

**THE UNDERGROUND MAN OF THE 19TH CENTURY: A COMPARATIVE
STUDY ON NIETZSCHE AND MARX**

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ABSTRACT

THE UNDERGROUND MAN OF THE 19TH CENTURY: A COMPARATIVE STUDY ON NIETZSCHE AND MARX

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In this thesis I searched for an Underground Man in Nietzsche and Marx. My search depends on an epistemological ascertainment. Kant's argument that the human mind cannot achieve knowledge of the thing-in-itself lies in the background of my thesis. I think that this argument is connected with the origins of modern philosophy. My thesis is concentrated on the 19th century. I perceived that with Kant's argument the fact that we can know this world within a subjective framework is emphasized especially in this century. The emphasis on a subjective framework is grounded on Kant's philosophy. This emphasis has a significant role in the epistemological arguments of Nietzsche and Marx. They also insist on the role of subjective contribution in knowledge. However their attitude towards epistemology is different from Kantian philosophy in that they emphasize social, historical and economical conditions. Thus, I call attention to the fact that they transpose epistemology into a social and historical context. My

conception of the Underground Man is born in this social context. My thesis aims at making room for an analysis of the Underground Man who is conceived in opposition to the Kantian understanding of the subject, in the context of are Nietzsche's and Marx's social and epistemological analyses.

Key Words: Underground Man, modern philosophy, 19th century, epistemology, consciousness, social epistemology.

ÖZ

19. YÜZYILIN YERALTI İNSANI: NİETZSCHE VE MARX ÜZERİNE KARŞILAŞTIRMALI BİR ÇALIŞMA

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Bu tezde, Nietzsche ve Marx felsefelerinde bir Yeraltı İnsanı araştırdım. Benim araştırmam epistemolojik bir saptamaya dayanıyor. Kant'ın "kendinde şey"i bilemeyiz savı benim tezimin arka planında yer alıyor. Bence bu sav modern felsefenin kökenleriyle de ilgilidir. Benim tezim daha çok 19. yüzyıla odaklanıyor. Kant'ın iddiasıyla birlikte bilgide öznel katkının yerinin özellikle bu yüzyılda vurgulandığını gözlemledim. Öznel çerçeve vurgusu Kant felsefesinde temellendirilir. Bu vurgu Nietzsche ve Marx felseferinde de önemli bir role sahiptir. Onlar da bilgide öznel katkıyı vurgulamaktadır. Ama onların sosyal, tarihsel ve ekonomik koşulları vurgulaması, Kant'tan farklı olarak epistemolojiye yaklaşımlarında önemli bir yer tutar. Dolayısıyla ben onların epistemolojiyi sosyal ve tarihsel bir bağlama dönüştürmelerine dikkat çekiyorum. Benim Yeraltı İnsanı kavramım bu sosyal bağlamdan doğmuştur. Benim tezim Nietzsche ve Marx'ın sosyal ve epistemolojik çözümlenmeleri bağlamında, Kant'tın öznel anlayışından farklı olarak tasarlanan bir Yeraltı İnsanı incelemek için bir araştırmaya yer açmayı amaçlamaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Yeraltı İnsanı, modern felsefe, 19. yüzyıl, epistemoloji, bilinç, sosyal epistemoloji.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Nietzsche, Marx and Dostoevsky are the radical thinkers of their century. All three of them think that recent theories of their time veil the real and concrete wo/man¹ of the 19th century, since they involve empty generalizations about human beings. To problematize this abstract and definite conception of human beings, they emphasize the multiplicity and complexity of people from different perspectives. In this thesis I will try to explain these perspectives within an epistemological context. Thus the starting point of my thesis is an epistemological argument.

In the years between 1789 and 1815 European culture is converted by revolutions and interruptions. The people who lived in these years deal with important social and political changes. As Marshall Berman says in *All That is Solid Melts into Air*, modernity is entirely a new experience for people in the 19th century. Many founding blocks of society are changed and the people and philosophers of this century find themselves trying to appropriate these changes. European philosophy contemplates on and participates in many of them. I think that the influence of German thinkers is especially enormous in this century. Influenced by Kant, German idealism predominates philosophy.

Of course, all the deadlocks and problems of the people in the 19th century cannot be based on or attributed to an epistemological problem. However I think that with the rise of modernity there also arises a problem of modern wo/man concerning her/his relation with her/himself and the outer world. With modernity

¹ I have a difficulty with this term, since the word “man” in English denotes a general conception which is used for both man and woman. My thesis is not a gender study; however I do not want to use this word “man” in a general way. For this reason, I use this word as “wo/man” throughout my thesis.

all the fulcrums of society, physical sciences, politics and philosophy are changed. People in a new world with new experiences try to find new grounds for their moral arguments and for their lives.² Scientific developments also influence the rise of modernity. The scientific background of modernity is dependent on the alterations and scientific investigations of the 17th and 18th centuries. By means of these scientific changes, fundamental physical laws and, along with them, the place of wo/man in the universe is changed. Thus, in the 19th century, modern wo/man finds her/himself in a world which is entirely strange for her/him.

Modern people give up the idea that they are a part of a cosmic unity and their society and political authority are directly connected with God. Before modernity there are “hierarchical societies that conceive of themselves as bodying forth some part of the Chain of Being.”³ This mystical and enchanted conception is removed by modernity. As a result, it is more difficult for modern people to know their place in the world and their role in society. With the influence of the Enlightenment and the French Revolution, a new conception of the “civil subject” takes root: “the self-autonomous subject who has freedom”. Modern thinking has developed a new conception of society which is constructed by free, autonomous and conscious individuals who act on mutual benefits by consent, by means of a social contract.

The older chain of being and the hierarchical society provide people with more definite attributes concerning their roles in society. Yet, a new set of attributes are brought forth by the rise of modern thinking. These new determinations of modern people are accepted as more abstract in the sense that they put forward a conception of wo/man who is universal, conscious, free and

² Marschall Berman in *All That is Solid Melts into Air: The Experience of Modernity* states that modernity means a new world of experiences for people and thinkers for the 19th century. He claims modernity is a continual reassertion of ambivalence and Dostoevsky, Nietzsche and Marx tries to adjust to this new and ambivalent world by means of their theories. See also his *Politics and Authenticity: Radical Individualism and the Emergence of Modern Society*, Zygmunt Bauman’s *Modernity and Ambivalence*, Peter Wagner’s *A Sociology of Modernity: Liberty and Discipline* and Charles Taylor’s *Modern Social Imaginaries* and *Sources of the Self: The Making of Modern Identity* on this issue.

³ Charles, Taylor, *Modern Social Imaginaries*, p. 99.

equal. It is accepted that the ultimate expression of this conception takes place in Kant's philosophy. People cannot find the concrete counterpart of this conception in their lives. Thus, modernity distorts modern wo/man's relation with the outer world and to her/himself. This situation is the chief starting point of the context in which my Underground Wo/man appears.

Kant's philosophy cannot be accepted as the main cause of this problem; however, we can grasp the main problems about modern wo/man pointed out by the other thinkers discussed in my thesis by comparing their philosophies with that of Kant's. When we do so, we will see that a careful deconstruction of Kant's philosophy and its assumptions will reveal different dimensions of modern life and thinking that Kant's philosophy encompasses and represents. For this reason, it is mostly Kant who is criticized concerning the problems of modern wo/man. For this reason, I think that to analyze Kantian philosophy may be a good way of understanding the 19th century.

We also begin to see the precursors of existentialism in the 19th century, via Nietzsche's and Kierkegaard's philosophies. In addition, utilitarianism, pragmatism, positivism, British idealism, transcendentalism and ultimately Marxism become prominent philosophical trends in the 19th century. Finally, the idea of evolution, which is postulated by Charles Darwin, has a significant influence on the philosophical currents of this century. I think that this century is an important stage in the history of humanity and many of the fulcrums of the 19th century are still a matter of conversation.

The remnants of the Enlightenment's philosophy establish the philosophical background of the 19th century. Kant's philosophy is the representative of the Enlightenment century. He tries to harmonize the influences of the Enlightenment in terms of epistemology, ethics, social and political philosophy. Self-authority is the main characteristics of this subject. This authority comes from her/his Reason alone. The only rival of this self-authority is nature

which is a causal and lawful network. Thus, the Enlightenment's subject has to deal with a comparison and split between her/himself and the nature.

Kant and the foremost thinkers of the Enlightenment try to attribute a lawful system to human thinking and social and political life in order to bridge the gap between wo/man and nature. The scientific formations of social and political life construct the basis of the contentions of the 19th century. This claim that it is possible to give a scientific form to our thinking and our society is widely contested. The desire to explain wo/man and his/her relation to nature scientifically defines important fields of research for philosophy. As a matter of fact, the idea of formulating a scientific conception of modern wo/man is a heritage of Enlightenment thinking.

Kant will appear in the first chapter of my thesis. I think that his conception of wo/man will be a firm basis for my treatise. In this chapter I will try to explain Kant's subject in terms of epistemology. His arguments on human knowledge are highly influential. His distinction between the "thing-in-itself" and appearances puts its signature on the modern subject. He argues that the features we discover in outer objects depend in the way that those objects appear to us. Thus, Kant situates the subject as a perceiver. Only in the realm of morality, this subject accesses the noumenal realm. Yet, after Kant no one can ignore the observation that we can only see the world from a subjective framework. Since I think that this point is important for my conception of the Underground Wo/man, in the first chapter of my thesis, I will explain Kant's subject depending on a long explanation of epistemology, and a short investigation of morality and aesthetics. Therefore, I want to summarize the main properties of Kant's subject in the first chapter.

My conception of the Underground Wo/man is a wo/man who resists being formulated by scientific theories. Because of his emphasis on scientific and legitimate knowledge, the roots of this wo/man can be found in Kant's thinking. Kant tries to lay down a scientific and legitimate ground for our moral,

epistemological, social and political ideas. I will try to formulate the roots of the Underground Wo/man within an epistemological framework. My framework depends on Kant's distinction between the "thing-it-itself" and appearances. I think that this distinction characterizes the modern wo/man. The Underground Wo/man also grapples with this distinction.

In connection with Kant's philosophy German idealism tries to develop philosophy into a scientific, autonomous and rigorous study. Nietzsche and Marx's objections are mainly concentrated on German idealism and its assumptions about the role of consciousness, but at the same time they consolidate their criticisms with their social and political ideas. In addition, for both of them philosophy is more than a scientific study. They find the general theoretical outlook of this century too superficial, inadequate and abstract to understand the inhabitants of it. Their main attempt to overcome this abstractness is to naturalize and socialize epistemology. For this reason, they try to engage in a deep analysis of human nature and the modern changes in the lives of human beings in this century without falling into the error of abstract generalizations. I use the conception of "Underground Wo/man" in order to reflect their approach to the 19th century's wo/man with reference to Dostoevsky. In this thesis, I will try to analyze this "wo/man" in terms of the basic points these thinkers make about human beings.

I believe that Dostoevsky's novels are profound sources concerning 19th century's wo/man and wo/man in general. His most philosophic novel is *Notes from the Underground*, from which my thesis gets its name. Moreover, I also perceive that an Underground Wo/man appears in every novel of him with a different character. For this reason, I think that a short analysis of his novels will be compatible with the main purpose of my thesis.

The change of attitude towards the notions of consciousness and rationality is particularly important for my thesis. Towards the end of 19th century, these conceptions have begun to be treated differently. They fell out of favor and the foremost thinkers of this century are skeptical of them. However, we must note

that the functional role of consciousness is accentuated in this century; the criticisms are about its being as an entity. At the end of the 19th century, Marx, Nietzsche and the American pragmatists insist that consciousness is not an entity that orders and commands our lives and our thoughts; it is not static, it is flexible and evolves in connection with our needs, our actions and our environment. Therefore I must note that the change concerning consciousness is the second auxiliary idea of my thesis. The first is to emphasize the difference of the “thing-in-itself” and appearance.

I think that the distinction between “thing-in-itself” and appearances and the changed attitude towards the role of consciousness are interconnected. When we put forward a self-reflexive wo/man who is reflected on her/himself, her/his consciousness gains importance. Kant tries to formulate this importance in his epistemology by grounding all knowledge in the transcendental unity of self-consciousness. After Kant, the other thinkers of my thesis try to naturalize the importance and role of consciousness.

The problem of consciousness is also connected with the abstract generalizations and idealism that Nietzsche and Marx criticize. To assert that all reality is “mental” or “ideal” and consciousness/mind is the ground of all being is one of the foundational arguments of idealism. Marx, Nietzsche and Dostoevsky oppose the exaggerated role attributed to consciousness. If we assume that modern human beings are conscious, resolute and responsible, we should base our social, political and moral theories on this assumption. Yet the definition of the self-autonomous and self-conscious subject has problems in itself for them.

For Nietzsche and Marx, this abstract approach leads to definite problems in explaining the main changes in the 19th century and the effects of them on the lives of the people who reside in this century. Furthermore, it also causes another problem about understanding human beings; to assume the above determinations as necessary may lead us to overlook the main political and economical deadlocks of the 19th century. On the whole, in the thoughts of Nietzsche, Marx and

Dostoevsky there appears an Underground Wo/man who is aware of and rejects the necessary assumptions about human beings. S/he tries to perceive her/himself and the outer world outside of these determinations and appears in the works of these thinkers by her/his different characteristics. I think that to compare my conception of Underground Wo/man with Kantian subject is compatible with my purpose.

Kant's subject is defined as self-conscious, free, democratic, and is aware that s/he is responsible for all his/her acts. All these attributes of modern human beings turn into significant problems for Nietzsche and Marx in the 19th century. They try to carve out a human being who is posited outside of these philosophical assertions. Indeed, they try to bring out the obscurities and existential problems of the "modern" wo/man. Accordingly, they pursue the goal of exposing the impossibilities of the type of person conceived of and idealized by the Enlightenment in their century and think that this definition and conception of human being is highly enigmatic in many respects. The Underground Wo/man in my thesis is a conclusion of these problems.

The fundamental purpose of Nietzsche is to reveal the influences of Christian morality and the Kantian conception of reality on moderns: he tries to portray the Underground Wo/man who is aware of these influences and can devaluate all the valuations of Western culture. On the other hand, Marx tries to describe the discrepancies of the modern capitalist system around economical and social relations; his aim is to disclose the problems of people who are drowned by the paradoxes of the economical inequalities and alienated relations of labor. His Underground Wo/man originates from this disclosure.

Kant's time is different from Marx and Nietzsche's in terms of the ontological and epistemological accounts. Kant's determinations –after having tried to solve the problems of classical empiricists and rationalists--in the realm of ontology and epistemology are so important that they frame all philosophy after him. His "transcendental" philosophy introduces big differences in many

philosophical matters and shapes the conception of human beings and human knowledge. It is controversial whether we can think that Nietzsche and Marx have epistemological interests. However, I think that a Kantian background will help us in explaining their philosophies.

The rejection of idealism plays an important role in Kant's ontological arguments. Kant wants to overcome the trouble that the philosophical tradition before him is steeped in. He admits that there are some bad assumptions that lead to skepticism, dogmatism and "transcendent idealism" in the tradition before him and in order to solve them he tries to go into the details of the operations and faculties of pure and practical reason and the capacity of judgment. However insistence on a powerful rationality and a deep investigation into the employments of reason is not the true way of overcoming idealism for Nietzsche and Marx. Indeed, this approach sets forth other difficulties.

Nietzsche, Marx and other thinkers in the 19th century follow a different way in order to solve the problem of idealism: to change the general conception of consciousness and subjectivity in contradistinction to Kant's philosophy. Nietzsche and Marx put a special emphasis upon the ideology that determines our outlook to the world and the social aspect of the reality that Kant does not emphasize. They choose the way of stressing the role of ideology and social and political relations of people instead of accepting a static conception of consciousness and rationality. In this way, they look at people and the world from the perspective of social, cultural, economical and political relations. In so doing, they aim at going beyond the dilemmas of the abstract viewpoint of German idealism.

I think that Nietzsche, Marx and Dostoevsky want to reveal an Underground Wo/man in the 19th century, who is not captured by the extant philosophical definitions and theories. Philosophical theories of the 19th century accept a rational, free and modern person who is different from the other human beings as conceived in the old centuries in terms of their social, intellectual and

economical capacities. In the century of Marx and Nietzsche, social and economical conditions in particular are different. Slavery, direct economical positions (as serfs, and feudalism, nobility) and religious authorities are removed. Especially after the effects of the French Revolution, the mottos of equality and freedom become important and prevalent. The general outlook of their century reflects the idea that a more democratic and more rational system can be constructed and human beings can live in better conditions. After Kantian influences, it is believed that by maturing our rational capacities we can reach a better and reasonable world and society.

By “Underground Wo/man” I mean a subject who is not defined by Enlightenment’s values. There is also a postmodernist rejection of the conception of rational wo/man who has definite characteristics. However, I wish to forestall a misunderstanding my thesis may give rise to in this sense. I do not want to emphasize a fully complicated and incomprehensible human being who can never be known. Neither of the thinkers in my thesis ever holds such a conception of human beings. They believe that we can solve and capture the characteristics of human beings, but they also emphasize that acknowledging a definite and absolute nature of human beings is also not possible. Their persistent emphasis is on the fact that the theories of the 19th century, especially German idealism and the theorists of political economy defend a wrong conception of human beings which is highly abstract. On the other hand, I do not conceive the movement of the Enlightenment as fully defective. It is important that the Enlightenment removes the religious authority on the people, and it has a chief positive effect on human life-process. I only want to emphasize the wrongness of the exaggerated conception of enlightened person of the 19th century.

For Nietzsche, free will and consciousness are the two conceptions that lead human beings into an unknown and abstract reality and a morality of self-sacrifice. He claims that these are the misleading conceptions that maintain human beings in “a slave morality” and “a feeling of revenge”. In contradistinction to this, he tries to reveal another person who is aware of the wrong assumptions and

values of European and modern culture, and I call this human being the “Underground Wo/man”. To sum up, Nietzsche’s “Underground Wo/man” is one who can devaluate all the values of Kantian thinking and Christianity. In the second chapter of my thesis I will try to elaborate Nietzsche’s Underground Wo/man by emphasizing his criticism of Kantian categories and epistemology.

In the Nietzsche chapter I will also explain the relation between Nietzsche’s epistemology and morality. Epistemology is not the main purpose of Nietzsche’s philosophy. As he says, to affirm our life is the chief aim of his thinking. Yet, I think that his attempt at naturalizing the abstract notions of classical epistemology is significant. This naturalist approach brings out a context in which his Underground Wo/man appears.

Nietzsche’s moral arguments and emphasis on the power of wo/man’s capacity for revaluation has similarities to Dostoevsky’s characters. Nietzsche sees Dostoevsky as a profound psychologist. By digging up the nature of her/his characters Dostoevsky also investigates their capacity for revaluation and their relation to God. He deals with the dark sides of his characters which cannot be explained by classical psychology and epistemology. In this sense, I believe that Dostoevsky can make an important contribution to my thesis. For this reason, I want to talk about his main characters in my Nietzsche chapter also.

Marx, on the other hand, wants to unveil the misleading assertions of capitalism in terms of human freedom and economical conditions. He thinks that capitalist modern society cannot provide human beings with the opportunities in order for them to realize their species-being. What Marx considers as species being will be explained in the last chapter of my thesis. Thus Marx will be the last thinker of my thesis. In this chapter, I will first explain his attitude of socializing epistemology. In this sense, I think that he has a similar purpose to Nietzsche. Therefore, I think that Marx also dissolves the notions of classical epistemology within social and material relations like Nietzsche. I will try to examine Marx’s Underground Wo/man in this context.

By Marx's Underground Wo/man, I refer a wo/man who begins to become aware of the contradictions in capitalist modern society. For Marx it is not possible for modern wo/man to extricate him/herself from the conditions of capitalism; however there is a point in his thinking at which people can be aware of the fact that they are alienated from themselves and I will bring out the Underground Wo/man from this point of awareness. In order to explain it, I will also explore the concept of alienation which Marx sees as the main paradox of the wo/man capitalist society. Thus, Marx's Underground Wo/man is born from his social epistemology.

It should be noted that the approaches of Marx and Nietzsche have some similarities and dissimilarities. Both of them point out the ideological character of "reality". On the other hand, whereas Marx advocates an economical and public revolution in the realm of society, Nietzsche's investigations are concentrated on an individual emancipation dependent upon an isolated human being. To state shortly, his conception of revolution and salvation is cultural and individual and aims at devaluating all the values of Western culture. On the contrary, Marx points to the impossibility of an individual and cultural revolution without changes in the economical system. He insists that, the inequalities and hidden facts in the capitalist economy impede our way of understanding the concrete world and the existence of ourselves. The economical determinations are the most tangible point that must be replaced, since they are interwoven with our conception of reality and us; only in this way can we get beyond the abstract conception of human beings in the 19th century. Otherwise we cannot understand the obstacles in recognizing the actual reality.

Kant also is interested in the social and economical relations. His analysis of common sense and the common acceptance of a historical movement, such as his attitude to the French Revolution, are significant. He tries to analyze the acts of people as if they are determined by the laws of nature.⁴ Yet, this approach is criticized for its superficiality by Nietzsche and Marx. In addition they also aim at

⁴ Kant, *Idea for a Universal History from a Cosmopolitan Point of View*.

dissolving Kant's epistemology from a practical viewpoint. Furthermore, his understanding of morality is sharply different from those of Dostoevsky, Nietzsche and Marx. While he tries to stress that the moral law must derive its laws from pure reason (that is, we cannot infer the rules of morality from our practical life) the other thinkers in my thesis claim that morality cannot be investigated in isolation from our practice in this sense.

Moreover, Kant is different from the other thinkers in the sense that he is hopeful of the developments and historical events that occur in his time. For this reason, instead of radically objecting like Nietzsche and Marx, he defends the influences of the Enlightenment. Thus, I will set forth Kant's views in order to expound Nietzsche's and Marx's rejections and to compare their position. Also I will try to explain the similarities in the purposes of these thinkers.

Consequently, in trying to understand human beings, the main key points of my study are deepened around the concept of rationality. Kant's main difference from Nietzsche and Marx is his insistence on the rational capacity of human beings and the traditional definitions of humanity. Nietzsche straightforwardly refuses this point, and for him both Kant and Enlightenment thinkers in general place an exaggerated importance on the concept of rationality. The Underground Wo/man in Dostoevsky's novel has complained about the rational and abstract conception of man in his century. He defends that all kinds of consciousness is an illness,⁵ and all people in his time are ill. I think that it is appropriate for my thesis to complete my introduction by Dostoevsky's Underground Wo/man's words, since they summarize my chief purpose:

We are oppressed at being men –men with a real individual body and blood, we are ashamed of it, and we think it a disgrace and try to contrive to be sort of impossible generalized man. We are stillborn, and for generations past have been be gotten, not by living fathers, and that suits us better and better. We are developing a taste for it. Soon we shall contrive to be born somehow from an idea.⁶

⁵ Dostoevsky, *The Notes from the Underground*, p. 23.

⁶ *Ibid*, p. 153.

CHAPTER II

KANT

Kant is the most influential thinker on the construction of the modern subject. His analyses on human knowledge turn the subject and her/his faculties into the main topic of modern philosophy. His inquiries into this issue are also significant since they determine the restrictions and competencies of the modern subject. His thought introduces important changes concerning the boundaries of the field of human knowledge. For this reason, the “modern subject” cannot be analyzed without an analysis of Kant’s account. In addition to describing the epistemological competencies of the subject, Kant also has important reflections on the modern subject in terms of ethics, aesthetics and social and political philosophy. It could easily be argued that his arguments and objectives have steered the development of modern thinking and the modern subject in almost every respect.

In the philosophical environment of the 17th and 18th centuries, epistemology has become the prominent branch of philosophy due to the influence of scientific developments. The attempt to achieve a scientific and ideal way of knowing becomes the main concern of the thinkers of this period, overtaking ontological investigations. This shift to epistemology is important in the construction of the roots of modernity. While Descartes is accepted as the father of modern philosophy with his emphasis on the subject and the ensuing subject-object dichotomy, Kant can be considered to have completed the project, since the subject who has self-reflection, the genuinely distinguishing characteristic of modernity, emerges fully with Kant. In other words, he is the philosopher who calls attention to the faculties and self-reflection of the subject and this attempt constitutes the actual foundation of modernity.

In *Aesthetics and Subjectivity*, Andrew Bowie argues that “modern philosophy begins when the basis upon which the world is interpreted ceases to be a deity whose pattern has already been imprinted into existence and becomes instead our reflection upon our own thinking about the world”.⁷ Kant is the most important thinker to bring about this change. By his *Critique of Pure Reason*, the basis upon which the world is interpreted becomes the self-reflection of the subject.

The emphasis upon the self-reflection of the subject brings an important conclusion at the same time. Kant blocks the way to the actual nature of things in our knowledge, by his argument that the “thing-in-itself” cannot be known. His return to the faculties of the subject leads to an undesired conclusion. It is undesired since his main purpose is to present a legitimate way of knowing and a competent explanation about the existence of the things outside us. In this respect, the “thing-in-itself” is inconsistent with the main objective of his philosophy.⁸ In the *Critique of Pure Reason*, he explicitly claims that “it still remains a scandal to philosophy and to human reason in general that the existence of things outside us [...] must be accepted merely on faith.”⁹ Kant aims at turning this faith into knowledge, but in contrast to the chief purpose of the *Critique*, this investigation comes to a close with an undesired consequence. Accordingly, it is accepted that philosophy after Kant “does not begin in an experience of wonder, as ancient tradition contends”, but “begins with disappointment”.¹⁰ Simon Critchley defines this situation as “the indeterminate but palpable sense that something desired has not been fulfilled, that a fantastic effort has failed”.¹¹

⁷ Bowie, *Aesthetics and Subjectivity*, p. 11, Robert Strozier also shares this view in his *Foucault, Subjectivity and Identity, Historical Construction of Subject*, p. 269.

⁸ Karl Ameriks argues that Kant cannot distinguish his philosophy from classical ontology in an adequate way, and because of this reason the thing-in-itself or *noumenon* is situated in his philosophy in *The Critique of Metaphysics: Kant and Traditional Ontology*, p. 272

⁹ Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, in a footnote, B xl.

¹⁰ Simon Critchley, *Infinitely Demanding*, p. 1.

In *The Critique of Metaphysics*, Karl Ameriks attributes this situation to the Kantian self-critical tendency in a manner that is similar to Bowie's emphasis upon "self-reflection". Ameriks claims that the Kantian attitude cannot be distinguished from an ontological. However Ameriks finds Kant's attitude towards ontology confusing. He argues that there is a contradiction in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, between the sections of "Transcendental Analytics" and "Transcendental Dialectics". Ameriks emphasizes that while the former section tries to justify the constitution of our spatiotemporal knowledge, the latter brings out the fallacies which arises when Reason tries to go beyond the realm of experience. It is important to note that Ameriks sees the search for spatiotemporal knowledge as a pursuit of metaphysics and ontology.

Ameriks emphasizes a contradiction in Kantian philosophy. He points out that while Kant's self-critical subject tries to legitimize her/his knowledge in Transcendental Analytics; s/he also undermines the roots of her/his spatiotemporal knowledge in Transcendental Dialectics. Thus, I want to emphasize that the self-reflective subject who heads toward her/himself at the same time brings out the threats which endangers her/his knowledge. S/he finds her/himself in a situation that cannot go beyond the realm of experience. In other words, the emphasis on epistemology within the faculties of the self-critical and self-reflective subject is concluded with a skeptical argument which Kant never aims at.

My central conception of the Underground Man is strictly connected with this undesired conclusion and the Kantian self-critical tendency. Although the Kantian subject is portrayed as possessing a self-autonomous rational capacity, the unintended skeptical conclusion restricts her/his knowledge. The inherent self-contradictory nature of this conception of the subject has become a main target of criticism in the 19th century. Instead of viewing people from the Kantian standpoint, Nietzsche and Marx investigate their practical lives. They criticize especially Kant's *a priori* and universal categories.

¹¹ *Ibid*, p. 2

In the philosophies of Marx and Nietzsche, an Underground Wo/man appears who is a non-subject in the Kantian sense. Moreover, their criticism is directed at the “undesired conclusion” mentioned above and the abstract assumptions around which the self-reflection of the subject is constructed. They emphasize that this undesired conclusion is a consequence of these abstract assumptions. I think that this undesired conclusion reflects also the gap between wo/man and nature/reality. I emphasize that this gap is an important characteristic of modern wo/man. Therefore, there are many dimensions of modern philosophy, modern thinking, or modernity¹², but this conclusion is extremely important for my thesis. I believe that it is essential in explaining the deadlocks and frustrations of the people of the 19th century.

The thoughts of Nietzsche and Marx are centered on the problems concerning the practical lives of people and they claim that they point to the actual problems of the inhabitants of the 19th century instead of a Kantian conception of the modern subject. Their philosophies emerge as the alternatives of Kantian and German idealism. Essentially they try to rupture the faltering and restrictive tendency of German idealism which is dependent on an absolutist effort in making philosophy “a fully immanent and rigorous science”.¹³ They thus aim at transforming philosophy into an affirmation of life or a philosophy of praxis. I believe that their philosophies can be made more comprehensible by an analysis of the Underground Wo/man who appears in their thought in interaction with an analysis of Kant’s subject.

Transcendental idealism is the name of Kant’s philosophy. In order to give a detailed analysis of human knowledge, he tries to demonstrate the deadlocks of

¹² There is a huge stock of resources about the expounding these terms, however I looked at some of them which are related to my purpose. Richard Wagner’s *The Sociology of Modernity*, Bauman’s *Modernity and Ambivalence* William R. Everdell’s *First Moderns* and Charles Taylor’s *Modern Social Imaginaries* emphasize the enigmatic tenets of modernism in the sense that the modern subject has difficulty in defining her/himself and the existence and continuity of the real world and nature. On the other hand, to have an adequate standpoint it must be ruled over a more extensive amount of sources.

¹³ *Cambridge Companion to German Idealism*, from the preface of Karl Ameriks, p. 11.

the classical empiricists and rationalists. He argues that the chief inadequacy of the philosophers before him is that their philosophy is dependent on a “transcendent” ground and his alterations in philosophy can be explained as a “transcendental” charge. The Kantian transcendental charge is connected with the “undesired conclusion” of his philosophy in the sense that in order to secure the way of our knowledge he rejects the identity of being and being-known and this rejection is connected with the differentiation between the realms of human knowledge and the existence of outer things. In this way, Kant formulates the distinction of the realm of appearances which we can know and the “thing-in-itself” which cannot be the object of our knowledge.

Although Kant claims that morality is his main purpose¹⁴, Kant’s moral, social and political philosophy is dependent on his epistemology. His systematization and determinations concerning the faculties of the human mind are influential on all areas of his philosophy. Kant’s trust on reason’s competency in using its faculties autonomously determines all his ideas. However, as mentioned above, searching for the firm basis for our knowledge in these faculties brings forth unpredictable conclusions. The main drive of Kant’s thinking is to give an account of how judgments can have universal validity and necessity. He believes that he accomplishes his aim by depending on human freedom and the power of reason alone. Yet, this means that he has to restrict the realm of objective and necessary knowledge for the sake of transcendental philosophy, which elevates the human subject to a central position. Ironically, this re-positioning of the subject leads to the counter result of restricting the power of human knowledge.

In this chapter, firstly I will try to portray Kantian epistemology in general, since his indications in epistemology are the basis of all his thoughts and his conception of the modern subject. The mottos of the Enlightenment in the 18th century put a special emphasis on the freedom and the power of rationality. Yet this emphasis becomes the problematic aspect of wo/man in the 19th century for Nietzsche and Marx, since they emphasize that this emphasis is coupled with

¹⁴ Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, A574/B586, p. 456

misleading assumptions. The other thinkers of my thesis defend that the influence of the Enlightenment on the modern subject and the emphasis on freedom introduce other kinds of submission and restrictions for wo/man. Mainly they emphasize the gap between nature and wo/man. They claim that this gap cannot be overcome by emphasizing rationality. For this reason, I will first explain Kant's conception of rationality and freedom in section 2.1.

After Kant's epistemology, in sections 2. 1 and 2. 2, I will extend my discussion of his conception of the modern subject by means of the emphasis on freedom in his morality and aesthetics. However, I will explain them in a more general way since I want to keep my discussion about the Underground Wo/man focused on the epistemological split. Thus, I aim at comprehending Kant's modern subject in an encompassing way. This aim is connected with the Underground Wo/man's problem of defining her/himself and her/his knowledge of the outer world. Finally, in section 2. 4, I will deal with a split in the Kantian subject in terms of certain conflicts and tensions within the human faculties. This split is an indication of the Underground Wo/man; thus we can see intimations of her/him in Kant. In the last section of this chapter, I will talk about the conception of *Doppelganger* and alienation of the modern subject in relation to my conception of Underground Wo/man. Thus, I think that these issues can be a firm background of my dissertation.

2.1 KANT'S EPISTEMOLOGY

The influence of the Enlightenment in Kantian philosophy is well-known. The subject of the Enlightenment is the wo/man who is a law-giver and has the responsibility and competency in using her/his reason.¹⁵ Influenced by the developments of his century, Kant has an optimistic sense about the aptitudes of human reason. He believes that wo/man in his century "is in the process of

¹⁵ Kant, "An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment".

becoming enlightened". He tries to demonstrate this "maturity" by resting it on a scientific and legitimate basis for our knowledge.

However, beside this optimism, Kant's philosophy always feels the tension between wo/man and nature. This tension is transformed into the tension between subjectivity and necessity in his philosophy. Kant's thought has been occupied with a dichotomy between universal validity and subjectivity or the dichotomy of necessity and freedom. These preoccupations are connected with the fact that Kant aims to sustain both the subjectivity and objectivity of our knowledge at the same time. Both of them depend on the unity of the subject since Kant presents the 'transcendental unity of consciousnesses' as the main basis of our knowledge.

The objectivity of our knowledge is a consequence of *a priori* and universal categories of the Understanding; however the unique ground of our knowledge is the unity of our mind. In other words, the faculties and conditions that sustain the objectivity of our knowledge belong to our mind eventually. Kant emphasizes that the unity of nature and the unity of the connection of appearances are dependent on "subjective grounds such unity contained *a priori* in the original powers of our mind". These subjective grounds and conditions provide at the same time the objectivity of our knowledge about the appearances.¹⁶ Thus, Kant ultimately looks for the roots of objectivity in Reason alone.

Sensibility and the intellect are presented as the two important sources of our knowledge in Kant's system.¹⁷ This distinction is a characteristic of human knowledge and it reflects also the distinction between nature and wo/man, or the knowledge of God and the knowledge of wo/man. Kant perceives human knowledge considering the active and passive parts of it. He emphasizes that human knowledge cannot be creative since it is restricted with an unknown realm. In this sense to have creative knowledge and to know the "thing-it-itself" is

¹⁶ Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, A125, p. 147.

¹⁷ For Sebastian Gardner, this viewpoint is a heritage from Leibniz and Newton for Kant. Gardner claims that Kant tries to solve their conflicts in an effective way, see Gardner's *Kant and Critique of Pure Reason*, pp. 18-19

identical in Kant. I will explain this point in the following sections of this part, which I devote to Kant's epistemology. The passive parts of human knowledge are connected with the faculty of sensation and the active parts are connected with the concepts of the Understanding.

By superposing the active and passive parts in a reasonable and coherent way, Kant also wants to give an alternative theory of knowledge to rationalism and empiricism. According to Kant, our knowledge is only possible with the collaboration of the spontaneity of the concepts and the receptivity of sensations and this point both provides the possibility of our knowledge and causes its restrictive aspect. This dichotomy of passivity and activity is operative in all the processes of knowledge in Kant's epistemology.

Kant believes that by synthetic *a priori* judgments he can solve the problem about the source of knowledge and harmonize senses and concepts in an excellent way. He accepts that the formulation of synthetic *a priori* is an original recipe for this purpose. His arguments on synthetic *a priori* judgments are also connected with his conception of metaphysics. Kant perceives metaphysics as a search for the possibility of knowledge in general. The possibility of knowledge is always a problem for Kant. His main drive is to justify our knowledge.

Kant's purpose of justifying our knowledge also cannot be distinguished from his ontological aim. As I mentioned above, Ameriks sees Kant's explanation concerning the justification of spatiotemporal knowledge as a search for ontology. I think that Kant's search for synthetic *a priori* judgments and metaphysics is also a search for ontology. While he is trying to find a justifiable and legitimate basis for our knowledge, he tries to be on the safe side concerning making a claim about the existence of something. However this attempt is made for overcoming skepticism by making room for a legitimate way of ontology. While trying to place philosophy and epistemological arguments on a firm basis, Kant never doubts the existence of outer things as I mentioned above. He sees skepticism as a danger to philosophy.

I also think that his search for something that he can believe certainly is a consequence of his ontological inclination. He demonstrates this inclination in the *Critique of Practical Reason*, by arguing that there are two things about which he has no doubt, the starry heaven and the moral law.¹⁸ I have stated that the gap between nature and wo/man is a background drive of Kant. Kant's attempt of bridging this gap by means of a critique of pure reason and pure practical reason shows his ontological inclination. He wants to secure the way of metaphysics of natural science and morality since he tries to dismiss the skeptical doubts concerning them. Pointing out his argument that metaphysics and ontological claims are eventually impossible does not prove that Kant avoids doing ontology. We must consider the fact that he mainly wants to clear up the skeptical and dogmatic doubts in the way of ontology. For this reason, he details the problems of traditional metaphysics also. I perceive Kant as a man who gives voice to the anxiety of modern wo/man who is confused and concerned about the gap between nature and her/himself. In order to go beyond this confused standpoint, s/he tries to make room for metaphysics of natural science and morality. Kant is confused because he tries to make something possible, which he accepts as impossible.

2. 1. 1 Metaphysics and Synthetic *A Priori* Judgments

Kant presents the *Critique of Pure Reason* also as the critique of metaphysics, since it also questions the possibility and the impossibility of metaphysics.¹⁹ Metaphysics is the “inventory of all our possessions through pure reason, systematically arranged”.²⁰ Kant means by ‘metaphysics’ a study that rests merely on concepts²¹ and independent from intuitions and experience. Thus, he claims that

¹⁸ Kant, *Critique of Practical Reason*, p. 260

¹⁹ *Ibid*, Axii, p. 9.

²⁰ *Ibid*, Axx, p. 14.

²¹ *Ibid*, Bxiv, p. 21.

metaphysics itself is “a completely isolated science of reason”²² and the system of pure Reason is also the metaphysics of nature.²³

For Kant, human Reason attempts to achieve completeness in knowledge; it has a tendency to the “unconditioned”. By ‘unconditioned’, Kant means an “absolute totality in the synthesis of conditions”.²⁴ Metaphysics is the fundamental science²⁵ that fulfills this tendency. In other words, Kant thinks that metaphysics is related to all attempts of knowledge, since it reflects our attempt at achieving unity and the absolute in our cognition. It is the enquiry of achieving unconditioned knowledge which goes beyond the limits of possible experience.

Kant believes that the human mind always tries to overstep its own limits and for this reason it always struggles in “a battle-field of endless controversies”. This battlefield is metaphysics.²⁶ The aim of transcendental philosophy is to bridle our tendency to make metaphysical claims. In the *Prolegomena*, Kant states that he actually criticizes the employment of pure Reason in order to do metaphysics.²⁷ Ultimately it is also an impossible enquiry and science, since its results are merely in the employments of speculative reason.²⁸ This impossibility reflects the anomalies of Reason in the *Critique of Pure Reason*. Reason’s speculative employments when trying to achieve the absolute and unconditioned confronts contradictions. Metaphysics is also the realm of absolute and unconditioned arguments. Although Reason runs into contradictions in this realm, Kant emphasizes that metaphysics is an inevitable and indispensable enquiry for human nature and human knowledge. In addition, the enquiries of Reason in the realm of

²² *Ibid*, Bxiv, p. 21.

²³ *Ibid*, Axxi, p. 14.

²⁴ *Ibid*, A326/B382, p. 318.

²⁵ *Ibid*, Bxxiv, p. 26.

²⁶ Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, Aviii, p. 7.

²⁷ Kant, *Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysics*, & 14.

²⁸ *Ibid*, Vxxiv, p. 26.

metaphysics are valuable for the employments of pure practical Reason. Only in the practical employment of pure Reason – the moral realm-, Reason inevitably oversteps its own limits.²⁹ Kant formulates this argument by means of the freedom of Reason in his morality. I will touch upon his standpoint in this realm in the section 2. 2 of this chapter of my dissertation.

After stating the importance of metaphysics, Kant investigates what kind of propositions and judgments metaphysics has. His answer is a combination of two conflicting contentions. Subsequent to formulating the differences between analytic judgments (which depend on concepts and do not extend our knowledge) and synthetic judgments (which do extend our knowledge) and judgments that are *a priori* (independent from experience) and a *posteriori* (dependent on experience), Kant states that it is accepted that until him synthetic judgments referred to *a posteriori*, while analytic judgments referred to *a priori* judgments. Yet, he argues that the *Critique of Pure Reason* is a complete examination of knowledge which is *a priori* and synthetic. He gives the examples of mathematics and geometry in explaining these propositions. Moreover, he thinks that this is an original formulation.³⁰

Kant claims that he is asking the question of how metaphysics and synthetic *a priori* judgments are possible in his critique, since he claims that this is the basic question of our knowledge. However, his answer is that it is impossible to arrive at complete knowledge through them. This impossibility is a consequence of the twofold character of our knowledge. As I have stated before, the Kantian distinction between concepts and senses, or intuitions and thoughts, is a reflection of the divided character of our knowledge. We cannot achieve the ‘unconditioned’ and absolute with this distinction. Human knowledge cannot capture the things as they are. In this sense, the *Critique of Pure Reason* is a search for a prospect which it accepts as impossible. This is also the reason behind the difficulty of making sense of Kant.

²⁹ *Ibid*, Bxxv, p. 27.

³⁰ Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, A10/B14-A10/B19, pp. 52-55.

Kant presents his transcendental philosophy in order to solve the old problems of empiricism and rationalism and give a profound examination for our knowledge. He perceives metaphysics as a science that reflects the possibility of human reason in achieving scientific and legitimate knowledge. Although he emphasizes that this science is impossible, for him it is important to inquire into the possibility of it in order to examine the limits and employments of our reason. He accepts that this examination is itself a metaphysical search. Incongruously, while he indicates the limited character of our reason, at the same time he also wants to reflect its competency. In the end of his examination it is clear that the complete knowledge concerning the absolute nature of things is impossible for us, so metaphysics is also an impossible science. The details of this conclusion can be revealed by the details of Kant's transcendental philosophy.

2.1.2 Transcendental Philosophy

There are certain basic assumptions which establish the background of Kant's transcendental philosophy. One of them is connected with his conception of outer things. He is careful in employing some words. Instead of the unity of "things", Kant tries to search for unity, completeness and objectivity of our knowledge. This point constructs the basis of his "transcendental" idealism. He does not try to prove the possibility of directly knowing the actual things but wants to prove the possibilities of experience.³¹ Thus, this attitude reflects the subtle procedure transcendental philosophy requires. Kant explains it as follows;

By transcendental idealism I mean the doctrine that appearances are to be regarded as being, one and all, representations only, not things in themselves, and that time and space are therefore only sensible forms of our intuition, not determinations given as existing by themselves, nor conditions of objects viewed as things in themselves.³²

³¹ Allen Wood, *Kant*, p. 200. According to Wood "how is experience possible" is the actual question of transcendental philosophy.

³² Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, A369, p. 346.

His emphasis upon the impossibility of metaphysics and of the shortcomings and contradictions of Reason demonstrate that he finds the effort of proving the existence of outer things in the method of traditional philosophy meaningless. In particular, he claims that it is impossible to make ontological claims in this sense. He argues that he tries to solve a scandal which is a heritage of old philosophy. However he does not address the existence of outer things in a systematic way. He always emphasizes the unifying competency of Reason. Instead of giving a definite formulation for the existence of outer things himself, he emphasizes the originality of his method. Kant sees dogmatism and skepticism³³ as the two main threats of traditional philosophy and he claims that we can escape from them by means of his approach. He thinks that his approach does not imperil the existence of outer things, since it presents them from a different viewpoint which reminds us that all we can talk about is their appearances that are only possible with the *a priori* forms of intuition.

The important issue for Kant is the idea that the source of all claims of knowledge concerning anything and all our cognitive faculties is ourselves, so the actual problem is to examine our cognitive faculties and their competencies. According to Melissa Merritt, this idea is also the actual motto of the Enlightenment. She claims that the actual characteristic of the Kantian Enlightenment is the awareness that we are the source of all our thoughts and cognitive states. In other words, she argues that the Enlightenment is dependent upon the Kantian transcendental apperception principle.³⁴

According to Merritt, Kant's conception of the Enlightenment "turns on the requirement that a subject be able to recognize herself as the source of her cognitions".³⁵ She accepts that the unity of apperception and the Enlightenment are

³³ *Ibid*, Bxxxiv, p. 32, Kant claims that "criticism alone can sever the root of materialism, fatalism, atheism, free-thinking, fanaticism and superstition, which can be injurious universally; as well as idealism and skepticism, which are dangerous chiefly to the Schools, and hardly allow of being handed on to the public.

³⁴ This argument is the chief claim of Merritt's "Kant's Argument for the Apperception Principle".

³⁵ Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, A11/B25, p. 59.

strictly connected.³⁶ For her, “the apperception principle belongs to an enlightenment philosophy.”³⁷ Similarly, Henry Allison argues that by his transcendental attack Kant “makes possible a radically new kind of epistemology, one grounded in the revolutionary idea that human cognition is governed by its own autonomous set of forms.”³⁸ I think that this new ground of epistemology is the fundamental maneuver of transcendental philosophy which also implies a new approach to ontology.

As I mentioned concerning Kant’s ontological inclinations, it is controversial that Kantian transcendental philosophy is connected only with epistemology. The chief problems are whether his transcendental philosophy is only “a part of reorientation of philosophy away from ontology towards epistemology” or not and the contradiction of transcendental philosophy with realism.³⁹ Paul Guyer, Henry Allison, Karl Ameriks and Kenneth K. Westphall examine the contradiction of the Kantian system in terms of its realistic implications and the actual purpose of transcendental philosophy.⁴⁰

It is controversial how much Kantian transcendental philosophy includes a realist approach. However, I believe that the hope of making claims about the existence of external things is at least an intention Kant never gives up. He never abandons a realist intention in terms of ontology and epistemology even though we cannot perceive that he tries to prove this in his critical philosophy.

³⁶ Melissa Mcbay Merritt, “Kant’s Argument for the Apperception Principle”, p. 87.

³⁷ *Ibid*, p. 61.

³⁸ Allison, *Kant’s Transcendental Idealism*, p. 120 in *A Companion to Kant*.

³⁹ Gary Banham, “Kantian Ontology”, p. 1.

⁴⁰ For further discussions, see Paul Strawson’s *The Bound of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason*, Allison’s *Kant’s Transcendental Idealism: An Interpretation and Defense*, Paul Guyer’s “Kant’s Intentions in the Refutation of Idealism”, Rae Langton’s *Kantian Humility: Our Ignorance of Things in Themselves*, Karl Ameriks’ *Kant and the Fate of Autonomy: Problems in the Appropriation of Critical Philosophy*, Kenneth Westphall’s *Kant’s Transcendental Proof of Realism*.

His persistent hostility to skepticism also indicates that Kant wants to dismiss all arguments that endanger the existence of outer things. There is a certain respect in which he has a realistic approach although he also holds that we cannot know the “things-in-themselves”. Whereas he is not a realist in terms of the knowledge of actual things in their absolute unity, he is a realist in accepting their existence. Furthermore he criticizes the crude realistic attempt which accepts the objects outside as independent from our cognition and tries to know them by a rudimentary method without a detailed analysis of experience.

Kant’s theory is about the “*a priori* forms and conditions under which objects can be cognized by the human mind,” and “it is grounded in a reflection on the conditions and limits of discursive cognition rather than one on the contents of consciousness or the nature of ultimate reality”.⁴¹ This attitude distinguishes his philosophy from that of Descartes’ or Berkeley’s.

Kant portrays our knowledge as dependent on the *a priori* condition of “transcendental” unity of apperception. Merritt connects this Kantian determination with his appeal to the spontaneity of the mind.⁴² She claims that the cognitive agency of the Kantian subject as the only source of all her/his cognitive acts is dependent on the spontaneity of the mind. Thus, Kantian Enlightenment is dependent on the conscious awareness and the self-legislative subject.

The most significant aspects of Kant’s transcendental philosophy are his emphasis on the self-criticism of the subject, the transcendental unity of apperception, and his rejection of the identity of being and being-known. By way of these contentions he brings up for discussion a new ground of epistemology. The rejection of the identity of being and being-known introduces a definite distinction between the realm of knowledge of the modern subject and the existence of things, in other words between the things that appear to us and “things-in-themselves”. This gap is highly significant in the conception of the

⁴¹ Allison, “Kant’s Transcendental Idealism”, p. 111-112, in *A Companion to Kant*.

⁴² *Ibid*, p.76, for further discussions about the spontaneity of mind see also, Pippin’s “Kant on the Spontaneity of Mind”.

modern subject, and no one after him can overlook this assumption in the realm of epistemology. This is why I emphasize that the modern subject is actually the self-critical and self-reflective subject. The major characteristic of this subject which is emphasized is his turning towards her/himself. This situation is an indication of the Kantian distinction between being and being-known.

2.1.3 The Identity of Being and Being-Known

The rejection of the identity between being-known and being has a significant role in Kant's critique of metaphysics and in his epistemology.⁴³ This identity is the main argument of classical idealism, since idealism asserts that the existence of concepts and objects 'in space outside me' are identical. Kant tries to disclose the difference between these two conceptions by defending the argument that our concept of Being is not a real predicate.⁴⁴ In other words, he claims that we cannot attribute the category of 'existence' to the things.

Kant's rejection of the identity of being and being-known is primarily dependent on the denial of scholastic ontological proofs concerning God's existence.⁴⁵ With respect to these proofs, he maintains that from our concepts of infinitude and perfection, we cannot derive and prove the existence of God or anything else. He mainly criticizes the attempt of explaining God's existence with pure and *a priori* notions which is in no relation to the objective reality. He says that "the necessity of existence can never be known from concepts but always only from that which is perceived in accordance with universal laws of experience."⁴⁶

⁴³ See, Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* (especially the chapter on "Refutation of Idealism"), and *Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysics*. This point (that the Kant's denial of the identity between being-known and being) is also explicitly maintained in Vincent Descombes' *Modern French Philosophy*, p. 29.

⁴⁴ Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason* A598/B626, p. 504. See also Heidegger's *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics* for an encompassing analysis of this argument.

⁴⁵ I intend mainly Anselm's proof and Descartes' construal of it.

Kant sees the idea of God as an assuring and completing supplementary idea for Reason's demand and inclination to the 'unconditioned'. An absolutely necessary and supreme concept of God "contains a therefore for every wherefore."⁴⁷ This concept shows Reason's attempt of systematic unity in and completing with an "objective correlative". God's existence is "a concept of an individual object which is completely determined through the mere idea."⁴⁸ Kant's critique of the idea of God makes room for his critique of traditional ontology. He precisely criticizes Reason's attempt at unifying the "objective reality" with the term of necessary existence.

Kant enunciates that "being is obviously not a real predicate; that is; it is not a concept of something which could be added to the concept of a thing".⁴⁹ In other words, he finds problematic to use the notion of existence as a "concept of a thing which we profess to be thinking solely in reference to its possibility".⁵⁰ Kant extends his criticism of justification of the existence of God depending on a mere idea. Although he does not deny Reason's attempt of achieving a systematic unity in its knowledge, he claims that this attempt leads it to the misemployments which are transcendental.⁵¹ According to Vincent Descombes, Kant's criticism of the ontological argument for God pioneered a new epoch in philosophy.⁵² This is a most significant assertion of Kant: It transforms our perspective to reflecting upon our thinking and knowing. Thus, his approach blocks the way of the illegitimate entrance into the realm of existences. This point is the chief turning point of

⁴⁶ *Ibid*, B 227, p. 247.

⁴⁷ *Ibid*, A585/B613.

⁴⁸ *Ibid*, A574/B604.

⁴⁹ *Ibid*, A598/B626, p. 504.

⁵⁰ *Ibid*, A597/B625.

⁵¹ *Ibid*, A598/B626.

⁵² Vincent Descombes, *Modern French Philosophy*, p. 22.

Kantian thinking away from classical metaphysics and thus it shapes the very characteristics of “transcendental” thinking.⁵³

For Kant, knowledge concerning God, free will and immortality go beyond the scope of experience and the knowing capacity of subjects. They are the cause of the unavoidable problems⁵⁴ and conflicts of Reason,⁵⁵ because they are the objects of metaphysics’ enquiries⁵⁶. Reason occupies itself with a transcendent employment by means of them.⁵⁷ Kant emphasizes that the employment of our Reason cannot introduce another realm of existence. He says that “since existence cannot be constructed, the principles can apply only to the relations of existence, and can yield only regulative principles.”⁵⁸ Kant calls ideas like freedom, God and immortality ‘regulative ideas of pure Reason’ to distinguish them from constructive ideas. Basically, his point is that Reason cannot have constructive ideas. This rejection of constructive ideas is the point where he rejects the identity of being and being-known for our knowledge.

Kant also arranges all transcendental ideas of reason in three classes; “the first containing the absolute unity of the thinking subject, the second the absolute unity of the series of conditions of appearance, third the absolute unity of condition of all objects of thought in general”.⁵⁹ They refer, respectively, to the subject (Kant calls it the object of psychology), the world (the object of cosmology) and God (the object of theology).

⁵³ For further discussions and explanations see Karl Ameriks’ “The Critique of Metaphysics: Kant and Traditional Ontology”, Paul Guyer’s *Kant and the Claims of Knowledge*, and Strawson’s *The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason*.

⁵⁴ *Ibid*, B 7, p. 46.

⁵⁵ *Ibid*, A750/B778, p. 600.

⁵⁶ *Ibid*, B395, p. 325.

⁵⁷ *Ibid*, A798/B826, p. 631.

⁵⁸ *Ibid*, A179/B222, p. 210.

⁵⁹ *Ibid*, A334, B391, p. 323.

The transcendental ideas of Reason represent Reason's metaphysical attempt. They have "an excellent, and indeed indispensably necessary, regulative employment, namely that of directing the understanding towards a certain goal upon which the routes marked out by all its rules converge, as upon their point of interaction."⁶⁰ Moreover Kant talks about the transcendental hypothesis of Reason beside them. They help in answering Reason's endless questions "whenever the explanation of natural existences is found to be difficult". They sustain the completeness and adequacy of Reason's attempts in this respect.⁶¹

The transcendental ideas and transcendental hypotheses assist in fulfilling the endeavor of Reason in making ontological claims. The metaphysical enquiries of Reason are connected with its attempt of assuming the identity of being and being-known. However Kant always warns us concerning them, he emphasizes that transcendental ideas and hypotheses are "permissible only as weapons of war, and only for the purpose of defending a right, not in order to establish it."⁶² In this way, the Kantian critique does not give permission to a transition from our concepts into the realm of objective reality and this is why he entitles his idealism "transcendental."

Kant tries to demonstrate the details of his transcendental philosophy in his threefold synthesis of knowledge. By means of this synthesis he wants to reflect both the active and passive parts of our knowledge in a new ground of epistemology. To defend the objectivity of knowledge with a subjective ground is also the main purpose of his system.

⁶⁰ *Ibid*, A644/B672, p. 533.

⁶¹ *Ibid*, A774/B802, p. 615.

⁶² *Ibid*, A777/B805, p. 618.

2.1.4 The Divided Character of Human Knowledge and the Threefold Synthesis

For Kant, “all human knowledge begins with intuitions, proceeds from thence to concepts, and ends with ideas”.⁶³ He argues that concepts and intuitions are the two ingredients of human knowledge.⁶⁴ He means ‘concepts’ as the form and ‘intuitions’ as the content of our knowledge. Thus, for him in order to have knowledge we need the synthesis of them. Kant defines synthesis as “the act of putting different representations together, and of grasping what is manifold in them in one act of knowledge”.⁶⁵ However, the stages of this synthesis are not arranged in order, they are the facets of the same synthesis.

Apart from the ideas of Reason, human cognition has three main parts: sensibility, imagination and the Understanding in Kant’s epistemology. In light of them, there is ‘the synthesis of apprehension in intuition’, “the reproduction in imagination” and “the synthesis of recognition in a concept”. Although they are three facets of one synthesis, we can distinguish their characteristics.⁶⁶ They are articulated in Kant’s differentiation between thoughts and intuitions, as the two sources of our knowledge. Thoughts reflect the active part of our knowledge, whereas intuitions reflect the passive part.

Kant has conflicting explanations about the actual executer of this synthesis. These tensions are connected with the difficulty of revealing the active and passive parts of our knowledge. He actually has a difficulty explaining the active part. This problem is revealed in his indecision in determining the actual ground of knowledge. Although in some parts of the *Critique of Pure Reason* he

⁶³ *Ibid*, A 732, B 730, p. 569.

⁶⁴ *Ibid*, A50/B74.

⁶⁵ *Ibid*, A 77, B 103.

⁶⁶ See Beatrice Longuenesse, *Kant and the Capacity to Judge: Sensibility and Discursivity in the Transcendental Analytic of Critique of Pure Reason*. She argues that sensibility, imagination and understanding are not distinct faculties in themselves; they are representations in one act of synthesis.

asserts that *the transcendental unity of apperception* is the ground of our knowledge, he gives importance to the acts of the Understanding, and he defines them as “the spontaneity of knowledge, the power of thought, the faculty of concepts, the faculty of judgments and the faculty of rules”.⁶⁷ Moreover he occasionally perceives imagination as the important faculty, instead of the Understanding, and claims that the main ground is the synthesis of imagination. However he does not detail the employment of this faculty; he seems undecided about whether imagination falls under the Understanding or not. Thus, there are important problems about the actual competent faculty in the synthesis of knowledge and he has problems about the spontaneous and active part of our thought in this respect.

Since every empirical stage presumes the transcendental synthesis, we cannot differentiate intuitions and thoughts in a time sequence. However, while Kant speaks of a threefold synthesis, his account focuses on concepts and intuitions and does not really attribute a significant role to ideas in the attainment of knowledge. Because of this reason, the gap between concepts and intuitions remains un-bridged.

After this clarification, regarding ‘the starting point of human knowledge’⁶⁸ Kant considers intuitions and he divides intuitions into two realms, as empirical and pure. In some parts of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, the concept of ‘pure’ can be understood as ‘intellectual’ or ‘*a priori*’ or ‘independency of empirical conditions’. However, the concept of pure intuition cannot be thought as ‘intellectual’ in terms of the concept of intuition in ‘transcendental aesthetics’.⁶⁹ In other words, Kant argues that human beings only have sensuous intuitions, and articulates the pure intuitions as the pure forms of sensibility, as space and time. This is related to the difference between human knowledge and divine knowledge.

⁶⁷ *Ibid*, A126.

⁶⁸ After asserting that they are the aspects of one synthesis, it is difficult to determine a starting point, but this explanation is required for the examination of Kant’s procedure.

⁶⁹ This point is also emphasized by Sarah Gibbons, *Kant’s Theory of Imagination*, p. 23.

Since this difference is connected with the limits of subjectivity, I shall explain it briefly.

2.1.5 The Difference between Empirical and Intellectual Intuition

We cannot have intellectual intuitions, since they belong only to God. The twofold characteristic of human knowledge, as thoughts and intuitions, cannot be attributed to God. Divine knowledge does not include such divisions.⁷⁰ “Sensible intuition is either pure intuition or empirical intuition of that which is immediately represented, through sensation, as actual in time and space.”⁷¹ Namely, we are not in an immediate relation to our intuitions, since they are mediated by concepts. Kant perceives immediacy as the indifferenciation between the subject and object. That is there is a mediated relationship between us and the objects of our intuitions. However, with respect to intellectual intuition, there is no such division and Kant intends a kind of creative intuition. In other words, if a being has intellectual intuitions, it is in a direct relation with the objects of its intuitions. This means that it has a creative intelligence.

According to Heidegger Kantian “knowing is primarily intuiting.”⁷² However Kant does not detail the notion of intuition. It is difficult to distinguish it from sensation. He means intuition as an immediate relationship with our object and a content of our knowledge. Besides, he differentiates finite and infinite intuition and argues that humans have a finite (empirical) intuiting. Divine knowing has intellectual intuiting and this is associated with its creative ability. “...the difference between infinite and finite intuition consists in the fact that the former, in its immediate representation of the individual, i. e., of the unique, singular being as a whole, first brings this being into its Being, helps it to its

⁷⁰ See Sallis’s *Gathering of Reason* for the difference between human knowledge and divine knowledge in terms of the divisions.

⁷¹ Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, p. 162.

⁷² Heidegger, *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, p. 16.

coming-into-being”.⁷³ Thus, for Kant to have intellectual intuition means being the cause of the whole Being and knowing the *noumenon* / “thing-in-itself”.

In this respect, the divine subject is not subject to any duality such as intuitions and concepts. Intuiting and being are identical in its existence. However, this finitude of human reasoning is not a deficiency of human reasoning, but it is always its characteristic.⁷⁴ Thus, the characteristic of human Reason depends on its attempt which it can never fulfill. This situation reflects the conflicting and inconsistent character of our Reason. It leads to the problematic aspect of Kant’s modern wo/man. This problematic aspect both reflects her/his main demand and incompetency.

Accordingly, human subjectivity is limited with empirical intuitions, and it has only pure forms of sensible intuitions as space and time. They are forms of sensibility, and forms of empirical intuitions. Space is the form of outer sense, while time is the form of inner sense. Being the form of inner sense, time is the subjective condition of all sensations and intuitions. In this respect, it is privileged over space. All our representations are in a time sequence.⁷⁵

Being the mediator between sensibility and understanding, the synthesis of imagination is the necessary ground for ‘pure apperception’. The relation of the manifold of sensation to pure apperception is possible with the transcendental synthesis of imagination as mentioned before. Kant calls this synthesis as “the synthesis of apprehension.” The synthesis of apprehension is important for the representation of the manifold in space and time and distinguishing each moment of time. However, this apprehension of manifold “would not by itself produce an image and a connection of the impressions”, unless “there exists a subjective ground which leads the mind to reinstate a preceding perception alongside subsequent perception to which it has passed, so to form whole series of

⁷³ *Ibid*, p. 17.

⁷⁴ Zizek, *Ticklish Subject*, p. 29.

⁷⁵ For further discussions, see Shereover’s *Heidegger, Kant and Time*.

perceptions”.⁷⁶ In other words, in order to have a connection of impressions, the reproduction of past impressions is necessary. And the reproductive synthesis of imagination is required for this act.

By this act, each moment of past impressions and experiences are revitalized in the present. It is the faculty of “representing an intuition of an object that is not itself present.”⁷⁷ However, this is not an active representing; Kant “is not suggesting that past appearances are recreated or re-experienced just as they had occurred in the past moment”.⁷⁸ Thus, the reproductive act of imagination is connected with the temporality of inner sense. Reproduction is necessary in assembling distinct representations into unity. It generates time and combines past and present representations.⁷⁹ The transcendental unity of apperception is dependent upon this reproduction. In this sense it is an “imagined unity”.⁸⁰

Kant’s synthesis of knowledge involves a problem about the role of imagination as mentioned before. Kant considers both reproductive and productive imagination in the *First Critique*. Though, it is argued that imagination has enormous signification,⁸¹ he does not detail the employments of imagination. In the *First Critique* Kant’s endeavor of demonstrating the fact that imagination works under the categories of the Understanding cannot be ignored. Yet, there is a distinction between the A and B editions of *Critique of Pure Reason*. While imagination is the more active faculty in the A edition, in the B edition its

⁷⁶ Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, B132, p. 142.

⁷⁷ *Ibid*, B151, p. 165.

⁷⁸ Gibbons, *Kant’s Theory of Imagination*, p. 24. See also Makreel’s *Imagination and Interpretation in Kant*, p. 24. In this sense, Gibbons also argues that Kant’s concept of imagination does not include a distinct contradiction in itself in terms of its reproductive and productive versions.

⁷⁹ For the discussions about time-forming character of imagination, see Heidegger’s *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, Makreel’s *Imagination and Interpretation in Kant*, Casey’s *Imagining*.

⁸⁰ Bernard Freytag, *Imagination and Depth in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason*, p. 21.

⁸¹ Eva Brann, *The World of Imagination*, p. 89. This depth is also explained in a more detailed way in Bernard Freytag’s *Imagination and Depth in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason*.

dependency on the categories of Understanding is emphasized.⁸² Thus, Kant left an important problem unanswered in his theory. This situation reflects the tension between the active and passive parts of our knowledge, since he is hesitant about the productive and reproductive synthesis of imagination as I explained above. Apart from the employments of other faculties, the problem about imagination is significant since this problem turns into another problem in the unity of pure apperception.

2.1.6 The Transcendental Unity of Apperception

Kant emphasizes the unity and conscious awareness of this subject as the main basis of human knowledge. He does not depict this “transcendental” unity merely as the unity of sensations and concepts in time relations; rather he emphasizes that the human mind must be conscious that s/he unites and relates all these representations.⁸³ The mere act of unifying these representations is empirical consciousness and although it is related to the “transcendental unity of apperception”, Kant does not accept that empirical consciousness is adequate for the objectivity of our knowledge.

For Kant, the subjective unity of consciousness is a “determination of inner sense” and this denotes the empirical unity of consciousness.⁸⁴ Kant claims that this empirical unity of consciousness is “wholly contingent”.⁸⁵ His persistent emphasis is on the fact that the transcendental unity of consciousness demands a “wholly conscious” activity, in contrast to the other unities and classifications that

⁸² For the discussions about this distinction see Heidegger’s *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*.

⁸³ *Ibid*, A108, p. 121.

⁸⁴ *Ibid*, B139. On the other hand, it is accepted that this unity of representations by the inner sense, time, is not adequately investigated. This critique is especially raised by Heidegger in *Being and Time* and *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*.

⁸⁵ *Ibid*, B140, p. 132.

are made by our faculties. He claims that it “lies *a priori* at the foundation of empirical consciousness”.⁸⁶

Kant uses the expressions “transcendental unity of consciousness”, “transcendental ego” and “transcendental consciousness” interchangeably.⁸⁷ As the ground of our knowledge this *a priori* condition is associated with the awareness of the fact that there is a supposition of “I think” accompanying all our thoughts. However, the Kantian supposition that there is an “I think” which accompanies all our representations⁸⁸ is problematic. He claims that it is an act of spontaneity, it is an *a priori* condition and it cannot belong to sensibility.⁸⁹ However he is not unable to demonstrate this “I think” as the transcendental unity of apperception.

Kant is criticized for accepting the transcendental unity of consciousness taken for granted. The confusions concerning his conception of imagination make this unity indefinite and unfounded.⁹⁰ On the other hand, this unity is supposed to be the most important basis of our knowledge, since knowledge of the existence of the phenomenal world is possible only with our act of unifying and classifying this world. Therefore, in Kantian thought, the existence and conditions of the “transcendental” unity of apperception brings forth some problems.

First of all, it is difficult to know this “transcendental” consciousness, since its existence can be known only in time. This means that we can know the actual unity of our existence and our consciousness as only an appearance, and we can only know empirical consciousness. Kant especially emphasizes that “we have no knowledge of ourselves as we are but merely as we appear to ourselves”.⁹¹

⁸⁶ *Ibid*, B220.

⁸⁷ In a footnote of A117, Kant states that “the consciousness of myself” is “original apperception”.

⁸⁸ *Ibid*, B131, p. 151.

⁸⁹ *Ibid*, B132, p. 154.

⁹⁰ For further discussions about the consciousness of self and the unity of transcendental unity of apperception, see Shoemaker’s “Self-Reference and Self-Awareness”, P. Keller’s *Kant and the Demands of Self-Consciousness*, A. Brook’s “Kant on Self-Reference and Self-Awareness”.

Manfred Frank argues that “in order to be aware of its own appearance (in time) the simple being of self-consciousness must always be pre-supposed – otherwise it is as if the self-awareness were to lose its eye”.⁹²

This fact reflects an influential and controversial part of Kant’s philosophy. It is emphasized that this assignment produces a split in the modern subject: there is a subject who is aware of the fact that s/he thinks in her/his every act and thought and there is another subject who tries to be connected with this subject’s thinking. Accordingly, there emerges a subject who cannot be identified with her/himself in Kantian thinking. It is accepted that this problem is connected with Kant’s contradicting purposes in terms of the activity and passivity of our mind. I shall explain these critiques in the last part of this chapter.

It can be said that Kant is at a turning point between the conception of “Being” which indicates a static and abstract reality and the conception of “Becoming” which depicts a chaotic and changing reality. Although his conceptions of existence and the subject are criticized to be abstract and stagnant, both of them dissolve in his investigations within the jungle of the manifold of appearances. Kant dissolves the possibility of knowing both of them.

The importance of the influence of his claim that knowledge arises from our Reason “dictating its laws” to this manifold on the philosophy that comes after him cannot be overstated. Everyone that comes after him needs to consider the view that we perceive the outer things from our subjective framework. I think that this determines the modern subject in different perspectives. His arguments in knowledge try to bring into line the subjective and objective knowledge within the realm of the *a priori* and universal faculties. We can also see the implications of this attitude in his moral arguments.

⁹¹ *Ibid*, B158, p. 169.

⁹² Manfred Frank, I took this reference from Bowie’s *Aesthetics and Subjectivity*, p. 19.

2.2 KANTIAN MORALITY

There is another ironical aspect of Kantian philosophy in his moral arguments: The possibility of ethics and moral arguments is dependent upon the finitude of human knowledge that is exhibited in the *Critique of Pure Reason*. Kant states that “for if appearances are things-in-themselves, freedom cannot be upheld”.⁹³ In other words, if “things-in-themselves” were indeed subject to the causal laws that hold sway over the phenomenal world, humans would also be subject to this causality, and “would turn into lifeless puppets”.⁹⁴ Thus, the unknowability of the “thing-in-itself” turns into a ground for the possibility of moral arguments. This point demonstrates that Kant’s epistemology is a preliminary study for his conception of morality. Although the importance of his epistemology gets ahead of other realms that he is interested in, Kant tries to bring the dignity of humanity in the realm of morality.

For Kant the possibility of our moral arguments depends on our freedom which he is able to posit since we cannot know the “thing-in-itself”. Again it is clear that Kant perceives knowing the “thing-in-itself” as becoming the agency who can start a causal and deterministic network. However, in contrast to God’s being, Kant thinks that if we attribute to wo/man this position of agency, we also would have to accept that the agency must be subject to this causality. This approach brings out a different conception of freedom in his morality. Freedom means the self-authority of woman who can start a causal chain in the realm of morality, yet this freedom also means to be subject to the rules which Reason itself legislates. Kant explains this situation in the *Critique of Practical Reason*;

...instead of the conflict which now the moral disposition has to wage with inclinations and in which, after some defeats, moral strength of mind may be gradually won, God and eternity in their awful majesty would stand unceasingly before our eyes...hence most of the actions that conformed to the law would be done from fear, a few only from hope, and none at all from duty, and the moral worth of actions, on which alone in the eyes of supreme wisdom the worth of the person and even

⁹³ Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, A536/B564, p. 466.

⁹⁴ This phrase and determination belongs to Slavoj Zizek in *Ticklish Subject*, p. 25.

that of the world depends would cease to exist. As long as the nature of the man remains what it is, his conduct would thus be changed into mere mechanism, in which, as in a puppet show, everything would gesticulate well, but there would be no life in the figures.⁹⁵

Kant's attempt of achieving universal and scientific categories of knowledge can also be seen in his moral arguments. I tried to explain Kantian epistemology from the viewpoint of the gap between nature and wo/man. Kant tries to give a scientific form to our knowledge in order to bridge this gap. In a similar vein, he tries to attribute scientific laws to our moral arguments. This is the main paradox which the other thinkers of my thesis find critical in Kant. From different perspectives, Nietzsche and Marx try to put forward the humanistic and subjectivist aspects of our knowledge and theories. On the other hand, Kant chooses another way in order to uphold a humanistic perspective. He tries to ascribe a scientific status to our subjective ideas. He even tries to reconcile human freedom with scientific laws by establishing an analogy between them. Thus he wants to establish an objective theory of morality. This objectivity depends on the restricted aspects of the human mind. In his morality Kant begins to denounce this restriction by carrying the subject into the *noumenal* realm.

The superiority of moral law along with the subjects is an inclination of the Enlightenment. As I mentioned above, Kant tries to make wo/man a scientist who legislates freely in the realm of morality, in order to reconcile her/him with nature. This attempt leads him to rationalize and systematize moral arguments. He tries to remove all of wo/man's inclinations, desires, and practical influences which he holds to be beyond our rationality, which, in turn, is necessary in order for wo/man to be moral. In fact, he tries to establish a kingdom of Reason in place of the old sovereignties, including God's supremacy, which is removed by the Enlightenment and modernity. In this sense, the Enlightenment is also criticized for restricting human freedom. According to this criticism, the Enlightenment drives us to an authority of freedom, to choosing an ideology and being subject to this ideology. Adorno and Horkheimer explain this situation by arguing that;

⁹⁵ Kant, *Critique of Practical Reason*, p. 152-3.

All are free to dance and amuse themselves, just as, since the historical neutralization of religion, they have been free to join, any of the countless sects. But freedom to choose an ideology...everywhere proves to be freedom to be the save.⁹⁶

Kant tries to lead wo/man to choose the freedom of adopting a moral theory which is universal and scientific. Thus, in his morality, the chief problem turns into the problem of founding a method to justify a universal and scientific form of morality. However instead of justifying moral arguments in an epistemological way, he puts forward the self-authoritative and self-legislating power of wo/man. He tries to explain how we construct synthetic *a priori* judgments of morality; however since he distinguishes the realm of moral arguments from practical life, his justification is systematized somewhere between human's freedom and self-legislating, self-choosing capacity. It is difficult to distinguish our freedom from these capacities. The difficulty of explaining Kantian morality arises from here.

Kant precisely emphasizes his confidence of the dignity of human beings. For him, this dignity is something more than an inner value. Oliver Sensen argues that in the famous passage on dignity in *Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals*, Kant states that "morality is raised above other determinations of will in that morality alone should be valued unconditionally".⁹⁷ Sensen conceives human dignity as a conception which indicates the superiority of our Reason to nature. The problem of the gap between nature and wo/man seems solved at this point where Kant makes wo/man a being who has superiority over the causal laws of nature. I believe that this interpretation is consistent with Kant's philosophy since his confidence in Reason can be explained in this way. Wo/man's freedom is of primary importance in his philosophy. He always contends for wo/man in contrast to nature. Thus, nature is precariousness in his thinking; he sees it as a threat for Reason. He both tries to liken Reason to nature by attributing it a scientific form

⁹⁶ Adorno and Horkheimer, *Dialectics of Enlightenment*, pp. 135-136.

⁹⁷ Oliver Sensen, "Kant's Conception of Human Dignity", p. 309, Sensen claims that Kant's conception of human dignity is always misinterpreted.

like nature and to posit it over nature by emphasizing its freedom. In the realm of morality, he tries to elevate Reason over nature.

Kant does not want to posit wo/man in the deterministic and causal network of scientific laws. Although in the other chapters of my thesis his attitude in epistemology is rendered as non-humanistic, his starting point is a humanistic perspective, which emphasizes the subjectivity and autonomy of wo/man in the realm of morality. Kant wants to establish a science/metaphysics of morality depending on rationality and free-will. He puts forward the spontaneity of our mind in justifying moral arguments. He claims that only freedom can be “the condition of moral law”.⁹⁸ The spontaneous aspects of our knowledge and Reason come from the realm of *noumenon* in Kant’s morality. He cannot present a firm basis for the freedom of Reason in epistemology; he wants to overturn this situation in morality. He explains this fact by arguing that “in order to make room for faith”; he must have to deny knowledge.⁹⁹

Kant accepts ethics to be a practical philosophy; however he wants to cut its relation to our practical life. His emphasis on human dignity leads him to justify a realm of morality which has nothing to do with practical life. The only relation between our Reason and the practical comes from the self-legislative superiority of Reason. Furthermore, he argues that “in this practical point of view”, the possibility of freedom “must be assumed, although we cannot theoretically know and understand it”.¹⁰⁰ For Kant, freedom is a “subjective necessity” and “a need of pure reason”,¹⁰¹ and to reject the possibility of it leads to the rejection of the possibility of moral arguments. To reject the possibility of morality indicates the rejection of the dignity of humanity itself. In other words, it also means the rejection of humanity.

⁹⁸ Kant, *Critique of Practical Reason*, 4: 400.

⁹⁹ Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, Bxxx, p. 29.

¹⁰⁰ Kant, *Critique of Practical Reason*, 4: 401.

¹⁰¹ *Ibid*, 4: 401.

There is one moral law in Kantian morality which has two main formulations: “act only in accordance with that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it become a universal law”¹⁰², “so act that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means.”¹⁰³ Both of them imply a necessity that our actions can be moral if they are performed only for the sake of the moral law. Kant wants to achieve a moral law which is universally valid and has an objective reality. Consequently, Kant wants to emphasize an inner voice that always reminds us of the moral law. He tries to make this voice scientific. He is not suspicious concerning this voice.

For Kant, for an action to be moral, it must be done for the sake of duty. We must distinguish our desires, inclinations and duties, since desires and inclinations are blind and slavish.¹⁰⁴ Our morality must be dependent on our right decisions and good intentions without the possibly conflicting influence of our inclinations. He uses the conception of the Categorical Imperative as the moral law or practical laws. For Kant, we can know the Categorical Imperative as a synthetic *a priori* judgment and this is the most valuable aspect of human beings.¹⁰⁵ It reflects the divine character of human reason and human beings also.¹⁰⁶ Thus, for our moral judgments, Kant trusts Reason alone which is independent from experience. He claims that, for our moral decisions, experience is the “mother of illusion” and we cannot derive “what ought to be done” from “what is done”.¹⁰⁷

¹⁰² *Ibid*, 4:421, 4:402.

¹⁰³ *Ibid*, 4:429, 4:436.

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid*, 4: 402.

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid*, 4: 436.

¹⁰⁶ Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, A738/ B766.

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid*, A 318-319, p. 313.

Kant is in search of the synthetic *a priori* judgments of morality in the *Critique of Practical Reason* and in *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*. His justification and examination of moral arguments is basically dependent on his belief in human's will for acting "for the sake of moral law". Kant claims that in order for an act to have moral content, "it is not enough that it conform to the moral law, but it must also happen for the sake of this law".¹⁰⁸ If our Reason chooses an act for the sake of moral law, Kant relates this choice to good will. This is the will which makes decisions only for the sake of the moral law. Kant conceives this goodness of will as *causa sui*. In other words it is good in itself and its goodness does not depend on practical life. Its goodness is dependent on merely itself.¹⁰⁹ It has a capacity to act in accordance with the moral law, and this capacity is established by practical reason itself. I think this *a priori* justification of good will is related to his confidence in an inner voice as I mentioned above. Kant's confidence in and justification of an inner voice is a significant and controversial issue.

Kant thinks that there is a distinction between technical practical Reason and pure practical Reason.¹¹⁰ Apart from the categorical imperative, we may have technical and pragmatic imperatives. He claims that the technical use of our Reason is connected with utilities, not ends and maxims. In this respect, moral arguments cannot be dependent on personal happiness, but the moral law.¹¹¹ Kant is against the utilitarian viewpoint in morality in his time. He does not find the ground of utility to be a firm foundation for moral arguments, since it can be changeable. His conception of Reason is independent from inclinations, desires, or personal utilities. Pure practical Reason can direct and command all of them. For this reason, moral law can only be dependent on pure practical Reason.

¹⁰⁸ Kant, *Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals*, 4:390.

¹⁰⁹ *Ibid*, 4: 393.

¹¹⁰ Kant, *Critique of Practical Reason*, p. 294.

¹¹¹ *Ibid*, p. 299.

Kant separates the realm of pure practical Reason from all other emotional and psychological facts. He accepts it as a distinct and genuine competent authority in directing our actions. Thus, there is a sharp difference between his conception of Reason in morality and all other psychological facts. It is because of this that his conception of Reason and rationality are so often criticized for being abstract and for ignoring the other aspects of wo/man. Moreover, it is argued that Kantian morality cannot explain and disregards the complexities of human psychology, such as subconscious motivations.¹¹²

For Kant, pure practical Reason can derive its principles from itself alone. It has synthetic *a priori* principles that command our will. In this sense, Kant accepts that pure practical Reason exists as a deep and genuine employment in us. He claims that we can see the examples of good will and moral acts in our life apparently. In other words, Kant has an unshaken belief that everyone has good will. Thus, he argues that “there is nothing it is possible to think of anywhere in the world, or indeed anything at outside it, which can be held to be good without limitation, excepting only a good will”.¹¹³ Furthermore he believes that even if all else failed, good will would “shine like a jewel for itself, as something that has its full worth in itself”.¹¹⁴

On the other hand, Kant’s morality attributes a responsibility to wo/man for acting in accordance with the moral law. He argues that everyone has this capacity. He formulates a third law for this responsibility; “so act, that by the maxim of your action you may present yourself as a universal legislator.”¹¹⁵ This law is also accepted as “the law of autonomy.” Kant claims that we must

¹¹² For these critiques see Onora O’Neill’s *Acting on Principle* and Barbara Herman’s *The Practice of Moral Judgment*.

¹¹³ Kant, *Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals*, 4:393.

¹¹⁴ *Ibid*, 4:394.

¹¹⁵ Kant, *Lectures on Ethics*, 27:518.

presuppose freedom “if we want to think of a being as rational and endowed with consciousness of his causality with respect to actions.”¹¹⁶

Kant wants to combine the idea of freedom and the necessity to act for the sake of the Categorical Imperative or moral law. In this respect, his conception of freedom puts human beings in charge. For this reason, his attitude of combining the Categorical Imperative and the conception of freedom is criticized to be contradicting. Kant posits freedom as the necessary presumption of practical law. It is argued that if the Categorical Imperative means for us an obligation, the question of how it can be superimposed on freedom remains.¹¹⁷ The actual problem is Kant’s grasping the ground of moral law as a priori and given. Nietzsche’s main criticism of Kantian morality is on this point: that he calls attention the connection of the categorical law and a form of obligation. He also emphasizes the relation of God with this form of obligation.

Kantian morality is generally thought to be optimistic and naïve. However Nietzsche’s criticism is also connected with his absolutistic approach. He finds the Kantian kingdom of ends and the ground of Reason alone to be problematic. Furthermore, Nietzsche claims that the Kantian approach is a cause of modern wo/man’s feeling of responsibility to another realm of Being and supreme God. In this sense, he claims that the Kantian viewpoint can be a cause of the degeneracy of modern wo/man. This degeneracy originates from the categorical imperative since Nietzsche accepts it as an adapted version of Christian morality which also presupposes the existence of God. Nietzsche finds a similarity between the presupposition of God and the presupposition of the Categorical Imperative which depends on the assumption of freedom.

Kant also claims that the existence of God must also be presupposed in order for moral law to be possible.¹¹⁸ He thinks that the idea of God can make

¹¹⁶ Kant, *Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals*, 4:449.

¹¹⁷ For further discussions, see Allison’s *Kant’s Theory of Freedom*.

¹¹⁸ Kant, *Critique of Practical Reason*, 4: 392.

room for punishment and the meaning of life. Yet, he does not detail this supposition. Like freedom, God is also a practical presupposition of moral law.

Although Kant is always in search for something that we can believe certainly and without doubt, ironically, Nietzsche thinks that Kantian thinking leads us to a situation of nihilism. In contrast to the ontological implications of nihilism, Kant writes: “Two things fill the mind with ever new and increasing admiration and awe, the oftener and the more steadily we reflect on them; *the starry heavens above and the moral law within.*”¹¹⁹ Kant’s distinction between necessity and freedom, or nature and freedom again can be seen in this quotation. Although they appear as two different realms from each other, we can find the implications of the desire to reconcile nature and freedom in all of Kant’s writings. He accepts nature as a systematically organized unity which has universal and necessary laws. He wants to provide a basis of systematization for our moral arguments that is similar to his conception of nature.

For this reason, he attributes a unity to morality with his “kingdom of ends”. This is related to another aspect of the Kantian conception of responsibility in acting for the sake of the moral law. We are not only responsible for the moral law; indeed we are also responsible for each other. This point reveals his search for necessity also since he thinks that morality is possible with the commitments of all members of a community. He calls this community a “kingdom” and argues that morality is possible with a “kingdom of ends”: “The conception of every rational being as one which must consider itself as giving in all the maxims of its will universal laws, so as to judge itself and its actions from this point of view – this conception leads to another which depends on it and is very fruitful, namely that of a kingdom of ends”.¹²⁰

‘Kingdom of Ends’ is the name of the Kantian systematization of morality. He takes it as a unity which every subject is a member of. In this way he tries to

¹¹⁹ Kant, *Critique of Practical Reason*, p. 260.

¹²⁰ *Ibid*, p. 51.

give morality a metaphysical unity similar to that of nature. He thinks that the universal laws of morality can be possible this way. The objectivity of these laws is made compatible with their subjective origin by assuming everyone to be a member of this kingdom. The freedom of the subjects attributes a responsibility to them in this membership. In the *First Critique* Kant emphasizes the relation between laws of nature and unity and systematization of our knowledge by accepting the Understanding as “the lawgiver of nature”.¹²¹ In morality this lawgiver is the moral law in us, and there is an important parallel between these two realms as well as an important difference.

In the realm of morality we are not accepted as only phenomenal beings, but noumenal beings, since we are both the lawgiver and the actual cause of moral laws in this realm. The identity between being and being-known is compatible with the moral laws. This aspect of his moral theory is in stark contrast to his epistemology. The idea of Kingdom of Ends leads to the conclusion that in morality we are not subject to our forms of appearances. In other words there is no difference between the forms and the contents in our moral thinking. The Kingdom of Ends regulates and systematizes our life and practices. It tries to realize itself in this world which the human beings live in. We must assume it in order to be moral.

This approach is criticized by Nietzsche because of this ground; since Nietzsche claims that this is an impossible ground which separates and negates the actual life. He especially finds the Kantian effort to found the moral law on reason alone to be wrong-headed. Kant’s ground is actually unknown. As mentioned above the idea of freedom may not be understood. However, it must be presupposed for the sake of itself. The difference between the Understanding and Reason gains meaning at this point. He states this difference in the *Critique of Pure Reason* in order to explain Reason’s desperate attempts in the realm of metaphysics. Yet the self-authority and self-dependence of Reason is the keystone of his morality.

¹²¹ Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, A 126, p. 148.

Kant's morality relies completely on reason and the good will of the subjects. He has no doubts about the roots of the moral law in us. He claims that only considerations about facts and misleading inclinations can sway us from moral decisions. He certainly believes that if everybody relied on pure *a priori* reasoning alone, everyone would act in accordance with their inner ground of morality;

There is no one, even the most wicked scoundrel, if only he is otherwise accustomed to use his reason, who does not wish, if one lays before him examples of honesty in aims, sympathetic participation and general benevolence (and in addition combined with great sacrifices of advance and convenience) that he might also be so disposed.¹²²

I think that this belief will be problematic for the other thinkers of my thesis and I shall try to consider what they would say especially about this quotation in the following parts of my treatise. I feel that Kant's belief at this point reflects the struggles of the Enlightenment's wo/man for her/his self-authority against nature.

I want to state shortly that Nietzsche and Marx see the moral world and wo/man from a different perspective. Their conception of the relation between wo/man and nature is entirely different. Nietzsche wants to reveal human's power of revaluation without any *a priori* suppositions. Marx does not perceive and feel the distance between nature and freedom like Kant. He is naturalistic and believes that wo/man essentially belongs to nature. Only I find a fundamental similarity between Kant's morality and Dostoevsky. I feel that Dostoevsky envies Kant and desires to believe the idea that is revealed in the above quotation from the *Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals* that everyone wants to act according to the moral law. He also questions the supposition of God in order to make room for morality. I will explain them in the following chapters of my thesis. Now I want to continue to another realm of Kant's studies in which again Kant struggles with the distance between wo/man and nature. Since I have tried to explain Kant's subject within the context of the distance between nature and wo/man, I want to explain this point shortly in order to complete my Kant section.

¹²² Kant, *Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Moral*, p. 71.

2.3 KANT'S AESTHETICS

The *Critique of Judgment* is accepted the main attempt of Kant to reconcile the world of human beings and nature. Bowie argues that the main Kantian question in the *Critique of Judgment* is the question of “how the deterministic natural world, whose mechanisms are becoming more and more accessible to the methods of the natural sciences, relates to the world in which we understand ourselves as autonomous beings”.¹²³

As mentioned above, Kant always tries to solve the problem between necessity and freedom. He on the one hand emphasizes the self-autonomous subject; on the other hand, he perceives that this subject has a difficulty confronting nature. This difficulty is grounded on the Kantian conception of nature which is dependent upon a unity of necessary laws. The subject conceives the unity of nature as a threat for its unity and rationality. However, Kant's subject feels her/his inadequacy when s/he compares her/himself with nature. S/he compares her/his own powers and faculties with the universal and unshakable laws of nature. At the end of this comparison, s/he has to accept that his/her subjective faculties are weak. Nature with its perfect and sublime unity resists the attempt of the subject to conceptualize it.

Kant correlates this situation with the subject's feelings concerning works of art. He also tries to find the roots of our conception of beauty in the interplay between our limited Understanding of nature and our Reason's desire to attribute more meaning to it. Moreover, he investigates the reasons in the background of arriving at a universal conception of the beautiful and the sublime. This universal basis is important for him, since he is always in search for the basis of universal laws. He compares our situation in withstanding nature with our situation in facing works of art. He especially tries to understand the creative aspect of nature and art.

¹²³ Andrew Bowie, *Aesthetics and Subjectivity*, p. 16.

Creativity is a problem for Kant, since he restricts the realm of human subjectivity with the uncreative and regulative ideas in his epistemology.¹²⁴ Our Reason feels itself inadequate in contending with nature which has a creative power. Nature which is the author and commander of all employments we intuit is a big problem in his thinking. Reason measures itself with it and confronts a challenge in facing the creative power.

In the *First Critique*, judgment is presented as a faculty of the Understanding as well as Reason. However, Kant also argues that the Understanding is the faculty of judgment. This is a problem which Kant does not explain in the *First Critique*. He mainly wants to relate this faculty with the spontaneous and active part of our reasoning which is a continuing problem of Kantian epistemology. The active part of our mind attempts to compare its creativity with the creativity of nature. Kant accepts that this part especially is connected with the Understanding. He tries to correlate the realm of the Understanding with the realm of nature in the *First Critique*. However this attitude becomes a problem for our mind in the end. He also claims that nature and freedom are the two objects of our mind, and they refer to different realms of causality.¹²⁵ The relation between them is a problem of Reason which concerns itself with the unity of all these faculties with each other and with nature.

To sum up, the distance between nature and wo/man makes itself clearly felt in the *Critique of Judgment*. This distance is revealed by Kant's explanation of subjectivist and universal character of our aesthetical judgments. In the *Critique of Judgment*, Kant investigates aesthetical judgments and the function of teleology in our understanding of nature. Kant thinks that both issues are related to the faculty of judgment; however their relation is controversial. Kant defines the faculty of judgment is "thinking the particular under the universal".¹²⁶ He claims that

¹²⁴ Nick, Land, *Nietzsche and Modern German Thought* p. 243. Land claims that although Kant never can be able to explain the animalistic aspects of nature, he does not try to reduce it like Hegel, Schelling and Schopenhauer.

¹²⁵ Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, A 176/B182.

judgment as a faculty of mind has determining and reflecting roles. The prominent role is reflective as defined “finding the role for the given particular”.¹²⁷

Reflective judgment employs in scientific investigations; it systemizes scientific researches and helps classification. It especially provides our understanding of nature along with laws and causal relations. Kant defines reflective judgment as the faculty of aesthetical and teleological judgments. Aesthetical judgments are concerning beautiful and sublime. Teleological judgments are concerning natural things, they provide us understanding natural things in relation to a purpose, a telos. Kant deals with aesthetical judgments, especially the judgment of beauty and the beauty of nature as in contrast to the beauty of works of art. He argues that “judgment reveals itself as a faculty that has its own principle”.¹²⁸ For Kant the actual relation between beauty and faculty of judgment is that the pleasure of beauty is a consequence of the exercise of judgment, especially the reflective judgment.

Kant explains the main features of the judgments of beauty. The judgment of beauty is disinterested, that the subject has not a desire for the object. It depends on feeling, not empirical sensation. Moreover, it has universal validity which does not depend on concepts. In other words, these judgments cannot be proved. In addition, the judgments of beauty have no purpose, however they involve purposiveness. It is not connected with a definite purpose; it has the form of purposiveness. In the exercise of judgments of beauty both imagination and the Understanding engages in. Kant says that the judgments of beauty are connected with the free play of the Understanding and imagination. Finally the judgments of beauty refer a necessity. Kant defines this necessary as exemplary necessary. He claims that if someone judges something as beautiful, this judgment is an example of the how everyone must judge it beautiful. Kant argues that the beauty of natural things gives us a hope. This hope leads us to think the nature is designed by an

¹²⁶ Kant, *Critique of Judgment*, Introduction IV, p. 179.

¹²⁷ *Ibid*, Introduction IV, p. 179.

¹²⁸ *Ibid*, p. 179.

artist and everything in nature has a purpose. Thus, Kant perceives the judgments of beauty as related to our perception and understanding of nature.

Apart from beauty, actually in the experience of sublime, we compare our power and the power of nature. Kant sees the judgment of sublime as the supremacy of us over nature. Distinguished from beauty, the judgment of sublime has not got a form of purposiveness. Kant claims that sublime has two notions as mathematical and dynamical. The judgment of mathematically sublime includes a feeling of superiority of Reason over imagination. These judgments reflect our capacity of sensory apprehension, the apprehension of the magnitude of empirical things. When we confront with a huge thing, this hugeness overwhelms the capacity of our imagination. Our imagination tries to comprehend it with a demand of Reason. Yet, it cannot do this. Kant claims that the play of imagination and the Understanding engages in concerning this incapacity. He argues that “just because there is in our imagination a striving to advance to the infinite, where in our Reason there lies a claim to absolute totality, as to a real idea, the very inadequacy of our faculty for estimating the magnitude of the things in the sensible world [viz. imagination] awakens the feeling of a supersensible faculty in us.”¹²⁹ For instance we can think of infinity as a whole through Reason. It “indicates a faculty of the mind which surpasses every standard of sense.”¹³⁰ Kant gives the examples of the natural things, as mountains, seas in order to explain the mathematically sublime judgments.¹³¹

Kant argues that we superiority to nature in the case of dynamically sublime judgments. He says that nature is “dynamically sublime” if we consider it “a power that has no dominion over us.”¹³² If we can conceive nature with a fear but with knowing ourselves to be in a secure situation, we can overcome this fear.

¹²⁹ *Ibid.*, & 25, p. 250.

¹³⁰ *Ibid.*, & 26, p. 254.

¹³¹ *Ibid.*, & 26, p. 256.

¹³² *Ibid.*, & 28, p. 260.

Kant explains this situation by arguing that “the irresistibility of [nature’s] power certainly makes us, considered as natural beings, recognize our physical powerlessness, but at the same time it reveals a capacity for judging ourselves as independent of nature a superiority over nature...whereby the humanity in our person remains undemeaned even though the human being must submit to that dominion.”¹³³ At this point, Kant gives examples of the overhanging cliffs, thunder clouds, volcanoes and hurricanes.¹³⁴

For Kant the feeling of sublime both involves a pleasure and displeasure. The pleasure is connected with our feeling of the superiority of Reason over nature. In mathematically sublime, this displeasure is a consequence of the incapacity of our imagination. The judgments of dynamically sublime, our displeasure comes from our feeling of powerlessness with respect to nature’s power.

Thus, Kant’s drive which shuttles between our power and nature’s power is revealed with the experience of sublime at most. The sublime causes pain in us. When Kant’s subject tries to confront nature, s/he compares her/himself with nature and the experience of the sublime which causes pain in us is the reflection of Kant’s tension of nature and wo/man. Although Kant argues that morality can be the rival of the power of nature, this problem is an ongoing problem in his philosophy. After this very brief explanation of Kant’s main purposes in the *Critique of Judgment* from the perspective of the tension between nature and freedom I will conclude this section the criticism of Kantian subject in terms of its self-split characteristic.

¹³³ *Ibid.*, & 28, p. 261, 262.

¹³⁴ *Ibid.*, & 28, p. 262.

2.4 THE SELF-SPLIT OF KANTIAN SUBJECT

The split in the Kantian subject is explained in relation to Kant's distinction between the receptive and spontaneous faculties of our mind and understanding and Reason. As I have mentioned before this is also the distinction between nature and freedom. This tension turns into a tension between the receptivity and spontaneity of our mind, and it is operative in all the stages of our knowledge. Deleuze calls the distinction between the receptivity and spontaneity as the alienation of the "other" in our thinking.¹³⁵ He claims that Kant wants to distinguish especially the representation and its form, and this is connected with Kantian *a priori* categories and sensible intuitions.

The difference between form and representation is connected with Kantian *a priori* forms of intuition. Kant especially tries to distinguish the form of our knowledge and its content. As mentioned before Kant makes this attempt for his transcendental philosophy. However Deleuze perceives it to be representative of a split in the subject since he claims that in this way the immediacy of the subject with his/her internal faculties is lost. In this sense, Deleuze argues that in the Kantian conception of knowledge, there is a split in the subject between the self who thinks and the other self who is aware of this self. Thus, for Deleuze the intuitional character of Kantian knowledge is problematic and the main reflection of the split appears with the broken immediacy of this subject.

A very similar attempt at depicting the modern subject can be found in the conception of "*doppelganger*". The term *doppelganger* expresses the "other" in the modern subject. It is a notion which was first expressed by Jean Paul. For Vardoulakis, the *doppelganger* "can be seen as an overcoming of the idealist autonomous subject, a subject that is premised on the ability to have an immediate access to its internal functions".¹³⁶ *Doppelganger* is accepted as the outcome of the problems arising from the idealist autonomous subject; it denotes a split in modern

¹³⁵ Deleuze, *Four Lectures on Kant*, p. 65.

¹³⁶ *Ibid*, p. 15.

subjects in terms of the difference of the subject which is defined as autonomous and self-conscious and the other subject who is different but tries to be this defined subject. For Vardoulakis, this problem is connected with rationality and subjectivity. Especially, Kant's insistence on rational capacities of the subject brings out this problem.

In *The Doppelgänger*, Vardoulakis expounds this *doppelgänger* in terms of its social and political relations.¹³⁷ He tries to explore the conditions of isolation of the subjects from each other and the subject of politics as the defined by the political system and the actual political subject. He indicates the contradictions between the autonomous subject which is defined by political and social presumptions and the individual subject who feels a self-split from this autonomous subject.

In relation to Kantian thought, Vardoulakis thinks that the *doppelgänger* in Kant is connected with the separation between the faculties of the mind. He claims that this division is the division of subjectivity and rationality. For him, Kantian "transcendental subject" lost her/himself in the immensity of reason. The individuality and universality of this subject cannot be identified and the actual meaning of the *doppelgänger* is revealed at this point.¹³⁸ This separation of the individual and universal subject is amalgamated in the self-reflexivity of the subject.

I think that this is a profound explanation of the main problem of Kant's subject. Vordulakis extends his analyses by justifying his *Doppelgänger* depending on a political context and by giving examples from literature. My *Underground Wo/man* has similarities with *Doppelgänger*. I started to explain my problem depending on an epistemological split in Kantian philosophy. With a difference from Vordulakis's aim, I will limit my search within an epistemological ground. However I will also talk about Dostoevsky's approach from literature. In

¹³⁷ Dmitris, Vordulakis, *The Doppelgänger*.

¹³⁸ *Ibid*, p. 3.

the second chapter, I will talk about Dostoevsky's Golyadkin, who is the main character of *The Double*. He is a good example of *Doppelgänger* and the Underground Wo/Man.

I have tried to formulate the Kantian subject by emphasizing its distance from nature. I emphasize that that Kant is always in search for a scientific and universal conception of subject whose main characteristics are being self-conscious, self-critical and autonomous. The epistemological context of my thesis reveals that the main problem of the Underground Wo/man originates from this self-reflexivity. Nietzsche criticizes Kantian *a priori* categories which distort the unity of Kant's subject. He mainly emphasizes that Kant's cowardly attitude towards nature causes the split of Kant's subject. He claims that from the beginning, the way Kant posits wo/man and nature is problematic. Moreover, Nietzsche also accepts this problem as the main problem of modern wo/man. Along with this approach, he criticizes Kant's epistemology also. In addition, ethics is an important realm for Nietzsche. His epistemological arguments depend on his emphasis on wo/man's power of revaluation in morality. For this reason, I will also explain Nietzsche's criticism of Kantian morality briefly in order to bring out his Underground Wo/man.

Marx also does not look at wo/man from a perspective which is distant from nature. He emphasizes that the self-awareness and self-reflexivity of wo/man is distorted by the social and economical relations. He investigates this distinction from the perspective of social reality. In addition he emphasizes that they are two aspects of the same reality. I will try to explain Marx's epistemology by an emphasis upon his analysis of social reality and economical relations. Thus, in that respect I will try to explain Marx's Underground Wo/man.

It is true that epistemology is not a purpose for Nietzsche and Marx. However I think that we can find the echoes of Kant's distinction between appearances and thing-in-itself in their philosophies. They both are against this difference. However by their analyses on different realms I believe that we can

find the common points between in their thoughts and Kant's undesired conclusions. I accept the distinction of thing-in-itself and appearances as a main characteristic of modern wo/man. Nietzsche and Marx try to reveal the problems of modern wo/man along with her/his contradictions with her/himself and nature. They handle the distinction between two realities from social, ethical, economical perspectives. They try to assimilate it within other contexts. Thus, I think that we can find an Underground Wo/man in these contexts. This is the main purpose of my dissertation.

Concluding Remarks

If we want to consider a problem about modern people, we cannot pass Kantian questions and determinations. My main problem is concerned around the definition of modern human beings as rational, conscious, free and moral. The Kantian conception of human beings in his time is hopeful in the sense that he believes that we mature our mind and we will reach a better society and a better world by means of the Enlightenment.

I did not elaborate Kantian social and political philosophy since I want to emphasize his epistemological approach. But it will be helpful to give a brief summary of it in terms of the distinction between nature and wo/man that he always keeps in mind. In addition this issue will make explicit the modern conception of wo/man in a different context.

Kant tries to attribute scientific laws to society correlatively with his epistemology and morality. In "An Idea for a Universal History from a Cosmopolitan Point of View", he tries to attribute scientific laws to society. He argues that "the greatest problem for the human race, to the solution of which Nature drives man, is the achievement of a universal civic society, which administers law among man."¹³⁹ Along with his general purpose in philosophy

¹³⁹ Kant, *An Idea for a Universal History from A Cosmopolitan Point of View*", fifth thesis.

Kant believes that if we can transform our social and political arguments into a scientific and universal form we achieve the ideal state for humanity. For Kant, this task is possible with the self-authority of wo/man similar to his morality. Kant states that nature employs the means to wo/man in order to achieve an ideal society. He presupposes self-authority and freedom of wo/man in his social and political philosophical philosophy too.

Kant also mentions that to achieve an ideal society along with scientific laws is a most difficult task.¹⁴⁰ He talks about the possible contradicting inclinations among people. He specifies wo/man's inclination to act for the sake of her/his own wishes. Kant calls this antagonism to society as "unsocial sociability" of wo/man. However he does not think that this causes threats for the improvement of an ideal society. He states that wo/man can be aware that this opposition may awaken all of wo/man's powers. Unsocial sociability drives wo/man to achieve "a rank among his fellows whom he cannot tolerate but from whom he cannot withdraw."¹⁴¹ Kant emphasizes that sociability is a main characteristic of wo/man and s/he can be aware that s/he can awaken all her/his powers merely in a society. His unsocial sociability drives her/him to attend a society. Kant emphasizes that in the social worth of wo/man, wo/man can notice that her/his talents gradually will be developed and her/his taste will be refined. At this point, Kant assimilates social contract theorists' natural selfishness of wo/man. Thus, he argues that "thanks be to nature" we have natural capacities that allow us improving our talents and sociability.

To sum up, Kant defends an enlightened wo/man with a good nature. He claims that his belief in this wo/man and her/his natural capacities are proved by the Enlightenment. Thus, he again presents a social theory which is dependent on his assumptions concerning people. He argues that if we follow the rules of our Reason, which nature equips us with, we can achieve a good society. These rules can be transformed into a scientific form of political and social approach. Apart

¹⁴⁰ Ibid, VI. Thesis.

¹⁴¹ Ibid, IV. Thesis.

from social contract theorists and the theorists who defend natural law, his conception of society has similarities with Rousseau also in terms of his conception of “general will”. Consequently to combine the rules of nature with the rules of wo/man is the main emphasis of Kant. The difficulty in his morality in terms of his presupposed arguments can be seen in his social and political philosophy also.

The removing of religious and divine hegemony on people is the important development of the 18th and 19th centuries. Kant’s excitement about and hope for humanity is based upon the dismissing of religious authority and the scientific developments of the 17th and 18th centuries. He believes that at this time people can be aware of the fact that they can think and act freely apart from their restricting bounds. However this positive aspect of the Enlightenment is overridden by the hegemony of the conception of an abstract, self-autonomous citizenship/subjectivity. It has often been argued since then that the new realm of hegemony, as the hegemony of the reason of the self-autonomous subject, is more influential on modern people.¹⁴²

A historical event such as the rising of the idea of Enlightenment and the French Revolution cannot be interpreted as totally negatively, however its consequences have not been what Kant hoped for. The thinkers who criticize Kant sometimes acknowledge Kant to be right for his questionings. Even Nietzsche accepts the importance of Kantian questions in the realm of epistemology and ethics. On the other hand, Nietzsche’s and Marx’s philosophies aim at revealing the deadlocks of the people in their century by a special emphasis upon the misconceptions in the theories accepted in their time.

Nietzsche and Marx question the appraisals of the 19th century in terms of the characteristics of the people in this time. To analyze the abstract, self-autonomous subject is a beginning point for them. Moreover, Dostoevsky inspires Nietzsche in terms of his encompassing viewpoint about human beings. At the

¹⁴² See Tocqueville’s *Old Regime and Revolution*.

same time, Dostoevsky is important in the sense that he analyzes the moral background of the people in the 19th century within praxis.

Kantian conception of epistemology, morality and human beings in general is dependent upon his conception of the transcendental ego. He makes the laws of nature and all our knowledge depending upon the *a priori* unity of the subject. To provide a scientific method for our knowledge under the influence of the scientific changes in the 17th and 18th centuries is Kant's central purpose. However he is criticized because of this subjective unity, since he accepts it *a priori*, as pre-supposed, self-caused and unfounded. The thinkers of the 19th century argue that Kant has a generalizing, abstract and impossible conception of subject which cannot be in relation to the practical world. Nietzsche and Marx are the influential thinkers of this century and I want to explain my conception of the Underground Man of the 19th century as an opponent of the modern subject (as a non-subject) in the following part of my treatise.

Kant's aims, the questions in the back of his mind, and his problems are different from Nietzsche's and Marx's in many ways, but I think that if we understand Kant's thinking and can compare him with Nietzsche and Marx, we can also capture the background of the people of our time. Kant's conception of abstract wo/man who is mostly criticized causes a difficult problem for Nietzsche and Marx also. Whether they presuppose a human nature who is good or bad is controversial. They emphasize the circular misconceptions of Kantian emphasis upon Reason. From the perspective of Nietzsche and Marx to attribute wo/man an abstract and a priori foundation is not a helpful way in understanding her/him. This approach transforms our knowledge and morality into a form which is dependent on abstract presuppositions. For this reason, wo/man's relation to nature becomes abstracted in Kantian thought. Marx's and Nietzsche's attack in order to overcome this problem is to emphasize the practical life of wo/man. Thus, their Underground Wo/man arises from their practical context. Now, it is time to explain Nietzsche's Underground Wo/man.

CHAPTER III

NIETZSCHE

The growing gap between nature and wo/man is the prominent problem of the 19th century. As I have explained in my first chapter, this problem is a heritage of the Enlightenment. In addition, it is a consequence of the emphasis on scientific knowledge. At first, Nietzsche considers this attempt of achieving scientific knowledge to be a cowardly approach to knowledge and to reality. He claims that this cowardly approach is a sign of modernity. He compares the attitude of moderns with the Ancient Greeks' tragic period. While he appreciates Ancient Greeks, he depicts his hostility to modernity.

However, this is not only a problem of modernity for Nietzsche. He sees this gap and the effort of rationalizing nature and reality as an old problem of philosophy. He emphasizes that philosophers always try to transform nature and reality into an intelligible form in order to understand it. Thus, this gap between nature and wo/man is connected with a wrong attitude towards knowledge. The abstract rational capacity attributed to people is conceived and emphasized in such a way that nature and human beings are presented as having different existences and it is difficult for people to achieve the knowledge of nature. This is the critical point where Nietzsche's Underground Wo/man emerges at first sight.

Nietzsche's Underground Wo/man wants her/his identity with nature again. S/he has a difficulty of adopting *a priori* categories of rationality. S/he finds them anti-natural. Epistemology or scientific knowledge is not the appropriate way to gain our identity with nature for Nietzsche. Mythology and Greek tragedy are more plausible ways at this point. Nietzsche admires Ancient Greeks. He perceives that they are the people who can be able to access reality without the need to over conceptualize. He sees the need for conceptualization and the

emphasis upon scientific knowledge as signs of the weakness of modern wo/man. I think that his interpretation of Greek tragedy is important in understanding his grasp of wo/man. In order to make explicit his criticism of modern wo/man, it will be fruitful for my treatise to begin my search for his Underground Wo/man with the Greeks. For this reason, I will start this section with Nietzsche's admiration of Ancient Greeks.

As the discussion above makes clear, epistemology is not Nietzsche's main purpose. However, I want to explain his criticism of Kant and the other philosophers of modernity in terms of his epistemological arguments. I believe that Nietzsche always points out a different wo/man which tries to probe the foundations of modern assumptions of epistemology and ethical claims. In order to explain this point I will try to investigate his conception of naturalism and consciousness. I will also talk about the differences of his perspectivism from Kant's categories. Finally in this part I will explain his moral arguments since, as with Kant, morality is the main drive of his epistemology. These explanations will help us in understanding the context in which his Underground Wo/man appears.

In the final part of this chapter, I want to talk about Dostoevsky's Underground Wo/man drawing on his *Notes from the Underground* and his other novels. Nietzsche appreciates Dostoevsky's approach to wo/man. He claims that Dostoevsky is a profound psychologist who can grasp the modern wo/man and wo/man in general. He claims that Dostoevsky's observations can give us important clues in understanding the characteristics of wo/man. Dostoevsky's questionings deepen the issues which we need to discuss in trying to understand the inhabitants of the 19th century. Dostoevsky's Underground Wo/man accepts consciousness as an illness and his approach to rationality has similarities to Nietzsche. Nietzsche's emphasis on practical life is also shared by Dostoevsky. Thus, I believe that to explain Dostoevsky's questions concerning wo/man will embellish and complete my dissertation on the Underground Wo/man.

3.1 NIETZSCHE'S ADMIRATION OF GREEK TRAGEDY

I have stated that the creative nature is always a problem for Kant's thinking. Kant's modern wo/man feels an inadequacy when s/he confronts nature. For Nietzsche, Kantian cowardice in the face of nature is connected with the Enlightenment culture. He thinks that modern wo/man cannot think and live according to nature. In *Beyond Good and Evil*, Nietzsche explains the relation of the Stoics with nature. He tries to elaborate why the Stoics cannot really live according to nature. I think that this elaboration can be applied to Nietzsche's criticism of modern wo/man also. For this reason it will be good to state his criticism of the Stoics. He claims as follows;

You desire to live 'according to nature'? Oh, you noble Stoics what fraud of yours! Imagine to yourselves a being like nature, boundlessly extravagant, boundlessly indifferent, without purpose or consideration, without pity and justice, at once fruitful, barren and uncertain: imagine to yourselves indifference as a power – how could you live in accordance with such indifference. To live -is not just endeavoring to be otherwise than this Nature? Is not living valuing, preferring, being unjust, being limited, endeavoring to be different? And granted that your imperative, 'living according to Nature,' means actually the same as 'living according to life'—how could you do DIFFERENTLY?¹⁴³

Nietzsche emphasizes that the main purpose of modern wo/man, like the Stoics, is to live according to nature. This attempt of modern wo/man is a heritage from social contract theorists and it is Kant's chief idea in his political philosophy as I have explained in the first chapter. However Nietzsche finds a contradiction in this aim. He emphasizes that actually modern wo/man wants quite the opposite. In other words, s/he cannot be like nature or live according to nature. Nietzsche claims that neither modern wo/man nor Kant really want to be like nature since they totally understand nature in a wrong way. Nietzsche's conception of nature does not imply a lawful being. He is against the value-laden and law-laden conception of nature. He says that nature is not as the way modern wo/man thinks it is. Modern wo/man grasps nature totally in an opposite way. S/he cannot access nature by her/his scientific laws. For this reason, in the quotation Nietzsche

¹⁴³ Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, & 9.

emphasizes the difference of nature from the conception of modern wo/man and the Stoics. He explains this fact as follows;

Why should you make a principle out of what you yourselves are, and must be? In reality, however, it is quite otherwise with you: while you pretend to read with rapture the canon of your law in Nature, you want something quite the contrary, you extraordinary stage-players and self-deluders! In your pride you wish to dictate your morals and ideals to Nature, to Nature herself, and to incorporate them therein; you insist that it shall be Nature ‘according to the Stoa,’ and would like everything to be made after your own image, as a vast, eternal glorification and generalism of Stoicism! With all your love for truth, you have forced yourselves so long, so persistently, and with such hypnotic rigidity to see Nature FALSELY, that is to say, Stoically, that you are no longer able to see it otherwise—and to crown all, some unfathomable superciliousness gives you the Bedlamite hope that BECAUSE you are able to tyrannize over yourselves—Stoicism is self-tyranny—Nature will also allow herself to be tyrannized over: is not the Stoic a PART of Nature? ...¹⁴⁴

Nietzsche’s philosophy deploys “a mixture of Enlightenment-inspired criticism and anti-Enlightenment vitalism to attack the life-negating aspects of modern culture.”¹⁴⁵ Nietzsche argues that values of modern societies oppress bodily energies and creativity.¹⁴⁶ To oppress these features means to negate life. In addition it is for this reason that modernity cannot understand nature. Thus, for Nietzsche nature means bodily energies and creativity.

While Kant tries to attribute a rational unity to nature, the Kantian subject always has a feeling of inadequacy and fear when s/he faces nature and reality. Nietzsche relates this fact with moderns’ wrong conception of nature. The paradoxes concerning the ‘thing-in-itself’, the inadequacies of the Kantian faculties of knowledge, and even his views on the sublime all reflect this cowardly and weak attitude of the modern subject towards nature. Nietzsche emphasizes that the malady of modern wo/man is related to her/his dissatisfaction with her/his own epistemological, moral and aesthetics faculties. He notes that “how unintelligible

¹⁴⁴ Ibid, & 9.

¹⁴⁵ Douglas Kellner, “Modernity and its Discontents: Nietzsche’s Critique”, p. 1.

¹⁴⁶ Ibid, p. 1.

must Faust, the in himself intelligible modern man of culture, have appeared to a true Greek, the Faust who storms dissatisfied through all faculties.”¹⁴⁷

Nietzsche thinks that the Greeks do not feel fear and inadequacy when facing reality, since they do not look at nature with an assumption of the difference between the ‘thing-in-itself’ and appearance. They can grasp the true existence of nature. They do not think that they are in the restricted realm of appearances. They do not feel an essential difference between themselves and nature. They are ready to confront the creativity of nature. Of course Greek epistemology is naïve and problematic but Nietzsche is speaking more about an “access to truth” attained through Ancient Greek art—Presocratic poetry and tragedies in particular.

In *The Birth of Tragedy*, where Nietzsche analyses Greek tragedies in light of their Dionysian culture, he interprets the relation between the audience and the play as one where the spectator gets in touch with the truth of nature. Nietzsche does not want to perceive wo/man as a spectator in the face of nature. He wants to make wo/man a participant in nature. He emphasizes that this is impossible for modern wo/man. In contrast to modern wo/man only Ancient Greeks can confront and understand nature as a participator to it. What Nietzsche says about “the cultural lie” can again be applied to modern wo/man. He says: “the contrast of this real truth of nature and the cultural lie which behaves as if it is the only reality is similar to the contrast between the eternal core of things and the thing-in-itself and the total world of appearances.” Nietzsche defines the abstract modern reality which is self-contradictory in itself as the modern “cultural lie.” While moderns are floundering around the appearances of this cultural lie, he thinks that the world of Greeks draws attention “to the eternal life of an existential core.” He finds even the concept of nature behind the romantic modern allusions to it to be weak and fake in contrast to the way the Greeks grasped nature. He writes as follows:

The idyllic shepherd of modern man is only a counterfeit, a totality of cultural illusions which he counts as nature. The Dionysian Greek wants

¹⁴⁷ Nietzsche, *The Birth of Tragedy*, & 17.

truth and nature in their highest power: he seems himself transformed into satyr.¹⁴⁸

Nietzsche finds myth to be a more profound way than the scientific approach of the moderns. The scientific approach rests on the efforts of attributing a rational unity to nature. Yet, the Greeks can conceive nature as it is without any systematization. Thus, Nietzsche argues that the wo/man of the tragic epoch is fearless and serene when we compare her/him with the moderns. He says that;

The satyr and the idyllic shepherd of our more recent times are both the epitome of the longing directed toward the primordial and natural, but with a strong fearless grip the Greek held onto his men from the woods, and how timidly and weakly modern man toys with the flattering image of a delicate and gentle flute – playing shepherd.¹⁴⁹

Nietzsche is interested in Greek tragedy in terms of the relation between the individuation and the eternal core of existence. It is because Greeks do not differentiate their existence from the eternal existence of nature, they try to understand their individuation by means of the antithesis of Dionysus-Apollo. Nietzsche appreciates Greek tragedy since he thinks that Greeks make use of their artistic abilities and myth in order to understand their own nature. Nietzsche calls this attitude courageous. For him, the Greek's conception of themselves and the eternal existence are deeper and stronger than the modern wo/man's.

Nietzsche perceives that the Greeks' glorified understanding of nature provides them with a strong, undistorted relation to all reality and to themselves. In Greek tragedy, Dionysus represents the chaotic and destructive nature of us, while Apollo is the god of harmony and order. In other words, they mirror the contradiction of our rational and emotional parts. By tragedy, Nietzsche argues that Greeks have a more comprehensive awareness of themselves than the modern people, since they try to harmonize the different aspects of human nature in a more plausible way. Nietzsche claims that "under the magic of the Dionysian, not only does the bond between man and man lock itself in place once more, but also nature

¹⁴⁸ *Ibid*, & 8.

¹⁴⁹ *Ibid*, & 8.

itself, no matter how alienated, hostile, or subjugated, rejoices again in her festival of reconciliation with her prodigal son, man.”¹⁵⁰

Nietzsche believes that with the insufficient stocks of knowledge within the limits of pure faculties and pure conceptions, it is difficult to understand our individuation through reality or will to power in the modern century. We, as moderns, have a tendency to neglect our desires and passions, our destructive and creative powers for the sake of rationality and objectivity. In other words, we try to suppress the Dionysus, as “the affirmative and affirming god” of Greek tragedy. He affirms the pains of growth which we avoid venturing and try to repress by means of rationality.¹⁵¹ Nietzsche’s and Dostoevsky’s Underground Wo/man try to be open to these sufferings, and they question whether the experience of suffering can be a means of realizing her/his own nature or not. However, their Underground Wo/man is bound culturally and epistemologically when compared with the Greeks. Thus, s/he has a depression about the meaning of her/his existence.

Our attempt to suppress the Dionysian aspect of our nature is connected with Nietzsche’s criticism of consciousness. We attribute a significant and exaggerated role to consciousness in our thoughts and acts. Besides, we try to repress our chaotic and complicated nature by means of this conception of consciousness. Consciousness and free will are the problematic conceptions of modernity that Nietzsche’s Underground Wo/man cannot appropriate. S/he does not feel that these are the actual properties of her/him. S/he discovers that s/he thinks and acts apart from a standpoint where s/he is wholly conscious and aware.

Nietzsche thinks that we, as moderns, cannot see nature as it is. This way of seeing requires the awareness of the identity between nature and wo/man. It also requires courage to capture the creative and deconstructing existence of

¹⁵⁰ Nietzsche, *The Birth of Tragedy*, & I.

¹⁵¹ Deleuze, *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, p. 13.

nature. Nietzsche intends to defend a conception of nature/reality which is catastrophic. To capture this catastrophic nature requires the awareness that we are also identified with nature. Our individuation process is also a process of becoming and for Nietzsche nature is not other than this becoming. Nietzsche emphasizes that although Ancient Greeks achieve this identity and unification with nature, we cannot. Our attempt to grasp nature scientifically interferes between nature and us. We cannot have an immediate relation with nature and we cannot perceive this world just as this physical world. Yet, his Underground Wo/man attempt to access reality with his courage after killing God.

3.2 NIETZSCHE AND EPISTEMOLOGY

Nietzsche's admiration of the Greeks in terms of their relation to nature is in accordance with his epistemological arguments. Nietzsche defends a unique ultimate reality which cannot be divided in itself. For him, the wo/man who accesses this reality cannot be distinguished from it. This approach causes a reconciliation of ontology and epistemology. In other words, we cannot distinguish Nietzsche's will to power from wo/man's perspectives and interpretations.

There are two characteristics of Nietzsche's epistemology. One of them cannot be distinguished from his ontology, since Nietzsche's epistemology is founded on his conception of will to power. This notion cannot allow any kind of distinction in itself. Nietzsche does not conceptualize will to power. It does not depend on anything. It does not originate from anything. It cannot be reduced or extended by means of our concepts. It is the name of the process which involves us. We are not external to it. Our perception is in it. Thus Nietzsche's perspectivism also depends on will to power. Our perspectives and will to power do not exclude each other. Nietzsche's will to power is considered as an implication of ontology which is close to naturalism and neutral monism. These

ontological implications cannot be distinguished from Nietzsche's epistemological arguments also. I will talk about them in section 3.2.1 of this part of my thesis.

Nietzsche's attempt of naturalization and socialization of epistemology is the second important point that characterizes his epistemological arguments. He transforms the abstract notions of epistemology into social and political facts. His attempt of naturalizing epistemology also coincides with his revaluative attempt at moral values. Therefore, it is difficult to distinguish Nietzsche's epistemological, ethical and social arguments. He dissolves them into a practical realm. I think that this is the context in which his Underground Wo/man grows up.

Deleuze places Nietzsche in the empiricist tradition of philosophy. He appreciates this tradition and claims that the philosophers in this tradition are the profound and noble thinkers of philosophy. For him, Spinoza, Hume and Nietzsche are empiricists. Deleuze defines his understanding of empiricism in relation to two characteristics; "the abstract does not explain and must itself be explained" and the main philosophical task must not be to "rediscover the eternal or the universal, but to find the conditions under which something new is produced".¹⁵²

Deleuze argues that Nietzsche wants to reconcile 'will to power' with empiricism. The ontological role played by the will to power is similar to Kantian categories in that it explains the conditions of our experience, but unlike Kant, Nietzsche is careful to keep this principle naturalistic. Nietzsche tries to explain will to power within the realm of senses and experiences without any reference to eternal and universal concepts. Deleuze explains that Nietzsche presents will to power as not an abstract universal or a transcendental principle; he tries to formulate it as an explanation of existence which cannot be reduced or extended by our concepts. Will to power "changes itself with the conditions and determines itself in each case along with what it determines".¹⁵³

¹⁵² Deleuze, *Dialogues*, vii, *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, p. 88.

Tsarina Doyle also finds Nietzsche's will to power and his perspectivism compatible. She claims that his perspectivism originates from his ontology. For her, Nietzsche takes the question of the metaphysical and epistemological relationship between the self and the world from Kant.¹⁵⁴ I have also stated that this is the main question of modern wo/man. In other words, the attempt at relating the self and world is a consequence of the self-reflexive subject of modernity. As I explained in the first chapter, seeing the world from a subjective perspective is the determining notion of modernity. However this self-reflexivity also leads to a self-split in the modern subject. Nietzsche connects this self-split with wo/man's split from nature. Thus, he perceives an epistemological gap between wo/man and nature and tries to overcome it. For him, the establishment of this gap can be found in Kant's formulation of a distinction between the "thing-in-itself" and appearances.

This difference is the main drive of my Underground Wo/man. S/he is born from this gap. Nietzsche argues that this distinction has a history from Socrates to the 19th century. He conceives it as a chronic problem of philosophy. Nietzsche is against the Socratic attitude of trying to make 'existence' intelligible and apparently justified.¹⁵⁵ Nietzsche calls this attitude "pneumatological elucidation of nature."¹⁵⁶ This elucidation attributes spiritual beings to nature in order to understand it.

Nietzsche defends that neither nature nor our knowledge is in need of spiritual and intelligible form in order to be possible. As I mentioned in section 3.1, he thinks that the idea that we cannot achieve knowledge of reality without attributing a scientific and intelligible form to nature is uncourageous. He argues

¹⁵³ Deleuze, *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, p. 50.

¹⁵⁴ Tsarina Doyle, *The World in View*, p. 3.

¹⁵⁵ Nietzsche, *The Birth of Tragedy*, 12.

¹⁵⁶ Nietzsche, *Human all too Human*, & 8.

that “every achievement, every step forward in knowledge, comes from courage, from harshness towards yourself, from cleanliness with respect to yourself”.¹⁵⁷

Nietzsche criticizes Plato and Socrates for having a cowardly approach of in the face of reality. He thinks that they escape into the ideal¹⁵⁸ since they are afraid of revealing reality or existence in its becoming. They are sunk into a “metaphysical need”¹⁵⁹, and cannot be able to perceive reality beyond this need. He argues that Plato and Socrates try to find out ‘imaginary causes’¹⁶⁰ and ‘metaphysical consolation’¹⁶¹ in knowledge in order to know reality. However these are incompatible with the actual reality.

For Nietzsche, Kant is also a follower of this cowardly attitude. Nietzsche says that Kant is merely “a true son of his century”, “the century of exaltation.”¹⁶² This century is the century of the Enlightenment. As I have explained in the first chapter, the Enlightenment is constructed on a conception of a subject who is self-autonomous and self-legislative. Nietzsche emphasizes the exaltation of this subject. As mentioned before, the thinkers of this century perceive the scientific developments which establish this movement as a competitor and challenge to human authority.

The Enlightenment thinkers think that if we attribute a scientific and universal form to human knowledge, we can cope with this world which becomes more accessible by means of scientific developments. Nietzsche sees in this approach total cowardice. He criticizes Kant since he is the follower and the representative of this attitude. Nietzsche says that Enlightenment and modernity imagine and exalt a lawful and valuable world. They want people to be subjected to this world.

¹⁵⁷ Nietzsche, *Ecce Homo*, Preface, 3.

¹⁵⁸ Nietzsche, *Twilight of the Idols*, “What I Owe to Ancients”, & 2

¹⁵⁹ Nietzsche, *Will to Power*, & 569.

¹⁶⁰ Nietzsche, *Twilight of the Idols*, “The Four Great Errors”, & 4.

¹⁶¹ Nietzsche, *The Birth of Tragedy*, &17.

¹⁶² Nietzsche, *Daybreak*, & 3.

However Kant's starting point is significant for Nietzsche since he applauds;

the anthropocentric turn of Kant's Copernican revolution as a welcome methodological rejection of dogmatism, overcoming the presupposition that we can access fundamental truths about reality directly by stepping outside our specifically human point of view.¹⁶³

Nietzsche's appreciation of the idea that we can directly access truths by stepping outside our human standpoint is a sign of his perspectivism. Thus, he is a follower of Kant in the sense he puts forward the subjective perspective. He emphasizes that we never go beyond this perspective. Modern wo/man is self-reflexive and is aware that all her/his knowledge is the consequences of this position. Her/his self-split is also brought out from this point. Nietzsche adapts this point with his perspectivism. To explore everything in the realm of the subject's construction and to emphasize the intuitions which are beyond concepts are the common point of Kant and Nietzsche. Deleuze also emphasizes the closeness of Nietzsche to Kant at this point by arguing that "Nietzsche's relation to Kant is like Marx's to Hegel: Nietzsche stands critique on its feet, just as Marx does with the dialectic".¹⁶⁴ Thus Deleuze also thinks that Kant quarrels with the right questions but his method is problematic.

As Deleuze points out, the 'thing-in-itself', pure categories of knowledge and the transcendental self-conscious subject are abstract terms and they cannot explain anything; instead they must be explained themselves. Nietzsche argues that the terms such as 'subject', '*noumenon*' and 'pure reason' are "changelings"¹⁶⁵. These notions which we think are the causes of our knowledge behind the appearances reflect the prejudices of metaphysicians¹⁶⁶ that prevent the

¹⁶³ Tsarina Doyle, *The World in View*, p. 2.

¹⁶⁴ Deleuze, *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, p. 88. Kevin Hill also claims that Nietzsche is a neo-Kantian, and Nietzsche's most important doctrines are written in response to Kantian question, see Hill's *Nietzsche's Critiques: Kantian Foundations of His Thought*.

¹⁶⁵ Nietzsche, *On the Genealogy of Morality*, I, & 13.

¹⁶⁶ Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, & 2.

true way of the critique of knowledge and values as genealogy. Critique means a self-critical examination for both Nietzsche and Kant. However Nietzsche finds Kant's critical philosophy superficial because of its tendency to changelings and misleading presumptions. For Deleuze, Nietzsche thinks that Kantian critique in the realm of epistemology and ethics "has given rise to a new form of conformism and submission".¹⁶⁷ Nietzsche interprets this submission in relation to moral arguments which I will consider in the following sections.

It is well known that Nietzsche rejects the difference between the "thing-in-itself" and appearance. This is the main point why he criticizes Kant's philosophy as being superficial. As I have mentioned, his conception of will to power cannot be reduced or extended by means of our concepts. For Nietzsche the difference between the "thing-in-itself" and appearance is a conceptual difference which is an error that dates back to Plato. He claims that Plato committed this error in order for the actual reality to be known only by philosophers. With Christianity, the true world (thing-in-itself) becomes a Christian reward which only virtuous Christians can acquire. For Kant, the true world becomes an imperative. For the positivists, it is accepted that the true world cannot be attainable. Nietzsche claims that in his time it is argued that we can get rid of the true world. He points that with his philosophy it is brought out that the idea of a true world which is totally independent from people and totally conceptual without an objective validity is a fable. His Zarathustra and Underground Wo/man appears wo/men who are aware of this fable and are in search of the actual reality apart from this fable.¹⁶⁸

As we can see, Nietzsche takes the problem of the true world as a psychological and moral problem. For this reason, it is difficult to isolate his epistemology and morality. He emphasizes that the difference between the true world and appearances is also established by different influences. "In Politics of

¹⁶⁷ *Ibid*, p. 1.

¹⁶⁸ Nietzsche, *Twilight of the Idols*, "How the True World Finally Became a Fable". In this part of *Twilight of the Idols*, Nietzsche summarizes these historical stages.

Truth: Power in Nietzsche's Epistemology" Paul Glen claims that the truth is not only an epistemological but a political problem in Nietzsche. Glen points out the relation between Nietzsche's epistemology, morality and political thoughts. He claims that Nietzsche's epistemology stems from a heated attack on Christianity. Thus his epistemology has a political and moral character as well. Glen claims that Nietzsche's main point is that the weak who cannot endure an uncertain and chaotic conception of becoming try to achieve 'an epistemology of clarity and certainty'. On the other hand, the strong who are joyful with uncertainties "seek to enjoy the richness and subtlety of a non-dichotomous view of the world".¹⁶⁹ Their quarrel is not only an epistemological quarrel, but also a moral and political one. In this sense, Nietzsche's criticism of Kantian and modern epistemology and ontology is connected with his arguments on free will and slave-master morality. I will explain Nietzsche's approach to morality in the last section of this chapter.

Tsarina Doyle interprets this attempt of socializing epistemology by arguing that Nietzsche naturalizes the knowing intellect. She claims that Nietzsche renders "the knowing intellect" as "participator rather than a spectator." As I mentioned in the section which is related to Nietzsche's admiration of Greek mythology, Nietzsche does not want to make wo/man only a spectator of reality. She emphasizes that for Nietzsche "our perspectives are always perspectives *in* rather than *on* the world, having reality in view to varying degrees."¹⁷⁰ Thus, for Nietzsche's naturalized subject, will to power is not external to her/himself. In the *Will to Power*, Nietzsche explains this point by saying that instead of epistemology he wants to give "a perspective theory of effects".¹⁷¹ In addition Doyle claims that for Nietzsche "reality" is "metaphysically independent of but epistemically accessible to human knowledge."¹⁷²

¹⁶⁹ Paul Glen, "In Politics of Truth: the Power in Nietzsche's Epistemology", p. 575.

¹⁷⁰ Tsarina Doyle, *The World in View*, p. 3.

¹⁷¹ Nietzsche, *Will to Power*, 462.

¹⁷² Tsarina Doyle, *The World in View*, p. 3.

Doyle interprets Nietzsche as a metaphysical realist and epistemological subjectivist. She thinks that this is the main point which reinforces Nietzsche's philosophy. Nietzsche achieves this point by reconciling his will to power and perspectivism. Doyle also thinks that by this reconciliation Nietzsche overcomes the problematic points of Kantian thinking. In addition, she claims that to reconcile these two approaches is important for both thinkers in order not to fall into the errors of skepticism. After this general introduction to Nietzsche's epistemology, I want to explain his account of naturalism briefly.

3.2.1 The Influence of Darwin and Nietzsche's Naturalism

In the first chapter I have stated that Kant also cannot be an advocate of a static conception of being. Both his subject and his "thing-in-itself" and his subject are dissolved in the manifold appearances. Nietzsche tries to disclose the designation of the difference between the thing-in-itself and appearances. It is for this reason that Deleuze conceives Nietzsche as a follower of Kant and likens their relation to the relation between Hegel and Marx. Deleuze tries to find the empiricist implications in both of them. It is accepted that the influence of Darwin is significant in Nietzsche's elaborating will to power. By this influence Nietzsche arrived at a process of becoming. It is also clear that Nietzsche's examinations on Greek tragedy lead him to develop an encompassing and undivided conception of process. As mentioned above, wo/man is also not excluded from this process.

According to Gregory Moore and Thomas Brobjer, Mach's neutral monism is also influential on Nietzsche. They claim that neutral monism "provides the basis for the correct interpretations of Nietzsche's published texts on central metaphysical and epistemological issues".¹⁷³ Deleuze also situates Nietzsche as a monist. He claims that Nietzsche defends a monism of force.¹⁷⁴ Nietzsche formulates his 'eternal return' and 'will to power' as ontologically neutral notions.

¹⁷³ Gregory Moore and Thomas Brobjer, *Nietzsche and Science*, p. 112.

¹⁷⁴ Deleuze, *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, p. 40.

He posits them to refer to the chaotic and changing process of becoming wherein concepts are not ontologically franchised. As Tsarina Doyle mentions, Nietzsche's theory of perspectivism is collaborated with his naturalistic and neutral monistic philosophy. Nietzsche's perspectivism is dependent on his emphasis on the irreducibility and primacy of interpretation in knowledge.¹⁷⁵ Naturalism reflects his avoidance of attributing any conceptual difference to existence.

While Nietzsche perceives all reality with the viewpoint of evolutionary theory, he at the same time criticizes Darwinist theory since it tries to apply an intelligible purpose to human beings and the other species. He claims that Darwin must "forget about the spirit" and the idea that "species grow in perfection".¹⁷⁶ Thus, Nietzsche claims that this aspect of Darwinian Theory is connected with the poor and weak attitude to reality and nature in modern philosophy. However, apart from these intelligible purposes, the Darwinist approach is compatible with his conception of reality and influential on his will to power.

Nietzsche tries to find a philosophical way to affirm our life. He expresses that he reevaluates all extant values in order to achieve a Dionysian wisdom in which we ourselves can be the eternal joy in becoming.¹⁷⁷ Moreover he argues that philosophy is for him "a life lived freely in ice and high mountains – visiting all the strange and questionable aspects of existence, everything banned by morality so far."¹⁷⁸ For Nietzsche, this life requires a Dionysian courage and resolution that many philosophers do not have. Nietzsche claims that his writings and examinations call out to people who have the Dionysian courage and to "free" and "real" philosophers.¹⁷⁹ Thus, his naturalistic approach is compatible with his emphasizing affirmation of life.

¹⁷⁵ For a further discussion see Cristoph Cox's *Nietzsche: Naturalism and Interpretation*.

¹⁷⁶ Nietzsche, *Twilight of the Idols*, Skirmishes of an Untimely Man, 14.

¹⁷⁷ Nietzsche, *Twilight of the Idols*, "What I Owe to Ancients", 5

¹⁷⁸ Nietzsche, *Ecce Homo*, Preface, & 3

Bernard Reginster claims that the affirmation of life is the main purpose of Nietzsche's philosophy.¹⁸⁰ For Reginster, Nietzsche is mainly interested in nihilism. Nietzsche detects the nihilism in the modern age, represented in the views that "existence is meaningless"¹⁸¹ and "the goal is lacking"¹⁸² in our life. For Nietzsche, "a nihilist is a man who judges of the world as it is that it ought not to be and of the world as it ought to be that it does not exist".¹⁸³ Nietzsche argues that nihilism is at the stage of Europe. He also claims that especially Kantian and Christian morality lead Europe into nihilism. Yet, he also considers this term positively. He believes that it can give us the possibility of reevaluating all modern values. He believes that if nihilism is completed, we can have the courage and desire to reevaluate all epistemological and religious values of Western thought.¹⁸⁴

Nietzsche thinks that with the influence of Kantian and Christian thinking, we try to rob reality of the meaning of things and values to the extent that we "make up an ideal world".¹⁸⁵ The need for an ideal world lies behind the Kantian gaps between the world of us and nature, or our freedom and nature. Nietzsche emphasizes that Kant sees the world for the sake of human beings and for this reason he tries to make a "value-laden world".¹⁸⁶ Nietzsche sees this value-laden world as an error. In order to construct a bridge between nature and wo/man Kant defines a "metaphysical need" for humans and formulates a method of satisfying this need.¹⁸⁷ This metaphysical need leads us to think that there are two worlds.

¹⁷⁹ Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, & 24

¹⁸⁰ Bernard Reginster, *The Affirmation of Life*, p. 51.

¹⁸¹ Nietzsche, *Will to Power*, & 36, & 585.

¹⁸² *Ibid*, & 2.

¹⁸³ *Ibid*, & 585.

¹⁸⁴ Bernard Reginster, *The Affirmation of Life*, p. 38.

¹⁸⁵ Nietzsche, *Ecce Homo*, Preface, 2.

¹⁸⁶ *Ibid*, & 29.

¹⁸⁷ Nietzsche, *Will to Power*, & 569.

Thus, Nietzsche thinks that the distinction between the apparent and real world is at the same time a social matter. His naturalism helps him to turn abstract notions into practical and social roots.

Naturalism, perspectivism and will to power are the main constituents of Nietzsche's epistemology also. I have stated that it is difficult to distinguish them. However, it will make Nietzsche's arguments more explicit to compare his epistemology with Kant's epistemology. .

3.2.2 Categories versus Perspectivism

Nietzsche claims that all knowledge is possible within certain perspectives of the subject. There are many conceptual schemes and we cannot reduce them the way Kant does. It is no possible to isolate one way of perceiving or thinking from the others since we can have knowledge merely by our perspectives. He argues as follows;

The only seeing we have is seeing from a perspective; the only knowledge we have is knowledge from a perspective. The more emotional affects we allow to be expressed in words concerning something, the more eyes, different eyes, we know how to train on the same thing, the more our 'idea' of this thing, our 'objectivity' will be.¹⁸⁸

The objectivity of knowledge for Kant is possible with the *a priori* and universal categories. However as I mentioned before, the ground of this objectivity is founded on the subject's synthesis. Eventually transcendental unity of apperception is the main ground of our knowledge and the objective validity of it. Nietzsche argues that we cannot isolate some conceptual schemes from the others. We cannot determine a definite way of perceiving and conceptualizing. He sees that this attempt makes the subject a spectator of knowledge. On the other hand, Nietzsche emphasizes that wo/man cannot be a spectator since knowledge means her/his perspective and interpretations. He claims that;

¹⁸⁸ Nietzsche, *On the Genealogy of Morality*, III, & 12.

In so far as the word ‘knowledge’ has any meaning, the world is knowable; but it is interpretable otherwise, it has no meaning behind it, but countless meanings – “Perspectivism”. It is our needs that interpret the world; our drives and their For and Against. Every drive is a kind of lust to rule; each one has its perspective that it would like to compel all the other drives to accept as a norm.¹⁸⁹

Nietzsche emphasizes that no conceptual scheme and evaluation method can go beyond cultural structures and subjective perspectives. Epistemology is not an isolated realm for him. As Deleuze points out, in his thinking, will to power has a role similar to Kantian categories. It schematizes and structures the realm of experience. However Nietzsche emphasizes that categories can only be means in achieving knowledge and they are not absolute means.

Nietzsche claims that there are no objective facts.¹⁹⁰ Everything is our interpretations. He considers interpretations as will to power. To accept one type of interpretation and conceptual schema as absolute is against Nietzsche’s conception of reality. He does not recognize any absolute in our knowledge. Our epistemological and ethical arguments are also interpretations for him. In every stage of our knowledge we make a new interpretation and a new assessment. This approach demonstrates Nietzsche’s naturalism in that he does not want to make any truth to be absolute by exalting it over and above its natural and practical roots. In contrast to Kant, Nietzsche emphasizes the temporary feature of categorical schemes. For him “every word is a prejudice”¹⁹¹ and we cannot achieve an absolute truth by means of concepts.¹⁹² The possibility of knowledge depends on perspectives, not the universal categories. Thus, there is no universal category and method of knowing.

¹⁸⁹ Nietzsche, *Will to Power*, & 481.

¹⁹⁰ Nietzsche, *Nachlass*, & 45.

¹⁹¹ Nietzsche, *The Wanderer and its Shadows*, & 55.

¹⁹² There are controversial arguments concerning Nietzsche’s conception of truth. Derrida, Nehamas and Deman claim that we cannot find any definite truth in Nietzsche and it indicates that Nietzsche is a nihilist. However Maudemaire Clark argues that this attitude is the attitude of early Nietzsche, and in his later writings he defends a conception of truth; see Maudemaire Clark’s *Nietzsche on Truth and Philosopher*. I do not detail these arguments, since I do think that it is strictly related my treatise.

Christoph Cox, in *Nietzsche: Naturalism and Interpretation*, claims that “the death of God” unifies Nietzsche’s conception of truth.¹⁹³ Nietzsche justifies his attempt at undermining all the absolute truths in knowledge, as the demand that all the remaining “shadows” of God should be “vanquished”.¹⁹⁴ His argument depends on the following passage in the *Gay Science*.

New struggles – After Buddha was dead, his shadow was still shown for centuries in a cave - a tremendous, gruesome shadows. God is dead; but given the way of humanity, there may still be caves for thousands of years, in which his shadow will still be shown. – And we- we still have to vanquish his shadow, too.¹⁹⁵

For Cox, to struggle against these shadows requires “naturalization of humanity” and “de-deification of nature”.¹⁹⁶ His argument depends on Nietzsche’s words in the *Gay Science*;

When will all these shadows of God cease to darken us? When will we complete our de-deification of nature? When we begin to naturalize humanity in terms of a pure, newly discovered, newly redeemed nature.¹⁹⁷

I think that this interpretation is compatible with Nietzsche’s attempt at socializing epistemology. This socializing and naturalizing account of epistemology constitutes the context in which Nietzsche’s *Underground Wo/man* appears. To explain Nietzsche’s conception of consciousness will help us in understanding Nietzsche’s naturalism and social epistemology. By his attempt of explaining the role of consciousness he again tries to reduce all truths and metaphysical notions to their practical roots.

¹⁹³ Christoph Cox, *Nietzsche: Naturalism and Interpretation*, pp. 70-71.

¹⁹⁴ *Ibid*, p. 71.

¹⁹⁵ Nietzsche, *Gay Science*, & 108.

¹⁹⁶ Cox, *Nietzsche: Naturalism and Interpretation*, p. 71.

¹⁹⁷ *Ibid*, & 109.

3.2.3 Nietzsche and Consciousness

Nietzsche speaks of “consciousness in a subsidiary role, almost indifferent, superfluous”, and he even claims that it is “destined to vanish and give way to perfect automatism”.¹⁹⁸ He argues that “consciousness does not really belong to man’s individual existence but rather his social or herd nature”.¹⁹⁹ William James, as a radical empiricist thinker in the 19th century, also argues that it is time to get rid of the classical definition of consciousness. For him, consciousness does not exist as a metaphysical entity, but only performs a function, a function of knowing.²⁰⁰ From a similar viewpoint, Nietzsche argues that we cannot infer the conclusion that “there is something that thinks” from the statement that “there is thinking”.²⁰¹ Thus, he finds the Cartesian argument of “I think, therefore I am” to be invalid.

As I mentioned in my introduction, there is a tendency in the 19th century to give up the classical conception of consciousness. It is also connected with the criticism of German idealism and its attempt at exalting all rational notions from an empirical ground. Marx and Nietzsche try to displace this static conception of consciousness independent of our experiences. American pragmatists such as James and Dewey share this viewpoint. The thinkers of this century want to replace the old conception. They think that it is dependent on a misleading assumption. Here also the influence of Ernest Mach in their approach cannot be overlooked. His neutral monism is effective in James’s philosophy as well as Nietzsche’s. Thus, the scientific hypotheses of the 19th century also provide the basis of the rejection of the classical conception of consciousness.

This rejection is mainly based on the idea that we cannot attribute any kind of ontological difference to ultimate reality by means of our conceptions. This

¹⁹⁸ *Ibid*, 523.

¹⁹⁹ Nietzsche, *Gay Science*, & 354.

²⁰⁰ James, *Essays in Radical Empiricism*, pp. 3-4.

²⁰¹ Nietzsche, *Will to Power*, 484.

approach which is rejected is a heritage from Kantian thinking and his objections to overlooking the difference between being and being-known. Moreover, the 19th century's conception of consciousness involves a radical criticism of Cartesian thinking and it is an important turning point in the history of philosophy. As mentioned in the second chapter, Descombes claims that this rejection also paves the way to existentialism and phenomenology.²⁰²

Accepting consciousness as a metaphysical entity and a different kind of substance rests on a wrong conception of reality. As we attribute our rational concepts to reality, we pretend that there is a division between intelligible and sensible things in this becoming. Nietzsche and James are against this attitude and instead of it; they defend a neutral monist ontology. In order to introduce a unique conception of reality which does not include a conceptual difference, Nietzsche employs the conception of 'will to power', while James uses the conception of 'pure experience'. They both emphasize that these are not abstract and stagnant conceptions and metaphysical entities.

Both thinkers argue that to accept consciousness as a metaphysical entity is a result of our grammatical and conceptual habits. We try to perceive every changing fact in "becoming" in identity. In this way, we call somethings 'substance' and create categories such as "substantial ego" and "object" or "a doer" and "a doing" (subject and object). Language or our way of thinking perceives in everything "a doer and doing; it believes in will as the cause; it believes in the ego, in the ego as being, in the ego as substance, and it projects this faith in the ego-substance upon all things".²⁰³ "Since we are unable to think anything at all just as it is"²⁰⁴ we attribute a subject to every act and thought.

For Nietzsche, the difference or similarities between things and facts are not rooted in "reality" itself; they are connected with our grammatical habits. This

²⁰² Descombes, *Modern French Philosophy*, p. 22.

²⁰³ Nietzsche, *Twilight of the Idols*, III, & 5.

²⁰⁴ Nietzsche, *Will to Power*, 436.

habit “adds a doer to every deed”, and “this is not merely the substantiation of a fact but a logical-metaphysical postulate”.²⁰⁵ In this sense, there is not a necessary causal relation in these postulates. For him, this postulation is actually allied with the universal law of the knowing subject;

The primary law of the knowing subject consists in the inner necessity of recognizing every object in itself as being in its own essence something identical with itself, thus self-existent and at bottom always the same and unchanging, in short as a substance.²⁰⁶

Our linguistic habits in general try to fix the real world, and “create a world which is calculable, simplified, comprehensible, etc., for us”²⁰⁷. Nietzsche accepts this attempt as part of the tendency of human beings, but he criticizes Kant because of his formulation of this inclination, since he thinks that Kant is the modern representative who tries to make an abstract and unknowable world legitimate and accountable. For him, Kant in this way contributes to the formulation of the modern wo/man’s incapability and insufficient capacity of capturing “reality” and the formulation of a conception of consciousness which drives us to assume metaphysical postulations in our thinking.

Similar to Nietzsche, James claims that the distinction between consciousness and its content in ‘pure experience’ is not made by way of subtraction, but by way of addition.²⁰⁸ We do not subtract the acts and thoughts from a competent authority, from consciousness, but we add something to the realm of experience. Thus, Nietzsche also claims that our perspectives are not external to will to power. James shares Nietzsche’s view that this situation is a conclusion of our habits and grammatical customs.

Thus, William James and Nietzsche do not want to admit an ontological difference in the realm of experience. They think that there are no two distinct

²⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, & 484.

²⁰⁶ *Nietzsche, Human all too Human*, & 18.

²⁰⁷ *Nietzsche, Will to Power*, & 521.

²⁰⁸ *James, Essays in Radical Empiricism*, p. 9.

spheres of existence, one of which is intelligible and the other sensual. The ultimate reality is all one and the same. This point reveals their neutral monism and their rejection of the classical conception of consciousness.

Nietzsche mainly criticizes a wrong conception of subjective agency by means of his criticism of consciousness. He is against the idea that we have a rational capacity which is a competent authority that rules our acts and our thoughts. For him this indicates a wrong conception of agency. He argues that “our thinking and judgments are, it seems, to be made the cause of our nature: but in fact it is our nature that is the cause of our thinking and judging thus and thus.”²⁰⁹ He does not defend the impossibility of reasoning, but he actually criticizes the stagnant conception of a capacity of consciousness or self-consciousness that directs us.

Nietzsche tries to emphasize that we are under the influence of different emotions, cultural habits, inclinations and all of them drive us in acting and thinking the way we do. Beside our conceptual and rationalizing attitudes, we must investigate the other features which influence us. Otherwise, we cannot understand our psychology and our nature. In addition, accepting this wrong conception of agency paves the way to moral prejudices which prevent us from affirming our actual and practical life.

However, I want to state that to explain all conscious facts in terms of their empirical roots brings out a problem concerning the role of consciousness. To attribute consciousness a wholly passive role is not adequate in explaining our consciousness. Nietzsche’s emphasis is on the fact that consciousness is not the significant part of our mental states. Nietzsche claims that there are unconscious mental states in *The Gay Science*;

Leibniz’s incomparable insight . . . that consciousness is merely an accident of representation [Vorstellung] and not its necessary and essential attribute; that, in other words, what we call consciousness

²⁰⁹ Nietzsche, *Human all too Human*, & 608.

constitutes only one state of our spiritual and psychic world . . . and not by any means the whole of it.²¹⁰

In *The Gay Science* Nietzsche also considers unconscious thoughts and feelings; “we could think, feel, will, and remember, and we could also ‘act’ in every sense of that word, and yet none of all this would have to ‘enter our consciousness.’”²¹¹ At this point, Nietzsche distinguishes our conscious thoughts and unconscious thoughts. He argues that “the conscious and unconscious cannot be drawn in terms of the awareness of the world.”²¹² The distinguishing feature of our conscious thoughts and feelings is connected with language. Nietzsche argues as follows;

Man, like every living being, thinks continually without knowing it [...]; the thinking that rises to consciousness is only the smallest part of all this—the most superficial and worst part—for only this conscious thinking occurs in words, which is to say signs of communication [...], and this fact uncovers the origin of consciousness. In brief, the development of language and the development of consciousness (not of Reason but merely of the way Reason enters consciousness) go hand in hand.²¹³

Paul Katsafanas, in “Nietzsche’s Theory of Mind” claims that the main difference between conscious and unconscious thoughts in Nietzsche is that conscious states are conceptually articulated but unconscious states are not conceptually articulated.²¹⁴ However Katsafanas emphasizes that it is difficult to rob the conceptual frame, that there “conscious states are somehow generated by unconscious states, and the exact mechanisms involved in this process deserve sustained attention.”²¹⁵ Katsafanas emphasizes the importance of Nietzsche’s argument that “consciousness is dangerous.”²¹⁶ Nietzsche argues that “all

²¹⁰ Nietzsche, *Gay Science*, & 357.

²¹¹ *Ibid*, & 354.

²¹² Paul Katsafanas, “Nietzsche’s Theory of Mind”, p. 3.

²¹³ *Ibid*, & 354.

²¹⁴ Paul Katsafanas, “Nietzsche’s Theory of Mind”, p. 5.

²¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 25.

²¹⁶ Nietzsche, *The Gay Science*, & 354.

becoming conscious involves a great and thorough corruption, falsification, reduction to superficialities, and generalization.”²¹⁷

Nietzsche emphasizes the deconstructive and corruptive features of consciousness which cannot be explained in Kant’s epistemology. While Kant presents the fact of “to be conscious” as the unique ground of our knowledge, Nietzsche explains the problematic features of it. Nietzsche emphasizes a difficulty concerning the argument that all our thoughts are conscious and “to be conscious” is the ground of our unity. Katsafanas argues that Nietzsche, “associated with Freud”, argues that “there are unconscious states that are in some sense inaccessible to us”.²¹⁸ Nietzsche criticizes Kant since he disregards this point. In contrast to him, he lays stress upon the disrupting role of our consciousness. This disrupting role is connected with the difficulty of distinguishing our conscious and unconscious states. Nietzsche thinks that this difference requires a deep analysis.

I have stated that in the 19th century there is a tendency of naturalizing the role of consciousness. However we can see the contradictions of this tendency in these thinkers also. James’s account of consciousness has a difficulty concerning the passive and active employments of consciousness. We can see a similar problem in Marx also. To regard consciousness as purely important and ineffective part of our existence and thinking is not compatible with the general argument of Nietzsche. He does not want to reduce all the functions of consciousness. He emphasizes the difficulties of this account. We can see his antagonistic attitude towards consciousness. He emphasizes its destructive interference in our thoughts. For Nietzsche, to access reality/nature the role of consciousness must not be exaggerated. This approach brings out an abstracted conception of knowledge, since concepts abstract from the content of our knowledge. For this reason, Nietzsche argues that consciousness is dangerous and it is not possible to explain

²¹⁷ *Ibid.*, & 354.

²¹⁸ Paul Katsafanas, “Nietzsche’s Theory of Mind”, p. 25.

it with Kant's approach. Thus, he thinks that Kant's approach is superficial and ignores the unconscious facts and the destructive role of concepts.

This problem is also connected with the difficulty of Kant's account of intuition. For Nietzsche, concepts and conceptual schemes may be the practical instruments that help the establishment of our knowledge. However we cannot overlook that they also ruin the immediacy of our knowledge. Kant's distinction between intellectual and empirical intuition enters the picture here. While Kant emphasizes the uncreative and regulative employment of ideas in our knowledge, Nietzsche emphasizes that knowing must be creative. However, he also criticizes Kant for his assumption; Kant thinks that if we accept that our ideas construct and introduce another reality it must be an abstracted and static reality.

Nietzsche accepts Kant's argument that our ideas can only have regulative roles since ideas and concepts are instruments; they are not the only true way of accessing nature/reality.²¹⁹ Yet he criticizes the Kantian argument that they can only create a static reality. Thus for Nietzsche our knowledge and nature is a dynamic process. Their relation is also a dynamic process. Kant's theory cannot explain this dynamism, since he assumes a static reality and avoids attributing an exaggerated role to our knowledge. For Nietzsche, Kant pretends that we must assume a value-laden and law-laden reality, and a similar way of knowing in order to have legitimate knowledge. Nietzsche is against this assumption. In terms of this assumption he regards Kant's and the moderns' approach to knowledge as cowardly. For him, they cannot access reality, since they accept an abstract and systematized reality. They cannot understand the catastrophic nature of it; in this sense, they cannot run the risk of accepting it as it is.

Nietzsche's Underground Wo/man has a trouble with consciousness since s/he feels that it is dangerous. It is dangerous since its conceptual and unconscious parts both destroy our unity and immediacy.

²¹⁹ Nick Land, *Nietzsche and Modern German Thought: Kant, Lange, Nietzsche: Critique of Knowledge*, p. 31. Land emphasizes that Lange's interpretation of Kant is influential on Nietzsche.

After this brief and general explanation of Nietzsche's consciousness, I want to explain his emphasis of revaluation in morality. I believe that it is also an important point for my Underground Wo/man.

3.2.4 Revaluation of Moral Values

Nietzsche is against the Kantian assumption of a value-laden world. He specifically relates this attitude to Christian morality. In accordance with his attempt of naturalizing and socializing epistemology, Nietzsche tries to transform our moral values into the practical and social roots. For this reason, he aims at carving out the extant values of Christian and modern culture. His main drive in this attempt of revaluation is to refuse an assumption of a value-laden world. As I mentioned in section 3.2.3, his purpose of naturalizing humanity carries with it an attitude of de-deification of nature. Nietzsche correlates this deification of nature with the attempt of a deification of a moral world. This point reconciles his naturalist account of epistemological and moral arguments.

In epistemology, Nietzsche does not want to reduce perspectives and interpretations into conceptual unities and absolutes; in morality Nietzsche is against the attempt of reconciling moral values with the idea of a moral and true world. He wants to reflect our various, infinite valuations within a social context in his philosophy. Thus his emphasis on becoming enters the picture here. David Couzen Hoy, in his essay "Nietzsche, Hume and the Genealogical Method", explains this aspect of Nietzsche as follows;

Notice that Nietzsche speaks of "our new 'infinite,'" of the world becoming infinite for us "all over again." He realizes that the thought of infinite interpretations [concerning reality which is unknown through experience] could tempt us to "deify again after the old manner this monster of an unknown world"²²⁰

Kant tries to make this reconciliation in morality. Kant tries to justify the moral law which comes from this monster of unknown world depending on the

²²⁰ David Couzens Hoy, "Nietzsche, Hume and Genealogy", p. 255.

self-authority and freedom of Reason. However, in the moral realm, Kant makes this world known and wants to reconcile wo/man with the noumenal realm. Nietzsche also emphasizes the self-authority of wo/man in the moral realm.²²¹ However, Nietzsche does not think that our moral values come from a true world which is beyond our social and material relations. He criticizes Kant's attempt at ignoring external motives and the influence of experience in our moral arguments. Nietzsche claims that moral values are dependent on wo/man's evaluations, however these valuations cannot be external to the realm of experience.

Nietzsche believes that Kantian moral law serves a type of submission as I mentioned above. He emphasizes the relation between the Kantian value-laden world and the Christian assumption of a true world. Thus he calls attention to wo/man's feeling of responsibility and guilty with reference to this true world. He points out that affirming "...the psychology of conscience is not 'the voice of God in man'; it is the instinct of cruelty... expressed, for the first time, as one of the oldest and most indispensable elements in the foundation of culture."²²² Therefore Nietzsche claims that moral values cannot be isolated from cultural and social relations and he examines the basic moral instincts that can be found in all societies in *Beyond and Evil*.

In *Beyond Good and Evil*, Nietzsche claims that we can see the examples of master and slave instincts in all the systems of morality in history. For him these instincts can also be seen in the same person as well.²²³ Although he describes the master's instincts by means of references to the aristocratic class and the slave instincts by means of lower classes, he does not want really to identify these instincts with social classes.²²⁴ He touches upon deep characteristics of

²²¹ David Cartwright argues that the emphasis of the self-authority of wo/man in the realm of morality and their antagonistic attitude to pity is the common points between Kant and Nietzsche's moral philosophy in his essay "Kant, Schopenhauer and Nietzsche on the Morality of Pity".

²²² Nietzsche, this statement is in the section of "The Genealogy of Morality", in *Ecce Homo*.

²²³ Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, & 202.

²²⁴ Nietzsche, *On the Genealogy of Morals*, 35.

human nature by means of his analyses on these instincts. They also reflect the strong and weak parts of our nature and our society as Paul Glen explained in his essay “The Politics of Truth: The Power in Nietzsche’s Epistemology”. As I have stated that Nietzsche’s explanation in epistemology and morality establishes a social and political argument that he does not want to exalt our ideas and values over the practical realm.

There is a critical point that connects Nietzsche’s moral arguments, epistemology and political thoughts. Paul Glen claims that the weak in Nietzsche’s epistemology may resort to metaphysical presuppositions in order to attain the illusion of knowledge. They cannot conceive the chaotic and changing nature of becoming; for this reason they want a classical epistemology which is dependent on the subject-object dichotomy and abstract and universal concepts. It also drives the weak to find a legitimate ground for knowledge outside themselves.²²⁵

This attitude also can be connected with Nietzsche’s conception of slave morality. Slave morality denotes the weak part of our nature. The person, who cannot suppress the slave instinct in her/himself and who cannot be noble, tries to find a ground for her/his moral arguments outside of her/him. S/he does not respect her/himself and her/his own ideas. S/he does not have the courage and competency to carve the roots of the values of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ out. For her/him every value which has utility is good.²²⁶ Yet, her/his conception of the good is based on the weaker drives. Slave morality does not want the good for the sake of the strong. Instead of finding and expressing the good in her/himself, the wo/man who has this instinct looks for the cause of badness in something outside her/himself. Nietzsche finds Kantian and Christian morality as exemplifying the slave instinct. He criticizes their attempt to equalize all people and their assumption of a value-laden world beyond us.

²²⁵ Paul Glen, “The Politics of Truth: The Power in Nietzsche’s Epistemology”, p. 575.

²²⁶ Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, 61.

In this sense, Nietzsche's criticism of equality steps in. He argues that to seek for utility and equality for all the members of society is an inclination of slave morality. By this way, slaves try to make all people weak and the same like themselves. Nietzsche claims that "to treat all men with equal good-humor, and to be kind without distinction of persons, may arise as much from a profound contempt for mankind as from an ingrained love of humanity".²²⁷ Nietzsche does not believe that this attempt originates from love of humanity. It can only be connected with the love of a value-laden world which people are subject to. This value-laden world does not lead to love of humanity; on the contrary it may lead to an antagonism. Nietzsche also explains these antagonistic feelings of people in relation with the feeling of resentment. I will explain this feeling at the end of this chapter. Thus for Nietzsche this attempt is most often connected with the contempt of people which is explainable within cultural and social relations. Nietzsche emphasizes the cultural connections of these feelings. Moreover, he claims that we cannot explain the conditions of a noble character by treating all people equally and wanting the same ideals for everyone. Nobility requires more than this.

The ideas of democracy, equality of rights and sympathy with all sufferers are modern ideas which, according to Nietzsche, reveal the slave instincts.²²⁸ He evaluates all modern social and political systems from this viewpoint. Democracy reflects the slave morality, since it is an attempt of making all people the same, and oppressing the power of wo/man's valuations in morality. But he does not find the will for the goodness of all society to be sincere. Nietzsche's approach to socialist movements in his time reflects his approach towards slave instincts. He argues that the design of socialists, who are piped-pipers is;

to enflame you with wild hopes? which bid you *to be prepared* and nothing further, prepared day upon day, so that you wait and wait for something to happen from outside and in all other respects go on living as you have always lived - until this waiting turns to hunger and thirst

²²⁷ Nietzsche, *Human all too Human*, I, & 236.

²²⁸ Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, 44.

and fever and madness, and at last the day of the *bestia triumphans* dawns in all its glory?²²⁹

Nietzsche criticizes this waiting and hoping for something from the outside. He claims that;

in contrast to all this, everyone ought to say to himself: 'better to go abroad to seek to become in weak and savage regions of the world and above all master over myself; to keep moving from place to place for just as long as any sign of slavery seems to threaten me; to shun neither adventure nor war and, if the world should come to the worst, to be prepared for death: all this rather than further to endure this indecent servitude, rather than to go on becoming soured and malicious and conspiratorial!'. This would be the right attitude of the mind: the workers of Europe all henceforth to declare themselves as a class a human impossibility and not, as usually happens, only a somewhat harsh and inappropriate social arrangement; they ought to inaugurate within the European beehive an age of a great swarming out such as has never been seen before, and through this act of free emigration in the grand manner to protest against the choice now threatening of being compelled to become either the salve of the state or the slave of a party disruption."²³⁰

As I have tried to emphasize, Nietzsche's epistemology, moral and social arguments cannot be distinguished from each other. He argues that the tendency towards objectivity²³¹ and realism in science are the reflections of slave morality. Nietzsche claims that the theoretical and scientific emphasis of the 19th century "looks instinctively for theories that seem to justify its fatalistic submission to matters of fact".²³² This submission to facts is a sign of slave morality. Furthermore, the attitude of the positivists and realists in accepting their theories as the only reality is connected with their slave instincts. He criticizes physicists and philosophers who are in search of an objective knowledge of reality for displaying slave instincts. In the *Gay Science* he argues that as follows:

To the realists – You sober people who feel armed against passion and phantastical conceptions and would like to make your emptiness a matter of pride and an ornament – you call yourselves realist and insinuate that

²²⁹ Nietzsche, *Daybreak*, 206.

²³⁰ Nietzsche, *Daybreak*, 206.

²³¹ Nietzsche, *Ecce Homo*, "Beyond Good and Evil", 1.

²³² *Ibid.*, & 95.

the world really is the way it appears to you: before you alone reality stands unveiled, and you yourself are perhaps the best part of it – oh, you beloved images of Sais! But aren't you to in your unveiled condition still most passionate and dark creatures, compared to fish, and still all too similar to an artist in love? And what is 'reality' for an artist in love! You still carry around the valuation of things that originated in the passions and loves of former centuries! Your sobriety still contains a secret and inextirpable drunkenness! Your love of "reality", for example – oh, that is an old, ancient "love". In every experience, in every sense impression, there is a piece of this old love; and some phantasy, some prejudice, some irrationality, some ignorance, some fear, and whatever else, has worked on and contributed to it. That mountain over there! That cloud over there! What is "real" about that? Subtract just once the phantasm and the whole human *contribution* from it, you sober ones! Yes, if you *could* do that! If you could forget your background, your past, your nursery scholl – all of your humanity and animality! There is no "reality" for us – and not for you either, you sober ones - we are not nearly as strange to one another as you think, and perhaps our good will to transcend drunkenness is just as respectable as your belief that you are altogether *incapable* of drunkenness.²³³

Nietzsche claims that the search for reality in an objective and scientific way reflects the slave morality, since the scientists and "philosophical laborers" following this purpose are afraid of understanding reality. The Kantian distinction between intellectual and empirical intuitions makes this argument more explicit. As mentioned in the first chapter, Kant argues that only God has intellectual intuition and being and being-known are identical in his existence. God knows things by creating them, but human beings know in another way. It seems that Nietzsche is chafing Kant when he calls some philosophers as 'free thinkers' and 'real philosophers' and claims that they are the law-givers and commanders. As he writes that "their knowing is creating, their creating is a law-giving and their will to truth is will to power,"²³⁴ he seems to be rivaling and challenging God's intellectual intuition as described by Kant.

Kantian moral law and free-will is also an important example of slave morality for Nietzsche. He clearly says that "if one hears within oneself the moral imperative" then "one belongs to the herd."²³⁵ For Nietzsche, the categorical

²³³ Nietzsche, *Gay Science*, II, & 57.

²³⁴ Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, 211.

imperative can only be an instrument of making people equal slaves. He does not believe in the Kantian purpose which looks for a universal ground for the goodness of humanity. Nietzsche believes that in the realm of morality, a wo/man “can posit her/himself as a goal” and s/he can be able to find the roots and causes of moral arguments. Yet, Kantian faculties cannot reveal a way for this awareness. They make us responsible for another being that is outside of us. All Kantian morality puts an emphasis on the fact that “God (my dear Sir Long-Ears-and-Virtuous) always watch us and our intentions”, for this reason “all we desire” must be “not to harm another”.²³⁶ This is the categorical imperative in us and it does not permit us to posit ourselves as a goal as a wo/man who has actual freedom. It does not permit a master morality and a strong-willed subject.

Creating and being a commander and law-giver are the features of master morality for Nietzsche. It is the morality of resoluteness. It is the law and power itself. Who has master morality perceives ‘goodness’ as nobility, courage and self-worth. Nobility is the sign of this morality. The masters respect only themselves in creating morality. They are capable of defining ‘good’ and ‘bad’ since they are sure of themselves in creating values and giving laws. Nietzsche emphasizes that master morality does not look for a reference point in her/his decisions from the outside. The master overflows with confidence. Nietzsche compares the valuation which is caused by slave instincts and master instincts in this way: The slave always “requires first an opposing world, a world outside itself”, on the other hand “the reverse is the case with the noble method of valuing: it acts and grows spontaneously.”²³⁷

Nietzsche explains the slave’s attempts of finding and accusing a hostile external world in terms of the feeling of resentment. He argues that “resentment” is the reflection of this feeling. He explains resentment as follows;

²³⁵ Nietzsche, *Will to Power*, & 286.

²³⁶ *Ibid*, & 286.

²³⁷ Nietzsche, *On the Genealogy of Morality*, 10.

That lambs are annoyed at the great predatory birds is not a strange thing, and the fact that they snatch away small lambs provides no reason for holding anything against these large birds of prey. And if the lambs say among themselves, “These predatory birds are evil—and whoever is least like a predatory bird—and especially anyone who is like its opposite, a lamb—shouldn’t that animal be good?” there is nothing to find fault with in this setting up of an ideal, except for the fact that the birds of prey might look down with a little mockery and perhaps say to themselves, “We are not at all annoyed with these good lambs—we even love them. Nothing is tastier than a tender lamb.”²³⁸

For Nietzsche, the slaves “construct their happiness artificially first by looking at their enemies, or in some circumstances to talk themselves into it, to lie to themselves (the way all men of resentment habitually do)”.²³⁹ In a similar way, slaves try to find an exterior reason for their unhappiness. They try to find a scapegoat for their problems and paradoxes. They always have problems with their actual situations. In contrast, noble type of person is at peace with her/himself.

In *Ecce Homo*, Nietzsche declares that “his formula for human greatness is amor-fati: that you do not want anything to be different not forwards, not backwards, not for all eternity.”²⁴⁰ Thus, by this term, Nietzsche indicates a strong-willed person who can welcome the changes, the problems, in short all aspects of life. In contrast to this, slaves always have problems with their own situations. They are always in search for other options and possibilities, and they cannot accept their own situations with fortitude and resoluteness. Nietzsche explains their problems as follows:

“If only I were some other person” is what this glance sighs: but there is no hope of that. I am who I am: how could I get away from myself? And oh- *I am fed up with myself!* ...In such a soil of self-contempt, such a veritable swamp every kind of weed and poisonous plant grows, all of them so small, hidden, dissembling and sugary. Here, the worms of revenge and rancor teem all round; here, the air stinks of things unrevealed and unconfessed; here, the web of the most wicked conspiracy is continually being spun, - the conspiracy of those who suffer against those who are successful and victorious, here, the sight of

²³⁸ *Ibid*, & 13.

²³⁹ *Ibid*, & 10.

²⁴⁰ Nietzsche, *Ecce Homo*, 10.

the victorious man is *hated*. And what mendacity to avoid admitting this hatred as hatred! What expenditure of big words and gestures, what an art of 'righteous' slander! These failures: what noble eloquence flow from their lips! How much sugar, slimy, humble humility in their eyes! What do they really want? At any rate, to represent justice, love, wisdom, superiority, that is the ambition of these who are 'the lowest', these sick people! And how skilful such an ambition makes them? In particular, we have to admire the counterfeiter's skill with which the stamp of virtue, the ding-a-ling golden ring of virtue is now imitated. They have taken out a lease on virtue to keep it just for themselves, these weak and incurably sick people, there is no doubt about it: 'Only we are good and just!', is what they say, 'only we are the *hominess bonce voluntatis*'.²⁴¹

Nietzsche thinks that Christianity and all other monotheistic religions are examples of slave morality, since they drive people to finding exterior causes for their unhappiness. People of these religions are always restless; they cannot perceive the world and their life as they are. They are not resolute and do not have serenity. They always look for other possibilities, other options and other lives. They cannot question their own lives, thoughts and feelings. They can understand neither themselves nor others.

This slave morality as described by Nietzsche is also connected with political, cultural and social situations. The slaves represent the timid, paradoxical and weak aspects of the modern wo/man. The Underground Wo/man in Nietzsche emerges when s/he questions the slave and master instincts in modern wo/man. Thus, Nietzsche's Underground Wo/man comes on the scene after a long and hard examination via epistemological and moral arguments. S/he appears after digging up the actual and practical sources of these valuations. The process of digging up makes her/him a murderer of God. Thus, Nietzsche calls his carving out the modern values as a process of killing God.

²⁴¹ Nietzsche, *On the Genealogy of Morality*, III, & 14.

3.3 NIETZSCHE'S UNDERGROUND WO/MAN

Nietzsche defines himself as a “subterranean man who tunnels, mines and undermines”²⁴² in philosophy. After digging up the roots of philosophical biases and moral values in modern thought, his Underground Wo/man appears in the *Gay Science*. S/he is excited and confused after clearing the philosophical air from “every type of anti-nature” or “idealism”.²⁴³ Her/his courageous attitude towards knowledge and nature drives her/him to remove all old-fashioned values of modernity. Her/his attempt of knowledge and revaluation brings her/him to a stage where God is death, and the Underground Wo/man cries;

I seek God! I seek God!"---As many of those who did not believe in God were standing around just then, he provoked much laughter. Has he got lost? asked one. Did he lose his way like a child? asked another. Or is he hiding? Is he afraid of us? Has he gone on a voyage? emigrated?²⁴⁴

The Underground Wo/man, after a deep self-analysis feels that s/he is the murderer of God. This self-analysis is at the same time an analysis of her/his social and cultural relations. Thus, this is not a pure analysis of thought. S/he knows that a pure analysis is impossible. Now, Nietzsche's Underground Wo/man is on her/his own in a world without God. Although s/he cries, s/he is at the stage which Nietzsche desired from the outset. As a subterranean, he brings out the practical roots of modern values and drives her/his Underground Wo/man to a stage where s/he can kill God.

Actually, the Underground Wo/man does not seek God. She is aware that s/he is in a search of becoming her/himself. S/he is wondering in what way s/he can continue her/his way. S/he reaches an important stage. However, s/he knows that there still are residues of God. Thus, s/he is still searching for a way for cleaning the remnants of old values and asks as follows;

²⁴² Nietzsche, *Daybreak*, Preface, & 1.

²⁴³ Nietzsche, *Ecce Homo*, &5.

²⁴⁴ Nietzsche, *Gay Science*, & 125.

God is dead. God remains dead. And we have killed him. Yet his shadow still looms. How shall we comfort ourselves, the murderers of all murderers? What was holiest and mightiest of all that the world has yet owned has bled to death under our knives: who will wipe this blood off us? What water is there for us to clean ourselves? What festivals of atonement, what sacred games shall we have to invent? Is not the greatness of this deed too great for us? Must we ourselves not become gods simply to appear worthy of it?²⁴⁵

The Underground Wo/man has finished a hard task in order to reach the stage of God's death. S/he has lost her/himself in this way. In order to crest s/he has concluded a deadly existential exercise. S/he listened Kant and dug up the roots of her/himself. S/he criticizes her/himself deeply. However s/he does not resort to any category for this scraping. S/he has acquired her/his freedom by deconstructing her/himself. Thus, freedom is not presented to her/him as an *a priori* presupposition. S/he feels that s/he is free since s/he killed God.

In every stage of her/his existential search, the Underground Wo/man kills her/himself and s/he gives birth over and over again. S/he reaches this point by means of suffering. As a consequence of harshness towards her/himself s/he comes to this point. At the end s/he feels her/himself as a murderer. S/he feels that s/he is bloody and carries the remnants of Gods who s/he killed. For this reason, s/he asks how s/he can clean her/himself. Finally s/he knows that s/he is still at the beginning of a hard way which is full of stones since killing also means creating new values. S/he asks her/himself what s/he will do from now on. Is s/he continuing to look for any other God and will s/he replaced her/himself with God?

Nietzsche's answer to this question would be negative. Her/his Underground Wo/man would not be in need of another God. Her/his process of becoming will never be completed. Thus, Underground Wo/man is in an eternal search for new evaluations. In criticizing modernity, Nietzsche finds modern thought to be a naïve approach. He thinks that modern thought "is a sign of positive progress that puts" moderns "far ahead of men of Renaissance." He

²⁴⁵ *Ibid*, & 125.

claims that “this is what every age thinks, what it has to think.”²⁴⁶ Yet, his Underground Wo/man does not believe that it is possible to achieve a stage which is far ahead all past decades. S/he is aware that s/he is always in a search. S/he does not want to finish her/his way of becoming. Even s/he knows that finishing this search is meaningless. The finishing of this road means negating life. Therefore, s/he knows that this search is her/his own life actually.

Nietzsche’s Underground Wo/man emphasizes that humans are in a different stage in which there is no God. She asks her/his audiences what is possibly waiting humanity;

Whither is God?" he cried; "I will tell you. *We have killed him*---you and I. All of us are his murderers. But how did we do this? How could we drink up the sea? Who gave us the sponge to wipe away the entire horizon? What were we doing when we unchained this earth from its sun? Whither is it moving now? Whither are we moving? Away from all suns? Are we not plunging continually? Backward, sideward, forward, in all directions? Is there still any up or down? Are we not straying, as through an infinite nothing? Do we not feel the breath of empty space? Has it not become colder? Is not night continually closing in on us? Do we not need to light lanterns in the morning? Do we hear nothing as yet of the noise of the gravediggers who are burying God? Do we smell nothing as yet of the divine decomposition? Gods, too, decompose. God is dead. God remains dead. And we have killed him.²⁴⁷

Nietzsche means the death of God as the removal of all obstacles that blocked our way of looking for ourselves. For him we must be in a search through all our life. Underground Wo/man knows that the deep process of understanding her/himself will never finish. He feels that modern thought has improved many obstacles in defining ourselves. These obstacles are abstract notions which we resort to when we are in trouble. This attitude means taking the easy way out. Modernity has a drive of accomplishing the process of becoming. In order to do this, it presents us many definitions which we can adopt. Thus, modernity ignores a harmful and suffering way of becoming. It assumes that we can easily complete this becoming by means of the categorical imperative and *a priori* categories.

²⁴⁶ Nietzsche, *Twilight of the Idols*, & 37.

²⁴⁷ Nietzsche, *Gay Science*, & 125.

However, the Underground Wo/man does not resort to any definitions. S/he does not want to cut corners. S/he is not a weakling who looks for finality. S/he looks for her/himself in modern definitions and s/he cannot find anything in them that is compatible with her/his actual life. For this reason, s/he is decided that s/he does not achieve any certain definition of her/himself. S/he tries to define her/himself anew every time. S/he knows that s/he does not need a self-autonomous Reason to become her/himself. S/he does not need the interference of Reason in order to access reality. On the contrary, s/he sees this Reason as an impediment to her/his accessing reality.

The Underground Wo/man wants to feel immediacy with nature. S/he tries to decrease the influences of conceptual frames. S/he cannot distinguish her/his intuitions and concepts. In fact, s/he knows that it is difficult to distinguish them. S/he finds Kant's distinctions superficial. S/he tries to think and act out of these faculties. S/he wants to break the conceptual chain of these faculties. S/he wants to gain her/his immediate intuitions. S/he is aware that the conceptions are instruments in her/his way which must be overcome. S/he feels that reality is not conceptual. Reality is not different from her/himself. However s/he is also aware that in order to feel that s/he is identified with reality s/he must get rid of her/his conceptual and conscious bonds.

The Underground Wo/man has a problem with her/his consciousness. S/he feels that consciousness is dangerous for her/his life.²⁴⁸ It is dangerous since it "does something"²⁴⁹ that s/he cannot distinguish from other unconscious states. Actually s/he does not know the difference between her/his conscious and unconscious states. S/he does not feel any difference between her/his instincts and thoughts. Her/his consciousness is not compatible with the one which taught before. The Underground Wo/man's consciousness "is a relation of drives" and her/his conscious and unconscious states are "causally efficacious".²⁵⁰ S/he feels

²⁴⁸ *Ibid*, & 354.

²⁴⁹ Paul Kastafanas, "Nietzsche's Theory of Mind: Consciousness and Conceptualization", p. 1.

that consciousness is dangerous since s/he knows that “all becoming conscious involves a great and through corruption, falsification, reduction to superficialities, and generalization.”²⁵¹ Her/his consciousness always distorts her/his unity. Not only her/his desires and dispositions are unconscious, but also her/his thoughts and perceptions are unconscious.

The Underground Wo/man’s unity is not acquired by her/his self-consciousness. Her/his self-identity with her/himself does not come from the inside. Actually s/he does not look for his/her self-consciousness. S/he is tired of all responsibilities and feelings of guilt which come from her/his self-consciousness. S/he looks for her/his identity with nature. This identity does not allow a stopping point. It does not mean a responsibility for her/him.

The Underground Wo/man is aware that s/he does not know the actual causes of her/his acts and this situation has been an important problem for her/him. S/he is tired of acting the way society forces her/him to. S/he tries to be free from her/his consciousness, since s/he thinks that her/his consciousness always reminds her/him to behave, think and even feel in a definite and presumed way. In this sense, s/he is stranded between her/his actual wishes, feelings and the rational decisions that everyone expects from her/him. S/he does not want to feel guilty because of her/his unconscious and irrational decisions and behaviors. Her/his consciousness plants itself in front of her/him like something outside of her/him. Thus s/he tries to stand against her/his consciousness. S/he and her/his contemporaries in the 19th century are tired of trying to be conscious and rational in the expected way.

²⁵⁰ Ibid, p. 1.

²⁵¹ Nietzsche, *Gay Science*, & 354.

3.4 DOSTOEVSKY AND UNDERGROUND WO/MAN

Dostoevsky is both an influential thinker and novelist of the 19th century. He tries to reveal a wo/man who is under the swing of various impulses, concealed paradoxes and complex passions apart from the notions which is used for expressing the people of the 19th century. As Nietzsche also demonstrates his admiration for him, he touches upon important problems of the people in the 19th century. For this reason, I think that a short analysis of his arguments along with his characters in his novels belongs to my dissertation. As a matter of fact, the name of my thesis comes from one of his novels.

Like Nietzsche, Dostoevsky also tries to elaborate the multi-dimensional and complicated parts of the modern wo/man which cannot be revealed by philosophical theories. While philosophical theories try to unify wo/man, he tries to decompose and deconstruct it. He wants to deepen the dark sides of wo/man. He feels that this deepening is difficult since it requires a process which involves suffering like Nietzsche's *Underground Wo/man*.

Dostoevsky's analyses go beyond the limits of the modern wo/man and 19th century. His investigations are not limited with modernity. He conceives that the traditional anchors are changed in this modern world and this is a new world in which extant values can no longer be supported by the old reference points. Therefore there is a need for new values and reference points. Nietzsche's *Underground Wo/man* explains this situation by saying that "God is dead" as mentioned above.

Dostoevsky is interested in the social and economical changes in the 19th century and he tries to elaborate the influences of these changes on human nature. He indeed wants to detail the true character of the human being. In this sense, his investigations extend the limits of modernity. He actually questions "what can I know", "what can I believe" and "who am I". However his questioning is different from Kant's. He believes that a wholly speculative thinking which flounders around our thoughts independently from our experiences cannot be a profound

way in answering these questions. To explain something without any abstract notion is a difficult problem. This is the critical point of my thesis. However if we try to abstract a wo/man from the thoughts of Nietzsche and Dostoevsky we find a wo/man who always questions her/his life and in an existential research. They try to keep their analyses of wo/man in a realm of conflicting and self-criticizing thoughts. Thus, the adoption of a critical method in their writings turns out to be a wholly different exercise from that of Kant.

Dostoevsky's Underground Wo/man is born out of his inquiries into the true character of the human being. Besides s/he originates from his criticism of modernity, since modernity enforces an ideal conception wo/man and the Underground Wo/man of Dostoevsky actually does not want to be this wo/man. His Underground Wo/man is in a limitless investigation of her/himself. Nietzsche's interpretations of modernity laid the foundation for the argument that the imposed definition of "modern man" distances human beings from their actual and existential nature. Both Dostoevsky's and Nietzsche's enormous and comprehensive inquiry into the subterranean wo/man in the 19th century is a sign of their purpose of unifying the 19th century's wo/man with nature again. In order to drift away from abstraction, they embark on a difficult and exhaustive task. Dostoevsky's Underground Wo/man is also a consequence of this hard task. To look for and understand this woman is an existential research which also changes the researcher in this process.

Dostoevsky's Underground Wo/man feels that "to be too conscious" is an illness, a real thorough-going illness.²⁵² With her/his exaggerated consciousness, "s/he genuinely thinks of her/himself as a mouse not a wo/man."²⁵³ S/he tries to escape from the emphasis on rationality in her/his contemporary society. S/he does not want to be rational anymore as everyone expects her/him to be. S/he is sick²⁵⁴ and tired of her/his conscious activities; since they remind her/him of the forces by

²⁵² Dostoevsky, *Notes from the Underground*, II, p. 8.

²⁵³ *Ibid*, II, p. 15.

²⁵⁴ *Ibid*, II, p. 3.

which society directs her/his actions and even thoughts. Although s/he states that when s/he sees a “real, normal man” s/he is jealous, actually s/he does not want to be this man. S/He says as follows;

Well, such a direct person I regard as the real normal man, as his tender Mother Nature wishes to see him when she graciously brought him into the being on the earth. I envy such a man till I am green in the face. He is stupid. I am not disputing that, but perhaps the normal man should be stupid, how do you know.²⁵⁵

The expression of the wo/man who “tender mother nature wishes to see” demonstrates Dostoevsky’s intention that he does not believe in such a wo/man. This argument which has repercussions from the Enlightenment shows that actually he criticizes the arguments and theories which involve a definition of a wo/man who has a true nature. He accepts these attempts as enforcement. He believes that we cannot make a claim concerning the actual definition of human nature. He especially criticizes and is antagonistic to socialists and the materialist conception of wo/man. It is believed that his *Notes from the Underground* is written for an answer to Chernyshevsky’s novel *What is to be Done*.²⁵⁶ Chernyshevsky is a well-known socialist novelist of the 19th century’s Russia. In his novel, he tries to elaborate a socialist way of life with reference to social relations especially between man and woman.

Dostoyevsky’s Underground Wo/man does not want to be the wo/man that society forces her/him to be. S/he also outgrows all political definitions. S/he feels restricted with social bonds. On the other hand, s/he is aware that s/he cannot stay outside all these rules. S/he knows that there is pressure on her/him concerning the meaning of happiness. The rules of society impose on her/him a kind of “happy and successful life” within certain limits and a certain way of knowing and thinking. However s/he does not believe in this happiness and does not want this presumed and enforced life. All of these influences bring out a self-inflicted

²⁵⁵ *Ibid*, II, pp. 14-15.

²⁵⁶ Nikolay Chernyshevsky, *What it is to be Done*.

depression for her/him. Thus, s/he thinks that s/he is the cause of this situation and wants to be another wo/man which s/he cannot define.

Dostoevsky emphasizes the hesitations, bad feelings and confusions of the modern wo/man. He is interested in probing the deep contradictions of the modern wo/man. He wants to reveal the actual contradictions of her/him, and tries to answer Nietzsche's question: "what does her/his conscience say?" In *Gay Science* Nietzsche tries to depict the ways of becoming who we are.²⁵⁷ By 'conscience' in this quotation he means our inner voice which reflects our actual thoughts and feelings. Therefore due to a deep examination of ourselves, Nietzsche and Dostoevsky try to expose the background of our judgments in relation to our instincts, inclinations, and passions.

Both of them emphasize that modern wo/man may confuse the sounds of her/his own conscience because of the social, political and religious restraints; as a result s/he cannot understand the actual voices of her/his conscience. Nietzsche claims that this situation "may be due to the fact that you have never thought much about yourself and have simply accepted blindly that what you had been told ever since your childhood was right".²⁵⁸

Both Dostoevsky and Nietzsche highlight that it is not an easy affair "becoming who we are", since it is not also merely connected with outer restraints. They try to point to the outer constraints on the modern wo/man; however their actual purpose is to explain our own self-deprecated paradoxes. In other words they think that the outer restraints become inner problems and we must bring out the sources and processes of by which they become personalized by us. To reveal and remove these restraints requires a deep analysis in us and they touch a difficult problem in this sense. This is the point which transforms their search into an existential exercise.²⁵⁹

²⁵⁷ Nietzsche, *Gay Science*, & 27.

²⁵⁸ *Ibid*, & 335.

Lev Shestov, who is a Russian existentialist philosopher, has a profound study on this issue in the “Dostoevsky and Nietzsche: Philosophy of Tragedy”.²⁶⁰ Shestov also improves his own existentialist philosophy in this work. Like Dostoevsky and Nietzsche, he takes the conceptions of ‘reason’, and ‘idealism’ as the frameworks that subordinate our life, thoughts and instincts. He conceives them as the ‘certainties’ that lead to a thought that they are absolute, eternal and unchangeable, and we cannot attain them by our restricted standpoint. Thus the existentialist roots in Nietzsche and Dostoevsky are connected with the negation of abstract generalizations that prevent our way of becoming ‘who we are’.

Nietzsche, Dostoevsky and Shestov call attention to the irrational parts of people, but it is not an attempt to totally negate ‘reason’ or ‘science’. They are merely against the absolutistic conception of reason and scientific explanations in the 19th century. This absolutistic conception conceives reason as a kind of supreme God, and this approach tries to reduce people only to ideas and rational faculties. In this sense, to emphasize the inclinations, passions of modern wo/man come along with an existentialist inquiry.

Nietzsche and Dostoevsky express their hostility to Darwin’s scientific formulas which are used for the evolution of man. They compare their existential inquiry with scientific inquiry. As mentioned before, Nietzsche criticizes Darwin’s approach for its teleological inclination. However Dostoevsky’s *Underground Wo/man* has a different problem than Darwin, since s/he feels that this scientific explanation makes her/him to be squeezed with a scientific formula similar to other scientific explanations. Dostoevsky’s *Underground Wo/man* asks as follows;

Why, of course, the laws of nature, the deductions of natural science, mathematics? As soon as they prove to you, for instance, that you are descended from a monkey, then it is no use scowling, accept it for a fact. When they prove to you that, in reality one drop of your own fat must be dearer to you than a hundred thousand of your fellow-creatures, that this

²⁵⁹ The existentialist approach in Dostoevsky and Nietzsche is discussed in philosophy and literature. Walter Kaufman analyses the sources of existentialism in Nietzsche and Dostoevsky in *Existentialism from Dostoevsky to Sartre*. For further discussions, see also William McBride’s *Existentialist Background: Kierkegaard, Dostoevsky, Nietzsche, Jaspers, Heidegger*.

²⁶⁰ Lev Shestov, Dostoevsky and Nietzsche: The Philosophy of Tragedy, in *Dostoevsky, Tolstoy and Nietzsche*.

conclusion is the final solution of all so-called virtues and duties and all such prejudices and fancies, then you have just to accept it, there is no help for it, for twice two is a law of mathematics. Just try refuting it.²⁶¹

The teleological explanation in science is still a controversial problem of Darwinist scientists. The problem is concerning the fact that they lead to the certain notions which are abstracted from the evolutionary process. In addition these notions try to explain physical facts with definite purposes. Dostoevsky does not want to accept the consequences of the Darwinist approach as a fact. He indicates the problem of explaining people as mathematical formulas.

Dostoevsky's *Underground Wo/man* resists to be formulated with scientific laws. S/he feels that it is contrary to her/his nature. S/he does not want to live in a world that is scientifically completed either. S/he thinks that the world cannot be explained in a wholly scientific way since this world and our life has not a scientific form. S/he thinks that all reality cannot be explained by scientific formulas. At this point, s/he flounders around a Kantian question: "how the deterministic natural world, whose mechanisms are becoming more and more accessible to the methods of the natural sciences, relates to the world in which we understand ourselves as autonomous beings".²⁶² I have mentioned this quotation in my Kant chapter. Andrew Bowie presents this question as the main problem of Kantian aesthetics. Dostoevsky's *Underground Wo/man* asks as a similar question in the 19th century:

Good heavens, gentlemen, what sort of free will is left when we come to tabulation and arithmetic, when it will all be a case of twice two make four? Twice two makes four without my will. As if free will meant that!²⁶³

Dostoevsky's *Underground Wo/man* compares her/his free will with the scientific laws. This problem which dates back to the Enlightenment is still questioned in the

²⁶¹ Dostoevsky, *The Notes from the Underground*, II, p. 18.

²⁶² Andrew Bowie, *Aesthetics and Subjectivity*, p. 16.

²⁶³ Dostoevsky, *The Notes from the Underground*, II, p. 49.

19th century. The hegemony of science which is founded in the 17th and 18th centuries is felt also in the 19th century. This hegemony is also a problem for Dostoevsky's *Underground Wo/man*. The comparison of scientific laws of nature with our world is continued. S/he also questions Kant's idea of freedom as in accordance with our interests and with laws of nature. Dostoevsky's *Underground Wo/man* cannot grasp the Kantian conception of free will and argues as follows;

You will scream at me (that is, if you condescend to do so) that no one is touching my free will, that all they are concerned with is that my will should of itself, of its own free will, coincide with my own normal interests, with the laws of nature and arithmetic.²⁶⁴

The *Underground Wo/man* criticizes the approach of explaining her/himself as a causal machine. S/he feels that a causal machine cannot explain her/his desires and choices. At this point he criticizes all scientific and philosophical attitudes which try to achieve a scientific formula for wo/man;

Besides, he will at once be transformed from a human being into an organ-stop or something of the sort; for what is a man without desires, without free will and without choice, if not a stop in an organ? What do you think? Let us reckon the chances—can such a thing happen or not?²⁶⁵

In contrast to scientific formulations, the *Underground Wo/man* presents a solution;

'I say, gentleman, hadn't we better kick over the whole show and scatter rationalism to the winds, simply to send these logarithms to the devil, and to enable us to live once more at our own sweet foolish will!'²⁶⁶

At this point Dostoevsky's *Underground Wo/man* reflects a weakness of modern wo/man which Nietzsche calls an old chronic problem of philosophy. This weakness, for Nietzsche dates back Socrates. This is the weakness of attempting to make reality intelligible and abstract. Dostoevsky's *Underground Wo/man* states that;

²⁶⁴ *Ibid*, II, p. 48.

²⁶⁵ *Ibid*, II, p. 42.

²⁶⁶ *Ibid*, II, pp. 39-40.

But man has such a predilection for systems and abstract deductions that he is ready to distort the truth intentionally, he is ready to deny the evidence of his senses only to justify his logic.²⁶⁷

Like Nietzsche, Dostoevsky's Underground Wo/man wants to reflect the creative and bodily energies of wo/man;

I agree that man is pre-eminently a creative animal, predestined to strive consciously for an object and to engage in engineering—that is, incessantly and eternally to make new roads, WHEREVER THEY MAY LEAD.²⁶⁸

Although Dostoevsky's Underground Wo/man states his envy towards normal wo/man, he also invites people to dig up wo/man's true nature in the underground. S/he claims that on the surface and by means of the scientific and absolutistic explanations we cannot understand it. Thus s/he says as follows;

The long and the short of it is, gentlemen, that it is better to do nothing! Better conscious inertia! And so hurrah for underground! Though I have said that I envy the normal man to the last drop of my bile, yet I should not care to be in his place such as he is now (though I shall not cease envying him). No, no; anyway the underground life is more advantageous. There, at any rate, one can ...Oh, but even now I am lying! I am lying because I know myself that it is not underground that is better, but something different, quite different, for which I am thirsting, but which I cannot find! Damn underground!²⁶⁹

Finally Dostoevsky's Underground Wo/man confesses that s/he has been underground for forty years. S/he claims that s/he learns from the underground that wo/man cannot be explained only by her/his rationality. S/he argues as follows;

Yes, but here I come to a stop! Gentlemen, you must excuse me for being over-philosophical; it's the result of forty years underground! Allow me to indulge my fancy. You see, gentlemen, reason is an excellent thing, there's no disputing that, but reason is nothing but reason and satisfies only the rational side of man's nature, while will is a manifestation of the

²⁶⁷ *Ibid*, II, p. 36.

²⁶⁸ *Ibid*, II, pp. 50-51.

²⁶⁹ *Ibid*, II, p. 58.

whole life, that is, of the whole human life including reason and all the impulses.²⁷⁰

We can see Dostoevsky's inquiries into these irrational characteristics of people in his novels, and Nietzsche accepts him as a profound psychologist especially with reference to his arguments and examinations in *The House of the Dead*.²⁷¹ Nietzsche claims that apart from the indefinite moral law in us, it is important to investigate the behaviors, feelings and experiences of criminals, since such an approach can rescue us from the swamps of empty generalizations. In Nietzsche the investigation of the actual passions and feelings of the modern wo/man means also a kind of philosophy which affirms our life, since as mentioned above he finds the approach of removing the passions from the realm of philosophy to be a way of negating life.²⁷² He thus thinks that Dostoevsky's inquiries into criminals and the other characters in his novels is in fact a search for affirming our life.²⁷³

The characters of Dostoevsky inquire into the roots of their thoughts, feelings of guilt, and passions. They try to understand who they are. However they feel that it is a hard problem and it is difficult to understand and follow the inner and actual wo/man in them. Dostoevsky's characters feel that they cannot succeed in being the wo/man that they actually are. In other words, they do not feel as if they are. Thus, they are confused about their actual thoughts and emotions.

Mikhail Bakhtin, in *The Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics*, defines Dostoevsky's novels as the examples of a genuine polyphony and the plurality of voices. He emphasizes that there emerge different voices from one person in the same novel and these voices continue independently from each other and even independently of the intentions of the writer. Thus, Bakhtin argues that the

²⁷⁰ *Ibid*, II, p. 43.

²⁷¹ Dostoevsky, *The House of the Dead*.

²⁷² Nietzsche, *The Antichrist, Morality as Anti-Nature*, 1.

²⁷³ For a further and recent discussion about this issue, see also Predrack Cicovacki's *Dostoevsky and the Affirmation of Life*.

different characteristics, worldviews, philosophies, inclinations exist together at the same time in his novels. Moreover Bakhtin claims that they are independent from Dostoevsky's own worldview since Dostoevsky does not want to restrain all the different aspects of people and all their multi-dimensional complexities.²⁷⁴ This is why Nietzsche is grateful for his success in the realm of human psychology.

Nietzsche also touches on the problem of how difficult it is to bring out the actual wo/man in us. He argues that to understand ourselves and to inspect our experiences "as severely as a scientific experiment" may take much time; it may last "hour after hour, day after day".²⁷⁵ This problem for him goes beyond the problems of modern wo/man, and it is a deep existential problem like Dostoevsky's. He argues that "everyone is farthest from himself".²⁷⁶ In order to understand ourselves he claims that we give ourselves laws which we create. "To that end we must become the best students and discoverers of everything lawful and necessary in the world: we must become physicists in order to become creatures in this sense...So, long live physics! And even more so that which compels us to turn to physics – our honesty!"²⁷⁷

The Underground Wo/man of Nietzsche and Dostoevsky tries to find a solution in the experience of suffering. S/he questions that maybe s/he can escape from this self-depression by means of suffering. Dostoevsky's Underground Wo/man asks: "perhaps suffering is just a great benefit to him as well-being?"²⁷⁸ S/he wants to suffer in order to be the real, actual man. On the other hand, s/he also feels that suffering is connected with her/his consciousness. S/he conceives that the actual reason of her/his suffering is her/his consciousness. Yet, s/he also

²⁷⁴ Mihail Bakhtin, *The Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics*.

²⁷⁵ Nietzsche, *Gay Science*, & 319.

²⁷⁶ *Ibid*, & 335.

²⁷⁷ *Ibid*, & 335.

²⁷⁸ Dostoevsky, *The Notes from the Underground*, p. 27.

thinks that suffering also reminds her/him that s/he truly alive. Nietzsche also criticizes the modern idea of happiness, since it is a means of suppressing our existential sufferings. He appreciates the Greeks, since they understand that suffering is a means of our individuation and affirming our life.

Nietzsche and Dostoevsky accept suffering as a revolt against the laws of nature. Their Underground Wo/man does not want to be a predictable and calculable wo/man. Dostoevsky criticizes the approaches of science in trying to make people as calculable objects. Nietzsche also agrees that and asks “is not living valuing, preferring, being unjust, being limited endeavoring to be different”.²⁷⁹ Thus as mentioned above the Underground wo/man is resisting to laws of nature, since s/he resists the science, since s/he does not want to be “a table of logarithms”.²⁸⁰

In *The Brothers Karamazov* Dostoevsky asks the question of “how our moral values and arguments are justified in this world in which children are exposed to cruelty”.²⁸¹ In this sense his inquiry into morality is directly connected with practical roots. He wants to investigate why we cannot see the actual examples of goodness and justness in our life. Even though Dostoevsky tries to find a divine reference point; Nietzsche finds Dostoevsky’s works valuable in this respect. Dostoevsky’s Underground Wo/man flounders around “killing God” in a different way from Nietzsche’s Underground Wo/man. I think that they are distinguished at this point.

As I had stated before, Nietzsche finds the Kantian foundation of practical legislation problematic. Dostoevsky also investigates the roots of this practical legislation. The problem of a moral reference point in the modern world is the prominent question of the characters of Dostoevsky. Thus, Dostoevsky’s

²⁷⁹ Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, 9.

²⁸⁰ Dostoevsky, *The Notes from the Underground*, II, p. 38.

²⁸¹ Dostoevsky, *The Brothers Karamazov*, pp. 355-382. I think that Ivan’s main problem is this question with his talking of Alexey on religion and Grand Inquisitor.

Underground Wo/man is in a sense in need of a belief in God. I believe that the difference between Dostoevsky's and Nietzsche's Underground Wo/man can be explained by means of a Kantian quotation. As I explained in the first chapter Kant trusts that;

There is no one, not even the most wicked scoundrel, if only he is otherwise accustomed to use his reason, who does not wish, if one lays before him examples of honesty in aims, sympathetic participation and general benevolence (and in addition combined with great sacrifices of advance and convenience) that he might also be so disposed.²⁸²

I think that Nietzsche and Dostoevsky are not sure that a person wishes sympathetic participation and general benevolence in this situation. In other words, the issue is not as simple as Kant argues, and it cannot be solved by depending on an indefinite basis in human beings. On the other hand, the difference of Dostoevsky's Underground Wo/man emerges here. In contrast to Nietzsche's Underground Wo/man s/he envies Kant, and s/he wants to believe the idea which is expressed in this quotation.

In *The Brothers Karamazov*, Ivan has a feeling of hatred to Aleksey, but he does not find any roots in himself to be a person like Aleksey. He asks the questions "why should we be good in this world" and "how can we find a reference point for faith in the divine?" I think that neither Ivan nor Aleksey has a definite answer, and Dostoevsky does not present the idea of a God that can solve our problems. Moreover, in *Prince Myshkin*, Dostoevsky investigates the possibility of "a good and just man" that Christianity defends. However, it cannot be said that he has an exact answer; he mostly tries to reveal the problems about why modern people cannot adopt the values of Christianity or how they do adopt them.

Dostoevsky tries to dig into the existential problems of moderns. He reveals why people act in contrast to their feelings of justice and goodness. Or he

²⁸² Kant, *Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Moral*, p. 71.

tries to answer “do they actually have these feelings or values”, and “how do they acquire them”. I said that his Underground Wo/man flounders around the meaning of killing God. S/he questions whether s/he can replace God with her/himself.

The characters of Dostoevsky question the expression of “killing God” by examinations of replacing themselves with God. Dostoevsky’s Underground Wo/man tries to understand whether we can justify some basic moral arguments concerning killing a wo/man or raping a child. S/he tries to look for a solution in this examination for the existence of God. S/he also seeks for a moral reference point. For this reason, “killing God” means for Dostoevsky’s Underground Wo/man creating new values. In addition it also means replacing God with her/himself.

Raskolnikov looks for possibilities of revaluation. He questions the possibility of changing the basic rules and values of society by depending on his own thoughts and analysis. He, as a representative of will to power, analyses the conception of crime and punishment in his society. I have stated that Dostoevsky’s Underground Wo/man, as Raskolnikov here, wants to believe Kant’s idea that in everyone there is a good will. However, he extends the question concerning Kant’s justification.

At the beginning Raskolnikov believes that it is good for everyone if he kills the old woman in *Crime and Punishment*. In other words, he believes that at least for some people it will be a good act. In the novel, there is discussion in a pub concerning the justice of killing the old woman. The richness of this old woman is accepted as a result of her good luck. In this discussion which occurs in the pub this fortune is expressed as “natural”. In other words it is accepted that this woman is rich naturally. The conditions of society concerning the fact that there is richness and poverty is expressed “by nature”. “By nature” also means fate in here. The people in the pub discuss whether we can change and correct

nature/our fate/the actual conditions of society. One student claims that we must correct nature;

Oh, well, brother, but we have to correct and direct nature, and, but for that, we should drown in an ocean of prejudice. But for that, there would never have been a single great man. They talk of duty, conscience—I don't want to say anything against duty and conscience;—but the point is, what do we mean by them?²⁸³

In this quotation, the student questions the first persons who establish the moral rules of society. This examination is similar to Nietzsche's question in *On the Genealogy of Morality* and *Beyond Good and Evil*. The student emphasizes that every moral law is established by a great man. Thus, he argues that every moral law is established by a wo/man and every morality implies social and cultural relations. Apart from people and apart from these relations, he asks "what do we do by them?" For this reason he claims that there must be some great man who can change the moral law at a definite time. Thus the actual question that creates Raskolnikov, as an Underground Wo/man, and as will to power, emerges here: Can he change a moral law as a great man?

This question also reflects Raskolnikov's attempt at killing God and replacing God with himself. He tries to dismiss God and his rules from his life. However after killing the old woman he cannot cope with his religious and moral apprehensions. He goes into depression and tries to find a way in connection with religion and morality again. For this reason, I think that Dostoevsky's Underground Wo/man, in contrast to Nietzsche's Underground Wo/man, is sometimes in need of a God.

We can see other examples of replacing God with oneself in the other characters of Dostoevsky concerning raping a child. These characters are Arkady Svidrigailov in *Crime and Punishment* and Nikolay Stavrogin in *Devils*. They both raped a child and they go into depression like Raskolnikov. In other words, they cannot cope with killing God. At this point Dostoevsky's Underground Wo/man feels a need of appealing to a God. Dostoevsky also questions the

²⁸³ Dostoevsky, *Crime and Punishment*, p. 88.

pragmatic benefit of an idea of God for the progress of society. On the other hand, his Underground Wo/man is sunk into an existential questioning about God. I do not think that s/he solves this problem with a definite answer.

Golyadkin is the last character which I want to talk about. Golyadkin is the main character of *The Double*.²⁸⁴ As an Underground Wo/man, he reflects Dostoevsky's investigation of his time in terms of working conditions. Yakov Golyadkin is a government clerk. He is gripped with the idea that another man appropriates his identity. This man is also a clerk in a government office. He is the same with him. His body and his dress are the same with Golyadkin. However his behaviors towards his employer and his fellow workers are different.

Golyadkin's other is self-confident and strong-willed in contrast to him. While Golyadkin has a weak character, his other's strong character influences people. In a little while the other is accepted by Golyadkin's friends and employer. In the end of the novel it is understood that the other is an illusion of Golyadkin and he goes mad. Golyadkin is a doppelganger which I explained in the first chapter. His other reflects the ideal man whom Golyadkin cannot be. He is a schmoozer with his employer and and extroverted. He tries to steal the character of the real Golyadkin and he is who Golyadkin must be. In this novel, Dostoevsky touches upon a problem of Underground Wo/man in terms of her/his relation to other people and his employer. Thus Golyadkin's double reflects a problem of identity of a person in the modern culture.

I have tried to explain the emergence and questions of Dostoevsky's and Nietzsche's Underground Wo/man. They both argue against a definite and rational conception of wo/man. In contrast to this definition, they try to take out a wo/man from the underground. This Underground Wo/man is aware that the real and normal wo/man which is described and enforced is not her/himself in the 19th century. S/he is an eternal search for her/his true nature. In this sense, Dostoevsky and Nietzsche do not accept a definite human nature without a wo/man who is

²⁸⁴ Dostoevsky, *The Double*.

always becoming. I tried to explain the critical epistemological and moral context in which this Underground Wo/man emerges. I want to conclude this chapter by considering the loneliness of this Underground Wo/man. I think that s/he is condemned to be alone when we compare her/him Marx's Underground Wo/man. I will try to explain this point in relation to Dostoevsky's and Nietzsche's antagonism towards socialism.

Both Nietzsche and Dostoevsky have an antagonistic attitude towards socialism. Nietzsche sees socialism as a despotic regime which forces people to be the same and equal and it is in this sense in contrast to human nature. Dostoevsky also questions the possibility of a socialist system in society by his analysis in *Devils*. He does not believe that it is a possible system for humans, since he also points out its despotic dimension.

While they try to understand people in a detailed and complete way, they present a wo/man who always questions her/himself. I want to understand this wo/man in their thinking in relation to their criticism concerning their time. Before going into the details of their Underground Wo/man, it will be helpful to state that both thinkers are trying to understand their time in relation to political, social ideas and philosophical theories. However, when we compare their analyses with Marx's studies, it can be seen that their questionings remain blind because of their antagonistic view to socialism and revolutionary movements in the 19th century. They are both critical about these movements, since they do not find these theories and movements to be valid and effective in understanding people.

I believe that both of them are great psychologists and perform insightful inquiries into the lives and thoughts of their contemporaries. Yet, their hostility to the revolutionary movements restricts their studies within the realm of an existential inquiry. For this reason, I said that their Underground Wo/man is condemned to be alone. Dostoevsky and Nietzsche take the problematic features of these movements and emphasize their inadequacy of investigating people. As mentioned before, Nietzsche criticizes the socialists in his time since he thinks that

they reflect the slave instincts. Dostoevsky examines the nihilistic movements in Russia and Europe. Moreover, Dostoevsky writes a book especially in order to question a leadership of a revolutionary nihilistic group, Sergey Nechayev.²⁸⁵

Neither Dostoevsky's nor Nietzsche's critical and leery approach to nihilistic and socialist movements can be overlooked. Although they cannot propound an alternative to socialism, their critical points are important. In particular, they put forward the problematic features of socialism in terms of its compatibility with the true characteristics of human nature. These features are significant and they are influential in the emergence of their Underground Wo/man. In the realm of politics, their thoughts are close to an anarchistic perspective. We can find similarities between Marx and their thoughts in this sense, since there is an anarchistic aspect of Marx's philosophy as well. Marx also tries to naturalize the conception of human nature. Thus, he presents wo/man in a process of becoming within the social and material relations. I think that his attempt of investigating an ideal society for this wo/man in terms of social, economical and material conditions embellish his theory. By this way, Marx finds a method of elaborating the actual problems which drive wo/man into the underground.

Thus, I think that Nietzsche, Dostoevsky and Marx have a common conception of wo/man and human nature. Their conception of human nature involves an anarchistic perspective. Nietzsche's explanation in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* can explain their conception of human beings; "what is great about human beings is that they are a bridge and not purpose: what is lovable about human beings is that they are a *crossing over* and a *going under*."²⁸⁶

Finally I want to state that my conception of Underground Wo/man is not hopeless and full of bad feelings. S/he is not the man who has resentment. S/he has courage and will for another life. Since Marx's Underground Wo/man has a more

²⁸⁵ It is accepted that *Devils* is written for examining the thoughts and character of Sergey Nechayev.

²⁸⁶ Nietzsche, *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, & 4.

practical solution, I think that s/he can be more hopeful. In other words, Marx has a more profound perspective in order to open the way of underground. As Dostoevsky said I think that “underground life is more advantageous” in explaining the real man of the 19th century. However as I have stated that this is also a general problem of modern wo/man. In order to open a way to underground I have tried to explain Nietzsche’s naturalist epistemology and morality. Now I want to continue with Marx’s Underground Wo/man.

CHAPTER IV

MARX

The departure point of my thesis is an epistemological problem. I have formulated it with Critchley's argument of Kantian disappointment. This disappointment is the Kantian argument that we cannot know the actual nature of things. I have tried to extend this disappointment to the relation of the modern wo/man and nature/reality. Marx claims that actually the capitalist relations distort the relationship of people with nature and each other. And he tries to envision an economical and social revolution which can be an answer to these distortions in terms of labor conditions.

Kantian disappointment characterizes the modern subject. In his social and political philosophy, he treats the rules of society by modeling them along the lines of. He believes in the idea that if we rule and act according to Reason, then we can improve the conditions of our society. Nietzsche sees this conception of freedom and Kant's epistemological ideas as impeding the affirmation of our lives and he claims that such an approach gives way to a form of submission.

Both Kant and Nietzsche emphasize the subject's perspective and try to make room for the possibility of her/his arguments in the realm of morals or the possibility of his/her revaluation. However, when we compare with Marx, their thoughts remain abstract since his starting point and key of the situation are more practical.

Marx believes that it is time to change the widespread comprehension of philosophy and to actualize it in order to reveal and solve the anomalies in the life-processes of people in the 19th century. The gist of his thinking lies in the aim of

bringing about social change by combining theory and practice.²⁸⁷ Accordingly, he aims at a philosophy which can be an answer to the actual, existential and economical problems of the people and is in a direct relationship with their practices especially in terms of labor conditions.

In order to solve the problem of abstractness, Marx chooses the way of urging for a practical, economical and sociological transformation of our life. He perceives his century from a practical perspective, and presents a practical and insightful solution. And he propounds a revolution.

Both Kant and Nietzsche are interested in the social and economical problems of their century; however they do not present a systematical theory of society, much less a theory of social transformation. Indeed they mostly emphasize an individual transformation. Kantian thought does address social problems in light of the Enlightenment; however his philosophy is ultimately dependent on the improvement of Reason instead of a social and economical revolution. Of course he is interested in the relations of people and “sensus communis”, but not in a way similar to Marx. Thus Marx’s solution depends on a form of society. Nietzsche’s Overman and Zarathustra can at most be a cultural and isolated form of revolution in contrast to Marx’s setting forth the problem. Thus, both the starting points and the actual solutions of Kant and Nietzsche are different from Marx.

In this chapter, I will first try to put forth the difference and challenging points of Marx’s theory epistemologically. In section 4.1, I will elaborate the meaning of a praxis philosophy in order to grasp Marx’s ideas on epistemology. It is controversial whether he has an epistemology or not. I want to open a discussion about the influences of Hegel’s philosophy on Marx and I think that his improvement of dialectical materialism can also have epistemological implications. I will explore the points where Marx overcomes the problematic features of German idealism and abstractionism. I know that epistemology is not a

²⁸⁷ Giddens, *Capitalism and Modern Social Theory*, p. 54.

main purpose of Marx. But I believe that if we can construct a dialog from Kant to Hegel in terms of the common questions they have tried to investigate, we can see the proximity of their questions and the differences between their solutions to these questions. I have considered the problem of the distinction between the subject and the object and the transformation of this problem into the relation between wo/man and nature. Thus, I think that it will be helpful in the first section to summarize Kantian background of this problem, and Hegel's solution to Kant's questions and Marx's answer and transformation of Hegel's dialectic.

In section 4.2, I will explain the conditions of the emergence of Marx's Underground Wo/man in terms of alienation in capitalist relationships. I interpreted this alienation a problem between the subject and the object also. Depending on his epistemological ideas and his criticism of ideology, I aim at bringing forth the details of Marxist philosophy and the points which his Underground Wo/man originates. Marx's Underground Wo/man is actually a wo/man who is ignored by the 18th and the 19th centuries' philosophical theories and economy politics. I will explain the conditions and problems of the ignorance of this wo/man.

I will complete this section with a general examination of Marx's arguments on human nature, since I think that it will fulfill Marx's humanistic aspect and it is important for my problem concerning Underground Wo/man.

4.1. MARX AND EPISTEMOLOGY

Marx poses an epistemological attitude to improve his philosophy of praxis. Marx takes a practical and anthropological approach to epistemology. In this section, I want to summarize Marx's epistemology in terms of the main questions which he takes from Kant and Hegel. The influences of Hegelian thought on his philosophy as a young Hegelian cannot be overlooked. For this reason, beginning from the Kantian disappointment and his distinction between being and being-known, or thought and being I will explain the solutions Hegel proposes to Kant's problems.

I believe that the main issues of Marx's epistemology can be explained in light of the critical tools he inherited from Hegel's philosophy. I believe that this epistemological background can provide a basis for understanding Marx's Underground Wo/man.

4.1.1 Marx's Questions that he takes from Kant and Hegel

K. Westphal and J. McDowell argue that the common and significant question shared by both Kant and Hegel, who are the influential thinkers of modernity, can be summarized as: "how a realist account of human knowledge can recognize and build on the deep and pervasive socio-historical dimensions of human knowledge?"²⁸⁸ Kant is criticized for his ignorance of explaining the socio-historical dimensions of knowledge.

Kant's portrayal of the categories of human mind as *a priori* and universal is thought to be disallowing to reflect these socio-historical dimensions of knowledge. In connection with this problem there is a tension in his thinking between wo/man and nature. Human mind with his definite categories and nature/reality which is difficult to understand it by means of these categories remains as an ongoing problem in his philosophy. This distance remains a main problem for all the thinkers of the Enlightenment and modernity as they try to attribute their rational theories to nature.

Hegel's way of explaining nature/reality depending on the journey of consciousness is accepted as an approach which can reflect the socio-historical dimensions of knowledge. In this way, he tries to explain the improvement of rationality in the history.

As I mentioned in the first chapter, the Kantian tension is also a consequence of his effort of reconciling "the deterministic natural world, whose mechanisms are more and more accessible to the methods of the natural science",

²⁸⁸ Westphal and McDowell, "Contemporary Epistemology: Kant, Hegel, McDowell", p. 275.

and “the world in which we understand ourselves as autonomous beings.”²⁸⁹ Thus the tension between realism and subjective contribution to knowledge also turns into the tension between nature and the autonomous subject. The difference between the deterministic and lawful conception of nature and an autonomous subjectivity indicates the difference between theory and reality. Thus, modern epistemology starts with the distinction as well as relation between theory and reality, or in the Hegelian sense, thought and being. To explain their relation within a systematic and dynamic method with an emphasis upon the subject’s role is an important question of modern philosophy.

The differences between concepts and senses in our knowledge point to a self-split in the Kantian subject. Kant tries to repress this split by assigning important, indefinite and abstract functions to Reason. These functions are criticized, since it is claimed that they cannot reflect the historical dimension of knowledge. It is argued that since Kant tries to reduce all knowledge into the *a priori*, universal and plain parts of human mind. This attitude and his emphasis upon order and system in our knowledge make his epistemology beyond history. It is accepted that in modern philosophy, it is Hegel’s philosophy which can bring a dialectical and historical frame in Kant’s epistemology and ontology. In order to solve the paradoxes of Kantian thinking Hegel thinks that the dialectical and historical dynamics of our knowledge must be put forward.

4.1.2 Hegel’s Criticism of Kantian Thinking and Modern Thought

Hegel takes the difference of being and thought as the main problem of modern philosophy. He thinks that the Kantian distinction between thought and being and the idea that we cannot have knowledge of the “thing-in-itself” is inconsistent. He actually takes this difference as the impassable dichotomy of subject and object in philosophy and tries to advance a way of transformation of this difference into a dialectical process. In this way, he also aims at achieving a philosophical

²⁸⁹ Andrew Bowie, *Aesthetics and Subjectivity*, p. 16.

standpoint where the abstract and concrete are amalgamated perfectly without any external allocating point.

Hegel tries to overcome the restrictive aspect of the Kantian subject and does not want any boundary caused by the residual “thing-in-itself”. He does not acknowledge any realm outside of consciousness as he dissolves all reality as the realization process of spirit. Thus, he presents his conception of spirit as a profound conception for overcoming the dichotomy of subject and object and thought and reality. For him, things in themselves are only “empty abstractions”²⁹⁰ in Kant’s systems, and these abstractions do not fall outside of spirit.

Hegel perceives the need of a dialectical process in Kant’s system and in modern epistemology. He takes dialectic as a tool for overcoming the distinctions of subject and object, and theory and reality in modern philosophy. In this way, Hegel believes that we can escape the static and isolated conception of being and knowledge. This static conception of knowledge goes back to Descartes for Hegel. He criticizes him for his ignorance of the fact that “consciousness is always consciousness of something” and the unity of consciousness is only possible with the other of consciousness. If we do not consider these points, we would have to deal with knowledge and consciousness as if they are absolute notions and we cannot explain the historical dimension of knowledge.

In the *Phenomenology of Spirit*,²⁹¹ Hegel investigates our knowledge within changing forms of consciousness. He proceeds from the simplest form of consciousness to its completed form in self-consciousness. In each form Hegel tries to reflect the engagement of the subject with the object. Due to this method, Hegel tries to demonstrate that the knowledge of self is also the knowledge of nature. He conceives nature as a product of our spirit, and our freedom.²⁹² He

²⁹⁰ *Ibid*, p. 121.

²⁹¹ Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*.

²⁹² Hegel, *Encyclopedia of Philosophical Science*, & 55.

wants to identify truth with the “whole”²⁹³ and he conceives every object as the carrier of some part of truth. In this sense, he accepts particulars as the reflections of universals, and does not want to isolate anything from the self-realization process of the spirit. In this way, Hegel tries to present a theory which can overcome the distance between nature and wo/man in light of the realization of the spirit. From this perspective, Hegel tries to explain the concrete parts of our knowledge in a dialectical movement. Dialectic for him is “the principle of all motion, of all life, and of all activation in the actual world”.²⁹⁴

This is the dynamical process of dialectic: “something is identified –it is grasped as at its point of origin; then, something negative strikes, which, in turn, leads it to the next step where something of the earlier moment is retained still”.²⁹⁵ By means of dialectic Hegel tries to show that every form of consciousness carries its other with itself. He emphasizes that the unity of our consciousness depends on its unity with the other. This is the point where the abstractness and absoluteness of Kantian subject can be overcome in Hegel’s philosophy.

In the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, Hegel carries the Kantian faculties and transcendental ideas to a practical realm. The Kantian claim that “reason does not receive its laws from nature but dictates them to her” becomes a practical reality in Hegel’s system. Hegel’s subject attributes her/his employments to nature by means of her/his labor process. While s/he is transforming nature, at the same time s/he transforms her/himself. In this sense, the historical process of transformation of nature is also a process of rationalization. Hegel reflects this point by arguing that “the real is rational and the rational is real”.²⁹⁶

However, after the completion of the journey through the forms of consciousness, Hegel gives philosophy a role that seems limited to interpretation.

²⁹³ Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, p. 11.

²⁹⁴ Hegel, *Encyclopedia of Philosophical Science*, 128-129.

²⁹⁵ Singh and Mohapatra, *Reading Hegel*, p. 6

²⁹⁶ Hegel, *The Philosophy of Right*, Preface, p. 25.

He claims that the philosopher can understand and interpret the actual historical and rational process only after the process is finished. He argues that as follows;

When philosophy paints its grey in grey, one form of life has become old, and by means of grey it cannot be rejuvenated, but only known. The owl of Minerva takes its flight only when the shades of night are gathering.²⁹⁷

Marx's epistemology attempts to change this role of philosophy. His thought is prompted by Hegel's philosophy in terms of the dialectical process of history and the emphasis on labor process in the lives and thoughts of wo/man. However, Marx also wants to transform philosophy into a more profound activity and tries to give a theory which is physically unified with reality/nature.

4.1.3 The Influence of Hegel on Marx

Dialectic is the vital spot of both Hegel's and Marx's philosophy. Marx conceives nature/reality and human beings as dynamic and changing. He thinks that both of them can be explained within their interrelations in a dialectical process. In this sense, Hegel's philosophy has an important role in Marx's thought.

The importance of Hegel's philosophy depends on his conception of the unity of opposites. He explains this notion by arguing that if we can try to think about being we proceed to think nothing further. Being and nothing refers to each other and we cannot think them isolated from each other. By this way we come to the conception of becoming.²⁹⁸ The idea that being carries its other with itself is accepted as the main drive of Hegel's philosophy.²⁹⁹ The main drive of Hegel's dialectic: Everything carries its opposite in itself. The existence of something is dependent on its relation to what is other. The idea of "negation" gives an important power to Hegel's dialectical process, since it provides us with the very

²⁹⁷ Hegel, *The Philosophy of Right*, Preface, xxi.

²⁹⁸ Hegel, *The Science of Logic*, pp. 45-57.

²⁹⁹ Marcuse, *Reason and Revolution*, p. 35.

essence of dynamism, and this dynamism and the involvement of its opposite in the existence of something reflect the idea of a flourishing becoming.

Hegel explains the notions of Being, Nothing and Becoming within their interrelations. He infers a fourth concept from them, determinacy. Hegel claims that to think something as a pure Being means abstracting it from becoming. He says that Kantian “thing-in-itself” is an abstraction that we achieve in this way. Thing-in-itself is a consequence of to think something devoid of all determination, as nothing. Thus, Hegel argues that if we think and abstract something in this way, “it is of course impossible to know what the thing-in-itself is.” Furthermore Hegel states that;

for the question: what? demands that determinations be assigned; but since the things of which they are to be assigned at the same time supposed to be things-in-themselves, which means, in effect to be without any determination, the question is made thoughtlessly impossible to answer, or else only an absurd answer is given.³⁰⁰

Consequently, for Hegel, thing-in-itself is an empty abstraction.³⁰¹ It is a product of thought and the self’s reflection of itself. It is connected with the attempt of abstract all properties of something.

Hegel’s explanation of “thing-in-itself” reflects also his criticism of skepticism. He rejects the argument that we cannot know reality as it is in itself. For Hegel, there is no world as thing-in-itself. There is only “these interrelationships between being-in-itself and being-for other.” Moreover, Hegel states that “being-in-itself only discovers what it is in relation to being-for-other that evokes the properties of being-in-itself.”³⁰² In this way, Hegel rejects the abstraction of relation between mind and the world. He claims that mind discovers the world not as a different entity. In his process of discovering the world emerges in an interrelationship between the world and mind. Thus, the mind recognizes that

³⁰⁰ Hegel, *The Science of Logic*, p. 121.

³⁰¹ *Ibid*, p. 121.

³⁰² Hegel, *Encyclopedia of Philosophical Science*, &194.

the world is his other. Therefore, Hegel claims that if we try to think something as totally an abstraction we fail. For him, all our thoughts are united with historical reality. Thus, Hegel wants to portray things as a dynamic relationship with the world. Hegel tries to depict abstract concepts and concrete things in their interrelations. He does not want to abstract something in the process of thought.

This rejection of abstraction can be seen in Hegel's conception of essence also. He defines essence "which is Being coming into mediation with itself through the negativity of itself."³⁰³ It is "self-relatedness". "Only in so far it is relation to an Other – this Other however coming to view at first not as something which is, but as postulated and hypostatized."³⁰⁴ In this way, after explaining the relation of Being and essence, Hegel tries to explain that there is not difference between essence and appearance.

The Essence must appear of shine forth. Its shining or reflection it is this the suspension and translation of it to immediacy, which, while as reflection-into-self it is matter or subsistence, is also form, reflection-on-something else, a subsistence which sets itself aside. To show or shine is the characteristic by which essence is distinguished from Being – by which it is essence, and it is this show which, when it is developed, shows itself, and is Appearance. Essence is accordingly is not something beyond or behind appearance, but – just because it is the essence which exists- the existence is Appearance.³⁰⁵

From this perspective, Hegel defends that there is no difference between essence and appearance as Kant postulates. He puts forward the interrelationship between them and in this way he overcomes the Kantian skeptical implications concerning our knowledge of the "thing-in-itself" since for Hegel "search for essence" is possible. The realm of essences does refer any other realm which is unknowable.

The dialectical relationship between slave and master mirrors an important common point between Marx and Hegel. Marx adopts the argument that the labor process has a significant role in the process of the self-realization of wo/man. He

³⁰³ *Ibid*, & 112.

³⁰⁴ *Ibid*, & 112.

³⁰⁵ *Ibid*, & 131.

believes that during laboring wo/man transforms both her/him and nature. In this respect, practical life and laboring conditions construct the very existence of wo/man. Inspired by Hegel's philosophy, Marx explains the labor process and human beings in a way that they are not abstracted from each other. Furthermore, since the laboring process is connected with social relations, both Marx and Hegel emphasize the social character of laboring. In Hegel, the slave is more close to her/his realization, since s/he is in a relationship with nature and this practical activity provides her/him to be related to her/his opposite.³⁰⁶ This closeness is important for Marx in terms of his emphasis on the proletariat class for revolution and for the creation of communist society.

Both Marx and Hegel also realize that the recognition of the "other" is necessary for the subject's self-realization. Marx is highly influenced by Hegel's understanding of inter-subjective recognition. This point also provides Marx with a rich method of understanding human beings within the relations of laboring. Marx, like Hegel, tries to conceive people within all their physical, social, political and subjective relationships in order not to fall into the errors of abstract notions.

The recognition of the other within inter-subjective relationships enables Hegel and Marx to develop a conception of subjectivity which is more plausible than that of the Enlightenment thinkers. This viewpoint sees people within a larger and comprehensive perspective in terms of their relation to nature as well as each other. It also allows Hegel to improve a conception of freedom which is connected with the identity of the subject in all her/his relations and in the unity of her/his opposite.³⁰⁷ For Hegel, this unity with what is other than oneself means freedom. This notion of freedom drives Marx to improve the notion of his own conception of freedom in *The Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right* and *On the Jewish Question*. For Marx, similar to Hegel, freedom cannot be explained with the removal of physical restrictions on the subject, and we can be free only with the unity of ourselves with others in our self-realization.

³⁰⁶ Hegel, *Phenomenology, of Spirit*, pp. 62-89.

³⁰⁷ Hegel, *The Philosophy of Right*, & 7.

Related to this idea of relationality is Marx's critique of the modern subject. For Marx, human being is "no abstraction inherent in each single individual"; rather it is to be sought for in the array of different conditions, relations, inclinations and thoughts.³⁰⁸ This view, which is also shared by Nietzsche, drives Marx to investigate the realization process of human beings within a practical viewpoint. Like Hegel, Marx also develops an ideal society which does not involve a split between people and nature. Furthermore Marx's approach to history is influenced by Hegel's analyses on the slave and master, since he states that "the history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles".³⁰⁹ In short, the points which Marx takes from Hegel construct the vital points of Marx's philosophy.

However, Marx thinks that Hegel's dialectic needs a more empirical basis and a radical change. He believes that the dialectical structure of nature cannot be explained by means of the self-realization process of the spirit. He does not want to accept this metaphysical ground, and he thinks that if we want to actualize philosophy we must ground all the process on an empirical basis. Marx aims at achieving a dialectical method which "begins and ends with the concrete".³¹⁰ He says that he tries to remove the "mystifying side of Hegelian dialectic".³¹¹ He argues as follows;

My dialectic method is not only different from the Hegelian, but is its direct opposite. To Hegel, the life-process of the human brain, i.e. the process of thinking, which, under the name of "the Idea", he even transforms into an independent subject, is the demiurgos of the real world, and the real world is only the external, phenomenal world of "the Idea". With me, on the contrary, the ideal is nothing else than the material world reflected by the human mind, and translated into forms of thought.³¹²

³⁰⁸ Marx, *Theses on Feuerbach*, VI.

³⁰⁹ Marx, *Manifesto of the Communist Party*, p. 1.

³¹⁰ Resnick and Wolf, "Marxist Economy, The Critique of Economic Determinism", p. 43.

³¹¹ Marx, *Capital*, volume I, p. 14.

³¹² *Ibid*, p. 14

In order to remove the mystifying side of Hegel's philosophy, Marx adopts a praxis philosophy³¹³ which can resolve all the idealistic, absolutistic and abstract sides of traditional philosophy into their practical origins. To achieve this aim, he tries to speak to the practical problems of the 19th century's inhabitants. His theory is dependent upon his investigations of labor processes of people in the 19th century. In this respect, Marx claims that his economic theory is original, since it "proceeds from an actual economic fact".³¹⁴ Beginning from the actual labor conditions, Marx tries to achieve a theory which also "ends with the concrete". He actually wants to overturn the method of German idealism and claims that "in direct contrast to German philosophy which descends from heaven to earth, here we ascend from earth to heaven".³¹⁵ Thus, he wants to represent things "as they really are and happen".³¹⁶ Moreover, he claims that by this method, he can turn right side up Hegel's dialectic which "stands on its head".³¹⁷

Since Marx accepts laboring as the important part of wo/man's realization, he thinks that the change must begin from these conditions. The terrible working condition of capitalism in the 19th century which "comes into the world with a congenital blood-stain on one cheek"³¹⁸ is the main target of Marx's philosophy. Via investigating these conditions, Marx engages in existential analyses of wo/man and makes philosophy a practical activity. As well as the practical dimensions of his philosophy, his notion of ideology and critique of the recent epistemological, social, political and economic theories play a considerable role in his philosophy. To achieve a comprehensive understanding of Marx's difference

³¹³ In *The Philosophy of Marx*, Etienne Balibar claims that Marx transforms the practice of philosophy and his philosophy goes beyond the limit of an abstract theory, p. 11.

³¹⁴ Marx, *Economic-Philosophic Manuscripts 1844*, p. 75.

³¹⁵ Marx, *The German Ideology*, p. 42.

³¹⁶ *Ibid*, p. 55. See also Bertel Ollman's *Dance of Dialectic, Steps in Marx's Method*.

³¹⁷ Marx, *Capital*, Vol. I, p. 15.

³¹⁸ *Ibid*, p. 532, Marx takes this expression from the definition of Augier.

in the history of philosophy and his epistemology, we must analyze his conception of ideology also.

4.1.4 Marx's Criticism of Ideology

For Marx, "all science would be superfluous, if the appearance, the form, and the nature of things, were wholly identical".³¹⁹ His admittance of this difference can also be seen in his criticism of contemplative materialists. Marx criticizes previous materialists in *Theses on Feuerbach* because of their limited conception of the object.³²⁰ There is a difference in German between *Object* and *Gegenstand* which Marx emphasizes. *Object* has a simple, plain meaning which refers to material things, but *Gegenstand* has a subtlety which involves the practice of sensation and knowing. The latter means the object known and sensed. Thus, *Gegenstand* points to the sensuous human practice which contemplative materialists overlook. Marx even states that idealism fares better than materialism at this point, since it has a more complete conception which does not ignore praxis.

Marx finds the attitude of previous materialists before him crude, since they cannot be able to see the difference between appearance and essence. We can see the traces of his emphasis upon subjective contribution to knowledge at this point. David Hillel Ruben claims that Marx aims at a synthesis of idealism and materialism shared with Kant. He argues that both Kant and Marx want to keep two measures; the interpretative capacity of the subject and the independence of the object known.³²¹ This shared attitude is the reason which lies in the background of Marx's admittance of the difference between reality and appearance.

³¹⁹ Marx, *Capital*, vol. III, p. 327.

³²⁰ Marx, *Theses on Feuerbach*, VI. Thesis.

³²¹ Ruben, *Marxism and Materialism*, p. 89.

However, in contrast to Kant, Marx does not think that the difference between appearance and reality is the cause of two different worlds. He claims that if we treat this problem in this way, we will have remained at an abstract and philosophical level. Indeed Marx argues that the actual solution lies in uncovering the material bases of the relations between the appearances and reality. This point also reflects the influence of Hegel in his thought. Thus, he sees this difference as the hidden and apparent part of the same reality³²² and tries to analyze it as a social problem. This analysis reflects also his investigations on the conception of “ideology”.

Marx accepts that the difference between appearance and reality is not a consequence of the misleading position of the subject or observer either. In fact, he perceives the difference between the apparent and the real as a social problem which is exacerbated by capitalist relations.³²³ Marx does not blame the cognitive apparatus and perceptual limitations of observers for the apparent and illusory façades of reality; rather, for him, they belong to reality itself. Depending on his conception of dialectic, Marx accepts that the apparent part of social reality is also a feature of the same reality.

Marx’s conception of ideology concerns the construction of a social reality which is imposed upon the members of society. Engels argues that ideology is the creation of a “false consciousness” and both the thinkers who produce it and the people who are exposed to it are oblivious to the actual dynamics behind its production.³²⁴

Marx’s investigation of ideology reflects the influence of Hegel’s dialectics on his philosophy. He adopts this investigation as a science. He tries to dissolve the ideology of capitalism by means of a scientific investigation. Hegel’s influence

³²² Ruben, *Marxism and Materialism*, p. 129.

³²³ See Ruben’s *Marxism and Materialism*, Karl Korsch’s *Marxism and its Philosophy* and Norman Geras’s *Essence and Appearance: Aspects of Fetishism in Marx’s Capitalism*.

³²⁴ Engels, *Letter to Franz Mehring*, p. 15.

on his thought engages in here again. Depending on his rejection of Kant's distinction between appearance and thing-in-itself, Hegel claims that the search for the truth of Being "penetrates further assuming that behind this Being itself, and that this background constitutes the truth of Being."³²⁵ Like Hegel Marx believes that "the search for essence, the attempt to understand the whole, the hidden inner connection of the parts, the 'obscure structure' is science. It is "on of the task of science to reduce the visible and merely apparent movement to the actual inner movement". Thus, Hegel's search for essence is compatible with Marx's "works of science".³²⁶ Thus, Marx does not treat reality as abstract conception. He tries to dissolve it into social relations. He, as a scientist, wants to dissolve the capitalist ideology. In this way, he also tries to dissolve the relationship between appearance and reality.

Marx's critique of ideology has two dimensions, one epistemological, the other economical. The first point is that Marx tries to turn the traditional relationship between theory and practice, or consciousness and our activities upside down. The second account of ideology concerns the relation between the ruling class and the proletariat. Thus Marx tries to unmask ideology by analyzing the nature of consciousness and in terms of economic relations. To analyze Marx's conception of ideology is important for my Underground Wo/man since this conception gives us a new angle from which to observe and explain the distorted and inverted relationship of the Underground Wo/man with the illusory image of her/his society and reality. I believe that this analysis can be an epistemological ground for Marx's Underground Wo/man.

³²⁵ Hegel, *The Science of Logic*, & 121.

³²⁶ Lebowitz, Michael, *Following Marx*, p. 71.

4.1.4.1 Marx's Attitude towards Consciousness

One of the auxiliary ideas of my thesis is that there is a tendency in the 19th century to overturn and change the traditional, misleading and static conception of consciousness. I have explained that in contrast to Kant, the other thinkers of my thesis criticize the exaggerated conception of consciousness. Nietzsche and Dostoevsky think that this conception of 'conscious wo/man' in the 19th century misguides us in explaining practical lives, thoughts and problems of the people in this century. I also mentioned William James's conception of consciousness which executes a pragmatic defense of this new conception.

This new conception of consciousness does not present consciousness as a commander and controller which precedes all our thoughts and behaviors. Nietzsche, Dostoevsky and James want to explain the role of consciousness in relational terms. Consciousness is not a stagnant entity in their theories. It has a role in our knowledge, but this role is not that of producing ideas by itself.

The 19th century emphasizes the influences of our practical, social and political relations on our consciousness. The thinkers of this century ascertain a mutual relationship between consciousness and social relations. In connection with this emphasis, there is a tendency towards naturalism in explaining the employments of consciousness. Marx is a follower of this attitude. He criticizes Hegel because he does not want to attribute a preceding role to consciousness and puts forth the empirical bases of consciousness and the influence of external relations on it. He is against the idea that our consciousness produces ideas by itself and he defends the opposite argument. He argues as follows:

The production of ideas, of conceptions, and of consciousness, is at first directly interwoven with the material activity and material intercourse of men, the language of real life. Conceiving, thinking the mental intercourse of men, appear at this stage as the direct efflux of their material behavior.³²⁷

³²⁷ Marx, *The German Ideology*, p. 47.

Although he criticizes Hegel, Marx is nevertheless influenced by the conception of consciousness involved in Hegel's dialectic. He is the follower of the idea that the thing which consciousness is directed at constitutes the content of consciousness.³²⁸ This viewpoint leads Marx also to develop a naturalistic explanation for consciousness. He emphasizes the role of natural and material causes and events in the bases of our ideas and thoughts and tries to dissolve the abstract employments of consciousness into the practical roots.³²⁹

On the other hand, Marx does not argue that our thoughts and acts can be explained in a totally mechanistic way. In other words, he also wants to emphasize the autonomous aspect of the human being. These two purposes cause a problem in Marx's explanation of consciousness. He has a difficulty concerning the role of subjectivity. This difficulty cannot be attributed only to Marx's philosophy. We can see the different implications of this problem in Nietzsche, Dostoevsky and also William James. In James there is a tension between two modes of consciousness one of which is active and the other passive.³³⁰ The discrepancy between structure and agency is a different version of the same problem. I will discuss the different interpretations of Marx regarding this issue in the last part of this chapter. At the present time, I want to state that this problem is significant especially in the 19th century. My conception of Underground Wo/man especially originates from this observation I think that the three thinkers of my thesis, Nietzsche, Marx and Dostoevsky, perceive that in the 19th century there is a misleading consequence of idealism. This consequence is the abstract conception of 'modern wo/man'. Marx, Nietzsche and Dostoevsky criticize this tendency to abstraction and claim that this tendency veils the concrete, real wo/man of the 19th century. However the Underground Wo/man in their thoughts also has a problem with her/his consciousness. On the one hand, s/he wants to be active and free, and on the other hand, s/he is tired of the idea of 'being conscious', as I mentioned in

³²⁸ Stumpf and Abel, *The Elements of Philosophy*, p.133.

³²⁹ This is the general purpose of *The German Ideology*.

³³⁰ Yılmaz, Zeliha Burcu, "How Does Consciousness Exist?"

the third chapter. Marx's Underground Wo/man also carries this problem. We can see the traces of this problem in Marx's conception of "human consciousness".

Marx considers both the animal aspects of human consciousness and the other aspects which reflect the species being of wo/man. He does not want to reduce all the thoughts of people into material needs and causes, since he wants to make room for the purposive character of wo/man and her/his species being. In the *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844*, he wrote as follows;

Man is directly a natural being. As a natural being and as a living natural being, he is on the one hand endowed with natural powers – he is an active natural being. These forces exist in him as tendencies and abilities – as instincts. On the other hand, as a natural, corporeal, sensuous objective being, he is a suffering, conditioned and limited creature, like animals and plants. That is to say, the objects of his instincts exist outside him, as objects independent of him; yet these objects are objects that he needs – essential objects, indispensable to the manifestation and confirmation of his essential powers.³³¹

In a similar way, in the *Grundrisse* Marx claims that man is the whole of its instincts, desires, needs "which exerts a force upon"³³² us. In this quotation, Marx displays his naturalistic tendency and the passive and restricted nature of human beings. This point brings wo/man closer to animals. However, he tries to impute a different conception of consciousness to people from animal consciousness also. In *The German Ideology*, he argues that as follows;

Men can be distinguished from animals by consciousness, by religion and anything else you like. They themselves begin to distinguish themselves from animals as soon as they begin to produce their means of subsistence, a step which is conditioned by their physical organization.³³³

Yet, there arises a difficulty in this definition, since animals also produce and they also influence their environment. Marx does not ignore this notion and in the following section of *The German Ideology* he states that;

³³¹ Marx, *Economic-Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844*, p. 42.

³³² Marx, *Grundrisse*, p. 201.

³³³ Marx, *The German Ideology*, p. 42.

It is true that animals also produce. They build nests and dwellings, like the bee, beaver, the ant etc. But they produce only their own immediate needs, or those of their young; they produce only when immediate physical need compels them to do so, while man produce even when he is free from physical need and truly produces only in freedom from such need; they produce only themselves, while man reproduces the whole of nature; their products belong immediately to their physical bodies, while man freely confronts his own product. Animal produce only according to the standards, of every species and of applying to each object to inherent standard; hence, man also produces in accordance with the laws of beauty.³³⁴

Marx states that to produce freely and according to laws of beauty determines wo/man's difference from animals in this passage from *The Economic Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844*. In the same work, he also states that while "animal is immediately one with its life activity", "man makes his life-activity itself an object of his will and consciousness."³³⁵ Marx claims that wo/man's mode of production is her/his main difference from animals in this passage from *Capital*. He argues that as follows;

A spider conducts operations that resemble those of a weaver, and a bee puts to shame many an architect in the construction of her cells. But what distinguishes the worst architect from the best of bees is this, that the architect raises his structure in imagination before he erects it in reality. At the end of every labor-process, we get a result that already existed in the imagination of the laborer at its commencement. He not only effects a change of form in the material on which he works, but he also realizes a purpose of his own that gives the law to his *modus operandi*, and to which he must subordinate his will. And this subordination is no mere momentary act.³³⁶

The difference between animal and human consciousness is connected with the wo/man's capacity for imagination, yet Marx does not ignore the rationality of animals and their imagination. He actually emphasizes that our productions reflect our intentions and images instead of the instinct of animals. This problem does not have an actual solution in Marx. It is also transformed into the question of "how much wo/man can make her/his history?" He explains his argument concerning

³³⁴ Marx, *Economic Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844*, p. 82.

³³⁵ Marx, *The German Ideology*, p. 75.

³³⁶ Marx, *Capital I*, p. 124.

the agency of people in a famous quote from *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte*; “men make their own history, but they do not make it as they please; they do not make it under self-selected circumstances, but under circumstances existing already, given and transmitted from the past.”³³⁷

Marx objects to a conception of agent who can determine her/his acts and thoughts by her/himself independently of outer relations in conjunction with his attitude towards consciousness. He always emphasizes that our ideas are “interwoven with material activity” and social relations. For him we cannot isolate “a wholly free agency” from these interwoven relations. His transformation of philosophy into praxis enters the picture here and he tries to melt the abstract image of the activities of our consciousness by an emphasis on actual life and active wo/man. He identifies consciousness and actual life-process as follows in *The German Ideology* as follows;

Men are the producers of their conceptions, ideas etc. – real, active men, as they are conditioned by a definite development of their productive forces and of the intercourse corresponding to these, up to its furthest forms. Consciousness can never be anything else than conscious existence, and the existence of men is their actual life-process.³³⁸

Marx’s conception of “real, active men” projects his emphasis on the influence of material conditions on our ideologies. He discusses morality, religion and metaphysics as the constituents of ideology and as forms of consciousness. He claims that these are not constructed by the conscious activities of free agents, and this point reveals the role his conception of consciousness plays in his criticism of ideology. Marx focuses on the fact that all of them affect our life and “life is not determined by consciousness, but consciousness by life”.³³⁹

In this respect, Marx presents his theory as different from a philosophical theory. He sees all philosophical theories as “empty talk” so long as they are practiced in abstraction from the material and historical conditions in which they

³³⁷ Marx, *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte*, p. 5.

³³⁸ Marx, *The German Ideology*, p. 45.

³³⁹ *Ibid*, p. 46.

are produced. They cannot explain the real, active wo/man, since they have no perspective which enables them to look behind the illusion of ideology. Marx thinks that traditional philosophical theories cannot explain the role of ideology in our life. This is the point where he transforms philosophy into praxis. Even though Hegel took the initial step in this transformation by showing the interdependence of theory and practice, it is only with Marx that the real gap between theory and practice is closed by looking at theory from the point of view of practical life and not vice versa. This is the radical aspect of his philosophy and he defends his standpoint by arguing that; “philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways: the point is to change it.”³⁴⁰

Consequently, Marx emphasizes the role of ideology in our practical life and in shaping our thoughts. He conceives ideology a misleading social reality which is constructed by the thinkers whose thought processes remain oblivious to the real conditions in which they are exercised. He criticizes these thinkers for their ignorance of ideology. Marx argues that ideology creates an illusionary conception of social reality, and although ordinary members of society can see this paradoxical aspect of ideology, these thinkers cannot understand this. Marx claims that as follows;

Whilst in ordinary life every shopkeeper is very well able to distinguish between what somebody professes to be and what he really is, our historians have not yet won even this trivial insight. They take every epoch as it word and believe that everything it says and imagines about itself is true.³⁴¹

In this section I tried to explain Marx’s criticism of ideology in terms of his conception of consciousness. Marx takes the traditional conception of consciousness as symptomatic of the illusion of ideology. He emphasizes the influence of material relations on our self-awareness. He wants to bring the relations between consciousness and our life as the actual important question on the scene. His arguments on consciousness are also connected with his conception

³⁴⁰ Marx-Engels *Selected Works*, vol. I, pp. 13-15, (*Theses on Feuerbach*, XI).

³⁴¹ Marx, *The German Ideology*, p. 64.

of species self and the problem concerning freedom of people. I will consider these issues in the final section of this chapter, when I will complete Marx's conception of human being and human nature. Consciousness refers to wo/man's self-awareness. Marx deals with especially wo/man's political and social awareness. His conception of consciousness is mostly a political consciousness. Thus, the question of ideology gets engaged when he deals with consciousness. He gives a political and economic account of ideology in terms of the relation between infrastructure and superstructure of our society and the ruling class. Now, to complete Marx's epistemological arguments in terms of ideology I will explore Marx's criticism of ideology from the perspective of the ruling class.

4.1.4.2 Ideology of the Ruling Class

Marx argues that "the ideas of the ruling class of society are in every epoch the ruling ideas" and the ruling class is the class "which is the ruling material source of the society, is at the same time its ruling intellectual force".³⁴² Marx separates all hitherto existing societies into two classes: the ruling class and the ruled class. For him, modern capitalist society involves the proletariat and bourgeois class. The main separation point between them is ownership of the means of production. According to Marx, "ruling ideas are nothing more than the ideal expression of the dominant material relationships."³⁴³ In other words, the dominant ideas in a certain society are fostered by the ruling class to protect their interests. Marx tries to expose the practical roots of the ruling class in order to decipher bourgeois ideology.

Marx argues that German idealism and even the Young Hegelians transform material relationships into 'pure' ideas; he tries to dissolve these ideas into their material roots again. He wants to show that the former attitude helps the bourgeois and ruling class as it prevents us from seeing that bourgeois ideology

³⁴² *Ibid*, p. 75.

³⁴³ *Ibid*, p. 82.

serves to reinforce the capitalist mode of production. Consequently, his main emphasis is that: Ideology is created, defended and reproduced by this class for the sake of their own interests.

I have stated that Marx's emphasis on praxis brings his conception of consciousness close to a 'political awareness' and 'political consciousness'. He perceives consciousness as a consequence of political and economical relations. The ideology of the ruling class justifies the inequalities in a society and transforms subordination and inequality into truths and ideas. Ideologies lead wo/man to think that these truths are ultimate and eternal. The subordinated wo/man accepts her/his situation as the only truth and does not criticize it. In this way, the workers acknowledge the hegemony of the capitalists. Thus, the ruled class is also influenced by ideology and for this reason Marx calls their political consciousness "false consciousness".³⁴⁴ Therefore, false consciousness of the proletariat class also helps in producing bourgeoisie ideology unconsciously.

Marx's critique of bourgeois ideology, which stems from and details his philosophy of praxis, is connected with his criticism of the capitalist mode of production. He claims that old types of society before capitalism were simpler and more transparent since in these societies the products of labor did not have imaginary forms.³⁴⁵ In capitalist society the products of labor appear suddenly in front of the producers having imaginary and inverted forms as commodities. These forms of bourgeois ideology mask the contradictions which occur in material relationships. Marx's distancing himself from the Young Hegelians and German idealist philosophy gains meaning at this point since he tries to analyze these material relationships around the notions of commodity, exploitation, alienation and fetishism.

Marx thinks that capitalist society is more complicated than previous societies in terms of the inverted consciousness of economical relations. He

³⁴⁴ *Ibid*, p. 48.

³⁴⁵ Marx, *Capital*, vol. I, p. 51.

believes that if we can bring out the paradoxes of this society and the capitalist mode of production around the notions mentioned above we can expose the mysteries of this system. In this way, we can also put forward the reasons that drive people to distort their relation between the nature and themselves depending on the inverted conditions of their laboring process. The reasons that drive people to distort their relation to nature and themselves are also the reasons which create the false consciousness of the ruled class. Thus, taking into consideration Marx's analysis of the capitalist mode of production, we can make explicit his criticism of ideology.

Depending on a passage from *The German Ideology*, I will try to explain the connection of Marx's views on political consciousness and the economical mode of production. Marx claims that wo/man possesses consciousness, but not a pure consciousness. He states that from the start, our consciousness "is afflicted with the curse of being "burdened" with matter, which here makes its appearance in the form of agitated layers of air, sounds, in short of language". Moreover he continues by emphasizing that language and consciousness develop through social relations. For him, language and consciousness, "arises from the need, the necessity, of intercourse with other men". Thus, Marx accepts that human consciousness "from the very beginning a social product, and remains as long as men exist at all."³⁴⁶

Marx continues his analysis by arguing that human consciousness "receives its further development and extension through increased productivity, the increase of need, and, what is fundamental to both of these, the increase of population."³⁴⁷ Especially after the division of mental and material labor, he argues, human consciousness gets "in a position to emancipate itself from the world and to proceed to the formation of "pure" theory, theology, philosophy,

³⁴⁶ Marx, *The German Ideology*, p. 45.

³⁴⁷ *Ibid*, p. 46.

ethics, etc.”³⁴⁸ His criticism of German ideology and the tendency of abstract notions begin here.

Marx says that after this formation of pure theory, our consciousness may “have come into contradiction with the existing relations,” and this contradiction “can only occur because existing social relations have come into contradiction with existing force of production.”³⁴⁹ He makes a connection between the exalted version of human consciousness and our ‘pure’ ideas and thoughts. He emphasizes the contradiction between these pure concepts and existing social relations. In the end he argues that the actual contradiction originates from inconsistency between the pure concepts and existing forces of production.

This long passage which I have tried to analyze demonstrates that Marx deals with an epistemological problem in connection with practical conditions. This problem is connected with a contradiction between abstract and pure notions which we use in explaining people and society and the real existing conditions. Marx tries to find the origins of this problem in the development of division of mental and material labor. Thus, his criticism of idealism and especially German ideology is dependent on a practical root. By this explanation he transforms an epistemological problem into a practical issue. It is a naturalistic and materialistic attempt to make a connection between pure thoughts and division of labor. Marx’s attitude at this point is criticized for being dependent on a naïve realism and empiricism which cannot be defended.³⁵⁰ I think that it is difficult to defend and justify his materialism on this passage, because the problem of pure and abstract thoughts needs more explanation apart from division of labor. However, it is important that ideology also dominates mental labor. The ruled class in capitalism

³⁴⁸ *Ibid*, p. 46.

³⁴⁹ *Ibid*, p. 47.

³⁵⁰ Rosebarry, “Marx and Anthropology”, p. 30.

is dragged towards material labor, and their relation to dominant ideas is also restricted.³⁵¹

To reveal the discrepancy between economic reality and ideology, Marx also criticizes the attitude of treating people as isolated individuals. In *Grundrisse*, he argues that the economists and thinkers of the 18th century write Robinsonades which depict isolated hunters and fishermen.³⁵² In doing so, their theories hide the material conditions and relations –for example that capital is a social product, that it is accumulated through exploitation and not hard work, and so on. Marx wants to overturn this approach. He wants to scratch out the material contradictions of capitalist society and the gist of his praxis philosophy lies in this point. I will try to find an Underground Wo/man in the tunnels that he opens in the second part of this chapter.

Furthermore, Marx tries to rupture the restrictive perspective that ideology sets by presenting itself as the ultimate reality and truth. He states that the interests of ruling class are naturalized by the thinkers who represent the bourgeoisie in order to impose their ideas as the only truths. This naturalization is made by isolating people as they are depicted in certain images that are formed of them. As mentioned before, for him, the economy politics of the 18th century treats people as imagined people isolated from themselves and material conditions, like Robinson. Thus, these images of people are transformed into eternal truths by the help of ideology. On the other hand, Marx claims that he tries to replace “an imagined activity of imagined subjects”³⁵³ by his analysis of real and active wo/man. He aims at finishing speculations which are for the sake of ruling class,

³⁵¹ For a good analysis of this situation Althusser’s “Ideology and Ideological State Apparatus” in *Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays* is a well-known source. However I want to state that I do not think that Althusser’s approach to Marx is not compatible with Marx’s main purposes. From the opposite of perspective Althusser, I believe that Marx can be understood with his emphasis upon wo/man’s humanistic properties in a more profound way. I will discuss Althusser’s and his critics’ approaches in the last section of this chapter.

³⁵² Marx, *Grundrisse*, p. 21.

³⁵³ Ibid, *The German Ideology*, p. 46.

and initiating a new science to remove the illusionary aspects of bourgeoisie ideology;

Where speculation ends –in real life- there real, positive science begins: the representation of the practical activity, of the practical process of development of men. Empty talks about consciousness ceases, and real knowledge has to take its place. When reality is depicted, philosophy as an independent branch of knowledge loses its medium of existence....Viewed apart from real history; these abstractions have in themselves no value whatsoever. They can only serve to facilitate the arrangement of historical material, to indicate the sequence of its spate strata.³⁵⁴

In “Karl Marx’s Critique of Modernity”, Christopher Paul Graves summarizes the meaning of ideology in Marx’s thought and it will be good to complete this section with this quotation. He argues as follows:

Ideology, then for Marx has multiple dimensions. Broadly speaking it refers to the ruling ideas determined and produced by the bourgeoisie. More specifically it refers to a picture of a subject abstracted from history, isolated from others, detached from bodily life and reduced to a thinking thing. Although these ideas present themselves as lacking a socio-politico-economic dimension, positing themselves as natural and eternal, this for Marx is nothing more than another effect of ideology. Indeed, by positing themselves in this way, they naturalize ideas as well as conditions of existence which are historically determined. In this way, ideology, for Marx mystifies consciousness, preventing the worker from attaining consciousness of her historical situation. Because of this, Marxism can with justice be thought of as demystification, or as providing the means by which the worker can become conscious of herself.³⁵⁵

The unshackling of the fulcrums of bourgeois ideology exposes Marx’s Underground Wo/man. This wo/man is born from the contradictions of the capitalist mode of production. Now I will try to explain Marx’s demystification of the capitalist mode of production to demonstrate the emergence of his Underground Wo/man and to provide a background against which this wo/man can become conscious of her/himself. I believe that Marx’s analysis of the capitalist system in terms of the notions of the capitalist mode of production and

³⁵⁴ *Ibid*, p. 46.

³⁵⁵ Christopher Graves, “Karl Marx’s Critique of Modernity through his Understanding Ideology”, p. 14.

especially alienation will constitute the main brush strokes for an accurate portrayal of the Underground Wo/man.

4.2 MARX'S UNDERGROUND WO/MAN

I have explained Marx's epistemology in terms of his emphasis on praxis philosophy and his arguments on ideology. His epistemology establishes the basis for the portrayal of his Underground Wo/man. Marx criticizes philosophers and political economists of his century mainly for their ignorance of social relations and the practical roots behind the ideas of political economy. He also criticizes them for their tendency towards abstract terms. While investigating the social relations behind these ideas, he aims at turning philosophy into a practical exercise.

As a result of Marx's examinations of social and economical relations, we can find an Underground Wo/man who cannot be explained by the arguments of the 18th century's political economists and philosophers. In this part of my thesis, I will reveal this wo/man within the conditions of capitalist economy. Marx's Underground Wo/man is an important part of my treatise since I think that Marx's criticism leads us to a more profound solution to the main problem of this thesis. This main problem is the attempt of explaining people of the 19th century without falling back on abstract terms. I will discuss how Marx struggles with this problem in this section.

My conception of the Underground Wo/man does not correspond only to the workers since my chief emphasis will be on the point that Marx goes beyond the problem of abstraction. Although the worker and Underground Wo/man have many similarities I think that to portray the Underground Wo/man in a larger context will be more appropriate to my purpose. In addition, by 'Underground Wo/man', I do not mean a worker who has class consciousness, instead I intend a wo/man who begins to become aware of the contradictions of the capitalist system and whose plight cannot be explained by the extant theories. Thus, I believe that

Marx's praxis philosophy gives us the most appropriate context for explaining my conception of the Underground Wo/man.

The first and fundamental soil on which the Underground Wo/man burgeons can only be properly understood with Marx's conception of laboring. I have stated that Marx conceives the labor process as the main means of realizing our existence. By laboring we transform both nature and ourselves. Thus, laboring constitutes the very nature of us. Our conditions of laboring are also the basis which establishes our way of relating to nature. The realization of human existence, laboring and human's relation to nature are intertwined in Marx's philosophy. In this sense, Marx's Underground Wo/man first comes on the scene in the struggle for production.

Before we enter into the workshop in which Marx's Underground Wo/man dwells, we are confronted with a signboard: "No admittance except on business". Marx emphasizes that this is the point where we leave behind the sphere which he calls the "Eden of the innate rights of the man."³⁵⁶ These rights are freedom, equality and property. In contrast to the picture painted by the bourgeois ideology of rights, in the actual work place to which there is "no admittance except on business," we find no freedom, equality or property for the worker but oppression, exploitation, alienation.

Marx probes the idea of freedom, and he explains the appearance of freedom on the surface of capitalism in this way: "Both buyer and seller of a commodity, say of labor-power, are constrained only by their own free will. They contract as free agents, and the agreement they come to, is but the form in which they give legal expression to their common will".³⁵⁷ As we have seen before, the modern idea of freedom is one of the main causes of the self-alienated and self-conflicting state of mind the modern wo/man in capitalist society finds her/himself in.

³⁵⁶ Marx, *Capital*, vol. I, p. 121.

³⁵⁷ *Ibid*, p. 121.

Like Nietzsche, Marx also embarks on criticizing the values of modernity which are the heritage of the Enlightenment and calls attention to the hypocritical nature of the reality underlying their production. Both Marx and Nietzsche perceive that the modern conception of free will both leads to and masks a form of submission. With a difference from Nietzsche, Marx's criticism is primarily dependent on economical relations. While Nietzsche focuses on the values of the Judeo-Christian tradition (as embodied in Kantian morality) as a form of submission, Marx focuses on how liberal ideology enslaves the proletarian class.

Marx emphasizes that, on the surface, the proletarian is "free" to sell her/his labor power, but capitalist economy as the free market economy inverts the thing s/he sells. This is a critical point of capitalism, since outside the workshop the worker is not conscious of what s/he sells. S/he is not aware that s/he sells her/himself when s/he sells her/his labor power. Her/his labor power becomes a commodity in the service of the capitalists who are "moneybags". In this way, the worker produces her/his deadly working conditions which become an enemy of her/his actual life.

In Marx's workshop, the Underground Wo/man begins to become aware of the reality underlying the doctrine of the capitalist system; however s/he does not know the actual reasons of her/his situation yet. S/he begins to become aware that nothing is the same underground as it appears on the surface. S/he tries to open up her/his mind to the contradictions in this system. In this way, s/he also takes a step towards the exercise of fulfilling her/his existence, since for Marx we cannot be in a unity with ourselves without analyzing and being conscious of our labor conditions. In this respect, capitalist labor conditions turn out to be the main obstacles in becoming who we are.

The question of how we become ourselves turns out to be a problem related to our economic and social relations in Marx. He calls attention to the fact that without analyzing these relations and the main reasons behind our working conditions we cannot have the awareness of our actual situation. He claims that

without being conscious of what we work for, we cannot be close to ourselves and nature. The workers can know their “moneybags” and “employers”, but they may not be aware that their only function in the capitalist mode of production is to create surplus-value for the sake of capital. This situation distorts their relation to themselves, humanity and nature. It endangers the unity of themselves. Now it is time to explain how the capitalist mode of production distorts the unity of people.

4.2.1 The Key Points of the Capitalist Mode of Production

Marx’s Underground wo/man has an epistemological problem, but this problem is mostly a practical problem also. I think that the practical aspect of epistemology is emphasized by Marx. In his explanation of capitalism, we can see the traces of combining epistemology with the practical realm. Thus, this attempt is engaged in here. The Underground Wo/man has a practical epistemological problem: In the long hours of laboring s/he begins to become conscious that everything continues in a way opposed to what s/he has been taught before. S/he finds out that there are contradictions between the apparent forms of production and her/his actual life. Her/his main paradox is the fact that s/he does not work for her/himself, indeed s/he does not know what s/he works for. Marx’s persistent emphasis is on the contradictions in and the gravity of her/his laboring conditions and this reflects his purpose of taking the real wo/man and concrete problems into the philosophical scene.

To clear the way for his criticism of capitalist production and remove the idealist mask of this system, I will summarize briefly Marx’s distinction between use-value and exchange-value and the concept of surplus value, which are the indispensable notions of the capitalist system. By means of analyzing and elaborating them, Marx tries to reduce and overturn the manifestation of the capitalist system into the practical and material relations.

In the capitalist mode of production, production is engaged in only for increasing the capital. It is assumed that capital is both the source and aim of

production. In this sense, production and labor are not carried out for the sake of humans. This situation brings up a contradictory aspect of capitalism. Marx claims that the fact that both the genesis and endpoint of production is for the sake of capital causes a contradiction in the capitalist system. Production and means of production do not serve human's subsistence. Capital justifies itself by means of itself, and this is the difficult and paradoxical point of capitalist production.³⁵⁸

For Marx, the relations of production, circulation, distribution, in short, all economical relations are also social issues. We cannot understand them without understanding their social and human context. Therefore, we are confronted with a problem at the beginning when we try to analyze the capitalist mode of production. This problem involves a self-contradiction since it makes a social issue subject to only one thing, capital. While production must be subject to human life and human subsistence, capital becomes the main reason for production, and this causes a problem concerning the relation between humans and the process of production.

As I mentioned before, in *Grundrisse: A Contribution to the Critique of Economy Politics*, Marx criticizes the approach of the thinkers of the 18th century. He claims that they investigate the economic conditions by isolating specific terms and people from the production process.³⁵⁹ They isolate people by defining them with definite and limitless needs and interests and they isolate the terms of 'capital' and 'capitalist mode of production' as if they are indispensable and ultimate truths for humanity. These 'truths' are "production is made for consumption" and "human needs are limitless". Marx emphasizes that they hide the anti-humanitarian and self-contradictory aspect of capitalist system. In his *Underground Wo/man* these aspects of capitalism begins to make themselves felt.

Actually, Marx claims that capitalist production does not continue according to the needs of individuals, rather it only aims at improving itself. This

³⁵⁸ Marx, *Capital III*, p. 245.

³⁵⁹ Marx, *Grundrisse*, p. 18.

aim transcends the purposes of workers and even capitalists who have money and the means of productions. In this sense human contribution and interference are limited in the capitalist system. It becomes a system which is uncontrollable³⁶⁰ and complex³⁶¹. Marx's Underground Wo/man is someone who finds her/himself in the network of uncontrollable and complex relations of capitalism. S/he begins to recognize that nothing is under her/his control. Her/his actual needs and purposes are lost in the supremacy of capitalism.

Presenting a certain definition and a general argument of something always runs the risk of overlooking details. This concerns a problem of abstraction which is one of the main issues that my thesis has been occupied with. In this sense, Marx's own arguments on the relations of production, and the solutions he offers under the name of communist society, may also confront the problem of abstraction. In other words, his criticism of the 18th century's economy politics involves an important difficulty which can be attributed to Marx as well. We confront the problem of abstract notions when we try to achieve a general argument or concept concerning something. The conception of species-being and his idea of communist society are the main issues for which Marx is criticized. The main criticism is held by Max Stirner³⁶² who is a Young Hegelian; I will try to explain these criticisms in the last part of this chapter.

However, in criticizing 18th century's political economists, Marx states that the difference of his perspective in investigating economic relations rests on laying bare the social causes behind the apparent arguments of 18th century's economists. For this reason, he inquires into the background conditions of the capitalist mode of production which have not been discussed up to his time. In order to not fall

³⁶⁰ In *Grundrisse* Marx claims that the conditions of capitalist production are external the capital and they are uncontrollable and external because of the opposition between money and commodity, p. 369.

³⁶¹ In the first volume of the *Capital*, Marx emphasizes that the previous mode of production is more simple and plain than capitalism, since they are dependent on a simple Exchange between money and stuffs. They do not involve surplus value and the purpose of excessive production.

³⁶² Stirner Max, *The Ego and its Own*, and David McLellan's *Stirner, Feuerbach, Marx and the Young Hegelians* is a profound source which we can find the critics of Karl Marx on this issue.

into the error of abstract notions, Marx attempts to explain the basic notions of the capitalist mode of production as elements of the same process.³⁶³ He does not want to isolate one of them. For instance, Marx perceives capital and labor as different aspect of the same thing. To accept them as a process and to emphasize their transformation between each other supports Marx's praxis philosophy since in this way he tries to remove the need to refer abstract notions. This point also characterizes his difference from the 18th century's economy politics.

Marx believes that economy politics and philosophers of the 18th and 19th centuries are in need of a deep analysis. It is because, as I have explained in the section concerning ideology, the mottos of capitalist economy are accepted as ultimate truths in his time and the social relations behind them are not investigated yet. He wants to underline the empirical and social roots of capitalism. This is the main drive of Marx's economic investigations. As he digs into the social and human causes and relations, we confront an Underground Wo/man in his analyses, who is not put forward and is even concealed by capitalist economy. In this sense, his claim that capitalist economy serves not the people but only capital itself is vindicated.

After this statement, Marx presents important characteristics of this system: in the capitalist mode of production it is not labor which is sold directly but labor power. Marx defines labor power as "the aggregate of those mental and physical capacities existing in a human being, whom he exercises whenever he produces a use-value of any description".³⁶⁴ The mental and physical capacities that are employed in the labor practices are the preconditions of our existence as mentioned before. In capitalism the workers do not sell only their concrete labor at a definite time, but they sell all their laboring power, which is the main constituent of their existence. Marx's Underground Wo/man begins to question what s/he sells and what s/he lost originally. S/he begins to become aware that s/he does not simply exchange the product of her/his labor for money.

³⁶³ Marx, *Grundrisse*, p. 304.

³⁶⁴ Marx, *Capital I*, p. 117.

The exchange between wage and labor power brings out derivative consequences at the same time. Surplus-value is one of these consequences. Because the exchange is not between labor and money, but rather between labor power and money, there arises a surplus-value in this process. The surplus-value is the consequence of the difference between the wage paid for labor power and the value produced by living labor.³⁶⁵ This difference is the main origin of surplus-value and the hidden characteristic of capitalist economy: The labor power of the workers creates a surplus-value and the “moneybags” levy it.

The surplus-value belongs to the capitalist and the actual interest of capital and the “moneybags” is surplus-value.³⁶⁶ To increase the surplus-value capitalism compels people to hard and long working hours. The proportion of surplus-value demonstrates the proportion of exploitation.³⁶⁷ The necessity of creating surplus-value and the dependence of the owners of the money on this necessity leads to harmful consequences for the lives of workers and for their existence. The Underground Wo/man is the residue of this harmful exploitation.

The transformation of labor and labor power into commodities is another characteristic of the capitalist system which Marx emphasizes. Indeed capitalism tries to turn everything into a commodity. It looks for the conditions for creating surplus-value from everything. According to Marx, the definition of commodity entails two points: it satisfies a want and it can be exchanged; in accordance with these two points, it has a use-value and an exchange-value. For Marx there is nothing enigmatic about use-value. However, a mystification begins to emerge with exchange-value in the sense that it begins to veil the fact that the value of the commodity is actually determined by social relations.³⁶⁸

³⁶⁵ Marx, *Grundrisse*, p. 129.

³⁶⁶ *Ibid*, p. 310.

³⁶⁷ *Ibid*, p. 217.

³⁶⁸ *Ibid*, p. 77.

Commodity is a real entity as much as a material stuff which we can buy anywhere. However, its mystical and incomprehensible content arises from the fact that its exchange-value is determined by social and economic relations in capitalism which distorts its real origin in human practices. Exchange-value constructs all the mystery of the commodity.³⁶⁹ Marx claims that the notion of commodity carries “metaphysical subtleties and theological niceties”³⁷⁰ since its exchange value has complicated social dimensions. He emphasizes that it is difficult to determine the process of ascertaining an exchange-value for commodities. In addition it is also difficult to understand the transformation of an object into a commodity. Marx’s conception of fetishism is also expositive at this point. Marx claims that capitalism transforms all people and all social relations into economical relations. It influences the perspectives of people. Thus capitalism drives people to see everything as they are commodities. Marx argues as follows:

There is a physical relation between physical things. But it is different with commodities. There, the existence of the things *quâ* commodities, and the value relation between the products of labour which stamps them as commodities, have absolutely no connection with their physical properties and with the material relations arising therefrom. There it is a definite social relation between men, that assumes, in their eyes, the fantastic form of a relation between things. In order, therefore, to find an analogy, we must have recourse to the mist-enveloped regions of the religious world. In that world the productions of the human brain appear as independent beings endowed with life, and entering into relation both with one another and the human race. So it is in the world of commodities with the products of men’s hands. This I call the Fetishism which attaches itself to the products of labour, so soon as they are produced as commodities, and which is therefore inseparable from the production of commodities.³⁷¹

In his explanation of commodity fetishism we can see another example of Marx’s aim of a practical epistemology. He analyzes the attempt of capitalism to distort the physical relations between things. It makes these practical relations become sophisticated. Marx’s epistemology tries to turn this attitude upside down.

³⁶⁹ *Ibid*, p. 81.

³⁷⁰ Marx, *Capital I*, p. 46.

³⁷¹ *Ibid*, p. 47.

Having emphasized the social causes behind commodities, Marx's philosophy leads to an ontology of social relations. He tries to dissolve the notions of commodity and exchange-value by examining their social origins. Lukacs explains Marx's attitude by claiming that for the first time in history the economical categories confront us as the reproduction of human life and in this way we can determine social being within material conditions.³⁷² This point is a consequence of Marx's praxis philosophy. In this way, Marx breaks the chain of abstract terms and heads towards the underground causes and relations. We can find his Underground Wo/man in these relations. Thus, the basis on which Marx's Underground Wo/man comes up is more practical and concrete since his method tries to combine social relations with an ontological perspective. In other words, he tries to dissipate ontological and epistemological terms by referring to their origins in social and material relations.

The aim of dissipation is compatible with the fact that Marx perceives the chief notions of the capitalist mode of production as processes instead of entities as I have mentioned before. As David Harvey points out, the realization of capital is dependent on a process in Marx's analysis.³⁷³ Marx explains commodity, exchange-value and capital as processes within social relations. In his analysis we cannot isolate them from each other. Thus Marx wants to construct a social and practical context in which we can understand the essential chains of wo/man in the 19th century. This context makes room for analyzing the Underground Wo/man who is drowned by means of the capitalist mode of production.

Another suffocative feature of capitalist production for The Underground Wo/man is the fact that capitalism leads all people to consumption beyond their needs. Excessive production and excessive consumption beyond our needs are the mottos of capitalism. Marx emphasizes that even the term of 'need' is determined

³⁷² Lukacs, Georg, *Marx's Basic Ontological Principles*, p. 5. See also Christopher Arthur's "The Spectral Ontology of Value" and Banu Yilankaya's "The Ontology of Social Relations in Marx's Capital".

³⁷³ Harvey, *A Reading of Capital*, p. 123.

by social relations in capitalism. Thus, capital “announces itself its first appearance, a new epoch in the process of social production.”³⁷⁴

The Underground Wo/man is lost and stranded under the restrictive features of capitalist consumption. The capitalist mode of production and consumption interferes in the wishes, desires, inclinations, needs and all the dimensions of our life. The Underground Wo/man has always a difficulty in defining her/his actual needs and wishes in the world of commodities. Her/his situation is similar to the Kantian subject who has lost her/himself in the immensity of Reason; Marx’s Underground Wo/man has lost her/himself in the immensity and boundaries of capital.

I have mentioned that at the beginning of this part, Marx criticizes freedom in terms of its being a modern value. He calls attention to the fact that the workers must sell their labor-power, and they possess nothing else. At this point, their freedom gains a self-contradicting meaning. Marx explains this point as follows;

For the conversion of his money into capital, therefore, the owner of the money must meet in the market with the free laborer, free in the double sense, that as a free man he can dispose of his labor power as his own commodity, and that on the other hand he has no other commodity for sale, is short of everything necessary for the realization of his labor power.³⁷⁵

The other values of the “Eden of innate rights” are equality and property. Marx does not analyze the notion of equality. He perceives this notion from the viewpoint that everyone in the capitalist mode of production is equal in having the necessity of selling her/his labor power. On the other hand, the examination of the emergence of private property constitutes an important part of Marx’s criticism of capitalism.

Private property is another form of submission for the Underground Wo/man. Marx claims that the emergence of private property has an important

³⁷⁴ *Ibid*, p. 118.

³⁷⁵ *Ibid*, p. 118.

role in the development of capitalist society. Moreover, he argues that the separation of capital, land and labor spell out fatal consequences for the workers.³⁷⁶ At this point, he emphasizes that there is another characteristic of capitalist economy: The relation between production and community is changed by the law of private property.

Marx explains that before capitalism “the landowner lays stress on the noble lineage of his property,”³⁷⁷ and his relation to his tenants is determined by this lineage. There was another relationship between landowner, production and the tenants in the economical system of the Medieval Age and earlier periods. This relation characterizes both landowners and tenants. It determines the tenants as members of a community. The subjection of tenants to their landowners has a foundational role for their character and life, so the relation of tenants with production and their products has a characteristic role for them. Marx emphasizes that there is an entirely different relationship between capitalists and workers. This relation is totally abstracted and robbed from humanistic features.

Marx emphasizes that in the previous mode of production before capitalism, the wo/man belongs to a community and her/his properties are determined by the properties of this community. There is a personal relationship between possession and possessor. There is also a personal relationship between people and their labor. With the rise of capitalism, property and human beings are distinguished by different parameters. The personal relationship between them is changed and every member of society has become the owner of private property.³⁷⁸ Individualism is strengthened and people are defined as isolated individuals who own private property. The relation between individuals, their community, their products and the landowners are severed by means of the capitalist mode of production. These relations lost their meanings which are valid in previous modes of production.

³⁷⁶ Marx, *Economic Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844*, p. 18.

³⁷⁷ *Ibid*, p. 38.

³⁷⁸ *Ibid*, p. 3.

In the first volume of *Capital*, Marx investigates the process of raping large areas of land by the first capitalists of the 16th, 17th and 18th centuries. The first capitalists use force in order to make people become a worker who must sell her/his labor power. Capitalism empties the characteristics of people concerning their family and their community. It makes society to be a stratified community between the workers and capitalists: Workers are “equal”, “free” individuals who have nothing apart from their labor power (their chain) and the capitalists are “completely unproductive rentier” and owners of land, workshops and means of production. This discharged and abstracted definition of wo/man also changes the relation of modern wo/man with her/his laboring and products. There emerges a modern category of labor which is a simple abstraction.³⁷⁹ Marx argues that “this abstraction of labor” is not merely the “mental product of a concrete totality of labors”.³⁸⁰ He explains the change of relation between wo/man and labor in capitalist society as follows;

Indifference towards specific labors, correspondence to a form of society, in which individuals can with ease transfer from one labor to another, and where the specific kind is a matter of chance for them, hence of indifference. Not only, the category, labor, but labor in reality has here become the means of creating wealth in general, and has ceased to be organically linked with particular individuals in any specific form.³⁸¹

Marx emphasizes that the labor becomes only a means of creating wealth in capitalist mode of production. The abstraction of labor distorts the relation of people with it. In capitalist society labor does not belong to our existence or essence since the workers are in a position of indifference towards specific labors. Labor and their products do not characterize them like in the earlier modes of production. I believe that this is an important argument of Marx’s in explaining his praxis philosophy and emphasis on concrete relations apart from abstractions. Marx analyses a practical relationship between modern workers and their labor

³⁷⁹ Marx, *Grundrisse*, p. 103.

³⁸⁰ *Ibid*, p. 104.

³⁸¹ *Ibid*, p. 104.

from an epistemological perspective. He argues that the modern relation between people and their labor is an abstract and emptied relation although it seems practical and logical. This idea also leads Marx to elaborate his conception of “abstract labor” and alienation.

We can find traces of the distinction Marx makes between abstract and concrete labor in *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy* and in *Grundrisse* where he talks about particular and general labor. He states this difference in *Capital* by arguing as follows;

On the one hand all labor is, speaking physiologically, expenditure of human labor power, and in its character of identical abstract human labor, it creates and forms the value of commodities. On the other hand, all labor is the expenditure of human labor power in a special form and with a definite aim, and in this, its character of concrete useful labor, it produces use values. [...] At first sight a commodity presented itself to us as a complex of two things – use value and exchange value. Later on, we saw also that labor, too, possesses the same twofold nature; for, so far as it finds expression in value, it does not possess the same characteristics that belong to it as a creator of use values. I was the first to point out and to examine critically this twofold nature of the labor contained in commodities. [...] this point is the pivot on which a clear comprehension of political economy turns.³⁸²

This twofold nature of labor and Marx’s conception of “abstract” labor are connected with the attempt of universalizing and equalizing all labor by emptying its humanistic character in capitalism. Capitalism makes the question “how much labor is necessary for producing anything” to be meaningless. I have stated that the exchange value of a commodity in the capitalist mode of production is determined by social and economical relations. In addition there is another problem concerning exchange-value because of the abstraction of labor. Capital subjects the exchange-values of all commodities to itself. In doing so, it determines the social relations and people. This is also a consequence of its uncontrollable nature. It determines exchange-values, needs and even our way of perceiving things. In capitalism it is difficult to determine the value of anything from the human standpoint.

³⁸² Marx, *Capital* vol I, p. 30.

Marx's Underground Wo/man cannot feel anything to her/his labor and products, because of the capitalist abstraction of labor. Her/his laboring carries nothing personal and humanistic. S/he does not realize and make her/himself when s/he is working. These working conditions bring forth also another problem which destroys all her/his relation with her/his life, as alienation.

4.2.2 Alienation

Alienation is a consequence of capitalism which hinders our self-realization. It denotes a self-split in human nature; this split is dependent on the labor conditions in a stratified society. Moreover, it is related to the problem of abstraction since Feuerbach employs this term in explaining the alienation of human being from an idea of God which has supremacy and is supernatural at first time.³⁸³

Moreover, Stirner argues that even the notion of 'humanity' is an alienated concept which refers to the distinction between the individual wo/man and the conception of 'human being'.³⁸⁴ Marx and Engels write *The German Ideology* partly in order to answer Stirner's criticism,. Therefore, the term 'alienation' is also used for a self-discrepancy between the abstract meaning of something and its individual entity and thus it is connected with the main problem of my thesis.

Although Marx explains alienation within the labor conditions of the capitalist system especially, its implications spread to all dimensions of human life. It refers to the estrangement of oneself from her/his own life process, from her/his own nature. It means a gap between us and our products and our labor. Because of alienation, wo/man cannot feel her/himself close to her/his nature. Therefore, it is the notion that explains how capitalism crumbles wo/man's unity as a human being. This is why I believe that Marx's analysis of alienation gives a more profound answer to my question.

³⁸³ Feuerbach, *The Essence of Christianity*.

³⁸⁴ Stirner, *The Ego and its Own*.

Marx explains alienation by emphasizing a split and an abstract interference between wo/man and her/his labor. This abstract interference is connected with Marx's analysis of 'abstract labor' as I mentioned in the previous section. Marx thinks that abstract labor is one of the main characteristics of capitalism since such a disruption between wo/man her/his laboring is formulized and also realized for the first time in the history. . Alienation is the main consequence of this situation. I think that alienation is the main characteristics of my Underground Wo/man. I have always found it difficult to explain the inhabitants of the 19th century by means of the abstract notions throughout my thesis.

I think that the actual problem which brings forth my Underground Wo/man is the gap between the notions which are used for explaining and defining her/him, her/his practical life and her/his actual feelings and her/his actual thoughts, activities and feelings which cannot be explained by these notions. While I am trying to understand Marx's notion of alienation, I feel that his main purpose is compatible with my aim at looking for an Underground Wo/man who resists being brought under alienated notions. I find myself in an existential exercise in explaining alienation with Marx. For this reason, I will not make a difference between Underground Wo/man and the general conception of wo/man which refer to modern wo/man in this section. Thus alienation is the actual explanation of my problem which I have tried to articulate by the other thinkers of my thesis. Alienation arises with the Underground Wo/man's awareness of contradictions in her/his life. In this section, I will try to explain Marx's conception of alienation both from the viewpoint of labor conditions and in terms of the self-split of Underground Wo/man.

Underground Wo/man finds her/himself to be an instrument and an object in the hierarchical structure of capitalist society. The Underground Wo/man is unable to determine her/his life and her/his destiny. S/he cannot control her/his actions, thoughts and feelings either. S/he cannot define her/his relationships with other people and the products which are produced with her/his labor. S/he cannot

understand why s/he is working and what s/he produces. Therefore, s/he has lost her/himself in the long hours of working while s/he is producing a part of something which s/he has no idea about. This is the meaning of alienation in Underground Wo/man's working. Marx examines alienation along with four types of it in the *Economic Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844*.

Marx first investigates the alienation between the worker and the object. The object at this point means both nature and the product which the worker produces. Marx argues that the worker is alienated both from nature and the products produced with her/his labor. Moreover Marx conceives nature with two meanings. One of them is that nature is the necessary condition of our laboring. Thus "the worker can create nothing without nature."³⁸⁵ With the term 'nature' here, Marx indicates the "sensuous external world." In addition, nature also is necessary for the physical subsistence of the worker since the worker is a biological entity at the same time. In both senses, Marx emphasizes that the worker is alienated both from nature and her/his products.

S/he is alienated from her/his product since s/he has no right concerning the design or the planning of her/his work. S/he cannot determine how s/he produces and what she produces. Every detail of her/his producing something is determined by the capitalists. This situation isolates her/him from her/his productions. This is the meaning of the alienation between the worker and the product. Moreover, s/he also has not got the means of production which nature serves her/him and this situation makes her/him alienated from nature too.

The meanings of worker both as a physical entity and a human being overlap in terms of alienation. "The height of" worker's servitude "is that it is only as a worker that he can maintain himself *as a physical object* and that it is only *a physical object* that he is worker".³⁸⁶ This overlapping is the consequence of the fact that the worker is forced to sell her/his labor power in *Capital*. The meaning

³⁸⁵ Marx, *Economic Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844*, p. 29.

³⁸⁶ *Ibid*, p. 29.

of the worker is not determined by its humanity but determined by the capital as a being that must sell her/his labor power and whom s/he can appropriate her/his labor power and products.

I have stated that for Marx labor is the vital part of wo/man's realization of her/his existence. However in the capitalist mode of production we can see that labor cannot help in realizing the worker's existence. On the contrary, the extant conditions of laboring in capitalism lead to the commodification of the worker and decrease its existence or his humanity. Marx explains it as follows; "under these economic conditions this realization of labor appears as *loss of realization* for the workers; objectification as *loss of the object and bondage to it*; appropriation as *estrangement, as alienation*."³⁸⁷

The second form of alienation is connected with the process of laboring. This alienation depends on specialization and division of labor. Marx emphasizes the difference between modern worker's laboring for the capitalists and the laboring of craftsmen. While the worker in the workshop cannot capture the whole process of production, s/he cannot know what s/he produces. S/he can only produce a small part of her/his productions and at the end of the laboring process s/he cannot recognize her/his products at the market.

This problem is also a current problem in our century.³⁸⁸ In this sense Marx's Underground Wo/man who is alienated from her/his laboring goes beyond the limits of the 19th century. Like her/him our contemporaries in this century cannot identify themselves with their works. Their work cannot help the realization of themselves. On the contrary, they lost themselves in the laboring process like Underground Wo/man. For this reason, Marx's analyses are important still in this century.

³⁸⁷ *Ibid*, p. 29.

³⁸⁸ This is a current problem how we can increase the production efficiency. After Marx's analysis, the capitalists and thinkers who study on the production and working conditions presents other solution of for the problem of production efficiency. Fordism, post-Fordism and Taylorism construct the current forms of working conditions, you can find their explanations in Ciulla's *The Working Life*.

In order to explain the alienation of the worker from the process of working Marx makes a distinction between the worker's laboring in the capitalist system and the craftsmen's laboring in the previous mode of production. The craftsmen has more control over the process of production can therefore personalize their work. They can reflect their thoughts, feelings, inclinations and abilities in their productions. They feel that they are identified with their laboring. Their place in the society and their awareness of themselves is not distinct from their laboring. Thus their products are the indications of their humanity. We can see that their labor is not 'abstract labor'. They do not isolate their work from their lives. They know for what they work and they can determine the designing and planning of their products. They make themselves by working. Therefore they are not alienated from their product and process of production.

In the third form of alienation, Marx refers the species being of wo/man. With this term Marx tries to explain what human life should be. In other words species being is humanity itself. Species being is the answer to "how we become ourselves". It is how human beings make themselves. Marx deals with this term especially in his early writings. There are discussions about this term in terms of Marx's conception of human nature and human essence. As I said before, I will explain these discussions at the end of this chapter to complete Marx's analysis of Underground Wo/man. Now I only want to state his arguments concerning the alienation of workers from their species being in their laboring.

Marx explains this form of alienation with the alienation of wo/man from all his life. Laboring within capitalist mode of production depends on division of labor, thus this situation causes the alienation of workers from her/his species being. He claims that in capitalism since "labor is only an expression of human activity within alienation, of the manifestation of life as the alienation of life, the division of labor, too, is therefore nothing else but the estranged, alienated positing of human activity, as a real activity of the species or as activity of man as a species

being”.³⁸⁹ He thinks that “the real, active orientation of man to himself, as a species being, or his manifestation as a real species being, is only possible if he really brings out all his species powers”.³⁹⁰ However, Marx thinks that the conditions of capitalist production do not allow workers to bring out all their species powers. As a consequence of these conditions the worker confronts with another alienated wo/man other than her/himself in his life. Both her /his product and s/he stand facing opposing her/him as her/his others.³⁹¹ The distance between the wo/man and her/his others is increased in capitalism. This is the third form of alienation for Marx.

The fourth form of alienation is the alienation of the worker from other workers and the capitalist. Capitalism turns all labor power into a marketable commodity. This situation leads to a competition between workers. The ‘moneybags’ or capitalists construct a competitive labor-market in which they can exploit the labor power of workers. In this market, the labor power becomes a commercial object. Workers become the enemies of each other because of competition. They cannot be aware of the fact that the actual reasons of their exploitation and they become alienated from other workers.

I have explained Marx’s perceptions on the origins of alienation in the capitalist mode of production. As we can see, his understanding of alienation goes beyond the limits of laboring conditions. He takes it as an existential problem.³⁹² He looks for “a way of becoming who we are” in laboring. He conceives laboring as an exercise through which we can bring forth our species powers. Since Marx

³⁸⁹ Marx, *Economic Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844*, p. 55.

³⁹⁰ *Ibid*, pp. 66-67.

³⁹¹ *Ibid*, p. 71.

³⁹² It is controversial whether Marx can be accepted as an existentialist or not. Sartre tries to improve a theory of Marxist existentialism by emphasizing Marx’s humanistic attitude. Sartre claims that “there will exist for everyone a margin of real freedom beyond the production of life” (in *Search for a Method*, p. 34) depending on Marx’s analyses. He believes that structuralism cannot understand Marx’s real purpose. For Sartre Marx put forwards the freedom of wo/man and his process becoming her/himself. In this context, Sartre finds an existential aspect in Marx’s philosophy.

claims that we can reveal our species being in laboring I think that he perceives realizing ourselves as an existential exercise.

In this existential exercise Marx's Underground Wo/man tries to become identified with her/himself. She tries to find the conditions and ways of becoming her/himself. It is because s/he cannot find a way of realizing her/his abilities, inclinations, humanistic aspects in laboring; s/he has an existential problem in laboring. This problem influences all her/his life.

Marx calls attention to other dimensions of alienation which rise by the development of capitalism. He also emphasizes that capitalism enforces a way of life. I have stated that "production for the sake of capital" instead of human beings is the main motto of capitalism. Along with this motto, from the perspective of capitalists all people other than themselves are only instruments which must increase wealth and surplus-value. They only try to establish the conditions for exploitation of labor power. This situation also enforces a certain way of life on the workers. In addition to the fact that they cannot realize themselves in those laboring conditions, their life is also usurped through the expectations of capitalist. The capitalist mode of production causes an increase of poverty for workers both physically and existentially. I have tried to explain the existential problems. Capitalism interferes in our social and humanistic activities also. Since it steals our time because of long working hours, it steals our time and short-circuits our humanity. Marx explains this fact as follows;

The less you eat, drink and buy books; the less you go to the theater, the dance hall, the public house; the less you think, love, theorize, sing, paint, fence, etc., the more you *save* – the *greater* becomes your treasure which neither moths nor rust will devour – your *capital*.³⁹³

The workers find themselves in a poverty of social and humanistic activities. In addition they are also in a material poverty. They cannot have the physical tools that would sustain their lives. Marx makes a comparison between a

³⁹³ Marx, *Economic Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844*, p. 51.

modern renter and a savage dwelling in a cave; he claims that modern man has an alienated habitation;

Man returns to a cave dwelling, which is now, however, contaminated with the pestilential breath of civilization, and which he continues to occupy only *precariously*, it being for him an alien habitation which can be withdrawn from him any day – a place from which, if he does not pay, he can be thrown out any day. For this mortuary he has to *pay*.³⁹⁴

Marx considers the problem of alienated situation of citizen subject in *On the Jewish Question* and *A Contribution to Criticism of Hegel's Philosophy of Right* as well. He criticizes Bauer's and Hegel's views on the relation between wo/man and the modern state. He argues that both Hegel and Bauer rationalize a modern state which involves a distinction for wo/man between her/his individual life and species being. Marx thinks that Bauer's and Hegel's conceptions of the modern state fall short of a state which allows people to exercise their freedom as a species being. Marx thinks the modern state creates an abstraction of real wo/man and cannot penetrate the actual life of this real wo/man. The position of the wo/man and the position of the state in relation to each other depend on an abstract civil wo/man. Marx claims that Hegel only applies his logic to the realm of right by his book and cannot be close to the real problems of modern citizens. Thus, Marx claims that in the Hegelian sense there cannot be any realm for citizens in order to realize themselves. It is mainly because Hegel conceives freedom from an abstract viewpoint and his conception of the modern and ideal state brings alienated rights and freedom for people.

Marx claims that Bauer either mixes political freedom and wo/man's realization of freedom as a human. According to Marx, Bauer understands freedom as the removal of physical restrictions on people. However Marx does not see that it is an adequate explanation of freedom. In the modern state wo/man cannot realize her/himself since s/he cannot identify her/his powers with the powers of the state. Marx argues that freedom and the identification of this power requires an intertwined relation between the state and the individual. He sees the

³⁹⁴ *Ibid*, p. 50.

distinction between the public and private realms as one of the signs of this lack of identity. Thus, Marx argues that in order for wo/man to realize her/himself in a state, s/he must be able to perceive the power of the state as her/his power. His explanation of freedom and species being are collaborated at this point. He argues that as follows;

Only when the real, individual man re-absorbs in himself the abstract citizen, and as an individual human being has become a *species-being* in his everyday life, in his particular work, and in his particular situation, only when man has recognized and organized his “own powers” as *social* powers, and, consequently, no longer separates social power from himself in the shape of *political* power, only then will human emancipation have been accomplished.³⁹⁵

To sum up, for Marx, alienation is an inclusive concept. His Underground Wo/man suffers from alienation in every part of her/his life. S/he tries to go beyond her/his restrictions and exert her/his species powers. S/he wants to escape from alienated situations of her/his life. I think that this search for her/his species being is connected with the main problem of my thesis. Depending on an epistemological split I have tried to look for an Underground Wo/man who feels this split and is in search for going beyond this split. Alienation encompasses a wide realm which has epistemological, ontological and practical implications. For this reason, to recognize the sources of our alienation from nature/reality in her/his practical life is an important step for my Underground Wo/man. Marx’s emphasis of looking for concrete sources for our existential problems is compatible with my main purpose in this treatise. This point explains why I believe that Marx has a more profound solution for my thesis which tries to point out the danger of understanding people with abstract notions especially in the 19th century. In addition I think that we can find this difficulty in our recent century, thus my problem touch upon a contemporary question.

Since Marx accepts that becoming ourselves is a process, his arguments on “human essence/species being/human nature” do not refer to a static conception of human essence. I will complete the Marx chapter of my thesis by explaining

³⁹⁵ Marx, *On the Jewish Question*, p. 16.

Marx's conception of human nature. To understand his conception of humanity will make clear his Underground Wo/man who is ignored by many thinkers of the 18th and 19th centuries.

4.3 THE RELATION BETWEEN MARX'S CONCEPTION OF HUMAN NATURE AND HIS UNDERGROUND WO/MAN

In order to bring out Marx's Underground Wo/man I have tried to summarize Marx's thought by emphasizing his arguments on wo/man especially. I believe that Marx has always considered wo/man and a conception of humanness throughout his life. I read him as a humanist. However I do not think that his humanism depends on the postulation of species being in his early writings. We can find an investigation of humanness in his analyses in many different realms. I think that he examines the main tenets of capitalism in order to depict the harmful influences of capitalism on people. Thus, wo/man is always fastened upon in his philosophy. For this reason I think that Marx's philosophy is compatible with humanism.

Marx obviously points out that he wants to explain the real and active man instead of the abstracted, generated conception of wo/man. In order to lean to the real wo/man of the 19th century, he criticizes idealist attitude of German philosophy. He claims that this real wo/man is lost in the network of abstract and 'ideal' notions of philosophy and economy politics. His main question concerns "how we bring out the practical man" apart from these abstract notions. This question is also similar to Nietzsche's question of "how we become ourselves". Marx examines the conditions of a kind of living and exerting our humanistic characteristics by means of these questions. This is also a sign of his humanism. In order to question the reasons why wo/man cannot realize her/himself in the 19th century, he wants to dig up the aspects of economical and social relations which are harmful and restrictive for human beings. I claim that Marx's questions make

room for an Underground Wo/man who cannot be explained by means of the extant theories of the 19th century.

In the 19th century there is an inclination to resort to philosophy as a way of “feeling at home”. This term is taken from Hegel’s *Phenomenology*. Hegel argues that the wo/man is alienated from nature and her/himself when s/he cannot exercise her/his potential powers, when s/he transfers her/his powers to nature, and finally when s/he is moved away from her/himself.³⁹⁶ To get rid of this alienated situation, Hegel thinks that spirit should know and recognize her/himself. In order to recognize her/himself spirit must be alienated at first, and then s/he can achieve the identity of her/himself. This identity is the identity of the particular and universal selfness of spirit in the unity of absolute spirit.

Hegel sees the journey of ‘absolute spirit’ both as a way of alienating from itself and as a way of returning to itself in order to escape from alienation. Via alienation he means a distance between the physical and spiritual existence of wo/man. Hegel argues that the spirit alienates itself from its products and social life. Thus, he conceives alienation both in relation to laboring and social institutions.³⁹⁷ Hegel sees the reconciliation between our individual and universal parts in our social and physical existence as the overcoming alienation. He also thinks that the freedom of the wo/man means overcoming this distance without losing its individuality. In order to be free and reconcile with ourselves Hegel thinks that we try to “feel at home” in our social and physical world. He investigates the alienation process in order to achieve the feeling of “being at home”. Thus, being at home is the linchpin of his philosophy.³⁹⁸

We can see the similarity of Hegel’s and Marx’s conception of freedom and alienation. They are both interested in the ways for wo/man’s exerting her/his

³⁹⁶ Hegel explains alienation in *Phenomenology of Spirit*, in the section of “Society and Culture”.

³⁹⁷ For the different implications of alienation see also Schacht’s “Social Structure, Social Alienation and Social Change” and Roger Salerno’s *Landscapes of Abandonment Capitalism*.

³⁹⁸ Hardimon, *Hegel’s Social Philosophy: The Project of Reconciliation*, p. 95.

species powers and the importance of the laboring process. Hegel and Marx conceive that our freedom and unity with ourselves is connected with human power and creativity. They point out our creativity, since they both refer to an exertion of our individualistic and humanistic powers.³⁹⁹ Although he criticizes Hegel in *A Contribution to Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right*, Marx accepts the influences of Hegel in his philosophy. He argues in *Early Writings* as follows;

The importance of Hegel's phenomenology... lies in the fact that Hegel conceives the self-creation of man as a process, objectification as loss of object, as alienation and supersession of this alienation; that he therefore grasps the nature of labor, and conceives objective man – true because real man- as the result of his own labor.⁴⁰⁰

“To feel at home” is a background drive of Hegel's philosophy. In order to achieve this feeling he investigates alienation in his philosophy. I said that this feeling is sought by other thinkers of the 19th century as well. As I mentioned above William James accepts philosophy as a way of “feeling at home”.⁴⁰¹ This pursuit is connected with the losing our individual and humanistic powers under the clusters of notions and arguments which are abstracted from our practical lives. I think that Marx is also in search of this feeling. For this reason, he tries to put forward the real and active wo/man within her/his practical and social relations. I think that his Underground Wo/man comes out as a consequence of this search. Therefore, I believe that Marx tries to feel at home by making the influences of capitalism on our active life comprehensible. In addition Marx does not want to resort abstract notions to bring out the real and active man. He thinks that abstract notions make philosophy distant from the real lives of people in the 19th century. For this reason, he also accepts that these notions are impediments to our feeling at home with philosophical theories. The epistemological context in which his Underground Wo/man arises depends on the distance between the theories that explains our life and our practical life. Marx relates the arising of

³⁹⁹ For the similarity between Hegel's and Marx's conceptions of freedom and species being, you can see Sean Sayer's “Creative Activity and Alienation in Hegel and Marx”.

⁴⁰⁰ Marx, *Early Writings*, pp. 385-6.

⁴⁰¹ James, William, *The Will to believe and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy*, pp. 67-68.

abstract notions with the division of labor. This relation may be problematic, and his empiricist and materialistic account is controversial at this point. However, I want to emphasize that his attempt of turning epistemology into praxis is original. Although this attempt has contradictions, it is clear that Marx tries to dissolve epistemic notions into their practical roots.

Marx tries to dissolve why epistemological theories cannot touch upon our lives. I have tried to formulate it in terms of the context where *Underground Man* arises. I think that this context reflects Marx's practical approach of epistemology. This practical approach is also connected with his attempt of explaining the role of consciousness. I have stated that Marx is also a follower of the approach of naturalism. He tries to explain the natural and material roots of our arguments concerning this world and our life. He thinks that to accept our consciousness as an entity which creates ideas by itself and commands our activities and thoughts is also an impediment in understanding the real, active man of the 19th century. Although again he has contradictions in terms of the role of our consciousness and the difference between human and animal consciousness, his practical emphasis in epistemology is revealed by his account of social consciousness. In this sense his *Underground Wo/man* is the wo/man who has lost awareness of her/himself because of the difference between her/his actual life and her/his ideas. Moreover, Marx also tried to demonstrate that her/his awareness of her/himself is distorted by material and social conditions. Along with these ideas I have tried to explain how the epistemological context is related to the appearance of *Underground Wo/man*.

Apart from his epistemological attitude, I have tried to explain the existential context in which Marx's *Underground Wo/man* arises. In order to explain it I emphasized Marx's idea that laboring is essential for our existence as human beings. In this context, I tried to explain why people cannot realize themselves in modern capitalist laboring conditions. In this context, Marx's *Underground Wo/man* emerges from the difficulty of exercising her/his species power. I have argued that Marx's arguments refer to an existential exercise which can allow us to become ourselves. However, this issue of becoming ourselves

causes a problem about the tension between his praxis philosophy and his conception of species being. Now I will summarize the criticisms which argue that Marx's species being is also an abstraction. These criticisms are also connected with the role of subjects in history and Marx's conception of freedom.

There are discussions concerning Marx's conception of species being and human freedom. Althusser presents a structuralist interpretation of Marx's philosophy.⁴⁰² In this view, the naturalistic and scientific explanation of human beings is emphasized and there is not so much place for subjectivity and freedom. Althusser argues that there is an "epistemological break"⁴⁰³ in Marx's works after *The German Ideology*. He claims that in his early writings Marx gives references to the "essence" of people, but beginning from *The German Ideology* he begins to look for a scientific and structural explanation for human beings without emphasizing their essences. Althusser thinks that the implications of structuralism are more effective in Marx's philosophy and we cannot attribute an important role to human freedom. This view is called "structural or scientific Marxism" in Marxist literature.

I think that to give a restricted role to subjectivity is not compatible with Marx's general purposes. As I mentioned above we can see a humanistic drive in all realms Marx studies on. Thus to emphasize the species being and subjectivity is a main motive for Marx, and to give a limited role to subjectivity is against his theory both in terms of his general purposes and the role which he attributes to the proletariat class.

In *Marx and Human Nature*,⁴⁰⁴ Norman Geras claims that Marx does not defend that the social and economical conditions as the only determinant of human

⁴⁰² See Althusser's *Reading Capital*, For Marx and *On Ideology*, Nicos Poulantzas's *The Problem of the Capitalist State*. These two thinkers are accepted as the chief structural or scientific Marxist in Marxist scholar.

⁴⁰³ Althusser, Louis, *Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays*, "Ideology and Ideological State Apparatus".

⁴⁰⁴ Norman Geras, *Marx and Human Nature* p. 28.

nature. For him, Marx tries to improve a theory of an ideal society which permits our human nature to exert all its powers. However, Geras emphasizes that Marx indeed does not want to accept an abstract conception of human nature which is restricted. Marx's conception of human nature is open to modifying and changing in each historical process. Marx claims that "all history is nothing but a continuous transformation of human nature".⁴⁰⁵

Depending on this claim, Geras argues that Marx's theory is compatible with a changing conception of human nature which does not involve an abstract and static essence. In this way, Geras believes that we can put forward the positive aspects of human nature which is not selfish and subject to her/his interests. In contrast to social contract theories, Geras thinks that Marx wants to bring out a positivistic account of wo/man who can realize itself within social relations. I think that this approach is compatible with Marx's general philosophy in terms of his conception of freedom and species being that he is improved in his early writings. There is also a discussion about the epistemological break that Althusser defends. Since I defend that Marx always consider humanistic powers and features, I do not perceive a difference between early and later Marx.

Georg Lukacs, Erich From, Herbert Marcuse are the well-known humanist Marxists. Humanist Marxism is also close to the account of critical Marxism. Critical Marxism emphasizes human activities and freedom. It gives importance to subjectivity. Marx's schema of infrastructure and superstructure is a matter of discussion at this point, since critical Marxists find the determinative role of economic conditions problematic. To attribute a highly determinative role to infrastructure leads to the restriction of subjective powers. In this sense, the role of proletariat and class struggles becomes questionable. For this reason, the Frankfurt School as the main representative of critical Marxism, try to expound the other dimensions of capitalism apart from economical conditions. I think that this extension is a more profound attempt which is compatible with Marx's philosophy.

⁴⁰⁵ Marx, *Poverty of Philosophy*, p. 15.

Etienne Balibar claims that Marx's subject can only be a subject who is multiple, practical and anonymous. S/he is society itself and the ensemble of the relations of production, exchange and consumption.⁴⁰⁶ He emphasizes that by his practical philosophy Marx "stirs the heart of philosophy and forces philosophy to think its boundaries."⁴⁰⁷ The emphasis on praxis leads to a conception of subjectivity and human nature which is developed in time.⁴⁰⁸ Balibar's approach is close to Geras's interpretation which I find compatible with Marx's philosophy. I also stated that Max Stirner criticizes Marx because of the abstractness of the notion of species being.⁴⁰⁹ In this respect, it is difficult to not refer any abstract notions while we try to achieve a general conception of something. I touched upon this problem in relation to Marx's criticism of social contract theories of the 18th century. I do not think that Marx certainly solves this problem by emphasizing continuous transformation of human nature. However I believe that his attitude is original in dissolving the abstract notions which define human beings in the 19th century.

To sum up, I begin Marx's *Underground Wo/man* in an epistemological context. This epistemological context is mainly related to our distance from nature. I have tried to explain how Marx adopts a dialectical method which tries to overcome this distance by explaining wo/man and nature with dynamic processes. He also attributes a dynamic and dialectical relation between nature and wo/man. This the general approach of Marx which is the basis of the epistemological context which brings out the *Underground Wo/man*. In order to detail this epistemological context, I have explained how Marx tries to emphasize the practical effects of epistemological arguments. Moreover, I have tried to explain Marx's emphasis upon practical conditions in order to escape from the error of abstract notions. Apart from the epistemological context I have tried to explain the

⁴⁰⁶ Balibar, *The Philosophy of Marx*, p. 91.

⁴⁰⁷ *Ibid*, p. 31.

⁴⁰⁸ Ernest Bloch, *Marxism and Anthropology*, p. 36.

⁴⁰⁹ Stirner mentions this criticism in *The Ego and its Self*.

existential context in which his Underground Wo/man arises. I think that the epistemological context which I tried to explore is connected with this existential context since Marx tries to present this existential practice as a way of overcoming alienated abstract notions. These notions are the causes our alienation from ourselves and from nature.

Marx's Underground Wo/man is stranded between the abstract and imposed notions which s/he must resort to while explaining her/himself and her/his life and her reality. For this reason I tried to explain its emergence in terms of an epistemological context at first. I tried to explain Marx's attempt of overcoming this difficulty by his emphasis upon laboring which appears as an existential exercise in his philosophy. His Underground Wo/man has a distorted self-awareness. I tried to explain the origins of this distortion. I have claimed that Marx turns philosophy into praxis with a drive of investigating the influences of material conditions on becoming ourselves. He wants to examine the details of the capitalist mode of production in order to give a way of bringing out the reasons why we cannot realize ourselves and why we cannot feel at home in this world with the extant epistemological arguments. I perceive his Underground Wo/man as a consequence of these questions. I think that an Underground Wo/man appears in his philosophy in relation to his humanistic approach.

I have argued that Marx's attitude is more appropriate with my conception of the Underground Wo/man. Throughout my thesis I have tried to relate my Underground Wo/man to the epistemological problems in terms of the distance between abstract notions and real and active wo/man. Marx's attempt at transforming epistemology into the practical roots yields a more profound context. I think that while we are trying to understand this world we must find solutions which can directly influence our practical activities. It is difficult to reconcile our life with philosophical theories since the role of philosophical theories is seen as restricted, such as to interpretation. Thus Marx transforms this role into a formulation which can directly change our life.

Of course Kant and Nietzsche are interested in practical and ethical questions. Indeed their main purpose is connected with moral arguments. However it is only Marx who has a moral and ethical attitude which is directly related to our practical life. In order for an ethical theory to influence our life practically it must have a power of directing our life. Kant's duty ethics is also in search of finding a formula for our practical life depending on the freedom of reason. It is controversial Marx has an ethical theory; however his ethical interest cannot be ignored. Brenkert in his *Marx's Ethics of Freedom* claims that Marx defends a virtue ethics which try to bring out our species power and humanistic virtues. In this sense, Marx's ethical attitude goes beyond the postulates of practical rules. I have stated that Nietzsche's philosophy is mostly connected with an isolated explanation of freedom of wo/man. Nietzsche does not want to present a way of life while emphasizing the personal and existential instinct of human beings. Marx's approach to life and ethics aims at achieving a way of ideal living which allows us to bring out the conditions of becoming ourselves. Simon Critchley explains this fact as follows;

For Marx, the philosophical and political task is the location, description and auto-emancipation of a group who will make philosophy practical and make praxis philosophical. This is the role he assigns to the proletariat who are designated as the universal class and the index of humanity. If Hegel socializes autonomy, then Marx communizes it, where the Kantian kingdom of ends moves from being a postulate of practical reason to an actual realm on earth without kings.⁴¹⁰

Finally, I think that Marx's philosophy gives a more comprehensive and practical context for the Underground Wo/man of the 19th century. His investigations in different realms aim at comprehending the actual problems of the inhabitants of this century. Thus, Marx's main goal is to explain wo/man with all her/his different dimensions. The unexplained dimensions of people's practical and humanistic aspects which Marx emphasizes cause his Underground Wo/man. In other words, Marx has a more comprehensive context in explaining my Underground Wo/man.

⁴¹⁰ Critchley, *Infinitely Demanding*, p. 35.

CHAPTER IV

CONCLUSION

I started my search of the Underground Wo/man with the Kantian argument that we cannot acquire knowledge of the actual nature of things. Kant formulates this position with his distinction between the “thing-in-itself” and appearance. I felt that this is a confession of modern wo/man and a reflection of the distance between modern wo/man and nature. My Underground Wo/man is born from this distance. The sources of this confession date back to the Enlightenment. In the second chapter of my thesis, I tried to explain this distance on the grounds of Kant’s epistemology, morality and aesthetics.

While Kant tries to avoid the direct question of “what exists”, he stresses upon the mind’s construction of knowledge. His well-known revolution is the transformation of perspective from nature to the mind. Furthermore, he is self-possessed in making claims concerning the existence of something since he thinks that the human mind is bordered with the realm of appearances while Reason attempts to go beyond this realm. Thus, the distinction between appearance and “thing-in-itself” constitutes the important part of Kant’s philosophy. He tries to overcome the contradictions which are inherited from classical empiricists and rationalists. He argues that these contradictions are consequences of traditional metaphysics which is transcendent.

Kant’s transcendental idealism depends on his attempt of finding a legitimate ground for our knowledge. He aims at dismissing the skeptical and dogmatic influences on knowledge by his transcendental attack. Besides, he also states that he endeavors to make room for faith due his attempt. However I noticed that this attempt reflects a modern confession which he blunders out. While he tries to emphasize the self-authority of Reason, his thinking introduces a skeptical

conclusion which he never aims at. First of all, I want to emphasize the conditions of this confession in terms of modern wo/man's relation to her/himself and nature in my thesis.

On the other hand, the Kantian unknown realm has a vacillating standpoint, since he refers to a system of universal laws which is beyond time and space in order to open the way for human knowledge as the only possible knowledge. I have tried to explain how his transcendental subject and the "thing-in-itself" are dissolved in a jungle of appearances. Since his transcendental subject remains an imagined unity in his epistemology, I perceived that we can find the roots of the Underground Wo/man in his thinking also. I tried to explain this wo/man with reference to the notion of *doppelganger* which is improved by Vordulakis.

Doppelganger has similarities with my Underground Wo/man. It is especially a consequence of the difference between the Kantian assumptions of an 'I think' that accompanies all our thoughts and the other self which is aware of this thinking. I tried to elaborate this self-split of the modern wo/man in relation to Nietzsche's emphasis on revaluation and Marx's analyses of capitalist mode of production. Kant's persistent emphasis is on the fact that the transcendental subject is wholly conscious that he is the only one who unifies his knowledge. Transcendental unity of apperception plays both an epistemological and a moral role. Epistemologically it unifies both knowledge and the self. Morally, self-consciousness and the self-authority of Reason make wo/man an ethical agent. Thus, Kant emphasizes a self-conscious subject who takes all his/her power from his/her own Reason. In the second chapter of my thesis I tried to summarize this subject. I have emphasized that Kant's subject is stranded between her/himself and nature/reality. In Vordulakis's words s/he is lost in the immensity of Reason.

Nietzsche, on the other hand, acknowledges that the difference between the real and the apparent world is a fable which speculative philosophy advocates. He does not ignore the interpretative capacity of the subjects, but his emphasis is to bring out the sublimation and hegemony of an abstract world which Western

culture and Christianity exalt. I see a similarity between Nietzsche's emphasis on interpretation and Kant's emphasis on subjectivity. Nietzsche also claims that we can perceive the world only from our viewpoint. However he does not want to situate the wo/man as a spectator of this world. In this way he also wants to dismiss an abstracted relation between the world and the self. I stated the arguments which Kant and Nietzsche share and disagree with in the third chapter.

Nietzsche's philosophical standpoint is founded on the rejection of this sublimation, the sublimation of a true world which is derived from appearances. Thus, he does not perceive a difference between the "thing-in-itself" and appearances. He introduces his will to power and perspectivism in order to solve the problems of epistemology which lead us to abstract notions. In his will to power nothing can be abstracted and exalted. The wo/man is not a spectator and her/his perspectives and interpretations contribute in the will to power. Nietzsche thinks that our categories and concepts are the instruments of our knowledge. He tries to eliminate a universal conceptual framework and claims that although concepts simplify our work on knowledge we cannot assert that they are absolutely true. In order to assert that they are certain and absolute we must exalt them apart from will to power. However he portrays his will to power as a process of becoming which cannot be reduced or extended by concepts. Thus, Nietzsche aims at explaining the relation between the self and the world in a more profound and dynamic way.

The role of consciousness is an important problem of my thesis. Nietzsche claims that we cannot definitely distinguish our conscious and unconscious acts and thoughts. They are interrelated and the role of consciousness cannot be easily explained. I stated that his conception of consciousness is similar to William James' by his emphasis upon the fact that our conscious and unconscious states are causally efficacious. This explanation gives a new direction to his epistemology and I have also tried to explain these points in the third chapter.

Nietzsche dissolves the distinction between the “thing-in-itself” and appearances by emphasizing the cultural and moral relations of wo/man. In order to do this, he takes a stand which brings out a new epistemological perspective. He thinks that epistemology, morality, social and cultural relations cannot be distinguished from each other. His naturalistic standpoint is engaged in at this point. In Nietzsche’s philosophy a value-laden and law-laden true world is traced back into its cultural and social roots. In other words, Nietzsche naturalizes this world. As a consequence of this naturalization, Nietzsche establishes a different context from speculative and traditional philosophy.

Depending on this naturalistic context, Nietzsche tries to transform modern values into their practical roots. In order to do this he claims that he works as a “subterranean”. This working requires a careful examination and scratching. This examination points to a way of dismissing the old values and creating new values. Nietzsche calls this process as revaluation and the process of “killing God”. God refers at this point to a system of a value-laden world. Philosophizing “with a hammer,” Nietzsche dismantles this world. Within the remnants of God, his Underground Wo/man appears as a mad man who is seeking God. Thus, in my third chapter I tried to explain the birth of Nietzsche’s Underground Wo/man within this context.

As I mentioned above, Nietzsche’s Underground Wo/man actually is not seeking God. S/he is aware of what s/he kills and is not in need of another God any more. S/he knows that God and his value-laden world is an obstacle in her/his way. This way is an eternal way of becoming. The Underground Wo/man is aware that it is full of stones and sufferings. However, s/he takes this risk. S/he has a courageous attitude towards knowledge. S/he is not a spectator of reality/nature. S/he is aware that her/his knowledge contributes to nature. Nietzsche’s Underground Wo/man is aware that reality/nature is a pathos and a becoming. It is not other than will to power. S/he is not afraid of this becoming.

Dostoevsky's Underground Wo/man resists being defined and calculated by scientific formulations. S/he wants to emphasize her/his passions and desires other than her/his rationality. S/he wants to put forward her/his aspects which cannot be calculated. S/he wants to dismantle her/himself in order to bring out her/his true existence. S/he invites us to the underground and claims that underground is more advantageous in understanding our actual nature. In the last part of third chapter I listened to her/him and tried to understand what s/he means.

Dostoevsky, like Nietzsche, has an anarchist viewpoint concerning human nature. He does not want to restrict wo/man within a definite explanation that depends on a definite cultural and social system. He emphasizes the creative and dark sides of wo/man. He finds naïve the philosophical and political theories of the 19th century in understanding human nature.

Dostoevsky's Underground Wo/man, along with his main characters, tries to bring out her/his creativity by means of a revaluation of the extant values of society. S/he questions her/his power of killing God. Unlike Nietzsche's Underground Wo/man, s/he sometimes feels her/himself in need of a God. S/he asks whether the existence of God may be helpful for the process of society. This questioning is in relation to the questions of killing someone and raping a child. Dostoevsky's examinations on human nature are extended sometimes by the investigation of criminals and sometimes a government clerk who encounters his double. Nietzsche finds his questionings valuable and profound for understanding wo/man. For this reason, I thought that Dostoevsky's characters can help elaborate my conception of the Underground Wo/man and I tried to briefly explain them in the third chapter. I thought that Dostoevsky's characters enrich my explanations of Nietzsche. Thus, Dostoevsky contributes in my thesis by giving concrete examples for Nietzsche's arguments on morality.

In the fourth chapter of my thesis I have tried to explain Marx's Underground Wo/man. Marx aims at analyzing the conditions and the dialectical relationship between the apparent relations of capitalism and the real forms of it

behind these apparent relations. Like Nietzsche, he wants to dissolve this distinction by a detailed analysis of the capitalist mode of production. For this reason, he also provides a concrete basis for my Underground Wo/man.

Marx claims that the problem of idealism dates back to the division of labor as mental and material labor. He tries to naturalize the problems of abstract notions in this way. His epistemology is intertwined with an analysis of social and material relations. He emphasizes that in capitalist society capital transforms everything and everyone by objectifying them. He perceives wo/man as embedded in the objectified material relations in the capitalist system. This viewpoint gives him a profound way in understanding wo/man since he unmask the veiled aspects of wo/man by means of his analysis. Thus, his Underground Wo/man is born with this analysis. This is the wo/man who is aware that there are other conditions and relations behind the capitalist mode of productions than what s/he thought.

I have looked for a concrete wo/man by means of the Underground Wo/man behind the philosophical theories of the 19th century. I searched for an appropriate method for this analysis. I chose epistemology since I think that we can dissolve the abstract notions concerning the definition of wo/man by means of an epistemological investigation. Thus, in other words, I want to unify real life and philosophy. To combine the practical and speculative aspects of philosophy, I think that Nietzsche's and Marx's philosophies are appropriate for my purpose.

Both Nietzsche and Marx try to socialize and naturalize epistemological notions which are abstract. I think that this is also an attempt to reconcile philosophical theories and practical life. Neither thinker aims at a classical conception of epistemology. They aim at establishing a philosophy which can touch upon life. For this reason they develop a counter attack. They want to turn epistemological theories and notions back to their origins. Inspired by their philosophies I want to establish an Underground Wo/man from a basis which can reconcile actual life and philosophical theories. Thus, I want to touch upon my Underground Wo/man by epistemology in a practical way.

I have said that, as different from the Underground Wo/man in Nietzsche and Dostoevsky, Marx's Underground Wo/man has a more concrete conception of society because of Marx's conception of communist society. This approach and Marx's species beings are criticized for their abstractness. However, apart from this problem, now I will compare the Underground Wo/man in Nietzsche and Dostoevsky with Marx's Underground Wo/man in terms of an assumption of an ideal society.

In Nietzsche and Dostoevsky my Underground Wo/man emerges as a killer. S/he reevaluates all modern values and tries to find a way of creating her/his own values. S/he proceeds in a hard way to become her/himself. S/he is interested in social and economical problems and s/he wants to see the real origins behind these problems. However s/he has not a hope for establishing a new system like Marx's communist society. This is because actually Dostoevsky and Nietzsche do not believe that we can achieve a society in which everyone can be equal. They emphasize that human nature is complicated and this complexity has cultural roots growing into centuries ago. Thus, it is impossible to remove these cultural determinations.

Nietzsche's explanations on master and slave instincts are connected with this issue. He states that these instincts can be found in ancient societies and they are the first instincts which organize culture and society. As I have explained these instincts reflect the difference between the aristocratic class and lower class. It cannot be said that Nietzsche defends master instincts easily; however it is clear that he argues that we cannot establish an ideal society by our slave instincts. He also emphasizes that it is difficult to remove slave instincts, since they have been settled centuries ago.

Furthermore, we can also find the traces of Nietzsche's explanations of these instincts in Dostoevsky's novels. Dostoevsky puts forward characters that are from the aristocratic class. He has an antagonistic attitude towards the lower class. I think that like Nietzsche he does not believe in an ideal society which

removes the implications of these instincts. While he invites us to the underground, he also finds the aristocratic class more advantageous. For this reason, he does not appreciate the revolutionary movements by the lower classes in his time.

I stated that nihilism has also an important problem for Nietzsche's thinking. Nietzsche emphasizes a positive influence of nihilism. He believes that nihilism may drive us to a way of revaluation and can be a method of dismissing the extant values of modernity. Thus, it may help our process of becoming. However I want to state that if we adopt nihilism and anarchism as eternal ways of becoming, the way of Underground Wo/man may be cut. S/he may remain in a jungle of nihilistic implications. Of course the anarchistic aspects of the process of becoming are important and drive us to reevaluate always. Yet, I believe that the socialist approach is not restrictive in this way as Nietzsche perceives.

Both Nietzsche and Dostoevsky criticize socialism and they find it contrary to human nature. I explained Nietzsche's emphasis upon nihilism. Dostoevsky has a different relation with nihilist movements in his time. In the 19th century nihilism is accepted as a revolutionary movement. The movements of socialists and nihilists are thought to be reconciled. Dostoevsky is antagonistic towards both of them; however he is also interested in both of them. In his novels he tries to analyze these revolutionary movements. He puts forward the despotic and harmful consequences of these movements for wo/man. These despotic consequences are connected with the method of organization of a revolutionary movement.

Dostoevsky and Nietzsche emphasize that to defend a socialist society and to struggle for this society may cause despotic influences. In addition it is not possible to establish such a society in a near future. Dostoevsky points to the influences of assemblies of elite and aristocratic groups instead of a revolutionary movement. He also does not trust the lower class for a revolution. He shares Nietzsche's anxieties concerning the slave instincts. Both of them think that it is so hard to remove slave instincts from society, since society has been culturally

bound by these instincts for a long time. I do not think that they have an antagonistic attitude towards the lower class, but their antagonism towards slave instincts become prominent.

I have stated that Marx's analysis is more compatible with my aim. I have also said that his Underground Wo/man is more advantageous concerning Marx's conception of an ideal society. However, I did not posit Marx's Underground Wo/man as a worker who is from the lower class. I think that Marx approaches both classes from a more objective viewpoint. He tries to approach in terms of labor conditions. In this sense, his investigations are more profound for my thesis. He emphasizes also the harmful influences of capitalism on capitalists. He claims that in a capitalist system no one can exert her/his species powers because of the capitalist mode of production. Since I want to achieve a concrete wo/man, I find Marx's approach is more fruitful. The investigations of alienation in working conditions render his philosophy a more comprehensive account.

The last point that I want to consider is concerning human nature. I did not aim at finding an Underground Wo/man who wants to actualize her/his nature. Or I did not aim at explaining human nature. Nietzsche, Dostoevsky and Marx try to leave this question open-ended. Marx's conception of species being is criticized for being inconsistent with his system at this point. However, I believe that he does not want to define a human nature strictly. He emphasizes the process of exerting species power. From his perspective slave instincts can be removed from society; since they are socially constructed, we can change them by a social organization. Unlike Nietzsche and Dostoevsky he has a difference at this point. I think that how we become ourselves is an important and open-ended question for all three of them. They emphasize the process of becoming. They indicate the practical implications of this process. My Underground Wo/man is connected with this process.

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APPENDIX A

TURKISH SUMMARY

Bu tezde özellikle Nietzsche ve Marx felsefelerine dayanarak, 19. yüzyılda ortaya çıkan bir yeraltı insanını açıklamaya çalıştım. Yeraltı İnsanı kavramını Kant düşüncesiyle yerleşmiş bir öznelliğin karşıtı olarak tanımladım. Bu yüzden Nietzsche ve Marx düşüncelerinde ortaya çıktığını iddia ettiğim Yeraltı İnsanı'nı Kant'ın öznesiyle karşılaştırdım. Tezimin ilk bölümünü Kant'a, ikincisini Nietzsche'ye üçüncüsünü de Marx'a ayırdım. Bu üç düşünür arasındaki karşılaştırmalı çalışmamı daha çok epistemoloji üzerinden yaptım.

Kant düşüncesindeki öznenin kastım, Aydınlanma ve modern felsefenin öne çıkardığı bir öznellik. Kant'ın öznesinin benim öne çıkarmak istediğim tarafı, bütün düşüncelerinin kaynağı ve yönlendiricisi olan bir özne olmasıdır. Kant'ın öznesi, Aydınlanma'nın tanımladığı şekilde, aklını kendi yönlendirme yetkinliğine sahip olan öznedir. Otonomi ve özgürlük bu öznenin en çok öne çıkarılan özellikleridir. Bu iki özellik aşırı derecede bir anlam yüklenmiş bir rasyonalite düşüncesiyle de desteklenmiştir. Nietzsche ve Marx felsefelerinde ortaya çıktığını düşündüğüm Yeraltı İnsanı özellikle bu noktalarda Kant'ın öznesine uymayan ve ona karşıt bir insandır. Marx ve Nietzsche otonomi, özgürlük ve rasyonellik kavramlarına Kant'tan farklı yaklaşır. Bu farklılıklar onların Kant'tan farklı olarak geliştirdikleri, epistemolojik yaklaşımlarının incelenmesiyle daha iyi açıklanabilir. Bu yüzden Yeraltı İnsanı kavramını epistemolojik iddiaların farklılığından yola çıkarak anlatmaya çalıştım.

Kant'ın özgürlük, otonomi ve rasyonalite kavramlarını öne çıkarmasında kendinden önceki metafiziği ve ontolojiyi dogmatik ve skeptik bulduğu için

eleştirmesi etkilidir. Kant'a göre bu iki hata, felsefenin en büyük düşmanlarıdır. Kant, aklın ideleri ve dışardaki şeylerin varlığı arasında doğrudan bir bağlantı kurulmasına itiraz eder. Bu ikisi arasında doğrudan ve yüzeysel bir bağlantı kurulmasının dogmatizm ve skeptisizm tehlikelerine yol açabileceğini vurgular. Kant'a göre, eğer bunları özdeş kabul edersek, ne bilimizin nasıl işlerlik kazanabildiğini ne de dışardaki nesnenin varlığını açıklayabiliriz. Kant kendinden önceki metafiziğin böyle hatalara düştüğünü, kendi felsefesinin de bunları aşabileceğini iddia eder.

Bunların çözümü ve felsefeye meşru bir zemin kazandırmak için, Kant aşkınsal idealizm adını verdiği kendi felsefesini geliştirir. Daha önceki felsefenin sorunlarını çözmek için, aklın kendi kendisini sıkı bir eleştiriden geçirmesi gerektiğini iddia eder. Aklın kendi başına ve deneyim alanıyla birlikte neler yapabileceği sorularını yanıtlamaya çalışır. Bu soru onun için metafiziğin alanına dair bir sorgulamadır. Kant için metafizik ontolojik iddiaların geneline ve mümkün olup olmadığına dair bir incelemedir. Kendi döneminde metafiziğin tehlikeye düştüğünü ve bu sorunun çözülmesi gerektiğini düşünür. Kant, genel olarak öznelliği vurgulamasıyla bilinmesine rağmen, onun için hem öznellik hem de ontolojik iddiaların imkânı aynı derecede önemli bir sorudur.

Kant'ın aşkınsal idealist olarak tanımladığı felsefesinde, çözüm temel bir varsayıma dayanır. Kant, Ortaçağ'dan kalma tanrının varlığına dair skolâstik kanıtları reddederek, bilinen şeylerin alanı ile olan şeylerin alanını ayırır. Ona göre olan şeylerin bizim bildiğimiz gibi olduğunu iddia etmek ve bu iki alanın özdeş olduğunu varsaymak yanlıştır. Böyle bir iddia temellendirilemez ve hem bilimizi hem de olan şeyin varlığını tehlikeye düşürür. Kant'a göre bizim idelerimiz kendinde şeye dair değildir. Gerçekte olan şeyler bizim bildiğimiz gibi değildir. Bence bu belirleme Kant düşüncesinin en önemli tarafıdır ve ayrıca bu iddia modern felsefenin en karakteristik iddiasıdır. Bu tezin arka planındaki iddia modern öznenin Kant'la birlikte varolana dair doğrudan bir yorumlama olanağının kesilmesidir. Kant'ın bu belirlemesi, modern öznenin epistemolojik iddialarının sınırına dair önemli bir ayırım getirir. Her ne kadar böyle bir şey hedeflemiş

olmasa da Kant'ın öznesinin en önemli karakteristiği bu sınırlılıktır. Tezimde bu durumu Kant felsefesinin beklenmeyen ve amaçlanmayan bir sonucu olarak değerlendirdim ve bu sonucu Kant felsefesinin modern düşünceye en önemli etkisi olduğunu vurguladım.

Konuyu daha iyi açıklamak için, tezimin ilk bölümünde Kant'ın epistemolojisini anlattım. Kant düşüncesinde neden kendinde şeyin bilinemeyeceğini, Kant'ın hangi sorunları çözmeye çalışırken buna başvurduğunu açıklamaya çalıştım. Kant, bilginin deneyim alanında başlasa da orada devam etmediğini ve *a priori* kavramlarla genişlediğini vurgular. Ona göre insan aklı her zaman kendinde şeye dair ontolojik iddialar ortaya atmak ister. Yani insan aklı her zaman metafiziğe eğilimlidir. Ancak bunu başaramaz. Kant'ın bu sonuca varmasında, aklın işlemesine dair ayrıntılı incelemesi etkilidir. Bu ayrıntılı incelemenin sonucunda ne gerçeklik ne de özne sistemli bir bütünlük içerisinde kalabilir. Aşkın metafiziğin hatalarına düşmemek için, Kant bir deneyim çokluğu içerisinde bilincin ve bilinen şeyin birliğini korumakta zorlanır.

Kant felsefesi en çok kendi bilincinin birliğini tam olarak bilemeyen bir özneliği savunduğu için eleştirilir. Tamalğının aşkınsal birliği ve her düşünceye eşlik eden “ben düşünüyorum” tasarımı Kant'ın felsefesinde tam olarak birleştirilemez. Aşkınsal analitikte zamansal ve mekânsal objelerin varlığına dar bir bilginin meşru temelleri sağlanmaya çalışılırken, aşkınsal diyalektik bölümünde aşkınsal çıkarımlar telikeye düştüğü için, Kant bir yandan yapmaya çalıştığını diğer yandan dağıtır. Kavramların deneyimin nesnelere uygulandığı aşkınsal şema da tartışmalıdır. Bu durum Kant'ın öznesinin usun içkinliğinde ve yoğunluğunda kaybolması olarak da değerlendirilir. Kant'ın evrensel temelde kurmaya çalıştığı öznenin tikel belirlenimleri ve dışardaki nesneye dair bilgisi tehlikededir. Kendi içinde bir bölünme söz konusudur. Kant epistemolojisinde, duyuları algılamadaki pasiflik ve kavramları uygulamadaki aktiflik harmanlanmamıştır. Kant'ın öznesi her zaman kendini toparlayamayan bir başka özneye referans vermektedir.

Bu durumun sonucunda Kant felsefesinde bir “çift kişilik” (doppelganger) problemi ortaya çıktığı iddia edilir. Kant’ın rasyonel ve evrensel olarak kurmaya çalıştığı özne kendi bilinci ve usuyla birleşmekte sorun yaşamaktadır. Evrensel ve zorunlu kategoriler, deneyim alanının çeşitliliği ve usun aşkınsal çıkarımları arasında sıkışmıştır. Kant’ın öznesi de bunların birleştirilmesindeki sorunlar ve usun enginliği arasında sıkışıp kalmıştır. Dolayısıyla, Kant’ın öznesi, kendi içinde yarılmıştır ve bir başka özneye karşılaşır. Bu sorun benim tezimdeki diğer düşünürler için de önemlidir. Çünkü onların felsefesine atfettiğim Yeraltı İnsanı kavramı Kant’ta birleştirilemeyen evrensellik ve tikellik sorunlarıyla ilişkilidir.

Kant düşüncesinde her zaman kendini hissettiren bir başka çelişki, doğa ve insan arasındaki gerilimdir. Kant her zaman doğadaki yaratıcılık ve düzenliliğe hayran olmuştur. İnsan bilgisine de böyle bir yapı yüklemeye çalışır. Bu yaklaşım aynı zamanda Aydınlanma düşüncesinin etkisidir. Ancak bu yükleme çabası, kendinde şeyin bilinebilmesine dair bir kuşkuculuğa ve yukarıda bahsettiğim gibi Kant’ın öznesinin kendi içinde bir yarılmasına yol açmıştır. Kant özneye güçlü ve meşru bir rasyonel yetkinlik kazandırmaya çalışırken, tam tersi sonuçlarla karşılaşmıştır. Doğa karşısında kendini güçsüz hisseden Kant’ın öznesi bu açığını estetik ve etik alanlarında da hisseder. Kant sadece etik alanında özneye kendinde şey alanına yaklaşma ve doğa karşısında güç kazanma imkânı verir.

Kant öznenin etik ilkeler konusunda iddialar öne sürmesinin ve herkes için ortak iyiyi istemesinin ancak usun özgürlüğüyle mümkün olduğunu söyler. Bu anlamda ahlak metafiziği olarak adlandırdığı etik iddialarda bulunma yetkinliğimiz sadece usumuza dayanır. Kant’a göre etik konusunda deneyim alanına güvenilemez ve bu konudaki yetkinlik sadece usumuzun özgürlüğüne ve yetkinliğine dayanır. Ayrıca, bu yetkinlik evrensel ve zorunlu olarak herkeste vardır. Kant düşüncesinde bilginin ve etik iddiaların olanağının temel dayanağı, usun özgürlüğü ve yetkinliğidir. Bu anlamda Kant etik konusunda özneye daha fazla bir yetkinlik yüklese de epistemolojisi ve etiği iç içedir.

Nietzsche felsefesinde de etik ve epistemoloji ve hatta ontoloji iç içe geçer. Nietzsche için de etik değerleri değerlendirmeye ve bilgiye dair her girişim öznenin otonomisine dayanır. Öznenin perspektifi ve yorumlaması temel bir öneme sahiptir. Ancak Nietzsche felsefesi temel olarak birçok noktada Kantçı düşüncenin eleştirisine dayanır.

Nietzsche Kant'ın doğaya ve insana yaklaşımını eleştirir. Aydınlanma ve modern felsefenin de bu konuda yanlış bir tutum takındığını iddia eder. Ona göre ne doğa ne de insan bilgisi sistematik ve düzenli bir bütünlük içerisindedir. Nietzsche için Aydınlanma düşüncesinin mirası olan bu varsayım Kant'ın felsefesini bilinmeyen bir gerçekliğe götürür. Ancak bu konuda sadece Kant'ı değil genel olarak felsefe tarihini de eleştirir. Ona göre görünen ve değişen dünyanın bir gerçekliği olmadığını, gerçek dünyanın ise bunun daha ilerisinde olduğunu düşünmek Platon ve Sokrates felsefelerinin uzantısı olan bir hatadır. Felsefe tarihinde birçok düşünür ve akım bu hatayı devam ettirmiştir. Aynı zamanda Hıristiyanlık ve diğer tek tanrılı dinler de bu yaklaşımı benimsemiştir. Bu yaklaşım doğruluk ve değer yüklü olmayan bir dünyanın kabul edilmesine yol açar. Böyle tasarlanan bir dünya bilinmeyen ve soyut bir gerçekliğin insanların karşısına dikilmesine neden olur.

Epistemolojik olarak Nietzsche Kant'ın kategorilerinin *a priori*, soyut ve evrensel olarak zorunlu ve verili kabul edilmesini eleştirir. Nietzsche'ye göre kavramlar, bilgiye ulaşmada aracıdır. Ancak, onların evrensel ve zorunlu olduklarını söyleyemeyiz. İnsan bilgisi bunlara ihtiyaç duyar ama bu sadece giderilmesi gereken bir ihtiyaçtır. Kavramlar, insanların gerçekliğe bakışını ve yorumlamasını düzenlemeye yardımcı olur ama bilgimizin asıl kaynağı değildir. Öznel yorumlar ve perspektifler herhangi bir kavramsal şemaya indirgenmeye çalışılmamalıdır. Bilgimizin asıl kaynağı her şeye belli bir açıdan bakıp yorumlamamızdır. Nietzsche'ye göre Kant, bilinen şey ve bilen özne arasında soyut engeller koymaktadır. Evrensel ve *a priori* olarak kabul edilen kavramlar soyut engeller haline gelir. Bu engeller olan biten şeyleri olduğu gibi algılamamızı engeller. Kant'ın insana, doğaya ve bilgiye yaklaşımı korkakçadır; çünkü olan

biteni deęişkenlięi ve çeşitlilięi içinde algılamak yerine bunun yerine deęişmeyen ve daha kolay bilinen bir gerçeklik tasarımı getirmeye çalışır.

Güç istenci ve perspektifçilik, Nietzsche epistemolojisinin ve ontolojisinin en önemli iki kavramıdır. Nietzsche'ye göre ne gerçeklik, ne doğa, ne de insan bilgisi bilimsel bir bütünlük içerisinde deęildir. Güç istenci kavramını genel olarak tüm gerçeklięi ve hayatı anlatmak için kullanır. Güç istenci herhangi bir kavramla genişletilemez ya da herhangi bir kavrama indirgenemez. Kendinden önce ya da sonra bilinebilecek herhangi bir şey yoktur. Nietzsche güç istenci kavramını gerçeklięi bir oluş süreci içerisinde anlatmak için kullanır. Ona göre gerçeklik kaotik ve deęişkendir. İnsan bilgisi bunu düzenlemek için kavramları kullanmak zorundadır, ama güç istenci kavramsal bir şey deęildir. Var olan her şey bir güç merkezidir. Güç merkezleri varolmak ve gücünü arttırmak için çalışır ve birbiriyle sürekli bir ilişki içerisinde. Dünya bu ilişkilerin yer aldığı bir akış içerisinde.

Nietzsche'ye göre bilgiye dair her bir yönelişimiz güç istencini yorumlama çabasıdır. Ona göre bilgi cesaret gerektirir, çünkü bilginin kendisi de bir güç istencedir. Nietzsche için, bilgide öznenin perspektifi ve yorumlaması temel bir öneme sahiptir. Öznellięi vurgulamak Kant felsefesinin de temel bir amacı kabul edilir. Ama Kant'tan farklı olarak, Nietzsche Kant'ın öznellięe evrensel ve sistematik bir bütünlük sağlama çabasını eleştirir. Bu sistemleştirme ve bilimselleştirme çabası ona göre güç istencini kavramsallaştırma ve indirgeme çabasıdır. Nietzsche'ye göre Kant insan bilgisinin ihtiyaçlarından ve sınırlılıęından doğan aşamaları evrensel bir doğru gibi göstermeye çalışır. Nietzsche temel olarak bu çabaya itiraz eder. Ona göre bu çaba korkakçadır. Çünkü bütün deęişkenlięi, yaratıcılıęı ve kaotik yapısıyla güç istencini anlamayı deęil, ona farklı ve kolay bir şekil vermeyi amaçlamaktadır.

Nietzsche'nin Kant'a bir dięer eleştirisi, rasyonellik ve bilinçlilięe dairdir. Kant bilginin her aşamasında bilinçli olduğumuzu ve insan bilgisinin imkânının temel olarak bu bilinçlięe dayandığını iddia eder. Nietzsche'ye göre rasyonel tarafımız sadece bilinçli deęil aynı zamanda bilinçsiz taraflarımızdan oluşur. Onun

için, Kant'ın düşündüğü gibi, insanın tamamıyla bilinçli olarak bilgiye ulaşması gibi bir durum söz konusu değildir. Bilincimizin yardımıyla oluşan kavramlarımızı bilinçli olmayanlardan ayırmak imkânsızdır. Bu bağlamda Nietzsche, Kant'ın rasyonelliğe ve bilgiye yüklediği soyut ve abartılı role itiraz eder. Bunlarla ilişkili olarak, Nietzsche için Aydınlanma'nın getirdiği otonomi ve özgürlük kavramları da problemlidir. Ona göre özgürlük ve otonomi bugüne kadar gelen bilgidaki evrensel tarafları ortaya çıkarmakla ilişkili olarak anlaşılabilir. Özgürlük ve bilgiye dair her bir adım bir yeniliği ve yeniden yorumlamayı gerektirir.

Bu noktada, Nietzsche etik alanında da yeni değerler oluşturma çabasını ve epistemolojiyi birbirinden ayırmaz. Nietzsche etik konusunda Kant'taki akıl ve usun özgürlüğü vurgulamasına itiraz eder. Kant'ın bu vurguyla bu dünyadan ayrı ve çok daha doğru kabul edilen değer yüklü bir dünyaya işaret ettiğine ve bunun da bir özgürlük değil boyunduruk anlamına geldiğine dikkat çeker. Kant'ın deneyim alanının ötesinde tutmaya çalıştığı etik kavramlarını ve iddialarını deneyim alanına geri döndürmeye çalışır.

Nietzsche etiğe dair kavramlarımızın sosyal ve kültürel bir zeminde ortaya çıktığına dikkat çeker. Her kavramın sosyal koşullar içerisinde bir tarihselliği olduğunu ve bu durumun toplumun yöneten ve yönetilen sınıflarıyla ilgili olduğunu söyler. Bu şekilde Kant'ın yaptığının tam tersine etik ilkelerin doğruluk ve değer yüklü bir öte dünyadan değil de deneyim dünyasından geldiğini göstermeyi amaçlar. Başka bir ifadeyle etiğe tarihsel ve sosyal bir bağlam kazandırır. Etik ve epistemolojisi iç içe geçtiği için, epistemolojiye de sosyal ve tarihsel bir yönelimi söz konusudur.

Nietzsche için köle ve efendi içgüdüleri etik kavramlarımızın ve iddialarımızın oluşmasında önemli bir rol oynar. Onun için bu iki içgüdü hem bütün toplumların tarihinde hem de her insanda görülebilen içgüdülerdir. Ancak Nietzsche bunları daha çok eski toplumlarda etik kurallarının ve belirlemelerinin nasıl geliştiğini anlatmak için kullanır. Ona göre her toplumda bir egemen sınıf bir de daha aşağı ve yönetilen bir sınıf bulunur. Egemen sınıfın üyeleri kendi ahlaki

değerlerini oluşturma konusunda daha cesaretlidir ve bu konuda kendi kurallarını ortaya koyabilirler. Nietzsche bu sınıfın taşıdığı içgüdüğü efendi içgüdüğü olarak adlandırır, ama bu aynı zamanda kendi kurallarını koyma cesareti olan her insan için de geçerlidir. Yani efendi ve köle içgüdülerinin hem toplumsal hem de kişisel bir boyutu vardır.

Toplumun daha aşağı kısmında ya da kendi kurallarını koyma cesareti olmayan insanlarda ise bir köle içgüdüğü hâkimdir. Köle içgüdüğüne sahip olanlar, “herkesin yararına” ve “herkes için” çağrışımlarına uyarak, ahlaki savlarına kendilerinin ötesinde bir sebep arar. Dolayısıyla, bu içgüdü insanların kendi kurallarını ortaya koyma çabasını engeller. Nietzsche’ye göre Kant’ın ahlak yasası, Aydınlanma felsefesi ve modern felsefe ancak bir köle ahlakı örneği olabilir.

Nietzsche’ye göre köle ahlakına uyan insanlar kendi usunun özgürlüğünü soyut bir özgürlük olarak benimser. Bu özgürlüğü Kant’ın iddiasındaki gibi ancak belli yasalara uyma zorunluluğu olarak kabul ederler. Daha önce de söylediğim gibi, hem Kant hem de Nietzsche için, etik değerler ve savlarda öznenin otonomisi temel bir role sahiptir. Ancak Nietzsche, öznenin kendi değerlendirmelerini ortaya sürmesini vurgulasa da, Kant gibi usun özgürlüğünü ve yetkinliğini etiğin temelinde koymaz. Etik değerlerin ve savların oluşumunda diğer unsurlara dikkat çeker. Ona göre varolan değerlerin sorgulanması ve öznenin yaratıcı, yorumlayıcı gücü önemlidir. Ancak Kant’ın söylediği gibi bu güç, herkes için geçerli olacak evrensel bir kural oluşturma için kullanılamaz. Daha doğrusu etik temellendirme bu şekilde yapılamaz. Nietzsche’ye göre etikte sürekli bir yeniden değerlendirme çabası önemlidir. Bu çaba toplumsal koşullardan etkilenir ve etik değerler sosyal ilişkiler içerisinde şekillenir. Kant ise bu ilişkiler ve koşulları göz önünde bulundurmayıp evrensel kurallara ulaşmaya çalışır. Kant’a göre herkeste ortak olan yeniden değerlendirme ve etik kuralları ortaya koyma yetisi evrensel doğrulara işaret ederken, Nietzsche de bu her öznenin kendi kurallarını koyabildiği bir farklılığa ve çeşitliliğe işaret eder.

Nietzsche'nin Yeraltı İnsanı bu anlamda modern değerleri yerle bir edip yeniden değerlendirebilen bir özne olarak ortaya çıkar. Kendi içinde bir ahlak yasasına dair bir şey bulamaz. Önüne koyulan her değeri sorgulayıp dağıtır. Nietzsche'ye göre Kantçı eleştiri eksiktir ve sürekli evrensel değerler peşinde koşarak yeni boyunduruk merkezleri bulmaya çalışır. Oysa Nietzsche'nin Yeraltı İnsanı her değeri daha derin bir eleştiriye tabi tutarak, modern felsefenin doğru kabul ettiği evrensellik atfedilen bütün değerleri alt üst eder. Nietzsche'nin çekiçle yaptığı felsefe, böyle bir insanı ortaya çıkarır.

Nietzsche'nin Yeraltı İnsanı bilgiye ve etiğe dair her çabanın bir yok etme çabası olduğunun farkındadır. Nietzsche için bilgi ve ahlak evrensel ve zorunlu olan kavramlarla değil cesaretle ve yok etme gücüyle yapılır. Nietzsche'nin Yeraltı İnsanı'yla karşılaştırıldığında, Kant'ın modern öznesi bu cesarettten yoksundur. Kendi aklını evrensel bir akıl ve kurallar bütünlüğü olarak koyutlayarak, onun boyunduruğu altına girmeye çalışır. Ancak Yeraltı İnsanı her an bir şeyleri dağıtıp yeniden kurma gücüne sahiptir. Bundan yorulmaz ve kaçmak için evrensel kurallara sığınma girişiminde bulunmaz.

Nietzsche'nin Yeraltı İnsanı *Şen Bilim*'de Tanrı'yı öldüren deli adam olarak ortaya çıkar. Bütün değerleri dağıtınca ortaya herhangi bir egemen fikrin ya da tanrısal dayanağın olmadığı bir dünya çıkmıştır. Nietzsche'nin Yeraltı İnsanı bu durumu "tanrı öldü" diye tanımlar. Yeniden değerlendirmelerin ve bütün kavramları derin bir eleştiriden geçirmenin sonucu olarak, ortaya bu sonuç çıkmıştır. Nietzsche'nin Yeraltı İnsanı boşlukta kalmış ve yeni bir tanrı arayışı içindeymiş gibi görünür ama amacı kesinlikle bu değildir. Bu durumu ortaya çıkarmanın kendisi olduğunun farkındadır ve kendi gücüyle herhangi bir tanrısal, evrensel kavrama başvurmadan ayakta kalmak ister. Yeraltı İnsanı, insanların belli bir zamanda ve kültürel ortamda oluşturduğu etik değerlere bir evrensellik yükleme çabasının anlamlı olmadığına inanır. Ona göre önemli olan kendindeki yeniden yaratma ve değerlendirme gücüdür.

Nietzsche'ye göre insanlara ve etiğe dair bir şeyler söylemek için, Kant'ın tam aksine deneyim alanlarını incelememiz gerekir. Onun için, Dostoyevski büyük bir psikologdur. Dostoyevski'nin romanları insanlara dair önemli kaynaklardır. Özellikle Dostoyevski'nin *Ölümler Evinden Hatıralar* gibi cezaevindeki suçluların psikolojisini incelediği romanlar Nietzsche'ye göre çok değerlidir.

Dostoyevski de 19. yüzyılda hâkim olan insanları belli evrensel kabüller çerçevesinde açıklama girişimine itiraz eder. Hem Nietzsche hem de Dostoyevski insanlara dair bilimsel açıklamaların yüzeysel kalmaya mahkûm olduğunu düşünür. Onlara göre bunların ötesinde insanların formüllerle açıklanamayan ve daha karmaşık tarafları vardır. Özellikle 19. yüzyılda modern düşüncenin etkisiyle rasyonel ve bilinçli bir öznenin vurgulanması Nietzsche ve Dostoyevski'yi rahatsız eder. Her ikisinde de bilimsel formüllerle sınırlanmak ve hesaplanmak istemeyen bir insan ortaya çıkar. Yeraltı İnsanı bu insandır.

Dostoyevski'nin kahramanları, Nietzsche'nin iddiasındaki gibi toplumsal ve tanrısal referansları olan etik normlar yerine kendi değerlerini ortaya koyma çabası içerisindedir. Bu anlamda Raskolnikov ve Stavrogin gibi Dostoyevski romanlarının önemli kahramanları kendi etik kurallarını uygulayıp tanrının, dinin kurallarının yerine kendilerinininkini koymaya çalışır. İnsan öldürmek, çocuk tacizi gibi evrensel olarak kötü kabul edilen kuralları sorgularlar. İnsanların ve toplumun bu şekilde normlar olmadan nasıl yaşayacağını araştırırlar. Ama Dostoyevski'nin kahramanları tanrıyı öldürme konusunda başarılı olamazlar. Dostoyevski insan doğasındaki çeşitliliğe ve yaratıcı güce dair çarpıcı çözümler ve incelemeler yapsa da zaman zaman onun kahramanlarının bir tanrı ve din arayışı içinde olduğu gözlemlenebilir.

Sonuç olarak hem Nietzsche hem de Dostoyevski'ye göre insanlar Kant'ın yaptığı gibi belli bir us kavramına dayanarak ve rasyonellik yetisi vurgulanarak açıklanamaz. Bu durumda Nietzsche'nin belirttiği gibi Kant'ın öznesi her zaman bilinmeyen bir doğa ile karşı karşıya kalmaya mahkûmdur. Çünkü hem kendisiyle hem de dışardaki şeylerle arasına soyut belirlenimler koymaktadır.

Somutta ise insan doğası karmaşıktır. Bu anlamda Nietzsche'nin ve Dostoyevski'nin Yeraltı İnsanı bu belirlenimlere ve insana dair bilimsel ve bütünsel açıklamalara karşıt olarak ortaya çıkar. Bu anlamda her ikisinin düşüncesinde de insan algılayışına dair anarşist bir eğilim gözlemlenebilir.

Tezimin son bölümünü Marx'a ayırdım. Marx'ın öznesinin de Kant'taki öznellik anlayışına karşıt olarak daha somut ve gerçek bir özneye işaret ettiğini vurguladım. Marx da böyle bir öznenin ortaya çıkışı da Marx'ın epistemolojik savları ekonomik ve toplumsal ilişkiler açısından incelemesi neden olmuştur. Dolayısıyla Marx düşüncesinde göstermeye çalıştığım Yeraltı İnsanı Marx'ın ayrıntılı bir kapitalist üretim ilişkileri çözümlemesinden çıkmıştır. Bu çözümleme Marx'ın epistemolojiye ve ideoloji kavramına dair getirdiği yeni bir boyutla da bağlantılıdır.

Epistemolojik olarak Marx felsefesi Hegel'in geliştirdiği diyalektik felsefeyi benimser. Hegel, Kant'ın kendinde şey kavramını ve onun bilgisine dair kuşkuculuğu eleştirir. Ona göre bu kavram düşüncenin kendi içinde bir soyutlamadır. Hegel felsefesi, Olmak, Yokluk ve Oluş kavramlarıyla Kant'ın ontolojik iddialarına yeni bir boyut kazandırmaya çalışır. Bu kavramlar aracılığıyla Hegel, Kant'ın bilinmeyen olarak konumlandığı alanı çözümlemeye ve bu alana dair kuşkuculuktan kurtulmaya çalışır.

Kant'ın doğa ve insan anlayışı yerine Hegel, dinamik bir doğa ve bilgi açıklaması öne sürmek ister. Tarihsellik kavramını devreye sokar. Hegel'in diyalektik yöntemi bu dinamizmi açıklamayı ve Kant'ın soyut olarak bıraktıklarını somutlaştırmayı amaçlar.

Hegel'e göre düşünce ve varlık özdeşdir. Diyalektik, düşüncenin ve varlığın gelişim sürecidir. Bu gelişim sürecinde herhangi bir şeyi açıklamaya çalışırken Hegel bir şeyin kendi karşıtını da içinde taşıdığına ve herhangi bir şeyin varlığını düşünmenin onun aynı zamanda yokluğunu da düşünmek anlamına geldiğine işaret eder. Hegel için, sadece düşünce alanında kalarak varlığa dair bir açıklama yapamayız. Böyle yaparsak Kant'taki gibi sadece soyut kavramlarla baş başa

kalırız. Hegel bu hatayı hem soyut hem de somut olanı kendi tarihsellikleri içinde bir arada kavramayı amaçlayan diyalektik yöntemiyle aşmaya çalışır.

Hegel soyut, somut ve olumsuzlamanın iç içe geçtiği bir yöntem öne sürer. Bu da bir anlamda kendi karşıtını içinde taşıyan bir akış ve tamamlanmamış bir sürece denk düşer. Ona göre hem soyut hem de somut olan bu olumsuzlama sürecine tabidir. Bu bağlamda Hegel'e göre Kant'taki gibi düşünce ve varlık birbirinden ayrıktır değildir. Hegel, Kant'ın soyut ve *a priori* kıldığı kategorilere bir zamansallık ve tarihsellik yükler. Eğer herhangi bir şeyi kendi tarihselliğinde ve ötekisiyle ilişkisi içinde açıklamaya çalışırsak, Kant'taki kuşkuculuktan kurtulabileceğimizi iddia eder. Hegel'e göre bir şeyin görünümü ve özü onun belirlenimleridir ve öz de belirlenimlerin incelenmesiyle görünebilir.

Görünüm ve öz arasındaki ayrımı Marx da kabul eder. Ancak aralarında Hegel'in kabul ettiği gibi ayrılamaz bir ilişki olduğunu iddia eder ve olan biteni bu ilişkisellik içinde açıklamaya çalışır. Bu yaklaşım Marx'ın Kant'taki gibi bilinmeyen ve soyut olarak kurgulanmış bir gerçeklik yerine Hegel'inki gibi akış içerisinde bir gerçeklik tasarlamasını sağlar. Bununla birlikte Marx'ın epistemolojisiyle ilişkili iddiaları da toplumsal bir bağlam kazanır.

Marx gerçekliğin görünen ve daha açık olan kısmının bilimsel bir eleştiriden geçirilerek asıl ve görünmeyen taraflarının ortaya çıkarılabileceğini savunur. Bu yöntemini kapitalist üretim ilişkilerinin incelenmesi için uygular. Ona göre 18. yüzyıldan başlayarak kendi dönemine kadar gelen düşünürler gerçekliğin görünen kısmını soyutlaştırıp mutlaklaştırmaya çalışır. Özellikle ekonomi politikçiler ve iktisatçılar, bu yüzyıllarda gelişip 19. Yüzyılda doruk noktasına ulaşan kapitalizmi mutlak bir doğru olarak benimsetme çabası içerisindeydi. Gerçekliğin görünen kısmını sorgulamak yerine, bunu evrensel bir doğru gibi kabul ederler. Bu durumda kapitalizm insanlığın asla değiştiremeyeceği bir sistem gibi görünür. Ayrıca Marx bu bakış açısını dar ve sığ bulur. Bu şekilde insanların birbirinden soyutlanarak incelendiğini ve bu inceleme yönteminin gerçek, somut insanı açıklamak yerine soyut ve gerçek dışı bir özne ortaya çıkardığını vurgular.

“İnsan ihtiyaçları sınırsızdır” ve “insanlar doğuştan bencildir” gibi genellemeler kapitalizmin doğru kabul ettirmeye çalıştığı iddialardır. Marx kendi döneminin filozoflarını ve ekonomistlerini bunları doğru ve evrensel kabul ettirmeye çalışmakla suçlar. Kendi felsefesinin bu şekilde görünen iddiaları derin bir sorgulamaya tutan bir eleştiri yöntemi sunduğunu iddia eder. Bu yöntemi *Alman İdeolojisi*'nde diğer düşünürlerin soyut olandan başladığı halde kendi yönteminin somut ve gerçek bir olaydan ve somut, gerçek insanlardan yola çıktığını söyleyerek anlatır.

Bu bakış açısıyla Marx kapitalist üretim biçiminin insanlar üzerindeki yıkıcı ve türsel varlıklarını engelleyici taraflarına dikkat çeker. 19. yüzyılda sermaye ve büyük toprak arazileri belli kişilerin ellerinde toplandığı için bunlara sahip olmayan, fabrika ve tarlalarda çalışmak zorunda olan insanların yaşantısı günden güne kötüleşmiştir. Sürekli artan bir sefalet içinde yaşayan işçi sınıfının kendi yaşantısı ve emek süreci üzerindeki belirleme gücü oldukça azalmıştır. İşçi sınıfının bütün yaşantısı ve düşünceleri yöneten ve sermaye sahibi olan sınıf tarafından belirlenmeye başlamıştır. Bu bağlamda Marx kapitalist üretim biçiminin daha önceki ekonomik sistemlerden farklı olarak, insanların kontrol edemediği ve tamamen sermayenin gelişimi lehine ilerleyen bir sistem olduğunu vurgular. Marx bu noktada ideoloji kavramını öne sürerek konuya yeni bir açıklama getirmeye çalışır.

Tezimde, Marx'ın ideoloji üzerine görüşlerini insan bilinci ve ekonomik koşulların belirleyici ilişkileri yönünden açıklamaya çalıştım. Marx insanın bilişsel etkinliklerini dış dünyadan aldığı etkilenimlerle beraber açıklamaya çalışır. Toplumsal ve ekonomik ilişkilerin insan bilinci üzerindeki etkisini vurgular. Marx'a göre, kafa ve kol emeğinin ayrılması insan bilinci ve idealizmin gelişmesi üzerinde çok önemli bir etki yapmıştır. İnsanların bir kısmının bunlardan birinden tamamen soyutlanarak diğerine yönelmesinin, idealizmin gelişmesine ve bazı soyut kavramların mutlak doğru olarak kabul edilmesine yol açtığını vurgular. Marx ve Engels için bu durum yanlış bir bilinçlenmeye ve gerçekliğin görünen

kısının mutlaklaştırılmasına yol açmıştır. Kapitalizm ideolojisi bu yanlış bilinçlenmenin bir sonucudur.

İdeolojinin gelişmesini etkileyen bir diğer unsur, yöneten sınıfın yanlış bilinçlenme sonucu kabul edilen ve mutlaklaştırılan sonuçları kendi çıkarı için kullanmasıdır. Marx bu şekilde kapitalist üretim biçiminin yöneten ve üretim araçlarına sahip olan sınıf tarafından mutlak ve doğru olarak dayatılması sürecine dikkat çeker. Marx'a göre sermayeye sahip olan sınıf tarafından bu dayatmanın sonucu olarak kapitalist üretim ilişkileri yerleşerek insan hayatının her alanına nüfuz eder. Kendi hayatları üzerindeki denetimi tamamen kaybeden insanlar, bu sistemde türsel varlıklarını ve kendilerini gerçekleştirme şansını bulamaz.

Marx'ın Yeraltı İnsanı kapitalist üretim ilişkilerinde herhangi bir sermaye ve üretim aracına sahip olmayan ve hayatını devam ettirmek için fabrikaya ya da tarlaya çalışmaya giden bir insandır. Fabrikanın kapısından girdiğinde “iş olmayan giremez” yazısıyla karşılaşan bu insan, çalışma koşullarında ona bu sistemle ilgili söylenenlerin hiçbir gerçekliği olmadığını fark eder. Marx'ın Yeraltı İnsanı'ndan kastım, sınıf bilincine ulaşmış bir işçi değildir. Ancak kapitalist üretim biçimindeki çalışma koşullarının kendi hayatı üzerindeki olumsuz etkilerini ve yabancılaşmayı fark etmeye başlayan insandır. Bu farkındalık Marx'ın Yeraltı İnsanı'nın temel karakteristiğidir.

Yabancılaşma insanın kendi hayatı, emek süreci ve emek ürünü üzerindeki denetimini kaybetmesiyle başlar. Marx daha önceki üretim biçimlerinde böyle bir durumun olmadığına dikkat çeker. İlkçağ'da ya da Ortaçağ'daki zanaatkârlık ve lonca sistemlerinde insanlar kendi işlerini denetmek ve kendi yaşamını gerçekleştirmek için benimsemek şansına sahiptir. Emek ürünleri ve emek süreçleri hayatlarının ve kendi türsel varlıklarının bir parçasıdır.

Marx türsel varlık kavramlarıyla genel olarak yaşam biçimimizi ve kendimizi gerçekleştirme sürecimizi anlatır. Bu kavram hayatımızı devam ettirmek için zorunlu olarak çalışmamız dışında kendi yetenek ve ilgi alanlarımızı geliştirmemiz ve kendimizi açığa vurmamız için yapılan etkinlikleri de kapsar.

Kısacası insan olmak derken kastedilen şeyler Marx'a göre türsel varlığımızı oluşturur. Bu etkinliklerde farkındalık ve kendimizi gerçekleştirme sürecimiz önemlidir.

Marx için türsel varlık aynı zamanda gerçek ve somut insan dediği kişiyi anlatmak için de önemlidir. Özellikle ilk dönem eserlerinde geçen bu kavram modern devletle birlikte tanımlanan soyut yurttaş ve özel alan ve kamusal alan arasındaki ayırımla da ilişkilidir. Ona göre Hegel'in ve Bauer'in devlet ve yurttaş anlayışları problemlidir, gerçek insana tekabül etmez. Gerçekte olmayan ama olması gereken bir insana işaret ederler. Bu durumda modern devlet kavramıyla birlikte gelişen Fransız Devrimi'nden kalan özgürlük, eşitlik ve kardeşlik gibi kavramlarda problemlidir. Marx'ın özgürlük anlayışı üzerimizdeki engellerin kalkması ya da politik olarak seçme ve seçilme haklarıyla ilişkili değildir. Devleti ve toplumu incelerken herkesin kendini türsel varlık olarak gerçekleştirdiği koşulları sağlamanın yollarını araştırır. Ona göre modern dönemdeki gibi, devlet soyut bir hak verme ve ceza verme kurumu olarak insana dışsal olarak tasarlandığı sürece bu koşullar sağlanamaz. Toplumsal kurallar bireyler tarafından benimsenip içselleştirilmelidir. Ancak bireylerin kendi hayatlarını toplumun ve kamunun hayatından ayrı görmediği bir sistemde Marx'ın türsel varlık dediği insan olma koşulları sağlanabilir.

Kapitalizm öncesi toplumlarda toprak mülkiyeti ve insanların yaptığı iş, insanların aynı zamanda karakterini belirleyen kavramlardır. Marx kapitalizmle birlikte bu durumun nasıl farklılaştığına dikkat çeker. Artık mülkiyet tamamen bireyselleştirilip özelleştirilmiş ve insanlar hangi işi yaparsa yapsın kendini gerçekleştiremediği bir durum yerleşmiştir. Emek süreci artık insanların sadece zorunlu olarak yapmak zorunda oldukları bir sürece işaret etmektedir.

Bütün bu koşulların sonucu yabancılaşmadır. Marx'ın Yer altı İnsanı kendini yabancılaşmış bir hayatta hiçbir şeyi denetleyemez bulmuştur. Bu koşullar altında kendini gerçekleştirmek bir yana artı emeğinin sömürüldüğü ve çok kötü koşullar altında çalıştırıldığı bir durumdadır. Hem hayatına, hem yaşadığı yere

hem de işine yabancılaşmıştır. Kendini hiçbirine ait hissetmez. Marx türsel varlık kavramını insanın olması gerektiği soyut bir varlık biçimi olarak kavramsallaştırmamaya çalışır. Yeraltı İnsanın olması gereken biçimi türsel varlık değildir. Ancak onun felsefesinde ortaya çıktığını iddia ettiğim Yeraltı İnsanı 19. Yüzyılın genel olarak kabul ettiği ve dayattığı bir öznellikten ziyade gerçek insana daha yakındır. Böyle bir insanın Marx'ın felsefesinde ortaya çıkması onun epistemolojik iddiaların ve bu yüzyılda doğru kabul edilen savların kökenine inme çabasıdır. Bu durumda hayatının problemleri ve sıkıntılı tafralarının nedenlerinin farkında olmaya başlayan ve kendi yabancılaşmasını çözümlenmeye çalışan bir insan ortaya çıkmıştır. Marx'ın Yer altı İnsanı dediğim insan tam olarak bu insana tekabül eder.

Bu çalışma süresince genel olarak modern özne deneni kavramının neden soyut bulunduğu ve özellikle 19. Yüzyıldan itibaren neden eleştirilmeye başlandığını incelemek istedim. Bu soyut bulunma sürecinde ortaya çıkan ve daha somut olduğu iddia edilen başka bir İnsanı özellikle Nietzsche ve Marx felsefelerine dayalı anlatmak istedim. Bu iki düşünürü seçmemin nedeni bu amaç için uygun olduklarına inanmamdır. Her iki düşünürde de bu insanın ortaya çıkma koşulları farklıdır. İlk başta Nietzsche ve Marx'ın Yeraltı İnsanı'nın da çok farklı olduğu söylenebilir. Ancak ben aralarında benzerlikler olduğunu düşündüm ve bunları açıklamaya çalıştım. Nietzsche'deki Yeraltı İnsanı daha güçlü ve daha etkin gibi görünse de Marx'ın benim amacım için daha uygun olduğunu da belirttim.

Benzerlik kurmaya çalıştığım nokta epistemolojiktir. Kant'ın "kendinde şey" bilinemez savından yola çıkarak modern insanın yepyeni ve bilinmeyen bir dünyada kendini tanımaya çalışan bir insan olduğunu vurguladım. Modern dünya ve modern hayat koşullarını deneyimleyen bu insan bunları anlamakta zorlanmaktadır. Bu bilinemezlik vurgusu Nietzsche ve Marx için kabul edilemezdir. Nietzsche ve Marx, Kant'ın neden böyle düşündüğünü ve nasıl bu sonuca vardığını bu bilinmeyen dünyayı toplumsal, politik ve ekonomik koşulları inceleyerek açıklamaya çalışır. Bu açıdan her iki düşünürün epistemolojiye daha

pratik ve sosyal bir zemin kazandırmaya çalıştığını söyledim. Bu zemin Yer altı İnsanın ortaya çıkmasını sağlamıştır.

Nietzsche'ye yakın olan Dostoyevski'nin yaklaşımı da benim tezim için önemlidir. Romanlarındaki farklı karakterlerle 19. Yüzyılda yeterince anlatılmadığını düşündüğü bir insanı anlatmaya çalışır. Dostoyevski ve Nietzsche'nin vurgusu insan doğasının sanılandan ve anlatılandan çok daha karmaşık olması ve bilimsel olarak hesaplanılamazlığıdır. Marksist bakış açısını ve sosyalizmi de bu hesaplanılamayan tarafı sınırlandıran ve mutlaklaştıran yanlış bir yaklaşım olarak değerlendirirler. Her iki düşünürün zamanın sosyalist ve devrimci hareketlerine bakışı benzerdir.

Ancak tezimde Marx'ın da bu karmaşık ve deneyim içerisinde sürekli gelişen insan anlayışına yakın olduğunu savundum. Marx'ın kapitalizm ve sosyalizm üzerinde görüşleri insanların birbirine benzediği bir sistemi dayatmaktan çok insanların farklılıkları ve türsel varlıklarını gerçekleştirebildiği bir sistemi savunmaktır. Marx bugüne kadar yapılan felsefeden farklı olarak kendi amacı için daha somut ve gerçek bir yöntem öne sürer. Kendi felsefesinin yorumlamayı aşırp deęiştirmeyi hedeflediğini söylemesi de bu yüzdendir. Marx'ın Yeraltı İnsanı ya da genel olarak insan olmak dediği şey bir aynılaştırma sürecine tekabül etmez. Marx'ın Yeraltı İnsanı derken olanın ötesinde ya da gerisinde kalmış, anlatılmamış ve bilimsel bir yöntemle incelenmemiş bir insanı kastettim.

Somit çalışma ve yaşam koşullarını incelemek Marx'ın yöntemine bir dinamizm ve esneklik getirmiştir. Dostoyevski ve Nietzsche'nin iddia ettiğinin aksine Marx'ın sosyalizm ve komünizm anlayışında da deneyimleriyle gerçekleşen ve deęişkenlięi, kaotik yapısı vurgulanan bir insan vardır. Marx'ın felsefesi felsefecinin baktığı yere daha çok sorumluluk yükler. Marx'ın teorik yöntemi olanı açıklamakla sınırlı deęildir, aynı zamanda deęiştirmeyi hedefler. Bu yüzden tezimde tanımlama ve belirlemelerin ötesinde kalan bir Yeraltı İnsanı incelemeye çalışırken bunun için Marx'ın bakış açısının daha önemli olduğunu söyledim.

APPENDIX B

CURRICULUM VITAE

PERSONAL INFORMATION

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EDUCATION

Degree	Institution	Years of Graduation
MS	METU, Philosophy	2013
BS	METU, Philosophy	2006
High School	Ödemiş High School	1998

WORK EXPERIENCE

Year	Place	Enrollment
2004-2013	METU, Philosophy	Research Assistant

PUBLICATIONS

Articles:

Zeliha Burcu Yılmaz (Acar), “Marcel Proust ve Zaman”, *Felsefe Yazın*, Sayı: 7, Mayıs-Haziran 2006.

Zeliha Burcu Yılmaz (Acar), “Milliyetçilik Tartışmaları ve Türkiye’de Kadınlık Durumları”, *Felsefe Yazın*, Sayı: 11, Ekim-Kasım 2007.

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APPENDIX C

TEZ FOTOKOPİSİ İZİN FORMU

ENSTİTÜ

Fen Bilimleri Enstitüsü

Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü

Uygulamalı Matematik Enstitüsü

Enformatik Enstitüsü

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YAZARIN

Soyadı : ACAR

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Bölümü : Felsefe

TEZİN ADI (İngilizce) : The Underground Man of the 19th Century: A Comparative Study on Nietzsche and Marx

TEZİN TÜRÜ : Yüksek Lisans

Doktora

1. Tezimin tamamından kaynak gösterilmek şartıyla fotokopi alınabilir.

2. Tezimin içindekiler sayfası, özet, indeks sayfalarından ve/veya bir bölümünden kaynak gösterilmek şartıyla fotokopi alınabilir.

3. Tezimden bir bir (1) yıl süreyle fotokopi alınamaz.

TEZİN KÜTÜPHANEYE TESLİM TARİHİ: