# SCHOPENHAUER'S PHILOSOPHY OF MUSIC AND THE POSSIBILITY OF SELF-TRANSFORMATION THROUGH AESTHETIC UNDERSTANDING OF THE WORLD

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#### **ABSTRACT**

# SCHOPENHAUER'S PHILOSOPHY OF MUSIC AND THE POSSIBILITY OF SELF-TRANSFORMATION THROUGH AESTHETIC UNDERSTANDING OF THE WORLD

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Schopenhauer sets forth a very striking proposition about philosophy: He claims that what music expresses is also true philosophy. In addition to this genuine idea, Schopenhauer's philosophy captures individual situation within existence profoundly with comprehensive discussions on the value of life. Putting these remarks together, at the very hearth of this dissertation two concerns prevail: How is music as philosophy possible and if it is possible, are there any practical implications of it?

Yet, in order to illuminate these concerns, it is a must to face two basic problems. First problem that has to be faced is related with knowledge. Schopenhauer claims that knowledge of the *thing-in-itself* is possible and even salvation (*Erlösung*) is related with this special kind of knowledge. This knowledge frees us from the sufferings of the world and it is revealed

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through arts and especially by music. In this discussion, I will try to make it

clear that Schopenhauer's usage of thing-in-itself is misleading and we are

still dealing with the phenomenal realm. This is of great importance to

provide a natural tie between Schopenhauer's philosophy with music. And

the second problem takes its source from Schopenhauer's idea that the object

of philosophy is grasping universal truth per se not guiding people for a

better conduct of life. This idea excludes querying a link between musical

experiences and transforming manner of actions in Schopenhauer's system.

Yet, I will try to overcome this difficulty claiming that Schopenhauer's

philosophy implicitly prescribes as well.

Keywords: Music, philosophy, knowledge, salvation

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## SCHOPENHAUER'IN MÜZİK FELSEFESİ VE ESTETİK KAVRAYIŞ YOLUYLA KİŞİSEL DÖNÜŞÜMÜN OLASILIĞI

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Doktora. Felsefe Bölümü

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Schopenhauer'ın felsefeyle ilgili çok çarpıcı bir iddiası vardır: Müziğin anlattığı şey aslında felsefenin anlatmaya çalıştığı şeydir. Aynı zamanda Schopenhauer felsefesi, insanın varoluştaki durumunu derinden kavrar ve hayatın değeri üzerine kapsamlı yorumlarda bulunur. Bu düşünceleri temel alarak, tezin merkezinde iki kaygı yer almaktadır: Felsefe olarak müzik nasıl mümkündür? Ve eğer mümkünse, bunun insana hayatta nasıl bir varolma tarzı verebilir?

Lakin, bu soruları aydınlatabilmek için yüzleşmemiz gereken iki temel sorun vardır. İlk sorun bilgiyle alakalıdır. Schopenhauer kendinde-şeyin bilgisine ulaşabileceğimizi ve bu sayede bir tür selamete (Erlösung) erilebileceğini iddia ediyor. Bizim dünyanın ızdıraplarından özgürleşmemizi sağlıyan bu bilgiyi sanatlar ve özellikle müzik esinliyor. Ben, bu konuda

Schopenhauer'ın kendinde-şey kelimesini kullanışının yanıltıcı olduğunu,

halen fenomenlerle ilgili olduğunu netleştirmeye çalışacağım. Bu çabanın

önemi ise Schopenhauer felsefesi ile müzik arasında doğal bir bağ kurulmuş

olacak. Tezimde ilgileneceğim ikinci sorunun kaynağı ise Schopenhauer'ın

felsefe uğraşısının sadece teorik olduğu, daha iyi bir yaşam için yol göseterici

olmadığı iddiasından kaynaklanıyor. Bu düşünce müzikal deneyim ve kişisel

dönüşüm arasında bir bağ kurma ihtimalini engelliyor. Bu noktada,

Schopenhaer felsefesinin dolaylı da olsa yaşam için yol gösterici niteliklerinin

çok güçlü olduğunu göstereceğim.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Müzik, felsefe, bilgi, selamet

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## To Vito Mercan

Verloren sei uns der Tag, wo nicht ein Mal getanzt wurde! Und falsch heiβe uns jede Wahrheit, bei der es nicht ein Gelächter gab! Nietzsche

#### **ACKNOWLEDGMENTS**

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#### **LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS**

WWR I The World as Will and Representation, vol. I

WWR II The World as Will and Representation, vol. II

FFR The Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason

FW Prize Essay on the Freedom of the Will

BM Prize Essay on the Basis of Morality

MSR (I – IV) Manuscript Remains in Four Volumes

PP I Parerga and Paralipomena, Vol I

PP II Parerga and Paralipomena, Vol II

#### **CHAPTER 1**

#### INTRODUCTION

Music expresses that which cannot be put in words
and that which cannot remain silent
Victor Hugo

#### 1.1 "Socrates, Make Music!"

Few hours before his death, imprisoned Socrates tells his friends that gathered around him, about a recurring dream that orders him to make music:

The same dream visited me often in my past life, sometimes in one aspect and sometimes in another but always saying the same thing. 'Socrates,' it said, 'make music and work at it!' Now at least in former times, I assumed that it was exhorting me and urging me on repeatedly to the very thing I was doing, and that just as people encourage runners, the dream kept urging me on to do what I was doing - to make music - since philosophy, in my view, is the greatest music and that's just what I was doing. But now, once the trial had taken place and while the festival of the god prevented me from dying, it seemed that if the dream had indeed often ordered me to make this popular music [music as popularly or ordinarily practiced], I shouldn't disobey but should make it; for it seemed safer not to go away before acquitting my self of any impiety by making poems and obeying the dream.<sup>1</sup>

This passage is quite striking because one of the most interesting riddles of philosophy is concealed in this passage. Socrates, one of the greatest figures of

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Plato, *Phaedo*, trans. Brann E., Kalkavage P., Salem E. (Newburyport: Focus Publishing/R Collins Co., 1998), 60e-61a.

philosophy who considered poetry or music threatening literally shows interest in music. In his *The Birth of Tragedy*, Nietzsche addresses this problem and gives a special emphasis on this music-making Socrates. Nietzsche comments on this event as rationalistic and intelligent Socrates hesitating about the limits of scientific knowledge and understanding.<sup>2</sup> Socrates was a man of reason and rationalistic stance who undervalues the artistic impulses (since, anything which was merely a semblance of truth or something unreasonable was not a matter of respect.) and Nietzsche also found the prototype of theoretical and modern scientific man in the famous figure of Socrates who represents dialectics, logic and calculated reasoning. Nietzsche imagined Socratic worldview, which represents a rationalistic and scientific stand, as questioning itself:

He [Socrates] may have asked himself: "Have I been too ready to view what was not intelligible to me as being devoid of meaning? Perhaps there is a realm of wisdom, after all, from which the logician is excluded? Perhaps art must be seen as the necessary complement of rational discourse?<sup>3</sup>

So, the riddle that finds its expression through the dream of Socrates which Nietzsche quite rightly questions is *the limits of understanding and the means to attain it.* Is understanding just a matter of calculative reasoning or is there any realm where conceptual logic is not allowed to access.

This perennial problem of philosophy concerning the limits of rational understanding is especially revitalized in the 18th century with Kant's

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Nietzsche, Friedrich. *The Birth of Tragedy and The Genealogy of Morals*, Trans. Francis Golffing, (New York: Doubleday & Company, 1956), 90.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Ibid., 90.

"Copernican Revolution". He declared his philosophical project as limiting knowledge to make room for faith and claimed that what we call knowledge of objects is simply related to how they appear to us. Therefore he introduced the term thing-in-itself to designate the realm of the world as it is. At the very end of Groundwork of Metaphysic of Morals, Kant also tells us about what happens when we come to the limits of sensible world: There remains an incomprehensible more.4 Kant aimed to show that sensuous motives are not capable of giving us supreme realities. Technical or scientific knowledge of the sensible world can, of course, provide us important information about the world; but relation with something "more" may reveal the potential for offering edifying truths. Rationality, scientific calculations, logic, theoretical investigations, in short, all the instruments that are useful to know something about the world can provide knowledge as they appear, but they cannot reveal any other understanding than conceptual, scientific and rationalistic understanding. Austrian philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein is another important figure in this discussion. Believing that the limits of the language are also the limits of the world, he ended his philosophical discourse with silence at the end of his Tractacus Logico Philosophicus where he points to a realm which is beyond conceptual understanding: Language accords with the rationality of Kant's categories and actually serve to represent the objects as they appear to us. Pointing to a realm which is beyond conceptual understanding,

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> My Idea signifies only a "something" that remains over when I have excluded from the grounds determining my will everything that belongs to the world of sense: its sole purpose is to restrict the principle that all motives come from the field of sensibility, by setting bounds to this field and by showing that it does not comprise all within it self, but that there is still more beyond it; yet with this 'more' I have no further acquaintance Kant, Immanuel *Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals*, trans. H.J. Paton, (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1964), 130.

Wittgenstein offered that it is possible to "throw away the ladder". 5 Yet, the question concerning what lies beyond rationality was discussed at length with great clarity and careful attention by Arthur Schopenhauer.

For Schopenhauer the aim of philosophy was simply to delineate the realm which cannot be reached with discursive language which means –just as Wittgenstein repeated the same idea after Schopenhauer- there is a borderline for conceptual rational thinking. Therefore what philosophy can achieve is to point the true realm of the world. The character of Schopenhauer's philosophy is negative since it speaks of only what to deny. From that point on only mystics can proceed positively through irrational states of mind, where subject abolishes any perception within the realm of time, space and causality.6

In 1813 notebooks of Schopenhauer, as he was developing his future philosophy at the age of 24, he was already searching for a discourse for transcendence of ordinary experience. His task was paradoxical because he wanted to represent the non-representible. He first labeled reaching to this non-representible understanding as "better consciousness" (besser Bewusstseyn). Rudiger Safranski explains Schopenhauer's "better consciousness" comprehensively as follows:

Under the label of 'better consciousness' Schopenhauer now gathered together everything that he had previously experienced as acts or ideals of transcending: Matthias Claudius's 'Man is not domiciled here'; the ecstasy of art, especially music; the experience of high mountains; that inward transcendence which made sensuality and self-preservation seem a mere game; the self-oblivion of engrossed contemplation or, the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> Wittgenstein L., *Tractacus Logico Philosophicus* trans. C. K. Ogden (London: Reprint Rutledge Kegan & Paul Ltd, 2005), 189.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> WWR II 612: Schopenhauer suggests his readers to check the works such as the *Enneads* of Plotinus or poems of the Sufis. (Abbreviations on Schopenhauer's books are given on page xiii)

other way round, the experience of the ego as a mirror reflecting the multifariously appearing world without being part of it; the Platonic 'idea', even though adopted hesitantly as yet; Kant's 'having to' – that riddle of freedom which tears apart the world of necessary being. <sup>7</sup>

In his later works, Schopenhauer never used the term "better consciousness" yet he persevered the view that trans-phenomenal realm, which offers edifying truths, is accessible. For him aesthetic understanding or ascetic suffering offers different dimensions of understanding over rationality or a glimpse of essence of the world.

Hence, Schopenhauer respected arts as revealers of transcendental truth. Art, artists, poets who are expelled from the ideal city of Plato are welcomed again in the philosophical frame of Schopenhauer as revealers of truth. What is defended here is this: Not reason of abstract concepts, but aesthetic-artistic and mystical states of mind can lead us grasping the true character of reality.

In his defense of arts over science for providing the essence of the world, Schopenhauer especially underlined the power of musical ecstasy. Music, for Schopenhauer, uniquely provides an intuition of the transcendental reality (*Wille*) which is beyond phenomenal realm (*Vorstellung*). What is revealed to us is ineffable, but still we can know what is revealed. In this sense, Schopenhauer asserted that philosophy and music try to express the same thing. Hence, music becomes the true philosophy.

Can we really regard music as *revealer of truth* as Schopenhauer claims? If it is possible, then how is this possible? And if we accept this claim we have

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> Safranski, R., *Schopenhauer and the Wild Years of Philosophy*, trans. Ewald Osers (United States: Harvard University Press, 1991), 132.

the right to ask another very vital question: What will we do with this knowledge that music provides?

These questions are the basic questions of this dissertation.

#### 1.2 A Short History of Schopenhauer and His Philosophy

Arthur Schopenhauer was a fearless "outsider" to academic life who never hesitated to make remarks that get on the nerves of "professors of philosophy". For example, the Royal Danish Academy refused to award him with a prize and found Schopenhauer's lucid essay "On the Basis Of Morals" as quite disturbing -in the jury report-noting that "Nor should it go unmentioned that several distinguished philosophers of recent times [Hegel and Fichte] are mentioned in such an indecent fashion as to provoke just and grave offence."9

Schopenhauer never covered his atheism, discussed sexuality, paid naive optimisms no mind, considered history as purposeless and considered human beings as creatures that are governed by motives. So, he remained as an outsider to academy of his times (those days discussing sexuality or atheism was enough to become an outsider to academy) but attracted the other outsiders such as Nietzsche, Wittgenstein or Horkheimer. As Young says "in one way and another, outsiders, Friedrich Nietzsche abandoned his professorship of Greek literature at Basel to become a lonely wanderer from

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> Schopenhauer uses this term quite often when he attacks academic philosophers.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> BM 276: To site an example about what Schopenhauer thinks about the philosophers of his time: "[Therefore], working in this spirit, and meanwhile constantly seeking the false and the bad held in general acceptance, indeed humbug (Fichte and Schelling) and charlatanism (Hegel) in the highest admiration, I long ago renounced the approbation of contemporaries." WWR I xxi.

one cheap pension to another, Ludwig Wittgenstein was disposed to disappear into remote huts in Norway and obscure primary schools in Austria, and Max Horkheimer was a Jew in Nazi Germany."<sup>10</sup>

In addition to these remarks, Schopenhauer has a wonderful prose; it has the Socratic spirit of irony and provocation beside clearness. His philosophical discourse is full of energy. Iris Murdoch states that he is as if he is talking to a fellow thinker and his "relation to his reader is relaxed, amicable, confiding" and "[h]e tells stories and make jokes." 11 The powerful spirit and motivation of philosophy that deals with real universal problems and engages with sufferings of the world and a holistic picture of life can be found in his allembracing philosophy. Clear prose is really one of Schopenhauer's virtues which accords with his understanding of intellectual ethics. If one wants to express any philosophical idea s/he has to make it as explicit as s/he can. Prose and logic of the arguments should be as clear as possible. If one has any idea it has to be expressed without trying to hide anything from the reader. And if one expresses anything in an unclear way with full of cloudy logical arguments, this becomes a sign of his/her intellectual degeneration. Intellectual honesty necessitates courage to express not to conceal. Schopenhauer blames Hegel and Fichte for their foggy and precarious way of writing and practice of logic.

Who was Artur Schopenhauer? He was born in Danzig in 1788 and died in Frankfurt in 1860 and produced a system of philosophy which is considered as pessimistic. His philosophy, which is a product of young age, was just

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> Young J., Schopenhauer, (New York: Routledge, 2005), 222.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> Murdoch I., Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals (London: Penguin Books, 1993), 79.

supplemented by mature Schopenhauer.<sup>12</sup> Even though his philosophy was not celebrated in the beginning of the nineteenth century where revolutions and excitements were at their summit in Europe, he did not find it really necessary to make some changes of his basic ideas pessimistic position. Yet, after the failure of nineteenth century revolutions of Europe, Schopenhauer's philosophy started to become more and more popular in Europe. R.S. Solomon explains this with the following words:

But his anti-Enlightenment, anti-rational, anti-scientific, and pessimistic views would not find a place in the nationalistic and still-hopeful world of the early nineteenth century. After 1850, however, with the failure of popular revolutions (which Schopenhauer, needless to say, did not support), Europe seemed ready for a philosophy that called for resignation rather than hope, that recognized the evil in the world and the vanity of life, and Schopenhauer's vision of the cosmic willful self would attract the attention of some of the most exciting philosophers in Europe.<sup>13</sup>

Through his family power, Schopenhauer received a good education, had contact with the most important intellectuals of his time (i.e. Goethe), traveled a lot and learned many languages. At the age of fifteen he made a two year Europe trip with his parents where he not only saw most famous sights of many nations, but he also witnessed lots of sufferings: People in chains, the

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 $<sup>^{12}</sup>$  In chapter three of this dissertation, I will argue that Schopenhauer modified his basic claim that the will (*Wille*) as thing-in-itself

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup> Solomon, Robert C., *Continental Philosophy Since 1750, The Fall and the Rise of the Self* (Oxford: Oxford University Press,1988), 85.

atmosphere of war, captives and slaves etc.He even visited the fortress of Toulon where the chained prisoners could be viewed.<sup>14</sup>

Schopenhauer's mother was a free minded person who established an intellectual and artistic meeting point in Weimar after the death of his father. He also benefited from these meetings. The two important figures that he met was Goethe and Friedrich Majer (an oriental scholar who opened the Indian philosophy to Schopenhauer).<sup>15</sup>

When Schopenhauer was twenty one years old he went to the University of Göttingen. There, he came across with the works of Kant and Plato. The works of these masters had a deep influence on him among with the Indian philosophy (that he come across through Friedrich Majer). Two years later he went to Berlin, where he attended to Fichte's lessons. But he never enjoyed them.<sup>16</sup>

In 1814 Schopenhauer wrote his *Fourfold Principle of Sufficient Reason*, which he presented as an essential work for understanding his actual philosophy. In this thesis he discussed that for everything exists in the world of phenomena there are sufficient reasons and these reasons can be found with science. He held the degree of doctorate at the University of Jena with this thesis. But this was not the book that reflected his real philosophy. It was more like an introduction part of a coming philosophy.

In 1819, Schopenhauer completed his *opus magnum*, *The world as Will and Representation*, where he presented a full picture of life (concerning essence of

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup> See Safranski, R., *Schopenhauer and the Wild Years of Philosophy*, Trans. Ewald Osers (United States: Harvard University Press, 1991), 34-51.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>15</sup> Janaway, C. Schopenhauer: A very Short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 3.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>16</sup> Blackburn, S. The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford Uni. Press, 2005), 330.

the world, mind-dependent reality, suffering, sexuality, aesthetics, ethics, salvation and the meaning of life). This was a clear book with a wonderfully lucid prose. Bryan Magee is totally right calling him "artist with words".<sup>17</sup>

The core idea within the book can be represented as: There is a real world (*Wille*) and apparent world (*Vorstellung*); and in the apparent world what we can experience is the ordinary occurrences of the phenomena. Yet, through aesthetic or ethical experiences one can reach the essence of the world.

Schopenhauer left many works but the hearth of all his works is his *opus* magnum and rest of his books are either supplements or foreword to this main work.<sup>18</sup> In his last work, the last words are as follows:

I now stand weary at the end of the road; The jaded brow can hardly bear the laurel. And yet I gladly see what I have done, Ever undaunted by what others say.<sup>19</sup>

On an autumn morning, his housekeeper found him on the sofa: "He was dead, his face undisfigured, without a trace of agony." 20

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>17</sup> Magee B., *The Philosophy of Schopenhauer*, (New York: Oxford University Press-Calderon, 2002), 19.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>18</sup> Schopenhauer considers his doctoral dissertation as foreword to *Will and Representation*. His other works revolve around the ideas in this book (For example his last book called *Parerga and Paralipomena* can be translated into English as supplements and additions)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>19</sup> PP II 658.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>20</sup> Safranski, R., *Schopenhauer and the Wild Years of Philosophy*, Trans. Ewald Osers (United States: Harvard University Press, 1991), 349.

#### 1.3 Intentions and Limits of the Dissertation

From the very beginnings of philosophy, music is discussed and analyzed which will be basically and broadly shown in the next chapter. Yet, I think it is safe to say that Schopenhauer emphasized the role of music in opening us the doors of the inner nature of the world and tried to represent what music reveals like no other philosopher.

What makes Schopenhauer quite different than all the other philosophers till his time is his very strong respect of aesthetics rather than logic and science. He reacted to Plato who degraded aesthetics and arts as imitation of the real. He tried to provide the adequate reverence to arts; since, through arts one is allowed to enter into the inner realm of nature where science does not have any access. Schopenhauer claims that the knowledge of the phenomenal world can be reached through science but it is impossible to penetrate into the inner nature of things with sciences. The phenomenal realm is like the web of Maya, "the veil of deception, which covers the eyes of mortals, and causes them to see a world of which one cannot say either that it is or that it is not; for it is like a dream" <sup>21</sup> Indeed, it is still possible to lift the veil of Maya –to an extent- through aesthetic experience. And within all the art forms, music has the best place of honor in Schopenhauer's philosophy.

Music expresses the inner nature of the world for Schopenhauer. At this point Schopenhauer faces the problem of trying to express something that is actually inexpressible. Yet, Schopenhauer is also totally aware of this problem and he never hides this from his readers. Hence, he tries an indirect way,

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>21</sup> WWR I 8.

which is through making analogies. With the words of Lydia Goehr "it helps inexpressible languages be *understood* even if they are not adequately (philosophically) *explained*."<sup>22</sup>

Schopenhauer draws a parallel between the phenomenal world and will with a lantern by analogy. Inside of this lantern, there is light and outside of it there are many colorful shapes. This is analogous to the world as will and representation, where the light inside that produces shapes is analogous to will and the shapes on the lantern are analogous to representations. And music is the way to immediate experience of the light inside the lantern.

But, still, many problems should be overcome to be able to approve his views on music. The metaphysical picture of the world that he presents is problematic, which is basically the reason why many philosophers stayed at a distance to his philosophy: Will as thing-in-itself or the ontological status of Ideas was not plausible. In this dissertation, I will argue that such problems can be overcome and Schopenhauer's philosophy in general and his philosophy of music specifically is too rich and lucid to be ignored.

What does it really mean philosophizing? Searching ways of better conduct of life and trying to choose a wiser way of life is one possible answer which gains more and more credibility.<sup>23</sup> There might be other answers, but in this world of becoming, perishing, death, and unhappiness call of philosophy is a call for self-transformation or practical wisdom as well as theoretical

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>22</sup> Goehr, L., "Schopenhauer and the musicians: an inquiry into the sounds of silence and the limits of philosophizing about music" in *Schopenhauer, Philosophy, and the Arts,* ed. Dale Jacquette, (NewYork: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 222.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>23</sup> Piere Hadot seems to be the leading figure on this issue. Basically, he claims that the aim of philosophy was not to grasp universal-theoretical truth *per se*, but to teach a way of life that leads to happiness. See Hadot, P. *Philosophy as a Way of Life: Spiritual Exercises from Socrates to Foucault*, trans. Michael Chase, (Oxford: Blackwell ,1995)

knowledge. We need philosophy and philosophizing for developing practical wisdom. Schopenhauer's philosophy captures individual situation within existence which can be an excellent example of such an understanding of philosophy. In this sense, at the very hearth of this thesis two concerns prevail: how is music as philosophy possible and if it is possible are there any practical implications of it. In order to illuminate these concerns, it is a must to face some problematic sides of Schopenhauer's philosophy. Yet, independent of the problems and possible solutions to Schopenhauer's considerations of music I will also start with providing an historical account of ideas concerning music throughout history in chapter two.

Then, first problem that we have to face is the Schopenhaurian claim that *thing-in-itself* is knowable. This idea is quite problematic since if the existence is mind-dependent how can we reach to such knowledge. Knowledge is quite an important issue since for Schopenhauer even transcendence is related with a special kind of knowledge. This special kind of knowledge frees us from the sufferings of the world and it is revealed through arts and especially by music. But what happens when we overstep the bounds of ordinary consciousness? Is it the knowledge of "thing-in-itself" which is revealed? In chapter three, I will mainly discuss this issue and I will support the view that this "reality" cannot be transphenomenal, it is rather immanent. This is of great importance since; such an understanding clears many paradoxes of Schopenhauer's philosophy and will provide a natural tie between Schopenhauer's philosophy with music.

The main question of chapter four will be a natural successor of chapter three. Provided that we are convinced with Schopenhauer's claim that music reveals us knowledge of the world, then the next question should be what to

do with such knowledge? Does it have any practical implications? Yet, at this point there is another difficulty that has to be overcome first. Schopenhauer thinks of philosophy as pure contemplative activity "to inquire, not to prescribe" This idea blocks the way for further discussions. Schopenhauer himself, refusing philosophy to be practical, seems to forbid us to consider his philosophy as functional. In chapter four, first I will try to overcome this difficulty by claiming that Schopenhauer's philosophy implicitly prescribes as well. And especially at the hearth of his philosophy, a concern for life and death issues prevail: The value of life, tranquility, suffering, passions, *Erlösung* (salvation) etc. And he is one of the greatest figures of the history of philosophy, whose philosophy can be labeled as "philosophy of life"; hence, dealing with his philosohy will be very rewarding. One can find a profound and comprehensive picture of life. Therefore, it is necesary to overcome this problem before mentioning music and ethics relation.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>24</sup> WWR I 271.

#### **CHAPTER 2**

#### PHILOSOPHY OF MUSIC:

#### MUSIC AS A SUBJECT OF PHILOSOPHY THROUGHOUT HISTORY

Music is significant in all aspects of life such as ethics, society, government, war, production, religion, spirituality, etc. Music is significant; since beyond its power to create moods or express emotions, it discloses "something". And it is also possible to say that the main concern of this thesis is to discuss what this "something" might be in Schopenhauer's philosophy.

Schopenhauer's philosophy of music is considered as one of the most significant one. To prove his significance it is more than enough to count the great musicians that Schopenhauer deeply influenced such as Wagner, Mahler or Prokefiev.<sup>25</sup>Yet, Schopenhauer's philosophy of music is not the only one. The idea that music revealing us a realm is not new and to track the traces of this idea throughout the history is a rewarding endeavor and this will provide us the historical ties to Schopenhauer's time. This may also expand our understanding of significance of music. And for the aims of this dissertation I will especially emphasis the ancient Greek culture and afterwards. I will try to do this without neglecting earlier periods as well, but an all comprehensive study with detailed sampling of materials from Near East, India, China, Mesopotamia, Birmania, Tibet, Japan and so on is beyond the scope of this

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>25</sup> See Goehr, L., "Schopenhauer and the musicians: an inquiry into the sounds of silence and the limits of philosophizing about music", *Schopenhauer*, *Philosophy*, and the Arts, ed. Dale Jacquette, (NewYork: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 200-229.

dissertation. Therefore, I will shortly present the basic features of some major ancient cultures on music for consideration, in order to point the central role of music in social and religious life for many cultures starting from generally neglected times of stone age. Then I will proceed with the ideas of the most significant philosophers to present how they defined what music reveals.

#### 2.1 Beginnings

Music is universal in the sense that all human societies have music. From first civilizations till our times all cultures made music. What music signifies for them may differ; but there exists no community without music. Separating sounds of nature and their own as nice or disturbing is a cognitive ability that human beings used for serving these sounds for the expressions of their mythical, mystical, religious, entertaining, ceremonial states from homoerectus till now. <sup>26</sup>

But making a history of music is difficult than other basic human occupations. It is nearly impossible to speak of musical scripts that is found and decoded from the first civilizations. It is possible to speak of sculpture or architecture of first civilizations. Any human occupation should be some how recorded in order to be able to remain for the later generations. But music is in this case problematic. Only sources that we can collect information of musical activities of pre-historical times are some wall paintings, and instruments that remained. It is true that it is difficult to speak of music in dark ages but at least we can conclude from the artifacts found, as illustrated in figure 1. and 2., that

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>26</sup> See: Cross, Ian, "Is music the most important thing we ever did? Music, development and evolution", *Music, mind and science*, ed. In Suk Won Yi, (Seul: Seul National University Press, 1999), 10-39.; 16.07.2010 http://www.mus.cam.ac.uk/~ic108/PDF/IRMCMMS98.pdf

from the very beginnings of human beings music was an integral part of human life.




Fig.1: Nearly 50000 Years Old Bear Bone Flute<sup>27</sup>



Fig.2: Bizon Headed Figure Playing Flute (Cave Painting from Trois Frères C. 10,000  $BP)^{28}$ 

In the first figure above, we find the oldest flute of the world and it is believed to be made nearly 50000 years ago. And if we assume that the flute is

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>27</sup> "Nearly 50000 Years Old Bear Bone Flute." N.d. *Norton Anthology Of Western Music Volume 3*. Tagg P.,, Apr. 2002. Web. 7 Nov. 2010. <a href="http://pdfsb.com/norton anthology of western music volume 3">http://pdfsb.com/norton anthology of western music volume 3</a>>.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>28</sup> "Bizon Headed Figure Playing Flute (Cave Painting from Trois Frères C. 10,000 B*P*)" N.d. *Norton Anthology Of Western Music Volume 3*. Tagg P.,, Apr. 2002. Web. 7 Nov. 2010. <a href="http://pdfsb.com/norton anthology of western music volume 3">http://pdfsb.com/norton anthology of western music volume 3</a>>.

a relative complex instrument, we can also assume that our ancestors made wood flutes or other material for making music. So, it is not difficult to assume that instrumental music started more than 100000 years ago (If we consider music made by voice or clapping hands, we have to consider even darker ages.).

As cognitive sciences and evolution theories are dealing with the development of mind, music takes a closer attention as well. The place of music in human evolution is what is sought. One of the answers is given by Ian Cross to this problem. In his article, "Is music the most important thing we ever did? Music, development and evolution" after discussing basic evolution theories on music, he suggests;

Music appears as a direct and necessary correlate of the architecture of the modern human mind, facilitating the development of individual minds and affording structures for their interactions in society. It can thus be argued that "music" as an identifiable human pursuit, emerges from its developmental precursors as a distinct and socially-conditioned activity in the particular processes of human evolution that gave rise to *Homo* sapiens sapiens, our own species. Music is integrally bound up with those processes, and can be considered to have been either evolutionarily adaptive or what Stephen Jay Gould would term "exaptive". In other words, music propels the development, and propelled the evolution, of mind by enabling consequence-free representational redescription across domains; music also facilitates the development, and facilitated the evolution, of social behaviors by enabling risk-free action and risky interaction. At the very least it may have contributed to the emergence of one of our most distinguishing features, our cognitive flexibility; at most, it may have been the single most important factor enabling the capacities of representational redescription to evolve. It may be that music is the most important thing that we humans ever did.<sup>29</sup>

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>29</sup> Cross, Ian, "Is music the most important thing we ever did? Music, development and evolution", *Music, mind and science*, ed. In Suk Won Yi, (Seul: Seul National University Press, 1999), 10-39.; 16.07.2010 http://www.mus.cam.ac.uk/~ic108/PDF/IRMCMMS98.pdf

The experience of sound is something immaterial. It won't be an exaggeration if it is claimed that the power of music comes from its ability to create an acoustic world that pictures human life with all its pains, sufferings, joy, death and love. Therefore even though cultures and their music differ, there is no society that does not produce music. The meaning of music or the purpose of music varies but it is role of revealing an acoustic world may be seen as same.

#### 2.2 Development of Elite Music

The settled cultures 4000-5000 B.C. started producing notation for music and complicated instruments such as harps, lyres, zithers etc. These instruments were used for court or temples. There are some spectacular artifacts of such instruments such as gold covered lyre which is from 2500 B.C. and found at Ur as can be seen from the figure below. <sup>30</sup>



Fig. 3. Ancient Sumerian Lyre 31

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>30</sup> Griffiths, P., A Concise History of Western Music, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 8.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>31</sup> "Ancient Sumerian Lyre." N.d. Photograph. *Sumerian Shakespare*. Web. 10 Nov. 2010. <a href="http://sumerianshakespeare.com/">http://sumerianshakespeare.com/</a>>.

Musical tuning, practice with instruments, understanding the intervals between notes, compositions all contributed for developing theories and ideas on music. Long before Pythagoras "Mesopotamians and Chinese discovered the relationship between the length of a string and the note produced by it." 32

As instruments and theory developed philosophers started guiding them. But before discussing major ideas on music, a general picture of Chinese, and Mesopotamian cultures on music will be presented.

#### 2.2.1 Chinese Music:

For Chinese, music was a matter of discussion for thousands of years. There is enough material and artifacts left from the times of 4000 B.C. which provides evidence of a sophisticated understanding of music in China. Chinese music, musical instruments and ideas on music spread to neighbor countries, India, and from India to Egypt and Mediterranean countries and to Europe.<sup>33</sup> Chinese considered music's educational role seriously long before Plato in Greece.

Confucius (551 – 479 BC) distinguished wholesome from unwholesome music, the former productive of harmony within the individual and order within the state. His views were seconded by Plato (c. 429 – 347 BC), one of the earliest Greeks to write about music. <sup>34</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>32</sup>Ibid., 8.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>33</sup> Ibid., 55.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>34</sup> Ibid., 55.

And it is even wrong to assume that polyphony started in West. There is also enough evidence that in Chinese temples and palaces there were choirs and orchestras performing polyphonic music.

#### 2.2.2 Mesopotamian Music:

Mesopotamia is the region between Tigris and Euphrates (Mesopotamia means "between rivers"). First known records of written information date back to 4000 B.C. are from Mesopotamia. It was the land where Sumerian, Babylonian, Akkadian civilizations developed.

There are many archeological artifacts that clearly reveal a sophisticated understanding of music thousands of years before Greek civilization had arisen. The first known tablet written is from Mesopotamia, as well as the first known composer is from Mesopotamia: Enheduanna, an Akkadian noblewoman.

In addition to these remarks, a Mesopotamian tablet that belongs to nearly 1800 B.C. has a seven-note scale which was later adopted in Greek. And the earliest recorded music, a hymn to goddess of moon, was found from the Ancient city of Ugarit.<sup>35</sup>

#### 2.3 Greek civilization.

For ancient civilizations, especially for Greeks, that the nature has an order was apparently an unquestionable fact. This feeling was effective for the rise of distinctive features of culture. Universality was not only sought in the order of

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>35</sup>Ibid., 9.

nature but also in ethics, society and art. Order and divine reason, which was granted for cosmos, were valid and sought for human beings as well. In the realm of human beings the idea of order infused ethical, religious and aesthetic values as well. And this order was basically characterized as musical. The harmony of the world in it self and the harmony of man was sought. Harmony naturally can simply be understood as fitting together of different parts; yet, the musical meaning was dominant since music was agreeable sensation.<sup>36</sup>

The idea of harmony, agreement of opposites, entered myth, religion, cosmogony and philosophical contemplation. With Pythagoras understanding of cosmos and mathematics was tied to music (This was an idea of great influence till Middle Ages of Western History).

Music was considered as revelatory. It was revealing universal truths in its own way. Music was for many centuries not just flowing pleasant sounds which has different effects depending on the melodies, but eternal relationships between ratios and a bridge for reaching higher truths: The essence of the universe, ethical values, God, or our real nature or ineffable truths that science cannot reach etc.

#### 2.3.1 From Mythos to Logos:

Two distinctive ideas of Greek musical outlook are harmony of the spheres and harmony of man. One is metaphysical and the other ethical. Music was combined with the harmony to be found in cosmos and tied with the moral sphere of man. And long before these ideas were explicated in the writings of

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>36</sup> For a detailed discussion see Lippman, Edward A., *Musical Thought in Ancient Greece*, (New York & London: Colombia University Press, 1964), 1-41.

philosophers, these ideas were expressed in myth. Edward A. Lipmann claims that this duality of thought can be found in the dualism of two instruments and their invention: <sup>37</sup> Aulos <sup>38</sup> and *lyre*. <sup>39</sup> Lyre, according to ancient Greek myths, is invented by Athena and it is the instrument of Apollo and symbolizes rational contemplation of the world. <sup>40</sup> Whereas aulos is the instrument of Dionysus and it is an imitation of suffering of man in this world and symbolizes ecstatic feeling.<sup>41</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>38</sup> Aulos is a reed instrument. Played two of them at the same time. One of them is called *auloi* but because of its being played with two hands at the same time it is called *aulos*. West, M.L., *Ancient Greek Music*, (Oxford [England]: Clarendon Press; New York: Oxford University Press, c1992, 2005), 49.



Fig. 4: " Aulos Player - Vase Painting." N.d. Ancient Greek Music. Michael Lahanas. Web. 10 Nov. 2010. <a href="http://www.mlahanas.de/Greeks/Music.htm">http://www.mlahanas.de/Greeks/Music.htm</a>.

<sup>39</sup> String instrument with various forms.



Fig. 5: "Orpheus Taming the Animals with Lyre." *THE HISTORY OF LYRE-GUITAR*. Elenora Vulpiani, n.d. Web. 10 Nov. 2010. <a href="http://www.mlahanas.de/Greeks/Music.htm">http://www.mlahanas.de/Greeks/Music.htm</a>.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>37</sup>Lippman, Edward A., *Musical Thought in Ancient Greece*, (New York & London: Colombia University Press, 1964), 87.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>40</sup> Lippman, Edward A., *Musical Thought in Ancient Greece*, (New York & London: Colombia University Press, 1964), 87

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>41</sup> Ibid., 87.

Between these two deities another mythical figure plays a very important role: Orpheus. About Orpheus there are different stories. Most stories point that he was Thracian and a source of inspiration for the religious-philosophical movement of Orphism. It is believed that as Hermes invented the lyre, Orpheus made it better.<sup>42</sup> As his wife, Eurydice dies; he wants to go to Underworld to bring her back.

Once in the realm of Hades, Orpheus again takes out his lyre and sings, moving everyone to tears. Sisyphos sits on his rock, transfixed. Ixion's wheel stops turning. The Danaides' leaky vase stops overflowing. For the first time, the Fates cry. Hades and Persephone are persuaded to release the shade of Eurydice,<sup>43</sup>

But this trip to underworld finishes unsuccessfully. He lost his wife during the journey since he looked back, which was forbidden to him till Eurydice reaches to the world. Orpheus himself was later killed by maenads.

As Orpheus remained as a legendary mythical lyre player, Orphism became a movement composite of Apollonian and Dionysian elements. In this story Orphic myth became a bridge between these two deities. For Orphism knowledge and clear understanding was important along with the Lyre, which was the symbol of Apollo, and at the same time mystical teachings of purification of the soul had Dionysian elements. The way to philosophy is led by the ideas of identification with divine, purifying the soul, prophecies with reason, freeing oneself from contamination.<sup>44</sup> The original music of Orpheus gave way to mythos and then logos.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>42</sup> Ibid., 89.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>43</sup> Ibid., 17.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>44</sup> Ibid., 48.

The most important sect of Orphism is Pythagoreans: The semi-scientific and semi-esoteric group.

# 2.3.2 Pythagoras: Musica Universalis

Pythagoras of Samos (around b.c. 570) can be considered as one of the first music theorists of West since he formulated and applied mathematical rules to sounds. Thinking that the arche of the universe as number, Pythagoreans even set the first mathematically formulated natural law which "was the relationship between musical pitch and the length of a vibrating harp string" 45

For Pythagoreans it was vital to understand the rules of harmony and mathematics. Because basically they thought anything which is knowable have to have numbers. Pythagoreans thought that the planets were "moving through something like air" and in that case "they must produce a sound, just as the strings of a musical instrument would if hung in a breeze" and they also thought it was harmonious.

While experimenting with lyres and considering why some combinations of string lengths produced beautiful sounds and others did not, Pythagoras, or others who were encouraged and inspired by him, discovered that the connections between lyre string lengths and human ears are not arbitrary or accidental. The ratios that underlie musical harmony make sense in a remarkably simple way. In a flash of extraordinary clarity, the Pythagoreans found that there is a pattern and

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>45</sup> Ferguson Kitty, *The Music of Pythagoras*, (New York: Walker & Company, 2008), 62.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>46</sup> Ibid., 258.

order hidden behind the apparent variety and confusion of nature, and that it is possible to understand it through numbers.<sup>47</sup>

Even though it is not easy to specify the exact achievements of Pythagoras, it is still possible to say that he had a powerful influence to the idea which combines music with cosmology, with rational order of things and even with ethical values. 48 It is no question that music was for Pythagoreans not an amusing hobby, but a central key for understanding the universe since they thought that the whole universe was bound with musical principles.

Another important feature of the Pythagoreans was the use of music for altering the disposition of listeners. They used music as a method of consolation, cheer, or excite. It is believed that Pythagoreans developed a therapeutical understanding of music. M. L.West mentions this aspect of Pythagoreans as follows:

The Pythagoreans in particular claimed to have developed (or rather to have inherited from Pythagoras) a science of musical psycho-therapy and a daily programme of songs and lyre pieces that made them bright and alert when they got up, and when they went to bed purged them of all the day's cares and prepared them for agreeable and prophetic dreams.<sup>49</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>47</sup> Ibid., 5.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>48</sup> Lippman, Edward A., *Musical Thought in Ancient Greece*, (New York & London: Colombia University Press, 1964), 6.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>49</sup> West, M.L., *Ancient Greek Music*, (Oxford [England]: Clarendon Press; New York: Oxford University Press, c1992, 2005), 31.

Lastly Pythagoreans are also believed to use music for physical illnesses as well. As they showed interest for esoteric ideas, they supposed music to be effective for the process of healing by its intrinsic properties.<sup>50</sup>

### 2.3.3 Plato: Ethical Education and Music

One of the most essential ideas about music is set forth by the ancient Greek philosopher Plato (429 B.C. – 347 B.C.). Many references to music can be found in his works but basically he emphasizes the educational role of music. It can be claimed that for Plato there is no good or bad music but right or wrong music. Even though in his later writings Plato accepted some of the Pythagorean peculiarities, unlike Pythagoras, he did not emphasize the correlation between musical ratios and cosmic order of life.<sup>51</sup> Music, for Plato, basically supports the education of youth to become better persons only if it is made with right scales and melodies. Otherwise, music also has the power to degenerate the soul of young people. Music has the ability to shape the mind and soul with its emotional potentials.<sup>52</sup> Allusions to music can be found in any work of Plato; It is possible to give an example of the educational value of music in his one of the most famous dialogues, *Republic*, where he is concerned with the effects of music and its educational role very specifically mentioning the scales.

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>50</sup> Ibid., 32.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>51</sup> Hadreas, Peter "Deconstruction and the Meaning of Music" *Perspectives of New Music 37*, (Summer, 1999): 7.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>52</sup> Even though I basically mention the educational role of music in Platonic discourse, it is also possible to find discussions on Pythagorean understanding of music, abstract analysis of musical structures and harmonic structures to the human soul. See Barker A., *Greek Musical Writings: I The Musician and His Art*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 124.

'Which then are the mourning modes? You're musical. You tell me.' 'The Mixolydian,' he said. 'The Syntonolydian. That sort of thing.' 'Should these be banned, then?' I asked. 'After all, they are no use even to women – if we want them to be good women – let alone to men.'

'Of course they are'

'Which of the modes, then, are appropriate to luxury and parties?'

'There are some Ionian modes,' he said, 'and again Lydian, which are called relaxed.'

'Will these be any use to men of a warlike disposition?'

'No,' he said. 'So it looks as if that leaves you with the Dorian and Phrygian.'

'I don't know about modes,' I said. 'Leave me the mode which can most fittingly imitate the voice and accents of a brave man in time of war, or in any externally imposed crisis. When things go wrong, and he faces death and wounds, or encounters some other danger, in all these situations he holds out to the end in a disciplined and steadfast manner. Plus another mode for someone engaged in peaceful, voluntary, freely chosen activity. He might be trying to persuade someone of something, making some request – praying to god, or giving instructions or advice to a man. Or just the opposite. He might be listening patiently to someone else making a request, or explaining something to him, or trying to get him to change his mind and on that basis acting as he thinks best – without arrogance, acting prudently and calmly in all these situations, and being content with the outcome. These two modes, then. One for adversity and one for freely chosen activity, the modes which will best imitate the prudent and of the brave in failure and success. Leave me those.'

'Leave you, in other words, with precisely the two I suggested just now,' he said.

'That means we shan't want an enormous range of strings, and every possible mode, in our songs and melodies.'

'No, I think not,' he said.

'In which case we shan't produce any makers of those triangular harps, or all those many – stringed instruments which can play many modes.'53

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>53</sup> Plato, *The Republic*, ed. Ferrari G.R.F., trans. Griffith Tom, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 398e-399d.

Here Plato specifies Lydian scales as sad, whereas soft drinking harmonies are lonian, and Dorian and Phrygian harmonies are the ones that give determination to the soul. Plato's classification of the modes represents the "tense" or "slack" character of them. For example, that the melody uses higher notes of the octave is a sign of tenseness. Otherwise the music may lead to slackness. These properties of the melody are connected with ethos since it affects the character in these directions.

And the Dorian mode, as aforementioned as the mode of Apollo, approved by Plato as one of the finest modes. This mode may imitate bravery in times of crisis:<sup>54</sup> A good model for maintaining a good life. But surprisingly Plato welcomes Phrygian mode which, as stated earlier, is associated with Dionysus and aulos. Since it is difficult to expect from Plato, who hardly has a high opinion of poetry or music, affirms a mode which may also excite religious frenzy.

# 2.3.4 More on Greek Philosophy of Music:

For ancient Greeks there is no doubt that music was important. They left archeological and literary evidence that proves this. Literary material provides us reliable understanding of significance of music for ancient Greeks. We are not just making suggestions about how musical life was for them relying on vase paintings or on artifacts that remained. We also have enough literary material for understanding how they approached to this art, and its role in every aspect of their life from moral to social.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>54</sup> Ibid., 88-89.

In literary materials we find features of musical practice, composition styles, reflections on philosophical aspects of music, sophisticated meditations on the significance of music, and technical discussions on musical harmonies. These materials are written by poets, historians, philosophers, musical theorists of the ancient Greece. Yet, since the investigation of ideas concerning music is my aim, inevitably a division between philosophical discussions on music should be separated from material that we find in heroic tales of Homer, poetry of Hesiod, drama and tragedies of antiquity, theoretical discussions of Theophrastus etc.

For the aim of an historical understanding of ideas concerning music, I presented two major figures, Pythagoras and Plato, that represent two distinctive ideas of Greek musical outlook: Harmony of the spheres and harmony of man.

## 2.4 Early Christian Music and Greek Heritage

Ancient Greeks achieved a sophisticated philosophy of music and developed great insigts and formulated principles. It is not superseded by early Christians but many aspects of Greek music were absorbed in early Christian Church. But at the same time many aspects of this music is rejected such as: Music as an art of enjoyment or music as a public spectacle. Church did not find the role of music in such kind of occasions suitable. Church wanted to erase all pagan past so it won't be an exaggeration if it is claimed that Church distrusted music it self.<sup>55</sup>

<sup>55</sup> Grout, D. J. & Palisca, C. V., A History of Western Music, (New York: Norton, c1988), 9.

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Music of the spheres is generally ignored but Greek ideas on the power of music that influence the character remained. There was one music worthy of listening which is performed in churches imposing the teachings of Christianity. Only, music with words could achieve this (therefore they had a low opinion of instrumental music). They respected music so long as it serves to religion but they did not respect instruments because of their pagan significances. It is also a doubtless fact that some in the Church despised not only music but also art and culture as inimical to religion. Hence, it should be relatively difficult to express the joy of listening music. This can be seen, for example, in the *Confessions* of Augustine where he expressed his confused feelings about his simple joy of music.

Another important figure within early Christians is Boethius. He is important because he was the one who gave a detailed account of ancient Greek music and became the chief authority on music for medieval times. Therefore, as significant figures of early Christianity their ideas will be discussed. Then I will mention shortly Bacon and Rousseau for the later developments in Western world.

# 2.4.1 Augustine

For the ancient Greeks before Christianity, music was a very important aspect of the society. They had a sophisticated attitude towards music. They searched for relations between cosmic order and the notes, between harmony and wisdom. But for the early Christians the importance of music was totally in a different sphere which can be specified as music being a bridge between what

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>56</sup> Ibid., 14.

is holy and what is human. One of the most important representatives of this idea is Augustine (354 – 430). Augustine suffered having pleasure in hearing fine music but ended his ideas with the beneficiality of practicing sacred song.<sup>57</sup> This can found in his *Confessions*:

The delights of the ear, had more firmly entangled and subdued me; but Thou did loosen, and free me. Now, in those melodies which Thy words breathe soul into, when sung with a sweet and attuned voice, I do a little repose; yet not so as to be held thereby, but that I can disengage myself when I will. But with the words which are their life and whereby they find admission into me, themselves seek in my affections a place of some estimation, and I can scarcely assign them one suitable.[...] Yet again, when I remember the tears I shed at the Psalmody of Thy Church, in the beginning of my recovered faith; and how at this time, I am moved, not with the singing, but with the things sung, when they are sung with a clear voice and modulation most suitable, I acknowledge the great use of this institution. <sup>58</sup>

And if one wants to jubilate the ineffable, then it is not possible to express this feeling with dry words but through singing.

Jubilation is a shout of joy; it indicates that the heart is bringing forth what defies speech. To whom, then, is this jubilation more fittingly offered that to God who surpasses all utterance? You cannot speak of him because he transcends our speech; and if you cannot speak of him, yet may not remain silent, what else can you do but cry out in jubilation, so that your heart may tell its joy without words, and the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>57</sup> Strunk O., *Source Readings in Music History*, ed. Oliver Strunk, (New York & London: W.W. Norton & Company, 1998), 132.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>58</sup> St . Augustine, *The Confessions of St. Augustine*, trans. Edward B. Pusey (Connecticut: The Easton Press, 1993), 194-195.

unbounded rush of gladness not be cramped by syllables? Sing to him in jubilation.<sup>59</sup>

#### 2.4.2 Boethius

Boethius (480 – 520) was a Christian Roman philosopher: the writer of the book *Consolatio* which occupied an important role in the intellectual culture of mediaeval times. He translated many ancient Greek texts into Latin. Even though he is known as one of the mediaeval music theorists, his reflections on music were philosophical. In his music philosophy it is possible to find a classification of music which was already inherent in ancient philosophy. He classified music into three groups: Musica mundana, musica humana and musica insturmentalis. Musica mundana refers to the music of the spheres. Musica humana defines the harmony of a persons spirit and body. This is not related with a person being musical or having fine understanding of the melodies. This is rather if he conducts a prudent existence or if he has wisdom for living a balanced life. And musica instrumentalis is enstrumental music which also includes human voice. Musica instrumentalis should reflect in an ideal case musica mundana and musica humana. In these first two cases, the music what Boethius metions cannot be heard but just the third one. Even

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>59</sup>St. Augustine, *Expositions on Psalms Volume I*, trans. Maria Boulding & John E. Rotelle, (New York: New City Press, 2000), 401.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>60</sup> Stapert, Calvin R., *A New Song for an Old World Musical Thought in the Early Church*, (Cambridge: William B. Eerdmans Publishing, 2007), 53.

though his treatise on music was mathematical, his writings on music became the central theoretical text untill the Renaissance.<sup>61</sup>

# 2.5. Later Developments

# 2.5.1. Roger Bacon (1214 -1292)

English philosopher and scientist Roger Bacon (1214 – 1292) discussed music and his focus was mathematical. In his work *Communia mathematica* includes an abstract and mathematical discussion on music. His work does not have a significant influence for the later generations but it is important; since, it points to the fact that music still occupied, for philosophical discourse, a central place in his time. <sup>62</sup>

### 2.5.2 Rousseau

Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712 – 1778) is one of the central figures who wrote extensively on music. He had a passion for music and contributed to different areas of music. He developed a different notation technique which he later published; yet it was not practical therefore it is ignored. In addition, he was a composer and his *Le Devin du Village* brought him an important place in the history of music. Commentators agree that after the success of this opera he

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>61</sup> Williams D. R. & Balensuela C. M., *Music Theory from Boethius to Zarlino A Bibliography and Guide* (New York: Pendragon Press, Hillside 2007), 26.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>62</sup> Ibid., 17.

could have lived on music; yet, it remained as a diversion for him.<sup>63</sup>And as Diderot asked him to write pieces about music for *Encylopedia*, he contributed in a vast scale.<sup>64</sup>

Rousseau had a passion for music and he considered it as a means for becoming human. This had a political significance as well "with his battle cry, 'Retournons à la nature'" as Strunk rightly expresses. 65 At the heart of Rousseau's thought "being human" was important. Our knowledge, our rational language or being a gentleman were not related with being human. For Rousseau the first languages of the world were full of emotions; yet with the development of civilization articulation, rational clarity became more important in the language not expression and feeling. 66 We forgot our essential nature. But luckily we still have a bridge to our true essence which is through music. Music had the potential to remind us of what is being human and remind us of our heart rather than reason.

### 2.6 Conclusion

Dealing with musical aesthetics offers some complexities; since, it is impossible to separate it from the general frameworks of the philosophers' metaphysics or ethics. I tried to choose philosophers with significant influences but what made them significant is –I believe- their emphasis on objective, deeper and timeless realities that music reveals. I started with Pythagoras but the story could also

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>63</sup> Dent N.J.H., A Rousseau Dictionary, (USA: Blackwell Reference, 1992), 166.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>64</sup> Ibid., 170.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>65</sup> Strunk O., *Source Readings in Music History*, ed. Oliver Strunk, (New York & London: W.W. Norton & Company, 1998), 895.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>66</sup> Hadreas, Peter "Deconstruction and the Meaning of Music" *Perspectives of New Music 37*, (Summer, 1999), 9.

be started from Babylonian and Egyptian understanding of universe and music relations. And for ancient Greek understanding of music, there are many texts that remained to our age with interesting ideas starting from Homer to Plutarch. For the place of music in Christian world view, Augustinian understanding was very influential and important as well as Boethius; therefore I mentioned them but it is also possible to find similar texts written by Arabic philosophers. They also discussed extensively on music. I am aware that I ignored many important philosophers but what I simply tried to show was, as it is aforementioned, throughout history, this wonderful art of sounds occupied an important role in philosophical discourse as a means to reveal objective, eternal and transphenomenal reality of the world and human beings.

What is written here is a prologue for a discussion on musical aesthetics of Schopenhauer. It was important to set a bridge between other philosophers with Schopenhauer. Their common idea in a nutshell is there is something objective that music reveals. I find it important to show that it was not only Schopenhauer who defended the view that music reveals transcendental realms.<sup>67</sup>

Schopenhauer defended the view that music points to a transcendental realm where scientific or conceptual knowledge is not allowed to access. In an age of scientific fervent, he defended the view that music uniquely provides an intuition of a transcendental reality which is ineffable, but still we can know what is revealed. And he defended his views with great clarity and concisely unlike any other transcendental philosopher. He defended the striking and

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>67</sup> Naturally philosophical discourse on music still continues. After Schopenhauer it is possible to find major philosophers such as Nietzsche, Adorno who wrote about music. Still, it is possible to claim that Artur Schopenhauer occupies one of the most important places in this discussion.

controversial idea that even philosophy and music try to express the same thing.<sup>68</sup> Therefore his philosophy of music is one of the most interesting in the history of ideas. In the following chapters of the dissertation, a detailed discussion of this simple idea and its significance on better conduct of life will be discussed.

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>68</sup> WWR I 264.

### **CHAPTER 3**

# FROM METAPHYSICS TO MUSIC AS PHILOSOPHY IN SCHOPENHAUER'S SYSTEM

## 3.1 Der eine Gedanke (One Single Thought)

At the very opening sentence of *The World as Will and Representation*, Schopenhauer announces that he will express only *one single thought*. The reader who starts with the first page of *The World as Will and Representation* may become quite happy after reading this sentence; since s/he may hope with one single proposition the core of the book will be revealed. But s/he may be disappointed since in the following sentence Schopenhauer declares: "Yet in spite of all my efforts, I have not been able to find a shorter way of imparting that thought than the whole of this book." <sup>69</sup>

Schopenhauer's *one single thought* actually underlines the characteristic of his philosophy in his *opus magnum* as an organic unity where every part supports the others and in this sense it differs from an architectonic system of thought where foundation stone carries the rest of the building till the pinnacle. <sup>70</sup> Every part of Schopenhauer's philosophy is connected with other parts and carries other parts; therefore, before discussing anything in Schopenhauer's philosophy, its connection with the rest should be given and kept in mind.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>69</sup> WWR I, xii

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>70</sup> WWR I, xii

If we consider Schopenhauer's philosophy as an organic unity –as he wants us to consider- then the hearth of this system would be nothing but "suffering". And the importance of aesthetics lies in its offering of a temporary salvation from sufferings of this world. The ground of this life is the will which is aimless and blind and which holds sway over everything. Since willing can provide nothing positive, it is unavoidable that this world becomes the world of suffering. In this sense, for Schopenhauer, suffering becomes the central issue that we have to contemplate: "If suffering is not the first and immediate object of our life, then our existence is the most inexpedient and inappropriate thing in the world."<sup>71</sup>

We are living in a purposeless world where we are the slaves of a blind and evil will and we are doomed to give harm and harmed by. Pain, evil, suffering and meaningless struggles are the rules of this world and even though we strive to be happy, what we get is oscillating between suffering and boredom. This is the simple rule of this life or epitome of the essence of the world what Schopenhauer sets forth. Yet, he left a door open to "something more", "salvation" (Erlösung) or a true world where unhappiness of willing does not exist: An awake and aware state of consciousness to the essence of the world which makes it possible to transcend it. With a "better consciousness" (this is a term which Schopenhauer used in his early philosophical thinking. Later he abandoned the term but this understanding endured in all his works), transcendence is possible. This basic idea penetrated all his works from beginning to the end of his philosophical thinking. But, what is this transcendence? And from where we are transcending? And what can we find?

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>71</sup> PP II 291

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>72</sup> Suffering starts when we want something and boredom starts when we get that. Then we find something new to desire and this cycle between suffering and boredom turns in this way.

Transcendence is related with "knowledge". Through knowing, we transcend the sufferings of this world. This special kind of knowledge is gained through arts and peak point of this knowledge is attained especially by music. In such moments, we become pure subjects of knowing. What we know is the reality. The reality is the will which is also our essence and when we reach to this knowledge we are liberated from it. Yet this explanation bears many paradoxes and complexities that we have to face. First problem that we have to deal is the nature of this inner reality. Schopenhauer claims that it is the "thing-in-itself". But I think Kant was right about claiming that knowledge of the thing-in-itself is impossible. Therefore, in this chapter first I will discuss the nature of the will. Another difficulty arises when we question the paradoxical character of transcending our essence. What does that mean? If the will is my essence, how can I transcend it?<sup>73</sup>

In this sense, the aim of this chapter is to discuss the metaphysical vision of the world of Schopenhauer, to set the place of music in this system; – since it has a metaphysical superiority than other arts, to discuss theoretical inconsisties and to prepare the grounds of aesthetic-ethics relation which will be the topic of next chapter: Because if we are to consider transcendence of the will through any kind of knowledge and reach to salvation then we have to consider if the will is really "thing-in-itself" as Schopenhauer claims it to be.<sup>74</sup> I think, his philosophy offers great wisdom explaining the unhappiness and evil in this world, the importance of arts, especially music, to transform into better

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>73</sup> This will be the issue of next chapter. Since, in this chapter I want to confine the topic with metaphysics. Next chapter will be related with ethics.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>74</sup> In many parts of *The World as Will and Representation I*, Schopenhauer directly claims this idea. Yet, in the second volume of the book there are some passages where he makes some modifications.

humans; yet, I think, it is vital to question and even soften his metaphysical extravagance.

It is also quite important to focus on the Schopenhauerian picture of this life as a whole. This great picture of life that Schopenhauer delivers provides practical wisdom<sup>75</sup> and offers answers to aesthetic-ethic relation. This is quite well expressed with the words of Nietzsche, his brilliant pupil:

His greatness lies in having set up before him a picture of life as a whole, in order to interpret it as a whole; while even the most astute heads cannot be dissuaded from the error that one can achieve a more perfect interpretation if one minutely investigates the paint with which this picture is produced and the material upon which it is painted; perhaps with the result that one concludes that it is a quite intricately woven canvas with paint upon it which is chemically inexplicable. To understand the picture one must divine the painter--that Schopenhauer knew. [...] the challenge of every great philosophy [...] always says this: this is the picture of all life, and learn from it the meaning of your own life. And the reverse: only read your own life and comprehend from it the hieroglyphics of universal life.<sup>76</sup>

Schopenhauer's philosophy is quite an important one since his integrating aesthetics with ethics offers great insights. And I think this is the reason why his ideas about the value of life, compassion, being connected to every other creature, value of arts have a great impact on artists and on people who are sensitive to practical traits of life and are strongly attracted to his philosophy. In this sense, this chapter will provide a bridge between metaphysics and

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>75</sup> Schopenhauer claims that philosophy is theoretical and it does not provide any practical guidance for a better conduct of life. But this is definately unsuitable for his philosophy which will be discussed in the next chapter.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>76</sup> Nietzsche, F., *Untimely Meditations*, trans. R.J.Hollingdale (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 141.

aesthetics trying to locate music as a linking point and discuss the basic concepts of Schopenhauer's world view.

# 3.2 An Overview of Schopenhauer's System

The essence of this life is the will which is aimless and blind. Since this aimless and blind will holds sway over everything, world of suffering is unavoidable. We desire and suffer; we achieve our goal and get bored; and, then start new desires and suffer again. Pendulating between suffering and boredom is actually inevitable but there is hope. This can be broken, which is at the same time the only possibility for salvation to a peaceful and tranquil existence, as set forth by Schopenhauer, by resignation from the will-to-life.

Schopenhauer accepted the real and apparent world distinction of Kant. The World as Will and Representation starts as if it is a continuation and simplification of Kant's philosophy. The first part of the book starts with a simple proposition: The world is my representation (Vorstellung). The first part of the book reveals Schopenhauer's conviction that the objects are subject dependent and phenomenal realm is –in this sense- constituted by us. It depicts how we reach to abstract concepts from immediate representation of things. The phenomenal realm can be objectively known through the forms that we impose on immediately received data (space, time and cause-effect relationship).

Schopenhauer argued that on the path of objective knowledge, we have to consider the world of phenomena. But we can "never get beyond the representation."<sup>77</sup> He accepts that appearance or the aspects of the world as

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>77</sup> WWR II 195.

representation can be explained through the categories and concepts of the mind. Till this point, he says nothing different than Kant. And in this sense, what we call rational knowledge is nothing but abstract consciousness fixing in concepts of reason what is generally known in another way. What we immediately perceive is actually what we know. Reason brings before knowledge only what has been received in another way. But here we do not extend our knowledge, just give it another form. In this sense, through rational knowledge of the phenomenal world we cannot really know anything new.

The second part of Schopenhauer's *The World as Will and Representation* constitutes the metaphysics of his system where he detaches from Kant. Where Kant declared that the thing-in-itself, the hidden truth of the cosmos, is inaccessible to human beings, Schopenhauer asserts that the underlying riddle of the world *can be solved*. This is his originality and his major divergence from Kant's philosophy. He defended the view that there is a transcendental realm where scientific or conceptual knowledge is not allowed to access. He names this realm as the will (*Wille*).

This inner nature of the world is an endless, undirected "blindly urging force" and it is the source of the representations. In other words, the mirror of the will appears in the world as representation.

As the will is the thing-in-itself, the inner content, the essence of the world, but life, the visible world, the phenomenon, is only the mirror of

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>78</sup> WWR II 195.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>79</sup> WWR I 51.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>80</sup> WWR I 51.

the will, this world will accompany the will as inseparably as a body is accompanied by its shadow; and if will exists, then life, the world, will exist.<sup>81</sup>

As aforementioned, for Schopenhauer the knowledge of the thing-in-itself is graspable. The key to this inner realm of the world is through our body and our individual willing. Our body is also like any other representation which is subject to the "law of nature, just as the changes of other objects follow upon causes, stimuli, and motives" 82 yet, it may provide an immediate revelation of the inner nature of the world. Just like any other representation, our body is also an objectification of the will and one can get the knowledge of it.

The main corollary of this separation of world into will and representation is summarized with the idea of principle of individuation (*principium individuationis*). The world as we perceive it takes place in *space*, time and in an order. Therefore, if something shall be known about the transcendental realm, the categories of space, time and causal chain which constitutes the subjects willing nature should be abandoned.

Schopenhauer's discourse on transcendence, salvation, aesthetics, and morality rests on this idea: This possibility of shifting our perception from a willing subject into a knowing subject. There are some states of the mind where one lays aside his practical and daily agitations and ambitions, come closer to understand the whole, free himself from the sufferings of this world and understand the miseries of others.

The third part of Schopenhauer's *The World as Will and Representation*, he presents us how this transformation of consciousness from subjective willing

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>81</sup> WWR I 275.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>82</sup> WWR I 99-100.

into objective knowing is possible. One of the answers to this question is aesthetic experience. Schopenhauer accepts that the thing-in-itself is inaccessible through representational knowledge which turns every experience into concepts. But, non-representational knowledge, which is unlike representational, can reveal the inner nature of life. This temporal, non-cognitive experience that we can reach to the world as will is aesthetic experience.

Aesthetic experience uniquely provides an intuition of a transcendental reality which is beyond phenomenal realm. What is revealed to us is ineffable, but still we can know what is revealed. Aesthetic object is reflected as an ideal object. At the same time the subject becomes "willless subject of knowledge."<sup>83</sup> So, in the Schopenhauerian sense, an aesthetic experience can reveal pure, timeless Ideas<sup>84</sup>. These eternal, unchanging Ideas cannot be experienced in the daily wishful activities of everyday life. One has to get out of these daily agitations of daily life.

Following aesthetic experience, Schopenhauer argues that just like the world, the arts also exemplify a hierarchy in the objectification of the will as Platonic Ideas and analyses the various art forms one by one. He starts his analyses from architecture. For example, architecture has in it the Ideas of gravity, rigidity which are "the fundamental bass-notes of nature." Then he continues with landscape painting, sculpture, historical painting, poetry,

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>83</sup> WWR I 195.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>84</sup> As aesthetic experience has the power to uplift the subject to a willless standpoint of eternity (*sub specie aeternatitatis*), the object becomes more than an individual thing. What is percieved is Paltonic Idea –which can be understood as a willless subject.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>85</sup> WWR I 214.

tragedy where every art reveals an objectification of will as an Idea. And lastly he analyses music.

Music "stands quite apart from all the other"<sup>86</sup> arts for Schopenhauer. The reason for this is that music is not a representation of the will's objectification as a Platonic Idea but "a copy of the will itself." <sup>87</sup> Claiming that music stands at the peak point of arts and it has the power to reveal the truth of life Schopenhauer ends the third book.

And lastly, in the fourth book, Schopenhauer's concern is ethics. This part of the book cannot be named as a theory of action while for Schopenhauer the object of philosophy is grasping universal truth *per se* not guiding people for a better conduct of life. However, we live in actuality and it is impossible to be indifferent to this simple fact. It is impossible to be foreign to the facts that time fleets, death is certain, future is indefinite, our bodies are fragile, and nature is indifferent. We try to understand what is going on and philosophize about life because through understanding of life and reality, we believe that we can transform our manner of actions into a wise way.

From this perspective, it seems difficult to ignore the practical virtues of Schopenhauer's philosophy: He wrote works such as *Parerga and Paralipomena* or *Aphorisms on the Wisdom of Life* and declared that philosophy should provide consolation before death. I even venture to say that his philosophy is more practical than theoretical. It seems to be no coincidence that artists and people who are sensitive to practical traits are strongly attracted to his philosophy. Schopenhauer presents us a whole picture of life which is theoretical; yet this great picture of life that Schopenhauer delivers provides practical wisdom and

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>86</sup> WWR I 256.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>87</sup> WWR I 257.

offers suggestions of stance before sufferings of life. This will be discussed in the next chapter in detail.

# 3.3 Basic Problem: What did Schopenhauer Aim at and What did He Achieve?

Schopenhauer's thoughts about *how* music reveals the transcendental reality are subject to many problems. The most important one is about music revealing the secrets of the *thing-in-itself*. Is it at all possible?

In Kantian context, the answer to this question is quite simple: No! Even though Kant's philosophy seems quite complex, the basic reason for this is quite simple: If all knowledge is mind-dependent, we cannot know a reality initself which is mind-independent.

Schopenhauer agrees with this idea that on the path of objective knowledge, we have to consider the world of phenomenon and can "never get beyond the representation." 88 Yet, he thought that the possibility of grasping the reality through irrational artistic or mystical ways stands open. So the very hearth of Schopenhauer's philosophy claims a privileged knowledge which can be gained through glimpses into this forbidden realm. Now, in order to understand if music can represent the non-representable, we have to question the ineffable knowledge of "in-itself". It is clear that Schopenhauer seems to be sure that a special kind of knowledge of the thing-in-itself was possible after completing his opus magnum, *The World as Will and Representation*. Perhaps he felt himself as a commander who conquered the impregnable castle of "truth": A conqueror that enlarged the borders of philosophical understanding and

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>88</sup> WWR I 195.

attained the ultimate castle of "thing-in-itself" which Kant claimed to be unattainable.89

Schopenhauer clearly fought with the enemies of understanding such as wishful-thinking, prejudices, fears and limitations of thought through dogmatisms. And he offered salvation (*Erlösung*), after presenting a world of ugliness, abysses and a life of suffering for consideration. His philosophy is definitely one of the most important major contributions to Western philosophy, but the greatness of Schopenhauer's work does not lie in where he claimed it to be: For example, he claimed that philosophy is not practical; but those who respect philosophy as a way of living embraced his philosophy; or he claimed that thing-in-itself is within the reach of human beings through irrational states but, later he modified this idea and suggested that his philosophy was just a clue or closest answer to solution of the problem. Nevertheless, his insights about the value and meaning of our daily agitations, sufferings, boredom and the unhappiness that accompany our futile desires are unequaled.

Kantian idealism separates the world into two: Appearance and reality. Phenomena of this world are simply appearances. The way things appear to us, space and time are mind dependent but reality - in-itself- cannot be known simply because we cannot know anything beyond experiences. We can come close to the door of metaphysics but we cannot conquer or even take a rapid glance inside. Schopenhauer wanted a direct attack on this unbreakable seal and leak into reality. As it is aforementioned, he thought that he conquered the ultimate castle of reality. He agreed with Kant claiming that it is impossible to

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>89</sup> It is quite easy to quote many passages where Schopenhauer clearly claims that his metaphysical "will," is the thing-in-itself. But is it so? Did he really achieve to conquer this area?

understand reality through rationality. And therefore, he offered another way or another tool to break the seal. For him, there are some states of mind which are not rational but still reveal the reality of the world. What is revealed is ineffable, it escapes when tried to fit into concepts. So, Schopenhauer's philosophy offers something of great value: 1) Not reality of life but only appearances can be grasped through rationality. 2) The reality of life is impossible to attain through rationality. 3) Access to ultimate reality –thing-initself- is possible for human beings through mystic or aesthetic experiences where rationality ceases.

Here, Schopenhauer's philosophy defends the first two theses with great clarity, but the problematic argument is the third one. In *The World as Will and Representation II*, old Schopenhauer himself also accepts vaguely that Kantian thing-in-itself is in no way attainable.<sup>90</sup>

It is quite impossible to defend the thesis that the will is the thing in itself.<sup>91</sup> Yet, Schopenhauer seems to have arguments for both defending will as thing-in-itself and arguing for will as not thing-in-itself (but rather an adequate expression of the "thing-in-itself).

For example, in *The World as Will and Representation* Schopenhauer insists that it is possible to know the thing-in-itself:

I have stressed that other truth that we are not merely the *knowing* subject, but that we ourselves are also among those realities or entities we require to know, that we ourselves are the thing-in-itself. Consequently, a

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>90</sup> WWR II 197.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>91</sup> For a detailed discussion of this issue, see Chapter 4 from Young J., *Schopenhauer*, (New York: Routledge, 2005) or Chapter 5 from Atwell J. E., *Schopenhauer on the Charachter of the World: the Metaphysics of the Will*, (Berkeley; Los Angeles; London: University of California Press, 1995)

way *from within* stands open to us to that real inner nature of things to which we cannot penetrate *from without*. It is, so to speak, a subterranean passage, a secret alliance, which, as if by treachery, places us all at once in the fortress that could not be taken by attack from without.<sup>92</sup>

Yet, in his *Manuscript Remains* Schopenhauer adjusts or explains the paradox saying that it is impossible to know the thing-in-itself; yet, the will is best fitting expression:

I have said that "we know our own will solely as phenomenon, not in itself."-I have further said that "the will is the thing-in-itself." This is not self contradictory; all that is known, is known only as phenomenon, for to-be-object and to-be-known already are part of the form of appearance. Therefore it is a contradiction to say that something is known as thing-in-itself; the thing-in-itself is never the known; this is already always phenomenon. I say that "the will is the thing-in-itself, but the knowledge of the will is already phenomenon," just because it is knowledge. But the cognitio intima everyone has of his own will is the point where the thing-in-itself enters most distinctly into the phenomenon and must therefore be the exponent or mouth-piece of every other phenomenon.<sup>93</sup>

Julian Young evaluates this as in his youth Schopenhauer made a mistake claiming that the will is the thing-in-itself; but the mature Schopenhauer admitted the will as a natural entity. 94 Schopenhauer wanted to show the possibility of metaphysics unlike Kant. This alone-I believe- is the reason why he is ignored by the academy.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>92</sup> WWR II 195.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>93</sup> MR III 113-114.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>94</sup> Young J., Schopenhauer, (New York: Routledge, 2005), 54.

So, again we have to ask how to understand Schopenhauer's will which is quite important to understand his aesthetics? We are left with two answers: Will is the thing-in-itself or it is not. If will is the thing-in-itself, we cannot know it. So, how can we solve this problem? John Atwell tries to save Schopenhauer from contradiction arguing that Schopenhauer has two different usages of thing-in-itself. Schopenhauer uses his concept of the will as "the essence of inner nature of appearance". This means that we cannot consider will as something transcendental but innate and we have to consider Schopenhauer's usage of the term as I try to draw in the following figure:




Fig. 6

This figure represents the will as essence of empirical world. Yet, traditional understanding of Schopenhauer's metaphysics can be shown as the following figure:




Fig.7

Since, Schopenhauer is generally understood as the second figure demonstrates where the will is considered as thing-in-itself, creates many problems. Therefore Atwell argues that the will is the thing in itself in appearance or the essence of the appearance. 95 So, if we understand Schopenhauer's metaphysics as immanent –not transcendent- then, it is possible to read him purified from major problems. I think Julian Young is right explaining why we find two different meanings in Schopenhauer's will. In his youth Schopenhauer thought he found knowledge of something which was non-representational so he was impatient to conclude that it should be the thing-in-itself. Yet, the mature Schopenhauer modified this idea.96 Hence, we have to consider his philosophy as an account of this world of representation

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>95</sup> Atwell J. E., *Schopenhauer on the Charachter of the World: the Metaphysics of the Will*, (Berkeley; Los Angeles; London: University of California Press, 1995), 126.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>96</sup> Young J., Schopenhauer, (New York: Routledge, 2005), 101.

(and definitely he has very deep insights and his ideas are invaluable). This is also something that Schopenhauer also confesses in his manuscripts:

My philosophy will never in the least go beyond the realm of experience, that is to say of the perceptible in the fullest range of the concept. For, like every art, it will merely repeat the world.<sup>97</sup>

It is important to leave the untenable extreme claims of Schopenhauer's system. As Schopenhauer claims an exalted way of knowing is possible and this is what is valuable in Schopenhauer's philosophy. And this is what makes his teaching great. But his greatness does not lie in extravagant claims of metaphysics. We try to understand life. And due to the dominance of logical thinking and rationality of our time, it is generally assumed that concepts and science are enough to achieve this goal. Dry concepts, schematizing, registering is not only way to understand. We are now alive, and will die at some point: Life, death, flowing time, strivings, sufferings, birth and existence as a whole do not fit into our dry concepts. But arts have the power to understand all these within a blessed disinterested stance. This understanding is quite vital because it is *the only* link between aesthetics and morality which will be discussed in the following chapter. But, for this it is not necessary to claim will as a transcended thing-in-itself.

As aforementioned, perhaps Schopenhauer really felt himself like a commander who conquered the impregnable castle of metaphysical truth. Yet, it was a mistake to claim that he attained the ultimate castle of thing-in-itself in Kantian sense. His greatness is related with his ideas on exalted way of

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>97</sup> MR I 281.

understanding (not necessarily metaphysical knowledge) and its practical implications.

# 3.4 The Task of Philosophy and Limits of Knowledge: The Border Line of Science

What is the task of philosophy? For Schopenhauer, the answer is quite simple: To decipher the whatness of the world. But before considering this issue in detail, we have to ask another vital question to ourselves. Why do we want to understand "what" the world is? The implicit answer to this question in Schopenhauer's philosophy is as follows. The world we are living in is a hostile one. And if we perceive the world around us with an ordinary consciousness, then we will consider everything as instruments for something. We will oscillate between suffering and boredom because of our individual will. Yet, the good news is that it is not our only alternative. There is a possible "better consciousness" where peace, content and tranquility can be revealed to us. Not rational mind, but mystical or aesthetical experiences allow us to reach this painless, will-less state: "the state of the gods". 9 So, in other words it is vital to understand "what" the world is, since it offers salvation from our existential problems. We are not simply satisfying our curiosity.

At this fundamental point of Schopenhauer's philosophy, he asserts that arts reveal us the whatness of being.<sup>100</sup> So genuine art becomes philosophy.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>98</sup> WWR I 82.

<sup>99</sup> WWRI 220.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>100</sup> In the next chapter, we will also question if art also offers us some kind of salvation as well.

And as the peak point of arts music becomes true philosophy<sup>101</sup> Actually this is the whole story of his philosophy of arts, yet we have to consider and criticize from beginning in a detailed way.

For Schopenhauer whatness of being is definitely a problem of metaphysics because science is –and always will be- insufficient for understanding the world. Why so? Why is science insufficient for revealing the whatness of the world?

This is actually another way of asking if appearance and reality are the same. Idealists claim that appearance cannot be a source for knowledge about reality. The qualities of objects that we sense do not provide us anything about reality. An apple does not have the color red at all circumstances and even its shape is not the same from all perspectives. So, idealists conclude that qualities that we attribute to things cannot exist outside the mind. For Kant, even space and time are the forms of mind.

Schopenhauer accepts Kantian idealism and from this point, he explains why science is not self-sufficient and needs philosophy. Science wants to explain phenomena and for this it needs three components: cause, effect and inner mechanism. 102 This inner mechanism explains the phenomenon but it is not explicable.

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 $<sup>^{101}</sup>$  Music reveals what the world is through feelings wheras actual philosophy tells us what the world is with concepts.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>102</sup> WWRI100/ FW 50-52.

 $C \rightarrow E$  C: Cause

E: Effect

→: Inner mechanism - natural

forces (gravity, electricity Qualitas Occultae) 103

Fig. 8

In this figure, arrow symbolizes the connection between cause and effect which is a mystery for sciences: *qualitas occultae*.<sup>104</sup> This is the last border that sciences can reach. At this point science needs help to give "meaning" to inner mechanism.<sup>105</sup> I want to understand "what" the world is and science offers me mystery at its fundamental level. If we follow scientific strategy, it becomes impossible to understand the world wholly. We may find perfect explanations, yet we will stop at the first principles. So, another strategy is needed to understand the world. The figure below classifies inner mechanism between causes and effects in different realms, which Schopenhauer labels as natural forces.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>103</sup> WWR I 97.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>104</sup> WWRI 125.

 $<sup>^{105}</sup>$  WWR II 172.

 $C \rightarrow E$ 

**Natural Forces:** 

Inorganic realm – causes

Vegetable realm – stimuli

Animals - motives

Human Beings - motives<sup>106</sup>

Fig 9

In this schema, if we try to understand the inner mechanism of cause- effect relations as an outsider, it is inevitable that *qualitas occultae* remains. But as human beings, it is not our only alternative to remain as outsiders. We have also an inner understanding of this world: A subjective understanding.

As aforementioned, for Schopenhauer we have access to the inner nature of the world through our body and our individual willing. Our body is also like any other representation which is subject to the "law of nature, just as the changes of other objects follow upon causes, stimuli, and motives" 107 yet, it may provide an immediate revelation of the inner nature of the world. Just

 $<sup>^{106}\</sup> FFR\ 70\text{-}71/\ FW\ 50\text{-}52.$ 

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>107</sup> WWR I 99-100.

like any other representation, our body is also an objectification of the will and one can get the knowledge of it. 108

the answer to the riddle is given to the subject of knowledge appearing as an individual, and this answer is given in the word *Will*. This and this alone gives him the key to his own phenomenon, reveals to him the significance and shows him the inner mechanism of his being, his actions, his movements. To the subject of knowing, who appears as an individual only through his identity with the body, this body is given in two entirely different ways. It is given in perception of the intellect as representation, as an object among objects, liable to the laws of nature. But it is also given in a quite different way, namely as what is known immediately to everyone, and is denoted by the word *will*.<sup>109</sup>

Here, Schopenhauer means that actions of the body, even though it belongs to the phenomenal world and subject to the laws of nature, reveal the inner nature of the world. In this sense, he argued that the inner nature of the world can be known. This is where science has to stop and arts may offer us this knowledge.

#### 3.5 Music and the World

Understanding Schopenhauer's will as an immanent –not transcendent-property of this world, gives us a key to understand his philosophy in a way which is purified from major contradictions. A natural Schopenhauer is more suitable for understanding his aesthetics as well. Now, we can consider the importance of aesthetics and music from this perspective.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>108</sup> In this matter Nietzsche occupies a special place since he turned Schopenhauer's dark Will and his teachings on life denying into life affirming doctrine of Will to Power.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>109</sup> WWR I 100.

As aforementioned, for Schopenhauer, when we try to understand the world just through a scientific outlook, we will stuck at the fundamental level; since the inner mechanism which explains the phenomenon itself is not explicable. The basic inner mechanism between cause and effect are nothing but *qualititas occultae*. But understanding the inner mechanism of the world is not wholly impossible. Now, it is possible to discuss possibility of grasping the reality through irrational artistic or mystical ways on a firmer ground.

As mentioned, there are stages of objectification of the will. The manifold of objects in each stage of objectification exists as Platonic Ideas. In Schopenhauer's philosophy every artwork has relation with Ideas; yet, music bypasses all the other arts since "music is as *immediate* an objectification and copy of the whole *will*"<sup>110</sup> He never hides that to prove this claim is impossible and on the contrary he draws the attention of his readers to this fact [music being a "copy of an original that can itself never be directly represented."]

I recognize, however, that it is essentially impossible to demonstrate this explanation, for it assumes and establishes a relation of music as representation to that which of its essence can never be representation, and claims to regard music as the copy of an original that can itself never be directly represented. 111

This is the paradox of philosophizing about music that Schopenhauer admits and faces. He tries to give the secrets of a world where conceptual expression does not work. Hence, he tries using an indirect way to express this using various analogies. These analogies are severely criticized by some of the

<sup>111</sup> WWR I 257.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>110</sup> WWR I 257.

commentators. Yet, I think these commentators undervalue the fact that Schopenhauer frankly admitted the inexpressibility of what music expresses. So, it is important to keep in mind that music has an inexpressible character in order not to judge Schopenhauer quickly and miss what we can learn from him.

The representations are copies of the will and so is the music, therefore Schopenhauer categorized his analogies in three different groups: Harmonic aspects of music, melodic aspect of music and rhythmic aspect of music.

Harmonic structure of music represents the grades of will's objectification as Ideas. In his analogy the ground-bass corresponds to the inorganic nature and the mass of the planets.

I recognize in the deepest tones of harmony, in the ground-bass, the lowest grades of the will's objectification, inorganic nature, the mass of the planet. 112

When one hears a particular musical sound (i.e. middle A on the piano), in addition to the main sound, one hears the overtones. Schopenhauer uses this fact for making his analogy further to claim that all the bodies and organizations of nature come to existence through the development out of the mass of the planet.

It is well known that all the high notes, light, tremulous, and dying away more rapidly, may be regarded as resulting from the simultaneous vibrations of the deep bass-note. With the sounding of the low note, the high notes always sound faintly at the same time, and it is

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>112</sup> WWR I 258.

<sup>113</sup> Human ear can hear the fundemental tone and four overtones.

a law of harmony that a bass-note may be accompanied only by those high notes that actually sound automatically and simultaneously with it (its *sons harmoniques*) through the accompanying vibrations. Now this is analogous to the fact that all the bodies and organizations of nature must be regarded as having come to existence through gradual development out of the mass of the planet. <sup>114</sup>

Audible sound has lower limits and that corresponds to the fact that "no matter is perceivable without form and quality." <sup>115</sup> At the same time "the definite intervals of the scale are parallels to the definite grades of the will's objectification, the definite species in nature" <sup>116</sup> which means the intervals of musical scale corresponds to the definite grades of animal and plant world. And the "departure from the arithmetical correctness of the intervals through some temperament" is similar to "the departure of the individual from the type of the species." <sup>117</sup> The impure discords are analogous "to the monstrous abortions between two species of animals, or between man and animal." <sup>118</sup>

The second aspect that concerns Schopenhauer's analogy between music and the world is melody. According to him all "the bass-notes and ripienos that constitute the *harmony*," lack "continuity of progress which belong only to the melody." <sup>119</sup> Melody corresponds to the conscious life of human beings.

<sup>114</sup> WWR I 258.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>115</sup> WWR I 258.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>116</sup> WWR I 258.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>117</sup> WWR I 258-9.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>118</sup> WWR I 259.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>119</sup> WWR I 259.

For Schopenhauer, it is possible to recognize "the whole gradition of the Ideas in which the will objectifies itself" in the world also in music from the bass to "the leading voice singing the melody." Melodic voice leads the whole musical piece. From beginning to end, the melody has a connection and progresses that flows freely. These are analogous to the intellectual endeavors of human beings.

He alone, because endowed with the faculty of reason, is always looking before and after on the path of his actual life and of its unnumerable possibilities, and so achieves a course of life that is intellectual, and is thus connected as a whole.<sup>121</sup>

So, as it is said the melodic structure of music represents the intellectual life of man.

Finally, in the *melody*, in the the high, singing, principal voice, leading the whole and progressing with unrestrained freedom, in the uninterrupted significant connexion of *one* thought from beginning to end, and expressing a whole, I recognize the highest grade of the will's objectification, the intellectual life and endeavour of man.<sup>122</sup>

Melody is also free to deviate from the tonal center in a thousand ways and that resembles the nature of man whose will strives and is satisfied and then strives anew. Man's transitions from "desire to satisfaction, and from this to a

<sup>121</sup> WWR I: 259

122 WWR I: 259

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>120</sup> WWR I: 258

fresh desire" <sup>123</sup> and suffering of the men (since there is no real satisfaction), corresponds to the digresion from the keynote of the melody.

At the same time, it is wrong to think that the melody is simply representative of the intellectual life of man. Melody also represents "the deepest secrets of human willing and feeling." 124

it relates the most secret history of the intellectually enlightened will, portrays every agitation, every effort, every movement of the will, everything which the faculty of reason summerizes under the wide and negative concept of feeling, and which cannot be further taken up into the abstractions of reason.<sup>125</sup>

And the final aspect of music that Schopenhauer furthers his analogy is rhythm. This aspect of music is representative for the different features of human feelings and strivings. "Slow melodies that strike painful discords" and turn back to the key note are sad "on the analogy of delayed and hard won satisfaction." Delay in reaching to keynote are similar to the delay in the excitement of the will. Schopenhauer continues with the following analogy:

The short, intelligible phrases of rapid dance music seem to speak only of ordinary happiness which is easy of attainment. On the other hand, the *allegro maestoso* in great phrases, long passages, and wide deviations express a greater, nobler effort towards a distant goal, and its final attainment. The *adagio* speaks of the suffering of a great and noble endeavour that disdains all trifling happiness. <sup>127</sup>

<sup>124</sup> WWR I 260.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>123</sup> WWR I 260.

<sup>125</sup> WWR I 259.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>126</sup> WWR I 260.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>127</sup> WWR I 260-261.

In all these analogies, one has to keep in mind that music never expresses particular things or the phenomenon, indeed "only the inner nature, the thing-in-itself, of every phenomenon, the will itself." What Schopenhauer tells us is that in music we grasp non-representially a kind of re-run of the phenomenal world. With the aforementioned analogies that he makes, we find a parallel between music and the phenomenal world and he adds that we can regard the phenomenal world and music as expressing the same thing. Schopenhauer expresses this idea in his comparison of concepts and ideas as well: "the concepts are the *universalia post rem*, but music expresses *universalia ante rem.*" 129

Concepts are *universalia post rem*, because it signifies the unity after things. The "whole" is reconstructed intellectually after the perception of multiplicity. It is an abstraction which is a construction of our reason. [A] concept is like a dead receptacle. [A] One can take just what one puts in it. No more than that. Concepts are simply useful, serviceable and necessary for science and life, but it is dry and unfruitful for art. Ideas, on the contrary, are defined as *universalia ante rem*. Literal translation means unity before things. That is the whole from which the parts originate. It is the object of perception.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>128</sup> WWR I 261.

<sup>129</sup> WWR I 263.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>130</sup>"The *concept* is abstract, discursive, wholly undetermined within its sphere, determined only by its limits, attainable and intelligible only to him who has the faculty of reason, communicable by words without further assistance, entirely exhausted by its definition" WWR I 234.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>131</sup> WWR I 235.

Schopenhauer defines it as "the unity that has fallen into plurality by virtue of the temporal and spatial form of our intuitive apprehension." 132

The ontological statuses of the ideas are not clear. The indefinite character of the Ideas is also another problematic point in Schopenhauer's philosophy. Because if there is inner-reality, which is the will, and the phenomenal reality, which are representations, then where shall we locate the ideas? I think the answer is a special way of "seeing the universal in particular." 133 Yet the comprehension of an idea is possible for the individual who is will is silenced and turned into the "pure subject of knowing". This is the reason why any comprehended Idea (not concept) is the real source of every genuine work of art.

Genuine works bearing immortal life arise only from such immediate apprehension. Just because the Idea is and remains object of perceptive, the artist is not conscious *in abstracto* of the intention and aim of his work. Not a concept but an Idea is in his mind; hence he cannot give an account of his actions.<sup>134</sup>

Unlike concepts, an Idea is like a "living organism, developing, itself and endowed with generative force, which brings forth that which was not previously put into it." 135

Now, turning back to our discussion on music, it is mentioned that it gives us *universalia ante rem*. The listeners of music do not just experience some

<sup>133</sup> WWR II 379.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>132</sup> WWR I 234.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>134</sup> WWR I 235.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>135</sup> WWR I 235.

sounds flowing, it is also the flood and ebb of the will. Music speaks of the non-conceptual.<sup>136</sup>

For, as we have said, music differs from all the other arts by the fact that it is not a copy of the phenomenon, or, more exactly, of the will's adequate objectivity, but is directly a copy of the will itself, and therefore expresses the metaphysical to everything physical in the world, the thing-in-itself to every phenomenon. <sup>137</sup>

Following the steps of Schopenhauer, now it is relative possible to understand what he meant asserting that philosophy and music expresses the same thing. They both express the real or inner nature of the phenomena:

Thus whoever has followed me and has entered into my way of thinking will not find it so very paradoxical when I say that, supposing we succeded in giving a perfectly accurate and complete explanation of music which goes into detail, and thus a detailed repetition in concepts of what it expresses, this would also be at once a sufficient repetition and explanation of the world in concepts, or one wholly corresponding thereto, and hence the true philosophy.<sup>138</sup>

So, in Schopenhauer's philosophy there seems to be two important conclusions about music: 1)In music we experience the re-run of the phenomenal world and 2) Music expresses the inner nature of the phenomenal world.

Inner-nature of the world as the will is not the thing in itself. It is, for Schopenhauer, rather the nearest answer that can be given to the problem of

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>136</sup> In this sense, it is not hard to imagine that for Schopenahuer instrumental music is more important than operas. But he is not underestimating this style, *if the words do not subordinate the melody*.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>137</sup> WWR I 262.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>138</sup> WWR I 262.

quiddity of being since knowledge is free from the forms of *space* and *causality*. But the form of *time* remains.<sup>139</sup> The experience of music has the form of time therefore the experience of music may reveal this inner essence more than any other art or sciences. This is where music is tied to Schopenhauer's metaphysics. And that is why Schopenhauer changes the words of Leibniz, who claimed that music is an unconscious exercise in arithmetic, and parodies the words again as "music is an unconscious exercise in metaphysics in which the mind does not know it is philosophizing." <sup>140</sup>

Next chapter will deal with music and ethics relation.

<sup>139</sup> WWR II 197.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>140</sup> WWR I 234.

#### **CHAPTER 4**

# FROM MUSIC AS PHILOSOPHY TO SELF-TRANSFORMATION: FROM ORDINARY CONSCIOUSNESS TO AESTHETIC PERCEPTION

It is quite obvious that philosophers tried to expose what life is; but it is not equally obvious why they did so. What is the motivation behind the efforts of revealing truths of life? Are we just trying to satisfy our curiosity about life? Are we not allowed to ask practical side of philosophy which may help conducting a better form of life?

Definetely, philosophy satisfies our curiosity about life to an extent; but it had another very important major role. The joy accompanying contemplation of life, preperation to death, acquirement of a stance towards the miseries and troubles of this life are also major features of philosophy. In other words, philosophy is not only theoretical. It also has practical role for transforming the subject from ordinary states of mind to a better life.

In this world, where death is ineviatable and time fleets, it is the general tendency to search for stability. Therefore, rather than affirming a painful changing world, we want the peace of something stable. We form blocks of thoughts that try to prove stability in life or after death that we consider as "normal" or "usual" understanding. But why should they be "normal" way of seeing the world? There are many different ways to construct life views hence, the role of philosophy should be critisizing the so called "usual" or "normal" ideas about life. It is not necessary that philosophy adds new ideas to our old ones; but it has to remind us that we forget the life of flux for the sake of

soothing explanations that offer stories and fairy tales of comfort. It is life of *becoming* that we forget for the sake of stability. Religious authorities, politicians, advertisers, banal chauvinisms all may offer and support ossified understandings of life which deprives people from authentic living. In such a case, philosophy offers animation to the soul through questioning such steorytypical ways of understandings.

Philosophy allows us to remember our potential for an authentic existence through a will to crtisize imposed beliefs and through a will to understand life starting within. The more soul is animated, the more one develops an authentic life; and philosophy may animate the soul through cognizance.

Music –as animating the soul- can help the same end of conducting a prudent existence. Music offers some kind of knowledge that directly touches the soul. Schopenhauer considered music as philosophy since it reveals the essence of the world. It is possible to add to this idea that music animates the soul through its fresh liveliness (not thorough cognizance) which can be considered as philosophy as well.

What is the difference between a life with music from a life without any music? Why was speaking not enough that we also started singing? In this sense, the main question of this section is questioning the significance of music for an individual self to transform his/her manner of actions for a wiser and better conduct life. In other words, I shall explore the practical implications of being moved by music within Schopenhauer's philosophical context. Schopenhauer sets forth two important propositions about philosophy and music: First one of them explains what music expresses is true philosophy and the second one; the object of philosophy is grasping universal truth per se not quiding people for a

better conduct of life. Through these premises, it is possible to conclude that querying a link between musical experiences and transforming manner of actions in Schopenhauer's system is implicitly excluded. Therefore, in order to question the practical implications of musical experiences first it is vital to overcome the difficulty of Schopenhauer's claim that philosophy is not practical.

# 4.1 Schopenhauer's Philosophy: Theoretical or Practical?

If philosophy is a pure contemplative activity "to inquire, not to prescribe" <sup>141</sup> as declared by Schopenhauer, then further discussions should be unnecessary. Schopenhauer clearly declares that "all philosophy is always theoretical" <sup>142</sup> and it has nothing to do with prescriptions or advices as a life guide. He declares that "Philosophy can never do more than interpret and explain what is present and at hand" <sup>143</sup> and there is no "ought" to be explicated from his system. <sup>144</sup> Moreover, he declares that philosophy should abandon the old pretensions "to become practical, to guide conduct, to transform character" <sup>145</sup> In this picture, the very object of philosophy becomes contemplation about universal truth *per se.* And this also means that after understanding what music reveals, we have to stop philosophizing as well: Apart from satisfying our curiosity philosophy has no role in guiding life.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>141</sup> WWR I 271.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>142</sup> WWR I 271.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>143</sup> WWR I 271.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>144</sup> WWR I 272.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>145</sup> WWR I 271.

Why not? Does philosophy have no power for transforming character? I think philosophy has the power to make a difference in general; but especially Schopenhauer's philosophy can be considered "practical" for several reasons. At least, artists and those with practical concerns in life are attracted by his philosophy which can count as a proof that his philosophy is somehow action guiding. Therefore, in this section, I will try to show that Schopenhauer's claim that philosophy is theoretical cannot be assented for his own philosophy.

First of all, as noted earlier, Schopenhauer's philosophy is a connected unity where metaphysics cannot be removed away from ethics. And the peak point of this unity can be understood as ethical denial of the world which is understood metaphysically.

Schopenhauer informs us that the miracle of the world is that subject of knowing and subject of willing are identical in human beings. This is what he calls miracle *par excellence.*<sup>146</sup>The distinction is clear cut, but still we can speak of an "identity" of the willing subject with knowing subject; therefore it is a miracle.<sup>147</sup> This is quite important because at this point we find the possibility of transformation. This happens when one attains consciousness of the world. Consciousness of the world is attained at the moments of "pure contemplation", when one is "raised for the moment above all willing." <sup>148</sup> This means when ones willing is silenced and s/he is purified from it, s/he becomes

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>146</sup> WWR I 102.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>147</sup> Schopenhauer writes that this miracle *par excellence* is the whole content of his *opus magnum*. (WWR I 102.)

<sup>148</sup> WWR I 390.

subject of knowing and s/he is "no longer the individual that knows in the interest of its constant willing." 149

Therefore, it is quite possible to say that in Schopenhauer's philosophy there is a road from *information* of the world to *transformation* of the way one conducts her life. There is a correlation between awareness of the world and silencing the will. Through aesthetic or ascetical experience one can detach from shallow egoisms and the representations of the world do not create lust anymore. So, it is possible to claim that philosophy may help one to tear her/himself from the slavery of willing through knowledge. Therefore there is no need to believe Schopenhauer's claim that philosophy has no transformational power.

Another reason why Schopenhauer's claim that philosophy cannot be practical is not valid for his own philosophy is his views about death. Schopenhauer considers death as "the real inspiring genius or Musagetes" 150 of philosophy and he counts Socrates to be right to consider philosophy as a "preparation for death" 151. Schopenhauer's central concept will-to-live is also connected with fear of death; and the duty of philosophy is to offer consolation. Schopenhauer basically offers denial of will-to-live which provides consolation before death. Knowledge of death motivates people "obtaining *metaphysical* points of view." 152 For Schopenhauer, fear of death is another form of will-to-live; therefore when he offers salvation through denial of will-to-live, he also offers his consolation before death. Just like sufferings

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>149</sup> WWR I 390.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>150</sup> WWR II 463. Musagetes is the leader of the 9 muses

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>151</sup> WWR II 463.

<sup>152</sup> WWR II 463.

and miseries of one's life stem from one's interests for the representations of this world, fear of death arise from the same interests. Schopenhauer's consolation before death takes its source from loosing oneself or egocenteredness and understands that s/he is united with a deeper realm. If this idea is consoling or not will not be discussed here; yet it is enough to say that Schopenhauer actually considers philosophy practical: Preparation for death, consolation before miseries and sufferings of this life. Therefore, Schopenhauer's detailed reasoning about theoretical issues has its roots in practical and urgent life problems.

Philosophy, and specifically Schopenhauer's philosophy has the power to make some differences: So, why does Schopenhauer claim that philosophy can't change one's life? The reason lies in Schopenhauer's understanding of character. He mentions four traits of character in his *Prize essay on the freedom of will* as: individual, empirical, constant and inborn. Schopenhauer does not believe that studying philosophy can change a person's course of life since nothing can change the character. For Schopenhauer, anything that exists, acts in accord with its character. We act in empirical world and it reflects who we are. From the totality of our acts we can infer what kind of character we have. Schopenhauer uses the words of Scholastics *–operari sequitur esse-155* to express "everything in the world acts in accordance with what it is." To Etherefore all my actions indicate what kind of character I have. In order to articulate the issue, Schopenhauer employs the terms "intelligible" and "empirical character"

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>153</sup> FW 68 – 72.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>154</sup> PP I 123.

<sup>155</sup> Being (essence) precedes acting

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>156</sup> BM 174.

which he borrowed from Kant's terminology. 157 Our empirical characters are just like any characteristic of any empirical object; yet, it is the manifestation of what I actually am; in other words intelligible character becomes visible as empirical character. Intelligible character is predetermined. Empirical character just the manifestation of it. Through our empirical character we may sense to certain degrees our intelligible character. What is intelligible character then? It is our unalterable essence which is outside phenomenal realm. All these explanations of character lead the discussion to a weird position. We are stuck in strict determinism where morality is not relevant. We cannot evaluate any behavior morally. Another problem that arises is that the status of intelligible character is not clear. Does it belong to the "in-itself" part of world? Or shall we consider it as a part of representations? What does essence outside empirical reality mean? Or can we say such a thing at all? How should we evaluate intelligible character?

As Schopenhauer expresses two sided reality of the world as thing-in-itself and representation <sup>158</sup>, it is legitimate to ask which part intelligible character belongs. Schopenhauer says that intelligible character is beyond spatio-temporal reality; therefore it has to be in the thing-in-itself part of reality. But any intelligible character *cannot* act outside spatio-temporal reality. So, something like "intelligible character" outside empirical reality becomes impossible or unthinkable. Since everyone has her/his own intelligible character represents multiplicity and that means it cannot reside in the in itself

<sup>1:</sup> 

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>157</sup> Schopenhauer uses the concepts of Kantian philosophy. For Kant empirical character fits to determinism of the phenomenal world; yet, intelligible character which represents the "reality" and therefore unknowable offers *possibility* for freedom: Trascendental freedom where empirical necessity rules. Schopenhauer considers this distinction in the discussion of freedom as Kant's one of the greatest contirbutions. WWR 1 505.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>158</sup> In the previous chapter, this was discussed in detail. Some commentators argue that seperating reality in two as thing-in-itself and representation drag Schopenhauer's philosophy in a contentious position.

part of reality; since, multitude belongs to the world of objects. Therefore Schopenhauer claims that intelligible characters are similar to his understanding of Platonic Ideas. <sup>159</sup> Intelligible character, which is our essence, cannot be outside phenomenal reality and it determines who we are. It is the fundamental tone of the course of life. Our disposition is a single unitary maxim which determines our actions in empirical world. <sup>160</sup> From our quasitranscendental intelligible characters, we have the feeling of freedom.

Each thing operates in accordance with its constitution, and its operation consequent upon causes reveals this constitution. Each human being acts according to how he is, and the individual case, solely by motives. Thus *freedom*, which cannot be encounterable in the *operari* [acting], *must reside* in the *esse* [being]. In all ages it has been a fundamental error, a putting of things backwards, to assign *necessity* to the *esse* and *freedom* to the *operari*. Quite the reverse, *freedom resides in the esse alone;* but from it and the motives the *operari* follows with necessity: and *in what we do, we come to know what we are.* <sup>161</sup>

On the issue of character, Schopenhauer has another very important concept: Acquired character. Acquired character is nothing but an individual becoming more and more aware of her intelligible character. Self-knowledge is attainable through experiences and one may become aware of who she is. Self-realization is also at the same time becoming what one truly is. Acquired character, as

<sup>159</sup> WWR I 156.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>160</sup> WWR I 106. Finding similarities with Sartre's idea of a fundamental project Young writes "Jean Paul-Sartre-who learnt more from Schopenhauer than he ever acknowledges- call this a person's 'fundamental project'" Young J., *Schopenhauer*, (New York, Routledge, 2005), 67.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>161</sup> FW 108-109.

"knowledge of our mental and bodily powers" 162, gives us the opportunity to behave in a better way:

This puts us in a position to carry out, deliberately and methodically, the unalterable role of our own person, and to fill up the gaps caused in it by whims or weaknesses, under the guidance of fixed concepts. This role is in itself unchangeable once for all, but previously we allowed it to follow its natural course without any rule. We have now brought to clearly conscious maxims that are always present to us, the manner of acting necessarily determined by our individual nature.<sup>163</sup>

With being able to "acquire" character and lead to conduct action through "fixed concepts" and being able to behave in a self-aware manner, I think, enough proof is provided for Schopenhauer's philosophy being potentially practical. There are many possible ways for achieving a better consciousness which leads a better conduct of life.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>162</sup> WWR I 305.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>163</sup> WWR I 305.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>164</sup> Young, in his *Schopenhauer*, objects the unalterable nature of character that Schopenhauer defends for three reasons: 1) intelligible character is inconceivable so there is no need to believe that we have such an unalterable nature 2) The days of Newtonian science is over and we are in "moral relaxed age of quantum indeterminacy"( Young J., *Schopenhauer*, (New York: Routledge, 2005), 164.) Since mature Schopenhauer revised some basic thoughts of himself, it is not possible to know how he considers "free acts of will". These alternatives at first sight may seem agreeable; yet his first proposition just shows that intelligible character is inconceivable. But it is not an argument against the inborn nature of character. 2.nd argument is unfortunately a very weak one; yet it has to be faced since it started to find voice in the critics of Schopenhauer's understanding of the world. It is true that Schopenhauer accepts determinism. It is also true that that the quantum-mechanics talk about indeterminacy of subatomic quanta. But this does not prove that determinism at macro-level is rejected. 3rd argument also does not show anything about why we should reject Schopenhauer's ideas on character.

On this issue, another alternative is offered by Matthias Kossler for the solution of Schopenhauer's ideas on responsibility and freedom which is quite plausible. He writes: "Freedom, and with it ethical responsibility, is therefore also present in action, yet not as the freedom that the individual *has*, but rather as the freedom by which the individual *becomes himself*. The individual can only act in line with his character, yet every action gives a new definition of the individual character from the numerous possibilities of being human as such; and in that sense the action is free. The character is perhaps on the one hand that which is experienced in action, yet not as already defined or laid down, but instead as a character that is realized a new in every action; the character is therefore also that which experiences, so that the expression 'experience of character' can be seen as binding both aspects." Kossler M., "Life is

# 4.2 Aesthetic Stance before Tragic Life

This is a question that one has to deal with if she is dealing with aesthetics of Schopenhauer. If salvation is achieved when the will is silenced, then the question becomes "how is redemption from serfdom to will possible if it is our very essence?" This is problematic because it is simply not natural. If even intellect is in the service of will and it is subordinate and conditioned by will. 165Yet, as individual's intellect is slave of her will and conditioned by will, only if intellect views the world around without being serving as a tool of will. So, aesthetic experience should be something which seperates intellect from its servitude to will. Exactly this should be clarified.

In order to understand this, we have to consider the genius in Schopenhauer's philosophy. Genius, seems like a possible answer. Schopenhauer considers genius as an exception of nature. He defines genius as monstrum per excessum 167, which signifies an individual where abundance of intellectual powers dominates over will. Such "superfluity and abundance" 168 allows the genius - through will-less understanding - to create artistically. Genius grasps the inner nature of life. Yet, even though superfluity of

but a Mirror: On the Connection between Ethics, Metaphysics and Charachter in Schopenhauer" in *Better Conciousness*, ed Neill A.and Janaway C. (UK: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009), 89-90.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>165</sup> WWR II 198.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>166</sup> WWR II 292.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>167</sup> WWR II 377.

 $<sup>^{168}</sup>$  WWR II 410.

independent intellect resides in genius as exception, Schopenhauer accepts that everyone has such a capacity at different levels:

Now according to our explanation, genius consists in the ability to know, independently of the principle of sufficient reason, not individual things which have their existence only in the relation, but the Ideas of such things, and in the ability to be, in face of these, the correlative of the Idea, and hence no longer individual, but pure subject of knowing. Yet this ability must be inherent in all men in a lesser and different degree, as otherwise they would be just as incapable of enjoying works of art as of producing them...[We] must therefore assume as existing in all men that power of recognizing in things their Ideas, of divesting themselves for a moment of their personality<sup>169</sup>

Yet, this explanation is a little bit confusing because it may make sense to consider the genius as an exception -a monstrum per excessum- to an extent; but, if even ordinary people have the capacity to free themselves from the servitude of will than, we have to ask this question again: "how is redemption from serfdom to will possible if it is our very essence?" The problem can be reformulated as how intellect may have more than what nature provided to it?170

I think the most plausible attempt to defend consistency in Schopenhauer's idea of intellect freeing itself from servitude of will is given by

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>169</sup> WWR I 194.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>170</sup> Writers such as Barbara Hannan, D. W. Hamlyn consider this position very problematic. Hannan writes "I believe Schopenhauer was confused and conflicted with regard to what, exactly art shows. This paralles his conflict with regard to whether the Platonic Forms are phenomenal or noumenal" (Hannan B., The Riddle of the World: A Reconsideration of Schopenhauer's Philosophy, (NewYork: Oxford University Press, 2009), 111.) and Hamlyn writes "There is an obvious problem about how it is possible for someone to free himself or to allow his intellect freedom from the dominance of the will so as to contemplate the Idea without being subject to the usual constraints of the principle of sufficient reason and the forms and conditions that it presupposes." (Hamlyn D.W., Schopenhauer The Arguments of the Philosophers (London; New York: Routledge, 1999), 109-110.)

Alex Neill.<sup>171</sup> On behalf of Schopenhauer's philosophy Neill, questions this problem appealing to by-products of nature. He writes: "the capacity for song, for example, which is not in itself necessitated by the survival needs of the individual will as it appears in human beings, as a by product of the emergence of the larynx, vocal chords etc., which is determined by (what is at least arguably) the survival need of the individual human will for the verbal communication." <sup>172</sup>

Another approach for understanding aesthetic experience is trying to understand what Schopenhauer means with ordinary consciousness. Because if through aesthetic experiences we are transforming ourselves into something better than it is total legitimate to ask: Who is this ordinary person? What are the main characteristics of such a person?

First of all, it is easier to see what intellect being subordinated to will means when we consider the ordinary consciousness or ordinary knowledge.<sup>173</sup> At this level a person remains just as a practical person who –under the servitude of will- considers objects as instruments. In other words individual considers objects in relation to the will.<sup>174</sup> Ordinary consciousness is limited in the sense that objects around never considered as non-instrumental qualities.

<sup>171</sup> See Neill A., "Aesthetic Experience" in *Better Conciousness*, ed Neill A.and Janaway C. (UK: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009), 26-40.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>172</sup> Ibid., 33.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>173</sup> Schopenhauer writes " [when] my teaching reaches its highest point, it assumes a *negative* charachter, and so ends with a negation. Thus it can speak here only of what is denied or given up" (WWR II 612.). With the same spirit, it is easier to see what ordinary individual is like.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>174</sup> "[K]nowledge that serves the will really knows nothing more about objects than their relations." WWR I 177.

The *intellect of ordinary people is kept strictly tied*, namely to its fixed point, the will, so that it resembles a short and therefore rapidly swinging pendulum, or an angle of elongation with short *radius vector*. The result is that in things they see really nothing except just their advantage or disadvantage, the latter, however, the more clearly whereby there comes a facility in dealing with things.<sup>175</sup>

Such a person cannot understand the unique, lively, astounding aspects of things

For willing and aims make it so one-sided, that it sees in things only what refers to these, and the rest partly disappears, partly enters consciousness in an adultered form. For example, a traveler who is anxious and in a hurry, will see the Rhine and its banks only as a dash or stroke, and the bridge over it only as a line intersecting that stroke. In the head of the man filled with his own aims, the world appears just as a beautiful landscape does on the plan of a battlefield.<sup>176</sup>

This is a pretty self-centered life which sees objects as instruments and according to interest. This way of seeing things has consequences. Such self-centeredness is limited, perhaps entrapped way of viewing life. One is entrapped in agitations and strivings of the world. In this case, ordinary person will oscillate between suffering and boredom. When such a person strives to be happy, what she gets is oscillating between pains of desiring something which is followed by boredom; since after getting what was wanted till finding another object to struggle she will be bored.

From this discussion, we find another property of ordinary person: Unhappiness. Self-centeredness leads the individual to oscillate between suffering and disappointment. Unhappiness, suffering, boredom and

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>175</sup> PP 69.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>176</sup> WWR II 381.

disappointment are rule of this life. But they are the rules of a prison called self-centered states of living. This is exactly the point where fork in the road about transcendence from ordinary states of life is possible. Transformation of the self is possible through aesthetic perception which detaches it self from the servitude of willing and through elevated consciousness one can be freed from the prison of self-centeredness. The subject is now free from the purposeless pushings, strivings and troubles of this world; and tranquility and peace is offered to such a person. Life may be tragic but an aesthetic response to such an existence is possible where willing subject is transformed into a knowing subject and at such moments one lays aside her/his practical ambitions, s/he understands the whole and becomes the clear mirror of life:

Then all at once the peace, always sought but always escaping on that first path of willing, comes to us in its own accord, and all is well with us. It is the painless state, prized by Epicurus as the highest good and as the state of the gods; for that moment we are delivered from the miserable pressure of the will. We celebrate the Sabbath of the penal servitude of willing; the wheel of Ixion stands still.<sup>177</sup>

## 4.3 Music and *Erlösung* (Salvation)

In Gay Science, Nietzsche writes the following about Schopenhauer:

As a philosopher, Schopenhauer was the first admitted and uncompromising atheist among us Germans: this was the background of his enmity towards Hegel...As we thus reject Christian interpretation and condemn its 'meaning' as counterfeit,

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>177</sup> WWR I 196.

Schopenhauer 's question immediately comes at us in a terrifying way: *Does existence have any meaning at all?*<sup>178</sup>

This is also exactly where we reach at our discussion of aesthetic – ethic relation in Schopenhauer's philosophy. As mentioned, the link between Schopenhauer's understanding of art and morality should be found in his understanding of the world whose essence is the blind will –which is also the individual's essence- that is aimless and causes nothing but suffering. This essence generates everything from inorganic things to living creatures. 179 Schopenhauer defines Platonic Ideas at this point: They are the archetypes of the objects in empirical realm. As the essence of the world and the individual is identical, Schopenhauer concludes that the individual life will be full of suffering that has no aim as well. In addition, the existence of any individual is also insignificant. So, repeating the question of Nietzsche: Does existence have any meaning at all?

The answer to this question is definitely "No"; but, for those who cling on his/her individuality. Behind the veil of maya 180 there is also no individuation. In a state of better consciousness, where individual looses her/his sense of individuality, reaches to a kind of peacefulness. So, existence may have no meaning at all; but nothingness does have a meaning. Schopenhauer finishes his opus magnum with the following words:

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>178</sup> Nietzsche, Friedrich. *The Gay Science*, trans. Josefine Nauckhoff, Adrian Del Caro, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 219.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>179</sup> WWR I 102.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>180</sup> Schopenhauer uses this term that he borrowed from Indian philosophy which means veil of illision.

[W]e freely acknowledge that what remains after the complete abolition of the will is, for all who are still full of the will, assuredly nothing. But also conversely, to those in whom the will has turned and denied itself, this very real world of ours with all its suns and galaxies, is – nothing.<sup>181</sup>

This is not an "absolute" nothing, but "relative" nothing. Beyond the world of phenomena there is nothing. Schopenhauer's philosophy, in that sense, talks about what it denies. 182 From there on philosophy can no longer proceed positively. This is a must for a philosopher because no philosopher can "communicate incommunicable knowledge." 183 So, for Schopenhauer communicable knowledge is about the whatness of phenomenal realm which he offers renunciation from. As stated earlier, unlike the spirit of idealism of his time, Schopenhauer never celebrated the identity of the individual with the essence of the world. It was just a horrible source of suffering rather than any kind of blessedness. We are not detached from the entire universe. We are identical. This is the idea where salvation begins. Yet, according to Schopenhauer, dissolution of the individual and unification with the whole makes us understand that we are doomed to suffering as long as we attach ourselves to this world. The German word for salvation that Schopenhauer uses is *Erlösung* which can be translated as becoming untied or unfastening. This is also what Schopenhauer teaches: Dissolution of the ties of attachment to life. Then salvation should be found in detaching from life. Ego can be renounced and no salvation can be found with consciousness or individuality, rather consciousness, ego or individuality should become silent. This is also where the importance of aesthetic experience lies. Aesthetic experience silences

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>181</sup> WWR I 412.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>182</sup> WWR I 409.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>183</sup> PP 11.

the ego and in such a situation "the person who is involved in this perception is no longer an individual, for in such perception the individual has lost himself". <sup>184</sup> As the individual is freed from the subordination to will, the perceiver and the perceived becomes one.

[W]e forget our individuality, our will, and continue to exist only as pure subject, as clear mirror of the object, so that it is as though the object alone existed without anyone to perceive it, and thus we are no longer able to separate the perceiver from the perception, but the two have become one<sup>185</sup>

When the individual self, which considers it self as special, unique, extraordinary, undergoes a transformation and sees the life –as Schopenhauer oft expresses with the words of Spinoza- *sub specie aeternitatis*. <sup>186</sup> This is also the point where art and ethics coincide as Wittgenstein wonderfully expressed:

The work of art is the object seen *sub specie aeternitatis;* and the good life is the world *sub specie aeternitatis.* This is the connection between art and ethics. The usual way of looking at things sees the objects as it were from the midst of them, the view *sub specie aeternitatis* from outside.<sup>187</sup>

For Schopenhauer, in such an experience the subject becomes the clear mirror of existence and, in this sense arts provide a bridge to true salvation since through providing a temporal relief from the servitude of willing, they indicate

<sup>185</sup> WWR I 178 – 179.

<sup>186</sup> Under the aspect of eternity.

<sup>187</sup> Wittgenstein L., *Notebooks 1914- 1916* ed. G.H. von Wright and G.E.M. Anscombe (Oxford: Blackwell, 1969), (prop.7.10.16), 83e.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>184</sup> WWR I 179.

the possibility of permanent renunciation. Through sciences or practically instrumental attitudes one cannot reach the reality of the world; yet, the possibility of grasping the reality through irrational artistic or mystical ways stands open. So at the very hearth of Schopenhauer's philosophy we find a privileged knowledge which can be gained through glimpses into this forbidden realm.

Schopenhauer considers music as a superior art for gaining this privileged knowledge; since, as we have seen, while the other arts represent an Idea, music represents the inner nature of the world. And since music, depicts the reality it self, it can be considered as philosophy. Music does not reveal any Platonic Ideas as the other arts do, but it reveals the metaphysical truth:

[Music] differs from all the other arts by the fact that it is not copy of the phenomenon, or more exactly, of the will's objectivity, but it is directly a copy of the will itself, and express the metaphysical to everything physical in this world, the thing-in-itself to every phenomenon.<sup>190</sup>

Now, if we consider Schopenhauer's understanding of salvation in a nutshell, when the will reaches to cognizance of itself in human beings<sup>191</sup>, it looses its power which makes salvation possible. This also attaches redemptive power to arts; yet, music is superior to other arts with its intensity and with its

<sup>189</sup> WWR I 256-257.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>188</sup> WWR I 261.

<sup>190</sup> WWR I 262-263.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>191</sup> This is the reason why Schopenhauer emphasizes becoming clear mirror of the world.

immediate affect. Among arts music answers the question "what is life?" for *perception* more profoundly<sup>192</sup>:

Thus for *perception*, every work of art answers that question [what is life], every painting, every statue, every poem, every scene on the stage. Music also answers it, more profoundly indeed than do all the others, since in a language intelligible with absolute directness, yet not capable of translation into that of our faculty of reason, it expresses the inner most nature of all life and existence.<sup>193</sup>

Music according to Schopenhauer expresses the "inner nature of the world" 194 without any need for abstraction: Direct, immediate, intuitive knowledge is offered through music. Music has the power to communicate what cannot be delivered through rational concepts. But what cannot be delivered through rational concepts? First of all, we gain access to emotional reality through music. Music speaks of the will within individual. "Stirrings of the will" is nothing but emotion; 195 yet when Schopenhauer argues that music expresses the will within individual, it is the nature of emotion without any motivation. Music has the power to express emotions in abstract without any motives for them.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>192</sup> See WWR II 406. (Philosophy answers the question "what is life" for *reflection*)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>193</sup> WWR II 406.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>194</sup> WWR I 260.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>195</sup> "The *emotion* is a stirring of the will, just as irresistable yet only temporary, by a motive that does not obtain its power through a deep rooted inclination." WWR II 593.

[M]usic does not expresses this or that particular and definite pleasure, this or that affliction, pain, sorrow, horror, gaiety, merriment, or peace of mind, but joy, pain, sorrow, horror, gaiety, merriment, peace of mind themselves, to a certain extent in the abstract, their essential nature, without any accessories, and so also without any motives for them.<sup>196</sup>

For Schopenhauer, these emotions do not belong to any specific individual, but to everyone. We know what is happening in us, we know the "stirrings of the will" from within. Yet, these emotions are detached from motives which creates a distance from actual reality (This is also the reason why we may enjoy a very sad melody or tragedy).

Music, in that sense is a language which surpasses other arts with its denseness and immediacy with respect to other arts. Music "speaks of" something which makes it a language - a universal language since everyone knows the "stirrings of the will" form him/herself - therefore Schopenhauer finds music without any text or program self-sufficient. 197 Music is self sufficient to tell the inner nature of the world. This signifies Schopenhauer's basic claim that music reveals us the world that cannot be understood through rational discourse. In this sense, this is also where he knows that he has to stop; since he explicitly recognizes the impossibility of rationally explaining what is revealed through music.

Schopenhauer, as discussed in the previous chapter, declared that will is not the thing in itself in a Kantian sense, but it is rather a close answer to the problem of whatness of being. Inner knowledge is independent of two forms:

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>196</sup> WWR I 261.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>197</sup> Which makes opera problematic in Schopenhauer's sysytem. In addition any imitative music is also a betrayal for Schopnhauer: "It is just this universality that belongs uniquely to music, together with the most precise distinctness, that gives it that high value as the panecea of all our sorrows. Therefore, if music tries to stick too closely to the words, and to mould itself according to the events, it is endeavoring to speak a language not its own." WWR I 262.

Space and causality. Yet, it has to happen in *time*. Therefore Schopenhauer considers will is the closest answer:

[T]he inner knowledge is free from two forms belonging to outer knowledge, the form of *space*, and the form of *causality* which brings about all sense-perception. On the other hand, there still remains the form of *time*...Accordingly, in this inner knowledge the thing-in-itself has indeed to a great extent cast off its veils, but still does not appear quite naked...Accordingly, the act of will is indeed only the nearest and clearest *phenomenon* of the thing-in-itself<sup>198</sup>

Music, in a similar manner, as an art form of time which starts and finishes within an interval, it is possible to associate the experience of music with the inner experience. So, what we find is a disclosure of the world or inner essence of the world in music. This was the point where metaphysics is with music connected.

The inexpressible depth of all music, by virtue of which it floats past us as a paradise quite familiar and yet eternally remote, and is so easy to understand and yet so inexplicable is due to the fact that it reproduces all the emotions of our innermost being<sup>199</sup>

Music has the power to transform the individual into pure subject of knowing temporarily. His/her individuality is dissolved at that moment. And at such moments, the essence of the world is revealed through emotions subjectively which prepares the individual for the insight into the whole. In this experience, we find liberation from our narrow egoisms and strivings.

 $<sup>^{198}</sup>$  WWR II 197.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>199</sup> WWR I 264.

### **CHAPTER 5**

#### **EPILOGUE**

'are not all words made for the heavy? Do not all words lie to the light?

Sing! speak no more!'

F. W. Nietzsche

If a person, who never read Schopenhauer's works before, decides to start his philosophy first by reading the comments of others, s/he will be surprised and eventually amused. Philosophy professors of the academy have a distance to his philosophy; on the other hand, artists, composers and those who are interested in practical philosophy are attracted by him. Some philosophers like Heidegger or Russell ignored him and some philosophers like Nietzsche find a real philosopher of courage and honesty.

Yet, Schopenhauer's influence on the culture after him is so great that it is even unnecessary to discuss his importance. Nietzsche, Wittgenstein, Freud, Tolstoy, Wagner, Mahler or Prokefiev are few great figures that can be counted. As Young points through the great individuals that Schopenhauer influenced, his thoughts "has become a part of the natural conciousness of the present age." 200 Professional philosophers often engage with his philosophy due to his great influence; yet Schopenhauer's philosophy offers tremendous wisdom concerning life seen as a whole. His ideas are not detached from "life problems." After setting great world view, Schopenhauer deals with spiritual

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>200</sup> Young J., Schopenhauer, (New York: Routledge, 2005), 245.

and ethical concerns, is also an extraordinary illustration of how to do philosophy. Philosophy has to touch life problems, and even, as Schopenhauer writes, offer consolation to us in our transitory existence. Therefore, I even venture to say that the spirit of philosophy is enlivened and refreshed in his writings.

Philosophy makes us remember. "Remember" because actually we have a direct, immediate contact with the world and we are also a part of this world; yet we still want it to be something other than what it is. We believe this world to be a lie and therefore search for salvation in other worlds. Since the terrors of this existence make suffering inevitable, yearning for a blessed life after death becomes dominant. Or we believe that money, fame, glory can provide permanency or stability; yet the world offers no such guarantee as well. So, in this sense philosophy doesn't have to teach a new thing, it may start with breaking our wishful thoughts. The spring of wishful thoughts should be sought in fear: Fear of this changing world and fear of death. These fears motivate us to search for a meaning to hold on to, or a soothing idea to step on to. Fears of this life that boil inside create many illusions about life.

Schopenhauer's philosophy is an attack to such illusions. And rational knowledge, even though it has a vital role for communication and practical issues, can serve for fixing what we already know in a different way. As mentioned in previous chapters, through reason, we do not extend our knowledge, just give it another form. In this sense, what Schopenhauer offers is a different way of existing: Being moved by the idea of existing beyond practical concerns, being carried away by aesthetical or mystical experiences. To be able to be carried away by such experiences, one has to overcome his/her practical concerns and release the ties (*Erlösung*) that connect us too fest to

daily practical concerns. In this way, philosophy makes us remember what life is beyond the walls of illusions. May be beyond these walls there is no God to be found, life is purposeless, we are not special beings etc. but there is freedom from sufferings and boredom of this life for such an inspired person. This is a state beyond will-to-life and this willess state lets one become free from selfish, unhappy agitations and become part of a greater reality. One cannot be a practical egoist and experience beauty. Or in other words if one experiences beauty, then s/he is not anymore an egoist. Aesthetic experience offer freedom from practical egoism, usual daily cares, and where-when we are. Experiencing such a state is therefore a key to moral judgements as well. What do we understand when we experience beauty? For Schopenhauer, we understand compassion. Because compassion requires transcendence of the egoistic self.

Putting these remarks together, this way of viewing the world is becoming part of living *sub specie aeternataits*. In this way, philosphy makes us remember this essence of our being. It is possible to understand life starting from within and without being carried away by daily practical agitations of this world. In this way, philosophy offers vitality.

And turning back to our discussion on music, we already mentioned that, in Schopenhauer's thought, it is philosophy without concepts. And as music releases us from daily concerns, carries us away from practical concerns and release the ties that connect us too fest to daily practical concerns, Schopenhauer is definitely right in defining music as philosophy.

## 5.1. Music as Philosophy

Music is glorified in Schopenhauer's philosophy like no other philosopher before him. It is possible to resist and object his evaluation of music according to the music theory of his time, his contrast of other arts with music and his contrast of instrumental music to opera; yet, still when we look at the general picture of his philosophy of music his ideas are invaluable. In this big picture what we recognize is the meaning of existing and the meaning of knowing; aesthetic experience as liberation from egoistic and practical strivings and thus, clearing the way for the *only possible* ethical living. Thomas Mann is quite right in defining Schopenhauer's *opus magnum, The world as Will And Representation*, as wonderful symphony composed of four parts.

We try to understand life. And due to the dominance of logical thinking and rationality of our time, it is generally assumed that concepts and science are enough to achieve this goal. Dry concepts, schematizing, registering is not only way to understand. We are now alive, and will die at some point: Life, death, flowing time, strivings, sufferings, birth and existence as a whole do not fit into our dry concepts. But arts have the power to understand all these within a blessed disinterested stance. This understanding is quite vital because it is *the only* link between aesthetics and morality.

When one achieves aesthetic understanding, s/he realizes the futility of strivings. It is not important if you are a sir, or lord anymore and it is not important how much money or possessions one has. Through aesthetic experience, one temporarily perceives "under the aspect of eternity." All narrow concerns are silenced. All the veils that separate one from the rest of the world are lifted and through this feeling of being united with everything

else s/he also understands what compassion is. S/he is at such moments not a selfish person who only cares about her/his daily agitations. In this new perceptual world, s/he understands the sufferings of others. This is *the* ethical way of living.

Ethics has nothing to do with memorizing ethical theories, belonging to a religious group, or practicing routines of any sect: Ethical living means being compassionate. As Schopenhauer mentions, one cannot become morally good through reading books on morality or one cannot experience beauty and become artists just through studying aesthetics. Knowledge is needed: but what kind of knowledge? Knowledge which is fresh, alive and penetrating is vital for an ethical life. And this life is blessed with happiness; since unhappiness is for those who always remain practical and narrow in this world of wiling. This thought rightly attracts artists and those who consider philosophy as a way of living. His metaphysical vision of the world is open to many criticisms; yet this does not undervalue the importance of his philosophy.

It is definitely difficult to face a world through Schopenhauerian glasses; since what one will see is a meaningless world of suffering and illusions. Yet, even such an understanding has a positive value for self-transformation. It reminds us of the mystery of existing and teaches what kind of a life we have. It removes us from our daily routines and, through feeling united with everything else in life, prepares us for compassion.

So, in Schopenhauer what we find is an exalted way of knowing –under the aspect of eternity (*Sub specie aetarnatitatis*)- and through such knowing what one gets is an exalted way of living.

We are alive. We have our lives. And we want to live a good life. Perhaps not directly we think that knowledge will provide us a good living. Some people think that the knowledge of how to make a fortune is the necessary condition for a good living; for some how to maximize bodily pleasures and for some it is the knowledge of how to be respected by others. Through such kind of knowing we all aim at a life free from our agonies, sufferings, troubles...The problem is where to find the knowledge which offers tranquility. We lack peace of mind and search for it.

Schopenhauer has a lot to offer on this issue. We suffer because we are practical and egoistic. And one understands his situation on this world and the world itself by encountering beauty and experience of beauty tears one from his practical concerns and offers a totally different perspective of seeing the world. The German word *erlösung* is translated as salvation in English. This word has the allusion of becoming untied or loosing the ties. The word has the connotation that if one looses his/her ties with the world than salvation is possible.

For thousands and thousands of years, just like every other creature, man oscillates between suffering and boredom since s/he is the slave of will; yet, through art, one realizes this situation and the knot slowly solves. Now, through such salvation (*Erlösung*), s/he feels free from practical concerns and this freedom gives the chance to become a better person. S/he has the capacity contemplate about this life. Now, s/he has the chance to enjoy the world whereas practical man has to suffer in this world.

Somehow, we will live and we will die. But the question about human life can be formulated as follows: Is a different life beyond the world of egoistic wheeling and dealings, sufferings and boredom which offers the awareness of

the enigmatic nature of existence? Is good and beautiful life of tranquility and peace possible? If possible, where should we search for such a life?

At this point Schopenhauer, has an invitation or he has a friendly call (may be he wouldn't agree that he has an invitation): There are possible ways of understanding apart from our egoistically motivated ones and transcending particular practical concerns is possible. A better consciousness is possible. A better life is possible

When we consider Schopenhuaer's philosophy from this perspective, now we can compare it with the voice in Socrates' dream that I mentioned at the very begining. If we loose the music of life, sinked in practical concerns and forgot the wonders of existence then Schopenhauer's philosophy whispers to our ears:

"...., make music!"

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## **APPENDICES**

## **APPENDIX A: CURRICULUM VITAE**

# PERSONAL INFORMATION

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## **EDUCATION**

Degree	Institution	Year of Graduation
MS	METU, Philosophy	2006
BS	METU, STATISTICS (Major Field)	2002
BS	METU, PHILOSOPHY (Minor Fie	eld) 2001
High School	Atatürk Anadolu Lisesi, Ankara	1997

## **SCHOLARSHIPS**

Scholarship for research at Schopenhauer-Research Centre of the Johannes Gutenberg-University Mainz Germany under supervision of Prof. Dr. Matthias Kossler from Turkish Scientific and Technical Council (TUBITAK) 03.2010 - 08. 2010

#### **WORK EXPERIENCE**

Year	Place	Enrollment
2005-2012	METU Department of Philosophy	Research Assistant
2003-2004	Christopherus Haus e.V. in Witten-Germ	any Volunteer
	for the handicapped people	
2002-2003	METU -International Students and	Research Assistant
	Study Abroad Office	

### **FOREIGN LANGUAGES**

Advanced English (KPDS 83,75), Advanced German (Test DAF 4-5-4-4)

### **PUBLICATIONS**

- **1.** Aktaş, A. O. "Hayatı Müzikle Anlamak ve Schopenhauer Felsefesinde Müzik", *Doğu-Batı*, Sayı 62 (Ağustos-Eylül-Ekim 2012), 43-71.
- **2.** Aktaş, A. O., "A Discussion of Integration from a Nietzschean Perspective" *Concerning Peace: New Perspectives on Utopia* Ed. Kai Gregor and Sergueï Spetschinsky, (UK: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2010), 119-128.
- **3.** Aktaş, A. O., "Anlam Arayışının Tehlikeleri Üzerine" (On the Dangers Of Searching for Meaning in Life) *Anlam Kavramı Üzerine Yeni Denemeler* der. A. Sol & S. Kibar & S.A. Bayram, (Legal Yayıncılık, İstanbul, 2010), 325-330.
- **4.** Aktaş, A. O., "Nietzsche'nin Korku ve Neşe Anlayışı Üzerine bir Deneme" ("An Essay on Nietzsche's Understanding of Fear and Joy") in Felsefe Yazın 04-05 2008, Felsefeciler Derneği , 43-46.

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**5.** Nietzsche, F.W., "Ahlak Dışı Anlamda Doğru ve Yalan Üzerine" ("Über Wahrheit und Lüge im aussermoralischen Sinne") trans Aktaş, A. O., in *Felsefe Tartışmaları 48* 

#### **APPENDIX B**

### **TURKISH SUMMARY\***

#### I.Müzik ve Felsefe

Müzik vardır, hayatın her alanına sızmıştır ve bir etkileşim ağı içerisinde çok önemli bir konumda durur: Kültür, alışveriş, reklam dünyası, düşünce, kimlik oluşumu, politika, din ve buna benzer hayatta akla gelebilecek ne varsa müzikle bir şekilde bağlıdır. Her toplumun dili olduğu gibi müziği de vardır. Bu nedenle müzik nedir sorusunun cevabı, müziğin bağlı olduğu ağın diğer ucundaki öğeler atılıp, kırpılıp sadece ses, ritm, konturpuan, melodi, harmoni gibi özelliklere indirgenerek anlaşılamaz. Müziğin taşıdığı çok fazla sırlar vardır. Öyleyse felsefe ve müzik bir anlamda elele vermelidir.

Peki, felsefe ve müzik bağını nerde aramalıyız? Bu sorunun cevabı müziğin taşıdığı gizli anlamlarla alakalıdır. Müziğin taşıdığı anlamlar kelimelere ihtiyaç duymadan iletilir. İşte müzikle ilgilenen felsefenin de görevi bu mesajı olabildiğince ifşa etme çabasıdır diyebiliriz. Müziği sadece kendi içinde müzik olarak görüp onun hayatın diğer alanlarıyla olan bağını gözardı etmek felsefi açıdan hatadır. "Müzik nedir ve ne anlatır?" sorusunun cevabı "İşte budur" diye verilebilecek türden değildir. İnsani bütün faaliyetlerin içine sızmış anlamlar çokluğu çerçevesinden bakılması lazımdır; zira müzik tam olarak bunu yapar. Varlık, ölüm, cinsellik, din, reklamlar, politika, kimlik hep müzikle bağlıdır.

<sup>\*</sup> Bu özetten önemli bir bölüm tarafımdan şu şekilde yayınlanmıştır: "Hayatı Müzikle Anlamak ve Schopenhauer Felsefesinde Müzik", *Doğu-Batı*, Sayı 62 (Ağustos-Eylül-Ekim 2012), 43-71.

Müziğin önemi bu noktada bu tezin yazılış amacını da el veriyor. Bu tez altta yatan bir inançtan kaynaklanıyor: Hayat güzel olabilir. Müzik –veya herhangi bir vesile- insanda daha iyiye dönüşüme yol açabilir. Müzik insanı bölünmüşlüğünden alıp, onu tekrar bütün yapma gücüne sahiptir ki bu hayatın rutinleri ve alışkanlıkları içinde kabuk bağlayıp kaybolmuş insanı tekrar dirileştirebilir ve olabileceği şeye dönüşebileceğini hatırlatır. Alışkanlıklar sahte bir bitimsizlik hissi verir: Yaşadığım şu an, daha önce yaşadıklarımın ve sonra yaşayacaklarımın aynısı...Böyle rutine gömülmüş ve kendini unutmuş insan aslında ölümlü olduğunu unutmuştur ve can sıkıntısı böyle bir hayatın kaçınılmaz sonucu olacaktır.

Oysa dem gelir, dem geçer öyleyse yaşam için dem bu demdir. Yani hayatın her anı biriciktir. İnsan olmak hırsların, basma kalıp düşüncelerin, rutinlerin, sıkkınlıkların yüklerinin kalkması ile hafiflemek demektir. Kendi bencil varoluş sınırlarının kırılırmasıyla insan, adına hayat denilen, kendisi haricinde akan bu muazzam cereyanın farkına varır. Akordu bozuk olup çirkin bir hayat süren insan, güzelliklere özgürlüğe ve aşka uygun akortlanır. Hayat artık, katlanılası bir yük, çekilesi bir kahır değil, şaşılası bir gizem, kutlanılası bir şenlik haline gelir.

Bu tez felsefenin ve müziğin insanın kalbine dokunup, bu dönüşüme yol açabileceği inancı ile yazıldı. Felsefe hayatın ne olduğunu kafaya anlatmaya çalışırken, müzik hayatın ne olduğunu kalbe anlatır. Bu temel iddiayı Schopenhauer felsefesi üzerinden inceleyeceğim.

Schopenhauer felsefesinde müziğin yeri biriciktir. Şimdilik kısaca ifade etmek gerekirse, Schopenhauer, müziğin öte bir gerçekliğe işaret ettiğini ve bu gerçekliğe, bilimsel veya kavramsal bilginin giriş izni olmadığını savunmuştur. Estetiğe bilim ve mantıktan daha fazla önem vermesi ve bunu müthiş bir

açıklıkla yapabilmiş olması, Batı felsefesinde yeni bir gün doğumu olarak bile anlaşılabilir. Müzik, Schopenhauer'a göre, fenomenlerin ötesinde olan aşkın bir gerçekliğe sezgi sağlar; ki felsefenin görevi de tam olarak budur. Anlaşılan şey dile getirilemez; fakat yine de bilinebilir.<sup>201</sup> Ve böylece müziğin anlattığı şey gerçek felsefeye dönüşür.<sup>202</sup>

# I.II. Tezin İlgileneceği Sorunlar

Her ne kadar buraya kadar sözü edilen düşünceler çekici ve ilginç olsa da, Schopenhauer felsefesi bazı zorluklar barındırmaktadır. Örneğin Schopenhauer'ın fenomenlerin ötesinde bir alana sezgi sağlanabilir düşüncesi başlı başına sorunludur. Schopenhauer'ın bu iddiası bir şekilde açıklığa kavuşturulmalıdır; aksi takdirde müziğin bize hayatın gerçeğini açıyor iddiası anlaşılamaz. Ben, tezimde bu zorluğu aşmak için Schopenhauer'ın Kant'çı anlamda her hangi bir kendinde-şeyin bilgisine ulaşılamayacağını ve Schopenhauer'ın felsefesinin fenomenler dünyası ile sınırlı algılanması gerektiğini göstereceğim.

Görünüş ve gerçeklik tartışması 18.yüzyıl sonrasında, özellikle Kant'ın "Kopernik devrimi" ile tekrar canlanmıştır. Kant, felsefi projesinin, bilginin ulaşabileceği sınırları çizmek ve inanca yer açabilmek olduğunu belirtmiş, bizim bilgi dediğimiz şeyin, aslında nesnelerin bize görünüşleri ile alakalı olduğunu iddia etmiştir. Bu nedenle dünyanın bize göründüğü halini değil de, bizden bağımsız olarak gerçekte olduğu halini anlatabilmek için "kendinde-şey" (Ding-an-Sich) terimini kullanmıştır. Kant, Ahlak Metafiziğinin Temellendirilmesi adlı eserinin sonlarında da, algılanabilir dünyanın sınırına geldiğimizde bir "öte" kalacağından bahseder. Wittgenstein da bu tartışmaya katkıda bulunmuş önemli bir filozoftur. Dilin sınırlarını aynı zamanda dünyanın sınırları olarak görmüş ve Tractacus Logico Philosophicus adlı kitabını, konuşulamayacak şeyler hakkında susmayı tavsiye ederek bitirmiştir. Wittgenstein, bu sözleri, dile gelmez olanın varlığını yadsımak amacıyla değil; aksine, hayatta kelimelerin nüfuz edemeyeceği bir alan olduğuna işaret etmek amacıyla kaleme almıştır. Nitekim, Wittgenstein, kavramsal anlayışın ötesine geçebilmek için "merdiveni fırlatmak"tan bahseder: Aklın merdiveniyle yeterince tırmandıktan sonra artık merdiveni tekmelemek gerekir. Rasyonelliğin sınırları konusundaki tartışmayı en açık ve dikkatlice tartışan düşünür ise Arthur Schopenhauer olmuştur.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>202</sup> WWR I 264.

Belirttiğim üzere Schopenhauer *kendinde-şeyin* bilgisine ulaşabileceğimizi ve bu sayede bir tür selamete erilebileceğini iddia ediyor. Bizim dünyanın ızdıraplarından özgürleşmemizi sağlıyan bu bilgiyi sanatlar ve özellikle müzik esinliyor. Ben, bu konuda Schopenhauer'ın *kendinde-şey* kelimesini kullanışının yanıltıcı olduğunu, halen fenomenlerle ilgili olduğunu netleştirmeye çalışacağım. Bu çabanın önemi ise Schopenhauer felsefesi ile müzik arasında doğal bir bağ kurulmuş olacak.Bu Schopenhauer'ın daha doğal ve makul bir okumasını mümkün kılacak ve bu sayede müziğin anlattığı şey ile ilgili fenomenal alanın dışında bir gerçeklik aranmayacak.

Tezimde amaçladığım diğer bir konu ise felsefenin ne olduğuna dair bir anlayış üzerine şekilleniyor. Felsefenin, Piere Hadot'nun etkili kitaplarında bize tekrar hatırlattığı üzere, bir yaşam şekillendirme uğraşısı, uygulamaya yönelik yaşam yolu olduğu inancı üzerine şunu sorguluyorum: Müzik, eğer Schopenhauer'ın iddia ettiği gibi felsefenin anlattığı şeyi -hayatı- anlatan, başka bir şekilde felsefe yapma biçimiyse eğer, o zaman müziğin hayat şekillendirme gücünü de sorgulamak tezimin bir diğer amacı. Yani özetle felsefenin dönüştürücü gücü olduğu iddiası üzerine müziğin dönüştürücü gücünü sorgulamak bu tezin diğer amacı. Fakat, bu konuda da bir zorlukla karşılaşıyoruz, o da Schopenhauer'ın kendisinin felsefeyi tamıyla teorik bir olarak gördüğü iddiası. Tüm bunlara olarak insanın uğraşı ek dönüşebileceğine dair de düşüncesi net: insan karakteri değişmez. Schopenhauer'ın bu iddiaları müzikal deneyim ve kişisel dönüşüm arasında bir bağ kurma ihtimalini bloke ediyor. Bu noktada, Schopenhaer felsefesinin dolaylı da olsa yaşam için yol gösterici niteliklerinin çok güçlü olduğunu göstereceğim.

## I.III. Sokrates, Müzik Yap!

Ölüm saati yaklaşan Sokrates, çevresinde toplanmış dostlarına son zamanlarında sıkça görmeye başladığı eski bir rüyadan bahseder. Rüya, kendisine müzik yapmasını emretmektedir.

Hayatımda bu rüyayı birçok defalar şu veya bu şekilde görmüşümdür; fakat rüya, her defasında bana aynı şeyi söylüyordu: "Sokrates, müzik yap". Ve nasıl ki seyirciler tezahürat yaparak koşuculara cesaret verirlerse, ben de, rüyanın beni zaten yaptığım işi yapmaya, felsefe yapmaya -ki felsefe en yüce müziktir- teşvik ettiğini düşünürdüm. Fakat şimdi, davanın bittiği, festivalin ölümümü geciktirdiği süre içerisinde düşündüm ki, rüya bana düpedüz müzik yapmamı emrediyor ve emre uymamak olmaz.<sup>203</sup>

Sokrates'in, müzik yapmaktan böyle olumlu bir şekilde bahsetmesi çok ilginçtir; fakat daha ziyade kafa karıştırıcıdır çünkü rasyonel, aklı sanatların önüne çıkarmasıyla emsal teşkil etmiş ve bu konudaki sözleri yüzyıllarca etkili olmuş olan Sokrates, kelimenin tam anlamıyla müzikle ilgilenmektedir.

Nietzsche, *Tragedyanın Doğuşu* adlı eserinde, "müzik yapan Sokrates" çelişkisinin altını çizmiştir. Nietzsche, Sokrates'i akıl, mantık ve diyalektik olarak görür ve ona göre, Sokrates figürü; modern, mantıklı, hesapçı, bilimsel insan tipinin ilk örneğidir. Bunun yanında, yukarıdaki alıntı Nietzsche için özellikle önem taşımaktadır çünkü Sokrates figürüyle ifade bulan, hayata yalnızca akıl ve mantık çerçevesinden bakma tutumu, adeta kendisinden şüphe etmektedir. Bu konuda Nietzsche şunları söylemektedir: "Sokrates'in, rüyasında duyduğu bu sözler, mantık evreninin sınırları konusunda düştüğü şüphenin biricik işaretidir. Sokrates, kendisine şöyle sormuş olmalı: 'Aklımın

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>203</sup> Plato, *Phaedo*, çev. Brann E., Kalkavage P., Salem E. (Newburyport: Focus Publishing/R Collins Co., 1998), 60e-61a.

almadığı şeyi anlaşılamaz olarak nitelemekte çok mu aceleci davrandım? Belki de mantık insanının girmesine izin olmayan bir bilgelik alanı vardır. Belki de sanat, aklın olmazsa olmaz tamamlayıcısı olarak görülmelidir.""<sup>204</sup>

Nietzsche'nin ele aldığı şekliyle, "müzik yapan Sokrates" figüründe ifadesini bulan kadim felsefe sorunu, anlayışın ne olduğu ve bunu elde etme araçlarının neler olduğudur diyebiliriz. "Anlamak" sadece hesap eden zihnin tekelinde olan bir yeti midir? Yoksa hesap eden, mantıksal çıkarımlar yapan zihnin giriş izni olmadığı başka bir anlayış mümkün müdür? Sanat, aklın ve mantığın bize sunamadığı bir anlayış sunabilir mi?

Bu tezde müzik örneği üzerinden açtığım bu tartışmaya, yine müzik üzerinden "müzisyenin filozofu" şeklinde niteleyebileceğimiz Artur Schopenhauer'ın (1788-1860) düşüncelerini, ayrıntıya girmeye çalışarak inceleyeceğim; fakat Schopenhauer'a gelene kadar müzik üzerine düşüncelerin ne minvalde geliştiğine de kısaca bir göz atacağım. Müzik nasıl olur da bizi ötelere taşır? Müziğin bizi taşıdığı o öteler neye benzer? Müziğe ve dolayısıyla hayata yüklenebilecek anlam dünyası ne denli zengindir? İşte tüm bu sorulara kısmen de olsa yanıt bulabilmek için, Schopenhauer felsefesini incelemeye başlamadan önce, kabaca müziğe yüklenen anlamların macerasını sunmaya çalışacağım.<sup>205</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>204</sup> Nietzsche, Friedrich. *The Birth of Tragedy and The Genealogy of Morals*, çev. Francis Golffing, (New York: Doubleday & Company, 1956), 90.

Müziğe atfedilen anlamların tarihini yazmak, kısmen zor bir uğraş; çünkü müziğe atfedilen anlamların tarihi geniş ve kapsamlı bir değerlendirme gerektirir. Her dönemin kendine has sosyoekonomik koşullarını ve kültürü etkileyen düşünce yapılarını göz ardı etmemek gerekir. Ve bu konu Batı felsefesi tarihinin sınırlarını çok aşar. Daha nicelerinin arasında, Farabi, Gazali, İbn-i Sina incelenmesi gereken büyük filozoflardır ve eski Çin, Hint, Sümer medeniyetleri, değerlendirilmesi gereken kültürlerdir. Fakat bu kısa yazıda müziğe yüklenilen anlamların tarihini -eksik olduğunun farkında olmama rağmen- yazma amacım, müziği daha öte bir yerlere ulaştıran bir köprü olarak değerlendiren belli başlı filozoflara örnekler vermektir.

Müzik üzerine ortaya konulan düşünceler verildikten sonra, özellikle Schopenhauer üzerinde duracak olmamın sebebi ise Schopenhauer'ın, varlığı anlayışımız ve bunun müzikle ilişkisi tartışması içerisinde istisnai bir konuma sahip olmasıdır. Schopenhauer'ın düşünceleri, özellikle müzisyenler ve sanatçılarda heyecan uyandırmıştır; örneğin Wagner, onun düşüncelerini temel alarak "Tristian ve Isolde" ve "Parsifal" gibi eserleri bestelemiştir. Hatta bu kadarla da kalmayıp Schopenhauer felsefesiyle karşılaşmasını, hayatının en önemli olayı olarak nitelendirmiştir. Daha sonra müzik dünyasının Mahler, Prokofiev, Rimsky-Korsakov gibi büyük isimleri de Schopenhauer'ın fikirlerini çeşitli vesilelerle kullanmışlardır. 207

Schopenhauer'ın, düşünürlere etkisi ise çelişkili bir konudur. Schopenhauer felsefesine, ihtiva ettiği karanlık varlık anlayışı nedeniyle yaklaşmayanlar veya onun düşüncelerinin –bazı çelişkiler barındırdığı içinpek de geçerliliğinin olmadığını savunanlar olmasına rağmen; Schopenhauer, Batı Avrupa felsefesine doğu felsefesini tanıtarak, Kant ve Hegel felsefelerini eleştirerek, Nietzsche, Wittgenstein, Proust, Turgenyev, Beckett gibi filozof ve yazarları etkileyerek felsefe tarihindeki özel konumunu elde etmiştir.

### II. Müziğe Yüklenen Anlamların Tarihteki Serüveni

Müzik evrenseldir. Müziğe atfedilen anlamlar değişebilir, müzikal zevkler farklı olabilir; fakat bilinen bütün kültürler müzik yapmıştır ve yapmaktadır.

<sup>206</sup> Bkz: Barry, Elizabeth Wendell "What Wagner Found in Schopenhauer's Philosophy" The Musical Quarterly, Vol. 11, No. 1. (Ocak., 1925), 132-134.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>207</sup> Bkz: Goehr, L., "Schopenhauer and the musicians: an inquiry into the sounds of silence and the limits of philosophizing about music", ed. Dale Jacquette *Schopenhauer*, *Philosophy*, and the *Arts*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 213-214.

Müzikle uğraşmayan herhangi bir halk, kabile, toplum, kültür yoktur. Tarih öncesi dönemlerin karanlığından dahi bu güne ulaşmış kemik flütler ve duvar resimleri vardır. İşte bu anlamda müzik evrenseldir.

İnsanın, ateşi yaklaşık 300.000 sene önce bulduğu tahmin edilmektedir. Bulunan en eski müzik aleti ise kemikten bir flüttür ve yaklaşık 50000 yaşındadır. Kemik flüt gibi görece karmaşık bir müzik aletine 50000 yıl önce sahipsek, bu demek oluyor ki, tahta flütleri veya daha az karmaşık müzik aletlerini daha da önceden yapabiliyorduk. Ellerimizi çırparak veya birtakım sesler çıkararak da müzik yapmış olduğumuzu düşünürsek, müzikle olan uğraşımızın, büyük ihtimalle, ateşin bulunmasından da önce başlamış olduğu sonucuna ulaşabiliriz. <sup>208</sup> Bunun yanında, atalarımızın müzik hakkındaki düşünceleriyle ilgili olarak, özellikle bunların yazılı olarak kaydedilmeye başlandığı, medeniyetlerin oluşumundan sonraki dönemler bize fikir vermektedir. Bu nedenle milattan önce 4000-5000 yıllarına göz atarak başlamak faydalı olabilir; zira ilk notasyonlar bu dönemde oluşmaya başlamıştır. Ayrıca bu yıllarda artık arplar, lirler ve sitarlara sahiptik ve en önemlisi, müzik ile ilgili düşünceler yazılı olarak kaydedilmeye başlanmıştı.

Pisagordan yüzyıllar önce, Çin ve Mezapotamya'da, müzik yapmakta kullanılan tel uzunlukları ve buna bağlı olarak çıkan sesler hakkında çok şey biliniyordu.<sup>209</sup> Çin'de müziğin çok yönlü ve gelişmiş bir biçimde bilindiğine dair kalıntılar, buna yeterli kanıt oluşturmaktadır. Çin müziğinin, müzik

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>208</sup> Bkz: Cross Ian, "Is music the most important thing we ever did? Music, development and evolution", (Ed. In Suk Won Yi) *Music, mind and science*, Seul National University Press, Seul 1999; s.10-39; http://www.mus.cam.ac.uk/~ic108/PDF/IRMCMMS98.pdf (ET: 16.07.2010) Bu makalesinde Ian Cross müziğin insan evrimindeki rolü, bilişsel ve sosyal yetenekler üzerindeki etkisi ile insan biyolojisi ve müzik bağını inceliyor.

<sup>209</sup> Griffiths, P., A Concise History of Western Music, (Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 8.

aletlerinin, onların müzik hakkındaki düşüncelerinin, öncelikle komşu ülkelere, sonra Hindistan üzerinden Mısır'a ve oradan da Avrupa'ya yayıldığı iddia edilmektedir.210 Müziğin eğitim alanındaki rolü de Platon'dan çok önce Çin'de ifadesini bulmuştur.<sup>211</sup>

Mezopotamya, Sümer, Babil, Akad kültürlerinden kalan buluntular da, bu kültürlerde müziğin önemine işaret etmektedir. Bilinen ilk notaya dökülmüş eser, antik Ugarit şehri yakınlarında, Ay Tanrıçası için kilden bir tablete yazılmış bir şarkıdır.<sup>212</sup>

Yunanlar için ise müziğin özellikle iki anlamı öne çıkmaktadır: metafizik ve etik anlamlar. Antik Yunan kültürü için doğanın bir düzeni olduğu şüphe götürmez bir gerçektir ve bu nedenle evrensel düzen her alanda aranmıştır. İlahi düzen (logos) nasıl kozmos için geçerliyse, insan için de geçerlidir. Ve bu düzen müzikal olarak karakterize edilir. Harmoni sadece dünya için değil insan için de geçerlidir. 213 Zıtların uyumunu ifade eden harmoni; mitlere, evrenin yaratılış hikâyelerine, dine ve felsefi düşünceye karışmıştır. Pisagor evren ve matematik ile ilgili fikirlerini müziğe bağlamıştır ki bu düşünce, orta çağın sonlarına kadar Batı düşüncesinde etkili olmuştur. Müzik, Yunan dünyasında, sadece akıp giden güzel sesler olarak düşünülmemiştir; oranlar arasındaki ezeli uyum ve daha yüce gerçeklere ulaşmak için bir köprü olarak görülmüştür.

<sup>210</sup> A.g.e., 55.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>211</sup> "Konfüçyüs (M.Ö. 551 – M.Ö. 479) tam olan müziği, kusurlu müzikten ayırmıştır. Tam olan müzik, insanda uyum ve devlette düzen sağlama gücüne sahiptir. Onun bu düşünceleri müzik hakkında ilk yazılı eserler bırakan Platon (M.Ö. 429 – M.Ö. 347) tarafından tekrarlanmıştır." A.g.e., 55.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>212</sup> A.g.e., 9.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>213</sup> Bkz: Lippman, Edward A., *Musical Thought in Ancient Greece*, (New York & London: Colombia University Press), 1-41.

## II. I.I Mitolojiden Logosa

Filozoflar müzikle ilgili düşüncelerini ifade etmeden çok önce, evrendeki uyum ve insanın ahlaki yapısı, mitlerde ve hikâyelerde çoktan müzikle birleştirilmişti. Bunun en önemli örneği, Yunan mitolojisinde yer alan efsanevi müzisyen Orfeus'un hikâyesidir: Orfeus, ölen karısı Euridike'nin peşinden yeraltı dünyasına inip karısını geri getirmek ister. Orfeus, yeraltı dünyasına girip şarkısını söylemeye başladığında, yeraltı dünyasının kralı Hades insafa gelir ve Orfeus'un Euridike'yi götürmesine izin verir. Fakat bunun için Hades'in bir şartı vardır: Orfeus, yeryüzüne tekrar çıkana kadar, arkasını dönüp karısına bakmayacaktır. Orfeus, tam yeryüzüne çıkacakken dayanamayıp karısına döner, bakar ve böylece karısını tekrar kaybeder. Kendisi de daha sonra, Dionysos'un takipçisi olan maenadlar tarafından öldürülür.<sup>214</sup>

Bu şekilde kabaca anlattığım lir üstadı Orfeus'un efsanesi, zamanla Apollocu ve Dionysosçu elementler içermeye başlamıştır. Lir, Apollo'nun müzik aletidir ve açık bir anlayışı sembolize etmektedir. Fakat Orfeus mitinde müzik yoluyla insanın kendisini kaybedip ruhunun arınması da önemli bir konudur ki bu da Dionysos'un gücü dâhilinde olan bir durumdur. İlahi olanla birleşme, ruhun arınması, akıl yoluyla birtakım işaretlerin çözümlenmesi, ruhun zaaflarınından kurtuluşu düşüncelerini özünde barındıran Orfeus miti, bu özellikleriyle felsefeye de el vermiştir.

Orfeusçuluğun en önemli mezhebi, hiç şüphesiz, Pisagorculardır: yarı bilim insanları, yarı gizemci topluluk.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>214</sup> Yunan mitolojisinde Dionisus'un kadın takipçileri.

### II. I.II. Pisagor: Evrenin Müziği

Samos'lu Pisagor (M.Ö. 570 - M.Ö. 495), Batı dünyasının ilk müzik teorisyeni olarak görülebilir; zira matematiksel kuralları seslere uygulayarak birtakım formüller geliştirmiştir. Pisagorcular için harmoninin ve matematiğinin kurallarını anlamak çok önemli olmuştur; çünkü onlar gezegenlerin dönerken sesler çıkardığına inanmışlardır. <sup>215</sup> Pisagorcuların başarılarını belirlemek ve bunları net bir şekilde sıralamak günümüzde zordur fakat şunu söyleyebiliriz ki, müziği kozmolojiyle birleştirmelerinin etkisi yüzyıllarca sürmüştür.

Müzik, Pisagorcular için eğlenceli bir hobi olmaktan çok öte bir anlam taşımaktadır: Evreni anlamanın yolu, müziği anlamaktan geçmektedir; zira bütün evren müzikal prensipler üzerine kuruldur. Onlara göre, müziğin bu ana anlamının yanında, bir de yan anlamı vardır: ruhsal şifa vermesi. Müziğin insan ruhu üzerindeki gücünün farkında olan Pisagorcular, dinleyicinin ruh halinde olumlu değişiklikler yapmak amacıyla müziği kullanmışlardır. <sup>216</sup> Müzik huzur, neşe veya heyecan yaratmakta kullanılmıştır. Pisagorcular, müziğin kişinin iç dünyasında değişiklikler yaratarak, fiziksel sorunları dahi iyileştireceğine inanmışlardır. <sup>217</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>215</sup>Ferguson Kitty, *The Music of Pythagoras*, (New York, Walker & Company, 2008), 258.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>216</sup> West, M.L., *Ancient Greek Music*, (Oxford : Clarendon Press ; New York : Oxford University Press, c1992, 2005), 31.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>217</sup> "Pisagorcuların bir tür müzikal psikoterapi ilmi geliştirdikleri (veya daha doğrusu Pisagor'un kendisinden miras aldıkları) iddia edilmektedir. Kendilerini uyandıklarında diri ve canlı tutacak günlük şarkılar ve lir eserleri programları vardı ve yatağa giderken kendilerini günlük sıkıntılardan uzaklaştıracak makul ve ilham dolu rüyaları esinleyecek müzikler dinlerlerdi." A.g.e., 31.

# II. I.III. Platon: Ahlaki Eğitim ve Müzik

Müzik hakkında birçok değerli düşünceyi Antik Yunan filozofu Platon (M.Ö. 429-M.Ö. 347) yazıya dökmüştür. Müzik, Platon'un felsefesinde, eğitimle alakalıdır: Ona göre iyi ya da kötü müzik yoktur, doğru veya yanlış müzik vardır. Başka bir şekilde ifade edecek olursak, ahlaki açıdan olumlu etkisi olan veya yozlaştırıcı etkisi olan müzikler vardır. Pisagor düşüncesinde yer alan kozmik düzen ve müzik bağı, Platon'da çok da vurgulanmaz, müzik bir eğitim aracı olarak görülür. Gençler doğru melodiler ve doğru tonlarda müzik dinlerlerse, bu onların daha iyi insanlara dönüşmelerine yardımcı olabilir. Eğer, gençler uygun müzikleri dinlemezlerse yozlaşabilirler. Müzik, sahip olduğu duygusal yoğunlukla insan ruhunu ve aklını şekillendirme gücüne sahiptir. Platon'un bu konuda ne kadar net olduğu, aşağıdaki alıntıda açıkça görülebilir:

- Hüzünlü makamlar hangileridir? Sen müzisyen adamsın, bilirsin.
- Miksolidyan, tiz lidyan makamları ve buna benzer makamlar.
- Öyleyse bu makamlar yasaklanmalılar mı? Zira bırak erkekleri, bunların kadınlara bile hiçbir faydası yoktur.
- Şüphesiz yasaklanmalılar.
- Bekçilerimize kendinden geçme, keyif düşkünlüğü ve tembelliğin yakışmadığı açık.
- Elbette
- Öyleyse hangi makamlar şamata ve eğlence içindir?
- Bazı iyonyan makamları ve lidyan. Bunlar zaten gevşek olarak adlandırılır.
- Peki, bu makamların savaşçılara bir faydası var mıdır?
- Hayır. Bu da demektir ki elimizde doryan ve frigyan makamlar kaldı.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>218</sup> Hadreas, Peter "Deconstruction and the Meaning of Music" *Perspectives of New Music 37*, (Summer, 1999), 7.

- Ben makamlardan anlamam. Fakat öyle bir makam bul ki bana, o, savaş veya dışarıdan gelen herhangi bir zorluk durumunda cesur kalabilen kişinin sesini hissettirsin: güçlükler ortaya çıktığında, yaralanmalar ve ölümle göz göze geldiğinde veya herhangi bir tehlike anında, ayakları yere sağlam basabilen ve bütünlüğünü sonuna kadar koruyabilen kişinin sesini... Aynı zamanda huzur içerisinde, gönüllü ve özgürce seçilmiş bir şeylerle uğraşan kişinin de makamı olmalı. Bu kişi, asla kibre kapılmadan, basiret ve sükunetle, birilerini bir şeylere ikna etmeye çalışıyor, dua ediyor, öğütler veriyor olabilir veya tam tersi şekilde birisini sabırla dinliyor, anlatıyor, en iyi yol olduğunu düşündüğü konularda tavsiyeler veriyor olabilir. Birisi bela durumu için diğeri sükunet anları için olan, başarıda veya kayıpta basiretli ve cesur olanın sesi olacak makamları arıyorum. İşte bana bu iki makam kalsın yeter.
- Sana öyleyse tam olarak az önce tavsiye ettiğim iki makam kalıyor.
- Demek ki bütün şarkılarımızda ve melodilerimizde her makamın sesini çıkaracak aralıklarda telli sazlara ihtiyacımız yok.
- Sanmıyorum.
- Öyleyse üç köşeli arpları veya birçok makamı çalan telli aletleri üretmemize gerek yok.
- Tabiî ki.
- —Fakat flüt yapanlar ve çalanlara ne demeli? Flütün karmaşık harmonileri kullanabiliyor olması ve hatta çeşitli sesleri çıkarabilen aletlerin flüte öykünerek yapılıyor olması, onu diğer bütün telli aletlerden daha kötü kılıyor. Tüm bunları düşününce onlara devletimizde izin verir miydin?
- Tabiî ki hayır.
- Öyleyse elimizde devletimizde kullanabileceğimiz sadece lir ve arp kaldı. Bir de kırsalda çobanlar için kaval.
- Argümanlarımızdan doğal olarak bu sonuç çıkıyor.
- Zaten Apollon'u ve onun müzik aletlerini, Marsiyas'a ve onun müzik aletlerine tercih edişimiz boşa değil.
- Hem de hic.
- Mısır'ın köpeği adına! Keyif içinde diye eleştirdiğimiz devletimizi nasıl da farkında olmadan temizliyoruz.
- Ve bunu da çok bilgece yapıyoruz.
- Hadi öyleyse temizleme işini bitirelim. Makamlardan sonra sırada ritimleri ele almak var ki ritimler için de aynı kurallar geçerlidir.<sup>219</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>219</sup> Plato, *The Republic*, cev. Griffith T., (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 398e-399d.

Görüldüğü üzere, lidyan makamlar ve bazı iyonyan makamlar üzüntülü ve yumuşak içki müziklerini oluştururken, doryan ve frigyan makamlar, ruhun kararlılığını arttırır. Müzik insanı gevşekliğe ve tembelliğe sürükleyebileceği gibi, insana canlılık ve dirilik de verebilir.

Platon en çok doryan makamı onaylar; zira bu makam, ışığın tanrısı Apollo'nun modu olarak düşünülür. Doryan makamın insanlara zor zamanlarda cesaret verdiği düşünüldüğü için, Platon'un bu makamı onaylamasına pek de şaşmamak gerek.<sup>220</sup>

## II. II. Antik Yunan Sonrası Erken Dönem Hristiyan Müzik Düşüncesi

Antik Yunan, çok yönlü ve gelişmiş bir müzik düşüncesine sahipti. Müzik hakkında Yunanların geliştirdiği anlayışa, erken dönem hristiyanlar sahip değillerdi; fakat yine de Yunan müziğinin birçok öğesini devraldılar. Aynı zamanda müziğin birçok doğal getirisi de hadım edilmeye başlandı. Örneğin, müziğin bir eğlence aracı olması veya halk gösterilerinde kullanılmasını kilise onaylamadı. Eski pagan geleneklerin hepsine birden şüpheyle yaklaşan kilise, haliyle müziğe de sıcak yaklaşmadı.<sup>221</sup>

Müzik ve gezegenler arasındaki ilişki, kurtuluşu ve mutluluğu ölümden sonraki bir cennette arayan ve bu nedenle fizikle veya gezegenlerle ilgilenmek konusunda hevessiz olan hristiyan düşüncesi ile birlikte göz ardı edildi. Fakat

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>220</sup> A.g.e., 88-89. Şaşırtıcı olan, Platon'un, Dionysos'un modu olarak bilinen frigyan makamı da onaylamış olmasıdır; zira bu, çılgınlığı tetiklediği düşünülen bir makamdır. Bu konunun ayrıntılı tartışması için bkz. West, M.L., *Ancient Greek Music*, (Oxford [England]: Clarendon Press; New York: Oxford University Press, c1992, 2005), 180-181.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>221</sup> Grout, D. J. & Palisca, C. V., A History of Western Music, (New York: Norton, c1988), 9.

Yunan düşüncesindeki, müziğin insan ruhu üzerinde yarattığı etkiler dikkat çekmekteydi. Bu nedenlerle kiliselerde sadece, insan zihnini ulvi dünyalara çeken, paganların sevdiği gibi enstrümantal olmayan, dini sözlerden oluşan müzik onay gördü. Müzik, dini amaçlara hizmet ettiği sürece değerli görülüyordu. <sup>222</sup> Müzikten alınan basit zevk, artık ifadesi güç bir hale gelmekteydi. Augustine buna güzel bir örnektir. Filozof, müzikten aldığı zevkin kendisinde yarattığı karmaşık duygulardan açıkça bahsetmiştir.

Hristiyan dünyasının müzik hakkında fikirlerini ifade etmiş değerli düşünürlerinden Boethius ise Antik Yunan müziği hakkında detaylı araştırmalarda bulunmuş ve orta çağda müzik konusunda otorite haline gelmiştir.

Bu dönemin önemli isimleri olarak bu iki düşünürün fikirlerini inceleyelim.

## II. II. I. Augustine (M.S. 354 - M.S. 430)

Hristiyanlık öncesi Yunan toplumunda müzik düşüncesi çok gelişmişti. Seslerin ahenginde, kozmik düzeni ve ahlaklı insanın bilgeliğini görüyorlardı ve bu doğrultuda eserler üretiyorlardı. Fakat erken dönem hristiyanlar için müzik, sadece ilahi olanla insani olan arasındaki köprü konumuna gelmeye başladı. Müzik insanı dünyevi olandan daha ulvi olana taşıyan bir araç olmalıydı. Bu fikrin en önemli temsilcilerinden biri, hristiyanlığın ilk ve en önemli düşünürlerinden olan Augustine'dir. Hristiyanlığın dünyevi olandan kopma çabaları ve dünyevi zevklere kötü damgası yapıştırması, Augustine'in

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>222</sup> Sadece müzik değil, sanat ve kültürün her alanında dini değerlerle örtüşmeyen herhangi bir eser, zaten düşman olarak görülmekteydi.

dini olmayan müzikten zevk almasına rağmen sadece ilahi müziklere yönelme konusunda çektiği ızdıraplardan görülebilir.

Hoş sedaların hazzı beni sıkıca sarmalamış ve bana boyun eğdirmişlerdi; fakat sen bu büyüyü bozdun ve beni kurtardın. Şimdi, akortlu ve tatlı bir sesle senin sözlerini ruhlara taşıyan melodilerde biraz huzur bulabiliyorum. Bununla birlikte, ben saplanmam buna, istediğim an kendimi çözebilirim. Fakat kendilerine yaşam veren sözlerle birleştiğinde bu melodiler gönlümde onay bulurlar ve takdirime mazhar olmak isterler ve ben güçlükle onlara bunu sunarım. [...] Fakat imana gelmeye başladığım o günlerde kilisede söylenen, beni gözyaşları içerisinde bırakan ilahileri ve o zamanlar sırf şarkıyla değilde duru bir ses ve uygun geçişlerle şakınan sözleri bile hatırlayınca müziğin önemini kabul ediyorum. <sup>223</sup>

Bununla beraber Augustine dile gelmez olanı kutlamak, yüceltmek isteyen bir insanın kuru kuru konuşmasının anlamsız olduğunu, hislerini şakıması gerektiğini de söylemiştir.

Bayram bir sevinç çığlığıdır; gönül dile gelmez olanı ifade etmek ister. Öyleyse bayram için bütün ifadeleri aşan Tanrı'dan daha uygun ne vardır? Onun hakkında konuşulmaz, çünkü o sözcükleri aşar; fakat sessiz kalmak da uygun düşmez. Bayram coşkusunu ve hecelemelerle engellenmemiş sınırsız bir şükran duygusunu ifade etmek için kelimelerin ötesinde elimizde ne var? O'na şakıyın coşkuyla.<sup>224</sup>

<sup>224</sup> St. Augustine, *Expositions on Psalms Volume I*, trans. Maria Boulding & John E. Rotelle, (New York: New City Press, 2000), 401.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>223</sup> Eliot W. C., *The Confessions of St. Augustine*, çev. Edward B. Pusey, (Connecticut: The Easton Press, Norwalk, , 1993), 194-195.

#### II. II. Boethius (M.S. 480 – M.S. 520)

Felsefenin Tesellisi adlı eserin yazarı Romalı hristiyan düşünür Boethius, orta çağın entelektüel hayatında etkili olmuştur. Birçok eski Yunan metnini Latinceye kazandırmıştır. Bir müzik teorisyeni gibi bilinmesine rağmen aslında onu müzik filozofu olarak ansak hata etmiş olmayız. Fakat yine de düşünceleri, Antik Yunan'ın müzikle ilgili barındırdığı sınıflandırmaları netleştirmek olarak görülebilir.

Boethius, müziği üçe ayırmıştır: musica mundana, musica humana ve musica instrumentalis. Musica mundana göksel cisimlerin müziğini, musica humana insanın sahip olduğu uyumu ve musica instrumentalis insan sesi dahil olmak üzere enstrümantal müziğe işaret etmektedir. Boethius'a göre, musica instrumentalis için ideal durum, musica mundana ve musica humana'yı ifade etme çabası içinde olmak idi. Onun bu düşünceleri rönesansa kadar etkili olmuştur. <sup>225</sup>

## II. III. Müziğe Atfedilen Anlamların Tarihi - Son Sözler

Boethius'tan çok sonra İngiliz filozof Roger Bacon (1214-1292) *Communia Mathematica* adlı eserinde müzik hakkında tartışmıştır. Fakat bu tartışmanın odağında müzik değil matematik vardır. Bu eserin aslında bir etki gücü olmamıştır ama eser, zamanında müziğe atfedilen değeri göstermesi açısından önemli sayılabilir.<sup>226</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>225</sup> Stapert, Calvin R., *A New Song for an Old World Musical Thought in the Early Church*, (Cambridge: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Co. , 2007), 53.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>226</sup> Williams D. R. & Balensuela C. M., *Music Theory from Boethius to Zarlino A Bibliography and Guide*, (NewYork: Pendragon Press, Hillside 2007, 54.

Batı Avrupa tarihi içerisinde müziğe en çok önem atfeden düşünürlerden birisi de Jean Jacques Rousseau'dur (1712-1778). Rousseau'nun temel düşüncesi, medeniyetle birlikte doğal duyguların ifadesini kaybettiğimizdir. Ona göre; rasyonel açıklık, mantıksal dil ve diksiyon kaygıları içinde kanlı canlı duyguların ifadesini unutmuşuzdur ve işte bu noktada da müziğin önemi ortaya çıkmaktadır.<sup>227</sup> Müzik, bizi gerçek ve samimi doğamıza ulaştırır ve medeniyetin getirdiği kuru ifadelerden ve yaşam tarzından sıyrılmamızı sağlar.

Müzik köprüdür; gündelik, sınırlı hayat anlayışımızı, daha farklı bir anlayış alanına taşıyan bir köprü. Yukarıda adlarını andığım tüm filozofların müzikle ilgili vurguladıkları ortak nokta işte budur. Pisagorcular için kozmik bir düzene; Platon için erdemli bir hayata; Augustine için dile getirilemez olan ilahi güçlere; Rousseau için bozulmamış, gerçek ve tertemiz doğamıza ulaştıran bir köprüdür müzik.

Tüm bu söylenenler, müziğin bizi farklı bir anlayış alanına taşıdığını ifade eder; fakat müziğin anlattığını anlatmaya kelimeler yetmez. İşte tüm bu söylenenler, Nietzsche'nin başta belirttiğim sorularına adeta cevap veriyorlar: Evet, hayatta bilimsel, mantıksal kavrayışın ötesinde, daha farklı bir anlayış mümkündür; hayatta müzik yoluyla -veya diğer sanatlar yoluyla- ulaşılabilen gizemli bir yön vardır; insan hayatı sadece mantığıyla anlamaz.

Bu noktada Schopenhauer da mantık diliyle ulaşılamayan aşkın bir gerçekliğin erişilebilirliğini savunmuştur. Düşünüre göre, hayatın bu gizemli yönüne, bu aşkın gerçeğe açılan bir kapı vardır, fakat buraya rasyonel yaklaşımlarla ulaşılamaz. İnsanı yücelten gerçeklere ulaşmak, ancak sanatlar

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>227</sup> Ayrıntılı tartışma için Bkz. Hadreas, Peter "Deconstruction and the Meaning of Music" *Perspectives of New Music*, Vol. 37, No. 2. (Yaz, 1999), 5-28.

ve estetik deneyimler aracılığıyla mümkündür. <sup>228</sup> Sanatlar, bilime kıyasla, varlığın özüne dair daha derin bir anlayış sunmaktadır.

Schopenhauer, bilimsel kavrayışın üzerinde tuttuğu "sanat yoluyla kavrayış" tan bahsederken, özellikle müziğin gücü üzerinde durmuştur. Müzik sayesinde dile gelmez olanın bize açıldığından söz etmiştir. İşte bu nedenle, Schopenhauer, müziğin ve felsefenin aynı şeyi anlatmaya çalıştığını savunur ve böylece müzik, gerçek felseye dönüşür.

Yazının kalanında Schopenhauer'ın bu iddialarını inceleyeceğim.

# III. Schopenhauer ve İsteme

Schopenhauer, *İsteme ve Tasavvur Olarak Dünya* adlı eserini bitirdiğinde kendisini görünüş dünyasının ötelerindeki, rasyonel düşünce ile binyıllardır ele geçirilemeyen –hatta asla bu yolla ele geçirilemeyecek olan- gerçeklik kalesini ele geçirmiş muzaffer bir komutan gibi hissetmiş olması çok muhtemel: Felsefenin bize sunabileceği sınırları sonuna kadar genişleten felsefenin Büyük İskenderi.

Schopenhauer şüphesiz düşüncenin düşmanları olan önyargılarla savaşmış, korkular sebebiyle yüzleşilemeyen kalıpları parçalamış, çirkinliklerden korkmamış ve bu sayede belki de gerçekten gerçeğin kapısına kadar gelebilmiş bir filozoftur; fakat sandığı gibi gerçeklik kalesini zapt edemediğini kabul eden bir komutan. Kant gerçeklik kalesinin adını "kendinde şey" (*Ding-an Sich*) olarak koydu ve hiç kimsenin bu kaleyi asla

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>228</sup> Aynı zamanda aziz (veya feleğin çemberinden geçmiş, çile doldurmuş ermiş) böyle bir bilgiye ulaşır. Yani, Schopenhauer felsefesinde öte gerçeklere ulaşmak için insan ya aziz olacaktır ya da sanatçı. Bu yazıda ben sadece sanat kısmını inceliyorum.

giremeyeceğini; çünkü eğer bütün bilgimiz akla bağlıysa, akıldan bağımsız olan bir öteyi asla bilemezdik.

Schopenhauer tamda bu mühre saldırmak istedi. Kant'ın sözlerini kabul etti; fakat akıl yoluyla elde edilemeyecek olan bu özün bilgisine akıl dışı yollarla giriş imkanı olduğunu ve bu nedenle kendinde-şeyin bilinebileceğini savundu. Schopenhauer'ın haklı olduğu nokta anlayışın sadece rasyonalite ile sınırlı olmadığı konusuydu. İrrasyonel diyebileceğimiz anlayış olanakları da mümkündür. Schopenhauer zaten bu düşünceleri ile Freud'u etkilemiştir diyebiliriz. Bu iddialar savunulabilir fakat savunması imkansız olan kendindeşeyin bilinebilir oluşu.

Schopenhauer'ın sanat veya mistik deneyimle hayatı akılla anlayacağımızdan daha derinden kavrayabileceğimiz iddiası muhteşem bir iddia olmakla birlikte bu düşünce ancak nomenal alanla ilgili değilde phenomenal alanla ilgili olursa değeri orataya çıkabilir. Schopenhauer, Kant'ın açılmaz dediği mühürleri açtığını sanması hatasından daha sonraki yıllarda döndü.

Schopenhauer çok değerli iddialarda bulunuyor: 1) Rasyonel algı ile hayatı derinden kavrayamayız. Akıl yetmez. Sanatlar ve mistik deneyimler özellikle hayatın özünü açar. 2) Hayatın ne olduğuna dair derin bir kavrayış mümkündür. 3) Nihai gerçeklik –kendinde-şey- bilinebilir.

Bu iddialar birbirlerine geçmiş haldedirler ve sorun çıkaran iddia 3. iddiadır. Kaldı ki Schopenhauer ilerleyen yıllarda kendinde-şey kavramını tekrar yorumlamış bu anlamda ikili bir kendinde-şey anlayışına yol açmıştır. Kantçı anlamda kendinde-şey ulaşılmazdır. Schopenhauer'ın kendinde-şey olarak bahsettiği ise gerçekliğe en yakın olabilecek bir öneridir. İsteme ve

*Tassavur Olarak Dünya II* adlı kitabında bu durumu biraz belirsizde olsa kabul etmiştir.<sup>229</sup>

İşte bu yorum üzerine artık Schopenhauer felsefesini daha doğal bir zemin üzerine oturtup, tartışmaya burdan devam edebiliriz; zira Schopenhauer müziğin bize hayatın gerçekliğini açıyor derken onun felsefesindeki aşırı iddialardan sıyrılmış ve paradoksları aşmış oluyoruz.

#### III. I. Bilimin Bize Anlatabilecekleri

Daha önce de belirtildiği gibi, sanatlar ve özellikle müzik bize varlığın ne olduğunu ifşa eder ve gerçek sanat felsefeye dönüşür. Ve sanatların en zirvesinde müzik olduğu için müzik felsefeye dönüşür. <sup>230</sup> Bu iddiaların temelinde varlığın ne olduğu sorunu vardır. Varlığın neliği ile felsefe uğraşır. Felsefe bilimin bir alt yardımcısı değildir. Tam tersine hayatın ne olduğuna dair, felsefe bilimin sınırlarının bittiği yerde başlar. Schopenhauer, böyle iddia ediyor.

Peki neden bilim bize hayatın ne olduğunu açamaz? Bu aslında görünüş ve gerçeklik ne derecede aynıdır sorusuna benzer bir sorudur. İdealistlerin iddiası basittir: phenomenal dünya veya görünen dünya gerçeklik hakkında bilgi sunamazlar. Şeylerin nicelikleri bize gerçeklik hakkında hiçbir şey söylemez. Elmanın rengi her durumda kırmızı değildir; şekli bile başka açılardan bambaşkadır. Böylece idealistler zihinden bağımsız bir gerçeklik olamayacağını düşünürler. Kant için, uzay ve zaman bile zihnin formlarıdır.

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>229</sup> WWR II 191-200.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>230</sup> Muzik dünyanın ne olduğunu hislere hitab ederek anlatırken felsefe kavramlarla aynı işe girişir.

İşte bu durumda Schopenhauer Kant'çı anlamda bir idealizmi benimseyerek bilimin yetersizliğinden bahseder. Bilim fenomeni açıklamaya çalışır ve üç öğeye ihtiyaç duyar: Sebep, sonuç ve iç yapı<sup>231</sup>.

Se → So Se: Sebep

So: Sonuç

→: İç yapı – doğal kuvvetler (yer

çekimi, elektirik vs. - Qualitas Occultae)232

İşte bu işleyişte sebep sonuç arasındaki bağ bilim için bir gizemdir: *qualitas occultae*. <sup>233</sup> Bilimin gelebileceği sınır işte burasıdır. İç yapıyı açıklayamaz. Örneğin, yer çekimi ile gezegenlerin hareketleri, cisimlerin düşüşleri vs açıklanabilse bile, yer neden çekiyor açıklanamaz. Bunun gibi ilk ilkeler *qualitas occultae* yani belirsiz özelliklerdir. Bu nokta bilimin sınırıdır ve bilim bu iç yapıya "anlam" vermeye çalışır, fakat bilimin sunabileceği sadece bir gizemdir. Bu bilimsel starteji ile hayatın bütüncül bir kavrayışı asla mümkün değildir. En iyi açıklamaları bile bulsa her zaman ilk ilkeler de takılacaktır.

<sup>231</sup> WWRI 100/ FW 50-52.

<sup>232</sup> WWR I 97.

<sup>233</sup> WWR I 125.

Bu noktada, Schopenhauer'e göre felsefenin sunabileceği çok şey vardır. Schopenhauer farklı bir strateji öneriyor. Aşağıdaki figür farklı düzeylerdeki sebep – sonuç ilişkisinin iç yapısını gösteriyor

Se → So

Doğal Kuvvetler: İnorganik düzeyde – nedenler

Bitkisel düzeyde – stimuli

Hayvanlar düzeyinde – dürtüler

İnsan düzeyinde - dürtüler<sup>234</sup>

Şimdi, eğer bu sebep-sonuç ilişkilerinin iç yapısını dışardan anlamaya çalışırsak, iç yapı *qualitas occultae* olarak kalır. Fakat insanın dünyayı sadece dışardan seyretme zorunluluğu yoktur, içerden de dünyayı anlayabilir.

Schopenhauer felsefesinde dünyanın iç yapısına nüfuz edebilmek kendi bedenimiz sayesinde mümkün: Kendi bireysel istememiz sayesinde. Bedenimiz doğa yasalarına tabi şeyler arasında sadece bir şeydir; fakat bize

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>234</sup> FFR 70-71/ FW: 50-52.

dünyanın iç yapısına dair dolaysız bir açıklık sağlar. Tıpkı herhangi bir nesne gibi insan da istemenin şekillendirdiği bir şeydir ve bu sayede, hayatın özü olan, istemenin bilgisine ulaşabilir.

Bu durum Dale Jacquette'in ifadesiyle "isteme olarak dünyanın yasaklı bilgisi şehrine, bireysel istemenin adeta bir Truva atıyla giriş yapmasına benzer. 235 Tabiî insan akıl ile kendi durumunu değerlendirebilen bir varlık olduğu kadar, aynı zamanda isteyen bir varlıktır. Bu açıdan bakılınca Schopenhauer, insanı akıl ve istemenin birbirine bağlı olduğu doğanın bir mucizesi olarak görür: İnsanda görüntüler dünyasının aldatıcılığını anlama ve buradan yola çıkarak şeylerin öz mahiyetini kavrama gücü de vardır. İnsanda isteme ve anlama, görünüş ve gerçeklik düğümü çözülebilir. İstemenin kölesi olan her şey gibi insan, eğer tasavvur dünyasının yanıltıcılığını kavrar, her canlının hayatta uğraştığı şeylerin boşluğunu fark eder, kendi istemesini tanır ve bu tanımayla birlikte istemenin kölesi olmaktan kurtulursa, o zaman Nirvanavari bir yere ulaşabilir. İsteme, kendisini insanda görür; bu haliyle insan, istemenin, kendisini görebileceği aynadır. Ve isteme, insanda kendi hakikatine ulaşırsa, eski gücü kaybolur. Schopenhauer'a göre bu durum, dünyanın ızdırapları ile cebelleşen, ölüm karşısında titreyen insan için tek çıkış noktasıdır.

Böyle bir bilme kimlere nasip olabilir sorusunun cevabı Schopenhauer'a göre ermişler veya sanatçılar olduğunu belirtmiştim: Hayata sanatçı gibi bakabilen insan sadece ilham anlarında, ermiş kişi ise kalıcı olarak bu düzeyi yaşayabilen insanlardır. Üstün bilinç, kavramlarla iş gören ve hiçbir yaratıcılığı olmayan kuru bilinç değil, aksine varlığın cevherini anlayabilen bilinçtir.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>235</sup> Jacquette, D., "Metaphysics of Appearance and Will", (ed. Dale Jacquette *Schopenhauer*, *Philosophy, and the Arts*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996),5.

Schopenhauer'ın aklın diliyle konuşmayan müziğin hayatın gerçekliklerini ifşa ettiği fikrine gelmeden önce istemenin nesneleşme dereceleri ve idealarla ilgili görüşlerini de incelememiz gerekmektedir.

## III.II. Müzik ve Dünya

Müzik, Schopenhauer felsefesinde diğer bütün sanatlardan öte bir yerde durmaktadır. <sup>236</sup> Bunun sebebi, Schopenhauer'a göre, müziğin, istemenin herhangi bir Platonik idea olarak temsilini değil, bizzat istemeyi resmetmesidir. <sup>237</sup> Müzik asla herhangi bir fenomene işaret etmez, "sadece özü, her fenomenin altında yatan kendinde-şeyi, istemenin bizzat kendisini" <sup>238</sup> ifade eder. Müziği dinleyen, sadece akan sesleri deneyimlemez; bu akan, aynı zamanda istemenin gel gitleridir. Müzik, kavramlaştırılamayan dünyanın cevherinden bahseder.

Çünkü müzik, ifade edildiği üzere, diğer tüm sanatlardan farklıdır. O, herhangi bir fenomenin görüntüsü veya daha iyi ifade etmek gerekirse, istemenin nesneleşmiş hali değildir; bizzat istemenin doğrudan bir görüntüsüdür ki bu görüntü, dünyanın fiziksel gerçekliğine karşı metafizik tarafın, fenomenlere karşı kendinde-şeyin resmidir. <sup>239</sup>

Bu düşünceleri Schopenhauer'i müzik ve felsefenin aynı şeyi anlatmaya çalıştığı fikrine götürmüştür.<sup>240</sup> Felsefe de, müzik de dünyanın ne olduğunu

<sup>237</sup> WWR I 257.

<sup>238</sup> WWR I 261.

<sup>239</sup> WWR I 262.

<sup>240</sup> WWR I 264.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>236</sup> WWR I 256.

anlatmaya çalışır. Schopenhauer, müziğin farkında olmadan aritmetik ile uğraşmak olduğunu ifade eden Leibniz'in sözlerini, müziğin farkında olmadan yapılan metafizik bir aktivite olduğunu ifade ederek değiştirir.<sup>241</sup> Tabiî burda önemli bir sorunla karşılaşmaktayız: Tasvir edilemez olan istemenin bir kopyası olduğu iddia edilen müzik hakkında nasıl konuşacağız? Schopenhauer'ın müziğin kelimeler olmadan hayatı anlattığı iddiasını kabul edersek bunu kuru kelimelerle nasıl anlatacağız? Buradaki zorluk, gizem hakkında gizemsiz sözler söylemenin zorluğudur ve Schopenhauer bu zorluğun farkındadır. O, bu zorluğun aşılamayacağını kabul eder ve buna rağmen bir sezgi sağlamak amacıyla sorunla yüzleşir.

Ne var ki bunun açıklanmasının imkânsız olduğunun farkındayım; zira bu açıklama, özü tasvir edilemez olan ile tasavvur olarak müzik arasında bir ilişki olduğunu varsaymak ve ortaya koymak durumunda kalıyor; yani müziğin tasvir edilemez olanın bir kopyası olduğunu iddia ediyor. <sup>242</sup>

Schopenhauer bu sorunla yüzleşme amacıyla bir takım analojiler kurmuştur. Müziğin anlattığı şeyin ne ölçüde ifade edilebilir olduğu sorunu aklımızda olmasına rağmen analojilere bakacak olursak bunların üçe ayrıldığını görürüz. Schopenhauer müziğin armonik, melodik ve ritmik yönlerini dünyanın çeşitli durumlarına benzetir.

Bunları sırasıyla inceleyecek olursak, müziğin armonik yönünde "temel bas seslerin cansız doğaya, gezegenlerin kütlelerine benzediği düşünülebilir"

<sup>242</sup> WWR I 257.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>241</sup>WWR I 265.

der Schopenhauer.<sup>243</sup> Bunun yanında eğer herhangi bir ses duyduğumuzda, bu ana sese eşlik eden diğer armonik sesler de tınlarsa, bu durumu Schopenhauer, gezegenler üzerinde vücut bulan diğer nesnelere ve bedenlere benzetir.

Bütün o hafif, titrek ve çabucak yok olan üst seslerin, derin bas notaların aynı anda titreşmeleri kaynaklı olarak değerlendirilebileceği çok iyi bilinir. Alt notanın ses vermesiyle neredeyse aynı anda, üst notalar ses verirler ve bir bas notaya sadece kendisiyle birlikte otomatik olarak aynı anda tınlayan üst seslerin (doğuşkanların) eşlik edebileceği, bir harmoni kanunudur. İşte bu durum, doğadaki tüm nesne ve teşekküllerin, gezegenin kütlesinden kademeli olarak gelişerek meydana geldiği gerçeğine benzer.<sup>244</sup>

Duyulabilir sesin sınırlarının oluşu, herhangi bir maddenin, biçim ve özellikleri olmadan algılanamayacağına işaret ederken, <sup>245</sup> gamın belirli aralıkları da, istemenin çeşitli nesneleşme basamaklarına, doğadaki çeşitli türlere<sup>246</sup> işaret eder; yani müzikteki gamların çeşitli aralıkları, bitki ve havyan dünyasının bir takım düzeylerine işaret eder. Eğer müziğin karakteri sebebiyle aritmetik doğruluktan sapılırsa, bu tıpkı bireyin, bağlı olduğu türün davranış kalıplarından sapmasına benzer.<sup>247</sup>

Müziğin melodik yönüne gelince, burda müziğin armonik yönünde bulunmayan bir özgürlük söz konusudur. Melodi değişebilir, ilerleyebilir, akabilir. Bu özgürlük insanın bilinçli yaşantısına benzer. <sup>248</sup> İstemenin

<sup>244</sup> WWR I 258.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>243</sup> WWR I 258.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>245</sup> WWR I 258.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>246</sup> WWR I 258.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>247</sup> WWR I 258-259.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>248</sup> WWR I 259.

nesneleşme basamaklarını, bas seslerden melodiyi söyleyen ana sese kadar görmek mümkündür,<sup>249</sup> melodi ise bütün müzikal esere yön verebilir, eserin başından sonuna kadar belirli bir özgürlükle akabilir ve tüm bunları Schopenhauer, insanın entelektüel çabalarına benzetir. Melodi, eserin tonal merkezinden binlerce farklı şekilde kopabilir ki bu da isteği, sürekli kabaran ve istediği şeyi elde edince başka şeylerin peşinde koşan insanın durumuna benzer kılar. İnsan ister, istediğini elde etmek için acı çeker, elde ederse tatmin olur, sonra cen sıkıntısı başlar ve yeniden bir şeyler ister, tekrar acı çeker ve çember böylece dönmesine devam eder. Zira insan, hayatta asla tam anlamıyla tatmin bulamaz ki bunu da Schopenhauer melodinin ana sesinden uzaklaşmak olarak görür.

Ben, son olarak, melodinin baştan sona *tek bir* düşünceye bağlantısını kaybetmemesi ve bütünü ifade etmesinde -yani üst, şakıyan, ana sesin bütüne yön vermesi ve sınırsız bir özgürlükte hareket etmesinde-istemenin en üst düzeyde nesneleşmesini ve insanın akli hayatını ve çabalarını görüyorum.<sup>250</sup>

Melodiyi sadece insanın entellektüel iniş çıkışları olarak da görmemek gerekir; zira melodide çırılçıplak bir şekilde insanın en gizli hisleri ve arzuları ortaya çıkar.<sup>251</sup>

Melodi, akıl ile aydınlanmış istemenin gizli tarihi, bütün çabalar, her bir uğraş, istemenin her anı, akıl yetisininin geniş ve menfi kavramı olan

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>249</sup> WWR I 258.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>250</sup> WWR I 258.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>251</sup> WWR I 260.

duygu ile özetlenen ve aklın soyutlamaları ile ifade edilemeyecek her şey ile alakalıdır.<sup>252</sup>

Schopenhauer, analojisini müziğin ritmik yönüyle sürdürür. Müziğin bu yönü insan çabalarını, uğraşılarını temsil eder. Örneğin, Schopenhauer ağır, acı dolu akorlarla ilerleyen ve nihayetinde ana sese dönen bir melodiyi insanın zorluklar sonrası elde ettiği tatmin duygusuna benzetir. Esas notaya dönme ertelenirse bu istencin tatminin ertelenmesine benzer. Hızlı dans ritimleri sıradan mutlulukları, *allegro maestoso* (görkemli ve canlı tempo) yüce hedeflere sahip olup onlara erişme çabalarını ve *adagio* (ağır tempo) ise basit mutlulukların ötesinde derin uğraşılara işaret eder. Esa

Schopenhauer'ın müzik ve fenomenler dünyası arasında paralellik kurması, bize müziğin varlığın macerasını nasıl resmedebileceği konusunda fikir verir. Varlığın özü olan isteme, sezgisel olarak müzik yoluyla bilinebilir. Hayatın akışı, fanilik, kırılganlıklar, çaresizlikler, coşkular, neşe, uyum, uyumsuzluk ve ölüm müziğin nağmelirinde ortaya çıkar. İşte bu nedenle müziğin anlattığı şey ve felsefenin anlattığı şey Schopenhauer felsefesinde ortaktır. Müzik ve felsefe bu şekilde birbirlerine bağlanırlar.<sup>255</sup>

#### IV. Felsefe ve Müzik

Müzik de, felsefe de bize hayatın ne olduğunu anlatıyor dedik. Fakat hayatın "ne" olduğunu neden anlamaya çalışıyoruz. Kuru bir merakın tatmini için mi?

<sup>253</sup> WWR I 260.

<sup>254</sup> WWR I 260-261.

<sup>255</sup> WWR I 264.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>252</sup> WWR I 259.

Schopenhauer'ın bu noktada evet demesi şaşırtıcıdır. Felsefesinin ana amacının metafizik bilgiyi aramak, dünyanın "ne" olduğunu ifşa etmek. Burda Schopenhauer felsefesini teorik olarak gösteriyor ve felsefenin davranış klavuzu, yol gösterici olmaması gerektiğini iddia ediyor. Fakat felsefesinin özünde bir kurtuluş (*erlösung*) olması, insanın sınırlı benliğinin bencilliklerinin ötesine geçebilmesine ihtimal bırakması, edinilmiş karakterin dönüşüm ihtimali olmasını iddia etmesi ve felsefenin insana ölüm karşısında teselli ermesi gerektiğini söylemesi ile tam bir yaşam filozofu olduğunu söyleyebiliriz.

Felsefe bu nedenle insana dönüşüm sağlaması nedeniyle değerlidir. Fanilik, kırılganlık, ölümlülük karşısında teselli sağlaması gerektiği söylenen felsefe, peki bizi neye uyandıracak? Neye ulaşacağız. Schopenhauer'a göre hiçbir şeye. Fakat bu "hiçbir şey" veya "hiçlik" ki Schopenhauer'ın *İsteme ve Tasavvur Olarak Dünya*'sının ulaştığı zirvedir çok önemli. Bunu şöyle yorumlayabiliriz.

Felsefenin görevi bize geçici varoluş içerisinde dünyanın aslında ne olduğunu bize hatırlatmak. "Hatırlatmak" çünkü aslında dünyayı dolaysızca bilen bir yapımız olmasına rağmen, dünyanın "başka bir şey" olduğuna inanmak istiyoruz. Sanıyoruz veya istiyoruz ki öte dünyalar, ölümden sonra hayatlar var. Ve bu akan hayatta para, ün, şöhret gibi şeyler bize kalıcılık kırıntısı sağlayacak. Oysa dünyanın böyle bir garantisi hiç olmadı. Bu anlamda felsefe bize yeni bir şeyler öğretmese de olur. Korku kaynaklı kalıplarımız ve değerlerimizi yıksa yeter. Ve bu yıkımın gerisinde "hiçbir şey" kalmaz. Boşluk kalabilir. Bu boşluk korkmamak gerektiğini, hatta bundan cezb olunması gerektiğini felsefe gösterebilir. Bu boşluk veya hiçlik, insana tanınma arzuları, yüzeysel ve kaba değerler, ahlakı tekeline aldığını sanan oluşumların fikirleri

sayesinde varolma çabasını eritir ve insana canlılık verir. Çünkü artık özgürdür.

Hayat kelimesinin kökü "hay"dır. Hay, insan için anlayışını keskinleştirip, samimi düşünebilmeye eşlik eden faal ve diri oluş halidir. Schopenhauer'da felsefe insanın içindeki hayattan çıkarak hayatı anlayabileceğimiz iddiasıdır.

İşte bu anlamda da müzik kelimelere dayanmayan felsefedir. Müzik insana dolaysızca dokunur. Müzikal deneyimi yaşayan kişi, sıradan deneyimlerinin ötesine geçmiştir. O an günlük rutinlerinin ötesindedir, nerde ve ne zamanda olduğu önemsizleşir, sıradan kabuk çözülür ve hayatın gerçekliği açılır. Burda kabuktan kasıt şudur: Rutinler, alışkanlıklar, ölüm unutkanlığı, sıradanlık, bencillik içerisinde anestezi olmuş benlik. Ve altta yatan gerçektende kasıt şudur: Alışkanlıkların ötesinde, fani oluşun farkındalığıyla gelen, estetize olmuş (canlı, diri) bir benliğin olasılığı.

### IV. I Felsefe Yapma Biçimi Olarak Müzik

Müzik, Schopenhauer felsefesinde daha önce hiçbir filozofta olmayan bir açıklık ve özgünlükle yüceltilmiştir. Her ne kadar onun, müziği zamanının müzik teorisine göre değerlendirmiş olması, müziği diğer sanatların üstüne yerleştirmesi, enstrümental müziği operadan üstün tutması gibi ayrıntılar tartışılabilir, eksik ve hatta tutarsız bulunabilinir ise de; bütün resme bakıldığında, insanın varlık karşısındaki durumu ile ilgili düşünceleri, bilmenin nasıl bir şey olduğunu ifadesi, derin sezgileri ve kavrayışı göz ardı edilemeyecek ölçüde değerlidir. Dolayısıyla, Thomas Mann, Schopenhauer'ın

İsteme ve Tasavvur Olarak Dünya adlı eserini dört bölümden oluşan muhteşem bir senfoniye benzetmekte hiç de haksız değildir.

Hayatı anlamaya çalışıyoruz ve elimizdeki kuru kelimelerin buna yeteceğine inanıyoruz, oysa Schopenhauer bize hayatı sanat yoluyla -özellikle de müzikle- bilebileceğimizi söylüyor. Kavramsal soyutlamalarla yaşamı, ölümü, fani oluşu, hayatın koşturmacalarını, sıkıntıları, neşeyi, doğumu, duyguları -kısacası hayata dair ne varsa- anlamak mümkün değil. Oysa sanatlar bize tüm bunları farklı bir şekilde anlatma gücüne sahiptir.

Schopenhauer'ın ahlakı ve sanatı da birbiriyle bağlıdır. İstemenin ne olduğunu gören insanda bir kırılma olur. O artık birlikte yaşadığı insanları unvanları, şöhretleri, paralarıyla değerlendiremez. Hem kendini, hem de diğer insanları bu garip ve fani varoluş içerisinde acı çeken sıradan varlıklar olarak görür. İnsanların, canlıların acılarını artık derinden bilen birisi olarak ahlaklı insana dönüşmüştür ve şefkat hissinin ne demek olduğunu anlamıştır. Kaldı ki ahlaklı insan olmak, etik teorilerini ezbere bilmek, herhangi bir dine mensup olmak veya herhangi bir dinin kurallarını ezbere yerine getirmek demek değildir. Ahlaklı insan olabilmek için, hayatı anlamanın getirdiği derin bir şefkat hissi gereklidir. Ahlak kitabı okuyup ahlaklı olunmadığı gibi, sanat teorisi okuyup da sanatçı olunmaz. Bilgi taze, diri ve nüfuz edebilen bilgi olmalıdır. Soyut, kavramlaşmış bilgiyle hayata yaklaşan insan; dünyanın kabuğuyla, alış verişle, hesaplarla, pratik işlerle sınırlı kalma riski içerisindedir. Varlığın nasıl bir yer olduğunu anlayan insan ise hayatın görüntülerinin altında yatan korkunç ve anlamsız kaynağı gördüğünde acı çekebilir fakat işte tam bu noktada o kişi için dönüşüm şansı vardır.

Bu tabiî ki zordur; zira ölümlü oluş ve hayat denilen cereyanda tutunacak dal olmaması dehşet verici deneyimlerdir. Fakat böyle deneyimler kesinlikle olumludur; çünkü insana nerde olduğunu, nasıl bir hayata sahip olduğunu, gelip geçici olmanın anlamını, tüm bu varlığın gizemini hatırlatır ve ona daha şefkat dolu ve anlayışlı yaşama olasılığı sunar. Aksi halde günlük rutinlere gömülmüş, dinini bile hesabi yaşayan, hayatın gizemini hissedemeyen, çıkarcı ve nihayetinde mutsuz, sıkıcı bir hayat kaderimiz olacaktır; zira Schopenhauer'ın bahsettiği can sıkıntısı ve ızdırap dünyası burasıdır.

Yaşıyoruz. Ve güzel yaşamak istiyoruz. Bilginin bize iyi bir hayat sağlayacağına inanıyoruz. Tabiî bu kimisi için nasıl köşeyi döneceğinin bilgisi, bir başkası için sevdiği kişiyi nasıl elde edebileceğinin bilgisi ve bir başkası için ise nasıl tanınacağının bilgisi olabilir. Ve bunlarana benzer şekillerde türlü türlü huzursuzluklarımızdan, acılarımızdan, korkularımızdan arındıracak bilgiyi arayıp dururuz. Fakat Schopenhauer'a göre tüm bunlar hala dünyanın kabuğu üzerinde debelenen insanın durumudur. İnsan, sanat yoluyla veya hayatın sıkıntılarıyla pişerek anlar; kendi durumunu ve hayatı anlar. İstemenin kölesi olan insanda artık düğüm çözülür ve o, binyıllardır insanların acı çekme ve can sıkıntısı arasında -tıpkı isteklerinin ucuna asılmış bir sarkaç gibi- gidip geldiğini görür. İnsanın hayatına gerçek anlamda hizmet edecek ve ona dönüşüm şansı verecek bilgi, işte böyle bir anlayıştır. Böyle bilen birisi için hayatı olduğu gibi temaşa edebilme gücü oluşurken, her işinde bir takım çıkarları kovalayan insanın ise hayatta mutluluk şansı yoktur.

Hayat bir şekilde yaşanacak, sonra da göçüp gideceğiz. Peki, hesap, üçkâğıt, çıkar dünyasından veya kuru kavramlar alanından öte, hayatın gizeminin farkındalığı, rahatlık ve dinginlikle dolu güzel ve iyi bir hayat mümkün mü acaba? Eğer mümkünse, böyle bir hayatı nerde arayacağız? Ve anlamlı bir hayat ne ile aranır? Bu noktada Schopenhauer -belki kendisi kabul

etmezdi ama- bize bir davette, belki de dostça bir hatırlatmada bulunmaktadır: Kavramların ulaşamadığı anlayış alanları ve böyle bir anlayışın sunduğu dünyanın ızdıraplarının ötesine geçiş mümkün. Bu açıdan bakınca Schopenhauer'ın sözlerini, ölüme yakın olan Sokrates'in rüyasına girip onu müzik yapmaya davet eden sese benzetebiliriz.

Ölüme yakın oluş konusunda Sokrates'ten daha avantajlı bir konuma sahip olmayan bizlere -eğer hayatımızın müziğini keyifsiz rutinler, hesaplar, kaygılarla kaybetmiş isek- Schopenhauer adeta kitaplarının arasından seslenir: "..., müzik yap!"

# APPENDIX C

# TEZ FOTOKOPİSİ İZİN FORMU

<u>ENSTİTÜ</u>			
Fen Bilimleri Enstitüsü			
Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü			
Uygulamalı Matematik Enstitüsü [			
Enformatik Enstitüsü			
Deniz Bilimleri Enstitüsü [			
YAZARIN			
Soyadı : Adı : Bölümü :			
TEZİN ADI (İngilizce):			
TEZİN TÜRÜ : Yüksek Lisans	Doktora		
Tezimin tamamından kaynak gösterilmek şartıyla fotokopi alınabilir.			
Tezimin içindekiler sayfası, özet, indeks sayfalarından ve/veya bir bölümünden kaynak gösterilmek şartıyla fotokopi alınabilir.			
Tezimden bir bir (1) yıl süreyle fotokopi alınamaz.			

1.

2.

3.

TEZİN KÜTÜPHANEYE TESLİM TARİHİ: