THE FACTORS FOR THE RISE OF POLITICAL ISLAM:
MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD IN EGYPT

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ABSTRACT

THE FACTORS FOR THE RISE OF POLITICAL ISLAM:
MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD IN EGYPT

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This thesis analyzes the factors that caused the rise of political Islam by looking at the emergence and evolution of Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. This thesis takes the view that rather than the nature of Islam, political Islam indeed, is a modern phenomenon that emerged as a reaction to the historical and contextual political and socio-economic factors that have been affecting the Muslim world. Islamists are opposing to the deficiencies of contemporary world order by using different tools and tactics from secular ideological movements. Dissimilar to the secular movements which ground their opposition on the rationally constituted ideologies, Islamists use a religious discourse to protest the failures of the modern world system.

This thesis aims to examine the reasons that led to the rise of political Islam within the framework of Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. The research question of this thesis is which factors led to the resurgence of political Islam and which historical and socio-political circumstances brought Muslim Brotherhood to power.

It is the major theme of this thesis that the appeal of the political Islam is the consequence of interrelated developments which are the hegemonic role of West manifests itself with the colonial rule in the Muslim world, the disenchantment of modernization, erosion of the authentic values and practices, identity problems and

the failure of economic policies coming with political oppression. Within this context, it is argued in this thesis that the British colonial rule in Egypt, the demise of secular nationalism following the Arab defeat in the Six Days War, the failure of Nasser's state led-developmet policy and Sadat's infitah policy and the poverty, economic stagnancy unemployment, political oppression, widespread corruption, stifling censorship during the Mubarak's period brought Muslim Botherhood to power.

ÖZ

SİYASAL İSLAMIN YÜKSELİŞİNE YOL AÇAN FAKTÖRLER:
MISIR'DAKİ "MÜSLÜMAN KARDEŞLER"

Pehlivan, Arife

Yüksek Lisans, Ortadoğu Araştırmaları Bölümü

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Bu tez, Mısır'daki Müslüman Kardeşlerin doğuşunu ve gelişimini inceleyerek siyasal İslamın yükselişine yol açan faktörleri analiz etmeyi hedeflemektedir. Siyasal İslam, İslam dininin gereklerinin bir sonucu olarak değil İslam dünyasını etkileyen tarihsel ve bağlamsal sosyo-ekonomik faktörlere tepki olarak ortaya çıkmış modern bir olgudur. Siyasal İslam'ın temsilcileri laik ideolojik gruplardan farklı olarak uluslararası sisteme ilişkin eleştirilerini dini bir söylem kullanarak ifade etmektedir. Bir diğer deyişle siyasal Islam, İslamı bir din olarak olarak değil bir siyasi ideoloji olarak yorumlamaktadır.

Bu çalışmada, bir taraftan siyasal Islamın doğuşuna ve gelişimine yol açan faktörler incelenmekte diğer taraftan da Müslüman Kardeşlerin Mısır'daki yükselişine yol açan sosyo-ekonomik ve siyasal faktörlerin ne olduğu sorularına yanıt aranmaktadır.

Söz konusu araştırmada, siyasal islamın yükselişine yol açan başlıca faktörlerin; sömürge dönemiyle öne çıkan batının İslam dünyası üzerindeki baskın konumu, modernizmin vaadettiklerinden faydalanamamanın yarattığı hayal kırıklığı, toplumsal değerlerin çöküntüye uğraması, kimlik problemi ve ekonomi politikalarının başarısızlığı olduğu savunulmaktadır. Bu bağlamda Mısır'daki İngiliz sömürgecilik faaliyetleri, batılı değerlerin öz değerlerin yerini almaya başlaması,

Nasır döneminde benimsenen laik Arap milliyetçiliğinin Altı Gün Savaşı mağlubiyetiyle birlikte çöküntüye uğramasıyla ortaya çıkan kimlik problemi ve toplumsal refahı sağlamayı vaadeden infitah politikasının (ekonomik liberalleşme) başarısızlığı ve Mübarek döneminde doruğa ulaşan ekonomik sorunlar, artan işsizlik, toplumsal yozlaşma ve otokratik siyaset anlayışının Müslüman Kardeşlerin iktidara gelmesine yol açan başlıca nedenler olduğu iddia edilmektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: siyasal İslam, Müslüman Kardeşler, Mısır, modernizm

This thesis is dedicated to my dear husband Alp

and to my lovely new-born daughter Zeynep…

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

This thesis intends to illuminate the factors that led to the rise of political Islam by looking at the emergence and evolution of Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. The academic studies that analyze the causes of political Islam involve two main tendencies. One argues that political Islam is the result of the imperatives of Islam through claiming the separation of religion and politics is impossible in Islam. Contrary to this approach, this thesis positioned itself in the second tendency that argues political Islam is a contemporary phenomenon and emerged as a reaction to the historical and contextual socio-economic and political factors that have been affecting the Muslim world. In other words Islamism is perceived as an emancipatory movement rising against the injustices of modern world order.[1] It is the recurrent theme in this thesis that the appeal of the political Islam is the consequence of interrelated developments which are the hegemonic role of West manifests itself with the colonial rule in the Muslim world, the disenchantment of modernization, erosion of the authentic values and practices, demise of secular nationalism following the Arab defeat in the Six Days War and the failure of economic policies coming with political oppression. Dissimilar to the secular movements which ground their opposition on the rationally constituted ideologies, Islamists use a religious discourse to protest the shortcomings of the modern world system.

As it is mentioned above, this thesis aims to analyze the reasons that cause the rise of political Islam within the framework of Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt.

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[1] Amir Ali, "Islamism: Emancipation, Protest and Identity", *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs*, Vol. 20, No.1, 2000

The research question of this thesis is which factors led to the resurgence of political Islam and which historical and socio-political circumstances brought Muslim Brotherhood to power. This thesis mainly focused on the period between the beginning of Western colonial rule and the end of the Mubarak administration period.

For detailed analyses of the political Islam, in the first chapter, the ideologies of the founding fathers of Islamism and the relationship between Islam and politics is examined. Unlike the dominant perspective that associates the rise of Islamism to the inseparability of Islam from the politics and other domains of life, it is argued that Islamism has an instrumental relationship with Islam. Thus Islamism is revealed as a political ideology that utilizes Islam to criticize and de-legitimize the rulers and the political structure through diverse methods and principles. The lack of comprehensive information on the matters of the state affairs and the formation of government structure in the Islamic sources make Islamists to designate their own formulas for the social, economic and political problems of societies. That is to say that since Islam does not provide sufficient instructions about the *din wa dawla,* Muslim scholars adopt different approaches regarding the form of state, type of government and structure of institutions. Whereas some Muslim scholars support the establishment of a very specific and distinctively Islamic model of governance, others argue that any system of government including the democracy is acceptable so long as it conforms to the principles of Islam. Hence Muslim thinkers like Abd al-Qadim Zalloum, Ali Abd-al Raziq, and Rashid al-Ghannoushi cannot reach a consensus regarding the issues of Islam and politics.

In order to obtain a better understanding regarding the relationship between Islam and politics, the history of Islam will be examined. It is argued that the political power of caliphate gradually lost its political power as the effective control of the Arabia had passed into the authority of generals, administrators, governors and local provincial lords.[2] It is to say that the de-facto political power of *caliphate*

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[2] Ira M. Lapidus , "The Separation of State and Religion in the Development of Early Islamic Society", *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol. 6, No. 4 (Oct., 1975), pp. 363-385

transferred to dynastic military and administrative authorities who maintained their adherence to Islam. While Sultanate was holding the political power, the *caliphate* which is supposed to authorize the government functioned to legitimize the state. At the same time, the communities affiliated with the Sunni, Shia and Sufi cults of Islam build up religiously organized forms of socio-religious spheres independent from that of ruling elites and governments. The religious institutions of these communities operated independently from the state so long as they preserved their loyalty to the rulers. Contrary to the conventional approach that advocates the domains of religion and politics is inseparable in Islam, this thesis defends the position that the history does not provide such a concrete example. Despite Islam includes moral principles by its nature, it cannot be depicted as a political religion. Neither Quran nor the Hadiths signifies how the leader should be designated and the government should be formed. Although the relation between state and politics is undeniable throughout the history of Islamic states, it is prominently due to the legitimizer function of religion for the decisions of rulers on political issues.

After examining the relationship between Islam and state, the thesis analyze the founding fathers of Islamism in the context of the ideological evolution of Islamism. The arguments of Abu'l-A'la Mawdudi, Hasan al Bana and Sayyid Qutb who shaped modern Islamism will be highlighted in order to understand the essence of political Islam. Why I chose to concentrate on the ideologies of these figures is that each ideologue represents a crucial position not only at the time in which they lived but also for future generations of Islamists throughout the Muslim world. It is asserted in this thesis that despite different experiences, the common denominators among these prominent figures of Islamism are the strong sense of resistance against foreign domination, the perceived moral corruption in the society and the failures of the local governing elites to deliver social welfare. It will be argued that it wasn't only the religion to compel these figures to engage in political struggles but the socio-political circumstances of the time.

In the second chapter of the thesis it is intended to examine the factors that caused the rise of political Islam. It is the assertion of this thesis that instead of the

nature of Islam, Islamism, is a modern phenomenon that emerged as a reaction to the historical and contextual political and socio-economic factors that has been affecting the Muslim world. Islamists are rising against the deficiencies of contemporary world order by using Islamic discourse ultimately to restore the Golden Age of Islam. As Haynes argues "there is a return to religion in developing countries, a contemporary consequence of a complex mix of: inclusive or unsatisfactory modernization, disillusionment with secular nationalism, problems of state legitimacy, political oppression, incomplete national identity, widespread socio-economic grievances, and perceived- and unwelcome- erosion of traditional morality and values."[3] In this context, the mass appeal of political Islam is the result of given interrelated developments: the hegemonic role of West following with the colonial rule in the Middle East, the demise of secular nationalism fallowing the Arab defeat in the Six-Days War in 1967 and the failure of economic progress, political participation and modernity projects coming with increasing authoritarianism of the local regimes. Within this framework, despite political Islam strongly criticizes modernity, ironically it is the product of the sociopolitical conditions that effects Muslim countries in modern times. Hence, this chapter will analyze the given factors in details. It is asserted in this chapter that Colonialism, Cold War and post-Cold War are three broad historical periods that generated the context in which political Islam was born and acquired mass support. In addition to the assymetrical relationship with the West, another factor that is argued to lead to resurgence of political Islam in this chapter is the failure of secularization and modernization theories which advocate that the role of religion in modern world will eventually decrease as a result of the urbanization, political pluralism, economic welfare, modern social institutions, and advancement in health care and better living standards. It is argued in this thesis that the rise of religion in the developing and underdeveloped countries is mostly the result of the failure of modernization. The processes of modernization that led to the rise of Islam is outlined in this thesis as fallow: Firstly, the Middle East has undergone a period of colonial rule perceived secularization and modernization as a different means of hegemony by the Western powers. Despite the hesitation of

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[3] Jeff Haynes, *Religion, Globalization and Political Culture in the Third World*, London: Macmillan Press Ltd., (1999). pp. 242

societies in the Muslim world that secularization has been imposed from above inevitably generated a counter reaction which arises in the form of Islamism decades later. [4] Secondly, modernization led to the negligence of traditional values and cultural traits that consequently produced resistance from conservatives who demand authenticity. In other words encroaching Western impact into all domains of life was encountered with the social defense from those who calls for the readoption of authentic values. Thirdly, modern means of communications enabled religious organizations to spread their message more easily, to collect donations from diverse places and to build up transnational networks. Lastly and more importantly, the failure of the ambitious promises of modernization such as equal allocation of opportunities, urbanization, open democracy, political participation, improvement in the living conditions, economic welfare created a great degree of disenchantment in the society. It is the argument of this thesis that the deprival of the opportunities constituted a deep sense of disappointment that compelled people to search for an alternative option, that is the political Islam in this case, to satisfy their demands. At this point Islamists who criticize modernity and promises to restore the golden age of Islam has acquired the supports of masses. Moreover, the economic grievance in the Muslim world that created widespread support for the Islamists is another factor that will be analyzed in this chapter. It is argued that today's Islamism is the outcome of social disenchantment of unemployed well-educated young generation, unpaid officers, underemployed and overworked professional experts whose expectations have not been realized by either neo-liberal policies or development-economics policies.

On the basis of given factors, the emergence and rise of Muslim Brotherhood will be analyzed in the second part of the thesis. The emergence of Muslim Brotherhood (*Al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun*) in Northern Egypt at the end of 1920s is examined in the socio-political context of the time. It is argued that, the period in which the movement appeared was marked by the conditions associated with the British colonial rule, corruption of the administrative system, the abolishment of the

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[4] Fred Halliday, *The Middle East in International Relations: Power, Politics and Ideology*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, (2005), pp. 6

caliphate that symbolized the unity of Muslims and gradual Westernization and of values, norms and behaviors of society associated with modernization.

First, the emergence of the Muslim Brotherhood under the British colonial rule will be examined. It is argued that the conditions associated with the British colonial power motivated Hasan Al-Banna to establish a movement that oppose the Western influence in the country through preaching and social activities. The movement strongly criticized the increasing power of the British in all spheres of life and the contaminated, amoral and fragmented nature of local politics. The Brotherhood pointed out the rights and grievances of frustrated Egyptian society and advocated to embrace a truly Islamic state based on the sharia law as a remedy to deal with the troubles of the country. The modernization that Egypt witnessed in the first decades of the twentieth century was seen as a different mode of domination imposed by the West. Brotherhood aimed to strive for the British exertions on the society through increasing education facilities in the form of preaching (*dawa*). Furthermore, the Brotherhood served as a charitable foundation in order to disseminate the Islamic ideology to low or middle income people. The unequal allocation of resources and the limitation of education facilities to a small section of society turned into an advantage for the Brotherhood that contributed to expand its influence across the country. The strategical and systematic operations of Brothers that prioritize the transmission of Islamic thought and the spread of solidarity through charity facilities led a small group of people to become a countrywide force with three thousand branches within the fifteen years.[5] However, as Mitchell points out, the success of the movement was not based on a coincidence but the systematic hard work:

> "In the first three years of the life of the society, its primary goal was the enlargement of its membership in and around Ismailiya. Banna and selected deputies pursued this goal by direct contract, touring the countryside on weekends an during vacations, preaching most usually in the mosques but also in the homes, clubs and other meeting places of the people. The use of the mosques gave the speakers the legitimacy and respectability they needed. Direct communication with the people in their homes, at their work and in their places of leisure added to that legitimacy the quality and sincerity and personal touch."[6]

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[5] Peter Mandaville, *Global Political Islam*, London: Routledge, (2007), pp. 70

[6] Richard P. Mitchell, *The Society of Muslim Brothers*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, (1993), pp.9

In addition to establishing direct contacts with people, the movement aimed to influence the power centers of the society. The *Ulema*, the *sheikhs*, the prominent families of the community, the clubs (social and religious societies) were the power sources that the movement planned to promote direct relationship. In this regard, the purpose of the Brothers was to influence the authorities who had the power in the decision making mechanisms of the state. Moreover, anti-colonialist and anti-Zionist rhetoric made Brotherhood more respectable and more legitimate in the eyes of people.

Secondly, the development of Muslim Brotherhood under the administration of Nasser will be examined. The secular Arab nationalism of Nasser and the criticism of Sayyid Qutb will be analyzed in detail. It is argued that the demise of secularization following the Arab defeat in 1967 which represented the end of Nassers' Arab nationalism caused the strengthening of the Brotherhood. The defeat of Nasser paved the way for an environment of religiosity that generated the conditions for the release of Islamists from the prison. The humiliation of Egypt by the Israeli forces was interpreted as a punishment of God for Nassers' pursuit of Arab nationalism, socialism and modernism that were seen as incompatible with Islamic ideals. Hence, the Egyptian society began to search for a permanent national identity. In the words of Abdo, "There were no foreign powers to inflict defeat, no imperialists depriving the masses of the economic gains they were promised under the veil of Arab socialism. Egyptians had only themselves to blame. It was natural then for the country to seek to reestablish its collective identity as a way to heal its wounds. That identity was Islam."[7] Thus the defeat of Egypt marked a new departure for the rise of political Islamists who promoted Islam as the only valid identity for Muslims opposing to the promotion of other alternative identity sources.

Additionally, the evolution of Muslim Brotherhood under the administration of Anwar Sadat who loosened the ties of the movement unlike his predecessor Nasser will be examined. At the beginning of his rule, Sadat released the members of Brotherhood from the prison and encouraged its exiled members to return to the

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[7] Geneive Abdo, *No God But God: Egypt and the Triumph of Islam*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000, pp.7

country in order to balance the Nasserists and leftists. Sadat opened up the way for the Brotherhood to operate freely in the social while preventing to form a political party. Sadat initiated the *infitah* (open-door policy) as a solution to the economic turmoil of the country after the semi-successful October 1973 War which provided Sadat the legitimacy to alter the Nassers' state-led development plan. It will be argued that the infitah policy that ruled out the welfare strategy contributed to the revival of Muslim Brotherhood through social services distributed to the deprived classes. In order to have a better insight for the revival of the movement the general lines of the Egypts' socio-economic structure and the *infitah* policy will be examined. Despite the high expectations, the *infitah* program couldn't be implemented at the pace with Sadat anticipated and the society had been promised. Within the framework of the evolution of Muslim Brotherhood, the outcomes of this new economic policy affected the organization in two ways: Firstly, Muslim Brotherhood developed a comprehensive network of social services and charity facilities that government couldn't be able to provide due to the economic burdens. These services of the Brotherhood strengthened its political power through the expansion of its network. Secondly, the *infitah* policy created the formation of an *infitah* class substantially with an Islamist cast that took an important part in Egyptian business cycles.

Finally, Mubarak period will be analyzed to introduce the circumstances that brought the Brotherhood to power. It is argued that since Mubarak closed all possible options for the political participation of Islamists through banning the formation of political parties and committing fraud in the elections, Brothers perceived the syndicates as an outlet to function. Esam el-Eryan and his like-minded Brothers who administered the syndicates were seeking for the means to accommodate the concerns of modern world and the imperatives of religion through perceiving the superiority of Islam over modernity. In this regard syndicates were considered as a way out for the professionals who were disgruntled at the economic conditions of the country and the transformation of the ethical standards of the society. It is argued that syndicates became a glimmer of hope for the frustrated generation of

professionals through encountering their spiritual and earthly needs with a wide range of social services combined with Islamic sentiments.

The circumstances which brought the end of Mubarak period and beginning of the Brothers' authority will be examined in this thesis. It is argued that the poverty, economic stagnancy, unemployment, political oppression, widespread corruption, and stifling censorship caused the end of Mubarak period who was power for three decades. On the other hand, these factors also carried Mohammad Morsi to the presidency because Bothers promised people the hope to overcome these circumstances.

CHAPTER 2

POLITICAL ISLAM

As it is observed by the subsequent developments, despite the widespread presumptions that the role of religion would gradually diminish in the modern world as a political force, religion maintains its prominence over the international politics in diverse ways. The leading religious figures of the communities put forward opinions on how state affairs should be conducted, religiously motivated organizations engage in charity facilities through establishing schools, hospitals and food-banks, conservative parties in Muslim countries have been getting stronger in state politics, transnational fundamentalist movements challenge international order operating beyond the state borders, the growth of Evangelical Christianity in American politics and the violent conflicts due to the ethnical and religious cleavages indicate how religion keeps its importance in domestic and global politics. Furthermore, the Iranian Revolution, the Solidarity Movement during the Polish Revolution and the Al Qaeda attacks in September 11 represented the momentous events that religion regained its position as a generic concept in international relations.[8]The rise of Political Islam became one of the important component of the global resurgence of religion that its influence keeps on rising in contemporary world politics at times through transnational terrorist organizations perpetrating attacks in the name of Islam such as Al Qaida, at other times through Islamic political parties operating in governments like Freedom and Justice Party in Egypt and Justice and Development Party in Morocco, and through the global Islamic movements such as Muslim Brotherhood and Gulen Movement.

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[8] Scott Thomas, *The Global Resurgence of Religion and the Transformation of International Relations: The Struggle of theTwenty-First Century*, London: Palgrave Macmillan, (2005), pp.2

Although Muslim politics is a widely discussed international phenomenon, the prevailing interpretations tend to ignore the pluralism and diversity of Political Islam[9] by characterizing the concept with religious connotations rather than a political meaning. Therefore it is essential to identify the term Islamism as political ideology rather than as a theological construct before beginning the discussion.

Islam like other religions involves essential rules that shape human life asserting what is right and wrong, which constitutes a unique value system. The institutionalized system of belief provides societies a moral core, a community spirit and a guide to social stability.[10] As Haynes comments, religion affects the world by what it says and what it does. While the former refers to the theological aspect, the later underlines its significance as a social phenomenon and an aspect of identity that has direct correlation with politics.[11] Thus the concern of this thesis will be primarily the political aspect of Islam.

Unlike the conventional perspective that correlates Islamism with the inseparability of religion from any other domains of life, Guilain Denoux portrays the concept as follows: "Politics lies at the heart of Islamism, which ultimately has far more to do with power than with religion. To Islamists, Islam is more a political blueprint than a faith, and the Islamic discourse is to a large extent a political discourse in religious garb. Thus while fundamentalists are typically concerned primarily with ideas and religious exegesis, Islamists are action oriented; they are preoccupied first and foremost with changing their world."[12] By this depiction Islam is revealed as a political strategy that has an instrumental relationship with religion. Islamists utilize Islamic values and principles to fulfill the sufferings of people that have been derived from the socio-political circumstances of modernity. The glory of

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[9] Islamism is used as synonymous with political Islam during the study.

[10] John Baylis, Steve Smith & Patricia Owens, *The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations*, Fifth Edition, Oxford: Oxford University Press, (2011), pp: 420

[11] Jeffrey Haynes, *An Introduction to International Relations and Religion*, Essex: Pearson Education Limited, 2007, pp: 12

[12] Guilain Denoux, "The Forgotten Swamp: Navigating Political Islam", *Middle East Policy* 9(2), 2002, pp. 56-81, at pp. 63

the early years of Islam has been provided as a glimmer of hope that would replace the unjust modern world order. Since the original Islamic sources provide very little imperatives on the matters of government, Islamism determines its own remedies for the social, economic and political challenges of society. Although the ultimate purpose is designated as the rejuvenation of the *Asr-ı Saadet*, the way forward to this purpose varies from movement to movement. Thus, the diversity of the environment in which Islamists operate generated the formation of highly heterogeneous and incoherent structures with dynamic structures. The Islamist movements follow different strategies on the basis of the established political system of the country in which they operate. Within the wide range of political Islam, whereas some promote to establish an Islamic state with revolution, others advocate to make changes on the basis of Islam conforming to rules of secular state. Further, others support an open democracy to express freely their religious identity in public spheres.[13] However, despite their diversity they have several sociological characteristics in common. The well-educated young men coming from middle class who look for upward mobility constitute the general profile of Islamists. Their political ideologies mostly formed in modern university campuses rather than religious institutions. Islamists are not the men of God who commit themselves purely to the dissemination of the religious principles but the political figures who challenge the established order by using religious terminology as *jahiliyya*, *dawa* and *asr-ı saadet* borrowed from Quran. The Islamist movements that are the outcomes of the modern world order adopted a religious terminology that is combined with the concepts of the left. Thus the revolutionary leftist ideology has been reinterpreted by the Islamists on the basis of Islamic principles.[14] Thus Islam turns into an ideology that is introduced to fulfill the disappointments of people stemmed from the shortcomings of modern political system. Islamists perceive Western values as the major threat for the Muslims that should be immediately purged away from the society. The moral erosion in the Muslim world is associated with the encroaching Western influence that is penetrated all aspects of life. Despite the strong anti-Western rhetoric, Islamists

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[13] Margot Badran, "Understanding Islam, Islamism, and Islamic Feminism", *Journal of Women's History*, 13 (1), Spring 2001, pp. 47-52, at pp.48

[14] Oliver Roy, *The Failure of Political Islam*, London: I.B. Tauris Publishers, (1994), pp.14

acknowledged that it is inevitable to embrace the Western technology to be able to compete in international arena.

2.1 Islam and Politics

It is a conventional assumption that from its inception Islam has been a political religion that the separation of religion and politics is nonexistent. The conviction that Islam refutes any possibility of division between religion and politics *din wa dawla*, includes the impossibility of Muslims to embrace the norms of democracy and the incompatibility of Western and Islamic worlds.

While Christian scripture were rendering a precise distinction between worldly and divine authority, such a consensus cannot be found in Islamic sources. Whereas some Muslim scholars support to establish a very specific and distinctively Islamic model of governance, some argue that any system of government including the democracy is acceptable so long as it conforms to the principles of Islam.[15] The conflict among Muslim thinkers like Abd al-Qadim Zalloum, Ali Abd-al Raziq, and Rashid al-Ghannoushi who defend different positions regarding the issue of din wa dawla, stems from the lack of sufficient information about the form of state, type of government and structure of institutions in Islamic sources.

Abd al-Qadim Zalloum the former professor at Al Azhar and the former leader of Hizb-ut Tahrir defends the restoration of *Caliphate* that will contribute to the unification of Ummah and the implementation of Shaira. For him "Muslim territories are governed by infidel regimes, and therefore, from sharia perspective, Muslims live in an 'abode of disbelief' (*dar al-kufr*)"[16] The only way that emancipates Muslims from the abode of disbelief was demonstrated as the restoration of *Caliphate*. Since Muslim world fragmented into small political entities that are in competitive with the world powers, *Caliphate* is expected to unite all Muslims under the single political authority. On the other hand Ali Abd-al Raziq who adopted a secularist approach argues that the two fundamental sources of Islam,

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[15] Peter Mandaville, *Global Political Islam*, London: Routledge, (2007), pp. 12

[16] Abd al-Qadim Zalloum, How Was the Caliphate Destroyed, in *The Contemporary Arab Reader on Political Islam*, ed. Ibrahim M. Abu Rabi, New York: The University of Alberta Press, 2010, pp.215

which are the Quran and Sunnah, does not have any reference to the Caliphate or any particular form of state system. According to him the formation of caliphate during the time of Prophet Mohammad based on the political necessities rather than the religious instructions that oblige Muslim to implement for the establishment of the state system. [17] Moreover, Ghannoushi opposed to the equation of democracy with the foreign intervention. For him, "democracy is a set of mechanisms to guarantee freedom of thought and assembly, and peaceful competition for governmental authority through the ballot box."[18] He argues that Islamists cause to the decline of Muslim world through the denial of the democratic system. According to him, as long as Islam produces a system of governance that is adaptable to modern conditions, it is inevitable for Muslims to embrace the democratic principles in the state mechanisms. He underlines that people who reject the norms of democracy can only defend authoritarianism through the implementation of one party system. As it is seen that, the nonexistence of a consensus regarding the form of state among the leading Islamic intellectuals proves the fact that Islam does not promotes any specific form of state system. However the thesis of Islamist that advocates the inseparability of religion and politics in Islam strengthens their legitimacy since they reveal to materialize the will of God.

2.2 The State and Religion in Muslim Society

In order to have a better insight regarding the role of religion in state affairs, the historical record of Muslims should be examined. The history of Islam began with the foundation of Islam by Prophet Mohammad who preached in all of lifes' concerns on the basis of Gods' revelations. He was the religious, political and military leader of Muslims whose authority mainly derived from his religious position that contributes him to unify *Ummah* into a single political structure under Islam. During his rule it was not possible to establish an autonomous political space from that of religion. The death of Mohammad changed the course of Muslim politics that the spiritual power of the sovereign has come to an end. Despite the end

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[17] Souad T. Ali, *A Religion not a State: Ali Abd-al Raziq's Justification of Political Secularism*, Utah University Press: Salt Lake City, (2009), pp.

[18] Rashid Ghannoushi, Islamic Movements, in *The Contemporary Arab Reader on Political Islam*, ed. Ibrahim M. Abu Rabi, New York: The University of Alberta Press, 2010, pp.133

of divinely ordained power, the office of caliphate was supposed to protect the religious legacy of Prophet Mohammad. In the words of Lapidus, "As successors to the Prophet, the *Caliphs* were obliged to preserve his religious and political legacy in its moral, religious, and legal aspects. It was their duty to teach the principles of Muhammads' revelation, to settle disputes, to maintain good order, and to extend Muhammads' conquests to secure the benefits they brought the community."[19] In this context, the position of caliphate was unique that no one other than the caliph can possess religious and political power in the Muslim community as a whole. Moreover, the caliph functioned to unify the *ummah* despite the tribal factions among the community. The caliph represented the unification of *ummah* in his personality regardless of the tribal identities of their members.

The death of Prophet Mohammed in 632 brought an immediate challenge, that is, the designation of a *khalifa* (successor) to the Muslim community. Since the revelation ended with the Prophets' death, it was not possible to claim divine authority for anyone who aspires to be the leader of the Muslims. Thus, the loss of Mohammad symbolizes the end of the integration of political and religious offices at the hands of the ruler. However *caliphs* maintained to account for preservation of the religious legacy of Prophet, the integrity of *Ummah*, protection of Muslim land and the maintenance of social peace.

Despite *Khalifa-I Rashidun*, the righteously guided caliphs have enjoyed widespread support among the community due to their closeness to the Prophet Mohammed, many of their decision were openly questioned and three of them assassinated by their political opponents. The quest for further legitimacy compelled the successors to obtain military and political success. Esposito contends that, "the first documentary references call the leader of community of Believers not *caliph* but '*amir al-muminin*' (commander of the Believers), and this may be the original term for the heads of community, replaced only some time later by the term *caliph*, which was seen as synonymous but had the advantage of being found in Quran"[20] As it is

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[19] Ira M. Lapidus , "The Separation of State and Religion in the Development of Early Islamic Society" , *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol. 6, No. 4 (Oct., 1975), pp. 363-385

[20] John Esposito, *The Oxford History of Islam*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, (1999), pp.15

seen, even the language became significant to prove that successor is the right person to preserve the divinely ordained moral principles in governance.

During the reign of the first two caliphs, Abu Bakr and Umar, conquests remained and the Islamic state became stronger. However, the eruption of First Civil War (*fitna*) between 656 and 661 marked an important milestone in the history of Islam. The civil war and two intra-Muslim (The Battle of Camel and Siffin) battles during the reign of Ali tore the Muslim community apart and caused the formation of Sunni and Shia sects in Islam.[21] With the assassination of Ali in 661, the era of rightly guided caliphs came to an end, the succession descended to Umayyad dynasty. However, because the questions – "how leaders of the community of believers were to be selected and above all what were the criteria for leadership"[22] remained unsolved, the Second Civil War, which resulted in the massacre of Alis' younger son, and Prophet Mohammad's grandson, Husain and his family at Karbala, erupted. The merciless slaughter of Husain and his seventy odd companions gave them a spiritual status of martyrdom. The deep sorrow of the martyrdom strengthened the Shiite's anger to Umayyad's, and started a process whereby Schism as a political movement gained a religious characteristic by turning into a subgroup within the Islam.[23] Thus, the system of caliphate, which is supposed to guard the Islamic moral system in theory, evolved into dynastic politics as a result of the fragmentation in the expanding Muslim community. It is seen that the golden age of Muslims lasted a short time and the integrity in the early years of *Ummah* was permanently lost.

Beginning with the middle of the tenth century the effective political control of the Muslim lands transferred from *Caliphs* to *sultans* and *amirs*. Whereas governments in Islamic communities, *Sultanates*, held all political power, the *Caliphate* served to legitimize the state although it was supposed to authorize the government in theory. Thus, the de facto separation of religion and politics was

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[21] Richard C. Martin, *Encyclopedia of Islam and the Muslim world*, London: Macmillan, (2004), vol.2, pp.621

[22] John Esposito, *The Oxford History of Islam*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, (1999), pp.16
[23] Ibid, pp.18

realized. The political bodies in Muslim states were institutionalized independently from the religious connotations, although they emphasized their loyalty to Islamic values and commitment to the protection of Islamic lands. In the meantime, religious communities build up an independent space from the state. Unless, they threatened the continuity of state, the political power has not interfered into the private space. As Roy comments, "any intervention into the private sphere is perceived as arbitrary, precisely because social relationships regulated by the sharia are not supposed to be subject to arbitrariness and violence, contrary to the image of the capricious despot that Western chroniclers often sent home."[24] Since the limit of *Sultan*'s political power has been determined by Sharia, any interference into the public domains was not the right of ruler. The only religious function of ruler was the protection of Islam and the maintenance of Sharia. As far as the political landscape allowed Muslims to practice their religion freely, the religious duty of political authority was fulfilled. In other words the authority of *Sultan* was not questioned if the Sharia is implemented and the Muslim territory is defended. In this regard, Muslim jurisprudence adopted the principle of obedience (*ittat-i ulul amr*) so long as the ethic of Islam has been provided.

On the other hand, the *ulema* have expressed opinions on social and religious life through functioning as judges, administrators and religious advisers to Muslims. The variety of the religious cults played an important role for the formation of different organizational structures such as Sunni jurisprudence, Shi'ite sects, or Sufi *tariqas* that hampered to reveal a common Islamic interpretation for the issues. The Schools, which included subgroups, served to guide society on how to pursue a life as a proper Muslim. Within this context people demand advices in matters of family law including intra-marriage issues, divorces and inheritances from the *ulema*. Moreover they make regulations on the certain aspects of commerce, conducted educational institutions, engaged in charitable activities, dealt with legal issues and arbitrate on disputes. [25] Thus, *ulema* established local administrative and social elite

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[24] Oliver Roy, *The Failure of Political Islam*, London: I.B. Tauris Publishers, (1994), pp.14

[25] Ira M. Lapidus , "The Separation of State and Religion in the Development of Early Islamic Society" , *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol. 6, No. 4 (Oct., 1975), pp. 363-385

whose power was derived from the religion through involving in matters related with the interpretation of Sharia. Furthermore religious institutions such as waqfs, mosques, and almshouses were separated from the ruling regimes as long as they avoided rising against the political authority. Despite the existence of de-facto separation between religion and politics in the Muslim community, the "Islamic political imagination" perceives this fact as deviant.[26] The differentiation of society after the death of Prophet Mohammad who held both the spiritual and political authority was completely ignored by Islamists. Dissimilar from the historical reality Islamist political imagination promotes an ideal state model that is presented as the matter of Islam. They created an ideological theory, which combines the Quranic terminology and the principles of political science. In the words of Roy, "from the Quran come the terms: *shura* (advisory council), *hizb* (party), *tawhid* (oneness), *mustadaf* (oppressed), *umma* (community of believers), and *jahiliyya* (ignorance), which are interpreted in a modern political context (democracy, political parties, a classless society, social classes, and so on.)" [27] Furthermore, *dar-al Islam* (house of Islam), *dar-al harb* (house of war), *hakimiyya* (sovereignty) and *dawa* (preaching) derived from the different traditions of Islam to strengthen the Islamic ideology. Thus, the religion of Islam turned into an ideological theory, which is utilized to appeal to masses that suffered from the socio-economic grievances.

As it is indicated before the religious institutions from the political institutions gradually differentiated following the death of Prophet Mohammad. In subsequent centuries the *Caliphate* lost its de-facto political power to dynastical military and administrative regimes, which preserved their loyalty to Islam. The loss of *Caliphate*'s political power can be clearly seen in the case of Ottomans when Mehmet Resat declared jihad against entente states relying on the power of caliphate he couldn't get the support of Muslims. In the meanwhile, Sunni, Shia and Sufi communities constituted religiously organized forms of socio-religious domains separated from that of ruling regimes and states. Contrary to the dominant assumption that posits the spheres of religion and politics is inseparable in Islam, the

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[26] Oliver Roy, *The Failure of Political Islam*, London: I.B. Tauris Publishers, (1994), pp.14

[27] Ibid, pp.40

historical background does not provide such a concrete example. As it is argued repeatedly, despite Islam includes moral principles by its nature, it cannot be depicted as a political religion. Neither *Quran* nor the *Hadiths* signifies how the leader should be designated and the government should be formed. Although the relation between state and politics is undeniable throughout the history of Islamic states, it is prominently due to the legitimizer function of religion for the decisions of rulers on political issues.

2.3 The Key Figures of Political Islam

In order to have a better insight regarding the ideological formation of political Islam, it is inevitable to analyze the 'founding fathers' shaped the modern Islamism. The Egyptian Hasan al Banna founder of Muslim Brotherhood, Pakistani Sayyid Abu'l-A'la Mawdudi creator of *Jamaat-i Islami* and Sayyid Qutb whose thoughts constitute the main feature of the Brotherhood are the progenitors of modern Political Islam. Each figure represents a crucial position not only at the time in which they live but also as primary landmarks for future generations of Islamists throughout the Muslim world.

2.3.1 Sayyid Abu'l-A'la Mawdudi

Sayid Abu'l-A'la Mawdudi is one of the outstanding intellectuals whose thoughts have been highly influential on the Islamic political theory. The circumstances of India between 1937-1941 became highly seminal for the formation of Mawdudi's ideological survey. The British rule in India was shaking and the prospective administration of the country seemed to be under the control of Hindus. While the future of the Muslims was ambiguous, Mawdudi positioned that it is indispensable for Indian Muslims to establish a separate state with a religious identity based on Islamic principles.[28] He refused to support the Congress Party, which was presented to represent Muslims in Hindu majority independent state. Moreover he harshly criticized Muslim League, which supports a separate secular-

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[28] Black Antony, *The History of Islamic Political Thought*, Edinburg: Edinburg University Press, second edition, (2011), pp.309

national state model. Nationalism and democracy were the notions that Mawdudi strongly opposed because in his perspective both would cause to the preponderance of non-Islamic forces. When the partition of India and creation of a separate Muslim state was to be realized Mawdudi established an organization rival to Muslim League. Thus the Jamaat-i Islami, which advocates the autonomy of Pakistan with religious propagation, was established in Lahore, Pakistan in 1941. Mawdudi intended to Islamize Pakistan and establish an Islamic state based on Islamic political order as opposed to the secular nation state system. To quote from Keppel, "Mawdudi favored what he called 'Islamization from above' through a state in which sovereignty would be exercised in the name of Allah and the Sharia would be implemented."[29] He believed the Islamization of society through the preaching that was layed out to inform society about the essentialness of Islamic rule. For Mawdudi religion is an integral component of politics. He conceptualized Islam as an ideology to pursue the political goal of establishing an Islamic state that would cover Indian Muslims. Mawdudi describes Jamaat- Islami, which was founded to perform jihad as follows: "It is not a missionary organization or a body of preachers or evangelists, but an organization of God's troopers."[30] Jihad revealed as a way of struggle that was waged to restore the authority of God through implementing Sharia.

Throughout his life, Mawdudi was on the front burner as a controversial figure in Pakistani political life and exposed to several arrests and long-term incarceration. Even after his death in 1979, his ideas remained to influence subsequent generations. As a journalist and author in Urdu, Mawdudi produced a set of books to account his conceptualization of Islamic political theory. He believes that the absolute sovereignty only belongs to God (*al-hakimiyya*), human beings are supposed to implement God's will on earth. Although statesmen have the political authority to realize particular arrangements, the sovereignty over people is not within their assigned positions.[31] According to Mawdudi, adoption of Western secularism,

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[29] Kepel Gilles, *Jihad: the Trail of Political Islam*, London: I. B. Tauris, (2006), pp.34

[30] http://www.alislam.org/library/books/mna/chapter_4.html

[31] Peter Mandaville, *Global Political Islam*, London: Routledge, (2007), pp. 65

nationalism and capitalism were among the main factors that cause to the downfall of the Muslim societies. Thus Mawdudi called for authenticity that would be replaced by the corrupted Western values. For him imperialism and colonialism brought Muslim world the conditions of jahiliyya that was associated with the catastrophic atmosphere of pre-Islamic Arabia. Returning to true Islam by fallowing the divinely revealed rules is presented as the only way for Muslims to retrieve their power.[32] On this basis, Mawdudi generated Islamic democracy, which configures Western liberal variant into the interpretation of Islamic tradition:

> "If I permit to coin a new term, I would describe this system of government as a theo-democracy, that is to say a divine democratic government, because under it the Muslims have been given a limited popular sovereignty under the suzerainty of God. The executive under this system of government is constituted by the general will of the Muslims who have also the right to depose it."[33]

Mawdudi combined the Quranic terminology with the principles of Western political science to ground his concept of theo-democracy. The consultation (*shura*) mechanism between state and society would be functioned and the truly Islamic society would have the choice to determine and depose the administrators in Mawdudi's theo-democratic system. According to Mawdudi, in order to be a true Muslim 'the credo' (*shadadatain*) is not enough; enforcement of Islamic moral order in all spheres of life with a sincere struggle for 'commanding good and prohibiting evil' is tremendously needed. For him, that is the only solution to escape the conditions of '*jahiliyya*' which contemporary Muslims suffering.[34]

As it is seen, the factors that compelled Mawdudi to theorize his ideology and to involve in politics actively can be derived from the sociopolitical landscape of India. While the colonial rule of Britain and the collaborations of Indians with the

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[32] Khurshid Ahmad, *Makers of Contemporary Islam*, ed. John L. Esposito, John 0. Voll, Oxford: Oxford University Press, (2001), pp. 43

[33] John Donahue, John Esposito, ed., *Islam in Transition: Muslim Perspectives*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, (1982), pp.254

[34] Nazih Ayubi, *Political Islam: Religion and Politics in the Arab World*, London: Routledge, (1991), pp.129-130

imperialists exemplify the sources of modern *jahiliyya*, these were also the factors that motivate Mawdudi to be a legendary figure among the Islamists. Mawdudi who led the Jamaat-i Islamis was not a cleric but indeed a journalist educated in modern university campuses. The religion of Islam is interpreted as a political ideology that embraced a Leftist revolutionary approach with a Quranic discourse. The Western notions of secularism and nationalism were evaluated as the deviant forces that caused to weaken the Muslim world. The return to Islam was indicated as the only remedy that brought Muslims through the conditions of *jahiliyya*.

2.3.2 Hasan Al Banna

Hasan Al Banna marked a new inception in Islamic political thought by founding the Society of Muslim Brotherhood, which is the main source of inspiration for today's Islamists. A number of momentous developments that were corrupting the Muslim world affected the religious and political affiliation of Banna. These can be summarized as the implications and impositions of British colonial rule, corruption of the administrative system, gradual Westernization and de-Islamisation of values, norms and behaviors of society associated with modernization. [35] Furthermore the abolishment of caliphate in Turkey in 1924 and the disillusionment of *Ulema* such as apparent support of Al Azhar scholars to the Western interpretations of Islamic issues became the final straw for Banna to be involved in politics.[36]

After five years of teaching experience in Ismailiya where close to the Suez Canal controlled by British and French, he chose to train in a government school in Cairo. When he was in Ismailiya, he frequently lectured at mosques, coffee shops and meeting halls to inform people about their religious duties. He invited people to the call of Islam (*da'wa*) by pointing out the devastating effects of anti-colonialism and anti-modernism in his speeches. When Banna moved to Cairo, he maintained his

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[35] Kemal Helbawy, *The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt: Historical Evolution and Future Prospects*, in the Political Islam: Context versus Ideology, ed. Khaled Hroub, London: Middle East Institute at SOAS, (2010), pp.62

[36] Nazih Ayubi, *Political Islam: Religion and Politics in the Arab World*, London: Routledge, (1991), pp.130

efforts and repudiated as a great public speaker among discontented groups. As people embraced the approach he asserted, he decided to establish an organization to realize the mission he advocated.[37] Thus Muslim Brotherhood, the organization that is centrally important within Islamism, was established in 1928. The evolution of Muslim Brotherhood will be comprehensively examined in the next chapter as a case study to understand the causes that lead to the rise of Islamism.

Al Banna considerably influenced by the ideas of Rashid Rida who advocates the comprehensiveness of Islam:

> "We believe the provision of Islam and its teachings are all inclusive, encompassing the affairs of the people in this world and the hereafter. And those who think that these teachings are concerning only with the spiritual or ritualistic aspects are mistaken in this believe because Islam is a faith and a ritual, a nation and a nationality, a religion and a state, spirit and deed, holy text and sword…The Glorious Quran…considers [these things] to be the core of Islam and its essence" [38]

Banna believed that Islam is an all-encompassing religion, which involves directives regarding all aspects of life. He rejected the vision that assumes Islam is only a spiritual religion emphasizing its political role as nation, nationality, state and sword. In other words he advocated the inseparation of Islam and state. As Mawdudi he was not a cleric but a teacher who developed a counter opposition movement through embracing the religious ethics and values. However rather than establishing an Islamic state to reach the ultimate goal, he indented to create a 'social Islam' through reforming the existing state. For him, establishing a truly Islamic state that can only be realized through sincere Muslims embracing the whole ways of Islam was crucial to retrieve the golden age of early Islam.[39] Thus he refused the revolution to establish an Islamic state but rather he intended to Islamize society through preaching, direct communication and social work.

Likewise Muhammad Abduh and Jamal al-Din-al Afgani, Banna believed the importance of overcoming Western materialism eventually to establish *Pax Islamica*. For him the salvation of Muslims can only be achieved through the

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[37] Peter Mandaville, *Global Political Islam*, London: Routledge, (2007), pp. 59

[38] Mansoor Moaddel, *Islamic Modernism, Nationalism, and Fundamentalism: Episode and Discourse*, Chicago/London: The University of Chicago Press, (2005), pp. 197.

[39] Peter Mandaville, "*Global Political Islam*" London: Routledge, (2007), pp. 60

purification of Muslim's life from the Western ideas and values. Islamic ideology was indicated as the way for emancipation that would carry Muslims out of the injustice and unequal conditions of modern world that was imposed by the Western civilizations.

2.3.3 Sayyid Qutb

Sayyid Qutb is one of the chief ideologue of Muslim Brotherhood, who established the theoretical basis of Islamic fundamentalism in the postcolonial Muslim world. He is widely known with his books written during his time in prison from 1954 to 1966. Sayyid Qutb was born in 1906 in the village of Musha in the province of Asyut, into a good practicing family.[40] After graduating from Education Arts in 1933, he began to work in the Ministry of Education. Beside his job in this state institution, he performs writing, literary critics and journalism. He strongly criticized the British backed royal government in his articles that causing him to be kept under the control of government and inducted different positions.[41] While his initial works reflect national sentiments, he began to adopt an Islamic perspective with his first book, *al-Adala al-Ijtimaiyya fi al-Islam* (Social Justice in Islam) written in 1949. In this book, Qutb posits that secularism, the separation of religion and politics, is the product of the conditions in Western societies, therefore it is redundant in Muslim communities due to the lack of struggle between clergy and political leaders. Islam is the single most important source of social justice and equality because Islam posits that all believers are equal and the ultimate sovereignty only belongs to God. [42]

His travel to America in 1948 had an immense impact on his ideological formation. The devastating erosion of values and lifestyles of 'capitalist individuals' in America represented the danger of moral corruption for Muslim communities

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[40] Sayed Khatab , *The Political Thought of Sayyid Qutb: The Theory of Jahilliyah*, London: Routledge, (2006), pp.45

[41] Ibid, pp.50

[42] Ibid, pp.51

which came by the colonial occupation. Thus the visit constituted a milestone for his political life that force him to oppose Western influence and call for the message of Islam that is supposed to provide Muslim societies to regain the glory of the past. After his return to Egypt, he began to search for an organization that advocate the necessity of social reform on the basis of Islamic rules and values and joined to Muslim Brotherhood in 1953. Only after one year of his membership he arrested with the top leaders of Brotherhood and convicted to fifteen years of hard labor.[43] During the imprisonment, he adopted an uncompromising approach with a gradual radicalization and produced his most seminal work *Ma'alim fi al-Tariq* (Signposts on the Road / Milestones), which became the guidebook of Islamists. In 1964 Qutb was released from the prison for his ill health. However in the second wave of arrests, Qutb accused of attempting to overthrow the Egyptian government and kill the president by reconstituting the Secret apparatus that resulted with the death penalty carried out in 1966. [44] The painful experience of Qutb's imprisonment and his execution created a deep feeling of anger to the regime and gave him the status of martyrdom. Qutb revealed as a legendary figure whose books and speeches are the most applied sources to be examined to understand the Brotherhood's ideology.

Jahiliyyah (ignorance) and *Jihad* (struggle) are the basic concepts in Sayyid Qutb's Milestones. He renders concise and uncomplicated accounts that pave the way for the welfare of Muslims. For Sayyid Qutb, the way out of *jahiliyya* and the world peace can only be achieved through an order based on *hakimiyyat Allah* (God's rule). He posits that hakimiyat Allah and Jihad as the binary opposite notions and engaging in Jihad is the duty of all Muslims to realize the first and sweep away the latter.

> "Islam knows only two kinds of societies, the Islamic and the *jahili*. The Islamic society is that which follows Islam in belief and ways of worship, in law and organization, in morals and manners. The *jahili* society is that which does not follow Islam and in which neither the Islamic belief and concepts, nor Islamic values and standards, Islamic laws and regulations and Islamic morals and manners are cared

[43] Nezih Ayubi , *Political Islam: Religion and Politics in the Arab World*, London: Routledge, (1991), pp.137

[44] Peter Mandaville, *Global Political Islam*, London: Routledge, (2007), pp. 78

for"[45]

Qutb strongly criticized people who restricted the existence of God only with heaven rather he argued that the sovereignty of God should be suspended in all domains of life and after life. The freedom of belief and worship was perceived as the tool to convince people that the will of God is established. However, for him the way for suspending God's sovereignty can only be possible through the implementation of Sharia.

Although the traditional understanding of Islamic literature uses *jahiliyyah* to characterize the era of ignorance in the pre-Islamic period, like Mawdudi Sayyid Qutb developed the term to portray his contemporary society.

> "We are surrounded by Jahiliyyah society today, which is of the same nature as it was during the first period of Islam, perhaps a little deeper. Our whole environment, people's beliefs and ideas, habits and art, rules and law- is Jahiliyyah, even to the extent that what we consider to be Islamic culture, Islamic sources, Islamic philosophy and Islamic thought are also constructs of Jahiliyyah."[46]

Qutb emphasized the corruption of Islamic culture and sources that prevents to enter Islamic values from the hearts and minds of Muslim. He recommended returning the pure sources of Islam that would contribute to derive the concept of life, the structure of government, the principles of politics and economics that Muslims have experienced. In this regard, he promoted a total transformation in order to uplift Muslim communities in Islamic social justice. Thus, according to him the pathway that must to be followed to reach the golden age of Islam is to fulfill the call of Islam through following the pure sources of Islam:

> "…the main reason for the difference between the first unique and distinguished group of Muslims and later Muslims is that the purity of the first source of Islamic guidance was mixed with various other sources…"[47]

Jihad, which Qutb mentioned in his last speech before his execution as is an integral part of his vision. For Qutb, *jihad* is the struggle to provide God's sovereignty and to establish an Islamic order that is based on Sharia. Although *jihad* is a conventionally accepted paradigm in Islam, what the tools of struggle is highly

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[45] Syed Qutb Shaheed, *Milestone*, pp.75
[46] Ibid, pp.13

[47] Ibid, pp.11

contentious. Qutb argues that:

> "…the Muslims were first restrained from fighting; then they were permitted to fight; later they were commanded to fight against the aggressors; and finally they were commanded to fight against all the polytheists."[48]

According to Qutb, the developmental stage of the Muslim communities will be determiner for the use of possible means. However the ambiguity of this assertion of *jihad* leads to different interpretations between radical and moderate defenders of Qutb. While militant interpreters advocate a warlike stance, moderates stress the emphasis on political activities and social measures to invite people to the call of dawa.[49] It is worth to note that, Qutb criticizes Muslims who define *jihad* as an inner struggle and deny fighting with arms. For him, even though as a final stage, holy war is an internal component of *jihad* that is indicated as the duty of all Muslims. To quote from Milestones:

> "If we insist on calling Islamic Jihad a defensive movement, then we must change the meaning of the word 'defense' and mean by it 'the defense of men' against all those elements which limit his freedom. These elements take the form of beliefs and concepts, as well as of political systems based on economic, racial and class distinctions. When Islam first came into existence, the world was full of such systems, and the present day jahiliyyah also has various kinds of such systems."[50]

Qutb refused to call *jihad* a defensive movement. For him *jihad* covers to fight against all elements that limit the freedom of Muslims that take the different form of beliefs and political systems based on injustices. He criticized the Western world order that is based on economic, racial and class distinctions and promoted *jihad* as a tool of struggle that would inevitably change this order.

Islamists aimed to Islamize society either from bottom up or from above through acquiring the political power. As Roy comments, "the moderates are partisans of re-Islamization from the bottom up (preaching, establishing socio-

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[48] Ibid, pp.49

[49] Barbara H.E Zollner, *The Muslim Brotherhood: Hasan al-Hudaybi and Ideology*, London: Routledge, (2009), pp.50

[50] Ibid, pp.47

cultural movements) while pressuring the leaders (in particular through political alliances) to promote Islamization from the top (introducing the sharia into legislation."[51] Mawdudi and Banna chose to follow this strategy denying to revolt against the state so long as state has not adopt an anti-Islamic position. They worked to convince society about the essentialness of establishing an Islamic state system through strengthening social ties among various segments of community. On the other hand radicals like Sayyid Qutb who adopted more radical stance advocated a political revolution. For them, Muslims have experienced the pre-Islamic conditions of *jahiliyya* whose conditions could be only removed by political rupture. Political power is an essential component of Islamist's agenda that is required to alter the conditions of *jahiliyya*. Fadlallah pointed out the necessity to "transform the religious discourse on power".[52]

In this chapter I tried to look at the relationship between Islam and state through examining the arguments of prominent Islamic thinkers and the Muslim society. One of the major outcomes of this chapter is Islam turns into an ideology that is introduced to fulfill the disappointments of people stemmed from the shortcomings of modern political system. Despite the conventional assumption that from its inception Islam has been a political religion that the separation of religion and politics is nonexistent, the disagreement of Muslim scholars prevents to make out such a generalization. While some Muslim scholars support to establish a very specific and distinctively Islamic model of governance, some argue that any system of government including the democracy is acceptable so long as it conforms to the principles of Islam. Moreover, the historical process of the state and religion in Muslim society shows that the religious institutions from the political institutions gradually differentiated following the death of Prophet Mohammad. In subsequent centuries the *Caliphate* lost its de-facto political power to dynastical military and administrative regimes, which preserved their loyalty to Islam. Furthermore religious

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[51] Oliver Roy, *The Failure of Political Islam*, I.B. Tauris Publishers, London, (1994), pp.14

[52] Sayyid Muhammad Hussain Fadlallah,, "Islam and The Logic of Power", in *The Contemporary Arab Reader on Political Islam*, ed. Ibrahim M. Abu Rabi, The University of Alberta Press, 2010, pp.56

institutions such as waqfs, mosques, and almshouses were separated from the ruling regimes as long as they avoided rising against the political authority. Despite Islam includes moral principles by its nature, it cannot be depicted as a political religion. Neither Quran nor the Hadiths signifies how the leader should be designated and the government should be formed. Although the relation between state and politics is undeniable throughout the history of Islamic states, it is prominently due to the legitimizer function of religion for the decisions of rulers on political issues.

The other major outcome of this chapter regarding the founding fathers of political Islam is rather pursuing purely religious purposes, all those figures utilizes Islam for their political agendas. All these figures are not clerics but intellectuals educated in secular modern university campuses who served as a teacher, journalist and civil servant. All challenged the position of *ulema* due to their submission to the corrupted political regimes, which compelled them to consent the secularism, modernity and the legal structure that challenged the principles of Sharia. Thus, they established their movements in university campuses, which were outside the domain of *ulema*. All figures perceive Islam as an all-inclusive system of thought that encompasses the affairs of people in this life. For them, Islam is a faith, a body of rituals, a nation, a nationality, a state, a law and an ideology. The failure of local governing elites to provide economic welfare, social justice and political participation has been discussed with a religious terminology that combined with the principles of modern social sciences. Mawdudi's theo- democracy, Banna's social welfare and Qutb's revolution are the terms borrowed from either Western social sciences or Leftist understanding that were interpreted in an Islamic fashion.

CHAPTER 3

FACTORS for the RISE of POLITICAL ISLAM

Rather than the nature of Islam, political Islam indeed, is a modern phenomenon that emerged as a reaction to the historical and contextual political and socio-economic factors that have been affecting the Muslim world. Islamists are opposing to the shortcomings of contemporary world order by using different tools and tactics from secular ideological movements. While secular groups ground their discontent on the rationally constituted ideologies, Islamists frame their protests with religious discourse. Hence, it is argued that Islamism is the product of given interrelated developments: the hegemonic role of West following with the colonial rule in the Middle East, the demise of secular nationalism fallowing the Arab defeat in the Six-Days War in 1967 and the failure of economic progress, political participation and modernity projects coming with increasing authoritarianism of the local regimes. Within this framework, although Political Islam refuses the modernity, ironically it is the outcome of the sociopolitical conditions Muslim countries undergone in modern times.

3.1 The Asymmetrical Relationship with the Western Powers

The uneven relationship with the Western powers which manifests itself as the colonial rule in many parts of the Muslim world, the partition of Arab world into the small separate states, foundation of a Jewish state in Palestine, the holy land of Muslims, and manipulation of politics in the region provoked a pervasive sense of anti-westernism that pave the way for the support of political Islam that embraced an anti-Westernist approach. Furthermore, although Saudi Arabia never fallen into colonial control, the British support for its establishment and then United States'

military presence over its territories revealed as other causes for the anti-colonial resonance in the region. Osama bin Laden stated the motives of the attack in September 11 as follows: "… the reality is that we are striking them because of their evil and injustice in the whole of the Islamic World, especially in Iraq and Palestine and their occupation of the Land of the Two Holy Sanctuaries."[53] The leader of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad Ramadan Abdallah Shallah posited the essential objectives that are supposed to guide the Islamists regarding the Western dominance as the elimination of illegitimate Zionist presence in Palestine, challenging Western military, political and cultural intervention in Muslim lands and resistance against the all forms of dependence on West.[54] Even though all Islamist movements do not share the same violent approach, the injustices of Western world threatening the Muslims world reflect the collective memory of Muslims. The uneven relationship will be examined in three broad historical periods that formed the context in which political Islam emerged and acquired mass support: colonialism, Cold War and post-Cold War periods.

3.1.1 Colonial Heritage

The birthplace of political Islam, the Middle East obtained a new strategic significance with the discovery of oil firstly in Iran and then respectively in Bahrain, Iraq, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, in addition to its geostrategic position. The British rule in some of the principalities of Middle East began in the early and middle part of the nineteenth century considerably because of its strategic location. It seized the control of India 1814, United Arab Emirates in 1820s, Bahrain in 1861, Kuwait in 1899, Oman in 1891, and Qatar in 1916.[55] In addition to territorial control, between 1913 and 1922, the British acquired vital concessions from the rulers of the provinces. Furthermore, just after the First World War, beside Britain, France and

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[53] *Intelcenter: Words of Osama Bin Laden*, Tempest Publishing L.L., (2008), pp.14

[54] Ramadan Abdallah Shallah , "The Islamic Movement and the Tasks of the Current Period" in *The Contemporary Arab Reader on Political Islam*, ed. Ibrahim M. Abu Rabi, The University of Alberta Press, 2010, pp.122,123

[55] Khalid Bin Sayeed, *Western Dominance and Political Islam: Challenge and Response*, New York: State University of New York Press, (1995), pp.6

Italy took part in the competition to get more shares from the lands of Ottoman Empire.

The superiority of Islamic armies lasting for centuries has come to an end with the siege of Vienna in 1682, which was marked as the last expansive battle of Ottomans. The subsequent wars were all defensive wars that were intended to protect the integrity of territories. The *dar al-Islam* (zone of Islam) fragmented by coming under either direct colonial rule or turning into Western protectorates. Thus, First World War considerably chanced the Middle East map; the only independent states after the war were Persia, Turkey, Afghanistan and central Arabia.[56] This fall of Islamic world created a "cultural schizophrenia of collective memories that was torn between glory and humiliation" as Tibi states.[57]

In comparison to long lasting imperial control in Africa, Latin America and South Asia, the period of formal European domination in the Middle East was short-lived. The decolonization process began within a decade or two in the former Ottoman territories seized after the First World War. Iraq gained independence in 1932, Egypt in 1936, Syria in 1943, Lebanon and Jordan in 1946.[58] However as Halliday contends "although the colonial period was a matter of decade only, it nonetheless had a significant impact on politics and society (of Middle East), building as it did on centuries of informal influence."[59] Despite the shortness of direct imperial control in the region (with the exception of Algeria and Tunisia), the legacy of colonialism bequeathed to the region created long term outcomes. The fear of subversion from foreign powers and the threat perception against the neighbor states were the basic outcomes of this colonial legacy and the artificially drawn borders. Islamists perceive that the Western colonialism has persisted in the Middle

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[56] Ibid, pp.6

[57] Bessam Tibi, *Islam in Global Politics: Conflict and Cross-Civilizational Bridging*, London: Routledge, 2012, pp.12

[58] Fred Halliday, *The Middle East in International Relations: Power, Politics and Ideology*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, (2005), pp. 82

[59] Ibid, pp.83

East in diverse manners. Prof. Ishaq Al Farhan, one of the leaders of Jordanian Islamic Action Front claimed that the evidences of continues Western colonialism in the Muslim World are the inflaming of nationalist sentiments, the encouragement of sectarian end regional fragmentations especially between Turks and Kurds, Arabs and Kurds and Persians and Arabs, international imperialism currently leading by United States and the military interventions waged by the Western forces.[60] Islamists aim to develop a counter reaction against Western powers as Leftist fractions do that provides them a widespread mass public support.

3.1.2 The Cold War Period

The Cold War period generated an immense impact on the Middle East in terms of foreign interference. The rivalry between the world powers to have the control of the region through the efforts of building up alliances, pouring weapons, providing economic aids testified the transition in international involvement from British and French to Americans and Russians.[61] The struggle between the new super powers of the global order has stand out on three levels which are "a geopolitical struggle to recruit allies and secure access to strategic resources (especially oil); diplomatic maneuvers to prevent the Arab–Israeli conflict from escalating into a superpower confrontation; and ideological competition for the future of the Muslim world."[62] The Suez Canal crisis, the overthrowing of Musaddiq with the involvement of CIA, Arab-Israeli wars and the invasion of Afghanistan were the occasions of global rivalry that culminated the foreign domination in the region. Although Cold War period has not make any change on the map of Middle East, except for Israel's expansion, the development of political Islam can be traced back to this period. The invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet forces in 1979 created two

[60] Ishaq Al Farhan, Toward a Common Arab and Islamic Strategy for the Middle East in *The Contemporary Arab Reader on Political Islam*, ed. Ibrahim M. Abu Rabi, The University of Alberta Press, 2010, pp.242

[61] Fred Halliday, *The Middle East in International Relations: Power, Politics and Ideology*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, (2005), pp. 127

[62] Douglas Little, *"The Cold War in the Middle East: Suez Crisis to Camp David Accords"*, *The Cambridge History of the Cold War*, Volume 2, 2010, pp.

severe outcomes for the future of the region. One the one hand, Soviets constituted the formation of ethnic conflicts through the manipulation of volatile dynamics of the country and left the uncontrolled nuclear weapons on the other hand Western forces encouraged uncontrolled violent militias motivated by the Islam. During that period, Islamism had been promoted in several Middle Eastern countries in order to reduce the influence of left-wing ideologies. [63] The creation of violent anti-communist militias in Afghanistan, which was a part of a greater plan applied in Central America and Angola, showed up as the initial cause of September 11. Ironically Al-Qaeda, which had been used as a tool against the Soviet power, paid back America with its own coin.

2.1.3 Post-Cold War Period

The events of the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait in 1990, the war of Afghanistan launched by the leadership of America to retaliate Taliban in 2001, the Anglo-US invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the ongoing unresolved conflict between Israeli and Palestine in the post-Cold War period proved the continual interest of foreign powers in the region. These consecutive events generated a widespread support and sympathy for the Islamism that bolsters up the notion of anti-Americanism among the Muslim societies. Thus, the ideas of Muhammed Abduh, Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, Mawlana Maududi, Hasan Al Banna and Sayyid Qutb obtained the support of masses that have known as their strong Western opposition. The disappointment of being the subject rather than the object of international order is one of the factors that nurtured the political Islam. The public opinion polls done in the Middle East demonstrates that anti-Americanism substantially has risen year by year.[64] The invasion of Iraq has fortified this anti-American sentiment because it is considered as a political choice that only seeks for material gain with the control of oil resources and backing up Israeli in the region. The collective sense of frustration and anger to America and American supported local regimes has been considerably manipulated by the Islamists to realize their own agendas.

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[63] Fred Halliday, *Islam and The Myth of Confrontation*, London: I.B. Tauris Co. Ltd., (2003), pp.81

[64] http://www.princeton.edu/~ppns/conferences/reports/fall/aa_exec.pdf

Yesterday's humiliations and today's weakness shape the basic motives of Islamism with the purpose of overcoming the uneven relationship between Muslims and the Western world. The sense of submission of the Muslim states to the world powers prompts the isolation that can be only relieved through opposition to status quo and inclining to tradition.[65] However, this resistance remains an obstacle in the Muslim world that produces strong politico-cultural responses to globalization and all kind of international partnerships since it is perceived as a different form of threat to their national integrity.

The resistance against the Western hegemony constituting the common denominator of the Islamic movements caused a misleading assumption that tars the various formations with the same brush. The recreation of the romanticized vision of Golden Age by the most of Islamists is believed to shift the uneven relationship with the West. According to Mohammad Ayoob the common trait among the Islamists is "the quest for dignity, a variable often ignored by contemporary political analysts in the West who can be dispossessed and dishonored with impunity, and the justice of whose cause will always be dismissed by the West, and particularly by the United States, as irrational fanaticism"[66]

Within this framework, the colonial legacy and Muslim world's economic, political and military interactions with the West in the Cold War and post-Cold War period generated a strong sense of humiliation and anger to the West and Western-guided regimes. The anti-Western rhetoric of political Islamists, which envisions the *nizam-i Islami* as an alternative to today's world order, contributed to achieve widespread support among the Muslim world.

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[65] Anoushiravan Ehteshami, *Globalization and Geopolitics in the Middle East*, London: Routledge, (2007), pp. 3

[66] Mohammad Ayoob, "Political Islam: Image and Reality", *World Policy Journal*, Fall 2004, pp.2

3.2 Rejection of Secularism and Modernism

Secularism can be basically defined as the separation of religion from the domains of the politics, economy and science. The evolvement for the notion of the secular has continued for eight centuries. The first reference to the term is found in the thirteenth century as *saeculum*, which emerged in binary opposition within Christianity. Contrary to the secular clergy who make use of the world, priests who chose to withdraw from the world *saeculum* constituted the religious clergy.[67] Thus, the notion included negative connotations to refer the clergy maintaining a worldly life unlike those adopting monastic life. With a gradual evolution the term gained the meaning of Godlessness and profane by the sixteenth century.[68]

Besides this meaning, "secularize," meant drawing something out of religious orientation was used to describe the massive expropriation of the Church properties generally by the state. According to Casanova the secularization process is the "passage, transfer, or relocation of persons, things, function, meanings, and so forth, from their traditional location in the religious sphere to the secular spheres".[69] Casanova indicates that during the time of the Peace of Westphalia, the appropriation of Church land was a widespread policy applied in the name of laicism.

In the last step of the transformation in meaning of the term, from the nineteenth century onwards, secularism gained the current meaning. Rooted in Enlightenment, the separation of religion from the domains of politics has been a strongly defended phenomenon by the popular scholars. As Voltaire comments, "the age of enlightenment would replace superstition and authoritarian religious order."[70]

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[67] Elizabeth Shakman Hurd, "The Political Authority of Secularism in International Relations", *European Journal of International Relations* 2004 10: 235

[68] Ibid

[69] Jose Casanova, *Public Religions in Modern World*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, (1994), pp.13

[70] Jonathon Fox, "Religion as an Overlooked Element of International Relations", *International Studies Review*, Vol.3, Fall 2001, pp. 53-73

Similarly, the majority of social scientists marked the eighteenth, nineteenth and twentieth century such as Comte, Durkheim, Freud, Marx, Nietzsche, Toennies, Voltaire and Weber put forward that an age of enlightenment would render reason dominant over religion as the basis for intellectual development and world order.[71] Durkheim's "The old Gods are growing old or already dead" and Nietzsche's "God is Dad" these are significant to reflect the dominant approach of the time. In the same vein, Weber asserts, "secular ideologies were replacing religion as the basis of legitimacy." These social thinkers champion the rationality and science in order to understand the worldly affairs by refusing religion as a factor of explanation in the modern industrial age.

A new interpretation of this paradigm, modernization theory, argues that the processes inherent to modernization urbanization, economic welfare, and political pluralism, modern social institutions, growing rates of literacy, advancements in health care and better living conditions would inevitably cause to the discredit of primordial factors like ethnic origin and religion.[72] Meanwhile secularization theory advocates the demise of religion with the same concerns. It asserts that advancement of the living conditions of societies would inevitably diminish the importance of religion for taking as an explanatory factor of the nature. The legitimizer role of religion for the state will be replaced by the 'will of the citizens' as a consequence of secularization process.[73]

Contrary to the profound belief to the dominance of secularization, the recent studies stating the growing power of the conservative parties, religious organizations, transnational religious movements, increasing power of religion over the policies of governments demonstrate a worldwide rise in the influence of the religion in politics. The Iranian Revolution, the September 11 attacks, the rise of political Islam after the Arab Spring, the conservative parties in power such as the Freedom and Justice Party in

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[71] Jonathan Fox and Shmuel Sandler, *Bringing Religion into International Relations*, London: Palgrave Macmillan, (2004), pp. 10

[72] Ibid, pp.10

[73] Ibid, pp.10

Egypt and the Justice and Development Party in Morocco, the role of Catholic Church in the democratization process of Poland, Spain, Portugal and Latin America, the operations of Muslim Brotherhood in various countries, Evangelical movement in America, ultra-Orthodox Jews in Israel, Orthodox Christians in Russia, the embracement of sharia as the public law in Iran, Saudi Arabia, Malaysia, Sudan and Pakistan, sectarian conflicts like in Northern Ireland proved the demise of secularization theory. Scott Thomas defined 'the global resurgence of religion' as follows:

> "the global resurgence of religion is the growing saliency and the persuasiveness of religion, i.e. the increasing importance of religious beliefs, practices, and discourses in personal and public life and the growing role of religious and religiously related individuals, non-state groups, political parties, and communities, and organizations in domestic politics, and this is occurring in ways that have significant implications for international politics"[74]

Hence, the global resurgence of religion is used to describe the intermingling of religion and politics throughout the world. The fact of this resurgence challenges the provisions of modernization and secularization theories.

The analysis of the causes that lead to the demise of secularization theory asserts that, modernization rather than contributing to the fall of religion reveals as the most significant factor for its "return from the exile".[75] In this respect, the rise of the religion especially in the developing and underdeveloped countries is mostly the outcome of the failure of modernization.

The processes of modernization that have contributed to the resurgence of religion can be described as fallow. First of all, both modernization and secularization, which is the product of Western experience, have seen as a different means of hegemony by the colonized states of Third World. Thus, both notions have been perceived as foreign and illegitimate, making religion as the only basis of the legitimacy. As Ernest Gelner has argued, "since the period of colonial occupation, the developing countries have been confronted by a dilemma: Should they emulate

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[74] Scott Thomas, *The Global Resurgence of Religion and the Transformation of International Relations: The Struggle for the Soul of the Twenty-First Century*, London: Palgrave Macmillan, (2005), pp.26

[75] Given as reference to the book, "The Return from Exile",Pavlos Hatzopoulos and Fabio Petito

the West in order to gain equality in power (thus spurning their own culture or should they affirm their own cultural and religious traditions (thus remaining materially weak)?"[76] Despite this dilemma, during the colonial era most of the administrations initiated the separation of religion from the domains of government and education, further advocate the exit of religious ideas from the norms and moral values of the society, which result in the stimulation of anti-colonial opposition.[77] The leaders of the Middle East, such as Ataturk, Nasser and Riza Shah appropriated secularism with the intention to strengthen the state apparatus through reducing or breaking the power of opposing groups, the *ulema* in the Arab countries, the *hocas* in Turkey and *mullahs* in Iran who had the potential to influence the public opinion.[78] They supported the essentialness of economic development, national identity and unitary authority so that religion that includes ethnicity, tribal loyalty and dogmatism has seen as a tremendous obstacle for the development-oriented state. The projects of secularization and modernization that have been imposed from above as a part of the developmental strategy of the underdeveloped countries produced a counter reaction, which arise in the form of political Islam. Islamists perceive secularism as a different manifestation of imperialism that ultimately aims subjugation of Muslims. The important Islamist Abdul Wahab'al-Masseri reflected this common inclination as, "in our view secularism is not a separation between religion and state as propagated in both Western and Arab writings. Rather it is the removal of absolute values-epistemologic and ethical- from the world such that the entire world –humanity and nature alike- becomes merely a utilitarian object to be utilized and subjugated."[79] Thus the mentality of imperialism and secularism has been considered as similar that both are perceived to exploit the material and spiritual resources of

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[76] Scott Thomas, "The Global Resurgence of Religion": Max L. Stackhouse with Diane B. Obenchain, ed., "Christ and The Dominions of the Civilizations", *God and Globalization*, Volume 3, Trinity Press International, Pennsylvania, (2002), pp. 113

[77] Jeff Haynes, *Religion, Globalization and Political Culture in the Third World*, London: Macmillan Press Ltd., (1999), pp.243

[78] Fred Halliday, *The Middle East in International Relations: Power, Politics and Ideology*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, (2005), pp. 6

[79] Abdul Wahab Al Masseri , The Imperialist Epistemological Vision, in *The Contemporary Arab Reader on Political Islam*, ed. Ibrahim M. Abu Rabi, The University of Alberta Press, 2010, pp.242

Muslim World.

Second, modernization caused the undermining of traditional values and customs, which consequently created resistance from conservatives who calls for authenticity. In other words, encroaching Western influence in all spheres of life was encountered with a strong cultural defense. In this regard, Palestinian Islamist Mounir Shafiq criticized the intellectuals who promote modernity as the most advanced vision of world. For him, modernization is imposed on Muslim communities to deny their historical and cultural heritage. [80] Hence, Islamists preached a critical perspective to modernization since the countries that impose this concept are the agencies of injustice, inequality, racism and the wars in the world. Therefore the rejuvenation of authentic Islamic culture is one of the main arguments of Islamism.

Third, modern means of communications enabled religious organizations to spread their message more easily, to collect donations from diverse places and to build up transnational networks. Internet and satellites turned into powerful tools that provide more recruitment and educate the members of organizations.

Last, the unfulfilled promises of modernization projects created a great degree of disappointment. In the Third World, the modernization programs incompatible with the religious values failed to provide equal allocation of opportunities, open democracy, political liberalization, economic welfare and legitimate basis for political participation. The deprival of the opportunities created "deep sense of alienation, stimulating a search for an identity that would give life some purpose and meaning."[81] At this point religion functions as a source that satisfies the search of meaning.

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[80] Mounir Shafiq , On Modernity, Liberalism and Islamism in *The Contemporary Arab Reader on Political Islam* , ed.Ibrahim M. Abu Rabi, The University of Alberta Press, 2010, pp.175
[81] Jeff Haynes, "*Religion, Globalization and Political Culture in the Third World*", London: Macmillan Press Ltd., (1999), pp.245

3.3 Socio-Economic Grievances

From sociological perspective, todays Islamism is the outcome of social disenchantment of unemployed well-educated young generation, unpaid officers, underemployed and overworked profession experts whose expectations have not realized by either neo-liberal policies or development-economic policies.[82]

Middle Eastern economy has been inevitably affected by the extraordinary amount of intra-regional conflict much of it stemmed from the artificially drawn borders and international disputes that force the region to command a larger share of budget to the military expenditures. In the twentieth century alone, the region imposed to the devastating conditions of two world wars and witnessed a war of independence in Turkey, seven years of colonial war in Algeria, four wars between Israel and its Arab neighbors, prolonged uprisings in Iraq, long term civil wars in Sudan and Lebanon, prolonged conflicts between Israel and Palestine, the Iran-Iraq war, the invasion of Kuwait, Kurdish insurrections in Turkey, civil war in Yemen, the intifadas in Palestine, The American invasion of Iraq, the war of Afghanistan and current insurrections in Syria.[83] In addition to the high share of military spending in the budget, the needs of the rapidly growing population must be considered in order to ensure the well fare of the society. Despite the structural differences among the countries the problems trouble all the countries of region have been almost same. As Richards and Waterbury asserts, "extracting and investing resources, building industrial sector while modernizing agriculture, and absorbing an ever-larger production of a growing population into cities, all the while trying to maintain political order and build credible military establishment"[84] were the common issues of developing countries. These problems have been the major obstacles for the region to ensure the economic stability.

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[82] Bryan S. Turner, "Class Generation and Islamism: Towards a Global Strategy of Political Islam", *Journal of Sociology*, Vol. No. 54, March 2003, pp: 139-147

[83] Alan Richards & John Waterbury, *A Political Economy of the Middle East*, Colorado: Westview Press, third edition, (2008), pp.1

[84] Ibid, pp.5

The failure of economic policies implemented by the countries of Middle East generated social frustration that consequently caused the emergence of Political Islam. It is worthy to analyze the economic conditions that contribute to the growth of Islamism. The Middle Eastern economic structure shows that the region composed of a wide variety of diverse economies and only several of those, notably Egypt and Turkey reflects the general mode of economic strategies like Import Substitute Industrialization and Export-Led Growth Model that later conforms with the principles of neo-liberal economy. Other countries implemented partial policies of the general modes with the exception of oil rich Gulf countries whose economic policies have been wholly different due to their enormous oil wealth. Even the states fallow same economic policies, the differences of the speed of growth, the degrees of openness and the specific circumstances prevent to make broad generalizations.[85] In this part of the thesis the general path that the region fallowed in different degrees will be evaluated.

The effects of two world wars caused a slow rate of industrial development in the Middle East until the middle of 1950s. Throughout the fifties and sixties Import Substituting Industrialization was initiated by the Middle Eastern countries with the notable exception of Israel to achieve economic development and socio-economic modernization. The underdeveloped industries and dependency on foreign sources forced the Middle Eastern countries to adopt ISI strategy that aims to increase the level of domestic production and provide self-sufficiency through protecting the local industries through imposing tariffs, quotas and subsidized government loans which based on the strong central planning. Despite its early success, the balance of payment crisis, severe budget deficit and huge distortion in the domestic market signaled the end of Import Substituting Industrialization and accompanied by international pressure that insist for openness and structural adjustment program of the Bretton Woods Institutions.[86] Thus ISI was abandoned respectively in Middle

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[85] Roger Owen & Sevket Pamuk, *A History of Middle East Economies in the Twentieth Century*, London: I. B. Tauris, (1998), pp.xv

[86] Ibid, pp.xvi

Eastern countries during the 1970s and a more open period in the economy has begun.

The failure of the ambitious development plans designated to reach the level of developed countries created a great degree of dissatisfaction among the masses that hope to attain better living standards. As Turner contends, the socio-economic experiment of the seventies and eighties resulted with the downfall has played a significant role for the rise of political Islam, which is "the consequence of the social frustrations, articulated around the social divisions of class and generation that followed from the crises of global neo-liberal economic restructuring."[87] The well-educated young Muslims who could not easily acquire aspired jobs due to the demographic explosion triggered the widespread support to the Islamists. The fertility rate in the Middle East between 1950 and 1970 was around 7 children per women. This high fertility rate caused the rapid population growth that increased the share of youth population. The population, which was averaged at 80 million in 1950, was doubled by 1975 and tripled by 1990. The high rate of population growth inevitably affected the age structure of region that led to a large youth bulge. As a result of the youth population growth, the rate of youth population increased from 18 percent in 1970 to 20 percent in 1990 and peaked at 22 percent in 2000. [88]The demographic explosion caused the limitation of job opportunities for youth who acquired high degree of education. The emergence of Islamism is highly related with the demographic explosion and the class conflict. The young generation, which is created by the post-war demographic explosion in the developing countries and the resulting massive migration from the countryside, embraced the way proposed by Political Islam. The disappointment of the inability to attain a job with a reasonable salary and the sense of alienation due to the migrations was turned into an advantage for the Islamist movements to increase their recruitments. Furthermore, "the

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[87] Bryan S. Turner, "Class Generation and Islamism: Towards a Global Strategy of Political Islam", *Journal of Sociology*, Vol. No. 54, March 2003, pp: 139-147

[88] Yousef Tarik, *Youth Explosion in Developing Rate: Approaches to Reducing Poverty and Conflict in an Urban Age*, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington, D.C., (2003),

pp.11

traditional God-fearing bourgeoisie" descendants of the merchant families from the bazaars and souks additionally the middle class becoming rapidly rich during the time of oil boom had been left aside by the decolonization movement. Despite their different ambitions and worldviews, the sense of frustration connected this entire social group around the Political Islamism. [89]

In this chapter I intended to illuminate the factors that generated the rise of Islamism. The major outcome of this chapter is Political Islam is the consequence of a complex set which are the disenchantment of modernization, demise of secular nationalism, erosion of the authentic values and practices, failure of economic policies coming with political oppression and consecutively loss of state legitimacy. The colonial legacy and Muslim world's economic, political and military interactions with the West in the Cold War and post-Cold War period created a strong sense of humiliation and anger to the West and Western-guided regimes. The anti-Western rhetoric of political Islamists, which envisions the *nizam-i Islami* as an alternative to today's world order, contributed to achieve widespread support among the Muslim world. Furthermore, despite the expectations of modernization and secularization theories that argue the role of religion will eventually disappear in the modern world, it is found out in this chapter that modernization rather than contributing to the fall of religion caused its resurgence. Modernization which is the product of Western experience is perceived as a different means of domination. Moreover, modernization which caused the undermining of tradition encountered with a strong cultural defense. The unfulfilled promises of modernization projects created a great degree of disappointment among the societies of developing world. Thus it is revealed in this chapter that the foreign, illegitimate and useless notion produced its counter alternative of religion it is argued in this chapter that today's Islamism is the outcome of social disenchantment of unemployed well-educated young generation, unpaid officers, underemployed and overworked profession experts whose expectations have not realized by either neo-liberal policies or development-economic policies. Overall, the disenchantment of modernization, demise of secular nationalism, erosion of the authentic values and practices, failure of economic

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[89] Gilles Kepel, *Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam*, London:I. B. Tauris, 4th Edition, (2006), pp. 6

policies coming with political oppression and loss of state legitimacy are the major factors that caused the rise of Islamism.

CHAPTER 4

MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD

The Muslim Brotherhood (*Al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun*), which had a turbulent history, first emerged in Northern Egypt at the end of 1920s in a very sociopolitical context. The period in which the movement appeared was marked by the conditions associated with the British colonial rule, corruption of the administrative system, the abolishment of the caliphate that symbolized the unity of Muslims and gradual Westernization of values, norms and behaviors of society associated with modernization

At the beginning the overall goals of the founders of the movement was challenging the modernization and Westernization of Egypt through the reformation of society, religion, politics, culture and economy on the basis of the purified Islamic values. The ideology of the movement rapidly expanded in Egypt and transnationalized through several adaptations on the basis of the socio-political contexts of different countries.

4.1 Muslim Brotherhood under the British Rule

The founder of the Muslim Brotherhood, Hasan al-Banna was a charismatic schoolteacher in Ismailiya, one of the three cities on Suez Canal controlled by the British forces. When he was in Ismailiya, he frequently lectured at mosques, coffee shops and meeting halls to inform people about their religious duties. He invited people to the call of Islam (*da'wa*) by pointing out the devastating effects of anti-colonialism and anti-modernism in his speeches. When Banna moved to Cairo, he maintained his efforts and repudiated as a great public speaker among discontented groups. As people embraced the approach he asserted, he decided to establish an

organization to realize the mission he advocated. Thus Muslim Brotherhood was established in 1928 sought primarily to oppose the erosive effects of Western influence and secularism through educating people about the significance of religion in all domains of life and advocating the purification of Islam.

Hasan al-Banna frequently criticized increasing authority of British colonial power in Egypt and related it to the contaminated, amoral and fragmented nature of politics. Banna believed the existence of direct relationship between economic and political interference of Britain and "the religious and moral corruption" in the society. Al Banna expressed his discontent for the conditions of the country as fallow "My heart was burning with pain exactly like others around me. I thought deeply and I found that there was no meaning for the pain we felt if it didn't spur us into action."[90] Britain has approved the semi independency of Egypt and the formation of a parliament in favor of his rule just five years before the establishment of the Brotherhood. Despite the theoretical end of the occupation the continuing British control over the country provoked the escalation of hatred toward Western domination. In order to counter the British forces a special apparatus was formed within the Brotherhood.[91] The Brotherhood pointed out the rights and grievances of frustrated Egyptian society and advocated to embrace a truly Islamic state based on the sharia law as a remedy to deal with the troubles of the country. The modernization that Egypt witnessed in the first decades of the twentieth century was seen as a different mode of domination imposed by the West. For instance, The Society of Freedom Brothers (*Jamia Ikhwan al Huriah*), which was established by the British forces with the purpose of attracting young Egyptian men to Western thought, was considered as a way to de-Islamize the youth.[92] Hasan Al Banna followed a well-conceived strategy that aimed to enlarge the organization through establishing direct contacts with people and engaging in social facilities. Brothers

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[90] Kemal Helbawy, *The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt: Historical Evolution and Future Prospects*, in the Political Islam: Context versus Ideology, ed. Khaled Hroub, London: Middle East Institute at SOAS, (2010), pp.63

[91] Geneive Abdo, *No God But God: Egypt and the Triumph of Islam*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000, pp.6

[92] Helbawy, pp.63

increased their education facilities through the work of preaching (*dawa*) in order to counter such kind of British exertions. Dawa presented to inform the society about the significance of daily religious practices to retrieve the power of past through reviving the Muslim identity. The essence of Islamic faith constituted the basic element of the speeches. Hasan Al Banna followed a well-conceived strategy that aimed to enlarge the organization through establishing direct contacts with people and engaging in social facilities. He organized meetings in the mosques and in the houses order to communicate with people from the different segments of society. While use of mosques was providing legitimacy, the meetings in the houses ensured the sincerity. In addition to conducting classes across the country, Banna intended to penetrate into the power centers of the community. As Mitchell points out these power sources were "the *Ulema*, the sheikhs of *Sufi* the orders, the elders by which he meant the leading families and groupings in the broadest sense, the clubs (social and religious societies)."[93] Thus, his purpose was to influence the decision makers who would shape the social and political structure of the country.

The Brotherhood appropriated the Sunni branch of Islam which stresses a return to the realization of the values indicated in the basic sources of Islam, to the Koran and to the exemplary personality of the Prophet as outlined in the prophetic traditions. They defended the principle of the inalterability of the Holy Scriptures emphasizing that they persist to follow the theological line and the practices of the early years of Islam and the great ulemas of Muslim tradition, such as Abu Hamid Al Ghazali, Ibn Taymiyya, Ibn Al-Kathir, or Ibn Al Qayyim Al Jawziyya.[94] This stance conforms to the canonical reformist movement whose key figures were Jamal Al-Din Al Afghani, Muhammed Abduh and Rahid Rida. Beginning with the second half of the 19th century the religious reformist movement promoted the cleanse of Islam of all alien accretions through the combination of 'syncretism of neo Hanbalite puritanism' and 'utilitarian pragmatism', that aimed to revivify the Islam while

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[93] Richard P. Mitchell , *The Society of the Muslim Brothers*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, (1993), pp. 7

[94] Brigitte Marechal, *The Muslim Brothers in Europe: Roots and Discourse*, Leiden and Boston: Brill, (2008), pp:21

challenging the influence of West.[95] This intellectual tendency endeavored to find out the factors that rendered Muslim societies weaker in comparison to the Western world in the hopes of coming up with solution. Thus while seeking to revivify the Golden Age by granting a renewed value to the early years of Islam, at the same time it questioned the religious perception dominant at the time through examining the alien customs and practices crept into the original form Islam. On the other hand, science and technology, the elements that made Western world powerful aimed to be taken from the West in order to acquire the capacity to compete with it, despite the strong opposition to the values, characters, morals and practices of Western civilization.

A wide range of social and educational activities formed the basic tenets of the movement's appeal that brought along political participation on several levels. At the most important level Muslim Brotherhood accepted to comply with the terms of established political order. Rather than overthrowing the regime the Brotherhood perceived the current conditions to be in need of reform on the basis of Islamic principles. In this regard, Banna opted for the establishment of an Islamic social order through transformation of the secular state system without the violent rupture of the regime. Rather than revolution that makes changes from above, Brotherhood intended to the Islamize society from below. The movement formally functioned as a charitable institution so that to transform the society through teaching and lecturing for the initial purpose of Islamisation of the Egypt. Since social welfare services were not equally distributed among all layers of society, the limitation of education facilities to a small section of population turned into an advantage for the Brotherhood to spread its influence across the country. Moreover the anti-colonial and anti-Zionist rhetoric provided the movement widespread support, respect and legitimacy. The strategy that prioritize the transmission of Islamic thought and the spread of solidarity combined with the Al Banna's charisma contributed the Brothers

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[95] Ibid, pp.21

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to become a countrywide political organization that played an important role in Egypt's struggle for independence against the British colonial forces.[96]

Muslim Brotherhood quickly merged with and assimilated several of other Islamic groups in the capital which provided the movement to enter a phase of growth that culminated with half million active members across two thousand branches. In addition to the capital, the Brothers grew dramatically from a small room in Ismailiya to three thousand branches across the whole country within the fifteen years.[97] In the words of Mitchell, "a series of moves brought the societies headquarters out of the alleys of the popular quarters to the main streets of Cairo, from little rooms to buildings and land with full-time, paid secretarial and clerical staffs in keeping with its growing membership strength, and internal and external activity."[98] The continual increase of diversified members that ranged from students to civil servants who engaged in social facilities, day and night time religious and political preaching rendered Brotherhood a significant actor in Egypt. In this environment of popularity, Al Banna and a number of the Brotherhood's members run as independent candidates in the legislative elections in 1942. However, the government manipulation or British prevention caused a crushing disappointment since all the candidates of the movement couldn't be elected. [99] As the legitimacy and the popularity of the Muslim Brotherhood grew, the fear of the loss of control forced the state to suppress the organization.

The partition plan of Palestine in 1947 and the first Arab-Israeli war were the events that canalized the organization to defend the Islamic cause with an active involvement. The Brotherhood sent volunteers and arms to Palestine to undertake Jihad against Israeli that led to the increased suspicion of government to the

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[96] Tarek Osman, *Egypt on the Brink: From the Rise of Nasser to the Fall of Mubarak*, New Haven: Yale University Press, (2011), pp: 91

[97] Peter Mandaville, *Global Political Islam*, London: Routledge, (2007), pp. 70

[98] Richard P.Mitchell, *The Society of the Muslim Brothers*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, (1993), pp. 13

[99] Maye Kassem, *Egyptian Politics: The Dynamics of Authoritarian Rule*, Colarado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2004, pp.135

organization. Within this framework, all branches of the Muslim Brotherhood were dissolved with a Military Order issued by the Egyptian Interior Ministry in 1948.[100] As Zollner posits, like the snowball effect the political violence nurtured the violence. The arrests and dispersals of the prominent members of Secret Apparatus[101] caused Al Banna to lose the control of this military wing of the organization. The assassination of the Prime Minister Nuqrashi by a member of the organization retaliated in kind; the fallowing year Hasan al-Banna was killed by the secret police of the government despite the condemnation of the violence and the assassination of al-Nuqrashi.[102]

Following the assassination of Hasan al-Banna it took two years to elect the leader of the organization, Hasan al-Hudaybi a well-respected judge was appointed as the new murshid. Al-Hudaybi tried to appease the chaotic atmosphere so that the movement could legally operate again. For this purpose, he abolished the Secret Apparatus and began to the talks with government to release the Muslim Brotherhoods detainees and prisoners.

The British colonial rule, which constitutes the main element of Brotherhood's criticism against the government, was shaking at the beginning of the 1950s. Throughout out 1951 and 1952, the Brothers fought against British troops for the liberation of Suez Canal Zone. Anwar Sadat stated in his autobiography that Muslim Brotherhood destroyed the British base in the occupied lands through the arms and ammunition provided by Sadat.[103] The realization of the long-standing argument for the independence of the country brought the movement a great deal of prestige among public. Kemal Helbawy who held various leadership positions in the

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[100] Tarek Osman, *Egypt on the Brink: From the Rise of Nasser to the Fall of Mubarak*, New Haven: Yale University Press, (2011), pp: 92

[101] "Secret Apparatus, al Jihaz al Sırri was composed of a relatively small number of Brothers who received special training in weapons, espionage and tactics and then took a special oath of allegiance and vow of secrecy. Widely regarded as the militant wing of the Brotherhood, the organization's second general guide Hasan al Hudaybi tried to shut down the Apparatus upon assuming leadership of the MB in 1951." Peter Mandaville, *Global Political Islam,* Routledge, (2007), pp. 70

[102] Peter Mandaville, *Global Political Islam*, London: Routledge, (2007), pp. 72

[103] Anwar Sadat, *In Search of Identity*, London: Collins St. James's Place, 1978, pp.103

organization states "This author still remembers how in secondary school he sang songs in praise of the martyrs of Ikhwan, and others killed in the Suez Canal War..."[104] The British colonial rule that played a significant role for the emergence of movement reached to an end with the involvement of Brothers.

4.2. Muslim Brotherhood under Nasser

The Free Officer Revolution marked the beginning of a new era, which led to the real end of the British colonial control and the disposal of the kingdom. Although Muslim Brotherhood made no direct contribution in these events, the close collaboration between the Brothers and the Free Officers is a well-documented phenomenon. According to Anwar al-Sadat's memories, Sadat informed Al Banna about the plans to overthrow the regime and asked for cooperation. After taking specific information about the power and purposes of the military group that aimed to carry out a revolution, Banna agreed on the necessity of cooperation.[105] The Brotherhood supported the Free Officers, led by Nasser and Muhammad Naguib, for the overthrowing of King Faruk that seen as corrupt and the puppet of British forces expecting to have a power in the formation of new government. Because of this explicit support, while dissolving all political parties, the new government permitted the Brotherhood to continue its activities because it labeled as not a political party but instead a social welfare organization.[106]

Nasser aimed to establish a secular state system that could fulfill the needs of society rather than a religious one. As a Soviet ally, Nasser planned to found a state based on socialist principles that would focus on the economic requirements of society. Despite the Free Officers have opposed to the ideological line of Brothers, the history of a close cooperation against the common enemies can be traced back to the time of Hasan Al-Banna. The shared position for the British control over the

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[104] Kemal Helbawy, *The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt: Historical Evolution and Future Prospects*, in the Political Islam: Context versus Ideology, ed. Khalid Hroub, London Middle East Institute at SOAS, (2010), pp.75

[105] Anwar Sadat, *In Search of Identity*, London: Collins St. James's Place, (1978), pp.24
[106] Denis J. Sullivan & Sana Abed Kotob, *Islam in Contemporary Egypt: Civil Society vs. the State*, Colarado: Lynne Rienner Publishers Inc., (1999), pp. 43

country and the common dissatisfaction based on the inefficiency of the existing parties to strive with the endemic corruption brought these groups together. Both parties expect to make use of other for the strategic and tactical reasons. While Free Officer perceiving the Brotherhood as a tool to provide widespread legitimacy and spiritual power in order to acquire popular support from the masses who resist a secular revolution, Muslim Brotherhood desired to acquire the support of the Free Officers planning to institutionalize an Islamic state.

Thus, once it became obvious to the Brotherhood that the expectation of founding an Islamic order could not be realized, the win-win cooperation expeditiously dissolved and the honeymoon period between 1951-1954 came to an end. The policies of government to prevent the rising influence of organization concluded with the growing tension between the two parties. In 1954, after an attempt on President Gamal Abdal Nasser's life, hundreds of Brothers were arrested and the government officially abolished the organization accusing the Secret Apparatus to plan the accusation. In order to prevent a possible public reaction, Nasser cooperated with the members of Ulema to acquire religious license for his Islamic socialism. In the words of Abdo, "Nasser drew a clear separation between religious and social matters, which he largely ignored, and political and economic reform, which he promoted, resting his legitimacy on his ability to improve the standards of living for the average Egyptian."[107] Nasser produced an alternative to the traditional Islamic interpretation that combined the Islamic and socialist elements in his Islamic socialism.

As Kassem argues, the post-1952 republic under Nasser directly influenced two important aspects of the development of Islamist groups in contemporary Egypt. As Kassem contends, "On one level, it crushed the Muslim Brotherhood movement in a manner unprecedented to date. On another level, the brutality involved in the regime's approach to the Brotherhood produced a reactionary Islamic ideology that not only was extremist in its interpretation, but also was the foundation of the more

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[107] Geneive Abdo, *No God But God: Egypt and the Triumph of Islam*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000, pp.7

radical Islamist groups that emerged in the late 1960s."[108] Thousands of the members of organization fled into the countries, such Saudi Arabia, sympathetic to their ideology where they accumulated a vast wealth. Some others settled in to the Western countries where they contributed to the transnationalization of the movement.[109] The fierce and brutal confrontation of new regime with political Islamists resulted in the birth of stronger interpretation of Islamism as reflected by the works of Sayyid Qutb who was the chief ideologue of the Muslim Brotherhood. Sayyid Qutb was sentenced to fifteen years of hard labor as a result of the accusations of being affiliated with the secret unit of the Brotherhood. During the imprisonment, he adopted an uncompromising approach with a gradual radicalization and produced his most critical work *Ma'alim fi al-Tariq* (Signposts on the Road), which became the guidebook of Islamists. In 1964 Qutb was released from the prison for his ill health. However in the second wave of arrests, Qutb accused of attempting to overthrow the Egyptian regime with arms supplied from Saudi Arabia and kill the president by reconstituting the Secret apparatus that resulted with the death penalty carried out in 1966. According to Sadat, the accusations that Muslim Brotherhood was planning to overthrow the regime were completely imaginary. To quote from Sadat, "Perhaps the rulers really believed it or they might have wanted to achieve certain objectives of their own in this way. In any case, thousands of victims fell, including Said Qutb, an eminent leader of the Brotherhood, who was executed."[110] The painful experience of Qutb's imprisonment and his execution created a deep feeling of anger to the regime and gave him the status of martyrdom. Qutb revealed as a legendary figure whose books and speeches are the most applied sources to be examined to understand the Brotherhood's ideology.

Although the relationship between Nasser and Muslim Brotherhood remained antagonistic, the defeat of Egypt in 1967 generated an aura of religiosity that enabled

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[108] Maye Kassem, *Egyptian Politics: The Dynamics of Authoritarian Rule*, Colarado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2004, pp.138

[109] Tarek Osman, *Egypt on the Brink: From the Rise of Nasser to the Fall of Mubarak*, New Havwn: Yale University Press, (2011), pp: 92

[110] Anwar Sadat, *In Search of Identity*, London: Collins St. James's Place, (1978), pp.50

the encouragement of religious activities and release of Islamists from prisons. The victory of Israeli was evaluated as a punishment for Nasser's pursuit of Arab nationalism, socialism and modernism instead of the Islamic ideals. It was only possible to obtain God's support only if Egypt would turn its face to Islam. In this atmosphere Islamic groups propagated the unislamic nature of the government using Islamic rhetoric and presented themselves as the best alternative to Nasser's secular and socialist state.[111] The deep sense of disappointment compelled the masses to ask for the prosecution of the authorities who responsible for the defeat of Egypt. Students involved in demonstrations to criticize the government for the abasement of Arab forces against Israel. Brotherhood unhesitantly became the part of this chorus of criticism adopting a religio-politic discourse. The defeat of Egypt marked the revival of Politic Islam through the end of secular nationalism or Islamic socialism.[112] As Tibi asserts, "Among the consequences (of the war) were the ascendancy of Political Islam moving from the fringe to the core of politics."[113] Thus the shattering Arab defeat in the Six Days War caused the delegitimization of secular regimes of the Arab world.

4.2.1 Secular Arab Nationalism

Shortly after the nationalization of Suez Canal that brought Nasser a tremendous prestige throughout the Islamic world, the government's first policy decisions were to initiate an ambitious developmental project in order to ameliorate the economic conditions of the country and to propose the Arab nationalism aiming to become the leader of Arab countries. Arab nationalism has tended to be referred as synonymous with Arabism, Pan Arabism and even Arab radicalism that put forward the cultural proximity with the purpose of political actions. Being an Arab and being an Arab nationalist had different connotations. While the former implying one's

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[111] Denis J. Sullivan & Sana Abed Kotob, *Islam in Contemporary Egypt: Civil Society vs. the State*, Colarado: Lynne Rienner Publishers Inc., (1999), pp. 44

[112] Geneive Abdo, *No God But God: Egypt and the Triumph of Islam*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000, pp.53

[113] Bessam Tibi, *Islam in Global Politics, Conflict and Cross-Civilizational Bridging*, London: Routlegde, (2012), pp.22

cultural heritage, the latter concedes the cultural uniqueness blending the sense of political recognition. [114] Although the material capacity of Egypt is not sufficient to undertake such a role, the glory of the ancient history has been a powerful card to convince the society. As Tarık Osman stated "The dominant views among the analysts of ordinary Egyptians fascination with Nasser and his grand project tend to be bifurcated: they see it either as a form of national hysteria (wherein a third world country with a more than 50 percent illiteracy rate becomes enamored by the fiery, yet empty, rhetoric of a military dictator) or as a moment of historic awakening (where an old nation with a rich history coalesces behind a historic figure who carves an immortal mark by meeting his people's profound longing for regeneration."[115] It is the fact that Nasser smartly used a populist discourse to get the support of the masses. The traces of such an endeavor to provide the acceptance of Arab Nationalism can overtly be seen in the opening section of the Egyptian National Charter of 1962 in which Nasser address to the nation as "the Arab people of the Egypt" and then asserts that "there is no conflict whatsoever between Egyptian patriotism and Arab nationalism".[116] The Arab nationalism of Nasser was also the only explicitly non-Islamic political project in the modern history of the country. The adoption of this political program stemmed from the existence of Coptic Christians who have been significant for the public life of the country. Arabism was thought to function as a binding agent that bonds all Egyptian people including the Copts. However Arabism that excludes the religious sentiments caused Brothers to raise eyebrows. The secular ideology of Arabism that inevitably brought the wave of modernization of the country became another important factor of Brotherhood's opposition.

Secular nationalism prevailed in Muslim countries in a diverse ways; as in the secular republic of Turkey, pan-Arab movement in Egypt and in the secular rule of

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[114] Adeed Dawisha, *Arab Nationalism in the Twentieth Century: From Triumph to Despair*, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, (2003), pp.8

[115] Tarek Osman, *Egypt on the Brink: From the Rise of Nasser to the Fall of Mubarak*, New Haven: Yale University Press, (2011), pp: 59

[116] James Jankowski, *Nasser's Egypt, Arab Nationalism and the United Arab Republic*, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers Inc., (2002), pp.27

Indonesia. The main point of criticism regarding the secular nationalism from the Islamist circles was that it was the notion originated from the Western civilization, which was not incompatible with the Islamic understanding. It was widely argued that secular nationalism was a sort of religion that is peculiar to the West. It is presumed that secular nationalism met the same kind of needs for collective identity, loyalty and moral authority that religion has responded in traditional societies.[117]

However, despite the unfaltering approach of Nasser to ensure the viability of secular nationalism, it was quite difficult to accommodate it in a Muslim society. Considering the influence of religious figures and institutions that sometimes achieved more efficiency, devotion and intelligence than the government apparatus, it was impossible to undermine the role of Muslim Brotherhood in public spheres.[118] Arab nationalism and Islamism remained the most potent ideological movement in the Egypt throughout the twentieth century. Despite the hostile and competitive relationship between the two they share some common elements. Whereas the large portion of the Arabs is Muslim, secular Arab nationalists admitted the significance of Islam within the Arab nationalist movement. Despite the given commonalities, Muslim Brotherhood strictly opposed to the implementation of secular nationalism without hesitation. As Nikki Kedie argues the elements of Westernization, which seen as a different mode of foreign intrusion, has created the formation of "dual culture" in the Middle East, through the fragmentation of society into two groups. Whereas the one group of people has embraced the components of Westernization that includes the secularism, nationalism, modern education, cultural traits, dress and behavior the other group persisted to fallow the traditional ways.[119] Within this perspective Muslim Brotherhood targeted the second group to disseminate its ideology underlying the devastating effects of secular nationalism.

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[117] Mark Juergensmeyer, "The New Religious State", *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 27, No. 4 (Jul., 1995), pp. 379-391

[118] Ibid

[119] Nikki R. Keddie, "The New Religious Politics: Where, When, and Why Do Fundamentalisms Appear?" *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, Vol. 40, No. 4. (1998), pp. 696-723

The resentment of the Brotherhood to the colonial period has not come to an end in the postcolonial state due to the ongoing efforts of Westernization. According to Keddie this stemmed from the fact that "postcolonial states often interfere with all aspects of life more than did colonizers, who were wary about interfering with personal and family arrangements."[120] Hence the postcolonial state of Egypt came under strict criticism since it was perceived as the puppet of neo-colonial system. As it was argued before, colonialism has been an essential factor that keeps Islamism alive throughout the decades. Although the direct colonialism has come to an end Westernization, secularism, secular nationalism and modernism created a deep sense of resentment among the Islamists. According to Mehmet Asık and Aykan Erdemir, the historical experience of Westernization in Egypt could be conceptualized as a "cultural trauma". That is to say that colonization and Westernization in Egypt throughout the nineteenth century marked a traumatic experience in the minds of political Islamists. They argue "as similar to the trauma of Holocaust, the traumatic experience of Westernization is perceived by the radicals as a fundamental threat to their sense of who they are, where they came from, and where they want to go."[121] This traumatic experience, which was the product of historical imagination, left a giant scar on the collective memories of contemporary Islamists. Asık and Erdemir posits that this traumatic process has constituted four types of emotions which are the sense of failure, sense of hatred, sense of being threatened and the desire to be respected and to have self-determination.[122] In the case of Egypt, the secular nationalism and ongoing modernization was perceived as the continuation of the indirect colonial rule in the country. For Brothers, the modern elite which was the other group collaborated with the Free Officers during the revolution was in fact the colonial elite serving as a pawn of Western powers to fallow their interest in Egypt.

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[120] Ibid

[121] Mehmet Ozan Asık and Aykan Erdemir, "Westernization as Cultural Trauma: Egyptian Radical Islamist Discourse on Religious Education", *Journal for the Study of Religions and Ideologies*, 9, 25 (Spring 2010), pp.111-132

[122] Ibid

After an attempt to Nasser's life, he coercively suppressed the Brotherhood and imprisoned or put to death several of its members. These acts are taken by the Brothers as a strategy to block the opposition of Islamists to the anti-Islamic secularization and modernization process. Although Nasser was depicted in the historical record as the hero who actualized the national sovereignty and non-alignment, from the perspective of Brothers he followed the anti-Islamic and pro-colonial policies. The collective identity of Muslim Brotherhood is the reflection of the traumatic experience of modernization in Egypt. This traumatic subconscious unremittingly reminds that the colonial circumstances still exist in the country.[123] Globalization, modernization, secularization, nationalism and liberalization are perceived as the never-ending threats of the West.

4.2.2 Sayyid Qutb's Thought on Nationalism

Sayyid Qutb is known as the chief ideologue of Muslim Brotherhood who authored many books and articles that became the guidebook of contemporary Political Islamists. As discussed above one of the root causes of the rise of Islamism is the defeat of the Arabs in the Six-Days War, which led to a deep crisis in the Arab nationalism. Sayyid Qutb who was one of the prominent opponents of the Nasser's Arab nationalism due to its non-Islamic character produced a strong ideological response to this concept emphasizing the Islamically based political theory of Islamic-nation state.[124] Hence it is essential to examine the theoretical basis of Qutb's understanding of nationalism and his counter argument of the Islamic nation state.

Qutb's concept of Islamic nation state that was extensively explained in Ma' alim consists of the interrelated constructs which were *hakimiyyah* (sovereignty), *uluhiyyah* (divinity), *ubudiyyah* (servitude), *alamiyyah* (universality), *al fitrah*

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[123] Ibid

[124] Sayed Khatab, "Arabism and Islamism in Sayyid Qutb's Thought on Nationalism", *The Muslim World*, Vol.94, (April 2004), pp. 217-244

(original nature of universe, life and man) and *al aql* (human intellect).[125] Through correlating *ubudiyyah* and *al fitrah* Qutb argues that all human beings at birth have Islamic identity because of their original nature. Alamiyyah is used to refer that Islam is a universal religion, which connects all Muslim throughout the world regardless of their ethnicity or nationality. Thus Qutb's Islamic nationalism is not limited to a particular territory, it is all encompassing supra-national concept. In order to emphasize the supra-national character of Islamic identity Qutb states that:

> "No sign is available that mankind, in its present stature, has outgrown Islam. It has not been able to produce a better system of ethics than that expressed in Islam. It has not been able to put the idea of human brotherhood on a practical footing, as Islam did in its supra-national concept of *ummah {fikrat al-qawmiyyah al-ulya: al-ummab)"[126]*

From the beginning of Islam, *Ummah* is a key notion that refers to a cross-cultural community which encompasses all Muslims without making any distinction. Bassam Tibi argues that the idea of *Ummah* is based on the revival of an historical ideal which Islam would be expanded to unite all humanity under the rule of Islam.[127] From this perspective Ummah is equated to Islamic globalism which declined to give way to Western Globalism. According to Tibi "The nineteenth century's Islamic revolt against the subjugation of Muslim people and of their territory to European rule led to the earlier revival of the concept of *umma* in a new concept of *jihad* understood by then as anti-colonial *jihad*."[128]

Qutb perceived nationalism as a tool to exploit people coming from different ethnic origins with the purpose of getting material gain. Islam refuses any kind of racism among the ethnicities since it accept all human beings equal from the birth.

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[125] Sayed Khatab, *The Political Thought of Sayyid Qutb: The Theory of Jahiliyya*, London: Routledge, (2006), pp.169

[126] Sayed Khatab, "Arabism and Islamism in Sayyid Qutb's Thought on Nationalism", *The Muslim World*, Vol.94, (April 2004), pp. 217-244, Qutb, Khasdis, 91-92

[127] Tibi Bassam, *Islam in Global Politics: Conflict and Cross-Civilizational Bridging*, London: Routledge, (2012), pp.14

[128] Ibid

Indicating the Quranic words of "The true believers are brothers", he underlines the redundancy of borders that limits the national homeland. For him it is not the territory, race or color that creates the real bond between people but instead it is the cooperation for the welfare of humanity as a whole in the name of Allah.

> "In the Islamic view, all human beings are one nation *{ummah wahidab)*. Thus, there is no race, or homeland *{watan)* that can exploit other races or the homeland of others . . . When Islam abolishes both those geographical bounds and racism *Cunswiyyab),* upon which the idea of the national homeland *{al-watan al-qawmi)* is established, it does not abolish the idea of homeland completely but preserves its righteous meaning, that is the meaning of association *{tajammu),* brotherhood, cooperation, system, and the meaning of the common goal with which the group is associated. This makes the idea of homeland *{watan)* an idea in the consciousness *{fikrah fi al-shuur),* not a piece of land. In the shelter of this idea, the peoples of all races, colors, and territories can associate as people of one homeland *{watan wahid).* They are brothers in the name of Allah, cooperating for their welfare and the welfare of humanity as a whole. This idea is Islam — The true believers are brothers' [Qur'än, 49:15] . . . Here the idea of Islam replaces the idea of homeland *{watan)* in its righteous meaning . . . What emerges from this [idea] is the feeling that every territory under the shelter of Islam is the homeland *{watan)* of all Muslims and they are all its citizens. .."[129]

In an ideal Islamic nation state he points out the necessity of the adoption of *Sharia* as the single source of law. For him, if *Sharia* is not implemented in a country, it cannot be the homeland of a Muslim.

> "The Muslim has no homeland *{watan)* other than that which implements the *Shari'ah* . . . The Muslim has no nationality *{jinsiyyah)* other than his Creed which makes him a member of the Islamic *ummah* in the Islamic homeland *{dar al-Islam)"[130]*

Since Qutb's nationalism has strong ties with Islamic understanding it is not a secular concept. Secular nationalism which is the concept that "individuals naturally associate with the people and place of their ancestral birth in an economic and

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[129] Sayed Khatab, "Arabism and Islamism in Sayyid Qutb's Thought on Nationalism", *The Muslim World*, Vol.94, (April 2004), pp. 217-244

[130] Ibid

political system identified with a nation-state"[131] is strongly opposed by Qutb due to its exclusion of Islamic sentiments. In his book *Adala al-Ijtimaiyya fi al-Islam* (Social Justice in Islam) Qutb considers that the separation of religion and politics is the product of the conditions in Western societies, therefore it is redundant in Muslim communities due to the lack of struggle between clergy and political leaders. Islam is the single most important source of social justice and equality because Islam posits that all believers are equal and the ultimate sovereignty only belongs to God. [132] As Mawdudi who views the adoption Western ideals of secularism, nationalism and capitalism were among the main causes that led to the downfall of the Muslims, for Qutb they are the evil of the West.

According to Qutb all human being are Muslim at birth and the rejection of this fact is connected to the *jahiliyya*. Moreover for him in a place where Sharia law is not accepted the law system, it still experiences the conditions of *jahiliyya*. As Mawdudi and Al-Banna, Sayyid Qutb's concept of *jahiliyya* is not restricted to the ancient times. According to him today's secular nationalists do it through prioritizing the ethnicities as the people of Arabia who rigorously sticked into their tribal identities. For him, Islam is the unique source that removes border among the people and unites them in the name of *Ummah.*

> "The *jahiliyyah* is the *jahiliyyah,* and each *jahiliyyah* has its types and forms of abominations, atrocities, enormities and taboos. The form of *jahiliyyah* of a particular time or place is not important. If there is no *Shari'ah* governing the daily affairs of the people, there will be nothing but *jahiliyyah* in any of its varying forms and shapes. The nature of the *jahiliyyah* of the world today is not different from the nature of the *jahiliyyah* of Arabia or the *jahiliyyah* of the world before Islam. The Arabs know that nothing transferred them from the stage of the tribe, the interests and revolts of the tribe, except Islam. Islam made them not only an *ummah* (nation) but also an *ummah* to lead humanity to the ideal program and system of life."[133]

Qutb was warning Nasser implicitly, if he continued to play the identity card, Egypt would turn to the conditions of *jahiliyya* and condemned to destruction.

[131] Mark Juergensmeyer, "The New Religious State", *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 27, No. 4 (Jul., 1995), pp. 379-391
[132] Ibid, pp.51

[133] Sayed Khatab, "Arabism and Islamism in Sayyid Qutb's Thought on Nationalism", The Muslim World, Vol.94, (April 2004), pp. 217-244

"This was Islam with all its particular characteristics, the identity card *{al-bitaqah al-shakhsiyyah)* by which the world has come to know the Arabs and to whom it has handed over leadership. Today, the Arabs have nothing more than this card. They have no message other than this message to address themselves to the world. If they carry it [the identity card: the message], the world will recognize them and respect them. If they do not carry it [identity card: the message], they will return to their status [i.e., *jahiliyyah]* prior to Islam, when nobody recognized them. They do not have anything other than Islam to present to humanity. Only Islam is the identity card *{al-bitaqah al-shakhsiyyah)"[134]*

According to Qutb Islam is the only source that constitutes nationality thus making itself as the identity of Arabs. Since Islam serves to unite entire human beings, Arab nationalism means fragmentation that separates the non-Arab Muslims.

Hans Kohn describes nationalism as fallow: "Nationalism is a state of mind permeating the large majority of people and claiming to permeate all its members, it recognizes the nation state as the ideal form of political organization and the nationality as the source of all creative cultural energy and of economic well-being. The supreme loyalty of men is therefore due to its nationality as his own life supposedly rooted in and made possible by its welfare."[135] The strong attachment of the man to his history, language and ethnic origin created the arise of nationalist movements in the Arab world resulted with the change in the Middle Eastern map. For Qutb, thus Arab Nationalism caused the division of Arab countries and separated them from the Islamic rule.

Before the Free Officers Revolution Sayyid Qutb asserted his ideological position regarding the Arab Nationalism as fallow:

"The flag which unites us in our struggle is the flag of Islam. Among us, a number of people prefer to be associated *{yatajammau)* under the Arab flag *{al-rayah al-arabiyyah).* I have no objection to this association *{al-tajammu)* being transitory *{waqtiyyan)* as a step on the road of a wider association. There is no conflict *{taarud)* between Arab nationalism *{al-qawmiyyah al-Arabiyyah)* and Islamic Patriotism *{al-wataniyyah al-islamiyyah),* only if we understood Arab nationalism as

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[134] Ibid

[135] Hans Kohn, *The Idea of Nationalism: A Study in it Its Origin and Background*, New Jersey: Transaction Publishers, (2008), pp.16

a step on the road. All the Arab land is part of the land of Islam. If we liberate the Arab land, it means we liberate part of the body of the Islamic homeland *{al-watan al-islami)*, which could be used to help in the liberation of the rest of the Muslim land. The point is to get it started."[136]

According to this statement Qutb accepted to be united under the Arab flag, only if it was seen as a transitory process to reach an Islamic state. Arab land is evaluated as a small portion of the great land of Islam. Therefore the liberation of Arabian Peninsula was not the ultimate purpose; it was only a step for the liberation of *dar-al Islam.*

Language is an important component of nations which contributes to the formation of historical records, literature and the sense of collectiveness. During his period Nasser attributed a special importance to Arabic through literature contests and disseminating the works of prominent poets as a part of his nationalist plan. Contrary to the Nasser does approach Qutb refused to acknowledge Arabic within the national concept prefer to phrase it "Islamic language". According to him:

"In the countries liberated by Islam, the geniuses went on to express themselves, not by their ages but by the new language, the 'Islamic language.' They produced works in every field of knowledge. The Islamic language became, actually, the mother tongue for these geniuses. This was because the energy of Islam and the nature of the obligation that this language [Islamic language] is carrying were closer to the soul of these geniuses than their ancient cultures and languages. This energy was only Islam. . ."[137]

The revelation of the holy book that is the most important source of Islam, created far reaching impacts on the content and the structure of the Arabic language. Islam contributed Arabic to obtain a universal status that it revealed as one of the principal languages of the world. Arabic is among the six official languages of United Nations. It can be argued that without the bond that provides a common language to *ummah*, Arabic would probably not cross the borders of the Arabian

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[136] Sayed Khatab, "Arabism and Islamism in Sayyid Qutb's Thought on Nationalism*", The Muslim World*, Vol.94, (April 2004), pp. 217-244

[137] Ibid

Peninsula with such speed and magnitude. [138] According to Sayyid Qutb Arab nationalism is the product of paganism. He states that,

> "the pagans have a variety of idols that sometimes called homeland *{watan)* and race *{jins)* or nation *{qawm).* These forms of idols appear from time to time — once under the name of popularity *{shuubiyyah),* once under the name of Hittite nationalism *{al-jinsiyyah al-turaniyyah)* and once more under the name Arab nationalism *{al-qawmiyyah al-Arabiyyah)* and sometimes under various names and flags."[139]

Overall, despite Nasser viewed nationalism as a way to provide unity through strengthening the enthusiasm of masses to achieve freedom from masses; Qutb rejected this notion since it was not grounded on the principles of Islam. According to Qutb Arab nationalism which positioned Islam as secondary threatened the universality of *uluhiyyah* (divinity), and universality of *hakimiyyah* (sovereignty of Allah over everything) and universality of *ubudiyyah* (servitude: complete submission of all humanity to Allah alone).[140] According to Qutb, The adoption of Arab nationalism is not compatible with the Islamic concept of Ummah which represents the unity of whole Islamic world. Qutb argues that secular nationalism is the element of *jahiliyyah* due to its insistence on the ethnic (tribal) connection which associated with the pre-Islamic era.

Overall the Six-Days War has not only resulted with the defeat of Arabs but also the defeat of secular Arab nationalism. Whereas Nasser was not "the leader of Arab" anymore and Arab nationalism that was the ideological base of his leadership lost a considerable degree of altitude as well. On the other hand, while the ideology of Qutb was reaching the large masses, Islamism was on the rise.

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[138] Elsayed M.H Omran, Islam, the Qur'an and the Arabic Literature, *Al-Serat*, Vol XIV No. 1 , Spring 1988

[139] Sayed Khatab, "Arabism and Islamism in Sayyid Qutb's Thought on Nationalism", *The Muslim World*, Vol.94, (April 2004), pp. 217-244
[140] Ibid

4.3 Muslim Brotherhood under Sadat

On the contrary to Nasser, his successor Anwar al-Sadat who assumed the presidency in 1970 has not viewed the Muslim Brotherhood as a political threat therefore he released its member from the prison and encouraged the exiled members to return to the country. Although Muslim Brotherhood was not entitled to legal recognition as a political party, Sadat paved the way to Islamists for operating in social arena. Furthermore Sadat allowed the Brothers to resume publication of its monthly magazine *Al Dawa* (The Call) which served the editorialization of Islamist views until it was banned again in 1981.[141] Sadat expressed himself as the "beliver-president" through a systematic integration of religion into his public discourse, building thousands of new mosques and rejuvenating the state's relationship with Al Azhar University.[142] Moreover he supported the political Islamists in university campuses in order to contain the leftist strands from Nasser's period. Within this framework the social and educational activities of Muslim Brotherhood consolidated its power and influence especially upon the poor and needy regions. The university campuses revealed as the focal point of the movement to galvanize its activities. The mosques have been used to display the regular meetings of the organization that gathered thousands of students across the country. The leading religious figures of the time such as Mohammad Al Ghazali from al-Azhar frequently preached about the religious duties of Muslims and the writings of Banna and Qutb that have been enthusiastically welcomed by the masses. Furthermore Brotherhood organized summer camps that are initiated as training grounds to impose their ideology to young minds. Brotherhood made use of this atmosphere of liberation to mobilize the youth on the basis of its ideology. The organization of the Brotherhood was more methodical and strategical with comparison to the previous decades.[143]

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[141] Denis J. Sullivan & Sana Abed Kotob, *Islam in Contemporary Egypt: Civil Society vs. the State*, Colarado: Lynne Rienner Publishers Inc., (1999), pp. 45

[142] Peter Mandaville, *Global Political Islam,* London: Routledge, (2007), pp. 83

[143] Geneive Abdo, *No God But God: Egypt and the Triumph of Islam*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000, pp.111

However at the middle of 1970s the atmosphere has changed. The conflicts between Muslims and Coptic Christians in Cairo marked the end of honeymoon between the government and Islamists. Sadat launched an intensive opposition campaign against Islamists to reduce the power of religious authorities. He imposed law enforcements against religious figures or preachers who issued fetwa or engaged in religious facilities that contradicted with government policies. Hence, he drew a thick line between the realm of *Ulema* and government in order to prevent any possible opposition to his rule.[144] As it become obvious that Sadat was not ready to meet the '*Sharia*' demands of Islamic groups, the realm of freedom for the Brotherhood tightened again. Sadat took the Islamization step backward and inclined to align Egypt with West. Several of his foreign policy decisions get strong reaction from the Islamist groups. His condemnation of the Islamic Revolution in Iran and initiation of the neo-liberal economic policy brought him to the edge. The Camp David Accords, peace treaty with Israel, caused him to be assassinated by a member of more radical and militant Islamic organization namely Jihad.

Since Sadat perceived the leftists and Nasserists as the biggest obstacle for his presidency, he chose to align with West. After the semi-successful October 1973 War which brought Sadat sufficient legitimacy he initiated the *infitah* (open-door policy) that became the stamp of the demise of Nasser's state-led development plan. The open door policy which ruled out the welfare strategy contributed the revival of Muslim Brotherhood through charity facilities. In order to have a better insight for the revival of the movement it is essential to examine the general lines of the Egypt's socio-economic structure and the *infitah* policy.

4.3.1 Infitah

The image of the Egypt in the mid-twentieth century was a typical Third World country. Egypt consisted of a peasant-based society approximately half of whose population was working in the agricultural sector. The living conditions of the populations was highly low that per capita income at about 300 dollars. The majority

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[144] Ibid, pp.54

of the population was illiterate and the illiteracy intensified among women.[145] Less than one percent of the population possessed about one third of the cultivated land caused many of people landless. The unemployment rate was severely high, the industry was underdeveloped and the productivity of the country largely relied on the manpower.[146]

The revolutionary government obliged to deal with the low profile economy which made Egypt as an underdeveloped country. Nasser planned to launch a state-led development and economic nationalism plan in order to ameliorate the conditions of the country. However in 1956, the construction project of Aswan Dam on the Nile which is supposed to finance the agricultural and development plan was denied by an Anglo-American decision. Nasser responded to this decision as nationalizing the assets of foreign-owned Suez Canal Company which led to the Anglo-French and Israeli invasion. However Russian and American forces intervened to the invasion and the sequestered companies were given under the control of a new body, the Economic Development Organization that is controlled by the government.[147] After the nationalization of Suez Canal, Nasser initiated the ambitious Import Substitute Industrialization Program. ISI was the most-tested national development plan within the underdeveloped countries. In the words of Richards and Waterbury, "It is designed to move economies traditionally dependent on the export of primary commodities and raw materials to an industrial footing. The new industries are expected both to produce goods that were previously imported and process domestic raw materials."[148] The ultimate purpose of this development policy is the, to reduce the dependency on external markets through the encouragement of infant industry to achieve economies of scale that would make them more profitable and

[145] John Waterbury, *The Egypt of Nasser and Sadat: The Political Economy of Two Regimes,* New Jersey: Princeton University Press, (1983), pp.4

[146] Iliya Harik, "Continuity and Challenge in Local Development Policies in Egypt: From Nasser to Sadat", *Int. J. Middle East Stud.* 16 (1984), 43-66
[147] Roger Owen & Sevket Pamuk, *History of Middle East Economies in the Twentieth Century*, London: I.B. Tauris, (1998), pp.130

[148] Alan Richards & John Waterbury, *A Political Economy of the Middle East*, Colorado: Westview Press, Colorado and Oxford", (1998), pp.25

competitive.[149] Within the framework of this program, infant industry is protected from foreign competition through the imposition of high tariffs. In addition to Egypt, Turkey, Tunisia, Israel, Mexico, Argentina, Iran, Syria, Iraq and Algeria have been among the countries who adopted ISI model.

At the initial phase ISI proceed through the expansion of basic consumer products that brings national welfare policies, popular support and political mobilization to the governments. However the latter stages of ISI provoke an upsurge in the imports of capital goods, raw material and technology that generates a serious foreign exchange gap led to the external borrowing. In the meantime, the protection granted to the national industries makes them uncompetitive in international markets. High rates of inflation, costly welfare programs, economic stagnation and balance of payment crisis characterize the final stage of the ISI.

The foreign policy decisions of Nasser brought additional burden to the suffering economy. Egypt's defeat in Six Days War in 1967 was not a political disaster only but also an economic one. As Pamuk and Owen asserted, "apart from the losses sustained in the war itself, the Egyptian economy suffered from further damage from the enforced closure of the Suez Canal, the loss of Sinai oil fields as a result of the Israeli occupation, and reduction in revenues from tourism." [150] Moreover, the Canal War with Israel in 1969-1970 which caused widespread destruction in the cities of Port Said, Suez and Ismailiya added additional expenditures for the rebuilding of these cities and strengthening the military forces. Finally due to the close relationship with Soviet Union, there was a great decline in the previous degrees of Western aid.[151]

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[149] Ibid

[150] Roger Owen & Sevket Pamuk, *History of Middle East Economies in the Twentieth Century*, I.B. Tauris, London, (1998), pp.133

[151] Ibid, pp.133

The successor of Nasser, Anwar al Sadat faced to such an economic conditions that pushed him to follow liberal economic policies. Sadat defined the economic legacy of Nasser as even worse than the political one. "We had, with crass stupidity, copied the Soviet pattern of socialism, although we lacked the necessary resources, technical capabilities, and capital."[152] After proclaiming victory in the semi-successful October 1973 war, Sadat acquired the legitimacy to announce the introduction of new economic policy that terminated the state led development model of Nasser. The new liberal economic policy known as infitah (opening up) was publicized through the October Working Paper in 1974. This 'outward looking economic policy' is supposed to provide foreign investment as well as to encourage local private sector in order to overcome the economic stagnation through increasing the capacity of production.[153] As Owen and Pamuk contends, "… Sadat launched his economic *infitah* or opening which he claimed would wed Arab petrodollars, Western technology, and Egyptian labor and management for the purpose of giving birth to a dynamic, industrialized, mixed private/public economy."[154] Despite the grand pronouncements, the new economic program couldn't be developed at the pace with Sadat pictures and the society had been promised. With regard to Muslim Brotherhood, the outcomes of *infidah* affected the movement in two ways: Firstly, Muslim Brotherhood extended a comprehensive network of social services and charity facilities that government couldn't be able to provide due to the economic burdens. These activities of the movement enhanced its political influence through the expansion of adherents. Secondly, the *infitah* policy created the formation of an *infitah* class substantially with an Islamist cast that took an important part in Egyptian business cycles.

The *infitah* policy paved the way for the formation of a new class of importers, financial investors and middlemen. While some members of this new

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[152] Anwar Sadat , *In Search of Identity*, London: Collins St James's Place, (1978), pp. 213

[153] Roger Owen & Sevket Pamuk, *History of Middle East Economies in the Twentieth Century*, I.B. Tauris, London, (1998), pp.135

[154] Clement Henry & Robert Springborg, *Globalization and the Politics of Development in the Middle East*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, (2002), pp.139

class achieved the wealth with their own conditions, some others utilized the assets and connections of the public enterprises in which they were previously working as manager or consultant. *Infitah* class was substantially made up of an Islamic cast. At the beginning of the 1980s, 8 of the 18 families who enjoyed the top rankings in Egypt's private sector were associated with the Brotherhood. The economic enterprises that linked to the Brothers generated the approximately 40 percent of the private sector.[155] Beginning with 1970s and 1980s, the leadership positions of Muslim Brotherhood were held by the figures who were affiliated with the old money and landed families. The family of Umar al-Tilmisani, the successor of Hasan al-Hudaybi, possessed 300 feddans (acres) and seven houses which was the indicator of a great wealth at that time of Egypt. Similarly, Mustafa Mashhuri the deputy of Tilmisani and the fifth murshid of the organization belonged to a wealthy landowning family in Sharqiyya.[156] Regarding this picture, it will not be the wrong to claim that Brotherhood constituted an important component of this *infitah* class.

Egypt's emerging *infitah* class generally composed of banking and financial sector, investment sector and small to medium sized businesses ranging from manufacturers to real estates. Before the Sadat's period, only four nationalized banks and a small number of specialized banks were operating in Egypt. After 1974 dozens of new banks which included several of Islamic banking bursted out.[157] The Faisal Islamic Bank and Islamic International Bank of Investment and Development were the Islamic banks that were holding almost 20 percent of deposits in Egyptian banking system. In addition to Islamic banks, in the middle of 1980s approximately one million Egyptian invested in Islamic individual proprietorships and joint-stock companies whose number was more than two thousands. Talia's al Imam, the most important construction company in Asyut, was founded by the son of Abdel Nadir who was among the members of Muslim Brotherhood executed to attempt the

[155] Joel Beinin, "Political Islam and the New Global Economy: The Political Economy of an Egyptian Social Movement", *CR: The New Centennial Review* 5, No.1, (Spring 2005), pp:111-139

[156] Ibid

[157] Ann Elizabeth Mayer, "Islamic Banking and Credit Policies in the Sadat Era: The Social Origins of Islamic Banking in Egypt", *Arab Law Quarterly*, Vol. 1, No. 1 (Nov., 1985), pp. 32-50

assassination of Nasser in 1954.[158] In this regard, the Islamists of *infitah* class which adopted an Islamic economic approach contributed to flourish the Brotherhood's social services through aids or donations.

The other outcome of the *infidah* policy that was the enormous income gap between the wealthy and poor classes of the society has been an advantage for Islamists. As Brian Turner points out "Political Islam or Islamism is the consequence of the social frustrations, articulated around the social divisions of class and generation that followed from the economic crises of the global neo-liberal experiments of the 1970s and 1980s."[159] It is the fact that, the adherents of Muslim Brother were generally comprised of the students and new graduates who were coming from low-middle income families. They come from peripheral towns to the big cities for university education. Overall, these well-educated young men coming from lower status sought to satisfy their aspirations for upward mobility. If they were lived in during the term of Nasser, they would probably begin to work in a government office with a middling income.[160]

During the presidency of Sadat, despite a triple increase in the number of university graduates, a job in a public sector with middling income was no longer available due to the cuts in the state budget imposed by IMF structural plan. Meanwhile, the economic crisis in the oil rich countries because of the declining oil prices put away the alternative of working abroad for young graduates who want to save money to be able to set up a small business or buy an apartment that is an important necessity for a middle-class marriage. Despite the 12 percent official unemployment rate which was concentrated among the graduates of intermediate

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[158] Joel Beinin, "Political Islam and the New Global Economy: The Political Economy of an Egyptian Social Movement", *CR: The New Centennial Review* 5, No.1, (Spring 2005), pp:111-139

[159] Bryan S. Turner, "Class, Generation and Islamism: Towards a Global Sociology of Political Islam" *British Journal of Sociology* vol. No. 54, issue no. 1 (March 2003), pp.139-147

[160] Ibid

schools or university, in the practice it was high more than this number.[161] Most of these aggrieved students either joined to the Muslim Brotherhood or sympathized to its ideology. Furthermore, the professionals who were unable to attain a life in line with their higher educations and qualifications began to search for a platform to express their troubles. Thus, the syndicates mainly controlled by the Muslim Brotherhood turned into outlets in which professionals work for acquiring better conditions. The young professionals constituted the core of Brotherhood obtained a huge success through dominating the Egyptian syndicates that would be the centers of mobilization for the movement. The failure of Nasser's Soviet socialism and the turmoil of Sadat's Western open door policy made society to seek for a more resilient identity, Islam. The increasing number of women covering their head, the dominant position of sheikhs in communication channels and the excess demand for the Friday prayers were the symbols for the rising influence of Islam among the Egyptians.[162]

Thanks to the donations obtained from Islamist *infitah* class Muslim Brotherhood established a highly efficient social infrastructure. The budget cuts in the welfare policies deepened the income gap among the layers of society and prevented to the allocation of basic resources to the needed people. Within these conditions Muslim Brotherhood developed a comprehensive network of social services that government could not provide due to the economic problems. The wide range of services offered by the Brotherhood is:

> "affordable healthcare in the form 'in the form of Islamic hospitals, 'non-corrupt' food-distribution centers in poor neighborhoods, practical assistance in finding jobs (especially targeted the newly graduated Muslims), welfare benefits, innovative transport solutions in some of Cairo's and Alexandria's most crowded suburbs, accommodation for out-of town students (in addition to lecture notes to study groups) and humanitarian activities in some of Egypt's most deprived areas."[163]

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[161] Joel Beinin, "Political Islam and the New Global Economy: The Political Economy of an Egyptian Social Movement", *CR: The New Centennial Review* 5, No.1, (Spring 2005), pp:111-139

[162] Geneive Abdo, *No God But God: Egypt and the Triumph of Islam*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000, pp.84

[163] Tarek Osman, *Egypt on the Brink: From the Rise of Nasser to the Fall of Mubarak*, New Haven: Yale University Press, (2011), pp: 93

Although Muslim Brotherhood has not functioned for a long time due to the suppression, these activities became the strong source of support and legitimacy among the public. While the legitimacy of the regime was melting down as a result of the socio economic consequences of *infitah*, Brotherhood revealed as the provider in the eyes of the Egyptian people.

4.4 Muslim Brotherhood under Mubarak

Following the assassination of Sadat in 1981 by a military jihadist, his successor Husnu Mubarak alleviated the repression upon the radical Islamist organizations to remove any possible threat against his presidency. During Mubarak's period, the cat and mouse game with Islamists has persisted. Since the jihadist and extremist Islamic groups that were founded in 1970s were abolished or exiled to a grate extend, the new threat to the Mubarak regime was coming from the militant and moderate groups such as Gemaa Islamiyye, an umbrella organization directed the efforts of some small but severely militant groups actively operating across Egypt.[164]

The Muslim Brotherhood's relation with government can be categorized into the three phases. The first phase is from the beginning of Mubarak's presidency to 1988 in which Muslim Brotherhood was treated with tolerance which provided the movement an opportunity to extend its support base through a matrix of social services to the Egypt's most deprived areas that government failed to offer due to the macro-economic burdens under the open-market economy.[165] During this phase, opposition press and political parties enjoyed the atmosphere of a relative softening and Muslim Brotherhood allowed entering into political coalition with Wafd Party for the elections of 1984. Since the organization has not have the legal recognition as a political party, coalition was the only option to take part in the competitions. For the next election in 1987 Brotherhood engaged in the Islamic Alliance with Labor

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[164] Peter Mandaville, *Global Political Islam*, London: Routledge, (2007), pp. 84

[165] Mariz Tadros, *The Muslim Brotherhood in Contemprorary Egypt: Democracy Redefined or Confined*, London: Routledge, (2012), pp.6

Party that achieved around 17 percent of the votes against the Mubarak's National Party's 67 percent, the Waft Party's 11 percent. The election result demonstrated that Muslim Brotherhood was becoming the dominant political opposition power although they had no officially licensed political party.[166]

The Parliamentary success motivated Abd al Mun'im Abu Al Fath who was the head of the Cairo University Student Union between the years of 1974 to 1977, with other top young Brothers to work on a plan to control the majority of Egypt's professional associations. In the words of Beinin, "Operating under the banner of the "Islamic Trend" or the "Islamic Voice," Muslim Brotherhood and its allies ran for positions on the executive boards of associations enrolling some two million engineers, doctors, dentists, pharmacists, teachers, commercial employees, agronomists, and others."[167] Syndicates have been important platforms that during the 1990s 22 professional syndicates were functioning in the country with a total 3.5 million members. Muslim Brotherhood made great efforts to control the five most politically active syndicates which represented engineers, doctors, lawyers, pharmacists and scientists. Furthermore, the Brothers tried to achieve the control of other syndicates following different strategies.[168]

Seam el-Aryan and his like-minded Brothers who administered the syndicates were seeking for the means to accommodate the concerns of modern world and the imperatives of religion through perceiving the superiority of Islam over the modernity. In this regard syndicates were considered as a way out for the professionals who were disgruntled at the economic conditions of the country and the transformation of the ethical standards of the society. Syndicates became a glimmer of hope for the frustrated generation of professionals through encountering their

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[166] Kemal Helbawy, *The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt: Historical Evolution and Future Prospects*, in the Political Islam: Context versus Ideology, ed. Khalid Hroub, London: Middle East Institute at SOAS, (2010), pp.82

[167] Joel Beinin, Political Islam and the New Global Economy: The Political Economy of Egyptian Social Movement, *New Centennial Review* 5, No.1, Spring 2005, pp.111-139

[168] Ninette S. Fahmy, "The Performance of the Muslim Brotherhood of the in the Egyptian Syndicates: An Alternative Formula for Reform", *Middle East Journal*, Vol.52, No.4, (Autumn 1998), pp.551-562

spiritual and earthly needs. As Abdo comments, "no aspect of daily life was too mundane for the union's helping hands, from increased maternity benefits, to a marriage fund, better pensions, housing assistance, help with consumer purchases, affordable holidays."[169] These entire services carried a religious character that is emphasized the compromise between the requirements of daily life with the principles of Islam.

Muslim Brother began to be the leading force in the Doctors Syndicate in which seven out of 25 seats of the Syndicate's governing council was obtained by the Brothers in 1984. The Doctor's Syndicates general council election that the majority of the votes were won by the Brotherhood witnessed the ascendancy the movement in 1992. Brotherhood not only controlled the Doctor Syndicate's governing council only, but also the affiliated syndicates of Cairo, Giza and Daqahliya.[170] While the Brotherhood was controlling the 54 out of 61 seats in Engineers Syndicate, all seats were held in 1988. Osman Ahmad Osman who was a multimillionaire owning a wide range of companies in the public and private sector served as the chair of the Engineers Association from 1979 to 1990. Osman developed prominent social service programs that constituted the exemplary activities of Islamic administration in the professional association. During his leadership, the Association founded a private hospital that provides affordable healthcare services and a social welfare fund that allocated to the poor and needy. Osman's successors who were also the member of the Muslim Brotherhood negotiated with the government to make an arrangement that enabled engineers to serve at their government jobs in the afternoons only so that they could work in the private sector in the mornings. This arrangement provided the engineers a fourfold increase in their salaries from 1985 to 1994.[171]

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[169] Geneive Abdo, *No God But God: Egypt and the Triumph of Islam*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000, pp.72

[170] Ninette S. Fahmy, "The Performance of the Muslim Brotherhood of the in the Egyptian Syndicates: An Alternative Formula for Reform", *Middle East Journal*, Vol.52, No.4, (Autumn 1998), pp.551-562

[171] Joel Beinin, "Political Islam and the New Global Economy: The Political Economy of Egyptian Social Movement, *New Centennial Review* 5, No.1, Spring 2005, pp.111-139

Thus, in 1995 Muslim Brotherhood acquired the majority of seats in Doctors, Engineers, Lawyers, Pharmacists and Scientists Syndicates. Ninette S. Fahmy point out that despite Muslim Brothers achieved the dominant position in the syndicates they have not attempt to compete for the presidency of the associations. On the contrary, as Fahmy comments, "the Muslim Brothers consistently supported the elected presidents, who, in every case, were government candidates, in return for those candidates' mediation with the regime on the Brotherhood's behalf."[172] The reason behind the Muslim Brotherhood's endeavors to exert political control over the professional candidates was the policy choice to avoid from the government's repression in the parliament. The restrictions imposed in the political spectrum had prevented the Muslim Brotherhood to take part in the parliament as an opposition party and caused to diminish the number of its representatives in parliament in the 1990s.[173]

The influence of the Muslim Brotherhood among the public was confirmed with the victories in professional syndicates. However, the government perceived the power of organization as a future political threat that in order to prevent the organization from accessing these associations's legislation was drafted. Hence a series of arrests of the Brothers was initiated by the government. As in the presidency of Anwar Sadat Mubarak persisted to interfere in the elections of professional associations to restrain any sort of opposition to his leadership. However, despite the arrests of the leading Brothers like Eryan, the movement had already permeated into the syndicates and universities. Moreover, Brotherhood was gaining the appeals of society with the charity facilities and the social messages that had a response in the lives of people. As Beinin comments, "the Islamic Trend's message of equity, social justice, moral renewal, and criticism of official corruption and neglect of the common welfare provided a cogent explanation for the social experiences and blocked ambitions of students and recent graduates and was an

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[172] Ninette S. Fahmy, "The Performance of the Muslim Brotherhood of the in the Egyptian Syndicates: An Alternative Formula for Reform", *Middle East Journal*, Vol.52, No.4, (Autumn 1998), pp.551-562

[173] Ibid

important factor in their professional association victories" [174] The unemployed graduates sympathized the movement not because its Islamic message but because the social infrastructure that embedded in lower and middle class communities and the criticism of the Brothers that resonated with the life experience of deprived and frustrated people.

The Islamic Trend decided to participate in the trade union elections for the first time relying on the success achieved in 1987 parliamentary elections. Although Islamic Trend had a strong Islamic point of departure, the discourse they used in the elections can be characterized as leftist. The right to strike, the criticism of neo-liberal economic policies, opposition to the government interference in the trade union elections, opposition to the liquidation in the public sector, removal of consumer subsidies and the law quality in the free education and health care were the recurrent themes of the Brotherhood. [175] It worth to note that syndicates and unions which have been supposed to be controlled by the leftist strands, seized by the Islamists that purported to defend Islamic causes with leftist connotations. These leftist arguments are combined with the anti-Zionist rhetoric claiming that Israel was forcing the Egyptian government to privatize the public sector so that the companies connected with the Jewish businessmen would take over the market. This widespread anti-Israel sentiment was utilized to get support of the Muslim spheres. [176] However due to the strong state control over the elections of trade union Brotherhood couldn't achieve the success as in the case of professional syndicates.

During the first phase of tolerance of Mubarak regime Mustafa Masshur, the successor of Umar Tilmisani and the fifth murshid of the Muslim Brotherhood, developed a plan with other senior brothers to spread the message of organization to other countries. Thus in 1982 the International Organization of Muslim Brotherhood was established as a global coordination body of the movement. The International

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[174] Joel Beinin, "Political Islam and the New Global Economy: The Political Economy of Egyptian Social Movement", *New Centennial Review* 5, No.1, Spring 2005, pp.111-139
[175] Ibid

[176] Ibid

Organization of Muslim Brother was established to contribute the transnationalization of the organization through coordinating the activities of various branches.

In 1988 represented the beginning of a new phase that brought the end of tolerance to the Muslim Brotherhood. From 1988 to 1992 the relationship between the government and Muslim Brotherhood began to sour because the former's suspicion and fears alleviated when the influence of Muslim Brotherhood extremely rose in the university unions, professional associations and parliament. It can be asserted that the period from 1992 to 2011 witnessed a series of rise and fall between the relationships of Muslim Brotherhood and Mubarak regime. Although the Brotherhood was officially outlawed, its independent candidates began to run in the elections of 1990s and 2005. In the elections of 2005 the independent candidates of the movement won 88 out of 444 seats. According to Mariz Tadros, "The Brotherhood arrived at an entente with government between 2005 and 2007 which coincided with a more relaxed policy on the part of Mubarak towards a political liberalization mainly in response to President Bush's democratization push". [177] Within this perspective the 2005 elections brought the movement more political representation that they have never enjoyed before. Despite the electoral success, the Brotherhood was not entitled to the legal party status. However, the movement was largely active in political, social and economic spheres throughout the country.

From 2007 to 2011, Mubarak readopted the repression policies upon the Muslim Brotherhood with the other opposition groups. Widespread suppression, limited political participation, corruption, socio-economic disenchantments and the legitimacy crisis of the government characterized the second half of the 2000s. In addition to given frustrations, the glaring violations of the basic law criteria caused Brotherhood to withdraw from the 2010 elections. [178] Despite the early statements of

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[177] Mariz Tadros, *The Muslim Brotherhood in Contemprorary Egypt: Democracy Redefined or Confined*, London: Routledge, (2012), pp.6

[178] Ibid, pp.7

Essam al Eryan, media spokesman of the Brotherhood, that signified the importance of mass political participation in order to prevent the regime to benefit from the boycott of elections, the movement quit the elections since it failed to acquire a single seat in the first round of elections with its independent candidates.[179]

Finally the toppling of Mubarak from the presidency by the mass uprisings beginning in 25 January 2011 paved the way for civil and political activism. More than fifty political parties and coalitions led by the youth depicted the political atmosphere of Egypt. In the first competitive elections of the country the Mohammed Morsi, the candidate of the Freedom and Justice Part, one of the five parties formed by the members of the Brotherhood, became the first civil president of Egypt.

4.4.1 The Way Forward the Victory of Muslim Brotherhood

In 25 January thousands of activists, the majority of whome were young, gathered for the uprising in Tahrir Square to protest against the poverty, economic stagnancy unemployment, political oppression, widespread corruption, stifling censorship and the presidency of Husnu Mubarak who have been in power for three decades. As a result of the uprising movements Mubarak was overthrown and Mohammad Morsi who was the member of the Muslim Brotherhood won the presidency with the 51.7 percent of the votes.

Within the framework of this work, the background to the reasons of revolution that carries the Muslim Brotherhood to power is required to analyze. It is no doubt that the most important reason that impelled the masses to pour into streets is the deteriorating economic conditions that dragged the people into a deep poverty. The official unemployment rate under the 30 age group which doubles the overall unemployment is enough to imagine the desperate picture of the country. Unemployment stems from the major economic changes of the past and present. Considerable amount of the university graduated young Egyptians could not have job related to their academic degree. Therefore, many university graduates opted for

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[179] http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-11890726

being unemployed rather than working in blue collar or laboring jobs.[180] On the other hand as a result of the large income gap among society the middle class almost disappeared, and the division of the rich and the poor extremely deepened. As Tariku Osman states "The psychological isolation and the emotional detachment slowly, gradually and subtly instill a feeling among poor that there is a major civilization gap between rich (and their neat world) and the rest of society."[181]

The unemployment and the low minimum wages prevent people to deal with the high inflation in basic consumer goods. The thorny socio economic conditions compelled the masses to move to suburbs of the metropolises such as Cairo's city of Dead. Dead consists of almost 8 square kilometers where 4 million poor inhabitants trying to pursue their lives as a semi-independent community. Dead is the city where thousands of children have not the opportunity to get the basic education, the healthcare and the sanitation is not provided, electricity is not supplied and the infrastructure is not developed. [182] As a result of the internal immigration the population of Cairo increased from six million to fifteen million in forty years. As the city of Dead, Imbaba where can be used to depict the chronic problems of Egypt, symbolized the poor of the country. The state failed to ensure sufficient infrastructure, health services and education in line with the population growth of Imbaba. As it is indicated in the official statistics 85 percent of the population in Imbaba is illiterate. Due to the excess number of students in primary schools, the classes are organized in three shifts which begin in the morning and end in the evening.[183]

Moreover the widespread corruption, the severe rise in the number of crime rate, disrespect for human dignity and the erosion of authentic values are the

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[180] Tarek Osman, *Egypt on the Brink: From the Rise of Nasser to the Fall of Mubarak*, New Haven: Yale University Press, (2011), pp: 216

[181] Ibid, 217
[182] Ibid, 219

[183] Geneive Abdo, *No God But God: Egypt and the Triumph of Islam*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000, pp.72

symptoms of disintegrating social structure. As Fatima Mareah Peoples emphasizes that Cairo's streets projects a culture of machismo wherein female sexual harassment is a common activity regardless of the women's age, status, nationality or religious affiliation. For her, one of the reasons of that harassment is, "political and economic reforms have distorted the structural conditions for upholding patriarchy as a uniform system of gendered social and spatial organization."[184]

Another reason that forced people to revolt was the limited opportunity for political participation and insufficient democratic reforms. Despite Mubarak's consistent claim that Egyptian people enjoy all kinds of democracy, it has not reflected the truth. As Jason Brownlee suggests, after the political opening period of 1980s and early 1990s the regime continually pressurize the opponent groups in order to prevent the formation of an alternative political power. Mubarak enjoyed a considerable degree of lack of inspection that he sent his opponents to military courts, shut down newspapers, abolished professional syndicates or imprisoned human rights activists. Furthermore, Mubarak reinstated the "state of emergency" after the assassination of Sadat and progressively extended its provisions for further years. In the state of emergency, the regime legalized the prohibitions of demonstrations, actualized the indefinite detentions without court decision and prioritized the presidential degrees with the power of law.[185] Additionally it is a well-known phenomenon that Mubarak has not avoided to commit electoral Freud to diminish the actual votes of opponents. Thus in any case of opposition, regime exerted its power over the people at times with brutal coercion and ignorance of human rights. These factors created a tense relationship between government and people.

All these factors made Egypt a very harsh place in the minds of citizens. Tarık Osman illustrated the situation as fallow:

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[184] Fatima Mareah Peoples, "Street Harassment in Cairo: A Symptom of Disintegrating Social Structures", *The African Anthropologist*, Vol 15, Nos. 1&2, 2008, pp. 1-20
[185] Jason Brownlee, "The Decline of Pluralism in Mubarek's Egypt", *Journal of Democracy*, Volume 13, Number 4, October 2002, pp. 6-14

"In 2006, around 8 million Egyptians (more than 10 percent of population, the vast majority of whom were under forty years age) applied for the green card lottery; Egyptians are among the top five nationalities applying to Canada's point-based approval scheme. From the mid-2000s thousands of Egyptian risked their lives attempting to reach the southern shores of Greece and Italy in search of work there or in countries to the North."[186]

Such kind of examples regarding the young people aspiring to flee from the country proves how challenging the conditions that people faced. The severe rates of unemployment, economic stagnation, low minimum wages, huge income gap between the poor and rich, the conditions of internal immigration, unqualified education and health care services, massive corruption, the erosion social values, political oppression, limited political participation are the factors that paved the way for the revolution.

Muslim Brotherhood was among the actors that dominated the political landscape of the pre-Mubarak era. What differs it from their rivals is widely its long-standing relationship with the frustrated people through establishing a comprehensive network of social services. Furthermore Brotherhood's special emphasis on the religious and authentic values made people to believe that they rebuild the society on the principle of justice. During the protests in January 2011, a statement of Muslim Brother explained the basic principles of Egyptian society in their administration as the democracy, social justice, freedom and independence which are the notions that Egyptian people desperately need.

In this chapter I tried to prove my thesis that Islamism is the product of the failures of contemporary socio-economic factors by looking at the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. It is argued that the emergence of Muslim Brotherhood is closely associated with the British colonial rule, corruption of the administrative system, the abolishment of the caliphate that symbolized the unity of Muslims, the gradual Westernization of values, norms and behaviors of society related with modernization, demise of secular nationalism following the Arab defeat in the Six Days War and the failure of economic policies coming with political oppression. The

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[186] Tarek Osman, *Egypt on the Brink: From the Rise of Nasser to the Fall of Mubarak*, New Haven: Yale University Press, (2011), pp: 215

major outcomes of this chapter can be summarized as fallow: The establishment of Muslim Brotherhood 1928 sought primarily to oppose the erosive effects of British domination, which constitutes the main element of Brotherhood's criticism against the government indicates the essentialness of the British colonialism for the movement's emergence. Moreover, the Arab defeat in 1967 which marked the demise of Nasser's Arab nationalism compelled the masses to search for a more resilient national identity. Thus the defeat of Egypt marked a new departure for the rise of Muslim Brotherhood who promoted Islam as the only valid identity for Muslims opposing to the promotion of other alternative identity sources. In addition, it is argued that Sadat's *infitah* policy affected the rise of the movement in two ways: Firstly, Muslim Brotherhood extended a comprehensive network of social services and charity facilities that government couldn't be able to provide due to the economic burdens. These activities of the movement enhanced its political influence through the expansion of adherents. Secondly, the *infitah* policy created the formation of an *infitah* class substantially with an Islamist cast that took an important part in Egyptian business cycles. Furthermore, the continual poverty, economic stagnancy unemployment, political oppression, widespread corruption, stifling censorship prepared the demise of Mubarak's rule opening a new page for the rising power of Muslim Brotherhood.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS

The rise of Political Islam has been a matter of question in the international and regional context. For that reason several of studies have been conducted to find out the bases for the emergence and rise of the Islamism. While some of these studies adopt an economic determinist approach, some focused on the cultural factors and some related this phenomenon with the external factors. Unlike the majority of the studies, this thesis embraced a comprehensive approach that takes into account the entire causes that have a role for the increasing appeal of Islamism.

Contrary to the dominant perspective that argues Islamism is the product of Islam that has been asserted as a political religion which denies the separation of religion and politics, this thesis argues that Islamists utilize Islam to criticize and de-legitimize the rulers and the established political structure. Thus, Islamism has an instrumental relationship with religion. The historical record of Muslims and the original Islamic sources does not provide precise information about the form of state, type of government and structure of institutions. Each movement designates its own rules on the basis of the environment in which they are operating. While some support to establish an Islamic state with revolutionary stance, others promote making changes on the basis of Islam conforming to rules of secular state. However, despite their diverse methods Islamists share some sociological characteristics in common. The well-educated young men coming from middle class who aspire for upward mobility generate the general picture of Islamists. Their political ideologies mostly formed in modern university campuses rather than religious institutions. Islamists are not the men of God who commit themselves purely to the dissemination

of the religious principles but the political figures who challenge the established order by using religious terminology as *jahiliyya*, *dawa* and *asr-ı saadet* borrowed from Quran. The Islamist movements emerged as a reaction to the shortcomings of the modern world order, which embrace a religious terminology that is married with the notions of the left. Thus the Islamists have reinterpreted the revolutionary leftist ideology on the basis of Islamic values. That is to say that Islam transformed into an ideology that is produced to encounter the demands of people arose from the deficiencies of modern world order.

It is argued that beginning with the middle of the tenth century the effective political control of the Muslim lands transferred from Caliphs to sultans and amirs. While governments in Muslim communities, Sultanates, were holding all political power, the Caliphate functioned to legitimize the state despite it was expected to authorize the government in theory. Thus, the de facto separation of religion and politics was realized. The political bodies in Muslim states were institutionalized independently from the religious connotations, although they emphasized their loyalty to Islamic values and commitment to the protection of Islamic lands. Meanwhile, religious communities build up a private space independently from the state. Unless, they threatened the continuity of state, the political power has not interfered into the private space.

However despite the existence of de-facto separation between religion and politics in the Muslim community, the "Islamic political imagination" perceives this fact as deviant.[187] Islamists preferred to ignore the differentiation of society after the death of Prophet Mohammad who held both the spiritual and political authority. Contrary to the historical records Islamist political imagination promotes an ideal state model that is presented as the matter of Islam. They created an ideological theory, which combines the Quranic terminology and the principles of political science. In the words of Roy, "from the Quran come the terms: shura (advisory council), hizb (party), tawhid (oneness), mustadaf (oppressed), umma (community of believers), and jahiliyya (ignorance), which are interpreted in a modern political

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[187] Oliver Roy, *The Failure of Political Islam*, London: I.B. Tauris Publishers, (1994), pp.14

context (democracy, political parties, a classless society, social classes, and so on.)"[188] Furthermore, dar-al Islam (house of Islam), dar-al harb (house of war), hakimiyya (sovereignty) and dawa (preaching) derived from the different traditions of Islam to strengthen the Islamic ideology. Thus, the religion of Islam turned into an ideological theory, which is utilized to appeal to masses who suffered from the socio-economic grievances.

Within this perspective it is argued that rather than the nature of Islam, political Islam indeed, is a modern phenomenon that emerged as a reaction to the historical and contextual political and socio-economic factors that have been affecting the Muslim world. Islamists challenge the shortcomings of modern world system by using different methods from secular ideological movements. Whereas secular groups were expressing their discontent on the human-made ideologies, Islamists shape their protests with religious discourse.

Overall, it is argued that Islamism is the product of the hegemonic role of West following with the colonial rule in the Middle East, the demise of secular nationalism fallowing the Arab defeat in the Six-Days War in 1967 and the failure of economic progress, political participation and modernity projects coming with increasing authoritarianism of the local regimes. In this framework, although Islamism opposes to the effects of modernity, ironically it is the product of the sociopolitical conditions that affected tremendously the Muslim world.

The asymmetrical relationship with the Western powers which manifests itself as the colonial rule in many parts of the Muslim world, the partition of Arab world into the small separate states, foundation of a Jewish state in Palestine, the holy land of Muslims, and manipulation of politics in the region provoked a pervasive sense of anti-westernism that pave the way for the support of political Islam that embraced an anti-Westernist approach. Moreover, the Arab defeat in 1967 which marked the demise of Nasser's Arab nationalism compelled the masses to search for a more resilient national identity. Thus the defeat of Egypt marked a new departure for the rise of Political Islamists who promoted Islam as the only valid

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[188] Ibid, pp.40

identity for Muslims opposing to the promotion of other alternative identity sources. Furthermore, the failure of the ambitious development plans designated to reach the level of developed countries created a great degree of dissatisfaction among the masses that hope to attain better living standards. The socio-economic experiment of the seventies and eighties resulted with the downfall has played a significant role for the rise of political Islam.

Within this context, the rise of Muslim Brotherhood to power is highly related with the given factors. The working strategy of Muslim Brotherhood which was carried the movement to power was successfully initiated to meet the spiritual and temporal demands of the society that stemmed from the troubles of modernity.

The Brotherhood followed a well-planned strategy that aimed to enlarge the organization through establishing direct contacts with people and engaging in social facilities. He organized meetings in the mosques and in the houses to communicate with people from the different segments of society. While use of mosques was providing legitimacy, the meetings in the houses ensured the sincerity. In addition to conducting classes across the country, Banna intended to penetrate into the power centers of the community. These power sources were " the *Ulema*, the *sheikhs* of *Sufi* the orders, the elders by which he meant the leading families and groupings in the broadest sense, the clubs (social and religious societies)."[189] Thus, his purpose was to influence the decision makers who would shape the social and political structure of the country. Moreover, a wide range of social and educational activities formed the basic tenets of the movement's appeal. Muslim Brotherhood extended a comprehensive network of social services and charity facilities that government couldn't be able to provide due to the economic burdens. These activities of the movement enhanced its political influence through the expansion of adherents. Affordable healthcare and education facilities, almshouses, assistance in finding jobs, welfare benefits, humanitarian activities, marriage fund, maternity benefits, housing assistance are the services of Brotherhood that are provided to the people in need.

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[189] Mitchell Richard P., *The Society of the Muslim Brothers* , Oxford: Oxford University Press, (1993), pp. 7

These entire services carried a religious character that is emphasized the compromise between the requirements of daily life with the principles of Islam.

Muslim Brotherhood used all possible means to participate in politics as establishing coalitions, running in the elections with independent candidates and controlling syndicates. Since the other opportunities were strictly limited by the ruling regimes syndicates were considered as a way out to pursue the political goals of the movement. Brothers like Esam el-Eryan considered the syndicates as a platform for the professionals who were disgruntled at the economic conditions of the country and the transformation of the ethical standards of the society. Syndicates became a glimmer of hope for the frustrated generation of professionals through encountering their spiritual and earthly needs. The social services carried a religious character that emphasizes the compromise between the requirements of daily life with the principles of Islam.

The discourse of Brotherhood that signifies the "equity, social justice, moral renewal, and criticism of official corruption and neglect of the common welfare" [190] represented the demands of students, recent graduates and professionals who failed to achieve what they deserved. The society supported the movement not only because its Islamic message but because the social infrastructure that embedded in lower and middle class communities and the criticism of the Brothers that resonated with the life experience of deprived and frustrated people. The deteriorating economic conditions that dragged the people into a deep poverty, the unemployment and the low minimum wages that prevent people to deal with the high inflation in basic consumer goods, the widespread corruption, the severe rise in the number of crime rate, disrespect for human dignity and the erosion of authentic values are the factors that forced people to revolt and brought the Brother Morsi to power.

Now in power Muslim Brotherhood as a political party faced the challenge of delivering on its promises that were exposed while it was a movement. The Brotherhood which was a social movement is now expected to co-opt into the peaceful democratic policies. Muslim Brotherhood owned its success to the given

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[190] Joel Beinin, Political Islam and the New Global Economy: The Political Economy of Egyptian Social Movement, *New Centennial Review* 5, No.1, Spring 2005, pp.111-139

crisis of modern world that were failed to be solved by the previous administrations. Thus, the future success of the movement as a political party is highly dependent on its ability to overcome the shortcomings of socio-economic conditions and political situations witnessed in the past. Egyptian seculars and the Salafis are expressing their discontent for the power of Muslim Brotherhood indicating different suspicions. As an Islamic party, Muslim Brotherhood is obliged to respond the expectations of these groups to keep the power. Since religious discourse will not be enough to keep the Brothers in power, the movement obliged to produce effective policies to meet the demands of society for a better future.

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98