

THE SHIFTING INFLUENCE OF THE UNITED STATES  
ON EUROPEAN UNION-TURKEY RELATIONS:  
A NEOCLASSICAL REALIST APPROACH

A THESIS SUBMITTED TO  
THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES  
OF  
MIDDLE EAST TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY

BY

DUYGU ÖZKAN

IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS  
FOR  
THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF SCIENCE  
IN  
THE DEPARTMENT OF EUROPEAN STUDIES

JANUARY 2013

Approval of the Graduate School of Social Sciences

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## **ABSTRACT**

### **THE SHIFTING INFLUENCE OF THE UNITED STATES ON EUROPEAN UNION-TURKEY RELATIONS: A NEOCLASSICAL REALIST APPROACH**

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January 2013, 133 pages

This thesis explores how and why the United States (U.S.) support for Turkey's participation in the European Union(EU) shifted from being an asset to a liability for Turkey between the years of 1995 and 2005. There have been some earlier studies that analyzed the impact of U.S. support for Turkey's inclusion in the EU on EU-Turkey relations. The purpose of this study is to contribute further to that literature with a plausible explanation for the shifting influence of the United States on EU-Turkey relations, utilizing the multi-dimensional approach of neoclassical realism. This thesis focuses on the changing EU-U.S. relations in the altered international climate after the end of the Cold War; the attempts and strategy of the U.S. in supporting Turkish membership in the EU; and why the reactions of EU leaders and politicians to U.S. interventions turned in a much more negative direction during the early 2000s. By applying neoclassical realism and its flexible methodology, this thesis is highly sensitive to the multi-levels of influence behind given policy outcomes by balancing the role of external structural factors with domestic contexts

and constraints. This analysis demonstrates that besides the international climate, a range of EU level and domestic factors operated together in influencing the EU decisions about Turkey and reactions to US interventions during the early 2000s. In turn, this analysis supplies evidence that, consistent with the perspective of neoclassical realism, external influences as well as a range of domestic influences should all be taken into consideration for a complete understanding of international policy outcomes and postures.

Keywords: EU-US Relations, EU-Turkey Relations, European Union Enlargement, Neoclassical Realism, United States Influence

## ÖZ

### AMERİKA BİRLEŞİK DEVLETLERİ’NİN AVRUPA BİRLİĞİ-TÜRKİYE İLİŞKİLERİ ÜZERİNDEKİ DEĞİŞEN ETKİSİ: NEOKLASİK REALİST BİR YAKLAŞIM

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Tez Yöneticisi: Prof. Dr. Atilla Eralp

Ocak 2013, 133 sayfa

Bu tez, 1995 ve 2005 yılları arasında , Türkiye’nin Avrupa Birliği’ne (AB) katılımını amaçlayan Amerika Birleşik Devletleri (A.B.D.) desteklerinin Türkiye için faydalı olmaktan çıkıp neden ve nasıl bir yük haline dönüştüğünü araştırmaktadır. Bundan önce, A.B.D.’nin Türkiye’nin AB’ye dahil edilmesi amacıyla gerçekleştirdiği desteklerin AB-Türkiye ilişkileri üzerindeki etkilerini araştıran bazı çalışmalar olmuştur. Bu çalışmanın amacı, A.B.D.’nin AB-Türkiye ilişkileri üzerindeki değişen etkisine Neoklasik Realizm’in çok boyutlu yaklaşımından faydalanan makul bir açıklama getirerek bu literatüre daha fazla katkıda bulunmaktır. Bu tez, Soğuk savaşın sona ermesiyle farklılaşan uluslararası ortam içerisinde değişen AB-A.B.D. ilişkilerine; A.B.D.’nin Türkiye’nin AB üyeliğini destekleme girişimleri ve stratejisine ve neden AB liderleri ve siyasilerinin A.B.D. girişimlerine tepkilerinin 2000’li yılların başlarında çok daha olumsuz bir şekil aldığına yoğunlaşmaktadır. Çalışma, Neoklasik Realizm ve esnek metodolojisini uygulayarak, yapısal dış faktörlerin yanında iç faktörleri ve kısıtlamaları da göz önünde bulundurarak belirli

dış politikara yol açan çok boyutlu etkilere son derece önem vermektedir. Bu analiz, AB'nin Türkiye ve A.B.D. müdahaleleri ile ilgili kararlarında uluslararası ortamın yanı sıra, bir dizi AB düzeyinde ve iç faktörün etkili olduğunu göstermektedir. Böylece, bu çalışma Neoklasik Realist teoriyle tutarlı olarak, uluslararası politika ve duruşların tam olarak anlaşılması için dış etmenlerin yanısıra bir dizi iç etmenin göz önünde bulundurulması gerektiğini göstermiştir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: AB-A.B.D. İlişkileri, AB Türkiye İlişkileri, Avrupa Birliği Genişlemesi, Neoklasik Realizm, Amerika Birleşik Devletleri Etkisi

## **ACKNOWLEDGMENTS**

First, I would like to express my sincere gratitude to my supervisor Prof. Dr. Atilla Eralp for his guidance, advice, criticism and insight throughout the research.

I would also like to thank to rest of my committee: Assoc. Prof. Dr. Galip Yalman and Assist. Prof. Dr. Özgehan Şenyuva for their critical questions, helpful comments and contributions.

My utmost and deepest gratitude goes to my dear friend Prof. Dr. Sherri Grasmuck, whose valuable suggestions and encouragement I will never forget. Throughout this research, she was always there to inspire and enlighten me with her wisdom and experiences during my hard and trying times. Without the assistance and emotional support she provided, I could never have finished this journey. Additionally, I would like to thank my colleague Aysel Önem who has been with me as I hurdle all the obstacles in the fulfillment of this study.

I also wish to offer my special thanks to my boyfriend Alper for making this thesis possible with his love and never ending support.

Last but not the least; I would like to thank my dearest family members, my mom, dad and brother, for their unconditional support, understanding and patience throughout my life. It is to them that this thesis is dedicated.



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## **CHAPTER 1**

### **INTRODUCTION**

This thesis explores how and why United States support for Turkey's participation in the European Union shifted from being an asset to a liability for Turkey between the years of 1995 and 2005 and the central importance of understanding shifting relations between the United States and Europe for understanding Turkey's fate in the process. The question of U.S. influence in the European Union -Turkey relations after the end of the Cold War offers a unique analysis to the researcher interested in multi-faceted analysis as the process unfolds on various levels. It is very remarkable that Turkey has stayed as one of the major issues in the transatlantic relations between the U.S. and EC (European Community) / EU since the end of World War II. Until the end of 1980s, the issue of Turkey and its inclusion in the West seemed to be unfolding in an affirmative manner. There seemed to be widespread international and domestic support for this development. However, the end of Cold War challenged the prospects for Turkey's inclusionary place in the West. The U.S., with its renewed foreign policy, focused on the geo-strategic location of Turkey and continued its support of Turkey in European circles. However, once the Cold War ended the common cause around international security issues, the Western unity crumbled. This deteriorating unity in the international arena meant that the position of Turkey in the EU also changed over time. However, despite the division in the Western alliance after the end of Cold War, U.S. efforts during the 1990s for anchoring Turkey to the EU seemed to be progressing in a positive manner, contributing to a Customs Union Agreement between Turkey and the EU in 1995 and the Helsinki European Council Decision in 1999, noticing Turkey's candidate statute in the Union.

However, by the Copenhagen European Council in 2002 and the 2004 European Council decision to start accession talks with Turkey, although U.S. power or the international structure did not change drastically, the impact of U.S. support on the Turkish question in the EU had shifted dramatically in a negative direction. In short, U.S. support had become a liability for Turkey.

This thesis aims to analyze the shift in U.S. influence on Turkey-EU relations within this context. It focuses on the EU and the U.S. in an altered international climate after the end of Cold War, the attempts and the strategy of the U.S. for Turkish membership in the EU and causes why the reactions of the EU leaders and politicians to U.S. interventions turned in a much more negative direction during the 2000s.

This thesis is primarily concerned with the European perspective behind the noticeable decreasing effects of the U.S. on Turkey-EU relations. It will explore how the altered international climate and specifically the changed relationship of the EU with the hegemonic power of the United States in turn impacted U.S. influence on the fate of Turkey and its relationship with Europe. Exploring this broader question will bring forward other minor questions to be answered in the following chapters such as the following: How did the U.S. and the EU handle the question of Turkey? By what means did the U.S. influence Turkey-EU relations? Whether, when and why did the U.S. shape the relations between Turkey and the EU? Why did the U.S. consistently and aggressively support Turkey in the EU? In which ways did it support Turkey? What are the limitations of American intervention in Turkey-EU relations? How did the relations between the U.S. and the EU progress throughout the 1990s and the early 2000s? What are the effects of the transatlantic relations on the legitimacy of the U.S. to advocate for Turkey in EU-Turkey relations?

In order to address the main question, I will review very briefly some relevant conceptual literature. However, the focus here will be on reviewing a series of

secondary sources which shed light on the significance of different levels of influence from the geopolitical to the national, and from structural (external) to non-structural (domestic) incentives in order to make sense of this shift.

The overall research will be limited to the period from 1987, when Turkey officially submitted its application for membership in the EU to the start of the accession talks with Turkey in December 2005, as this period best encompasses the key elements to evaluate the gradually decreasing scope of the U.S. influence on Turkey-EU relations. Among the factors to be considered are the sharp end of the Cold War at the end of 1980s and the Iraq War at the 2000s. Furthermore, in this period, there lingers the impact of the Cold War international climate in Europe and the ambiguous atmosphere of the post-cold war period dominates the foreign behaviors of the EU; as a consequence U.S. influence seems to be positively resonating in European capitals. Thirdly and more prominently, after the start of accession talks in 2005, Turkey-EU relations started to shift into a different framework. Then, it became clear that the final decisions of the Union, such as with the ratification of the association agreement of Customs Union in 1995 or the granting Turkey candidate status in Helsinki Summit in 1999, would not be under the influence of the external forces anymore. Instead, the fate of Turkey and the issues at the heart of the negotiations between the EU and Turkey involve domestic reforms in Turkey, a shift that progressing more systematically in the domestic direction. After the start of accession talks, the decision making of the EU about Turkey started to be linked closely to Turkey's reform process, and by then Turkey and the U.S. understood that the U.S. intervention would mean nothing unless Turkey would adopt the necessary reforms. In another words, U.S. strategic interests no longer dominated the outcome for Turkey.

The following chapters take up these issues sequentially. In order to understand the impact of the changed international atmosphere after the end of Cold War on the

foreign behaviors of the hegemonic powers of the U.S. and the EU towards Turkey, **the second chapter** of this thesis sets the historical context for the reader, with an overview of the history of the bilateral relations. This chapter makes the reader familiar with the changing bilateral relations of the U.S. and Turkey, as well as EU-Turkey relations and emphasizes the divergences in the approaches of the EU and the U.S. towards Turkey, which came to the surface after the West divided with the disposal of Soviet threat. Throughout this chapter and overall in the study, Turkey's foreign and domestic policies are not emphasized but rather the focal point is centered on the U.S. and the EU approaches, motivations and their foreign behaviors and interests. To understand the divergence in their approaches towards Turkey and the decreasing extent of U.S. influence on Turkish membership in the EU, this chapter introduces the perspective of neoclassical realism and its assumptions as an overarching international relations theory of this study. The chapter elaborates the defining analytic features of this perspective on international relations as well as how it relates to a variety of related perspectives. First, it situates neoclassical realism along a continuum of theoretical approaches ranging from realism to social constructivism before turning to a consideration of distinct schools of thought within the neoclassical realistic approach. Then, the chapter explores how, differently from realist and neorealist theories, neoclassical realism adopts a rather flexible methodology, including a series of domestic intervening factors operating along side of the international environment as mattering to our understanding of foreign policies.

By applying neoclassical realism and its flexible methodology, this thesis aims at being highly sensitive to the multi-levels of influence behind given policy outcomes, by balancing the role of external structural factors, national concerns with security and domestic contexts for a complete understanding of foreign policy outcomes. Neoclassical realism, being highly comprehensive and flexible, will be able to strengthen the study with its 'richness' (Juneau, 2010), balancing external incentives

with domestic factors. However, this thesis does not try to evaluate neoclassical realism in terms of its sufficiency nor test its validity in the foreign policy explanations. Rather, neoclassical realism offers tools for analyzing the main problem in a systematic way and strengthens the argument proposed throughout the study.

In order to understand the scope of U.S. influence on the EU-Turkey relations, **the third chapter** provides U.S. attempts of support during the 1990s and early 2000s, with a special attention to U.S. approach to Turkey's membership after the Cold War. This chapter first questions the national interests of the U.S. and the motives behind U.S. support for Turkey-EU relations by focusing on the international climate as an independent variable, and its effects on U.S. foreign policy related to supporting Turkish membership in the EU. Then, to understand when and how the U.S. influenced Turkey-EU relations, the chapter maps how U.S. support for Turkey progressed in the historical instances of Turkey-EU relations from the end of the 1980s to 2005. In demonstrating the form of US interventions in that period, perceptions and ideologies of US leaders are considered here as domestic intervals. However, the chapter prominently emphasizes the consistent and increasing nature of U.S. interventions by relating them to the shifting structural influences with the sharp end of the Cold War, the 9/11 attacks and emerging Iraq crisis. The chapter is divided in two parts in examining U.S. interventions in Turkey-EU relations: American support during the 1990s and American support at the early 2000s. In the first part, during the 1990s, U.S. support in two important historical events and its consequences are examined: U.S. support for the Customs Union Agreement in 1995 and Helsinki European Council in 1999. To set forth the altered reactions of the EU to U.S. interventions, the second part of the chapter is devoted to U.S. support and its reflections on the EU on the eve of Copenhagen Council in 2002 and the decision to start accession talks in 2004. By focusing on the changing reactions by the EU to U.S. interventions during the presidency of Clinton and Bush, the chapter presents



empirical data showing the noticeably decreasing legitimacy of the U.S. during these two presidencies on EU-Turkey relations.

**The fourth chapter** is devoted to questioning why the scope of U.S. direct influence on EU-Turkey relations decreased noticeably, by examining the EU approach towards the issue of Turkey and U.S. support for Turkish membership with the help of non-structural intervening variables. As a consequence, this chapter introduces multiple levels of analysis which combines structural international influences as well as a range of national level domestic influences in explaining the EU policy outcomes related to Turkey's inclusion and limitations of American support. Besides the external variables from international structures such as the Balkan and Iraq crises, intervening state level variables (domestic) will be considered here. These include such variables as the political and economic context of the EU, a range of social and cultural factors, emerging ideological differences, domestic political pressures, differences in the perceptions of transatlantic leaders, elites and politicians regarding systemic incentives and security during the Iraq Crisis, and different strategic understandings of Turkey's role. These factors are all need to understand the changing scope of U.S. influence on the EU regarding Turkey from post-cold war period to post 9/11 attacks.

These chapters, put together, tell the story of how paradoxically the consistent and sustained support of the U.S. for Turkey's inclusion in the central supra-national governing body of Europe became overtime delegitimized in the eyes of European leaders. In turn this case illustrates the central importance of shifting geo-political hierarchies and the shifting balance between international and domestic concerns for understanding international policy outcomes.

## **CHAPTER 2**

### **SETTING THE CONTEXT: HISTORICAL AND THEORETICAL BACKGROUND**

#### **2.1. Introduction**

Since the establishment of Turkish Republic in 1923, the US and Europe have together represented Western orientation to Turkish leaders and politicians for facilitating the modernization and development of the country. Similarly, Turkey has always remained on a remarkable ground in the transatlantic relations of the US and the EU since the end of World War II. During the Cold War, security-strategic emphasis of the foreign policies of the Western European states and the US brought forth a consensus in including Turkey in the Western alliance. Turkey also considered it vital to be anchored to the West to attain security against Soviet expansionism. After the end of Cold War, the bilateral relations underwent a transformation. Having close relations with Turkey kept its prominence for the US agenda, as the US policy after the disposal of Soviet threat was centered on the critical regions surrounding Turkey: the Balkans, the Middle East, the Caucasus, Central Asia, and the Persian Gulf. For the US, Turkey's location and its alliance gained more importance after 9/11 attacks and the President Bush's 'War on Terrorism' started. As a consequence, Turkey-US relations progressed on a geo-strategic base after the end of Cold War. However, the end of the Cold War changed the dimension of the EU and Turkey relations. With the disposal of the Soviet threat and common endeavor, common security concerns declined and the political transformation of the European Economic Community accelerated. While Turkey's geo-strategic position stayed important for Europe, the ideology of Europe about Turkey came to the surface. As a

consequence Turkey-EU relations continued in a different dimension with the relations set up with the US.

With this context in mind, this chapter will introduce the historical and theoretical background of this thesis to facilitate and strengthen the analysis of the main subject. First, it will map an overview of the US-Turkey and EU-Turkey relations after Cold War to set the context to the reader, emphasizing the different contexts of the bilateral relations, which emerged after the West divided at the end of 1980s. While introducing the historical background of the US-Turkey relations, this chapter will focus on some basic issues, which have implications for EU; such as Gulf War, Balkans, energy policy, and Iraq War. In EU-Turkey relations, it will emphasize multi-dimensional and complex context rather than depending on a sole geo-strategic argument. In explaining US and EU foreign policies and the decreasing extent of US influence on EU-Turkey relations, this chapter will introduce ‘neoclassical realism’ as an overarching theoretical framework of the analysis. Neo-classical realism is described as having the most appropriate methodology to explain multi-dimensional and complex extent of US influence as it is a highly comprehensive and flexible theory, which connects the features of both the neorealism and social constructivism (Rose, 1998). With the help of this theory, this analysis will include the domestic context of the sides near the external structural factors. Neo-classical realism will contribute to the analysis by combining the external variables with the domestic factors.

## **2.2. Historical Background of the Bilateral Relations**

### **2.2.1. US-Turkey Relations after Cold War**

At the beginning of the US-Turkey relations, the US viewed Turkey as part of the European world (Lesser, 2008, p.217). With the alert of increasing Soviet

expansionism towards the Middle East and the rich oil resources, the US started to approach Turkey as a more delicate issue as Turkey geo-strategically had a critical position in fighting against the Soviet expansionism. Truman Doctrine (1947), granting economic and military aid to Turkey and Greece to protect them from the impacts of communism (Kayhan and Lindley, 2006, p.212) and the Marshall Plan (1948-52), similarly providing economic assistance, were primary American actions to support Turkey in the Cold War era. Turkey's entry into NATO in 1952, facilitated by its transition to full democracy with the multi-party system in 1950, and its contributions in Korean War in 1950 made it possible for Turkey to strengthen its tie to the West to guarantee its security (Kayhan and Lindley, 2006, p.212).

However, the end of the Cold War challenged the global role of the US. The sharp end of the threat of communism led everyone to wonder about the future actions of the US in the international arena. After the elimination of the Soviet threat, the US turned its attention to the Middle East, which had rich oil resources in the Caspian region and the Caucasus. Turkey stayed extremely important for the US to implement its policy and to provide stability in those regions due to its unique geo-strategic location. Turkey was straddling the heart of geographic areas of increasingly strategic importance in the post-Cold war era: the Balkans, the Middle East, the Caucasus, Central Asia, and the Persian Gulf. Its borders with Iran, Iraq and Syria, its good relations with Israel and the critical role of its airbases made Turkey a major partner for the US in the Middle East. The US policy also used Turkey as a secular model for democracy promotion in the Middle East. The Clinton administration also assumed that Turkey would be a good model for the countries emerging after the collapse of the Soviet Union to speed up their democratic transformation and adopt free economies (Tocci, 2011). As a consequence, in 1999, Turkish-American alliance was described as a 'strategic partnership' by the Clinton administration and based on 'multi-faceted' and 'multi-dimensional' relations. (Kayhan and Lindley, 2006, p.216). During the post-cold war period, Turkey and the

US relations were based on geo-politic and strategic understanding and they cooperated in many critical instances.

In the first place, the post-cold war era partnership started with Turkey's cooperation with the US in Gulf War. The economic assistance by the US was a crucial point in the decision making of Turkey about the collaboration in the War. Further, with the increase of PKK mobility and threats in the area, it didn't see any options rather than complying with the US (Oğuzlu, 2008). The War also presented a good set of circumstances for Turkey to prove its importance to the West. Turkey's willingness to cooperate with the US in the Gulf War indicated that Turkey was a valuable alliance to the West. When the US launched the offensive act on January 17, 1991, the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA) accepted the bill that the Turkish army would join a coalition with the US bases against Iraq. Turkish parliament also approved periodically the use of its grounds by the US aircraft and ground troops with Operation Provide Comfort (OPC), (renamed as Operation Northern Watch 'ONW' in time), which created controversial debates in the country (Barkey, 2007, p. 450).

As a second, to provide the stability in the Balkans, the US and Turkey played an active role in resolving the conflict in Bosnia. Turkey's foreign policy in the Balkans proceeded in accordance with the US policy in 1990s. The US engagement in Kosovo with the mobilization of NATO against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) and the following economic support and its impressive manner in NATO's actions in Balkans were remarkable efforts to maintain peace and the stability in Balkans (Tocci, 2011). Similarly, Turkey played an active role in the Balkans with the encouragement of Washington. In addition to using its Muslim identity to create closer relations between the Muslims in Bosnia and Croatia, Turkey matched and harmonized the attempts for constitutional agreement in Bosnia (Tocci, 2011). Turkey demonstrated its importance to the Western world, and joined in NATO involvements

of “UN Protection Force in Bosnia- Herzegovina (UNPROFOR) in 1993–95, Implementation Force (IFOR) and Stabilization Force (SFOR) in Bosnia- Herzegovina (1996–present), Combined Police Force in Bosnia Herzegovina (1995), UN Preventive Deployment Force in Macedonia (1995–present), International Police Task Force in Bosnia Herzegovina (1997–present), Operation ‘Alba’ in Albania (1997), Kosovo Verification Force (1998–99), and Kosovo Force (2001–present)” (Oğuzlu and Güngör, 2006,p.476).

During the 1990s, the bilateral relations grew stronger with the cooperation between Turkey and the US in the energy policies of the Caspian region. In that period, the visit of President Clinton to Turkey after its İzmit earthquake strengthened the relations (Flanagan and Brannen, p.2). Further, US support in prevention of a war between Turkey and Greece in 1999 and delivering PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan (Kirişçi, 2001) was similar to an award for Turkey to keep its presence for the US security based policies in the Middle-East. Besides the cooperation in the Gulf War, the collective action during the Balkan crisis, and the cooperation in raising the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline to bring Azeri oil to the Turkish Mediterranean part of Ceyhan ( Barkey, 2008, p.32), US advocacy in Turkey’s accession attempts to the EU was another representation of Turkey-US close relations during the 1990s.

However, transatlantic relations started to get strained at the start of the 2000s after the 9/11 terrorist attacks to the US by the Islamist militant group al-Qaeda . The start of US fight against anti-Western Islamism transformed US policy into a more interventionist one as the US started to take more immediate actions. After 9/11 attacks, Turkey’s more independent security and defense policy and its responding process towards the US requests after analyzing the results for its own interests put the relations into crisis.

After the September 11 terrorist attacks, Turkey declared its presence near the US for the fight against the terrorism as a country which lost a large number of its citizens' lives in the terrorist attacks. Turkish participation in the war against Afghanistan showed that it was eager and prepared to cooperate with the US in the war against the terrorism (Kayhan and Lindley, 2006, p.216). Turkey opened its airspace to the US in the war against the Taliban and sent its Turkish special forces to Afghanistan as support to the US (Kayhan and Lindley, 2006). Besides giving logistical and intelligence assistance to the US during the war, Turkey also took part in the International Security Assistance Force after the war ended and the Taliban Regime collapsed (Kayhan and Lindley, 2006, p.216). Furthermore, Turkey had the command of the ISAF from June 2002 to February 2003 and from February 2005 to July 2005 (Kayhan and Lindley, 2006, p.216).

As for the Iraq War, Turkey was skeptical about the war and opening American bases in Turkish lands given its consequences. It was aware that economic alarm from a war nearby could be caused, and wasn't satisfied with the economic aid it received from the US after the Gulf War (Güney, 2005). The Turkish administration was also worried about a possible Kurdish state in the Northern Iraq which would affect badly the Kurdish population and spread of terrorism in Turkey's borders. The country was afraid of a revolt from its Kurdish population in the case of an emergence of a Kurdish state in Northern Iraq, as well as the fleeing of refugees coming to Turkish lands after a military strike in its borders (Güney, 2005). Furthermore, AKP(Justice and Development Party) government, which came to power right before the US pressure for permission and had Islamic roots, was unable to decide easily because of its policy structure (Güney, 2005). It was difficult for this government to support a war against another Muslim country. However, the US didn't initially expect a Turkish hesitation to the US requests. Turkey's full support was of vital importance for Washington and its Western allies. In fact, one can make the argument that,

without Ankara, Washington would have had ‘a terrible time keeping Saddam Hussein in a box.’ (Barkey, 2008, p.32).

The US, to accelerate the decision process of the government and convince the government to permit US deployment of forces in Turkey, made promises for economic aid to Turkey. When the global economic crisis of 2002 hit Turkey, that economic aid packet was quite important for Turkey. Still, as Turkey had not been able to get the compensation for the Gulf War, it was still suspicious about supporting the war (Güney, 2005). Instead, Turkey was willing to provide the peace in the area and tried to guarantee the support of the other Middle Eastern countries. When the US was pushing to get the permission for establishing the bases in Turkey, the Erdogan government gathered the foreign ministers of Syria, Iran, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan to keep stability in the Middle East and avoid the war (Güney, 2005).

As the time passed, Bush administration was getting impatient about deploying the forces. The US offered Turkey up to 20 billion dollars in loans from the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Also, the US promised to provide 14 billion dollars in grants in exchange for Turkish support in the war, which Turkey ultimately declared insufficient in the negotiations (Güney, 2005, p.349). Although Bush administration intimidated Turkey that it would cut the military aid in the case of a rejection by the Turkish government and the Erdogan government did not want to lose the US, the Turkish parliament rejected the use of Turkish lands by the US forces to invade the Iraq by 264-251 votes with 19 abstentions. After all of the US attempts to attract Turkey to cooperate in the war and the negotiations and the promises on the economic aids for recovery after the war, the TGNA disapproval to the transfer of American forces to Iraq from Turkish lands came as a complete shock for the US (Congress of the United States, 2003).



TGNA's March 2003 rejection of the use of Turkish lands by American forces to attack Saddam Hussein's regime brought the US-Turkey relations into crisis and seriously damaged the alliance. The Erdogan administration, to compensate for the refusal and to prevent the US from taking a position against Turkey, offered a new bill to TGNA to open the airspace of Turkey to US combat aircraft and permit the US to use Turkish lands for humanitarian operations and logistical support for US personnel in Iraq. TGNA approved the bill, which was quite beneficial for the US, although not to the extent that the US had initially expected. Although Turkey was unwilling to participate in the war, the result of the TGNA approval reflected Turkey to be in favor of the Iraq invasion. Subsequently, the TGNA in October 2003 voted to confirm the deployment of 10.000 Turkish troops to Iraq against the Kurdish threat in the area. The Turkish troops in Northern Iraq created harsh criticisms and reactions from the US, as well as Europe (Oğuzlu, 2004).

It can be argued that the developments in the Middle East and subsequent Iraq events evidently showed that Turkey had a more 'activist' and independent foreign policy after the US adopted a more interventionist Middle East Policy (Barkey, 2008, p.43). Although Turkey demonstrated its appetite to act with the US, it didn't hesitate to behave separately when the estimated results would harm its favors. Turkey's foreign policy and its stance in the Balkans and the Middle East was affected by the US policy, but not completely a product of it (Tocci, 2011). After the end of Cold War, Turkey started to develop a slightly more independent foreign policy under the leadership of President Turgut Özal, and R. Tayyip Erdoğan's administration took it forward further with its own foreign policy, including the policy of 'zero problems' with regional neighbors (Kayhan and Lindley, 2006). Turkish foreign policy toward Russia, Iran, Iraq and Syria can be analyzed in the lights of its interests and domestic institutions, state bodies, as well as civil society groups (Kirişçi, 2009).

On the eve of the Iraq War in 2003, Turkey tended to cooperate with its neighbors. As a consequence, at the beginning of the 2000s, Erdoğan administration had taken steps to cooperate with Iran against PKK terrorism at their shared borders. In addition, Turkey started to take initiatives to mediate between Israel and Syria, dating back to the January 2004 visit of Syrian President al-Assad to Turkey (Tocci, 2011, p.136). During the Iraq War, instead of the US, who started to lose its prestige as a peacemaker, Turkey started to play the role of attempting to provide tranquility and stability in the Middle East. Turkey's 'arm's length' policy towards the Washington policy in the Middle East and Iraq especially after the TGNA refusal, and a more 'active' and engaged approach to Iran, Palestine and Syria, created worries in Washington that led to the inevitable question: was 'the US... losing Turkey?' (Lesser, 2008, p.221). Turkey, afraid of being completely removed from the West, paid more attention to its Europeanization process when the relations with the US were in conflict during the Iraq crisis. Yet, even though Europe was the priority for Turkey, especially after Helsinki summit, for Turkey it was very important not to lose the US and guarantee at least its partial support.

### **2.2.2. EU-Turkey Relations after Cold War**

The relations that Europe has pursued with Turkey have been complex and multi-dimensional throughout history. Since the foundation of its republic, Turkey has viewed its relationship with Europe as a supporting agent for a place in the West and accelerating its own modernization process. On the other hand, Europe, with realistic prospects, has always been willing to improve its relations with Turkey. However, both sides have interpreted the dimensions of these relations differently. While Turkey has consistently attempted to link to Europe closely and attain membership in the EU, the views about Turkish membership have differed among the member states and been a source of debate and conflict within the Union. After the framework of Turkey's association agreement changed with a formal application for membership in

1987, the bilateral relations underwent a transformation and arrived at a different form, demonstrating a turn from the Cold War into the Post-Cold War period.

From World War II to the 1990s, Europe shared similar ideas about Turkey with the US, focusing on the geo-strategic position of the country (Kramer, 2000, p.223). Turkey's geographical location was relevant to the security-oriented foreign policy of Europe during the Cold War era. As asserted by Gordon and Taspinar (2008):

As a NATO member country that shared borders with the Soviet Union and tied down some twenty-four Russian divisions, Turkey's credentials as a valuable military asset to the West were undisputed. Thorny questions about democratic standards, military interventions, human rights, and Muslim identity were set aside (p.40).

Within an international environment full of security concerns, the ideologies of the member states regarding Turkey's different culture, religion, and domestic shortcomings did not reflect their foreign policy towards the country. In this international context, Turkey succeeded in becoming one of the first countries named as a member of the Council of Europe in 1949. It was a founding member of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) in 1961 and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in 1973.

Turkey had its first contractual relation with the European Community (EC) in the 1960s. It submitted its first formal application to become a member in 1959, and had the position of associate membership in the EC in 1963, with the Ankara agreement coming just two years after the agreement with Athens, Greece (Öniş, 2000, p.467). The agreement was the basis of a Customs Union, which would start after a preparatory phase of five years and a transition period of twelve (Franck, 2002, p. 109). Article 28 of the agreement assured: " ...when the operation of the agreement makes it possible to envisage acceptance by Turkey of the full obligations deriving from the Treaty establishing the Community, the contracting parties shall examine

the possibility of the accession of Turkey to membership of the Community” (cited in Franck, 2002, p.109). The additional protocol to the 1963 agreement, which was signed in September 1970 and came into force in January 1973, mapped the direction of the transitional period for completion of the Customs Union. However, the transitional period lasted instead until January 1996 (Franck, 2002, p.109).

During the Cold War period, the bilateral relations between Turkey and the EC progressed in a favorable way for Turkey. In that period, Greece and Turkey had similar places in the EC and there were no noticeably different attitudes towards Greece, Portugal, Spain or Turkey (Öniş, 2000, p.467). Further, the EC launched its Mediterranean policy in 1972. The Turkish Association was signed within this framework, similar to the associations with Malta and Cyprus in 1970 and 1972 respectively (Franck, 2002, p.109). The participation of Turkey in the process of Western integration equally with other non-member countries demonstrated the common understanding of the US and the EU regarding Turkey.

Before signing Turkey’s Association Agreement, Walter Hallstein, the German Christian Democrat, who was the first president of the European Economic Community, demonstrated the organization’s common understanding with the US, declaring: “Turkey is part of Europe: today that means that she has established an institutional relationship with the European Community. As for the Community itself, the relationship is imbued with the concept of evaluation” ( cited in Economist, 2010, October 21; Franck, 2002, p.109). Similarly, the security-based policy of the Community towards Turkey was emphasized in 1963 with the saying of Eugene Schaus, the president of the Council of Ministers: “Turkey has been one of the first European countries to express its trust in the Community and its role in the organization of the free world underlines the importance of its participation in our common endeavor” (cited in Tocci,2011,p.93). In that period, Turkey was part of the ‘free states’ and “played a key role in the defense of ‘Western civilizations’ in its

struggle against the Soviet Union” (Tocci,2011, p.90). Turkey’s good relations with the EC also showed the economic importance of Turkey for Europe. During the Cold War era, about 50 percent of Turkey’s trade was with the EC (Franck,2002,p.108).

The similar security policy of the EU with the US, focusing on Turkey’s geo-strategic position, started to disappear with the end of Cold War. In the absence of the security concerns, the EU had the chance to turn inside, work on its domestic structure, and ultimately experienced dramatic economic and political change (Öniş, 2000, p.464), which started with the Single European Act in 1987. As a consequence, the ideology of Europe about Turkey, which was hidden under the pressure of the Cold War, started to rise in European circles. The arguments about Turkey in the EU started to be affected by the changing nature of Post-Cold War Europe and the political and religious reflections of the post-9/11 events on Europe (Alessandri, 2010, p.94).

Still, after the end of the Cold War, for the Europeans, good relations with Turkey remained a significant asset, in light of Turkey’s prominence as a key player for providing stability in the Middle East and Eurasia (Larrabee and Lesser,2001). Within its foreign policy, the EU approached Turkey in a realistic view, paying attention to its location as a bridge to Russia and Central Asian Republics in addition to the economic opportunities Turkey presented within its domestic market (Öniş, 2000, p.466). Nonetheless, given the fact that Europe did not focus on Turkey’s neighboring area in the same sense as the US, it interpreted Turkey’s location in a more broad way (Kramer, 2000, p.223). Kramer (2000) explains this European understanding in the following manner:

For the Europeans, relations with Turkey kept their strategic value but were defined in more general and imprecise terms, such as the country's function as a bridge to the Islamic world or to Central Asia or as a barrier against the advance of threatening Islamic fundamentalism. This is a consequence of the

equally vague way the Europeans tend to define their new security interests more generally: stability, prosperity, and peace in Europe and its neighborhood (p.223).

When the orders changed with the disposal of the Soviet threat, Turkey had to determine its place and stance in an international environment of ambiguity. Ankara soon decided that to achieve stability in both its domestic economy and politics, it was vital to join the ‘progressive and increasingly democratic institutions that Europe represented’ (Gordon and Taspinar, 2008, p.39). After the military left the position of authority in the nation and Turkey gained democracy again in 1983, Ankara didn’t see any obstacles to formally apply to the Community for membership (Öniş, 2000, p.468). As a consequence, in 1987, Özal’s government formally applied to the EC to accelerate the democratization and economic development of the country. The formal application to the EC in 1987 was significant in terms of bringing the Turkey issue back to the EC’s agenda (Yılmaz, 2009, p.56).

European Commission showed their changing vision by rejecting the Turkish membership application in view of the country’s democratic and economic deficits. The formal application of Ankara for membership made the ‘Turkey issue’ more delicate for the EC and carried the bilateral relations to a different context. Although there was an associate membership agreement between the EC and Turkey during the Cold War, the full membership application seemed to be more serious and created fear within European circles. In the context of its domestic policy, the EC/EU approached Turkey with some concerns related to the nation’s political and economic deficits, religious and cultural differences (Öniş, 2000, p.466) and the consequences of its membership on the EC/EU’s political and economic integration, which will be explained in detail in chapter 4.

Besides the intervention of Turkish troops in Cyprus in 1974, Turkey’s worsening economic and political situation and military coup in 1980 had already created a new

low in the relations (Öniş,2000, p.468). The economic struggle and political crisis of Turkey under the pressure of the PKK, the removal of the Islamist Prime minister Necmettin Erbakan (Gordon and Taspinar, 2008, p.40), and the Community's concerns related to its political integration and completion of the free market, were all factors in the negative decision. Further, with the risk of instability coming from Central and Eastern European countries after the disposal of Soviet Union, inclusion of those countries to the West seemed more urgent to the Community. (Gordon and Taspinar, 2008, p. 40).

As the Commission approved Turkey's 'eligibility' for membership in 1989, Turkey didn't give up the prospect of full membership in the EU and didn't change its vision of integrating with the West (Tocci, 2011, p.2). After the rejection of 1989, the **Customs Union** was another chance for Turkey to have a place in the West. Hence, besides adopting domestic reforms at home, Turkey lobbied firmly with the Europeans to approve the Customs Union agreement. Finally, the European Parliament ratified the Customs Union agreement with Turkey in December 1995. The agreement was important in terms of integrating Turkey economically with the West. With the help of the Customs Union, at the end of the 1990s, nearly "50 percent of Turkey's yearly trade was with the EU" (Nachmani, 2003, p.64). Ankara viewed the agreement as a hopeful mark of future membership in the EU. On the other hand, for many European leaders, the Customs Union agreement was solely sufficient for having Turkey as part of the West (Yılmaz, 2009, p.56); there was no need to give Turkey a membership statue.

**In December 1997, The Luxembourg European Council** did not include Turkey as a candidate country along with the other Central and Eastern European countries, claiming it didn't meet the criteria for candidacy. Before the Luxembourg Summit, the European Christian Democratic Union (CDU), asserted: "the EU is in the process of building a civilization in which Turkey has no place" (cited in Gordon and

Taspinar, 2008,p.41). The Luxembourg Council decision implied one more time that the EU-Turkey relations would not progress at the same pace as US -Turkey relations. The summit placed Turkey in the ‘framework of a new European strategy’ (Gordon and Taspinar, 2008, p.41) and demonstrated Turkey’s integration to the EU would not be simply on a geo-strategic basis, similar to its relationship with the US. (Öniş, 2000, p.465).

Ultimately, the Luxembourg decision deteriorated the positive atmosphere which was created with the Customs Union agreement. The EU’s rejecting of Turkey’s candidacy generated a disappointment in the nation and put the relations in tension with each other. Ankara considered the result an unfair decision since the other candidate countries were not ahead of Turkey in terms of economic and political structures and Turkey had applied earlier than the other countries (the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland ,Slovakia) (Öniş, 2000,p.463). As a consequence of this, the Turkish government froze its relations with the EU and threatened to withdraw its membership application by summer 1998 (Barchard, 1998, p.2).

However, after two years, ‘paradoxically’ the EU changed its decision in **the Helsinki Council of 1999** (Öniş, 2000, p.464). As an attempt to improve relations with Turkey, which had been worsening since the Luxembourg decision, the EU gave the candidate statue to Turkey in the Helsinki Council. While approving Turkey’s candidacy, the European Council in Helsinki made it clear that the Union would open the negotiations with Turkey on the condition that Turkey would meet the Copenhagen political criteria, which are the provisions of the EU to determine whether a country is eligible for full membership. After Turkey’s candidacy took effect, the EU took responsibility for Turkey’s economic and political reform process by providing economic assistance to the country. At the same time, the Commission started to monitor the developments in Turkey’s domestic reform process and made



recommendations, by designing a first Accession Partnership for Turkey (Tocci, 2011, p.4).

After the Helsinki decision, the course of political and economic reforms to comply with the EU criteria came at the top of the agenda in Ankara; Turkey underwent a comprehensive reform process during the early 2000s. Turkey strengthened its reform process upon the declaration of the **Copenhagen European Council** in 2002 that the final decision regarding the start of accession talks would take place in December 2004, according to Turkey's performance related to political and economic transformations.

With the aim of opening accession negotiations, Turkey accelerated its reform process under the AKP government during the early 2000s. The prospect of the EU membership played an important role in dealing with domestic deficits, besides the attempts of resolving the disagreements with its neighbors (Alessandri, 2010, p.88). Turkey adopted a range of domestic reforms related to its political and economic structure, such as increasing the civilian control of the National Security Council, drastic improvements in human rights and freedoms of speech, increasing minority rights for Kurdish citizens, monitoring prisons to avoid torture and abuse, removing State Security Courts, which were established in 1980 during the military coup, and liberalizing the economy (Gordon and Taspinar, 2008, p.44). Turkey's attempts at reforms seemed to reflect the **EU's decision in December 2004**. The EU consented to open the accession talks with Turkey in October 2005, reporting that Turkey 'sufficiently' met the condition to open the accession talks by this time (Tocci, 2011, p.4).

In December 2005, the start of accession talks supported the belief in Turkey that its performance in the reform process would ultimately be influential in securing its entrance to the EU. After the start of the accession talks, the EU started to trace

Turkey's reform process and adopted a continuum consisting of negotiations. The EU intended to support Turkey's preparation for membership and reform process with the help of updated accession partnerships and recommendations by the Commission's progress reports (Tocci, 2011, p.4). However, the process seems to be progressing slowly, as concluded by then French president Chirac: "Let's be clear if conditions allow the negotiations to start at the beginning of next year, we have to know these negotiations will be long, very long" (Guardian, 2004, April 30). The process has included multi-level aspects such as 'economic, political, cultural, ethnic, social, religious, secular and excessive national issues, the democratic process and military interventions in that process, human rights, minority rights, immigration and other aspects' (Nachmani, 2003, p.55). It is appropriate to anticipate that a difference exists with the relations established with the US. As argued by Kuhnhardt (1999): "The United States perceives Turkey primarily as a strategic asset, whereas the European states tend to concentrate more on conditions in Turkey, in particular human rights and problems of democratic consolidation but also the divide between Christianity and Islam" (p.234). In this regard, Turkey's relations with the EU will continue to progress in a multi-dimensional and complex context rather than depending on a sole geo-strategic argument.

## **2.3. The Overarching International Relations Theory of the Study**

### **2.3.1 Introduction to Neoclassical Realism**

The overarching theoretical framework I apply in this analysis of how the influence of the U.S. on EU-Turkey relations shifted over time is neoclassical realism. I will present the main assumptions and defining analytic features of this perspective on international relations as well as how it relates to a variety of related perspectives. As I will elaborate here, the main advantage of the neoclassical realist perspective for my analysis is that it is a comprehensive and an elastic theory, straddling structuralist

and constructivist theories (Rose, 1998, p.153). It is highly sensitive to the impact of global hierarchies of power, besides its emphasis on the importance of multi-levels of influence behind given policy outcomes.<sup>1</sup> I begin with broadly situating neoclassical realism along a continuum of theoretical approaches ranging from realism to social constructionism before turning to a consideration of distinct schools of thought within the neoclassical realist approach.

In 1998, Gideon Rose put forth the term ‘neo-classical realism’ to apply the field of study associated with the works of scholars such as Fareed Zakaria, Randall L. Schweller, William C. Wohlforth and Thomas J. Christensen (Ratti, 2006, p.96). Neoclassical realism derives from realist theories, which contain “some general assumptions about the motivations of individual states but does not purport to explain their behavior in great detail or in all cases” (Rose,1998,p.145). It is a theory which borrows assumptions from the theory of international politics of Waltz and the ‘Innenpolitik’ approaches of liberalism and constructivism (Onea, 2012, p.140). However, neoclassical realism is different from liberal and constructivist theories as it accepts the main assumption of structural theories that international structure is more important than the domestic structure of the state in constructing its foreign policy. According to the theory, hegemonic powers aim to influence and formulate the international environment by using their capabilities or resources to cope with the ambiguity of the international environment (Rose,1998,p.152). In the long run, as the power of a state increases, the state will be willing to expand its influence more in the international structure to a greater extent or vice-versa to withdraw with diminishing power (Rose,1998).

Neoclassical realism shares the approaches of realism and neorealism in its emphasis on the relative power of a state in the international system as the main determinant of

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<sup>1</sup> for a detailed discussion, see Brawley, 2008; Brawley, 2008-03-26; Dyson, 2010; Haas, 2006-08-31 ; Haas, 2006; Haas, 2007; Juneau, 2010; Onea, 2012; Schweller, 2006; Rose,1998.

its 'overall intentions' (Juneau, 2010, p.1). However, it balances that emphasis with domestic concerns. It assumes that international positioning and external pressures are filtered through a range of intervening domestic variables to produce foreign policy orientations and outcomes (Schweller, 2006, p.164). To reach a more comprehensive account of foreign policy, the researcher "must open the black box of the state and incorporate in the causal chain domestic-level variables which act as filters between systemic pressures and actual policy choices" (Juneau, 2010, p.1). Similarly, as Zakaria (1992) asserts: "a good account of a nation's foreign policy should include systemic, domestic and other influences, specifying what aspects of policy can be explained by what factors" (p.178). As Rose (1998) describes neoclassical realism:

It explicitly incorporates both external and internal variables, updating and systematizing certain insights drawn from classical realist thought. Its adherents argue that the scope and ambition of a country's foreign policy is driven first and foremost by its place in the international system and specifically by its relative material power capabilities. This is why they are realist. They argue further, however, that the impact of such power capabilities on foreign policy is indirect and complex, because systemic pressures must be translated through intervening variables at the unit level. This is why they are neoclassical. (p.145)

According to this theory, the domestic intervening variables such as the ideologies of political leaders and elites and their perceptions of the state strength and systemic incentives play an important role in the foreign policy choices (Rose, 1998). As it is asserted by Ratti (2006):

Unlike neo-realists and offensive realists, neoclassical realists explicitly reject the injunction that theories ought not to include explanatory variables at different levels of analysis. Neo-classical realists instead assume that foreign policy can be influenced also by unit-level variables (p.96).

The dependent variable, namely the foreign policy outcome is affected by “the intervention of internal factors, such as domestic interest groups, state interests or elite perceptions” (Juneau, 2010, p.1). Thus, following this line of thought, to comprehend the connection between ‘power’ and ‘policy’, the researcher should also analyze the context with help of the multiple levels of analysis involving multiple sources of influence (Rose, 1998, p.146).

Neoclassical realism emerges as a challenge to a range of perspectives such as the ‘innenpolitik’, ‘offensive’ and ‘defensive theories’ and exists in the middle of the realist and constructivist theories (Rose, 1998). The **innenpolitik theories** claim that to understand foreign policy, one should investigate closely the domestic politics of states (Rose, 1998). According to this approach, ‘political and economic ideology, national character, partisan politics or socio economic structure’ are some of the basic factors to be taken into consideration to understand the foreign policies of the states (Rose, 1998, p.148). Rose (1998) criticizes this approach for being insufficient in explaining the reasons behind the different behaviors of the states with similar domestic system and the similar behaviors of the states with different domestic structures in similar situations (p.148). He emphasizes that the main difference of neo-classical theory from the approach known as ‘Innenpolitic’, (domestic) are :

Innenpolitik theories are misguided, the neoclassical realists say, because if there is any single, dominant factor shaping the broad pattern of nations' foreign policies over time, it is their relative material power vis-a-vis the rest of the international system-so this is where analysis of foreign policy should begin (Rose, 2008, p151).

According to neoclassical realism, one should put the unit-level variables at the domestic level in the second place to understand the state behaviors comprehensively since a state cannot prevent from being influenced by the systemic incentives of the international environment in the long run (Rose, 2008, p.152).

Similarly, **offensive realists** consider that the international system should be viewed as the independent variable to understand the state behaviors (Rose, 1998). According to this theory, the similar external situation of the states is able to form their behaviors regardless of their internal structures. Rose (1998) observes:

foreign policy activity is the record of nervous states jockeying for position within the framework of a given systemic power configuration. To understand why a state is behaving in a particular way, offensive realists suggest, one should examine its relative capabilities and its external environment, because those factors will be translated relatively smoothly into foreign policy and shape how the state chooses to advance its interests (p.149).

**Defensive realism**, in contrast to the offensive realism, sees the security challenge as being rare in the international context (Rose, 1998). The states act rationally without a conflict as soon as their securities are not challenged. However, when the security is scarce, then the risk of the conflict among the states emerges. According to the defensive theory, the disregard or the misperception of the ‘security-related incentives’ by ‘rogue states’ concludes in the conflict in the international environment (Rose, 1998, p.150).

Neoclassical realism emerges as a challenge to these theories by drawing on their respective strengths. Neoclassical realism accepts the state as a unit actor and the international environment as an independent variable. As asserted by Zakaria (1998), a foreign policy theory “should first ask what effects the international system has on national behavior” (cited in Korteweg, 2011, p.38). Neoclassical realists start the analysis from the international structure by taking the relative power of the states as the main independent variable to understand the state behaviors while, at the same time, taking the intervening variables into account at the domestic level.<sup>2</sup> Ratti

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<sup>2</sup> for a detailed explanation, see Brawley, 2008; Brawley, 2008-03-26; Dyson, 2010; Haas, 2006-08-31; Haas, 2006; Haas, 2007; Juneau, 2010; Oneao, 2012; Schweller, 2006; Rose, 1998.

(2006) analyzes the difference between neoclassical realism and realist theories in this way:

Neo-classical realists subscribe to the neo-realist assumption that an increase in relative material power will result eventually in a corresponding expansion in the ambition and scope of a country's foreign policy, while a decrease in such power will lead eventually to a corresponding contraction. However, they challenge the neo-realist view that this process will necessarily be gradual and uniform. By contrast, neo-classical realists emphasize that it will be influenced by intervening variables at the domestic level. States that are more powerful will pursue foreign policies that are more far-reaching, although unit-level factors, such as the domestic structure of the state and its leaders' perceptions, will also shape responses to structural changes and influence state policies (p.96-97).

In this sense, neoclassical realism is best explained as being between the neo-realists and the social-constructivists (Rose, 1998). As argued by Rose (1998):

To understand the way states interpret and respond to their external environment, they say, one must analyze how systemic pressures are translated through unit level intervening variables such as decision-makers' perceptions and domestic state structure. In the neoclassical realist world leaders can be constrained by both international and domestic politics. International anarchy, moreover, is neither Hobbesian nor benign but rather murky and difficult to read. States existing within it have a hard time seeing clearly whether security is plentiful or scarce and must grope their way forward in twilight, interpreting partial and problematic evidence according to subjective rules of thumb. In this respect, therefore, neoclassical realists occupy a middle ground between pure structural theorists and constructivists. The former implicitly accept a clear and direct link between systemic constraints and unit-level behavior; the latter deny that any objective systemic constraints exist at all, arguing instead that international reality is socially constructed and that "anarchy is what states make of it." (p.153)

Neoclassical realism suggests that only investigating the systemic incentives will not be sufficient to analyze the reasons behind the different foreign policies in the international context. It emphasizes that to understand the divergencies among the foreign policies, it is necessary to include the unit-level intervening factors, while

examining first the external incentives by the international structure ( Rose, 1998). There is an ‘imperfect transmission belt’ between a state’s relative position in the system and its foreign policy (Korteweg, 2011, p.38; Taliaferro, Lobell and Ripsman, 2009, p.4). However, neoclassical realism accepts that the same intervening variable can result in different foreign choices in different situations (Tang, 2009, p.810). That shift could be coming from the fact that, as argued by Taliaferro (2009), “systemic forces influence the domestic process of a state, creating restrictions to the states’ capacity to respond to systemic imperatives” (cited in Korteweg, 2011, p.39).

As a first intervening variable, neoclassical theory introduces the ‘state strength between national capabilities and officials’ behavior’ (Rose, 1998). It is related to the capabilities of the leaders to lead the public to accept the final policy of the state (Rose, 1998, p.162). “The distinct qualities of individual government and societal structures as well as actor preferences within these structures influence political outcomes in discernable ways” (Agner, 2009, p.75).

Another significant interval variable introduced by neoclassical realism is the perceptions of the relative power of the state by the leaders and elites. “Officials filter information about the external security environment through their ideologies, histories and political philosophies”(Korteweg, 2011, p.42). As argued by Agner (2009):

As such analyses demonstrate, proponents of NCR (neoclassical realism) have argued for a need to focus not only on the systemic factors which may influence international political outcomes; instead, they contend that the institutions and actors involved in the policy-making process are relevant as well because of their role in interpreting the specific challenges which resulting policy outcomes are expected to address (p.75).



Besides the relative power of the state in the international environment, the perception of the material power by the state leaders and elites, and other intervening factors shape the foreign policy of the state.

Neoclassical realists see the international environment as a complicated structure full of details to understand. Power is not stable and so the foreign acts of the states are ambiguous and changeable. Although states are the basis units and primary actors in the international system, there are other factors affecting the system such as 'domestic actors with conflicting goals' (Juneau, 2010, p.5). So, the foreign policies of the states are the consequences of the external and internal motives (Juneau, 2010, p.5). As argued by Juneau (2010):


even though they (neoclassical realists) accept that power is both a means and an end, they also accept that it is unnecessarily restrictive to posit that states may pursue only one end, be it power or security. For neoclassical realists, states pursue a variety of ends, depending on circumstances (p.5).

Moreover, neoclassical realism introduces the '**confined rationality**' to the endeavor (Juneau, 2010, p.6). The state may find the possibility for applying 'rationality' in their foreign decisions under the pressure of the international structure (Juneau, 2010, p.5). To the extent to which a the capacity of state 'allows', the states finds the opportunity of using 'rationality' and deciding 'to maximize a number of ends in the economic, value maximizing sense'(Juneau, 2010, p.5). However the choices are confined to the incentives by the international system; and the states are mostly inclined to misapprehend their external environment. As the 'rationality' of the states is difficult to diagnose, research needs specific intervening variables to understand how the rationality of any particular state works (Juneau, 2010, p, 6).

Juneau describes the neoclassical realism as a rather 'flexible' approach. Neoclassical realism can provide the 'detailed, rich and current' examinations to the

researcher (Juneau, 2010, p.3). How to approach to the problem (specificity vs generalizability) should be based on the needs of the study. It has a robust capacity to add more variables to explain an undefined or ambiguous problem. To obtain more definite and accurate explanations, the researcher can follow two ways by ‘adding more intervening variables, and operationalizing the intervening variables in more specific ways.’ Instead of using one intervening variable, either ‘leaders’ or ‘state interests’, a specific study could add both of them (Juneau, 2010, p.3). At the same time, it can “increase their individual specificity by in some cases changing the focus to factional politics (which) incorporates the balance of power among key regime factions) and in other cases to variables associated with Schweller’s model (which further divides state interests into five categories; 1998) or into the more nuanced variable of ‘regime identity’” (Juneau, 2010, p.4).

Neoclassical realism is an approach that has taken different forms depending on the researcher. Juneau (2010) identifies a spectrum of three approaches within neoclassical realism, ‘ranging from the Rathbunian end to the Rosian opposite, with the Zakarian version in the middle.’ (p.3) Among these three approaches, the Rathbunian is the most flexible variation of neoclassical realism which gives the analyst the opportunity of including a range of domestic intervals to understand the nature of state behaviors.



**Figure 1: Juneau’s Three Approaches of Neoclassical Realism**

*Source:* Juneau, 2010, p.3

These three approaches are not inconsistent with each other. The researcher can choose the most appropriate on the basis of his study. According to him, as the researcher moves towards ‘specificity’, he will reach more detailed and explicit answers. It will be compulsory to put one more than one intervening variable, in order to obtain more comprehensive and specific explanation of the state behaviors. His ‘neoclassical realist strategic’ analysis can consist of any form of research along the Rosian-Rathbunian spectrum (Juneau, 2010, p.3).

Onea considers the case of US foreign policy in the aftermath of the Cold War as a significant experiment for neoclassical realist theories due to the clear situation of ‘unipolarity’ in the Post-Cold War (Onea, 2012, p.140). In his article, he brings **three schools of neoclassical** realism and then explains their explanations of the US foreign policy in the post-Cold War period.

	International relations	Domestic attributes
Structural	Structural realism Orthodoxy Semi-orthodoxy	Democratic peace theory
Non-structural	Classical realism Revivalism	Moravcsik’s liberal theory Constructivism

**Figure 2: Onea’s Three Schools of Neoclassical Realism**

*Source:* Onea, 2012, p.142

He labels the first school, as ‘Orthodoxy’, which is ‘closest to Orthodox neorealism’. The third school, ‘Revivalist’ rests on the ‘Reviving classical realism’. And the second school, which he names as ‘Semi-orthodoxy’, has common assumptions with both of the other schools. He differentiates these three schools according to their use of structural and no-structural variables and their focus on domestic or international variables in the foreign behavior of the state (Onea, 2012, p.142).

While **orthodox** interprets non-structural variables as creating anomalous behavior and semi-orthodox gives them a restricted place in explaining the foreign policy, revivalism 'goes furthest by contesting the absolute supremacy of the international system.' (Onea, 2012, p.144). Although revivalism may seem as a distinct body from the neoclassical realism, some of the works of the revivalism rests on the basic assumptions of the neoclassical realism (Onea, 2012, p.144).

In his article, he argues that **orthodoxy** retains the international structure as the main source of foreign policies of the states. Non-systemic variables does not intervene unless the state is not willing to in contradiction with the restrains by the system. The non-systemic variables are not permanent and not to encounter with the unlucky consequences, the states have to behave according to the conditions of the system. Accordingly, the orthodox interprets the US expansionist foreign policy in the Post-Cold War as playing the role of 'unipolar power'. The US foreign policy represented an effort to increase its power as it had the necessary capabilities to do it. Otherwise its fate in the international environment would be dire (Onea, 2012, p.143-144).

However, **semi-orthodoxy** approaches view the internal variables as unavoidable in states' foreign policy making processes. While sharing the same assumption with Orthodoxy that the foreign policy is shaped by the relative power, it also emphasizes domestic politics. Non-structural variables intervene in the foreign behaviors regularly. Especially, when the security is plenty, the domestic factors gain more capacity to affect the foreign policy decisions more (Onea, 2012, p.144).

According to semi-orthodoxy approach, until the 9/11 terrorist attacks, US foreign policy was affected mostly by domestic politics as there was no serious security risk coming from the outside. Plenty of security in the international system translated into the unwillingness to use military tools and the focus by Clinton administration on democracy and the economic situation. However, once the security challenge

emerged with 9/11 attacks, the domestic context started to lose its pull and the requirements of the external structure became more dominant. The domestic politics were still influential on the 'tactics of the Global War on Terror', but the outside security scarcity was more influential on the foreign policy of 'George W. Bush's first term' (Onea, 2012, p. 144).

The third neo-classical realist approach described by Onea, revivalism, differently from the two just considered, doesn't view the 'anarchy' as stringent. However, it either does not intend to reject the 'anarchy' (Onea, 2012, p.145). But it implies that the states, especially 'the great powers', for a plenty of time, can disregard the systematic intervals. The international structure can define what the states are able to 'achieve' rather than what they exactly will do (Onea,2012, p.145). As the anarchy is not strict, states do not have to search for 'security' or 'expansion'. States "choose different goals – whether gain, security or prestige – and hence face **a real choice between expansion and non-expansion**, which is not necessarily predetermined by their superiority or inferiority in capabilities" (Onea, 2012, p.145). Namely, the state behaviors are affected by mostly non-structural intervals rather than systemic incentives. According to revivalism: "the interaction between any two states is influenced by much more than just their comparative military forces and GDP, or by their respective institutions, ideologies and internal group interests. Accordingly, the states' geopolitical position, the historical record of previous interactions with each other and with other polities, the perceptions and learning processes of their key decision makers, as well as the anticipation of the other party's likely response to any action also sizably shapes the decisions they would adopt" (Onea,2012, p.145).

However, revivalism is not at the same level with Innenpolitics (Onea, 2012). Although the domestic politics are effective in the outcomes of state behaviors, they are not the predominant motives of the state behaviors. The main motive behind the foreign policies of the states are their **interactions with the other states**. Behind 'the

Grand strategy' of the states, there is still the international structure as the basic factor ( Onea,2012, p.146). Revivalism focus on the strategic interactions of a state with the other states in the international environment (Onea, 2012, p.147). Consequently, the shift in the US policy from 'status quo' at the early 1990s to the 'expansion' late in the decade can best be explained by its relations with the 'allies' and 'foes' (Onea, 2012, p.147).

### **2.3.2. Neoclassical Realist Approach and the Case of U.S. Influence**

As mentioned in Chapter 1, this study will consist of a multi-dimensional analysis of US-EU relations, their approaches towards Turkey and the influence of the US on Turkey-EU relations. This analysis requires a flexible approach as much as possible to understand the shifting scope of US influence on EU-Turkey relations. I will move towards 'specificity' as described by Juneau (2010), to obtain more detailed and explicit answers to understanding the US and EU policy towards Turkey. Accordingly, I rely on a range of domestic intervening variable for my analysis , and position myself closest to approach of Rathbunian by Juneau (2010) and the school of semi-orthodoxy by Onea (2012).

I consider the Western alliance and cooperation with Turkey during the Cold War as based on a realist consensus to balance forces against the Soviet Union. My point is that after the end of the Cold War, European integration continued to operate in a systemically anarchic environment. Although Europe's political integration gained momentum toward becoming a political union of a supranational nature, its foreign policy was exposed to the constraints by the anarchic structure. However, as the pressure of the security risk from the international environment decreased, the foreign behaviors of the EU and the US started to be shaped mostly by the impacts of their domestic factors. In a parallel manner, I argue that, the divergencies in the EU and the US foreign behaviors and their approaches towards Turkey, changing from

post-cold war period to post 9/11 attacks, are best explained by intervening state level variables(domestic) such as social and cultural factors, ideological differences, domestic political pressures, and the differences in the perceptions of the leaders, elites and politicians.


In my approach, the EU will be handled as a single unit in the international context. After the end of the Cold War, we observe the EU as an emerging global actor, departing from US hegemony. In contrast to the expectations of the classical realists, the EU did not dissolve with the end of the Cold War (Norris, 2002). As argued by Joseph Nye Jr : “A political bloc is emerging in the form of the European Union that likes to see itself as a challenge to America” (cited in Norris,2002, p.43). During the cold war, the EC had been structured under the US hegemony as a bloc against the Soviet threat. However, after the Cold War, the EU underwent a transformation in order to become a strong political actor in world politics. With institutional reforms, its governance, economic and political integration the EU started to play as a single unit in the international environment (Norris, 2002, p.43). The political integration of the EU does not conform to the structural assumptions of the realism. The conflict groups, predominating the international system could also be organizations including “politically united actors who are bound by a common interest, though realists are interested mostly in the ‘primary’ groups, which since the seventeenth century has meant nation-states”(Norris, 2002, p. 41).

Nonetheless, the EU was not an undivided polity like the US; it was subject to the national interests of its member states. I assume that the national interests of its member states affected the foreign policy of the EU and estimations of the role of US influence on Turkey-EU relations. As argued by Ratti (2006), “the realist perspective and neo-classical realism share the view that supra-national institutions are above all a tool of national governments and that states use them in ways that suit their national interests” (p.98). Thus, in my analysis I will also focus on EU member

states, which have a great deal of influence on the Union, and on their ideologies about Turkey to understand the U.S. influence on EU-Turkey relations thoroughly.

In general, as demonstrated in Figure 3, my approach to the subsequent analysis will apply the perspective of neoclassical realism which effectively emphasizes the changes in the international climate as the critical independent variable behind the shift in the influence of the U.S on EU-Turkey relations. However, I also will stress domestic factors, such as the internal developments in the EU and member states , the ideologies of U.S. and European decision-makers, different perceptions of European and US leaders regarding systemic incentives and security, and different understanding of strategic Turkey's role. My analysis will present that the economic, political, and cultural implications of Turkish membership in the Union becomes a domestic issue for the EU. Accordingly, my analysis will consider negative reactions by European leaders to US support for Turkey as it relates to domestic political and economic considerations and E.U leaders' perceptions of the de-stabilizing effect of Turkish membership on the political and economic integration of the Union. It should be apparent from this overview that this analysis involves multiple levels of analysis which combine structural international influences as well as a range of national level domestic influences in explaining the EU policy outcomes related to Turkey's inclusion and American interventions.





**Figure 3: Neoclassical realist analysis of the shift in EU policy outcomes towards Turkish membership and American interventions in the early 2000s**

## **CHAPTER 3**

### **US APPROACH TOWARDS TURKISH MEMBERSHIP: AMERICAN SUPPORT FOR TURKEY**

#### **3.1. Introduction**

In order to demonstrate how U.S. influence on EU-Turkey relations progressed throughout the 1990s and early 2000s, this chapter provides U.S. understanding of Turkish membership in the EU after the end of the Cold War, its attempts of supporting Turkey and their reflections on EU-Turkey relations. The chapter first elaborates the strategic expectations of the U.S. in supporting Turkish membership in the EU during the post-cold war and post 9/11 attacks. Then, to understand when and how the U.S. influenced Turkey-EU relations, it maps how U.S. support for Turkey operated in the historical instances of Turkey-EU relations from the 1990s to 2005 and the reactions of European leaders and politicians to US interventions.

In this chapter, as set in section 2.3, the analysis is centered around the impacts of the overarching international climate, as an independent variable, on U.S. posture towards Turkey-EU relations. It mainly focuses on the shifts in the international environment with the end of the Cold War and the 9/11 attacks and the effects of those structural factors on U.S. actions of supporting Turkey in European circles. In addition, the ideologies and perceptions of U.S. leaders are included here as domestic intervals in understanding the form of U.S. interventions. In section 3.3. of this chapter, the attempts of U.S. interventions are evaluated with a special attention to the approach of Clinton administration in supporting Turkish membership in the EU. The domestic political structure of Clinton administration is emphasized here as a domestic factor affecting the form of U.S. interventions in EU-Turkey relations

during the 1990s. In section 3.4 of this chapter , U.S. interventions in EU-Turkey relations are evaluated with a special attention to the interventions of Bush administration in EU-Turkey relations under the pressure of the shifting international climate with the 9/11 attacks and emerging Iraq crisis. More prominently, the chapter draws a parallel line between the shifting external influences and increasing U.S. interventions in EU-Turkey relations during the early 2000s.

### **3. 2. U.S. Perception of Turkey's Membership to the EU**

The Western alliance and cooperation during the Cold War was based on a realist consensus to balance forces against the Soviet Union. After World War II, the U.S. was the supporter of European Integration for constructing a strong Western block against Soviet expansionism. After the end of Cold War, as a result of its 'geo-strategic and interests' (Morningstar, 2010, para.2), the U.S. started to pursue a firm support policy for the EU enlargement, and was committed willingly in the EU's endeavor of growth and expansion towards the Central and Eastern European countries Turkey issue was in this framework of the U.S. assistance to the EU enlargement, as it related to the U.S. wish of having Europe and Turkey as stable allies. As asserted by Carlucci and Larrabee (2005, June 8): "Turkey's entry into the European Union is in the long-term interest of the United States. It will make Europe a stronger strategic partner and strengthen efforts to promote democratic reform in Turkey" (p. A18).

After the decades of alliance, the sharp end of the Cold War had brought ambiguities to the transatlantic relations. The U.S. put the strategy of supporting Turkey in the EU at the top of its agenda after the end of the Cold War, given that the Post-Cold War U.S. saw that removing the effects of Soviet Union was at the core of Turkey's ties to the West. More prominently, as mentioned before, Turkey was representing a security guard for the U.S. foreign policy, with its geo-strategic position in the

Balkans, the Caucasus, Central Asia and the Middle East. Gaining Turkey's support in those regions was critical for U.S. national interests.

The former U.S. ambassador to Turkey, Mark Parris confirmed Turkey's continuing strategic importance for the U.S. security policy in the post-cold war era asserting:

From a security perspective, the military dimension of the relationship proved as important as during the Cold War. Turkish participation in peacekeeping actions in Somalia, Bosnia Kosovo and Macedonia demonstrated to the Pentagon and White House planners Ankara's capabilities and readiness to shoulder responsibility as a 'security producing' nation. (Parris, 2003, p.9).

Turkey and the U.S. cooperated in many acts in the post-cold war in Balkans and the Middle East. The U.S. provided economic assistances to Turkey as well as the capture of PKK leader Öcalan. The U.S. support in Turkey-EU relations was similarly a part of this policy to maintain the U.S.-Turkish partnership for U.S. regional interests (Sayarı, 2006). Also, the support for Turkey would be a compensation for the good relations of then Turkish President Özal with the U.S. president Bush and Turkey's willingly contributions to the Gulf War in 1990-91 (Tocci, 2011). As asserted by Öniş (2001), apart from the investments in Turkey, the best assistance the U.S. could provide for Turkey would be to lead the EU deal with the issue of Turkey and handle the question of its membership seriously (p.165). As a further, as asserted by Sayarı (2011), the U.S. intervention in the Turkish membership process "has rested on the recognition of the fact that membership is an internal matter for the EU and that Turkey's progress towards full integration depends on Ankara's ability to undertake the reform measures needed to comply with the Copenhagen criteria" (p.255).

Clinton administration emphasized that Turkey, to be in the Western World, needed to be attached to the EU as a democratic country(Tocci,2011). As Kayhan and Lindley (2006) propose:

In an era in which American strategic interests have focused on dealing with the instability and chaos in the Balkans, Caucasus, Central Asia, and the Middle East, it is crucial for the US that Turkey stays strongly anchored to the West as a stable, modern, secular, and democratic ally (p.3).

Especially during the presidency of Clinton, it was vital that Turkey would adopt the necessary reforms for the democratization of its political system. Thence, by advocating Turkey on its path to the European Union, the U.S. aimed at having a democratic and strong ally connected to the West and its global norms. In the first place, NATO and then the EC/EU were significant opportunities to anchor Turkey to the West as a democratic ally (Öniş and Yılmaz, 2005). Eric Edelman, the US ambassador to Ankara, pointed out in 2005 that the US wanted to see Turkey on the path to EU reforms. He declared that the strategic expectations and interests of the US were to have a strong Turkey. It would be possible with Turkey's membership to the European Union. (Yetkin, 2005, May 18).

In general, Washington supported Turkey's linking to the Western institutions for ensuring that Turkey would basically pursue Westernized foreign and security policies (Makovsky, 2001, p.362). The prominent act the Washington could do to enforce Turkish Westernization as a secular, democratic country maintaining the rule of law was to support Turkey's membership process (Özel, Yılmaz and Akyüz, 2009). In this way, the US would have a democratic and potent ally in important regions to provide the stability and would not be the major responsible in the democratic transformation process of Turkey. In this respect, Teitelbaum and Martin(2003) reported: "It is in the strategic interest of the U.S. that Turkey continue to democratize, westernize and modernize. A stable and prosperous Turkey will be an anchor for the entire region from the Balkans to the Middle East to the Caucasus and Central Asia" ( p.3).

The EU would be the most affective agent in accelerating Turkish reform process, as U.S. efforts for the democratization of Turkey wouldn't turn out be as valid as the

requirements of the EU. The recent changes in Turkish democratic system have showed that rather than the encouragements and the discourses by the U.S. officials, the EU has turned out to be a more prominent agent in activating the democratic transformation in Turkey. As concluded by Özel et al. (2009):

Should that process falter either because the EU proves utterly unimaginative or beholden to its members that want only an ambiguous “privileged partnership” or because Turkey loses interest completely, the result could well be a deterioration of democratic standards and practices in Turkey. Such an outcome would certainly be detrimental for the nation. It should also be against the interests of Turkey’s EU and NATO partners, particularly the United States ( p.29).

Turkey’s close relations with the EU and its membership in the Union “would enhance Turkey’s political stability and promote economic growth, as well as help ensure a strong, democratic Turkey on the doorstep of a sometimes turbulent Middle East and Central Asia” ( Atlantic Council,2004,p. 9). Turkey’s membership would speed up its democratization ( Kuniholm,2001,p.37) and modernization procedure, which would conclude in its stability. A stable ally in the unstable regions surrounding Turkey was highly significant for the U.S. security policy.

After the 9/11 attacks, Turkey’s increasing importance for the U.S. as an alliance drove the Bush administration to multiply its supports in Turkey-EU relations. To convince Turkey to permit the use of its lands and air space for invading Iraq, the Bush administration promoted its diplomatic advocacy especially in 2002. The Annan plan in November 2002 to resolve the dispute over Cyprus and the speeches to the many European leaders made publicly and behind closed doors before the Copenhagen Summit in 2002 to start the accession talks were all primary acts by Washington in that term (Öniş and Yılmaz, 2005). However, all of those U.S. attempts were interpreted by some Europeans as maneuvers by Bush administration to obtain Turkish assistance to open a Northern front in attacking the Saddam

Hussein regime and to use Incirlik and other bases for the troop deployment to Iraq, (Sayarı, 2006) which will be discussed in detail in chapter 4.

In the fight against the terrorism coming from the radical Islamic groups, Turkey's Muslim identity became more prominent for U.S. foreign policy. If attached to the West, it would be a good model as a secular democratic country with its majority of Muslim population (Kayhan and Lindlay, 2006; Kuniholm, 2001; Öniş and Yılmaz, 2005). Hence, another reason for American support for Turkish accession to the European Union was the role of Turkey as a secular and democratic model for the Muslim world. In contrast to the common understanding in some of the member states such as France and Germany, the U.S. believed that in order for Turkey to act as a bridge to the Islam world, Turkey needed to be firmly anchored to the West.

Turkey would also take part in overcoming the reactions to U.S. foreign policy and anti-Americanism arousing in the Muslim world. Besides, the EU, by accepting Turkey, would prove that it wasn't against the Muslim population (Debnar and Smith, 2006, p.20). If the EU insisted on delaying to accept Turkish membership, the West would face the risk of confirming its image as an anti-Muslim identity. To overcome the 'clash of civilizations' (Huntington, 1996) orientation of some internal voices and to dissolve the Islamic terrorism against the West, Turkey's membership was of great importance. As asserted by Robert (2005):

welcoming Turkey into the European club would send a powerful message to the rest of the Muslim world. It would say that the largely white, Christian West is not biased against those who hold the Islamic faith. It would say that it wishes to reconcile, let bygones be bygones, and start the relationship afresh with a new partnership of equality and mutuality (p.7).

The U.S. was also worried that if the EU had not let Turkey in, Turkey would lose its motivation for democratization and Westernization and would search for regional cooperations with the other Muslim countries (Sayarı, 2006 p.7). Not to lose Turkey

and to have its cooperation as a bridge to the Arab and Islamic world, the EU was a critical institution for Turkey's ties to the West.

Further, Turkey's membership would enable the EU-U.S. cooperation in the critical regions surrounding Turkey. Especially at the 2000s, Turkish membership would decrease the responsibilities of the U.S. in these regions as the EU would have to face the challenge of the threat after enlarging its borders to the Middle East. As Atlantic Council (2004) asserted that, "If admitted to the EU, Turkey would expand the Union's borders, bringing it into direct contact with some problematic neighbors" (p.9). After accepting Turkey in the Union, the EU would enlarge its borders to the Middle East and critical countries such as Iraq, Iran and Syria. In this way, the EDSP engagement would cover those regions and the EU would have to apply a more consistent and relevant policy in that area. It would be more possible for the U.S. to have the EU's cooperation in its acts in the area.

Turkey, with its high population, would be the one of the largest countries in the Union, and have a great role in decision-making process of the Parliament. According to some European officials, given that Turkey has always been a faithful ally of the U.S., having Turkey in the EU meant that Washington would gain its prominent role in the EU which gradually decreased from the end of Cold War to the early 2000s. Especially with President Bush's Policy of the early 2000s, American support for Turkey was captured as a strategy by some Europeans, to decrease the role of France and Germany in the Union, which were against U.S. interventionist policy in 2000s.

The legitimacy of those interpretations is debatable; however it is clear that, especially after the Nice Summit in 2000, the U.S. started to get concerned about the 'separate operational movement capability' of European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) and its relations with NATO (Kuniholm, 2001, p.37). To provide the



cooperation between the ESDP and NATO (Tocci, 2001) and eliminate the risk of ESDP's acting independently from NATO, Turkey's presence in ESDP, as an advocate of NATO would relieve the related concerns of the U.S. that Turkey's membership would make ESDP stronger, and it might act in cooperation with the US and the NATO ( Atlantic Council, 2004, p.25). In this way, having Turkey as a member, the EU could be a stronger strategic partner to the U.S. (Carlucci and Larrabee, 2005, June 8).

The debates that Turkey would be more ' European' after becoming a member country and turn to Brussels rather than to Washington (Carlucci and Larrabee,2005, June 8) did not prevent the US from supporting Turkey in the EU. Instead, Turkey's membership to the Union would integrate a different 'Atlanticist voice' to the Union. Although, the EU could react divergently to some of the transatlantic issues, it would be possible for the U.S. to make its voice heard in Europe (Tocci, 2011, p.79). Moreover, Turkey's membership in the Union would improve the economic aspect of the transatlantic relations between the US and the EU. If entered into the Union, Turkey would bring its dynamic labor potential to the Union. With its growing rate, Turkey would make Europe more appealing for US investments, which would conclude in closer links between the US and the EU (Atlantic Council, p.24).

Although a divergence between the US and the EU policy emerged after the end of the Cold War, and that divergence turned into tensions after the 9/11 terrorist attacks and the Iraq War, Washington always pursued its consistent policy of advocating Turkey's bilateral relations with the US. As stated by Makovsky (1998): "probably in no other internal EU issue has the U.S. been so actively involved and asserted a right" (p.60 ). In fact, supporting Turkey in its attempts for a membership in the EU and the advocates to strengthen Turkey's relations with Europe didn't cost anything to the U.S. except for some reactions by some of the member states (Abramovitz, 2001; Öniş and Yılmaz, 2005; Sayarı, 2006; Sayarı, 2011). However, it is appropriate

to agree that there are also some risks of Turkey's membership to the EU for the US. Having a 70 million plus Muslim population, the EU might not act in coordination with the US policy in its Middle Eastern Policies. In addition, after being a more European country with the EU, Turkey might loose its links with the U.S (Bremmer, 2004, October 22). By joining the Union and ESDP, Turkey might distance itself from NATO and the EU could apply to more active and independent policies in the Middle East. Still, Turkey's membership to the EU has been a part of US policy in its relations with Turkey and European member states since the end of 1980s (Sayari, 2006), as a consequence of U.S. security-basis expectations shaped over time by the shifting international climate after the end of the Cold War.

### **3.3. American Support for Turkey during the 1990s: Customs Union and Helsinki Summit**

#### **3.3.1 American Support in Customs Union between the EU and Turkey**

During the 1990s, President Clinton emphasized the promotion of liberal values, democracy and economic growth in Europe to provide the economical and political stability and reconstruction of the continent after the disposal of Soviet threat. Accordingly, the US consistently supported the EU enlargement towards to the CEECs. To eliminate the communist influence of the Soviet Union and to secure the continent with liberal economy, it was important to have a strong and stable EU, which shared the same political and economic values with the U.S. As it was reflected in President Clinton's words: "We must build a new security for Europe; the old security was based on the defense of our bloc against another bloc. The new security must be found in Europe's integration—an integration of security forces, of market economies, of national democracies" (cited in Daalder, 2002, p.75). The EU was emerging as a new economic power with 'its unique market' (Peterson and

Cowles, 1998, p.251) and the US wanted to see Turkey with its growing economy, in this growing free market .

Clinton believed that Turkey's ties to the EU would develop geo-political and economic bilateral relations of the US with Turkey .He emphasized that, "When Turkey enters the EU, Turkish-US relations will not weaken but grow stronger" (cited in Kohen, 2002, November 7). In this regard, Customs Union would be an important step in Turkey's integration to the West after Cold War. It was necessary to prepare Turkey economically and include it into the European system after Turkey's Association Agreement with the EC in 1963. As a consequence, after becoming the president, Clinton and the US officials effectively pushed the Europeans to incorporate Turkey into the Customs Union.

By pointing out the need of the Europe to gain Turkey after the Commission's rejection in 1989, the US lobbied firmly in the Europe and contacted to many European leaders and officials (Sayarı, 2006). Before the Customs Union, the European Parliament emphasized that, "approval would depend on human rights reform" (Makovsky, 1995, para.9). Clinton administration also approved that to comply with the Copenhagen criteria and democratic standards of the EU, Turkey needed to adopt the necessary reforms swiftly. Within this framework, the intervention of Clinton administration to Turkey-EU relations proceeded in two dimensions: advocating Turkey in EU capitals and leading Turkey to make constitutional amendments and domestic reforms (Tocci, 2012). Given the fact that the US never wanted to lose Turkey with the geo-strategic concerns, it neither forced Turkey nor criticized its political structure harshly. Instead, it preferred to encourage Turkey with annual human rights reports or enthusiastic speeches related to democracy or human rights (Tocci, 2011).

Initially, the Parliament seemed reluctant to have a formal Customs Union agreement, and a close vote was expected (Sayarı, 2006). To change the route, the chief US trade negotiator, Stuart Eisenstadt was personally engaged in lobbying activities in Strasbourg (Sayarı, 2006). Furthermore, before the Customs Union agreement, former Ambassador to Turkey Mark Grossman and the US Assistant Secretary of State forced Turkey to liberate the journalists in jails, reduce torture and to expand the freedom of expression (Tocci, 2011). After the US attempts to convince Turkey to adopt necessary reforms; Turkey made minor amendments in Turkish Constitution and passed Anti-Terror Law in 1995 immediately before Customs Union (Tocci, 2011, p.80).

Furthermore, Cyprus issue was standing as an obstacle before the European Parliament voting for Customs Union. Turkey and the Northern Cypriot Republic leader Denktash had already emphasized that Turkish membership application did not refer to the Turkish Cypriot (Park, 2000, p.35). Nonetheless, the EC pointed out the need of resolution on Cyprus at the Dublin summit in 1990, stating that “future relations with Turkey would depend on Ankara adopting a more cooperative stance on the Cyprus issue” (cited in Park, 2000, p.35). President Clinton tried to achieve a resolution on the island to facilitate the ratification of Customs Union by the European Parliament. During his talks to then Turkish Prime Minister Çiller, he emphasized the need of a consensus between Cyprus and Turkey, as allies of NATO. Çiller promised him to solve the dispute. Even, Clinton used this issue as a slogan on the eve of presidential elections to be held in the US in 1996: ‘I will solve the Cyprus problem.’ He also planned a meeting for Cypriot leaders Clerides and Denktash in New York early in 1996. His attempts were not able to make progress in the way to solving the Cyprus question (Duğan, 1995, December 12). Nonetheless his interferences to solve the dispute, and the positive manner of Çiller about a resolution were welcomed in European circles.

In March 1995, the EU Council reported that Customs Union with Turkey would come into force in 1996 and accession talks with Cyprus would start after the 'conclusion of 1996 Intergovernmental Conference' (Franck, 2002, p.105). In this way, Greece, under the strained atmosphere of Cyprus conflict with Turkey, wouldn't be able to veto the Customs Union agreement (Franck, 2002).

The US also lobbied with Israel to convince the European Parliament to approve the agreement (Franck, 2002, p.105). Israeli diplomats and Prime Minister Peres in person advocated Turkey in his speeches to the European leaders (Makovsky, 1995, para 3). The socialist Member of the European Parliament, Pauline Green accepted that, "these countries had addressed 'wise words' to the Assembly and the EP's assent was finally given in December 1995 by 343 votes to 149 and 36 abstentions" (cited in Franck, 2002, p.105).

Shortly after the ratification of Customs Union, Clinton, in 1996, intervened in the conflict between Greece and Turkey on Simia, an islet located 4 miles from Turkish coasts. The EU was imperatively near Greece, in confronting with Turkey for the issue related with the Aegean borders of an EU member country (Cooley, 1996, February 13). When the Greek and Turkish forces were unwillingly ready for a fight, Clinton tried to lead both leaders Simitis and Çiller to negotiate and remove their flags from the islets, Simia and Marines, for ending the confrontation. Both leaders were positive about the intervention of Clinton administration as an attempt to maintain the peace between the allies of NATO. US pressure to resolve the conflict between Turkey and Greece were met with pleasure in Turkey. However positive attitude of Socialist Simia to American request was criticized by then right wing sides in Greece (Cooley, 1996, February 13).

US attempts of maintaining Turkey's good relations with Europe, supporting Turkey in European circles, and encouraging Turkish government to adopt the domestic

reforms turned out to be influential when Customs Union came into force in 1996. The positive manner of the European leaders for the attempts of Clinton administration before and after the agreement ratified the legitimacy of U.S. support to anchor Turkey to the West. It justified the next attempts of the US to support Turkey in the EU and created strong expectations in Turkey about the US support.

Looking from U.S. perspective, it can be argued that one of the reasons of U.S. success was the form of US interventions during the presidency of President Clinton, emphasizing the importance of liberal values in the EU's enlargement and the reforms process of Turkey (Tocci, 2011). While pressing the EU for Turkish membership, the U.S. tried to accelerate Turkey's reform process in that period though it had a limited scope. For instance, in 1994, the US forced Turkey to make amendments about Kurdish problem by reducing the economic aid and making 10 percent of it conditional on an amendment related to Kurdish issue (Tocci, 2011). Also, it deferred the export licenses of Cobra helicopters to prevent their implementations against the Kurdish people in Turkey (Kirişçi, 2001, p138). Further, the form of U.S. interventions during the presidency of Clinton did not include strong pressures or harsh criticisms with public speeches to the European officials regarding the resistance of the EU about a Turkish membership (Tocci, 2011). Rather, it usually consisted of personal phone calls from the US diplomats to their counterparts and the US president to the European nations' leaders. Clinton administration supported Turkey in the Union with its 'diplomats privately engaged with European counterparts' (Tocci, 2011, p.84).

The most prominent motives of Turkish success in Customs Union agreement derived from the European perspective. First of all, the agreement offered economic advantages to the EU member states. As a further, besides the lack of low in the transatlantic relations of the US and the EU during the 1990s, the cooperation of Turkey with Europe during the Balkan crisis, the geo-strategic and military

importance of Turkey, the ambiguity in domestic and political structure of the EU and the security concerns during the 1990s in Europe were all affective in the positive climate in Turkey-EU relations during that period. Besides all of these factors, the direct U.S. influence in European circles and the motivation provided by Clinton for the domestic reforms in Turkey operated as influential American assistances for Turkey's fate in EP's ratification of the Customs Union.

### **3.3.2 American Support in Helsinki Summit**

The Luxembourg European Council in December 1997, as a process of the fifth enlargement of the Union, decided to start the accession negotiations with Czech Republic, Estonia, Greek Cypriot Administration of Southern Cyprus, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia. With Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Romania and Slovakia, the accession negotiations would start at the Helsinki Summit in December 1999. Turkey's candidacy was not included in the Council, which created a disappointment both in Washington and Ankara.

The decision of the Luxembourg summit, not to include Turkey as a candidate country, left behind the Clinton administration's efforts for Turkey's close relations with the EU. Washington deplored the result against Turkey and interpreted the decision as a 'mistake' (Franck, 2002, p.105). Under Secretary Richard Holbrooke stated: "We think that the invitation to Cyprus was correct and the treatment to Turkey was a mistake, and we hope that the EU and Turkey will work together actively to improve the situation for Turkey"(cited in Franck, 2002, p.105-106).

The decision also created anti-European reactions in Turkey when the two nationalist parties, Democratic Left Party and the Nationalist Action party and the Motherland Party (the ANAP, which didn't have a particular approach towards the EU) came into power with a coalition government (Öniş and Yılmaz, 2005, p.6 ). Turkish

government froze its relations with the Union and threatened to withdraw its membership application by summer 1998 (Barchard,1998,p.2). As Kinzer (1998) argued in the New York Times:

That set off a storm of protest in Turkey, highlighted by emotional denunciations of Europe and suggestions that Turkey should look for friends elsewhere. American leaders, including President Clinton, criticized the European decision and urged that Turkey not be made to feel unwelcome in the West (Kinzer, 1998, May 1).

The US increased readily its efforts to revive the relations between the sides (Öniş and Yılmaz, 2005). A former State Department official reported that, “American diplomats would not miss an opportunity to lecture European counterparts on the imperative of reversing the Luxembourg decision” (cited in Barkey, 2003, p.215). President Clinton, with an expectation to change the fate of Turkey, switched on a strong advocating process both formally and informally. He started to ‘press EU leaders to revise the Luxembourg decision’ (Franck, 2002, p.106). He personally had telephone calls with European leaders to change the decision taken in Luxembourg. (Sayarı, 2006; Gordon and Taspinar, 2008). He aimed to demonstrate how Turkey and its democratic transformation were significant for the West.

Senior diplomats from the Washington forcefully lobbied to convince the European leaders and officials to internalize a more mediatory approach towards Turkey. (Kinzer, 1998, May 1). The US officials involved in efforts worked hard to change the European attitude and get a decision in favor of Turkey in the summit to be placed in Kardiff, Wales in June 1998 (Kinzer,1998, May 1). Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright called Foreign Minister Hubert Vedrine of France, Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel of Germany and Foreign Secretary Robin Cook of Britain to ask for a conciliatory policy towards Turkey. It was reported that Ms. Albright made some progress in her talks, but she also discovered that the high anti-Turkish sentiment in Greece and the national election campaign in Germany were main



barriers in Turkey-EU relations (Kinzer, 1998, May 1). A state department official working with German leaders also stated: “This Turkey question is probably the most serious disagreement we have with Germany” (cited in Kinzer, 1998, May 1).

A United States diplomat related to the U.S. efforts in Turkey-EU relations claimed: “We are now engaged in a full-court press to get the E.U. to ease up on Turkey, to make the Turks feel more welcome in Europe.” He also added: “There are intense negotiations going on aimed at getting the E.U. to improve the terms of its offer. The European countries have accused us of not understanding their problems. We do recognize that it will be a long time before Turkey is ready to join” (cited in Kinzer, 1998, May 1).

Similarly, Under Secretary of State Strobe Talbott, expressing American wish that Turkey be a member in the EU, declared:

As a very interested non-member and non-applicant, the US has urged the EU to find ways to bring Turkey more fully into the process of enlargement. We have done so-and we will persist in doing so-for reasons that have as much to do with our hopes for Europe as with our hopes for Turkey. We do not believe that European unity and integration will be fully successful if a key European country is set uniquely alone and apart. (cited in Franck, 2002, p.106).

As mentioned before, after the end of Cold War, the common European view that Turkey was not a European country had already come to the surface. For instance, in the early 1997, German Chancellor Helmut Kohl gave a statement emphasizing ‘the gap in culture and civilization between Europe and Turkey’, which supported the general Turkish criticism about the EU that it was a ‘Christian club’ (Kohen, 1997, p. 2). Against this situation, President Clinton promoted Turkish membership as an opportunity to bring the West and the East closer. The U.S. publicly argued that Turkey would play as a bridge between the Muslim world and the West (Kohen, 1997). President Clinton, in advocating Turkey, focused on the liberal values and

situated Europe in the international arena as an important agent for expanding these values to keep the peace on the continent. When he publicly spoke to his European counterparts, he always emphasized the prominence of Turkish membership in the EU to accomplish the peace and political and economical cohesion on the continent. President Clinton (1998) expressed U.S. perspective related to EU enlargement and Turkey's participation, declaring:

The foresight to see that our vision of a Europe that is undivided, democratic and at peace for the first time in all of history will never be complete unless and until it embraces Turkey. The United States is not a member of the European Union, but I have consistently urged European integration to move further and faster, and that includes Turkey. There are still those who see Europe in narrower terms. Their Europe might stop at this mountain range or that body of water or, worse, where people stopped to worship God in a different way. But there is a growing and encouraging consensus that knows Europe is an idea as much as a place, the idea that people can find strength in diversity of opinions, cultures and faiths, as long as they are commonly committed to democracy and human rights ;the idea that people can be united without being uniform, and that the community we loosely refer to as the West is an idea, it has no fixed frontiers. it stretches as far as the frontiers of freedom can go (p.2096).

After the disposal of Soviet Union, European enlargement policy towards to the East was also enthusiastically centered around the liberal values, such as democracy and human rights. In this regard, Clinton's speeches turned out to be quite effective in European circles (Tocci, 2011).

As a further, Clinton administration continued to support Turkey's reform process to change the Luxembourg decision in favor of Turkey. For instance; in 1997, the U.S. State Department and then the Turkish Prime Minister Yılmaz, discussed the necessary reforms to be adopted such as the freedom of speech, torture, liberation of journalists and members of parliaments, NGOs, political involvement, and the issue of the emergent situation in southeast, and the issue of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) (Barkey,2003). The U.S. also continued its attempts of resolving the conflict

on Cyprus. An American mediator, Richard C. Holbrooke, visited Cyprus in that term. However, his talks with Greek and Turkish Cypriot leaders did not have satisfactory results. After his visit to Cyprus, Holbrooke reported that Cypriots were not accepting to consider serious compromises as long as Europe treated Turkey in a manner that they considered unfair (Kinzer, 1998, May 1). Also, the U.S. President visited Turkey and Greece one month before the Helsinki Summit, as did German Chancellor Schroeder (Marsden, 1999). As observed by Abramowitz (2001), President Clinton's historical visit to Turkey, which was the third of this kind of visitations in the bilateral relations between the U.S. and Turkey in forty years, was very successful in terms of its contributions to the ongoing domestic reform process in Turkey, strengthening Turkey's situation in its bid to the EU and increasing American influence on Turkey (p.3).

In his visit, which was just before Helsinki Summit, President Clinton, addressing the Turkish Grand National Assembly in Ankara on 15 November 1999, asserted: "The coming century will be shaped in good measure by the way in which Turkey itself defines its future and its role today and tomorrow, for Turkey is a country at the crossroads of Europe, the Middle East and Central Asia." Then, he emphasized the support of the US for Turkey's membership in the EU declaring: "the future can be shaped for the better if Turkey becomes fully a part of Europe as a stable, democratic-secular nation" (Clinton, 1999). He underlined the importance of Turkish membership for the EU, by claiming: " Turkey is where Europe and the Muslim world can meet in peace and harmony" (Clinton, 1999).

Moreover at the November 1999 summit conference of Organization for Security and Cooperation (OSCE) in Europe in Istanbul, the President, demonstrating the importance of Turkey for the US, stated:

What Turkey does, and what we do together in the coming years, will help determine whether stability takes root in the Balkans and the Aegean, whether true and lasting peace comes to the people of the Middle East, and whether democratic transformation in the states of the former Soviet empire, from the Caucasus to Central Asia, actually succeeds. (cited in Niblet, 2005, para.2)

The European Council of Helsinki, making a historical decision, granted Turkey a candidate status in December, 1999. The council decision opened a new era in Turkey-EU relations. The U.S. played a noticeable role in Turkey's path to the Helsinki Summit. In May 2005, March Edelman, the U.S. ambassador to Turkey (2003-2005), in his talk to a Turkish domestic newspaper, declared that the US had a role in Turkey's being granted to the candidate country status in December 1999 Helsinki. He was an ambassador to Helsinki then. He told that March Grossman in the Foreign Ministry in Washington, Nicholas Burns in Athens, the ambassador Mark Parris in Ankara and the diplomat Jim Jeffrey, then the ambassador to Albania, worked hard for several days before the summit and immediately after the decision. He was the ambassador to Ankara when Turkey was given the date for the accession of talks on the 17th December. He described that day as one of the most satisfying days in his professional life (Yetkin, 2005, May 18).

Since the EU started accession negotiations with Cyprus without a settlement on the Island, Turkish Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit intended to refuse the offer of candidate status. To calm down Ecevit, President Clinton personally called him and prevented him from turning down the agreement. At the press conference, Ecevit said that he accepted the deal since Clinton convinced him of its advantages. (Tocci, 2011, p.82)

The attempts of the Clinton administration were rather effective on the affirmative decision of the EU about Turkey in 1999 Helsinki Council. Upon the decision, President Clinton expressed his 'pleasure' and stated: "the US had long supported Turkey's bid to join the EU in belief that this would have lasting benefits not only for Turkey, but also for EU members and the United States" (cited in Sayarı, 2006, p.

169). He congratulated Ecevit for his efforts of reforms and democratization of the country and thanked particularly to Greek Prime Minister Simitis, the Finnish government, and EU members for their decision on Turkey's candidacy (Turkish Daily News, 1999, December 13). In Helsinki summit in 1999, an enlargement towards to the East with six-ten countries was in accordance with the US expectations from the EU (Lippert, 2002, p.45), given the fact that it was significant to keep the stability and union on the continent, especially in Central and North-Central Europe (Lippert,2002).

Many other factors, deriving from the European Perspective, affected this historical decision of Helsinki. First of all, the decision in the Council was mostly been affected by the dependence of the Union on the US and NATO during the Kosova War in 1998-1999 (Kuniholm, 2001,p.42), and geo-strategic and military based considerations of the EU, related to Turkey. The US and Turkey's interventions in Balkan crisis during the 1990s to provide the stability had already led the EU to consider Turkey as a possible asset for the future security and defense policy of the Union. During the Balkan crisis, the EU didn't have a sufficient and strong CSDF and was unable to handle the Balkan challenge. The NATO intervention in the conflicts in Balkans and the US aid were considered as necessary international actions by most of the member states, inspiring to bring an end to the confusions expanding on the continent. Accordingly, US policy in Balkans and Turkish-American alliance in the region were recognized as quite significant actions in the Union. This situation strengthened the arguments, emerging in government bodies and in many business associations in Europe, that Turkey with its military capabilities and the second largest military force in NATO would be an asset to the improvement of CSDP. Turkey would provide the material force Europe needed to arrange the stability in the Western Balkans and the Middle East (Tocci,2011). While Turkey was excluded from the candidate country statute in Luxembourg summit in 1997, the new embodiments in the Balkans and Turkey's contributions in the region

affected Commission's transforming the enlargement policy and including Turkey as a candidate country in Helsinki summit in 1999 with the other Balkan countries (Tocci, 2011). Before Helsinki summit, the EU was also already uncomfortable with the crisis in relations with Turkey, occurring since the Luxembourg Council. The EU, with the geo-strategic and military concerns besides the economic aspects, would not venture losing Turkey.

Added to the above, Social Democratic parties emerging in Europe with their focus on multi-culturalism also played a considerable role in the decision (Öniş and Yılmaz, 2005, p.6). In Germany, the removal of Chancellor Kohl (Abromowitz, 2001, p. 262) and Social Democrat Gerhard Schroeder's election prevented the severe reactions of Germany towards Turkish membership. Moreover, by 1999 decision, Turkish-Greek relations had also started to warm up. The democratic transformation of Greece led the country to approach Turkey's situation positively in contrast to the past. After the cooperation in the earthquake in 1999, the Greek socialist party PASOK started to uphold Turkey in the Union (Tocci, 2011). The domestic affairs in Europe and lobbying activities of Tony Blair's government in Britain (Öniş and Yılmaz, 2005 ; Daniel, 2002), the lobbies of Turkish business communities, like TUSIAD (Öniş and Yılmaz, 2005) and U.S. advocacy operated together in shaping the positive decision of European Council. As a further, the form of US interventions during the 1990s did not arouse the negative reactions of the EU leaders and officials (Tocci, 2011). During the 1990s, American interventions did not encounter any harsh reactions or publicly critics by the European leaders or other European officials. Instead, as Makovsky observed: "U.S. diplomacy was crucial to the process of Turkey achieving candidate status" (Makovsky, 1999, para.1).

In spite of the end of the common security threat and emerging common European concerns about Turkey after Cold War, US direct support played a critical and contributive role in Turkey's bid to the EU from Customs Union to Helsinki (Sali,

2010, p.30). As asserted by Sali (2010): “The US was successful both in egging the EU to press forward its relations with Turkey and in contributing to a more favorable climate in the Eastern Mediterranean which in turn eased an EU-Turkey rapprochement , especially on Cyprus and Greek- Turkish relations” (p.31). Without US support during that period, Turkey’s process could have been operating under more difficult conditions, and Turkey could have waited for longer and encountered with more delayed decisions by the EU.

### **3.4. American Support for Turkey at the early 2000s: The Start of Accession Negotiations**

After the 9/11 attacks, Turkey’s alliance with the U.S. in the security policy of President Bush’s administration against the threat of terrorism turned out to be more critical. Attaching Turkey firmly to the Western world with the help of the EU would provide Turkish assistance in cutting the terrorism by radical Islamic groups. As a further, to gain Turkey’s cooperation in fighting against Saddam Hussein in the Iraq War at the early 2000s, President Bush expanded his interventions in Turkey-EU relations . Helping Turkey in its bid to a membership in the EU would in turn provide Turkish support in the Iraq War.

While supporting Turkey, Bush administration mostly emphasized the Muslim identity of the country (Tocci,2011). He described Turkey as a bridge between Europe and the Muslim world, and a model for the other Muslim countries (Taylor, 2002, December 3). By accepting Turkey, the EU would overcome the clash between the Muslim and Christian identities within the Union and be able to expand the liberal values and democracy towards to other Muslim countries. President Bush (2004) expressed this perspective in the following manner:

America believes that as a European power, Turkey belongs in the European Union. Your membership would also be a crucial advance in relations between the Muslim world and the West, because you are part of both. Including Turkey in the EU would prove that Europe is not the exclusive club of a single religion, and it would expose the 'clash of civilizations' as a passing myth of history (Bush, 2004).

By including Turkey in the EU, the risk of the Islamist terrorism towards to the Western world would be challenged with Turkey's participation, as a democratic and secular Muslim country. In this way, President Bush consistently and strongly forced the EU leaders to change their negative attitudes towards Turkey and accept the country's membership. For example, in December 2002, in London, the U.S. Deputy Defense Secretary Paul D. Wolfowitz claimed: "Turkey offers a valuable model for Muslim-majority countries striving to realize the goals of freedom, secularism and democracy," and added: "Those who would criticize Turkey for its problems confuse what is challenging with what is fundamental. They focus too much on the problems Turkey is struggling today and ignore where it is heading" (cited in Gordon, 2002, December 3).

Before the Copenhagen European Council in December 2002, President Bush, seeking the permission of Turkish government to ferry the US troops into Iraq, increased his efforts of supporting Turkey in the Europe to specify a date for opening accession talks with Turkey. When Erdogan visited the White House before the Copenhagen summit in 2002, as the leader of the ruling party of Turkish government, and asked for the US support for Turkey's bid to the EU, the US President expressed his support. He declared: "the US stood side-by-side with Turkey in its desire to become a member of the European Union" (Radikal, 2002, December 11; Watson, 2002, December 11) . Against the Bush's words, Watson (2002, December 11) declared in BBC News: "In diplomacy, though, there is often a catch. The US also hopes that backing Turkey's efforts to join the EU will, in turn, lead to Ankara supporting possible military action against Iraq".



President kept his promise after the meeting and started a firm lobbying process with the support of British government (Daniel, 2002, November 28; Radikal, 2002, December 12). Bush also in person telephoned the French President Jacques Chirac before Copenhagen. He also twice phoned Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen of Denmark, who was holding the EU's revolving presidency (Vinocur, 2002, December 13; Radikal, 2002, December 12). After talking to Bush, Rasmussen reported that had he told Bush that admitting Turkey was 'a European decision'. He emphasized: "We don't allow ourselves to be pressured from any quarter" (Vinocur, 2002, December 13). In contrast to the attempts of Clinton, President Bush's pressures on European leaders arouse harsh criticisms and reactions by the key EU leaders and officials. As asserted by Sayarı (2001): "it has angered many Europeans who have increasingly viewed the US policy as unwarranted American interference in the internal affairs of the EU" (p.251).

Italian Romano Prodi, who was the president of then European Commission, notified that any decision related to the future boundaries of the EU was only a EU decision. He declared: "We should be allowed to decide our own future without any interference from the United States or anyone else." "The debate on where Europe's borders lie is a debate about our identity. It will be conducted in the European Parliament, in the national parliaments and involve all European citizens" (cited in Banks and Chapman, 2002, December 19).

His words were firmly encouraged by the leaders of the Parliament, as well. Enrique Barón, leader of the Group of European Socialists, endorsed the speech of Prodi saying: "We support Prodi 100% on this. It's a matter for the EU to decide who joins the Union. The Americans should leave the EU to handle its own affairs" (cited in Banks and Chapman, 2002, December 19).

Hans-Gert Pöttering, the chairman of the European People's Party group, reacted very negatively to the US intervention in Turkey-EU, asserting: "We do not advise

the Americans on their relations with neighbors such as Mexico. They should not be telling us what to do with our neighbors such as Turkey.“The message is: ‘don't push it’”(cited in Banks and Chapman, 2002, December 19).

Graham Watson, Liberal group leader, voiced their disapproval of the US intervention claiming that the US had “gone over the top” in its pressures on the EU to convince the officials to start accession negotiations with Turkey immediately. The negative reactions and harsh criticisms to the interference of Bush were similar was in smaller groups, too. Daniel Cohn-Bendit, leader of the Greens/European Free Alliance group, asserted: “I agree with Prodi. I wonder how President Bush would react if the EU insisted on Mexico or Canada being integrated into the US?” Francis Wurtz, head of the European Left group, agreed: “Of course Prodi's right. The US totally overstepped the mark in interfering in the enlargement negotiations”(cited in Banks and Chapman, 2002, December 19).

Similarly, Former French President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, who was working on the future constitution of the Union, told *Le Monde* in 2002 that those who supported Turkish membership in the EU were ‘the adversaries of the European Union’ (BBC News, 2002, November 8). The French Industry Minister, Nicole Fontaine, who once served as the president of the European Parliament, reacted very negatively to Bush’s intervention, and his declarations at the meeting with Erdogan. He said: “It's certainly not up to the president of the United States to interfere in something so important and which mainly concerns Europeans” (cited in Vinocur, 2002, December 13).

Another French official, Pascal Lamy, the EU's trade commissioner, responded Bush’s advocacy saying: “It's a classic of U.S. diplomacy to want to put Turkey in Europe. The further the boundaries of Europe extend, the better U.S. interests are

served.’ Then, he asked: ‘Can you imagine the reaction if we told them they had to enlarge into Mexico?’ (cited in Vinocur, 2002, December 13).

During the busy traffic of calls and talks between the US officials and the EU, Colin Powell, the U.S. Secretary of State, had a phone call with Danish foreign minister, Per Stig Moeller. Differently from the French reactions, Moeller was quite positive and said: “quite appropriate that our American friends speak their mind. It's not a question of pressure, not at all” (cited in Filkins, 2002, December 13).

In London, before the Copenhagen in December 2002, US Deputy Defense Secretary Paul D. Wolfowitz also pushed the EU member states to set a date for the start of accession talks with Turkey, even though some American officials accepted that trying to overcome the European resistance to Turkey was ‘something of a long shot’ (Gordon, 2002, December 3). He gave a speech at the International Institute for Strategic Studies and said: “The decision on E.U. members is, of course, Europe's to make, but history suggests that a European Union that welcomes Turkey will be even stronger, safer and more richly diverse than it is today. The alternative, exclusionary choice is surely unthinkable” (cited in Gordon, 2002, December 3). He also focused on the importance of Turkish membership in the EU to overcome the clash of civilizations with the Muslim world. It is not surprising to note that his speech was just one day before his trip to Ankara to have a meeting about a possible war in Iraq (Gordon, 2002, December 3).

The US also increased its efforts to solve the dispute in Cyprus between Turkish and Greek Cypriots, which was a major obstacle in Turkey-EU relations. The introduction of the Annan Plan in December 2002 by the UN was the first substantial plan to overcome the conflict in the Island. The UN Secretary General Kofi Annan introduced a detail plan to resolve the political conflict and to reconcile the island (Morelli and Migdalovitz, 2009). The plan, supported by the US, aimed at recreating

a single state on the island, consisting of two equal nations. The US handled the process with the UN to accomplish the Annan Plan so that a final settlement would be provided on Cyprus and one of the obstacles of Turkey-EU relations would be resolved. In April 2004 referendum on the Annan Plan, 65 percent of the Turkish Cypriots voted in favor, while 75 percent of the Greek Cypriots voted against. In spite of the result, the recognized government of Cyprus, with the overall impact of Greece as a member, entered the EU as a full member in 2004, while the Turkish Cypriot Republic stayed divided. The positive stance Turkish side took demonstrated to the EU that Turkey was willing to resolve the dispute on the Island.

In the Copenhagen European Council in December 2002, the EU decided that the EU would start the accession talks with Turkey ‘without delay’ on condition that the European Council in December 2004, upon a report from the Commission, would agree that Turkey met the Copenhagen political criteria (Commission, 2002). While the US and Turkey were waiting for an immediate and specific date for the start of negotiations, the EU didn’t put a definite date. The stance of the EU in the new millennium showed “although American support is important, what ultimately matters is the ability of Turkey to undertake domestic economic and political reforms and to implement the Copenhagen criteria fully” (Öniş and Yılmaz, 2005, p.11). The decision underlined the dependence of the decision on Turkish reform process and Turkey’s meeting the Copenhagen criteria by December, 2004. Unlike in Customs Union and Helsinki, Washington’s efforts didn’t achieve its goal of setting a date for the start of accession talks in 2002 Copenhagen Decision.

The Copenhagen summit pointed out that Washington support for Turkish membership lost its influence on the EU. As some analysts asserted: “They (Europeans) perceived the American involvement as an illegitimate interference in internal EU affairs” (Islam, 2008, p.22). The summit decision “clearly displayed the limits of American power in so far as decision-making regarding EU membership

was concerned” (Öniş and Yılmaz, 2005, p.10). The decision gave the message to Washington and Ankara that the decision regarding to the future of the EU belonged to the EU leaders and officials. The important EU decisions were not dominated by the US national strategic interests anymore; rather, it was being filtered through the domestic lens in the EU.

Rather than being an asset, the support of President Bush for Turkey in European circles became a liability for Turkey in the EU. As noted by Robins (2003), one of the reasons why Turkey did not achieve what it expected at the Copenhagen European Council was “the involvement of the US as an advocate on Turkey’s behalf, just at a time when transatlantic differences were becoming alarmingly prominent in the context of the developing Iraq crisis” (p.555). President Bush's support, rather than helping Turkey, backfired and created suspicion among European circles about Turkish-American alliance and the motives behind the US efforts. His advocacy was considered in accordance with his wish to include Turkey in the Iraq War. Although US support for Turkish membership had existed at the US agenda since the end of 1980s, his attempts were captured as a strategy of including Turkey to weaken the integration of the Union and strong European member states given the transatlantic rift between the US and some European member states such as France and Germany during the Iraq War.

Further, differently from Clinton, Bush’s attempts included more publicly made speeches and strong pressures to the European leaders (Tocci,2011). During the 2000s, many Europeans leaders and officials complained about US pressures for Turkey’s eventual membership. For instance, the former Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari, the head of the European Council at the time of the Helsinki Summit in 1999, declared: “don’t publicly interfere, but quietly support the process” (cited in Tocci,2011,p.85). Similarly, Senior European Commissioner’s suggestion to the U.S . officials in relation to the appropriate way of U.S. interventions was to implement

‘quite diplomacy’ (cited in Tocci, 2011, p.85). In addition, the Commissioner for Enlargement, Gunter Verheugen complained about U.S interventions by saying: “ the veiled pressure and threats that came from within Turkey but also from the outside... caused a kind of overkill...it was just a fraction too much, a fraction that triggered a negative reaction in Europe” (cited in Robins, 2003, p.556). However, the US officials believed that the EU pointed the US attempts as ‘an excuse’ to conceal its reluctance (Sayarı, 2006, p.169).

Further, President Bush usually pursued its policy of interventions on the same member states such as: Britain, Germany, and France: or Denmark and Belgium. He had phone calls with the leaders of those member states, and talking to their ambassadors. Between Bush administration and those of most of these member states (eg. Germany-France), there were already tensions due to his foreign policy in 2000s. As suggested by Atlantic Council (2004):

the United States should focus on the new EU members and a few others, where the U.S. advocacy could make a positive difference, but not campaign openly in those countries such as Germany or France, where public efforts are likely to be counterproductive. In those countries, quiet encouragement of favorably inclined leaders is likely to be a more effective strategy. (p.vii)

After Copenhagen summit, the US continued its efforts to support Turkey in Europe, to obtain an ultimate decision regarding the start of negotiations in December, 2004. Although March 2003 TGNA rejection to American forces on Turkish Lands on the eve of the Iraq War deteriorated the relations between the US and Turkey, the US did not give up advocating Turkey in European circles. As U.S. Secretary Powell, when asked about the U.S.-Turkey relations after the US disappointment during the Iraq War, declared: “Turkey is a good friend, a good ally, and . . . notwithstanding [any] disappointment of a couple of months ago . . . we have a good partnership with Turkey and I'm sure it will continue to grow in the years ahead” (cited in Grossman,

2004, p. 67). As the U.S. pursued its national interests in the critical regions surrounding Turkey, it continued to support Turkey for a membership in the EU.

Washington pursued its consistent policy urging the EU capitals aggressively to accelerate the beginning of accession talks. However, the EU insisted Turkey should undertake reforms for membership while Turkey was declaring it had already launched a range of reforms since 1999 (Atlantic Council, 2004, p.2). In advocating Turkey, Bush continued to pointing at the Muslim identity of the country as an advantage for the goal of overcoming the ‘clash of civilizations’(Huntington,1996) and expanding the liberal values through Europe. Before the decision of the EU regarding the start of accession talks, he gave a speech to the NATO summit at Galatasaray University, Istanbul, emphasizing Turkish-American alliance throughout the history and American support for Turkish membership in the EU. He declared:

For decades, my country has supported greater unity in Europe -- to secure liberty, to build prosperity, and to remove sources of conflict on this continent. Now the European Union is considering the admission of Turkey, and you are moving rapidly to meet the criteria for membership. Mustafa Kemal Atatürk had a vision of Turkey as a strong nation among other European nations. That dream can be realized by this generation of Turks. America believes that as a European power, Turkey belongs in the European Union. Your membership would also be a crucial advance in relations between the Muslim world and the West, because you are part of both. Including Turkey in the EU would prove that Europe is not the exclusive club of a single religion; it would expose the "clash of civilizations" as a passing myth of history. Fifteen years ago, an artificial line that divided Europe -- drawn at Yalta -- was erased. And now this continent has the opportunity to erase another artificial division -- by including Turkey in the future of Europe (Guardian, 2004, June 29).

After a meeting with Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan on June 29 2004, Bush said: “As Turkey meets the EU standards for membership, the EU should begin talks that will lead to full membership for the Republic of Turkey” (cited in Beatty, 2004, June 26, para.1) .Upon the speech of Bush, the reactions by the EU were again harsh and quite negative. For example, the speech of former French President Jacques Chirac,

in Istanbul 2004 at the NATO summit, demonstrated European impatience to the presses of President Bush. He remarked severely: “Mr. Bush not only went too far but went on territory which is not his own. ...it’s as if I was advising the US on how they should manage their relationship with Mexico” ( cited in Black, White and Trimlet , 2004, June 29).

In December 2004, The European Council agreed to start the accession talks with Turkey in October 2005. In October 2005, right before the beginning of accession talks, the US had to intervene again to resolve a conflict between the parts. The dispute emerged because of the 7th provision of Turkey’s Accession Negotiations Framework. The provision regarding the prohibition towards Turkey not to block the membership of a member state to any international institutions led to crisis. Despite not being solved, the crisis were calmed down with the telephone calls by Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice to the EU, British, Turkish and Northern Cypriot leaders (Radikal, 2005, October 6). She also led the British president then of the EU to publish a notification regarding the issue. After that, she gathered the EU ambassadors to talk about Turkey. Upon her helps, Turkish President Gül called Washington to thank her (Radikal, 2005, October 6).

The decision to start negotiations in October 2005 was mostly affected by the constitutional reforms and legal harmonization packages adopted by Turkish government after Helsinki Summit to abide by Copenhagen Criteria. After Helsinki summit, Turkey had gone into a reform and democratization process. Turkey’s official relationship related to the membership concluded in a transformation in Turkish democratic system. At the end of 2001, TGNA had accepted a major Constitutional package amending the articles on freedom of expression and the death penalty of the 1982 Constitution. This package was the start of constitutional reforms under the National Programme for the Adoption of the EU Acquis (Müftüler-Baç, 2005, p.21).



The new ruling party, coming into force in 2002 AKP ( the Justice and Development Party) after a big electoral victory, seemed more willing to place Turkey in the Union and to adopt the required reforms (Öniş and Yılmaz, 2005). The victory of AKP, which was indicated as a moderate Islamic party, was encountered with pleasure in many European nations, such as Greece and Germany (Öniş and Yılmaz, pp.6-7). With its majority in the Parliament, the new government passed several important political and social reform packages. Turkey had many reforms ranging from extending the minority rights to the elimination of death penalty in 2002. The AKP government also adopted major economic changes predominated by the plan determined with the International Monetary Fund (Atlantic Council, 2004, p. 4). While Turkey was attempting to adopt such reforms for membership, a rejection by the EU could lead to confusion in the Muslim population in some of the European nations (Atlantic Council, 2004).

Moreover, by not participating in the Iraq War with US President Bush, Turkey had the chance of working on its reform process (Kayhan and Lindley, 2006). As Kayhan and Lindley(2006) observes: “If Turkey had entered the Iraq War with the US in 2003, Ankara administration and the military would solely concentrate on the war rather than the reform and democratization process for the EU and the attempts for meeting the criteria” (p.7). Consequently, the opening negotiations in 2005 would not be possible due to the Turkish concentration on the Iraq War. By staying outside of the war, Turkey was able to work on the reform process for the EU. Turkey, afraid of being removed from the West, paid more attention to its Europeanization process when the relations with the US were in conflict during the Iraq crisis (Kayhan and Lindley, 2006).

If Turkey had entered the war, the military would have still kept prominent power over the government in Turkey (Kayhan and Lindley, 2006). In contrast, to comply with the EU criteria, Turkish administration decreased the power of military with the

seventh harmonization package, by decreasing the power of National Security Council (NSC) in 2003-2004 (Kayhan and Lindley, 2006). In July 2003, the provision that the NSC secretary be a military officer was aborted; and the number of NSC meetings decreased from once a month to every other month. NSC was turned into an advisory body, by increasing the number of civilian members in the Council. These reforms aimed at preventing the military to use the NSC for intervening in the administration of the civilian government (Larrabee, 2010, p.161).

Washington attempts were not influential in European agreement to begin negotiations with Turkey in October 2005. While American officials successfully supported Turkey in the EU during the 1990s, US direct influence on EU-Turkey relations decreased dramatically at the early 2000s. In contrast to the situation of 1990s, European officials did not appeal President Bush's interventions in the early 2000s. The European leaders and officials accused the US and President Bush of interfering in the European Union's business by lobbying hard and forcing the EU leaders for the admission of Turkey as a member. "Their reactions have been either polite silences, long-winded explanations of the complications inherent in the accession process, or impassioned demands of non-interference in a quintessentially European affair" (Tocci, 2011, p.83). The EU rejected US attempts, viewing them as irrelevant and inappropriate interventions in a domestic issue of the Union. The US insistence mostly created suspicions, disapprovals and severe reactions in European side.

### **3.5. Conclusion**

This chapter has presented empirical data showing the noticeably decreasing legitimacy of U.S. influence on EU-Turkey relations from 1990s to the early 2000s. It has argued that as Turkey kept its prominence for U.S. foreign policy after the end of Cold War, Washington consistently supported Turkey throughout the 1990s and

early 2000s. This chapter, consistent with the perspective of neoclassical realism, explored that U.S. support for Turkey-EU relations in that period was mainly motivated by the realistic prospects of the U.S., which were mainly shaped by the shifting external influences such as the sharp end of the Cold War, emerging terrorism and Iraq crisis. While the attempts of Clinton administration successfully operated during Customs Union in 1995 and Helsinki decision in 1999, the heavy pressures of President Bush on the eve of Copenhagen Council in 2002 and the start of accession talks evoked strong and severe reactions of some key European leaders and politicians. It is also important to note here that when the security was plenty in the international environment until the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the impacts of the domestic political structure of Clinton administration were more explicit on the form of US interventions during the 1990s. In other words, plenty of security in the international system translated into Clinton administration's policy of supporting Turkey calmly in European capitals and emphasizing the implications of liberal values in EU's enlargement towards Turkey and importance of Turkey's reform process. However, once the security challenge emerged with 9/11 attacks, the domestic context started to lose its pull and the requirements of the external structure became more dominant. As a consequence, President Bush increased US attempts of supporting Turkey with strong urges in the context of his War on Terrorism and Iraq War in the early 2000s. The domestic intervals such as the ideology, perceptions and the diplomatic style of US leader Bush were still influential on the form of US interventions during the 2000s, including strong pressures and loud public speeches to his European counterparts. However, the outside security scarcity was more influential on his policy of supporting Turkey consistently and his increasing urges on the EU for Turkey's inclusion. As a matter of fact, the structural influences were the main sources of US approach towards Turkish membership, the consistent US support for Turkey-EU relations throughout 1990s and early 2000s, and noticeable increase in U.S interventions in the early 2000s.

However, this study argues that, the structural influences of the Post-Cold War period and the early 2000s are not sufficient alone to explain the drastic shift in U.S. influence. Hence, as set in Section 2.32., the next chapter will balance the structural influences with the internal influences primarily coming from the European perspective to explore the emerging limitations of American support in the early 2000s.

## **CHAPTER 4**

### **THE LIMITATIONS OF AMERICAN SUPPORT FOR TURKEY-EU RELATIONS**

#### **4.1. Introduction**

To reach a comprehensive explanation of the decreasing extent of U.S. influence on the EU-Turkey relations, it is vital to place the ‘European perspective’ at the core of this analysis. Accordingly, this chapter focuses on two limitations of American support: European Approach to Turkey’s membership after Turkey’s framework shifted into the candidate membership statute and the reflections of the EU-US relations in the altered international climate after the end of the Cold War on the EU-Turkey relations. As a consequence, this chapter will combine a range of internal influences as well as structural ones in explaining the limitations of American support. Firstly, it will map the transformation of EU’s economic and political structure, by analyzing EU’s various reforms such as: its new economy, institutions, growing supranational structure and governance, new security policy based on norms and values and new enlargement policy, and their effects on its approach towards the inclusion of Turkey and American interventions during the 1990s and early 2000s. Then, it will question the controversial debates in the EU and member states about Turkey after 1999 Helsinki Council Decision, with a special attention to the altered inner context of the EU at the early 2000s. Secondly, to understand why U.S. legitimacy on the EU shifted over time, it will examine the transatlantic relations during the Post Cold War and the Iraq War, emphasizing the reflections of the War on EU perceptions of Turkish membership and US pressures in the early 2000s.

## **4.2. European Approach towards Turkey: From a ‘Foreign Policy’ to a ‘Domestic Policy’ Issue**

As set in Section 2.3.2, besides the international structure, the intervening variables coming from the European perspective are considered in this section for exploring the shift in the reflections of US interventions on EU-Turkey relations. Given that the issue of Turkey turned out to be a domestic policy issue of the Union with Helsinki Decision in 1999, EU level and domestic factors are all need to understand the changing scope of U.S. influence on the EU regarding Turkey from post-cold war period to post 9/11 attacks. These variables include various elements such as the altered social and political structure of the EU and member states, domestic political and economic pressures and considerations in the EU, religious, cultural and social factors, and increasing inner concerns and debates in the EU and many member states about Turkey’s membership.

### **4.2.1. The New Europe: The Transformation of the EU after Cold War**

With the sudden and unexpected fall of the Soviet Union, Europe entered a period of confusion. The post-cold war EU launched a new order and renewed its priorities and policies to cope with the challenges of the new international environment and arrange its relations with its neighbors after 1989. The disposal of the main Russian threat, a new unified Germany and widening geographical and cultural boundaries (inclusion of Austria, Finland and Sweden in 1995) in the post-cold war period brought many domestic questions in the Union regarding the governance, political and economic integration, domestic security and the implications of the enlargement. The fall of the Berlin Wall and the disposal of the main security threat ensured that the EU would be able to turn inside and become more unified. We observe the EU after Cold War evolving as ‘a complex political system, difficult even for interested Europeans to understand’ (Dinan, 1994, p.6). With the Single European Act (1986),

which facilitated the decision-making process by bringing majority voting instead of the need of unanimity, and the completion of the single market, the European Community aimed at accelerating its political and economic integration. The community signed the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 to form the European Union and take the Union to the single European currency, the euro. Then, the Maastricht Treaty was amended by the treaties of Amsterdam in 1997 (1997/came into force in 1999) and Nice (2001/came into force in 2003) in 2001, taking it to a political union. By the early 2000s, the EU had already completed single market and adopted single currency 'euro'.

When the US was supporting Turkey in the EU at the early 1990s, the EU's political structure was still new and rough (Tocci, 2011). However, by the 2000s, the EU had already progressed its political integration, having been engaged with the political and constitutional debates regarding the future of the Union (Tocci, 2011). The EU was working on a supranational structure to create a politically united Europe by pooling the sovereignty of the states and maintaining the commitments of similar policies by the member states. It drove a very complex policy "based upon the breakdown of the distinction between domestic and foreign affairs, on mutual interference in each other's domestic affairs, on increasing mutual transparency and on the emergence of a sufficiently strong sense of community to guarantee mutual security" (Wallace, 1999, p.519). The results were ambiguous and the debates between the supranational and intergovernmental structure of the Union kept going; still, the states had to coordinate their interests and preferences according to the common rules as the domestic affairs of any state would affect the other states. Accordingly, the EU started to take into more consideration the domestic situation of the candidate countries during the pre-enlargement process.

Further, the prospect of the enlargement towards the Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs) affected the policy of the EU to a large extent. The EU started to

pursue a more inward policy to build a new European system with a specific focus on the CEECs and process of deep integration. With the magnitude of the problems the EU would certainly face after the growth, it had to adopt the strategy of ‘widening’ and ‘deepening’. While “maintaining its own system of governance, it needed to provide the stability in widening to the Eastern Europe” (Friis and Murphy, 1999, p.212). Similarly, to prove effective cooperation, the candidate countries had to modify and adapt their political structures to maintain the successful operation of European institutions. Thus, the EU got engaged mostly with balancing its governance and providing the stability in the new countries besides its heavy agenda of economic union (Friis and Murphy, 1999).

Another development in the Post-Cold War period was the change in the EU’s security policy, bringing a ‘stability-focused’ approach to the agenda (Korteweg, 2011, p.221). The unexpected removal of the Berlin Wall changed the security policy of the EU from Russian threat to the new countries in the Eastern Europe. The fact that the Union was not able to prevent the spill-over effects of the instability and disorder in the CEECs on the member states, it had to deal with those critical regions. The EU had to search for applicable policies to overcome the threats coming from those regions. As the main challenge was to provide the domestic security, and it had social and economic implications, the EU didn’t have the traditional security understanding like the US after 1989. Sayarı (2006) describes the post-world Europe security policy as transferring “beyond the realm of traditional military concerns, to include illegal immigration, refugees and asylum seekers, drug trafficking, and environmental problems” (p.173).

The developments within Europe led the EU to using the norms as ‘a means of agency’ to maintain the security (Flynn and Farrell, 1999, p.512). The new environment created the need of a new European order, which introduced the norms of democracy as the basis for overcoming the conflicts between the states.



Differently from the civilizational geopolitics, the EU aimed to create a European home to provide the harmony among the states in the Europe. The new method to overcome the conflicts between the states in the Europe was the establishment of democracy (Flynn and Farrell, 1999, p.512). As a consequence, in the Copenhagen Conference (1990), the states declared:

participating states express their conviction that full respect for human rights and fundamental freedom and the development of societies based on pluralistic democracy and the rule of law are prerequisites for progress in setting up the lasting order of peace, security, justice, and cooperation that they seek to establish in Europe (cited in Flynn and Farrell, 1999 p.516).

The aim was to increase the notion of norms and values while military means are refrained (Korteweg, 2011). Under all of those conditions mentioned above, the EU had to implement a serious enlargement policy. The mission of reuniting the continent led the EU adopt an enlargement policy to ensure a market economy, political stability and democracy and human rights in the candidate countries (Leech, 2002, p.15). European Council in Copenhagen(1993) declared:

Membership requires that the candidate country has achieved stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities, the existence of a functioning market economy as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union. Membership presupposes the candidate's ability to take on the obligations of membership including adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union ( p.13).

The transformation of the candidate countries towards democracy and preparation for the market economy lied at the heart of EU enlargement, which concluded in identifying the entry conditions (Friis and Murphy, 1999, p.221).

The EU set and specified the necessary reforms and ‘*acquis communautaire*’<sup>1</sup> to be fulfilled by the candidate countries, with Copenhagen (1993), the Commission’s White Paper (1995) and Agenda 2000(1999) (Leech, 2002, p.16). At the Copenhagen summit in 1993, the Copenhagen Criteria, stating that a country must be a democracy, operate a free market and be willing to adopt the entire body of EU law already was set out. The White paper meant to guide the CEECs on the transition to the internal market. The Amsterdam treaty (1997) designed the enlargement process to a great extent to ease the absorption of the new membership in the Union, by setting normative values, such as the principle of respect for human rights and fundamental problems as an obligation to be ensured by the member states (Friis and Murphy, 1999, p.224).

However, the EU, not being an undivided unity, had obstacles in the decision making process. As the enlargement would affect national interests of the member states besides the general system of the EU, a consensus had to be provided among the member states (Friis and Murphy, 1999, p 215). As stated by Friis and Murphy(1999):

In the case of enlargement, decisions have implications for the EU as a system of governance (e.g. capacity to act, the influence of individual states within the system); and intra-EU politics (e.g. the distribution of costs and benefits, the geopolitical profile of the Union). Hence, for each state, enlargement triggers a broad range of strategic concerns and affects the domains of security, politics and economics (p.215).

As the national preferences in the EU extended with the national preferences of many member states, it seemed difficult for the EU to take immediate decisions

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<sup>1</sup> *Acquis communautaire* is a French term ,which indicates the cumulative body of European Community laws, the EC’s objectives, substantive rules, policies and, in particular, the primary and secondary legislation and case law – all of which form part of the legal order of the EU. All Member States are bound to comply with the *acquis communautaire*. The term is most often used in connection with preparations by candidate countries to join the Union. They must adopt, implement and enforce all the *acquis* to be allowed to join the EU (<http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/>).

about the significant issues. As a consequence, the enlargement process always created tensions in the Union. The attempts to revitalize the union upon the enlargement, the fails of the Treaty of Amsterdam (1997) and the Treaty of Nice (2001) made the enlargement issue more delicate for the EU. With the security concerns, and different approaches towards Turkey and Cyprus, the enlargement process became a complex prospect of the Union at the early 2000s (Friis and Murphy, 1999).

In its endeavor of the enlargement, the US supported EU enlargement, seeing it necessary for securing the stability in the continent in the ambiguous environment of the changing orders. The US and the EU worked together in the enlargement towards the Eastern Europe during the late 1990s. Furthermore, immediately after Cold War, both of the sides agreed on the geo-strategic prominence of Turkey in the Balkan crisis and ambiguous nature of the post-cold war. Also, during the process of enlargement towards to the East, Turkey enjoyed the enthusiasm of the EU of expanding the liberal values (Tocci, 2011). Accordingly, Clinton administration's emphasis on the argument that the EU was an agency to expand the liberal values was influential in Helsinki Decision (Tocci, 2011). Within this framework, the US was able to contribute in carrying Turkey to the Customs Union and candidate statue.

However, the influence of post-cold war security concerns and geo-strategic focus of the EU had been rubbed off by the early 2000s (Tocci, 2011). Parallel to the perspective of neoclassical realism, when 'the security environment is stable' ( Taliaferro et al., 2009, p.191), the EU's policy toward Turkey is seen to be transforming under the impacts of the internal factors. As the economic and political structure of the EU had developed more until the early 2000s, the argument, favored by many Europeans and used by the US to support Turkey, that Turkey would be a geo-strategic value to the EU lost sway(Tocci,2011). Then, the EU, having developed its political and economic integration, started to view the enlargement policy more

serious and had a more awareness about the political and economic consequences of Turkish membership (Tocci, 2011). Accordingly, the geo-strategic considerations in the EU were replaced by the domestic concerns regarding the impacts of Turkish membership on the ‘functioning of the EU institutions’ (Tocci,2011,p.95). Having accelerated its political integration, been engaged with constitutional debates and adopted Euro by the early 2000s, the EU then, was viewing Turkey’s full membership as a challenge to EU’s capacity of establishing the policies of a wholly integrated internal market and a politically united Europe. For example, in 2001, Ulrike Guerot, then the head of EU research at the German Council on Foreign Relations, against American advocating arguments related to Turkey’s strategic importance, claimed: “These Americans have no conception of what EU membership entails,...Yes, there is a security aspect; but if you want the EU to be a strong partner, you cannot have Turkey inside the EU, destabilising it.” (Economist, 2002, May 17).

Accordingly, the pro-enlargement attempts of the US regarding Turkey started to lose its legitimacy over the EU capitals in the early 2000s. As noted by Leech (2002): “...enlargement is more than a matter of US preferences; it is also a matter of the expectations of the Europe itself” (p.17). As the US kept on supporting Turkey, the EU insisted on the necessary reforms Turkey had to adopt and focused on the consequences of its membership on the EU’s institutions and economy. As argued by Lippert (2002):

While the US, just like most CEECs, seems to concentrate on the status of membership, the EU points to the level political and economic integration that is already being achieved prior to accession. That is why the EU focuses more on the process of enlargement. Process versus product is a well known pattern of conflicting perceptions and priorities in US-EU relations ( p.30).

For the EU, the enlargement process was not the same with that of NATO (Tocci, 2011, p.95). Instead, the enlargement of the EU, as a political process, contained the economical and political implications. As a consequence, at the 2000s, Turkey’s

domestic context and reform process turned out to be more important than its geo-strategic position and military capabilities, a shift that were progressing considerably in the domestic direction.

#### **4.2.2. Turkey as a Domestic Issue in the EU: EU Perceptions about Turkish Membership**

After the question of Turkey in the EU entered into the framework of candidate membership statute with Helsinki decision in 1999, its enlargement process became a controversial issue, arousing domestic debates related to the future of the EU and national interests of the member states as the case turned out to be a domestic policy issue, in which the EU had the last word (Tocci, 2011; Tocci, 2012). As asserted by Sali (2010):

The decision taken at the Helsinki European Council in 1999 represents a fundamental turning-point in U.S.- Turkey-EU relations. From that date on, Turkey will concern Europeans primarily as a matter of domestic policy, as a country which has been recognised officially as a candidate to EU accession, thus opening the prospects of Turkey's membership on a par with member states such as France and Germany (p.32).

Similarly, as noted by Atlantic Council (2004), for the new Europe, differently from the US perspective, Turkey was not a 'foreign policy' or a 'strategic issue' anymore (p.6). More specifically, Atlantic Council (2004) points out that, "The Turkish issue raises fundamental questions about the future of the European Union, including its composition, its direction, and its governance" (p.6). As a consequence, the EU, as a more unified political unit at the 2000s, paid more attention to Turkey's reform process and its sufficiency in complying with 'acquis communautaire' rather than its geo-strategic position and military capabilities.

Turkey, as an internal issue in the altered political and economic context of the EU at the early 2000s, had to face with some moral questions instead of strategic ones: such as ‘ the role of the military in politics, human rights, freedom of speech, freedom of religion, and the protection of minorities’ (Kuniholm, 2001, p. 39). In addition, the Kurdish issue (Larrabee, 1997) and increasing influence of Kurdish lobby in some of the member countries promoted the debates related to Turkey’s deficits in human rights (Kuniholm, 2001, p.39). Turkish government’s inner conflicts with the Kurdish population (Larrabee, 1997), and its ongoing problem with the terrorist organization of PKK (Kurdistan Workers’ Party) started to be emphasized by the EU in that period ( Robins, 2001,p.106). As Robins (2001) concluded, it can be viewed as a misfortune of Turkey that the Kurdish problem was at the top of Ankara’s Agenda at the same time with EU’s rising idealism about the human rights after the end of Cold War (p.108).

Especially, given the fact some crucial political changes emerged within the Union and some of the member states at the early 2000s, the results turned out to be more negative for Turkey’s fate in the process. For example, the rise of right-wing parties in Europe in the early 2000s created domestic political pressures against a Turkish membership, which in turn decreased the extent of the efficacy of US supports on Turkey-EU relations (Tocci, 2011). Besides the accelerated political dimension of European integration, the rise of Green parties and the increasing role of the European parliament led the EU leaders to focus on political deficits of Turkey (Kuniholm, 2001, p.39). Also, Greek accession in 1981, inevitably had already made the situation worse for Turkey due to the historical conflicts between Greece and Turkey. As observed by Franck (2002): “As an insider, Greece shared responsibility for shaping EC/EU policy towards Turkey and could help to thwart more positive approaches many EC/EU members wished to make towards Ankara” (p.105).

After 1999 Helsinki decision, the issue of Turkish membership created controversial political and economic debates related to its culture, religion, borders and size, besides its political and economic shortcomings. In a Congressional Staff Forum, Bülent Alirıza, then the director of CSIS Turkey project, emphasized the divergence in EU and U.S perspectives toward Turkey, by declaring that both the U.S. and the EU supported Turkey's accession to the EU in terms of its geo-political and strategic place and its importance to link the Western and Muslim communities. He added, highlighting the distinction in their views, the U.S. was primarily focusing on the macro level, while the EU was contemplating in local terms. The EU was concerned with the consequences of Turkish membership on their national budget beside the effects of Turkey's Muslim identity (Niblet, 2005, para.9). The Europeans were also viewing Turkey and its borders as a security challenge, as remarked by Alirıza (2005), carrying the risk of bringing the conflict of 'troubled Muslim World' to the Union (Niblet,2005, para.9). As a further, as observed by Atlantic Council (2004), Europe approached to Turkey in two levels. The most visible level emphasizes the Copenhagen criteria and questions the issues such as " Turkey's record on human rights, judicial practices, and economic standards, as well as the strategic and foreign policy considerations of membership". However, at another level, "differing cultural traditions, Turkey's largely Muslim population, and the feared influx of Turkish workers into the member states" are examined (Atlantic Council, 2004, p.6).

Regarding the security issue, as argued by Kuniholm (2001), the EU had "a better understanding (than the US) of the potential threats that the regional powers pose to Turkey's existence" (p.31). Especially, with the crisis in the Middle East at the 2000s, the main US geo-strategic argument in supporting Turkey that it would be a bridge between the East and the West lost its influence on the EU (Tocci, 2011). The fear that Turkey, with its borders to the critical regions, would carry its security risks to the Union was more common among the Europeans. Particularly, emerging Islamist terrorism at the 2000s and the Iraq War in 2003 made the region more

critical. Consequently, the member states were very skeptical about enlarging the borders to the Syria, Iran and Iraq. The Atlantic Council (2004) interpreted the EU's understanding of Turkey's strategic situation in the following manner:

The situation in the broader Middle East is also likely to influence the EU's attitude toward Turkey. If the region seems more stable by December, especially if there are indications that reform is being pursued in a gradual but effective manner, the EU member states will find it easier to contemplate Turkey as an eventual member — one that could help build a bridge to that region and even act as an example of positive reform. If, however, the situation in the region worsens, especially in Iraq, the West Bank, and Gaza, opinion is likely to be sharply divided. A resurgence of Kurdish nationalism on Turkey's borders could also prove destabilizing, especially if the PKK renews terrorist activities within Turkey. Under these circumstances, some in Europe will be tempted to make Turkey into a barrier — a cordon sanitaire — that keeps those instabilities distant from EU borders. Others will argue that the more volatile circumstances make it even more crucial that Turkey be brought into the safety of the Union, where it can continue on its current democratic and stable path. (p.16)

Added to the geo-strategic perspective, the EU addressed to certain economic concerns about Turkey's membership. By the beginning of the 2000s, the EU agenda had already been filled with the reforms under the 'Lisbon strategy', to make the EU "the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world" by 2010 besides the concerns related to the 'future of Stability and Growth Pact' (Atlantic Council, 2004, p.7). Turkey's reasonably lower economic standards would certainly decelerate the economic initiatives of the Union. The high inflation rates in the country and the high level of unemployment would affect the economies of the other member states and the common economic policies (Kuniholm, 2001).

Another domestic concern regarding Turkish membership was the country's cultural roots. The disposal of Soviet Union and the prospect of enlargement increased the cultural awareness of the EU. Although the EU accepted Turkey's 'Europeanness' in Helsinki in 1999, the concerns about the cultural consequences of Turkish



membership existed in many EU states (Dinan, 1994, p.5). While the social democrat wave in the EU during the 1990s still agreed with the liberal arguments of the US, considering Turkish membership as a sign of the EU's global role to expand liberal values, the early 2000s witnessed the reaction of right wing politicians to these discourses (Tocci, 2011). Most Europeans started to voice openly that Turkey did not belong to Europe as it was culturally different. Turkey, having its roots in the Ottoman Empire, were coming from a highly different historical background and culture, and having a 'non-Christian, and hence non-European character' (Erdoğan, 2002). At the eve of the Iraq War, the former French president and then President of the European Convention on the future of Europe, Giscard d'Estaing (2002) declared:

Turkey should fall beyond the borders of Europe because it has a different culture, a different approach, a different way of life...its capital is not in Europe, 95 percent of its population lives outside Europe, it is not a European country...in my opinion it would be the end of the EU (BBC News, 2002, November, 8).

Similarly, the member of the European Parliament, Jean-Louis Bourlanges, in 2005 openly voiced: "Turkey is not a part of Europe and it is foolish to persist in building a multi-civilizational EU with unlimited, ever extending borders." (cited in Tocci, 2011,p.59).

Turkey's Muslim identity was another source of domestic debates in European circles, challenging Turkey's membership process. While supporting Turkey, President Bush relied on the civilizational arguments claiming Turkey's membership in the EU as a Muslim majority country would overcome the conflict between Muslim and Christian world (Tocci, 2011). He emphasized Turkey "as a strong, secular democracy, a majority Muslim society, and a close ally of free nations" (Washington Post, 2004, June 29). He also declared: "Including Turkey in the EU would prove that Europe is not the exclusive club of a single religion, and it

would expose the ‘clash of civilisations’ as a passing myth of history” (cited in Russell, 2004, June 30). However, his words did not sound positively in Europe during the early 2000s. The end of the Cold War had already started to shape European identity. During the Cold War, the Soviet threat and communism was the main enemy and the common ‘other’ against the European identity (Barkey, 2008). After the end of the Russian threat, the Europe shaped a new other: it was the Islam against the Christian popularity (Barkey, 2008). Then, the 9/11 attacks, the fundamentalist Islam targeting the West and terrorist attacks by radical Muslim groups in European capitals in the 2000s strengthened the European identity against Muslim identity. Filkins Dexter argued in December, 2002: “ The attacks of Sept. 11 last year and the possible war in Iraq have placed the debate over Turkey in the context of the clash between Islam and the West” (Filkins, 2002, December 13).

After the terrorist bombings in Madrid in 2004, the anti-Muslim reactions in the member states increased to a large extent, concluding in the initiatives of assimilations against the Muslim populations living across the Europe. For instance, France passed a law prohibiting the Muslim headscarf in the state schools in 2004 (Bremmer, 2004, October 22). Bremmer (2004) describes the situation in Europe, on the eve of EU’s decision whether to open the accession talks with Turkey in October 2004, in the following manner :

Anti-immigrant far-right parties are building a political following across Europe. Austria's Freedom Party, Italy's Northern League, Switzerland's People's Party, and Norway's Progress Party cooperate with similar groups in France, Germany, Belgium, and elsewhere. Anti-Muslim assaults are on the rise, particularly since last spring's Madrid train bombings (Bremmer, 2004, October 22, para.3).

In the eyes of many Europeans, Turkey was conveying a risk with its majority of Muslim population. The ruling parties of Islamic roots, such as the Welfare Party of Erbakan (Refah Partisi) in the middle of 1990s and the Justice and Development

Party of Erdoğan (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi) beginning in the early 2000s, and their activist policies in the Middle East arouse the fears of the member states to a large extent. As noticed by Aliriza (2005): “The current debate on European Muslims and EU relations with the Islamic world has become more intense because of the Turkish application and because Turkey is led by a party with Islamist origins”(Niblet, 2005, para.10). As Aliriza (2005) noted, criticizing European reluctance to Turkish membership and debates on Turkey’s Muslim identity, Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan asked ‘whether the EU wanted to be only a Christian club’. He declared that Turkey’s membership in the EU as Muslim majority country would assist Europe in overcoming ‘clash of civilizations’ (Niblet, 2005, para.10).

Still, Europe has never undermined the fact that refusing Turkey might arouse the reactions against European policies by the Muslim communities and the radical Muslim groups across the world (Erdoğan, 2002, p.10). As asserted in Economist (2004): “The EU is meant to be a liberal organisation, based on rational, non-discriminatory principles. It cannot say (to Turkey): ‘We won’t let you in because you are mainly Muslims’” (Economist, 2002, May 17). The EU never accepted that the religion played a role in the enlargement process; instead, EU leaders, and politicians underscored the liberal democratic values as the basis of EU enlargement. For instance, Gunter Verheugen, who served as a European commissioner for enlargement from 1999 to 2004, said: “Turkey can hardly be excluded for being Muslim when millions of Muslims are already citizens of the EU” (cited in Economist, 2002, May 17). However, in contradiction with his previous words, at the Commission, he declared that the people of Armenia and Georgia “were Christians when the West Europeans were still pagans” upon a discussion about their memberships (Economist, 2002, May 17).

Another domestic debate related to the prospects of Turkish membership, was the ‘immigration’ issue. Most of the member states such as Germany and France

considered Turkish membership as a domestic challenge in terms of immigration. The political and economic risks regarding the inclusion of different ethnicities in an environment of economic crisis beginning at the 2000s were the main sources of the debates (Atlantic Council, 2004, p.8). Especially Germany, with its high percentage of Turkish population, and France, with its increasing Muslim immigrants, were worried about the consequences of the new Muslim people's inclusion on Europe (Atlantic Council, 2004, p. 8).

Moreover, especially Germany and some other large states were skeptical about Turkish membership in view of its size and population. Turkey with its large geography and population would have an important place in the Parliament and the Council of Ministers, which would be a challenge in the decision making process to the other member states (Atlantic Council, 2004 p.7). In this regard, Valéry Giscard d'Estaing underlined the European concern by asserting: "the biggest member state in the European Union . . . with the biggest bloc in the European Parliament" (cited in Filkins, 2002). Similarly, Ulrike Guerot, then the head of EU research at the German Council on Foreign Relations, reacted to Turkey's membership claiming: "You cannot have a situation in which the country with the biggest weight in the EU is also the poorest, is on the geographical periphery of Europe, is not a founding member of the European Union and has no history of European integration" (cited in Economist, 2002, May 17).

The EU also gave prominence to good relations of the candidate countries with their neighbors. With the help of its pre-accession process, the EU aimed at preventing the candidate countries to bring their neighbor problems to the Union. Thence, Turkey's dispute with Southern Cyprus was an obstacle for Turkey in its bid to the EU. After Cyprus became the member of the EU in May 2004, the need to solve the conflict on the Island started to be emphasized more by the Commission (Commission, 2004).

All of those debates about the prospects of a Turkish membership have been controversial and diverged among the member states, which seems to be deriving from the nature of the Union. In contrast to the US, it is difficult to observe a coherent and consistent set of perceptions and approach towards Turkey in the EU, as the EU was not an undivided unit; each member state handled the issue through its lens (Kuniholm, 2002, p.38). With the inadequacy in its structure, the EU proved to be feeble in acting in most of the important issues regarding Turkey. As Kramer considers the EU:

as still unable to develop genuine strategic relationships with non member countries because it lacks effective common and security policies. This has meant the EU has never developed a strategic place for Turkey within political conceptions about, for instance, relations with the Middle East, Central Asia, or the Caucasus....The Association agreement relationship was never regarded as an element of European strategic foreign policy, although it came into existence for just such a purpose during the Cold War..Because of its poor performance in pursuing strategic political interests, the EU has been ambiguous in defining its relationship with Turkey.It was hesitant to declare Turkish membership in the European Union as the long term goal of relations and shied away from developing a political strategy toward that end. Thus its affirmations of the strategic importance of relations with Turkey become dubious in the eyes of many a Turk (cited in Kuniholm, 2002, p.38).

However, in spite of the negative perceptions about Turkish membership in the EU and European reluctance for a full membership of the country, the EU never wanted to lose Turkey (Erdoğan, 2002, p. 10-11). For the EU, it was important to ‘keep Turkey close’ (Erdoğan, E 2002, p.11). Prominently, Turkey was one of the major partners of the EU economy with the business opportunities, and its role in the Customs Union, linking the markets of the Europe, Eurasia and the Middle East (Erdoğan,2002,p.11). Moreover, agreeing with the US perspective, the EU recognized that, Turkey was offering an important source of energy to the Europe (Tocci, 2011). The arguments related to Turkey as an energy bridge from the East to the West sounded in the EU in favor of Turkey; many European politicians, business

people and civilian groups considered Turkey as the future source for European energy (Tocci, 2011). The Commission underlined Turkey's significant position in the energy policy of the Union. In the Progress report on Turkey in 2004, Commission claimed: " Turkey will play a pivotal role in diversifying resources and routes for oil and gas transit from neighbouring countries to the Union" (Commission, 2004). As a consequence, the EU developed a new strategy for Turkey: not to be 'united' nor 'undivided' (Erdoğan, 2011, p.10). Rather than having Turkey as a full member , 'a privileged' partnership of Turkey in the EU would be more suitable and advantageous (Tocci, 2011, p.97). Former German Chancellor Angela Merkel explained this idea of Europe in the following manner: "a bridge...should never belong totally one side. Turkey can fulfill its function as a bridge between Asia and Europe much better if it does not become a member of the EU" (cited in Tocci, 2011, p.97).

That broad argument set in section 2.3.2, introducing those mentioned European perceptions as operating as intervening variables behind the EU's policy outcomes toward Turkey's inclusion and American advocacy, might bear the following questions: Why did not Europe's negative perceptions about Turkey prevent the country's gaining candidate membership statute in 1999? Why did American advocacy turn out to be noticeably influential during the 1990s? As mentioned before, neoclassical realism again offers the best perspective to achieve an explanation. Parallel to the assumptions of the theory, the increasing internal concerns in the EU and many member states were able to dominate the policy outcomes of the EU after the international structure underwent a relaxation and the environment started to contain plenty of security. All of those domestic concerns seem to be resonating to the EU policy outcomes after the pressures of the international climate on the EU removed. Differently from the situation of the early 2000s, Europe was still under the influence of Cold War period security concerns and the pressure of Balkan crisis in the ambiguous environment of Post Cold War era during the 1990s. However, the

influence of Cold War period and security concerns had disappeared until the early 2000s. U.S. strategy, introducing Turkey as a buffer with its geo-strategic location, lost popularity in European circles (Tocci, 2011). Accordingly, EU level and domestic concerns about Turkish membership, increased opposition towards Turkey, the pressures of domestic interest groups, and the effects of internal debates about Turkey such as its domestic politics, economy, culture, religion, and borders were more affective and explicit at the 2000s.

### **4.3. The Effects of the Transatlantic Relations on U.S. Influence**

This section explores the motives behind the decreasing U.S. legitimacy on the EU after the end of Cold War with the help of structural and non-structural factors as set in section 2.2.3. While emphasizing the division in the Western alliance after the end of Cold War, this section first examines the transatlantic relations during the Gulf War, Balkan crisis and EU's enlargement towards the Eastern European Countries in the post-cold war period. Then, it examines the transatlantic low between the EU and the U.S. during the Iraq crisis. The domestic variables to be applied here include increasing policy gaps, the divergences in diplomatic styles, ideologies and perceptions of the systemic incentives and security threat between European leaders and President Bush during the Iraq crisis, and the new domestic concerns related to Turkish membership, arousing with the emergence of Iraq War.

#### **4.3.1. The West Divided: The EU and U.S. in the Post-Cold War Period**

The core of US and European foreign policies of the Cold War era was mostly a containment strategy towards the Soviet expansionism (Kissinger, 1999). The U.S. generated its hegemony to block communist expansionism with an ideologically undivided Europe. As argued by Kotzias and Liacouras (2006): "...the invocation of the threats posed by the Soviet Union during the Cold War also aimed at subjecting

the Western allies of the US to the latter's leadership ambitions.' ( p. 9). Similarly, Western Europe needed the US more than ever to protect itself from the Soviet expansionism.

After the end of World War II, the consequent American support for European integration, played an important role in shaping and securing the European continent. As claimed by Gaddis (1992): "without that influence (US influence), it is difficult to see how integration could have proceeded as far as it has" (p.211) .With US contributions, the economic revival in Europe would help stabilize the economic situation in the continent and diminish the effects of communism .The Marshall Plan , which had profoundly contributed to the European integration, the support for the institutions such as the Organization of European Economic Cooperation (OEEC),the European Coal and Steel Community ( ECSC), the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM), and the European Economic Community (EEC) were all initiatives by the US to create regional collaboration and stability on the continent prominently against the Soviet expansionism.

After the end of the Cold War, various events influenced the changing relations between the US and Europe (Keens and Soper, 1999). The collapse of Soviet Union, the unification of Germany and the developments in the Eastern Europe concluded in a transformation in U.S. -EU relations. The elimination of the common threat started to change the positions of the parts of this alliance and the interdependence between those parts. The most important result of the disappearance of Soviet threat, in terms of its effects on the EU-U.S. relations, was the relative weakening of U.S. hegemony over European countries. Bentley (2006) describes the post-cold war relations as having "new forms of interdependence and vulnerability" (p.75). As asserted by Norris (2002): "As Western Europe and the United States were no longer bound by a common enemy, the imperative of self-help did appear to bear a stronger impact on the outlook of each side, with the United States more concerned than before about its



domestic politics, and Europe alarmed at the apparent lack of depth and reliability to its dependence on the US” (p.73-74). The Post-Cold War period witnessed the emergence of the EU as distinct global actor from the US. As Marsh (2006) argued:

The EU, liberated of strategic dependence on America, anxious to tie-in reunified Germany, and sensing an opportunity to push for deeper political integration on the back of the Single Market programme, sought a stronger security role in the lead up to the Treaty on European Union (p.89).

In the new international order with the disposal of the Soviet threat, the European states, rather than balancing against the other European states, would deepen the integration to ‘balance against the remaining superpower(s)’ (Norris, 2002, p.37). Consequently, the EU emerged as an independent actor, slipping out from under US hegemony after 1989. As dramatically declared by Rosecrance: “Five great bases of power again control the organization of the world order: the United States, Russia, the European Community, Japan and China” (cited in Norris, 2002, p.37).

The different foreign policies of Europe from those of the US were already apparent in the Post-Cold War era. For instance, in the post-cold war period, on most of the important issues such as Israel-Palestine relations, the member states (Britain, Italy, France, Germany, Spain) were not close to the US position (Glenny, 2006, p.118 ). For instance, in 1999, the former French Foreign Minister Huber Vedrine described the US as ‘hyper power’ and asked what should be done ‘to resist the steamroller’ (New York times, 1999, February 5). US strategy in the Middle East, and the different approaches towards the presumed weapons of mass destruction were among the important issues where the US and the EU needed dialogue in the new era. (Larrabee, 2006, p.63 ) Similarly, the EC demonstrated its independence from the US when it deferred Turkish membership application by then Turkish president Turgut Ozal in 1987 by pointing out the economic and political deficits of Turkey.

However, the post-cold period, with its ambiguity, did not witness serious transatlantic rifts; indeed, the effects of the Cold war proceeded for a while. In spite of the ups and downs, the transatlantic relations between the US and Western Europe didn't go into deep crisis due to the necessities of the era. The ambiguity of the post-cold war era required that both of the sides take the initiative to create stable joint action plans to ensure cooperation in the challenging events. The 'November 1990 Transatlantic Decision' was one of the important steps taken for creating a coordination between the policies of both sides (Smith and Woolcook, 1994, p.469). In January 1994, both sides decided on 'Partnership for Peace' approach for central and East European countries in the NATO summit meeting. The agreement on the 'Combined Joint Task Forces' (CJTF) created a warmer relation between the parts in the context of the use of NATO forces outside the Europe (Smith and Woolcook, 1994, p.473).

After Europe and the US came out from the Cold War with victory, the EC/EU and the US worked acted together on the historical events of the period. Immediately after the end of the Cold War, the Gulf War broke out. On September 11,1990 President George Bush, following the crisis with Iraq declared that:

the crisis in the Persian Gulf...offers a rare opportunity to move towards a historic period of cooperation. Out of these troubled times...a new world order-can emerge: a new era-freer from the threat of terror, stronger in the pursuit of justice, and more secure in the quest for peace, an era in which the nations of the world, East and West, North and South, can prosper and live in harmony (cited in Roper&Baylis,2006,p.1).

To force Saddam Hussein to withdraw from Kuwait, Europe collaborated with the US (Baylis and Roper, 2006, p.1). Further, during the 1990s, the EU still needed the US security power and contributions to overcome the conflicts in the Balkans. As noted by Baylis and Roper (2006):

In Europe, after the Wall was breached the challenges of further economic and political integration were juxtaposed with the resurgence of ethnic conflict in the Balkans. With its political map changing rapidly, maintaining peace and security within the newly defined borders of continental Europe became a new mission for a NATO alliance that had been formed in the crucible of Cold War containment. (p.1).

In consequence, US intervention in the Balkans and the US and Turkey alliance to stabilize the region were welcomed in European member states. “The European experiences in the Balkans, however, have clearly marked a shift in Europe’s ambitions and determination to lessen its dependence on Washington” (Norris, 2002, p.76). The US, at first, approached the conflicts in Bosnia and Kosova as “being within Europe’s sphere of responsibility but as it turned out, US military power and leadership became essential to the defusing of these crisis” (Dockrill, 2006, p.123). In fact, the EU had started to focus on strengthening its Common Foreign and Security Policy when the crisis in Balkans arose (Norris, 2002). The Maastricht Treaty, aiming to improve the political integration of the Union, emphasized the need of the EU “...to assert its identity on the international scene, in part through the implementation of the common foreign and security policy including the eventual framing of a common defense policy, which might in time lead to a common defense” (cited in Norris, 2002, p.52). Similarly, during the Balkan crisis Jacques Poos, then President of the European Council, had clearly voiced: “It is the hour of Europe, not the hour of the Americans” (cited in Norris, 2002, p.52).

The reluctance of Washington to intervene in Yugoslavia at first and the incapability of the EU to provide stability in the Balkans demonstrated the need for strong CSFP in the Union (Norris, 2002). For one thing, Europeans realized that NATO and its activities were connected to the US, and further “Europeans saw the role of NATO as tied to American domestic politics in an unprecedented way. This meant that the EU states would have to prepare themselves for military interventions in the event that the United States would again decline its traditional leadership role” (Norris, 2002, p.

63). George Robertson, then the defense secretary for the United Kingdom, ambitiously declared: “Our ultimate aim...is not so much a European Security and Defence Identity but something altogether more ambitious – namely, a European Security and Defence Capability”(cited in Norris,2002,p.73). Consequently, the Balkan crisis in the 1990s was an important factor encouraging the EU to work more on its CFSP. The accelerating efforts to create a joint forces in the form of CSDP created fears in the US about the role and legitimacy of the NATO. It also brought forth the increasing possibility that the EU could take independent actions from NATO and the US (Norris,2002). Yet, the conflicts in the Balkans proved one more time that Europe still needed the US support specifically in terms of military assistance. Within this context, the EU tended to see Turkey, with its military capabilities as a possible asset for its CFSP.

After Cold War, the EU exceptionally kept its prominence for the US. The EU “still provided the bulk of America’s allies and the US was locked into profound economic interdependence with the EU especially” (Marsh,2006,p.91). Moreover, in 1992, General Colin Powell, at that time the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs-of-Staff, stated that the motive behind the wish to maintain the ‘Atlantic Alliance’ and securing ‘America’s engagement in Europe’ was that ‘forces on the European side were no longer for exclusive use in Europe but that ‘across the Atlantic’ incorporated also the Middle East and South-West Asia (Franck,2002,p.107). As Wyllie argues : “in the contemporary world, Europe can act as a base for American transatlantic strategic interests and as a repository of dependable allies who will share the responsibility for the international security from which they also benefit” (cited in Franck,2002,p.107).

Accordingly, the US attempts in Turkey-EU relations should be partly considered within the framework of this geo-strategic concern.(Franck,2002,p.107) Further, having a strong transatlantic alliance was vital for the US in the post-cold war international order. Consequently, the US supported EU enlargement towards the

former Soviet countries to provide the stability in the Europe. At the end of the 1980s, President Bush, demonstrating US wish to collaborate with Europe in its integration to the East, declared: “We believe a strong, united Europe means a strong America...a resurgent Western Europe is an economic magnet, drawing Eastern Europe closer, toward the common wealth of free nations” (cited in Gardner, 1999, p.6). Consequently, the US supported the EU acts for the progression of the enlargement towards the Eastern European countries.

US support for Turkish membership alongside the Central and Eastern European Countries during the 1990s had the chance of having fruits in this ambiguous international context of Post-Cold War period. As asserted by Tocci (2011): “Emerging victorious from the Cold War, working shoulder-to-shoulder on the transition of Eastern Europe, and intervening to put an end to bloodshed in the Balkans, the Clinton administration enjoyed considerable gravitas in Europe” (2011,p.162). As a matter of fact, due to the weighty matters of international actions in which the US and EU had to collaborate, US support for Turkey still kept its legitimacy on the EU during the 1990s.

#### **4.3.2 The Iraq Crisis: The Loss of U.S. Legitimacy within the EU**

The transatlantic conflict between the Europe and the US at the early 2000s caused the setbacks and negative reactions by European capitals to the US pressures for Turkish membership in the EU. The conflict emerged in response to the security doctrine of the Bush administration against the terrorist attacks during the 2000s (Kotzias and Liacouras,2006). If the Soviet threat led the West to the unity, as observed by Ash (2006), it is undeniable that, “the Middle East now divides that unity” (cited in Kotzias and Liacouras, 2006, p.21).

The fight against the terrorism shaped the main US security agenda after the 9/11 attacks. Initially, the terrorist attacks of 9/11 created a joint stance towards terrorism as the terrorist attacks were quite persuasive and dramatically caught the attention of any member states (Gardner, 1999). The EU, for example, supported U.S actions in Afghanistan against the Taliban regime (Gardner, 1999). The transatlantic relations, however, underwent a rift with the American stance towards Saddam Hussein's regime in Iraq. As asserted by Mowle (2004): "In 2002-3, the Iraqi crisis made clear that the United States and its allies in Europe are increasingly at odds" ( p.1). G. Papandreu (2006), the former prime minister of Greece, describes the Iraq crisis in the following manner:

Paradoxically, since the collapse of the former Soviet bloc in 1989, transatlantic approaches to tactical problems have tended towards divergence rather than convergence. The terrorist attacks on the United States in 2002 triggered a wave of solidarity with the United States. Americans and Europeans joined forces to fight the oppressive Taliban regime in Afghanistan. But shortly afterwards, differing views on how best to deal with Saddam Hussein's regime in Iraq led to a dangerous cooling of transatlantic relations. (p.x)

There are different views by the scholars related to the origins of the transatlantic low at the early 2000s. Christoph Bertram, for example, observes that the divergencies between Europe and the US are not a result of recent situation and conditions, rather emerge from 'differing interests and different views regarding history and the state of the contemporary world and its prospects' (cited in Kotzias and Liacouras, 2006,p.18). In contrast, Hoffman believes that the tensions in transatlantic relations are because of new US foreign policy rather than the 'pre-existing differences' (cited in Kotzias and Liacouras, 2006, p.22). As a further contrast, in my opinion, although the distinct understandings of historical and international world and national interests of the US and the European member states are at the core of the divergencies between the transatlantic sides, the Iraq crisis has been the turning point in kindling the fire. The Iraq crisis uncovered the distinct

nature of the US and the EU leaders regarding their different interpretations of the incentives by the international context.

The US considered the risk coming from Iraq as more serious than the EU did (Kotzias and Liacouras, 2006). Similarly, Andreani (2006) believes that the Iraq crisis revealed the differences in the US and the EU perceptions more than it created. (p.51). He argues that the main difference emerged from their distinct perception of the conditions in Iraq. Further differences in diplomatic styles additionally divided. According to Andreani (2006), the EU preferred to apply “a process of negotiation, influence and compromise leading to consensus as a precondition for action, at least in foreign policy” (p.51). On the other hand, President Bush’s policy during the Iraq crisis ignored that procedure. The shaping of the US foreign policy at the eve of the Iraq war clearly demonstrated that negotiation or consensus was not captured as necessary by the US (Andreani, 2006, p.51). Instead, according to Bush, they would cause a loss of time in his ‘War on Terror’.

Pfaff (2006), offering a similar perspective, argues that there are profound differences in “fundamental policy assumptions and strategy ‘between the Bush administration and nearly all the EU’s members,’ not only on most of the cited issues, but also philosophical differences concerning the nature of history, historical expectation, and the scope of legitimate national action, notable in the use of violence and the practice of pre-emptive war” (Pfaff, 2006, p.39). Differently from the US policy, the European leaders aimed to operate their foreign policies in a ‘more multilateral framework’ (Norris, 2002, p.173). In contrast to the style of Bush administration, the EU leaders internalized an idealist way by preventing to apply to military tools to deal with terrorism (Norris, 2002).

Bertram (2006) claims that the US, as the most powerful state in the international world, accepted ‘the international status quo’ in the Post Cold War era. However, he

argues, the US changed its policy under the impact of 9/11 attacks (p.41). On the other hand, the EU, Bertram (2006) argues,

is not a status quo power on the European continent, where enlargement and integration are truly revolutionary concepts of how to provide stability and prosperity to a growing number of states. But, beyond the boundaries of their Union, European governments either have no strategic ambition at all or are content with things as they are, seeking to encourage stability through international agreement and inclusion instead of military intervention and outlawing of problem states. This is so by conviction, but also partly by indifference, lack of the means or the inability to take urgent strategic decisions at the Unit level (p.41-42).

These differences were further reflected in differing expectations about collaboration of efforts. During the Iraq crisis, the US expected its alliances to share the same responsibility in its struggle with terrorism. On September 20 2001, for example, President George W. Bush gave a speech, addressing the nations:

Every nation, in every region, now has a decision to make. Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists. From this day forward, any nation that continues to harbour or support terrorism will be regarded by the United States as a hostile regime. (cited in Baylis and Roper,2006,p.2)

The speech of the President Bush arouse the reactions in European capitals. While the US and the Britain worked hard to get other states' supports and UN sanction for the invasion in Iraq most of the member states, such as France and Germany criticized the US for its interventionist policy in the region. France had already announced that in case of an approval of the war by UN, it would veto the decision immediately. European Commissioner Chris Patten, wanted European governments to oppose before the US 'goes into unilateralist overdrive'(Everts, 2002, February 17). Similarly Germany expressed its skepticism of the Iraq War and declined to participate in the Iraq War. Schröder, then Chancellor of Germany and the leader of Social Democrat Party, declared: "We are ready [to give] solidarity. But, this country under my leadership is not available for adventure" (cited in Hooper,2002, August 6).



In response to a European distrust of the US security policy in Iraq, the US harshly criticized the European states for staying passive in the war on terror. The President Bush's policy in Iraq and his stance towards the other nations, which were not participating in the war, affected the US popularity in Europe negatively. The US intervention in Iraq and the war increased anti-Americanism in some of the member states.

Consequently, US intervention in Turkey-EU relations gets reinterpreted in this new more hostile climate as an attempt of the Bush administration to get the support of Turkey to facilitate the Iraq War. As claimed by Barkey (2008), "Ironically of the war's two effects, getting Europe and Turkey closer to each other and reduced the US influence on championing the Turkish cause, the latter was perhaps far more significant and likely to be larger lasting" (p.202). The Iraq War and the reactions to US policy decreased the effectiveness of direct advocacy of US for Turkish membership (Barkey, 2008). As argued by Atlantic Council (2004): "the decline in US popularity and credibility among the European public makes the US government a less effective advocate in Europe on any issue" (p.19).

Bush's policy in the Iraq created one of the deepest transatlantic rifts in the international context "which led European trust in the US to sink" (Tocci, 2011, p. 89). The tensions between Europe and the US during the Iraq crisis declined the legitimacy of the US in the European capitals; the EU started to approach to US interventions with growing suspicions as a US policy to achieve its goals in the Middle East (Tocci, 2011). US support for Turkey was viewed "through the lens of the looming war in Iraq and Bush's ambitions in 2002 to pursue a second front attack through Turkey at the time" (Tocci, 2011, p.89).

Additionally, the Iraq attack created a 'split' in European visions, regarding the 'independence of the EU policy from the United States' (Andreani, 2006, p.51 ).

There was not even a ‘common voice’ within the Union during the crisis (Rioatta, 2003, February 12). While the Iraq crisis did not cause profound repercussions in Atlanticist member states such as Britain, Italy and Spain, it aroused skepticism in some of the member states such as France, Germany or Austria. In parallel, the extent of Atlanticism within the Union had an impact on the credit of the US advocacy for Turkey in the EU (Tocci, 2011, p.90). Accordingly, President Bush’s calling for Turkish membership was not interpreted as a negative action by Italy, Spain or the UK, while creating ‘backlash’ in the member states such as France, Austria or Greece (Tocci, 2011, p.90).

According to the opponents of the war such as France, Germany or Austria, Bush would include Turkey in the war while harming the European political integration (Tocci, 2011, p.89). President Bush’s attempts to support Turkey’s EU accession, as an attempt to include Turkey in the war, were considered as an obstacle towards the political nature of the Union. The support was conceived as a bid to harm some member states so that the US wouldn’t encounter strong political opponent. As argued by Debbar and Smith (2006):

The belief is that Turkey, along with the post-Communist countries of Eastern Europe, represents a strong pro-American ally. Thus, the argument goes, its inclusion within the EU, could help tip the balance of the EU and reduce the dominance of France and Germany, who both opposed the 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq (p.21).

The US wanted to include Turkey in the EU to play, some asserted, as a ‘Trojan Horse’ (Grant, 2005; Lesser, 2008). As a consequence, the efforts by the US to support Turkey generated negative reactions in many EU member states, with growing suspicions towards President Bush and his policy.

#### **4.3.3 The Iraq Crisis and its reflections on EU-Turkey relations**

Iraq War and the U.S. policy in the Middle East at the 2000s created adamant reactions in many European member states. Most of the European governments, civilian groups, and public strongly protested the war and its results for Europe. That environment of the transatlantic tensions and the US efforts to include Turkey in the War created perceptions-misperceptions in the EU about Turkey and its membership process indirectly (Barkey, 2008; Kayhan-Lindlay, 2006; Lesser, 2008; Tocci, 2011).

Turkey's reluctance to participate in the War and rejection to transfer of the US troops through its lands put the US-Turkey relations in crisis. In this way, Turkey appeared to be in a closer place with some of the European member states such as France and Germany. Turkey's refusal to intervene in the War and the March-2003 TGNA decision created favorable reactions in European media and the member states against the war. As a consequence, Turkey's skeptical approach to the Iraq War hindered a Turkey-EU conflict and facilitated Turkey's democratic transformation in a more smooth environment (Kayhan and Lindley, 2006). It changed the perception that Turkey would play as a 'Trojan horse' of the US in case of a membership in the EU (Barkey, 2008).

However, as claimed by Sali (2010): "while it is true that the Iraqi war dug an apparent and formal ditch between the US and Turkey, this did not suffice to fill the one between Brussels and Ankara" (p.36). 2003 refusal of TGNA and the tensions between the US and Turkey didn't remove the skepticism about Turkey and its membership in the EU (Lesser, 2008) as the European doubts about Turkey's accession had domestic (cultural, political and economic) implications related to its affects on the European political and economic structure. Thus, Turkey's stance against the war, didn't exceptionally accelerate its membership process. As argued by Lesser (2008):

the pervasiveness of Turkish anti-Americanism in recent years does not necessarily imply closer Turkish relations with Europe, or warmer European attitudes towards Turkey as a potential member of the EU. European perspectives and policies towards Turkey have their own diverse dynamics. American influence and the US-Turkish relations are part of the equation, but not the core, and arguably becoming less central over time (p.216).

Moreover, most of the Europeans thought Turkey did not have the similar reasons with the EU in being against the War. Besides Turkish fear of Kurdish problem in its borders, they believed, Turkey's Muslim identity caused the rejection to the US to protect the Muslim World (Lesser, 2008, p.216).

Further, the change of route with a new TGNA decision in 2003 found reflections in European capitals. To recover the conflicts with the US, TGNA accepted permitting the US to use its airspace in its attacks to Iraq. As a consequence, Turkey didn't seem to be very decisive and strict about the war. It drew a Turkish image as a supporter of the war in this way. Hence, Turkey couldn't benefit from the March, 2003 vote in terms of its consequences in Turkish membership in the EU (Kayhan and Lindley, 2006).

Additionally, TGNA decided to send troops to Northern Iraq to secure the stability in case of a Kurdish threat in its borders after the Iraq War. That decision implied that Turkey was violating the human rights and it was against the liberal values of the EU. Then commissioner for Enlargement Verheugen stated Turkey's military intervention would affect Turkey's path to the EU negatively. He openly warned that Turkish intervention in Northern Iraq could 'delay the launch of Turkey's accession negotiations'(cited in Tocci, 2011, p.145).

The negative reflections of the Iraq War on the EU and its perceptions related to Turkey were in a high extent. Prominently, the Iraq crisis decreased the efficacy of

the US advocacy and removed the effectiveness of the US argument that anchoring Turkey to the West would build a bridge between the Middle East and Europe (Tocci, 2011). Instead, the crisis brought the issue of the borders to the EU. With the conflicts in the Middle East, Turkey became a security challenge for the EU; it would carry the security risks of its borders to the EU (Barkey, 2008). Having trouble with its CSDP, the EU started to concern about Turkish accession, which would enlarge the EU's borders to the East. The EU would probably be forced to develop an 'EU army' after accepting Turkey's membership (Debnar and Smith, 2006, p.21). As a consequence, the crisis near Turkey's borders, and the US policy in the Middle East entailed the EU's realization of Turkey's geographical situation and the responsibilities it can give the EU (Barkey, 2008).

Europe was also worried about a possible war between Turkey and Iraq in the future because of the Kurdish question growing in the Northern Iraq (Barkey, 2008). The crisis enforced the idea that Europe should have borders and stimulated disputes over the European Neighborhood policy. Given the security challenge Turkey would bring to the Union, Turkey started to be considered for a privileged partnership in the EU. In this way, Turkey would play a bridge role between the West and the East to maintain the stability in the Middle East.

More importantly, Iraq Crisis drew a plain line between the East and West. (Barkey, 2008) As Barkey(2008) asserts: "It is therefore ironic that after arguing for decades that Turkey is a European country, the US through its Iraq invasion has in one bold stroke managed to push Turkey back into the Middle East in the eyes of many Europeans" (p.199). It brought the assumption that Turkey belonged to the East rather than the West (Barkey, 2008). Hence, as an Eastern country, Turkey's membership would be the end of European idea. The US policy including Turkey in its plans of the Middle East reinforced the arguments of the right wing politics that Turkey culturally did not belong to Europe. The crisis strengthened the European

view that Turkey was different from the Europe due to its borders with the Muslim Middle East and its different culture and religious.

Iraq crisis also increased the fear in Europe against the Muslim World (Kayhan and Lindley, 2006). For most of Europeans, Turkey's accession to the Union was inviting the Muslim terror to the continent. Although Turkey's Muslim identity was already a source of anxiety in the member states, the concern became more serious with the Iraq crisis (Kayhan and Lindley, 2006). Moreover, with the Iraq crisis and tensions with the US, Turkey started to pursue a more independent policy in the Middle East. Turkey's more active foreign policy in the Middle East, searching a resolution to the conflict without a war, created the misperception that it was getting closer to the Islamist countries in the Middle East rather than to the European countries in the EU.

Moreover, the economic promises made by the US to gain Turkey's support in the war and the negotiations between the US president and Turkey leaders about the economic aid package had highly negative implications in the EU. US economic assistance to Turkey raised doubts and criticism in many European countries as well as Turkish media and public (Güney 2005; Tocci, 2011.) Turkish dependence on the US economically created a Turkish image in the EU as always being in need of the US and not being able to take independent decisions and actions (Tocci, 2011, p.111). The US economic power on Turkey supported the suspicion that Turkey would play as an ally of the US in the EU.

In sum, while the President Bush was pressing the EU to accept Turkey, with the expectation of Turkish support in the Iraq War, his policy created unintentional reflections on Europe regarding Turkey. The foreign policies of the each side, the meetings between President Bush and Erdogan, and all of the public speeches by the leaders affected indirectly the impressions of the European leaders about the prospect of Turkish accession. While the Turkish rejection to the war and the US troops in

Turkey prevented a crisis between the EU and Turkey, it could not avoid the negative perceptions of Europe about Turkey after the Iraq War. The most important reflection of the war was carrying Turkey closer to the Middle East in the eyes of Europeans and accordingly increasing the internal concerns in the EU regarding Turkey's borders, culture and religion.

#### **4.4. Conclusion**

This chapter, as set in Section 2.3.2, explored that besides the systematic variables, a range of non systematic variables operated behind the shifting EU policy outcomes related to Turkey and American support. As the international environment had become more stable by the early 2000s, then the inner economic and political pressures in the EU and member states gained more capacity to intervene in EU policy outcomes.

The chapter first emphasized the transformation of the EU after the Cold War and the consequent economic and political considerations about Turkey's inclusion as intervening variables on EU policy outcomes. The complex political nature of the Union, its serious enlargement policy, new security understandings based on a common set of norms and values, its new economy, governance, and institutions have been elaborated here. After the framework of Turkey shifted into a candidate membership statute, it became a domestic issue rather than a strategic one, which created political and economic debates about its de-stabilizing effects on the integration of the Union. Various non-structural variables such as the economic, social and political changes in the EU and many member states, religious, cultural and social factors, the common European ideology about Turkey, common set of norms and values in the EU, provocations by political parties, actors and domestic interest groups and increasing negative perceptions about Turkey with the Iraq crisis at the early 2000s, have been emphasized here in exploring the controversial debates

in the EU and member states about Turkey's economy, culture, identity, religion, immigration and border concerns, moral values, and Turkey's relations with its neighbors. Moreover, the different perceptions about the security threat during the Iraq crisis, diverging security policies, diplomatic styles, and ideologies between U.S. President Bush and some key European leaders were emphasized as intervening variables here, as set in section 2.3.2., which created a transatlantic conflict and loss of the U.S. legitimacy on the Europe. As a consequence, this chapter underlined the importance of shifting influences, primarily coming from international level at one moment, but at different junctures coming from domestic considerations in exploring the shifting influence of the U.S. on EU-Turkey relations.



## **CHAPTER 5**

### **CONCLUSION**

This thesis has mainly been interested in the influence of the U.S. on EU-Turkey relations after the end of Cold War. It questioned how and why U.S. support for Turkey's participation in the EU shifted from being an asset to a liability for Turkey between the years of 1995 and 2005, with a special attention to the shifting relations between the U.S. and the EU for understanding Turkey's fate in the process.

This thesis argues that the motives behind the negative reactions of the EU leaders and politicians to U.S. supports for Turkey beginning in the early 2000s centered around EU level and domestic concerns beyond external ones. First of all, my analysis explored that after the stability in the Balkans emerged, the security concerns of the post-cold war era declined, and the political integration and consequent political power of the EU increased in the 2000s, the EU then, as a more unified political actor, started to adopt a more diversified approach towards Turkey. After the issue of Turkey entered into the framework of the candidate membership statute with the Helsinki Decision in 1999, the debates about Turkey became more controversial as a domestic issue in the Union rather than a foreign policy, and focused increasingly on the future of the EU and national interests of the member states. Although Turkey was still important for Europe in terms of geo-politic and economic prospects, the negative reactions by the key European leaders in the early 2000s to U.S. support for Turkey's full membership were related to domestic political pressures and the EU leaders' perceptions of the de-stabilizing effect of Turkish membership on the political and economic integration of the Union. Secondly, the transatlantic rift between George W. Bush's foreign policies and most

of the European member states decreased U.S. legitimacy and created harsh reactions in the EU. U.S. policy after the 9/11 attacks, the diplomatic style of Bush, obsessed with military intervention in Iraq, the different perceptions about the security threat, diverging security policies, ideologies and expectations about the international order between Bush and some key European leaders created a transatlantic conflict and loss of the U.S. legitimacy on the Europe. The pressures of the Bush administration in Turkey's favor started to be viewed as a U.S. trick to gain Turkey for its aims in the Iraq War and to incorporate its ally into the EU in order to weaken the political structure of the Union and weaken U.S. adversary EU member states such as France and Germany. As a consequence, the efforts by the U.S. to support Turkey were increasingly encountered with strong negative reactions by the opponents of the war in Europe, with growing suspicion towards President Bush and his policy.

This broad overarching argument unfolds in various chapters of the thesis. **Chapter II** of this thesis, with an overview of history of the bilateral relations, introduced the bilateral relations and U.S. and the EU policies towards Turkey after the end of Cold War. The U.S. and the EU, with realistic prospects, have always been willing to have close ties with Turkey in view of its highly important geopolitical position. Until the end of Cold War, geo-strategic and security-based foreign policies of the Western European states and the U.S. against Soviet expansionism helped Turkey to exist in the Western bloc. Turkey succeeded in becoming one of the first countries as a member of the Council of Europe in 1949, became a member of NATO in 1952, and had the statute of associate membership in the EU in 1963. After the end of the Cold War, having close relations kept its high priority for the U.S. and Turkey; and Turkey-U.S. relations progressed on this geo-strategic base. However, the end of the Cold War changed the dimension of the EU and Turkey relations. While Turkey has consistently attempted to link to Europe closely and attain membership in the EU, the views about Turkish membership have differed among the member states and been a

source of debate and conflict within the Union. The EU demonstrated its new vision when it rejected Turkey's formal membership application in 1989.

Although the U.S. had a limited scope of influence on EU-Turkey relations after the end of Cold War, its support for Turkey played an important role in some historical instances for Turkey-EU relations during the 1990s. As discussed in **Chapter 3**, after the end of Cold War, the U.S. with its national interests committed itself to support EU enlargement and include Turkey in this process. The consistent and increasing U.S. support for Turkey in that period was prominently shaped by the shifting structural influences even though the perceptions and ideologies of US leaders affected the form of U.S. interventions during the 1990s and the early 2000s. During the 1990s, with its geo-strategic concerns, the U.S. aimed at including Turkey in the EU's enlargements towards to the Eastern European Countries in order to have a democratic NATO ally linked to the liberal values of Europe. President Clinton's administration supported Turkey with public speeches, emphasizing the liberal values, lobbying activities in European circles and attempted to convince Turkey to adopt necessary reforms. Although the efforts set back during the Luxembourg Council in 1997, American support was vital in the Customs Union Agreement in 1995 and the Helsinki European Council decision in 1999. The rest of this chapter details how after the 9/11 attacks, President Bush increased the attempts of support to gain Turkey's assistance in his 'War on Terrorism' and fighting against Saddam Hussein in Iraq. President Bush and American officials pressed the European counterparts strongly with lobbying activities, private phone calls and public speeches to get a date for the start of the accession talks with Turkey at the early 2000s. However, rather than being advantageous for Turkey, the attempts of President Bush encountered with harsh criticisms and negative reactions by some of the European leaders and politicians.

In order to understand this shift in European reactions to U.S. support during the 2000s, **Chapter 4** examines in detail the emerging limitations of American support within Europe. This chapter, in accordance with the perspective of Neoclassical realism, explores a series of intervening factors operating along side of the international climate as mattering to the understanding of the shift in European policy towards Turkey and American support. With the disposal of Soviet Union, the challenge of a new unified Germany, and enlarging geographical and cultural borders, the EU had to turn to more interior concerns and adopted a deep integration strategy after the end of Cold War. Although Europe's political integration gained momentum towards becoming a political union of a supranational nature, its foreign policy and transatlantic relations were still exposed to the constraints by the international structure. During the early 1990s, the EU, with its new and rough political structure and debates on the CSDP, was still under the influence of the Cold War pressures and the Balkan crisis. However, the familiar European ideology regarding Turkey's different culture, religion and domestic shortcomings had already started to emerge. Nonetheless, Turkey's geo-strategic location and military power were still predominant to interests of the EU and member states in the ambiguous climate of the Post-Cold War period. However, the Cold War influence and these strategic concerns of the EU did not last long. Also, the EU had already completed its economic integration, had adopted the single currency 'euro', had a complex supranational structure, and had been engaged with the debates on its constitution by 2000s. Europe was standing as a complex political union in the world arena, with its serious enlargement policy, and critical to the shift, new security understandings based on a common set of norms and values, its new economy, governance, and institutions. This, by the 2000s, Europe was more aware of the consequences of the enlargement and the impact of Turkish membership on the operation of its institutions, economy and political integration. After the issue of Turkey entered into the framework of membership with Helsinki European Council decision in 1999, the question started to be viewed as a more serious domestic concern, arousing

controversial domestic debates in many member states, related to culture, identity, religion, immigration and border concerns, moral values, and Turkey's relations with its neighbors. Shifting from a strategic issue as framed by U.S. interests, the case of Turkish membership started to be viewed under the pressure of domestic interest groups, and filtered through the domestic context and changes within the EU in the 2000s including provocations by Greek lobbies, the debates of right wing parties, and the increasing role of Parliament.

Added to the above, **Chapter 4 also highlights** how the transatlantic relations of the hegemonic powers of the U.S. and the EU experienced the deepest crisis at the early 2000s with President Bush's foreign policy, due to the divergences in security policies, diplomatic styles, ideologies and understanding of security threat between some key European leaders and President Bush. Although, the end of Cold War had already divided the West and derived Europe out from U.S. hegemony, the EU-U.S. relations underwent the most serious and critical transatlantic law during the Iraq War of U.S. President Bush. While the Turkish rejection of the war and U.S. troops in Turkey had prevented a crisis between the EU and Turkey, it could not avoid the negative perceptions toward Turkey of Europe after the Iraq War. The most important reflection of the war was the way Turkey shifted closer to the Middle East in the eyes of Europeans and accordingly bringing in new domestic concerns in the EU regarding Turkey's borders, its distinct culture and its Muslim national identity.

With the help of the multi-level analysis introduced above, this thesis explored the ways that beyond the international structure, a range of domestic factors operated together in influencing EU decisions about Turkey and reactions to U.S. interventions during the early 2000s. The role of external structural factors, such as the increasing political power of the Union in the early 2000s, and decreasing national concerns with security in Europe in contrast to the US surely paid an important role in the shifting policy outcomes. However, in addition, the effects of

domestic variables, such as the intra-European tensions, including the mobilization of political actors raising issues of the shared set of norms and values in the EU and cultural, political, religious and economic differences between Europe and Turkey, the distinct political, historical and ideological natures of some of the key European leaders, politicians and elites with U.S. President Bush, and different strategic understandings of Turkey's role played a role in the growing divergences around Turkey's inclusion and emerging negative reactions in the EU toward American support in the 2000s . As a consequence, this analysis, parallel to the assumptions of neoclassical realism, has illustrated the central importance of shifting geo-political hierarchies and the shifting balance between international and domestic concerns for understanding international policy outcomes. In turn, this case underscored how structural international influences as well as a range of national level and domestic influences should be taken into consideration in explaining the EU policy outcomes related to Turkey's inclusion and the evolving impact of American support.

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## APPENDIX

### TEZ FOTOKOPİSİ İZİN FORMU

#### **ENSTİTÜ**

Fen Bilimleri Enstitüsü ☐

Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü ☐

Uygulamalı Matematik Enstitüsü ☐

Enformatik Enstitüsü ☐

Deniz Bilimleri Enstitüsü ☐

#### **YAZARIN**

Soyadı:

Adı:

Bölümü:

**TEZİN ADI** (İngilizce):

**TEZİN TÜRÜ** : Yüksek Lisans ☐

Doktora ☐

1. Tezimin tamamından kaynak gösterilmek şartıyla fotokopi alınabilir. ☐
2. Tezimin içindekiler sayfası, özet, indeks sayfalarından ve/veya bir bölümünden kaynak gösterilmek şartıyla fotokopi alınabilir. ☐
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**TEZİN KÜTÜPHANEYE TESLİM TARİHİ** :