami, 2005).

²² For example, the hegemonic masculinity that Connell discusses in *Masculinities* (2005) is a result of current western capitalist patriarchal society in the late 20th century.

determinants. As I am going to discuss in the chapter on methodology, this idea is going to be employed for developing an understanding of the construction of masculinities in the city of Trabzon in Turkey.

In Connell's theory masculinities are considered as "configurations" constructed by the outcomes of structures labour/production, power and cathexis (2005, p. 44). These structures enable the men to establish their hegemony over women and the queer people, while creating diversities caused by differential access to overall men's domination. Connell's theory presents a ground for understanding masculinities in general, leaving a limited space for understanding cultural and diversities of masculinities. On the other hand, rather than depending on stable structural determinants, masculinities are contextually constructed, relying on resources such as particular social and cultural incidents of the place they exist, state interruption, fluid, family structures, socialization, sexuality, class relations, ideology and historical and cultural background, as well as the already-existing social organization of overall capitalist patriarchal power relations²³. Investigations of masculinities must consider all the integrating, yet particularistic components of the construction of masculinities.

In this thesis, the construction of masculinities in Trabzon a particular construction of masculinity which is widely recognized with its particularly patriarchal, conservative, aggressive, extroverted and irrational qualities and which is culturally hegemonic in the Eastern Black Sea Region of Turkey, is going to be investigated by critically adopting Connell's approach. Therefore investigating the construction of masculinities in Trabzon, these local dynamics of the city will be taken into consideration.

²³ Therefore, we may state that masculinity studies adopts the theoretical advantage of integrating structure-agency debates and the postmodern developments (cf. Scambler, Ohlsson and Griva, 2004, p. 103).

2.3.4.3 An Assessment and a Critique: Connell and the Theoretical Ground for Studying Masculinities in Trabzon

Connell's groundbreaking theory on multiple masculinities presents a quadripartite structural model, comprised of *production/labour*, *power*, *cathexis* and later added *symbolisation* (Carrigan, Connell and Lee, 1985; Connell, 1987; 2000; 2005; Connell and Messerschmidt, 2005). As Whitehead points, this theory provides a macrostructural investigation of gender relations centring on men and masculinities (1999, p. 58). Correspondingly, Connell's theory aims to provide a general theory of masculinities, which is applicable to masculinities worldwide.

In their reformulation article "Hegemonic Masculinity: Rethinking the Concept", Connell and Messerschmidt stress that "empirically existing hegemonic masculinities can be analysed at three levels" (2005, p. 849). The first level is the "*local*" level. It is comprised of face to face relations in institutions such as families, workplaces and organizations. The authors point that the ethnographic research focuses on this level. On the other hand, the second level of analysis focuses on the "*regional*" level, the level that includes diverse cultures, societies and nation states. Connell and Messerschmidt stress that the discursive, political, and demographic research investigates this level. Thirdly and finally, the "*global*" level includes the world-scale politics and transnational media and business grounds, which is examined by the globalization and masculinities researches (ibid.). Connell's theory aims to discuss masculinities at all those three levels. In this theory, all the three levels are interrelated.

Although they emphasise their position towards an all-embracing theory of masculinities in general, that is valid for all these three level of analysis,

Connell and Messerschmidt point the requirement of the investigation of masculinities in the non-western contexts too (ibid. pp. 849-850). However, they emphasise that the hegemonic masculinities *generally* overlap with local, regional and the global level of masculinities. Accordingly, they forewarn to be particularistic in theorizing masculinities. Connell and Messerschmidt state that

Adopting an analytical framework that distinguishes local, regional, and global masculinities (and the same point applies to femininities) allows us to recognize the importance of place without falling into a monadic world of totally independent cultures or discourses. (ibid. p. 849).

Connell and her colleagues' theory and the majority of their studies consider masculinities particularly in western settings. Throughout the vast majority of her studies, Connell emphasises the differences between different masculinities. She locates these differences between the patriarchal power positions of a number of masculinities such as "hegemonic", "complicit", "marginal" and "subordinate" masculinities (Connell, 2005, pp. 76-81). Connell devotes and centres her effort on investigating the establishment and spread of men's hegemony²⁴. This is also reflected on the body of masculinity studies literature, which is largely comprised of microsociological studies of western masculinities. Hence, the differences, diversities and pluralities between men in Connell's theory focus on and emphasise the men's differences of access to patriarchal power, rather than local and/or regional differences. Although she presents an insightful and invaluable theory on masculinities, Connell's effort (and especially her late emphasis with Messerschmidt) of moving towards a

²⁴see multipublished edited volumes in masculinity studies such as Brod and Kaufman (eds.), 1994; Kimmell and Messner (eds.), 2004; Whitehead (ed.), 2006; Whitehead and Barrett (eds.), 2001.

universalistic theory contradicts with the pluralistic notion of masculinities, which aims to underline and investigate the differences and diversities between men and masculinities.

As Lusher and Robbins precisely emphasise, Connell's theory "links up with a singular regional pattern" (2009, p. 405). As a result, the structural model it presents considers the dynamics that exist in the western settings, which ground on generally developed economies, have different histories, and are based on different cultural and social relations. The local and the regional conditions provide diverse dynamics that construct and mould masculinities, which cannot be totally understood by the quadripartite model Connell presents. Therefore, the contextual impact of the regional and local dynamics that contribute to the construction of masculinities must be investigated.

Relying on Connell's pluralistic contextual ground with its emphasis on the notion of "masculinities", rather than the generalizing and universalistic conceptualizations it embodies, this study is going to investigate the impact of the local and regional dynamics of Trabzon on the construction of masculinities. In this respect, I am going to introduce three local and regional trajectories for studying masculinities in Trabzon, in other words the characteristics of masculinities particular to the context of this region. In the context of Trabzon, the regional dynamics that I consider to construct masculinities are based on (1) cathexis, (2) families and domestic lives and (3) the rightist politics and football fanaticism of Trabzonspor.

2.4 TRAJECTORIES OF STUDYING MASCULINITIES IN TRABZON

Contemporary Trabzon is a place which already existing traditional relations coming from a past that is based on agricultural economics (that the people lived as distant, self-sufficient and all-powerful households) in male-headed families of classical patriarchy whose remnants nourishes contemporary rightist politics clashes with pains of integration into global capitalism that comes with high unemployment and poor industry and commerce (Emirođlu, 2009). In this context, the existing culture of the Eastern Black Sea Region of Turkey creates the extrovert, sociable, patriarchal and rightist characteristics of “Trabzonlular”²⁵ (people who are natives and inhabitants of Trabzon). The masculinities in Trabzon are constructed and reconstructed in this context. The men in Trabzon like to call and construct themselves as “Trabzon erkekleri”²⁶ (Trabzon men) and name this configuration of masculinity as “Trabzon erkeklđđi” (Trabzon masculinity); at the same time in the general Turkish colloquial speech, they are labelled as so. In this thesis, I am going to discuss the construction of masculinities in Trabzon considering primarily three trajectories, grounding on the findings of the field research conducted in Trabzon between August 2010 and October 2011.

²⁵ In Turkish being a native and an inhabitant of a city is considered as inseparable phenomena. Accordingly, “Trabzonlu” means both being a native and an inhabitant of that city. Following that, I am going to use the words “Trabzonlu” and its plural “Trabzonlular” in this thesis.

²⁶ From now on I am going to use the phrases “Trabzon erkekleri”, “Trabzon erkeđđi” (the singular of “Trabzon erkekleri”), and “Trabzon erkeklđđi” in its original forms in Turkish, to emphasise how these men call and construct themselves, beside the phrase “masculinities in Trabzon”, which has a more social scientific connotation.

2.4.1 Cathexis: Emotional and Sexual Lives

In Connell (1987; 2005) cathexis primarily implies the sexual and emotional attachment to the object(s) of desire. In this thesis, I am going to extend that approach beyond the object(s) of desire. I am going to argue that men's cathexis embraces men's emotional attachment to their friends, as well as the object(s) of sexual and emotional desire. Men's cathexis is shaped by two complementary ways: (a) men's *emotional* attachment to their friends and their sexual partners and (b) men's *sexual* attachment and detachment to object(s) of desire. The choices and inclinations, in terms of cathexis shape how men construct and experience their masculinities.

In the case of Turkey, the form of cathexis is based on homosocial friendships and heterosocial marriages or partnerships, combined with heterosexual relations. In this context, the men usually become friends primarily with men (than women) but their choice of partners is generally the women while they oppress and subordinate the queer people, forcing them to be invisible. In Trabzon, most of the men establish homosocial friendships with other men, engaging in "erkek muhabbeti" (men's talk), like many other places in Turkey. In Trabzon, one meets men wandering in the public sphere, in the streets as groups of men. In these relations, men experience male bonding in which they construct and reconstruct patriarchal masculinities. These men hide their emotions, which they assume that might present them weak, while showing up those that might present them strong and manly. They usually consider the women weak and irrational. In their friendships with the men they praise manly values, usually speak about women and the queer people with scorn, humiliation and offense, and reproduce patriarchy.

The partner choice, sexual inclinations and sexual relations of men are quite patriarchal too. In the current experiences of cathexis, heterosexism is quite prevalent. Many men experience sexuality by oppressing the women. A lot of them go to prostitutes or keep a mistress. In the context of Trabzon, many men experience sexuality with Natashas, the prostitutes who come from the former USSR and Eastern Bloc, as well as their partners or their wives. This happens even in those cases in which they are married. In this context, the men are homophobic and transphobic. The queer people and being queer are generally considered as inconsiderable. In Trabzon, the queer people are not visible in the public sphere.

The emotional and sexual lives of men usually involve verbal and physical violence, which is naturalized as an ordinary part of life. Men's dominance and hegemony is strengthened by the support of this cathexis. In brief, current experiences of cathexis construct patriarchal masculinities.

2.4.2 Families and The Domestic Lives

The men are considered as the all-powerful head of the families in the context of Trabzon. This is quite reminiscent to the classical role of men in the families (Rotundo, 2006). The classical patriarchal role of masculinities especially emphasises protection of the family, reproduction, and breadwinning (Morgan, 2004). In many aspects of domestic sphere, men give the final decision that is related to the public sphere. Family is seen as the sphere, which the individual adult men's authority is ultimately realized. As discussed above, in a similar vein, Gilmore stresses, the four moral imperatives of masculinity in circum-Mediterranean societies are impregnating one's wife, provisioning the dependants, protecting the family and personal autonomy (1990, pp. 48-49). These four imperatives of men in

families sketched by Gilmore also affect the construction of masculinities in the context of Trabzon.

In contemporary Trabzon, the impact of global capitalism emphasises the breadwinner role of men. In order to be socially accepted men, “Trabzon erkekleri” (Trabzon men) firstly feel obliged to provision their dependents. Thus, they experience migration to other cities or abroad for short or long periods for earning money. Adult men exercise masculinities as being the head of families and the fathers.

2.4.3 The Rightist Politics And Football Fanaticism

There is a dialectical relation between rightist²⁷ politics, football fanaticism and patriarchy. All of them largely depend on patriarchal masculinities, while patriarchal masculinities act as the primary agents and actors in rightist politics. On the other hand, as Koçak (2010) argues, football is the playground of rightist politics. In rightist politics in Turkey, unlike the contemporary leftist reel politics that presents a gender-egalitarian direction, primary actors in social life are expected to be patriarchal masculinities. Rightist ideologies are fed from the patriarchal values; on the other hand, with the patriarchal and rightist ideology, men are expected to be Islamist, nationalist, conservative, patriotic, militarist and ready to fight for the sake of nation and religion. In the near history of Trabzon, rightism expressed itself, in its one of the purest forms, as lynching attempts and murders. The masculinities in Trabzon have a nationalist and micro-nationalist character. At the outset, Trabzon is a nationalist city. Many of the

²⁷ In this thesis, following T. Bora (2009a), I am going to use “rightism” in terms of its complementary three states in Turkey, as Islamism, nationalism and conservatism.

Trabzon inhabitants, rightist or leftist, have an overtly explicit sympathy for Turkey and Turkish nationalism. And subsequently, for many of the inhabitants of Trabzon, being a “Trabzonlu” and/or sometimes being a “Karadenizli” is more significant than many things. Quite often, the state of being Trabzonlu and/or Karadenizli comes before being Turkish. At the same time, Trabzon is known as an Islamist city. Many men fill the Mosques and fast at Ramadan. The people are proud of their Islamic identities. The city boasts with its well-known mosques and the theologians. Moreover, in the last twenty years, at the national elections for the parliament, the rightist parties have constantly gained more than 80% of the representatives in Trabzon (TUİK, 2012). The rightist ideologies construct and support patriarchal masculinities, especially since they feed from capitalist patriarchy and the values and norms it includes.

The rightist values are reflected in football supportership and football fanaticism. Football is considered as a men’s game: primarily men play, watch football and support football teams. Football includes values that are attributed to masculinities, such as strength, endurance, youth, toughness, male bonding, and aggressiveness. As authors such as T. Bora presents, these are also the values of rightism (2010). In Trabzon, the supportership of Trabzonspor is one of the most central facts of social relations. Men support the team, go to the matches, talk about it as a crucial and inseparable part of their lives and consider the team and the players, as if they were their families or kinspeople. For the “Trabzon erkekleri” (Trabzon men), Trabzonspor is a source of manly pride, which is equivalent to nationalist and micro-nationalist pride. On the other hand, the rightism in the city is reflected on Trabzonspor quite occasionally, such as wearing the white beret of Hrant Dink’s ultranationalist assassin for massive support.

CHAPTER 3

THE BACKGROUND

AND

THE METHODOLOGY OF THE STUDY

3.1 TRABZON: THE BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY

3.1.1 An Overview of Trabzon

Studying men and masculinities in peripheral, developing, non-western and modernizing contexts require considering the dynamics that are culturally and historically different than those of the modern western world. In the 20th century, Turkey has experienced change towards modernization and development, which had begun in the early 19th century (Ahmad, 2007; Zürcher, 2009). As authors such as Moghadam points, contemporary Middle East, including Turkey, comprises and integrates the collision of tradition and penetration and establishment of modern patriarchal and capitalist relations (1993). Turkey experiences a “neopatriarchal” condition in Sharabi’s sense, which integrates the modern and pre-modern gender relations (1992). Turkey is a country, which modern, modernizing and pre-modern and capitalist and pre-capitalist cultural and social dynamics exist altogether¹.

¹ In this context, following basic premises of new dependency school in development studies, I shall emphasise that, underdevelopment and development might exist altogether

In Turkey, integration into global capitalism and the capitalization of traditional elements is an on-going process. There are high rates of nation-wide unemployment². Moreover in some regions, such as the Eastern Black Sea Region, the unemployment rates are even higher³. On the other hand, there is not a concentration of industrial, commercial or service sector enterprises in the region⁴, hinting a slight underdevelopment. Therefore, this region is currently a part of Eastern Black Sea Development Project⁵, one of the twenty-six government supported regional development agencies in Turkey. Although the employment rates of the region are one of the highest⁶ in Turkey, primarily because of the import goods tea and

at the same time (So, 1990, s. 135). Although periphery can be dependent to the centre, its underdevelopment does not totally obstruct its development to a certain extent.

² According to Turkish Statistical Institute (TurkStat), The Household Labour Force Survey for The Period Of December 2011, current rates of nation-scale unemployment, in all age groups in 2011 is 9.8%. These rates are 18.1% in the rates of youth (ages 15-24) unemployment (<http://www.turkstat.gov.tr/PreHaberBultenleri.do?id=10775>, retrieved 15th March 2012).

³ In the TK90 region of TurkStat, which comprises the cities Trabzon, Gümüşhane, Ordu, Giresun, Rize and Artvin, current rates of unemployment in all ages is 10.86% and rates of youth unemployment (ages 15-24) are 20.55% (<http://tuikapp.tuik.gov.tr/isgucuapp/isgucu.zul>, retrieved 15th March 2012).

⁴ According to the TurkStat General Census of Industry and Business Local Units Provinces 2002 report, the number of 69835 workplaces exist in TR90 region that includes the cities Trabzon, Gümüşhane, Ordu, Giresun, Rize and Artvin, while the highest concentration of the workplaces exist in covering the TR1 region of the survey that only includes the city of Istanbul with the number 347617 workplaces, while there are total number of 1858191 workplaces nationwide (TurkStat, 2007). It can be seen from this data that the six cities of the Eastern Black Sea Region have only the 20% of the workplaces of the number of the workplaces in Istanbul, and 0.3% of the number of the nationwide workplaces.

⁵ <http://www.ebsd.org/> retrieved, 15th March 2012.

⁶ According to TurkStat's regional indicators, the rate of the participation into workforce has been 58.2% in TR90 region, with the highest percentage in Turkey in 2010 (TurkStat, 2011, p. 15). On the other hand, the rate of unemployment has been 6.1%, with the least rate in Turkey (ibid.).

hazelnuts this region, the speed of the population increase⁷ and the speed of migration⁸ are quite high. Studying gender relations in this context involves the consideration of amalgamation of developed, developing and underdeveloped qualities of patriarchal and capitalist relations simultaneously. These dynamics are also quite manifest in Trabzon, the plot of this study.

Trabzon is often recognized as a patriarchal city, and in the last decades as a ground of rightist and violent uprisings. This image is embraced with popular narratives of irrational, feverish and aggressive behaviour and endless sexual desire of men, the glorious stories about Natashas, told successively with the rugged, industrious but never-suffering Trabzon women... In this context, Trabzon presents a significant, yet underexplored case for gender research.

3.1.2 The Significance of Trabzon for Studying Masculinities

Trabzon is a coastal city located in the Eastern Black Sea Region of Turkey. Although it neither is the most populous city⁹, nor hosts the most

⁷ According to TurkStat's regional indicators, the rate of the speed of the population increase in TR90 region is -4.15%, being the 25th (of 26 regions in TurkStat's classification) in 2011 (TurkStat, 2011, p. 12); In Trabzon, this rate is -1.85%, being the 58th of 81 cities of Turkey (ibid. p. 20).

⁸ According to TurkStat's regional indicators, the rate of the speed of migration in TR90 region is -9.0%, being the 20th (of 26 regions in TurkStat's classification) in 2011 (TurkStat, 2011, p. 13); In Trabzon, this rate is -9.7%, being the 59th of 81 cities of Turkey (ibid. p. 22).

⁹

http://rapor.tuik.gov.tr/reports/rwservlet?adnksdb2&ENVID=adnksdb2Env&report=wa_turkiye_il_koy_sehir.RDF&p_il1=61&p_il2=55&p_kod=2&p_yil=2011&p_dil=1&desformat=pdf, retrieved 15th March 2012

developed, industry, commerce or tourism, Trabzon is historically, culturally, socially and economically one of the most recognized and most prominent cities of the whole Black Sea Region of Turkey. This picture that might be contradictory at the first glance, is also evident for Trabzon. It is neither a metropolitan city¹⁰, nor has the largest population¹¹ or the strongest economy of the region. In Turkey, Black Sea Region is quite often recognized primarily with Trabzon and the popular imagery of its irrational, feverish, stubborn, aggressive and patriarchal men. The significance of studying masculinities in Trabzon primarily comes from the reasons that I discuss below.

Firstly, since the Antiquity¹², Trabzon has a politically and culturally dominant role, that still persists in the Eastern Black Sea Region. Throughout the history, powerful states of Black Sea Region such as

¹⁰ For more than a decade, Trabzon endeavours to be considered as a metropolitan city. See <http://bianet.org/bianet/ekonomi/9654-buyuksehir-yolunda-ilk-adim>, retrieved, 18th March 2012. On the other hand, at the time this thesis was being written, with a new legal arrangement covering the cities Aydın, Balıkesir, Denizli, Hatay, Malatya, Manisa, Kahramanmaraş, Mardin, Muğla, Tekirdağ, Trabzon, Şanlıurfa and Van, the metropolitan status of Trabzon was about to be officially declared. <http://m.gazetevatan.com/NewsDetail.aspx?ArticleID=129003&CategoryID=2>, retrieved, 26th November 2012.

¹¹ According to the Address Based Population Registration System of Turkish Statistical Institute, the population of the biggest city of Black Sea Region in 2011 is Samsun with a population of 1.251.729 people, while Trabzon is the second with a population of 757.353 people. Trabzon has the 2nd largest population in the region and 27th largest population in Turkey (http://rapor.tuik.gov.tr/reports/rwservlet?adnksdb2&ENVID=adnksdb2Env&report=wa_turkiye_il_koy_sehir.RDF&p_il1=55&p_il2=61&p_kod=2&p_yil=2011&p_dil=1&desformat=pdf, retrieved 15th March 2012).

¹² Trabzon was found in the Antiquity, “as Τραπεζοῦς (*Trapezous*) by Miletan traders (traditionally in 756 BC). It was one of a number (about ten) of Milesian *emporía* or trading colonies along the shores of the Black Sea” (<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trabzon>, retrieved 15th March 2012). However the city gained significance beginning with the Kingdom of Pontus that was established in 291 BC (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kingdom_of_Pontus, retrieved 15th March 2012).

Kingdom of Pontus¹³ (291 BC – 65 BC) and Empire of Trebizond¹⁴ (1204 – 1461 AD) existed in this region. This significance continued in the Ottoman era (1461 – 1923 AD), the city being a “sandjak” and later a “vilayet”, that controlled the region¹⁵ (Emiroğlu, 2009). As Emiroğlu (2009) and Meeker (2001) emphasise, in the Ottoman period, a number of families *de facto* ruled the region like feudal lords of the Medieval Europe, and many of those regions are currently districts of Trabzon such as Of, Beşikdüzü or Vakfikebir. Moreover, as it is habitually mentioned by many inhabitants of the city, Trabzon is the birthplace of the Ottoman Sultan Suleiman the Magnificent (Suleiman 1). With the establishment of the Turkish Republic, the city gained significance, especially for its central position in local, cultural, commercial and agricultural activities¹⁶. Despite the economic fluctuations and rising impoverishment, the prominence of the city persists. On the other hand as Tursun emphasises, Trabzon has a non-Muslim past, in which Rums, Armenians and the Lazs lived in the city until the late Ottoman era (2012). However, those people faced severe state pressure, they were deported or assimilated and forced to become Muslims (Özkan, 2012). Those people now over emphasise their Turkishness and take place in conservative and Turkish-nationalist uprisings. As Hobsbawm asserts, history and tradition are “invented” phenomena (2006). Peoples continuously construct, invent and make up their pasts. Usually this is told as a glorious past. This is also relevant in Trabzon. The historical

¹³ http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kingdom_of_Pontus, retrieved 15th March 2012.

¹⁴ http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Empire_of_Trebizond, retrieved 15th March 2012.

¹⁵ As it is quite often said by the inhabitants as a source of pride, Trabzon is the birthplace of Ottoman Empire Kanuni Sultan Süleyman (1494-1520).

¹⁶ In the economy of Trabzon, until the 1950's, the major agricultural products of the city were corn and tobacco. On the other hand, tea and nuts, two import products gained prominence after the WWII (Emiroğlu, 2009).

significance of the city is reflected on today's life and many Trabzonlular¹⁷ tend to construct a pride on their past. At the same time, as Emiroğlu precisely asserts, the contemporary (micro)nationalist tendencies in the city reflect the residues of its feudal past (2009). Contemporary Trabzon has a lively social and cultural life. There are many centres of culture, shopping malls, tea houses, pedestrian areas and sports areas in the city, where people spend their time in communication with each other. The city is the actual trade, commerce, cultural, political, and sports centre of the Eastern Black Sea Region of Turkey.

Secondly Trabzon is located on the intersection point of the transport roads that connect the provinces closer to Georgia-Turkey Border on the East, to the cities of the West on the one hand and the on the starting point of the road that connects the Black Sea Coast to the inner Anatolian cities¹⁸ on the other. Despite its current economic derogation, and loss of its hinterland, the city is significant for hosting Trabzon Harbour, which largely connects Inner Anatolian¹⁹ and Middle Eastern cities such as those of Iran²⁰ to the regions around Black Sea of Russia, Ukraine, Georgia, Bulgaria, and Romania. Moreover, the city also inhabits the Trabzon Airport, which is ranked 8th in terms of domestic traffic and 10th in terms of total passenger

¹⁷ In Turkish "Trabzonlu" (the plural "Trabzonlular") means a person *originated from* and/or a person whose family is an *inhabitant of* Trabzon. In the rest of this text I am going to use this word.

¹⁸ Certainly, Zigana Pass has a significant role in connecting Trabzon to the inner Anatolian provinces.

¹⁹ To an extent Caucasian and Iranian and Asian cities provide a potential hinterland to this harbour. <http://www.al-port.com/KapasiteVeHizmetler.aspx>, retrieved 15th March 2012. However, as far as I have observed several times between August 2010 and March 2012, it is generally quite deserted.

²⁰ <http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/12/07/us-turkey-iran-idUSTRE6B63VX20101207>, retrieved 8th May 2012

traffic among the airports in Turkey, according to the December 2011 statistics of Turkish General Directorate of State Airports Authority²¹.

Thirdly, despite the fact that it has almost the 60% of the population of the larger city of Samsun, Trabzon is one of the cities that has the most immigrants in other cities, compared to its local population²². At the same time, Trabzon receives many immigrants from other cities²³. Likewise, in the wave of the labour migration to Germany in the middle of the 20th century, many migrant labourers from the city were sent abroad²⁴ (Abadan-Unat, 2002; Emiroğlu, 2009, p. 113). Trabzon has a well-known status of being an immigrant-sending and immigrant-receiving city, whose migrants are concentrated in some sectors, such as construction and commerce (Duben, 2002). Accordingly –although the vast majority of the inhabitants of Trabzon are not Laz²⁵- the inhabitants of the city are stigmatized as so. The famous common-sense images of the “Trabzonlu Laz müteahhit” (Laz building contractor from Trabzon) in daily speech and the “Laz” character of the

²¹ <http://www.dhmi.gov.tr/istatistik.aspx>, retrieved 15th March 2012.

²² According to TurkStat Address Based Population Registration System Database, the nation-wide total population of people who are registered in Trabzon in 2011 is 1434107 people, that is 1.89% of the total residents in the city. On the other hand, there are eight cities, (Ankara, Bursa, İstanbul, İzmir, Kocaeli, Sakarya, Samsun, Zonguldak) which inhabit more than 10000 people who are registered to Trabzon (<http://tuikapp.tuik.gov.tr/adnksdagitapp/adnks.zul>, retrieved 15th March 2012).

²³ According to TurkStat Address Based Population Registration System Database, Trabzon receives the most immigrants from the cities Artvin, Gümüşhane, Ordu, Rize, Samsun, and Bayburt (<http://tuikapp.tuik.gov.tr/adnksdagitapp/adnks.zul>, retrieved 15th March 2012).

²⁴ Emiroğlu points that the external migrants were half of the total migrants of the Çaykara district, and one thirds of the total migrants in Maçka district of Trabzon in 1980 (2009, p. 113).

²⁵ See Beller-Hann and Hann (2003) and Hür (2009).

Turkish traditional shadow play Karagöz and Hacivat²⁶ that are associated with the city, reflect an enterprising, stubborn, irrational, feverish, sociable, aggressive and mannish male character. These people actively participate in social life in Turkey and spread the influence of Trabzon across the country.

Fourthly, in the last two decades, Trabzon has been recognized with being one of the centres of sex trafficking by prostitutes from the former USSR and Eastern Bloc, who are abstracted from their humane identities and stigmatized as “Natashas”. They appeared in the city primarily beginning from the opening of the Georgia-Turkey border in 1989 to the last years of the first decade of the 2000’s, which the sex trade began to disappear (but never totally vanished) in the city centre with the legal and police actions. Trabzon was the closest centre to the border, it was more accessible than other cities by air, sea and land routes, the Natashas (then) had been considered as physically more attractive, appealing and different than the local women and more importantly, its patriarchal masculinities presented a proper mass of demanders to sex trafficking by these foreign prostitutes (Günçikan, 1995; Kalfa, 2008; 2010; Zengin, 2011). Natashas experienced financial pressure from the pimps, and police oppression, as well as harassment and sexual and physical violence from their customers consistently (Gülçür and İlkaracan, 2002). During this process, in order avoid their husbands to leave them and to protect their families, the Trabzon women, who are traditionally oppressed to the role of being industrious, contented, rugged and child carer, experienced another oppression: they felt themselves as if were forced to become more sexually appealing and started to go to the beauty parlours. Natashas often

²⁶ See <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Karagoz>, retrieved 16th March 2012.

appeared in the nation-scale media as a problem, a source of financial income and immorality, polluting the city and as a glory of the masculinity, simultaneously²⁷. In this context, both the Trabzon women and the Natashas, the women *in* Trabzon experienced intense oppression and subordination.

Fifthly, Trabzon quite often comes into prominence in nation-scale media and global media²⁸, with rightist uprisings and violent incidents especially in the last decade. Countless number of TV programs, news, newspaper articles, special issues and books were (and are still being) produced on the issues and incidents in and on Trabzon. Currently the city is widely recognized as the bedrock of uprisings and violent attacks²⁹. Many

²⁷ There are many examples of patriarchal news on Natashas. For example, in a news in *Hürriyet*, one of the major mainstream newspapers in Turkey, on 13th August 1998, appeared a news titled “Bir Gemi Dolusu Nataşa Geliyor” (A Shipload of Natashas are Coming) <http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/ShowNew.aspx?id=-38071>, retrieved 6th May 2011. This news shows that the mainstream media considers sex workers as a commodity, abstracted from their humane conditions, consciously disregarding the severe oppression they experience. This is more evident in columns. For example, in an article published in 1997, the most hectic period of this process, Enis Berberoğlu, then a commenter of economics (now the head) in the newspaper *Hürriyet*, considered Natashas merely, in terms of income <http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/ShowNew.aspx?id=-273593>, retrieved 23th May 2011. On the other hand, in an article published in 2003, Erman Toroglu, a popular and quite patriarchal media commenter, considers Natashas a problem of the Trabzon, blaming the sex workers as the cause of this issue <http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/ShowNew.aspx?id=191354>, retrieved 19 March 2012. In another vein, in an article published in 2005, another popular and moderate commenter Can Dündar emphasises the impact of Natashas on Trabzon women, by forcing the local women to rush into beauty parlours in order to endeavour to become look alike the prostitutes <http://www.milliyet.com.tr/2005/08/02/guncel/agun.html>, retrieved 13th December 2010. In a more recent news in December 2011 mainstream newspaper *Vatan* presents the sex workers in terms of “two thousands of condoms one prostitute presently has in a single hotel room” <http://haber.gazetevatan.com/fuhus-baskininda-sasirtan-goruntu/414721/1/Gundem>, retrieved 1st December 2011.

²⁸ For example in BBC News Rainsford considers Trabzon as one of the most prominent the sources of nationalist uprisings in Turkey (2007, March 1).

²⁹ For example, *Hürriyet*, one of the most recognized nation-scale newspapers in Turkey published a news, with a title “Trabzon’da Ülkeyi Sarsan Beş Olay” (Five Incidents in Trabzon That Shook the Country) in 10th February 2006

murders, assassinations, bombings, lynching attempts, violent fights and protests are executed by rightist men from Trabzon. As Akal points, these incidents are not new and they exist in the collective memory of the city (2009). Prior to the 12th September 1980 military coup d'état, many political assassinations and violent fights took place in Trabzon. Similarly, the students and scholars of Karadeniz Teknik Üniversitesi (Karadeniz Technical University) the oldest university of Black Sea Region and Trabzon, experienced strong rightist pressures, violence and murders (Kapucu, 2009).

Finally, Trabzon is widely recognized with Trabzonspor, the city's most prominent football team in the Süper Lig³⁰, amongst its other national and international honours³¹, which is (as always stressed in Trabzon) the first team that is not from İstanbul that became the league champion³². The significance of Trabzonspor comes from widespread support that it receives, the dynamism it brings to the city and the mythic narratives that create a substantial impact on the city as well as its honours in sports. There is an organic relation of the sports club with the inhabitants of the city, the Trabzon people considering the team as part of their own lives, rather than a simple football club that they support. Trabzonspor brings liveliness to this provincial city with football competitions and becomes a

<http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/ShowNew.aspx?id=3915770>, retrieved 19th March 2012. Similarly, a year later, another most recognized nation-scale newspaper Milliyet published a news titled "Bomba, cinayet, linç... Trabzon'da Neler Oluyor?" (Bombing, Murder, Lynch... What is happening in Trabzon) <http://www.milliyet.com.tr/2007/01/22/guncel/axgun02.html>, retrieved 19th March 2012.

³⁰ Since the official name of the highest level of football league changes with new sponsors in Turkey (currently it is SporToto Süper Lig), in order to discard those changes, I prefer using the common name "Süper Lig" in this thesis.

³¹ See <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trabzonspor>, retrieved 22nd March 2012.

³² Trabzonspor has been the champion of the Süper Lig six times between 1975 and 1984.

source of joy and pride with the honours of the team. In the match days, the city centre turns into maroon-blue, the colours of the team. Like many other teams worldwide, vast majority of the active supporters of Trabzonspor are men who embody, produce and reproduce patriarchal relations. However, as seen in the current slogan of the supporters “Bize her yer Trabzon” (Everywhere is Trabzon for us), the patriarchal and rightist values in the city are reproduced by social relations interwoven around Trabzonspor³³.

3.1.3 Breakpoints in the Near History of Trabzon

In the near history of Trabzon, with the increase in the integration of the global capitalism after the military coup in 1980, there have been three crucial breakpoints that affected the social relations in the city from families to commerce and from embodiment to politics. These breakpoints left a significant impact on the collective memory of the city. Many people refer to these breakpoints while talking about Trabzon and accordingly, they have been often mentioned in the interviews. These breakpoints are (1) economic collapse and unemployment, (2) the rise of conservatism, nationalism and Islamism and rightist uprisings and finally (3) the opening of the Georgia-Turkey border. The three breakpoints that I am going to discuss below contribute to the social construction of the contemporary masculinities in Trabzon.

³³ See the volumes edited by Çelik and “written by the supporters of Trabzonspor” for these patriarchal and rightist relations (2008; 2010).

3.1.3.1 Economic Collapse and Unemployment In Trabzon

Integration into global capitalism is a quite painful process in the periphery regions like Trabzon. Although migration for employment has been a part of life of the families in the city throughout the 20th century, in the recent years, Trabzon experienced an increasing migration of its inhabitants to other cities. As noted above, despite the city seemingly has one of the highest rates of employment with 58.2%, it also has higher rates with -9.7% of the increase of migration to other cities. The high rates of employment are mainly because of the high participation in agriculture³⁴. Currently, the economy of Trabzon primarily depends on import of valuable agricultural products such as hazelnuts, and to an extent tea³⁵. The unemployment in the city is actually quite high. In the pedestrian streets, shopping malls, teagardens Trabzon, there are many unemployed men, wandering, watching the people passing by and recklessly wasting time.

As many people, including Erdoğan Bayraktar, The Minister of Environment and Urbanization who is also a Member of Parliament from Trabzon, repeatedly emphasise, “unemployment is the greatest problem in Trabzon”³⁶. On the other hand, as many people such as Bayraktar³⁷ and

³⁴ According to TurkStat Address Based Population Census, the population of the central district of Trabzon is 239704 people, while the population of the people living in the town centres is 421504 and the total population was declared as 757353 in 2011. http://www.trabzonhaberajansi.com/haber_detay.asp?haberID=2276, retrieved 26th March 2012. Even the urban and towns' population seems the half of the total population, it should be A lot of people living in the urban areas also participate in agriculture in Trabzon.

³⁵ <http://ttso.org.tr/index.php?link=sabit&no=69>, retrieved 27th March 2012.

³⁶ http://www.trabzonhaberajansi.com/haber_detay.asp?haberID=2276, retrieved 27th March 2012.

³⁷ *ibid.*

institutions such as Trabzon Chamber of Commerce and Industry point³⁸, the industry and commerce in the city are not strong and the primary hopes for developing the economy of the city is proposed as the development of tourism³⁹. The poor, unemployed and hopeless masculinities can easily present anger, take place in violent incidents and participate in rightist uprisings, since poverty and unemployment construct one of the strongest material bases of patriarchy.

3.1.3.2 The Rise of Conservatism, Nationalism and Islamism

In the last decade, Trabzon became to be widely recognized with rightist uprisings, murders, and lynching attempts. The most known of these incidents in the last decade are chronologically as follows. In October 2001 journalist Ahmet Ayvacı was attacked by anonymous attackers⁴⁰. In October 2004 McDonalds at the Trabzon city centre was bombed⁴¹ by Yasin Hayal, a member of ultranationalist and Islamist Büyük Birlik Partisi (Great Union Party). The bomber declared that his action aimed people who preferred to continue to eat daytime while Muslims' Fast⁴². In the

³⁸ The economic depression is so strong that, among the solutions offered, there is also an opening of a regional prison. http://www.trabzonhaberajansi.com/haber_detay.asp?haberID=2276, retrieved 27th March 2012. Another proposed solution is the establishment of a hydroelectric power plant that is going to be operated by Trabzonspor. <http://www.ntvmsnbc.com/id/25334022> retrieved 26th March 2012.

³⁹ <http://www.ttso.org.tr/index.php?link=haberdetay&id=3116>, retrieved 27th March 2012.

⁴⁰ <http://bianet.org/bianet/medya/5161-gazeteci-ahmet-ayvaci-dovuldu>, retrieved 19th March 2012.

⁴¹ <http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/ShowNew.aspx?id=267519>, retrieved 19th March 2012.

⁴² <http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/ShowNew.aspx?id=267763>, retrieved 19th March 2012.

following two years, Asst. Prof. Dr. Hicabi Cındık⁴³ in 2004, and almost a year later Prof. Saadettin Güner⁴⁴ from Karadeniz Technical University, and his son were assassinated in 2005. Although these last two were not directly political assassinations⁴⁵, since they were murders of scholars executed by local men, they left a nation-wide impact. In 4th April⁴⁶ and 10th April⁴⁷ 2005, there were two consecutive lynching attempts by thousands of people in the Trabzon Atatürk Square, towards members of TAYAD who wanted to spread manifests that protest the poor conditions in prisons. Those people were rescued by the intervention of Police after hours of violence, fight and protest. In August 2005, there was another lynching attempt towards captured members of PKK in Maçka district⁴⁸. In January 2006, a Molotov cocktail was thrown to a teahouse that Kurdish workers from Eastern Anatolia usually spent time⁴⁹. In January 2006 a bomb was left in front of the building of the Trabzon City Headquarters of Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi (Nationalist Movement Party) and its supporting organization ultranationalist Ülkü Ocakları Örgütü (Grey Wolves

⁴³ <http://arsiv.sabah.com.tr/2004/11/29/gun108.html>, retrieved 19th March 2012.

⁴⁴ <http://arsiv.sabah.com.tr/2005/01/09/gnd101.html>, retrieved 19th March 2012.

⁴⁵ Cındık was assassinated because of a debt issue with his business partner and Güner and his son were claimed to be “accidentally” assassinated by gunmen who wanted to murder somebody else.

⁴⁶ <http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/ShowNew.aspx?id=309645>, retrieved 19th March 2012.

⁴⁷ <http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/ShowNew.aspx?id=310732>, retrieved 19th March 2012.

⁴⁸ <http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/ShowNew.aspx?id=344284>, retrieved 19th March 2012.

⁴⁹ <http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/ShowNew.aspx?id=3814782>, retrieved 19th March 2012.

Organization) at the city centre⁵⁰. In January 2006, the automobiles and workplaces of Fatih Tekke and Gökdeniz Karadeniz, football players of Trabzonspor, were attacked with guns⁵¹. A year later, Fatih Tekke's car in Trabzon was shot again, who then was playing at FC Zenith Saint Petersburg⁵². In February 2006, Andrea Santoro, Priest of Santa Maria Catholic Church of Trabzon, was assassinated in the church by a sixteen-year old young Muslim man⁵³. In January 2007, Armenian journalist, founder and director of Armenian-Turkish newspaper Agos, Hrant Dink was assassinated in Istanbul, in front of his newspaper by gunman Ogün Samast (then 17 years old), and his accomplices Yasin Hayal and Erhan Tuncer, all of whom were raised in Trabzon⁵⁴. Samast and Hayal were members of Büyük Birlik Partisi (Great Union Party) and Tuncer was a police informer. These greater-echoing incidents are continued by the countless ones that are normalized as a part of daily life of Trabzon. For example in January 2011, there has been a protest against the TV series Muhteşem Yüzyıl (Magnificent Century) at Atatürk Square at the city centre by hundreds of young men⁵⁵; on the other hand, in May 2011 there was an attack against young people who wanted to perform a street play⁵⁶ and in

⁵⁰ <http://www.radikal.com.tr/haber.php?haberno=177976>, retrieved 19th March 2012.

⁵¹ <http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/printnews.aspx?DocID=3881880>, retrieved 19th March 2012.

⁵² <http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/ShowNew.aspx?id=6219284>, retrieved 19th March 2012.

⁵³ <http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/haber.aspx?id=3892111&tarih=2006-02-05>, retrieved 19th March 2012.

⁵⁴ <http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/ShowNew.aspx?id=5805242>, retrieved 19th March 2012.

⁵⁵ <http://www.ntvmsnbc.com/id/25169255>, retrieved 23rd January 2011.

⁵⁶ http://www.kaosgl.org/icerik/trabzonda_boyle_seyler_olmaz_diyerek_kestirip_atiyorlar, retrieved 4th May 2011.

the same month, supporters of Trabzonspor attacked the election office of moderate Islamist party Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (Justice and Development Party) at Kunduracılar Sokak⁵⁷ at the city centre. There are many incidents, such as violence against women, the prostitutes and the children that the ordinary people experience, naturalized as a part of the daily life in Trabzon⁵⁸. Although not all of the men in Trabzon do actively participate in those incidents, many of them approve them. As noted above, there is a dialectical relationship between these rightist and violent incidents and patriarchal masculinities: each nourishes and nurtures the others.

3.1.3.3 The Opening of the Georgia-Turkey Border

The opening of the Georgian-Turkish border, that is located in Sarp Village of Artvin, in 31st August 1988⁵⁹, with the dissolution of USSR, brought two major sources of change: informal trade of goods that is commonly named “bavul ticareti” (luggage trade) by temporary migrants and sex trade by prostitutes from countries of former USSR and Eastern Bloc. In the beginning the first temporary migrants brought everything they can sell to at the “Rus Pazarları” (Russian Markets) that were set along the districts and

⁵⁷ <http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/ShowNew.aspx?id=17851414> retrieved, 19th March 2012.

⁵⁸ For example, in March 2011, a young girl was severely beaten by her father who claimed she was late home from school. <http://www.ntvmsnbc.com/id/25331539/> retrieved, 19th March 2012. A couple of days later, the beating father was let free, the family of the beaten girl claimed the beat did not create a trauma and demanded their daughter, (who was then kept by the state at an orphanage) back. <http://www.ntvmsnbc.com/id/25332692> retrieved, 21st March 2012. Similarly, in August 2011 the women were beaten by men for reasons such as dislike the food, for being unclean, for listening to music and so on... http://www.sendika.org/yazi.php?yazi_no=39374&ref=halkevleri retrieved 31st August 2011. These examples can easily be augmented.

⁵⁹ Balçı and Ata, 1988, September 1.

provinces throughout the Black Sea coast of Turkey. Then, the poorer women, who had nothing more to sell, began to sell their bodies (Günçikan, 1995; Zengin, 2011). These prostitutes, who experienced severe oppression and subordination, were stigmatized as “Natashas”. Coming forward with its patriarchal masculinities, closeness to the border (both from the sea and the land) and being a centre of the region Trabzon became one of the centres of sex trade in Turkey until the second half of the first decade of the 2000’s.

3.2 METHODOLOGY AND FIELDWORK

3.2.1 Feminist Methodology

In this thesis, I investigate the social construction of masculinities in Trabzon, based on a qualitative fieldwork in the central district of Trabzon, which was conducted between August 2010 and October 2011. In order to critically understand men and masculinities in Trabzon, I employed a feminist methodology. Feminist methodology is not a stable and strictly defined methodology; rather, it is open to endless possibilities. It is a non-hierarchical methodology that the researcher can reflect and problematize her/his own problems in the field; she/he can explore the field from her/his standpoint and the distance between the researcher and the respondents might be removed to a certain extent. Grounding on the ideas of Harding and Reinharz, Hekman emphasises that there is neither a single feminist methodology nor a single approach that encompasses all the methods that can be classified under feminist methodology; rather there are a set of common themes that exist in feminist research (2007, p. 539). Making a similar point, Hesse-Biber outlines the basic qualities of feminist research as follows (2008):

“What makes research feminist lies in the particular set of theoretical perspectives and research questions that places women’s issues, concerns, and lived experiences at the center of research inquiry. Feminist research stresses the importance of considering how gender intersects with other forms of women’s oppression based on the characteristics such as race, ethnicity, class, nationality and so on. Feminist research promotes social justice and works to initiate social change in women’s lives. Feminist research praxis emphasises issues of power and authority between the researcher and the researched, offsetting the influence of these factors through the practice of reflexivity through the research process.” (2008, p. 335).

Feminist methodology primarily involves criticising patriarchal power relations and men and masculinities, being on women and queer people’s side. It enables to present how patriarchal relations are constructed by different masculinities. In the fieldwork, feminist methodology enables using a wide variety of research methods such as participatory observation, survey, interviews, oral history or documentary history.

Since feminism considers “the personal is political”⁶⁰, especially with standpoint feminism, feminist methodology considers the personal lives, experiences and emotions of researcher and the researched as a part of scientific inquiry (Naples, 2007). Hence, feminist methodology allows and pushes the researcher to be self-reflexive in the process of evaluating and writing the data. The implications and comprehensions of these emphases enable to critically investigate and transform various aspects men and masculinities from personal experiences to sexuality, from families to selfhood and socialization.

⁶⁰ This phrase is first expressed in an article by Hanisch in 1969 and became one of the most common mottos of feminism. <http://www.carolhanisch.org/CHwritings/PersonalisPol.pdf>, retrieved 6th April 2012.

On the other hand, the social issue that the social scientist studies generally intersects with the troubles she/he experiences as an individual as Mills points (1967, p. 6). He emphasises that “the sociological imagination enables us to grasp history and biography and the relations between the two in the society” (ibid.). As Mills shows us, the sociology should endeavour to understand and present personal problems as a part of larger social issues. Hence sociological practice becomes a bridge that “the individual can understand his own experience and gauge his own fate only by locating himself in that period, that he can know his own chances in life only by becoming aware of those all individuals in his circumstances” according to Mills (p. 5). These emphases of Mills have two integrated reflections for this study. Firstly, although many respondents spoke about themselves, their experiences and their opinions with a repeating emphasis of insignificance in the interviews, the answers and narratives they provided presents social patterns of masculinities in Trabzon. All the individual narratives take place in the social relations. The individual men that I conducted interviews are a part of contemporary masculinities in Trabzon and at the same time they are a part of current masculinities of Turkey, and masculinities in contemporary capitalist patriarchy. Secondly, this study is an outcome of my individual struggle against and reflections on contemporary patriarchal masculinities, which I am unwillingly a part of because of my gender identity⁶¹. Therefore, this study is both a critical effort towards understanding patriarchal masculinities in Trabzon, and a self-reflexive process that I explore my position as a (pro)feminist male social scientist in a capitalist patriarchal society.

⁶¹ Connell emphasises that even some men might be struggling against patriarchy and/or living in a gender-egalitarian way of life, they also benefit from patriarchy by taking “patriarchal dividend” just because they are men. She adds that therefore many men have a “complicity” relationship with patriarchy, without “being in the frontline troops” of it (2005, p. 79).

3.2.2 The Story of Studying Masculinities in Trabzon

Trabzon was a nation-scale hot spot in my adolescence in the 1990's, with Natashas and the image of ridiculed imagery of "Laz" masculinities, being irrational (and to an extent naïve and dupe), aggressive, sexually demanding and patriarchal. From Istanbul, where I lived that period, Trabzon was reflected as a distant city told with Laz jokes, the mainstream news about Natashas, stories about the once-glorious Trabzonspor, and memories about the misty and green beauty of the landscape of the Black Sea Region. In those narratives, the two main characters of Laz jokes, Temel and his wife Fadime were presented as dupe, irrational, hardnosed and provincial people. Although only a few Trabzonlu people were actually Laz, all of them were stigmatized as so, being pushed into those stereotypes. They had peculiar characters and had a traditional background that drove them to act preposterous, in patriarchal and sometimes violent ways.

In the 1990's, Natasha stories was a major part of those narratives. All the sex workers from the then newly dissolved USSR and Eastern Bloc were immediately began to be stigmatized as Natashas. Those poorer sex workers were appearing in the mainstream media and mockingly told in the colloquial speech as derogatory and immoral women who made prostitution and suitcase trade that polluted the nature of the Black Sea men, who were imagined to be sexually demanding and patriarchal, however quite credulous provincial people, reminiscent to the Temel character of the Laz jokes. Those women were perceived different than the local people: they were physically different, perceived as sexually appealing and known to be higher educated. Moreover, Natashas had been coming from the former

USSR and the Eastern Block, which were perceived as the natural enemies of the state. Men's experiences about Natashas were told as if they were a conquest and a massive rape of communism. Even so, Natashas and suitcase traders existed in Istanbul beside us, in neighbourhoods such as Laleli too. Nevertheless, the narratives about the things that happened in Istanbul were quite similar to those in Trabzon. These were what we heard of Natashas in Trabzon. I remember myself perceiving the situation of Natashas quite tragic and men's narratives and attitudes about their experiences quite repulsive.

In another way, Trabzon also had a fairly nationalist image from Istanbul. It was the period of the post September 12 1980 coup period and nationalism was on the rise with issues such as the conflicts with the PKK (Kurdistan Workers Party), the mafia related counter-guerrilla and "deep state" organizations and as an echo of all these, the rightist politicians who liked to expose their nationalist actions and ideas whenever possible. Then, the rightist uprisings and murders had not re-started after the 1970's incidents. From Istanbul, the reflections of these on Trabzon were embodied as Mehmet Ali Yılmaz, the nationalist then-president of Trabzonspor and Ünal Karaman, nationalist then-footballer of Trabzonspor⁶² with his long leaning-down moustaches symbolizing his well-known sympathy for Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi. Then, the rise of nationalism was also a quite hot issue and in my life, it was perceived as a quite significant danger of moving towards fascism.

⁶² While this thesis was being written, Karaman, who had become a technical director, was the second manager and trainer of Trabzonspor football team, as the assistant of Şenol Güneş. <http://www.trabzonspor.org.tr/default.asp?Sayfa=Personel&IND=8#Icerik>, retrieved 5th June 2012.

In addition to those narratives, Trabzon had a special place in my family history, because of the tales about my grandfather who had worked in the construction of the old Black Sea Coastal Road and the Trabzon Airport in the late 1950's as an engineer. In those tales were the stubborn and unreasonable patriarchal provincial Black Sea people. Those memories reflected Trabzonlular as strange but warm people. From the life of a teenage boy in Istanbul in the 1990's, those narratives, in other words the "Trabzon erkekleri" (Trabzon men) and the "Trabzon erkekligi" (Trabzon masculinity) represented in the Laz jokes, the Natashas, the stories about rightist sportspeople and family memories were distant but impressive, leaving their stamp in my mind. I unconsciously retained those in my mind, until I recognized them back many years later, when I began to seek a place to study the social construction of masculinities.

My initial consideration of masculinities, as a formulated problem in social sciences dates back to 2001, when, in a summer vacation, I came across a friend who was reading a translation of *The Hazards of Being Male* (1996) of male liberationist Goldberg, while I was studying philosophy at the university. Goldberg pointed that patriarchy also harmed men. Then, I did not know much about feminism or gender. However, I had been quite disturbed and unpleasant with the patriarchal roles attributed to men and quite upset with women's conditions since my childhood, and trying to live my life in a gender-egalitarian way. I believed masculinities must be changed, in order to do that they had to be criticised. Hence, in my master's in anthropology at Hacettepe University I studied the socio-cultural construction of male identity, at a gecekondu neighbourhood in Ankara with a psychoanalytical approach, focusing on male initiation rituals⁶³.

⁶³ see Bozok, 2005.

During the pre-thesis period of my doctoral process, I always kept an interest on criticism of patriarchal masculinities. I developed a deeper interest in feminist theories and feminist studies. In the doctoral process in sociology, my interest in the wider spectrum of the social construction of masculinities drove me to study this issue. In my search for a proper location for fieldwork I recognized the story above.

Trabzon had a quite patriarchal image and the rightist and traditional tendencies existing in the city emphasised that patriarchal quality. Similarly, Meeker, who had conducted an invaluable research in the Of District of Trabzon in the 1960's, pointed to similar tendencies, as one of the starting points of his research: "I had been specifically attracted to the Eastern Black Sea coast by the reputation of its inhabitants. They were said to be unusually conservative in their social relations, but nonetheless successful as officials, professionals, and entrepreneurs" (2001, p. 5). Moreover, in the last years, the almost-trademark Trabzon erkekleri (Trabzon men) came into prominence, with their patriarchal qualities than the masculinities of many other cities, in Turkey (Bozok, 2012).

In the days which I decided to study Trabzon, the city again had come into the prominence in Turkey, with the second half of the 2000's, this time with the rightist uprisings, the decline of Natashas and the accustomed violence of Trabzon erkekleri (Trabzon men) in the daily life. Keeping in mind the rise of rightism⁶⁴ and unemployment⁶⁵ on one hand and on the other hand the sex trade and men's naturalized daily violence enforces and feeds from patriarchal masculinities, I decided to study the social construction of masculinities in Trabzon.

⁶⁴ See Bora, 2009.

⁶⁵ Öncü points that "the unemployed men brings fascism" (2002).

3.2.3. The Story of the Interviews

My previous acquaintances with the Black Sea people and Trabzon as a city were quite limited. Before the entrance into the field, I neither had an informant, nor there was a person I knew before in Trabzon. Moreover, I had not even wandered on the streets of the city before. Therefore, my initial encounter with the field has been a totally new entrance. During the fieldwork, I had begun to live in Artvin. I began to investigate the social construction of masculinities in Trabzon by going to Trabzon from Artvin in the mid-week, conducting my field study and going back to Artvin on Mondays. In all of my travels to the field, I accommodated at the state guesthouses near the city centre. Staying in the city centre during the fieldwork enabled me to observe the daily life of Trabzon people. I woke up early in the morning and until late at night, I observed the people of the city, made interviews, participated in the city life, wandered in the streets of various neighbourhoods, spent some time in the tea gardens with Trabzon erkekleri (Trabzon men) and took fieldnotes. I tried to feel and understand the times, spatial organization, manners, embodiment and the daily language of the city.

Beginning in the end of August 2010 until October 2011, I conducted interviews with 43 men⁶⁶ from Trabzon. All of those respondents defined themselves as “Trabzon erkeği” and spoke in the name of “Trabzon erkekleri” (Trabzon men) and a masculinity that is commonly called by them as the “Trabzon erkeklığı” (Trabzon masculinity). All of the interviews took place in the central district of Trabzon. I found majority of the respondents

⁶⁶ See Appendix A for Table of Respondents.

randomly⁶⁷, directly asking if I could make an interview with them on “Trabzon erkekligi” (Trabzon masculinity) for my thesis at METU. Also, to be representative of the city, the respondents’ occupations and monthly family incomes’ were chosen to present a wide range. In order to learn the approximate monthly income⁶⁸ of the respondents, I gave them a chart with to tick the income categories⁶⁹. According to their statements, the approximate monthly family income of the respondents vary from no income of an unemployed respondent to 4000-6000TL of entrepreneur⁷⁰ respondents and 10000-15000TL of a businessman respondent. Amongst the respondents, there are shopkeepers, workers, labour unionists, businesspeople, imams, teachers, lawyers, students and unemployed and retired people (see Appendix A). These men provide a wide-angled picture of the masculinities in Trabzon. The fieldwork was ended after a

⁶⁷ The only exceptions for this random sampling are the two lawyer respondents whom I met through my father in law who is also a lawyer who knew them, and the one police respondent, whom I met through a colleague in Artvin, who was his friend.

⁶⁸ I wanted to learn approximate and real income in order to understand the respondent, rather than having precise and exact information of their income.

⁶⁹ The categories of monthly family income chart were as follows: Under 100TL; 100 – 500TL; 100 – 500TL; 500 – 1.000TL; 1.000 – 1.500TL; 1.500 – 2.000TL; 2.000 – 3.000TL; 3.000 – 4.000TL; 4.000 – 6.000TL; 6.000 – 8.000TL; 8.000 – 10.000TL; 10.000 – 15.000TL; 15.000 – 20.000TL; and Over 20.000TL. On the other hand, as of 1st February 2011, in the middle of the fieldwork, the currency rates were as follows: 1USD = 1,754TL; 1TL = 0.570USD. http://www.xe.com/ict/?basecur=USD&historical=true&month=2&day=1&year=2012&sort_by=name&image.x=38&image.y=7, Retrieved, 19th April 2012.

⁷⁰ In the economy of Trabzon, tea and hazelnut production keeps a notable place. The production of these products does not require intensive labour, except putting fertilizers and harvesting. Many of the inhabitants of Trabzon still have ties with the rural where agricultural production is exercised. Many of the people in Trabzon own tea gardens or hazelnut fields or both, of which they earn an income. There are very few beggars in the city centre. Therefore, although they might be unemployed or impoverished, the continuation of the growth of these market products prevents the inhabitants of the city to fall into absolute poverty.

“saturation” was reached (Kvale, 1996) and a repeating pattern of masculinities in Trabzon emerged with parallel answers and similar stories.

In the contemporary gender order, the global capitalist patriarchy, since the breadwinner role is more influential in the power mechanisms of patriarchy, the men in the active workforce are the active and primary agents of this gender order. Adult men form that category. In order to understand how these active agents of patriarchy socially construct their masculinities, I made interviews with adult and working men. The exceptions are the two students, four retired and one unemployed people, who are added to represent the rest of the men. On the other hand, the ages of the respondents range from 20's to 70's (see Appendix A).

In the fieldwork, I made three types of interviews. The primary body of data of this thesis was collected from twenty eight face to face semi-structured in-depth interviews with Trabzon erkekleri (Trabzon men). Many authors, such as Bailey (1987), Bryne (2004) and Denzin and Ryan (2007) emphasise the flexible nature of qualitative interviews. Therefore, beginning from the fieldwork, I used a flexible interview guideline rather than a stable question form, in order to reveal the respondents' perception and the ways of construction of masculinities, I asked new questions, sometimes used informal speaking, often changed the order of the questions due to the flow of the interview, or occasionally reformulated the questions. In these in-depth interviews, I asked the respondents questions on their wealth, their education, their identity, how they perceive masculinity, their emotions, their sexualities, their families, violence, gender division of labour, and their opinions about the rightist incidents and the Natashas in Trabzon.

In the preparation for fieldwork, I planned to ask questions the respondents' opinions on queer people in the final part of the interviews, in order to

reveal heterosexism, homophobia and transphobia. However, since many of the respondents showed off to be quite patriarchal from the beginning of the interviews and displayed a very homophobic/transphobic image, I could not even intend to ask those questions, with the exception of a few interviews. These exceptions are also meaningful. There were only five respondents I was able to ask questions on this issue. Two of them were heterosexual students, who were amongst the organizers of the Anti-Homophobia Meetings of LGBTTT organization Kaos GL in 2010 and 2011 in Trabzon; one was the first open gay football referee in Turkey. Only two of the respondents I could be able to ask questions about queer people were ordinary heterosexual laymen, who expressed their contempt to homosexual people with quite short sentences. In those two interviews, I could only ask what they thought about “homoseksüeller” (homosexuals). This opened the possibility of asking that almost-taboo question to my respondents. At the same time, in the daily Turkish language, this word was used to cover all the queer people to a certain extent. Asking my question in this way enabled me to see the expression of heterosexism to a certain degree.

The interview guideline presented in Appendix B presents the general course of interview questions that are asked in the fieldwork. After I began the fieldwork, the answers to the interviews began to present the pattern of masculinities in Trabzon with a few interviews. Also I made five expert interviews, one with a lawyer about the divorces, one with a police officer about the crimes, and three with imams about the religious attitudes in the city. On the other hand, I made eleven unstructured interviews on Trabzon, about the city, its social life and the incidents that took place and Trabzon erkekleri (Trabzon men) on the qualities and how they express themselves,

with the men I met in the streets, in the parks and in the public transport minibuses.

The finding of a suitable respondent for many of the interviews had a random quality. In many interviews, I just asked a man to make an interview and after his approval I began asking my questions. After explaining my reason for interviews, although a few rejected, many of the men I asked agreed to participate in this research. The interviews approximately took 35 to 115 minutes, of which majority of in-depth interviews took more than an hour, with the exception of unstructured interviews, that were shorter. Excluding the unstructured interviews, all of the interviews are recorded using a voice recorder. The data from unstructured interviews were saved with fieldnotes after the interviews and the voice recordings of in-depth interviews and the expert interviews were transcribed after the end of the field research. Only two respondents, who were an imam and the other a police officer, did not allow me to record the interviews, claiming their official positions. In all the interviews, after the initial meeting and taking permission for recording the interview, I put my voice recorder visible on the table, opened it, and began asking the questions. In order to keep the privacy of the respondents, all of the names and some of the actual occupations of the respondents are changed, using nicknames that are chosen to represent their identities according to their social, political or religious positions or statuses. Unless the respondent allowed me to use her/his real name or the respondent is a well-known person, I did not use the respondent's real name or occupation (see Appendix A).

After I began to discover and explore the city by wandering in the public areas and making some interviews, I began to learn the proper times and locations for interviewing and understanding masculinities in Trabzon. During the fieldwork, I generally made two or three in-depth interviews and

a number of unstructured interviews in a day. The hours of the interviews reflect the daily rhythm of the masculinities in Trabzon. I discovered that the most available times to make an in-depth interview that could usually take more than an hour requires the men to be free to talk. Hence, the times of the interviews have been mostly in the morning when the workplaces of men were just opened and the customers did not begin to rush in, and the mid-afternoon when the work-out hour, had not begun. These are the hours when the men start to appear in the public sphere, and/or enjoy the pleasures of short periods of rest.

Trabzon is a small and conservative city. The inhabitants of the city quickly notice the strangers. The “undesired” strangers, in other words Kurds, non-Muslims and queer people are kept away from the social relations. The Kurds are often told to be disallowed in the city centre, by many respondents⁷¹. This is reflected in the social scientific research and Trabzon emerges as an unsafe field for research. In the beginning of the fieldwork, a bookstore employee whom I offered to make an interview in Uzun Sokak, a pedestrian street in the city centre smiled with a threatening bitter sarcasm told me that Trabzon could never allow a study on masculinities; and refused to make an interview. Months later, at the end of the fieldwork, when I met him again in the same store of which I had entered to ask for some notebooks, he recognized me and threateningly mocked with me about my research. Similarly, Alpaslan, one of the respondents who openly answered my questions, said “some scientists who tried to ask questions in the city square were kicked out by local boys a couple of years ago” in the end of the interview. In another interview, Muhsin considered the two

⁷¹ Getting there early in the morning, at 6 o'clock, I observed the gathering of the Kurdish workers at the labour market that is located in front of the MHP (Nationalist Movement Party) and Greywolves Organization Trabzon Headquarters building eve

successive violent lynching attempts against the TAYAD members in the Atatürk Square, that he said he had witnessed, which about two thousand people participated, as “önemsiz bir itiş kakış” (an insignificant scuffle). These incidents force the researcher to be cautious in the field where he/she is simply spotted.

In this study, all of the interviews took place in the public sphere: in the teagardens, in the parks, in the coffeeshouses, in labour unions, in mosques, in the offices of political parties and in their workplaces. This publicness has led to a series of consequences. Principally, the men control the public sphere, which is the field of superstructure, in which economic actions that shape the rest of the society take place. Consequently public sphere is perceived as men’s area in the patriarchal societies, than women’s (A. Bora, 1997; Walby, 1992). The men tend to spend majority of their time in the public sphere than the private sphere. Unlike many sociological researches that focus on women or includes surveys with women, which would allow the researcher to conduct at least a part of the field research at the private sphere, interviewing men forces the researcher to conduct the fieldwork in the public sphere. During my fieldwork, I could neither make interviews at the private sphere, nor was I invited there like a female researcher studying women would have been.

3.2.4 A Note on Politically Correct Narratives of Masculinities

Although every man engage in the (re)production of patriarchy and benefit from the oppression and subordination of women and the queer people (Connell, 2005, pp. 79-80), many of them do not like talking about their patriarchal actions to the “strangers” in Turkey. Certainly, this category of “stranger” and/or “outsider” also includes social scientists who are generally

thought to have aims to reveal the “pure” and “innocent” actions and ideas of local people to other people and who are considered to have hidden malicious agendas. As A. Bora and Üstün point, in many cases, the men speak about common beliefs and values on gender by enveloping them in a series of clichés (2010, pp. 49-50). On the other hand, the men reproduce patriarchy by boasting about their patriarchal actions in homosocial relations, in other words, in men’s friendships and in “men’s talk”. Contrary to the solidaristic and empowering dialogues between women, that is generally conceptualized as “sisterhood” in (radical) feminism (Gamble, 2004b, pp. 315-316; Humm, 2002, p. 268; Tong, 2009, p. 24) which include the sharing of troubles, unjust treatment and problems of daily life, the “men’s talk” comprises of performances and narratives of the strength, success and appraisal of masculinities. In line with this, the men draw a line between the “strangers” (or outsiders) to whom they do not tend to express themselves and those they consider fellow comrades to whom they talk about and perform their masculinities. This is a line of intimacy for patriarchal masculinities. The intimacy of masculinities prevents them to speak about their actions and ideas but enables them to act and think freely in their sphere under the protection of the other men and the whole masculinity in general. Reflecting the Turkish proverb “kol kırılır yen içinde kalır”⁷² (literally, the arm gets broken but stays in the sleeve), the men tend to keep the incidents of masculinities hidden from the outsiders, who may disturb or force to change them, to protect, continue and reproduce their values, ideas and ways of living. The men tend to reflect their patriarchal side to people whom they feel “brotherhood” of complicity, or on subjects they feel safe to talk about. This has also occurred in the fieldwork of this thesis.

⁷² This proverb emphasises the intergroup incidents are kept (and should be kept) in the group without revealing to the outsiders.

Before starting the fieldwork, considering their image for being strongly and explicitly patriarchal men, I expected the Trabzon erkekleri (Trabzon men) would be eager to show up, narrate and perform their patriarchal sides. In the interviews, the open expressions of patriarchal masculinities took place after initial narrations of gender equality. In the beginning of the interviews, almost every respondent tried to present himself as an egalitarian man with statements of learned clichés of gender equality, in answering the first question on gender, “are women and the men equal according to you?”; and tried to conceal the patriarchal qualities of himself in the face of the researcher. In the fieldwork most of the openly patriarchal expressions came after some confidence was set in the interview with a few “safe” questions⁷³. Most of these initial responses have been politically correct narratives of gender equality. After these initial statements, many patriarchal enunciations came out. For example, Cihangir a lawyer in his fifties said that:

“Formally, in front of the law, there can be no difference between a man and a woman. Legally it is so. I support that too. But there are different treatments for women and there are different treatments for the men. The women are plainly incapable than the men. How can this incapability of the women than men be? That depends on from one person to another. But if we give an example from driving vehicles in traffic, I am in the opinion that the men can give more proper decisions. On the other hand, I believe that the women are more prejudiced [he moans], more weak and let’s say more different.”

Similarly, another respondent Ayhan, a high school headmaster who claimed that he supported gender equality began by saying “being teachers, we are strictly against the segregation of women and the men in education.” However, afterwards he maintained that:

⁷³ As noted above, the initial questions of the interview have been on wealth, marital status and life standards (see Appendix C).

“The women and the men are not equal. Culturally the women and the men cannot be equal. Islam does not allow the men and the women to be equal. The Turkish culture does not consider the equality of the men and the women and the men. The male superior culture is very dominant.”

In the same interview, Ayhan later confessed that in the past he had beaten his wife several times.

İsmet, a then newly married worker in furniture industry replied that question directly, saying “The women and the men are equal”. However, later in the interview he told that he bought all the furniture and the home electronics himself without asking his wife:

“I decided to buy all the furniture and the home electronics myself. I bought the carpets and the furniture. I bought the washing machine. I bought the refrigerator. I bought the carpet cleaning machine. I bought them alone, for my family.”

In the same interview, İsmet also stated that “a woman can be beaten if necessary”.

Likely, another respondent, Latif, a retired old man said that “The men and the women are equal” and told that after the death of his father they shared the land he used to own with his sisters equally. But even he was less patriarchal (to an extent) he made patriarchal statements by adding that

“...The men and the women are like each other. Equal I mean... How can I say... In order to continue the breed, the women must make children.”

Perhaps, the most striking example of political correctness turning into harsh patriarchy was the interview with Miraç, an old and religious watch repairer. In that lengthy interview, he mostly made a speech that can be considered as liberal feminism, emphasising the significance of education

and providing the equal opportunities for women. In the end of that interview, he said the following:

“I am saying that your primary duty is making your man happy. I have a friend, who says that a little rudely. He says “your duty is being the bitch of your man”. The woman is the sex slave of the man.”

And he finished the interview, adding words of a patriarchal and offensive narration of sexuality.

Another notable point on the field research is that some of the respondents expressed directly patriarchal statements after questions on specific issues. Those have been the questions on relations with Natashas, rightist incidents in Trabzon, violence against women, men’s families and gender division of labour. These are the subjects that have strong relations with patriarchy. The respondents’ statements on those issues reveal the patriarchal qualities of Trabzon masculinity.

These cases of political correctness are a part of the patriarchal masculinities in general and Trabzon masculinity in particular. In the interviews, I paid attention to the moments of silence, hesitation, excitement, aggression, suspicion, aggression, misunderstandings and to the moments when their body language changed and become more bustling or calmed down. I took notes on the attitudes of the respondents and reflected those to my analysis of masculinities in Trabzon. Since these are culturally and socially driven actions, they cannot be interpreted as totally individual acts or psychological states. Besides the explicit expressions, they present patterns and reflect the implicit expressions of patriarchy. In consequence, the implicit and explicit expressions of patriarchy on the issues, the spatiality and embodiment, the politically

correct narratives, the families, the domestic and the sexual and emotional lives of men, and the politics and the sports formed the body of this thesis.

3.2.5 Of Those, Whose Stories Are Told

Studying masculinities creates particular conditions in the field research. The main methodological difference is that in a typical feminist research, the central gender role is related to women. The researcher, who is generally a woman, establishes empathy with the problems of the respondents, in order to contribute to the struggle of the emancipation or empowerment of women (Hekman, 2007; Naples, 2007; Neuman, 2006, pp. 152-155). In that typical feminist field research, generally both of the sides aim to overcome patriarchy. On the other hand, the researcher and the researched relationship has a different balance in (pro)feminist criticism of patriarchal men and masculinities by a male researcher.

The (pro)feminist researcher aims to criticise the people generally in the gender same as himself. He reflects and criticises both his patriarchal qualities and those of the researched men and masculinities' in the field. The most crucial point is that during the field research, he generally faces the people he aims to criticise and change: the men like him. Although this field provides a ground for self-reflection and criticism, this standpoint disables the researcher to establish empathy with the researched men's content for being patriarchal male human beings. Therefore, the male (pro)feminist researcher faces patriarchal men who consciously oppress and subordinate women and queer people. On the other hand, despite the patriarchal men openly oppress and subordinate the women and queer people, they often do not like to speak about that to strangers openly, including the social scientists, even they might be in the same gender with

themselves. The researcher has to develop strategies to overcome those situations. These issues have also been the case in my field research in Trabzon.

In the course of the fieldwork, I found myself on the same the side with women and the queer people, whom I listened the stories of their oppression and subordination from the oppressors. I felt a deep sorrow for the women and the queer people and condemnation against those men. I struggled a lot with criticising them directly or not, while listening to the respondents, who told opinions and experiences that I totally disapprove. After each interview I was packed with stories of oppression and subordination of women and the queer people, and I went to the new interviews with the load of those. During the fieldwork, I met and made interviews with men who easily and freely admitted they beat their wives (or sex workers) for some reason, who believed the women were not equal with men, who went to prostitutes, who praised cheating their wives with prostitutes, who stated they despised and hated the queer people... On the other hand, I was to investigate how these men construct their masculinities. I could never establish empathy with those people. I had to be patient and hide my negative emotions against those patriarchal men. In this path, facing the patriarchal men I was criticising, I had to develop techniques to obtain answers for my questions. My initial precaution was about my appearance. I always tried to wear neutral, in other words casual clothing⁷⁴ to become invisible and not obstruct the encounters and expressions in the field. On the other hand, during the meetings and interviews, I tried to use a casual language in order to communicate more easily with the men whom I spoke to. Usually I addressed the respondents

⁷⁴ I generally wore black shoes, blue jeans, an informal shirt, dark coloured pullover or plain coloured t-shirt in warmer weather.

informally calling them “abi” (older brother), using an informal “sen” (“you”, second person singular) language, rather than a formal and distant “siz” (“you”, second person plural) language in the field. In this way, the respondents got the false impression that they were speaking to a man like themselves and expressed ideas and experiences to an alien social scientist they would possibly never meet again. These two strategies made possible to obtain answers, by enabling me to seemingly act to approve the respondents’ patriarchal attitudes and actions, although I never expressed anything to approve them. I did not do those in order to “cheat” the respondents or to induce them to speak more. Since “abi” is a culturally valid word for addressing men amongst men in Anatolia, it removes the distance and hierarchy between the researcher and the respondents. However, my effort for removing this distance never meant to be like the respondents, or approving them, since no distant or warm way of speaking can justify the oppressors and disapprove the oppressed.

CHAPTER 4

CATHEXIS: EMOTIONAL AND SEXUAL LIVES OF MASCULINITIES IN TRABZON

4.1 INTRODUCTION

The relations, choices and orientations concerning emotionality and sexuality are of the core elements, which construct masculinities. Emotional and sexual spheres are primarily two intimate, psychic and reproductive fields of actors' lives. Moreover, they are dialectically interrelated spheres which the gendered actors experience patriarchy, and construct their gender identities. The individual actors' experiences, expressions and attitudes in terms of the spheres of emotions and sexualities are constructed and shaped by the capitalist patriarchal gender order. The individual actors individually experience the emotions and the sexualities with and in relation to others, in a social environment that bears the stamp of the already existing gender order.

Connell discusses emotions and sexuality in terms of the structure *cathexis*. Talking about the social nature of sexuality in *Gender and Power*, she describes her usage of the concept "cathexis" as follows:

"Freud used the term 'cathexis' to refer to a psychic charge or instinctual energy being attached to a mental object, i.e., an idea or image. Here I am generalizing it to the construction of emotionally charged social relations with 'objects' (i.e. other people) in the real world. As with Freud's usage, it is

important to note that the emotional attachment may be hostile not only affectionate.” (1987, p. 112).

In *Masculinities*, broadening the emphasis to queer people, she adds that

“...when we consider desire in Freudian terms, as emotional energy being attached to an object, its gendered character is clear. This is true both for heterosexual and homosexual desire.” (2005, p. 74).

In this manner, in *Gender and Power*, following Freud, Connell is firstly referring to sexuality but expands Freud’s notion to “emotionally charged social relations”. She discusses cathexis in terms of the issues related to desire attached to an object. Connell’s Freudian emphasis continues in her later studies *Masculinities* (2005[1995], pp. 74-75) and *The Men and the Boys* (2002, pp. 25-26). In all of these three studies, she defines cathexis using the same words: “emotional energy being attached to an object” (2002, p. 25; 2005, p. 74). The desire, that cathexis is involved about, can present any sexual or social orientation (2005, p. 74). In brief, Connell’s conceptualization of cathexis can be defined as the emotional and the sexual energy attached to an object. Connell emphasises that since desire, emotion and sexuality are gendered, the practices that shape and realize desire are crucial aspects of gender order (2005, p. 74). In Connell’s approach, the social organization of cathexis presents significant clues about the capitalist patriarchal gender order. The (conscious and unconscious) emotional and sexual attachment to particular objects and the detachment to other particular objects define the cathexis. In this manner, homosociality, heterosexism, homophobia and transphobia are all results of the patriarchal organization of cathexis. However, in Connell’s approach, the notion of cathexis largely emphasises the psychic, rather than the social aspects of emotional and sexual fields.

Here, I am going to expand Connell's debate on cathexis focusing on the social aspects. I am going to consider cathexis covering a broader sense of the emotional and the sexual spheres. I am going to embrace a number of issues: firstly, the palette of emotions which men tend to express and how they present them; secondly, men's relationships and the content of those relationships; and finally men's sexual attachment and detachment to object(s) of desire. Cathexis involves the social abilities and performances to (un)express emotions, as well as the friend and partner choice, and the content of intimate relationships as well as the exclusion of homosexuals and the queer people. Therefore we may state that cathexis presents configuring practices, while constructing masculinities¹. These configuring practices are shaped socially and culturally. In terms of this schema of cathexis, the wider fields of men's emotional and sexual lives, and more significantly, how the men construct their masculinities and their dominance and hegemony over the women and the queer people can be understood.

Commonly accepted cliché narratives on the qualities of the masculinities in Trabzon form the showcase of the cathexis, giving significant clues to the organization and social construction of it. Trabzon erkekleri (Trabzon men) proudly like to be known for their "emotionally expressive" and "sexually demanding" character. In the beginning of interviews, when I told a potential respondent that I was conducting a doctoral research on Trabzon masculinity, before even asking a question, every time I faced with a set of qualities that define the local masculinities. This commonly used set of clichés, which both the actors themselves and many outsiders, are used to define "Trabzon erkekleri" (Trabzon men) or in a more generalizing manner "Trabzon erkeği" (Trabzon masculinity). Its components being used fully or

¹ see Connell, 2005, p. 44 for gender configurations.

partially, this set includes many characteristics directly related to cathexis. For example Kâmil listed those qualities all in one breath:

“Trabzon erkekleri (Trabzon men) are warm-hearted and hospitable. However, they get quickly exasperated. Trabzon erkeği acts spontaneously and does not think the outcomes of his actions. When Trabzonspor comes, we forget everything. We, Trabzon erkekleri (Trabzon men), are devoted to our country, our nation and our families.”

Sadri defined Trabzon erkekleri (Trabzon men) with pride as follows:

“Trabzon erkeği (a Trabzon man) is acrimonious, passionate and ambitious. He acts recklessly. He is a tough guy. He has a strong ambition to carrying and using guns. He is devoted to his country and nation.”

Similarly, Necat defined Trabzon erkeği (a Trabzon man) as follows:

“Trabzon erkeği (a Trabzon man) is a man dedicated firstly to his country and nation, then to his family. Then comes his main ambition Trabzonspor...”

Miraç sketched Trabzon erkeği as follows:

“Trabzon erkeği (a Trabzon man)... is a hectic man. He does not hesitate to use violence. He is a tough guy. He is devoted to his country and nation. He is devoted to his family. He is dedicated to his dick. But what else... He is warm-hearted, frank and helpful. For us, our religion comes first. Is it because of its air, weather or the anchovy we eat, we are as such.”

Cihangir, who was a restless and aggressive man that constantly moved on his chair during the interview, said

“[Trabzon erkeği] never stands back against the society. He is warm hearted. He protects his friends, fellow countrymen. Trabzon erkeği never thinks “why I am doing that” when doing something. He thinks his ideas are true and indisputable. He is strictly dedicated to his family. I mean he thinks his ideas are completely and perpetually right. Saying “I am right!” and “My ideas are

right!” he supports himself against society. This is because he is devoted to his values, nothing else!...”

On the other hand, Ercan openly said that

“Trabzon erkeği is patriarchal. I don’t know either because of its air or water, but it is as such... We are as such... We try to do what we saw from our fathers. We never let anyone cast a slur on our families and our honour. Trabzon erkeği is aggressive. He acts rashly. Many of them carry guns. He does not hesitate to use it when necessary. If he is going to use the gun, he does this without thinking too much. Usually he gets sad afterwards. But he never thinks on it while doing that. Because... How can I say... He is a “sensitive” man about his honour and country. We, being Trabzon erkekleri (Trabzon men), get quickly flared up. We are as such at work as well as at home. I do not know if the people whom you are going to meet will speak frankly but... Trabzon erkeği is not sissy at home. We do not do housework, since there are the ladies who are to do. It is wrong. The women and the men are equal. I know. But every one of us smack when we get angry to our wives. I have done such things too. Therefore we are patriarchal unfortunately. We have to change... Trabzon erkekleri (Trabzon men) are conservative. However, we are warm hearted, helpful and talkative. We love totally when we love someone. We protect and watch over the people we love. That is to say, real Trabzon erkeği is a straightforward guy. There are many things said about us... In the past Trabzon erkeği went to Natashas. We all went to Natasha, when we were lads, when we were not married... That is nothing bad. Trabzon erkeği is devoted to his sexuality.”

These definitions, which can be easily augmented, are generalizable to many men in Trabzon. Many respondents reiterated similar qualities in the interviews. The Trabzon erkekleri (Trabzon men) are generally define themselves as “heyecanlı” (feverish), “yerinde duramayan, kıpır kıpır” (restless), agresif (aggressive), “çabuk parlayan ve çabuk sönen” (quickly gets exasperated and quickly gets calmed), “yaptığı işin sonuçlarını düşünmeden hareket eden” (irrational), “sıcak kanlı” (warm-hearted),

“konuşkan” (talkative), “giyim-kuşamına düşkün” (devoted to his clothing), “bakımlı” (well-groomed) “silah kullanmaya ve silah taşımaya çok meraklı” (dedicated to using and carrying guns), “ailesine çok değer veren” (devoted to his family), “Trabzonspor fanatığı” (fanatic supporter of Trabzonspor), “vatanına-milletine aşırı düşkün” (devoted to his country and nation), “dinine bağlı” (pious) and more significantly, as nearly everyone emphasise, “duygularını anında ortaya koymaktan çekinmeyen” (emotionally expressive in a presumptuous and bold manner) and “cinselliğine düşkün” (devoted to his sexuality) people. This set, which is primarily composed of socially constructed cliché qualities, indicates that the masculinities in Trabzon try to perceive and present themselves as extroverted and emotionally expressive males, at least at the common sense epistemological level.

In this context, surrounded by the clichés, the cathectic organization of masculinities in Trabzon that I am going to discuss below, presents a particularistic configuration that reflects the contemporary capitalist patriarchal gender order in the city. The masculinities in Trabzon experience cathexis in terms of restricted emotional expressiveness of men, homosocial relations which non-personal issues such as politics, business and football are shared, besides the oppression of women through paid sexual relations with Natashas and the humiliation of Trabzon women, and the exclusion of queer people.

4.2 EMOTIONAL LIVES AND INTERPERSONAL RELATIONS OF MEN

As authors such as Lupton (2002) and Seidler (1991; 1994) emphasise, especially in the western literature, the men are generally related to rational and emotionless qualities, compared to women who are related to natural and emotional qualities. In this duality, the cathectic grounds of men’s

hegemony, violence and pseudo-strength came from that emotionlessness state. Lupton stresses that the men are typically accepted as emotionally more raw, blind and less sensitive (2002, p. 170). Similarly, being a practicing psychiatrist who focuses on men's problems, Gratch even emphasises that the greatest problem of men is that they lost their abilities to become conscious of and express their emotions (2002).

The actors' palettes of emotions, in terms of what and how they perceive, repress or express them reflect the social and cultural order. For example, in many patriarchal societies, the emotional expressiveness of men is not a socially accepted manner. It is to say that in the common expression in many patriarchal societies, the men are expected to show up "no sissy stuff" and conceal all their emotions that can be related to women (Brannon, as cited in Badinter, 1995, p. 130; Seidler, 1991; Whitehead, 2007, pp. 168-177). The emotional expressiveness is related to weakness and vulnerability of men (Lupton, 2002, p. 170-171). The men are expected to be rational and hide what they feel. As a result, the socially accepted set of emotions for the men is quite limited. The men generally tend to express emotions, such as aggression, courage or arrogance that construct them as powerful actors and conceal emotions such as fear, anxiety, or even love that might present them "weak" and "less manly" men.

Providing examples from western cases, Lupton emphasises that there is no single hegemonic masculinity that defines how men should emotionally act (2002, p. 170). Similarly, in some periphery regions, such as the Mesoamerican (Gutmann, 1996) or Mediterranean (Herzfeld, 1988) societies, the men are encouraged to express their emotions, although they are quite patriarchal. The ground of expressing a number of emotions in a patriarchal society does not mean that there is the social and cultural ground for men's emotional expressiveness. The palette of socially

accepted and concealed emotions of men reflects the cultural dynamics and social necessities of the existing capitalist patriarchal gender regime.

As noted above, masculinities in Trabzon like to present themselves as emotionally expressive actors. However, merely the state of emotional expressiveness does not construct masculinities in Trabzon as vulnerable, sensitive and/or empathetic actors, since Trabzon erkekleri (Trabzon men) construct themselves as reckless, bold and patriarchal actors by means of their emotional palettes. There are two primary dimensions of emotions of men: firstly, *what men think and feel emotionally* and secondly, *what men do to express their emotions*.

Nearly all of the respondents acted to be straightforward people. They tried to construct their outspoken and so that manly qualities on this straightforwardness. However, as well as stating the existence of this culturally laden (and supported) emotional expressiveness, its social outcomes should be investigated. Murat who emphasisingly acted to be quite extrovert stated “The men [of Trabzon] can express their emotions freely” and continued:

“Trabzon erkeği is very open in expressing his emotions. Trabzon erkeği is very outspoken and frank. I mean he can frankly clearly say what he wants to say.”

This state of comfort and ease is more a social and cultural freedom of men to act in the public sphere, on the ground of the existing capitalist patriarchy. Another respondent Celil said:

“Trabzon erkekleri (Trabzon men)...we like to express our emotions. Our nature, including myself, is as such. We are impatient men. We cannot be patient to listen to others. We say what we want to say. We cannot stand criticisms. That is because of the culture here.”

This state allows the men to experience and reproduce their dominant gender identities. Indeed, another respondent, Fethi who said that

“We, Trabzon erkekleri (Trabzon men), like to not to hide our emotions. However we, the men choose to be stern than the women. The women are more cry-baby... That is to say they are more simpleminded.”

In the other parts of that interview Fethi freely and easily spoke about his starkly patriarchal actions, such as his habit of beating his wife when necessary, or “kaçamak yapmak” (having an affair) a couple of times. The existence of this emotionally surrounded free speech extensively enables the Trabzon erkekleri (Trabzon men) to legitimize their patriarchal actions.

For example, Nurettin who continuously spoke in an emotionally aware and emotionally expressive language during the entire interview confessed how he established violent and severe pressure, and on his wife:

“I don’t know but I sometimes get extremely angry. Maybe this is because of the troubles of life. I don’t know why... That’s why I cannot understand her sometimes. And I do those bad things. You know... I am aware I am doing wrong. She doesn’t exaggerate because she understands me. If she dig heels in, certainly she wouldn’t forgive me. And we would split after a couple of times.”

Although nearly every respondent tried to present Trabzon erkeği as emotionally expressive, some of the respondents were aware of the limits of this expressiveness. For example, Ayhan, who used a very extrovert, self-confident, all-powerful and overtly patriarchal body language and an almost shouting speech during the interview, confessed:

“All men are emotional... But men cannot express... show their emotions.”

When I asked how men expressed their emotions, he responded focusing on the love of the children:

“Men do not love their children in front of their own fathers... they cannot. They cannot hug and kiss them. They can face every problem for their children but cannot hug them in front of the society or their relatives. Maybe a man can try to satisfy his aspirations when he is alone... I am not sure many men really do that. In front of the society, they do not show they love their children with their acts and attitudes. I do not remember my father to hug and kiss me. But now I believe he loves me. He never showed his love to us. He had a quite hard manner.”

The anxieties of expressing emotions in the presence of other people, including their own parents, demonstrate the pressure on emotional expressiveness. However, even Ayhan, who had defined himself as a “democrat and progressive man” (in other words, a leftist), adhered to the conservative family discourse and never spoke of emotions outside the sphere of children and family.

Similarly, Alpaslan, who was a middle-scale entrepreneur that owns small scale business in Germany (and who lived abroad for a period) as well as those in Turkey, told not every men in Trabzon is able to express his emotions freely. He said that the men over middle age cannot express their emotions. Alpaslan told

“...I couldn't express some of my emotions before marriage. I couldn't do that even at the university. We used to hesitate... Our friends... I mean girlfriends loved us. But I think, we saw ourselves as the protectors. Actually, we (I) felt difficulties to say “I love you”. We were hesitant in everything, except speaking about ourselves with our (male) friends. Those were about business, sports, politics and so on and so forth...”

This state of expressing of emotions in the same-sex social relations enables the Trabzon erkekleri (Trabzon men) to reproduce the patriarchal qualities of masculinities. This is even more evident in the emotional palettes of men and how they express those emotions. As Ahmed points, the emotions are not value-free or have essential meanings; rather, they function in social and cultural conditions (2004). The emotions do not have culturally or socially essentially meanings. Their meaning arises from their functioning. Therefore, in order to understand the emotions, we have to understand the functioning of the emotions (Sirman, 2010, p. 30). In this manner, the emotions construct masculinities in Trabzon as patriarchal actors.

In the fieldwork, I asked the men in Trabzon how they expressed their emotions, especially asking crying, sadness, happiness, anger, despair, and love to their partners and their children (see Appendix B). In other words, I asked the respondents a number of primary emotions in order to reveal their “fragile” sides as well as their “tough” sides in the patriarchal sight. Although they initially presented themselves as emotionally expressive actors, majority of the respondents tried to construct themselves as sturdy and all-powerful men. They generally tend to express their fragile sides when they are alone or in the men’s brotherhood and hide their emotions from their wives and children. The emotions which the men express are those that are considered “manly” ones. That is to say, the men generally tend to express their manly emotions and in the presence of their patriarchal comrades.

For example, Murat, who tried to present himself as a “modern” man, said he gathers with his friends when he gets sad; when he gets happy, he radiates happiness, gets uncontrollable when he gets angry and cried once in his [adult] life when one of his friends died:

“...I usually don’t get sad. When I get sad, I get together with my friends and speak to them. I tell my troubles and get relief.”

“...When I get happy, I take all of them to a dinner. Such things happen.”

“...When I get angry... I cannot predict that. I can do something wrong...”

“I cried only once. I cried because one of our beloved died. I mean I cried because we lost one of our close friends. I never cried except that.”

Another respondent Latif, who hardly spoke about his emotions, said

“Everyone necessarily cries. I cry. But I cry inside. A manly man does not show up from his eyes. But he cries inside.

When I asked when he cries, Latif responded

“Honestly... He cries when his mother and father dies... He cries when something bad happens to his religion and his state... He cries when war happens... I mean recruitment to army... There are those things to cry. When someone touches my religion, when someone says I so-and-so to your religion, I say “God give me patience!”... I think what to do. I say “God give me patience.”. I can say “that is none of your business”. To myself I say “he can accuse himself”. I cry inside those times. I only cry openly when mother and father dies. But almighty Allah says “one should pray rather than crying”. One should cry only alone. Therefore I only cry when I am alone.”

Latif was an old and retired worker in his sixties who told that he shared all his joy with his family. He told after calming himself with long walks, he discussed the family issues with his wife. But this is peculiar to a few men and cannot be generalized to every man in Trabzon. For example, İsmet told he threatens to beat his wife when he felt sad:

“When you feel sad, your wife comes and wants to placate you. She does not want to see you sad and she wants to concile you. If she could not manage to

do that, she says “let’s go out to have a walk”. You say “Get the hell out of here! I cannot bother myself wandering! I am going to slap you in the face!”.

When I asked İsmet when he cries, he responded

“Crying? You start crying when you get really angry. That is it! But you must not cry everywhere. You may do it in a secluded place.”

İsmet told he generally beats his wife anytime he gets angry:

“MB: What do you do when you got angry?”

İSMET: “There are some people who don’t do anything when they got angry. You know... Those are really strange. I mean, when you get angry to your wife, you can bash up her; slap her in the face. That is normal. You know... But that must not be done every time. When you got angry, you smoke a cigarette, go to a coffee house [and spend some time there]... When you calm down you may go to your home.”

MB: “What do you do when you get angry to someone else?”

İSMET: “When you get angry, one cannot think about his wife. He beats or slaps his wife. When loses his interest [in beating], he calms down.”

In the end of the questions on emotions, İsmet left no space for his wife’s own emotional sphere, and said when he gets happy, his wife should be happy too². This points at the men’s freedom and easiness of controlling women, both emotionally and by using violence. They easily push up their emotions to their wives. Men’s dominance is naturalized via the emotional lives of men, which bear oppression and subordination of women.

² In another part of that İsmet also told it was himself who decided all of the home appliances and the furniture, without asking his wife, when they got married (at the time of the interview, a month ago).

This is also evident in Fethi's extrovert answers to the questions on emotions. He said he openly expressed his sadness by crying, hugs his son when he gets happy. However, this emotionality bears patriarchal manliness too. He said:

"Well I don't know... A man may cry when he remembers his past³. This doesn't mean I am crying because of death. I mean... I mean I can cry when my son's finger gets cut. I mean I am as such."

Fethi told he raises laughter when he feels happiness. However, the reason for his greatest happiness reflects a patriarchal masculinity. He said

"When I get really happy, I burst into laughter. I jump into air. I feel happy I mean... I get happy how one can get happy I mean... In my entire life, one of the moments I really got happy was our second goal against Fenerbahçe. The goal we reached the score 2-1. That happiness was greater than my wedding, having a baby... That happiness was different. I cannot compare that to anything else I mean. That is not something in my control. I mean I did nothing... I mean I did not jump into the air when my son was born. But then, my blood pressure dropped and I fainted."

Fethi told he beats his wife when she does not obey him and go out:

"Well... One's wife can be a coffee-goer (kafeci)... I mean she might like to go out. She might like to wander with her friends. That depends on the lifestyles. There are not such things amongst us. I cannot accept those things. In those things I speak my slap on her. But she knows those things. And she does not do them."

On the other hand, Ayhan confessed he uses violence against his wife in a paradoxical manner. He said

³He means his past glories of manhood, such as sexual affairs, football supportership and military service.

“I support the equality of the men and the women. But I used violence against my wife several times. Several times I beat her. I do that very much. Although I get regretful right afterwards, I do that. I quickly get furious. That is my nature. What can I do... I want my words to be obeyed.”

These cases of violence present a socially legitimized emotion rather than a spontaneous burst of anger. That is to say, the men are allowed and promoted to use violence against the women, while the women get subjected to this violence. These examples of expression of emotions present a widely seen pattern of emotional organization amongst the masculinities in Trabzon.

In Trabzon, there are many men who consider themselves as emotionally expressive. However, those are the emotions that construct and reproduce patriarchal masculinities. And those men experience these “manly” emotions predominantly in the presence of other men, in homosocial environments. On the other hand, there are also some men who are conscious that the men cannot express their emotions freely. The men feel difficulties on expressing and experiencing emotions which present them weak in the patriarchal sight. The cultural relations in Trabzon provide the ground for the men to express themselves without restrictions. However this freedom of expression is merely in terms of a patriarchal manner. Outside the circle of patriarchal emotions attributed to men, the men in Trabzon hardly express their emotions.

Accordingly, as in many patriarchal societies, the men (and the women) in Trabzon are socially encouraged to enter into homosocial relations, in other words the same-sex peer relations. In those homosocial relations, the cultural qualities of their gender identities are reproduced in relation to other actors of the same sex (T. D. Cohen, 1992; Spain, 1992; Swain, 1992). The choice of friends and the content that is being shared in those relationships,

outline the reproduction of patriarchy and the construction of gender identities (Seidler, 1994).

Some of the masculinities in Trabzon involve total exclusion of women from sincere interpersonal relations. These men claim they enter into insincere and thus dominating relationships with women. For example, Azmi states that the men share their emotions sincerely with limited people; and this does not include the women:

“Now a man always speaks about his true emotions only in front of a man. Always... But he cannot say those to a woman. Generally he says lies. It is sixty per cent so.”

It is those men who feel difficulties for establishing sincere emotional and sexual relationships with women.

The men create a men's intimacy around men's brotherhood in homosocial relationships. They construct a men's world and share what they feel they cannot share with the women and the queer people. However, the homosocial relations of men are quite different than the women's sisterhood. The sisterhood of women is built on the sharing of troubles, discussion of the strategies of empowerment and solidarity of women (Gamble, 2004b, pp. 315-316). As Humm points, “sisterhood has its core the affirmation of freedom” (2002, p. 268). The homosocial relations of women include the raising of empowerment from women's subjective experiences. Conversely, men's homosocial relations are one of the primary spheres, in which the men's power is constructed, rather than creating solidarity against patriarchal power. Those are the grounds in which the oppression of women and the queer people are legitimized by the similar experiences of other men. Even the issues that are shared might be about “intimate” such as sexual experiences, men generally discuss issues in a

strictly oppressive and therefore impersonal manner in such relations. Sometimes called “men’s talk”, the homosocial relations of men involve issues such as football, politics, business and the sexual experiences. As Nick Hornby narrates in *Fever Pitch*, men’s homosocial relations make them to forget the personal troubles in an impersonal and collective manner in talks about football (2010). That is also the case of masculinities in Trabzon.

In the rightist spirit of Trabzon, men’s homosociality is embedded in the interplay of the impact of religion, nationalism and football⁴. Those dynamics support and are reproduced in homosocial relations of men. For example, Fethi, told that he regularly went to Mosque as well as the meyhane⁵ with his friends. Right afterwards, on men’s homosocial relations those are commonly labelled as “men’s talk” he maintained

“In my opinion, men’s talk includes firstly football. Football is men’s talk. I can say politics goes under men’s talk.”

Similarly, two businessmen respondents Ahmet and Volkan tended to lay the interview into a men’s talk and in the warm and friendly manner of brotherhood, they spoke lengthily (and almost non-stop) about Trabzonspor’s glorious days and the proceeds the city earned from sex-tourism in the Natashas, when I asked them about Trabzon erkeği. Likewise, an older retired respondent, Latif spoke he chatted about issues such as football, politics and sometimes the envy for wealthier men with his friends:

⁴See Chapter 6 on rightism, football and masculinities.

⁵ Meyhane is a space in Turkey, reminiscent to both the restaurants and pubs of the western world, in which people consume spirits, eat, chat and sometimes listen to live traditional music.

“Honestly, I have no female friends. I only befriend with my neighbours. I sometimes go to the coffeehouse at my neighbourhood. We sit there and play cards. I have no interest in politics.”

The constant sharing of that cluster around such impersonal issues constructs a patriarchal and rightist masculinity in Trabzon. For example, when I asked whom he befriended with, another respondent Bora –who had a slightly degrading emphasis towards women in the entire interview, and who previously told he (and his friends) had relationships with kept foreign prostitutes in the past- said he engaged in friendships

“With the men of course... Only a real man understands a man’s words. I share matters like football, the women and the business with my friends. (he laughs with bitter sarcasm) A woman can never understand those.”

The habitual sarcasm implies the constant agency (and sometimes complicity) in the subordination and oppression of women. This men’s bonding can also be reproduced via the men’s slang that emphasises the use of patriarchal oppression as its centre. Such a case can be seen in Alpaslan’s words.

ALPASLAN: “I only befriend with the men.”

MB: “What do you share with the men?”

ALPASLAN: “The men’s talk... The donkey’s talk. You can talk slang with the men too. In our neighbourhood Faroz, this habit is the word itself. Sometimes we ask ourselves “What is that? Every word of us is slang!...” Why... (He pauses) Now when we say “let’s go”, instead we say “fuck let’s go”... I mean those things are embedded in our relationships.

On the other hand, some Trabzon erkekleri (Trabzon men) like Fethi separate relations between men and relations between women. For example another respondent Fethi maintained that

“I mean they [the women] make gossip. They backbite the others... Your hair is as such...your eyes became as such...she became more beautiful than me in that wedding... are what they talk. I mean... You gained weight, you did that and that... They are always as such. That sort of chat never happens amongst the men.”

When I asked sharing issues on sexuality in peer relationships, the same respondent Fethi emphasised honour and intimacy as the difference between talking to a man and a woman. Moreover, he emphasised the fidelity and the infidelity, as infidels that can be spoken about and the fidels that cannot be spoken about:

“I mean a married man had spoken what is necessary before marriage. Compared to women, the men don't talk about sexuality. The women talk amongst themselves, rather than the men. The men don't speak about sexuality amongst the men. Because the concept of honour is different; I mean more strong. We do not speak about our wives. But in our crazy days, we used to speak about the Natashas. It was different.

Fethi told a brief narrative that he spent some time with his friends doing an “escapade”, out of the city with the absence of their wives:

“Two years ago we, eight buddies, from the [compulsory service of] military, met in İstanbul. I spent excellent five days with the money I salted away. There were no wives there. It was excellent!.. However I took her permission for that. Because it is she who must look after me.”

Similar responses can be easily augmented. The shared issues such as business, politics, sports and sexualities are the fields, which the public masculinities are constructed (Hearn, 1992). Through the employment of those fields, the men reproduce their hegemony. The masculinities in Trabzon are constructed in homosocial relations, in which the shared

content between the male actors constructs and reproduces the men's oppression on women⁶.

Trabzon erkekleri (Trabzon men) tend to engage in same sex peer relationships with other fellow townsmen, around (and in) football stadiums, in the shopping malls, around the "prostitution hotels"⁷, and at the teahouses, coffeehouses and the men's locals (Bozok, 2012, pp. 418-422). For example, at the time of the fieldwork⁸ many open-air teahouses in the Atatürk Square in the city centre were occupied by men. In those teahouses merely the men spend long hours chatting all day long and there was neither women's peer-groups, nor women except the presence of other kinsmen. At the same time, the men in small peer groups sit, drink tea and chat at the terraces and the food courts of the newly emerging shopping malls, such as Varlıbaş Atapark and especially the larger and more crowded Forum.

On the other hand, another homosocial case is from a local towns-association, whose similar examples can be found in many places. For instance, Oflular Derneği (Association of the Inhabitants of the Of District) is an association of local townsmen of a particular district, located at the upper three floors of a four-floor building in the city centre. This association actually serves as an upper class men's club, that both the town's elites, such as the middle and upper rank upper-educated clerks, the retired

⁶The limits of this study did not enable me to witness the men's homosocial relationships in long-term friendships.

⁷That is a region-wide used local idiom, which I am going to discuss more in the following section on sexuality.

⁸Trabzon city centre began to undergo an urban renewal especially beginning from the spring 2011. After the completion of the renewal and modernization of the city square in autumn, more women began to spend time in the teahouses.

people and the members of the local bourgeoisie attend. Unlike the many of the local men in Trabzon, the men that all wear suits drink tea, coffee and play card games and chat about issues such as the glorious past of the city, Trabzonspor and local politics in the upper floor. And on the uppermost floor of Of'lular Derneği serves as a meyhane, open particularly to men⁹ who consume spirits and chat about politics, women and their lives.

Finally, the spaces around football¹⁰ fields constitute homosocial environments (see Chapter 6). Astro pitches that ordinary people play football, pitches of local football clubs¹¹, that many Trabzon erkekleri (Trabzon men) spend their time, watching football, supporting the local players, and chatting lazily. And more significantly, at Avni Aker Stadium, the biggest football stadium of Trabzon, which is filled with thousands of people (of whom the majority is the men) who support the local team Trabzonspor every weekend for matches. Those are the grounds, which the men consider the footballers as if they were a part of their families¹². Many of the respondents said they knew (or used to know) footballers personally. For example Alpaslan told some of the footballers of former teams of Trabzonspor were his own neighbours from Faroz, while Latif's younger son was a footballer at a lower league, while Hakan, one of the young lawyers of Trabzonspor told he always experienced respect of the local Trabzon erkekleri (Trabzon men) in the city centre as if he was an actual member of the football team. As Kulaçoğlu's volume presents, football is an organic

⁹At least, at the time of the interview, I witnessed no women.

¹⁰Football is largely considered as a men's sport. I am going to discuss that in the following chapter.

¹¹For example Yavuz Selim Stadium that is located by the Avni Aker Stadium.

¹²As noted before, since its beginning, the members of Trabzonspor, from footballers to the administrators, have predominantly been an organic part of the city (Güneş, 2009).

part of the social lives in Trabzon (2009). The men shout at and speak about the football players as if those were the central issues of their lives (Bozok, 2012, p. 428). In those spaces, the Trabzon erkekleri (Trabzon men) support their team members adopting patriarchal emphases such as “manhood” (itself), “strength”, “violence”, “sturdiness”, “sexual assault”, “toughness”, “greed” and “youth” in their ovations. In those fields the men’s shared moments of their lives around the devotion to football club and screamed and supported patriarchal men’s values actively reproduce the masculinities in Trabzon.

4.3 NATASHAS AND THE SEXUALITIES OF MASCULINITIES IN TRABZON

Many men in Trabzon not only experienced sexuality with their wives who are so-perceived *confidential partners* but also with Natashas, considering those as *performances* of masculinities. The relations with “Natashas”, the prostitutes¹³ from former USSR and the Eastern Bloc, have a significant role in the construction of the current perception of the sexuality amongst the masculinities in Trabzon. Gülçür and İlkaracan point that the term “Natasha” is used in a similar manner in Israel, Britain and the US (2002, p. 414). Natashas in Trabzon in that period has got a significant place in the literature on sex trafficking as mentioned by scholars such as Altman, who

¹³In the feminist literature, “prostitute” is used in a radical feminist manner, while “sex worker” is used in Marxist feminist and socialist feminist approaches for women who take place in sex trade (see Tong, 2009). On the other hand, in Turkish, the phrase “hayat kadını” (literally “the woman of life”) is used for those oppressed actors of the society. In this usage, they are considered as the “women of life” in order to emphasise their tragic oppression in the course of the conditions of life. They are considered as the victims of life who also actively resist and challenge the oppressions of social life. Here, I am going to use “sex worker” and “prostitute” interchangeably, keeping in mind the Turkish emphasis of those actors’ oppression and resistance in life.

considers the global dimension of sex trafficking, points to Turkey as one of the primary centres of sex trade exercised in relations with Natashas (2003, pp. 18-19). Similarly, Hughes considers Turkey as one of the centres of the sex trafficking by the sex workers from the former USSR and the Eastern Bloc (2000). On the other hand, Malarek, a newspaper reporter who discusses the tragedy of those sex workers worldwide, emphasises that Natashas constitute one of the greatest movements of world-scale sex trafficking in world history (2004, pp. 18-19).

Currently, the activity of the sex trade has diminished and the visibility of Natashas is significantly decreased in Trabzon. However, similar to observations of Günçikan in 1995, Beller-Hann in the midst of the 1990's and Dündar in 2005, Natashas' impact still continues in Trabzon and amongst masculinities in Trabzon and they are still a part of everyday talks and occupy a significant role in the collective memory (Beller-Hann, 1999, pp. 83-106; Dündar, 2005, August 2; Günçikan, 1995, pp. 63-144).

Sexual experiences with Natashas have a crucial part in the imaginations, narratives and social construction of masculinities in Trabzon. Currently, although the Natashas have disappeared from the public sphere of the city, majority of Trabzon erkekleri (Trabzon men) have got an extensive knowledge of them, ready to tell anyone who wants to listen to their stories of their patriarchal "glories" of their manhood, in which they endlessly endeavour to legitimate the oppression of Trabzon women as well as Natashas.

The period, which the impact of the Natashas was felt most, primarily covers the period between 1990, and the last years of the first decade of the 2000's (see Chapter 3). Due to the fact that sex-trade is predominantly an informal field, it is not possible to speak about exact extent, dates or

numbers within it (Hughes, 2000). However, considering the literature as well as the respondents' narratives, it can be stated that there is a dense "past" period, when the relations with Natashas have been intense, and a "present" period that covers the years beginning from the second half of the 2000's, which they disappeared from the public sphere but their impact still remains (Aksoylu, 2012; Dündar, 2005, August 2).

In that dense *past* period, Natashas had been most visible in the public sphere of Trabzon. They wandered in the pedestrian areas in the city centre, openly engaged in bargains for sex trade, sold goods in Russian Bazaars, made shopping for textile, food and electrical house goods in the Trabzon Çarşısı (Market of Trabzon), went to the banks for sending money to their families abroad, and to the beauty parlours, all alongside the inhabitants of the city. In that period, Trabzon became one of the nation-scale (and international) centres¹⁴ of sex trade with the prostitutes from the dissolved USSR and the Eastern Bloc. In that period, many hotels were opened and the urban space of Trabzon became to be organized for that traffic¹⁵. On the other hand, as Aksoylu points, this centrality of Trabzon in sex trafficking in the Black Sea coast is so influential that, there is no officially accepted brothel in the region, except the prevalent usage of hotels, night clubs and restaurants for these purposes (2012, p. 460).

¹⁴As authors such as Gülçür and İkkaracan (2002), Kalfa (2008; 2010) and Zengin (2011) point, in the initial period, the other centre of sex trade with Natashas has been İstanbul, and especially Laleli Neighbourhood, where (similar to Trabzon) informal trade of goods from former USSR and Eastern Bloc were sold in exchange with textile and electric goods.

¹⁵For example, Dündar points that between 1989 and 1999, the number of hotels in the Çömlekçi Neighbourhood of Trabzon increased from three to thirty three (2005, August 2). On the other hand as Aksoylu (2012) and Günçikan (1995) point, there have been houses which were used as brothels, or kept for long term relations with paid sex workers. Many respondents, such as Dursun, a hotel-owner in Çömlekçi, said that many places (other than hotels) such as restaurants, nightclubs and groceries have been used for sex trade. Therefore, it can be emphasised that the exact number and the locales of the places used for sex trade cannot be determined.

Sex trade with Natashas in Trabzon was not limited to Trabzon erkekleri (Trabzon men): many men who came from other Anatolian cities also engaged in the sex trade with Natashas, alongside with Trabzon erkekleri (Trabzon men). By masculinities in Trabzon, Natashas were perceived as physically different, attractive and undefended “*Russian*” women, who can be roughly purchased, experienced sex with, arbitrarily used violence on, oppressed and yet never approached with humane behaviour.

Trabzon had been a conservative city that is quite often described in terms of the discourses of the official ideology, with its (conservative) family values, morality, Islamic religiousness and nationalism¹⁶. Despite the existence of that spirit, the masculinities in Trabzon prevalently experienced sex trade with Natashas. On the other hand, the Trabzon women were forced to accept the relations of Trabzon erkekleri (Trabzon men) with Natashas and felt the constraint to rush into beauty parlours, to look alike the Natashas and endeavoured to keep their husbands for their families. In that process, the men considered neither the tragedy of the Natashas, nor the oppression of the Trabzon women or their own families. As a result, as authors such as Beller-Hann who observed that period emphasise, although the relations of masculinities in Trabzon with the Natashas have been commonly considered as a significant moral problem, the affairs of Trabzon erkekleri (Trabzon men) with the prostitutes were tolerated (1999, pp. 83-106).

This process had begun with the dissolution of the USSR and the Eastern Bloc and opening of the Georgia-Turkey border in 1989, and the arrival of the poorer people who looked for earning some income. They initially sold their personal belongings and the collected items whatever that could be

¹⁶ see Chapter 4 and Chapter 6.

turned into money. The initial result of that was the opening of “Russian bazaars” alongside of the Black Sea Coast, in which goods¹⁷ from the former USSR and the Eastern Bloc were informally sold (see L. Akyüz, 2012). The poorer women, the vulnerable victims of capitalist patriarchy, quickly exhausted the commodities they could sell and turned to prostitution. One of the centres of these informal markets was Trabzon, which is the nearest centre to the Georgia-Turkey border in the Eastern Black Sea Coast, with a strong patriarchal background that presented a strong demand for sex trade. In the Russian bazaars, these poorer women had met the local men. In Trabzon, the most remarkable Russian bazaar was found in Çömlekçi Neighbourhood, right across the Trabzon Harbour (Somel, 2011, p. 90). This bazaar has served as the intersection place where the commoditized remnants of former USSR and the Eastern Bloc, as well as the Natashas were marketed. Çömlekçi is now the primary locale where sex trade by Natashas is visible. It is a poorer neighbourhood, full of hotels in which sex trade is exercised (see Bozok, 2012).

As Aksoylu points, in the first years of that sex trade, Russian bazaars have served as the meeting points of the sex trade (2012, p. 459). Trabzon erkekleri (Trabzon men) and Natashas first met and settled in sex trade each other whilst bargaining for goods in Russian bazaars.

In the first fifteen-year period, Natashas have been active, visible, and quite central in the social life of Trabzon. In that period, the women who were physically thought to be “different” than local people were stigmatized as “Natashas” in the city. Günçikan, who witnessed the local perception of

¹⁷The goods sold in those markets include a wide range of items from dishware to medals of former USSR, and from clothes to electronic goods (see L. Akyüz, 2012).

Natashas “in 1992, when the Eastern Bloc was newly split”¹⁸ emphasises that

“It does not matter whether [they are] Azerbaijani, Georgian, Ukrainian, Belarusian, Lithuanian, the nationality of all the foreign women are [perceived as] Russian in the entire Black Sea coast. The name of all of the women is Natasha. In the eyes of the Black Sea man, without exception every Natasha has a value. This value starts from twenty [US] dollars and climbs up to hundred dollars. The hotels are not included in this price. Having a one-night escapade costs more than a million¹⁹ [Turkish Liras]. (1995, p. 86)

In the initial *past* period, including most of the respondents, many Trabzon erkekleri (Trabzon men) had sexual relations with the Natashas. Those narratives are told in a tone of nostalgia of the *good old days* of manhood. They are told as if they were “glories” of manhood, whose traces could be noticed. These glory narratives of masculinities are reflected on today for the construction of contemporary masculinities.

The narratives on Natashas openly approve patriarchy, by openly legitimizing the oppression of prostitute women. For example, like many Trabzon erkekleri (Trabzon men), Yılmaz told:

“A real man makes lechery (çapkınlık). Lechery is the glory of a man. From those Russians, Trabzon erkeği saw what a women is. All we have amused ourselves. Lot’s of money has gone. But what we lived is all deserved...”

Yılmaz’s words emphasise the general claim of Trabzon erkekleri (Trabzon men) that they had deserved the experiences with Natashas, plainly because they are men. There are many similar narratives constantly being

¹⁸Personal communication with the author via e-mail, 29th September 2011.

¹⁹As of November 16, 1995, the exchange rate was \$1 = 52142.30TRY <http://www.xe.com/currencytables/?from=TRL&date=1995-11-16>, retrieved 17th July 2012.

told by Trabzon erkekleri (Trabzon men). When I asked Bora the story of Natashas, he smiled wryly and told:

“Those things took place mostly in the nineties. Those were the good days. Very good days indeed... We were crazy-blooded. We were alive and kicking!.. In our youth, every one of us went to Natashas. Those by the city square...They were hot as hell!..”

Similarly, another respondent Muhsin said:

“All we have gone to the Natashas. We were young boys then!.. We made rascalities. Then Trabzon was like a storm!... They were awesome days!.. Russians²⁰ were wonderful!.. They were different!.. Our youth has passed and Natashas disappeared...”

Those narratives on experiences with Natashas can be easily augmented, generalizing to masculinities in Trabzon: whether they expressed or not, many Trabzon erkekleri (Trabzon men) experienced paid sexual relations with Natashas.

The masculinities in Trabzon experienced such relationships, although they are laden with conservative (and rightist) family values, which constantly emphasise the value of family and the legitimized marriage, monogamy and the protection of family (see Chapter 5). This is primarily because of the existing conservative patriarchal ideology that tolerates men’s actions to the extent they protect and reproduce the sources of capitalist patriarchy. This is quite similar to Gilmore’s “moral imperatives of manhood”²¹ (1990, p. 48): Trabzon erkekleri (Trabzon men) are provided with an encouraged personal autonomy, so long as they provision their dependents and protect their

²⁰ In other words Natashas.

²¹ See Chapter 2.

families. Those seemingly-contrasting affairs present the strength of the patriarchal side of the cathectic organization of masculinities in Trabzon.

In the narratives on the *present* of the Natashas, there is a performative character. The men take place (or has taken place) in certain sexual relations to perform their masculinity, and tell those intercourses to other men. For example, Yavuz a tradesman and a politician compared the Natashas of the past and today and told

“Twenty percent of the Trabzon erkeği do that²² now. But they are totally idiots. The women, who are left now in Çömlekçi are dirty, old and blowzy. Only a man who came from a village may have an intercourse with them. Those men are idiots and have no culture!.. A [real] man does lechery. But how does he do that... He does this so that he can tell it to his friends. (He picks a sheet on the table as if it was a photo and hits it as if he was showing that photo.) He wants to say “Look at that!.. I was with a woman last night. Look !.. It was [so good] like that!.. I squeezed her like a grapefruit. I took her juice off!..” What can you tell if you get together with a woman in Çömlekçi...”

The different physical appearance of Natashas of the past had provided the ground for performing the patriarchal fantasies of Trabzon erkekleri (Trabzon men). In many cases, the sexual intercourses with Natashas served the place of the performances of manhood than the satisfaction of both sides. Rather than speaking about actually living humans, these narratives are produced to oppress the women. The men cage the women in the binary of attractive and unattractive. Compared to the negative attributes of their narratives on Trabzon women, this performativity is an endeavour in satisfying the needs of the patriarchal discourses on the choice of the partner, rather than finding sexual satisfaction.

²²He mentions having sexual relations with Natashas.

The Natashas were perceived to be physically different than the local Trabzon women. This difference is a quite often-emphasised narrative in the Black Sea Region. Almost every time, the men start speaking about Natashas, by emphasising the physical differences between them and the local women throughout the region. There is a multi-sided and dense insult in that sight. There are two complementary common narratives on the embodiment of Natashas in the imaginations of masculinities in Trabzon.

In the first of these common narratives, the (past) Natashas are presented as attractive, sexually appealing and modern women, contrasted to the “smelly”, “sweaty”, “rude”, “sexually ignorant”, yet hard working, suffering and family-focused Trabzon women. In the second group of these complementary narratives, the *past* and the *present* Natashas are contrasted in terms of their physical appearance and desirability. One of these first group of narratives, in which the Natashas are contrasted to the Trabzon women, was told by Refik:

“These [Natashas] were two meter tall, blonde calamities. Have a look at that [woman] at home and have a look at this... Making an escapade from time to time is nonsense. It is the glory of a man.”

On the other hand, in the second group of Natashas *past* “attractive” Natashas are contrasted to the “unattractive” Natashas of the *present*. This emphasis of difference of the *past* and the *present* are especially concretized on the current Natashas of Çömlekçi. For instance, in this manner, voicing in a narrative quite often told by Trabzon erkekleri (Trabzon men), Yılmaz a retired labourer and a farmer said

“Forgive me but our women smell like cows because of working in the field. They don’t know to take care of themselves. A woman ought to satisfy her husband. Our religion orders so. Before the Natashas, our wives couldn’t fulfill their duties to their husbands. The Trabzon women learned to be beautiful

from the Natashas. Trabzon women realized they must make their husbands happy from the Natashas. They did so to keep their husbands in their hands. I mean, Natashas have been very useful for Trabzon in this manner. However, the former Natashas were different than those current ones. The [Beautiful and attractive] Natashas of the past are not left now. All are gone to Antalya and Alanya. Only the aged ones are left in Çömlekçi now. Prostitution is everywhere. Natashas are in Antalya, Alanya and in Hopa too. But they created stories as if Natashas only belonged here. Those are the outcome of foreign forces that are jealous of Trabzon erkeği!..”

Similarly Muhsin told

“Now there is Çömlekçi. But it doesn’t deserve a manly man to go there!.. The women there are not like the Natashas of the past!... Current ones are stinking and old!.. Only the villagers may go there. You have to go to Batumi to make a rascality. We do those with our friends sometimes. But its fun is gone. Things were much better in the past.”

There are many narratives that echo those two responses. The women are oppressed by being placed in those oppositions. In the perception of the masculinities in Trabzon, the women are located in the dichotomy of being either a prostitute, as personified by the Natashas, or a housewife who works at the domestic spheres of houses or tea (or nut) fields as personified by the Trabzon women. The masculinities in Trabzon construct their dominance on the power over controlling the women through sexuality, by imprisoning them to a threatening choice. The choice is left to the men, while the women's words and demands remain unasked. These masculinities have the power to choose and dominate the women. That control is even more vivid in the classification of the Natashas.

In line with these discourses on the physical appearance, in a quite patriarchal manner, many Trabzon erkekleri (Trabzon men) also tell that the arrival of the Natashas contributed to the change of the Trabzon women.

Many narratives of Natashas usually end up with the masculinities in Trabzon emphasizes on the idea that those foreign sex workers' forced the Trabzon women to learn to be more attractive²³. These common narratives claim that the "ragged" Trabzon women learned to be more sexually appealing from the Natashas. For example Dursun said

"The Trabzon women learned what she learned from the Natashas. They learned to be appealing, they learned to be beautiful... Many beauty parlours opened after the Natashas."

In parallel with that, Alp said

"Because the Russians are people who look after themselves, they are more sexually appealing in the eyes of the men. They have thought the Turkish women to look after themselves. Our women started to make make up, take care of themselves, to go to the hairdressers, to go to the beauty parlours. They (the Natashas -MB) have gone now... But what happened?... Our people now make their make up better than them. There used to be no beauty parlours in the city in the past. Now there are lots of them..."

On the other hand, Reha told

"The women in Trabzon do not know how to make love. They are crude. They smell like cows. They are ragged. The [local] women who look after themselves are no more than ten percent!.. The Trabzon women do not know to satisfy their husbands. They always work in the fields!... When they don't work, they only think about the housework and their children. They neglect their husbands. The Trabzon women learned how to treat their husbands after the 90's. The Trabzon people learned what they know about making sex from the Russian and the Ukrainian women. Natashas knew how to make love. Before all, they were clean. Our women learned to be attractive, to look after themselves. They learned to take a shower before making sex."

²³I heard similar responses whenever I said something about Natashas anywhere to a Trabzonerkeği.

These narratives that claim the contribution of Natashas, in fact explicitly oppress the Trabzon women. They show that the masculinities in Trabzon degrade the women's sexualities to the mere demands of the men. The masculinities in Trabzon who generally emphasise that they value their spouses and their families, openly subordinate them while trying to legitimize the impact of the Natashas.

On the other hand, according to some of the respondents, there is a difference between the men who have sexual relationships with them. In the *past*, though there have been some difficulties, the masculinities in Trabzon experienced the paid sexual relationships with Natashas everywhere in Trabzon; on the other hand, in the *present*, the people who experience those relationships are primarily those people who come from other nearby cities. For example, Murat said

“I mean the people now come to Trabzon from cities like Bayburt, Gümüşhane or Rize for Natashas. Especially from Bayburt and Gümüşhane... I heard their wives try not to send their husbands to Trabzon: “please don't go there” so on and so forth...”

On the other hand, at the same time, some of the respondents like Alp emphasised that the Trabzon erkekleri (Trabzon men) want (and used to want) to experience paid sexual affairs away from their homelands. The reason for that is the men's anxiety to be condemned for doing immoral things and stigmatized for going to Natashas in their hometown. Although the masculinities in Trabzon adopt the relationships with Natashas in order to construct their identities, in order to experience those relations secretly, they engage in sex trade in other places. Alp explained this pattern as follows.

“Because the women (the prostitutes) are here, Giresun Ordu Gümüşhane Bayburt Rize comes to here. But a man from places...let's say Ordu or Hopa who wants to make lechery does not do that at his hometown. He does not want to become a subject of gossip for anyone. For the lechery, he comes to here. If a man is somehow wealthy, he goes to there, especially Batumi, from here.”

As a result of that, according to the respondents, mostly the “stranger” men, may experience relationships with Natashas in Trabzon. On the people who currently experience relationships with Natashas, Dursun said

“Here in Çömlekçi, you cannot see a Trabzon erkeği!... Those who [nowadays] go to Natashas are cultureless, poorer Turks.”

The primary reason for that seems to be the migration of the prostitutes who are found “appealing” by the masculinities in Trabzon to the touristic places such as Antalya and Alanya, because of the rise of the interests in those new locales of sex trade. On the other hand, some of the respondents such as Muhsin and Alpaslan point that the current sex trafficking with Natashas in the Eastern Black Sea coast is shifting to distant and foreign places such as nearby Batumi (of Georgia) and Sochi (of Russia). These places provide the Trabzon men to engage sex trade in secrecy, away from the direct gaze of local people who might condemn them, as well as being locales of tourist attraction²⁴. Many people in the Black Sea coast know that common travels of Trabzon erkekleri (Trabzon men) to post-Soviet geographies usually mean sex tourism; however, as the respondents point, those are considered as a part of “men’s glories”. So

²⁴ In the case of Batumi, the sources of tourist attraction are legal gambling in huge casinos and consumption of cheaper spirits as well as prostitution.

long as sex trade with Natashas is kept secret²⁵, it is not considered to present an open social problem, because of the strong patriarchal relations.

The perceptions of “desired” and “neglected” on Natashas are determined in clear lines. Especially in terms of the current sex trade in Çömlekçi Neighbourhood, the men know, clarify, define and categorize the prostitutes they want to have an affair. These are the descriptions of the desired partners in men’s patriarchal imaginations and fantasies. For example, Dursun, a hotel owner in Çömlekçi who claimed he had an honourable and prostitution-free hotel, quite openly talked about the terms and the conditions of prostitution told

“Natashas are from every nation: Russian, Azerbaijani, Armenian, Georgian, Uzbek... The poorest quality of those, the filthiest of those is the Azerbaijanis, then comes Georgians, then Armenians and then the Ukrainians come. The highest quality of those, the most beautiful ones are the Russians. But the Russians went to the south [coast of Turkey], to Antalya and Alanya. On the other hand, there are young and old ones; the virgin and unvirgin ones, the blondes and the brunettes. A young blonde Russian, if she is even a virgin is the most expensive one. You cannot find one of them here, in Çömlekçi.”

According to Dursun, there is a detailed and well-known organization for the sex trade with Natashas, which I also heard from many other people (except the respondents) whom I met in the Black Sea coast. Following the common phrases in the region he grouped the hotels as “temiz aile oteli” (clean family hotel) and “fuhuş oteli” (prostitution hotel). On the other hand, being a hotel owner, who claimed his one was one of the “clean” hotels in Çömlekçi”, he categorized the order of Natashas in a manner like a scholar who is specialized on a particular issue. He said that the prostitution existed

²⁵ In my travels to Batumi (apart from my fieldwork), I observed that all the individual men who come from Turkey to Georgia disappear in a few seconds after they cross the border, to engage in sex trade. These men are almost invisible in the streets of Batumi.

at the places around the Atatürk Square, inside the hotels. He emphasised that

“Currently, the mere difference of Çömlekçi from the rest of the city is that there is bargaining for prostitution on the streets. I mean, it is done openly. Çömlekçi is the place where prostitution is intensified. The customer and the labourer -I mean the prostitute- knows there is prostitution here.”

In a manner like a scholar who is specialized on a particular issue, Dursun told that there were four methods of prostitution²⁶ in Çömlekçi. In the first method, he said the Natashas were staying in the specialized hotels during the day. He explained that method as follows:

“Those hotels are only for the relaxation of the prostitutes. They are closed to the people other than the Natashas. When a family comes, they say “we have no free room”. Then, they are sent to a clean family hotel. So on and so forth... Those Natashas have two ways [for sex bargaining]. They agree to meet at a certain luxurious hotel at a certain time by phone. At those luxurious hotels, the personnel of the hotel assist them.”

According to him, this was the most expensive method. In that method, he said

“...the prostitute earned “at least \$300 from the customer. The customer pays at least \$200 for the hotel and the food and the drinks.”

On the other hand, he told that there were the Natashas who *permanently stayed* at Çömlekçi, either bargaining by themselves on the streets and take their customers to the hotel, or stayed at the restaurant, teahouse, or

²⁶ As of 1st October 2011, on the date of the interview, the exchange rates were as follows: 1USD=1.8601TRY and 1EURO=2.4858TRY. Retrieved <http://www.xing.com>, 3rd October 2011.itxy

cofeehouse below the hotel and her customer came there. According to Dursun,

“Those are hourly affairs. Natasha pays 20TL and her customer pays 20TL to the hotel owner, while the customer pays 20TL to the Natasha. A customer usually has to pay 60TL to 100TL. If a Natasha can rook her customer, she may earn something.”

He considered the third method as *the night system*. He outlined that method as follows:

“The customer rents the room and starts to wait. After midnight, the Natashas start to knock the doors. If a customer likes a Natasha, he takes her in. The hotels watch those with cameras. If a Natasha enters a room, the hotel-owner takes money from the Natasha. This also happens in some of the luxurious hotels. There are two ways in that system. In the first one, Natasha stays in the same hotel and rests during the day. She works in the camera-watched hotel at night. In the second, Natasha stays somewhere else during the day and works at the camera-watched hotel at night.

On the other hand, he considered the last method of prostitution in Çömlekçi as the “brothel method”. According to him his method was the more traditional way of prostitution. In that method, a customer entered a hotel, in which in the entrance, the Natashas waited. He added that the customer went to the upper stairs of rooms with the prostitute he liked. Dursun presented a stark exploitation of the prostitutes. He said

“The Natashas are generally marketed by the hotel, store, teahouse, or restaurant owners. The hotel owners earn at least \$3000 a month from a Natasha. I mean that is the least amount a hotel-owner may earn. Most of them earn much more. I heard a cellphone shop owner who made a partnership with a Natasha to keep her. But that is not frequent kind of relationship.”

Dursun's account presents the detailed order of sex trade in Çömlekçi. It is not simply commodification of sex, but also a quite organized relationship.

On the other hand, in the grouping of hotels in the neighbourhood as "temiz aile oteli" (clean family hotel) and "fuhuş oteli" (prostitution hotel) points the inherence of the conservative family ideology in sex trafficking in Trabzon. In that classification, if there is no prostitution at a hotel, it is labelled as a place of that ideology, in terms of hygiene. This also points that according to this widespread classification, although sex trade with Natashas is quite common amongst the masculinities in Trabzon, they stigmatize it as "unclean", so that as a danger against the order of the society. This is quite similar to Douglas' ideas that emphasises that the dirt is seen as a threat to the order (2007). In that vein, some of the Trabzon erkekleri (Trabzon men) see Natashas as the cause of immorality. Despite all the glory narratives on Natashas, some of the Trabzon erkekleri (Trabzon men) tell the relations with Natashas in a veiled manner. In a widely observed manner Alpaslan said

"We all have done it. [We have gone to the Natashas] At our delikanlı²⁷ age, we did it. Our neighbours might say [to you] that they did not go. But most of them went. Many families were harmed in that period."

The Natashas have also been seen as the danger to the conservative image of the purity of the society. Accordingly, a result of the police, the state and the media pressures, by the first decade of the 2000's, the Natashas are began to be removed from the city centre, by imprisoning them to the ghetto-like borders of Çömlekçi Neighbourhood²⁸.

²⁷Literally "crazy-blooded(ness)", the Turkish word "delikanlı" refers to patriarchal manners of men embedded in male bravado.

²⁸Current urban renewal projects also contribute to those efforts (see Chapter 3).

As Beller-Hann (1999) and Günçikan (1995) point, Natashas experienced all kinds of violence, harassment and subordination from the institutions such as police, state, the media and the civil society, as well as verbal harassment from local people and the deception of the pimps. These sex workers had been more vulnerable than their fellow Turkish colleagues, since most of them worked informally and without the state protection and social security. As those authors emphasise, these pressures were a part of the daily lives of the Natashas in the 1990's. Moreover, the masculinities in Trabzon did not only have paid sexual relationships with Natashas, rather they commonly used violence that ranged from harassment to rape. The respondents' words are also in the same parallel. For example Ayhan said

“...Many times I heard stories of violence [against Natashas]... One of our fellow Turkish men experiences an affair with a Russian woman. Then he kicks her out of the door of his car after his job is finished.”

Similarly, Ertuğrul told that

“Our people finished the money that they earned in a year from tea and nuts, in a couple of days. When the money finished, they beat the Natashas. This is because our people wanted to continue to be together with Natashas for free. When the Natashas refused that, they beat them.”

He added that there were many stories like that. There are unreported practices of violence inherent in the sexual relationships with the Natashas. This is primarily because men try to control and discipline women's sexuality. As well as controlling their wives' sexualities in the domestic sphere, the masculinities in Trabzon extended that control to the public sphere by using and legitimizing violence against the Natashas.

Presently, Natashas are now squeezed to the borders of the Çömlekçi, which in fact resides at a close distance from the Atatürk Square. Located

in-between the Tanjant Yolu, the trestle-road that connects the Black Sea Coastal Highway to the city square, the Trabzon Harbour, the Atatürk Square and the old Trabzon Çarşısı (Trabzon Bazaar), Çömlekçi is now an environment, whose borders are closed but at the same time have close interactions with the city centre. This small neighbourhood, which resides only a couple of hundred meters away from the city square, is overwhelmed by dozens of (legal and illegal) hotels in which prostitution is commonly exercised. At the time of the fieldwork of this thesis, Natashas were making sex trade on the streets, in the restaurants, in the teahouses, in the groceries and in the “prostitution hotels”, openly in Çömlekçi. On the other hand, despite Natashas are removed from the city centre (and therefore they are invisible in the city), bargains for prostitution is exercised in the neighbourhood. This creates an environment, in which sex trade takes place hidden but also in front of the ordinary people.

The primary public transportation system in the city, the minibuses which go to Yomra, Kaşüstü, Arsin, Araklı, Of, Sürmene the eastern districts of the city and Rize, the city on the eastern side of Trabzon depart from Çömlekçi Caddesi, just by the hotels, noted. At the same time, there is a marketplace and a number of groceries and stores in which the ordinary people, the women, the students, the peasants, the officers... shop for their domestic needs; however these people do not turn to the immoral and ominous labeled back streets. All these take place simultaneously with the bargains for sex trade. *Present* Natashas are gloomy and tragic looking women who wear exaggerated make up and clothing. However, this outlook of emphasised femininity only attracts the interest of their (potential) customers. Although Natashas walk on the same street with the Trabzon women, the latter ignore the former. The men walking alongside the street

seem to be indifferent. Who go to Çömlekçi for sex trade can only be identified if only they stop to bargain with the Natashas.

It can be stated that, this spatial organization reflects Zengin's notion “the sexual coasts of the state”, (2011). According to her, the prostitution is one of the coasts of state is what the state wants to keep hidden from the daily routine, since it is assumed to destroy the order of the society. However, the state also benefits from the incomes of it. Therefore the state removes prostitution from the public sight to the margins of the society. In a similar vein, the unwanted practices of sexuality with Natashas are bounded to Çömlekçi. However, as Dursun who formerly owned a shop that primarily sold leather and textiles for the customers from the former USSR and the Eastern Bloc, emphasised, the state pervasively benefits from Natashas. As well as the taxes paid by the hotels, Natashas bring economic liveliness to the city. Moreover, the police and the legal institutions are involved in bribery from that illegal sex trade. On the other hand, unlike the *past* Natashas are largely kept away from the public eye, from the city centre and the pedestrian areas.

Honour is described by Sirman as “the capability of a person to live in accordance with the standards on femininity and masculinity” (as cited by Zengin, 2011, p. 99). The standards of honour define the sphere of morality. Indeed, echoing Sirman’s words, Latif describes morality as follows:

“Let’s say I never envy your honour. You don’t envy mine too. We get along well [then]. Isn’t it as such in our religion... We have to pay respect to honour of each one of us.”

The Natashas are considered out of this sphere of morality. Therefore, even though the actors might be actively participating in an activity that is considered immoral and/or dishonourable, they try to give the impression of

keeping away from it. Some of these narratives are openly told stories of glory and some of them are full of indirect allusions, claiming they did not experience relations with Natashas but some acquaintances did.

The local men's code of honour has a determinative role in the mind and actions of Trabzon erkekleri (Trabzon men). Despite the prevalence and the impact of the sex trade with Natashas, Trabzon erkekleri (Trabzon men) also tend to consider the impact of these relations in terms of their "hazardous" outcomes on the city and themselves, generally speaking about men's code, "delikanlılık"²⁹. For example, echoing the responses of interviews of Dündar in 2005 (Dündar, 2005, August 2), Aksoylu who discusses Natashas in an extensive article underlines "...Except the existing conservatism, in the delikanlılık code of Trabzon erkeği, there can be no habits such as lechery or profligacy." And continues that "...As it is widely known, the arrival of the Natashas destroyed the delikanlılık code of Trabzon men, while putting our women's nose out of joint" (2012, p. 459). That is a common perception of two-sided masculinity. Intercourse with foreign prostitutes has been perceived as a glory of masculinity in sexual performances, at the same time bringing an injury to the code of masculinity by harming the local codes of honour.

Natashas began to disappear from the public life of Trabzon with the second half of the first decade of the 2000's. This condition is evaluated by masculinities in Trabzon in a number of narratives. In one of them, some of the respondents stress that masculinities' experience with Natashas caused the dissolution of the families. However, because of the cultural and social background of the city, the informations on that issue are descriptive, rather

²⁹See above.

than explanatory. As a result, the respondents and informants of journalists like Dündar (2005, August 2) speak about that issue as a tragedy, while there is not much quantitative and qualitative data on the divorces in that period. Yet, the responses are to a significant extent contradictory. One of the respondents Levent, who was a lawyer said

“The men started to go after the Natashas, leaving their families. Many families were dissolved. Many families were prevented from dissolution because the women did not raise their voices. Even in those families, the men used violence against their wives.”

On the other hand, another lawyer respondent Arif told

“In that period many families dissolved...or they faced the danger of dissolution. However, because of the efforts of the Trabzon women, many of the disputes did not go to divorce. That is very common here.”

Indeed, Levent and Arif's responses overlap with each other. Despite the Trabzon women seemed to have disputed with the Trabzon erkekleri (Trabzon men), many of them avoided to divorce from their husbands. At the same time, the Turkish legal system tries to obstruct the divorces in favour of the men. As a result, as I emphasise grounding on the information provided by the lawyer Şinasi Mortaş (personal communication 5th February 2011) and lawyer Mehmet Tomruk (personal communication 27th May 2011) point,

“Although adultery exists (Entry No 161) in the Turkish Civil Code, since proof is required in such cases and since it is considered dishonourable by many people, they try to hide those matters from other social actors and usually prefer not to divorce or they divorce by asserting the more acceptable The Dissolution of the Roots of the Union of Marriage (Entry No 166). In Trabzon, a patriarchal city fed up with traditional relations, because of the social pressures, the women, whose economic independence is limited, prefer not to

reflect their own problems to the public sphere and avoid divorce, unless those problems get to be unendurable. Therefore there is no precise information on divorces resulted by going to the Natashas or prostitution (In the TurkStat Divorce Statistics, the number of divorces caused by adultery in Trabzon between 2001 and 2010 is 0. Moreover, the overall divorces caused by adultery are only 93 in 2001 and 75 in 2010 in Turkey in general. TurkStat 2011b). (Bozok, 2012, p. 431).

This reflects that, despite the promiscuity and the patriarchal masculinities' efforts to oppress and hide women's tragedies, the families experienced significant risks of dissolution. According to Bellér-Hann (1999) and BÉller-Hann and Hann (2003), this reflects the patriarchal culture in that region: if the women divorced from their husbands, they would be stigmatized as immoral people who disturb the codes of honour and in that patriarchal environment, they would become (economically and socially) unable to take care of their children. In consequence, as noted above, the Trabzon women, who endeavoured to prevent the dissolution of their families rushed into the beauty parlours, in order to make their hair blonde and to look like the Natashas (which did not stopped the masculinities in Trabzon mobility for sex trade).

Another common narrative is told on the impact of Natashas on the economy of Trabzon and masculinities in Trabzon. In a typical speech, echoing some of the Turkish economists³⁰, Alpaslan spoke about the loss of wealth because of Natashas. He said,

³⁰For example Hurşit Güneş, a social democrat economist, considered Natashas in terms of their harm to the Turkish economy in 2008. He says "Every women who makes prostitution sends \$1000 to Russia every month. This makes 50 million dollars a month and makes 600 million dollars a year. What are we paying for abroad? We are sending the money for the whores!" (As cited in Aksoylu, 2012, p. 461). Another example is mainstream newspaper Hürriyet's former economy columnist Enis Berberoğlu's article, published 14th November 1997, titled "Nataşa Avrupalı'nın 6 Katını Kazandırdı" (Natasha Brought 6 Times of the European)

“Trabzon was a nationalist city. Those [men] who made no mistake to their wives started to go to the Russian bitches. They experienced economic crisis because of them. They went by taking big amounts of money from here. I think the decadence (çöküş) of Trabzon started then. When the borders were opened, the men who got some money run to them. Think about that!.. Russian bitches began from 10 millions. Shortly afterwards they saw that these are idiots. You understand what I mean... They said “if we requested \$100, they would pay. And it happened!... Then \$100 and later \$150... We saw those who sell their cows ran to the Russian bitches. I have many friends who sold their wives' golds [from wedding]. Who sold their wives ran to the Russian bitches. For the Natashas they went to Moscow... They went to Sochi... They went to Batumi... Do you understand? These are big moneys. And decadence (çöküş) began. Everyone went from here. There were those who went two or three times a week. Can you imagine \$200-\$300 a week!.. Can you imagine the money that went out from Trabzon!.. Lots of money went out from here. What did they give for that? Flesh! Anything else? Sex! You wouldn't mind if they gave big Chinese porcelain for that. The women took all the money they gained to Russia!..”

In that narrative, the impact of Natashas is evaluated as a negative loss of wealth from Trabzon. On the other hand, Volkan, the owner of a well-known four-star hotel in the city said

“Ten years ago Natashas were a primary source of income for Trabzon. It was an amazing source of income. People from other places came to this city only for the Natashas!.. Now the market reached satisfaction and this brilliant era ended for us. We lost enormous amounts of money. Now if you go to Alanya, you'd see many of these Natashas.”

<http://hurarchive.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/ShowNew.aspx?id=-273593> retrieved 19th March 2012. In that newspaper article, Berberoğlu compares the profit of Natashas with the tourists who come to Turkey from Europe.

In these common narratives, either from the eyes of laypeople or the bourgeoisie, the double burden of Natashas' and the Trabzon women's tragedies are reduced to a mere economic functioning.

Finally, the experiences of Trabzon erkekleri (Trabzon men) with Natashas, especially between 1990 and the last years of the first decade of the 2000's created a masculinity that constructs itself on performative clichés of sexuality. Connell emphasises, "the practices that shape and realize desire are one of the constructive aspects of gender order" (2005, p. 74). As a result, of the experiences emphasised above, the Trabzon erkekleri (Trabzon men) are commonly stigmatized in Turkey as sexually demanding people, of whom they also accept and consider as a source of glory and honour, which constructs themselves. Currently, masculinities in Trabzon still tell those stories as if they had been just experiencing them, or had experienced them in a very close past. The masculinities in Trabzon almost never consider the tragedies of the local and the sex worker women beneath these. In all these stories, the emotional, bodily, economic and even political lives of the women are harshly destroyed because of the sexual demands of the men.

It can be stated that the masculinities in Trabzon adopt patriarchal hierarchies between the women in Trabzon. On the top of the hierarchy, there are the rugged and suffering women of Trabzon, the spouses, wives, mothers, sisters and daughters of the masculinities. Despite they despise those women for being unattractive and unappealing, they state that they are the most precious for them and consider protecting their honour and shame as a primary duty of masculinity. The relations with the local women construct the core of the power and dominance of masculinities. In the second step of this hierarchy, there are the Natashas of the *past*, the beautiful, sexually appealing, attractive and well-groomed prostitutes, who

now are said to left the city. Those women also have a hierarchy in themselves concerning their nationality, age, appeal and sexual maidenhood. The relations with those women construct the currently-nostalgic glory narratives of masculinities. In the last step of this hierarchy are the *present* Natashas who now exist in Trabzon. These are considered as unattractive, old and rugged prostitutes. The relations with those women are generally disapproved amongst the masculinities. In this vein, the second hierarchy emerges between the men who experience relations with which category of Natashas. In this hierarchy, the men who enter into intercourse with the first group of “appealing” Natashas are considered to perform the requirements of masculinity more than the “less attractive” ones. Considering those hierarchies, it should be emphasised that attributing the women different values are used in the construction of the patriarchal masculinities. The women are considered as beings that are expected to fit the gaze of the masculinities, rather than equal and autonomous beings. Moreover, comparing them in a hierarchical gaze they are pushed into a patriarchal competition which abstracts them from their selfhood.

All the narratives that emphasise attractiveness and unattractiveness of women are simply patriarchal tools to reduce women to stigmas and oppress them. The Trabzon erkekleri (Trabzon men) speak about the Natashas as women whom they buy (or bought) to perform their “superior” sexualities, whom they could attack freely as they like, in other words unpersonified commodities whom they could oppress whenever as they like. None of the respondents (or men from Trabzon whom I spoke afterwards, outside the limits of the interviews) spoke about the emotional and/or sexual demands of neither Natashas, nor the women of Trabzon, except trying to legitimize their affairs with Natashas, emphasising the

latter's "contribution" to the Trabzon women's physical appearance. The women in general are reduced to the dichotomy of being either a labourer (in tea or nut fields) mother and wives (of families) or a foreign prostitute (Natashas) from formerly hostile lands (USSR and Eastern Bloc). Those narratives certainly feed up from the rightist patriarchal cultural background of the city. These emphases on physical appearance and the exaggerated performances of the sexualities of the men are patriarchal discourses that construct masculinities in Trabzon.

4.4 THE EXCLUSION and OPPRESSION OF THE QUEER PEOPLE

Homophobia, transphobia and the idea of the unacceptability of the existence of the queer people are of the crucial parts of the rightist and patriarchal discourses. The queer people are presented as immoral, weaker and less manly chains of the society (Erol, 2010; Türker, 2010; Sancar, 2009). Moreover, they are forced to stay at the margins of the society.

Halil İbrahim Dinçdağ, the first open gay football referee of Turkey, lengthily told the pressure over queer people like him in Trabzon. He told, although the people in Trabzon accepted his status, he was forced to be invisible. In that interview, he told one of his memories:

"Unfortunately the homosexual friends avoid being seen alongside me. We have a [gay] friend, who is a student at a university in another city. He asked to one of our friends here that "do you have a gay friend at Trabzon?". That friend is also a gay. He told he knew me. The first one said "What? Are you befriending with him? Are you talking to him" My friend said "Yes I do. What's the problem?". He said "I never walk with him. I never meet him in front of other people.". My friend asked "Why? Why do you say so?". He said "Halil İbrahim is a well-known person. If you walk with him, if you talk to him, the

other people talk about him as such. They say “you are a gay”. If someday you got married to a woman, that will be no good for you.” That was simply an example. Think about the rest...”

In line with that, as aforementioned in Chapter 3, talking about queer people is considered as a taboo in Trabzon. In the fieldwork, I could hardly ask questions on this subject matter. Except Dinçdağ, who was an open gay himself, and Sinan and Mahir, two of the organizers of the Trabzon leg of the anti-homophobia³¹ meetings in both 2010 and 2011, I could only ask this issue to two more respondents. I asked them what they thought about “homosexuals”, since the queer categories except that such as “transsexual”, “bisexual”, or “asexual” were even unimaginable. The attitudes of these respondents were negative. The first one, Korkut, the owner of a busy bookshop, tried to ignore the existence of the queer people. When I asked what he thought about the “homosexuals”. He said

“There is no single prominent homosexual figure in Trabzon. That’s why that issue is never being talked about. I saw none of them here. Besides, that does not interest me. This is a matter outside the natural structure of human beings. Therefore I cannot approve that.”

The other respondent Alpaslan’s views were more unsympathetic, more nationalist and more insulting. He said

“We don’t like them here. It (homosexuality) is perceived improper. If one or two of them comes from a neighbourhood, they protect him. But... If he comes from another city, it is never accepted. It is wrong (ters) for us. But do we beat him? We do not do such things. Indeed, homosexuality is wrong for our religion as well. We are grown like that. When you come to the essence of this subject matter it is wrong as well. When you think about the religion... Or forget the religion, if you think with your reason, when there is a woman

³¹ <http://www.kaosgl.com/sayfa.php?id=4573>, retrieved 10th December 2012.

standing there, having a relation with a man is unacceptable, illogical. It is like having a relation with a dog. It is not correct!.. What is it said? “You are going to understand the end of the world with the relations of the humans with the animals.” It means, the end of the world has come closer. I don’t know if it is five years or ten years...”

On the other hand, at another side of this picture were the students of KTÜ, who organized anti-homophobia meetings in Trabzon. In my interviews with Sinan and Mahir, they complained about the homophobia in the city. They reported that almost nobody, except the organizing a dozen people and the guests did not participate the anti-homophobia meetings in 2010 and 2011, although many people were personally invited. When I asked them whether they experienced an attack, they told that they had been so ignored that nobody even considered disturbing them.

Even these brief accounts present the exclusion of queer people from the social relations in Trabzon. The masculinities in the city present a significant hostility towards the queer people. Despite the visible existence of Halil İbrahim Dinçdağ, the masculinities try to ignore and exclude the queer people as if they never exist. This homophobic and transphobic position contributes the construction of a quite patriarchal cathectic organisation of masculinities in the city.

CHAPTER 5

FAMILIES AND DOMESTIC LIVES OF MASCULINITIES IN TRABZON

“A man’s home is his castle.”¹

5.1 INTRODUCTION

Male headed family, which is typically composed of a married heterosexual couple, living together with their children and sometimes alongside their parents (and sometimes other kinspeople), lies at the heart of conservative ideology². The family serves as the primary ground for the social and biological reproduction of the already-existing patriarchal and conservative values and norms. Nevertheless, “family” is one of the most common, yet the most complex and most diverse notions in the social sciences (Pine, 1998, p. 223; Terrell, 2001, 179). In the contemporary conservative discourse, it is considered as the essential space for legitimized sexual intercourse, generating the offspring, socialization of children, housework, taking care of the elderly, and in certain cases, to an extent production with

¹ Anonymous Anglo-American proverb.

² There are many other forms of family, such as non-married couples, single-parent families or homosexual couples, rather than the conservative family in industrialized, developing and non-industrialized societies.

non-commoditized family labour (Sancar, 2012, pp. 232-273). In *Gender and Power*, Connell maintains that

“Conservative ideology speaks of the family as “the foundation of society” and traditional sociology has often seen it the simplest of institutions, the building-block of more elaborate structures. Far from being the basis of society, the family is one of the most complex products. There is nothing simple about it.” (1987, p. 121).

Rather, family is a ground in which countless social relations take place simultaneously. As dual systems theorist Juliet Mitchell presents, relations of reproduction appear hand in hand with production and socialization in family (Mitchell, 1990). In relation to this, family is a scene, in which power relations exist in an integrated manner with the gendered division of labour. In this context, the men do not do the housework, which is considered as the work of the women. This perception of housework has a quite wide range from cleaning the house to the taking care of the elderly, and child rearing to the daily preparation of food. In this gendered division of labour, the women are confined to the domestic sphere, while the men spend most of their time in the public sphere, earning the income for the family. This brings the men the role of the breadwinner, while leaving the women the wife of the house, which does the housework while caring for the children and her husband³. Household⁴ emerges as the core ground of the adult men’s power⁵.

³ As the socialist feminist scholars such as Eisenstein (1990), Hartmann (2006), Mitchell (1990) and Walby (1992) emphasise, gendered division of labour, which forces the women to do the housework in the domestic sphere and make production or earn income within the public sphere at the same time, pushes them into a “double burden”. In the traditional and conservative forms of patriarchy, the women are even not allowed to earn income in the public sphere. In this way, capitalist patriarchy oppresses and subordinates the women simultaneously in the spheres of reproduction and the production. In the traditional and conservative forms of patriarchy, the women are not allowed to earn income in the public sphere.

The breadwinner role of men in family, which is continuously emphasised with the morality of capitalism, provides the material ground for the power of the men in the household. In line with the provisioning the dependent members of the family, the men are forced to fulfil the duties of breadwinner (or provision the dependents) in order to fully execute their duties in the patriarchal order. As Morgan emphasises, if they fail to do that, they face the condemnation for not performing the duties of manhood, in a similar manner to Weber's emphasis in *Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, experiencing one of the most significant losses of the social and material bases of the contemporary capitalist patriarchal grounds of masculinity (1992, pp. 54-65). Morgan even points that breadwinner role provides the spirit of masculinity (pp. 54-55).

The men arbitrarily contribute the nurturance, socialization and education of their children, exercising an almost endless power, merely displaying a manly love to them, rather than continuously caring for them. This paternal role is generally expected to stay out of question, creating an unapproachable, almighty imagery of the father (Thomä, 2011). The relations of the husband and the wife remain quite distant in this conservative perception of family. The men generally share a few things with their wives and give many of the decisions of the family. They leave their wives quite limited space of domestic sphere for decision making. The women, who generally have a limited economic freedom, give decisions on a small number of issues such as the preparation of food or the issues

⁴ As Pine points, with its emphasis on the domestic space and its inhabitants, "household" is largely conceptualized as the equivalent of "family" in the social sciences (1998, p. 223).

⁵ This might be compared to the classical conceptualization of patriarchy. The term "patriarchy" comes from the Ancient Greek word πατριάρχης (patriarchia) that literally means the supremacy of the father. It also means the old and male head of family, tribe, community, or Church. <http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/patriarchy?s=t>, retrieved, 23rd December 2012.

about the children. As a result of that, as Kandiyoti (1988) emphasises, the centre of the family shifts from the relations between the married couple to the relations between the male head of family and his parents and his children. The women only find the soothing for themselves relating to their adult sons when they got old, while the younger women experience strike oppression from their husbands. The relations between the married couple is the ground in which the patriarchal relations of power exist in the most crystallized manner. This culturally exalted scheme of the roles of the men and the women in the family supports the continuation of the status quo within the society.

At the same time, as Yasa emphasises, majority of the men in rural Turkey use the word “aile” (family) signifying their *wives* and more specifically the *mother of their children* (as cited in Duben, 2002, p. 109). This observation points that the notions of “family” and “spouse” are seen as the equivalent of each other according to the masculinities, since both are considered in terms of the confidential space of men.

In line with those, “impregnating one’s wife”, “provisioning dependants”, “protecting family” and “personal autonomy”, the four moral *imperatives* of masculinities living in the lands around the Mediterranean Sea⁶ which Gilmore argues⁷ place the conditions of being a socially accepted male, centring around families (1990, pp. 48-49). The men have to be breadwinners by securing the presence, nourishment and income of their families. They have to prove that they are sexually potent males by becoming fathers. They have to protect their families from the potential

⁶ In Gilmore’s discussion, that region also covers the lands in Anatolian Peninsula.

⁷ It should also be noted that, Gilmore’s argument is based on a cross-cultural investigation of various studies on male socialization and/or enculturation in 20th century.

attacks of other men and the other people that pose potential threats to the honour and shame to their families; and at the same time they have to protect the lives of the younger generations. As an outcome of that, they gain personal autonomy, which allows them to act as *individual*⁸ and omnipotent atomic actors, which are socially capable of doing what they want in terms of patriarchal customs. Performing those four moral imperatives promotes the men to their so-called superior position in the capitalist patriarchal gender order. In line with this argument, based on the findings of my research on Tepecik gecekondü neighbourhood in Ankara, I emphasised that the Muslim men in Turkey are obliged to pass through a number of rites of passage in the socialization process to become socially accepted adult men (Bozok, 2005). The stages of those rites are (1) *circumcision*, (2) *military service*⁹ and (3) *marriage* (and becoming a *father*). Through those ritualized stages, the men become a part of *religion*, a member and a part of *nation state* and finally a part of adult and patriarchal *men's world* respectively. In the still continuing conservative and traditionalist legacy of Trabzon, Morgan's (1992), Gilmore's (1990), and Bozok's (2005) arguments find significant parallelisms. Below, I am going to discuss the families and domestic lives of the masculinities in Trabzon.

⁸ Here, it has to be noted that the etymological origin of the word "individual" comes from Latin word "individuum" (an indivisible thing), neuter of "individuus" (indivisible, undivided). <http://www.seslisozluk.net/?word=individual>, retrieved 25th December 2012.

⁹ Similarly, Selek also stresses the significance of military service in the construction of masculinities in Turkey (2008).

5.2 THE CENTRALITY OF FAMILY in MEN'S LIVES in TRABZON

Expressed as the massive support of rightist politics in the public sphere¹⁰, the conservative demeanour of the masculinities in Trabzon shapes their perception of the domestic sphere and their relations with their wives and their children. Trabzon is also known for its extended families in which the family members act in a communitarian way, supporting the other members (Emiroğlu, 2009; Meeker, 2001). In his article "Trabzon Ne Yetiştirirsin?" (Trabzon What Do You Grow?), Emiroğlu describes the passage from a rural past of semi-autonomous families to the contemporary urban inhabitants of Trabzon who retain the remnants of the past (2009). He emphasises that severe social and environmental conditions used to force the families and households to become self-contained units in Trabzon (2009, p. 101-104). In those rural and traditional families, the women worked at the home and in the field, while men very rarely participated those. They acted as individual actors, only protecting their families, fighting with other men and the families that posed threat. In order to guarantee the continuation of their families, the male members of these families could use violence without thinking much as a result of the urgency of the pressures. These relations had created a "crazy-blooded", "almost totally autonomous", "heroic" and "utopic" masculinity that protected his family, yet depended on the labour of the women (p. 101-105).

Majority of the families in contemporary Trabzon are male headed nuclear families. Those families are largely composed of the men, women, and the children whose roles are clearly defined¹¹. With the exception of two, all of

¹⁰ See Chapter 6 on rightist politics in Trabzon.

¹¹ In more conservative and/or traditional households, the elderly parents of the men are added to the nuclear family.

the respondent men were in breadwinner position in their families. Many of the spouses of the married respondents' were housewives¹². The respondents emphasised that their primary duty for their families was earning the income. Many of them emphasised the Trabzon men's practices of labour migration for fulfilling that duty. Many respondents said they fairly seldom contribute the housework. On the other hand, they emphasised they were the heads of their families, giving decisions on every issue. The household is a space in which the children are raised with traditional ways, by the women. Within the household, the men exercise the patriarchal power, on the women and the children, while reproducing the masculinities. They are considered as the ultimate heads of the families. This unconditional and detached power of the men in the family prepares the grounds for the violence against the women and the children. On the other hand, the respondents said that their relations with their children and their wives are warmer and less violent than the relations between their fathers and their mothers. From this picture emerge the contemporary families of masculinities in Trabzon shaped by the conservative ideology.

In relation this, despite different responses centring on the issues of masculinities and patriarchal discourses were assumed prior to the field research, with the only exception of İsmet who stressed primacy of health¹³, all of the respondent Trabzon erkekleri (Trabzon men) clearly emphasised that the most valuable thing in their lives were their families. For example, Cihangir said

¹² The exceptions were İsmet, whose wife was a labourer like him, and Ertuğrul, Ayhan and Cihangir's wives, all of whom were secondary school or high school teachers at various schools in the city.

¹³ His response was even moralist. He said "According to me, the most valuable thing is not harming my life. I mean you shouldn't smoke. You shouldn't play cards. You shouldn't go to the coffeehouse."

“A man’s primary duty is being a father, continuing his offspring, bringing bread to his home. A manly man is a man who brings bread to his home, who feeds his children. Those are his physical duties.”

On the other hand Murat said

“...I mean according to me, the most valuable thing is my family. They are the most precious for me.

Similarly, Azmi said

“For me, the most valuable thing in a man’s life is a sturdy, honourable family. There is nothing more valuable than those.

On the other hand, Bora focused on the difference between a married and a single man. He said

“The most valuable thing in a man’s life is his family. He goes there when he falls in trouble. The crazy-blooded young man can do lechery. But when he gets married, this stops. The married man has to take care of his family. He has to protect his honour.”

On the other hand, combining family with the idea of honour and shame of state and religion, Latif said

“For me, the most valuable thing is protecting my family. Protecting my family and my children... Living in accordance with our customs and our traditions... What else shall we do? We are going to protect our state from the foreigners. We are going to protect our religion and our family. Nobody will harm our honour and our shame. And we will not harm anyone else’s.”

Similarly, Fethi said

“The most valuable things in a man’s life... Those are his wife, his children and his parents. A man has to continue his offspring. I mean those are the

most valuable things. [National] flag, land, shame, honour, they are the most valuable things in life.”

These responses, which reflect common opinions, present the fundamentality of family in the lives of the masculinities in Trabzon. For the most part this is because the family brings the men the space to obtain privileges of patriarchal power by forming his own family. In this conservative discourse of the respondents, a man’s establishment of the family presents that he is a true and potent heterosexual man, who can work, impregnate his spouse, protect his family, provision his dependents. The (new) household that he establishes places a man as the patriarch, in other words the ultimate leader of his own family.

In line with those, the family provides the men the ground to perform their masculinities by entering into legitimized sexual intercourse and becoming a father. In the conservative capitalist patriarchal gender regime of Trabzon, family brings the men one of the most crucial grounds for social reproduction of masculinities. Therefore it has to be emphasised that family is seen an essential and indispensable part of the lives of the masculinities.

Furthermore, the men equate the loyalty to the (semi-extended nuclear) family with loyalty to the state, religion, and country. That is to say that family in those conservative discourses, which is overtly emphasised with “blood ties” is equated to state and religion in terms of similar kin terms (Moghadam, 1993, pp. 99-100). As Anderson argues, state and nation (and religion) are “imagined communities”, which makes people feel and act as if they were connected with kin ties in the building of the nation-states (2006). In the same manner, the respondents emphasised the state, nation and religion as a crucial part of their lives, equating them to the ground of their

social reproduction (and their identities). These opinions of the respondents reflect the conservatism in the level of family (see Chapter 6).

In consequence, these statements of the respondents take us to two other significant issues. Firstly, many respondents made distinctions between a single man and a married man (who is a father). In this manner Cihangir said

“A single man and a married man are two different things. You should know that. The measure of masculinity of a single man is evaluated by his mother and his father, while it is evaluated by his wife when he gets married. She has personal expectations from him. His wife has personal expectations from him. Do you understand me... Other people in the society cannot enter into a man’s life after he gets married. If they enter, that would be a significant problem. I mean, the criteria is the person’s mother and father before marriage; and his wife after marriage.”

Many of the respondents emphasised the turning point of a men’s life is starting to earn money¹⁴ and getting married. For example, Alpaslan said

“The turning point is starting to earn money. When he starts to do that, he finds the ground for establishing his family. He becomes a leader. He becomes the head of his family. In any case it is one of the necessities of manhood.”

These responses emphasise the men’s increasing responsibilities with the establishment of his family. These responsibilities of provisioning the dependents and becoming an effective person in and around family limit the “rascalities” of a non-married man. Despite these undesirable outcomes, establishment of a family opens a man becoming the leader of a household, and enjoy being in control, while nurtured by the women.

¹⁴ I am going to detail the significance of the breadwinner role in the following section of this chapter.

On the other hand some of the respondents emphasised the primacy of marriage than the military service. For instance Refik said

“The turning point of a man’s life is earning money first of all. He passes his crazy-blooded age, starts to earn money.

MB: What happens in those? Why are they important for you?

REFİK: He gets married and gets children. Those are important. It is because he continues his offspring. That is a quality of manhood.

MB: What do you think about the change that the military service causes?

REFİK: Of course military service is important too. But marriage is more important.”

Fethi made a similar emphasis by focusing on the challenges of work life in a man’s life. He said

“Military service does not change a man’s life that much. Because I did not continue my education. It only affects the educated people to a small degree. I was working here at Boztepe Tea Garden before military service. I quit and went to the military service. I think I was loved. They allowed me to start here again when I returned in 2001-2002. I am still continuing here. I was working here before as well. I got married in 2004. I mean a man needs to enter into an order. Some people might gave strong economies; those might not want to marry. For people like us, marriage is always better. I mean he has to put his life in an order. I mean he has to get into his responsibilities. Previously we were somehow rascal in the past. For people like us, marriage is taking the bread under your arm and going home. Because the life outside is not for us... It is not for us... Discos, bars, etc.

MB: Is that the rascality you mean?

FETHİ: That is the rascality I mean. How can I say... Prostitutes (hayat kadınları), Russians, and that sort of things... I did all those in the past. But thank Allah, my transformation (dönüşüm) has been very perfect.

MB: What happened for that transformation?

FETHİ: I returned from military service and got married just afterwards.”

Ziya made a more thorough statement on this issue by comparing marriage and military service. He said

“ZİYA: The turning point of a man’s life is marriage. It is the most important turning point. Because you reach a loaded life from a zero life. Because you become two while you were one; you can become three, four, five while you were two. Your responsibility increases. Now a single man can say “I can go home at midnight. I can drink booze and make I can go on the razzle-dazzle. I can make lechery.” You cannot do those when you are married. You have an order for going to your home. You don’t drink booze. You cannot go out with your girlfriends or you cannot go to the whores. Marriage is the turning point of a man’s life. This can be towards good or this can be towards bad. But the turning point is marriage.

MB: You mean, the turning point is not going to the military service.

ZİYA: It is not. Military service is obligatory while marriage is not. Therefore the most important turning point is marriage. Whatever you do, you are going to go to the military service. That is a compulsory education. It has no escapade. But it is possible not to marry. If you would like, I may speak about Trabzon. There is a world of non-married people. But all of them went to military service. Military service is not a turning point. Some people say that a man smartens up after military service. It is nonsense. It depends on the capacity of a man. The most reasonable is marriage.”

The Trabzon erkekleri (Trabzon men) narrate both the marriage and military service as turning points of men’s lives¹⁵. However, they place marriage to a more prioritized position than the military service. As Nagel (2009) present, notions of military and nation are equated with family in the

¹⁵ Although I asked circumcision in some of the interviews, the respondents placed it in a tertiary place.

construction of the nation. The respondents' preference of marriage to the military service points to the prioritization of being a part of the married patriarchal men, by establishing a family. It should be emphasised that the military (and therefore the nation) is seen as the mere thing that could be compared to the family. However, military service is perceived as a compulsory experience in men's lives. They emphasised that this was an inescapable duty. Despite it is emphasised that the men enter into the manly order and discipline of the military service, the experienced bravado is perceived as of secondary significance. The reason for that is marriage provides the men the ultimate patriarchal power. In their own families the men find their social reproduction by the women, exercise the continuation of their offspring through fatherhood and enjoy beneficiaries of patriarchal power.

And lastly, the worst thing that could happen to a man is described in accordance with the conservative ideology outlined above, with emphases on unemployment, honour and the loss of the members of the family. İsmet stated that the worst things in a man's life were unemployment and the loss of family. He said

"The worst things are losing your job and losing your family. I have not lived those; but those are awful. Your family looks after you. They give you joy. Losing your job is bad. If you lose your job, it is like losing your family. You cannot look after your family and perform your duties as a man.

Cihangir directly emphasised the loss of family. He said

"The worst thing that may happen to a man is losing his family. For example, I lost my father when I was ten years old. In the growth of a boy, the most important person is the father, while In the growth of a girl, the most important person is the mother. If a boy, let's say aged thirteen loses his father, that

would be disastrous. It is to say, for a manly man, losing his family is a disaster. So on..."

On the other hand, Ziya, Latif and Korkut emphasised the loss of shame as the worst thing that could happen to a man. Ziya emphasised being cheated by a woman as the worst thing that could happen to a man. He said

"The worst thing that can happen to a man is being cuckolded; being cheated. There can be nothing worse than that."

Korkut stressed the possible loss of shame as the worst thing that could happen to a man He said

"I mean the worst thing can happen to a man's honour and shame. To his wife and his family I mean. I think that way. This is valid in lots of places in the world. This never changes despite there are lots of men in the world. "

Latif emphasised the significance of earning money for the protection of honour and shame. He said

"For a manly man, earning money is very important. This allows him to protect his shame. The worst thing is losing his job. Earning money is necessary for protecting his shame. Money is necessary to live in a honourable family. Here is Trabzon. You have to warn your children to live in an honourable way; not to do anything than the way of supreme Allah. If a man does not earn money, he goes to other ways than the way of Allah."

Those responses present the existence of the integration of traditional (or classical) and conservative patriarchal values of honour, shame and family ideology, with the modern capitalist patriarchal values of breadwinner role

amongst the masculinities in Trabzon¹⁶. The masculinities in Trabzon give significant priority to establish a family in a man's life and consider it as one of the most prominent stages of becoming to be totally accepted as an adult male. Marriage is considered to emphasise the responsibilities of a male individual to other people, especially his dependents. In relation to the existing traditional patriarchal codes, some respondents stressed the loss of honour and shame as the worst thing that could happen to a man. An attack towards honour and shame would shake the patriarchal grounds of peace and dignity on which the masculine values are based upon. On the other hand, the other crucial emphasis is made on the breadwinning role of the men. This is certainly a part of the capitalist patriarchal ideology. The ability to become a breadwinner and to continue it, is considered to enable the establishment of a family for a man. Therefore, it is considered as a vital step for becoming a socially accepted man. In the following section, I am going to consider this gendered division of labour more in detail.

5.3 GENDER DIVISION of LABOUR

Gendered division of labour is one of the most crucial elements of capitalist patriarchal gender order. It is one of the broadest debates in the feminist literature. From the early first wave feminists of the nineteenth century to the contemporary debates on globalization and neoliberalism, gendered division of labour has been widely discussed. Through issues like assigning the domestic works to the women, forcing them to work in lower status jobs and/or lower waged occupations, the men are placed in a superior position

¹⁶ This integration might even be compared to Sharabi's notion "neopatriarchy", which points the unification of traditional and modern patriarchies in modernizing and developing societies (1992).

in society. As Rotundo emphasises, with the emergence of the distinction between public and private spheres with the modernity, the capitalist patriarchy tried to keep the women away from the public sphere, by disallowing them to work or force them to accept lower wages. (2006). The men inhabited in the public sphere, while the women in the private. As many Marxist feminist and socialist feminist scholars emphasise, this distinction contributed capitalism to control the income of the families by oppressing the real value of the women's labour, while highlighting the men's labour (Donovan, 2001, pp. 129-174; Tong, 2009, pp. 94-129). As a result, the women were forced to work with lower wages than men or even forced not work at all in the public sphere. Moreover, in the more traditional experiences of capitalist patriarchy, the women are even largely kept away from the occupations in the public sphere. These relations enabled the emergence of the men as the "breadwinners" with the beginning of the nineteenth century (Adams and Coltrane, 2005, pp. 231-232). In the patriarchal ideology, the housework is presented as the women's duty. Regardless of whether they worked or not, the women are generally forced to do the housework, while the men detest doing that and claim to commit themselves to the labouring in which they earn money. This gendered division still continues in the contemporary neoliberal capitalist patriarchy. Despite some cultural and differences this scheme of division of labour still persists in many contemporary societies.

The respondents' accounts on the gendered division of labour are similar to the overall conservative and patriarchal scheme of gender relations. The masculinities in Trabzon embrace a division of labour in which the women are expected to do all the housework, while men do not participate those. On the other hand, they emphasise their role in family as breadwinners. They provide the material income of their families. Furthermore they stress

that the men of the city has a tradition of sending migrant workers to other cities and abroad. Those men concentrate in sectors like construction (Duben, 2002). This pattern of migrating men contributes the imagery of distant and authoritarian men. The breadwinner role is so crucial in the lives of the men that the loss of job is seen as one of the most significant sources of anxiety.

The respondent Trabzon erkekleri (Trabzon men) emphasised that they did not do housework, since they considered it as a women's work.

Ercan stressed the patriarchal morals of the domestic division of labour. He associated doing housework with being a transgender. In an arrogant and heterosexist manner he said

"Trabzon erkeği is not a sissy at home. While there are women there, we don't do work at home. Doing housework is wrong for the men!"

Fethi emphasised the differences of the responsibilities in the division of labour. He said

"If we divide the responsibilities, the equality between a man and a woman is 60%. Why? Our responsibilities are different. The woman must do the work at home. The man must go to his job; because he has children to provide his needs."

İsmet and Cihangir emphasised that they did not do housework although their wives were earning income. Without even mentioning that this causes a double burden on the women, they stressed that doing housework was the duty of the women. İsmet plainly said the housework was the duty of the women and the public sphere belonged to the men than the women. He said

“...You are asking who does the work at home. That’s a good question. The ladies must do the housework. Yes. The women must do the housework and the men must do the exterior work. The men must work outside. The men must not do any work at home. The women’s duty is doing all the work at home.”

Despite his wife was a teacher, Cihangir emphasised the primacy of a men’s responsibilities as a breadwinner in the differentiation of division of labour. He claimed that the gendered division was an essential outcome of the natural differences between the men and the women. Moreover, he stressed that the gendered division of labour was even unquestionable and undisputable. In a feverish and aggressive manner he said

“Because the married man feels the responsibilities of the life on his shoulders, he acts differently; he thinks differently. The responsibility to struggle with the difficulties of life belongs to the men not the women. Therefore the manly man wants to make his word to be obeyed. He does not want to bother with housework, cleaning the clothes, cleaning the dishes, cleaning the house. This is his right. Do you understand what I mean?!.. This is his right!.. For example I do not cook at home. I have to but I never do. Why?! I never cooked in my life. Never! When my wife is with her parents and when I got hungry I eat outside. If I couldn’t do that I stay hungry. That is a man’s nature! But my wife does everything. She cleans the home and does the cooking with her motherly instincts! I never cleaned my clothes. Never! If it is necessary, I go to the dry cleaner and have them cleaned. That is a man’s nature! My mother says “how a weird man you are; go and clean your clothes”. But I cannot! That is my nature!”

On the other hand, Nurettin made an emphasis on being the head of the household, which stems from the religious codes. He stressed the head of the household shouldn’t be expected to do housework, while he was obliged to earn the income. Nevertheless, he told he sometimes did some

housework he found doing suitable. However, he told those ashamedly, in a tone of confessing guilt or a weakness. He said

“NURETTİN: Because a man is physically strong, he can do whatever he wants to do. He can go out whenever he wants. Allah has created us as such. And our religion obliges us to live according to the orders of Allah. Of course this gives the men some privileges. Since the man is the head of the family, he has the responsibility of the load of [earning the income of] the home. The women are expected to do the work at home. It is their duty.

MB: Do you make any housework?

NURETTİN: (He sighs.) A man may iron his clothes if he does any housework.

MB: Do you do that?

NURETTİN: (He sighs and speaks in a shy voice) I only iron my clothes sometimes. And I do that because the woman might be tired. A man might do that only. But a man never cooks for me. A man never washes clothes. The machine washes the clothes; but a man does not do it. Those things do not suit a man. And I do that way.”

As it is seen from this account, doing housework is equated with weakness, and in a homophobic tone with being a queer person. The men try to avoid doing housework that would equate them with the women of whom they exploit and oppress their labour. The accounts of Trabzon erkekleri (Trabzon men) on not participating the housework can be easily augmented.

The only respondent who emphasised he did housework was Latif. Being an elderly, poorer and retired labourer, like his deceased father, he said he participated the housework. His account is significant since it highlights the

role of economic wealth and socialization in men's contribution to housework. He told

"...There might be illness, birth or whatever. We went to the barn. We cooked the meals. We washed the clothes. We did everything. You do what she cannot do. Housework is common. She does what you cannot do. You are going to build the house, break the stones. She cannot do those. But you are going to do the housework together. She will look after your child. You will cook and prepare the food of the baby. She will feed the baby. The works will happen altogether. I never saw my father to do the cleaning. But he cleaned the front of the house. He was a hardworking man. God save his soul. He helped my mother."

It should be emphasised that Latif's account of voluntarily contributing the housework is an exception in the case of the masculinities in Trabzon. It should be noted that those reflect an individual attitude rather than a social pattern. It is still a meaningful example showing the impact of socialization (taking father as a role model) for changing the gendered division of labour¹⁷.

On the other hand in Trabzon the men's roles are mostly defined in terms of earning income. Majority of the respondents emphasised their role as men in terms of looking after their families by legitimizing the breadwinner role, while unemployment was told in terms of anxiety. Many of the respondents spoke approving that capitalist patriarchal discourse. For instance Cihangir directly defined masculinity in terms of the breadwinner role. He said

"A manly man is a one, who brings bread to his home; who provides the food of his children. Those are the man's duties; not the women's."

¹⁷ Here it should also be noted that Juliet Mitchell (1990), one of the founding theorists of socialist feminism, also emphasised the impact of socialization in the construction and reproduction of patriarchal relations.

However, in the later parts of this interview, he told the tragic impact of the breadwinner ideology on the life of his father. He said

“My father was a poor tailor who worked in a hired store. He died when he was 40. My mother was a housewife. My father brought bread to the home. My mother was waiting for that bread. We should ask why my father died. My father worked continuously, night and day. My mother had wanted to contribute to the economy of the family. Without the knowledge of my father, she had knitted some pullovers and sold them. The day my father died, she had brought the first money she earned to our home. When my father learned that, he had a heart attack and died in that moment.”

This case presents the strength of the breadwinner ideology on the lives of the masculinities in Trabzon. Cihangir’s father had died of the heart attack because he couldn’t accept that a woman, particularly his wife whom he believed he had to earn her (and her children’s) living, could not work. His wife’s attempt to earn money had made him to feel weakness of performing his masculinity. Therefore he considered this as a matter of honour and that had caused a high stress which triggered his heart attack.

On the other hand, Latif, who was discussed above in terms of his egalitarian attitude on doing housework, presented a quite conservative and religious attitude on the breadwinner role of the men. He emphasised that earning income, which was men’s duty, was necessary for the protection of the honour and shame of the family. Latif said

“Earning money is certainly for a man’s family. It is for provisioning his family and his children. Money is necessary for living in an honourable family. Here is Trabzon. In order to live in an honourable family, you should earn money. That is what supreme Allah orders us to do.”

Here it is seen that breadwinner role is perceived as a guarantee to prevent the members of the family to deviate from the moral codes. It is believed

that in the case of poverty, the family might fall into corruption and decadence. Hence, men as the breadwinners arise as the protectors of the honour of their families.

On the other hand, Levent emphasised socialization in the determination of breadwinner role. He said

“Being a woman means being attractive; impressing a man. However bringing bread to his home is taught a man from childhood. On the other hand, a woman is taught that your man will provide your needs. You should look after him. If a woman is working, she spends all the money she earns for herself. But the money a man earns goes to the needs of the family. The man is like the bank of his family. Earning the money for the family is a man’s duty.”

Many other respondents emphasised the significance and inevitability of the men’s breadwinner role in the society. The other significant pattern in the interviews was labour migration amongst the masculinities in Trabzon. Although this was largely the practice of the former generation, this continued amongst the contemporary masculinities to a degree as well. It has to be stressed that the practices of the labour migration has a considerable impact on the autonomous, tough and ambitious character of the masculinities in Trabzon.

Berke, a young and ambitious civil engineer, was the only respondent who *de facto* experienced labour migration himself. He was more focused on the successes in the job than anything else. In an excited and joyful manner, he told

“After graduating from KTÜ, I rapidly found a job in Ordu at TEDAŞ¹⁸. I had to earn money for my living. I am an ambitious man. I was working at a construction site there. There were many workers from Trabzon. We, the men

¹⁸ TEDAŞ is a company that produces and distributes electrics.

from Trabzon support and love each other. I was solving every problem there. I was solving the problems of the workers, as well as the problems in the construction site. The workers supported me and I supported their backs. The manager of the construction site realized that very quickly. Three months after I began working at TEDAŞ, the manager promoted me. And I became a chief engineer.”

Not all the masculinities in Trabzon experienced worry-free experiences as Berke, who was single, and had no dependents at the time of the interview.

Muhsin made an emphasis on the separation of the family with migration and said

“Our fathers are all guest workers. They went to Istanbul, Ankara and Europe for labouring. In every neighbourhood, in every village you see the families of the migrant people. I did not want to go because I wanted to stay here and look after my parents.”

On the other hand, Ayhan was a son of a migrant worker. He pointed a stark domestic division of labour, violence and pressure in his parents’ house. When we started to speak about the domestic sphere, he said

“Do you really want to hear something true about the homes here? Here, gurbetçilik (living away from home for labouring) is essential. The father... he goes to other cities or other countries for labouring... He comes home once a year; leaves a child here; goes away. It was like that in the past. We are ten siblings. My father... He was a labourer who went to other cities to earn money for us. Every time he returned from Istanbul my mother had become pregnant. He went to gurbet [and left] one kid. He returned [and left] one kid. We were as such... This changed in years. My father had ten children, I have two. He was a very tough man. The legacy of the past culture is still continuing. He never spoke to us. He never spoke to my mother. My father always gave the glass he drank water to my mother. He never put that glass on the table. Every so often he beat her.”

The labour migration was stemmed from the poverty and lack of the opportunities of employment in the city. The other dynamic of the labour migration was the breadwinner role of masculinities. The migrant men lived separately from their families for long periods, going to other cities or abroad particularly for earning income for their families than their personal interests. The labour migration contributed the social construction of distant, autonomous, violent and authoritarian masculinities in Trabzon¹⁹. The moral force of earning the livelihood of the family was so strong that the men ventured leaving their families, which they were expected to protect

On the other hand, finally, the force of providing the livelihood of the family presents a strong pressure on men. Therefore, unemployment and the risk of unemployment are perceived as a great anxiety for the masculinities in Trabzon. Although he was a retired labourer, Latif resisted speaking about unemployment. Speaking with a feeling of terror, he considered unemployment in terms of losing honour. He said

“I say a man loses his honour if he gets unemployed. I mean you get afraid. I mean you cannot sit here silently, by yourself. Everything can happen to a man if he loses his job. Everything can happen. You may say “here is Trabzon”. That is right. We are addicted to each other. Still everything can happen. Allah please help those [unemployed people].”

On the other hand, İsmet made a similar remark. He said

“If you lose your job, you shout, cry and lament for a couple of days. You try to forget it but you cannot. You feel sad. You feel sorry. You feel sorry for your wife. You feel guilty for your family.”

¹⁹ It should also be noted that the absence of the authoritarian men enforced the women's decisive position in the households.

As pointed by Morgan, unemployment is experienced as a deep threat to gender identity (1992, p. 105). In the conservative and traditional ways of thinking which place the men as the ultimate heads and the breadwinners of the household, unemployment symbolically signifies that the man is “not able to perform his natural function” (Bakke, as cited in Morgan, 1992, p. 106). This is the case of the masculinities in Trabzon. The possibility of unemployment reminds the men to lose their function as men (and therefore Latif and İsmet experienced difficulties in speaking on that). In line with that, it signifies the loss of the material grounds of the men’s power in their families.

The men in Trabzon culturally have the responsibility of provisioning the livelihood of their family. Those men place themselves in the public sphere, in which they earn the income for their families, while the women are at kept home and are expected to do the housework and raise the children. This has a number of impacts. Since the most valuable thing perceived by the men are their families, the breadwinner role materially provides the men to be the head of their families, and to prove and support their power and authority. By keeping the women away from the economic relations, the men also keep them to gain the power position in domestic and the public spheres. In this way, the masculinities in Trabzon experience the beneficiaries of the patriarchal power.

5.4 PATRIARCHAL POWER RELATIONS in FAMILY and FATHERHOOD

In the families of Trabzon, the men are the heads of the families. In those families, the women have very limited access to decision making processes. In this ordering of gendered relations of power, the women are

considered to have almost no value and freedom of choice²⁰. Connell emphasises that “the axis of power in the contemporary gender order is the overall subordination of women and the dominance of men” (2005, p. 74). This is also the case of Trabzon. The male heads of the families exercise almost endless power on the women. The men give the final decision on substantial issues, such as how the income of the wealth is spent and distributed, how the more expensive goods electrical are going to be purchased and the children’s future occupation in families. As mentioned above, the masculinities in Trabzon leave the women the decisions, which they consider of minor importance, such as the deciding which food will be cooked, or the clothes will be bought. In line with that, majority of the married respondents maintained that they usually had somehow emotionally remote relationships with their spouses. However, many of them claimed that they tried to negotiate with their wives in problematic situations, while many others denounced the violence against women. Despite this claim of negotiation with the spouses, some of the respondents confessed they use (or used) violence against their spouses in certain conditions.

²⁰ There are many tragic accounts of the patriarchal qualities of the gender relations in Trabzon. One of them is a memoir told by Professor-in-Ordinary Hıfzı Veldet Velidedeoğlu in his classes in Istanbul University. Being a distinguished professor in law, Velidedeoğlu went to Trabzon in the late 1960’s as a part of his Black Sea travel. There he met one of his former students who became a significant Judge in Trabzon. The former student offered his professor to go to a legal exploration at a village nearby. They went there. In the village, there was the case of a woman who died under a tree, which her husband had cut and which fell on her. Her husband, a peasant man, had tied a rope to his wife’s waist and started cutting the tree with an axe. He had expected his wife to pull the falling tree. However, when the tree was cut, the tree fell right on the woman who immediately died there; and the tree fell down with the woman’s corpse from the cliff. When the Judge asked the husband why this had happened, he replied “I am not sorry for the woman but the tree is lost sir”. (Şinasi Mortaş, personal communication, 5th February 2011). This reflects the harsh subordination of the women in Trabzon.

On the other hand, despite differentiating themselves from their own fathers in being warmer and less violent, contemporary masculinities in Trabzon still largely keep themselves distant from their children, fatherhood primarily being perceived as the continuation of the offspring, and in a conservative manner, being a “dutiful child”. The relations of the masculinities in Trabzon are quite patriarchal, with the men known with their tough, aggressive and inaccessible character.

Ertuğrul the only respondent who told he had an egalitarian relationship with his wife emphasised that his family relations were an exceptional case in Trabzon, since nobody he knew or heard had such relations²¹. However, he outlined situation in the city with the following words:

“Do you want to learn the situation in Trabzon?.. Then note this: In Şalpazarı, they put the women’s identification cards in a lace case and give it to their husbands when they marry. The women have no identity in Trabzon. They have no freedom. My story, my life is not the typical thing. This is the general situation of Trabzon.”

Ertuğrul’s words present a strong oppression on women in Trabzon. Many respondents were actively agents of this oppression. Cihangir was one of them. He told his story, forcing his wife to move (back) to Trabzon from Çanakkale. He said

“At home, a married man’s words must be listened. I have lived in Çanakkale for years. I met my wife there and we got married. My children were born

²¹ Prior to my interview with Ertuğrul, in a preliminary interview, I met and talked to his wife Nazan, a feminist music teacher at a high school, about the gender relations in the city, without knowing they were married. The account she told about her marriage was quite similar to Ertuğrul’s story, presenting a quite egalitarian relationship. However, this was the only case I was able to interview both a husband and a wife, in the patriarchal conditions of the city in which the spouses of the men are considered as the “mahrem” (private) realm of the men, that is close to the interaction of other (alien) men according to the conservative and Islamic codes of Trabzon.

there. My wife... She is a primary school teacher. I am from Trabzon. When I got older, the longing for my homeland became to be outweighed. I said my wife "prepare yourself; we are going to Trabzon!". She resisted and said "Here is beautiful. I like it here. I got my family here". She did not want to come. For the continuation of the family, my decision became the common decision of the family. We moved to Trabzon last year. If a problem occurs, one of the partners should accept the decision of the other. And since the head of the family is the husband, his decisions must be accepted. He has to be obeyed. This might seem toughness. But it is not. A man has to keep the unity of his family."

Cihangir's words present a strong patriarchal attitude. This attitude leaves no space in decision making for the women. The men (in this case Cihangir) usually give the decisions, which may affect the family as a whole, themselves and expect the women to obey them. These relations are not limited to him.

İsmet also presented a similar account. He told his story of purchasing all the furniture and the home electronics himself without asking his wife:

"I decided to buy all the furniture and the home electronics myself. I bought the carpets and the furniture. I bought the washing machine. I bought the refrigerator. I bought the carpet cleaning machine. I bought them alone, for my family."

As mentioned in the previous section, the white goods that contribute the housework are primarily used by the women who are imprisoned to the duties in the public sphere. This case presents that the men do not even hesitate to ask their wives about the things in the house. It is primarily the men who decide how the income of the family would be spent, leaving almost no space for the decision (or even the opinions) of the women.

In a similar manner, Cihangir said

“It is my wife who decides the clothing of the children. The women decide the food and the drinks of the household. But if we are to decide to buy a land, or how to put our savings into good use, I make the decision. The men decide in the world of work himself.”

His words present men’s differentiation of the domestic and the public spheres. Subordinating the women, the masculinities consider them as beings incapable of giving more crucial decisions, which affect the microcosmos of the domestic sphere. This presents that the men consider themselves as superior subjects who are capable of controlling the broader scope of the public sphere.

On the other hand, Reha even more brashly expressed how the home economy had been operating. He said

“REHA: I spend the money outside and my wife spends the money inside. That is all how this happens. She buys for the house and I buy for myself. That’s all.

MB: Do you ask her how to spend money?

REHA: No. The opposite. She has to ask me. Why should I ask her?.. It is not her but I am the head of the family.”

His words reflect the men’s individualist and autonomous attitude towards spending money. He expressed that the women had to spend for their families and the domestic sphere, while the men were freely spending money for their own wishes. The men control the women’s expenditures and the women are forced to give an account of their actions to their husbands. In contrast the women cannot control the men’s actions. This pattern is parallel to the observations of Bellér-Hann and Hann (2003) who observed patriarchal relations in the Eastern Black Sea coast in late 1980’s. Similar to their observations the men force the women what to do and what

to think in the domestic sphere as well as the public sphere where they control, grounding themselves on the morals or religious norms. Accordingly, the masculinities in Trabzon demand total obedience from their wives rather than an egalitarian partnership.

Miraç, who criticised the unemployed and lumpen man for not providing the livelihood of their families, said that

“Our Prophet [Muhammad] says that “firstly you have to look after your wife and your family; and afterwards you are going to demand obedience from her”. Our people only want willing obedience. Here many men beat their wives for that reason. The men come home late at night. He knows nothing more than saying “shut up woman”. Do you know why those happen? The TV killed interaction between the wife and the husband. You can demand obedience from your wife but firstly you have to look after her properly. It is the women’s duty to serve for the men.”

He criticised the attitude of some men for being unsuccessful in performing their duty as a breadwinner. Although his words involved criticism of misdemeanour towards the women, Miraç’s emphasis in his criticism was in fact on the religious order. He accepted the demand of obedience from the women, but emphasised this could be realized if only the obligations of masculinities are fully performed. Miraç’s account reflects a prevalent opinion. It highlights that the women’s oppression is a morally legitimized fact, if the conditions of the patriarchy are fulfilled.

There are many accounts on the approval of the oppression of women by the masculinities in Trabzon. Ayhan mockingly told a sexist story about an elderly couple from Trabzon. He said

“In a village here, they asked Aunt Havva “Does Uncle Hüseyin listen to your word?” She said “He does never listen to me my son... He is a Trabzon erkeği. He never listens to me...” Afterwards, they asked Uncle Hüseyin

“Have you ever listened the words of Aunt Havva?” He answered “My son didn’t I ever listened to her words? I did everything in this life after asking her ten times. However I did the opposite of what she said.”

Ayhan subsequently burst a laughter and added:

“A Trabzon erkeği asks his wife what to do; but he always does what he knows to do”.

These complementary accounts present a strong sexism and subordination of women. The masculinities in Trabzon consider that the opinions and the attitudes of the women are “ten times” wrong, and therefore invaluable than those of the men. These masculinities, that oppress and subordinate their wives, shift their primary attention from their partners to their children and their parents. In this vein it should be stated that being the father is considered crucial by the masculinities in Trabzon.

As Marsiglio and Pleck present, fatherhood is considered by various schools and theories in the social sciences literature, from the Freud’s Oedipus Complex to the sex role paradigm of Parsons and from the sociobiology and to the (pro)feminist masculinity studies (2005). Although they presented significant differences and variations, the chief emphasis of the schools prior to the (pro)feminist studies was the father’s role in socializing his (male) children to enter into the male dominated world of patriarchal relations. On the other hand, as Rotundo presents in his article on the United States of America, similar to the variation and change of the masculinities, the fatherhood experienced a significant change from the unquestionable patriarchal fatherhood to the nurturing and participant fatherhood as well (2006). The (pro)feminist turn opened the discussions of issues egalitarian, participant, loving and non-patriarchal fatherhood

(Whitehead 2007, pp. 150-155). Here, my focus will be on the criticism of the patriarchal and conservative fatherhood practices in Trabzon.

Similar to the study of Sancar (2009) on masculinities in Ankara in the second half of the 2000's, fatherhood is considered as one of the crucial turning points of manhood according to many respondent men in Trabzon. Being a father implies being totally considered as an adult man, which is an actor of the patriarchal men's world. It is seen as the proof of a man's ability to be sexually and socially potent to continue his offspring. A man that has acquired being a father is expected to be performing his responsibilities of being the head of his family, providing his dependents. At the same time, he is considered as the figure that protects the family. Being an authoritarian figure, as in the case of Trabzon, he is generally the distantly-loving, "fatherly" figure of the family. In this vein, the fatherhood implies the secondary socializing figure of the children²². In this conservative construction of fatherhood, the men consider themselves as a figure that expects to be obeyed by his children, entering into warm yet oppressive relations with them.

Latif described fatherhood as follows:

"Fatherhood... It is the most beautiful of everything. You are the father after the supreme Allah. You are to look after your children and your family. You are to wish the best for them. The father means the head of everything; the father means the supreme Allah. Fatherhood is next to Allah."

In his religiously motivated account, Latif considers fatherhood that has a supreme power and love, similar to those of the god. In his approach the

²² Here it has to be noted that the secondary position of fatherhood in the socialization process of the children is parallel to the post-Freudian arguments of Nancy Chodorow (1974; 1978), who emphasised that the father is the *secondary* love object, while the mother is the *primary* love object.

father is the head of the family, who loves, who presents care and who yet exercises his power on his subjects: his children and his wife.

After those words, Latif told he tried to establish warmer relations with his three children, who were in the age of twenties. He said

“For me, the daughter and the son are the same. Six years ago my son came to me and said “father I want to be a footballer”. I said you can do whatever you want my son. However, you got a life to live according to the orders of the supreme Allah. Do whatever you want but live according to the orders of our religion. You got to do whatever our state wants you to do. You got to protect our religion and our state. He said “I will follow what you said father.” Now he is playing football at the second league. I talk everything with him. A child has to obey his father. He must take the prayer of him than his curse.”

Despite he tries to express himself in terms of entering into a dialogue with his children, Latif’s account presents his will for being obeyed, rather than being an egalitarian father. On the other hand, despite he states that he considered his daughter and son equal, he only spoke about his relationship with son (like the rest of the interview). In his words he promotes his son to have a conservative lifestyle, advising him not to deviate from the official religious and state ideology. In a warm manner, the father leads his son to act according to the patriarchal and conservative morals of manhood. This moral advice is a general attitude of which the men adopt to contribute the socialization of their children.

On the other hand, despite an authoritarian fatherhood is seen in Trabzon, some of the respondents emphasised the differences between the fatherhood practices of themselves and their fathers. Miraç told his father had been a quite authoritarian man. He told

“MİRAC: My father was a very tough man. He was very tough for my mother and us. I saw him beat her many times. He loved us. We knew that. He had a

hard life. He was trying to earn the money for us in his watch-repairer's shop. He never left us hungry. But he rarely talked to us. We never saw him cry, except the day my mother died. I am trying to be different than my father. I am trying to talk everything with my sons.

MB: What do you share with them?

MİRAÇ: I usually talk about business or politics with them. I tell them to live according to the orders of our religion.”

Miraç's account presents the general pattern in Trabzon, in which the fathers of the former generation²³ had been more distant and authoritarian, while the contemporary men try to establish more friendly, yet manly and impersonal relations with their children.

This attitude is seen in other respondents' accounts as well. Similarly, Refik differentiated himself from his father, and the men of the former generation, criticising the distant practices of fatherhood. He said

“REFİK: How can I say... There are enormous differences between us and our fathers. My father was a very tough man. He played cards... He was a gambler. He was a fisherman. He used to earn good money. Black Sea used to be more fertile back then. He used to come home late at night even when he was not at sea. He was gambling. He used to come and shout at us. He used to beat my mother, my older sisters and I. This always happened. He never listened to us. We were afraid of him. But we have never been disrespectful to him. Never... My deceased father...he was a good man; he left no debt to us. I am not like my father was. I talk to my children more. I try to teach my son to have a moral life. He became a fisherman like me. A good son has to follow his father's words. I advise him to obey the state and the orders of our religion. I advise him to have an honourable life and live like a man.

²³ The fathers of the respondents.

MB: What do you share with your daughter?

REFİK: How can I say... Because I am not at home usually, I don't share much with her."

In the similar vein to many men's accounts in Trabzon, Refik's responses present a mild criticism of the former generation. "Tough" and "distant" practices of fatherhood lie in the base of this criticism. Despite the contemporary masculinities tend to act in a more sociable manner, it is hard to say that their attitudes present a loving, caregiving and participant fatherhood. Unlike the former generation the contemporary men primarily contribute the socialization of their children by presenting conservative advices of the codes of patriarchal manhood. And the target of this process is sons rather than daughters.

On the other hand, Korkut presented an account of a working father, who spends much of his time at work. He said that

"...As I said before, I got a daughter and a son. My daughter is 7 and my son is 9. When I look at myself, I see that I got codes. I got codes that came from my father and my mother. My deceased father... He was a farmer at Vakfikebir. He got small fields beside our tea garden. Very small fields and a small tea garden I mean. And we got some cows. We used to earn our living from those small fields. My father tried to finance our education with those. He was illiterate but he paid great respect to the education. He was a good man. But... How can I say... He was a traditional man. He did not interfere us but he also rarely talked to us. We knew he was a very tough man. After he died I learned he was jailed twice for fighting before I was born. Anyway... I am trying to be friendlier for my children. But as I said, I work all day long. I go home late at night. My wife looks after them. I sometimes see some beautiful clothes or toys for them. I say my wife to buy them for the children. When I find time to see them, I try to teach my son to be a manly man."

Similar to many other respondents, Korkut's words present a fatherhood that tries to be different than his father. Being a labouring father is in the focus of his account. The absence of father, who is the position of the breadwinner presents the gendered division of labour in the socialization processes of the children. Those masculinities position themselves as the head of the family, who cares for the members of the family, yet does not participate to the nurturance of the children. As seen in the accounts of the other respondents (with the only exception of the account of Ertuğrul) the respondents do not establish truly friendly and loving relations with their children.

Unlike the contemporary tendencies on the crisis of masculinity in masculinity studies, like those investigated by Sancar (2009, pp. 120-152) and Whitehead (2007, pp. 154-155), which emphasises the (pro)feminist men's quest of questioning and transforming the patriarchal practices of fatherhood, none of the respondents in Trabzon expressed their protest against their father, or their will to change towards an egalitarian, participant, loving and non-patriarchal fatherhood, merely emphasising their obedience and their duties to their own parents and their children. Although they showed no will for an non-patriarchal change, due to the culturally-motivated generally warm and sociable character of masculinities in the city, the respondents emphasised that they were trying to establish more friendly (yet unequal) relations with their "children". However, it should be stated that the respondents' shares with their children focus on impersonal issues rather than the children's lives or emotional lives. On the other hand, although they did not speak much about the socialization of their sons and

daughters in detail, the narratives of the respondents on their fatherhood practices largely focused on their sons rather than daughters²⁴.

Finally, it should be emphasised that in the contemporary Trabzon, the masculinities consider family as a space for reproducing the conservative codes of patriarchy. The figure of the father-husband signifies the *breadwinner*, the *patriarch* (head of family), the *protector* and the *socializing authority* over the next generations. He provides the livelihood of the family as the *breadwinner*. On the other hand, they oppress and subordinate the women by keeping them away from the public sphere in which economic interactions take place, and forcing them into the burden of doing housework. Those masculinities still act as the largely unquestionable heads of their families in a similar vein to the traditional *patriarchs*. Being the men, they are seen as the *protectors* of their families. And through fatherhood, they act as the *socializing authority* transmitting their children the conservative and patriarchal codes of masculinities. On the other hand, the family provide the men the ground for their social and biological reproduction, presenting the legitimate ground for sexuality and continuation of their offspring and the free personal care of women.

²⁴ This is valid even for the respondents Latif, Korkut, Miraç, Refik, and Alpaslan had daughters as well as sons.

CHAPTER 6

RIGHTIST POLITICS AND FOOTBALL FANATICISM AMOGST MASCULINITIES IN TRABZON

6.1 INTRODUCTION

In the current capitalist patriarchal gender order, rightist politics, football fanaticism and patriarchy are three dialectically interrelated fields. Rightist politics and football fanaticism ground on and feed from the patriarchal values, and ideas. On the other hand, patriarchal values and ideas also provide content and form to the rightist politics. Rightist politics and patriarchy construct themselves and serve for the interests of the heterosexual men. We see patriarchal values and ideas integrated in rightist politics. Rightism is patriarchal¹ (Enloe, 2003; Sancar, 2012; Walby, 2009). It is indispensable from the existence of patriarchy.

Football fanaticism is one of the crystallized forms of patriarchy. Football is primarily considered as a men's game. It is the men who play in the highest ranking professional football leagues; it is the men who support football teams and it is the men who constitute majority of the football fanatics. Football fanaticism is one of the most vivid scenes, where patriarchal masculinities and rightist politics are reflected and performed. Patriarchal masculinities are the primary agents of both the rightist politics and the

¹ Though not all the patriarchy is rightist, since patriarchy has existed (and is still existing) in leftist politics to a significant degree too.

football fanaticism and it is the ground on which rightist politics and football fanaticism are constructed.

Trabzon comes forward with its rightist background in one hand, and the successes and football fanaticism of the city's major football team Trabzonspor on the other hand (Bozok, 2012, pp. 423-429). The city is widely known for its rightist spirit from the support of rightist parties to its Islamist and conservative environment. These social relations, actors outside of the identity whose socially legitimated borders are drawn as being Turkish, Muslim and Trabzonlu (or to a degree Doğu Karadenizli²), and commonly meshed up with being a rightist, are perceived potential threats. In the last decade, Trabzon has been the hotbed of rightist uprisings. In a nationalist, Islamist and conservative manner, the Trabzonlular presented reactionary oppositions against journalists, scholars, TV serials and political parties, which they considered to conflict with their own traditional manners or political views³. In that manner, many rightist attacks, murders, lynching attempts and mass protests took place in Trabzon.

On the other hand, there is a massive support of Trabzonspor in the city, which extends to football fanaticism. In Trabzon, every Trabzon erkeği is considered as a fanatic supporter of Trabzonspor by nature. Surrounded by values attributed to the men, football fanaticism provides a socially legitimized ground for the performance of patriarchal masculinities. Rightism and football fanaticism present a concomitant picture in the city. Trabzonspor and its successes in football are seen as an equivalent of micronationalist and local pride. Accordingly, Trabzonspor fanatics bear a

² Person of Black Sea Region.

³ For a more detailed listing of those incidents see Chapter 3.

nationalist and micronationalist spirit, use rightist discourses and symbols widely and they take place in rightist social reactions. In both the rightist politics and the Trabzonspor fanaticism, Trabzon erkekleri (Trabzon men) and the masculinities in Trabzon are the primary actors.

6.2 RIGHTIST POLITICS IN TRABZON

In the widest sense of the term, the right wing politics involves ideologies and social approaches from mass fascism to militarism, from traditionalism to religious fundamentalism, from economic liberalism to capitalism, from nationalism to anti-communism, from lynchings (and lynching attempts) to conservative family ideology and from xenophobia to ethnic and/or racial discrimination. On the other hand, these ideologies generally present a complementary and integrated character. Many of them incorporate other approaches' ideas and values. As Bobbio points, ideas such as transcendental values, essentialism, traditionalism, the profoundness of the existing order, support of the hierarchy and stratification crosscut these distinct but complementary perspectives and ideologies; on the other hand, the right wing politics are against the social equality, self-determination, freedom, solidarity with the oppressed, and the transformability of the world, in other words the values of left wing politics (as cited in T. Bora, 2012, p. 10). Moreover, as T. Bora points, one of the prominent characteristics of rightist politics is being "reactionary" (p. 11). It defines itself being in opposition with leftism and the leftist values. This reactionary standpoint involves a wide spectrum including distinct standpoints such as communism or social democracy, and the constructed ethnical, religious, national and gendered others' of the official religion and the state.

In the context of Turkey, rightist politics primarily present a trivet picture, consisted of three core ideologies. These ideological and political approaches are nationalism, Islamism and conservatism. T. Bora argues that these three political standpoints can be considered as “three states of rightism” (2009a). He uses the metaphor of “states of matter”, in other words “solid”, “liquid” and “gas” for these ideologies. He maintains that *nationalism* provides the adaptive force, while Islamism presents the value, ritual and image source and conservatism accommodates the spirit and style for politics in Turkish rightism (p. 8). He emphasises that since these distinct ideologies ground on and support the others, they can easily be converted to and take place of each other. In the underlying *rightist* background, the ideas, approaches, values and lifestyles concerning these ideologies can transform to each other depending on the conjuncture. Similar to the Bauman’s emphasis in *Liquid Modernity* (2006), people’s political views and attitudes do not present a fixed manner in the contemporary world; they flow from one to the other, change their force and shape and take new forms.

Rightism does not merely points to certain state formations and social movements within the realm of reel politics; it is also about ideologies (and common sense thinking) that concern every aspect of life, from embodiment to customs, interpersonal relations, and sexuality. Since they act in synchronisation as T. Bora emphasises, these different levels of rightism cannot be separated from each other (2006, pp. 135-136). In the case of Trabzon, the rightist spirit exists as integrated into every social relation. In these conditions, different wings of common sense rightism are experienced by Trabzonlular, almost in an amalgamated manner.

Trabzon is essentially a rightist city⁴. It is felt in almost social relation, from the discourses of laypeople (especially the men of Trabzon) to the Islamic and nationalist symbols you encounter in every corner of the city. Wandering in the city, almost every place in the city from the glasses of stores and public transport vehicles and the clothes of the people, you see the Trabzonspor's current slogan "bize her yer Trabzon" (everywhere is Trabzon for us), which was found by anonymous supporters of the team. In many public transport vehicles, like dolmuş, on the inside-roofs you see large Turkish flags, Islamic prayers, Trabzonspor flags in maroon-blue, and sometimes the three crescents or howling wolf pictures of Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi (Nationalist Movement Party). In the streets of the city centre, adult women, many of whom wear veils, are quite often visible only with the accompaniment of their children or their spouses, usually with plastic bags that contain domestic shopping presenting a conservative family imagery. The women are visible, but only with the existence of other people, who are mostly their relatives.

For more than six decades, most of the members of Turkish Grand National Assembly from Trabzon have been (and are) from right wing parties⁵. In

⁴ This can even be stated despite many significant leftist intellectuals who were grown in Trabzon, such as Bedri Rahmi Eyüboğlu, Sabahattin Eyüboğlu, Bahriye Üçok or Altan Öymen.

⁵ Leftist parties never got the majority of the deputies from Trabzon, with the exception of 1977 and 1973 elections, in which Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi got the majority of deputies; although CHP has never been a truly leftist party in its history, merely slinging in the borders of social democracy and etatism. In 2012, 2007 and 2002 elections respectively conservative and mild Islamist Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi got the majority of the deputies see <http://tuikapp.tuik.gov.tr/secimdagitimapp/secim.zul>; http://www.belgenet.net/ayrinti.php?yil_id=15&il_id=1042; http://www.belgenet.net/ayrinti.php?yil_id=14&il_id=961; retrieved 3rd December 2012. In 1999 elections, nationalist Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi got the majority of the deputies see http://www.belgenet.net/ayrinti.php?yil_id=13&il_id=61 retrieved 3rd December 2012. In 1995; 1991; 1987 and 1983 elections respectively, central right Anavatan Partisi (Motherland Party) got the majority of the deputies see http://www.belgenet.net/ayrinti.php?yil_id=12&il_id=141;

contemporary Trabzon, rightist people's attitudes oscillate between central-right, Islamism, nationalism and conservatism. Moreover, even for some respondents who said they voted for rightist parties in the past, even the election of a social democrat head of municipality does not make any sense sometimes. For example Miraç said

"I voted for MSP. I voted for Refah Partisi. I even voted for [Süleyman] Demirel's DYP in the 80's. In the last election, I voted for AKP. However I don't like Fevzi Gümrükçüoğlu of AKP, our head of municipality. He makes nothing useful for us!.. How I wish I hadn't voted for him. Volkan Canalıoğlu was from CHP; but he was better!.. How I wish I could vote for him someday."

Ercan, a leftist labour unionist echoed those ideas from a different angle as follows:

"In the past, the Saadet's⁶ supporters were stronger; today those AKP people. In Trabzon, the ground of MHP is strong. They have a lot of incidents prior to September 12 [1980 Military Coup]; because this city has a nationalist background. Everyone you may talk to, leftist or rightist is actually nationalist. We should say this: this city heads toward the rightist party that is stronger than the others. If you ask me, in fact nobody thinks much whether to support the nationalists or the Islamists. Once Volkan Canalıoğlu was elected from CHP. But his ground weakened shortly afterwards. CHP people could not hold

http://www.belgenet.net/ayrinti.php?yil_id=11&il_id=220;
http://www.belgenet.net/ayrinti.php?yil_id=10&il_id=294;
http://www.belgenet.net/ayrinti.php?yil_id=9&il_id=361, retrieved 3rd December 2012. In 1977 and 1973 elections, central left Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi got the majority of the deputies respectively see http://www.belgenet.net/ayrinti.php?yil_id=8&il_id=428;
http://www.belgenet.net/ayrinti.php?yil_id=7&il_id=495, retrieved 3rd December 2012. In 1969; 1965 and 1961 elections, central right Adalet Partisi got the majority of the deputies respectively see http://www.belgenet.net/ayrinti.php?yil_id=6&il_id=562;
http://www.belgenet.net/ayrinti.php?yil_id=5&il_id=629;
http://www.belgenet.net/ayrinti.php?yil_id=4&il_id=696 retrieved 3rd December 2012. In 1957 and 1954 elections central right Demokrat Parti got the most deputies see http://www.belgenet.net/ayrinti.php?yil_id=3&il_id=763;
http://www.belgenet.net/ayrinti.php?yil_id=2&il_id=827, retrieved 3rd December 2012.

⁶ Saadet Partisi.

Trabzon. Now AKP is strong and I bet they are going to win in 2011. I don't think leftist votes would increase sooner."

Despite the votes altered from one party to another, a rightist background remained. Trabzon has long been the hotbed of right wing parties. In this political background, a nationalist and micronationalist spirit is felt at the outset. As authors such as Altınay (2009), Enloe (2003; 2006), Kandiyoti (1989), Nagel (2009), T. Bora (2012, 01 March), Sünbuloğlu (2009), Yuval-Davis (2003), Yuval-Davis and Anthias (1989) and Walby (2009) stress, nationalism, by nature, is a patriarchal and misogynist ideology. Primary agents of nationalism are the men. Moreover, nationalist ideology oppresses the women, while exalting and utilizing the patriarchal male values. On fascism, as the crystallised form of nationalism, T. Bora emphasises that

"Fascist movement, quite clearly is a *male* movement; we can say that it is the most passionate effort towards pushing the women away from the public sphere in the modern times. Again, it does this in a modern way and in accordance with the nature of the fascist mass mobilisation, charging the women themselves in the propaganda of a femininity that is reduced to motherhood and wifedom-as-a-servant. Fascist ideology constructs masculinity as simplicity, purity, and "shield"-selfhood whose borders are clearly defined; while constructing femininity as slipperiness, contaminable, uncanniness, and liquid, slippery selfhood." (2006, pp. 146-147).

T. Bora's those words present the sexist nature of nationalist ideology. Those characteristics can be generalized to other *states* of rightism as well. On the other hand, Nagel emphasises that the culture of nationalism emphasises the male values, such as "honour, patriotism, courage, and duty" (2009, p. 79). In the nationalist culture, the real men never try to escape from duty of protecting the nation and the country; otherwise they are labelled as cowards or sissies (p. 80).

Honour is *de facto* a patriarchal term. The perception of honour generally involves the protection of the morality of women and family by men. The women are seen as the agents of men's honour (Nagel, 2009, p. 86). This patriarchal understanding of honour is reflected upon the country and nation. As Yuval-Davis points, in the nationalist discourses, the country and nation are equated to the women that are to be protected (2003). As a result, as Nagel emphasises real or a symbolic threats or attacks on values related to nation and/or the country are considered as a rape of women (2009, p. 88). Therefore, the active protectors of the honour and the chastity of the nation and the country are considered the men in the nationalist and patriarchal understanding. This is also seen in the rightist spirit of Trabzon amongst the masculinities.

In the fieldwork of this study, almost all of the respondents defined themselves as Trabzon erkekleri(Trabzon men), emphasising their nationalist character. In many of those narratives, the priority was given to being a Trabzonlu than a Turkish, although both were emphasised. For example Fethi defined a typical Trabzon erkeği with those words that many men in Trabzon use:

“...Trabzon erkeği has a character that loves his country and nation, that loves his flag, that has national emotions, that loves his honour. You know what I mean... We are always ready to fight for the honour of our country and nation.”

Similarly, Kamil said:

“Trabzon erkeği, forgets everything when Trabzon and Trabzonspor comes in question. All we are addicted to our country and our nation.”

Likewise, with an aggressive emphasis, Murat said:

“Trabzon erkeği is... How can I say... He is some sort of (emphasises) a “sensitive” man about his country. Because we love our country. We get excited when we speak about it. We feel it in our vessels.”

Bora said similar words as well:

“Our most significant quality is our addiction to our honour. Our nation and our family are our honour. Therefore we love carrying guns. We are addicted to our country and our nation.”

The discourses that define the identity of masculinities in Trabzon by emphasising their nationalist aspects can be seen commonly, since most of the respondents made similar emphases. In those statements male actors’ perceptions of nation, country, Trabzonspor fanaticism, weaponry, honour, family and the women get amalgamated.

Many Trabzon erkekleri (Trabzon men) perceive those as inseparable issues. Nation and country is seen inseparable from honour, women and the family. On the other hand, similar to perception of the masculinities as unquestionable concerns (see Chapter 3), the other side of this coin, being a nationalist and Muslim having a conservative lifestyle is also considered almost as an unquestionable precondition of manhood by the masculinities in Trabzon. This also leaves almost no space for the possible existence of others such as the forced invisibility of queer and protest masculinities⁷, as well as the ethnic and the religious minorities.

A possible attack towards the country and nation is also perceived as an attack towards the honour and chastity of the women. Because, as Najmabadi points the country (and the nation) is presented as the beloved

⁷ Here I am using the term “protest masculinity” following Connell (2005, pp. 109-112), emphasising a particular type of masculinity that criticises the patriarchal relations and lives accordingly.

and the mother simultaneously in the nationalist discourse (2009). Therefore, within that discourse, it is emphasised that it has to be loved, embraced and protected. On the other hand, Enloe emphasises that the nationalist discourse enforces the local men to resist the aliens' to take advantage of their women (2003, p. 77). In that relation while the women are placed on the passive side. This is also valid for Trabzon.

The masculinities in Trabzon perceive protecting the honour of the women and the nation altogether and feel the men's duty to protect them against the threat of the aliens. On the other hand, in a psychoanalytic manner, the phallic symbolism of weapons signifies the means for this defence as well as the possible (counter)attack. Those (counter)attacks have been experienced in the case of the rightist actions aroused from the city in the last three decades.

In addition to those, nation, country and Trabzonspor are used in the place of each other. Since they are thought to represent the same thing, the "nation" (millet) a term concerning the peoples and "country" (vatan) a term concerning the land were used altogether in a supplementary manner by the respondents. On the other hand, in this nationalist discourse, Trabzonspor is combined with this binary, placing the fanaticism of the sports club an equivalent of nation and country, the core elements of nationalist ideology. So that, we may assert that the fanatic support of Turkey as a land and a nation is exposed as the fanaticism of Trabzonspor. Indeed, as I am going to discuss in the following section, football fanaticism emerge as one of the most significant and vivid complements of nationalism and the nationalist symbols and relations are reflected in this fanaticism. On the other hand, the masculinities with that nationalist character in Trabzon feed from three complementary and competing sources of pride.

The first source of pride is being “Türk” (Turkish); the second is being “Doğu Karadenizli” (being from Eastern Black Sea) and third is being “Trabzonlu” (being from Trabzon). The first one represents the national level, while the second represents the regional level and the third represents the local level. Those three levels also represent three grounds for nationalist pride. In the discourses of the masculinities in Trabzon, the national level is being Turkish, the regional being Doğu Karadenizli and the local level⁸ is being Trabzonlu. The masculinities in Trabzon habitually embrace both three levels of nationalist pride. However, being Trabzonlu, and in some cases being Doğu Karadenizli are sometimes prioritized. The preference of local identities is primarily and most visibly seen in the famous and widespread slogan of Trabzonspor, “bize her yer Trabzon” (everywhere is Trabzon for us).

On the other hand, the local identity is perceived as a multi-layered fact. The layers such as solidarity, economic relations, fanaticism of Trabzonspor, patriotism, nationalism, Islamism and conservatism are expressed in a holistic manner. Many respondents made similar statements; but their reasons for that reflected different points of rightist spectrum, from Islamism and conservatism to economic liberalism and football fanaticism. They suddenly jump from one issue to the other while describing their own identity. For instance, Ercan said

“Trabzon is like the capital of the Black Sea. Trabzon comes before everything for us.”

Korkut directly emphasised the primacy of Trabzon before everything else. He said

⁸ In the case of Trabzon, the local districts, which used to be the centres of the feudal manors in the Ottoman era, also form micro-local sources of nationalist pride (cf. Emiroğlu, 2009; Meeker, 2001).

“For a Trabzonlu, being a Trabzonlu comes before everything. Do you understand me... It comes before being a Muslim. It comes before being a Turkish.”

Quite similarly, Berke emphasised passion and ambition. He said

“I am proud of being Trabzonlu. For me, being Karadenizli and the other things come afterwards. Do you know why? Because we are ambitious and go getting people. Our success comes from that reason.”

On the other hand, Muhsin emphasised the interrelatedness of patriotism, nation, religion, and the family:

“Trabzon is more patriotic...more religious. Trabzonlu is more addicted to his country and his religion. For us Trabzon comes first, then our nation, and then our religion. Those are above everything. How we love our families, we love Trabzon this way. I don't think other places in Trabzon can be as such...”

Fethi also made a statement that considers the priority of patriotism:

“...I mean of course there is a difference between Karadenizli and Trabzonlu. Can you separate a Karadenizli from a Trabzonlu?... I don't think separating a Karadenizli from a Trabzonlu would be a correct thing to do. But... How can I say... Trabzonlu is more patriotic than the rest. I mean sixty-seventy percent of Trabzonlular is as such.”

Kemal emphasised solidarity amongst the Trabzonlular:

“We, the Trabzon erkekleri (Trabzon men) always support each other even a conflict occurs amongst us. In fact here you may see many people having continuous conflicts with each other. But when we feel a threat from the others, we unite and defend ourselves.”

Likewise Refik emphasised solidarity, but emphasising the customs:

“We [the Trabzonlular] are devoted to each other. Always we respect the elderly and the youngsters. We love them. We try to be careful for not making a single (moral) mistake. In that way, we know and care for each other...”

On the other hand, Nurettin made a more Islamist emphasis:

“Trabzon comes before everything for us. But how can I say... The men in here are... they call “conservative”, or I call “Islamic”. Islam overweighs here. We are trying to live according to the rules of our religion.

Despite he was an Imam, Osman made a more economic statement comparing Trabzon with Samsun, by adding Trabzonspor as well:

“...Here is not a Samsun. Maybe Samsun doubles here. But here it is more different than Samsun. Here is livelier. I mean the culture of our city is more different than the other places; in terms of life[style] I mean. Certainly, we also have our Trabzonspor. When someone comes to Black Sea, he comes to Trabzon. He doesn't go to Rize; he doesn't go to Ordu; he doesn't go to Giresun; he doesn't go to Samsun; he never goes to Artvin.”

And finally, Turhan made a history-based statement:

“Do you know why Trabzon is significant... If we take it historically, considering cities like Sinop, Samsun and the other cities inside the Black Sea region... Trabzon is a city that was the capital of an empire. Hence, Trabzon must be good. It doesn't have to be perfect but it must be good.”

Different respondents presented their admiration of the city, approaching the city from different viewpoints. In all of those narratives, we clearly observe approbation of the different qualities of Trabzon. As a result, the city appears as a source of nationalistic pride for the masculinities in Trabzon. As Hobsbawm emphasises, the traditions that construct the national pride are “invented” facts, rather than eternal beings (2006). These invented traditions, such as the values and practices, exist and affect for

(relatively) limited periods of history (p. 2). Therefore in a similar path, we can maintain that the Trabzon men's sources of nationalistic pride present a complementary and constructed⁹ picture, rather than a real and perpetual one. On the other hand, combined with local pride, another constituent of the identities of the masculinities in Trabzon is xenophobia.

In those narratives, the existence of the ethnic minorities in the city was directly despised. In the initial interviews around Atatürk Square, in a moderately threatening tone, I was often told that the Kurds were not allowed to wander in the city centre. For example, in a short minibus journey, after he learned that I was conducting a field research, Kamil said that

“The Kurds cannot enter in the city centre. We won't allow that. They cannot go beyond the coffeehouse behind the square. The men coming from Diyarbakır cannot pass that line. We will never allow them.”

Similarly, speaking about Trabzon, Necat said

“Here there are people who come from everywhere. But we don't allow the Kurds to enter into the city centre.”

On the other hand, Orhan stressed that

“The Trabzonlular do not like those who come from the other cities. It is the proof why we do not meet many Eastern people in the city.”

On the other hand, Latif paid tribute to being Trabzonlu in a supremacist tone, while speaking about the Kurds:

⁹ In Hobsbawm's words “invented”

“The Kurds... They are usually construction workers here. From Kars or Ağrı I mean... But... The Eastern people¹⁰ cannot go beyond the line of [Atatürk] Square. The building constructors from Trabzon bring them here; give them some place to sleep; and employ them. If there are thousand workers, a hundred of them, two hundred of them are from the East. But the work a local (Trabzonlu) does and an Eastern does are quite different things. Our Vakfikebir people are all masters [of construction]. A Kurd coming from East does workmanship. But our local people do it much better.”

Contrary to these respondents' opinions, I observed that the Kurdish people were freely wandering in the city centre during the day and the night, like the local people of Trabzon. Moreover, one of the major constructor-workers' market was established right at the city centre, in the early hours of every day in front of a coffeehouse, just a few meters away from the Atatürk Square. At the same time, the Trabzon city head offices of the ultranationalist organizations of both MHP and Ülkü Ocakları Örgütü (Grey Wolves Organization) were rising just above that coffeehouse. The existence of these organizations beside the labour market, where mostly the Kurdish people looked for work, present the existence of the rightist spatial control over the minorities who are considered as the enemies of the dominant Turkish identity. In other words, the nonexistence of the Kurdish people in Trabzon city centre merely reflected the imaginations of the masculinities in Trabzon. In a similar vein to Das and Poole's notion “the margins of the state”, which emphasises placing the marginalisation of certain groups of people through dislocation, pacification, illegible control, embodiment and power, these speculations restrain the ethnic minorities (in this case the Kurdish people) to the margins of the social relations. They are dislocated and pacified, and hence placed in strain and control (2004).

¹⁰ He means the Kurds.

On the other hand, there were more stern respondents as well. Muhsin drew the boundaries of locality in a supremacist tone, by emphasising contamination with the labour migration:

“Many people came here from places like Gümüşhane, Tokat, Ordu and Rize... But it is the Kurds who pollute Trabzon.”

Finally, in a clearly racist and patriarchal manner Alpaslan spoke about the procreation of the Kurdish people:

“...[Prime Minister] Erdoğan has a proper word. He says “make three children at least”. Do you know why? [Turgut] Özal repeatedly said “don’t make children”. How can Turkey become in this way? Not good! When we were not making children, the Eastern people were making seven-eight children!.. They reproduce like the dogs!..”

Combined with the isolation of the ethnic minorities as presented above, these words which reflect the existence of racism and ultranationalism present the existence of a strong xenophobia in Trabzon¹¹. The speculated nonexistence of the ethnic minorities and the imagery of being a mono-ethnied Turkish city creates an “imagined community” in Anderson’s sense (2006). As the author emphasises, the nations are socially constructed (or “imagined”) communities in which its members are connected to each other through fictional ties rather than actual face to face relations. In the case of Trabzon, the segregation of Kurdish people forms this imagined community of the brotherhood amongst the masculinities in Trabzon. In this brotherhood, the actors are the masculinities in Trabzon, rather than the other subordinated groups like the women and the queer people. On the

¹¹ During the field study, being a researcher, I was threatened by the men in Trabzon twice as well (see Chapter 3).

other hand, the already-existing xenophobia contributed the release of the hostility as massive lynchings.

In the last decade the city came into prominence with the rightist attacks, uprisings, and murders as well as the constant rightist pressures towards the scholars and the students at KTÜ many times (Akal, 2009; Kapucu, 2009; T. Bora, 2008). The most serious rightist uprisings in (or grounding from) Trabzon in the recent years have been the bombing of McDonalds in 2004 by Yasin Hayal; the murder of Hrant Dink by Ogün Samast, a young man from Pelitli, Trabzon in 2007; the protest¹² of the TV serial *Muhteşem Yüzyıl* (Magnificent Century) in January 2011; and the stoning of AKP election bureau in May 2011 after Trabzonspor's forfeiture of Süper Lig Championship (see Chapter 3). Those incidents highlighted Trabzon as one of the hotbeds of rightist uprisings. Either leftist or rightist, many men in Trabzon are apt to consider that those incidents were executed by the conspiracies of external forces, rather than the conscious actions of the rightist and patriarchal actors in the city. For example, after criticising the "nationalist" (milliyetçi) and "Islamist" (dinci) uprisings in the city, Ertuğrul, a socialist activist, said that

“...Organizing lynchings and the other murders cannot be achieved by our people alone. Besides, the Priest Santoro matter is said to be kinky. Many people say it is a personal matter. However, the others are big organizations. They are games of the external forces. It won't be right to attribute them to the entire city.”

On the other hand, Refik said

¹² This is the first protest of this controversial TV series in Turkey.

“Those incidents were attacks against our people. Our people simply protected our city. Our people did nothing more. It is the external forces that consider them as significant incidents. This is not a good thing.”

Similarly but in a more hostile manner, Bora said the following:

“Those incidents cannot be attributed to the entire city. The national feelings of the people of the city are strong. Trabzon is a city that won't fail to the games of the external forces. No one can make Trabzon a toy of the games and the charges of the external forces. This city won't be deterred by the PKK and Christian terrorists. Those are insignificant events that are told to condemn the Trabzonlular.”

On the other hand, Ahmet, a businessman, commented on the protests against the TV series *Muhteşem Yüzyıl*¹³ (Magnificent Century) but tried to conceal it by jumping to Trabzonspor. He said:

“Surely there has been a protest about *Muhteşem Yüzyıl* (Magnificent Century TV series) in January. What did the Sultan do in the Ottoman times blah blah... It shouldn't have been like that. Those things must not be identified with Trabzon. There were many other similar things in the other places of Turkey. Those are individual things. But when it happened in Trabzon, it got highlighted. That's unfair. A long time passed after those things. Trabzon had

¹³ *Muhteşem Yüzyıl* (Magnificent Century) is a controversial prime time TV series on the life of Ottoman Sultan Suleiman 1 The Magnificent. This TV series began in 2011 in Show TV, and it was still continuing at Star TV while this thesis was being written. The controversies, which also Turkish government including Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan later interfered, began as a result of the claims of “misrepresenting” the Ottoman court as intrigant, hedonistic and womanizing people who were claimed to be the “glorious” and “magnificent” antecedents of the Turkish people. Many protests, which initially happened in Trabzon, took place in many cities on those controversies. At the time this thesis was written, these controversies were settled (but not totally solved) by changing the TV series into a more conservative and religious story and presentation, such as the beginning of the court women to wear veils and pray every so often. <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/mar/20/turkish-drama-magnificent-century-divides>, retrieved 20th January 2013. <http://www.sabah.com.tr/Gundem/2012/11/25/basbakan-erdogan-konusuyor>, retrieved 20th January 2013.

been calm. No one speaks about that. But we have our Trabzonspor besides those nasty things!...”

The lynchings took place in Atatürk Square in April and August 2005 against five members of TAYAD, while they attempted to spread manifests protesting the prison conditions, in which two thousand people participated¹⁴. As T. Bora points, lynch is a reactionary action against constructed enemies (2008, pp. 5-9). The line between a national or local “us” and the “others” as the constructed enemies is drawn. Generally those enemies are found amongst ethnic, political or gender minorities, that are claimed to bear “threat” upon the values of the lynch mob (p. 18-21). The actors who are provoked (or sometimes self-provoked) to feel threat against their own national or local values, tend to join the call for (and of) lynch. In lynchings of 2005, TAYAD members were blamed to be members of PKK, to be Kurdish, and to be separatist terrorists. On the other hand, as Bora points, the lynch mobs are composed of laypeople rather than extraordinary criminals (pp. 18-20). They are the people whom we meet and have relations every day. Majority of the actors in those rightist uprisings have been the Trabzon erkekleri (Trabzon men).

In the field study of this thesis in Trabzon city centre, many respondents had inclusive information about these lynchings. One of the respondents stated he actively participated the lynchings, while some of the respondents supported the lynchings and for some respondents, participants of the lynch mob were people who are pretty close to them. For instance Ertuğrul and Ayhan said that they heard their mutual students at high school in Arsin had come to the city to participate to lynch that day. On the other hand, some of the respondents openly said they approved these lynchings, while they

¹⁴ For a more detailed account of these lynching attempts in Trabzon, see T. Bora, 2008, pp. 59-62.

emphasised their sorrow for not being able to participate. For example Kaan said

“I couldn’t participate because I was working here, at the pharmacy. However, I wanted to participate and throw some punches. Of course we would not provide ground for the charges of those terrorists!..”

Moreover, Muhsin, one of the approving respondents, claimed that those were insignificant incidents rather than lynchings in which two thousand people participated. He said

“I was here [at the bookshop] that day. In fact nothing had happened. That was only an unimportant melee. It was too close to here. Nothing more... They exaggerate everything!..”

The effort to present violent reactionary protests as insignificant quarrels is a repression. In fact those words signify a strong support for the lynchings. The men like Bora, Kaan and Muhsin, who claim they did not participate, cannot be separated from the active members of the lynch mob. This repression is a legitimization of using violence against the targeted enemies. On the other hand, one of the respondents of this research, Alp openly declared that he had taken part in the lynch mob. In a bold manner, he told the lynchings and his participation as follows:

“...Do you really want to know what really happened... It all began with a rumour that they burned the Turkish flag. They said the PKK guys burned the flag. They were called PKK guys [by the Trabzonlular]. They were spreading manifests with red and yellow overalls. They were shouting “no to isolation [at prisons]”. The people gathered around them. There were three-five thousand people. In a sudden, everyone got boiled over... That was not a simple thing. Punches, pushes, shoutings... That happened all day long, until evening... I mean, there were even people cursing to Allah. There were... Can you imagine, I attacked to the TAYAD people... I was saying fuck your mother. Can there be such a reason... I was not thinking anything while I was hitting

them. I was there because I thought those [the TAYAD people] heathen separatists were attacking our religion and our Trabzon.”

The masculinities in Trabzon considered a small-scale¹⁵ leftist protest as if it was a threat against their values, their religion and their local and national identity. Reacting against this constructed threat was reflected upon a men’s obligatory action and as a result come out as two lynchings against the TAYAD members. In all of these rightist uprisings, vast majority of the respondents have been the men, while they served the (re)construction of masculinities, by emphasising the patriarchal men’s values. In those uprisings, the men of Trabzon found spaces for the performances of the masculinities, as well as the rightist political action. In these protests, the Trabzon erkekleri (Trabzon men) performed patriarchal masculinities as aggression, male bravado, unrestrictedness, violence, action, combat, pride, glory and heroism.

On the other hand, it should also be noted that, almost simultaneously, these rightist uprisings were usually reflected and expressed in Trabzonspor’s football matches in Avni Aker Stadium. One of the recent examples of that is the case of the massive wear of Hrant Dink’s assassin Ogün Samast’s white beret in the stadium, as a symbol of support to the ultranationalists and hatred against the Armenians and the other minorities that challenged the dominant Turkish nationalism (see Sünbuloğlu, 2009). As I discuss in the next section, those incidents present the interrelatedness of rightist politics and football fanaticism. Those rightist uprisings are the crystallized expressions of rightism. They vividly take place in front of the public gaze. There are less apparent, yet influential

¹⁵ T. Bora points there were only four TAYAD members at the Atatürk Square who were spreading the manifests (2008, pp. 59-61).

expressions of rightism, that are found in the daily life rather than mass protests and overwhelming fights, attacks, murders and/or bombings.

We find those expressions in every aspect of social life such as the perception of families, embodiment, the moral codes and the lifestyle. They are primarily rooted in two interrelated wings of rightism as Islamism and conservatism. In a hardly separable manner, they exist as permeated in in the daily life of Trabzon. In this integrated picture, Islam primarily provides the moral codes, while conservatism accommodates the lifestyle and frame of the common sense social thought. On the other hand, in many interviews, Islamism and conservative lifestyle appeared hand in hand with the devotedness to the state, since they are perceived to supplement the others. This is blatantly expressed in the social relations in the daily life of the city. As a result, Trabzon appears as a religious and conservative city¹⁶.

In every Friday, In Trabzon, the mosques in the city centre, such as İskender Paşa Camii, Konak Camii and Çarşı Camii, fill with hundreds of men who come for Cuma Namazı (Friday's Prayer). Many of the stores are closed and life is paused for the prayer. As an outcome of the Islamic codes, it is the men who attend this public prayer. This creates a homosocial environment around this ritual. In the field research, the respondents presented their relation to Islam as their devotedness to Islamic codes of morality, behaviour, and the rituals. On the other hand, in the beginning of the field research in August 2010, it was the Ramadan, in which the Muslims fast. The pedestrian areas of the city centre were away from their usual liveliness, because of this prayer in a deeply religious mood. In this mood, the pressure on people who do not fast was clearly

¹⁶ Meeker's ethnological study in Of, one of the so-called religious centres of Trabzon, traces the roots of this Islamism in this district and the city (2001).

observable because during the daytime there were almost no open restaurants. The possibility of not to participate the fast or not to believe in Islamic codes is perceived unimaginable and impossible. Being a liberal businessman, Ahmet criticised the pressure on the people who do not participate the fast:

“Tourists from foreign lands come to Trabzon. You know that. There is a strong pressure on them. Those tourists come from distant places. They want to eat something here. There should be [open] restaurants or so... Those people have the right for not fasting.”

This was the single comment against the freedom of the people. However, its genuine emphasis is on the freedom of consumption, than freedom of belief.

Only a few respondents directly emphasised the primacy of Islam and two of them were Imams professionally. In one of those, Yılmaz defined being Trabzonlu in terms of Islam. He said

“A Trabzonlu is a man who fulfils his religious duties. We can even call him pious.”

Osman was one of the Imams. He said that

“The society must protect its culture and its traditions. We don't know Islam well. We try to adapt Islam to our culture and customs. I think if we manage to learn Islam, our religion, everything will be fine. Although we act as if we know it; we know nothing.”

The other Imam Fahrettin's account was more fundamentalist and more patriarchal. He said

“Education isn't Islamic. The deficiency roots from not obeying the orders of Allah. It is ordered to be moral, to keep away from adultery, to be righteous, to

obey his holy laws and to have a society with character. What do we do?.. There is immorality at the coast to its highest extent. The girls sit on the laps of the boys. This is ugly. This is disgusting!.. If a man and a woman comes together, the third will be Satan. If you had educated the child according to the orders of Allah, those wouldn't happen.”

On the other hand, many respondents' attitudes were focused on perceiving Islam, and conservatism altogether. They emphasised Islamic notions of morality, alongside with conservative issues like lifestyle, clothing, honour, family and state. For example Latif said

“We are going to save our state from the strangers. We are going to protect our religion and family. Nobody can touch our chastity.”

In the later parts of the same interview, on the parliamentary elections (that were to be the year after that interview), he said

“We have to vote for those who will be worthy for our religion, who will save our religion, who will save our state and our army...who will save those things... We have to vote for who is the best for those.”

On the other hand, Nurettin emphasised the contrasts between Islam and technology. In a lengthily speech, he emphasised that

“Surely there is a relation between the religion and technology. Technology, it obstructs the religion. It obstructs the way we can live life in a moral way. However, I must say that the religion could not discard technology. It is what the people can do but we don't do that usually.”

Afterwards, he suffered from the moral destruction by technology and the media. According to him, TV, the outcome of the technology destroyed the relations in the family He told that he had terminated his own TV, to prevent his family from the morally harmful influences of the TV programs. After

that, he told how he restricted his wife's clothing and how he trained his adolescent son. His narrative reflected a strong conservative pressure:

"...I like wearing shorts neither at home, nor in the street. However the other people do that. What do I do then? I don't go to those people's homes. I don't let my wife to wear [clothes with] short sleeves... My son is sixteen years old. He was wearing shorts. I said "My son, you cannot do that. You cannot wear shorts according to our beliefs.". Moreover, finally I said that "If you want to wear shorts; if you want to live like the others, go away and open a new way for yourself! Go away, you don't have a father! Do never come close to me again!". I mean I created an environment as if I was having my final word. I knew that is violence. But I knew that the boy could not go anywhere. He must obey me, forcedly or willingly."

Nurettin and Fahrettin's remarks, alongside with the responses of the other respondents, reflect the conservative pressures which the masculinities in Trabzon exercise. These experiences and expressions are seen densely in the social relations of Trabzon, so that those impacts are seen in almost every aspect of the life. They cannot be separated from the construction and experiences of the cathexis, the family life, the behaviour, the embodiment and the perception of overall gender relations. Rightism is a patriarchal ideology and it supports and benefits from the construction of patriarchal masculinities. At the same time, rightism is closely interrelated with football and football fanaticism. In the interviews, the respondents expressed their political ideas in integration with football. As I shall discuss below, rightism and rightist politics are reflected upon football and football fanaticism.

6.3 FOOTBALL FANATICISM IN TRABZON

Trabzon is a city embedded in football fanaticism and football is predominantly a men's game. Trabzonspor visibly affects the people's lives from change of emotions of the people, to the daily talks, organization of life and sexuality. On the discursive level, Trabzonlular like to present Trabzonspor as the central focus of their lives. Football is embedded in a wide range of relations. It is a field in which various aspects of social reality concomitantly take place. As N. Erdoğan emphasises,

“Popular football culture is one of the cultural forms, in which different forms of consciousness and discourses struggle over different social powers. It constitutes one of the dimensions of hegemonic social practices, as a ground in which social meanings are (re)constructed, found, destructed, transformed.”
(1993).

Football affects the people's lives in a multidimensional way In Trabzon as well. The public space reflects this affectionate attitude for Trabzonspor: maroon and blue, the colours of Trabzonspor, the city's most prominent team in Süper Lig are seen almost everywhere, and on everything in the city. The times of this city are organized according to the football matches of this team. Just before the matches the clothes of the people in the pedestrian areas turn to maroon and blue quickly and during the matches, the pedestrian areas of the city are away from their usual liveliness.

The relations between Trabzonspor and Trabzonlular are quite close. The administrators, the players and the personnel of the team are perceived and treated as the celebrities. In the city, every Trabzonlu is expected to be a fanatic supporter of Trabzonspor by nature. Its often-emphasised successes being the Süper Lig champion “six times” between 1975 and 1984, as the first team that is coming from a city outside of Istanbul, being

called as “fourth major”¹⁷ (dördüncü büyük) team in the country, and other major successes versus significant national and international teams are often told¹⁸. Football constitutes one of the major sources of the (micro)nationalist pride for Trabzonlular, which sometimes passes before the national (Turkish) identity, emphasising the local identity being Trabzonlu. Rightist politics are reflected on and expressed at the tribunes of the Avni Aker Stadium. In this way, football fanaticism of Trabzonspor provides one of the most fertile grounds for the strengthening of rightism as nationalism and militarism. On the other hand, there is a male sociality around football fanaticism. Despite the existence of a small number of female fanatics, vast majority of the supporters and the fanatics of Trabzonspor are the men.

These relations largely create a homosocial environment around football in which male bonds are formed. In such relations, men’s identities are reproduced, male values dominate, and patriarchal masculinities are performed. Football is predominantly a male dominated phenomenon. Sülzle argues that football cannot be decontaminated from sexism since the equation of football and masculinity has an unshakeable ground; hence it provides the archaic and proletarian masculinities to emancipate from its civil boundaries; as a result, it opens the possibility for problematization of masculinities (as cited in T. Bora 2012b). This is also valid for Trabzon, where majority of relations around football takes place by and around the masculinities. With the exception of a few female supporters, majority of the fanatics are the men.

¹⁷ “Six-time championship” and “being the fourth major” are quite often repeated discourses.

¹⁸ Trabzonspor became the Süper Lig champion six times between 1975-1976 and 1983-1984 seasons.

There are many men in Trabzon who passionately follow the other leagues than the Süper Lig all the year round. Besides Trabzonspor, which is a part of the Süper Lig, the city has other clubs at the first league, second league, third league and amateur leagues, such as İdmangücü, İdmanocağı, 1461 Trabzon¹⁹, Akçaabat Sebatspor, Yalıspor, Martıspor, Necmiati and Arsinspor. The men gather around the smaller stadiums like Yavuz Sultan Selim Stadium, that is located next to the greater Avni Aker Stadium and fanatically support their teams. The poorer and the lumpen men spend the whole day around the stadiums making ovations talking to the footballers and the other supporters, in homosocial relations, in which they reproduce their masculinities dominated by patriarchal men's values. The passion and fanaticism is so strong that the supporters, talk about the footballers warm heartedly, as if they were a part of their families. Football stadiums are one of the spaces in which male strength, struggle and heroism are presented and provoked with the ovations (Bozok, 2012).

The interactions concerning the football and Trabzonspor take place almost everywhere in the public sphere, from football stadiums to the work places. In those relations, men think football, talk about football, experience aggression and violence in socially legitimized grounds; perform their masculinities in front of other people, shout and scream slogans of Trabzonspor, and reproduce men's values. At the same time, football provides the masculinities a leisure issue to talk about for hours. In his famous memoir *Fever Pitch*, football author Nick Hornby says the following:

¹⁹ The metaphoric meaning of the name of this club is also significant since the name refers to the date (1461) when Ottoman Sultan Mehmet II The Conqueror conquered the Greek Empire of Trebizond.

“[On football] we could talk when we wanted, the football gave us something to talk about (and anyway the silences weren’t oppressive), and the days had a structure, a routine.” (2010, p. 16).

In the following pages, on the impacts of football on the emotional lives of men, he says that

“I am aware of the downside of this wonderful facility that men have: they become repressed, they fail in their relationships with women, their conversation is trivial and boorish, they find themselves unable to express their emotional needs, they cannot relate to their children, and they die lonely and miserable.” (p. 22).

The points observed by Hornby are also valid for the masculinities in Trabzon. Football gives the men a safe issue to talk about and to keep away from their emotions and their families, of all which bear the possibility to create unwanted problems to solve. In the fieldwork, many respondents spoke lengthily and freely liked to talk about football, despite they hesitated to talk about masculinities in the beginning of the interviews (see Chapter 3). The most notable example of this sort was the interview with Ahmet, a businessman and a member of the administrative board of Trabzon Chamber of Industry and Commerce. He almost nonstop spoke about Trabzonspor in almost half of this interview that took 62 minutes, generally emphasizing the successes of the team. On the other hand, some respondents initially spoke about the meaning of Trabzonspor by emphasizing it was the only entertainment source of the city. For instance Yılmaz said that

“...The only entertainment of Trabzon and Trabzonlu is Trabzonspor. Here is a four season rainy and cloudy place. It is surrounded by the mountains. This city has got no other source of amusement. Our only fun, our only passion is Trabzonspor.”

Similarly, while watching the match against Liverpool August 2010 at the Atatürk Square in our brief interview Sadri said

“We love our city. But the people of Trabzon like supporting and talking about Trabzonspor because we have got no other source of entertainment in this gloomy, humid and rainy city.”

On the other hand, in the only response that related economy to Trabzonspor in the interviews, Alpaslan said that

“There is no industry, nothing! There are only a few opportunities for employment. Why are the people fanatics of Trabzonspor? They sleep and wake up with Trabzonspor! Do you know what?.. It is the only entertainment for them.”

This is a common opinion on the meaning of football in Trabzon²⁰.

At the same time, in line with that, the respondents' attitudes towards football in Trabzon are parallel to their attitudes towards the Natashas. The masculinities in Trabzon have extensive information on both the Natashas and Trabzonspor. Moreover the respondents narrate Natashas and Trabzonspor matches as their mere entertainment in the city. Those are two of the fields²¹ that are subject to the strongest effects of capitalist patriarchy. The men spend time and money in patriarchal ways. Both the sex trade and football are seen as inseparable fields for the reproduction of masculinities in Trabzon. The masculinities in Trabzon express and

²⁰ Those ideas are quite widespread in Trabzon. In his study on violence amongst football fanatics, Ünsal quotes from popular football magazine of the time *Tribun Dergisi* which made interviews with the fanatics of Trabzonspor in 2002. In one of these quotes, a Trabzonspor fanatic named Sacit said that “...There is nothing more than Trabzonspor in Trabzon. Everybody's life is Trabzonspor. When the league finishes, the life finishes as well.” (2005, p. 267).

²¹ Natashas are a part of the global sex trade while Trabzonspor is a part of global industrial football (see Kuper and Szymanski, 2009; Malarek, 2004).

exercise the purest and most exploitative forms of patriarchal relations, creating the potent and glorious imagery of “Trabzon erkekleri” (Trabzon men).

On the other hand these attitudes of placing football as the primary entertainment of life echoes the rephrasing of Marx’s famous words “Religion is the sigh of the oppressed creature, the heart of a heartless world, and the soul of soulless conditions. It is the opium of the people” (1997, pp. 191-192) as “football these days is the opium of the people” by Eagleton (2010, June 15), also emphasising the increased populism amongst the poorer classes. Football provides the unemployed and poorer people the entertainment they need in their lives as Marx speaks about. On the rightist background of Trabzon, similar to Eagleton’s view, football serves for populism as well. Football presents an entertainment for the men, keeping them away from their economic and emotional sorrows of the life and provides a ground to perform their masculinities to compensate these problems; at the same time, in conditions of poverty and unemployment, football fanaticism provide the ground for the rise of nationalism (Öncü, 2002, 03 November).

The men perform their masculinities extremely in a socially legitimized way, in a sense of *catharsis*²². They experience patriarchal men’s values such as aggression, courage, struggle, heroism, victory, fight, violence, in ovations, public talks, at stadiums, at fights and discussions with fanatics of other players and identify themselves with the bodily power and successes of the footballers. The extent of the *catharsis* is so wide that it even enables the

²² The Ancient Greek term “catharsis” (or “katharsis”), which was widely used by distinct theorists like Aristotle and Freud, implies the cleansing, purification or purgation from guilt, sorrow, pity, fear and other disturbing emotions (Angeles, 1997, p. 155; Blackburn, 1996, p. 58).

masculinities to forget about their families and their children, whom the masculinities in Trabzon emphasise, they attribute the most value in their lives, as well as their economic and emotional troubles. For example, after speaking the successes of Trabzonspor in an ecstatic mood, Fethi told

“I witnessed many of the successes myself. That is a passion... That’s hard to believe. Those come from our genes. That’s an amazing thing!... I mean achieving those is a very different, unbelievable thing!.. I travelled a lot after Trabzonspor. I went to Urfa to watch the away game; to watch the cup game²³ versus Fenerbahçe. I saw the greatness of Trabzonspor there once again. I went to Kadıköy²⁴ and saw it; I went to İnönü²⁵ I saw it; I went to Sivas²⁶ I saw it!... Trabzonspor is so great that they prepared at least ten big banners. Do you understand what I mean... Ten big banners!... I mean you have to experience those in order to understand them. Trabzonspor is very different I mean. (He takes a deep breath and sighs.) One of the most exciting moments of my life is our second goal at Urfa, the goal that took us to the score 2-1. I got my wedding, I got my baby... But that was a totally different moment... I can never exchange that delight to anything else. I did not bounce and...(he sighs) scream...(he sighs) when my baby was born... But there I know I black out...my blood pressure fell down. That was different.”

Fethi’s words reflect the *cathartic* aspect of football fanaticism. But this state of mood cannot be limited to the fanaticism of laypeople because this unrestrained excitement is also found amongst the fanatics from other classes. In other interviews many other respondents told their feelings and

²³ He mentions the Turkey Cup match Trabzonspor vs. Fenerbahçe that was played in 5th May 2010, which Trabzonspor won 3-1. <http://www.ntvmsnbc.com/id/25091029/>, retrieved 15th December 2012.

²⁴ He mentions Şükrü Saraçoğlu Stadium at Kadıköy, Istanbul.

²⁵ He mentions İnönü Stadium at Beşiktaş, Istanbul.

²⁶ He mentions Sivas 4 Eylül Stadium at Sivas.

opinions about Trabzonspor in similar signs of excitement, in which they did not present about any other issue.

These experiences are similar to the values of rightism (especially nationalism) discussed in the previous section. *Cathartic* experiences, which the masculinities got agitated, provide the ground for enabling the men to engage into the nationalist political actions like fights amongst the fanatics or the lynch mobs. The discourses of the rightist politics are reflected in arenas of football fanaticism. Rightism requires the support of football fanaticism to get spread and affect the masses²⁷. In this vein, T. Bora points that

“The values, images, and metaphors of nationalism, masculinity and militarism feed, and augment each other in a “league order”. This symbiotic relation enables the turn on for nationalism, masculinity/machismo and nationalism in a *combined*²⁸ way, as well as providing the possibility for *substitution*²⁹ and *representation*³⁰ of each other. And football provides a suitable ground for this for this symbiosis. (I have to underline that this is *suitable*³¹, but not *inevitable*³².) (2012b).

²⁷ As a notable example in this manner, Salazar, the fascist dictator of Portugal, dominated the country by adopting and developing a “three f” formula, consisted of *football*, *Fatima* (the place where Virgin Mary was believed to be seen, by attributing religious values) and *fado* (a dance). <http://www.guardian.co.uk/music/2007/apr/27/worldmusic>, retrieved 25th August 2012.

²⁸ Original emphasis.

²⁹ My emphasis.

³⁰ My emphasis.

³¹ Original emphasis.

³² Original emphasis.

Trabzonspor fanatics are famous for their close relations with nationalist politics and violent fights, especially with the 1990's³³ (Eroğul, 2009; Kondel, 2012; Ünsal, 2005). The grandstands of Avni Aker Stadium have been one of the primary spaces of nationalists, since the 1990's. Eroğul points that Avni Aker Stadium is the *first* stadium in Turkey where anti-PKK uprisings and nationalist slogans against the Kurds began in the 1990's (2009, p. 353). Simultaneously, Trabzonspor fanatics became one of the communities which started ritualizing singing the Turkish national anthem before the football matches, as a nationalist symbol against the non-Turkish and non-Muslim people. In 1990's, in the same period, the existence of the Ünal Kahraman, Trabzonspor's famous football player, also known for its hanging moustaches the symbol of MHP supporters, came forward with his nationalist standpoint tempered the ultranationalist ovations (ibid.). Many senior administrators of Trabzonspor are known for their notable relationships with nationalist and racist politics and found significant support from the city, rather than presenting a reaction. Two of such cases have been like Mehmet Ali Yılmaz and Hayrettin Hacısalıhoğlu. Yılmaz, who was then the president³⁴ of Trabzonspor called Kevin Campbell one of the black footballers of the team as "yamyam"³⁵ ("maneater" and/or "nigger") in 1999³⁶; while Hayrettin Hacısalıhoğlu saluted the soldiers making a Nazi

³³ This is also the period in which the Kurdish movement, the natural enemy of Turkish nationalism, gained strength.

³⁴ Yılmaz also was a Member of Parliament from DYP and served as the Minister of State Responsible of Youth and Sports between 28th November 1993 and 15th July 1994. <http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/hukümetler/HB50.htm>, retrieved 14th December 2012.

³⁵ In Turkish, "yamyam" signifies both "nigger" and "cannibal" in daily language. Therefore I am using both of them here.

³⁶ The full words of Yılmaz on Campbell are more pejorative indeed. He said "we bought our maneater/nigger as a goal machine; but he turned out to be a washing machine". <http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/ShowNew.aspx?id=-65190>, retrieved 15th December

salute in office as the his second president (Kondel, 2012, p. 488). On the other hand, the nationalist uprising of the fanatics of Trabzonspor reached one of its peak points January 2007. After the murder of the Armenian leftist journalist Hrant Dink in 19th January 2007, the fanatics of the team began to wear white berets similar to that of his murderer Ogün Samast, showing their support, and shouted “who don’t stand up [and support us] should become an Armenian”³⁷.

The nationalist uprisings exposed itself in the significant change of the mottos of the fanatics of Trabzonspor from the 1980’s to the 2000’s too. As T. Bora and N. Erdoğan emphasised, the “En Büyük Lazlar - Başka Büyük Yok!”³⁸ (The Greatest is the Lazs – There is No Other Great!) banner hanged by the Trabzonspor supporters at the İnönü Stadium in the midst of the 1980’s enabled Trabzonspor become a major team and therefore a ‘national value’ in the football folklore; and enabled the Laz³⁹ identity to melt in the pot of national identity (2004, p. 227). As the authors point, this banner emphasises the idea that “everywhere of Turkey is everyone’s” (p. 226). On the other hand, the use of this banner denotes that the people of Trabzon accept the common jokes and discourses which stigmatizingly call them as “Lazs” with an irony, bypassing the ethnic connotations of that name and did not hesitate to be called as “Lazs”. In this way, they tried to emphasise their significance in the country by incorporating the Laz people, and attend to amalgamate with the greater national Turkish identity (Bozok, 2012, p. 424-425). This banner stresses the local Trabzon people’s efforts

2012; <http://haber.gazetevatan.com/turkiyede-irkcilik-sahadan-hic-cikmadi-ki/444486/5/Haber>, retrieved 15th December 2012.

³⁷ <http://www.milliyet.com.tr/2007/01/29/guncel/agun.html>, retrieved 15th December 2012.

³⁸ My emphasis.

³⁹ As aforementioned in Chapter 3, despite the Lazs are a minority in Trabzon.

for being accepted as well. It meant, the oppressed and the mocked local could gain success and become “the greatest” and significant with its own efforts; and the successes in football would provide that. This emphasis reflects the nationalist efforts towards participating the nation-building, by assimilating the local identities in the greater Turkish identity; and the successes of Trabzonspor was providing the ground for this. On the other hand, with the general rise of the rightism through the 1990’s to the 2000’s, the shape of nationalism has changed (p. 425). Beginning from the 2000’s the popular⁴⁰ slogan turned to the ultranationalist “bize her yer Trabzon” (everywhere is Trabzon for us). This widely-used slogan emphasises that every part of Turkey and the world belongs to the local people of Trabzon metaphorically (p. 425). It symbolizes that the nationalist fanatics of Trabzon gave up the struggle to become a part of the greater Turkish identity, since they thought they already incorporated it and became a part of the greater hegemonic (national) identity as all-powerful subjects. Moreover, they stress that metaphorical conquest of the world is already completed, by the ultranationalist fanaticism of Trabzonspor. This narcissistic and arrogant position in fact signifies a defeat from the struggle to be accepted, since it positions itself as a superior subject. As discussed above, this ultranationalist position in fact reflects the masculinities’ (of Trabzon) endeavour to escape from the greater sorrows of social life.

On the other hand, for many of the Trabzonlular, Trabzonspor is a means for challenging the situation of being left at the periphery and breaking the chains of underdevelopment. The fanaticism of Trabzonspor reflects the collective and passionate effort to overcome that destiny. This struggle has

⁴⁰ Prepared by author and Trabzonspor fanatic Harun Çelik, locally-bestselling books *Bize Her Yer Trabzon* (2008) and *Kuzeyli Yazılar* (2010) reflects this ultranationalist and racist spirit amongst the fanatics of Trabzonspor, which it is a part of.

a quite patriarchal, individualistic and personal disposition⁴¹. Football has a history in the city for about a century according to Eroğul (2009) and Tunç (2011). There are (and have been) many football clubs in the city, followed by many football fanatics. Trabzonspor is a public effort that began in the 1960's to come together, and create a more powerful nation scale football club⁴².

In this process, from its very beginning, similar to a nation-state building, the club had a truly symbiotic relation with the local people of Trabzon. The people of the city supported the team, while the successes of the team provided the base for the pride. As Şenol Güneş, former goalkeeper⁴³ of the team that experienced the championships succinctly emphasises, the members of the team were perceived as “the sons of every home” (2009). At the same time, the local people provided the footballer resources for Trabzonspor⁴⁴. The integrated presence of the team and the people was so evident that Trabzonspor's football playing style was then called as “Faroz, Sotka, Arafılboyu” named after three neighbourhoods which provide many

⁴¹ In this manner, the case of the former Trabzonspor footballer Ali Kemal Denizci, as narrated by Dilek (2009) is noteworthy. Coming from a poorer family that was living in Faroz Neighbourhood, Denizci played football as a struggle to earn his living; became very successful; earned great amounts of money and lost them quickly in gambling and prostitution, living the life of a hegemonic and heroic male ideal. This tragic (and yet quite generalizable) case represents the dreams of fanatics and the footballers; and how these dreams are broken.

⁴² Trabzonspor was established as the union of local sports clubs İdmanocağı, İdmangücü, Martıspor and Karadenizgücü, in 1967 (Eroğul, 2009, p. 345).

⁴³ Currently, Güneş is the technical director of Trabzonspor.

⁴⁴ This largely continued until the turn towards industrial and commercial football in the late 1980's, as a result of the pressure to compete with the Istanbul teams which had larger budgets and which imported world-famous football players. Many authors tend to consider this turn as the betrayal of the origins of Trabzonspor (Ata, 2009; Atalay and Sungur, 2009; Kulaçoğlu, 2009).

footballers to the team (Baş, 2009). For example, Refik an older inhabitant of Faroz⁴⁵ said

“Trabzonspor has always been beautiful. Ali Kemal, Turgay, Necati, Kadir, Hüseyin... They were all from here [Faroz]. They were my friends, our friends... In those years, Trabzonspor became champion five-six times. We used to scream in the grandstands of Avni Aker. Those were very good days...”

Football fanaticism provides an identity and belonging to the team. In this vein, starting from the establishment, many people formed close relations with Trabzonspor. Many local people personally have had close relationships with the footballers and the administrators in person, having a belonging and claiming an ownership over Trabzonspor. For example, Latif, who had a son playing football in a second league club, said

“Hüseyin from Trabzonspor... He was my friend. He was a very good man indeed. Later he was transferred to Bursaspor. We played some football together as well. We played alongside with the son of Ulusoy⁴⁶ and some other people.”

On the other hand, Hakan, one of the legal counsellors and lawyers of Trabzonspor told that the fanatics called the club quite often to ask about the losses and injustices happen to the team, forcing the club to open trials. He told that the identification of the people of Trabzon with Trabzonspor was very strong. He said

“Indeed Trabzonspor means a lot for Trabzonlular. When I walk at Kunduracılar Caddesi, some shopkeepers recognize me and stop me. They

⁴⁵ Faroz Neighbourhood also hosts Avni Aker Stadium, the primary stadium of Trabzonspor.

⁴⁶ He mentions the family that are amongst the owners of the Ulusoy Holding Company. Haluk Ulusoy the former head of Turkish Football Federation was also from this family.

introduce me to the others. They say “he is the lawyer of Trabzonspor. They pay a lot of respect. The others suddenly stand up. The owner of the shop has a seat next to his safe. He stands up and gives his place. He sits the chair next to me. He looks at me in amusement. He looks as if I was the prime minister; as if I was the president. Our people embrace Trabzonspor too deeply.”

This passionate support is so strong that some respondents even spoke about the effects of fanaticism of Trabzonspor on the emotional and sexual lives of the men. They emphasise that the psychological and sexual mood of the masculinities are closely related to the successes and/or losses of the team. For instance Bora said

“The life stops here in the match days. Then there happens to be nobody left in the streets. Before the matches we can never sleep. If Trabzonspor loses the shopkeepers pull a long face. Nobody wants to go out. You should see the fun if it wins.”

Alpaslan and Hakan’s narrations present a closer relation. Alpaslan said

“Look... If Trabzonspor loses, people do not enter into sexual intercourse with their wives for a week. Because the mood of the man feel low!... Football is not simple! That happens as I say. When the team loses, you should know that the men never enter into intercourse with their wives. Then they should be watching the news separately or watching other programs. The men never talk to their wives. If Trabzonspor loses... Allah forbid that!.. (He laughs).”

In an enthusiastic tone Hakan used similar but more detailed words:

“The impact of Trabzonspor is very strong here indeed. Do you know what... The year we lost the [Süper Lig] championship in 1996, three men committed suicide. That is an unbelievable thing... Three men killed themselves for the club. There are also many men here who say they would marry if Trabzonspor becomes champion. I hear those myself. If Trabzonspor goes well in the league, the personal lives and sexual lives go well. There is one more thing.

When Trabzonspor loses points in the league, the shopkeepers do not want to open their stores. I mean the men become to be stressed and aggressive. We see that. But you should see the joy when Trabzonspor wins. The people shine out!.. They burst laughter, make shopping, go out... Anything you want!... I mean, the life in Trabzon is closely bound to Trabzonspor.”

The identification of the relations of Trabzonspor’s success and loss are so intense that, in 22nd May 2011, two days before the interview with Hakan, the election offices of AKP at Kunduracılar Caddesi and Kahramanmaraş Caddesi were attacked by stone-throwing fanatics, who claimed Trabzonspor lost Süper Lig Championship to their long-term rival Fenerbahçe with illicit ways, with the help of their rival’s hidden-relations with the government party whose head was known to support that team⁴⁷. Later, no news appeared on media that those fanatics experienced legal action. These incidents and attitudes on football present an uncontrolled expression of patriarchal masculinities.

As emphasised by Koçak, football fanaticism provide the rightism a “hunting land” (2010). At the same time, this is a land which is considered as a “man’s game” takes place (T. Bora, 2010). In the football fanaticism, the patriarchal codes of masculinities and rightist politics (especially nationalism) integrate and express themselves. The masculinities find socially legitimated grounds for the expressions of violent, idealized, heroic, uncontrollable manhood in football fanaticism. In the football fanaticism, the rightist discourses are expressed by the masculinities, who are the voluntary and willing actors. In other words, in the intersection points of rightist politics and football fanaticism, patriarchal masculinities are embodied.

⁴⁷ <http://www.ntvmsnbc.com/id/25215767>, retrieved 23rd May 2011.

CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSION

This thesis investigates the social construction of masculinities focusing on the case of contemporary Trabzon, Turkey. Masculinities are not transhistorical; rather, they are products and constructs of the social, cultural and historical conditions. They are neither universal, nor totally unique. They are shaped neither merely by the structural nor the local dynamics. Rather, the masculinities are constructed in the dialectical interrelatedness and interplay of the structural dynamics of global capitalist patriarchal gender order and the local and regional dynamics they exist. In this simultaneous interplay, the global capitalist gender order shapes masculinities as a whole, while its products, actual men and masculinities in the local and regional levels reproduce and reconstruct it. At the same time, global capitalism moulds the particular social and cultural dynamics that construct the local and regional masculinities.

As Connell, one of the leading theoreticians of masculinity studies emphasises “masculinities are configurations of practice structured by gender relations” (2005, p. 44). These configurations are shaped in the local contexts, under the impact of the global capitalist patriarchal gender order. Therefore, in order to critically understand the masculinities in a particular regional or local context, the impact of the historical and social conditions of the gender order that construct it must be investigated. Investigating masculinities in local contexts provides significant clues for

understanding different masculinities that emerge out of the patriarchal relations peculiar to those local contexts, as well as understanding the construction of overall domination of men. Hence, in order to reach a more comprehensive understanding of patriarchal relations, the construction of masculinities must be investigated. This is also valid for the masculinities in Trabzon.

In contemporary Trabzon, masculinities are constructed as an outcome of the interrelatedness of men's superior and almost unquestionable position in family, their cathectic organization shaped by expressiveness of manly emotions and the relations with Natashas, the exclusion of the queer people, rightist protests, fanaticism of Trabzonspor and an overall spirit of conservatism, nationalism and Islamism.

Although it preserves its culturally hegemonic position in the region, the Eastern Black Sea city of Trabzon, which has a history of more than two thousands of years being located on the historical Silk Road, which used to be one of the significant trade and commerce centre of the Middle East, Caucasus, and Black Sea lands, and which used to inhabit many ethnic groups, religions, languages and cultures, is currently away from the prosperous days of the past.

The industrial, commercial, and service-related enterprises are quite limited, and the city is experiencing impoverishment, due to the impacts of neoliberalism. As a result of the ethnic cleansing, Islamization and Turkification policies of the last two centuries, the ethnic, religious and cultural memory is largely cleansed and the city has lost its cultural, ethnic and religious riches. In the last two decades, Trabzon experienced nationally and internationally echoed rightist attacks, lynchings, assassinations, bombings and protests that were massively supported by

the inhabitants of the city. In the social and cultural life in Trabzon, the impact of this Islamist, conservative and nationalist spirit is being felt everywhere, and the primary actors and beneficiaries of this situation, which supports and feeds from patriarchy, are the men and the masculinities.

With the dissolution of the USSR, Eastern Bloc and opening of the Georgia-Turkey border in 1989, the influx of the poorer women that are forced to become prostitutes to the local centre Trabzon had begun. These women were stigmatized as “Natashas”. In its patriarchal background, Trabzon, became one of the most prominent centres of sex trade in the Eastern Black Sea region and Turkey. The most significant customers of this patriarchal and exploitative trade were the masculinities in Trabzon. At the same time, the impact of the already-existing patriarchal and rightist background in the city let the men to emphasise the value they attributed to their families (like it has been being done in the city for centuries) on one hand, and experience paid sexual intercourses with the Natashas at the same time. Although the Natashas begun to leave the city in the first decade of 2000’s to a significant extent, the constantly narrated memories of the relations with them still continue to affect the sexualities in the city.

On the other hand, Trabzonspor, the major football team of the city had experienced substantial successes between 1975 and 1984. Despite only the memories exist of these successful days, the city has been experiencing a massive football fanaticism that is felt in every aspect of social life in the last two decades. In Trabzon, Trabzonspor affects social and cultural life from time, space, sexualities, economic activities to manners. Football fanaticism, as one of the crystallized grounds in which patriarchy and rightism intersect, provides the men to construct and reproduce their masculinities.

Grounding on that background, the impoverished and rightist masculinities in Trabzon spend much of their time in homosocial environments, narrating patriarchal experiences of masculinities, experiencing paid sexual intercourses with Natashas and ready to take place in (rightist) incidents. In other words, masculinities as actors and beneficiaries exist in the intersection point of the many significant incidents that took place and affected Trabzon and the Eastern Black Sea coast.

In the context of contemporary Trabzon, the masculinities present an explicit as well as an implicit picture. In the interviews, the respondents initially tried to conceal their patriarchal attitudes and ideas behind their-so-recognized politically correct narratives of gender. This has three complementary aspects that are like the two sides of the same coin. Firstly, despite they mostly believed the opposite, the masculinities had begun expressing themselves as if they supported gender equality, stating the women and the men are equal. However, these narratives in fact reflected their *accepted* understanding of limited and moreover pseudo gender equality rather than a *real and inclusive* gender equality. This puts the masculinities in Trabzon as socially-acceptable actors in front of the gaze of the strangers.

Secondly, they try to conceal themselves behind a set of cliché qualities of commonly accepted and extensively narrated “Trabzon erkekleri” (Trabzon men), such as emotional expressiveness, patriotism, bravery, feverishness, aggressiveness, sexual demandingness, irrationality, warm heartedness nationalism, religiosity. These narratives establish a legitimizing and protecting shield for the existing patriarchal masculinities, in face of all the aliens (including me, as the researcher). This cliché qualities contribute the extroverted, unquestionable and autonomous imagery of the masculinities in the city.

Thirdly, this socially constructed public *imagery* of almost-trademark “Trabzon erkekleri” (Trabzon men) provides a source of pride that gathers the individual men around a sense of “imagined community”¹, and an identity they belong. As noted above, this identity provides the men to live their lives in an extrovertedly patriarchal manner that lets them to engage in rightist incidents, experience relations with Natashas, become football fanatics, and present themselves as idiosyncratic and unquestionable actors. This public imagery of “Trabzon erkekleri” (Trabzon men) is based on the exaggerated yet actual experiences of the men, more than a representation that is commonly shared. The roots of these qualities exist in the local dynamics of the city.

The *cathexis* of the masculinities consists of four crucial components: the palette of emotions which the men express; men’s preferences and inclinations of social and emotional relations and the content of those relations, the men’s sexual attachment and detachment to objects of desire and the exclusion of queer people. The masculinities in Trabzon present themselves as emotionally expressive actors. However, this expressiveness mostly heaps up around emotions that present the men as strong rather than fragile actors. Many respondents told that they freely expressed their emotions such as laughter, joy, anger, sadness, and crying. However, they said experienced those emotions in the company of men in homosocial relations, with whom they reproduce their masculinity, rather than the women or the children who are thought to perceive this expressiveness as weakness or fragility, (or a tendency of a crisis of masculinity, such as those that exist in metropolitan spaces and Western settings).

¹ This is pretty similar to Anderson’s ideas on the construction of nations in *Imagined Communities* (2006).

At the same time, in their cliché narratives of identity, these masculinities present themselves as sexually demanding, reckless, competitive, ambitious, tough, feverish, bold, warm hearted, hectic, hospitable, non-sissy and fanatic-of-Trabzonspor actors, devoted to a number of rightist issues such as their country, nation, flag, religion, region and Trabzon. Moreover, the respondents even presented their approval and contribution to violence against women, and feverish explosions of aggression, which is also simply expressed in rightist uprisings. As Ahmed points, the emotions are not value-free or have essential meanings; rather, they function in social and cultural conditions (2004). This palette of emotions constructs an extrovert, reckless and patriarchal masculinity in the city. The masculinities in the city legitimize their patriarchal attitudes by means of that palette of emotions and emotional preferences. These patriarchal attitudes also reflect in the sexualities of the men.

In the last two decades of Trabzon, especially until the mid-2000's, the sexualities of the masculinities have been largely moulded and constructed in the men's relations with the Natashas, the prostitutes from the dissolved USSR and the Eastern Bloc. Those relations have been one of the most prominent grounds in which the masculinities experienced, narrated, stigmatized and shaped their perceptions of desire. All of the prostitutes from the former USSR and Eastern Bloc were stigmatized as "Russian", a word used for signifying both the communist states, and the state that used to be formerly long-term enemy of the Ottoman Empire. The paid sexual relations with the Natashas signified the patriarchal and nationalist conquest of the women of the long-term enemies, and communists. In that period, Trabzon had been one of the most prominent centres of the sex trade in Turkey. Many men from the city experienced sexual relations with

the Natashas. These relations jogged to the memories, identities and so that the continuing construction of the masculinities of Trabzon.

The men experienced the realization of their patriarchal fantasies in exploitative and oppressive experiences of sexuality in the relations with Natashas. Those were paid sexual relations with women who fitted their imagery of idealized women, who were physically different, sexually appealing and more significantly, who were easily accessible and consumable. The women disidentified, and abstracted from their humane qualities as commodities. Many of those relations often included physical, financial, verbal and sexual violence against the prostitutes. However, the men experienced those relations as the patriarchal glories of manhood, as a significant part of the overall construction of the masculinities in Trabzon.

The masculinities in Trabzon had extensive information on the Natashas. They knew their prices, their actions, their spaces, their appeal, their countries of origin, and their ages. This information enabled the men to control their performative experiences with the Natashas. The information on the Natashas covered two distinctions. The first one is the comparison between the early Natashas and the late Natashas; and the second comparison is between the Natashas and the local women of Trabzon. In the first distinction, they considered the initial women who came to the city for prostitution as more beautiful, attractive and sexually appealing. Those were the women who had fit the patriarchal fantasies of the masculinities. In that period, the prostitutes had been most visible. The experiences with those prostitutes had lasted until the removal of the prostitutes from the centre of the city to the margins of social life by means of legal and police action. The early prostitutes had moved to the other locales of sex trafficking. Beginning from that period, mostly the undesirable and the

unattractive Natashas were left in the city. They were forced to be caged in the ghetto-like and yet visible and controllable space of Çömlekçi Neighbourhood in Trabzon, and to other locales. The experiences with the early Natashas form the basis of the still-told glory narratives of the masculinities in the city.

Natashas were also compared to the local women of Trabzon, and both sides of this comparison experienced stark oppression and exploitation from the masculinities in the city. Natashas were perceived as the figures of idealized femininity, appeal, while the local women were characterized as sweaty, rugged and sexually unattractive figures. The masculinities in Trabzon often narrate that the Natashas had contributed the local women by forcing them to learn to become more attractive by starting to look alike them by using cosmetics, wearing fashionable clothing and going to the beauty parlours. Moreover the masculinities felt no responsibility for the Natashas, while provisioning the families of the local women were of their so-perceived most important responsibility. The women were forced to fit the binary of foreign prostitutes and the suffering local mother-housewives. The men in the city experienced their masculinities without caring this two-sided burden of the local and the foreign prostitutes. The constantly narrated relations with the Natashas contribute to the construction of the patriarchal masculinities in the city. Nevertheless, the severe patriarchal oppression and subordination in the city cannot be limited to those.

There are strong pressures on queer people in the city. The queer people in Trabzon are almost totally forced to invisibility, despite the emergence of Halil İbrahim Dinçdağ, as the first open gay football referee of Turkey, and the organization of the anti-homophobia meetings since 2010. Usually one cannot meet any open queer people in the city. In Trabzon, speaking or asking questions about the queer people is considered as a taboo as well.

The queer issues are commonly considered to be against the Islamic religion and the customs. On the other hand, the queer people are equated to weak, fragile, abnormal, and unmanly. These present a quite conservative attitude. In order to construct themselves as unfeminine, strong and tough actors, the masculinities in Trabzon exclude the queer people by coercion, as well as distancing themselves from those issues. As a result, homophobia, transphobia, the hatred attitudes and the social exclusion towards the queer people form one of the crucial aspects constructing a quite patriarchal masculinity in Trabzon. These patriarchal masculinities are also the primary actors in rightist politics and football fanaticism in the city.

The masculinities in Trabzon emphasise that family is the most prominent and most valuable thing in their lives, even so that marriage is generally prioritized to other stages of male initiation, such as the military service. At the same time, they relate family to religion, nation, country, state and the women. This has a series of reasons. The family provides the men indispensable grounds for their patriarchal authority, the space for legitimized sexual reproduction, continuation of their offspring, and experience fatherhood. Family forms one of the most crucial grounds for the social reproduction of masculinities. Therefore, the masculinities in Trabzon prioritize family to other aspects of their lives. Legitimizing their narratives with Islamic, conservative and nationalist values, the masculinities in Trabzon emerge in terms of breadwinners, protectors, socializing authorities and all-powerful patriarchs in families.

Trabzon's patriarchal, conservative, and rightist families have got roots in the past of the city. As Emiroğlu (2009) points, even in the late Ottoman history of Trabzon, the families had to be self-contained, all powerful and to an extent semi-autonomous units with male heads who used to act like

patriarchs. This is largely continued by the contemporary masculinities. Men's position in family is experienced in terms of being the patriarchal head of the family, alongside with being their breadwinner role. Male breadwinner role is more modern than traditional, being an outcome of the capitalist society. The masculinities act as the ultimate decision makers, who rarely let the women to interfere their decisions. Moreover, some of them confessed that they used violence whenever they felt necessary. In the history of masculinities in Trabzon, the men migrated for labouring in other cities and countries. This created a masculinity constructed by means of increased emotional distance between the spouses, intensified patriarchal attitudes and an autonomous (and unquestionable) character. In this vein, the masculinities in the city consider themselves as head of family whose decisions must be obeyed, than discussed or questioned. The men can go to Natashas, to rightist political actions or football matches, autonomously, without being questioned by the women or the other members of the family.

In the families of Trabzon, men emerge as the breadwinners who earn almost all the income of their families. They do not let their spouses to earn income. Keeping the women from economic sphere and the emphasised breadwinner role of the men are legitimated in terms of the orders of Islam and the customs that exist in the city, despite those are in fact the outcomes of the capitalist patriarchy. At the same time, controlling and getting interest on women's non-commoditized labour in the domestic sphere, the men create a double burden on them. In those exploitative and oppressive relations, the masculinities find an almost-free space for their reproduction in the household. Vast majority of them do not contribute the housework, almost totally considering it as the women's duty. Keeping the

women away from the public sphere, the men control the economic and productive relations in the public sphere.

Earning the economic income of a family enables an individual man to establish a family, by letting him to provision the needs of the dependent women and the children. In other words, this contributes the cultural roles of the men that exist in the city. In this vein, by means of performing that role, the men become to be able to experience legitimized sexual intercourse in family and continue their offspring. As a result of these, they completely become as socially accepted adult men, as members of the patriarchal men's community. Accordingly, earning money provides the men the ground for establishing their power in domestic sphere. In other words, breadwinner role in family is seen as the material base of men's position in family, and the society.

At the same time, this position enables the men to act autonomously, in an almost unquestionable manner. Grounding on this role, the men supported their position as the head of their families. At the same time, they experienced sexual intercourses with the Natashas, by taking force from their position in their families, or spend that income as they wished. On the other hand, breadwinner role is seen as the guarantee of the protection of the honour and shame of the members of the family, especially the wife of the head of the family. Alongside with the role of the head of family, this breadwinner role was so decisive that, rather than creating a conflict for preventing the men to enter into intercourses with Natashas, the moral codes of Islam and the customs are used to socially legitimize their actions.

On the other hand, the possibility of unemployment is experienced amongst the masculinities in Trabzon as a significant anxiety, meaning losing the material grounds for performing the duties of masculinity, and losing their

autonomous actions. Under the impacts of neoliberalism, the risk of unemployment and uncertainty increases this anxiety. As noted above, the breadwinner role supported by the overarching Islamic and conservative family ideology enables the men and masculinities the position of an almost unquestionable head of family.

Fatherhood in the family is perceived as being a socializing and mostly distant authority over children. However, the respondents said they tried to establish closer relations with their children while mostly demanding obedience from them at the same time. At the same time, fatherhood is seen as the continuation of offspring (and in this manner the sexual potency) of the men. And many men stated they prioritized their sons to their daughters, in a patriarchal manner. Many (father) respondents told they could hardly experience warmer relations with their children despite they loved them. The expectancy of obedience and respect from the children, while presenting them a distant love presents a patriarchal fatherhood. In other words, fatherhood is seen as the highest degree of the realization of masculinity, men's power and supreme position in family, surrounded by traditions, customs and religious morality.

The contemporary masculinities in Trabzon experience family in terms of conservative and religious family ideology. Many respondents related family to state, nation, and religion. Moreover, their actions related to their families reflect the rightist tendencies of the masculinities in the city. The perception and the narratives of the experiences of family and the legitimation of women's and children's oppression are in terms of conservative discourses. The family is perceived as one of the most crucial grounds of ultimate realization, performances and construction of patriarchal, and rightist masculinities.

Trabzon has long been a rightist city, from the massive support to the right wing parties, to the conservative spirit and to the rightist uprisings that have been a national (and international) issue in the last decades. Despite the tremendous impressions of events such as murders of Priest Santoro and Hrant Dink by assassins from Trabzon, and the massive lynchings against the TAYAD members, these are just the tip of the iceberg and the rightist spirit is more widespread and more influential than the sensational events and uprisings.

The rightist politics in the city appear as the amalgamated expositions of nationalism, Islamism and conservatism. They flow from one to the other, changing shape, strength and direction. At the same time, those ideologies are quite patriarchal. They serve for the interests of the adult heterosexual men and masculinities. In Trabzon, rightist symbols are seen everywhere, from Islamic prayers, widespread Turkish flags, clothing and the common subordination and oppression of women to the popular slogan of Trabzonspor “everywhere is Trabzon for us”.

Rightism is patriarchal since it serves for the interests of the adult and heterosexual men. In this manner, it contributes the construction of the patriarchal masculinities. At the same time, it necessitates the patriarchal masculinities that reproduce the rightist values, practices and ideas.

The masculinities in Trabzon are quite nationalistic and micronationalist. The men emphasised that they prioritize their nation (Turkishness), their region (Eastern Black Sea Region), their city (Trabzon) to many other things; and often Trabzonspor is added to this list. On the other hand, many respondents emphasise the religious character of themselves and the city. They usually manifest their devotion to their customs. At the same time, as in the rightist incidents, there is a conspiratory anxiety of the interference of

the external forces to the city amongst the masculinities in the city. Many of the men in the city like to envision Trabzon as a totally Turkish city from eternity, free from the potentially-polluting existence of other ethnic groups, despite the current existence of religious and ethnic minorities and more significantly the Greek, Armenian, Laz, and Christian populations that were once the majority in the past of the city. The masculinities in Trabzon utilize those issues as sources of their identity which keeps them altogether, as a part of a larger imagined Turkish, Islamic and Eastern Black Sea community where they consider themselves as the hegemonic actors. The masculinities in the city perceive the ideas of those diverse rightist ideologies as inseparable and undifferentiable.

The Islamist character of the masculinities is reflected to their ideas on family, sexuality, child-rearing, football, spatiality, clothing and manners. Despite it is seen in many aspect of the masculinities, this Islamism is more a widespread and gas-like common sense ideology than a sturdy fundamentalism, since it is substantially adopted and transformed to other ideologies of rightism, as etatism, nationalism, traditionalism and conservatism. On the other hand, nationalism, which shapes much of the discourses on masculinities in Trabzon, is also spoken alongside with terms like Islamic religion, family, traditions, honour, shame, and Trabzon, Trabzonspor. At the same time, those are narrated in terms of preserving the original qualities of the city from potential threats of change in a conservative manner. In other words, the diverse sources of nationalist, Islamist, and conservative ideologies and common sense thought present an integrated picture, contributing the construction of masculinities, as if it was its inextricable part.

In relation to those, from their private spheres of home and family, to the male-controlled public sphere they make pressure on the other people, the

aliens and the (potential) enemies. These pressures are directed on the women, the Kurds, the non-Muslims, queer people, the leftists, the aliens and the students, in other words to the groups who experience discrepancy and/or conflict with the hegemonic elements of identity.

Rightist values and ideas like country, nation, religion and the customs of the city are commonly expressed as integrated with patriarchal constructs of women, family, honour, chastity and shame. Those are both the masculinities' sources of strength and issues that need protection for being under the risk of the attack from the other masculinities. In this perception, the men and the masculinities appear as the guardians and saviours. Accordingly, the common sense rightism provides the grounds for the performances of the patriarchal men's values such as the male bravado, aggression, solidarity, unrestrictedness, combat, pride, glory, and heroism. At the same time, the rightist ideologies are reactionary. They mobilize the people for political action, fights, and protests. The masculinities in Trabzon are constructed accordingly. The perceived threats against the values that rightist ideologies constantly emphasise result as the violent actions, such as the pressures, protests, lynchings, attacks, fights, and murders. The patriarchal codes of masculinity in the city legitimize the men's participation in violent rightist political actions as an indispensable part of their identities. As a result, rightism is embodied in the masculinities in Trabzon.

Alongside with the football fanaticism, these rightist actions are the public side of the men's patriarchal relations with Natashas and the women from Trabzon. Rightism and patriarchy overlap in football fanaticism. Football is considered as a men's game. It praises the patriarchal men's values such as strength, endurance, fight, conquest, aggression, competition, excitement, and heroism, which are quite similar to those of rightism. In this vein, the sociality around the football matches reproduces the rightist and

patriarchal masculinities. In the football matches, the fanatics and the players experience catharsis, forgetting the disturbing issues in a sense of collective ecstasy. The successes of Trabzonspor are considered as the successes of the masculinities of Trabzonspor.

The masculinities in Trabzon have a strong and widespread support for Trabzonspor. This football club that became six-times champion of Süper Lig in the late 1970's and early 1980's form one of the major sources of belonging, appropriation, pride and identity in the city. The successes of Trabzonspor as an outcome of the collaborative effort of the citizens made it as an organic part of the life in the city. The masculinities in the city narrate Trabzonspor as an indispensable part of their lives, as if they are speaking about their families. Many men personally recognize the footballers, technical staff and administrators of the club. Trabzonspor creates a true sense of homosocial male community in the city. Many men spend most their time speaking, watching and contemplating about football, and spaces concerning football, like stadiums, teahouses, or coffeehouses.

Many respondents emphasised that football was the only joy of men in the gloomy city. The masculinities have extensive information on both of those. In fact, in the conditions of unemployment and poverty in the last decades, alongside with sex trade with Natashas, it serves as the opium for the hopeless masses. This community is transferred to the rightist protests in the grandstands of Avni Aker Stadium, as in the massively worn white beret of Hrant Dink's assassin Ogün Samast, and the first anti-PKK protests of Turkey took place in the stadium. Football fanaticism serves as a uniting glue for rightism, and especially nationalism. Moreover, it serves as one of the vital grounds in which rightist ideologies are spread to the masses through the masculinities. This is especially evident in the current slogan of Trabzonspor fanatics "everywhere is Trabzon for us", that emphasises the

masculinities' construction of being a part of the community of Trabzon(spor) as a superior and hegemonic identity in Turkey, than a part of the larger whole.

From football fanaticism to the narratives of the experiences with the Natashas, from conservatism to the oppression on the women, from the invisibility of the queer people to the male headed families, from the male bravado to the nationalism, and from the expressiveness of emotions to the rightist uprisings, the pattern of the configuration of the construction of masculinities in Trabzon present a Islamist, nationalist, conservative and quite patriarchal picture. This contextual construction of masculinity, which is investigated in this thesis focusing on the case of the contemporary Trabzon, serves for the reproduction of rightist and patriarchal values. In this context, families serve as the grounds in which these masculinities are reconstructed and hence they exercise their patriarchal duties such as being the ultimate and autonomous head, being the breadwinner, continuation of their offspring, experiencing legitimized sexuality, fatherhood and socialization. On the other hand, the cathectic organization of masculinities socially, religiously, and morally legitimizes and the men's interactions with Natashas, not reprimanding the oppression, subordination, and exploitation of the women, and total exclusion of the queer people from Trabzon. In that background of the private sphere, the men control the economic, political, and public spheres, and express themselves in homosocial environments of football fanaticism, and male-dominated locales like coffeehouses. Despite the sample of this research is based on interviews with forty three men in the centre of Trabzon, this configuration reflects one of the contemporary reflections and experiences of the capitalist patriarchy, presenting significant clues to the constructions of diverse patriarchal masculinities of the Middle East, Black Sea, Southern

Caucasus, and the Eastern Mediterranean lands. Henceforth, challenging and broadening the constructionist, and performative as well as the structuralist debates in masculinity studies, this thesis presents information on the construction of masculinities focusing on the contemporary case of Trabzon, Turkey.

Further investigations of the construction of masculinities in other historical, social and cultural contexts and settings are necessary to broaden our understanding of the dynamics of patriarchal relations. Those studies are going to contribute the scholarship on masculinities by extending the debates on actual living men besides those on the representations of masculinities. Those studies will contribute to critically understand how diverse patriarchal relations are constructed and experienced in diverse locations than the metropolitan and western settings.

Concluding this thesis, I would like to emphasise a point. There are other masculinities and constructive dynamics that construct them in Trabzon than those that are investigated in terms of this thesis. However, this thesis aimed to critically discuss the common trajectories, common relations and recurrent themes that exist in the city, following the traditions of (pro)feminist scholarship in sociology.

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

TABLE OF RESPONDENTS

Name ¹	Age ²	Occupation ³	Education	Marital Status ⁴	Monthly Family Income ⁵	Type ⁶	Location
Kamil	40's	Minibus Driver	Primary School	m	500-1000	U	Minibus (His Work Place)
Kemal	50's	Independent accountant	University	m	1500-2000	U	His Own Office
Necat	20's	Sales representative at a shoe shop	Vocational School	s	500-1000	U	In Front Of The Forum Shopping Mall

¹The order of the respondents reflects the progress of the interviews. On the other hand, in order to keep the privacy of the respondents, all of the names and some of the actual occupations of the respondents are changed, unless the respondent allowed the researcher to use her/his real name or unless the respondent is a well-known person.

²As of 2010-2011.

³ see Footnote 1 and Footnote 2.

⁴m indicates a married person, s indicates a single person.

⁵In terms of Turkish Liras, as of 2010-2011. As of 1st February 2011, in the middle of the fieldwork, the currency rates was as follows: 1USD = 1,754TRY; 1TRY = 0.570USD. http://www.xe.com/ict/?basecur=USD&historical=true&month=2&day=1&year=2012&sort_by=name&image.x=38&image.y=7, Retrieved, 19th April 2012.

⁶ "U"s indicate the unstructured interviews, the "E"s indicate the expert interviews, "I"s indicate the in-depth interviews and the "S"s indicate short interviews.

Latif	61	Retired	Primary School	m	500-1000	I	Park At The Seaside
Sadri	50's	Municipal cleaning worker	Primary School	m	500-1000	U	Ataturk Park At The Public Square Of Trabzon
Ercan	40's	Teacher, Labour Unionist	University	m	1500-2000	U	KESK Trabzon Office
Cihangir	55	Lawyer	University	m	2000-3000	I	His Office At The Law Bureau That He Owns With His Partners
Levent	30	Lawyer	University	s	2000-3000	U	His Office At The Law Bureau That He Owns With His Partners
Bora	30	Clerk at a Jewelry shop	High School	s	1000-1500	I	Jewelry Shop That He Is Already Working At
Ertuğrul	60	Architect	University	m	2000-3000	I	Ganita Teagarden
Ayhan	60	High School Headmaster	University	m	2000-3000	I	Association Of The Inhabitants Of Of District
İsmet	20's	Furniture worker	Primary School	m	500-1000	I	Ataturk Park At The Public Square Of Trabzon
Miraç	60's	Watch seller, repairer and entrepreneur	High School	m	4000-6000	I	The Watch Seller And Repairer Store He Owned

Kaan	30's	Pharmacist	High School	s	1000-1500	U	Pharmacy He Worked
Halil İbrahim Dinçdağ	33	Former referee of the local soccer league and the first open gay football referee of Turkey, Halil İbrahim Dinçdağ, then unemployed.	High School	s	-	I	The Café Of Trabzon Culturehouse
Orhan	29	Police Officer	University	s	1500-2000	E	Café Of Chamber Of Architects
Murat	30	Middle-level employee in a nation-scale furniture shop	High School	s	500-1000	I	Furniture Shop (His Work Place)
Reha	70's	Journalist, Radio and Television Programmer	University	m	2000-3000	I	Association Of The Inhabitants Of District
Nurettin	40's	Herb and spice seller	Primary School	m	500-1000	I	Herb And Spice Shop (His Own Shop)
Fethi	34	Waiter	Secondary School Abandoned	m	500-1000 Variable Seasonally	I	Boztepe Teagarden (His Workplace)
Azmi	33	Furniture worker (low skilled worker)	Primary School	s	500-1000	U	Furniture Shop (The Store He Worked In)
Ziya	31	Furniture worker (low	Primary School	s	500-1000	I	Furniture Shop (The

		skilled worker)					Store He Worked In)
Osman	40's	Imam of a Mosque	University	m	1500-2000	E	Imam's Room At The Mosque He Works
Fahri	50's	Imam of the Mosque	University	m	1500-2000	E	Imam's Room At The Mosque He Works
Muhsin	30	Salesperson at a bookshop	High School	s	500-1000	U	Bookshop (His Work Place)
Refik	62	Fisherman	Primary School	m	500-1000	I	Fishermen's Shelter In Faroz
Korkut	38	Bookshop owner	University	m	2000-3000	I	Bookshop (His Own Shop)
Alpaslan	54	Entrepreneur	University	m	3000-4000	I	Coffeehouse
Alp	35	Freelancer	Imam Hatip High School	s	500-1000 Variable	I	Dere Café At Uzun Sokak
Turhan	63	Owner of a Café	Secondary School	m	2000-3000	I	Dere Café At Uzun Sokak (His Own Café)
Adil	50's	Retired (Former Shopkeeper)	University	m	1000-1500	I	Trabzon Office Of A Leftist Party
Celil	50's	Retired (Former Teacher)	University	m	1000-1500	I	Trabzon Office Of A Leftist Party
Sinan	30	Undergraduate Student at KTU, Electrical Engineering	Undergraduate Student	m	500-1000	I	The Café Of Trabzon Culturehouse

Mahir	26	Undergraduate Student at KTU, Physics	Undergraduate Student	s	500-1000	I	The Café Of Trabzon Culturehouse
Hakan	30	Lawyer of Trabzonspor	University	s	3000-4000	I	His Office At Trabzonspor Mehmet Ali Yılmaz Sports Campus
Arif	33	Independent Lawyer	University	s	3000-4000	E	His Law Office
Ahmet	60	Businessman, Member of Administrative Board of Trabzon Chamber of Industry and Commerce	University	m	4000-6000	I	His Office At Trabzon Chamber Of Industry And Commerce
Volkan	50	Businessman, Member of Administrative Board of Trabzon Chamber of Industry and Commerce	University	m	4000-6000	I	His Office At Trabzon Chamber Of Industry And Commerce
Galip	50	Assistant Mufti of Trabzon	University	m	2500-3000	I	His Office At Trabzon Bureau Of Mufti
Berke	32	Civil engineer	University	s	2000-2500	U	Terrace Of Forum Shopping Mall
Yılmaz	60	Retired Worker and Farmer	Primary School	m	500-1000	U	At A Bench At Kunduracılar Sokak Which The Unemployed

							And Lazy Men Sit
Yavuz	55	Tradesman and politician	University	m	4000-6000	I	Trabzon Office Of A Left-Wing Party
Dursun	57	Hotel owner and former tradesman	University	m	4000-6000	I	One Of The "Clean Family Hotels" In Çömlekçi Neighbourhood

APPENDIX B

INTERVIEW GUIDELINE

1. Class and status

- How old are you?
- Where were you born?
- Where are you from?
- What is your level of education?
- What is your occupation?
- Is this your own job?
 - (If yes) How many employees do you employ?
- What is your position in your job?
- In which way do you earn income from your job?
- What is your marital status?
 - If married...
 - Do you have children?
 - How many boys and how many daughters do you have?
 - With whom do you live in your household?
- Does your wife work?
 - (If yes) Where?
 - What is the position of her in her job?
- Where do you spend your holidays?
- Which things can be considered as luxurious consumption?
 - How often do you do these things?

2. Identity

- Which one of those is more significant for you? Being a Turkish, being a Muslim, being a man of Trabzon (Trabzonlu), or being of Eastern Black Sea Region (Karadenizli)?

3. Masculinity and gender

- Are the women and the men equal in your opinion?
 - Why?
- What does the society thinks about “being a man” in your opinion?
- What should it be done and not done- to be a socially accepted man in the society according to you?
 - Do you think you are accomplishing those?
- Do the men change according to you?
 - (If yes) What kind of a change is that? Positive? Negative? What is the direction of this change?
 - Why do the men change according to you?
- What makes a man a “real man” according to the society?
 - Do you accept these?
- How much do you perform the necessities of society to be a man?
- How should be the outlook of a “real man” according to you?
- What is the most valuable thing in a man’s life?
- What is the best thing that can happen to a man according to you?
- What is the worst thing that can happen to a man according to you?
- What are the social advantages and disadvantages of being a man according to you?
- How did the place where you were born affect your understanding of masculinity?
- How do your religious beliefs affect your understanding of masculinity?

4. Trabzonspor

- What does Trabzonspor mean to you?
- What do you feel when Trabzonspor rises to higher ranks or falls to the lower ranks in Süper Lig?

5. Natashas

- What do you think about the Natashas?
- How did Natashas affect Trabzon since the 1990's?
- How did Natashas affect the men?
- How did Natashas affect the families in Trabzon?
- Did you go to Natashas?
 - (If yes) What did you experience with them?

6. Local and regional diversities

- Is there a thing that can be called “Trabzon erkeği” (man of Trabzon) according to you?
 - (If Yes) Would you please define Trabzon erkeği.
- Is Trabzon erkeği different than the men of other places according to you?
 - (If yes) What are those differences?
- Is the “Karadeniz erkeği” (man of Black Sea Region) different than the men of other places according to you?
 - (If yes) What are those differences?
- Is there any differences between the Trabzon erkeği and Karadeniz erkeği according to you?
 - (If yes) What are those differences?

7. The life cycle of the men

- What are the turning points of a man's life according to you?
- What did circumcision change in your life?
- What did starting to earn money change in your life?
- What did the military service change in your life?
- (If married) What did marriage change your life?
- (If he has children) What did becoming a father change in your life?

8. The impact of wealth

- What is the significance of earning money for a man according to you?
- How does wealth affect a man according to you?
- How does unemployment affect a man according to you?

9. Family

- What is the place of his family in a man's life according to you?
- What are the responsibilities of a man to his family according to you?
- Who makes the final decision in your family?
- How are your relations with your parents?
 - What do they expect from you?
 - (If he has children) What do you expect from your children?

10. Fatherhood

- What does fatherhood mean for you?
- Are there any differences between your father's attitudes to you and your attitudes to your children?
- What kind of a person do you teach your children to become?

11. Domestic division of labour

- What is domestic labour for you?
- Who does the housework at your home?

- What are the domestic duties of a man?
 - How many of them do you do?
- Who did the housework in the home you were grown up?
- Who cares for the children in your home?

12. The emotional relations of men with their partners

- What do you share with your wife?
- What are the issues that create problems in marriage according to you?
- What do you do when you experience problems with your wife?
- Why do the men beat their wives?
- Have you ever beaten your wife?
 - (If yes) Why?

13. Men's friendships

- With whom do you befriend with? The men or the women?
- What is men's talk according to you?
 - What do men talk in terms of men's talk?
 - Do you engage in men's talk?
- What are the differences of men's talk with speaking with women?
 - What are the things you share with the men and you cannot share with the women?
 - What are the things you share with the women and you cannot share with the men?
- What do you do in your free time?

14. Speaking about sexuality

- What do you speak about sexuality with the men?
- What do you speak about sexuality with the women?

15. Expressing emotions

- Do the men express their emotions freely according to you?
- Do you express your emotions freely?
- Do you express any difficulties when expressing your emotions?
- How should a man express his emotions according to you?
- In which circumstances do you cry?
- How do you express your happiness? What do you do?
- How do you express your sadness? What do you do?
- How do you express your anger? What do you do?
- How do you express your hopelessness? What do you do?
- How do you express your love to your spouse? What do you do?
- How do you express your love to your spouse? What do you do?

16. Queer

- What do you think about the homosexuals?

APPENDIX C

CURRICULUM VITAE

PERSONAL INFORMATION

Surname, Name: Bozok, Mehmet

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EDUCATION

2005-2013 PhD, Sociology Department, METU. Thesis title: *Constructing Local Masculinities: A Case Study From Trabzon, Turkey.*

Summer School, 27th June 2011 – 8th July 2011 “The Politics of Ethnicity, Nationality and Citizenship”, Summer University, Central European University, Budapest, Hungary.

2002-2005 MA, Anthropology Department, Hacettepe University. Thesis title: *Erkeklik Kimliğinin Sosyokültürel İnşası: Ankara Tepecik Mahallesi Örneği.*

1997-2002 BA, Philosophy Department, Hacettepe University.

1990-1997 Beşiktaş Atatürk Anadolu Lisesi.

AWARDS

2011 Education Award, CEU Summer University, Central European University, Budapest, Hungary.

2011 Travel Award, CEU Summer University Open Society Institution, İstanbul, Turkey. (http://www.aciktoplumvakfi.org.tr/ebulten_2011-1.php)

WORK EXPERIENCE

2010 – Present Research Assistant, Sociology Department, Artvin Çoruh University, Artvin, Turkey.

ACADEMIC INTERESTS

Men and Masculinities; Gender; Feminism; Sociology of Borders; Ethnicity and Nationalism; Sociology of Sports; Social and Cultural Anthropology.

PUBLICATIONS

Book

2011 *Soru ve Cevaplarla Erkeklikler*. SOGEP: İstanbul.

2011 *Masculinities: Questions and Answers*. (Trans. P. Karababa)
SOGEP: İstanbul.

Translation

2002 *Marksizm ve Antropoloji*. Maurice Bloch, Ankara: Ütopya Yayınevi.

Articles

2013 “Eleştiren İle Eleştirilenler Arasında Nazik Karşılaşmalar:
(Pro)Feminist Bir Yaklaşımla Trabzon’da Erkeklikleri İncelemek”.
Manuscript submitted for publication.

2012 “Yoksullaşma, Sağcılık, Trabzonspor Taraftarlığı Ve Nataşaların
Gölgesinde Trabzon Erkekliği”. In, Biryol, U. (Ed.) *Karardı Karadeniz*,
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2011 “Erkeklik İncelemeleri Alanındaki Başlıca Kuram ve Yaklaşımların
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Other Publications

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- 2008 “Batsın Bu Dünya’dan ‘İhtiyacım Var’a: Türkiye’de Toplumsal Değişim ve Arabesk Müzik.” *ODTÜ Haber*, <http://www.odtuhaber.com/ReadArticle.aspx?ID=35> (13.5.2008).
- 2007 “Ataerkillik ve Kapitalizm Karşısında Eşcinsellik, Travestilik ve Transseksüellik.” *Kaos GL*, 32.

PRESENTATIONS

International

- 1-4 Ağustos 2012 (with Nihan Bozok) “Pharmaceuticalization Of Society Through The Popular Healthy Life Discourse: The Case Of Turkey”. The Second ISA Forum Of Sociology: Social Justice And Democratization. Buenos Aires, Argentina.
- 17-19 Mayıs 2012 (with Nihan Bozok) “Endless Bargains On Belonging ‘This Side’ or ‘Other Side’: The Case of Georgian - Turkish Border in

Hopa". Crossing Borders: History, Dialogue Of Languages And Culture 5th International Scientific Conference On The Border Of The EU In Narva, Tartu University, Estonia.

13-16 Ekim 2009 "Erkekliđi Sorunsallařtırmanın Feminizm iin Kuramsal nemine İliřkin Bir Deđini." International Multidisciplinary Women's Congress, Dokuz Eyll niversitesi, İzmir.

National

15-16 Kasım 2012 "İrazca'dan Uluguş'a Fakir Baykurt'un Erkek Egemen Dzene Direnen Kadınları". Kltr ve Edebiyatta Cinsiyet, Cinsellik, řiddet Sempozyumu". EKAM, Ege niversitesi, İzmir.

14-16 Aralık 2011 "Dođu Karadeniz'de "Natařa" Tahayyl Aracılıđıyla řekillenen Ataerkil Kurgular" TSBD 12. Ulusal Sosyal Bilimler Kongresi, ODT, Ankara.

9-11 Aralık 2009 "Kırda Erkek Egemenliđini Anlamak İin Feminist Bir Perspektifle Erkekleri İncelemek: Kırsal Erkeklik İncelemelerine Eleřtirel Bir Bakıř." TSBD 11. Ulusal Sosyal Bilimler Kongresi, ODT, Ankara.

1-3 Ekim 2009 "Erkeklik İncelemeleri Alanındaki Bařlıca Kuram ve Yaklařımların Sosyalist Feminist Bir Eleřtirisine Dođru." 6. Ulusal Sosyoloji Kongresi, Adnan Menderes niversitesi, Didim, Aydın.

APPENDIX D

TÜRKÇE ÖZET

GİRİŞ

Erkekliklerin Yereldeki İnşası: Trabzon, Türkiye Örneği adlı bu tez, Trabzon'da erkekliklerin bağlamsal sosyal inşasını (pro)feminist bir yaklaşım ile ele alıyor. Türkiye'de güçlü bir ataerkillikle şekillenen "erkeklik" söz konusu olduğunda son yıllarda ilk akla gelen, ilk dile getirilen yerlerden biri olarak öne çıkıyor Trabzon. Ataerkilliği üzerinde uzlaşılan bir "Trabzon erkeklığı" imgesi, Doğu Karadenizlilerin yanı sıra Trabzon hakkında kulak dolgunluğu olan birçok kimse tarafından son yıllarda yaygın bir biçimde ifade ediliyor ve Trabzon son derece ataerkil bir şehir olarak görülmekte ve ataerkil nitelikleriyle öne çıkmakta. Aynı zamanda bu kent son iki on yılda erkeklerin Nataşalar ile yaşadıkları deneyimler, sağcılığın yükselişi, Hrant Dink ve Rahip Santoro cinayetleri, linç girişimleri, Trabzonspor fanatizmi, ve hinterlandını kaybetmenin sonucunda yaşamakta olduğu yoksullaşma gibi olaylarla ulusal ve uluslararası ölçeklerde gündeme geldi.

Öte yandan Trabzon, bu olayların bizatihi aktörleri olan Trabzon'lu erkeklerin yanı sıra kent hakkında malumatı olanlarca dile getirilen bir "Trabzon erkeği" imgesi ile birlikte anılıyor. Trabzon'lu erkekler sıklıkla kendilerini ataerkil ve sağcı nitelikleriyle tanımlıyorlar. Bu "Trabzon erkeği" söylemi –buna tanık olan ve deneyimleyen öteki toplumsal aktörlerin yanı sıra- hem bizzat Trabzon'lu erkek failer tarafından yeniden üretiliyor, hem de sözkonusu failerin erkeklığe dair deneyimlerini ve algılarını

şekillendiriyor. Trabzonlular, “Trabzonlu olmak” ve “Trabzonspor’un” ardından en çok “Trabzon erkeğinden” gurur duyuyor. Birçok Trabzon erkeği tarafından bir yandan şehrin halkının milliyetçi, muhafazakar, dindar ve ailesine bağlı özellikleri ön plana çıkarılırken, diğer taraftan da müstehzi bir biçimde Nataşaların yer aldığı hikayelerde gururla anlatılan bir “Trabzon erkeklığı” anlatısı dile getiriliyor. Peki, bu ilk anda çelişkiler yumağıymış gibi gözükten durumdan nasıl bir erkeklik çıkıyor ve kentte deneyimlenen bu erkeklığı inşa eden etmenler neler?

Bu tez, Trabzonlu erkekliklerin özgül dışavurumları ve deneyimlenme biçimlerinin ve Trabzon’un bir erkek şehir olarak kurulmasının ardında birbiriyle ilişkili son iki on yılda oldukça etkili olan özellikle etkili olduğu üç temel etmenin bulunduğunu savunuyor ve bunları kentte 2010 Ağustos ile 2011 Ekim ayları arasında kent merkezinde rasgele örneklem yolu ile ulaşılan 43 erkek ile yarı yapılandırılmış sorular sorulan yüz yüze görüşmeler yapıldığı niteliksel bir alan araştırması aracılığıyla ve profeminist bir yaklaşımla ele alıyor.

Bunların ilki, Trabzon’daki erkeklerin duygusal ve cinsel yaşamlarını şekillendiren *katektik* örgütlenmeleri. Bu *kateksis*, kentteki erkeklerin sıklıkla kullanmayı sevdikleri ve üzerinde ortaklaştıkları “Trabzon erkeklığı”ne dair üzerinde ortaklaşılan klişe bir özellikler kümesi, duygusal dışadönüklük, eski SSCB ve Doğu Bloku’ndan gelen hayat kadınları Nataşalar ile Gürcistan-Türkiye sınırın açıldığı 1989’dan 2000’lerin ortalarına değin uzanan süreçte yaşananlara dair anlatılar, Trabzon’lu kadınların maruz kaldıkları baskı ve ikincilleştirilme deneyimleri ile queer¹ bireylerin kentteki

¹ “Queer” kavramını heteronormatif olmayan tüm cinsel yönelimleri kapsayacak şekilde kullanıyorum.

total dışlanmaları çevresinde şekilleniyor. Bu kateksis, kentte ataerkil ve muhafazakar erkekliklerin inşasına katkıda bulunuyor.

İkincisi, erkeklerin *aileleri ve eviçi yaşamları*. Özerk ve ataerkil nitelikleriyle Trabzon'lu erkekler, aile içindeki sorgulanamaz ve kadiri mutlak nitelikleriyle öne çıkıyorlar. Geçmişten günümüze Trabzon'da atom-benzeri kendine yeten bir birim olagelen aile, erkekler için ataerkil iktidarlarının kaynağı olan, biyolojik ve toplumsal yeniden üretimlerini gerçekleştirdikleri, meşru yollardan cinselliği yaşadıkları bir alan. Trabzon özelinde bu alan, evin geçimini münhasıran erkeklerin sağlamaları, ailenin reisi ve koruyucusu olarak öne çıkmaları çerçevesinde deneyimleniyor.

Üçüncüsü, ise kentte uzun süredir hakim olagelen *sağ siyasetler ve futbol fanatizmi*. Trabzon'da en çok Trabzon'lu olmak ve Trabzonspor'dan gurur duyuluyor. Bu iki noktada, gerilimleri ifade etme tarzları hızla, kolayca birbirine aktarılabilen (mikro)milliyetçilik ve Trabzonspor (futbol) taraftarlığı bulunuyor. Gerilimler bazen stadyumlarda, bazen de 2000'lerin başlarından günümüze uzanan süreçte yükselişe geçen, ve şehirde yaşayanların birçoğunun kol kırılır yen içinde kalır yaklaşımıyla "münferit vakalar" olarak değerlendirme eğiliminde olduğu, sağ² kalkışmalar aracılığıyla dışa vuruluyor. Stadyumlarda da sağ kalkışmalarda da asli aktörler erkekler (Bozok, 2012). Ancak sağcılığın dışavurumları Trabzon'da sadece futbol fanatizmi ve sağ kalkışmalarda değil, ailede, giyim kuşamda, kadına ve queer bireylere yönelik tutumlarda, çocuk yetiştirme pratiklerinde, seçmenlerin 20. Yüzyıl boyunca fazla değişiklik göstermeden süregiden siyasal tercihlerinde... kısacası yaşamın her alanında karşımıza çıkıyor.

² Trabzon'da son dönemdeki milliyetçi, muhafazakar ve İslamcı motivasyonlara dayanan olayları, şehirde bu üç yaklaşımın kaygan bir biçimde birbirinin yerini alabilmesi ve aralarında keskin ve kalıcı sınırlar olmaması nedeniyle, Bora'nın (2009) izinden giderek genel olarak "sağ" olarak değerlendirmeyi tercih ediyorum.

Hem sađcılık, hem futbol, hem de futbol fanatizmi, ataerkilliđi ve ataerkil erkeklik kodlarını yceltiyor ve sylemsel dzlemde bunlardan yararlanarak etkin oluyor. Bu  alan da kapitalist ataerkilliđin belirlediđi erkeklik kodlarıyla iřliyor ve Trabzonlu erkeklikleri řekillendiriyor. Tam da bu noktada Trabzonlu erkeklikleri anlamaya alıřırken yolumuz “erkeklik incelemeleri” alanıyla kesiřmekte.

TEORİ VE METODOLOJİ

Sosyal bilimler dahilinde, “erkeklik” ile ilgili konular, 1980’lerin bařlarından bu yana, ađırlıklı olarak, (pro)feminist bir alan olarak geliřen “erkeklik incelemeleri” dahilinde tartıřıldı. Erkeklik incelemeleri “erkekliđi” evrensel ve tarih tesi bir olgu deđil, belirli tarihsel ve toplumsal kořulların rn olarak deđerlendirme eđiliminde. Bu alan, kendisinden nceki toplumsal cinsiyet alıřmaları, feminist alıřmalar ve queer alıřmaların erkekler ve erkekliđi ayrı bařına bir kuramsal mesele olarak sorunsallařtırmayı ve incelemeyi ihmal ettiđini vurgulamakta. Erkekliđe antropolojinin penceresinden bakan Gutmann’ın ifade ettiđi zere, “yakın zamana kadar antropoloji hep erkeklere erkekler hakkında konuřan erkekler barındırdı; fakat “insan biliminde” pek az kiři erkekleri erkekler olarak inceledi” (1997, s. 385). Gutmann’ın antropoloji hakkındaki bu sznn sosyal bilimlerin tamamına genellenebileceđi kanısındayım. Bu nedenle, ataerkilliđi failleri tarafından inřa eden srelere, ataerkilliđi inřa eden faillere ve ondan ıkar sađlayan znelere ve sz konusu znelerin deneyimlerinin, diđer bir deyiřle bunların kesiřim noktasında yer alan erkekler ve erkekliklerin eleřtirel bir bakıř aısıyla incelenmesi gerektiđini savunuyor.

Ağırlıklı olarak (pro)feminist³ bir patikadan ilerleyerek gelişen erkeklik incelemeleri⁴, erkekleri ataerkilliğin asli faileri olarak değerlendirerek, erkekliklerin eleştirisini yapmaya girişti (Bozok, 2009). Son üç onyılda hızla gelişen erkeklik incelemeleri dahilinde, erkeklik üzerine birçok ayrıntılı ampirik çalışma yapıldı ve bu görece yeni alanda kuramlar geliştirilmeye çalışıldı. Başlangıcından günümüze, Connell'in ortaya atmış olduğu "erkeklikler" üzerine kuramsal fikirleri, gerek alan dahilinde, gerekse de birçok feminist çalışmada erkeklik üzerine çalışmalara damgasını vurmuştur.

Connell toplumsal cinsiyet ilişkilerinin durumunu şekillendiren "toplumsal cinsiyet rejimleri" bulunduğu fikrini ortaya atar (1999, s. 166). "Toplumsal cinsiyet rejimi", belirli tarihsel koşulların ürünü olan erkek egemen iktidar örüntüleridir (age., s. 140). Toplumsal cinsiyet rejimleri zamansal, mekansal ve kültürel farklılaşma gösterirler. Erkek egemenliği, farklı toplumsal cinsiyet rejimlerinde farklı stratejiler aracılığıyla inşa edilir. Farklılaşan bu stratejiler, hem ataerkilliğin farklı deneyimlenme biçimlerini, hem de Connell'in evrensel ve değişmez olmadığına vurgu yaptığı farklı erkeklik tiplerini, diğer bir deyişle "erkeklikleri" doğurur. "Erkeklikler" fikri, erkek egemenliğinin farklı toplumsal cinsiyet rejimlerinde, farklı şekillerde, toplumsal cinsiyet ilişkilerine dair farklı konfigürasyonlar aracılığıyla kurulduğunu vurgulamaktadır⁵.

³ Erkeklerin feminizm dahilindeki konumları, ayrı başına bir tartışmanın konusu. Çoğu zaman yaptığım gibi, burada da bu polemiki es geçerek, erkeklerin hem feminist, hem de profeminist (feminizmin destekçisi) olabileceklerini savunan "(pro)feminist" kavramını tercih ediyorum. Bu konuyla ilgili daha ayrıntılı tartışmalar için bkz. Digby, 1998; Gardiner 2002; Murphy, 2004.

⁴ Erkeklik incelemeleri (masculinity studies) alanı, ataerkillikle mücadelede kendini feminist çalışmalar ve queer çalışmaların müttefiki olarak kurmaktadır.

⁵ Buradaki "ler" eki erkekliğin tek biçimli olmadığı hususuna ve erkeklik hallerinin çoğul inşa ve temsil edilme biçimlerine vurgu yapmaktadır.

Connell ve izleyicilerinin kuram ve alıřmaları, erkeklikleri anlamak iin olduka nemli kuramsal ipuları sunsalar bile, erkeklikleri ağırlıklı olarak kentli ve batılı baėlamlarda ve oėu zaman da erkekliklerin temsillerine odaklanarak incelediler. Buna karřılık olarak, sosyal ve kltrel antropoloji alanındaki alıřmalar bir kenara bırakılacak olunursa, yerel ve blgesel dzlemlerde, ataerkilliėi bizzat kuran, fiilen deneyimleyen ve ondan pay alan erkekler ve erkekliklerin incelemeleri sosyal bilimlerde olduka yetersiz bir biimde alıřıldı. Bu tez, erkekler ve erkekliklerin yerel baėlamlardaki inřasını Trabzon kentinin gnmzdeki toplumsal, kltrel ve tarihsel dinamiklerine odaklanarak ele almakta.

Ataerkil toplumsal cinsiyet iliřkilerini anlamak iin, erkekliklerin yereldeki toplumsal cinsiyet rejimlerinde farklı baėlamsal konfigrasyonlar aracılıėıyla nasıl (yeniden) inřa edildiėine bakmak gerekir. Bu baėlamda toplumsal cinsiyet iliřkilerini inřa eden yereldeki konfigrasyonları dikkate alarak “Trabzon erkekliėine” bakmak, bir yandan gnmzdeki Trabzon’u anlamak, te yandan da genel olarak erkeklikleri anlamak iin nemli bir anahtar sunuyor. Trabzonlu erkeklikler, bir yandan lkedeki bařka erkekliklerle kesiřiyor, diėer yandan da kendi zgl kltrel ve toplumsal zellikleri nedeniyle farklılařıyor. Bu erkekliėin, bir taraftan Trkiye, Karadeniz evresindeki lkeler, Gney Kafkasya, Doėu Akdeniz ve Ortadoėu’daki erkekliklerle ortaklařan yanları var. Ekonomiyi, sporu, siyaseti, cinselliėi, aileyi, evi, kamusal alanı ve sokakları iine alarak kendilerini kuran Trabzonlu erkeklikleri Trabzon řehrini de erkek bir řehir olarak sunuyor⁶.

⁶ nk erkekliėin kurulma, anlatılma ve temsil biimleri hayatın ve řehrin tm alanlarını kendi hizmetinde gryor. Erkekliėi kurmada devreye giren bu istilacı dil, řehrin temsilini ve sunumunu da kaınılmaz olarak erkekleřtiriyor.

Bu tezde Trabzonlu erkekliklerin inşa süreci ele alınırken, ilk olarak Trabzon'lu erkeklerin duygusal ve cinsel yaşantıları, kentte erkeklığe dair klişe anlatılar, erkeklerin duygusal deneyimleri ve dışavurumları, Nataşalarla ilişkiler ve queer bireylerin kentte maruz kaldıkları dışlanma, diğer bir deyişle *kateksis* ele alınıyor. İkinci olarak erkeklerin aile içindeki konumları, aile reisliği, evin geçimini sağlama ve babalığa odaklanılarak ele alınıyor. Son olarak da, İslamcılık, milliyetçilik ve Trabzonspor futbol fanatizminin erkeklikle ilişkisi ele alınıyor. Kentin yakın tarihinde erkeklikleri inşa eden bu üç toplumsal dinamik, bir yandan günümüzdeki Trabzonlu erkeklikleri kurarken, öte yandan da Trabzon'daki ataerkil örüntüleri şekillendirdi. Birbiriyle kesişen ve birbirini etkileyen bu etmenlerin Trabzonlu erkeklikler üzerindeki etkisini anlamaya çalışmanın, Trabzon'u da anlamaya katkı sağlayacağı inancındayım.

Bu tezde Trabzonlu erkekliklerin inşası incelenirken feminist bir metodolojiden yararlanılarak kent merkezinde yüz yüze nitel görüşmeler yapıldığı bir alan araştırması gerçekleştirildi. Bu amaçla 2010 Ağustosunu ile 2011 Ekim ayları arasında kent merkezinde 43 erkekle yüz yüze görüşmeler yapıldı. Bu çalışmada feminist metodolojiden yararlanıldı. Fakat burada alan çalışması bakımından bir farklılık yaşandı. Genellikle feminist metodolojide alan araştırmaları, ataerkillik nedeniyle baskı ve ikincilleştirilmeye maruz kalan kadınların güçlenme, özgürleşme ya da kurtuluşuna katkıda bulunmayı amaçlayan feminist kadın araştırmacılar tarafından gerçekleştirilir.

Trabzon'daki alan çalışmamda, hem incelediğim konunun erkekler olması, hem de benim profeminist bir erkek araştırmacı olmam nedeniyle bu denklem daha farklı dinamikler üzerine kuruldu. Alanda karşılaştığım ataerkil erkekler, gerek yerli kadınlar, gerek yabancı seks işçileri ve gerekse de kentte son derece görünmez olmaya itilen queer bireylerin uğradıkları

korkunç baskı ve ikincilleştirilmelerin asli failiydi ve deđiřmeye gönülsüzdüler. Buna karşılık ben alana Trabzon'daki ataerkil erkekliklerin eleřtirisini yapmak için çıkmıřtım. Bu karşılařmalar, feminist metodolojide genelde alışık olunmayan sonuçlar doğurdu. Feminist kadın arařtırmacılar görüşmecileriyle duygudařlık bađı kurup, onların "tarafında" yer alabilirlerken, bense onaylamadıđım ataerkil davranıř ve fikirleri dinleyip görüşmecilerin "karřı" tarafında durdum. Mülakat yaptıđım erkekler karřılarında kendileri gibi erkek olan birinin, hayatlarının temelini oluřturan ve fakat bir arařtırmacı tarafından arařtırma konusu edilebileceđine çođu zaman inanamadıkları erkek olmaya dair sorduđu soruları yanıtlarken, ben ise onların doğallařtırarak anlattıkları baskı ve řiddet hikayelerini dinledim. Bu bakımdan bu çalıřma, feminist kadın arařtırmacı(lar)ın kadınları incelediđi anaakım feminist alan arařtırmalarını, erkek bir arařtırmacının erkekleri (pro)feminist bir yaklařımla ile incelemesi nedeniyle feminist metodolojiyi erkekleri de kapsayacak řekilde geliřtirme yönünde bir katkı sađlamakta.

KATEKSİS: TRABZONLU ERKEKLERİN DUYGUSAL VE CİNSEL YAŐAMLARI

"Trabzon erkeklidi" imgesine iliřkin "Trabzon erkeđini diđer yerlerin erkeđinden ayıran nedir" sorusu sorulunca, görüşülenler, "heyecanlı", "yerinde duramayan", kıpır kıpır", "agresif", "çabuk parlayan ve çabuk sönen", "yaptıđı iřin sonuçlarını düşünmeden hareket eden", "sıcakkanlı", "konuřkan, duygularını anında ortaya koymaktan çekinmeyen", "giyim-kuřamına düşkün", "bakımlı", "silah kullanmaya ve silah tařımaya çok meraklı", "ailesine çok deđer veren", "cinselliđine düşkün", "Trabzonspor fanatidi", "vatanına-milletine ařırı düşkün", "dinine bađlı" gibi bir kliře

özellikler listesini ortak bir biçimde dile getirmekteler. Trabzonlu erkekliklerin özelliklerine ilişkin bu özelliklerin kümesinin görüşülenlerin ataerkilliğini ele veren önemli unsurlardan biridir. Bunlar, görüşülen Trabzonlu erkeklerin birçoğunun ifade ettiği üzere eşsiz ve benzersiz olmaktan ziyade kimlik inşasına yarayan bir özellikler kümesi var. Bu özellikler manzumesi, bir yandan Trabzonlu erkeklerin ataerkil tutum ve eylemlerini meşrulaştırırken, diğer taraftan da kentin erkeklerini bir hayali cemaat çevresinde bir araya getiren, üzerinde ortaklaşılan bir kimlik inşasına katkıda bulunuyor.

Buna paralel bir biçimde birçok Trabzonlu erkek öncelikle kendilerini duygularını ifade eden aktörler olarak kuruyor. Görüşülen birçok erkek neşe, sevinç, üzüntü, coşku, öfke gibi duygularını ifade edebildiklerini, ve hatta ağlayabildiklerini belirttiler. Birbirini tamamlayan “agresiflik” ve “çabuk parlama” hali, Trabzon’daki erkekliğin özelliklerinden biri. Ancak bu duyguları ifade edebilirlik, çoğunlukla kadınlar değil, ağırlıklı olarak diğer erkekler ile birlikteyken, ve daha da önemlisi ataerkil erkeklik kodları dahilinde gerçekleşiyor. Trabzonlu erkekler, dışadönük ve agresif bir ataerkilliğin failleri. Bu dışadönüklük hali, erkeklik kodları dahilinde duyguların anında dışa vurulmasına yol açıyor. Bu durum, erkeklerin kırgan ve/ya zayıf aktörler olarak kendilerini inşa etmelerine, ya da batıdaki anlamıyla bir erkeklik krizine değil, bilakis ataerkil erkeklik kodlarını kuvvetlendirmeye ve pekiştirmeye katkıda bulunuyor. İşte bu erkekler, son iki on yılda görüldüğü üzere, sağ eylemliliklerde yer alıyor, nevi şahsına münhasırlık iddiasıyla ailede ve kamusal alanda şiddet eylemlerinde bulunuyor, bir yandan muhafazakar bir vurguyla aileye bağlılığı öne çıkarırken öte yandan da Nataşalarla deneyimlerini ataerkil erkekliklerin zafer anlatıları olarak aktarıyorlar.

Eski SSCB ve Doğu Bloku kökenli seks işçileri Nataşalar⁷ ve onların çevresinde gerçekleşen seks ticareti, Hughes'un da işaret ettiği üzere en yoğun sömürünün gerçekleştiği alanlardan biri (2000, s. 625). Son yirmi yılda Trabzonlu erkeklerin cinselliğe ilişkin deneyimlerinde ve daha da önemlisi bugün cinselliklerini nasıl kurduklarında, Nataşalar ve onlara ilişkin anlatıların önemli bir yeri bulunuyor. Günümüzün Trabzonlu erkekliklerinin duygusal ve cinsel tahayyüllerini oluşturan yakın tarihteki en kritik momentlerden biri, Nataşalarla yaşananlar ve bunlara ilişkin günümüzdeki anlatılar (Bozok, 2012).

Türkiye-Gürcistan sınırınının 1989'daki açılışından, sınırlı bir bölgeye itilerek –tamamen ortadan kalkmasa da- polisiye ve adli önlemler sonucu görünürlüğünün azalmaya başladığı 2007-2008'e⁸ değin en hareketli dönemini yaşayan süreçte Trabzon'da Nataşalarla yaşananlar şehrin toplumsallığında önemli bir yer kapladı⁹. Nataşaların etkisini, Trabzon erkeğinin yabancı seks işçileri ile birlikte olmasıyla –diğer bir deyişle erkeklerin basit bir biçimde fuhşa yönelmesiyle- sınırlandırmamak gerekir. Trabzon'da toplumsal cinsiyet ilişkilerinde izleri bugün de hissedilen kayda değer bir sarsılma yaşanmıştır. Bu etkiler görüşülenlerin ortak bir biçimde vurguladıkları üzere “yuvasının yıkılmasını istemeyen”, daha doğrusu erkeklerin ataerkil taleplerinin yarattığı baskının mağduru olan Trabzon kadınının güzellik salonlarına akın ederek, saçlarını sarıya boyatma, abartılı makyaj yapma ve “onlar gibi” giyinmeye çalışarak Nataşalara benzemeye

⁷ Gülçür ve İlkaracan, “Nataşa” adlandırmasının benzer bir anlamda İsrail, Britanya ve ABD'de de yaygın olarak kullanıldığını belirtmektedirler (2002, s. 414).

⁸ Bu tarihler net ve kesin olmayan bir biçimde anlatılıyor. Kimi Trabzonlular Nataşaların 2005 gibi ve bazıları da 2007-2008'de polisiye önlemler ve baskılarla tamamen ortadan kalktıklarını söylüyor.

⁹ Hatta yerel ölçekte kalmayıp, ülke basınında da geleneksel ve ataerkil görülen Trabzon erkeğine ilişkin onaylar ve müstehzi ifadelerle yer buldu.

çalışmasından, artan boşanmalara¹⁰, bu dönemde şehirde, yabancı seks işçileriyle buluşulabilecek mekanlar olan oteller, restoranlar ve eğlence mekanlarının sayısının artmasına ve bunlara karşı alınan önlemlere değin geniş bir yelpazede yer alıyor. Tüm bunlar, şehrin mekansal örgütlenmesinin değışmesine, ailelerin sarsılmasına, cinselliğe olan bakışı sorgulanmasına, kentteki iktisadi ilişkilerin etkilenmesine ve daha da önemlisi yabancı seks işçileri ve Trabzon kadınının üzerindeki ataerkil kapitalist sömürünün pekişmesine yol açtı (Bozok, 2012).

SSCB'nin yıkılışının ardından 1989'da Türkiye-Gürcistan sınırının açılması, eski Sovyet ülkeleri ve Doğu Bloku ülkelerindeki yoksul insanların ticaret yapmak için Türkiye'ye gelmeye başlamasına yol açmıştı. Doğu Karadeniz'deki yerleşimlerde önceleri çoğunlukla "bavul ticareti" olarak anılan ve kayıt dışı ticaret şeklinde başlayan bu süreç, kısa süre sonra farklılaştı. Kendi bedeninden başka satacak bir şeyi olmayan bu ülkelerin yurttaşı yoksul kadınların seks ticaretine gönülsüz bir biçimde ve çoğu zaman zor kullanılarak yöneldiler. Eski Sovyet ve Doğu Bloku kökenli seks işçileri Nataşa olarak damgalanarak kimliksizleştiriliyordu.

¹⁰ TC Medeni Kanunu'nda boşanma gerekçeleri arasında Zina (Madde 161) yer alsa da, birçok kimse bunu onur kırıcı olarak değerlendirdiği ve hatta bu gerekçeyle açılan davalarda ispat şartı arandığı için, diğer toplumsal aktörlerden gizlemekte ve boşanmamayı tercih etmekte, ya da daha kabul edilebilir bir gerekçe olan Evlilik Birliğinin Temelden Sarsılması'nı (Madde 166) ileri sürerek boşanma yoluna gitmektedir. Geleneksel ilişkilerden beslenen ataerkil bir kent olan Trabzon'da, ekonomik bağımsızlığı sınırlı olan kadınlar, toplumsal baskıların da etkisiyle, kol kırılır yen içinde kalır diye düşünerek bıçak kemiğe dayanmadıkça boşanmaktan kaçınmışlardır. Bu nedenle, Nataşalara gitme –veya fuhuş- nedeniyle gerçekleşen boşanmaların sayısı hakkında sağlıklı bir bilgi bulunmamaktadır (TUİK'in Boşanma İstatistikleri'nde Trabzon'da zina nedeniyle boşanma sayısı 2001'den 2010'a uzanan süreçte hep 0 olarak gözükmekte. Hatta Türkiye genelinde bile, zina nedeniyle boşanma sayısı örneğin 2001'de sadece 93 ve 2010'da da sadece 75 adet olarak gözüküyor. TUİK, 2011b). Ancak bu halde bile, bilebildiğimiz ve görüşülenlerin ifade ettikleri üzere, bu 1989-2007 arasında şehirde erkeklerin fuhşa yönelmesi nedeniyle gerçekleşen boşanmalar artmıştır. (Av. Mehmet Tomruk ile görüşme, 27.05.2011; Av. Şinasi Mortaş ile görüşme, 5.02.2011)

Aşağılanan, küçük görülen, aldatılan, emek sömürüsüne maruz bırakılan ve Nataşaya giden erkekler tarafından parasına el konan¹¹ Trabzon kadını, hem de yoğun bir cinsel, bedensel, fiziksel, maddi ve hatta siyasal sömürüye, şiddete baskıya ve ikincilleştirmeye maruz kalan Nataşalar üzerinden Trabzonlu erkeklikler yeniden inşa edildi. Her iki tarafın da daha doğru bir ifadeyle ataerkillik karşısında konumlanışlarıyla tek taraf olan tüm bu kadınların farklı farklı nedenlerle duygu dünyaları tarumar edildi (Bozok, 2012). 1989'dan 2000'lerin sonlarına değin uzanan yaklaşık on beş yıllık süreçte seks ticareti Doğu Karadeniz'de yaygın bir biçimde gerçekleşti (Bellér-Hann, 1999; Günçikan, 1995). Temelde Trabzon'un Gürcistan sınırına en yakın bölgesel merkez oluşu, seks ticaretinin gerçekleştiği en önemli yerlerden biri olmasına yol açtı. Geleneksel ilişkilerin varlığını sürdürdüğü, ataerkil ve kapitalist yapısıyla Trabzon, seks ticareti için biçilmiş kaftan gibiydi. Üstelik, hem Samsun üzerinden Batı Karadeniz'e, hem Gümüşhane üzerinden iç bölgelere açılan yolların kesişim noktasında bölgesel bir merkezdi, hem Gürcistan sınırına yakındı, hem de Karadeniz'e açılan bir limanı vardı. O dönemde Trabzon şehir merkezinde dericilikle uğraştığını belirten bir görüşülenin ifadesiyle "alıcısı ve satıcısı belli, açık ve net bir alışveriş" olarak görülüyordu. Nataşaların Trabzon'a gelişleri ve kentten el etek çekmeleri Trabzon erkeğince, kadının iradesi yok sayılarak bir arz-talep ilişkisi çerçevesinde değerlendiriliyor (Bozok, 2012).

Bütün bu süreçte erkekler ne Trabzon kadınının dramını düşündü, ne de Nataşaların maruz kaldıkları ataerkil sömürüyü umursadı. Bu döneme tanıklık eden Beller-Hann'ın (1999) ve Günçikan'ın (1995) aktardığı üzere, Nataşalar ile Trabzonlu erkeklerin ilişkileri büyük bir "ahlaki" sorun olarak

¹¹ Bu süreci Doğu Karadeniz'de gözlemleyen Beller-Hann ve Hann, Nataşalara giden erkeklerin karılarının çaydan kazandığı paraya el koyduğunu, buna karşılık kadınların da çocuklarını okula yollayabilmek için türlü bahanelerle paralarını kocalarından saklamaya başladıklarını aktarıyorlar (2003, s. 188-190).

görülse de, polis Nataşa olarak değerlendirerek, dış görünüşü Trabzonlulardan farklı tüm kadınlar üzerinde yoğun bir baskı kursa da, şehrin ataerkil dokusunun sonucu olarak, Trabzonlu erkekler Nataşalara gitmeye devam etti. Üstelik de birçok görüşmede anlatıldığı üzere, o dönemde birçok seks işçisi kendileriyle birlikte olan Trabzonlu erkeklerin fiziksel, sözlü, duygusal ve maddi şiddetine maruz kaldı.

Nataşalar, Douglas'ın (2007) vurguladığına benzer bir biçimde düzene karşı gelen, onun için bir tehdit oluşturan ve bu nedenle de ortalıktan süpürülmesi gereken bir "kirlilik" olarak görülse de, kimi Trabzon kadınlarının muhalefet etme çabalarına (Beller-Hann, 1999, s. 97) karşın, yukarıda sözünü ettiğim ilk dönemde şehir merkezinde neredeyse her yerde oldukça görünür durumdaydılar. Nataşalar bir yönüyle ataerkil erkeklerin –Freudyen anlamda- arzu nesnesi, bir yandan fiyatı olan bir meta, bir yönüyle de – üzerine basıla basıla mahrem, kişiye özgü ve temiz olduğu vurgulanan- ev içi alanla sınırlanması gerektiği kabul edilen cinselliği kamusal alana taşıyarak açık eden ve onu ahlak dışı kılarak "kirlettiği" düşünülen kimselerdi. Zengin'in işaret ettiği üzere, "kamusal alanı kadın cinselliğinden temizlemek, bizlere "kamusal alan" dediğimiz şeyin sanılanın aksine cinsel olarak nötr olmadığını, aksine ne kadar heteroseksüel erkek cinselliğinin egemenliği altında kurulduğunu gösteriyor" (2011, s.77). Bu nedenle de Nataşalar her ne kadar hem Trabzonlu erkeklerin ataerkil cinsel fantezilerini gerçekleştirmiş olsalar ve hatta üç yıldızlı ünlü bir otelin sahibi olan bir görüşülenin hayıflanarak ifade ettiği üzere "burada [yani Trabzon'da –MB] olmaları şehrin ekonomisine katkı sağlıyor" idiyse de "ahlakı bozdukları" düşünülerek, kent merkezinden uzaklaştırılmaya çalışıldılar. Günümüzdeyse, bir yıl süren alan araştırmamda yabancı seks işçilerinin, geçmiştekinin aksine, gündüz ve hatta gece şehir merkezinde neredeyse hiç görünür olmamalarına karşın, meydanın oldukça yakınındaki Çömlekçi

Mahallesi'nde, sıradan insanların yanı başında simgesel sınırlar olmaksızın fuhuş pazarlığı yaparak son derece görünür olduklarına tanık oldum. Bugün fuhuş Çömlekçi'ye itilerek gözlerden uzaklaştırılmış durumda.

Tam da bu noktada Trabzon erkeğinin anlattığı, tariflediği Nataşalar ve şehirde gözükken Nataşalar arasında bir fark ortaya çıkıyor. Erkeklerin tariflerine göre Nataşalar, “güzel”, “bakımlı” ve “sevişmesini bilen” kadınlar. Lakin bu görüntü Trabzon erkeğinin fantezilerinden çok farklı. Bu ne bir güzellik, ne de bir bakımlılık hali. Sadece kendini görünür ve fark edilir kılmaya yönelik. Nataşaların yorgunluğu, bezginliği ve yoksulluğu yüzlerinde hemen fark ediliyor. Güneydeki tatil yerlerine gittiği söylenen geçmişteki “güzel” Nataşaların yerini, görüşülenlerden birinin ifadesiyle “talebin azalması sonucu” günümüzün bedbin, yıkkın ve yoksul seks işçileri almış. Trabzon'da bulunan seks işçilerine geçmiştekinden oldukça farklı gözle bakılıyor. Görüşülen erkekler geçmişteki seks işçilerinden gururla bahsederken, günümüzdekilerden onların bıkkın ve kirli halinden rahatsız bir tonda konuşuyorlar. Bu iki çelişik Nataşa tarifi, eskiye ve bugüne ait olan bu iki tarif, erkeklerin kadınlar hakkında ne kadar da kolay konuşabildiğini gösteriyor. Güzelliğe ya da çirkinliğe ve pisliğe yapılan bütün bu vurguların söz konusu kadınları işaretlemeye ve damgalamaya devreye giren ataerkil söylemler olduğuna hiç kuşku yok.

Günümüzde Trabzonlular Nataşalar ile birlikte olmayı anlatırken bunu hem bir ahlaksızlık vurgusuyla, onaylamaz gözükerek anlatırken, hem bir zafer hissi yaşadıkları açık olan geçmiş deneyimlerden gurur duyduklarını gizlemiyorlar. Görüştüğüm birçok Trabzon erkeği için “Nataşa” gerçek, duyguları ve bedeni olan, örneğin üzülen, acı çekebilen ve sevinebilen bir *insan* değil, bedeli ödenip bir kenara koyulabilen, istendiğinde ceza

görmeksizin şiddet uygulanabilen¹², kirli, ahlakdışı fakat arzulan bir şey gibi değerlendiriliyor. Tüm bu onay-onaylamama ikileminin içinde Trabzon'un Nataşalarla deneyimleri ve bugün, geçmişe dönük anlatıları şekillendi. Sınıfsal konumuna bağlı olarak, Çömlekçi'de otel sahibi olan bir görüşülenin işaret ettiği üzere, kimi Trabzonlu erkekler Nataşalarla “dost hayatı” yaşadı, kimisi Çömlekçi'deki otellerde saatlik ilişkiler yaşadı, kimisi de onlarla lüks otellerde, restoranlarda ve gece kulüplerinde buluştu. Kimi anlatılanları dinledi, kimi dinlediklerini anlattı (Bozok, 2012).

Görüştüğüm Trabzonlu erkekler, ailenin direği, anaç, cefakar ve çalışkan olarak kurdukları Trabzon kadınına “çalıştığı için inek gibi pis kokan”, “bakımsız”, “oturmasını kalkmasını bilmeyen” ve “kaba saba” gibi sözlerle aşağılayarak anlatırken, geçmişteki ilk dönemde şehre gelen eski SSCB ve Doğu Bloku kökenli seks işçilerini “güzel”, “bakımlı” ve “sevişmesini bilen” gibi sözlerle betimliyorlar. Kadın, Trabzon'da bu iki imgenin arasına sıkıştırılmış durumda. İlk dönemdeki Nataşalar, Doğu Karadeniz'lilerden farklı fiziksel özellikleri ve vurgulanmış kadınsılıkları ile görüşülen Trabzonlu erkeklerin tamamının en değerli şeyleri olarak ifade ettikleri aileleri ve karılarına ilişkin kurulan “kutsal anneye” karşılık olarak, “fahişe” imgesinin somutlaşmış ve de bedenleşmiş hali olarak görülmekteydiler. Trabzon'da kadınlar, kadın düşmanı bir yaklaşımla, bu iki konumdan birinde yer almaya zorlanarak, ezilmekte ve ikincilleştirilmekte. Ataerkil yapı içinde öteden beri ezilen, insan yerine koyulmayan, erkekler tarafından bir an bile düşünmeksizin şiddete maruz bırakılabilen ve bir kenara itilebilen Trabzon kadınına karşılık olarak, korkunç bir sömürüye maruz kalarak erkeklerin cinsel fantezilerini gerçekliğe kavuşturan Nataşalar, günümüz Trabzonlu erkekliklerin duygusal ve cinsel bağlanmaya ilişkin kodlarının yeniden

¹² Birçok görüşülen, Nataşalarla birlikte olan Trabzonlu erkeklerin, ilişki sonrasında seks işçilerine fiziksel, cinsel ve sözlü şiddet uyguladıklarını aktarıyor.

inşasını sağladılar. Bu kodların doğasının, hem Trabzonlu kadınları hem de “Nataşa” olarak damgalayarak ötekileştirdiği yabancı seks işçisi kadınların varoluşunu fütursuzca parçalamaya yönelik ataerkil bir nitelik taşıdığıının açık olduğu kanısındayım.

Gerçekte Nataşaların kimler olduğu ve onlarla neler yaşandığından çok, erkeklerin onlara ilişkin tahayyülleri ve bu tahayyüller çerçevesinde kurdukları performansa dayalı, abartılı erkeklik anlatıları günümüzde bile Trabzonlu erkekliklerin inşasına katkıda bulunuyor. Toplumsal cinsiyet rejimini anlayabilmek için en önemli anahtarlardan biri, cinsel ve duygusal ilişkilerin incelenmesi. Connell’in kateksise dair vurguladığı üzere, “tutkuyu biçimlendiren ve gerçekleştiren pratikler, toplumsal cinsiyet düzeninin [kurucu] yönlerinden biridir” (2005, s. 74). Trabzonlu erkekliklerin günümüzde kendini nasıl yeniden yeniden kurduğu noktasında, Nataşalara ilişkin deneyimleri ve günümüzde bunlara dair anlatıları oldukça önemli bir yer kaplıyor.

Öte yandan, kentte neredeyse tamamıyla erkeklerin denetiminde, erkek egemen ve –tamamen olmasa da- ağırlıklı olarak eştoplumsal¹³ bir kamusal alan gerçekleşiyor. Trabzon’da –elbette istisnalar dışında- esnaflar erkek, kahvehanelerde vakit öldürenler erkek, çay bahçelerinde oturanlar erkek, amatör küme maçlarını izleyenler erkek, sokaklarda volta atanlar erkek, gece dolaşanlar erkek, linç girişimlerine katılanlar erkek, alışveriş merkezlerinde öbek öbek zaman öldürenler erkek. Trabzonlu kadınlar kamusal alanlarda pek az gözükyorlar ve/ya buralarda erkeklerden çok daha sınırlı sürelerde zaman geçiriyorlar. Erkeklerden farklı olarak kadınlar uzun saatler boyunca şehir meydanında oturmuyorlar, yalnız başlarına

¹³ “Eştoplumsal” sözcüğünü İngilizce’deki aynı cinsiyetten bireylerin bir araya geldiği toplumsallık ve toplumsal ilişkiler anlamındaki “homosocial” kavramının karşılığı olarak kullanıyorum.

dolaşmıyorlar, yanlarında kocaları olmadıkça gece sokağa çıkmıyorlar. Sokaktaki kadın hallerinin istisnasını Türkiye'nin diğer yerlerinde olduğu gibi öğrenciler oluşturuyor. Eşcinseller ve daha genel anlamda queer bireylerin görünürlüğü ise söz konusu bile değil¹⁴. İlk bakışta tamamen erkeklerin egemenliğinde bir şehir meydanı görmüyoruz. Meydanda kadınlar gündüzleri hep var. Ancak kadınların meydanda nasıl var olduklarına dikkatlice bakınca, kadınların kamusal alanda nasıl varolacaklarını belirleyen ataerkil örüntüler su yüzüne çıkıyor. Kadınlar yaya alanlarından geçtikleri zaman bile bu, erkeklerin denetiminde, erkek bakışının altında gerçekleşiyor. Bu erkek egemen eştoplumsallık, Trabzonlu erkeklerin

Emiroğlu'nun da işaret ettiği üzere, geçmişten beri süregelen ataerkil bir kültürel dokusu var (2009). Nataşalarla girdikleri ilişkilerde cinselliğini yaşamaya çalışan da, aileden en kutsal varlık diye bahseden de, seks işçilerine kocalarını kaptırmamak isteyen kadınların güzellik salonlarına akın etmesini kadının yararına bir şey olarak değerlendiren de ve en önemlisi bu ilişkilerin aslında kadınları –ve ailelerini- ezdiğini umursamayan da işte Trabzonlu erkeklikler.

AİLE VE EVİÇİ YAŞANTILAR

Görüşülen Trabzonlu erkeklerin neredeyse tamamı, ailenin kendileri için en değerli şey olduğuna vurgu yaptılar. Aile, erkekler için ataerkil iktidarı elde etmenin, meşru cinsel ilişkiler ve kişisel yeniden üretimin, soyun devamını sağlamanın ve baba olmanın en temel alanı olarak görülüyor. Bu bakımdan

¹⁴ Ülkenin ilk açık eşcinsel futbol hakemi Halil İbrahim Dinçdağ Trabzonlu olmasına ve bu bölgede hakemlik yapmasına karşın bu böyle. Kendisiyle yaptığım görüşmede Dinçdağ, kendi "durumunu" birçok insanın bilmesine karşın, bu durumun görmezden gelindiğini belirtti. Trabzon'da heteroseksüel olmamak o denli kabul edilemez görülüyor ki, bu hiç yokmuş gibi tutum takınmaya çalışılıyor.

aile erkekliklerin toplumsal yeniden üretiminin Trabzon özelindeki en önemli ve en kritik alanlarından birini oluşturuyor. Trabzonlu erkekler, ailenin geçimini sağlayan, ailenin kadiri mutlak reisi olan, ailenin koruyucusu konumunda ve otoriter yollardan babalığı icra eden, ataerkil ve muhafazakar aktörler olarak öne çıkıyorlar.

Eşlerini zamanlarının çoğunu eviçi alanda, ev kadını olarak geçirmeye zorlayan Trabzonlu erkeklikler, ailede öncelikle ailenin maddi gelirini temin eden aktörler olarak karşımıza çıkıyorlar. Trabzon'da görüşülen birçok erkek, evin geçimini sağlamanın önemine vurgu yaptı. Ailenin geçimini sağlayabiliyor olmak, erkeğe aile kurma, eviçinde iktidar sahibi olma, ve böylece de meşru yollardan cinsel deneyim yaşayarak soyunun devamlılığını sağlama imkanı tanımakta. Bu nedenle birçok görüşülen, hayatlarının dönüm noktasının aile kurmak olduğuna vurgu yaptı. Erkekler maddi gelir kazanabiliyor olmaları dolayısıyla yetişkin ve toplumsal kabul gören, ataerkil erkeklerin dünyasında var olmanın aracı olarak görülüyor. Bu nedendir ki, ailenin geçimini sağlama, erkeklerin ailedeki konumlarının maddi temeli olarak görülüyor. Bunun aksi olan işini kaybetmek ise, kapitalist ataerkil toplumda erkekliğin temellerinin sarsılmasına işaret ettiği için, görüşmelerde derin bir kaygı vurgusuyla anlatıldı.

Trabzonlu erkekler, zamanlarının çoğunu kamusal alanda ve ekonomik ve siyasal etkinlikleri denetleyerek geçirirlerken, ev işlerine neredeyse hiçbir zaman katılmamaktalar. Görüşülen erkeklerin tamamı ev işlerini kadın işi olarak gördüklerine vurgu yaptılar. Böylece ev içi alanda bulaşıktan temizliğe ve çocuk bakımına değin yeniden üretimlerini gerçekleştirmede kadın emeğinden yararlanmakta ve onlar üzerinde baskı kurmaktalar. Kadınların yoğun bir emek sömürsüne maruz kaldığı bu ilişkilerde erkekliğin yeniden üretimi için neredeyse bedelsiz bir biçimde gerçekleşiyor.

Öteden beri ataerkil, İslami yönü güçlü ve muhafazakar nitelikleriyle bilinen Trabzon aileleri, günümüzde de sertliği, otoriterliği, kadiri mutlak oluşu ve özerkliği öne çıkan pederşahi erkek aile reisleri tarafından yönetilmekteler. Erkeklerin aile içindeki konumlarının temelinde bu aile reisliği bulunuyor. Trabzonlu erkekler, kadınların karar alma süreçlerine katılmalarına çoğunlukla izin vermiyorlar ve ailede de kamusal alandaki gibi mutlak karar vericiler olarak davranıyorlar. Dahası, görüşülen kimi erkekler, keyfi bir biçimde kadınlara karşı şiddet kullandığını belirttiler. Bu ataerkil ilişkilerde aile içinde erkekler kendilerini sorgulanamaz otoriter aile reisleri olarak konumlandırarak, eşleri ve çocuklarıyla mesafeli ilişkiler kurmaktalar.

Böylece, Trabzonlu erkekler babalığı da çoğu zaman çocuklarla mesafeli ilişkiler içinde, onların sosyalizasyon süreçlerine uzak figürler olarak kurmakta ve deneyimlemektedirler. Birçok Trabzonlu erkek, kendi babalarıyla kıyaslandığında çocuklarıyla daha yakın ilişkiler kurduklarını vurgulasalar da, çocuklardan itaat beklentisinin öncelikli oluşu nedeniyle, bu eşitlikçi bir ilişki olmaktan uzak. Benzer bir biçimde birçok erkek çocuklardan söz ederken aslında sadece erkek çocuklarına vurgu yapıyorlar. Babalık, aynı zamanda neslin devamı –ve bu nedenle de cinsel iktidar- olarak görülüyor. Çocuklara ancak mesafeli bir sevgi verirken onlardan itaat ve saygı beklemek, kentte son derece ataerkil bir erkekliğin bulunduğu bir kez daha işaret ediyor. Diğer bir deyişle babalık, gelenekler ve dini ahlak ile çevrili olarak, erkekliğin en üst düzeyde gerçekleşmesi olarak değerlendiriliyor.

Trabzon'daki çağdaş erkeklikler, aileyi muhafazakar ve dini ideoloji çerçevesinde deneyimliyorlar. Birçok Trabzonlu erkek aileden söz ederken onu namus, şeref, din, devlet, vatan ve millet kavramlarıyla iç içeymişçesine aktarıyor. Böylece kentte aile muhafazakar, İslami ve milliyetçi erkekliklerin

inşa ve yeniden inşa süreçlerindeki en önemli alanlardan biri olarak karşımıza çıkıyor.

SAĞCILIK VE TRABZONSPOR FANATİZMİ

Trabzon, ne futboldan ne de son dönemde milliyetçi yönü ağır basan bir sağcılıktan ayrı düşünülemez bir şehir. Futbol ve sağcılık birbirini besliyor: bazen iç içe geçiyor, şehirde bazen biri, baden de diğeri insanları peşinden sürüklüyor. Bunların taşıyıcıları ve faileri ise çok büyük çoğunlukla erkekler. Son yıllarda artan ve sıradanlaşan sağ kalkışmalar ve futbol fanatizmi kol kola varoluyor. Koçak'ın da işaret ettiği gibi, "futbol, milliyetçiliğin av sahalarından biri" (2010, s. 28). Yakın dönemde, şehrin en büyük takımı Trabzonspor'un mikromilliyetçi sloganı "bize her yer Trabzon", Hrant Dink'in milliyetçi katili Ogün Samast'ın beyaz beresini sahiplenen Trabzonspor taraftarları ve Trabzonspor hakkında son dönemde yayımlanan birçok kitaptaki¹⁵ milliyetçi vurguda görüldüğü üzere şehirde sağ ve futbol birbiriyle oldukça yakın ilişkili bir biçimde varoluyor. Sağ ve futbol arasındaki bu ilişkinin, futbol stadyumlarının kitle ruhunun taşıyıcısı olma¹⁶ niteliğini ortaya koyduğu kanısındayım.

Ancak Trabzon'da futbol basitçe sağcılık ile açıklanamayacak bir olgu. Şehrin dokusuna sinen, neredeyse sokaklarda her yerde, konuşulan her Trabzonluda karşılaşılan bir olgu Trabzonspor fanatizmi. Yoksullaşan, artık mitoslaşmış olan eski görkemini yitiren şehrin en büyük gurur kaynağı konumunda. Bu gurur, Emiroğlu'nun (2009) tarihsel nedenlerini etraflıca tartıştığı yerel gururun ulusal ve yerel düzeydeki milliyetçi tezahürlerinden,

¹⁵ Örn. Çelik 2010; 2008.

¹⁶ Koçak, 2010, s. 29.

futbolda Trabzonspor'un 1975-1984 arasındaki "altı defa şampiyon" ve/ya "dördüncü büyük" olma¹⁷ niteliğini taşıma söylemi arasında gidip gelen akışkan bir özelliğe sahip. Hakim mikromilliyetçi hal, stadyumlardaki yukarıda andığım "beyaz bere" tavrından sağ kalkışmalara rahatlıkla geçiş gösterebilmekte. Futbol ve sağ, insanları birleştirmek, bir araya getirmek, pervasızlık, saldırganlık ve görüştüğüm tüm Trabzonluların "çabuk parlamak" olarak dile getirdikleri agresif olmak gibi konularda ortaklaşıyor ve Trabzon erkekliğinde vücut buluyor. Trabzonspor'un maçı olduğu zaman, merkezdeki bütün sokaklar maç saati yaklaştıkça, hızla takımın renkleri olan bordo-maviye dönüyor. Bu, sadece asılan bayraklarla ilgili değil, kamusallığın bordo-mavi formalar giyen insanlarca kuruluyor olmasından da kaynaklanıyor. Böylece futbolun en bilinen özelliklerinden biri olan tektipleştiren, rakip takımı destekleyenlerden –yani yabancılardan- ayıran, rakibi ulusal bir düşmanmış gibi kurgulayarak onu ezmeye yönelik¹⁸, bölünmez bir birlik hissiyatı içinde kendini gerçekleştiren erkek dayanışması vücut buluyor.

Görüşülen Trabzon erkeklerinin, Trabzonspor'u niçin böyle büyük bir coşkuyla destekledikleri sorusuna verdikleri ortak yanıt, futbolun şehrin tek eğlencesi, Trabzonspor'un da şehrin en büyük gurur kaynağı olduğu yönünde. Trabzon'da öteden beri sağcılığın kayda değer bir güç sahibi olduğu açık. Futbol takımlarının başarıları ulusal gurura benzer bir his yaratarak Trabzonlular için yerel düzlemde bu milliyetçiliği besliyor. Ancak sağın Trabzonspor taraftarlığındaki dışavurumu, yakın geçmişte bile oldukça kritik bir biçimde kabuk değiştirmiş durumda. Bora ve Erdoğan'ın

¹⁷ Bilindiği üzere, Trabzonspor 1975-1976 sezonu ile 1983-1984 sezonu arasında birinci ligde altı kez şampiyon olmuş, İstanbul takımları dışında birinci lig takımları arasında şampiyon olma başarısını gösteren ilk Anadolu takımı olma başarısını göstermiştir.

¹⁸ Bora, 2010.

işaret ettikleri üzere, “80’lerin ortalarında Trabzonsporluların İnönü Stadyumu tribünlerine astığı “*En Büyük Lazlar – Başka Büyük Yok!*”¹⁹ pankartı... Trabzonspor’un büyük takım ve böylelikle de ‘milli değer’ haline gelmesini” sağladı (2004, s. 227). Pankart, yazarların da vurguladıkları üzere, “Türkiye’nin her yeri herkesindir” fikrinin altını çiziyor (age. 226). Trabzon şehri, 1980’lerde yerel değil ulusal ölçekte varolduğunu kanıtlamaya çalışıyor. O dönem bir etnik kimlik olarak değerlendirilmeyerek yaygın konuşma dilinde bütün Doğu Karadenizlilere atfedilen “Laz” olarak nitelendirilerek, Trabzonluluğun Türk ulusal kimliğinin ayrılmaz bir parçası olduğu vurgulanmaya çalışılıyor. Kuşkusuz, bu slogan, milliyetçiliğin Cumhuriyetin kuruluşundan beri ifade edilen halini yansıtıyor. Sağın 1990’lardan itibaren yaşadığı yükseliş²⁰, Trabzon’da milliyetçiliğin de kabuk değiştirmesine yol açtı. Bu yeni hal, mikromilliyetçiliğin beslediği bir vurgu barındırıyor. Trabzonspor’un ülke çapında ün kazanan son dönemdeki ünlü sloganı “*Bize Her Yer Trabzon*” işte bunun yansıması. 1980’lerde “*En Büyük Lazlar – Başka Büyük Yok!*” pankartında Trabzon Türkiye’nin bir parçası olarak görülürken, 2000’lerden itibaren, “*Bize Her Yer Trabzon*” sloganında bu tersine dönüyor ve mikromilliyetçi vurguyla Türkiye’nin ve dünyanın her yerinin metaforik bir biçimde Trabzon’un bir parçası olduğu vurgusu öne çıkartılıyor. Burada gözden kaçırılmaması gereken bir diğer nokta, Trabzonlular Laz fıkralarındaki Temel ve Dursun’un kestirmeden aklını, cinsel gücünü, ataerkil yapısını ne kadar kabul edilebilir bir şey olarak görüyorlarsa, “Laz” sözcüğünün son dönemde taşıdığı etnik imadan, bu imanın bir Laz dili ve kültürü ile içinin doldurulmasından bir o kadar uzak duruyorlar. Dolayısıyla, Trabzonspor’un sloganı konjonktürel olarak

¹⁹ İtalik bana ait.

²⁰ Bu yükseliş, önce milliyetçilik ardından da İslamcılık olarak gerçekleşmiştir.

değişiyor ve Lazlık vurgusu yerini Trabzonluluk vurgusuna ve gururuna bırakıyor (Bozok, 2012).

Trabzonspor'un yerel düzlemde bu denli derin bir biçimde kabul görmesinin temel nedenlerinden biri de, İstanbul kulüplerinden farklı olarak birçok Anadolu kulübü için geçerli olduğu üzere, kulübün şehrin ve şehir insanının organik bir parçası olarak görülmesi. Şampiyonlukların yaşandığı 1980'lerin ortasına kadar uzanan dönemde bu durum somut bir gerçekliği bulunmaktaydı. O dönem Trabzonspor'da oynayan Şenol Güneş ve Ali Kemal Denizci üzerine (oto)biyografik anlatılarda da görüldüğü üzere, futbolcular sadece şehrin değil, "bizim mahallenin çocuğu" olarak görülüyordu (Dilek, 2009; Güneş, 2009). Şehir ve –gerçekte profesyonel olan- futbolcular arasında karşılıklı bir sorumluluk duygusu hakimdi. Taraftarlarla aynı sokaklarda büyüyen, aynı tencereye kaşık sallayan²¹, birçoğuyla halen devam eden yüz yüze ve yakın ilişkileri bulunan futbolcular kendilerini "besleyen" şehre karşı bir aidiyet, bağlılık ve sorumluluk hissediyorlardı. Birçoğu lümpen kökenlerden gelen ve oldukça ataerkil olan bu futbolcular ile onları destekleyen Trabzon erkeği arasındaki sınıfsal fark yok denecek kadar önemsizdi.

Trabzon'da futbolun yerel kaynaklardan beslendiğine yapılan bu vurgu, günümüzün endüstriyel futbolu içinde kimlik inşasına yardımcı olan bir mitos olarak varlığını sürdürüyor²². Böylece futbolcular Trabzon erkeğinin başarıya ve zafere yönelik ideallerini gerçekleştirecek kahramanlar olarak

²¹ Dilek'in Ali Kemal Denizci'ye ilişkin biyografik anlatısındaki yoksulluk vurgusu çarpıcıdır (2009).

²² Trabzonspor geçmişte tamamı Trabzon doğumlu futbolculardan oluşan bir takımdı. Bugün de şehrin takımı olma vurgusuyla, yerli futbolcularla altyapısını güçlü tutmaya gayret ediyor. Fakat geçmiştekinin aksine, günümüzde takımın endüstriyel futbolun bir parçası haline gelmesiyle, birinci ligde oynayan takımdaki Trabzon doğumlu oyuncu sayısı bir elin parmaklarından az.

görülüyor. Bu, Erdoğan'ın da vurguladığı “milli kimliğin kuruluşunda etkin, saldırgan ve güçlü erkeklik mitinin cisimleşmesinde” (1993), hem de futbol aracılığıyla Trabzonlu erkeklikler dayanışmacı, milli/yerel değerler ekseninde bir araya gelen bir “hayali cemaat”²³ şeklinde, “biz” olarak kurulmasını sağlıyor.

Öte yandan, yerel kimliğe yapılan vurgunun bu denli yoğun olduğu günümüzde Trabzonlu erkeklikleri için futbol sadece Trabzonspor ile de sınırlı değil. Şehirde yaz kış hem profesyonel ligleri hem de amatör ligleri tutkuyla izleyen birçok erkek var. Şehirde futbol büyük bir tutku halinde yaşanıyor. Bu tutku o denli güçlü ki, Faroz'lu²⁴ bir görüşmecinin mecazi ifadesiyle, “Trabzonspor kaybedince şehirdeki insanlar bir hafta karılarıyla birlikte olmuyorlar”.

İşsiz erkeklerin en çok zaman geçirdikleri yerlerden biri futbol stadyumları. Trabzon'da futbola ilgi yıllardır birinci ligde²⁵ yer alan Trabzonspor'la sınırlı değil²⁶. Trabzonspor kadar, günümüzde bölgesel ve ulusal başarılarla sahip olan ikinci lig, üçüncü lig ve amatör liglerdeki İdmangücü, İdmanocağı, Akçaabat Sebatspor, Necmiati, Yalıspor, Arsinspor ve 1461 Trabzon gibi takımlarıyla da tanınıyor. Özellikle işsiz erkeklerin bir araya geldiği başlıca toplumsallaşma ve eğlence alanlarından biri bu takımların maçları. Genci

²³ Anderson, 2004.

²⁴ Trabzon sahilinde yer alan Faroz, son yıllardaki kolbastının yanı sıra ve –bundan daha önemli olarak- kuruluş döneminde uzun süre Trabzonspor altyapısı üzerinde etkili olan mahalleler “Faroz, Sotka, Arafilboyu” üçlüsünden biri olan ve Trabzonspor'un stadyumu Hüseyin Avni Aker'e ev sahipliği yapan köklü bir balıkçı mahallesi olmasıyla öne çıkıyor.

²⁵ Futbolda eskiden “birinci lig” olarak bilinen en üst düzey profesyonel kümenin adı son yıllarda sponsorluk anlaşmalarıyla birkaç kez değişti. Burada mesele bunun resmi adı olmadığı için, eski usul seviyeleri belirten “birinci lig”, “ikinci lig”, “üçüncü lig” ve “amatör ligler” ifadelerini tercih ediyorum.

²⁶ Trabzon'da futbolun Trabzonspor'un kurulduğu 1967 öncesindeki tarihi için bkz. Tunç, 2011.

yaşlısı, çoğu işsiz ve yoksul birçok erkek, yaz kış, yağmur çamur demeden bu takımların maçlarını izliyor.

Futbol maçları çevresinde oluşan toplumsallık erkek erkeğe ve son derece eştoplumsal. Kadınlar erkekleştikleri takdirde, birinci lig maçlarındaki varlıkları tolere ediliyor (hatta az da olsa bu durum destekleniyor); fakat alt liglerdeki maçların oynandığı stadyumlarda böyle bir şey söz konusu değil. Çünkü buraları erkek sertliğinin ve dayanıklılığının sergilendiği ve tezahüratlar altında kışkırtıldığı alanlar. Buraları işsiz ve yoksul erkeklere hayatın altından kalkamadıkları baskıları karşısında bir tür ferahlama alanı gibi geliyor. Örneğin, Trabzon Avni Aker Stadyumu'nun hemen yanında yer alan Yavuz Selim Stadyumu'nda yaşlı erkekler kışın soğuk ve yağışlı havalarda bile sabahtan akşama birbirinin peşi sıra oynanan amatör maçları aralıksız, saatlerce tezahürat yaparak izliyorlar. Erkekler buraları o kadar kendi dünyaları belliyorlar ki, amatör küme maçları sırasında kendi aralarında konuşurken, taraftarı olmadıkları takımların futbolculardan bile kendi ailelerine mensup bireylermiş gibi bahsediyorlar. Futbol bir erkek oyunu ve futbolcular –sanki- erkeklerin hayallerini gerçekleştiren aile bireyleri. Stadyumlardaki bu erkek toplumsallığında, Trabzonlu erkeklikler, sertlik, dayanıklılık, hırs, gençlik, fiziksel kuvvet ve erkek dayanışmasının yüceltilmesi ve küfürlerde kadının aşağılanması gibi faşizan ve ataerkil vurgularla yeniden inşa ediliyor.

İşte bu toplumsal doku içinde, Trabzonlu erkekler futbolda olduğu kadar, son dönemdeki milliyetçi niteliği ağır basan sağ kalkışmalarda da eyleme geçiyorlar. Akal'ın da işaret ettiği üzere, sıklıkla şiddete başvuru, çokça kan akan sağ eylemler hiç de yeni değil; Trabzon'un böyle bir geçmişinde, hafızasında bu deneyimler var (2009). Günümüzde de bu sağ kalkışmalar devam ediyor. Bu yazının son şeklini aldığı 2011 sonu itibarıyla son dönemdeki sağ kalkışmaların en bilinenleri, Ekim 2004'te şehir

merkezindeki McDonalds'ın Yasin Hayal tarafından bombalanması; Karadeniz Teknik Üniversitesi'nden (KTÜ) 2004'te Yrd. Doç. Dr. Hicabi Cındık'ın, 2005'te Prof. Saadettin Güner ve oğlunun açılan ateş sonucu öldürülmesi; Nisan 2005'te bildiri dağıtmak isteyen Tutuklu Hükümlü Aileleri Yakınları Derneği (TAYAD) üyelerinin şehir merkezinde binlerce kişi tarafından linç edilmeye çalışılması; Ağustos 2005'te Maçka'da yakalanan üç PKK militanına yönelik linç girişimi; Ocak 2006'da Doğulu işçilerin gittiği çay ocağına molotofkokteyli atılması; Ocak 2006'da MHP İl Başkanlığı önüne bomba konulması; Ocak 2006'da Trabzonsporlu futbolcular Fatih Tekke ve Gökdeniz Karadeniz'in eşlerinin otomobillerinin kurşunlanması; Şubat 2006'da Sancta Maria Kilisesi'nin İtalyan rahibi Andrea Santoro'nun kilisesinde 16 yaşındaki bir genç tarafından vurularak öldürülmesi; Ocak 2007'de Agos Gazetesi Genel Yayın Yönetmeni Hrant Dink'in -İstanbul'da- Trabzon'lu Ogün Samast tarafından öldürülmesi; Ocak 2011'de Muhteşem Süleyman dizisi protestosu; Mayıs 2011'de sokak tiyatrosu yapmak isteyen gençlere yönelik saldırı ve son olarak da Mayıs 2011'de Trabzonspor taraftarlarının şehir merkezindeki Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (AKP) seçim bürolarını taşlamaları.

Elias, milli maçların, uluslararası gerilimlerin giderilmesi için oldukça iyi bir "supap" olduğunu vurguluyor²⁷. Bu fikrin ulusal ölçekte için de geçerli olduğu kanısındayım. Stadyumlar, ulusal ölçekteki gerilimlerin kabul edilebilir yollardan dışa vurulması için de önemli bir araç. Trabzon özelinde, sağ ideolojiler, çoğu zaman yerel düzlemde Trabzonspor, tribünleri ve taraftarları aracılığıyla dışa vuruyor. Stadyumların çevresindeki onca kavgaya ve holiganizme karşın, futbol aslında oldukça tehlikesiz bir supap.

²⁷ Elias'tan aktaran, Bora ve Erdoğan, 2004, ss. 233-234.

Gerilimler bezen stadyumlarda, bazen de sađ kalkışmalar olarak dıřa vuruluyor.

SONUÇ

Dođu Karadeniz denince akla ilk gelen Őeylerden biri, bōlgedeki kōltōrel hegemonyasından ōtūrō Trabzon; ve Trabzon denince de akla ilk gelen Őeylerden biri Trabzon erkeđi. Trabzon, hamsisi, Trabzonspor'u, ekmeđi, sađ kalkışmaları ve tereyađı kadar, deli dolu, agresif ve her an parlayabilen erkekleriyle maruftur. Gōndelik konuřmalarda ataerkil sōylemi meřrulařtırırcasına deli bozuk, cinselliđine dōřkōn, Őiddet kullanmaya yatkın, irrasyonel... kısacası nev'i Őahsına mōnhasır olduđu vurgulanan gōnōmōzōn Trabzon erkekliđi, tarihōtesi deđil, bu erkeklik tipini inřa eden tarihsel ve toplumsal kořulların ūrōnōdūr. Ne Trabzon erkekliđi bōtōnōyle biriciktir, ne de evrensel, deđiřmez ve tek tip bir erkeklik mevcuttur. Trabzon erkekliđi, halihazırdaki ataerkil kapitalist kořulların Őehirdeki etkilerinin bir ūrōnō.

Trabzon'a bakmanın kıymeti Őurada saklıdır: genel anlamda ataerkilliđi anlayabilmek iēin, ataerkilliđin birincil failleri olan erkek(lik)leri de anlamak gerekir. Erkekleri anlamak iēinse genel ve evrensel anlamda bir (ataerkil) "erkeklik" deđil, farklı yollardan erkek egemenliđini kuran "erkeklikleri" eleřtirel bir bakıřla ele almak lazımdır. ēōnkō toplumsal cinsiyet rejimlerini oluřturan kořullar, erkek egemen toplumsal cinsiyet iliřkilerinin farklı stratejiler aracılıđıyla kurulmasını ve ataerkil ōrōntōlerin deneyimlenme biēimlerini oluřturur. Erkeklikler, toplumsal cinsiyet rejimlerinde ortaya ēıkan farklı toplumsal cinsiyet konfigōrasyonlarının ūrōnōdūr. Yerel dōzlemdeki toplumsal cinsiyet iliřkilerinin sonucu olarak ortaya ēıkan erkeklikleri anlamak, hem yerel dōzlemdeki farklı ōzgōl ataerkil stratejileri, hem de

genel anlamda erkek egemenliđinin nasıl kurulduđunu anlamak için ipuçları sağlayacaktır. Dolayısıyla, ataerkilliđe dair daha ayrıntılı bir kavrayışa ulaşmak için erkeklikleri kuran etmenlere ve erkekliklerin kurulma stratejilerine de bakmak gerekir. Bu durum Trabzon erkekliđi için de geçerlidir.

Trabzonlu erkeklikler yakın geçmişte en çok, her an ülkenin gündemine oturabilen sağ kalkışmalar, söylemsel düzlemde iç içe geçen suç ortaklıđı ve ahlaksızlık vurgularıyla ifade edilen Nataşalarla ilişkiler, küresel kapitalist koşullara direnememe sonucunda yoksullaşma ve elbette Trabzonspor ile gündeme geldi. Bu olayların, yakın geçmişte Trabzon erkekliđinin bugününü etkileyen ve yarınını şekillendirecek etmenler olduđu kanısındayım. Bu yazıda, yoksullaşma, sağ kalkışmalar, Trabzonspor ve son olarak da Nataşalar ile ilişkilerin Trabzon erkekliđini nasıl etkilediđi, bunların sonucu olan ataerkil örüntülerin nasıl bir “Trabzon erkekliđine” yol açtıđı tartışılmaya çalışıldı. Günümüzün Trabzon erkekliđinin gelenekselliđin kalıntıları ile modern ve hatta postmodern olanlar arasında sıkışmış ataerkil kapitalist ilişkileri yeniden ürettiđi kanısındayım.

Futbol fanatizminden Nataşalarla ilişkilere, aileden sağ kalkışmalara, erkekliklerin bedenleşmesinden kentteki yerli kadınların ezilme ve ikincilleştirilmelerine uzanan yelpazede, Trabzonlu erkekliklerin bağlamsal inşasına ilişkin cinsiyet konfigürasyonu, İslamcı, milliyetçi, muhafazakar ve son derece ataerkil bir erkekliđe işaret etmekte. Erkeklikliđin bu tezde ele alınan inşası, Trabzon’da ataerkil ve sağcı değerlerin yeniden üretimine hizmet ediyor. Bu bağlamda, *aile* erkekliklerin ataerkil bir biçimde yeniden inşa edildiđi, erkeklerin kadiri mutlak ve otoriter aile reisi olmayı deneyimledikleri, ailenin maddi yollardan geçimini sağladıkları, meşru cinselliđi, ve baba olmayı deneyimledikleri alan olarak karşımıza çıkıyor. Öte yandan erkekliklerin *katektik* örgütlenmesi, dini ve geleneksel ahlak

dolayısıyla meşrulaştırma sağlayarak, onların ataerkil aktörler olarak, kınanmaksızın Nataşalarla ilişkiler yaşamalarına, kentteki yerli kadınları ezmelerine, ikincilleştirmelerine ve kentteki queer bireyleri kentten bütünüyle dışlamalarına yol açıyor. Bu arkaplanda erkekler ekonomik, siyasal ve kamusal alanları denetliyorlar ve kendilerini futbol fanatizmi, ve kahvehaneler gibi erkek egemen mekanlarda, eştoplumsal ilişkiler içinde ifade ediyorlar. Böylece, sağcılık, Trabzonspor fanatizmi ve Nataşalarla ilişkiler gibi son iki on yıla ulusal ve uluslararası ölçeklerde damgasını vuran olayların faileri olarak karşımıza çıkıyorlar.

Bu çalışma Trabzon'da kırk üç erkekle yapılmış olan görüşmelere dayanmakla birlikte, bu erkeklik konfigürasyonu, kapitalist ataerkilliğin çağdaş dışavurumlarından birine ilişkin önemli ipuçları sunuyor. Böylece erkeklik incelemelerindeki yapısalın yanı sıra inşacı ve performatif tartışmaları genişleterek, temsilin yanı sıra Trabzon özeline odaklanarak, fiili erkekliklere ve bu erkekliklerin farklılaşmalarına ilişkin kuramsal bilgiler sunuyor.

APPENDIX E

TEZ FOTOKOPİSİ İZİN FORMU

ENSTİTÜ

Fen Bilimleri Enstitüsü

Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü

Uygulamalı Matematik Enstitüsü

Enformatik Enstitüsü

Deniz Bilimleri Enstitüsü

YAZARIN

Soyadı : Bozok

Adı : Mehmet

Bölümü : Sosyoloji

TEZİN ADI (İngilizce) : Constructing Masculinities in Trabzon

TEZİN TÜRÜ : Yüksek Lisans Doktora

1. Tezimin tamamı dünya çapında erişime açılsın ve kaynak gösterilmek şartıyla tezimin bir kısmı veya tamamının fotokopisi alınsın.
2. Tezimin tamamı yalnızca Orta Doğu Teknik Üniversitesi kullanıcılarının erişimine açılsın. (Bu seçenekle tezinizin fotokopisi ya da elektronik kopyası Kütüphane aracılığı ile ODTÜ dışına dağıtılmayacaktır.)
3. Tezim bir (1) yıl süreyle erişime kapalı olsun. (Bu seçenekle tezinizin fotokopisi ya da elektronik kopyası Kütüphane aracılığı ile ODTÜ dışına dağıtılmayacaktır.)

Yazarın imzası

Tarih