REASONS AND CONSEQUENCES OF (NON)COOPERATION DISCOURSES
IN TURKEY'S IRAQ POLICY:
A NARRATIVE EXPLANATION FOR EPISODES OF PACTS AND WARS

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ABSTRACT

REASONS AND CONSEQUENCES OF (NON)COOPERATION DISCOURSES IN TURKEY'S IRAQ POLICY: A NARRATIVE EXPLANATION FOR EPISODES OF PACTS AND WARS

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Given their inter-connectedness, one expects the prevalence and continuity of cooperation in Turkish-Iraqi relations. The Turkish government officials, however, have not yet fully achieved their goal of comprehensive cooperation with their Iraqi counterparts. Theoretical and empirical inquiry into this lingering puzzle formed the main research aim for this study. This dissertation sought to bring a narrative explanation for comprehending paradoxes of cooperation and non-cooperation discourses in Turkey's Iraq policy. Four cases were explored. In the cooperation episodes, the pacts of Saadabad (1937) and Baghdad (1955) were taken as central events. The Gulf War (1991) and the Iraq War (2003) were examined as central events of non-cooperation episodes.

By analyzing these episodes, the thesis found that (non)cooperation discourses in Turkey's Iraq policy were primarily shaped by pre-event contextual reasons. In the making of pacts, Ankara's ambiguous discourses did not pay well in providing more favorable environment for improving cooperation with Baghdad. Conversely, Turkey's ambivalence led to less cooperative political outcomes in bilateral relations. In the war cases, the shadow of future dyadic conditions emerged as the basic contextual reason for Ankara to sever ties from Baghdad. Hence Turkish governments' framings of their war positions remained uncertain. Liminal non-cooperation discourses primarily brought more costly political outcomes. Turkey was confronted with the challenge of Kurdish problem and the threat of

PKK on both side of the border. War episodes were marked by unintended but enduring consequences for Turkish-Iraqi relations. Overall, these findings raised awareness about the implications of discursive strategies in current and future cases of Turkey's (non)cooperation with Iraq.

Key Words: Turkey's Iraq Policy, Discourses of (Non)Cooperation, Contextual Reasons-Consequences, Ontological Modes-Rhetorical Models of Reasoning, Narratives-Frames.

ÖZ

TÜRKİYE'NİN IRAK POLİTİKASINDAKİ İŞ BİR(LİKSİZ)LİĞİ SÖYLEMLERİNİN GEREKÇELERİ VE SONUÇLARI:
PAKT VE SAVAŞ DÖNEMLERİNE İLİŞKİN ANLATISAL BİR AÇIKLAMA

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Türkiye ile Irak arasında var olan karşılıklı bağlantılar dikkate alındığında, iki ülke ilişkilerinde iş birliğinin hâkim olması beklenmektedir. Oysaki, Türkiye hükûmeti yetkilileri, Iraklı meslektaşlarıyla kapsamlı iş birliği hedeflerini henüz tam olarak gerçekleştirememiştir. Hâlen devam eden bu paradoksun teorik ve ampirik olarak araştırılması, bu çalışmanın temel amacını oluşturmuştur. Bu doktora tezi, Türkiye'nin Irak politikasına ilişkin iş birliği ve iş birliksizliği söylemlerindeki süreğen karmaşıklığın kavranmasına yönelik anlatısal bir açıklama getirmeyi hedeflemiştir. Bu açıklama, dört örnek olay incelemesine dayandırılmıştır. İş birliği söylemlerine ilişkin örnek olaylar olarak, Saadabad (1937) ve Bağdat (1955) paktları ele alınmıştır. Körfez Savaşı (1991) ve Irak Savaşı (2003), iş birliksizliği söylemlerine ilişkin örnek olaylar olarak incelenmiştir.

Yapılan vaka çalışmaları sonucunda, Türkiye'nin Irak politikasına ilişkin iş bir(liksiz)liği söylemlerinin temel olarak olay-öncesi bağlamsal gerekçeler tarafından şekillendirildiği bulgusuna ulaşılmıştır. Pakt yapım süreçlerinde, Ankara'nın ikircikli söylemlere yönelmesi, Bağdat ile iş birliğinin geliştirilmesine yönelik uygun ortamların oluşturulmasına katkı sağlamamıştır. Tam tersine, Türkiye'nin kararsız söylemleri, ikili ilişkilerde daha az iş birliğine yol açan siyasi sonuçların ortaya çıkmasına neden olmuştur. Savaş hâllerinde ise ikili koşulların geleceğine ilişkin belirsizlik, Ankara'nın Bağdat ile bağlarını koparmasına yol açan temel bağlamsal gerekçeyi teşkil etmiştir. Bu yüzden, Türk

hükûmetlerinin savaş konumlarına ilişkin çerçevelemeleri belirsiz kalmıştır. İki arada (eşikte) kalan iş birliksizliği söylemleri, siyasi açıdan daha maliyetli sonuçlara yol açmıştır. Türkiye, sınırın her iki tarafına yayılan Kürt sorunu ve PKK tehdidi ile mücadele etmek zorunda kalmıştır. Savaş dönemleri, Türkiye-Irak ilişkileri açısından istenmeyen ancak kalıcılık kazanan sonuçlarıyla belirginleşmiştir. Sonuç olarak, bu tezde elde edilen bulgular, Türkiye'nin Irak ile iş bir(liksiz)liği hâllerinde uygulayabileceği söylemsel stratejilerin etkinliğine ilişkin farkındalığın artırılmasına katkı sağlamıştır.

Anahtar kelimeler: Türkiye'nin Irak Politikası, İş Bir(liksiz)liği Söylemleri, Bağlamsal Gerekçeler-Sonuçlar, Akıl Yürütmenin Ontolojik Modları-Retorik Modelleri, Anlatılar-Çerçeveler.

To My Dear Family,

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

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AKP/AK PARTi – Justice and Development Party (*Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi*)

ANAP – Motherland Party (*Anavatan Partisi*)

CENTCOM – Central Command

CENTO – Central Treaty Organization

CHF/CHP – Republican People's Party (*Cumhuriyet Halk Fırkası/Partisi*)

CIG – Central Iraqi Government

DECA – Defense and Economic Cooperation Agreement

DP – Democrat Party (*Demokrat Parti*)

DSP – Democratic Left Party (*Demokratik Sol Parti*)

DTP – Democratic Society Party (*Demokratik Toplum Partisi*)

DYP – True Path Party (*Doğru Yol Partisi*)

EU – European Union

FPA – Foreign Policy Analysis

GAP – Southeast Anatolian Project (*Güneydoğu Anadolu Projesi*)

GNA – Grand National Assembly

HEP – People's Labor Party (*Halkın Emek Partisi*)

ICP – Iraqi Communist Party

IMF – International Monetary Fund

IR – International Relations

ITC – Iraqi Turkmen Front (*Irak Türkmen Cephesi*)

KDP – Kurdistan Democratic Party

KFS – Kurdish Federated State

KIP – Kurdish Independence Party

KRG – Kurdistan Regional Government

LN – League of Nations

MES – Middle East Studies

MEDO – Middle East Defense Organization

MFA – Ministry of Foreign Affairs

MHP – Nationalist Movement Party (*Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi*)

MoD – Ministry of Defense

MoU – Memorandum of Understanding

MP – Member of Parliament

NATO – North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NSC – National Security Council

ONW – Operation Northern Watch

OPC – Operation Provide Comfort

PKK – Kurdistan Workers' Party (*Partia Karkaren Kurdistan*)

PM – Prime Minister

PUK – Patriotic Union of Kurdistan

RAF – Royal Air Force

RDF – Rapid Deployment Force

SHP – Social Democrat Populist Party (*Sosyal Demokrat Halkçı Parti*)

TCF – Progressive Republican Party (*Terakkiperver Cumhuriyet Fırkası*)

TFP – Turkish Foreign Policy

TGS – Turkish General Staff

TÜSİAD – Turkish Industrialists' and Businessmen's Association
(*Türkiye Sanayici ve İş Adamları Derneği*)

UAR – United Arab Republic

UK – United Kingdom

UKDP – United Kurdish Democratic Party

UN – United Nations

UNSCR – United Nations Security Council Resolution

US – United States of America

USSR – Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

TGNA – Turkish Grand National Assembly

CHAPTER

1. INTRODUCTION

It is widely accepted that Turkey has always been interconnected to Iraq in many respects. Material (border trade, oil-water exchange) and non-material (socio-cultural interaction) factors establish strong ties between the two countries. Given this interconnectedness, one expects the prevalence and continuity of cooperation in Turkish-Iraqi relations.[1] On the contrary, the ongoing state of affairs between Ankara and Baghdad does not neatly fit into this picture. Making sense of the recent deterioration in Ankara-Baghdad relations have presented a theoretically puzzling picture, even for the established scholars and experienced observers.[2]

To a certain extent, the lingering puzzle can be linked to Turkey's approach to the Kurdish issue that historically comprised one of the main parameters of both cooperation and non-cooperation with Iraq. In the recent years, Turkey's Iraq policy discourse began to display signs of strain, largely due to the confounding conceptualization and/or ambivalent articulation of the Kurdish question. Consequently, governments in Ankara and Baghdad have come closer to political confrontation, rather than institutional coordination.

International, regional and other external causes could be held accountable for the miring of these relations. Yet, a daunting paradox still remains. Despite its growing cooperation with Erbil, Ankara has begun to fall apart from Baghdad, at a time of urgent need. Weakening of political/inter-governmental co-operation (if defined as "policy co-

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[1]   See for instance, Ramazan Gözen, *İmparatorluktan Küresel Aktörlüğe Türkiye'nin Dış Politikası*, (Ankara: Palme Yayıncılık, 2009), 212.

[2]   Henry Barkey, "Turkey-Iraq Relations Deteriorate with Accusations of Sectarianism," 30 April 2012, <http://www.al-monitor.com/> 11 October 2012.

ordination"[3]) with the Central Iraqi Government (CIG) might prove to be costly for the Turkish Government in its efforts targeted towards disarming of the PKK (Kurdistan Workers' Party) militants, including the top cadres located in northern Iraq. In order to better implement its Syrian policy and possibly reach to the desired end state (change of political leadership) in Damascus, Ankara would also need to coordinate its policies with Baghdad.

Given these likely prospects for the foreseeable future, it becomes all the more ironic if one revisits ambitious goals of co-operation put forward in the "joint political declaration"[4] signed on 10 July 2008 by the Prime Minister of Turkey, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, and the Prime Minister of Iraq, Nouri al-Maliki. In less than five years, it seemed that Turkey-Iraq "High-Level Cooperation Council" began to lose its *raison d'être*. Why did Turkey's viewing of "long-term strategic partnership" with Iraq die down in such a short time? Is Turkey, entering into another episode of intended but failed cooperation with Iraq? Or is Ankara, once again, moving towards equilibrium of partial/non-cooperation with Baghdad? Time will exactly tell which one of the paths actually holds.

Against the backdrop of these historical questions, the aim of this study is to critically analyze former episodes of failed cooperation and/or partial/non-cooperation with Iraq. In order to grasp contextual-discursive reasons and consequences of Turkey's (non)cooperation with Iraq this dissertation seeks a "narrative explanation", along the lines proposed by Hidemi Suganami. In general, the structure of narrative explanations follows a temporal order, which can be roughly formulated as the beginning (initial conditions-inputs), the middle (processes-acts), and the end (final circumstances-outputs). This temporal format helps to observe and document mutually constitutive relationship between contextual reasons and agential reasonings.[5]

By following the narrative explanation structure, this study explores four cases of Turkey's (non)cooperation with Iraq. Each case falls into distinct chronological periods, i.e. inter-War (1914-1939), early Cold War (1946-1960), post-Cold War (1991-2001), and post-9/11 (2002-2012) years. In the cooperation episodes, the pacts of Saadabad (1937) and Baghdad (1955) are taken as central events. The wars of 1991 (UN-led Gulf War) and 2003

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[3]   Helen Milner, "International Theories of Cooperation among Nations: Strengths and Weaknesses," *World Politics* 44 (April 1992): 467.

[4]   "Türkiye Cumhuriyeti ile Irak Cumhuriyeti Hükûmetleri Arasında Yüksek Düzeyli İşbirliği Konseyi'nin Kurulmasına İlişkin Ortak Siyasi Bildirge," <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/> 24 April 2011.

[5]   Hidemi Suganami, "Narrative Explanation and International Relations: Back to Basics," *Millenium: Journal of International Studies* 37, no. 2 (2008): 327-356.

(US-led Invasion) are examined as central events of non-cooperation episodes. Each episode is studied under three (pre-event, event and post-event) sections. With this temporal division, episodic transformation of contextual-discursive reasons and consequences is analyzed critically.

By critical analyses of pact and war episodes, this thesis argues that cooperation and non-cooperation discourses in Turkey's Iraq policy were primarily shaped by pre-event regional-dyadic/local contextual reasons. In the making of pacts, Ankara's discursive ambiguity did not pay well in providing more favorable environment for improving cooperation with Baghdad. Conversely, Turkey's ontological-rhetorical ambivalence (utilitarian ontology-ideational rhetoric) led to less cooperative political outcomes in bilateral relations. In these episodes, Turkey mainly faced short and mid-term dyadic costs. Consequentially, discourses of cooperation ended up with undesired regime changes in Iraq.

In the war cases, the shadow of future dyadic conditions emerged as the basic contextual reason for Ankara to sever ties from Baghdad. But Turkish governments' framings of their war positions remained uncertain betwixt entering in and staying out. Liminal discursive reasonings did exacerbate, rather than alleviate, domestic and dyadic political-military costs. Non-cooperation discourses primarily brought more costly political outcomes. Turkey was confronted with the challenge of Kurdish problem and the threat of PKK on both side of the border. These episodes were marked by unintended but enduring consequences for Turkish-Iraqi relations.

So far, the reasons and consequences of long-term contextual-discursive transformations in Turkey's policy of (non)cooperation with Iraq have not been analyzed critically. This study is an attempt to fill this gap. All in all, the thesis found that the conceptual lines between foreign policy discourses and actions were not as sharp as they had often been assumed. By blurring these lines, this dissertation raised analytical awareness about the implications of pragmatic (contextual-discursive) acts in Turkey's Iraq policy. In the future, talking about (what is done in) Iraq would most likely be a costly affair for Turkish governments. Hence keeping a critical eye on discursive strategies like contextual resonance, ontological coherence and rhetorical consistency might help Ankara to ease the dilemma of cooperation and non-cooperation with Baghdad.

This dissertation epitomizes the application of an established theory to a novel case. In addition to narrative theory, this study distills insights from the findings in various research areas, most prominently International Relations (IR), Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA), Middle East Studies (MES), Turkish Foreign Policy (TFP), discourse analysis and rhetorical criticism. The structure of the thesis includes six chapters. The Introduction is followed by

five chapters covering case studies and the Conclusion. The first Chapter provides conceptual basis, empirical orientation, and research design.

1.1. Conceptual and Analytical Basis

The conceptual basis of the dissertation is founded within the IR-FPA interface. This research space allows grasping the nexus between IR theories and FP practices. Within this tradition, particularly the critical constructivist research agenda offers insight to inquire modes of reasoning in discursive practices. By focusing on rhetorical uses of IR models/narratives/frames, critical constructivist inquiry helps to examine ontological representation of foreign policy events. In this regard, analyses of ontological modes, rhetorical models and frames in political narratives shed substantive light on foreign policy making.

In the first part of this section, IR-FPA and context-discourse linkages are substantiated. Secondly, analytical significance of basic notions such as ontology, rhetoric, theory, and discourse are emphasized. Then, the theory-practice connection is highlighted. It is also reiterated that grasping actor's theory (ontological predisposition) in discursive practice provides analytical avenues for making sense of foreign policy events. In the following sub-sections, it is acknowledged that critical constructivist IR/FPA approaches are well suited for understanding the constitutive interplay between context and discourse. They provide conceptual and methodological basis for analyzing contextual reasons and discursive reasonings behind foreign policy actions.

1.1.1. IR-FPA Interface and Context-Discourse Linkage

This thesis inquires "intentional and dispositional dimensions"[6] of Turkey's Iraq policy. Appreciation of these two dimensions entails a critical perspective and an interpretative approach that aims to work within and contribute to the "IR/FPA interface."

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[6] Walter Carlsnaes, "Actors, Structures, and Foreign Policy Analysis," in *Foreign Policy*, 97.

This academic position observes intrinsic interactions between IR theories (theoretical knowledge) and foreign policy practices (empirical reality). "[A]ll theories of IR make assumptions about state behavior. The relationship between them and the study of foreign policy is absolutely unavoidable."[7]

Basic IR theories offer a broad and simple picture of foreign policy context. Such knowledge of conceptual-interpretative frameworks is essential for foreign policy makers. At least a vague theory is necessary for the diagnosis of foreign policy problems, formulation of rationales and assessment of actual performance. Bluntly put, foreign policy could be deliberately informed or unconsciously made "on the basis of some sort of theory." It does not make a big difference whether (the name of) the theory remains implicit or explicit in public-political discourse.[8]

Foreign policy is inherently a contextual and relational activity. Neither the political reasoning of particular actor nor the surrounding of contextual reasons "taken in isolation can explain the success or failure of a certain foreign policy to deliver an intended outcome." Hence it is important to study the "dialectic interplay" between actor reasonings and political contexts. At this point, international (global, regional, local or dyadic) "context becomes truly 'real'" only when looked at [and seen] from the perspective of the individual actor in question." Context is intended through narratives and discourses of actors and constituted by material and non-material relations among them. This implies a mutually constitutive and transformative relationship between contextual reasons and discursive-narrative reasonings. Particular phases of cooperative, non-cooperative and conflictual foreign policy attitudes may not be the consequence of "an objective change in the country's position in the world but…as a result of different interpretations of the same position." In other words, "context means different things to different actors, depending not only on where they are placed, but

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[7] Steve Smith, Amelia Hadfield, Tim Dunne, "Introduction," in *Foreign Policy*, 5-8. See also Carlsnaes, 95.

[8] Stephen M. Walt, "The Relationship Between Theory and Policy in International Relations," *Annual Review of Political Science*, no.8 (2005): 23-48. See also Stephen M. Walt, "International Relations: One World, Many Theories," *Foreign Affairs*, (Spring 1998): 29-45. See also David A. Baldwin, "Success and Failure in Foreign Policy," *Annual Review of Political Science*, no.3 (2000): 173, 179. Baldwin contended that foreign policy success can be conceived in many dimensions. According to him, "in order to calculate a 'bottom-line,' i.e. profits" and costs, foreign policy makers "must have an analytical framework".

also on how they interpret" material and non-material features of the context within which they constantly inter-operate.[9]

Context can be conceived like "a kaleidoscopic formation" continuously constituted within the continuum of horizontal tiers (global, regional, local) and vertical layers (political, economic, military, normative, and cultural). Keeping "a certain degree of internal consistency within" and harmony between these two dimensions is the main task of foreign policy makers. The processes of "making these different logics work in synergy" and providing "consistency and coherence in foreign policy" pose enormous challenges. Instead of dealing with these complexities, most foreign policy planners and practitioners often take a holistic view of external context. While defining and acting in the outside world, foreign policy makers should also pay attention to the internal context. Ignorance of domestic political consensus and public support might impede implementation of foreign policy. By orchestrating a dynamic synergy between internal and external realms, politicians can breed their prospects for success both inside and outside. Foreign policy failures may reflect "the underlying problems of planning and [political] rationality" or they could be associated with incompetent bureaucratic implementation.[10]

In this regard, policy makers have to interpret the context and consequences of their choices in logically coherent and consistent manner. At worst, they ought to rank their preferences to meet minimal commonsensical requirements. Their judgment might be often impaired by heuristic (experiential) devices, like simplified models, conventional presuppositions and political frames. Politicians habitually use available knowledge short-cuts and convenient rules of thumb. What they already know to exist (ontology) has an impact on their future foreign policy decisions. Political leaders could easily "reverse their preferences and make different choices when problems are reframed as losses rather than gains." Nonetheless, oversimplification of issues and inconsistent reasoning may end up with foreign policy failures.[11]

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[9] Elisabetta Brighi and Christopher Hill, "Implementation and Behaviour," in *Foreign Policy: Theories, Actors, Cases*, eds. Steve Smith, Amelia Hadfield, Tim Dunne (NY: Oxford University Press, 2008), 118-120. See also Joseph Lepgold and Alan C. Lamborn, "Locating Bridges: Connecting Research Agendas on Cognition and Strategic Choice," *International Studies Review* 3, no. 3 (Fall 2001): 3.

[10] Brighi and Hill, 122-127.

[11] Janice Gross Stein, "Foreign Policy Decision-Making: Rational, Psychological, and Neurological Models," in *Foreign Policy*, 102-105. See also Lepgold and Lamborn, 5, 6.

Therefore devising a contextually compatible (and domestically consensual) foreign policy rationale is not an easy undertaking for political leaders. More than anything, it requires an intellectual framework for interpreting the world and the relational position of their country. Their interpretation of the world could help them to take a certain course of action. That's why inquiring actors' ontological reasons for and rhetorical reasonings behind their action is important. Without this type of inquiry, foreign policy making cannot be comprehended thoroughly.[12]

1.1.2. Ontology and Rhetoric in the Making of International Relations

Ontological presuppositions have an impact on the theory and practice of international relations. These preconceptions are political interpretations in the sense that they represent different world views. Simply put, ontologies constitute what makes the world politics what it is and determine what it could or should be.[13] As observed by Robert W. Cox, all theoretical concepts and real entities are conceived and constituted by intersubjective ontological terms and meanings. Thus, "[o]ntology lies at the beginning of any inquiry…There is always an ontological starting point." Ontology of theoretical thinking, political practice, and historical reality inherently imply one another.[14]

> Theory follows reality. It also precedes and shapes reality…theory is made through reflection upon what has happened…theory feeds back into the making of history by virtue of the way those who make history (…human collectivities, not just about prominent individuals) thinks about what they are doing. Their understanding of what the historical context allows them to do, prohibits them from doing, or requires them to do, and the way they formulate their purposes in acting, is the product of [grand and/or common-sense] theory…The ontologies that people work with derive from their historical experience and in turn become embedded in the world they construct. What is subjective in understanding becomes objective through action…These embedded structures

[12] Carlsnaes, 97.

[13] Colin Wight, *Agents, Structures and International Relations: Politics as Ontology*, (Cambridge University Press, 2006).

[14] Robert W. Cox, "Towards a Posthegemonic Conceptualization of World Order: Reflections on the Relevancy of Ibn Khaldun (1992)," in *Approaches to World Order*, Robert W. Cox with Timothy J. Sinclair (NY: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 144.

of thought and practice – the nonphysical realities of political and social life – may persist over long periods of time, only to be problematic, to be called into question, when people confront new sets of problems that old ontologies do not seem able to account for or cope with.[15]

While accounting and coping with the world, actors "are caught up in a hermeneutic [interpretative] circle" of language, which is "embedded in history." Hermeneutics (interpretation) is necessary for comprehending the history of actors' ontological preconceptions and discursive reasoning practices.[16] Language users are embedded in and shaped by their context. Their linguistic choices and speech acts also constitute the context within which they operate. At this point, making sense of the relationship between language, logic, and world becomes important. Language use reflects the meaning and logic of action; hence it is a "logical form of action." It is like "making moves in a [multi-layered] game." Since theoretical and practical "language games" are constitutive of "multiple logics" of world politics, the language of these games (including the discursive construction of material context), contextual transitions and discursive dynamics of change between these logics can be revealed by critical interpretation.[17]

In making sense of international events and issues, one has to rely on some sort of theoretical assumptions. International reality "can be interpreted and understood only by reference to a conceptual framework." At least some of the basic theoretical concepts of international relations help to shape actors' views and in turn constitute their practices in world politics. For these instances, theory needs to be treated more than an epistemological tool for explaining reality. It constitutes ontological conditions of possibility for the making of reality. Therefore, we need "constitutive", in addition to "explanatory", viewing of IR theories. Studying with the constitutive comprehension of IR theories is especially important; as it would enable us examine "just how distorted and distorting any particular world-view may be."[18]

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[15] Ibid., 145.

[16] Steve Smith, "Positivism and Beyond," in *International Relations: Critical Concepts in Political Science (Volume I)*, ed. Andrew Linklater (London and NY: Routledge, 2000), 581, 582, 584. See also Cox, 147.

[17] Karin M. Fierke, "Links Across the Abyss: Language and Logic in International Relations," *International Studies Quarterly* 46 (2002): 335-338, 340-342.

[18] Scott Burchill and Andrew Linklater, "Introduction", in *Theories of International Relations*, Scott Burchill et al. eds. (NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 15-18.

In this sense, international relations can be studied with a view of IR as "theory of practice" or theory in practice. As observed by Ivan Ermakoff, actors inherit a practical knowledge and interpretive logic, "a set of dispositions that sets internal limits to their own capacity for action and frames their sense of the possible. Since this set of dispositions eludes their conscious mastery, it is also resilient in the face of external change." Actors constantly put this implicit (habitual/experiential) rationality into discursive-political practice. Actors' reasons for political action are inherently relational and situated in discursive practice. By their very nature, ontological reasonings are historical and contextual.[19]

Ontological reasonings are represented through discursive practices and may or may not directly correspond to the "veridical description of reality." This does not imply that we can ignore contextual transformation of ontological representations in foreign policy discourses. Particularly in areas such as framings of issues and choices, ontological presuppositions play a significant role. To a certain extent, definition of foreign policy problems and determination of available options emanate from ontological predispositions of actors. In communicative and interpretative environments (like international affairs), ontologies are constituted by language and hence contain representations. All in all, changes in discursive framing of foreign policy contexts, linguistic representation of reasonings on present problems and future alternatives reflect ontological modes of decision makers.[20]

"*Modes* offer specific orientations to the world". They reflect "'deep' ontological orientations". The "choice of *mode* is foundational to meaning-making. *Mode* brings its *logics*, its entities".[21] In order to better grasp these modes; scholars need "to examine…what actors say, in what contexts, and to what audiences." Rhetorical dynamics, such as narrative and framing games, plays an important role in cases of both political persuasion and coercion. Understanding of "the rhetorical interplay itself provides leverage in explaining [political] outcomes."[22] Political rhetors often resort to theoretical concepts to attach

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[19] Ivan Ermakoff, "Theory of Practice, Rational Choice, and Historical Change," *Theory and Society* 39 (2010): 527–531, 539, 549.

[20] Donald A. Sylvan and Stuart J. Thornson, "Ontologies, Problem Representation, and the Cuban Missile Crisis," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 36, no. 4 (December 1992): 709-717.

[21] "It is as though each mode provides its specific lens on the world and with that lens the world seems organized as specific *arrangements* in space, in time, or both." Gunther Kress, *Multimodality: A Social Semiotic Approach to Contemporary Communication*, (NY: Routledge, 2010), 154, 155.

[22] Ronald R. Krebs and Patrick Thaddeus Jackson, "Twisting Tongues and Twisting Arms: The Power of Political Rhetoric," *European Journal of International Relations* 13, no. 1 (2007): 35, 36.

meaning to their actions. In this case, theory serves as a "hermeneutical mechanism" for interpretation and making of the reality. "[T]heories do not affect reality on their own terms, by their original formulations, or even according to theoreticians' intentions." As theoretical concepts are widely used in the public sphere, they transform into simple, perhaps distorted, but convenient knowledge conventions, which help to shape commonsensible understanding of world affairs and short-cut framing of political reasons (and motivations) for action.[23] That is to say, theoretical concepts could be deliberately deployed into public-political discourses. These sorts of rhetorical moves are never without discursive costs and political consequences. Rhetorical qualities of theories make them vulnerable to abusive political utilization.[24] This applies to IR theories as well. As pointed out by Markus Kornprobst:

> Rhetoric comes to IR scholars naturally. The discipline's rhetorical dimensions are pervasive in scholarly practices across the field...We are oblivious to the discipline's rhetorical dimensions. As they come to us naturally, it seems unnatural to us to reflect upon them.[25]

The rhetorical repertoire of IR is much broader than it is commonly conceived. IR scholars make use of metaphors[26] and myths (narratives and stories).[27] Rhetorical modes of reasoning in IR pose an important disciplinary problem, which could be addressed in an appropriate manner.[28] The implications are equally problematic for both political practitioners and analysts working within the realm of international relations. First and foremost, the theoretical meanings of concepts, such as balance of power and national

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[23] Piki Ish-Shalom, "Theory as a Hermeneutical Mechanism: The Democratic-Peace Thesis and the Politics of Democratization," *European Journal of International Relations* 12, no. 4 (2006): 565-569.

[24] Piki Ish-Shalom, "The Rhetorical Capital of Theories: The Democratic Peace and the Road to the Roadmap," *International Political Science Review* 29, no. 3 (2008): 281–301.

[25] Markus Kornprobst, "Doing What Comes Naturally Without Being Oblivious to It?: Rhetorical Pragmatism and International Relations," in the Forum on Pragmatism and International Relations, ed. Gunther Hellmann, *International Studies Review* 11, (2009): 652, 653.

[26] Michael P. Marks, *Metaphors in International Relations*, (NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011). See also Francis A. Beer and Christ'l de Landtsheer eds., *Metaphorical World Politics*, (East Lansing, MI: Michigan State University Press, 2004).

[27] Cynthia Weber, *International Relations Theory: A Critical Introduction*, 2nd ed., (London and NY: Routledge, 2005), 4. Weber looks at IR theories as "'ensemble of stories' told about...the world of international politics."

[28] Kornprobst, 653-655. See also Markus Kornprobst, "International Relations as Rhetorical Discipline: (Re-)Newing Horizons," *International Studies Review* 11, no. 1 (2009): 87–108.

interest, vary even in canonical IR texts.[29] Consequently, the rhetorical connotations of basic realist and/or idealist frames like power, threat, security, and peace, could not be easily discerned from the academic text alone. But it remained clear that one thing could be singled out. The rhetorical meanings of IR theoretical concepts emerge out of the discursive contexts. Therefore, rhetorical constructions appearing in any foreign policy discourse need to be analyzed in their particular historical context.[30]

In this regard, theoretically/conceptually oriented "discourse-tracing" route, illuminated by Piki Ish-Shalom, provides an analytical point of departure. The aim of this perspective "is not to offer a process-tracing of the transformation of [theoretical] ideas into [foreign] policies." Rather, this method seeks to explore transformation of foreign policy discourses by focusing on political uses of interpretive/theoretical constructs to frame reasons (rationalizations) and shape actions in public space.[31] What would be the substantial (causally explanatory) findings that scholars might expect to get by taking such kind of a research path? According to Donald Davidson reasons (rationalizations) can causally explain actions.

> What is the relation between a reason and an action when the reason explains the action by giving the agent's reason for doing what he did? We may call such explanations *rationalizations*, and say that the reason *rationalizes* the action.
>
> A reason rationalizes an action only if it leads us to see something the agent saw, or thought he saw, in his action—some feature, consequence, or aspect of the action the agent wanted, desired, prized, held dear, thought dutiful, beneficial, obligatory, or agreeable.[32]

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[29] Richard Little, *The Balance of Power in International Relations: Metaphors, Myths and Models*, (NY: Cambridge University Press, 2007). Scott Burchill, *The National Interest in International Relations Theory*, (NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005).

[30] Barry J. Balleck and Francis A. Beer, "Realist/Idealist Texts: Psychometry and Semantics," *Peace Psychology Review* 1, no. 1 (Spring, 1994) 38-44. See also Francis A. Beer and G. R. Boynton, "Realistic Rhetoric But Not Realism: A Senatorial Conversation on Cambodia," in *Post-Realism: The Rhetorical Turn in International Relations*, eds. Francis A. Beer and Robert Hariman (East Lansing, MI: Michigan State University Press, 1996), 369-383.

[31] Ish-Shalom, "Theory as a Hermeneutical Mechanism," 566, 567.

[32] Donald Davidson, "Action, Reasons, and Causes," *Journal of Philosophy* LX, no. 23 (November 1963): 685. See also Stephen Everson, "What are Reasons for Action?," in *New Essays on the Explanation of Action*, ed. Constantine Sandis (NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 22-47.

Building on this philosophical position, Albert S. Yee argued that interpretative analyses of languages (vocabularies) and discourses in international relations can help to demonstrate the constitutive, if not quasi-causal, impact of ideations on policies. Concepts available in political discourses "authorize or restrict, as well as prioritize and distribute, the ideas…that policymakers can think and in so doing partly delimit the policies they can pursue." They also provide "conventions that govern the speech or utterances that are possible…In some well-defined instances, these speech acts are themselves actions that perform illocutionary functions." Rhetorical constructs, like narratives, shape the political meaning of events and situations. Discursive concepts deployed into the public sphere "affect policies by organizing and imprinting meaning." These "inter-subjective meanings quasi-causally affect certain action not by directly or inevitably determining them but rather by rendering these actions plausible or implausible, acceptable or unacceptable, conceivable or inconceivable." In other words, discursive practices endorse certain modes of reasoning that enable constitution of particular contextual reality.[33]

Put in another way, discourses and contexts of foreign policy are mutually constitutive. Therefore, this thesis seeks to examine (ontological-rhetorical) modes of reasoning in Turkish foreign policy discourses that facilitated the contexts of (non)cooperation with Iraq. Critical constructivist IR/FPA approaches are well suited for analyzing the constitutive interplay between these contexts and discourses. They offer conceptual and methodological tools to explore Turkey's (contextual and discursive) making of pacts and wars with or against Iraq.

1.1.3. Critical Constructivist-Discursive Approaches in IR/FPA

Critical-interpretative IR/FPA approaches recognize the mutually constitutive relationship between structural (contextual) reasons and agential (discursive) reasonings that makes foreign policy action possible. These analyses are also sensitive to the discrepancy between discourse (saying) and action (doing). "[S]earch for gaps between words and deeds…allow academics to hold leaders accountable to the claims and benchmarks contained

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[33] Albert S. Yee, "The Causal Effects of Ideas on Policies," *International Organization* 50, no. 1 (Winter 1996): 94-99.

in policy statements and commitments."[34] That is to say, both the text and the context of foreign policy discourses have to be examined critically. These post-positivist epistemological commitments are in line with the "critical constructivist"[35] IR/FPA tradition, which treats entities of discourse (social structures and agents) as the ontological subject matter of scholarly analysis.

As delineated by Jennifer Milliken, discursivist tradition of IR has developed some analytical methods. According to her, discourse can be studied in three inter-related respects; (1) as a linguistic game of signification, (2) as a public performance for rationality (common-sense/knowledge) production, and (3) as a political play on practice (trans)formation. In terms of their significative characteristics, models and frames (together with presuppositions, predicates and metaphors) are important devices for the linguistic construction of political reasoning and reality in public space. Interpretative (reading and seeing) procedures focusing on these significative aspects help to refine and carry out the research on empirical (textual-contextual) analyses of historical continuity and change in discourses.[36]

In terms of methodological design, discourse studies can be divided into three sub-sections. While "content" and "frequency" analyses form the major backbone of doing "syntax" and "semantics," "pragmatics" focuses on the role of linguistic tropes like "frames" and "presuppositions" in order to better delineate contextuality and relationality in discourse.[37] In this regard, presuppositions form "an important textual mechanism that

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[34] Smith et al., 5, 6. See also Carlsnaes, 95.

[35] For a differentiation of main trends within constructivist school, see Ted Hopf, "The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory", in *International Relations: Critical Concepts in Political Science IV*, ed. Andrew Linklater (NY: Routledge, 2000), 1756-1782. By drawing upon Hopf (See also Ted Hopf, 'The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory," *International Security* 23, no.1 (1998): 171–200), Edward Lock argues that "conventional constructivists…adopt a correspondence theory of language, while critical constructivists…adopt a constitutive theory of language. The former assume that language corresponds directly to, or mirrors, aspects of an objective world…Alternatively, those who adopt a constitutive theory of language contend that our use of language serves to construct the world in which we live." Edward Lock, "Refining Strategic Culture: Return of the Second Generation," *Review of International Studies* 36 (2010): 704-706.

[36] Jennifer Milliken, "The Study of Discourse in International Relations: A Critique of Research and Methods," *European Journal of International Relations* 5, no. 2 (1999): 229-236, 248.

[37] Gillian Brown and George Yule, *Discourse Analysis*, (NY: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 25-31, 204, 205. 238-241. According to Brown and Yule, "frame" is a representation of "background knowledge" and/or "stereotyped situation" about the world. "Presupposition" can be defined as unchallenged, taken for granted "preconception" or "assumption" about an entity or phenomenon. See also Peter Grundy, *Doing Pragmatics*, 2nd ed., (NY: Oxford University Press, 2000); Stephen C. Levinson, *Pragmatics*, (NY: Cambridge University Press, 1983).

creates background knowledge and in doing so constructs a particular kind of world in which certain things are recognized as true." These linguistic tropes constitute particular interpretative dispositions and ontologies (modes of being) by which certain contextual subject-object relations and discursive-political practices are made possible. "The actual *behavior* or physical content of these practices…might be identical…How we 'know' what a practice is and the kind of subject engaging in it is through language."[38]

> Statements rarely speak for themselves. Even the most straightforward and ostensibly clear statements bring with them all sorts of *presuppositions* or background knowledge that is taken to be true. When one uses language, one is implying something about the existence of subjects, objects, and their relation to one another.[39]

If contextual/intertextual presuppositions hang together in a certain way, they can be indicative of a coherent discourse embedded in a shared world-view and a common ideational framework. In some cases, the discursive uses of referential-conceptual frameworks by decision makers might reflect misconceptualizations of the foreign policy context. Under these circumstances, discursive analyses shed light on problems associated with reasoning practices and political performance. For those problematic instances, when similar or complementary frames of presuppositions can be clustered around their coherent representative characteristics, one can make sense of the dominant discursive logic (mentality and reasons) that sets the parameters for particular foreign policy practices.[40]

By and large, foreign policy discourses reflect part and parcel of states' governing mentality. That is to say, governmental discourses are constitutive of governmental reasoning practices. As a corollary to the conventional rationale, foreign policy discourses seek public resonance for governmental actions and are deliberately designed for public consumption. For this reason, they appeal towards the common sense in one way or another. Construction of common sense is not an easy task to perform. In some cases, government officials resort to rhetorical ambivalence, by using vague vocabularies like obscure concepts and phrases. Unraveling of the reasons and repercussions of these naturalized ambiguities is

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[38] Roxanne Lynn Doty, "Foreign Policy as Social Construction: A Post-Positivist Analysis of U.S. Counterinsurgency Policy in the Philippines," *International Studies Quarterly* 37, no. 3 (1993): 298, 306-309, 312.

[39] Ibid., 306.

[40] Ibid., 304, 305, 310-312, 314.

a critical goal for the discursive analysis of foreign policy. One way to dissect these ambiguous discourses is to track governmental narratives and frames in their contextual (everyday being-in-the-world) conditions for analyzing their discursive-political implications.[41]

> Every discourse contains its own assumptions, logic and reasoning, and terminology that establish what can be said, how it is said, and by extension, what cannot be said. It privileges a certain way of viewing reality and thus affects what we perceive, how we think and feel, and the actions we take. It triumphs when its basic tenets are reflexively accepted as conventional wisdom, outside the realm of debate…Political discourses focus on social or political problems, events, issues, or actors; like all other discourses they create the language that shapes how we view aspects of the world around us, providing in this instance, rhetorically constructed realities about the exercise of power and influence.[42]

One way to identify the ontology of public-political discourses is to classify them as (pro)governmental and oppositional. Given its ontological effects, governmental discourse has a significant impact on the political life. Foreign policy is made possible by governmental discourse.

> [G]overnmental discourse…make[s] sense of a government's rationale behind a policy and its interpretation of the international environment. Thus, governmental foreign policies become meaningful…by way of governmental discourse…Governments employ their informational and ideational resources that they possess and provide…a frame or 'organizing idea' which may direct…understanding and interpretation of a foreign policy issue. Frames (or, better, contexts and contextualisation) influence an actor's definition of what a policy problem is about.[43]

Like any other discursive subjects, governments heavily rely on linguistic constructs to explain and justify their reasons for foreign policy actions. Without a governmental discourse the reason of state makes little, if not any, sense. As a corollary to their ontological

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[41] Milliken, 236-241, 244-248.

[42] Erika G. King and Robert A. Wells, *Framing the Iraq War Endgame: War's Denouement in an Age of Terror*, (NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 6.

[43] David Bosold and Kai Oppermann, "Governments as Gatekeepers: Mediating Domestic and International Discourses in Two-level Games," 4th CEEISA Convention, (Tartu: 25-27 June 2006), 7-8.

status, states need to tell stories about themselves and the world.[44] "The state, as an international subject, is constructed by the discursive practices of those who speak about, write about, and act on its behalf."[45]

In other words, *raison d'état* is not predetermined. It has to be constructed by governmental discursive practices. Foucaldian notion of govern-mentality or state rationality[46] helps to denaturalize governmental reasoning *(hikmet-i hükûmet)*. This conceptualization is in line with the critical constructivist research agenda offered by Jutta Weldes:

> In contrast to…reification of events…and to the limitation of rationality to a choice mechanism, a critical constructivist might focus on…'mode of reasoning.' This phrase is intended to suggest the limitations of conceiving of rationality merely as a singular and formal mechanism of choice by highlighting the multiplicity of forms of reasoning that are available to actors, by emphasizing that rationality is an active process or set of practices through which meaning is produced, and by noting the intersubjective rather than individual character of reasoning practices.
>
> Modes of reasoning are the rules through which discourses make possible the construction of particular representations of the social world, of interests, and of policy problems. Just as discourses are not 'in people's heads' but are inter-subjective structures of meaning-in-use, so modes of reasoning are not individual cognitive processes but are instead intersubjective structures of rules that make particular forms of reasoning possible.[47]

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[44] Erik Ringmar, "On the Ontological Status of the State," *European Journal of International Relations* 2, no. 4 (1996): 439-466.

[45] Doty, 310.

[46] According to Michel Foucault, governments produce "specific type of political rationality…in this respect, political practices resemble scientific ones: it's not 'reason in general' that is implemented, but always a very specific type of rationality…regarded as an 'art', that is, a technique conforming to certain rules. These rules do not simply pertain to customs or traditions, but to knowledge - rational knowledge…[T]he expression *reason of state*…[is] a rationality specific to the art of governing…From where does this specific art of government draw its rationale? The answer to this question provokes the scandal of nascent political thought. And yet it's very simple: the art of governing is rational." Michel Foucault, "*Omnes et Singulatim*: Towards a Criticism of 'Political Reason'," The Tanner Lectures on Human Values, Stanford University, 10 and 16 October 1979.

[47] Jutta Weldes, "Bureaucratic Politics: A Critical Constructivist Assessment," *Mershon International Studies Review* 42, no. 2 (1998): 223.

"[M]odes of reasoning arise from longstanding human practices."[48] This is not to deny the fact that most of the diplomatic talk on international relations do occur behind the scenes. Notwithstanding the general tendency of secrecy in diplomatic conventions, public discourse has constituted a part and parcel of foreign policy making. Foreign policy discourse may not reveal "decision makers' thought processes in a simple and unmitigated manner. However, public discourse is the end-product of a reasoning process and as such not unrelated to it…[W]hat is used in public to justify is also used in private to analyze."[49]

In an experimental study on modes of reasoning, Donald A. Sylvan, Thomas M. Ostrom, Katherine Gannon categorized three (model-based, explanation-based, case-based) styles relevant for FPA.[50] However, as observed by Joseph Lepgold and Alan C. Lamborn, "[e]xplanation…takes place within the context of a particular theory or set of theories. By its very nature, explanation is *theoretical*." Therefore, "explanation-based reasoning" should be treated within the "model-based" category.[51]

Model-based (abstract) reasoning style requires references to general principles, causal explanations, and pre-packaged theoretical knowledge, "that is a generalization about a class of events or situations." On the other hand, analogical (case-based) reasoning style is not easily accessible. It does not provide a simple short-cut to reality. "*Case-based reasoning* often entails…explicit comparisons between a current issue and a previous situation."[52]

"Cases are important to our understanding of both how decision makers decide about foreign policy and how we understand and communicate the substance of international politics."[53] But, without a preconceived "model", a case, in its own nature, cannot make a singular sense, and gain a significant discursive meaning. Making of cases (analogies),

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[48] Nicholas Greenwood Onuf, *World of Our Making: Rules and Rule in Social Theory and International Relations*, (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina, 1989), 96. Here Onuf also asserts that "[r]easoning takes practice; cognition is conduct."

[49] Breuning, 230, 232. Breuning quotes from Yuen Foong Khong, *Analogies at War: Korea, Munich, Dien Bien Phu, and the Vietnam Decisions of 1965*, (NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992), 260.

[50] Donald A. Sylvan, Thomas M. Ostrom, Katherine Gannon, "Case-Based, Model-Based, and Explanation-Based Styles of Reasoning in Foreign Policy," *International Studies Quarterly* 38, no. 1 (1994): 61-65.

[51] Lepgold and Lamborn, 4.

[52] Marijke Breuning, "The Role of Analogies and Abstract Reasoning in Decision-Making: Evidence from the Debate over Truman's Proposal for Development Assistance," *International Studies Quarterly* 47, no. 1 (2003): 234, 235.

[53] Sylvan et al., 63.

myths, and metaphors are all part of model-based thinking in international relations. By utilizing conceptual (analogical, mythical, and metaphorical) frames, IR academics build analytical "models" to make sense of the international reality.[54]

Evidence suggests that model-based reasoning style could be witnessed in discursive practices of policymakers.[55] In other words, politicians can incorporate model-based frames into their foreign policy discourses. Decision and opinion makers may appeal towards establishing "a rhetorical model [that] constitutes a central organizing argument for presenting foreign policy to the public."[56] Rhetoric is "the art of using language to help people narrow their choices among specifiable, if not specified, policy options". It tells a story with a political purpose. By understanding rhetoric, "one acquires a special perspective on the world" of storytelling actors.[57] Therefore, tracing of rhetorical models in political narratives and frames is an important facet of critical constructivist foreign policy analyses.

1.1.4. Rhetorical Models in Foreign Policy Narratives and Frames

Governments need to adopt a rhetorical model that would provide explanation (an interpretative formulation of intellectual presuppositions and political frames) for justifying foreign policy actions. Successful representation of reasons and rationales through governmental rhetoric is important for domestic legitimation of foreign policy.[58] Ronald R. Krebs and Patrick Thaddeus Jackson assert that policy makers have the wherewithal to judge the implications of their public rhetorical commitments (framing of behaviors, positions,

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[54]   Little, 55, 56. According to Little, a model is a simplified version of reality. It can be defined as "a simplified picture of part of the real world. It has some of the characteristics of the real world but not all of them. It is a set of interrelated guesses about the real world. Like all pictures it is simpler than the phenomena it is supposed to represent or explain." Little provides this definition with a quotation from Charles A. Lave and James G. March, *An Introduction to Models in the Social Sciences*, (NY: Harper & Row, 1975), 3. See also Weber, 4.

[55]   Breuning, 231, 233.

[56]   Timothy M. Cole, "Avoiding the Quagmire: Alternative Rhetorical Constructs for Post-Cold War American Foreign Policy," *Rhetoric & Public Affairs* 2, no. 3 (Fall 1999): 368.

[57]   Roderick P. Hart, *Modern Rhetorical Criticism*, 2nd ed., (MA: Allyn&Bacon, 1997), 2-7.

[58]   B. Thomas Trout, "Rhetoric Revisited: Political Legitimation and the Cold War," *International Studies Quarterly* 19, no. 3 (September 1975): 251-284.

reasons and actions). According to Krebs and Jackson, rhetorical framing is made possible by the use of relatively stable discursive conventions, i.e. universally shared intellectual constructs. Political frames are drawn from already established intellectual fields. That is to say, political rhetoric has always been structured by common intellectual discourse. Short term rhetorical possibilities rest in an almost fixed ground. Rhetorical change is only possible in the long run. The degree of rhetorical success is inherently episodic and hence depends on particular discursive context. Strategic uses of public language empowers foreign policy rhetoric and "has a real causal impact on political outcomes."[59]

Rhetorical storytelling is temporal and contextual. It entails a political perspective, a discursive bottom line, and a certain underlying logic.[60] By their very nature, narratives are rhetorical stories utilized for public persuasion and justification. Thus, they need consistent "good reasons", by extension a coherent "narrative rationality (rhetorical logic)."[61]

As rhetorical constructs, narratives reflect particular experiences in specific contexts. Time and perspective (view-point) are important features of a narrative.[62] Narratives are intrinsically embedded in "actors' worldview".[63] Worldviews reveal ontological modes and rhetorical models of reasoning; "how and why things became the way they are, and how and why they continue and change." "Changing worldviews enable the same event to be looked at, reported and interpreted differently."[64] As rhetorical models of reasoning change, so do the political narratives.

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[59] Krebs and Jackson, 42.

[60] Hart, 92, 93.

[61] Walter R. Fisher, "Narrative Rationality and the Logic of Scientific Discourse," *Argumentation* 8, (1994): 21-32. Drawing on Fisher's explanations in *Human Communication as Narration: Toward a Philosophy of Reason, Value, and Action*, (Columbia, S.C.: University of South Carolina Press, 1987); Kimber Charles Pearce defines "narrative rationality as a rhetorical logic of human communication." According to Fisher, "Narration…designates a conceptual frame,…intrinsic to the nature of human beings….Thus, all forms of discourse can be considered [as] stories, that is, interpretations of some aspect of the world occurring in time." Walter Fisher, "Narration, Knowledge, and the Possibility of Wisdom," in *Rethinking Knowledge: Reflections Across Disciplines*, ed , Robert F. Goodman and Walter R. Fisher (Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York Press, 1995), 17; quoted in Kimber Charles Pearce, "Narrative Reason and Cold War Economic Diplomacy in W. W. Rostow's Stages of Economic Growth," *Rhetoric & Public Affairs* 2, no. 3 (1999): 396, 411.

[62] Leonard Webster and Patricie Mertova, *Using Narrative Inquiry as a Research Method: An Introduction to Using Critical Event Narrative Analysis in Research on Learning and Teaching*, (NY: Routledge, 2007), 32, 86.

[63] Dietrich Jung, "Turkey and the Arab World: Historical Narratives and New Political Realities," *Mediterranean Politics* 10, no. 1 (2005): 1-17.

[64] Webster and Mertova, 29, 30.

Political narratives are a short-cut to political reality. By "simplifying complex situations into chains of events", political narratives play a key role in public discourse. They fit well to "the political logic of trying to shape the present in light of lessons learned from the past." There is a "complex metabolic exchange" between "political narratives" and "political reality", which may take various forms like "mutual ingestion, imitation and modification".[65] To a certain extent, the discursive (intellectual) frames deployed in political (public)[66] narratives are simplified versions and/or distorted configurations of conceptual (theoretical) frames circulating in academic (disciplinary) narratives. Theoretical concepts can easily be transferred into public framings of political discourse.[67] In this regard, government officials employ abstract concepts to justify their political positions and actions. On their way, foreign policy makers often misuse and even abuse theoretical (conceptual-abstract) frames.[68]

As discursive entities, frames have profound ontological effects. "*Frame, text, communication* are inextricably interwoven. Without *frame* no *text*, without *framed entities* no *communication*…To be in a world of meaning is to be in a world of *frames*, of *framing*…and of constant remaking of all these in transformative representation."[69] According to Erika G. King and Robert A. Wells, political frames are:

> central organizing ideas that make sense of relevant events or situations and weave them into a basic narrative or storyline…A well-constructed political frame thus…fashions certainty from uncertainty and provides ready responses to often thorny questions. It restricts ways of viewing any situation by assigning to it a limited range of meanings and imbuing it with a particular understanding;

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[65] Shenhav, "Political Narratives and Political Reality," 247, 248, 254.

[66] Most political narratives are part of public narratives. Public narratives are considered as "narratives that are shared within public spheres of communication and/or that have come to be broadly identified within a society." Derrick Alan Everett, "Public Narratives + Reparations in Rwanda: On the Potential of Film as Promoter of International Human Rights + Reconciliation," *Northwestern Journal of International Human Rights* 7, no.1 (Spring 2009): 103. See also Mona Baker, "Reframing Narratives in Translation," 7 March 2007, <http://www.ceviribilim.com> 18 March 2010. Baker identifies four types of narratives: conceptual (disciplinary), public, ontological (personal), and meta-narratives. Baker refers to Margaret R. Somers and Gloria D. Gibson, "Reclaiming the Epistemological 'Other': Narrative and Social Constitution of Identity," in *Social Theory and Politics of Identity*, ed. Craig Calhoun (Oxford UK&Cambridge USA: Blackwell, 1994), 37-99.

[67] Ish-Shalom, "The Rhetorical Capital of Theories," 281–301.

[68] Ish-Shalom, "Theory as a Hermeneutical Mechanism," 565-569.

[69] Kress, 154.

in essence, then, this narrative not only constructs but also promotes its own streamlined and simplified reality—what we 'know' to be true about a subject and accept as a given without having to undergo any undue cognitive strain.[70]

As observed by various scholars of regional and country studies frame analysis and narrative inquiry are valid research methods in FPA.[71] Here the main aim is not to provide a revisionist historical account. Rather narrative frame analysis primarily deals with the writing, not making, of history, in order to unravel intellectual and political codes from the public discourse. Hence, foreign policy research based on narratives and frames relies heavily on publicly available historiographical evidence, rather than almost inaccessible official archival materials.[72] Since this variant of foreign policy analysis is usually based on resources open to public, it helps to overcome the difficulty faced by most of the academicians in accessing to the decision makers and the classified materials.[73] Scholars working on Turkish foreign policy (particularly towards Iraq) were also confronted with quite similar limitations.[74] One way to overcome this challenge is to utilize Turkish newspapers for documenting various foreign policy discourses.[75] For obvious experiential reasons, the research orientation of this dissertation is grounded onto an analytically applicable and empirically rooted basis.

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[70]   King and Wells, 6.

[71]   Gitika Commuri, "The Relevance of National Identity Narratives in Shaping Foreign Policy: The Case of India–Pakistan Relations," *Journal of South Asian Development* 4, no. 2 (2009): 161–202. Shaul Shenhav, "Once Upon a Time there was a Nation: Narrative Conceptualization Analysis. The Concept of 'Nation' in the Discourse of Israeli Likud Party Leaders," *Discourse&Society* 15, no. 1 (2004): 81-104. Christopher S. Browning, "Coming Home or Moving Home? 'Westernising' Narratives in Finnish Foreign Policy and the Re-interpretation of Past Identities," *Cooperation and Conflict* 37 no.1 (2002): 47-72.

[72]   Christopher S. Browning, *Constructivism, Narrative and Foreign Policy Analysis: A Case Study of Finland*, (Bern: Peter Lang, 2008), 63-69.

[73]   Randall S. Clemons, Richard H. Foster, "Narrative Analysis and Foreign Policy," Paper prepared for delivery at the 2004 annual meeting of the Western Political Science Association, (Portland, Oregon: 11-13 March 2004). <http://www.allacademic.com/> 9 January 2010.

[74]   Gül İnanç, *Türk Diplomasisinde Irak (1978-1997)*, (İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2008), xiv.

[75]   See for example Nevin Balta, *Milliyet'ten Yansımalar: Türk Dış Politikası (1950-1980)*, (Ankara: Lazer Yayınları, 2005).

1.2. Empirical Roots and Research Orientation

In order to make a scholarly assessment on episodes of (non)cooperation in Turkey's Iraq policy, this dissertation followed academic precursors in MES and TFP. These constructivist and critical scholarly writings have formed the main academic signposts guiding the research orientation of this study. They also formed empirical roots for this dissertation.

1.2.1. Analyses of Discursive Practices in MES and TFP

In MES, best exemplars of discourse analysis came from constructivist scholars like Michael N. Barnett and Marc Lynch. These studies offered an intellectual hope for bridging the academic gap between MES and IR.[76] Barnett demonstrated the significance of socio-linguistic constructs, such as narratives and frames, in making sense of inter-Arab[77] and Israeli[78] foreign policies. Constructivist school of MES was further enriched by Lynch's re-conceptualization of public sphere as discursive space. His analysis highlighted the salience of interpretive/strategic framing practices in Jordanian foreign policy. Lynch argued that successful framing of events or "[t]he ability to successfully interpret action…is a very real dimension of political power." Framing practices are "not simply a function of balance of [material] power." They should be judged by their "ability to explain ongoing developments." Realist framing practices do not always explain the political reality.

> The observation that Realism plays a role in public sphere contestation does not, of course, necessarily mean that it is not correct as an explanation of state

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[76] Andrea Teti, "Bridging the Gap: IR, Middle East Studies and the Disciplinary Politics of the Area Studies Controversy," *European Journal of International Relations* 13, no. 1 (2007): 134-136.

[77] Michael Barnett, *Dialogues in Arab Politics: Negotiations in Regional Order*, (NY: Columbia University, 1998).

[78] Michael Barnett, "The Israeli Identity and the Peace Process: Re/creating the Un/thinkable," in *Identity and Foreign Policy in the Middle East*, eds. Shibley Telhami and Michael Barnett (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002), 58-87.

behavior. Indeed, a strong constructivist argument could be made that the more actors justify their action in Realist terms, the more their interpretation of reality will come to approximate the Realist vision and the more they will in fact behave according to Realist precepts. This claim contrasts with the familiar Realist assertion, that states always act as Realists although their public rhetoric changes.[79]

Following this broad constructivist agenda, MES scholarship turned their efforts to understand and explain the role of identity, ideology, and interests on state action. These general concepts were also exhausted by the scholars of TFP. Utilization of conceptual categories, i.e. Kemalist ideology, Western identity, Islamist outlook, and neo-Ottoman vision, served as a major research apparatus.[80] Theoretically informed analyses have become a common key to unlock the logic behind Turkish foreign policy making and writing.[81] İlhan Uzgel explained this tendency in a critical manner.

> Writing [and making] of Turkish foreign policy…displayed itself with a methodology [and ontology] based on Realism. This viewpoint, which was founded on Morghenthauist Realism, did almost completely converge with Turkey's political agenda and foreign policy understanding…[However,] this outlook did ignore theoretical transformations in international relations, and even missed out the Neorealist perspective, but kept its hold on this first version of Realism.[82]

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[79] Marc Lynch, *State Interests and Public Spheres: The International Politics of Jordan's Identity*, (NY: Columbia University Press, 1999), 264-267.

[80] Philip Robins, "Turkish Foreign Policy Since 2002: Between a 'post-Islamist' Government and a Kemalist State," *International Affairs*, C.LXXXIII, no.1, (2007): 289-304. Şaban Kardaş, "Turkey and the Iraqi Crisis: JDP Between Identity and Interest," in *The Emergence of a New Turkey: Democracy and the AK Parti*, ed. M. Hakan Yavuz (Utah: University of Utah Press, 2006), 306-330. Yücel Bozdağlıoğlu, *Turkish Foreign Policy and Turkish Identity: A Constructivist Approach*, (NY: Routledge, 2003). Kemal İnat and Burhanettin Duran, "AKP Dış Politikası: Teori ve Uygulama," *Demokrasi Platformu* 1, no. 4, (Fall 2005): 1-39. Şaban H. Çalış, "Ulus, Devlet ve Kimlik Labirentinde Türk Dış Politikası", in *Türkiye'nin Dış Politika Gündemi: Kimlik, Demokrasi, Güvenlik*, Şaban H. Çalış et al. eds. (Ankara: Liberte, 2001), 3-34.

[81] İlhan Uzgel, "Dış Politikada AKP: Stratejik Konumdan Stratejik Modele", in *AKP Kitabı: Bir Dönüşümün Bilançosu*, eds. İlhan Uzgel and Bülent Duru (Ankara: Phoenix Yayınevi, 2009), 357-380.

[82] İlhan Uzgel, "Türk Dış Politikası Yazımında Siyaset, Ayrışma ve Dönüşüm," *Uluslararası İlişkiler* 4, no. 13, (Spring 2007): 113-128.

In this regard, depiction of conceptual dualities in Turkey's foreign policy discourses has long been a common theme.[83] Pınar Bilgin reconfigured the notion of ideational ambivalence in Turkey's Western/European foreign policy orientation.[84] More recently, Lerna K. Yanık explored metamorphosis of visions and discursive transformations of hybrid and liminal positions in the make-up of Turkish foreign policy.[85]

Broad brushed emphasis on discursive ambiguity can also be witnessed in the studies on Turkey's Middle East and Iraq policy. For instance, Malik Mufti assessed the political implications of metaphorical binaries—swamp and backyard—permeating Turkey's strategic culture in regional affairs. According to him, the enduring incoherence in Turkey's Middle East policies has emanated from the ambivalence between isolationist (swamp) and activist (backyard) outlooks. In this regard, he argued that successive Turkish governments—reigned in 1993-2000 period—could not come up with a coherent regional strategy to overcome this central paradox.[86]

The discursive incoherence in Turkey's Middle East and Iraq policies were acknowledged by Meliha Benli Altunışık. She found that worldviews of key Turkish political actors and opinion makers contained assumptions similar to major IR theories, i.e. realism, liberalism and constructivism.

> Overall, the challenges and opportunities that emerged in the international, regional and domestic contexts led to a battle of ideas…old perspectives began to be challenged, new ones emerged and, in general, there was a move towards new narratives, and perspectives in Turkish foreign policy in the Middle East. Therefore, competing [and coexisting] visions emerged…[R]ealist, liberal and constructivist worldviews [and assumptions] are dominant among policy-as well as opinion-makers in Turkey today…[I]t is interesting to look at the

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[83] Ziya Öniş, "Conservative Globalists versus Defensive Nationalists: Political Parties and Paradoxes of Europeanization in Turkey," *Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans*. 9, no. 3 (December 2007): 247-261. Malik Mufti, "Daring and Caution in Turkish Foreign Policy," *Middle East Journal* 52, no.1 (Winter 1998): 32-50.

[84] Pınar Bilgin, "Securing Turkey Through Western-Oriented Foreign Policy," *New Perspectives on Turkey*, no. 40 (2009): 103-123.

[85] Lerna K. Yanık, "Constructing Turkish 'Exceptionalism': Discourses of Liminality and Hybridity in Turkish Foreign Policy," *Political Geography* 30 (2011): 80-89. Lerna K. Yanık, "The Metamorphosis of Metaphors of Vision: 'Bridging' Turkey's Location, Role and Identity After the End of the Cold War," *Geopolitics* 14, no. 3 (2009): 531-549.

[86] Malik Mufti, "From Swamp to Backyard: The Middle East in Turkish Foreign Policy," in *The Middle East Enters the 21st Century*, ed. Robert O. Freedman (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2002), 80-110.

relationship of these three perspectives at different junctures and in different cases.[87]

According to Altunışık, rationalist accounts do not provide a comprehensive picture "either for Turkey's non-cooperation with the USA in this war [in 2003] or for the articulation and implementation of Iraq policy since then…Turkey's view of…Iraq was ambivalent, as indeed its overall Iraq policy had been ever since the Gulf War [in 1991]." She asserted that Justice and Development Party (AKP) "government clearly did not do a good job in explaining Turkey's [policy] position" during the Iraq War in 2003. Ankara remained ambiguous between the frames of realism (rational national interests) and idealism (moral norms). By the end of 2003 war, the inability to overcome ideational ambiguities impeded Turkey from developing an effective foreign policy towards Iraq.[88]

The understanding of theory-practice nexus in Turkey's Iraq policy discourse was also emphasized in other studies. Tarık Oğuzlu argued that Turkey's post-2003 Iraq policy had been wedged between "realist-exclusivist" and "liberal integrationist" discursive positions.[89] Murat Somer observed that the imports of realist theoretical conceptualizations (rival-exclusivist ethnicity frames) in Turkish public-political discourse have long impeded cooperation between Ankara and Erbil.[90] Along similar lines, Erol Kurubaş found that because of incoherent framing of Kurdish question, Ankara has been hardly pressed between realist and constructivist understandings. By implication, Turkey recently faced normative inconsistencies and practical controversies in relations with its Middle Eastern neighbors and Western partners.[91] In order to explain main reasons and consequences of long-lasting ambivalence in Turkey's Iraq policy, this study underlines the significance of pragmatics that is the analysis of discursive practices in episodic contexts.

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[87] Meliha Benli Altunışık, "Worldviews and Turkish Foreign Policy in the Middle East," *New Perspectives on Turkey*, no. 40 (2009): 169-192.

[88] Meliha Benli Altunışık, "Turkey's Iraq Policy: The War and Beyond," *Journal of Contemporary European Studies* 14, no. 2, (August 2006): 183-196.

[89] Tarık Oğuzlu, "Turkey's Northern Iraq Policy: Competing Perspectives," *Insight Turkey* 10, no. 3 (2008): 5-22.

[90] Murat Somer, "Failures of the Discourse of Ethnicity: Turkey, Kurds, and the Emerging Iraq," *Security Dialogue* 36, no. 1 (March 2005): 109-128. Murat Somer, "Turkey's Kurdish Conflict: Changing Context, and Domestic and Regional Implications," *Middle East Journal* 58, no. 2 (Spring 2004): 235-253.

[91] Erol Kurubaş, "Etnik Sorun-Dış Politika İlişkisi Bağlamında Kürt Sorununun Türk Dış Politikasına Etkileri," *Ankara Avrupa Çalışmaları Dergisi* 8, no.1 (2009): 39-69.

1.2.2. Pragmatics of Turkey's Iraq Policy and Narrative Explanation of (Non)Cooperation Episodes

In most analyses of Turkish foreign policy, the theory is taken as an instrument to explain the event. In this approach, the standard research questions for scholars can be formulated along these lines: Which theory can be used as a simplifying device to explain the event? How can we describe the context by the help of theories? What can be the causal explanations provided by IR theories? Subscription to the explanatory approach has been common in the studies on Turkey's Iraq policy.[92] Recently, Mustafa Serdar Palabıyık attempted to provide a theoretically informed explanation for Turkey's position in the Saadabad Pact (1937). He used IR (alliance) theories to explain this event. His findings are quite telling. No single theoretical approach can adequately describe and explain Turkey's role in the initiation and virtual termination of Saadabad Pact.[93]

This thesis argues that explanatory approaches cannot bring sufficient insight for understanding Turkey's changing discursive logic in constituting either partial cooperation or non-cooperation with Iraq. For this reason, there is an academic need to demonstrate the analytical implications of constitutive theory perspective within the route of discourse tracing. Constitutive viewing of theories has been a relatively new pursuit for the students of TFP. By most accounts, it is a less traveled research path, which seeks to understand discursive/rhetorical constitution of theories in events. This path enables abstract thinking on various cases (situations and acts) of international affairs and helps to observe discursive patterns in the making of events. In this approach, alternative questions can be posed: What are the conceptual frames discursively deployed for making sense of the eventual context? How dominant reasons are publicly constructed for the event? Which theoretical models or their cognates are embedded in rhetoric of the event? How do context and discourse mutually interact in shaping the political consequences?

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[92] See for instance, Gözen, *İmparatorluktan Küresel Aktörlüğe*, 211-369.

[93] Mustafa Serdar Palabıyık, "Sadabad Paktı (8 Temmuz 1937): İttifak Kuramları Açısından Bir İnceleme," *Ortadoğu Etütleri* 2, no.3, July 2010: 147-179.

Reformulation of these questions can shed substantive light on the theory in events of cooperation and non-cooperation in Turkey's Iraq policy. At this point, (non)cooperation needs to be studied as a foreign policy discourse emerging at "critical turning points."[94] Treatment of (non)cooperation as a discursive practice in context provides an analytical avenue to examine "pragmatics" of ontological modes, rhetorical models, and frames in political narratives. It is the pragmatics of discursive practices that creates "illocutionary (what is done *in* saying) and perlocutionary (what is done *by* saying) acts". Analysis of these pragmatic acts embedded in discursive practices can only be made by focusing on the inter-relationship between context, agency and audience.[95] These assertions apply to the cases of cooperation and non-cooperation discourses in Turkey's Iraq policy. More often than not, these discourses have reflected pragmatic (context and audience constituting) practice of governments.

Context constitutes "malleable" facet of (non)cooperation. Actors can "pursue different strategies within an established context of interaction, they may also seek to alter that context" with their cooperative or non-cooperative policies.[96] As the agency of cooperation, governments hold the wherewithal and responsibility for making political commitments. While making commitments for bargaining and enforcement of (non)cooperation, governments face (internal-external) veto players and audience costs, which may affect the political outcome.[97]

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[94] Henri J. Barkey and Graham E. Fuller, "Turkey's Kurdish Question: Critical Turning Points and Missed Opportunities," *Middle East Journal* 51, no.1 (Winter 1997): 61. Barkey and Fuller are specifically concerned about domestic politics. They define "critical turning points" as "periods of broad changes that represent fundamental choices in the way societal relations are constructed." I treat this term more broadly. Critical turning points also include "junctures at which" foreign policy "decisions [are] made…These moments create possibilities for the redefinition or transformation of" foreign policy as well.

[95] Thierry Balzacq, "The Three Faces of Securitization: Political Agency, Audience and Context," *European Journal of International Relations* 11, no. 2 (2005): 172, 177, 178, 188.

[96] Robert Axelrod and Robert O. Keohane, "Achieving Cooperation Under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions," *World Politics* 38, no. 1 (October 1985): 227, 228.

[97] James D. Fearon, "Bargaining, Enforcement, and International Cooperation," *International Organization* 52, no. 2 (Spring 1998): 269-305. Susanne Lohmann, "Linkage Politics," *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 41, no. 1 (February 1997): 37-67. James D. Fearon, "Signaling Foreign Policy Interests: Tying Hands versus Sinking Costs," *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 41, no. 1 (February 1997): 68-90. James D. Fearon, "Rationalist Explanations for War," *International Organization* 49, no. 3 (Summer 1995): 379-414. James D. Fearon, "Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes," *The American Political Science Review* 88, no. 3 (September 1994): 577-592.

Discourses of cooperation and non-cooperation in Turkey's Iraq policy have always embedded in a certain context. While talking about (non)cooperation with Iraq, the Turkish governments have inevitably made discursive commitments towards the constitution of international, regional, dyadic/local, and domestic contexts. Thus, the talk of cooperating with or against Baghdad has never been a cheap endeavor for Ankara. Bargaining and enforcing of (non)cooperation incurred either domestic or dyadic costs. In most cases, like Saadabad and Baghdad pacts, Gulf War and US invasion, Turkey faced undesired, perhaps unintended, but definitely unbearable political consequences. This dissertation asks, what went wrong at these critical turning points? The next section begins with restatement of main research questions.

1.3. Research Design

1.3.1. Research Aims and Questions

The main research aim of this dissertation is to analyze contextual reasons, discursive reasonings and contextual consequences in episodes of Turkey's (non)cooperation with Iraq. In order to attain this goal, "narrative explanation" [98] is taken as a general research format. Structured in a temporal (pre-event/event/post-event) order, this thesis specifically seeks to analyze pragmatics of discursive practices in Turkey's policy of (non)cooperation with Iraq. It takes (non)cooperation discourses as contextually situated pragmatic acts committed by Turkish governments. Without any doubt, these pragmatic practices did create political costs and consequences, either calculated or unforeseen by Ankara.

Along these lines, three main and two supplementary research questions are elaborated: What were the contextual reasons that paved the way for Turkey's (non)cooperation with Iraq? How (non)cooperation with Iraq was made possible by the discursive reasoning practices of Turkish governments? What were the political consequences of (non)cooperation discourses? Have there been commonalities or differences

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[98] Suganami, 329-340.

between (non)cooperation episodes? How did contextual and discursive dynamics shape long-term transformation of Turkey's Iraq policy?

1.3.2. Variables and Hypotheses

In this research design, "Turkey's Iraq policy" is taken as a "discursive transformation" in order to examine how "the pragmatic change in pro-governmental framing practices (the independent variable)" constitutes "the contextual-discursive change in Turkey's Iraq policy (the dependent variable)." Here, it is hypothesized that governments of Turkey decided to (non)cooperate with governments of Iraq, at least for some reason. In other words, Turkey's policies of (non)cooperation have been inherently based on some sort of rationality.[99] These reasonings also provided the basis for the interpretation of contextual reasons. Thus, analyses of ontological modes, rhetorical models and frames of reasoning are important to understand discursive and contextual implications of (non)cooperation in Turkey's Iraq policy.

Empirical observations were based on the pragmatics of discourse. The aim was not to document linguistic configurations, but to capture basic perspectives or discursive bottom lines in these narratives. Thus, I did not present a detailed textual analysis. Rather, the focus was directed towards main presuppositions regarding the context and rationality of (non)cooperation. In terms of (non)cooperation context, framings of temporal orders (status quo ante, current status of affairs, shadow of future) and spatial settings (global environment, regional conditions, dyadic/local situation, domestic circumstances) were explored. Framings of reasons (rationales) and issues (goals) provided important cues for the types of rationality driving the policy of (non)cooperation.

With regard to rationality of (non)cooperation, I developed two sub-hypotheses.[100] Rationality of cooperation could be based on material (power-threat balancing, interdependence/hegemony/dependency, geopolitical influence) or ideational (identity,

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[99] Milner, 468.

[100] On general hypotheses about the rationality of (non)cooperation, see Milner, 466-496; Axelrod and Keohane, 226-254.

ideology, norms, ideals) presuppositions.[101] Depending on these main reasons (rationales), central issues (goals) of (non)cooperation could be articulated by framings.[102] In parallel to these two sub-hypotheses, issues (goals) of (non)cooperation might be framed with utilitarian presuppositions, like political (regime security, diplomatic prestige), military (national security, territorial defense) and economic (trade, resources) interests. Ideational preconceptions might also serve for the framing of social-cultural-ideological goals (reputation/solidarity/influence) and normative issues (legitimacy, peace, democracy, human rights).

After exposing rationality types, I proposed two hypothetical typologies for ontological modes and rhetorical models of reasoning. These typologies were developed around some basic assumptions: (1) Speaking in terms of ontology, (non)cooperation can exist in both material and ideational realms. Hence (non)cooperation can be conceived by material and ideational modes of reasoning. (2) The rhetoric of (non)cooperation may or may not depend on ontological conceptions.

Utilitarian mode of reasoning conceives cooperation as a matter of stability emerging out of the exchange of material costs and benefits. For this mode, cooperation is a business-like, realistic affair. As rhetorical models, mutual utility and material reciprocity represents this mode. The other mode is idealistic and treats cooperation as an ideational interaction. Ideational mode is concerned about the harmony of non-material gains and losses. Manifestation of this mode emphasizes non-material rhetoric based on common culture, social solidarity and shared ideology.

Obviously, these ontological modes and rhetorical models might remind some IR conceptualizations. But these modes and models themselves do not carry a prior claim for the possession of or exposition to any IR knowledge. Unlike paradigmatic ideal types extant in IR, the discursive lines between these heuristic typologies are commensurable. For some, they could be associated with two broad schools of IR thought, i.e. realism and idealism.

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[101] For the distinction of material and ideational conception of (non)cooperation, see Robert Jervis, "Realism, Game Theory, and Cooperation," *World Politics* 40, no. 3 (April 1988): 317-349; Robert Jervis, "Realism, Neoliberalism, and Cooperation: Understanding the Debate," *International Security* 24, no. 1 (Summer 1999): 42-63. See also Robert O. Keohane, *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy*, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), 5-17, 110-132.

[102] Jeffrey Berejekian, "The Gains Debate: Framing State Choice," *American Political Science Review* 91, no. 4 (December 1997): 789-805. See also Francis A. Beer, "Games and Metaphors: Review Article *The Evolution of Cooperation* by Robert Axelrod," *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 30, no. 1 (March 1986): 171-191.

Even so these discursive typologies do not connote any academic theory. At best they can represent theory of/in human practice. For this reason, they are more likely to be attached to realistic and idealistic ways of human thinking and talking. Clearly put, these typologies were developed for the analytical purposes of this study. They are not all-inclusive and can be broadened or reformulated depending on specific research goals. These hypothetical typologies are summarized in Table 1.

For this study, the primary purpose was to trace discursive and contextual transformation of Turkey's Iraq policy during the central events of cooperation and non-cooperation. That is to say, the event analyses focused on the pragmatics of framing practices in order to understand illocutionary (what is done *in* saying) and perlocutionary (what is done *by* saying) acts committed in situational contexts. In line with the overarching narrative explanation protocol, the event analyses sections (the episodic middles) were structured in temporal and consequential order.

1.3.3. Empirical Outline and Data Analysis

Discourses of cooperation and non-cooperation in Turkey's Iraq policy were analyzed in four episodes. Each episode was studied in three (pre-event, event, and post-event) sections. Pre-event analyses laid out the historical backgrounds and discursive contexts that paved the way for Turkey's making of major events. After episodic beginnings, the second sections constituted episodic middles. In these sections, the analyses were mainly based on political narratives published in one of the leading newspapers[103] of the time. Empirical observations were mostly directed towards capturing of "the lived experience". This focus is a key for making an analytical inquiry into foreign policy narratives.[104]

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[103] Newspapers have been important sites for public construction of political discourses in Turkey. For this reason, they can be treated as rich resources to understand discursive strategies applied by political subjects located within various spatial-temporal contexts of Turkey. See for example Çiler Dursun, "The Struggle Goes On: The Discursive Strategies of the Islamist Press in Turkey," *Journal of Contemporary European Studies* 14, no. 2 (August 2006): 161-182.

[104] Browning, *Constructivism, Narrative and Foreign Policy Analysis*, 68.

Table 1: Hypothetical Typologies for Tracing of (Non)Cooperation Discourses (Modes, Models and Frames of Reasoning)

Ontological modes	Rhetorical models	Frames			
		Presuppositions on rationality		**Presuppositions on context**	
		Main reasons (rationales)	Central issues (goals)	Temporal orders	Spatial settings (players)
● Utilitarian affair (realistic) ● Material (cost/benefit) stability	● Mutual utility ● Material reciprocity	● Power balancing ● Threat balancing ● Interdependence, hegemony/dependency ● Geopolitical influence	● Political interests (regime security, diplomatic prestige) ● Military interests (national security, territorial defense) ● Economic interests (trade, resources)	● Status quo ante (past context) ● Current status of affairs (status quo and coinciding events) ● Shadow of future (desired, intended context)	● Global environment ● Regional conditions ● Dyadic/local situation ● Domestic circumstances
● Ideational interaction (idealistic) ● Non-material (gain-loss) harmony	● Common culture ● Shared ideology ● Social solidarity	● Identity, ideology ● Norms, ideals	● Social-cultural-ideological goals (reputation/solidarity/ influence) ● Normative issues (legitimacy, peace, democracy, human rights)		

Primary political narratives were dissected since the narrator had constituted the historical subject that experienced and narrated the event almost synchronously. In addition to these historical narratives, select historiographical (spectatorial and/or retrospective) narratives were examined in order to thoroughly grasp modes and models of reasoning that provided discursive conditions of possibility for Turkey's (un)making of cooperation with Iraq. This was necessary for understanding the interplay between history and historiography of Turkey's Iraq policy.

Primary political narratives and frames were taken as the main empirical data. In the middle of each episode, issues of select pro-governmental newspapers[105] were examined to unravel contextualizations and rationalizations in Turkey's discourses of cooperation and non-cooperation with Iraq. Given the usual nature of government-media relations[106], narrative-framing practices are quite important for understanding the implications of pro-governmental commonsense production processes.

In this regard, the discursive data was collected from four pro-government newspapers published during the central events: Saadabad Pact (*Cumhuriyet*, 8 July-17 August 1937)[107], Baghdad Pact (*Milliyet*, 12 January-24 February 1955)[108], Gulf War (*Sabah*, 15 January-27 February 1991)[109], Iraq War (*Yeni Şafak*, 20 March-9 April 2003)[110]. Primary discursive evidence and secondary data were collected to the point where they had become adequate and reliable in confirming the typological validity of utilitarian-ideational (non)cooperation discourses. Together with the (external checking of) secondary resources, the discursive data

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[105] For an extensive study on the evolution of political relations between government parties and newspapers in Turkey, see Salih Bayram, "Political Parallelism in the Turkish Press, a Historical Interpretation," *Turkish Studies* 11, no. 4 (December 2010): 579-611. The ideological-political relationship between the Turkish governments and the Turkish media has largely remained inter-dependent. See Umur Talu, "Medyanın Siyasi İdeolojilere Etkileri," in *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce-Cilt 9: Dönemler ve Zihniyetler*, ed. Ömer Laçiner (İstanbul: İletişim Yayıncılık, 2009), 902-916.

[106] In terms of government-media relations, the implications of framing practices can be outlined by three interrelated models. The hegemony model holds that governments create political consent by using the media. The indexing and cascade models also emphasize the salience of political control over the media. See King and Wells, 17-19.

[107] Microfilm archive was available in the periodicals section of the National Library in Ankara, 1-30 September 2010.

[108] Electronic archive was available at <http://www.milliyet.com.tr> 1-30 May 2011.

[109] Print archive was available in the periodicals section of the National Library in Ankara, 1-30 August 2011.

[110] Electronic archive was available at <http://yenisafak.com.tr> 1-30 April 2012.

collected from these newspapers provided sufficient evidence to make sense of dominant discursive patterns (ontological modes/rhetorical models) in Turkey's Iraq policy. Put in other words, the data became representative and conclusive for the analytical tracing of ontology and rhetoric in Turkey's Iraq policy. At that point, there did not emerge a necessary need to look for additional textual resources.[111]

Within this inter-textual scope, the main focus was devoted to the narratives of the leading political-military and/or intellectual figures who were directly involved in the discursive making of four central events. In addition to the public discourse of official figures—Turkey's Presidents, Prime Ministers, Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Ministers of Defense, Chiefs of Turkish General Staff and other officials (like ministers, parliamentarians, speakers, advisors and bureaucrats)—political narratives of key pro-government columnists were incorporated into the analyses for complementary purposes.

As opinion makers, these columnists played an intermediary role in the public construction of Turkey's Iraq policy. The chief columnist of *Cumhuriyet*, Yunus Nadi, was influential during the Saadabad Pact (1937). The chief editor of *Milliyet*, Ali Naci Karacan, passionately supported and personally involved in the construction of Baghdad Pact (1955). Mehmet Barlas (the columnist of *Sabah*) and Fehmi Koru (the chief columnist of *Yeni Şafak*) made considerable discursive contributions to the writing of Turkey's Iraq policy during the Gulf War (1991) and Iraq War (2003), respectively.

Like "public intellectuals"[112], these columnists served as discursive carriers of pro-governmental narratives. Their writings supported the process of commonsense production in the midst of both pact and war episodes. Analyses of these framings helped to make better sense of Ankara's public rationalizations during the central events of (non)cooperation with Baghdad (and Erbil).

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[111] The researchers of discourse encounter a common problem, "namely when to stop analyzing texts. An analysis can be said to be complete (validated) when upon adding new texts…the researcher finds consistently that the theoretical categories she has generated [also] work for those texts." See Milliken, 234.

[112] "Public intellectuals" can be differentiated through their major writings and their main audience. Public intellectuals write on public affairs in the broadest sense. Unlike "intellectuals of statecraft", public intellectuals targets the general public and do not need specialized audience. Richard A. Posner, *Public Intellectuals: A Study of Decline*, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002), 23. See also Eylem Yılmaz and Pınar Bilgin, "Constructing Turkey's 'Western' Identity During the Cold War: Discourses of the Intellectuals of Statecraft," *International Journal: Canadian Institute of International of Affairs* 61 (Winter 2005-2006): 39-59.

After the episodic middles, post-event discursive dynamics and historical developments were examined until the episodic endings constituted by major events. In the conclusion sections, episodic findings were gathered. The last chapter of the thesis is devoted to the conclusion in which overall findings were presented. The analytical outline of the episodes is sketched into Table 2.

Table 2: Analytical Outline (Episodic Layout)

Episodes	Pre-event Analysis: Historical Background and Discursive Context	Event Analysis: Frames, Models and Modes of Reasoning		Post-event Analysis: Historical Developments and Discursive Dynamics
	Episodic Beginnings (Major Events)	**Episodic Middles (Central Events)**		**Episodic Ends (Major Events)**
Pacts (Cooperation)	**Saadabad Pact**			
	the signing of border agreement (5 June 1926)	the signing of Non-Aggression Treaty	the fall of Süleyman-Sıtkı government in Iraq	the signing of Ankara Pact between Turkey, Britain and France (19 October 1939)
		8 July 1937	17 August 1937	
	Baghdad Pact			
	the signing of Treaty of Friendship and Neighborly Relations (29 March 1946)	the Joint *Communiqué* for regional defense pact	the signing of Treaty of Mutual Cooperation	the fall of Hashemite monarchy in Iraq (14 July 1958)
		12 January 1955	24 February 1955	
Wars (Non-Cooperation)	**Gulf War**			
	the Iran-Iraq war (22 September 1980-17 July 1988)	the expiration of UN deadline for Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait	the Iraqi acceptance of UN conditions	resumption of diplomatic relations (February 1993)
		15 January 1991	27 February 1991	
	Iraq War			
	resumption of diplomatic relations (February 1993)	the start of air bombardment	the fall of Baghdad	the opening of Erbil Consulate (29 March 2011)
		20 March 2003	9 April 2003	

CHAPTER

2. THE SAADABAD PACT: COOPERATION DISCOURSE AND DYADIC COSTS

The Oriental Entente (*Şark Misakı*)—formed among Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and Afghanistan on 8 July 1937—has almost been an unforgotten case for the students of Turkish Foreign Policy (TFP), Middle East Studies (MES) and International Relations (IR). There have been very few scholarly attempts[1] to enter into this uncharted intellectual territory. Recently, Mustafa Serdar Palabıyık took an exceptional step to explore this case. He argued that domestic dynamics have played an important role in Turkey's Saadabad Pact policy.[2] Yet, Palabıyık's conclusions did not provide sufficient insight to understand the episodic context and discourse of partial, if not virtual, cooperation with Iraq. In this regard, there is a further need to delineate Turkey's modes of reasoning behind the formation of Saadabad Pact.

As far as the temporal layout of this dissertation is concerned, the signing of "Border Agreement" on 5 June 1926 constitutes a major event which helps to contextualize the episodic beginning of Turkish-Iraqi relations during inter-War years. In the pre-event section of this chapter I will present the historical background and discursive context within which Ankara moved towards the formation of *Şark Misakı*. In the episodic middle, I analyze discursive frames of presuppositions during this central event. Here, I will excavate political narratives published pro-government daily *Cumhuriyet* between the signing of "Non-

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[1] See for instance, Cameron D. Watt, "The Saadabad Pact of 8 July 1937," in *The Great Powers in the Middle East 1919-1939*, ed. Uriel Dann (NY: Holmes & Meier Publishers, 1988), 333-352.

[2] Mustafa Serdar Palabıyık, "Sadabad Paktı (8 Temmuz 1937): İttifak Kuramları Açısından Bir İnceleme," *Ortadoğu Etütleri* 2, no.3, July 2010: 147-179.

Aggression Treaty" on 8 July 1937 and the fall of (pro-Turkey) Iraqi government on 17 August 1937.

This discursive experience and narrative practice that molded during the central event (Saadabad Pact) highlight combinations of utilitarian and ideational frames, which imply mixed mode of reasoning in Turkey's Iraq policy. Within almost two years after the fall of pro-Turkish (Süleyman-Sıtkı) government in Iraq, and mainly due to the impending of war in the world horizon, *Şark Misakı* lost its political significance for Ankara. Despite the pressure of London and Paris, the Turkish government did not opt to elevate the international standing of Oriental Entente from "a consultative body" to "a military convention". Instead, Turkey signed a new pact with Britain and France on 19 October 1939. This major event implied the virtual end of Saadabad Pact episode. This end also wraps up the post-event (post-Saadabad) section in which historical developments and discursive dynamics were laid out.

The episodic analysis is concluded with the assertion that Ankara's mixed logic of cooperation with Baghdad was reflected in framings of presuppositions in pro-governmental discourse. Rhetorical mastering was based on combination of two models (shared solidarity and mutual utility). Even though this combined discursive strategy did work well in the bargaining (including the ratification) period, it did not help to secure the enforcement process. More importantly, the sudden regime change in Baghdad emerged as an unforeseen political outcome. At least because of the immediate political costs, the Oriental Entente discourse brought about a partially cooperative dyadic context and almost consequentially paved the way for virtual cooperation.

2.1. Pre-Event Analysis: Historical Background and Discursive Context

Public narratives on Turkey's Iraq policy every now and then flash back to the Sèvres syndrome, i.e. the anachronistic fear from the establishment of a Kurdish state.[3] This age-old

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3   Dietrich Jung, "The Sevres Syndrome: Turkish Foreign Policy and its Historical Legacies," in *Oil & Water: Cooperative Security in the Persian Gulf*, ed. Bjørn Møller (London and New York: I.B. Tauris Publishers 2001), 131-159. <http://www.unc.edu/depts/diplomat/archives_roll/2003_07-09/jung_sevres/jung_sevres.html> 25 March 2010.

phobia demonstrates the profound impact of formative historical (Sèvres-Lausanne period) context on Turkey's making of (non)cooperation with Iraq. Without fully understanding this historical background, one cannot thoroughly grasp discursive dynamics of Turkey's relations with Iraq in later epochs. First and foremost, the episode of *Şark Misakı* was historically contingent on the resolution of Mosul dispute between the Mudros Ceasefire Agreement in 1918 and the Trilateral (Turkey-Britain-Iraq) Border Agreement in 1926.

According to Baskın Oran, Turkish foreign policy making in this period reflected balance of power reasoning directed towards the preservation of territorial borders.[4] In fact, by the beginning of 1920's, various power/threat balancing rationales were prevalent in Turkey. This was quite understandable given the heavy stipulations of the Mudros Ceasefire Agreement signed on 30 October 1918. While the Istanbul Government was stumbling for a balance to achieve regime security, the Government in Ankara was opting for a balance strategy based on territorial survival. Under inauspicious circumstances, Mustafa Kemal Pasha left Istanbul. Upon arrival to Samsun on 19 May 1919, he began to work for gaining national sovereignty. In the Congress of Sivas held on 4-12 September 1919, *Misak-ı Millî* (National Pact) was accepted as a blueprint for Turkey's struggle for independence. In a sense, territorial, political and socio-cultural boundaries of Turkey were framed in the National Pact. The first, and foremost important, article of *Misak-ı Millî* stipulated the indivisibility of the land inhabited by Ottoman-Islam (non-Arab) majority, when the Mudros Armistice was concluded.[5] In a sense, major frames in the *Misak-ı Millî* narrative have determined the foundation of Mosul problem for Ankara.

2.1.1. Foundation of the Mosul Issue: From *Misak-ı Millî* to the Sèvres

By the end of 1919, Mustafa Kemal came to Ankara to lead the War of Independence. In those days, he publicly stated that Mosul, Kirkuk and Suleymaniyah were under the control of the Ottoman army, when the Mudros Armistice was sealed off. Once the ceasefire

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[4] Baskın Oran, "Türk Dış Politikasının Teori ve Pratiği"; "Kurtuluş Yılları, 1919-1923: Dönemin Bilançosu," in *Türk Dış Politikası: Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar* (*Cilt I: 1919-1980)*, ed. Baskın Oran, 14th ed., (İstanbul: İletişim, 2009), 46-49, 104-109.

[5] Mustafa Budak, *Misâk-ı Millî'den Lozan'a: İdealden Gerçeğe Türk Dış Politikası*, 4th ed., (İstanbul: Küre Yayınları, 2008), 167-174, 179-182. See also Oran, "Kurtuluş Yılları," 105-107.

entered into effect in the afternoon of 31 October 1918, British forces had been around 60 km away from the city of Mosul. In addition, Mosul, Kirkuk and Suleymaniyah were predominantly inhabited by Turks and Kurds, and it was adjacent to an area to its south in which mostly Arabic speaking Ottoman communities resided. In any case, the British Army had invaded the city of Mosul, under the pretext of Article 7 of Mudros Ceasefire Agreement, which provided the Entente Powers with the right to occupy any part of the Ottoman land as they would deem necessary for their security. This heavy stipulation alone meant a virtually "unconditional surrender", and made the defense of *de facto* ceasefire line almost impossible. Under intense British political-military pressure, the commander of Ottoman 6th Army in Mosul, Ali İhsan Pasha could only resist for ten days and was forced to evacuate the city on 10 November 1918.[6] Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk) would later regret that Ali İhsan (Sabis) could have resisted firmly against deceptive political-military actions of the British forces out of Mosul.[7]

Nevertheless, the conditions dictated by the Entente Powers were really harsh. This became more apparent on 13 November 1918 as the Entente fleet anchored to its naval base in Istanbul. In midst of all these political-military disappointments, Mustafa Kemal moved along the lines drawn by the *Misak-ı Millî*. Interestingly enough, he managed to persuade the Istanbul Government—represented by the Minister of Navy Salih Pasha—in Amasya on 20-22 October 1919, to recognize the National Pact. The ratification of *Misak-ı Millî* by the Ottoman Parliament (*Meclis-i Mebusan*) was made public on 17 February 1920.[8]

Scholarly analysis of Mustafa Kemal's public (and private/secret) narratives between January and May 1920[9] reveals significant hints about the mode of reasoning behind *Misak-ı Millî*. In this mode of reasoning, all Muslim groups, including Kurds and Arabs, within the *Misak-ı Millî* were deemed as united. On the other hand, Muslims outside the *Misak-ı Millî* were partners against the common enemy that was the Western imperialism. Anti-imperialist in its essence, this rationale was emanating from the awareness that Ottomanist goals, either

[6] Zekeriya Türkmen, *Musul Meselesi: Askerî Yönden Çözüm Arayışları (1922-1925)*, (Ankara: AKDTYK Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi, 2003), 15-19, 30-32.

[7] Gazi Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, *Gençler İçin Fotoğraflarla Nutuk*, eds. Sabahattin Özel and Erol Şadi Erdinç, 11th ed., (İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2011), 447-450.

[8] Haydar Çakmak, "Mondros Mütarekesi ve Sevr Antlaşması," in *Türk Dış Politikası (1919-2008)*, ed. Haydar Çakmak (Ankara: Barış Platin Kitap, 2008), 55, 56. Oran, "Kurtuluş Yılları," 105, 112.

[9] Eyüp Çakmak, "Orta Doğu ve Atatürk'ün Orta Doğu Politikası," MA Thesis, (İstanbul: Marmara Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, 2000), 72-80.

in "Pan-Islamist" or "Pan-Turkist (Turanist)" forms, could be a delusive utopia, which might endanger Turkey's survival as a state. By appealing to shared solidarity rhetoric, Mustafa Kemal engaged with both Kurdish and Arab groups in an almost equal footing. These discursive moves facilitated heightening of resistance against the British occupation in Anatolia (Turkey) and Mesopotamia (Iraq).[10]

In fact, the Entente Powers did not cease fire as they were expected to do so under the terms of Mudros. They were expected to bring a comprehensive peace settlement onto the table. After almost two years of *de facto* invasion, the peace treaty was notified to the Istanbul (Ottoman) Government on 11 May 1920.[11] In its reply dated 25 June 1920, Istanbul Government rejected to sign the agreement. But when the Allies gave an ultimatum on 16 July 1920, the Council of Sultanate (*Şura-yı Saltanat*) felt that they had no choice, but to accept. The rationale behind the decision was framed as a matter of life and death. Under war conditions, Ottoman Government assumed that the agreement was providing a way out, restrictions on national sovereignty notwithstanding. Refusing the settlement merely meant a political suicide. In other words, rejection of the treaty would unleash militarily unbearable consequences; hence might bring an immediate end to the regime. Among the three ill-fated Ottoman delegates that were sent to Sèvres, there was a senator—member of the *Meclis-i Âyan*—from Baghdad named Hadi Pasha.[12]

The Grand National Assembly (GNA) in Ankara has never officially been informed about the Treaty of Sèvres. Nevertheless, it was following the developments with utmost attention. Upon a proposal by Kâzım Karabekir Pasha, the GNA proclaimed those as traitors who supported the signing of Sèvres on 10 August 1920. The number of indicted was around forty-five, which included three signatory delegates and most members of the *Şura-yı Saltanat*.[13]

At this point, the reaction of Karabekir has to be put into socio-historical context. At that time, Karabekir had been serving in the Eastern Front, as the commander of 15th Corps in Erzurum. During the First World War, his rhetorical framing of Muslim brotherhood between Turks and Kurds had been quite influential in undermining a probable cooperation

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[10] Qassam Kh. Al-Jumaily, *Irak ve Kemalizm Hareketi (1919-1923),* edited and translated by İzzet Öztoprak, (Ankara: AKDTYK Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi, 1999).

[11] Bilâl N. Şimşir, *Kürtçülük I: 1787-1923*, (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 2007), 416.

[12] Baskın Oran, "Mondros Silah Bırakışması," in *Türk Dış Politikası (Cilt I)*), 118-124. Şimşir, 425.

[13] Şimşir, 436, 437.

between Kurds and Armenians. By 6 January 1920, he had warned both Cemal Pasha in Istanbul and Mustafa Kemal in Ankara about the repercussions of possible foreign (read British) intermingling in and around the Kurdish question.[14] For most of the (ex)Ottoman pashas, who constantly stayed in war uniforms, the Kurdish question was conceived in line with threat balancing rationale.

More than two months later, on 16 March 1920, the Ottoman capital Istanbul was put under formal occupation by the Entente Powers and afterwards the *Meclis-i Mebusan* was closed down. Even though Sèvres was not ratified by either the Ottoman Parliament in Istanbul or the GNA in Ankara[15], its acceptance by the Istanbul Government on 10 August 1920 dealt a serious blow to the mode of reasoning that was enshrined in the *Misak-ı Millî*. Under the provisions of Article 62-63, the Treaty of Sèvres opened a door for the establishment of an ostensibly autonomous, but implicitly British-controlled, Kurdistan in the lands of Anatolia (Turkey) and Mesopotamia (Iraq).[16] So the rationale in Ankara was set to defend *Misak-ı Millî* no matter what may be the costs. Mustafa Kemal delineated this point on 1 May 1920.

> The people, who form this High Assembly, are not only Turk, not only Circassian, not only Kurd, not only Laz. They are constituencies of Islam (*anasırı İslamiye*) composed of all, as a sincere whole…[W]hen the border issue was discussed and determined, [we accepted that]…our national borders passes along the south of Alexandretta (*İskenderun*), extends to the east and includes Mosul, Suleymaniyah and Kirkuk. This is our national border, we said! In fact, there are Turks as well as Kurds in the south of Kirkuk. We did not distinguish (*tefrik*) them [as such an inclusive manner]. Consequently, the nation that we take care for its preservation and defense is naturally not a single constituency (*unsur*). It is composed of various constituencies of Islam. Each constituency of Islam that forms this whole is our brothers and our citizens with completely common interests…[W]e all reiterated and sincerely accepted that constituencies of Islam would respect each others' rights of any sort…Therefore, our interests are common. The unity that we strive to rescue, is not only Turk, not only Circassian, is a single constituency of Islam, incorporating all [of them].[17]

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[14] Kazım Karabekir, *Kürt Meselesi*, ed. Faruk Özerengin (İstanbul: Emre Yayınları, 2000), 10, 50, 51. Şimşir, 361, 371-374, 386.

[15] Melek Fırat and Ömer Kürkçüoğlu, "Orta Doğu'yla İlişkiler, 1919-1923," in *Türk Dış Politikası (Cilt I)*), 203.

[16] Oran, "Mondros Silah Bırakışması," 130, 131. Şimşir, 428-431.

[17] TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi, Devre I, İçtima Senesi 1, Cilt I, (Ankara: TBMM Matbaası, 1959), 165-166; quoted in Şimşir, 369, 370.

As time passed on, these frames gained more significance in Mustafa Kemal's rhetoric. First and foremost, his main goal was to preserve Turkey's territorial integrity and national sovereignty, which included at least the city of Mosul as espoused in *Misak-ı Millî*. The discourse on and around *Misak-ı Millî* deeply resonated with the public at large, and was well received in both Turkey and Iraq. So, public narratives of *Misak-ı Millî* and the discursive frames embedded within it have been quite influential in shaping Turkey's Iraq policy up until the Lausanne peace negotiations.

2.1.2. Lingering of the Problem after the Lausanne

Turkey's military success in the War of Independence created both external and internal ramifications. Before the Armistice of *Mudanya* on 11 October 1922, Britain attempted to secure its military position in Mosul. London signed a mandate agreement with Baghdad on 10 October 1922.[18] On the other side, Turkey desired to achieve territorial integrity and national unity. These goals could only be achieved by securing natural, if not strategic, boundaries espoused in the *Misak-ı Milli*. "All the territories contained in the National Pact constituted a formal and non-divisible whole."[19]

Before the peace negotiations convened in the Lausanne Conference on 21 November 1922, İsmet Pasha, the elected head of the Turkish delegation, publicly summed up their diplomatic goal in two words: *Misak-ı Millî*.[20] Turkey's goals for peace negotiations were discussed in the GNA and stipulated in official directives of the government. According to these directives, the issue of minorities (*ekalliyetler*) was to be resolved by population exchange (*mübadele*) of non-Muslims. The Turkish delegation would "demand cities of Suleymaniyah, Kirkuk and Mosul" and receive further directions as new conditions may

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[18] Oran, "Kurtuluş Yılları," 101. Fırat and Kürçüoğlu, "Orta Doğu'yla İlişkiler," 203.

[19] Selim Deringil, *Turkish Foreign Policy During the Second World War: An Active Neutrality* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 64-68.

[20] Ali Naci Karacan, *Lozan*, ed. Hulûsi Turgut, 3rd ed., (İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2011), 41. See also Ercan Karakoç, *Atatürk'ün Dış Türkler Politikası*, (İstanbul: IQ Kültür Sanat Yayıncılık, 2002), 166, 167.

arise. On the issue of oil some concessions could be made.[21] Even though it had something to do with oil policies of the contending parties,[22] the Mosul dispute in Lausanne, was mainly related to the demarcation of Turkey-Iraq border and to a lesser extent resolving the issue of minorities.[23]

In addition to its strategic value, the Mosul provincial district (*vilayet*), which included cities (*liva*) of Suleymaniyah, Kirkuk and Mosul, was important in terms of its significance for the fate of Kurds living in Turkey. Put in another way, resolution of the frontier issue was a challenge having two significant dimensions: security and identity. For Mustafa Kemal, Mosul was not a matter of compromise. On 2 January 1923, he publicly stated that "For many times, we declared that the city of Mosul is inside our national borders…Now, it would be a very unjust act to seize [even] a small piece from our national land. We definitely do not agree with this." [24]

Compounded with other issues, such as minorities, finding a definitive solution to the question of Mosul, might be an impediment to conclude the peace agreement at Lausanne. In those days (14-19 January 1923), Mustafa Kemal made important public speeches during his visit to Eskişehir and İzmit. He publicly expressed his views on foreign and domestic policy issues, which included Mosul and Kurdish questions as well. "The Eskişehir-İzmit Speeches" gave strong hints about power/threat balancing rationale in Turkish foreign policy discourse. In terms of preconceptions, Mustafa Kemal portrayed a multi-polar world order. According to him, the British, the French and the Italians were unlikely to sustain their war-making efforts due to their emergent domestic weaknesses. The Russians might be more powerful than the Czarist era, if they do away with the "communist nonsense." As a result of the Austria-German disintegration, a power vacuum emerged right at the center of Europe. Hence, a power struggle between Russia and France would be imminent. In order to preserve

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[21] Budak, 313, 320. Bilâl N. Şimşir, *Lozan Telgrafları II (Şubat-Ağustos 1923: Türk Diplomatik Belgelerinde Lozan Barış Konferansı,* (Ankara: TTK TTK Basımevi, 1994), 1-3, cited in Şimşir, 487, 488.

[22] Meliha Benli Altunışık and Özlem Tür, *Turkey: Challenges of Continuity and Change*, (London and NY: Routledge/Curzon, 2005), 95.

[23] Peter J. Beck, "A Tedious and Perilous Controversy: Britain and the Settlement of the Mosul Dispute, 1918-1926," *Middle East Studies* 17 (April 1981), 256, 257. Şimşir, 490-503. Karakoç, 166-187.

[24] *Atatürk'ün Söylev ve Demeçleri 1906-1938,* C. III, 3rd ed., (Ankara: 1981), 56; quoted in Mim Kemal Öke, *Belgelerle Türk-İngiliz İlişkilerinde Musul ve Kürdistan Sorunu 1918-1926*, (Ankara: Türk Kültürünü Araştırma Enstitüsü, 1992), 114.

its hegemonic position in the West and the East, Britain would most likely tilt towards the losing side. In this regard, both Britain and France would almost inevitably move towards making peace with Turkey. On the other hand, the friendship between Ankara and Moscow would most probably suffer from the Russians' intrusive policies, which were deliberately designed to push Turkish government towards a dependent position.[25]

As far as regional countries were concerned, Mustafa Kemal talked about the position of Turkish-Afghan and Turkish-Iranian relations. According to him, the Emir of Afghanistan could not pursue an independent foreign policy, by tilting towards both Russia and Britain. Due to this ambivalent position, the course of Turkish-Afghan relations would unlikely take a more meaningful direction. Mustafa Kemal acknowledged that the British influence over Iranian parliament and the dictatorial rule of Reza Khan, as the Minister of War, were two major predicaments for the development of good relations between Ankara and Tehran. Basically, for his own personal, political reasons, Reza Khan kept intentions to get rid of the British presence in Iran. In the words of Mustafa Kemal, "his degree of success was indefinite." Perhaps more problematically, he was expecting to receive arms and ammunitions from Ankara, presumably in exchange for extending Tehran's political-military support for Turkey's possible operations over Mosul.[26]

Under these circumstances, Mustafa Kemal thought that the Turkish government should play by the rules of balance of power and threat. In contrast to the "personal policies (*şahsî siyaset*)" of Ottoman sultans, Turkey had to develop and pursue a "state policy" in the external domain. The basis of this foreign policy should be "strong internal policy, domestic administration and internal institutions. Domestic policy and foreign policy must always be interrelated." In terms of domestic politics, Mustafa Kemal painted a bright picture. Even in the most persistently troublesome area of Dersim, conditions of security did prevail.[27] He framed the Kurdish question as a matter against Turkey's interests. Turks and Kurds did work together to form the GNA. "[T]hese two constituencies (*unsur*) [are] united [in] their interests and destiny…Attempting to draw a distinct line [between them] is not the right

[25] Arı İnan, *Gazi Mustafa Kemal Atatürk'ün 1923 Eskişehir-İzmit Konuşmaları,* (Ankara: TTK Basımevi, 1982), 46, 47.

[26] Ibid., 47, 48.

[27] Ibid., 49, 86, 87.

thing to do." As may be stipulated by the new Constitution, some form of "local autonomy" would be possible in "a province (*liva*)" that is populated by Kurds.[28]

After devising a strong domestic policy, it would be most reasonable for Turkish foreign policy makers to keep in touch with "the countries where populations of same culture and race live", collectively develop and move towards the road of civilization together. Institutionalized cooperation among sovereign Muslim countries could be a possibility, albeit a distinct one. In order to establish balance of power, Mustafa Kemal argued, Turkey could make "ententes and alliances" both with the East and the West, or chose to "stand alone", depending on circumstantial changes. His primary preconception on world-regional affairs was based on the concept of "balance (*muvazenet*)." In line with this conceptual presupposition, Mustafa Kemal's basic frame for Turkish foreign policy making was crystal clear: "We cannot [completely] set our heart on neither the east nor the west."[29]

In this regard, Mustafa Kemal reiterated that he himself conceptualized the notion of "national boundaries (*hudud-ı millîye*)" to determine Turkey's international position vis-à-vis the Mosul provincial district (*vilayet*). With some "inspiration from the Wilson principles", he thought that the ceasefire line could constitute the national boundaries of Turkey. Mustafa Kemal acknowledged that had İhsan Pasha not been deceived by the British army, Mosul might have remained inside Turkey, perhaps without any international interference. In this mindset, Mustafa Kemal foresaw that the British side was unlikely to give such an important territorial concession in the Lausanne talks. In spite of this, he believed that the Turkish side should insist on not ceding Mosul to the British mandate in Iraq. As he candidly put: "the *vilayet* of Mosul is not oil but a territorial issue (*memleket meselesi*)", notwithstanding its vast, valuable oil resources. Mustafa Kemal's framing of Mosul question in terms of its territorial (land) dimension was quite significant. He argued that the Mosul problem has been directly linked to the "Kurdish-ness issue (*Kürtlük meselesi*)." Put more bluntly, the British

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[28] Mustafa Kemal, *Eskişehir-İzmit Konuşmaları (1923): İlk Sansürsüz Tam Metin*, (İstanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, 1993), 104, 105, quoted in Seyfi Öngider, "Kemalist Rejimin İnşası: Takrir-i Sükûn Kanunu," in *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce-Cilt 9: Dönemler ve Zihniyetler*, ed. Ömer Laçiner (İstanbul: İletişim Yayıncılık, 2009), 314, 315. See also Mesut Yeğen, "'Prospective-Turks' or 'Pseudo-Citizens:' Kurds in Turkey," *Middle East Journal* 63, no. 4 (Autumn 2009): 598, 599. See also Robert Olson, "Kurds and Turks: Two Documents Concerning Kurdish Autonomy in 1922 and 1923," *Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies* 15, no. 2 (Winter 1991): 21, 22. In this article, Olson quoted his translations from *İkibine Doğru*, no. 46, 6 November 1988. See also Andrew Mango, "Atatürk and the Kurds," *Middle Eastern Studies* 35, no.4 (1999): 15, 16. In this article, Mango quoted his translations from Doğu Perinçek ed., *Mustafa Kemal: Eskişehir-İzmit Konuşmaları (1923)*, (İstanbul: 1993), 104.

[29] İnan, 86, 87, 108, 109.

has had a desire to establish "a Kurdish government" in northern Iraq. "Had they done so, this idea could have spread to the Kurds inside" Turkey's borders. "In order to hinder this idea, it would be necessary to move the border [further] to the south." Interestingly enough, Mustafa Kemal posed some key questions that shed more light on the likely path of Turkish foreign policy making vis-à-vis the resolution of Mosul dispute with Britain: "In case we do not take Mosul, would we continue to the war?...After all the things happened, is keeping on war for Mosul a rational thing?...Isn't it impossible to take Mosul by way of war? It is easy to take Mosul and our forces are completely ready to conduct operations in that front." [30]

In those days, the Turkish government in Ankara and the Turkish delegation in Lausanne were under intense international pressure to accept the draft peace treaty extended by the Allied Governments. It was reported by Arnold J. Toynbee that the draft treaty fulfilled "four-fifths of the [National] Pact…as İsmet Pasha himself declared at Lausanne."[31] The gaining of Mosul constituted the biggest chunk of the remaining one-fifth of *Misak-ı Millî*. As conceived by İsmet Pasha, the vitality of "peace was beyond the Mosul issue."[32]

In fact, it was since 26 November 1922 that he and Lord Curzon—the head of both British delegation and the Lausanne Conference—could not agree on the fate of Mosul. While Ankara principally defended implementation of plebiscite, London essentially demanded the League of Nations' arbitration. Basically for this reason, peace negotiations came to a halt on 25 January 1923. On that day, Lord Curzon sent a letter to the League of Nations. By doing so, he portrayed the Mosul issue as a serious border dispute which might threaten international peace and stability. After this political maneuver made by London, Ankara was left with the challenging choice of making war for Mosul or making peace without Mosul. Having received consent from Mustafa Kemal, İsmet Pasha explained Turkish decision as early as 4 February 1923. In order not to prevent making of comprehensive peace, Turkey accepted the postponement (*ta'lîk*) of Mosul resolution. Within one year, the issue would be settled through bilateral negotiations between Turkey

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[30] Ibid., 43-45. See also Baskın Oran, "Mudanya Silah Bırakışması ve Lausanne Barış Antlaşması, 1919-1923," 223. Oran quotes from Doğu Perinçek ed., *Mustafa Kemal Eskişehir-İzmit Konuşmaları, 1923*, (İstanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, 1993), 96.

[31] Arnold J. Toynbee, "The New Status of Turkey," *Contemporary Review* 123, (January-June 1923): 284.

[32] Tahir Kodal, *Paylaşılamayan Toprak: Türk Basınına Göre (1923-1926) Musul Meselesi*, (İstanbul: Yeditepe Yayınevi, 2005), 97. Kodal quotes from Bilâl N. Şimşir, *Lozan Telgrafları I (1922-1923)*, (Ankara: TTK Yayınları, 1990), 384, 385.

and Britain.[33] As reiterated by Mustafa Kemal, Mosul issue did "not have anything to do with the League of Nations."[34]

The government held private sessions to receive approval from the GNA. The decisions of Mustafa Kemal and İsmet Pasha were granted strong parliamentary support. The margin of political backing was fairly high. On 6 March 1923, out of 190 parliamentarians, 170 supported government's decision. Turkish government did not take the risk of making a costly war in order to regain Mosul from Britain. At that point, Ankara chose to re-open rather than close the door of diplomacy.[35]

Turkey signed the Peace Treaty on 23 July 1923 and opted to postpone the Mosul question, perhaps with an expectation of a more favorable international environment to come. Ankara's probable reasoning was summarized by Toynbee:

> The strategy of exhaustion, which has succeeded against the Greeks, might be turned with effect against a Power whose bases were far more distant from the theatre of operations and whose economic life would be still more seriously deranged by an interminable state of belligerency. No doubt the British and the Turkish General Staffs have both calculated how many times as much it costs to maintain a British soldier at Chanak or Mosul as it does to keep a Turkish soldier, 'containing' him, at Bigha or Diarbekr, and this ratio would give a fairly accurate measure of the advantage possessed by the Turks over ourselves in the event of fresh hostilities.
>
> A [probable] decision to fight would, therefore, be neither so inconceivable nor so insane, on the part of the Turks, as it sometimes assumed in current forecasts; and evidently there is a party at Angora in favor of this policy. It is, of course, impossible to predict whether that party would prevail…The natural orientation for a Turkey which has recovered the Straits and Eastern Thrace is towards the 'Little Entente'…[or] more probably…[towards] her Oriental neighbors…An Oriental Entente of this kind would, however, be a precarious affair, and all the chances would be against its succeeding.[36]

In fact, after the heavy stipulations of Sèvres Treaty, Turkey's recovery was relatively swift. There was not any mention of either "Kurdistan" or "Kurdish minority" in the

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[33] Kodal, 98-134.

[34] *Atatürk'ün Söylev ve Demeçleri C.3 (1918-1937)*, (Ankara: TTK Basımevi, 1961), 58, 59; quoted in Karakoç, 172.

[35] Kodal, 138-158. See also *TBMM Gizli Zabıt Ceridesi,* C. III, (Ankara: 1985), 1318; quoted in Öke, 117, 118.

[36] Toynbee, 284, 289.

Lausanne Treaty. These solid results showed that *Misak-ı Millî* narrative paid off well in and outside of Turkey. In spite of that there remained a significant caveat. Article 3 paragraph 2 of Lausanne Treaty entailed further bilateral negotiations on the question of Mosul between Turkey and Britain. If the direct talks failed to yield an agreement within nine months, the matter would be referred to the League of Nations (LN). At that time Turkey was not a member of the LN, which was under heavy British influence. Apparently, the designation of the LN as the site of final settlement was not the desired outcome for Turkey. However, Turkey was given a case-specific representation in order to facilitate a solution to the dispute.[37]

Lausanne Peace Treaty constituted the "founding document" [38] of Turkey, well before the proclamation of Republic on 29 October 1923. For the new regime, preservation of "national sovereignty" rather than say Islamic unity remained as the sole ideal to build the nation and the state simultaneously. In order to establish a modern nation-state they thought that the public sphere had to be secularized first. As a corollary, particularly the religious remnants of ancient regime had to be wiped out, no matter what may be the collateral repercussions. Hence the Caliphate was immediately abolished on 3 March 1924. Perhaps, in order not to sever ties too early too soon from the conservative masses, that included Kurdish population in the East, it seemed appropriate to stipulate "the religion of Islam" as "the religion of the state" in the Constitution promulgated on 20 April 1924. In the new Constitution all "inhabitants of Turkey are called as Turks, notwithstanding differences of religion and race".[39]

As the bilateral negotiations failed at the Haliç (Istanbul) Conference on 5 June 1924, the nine-month period has expired. On 6 August 1924, Britain referred the Mosul dispute to the LN. In the very following day, the Government of Turkey was shocked by a rebellion of "Nestorians". Some of the Kurdish descent rank and file—in the units tasked to defeat the rebels—defected from Turkish army on 4 September 1924 and passed to the Iraqi side of the

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[37] İlhan Uzgel and Ömer Kürkçüoğlu, "Batı Avrupa'yla İlişkiler, 1923-1939" in Oran ed., *Türk Dış Politikası (Cilt I)*, 259-270. Türkmen, 72-75. Beck, 258-260. Oran, "Mudanya Silah Bırakışması," 223-225.

[38] Oran, "Mudanya Silah Bırakışması," 222.

[39] Ahmet Özer, *Beş Büyük Tarihi Kavşakta Kürtler ve Türkler: Tarihsel Gerçek, Sosyolojik Durum, Demokratik Çözüm*, (İstanbul: Sis Yayıncılık-Hemen Kitap, 2009), 293.

border, which was under British control.[40] The bombardments of Turkish military strongholds by the Royal Air Force (RAF) on 9, 12 and 14 September 1924 was a cause of serious concern for Turkey. Nevertheless, Mustafa Kemal hoped that the LN would make its decision on the basis of "righteousness and justice". "Because, there were no doubt that [even] the sincere ideal of the LN can be regarded as a requirement of security (*mucib-i selâmet*)."[41]

Nonetheless, at a time when the dispute over Mosul was still lingering on, Kurdish association with the Nestorian rebellion could not just be a coincidence. Britain might have given support to the rebels. Since British intentions towards Kurdistan had become apparent in the Sèvres Treaty, London's ensuing entanglements with the Kurds and the Nestorians did not come as a surprise. In a sense, this event added insult to injury and hence strengthened discursive salience of "foreign incitement (*harici tahrik*)" frame. By implication, this framing would create narrative linkages between Turkey's making of Kurdish question and its Iraq policy.

2.1.3. Sheikh Said Rebellion and the Mosul Dispute: Narrative Linkages

The League Council convened on 20 September 1924 to discuss the issue of Mosul. Turkey's proposal was to conduct a plebiscite, which was countered by the offer of British side, i.e. formation of a commission of inquiry. On 30 September 1924, under the auspices of LN, a neutral commission of inquiry was established. The commission—a Swedish diplomat, a Hungarian politician and a Belgian colonel—would collect relevant data through on-spot investigations and recommend a suitable framework for the settlement. Since the frontier line was still vague, both Britain and Turkey tried to challenge the status quo. Minor frontier clashes did occur. In spite of British protests and limited use of air power against the troop movements, Turkish military did not abandon the territory it had held. On 9 October

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[40] "Nestorians were a small and archaic Christian community. Since they lived together with the Kurds and dressed like the Kurds for hundreds of years, they were called by some as 'Christian Kurds'. Most of them were living in the localities of Hakkari." Bilâl N. Şimşir, *Kürtçülük II: 1924-1999*, (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 2009), 115-119. Şimşir refers to Abdulhalûk Çay, *Her Yönüyle Kürt Dosyası*, (Ankara: Boğaziçi Yayınları, 1993), 394; and Uğur Mumcu, *Kürt-İslam Ayaklanması 1919-1925*, (Ankara: UM:AG Vakfı Yayını, 2005), 47. See also Uzgel and Kürkçüoğlu, 263.

[41] *Atatürk'ün Millî Dış Politikası*, C.II: 1923-1938 (Ankara: 1981), 44; quoted in Öke, 142.

1924, Britain delivered an ultimatum. By 16 October 1924, Turkey countered diplomatically, tried to defend its position. Turkish military claimed control over the area which it interpreted as falling within the Turkish jurisdiction.[42]

Clashes ensued in border areas between Mosul and Hakkari. Consequently, the League Council drew the "Brussels Line" as the temporary frontier on 29 October 1924. This temporary demarcation divided the Hakkari province from the district of Mosul, to Britain's advantage. On 15 November 1924, Turkey had been forced to accept the "Brussels Line".[43] As early as January 1925, the Commission of Inquiry arrived to Ankara. Government of Turkey delivered a written statement to the Commission, in which the plebiscite option was strongly recommended. It is important to note that this statement revealed Turkey's attempt to frame the issue of Mosul as an important matter between the Eastern and the Western world. For Turkey, the resolution of Mosul question could have implications not only for the accountability of LN, but also for the future of newly emerging international order. Therefore, "the inhabitants of Mosul provincial district" should be given the opportunity "to determine their destiny (*mukadderat*) freely."[44]

Together with three observers as representatives of Turkey, Britain and Iraq; the Commission reached to Baghdad on 16 January 1925. Here King of Iraq Faysal defended British-Iraqi thesis, which was designed to put Mosul under the control of Baghdad. As the Commission arrived to the city of Mosul on 27 January 1925, Turkish observer Cevat Pasha was welcomed with cheers of the local population. The commission of inquiry was still working in the provincial district of Mosul, when Sheikh Said rebellion had broken out on 13 February 1925 in Bingöl (Genç) deeper inside the borders of Turkey.[45]

In general, Turkish press coverage as of late February 1925 portrayed a linkage between the instigation of Sheikh Said rebellion and the international wrangling in and around the Mosul dispute. In most of the public narratives, the Sheikh Said rebellion was framed as a "reactionary movement (*irtica hareketi*)" carried by Kurdish-Islamic groups that had already been "incited by foreign powers".[46] In this case, "foreign incitement" frame was

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[42] Beck, 263-265. Öke, 147-149. Uzgel and Kürkçüoğlu, 263.

[43] Karakoç, 166-187. Uzgel and Kürkçüoğlu, 263, 264. Öke, 140-158. Şimşir, *Kürtçülük II*, 120-122. Beck, 260-263.

[44] Öke, 147.

[45] Şimşir, *Kürtçülük II*, 120-122. Öke, 140-158. Beck, 263-265.

[46] Şimşir, *Kürtçülük II*, 128, 129, 277-279.

presumably pointing finger to Britain mandating in Iraq and to a lesser extent referring to France mandating in Syria. Put in other words, the narrative nexus between Turkey's Kurdish question and its Iraq policy was gaining more significance in the public sphere, as the Law on the Maintenance and Reinforcement of Public Order (*Takrir-i Sükûn Kanunu*) was brought into the agenda of GNA.

2.1.4. *Takrir-i Sükûn*: Kurdish Issue and Regime Security

In fact, the rebellion was planned by Sheikh Said—an influential leader in Kurdish community, having ties with the Naksibendi religious groups and the Zaza tribes—and the *Azadi*—the secular-nationalist Kurdish militia formed in 1923—for May 1925. It "broke out prematurely" in relatively small localities such as Dicle (Piran), Ergani, Lice and Bingöl (Genç).[47] But in around ten days, the rebels' activities got out of hand and the uprising spilled over to almost fifteen cities. As a result, Republican People's Party (CHF) Government proposed a motion for the implementation of martial law (*idare-i örfî*) in rebel areas for one-month period. The GNA took the issue urgently and gathered on 25 February 1925. At that time, Prime Minister Ali Fethi Bey (Okyar) publicly told that the Government was keeping an eye on Sheikh Said for at least one year, after his witnessing in the trial opened to indict the accused of Nestorian revolt. Ali Fethi framed the rebellion as inherently "Kurdist", notwithstanding its use of Islamic and Ottoman symbols in order to manipulate religious segments of Kurdish population. For that reason, taking strict legal measures against the rebels was necessary. Karabekir, the leader of Progressive Republican Party (TCF) in opposition, concurred with the idea of martial law, and further broadened the framing of Sheikh Said rebellion by emphasizing the role of "foreign incitement". Government motion for the one-month martial law was passed unanimously on 25 February 1925. On the same day, the motion on the revision of Treason Law was also accepted without any defection. By this change, treason charges were extended to cover offences, in which the religion or the holies of religion (*mukaddesatı diniye*) were instrumentalized for political or social wrongdoings, like incurring any kind of damage on state or public order.[48]

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[47] Zürcher, 170, 171.

[48] Şimşir, *Kürtçülük II*, 237-245.

Upon the ongoing turbulence in the East, President Mustafa Kemal issued a written statement on 5 March 1925 that was published in the pro-government daily *Hakimiyet-i Millîye* three days later. The statement, basically a duty call for the elimination of rebels, was addressing not only the political-military officials, but also the general population:

> The event was received with hatred by all of the citizens and the local population, with a sense of sudden resistance, put effort to defend the Republic. Government of the Republic, which is endowed with material and ideational (*maddi ve manevi*) powers of the GNA, has directed the armed [military] means against the rebels and took efficient measures that will bring concrete results soon….It is apparent that this event violated not only the tranquility of population living in one corner of the homeland, it also effected and damaged the wellbeing, happiness, working, economy and production [that is to say the general life conditions] of other citizens that are inhabited in more distant places. [For this reason, providing domestic safety and public order is especially important for] the developments in economy and trade,…which can only be found in security and power…[O]ur patriot nation has shown its powerful and firm will in order to absolutely preserve the Republic, and the public order (*sükûn*) and domestic safety (*asayiş*).[49]

Ali Fethi, relatively a soft-liner within the CHF, was forced to resign and was replaced by Mustafa İsmet (İnönü)[50] on 3 March 1925. The program of the new government was saturated with security frames: "In the external realm preservation of good relations with foreign states,…preservation and strengthening of the land, naval and air forces in order to defend the country,…In the domestic policy domain, first of all extinguishing of recent events harshly and immediately,…preservation of tranquility and public order and in any case for the confirmation and consolidation of state influence, taking quick, efficient and special measures...[is necessary.]" This program and the Government received vote of confidence, notwithstanding 23 no-confidence votes and 3 abstentions. On the same day, the motion for Law on the Maintenance and Reinforcement of Public Order (*Takrir-i Sükûn Kanunu*) was brought into the agenda of Justice Commission in the GNA. By this motion, the Government was demanding a full political authority for two year period to curb any activity, including the press, and even perhaps an intention, that would be deemed as directed

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[49] *Atatürk'ün Bütün Eserleri, Cilt 17, (1924-1925)*, (İstanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, 2005), 205, 206; quoted in Şimşir, *Kürtçülük II*, 279, 280.

[50] İnönü's full name was "Mustafa İsmet". Turkish citizens began to acquire surnames after the promulgation of relevant law in 1934. See Metin Heper, "İsmet İnönü: A Rationalist Democrat," in *Political Leaders and Democracy in Turkey*, eds. Metin Heper and Sabri Sayari (NY: Lexington Books, 2002), 25-44.

against "public order, tranquility, safety and security." "In regards to the interests of the homeland," the motion was found to be appropriate by the Justice Commission.[51]

As expected, political narratives and discursive frames during the discussion of *Takrir-i Sükûn* did not change so much. Members of Parliament (MP's) from the TCF strongly defended their case. They were determined to "make reform" by "preserving and strengthening" "the basis of public security and order (*emniyet ve asayiş*)" in the East. In order to assure "the legitimacy" of the GNA and the state both inside and outside, they had to take strict measures against "the Istanbul press." Otherwise, the country might spiral into "anarchy." With this strong backing, the law of *Takrir-i Sükûn* did pass with 122 for, 22 against margin. Subsequently, the Government's proposal for the opening of two Independence Tribunals—in the Rebel Region and in Ankara—was also accepted by the majority in Parliament.[52]

The Government was too quick to implement new restrictive measures. The Istanbul press was the first to be heavily hit. On 6 March 1925, most of the anti-government newspapers and journals (*Tevhid-i Efkâr*, *İstiklâl*, *Son Telgraf*, *Aydınlık*, *Orak-Çekiç*, *Sebilürreşat*) were closed down. Only two pro-government dailies—Ankara-based *Hakimiyet-i Millîye* and Istanbul-based *Cumhuriyet*—remained open. In terms of regime security, *Takrir-i Sükûn* did bear fruit too early too soon. The CHF MP's formed the tribunals on 7 March 1925. The martial law was extended for another month on 23 March 1925. One week later, the Government passed a law on 31 March 1925 with a high margin—123 in favor, 20 against—to execute death sentences under extra-judicial circumstances by the approval of high-level, local commanders. In an official statement issued on 15 April 1925, the Government declared that Sheikh Said was captured and put on trial by the Independence Tribunal established in the Rebel Region. In almost two months time, *Takrir-i Sükûn* policies dealt a serious blow to the "reactionary uprising (*irtica*)" that influenced most of the Eastern, heavily Kurdish inhabited localities.[53]

In a sense, threat-based framing and regime security rhetoric was an indication of balancing rationale. Perhaps unintentionally, domestic balancing would weaken Turkey's international position against Britain vis-à-vis the ongoing Mosul dispute. First and foremost, domestic unrest among the Kurdish population contradicted Turkey's thesis, which was

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[51] Şimşir, *Kürtçülük II*, 246-255.

[52] Ibid., 250-265.

[53] Öngider, 312-318. Şimşir, *Kürtçülük II*, 263-293.

based on the idea of peaceful co-existence between Turks and Kurds. Secondly, and to a lesser extent, after having been dragged into a salient internal strife, Turkey was forced to accept a more defensive political-military posture. That sense of weakness, emanating from defensive posture, deepened as the Commission of Inquiry submitted its report to the Council of the LN on 16 July 1925.[54] Gradually, Ankara moved towards the closing of Mosul chapter with the hope of a new beginning in trilateral (Turkish-British-Iraqi) relations.

2.1.5. Trilateral Border Agreement: A New Beginning

In their report, the Commission came to a conclusion that the disputed land—former Ottoman provincial district of Mosul—should not be partitioned. That meant annexation of the southern part of Brussels line to Iraq, which would remain under the LN mandate for 25 years. At the end of mandate period, if the Kurds were not given local autonomy, they might choose joining to Turkey. If a decision for partition can be made, the watercourse of Little Zap might be the new frontier. In that case, the city of Mosul would be left to Turkey, while the city of Kirkuk remained in Iraq.[55]

Foreign Minister Tevfik Rüştü Bey (Aras) outlined position of the Turkish side: "the only solution was to reinstate Turkey's control *de facto* over an area where its *de jure* sovereignty had never ceased." In fact, Turkey tried to balance British influence in the LN, especially by engaging with so-called "small powers." Nonetheless, it was not an easy task for Turkey to take the advantage of great power rivalry. Regarding the Mosul issue, Britain, France and Italy were all tightened on the same side.[56] Tevfik Rüştü made an important diplomatic move by questioning the legitimacy of Council's decisions, given the specific nature of the case at hand. As the LN Council referred the issue to the Permanent Court, Turkey had ceased to attend the Council meetings. As expected, the Permanent Court's judgment was not in favor of Turkey. In the later period, Turkey rejected the Permanent Court's judgments and any further decisions to be taken in its absence. By the Council's decision on 16 December 1925, in Turkey's absence, the Brussels line was accepted as the

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[54] Öke, 149-153.

[55] Uzgel and Kürkçüoğlu, 264. Öke, 153-158.

[56] Beck, 263-265.

permanent border and hence the provincial district of Mosul as a whole was detached from Turkey. In reaction, Turkey's representative in Geneva was called back. One day later, Turkey signed a Neutrality and Non-Aggression Pact with the Soviet Union, to Britain's dismay.[57]

As far as the discursive reactions were concerned, Mustafa Kemal framed the Mosul issue as a matter between "European states and Eastern (*Şark*) nations". "It was apparent and certain that the European states did not give up suppressing the Eastern nations." Under these circumstances, it could be possible to form an alliance or a grouping among Eastern nations to thwart the ambitions of West, which was abusing the LN for its own interests.[58] By deploying the East vs. the West frame into the political narratives, Mustafa Kemal perhaps hoped to give a message to the international audience. At least a discursive unity among the Eastern nations, might intensify political reaction against the British colonial aggrandizements, this in turn could help Turkey to assume a more prominent role in regional affairs, including the Mosul dispute. Unity among the Eastern nations may not be achieved in the very short term. But, it could be possible in the coming years, if not decades, given the strengthening resentment against Western colonialism. Tevfik Rüştü was more straightforward. Britain was still relentless on making Turkey to accept the things that it had refused in Lausanne. This was clearly a "fait accompli."[59] Turkey was militarily inadequate to support a defiant posture especially considering the fact that air power would prove to be decisive in defining the parameters of any conflictual undertaking. Turkey's defiance over the Mosul issue neither turned into overt military action nor lasted too long.[60]

There remained only one option that was direct negotiations with Britain. On 5 June 1926, Turkey Britain and Iraq signed a trilateral border agreement in Ankara. By doing this Turkey did accept the Brussels line permanently. Resolution of the Mosul dispute not only eliminated the possibility of an Italian aggression[61], but also helped Turkey to come to more

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[57] Altunışık and Tür, 96. Uzgel and Kürkçüoğlu, 265.

[58] Öke, 170.

[59] *Atatürk'ün Millî Dış Politikası II*, 106, 107; quoted in Öke, 171.

[60] Beck, 265-270. Öke, 158-164. Uzgel and Kürkçüoğlu, 263, 264.

[61] There were "Italian military threats against Turkey in 1925-26. This pressure was coordinated with Britain in order (among other things) to help gain Turkish recognition of the Iraqi annexation of Mosul." See Haggai Erlich, "Mussolini and the Middle East in the 1920s: The Restrained Imperialist," in *The Great Powers in the Middle East 1919-1939*, 214, 220.

favorable terms with France.[62] In exchange for reconciliation with Britain over the border issue, Turkey was given 10 percent of oil royalties found in Mosul for 25 years. The economic compensation received by Turkey merely served for face-saving purposes. Oil concession in the trilateral agreement was far from providing economic benefits that Turkey desperately needed. But, the use of oil for the final resolution of the Mosul question, which was claimed on socio-cultural grounds and disputed for territorial reasons, proved that economic rationale had somehow been intruded into Turkey's strategic (political-military) thinking on Iraq.[63]

Two days later, the trilateral border agreement was presented to the GNA for approval. Karabekir just presented his regret about the way in which the Mosul issue was resolved. Tevfik Rüştü accepted that it was deeply painful for Turkey to cede Mosul to Britain. But, under the given circumstances it was at least better than making war with Britain, which might prove too costly to bear. "[F]or the peace and tranquility of world and near east, for the independence and wellbeing of Iraq, for the normalization of relations with the Empire of Great Britain…we [made] sacrifices [to] bear."[64]

At that time, public narratives on the resolution of the Mosul dispute reiterated two important points. There was a level of consensus that some sort of a sacrifice had to be done. Yet in most narratives there was a sense of doubt about the long-term consequences that submission might bring. Deemed as "complementary part (*eczây-ı mütemmime*)" of Turkey,[65] Mosul was not a lost territory; but "it was perhaps part of the homeland that was not saved." ("*Musul kaybetiğimiz bir vatan parçası değil, belki kurtaramadığımız bir vatan parçasıdır!*")[66] This framing, which apparently aimed to ease the feeling of loss by appealing to the sense of save, has long resonated with the hearts and minds of Turkish public at large. More than seventy five years later, Professor Sadık Tural—President of Atatürk Supreme Council for Culture, Language and History—wrote; "Though previously within the

[62] Nevin Yazıcı, *Petrol Çerçevesinde Musul Sorunu (1926-1955)*, (İstanbul: Ötüken, 2010), 357, 358.

[63] Robert Olson, *The Emergence of Kurdish Nationalism and the Sheikh Said Rebellion: 1880-1925*, (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1989), 135-139, 148. Öke, 165-176.

[64] Öke, 176. Öke quotes from *Atatürk'ün Millî Dış Politikası II*, (Ankara: 1981), 134; and Aptülahat Akşin, *Atatürk'ün Dış Politika İlkeleri ve Diplomasisi*, (İstanbul: 1966), 9.

[65] Kodal, 434.

[66] "İmza Muvacehesinde," *Cumhuriyet*, 6 June 1926; quoted in Kodal, 411. "Musul Muahedesi Tam Nısf-ı Leylde İmza Edildi," *Cumhuriyet*, 6 June 1926; quoted in Yazıcı, 65.

territories of Turkish National Pact, Mosul being left out of this territory, became a still bleeding wound." He further added; "Mosul is [like] a very painful wound that would bleed in the Turkish hearts for so long years."[67]

Framing of Mosul as sacrificed and unsaved land, rather than lost territory, would have serious discursive implications for the making of Turkish-Iraqi relations. Representation of the Mosul frame in pro-governmental narratives could give important signs about the discursive orientation of Turkey's Iraq policy in the coming decades. At this point, the formation of Oriental Entente (*Şark Misakı*) emerged as the first test case. Therefore, the next section will focus on the analysis of Turkey's mode of reasoning during this central event.

2.2. The Event Analysis: Frames, Models and Modes of Reasoning

From the mid-1920's up until the end of 1930's, the international environment has been shaped by "a curious hybrid…in which…[Western, more prominently British, policy-makers] sought to blend a traditional alliance [concept] with new principle of collective security."[68] During this period, the League of Nations was seen as a key for peaceful international relations. Nonetheless, balance of power was still relevant for conduct of foreign policy.[69] Writing and making of Turkey's relations with Iraq was not so remote from these conceptualizations. By the mid-1930's, "Turkey's policy was pragmatic, but not necessarily inactive as sometimes argued."[70]

What was the pragmatics of Turkey's *raison d'état* in diligently striving for the formation of Oriental Entente (Eastern Pact) for almost two years, between 1935 and 1937?

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[67] See Türkmen, ix, x.

[68] Henry Kissinger, *Diplomacy*, (NY: Simon&Schuster Inc., 1994), 273.

[69] Cameron G. Thies, "Progress, History and Identity in International Relations Theory: The Case of the Idealist-Realist Debate," *European Journal of International Relations* 8, no. 2 (2002): 147–185. See also Atila Eralp, "Uluslararası İlişkiler Disiplinin Oluşumu: İdealizm-Realizm Tartışması," in *Devlet, Sistem ve Kimlik: Uluslararası İlişkilerde Temel Yaklaşımlar*, ed. Atila Eralp, 12th ed. (İstanbul: İletişim, 2010), 57-88.

[70] Altunışık and Tür, 100.

Even though its birth dates far back to King Faysal's visit to Ankara on 6-7 July 1931,[71] the Eastern Pact was first initialed in Geneva on 2 October 1935 as a non-aggression treaty between Turkey, Iraq and Iran. Coincidentally on the same day, Italian aggression against Abyssinia (Ethiopia) was instigated. Due to this temporal coincidence, it was taken for granted that Turkey attempted to stand against the rise of Italian threat in the Eastern Mediterranean, by initializing a neutrality and non-aggression treaty with Iraq and Iran.

This painted picture has been neatly fitting into the rationale that states cooperate in order to balance threats. But this might not be the case. In order to understand Turkey's policy rationale during the initialization of the Oriental Entente, there is a need to reinterpret the representation of Italian threat in the public sphere.

2.2.1. Initialization of the Oriental Entente: Reinterpreting the Italian Threat

A closer look onto some of the retrospective narratives reveals that combination of ideational and utilitarian modes of thinking has provided discursive conditions of possibility within which *Şark Misakı* was initialed. As observed by Turkey's Minister of Foreign Affairs Tevfik Rüştü Aras, world nations were lingering in between "realistic" and "idealistic" visions during the inter-war years. In this regard, neither of the two paths could be singled out by Turkey from the beginning of 1930's. Turkey's membership to the LN on 18 July 1932 seemed as a significant step reflecting idealistic considerations. However, this could only be made possible by courting an intricate balance between the European quartet—Britain, France, Italy and Germany—and the Soviet Russia. These big powers had the potential to change the course of international history. Other powers might only assume a facilitating or constraining role in international affairs.[72] States in and around the periphery

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[71] During this visit, while exchanging views with Faysal, Atatürk talked about Turkey's ceding of land to Iraq and hence resorted to the Mosul frame. Faysal responded quite astutely: "Yet, in exchange, you won [the hearts] in all over Iraq." "Kral Faysal Bu Sabah İstanbula Geliyor," *Cumhuriyet*, 9 July 1931; quoted in Yazıcı, 288.

[72] Tevfik Rüştü Aras, *Atatürk'ün Dış Politikası*, (İstanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, January 2003), 105-130. For an earlier publication see Tevfik Rüştü Aras, *Görüşlerim*, (İstanbul: Semih Lütfü Basımevi, 1945) as cited in Hasan Berke Dilan, *Atatürk Dönemi Türkiye'nin Dış Politikası (1923-1939)*, (İstanbul: Alfa, 1998).

of these powers, like Turkey, had no choice but to adopt a combined mode of reasoning from which a mixture of material and ideational discursive frames would be deployed into public narratives.

In 1934, Yusuf Hikmet Bayur published *State of Turkey's Foreign Policy* (*Türkiye Devletinin Dış Siyasası*). By taking contributions from key political-military figures—Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, Tevfik Rüştü Aras and Fevzi Çakmak—Bayur presented a historical narrative of Turkey's foreign policy during formative years. In this sense, Bayur described the unfolding of TFP by the beginning of 1930's as the "new phase", in which Turkey began to be treated as "an important and powerful constituent in the general [global] balance." Signing of a non-aggression and neutrality treaty with Italy on 30 May 1928 was a significant development in the new phase, which virtually eliminated the Italian threat from Turkey's security agenda.[73]

In addition, Turkey and Italy signed a trade agreement on 4 April 1934. Nonetheless, the Abyssinian crisis created a negative impact on Turkish-Italian relations. On the face of it, the Abyssinian crisis provided an appropriate atmosphere for mixed framing: "the two concepts [of] collective security and balance of power…[seemed as if they were] in direct confrontation."[74] After almost three years of its accession to the LN, Turkey acted alongside the international community that voted for the international sanctions against Italy on 9 October 1935. Turkey was more concerned about what it perceived as Italian expansionism in the Mediterranean. During this period, Turkey tried to strengthen its relations with anti-revisionist (status quo) European powers and Balkan countries, such as France and Yugoslavia. Put it clearly, Turkey addressed the rise of Italian threat within both European and Balkan contexts. In order to not to upset European balance of power, Britain demanded and majority in the LN voted for the lifting of sanctions against Italy on 6 July 1936. After the signing of the Montreux Convention on Turkish Straits on 20 July 1936, Turkish-Italian relations began to normalize. On 3 February 1937, Aras was in Milan to meet with his Italian counterpart. Main item on the table was Italian participation to the Montreux Convention.[75]

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[73] Yusuf Hikmet Bayur, *Türkiye Devletinin Dış Siyasası*, 2nd ed., (Ankara: TTK Basımevi, 1995), 172-176. (First published in 1934).

[74] Michael Howard, *War and the Liberal Conscience*, (NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1978), 92-94.

[75] Aptülahat Akşin, *Atatürk'ün Dış Politika İlkeleri ve Diplomasisi*, (Ankara: TTK Basımevi, 1991), 219-227.

Reinterpretation of the Italian threat would clear some of the dust surrounding *Şark Misakı*. Nonetheless, there persists a second unsettled question over the formation of Eastern Pact. Along with the threat balancing rationale, did Turkey form an alliance with its neighbors, including Iraq, to address its domestic Kurdish problem? To a great extent, this question is again related to the unearthing of Turkey's governmental reasoning that made *Şark Misakı* possible. Temporal coincidence of Dersim (Tunceli) revolt with the signing of *Şark Misakı* brings about a blurring picture. In order to unravel this temporal de-linkage, one needs to revisit discursive frames in pro-government daily *Cumhuriyet*.

2.2.2. Moving to Baghdad: Representation of Dersim Revolt in *Cumhuriyet*

Excavation of public narratives on the initialization period of *Şark Misakı* reveals that it was problematic to constitute a nexus between Turkey's Dersim problem and its Iraq policy. The situation in Tunceli was a domestic concern that had been addressed as early as 1925. Heavy-handed reform program for the Eastern cities has begun in the aftermath of Sheikh Said rebellion. In the first half of 1930s, the Government of Turkey, under the leadership of Prime Minister Mustafa İsmet (İnönü), stepped up its Eastern reform program with harsh measures such as relocation of Kurdish tribal chiefs for domestic safety (*asayiş*) reasons. Almost in parallel to the spread of fascism in Europe during the 1930's, Turkish government turned towards more hard-line policies from within.[76] "The Settlement Law of 1934 relocated some Kurdish speakers from the eastern parts of Turkey to the West to make them learn Turkish and assimilate into Turkish culture. The law also banned those whose mother tongue was not Turkish from setting up villages or districts."[77] During this period, İnönü cooperated with the pro-British Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri Said to contain intermittent, cross-border Kurdish uprisings led by the Barzani tribe. On 10 January 1932, Turkey and Iraq signed a cooperation agreement on areas of trade (arrangement of import-export related activities) and security (extradition of criminals). Between 1932 and 1935, Ankara's security cooperation helped Baghdad to bring the Barzani revolt to an end. By July 1935, the Iraqi

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[76] Çağlar Keyder, *Türkiye'de Devlet ve Sınıflar*, (İstanbul: İletişim, 1989), 138.

[77] *T.C. Resmi Gazete*, 21 June 1934, n. 2733 cited in Senem Arslan, "'Citizen, Speak Turkish!': A Nation in the Making," *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics* 13 (2007), 252.

government took the control of domestic Kurdish dissent.[78] Then, the Turkish government began to focus more on the internal dimension of Kurdish question.

Upon Atatürk's request, İnönü had paid official visits to some twenty cities, most of them located in Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia. After this long trip, İnönü submitted his report—dated 21 August 1935—to Atatürk. The İnönü report basically reproduced the fear of Kurdistan. Against this danger, it proposed largely heavy handed, political-military measures, like relocation, coercion and assimilation.[79] By putting the "Tunceli Law" into effect on 2 January 1936, İnönü cabinet aimed to employ a five-year reform program in Dersim (Tunceli) region. Lieutenant General Abdullah Alpdoğan was appointed as the top political-military official to administer the city of Tunceli. Reform program was basically designed to institute the central authority and by extension provide regional development. Due to ambitious employment of reform program under military supervision, especially Kurdish tribal chiefs—who controlled a certain number of armed men—got wary about losing their longstanding socio-political influence.[80]

When the Kurdish tribes in Dersim—deeply inside Turkey's borders—led by Seyit Rıza revolted against the local Gendarmerie forces on 21 March 1937, the central Government in Ankara was by no means caught off the guard. In order to punish (*tedib*) and repress (*tenkil*) the rebels, coercive military means, including the air power, was utilized as early as 3 May 1937.[81] The situation in Dersim (Tunceli) was publicized as a matter of "reform and civilization", rather than an issue of security, in pro-governmental narratives. On 14 June 1937, Prime Minister İnönü publicly explained that reform program in the city of Tunceli was aimed to civilize this region. As İnönü began an inspection visit to Tunceli on 17-18 June 1937, Yunus Nadi echoed with İnönü's "reform-civilization" frame and

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[78] Yazıcı, 289, 328-334.

[79] Hüseyin Yayman, *Türkiye'nin Kürt Sorunu Hafızası*, (İstanbul: Doğan Kitap, 2011), 135-143. Saygı Öztürk, *İsmet Paşa'nın Kürt Raporu*, 5th ed., (İstanbul: Doğan Kitap, 2008).

[80] Celal Bayar, *Şark Raporu*, with a foreword by Nilüfer Bayar Gürsoy, 2nd ed., (İstanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, 2009), 11-16. Şimşir, *Kürtçülük II*, 297-310, 372-396.

[81] Abdulhalûk Çay, *Her Yönüyle Kürt Dosyası*, (Ankara: Boğaziçi Yayınları, 1996), 418, 419; cited in Nurşen Mazıcı, *Celal Bayar: Başbakanlık Dönemi (1937-1939)*, (İstanbul: Der Yayınları, 1996), 76. See also Şimşir, *Kürtçülük II*, 397.

publicized the issue as of a "moral correction" not a "military repression" in chief editorials of *Cumhuriyet*.[82]

The military operations against the "Kurdish tribal uprising" in Tunceli were driven to its close as Turkey's Minister of Foreign Affairs Aras and Minister of Economy Mahmut Celal Bayar were accepted by the Iraqi King Ghazi on 24 June 1937. At some point in their speeches, both Aras and Naci Asil—the Iraqi Minister of Foreign Affairs—talked in Turkish[83] and put emphasis on both material and ideational frames like "common interests" and "mutual friendship". Furthermore, Aras extended his pleasure that they had received warm welcome from the Iraqi public. According to Aras, the friendship between Turkey and Iraq was a basis for peace and stability in the Middle East. Beginning right from the border area, the Turkish delegation met with cheerful Iraqi people, whose numbers increased, as they moved along to the Iraqi countryside.[84]

The welcome ceremony was remarkable especially in Kirkuk, which would later be thoroughly reported in *Cumhuriyet*.[85] While the Turkish military planes were bombarding the final strongholds of armed rebels in Tunceli, for Yunus Nadi, the relations between Turkey and Iraq have gone beyond "friendship" and "neighborhood", and reached to "brotherhood" during five hundred years of co-habitation in a common home-land. Relatively short cooling off relations between the two brothers has to be conceived as an exceptional case under intensely harsh conditions emanated from the demise of Ottoman Empire. The warm welcome of the Iraqi people delivered to the visiting Turkish delegation reiterated that hard times in Turkish-Iraqi brotherhood did pass away.[86]

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[82] Yunus Nadi, "Tunceli Vilâyetimizin Islahı ve Medenileştirilmesi," "Maksad Tenkil Değil Temdindir," *Cumhuriyet*, 17-18 June 1937. "Başvekil İsmet İnönü Dün Akşam Ankara'ya Hareket Etti," "Başvekil Tunceli'ne Gitti," *Cumhuriyet*, 17-18 June 1937. See also Şimşir, *Kürtçülük II*, 402-404.

[83] Yazıcı, 298.

[84] "Tunceli Harekâtı Son Safhada", "[Irak Kralı] Gazi Vekilleri Kabul Etti", "Türk-Irak Dostluğu: Naci Elasil ve Dr.Rüştü Arasın Söyledikleri Hararetli Nutuklar", *Cumhuriyet*, 24-25 June 1937.

[85] "Irak Mektubu: Türk Vekilleri Gergükte Nasıl Karşılandılar," *Cumhuriyet*, 3 July 1937.

[86] Yunus Nadi, "Dost ve Komşu Irak ile Çok İyi Münasebetlerimiz," *Cumhuriyet*, 26 June 1937. "Tuncelinde Şekavet Can Çekişiyor: Tayyarelerimiz Şakilerin Son Sığınaklarını da Bombaladı," *Cumhuriyet*, 26 June 1937.

As Aras moved to Tehran on 27 June 1937, Bayar paid a short visit to Basra, together with the director of *Sümerbank*, Nurullah Esad Sümer.[87] On 4 July 1937, the headline of *Cumhuriyet* was "The Pact Uniting Four States". This was not an "Asian Pact". The "Near East Pact (*Yakın Şark Misakı*)" was a "[geopolitical] bloc [that] would have a significant influence on world politics." The economic and geographic positions of the four countries were complementary. Oil rich countries Iraq and Iran sought a clear-cut access to the European markets through Mediterranean. Turkey and Afghanistan needed oil in order to run their economy. Economic interaction could help to reinforce regional security and enhance global peace. In order to intensify economic exchange among the four countries, new railways have to be built to connect the existing Nusaybin-Mosul line to the prospective Erzurum-Tebriz-Tehran-Kabil transportation route. This might be achieved in fifteen years time.[88] According to Yunus Nadi, the new pact was like a "great state" encompassing wide geographical space extending from the Hindu Kush Mountains to the Mediterranean Sea. This, in turn, would provide both "internal confidence" and "external power" for the Eastern nations.[89]

The framings on Dersim revolt implied that İnönü government was strong enough to eliminate the domestic Kurdish uprising.[90] In this regard, Ankara could hardly need Baghdad's support. The discursive logic of Turkey's cooperation with Iraq was not solely based on domestic threat conceptions. The formation of Eastern Pact was prepackaged with geopolitical and economic reasons.

In fact, the deployment of long-term unification schemes, and even unity dreams, revealed practical implications for the very short term. In those days, the hottest foreign policy issue was the uncertainty in Sancak (*Hatay*).[91] By upgrading its cooperation with Iraq, Turkey would hope to improve its regional standing, especially in the Arab world, and put more pressure on Syrian Arabs. As a result, Turkey could seal a deal with the mandatory power in Syria, namely France. Succinctly put, political support to the status quo in

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[87] "Hariciye Vekilimiz Tahran Yolunda", "Celal Bayar Basra'ya Gitti Geldi", *Cumhuriyet*, 27 June 1937.

[88] "4 Devleti Birleştiren Misak," *Cumhuriyet*, 4 July 1937. Murad Sertoğlu, "Tahran Misakının Akdi Arifesinde: Dört Devletin İktisadî ve Coğrafî Vaziyeti," *Cumhuriyet*, 6 July 1937.

[89] Yunus Nadi, "Tahran Görüşmeleri ve Şark Misakı," *Cumhuriyet*, 4 July 1937.

[90] Yunus Nadi, "Tarihe Gömülen Dersime Dair," *Cumhuriyet*, 18 July 1937.

[91] Peyami Safa, "Bayraksız Ülkenin Kızları," *Cumhuriyet*, 28 June 1937.

Baghdad, would help to strengthen Ankara's regional position vis-à-vis Damascus. Mutual inter-dependency (oil and trade) frames were also a reflection of utilitarian reasoning.

2.2.3. Tracking the Dyadic Context and Discursive Linkages: Framings of Hatay, Oil and Trade

At the height of international power struggle between Britain-France entente and Germany-Italy axis, Atatürk decided to pursue a policy of annexation towards Hatay. Special administrative status of Sancak was already guaranteed by the Treaty of Lausanne. So, Syrian sovereignty over the Sancak constituted a serious breach. In September 1936, France signed a treaty with Syria to severe its mandating commitments gradually.[92] The next month, Turkey demanded independence for Sancak from France, in a diplomatic note dated 9 October 1936. Atatürk was ready to take risk and challenge the status quo in Hatay.[93]

Geopolitical rivalry between Britain and Germany created repercussions for domestic Iraqi politics especially in various forms of nationalist ideologies.[94] Political and ideological struggle inside Iraq presented risks and opportunities for the Turkish foreign policy makers and Iraqi Turkmen politicians, most prominently Hikmet Süleyman (Atatürk's close friend and brother of Mahmut Şevket Pasha[95]). During 1936, pan-Arabist Iraqi government turned

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[92] Melek Fırat and Ömer Kürkçüoğlu, "Sancak (Hatay) Sorunu," in *Türk Dış Politikası (Cilt I)*, 279-283. Keith D. Watenpaugh, "Creating Phantoms: Zaki al-Arsuzi, the Alexandretta Crisis, and the Formation of Modern Arab Nationalism in Syria," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 28, no. 3 (1996), 366-369.

[93] Erhan Şenşekerci, *Türk Devriminde Celal Bayar (1918-1960)*, (İstanbul: Alfa, 2000), 149. İsmet Bozdağ, *Devlet Kavgası: Atatürk-İnönü İnönü-Bayar*, (İstanbul: Tekin Yayınevi, 2000), 114-116. See also Mazıcı, 87-93.

[94] Reeva S. Simon, *Iraq Between the Two World Wars: The Creation and Implementation of a Nationalist Ideology*, (NY: Columbia University Press, 1986), 37-41. Reeva S. Simon, "The Imposition of Nationalism on a Non-Nation State: The Case of Iraq During the Interwar Period," in *Rethinking Nationalism in the Arab Middle East*, eds. Israel Gershoni and James Jankowski (NY: Columbia University Press, 1997), <http://www.ciaonet.org/book/jankowski/jank05.html> 13 October 2012. Michael Eppel, "The Elite, the *Effendiyya*, and the Growth of Nationalism and Pan-Arabism in Hashemite Iraq, 1921-1958," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 30, (1998): 227-250. See also C. Ernest Dawn, "The Formation of Pan-Arab Ideology in the Interwar Years," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 20, (1988): 67-91.

[95] Yazıcı, 292, 293.

towards more authoritarian policies under the leadership of Prime Minister Yasin al-Hashimi (a key Sherifian officer in the Arab revolt of 1916[96]) and his brother the Chief of General Staff Taha al-Hashimi. The Iraqi body politic, including King Gazi, was alienated by the dictatorial tendencies of Hashimi brothers.[97]

On 29 October 1936, pan-Arabist Hashimi government was toppled by the left-leaning territorial nationalist *Al-Ahali* movement. The leading cadre of *Al-Ahali* was formed by Süleyman[98] and General Bekir Sıtkı (known to have Turkish and/or Kurdish descent[99]). Süleyman-Sıtkı double collaborated with Kamil al-Chadirci (a lawyer-journalist, the son of a one-time mayor of Ottoman Baghdad) and Ja'far Abu al-Timman (a Shiite Arab who persistently involved in anti-British politics).[100] After the *Al-Ahali* takeover, pro-British Iraqi Minister of Foreign Affairs Nuri Said (a key Sherifian officer in the Arab revolt of 1916[101]) fled the country and was replaced by Naci Asil (who was known to speak Turkish).[102] Süleyman and Sıtkı also shared "a strong affinity with all things Turkish."[103] Süleyman-Sıtkı regime espoused a non-Arabist (Iraqist) foreign policy outlook which was coined as "Iraq first." They "relegated relations with the Arab world almost to an afterthought." Accordingly, Iraq turned its face towards the non-Arab world, most prominently Turkey.[104]

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[96] Peter Vien, *Iraqi Arab Nationalism: Authoritarian, Totalitarian, and Pro-Fascist Inclinations, 1932-1941*, (NY: Routledge, 2006), 16, 19, 30, 59.

[97] Charles Tripp, *A History of Iraq*, 3rd ed. (NY: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 84-86.

[98] Süleyman's wife Hacer Dagestani was the daughter of Mehmed Fazıl Pasha who displayed great success in the Iraqi front during the First World War. See "Irak Başvekilinin Zevcesi İstanbulda," *Cumhuriyet*, 20 July 1937.

[99] Yazıcı, 293, 294.

[100] Hanna Batatu, *The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq: A Study of Iraq's Old Landed and Commercial Classes and of its Communists*, *Ba'thists and Free Officers*, (London: Saqi Books, 2004), 294, 295, 298, 302, 303. Batatu's book was first published by Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 1978.

[101] Vien, 16, 19, 30.

[102] Yazıcı, 293, 295, 298.

[103] Tripp, 86.

[104] Adeed Dawisha, "Footprints in the Sand: The Definition and Redefinition of Identity in Iraq's Foreign Policy," in *Identity and Foreign Policy in the Middle East*, eds. Shibley Telhami and Michael Barnett (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002), 123, 124.

Even the establishment of a confederation between Iraq and Turkey looked as if not a distant possibility.[105]

After coming to power, pre-dominantly popular leftist *Al-Ahali* split into conformist (authoritarian) and reformist (radical) factions. The political alliance that formed the backbone of Süleyman-Sıtkı government faced a serious backlash when four reformist ministers (including Timman and Chadirci) resigned from the cabinet.

> The resignation of four of his seven ministers weakened Sulaiman [Süleyman], but also gave him the opportunity to make a final break with the reformists. In their place, he appointed men more acceptable to Bakr Sidqi [Sıtkı] and his following in the officer corps…However by this stage the centre of gravity had shifted to the officer corps itself and away from the cabinet. Within the armed forces, resentment at Bakr Sidqi's favouritism combined with more general concern about the leadership's seeming neglect of pan-Arabism and the 'duties' which an Arab nationalist creed was assumed to bring with it.[106]

By the beginning of July 1937, pro-British and pan-Arabist Iraqi opposition were wary about domestic and foreign policies of Süleyman-Sıtkı administration.[107] Quite apparently, Iraqi regime was in need of a strong external support. Cooperation with Turkey was a matter of regime, rather than territorial, security for the Iraqi government. Presumably, Turkish government was cognizant of the dyadic context in Baghdad, which was publicized by the *Times*.[108]

On the other hand, Aras and Bayar seemed more concerned about the Arab nationalist opposition in Hatay, rather than the opposition against the regime in Baghdad. While heading towards Baghdad to craft the deal for *Şark Misakı*, Aras addressed the Syrian journalists. He emphasized that "By respecting each others' national feelings, Arabs and Turks must get along friendly."[109] Upon his arrival to Baghdad, Aras exchanged his views on Turkish-Arab regional relations with Sıtkı and Süleyman. He privately "assured Suleiman

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[105] Yazıcı, 296-298, 389.

[106] Tripp, 90. See also Batatu, 304. Batatu claims that reformists "turned their backs on him [Sıtkı] on 19 June 1937."

[107] Yazıcı, 296-298, 389. Tripp, 88. Batatu, 297. Kadir Kasalak, "Irak'ta Manda Yönetiminin Kurulması ve Atatürk Dönemi Türkiye-Irak İlişkileri," *Askerî Tarih Araştırmaları Dergisi* 5, no. 9 (February 2007): 200.

[108] "Şark Misakına Verilen Ehemmiyet: Taymis Gazetesinin Neşrettiği Bir Başmakale," *Cumhuriyet*, 3 July 1937.

[109] "Rüştü Arasın Suriye Gazetecilerine Beyanatı," *Cumhuriyet*, 21 June 1937.

[Süleyman] of Turkey's support for Iraqi leadership in the Arab world". Nonetheless, "his attempt to invite the Syrian premier and foreign minister to Baghdad…for direct negotiations on the Sanjak issue" was declined by Süleyman.[110]

At this point, İnönü did not miss the opportunity to talk with the Syrian Prime Minister Cemil Mürdüm, who was returning to Damascus from Paris. Commenting on that occasion, Yunus Nadi inexplicitly referred to the *Misak-ı Millî* narrative and reiterated that Hatay was a matter of Turkey's national right. He hoped that Syrians would come to terms with this reality. If they do so, Turkey's relations with Syria would reach to the ideal level of "brotherhood."[111]

Not coincidentally, however, Iraqi fears regarding the fate of Mosul have been resumed due to Turkey's apparent ambitions towards Hatay. Against the backdrop of Arab nationalist fervor, Turkey assumed a facilitating role in the settlement of "Shatt al-Arab border dispute" between Iraq and Iran. In fact, it was Turkey's relentless diplomatic effort that paved the way for the signing of "Iraq-Iran Boundary Treaty and Protocol" on 4 July 1937.[112] This treaty was protested by pan-Arabist demonstrations in Baghdad and Basra.[113] Despite Turkey's good offices and face saving diplomacy, a discursive linkage between Hatay question and Mosul issue had been established in the Arab public sphere. Undoubtedly, co-construction of these problems bolstered the pan-Arabist cause and did nurture anti-Turkish sentiments in the Arab world. At the same time, it fueled animosity against the Iraqi Turkmen.[114]

No sooner did Bayar return to Ankara, the significance of improving trade relations between Turkey and Iraq had been made public. Railroad construction project for linking Al-Jazeera and Diyarbakır was already underway. Turkey would export trade goods, in

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[110] Watt, 341, 342.

[111] Yunus Nadi, "Türkiye-Suriye Münasebetleri Üzerine," *Cumhuriyet*, 27 June 1937. "Dün Ankaradan Gelen Başvekilimiz Cemil Mürdümü Kabul Ederek Görüştü," *Cumhuriyet*, 27 June 1937.

[112] Ahmad Abdul Razzaq Shikara, *Iraqi Politics 1921-41: The Interaction Between Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy*, (London: LAAM Ltd., 1987), 133. Abid A. Al-Marayati, *A Diplomatic History of Modern Iraq*, (NY: Robert Speller & Sons, Publishers, Inc., 1961), 69-72.

[113] Tripp, 88.

[114] Yazıcı, 296-309, 352-356.

exchange for its import of oil from Iraq.[115] It was oil, not an external ally that was seemed to be desperately needed. Even the royalties that Turkey had been receiving from Iraq since 1931[116] could not alleviate scarcity of oil. Lack of oil compelled Turkey to acquire technology for extracting benzol from coal. Even this attempt did not help to diminish constantly rising need for oil. This was publicly admitted by Bayar on 30 April 1937, while he was accompanying to the Iraqi Minister of Foreign Affairs Asil in "Ankara Coal Exhibition." By visiting Baghdad and Basra, Bayar might have hoped to find some ways to ease Turkey's oil shortage.[117]

Early in his career in a private bank, Bayar got acquaintance with, or at least acquired knowledge of, economic reasoning. Bayar was in favor of economic and social measures in dealing with the domestic Kurdish issue.[118] In contrast to İnönü's cautious and security-oriented logic of foreign policy, Bayar's outlook was based on economic rationales, like growth, development and external interaction.[119] In order to reach out to the ideal of "powerful and prosperous Turkey", what Bayar proposed was a "mixed (*karma*) economy"—an eclectic combination of liberal and socialist models. Preventing trade imbalances was a salient feature of Bayar's economic policies. According to his reasoning, "external trade" had to be conceived as the critical facet of "foreign policy-making."[120]

In this regard, Bayar sought countermeasures against the monopolistic trade regime of Soviets. Economic tyranny and abuse harshly hit Eastern cities of Turkey. Soviets were selling oil products with high prices and buying primary goods like meat and wool with low

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[115] "Celal Bayar Bugün Ankaraya Geliyor: Yakında Memleketimize Bir Irak Ticaret Heyeti Gelecek," *Cumhuriyet*, 1 July 1937. "Türk-Irak İş Birliği: Bağdadda Mühim İktisadî Esaslar Hazırlanıyor," *Cumhuriyet*, 3 July 1937.

[116] Yazıcı, 375.

[117] "Misafir Irak Nazırı Ankara Kömür Sergisini Çok Takdir Etti," *Cumhuriyet*, 30 April 1937. "İktisad Vekili Iraktan Avdet Ediyor," *Cumhuriyet*, 28 June 1937. "Petrol ve Benzin Fiatları Bir Türlü Nizama Girmiyor," *Cumhuriyet*, 1 July 1937. "Benzin İhtikârı Cezrî Surette Halledildi," *Cumhuriyet*, 9 July 1937. "Bursa'da Benzinsizlik," *Cumhuriyet*, 10 July 1937.

[118] Bayar, 63-68. Mazıcı, 78-80, 147-149.

[119] Malik Mufti, *Daring and Caution in Turkish Strategic Culture: Republic at Sea*, (NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 2-4, 20, 25, 26, 30. See also Malik Mufti, "From Swamp to Backyard: The Middle East in Turkish Foreign Policy," in *The Middle East Enters the 21st Century*, ed. Robert O. Freedman (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2002), 82, 90, 91.

[120] Şenşekerci, 137-145. See also "Celâl Bayar'ın Teşkil Ettiği İcra Vekilleri Heyetinin Programı," M.M. Tutanak Dergisi D: 5, C: 20, S: 19, reprinted in Kazım Öztürk, *Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Hükûmetleri ve Programları*, (İstanbul: Ak Yayınları, 1968), 168, 173, 182-185, 212.

costs. In Bayar's words, "fairness and justice had no place in international politics" and the Soviet "trade business in the Eastern Cities" was "just a robbery that should be ended immediately."[121] Revisiting of Bayar's economic outlook, his approach to Soviet trade hegemony, his discursive framing of mutual oil and trade interdependency did help to make substantial sense of Turkey's logic of cooperation with Iraq.

2.2.4. After the Signing of *Şark Misakı*: A Tentative Story

Arguably, it was Turkey's leading role that paved the way for the signing of *Şark Misakı* on 8 July 1937 in the Saadabad palace of Tehran.[122] As reaffirmed by Turkey's Minister of Foreign Affairs Aras, the real value of Eastern Pact was purely "psychological."[123] The "Non-Aggression Treaty" of Eastern nations entailed political, rather than military, commitments; like non-interference into the domestic affairs, inviolability of common borders, consultation on international matters of mutual concern, avoidance of aggression of any kind.[124] For some, the Saadabad regional deal might have a little meaning without its seventh article by which "the contracting parties undertook to refrain from setting up on their territory armed bands, groups or organizations designed to undermine the institutions, disrupt order and security in, or overthrow of the regimes of the other contracting parties; and agreed to impede the action of such groups." On the other hand, Oriental Entente was not deemed to be "a defense or military pact."[125]

In fact, Turkey had already signed security cooperation agreements with Iraq and Iran, between 1926 and 1935. Article 7 of the Saadabad Pact was just a reiteration of earlier

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[121] Bayar, 20-22, 140-151.

[122] "Şark Misakı Arifesinde: İran-Irak Hudut İhtilafı Resmen Halledildi," "Güneş Şarktan Doğuyor," *Cumhuriyet*, 6-7 July 1937. "Şark Misakı Dün İmzalandı: İmza Töreni Sa'dabad Sarayında Yapıldı," *Cumhuriyet*, 9 July 1937.

[123] Kasalak, 201. See also Akşin, 198, 199.

[124] "«Saadâbad Paktı»nın İmzasından Sonra," *Cumhuriyet*, 11 July 1937. See also "Türkiye Cumhuriyeti ile Afganistan, İran ve Irak Devletleri Arasında Tanzim Olunan Ademi Tecavüz Muahedenamesi (Sadabat Paktı)," <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/> 25 April 2011.

[125] İsmail Soysal, "70 Years of Turkish-Arab Relations and an Analysis on Turkish-Iraqi Relations", *Studies on Turkish-Arab Relations* 6, (1991): 44, 45.

bilateral commitments. By most accounts, *Şark Misakı* was a deliberate attempt to deter the probability of conflict among the Eastern nations. Border disputes might unleash regional conflicts. By addressing the sources of instability in trans-boundary areas, the Saadabad Pact could protect the Eastern nations from becoming the target of aggression of any sort, which also included the possibility of even a war on a global scale. In a sense, Turkey was working to prevent risks, and perhaps to minimize damages that might emerge out of a major war in its immediate neighborhood. On the part of Turkey, the text and context of non-aggression agreement reflected a political interest driven towards conflict prevention and war avoidance in peripheral regions, like the Middle East. At this point, Turkey's facilitating role in the settlement of "border dispute" between Iraq and Iran has to be noted.[126]

The regional impact of the Saadabad Pact was well received especially by the leadership in Damascus. It was reported by *Cumhuriyet* that Syria has taken a firm decision to get along friendly with Turkey.[127] The softening of Syrian attitude towards Turkey might soon facilitate the independence of Hatay.[128] In addition to the strengthening of Ankara's regional influence, the establishment of Saadabad Pact could support Turkey to enhance its international position. Under the League of Nations' terms, the Pact envisaged setting up of a consultative body among the signatories. In its first meeting, the Ministerial Council took four decisions, none of which touched upon any kind of security matters. The most significant of these was the decision to support Turkey's right of re-eligibility for non-permanent membership in the League of Nations' Council.[129] After the signing ceremony, Aras explicated Turkey's mixed rationale behind the Saadabad Pact. According to Aras, the pact constituted "the beginning of a new era for the east." After emphasizing the

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[126] In order resolve Shatt al-Arab border dispute with Iran, Iraq appealed to the League of Nations on 29 September 1934. The League of Nations could not settle the issue up until the signing of the Saadabad Pact. Aras, *Atatürk'ün Dış Politikası*, 110.

[127] "Suriye Başvekili Diyor ki: Türkiye ile Dost Geçinmeğe Karar Verdik ve Bu Karar Katidir," *Cumhuriyet*, 13 July 1937.

[128] "Hatayın İstiklali: Bütün Sancak Bayram Yapıyor," *Cumhuriyet*, 14 July 1937. Yunus Nadi, "Hatay İstiklâli Resmen de İlân Edildi," *Cumhuriyet*, 15 July 1937.

[129] "«Saadâbad Paktı»nın İmzasından Sonra," *Cumhuriyet*, 11 July 1937. Other three decisions were: (1) Support for the membership of Iran to the League of Nations, (2) Giving of information to the League of Nations' Secretary about signing of the Pact, (3) Providing information to the neighboring and friendly states about signing of the Pact. See also Akşin, 199, 200. Turkey was non-permanent member in the LN Council during 1935-1937. Turkey's Minister of Foreign Affairs Aras served as the President of LN Council in 1937. See İlhan Uzgel, "Uluslararası Güvenlik Sorunları ve Türkiye," in *Türk Dış Politikası (Cilt I)*, 312.

"psychological" significance of the pact, Aras acknowledged that they would "set up a group of non-aligned [states] in the League of Nations. None of the aggressors could expect even a minor assistance from this group…We are a group of nations who pursue positive and pro-peace policy."[130]

> In this part of the world, we believe in brotherhood…We follow a policy of universal friendship and care…Peace is the solitary aim for us. Peace is not an instrument; it is a goal for us. If we want to be powerful, this is because of the fact that we hate from weakness of not only us and but also of others. If we detest war, this is possibly not because of our fear from it; it is perhaps because we believe that none of the matters could be resolved by resorting to war…We are sincere and loyal servants of the peace cause. We work with our own means in order to preserve international peace. We find the well-being and interests of our countries in peace. Abrogation of peace in other parts of the world is not appropriate for our interests. We do not seek our security within the conflictual relations of other states.[131]

On that occasion, Atatürk exchanged official messages with his Iranian, Iraqi and Afghan counterparts. His framings were more concise in reflecting the ideational rationale in Ankara. On the way of establishing "a common basis for the ideal of [world] peace,"[132] *Şark Misakı* would provide avenues for "joint efforts and fruitful cooperation…among the four states, which have been tied to each other with bonds of brotherhood and friendship."[133] Atatürk also suggested that Saadabad Pact was made possible "thanks to the peace-loving" character of "four brotherly nations."[134]

Unlike Atatürk, Aras also touched upon geopolitical and "economic" salience of the Saadabad Pact. In his words, "the political and economic boundaries of Europe were supposedly extended to the edge of Himalayas." For the "international goodness (*beynelmilel iyilik*)", economic development should not be overlooked. "Political trust cannot be separated from economic confidence and there exist an association between political disputes and economic issues…Political and economic matters must be handled together in a mindset,

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[130] "Saadâbad Paktı: Üç Devlet Nazırı Nutuklarında Bu Anlaşmanın Tarihi ve Siyasi Ehemmiyetini Tebarüz Ettirdiler," *Cumhuriyet*, 13 July 1937.

[131] Akşin, 199.

[132] "Telgrafların Metni," *Cumhuriyet*, 11 July 1937.

[133] "Dostluk ve Kardeşlik Tezahüratı," *Cumhuriyet*, 12 July 1937.

[134] "Atatürkle Efgan Kralı Zahir Han Arasında," *Cumhuriyet*, 17 July 1937.

based on broad, mutual understanding." In this regard, "security and well-being" of all human populations has to be taken into consideration. Before closing his remarks, Aras made it clear that their "two big neighbors" (read Britain and Russia) were informed about the "scope and content" of Saadabad Pact.[135] Together with the Minister of Interior Şükrü Kaya, Aras was welcomed by Moscow on 14 July 1937.[136]

The geopolitical rationale of Aras further delineated by Yunus Nadi who conceived that "the Balkan Entente of the Near East Europe was joined [and complemented] by the Saadabad Pact of Western Asia." In this regard, both regional groupings were equally deemed important. In his words, Saadabad Pact has established "a real turning point of history." For its participants, "civilization" has been the sole target. Yunus Nadi argued that "wholehearted reliance on peace" has constituted "the highest [level of] consciousness" in "real civilization". "Peace with whom? Naturally, first priority is peace from within; after that peace with neighbors." In fact, Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and Afghanistan have already reached to the level of "brotherhood" in their relations. Documentation of this fact on a sheet of paper would help to bring about "psychological" influence on various grounds. "The document that was accorded, signed and agreed in Saadabad has not been an alliance agreement and has not aimed at anyone near or far." The signatories, Yunus Nadi added; "have completely eradicated the idea of aggression from their lives, and hence they would not assist any aggression or aggressor in their new lives…The humanity should see this pact as an important step among the measures taken to remove the war from face of the earth." Like the Balkan Entente, the Saadabad Pact was deliberately designed to make war "inconceivable," if not impossible, around Turkey's periphery. By this way, "the ideal of peace" would reach "from the shores of Mediterranean to the foot of Himalayas."[137]

Despite these grand geopolitical schemes, Aras reiterated that Turkish foreign policy makers were attentive to the balance of power in the world. Turkey had to be concerned about possible British and Russian reactions. Before the conclusion of Saadabad Pact, Turkey (together with Iraq and Iran) confirmed that both Britain and Russia had given their blessing. In the foreseeable future, had great powers opted to use force in international

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[135] "Saadâbad Paktı: Üç Devlet Nazırı Nutuklarında Bu Anlaşmanın Tarihi ve Siyasi Ehemmiyetini Tebarüz Ettirdiler," *Cumhuriyet*, 13 July 1937.

[136] "Rüştü Aras Moskovada Hararetle Karşılandı," *Cumhuriyet*, 15 July 1937.

[137] Yunus Nadi, "Günün En Mes'ud Hâdisesi: Saadabad Paktı," *Cumhuriyet*, 14 July 1937. See also Yunus Nadi, "Tam Bir Dostluk Havası İçinde İmzalanan Anlaşma: Şark Misakı," *Cumhuriyet*, 10 July 1937.

matters, Turkey could have protected itself from such dangers. If most nations had chosen to cooperate, then Turkey would have followed the suit. Therefore, cooperation with the eastern neighbors was quite important for Turkey. In the East, Turkey sought to "find bilateral and multilateral harmony with Iranian, Afghan and Arab nations" and by extension to search for "building of a regional order based on good neighborly relations". In this regard, Aras added that Iraq would constitute a bridge between the Pact members and the Arab states.[138]

By looking at the framing of Saadabad Pact in relation to other daily events in pro-Government *Cumhuriyet*, a peculiar narrative linkage could also be established. On 3 July 1937, participation of foreign observers to Turkey's military exercises was also made public. In August 1937, Iraqi and Iranian Chiefs of General Staff would be in Thrace, together with their Romanian, Yugoslavian and Greek counterparts.[139] Obviously, this had nothing to do with the Kurdish problem inside Turkey. Most probably, Turkey—the sole common member of Balkan[140] and Oriental Ententes—was attempting to lead political-military cooperation around its immediate regional periphery. By enhancing its external security with these two regional Pacts, Turkey could hope to thwart probable ambitions of non-regional players.

More than a month after the signing of *Şark Misakı,* the headline and chief-editorial of *Cumhuriyet* on 12 August 1937 were reflecting a combined mode of reasoning in public construction of Turkey's foreign policy. In response to an article published in the Soviet daily *Pravda*, *Cumhuriyet* felt the need to reiterate Turkey's decisive posture vis-à-vis its sovereign rights over the Turkish Straits, which were sealed in 1936 by the Montreux Convention. Therefore, it was impossible for Turkey even to imagine any kind of a concession in the new Straits regime. According to Yunus Nadi, Italian accession to the Montreux should not be perceived as a fascist expansion towards Turkey. Cooperation between Turkey and Italy would only help to reinforce security in the Mediterranean region, to which Turkey has been strongly committed. Turkey's good relations with Italy and Germany could not impede its friendship with Russia. For more than a decade Turkish-Russian friendship developed on the basis of non-interference in domestic affairs. Each

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[138] Aras, 105-111. Akşin, 200, 201.

[139] "Büyük Manevralar: Irak ve İran Erkânıharbiye Reisleri de Hazır Bulunacak," *Cumhuriyet*, 3 July 1937.

[140] The Pact of Balkan Entente was established among Turkey, Greece, Yugoslavia and Romania on 9 February 1934. See Melek Fırat, "Yunanistan'la İlişkiler," in *Türk Dış Politikası (Cilt I)*, 350-353. According to Fırat, Balkan Entente was formed to control Bulgarian, rather than Italian, revisionism in the region. In contrast, Uzgel emphasizes Italian opposition to the Balkan Entente. See Uzgel, "İtalya'yla İlişkiler," in *Türk Dış Politikası (Cilt I)*, 295.

country accepted to respect the other's regime type. Internal ideological developments, i.e. communism in Russia and nationalism in Turkey, never plagued external relations between two countries. This implies that ideological commitments emanating from domestic regime types cannot guide foreign policies. On condition of a "correspondence (*tekabül*) or collision (*tesadüm*) of national interests, foreign policies may find their balance (*muvazene*)." Spread of fascist movements in the Balkans should not be exaggerated. They could be conceived just as usual political-military combinations rarely witnessed in international affairs. As it did in the past, Turkey will constantly pursue policy of peace, together with other peace-loving nations. This does not mean Turks fear from war. In case a necessity arises, Turkey has always been ready to fight against the aggressors alone or react in combination with other nations, in order to preserve its independence.[141]

Just like any other state, Turkey had to seek diverse combinations in its foreign policy in order to cope with international uncertainty. The recent regional combination was *Şark Misakı*. Nonetheless, the assassination of Bekir Sıtkı Pasha, Iraq's Chief of General Staff, on 12 August 1937, dealt a serious blow to the expectations formed around Oriental Entente. The next day, *Cumhuriyet* reported the event in grief on its front page.[142] In another pro-government daily *Ulus*, the event was depicted as "Mosul Tragedy."[143] Bekir Sıtkı, who was heading towards the military maneuvers in Thrace,[144] was killed by an Iraqi soldier inside the military airport of Mosul. According to the Baghdad representative of *Cumhuriyet*, Bekir Sıtkı was an ex-Ottoman military officer who also had participated to the Battle of Dardanelles. He was a man of accomplishment. After achieving Iraq's liberty from the British mandate on 30 May 1932, Sıtkı even worked for the independence of Syria from the French mandate.[145]

At this point, it has to be reiterated that Bekir Sıtkı, together with Hikmet Süleyman tilted towards Turkey in their foreign policy orientation. Apparently, their policies were not

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[141] "«Pravda»nın Bir Makalesi ve Türkiyenin Harici Siyaseti," *Cumhuriyet*, 12 August 1937. Yunus Nadi, "Akdenizin Emniyetinde Alâkamız Çok Sıkıdır," *Cumhuriyet*, 12 August 1937.

[142] "Irakta Şeni ve Feci Bir Suikasd Oldu," *Cumhuriyet*, 13 August 1937.

[143] "Musul Faciası," *Ulus*, 14 August 1937; *Ayın Tarihi*, August 1937, no.: 5, 188-189; cited in Yazıcı, 295.

[144] Just like his Iranian, Romanian, Yugoslavian and Greek counterparts, Sıtkı was invited to observe the exercise in which more than 100 war planes were prepared to join. "Manevra Hazırlığı: Askerî Harekâta 100 den Fazla Tayyare İştirak Edecek," *Cumhuriyet*, 8 August 1937.

[145] "Irakta Şeni ve Feci Bir Suikasd Oldu," *Cumhuriyet*, 13 August 1937.

in the best interests of pan-Arabist and pro-British oppositional forces, particularly embedded in the Iraqi army. Both Taha al-Hashimi and Nuri Said were busy with cultivating influential army officers. Nuri Said also attempted to assume a political role to support British position in Palestine.[146] At that time, British policy makers were concerned about Hikmet Süleyman's rising role over the Palestine question. By July 1937, Britain's partition plan for the Palestine was made public.[147] While the talks were in progress by the beginning of August 1937 under the League of Nations' auspices in Geneva, news about a new unity scheme among the Arabs was spreading momentarily.[148] Hikmet Süleyman, as the sole leader of a sovereign Arab country in the League of Nations, protested against the partition plan of Palestine.[149] Perhaps, this move was a deliberate attempt to thwart the pan-Arabist opposition. Iraq's bold diplomatic move, which appealed to the Palestinian cause, had to be interpreted beyond the confines of inter-Arab affairs. That is to say, the Iraqi leadership was flexing its diplomatic muscle against the British supremacy in the region.[150]

In retrospect, it seemed that neither the Süleyman-Sıtkı double in Baghdad nor the Turkish government in Ankara were able to foresee likely domestic ramifications of Saadabad Pact. To no avail, it was too late to react. The Iraqi opposition led by pro-British forces and the pan-Arabist movement rolled back approximately in one year time.[151] After the assassination of Bekir Sıtkı, Hikmet Süleyman could not withstand the strong opposition in the Iraqi army. He was arrested and forced to resign on 17 August 1937.[152] Up until the British military occupation in 1941, Iraq became a conspiratorial and ideological battleground for political-military interventions of various internal and external actors. The fall of (pro-Turkey) Süleyman-Sıtkı regime constituted a historical turning point, which would bring critical consequences for Iraqi politics in both domestic and foreign realms.[153] In

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[146] Tripp, 91, 94.

[147] Muharrem Feyzi Togay, "Arap İmparatorluğu ve Yahudi Devleti," *Cumhuriyet*, 10 July 1937.

[148] "Filistin Meselesi Cenevrede Görüşülüyor," *Cumhuriyet*, 31 July 1937. "Arap Birliği: Yemen Veliahdı Verilen Haberleri Tekzib Etti," *Cumhuriyet*, 8 August 1937.

[149] "Filistinin Taksimi: Irak Bu Kararı Protesto Etti," *Cumhuriyet*, 6 August 1937.

[150] Muharrem Feyzi Togay, "Filistin Meselesi ve Irak," *Cumhuriyet*, 11 August 1937.

[151] Yazıcı, 270, 271.

[152] "Musulda ve Irak Ordusunda Hâdiseler," *Cumhuriyet*, 18 August 1937. See also Tripp, 91.

[153] Muharrem Feyzi Togay, "Irak Ahvali," *Cumhuriyet*, 18 August 1937. See also Tripp, 91-104.

this sense, this event marked the end of short-lived cooperation discourse in Turkish-Iraqi relations. Therefore, the next section turns to the post-event analysis.

2.3. Post-Event Analysis: Historical Developments and Discursive Dynamics

While Turkey was busy with the making of *Şark Misakı*, signs of instability were permeating into the European continent. At the center of power struggle laid the Mediterranean.[154] The strengthening of the Berlin-Rome-Madrid axis and its repercussions for Mediterranean and Aegean security alarmed Paris, London and Ankara. Upon invitation by France, Turkey joined the Nyon Conference on 10 September 1937, together with Russia. By ratifying the agreement, Turkey sided with Britain and France, in order to balance Italian aspirations over the Mediterranean. İnönü was reluctant to take part in any entanglements which might endanger Turkey's neutral position in the international status quo. Hence he was sidelined from the politics for some time to come.[155]

Aras continued to serve as the Minister of Foreign Affairs in Bayar cabinet which formed on 1 November 1937. After the formation of the new cabinet, Atatürk and Bayar began their travel to the East on 12 November 1937. As this visit was going on, Seyit Rıza and six of his cohorts were executed on 15 November 1937, upon the verdict of court in Elazığ. After returning from the East, Bayar publicly explained his position vis-à-vis the situation in Dersim: "We will do whatever [needed] in order to reinvigorate (*ihya*) the limited oasis….We will find productive lands for the people perpetuating an unhappy life in that place."[156]

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[154] "Avrupa Sulhu Yeniden Tehlikeye Girdi: Alman ve İtalyan Gemileri Akdenizde Toplanıyor," *Cumhuriyet*, 21 June 1937. Yunus Nadi, "Milletler Arası İşlerinde Büyük Bir Hassasiyet," *Cumhuriyet*, 21 June 1937. Muharrem Feyzi Togay, "Akdenizde Almanya ve İtalya," *Cumhuriyet*, 26 June 1937.

[155] Bozdağ, 116-119. Şenşekerci, 149. Akşin, 232, 233. Baskın Oran, "Göreli Özerklik-1, 1923-1939: Dönemin Bilançosu," in *Türk Dış Politikası* (*Cilt I)*, 256, 257. Atay Akdevelioğlu and Ömer Kürkçüoğlu, "Orta Doğu'yla İlişkiler," in *Türk Dış Politikası* (*Cilt I)*, 368. Uzgel, "Uluslararası Güvenlik Sorunları ve Türkiye," 313. Uzgel, "İtalya'yla İlişkiler," 297.

[156] *Cumhuriyet*, 26 November 1937, cited in Mazıcı, 78. See also Şimşir, *Kürtçülük II*, 412.

In fact, Bayar had privately clarified his approach to Turkey's Eastern (*Şark*) question, almost one year earlier. As the Minister of Economy, he had taken a long trip to some twenty Eastern and Southeastern cities between 11 September and 21 October 1936. The "*Şark* Report" of Bayar—dated 10 December 1936—foresaw that economic development, especially in the area of agriculture, would improve the social conditions in the East. Therefore, "bureaucratic mindset" had to be made aware of this fact. The meaning of violent measures that had been taken against the Kurdish rebels was understandable. Yet, in the aftermath of rebellion, the Government should create an indiscriminative system in treating its Kurdish speaking citizens. In order to hinder harmful effects of external policies designed to intrude into Turkey from the outside and to connect these citizens to the motherland, it was necessary to work persistently. In the event that Kurds were framed as "foreign" in official discourse, the only result would be a "reaction".[157]

During the two years of Dersim crisis, Prime Minister Bayar's narrative reasoning swung back and forth between economic and political rationales. Since the Government felt the need to take more serious measures in Dersim, Bayar raised his concern in a quite dualist approach on 29 June 1938: "The residents of Dersim should hear our voice….There is power as much as compassion in our voice….The choice from these two options belongs to them. They must know that our compassion and coercion is abundant."[158] During his fifteen-month in political power, Bayar took military as well as economic measures in dealing with the situation in the East, specifically in Dersim.[159]

Despite the use of economic frames, Bayar's mode of reasoning towards the Kurdish question turned out to be no less security-oriented and repressive than İnönü's mind-set. Bayar's political rhetoric differed in its attempt to address domestic security (*asayiş*) with economic frames. In other words, economic rationale was incorporated into governmental reasoning in a very complementary manner. This could be perceived as a combined mode of reasoning, seeking to preserve state interests defined in terms of not only security but also economy.

In the foreign policy domain, Atatürk, Bayar and Aras had to respond to external developments as well. According to them, cooperation with the status quo powers would upgrade Turkey's international position vis-à-vis the so-called revisionist states. This

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[157] Bayar, *Şark Raporu*, 64-67. See also Yayman, 153-161.

[158] TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi, D: 5, C: 26-29 June 1938, cited in Mazıcı, 80.

[159] Mazıcı, 78-85.

reasoning proved effective when Italy accessed to the Montreux Convention on 2 May 1938. Within three months, on 25 June 1938, the ratification process of the *Şark Misakı* was completed.[160]

After Atatürk's passing from the political scene on 10 November 1938, İnönü assumed the Presidential office. He also followed a power/threat balancing rationale, especially in European affairs. Italian aggression over Albania in April 1939, Germany-USSR Non-Aggression Treaty in August 1939 and the partition of Poland by Germany and USSR in September 1939 have paved the way for the signing of Ankara Pact between Turkey, Britain and France on 19 October 1939.[161] Up until the beginning of 1940's, domestic instability marked by recurrent coups ensued in Iraq. As a result, Saadabad Pact lost its *raison d'être*. This was especially salient in regards to Turkey's logic of cooperation with Iraq.

Andrew Mango concisely captured Turkey's sense of desperation vis-à-vis the coming of the Second World War:

> Turkey had an interest in preventing the Middle East from becoming a battlefield in another world war. But when war broke out, neither Turkey nor the other signatories of the Saadabad Pact could do anything about it. There was, in the event, nothing to consult about - no possibility of military cooperation, since all the signatories were dependent on outside supplies of arms, no real freedom of action and, in any case, no desire to incur real sacrifices for the sake of a member country.[162]

Since the War broke out, Britain and France desired to deter Soviet aggression against the Middle East. Then, they "suggested that the Saadabad Pact be bolstered by a military convention". In response, "the Turkish government informed London and Paris that the Saadabad Pact was a consultative body." It could not be turned into a military convention. The last Ministerial Council of Oriental Entente met in 1939. As the war drew on, the fate of *Şark Misakı* was "virtually forgotten." Nonetheless, any one of the signatories did not

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[160] Oran, "Göreli Özerklik-1," 256, 257. Atay Akdevelioğlu and Ömer Kürkçüoğlu, "Orta Doğu'yla İlişkiler," in *Türk Dış Politikası (Cilt I)*, 368. Uzgel, "Uluslararası Güvenlik Sorunları ve Türkiye," 313. Uzgel, "İtalya'yla İlişkiler," 297. Akşin, 232, 233. Bozdağ, 116-119. Şenşekerci, 149.

[161] Uzgel and Kürkçüoğlu, "Batı Avrupa'yla İlişkiler," 276. Fahir Armaoğlu, *20. Yüzyıl Siyasî Tarihi (Cilt 1-2: 1914-1995)*, (İstanbul: Alkım Yayınevi and Kurtiş Matbaacılık, n.d.), 304.

[162] Andrew Mango, "Turkey in the Middle East," *Journal of Contemporary History* 3, no. 3, (July 1968): 229, 230.

demand termination, at least until the mid-1950.[163] When Ankara worked for the formation of a new pact with Baghdad, its foreign policy discourse was reconstructed on the basis of former narratives of cooperation with Iraq. By implication, utilitarian and ideational modes of reasoning and mixed frame combinations, which molded in the episode of *Şark Misakı*, has helped to re-define discursive conditions of possibility for Turkey's making of the Baghdad Pact in 1955.

2.4. Conclusion: Episodic Findings

This chapter laid out contextual and discursive transformation of Turkey's Iraq policy in the Saadabad Pact episode. Pre-event analysis basically documented Turkey's making of the Mosul dispute between 1918 and 1926. This section revealed that a multi-polar world order was presupposed by Turkish foreign policy makers. Power balancing (*muvazenet*) was portrayed as the main rationale. In this regard, small powers (regional countries like Iran and Afghanistan) could only assume epiphenomenal roles. Only by taking the advantage of global balancing game, the Turkish government might hope to get the most out of the power struggle between Russia and Britain-France axis and make peace under the conditions set by *Misak-ı Millî*. In order to ascertain national boundaries (*hudud-ı millîye*), Ankara could thrust neither the east nor the west.

In the pre-event period, representation of Mosul problem primarily defined Turkey's discursive logic while approaching to Iraq. Despite the salience of oil, Mosul was framed as a question having two interrelated dimensions, i.e. territorial (*memleket meselesi*) and ethnic (*Kürtlük meselesi*) issues. British designs for the establishment of "a Kurdish government" in northern Iraq constituted a serious domestic concern for Ankara. In this threat balancing mind-set, a narrative nexus was established between Turkey's makings of its own Kurdish question and its Iraq policy. Under the pretext of Sheikh Said rebellion, "foreign incitement (*harici tahrik*)" frame gained more salience in governmental discourse. By implication, this framing further strengthened external balancing rationale.

Nonetheless, external balancing proved to be a difficult and an unrewarding process for the Turkish government. Ankara faced a major setback since Turkey was not an LN

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[163] Soysal, 45, 46. Aras, 110.

member. Moreover, under British influence, both France and Italy were sided against Turkey. Even the framing of Mosul issue as a matter between European states and Eastern (*Şark*) nations did not help. Turkey could only regain Mosul by making a costly war with Britain. Making war for Mosul did not seem to be worthwhile. What Ankara conceived as politically rational was sealing a trilateral (Turkey, Britain and Iraq) deal on 5 June 1926. Yet the rationalization of this event would create unforeseen repercussions. Re-framing of Mosul as sacrificed and unsaved, rather than a lost, land might bear serious discursive implications for the relations between Ankara and Baghdad.

However, dyadic repercussions did not emerge during the formation of Saadabad Pact. Membership to the LN in 1932 increased Ankara's diplomatic prestige. As the international power struggle between Britain-France entente, Germany-Italy axis and the Soviet Russia was heightened, Turkey turned towards regional balancing policies like establishment of Balkan Entente with Greece, Yugoslavia and Romania in 1934. The signing of the Montreux Convention on Turkish Straits in 1936 was also an indication of Ankara's aptitude in playing the balance of power game. The making of Oriental Entente on 8 July 1937 also fit into utilitarian rationale, albeit with some caveats.

First and foremost, Turkey's rhetoric of cooperation with Iraq was not based on threat balancing. Within both European and Balkan contexts, Ankara had the wherewithal to deal with the rise of Italian threat in due course. The framings on Dersim revolt implied that Turkey was strong enough to eliminate domestic Kurdish uprisings within its borders. Turkish government did not give any discursive hint that would mean a political desire for linking Dersim issue with Iraq policy.

The government was also careful in not giving any detail about the dyadic context. Iraqi domestic politics was almost taken for granted. Global and regional status quo was portrayed as conducive for Ankara to upgrade its level of cooperation with Baghdad. One of the most consistent features of Turkey's Saadabad policy discourse was the presupposition of multi-polar world order. By and large, framings of regional affairs also cumulated around this preconception. Internal conditions seemed favorable as well. Since veto players did not emerge, domestic audience costs remained low.

In terms of dyadic situation, governmental discourse could not adequately address the veto players in Baghdad. Therefore, dyadic audience incurred a relatively high cost by upsetting the pro-Turkey political status quo. Iraq's Chief of General Staff Bekir Sıtkı was assassinated on 12 August 1937 and Prime Minister Hikmet Süleyman was forced to resign on 17 August 1937. Accordingly, Turkey's political leverage diminished. Almost forty days after the signing of Saadabad Pact, Ankara had to face with these unintended, perhaps unforeseen, political consequences.

On the other hand, discursive evidence suggests that Turkish government might have taken the risk of alienating pro-British and Arab nationalist opposional forces in Iraq for mainly geopolitical reasons. Chief among them was Hatay. After the ceding of Mosul to Iraq with loss framing, the Oriental Entente with Iraq, Iran and Afghanistan enhanced Turkey's regional standing to move towards gain framing. In order to advance its geopolitical interests over Hatay, Turkey was able to take a better regional position vis-à-vis Syria and France.

Overall, Turkey's rationale was prepackaged with geopolitical presuppositions. Geopolitical rationale was best reflected in framing of *Şark Misakı* as a great state extending from the Hindu Kush Mountains (or Himalayas) to the Mediterranean Sea. Economic rationality was also incorporated into the governmental discourse. Negative framing of Soviet regional trade hegemony and positive framing of Turkey-Iraq mutual oil-trade interdependency implied a discursive appeal towards utilitarian reasoning.

Last, but not the least, cooperation with Iraq was consistently constructed with normative frames like the ideal of peace, mutual friendship, common neighborhood and socio-cultural brotherhood. Consistent and selective blending of ideational and material presuppositions was merely designed to serve psychological and political purposes. On the part of Turkish government, the Saadabad Pact narratives reflected a political desire driven towards prevention of conflict and/or war, particularly in the Middle East. The war around Turkey's periphery could not be made utterly obsolete, but it could be made merely inconceivable.

The shadow of future did shape the discourse of Turkey's cooperation with Iraq. Hence, Ankara bargained hard for the making of *Şark Misakı*. Mainly because of dyadic context (pro-British and pan-Arab opposional forces), pro-Turkey (Süleyman-Sıtkı) government of Iraq was removed from office. On the part of Turkey, the Oriental Entente incurred costs, since favorable dyadic context was undermined. Born into a bleak status quo, Saadabad Pact remained as a partially cooperative and virtually un-enforced arrangement. Turkey's episodic discursive commitments brought short term political costs and consequentially ended up in partial cooperation context. As the Second World War loomed large on the horizon of Ankara, the discourse of even partial cooperation with Baghdad did fade away.

CHAPTER

3. THE BAGHDAD PACT: RHETORICAL REASONS AND CONTEXTUAL CONSEQUENCES

The third chapter examines discursive transformation of Turkey's Iraq policy during the early Cold War period. Here, the Baghdad Pact of 1955 is taken as the central event to dissect temporal and conceptual axes of Turkey's Iraq policy discourse in this episode. In terms of temporal idiosyncrasies, this case presents a stark contrast with the earlier two junctures, at which Turkey's cooperation efforts with Iraq, i.e. Border Treaty of 1926 and Saadabad Pact of 1937, had either coincided with or preceded closely by the internal Kurdish uprisings.

What makes the new chapter theoretically and empirically puzzling is the rise of Kurdish political aspirations in Iran and Iraq, long before and immediately after the formation of the Baghdad Pact. More than two months after the Iranian Kurds—presumably under Soviet tutelage—had declared the establishment of Republic of Mahabad in 1946, Turkey signed a comprehensive bilateral cooperation agreement with Iraq. In terms of foreign policy reasoning, 1946 agreement could be classified as a text that galvanized cooperation based on threat balancing, i.e. Soviet regional influence. It might also be argued that balancing of regional Kurdish threat in 1946 could be a key reason for Turkey to cement cooperation with Iraq. That is to say, Turkey's mode of reasoning fitted into the regional pattern of the period[1] that was externally and internally oriented threat balancing.

It seemed that 1946 agreement could hardly be an exception to the balancing rationale. Ankara cooperated with Baghdad to eliminate the rise of Kurdish threat in the region. Had this been the case, why did Turkey diligently strive for signing another treaty with Iraq in

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[1]   Zeev Maoz, "Domestic Politics of Regional Security: Theoretical Perspectives and Middle East Patterns," *Journal of Strategic Studies* 26, no. 3 (2003): 33.

less than ten years? Given the fact that Kurdish movements in the Middle East had almost died down in the 1950-55 period,[2] threat balancing rationale fails to capture the reason that moved Turkey towards formation of the Baghdad Pact.

Whether Turkey entered into a defensive alliance with Iraq in order to seek strategic rents (economic aid) or side payments (financial assistance in cash-credit form) from its super-power patron (the US) and its key extra-regional ally (the UK) still remains a question. As early as 1954, Turkey's economy gave signs of strain due to the declining financial solvency.[3] Under dire economic circumstances, the Government might have opted to raise revenues from abroad in exchange for Turkey's contribution to the defense of the Middle East against probable Soviet aggressions. Rent-seeking or financial (inter)dependency rationale explains some of the regional (especially inter-Arab) relations.[4] However, Middle Eastern states chose their extra-regional Cold War allies based on their external threat calculations. During the Cold War, economic aid played a minor role in the making of alliances between superpower patrons and regional clients. Economic aid was not the predominant cause, but the effective result of alignment decisions in the Middle East.[5]

What we are left with then? Were there any ideational, other than material, reasons pushing Ankara towards Baghdad in 1955? The formation of Baghdad Pact was a historical juncture at which Egypt and Iraq confronted over the terms of regional order. While Egypt pursued Pan-Arabist, revisionist policy line, Iraq aimed to defend the status quo.[6] In fact, Turkey attempted to flirt with Egypt in 1954.[7] The Egyptians did not welcome to side with the Turks, who had chose to collaborate with their former colonial master, namely Britain. As a result, Turkey had no choice but to balance Egyptian discursive bid for regional

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[2] Avshalom H. Rubin, "Abd al-Karim Qasim and the Kurds of Iraq: Centralization, Resistance and Revolt, 1958-63," *Middle Eastern Studies* 43, no.3 (2007): 356.

[3] Ayşegül Sever, *Soğuk Savaş Kuşatmasında Türkiye, Batı ve Orta Doğu 1945-1958*, (İstanbul: Boyut Kitapları, 1997), 194. Yiğit Bulut, "Türkiye 'Darbeler Tarihi'!", <http://www.haberturk.com/yazarlar/634808-turkiye-darbeler-tarihi> 28 May 2011.

[4] Laurie A. Brand, *Jordan's Inter-Arab Relations: The Political Economy of Alliance Making*, (NY: Columbia University Press, 1994).

[5] Stephen M. Walt, *The Origins of Alliances*, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987), 42, 221, 224, 241.

[6] Michael N. Barnett, *Dialogues in Arab Politics: Negotiations in Regional Order*, (NY: Columbia University, 1998), 108-120.

[7] Ayşegül Sever, "The Compliant Ally? Turkey and the West in the Middle East 1954-58," *Middle Eastern Studies* 34, no.2 (1998): 77, 88.

hegemony. Had Government of Turkey reasoned that Baghdad Pact debacle would turn out to be one of the primary causes of Iraqi revolution of 1958[8], it could have tried any other course of action.

Revolution in Iraq could not be the end-state, which Turkey desired. Iraqi revolution of 1958 can be portrayed as an unintended consequence, unleashed by the formation of Baghdad Pact. Perhaps, it was inconceivable in 1955. But the burden was still rested on shoulders of the Turkish government. Bluntly put, Turkey could not read, or misread, the significance of Arab-Israeli conflict, which constituted a serious impediment for the institutionalization of regional security and defense. In 1955, Ankara's political undertakings in the Middle East should not have underestimated the salience of Arab nationalism in Cairo and Baghdad. Inter-Arab rivalry was a key determinant of regional stability. Undoubtedly, Turkey did not desire a regime change in any of its southern neighbors. A communist regime bordering Turkey might inevitably imply a rise of Soviet influence in the region. What happened in Iraq was clearly against Turkey's political interests.

To be more specific, Turkey supported the establishment of Baghdad Pact in order to balance, if not contain, the emergent Soviet threat in the Middle East. The "balance of external threat" frame may provide a substantial hint on why Turkey subscribed to the formation of Baghdad Pact in such a hasty manner. Yet, it cannot sufficiently capture why Turkey faced a serious backlash, as a consequence of the Iraqi Revolution in 1958. On the part of Turkey, Baghdad Pact turned out to be a major policy failure. Had Turkey acted deliberately based on the calculation of rational (military) interests, why did it fail in its action? When Turkey is driven by interest satisfaction, how does it make mistake in its action?

This chapter sheds light on these questions, by analyzing temporal and contextual transformation of Turkey's pro-governmental discourse. In the pre-event analysis, historical background and discursive context is presented. In the early Cold War period, the "Neighborly Relations Agreement" of 29 March 1946 represents the episodic beginning (major event) of Turkey's Iraq policy. The episodic middle (central event) is constituted by two critical junctures, i.e. declaration of the Joint *Communiqué* on 12 January 1955 and signing of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation on 24 February 1955. In this section, frames of presupposition in Turkey's Iraq policy discourse are dissected. Here, political narratives published in pro-government daily *Milliyet* are examined. Discursive evidence indicates that

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[8]   Barnett, 133.

ambivalent and/or mixed utilitarian-ideational frames were used to justify the formation of Baghdad Pact.

Apart from the lip-service paid to ideological presuppositions, one could hardly witness a discursive frame depicting the real strength of "Arab nationalism" for the post-colonial politics of the Middle East. Having rooted in an anti-imperialist, anti-Western, and anti-Zionist socio-political setting, Arab nationalism has played an important role in the rationalization of extra-regional alignment choices of Arab governments in the early Cold War era. Due to their colonial experience, nationalist Arab states—most notably Egypt—declined, at least openly, to side with the Anglo-American axis. Instead, these progressive regimes tilted towards the Soviet Union. "The principal ideological link between the Soviet Union and its Middle East allies has been mutual opposition to imperialism." "In the Arab world, the threat of ideological subversion has been far more important than the threat of direct conquest." Both Soviets and their Arab allies in the region have framed the Baghdad Pact as an "imperialist" design and worked hard for its demise.[9]

After almost three years, Ankara's discursive logic of cooperation with Baghdad once again lost its meaning. This time, the fall of Hashemite monarchy on 14 July 1958 emerged as the major event. In the third section, Turkey's foreign policy discourse in the "post-Baghdad Pact" period will be analyzed with a view to assess discursive reasons that led to a dyadic defection, i.e. the Iraqi departure from the defensive alliance. Theoretical and empirical findings will be summarized in conclusion. The general argument on the Baghdad Pact episode asserts that ambivalent cooperation discourses might lead to less cooperative political outcomes.

3.1. Pre-Event Analysis: Historical Background and Discursive Context

During the Second World War, Turkey took a relatively neutral stance in the Middle East. The situation began to change as a new world order emerged. The international structure has moved towards bipolarity. In those years, Turkey was preoccupied with Soviet territorial demands. Thus it chose to cooperate with the Western powers. The general

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[9]   Walt, 193-199, 214-217.

objectives of the Turkish foreign policy in the Middle East in the late 1940's were subordinated to its pro-Western and anti-communist position. These aims could be summarized as first, achieving national security, second, gaining economic aid, and third, expanding its regional influence. In the immediate aftermath of the World War II, Turkey could not stay immune to the developments occurring in its regional environment. Nationalist movements in the Middle East, especially in Egypt and Syria, were added to uncertainties emanating from the Cold War. In the late 1940's, Arab nationalism became a source of anxiety for Turkey. Soviet support to the Arab nationalist movements had a significant bearing upon Turkey's decision-makers. Arab nationalists in Syria were reclaiming their interest towards Hatay.[10]

Encouraged by the Soviets, Qazi Muhammad, the leader of Democratic Party of Kurdistan in Iran, proclaimed the foundation of Kurdish Republic of Mahabad on 22 January 1946. Mulla Mustafa Barzani, who led the abortive Kurdish tribal uprising against the Iraqi government in 1943 and founded the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) of Iraq in 1946, seized the opportunity to collaborate with the Kurdish nationalists in Iran. However, the Mahabad Republic could only survive less than a year. In mid-December 1946, Mohammed Reza Shah was backed by the US government to put end to the pro-Soviet Kurdish republic in Iran. As a result of the collapse of the Mahabad Republic, Barzani fled to the Soviet Union and Kurdish separatism in Iraq temporarily died down. Yet, the Iraqi Communist Party (ICP) has continued to attract many of the young and educated Kurds. The collaboration between KDP and ICP remained as a serious challenge for the Hashemite monarchy in Iraq.[11] Within this historical background, Turkish and Iraqi governments moved towards negotiating a bilateral cooperation agreement.

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[10] Kemal H. Karpat ed., *Turkey's Foreign Policy in Transition 1950-1974*, (Leiden: E.J.Brill, 1975), 108-115. George Lenczowski, *American Presidents and the Middle East*, (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 1990), 13-15.

[11] Bilâl N. Şimşir, *Türk-Irak İlişkilerinde Türkmenler*, (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 2004), 116. M. E. Yapp, *The Near East Since the First World War: A History to 1995*, 2nd ed., (NY: Longman, 1996), 182, 183. Rubin, 355, 356. Lenczowski, 9-13.

3.1.1. Making of the 1946 Agreement: A New Logic for Bilateral Cooperation

On 29 March 1946, Turkish-Iraqi Governments, led by İsmet İnönü and Nuri Said, signed the "Treaty of Friendship and Neighborly Relations" in Ankara. The new settlement did make reference to the Border Treaty of 1926, but not to the Saadabad Pact of 1937. Both countries were "inspired by the desire to strengthen…friendly and neighborly relations…and to reinforce…bonds of brotherhood which have existed for centuries between the two peoples." They considered that "their foreign policy…[was] firmly based on the conviction that the ideal of peace and security held by these two peoples…[has been] inseparable from the peace and security of the peoples of the world, and especially of the Middle East."[12]

In this regard, the treaty was portrayed as the first application of the United Nations Charter—signed in late June 1945. In the Article 1, both Parties agreed "to respect their territorial integrity and their common frontiers." The Article 2 stipulated "a policy of absolute non-intervention in the domestic affairs." From the Article 3 to the Article 5, we understand that both sides would consult, cooperate and support each other while dealing with "international affairs…especially…having a regional character affecting themselves." By extension, Turkey and Iraq would refer to the UN in case of "threat of aggression or…violation of the territorial integrity or frontiers of either Party." Peaceful settlement of any disputes, especially among neighbors, was also enshrined. The Article 6 listed the Protocols and Conventions—as integral part of the Treaty—which instituted modalities of cooperation in eight fields, i.e. regulation of trans-boundary waters, mutual security (police-intelligence) assistance on criminal matters, such as "subversive propaganda" and "rebellion," educational-cultural exchange, communications, economic issues, border affairs, extradition, and legal assistance.[13]

Ankara dealt bilateral and regional issues by signing the cooperation agreement with Baghdad. Yet this cooperation could not alleviate the danger posed by the red menace. Soviets and their Communist allies had been moving towards imperial expansion. Ankara's

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[12] "Türkiye ile Irak Arasında Dostluk ve İyi Komşuluk Antlaşması ve Ek 6 Protokol," <http://www.mfa.gov.tr> 25 April 2011.

[13] Yaşar Canatan, *Türk-Irak Münasebetleri (1926-1958)*, (Ankara: T.C. Kültür Bakanlığı, 1996), 100-106. See also "Türkiye ile Irak Arasında Dostluk ve İyi Komşuluk Antlaşması ve Ek 6 Protokol."

position with regard to the communist danger had further weakened, after the UK's decision on 21 February 1947 to withdraw its forces safeguarding Turkey (and Greece) almost in a month. During the 1947 Pentagon talks, the British and American political-military officials concluded that Britain should not withdraw from the Middle East completely and immediately.[14]

In order to address the new situation, the Truman Doctrine was announced by the US on 12 March 1947.[15] Under Truman Doctrine, US military assistance program to Turkey started on 12 July 1947. Turkey began to receive US economic aid on 4 July 1948, according to the Marshall Plan of April 1948. Not only did Turkey face external challenges, but also it had to deal with internal developments. American aid was given with strings attached. The duty of political scrutiny over of the security institutions, most notably the army, handed over to the Defense Ministry in June 1949.[16] Transition to multi-party system was designed to adapt Turkey to the Western type of democratic rule. Nevertheless, initial political liberalization attempts seemed not to be aiming a genuine democracy. Authoritarianism against the left, presumably under the banner of fighting against communism, was salient. Despite these setbacks, moving towards democracy created repercussions for Turkey's political development.[17]

Main factor conditioning Turkey's Middle East policy in 1948 has been a quest for alignment with the West in general and the Anglo-American axis in particular.[18] In January of that year, Britain sought to revise the 1930 Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of Preferential Alliance. Due to the riots orchestrated by the nationalist opposition, the Portsmouth Treaty of 1948 did collapse and the future of British military presence in Iraq, especially in al-Shu'aybah and Habbaniyyah air bases, remained at risk.[19] Iraq was not the only Arab country where Britain

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[14] Sever, "The Compliant Ally?," 73, 74.

[15] Lenczowski, 15-17.

[16] Çağrı Erhan, "ABD ve NATO'yla İlişkiler, 1945-1960" in *Türk Dış Politikası: Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar* (*Cilt I: 1919-1980)*, ed. Baskın Oran, 14th ed., (İstanbul: İletişim, 2009), 537.

[17] Cem Eroğul, *Demokrat Parti: Tarihi ve İdeolojisi*, 4th ed., (Ankara: İmge Kitapevi, 2003), 1-20. Baskın Oran, "Dönemin Bilançosu, 1945-1960," in *Türk Dış Politikası* (*Cilt I*), 492-494. Erhan, 532-534, 539-542.

[18] E. Athanassopoulou, "Western Defence Developments and Turkey's Search for Security in 1948," *Middle Eastern Studies* 32, no. 2 (1996): 77-108.

[19] Ara Sanjian, "The Formulation of the Baghdad Pact," *Middle Eastern Studies* 33, no. 2 (1997): 233, 234.

had been forced to evacuate, due to domestic resentment. Since 1946, Egyptians had not yield to Britain's demand for maintaining its military base in the Suez Canal. Having faced challenges at the bilateral level with Iraq and Egypt, Britain attempted to develop a regional-multilateral approach, by which it would retain its strategic position. Britain considered establishment of "a Middle East defense pact" against the emerging Soviet threat. The regional pact should include "all Middle East countries" and had to be backed by the UK and the US. After the end of British mandate in Palestine and Israel's declaration of independence on 14 May 1948, Britain realized that ensuing Arab-Israeli conflict "would render the formation of such a pact problematic."[20] Largely due to international and regional contextual reasons, Ankara got entangled with issues of regional defense and by extension defense cooperation with Baghdad. Two years after the signing of comprehensive bilateral cooperation agreement, the Turkish government began to work with the Iraqi officials for the rationalization of their re-alignment.

3.1.2. Rationalization of Re-Alignment: Preconceptions on Regional Defense

The incumbent Turkish Government—led by the Republican People's Party (CHP)—applied for the membership of newly emerging "Atlantic Pact" in November 1948, rather than taking "the lead in forming a pro-Western alliance in the Middle East".[21] Despite Arab opposition, Turkey became the first Muslim country to recognize Israel on 28 March 1949. Turkey's recognition of Israel not only did help to contain Syria,[22] but also opened the way for membership to the European Parliament in August 1949. In order to line up with the West, Ankara took the risk of alienation from the Arab world. This policy would later put "burden" on Turkey's relations with the Arab countries, especially with Iraq.[23] After the

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[20]   Behçet K. Yeşilbursa, "Turkey's Participation in the Middle East Command and Its Admission to NATO, 1950-52," *Middle Eastern Studies* 35, no. 4 (1999): 70-72.

[21]   William Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy 1774-2000*, (London: Frank Cass, 2002), 116.

[22]   Karpat, *Turkey's Foreign Policy in Transition*, 112-114.

[23]   Hüseyin Bağcı, *Türk Dış Politikasında 1950'li Yıllar*, 2nd ed., (Ankara: METU Press, 2001), 40-44, 131. Melek Fırat, Çağrı Erhan and Ömer Kürçüoğlu, "Orta Doğu'yla İlişkiler, 1945-1960," in *Türk Dış Politikası (Cilt I)*, 616, 617, 637-642.

formation of NATO in the summer of 1949, the US remained reluctant "to encourage any Near Eastern regional defense pact." In the following summer, however, the outbreak of Korean War convinced the US "to strengthen the defense of the Middle East against the growing Soviet threat."[24]

Democrat Party (DP)—founded on 7 January 1946—came to power receiving 53.3 percent of the popular votes in the general elections held on 14 May 1950. Like its predecessor, DP government actively strived for NATO membership. In an effort to defeat communist aggression, DP government sent a military force to the Korean War in 1950. Turkey was invited to NATO on 20 September 1951. In its way to NATO membership, Turkey became an active participant in the Middle East Defense Organization (MEDO) in October 1951. On 24 November 1951, the Soviets dispatched a diplomatic note to the DP government, reiterating their concern over Turkey's involvement in pro-Western regional arrangements namely the MEDO. Under the strong influence of Egypt, the Secretary General of Arab League Azam Pasha, declared their opposition to the MEDO. Israel, not communism, was the real threat for the Arabs. After deliberations over the MEDO, anti-Turkish feelings have risen dramatically in Egypt. After the military coup of 1952, Free Officers formed the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) in Egypt. In the beginning, the chairman of the RCC was General Muhammad Najib. In 1954, the conspiratorial leader of Free Officers, Colonel Gamal Abdul Nasser, dismissed Najib from political power. Nasser appealed to Pan-Arab nationalism in order to achieve regional preponderance. The hegemonic desires of Cairo were a regional concern for Ankara. Despite criticisms from the main opposition CHP, Turkey's Prime Minister Adnan Menderes favored for a policy of leadership in the Middle East. Turkey's engagement with the region would aim at building a pro-Western (and by implication anti-communist) security institution. DP government viewed Turkey's interests as identical with the Western (read the US) interests. This gave a clear sign that Turkey assumed a pro-Western role in the Middle East.[25]

The election of Eisenhower as the US president provided a new opportunity for the Menderes government. On 1 July 1953, US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles reiterated that the Soviet threat should be contained in its very neighborhood. In this regard, much

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[24] Yeşilbursa, 72, 73.

[25] Sever, *Soğuk Savaş Kuşatmasında Türkiye,* 87-131. Mahmut Dikerdem, *Ortadoğu'da Devrim Yılları,* (İstanbul: Cem Yayınevi, 1990), 71-95. Fırat and Kürkçüoğlu, 615-622. Bağcı, 37-50.

more emphasis was put on the defense of "Northern Tier," Pakistan, Iran, Turkey and Iraq. US-Pakistan technical and economic agreement was signed on 28 December 1953. After the signing of a bilateral agreement, Iraq began to receive US military assistance in April 1954. In the face of Soviet reactions and Egyptian criticisms, Turkey-Pakistan cooperation agreement was signed on 2 April 1954, in Karachi. Despite its rising political support to 56.6 percent, DP's economic position began to deteriorate in 1954. Turkey deeply needed US financial aid. In an effort to boost financial support, Menderes paid an official visit to the US between 30 May and 7 June 1954. During that visit, Menderes made a quite controversial statement, by asserting that "the recognition of Israel's existence was a necessity for the Arab states." This statement added more fuel to the Arab nationalist rhetoric and anti-Turkish sentiments began to shape the Arab street. In the following period, Arab reactions to the pro-Western regional security policies of Menderes government have ensued.[26]

Upon signing an agreement with Egypt on 27 July 1954, Britain accepted to depart from the Suez Canal zone. Nasser felt victorious and determined to oppose any pro-Western security arrangement in the Middle East. On 12 September 1954, pro-British Nuri Said established the government in Iraq. While returning from Britain, he visited Turkey on 9 October 1954. This visit was the last step towards signing of a defense pact between Turkey and Iraq.[27] To summarize, international/regional circumstantial conditions of the pre-event (1946-54) period have formed main contextual reason for Turkey's making of cooperation with Iraq. In the event analysis section, Turkey's discourse of cooperation during the formation of Baghdad Pact is analyzed.

3.2. The Event Analysis: Frames, Models and Modes of Reasoning

In this section, political narratives will be dissected in order to identify the reasoning behind Turkey's push towards the Baghdad Pact. In the following two sub-sections, I will trace how discursive frames provided conditions of possibility for the Menderes Government in making agreement with Iraq. On this occasion, bargaining process took place in two steps.

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26 Fırat and Kürkçüoğlu, 620-622. Sever, "The Compliant Ally?," 74.

27 Canatan, 79-83.

These stages were epitomized by two events, i.e. declaration of the Joint *Communiqué* on 12 January 1955 and signing of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation on 24 February 1955.

3.2.1. The Joint *Communiqué*: A Quest for Meaning of Cooperation

Based on their prior decision made public after Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri Said's visit to Istanbul in October 1954, Turkey and Iraq reached a common understanding on 12 January 1955 to first establish and then broaden cooperation for "the stability and security in the Middle East." Pro-government daily *Milliyet* fully publicized the Joint *Communiqué* and framed the event as a move towards a "joint defense pact" between Turkey and Iraq. The agreement would be in line with "the principle of legitimate self-defense"—as stipulated in Article 51 of the UN Charter—and "involve commitment for mutual cooperation to counter any aggression against the signatories, which may come from either within or out of the region." Both Governments believed that the agreement would prevent intentions for aggression by preserving peace and strengthening security. It would be beneficial and necessary to open this agreement for accession of those states which either have demonstrated their determination to work for the realization of goals set by the agreement, or have been in a position to put effort in this direction due to their geographic location or because of capabilities at their disposal.[28]

On that occasion, Menderes became the first foreign official to address the Iraqi Parliament. In concurrence with the opening remarks made by the Speaker of Iraqi Parliament, Menderes appealed to "(historical) neighborhood" and "(religious) brotherhood" in framing Turkey-Iraq relations. Along these lines, Menderes emphasized the need to enhance security of both countries against the dangers appearing in various forms. In a very short time, it would be possible for the two countries to eliminate the anxieties permeating into their common conscience. In an interview to the Iraqi newspaper *Al Ahbar*, Menderes stated that "Turkish-Iraqi friendship was not a new phenomenon. It was a legacy inherited from the past centuries. In recent years, it [this legacy] has continued in a perpetual and firm manner."[29]

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[28] "Türk-Irak Müşterek Müdafaa Paktı Hazırlandı", *Milliyet*, 13 January 1955. See also İsmail Soysal, *Türkiye'nin Uluslararası Siyasal Bağıtları* (*Cilt II: 1945-1990),* (Ankara: TTK Basımevi, 1991), 499-500.

[29] "Türk-Irak Müşterek Müdafaa Paktı Hazırlandı", *Milliyet*, 13 January 1955.

Even though Menderes did not talk about Turkey's oil interests, some foreign resources claimed that one of his Ministers, Fatin Rüştü Zorlu, was in Baghdad to convince the Iraqi side for the building of an oil pipeline from Mosul to İskenderun. Turkey's offer did not resonate well with Iraqi policy makers who were primarily concerned about Arab nationalist reactions. According to their view, the establishment of Iraq-Turkey pipeline would be perceived as a threat by the Arab League. For this reason, Turkey's pipeline dream did not come true. Since then Turkish government could only remain satisfied with the oil royalties that the Iraqi government had to pay along the stipulations of bilateral agreements signed between 1926 and 1955.[30] In other words, Ankara did not utilize oil as a frame of cooperation with Baghdad. While explaining good reasons for the joint defense pact, the Turkish government appealed to ideological rhetoric in order to counter Egyptian propaganda.

3.2.1.1. Explaining Good Reasons for the Joint Defense Pact

Pro-government editor in chief of *Milliyet*, Ali Naci Karacan observed that "Turkey's friendship policy with the Arabs" has not necessarily entailed "enmity towards the Jews (read Israel)." According to him, "civilized Turkey" stood beyond these essentially deterministic, "primitive", and "backward" conceptualizations of international relations. Karacan thought that attribution of anti-Semitism to Turkey has been impossible, due to the peaceful nature of historical encounters between Turks and Jews. More importantly, it was a dangerous delusion to conceive a "Turkish-Jewish" and even an "Arab-Jewish" enmity, as a result of "Turkish-Arab" rapprochement. The reality seemed to be just the opposite. It would be quite problematic for an Arab state to attack Israel, should Turkey reach an agreement of peace and security with the Arabs. "Friendship with the Arabs is not for aggression against anyone; its aim is to fortify peace, security and to counter aggression coming from any side [or direction]". For this reason, Karacan argued, peace-loving countries should unite around Turkey.[31]

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[30] Nevin Yazıcı, *Petrol Çerçevesinde Musul Sorunu (1926-1955)*, (İstanbul: Ötüken, 2010), 201-203., 221, 231-234.

[31] Ali Naci Karacan, "Yahudi Düşmanlığı Vahimesi," *Milliyet*, 13 January 1955.

Karacan's political narrative was a significant attempt to restrain Israeli doubts about Menderes Government's effort to sign a security cooperation agreement first with Iraq, and then possibly with other Arab states. Karacan's message was well received indeed.[32] However, Israel was not alone in having suspicions about regional repercussions of Turkey's likely entente with Iraq. Most notably Egypt, under the leadership of Nasser, was concerned about tightening its political grip over the inter-Arab relations. Not unexpectedly, the Joint *Communiqué* issued in Baghdad was not welcomed by the authorities in Cairo.[33] Given the salience of Nasserite propaganda disseminated by the broadcasts of Radio Cairo, the tide of Pan-Arabist opposition to Turkish-Iraqi joint declaration was sweeping the streets of Syria and Lebanon. Yet, Menderes was convinced that a new chapter was opening in the history of Middle Eastern affairs. Perhaps encouraged by warm attitude in London and Washington,[34] he believed that countries of the region were on the eve of rewarding developments. The "declared decision of cooperation and alliance" will serve for the "interests of Middle Eastern [*Orta-Şark*] countries" and belonging to the "community of peace-loving nations", who are willing to "work together to eliminate aggressive ambitions and threats". So, the door was widely open for a "multilateral cooperation", especially among the "community of Arab nations". This endeavor might create "anxiety and resentment" in some "narrow minded or bad intended circles." Having shared these thoughts with the Iraqi and foreign journalists, Menderes flew to Damascus and Beirut to garner regional support for the emerging pact.[35]

Syrian and/or Lebanese accession to the joint defense pact would help to undermine probable communist influence in Turkey's southern neighborhood. For Karacan, Turkish-Iraqi agreement could well be regarded as an attempt to fill the gaps in a "civilization barrier", which was "set to counter grand waves of communism, possibly originating from the north". By signing the agreement, Iraq would not only gain wherewithal to protect its territory—coined as "land of the caliphs" by Karacan—against any kind of aggression like a

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[32] "İsrail, Kararı Müsait Karşıladı", *Milliyet*, 15 January 1955.

[33] "Mısır, Kararı İyi Karşılamadı," *Milliyet*, 14 January 1955. "Mısır Basını Anlaşmayı Tenkid Ediyor," *Milliyet*, 15 January 1955.

[34] "Tebliğ Londra'da Cesaret Verici Olarak Karşılandı," *Milliyet*, 14 January 1955. "Amerika'da Memnunluk," *Milliyet*, 15 January 1955.

[35] "Başvekil, Bugün Suriye'ye Gidiyor," "Suriye'de Nümayişler," "Menderes, Lübnan'da Alâka ile Bekleniyor," *Milliyet*, 14 January 1955. "Anlaşmanın Akisleri", *Milliyet*, 15 January 1955.

"Bolshevik occupation", but also it would prevent any "instigation" perpetrated by "armed tribal groups" inside the country. Otherwise, Soviet Russia might exploit the fragile situation, emanating from lack of sympathy, if not outright thrust, between Turkey and Iraq. Not so long ago, in the words of Karacan, Turkey saw Iraq as a "slippery ground open to foreign incitements". At that time, Iraq viewed Turkey like a "foreigner" to "Islam-hood" and "Arab-hood". That is to say, perceptions of "alienation" and "indifference" have plagued bilateral relations for quite some time. In the end, Ankara and Baghdad managed to develop a "common sense" against a "common danger." When Turkey and Iraq sign the joint defense agreement, they would act as "vanguards" in helping the "Muslim world"—a "civilization" extending from "Morocco" to "India"—to take a deep "breath".[36] These frames reflected the ideological struggle in the making of Turkish-Iraqi cooperation.

3.2.1.2. Ideological Face of Cooperation: Struggling against the Egyptian Propaganda

At the current circumstances, Turkey's efforts towards building peace should be supported, especially by the US. Karacan found it appropriate for Kasım Gülek—General Secretary of the main opposition CHP—to act in a bi-partisan fashion and bring financial matters into the forefront of his visit to Washington. Karacan framed the issue more bluntly: What Turkey just needed has been "money" for its peaceful development, not "weapons" for war fighting.[37] Nonetheless, there was a need for a "defense pact" in order to "provide stability, sustain security" in the Middle East. It was necessary to "jointly counter any aggression, which might come from the inside or the outside." The pact would remain open for "peace-loving countries", i.e. "states in the region", "states concerned with the region," and states interested in "helping the pact with the capabilities at their disposal." In view of Karacan, external reactions to the Turkish-Iraqi pact were mixed. Jordan and Lebanon were seemingly in favor. Syrian government had the political will to join the pact. On the other

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[36] Ali Naci Karacan, "Türkiye-Irak Anlaşmasının Ehemmiyeti," *Milliyet*, 14 January 1955.

[37] Ali Naci Karacan, "Gülek'in Amerika Seyahati," *Milliyet*, 16 January 1955. "Kasım Gülek Bugün Amerika'ya Gidiyor," *Milliyet*, 16 January 1955. Expectedly, Gülek emphasized the need for an "increase in US economic assistance" to Turkey, at least in one of his speeches. "Gülek Amerika'da İyi Bir Konuşma Yaptı," *Milliyet*, 23 January 1955.

hand, the Syrian opposition, involving "the communists and the Muslim Brotherhood," was trying to thwart such a move by staging wide spread street demonstrations. Israel, at least, did not express a significant discontent regarding Turkey-Iraq joint decision. If a shield could be interwoven through the Turkish-Iraqi pact, Israel might cease to dream about expanding its territory over to the rivers of Nile and Euphrates.[38]

Karacan thought that the incumbents in Cairo were just playing a language game and exploiting the fear formed around the myth of Greater Israel. In this regard, he singled out Egypt as the sole country openly against the Joint *Communiqué* issued in Baghdad. Egyptian Minister for National Direction, Salah Salem, argued that Turkey-Iraq joint proposal for a defense pact dealt a serious "blow to the Arab Union/League." In addition, Egyptian government sent a diplomatic note to Iraq, stating their intention to disrupt the signing of Turkey-Iraq agreement. Conflictual attitude of Egyptian leaders did not come as a surprise to Karacan, who had earlier publicly reported his meetings with some of them, especially Salem. "Egyptian policy was handicapped" for various reasons. Foremost among them, was the "presumption" that Egypt was "geographically far from the Russian menace." Secondly, perhaps more importantly, Egyptian policy-makers were pursuing a "utopian goal" of gathering all Arabs under one flag. Therefore, Egyptian leaders were abusing fears about "Greater Israel." In view of Karacan, propagating a "racial and Pharaonic [tyrannical]" union among Arab states remained an "unattainable, illusionary" scheme. Egypt's recent political moves were totally "ignorant of daily realities" and constituted a "severe mistake" on their side. Karacan hoped that Egypt might "rescue itself from mythological imaginations" and regain its "exceptional, well-deserved regional position" by pursuing "a realistic policy" in the Middle East.[39]

Despite Egyptian and Russian[40] opposition, Foreign Ministers of Britain and the United States, Sir Anthony Eden and John Foster Dulles, expressed their support for Turkey-Iraq pact. Not surprisingly, the *Sunday Times* echoed with a praising voice, while commenting on Turkey's Prime Minister's vigorous moves in regional affairs: "The free

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[38] Ali Naci Karacan, "Türk-Irak Paktının Akisleri," *Milliyet*, 18 January 1955.

[39] Ali Naci Karacan, "Mısır'dan Notlar: Kamal Abd-El-Nasser," *Milliyet*, 2 January 1955. Ali Naci Karacan, "Mısır'dan Notlar: Bir Hukuk Devleti Kurmanın Zorlukları," *Milliyet*, 3 January 1955. Ali Naci Karacan, "Mısır'ın Sakat Politikası," *Milliyet*, 19 January 1955. Ali Naci Karacan, "İsrail Vahimesi," *Milliyet*, 21 January 1955.

[40] "Moskova Radyosu Irak ve Türkiye'ye Çatıyor," *Milliyet*, 5 January 1955. "Moskova Radyosu'nun Hücumları," *Milliyet*, 20 January 1955.

world should thank to Menderes for the role he assumed to connect the West and the East."[41] Like the *Sunday Times*, Menderes had even hoped to talk and perhaps convince Nasser.[42] Nevertheless, the visit of Menderes to Damascus proved to be very disappointing. Almost five thousand people demonstrated against the surfacing of Turkey-Iraq pact.[43] Even though Lebanese Government was more amenable to the offer extended by Menderes, they adopted a wait and see approach and sought to reach some sort of a consensus among the Arab states.[44]

Egyptian opposition to any regional undertaking might be too costly to bear for the Menderes Government. Therefore, no sooner had Menderes returned to Istanbul, Turkey sent a "verbal note" to Egypt. Turkey's request was clear. Cairo-based press had to stop publishing materials against Turkey and Iraq.[45] Moreover, Menderes invited Ahmet Remzi, the Egyptian Ambassador in Ankara, to exchange views on the current state of bilateral and regional affairs.[46] But, Egyptian leadership did not take Turkey's persistent overtures into account. These developments did not thwart Menderes from the discourse of defense cooperation in the Middle East. By reframing utilitarian rationales, his discursive deployments reiterated the political reasoning behind the cooperation narrative.

3.2.1.3. Reframing of Utilitarian Rationales and Reiteration of Cooperation Narrative

Menderes could not remain silent and publicly explained why he was regretting Egyptian attitude. "With regard to the institutionalization of Middle Eastern defense, Turkey

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[41] "Başvekil Bugün Yurda Dönüyor," "Dulles'ın Memnuniyet Mesajı," "Londra'daki Müspet Akisler," *Milliyet*, 17 January 1955.

[42] "Beyrut Görüşmeleri Dün Sabah Başladı," "Abdünnasırın Temasları," *Milliyet*, 16 January 1955.

[43] "Suriye'de Nümayişler," *Milliyet*, 17 January 1955.

[44] "Lübnan, Türk-Irak Paktına Davet Edildi," *Milliyet*, 17 January 1955. "Başvekil Yurda Dönüyor: Lübnan Resmi Açıklaması," *Milliyet*, 18 January 1955. "Başvekil, Orta-Doğu Seyahatinden Döndü: Lübnan Başvekilinin Beyanatı," *Milliyet*, 18 January 1955.

[45] "Türk Irak Paktının Hariçteki Akisleri: Mısır'a Şifahi Bir Nota Verdik," *Milliyet*, 20 January 1955.

[46] "Başvekil Mısır Elçisi ile Görüştü," *Milliyet*, 21 January 1955.

has put efforts for a long time." The agreement with Pakistan was a significant step in this direction. On this issue, there had been various contacts with "friendly and brotherly Arab states." "Recurrent efforts put for institutionalizing the Middle Eastern defense, taking measures against aggressive intentions and acts, and establishing cooperation with brother countries" cannot be treated just as they had all happened in one-day. It should not be dealt as "today's work." In all respects, the last decision between Turkey and Iraq was "not an unexpected event, as it had been desired to be portrayed by some [countries]." In the summer of 1954, Turkey and Iraq released a joint statement that clarified their decision to cooperate, Menderes further added. Moreover, Turkey did make a diplomatic attempt as of September 1954, to have a political dialogue with Egypt at the level of Prime Ministers. At first the Egyptian side hesitated and then accepted the visit of Menderes for November 1954. Later on, they changed their mind, put off the visit to an uncertain date. As candidly put by Menderes, the Turkish side was ready to openly talk with their Egyptian counterparts. The goal of Turkey and Iraq has been "to act with all Arab states against probable aggression from within and without the Middle East region." Evidently, "the geographical positions of Turkey and Iraq were different from those of other Arab states." Therefore, these two countries had to take the lead for regional cooperation, as soon as possible. This did not mean that Turkey and Iraq would have some kind of an upper hand over regional matters. Paraphrasing Menderes, all countries in the community of Middle East were determined to cooperate for "mutual reinforcement of security and protection of their interests."[47]

To no avail, Nasser remained defiant.[48] For the Egyptian leadership, the "Turkish-Iraqi pact was dangerous."[49] Unlike Nasser, Dulles and Eden found the pact as a productive, positive development. They were strongly supportive of closing the gap along the "northern tier," between Turkey and Pakistan.[50] In view of Karacan, British and the US support "constituted a significant event." In short, prospective Turkey-Iraq pact would be "in harmony with peace and security policies of the greatest powers."[51] In this regard, political-

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[47] "Mısır'ın Türk-Irak Paktına İştirakini Arzu Ediyoruz," *Milliyet*, 22 January 1955.

[48] "Cemal Abdünnasır Türkiye'ye Gelmiyor," *Milliyet*, 21 January 1955.

[49] "Mısır, Türk-Irak Paktı Tehlikelidir, Diyor," *Milliyet*, 23 January 1955.

[50] "Dulles ve Eden'in Gazetemize Gönderdikleri Telgraflar: Türkiye Yapıcı Bir Rol Oynuyor," *Milliyet*, 25 January 1955.

[51] Ali Naci Karacan, "Eden-Dulles Mesajlarının Gerçek Değeri," *Milliyet*, 26 January 1955.

military contacts with Britain, the US and Pakistan have already been underway.[52] Nonetheless, Nasser seemed to be courting Soviet influence to gain political advantage.[53]

According to Karacan, "Egypt has taken the wrong path" and acted against "the political wisdom…It could have been better for Egypt, had it looked the Turkey-Iraq pact from the perspective of good will, common interests." One thing was crystal clear: "Defense of the Middle East region has been open to Russian danger." Turkey-Iraq defense line was a key for the regional security. Might this line be broken, no single country would survive, including Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Israel, and Egypt. Those who may break this line can even go as far as Dakar without any resistance. Therefore, regional defense cooperation has to be established by great powers' support. Otherwise, who could take care of the defense of Middle East? In other words, Karacan concluded, Egypt should not miss "the best political opportunity of the last century." Joining the Turkey-Iraq pact may bring innumerable political fortunes. Karacan counted only four of them: (1) territorial defense, security against external aggression, (2) domestic political order, internal peace and stability, (3) comfortable working environment for the government, (3) confidence and assistance paid by the great powers.[54]

Undoubtedly, political calculations in Cairo were incredibly dissimilar, challenging the conventional wisdom in Ankara. In spite of the negative discursive moves by Egypt, Turkey hoped that "common sense" would prevail in the region and all Arab states could take "realistic course of action, like their Iraqi brothers."[55] According to one official from the Menderes government, Egypt's disruptive efforts were "damaging the interests of peace and democracy front."[56] Nasser's response was even more distressing for Turkey and the Arab

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[52] "Türk-İngiliz-Amerikan Görüşmeleri," *Milliyet*, 23 January 1955. See also, "Başvekil İngiliz Elçisiyle Görüştü," *Milliyet*, 23 January 1955.

[53] "Rusya ve Mısır Arasında Ankara'daki Temaslar," *Milliyet*, 28 January 1955. "Ankara'da Mısır Sovyet Temasları," *Milliyet*, 10 February 1955. "Rusya Mısır'a Garanti Verdi," *Milliyet*, 11 February 1955. See also "Mısır Elçisinin Notası," *Milliyet*, 13 February 1955. "Mısır'da 70 Kızıl Serbest Bırakıldı," *Milliyet*, 21 February 1955. "Mısır Başvekili Moskovaya Çağrıldı," *Milliyet*, 23 February 1955.

[54] Ali Naci Karacan, "Mısır'ın Tuttuğu Yanlış Yol," *Milliyet*, 30 January 1955.

[55] "Türk-Irak Dostluğu ve Mısır," *Milliyet*, 2 February 1955.

[56] "Hükümet Sözcüsünün Beyanı," *Milliyet*, 3 February 1955.

states: If Iraq might sign the defense treaty with Turkey; Egypt would not only cease diplomatic relations with Iraq but also terminate its membership in the Arab Union.[57]

In addition, Cairo based "Voice of the Arabs" broadcasted claims on "existence of an agreement between Turkey and Israel that was political and military in nature." Almost on a daily basis, Egyptian government officials were proposing same claims in their public statements, despite Turkey's recurrent public denials. Presumably Salem orchestrated and the Egyptian press implemented a subversive propaganda campaign against Iraq and Turkey.[58]

Under the influence of Revolutionary Command Council in Cairo, an Al Azhar Sheikh Abdurrahman Taç asserted that the Turkish-Iraqi pact was against "the Muslim-hood." Egyptian protégés distributed brochures calling for a mass uprising in Iraq. In response, Iraqi government vehemently protested against Egypt's incitements.[59] Entry of the Egyptian daily (*El Cumhuriye*) to Iraq was prohibited.[60] According to Karacan, Egypt went further as to threaten Iraqi Prime Minister with death. Nuri Said reacted in patience. Nuri Said's "wise policy" saved "the holly [mübarek] Iraq", Karacan contended. On the other hand, "the ancient Egyptian nation, historical Egyptian nation," missed "a great opportunity" that "may come once in the centuries." In Karacan's framing, this was a "crushing victory" for Turkey and Iraq, a "total failure" for Egypt.[61]

Since all the dust has seemed to be settling, Turkey and Iraq energized their efforts towards concluding the agreement on 23 February 1955.[62] Signing of the pact provided favorable conditions for both Iraq and Britain to review—if possible renew within ten days—their bilateral political-military agreement, which would expire by the beginning of

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[57] "Cemal Abdünnasırın Tehditleri," *Milliyet*, 3 February 1955.

[58] "Bir Tekzip," *Milliyet*, 5 February 1955. See also "Köprülü Mısır Elçisiyle Görüştü," *Milliyet*, 12 February 1955; "Arabın Sesi Radyosunun Hezeyanları," *Milliyet*, 13 February 1955.

[59] "Arap Birliğinde Yeni Gedikler Açılıyor: Mısır, Irak Halkını Ayaklanmaya Teşvik Ediyor," *Milliyet*, 9 February 1955.

[60] "Irak-Mısır Münasebetleri Tehlikede," *Milliyet*, 11 February 1955.

[61] Ali Naci Karacan, "Türkiye-Irak Güvenlik Paktının Zaferi," *Milliyet*, 8 February 1955.

[62] "Irak Meclisi, Türk-Irak Paktını İttifakla Tasvip Etti," *Milliyet*, 7 February 1955. "Bayar, Menderes Irak'a Gidiyorlar," *Milliyet*, 10 February 1955. "Türk-Irak Paktının Esasları Hazırlandı: Hariciye Komisyonunda Türk-Irak Paktı Görüşüldü," *Milliyet*, 11 February 1955. "Türk-Irak Paktı 23 Şubatta İmzalanıyor," *Milliyet*, 12 February 1955.

1957.[63] On the other hand, Turkey's rationale in entering the pact seemed to be preordained by real and/or imagined preconceptions about "the communist Soviet Russian policy."[64] Menderes publicly explicated Turkey's foreign policy position in "a world divided into two headquarters… You know from where the threat comes…It has been necessary not to make mistake in taking precautions…to defend homeland of the Turkish nation." In this regard, "America and Britain did not hesitate to give support, assistance" to Turkey's efforts "for enhancing the peace front in the region."[65] To Moscow's chagrin,[66] Menderes Government was determined to establish the "Middle East Defense System."[67] In the end, Turkey and Iraq signed the "Treaty of Mutual Cooperation" on 24 February 1955.[68] Karacan framed the making of alliance with ideational terms: "the good prevailed over the evil."[69]

3.2.2. The Treaty of Mutual Cooperation: Alliance in the Making

To a certain extent, the "statement of reason" for the Turkish-Iraqi pact published by the *Milliyet* corresponds to the preamble of agreement. According to the preamble, the treaty of 1946 was still in effect. Both sides believed that the treaty of 1946 "formed the basis of two countries' foreign policies." The aim of the new agreement was complementary by its very nature. Under new conditions in the world, both countries deeply felt the need to maintain peace in the Middle East and hence decided to fully coordinate their foreign policies.[70]

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[63] "Eden, Nuri Sait Paşa ile Bağdatta Görüşecek," *Milliyet*, 13 February 1955.

[64] Ali Naci Karacan, "Harb Olacak mı?," *Milliyet*, 10 February 1955. Ali Naci Karacan, "Rusya'da Vaziyet," *Milliyet*, 11 February 1955.

[65] "Başvekil İç ve Dış Politikamızı İzah Etti," *Milliyet*, 15 February 1955.

[66] "Moskova Yine Bize Çatıyor," *Milliyet*, 15 February 1955.

[67] "Orta-Doğu Savunma Sistemi Kuruluyor," *Milliyet*, 22 February 1955.

[68] "Türk-Irak Paktı Dün İmzalandı," *Milliyet*, 25 February 1955.

[69] Ali Naci Karacan, "Pencerelere Demir Vuruyoruz," *Milliyet*, 24 February 1955.

[70] "Türk-Irak Paktının Gerekçesi," *Milliyet*, 25 February 1955. Soysal, *Türkiye'nin Uluslararası Siyasal Bağıtları (Cilt II)*, 501.

No sooner had Menderes returned to Ankara, the Government proposed a motion for the ratification of Turkish-Iraqi agreement. Upon detailed explanation provided by Menderes, Foreign Relations' Committee decided to send the motion to the Grand National Assembly (GNA) for approval. The GNA gathered in an open session with attendance of Ambassadors of Britain, the US, Iraq, Syria, and Saudi Arabia. In the beginning, the speaker of the main opposition CHP stated that they did not have a difference of opinion with Government's foreign policy. Then, one member of the CHP raised his concern about whether the treaty demanded a "military commitment" in an "automatic" fashion. The opposition was also curious about whether the treaty had conceded an unconstitutional authority to the Government.[71]

From the Government side, Minister of Foreign Affairs Mehmet Fuat Köprülü was first to take the turn. He framed the agreement as an implementation of "peace at home, peace in abroad" understanding. According to him, "Bled Agreement" in the West and "Pakistan Agreement" in the East have formed a backbone for the foundation of a "security system." All of the countries were aware of Turkey's efforts towards building a "peace front" in the Middle East. Yet, there have been undue reactions to the Turkey-Iraq agreement. Each and every state knows that "fronts have been determined…There is one front of aggression…[In other words,] attempting to establish…a non-aligned front implies an inadvertent service to the aggressive front…Those who want to protect their interests based on non-alignment in the Middle East have to think that these states could have already perished had the freedom front not existed." Any country having no aggressive intentions should not be against this defensive treaty, Köprülü argued. Iraq was not precluded from ensuring its commitments in the Arab Union. Without receiving consents of Turkey and Iraq, a country could not accede to the treaty. Since Israel was not recognized by Iraq (and other Arab states), its accession to the agreement was practically impossible. Moreover, while signing the agreement, Turkey and Iraq exchanged letters stating that they will work to implement UN decisions on Israel [and Palestine]. Paraphrasing Köprülü, military commitments for joint defense were to be invoked on the basis of Article 51 of the UN Charter, and hence they could not be implemented automatically. Lastly, Köprülü implied

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[71] "Türkiye-Irak Paktı İttifakla Tasvip Edildi," *Milliyet*, 26 February 1955. "Meclis, Türk-Irak Paktını Dün İttifakla Tasvip Etti," *Milliyet*, 27 February 1955.

that Government's conduct of foreign policy has not been based on secrecy and remained in line with the Constitution.[72]

In order to elaborate more on Government's position, Menderes took the turn. He framed the agreement as a "defensive alliance" that entailed a "joint action in case of aggression." In order to coordinate joint action, necessary preparations had to be made. As stipulated in Article 5, the treaty was still open for the accession of other countries, carrying appropriate qualifications. "We are wishful about Egypt's accession…There have been historical ties, cultural and social bonds between the Arabs and Turks. These feelings will re-awaken in one day…We regret that an ill-fated view and a pointless anger were awakened due to erroneous propaganda." Menderes still hoped that Egyptian leadership might find a way to get out of the current political impasse.[73] After the ratification, Turkey's cooperation rhetoric appealed towards the construction of better future.

3.2.3. After the Ratification: Rhetorical Construction of Better Future

Having been personally involved in the preparation phase of Turkey's agreement with Iraq, Karacan was satisfied to watch the completion of ratification processes in both Ankara and Baghdad. In this sense, he was more hopeful about the future of Turkey's relations with the Arab countries. According to him, Turkey had to develop a new approach, in order to recover the Arab world from the past memories of "the Ottoman Empire or the administration of Union and Progress [İttihat ve Terakki]…What we articulate Iraq is the retaining wall of Turkey in its Eastern border. If we define our geopolitical position as such, we think the importance of the accomplished pact can be better comprehended." Imagine Turkey as a house. You may suppose that Egypt is a villa located by the deep end of Turkey's "backyard." In this picture, you might visualize other Arab states just as "little neighbors whose door is opening to the eastern wall of [Turkey's] backyard…As you see, all

[72] "Türkiye-Irak Paktı İttifakla Tasvip Edildi," *Milliyet*, 26 February 1955. "Meclis, Türk-Irak Paktını Dün İttifakla Tasvip Etti," *Milliyet*, 27 February 1955.

[73] "Meclis, Türk-Irak Paktını Dün İttifakla Tasvip Etti," *Milliyet*, 27 February 1955. See also Faruk Sükan, *Başbakan Adnan Menderes'in Meclis Konuşmaları (1950-1960)*, (Ankara: Kültür Ofset, 1992), 238-242.

are neighbors, all are important, all are brothers. Therefore, [Turkey] should [find ways to] take them all one by one, the Arab world all together…into the ring of brotherhood."[74]

Karacan was already aware of the fact that intra/inter-Arab rivalries could be a serious impediment for Turkey's aspiration for regional cooperation. First and foremost, there was a political rift[75] among the Revolutionary Committee in Cairo, as Karacan made it clear to his former friend Ahmet Remzi, the Egyptian Ambassador in Ankara.[76] In view of Karacan, Nasser seemed not to be posing a serious concern for bilateral and regional relations. The real danger lied with Salem, who demonstrated his desire to dominate the Middle East by oppressing and subjugating all Arab states under Egyptian political will.[77] Syria became the first prey who fall victim to Egyptian desire for regional hegemony. Egypt's likely collaboration with Syria was designed to do away with the Turkey-Iraq pact.[78]

Earlier, Saudi Arabia did opt to side with Egypt based on a starkly simple reason. The Wahhabis in Riyadh did not want to be seen as submitting to the will of Hashemites in Baghdad. Given the historical enmity between these two regimes, any attempt strengthening political-military position of Iraq would be perceived as detrimental by Saudi Arabia.[79] Faysal, the Hashemite king in Baghdad, was more concerned about domestic balance of power. The nationalists were strongly opposing to the British military presence in Iraq. Before the expiration of Anglo-Iraqi treaty in 1957, both Britain and Iraq found it appropriate to retain their bilateral, political-military relations under the guise of multilateral, regional defense cooperation.[80]

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[74] Ali Naci Karacan, "Arap Alemi ve Yeni Devir," *Milliyet*, 28 February 1955.

[75] "İhtilal Komitesinde İhtilaf Başgösterdi," *Milliyet*, 10 February 1955.

[76] Karacan states that he met with Remzi while he was a journalist reporting Lausanne peace negotiations in 1922-23. During that time, Remzi was a prominent student and had cordial relations with the Turkish delegation in Lausanne.

[77] Ali Naci Karacan, "Mısır Elçisi ile Bir Konuşma," *Milliyet*, 4 March 1955. "Salah Salem'in Yanlış Bir Tefsiri," *Milliyet*, 4 March 1955. Ali Naci Karacan, "Arabayı Devirmek İstemiyorlarsa," *Milliyet*, 7 March 1955.

[78] "Mısır ve Suriye Bir Pakt İmzaladılar," *Milliyet*, 4 March 1955. "Suriye ve Mısır Bize Karşı Birleştiler," *Milliyet*, 7 March 1955.

[79] Ali Naci Karacan, "Tarihi Bir Kavganın Neticesi," *Milliyet*, 16 February 1955.

[80] "Irak Meclisi de Paktı Tasvip Etti," *Milliyet*, 27 February 1955. Soysal, *Türkiye'nin Uluslararası Siyasal Bağıtları (Cilt II: 1945-1990)*, 490.

In addition to the intra/inter-"Arab Cold War," all of a sudden, a military clash broke out on the border area of Gaza, between Egyptian and Israeli soldiers. As far as Turkey's regional policy was concerned, the event in Gaza was another reminder of the need for "cooperation among friendly and brotherly nations."[81] Despite the sense of insecurity run deep into the region, Turkey's defense was based on a firm ground. Discursive frames embedded in President Mahmut Celal Bayar's political narratives gave a clear sign about Turkey's political-military rationale in cooperating with Iraq.

On 5 March 1955, Bayar was returning from an official visit to Pakistan. After anchoring to the port of Basra, Bayar flew to Baghdad to meet with Faysal, the Iraqi King.[82] Pertaining to the lately signed treaty, Bayar publicly acknowledged that institutionalization of bilateral ties between Turkey and Iraq has had a very deep and fully developed meaning. With this "alliance," the two countries could form a "collective destiny at times of peace and war," and would strengthen their feelings of "friendship and brotherhood." Strategically, the Middle East has deserved "great importance." Bayar put it succinctly; Turkey and Iraq took a regional "responsibility" in order to "defend" principles of "peace" stipulated in the UN Charter. By so doing, they fashioned a treaty based on "prudence" and "realism." According to Bayar, this agreement would serve for advancing the causes of "peace, security and justice" in the region. Despite various difficulties posed by those who did not want to understand its "realistic" and "auspicious" nature, the "alliance treaty" was ratified in Ankara and Baghdad. For Bayar, this meant that the "spirit of agreement has essentially lived in the consciousness of…[two] nations."[83]

Nonetheless, the public mood of Ankara pointed to a political anxiety over tightening of Cairo-Damascus axis. Under the pressure from the Egyptian leadership, Syrian Prime Minister first admitted that Turkey viewed the interests of Arab countries from a different point. Then, formation of a joint military command structure among the armies of Egypt, Syria and Saudi Arabia was declared, notwithstanding Turkey's diplomatic protest. For

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[81] "Mısır-İsrail Sınırında Sert Çarpışma Oldu," *Milliyet*, 2 March 1955. "Gazze Hadisesi Karşısında Türkiye Hassas Davranıyor," *Milliyet*, 3 March 1955.

[82] "Bayar Bugün Merasimle Karşılanacak," *Milliyet*, 5 March 1955. "Bayar Bağdat'da," *Milliyet*, 6 March 1955. "Bayar Irak Devlet Adamları ile Görüştü," *Milliyet*, 8 March 1955.

[83] "Cumhurbaşkanımız Celâl Bayar'ın, Irak'ta Melik İkinci Faysal'ın Söylevine Verdikleri Cevap," *Zafer*, 6 March 1955; "Cumhurbaşkanımız Celâl Bayar'ın, Irak Gazetecilerine Demeci," *Zafer*, 11 March 1955 reprinted in *Celal Bayar'ın Söylev ve Demeçleri-Dış Politika (1933-1955)*, ed. Özel Şahingiray (İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Yayınları, 1999), 219-221.

Menderes, Egyptian domination over the Arab states could not be interpreted by the concept of state sovereignty.[84]

Karacan framed the tripartite Arab entente with a provocative metaphor: "the cross of the hajji."[85] He was also critical of the French attitude, articulating discursive support for the Syrian government. Not only did France dream about its past colonial rule over Syria, but it also ignored Turkey's NATO membership. Despite sharing a similar colonial past with France, Britain has at least been retreating from its imperial engagements.[86] Thus, British entry into the Turkish-Iraqi pact was more than welcomed. In view of Karacan, the support of Britain both helped to "harden the wall of civilization" and to open the way for accession of other countries, most notably Pakistan, Iran and the United States.[87]

It was expected that US accession to the Baghdad Pact might ease some of Turkey's predicament in its fight against communism. As Bayar had already conceived, "the greatest allies of communism have been ignorance and poverty. In order to maintain a firm ideological stance against the opponent, each country has had to seek solutions for developing the life standards of its people."[88] Karacan foresaw that the US might move beyond its past mistakes and do its best for Turkey's economic development, which has been the key for the military build-up. For a long time, unreasonable US governments did not allow Turkey to receive credit, especially from the Import-Export Bank. Karacan reasserted that Turkish-American alliance has been established on the basis of mutual interests. The US has allied with Turkey in order to set a barrier against the Russian threat. By allying with the Americans, Turks hoped to get support and assistance against the Russians, who posed a serious threat against the very survival of Turkey.[89]

Given the fact that Karacan had personally involved in the preparation of Turkish-Iraqi mutual defense agreement, his framing of the Baghdad Pact as an alliance with the US-

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[84] "Başvekil, Orta-Şark Durumunu İzah Etti," *Milliyet*, 6 March 1955. "Suriye ve Mısır Bize Karşı Birleştiler," *Milliyet*, 7 March 1955. "Suriye Hükümetine Protesto Notası Verdik," *Milliyet*, 11 March 1955.

[85] Ali Naci Karacan, "Hacının Çıktı Haçı…," *Milliyet*, 12 March 1955.

[86] Ali Naci Karacan, "Şu Fransanın Haline Bakın," *Milliyet*, 18 March 1955.

[87] "İngiltere, Türk-Irak Paktına Girdi," *Milliyet*, 31 March 1955. Ali Naci Karacan, "Medeniyetin Aşılamayacak Duvarı," *Milliyet*, 1 April 1955.

[88] "Ohio Temsilcisi Frances Bolton'un Söylevine Cumhurbaşkanı Celâl Bayar'ın Cevabî Söylevi", *Zafer*, 28 January 1954 reprinted in Şahingiray, *Celal Bayar'ın Söylev ve Demeçleri-Dış Politika*, 100.

[89] Ali Naci Karacan, "Amerika'da İdrak Olsa!," *Milliyet*, 22 April 1955.

UK axis against the Russian threat gave important signs about Turkey's making of cooperation with Iraq. By tracing the pro-governmental discourse during the formation of Baghdad Pact, the event analysis section highlighted the salience of ambiguous reasoning in Ankara. Whether deliberate or not, the ambivalence between utilitarian (threat balancing) ontology and ideational (shared ideology/anti-communism) rhetoric would most likely create ramifications for Turkish-Iraqi relations. In the post-event section, episodic consequences of Turkey's discourse of cooperation with Iraq are assessed.

3.3. Post-Event Analysis: Historical Developments and Discursive Dynamics

In the post-event period, it became obvious that the fate of the Baghdad Pact would remain dependent on US support. Up until the Suez crisis, pact members were extensively busy with getting Washington on board. In fact, Turkey was not the only country in need of US aid. Other members—including Pakistan and Iran[90]—were urging the United States to join the Pact. Washington was politically reluctant because of the global and regional ramifications that such a move might bare. In terms of global impact, the US had no desire to provoke any Soviet aggression. Regionally, the US had to be more cautious. Offending Arab countries (especially Egypt) and Israel might push them towards the Soviet orbit. As a result, the US chose to participate the first meeting of Baghdad Pact as an observer. By the end of that meeting on 22 November 1955, the United States was eager "to establish permanent liaison with the economic committee" of the Baghdad Pact.[91]

The second session of the Ministerial Council of the Baghdad Pact was held in Tehran on 16-19 April 1956. In that session the US became "a full member of the Pact's Economic Committee," accepted "a full membership in the Counter-Subversion Committee," and agreed "to establish a military liaison office at the permanent headquarters of the pact" in Baghdad. After the conclusion of meetings, the Economic Committee decided "that members

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[90] Pakistan announced its formal adherence to the alliance on 23 September 1955. Iran formally adhered on 3 November 1955.

[91] "Baghdad Pact," *International Organization* 10, no.1 (1956): 212, 213. Melek Fırat and Ömer Kürkçüoğlu, "Orta Doğu'yla İlişkiler, 1945-1960," in *Türk Dış Politikası (Cilt I)*, 625.

should cooperate in the economic field, in technical education, in the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes, and in training to raise standards of living, health, irrigation and farming." The Military Committee agreed to develop a common defense policy. The "Counter-Subversion" and "Liaison" Committees reviewed subversive communist tactics and recommended combined counter measures to be adopted by the Council. Considerable time was spent in order to address "key controversies affecting member states", such as "the attempts of Egypt and Saudi Arabia to subvert the pact organization." Joint political commitment for the early settlement of Palestine and Kashmir disputes were also emphasized.[92] Not unexpectedly, the first challenge for the sustainability of the Baghdad Pact came from Egypt. The Suez crisis appeared as a serious case testing the discourse of alliance.

3.3.1. After the Suez Crisis: Discursive Testing of the Alliance

Britain had been forced to leave from Egypt in 1954 without jeopardizing its access to the Suez Canal. In the following period, Nasser tilted towards the Soviet Union. On 26 July 1956, Nasser declared that he would nationalize the Suez Canal, to the detriment of British interests. This led to a serious crisis in the region. In collusion with Israel, Britain and France attacked Egypt on 29 October 1956. As a result of the domestic instability ensuing from the Suez crisis, King Faysal shut down the Iraqi Parliament and declared martial law on 1 November 1956.[93] To discuss the regional situation, members of the Baghdad Pact, except Britain, convened in Tehran on 5-8 November 1956. Iraq and Pakistan recommended that Britain should be exempted from the Pact. Together with Iran, Turkey took a moderate stance.[94]

After the Tehran meeting, a joint statement was issued, which condemned "Israeli aggression, called for immediate withdrawal of Israel[i] troops from Egypt and release of Egyptian prisoners taken by Israel, and requested the United Kingdom and France to stop hostilities, withdraw their forces from Egypt, and respect Egypt's sovereignty, integrity, and

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[92] "Baghdad Pact," *International Organization* 10, no.4 (1956): 647, 648.

[93] Erik J. Zürcher, *Turkey: A Modern History*, (NY: I.B. Tauris, 2005), 229-232. Bağcı, 79-84, 91.

[94] Sever, *Soğuk Savaş Kuşatmasında Türkiye,* 167, 168.

independence." Britain should not be invited to the Pact meetings until it completely withdrew from the Suez Canal. Despite the pull of the Baghdad Pact, Nuri Said could not withstand the push of domestic-regional Arabist opposition. On 9 November 1956, he declared that Iraq "would boycott any Baghdad Pact Council meetings attended by the United Kingdom." This development alone was sufficient to demonstrate the political fragility of Iraqi membership to the Pact. Baghdad's defection seemed to be an impending probability. Therefore, Menderes put personal effort in order to strengthen Nuri Said's domestic political standing and by extension save the Iraqi membership to the Pact.[95]

On 10 November 1956, Menderes informed the British Ambassador in Ankara that the Iraqi attitude would be temporary by its very nature. In order to enhance the Baghdad Pact, Turkey lowered its level of diplomatic representation in Israel to charge de affair.[96] Yet, Iraq was not satisfied with Turkey's diplomatic maneuvers. Soviet influence in Syria had been increasing. Especially Turkey and Iraq needed "a clear policy with respect to Syria." On 18-23 November 1956, Menderes was in Baghdad to conduct further discussions with his counterparts from Iraq, Iran and Pakistan. During these discussions, Iraqi leadership revealed that they had no desire "to lose the defense support provided by the pact." It was also acknowledged that Iraq "might reconsider its refusal to take part in future meetings of the Baghdad Pact at which the United Kingdom was represented if the United States would enter the pact." Members present in the Baghdad meetings agreed that US entry into the Pact would assure its efficiency. According to Nuri Said, the US accession to the pact would have a "calming and stabilizing effect." It "might even have the effect of bringing the Arab countries [Lebanon and Saudi Arabia] in." Two days later, on 29 November 1956, the US issued a public statement confirming its commitment "to the independence of members of the Baghdad Pact." In this view, any threat to the pact territories would be dealt "with the utmost gravity."[97]

In line with the UN decisions, Britain and France pulled out from the Canal Zone. To the dismay in Western capitals, Nasser's effort to nationalize the Suez Canal has intensified. On 7 December 1956, "Pakistan stated that there was no reason for exclusion of the United Kingdom from the next meeting of the Council of the Baghdad Pact." All members believed that the Suez crisis created a security gap in the region. On 24 December 1956, Nuri Said

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[95] "Baghdad Pact," *International Organization* 11, no.1 (1957): 186-188.

[96] Bağcı, 70-84. Fırat and Kürkçüoğlu, 627-629. Sever, 168-170.

[97] Sever, *Soğuk Savaş Kuşatmasında Türkiye,* 170-173. "Baghdad Pact," 186-188.

reiterated that the US should join the Pact. In response, President Dwight Eisenhower proposed a plan on 5 January 1957, which outlined the new US doctrine in the Middle East. By adopting the "Eisenhower Doctrine", the US pledged "military and economic aid where requested to prevent communist expansion in the Middle East." The US decision to join to the military committee of the Baghdad Pact did not come as a surprise on 22 March 1957. The pact members welcomed the US decision. Without being a formal member of the Pact, the US became a member of the Pact's three main—economic, military, counter-subversion—committees.[98] The deepening of US engagement with the Baghdad Pact was important for Turkey's continuous commitment to work with the pact members. This allegiance was not remitted by the unfolding of a crisis in Turkish-Syrian relations.

3.3.2. Working with the Pact Members and Unfolding of the Syrian Crisis

The annual meeting of the Pact was held in Karachi on 3-6 June 1957. Main focus of the US and UK were "the threat of international communism." On the other hand, "four Middle Eastern members had shown a tendency to regard the pact as their own property." Iraq and Pakistan were more concerned about the threats coming from other directions, i.e. Israel and India respectively. "[T]here had been considerable discussion on the question of subversion from sources other than communist." However, divergence of opinions among the Pact members did not plague the work of main committees. The Economic Committee drew up plans "for a network of highways, railroads and telecommunications," recommended intra-regional projects for promotion of trade and technical cooperation, and even envisaged "establishing a customs union, free trade area and common market in the Pact region…[J]oint development plans for the Tigris Euphrates basin" was taken into the agenda of the Economic Committee. While the US was expected to fund $12,570,000, the UK would likely to finance £2,000,000 in contribution for these projects. The US assistance was not confined to the economic field. The Military Committee reached agreement on measures required to improve defense potential in the Pact area, by setting up a "military planning structure," composed of joint military staff. In order not to invoke a Soviet intrusion into the region, it would be unwise to have "a fully fledged NATO-type command"

[98] "Baghdad Pact," *International Organization* 11, no.3 (1957): 546, 547. Sever, 176-180.

structure. In this regard, the Counter-Subversion Committee was instructed to eliminate subversive threats "inspired from outside."[99]

On 19 August 1957, Iraqi King and his heir to the throne were in Ankara. Main reason for their visit seemed as a concern about the latest developments in Syria. In addition to the signing of a Soviet-Syrian technical and economic cooperation agreement on 6 August 1957, rise of communist influence within the Syrian army had alarmed both Baghdad and Ankara. Weary about the likely consequences of Syrian rapprochement with the Soviets, Menderes government opted to urge the US for a joint military action. Even though the US government officials shared similar concerns, they were reluctant to intervene in Syria militarily. Despite reactions from the Soviet Union, Turkish military lined up along the Syrian border by late September 1957. Turkey's action spiraled into an international crisis, to be dealt within the UN framework. Why did the Menderes government deliberately escalate the crisis? Perhaps, they needed to divert attention from domestic economic and political problems, just before Turkey's general elections of 27 October 1957. Another reason might be to take the opportunity to get support from its allies—most prominently the US—by reminding Turkey's regional, geopolitical significance. Turkey's historical Russo-phobia and fear of a Soviet infiltration from the south, in other words a sense of communist siege, might also have played a considerable role in shaping Turkey's seemingly interventionist attitude towards Syria. During this crisis, which ensued almost a month, Iraq took a more sympathetic position towards Syria. Alliance with Turkey had little or no impact on the primary allegiance of Iraq, which remained as the Arab League. Hence Turkey had to think twice before bringing the Syrian crisis into the Baghdad Pact's agenda. Unlike the Suez crisis, the Pact did not convene in an emergency session, nor did it take a joint decision.[100]

Menderes chaired the annual meeting of the Council of the Baghdad Pact, which was held in Ankara, on 27-30 January 1958. Regional members were more worried about regional matters. As far as Turkey was concerned, Cyprus question put into the agenda, in addition to Kashmir and Palestine issues, which had been discussed in previous sessions. The Palestine question was viewed as "the principal cause of unrest in the Middle East." Besides, regional members—Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and Pakistan—"stressed the need for more economic aid to the pact area." In response, Dulles reiterated that the US had already provided $8 million for conducting surveys, designed to examine avenues for developing communication

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[99] "Baghdad Pact," 546, 547.

[100] Sever, 181-204. Bağcı, 90-93. Fırat and Kürkçüoğlu, 627-632. Eroğul, 175-185, 200-203.

and transportation among regional members. In addition, he pledged to make available $10 million "for the improvement of telephone links" and "a high-frequency radio network" between the capital cities of regional members. In the spring of 1958, Turkey-Iraq and Turkey-Iran road links would be built by $2 million US fund. For the same period, Turkey would receive $2,100,000 US aid in order "to begin work on a railroad line between Turkey and Iran." In terms of meeting their needs for "economic development," regional members were satisfied. The pact would also prove to be beneficial in fulfilling their demands for providing political-military security against "communist imperialism." Regarding political matters, subversion in the pact area has been an ever present danger. Hence there was a "need for constant exposure of communist subversive penetration disguised as friendly co-existence and help for under-developed countries…the international communist movement attempted to exploit nationalism," anti-colonialism, Arab-Israeli conflict, and economic weaknesses "through propaganda and communist-controlled and influenced organizations." For these reasons, pact members had to continue to safeguard themselves, by pursuing the program of defensive measures. Inauguration of permanent Combined Military Planning Organization in Baghdad and appointment of Lieutenant General Ekrem Akalin of the Turkish Army as director of the Combined Military Planning Staff were two significant developments, demonstrating Pact's composure in the military sphere.[101]

In the following months, regional developments unleashed a political-military picture, almost exactly alike to the one foreseen by the Baghdad Pact members. First and foremost, the United Arab Republic (UAR) was established between Egypt and Syria on 1 February 1958. For Menderes government, the UAR posed a communist ploy in the region. On the other side, when monarchies in Iraq and Jordan merged in a Hashemite union on 14 February 1958, Turkey gave its blessing only within five days. Later on, Turkey acted alongside the US and recognized the UAR on 11 March 1958.[102] As a result of these rapid regional developments, the discursive uncertainty in Ankara was heightened. International and regional wrangling of Menderes government could not preempt the unfolding of a revolution in Baghdad.

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[101] "Baghdad Pact," *International Organization* 12, no.2 (1958): 230-232.

[102] Sever, 205-217. Bağcı, 90-102. Fırat and Kürkçüoğlu, 632-635.

3.3.3. Iraqi Revolution and Unmaking of Cooperation

On 14 July 1958, when Iraqi delegation was expected to attend the Baghdad Pact meeting in Istanbul, Free Officers led by Brigadier General Abd al-Karim Qasim and Colonel Abd al-Salam Arif abolished the Hashemite monarchy in Baghdad. The pro-Western Nuri Said government was overthrown by the coup. According to the Baghdad Pact members, the military takeover was backed by communists and Nasserites. Given Nasser's attempts towards garnering support for the involvement of Iraqi Kurds within the anti-Hashemite opposition and the domination of Kurds over the Iraqi Communist Party (ICP)—by far the strongest political faction in the country—revitalized Turkey's (and Iran's) fears about UAR's regional ambitions, which might even go far as to incite Kurdish separatism inside Iraq.[103]

In this period, Qasim government had ceased to attend the Baghdad Pact meetings. On the other hand, Turkish government attended the Pact meetings and condemned the murders committed by the new Iraqi regime. In addition, Ankara urged Washington to intervene against the fait accompli in Iraq. The Menderes government was ready for a unilateral intervention and even asked for the US air cover. Main opposition led by the CHP leader İnönü, was against any kind of intervention, be it unilateral or multi-lateral. On 15-17 July 1958, the US and British forces intervened in Lebanon and Jordan. The CHP opposition highly criticized the use of İncirlik (Adana) Air Base[104] by the US forces acting outside the NATO provisions. By helping the allies in Lebanon and Jordan, Menderes government might have hoped to receive some sort of support for its military action against the Qasim regime. Nonetheless, the US had no desire to further provoke the communists in Iraq. Thus it took a softer stance towards the new Iraqi government. Turkey, on the other hand, was worried about losing the single Arab member of the Baghdad Pact and giving a free hand to Kurdish separatism in the region.[105]

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[103] Rubin, 355-360. Sever, 205-217. Bağcı, 90-102. Fırat and Kürkçüoğlu, 632-635.

[104] After Turkey became NATO member, the Turkish Air Force (TAF) needed American assistance to ensure its facilities met NATO standards. The Turkish General Staff (TGS) and the United States Air Force (USAF) signed an agreement on 6 December 1954 for joint use of the base installed in İncirlik between 1951 and 1954. Adana Air Base (AB) was officially inaugurated on 21 February 1955. Adana AB was renamed as Incirlik AB on 28 February 1958. "Incirlik Air Base," <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/facility/incirlik-history.htm> 6 August 2011.

[105] Sever, 205-217. Bağcı, 90-102. Fırat and Kürkçüoğlu, 632-635. Rubin, 358, 359.

After the London meeting of the Baghdad Pact on 28 July 1958, the US promised to increase military assistance to three regional members, in order "to further strengthen their united defense posture."[106] Given its economic and military dependency to the US, Turkey could not act unilaterally and was forced to recognize the new Iraqi regime on 31 July 1958.[107] Moreover, Turkish government's "pro-Hashemite stance and its desire to intervene in Iraq" did nurture domestic political opposition. In a press conference on 2 August 1958, CHP leader İnönü argued that "an adventurous foreign policy creates all sorts of dangers for the country…There is neither a need nor a justification for insinuating ourselves so eagerly as a third element in the grand strategic conflicts of the Middle East."[108] According to Minister of Foreign Affairs Fatin Rüştü Zorlu, the DP government took calculated risks and "İnönü has always misjudged in making such calculations".[109] Earlier, the DP government was also denounced by Bülent Ecevit—İnönü's young protégé—who also recommended reconciliation with Nasser instead of choosing Qasim's side.[110] The Turkish government was "confronted with the prospect of total collapse of their bid for regional influence". Regardless of Washington's discontent, Ankara began to tilt towards Qasim in order to counter-balance pro-Nasser (Pan-Arabist) forces in Iraq.[111]

In fact, Qasim seemed "to have shared the fears of the Iranian and Turkish governments, but in reverse order." For Qasim, Kurds' backing of his domestic Pan-Arabist rivals, led by "Nasser's local proxy" Arif, was more dangerous. In November 1958, Qasim "publicly enjoined against 'imperialists' who had allegedly distributed maps of an independent Kurdistan and money to some Iraqi Kurds." While eliminating Arif's influence among the Kurds, Qasim offered amnesty to Mulla Mustafa Barzani, "a Kurdish chieftain and an opponent of the monarchy" who had been exiled in the Soviet Union for more than

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[106] "Baghdad Pact," *International Organization* 12, no.4 (1958): 548-549.

[107] Sever, 217.

[108] Malik Mufti, *Daring and Caution in Turkish Strategic Culture: Republic at Sea*, (NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 34. Mufti quotes from Şevket Süreyya Aydemir, *İkinci Adam (İsmet İnönü): 1950-1964*, (İstanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 1968), 340, 341.

[109] Ibid, 34. Mufti quotes from *Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Tutanak Dergisi* 1, no. 87 (21 August 1958): 843-857.

[110] Ibid, 184. Mufti cites Bülent Ecevit, "İflas Eden Politika," *Ulus*, 16 July 1958.

[111] Ibid., 33-35.

ten years.[112] The return of Mulla Mustafa Barzani to northern Iraq was perceived as a rise of Kurdist danger, especially in the CHP circles.[113] Qasim "did his best to transform Barzani and his confidantes into state functionaries" upon their return to Iraq between October 1958 and April 1959.[114]

In their Karachi meeting on 26-28 January 1959, the Baghdad Pact members "reaffirmed the value of the pact for defensive military cooperation as well as economic and technical cooperation in raising living standards." Under Article 1 of the Baghdad Pact, bilateral defense agreements between the United States and Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan were signed in Ankara on 5 March 1959.[115] At that time, Iraq was embattled by domestic strife between pro-regime forces—mainly the ICP, the United Kurdish Democratic Party (UKDP), and the Barzanis—and Pan-Arabist opposition. In terms of domestic politics, Qasim was wedged between Scylla and Charybdis. Under these circumstances, Iraq's membership to the Baghdad Pact was terminated on 24 March 1959. Fearing from his Nasserist/Pan-Arabist rivals, Qasim turned a blind eye on deepening of cooperation between the communists and Kurdish tribes, especially in Kirkuk. "The city was sharply divided between a largely middle class, socially conservative Turkmen population, and a largely working-class Kurdish population, many of whom sympathized with the ICP." On 14 July 1959, the first anniversary of the revolution, Kirkuk erupted into ethnic violence. Twenty eight key Turkmen figures were killed, presumably by armed Kurdish groups i.e. the ICP-UKDP militants and/or pro-Barzani tribal militia.[116]

This time, Menderes government responded in a diplomatic and relatively cautious manner. Turkey's Ambassador in Baghdad, Fuat Bayramoğlu, came to Ankara to inform the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Fatin Rüştü Zorlu. Upon his return to Baghdad, Bayramoğlu presented Menderes government's message to Qasim. As a result, Qasim "blamed the ICP, ordered the arrests of hundreds of party members, and sharply curtailed the activities of its

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[112] Rubin, 358-360, 364.

[113] Mustafa Akyol, *Kürt Sorununu Yeniden Düşünmek: Yanlış Giden Neydi? Bundan Sonra Nereye?*, 5th ed. (İstanbul: Doğan Kitap, 2007), 144. Akyol refers to Avni Doğan, "Tehlike Çanı," *Vatan*, 19-23 November 1958.

[114] Rubin, 357, 360.

[115] "Baghdad Pact," *International Organization* 13, no.2 (1959): 333.

[116] Mahir Nakip, "Irak Türkleri ve Türk Siyasal Partileri: 1923-2000," in *Uluslararası İlişkiler ve Türk Siyasal Partileri*, eds. Nejat Doğan and Mahir Nakip (Ankara: Seçkin Yayıncılık, 2006), 155-159. Şimşir, *Türk-Irak İlişkilerinde Türkmenler*, 130-135. Rubin, 365.

affiliate groups." Fearing from a reprisal, Barzani paid homage to Qasim and abandoned "the image of a pro-Soviet freedom fighter for that of a Kurdish agha." Qasim was also suspicious about the UKDP's role in stirring unrest in the north. He objected to both UKDP's allegiance to "Marxist-Leninist doctrine and its aspiration to Kurdish autonomy." Until the end of his reign in power, Qasim has had hard time in reconciling with the political aims of (U)-KDP and the Barzanis.[117]

Almost in concert with the emergent movement of Iraqi Kurds between 1958 and 1959, Kurdish Diaspora groups held three congressional meetings in London, Munich and Vienna. In this period, Turkey's Kurds had not stayed aloof to the developments in both Iraq and Europe. They secretly established the left-leaning/Marxist "Kurdish Independence Party (KIP)". Diverging from the Kurdish mainstream politics, which had been plagued by clientelism and nepotism of aghas and sheikhs, KIP attempted to cultivate ethno-national consciousness, an anti-feudal and autonomous political order in Eastern Turkey. Most of the KIP founders were arrested on 17 December 1959. Primary accusation was Kurdism, designed to divvy up Turkey. Allegedly, KIP was receiving foreign assistance and having contacts with the Kurdish organizations in Iraq.[118]

At least temporally, Menderes government's crackdown on the leftist Kurds had coincided with the transfer of the Baghdad Pact headquarters to Ankara. The name of the Pact was changed and became Central Treaty Organization (CENTO). The first CENTO meeting was held in Washington, D.C., on 7-9 October 1959. In a joint statement, CENTO members gratified "the determination of the United States to assist the signatory nations to maintain their security and independence, while simultaneously contributing to the enhancement of their economic potential." [119]

As the Pact was transformed into the CENTO, long-term implications of cooperation with Baghdad became more apparent for Ankara. First and foremost, dyadic status quo was challenged irrevocably. Under the impact of fierce political struggle among communist and nationalist fractions, Baghdad was driven towards an unending turmoil. At this point, it should be remembered that the Turkish government could barely overcome dyadic and regional audience costs associated with the bargaining process. As the sides moved to the

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[117] Rubin, 365, 377. Şimşir, 132-135.

[118] Bilâl N. Şimşir, *Kürtçülük II: 1924-1999*, (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 2009), 514-518.

[119] "Baghdad Pact," 333. "Central Treaty Organization," *International Organization* 14, no.1 (1960): 216, 217.

enforcement phase, dyadic/regional veto players displayed their resilience. In this regard, Turkey's Baghdad Pact discourse did not help to create a more cooperative environment. Quite the contrary, it brought unintended political consequences for the long-term relations between Ankara and Baghdad.

3.4. Conclusion: Episodic Findings

The third chapter provided an episodic account of Turkey's Iraq policy discourse, as Ankara straddled between remaking and unmaking of a new pact with Baghdad. Its findings are both theoretically and empirically significant. First and foremost, Turkey's Iraq policy discourse was embedded in the pre-event context within which the Baghdad Pact emerged. What was the main contextual reason that pushed Turkey towards signing a defense cooperation agreement with Iraq? Primarily, it was the bipolar global context. Like its Western allies (the UK and the US), Turkey had (real or imagined) fears about Soviet revisionism in the region. Hence its Iraq policy discourse was rationalized around the global balance of power and/or threat. Since the global power struggle between the US and the USSR loomed large over the horizon of Middle East, Turkey presumed that it had no choice other than taking a pro-Western position. Based on this presumption, Ankara assumed an anti-communist discourse. Could there be any other way around? That is to say, might it be contextually possible for Turkey to take a non-Aligned/non-Western position and appeal towards more neutral discourse. Indeed, this counter-factual statement gives important hints about context-dependent nature of Turkey's political narratives on the making of Baghdad Pact.

Discursive evidence suggests that Turkey's membership to NATO was somehow conditioned by its future commitment to the Middle Eastern defense. Britain's declining regional influence and especially its precarious position in Iraq and Egypt (Suez), had forced Turkey to act in a collective manner. As an ally, Turkey helped Britain to secure its military access to Iraq, especially the air bases. Baghdad Pact provided an institutional setting for continued British military presence in Iraq. Had Ankara not provided this assistance, London might not recover from the strain posed by strongly anti-British opposition in Baghdad. Service to the British aims could be a deliberate act on the part of Turkey's government. One can presume that benefits and costs of this action were calculated rationally. Preservation of regional status quo would be the most likely benefit. Additionally, Britain's side payments in

cash or credit form might alleviate some immediate problems in the Turkish economy.

Even though it had been envisaged by the "Treaty of Mutual Cooperation," Turkey did not urge Iraq to sign protocols that would delineate the details of defensive alliance. In terms of defense capabilities, Turkey had much to lose by allying with Iraq. Just in case of a war, Iraq would seek Turkey's assistance. In addition to a risk of war, Turkey was aware of the regional costs. Especially the MEDO experience had confirmed that any attempt to build a regional security-defense institution was doomed to fail due the Arab-Israeli conflict and inter/intra-Arab rivalry. Despite its geographical proximity to the USSR, Iraq's immediate concern reflected regional and/or internal threat conceptions. In the Arab setting of Cold War, Israel was portrayed as the major enemy. Domestic opposition to the regime was another salient threat for Hashemite monarchy. In parallel to containment of internal risks, the Iraqi regime had to balance Egyptian revisionism.

In the last, perhaps the most decisive, round of this iterated balancing game; Turkey opted to support Iraq. That is to say, Turkey allied with Iraq in order to balance Egypt and by extension to perpetuate the regional status quo. It might also seem as if Turkey took the lead in the formation of the Baghdad Pact, merely for regional influence. Had this been the case, Turkey would appeal to host the Pact's headquarters in Ankara. Instead, Turkey extended the benefit, or perhaps the burden, over to Iraq. Were there any domestic costs for the Government of Turkey? In fact, there was not any significant opposition. Given the lack of any domestic veto player, Turkey's external balancing discourse seemed reasonable. What was missing in this discourse was a better grasp of domestic balancing rationale permeating the Arab politics. Understanding of the pervasive nature of Arab nationalism in the Middle East could help Turkey to articulate a more coherent foreign policy discourse on Iraq.

As a matter of fact, the framing of "Treaty of Mutual Cooperation" as a "defensive alliance" by Menderes gave a significant cue about Turkey's power/threat based orientation. Quite paradoxically, however, Turkey's Iraq policy rationale reflected a fierce discursive struggle for the regional meaning of communist threat. Bluntly put, communism was what Turkey has made of it. Pro-governmental narratives were deployed to win the ideational battle for telling the true story of communism. The tale of communism wagged Ankara towards Baghdad in a hasty manner.

At the regional level, Turkey's foreign policy discourse has largely been predisposed by its anti-communist rhetoric. Conceptualization of and approach to the communist threat has shaped the rhetoric of cooperation in Turkey's Iraq policy. On the other hand, Ankara's fear from Moscow did not resonate well with the Arab's threat perceptions about Israel. Moreover, Nasser's anti-Western rhetoric swayed the Arab public opinion. Apparently,

Nasser and Salem were contending for Egyptian leadership in the region. Menderes and Nuri Said were among the few of their main rivals. Nasser has garnered political support from both nationalist Arabs and communist Kurds in Iraq. Under the influence of Nasserites, the Hashemite monarchy could not afford to openly support pro-Western policies. It was crystal clear that Baghdad Pact might unleash dire consequences for the survival of incumbent Iraqi regime. By taking those risks, Turkey seemed to be hastily taking Iraq from the Arab League. In fact, Ankara has misread, or could not read at all, the ideational strength of anti-colonialism in its very neighborhood and sociopolitical appeal of Arab nationalism and Kurdish communism in Iraq. Perhaps, Menderes government turned a blind eye to the identity issues in the region, hoping to satisfy material interests in the form US financial aid.

By portraying the US and the UK as friends of regional status quo, DP government gave the impression that it has been a tool for Western imperialism. Even though there were alternative policy options, Turkey was not in a position to grasp them. In post-Baghdad Pact period, contextual reasons were also shaped by pro-governmental discourse of cooperation. Turkey's Government could not figure out dyadic conditions of possibility for a revolution in Iraq. Only after the event, the delicate implications of a regime change in Iraq were realized by Ankara. As a result, Menderes turned wary about the Iraqi defection from the Baghdad Pact.

In hindsight, it could be assumed that Menderes could take less ideological, more substantive position in devising the cooperation discourse with Baghdad. Ideological rhetoric impeded Turkey from taking a better discursive position in the region. Construction of a more combined rhetorical model would better fit Turkey's long-term goals of cooperation with the region. Had the Turkish government pursued substantially coherent discursive strategy, Turkey would have created better conditions to safeguard the enforcement phase of Baghdad Pact and perhaps prevented Iraqi defection.

Rather than pushing itself too far towards the anti-communist rhetoric, Ankara could work harder to convince Baghdad for the building of Iraq-Turkey pipeline. This would be a better move than just requesting oil royalty debt payments from the Iraqi side. Construction of the proposed oil pipeline from Mosul to İskenderun would definitely strengthen material basis of bilateral cooperation between Turkey and Iraq.

Besides, the defense pact would be much more enhanced if Turkish government devised complementary cultural policies towards the Iraqi society. Turkey's Iraq policy discourse did not conceive building of communal cooperation among Arabs, Kurds and Turkmen. Instead, Iraq was framed as an "all Arab" state. Neither Turkmen nor Kurds were taken as constituents of Iraq. That is to say, the dyadic context remained as a discursive space of silence or a point of closure. It was for sure that Turkey's support to Iraqi Turkmen

community would immediately imply policy of irredentism. Ankara might face with Arab reactions in the short term. In the long term, however, Turkmen, just like the Kurds, would be a key communal actor and a significant player within the Iraqi body politic.

In the Baghdad Pact episode, Turkey's discourse of cooperation with Iraq was less founded on social solidarity frames, like shared neighborhood and common cultural heritage, but it was more based on inter-subjectively constituted Western perceptions about the communist threat and regional status quo. These perceptions feed into Turkey's discursive presuppositions. Paradoxically, Turkey's rhetoric of cooperation did pave the way for Soviet infiltration into the Middle East. As a result Turkey's bilateral relations with Iraq had to be developed under less cooperative conditions. In the following period, formulating and executing a more cooperative policy towards Baghdad would be much more difficult for Ankara.

CHAPTER

4. FROM COOPERATION TO NON-COOPERATION: DISCURSIVE AND CONTEXTUAL COSTS OF THE GULF WAR

The fourth chapter tackles the puzzling case manifesting both cooperative and non-cooperative aspects of Turkey's Iraq policy discourse. Episodic account of the Gulf War will be provided in three sections. Pre-event analysis (episodic beginning) lays out the historical and contextual background post-Baghdad Pact period, with a specific notice on the regionalization of Kurdish question for Ankara, due to the eight-year war between Iraq and Iran in the 1980's. After the formation episode, epitomized by the Sheikh Said rebellion of 1925 and the trilateral border treaty of 1926, pre-Gulf War phase was the second period within which the Kurdish problem turned into both an internal and a foreign policy issue for Turkey. By extension, Kurdish issue was constituted by dual (security-identity) reasoning.

During the Gulf War, Ankara's rhetorical ambivalence was deepened. The second section (episodic middle) traces pro-government narratives published in daily *Sabah* between the expiration of UN deadline for Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait on 15 January 1991 and the Iraqi acceptance of UN conditions on 27 February 1991. Wartime frames became influential in constituting discursive rationales for non-cooperation with Baghdad. These reasons shaped the post-event context as well. Post-Gulf War context and non-cooperation discourse created serious political, military and economic ramifications for Turkey's relations with Iraq. Consequently, Ankara resumed diplomatic relations with Baghdad in February 1993. This event constituted the end of non-cooperation discourse and Gulf War episode.

4.1. Pre-Event Analysis: Historical Background and Discursive Context

In order to rightly assess Turkey's modes of reasoning during the course of the Gulf War, first and foremost, one needs to chart out the seemingly distant historical developments

that had shaped key parameters of the Turkish-Iraqi relations in the post-Baghdad Pact era. Secondly, perhaps more importantly, the significance of discursive context for the analysis of pre-Gulf War period should be delineated.

4.1.1. Bilateral Context after the Baghdad Pact: Kurdish Problem, Oil and Water

In the post-Baghdad Pact period, Kurdish question endured, and perhaps revived, to condition Turkey's relations with Iraq. This was mainly due to the recurrent Kurdish uprisings in northern Iraq between 1960 and 1970. By the mid-1960's "two thirds of the Iraqi army was committed to…solve the Kurdish problem"[1] in northern Iraq. On 29 June 1966, a compromise was reached between Mulla Mustafa Barzani—the leader of Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iraq (IKDP)—and the central government in Baghdad. "The June Declaration" recognized some rights for the Kurds in Iraq.[2] It "allowed for a decentralized administration…not autonomy…but permitted the use of the Kurdish language."[3] The skirmish ensued since the agreement had not entered into force.

To some extent, especially due to the Iranian interference, Turkey was concerned about regional repercussions of the Kurdish revolt in Iraq. In addition, the demonstration effect might unleash serious domestic ramifications, as long as the conflict in northern Iraq had the potential to spill over to the Turkish side of the border. Some underground Kurdish groups had already formed the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Turkey (TKDP) in 1965. By the late 1960's, semi-secret, outlawed or disbanded Marxist groups, like the Revolutionary

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[1]   M. E. Yapp, *The Near East Since the First World War: A History to 1995*, 2nd ed., (NY: Longman, 1996), 246.

[2]   Marion Farouk-Sluglett and Peter Sluglett, *Iraq Since 1958: From Revolution to Dictatorship*, 2nd ed., (NY: I.B.Tauris, 2001), 104, 130-132, 142-144.

[3]   Yapp, 246, 247.

Eastern Cultural Hearths (DDKO), aspired to lead Kurdish movements in Turkey. Hence Ankara had good reason to remain cautious about the situation in northern Iraq.[4]

Regarding the political aspirations of Iraqi Kurds, another deal was struck by "the Manifesto of 11 March 1970." This time "Kurdish autonomy was conceded, the Kurdish language was to become an official language with Arabic and there was to be a Kurdish vice-president."[5] March Manifesto was quite alarming for Ankara. "From July onwards, the Turkish government stepped up its vigilance in the eastern provinces. In April 1971 the Turkish government announced that a Kurdish independence movement in Turkey, set up and supplied by Barzani, had been uncovered."[6] The bond between TKDP and IKDP was beyond nomenclatural association.[7]

The details regarding the implementation of the Manifesto would be worked out over a four year period. In the beginning, "everything seemed to be proceeding" perfectly. Kurdish national rights for autonomy were included in "the new (provisional) Iraqi constitution of July 1970." In mid-November 1971, the Ba'thists announced "the National Action Charter", which "reiterated the main points of the March Manifesto on Kurdish autonomy." Nonetheless, "the [Iraqi] regime was essentially buying time and not seriously concerned to implement Kurdish autonomy." The friendship agreement with the Soviets in 1972 bode well into the hands of Ba'thists. Under these circumstances, Barzani had made little progress during the four year negotiations, which he "finally abandoned in the spring of 1974." By the end of March 1974, the Iraqi Kurds—with the backing of Iran and the US—returned to the infighting against the Ba'th regime. "The open warfare" took almost one year. Iraqi Vice-President Saddam Hussein and Iranian Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi terminated hostilities by signing the Algiers Agreement on 6 March 1975. The deal in

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[4] Melek Fırat, Atay Akdevelioğlu and Ömer Kürkçüoğlu, "Orta Doğu'yla İlişkiler, 1960-1980," in *Türk Dış Politikası: Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar* (*Cilt II: 1980-2001*), ed. Baskın Oran, 10th ed., (İstanbul: İletişim, 2008), 785-791, 801-802. Aliza Marcus, *Blood and Belief: The PKK and the Kurdish Fight for Independence*, (NY: New York University Press, 2007), 20, 21.

[5] Yapp, 247. See also Sluglett and Sluglett, 104, 130-132, 142-144.

[6] Ali-Fuat Borovalı, "Kurdish Insurgencies, the Gulf War, and Turkey's Changing Role," *Conflict Quarterly* (Fall 1987): 34.

[7] Marcus, 20.

Algiers sent a devastating blow to the Barzani forces. "Within forty-eight hours of the signature of the Agreement,…the Kurdish resistance collapsed."[8]

For obvious reasons, Turkey welcomed the Algiers Agreement. Easing of the tension in northern Iraq could help Turkey improve its bilateral relations with Iraq. In this regard, the opening of Kirkuk-Yumurtalık oil pipeline on 3 January 1977 was a significant step. The oil pipeline not only did facilitate the increase in bilateral trade transactions but also it paved the way for long-term Turkish-Iraqi economic interaction. However, materialization of interdependence between Turkey and Iraq turned out to be an uneasy process. On 20 November 1977, Iraq stopped the oil flow through the pipeline, due to Turkey's building of Karakaya Dam in the Tigris Euphrates basin. From that time on, oil and water constituted two important material reasons of both cooperation and non-cooperation discourses in Turkey-Iraq relations.[9]

By the end of November 1978, Turkey's Kurdish question entered into a new phase. PKK (Kurdistan Workers' Party) was established by Abdullah Öcalan and his inner circle during the clandestine meeting in the village of Fis in the Lice township of Diyarbakır.[10] From the outset, PKK adopted a Marxist, Kurdish nationalist program. Its goal was foundation of an independent Kurdistan through armed struggle. Given the precarious position of Kurds in Iraq, Iran and Syria, the Turkish state perceived Kurdish separatism as "a mortal threat" to its security.[11] That is to say, the activities of PKK might lead to consequences that would in turn weaken Turkey's position in both domestic and foreign policy fronts.

In June 1979, "PKK leaders left Turkey for the Syrian-controlled Bekaa Valley." By moving into a safe haven on the eve of the military coup of 12 September 1980, Öcalan not only did escape from the martial law conditions inside Turkey, but also sought to garner

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[8] Sluglett and Sluglett, 104, 130-132, 142-144, 158-160, 164-170.

[9] Ramazan Gözen, *İmparatorluktan Küresel Aktörlüğe Türkiye'nin Dış Politikası*, (Ankara: Palme Yayıncılık, 2009), 214-219, 226, 227. Melek Fırat and Ömer Kürkçüoğlu, "Orta Doğu'yla İlişkiler, 1960-1980," 795. Melek Fırat and Ömer Kürkçüoğlu, "Orta Doğu'yla İlişkiler, 1980-1990," in *Türk Dış Politikası (Cilt II)*, 142.

[10] Michael M. Gunter, "The Kurdish Insurgency in Turkey," *Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies* 13, no. 4, (Summer 1990): 61. Marcus, 46.

[11] Michael M. Gunter, "The Kurdish Problem in Turkey," *Middle East Journal* 42, no. 3, (Summer 1988): 403, 404. See also Fikret Bilâ, *Komutanlar Cephesi*, (İstanbul: Detay Yayıncılık, 2007), 200-204. See also Fikret Bilâ, "Emekli Org. Aytaç Yalman Paşa Anlatıyor: PKK Sorunu Sosyal Aşamada Çözülmeliydi," <http://www.milliyet.com.tr/2007/11/03/yazar/bila.html.> 31 December 2008.

external support for military build-up.[12] "[T]he violence that PKK engendered soon provoked a widespread Turkish military crackdown. By 1981, more than 2000 alleged PKK members were in prison, while 447 were put on mass trial and accused of forming 'armed gangs' to 'annex' southeastern Turkey."[13] According to Turkey's President General Kenan Evren, "the Kurdish problem" was stemming "from foreign incitement." He was basically referring to the Soviet and Syrian support for the PKK.[14] At this point in time, PKK had also begun to cooperate with the Iraqi-Kurdish opposition groups, like Celal Talabani's Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) stationed in Syria. To counter Syria's rapprochement with the PKK and the PUK, Ankara enhanced its cooperation with Baghdad by the beginning of 1980's.[15] Rapidly shifting local alignments were intensified by the onset of a war between Iraq and Iran. This war unleashed regionalization of the Kurdish question.

4.1.2. The Iran-Iraq War: Regionalization of the Kurdish Question

The Iran-Iraq war, which commenced on 22 September 1980, entered into a new stage in July 1982. "The war in the north had become a war of proxies…Once again, a balance of power game was being played with the Kurds as both pawns and manipulators."[16] The Iranian offensive into northern Iraq, with Masoud Barzani's forces "spearheading the drive," threatened the security of Kirkuk-Yumurtalık pipeline. In the same period, Syria (and Iran) facilitated transfer and basing of PKK militants into areas of northern Iraq under the control of IKDP. After two years into the Iran-Iraq war, "active neutrality" was no longer a

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[12] Nur Bilge Criss, "The Nature of PKK Terrorism in Turkey," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 18, (1995): 19. Gunter, "The Kurdish Insurgency in Turkey," 62, 63. Ümit Özdağ, *Türk Ordusunun PKK Operasyonları*, 2nd ed., (Ankara: Pegasus Yayınları, 2007), 37. Fikret Bilâ, *Satranç Tahtasındaki Yeni Hamleler: Hangi PKK?*, (Ankara: Ümit Yayıncılık, 2004), 28.

[13] Marvine Howe, "Turkey Opens Campaign Against Kurdish Rebels," *New York Times*, April 1, p. A9; and Metin Münir, "447 Turkish Kurds Are Put on Trial for Separatist Violence," *Washington Post*, April 14, 1981, p. A14; cited in Gunter, "The Kurdish Problem in Turkey," 395. See also Gunter, "The Kurdish Insurgency in Turkey," 63.

[14] "General Evren on Important Problems," *Outlook* (İstanbul), Oct. 21, 1985, pp. 4-5; cited in Gunter, "The Kurdish Problem in Turkey,"400, 401.

[15] Fırat and Kürkçüoğlu, "Orta Doğu'yla İlişkiler, 1980-1990," 130-132.

[16] Borovalı, 36, 37.

reasonable policy option for Turkish decision-makers. Faced with the risk of destabilization spilling over to southern Turkey from northern Iraq, Ankara enhanced security cooperation with Baghdad by signing two bilateral agreements between February 1983 and October 1984. With these agreements, Turkey and Iraq mutually consented to conduct premeditated "hot pursuit" operations within 5 kilometers (approximately 3 miles) depth of each side's territory.[17] Hot pursuit agreement epitomized that the Turkish-Iraqi security cooperation moved to a further stage than treaties of 1926 and 1946.

In those days, "Turkish intelligence sources had identified a force of some 12,000" PKK militants "in an area stretching approximately 70 kilometers along Turkish-Iraqi frontier." These militants "were able to conduct frequent raids from their Iraqi sanctuary into Turkey's southeastern region, especially Hakkari Province." On 10 May 1983, "PKK militants ambushed a Turkish army unit" in Uludere-Hakkari. In reaction, Turkish army—with the limited support of the Iraqi forces—launched a cross-border strike on 26 May1983. Turkey's, apparently first, military strike "failed to end" PKK's terrorist activities in the region. Quite the contrary, it created controversial results, like pushing Barzani towards cooperation with Öcalan. By signing a protocol called "the Principles of Solidarity," IKDP and PKK cemented an "alliance" as of July 1983.[18]

After February 1984, most of the PKK militants began to gather in northern Iraq. From then on, they infiltrated into Turkey. By June 1984, Öcalan gave orders for the planning of grand and sensational armed attacks against the Turkish troops in Eruh/Şemdinli-Hakkari and Çatak-Van. These attacks were deliberately designed for the dissemination of PKK's organizational targets, i.e. "moving from the stage of armed propaganda to the guerilla phase."[19] On 15 August 1984, PKK's raid targeted military posts in Eruh/Şemdinli-Hakkari. Turkey's counter-strike, referred as "Operation Sun," came in.

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[17] Süha Bölükbaşı, "Ankara, Damascus, Baghdad, and the Regionalization of Turkey's Secessionism," *Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies* 14, no. 4 (Summer 1991): 23-26. Gunter, "The Kurdish Insurgency in Turkey," 65, 66. Ümit Özdağ, *Türkiye Kuzey Irak ve PKK: Bir Gayri Nizami Savaşın Anatomisi*, (Ankara: ASAM Yayınları, 1999), 34-37. Özdağ, *Türk Ordusunun PKK Operasyonları*, 43-47. Fırat and Kürkçüoğlu, "Orta Doğu'yla İlişkiler, 1980-1990," 133, 134.

[18] Fırat and Kürkçüoğlu, "Orta Doğu'yla İlişkiler, 1980-1990," 133. See also Gunter, "The Kurdish Insurgency in Turkey," 65; and Gunter, "The Kurdish Problem in Turkey," 396.

[19] Nihat Ali Özcan, *PKK (Kürdistan İşçi Partisi): Tarihi, İdeolojisi ve Yöntemi*, (Ankara: ASAM Yayınları, 1999), 94-97.

"Nothing conclusive, however, was accomplished."[20] In the later period, Turkish army conducted various cross-border operations into northern Iraq, most prominently in August 1986 and March 1987, the latter coincided with Iranian offensive "aimed at bolstering the Iraqi Kurds". "Hence Turkey's action was interpreted as one of siding with Iraq." In the meantime, Ankara warned "Tehran that the Kirkuk-Yumurtalik pipeline was of vital importance and that Iran should refrain from disrupting the oil flow." Prime Minister Turgut Özal indicated that Turkey "could adopt a more active policy if it looked as if its security was at all threatened." But he was against Turkish interference into the war. For him, "this is because we are well aware of the situation in Iraq, our close friend and neighbor, and because we view our relations with a long-term perspective…" Arguably, it was this viewpoint that had driven Özal to visit Baghdad in April 1988 and shook hands with Saddam Hussein.[21]

Even though Turkey did not directly intervene into the war, its cross-border operations proved to be costly, especially for the IKDP. Thus Barzani decided to break off ties with the PKK and Iran. Consequently, Öcalan turned to cooperate with Talabani's PUK. "Protocol of Understanding" between PKK and PUK was signed on 1 May 1988. Talabani's visit to Washington, D.C. on 9 June 1988, added more insult to the injury in Ankara.[22] Internationalization of the Kurdish question and "the renewal of Kurdish insurgency in southeastern Turkey" were two "most detrimental by-product[s] of the Iran-Iraq war."[23]

During the second half of the Iran-Iraq war, Turkey almost periodically conducted hot pursuit operations against PKK militants located in northern Iraq. Due to the eight year long war with Iran, the Iraqi economy became much more dependent on Turkey. In this regard, the capacity of Kirkuk-Yumurtalık pipeline was boosted from "800,000 barrels per day (b/d)…to one million b/d by the end of 1984, then by the construction of a second line, opened in 1987 with a capacity of 500,000 b/d…Iraq also exported considerable volumes of

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[20] Gunter, "The Kurdish Insurgency in Turkey," 67. See also Fırat and Kürçüoğlu, "Orta Doğu'yla İlişkiler, 1980-1990," 134-136.

[21] Bölükbaşı, 29, 30, 32.

[22] Fırat and Kürçüoğlu, "Orta Doğu'yla İlişkiler, 1980-1990," 134-136. Gunter, "The Kurdish Insurgency in Turkey," 73, 79. Bölükbaşı, 31, 32.

[23] Henri J. Barkey, "The Silent Victor: Turkey's Role in the Iran-Iraq War," in *The Iran Iraq War: Strategic and Political Implications*, ed. Efraim Karsh (London: Macmillan, 1989), 141; cited in Evren Altınkaş, "The Iran-Iraq War and its Effects on Turkey," *Uluslararası Hukuk ve Politika* 1, no. 4, (2005): 137-144.

oil via Turkey by tanker truck." In exchange, Turkey's commodity exports to Iraq increased enormously. During the war, Iraq became Turkey's largest trading partner in the Muslim world, albeit with some caveats. These extraordinary economic interactions were only made possible by Turkish financial credit, which amounted to some $2 billion by the end of war. Debt rescheduling negotiations turned out to be tough for the Iraqi side. As a result, Baghdad became uneasy about over-reliance on Ankara and "wished to reassert its independence." By the end of Iran-Iraq war, political relations between Ankara and Baghdad began to cool off. Even the common political-military interest towards elimination of Kurdish threat was "not sufficient to guarantee good relations or policy harmonization." Hence security cooperation between Ankara and Baghdad began to unravel.[24]

During the Iran-Iraq war, Turkey's approach to the domestic Kurdish question was security oriented. The 1982 constitution prohibited the use of Kurdish language. The constitutional ban was "reinforced in 1983 by law 2932."[25] In mid-1987, this political ban still had a discursive logic in governmental narratives. One of Özal's top advisers, Adnan Kahveci, stated that "if the founders of the [Turkish] Republic had decided that each ethnic group could have its own language, (of which most of them are only dialects) Turkey would today be like Lebanon."[26] This confirmed that the government of Turkey was not yet willing, perhaps able, to grant even cultural recognition for the Kurdish language. But, the public debate in the Turkish press indicated that the governmental discourse may not stay aloof to the Kurdish question for a long time.[27]

Secondly, perhaps more importantly, the Turkish government established the "village guards" in 1985. Primarily composed of loyal Kurdish tribesmen, these local paramilitary forces were supposed to counter the PKK militants in rural areas. On top of the security measures in the south-east was the introduction of "regional governorship" for extraordinary

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[24] Philip Robins, *Turkey and the Middle East*, (NY: Council on Foreign Relations Press for the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1991), 59-64. See also Philip Robins, "The Overlord State: Turkish Policy and the Kurdish Issue," *International Affairs* 69, no. 4 (1993): 672, 673.

[25] Michael M. Gunter, "Turkey and the Kurds: New Developments in 1991," *Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies* 15, no. 2, (Winter 1991): 33. See also Gunter, "The Kurdish Problem in Turkey," 399. Law 2932 was terminated on 12 April 1991. See Baskın Oran, "Dönemin Bilançosu, 1990-2001," in *Türk Dış Politikası: Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar (Cilt II: 1980-2001)*, ed. Baskın Oran, 10th ed., (İstanbul: İletişim, 2008), 24.

[26] Adnan Kahveci, "On the Question of Ethnic Problems in Turkey," *Turkish Daily News*, 2 June 1987, p.6; cited and quoted in Gunter, "The Kurdish Insurgency in Turkey," 80.

[27] Gunter, "The Kurdish Problem in Turkey," 405, 406.

rule in 1987.[28] In addition to these domestic steps, Turkey sought for regional partners (other than Iraq) to enhance its security. Almost in concert with signing of the "hot pursuit" agreement (with Baghdad), Ankara obtained Tehran's assurances over not harboring of the PKK in Iranian soil. Furthermore, Turkey signed security protocols with Syria in 1985 and 1987.[29] Turkey's security-oriented logic of cooperation with Iraq faced a serious backlash by the end of Iran-Iraq war. The cross-border Kurdish refugee crisis marked the beginning of non-cooperation in Ankara-Baghdad relations.

4.1.3. Refugee Crisis: The Beginning of Non-Cooperation

The end of the Iran-Iraq war on 17 July 1988 exacerbated Turkey's security predicament over the northern Iraq. Right across the other side of the border, the Kurds have been encountering brutalities of Saddam Hussein. By late February 1988, the first "Anfal campaign" was instigated. On 16 March 1988, Iraqi Kurds suffered approximately five thousand deaths in the town of Halabja. The Iraqi security forces launched the final "Anfal campaign" by the end of August 1988.[30] "Like its predecessors, the campaign was marked by mass shootings of civilians" and the "alleged" use of poisonous gases or chemical weapons. Barzani appealed to the UN to prevent more casualties. Passed on 26 August 1988, the UN Security Council Resolution 620 condemned "the use of chemical weapons" and encouraged investigations "in order to ascertain the facts of the matter."[31]

By the end of August 1988, Turkish decision-makers faced a serious dilemma. While Saddam Hussein requested to conduct cross-border operations against the escaping Kurdish rebels, Barzani demanded opening of the border. Under those international circumstances,

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[28] Erol Kurubaş, *Kürt Sorununun Uluslararası Boyutu ve Türkiye (Cilt II-1960'lardan 2000'lere)*, (Ankara: Nobel Yayıncılık, 2004), 32, 33, 40-43.

[29] Fırat, Akdevelioğlu and Kürkçüoğlu, "Orta Doğu'yla İlişkiler, 1980-1990," 135, 137, 154.

[30] Human Rights Watch/Middle East, *Iraq's Crime of Genocide: The Anfal Campaign Against the Kurds*, (NY: Human Rights Watch/Middle East, 1995); trans. Akın Sarı-Orhan Akalın-Umut Hasdemir, *Irak'ta Soykırım: Kürtlere Karşı Enfal Harekâtı*, (İstanbul: Aram Yayıncılık, 2004), 92, 137, 243, 424. See also Michael M. Gunter, "The Foreign Policy of the Iraqi Kurds," *Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies* 20, no. 3, (Spring 1997): 6.

[31] Kerim Yıldız, *The Kurds in Iraq: The Past, Present and Future*, (London: Pluto Press, 2004), 26-33. Full text of Resolution 620 (1988) is available at <http://www.un.org> 31 August 2011.

cooperation with Baghdad was too risky. On the other hand, "influx of some 60,000 Iraqi Kurds" might also create further problems for the government. Given its application for full-membership to the European Community, Turkey ought to act in line with democratic-humanitarian norms. Some segments of the Turkish political-military elite held suspicions about the U.S. support for the Kurds. In the late Cold War international setting, the most likely U.S. intent would be to play a balancing game to achieve regional supremacy. By playing this game, the U.S. might endanger "Turkey's domestic security and sovereignty in the southeast region."[32] In terms of international context, Ankara had no choice but non-cooperation with Baghdad.

As for the domestic context, non-cooperation seemed less costly. Had Turkish borders been closed to the Iraqi Kurds, Özal government might have lost most of its political backing in the south-east region. Electoral support, particularly among the Kurdish populace, was a key for the coming referendum, which would be held for fixing the date of local elections. By opening the borders, Özal took the risk of alienating Saddam Hussein. Not earlier than expected, Saddam withdrew from the bilateral security cooperation.[33]

Within this historical background, Turkey's response to the "refugee crisis" in 1988 reflected a significant shift in the policy rationale. What was the major reason for that kind of a change? Undoubtedly, policy change was made possible through governmental discourse. Further examination of these discursive practices gives important clues about Ankara's pre-war contextual rhetoric of non-cooperation with Baghdad.

4.1.4. Pre-War Contextual Rhetoric: Discursive Logic of Abandonment

As reiterated by Prime Minister Turgut Özal in private talks, the opening of the borders in August 1988 constituted the crucial change in Turkey's policy towards the Kurds and Iraq. This was not an easy decision to take, let alone to implement, given the resistance

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[32] "U.S. Support for Kurds Annoys Ally," *Briefing*, 20 June 1988, p. 14; "Again a Difficult Choice," *Briefing*, 19 September 1988, pp. 7-9; cited and quoted in Gunter, "The Kurdish Insurgency in Turkey," 78, 81.

[33] Bölükbaşı, 34. Fırat and Kürkçüoğlu, "Orta Doğu'yla İlişkiler, 1980-1990," 138, 139.

especially posed by the military bureaucracy.[34] "Though the refugees were Iraqi, the very fact that Ankara was providing humanitarian relief to Kurds was a significant step in acknowledging their existence" and recognizing "their ethnic identity."[35] For which reasons did the Motherland Party (ANAP) government led by Özal ceased to cooperate with Baghdad? Unraveling of the discursive context will help to probe Turkey's making of reasons in that instance.

For one observer, Özal's political reasoning had less to do with philosophical sophistication but more to do with utilitarian considerations. Özal's simplistic approach to political-economic matters has reflected some forms of practical logic.[36] Public discourse of Özal, on the other hand, gave signs of an ambivalent bridging attempt to synthesize Western and Eastern worldviews. Despite very few exceptions, Özal's mode of reasoning has resonated well with key decision-makers in the government.[37]

Özal government was keenly aware of further offending the Iraqi regime. In this regard, Turkey gave provisional reside to the Iraqi Kurds, rather than granting refugee status to them. Moreover, "Ankara tried to please Baghdad" by not accepting "a United Nations (U.N) team of experts to investigate the allegations of chemical weapons use. Özal said: 'I do not want the U.N. to interfere in this. This will add a political element to the problem.'"[38] Özal's reasoning was based on material (political-military and economic) interests. Any type of international interference on chemical weapons issue might challenge Baghdad's balancing position vis-à-vis the PKK, IKDP and KYB. Persistent power vacuum in northern Iraq could be damaging for Turkey's political-military interests. If the U.N. had decided to implement sanctions, Iraq might have faced international isolation. For this reason, Ankara could have been forced to downgrade its substantive economic interactions with Baghdad.

At that time, "Iraq was Turkey's most important trading partner. Turkish exports to Iraq constituted 50 percent of Turkey's exports to its seven leading Arab trade partners, and

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[34] M. Ali Birand and Soner Yalçın, *The Özal: Bir Davanın Öyküsü*, 3rd ed., (İstanbul: Doğan Kitap, 2001), 451.

[35] Henri J. Barkey and Graham E. Fuller, "Turkey's Kurdish Question: Critical Turning Points and Missed Opportunities," *Middle East Journal* 51, no.1 (Winter 1997): 66.

[36] Yavuz Gökmen, *Özal Sendromu*, (Ankara: Verso Yayıncılık, 1992), 51, 52, 76, 80.

[37] Ramazan Gözen, *İmparatorluktan Küresel Aktörlüğe Türkiye'nin Dış Politikası*, (Ankara: Palme Yayıncılık, 2009), 8-10, 74-89, 190-195, 201-204, 221, 254-257, 292. See also Birand and Yalçın, 541-543.

[38] *Hürriyet*, 16 September 1988, p.1; cited and quoted in Bölükbaşı, 33, 34.

amounted to more than $1.5 billion in 1988."[39] Moreover, isolated Saddam regime might find an excuse to turn against the Iraqi Turkmen population. This reasoning had already been articulated by at least one prominent ANAP figure. Kamran İnan, a close advisor to Özal, acknowledged that "Turkey met 40 percent of its oil needs from the oil emanating from Kirkuk oilfields." İnan also maintained that "it would be unthinkable for Turkey to 'turn its back on the fate of 1.5 million Turkish Muslims living in the Kirkuk region.'"[40]

Courting of the Iraqi regime against a probable outside intervention had a domestic political logic as well. The right-wingers, within the ruling ANAP, did not like the idea of strengthening kinship among the Kurds residing across the two sides of Turkish-Iraqi border.[41] Özal quickly realized the danger of ethno-political polarization not only in ANAP rank and file but also within the society at large. On 16 September 1988, he touched upon the lurking problem of (ethnic) discrimination, when he delivered a public speech in Diyarbakır. After referring to the shared historical experiences in the past, Özal also alluded to the religious commonality (Muslim-hood) among Turkey's citizens. Özal was quite concise in his wording:

> I hereby declare to the whole country that there is no difference, division among our people…All of our citizens living in the Turkish Republic have same [equal] rights…Without making any distinction didn't our grandfathers, fathers fought shoulder to shoulder in Gallipoli? Weren't we all together in Dumlupınar? Weren't we together, while driving out the enemy from Adana, Maraş, Urfa? For this reason, is there [really] a need to discriminate? [42]

The issue of ethnic kinship among ANAP circles came to a new stage when Prime Minister Özal began to raise awareness about the experience of socio-economic integration, which led to the mixing of ethnic groups in Turkey. To give an example, Özal even talked

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[39] Kemal Kirişçi, "Turkey and the Kurdish Safe-Haven in Northern Iraq," *Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies* 19, no. 3 (Spring 1996), 28, 29.

[40] *Cumhuriyet*, 13 January 1987; cited and quoted in Robert Olson, "The Creation of a Kurdish State in the 1990's?," *Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies* 15, no. 4 (Summer 1992): 25.

[41] Gunter, "The Kurdish Insurgency in Turkey," 77.

[42] Başbakan Turgut Özal'ın Diyarbakır'da Halka Hitaben Yaptığı Konuşma, 16 Eylül 1988., Başbakan Turgut Özal'ın TBMM-Yurt İçi Seyahatlerinde Yaptığı Konuşmaları, 13.12.1987-12.12.1988, pp. 468-469 cited and quoted in Ömer Faruk Gençkaya, "Turgut Özal'ın Güneydoğu ve Kürt Sorununa Bakışı," in *Kim Bu Özal?: Siyaset, İktisat, Zihniyet*, eds. İhsan Sezal and İhsan Dağı, 2nd ed., (İstanbul: Boyut Yayıncılık, 2003), 129.

about his partial Kurdish descent.[43] After assuming the Presidential office in November 1989, Özal publicly explained: "Probably his grandmother was a Kurd." [44] But he stated that he always accepted himself as a Turk. He delineated this point by reframing Atatürk's motto: "Happy is the one, not who is a Turk, but who says I am a Turk."[45]

Özal's public recognition of Turkey's Kurds was a significant development. Arguably, this discursive move was made possible within the context of 1988 refugee crisis. Public debate over the opening of borders to the Iraqi Kurds provided appropriate pre-text for the government to make such a change in its discourse. Even Prime Minister Özal himself could not have imagined this kind of a change between 1983 and 1988. In those five years, the Kurdish issue was generally addressed in terms of regional underdevelopment and integration. Surely, the panacea was economic investment. Security problems posed by the PKK terrorists were dealt with military measures. Other options, like social-political initiatives, were almost out of the government's agenda.[46]

By 1989, Özal not only did hint on ethnic dimension of the Kurdish problem in Turkey; but also emphasized the external (regional) characteristic of PKK terrorism. In parallel to Özal, the Chief of Turkish General Staff General Necip Torumtay, argued that the PKK has been supported by foreign powers, interested in weakening of Turkey.[47] According to Özal, neither the PKK nor Turkey's southeastern neighbors (namely Iraq and Syria) would welcome Ankara's gaining of more assertive position by the completion of Southeast Anatolia Project (GAP)[48] in the Tigris-Euphrates basin. Regional instability, mostly

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[43] "ABD Heyeti: Özal Bize 'Kürt Kökenliyim' Dedi," *Hürriyet*, 17 October 1989; cited and quoted in Gençkaya, 130.

[44] "Özal: Büyükannem Muhtemelen Kürt'tü," *Cumhuriyet*, 28 Mart 1991; cited and quoted in Gençkaya, 130.

[45] Anavatan Partisi Genel Başkanı ve Başbakan Sayın Turgut Özal'ın ANAP Grup Toplantısı'nda Yaptığı Konuşma, Ankara, 31 October 1989, p. 86; cited and quoted in Gençkaya, 128.

[46] Gençkaya, 110.

[47] Michael M. Gunter, "Transnational Sources of Support for the Kurdish Insurgency in Turkey," *Conflict Quarterly* (Spring 1991): 7.

[48] The building of Keban Dam was completed between 1968 and 1975. Right after the completion of this dam, Turkey began to construct Karakaya Dam in the same basin. GAP, which included 21 dam and 19 hydroelectrical power plants, was initiated in 1977. Karakaya Dam was completed in 1988. Before the completion of Karakaya Dam, the construction of Atatürk Dam had begun. See Özhan Uluatam, *Damlaya Damlaya…(OrtaDoğu'nun Su Sorunu)*, (Ankara: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 1998), 63, 65, 66.

emanating from northern Iraq, was merely a repercussion of long-term power struggle for the sharing of trans-boundary waters.[49]

Divergence over the water issue has set the negative tone of Turkish-Iraqi bilateral relations in 1990. This disagreement was controversially intensified when Iraq's secret armament attempt—a deliberate design to acquire long-range artillery—uncovered by the assistance of Turkish intelligence.[50] This incident would prove to have an impact in the very short run. On 5-7 May 1990, Prime Minister Yıldırım Akbulut paid an official visit to Baghdad. During that visit Saddam Hussein's stance towards Turkey was unfriendly and even threatening. He was attempting to present the water issue as a matter of conflict. Akbulut countered in a peaceful manner and made the Iraqi leader sure about Turkey's powerful military position in the region. Almost two months later, Saddam orchestrated an act of aggression against one of Iraq's neighbors. On 2 August 1990, Kuwait was invaded by the Iraqi army.[51]

Turkey's response to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait can be analyzed by differentiating the peculiarities in three periods. In the very early days and months of the invasion, "peaceful resolution of the crisis" was the major frame in governmental discourse. Both President Özal and Minister of Foreign Affairs Ali Bozer expressed their concern over possible military intervention. They anticipated that effective sanctions might induce Iraqi withdrawal. In accordance with the UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 661, Turkey began to implement sanctions by closing the Kirkuk-Yumurtalık oil pipeline on 7 August 1990. Özal and Bozer have had hard time in convincing their counterparts, especially in Tehran, Damascus and Amman, to strictly abide by UN sanctions.[52]

When the two Turkish foreign policy makers visited Washington in September 1990, Bozer was somehow sidelined by Özal. Thus, Bozer "had strongly resented the fact that Özal had virtually cut him out of conversations with President Bush." On 11 October 1990, Bozer announced his resignation.[53] It was not later than expected, when the second blow came on

[49] Gençkaya, 116, 122. See also Fırat and Kürkçüoğlu, "Orta Doğu'yla İlişkiler, 1980-1990," 139-147.

[50] Gözen, 236.

[51] Hulki Cevizoğlu, *Amerika'nın Körfez Savaşı*, 2nd ed., (Ankara: Işık Yayıncılık, 2003), 140, 141. Gözen, 233, 234.

[52] Gözen, 275-278.

[53] William Hale, "Turkey, the Middle East and the Gulf Crisis," *International Affairs* 68, 4 (1992), 686.

18 October 1990. That day, the Minister of Defense İsmail Sefa Giray also resigned. On 29 November 1990, the UN gave an ultimatum to Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait until 15 January 1991. After the declaration of UNSCR 678, war appeared to be imminent. Ankara calculated the risks of an unwanted war. War might unleash grave consequences for Turkey. The costs of even taking a neutral stance would be higher than expected. At this second stage, Turkish foreign policy makers began to "envision war as a method" to overcome the deadlock. As Özal made it clear, Turkey allied with the "righteous and winning side", i.e. the UN.[54]

In order to have a say in post-war arrangements, Özal thought that Turkey should give support to the Coalition by making troop contribution, perhaps in the northern front. For the military bureaucracy, joining the war would be more costly. According to them, the involvement of Turkish troops in northern Iraq could make matters worse. In fact, the tradition of non-involvement and non-interference in Middle Eastern affairs has to prevail under all circumstances. Because of the disagreement with President Özal over Turkey's role in the coming war, the Chief of the Turkish General Staff General Necip Torumtay resigned on 3 December 1990.[55]

Iraqi invasion still ensued one week before the UN deadline. In the final days, two significant peace initiatives have appeared. The US had made "one last attempt." On 9 January 1991, Secretary of State James Baker met with the Iraqi Minister of Foreign Affairs Tarık Aziz in Geneva. The talks did not bring any fruitful result. There remained "one last hope." The UN Secretary General Perez de Cuellar came to Baghdad to have an ultimate conversation with Saddam. Cuellar also failed to bring a peaceful resolution to the crisis. Since the war loomed large on Baghdad's horizon, Turkey's Ambassador Necati Utkan began to prepare for evacuation. Only the Ambassador of Soviet Union stayed in Baghdad, as Utkan's convoy was en route to the Habur border gate on 15 January 1991.[56]

When the UN deadline expired, actual war conditions set in the Gulf. In this stage, Turkish foreign policy makers had to rationalize and justify their war position through public discourse. Therefore, the next section turns to the event analysis. In this section, salient pro-

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[54] Cevizoğlu, 34. See also Gözen, 275-280; and İlhan Uzgel, "ABD ve NATO'yla İlişkiler, 1990-2001," in *Türk Dış Politikası II*, 254-257.

[55] Hale, 686.

[56] Gül İnanç, *Türk Diplomasisinde Irak (1978-1997)*, (İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2008), 73-77. See also Nurdan Bernard, "BM Genel Sekreteri: Barış İçin Umut Yok," *Sabah*, 15 January 1991.

governmental narratives on Turkey's Iraq policy will be unearthed. The aim is to shed light on the discursive frames and models of reasoning that justified Ankara's non-cooperation with Baghdad.

4.2. The Event Analysis: Frames, Models and Modes of Reasoning

Just before the expiration of UN deadline for Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait, U.S. President George Bush stated that "they would not wait to attack so long" after 15 January 1991 24.00 hrs. New York time.[57] According to the US press reports, Bush informed Özal about their war plan, including the exact timing of the air bombardment. In fact, Baker was in Ankara to work out the final details of military cooperation between two NATO allies. Despite Turkey's concerns over the Iraqi retaliation, İncirlik air base[58] was supposed to be utilized by U.S. war planes. Turkey could only limit the scope of air operations conducted from its soil and air space. In exchange for this "limited use," the U.S. was expected to compensate Turkey's military needs and economic demands.[59]

As long as Turkey was not attacked, Turkish soldiers and Turkish aircrafts would not get into this war. Turkey would only provide logistical support to the US war planes, which included forty eight F-111 aircrafts expected to arrive soon. After gathering of the Council of Ministers, Prime Minister Akbulut reiterated the government's position:

> We have never been proponent of a solution based on war and [we] always put
> forward efforts to find a peaceful way... [Y]et, as recent developments were
> taken into consideration, we have to accept that [the chance for] the peaceful

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[57] "Allah Ülkemizi Korusun," *Sabah*, 15 January 1991.

[58] The Turkish General Staff (TGS) and the United States Air Force (USAF) signed an agreement on 6 December 1954 for joint use of Adana (İncirlik) Air Base (AB). In mid-1975, Ankara announced that non-NATO activities in İncirlik AB were terminated due to the U.S. embargo, which had been imposed against the Turkish military intervention in Cyprus. The U.S. embargo was lifted in September 1978. Turkey and the U.S. signed the Defense and Economic Cooperation Agreement (DECA) on 29 March 1980. "İncirlik Installation" accounted for nearly "five percent of the combat missions in Operation Desert Storm" of the Gulf War. "Incirlik Air Base," <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/facility/incirlik-history.htm> 6 August 2011.

[59] Savaş Süzal, "Bush Özal'a Savaş Tarihini Mektupla Bildirdi," "Bush, İncirlik Üssünü Kullanmak İçin Özal'a Büyük Ödünler Verdi..," *Sabah*, 15 January 1991. See also "Diplomatik Üs: Ankara," "Baker Savaş Şifresini Getirdi," *Sabah*, 13-14 January 1991.

resolution of the crisis has incrementally weakened…Turkey has not taken a decision for opening of a second front. Turkey does not desire and will not take part in a hot battle.[60]

At previous night, President Özal had made very similar comments on the TV. According to him, Turkey acted within the framework of international law and it implemented decisions taken by the UN, since the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on 2 August. "With this attitude, we proved that Turkey is such a reliable country in the region." Iraq had been given one and a half months to prevent the crisis from escalating into war. "Diplomatic efforts, as a whole, have not brought any positive results." In this context, Özal explained that he sent a last message to Saddam on 11 January. No positive response was received. Özal made a final call on the TV. But his last call was more than late. "As of today, all of us are aware that the crisis has reached to the climax that threatens peace." Even so, Turkey would get out of the crisis in a powerful manner. For this reason, Özal believed that Ankara had to show to the outside world, especially to "the probable enemy or adversaries," that Turkey was united and strong. In this regard, he hoped to get the opposition party leaders— True Path Party (DYP) leader Süleyman Demirel and Social Democrat Populist Party (SHP) leader Erdal İnönü—on board.[61] Yet, opposition leaders largely remained defiant. The domestic political dissent further pushed pro-governmental rhetoric towards liminality.

4.2.1. Liminal Frames in Storytelling: Neither in nor out of the War

By the very first days of war, Mehmet Barlas began to frame the events in line with the governmental discourse. In the words of Barlas, "despots like Saddam" do not need a domestic consent to make war. On the contrary, Barlas prepackaged war as "the worst alternative and a political nightmare for the [democratically] elected leaders, including President Bush…[W]ar would set off a disaster for the Iraqi people…[which they] do not deserve…Had Saddam not been encouraged [from the outside], ill-fated Iraqi people might have not come to the point of war." According to Barlas, pacifism (anti-war movement) was "a utopia" for Turkey. In fact, "yearning for the peace" was not so different from "standing

[60] "Amerika'dan 48 Adet F-111 Savaş Uçağı İstedik," *Sabah*, 15 January 1991.

[61] "Özal'dan Liderlere Çağrı," *Sabah*, 15 January 1991.

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against Saddam's aggression in Kuwait." Siding with Saddam could never be an option for Ankara. Barlas succinctly put Turkey's position in the coming war as such: "Turkey is a party [which takes a side] in this war. Yet it is not in the war." In other words, Turkey would remain out of the war, so long as Iraq did not attack.[62]

Taking of this position seemed as "the most profitable business" for Özal. The possibility of achieving such a big gain, with so little effort was quite unprecedented. Of course, this framing was about the utility of Turkey's war policy. Özal leaked some of the costs and benefits, which were calculated, at least by him. Greece, presumably the archenemy of Turkey, got weary about the deepening cooperation between Ankara and Washington. The US would send 104 Patriot missiles to strengthen Turkey's air defense. Turkish Air Force would receive 160 Phantom fighter jets. Additionally, Turkey would get some small arms and light weapons. The only loss might emanate from Saddam's retaliation attempts. In terms of the post-war map making process, Özal did not anticipate any change in the current borders, including the Turkish-Iraqi one.[63]

Barlas argued that the Gulf War should not be perceived as "a bilateral issue" between Turkey and Iraq. That is to say, Turkey has not acted unilaterally against Saddam. "Invasion of Kuwait is a regional and a global matter…Now, Saudi Arabia is an active party against Saddam, both itself and with the UN force based in its territory. Syria shares a common border with Iraq, yet, at the same time, Syrian soldiers are located in the Saudi soil." "Iraq's other neighbor, Iran has fought an eight-year war against Saddam" and lost many lives. Main war target for Saddam was Israel, not Turkey.[64]

On the basis of global-regional balance of power (and of threat), Turkey has taken calculated risks, Barlas contended. In this sense, Özal's war policy was the continuation of Atatürkist foreign policy. "When fascist dictator of Italy, Mussolini, committed aggression against Abyssinia (Ethiopia) on 3 October 1935, the League of Nations (LN) decided to implement sanctions against Italy." At that time, Italy was Turkey's biggest partner in foreign trade. In spite of this fact, Italy had threatened Turkey by "militarizing the Dodecanese Islands, particularly Leros." Under those circumstances, Ankara supported the LN decision by joining the embargo against Rome. In this way, Turkey "gained

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[62] Mehmet Barlas, "Gözlem: Barış İçin Son Söz!," "İçeride Hukuka Saygı, Körfez'de Saddam'a Alkış," "Pasifizm: Sosyalizm Gibi Bir Ütopya!..", *Sabah*, 15-16 January 1991.

[63] "Özal: Hayatımın En Kârlı İşi Bu!," *Sabah*, 16 January 1991.

[64] Mehmet Barlas, "Egosantrizm: Ya Saddam Ayakta Kalırsa?," *Sabah*, 16 January 1991.

[international] prestige," which was "used in 1936, at the Montreux Convention on Turkish Straits." By the beginning of Gulf War, the Turkish government made "mid/long-term calculations" and pursued Atatürkist foreign policy against another dictator (read Saddam), who "threatened Turkey in June-July 1990 under the pretext of Atatürk Dam."[65]

PM Akbulut and Minister of Foreign Affairs Ahmet Kurtcebe Alptemoçin recapped that the government should have been held accountable for its actions, had it not taken any precautions. Since the beginning of the crisis, all measures were taken to protect Turkey's territorial integrity. In order not to face a *fait accompli*, additional army troops were sent to the south-east region. In case of an attack, Turkey would respond. Undoubtedly, NATO was on Turkey's side. Hence NATO's defensive assets were to be invoked. Bargaining for material interests, in a time of war, might not be an appropriate attitude. But it was legitimate for the Turkish government to seek compensation for its losses. On the other hand, the opposition, led by Demirel and İnönü, maintained that the ANAP government and Özal were driving Turkey into a costly war. The opposition took a non-interventionist stance and argued that staying neutral could be more in line with the traditional principles of Turkish foreign policy.[66]

Nonetheless, Demirel and İnönü could not keep up with the pace of regional developments. The opposition has had a difficulty in foreseeing the very near future. After the Gulf War, the region would never be same again. In this regard, Özal had been moving, at least two days, ahead of time.[67] On the first day of the Gulf War, Özal was contemplating over Turkey's post-war position in the Middle East. He took almost everyone off guard, when he proposed a protecting role over the Iraqi Kurds. According to Özal, Baghdad has been perceived as the main protector of Kurds for many years. Now, this had to be changed. Since most of the Kurds resided in Turkey, Ankara could take a leading role in protecting Kurds. The Kurds living in other countries, like Iraq, are of the "same race with [some of] our citizens." Had Ankara taken a protective role earlier than before, "the incident in Halabja might have not occurred." Assuming of this new role would not mean that Turkey could allow for the independence of Iraqi Kurds. Even Özal himself was primarily apprehended by a longstanding fear of a Kurdish state in northern Iraq that might be established under post-

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[65] Mehmet Barlas, "Mussolini: Atatürkçü Dış Politika Sürüyor…", *Sabah*, 16 January 1991.

[66] "Meclis'te Savaş Görüşüldü," *Sabah*, 16 January 1991.

[67] Mehmet Barlas, "Çankaya: En Uzun Gece Özal'lardaydık..", "Gözlem: İnsan Cumhurbaşkanı da Olabilir…", *Sabah*, 17 January 1991.

war conditions, in which Baghdad would be too weak to assert central authority. Therefore, the second tier of Özal's dual strategy was preventive, designed towards the containment of Kurdish political aspirations in Iraq.[68]

Without giving any sign, the age-old phobia somehow haunted in Ankara. The ANAP government did not make any discursive reference to the Sèvres and had shown no desire to resurface political dreams over Mosul and Kirkuk. Deputy Prime Minister Mehmet Keçeciler acknowledged that Turkey's policy has been based on "the preservation of territorial integrity of [both] Kuwait and Iraq." The Turkish government had no irredentist intentions towards Mosul and Kirkuk. "Let's assume that we took those places. Think of the situation in Israel. We would live with the same trouble. Tranquility and security of Turkey could be damaged," if the "south-east problem" were broadened. For this reason, it was better to have an interest in the oil resources of Mosul-Kirkuk region. Before the Kuwait crisis, Ankara had extended an offer to Baghdad to cooperate on oil production in those areas. Iraq declined the joint venture proposal. Keçeciler believed that realization of oil related projects should suffice Turkey's ambitions.[69]

On the other hand, Özal thought that the government should have sent troops to the Gulf. Had they done so, Turkey wouldn't have missed a significant opportunity. One of the major opponents of war, France joined the coalition at the very last minute. "Even Greece has sent soldiers. Does it [really] fight? Did it take part in the business?" Turkey "could not take the advantage of this opportunity. What would happen, had we sent a small number of soldiers? Wouldn't it be better, did those soldiers see the most high-tech weapons, and learn the war games." Özal's contention was just a wishful thinking for that conjecture. Despite Özal's wishes, the ANAP government hesitated to demand the full war powers from the Parliament. In fact, the US was more concerned about, and perhaps would be more thankful for, the use of "joint facilities," particularly the İncirlik air base, rather than Turkey's troop contribution to the Gulf.[70] Even the use of İncirlik air base would create audience costs,

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[68] "Savaş Başladı!", "Özal: Kürtlerin Hamiliğini Bundan Sonra Biz Yapacağız," *Sabah*, 17 January 1991.

[69] Erhan Karadağ-Ayşegül Akın, "Keçeciler: Musul ve Kerkük'e Girmemiz Sıkıntı Yaratır," *Sabah*, 17 January 1991.

[70] "Özal: Keşke Biz de Asker Gönderseydik," "Akbulut: Üslerin Kullanılması İçin İzin Verebiliriz," "İncirlik Üssünde Yoğun Trafik Var," "Bush'tan Türkiye'ye 82 Milyon Dolarlık 'Teşekkür' Yardımı!," *Sabah*, 18 January 1991. See also "Cumhurbaşkanı Özal Hodri Meydan'a Çıktı," "Türkiye'de Bulunan Üsler Daha Kapsamlı Kullanılacak," *Sabah*, 19 January 1991.

particularly in the domestic public sphere. This move might mean opening of a second war front from the north.

4.2.2. Rationalization of the Second Front: Opening but not Entering

Parliamentary opposition, led by Demirel and İnönü, argued that the use of İncirlik by the US fighter jets to attack Iraq would mean to be the "opening of second front" and hence "entering into the war." Political opposition has gone as far to accuse Özal with treason. In response, Prime Minister Akbulut asked "[w]hether the opposition group was defending Iraqi or Turkey's interests." He asserted that the government should take precautions against Iraq, which has acted as an "aggressor state." However, the Prime Minister was aware of polarizing and divisive impact of the political debate on the Gulf War, even from within its own ranks. Moreover, domestic public opinion was against the war.[71]

Given its precarious domestic position, the government only demanded to adapt its formerly received crisis-time mandate to the conditions of war. Short of war declaration warrant, the new motion would expand government's room of maneuver. Otherwise, the government could not have a legitimate authority to permit the use of Turkish Armed Forces in foreign soil and to allow the use of Turkish territory/airspace by foreign troops. Supposedly, Turkey would not open a second front, and by extension would not be a party in the war. The Turkish military could be sent to Iraq only under two conditions. The first contingency might be the Iranian and/or Syrian intervention in (northern) Iraq. The second scenario was associated with the potential of instability in northern Iraq, due to a probable political breakdown in Iraq's territorial integrity by the emergence of an independent Kurdish state. On 17 January 1991, when the Iraqi Scud missiles hit Israel and the Coalition forces destroyed most of Iraq's air capability, the ANAP government passed the motion with 250 votes, notwithstanding more than twenty defections.[72]

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[71] "Savaş Yetkisi ANAP'ın 250 Oyuyla Kabul Edildi," *Sabah*, 18 January 1991. "ANAP'ın Savaş Anketine Göre Türkiye Savaşa Girmemeli," *Sabah*, 19 January 1991.

[72] "Savaş Yetkisi ANAP'ın 250 Oyuyla Kabul Edildi," "Irak'a Girmeye Hazırlanıyoruz," "Saddam İsrail'e Füzelerle Vurdu," "Bombardıman Halâ Sürüyor," *Sabah*, 18 January 1991. See also "Akbulut: Irak'ın Bize Saldırma İmkânı Yoktur," *Sabah*, 21 January 1991.

Demirel and İnönü were far from challenging Özal's rationale in taking side with the Multinational Coalition mandated by the UN. According to Barlas, opposition politicians should have acted with prudence, not with a spirit of "amateur pacifism." "Who does desire war and bloodletting? Didn't pro-peace Ecevit initiate the Cyprus war when it was necessary? Now, the Saddam's men [Demirel and İnönü] have to stop vicious antagonisms of domestic politics and must return to the world. Turkey is in the Middle East. Iraq is a threat for Turkey as well. The United Nations is the righteous side. It was not Özal, but Saddam, who has invaded Kuwait."[73]

In essence, there have been two sides to this war: "Iraq" or perhaps more correctly "Saddam," and "the UN." By insisting on invasion of Kuwait, Iraq has been the "unjust" party. There "is no way out" from this war, other than "Iraqi defeat" and "liberation of Kuwait." Iraq would definitely be the loser. But the end state "is not to conquer, invade or carve up Iraq." The US war aims are not only molded by oil interests. Even imperial powers, i.e. the US, might have decent goals like standing against aggression.[74]

As indicated by Barlas, the drive of moral imperatives in the US foreign policy making has been relatively a new tendency, as witnessed in two earlier occasions: the US invasion of Panama and the US bombing of Libya. On both occasions, the political wisdom was based on the punishment of non-democratic, despotic leaders Noriega and Qaddafi. Without Gorbachev's consent, Bush could not make those military interventions. Those two events, together with the Bush-Gorbachev summit in Malta, were the latest signals of Washington-Moscow rapprochement. Saddam Hussein could not read salient signs of the Cold War's coming end.

> The Gulf War…is the indicator of new world order and balances [of power]…From now on, the most influential instrument of new world order is the United Nations…[Seemingly,] the Security Council resolutions, like the domestic laws of countries, are deemed to become binding texts.[75]

In the press release published on 19 January 1991, the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) emphasized the binding nature of UNSCR 678 in determining Turkey's

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[73] Mehmet Barlas, "Siyaset: Saddam'ın Adamları..", *Sabah*, 19 January 1991.

[74] Mehmet Barlas, "Gözlem: Saddam'ın Sonunun Başlangıcı," *Sabah*, 19 January 1991. Mehmet Barlas, "Gözlem: İki Tane de İyi Haber," "İnsaf: Türkiye'de Petrol mü Vardı?," *Sabah*, 20 January 1991. Mehmet Barlas, "Ateşkes: Kayıtsız Şartsız Kuveyt," *Sabah*, 22 January 1991.

[75] Mehmet Barlas, "Yeni Düzen: Noriega'dan Saddam'a..", *Sabah*, 20 January 1991.

position in the war. In order to minimize the human losses from both of the belligerents, the military operations ought to be finished as soon as possible. Accordingly, Turkey had to extend its support to the UN-led multilateral coalition.[76]

Even though the MFA had a clear-cut policy, Alptemoçin faced a serious predicament in selling it to the public. His words were quite illustrative in grasping the government's dilemma over going public in the very first days of the Gulf War.

> Is it good for Turkey to state that it has been the second front? Does it serve nation's interests? Turkey took all types of measures in order not to be the second front. What I would say more, I don't know.[77]

As a matter of fact, the ANAP government seemed that they had a premeditated press policy. Akbulut acknowledged that the Coalition forces had been using the İncirlik base "for military, reconnaissance and training purposes." For security and military reasons, giving further details might be damaging.[78] There was nothing wrong with the government's press policy, Barlas contended. Not all political undertakings could be made public. Some of them need to be kept secret, at least for some time. This was the way how foreign policy has worked in Turkey and in other places as well. Based on "national interests," going secret was "normal." But it has increasingly become unfeasible in an age of globalization.[79]

In addition to global developments, regional dynamics could make things more complicating for Turkey. Due to Israel's retaliation against Iraq, Jordan might be a battleground. Even under those circumstances, a change in the current positions of Egypt and Saudi Arabia was highly unlikely. They were expected to stay in the Coalition. Barlas was not sure about the future policies of other countries in the region. Therefore, he felt a need to keep an eye on the subsequent positions of Syria, Iran, Algeria and Libya.[80] In terms of post-war designs, the US policy makers have been monitoring regional balances carefully. Barlas

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[76] "Türkiye'de Bulunan Üsler Daha Kapsamlı Kullanılacak," *Sabah*, 19 January 1991.

[77] "Hükümet Amerikalılar'ın İncirlik'i Kullandığını Israrla Halktan Saklıyor," *Sabah*, 21 January 1991.

[78] "Akbulut İncirlik Üssü Kullandırılıyor," "İncirlik Savaşıyor!," *Sabah*, 22 January 1991. See also "Akbulut: Havaalanımızı Hedef mi Gösterelim?," *Sabah*, 24 January 1991.

[79] Mehmet Barlas, "Gözlem: CNN'de Müstehcen Yayın…", "Savaş: Dünya Küçük Bir Köydür…", *Sabah*, 22 January 1991. See also "TRT'nin Halktan Sakladıkları: CNN'in Yayınına Sansür!", *Sabah*, 21 January 1991.

[80] Mehmet Barlas, "Son Durum: Savaş, Siyaset ve İttifaklar," *Sabah*, 20 January 1991.

presumed that the US would "preserve Iraq's territorial integrity" in order to contain Iranian and Syrian influence over Iraq.[81]

Above all, the Turkish policymakers (President Özal included) should have thought twice in trying to hide the fact that Turkey was to be involved, albeit indirectly or passively, in the air bombardment against Iraq, due to the use of Turkish territory and airspace (most prominently the İncirlik air base) by the US forces. Framing of Turkish foreign policy as "neither in nor out of the war" did not help to win the public debate, especially during the air bombardment phase of the Gulf War.

As Barlas argued, ANAP government had to discern the meaning of their actions. That is to say, "the use of İncirlik base might mean Turkey's going into the war. This does not imply land warfare in Turkey's borders, but air front might be an issue of concern."[82] At the very early hours, the "silence" over the "air front," might have served well for counter-intelligence purposes, had the Turkish government been able to somehow conceal, if not censor, the BBC broadcasts, by which the live pictures of US fighter jets' take off from İncirlik were disseminated all over the world. In fact, Turkey had demanded from the Allies (its partners in NATO and/or in the Coalition) not to disclose too much detail over the allocation of İncirlik. This demand was well received and implemented by Washington. In contrast, London did not act in a responsive manner, and made Ankara wary of its intentions. The Turkish policymakers held suspicious whether Britain was provoking Saddam to retaliate. Any kind of reprisal towards İncirlik, could inevitably lead Turkey's direct, active entry into the war with Iraq.[83]

What would Britain get by Turkish-Iraqi confrontation still remains an intriguing question. But this incident made one thing crystal clear for the Turkish government. As an international phenomenon, war in general, the Gulf War in special, has been not only about (counter) intelligence but also about (counter) propaganda. As the air bombardment continued, perhaps longer than expected, Ankara had to revise its silence policy in order not to lose the hearts-and-minds, at home and abroad.

In this regard, the Minister of Defense Hüsnü Doğan implied a failure in government's discourse. In the beginning, "perhaps, a different path was taken…the aim was not fully conveyed …Upon a need for keeping the related impact of this incident on us at a certain

[81] Mehmet Barlas, "Saddam'dan Sonrası İçin…", *Sabah*, 21 January 1991.

[82] Mehmet Barlas, "Son Durum: Savaş, Siyaset ve İttifaklar," *Sabah*, 20 January 1991.

[83] Mehmet Barlas, "Özal Londra'dan Rahatsız," *Sabah*, 25 January 1991.

level, we did not talk on the issue of İncirlik" for quite some time. As for İncirlik, Turkey's policy was in line with UNSCR 678, which "foresaw" providing of "help and support" for the countries taking military actions against Iraq. The use of "joint facilities," including the one in İncirlik, was also stipulated in the Defense and Economic Cooperation Agreement (DECA).[84]

Besides, the government had received Parliamentary approval and decided to use its authority. In terms of defensive measures, 42 fighter jets from the air component of NATO Rapid Deployment Force (RDF) were positioned in Malatya and Diyarbakır. Air defense was strengthened by the deployment of (NATO/Coalition) Patriot missile batteries in İncirlik and Diyarbakır. Moreover, the military presence over the Iraqi border was enhanced. Even this move alone would be sufficient to keep "eight or more Iraqi divisions" away from the main battleground in the south. Furthermore, Turkish government decided to give additional support to the US-led multi-national Coalition, so that their operation against the Iraqi leadership would be concluded quickly and with minimum loss. Consequently, 96 US aircrafts, stationed in İncirlik, have made 400 flights during the air operations against the military targets in northern Iraq. More recently, 55 of the US aircrafts were re-located in Batman, to increase the efficiency of air operations.[85]

The Turkish government had calculated the risks of this extra support. Governmental logic was based on three general points. First and foremost, invasion and annexation of Kuwait was a serious breach of the international law. Secondly, the territorial integrity of Iraq had to be preserved, under all circumstances. Lastly, the Turkish soldiers would not directly, actively intervene into the war, unless Turkey was encountered with aggression.[86] The Parliamentary endorsement for sending of Turkish soldiers into foreign lands has just been a precautionary step. Ankara has had no irredentist aims towards northern Iraq. Last but

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[84] Mehmet Barlas, "İncirlik Üssünden 96 Uçak Saldırdı!" *Sabah*, 24 January 1991. DECA was signed between Turkey and the US in 1980. Subsequent to its date of expiration on 18 December 1985, DECA was extended on 21 February 1988 by the Government of Prime Minister Turgut Özal. See Uzgel, "ABD ve NATO'yla İlişkiler, 1990-2001," 55-59.

[85] "Özal: Saddam Artık Kazanma İhtimali Olmadığını Görmeli," Mehmet Barlas, "İncirlik Üssünden 96 Uçak Saldırdı!" *Sabah*, 24 January 1991. "Demirel Sıkıştırınca Alptemoçin 'İncirlik Kullanılıyor' Dedi," "İncirlik'ten Sonra Sıra Batman'da," *Sabah*, 24 January 1991. "Batman'dan da Uçaklar İniş Kalkış Yapıyor," *Sabah*, 25 January 1991.

[86] Mehmet Barlas, "İncirlik Üssünden 96 Uçak Saldırdı!," *Sabah*, 24 January 1991.

not least, Turkey was hopeful about maintaining close relations with the Iraqi people in the post-war period.[87]

Not unexpectedly, Baghdad could not be so optimistic about the future. Ankara faced a backlash, when Tarık Aziz, the Iraqi Minister of Foreign Affairs sent a letter of protest.[88] The Deputy Spokesperson of Turkish MFA, Murat Sungar, told that there were no serious protests from the Arab countries. Evidently, Ankara remained in deaf ears and chose not to send an immediate response to Baghdad. Nonetheless, Sungar did not waver, while restating Turkey's strong opposition to "the establishment of any Kurdish state in its south."[89]

Sungar's restatement became more meaningful when Özal disclosed his private conversation with some journalists, which had taken place on 18 August 1990. As the Gulf crisis had unfolded, assuming an anti-American/Western stance was not tenable for Özal and the ANAP government. By extension, cooperation with Iraq seemed as an unsustainable move. Given Turkey's longstanding international, multi/bi-lateral political-military commitments (UN, NATO, DECA etc.), traditional approaches, like non-interference and neutrality, could never promise the best results for the job at hand. By staying completely out, Ankara would not have a say in the post-war political negotiations. Therefore, Özal formulated his policy goal as "maximum benefit with minimum cost." Obviously, war might bring grave consequences. According to the publicized account, "the establishment of Kurdish state," under (post) war conditions, might be the most significant cost for Turkey. This was the key issue in shaping Ankara's decision to implement the UN sanctions almost instantaneously. By taking this action in a timely manner, Turkey has advanced its international and regional position. During the crisis, Özal believed that Turkey had to play a balancing game, in order to protect its "own interests." After the Gulf crisis, the government should be able to carry "two cards" in dealing with "the Western countries" on one side, "Arab [and Muslim] countries" on the other side. Turkey's "weight in the West, would be in harmony with its weight in the East."[90]

Özal's private desire was to (im)prove and even advertise "Turkey's strategic importance". Since Turkey has been located in an "extremely critical geographical region", it

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[87] "Özal: Saddam Artık Kazanma İhtimali Olmadığını Görmeli," *Sabah*, 24 January 1991.

[88] "Irak'tan Tehdit: İncirlik Üssü İçin Hesap Vereceksiniz," *Sabah*, 24 January 1991.

[89] "Sungar: Kürt Devleti Kurulmasına İzin Yok," *Sabah*, 24 January 1991. "Irak'ın Notasına Cevap Vermiyoruz," *Sabah*, 25 January 1991.

[90] "Özal Gazetecilerle Yaptığı Gizli Görüşmeyi Açıkladı," *Sabah*, 25 January 1991.

should have a deterrent military capability. More than anything, this necessity has entailed economic power. By looking at the development that has been made economically, Özal envisioned that the country was moving in that direction. Moreover, he was hopeful that Turkey may lead regional economic cooperation after the end of the Gulf War.[91]

In Özal's thinking, Turkey would also provide a better place in the Post-Cold War global order, if only it could play a strategic role in the Gulf War. By assuming a special international position, Turkey would (re)assert itself as a center of power in post-war regional affairs. Özal was particularly wary about the likely impact of Iranian influence over the Shiite Arabs of Iraq. In order to achieve regional dominance, Turkey has to establish a geopolitical influence over post-war Iraq. Özal's plan was twofold having dyadic and domestic dimensions. In terms of dyadic circumstances, the "Turkmen card" single-handedly could not be sufficient for building political-economic influence inside Iraq. Thus, Ankara should seek rapprochement with the Iraqi Kurds. Given Turkey's domestic predicament vis-à-vis its own Kurdish population, gaining of the "Kurdish card" inside Iraq was not an easy task. For this aim, the Turkish government had to take gradual steps for the resolution of domestic Kurdish problem.[92] During the war, the Kurdish predicament hindered Turkey from deploying a better peace vision in the public sphere. Hence, Ankara began to prepackage ambiguous presuppositions on peace.

4.2.3. Post-War Prepackaging: Ambiguous Presuppositions on Peace

After prevailing over the İncirlik squabble with essential discursive moves, Ankara did not face any challenge in its balancing act until mid-February. Key veto players, like the military bureaucracy, expressed their consent on Turkey's attitude over the Gulf crisis.[93] On 16 February 1991, it was reported that Saddam Hussein had talked about conditional

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[91] "Cumhurbaşkanı Turgut Özal'ın Harp Akademileri'ndeki Konuşmaları-15 Şubat 1991," (Ankara: Başbakanlık Basımevi, 1991), 1-48.

[92] Cengiz Çandar, *Mezopotamya Ekspresi: Bir Tarih Yolculuğu (Türkiye-Kürtler-Ortadoğu-Batı)*, (İstanbul: İletişim, 2012), 97-103.

[93] "Genelkurmay Başkanı Orgeneral Doğan Güreş: Körfez Krizinde Türkiye'nin Tutumu Takdirle Karşılandı," *Sabah*, 16 February 1991.

withdrawal from Kuwait. As air bombardment phase draw to its close and all out land warfare loomed large in Baghdad's horizon, Saddam decided take a step back.[94]

The Soviets, Iraq's former patron, seemed eager to reassert themselves by facilitating the cease fire, under more favorable conditions for Baghdad.[95] While Moscow entered into the play, the ANAP government was wrangling with a serious political rift within its own ranks. President Özal, the founder of ANAP, together with his wife, sided with the liberal wing and rebuked the conservatives for their yearning towards the pre-Islamic era, i.e. "the jahiliyya." In view of Barlas, "domestic and foreign policy have a mutual influence on each other."[96] "International conjecture has laid down a condition for the ANAP to enter into a more liberal, more pro-freedom, more secular and more modern appearance. This has been a consequence of the Gulf Crisis effecting Turkey." Due to American preeminence over the crisis, the winds of democracy, freedom and market economy could be felt much stronger, even in the Middle East.[97]

Under these hegemonic circumstances, why would the US accept Soviet peace plan, which was far from meeting its demands? Conditions for the ceasefire should not be set in order to save Saddam. "Peace with Saddam is not better than the war that eliminates Saddam."[98] In terms of peace, Özal seemed hopeless about the Soviet plan and remained silent.[99] On the other hand, Alptemoçin made it clear to his counterpart in Washington that Turkey's preference was "a peace without Saddam."[100] But this was just a wishful thinking. Turkey could only pursue its "national interests." Moreover, a regime change in Baghdad was beyond the stipulations of UNSCR 678. In this regard, a return to the status quo ante in

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[94] "Saddam Kıvırtıyor!," "Kara Savaşı Çok Yaklaştı," *Sabah*, 16 February 1991.

[95] "Gorbaçov'dan Başkan Bush'a Çok Önemli Bir Mesaj: Tarık Aziz'i Bekleyin," *Sabah*, 17 February 1991. "Gorbaçov'dan Saddam'a: Çekil," *Sabah*, 19 February 1991.

[96] Mehmet Barlas, "Gözlem: İç Politika ve Dünya…", "Özal: Yetim Hüsnü'den Brütüs Hüsnü'ye..", "ANAP: Semra Hanım Yalnız Değil Artık," "Zor Karar: Şimdi Akbulut Ne Yapacak?," *Sabah*, 18 February 1991. See also "Özal İsyancıları Defterden Sildi," *Sabah*, 18 February 1991.

[97] Mehmet Barlas, "Gözlem: Olayın Çapı Çok Büyük," "ANAP: Fazla Alternatif Yok," *Sabah*, 19 February 1991. See also "Asi Bakanlar Direniyor," *Sabah*, 19 February 1991.

[98] Mehmet Barlas, "Gözlem: Artık Saddam'ı Kim Dinler," *Sabah*, 21 February 1991.

[99] "Turgut Özal, Bush'la Telefonla Görüştü," *Sabah*, 21 February 1991. Şükrü Küçükşahin and Remzi Hayta, "Özal: Ordumuzla Göğsüm Kabarıyor," *Sabah*, 21 February 1991.

[100] "Saddam'sız Barış: Alptemoçin Türkiye'nin Ne İstediğini Baker'a Anlattı," *Sabah*, 23 February 1991. Savaş Süzal, "Türkiye Saddam'sız Bir Barış İstiyor," *Sabah*, 23 February 1991.

both Kuwait and Iraq could be sufficient. Alptemoçin thought that Washington would desire Ankara's involvement in post-crisis security arrangements. In the post-war period, Turkey could primarily be interested in reconstruction projects in Kuwait and Iraq, and additionally, it may seek joint ventures, particularly in areas of water, oil and natural gas, to increase "mutual economic interdependence" among regional countries.[101] While envisioning policies in post-Gulf War Middle East, Turkey's governmental discourse was leaning towards utilitarian reasoning.

"Economic cooperation" based on "mutual interdependence" was also a dominant discursive frame in Özal's political narratives. In contrast to Alptemoçin, Özal was relatively ambitious, but more ambiguous, in his post-war vision, especially on Iraq. "Our desire" could be "the building of a democratic regime that would protect the rights of Arabs, Kurds, Turkmen and others."[102] "Winds of democracy" blowing in Eastern Europe, were expected to arrive to the Middle East sooner than later. Post-war regional environment would be much more conducive to political reform. "After the war, a type [or a form] of democracy must enter into Iraq." For this reason, the Iraqi people would end Saddam's reign. Under leadership of the "sole superpower," i.e. the US, "the whole world wants to see an Iraq, which is not governed by Saddam and [hence] relatively democratic."[103] The emphasis on unipolar world conception and by extension on the perception of US domination over international affairs, specifically in economic and military fields, was a significant frame that reflected balance of power reasoning in pro-governmental discourse.

In fact, Turkey's post-war Iraq policy discourse was quite problematic. The fundamental predicament was actually associated with the conceptualization of a more stable international and regional environment under conditions of unipolarity. As we continue to witness in the contributions of Barlas, some of the discursive frames in pro-governmental narratives on Turkey's post-Gulf War Iraq policy have been based on taken for granted, but still incoherent presuppositions.

Barlas assumed that foreign policy, like domestic politics, has to be rooted in wise calculation of "power balances." From this perspective, the Iraqi regime had attempted to manipulate regional and global rivalries; right before the land warfare began. The Soviet

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[101] "Alptemoçin Amerika'dan Destek Verdi," *Sabah*, 24 February 1991.

[102] "Özal: Tek Şartımız Kürt Devletinin Kurulmaması," *Sabah*, 18 February 1991.

[103] "Özal: Savaştan Sonra Demokratik ve Saddam'sız Bir Irak Görmek İsteriz," *Sabah*, 24 February 1991.

ceasefire (peace) plan was just a ploy for Saddam's struggle to remain in Baghdad. But it was too late for Saddam, since he had made a chain of crucial mistakes, which included threatening of Turkey due to the GAP and the Atatürk Dam. Because of the wide-ranging damages that had been incurred, Saddam could not stay in power. He had to be brought into justice.[104]

Barlas was not only more vocal about imagining a post-Saddam period, but also more articulate on seeking a "new order" in the Middle East. Colonial order, which had been created by Britain and France, did not work well. After the Gulf War, those imperialistic mistakes should not be repeated. "Otherwise, new order would result in fiasco as well." In order to prevent a probable failure, Barlas listed some basic tenets of the new regional order: (1) preservation of "territorial integrity of regional countries" (2) regional economic integration based on "mutual interdependence" (3) region-wide political liberalization.[105]

Post-Saddam era would only come by liberation of both Kuwait and Iraq. The conduct of the land warfare was faster than expected. With this successful execution, the US came over the "Vietnam Syndrome."[106] The land component of the Coalition Forces has managed to liberate Kuwait in less than 24 hours.[107] Having realized the Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait, the US became the first country to re-open its Embassy. The Turkish government followed the suit and decided to send Ambassador Güner Öztek back to Kuwait city. Turkey's Ambassador to Baghdad Necati Utkan was among the few diplomats participating to the farewell ceremony in Ankara.[108] After the catastrophic retreat of its forces from Kuwait, the Iraqi regime had no choice but declaring a unilateral cease-fire.[109]

Since the military ground was almost ready for cease-fire talks, the leader of the winning side, the US, began to accelerate its diplomatic efforts for the post-war political

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[104] Mehmet Barlas, "Gözlem: Saddam Hayal Görüyor," "Dengeler: Kimin Eli Kimin Cebinde?," "Ateşkes: Barış İçin Saddam Gitmelidir," "Gözlem: Kriz ve Savaş Biterken," "Gözlem: Saddam Yakalanmalıdır!," "Saddam: Yanlış Hesap ve Bağdat'taki Adam!...," *Sabah*, 23-25 February 1991.

[105] Mehmet Barlas, "Gözlem: 'Yeni Düzen'in Ön Arayışları," *Sabah*, 26 February 1991.

[106] Mehmet Barlas, "Kuveyt Kurtuldu, Sıra Irak'ta," "Askerlik: 'Vietnam Sendromu Bitti..'", *Sabah*, 27-28 February 1991.

[107] "Tankların Hedefi Basra!," "Kuveyt'e Ulaşıldı," "İstediğimiz Bütün Hedeflere Vardık," *Sabah*, 25 February 1991.

[108] "Kuveyt Elçimizi Gönderiyoruz," *Sabah*, 28 February 1991. "Kuveyt Büyükelçimiz Görevinin Başına Döndü," *Sabah*, 2 March 1991.

[109] "Sıra Saddam'ın Cezasına Geldi!," "Saddam Kaçmaya Hazır!," *Sabah*, 27-28 February 1991.

deal-making. Each and every country, having assumed either active or passive role, "has desired to get [their fair] share from the [(re)settlement] pie."[110] Turkey was more interested in compensating its economic losses, particularly in the form of war reparations from Iraq, and receiving economic and military aid mainly from the US, in exchange for its providing of logistical support and security assistance during the war.[111] These gains could only be materialized after the conclusion of conflict resolution process. Should Saddam stay in power, economic and military sanctions might resume. This would be an unintended, yet perhaps the most complicating, outcome of the Gulf conflict.[112] Equally perilous for Turkey was the humanitarian consequences, associated with the mass refugee influx from northern Iraq.[113]

Without taking any risk, Ankara could gain almost nothing. Especially Özal did like to take calculated risks. In his words, "[a]ll events are part of a single whole."

> Turkey is not an extra player in the Middle East as well as in the world. It is on the frontline with those who are righteous, lawful, advanced and modern. On this issue, Turkey has the power to execute the things laid upon to its part…Cooperation with America is not 'being a satellite,' but [it is] 'mutual interdependence' [and]… [e]qual relationship. [W]ith this attitude, Turkey is a candidate to have a more respected and stronger position…Now, this is acknowledged in America, Europe and the Middle East.[114]

In the end, "Turkey got out of the crisis" in a prestigious manner. Propagandas, which alleged Turkey with irredentist aims over Mosul-Kirkuk, did fail. The disaster of war, which the Iraqi people have lived through, became inevitable because of "one man rule."[115] On this point, Barlas concurred with Özal. The burden of the defeat completely rested on Saddam's shoulders. By and large, the Iraqi people could not be held responsible for the war they had never approved. Since it was "Saddam's war," most of the soldiers in the Iraqi army did

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[110] "Amerika Savaş Sonrası İçin Temasa Başlıyor," *Sabah*, 1 March 1991.

[111] "Bakan Işın Çelebi Açıkladı: Körfez Savaşı Türkiye'ye 7 milyar Dolara Mal Oldu," *Sabah*, 24 February 1991. "Zavallı Irak," "Baker Geliyor," "Türkiye Irak'tan Tazminat İsteyecek," *Sabah*, 1 March 1991. "Kandemir: Amerika'ya Açık Çek Vermedik," *Sabah*, 2 March 1991.

[112] Mehmet Barlas, "Gözlem: Savaş Sonrasında Akıl Galip," "Irak: Saddam'lı Orta Doğu Olmaz!..", *Sabah*, 2 March 1991.

[113] "Irak İçin 100 Binlik Çadırkent Kuruluyor," *Sabah*, 25 February 1991.

[114] Mehmet Barlas, "Cumhurbaşkanı Özal'ın Sabah'a Özel Demeci," *Sabah*, 2 March 1991.

[115] "Özal: Krizden Alnımız Ak, Başımız Dik Çıktık," *Sabah*, 3 March 1991.

surrender, without firing a bullet. As a result, "Saddam, not the Iraqi people, was defeated."[116] If the Iraqis wanted to find the root cause of their remorse, they should examine themselves and their own country. The reasons were emanating not from "Imperialism" or "Zionism," but from "ignorance." Turkey prevailed over ignorance since 1923. Now, it was the time for the Iraqis and the Arabs to emulate the Turkish model, in their fight against ignorance.[117] Özal was more political in his approach to the Iraqi public: "The Iraqi populace does not deserve this fate…We want to help the people of Iraq" in their struggle towards a better future.[118] Even though Turkey had been on the winners' side, Ankara needed to work harder for building peace in the region. Should there be reasonable and visionary political leaders, "the Gulf Peace" and "New Order" could not be two distant prospects for the Middle East. This was the right time for Turkey to take the advantages of the post-war regional environment.[119]

It remained to be seen whether these preconceptions would come true. Apparently, Turkey's discourse of non-cooperation could bring consequences primarily for bilateral relations with Iraq. These ramifications are analyzed in the post-event section.

4.3. Post-Event Analysis: Historical Developments and Discursive Dynamics

When the ceasefire was brokered by the promulgation of UNSCR 686 on 2 March 1991,[120] the Coalition forces were about to reach to the outskirts of Baghdad, without facing any resistance. The virtual collapse of the Iraqi army created an environment conducive to rebellion by the Shiite Arabs in the south and the KDP-PUK led Kurdish unrest in northern Iraq. Contrary to the expectations, the US did not give support to the rebel groups. Security

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[116] Mehmet Barlas, "Gözlem: Savaş Sonrasında Akıl Galip," *Sabah*, 2 March 1991.

[117] Mehmet Barlas, "Gözlem: Irak Cehalete Yenildi," *Sabah*, 3 March 1991.

[118] "Özal: Krizden Alnımız Ak, Başımız Dik Çıktık," *Sabah*, 3 March 1991.

[119] Mehmet Barlas, "Türkiye: Türkiye'de Ekonomik Patlamaya Doğru," "Gözlem: Orta Doğu Bir Mozayiktir," *Sabah*, 3-4 March 1991.

[120] "Irak Utanmadı!," *Sabah*, 4 March 1991.

forces of Iraq crushed the Kurdish uprising by the end of March 1991. As a result, around two million people fled their country and sought refuge in Turkey and Iran. Largely due to the harsh climatic and topographic conditions, a refugee disaster occurred. It was at this point in time that Turkey began to have a seemingly official northern Iraq policy. President Özal "took the first step in establishing [open] relations with the Kurds of Iraq…These contacts went as far as issuing Turkish diplomatic passports" to Barzani and Talabani. "Özal seemed keen to support the Kurds in northern Iraq against Saddam Hussein and gave the two Kurdish groups the possibility to open [political] offices in Ankara."[121]

Against the backdrop of Turkey's engagement with KDP and PUK, Saddam took a chance for cooperation with the PKK. Diplomatic contacts with the Iraqi Kurds were in coincidence with the lifting of the ban on the Kurdish language in Turkey, which could pave the way for official recognition of Kurdish identity. In order to address the human tragedy faced by the Iraqi Kurds, "Turkey played a central role" in the adoption of UNSCR 688 on 5 April 1991 and subsequent launching of Operation Provide Comfort (OPC). International relief efforts and multinational security assistance were to be coordinated under the banner of OPC. The military component was essentially tasked with creating a "safe haven" in northern Iraq that could facilitate "voluntary repatriation."[122]

Turkish policymakers were mainly concerned about the likely impact of refugee crisis on domestic stability. Across the Turkish-Iraqi border, Kurdish separatism could be agitated by the PKK. More to the point, the creation of a safe haven north of the 36th parallel unleashed de facto conditions, this then became suitable for political aspirations (like self-rule and regional autonomy) of Kurdish groups in northern Iraq.[123]

By the end of May 1991, the number of military personnel in the OPC detachment (including the air wing) "grew to more than 20,000…from 11 countries…By September 1991 only the air wing of this force remained in Turkey and its presence since then, has been based on a mandate renewed every six months by the Turkish Parliament." In the mean time, deputies from the People's Labor Party (HEP), mainly representing the left-wing Kurdish voters, entered into the Turkish Parliament. Political relations between Ankara and Erbil warmed up by Talabani's visit in November 1991. The general elections of November 1991

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[121] Kirişçi, "Turkey and the Kurdish Safe-Haven in Northern Iraq," 30.

[122] Ibid., 21, 22.

[123] Uzgel, "ABD ve NATO'yla İlişkiler, 1990-2001," 259-263. Melek Fırat and Ömer Kürkçüoğlu, "Orta Doğu'yla İlişkiler, 1990-2001," in *Türk Dış Politikası II*, 554-558.

brought Demirel-İnönü (DYP-SHP) coalition into the government. "The government program promised major reforms to improve the economy of [south] eastern Anatolia and to address the 'Kurdish problem.' In December 1991, Deputy Prime Minister Erdal İnönü called for the need to recognize the cultural identity of Turkey's Kurdish citizens." [124]

While talking to journalists on his visit to Diyarbakır on 8 December 1991, Prime Minister Demirel made historical remarks.

> The people in the south-east are our brothers; the people in northern Iraq are their brothers and ought to be our brothers too. We now speak of the Kurdish identity. It is impossible to oppose this. Turkey must recognize the Kurdish reality…[F]aced with events in northern Iraq, Turkey was just a bystander. For instance, there was the Halabja incident. We said 'that's outside our frontiers; it's nothing to do with us'. This policy ought to change. Turkey's new policy should be as follows: if Baghdad commits another barbarity in northern Iraq, it will find us opposing it. [125]

By courting the Iraqi Kurds, the government projected a positive image towards the Kurdish citizens. Taking the advantage of this favorable climate, Barzani came to Ankara in February 1992. He had encouraging talks with Özal, Demirel and İnönü. Nevertheless, the new policy rationale gave signs of strain and began to crumble in the coming months. During the Kurdish New Year celebrations (*Nevruz*) in March 1992, violence broke out between PKK supporters and the Turkish security forces. In May 1992, KDP and PUK held elections for the regional parliament in Erbil, and declared the establishment of Kurdish Federated State (KFS) in October 1992.[126]

The Turkish government did not welcome this development, "for three reasons. First, there was a great concern that this could eventually lead to the formation of an independent Kurdish state in northern Iraq, which could adversely affect the Kurdish problem in Turkey. Second, the PKK would now be able to operate from northern Iraq with greater ease, complicating Turkish government efforts to ensure the security of southeastern regions against the attacks of the PKK." Third, the emergence of KFS could increase volatility "in an already unstable region."[127] In order to address Turkey's security concerns, Kurdish groups

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[124] Kirişçi, 22, 25, 26.

[125] Hale, "Turkey, the Middle East and the Gulf Crisis", 690. Hale directly quoted from *Milliyet*, 9 December 1991.

[126] Uzgel, "ABD ve NATO'yla İlişkiler, 1990-2001," 264. Kurubaş, 74-76.

[127] Kirişçi, 23, 32.

(especially KDP) assured that "the PKK could not use the safe haven for mounting raids into Turkey." In October 1992, the Turkish army, in cooperation with KDP, conducted cross border operations against the PKK bases in northern Iraq. Cooperation against the PKK marked the beginning of security interdependence between Turkey and the KFS.[128]

Incidentally, General Eşref Bitlis—Chief of Gendarmerie General Command—visited Erbil on 4 November 1992. In exchange, Barzani and Talabani came to Silopi on 11 November. In their third meeting in Salahaddin, the two sides signed a protocol on 17 December. Besides the containment of PKK in northern Iraq, Turkey began to forge a four-pronged policy in this period. First and foremost, it urged the Central Iraqi Government (CIG) to reassert its authority over northern Iraq. In this regard, the Speaker of Iraqi Parliament Mehdi Salih paid a visit to Ankara on 13 October 1992. Secondly, Ankara pushed Erbil to have a dialogue with Baghdad. The third facet was a regional attempt to harmonize relations with Iran and Syria in order to thwart further political ambitions of KFS. On 14 November 1992, Turkish, Iranian and Syrian Ministers of Foreign Affairs declared their joint political commitment towards the territorial integrity of Iraq. Last but not least, Ankara began to put effort for the easing of international sanctions against Baghdad, notwithstanding the US opposition. Not only could this initiative facilitate re-opening of the Kirkuk-Yumurtalık oil pipeline, but also revive bilateral trade cooperation with isolated Iraq.[129]

By its very nature, this multifaceted approach was full of risks. Because of the inherent ambivalences, implementation of this strategy could inevitably lead Turkey's (northern) Iraq policy into a deadlock in the coming years, if not months.[130] Come what may, the DYP-SHP coalition government took a decision by the end of 1992 to reactivate the Turkish Embassy in Baghdad. Ankara's move was not a deliberate act against the UN sanctions. The only aim of this diplomatic effort was to restore the level of bilateral relations, which had been achieved before the Gulf War. By doing so, Turkey could become the first NATO country to have diplomatic representation in Baghdad. President Özal was against the re-opening of Baghdad Embassy, most probably due to the US opposition. When Özal was abroad, the Deputy President (Speaker of the Parliament) Hüsamettin Cindoruk signed the

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[128] Ibid., 30.

[129] Uzgel, "ABD ve NATO'yla İlişkiler, 1990-2001," 264. Fırat and Kürkçüoğlu, "Orta Doğu'yla İlişkiler, 1990-2001," 557, 558. Kurubaş, 74-78, 297-300.

[130] Kurubaş, 74-78, 82-85.

letter of sending. Turkey's Charge de Affair, (Ambassador) Sadi Çalışlar received a warm welcome upon his arrival to Baghdad by the end of February 1993.[131]

After the ceasing of cooperation for two years, the gap was closed in Turkish-Iraqi relations, as Ankara reconstituted its diplomatic presence in Baghdad. This event signifies the end of post-Gulf War episode in Turkey's Iraq policy. Hence, episodic findings are presented in the conclusion.

4.4. Conclusion: Episodic Findings

This chapter examined discursive transformation of Turkey's Iraq policy during the Gulf War episode. Episodic findings revealed that Turkey moved back and forth between cooperation and non-cooperation discourses. In the post-Baghdad Pact period, the opening of Kirkuk-Yumurtalık oil pipeline in 1977 was a significant step towards enhancing material basis of bilateral cooperation context. But, Iraq stopped the oil flow in the same year, when Turkey started to build a new dam in the Tigris Euphrates basin. After that moment, oil and water constituted two important material reasons of both cooperation and non-cooperation in Turkey-Iraq relations.

In terms of ideational reasons, Kurdish issue resumed to condition the dyadic context and Turkey's discursive logic of cooperation with Iraq. Between 1960 and 1970, Ankara had good reason to remain cautious about the situation in northern Iraq. Recurrent Kurdish uprisings had the potential of spill over to the Turkish side of the border. Demonstration effect unleashed serious domestic ramifications for Ankara. In the 1970's, most Kurdish political movements turned into semi-secret, outlawed or disbanded Marxist groups. Within the political climate of late 1970's, PKK (Kurdistan Workers' Party) emerged.

Due to the security threat posed by the PKK, Turkey's framings of the Kurdish problem and its policy towards Iraq reflected a security oriented rationale. By the mid-1980's, the Kurdish question was reframed by redeployment of foreign incitement threat into the domestic public sphere. In the midst of Iran-Iraq war, balance of threat reasoning enabled Ankara enhance security cooperation with Baghdad. This rationale began to change after the

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[131] İnanç, *Türk Diplomasisinde Irak*, 104-107.

opening of borders to the Iraqi Kurds during the 1988 refugee crisis. For largely humanitarian reasons, Ankara chose to cooperate with Erbil rather than Baghdad. The logic of cooperation with Erbil implied the recognition of Kurdish identity in Turkey. Earlier, the Kurdish issue was generally addressed by economic means, like regional development and integration. For quite a long time, identity dimension of Kurdish problem was almost out of the governments' discursive agenda.

Like this limited turn towards ideational reasoning, Ankara's utilitarian discourse of non-cooperation with Baghdad was a response to circumstantial changes created in the pre-Gulf War context. By all accounts, the invasion of Kuwait was an act of aggression committed by Iraq. The UN Security Council took the situation under its control by consecutive resolutions. As a UN member, Turkey had to abide by the international norms. Ankara expected that the UN embargo would work to enforce the Iraqi withdrawal.

The Turkish government was faced with a serious breach of international law and hence defended the UN sanctions regime through public discourse. The closure of Kirkuk-Yumurtalık pipeline was portrayed as an inevitable move. By doing it right on time, without any international interference, Ankara strengthened its discursive position for the peaceful resolution of crisis. When war conditions were set by the UN mandate, there remained no alternative, but to turn to the ideational rhetoric that appealed to the just and legitimate nature of the war. Reconstruction of UNSCR 678, which stipulated "appropriate support for the actions" of the Coalition, provided the normative make-up of pro-governmental narratives on Turkey's Gulf War policy.

In terms of material dimension, balance of power was one of the major frames in Turkey's Iraq policy discourse. As the Cold War draw to its close, the US emerged as the sole superpower. Under conditions of unipolarity, deepening of the alliance with Washington became much more important for Ankara. The reason was simple. Turkey increasingly needed US aid, particularly in military and economic fields. In exchange, the US sought to make extensive use of joint military facilities (including İncirlik air base) designated by the DECA. What would happen if Turkey prevented the US-led Coalition from accessing into the joint facilities (most prominently İncirlik) during the crisis? How could the Turkish government publicly defend the position of non-cooperation with the US? These counterfactual questions are important to understand contextual and discursive making of non-cooperation in Turkey's Iraq policy.

The pre-war contextual environment was shaped in such a way that Ankara could not conceive any possibility for cooperating with Iraq. Even the discourse of cooperation with Baghdad was deemed unsustainable, if not irrational. At least over the crisis-time, cooperating with the US was seen as discursively reasonable. President Özal treated the

crisis as both a challenge and an opportunity for Turkey. Thus, he sought to get maximum gain with minimum loss. He realized that crisis bargaining could incur domestic costs, when some of the key veto players resigned. Due to the domestic public-political opposition crisis bargaining proved to be an uneasy process. Rationalization of the Gulf War policy in the public sphere became a serious predicament for Ankara. Turkish government did not prefer to portray the war as a bilateral issue with Baghdad. Turkey's war position framed as an extension of its relations with Washington.

For this reason, Ankara could not embrace the war in an all out fashion. Governmental narratives portrayed Turkey's war position as "neither in nor out." None of the Turkish soldiers could shot a single bullet against the neighboring Iraqi army. By implication, this meant that Ankara did not want to be seen as making an actual war with Baghdad. Turkey was just providing necessary support to the lawful war effort—led by its chief ally, the US— against an aggressor state, i.e. Iraq. Sustenance of this betwixt position in the public sphere proved to be too risky for the Turkish government to win the political deliberation over the war. Arguing from a liminal debating position, Ankara inevitably opened the way for a host of discursive ambiguities, and seriously impaired its ability to win the hearts and minds.

Ankara could not be in the Gulf War, but should not stay completely out of it. What was opened by the Turkish government during the war, ought not to be perceived as the second front (on the ground), but might be conceived as an air front. On the other hand, Turkey must enter the war only under three circumstances: (1) Iraqi aggression towards Turkey (2) Iranian and/or Syrian interference into northern Iraq, (3) the establishment of an independent Kurdish state in northern Iraq.

The first condition set the territorial defense dimension of Turkey's war policy discourse. Ankara, would indirectly help the making of war, but could not actively involve in it. Despite the emphasis on Turkey's passive role, the pro-governmental narratives were quite vocal in setting the conditions of possibility for a likely military intervention. It was already known that Syria was part of the Coalition. Iran was relatively neutral. That is to say, the second condition was based on a highly unlikely scenario. In spite of that, it might serve for defensive purposes, and constrain Damascus and Tehran. To a certain extent, the third entry condition was signaling a posture related with national security and threat balancing. Rationalization of war with the presupposition of imagined danger (Kurdish state), rather than the real threat posed by the PKK, was essentially unrealistic.

In fact, presuppositions have become quite influential in defining discursive and political dynamics of the Gulf War episode. Pro-governmental discourse on Turkey's Iraq policy, particularly political narratives of Özal and Barlas, reflected a preconceived world order that was regulated by US power. Clearly, this presupposition fed the power balancing

rationale. Despite, discursive reasoning of Turkish government gave signs of tension and hesitation. Ankara did not opt for full-swing cooperation (opening of the second ground front in the north or joining the southern front), which might be more rewarding for its international position vis-à-vis the West (read the US). Pro-governmental frames echoed at best a limited, partial cooperation. This strain was emanating from Ankara's dual discourse, which attempted to oscillate between material and ideational rhetoric, and betwixt Western and Eastern (Arab-Muslim) worlds. Liminal mode of reasoning was inherently volatile, became more controversial in making sense of the post-war Middle East and Iraq.

One of the most salient features of Turkey's Iraq policy discourse was the framing of a better post-war order. The so-called "new order" was an ambivalent mix of presuppositions. Particularly Özal and Barlas have envisioned a world run by a single super power. In fact, there was nothing wrong with this assumption while taking a global position. The crucial problem was the preconception of regional peace, stability and integration under conditions of unipolarity.

The prepackaging of post-war Iraq reflected the uncertain character of Turkey's cooperation discourse. Turkish policy makers' wish was to have a "peace without Saddam." At least, they expected the emergence of a better dyadic status quo, i.e. "democratic, modern, civilized Iraq." When they discerned that wishful thinking had not helped to materialize their goals, their rather optimal choice was framed as "Iraq without a Kurdish state" or "territorially compact Iraq." The return to the status quo ante was what Turkey could hope to get at best. So the utilitarian framing of Turkey's war policies as "beneficial business" rocked to the bottom by the end of war. Once again, the shadow of future seemed as if it was not on the side of Turkey. But this did not hide the fact that Ankara miscalculated the contextual consequences of the Gulf War. To a certain extent, misconceptions about the post status quo incurred long-term costs for Turkey's Iraq policy.

The governmental rhetoric of post-war Turkey-Iraq relations was primarily based on presuppositions about the utility of "economic cooperation" based on "mutual (oil-water) interdependence." Yet, cooperation discourse lacked coherence in addressing outstanding political-military issues of Turkish-Iraqi relations. In the post-Gulf War period, Ankara could only envisage politically paradoxical, discursively dueling strategies towards Baghdad (prevention of Kurdish statehood) and Erbil (protective role over the Kurds). While swinging between unwanted conflict and uneasy cooperation, Turkey's Iraq policy discourse faced inconsistency. The dilemma emanating from rhetorical incoherence would most likely exacerbate in the years to come.

CHAPTER

5. THE US INVASION AND BEYOND: CONTEXTUAL AND RHETORICAL DILEMMA OF COOPERATION WITH OR AGAINST BAGHDAD

The aim of this chapter is to highlight the reasons of more recent changes in Turkey's foreign policy discourse towards Iraq. The US invasion of Iraq in 2003 is taken as the central event shaping the episodic dynamics. Pre-event analysis lays out the discursive context before the invasion. This part specifically focuses on Ankara's making of reasons vis-à-vis the first and second motions for the (un)opening of so-called northern front.

The event analysis section covers the period between the commencement of air bombardment on 20 March 2003 and the fall of Baghdad on 9 April 2003. In this section, I analyze discursive frames that were published in the pro-government daily *Yeni Şafak*. Turkey's narrative rationality during the war implied a mixed mode of reasoning, which attempted to uphold security and economic interests without relinquishing identity matters. It was this sophisticated logic that provided the discursive conditions of possibility for all-out embracing of northern Iraq in the post-event period. The official inauguration of Turkey's Erbil General Consulate on 29 March 2011 did mark the episodic end of Turkey's post-war Iraq policy. In other words, this incident bears sufficient significance to close the post-event section of this chapter.

Under and beyond the circumstances of invasion, the discursive logic of Turkey's dealing with its neighbor (Iraq) and its Kurdish question have changed quite dramatically. Ankara's cooperative and non-cooperative approaches to Baghdad and Erbil have become more salient than ever before. Finding a reasonable solution to the Kurdish problem has still formed the major predicament for rationalizations of pragmatic acts in Turkey's Iraq policy discourse.

5.1. Pre-Event Analysis: Historical Background and Discursive Context

After the Gulf War of 1991, the US has gained an international position to lead the world. Regional repercussions of US hegemony have also permeated into Middle Eastern affairs. Mainly due to the containment strategy of the US against the Saddam regime, Iraq has had to live under UN-endorsed international embargo. Until the US invasion in 2003, the negative impact of sanctions on Iraq has not abated.

In the post-Gulf War era, implementation of military and economic measures against Baghdad has created severe consequences for Ankara. Governments of Turkey seemed to have almost no choice, but extend their support to the US for the implementation of UN-mandated northern no-fly zone over Iraq. As a result of the Operation Northern Watch (ONW)—initially Operation Provide Comfort (OPC)—launched from the Turkish territories, the Central Iraqi Government (CIG) had to cease its tight military grip over northern Iraq. Regional power vacuum was filled by emergent Kurdish groups. Without further ado, "the embryo of a Kurdish state" has been sown by Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). Besides, the region had turned out to be a safe haven for the PKK terrorist activities. Between 1991 and 1993, "the PKK was to find it easier than ever before to operate from northern Iraq."[1]

Rising of Kurdish political aspirations inside its own borders could only fuel the securitization of both Turkey's Kurdish question and its Iraq policy. Turkey could not break the cross-border impasse by only resorting to military power. As President Turgut Özal saw, the military solution was not in the offing on both sides of the border. Hence he opted for political-economic measures in dealing with northern Iraq.[2] Additionally, Ankara resumed

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[1]   Philip Robins, "The Overlord State: Turkish Policy and the Kurdish Issue," *International Affairs* 69, no. 4 (1993): 674.

[2]   Tarık Oğuzlu, "Turkey's Northern Iraq Policy: Competing Perspectives," *Insight Turkey* 10, no. 3 (2008): 10.

diplomatic relations with Baghdad. Then, the two capitals were continuously visited by various delegations.[3] In this period, Turkey's cooperation discourse displayed a return towards the security oriented rhetorical logic.

5.1.1. Revisiting the Rhetoric of Security

Özal engaged with the leaders of KDP and PUK, Masoud Barzani and Celal Talabani. By doing so, he attempted to drive the head of PKK Abdullah Öcalan towards a ceasefire, which would be declared as of 20 March 1993. After the sudden death of Özal on 17 April 1993, the ceasefire was put on a backburner. Süleyman Demirel, who assumed the Presidency on 16 May 1993, sided with the military. The killing of 33 Turkish army recruits in the PKK ambush broke the ceasefire on 25 May 1993. In late June 1993, Tansu Çiller became the new Prime Minister. As a consequence of Çiller's inexperience "in security and foreign policy matters…the hard-liners and the military" strengthened their hands.[4]

In almost rest of the 1990's, the Turkish army had sustained its upper hand in national security and foreign policy making processes. Military modes of reasoning have nicely fitted into the Turkish security mindset. In stark contrast to the post-Cold War global developments, especially in Eastern Europe, Turkey was driven towards more militarily oriented policies, particularly in northern Iraq.[5] This state of mind led Turkey to enhance its security cooperation with Iran and Syria. After the trilateral meeting held in Damascus, on 23 August 1993, Turkish, Iranian and Syrian foreign ministers "expressed their unalterable

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[3]   Robert Olson, "The Kurdish Question and Turkey's Foreign Policy, 1991-1995: From the Gulf War to the Incursion into Iraq," *Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies* 19, no. 1 (Fall 1995): 13, 14. Turkish-Iraqi diplomatic relations was resumed in February 1993. See Gül İnanç, *Türk Diplomasisinde Irak (1978-1997)*, (İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2008), 104-107.

[4]   Henri J. Barkey and Graham E. Fuller, "Turkey's Kurdish Question: Critical Turning Points and Missed Opportunities," *Middle East Journal* 51, no.1 (Winter 1997): 68-72. See also Melek Fırat and Ömer Kürkçüoğlu, "Orta Doğu'yla İlişkiler, 1990-2001," in *Türk Dış Politikası: Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar (Cilt II: 1980-2001)*, ed. Baskın Oran, 10th ed., (İstanbul: İletişim, 2008), 557, 558.

[5]   İlhan Uzgel, "Ordu Dış Politikanın Neresinde?," in *Bir Zümre, Bir Parti: Türkiye'de Ordu*, eds. Ahmet İnsel and Ali Bayramoğlu, (İstanbul: Birikim Yayınları, 2004), 311-318. See also Erol Kurubaş, "Etnik Sorun-Dış Politika İlişkisi Bağlamında Kürt Sorununun Türk Dış Politikasına Etkileri," *Ankara Avrupa Çalışmaları Dergisi* 8, no.1 (2009): 39-69.

opposition to the fragmentation of Iraq", presumably by the US.[6] The fear of Iraq's partition provoked the "the Sèvres syndrome"[7]. This age-old phobia has created havoc in Turkish domestic and foreign policy up until the capturing of Öcalan in 1999.[8]

On the other hand, consecutive Turkish governments, including the one led by Necmettin Erbakan in 1996, allowed the US Air Force units—stationed in Turkey—to continue their operation (Northern Watch) over northern Iraq by using the air space of Turkey. The existence of northern-no-fly-zone gave a free hand to the Turkish military to devise intermittent operations against the PKK terrorist camps in northern Iraq. Paradoxically, however, Iraqi territory in the north of the thirty sixth parallel, which was dominated by the Kurdish population, became more autonomous. The autonomy might be regarded as a step towards federal status. In 1996, there emerged a reshuffling of alliances in the northern Iraq region. Due to a power struggle, the rapprochement between Barzani and Talabani was broken. In order to balance the Talabani-Iran-PKK axis, Barzani sided with Baghdad and Ankara. As a result of these realignments, Ankara assumed a better diplomatic position for regional maneuverings. By facilitating the representation of Iraqi Turkmen Front (ITC) in the "Ankara Process" of October 1996, Turkey further strengthened its hand over northern Iraq.[9]

By 1996, the Turkish General Staff (TGS) was designated as the coordinating institution for Turkey's northern Iraq policy.[10] In the same year, the former Chief of TGS retired General Necip Torumtay proposed a cautious approach regarding northern Iraq.

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[6] Olson, 5.

[7] Dietrich Jung, "The Sevres Syndrome: Turkish Foreign Policy and its Historical Legacies," in *Oil & Water: Cooperative Security in the Persian Gulf*, ed. Bjørn Møller (London and New York: I.B. Tauris Publishers 2001), 131-159. The republished version of this chapter was accessible <http://www.unc.edu/depts/diplomat/archives_roll/2003_07-09/jung_sevres/jung_sevres.html> 25 March 2010. According to Jung, the Sèvres syndrome is "the perception of being encircled by enemies attempting the destruction of the Turkish state" through the establishment of "a Kurdish state in the region", as it had been envisaged in the Treaty of Sèvres (1920). This "anachronistic worldview" demonstrates "the persistence of conspiracy theories among Turkey's elite".

[8] Baskın Oran, "Dönemin Bilançosu, 1990-2001," in *Türk Dış Politikası (Cilt II)*, 219, 235, 236.

[9] İlhan Uzgel, "ABD ve NATO'yla İlişkiler," in *Türk Dış Politikası (Cilt II)*, 265, 266. ITC was established in April 1995. See Michael Gunter, *The Kurds Ascending: The Evolving Solution to the Kurdish Problem in Iraq and Turkey*, (NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 53.

[10] İlhan Uzgel, "Dış Politikada AKP: Stratejik Konumdan Stratejik Modele", in *AKP Kitabı: Bir Dönüşümün Bilançosu*, eds. İlhan Uzgel and Bülent Duru (Ankara: Phoenix Yayınevi, 2009), 373. Uzgel cites Fikret Bila, "Özel Siyaset Belgesi ve Rumsfeld," *Milliyet*, 20 July 2003. See also Uzgel, "Ordu Dış Politikanın Neresinde?," 314.

According to Torumtay, because of the Barzani-Talabani rivalry and the PKK activities, the situation in northern Iraq would remain unclear, at least for five to ten years. Saddam would most likely remain in power for the next decade or so. After Saddam, the chances for a democratic government to emerge in Iraq were so bleak, given the fact that Western countries would not put sufficient support and generosity. In this rather grim picture, Turkey had two major policy options that could be taken into consideration: The pro-active stance was more prone to the troubles associated with interventionism. Based on the principle of non-interference, hands-off or wait-and-see approach seemed to be safer. Within these opposing lines, Torumtay attempted to find a middle-ground. He came up with a hybrid phrase called "active non-interventionism"[11] the meaning of which was still vague.

In Torumtay's words, "Turkey has to openly declare that it will not accept any solution, like a federative arrangement, that might cause geographic (read political) disintegration of Iraq." Torumtay was wary about the cooperation between Saddam and Barzani that began in September 1996. He thought that the establishment of a Kurdish Federation in Iraq might eventually pave the way for actual political independence. This development would alone create security problems and serious social repercussions for Turkey. The proto-federation of Kurds in northern Iraq was already underway. In connection with the PKK, this federation could have an influence over the Kurds in Turkey. This would mean a new question for "Turkey's citizens of Kurdish origin". As a result, "Turkey would really be drawn into the Middle Eastern impasse." For this reason, Turkey has to support territorial integrity of Iraq in a non-interventionist fashion. By this manner, Turkey would safely distance itself from northern Iraq. By implication, this proposal was based on the idea of disengagement from northern Iraq in political, economic and military fronts. On the other hand, Torumtay argued that humanitarian and economic assistance provided by Turkey to the northern Iraqi population should be maintained.[12]

In this period, prevention of a federal Kurdish region in northern Iraq was the main motive driving Turkish foreign policy makers. In order to realize Turkey's security interests and provide regional stability, Torumtay proposed a three-fold strategy:

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[11] Necip Torumtay, *Değişen Stratejilerin Odağında Türkiye*, (İstanbul: Milliyet Yayınları, 1996), 242, 244-251.

[12] Ibid., 247-249.

- Firstly, helping Iraq to abide by the UN resolutions, supporting Iraqi government to normalize its international relations without interfering with its domestic affairs,
- Secondly, eliminating the PKK threat by joint endeavors in the territories of Iraq,
- Thirdly, improving political and economic relations with Iraq in parallel to its normalization in the international system.[13]

This three-tiered strategy more or less defined the parameters of Turkey's Iraq policy up until the US invasion. One would rightly argue that the so-called 'red lines', outlined by the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) long before the Iraq war, was an extension of this strategy. The red lines were about the establishment of an independent Kurdish state in northern Iraq,[14] the status of Kirkuk and Mosul and the safety of Turkmen population living in Iraq.

In September 1998, the Iraq Liberation Act was approved by the US Senate. From then on, Washington has sought a regime change in Iraq. The policies of Washington and Ankara began to diverge on Iraq. But the "strategic partnership" between the two countries has been rejuvenated in 1999. First, the US assisted the capturing of Öcalan on 15 February 1999, which dealt a detrimental blow to the PKK. Secondly, the US put forward a firm support for Turkey's EU accession process.[15] Consequently, Ankara unleashed domestic political reforms, through which it had to re-configure Kurdish question. Re-conceptualization of the plight of Kurdish citizens, with cultural and social, if not political, frames; would inevitably create implications for Turkey's (northern) Iraq policy.[16]

By the beginning of new century, while the EU reforms were pushing Ankara towards political liberalization, the "neoconservative revolution"[17] was about to be completed in

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[13] Ibid., 58-60, 226-232, 250, 251.

[14] Baskın Oran, "Türk Dış Politikasının Teori ve Pratiği," in "*Türk Dış Politikası: Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar* (*Cilt I: 1919-1980)*, ed. Baskın Oran, 14th ed., (İstanbul: İletişim, 2009), 26. Oran quotes from an official MFA report, which was leaked to *Cumhuriyet* on 13 May 2001.

[15] Uzgel, "ABD ve NATO'yla İlişkiler," 253, 271, 277, 295-297. Oran, "Dönemin Bilançosu, 1990-2001," 230.

[16] Kemal Kirişçi, "The Kurdish Question and Turkish Foreign Policy", in *The Future of Turkish Foreign Policy*, ed. Lenore G. Martin and Dimitris Keridis, (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2004), 277-314.

[17] Michael C. Hudson, "The United States in the Middle East," in *International Relations of the Middle East*, ed. Louise Fawcett, (NY: Oxford University Press, 2005), 298, 301.

Washington. Most of the key posts of President George W. Bush's Republican Administration have been occupied by neo-conservatives, like Vice President Dick Cheney, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz. With the ascendancy of neo-conservatives, the conventional outlook of US foreign policy was challenged by unrealistic global vision and contentious regional ideals. Neoconservatives were more prone to pro-Israeli policies due to their ideological (Zionist) and religious (Jewish-Evangelical Christian) affiliations. They were at "the far-right of the mainstream US foreign policy establishment and was dominated by a coalition of the extremist/militarist wings of the Zionist lobby…and the arms/oil lobbies" represented by Rumsfeld and Cheney.[18] The traditional outlook of the American foreign policy establishment (the Department of the State) was outweighed by the mindset of neoconservatives sitting in the Pentagon and the White House.[19] Neoconservatives "believed, in a highly traditional American cast of mind, that the solution to the world's problems lay in transforming…autocratic regimes into free-enterprise democracies."[20]

"The policy of pre-emption" has long preoccupied the mind of Bush administration.[21] Particularly Cheney and Wolfowitz have shared "a moral claim that the United States has a responsibility to ensure international order."[22] They "wanted the power to strike, without consultation and without warning. They believed in particular that enemies like Saddam could be disposed of only by unilateral action, with the assistance of…Britain and any British associates, like Australia…The horror of 9/11 set the new President…on a neo-conservative path."[23] "The neoconization of US foreign policy"[24] gained more salience after

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[18] Raymond Hinnebusch, "The American Invasion of Iraq: Causes and Consequences," *Perceptions*, (Spring 2007): 9, 10, 14.

[19] Isam al Khafaji, "A Few Days After: State and Society in a Post-Saddam Iraq," in *Iraq at the Crossroads: State and Society in the Shadow of Regime Change (Adelphi Paper 354)*, eds. Toby Dodge and Steven Simon (NY: Oxford University Press for the IISS, 2003), 78, 87. See also Raymond Hinnebusch and Rick Fawn, "Lessons of the Iraq War," in *The Iraq War: Causes and Consequences*, eds. Raymond Hinnebusch and Rick Fawn (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2006), 324.

[20] John Keegan, *The Iraq War*, (NY: Vintage Books, 2005), 95-98.

[21] John Ehrenberg, J. Patrice McSherry, José Ramón Sánchez, and Caroleen Marji Sayej eds., *The Iraq Papers*, (NY: Oxford University Press, 2010), 1-40.

[22] Anthony F. Lang Jr., "The Role of International Law and Ethics," in *The Iraq War: Causes and Consequences*, 271.

[23] Keegan, 98.

[24] Raymond Hinnebusch, "Hegemonic Stability Theory Reconsidered: Implications of the Iraq War," in *The Iraq War: Causes and Consequences*, 298.

11 September 2001, as international environment was securitized under the banner of Bush doctrine. Afghanistan became the first target of US-led war on terrorism. As of December 2001, the US Central Command (CENTCOM) had drafted the initial plan for "an operation against the Saddam regime in Iraq." In January 2002, the US President denounced Saddam regime as belonging to the "axis of evil."[25]

"Bush, a man convinced of his divinely appointed mission…was uniquely vulnerable to the advice of hawks, particularly Paul Wolfowitz, the most consistent advocate of [Iraq] war, whom Bush…found especially persuasive." According to Wolfowitz, "overthrowing Saddam would bring peace and democracy to the Middle East and allow abundant oil to flow to the US."[26] Wolfowitz's framing of the Iraq war implied a "macrotranformationalist" approach. "Under U.S. supervision Iraq can be totally transformed, becoming a beacon of liberal democracy for the Middle East and wider developing world."[27]

Wolfowitz was the most influential figure decisively seeking Turkey's support for the Iraq war. He and Under Secretary of State Marc Grossman visited Ankara on 16 July 2002. Their talks with the Turkish government officials (including Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit) and political-military bureaucrats did not bear fruit.[28] The initial US war plan "for the invasion of Iraq laid heavy emphasis on the need for Turkish co-operation…It needed the use of Turkish airspace…It even more urgently needed transit rights through Turkish territory into northern Iraq, for the passage of a major military force able to engage Saddam's army from a second direction. A division, the 4th Infantry, had been earmarked for the intervention and had been brought to…the eastern Mediterranean." Even if Turkey could not grant transit rights, the deployment of 4th Infantry Division in the Mediterranean would have deceived Saddam to commit at least some troops (presumably two brigades) to the northern front.[29]

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[25] Keegan, 98, 100, 247, 248.

[26] Hinnebusch, "Hegemonic Stability Theory Reconsidered," 298, 314. Hinnnebusch cites Dilip Hiro, *Secrets and Lies: The True Story of the Iraq War*, (London: Politico, 2005), 417, 385.

[27] Toby Dodge, *Inventing Iraq: The Failure of Nation Building and a History Denied*, (NY: Columbia University Press, 2003), x, xi.

[28] Murat Yetkin, *Tezkere: Irak Krizinin Gerçek Öyküsü*, (İstanbul: Remzi Kitapevi, 2004), 53.

[29] Keegan, 137-139, 248.

Therefore, Washington began to implement harsh political pressure over Ankara in order to get permission for military entry into the Turkish territory. Bilateral negotiations aimed to receive consent from the Turkish Parliament for the US military site surveys inside Turkey. These deliberations proved to be a challenging process, as both sides moved towards the making of motion crisis.

5.1.2. Permission for Site Surveys: Moving towards the Motion Crisis

When the Justice and Development Party (AKP/AK PARTi[30]) came to power on 3 November 2002, Iraq war was still at the top of US foreign policy agenda. In order to build a broad-based international military Coalition, the US "sought to construct a legal argument for the war" against Iraq. The US legal productions "served as a counternorm to overcome the standard international law and Security Council procedures upheld by most other states, including some traditional allies of the United States". The UN Security Council Resolution 1441, passed on 8 November 2002, "was selectively used to suggest that Iraq was not being completely up-front about its WMD [weapons of mass destruction] programs."[31]

As of 3 December 2002, Wolfowitz and Grossman were again in Ankara. This time they had talks with Prime Minister Abdullah Gül. This was the first official meeting when the US side offered a military cooperation plan, which involved three incremental stages, i.e. "site inspection, site preparation and actual operation." Both sides agreed to go with the plan. Even though the Turkish side had warned that the cooperation for the first and second stages would not guarantee the cooperation for the third stage, before all else the US side preferred to hear what they had wanted to. "The Turkish government insisted that any Turkish involvement had to be amply offset by taking into account the political, economic and diplomatic costs that Turkey would incur as a result."[32]

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[30] Within the textual analysis, the reader would come across contextual usages of both AKP (common scholarly reference) and AK PARTi (institutional reference) as acronyms of the Justice and Development Party. For the institutional reference, see "AK PARTi Kurum Kimliği Klavuzu (2006)," <http://www.akparti.org.tr/AKPARTi%20Kurumsal.pdf> 24 March 2008.

[31] Lang Jr., 272-274.

[32] Ali A. Allawi, *The Occupation of Iraq: Winning the War, Losing the Peace*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007), 87, 88. See also Yetkin, 99-105.

On 10 December 2002, AKP leader Recep Tayyip Erdoğan visited the White House. At that time, Erdoğan was not the prime minister of Turkey. For this reason, he could hardly speak on behalf of the Turkish government's position vis-à-vis the Iraq war. He was not able to give any promises. On the other hand, Erdoğan hinted the serious predicament for the US coalition building efforts. Participation of regional (Arab-Muslim) countries, like Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Syria, and Jordan, was deemed important by Erdoğan.[33]

US demands were basically about the opening of northern front for the Iraq war. While AKP officials went on negotiating with the US, Turkish people, by and large, were getting wary about the situation. Almost 90 percent of Turkish public was opposing to any kind of war against Iraq. AKP was wedged between enormous US pressure and rising popular opposition. For AKP, US political and economic support was crucial. Financial crisis in 2001 was still fresh in the collective memory. In 2002 national budget had given approximately 2.3 percent deficit. Total debt was around 250 billion dollars. In any condition, International Monetary Fund (IMF) program had to be sustained. At the first hand, AKP government needed US financial and diplomatic support. Therefore, it could not reject US war demands in an open and more direct way. Ignoring domestic public opinion would also be too costly.[34]

As war had been looming large on the horizon of Iraq, Turkey's political-military bureaucracy became primarily concerned about the damage that would be incurred on state interests. Domestic ramifications of the Gulf War and subsequent changes in international and regional status quo proved to be fatal for Turkey's economy and security.[35] Thus, AKP had to first opt for continuation of status quo and buy some time. Prime Minister Abdullah Gül, Minister of Foreign Affairs Yaşar Yakış and their adviser Ahmet Davutoğlu sought for diplomatic solutions. In this regard, Turkish government led the formation of "Iraq's Neighbors Group" in order to prevent invasion and/or protect territorial integrity of Iraq. On 23 January 2003, Turkey hosted the first of these regional diplomatic consultations in

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[33] Yetkin, 109.

[34] Meliha Altunışık, "Turkey's Iraq Policy: The War and Beyond," *Journal of Contemporary European Studies* 14, no. 2, (August 2006): 187-189. Altunışık provides a long list including Washington's overtly ambitious demands from Ankara. Among those demands most significant were opening of several air bases and seaports without any notification requirement, deployment of 120,000 US and British combat troops, troop contribution of around 35,000 to 40,000. In exchange, the US offered six billion dollars in aid, in addition to some 26 billion dollars in loan guarantees.

[35] Mustafa Aydin and Damla Aras, "Political Conditionality of Economic Relations Between Paternalist States: Turkey's Interaction with Iran, Iraq, and Syria," *Arab Studies Quarterly* 27, no. 1-2, (Winter-Spring 2005): 21-43.

İstanbul.[36] Gül's close friend, Fehmi Koru was also supportive of policies directed towards the prevention of war. From the very beginning, Koru staunchly defended that Turkey should not get involved in this war whatsoever.[37]

Why were these key figures so concerned about preventing the war? What was their major mode of reasoning? Given his academic credentials, Davutoğlu could well be regarded as the master mind, who had been trying to intellectually orchestrate AKP's foreign policy making process behind the scenes. Davutoğlu's making of Turkey's Iraq policy had pointed to a deeply geopolitical and economic rationale, rather than a purely solidarity reasoning. According to this wisdom, pumping of oil from the Kirkuk-Yumurtalık pipeline was the key material reason for Turkey's cooperation with Iraq.[38] For geopolitical reasons, Davutoğlu strongly opposed Turkey's concrete contribution to and direct involvement into the war. The US war against Iraq could not serve Turkey's own interests.[39] Seen through the utilitarian perspective, the war had nothing to do with US national interests either. On these terms, it could even be regarded as "unnecessary." At best, it would serve to the special (oil-arms) interests of the religious-ideological (Evangelical-Zionist) coalition ruling in Washington.[40]

By implication, AKP government did not have the wherewithal to thwart war ambitions of the Bush administration against the Saddam regime. The unfolding of events also reiterated the fact that Ankara could not prevent the war between Washington and Baghdad. Therefore, Turkey's state (political-military) bureaucracy sided with the idea of

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[36] Nuri Yeşilyurt, "Orta Doğu'yla İlişkiler," in *Türk Dış Politikası: Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar* (*Cilt III: 2001-2012*), ed. Baskın Oran, (İstanbul: İletişim, 2013), 405, 406.

[37] Yetkin, 113.

[38] Ahmet Davutoğlu, *Stratejik Derinlik: Türkiye'nin Uluslararası Konumu* (İstanbul: Küre Yayınları, 2001), 180, 181, 363, 400, 411, 416, 423, 437-453. The index of the book has no entry on "Turkmen" or "Iraqi Turkmen" but "Kirkuk-Yumurtalık pipeline." See for these entries pages 576 and 583.

[39] Gürkan Zengin*, Hoca: Türk Dış Politikası'nda "Davutoğlu Etkisi"*, (İstanbul: İnkılâp Kitapevi, 2010), 142, 143. Gürkan Zengin, *Editör Programı*, CNN Türk, 12 February 2002. This interview was reprinted in Ahmet Davutoğlu, *Küresel Bunalım:11 Eylül Konuşmaları*, ed. Faruk Deniz, 14th ed., (İstanbul: Küre Yayınları, 2013), 197-207. See also Derya Sazak, "Sohbet Odası," *Milliyet*, 13 January 2003. This interview is reprinted in Ahmet Davutoğlu, *Teoriden Pratiğe: Türk Dış Politikası Üzerine Konuşmalar*, eds. Semih Atiş-Sevinç Alkan Özcan, 2nd ed., (İstanbul: Küre Yayınları, 2013), 89-94.

[40] Raymond Hinnebusch, "The US Invasion of Iraq: Explanations and Implications," *Critique: Critical Middle Eastern Studies* 16, no.3 (Fall 2007): 209-212, 223-226. Hinnebusch cites John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt, "An Unnecessary War," *Foreign Policy*, (January/February 2003): 50-60.

opening the northern front. Their decision was based on security reasons, like balancing the PKK threat and eliminating the creation of a Kurdish state in northern Iraq.[41] However, President Ahmet Necdet Sezer took a normative stance and argued for a multilateral military action only if it is based on international legitimacy. Turkish General Staff (TGS) also would have preferred to act on the basis of a UN mandate or some kind of a NATO umbrella or even a regional initiative. These options waned by the end of January 2003, when significant amount of US and British troops completed their deployment into the Persian Gulf. Opening of the northern front was the last resort for the TGS. Their situation was like choosing between a rock and a hard place. Non-cooperation with the US might cost much more than collaboration. Rational action would inevitably involve cost-effect analysis. This was the time that Turkey had to take some risks.[42]

Since military intervention against Iraq had political and economic implications, TGS officials coordinated their efforts with their civilian counterparts almost on a daily basis. During the crisis period, AKP government held regular discussions with the bureaucrats of MFA and officials of TGS. Process of deliberation over the Iraq war facilitated AKP government to re-conceptualize their approach to political-military interests. One would argue that attitude of TGS and MFA might have had some influence on AKP decisions. To a certain extent, it was security interests that had driven AKP towards cooperation with the US for pre-war arrangements, i.e. site survey and base modernization. On 6 February 2003, the first motion was passed with a 308 to 193 margin. AKP suffered 53 against votes from its own ranks.[43]

Despite strategic interests and military considerations, the situation in northern Iraq was also a matter of identity for AKP officials. As the leader of AKP, Erdoğan articulated a dual position in mid-February 2003. Even though he was morally against the war, the Government would do whatever necessary in order to protect Turkey's interests. In a sense, Erdoğan's ambivalent stance was falling somewhere in between utilitarian and ideational modes of reasoning. While dealing with the issue of war in Iraq, he opted for a mixed

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[41] Fikret Bilâ, *Ankara'da Irak Savaşları: Sivil Darbe Girişimi ve Gizli Belgelerle 1 Mart Tezkeresi*, (İstanbul: Güncel Yayıncılık, 2007), 160-165, 277-279, 283-307. Deniz Bölükbaşı, *1 Mart Vakası: Irak Tezkeresi ve Sonrası*, (İstanbul: Doğan Yayıncılık), 36-51.

[42] Mim Kemal Öke, *Derviş ve Komutan: Özgürlük-Güvenlik Sarkacındaki Türkiye'nin Kimlik Sorunsalı*, (İstanbul: Alfa, 2004), 360-369.

[43] Yetkin, 116-119, 128-130, 149. See also Öke, 187-189.

approach in order to achieve economic and security interests without frustrating socio-political and ethno-religious concerns.[44]

President Sezer's normative attitude became influential during the National Security Council (NSC) meetings, including the last one on 28 February 2003. NSC did not take any binding decision and did not recommend any specific course of action either. The second motion, which would virtually open up the northern front, was voted on 1 March 2003. Of 533 parliamentarians in that session, 19 abstained and 250 voted against the motion. The number of advocates reached 264 but fell short of meeting the constitutional requirement of 268. Among the opponents, there were 99 deputies from the AKP. It was reported that some of AKP's representatives from southeastern cities[45] had voted against the motion for ethnic reasons, thinking that Turkey's participation into the war could yield negative repercussions on the Iraqi Kurds.[46] They were more likely acting upon sense of a shared ethnic identity.[47]

In a sense, the motion crisis marked the political significance of solidarity rationale in Turkey's Iraq policy discourse. Before the war, ideational reasoning would become quite influential in halting Ankara's cooperation *against* Baghdad. But this rhetoric remained weak in defining Turkey's discursive position vis-à-vis the US invasion. The event analysis section substantiates this point.

5.2. The Event Analysis: Frames, Models and Modes of Reasoning

Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan read his government program on 19 March 2003. The program stipulated that Turkey's policy towards the Iraqi problem was rationalized around political, military and economic interests. Protection of interests was the most salient political frame that determined AKP government's discursive position during

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[44] Altunışık, 189, 195.

[45] The number of AKP deputies in eastern and south eastern electoral districts was at least 56. Statistical Data for the General Elections of 3 November 2002, <http://www.ysk.gov.tr/ysk/docs/2002secim/turkiye/cevremilletvekilisayisi.htm> 31 December 2007.

[46] Yetkin, 172, 173.

[47] Ian O. Lesser, "Turkey: 'Recessed' Islamic Politics and Convergence With the West," in *The Muslim World After 9/11*, Angel M. Rabasa et al. (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2004), 181-183. See also Öke, 360-369.

the Iraqi crisis. If and when those interests were threatened, AKP government would take appropriate decisions, in order to guarantee "the survival of state and the well-being of nation."[48] According to the program read by Erdoğan:

> We [the government] wish the Iraqi problem would be resolved within the framework of UN decisions…Our government attaches great importance to the protection of Iraq's territorial integrity and political unity. We consider that Iraq's under and over ground resources belong to the Iraqi people. Our desire is that the main constituencies of Iraq; Turkmen, Arabs, Kurds and other communities would live in peace.[49]

At this point, the new government was ready, if not eager, to renew the second motion, which was declined by the TGNA on 1 March 2003. There was an urgent need to provision modalities of Turkey's further cooperation with the US in its war effort against Iraq. No sooner had the US President George W. Bush declared 48 hours ultimatum—for Saddam Hussein and his sons Uday and Kusay to leave Iraq—the Istanbul stock-exchange faced a sharp decline. Financial collapse of 17 March 2003 was called as "the Black Monday."[50] In order to eliminate the volatility in domestic market—which might have been generated by perceived concerns rather than the real causes—the third motion has to be passed, even before the new government would seek the vote of confidence on 23 March 2003. Notwithstanding the domestic public opinion,[51] the AKP officials were certain that this time the motion, with the minor changes only in its wording, could be approved by the overwhelming majority of AKP deputies.[52]

Just like the second, the third motion would allow the US army to station 62 thousand ground troops in Turkey. Of that total, 17 thousand was expected to participate into the

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[48] "İkinci AK Parti Dönemi," <http://yenisafak.com.tr/Arsiv/2003/Mart/19/index.html.>. 26 March 2012. TBMM Bürosu, "[Başbakan Erdoğan:] Çıkarımızı Koruyacağız," <http://yenisafak.com.tr/Arsiv/2003/Mart/19/politika.html> 26 March 2012.

[49] TBMM Bürosu, "[Başbakan Erdoğan:] Çıkarımızı Koruyacağız," <http://yenisafak.com.tr/Arsiv/2003/Mart/19/politika.html> 26 March 2012.

[50] "Küresel Kriz Çıkar," "Piyasalar Sakin," "Borsa Normale Döndü," <http://yenisafak.com.tr/Arsiv/2003/Mart/19/> 26 March 2012.

[51] "Halk, Irak'a Saldırısında ABD ile İşbirliği İstemiyor," <http://yenisafak.com.tr/Arsiv/2003/Mart/19/e4.html> 26 March 2012.

[52] Nevzat Demirkol-Bilal Çetin, "Hükümet Tezkereden Emin," <http://yenisafak.com.tr/Arsiv/2003/Mart/19/p5.html>, Veli Toprak, "ABD'nin 'Mali' Baskısı Tezkereyi Erkene Aldırdı," <http://yenisafak.com.tr/Arsiv/2003/Mart/19/p7.html> 26 March 2012.

ground offensive to be launched in northern Iraq. Remaining 45 thousand of US soldiers would stay in the Turkish territory for logistical purposes.[53] Some of those soldiers were desperately seeking to rent suitable lands for their bases, as the US ultimatum of 48 hours was about to expire. While the UN officials were leaving from Baghdad, the US military was coordinating the initiation of a command center in especially KDP (Barzani) held areas of northern Iraq.[54]

Enhancement of cooperation between the US and the Iraqi Kurdish groups had always been a serious concern for the Turkish policy makers. Staying out of the game in northern Iraq seemed to be too risky for Ankara. Hence, the Turkish diplomacy kept open its contact channels, with almost all players. Despite the vocal opposition of KDP and PUK circles, Turkish diplomats sought to garner verbal assurances from Ambassador Zhalmay Khalilzad, the US President's Special Representative for Iraq, to preserve regional stability and to protect the rights of Turkmen during and after the war.[55]

To a certain extent, the joint declaration of the Ankara summit addressed Turkey's political-military concerns vis-à-vis the Iraq war. Officials from the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs acknowledged that "all participants displayed a constructive attitude." In addition to Khalilzad, the PUK leader Celal Talabani, the KDP representative Nechirvan Barzani, the leader of Iraqi Turkmen Front Sanan Ahmet Aga, the chief of Iraqi National Congress (INC) Ahmet Çelebi, the representative of SCIRI (High Council of Islamic Revolution) Abdelaziz Al Hakim, and representatives from Assyrian Democratic Movement and Iraqi National Conciliation Movement have participated to the meetings in Ankara. With the joint declaration all participants agreed that;

> - Iraq's territorial integrity, national unity, independence and sovereignty will be protected. All regions and cities inside the country are the land of Iraq as a whole.
> - In order to strengthen the national economy, the natural resources, which are the national wealth of Iraq, will be used for the [benefit of] Iraqi people.

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[53] TBMM Bürosu, "[Başbakan Erdoğan:] Çıkarımızı Koruyacağız," <http://yenisafak.com.tr/Arsiv/2003/Mart/19/politika.html> 26 March 2012.

[54] Veli Toprak, "ABD'nin 'Mali' Baskısı Tezkereyi Erkene Aldırdı," Sabgetullah Anmal, "ABD Güneydoğu'ya Adım Adım Yerleşiyor," "Salatalık Değil 'Coni' Tarlası"; "Irak'ta Kimse Kalmadı," "Küresel Kriz Çıkar," "Göç Dalgası Geliyor," <http://yenisafak.com.tr/Arsiv/2003/Mart/19/> 26 March 2012.

[55] Kaan İpekçioğlu, "Ankara'da Türkmen ve Asker Pazarlığı," <http://yenisafak.com.tr/Arsiv/2003/Mart/19/p6.html> 26 March 2012.

- The constituent people of Iraq are Arabs, Kurds, Turkmen, Assyrians, Chaldeans and others. The rights and freedoms of all these constituent nations will be assured.
- Terrorism and support for terror will be prevented. Provisioning of arms and safe havens for terrorists will not be permitted at all.[56]

The joint declaration was a significant development in terms of challenging the assumption that the US could not go to war, without opening the northern front in Turkey. In fact, the indispensability of Turkey for US war effort was the major frame reiterated by the leading columnist of *Yeni Şafak* Fehmi Koru. As a frame of presupposition, the indispensability thesis was (re)deployed by Taha Kıvanç—Koru's pen name.

5.2.1. Opening the Air Corridor: Deployment of Indispensability Theses

Kıvanç argued that "all of the US war plans depend on the opening of a front in the north (i.e. in Turkey); Washington does not have a Plan B; if it does, Plan B as well as Plan C" included Turkey. When the motion was rejected, "did Washington say that it 'quitted from the northern front' and [notified its war] ships in the Mediterranean to 'move to the south.'" Quite the contrary, the US war ships have been hanging around "the Turkish territorial waters" for almost three weeks and "some of them disembarked their loads to the port of Alexandretta, without any permission." As Ankara took a tougher line against joining the war, diplomatic position of the US, especially in the UN platform, had been weakened. In fact, this was the second thesis of Kıvanç. The third thesis was built on the first and the second. Without the UN blessing and the Turkish support, "the US could do nothing" to instigate an illegitimate war. To Kıvanç's dismay, the "war lobby" in Washington, had been attempting "to establish a world order along their private interests by using the power of America" and hence conducting "psychological warfare" against Turkey. They have yet to receive the strongest message from Ankara. In this regard, Kıvanç expected that Erdoğan

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[56] "Muhalifler Zirvesinde Ankara'nın İstediği Oldu," <http://yenisafak.com.tr/Arsiv/2003/Mart/20/p4.html> 26 March 2012.

government would turn down the recent request of US for accession into the Turkish airspace. Otherwise, TGNA would hopefully reject the motion.[57]

Like Kıvanç, Turkey's former Minister of Foreign Affairs Yakış formidably believed in the indispensability thesis: "I think that the US has not given up stationing of soldiers in Turkey's lands. In case this happens, a new motion might come to the agenda."[58] By the beginning of war, Turkey's foreign policy discourse was primarily imprisoned by a pervasive geopolitical vision that is predetermined by the indispensability assumption: without Turkey's indispensable support, the US could not instigate the war on Iraq. As a frame of presupposition, the discursive logic behind indispensability thesis largely rested on Turkey's geopolitical position. Geopolitical framing of Turkey's position by Kıvanç (Koru) constituted a major discursive point for the rationalization of war policies.

Before the beginning of war, geopolitical mode of reasoning, propounded by Koru, provided the basic discursive logic for the AKP government to resist to sheer US power. According to Kıvanç, "the general publishing director of Turkey's best selling newspaper" had portrayed him as the mastermind behind the failure of second motion.[59] The alleged political role of Koru was also scrutinized by Robert Pearson, the US Ambassador in Ankara.[60]

According to Koru, the Erdoğan government was hastily driven towards securing a parliamentary approval for the same motion that had not been accepted less than twenty days ago. As Koru saw, there was no reason for Turkey to take part in this illegitimate war. The US was far from providing factual evidence that might make its war claims legitimate. Both Hans Blix, the leader of UN team for weapons inspection in Iraq, and Muhammad Al Baradei, the chief of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), strongly refuted the US war claims, which had been based on Iraq's acquisition of WMD capability. Since the 9/11 attacks, the US has continuously alleged a link between the secular, socialist Baath regime

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[57] Taha Kıvanç, "Savaş Üzerine Tezler," <http://yenisafak.com.tr/Arsiv/2003/Mart/20/tkivanc.html> 26 March 2012.

[58] "Kuzey Cephesiz Olmaz," <http://yenisafak.com.tr/Arsiv/2003/Mart/22/>, "ABD Kuzeye Mahkum," <http://yenisafak.com.tr/Arsiv/2003/Mart/22/p2.html>, 26 March 2012.

[59] Taha Kıvanç, "Olmaz, Olmaz, Olur...", <http://yenisafak.com.tr/Arsiv/2003/Mart/25/tkivanc.html> 14 April 2012.

[60] Taha Kıvanç, "Gerçek Dünya, Sanal Dünya," <http://yenisafak.com.tr/Arsiv/2003/Mart/24/tkivanc.html> 26 March 2012. Kıvanç put quotes from the long piece published in *Christian Science Monitor* by Ilene R. Prusher.

and the radical, Islamist Al Qaeda terrorist organization. Yet those allegations still remained unproven. If the motion passed from the TGNA, the Turkish government would not only be held accountable for "the launching of an unjust war," but also become exposed to "joint responsibility" of lawlessness that might emerge out of "the war that lacks international legitimacy."[61]

Kıvanç reiterated that economic downturn, either perceived or real, could not provide a good excuse for the AKP government to incline towards a pro-war stance. Even the war makers, namely George W. Bush and Tony Blair, preferred hiding their economic motivations in order not to give a bad impression. Turkey should not be a country that appeared to "count money as a cause of war." Thus, TGNA rejected Washington's financial aid package, a bribing offer of 26 billion dollars. By doing so, Ankara did choose to stay out of the war and did not give a free hand to the US land forces to open the northern front.[62]

Kıvanç's negative framing of US economic assistance was almost echoed by Prime Minister Erdoğan. At his first in-country visit in Çorum, he asserted that they did not "speak [in terms of financial] numbers" with the US. "Now, all of our calculation is political and military." With regard to the new motion, there is no "uncertainty." Two things have been clarified. First and foremost, the motion would allow "the entry of Turkish military into northern Iraq." Secondly, "the air corridor (over flights)" would be opened for the US war planes.[63] In a sense, rhetoric of the third motion demonstrated Ankara's discursive desire to construct reasons for (re)entering into northern Iraq.

5.2.2. Rhetoric of the Third Motion: Constructing Reasons for Re-Entry

The latest telephone diplomacy between Gül and US Secretary of State Colin Powell made it clear that economic dimension of the Turkish-US bilateral negotiations almost collapsed, while the other two tiers (political and military) somehow resumed. The financial

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[61] Fehmi Koru, "Neden?", <http://yenisafak.com.tr/Arsiv/2003/Mart/19/fkoru.html> 26 March 2012.

[62] Taha Kıvanç, "Savaşa Yuvarlanıyor muyuz?", <http://yenisafak.com.tr/Arsiv/2003/Mart/19/tkivanc.html> 26 March 2012.

[63] "Erdoğan: ABD ile Para Konuşmuyoruz," <http://yenisafak.com.tr/Arsiv/2003/Mart/20/politika.html>; Veli Toprak, "ABD ile Anlaşma Sadece Siyasî ve Askerî," <http://yenisafak.com.tr/Arsiv/2003/Mart/20/> 26 March 2012.

aid package, which had already been reduced to 6 billion dollars, was not on the negotiation table. The US would only assist Turkey in steering the IMF mandated economic program. On the other hand, the US government remained quite conducive to Ankara's political-military demands, i.e. the stationing of Turkish troops in northern Iraq and the acceptance of Turkmen as constituent elements of Iraq. Turkish soldiers were expected to "enter into Iraq as part of international coalition" under the leadership of "Turkish commander." In exchange, the Turkish government agreed to provide air access for transit purposes. The motion would only allow the US war planes to fly over the designated routes. In spite of US demands, the refueling within Turkish air space would not be permitted. Powell insisted that the motion be voted on 19 March 2003, almost in concert with the initiation of US air bombardment against Iraq. This was a late call. On that day, the Turkish government was only able to send the motion to the TGNA. The voting seemed impossible to take place before 20 March 2003.[64]

Yeni Şafak reported that "American and British soldiers had entered into the demilitarized zone in Kuwait-Iraq border." While flying over the southern no fly zone, the US fighter jets bombed some of the Iraqi positions that shot fire at them. Baghdadis were completing their last preparations for the war. They believed that their "city of peace" had turned into a "city of ghosts."[65]

Under these circumstances, what could be the meaning of new motion for the policymakers in Ankara? According to Koru, it might be regarded as submission to the desires of "war lobby in Washington." The Iraq war was not a new project for them. The "gang of hawks" has been working on this war for more than ten years. This became more apparent when the "Project for New American Century (PNAC)" was inaugurated in 2000. PNAC had desire to establish a "power-based global administration like the 'Roman Empire.'" Their regional goal was to transform the Middle East along Israel's interests. In this regard, Turkey's support for regional transformation was important for two main reasons. As a key Muslim country, Turkey could eliminate the resilient and detrimental stigma, associated with "the clash of civilizations." Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, Turkey could assume a linchpin role in the making of *Pax Americana*, like the "vassal

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[64] "Powell'dan Çirkin Oyun," "Powell'den Çirkin Diplomasi," "Tezkere Genişleyebilir", <http://yenisafak.com.tr/Arsiv/2003/Mart/20/> 26 March 2012.

[65] "Çöl Kâbus Olacak," <http://yenisafak.com.tr/Arsiv/2003/Mart/20/dunya.html>, "Bağdat'ta Hüzün Var," <http://yenisafak.com.tr/Arsiv/2003/Mart/20/d2.html>, "Amerikan Savaş Uçakları Irak'ın Batısını Bombaladı," <http://yenisafak.com.tr/Arsiv/2003/Mart/20/d5.html> 26 March 2012.

states" of Roman times. Put in other words, votes for the third motion would clearly and "enormously" play into the hands of war makers in Washington.[66] During the voting of previous two motions, the Turkish government claimed that "Turkey would not participate into the war." They argued that the motions were needed only to have an influence over the Baath regime in Iraq. This argument proved to be invalid, because the US began to bomb Baghdad, after it had received access to the Turkish airspace.[67]

According to Turkey's President Ahmet Necdet Sezer, the "process" at the UN Security Council had to be finalized. Without the conclusion of that process, the US took a "unilateral" action. He reasserted that the US decision to wage war against Iraq was not "right."[68]

Nonetheless, the motion that handed authority to the government for six months was accepted by the TGNA. The motion included the opening of Turkish airspace to the foreign (read US) military forces and the sending of Turkish troops to contingencies in abroad (read northern Iraq). Among the present 535 deputies, 1 abstained and 202 voted against. The motion passed with 302 votes. The number of defectors among the AKP was around 15. Both Erdoğan and Gül put personal pressure on their own ranks to keep the impact of defections at a marginal level. This time, their arguments might have seemed to be more convincing. Erdoğan asserted that Turkey had done its best for peace. As he put, the acceptance of motion was a requirement with regard to enhancement of border security by the Turkish Armed Forces and sustenance of good relations with the US. "We govern the country in line with the realities of the world and Turkey. There are four years ahead of us. No one should scorn the economy. Yesterday I was in Çorum. No one asked [any question] about Iraq. Everyone was concerned about [their own] well-being. Economic failure may hurt us tomorrow."[69] The US support for the economy was still critical, especially in terms of

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[66] Fehmi Koru, "Tezkere Ne Anlama Geliyor?", <http://yenisafak.com.tr/Arsiv/2003/Mart/20/fkoru.html> 26 March 2012.

[67] Fehmi Koru, "Bağdat'a Düşen Bombalar," <http://yenisafak.com.tr/Arsiv/2003/Mart/21/fkoru.html> 26 March 2012.

[68] "ABD'nin Savaş Kararı Doğru Değil," <http://yenisafak.com.tr/arsiv/2003/mart/21/politika.html> 26 March 2012.

[69] "Tezkere Kabul Edildi," <http://yenisafak.com.tr/arsiv/2003/mart/21/politika.html>, Bilal Çetin-Veli Toprak, "1 Milyar Dolarlık Teklif," <http://yenisafak.com.tr/arsiv/2003/mart/21/p2.html> 26 March 2012.

managing the IMF program. Due to the Iraqi crisis, additional economic measures had to be taken.[70]

After the first motion, which had passed on 6 February 2003, around 2,500 US military personnel came for site survey and modernization of former bases. Had the second motion not been rejected, approximately 40,000 US ground troops could have entered into the Turkish territory. Erdoğan, reiterated that the third motion would not allow either stationing of the US land forces and using of air bases by the US war planes. "In the new motion, there was not any point that might cause anxiety." After Erdoğan, Gül took the turn to persuade AKP deputies. He told that Americans would be more than satisfied by receiving only the permission for over flights. Under this circumstance, the US would not make any financial commitment. As pointed out by Gül, Americans pledged "1 billion dollars in exchange for the over fight permission, the use of İncirlik and other bases." This offer meant almost full cooperation and hence a return to the rejected motion. In exchange for the stationing of US troops, the Turkish side asked for the earlier bill, that was 6 billion dollars. As a result, the US side decided not to use the Turkish air bases.[71] Instead of Turkey, Israel and Egypt could well receive their fair share from the US financial aid package.[72]

The motion had passed even before the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) was drafted. The first MoU for the site surveys and base modernizations was signed and put into effect. Based on a full-scale military cooperation, including the use of Turkish air space, the second MoU was drafted and negotiated. Nevertheless, it was not signed due to the rejection of the second motion. To delineate new modalities of cooperation, Pearson and Uğur Ziyal, Undersecretary of Turkish MFA, started a new round of talks. No sooner had the motion passed, the British Ambassador in Ankara, Sir Peter J. Westmacott expressed his government's desire to have access to the Turkish air space, once again.[73]

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[70] "Millî Direniş," <http://yenisafak.com.tr/arsiv/2003/mart/21/e2.html>, Hüseyin Özay, "Ek Tedbirler Alacağız," <http://yenisafak.com.tr/arsiv/2003/mart/21/ekonomi.html> 26 March 2012.

[71] Bilal Çetin-Veli Toprak, "1 Milyar Dolarlık Teklif," http://yenisafak.com.tr/arsiv/2003/mart/21/p2.html> 26 March 2012.

[72] "Irak Krizi Yardımı İsrail'e," <http://yenisafak.com.tr/arsiv/2003/mart/21/ekonomi.html>, "Mısır Irak'ı İki Milyar Dolara Sattı," <http://yenisafak.com.tr/Arsiv/2003/Mart/22/dunya.html> 26 March 2012.

[73] "İngiliz 'Hava' Peşinde," <http://yenisafak.com.tr/arsiv/2003/mart/21/p5.html>, Kaan İpekçioğlu, "Mutabakat Sözde Kaldı," <http://yenisafak.com.tr/arsiv/2003/mart/21/p4.html> 26 March 2012.

As re-negotiations were underway, the Coalition forces took control of Umm Qasr and Safwan, two Iraqi cities in the south.[74] In stark contrast to the Gulf War, Turkey decided not to close the Kirkuk-Yumurtalık pipeline, so long as it remains unharmed. Interestingly enough, Turkey sought assurances from the US in order to increase the capacity for oil flow.[75] Unlike the oil issue, the Kurdish question proved to be a major predicament for Turkey's cooperation with the US. Kurdish groups in northern Iraq have pledged full and unconditional support to the Coalition Forces. Under this pretext, primarily KDP, and to a lesser extent PUK, was against any Turkish military involvement into the war.[76]

On the other hand, Government Spokesman Cemil Çiçek, reasserted the fact that entering into northern Iraq during the war, was the "policy of the state."

> Before so long, Turkey has determined and made public its policy towards Iraq. This is the state's policy. In other words, it is not AK Party [AKP] government's policy. Currently, the policy that we implement vis-à-vis Iraq, as I underline, is a state policy. It is [as simple as] this: We want Iraq's territorial integrity. We do not find reshaping of the geography as right. The business [or the dealing] that we do is not a money bargain. What we look for is a political arrangement. A military agreement could only bring about [that kind of] political arrangement…We do have a first-hand interest on the incident that took place in Iraq. Our security concerns have to be assured. This is our first request from the US.[77]

Despite the rising expectations in Ankara, bilateral relations with the US were still under the fire of "motion war." This was mainly due to the uncertain attitudes in Washington. The statements made by US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld were quite illustrative in this regard: "From time to time, Turks go in and out northern Iraq. In this regard, some [not too many] Turkish soldiers might be [temporarily available] in northern Iraq." As far as the US war planning efforts were concerned, the US Special Forces were

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[74] "Sirenler Hiç Susmadı," <http://yenisafak.com.tr/arsiv/2003/mart/21/d2.html> 26 March 2012.

[75] "Yumurtalık'tan Petrol Sevkiyatı Devam Ediyor," <http://yenisafak.com.tr/arsiv/2003/mart/21/e7.html> 26 March 2012.

[76] "Türkiye'yle Dostuz Ama...", <http://yenisafak.com.tr/arsiv/2003/mart/21/p6.html> Kaan İpekçioğlu, "Ankara'da Türkmen ve Asker Pazarlığı," <http://yenisafak.com.tr/Arsiv/2003/Mart/19/p6.html> 26 March 2012.

[77] "Çiçek: Irak Politikası Devlet Politikasıdır," <http://yenisafak.com.tr/Arsiv/2003/Mart/22/p4.html> 26 March 2012. See also Yetkin, *Tezkere*, 197. According to Yetkin, Çiçek was attempting to (re)distribute the responsibility of especially political (MFA) and military (TGS) bureaucracy in the making of Turkey's Iraq policy.

extensively engaged with the Kurdish militias in northern Iraq. Therefore, the modalities of (long-term) Turkish military presence in northern Iraq have not been resolved. Approximately four months of negotiations were yet to conclude on this outstanding issue.[78]

Ankara could not secure a political assurance from Washington that would give consent to the Turkish Armed Forces' entry into northern Iraq. For this reason, Erdoğan government remained cautious. At least in the beginning, they were not hasty and did not rush to open the airspace immediately. Due to recurrent requests by Powell and Pearson, Erdoğan had to convene a "security summit" with key officials in his office. After the summit, Minister of Defense Vecdi Gönül made a public statement: "As a result, it was determined that the opening of Turkish air space would be favorable to the interests of Turkey." Hence, Erdoğan informed Powell on their decision. On the phone, both sides agreed to further military cooperation based on "humanitarian purposes", like emergency landing and medical evacuation.[79]

On the question of the Turkish Armed Forces' entry into northern Iraq, Gönül reiterated the fact that negotiations have still lingered on. "[T]he issue of Turkish [military] presence in northern Iraq…[and] its implementation will be brought to a certain end by the mutual talks of our diplomats and [the officers of] our General Staff"…with their American counterparts.[80] Upon his return from the EU summit in Brussels, Gül claimed that all problems with the US had been resolved. In many fields, areas of cooperation have not been made public. Turkey's cooperation with the US has been "a dynamic process." Therefore, the Turkish government could not let anyone damage those relations. Gül also made it clear that the Turkish soldiers would enter into northern Iraq for security reasons. "We have not an eye on northern Iraq…Our sensitivity is that this region should not be a nest for terror, once again by taking the opportunity of [political] vacuum. We do not have any other intention." These remarks were welcomed, especially by his German, French, Spanish and Greek

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[78] "Koridorda Ayak Oyunu," <http://yenisafak.com.tr/Arsiv/2003/Mart/22/>, Veli Toprak, Kaan İpekçioğlu, "Powell, Diplomasiyi 'Koridor'a Sıkıştırdı," <http://yenisafak.com.tr/Arsiv/2003/Mart/22/politika.html>, 26 March 2012.

[79] "ABD Elçisi Pearson Gece-Gündüz Dışişleri'nde," <http://yenisafak.com.tr/Arsiv/2003/Mart/22/p10.html>, Veli Toprak, Kaan İpekçioğlu, "Powell, Diplomasiyi 'Koridor'a Sıkıştırdı," <http://yenisafak.com.tr/Arsiv/2003/Mart/22/politika.html> 26 March 2012.

[80] Veli Toprak, Kaan İpekçioğlu, "Powell, Diplomasiyi 'Koridor'a Sıkıştırdı," <http://yenisafak.com.tr/Arsiv/2003/Mart/22/politika.html> 26 March 2012.

counterparts. In order to alleviate the economic burden of Iraq war on Turkey's shoulders, the EU side offered a financial aid package of 2 billion Euros.[81]

Yeni Şafak claimed that the rise of Euro, as an alternative global currency, was one of the major causes of Iraq war.[82] What would be the impact of the warfare between dollar and euro on Turkey? Various proposals have been circulating to steer the ailing Turkish economy on the brink of various sorts of wars.[83] In addition to the money wars, global arena was under the shadow of geopolitical struggle between the US and the EU. Could Turkey take the advantage of EU's oppositional stance towards the US war on Iraq? According to *Yeni Şafak*, the answer was positive: "Due to its geographic location, Turkey, is a country that none of the global powers can dispense with." The divide between the US and the Continental Europe (led by Germany and France) provided a wider space for Turkey's foreign policy maneuvers. The rivalry among global powers, the entente of US-UK and the loose oppositional bloc formed by Germany-France axis, Russia and China, would provide favorable conditions for Turkey to increase its regional influence over Caucasus, Central Asia and the Middle East. Located at the center of these regions, Ankara could play an active role in the making of energy policies, especially in the East Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf.[84]

In addition to the external power struggle, the Iraq war also unleashed internal challenges for the AKP government. Koru perceived and thus treated the war as a discursive battle for winning the hearts and minds particularly inside Turkey. The power of media, or war in the media, has been shaping the political scene. "Under conditions of confusion, media can stir the already confused minds, and in this way it can shorten the life of [incumbent] governments. Washington's war against Iraq created a complicated environment…Now, the media are using this confusion to settle [scores] against their disliked Ak Party government." In terms of war in the media, the discursive performance of

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[81] "AB Kesenin Ağzını Açtı: 2 Milyar Euro," <http://yenisafak.com.tr/Arsiv/2003/Mart/22/p5.html> 26 March 2012.

[82] "ABD Doları Dünyaya Hakim Kılmak İstiyor," <http://yenisafak.com.tr/Arsiv/2003/Mart/22/e2.html> 26 March 2012.

[83] "Hükümet Savaş Tahvili Çıkarsın," <http://yenisafak.com.tr/Arsiv/2003/Mart/22/e3.html>, "IMF: Türkiye Programı Uygulamayı Sürdürmeli," <http://yenisafak.com.tr/Arsiv/2003/Mart/22/e4.html>, "Türkiye'nin Gözü IMF ve DB'de," <http://yenisafak.com.tr/Arsiv/2003/Mart/22/e6.html>, 26 March 2012.

[84] "ABD Türkiye'den Vazgeçemez," <http://yenisafak.com.tr/Arsiv/2003/Mart/22/p3.html> 26 March 2012.

AKP government has remained under Koru's expectations. As championed by him, the government "[f]rom the very beginning, should have been able to say that 'Turkey has no place in this war.' Broadening of bases, opening of air corridor should not have been allowed. But, again, by rejecting 'the second' motion that meant entry into war [together] with the US side, Ak Party and its government...had executed a mission, 'the historicalness' of which would be better appreciated later on." The third motion was not the best option conceived by Koru. On the other hand, the government's overall posture (including its discursive practices) had created significant implications. First and foremost, the calculations of "war lobby" were dealt a serious blow. "Washington was forced to change the route of ships awaited for 'the northern front'..." Secondly, perhaps more importantly, the members of UN Security Council enhanced their diplomatic position vis-à-vis the US-UK axis and "gained courage" to raise a strong opposition to the "illegitimate" war. "These are...extraordinarily important for a 'more just' and 'more peaceful' world...The Ak Party government has assumed a 'historical' mission' that would change world's destiny." Erdoğan's public speech on television, conducted after the confidence vote on 23 March 2003, gave a clear sign about AKP government's attitude to transform Turkey towards "a real 'model'."[85]

In a quite similar vein, Erdoğan concurred with Koru that the media has played a key role especially during Turkey-US negotiations that led to the crisis of second motion. "The US media...portrayed Turkey as a country that [merely] pursues [its] financial interests." With the third motion the situation seemed to be improving. At this point, the US side accepted the entry of Turkish soldiers into northern Iraq in exchange for the over flight right. The anticipated depth of entry (approximately 20 km) proves that the aim is not to occupy northern Iraq. Without being seen as an occupier, Erdoğan claimed that "Turkey has been part of the Coalition."[86]

As of 23 March 2003, the status of Turkey's military involvement in northern Iraq has yet to be coordinated with the US. According to Gül, both sides were still trying to reach an

[85] Fehmi Koru, "Gerçek 'Modele' Doğru," <http://yenisafak.com.tr/Arsiv/2003/Mart/24/fkoru.html> 26 March 2012. See also "Başbakan Erdoğan'ın 'Ulusa Sesleniş' Konuşması," <http://www.belgenet.com/2003/erdogan_230303.html> 26 April 2012.

[86] "Erdoğan: ABD, Irak'a Girmemizi Kabul Etti," <http://yenisafak.com.tr/arsiv/2003/mart/24/p2.html> 26 April 2012.

agreement.[87] For the US side, the picture was slightly different. The US President Bush acknowledged that "currently, Turks had no reason to enter into northern Iraq. We are keeping up constant contact with the Turkish army as well as the Turkish politicians. They know our policy. This is a strict policy. We have told clearly that we expected them not to enter into northern Iraq. They know that we work together with the Kurds in order to prevent any incident that would create a pretext for [the Turkish] entry into northern Iraq."[88]

On the question of Turkey's entry into northern Iraq, the US Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld recapped: "We have recommended to the Turkish government and [the Turkish] army that it would not help if they enter into Iraq with too many number of soldiers." [89] The US Chief of General Staff General Richard Myers further repeated that there were not any reasons, other than border security and migration control, that might compel the Turkish military to re-enter:

> Turkey has already soldiers in northern Iraq…The US Government's policy is [to ensure] that Turkish forces, [conditions for] the prevention of refugee flow excluded, does not [re]enter into northern Iraq. So far, that kind of refugee flow has not seen, and hence there is no reason for [more of] the Turkish forces to enter. It is quite natural that the Turkish government and the Turkish Armed Forces preserve [their] right to defend [Turkey's] borders. On this issue, we work closely with Turkey in [using] both diplomatic and military-to-military [contact] channels. Turkish General Staff displays a very close cooperation on this matter. I do not suppose that [kind of] a situation, in which Turkey would enter into Iraq, might emerge.[90]

Due to its insistence on re-entry into northern Iraq, Turkey might face serious consequences. Heavy military intervention into northern Iraq could upset the course of Turkey's existing relations with the Kurdish groups. The US was anxious about a likely conflict between Turks and Kurds. This could be detrimental for the conduct of war, especially in the northern front. An intense international pressure has been mounted against

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[87] "Gül: ABD ile Görüşmeler Sürüyor," <http://yenisafak.com.tr/arsiv/2003/mart/24/p3.html> 26 March 2012.

[88] "Bush: Türkiye'nin K.Irak'a Girmesi İçin Bir Gerekçe Yok" <http://yenisafak.com.tr/arsiv/2003/mart/24/dunya.html> 26 March 2012.

[89] "Dünya ABD'yi Bıraktı Türkiye'yi Tartışıyor," <http://yenisafak.com.tr/Arsiv/2003/Mart/23/politika.html> 26 March 2012.

[90] "Türkiye'nin Zaten K.Irak'ta Askeri Var," <http://yenisafak.com.tr/arsiv/2003/mart/25/p3.html> 14 April 2012.

Turkey's entry into northern Iraq, not only by the US but also by the EU. In order to address the disinformation in the international media, the Turkish General Staff issued a public statement to explain the reality on the ground. The international news that claimed around one thousand Turkish soldiers' entry into northern Iraq was farfetched. The army was closely monitoring the terrorist activities and migrant population movements in northern Iraq. At least for the moment, they have not need any kind of intervention.[91]

In addition to the rising of international tensions, Ankara's relations with Baghdad were also at risk. The Iraqi Minister of Foreign Affairs Naci Sabri stated that "Turkey's assistance to the US-led war would give a great damage to the [bilateral] relations…We hope that our Turkish neighbors would realize what their real interests are. Whoever attempts to give damage to Iraq, would [inadvertently] incur a huge damage on itself."[92] In response, it was emphasized that "the US had quitted its plan to send heavy armored ground troops to northern Iraq from Turkey."[93] Moreover, the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs declared *de jure* end of the ONW in a public statement: "Operation Northern Watch, which had been commenced by the TGNA decision, numbered 477 and dated 25 December 1996, was put to end in accordance with the decision taken by the Council of Ministers on 21 March 2003, due to the need foreseen as a result of the war conditions [currently] ensuing in Iraq. The decision was sent to the embassies of US and UK in Ankara."[94]

Almost upon ONW's end, on 22 March 2003, the US began to use the Turkish airspace in order to transport troops into northern Iraq. Myers explained that "these soldiers are not the first US soldiers in northern Iraq. But they are the first soldiers that have gone to the region with the permission received as a result of the voting in the Turkish parliament."[95] As later revealed by the Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, Turkey's permission was quite important for the US war effort. In addition to transiting of Tomahawk missiles, B-

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[91] "Dünya ABD'yi Bıraktı Türkiye'yi Tartışıyor," <http://yenisafak.com.tr/Arsiv/2003/Mart/23/politika.html> 26 March 2012.

[92] "Irak: Türkiye'nin ABD'ye Desteği İlişkileri Zedeler," <http://yenisafak.com.tr/arsiv/2003/mart/24/politika.html> 26 March 2012.

[93] "Türkiye'den [Ağır Zırhlı] Birlik Gitmeyecek," <http://yenisafak.com.tr/Arsiv/2003/Mart/23/>, "Coniler Geri Dönüyor," <http://yenisafak.com.tr/arsiv/2003/mart/24/politika.html> 26 March 2012.

[94] "Dışişleri: Kuzeyden Keşif Harekatı Bitti," <http://yenisafak.com.tr/Arsiv/2003/Mart/23/politika.html> 26 March 2012.

[95] "Türkiye'nin Zaten K.Irak'ta Askeri Var," <http://yenisafak.com.tr/arsiv/2003/mart/25/p3.html> 14 April 2012.

52 bombardment planes, the US Special Forces were transported to northern Iraq through the use of Turkish airspace.[96] It was also reported that the US Special Forces, together with KDP and PUK militias, have begun a joint offensive against "the Ansar Al-Islam group", located in the south of Erbil and Suleymaniyah.[97]

There were not any doubts that military cooperation between the US and the Kurdish groups (KDP-PUK) could be the undesired outcome for the Turkish General Staff (TGS). However, the remarks of the TGS' Chief General Hilmi Özkök were calm and cautious. He made it clear that the sending of troops to northern Iraq and the opening of Turkish air space were two different issues with distinct qualities. The implementation of "each was not conditioned by the other." Each issue will be "taken into consideration as the situation develops" on the ground. "Turkish Armed Forces has made several plans, various preparations." In an appropriate time and a correct place, "relevant decisions will be taken, and these [decisions] will be implemented."[98]

In fact, the Council of Ministers, chaired by Erdoğan, had been taking some decisions which were explained by Çiçek as of 24 March 2003 13.15 p.m. Surprisingly, Çiçek gave the exact timing of his explanation, in order to emphasize the tremendous pace of developments vis-à-vis the Iraq war. Basically, he was critical of the disinformation campaign in the media. According to him, the government's policy has not been changing on a daily basis. He reiterated what has been unchanged:

> We want territorial integrity of Iraq. We say that the wealth of Iraq belongs to the whole people of Iraq. We express that the people of Iraq are composed of [three] main constituents, formed by Arabs, Turkmen and Kurds, and other constituents. All of these [constituents] are our brothers. To be interested with these human beings is natural.[99]

According to Çiçek, Turkey has not had a "secret plan" towards northern Iraq. Turkey wants peace in this place in order not to face with "massacres similar to the ones perpetrated

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[96] "B Planı Bozgunu Bush'u Madara Etti," <http://yenisafak.com.tr/arsiv/2003/mart/29/politika.html> 15 April 2012.

[97] "Ensar'a İki Cepheden Saldırı," <http://yenisafak.com.tr/arsiv/2003/mart/25/dunya.html> 14 April 2012. "Amerika ve Kürtler Ensar'a Saldırıyor," <http://yenisafak.com.tr/Arsiv/2003/Mart/27/d3.html> 15 April 2012.

[98] "Zamanı Geldiğinde Gerekeni Yaparız," <http://yenisafak.com.tr/arsiv/2003/mart/25/p4.html> 14 April 2012.

[99] "Gizli Niyetimiz Yok," <http://yenisafak.com.tr/arsiv/2003/mart/25/p5.html> 14 April 2012.

in the Balkans." Ankara was not eager to experience "a negative occurrence due to terror." "By this moment, we want to take measures against this [kind of likely occurrences]. What we have been doing has a basis in both national and international law. These have formed the principles of negotiations for political understanding that were conducted with the US." Çiçek emphasized that Turkey's current and future military presence in northern Iraq has been and would be based on two reasons: "humanitarian considerations" and "concerns about terror." For these two reasons, the Turkish government would "take the decisions on its own." But these decisions have to be coordinated, so as to act in line with the procedures of alliance and coalition with the US.[100]

The US side was against Turkey's unilateral military actions in northern Iraq. Should Turkey decide to enter, it has to coordinate with the US. On the other hand, the US did not have any objection to the Turkish military presence in northern Iraq. But this presence should not give the "impression of occupation."[101] For Ankara, this was a crucial strategic predicament, with serious security implications.

On the political front, Erdoğan government also faced with a challenging dilemma. As argued by Koru (Kıvanç), "Turkey was at the crossroads" not in the sense that had been portrayed by "some newspapers." Before and during the rejection of the second motion, some newspapers argued that Turkey has had to participate to the war. After the third motion was accepted, they regret that Turkey would face serious consequences, since Ankara has not taken part in the war. According to them, Turkish foreign policy has lost its anchor in the West (read the US and the EU). Koru countered this argument by revising and redeploying his indispensability thesis. "Not only is Turkey a country that the West could abandon at once, but also the interests of the country are amenable to the enhancement of relations with the West." Put in other words, both Turkey and the West are deemed to be indispensable for each other. This was mainly because of "the global conditions" that have changed dramatically after the end of the Cold War. "These changes have increased the value of geography in which Turkey constitutes the center."[102]

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[100] "Gizli Niyetimiz Yok," <http://yenisafak.com.tr/arsiv/2003/mart/25/p5.html> 14 April 2012.

[101] "ABD: Girin Ama İşgal Görüntüsü Vermeyin," <http://yenisafak.com.tr/arsiv/2003/mart/25/politika.html>, "Kuzey İçin Pazarlık," <http://yenisafak.com.tr/arsiv/2003/mart/25/index.html> 14 April 2012.

[102] Taha Kıvanç, "Olmaz, Olmaz, Olur...", <http://yenisafak.com.tr/Arsiv/2003/Mart/25/tkivanc.html>, Fehmi Koru, "Yol Ayrımı," <http://yenisafak.com.tr/Arsiv/2003/Mart/25/fkoru.html> 14 April 2012.

Ostensibly, Koru was alluding to a very traditional geopolitical presupposition as his discursive frame. On the contrary, however, Koru was critical of the "traditional political structure" run by "the traditional elites." Against the backdrop of "traditional influence mechanisms" in Turkey, Koru argued, the "Ak Party" government pursued a policy based on national desires and directed towards the "interest[s] of [the] country". "Thanks to their courage, the traditional policy, the mother of all ills that left the country behind [and underdeveloped], was dealt with a severe blow." Thus, Koru was hopeful about AKP's future. He claimed that one day "Turkey might reach to a participatory democracy, in its real meaning."[103]

Even though Koru was trying to uphold a critical position, he has been doing this within a traditional jargon, confined to the geopolitical understanding of international affairs. How come could he then oppose traditionalism in Turkish politics and quite astonishingly foresaw a new path, presumably a post/neo-traditionalist one, for the AKP government is an intriguing question indeed. It seems that what Koru had proposed was a new foreign policy direction albeit with an old compass. Conception of an anti-traditional foreign policy vision with old geopolitical discursive frames implied an ambivalent mode of reasoning.

Ambivalence was a prevalent feature of Turkey's Iraq policy discourse. Right from the beginning of the Iraq war, AKP government attempted to overcome the motion crisis by allowing the US military to have access to the Turkish air space for supposedly humanitarian purposes. Framing of the third motion, particularly the making of good reasons for the re-entry into northern Iraq reflected a discursive swing between utilitarian and ideational rationales.

Appeal for balance of power was easily discernible from pro-governmental narratives. Predominant presuppositions were framed in regards to the re-making of alliance with the US, i.e. the unipole. Security (political-military) interests, power-threat balancing perspectives were major frames for policy orientation. However, AKP government's discursive performance gave minor signs of engagement with the lexicon of solidarity. This was more prominent in framing of the Iraqi people with identity references, Arab, Turkmen, Kurd and other constituencies. Purely materialist rationality might have had little or no preconceptions about social (id)entities.

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[103] Fehmi Koru, "Yol Ayrımı," <http://yenisafak.com.tr/Arsiv/2003/Mart/25/fkoru.html> 14 April 2012.

In addition to this, framing of the Iraqi people as Turkey's brothers and neighbors does hardly fit into the utilitarian mode of reasoning. The identity consciousness vis-à-vis Iraq might well be treated as a discursive sign of ideational logic. Though less salient, some frames deployed into the public sphere by government officials were based on humanitarian and ethical-legal reasons. Despite the resilience of political-military and economic interests, social-cultural and normative frames were incorporated into the discursive practices. These discursive evidences are sufficient to delineate an ideational rationale. As AKP government began to contemplate peace in the midst of ongoing war, ideational preconceptions of cooperation with the Iraqi people remained incoherent. But these discursive frames reflected the meaning of (being in) the Coalition for Ankara.

5.2.3. Discursive Meaning of the Coalition: Incoherent Preconceptions

On the part of AKP government, ambivalence in public statements of reasons for entering into northern Iraq, particularly framing of this issue began to challenge the credibility of its discursive position in the domestic and international media. Thus, Gül had felt the need to acknowledge that their public explanations were true and "all of them have to be believed. On this issue [of entering into northern Iraq], of course Turkey will itself take the decision it needs. Within war conditions, it is only natural that we have been in coordination with our allies." Gül also added that it would not be true to perceive the negotiations with the US in such a way that portrays them as "a trade agreement." The opening of Turkish airspace was aimed to "build peace, provide security and prevent threatening postures." Based on three intentions, i.e. border security against terrorist infiltrations, control of mass migration and humanitarian assistance, Turkey might decide to enter into northern Iraq. Ankara had no desire for annexation. According to Gül, the Government had been pursuing an active policy in line with "national interests", rather than passively watching the developments unfolded in the region and the globe. With this policy,

Turkey assumed "a central position." In this regard, Turkey became a "unique country that would refute the clash of civilizations thesis."[104]

Nevertheless, Ankara's intentions towards northern Iraq have been targeted by the international media. As a result, some of the EU countries' leaders expressed their concerns and warnings to the Turkish government. In fact, Turkey had wanted to reinforce its military presence already existing in northern Iraq,[105] under the pretext of the prevention of terror and the control of mass migration. These seemingly legitimate reasons were not well regarded. Instead, rumors were running about Turkey's (alleged) intentions on occupying northern Iraq. Cornered by international media allegations and political pressure, the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs assured the EU, NATO and Arab League members that Turkey has "no intention of military interference" or intervention into northern Iraq "other than the aims of prevention of humanitarian disaster[s] and humanitarian assistance."[106]

This assurance was particularly relevant for the process of Turkey's accession into the EU. Less significant was the financial dimension. The European Commission was about to double their three-year financial assistance to Turkey. In total, it would be around one billion Euros. Furthermore, on the other side of Atlantic, it was expected that the US Congress would approve one billion dollars of aid package to Turkey. Given the overwhelming public debt crisis ensuing in Turkey's economy, the amount of international aid to Turkey could best be regarded as a symbolic gesture. As *Yeni Şafak* claimed, the Turkish government has allocated 56 billion dollars in recent two years in order to cover public financial debt.[107]

Moreover, the Turkish-US diplomatic negotiations came to a halt, since a disagreement arise about command-control issues. Turkey did not want to interfere into the war, which has been conducted against the Saddam regime by the US-UK led Coalition. For

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[104] "Gül: K.Irak Kararını Türkiye Verir," <http://yenisafak.com.tr/Arsiv/2003/Mart/26/p8.html> 14 April 2012. "Gül: Gayet Açık Söyledik," <http://yenisafak.com.tr/Arsiv/2003/Mart/27/p2.html>, "Gül'den AB'ye: Niye Heyecanlanıyorsunuz?", <http://yenisafak.com.tr/arsiv/2003/mart/29/p4.html> 15 April 2012.

[105] The number of Turkish troops in northern Iraq was around 1400-2000. See İlhan Uzgel, "ABD ve NATO'yla İlişkiler," in *Türk Dış Politikası III*, 277.

[106] "AB'nin Kriterler[i] Türkiye İçin Geçerli," <http://yenisafak.com.tr/Arsiv/2003/Mart/26/p6.html> 14 April 2012.

[107] "ABD Desteği Hortumun Küsüratı," <http://yenisafak.com.tr/Arsiv/2003/Mart/26/e15.html>, "ABD'den Türkiye'ye 1 Milyar Dolar Yardım," <http://yenisafak.com.tr/Arsiv/2003/Mart/26/e4.html>, "MÜSİAD: Türkiye Krizi Yalnız Çözer," "Faizdeki Artışın Maliyeti 4 Milyar $," <http://yenisafak.com.tr/Arsiv/2003/Mart/26/ekonomi.html>14 April 2012.

either security or humanitarian reasons, the Turkish side wanted to preserve, reinforce military presence in northern Iraq. At the same time, Ankara insisted that their units remain outside of Coalition control and hence had to be commanded by a Turkish general. In order to address the disinformation campaign in the US media, the Turkish side assured that the Turkish military would not be a force of occupation in northern Iraq and stay there until the completion of their designated mission.[108]

In Koru's opinion, the Iraqi general populace perceived the Coalition soldiers as forces of occupation rather than liberation. Intelligence assessments, which anticipated a warm welcome towards the US military personnel in Iraq, proved to be misleading. As a result, would-be liberators could only turn out to be the occupiers of Baghdad.[109]

Kıvanç argued that the "war lobby" in Washington made a grave miscalculation by putting all of their pieces only on a "win-all" bet. "The strong has always looked down on the weak, on the contrary even the least powerful human being might have a [form of] domination to [incur a] cost on the strong…Now, the whole world acknowledged this fact" in Iraq. On the face of acute weakness, the Iraqis posed a peculiar threat to US military domination. This was epitomized in the hunting down of a US military helicopter, presumably by an old Iraqi farmer with his outmoded rifle. The rise of resistance among the Iraqi populace would be the most undesired outcome for the Pentagon. Therefore, the US prepared its plans for the post-war reconstruction of Iraq. Immediately after the war, peace has to be won no matter what.[110]

In the midst of war, the US began to contemplate on its peace-time administration in Iraq. Occupation was destined to be ruled by General Tommy Franks. Under him would be a retired general named Jay Garner. According to Koru, Garner has become an active affiliate of the JINSA (the Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs) upon his retirement from the US military. Garner had worked as a contractor for the Pentagon. Before the war, he was brought to the head of the "Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance". As for

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[108] "Mehmetçiğin Komutası Görüşmeleri Kilitledi," <http://yenisafak.com.tr/Arsiv/2003/Mart/26/politika.html> 14 April 2012. See also "Zalmay Halilzad Kürt Grupları İkna Edecek," <http://yenisafak.com.tr/Arsiv/2003/Mart/27/p7.html> 15 April 2012.

[109] Fehmi Koru, "Yiğitliğin Altın Kuralı," <http://yenisafak.com.tr/Arsiv/2003/Mart/26/fkoru.html>, 14 April 2012.

[110] Taha Kıvanç, "Muamma Nihayet Çözüldü", <http://yenisafak.com.tr/Arsiv/2003/Mart/26/tkivanc.html> 14 April 2012. See also "Direniş Güç Kazanıyor," <http://yenisafak.com.tr/Arsiv/2003/Mart/27/d2.html>, "İşgalcilerin Zayiat Raporu," <http://yenisafak.com.tr/arsiv/2003/mart/30/dunya.html> 15 April 2012.

the post-war Iraq, Garner envisaged to run the country with three regional governors selected among the diplomatic corps. Five knowledgeable US Ambassadors, who had served in regional countries like Yemen, Qatar, Pakistan, Morocco, Sudan and Namibia, would be the key officials to form the administrative team led by Garner.[111]

As far as the reconstruction business was concerned, "multinational corporations close to the US government, such as Halliburton and Carlyl", were likely to receive the lions' share. At least a segment of the Turkish business circles, especially some Turkish Industrialists' and Businessmen's Association (TÜSİAD) members, could only hope to get a modest piece from the reconstruction pie.[112] After the liberation of Iraq, the US Senate deliberated that oil wealth could be utilized for war reparations and reconstruction purposes.[113]

Unlike Washington, Ankara's agenda was still stuck with security repercussions of the war, rather than post-war economic settlements. The National Security Council (NSC) declared that Turkey's Iraq policy "has been implemented through the efficient coordination among relevant state offices." In this regard, dominant frame was the national security interests. Against the threat of terrorism posed by the PKK (KADEK) existing in northern Iraq, Turkey could take each and every necessary measure.[114]

Nonetheless, the Turkish government remained cautious in order not to give the impression of an opportunist country. Gül acknowledged that "on the issue of protecting Iraq's territorial integrity" Turkey has been "the most sensitive country." From the very outset, Ankara has pursued a clear policy towards northern Iraq. Two conditions—the development of mass migration and the rise of PKK (KADEK) terrorist activities in cross-border areas—were set to assess the need for Turkish military intervention. "At present, any need to intervene has not been arisen [yet]." As of that day, the government was in a better position to look after three major priorities. Contrary to the general presumptions, relations

[111] Taha Kıvanç, "Muamma Nihayet Çözüldü", <http://yenisafak.com.tr/Arsiv/2003/Mart/26/tkivanc.html> 14 April 2012.

[112] Fehmi Koru, "Şişman Kediler Atakta," <http://yenisafak.com.tr/Arsiv/2003/Mart/27/fkoru.html>, Kaan İpekçioğlu, "Savaş İhaleleri Mr. Cheney'e," <http://yenisafak.com.tr/arsiv/2003/mart/30/g7.html> 15 April 2012.

[113] "Savaşın Parası Irak Petrolünden," <http://yenisafak.com.tr/arsiv/2003/mart/29/e5.html> 15 April 2012.

[114] "MGK'dan Birlik Beraberlik Çağrısı," <http://yenisafak.com.tr/arsiv/2003/mart/29/p5.html> 15 April 2012.

with the US were developing. Secondly, Turkey managed to remain out of the war. Most importantly, the Turkish economy was kept to float on a right track.[115]

Like Gül, Erdoğan expressed his content with Turkey's Iraq policy. Despite all governmental efforts, Ankara could not prevent the onset of war. Nonetheless, the three motions were not issued to give support to the initiation of war. Those motions were requirements emanating from "the alliance relations of our state and our [national] security." In this regard, the AKP government did not fall into a dual trap. On one side, it did not accept to take a pro-war stance just for the sake of money. On the other side, it did not act against the world realities. Faced with this double-sided trap, the government was driven towards political and military, rather than economic, priorities. As envisioned by Erdoğan, Turkey's approach to the Iraq problem was multi-dimensional. Turkey has not had an intention to occupy or annex northern Iraq. Like the other independent and sovereign capitals, Ankara had to take necessary measures, just in case its sensitivities were jeopardized.[116]

Those sensitivities were clarified by Erdoğan: "re-emergence of a mass migration wave" creating serious ramifications like the occasion in 1991, "harming of civilian population due to the war, dismemberment of Iraq and destabilization in the overall region, massacring of Turkmen as had been perpetrated in the past and exploitation of the regional power vacuum by terrorist groups." "As long as the US troops could not prevent these negative developments, it might be possible for the Turkish Armed Forces to assume a mission for a limited contingent and in a limited region." In such circumstances, Turkish units would coordinate its activities with the US and inform the groups in the region. Turkey's military goal could only be threat prevention not occupation. As for the post-war Iraq, Erdoğan disclosed Turkey's desire for "building of peace and free and democratic government." He seemed wishful to restore good economic relations with Turkey's longtime, second largest trading partner.[117]

However the AKP government did not make a significant attempt towards building peace in Iraq. The only exceptions were seeking of ways to control mass migration and to

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[115] Mustafa Karaalioğlu, "AB Bize Söylüyor ABD'ye İşittiriyor," <http://yenisafak.com.tr/arsiv/2003/mart/30/p2.html> 15 April 2012.

[116] "Tuzaklara Düşmedik," <http://yenisafak.com.tr/arsiv/2003/mart/30/politika.html> 15 April 2012.

[117] "Avrupa'ya K.Irak Mesajı," <http://yenisafak.com.tr/arsiv/2003/mart/31/politika.html>, 15 April 2012. See also "Erdoğan Wall Street Journal'e Makale Yazdı," <http://yenisafak.com.tr/Arsiv/2003/Nisan/01/p8.html> 15 April 2012.

deliver humanitarian aid to the Iraqi population.[118] Even though the AKP government had flexed enormous diplomatic muscle in order to prevent the onset of war, at that moment they could not move a finger to stop the war. President Sezer was against the war. But he did not display an interest toward ending it. Koru argued that the time was more than ripe for ending the illegitimate war. On moral grounds, the US had no chance of winning the Iraq war. For this reason, Ankara should prevent Washington from drowning into a protracted conflict. At this point, Turkey had substantial avenues for cooperation with the UN and the EU.[119] By helping to end the war, the AKP government would contribute to prevent more bloodletting and hence more losses in human lives.[120]

Government spokesperson Çiçek argued that Turkey "has not sought its own well being and its own interests in other nations' blood and tears…Since the peace alternative was eliminated, we naturally have been putting efforts to protect [national] interests and provide security for our country. Everyone has to know that we have not been opportunistic, have not held imperialist intentions."[121] Prime Minister Erdoğan was more succinct in framing Turkey's precarious straddle between war and peace: "Turkey, together with the US—its strategic partner and more than fifty years old ally—is determined to maintain close cooperation in order to provide peace and durable stability in the region. Yet, at the same time, we hope and pray for the sooner end of humanitarian disaster in Iraq."[122]

On 2 April 2003, Erdoğan told Powell that "civilians and children should not die" and the war would end as soon as possible. At the same time, AKP government took a utilitarian stance to pursue political, economic and military interests. Gül (and Powell) reverberated: "Turkey has been in the Coalition." This statement was made after Turkish and US officials have reached an understanding on a number of outstanding issues. Most prominently, the US side verbally pledged that Mosul and Kirkuk would not be occupied by any Kurdish group.

[118] "Türkiye'den İnsanî Yardım," <http://yenisafak.com.tr/arsiv/2003/mart/31/g5.html>, "Mülteci Hazırlığı Tamam," <http://yenisafak.com.tr/arsiv/2003/nisan/02/p2.html> 15 April 2012.

[119] Fehmi Koru, "Bu Savaş Durmalı," <http://yenisafak.com.tr/arsiv/2003/mart/30/fkoru.html> 15 April 2012. "Sezer: Savaşın Ne Zaman Biteceğini Onlar Düşünsün," <http://yenisafak.com.tr/Arsiv/2003/Nisan/01/p2.html> 15 April 2012.

[120] Fehmi Koru, "Savaş Üzerine Düşünceler...", <http://yenisafak.com.tr/Arsiv/2003/Nisan/01/fkoru.html> 15 April 2012.

[121] "Kan Üzerinde Çıkar Hesabı Yapmadık," <http://yenisafak.com.tr/Arsiv/2003/Nisan/01/politika.html> 15 April 2012.

[122] "Erdoğan Wall Street Journal'e Makale Yazdı," <http://yenisafak.com.tr/Arsiv/2003/Nisan/01/p8.html> 15 April 2012.

In addition, Washington assured to address two most salient concerns of Ankara. It was guaranteed that the US troops (in coordination with the Turkish Armed Forces) would intervene if and when mass migration movements and PKK (KADEK) terrorist infiltrations arise in cross border areas. Since their conditions were met, the Turkish side was ready to further military cooperation particularly in areas of logistical support such as fuel, food, water, medicine and medical evacuation. All of the logistical aid would be provided under "the guise of humanitarian assistance." Erdoğan publicly explained that arms and ammunition could not be included into the logistical support.[123] On those days, it was reported that around 30 trucks of military equipment (approximately 200 Hummer type jeeps) crossed to northern Iraq from Habur land border gate.[124] Powell was more than satisfied with sealing a better deal. He recapped that Turkey, as a Muslim and democratic country, would not only contribute to the reconstruction of Iraq, but also serve as the best example for Iraq.[125]

Powell's visit helped to mend the fences between the two countries. Thus, it was also welcomed by President Sezer's office.[126] Coincidentally, Prime Minister Erdoğan had made the last corrections in his letter to the US Congress. His messages were crystal clear: "Since 1952, Turkey has been a friend and ally of the US." After Somalia, Bosnia and Afghanistan, bilateral cooperation has now extended to Iraq. Present understanding between the two countries has given a strong sign for a new direction.

> Opening of the Turkish airspace to the US airplanes is not a simple incident. We are a neighbor country of Iraq. Opening of our airspace has to be regarded in this respect. In the 1991 Gulf War, Turkey experienced great losses. 500 thousand refugees flow to our borders. After the Gulf War PKK terrorist

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[123] Veli Toprak-Bilal Çetin, "Musul ve Kerkük'e Kimse Göz Dikmesin," <http://yenisafak.com.tr/arsiv/2003/nisan/03/p2.html>, "Halilzad'ın Görevi Ankara'yı Oyalamak," <http://yenisafak.com.tr/Arsiv/2003/Nisan/01/p7.html> 15 April 2012.

[124] "Silopi'den Deldiler," <http://yenisafak.com.tr/arsiv/2003/nisan/03/p5.html>, Hakan Göktepe, "Amerikan Hummer'ları Kuzey Irak'a Gidiyor," <http://yenisafak.com.tr/Arsiv/2003/Nisan/04/p14.html>, Kaan İpekçioğlu-Veli Toprak, "12,7 mm'lik İnsani Yardım," <http://yenisafak.com.tr/Arsiv/2003/Nisan/04> 15 April 2012.

[125] "Powell Silahlara İnsani Kılıf Buldu," <http://yenisafak.com.tr/arsiv/2003/nisan/03/politika.html> 15 April 2012.

[126] "Yanlış Anlamalar Düzeltildi," <http://yenisafak.com.tr/Arsiv/2003/Nisan/04/p2.html> 20 April 2012.

organization has cost 30 thousand lives of our people. Despite all, US-Turkey friendship would continue.[127]

Not unexpectedly, Koru was not pleased with the pro-US/war steps taken by the AKP government. For him, this policy was not new at all. Erdoğan and Gül made a fundamental and quick return to the old, traditionalist policy line. At this point, Koru posed an essential question: "How Tayyip Erdoğan, Abdullah Gül and their friends could accord with a political attitude that would increase the tears in their own households? There is only a single explanation for this question: Turkey's 'special situation' capitulated them too." For almost all Turkish governments, pursuance of pro-US polices has always been a practical stance. "Ak Party government had not behaved so different from the earlier administrations." By supporting the US-led war Coalition, they preferred not "the difficult and respectful," but the easier option even though it was undignified.[128]

Koru's relatively negative framing of Turkey's support to the war was quickly echoed by the higher echelons of AKP circles. Speaker of Parliament Bülent Arınç asked "how come Turkey be in the Coalition?" and urged a further explanation from Gül.[129] No sooner than Arınç's request, Gül's explanation came out: "Turkey is not a belligerent country which had entered, [and] has been actively contributing to the war. Turkey is not in the war. Turkey does not give active support to the war." The transportation vehicles entering Iraq from Turkey's land borders have not carried "arms and soldiers." In that respect, Turkey has not faced "any aggression from Iraq." There was no doubt that Turkey has been an ally of the US. "Within this framework, Turkey has opened its airspace." This was what all Gül had "wanted to say."[130]

According to this ambivalent framing, Turkey has been in the Coalition but not in the war. The delicate discursive position taken by the AKP government gave signs of the old, domestic balancing act displayed in Ankara for so long. Like most of the Turkish political leaders, Erdoğan had to address the popular appeal among his constituents. According to the results of polling endorsed by Erdoğan, while 55 percent of the respondents admitted that

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[127] "Erdoğan'dan Kongre'ye Mektup," <http://yenisafak.com.tr/Arsiv/2003/Nisan/04/p3.html> 20 April 2012.

[128] Fehmi Koru, "Son Kare," <http://yenisafak.com.tr/arsiv/2003/nisan/05/fkoru.html> 20 April 2012.

[129] "Arınç: Dışişleri Bakanı'nın Herhalde Bir İzahı Vardır," <http://yenisafak.com.tr/arsiv/2003/nisan/05/p5.html> 20 April 2012.

[130] "Savaşın İçinde Değiliz," <http://yenisafak.com.tr/arsiv/2003/nisan/05/p4.html> 20 April 2012.

"Turkey, with its government and state, must definitely stay out of war"; 40 percent acknowledged that "Turkey must move in the direction of its interests, if necessary Turkish Armed Forces has to enter into Northern Iraq."[131]

In addition to playing by the rules of internal balancing game, the AKP government felt the need to court the ongoing external balancing game as well. Almost simultaneous to the renewal of cooperation with the US, Turkey revived its dialogue with Iraq's neighbors. Despite considerable opposition in Washington,[132] Ankara began to warm up its relations with Tehran and Damascus. The Iranian Minister of Foreign Affairs Kemal Kharrazi was soon expected to visit Turkey. After having contacts with his Iranian counterpart in Ankara, Gül would pay an official visit to Syria. Gül framed Turkey's position in the revival of trilateral cooperation with these words: "There has already been cooperation among Iraq's neighbors, particularly among countries that have been interested in Northern Iraq." Regarding its relations with Iran and Syria, "Turkey decides by itself on what its own interests are." For Gül, "it was important" and possible to sustain cooperative relations with the US and its regional rivals, namely Iran and Syria.[133] Balance of power might be a key for settling the post-war regional equation as well.

Koru argued that the emphasis on Turkey's being in the Coalition implied AKP government's inclination for finding a better place in post-Saddam regional designs. In his wording, "the concept of 'Coalition' carries this kind of meaning." According to him, Turkey was already in the list of "Coalition countries" posted in the White House website on 21 March 2003. In a respective order, by passing of the first and more lately the third motions, the Turkish government, was authorized to give permission for the site surveys/base modernizations and the opening of air corridor for the US military. "Logistical support" and "humanitarian assistance" were "sufficient to become a Coalition member." There was no need "to send troops to the battlefront." Another strong signal of being inside the Coalition was the government's latest decision to deport three Iraqi diplomats from

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[131] Veli Toprak, "Erdoğan, Halkın Nabzını Tuttu," <http://yenisafak.com.tr/arsiv/2003/nisan/05/p2.html> 20 April 2012.

[132] "Powell Yine Suriye ve İran'ı Tehdit Etti," <http://yenisafak.com.tr/arsiv/2003/nisan/05/d4.html> 20 April 2012.

[133] "Savaşın İçinde Değiliz," <http://yenisafak.com.tr/arsiv/2003/nisan/05/p4.html> 20 April 2012.

Turkey.[134] This event almost came towards the fall of Baghdad.[135] In a sense, the moment was ripe for Ankara to frame the consequences.

5.2.4. Towards the Fall of Baghdad: Framing of Consequences

Koru began to reflect on the linkage between the causes and consequences of Iraq war. The causes were "based on two major assumptions" about the threat posed by the Iraqi regime. Saddam was speculated to have weapons of mass destruction inventory. The second presumption was more controversial. Saddam was alleged to have links with Al Qaeda. He was presumed as the mastermind behind 9/11 attacks. Both of these predispositions were proven to be false. Bluntly put, the war was initiated and caused by false assumptions. If so, then what would be the legal consequences? The powerful might not be the righteous all the time. "Law prevents both the strong from suppressing the weak and unjust from pretending to be just. Maybe not today, but certainly tomorrow…"[136] In a similar vein, Erdoğan echoed:

> We want justice in the world. We have historical experiences. We invite everyone to take advantage from these historical experiences. The tragic consequences of the existing war have drawn to our borders. Our efforts continue in order to end the war without any further delay. We want the arrival of peace immediately.[137]

After having talks with Kharrazi, Gül restated that their shared priority was "ending of the war, and particularly stopping of civilian casualties. On the issue of Iraq's reconstruction it has to be appealed to the common desire of Iraqi people. The aspirations of Arab-Kurd-Turkmen have to be reflected well into the new administration." Both Ministers expressed

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[134] Fehmi Koru, "Koalisyon Üyesi," <http://yenisafak.com.tr/arsiv/2003/nisan/06/fkoru.html>, "Iraklı 3 Diplomat Sınırdışı Ediliyor," <http://yenisafak.com.tr/Arsiv/2003/Nisan/06/p4.html>, "Dışişleri'nde Delil Var!", <http://yenisafak.com.tr/Arsiv/2003/Nisan/07/p4.html> 21 April 2012.

[135] "Bağdat Boşalıyor," <http://yenisafak.com.tr/Arsiv/2003/Nisan/07/g7.html>, "Bağdat Direniyor," <http://yenisafak.com.tr/Arsiv/2003/Nisan/07/dunya.html> 21 April 2012.

[136] Fehmi Koru, "Üç 'Anlamsız' Soru," <http://yenisafak.com.tr/arsiv/2003/nisan/07/fkoru.html> 21 April 2012.

[137] "CHP Meclis'ten Kaçtı," <http://yenisafak.com.tr/Arsiv/2003/Nisan/07/politika.html> 21 April 2012.

their mutual concern and opposition to the establishment of a separate Kurdish state within the territorial borders of Iraq. The two sides agreed to maintain their diplomatic contact with the Syrian leadership. In this regard, Gül was expected to fly to Damascus and meet with Syrian Minister of Foreign Affairs Farouk al-Shara on 13 April 2003.[138]

According to Koru, the longstanding "trilateral consultation mechanism," established to "prevent undesired outcomes in northern Iraq", was doomed to fail as a result of the war. Due to its huge military build-up in Iraq, "US gained the ability to become the ordering power" in the Middle East. Therefore, Turkey, Iran and Syria have lost their capability to influence developments in their region. "Washington would decide what type of a new structure emerges out of Iraq; as well as which other targets to be attacked…" after the imminent fall of Baghdad. Could Ankara resist if Washington chose to attack Damascus and Tehran in a consecutive order? The Iraq war has dealt a detrimental blow to "balances" in the region. In the years to come, the Middle East would remain in shambles, if Turkey does not assume a new "mission" appropriate for its democratic and historical experience. Due to sharing of rich cultural heritage and common ties with "vast geography", Turkey is "expected to assume an active role for providing regional security."[139]

The AKP government has had "two soft underbellies: Economy and foreign policy." Due to "Turkey's geographical location" and the current global "conjecture," foreign policy issues have turned out to be more challenging than economic matters. Moreover, "non-political [read bureaucratic] centers" make Turkish foreign policy a demanding area of concern. Even though Turkey has changed its governments, it could not alter its "traditional line" in foreign policy. Traditional policies do not avail solutions for current regional problems. For example, partnership with the US should not have entailed Ankara just "look at, [and] even help" Washington to push its feet and then stuck into an apparent "quagmire." In order not to "fall apart from the West [read US]" AKP could not pursue "long-term" and "alternative" regional policies in line with the "main principles" enshrined in "the government program." Yet the government had no way but to break the "vicious circle" that has pervasively intruded into the "foreign policy" domain. Otherwise, Turkey could not have an impact over the global developments; quite the contrary, global developments would

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[138] "İran'la Kaygılar Ortak," <http://yenisafak.com.tr/Arsiv/2003/Nisan/07/p3.html> 21 April 2012.

[139] Fehmi Koru, "Doğruya Doğru, Eğriye Eğri," <http://yenisafak.com.tr/arsiv/2003/nisan/08/fkoru.html> 21 April 2012.

create negative implications for Turkey.[140] To put in other words, Koru proposed unconventional, if not anti-traditional, policies in the region, including Iraq.

Paradoxically, however, Turkish foreign policy makers had to deal with an old, traditional question. Even at that point in time, uncertainty in the faith of Mosul-Kirkuk created the major predicament for Ankara. Alarm bells rang as a consequence of news spreading the impression that some Kurdish groups were heading towards Mosul and Kirkuk. Prime Minister Erdoğan reiterated that the US government officials (most prominently Powell) promised that Mosul-Kirkuk region would not be subjugated. He did "not believe that they could not keep these promises." On behalf of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Gül restated that the US had given guarantees on the issue. In this regard, there was no need to send a diplomatic note to Washington.[141]

Government of Turkey was further disappointed, as the news was confirmed by the reports on movements of Kurdish Peshmergas (KDP-PUK militias) towards Mosul-Kirkuk and their ongoing clashes with Arab-Turkmen groups.[142] Gül responded with a calm attitude. Turkey would enter into northern Iraq, if its preconditions come true.[143] For Erdoğan, current situation posed the greatest challenge that Turkey has ever faced. Global and regional crises were encircling each other. Under these circumstances, Turkey has been transforming itself together with the world. The government has worked hard in order to manage the crisis. By preserving the balances, Turkey could find its way in "this multi-variant crisis environment". Erdoğan also added that they have to protect the Iraqi people from further violence and hence end the war immediately.[144]

On 9 April 2003, the US forces "reached Firdos (Paradise) Square, dominated by one of the many statues of Saddam Hussein…The fall of the Saddam statue on 9 April, televised

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[140] Fehmi Koru, "Makûs Talih," <http://yenisafak.com.tr/arsiv/2003/nisan/09/fkoru.html> 21 April 2012.

[141] "ABD, Musul-Kerkük İçin Bize Söz Verdi," <http://yenisafak.com.tr/arsiv/2003/nisan/08/politika.html>, "Gül: ABD'ye Nota Vermedik," <http://yenisafak.com.tr/arsiv/2003/nisan/08/p3.html> 21 April 2012.

[142] "Musul-Kerkük Sözü Tutulmayacak Gibi," <http://yenisafak.com.tr/arsiv/2003/nisan/09/p5.html> 21 April 2012.

[143] "Gül: Gerekirse K. Irak'a Gireriz," <http://yenisafak.com.tr/arsiv/2003/nisan/09/p2.html> 21 April 2012.

[144] "Bu Krizden Çıkacağız," <http://yenisafak.com.tr/arsiv/2003/nisan/09/politika.html> 21 April 2012.

across the world, was taken by its media to mark the fall of the Saddam régime."[145] The fall of Baghdad came as no surprise to Koru.

> The US has been the sole superpower of the world and transformed itself into a whole war machine. On the other hand, Iraq has faced very comprehensive sanctions for twelve years and lived under the pressure of 'disarmament' during the last year. From the military perspective, the US and Iraq are two countries that can never be [regarded as] rivals [of equal footing]; at last the one having power would defeat the weak.[146]

Koru argued that some segments of the Iraqi population welcomed the fall of the Saddam regime. But this does not counter "the fact that the US war has been unjust and unlawful" according to the UN system, which was established by the US after the Second World War. Under this system the disagreements have been resolved through the ways other than war. By resorting to the Iraq war, without receiving the approval of the UN Security Council, the US has opened a new era. In this period, the world might return to the past system run by the "pre-eminence of power".[147]

With regard to the likely impact of the Iraq war, the Turkish President Sezer asserted that Turkey must "take measures that will protect its national interests".[148] Prime Minister Erdoğan delineated three major concerns that have been shaping Turkey's policy and explained Ankara's post-war vision:

> First, the peaceful Iraqi population should not be punished because of their government's mistaken attitude. For this reason, from the very beginning, we have defended the trial [and exhaustion of] of all peaceful means. We have been attaching great importance to the eradication of weapons of mass destruction…but we pointed our different thinking on the issue of method for this [undertaking].
> Secondly, Turkish people have been compelled to pay heavy social and economic cost[s] as a consequence of the first Gulf War [in 1991]. Due to the authority [and power] vacuum emerged in Northern Iraq, PKK/KADEK

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[145] Keegan, 201, 202. See also "İşgalciler Bağdat'ta," <http://yenisafak.com.tr/arsiv/2003/nisan/10/d2.html> 21 April 2012.

[146] Fehmi Koru, "Sona Doğru…", <http://yenisafak.com.tr/arsiv/2003/nisan/10/fkoru.html> 21 April 2012.

[147] Fehmi Koru, "Sona Doğru…", <http://yenisafak.com.tr/arsiv/2003/nisan/10/fkoru.html> 21 April 2012.

[148] "Sezer: Türkiye, Çıkarlarını Korur," <http://yenisafak.com.tr/arsiv/2003/nisan/10/p11.html> 21 April 2012.

terrorists have found safe havens in that region...[and] infiltrated into our country and continued to massacre our people. After the war, Turkey's economic balances were damaged. That's why our loss list is long and its impact has been felt since the first Gulf War. It is impossible for us to endure a new burden such as this one.

Thirdly, there has been an inherent and functioning democracy in Turkey. By and large, the Turkish public opinion is also against the war. On issues of war and peace, the final decision authority is our parliament.

Our vision and policy [goal] is a free Iraq with its integrity protected. Iraq has to protect its political and territorial integrity, all of its population, including the founding constituents Arabs, Kurds, Turkmen and other peoples, have to take part in the administration of their mutual state and equitably share the wealth of their rich natural resources.[149]

Even before the end of Iraq war, the US had disclosed its plans for the post-Saddam era. No sooner than the fall of Baghdad, Powell had urged the setting up of transitional administration for Iraq.[150] What would be the likely implications of these plans for Ankara? The end of the war brought whole lot of uncertainties. Among them, the dubious status of Kirkuk loomed large. The repercussions of war on Turkey's Iraq policy discourse are analyzed in the post-event section.

5.3. Post-Event Analysis: Historical Developments and Discursive Dynamics

In the aftermath of war, regime change did occur in Iraq. Paradoxically however, Iraq would become a failed state living on the verge of virtual civil war in years to come. This was largely due to the significant mistakes committed by the US. Neoconservatives pushed hard for the total de-Ba'thification in state institutions. The Iraqi army and in turn the Iraqi state was completely dissolved. Particularly central and southern areas of Iraq were drawn

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[149] "Erdoğan, Irak'la İlgili Üç Temel Tavrı Anlattı," <http://yenisafak.com.tr/arsiv/2003/nisan/10/politika.html> 21 April 2012.

[150] "İşte Manda Yönetimi," <http://yenisafak.com.tr/arsiv/2003/nisan/09/d2.html>, "Powell: Türkiye'den Yoğun Sevkiyat Yaptık," <http://yenisafak.com.tr/arsiv/2003/nisan/09/dunya.html> 21 April 2012.

into chaos. The complete collapse of security institutions paved the way for sectarian (ethno-religious) strife and hence militant insurgency.[151]

Under chaotic circumstances ensuing after the fall of Baghdad on 9 April 2003, PUK and KDP followed a provoking policy. As early as 10 April 2003, the Kurdish militias began looting first in the oil-rich city of Kirkuk and later in Mosul. The US military officials fall victim to the political aspirations of their local collaborators. The alarm bells began to ring for the national security establishment in Turkey. Ankara was utterly disturbed by the enhanced military cooperation between the US and the Kurdish groups in northern Iraq. The "hood incident" of 4 July 2003, which was instigated by the imprudent acts of "Talabani, Barzani, and the US military personnel (particularly Colonel Bill Mayville)" against the contingent of Turkish Special Forces stationed in Suleymaniyah, has added an insult to the injury.[152] On the same day, Suleymaniyah based Turkmen political and cultural institutions were also targeted. Detained Turkish soldiers were interrogated for fifty five hours in Baghdad. Upon Prime Minister Erdoğan's request from US Vice President Cheney, Turkish soldiers were released.[153]

Since Kurdish aggressions have not been prevented, KYB and KDP came close to annex Kirkuk by the beginning of 2004. "The issue was at the top of Turkey's agenda during the January 2004 high level visit to Washington. Prime Minister Erdoğan warned the Kurds not to play with fire."[154] Political-military anxiety has risen after 2005, when the PKK (KONGRA-GEL) terrorist organization began to reinforce its strongholds in northern Iraq and began to target security forces in Turkey. Without local support from the Kurdish authorities, this region could not be a safe haven for the PKK.

Between 2005 and 2007, the deepening relationship between PKK, KDP and PUK was perceived as a serious threat for security interests of Turkey. More than any other

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[151] Keegan, 204-212.

[152] As acknowledged by the Chief of TGS General Hilmi Özkök, the "hood incident" constituted an unforgettable event for the Turkish Armed Forces. It was a deliberate act committed by "friendly and allied" US forces against a Turkish military unit stationed in northern Iraq. The incident was provocative since Turkey's 3 officers and 8 non-commissioned officers were taken into custody just like insurgents. Detention measures were quite unprecedented and disturbing, went as far to put hoods onto the heads of Turkish soldiers. See Bilâ, *Ankara'da Irak Savaşları*, 233-246.

[153] Uzgel, "ABD ve NATO'yla İlişkiler," in *Türk Dış Politikası III*, 277, 278.

[154] Bill Park, "Between Europe, the United States and the Middle East: Turkey and European Security in the Wake of the Iraq Crisis," *Perspectives on European Politics and Society* 5, no. 3 (2004): 502. See also Gunter, *The Kurds Ascending*, 15, 16.

institution, the TGS got wary. The situation would lead the Chief of TGS General Yaşar Büyükanıt in April 2007 to publicly acknowledge the necessity of a cross-border military operation against the PKK. This was the same general who, in the previous month, had made an auto-critic about the policy mistakes made by Turkey during the 1990's. Büyükanıt was simply referring to the fact that the implementation of No Fly Zone over northern Iraq (Operation Northern Watch) resulted with unintended, perhaps unforeseen, consequences.[155] The discursive position of TGS indicated a dual desire, i.e. conduct of cross-border operations and (to a lesser extent) gradual renewal of bilateral cooperation with Baghdad.

5.3.1. Cross-Border Operations and Renewal of Bilateral Cooperation

After the so-called "e-memorandum" was posted on the TGS official web-site on 27 April 2007, domestic climate has changed in Turkey. Even though the caution had primarily been designed to warn AKP about its anti-secular activities, the TGS did remind of the sensitivity of Kurdish issue as well. Then, the socio-political stage was set for the general elections on 22 July 2007. During the election campaign, cross-border operation became a dominant theme. On 13 June 2007, Prime Minister Erdoğan explained that the primacy should be given to military operations inside the borders. Like other center-right parties, AKP election campaign appealed to populism. AKP's attitude with regard to the cross-border operation was the major difference. This was an instrumental move not to alienate the Kurdish voters. The election results showed that AKP read the socio-political circumstances quite well. In eastern and south eastern electoral districts, while the independents supported by DTP (Democratic Society Party) received almost 25 percent of the votes; AKP's percentage was around 55. Behind the electoral success of AKP, Erdoğan's political discourse became quite influential.[156] In this regard, Erdoğan's Diyarbakır speech on 12 August 2005 has to be noted.

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[155] Fikret Bilâ, *Komutanlar Cephesi*, (İstanbul: Detay Yayıncılık, 2007), 229, 306-312. "Büyükanıt: K.Irak'a Operasyon Yapılmalı," *Sabah*, 12 April 2007, <http://arsiv.sabah.com.tr> 23 June 2008.

[156] "AKP'li Kurt: DTP'nin Oy Kaybında Başbakan'ın Konuşması da Etkili Oldu," *Milliyet*, 30 June 2007, <http://www.milliyet.com.tr/2007/07/30/son/sonsiy18.asp> 24 March 2008.

How much Ankara, İstanbul, Samsun, Erzurum are Turkey; so is Diyarbakır. A great state and a strong country like Turkey had dealt with many challenges. Hence, it is not appropriate for great states to deny the past mistakes. Great state, powerful nation, has the confidence to move towards future by putting its mistakes and misconducts (or sins) onto the table and face with them…There is no need to label each and every question. Problems are ours. If you desire to give a name for it, "Kurdish issue" belongs to the whole nation, not only to one part of it. For this reason,…that issue is my problem prior to anyone else. We are a great state and we handle each question with more democracy, more law for citizenship, and more well-fare; we will continue to do so. We do not deny any issue of the country, we accept that every question is real and we are ready to face (with these problems).[157]

By looking at Erdoğan's framing, one could easily realize that Erdoğan first and foremost internalized the Kurdish question, without making any clear reference to the situation in (northern) Iraq. However, his speech has involved at least some elements of power rhetoric, usually associated with the reason of state. Erdoğan's discursive stance vis-à-vis the Kurdish question and by extension towards Iraq may further be delineated from his Şemdinli speech on 21 November 2005. In that speech, Erdoğan suggested that Kurdish ethnicity should be recognized as a "sub-identity".

Nothing could be done by killing our people…There is no other country that has paid a heavy cost because of terrorism. Unfortunately, the country lost forty thousand people in thirty years. We have to live together, regardless of our ethnic, religious and regional differences. Otherwise, those who are eager to tear our country into pieces will be happy. Let's not make them happy.…We have three red lines. First we said that there would not be a nationalism based on ethnicity. We will eradicate this…Turks, Kurds,…we are all going to unite under the supra-identity of Turkish Republic citizenship. We will respect the sub-identities as such…a Kurd would be able to say s/he is a Kurd…Anyone should not be offended by this, would not do so, because this is our Constitutional citizenship. It is not possible to act according to ethnic identity within this country.[158]

Erdoğan's discursive move on the conceptualization of supra-identity and sub-identities became a contentious issue for the public debate. Even though main opposition parties—Republican People's Party (CHP) and Nationalist Movement Party (MHP)—voiced

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[157] Cengiz Çandar, "Başbakan ve Diyarbakır, 12 Ağustos 2005-21 Ekim 2008," *Radikal*, 22 October 2008.

[158] "Başbakan Şemdinli'de Konuştu," <http://www.haber7.com/haber/20051121/Basbakan-Semdinlide-konustu.php> 1 January 2009.

their discontent, the messages given by Erdoğan were very parallel to those of TGS' Chief General Özkök. During the Presidential reception on the eighty first anniversary of Turkey's foundation, on 29 October 2004, Özkök stated that "There is nothing to be feared about Turkish supra-identity. Here the word Turkish implies living in Turkey."[159] So, Erdoğan's supra-identity argument was not a new phenomenon. What was more striking is that Erdoğan's discourse was under the deep influence of security rationale. This became more evident when Erdoğan and Chief of TGS General Yaşar Büyükanıt debated over the modalities of contacting with Kurdish leadership in northern Iraq. At a press conference in Washington on 16 February 2007, Büyükanıt firmly confirmed his position: "Those who want to go and talk (with KDP and PUK) may do so. But, as soldiers, it is not possible to accept such an experience. It will not be beneficial to talk with those who see PKK as a political phenomenon. Both groups give full support to the PKK. There is nothing to talk with them." Even though Erdoğan was open to establish low-profile contacting channels, he could not escape from the force of political-military rationality. Therefore, he did not accept Barzani as his counter-part. In his words, he talked with the officials of the CIG (Central Iraqi Government), but he could not talk with a "tribal chief".[160] In fact, Erdoğan did rarely talk with the DTP figures since they had not renounced the PKK. His negative framing of Barzani was a corollary of security reasoning, which has long influenced Turkey's policies towards the Iraqi Kurds.

Despite Erdoğan's stepping-back, AKP government skillfully pursued a comprehensive policy in order to outreach all parts (Baghdad, Mosul, Basra and Erbil) and segments (Sunni/Shiite Arabs and Kurds) of Iraq. With the personal effort of Davutoğlu, Ankara had managed to integrate the alienated Sunni Arab groups (including Tarıq al-Hashimi who would later become Vice President) into the domestic political process in Baghdad. Consequently, the new Iraqi Constitution was promulgated on 15 October 2005

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[159] Okan Müderrisoğlu, "Üst Kimlikte Korkulacak Bir Şey Yok," <http://arsiv.sabah.com.tr/2004/10/30/gnd102.html> 1 January 2009. Given before the important 17 December 2004 EU summit, Özkök's statement might seem to be a deliberate calculation. Upon his retirement, Özkök delineated Turkey's deep dilemma in dealing with the Iraqi Kurdish groups: "In fact, it has been a miscalculation for Turkey to give prestige to local Kurdish leaders in order to get their cooperation against the PKK. Accommodationist attitudes have helped them to assert their political aspirations gradually. What would happen, had Turkey not pursued this type of policy? It is another matter. Because they are the relatives of our Kurdish origin citizens. At least, we have ethical responsibilities." See Bilâ, *Komutanlar Cephesi*, 226, 227.

[160] "Erdoğan Kürt Liderler Konusunda Değişti: Ben Bir Kabile Reisiyle Görüşmem," <http://www.milliyet.com.tr/2007/06/08/siyaset/axsiy03.html> 1 January 2009.

and the Parliamentary elections were held on 15 December 2005. In this period, Turkey's Special Representative for Iraq, Ambassador Osman Korutürk, held talks with the leaders of Iraqi Shiite community.[161] By doing this, Ankara would able to demonstrate a non-sectarian stance, and hopefully might check Tehran's growing influence over Basra and Baghdad.

In addition, low-profile political contacts have been maintained with the local Kurdish authority of northern Iraq, i.e. the KRG (Kurdistan Regional Government) which was established in May 2006. Presidential post of KRG has been (re)assumed by Masoud Barzani. His nephew Nechirvan İdris Barzani became the regional prime minister. KRG was "consisted of thirteen ministries headed by the KDP and fourteen by the PUK. Islamists held three ministries, and Turkmans and Assyrians were granted one each." By the same month, Baghdad had a new central government too. While Nouri al-Maliki, a Shiite Arab, was chosen as prime minister, Kurdish (PUK) leader Talabani emerged as the president. "Several other prominent Kurds also joined the new Iraqi government…Barham Salih was tabbed as one of the two deputy prime ministers and Hoshyar Zebari remained the foreign minister."[162]

While cautiously watching the Kurdish ascendance in the CIG and the federalization of relations between Erbil and Baghdad, Ankara has kept intense pressure over the PKK strongholds in northern Iraq. In July 2006, Ankara "threatened to send its army into northern Iraq to root out the PKK" safe havens (bases and camps). "In an attempt to assuage Turkey, the KRG prime minister Nechirvan İdris Barzani declared—with reference to PKK [cross border] attacks upon Turkey from bases [located] in [areas of] the KRG—that the KRG and Baghdad government 'will not permit our country to become a base for attacking neighboring states.'"[163]

In the economic front, Turkey's ties with the KRG began to develop in 2006. "Vakifbank and Akbank (two of Turkey's largest banks) announced that they would open branches" in various cities of northern Iraq; like Erbil, Suleymaniyah, Dohuk and even Kirkuk. "Turkish trade and [other] economic relations with the KRG were expected to reach $3 billion in 2006."[164] In spite of the economic developments, the relations between Ankara and Erbil remained under the dusk of uncertainty emanating from the future status of Kirkuk.

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[161] Zengin, 265-271.

[162] Gunter, *The Kurds Ascending*, 17, 18.

[163] Ibid., 54. Gunter cites and quotes "Nechirvan Barzani: Iraq Will Not Be Used as a Base for Attacking Neighboring States," *The Globe*, 22 July 2006.

[164] Ibid., 42. Gunter cites the *Turkish Daily News*, 23 January 2006.

The new Constitution "provided that a referendum be held by the end of 2007." In this regard, "al-Maliki promised that Baghdad would accept the outcome of the referendum to be held before the end of December 2007." From then on, a time bomb began to tick for all the parties that have a concern over the fate of Kirkuk. By the end of 2006, none of the Iraqi groups demonstrated "willingness to compromise on their maximal demands." Under those circumstances, the "Baker-Hamilton" report "recommended that the referendum be postponed in order to prevent further conflict."[165]

In spite of the Kirkuk stalemate, Ankara did not hesitate to pursue its comprehensive policy towards Iraq. Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs re-opened its Mosul General Consulate in February 2007.[166] Within the same month, the US sent extra combat troops to Iraq to implement the surge security strategy in Baghdad. After the surge became successful, the US and Iraq signed an agreement that pledged the withdrawal of US combat forces from Iraq between June 2009 and December 2011.

In this period, the first Turkish high-level visit to Baghdad was paid by Gül on 23 October 2007. During Maliki's Ankara visit on 7 August 2007, the two sides expressed mutual intentions for the opening of their second general consulates in Basra and Gaziantep. In a draft "Memorandum of Understanding (MoU)", both sides agreed to enhance bilateral security cooperation in the fight against terrorist organizations (including PKK/KONGRA-GEL). Pledges for the boosting of economic cooperation, particularly in the oil and natural gas sector, have been made. In terms of their planning for regional policies, Ankara and Baghdad have reached an understanding to enhance their joint standing for the "Broadened Neighbors of Iraq."[167] Kirkuk-Yumurtalık oil pipeline was re-opened by the beginning of 2008.[168] These developments were clear signs of major changes in Turkey's formulation of Iraq policy.

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[165] Ibid., 45, 48. Gunter cites James A. III Baker and Lee H. Hamilton (Co-Chairs), *The Iraq Study Group Report: The Way Forward—A New Approach*, (NY: Vintage Books, 2006).

[166] <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/data/DISPOLITIKA/Bolgeler/> 30 April 2011.

[167] <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/data/DISPOLITIKA/Bolgeler/> 30 April 2011.

[168] Yeşilyurt, 409.

5.3.2. Comprehensive Engagement and Reformulation of *Raison D'état*

AKP's comprehensive engagement policy with Iraq (which included the KRG) had positive repercussions over the Kurds living in Turkey. In parallel, domestic policies based on respect for the socio-cultural significance of Kurdish identity have had a positive impact on Turkey's northern Iraq policy. As a result of rising economic investment and the boosting of social services available to the local population, ordinary people on the street felt that they were treated decently. For some, AKP was re-constructing the Kurdish identity for its own interests. Be that as it may, as AKP nurtured the feeling of dignity among the Kurds, political fruits naturally ripened. In contrast to AKP's active policy at the municipal level, the performance of municipalities run by DTP remained quite low. Since they were primarily busy with ethno-nationalist and ideological concerns, they paid the political price heavily within the Kurdish constituency.[169]

Socio-political cleavage among the Kurdish community has been more apparent in the voting for the motion, which was designed to authorize the Turkish Armed Forces to conduct cross-border operations in northern Iraq for a period of one year. On 17 October 2007, only parliamentarians from the DTP voted against. The motion passed without any significant defection from the AKP. Five days before the motion was voted, one of the prominent Kurdish deputies within AKP had made a socio-political assessment, which gives some clues about how he views Kurdish identity and interests. According to Abdurrahman Kurt, "For some years, religious Kurds had given support to DTP, just like paying a debt. They had been aware of the fact that DTP had a leftist and secular tendency. But they lacked any viable political alternatives. This trend has changed after AKP entered into the political scene." Regarding the cross-border operation, Kurt further added, "Northern Iraq is like a swamp. Entering into northern Iraq might be a risk for the Kurds in Turkey. We should focus on the problems inside the borders." All of these arguments turned out to be just a lip service. Kurt and his friends voted for the motion.[170]

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[169] Rabia Karakaya Polat, "The AKP and the Kurdish Issue: What Went Wrong?," *SETA Policy Brief*, no.14, (Ankara: SETA, May 2008). "Erdoğan: Öncelik Yurt İçi Mücadelede," *Sabah*, 13 June 2007, <http://arsiv.sabah.com.tr> 23 June 2008. "AKP Kendi Kürt'ünü Yaratmak İstiyor," 17 January 2008, <http://www.atilim.org> 24 March 2008. Mustafa Akyol, *Kürt Sorununu Yeniden Düşünmek: Yanlış Giden Neydi? Bundan Sonra Nereye?*, 5th ed., (İstanbul: Doğan Kitap, 2007), 14-25.

[170] "AKP Milletvekili Abdurrahman Kurt: Kuzey Irak Bataklıktır," <http://www.haber5.com> 20 April 2008.

Despite the fact that the Parliament had given authority for cross-border operations, the incursion of PKK terrorists into Dağlıca province of Hakkari on 20 October 2007 put serious pressure on the AKP government. Erdoğan appealed to national security interests when he smoothly sealed the military-intelligence cooperation deal with the US on 5 November 2007. Cross-border air strikes started in December 2007. CHP and MHP advocated for the establishment of a security zone and demanded a de facto military control over northern Iraq. This would entail a longer military operation than expected or planned. Since the voice of the opposition sharpened, relations between AKP and TGS somehow relaxed. The cross-border land operations proved to be successful in early February 2008.[171]

Paradoxically, however, interest-based action did not result in a change in the perceptions of AKP's identity. In fact, success in the foreign policy domain could do little or nothing to ease social tensions and political grievances at home. Having garnered political support from largely conservative and religiously sensitive voters for the second term in office, AKP had to pay back. By late February, AKP attempted to seek parliamentary majority to amend the Constitution for lifting the headscarf ban in the universities, and perhaps in the public schools. The headscarf problem was also a concern for the Kurdish voters of AKP.[172]

On the headscarf issue, AKP was faced with a strong secular opposition. In essence, the debate was based on basic ontologies reflected through rhetorical uses of secular (profane, mundane) and sacred (metaphysical) frames in political narratives.[173] The discursive attempt of AKP was perceived by the secular state institutions—most prominently the Constitutional Court—as a significant step towards the Islamization of public sphere. AKP's closure case was opened at the Constitutional Court on 15 March 2008. Three days before, Erdoğan had disclosed AKP's comprehensive package for the southeast region. He acknowledged that the southeast problem has socio-economic, psychological and cultural dimensions. Therefore, his plan included the opening of a Kurdish broadcasting channel in

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[171] "AK Parti ile Ordunun Flörtü," 7 Mart 2008, <http://www.ntvmsnbc.com/news/438254.asp> 24 March 2008.

[172] The number of JDP deputies in eastern and south eastern electoral districts has risen from 56 to 75 after the general election on 22 July 2007. "Turkey, the Kurds and Islam: A Religious Revival," *The Economist*, 31 January 2008, <http://www.economist.com> 22 March 2008. "Turkey's Secular Constitution: See You in Court," *The Economist*, 19 March 2008, <http://www.economist.com> 22 March 2008.

[173] Elizabeth Shakman Hurd, "Theorizing Religious Resurgence," *International Politics* 44, (2007): 647-665.

the official state television, namely TRT. In order to further develop relations with Iraq, opening of a Turkish consulate in Basra was also on AKP's agenda.[174]

Despite his domestic predicaments, Erdoğan went on to follow AKP's policy of comprehensive engagement with Iraq. On 24 April 2008, NSC emphasized the utility of "prevention of [PKK] terrorist activities in northern Iraq," "maintenance of consultations with all Iraqi groups and entities," and "further enhancement of bilateral relations, particularly in areas of economy and energy."[175] NSC's declaration also signaled the military's support for the comprehensive cooperation with Iraq. CHP followed the suit by sending messages of friendship towards northern Iraq. In this respect, the warm signal given by MHP leader Bahçeli to Hasip Kaplan—an outspoken deputy of DTP—was quite unprecedented. As the climate became more conducive, Minister of Foreign Affairs Ali Babacan reaffirmed that contacts with northern Iraq will be extended and diversified.[176]

On the first of May, Erdoğan's foreign policy advisor Davutoğlu and special representative for Iraq Murat Özçelik—who had served for Özal's Presidential office as a private aide—were in Baghdad to meet with the Iraqi officials, including the PM of KRG Nechirvan Barzani. On the same day, Deputy Iraqi President Tarıq al-Hashimi flew to Ankara for diplomatic meetings. In exchange, Erdoğan's historic visit to Baghdad on 10 July 2008 proved to be successful. Security, economy and cultural issues were all discussed during the bilateral talks. PKK terrorism, by implication the Kurdish question, has dominated the agenda. By reconciling their major differences, Turkey and Iraq signed a "joint political

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[174] "Erdoğan'ın Yok Dediği Güneydoğu Paketi 12 Milyar," *Milliyet*, 12 March 2008, <http://www.milliyet.com> 3 January 2009. "İşte Başbakan'ın NYT'ye Açıkladığı Güneydoğu Paketi," <http://www.nethaber.com> 3 January 2009.

[175] <http://www.mgk.gov.tr/Turkce/basinbildiri2008/24nisan2008.htm> 3 January 2009.

[176] "Babacan: K.Irak'la Temaslar Sıklaşacak," *Milliyet*, 29 April 2008. On 2 January 2009, Babacan was the guest speaker of *Enine Boyuna* at TRT-1. During that program, he declared that Turkey was at the very early stage of security cooperation with the regional administration in northern Iraq. Referring to the report prepared by Sönmez Köksal—who served as the ambassador in Baghdad between 1986 and 1990 and later became the chief of National Intelligence Agency—Babacan stated that there would be a possibility for Turkey to open a consulate in Erbil when political conditions were met.

declaration"[177] to form a "High-Level Cooperation Council," which would be tasked with the improvement of bilateral relations in many respects.[178]

On 2 August 2008, the Constitutional Court decided to sanction AKP via fine payments, instead of directly closing it. Upon Erdoğan's visit to Baghdad, the NSC meeting that convened on 21 August 2008 and reached to the conclusion that "concrete projects has to be carried out" in Iraq within the framework of strategic cooperation.[179] This meant that the military was not challenging AKP's Iraq policy. Perhaps not coincidentally, the military was revising its national identity perceptions. On 28 August 2008, the new Chief of TGS General İlker Başbuğ reformulated the meaning of sub- and supra-identity in Turkey.

> The founders of our Republic, Mustafa Kemal and his friends, had never denied the existence of…sub-identities that form the nation. They called those who accept to live under one supra-identity—while preserving their different [sub]identities and uniting willfully on common denominators—as the "Turkish Nation". However, they did not tolerate any activity that might harm the common denominators and the supra-identity. Within this framework, all citizens of Turkey should not hesitate to say that…"I am an Individual and a Citizen of Turkish Nation"…Turkish Republic respects cultural differences…[and] has made necessary arrangements in order to support cultural survival and enhance cultural richness, only on the conditions that [demands] remain at the individual level within the cultural sphere and [more importantly] Turkey's nation-state structure is not damaged. Beyond the cultural domain, no one could demand any kind of communal arrangement in the political realm for a specific ethnic group…Were cultural arrangements somehow brought into the political domain and sub-identities transformed into supra-identities…the country might spiral into polarization and separation.[180]

By this discursive move into the ideational mode of reasoning, the military was attempting to expand its security rationale. As reported by TGS, air strikes have continued intermittently against the PKK camps in northern Iraq until the Aktütün incursion on 3 October 2008. The Parliament voted for the motion on 8 October 2008 to extend the

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[177] "Türkiye Cumhuriyeti ile Irak Cumhuriyeti Hükûmetleri Arasında Yüksek Düzeyli İşbirliği Konseyi'nin Kurulmasına İlişkin Ortak Siyasi Bildirge," <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/> 24 April 2011.

[178] "Irak Politikasında Kırmızı Çizgiler Değişti," <http://www.dunyabulteni.net/> 24 October 2008. Information is based on Devrim Sevimay's interview with Haşim Haşimi in the *Milliyet* daily. "Erdoğan'dan Irak'a Teşekkür", *Milliyet*, 11 July 2008.

[179] <http://www.mgk.gov.tr/Turkce/basinbildiri2008/21agustos2008.htm> 3 January 2009.

[180] <http://www.tsk.mil.tr/KOMUTANKONUSMALAR.html> 10 January 2009. Başbuğ delivered this speech during the ceremony in which he assumed the command post at the TGS.

authorization for cross-border operations for one year. In order to eliminate PKK militants, Ankara enhanced security cooperation with Erbil.[181]

By then the Turkish domestic political stage has been set for the local election campaigns of 29 March 2009. Erdoğan intensified his vocal bid for winning the election in Diyarbakır municipality, which was held by the DTP. Again, Diyarbakır became a spatial symbol of Kurdish question. The political battles between AKP and DTP over the eastern-southeastern municipalities have created implications for Turkey's Kurdish problem.

In this respect, Erdoğan's controversial speech in Hakkari on 1 November 2008 has to be noted, notwithstanding the fact that its main target audience was domestic. "A Kurd can say that s/he is a Kurd. But we have united under one flag. What we have said is one nation, one flag, one county; one state…There is no place in this country for the one who oppose this (view). S/he may go wherever desired."[182] Since his discursive frames gave signs of security rationale, Erdoğan's milder political language during his first term in office (2002-2007) was portrayed as "Özalization", while his turn towards harsher discursive overtures was referred either as "Demirelization" or "Çillerization".[183] Since Çiller's approach to Kurdish question had been primarily based on military reasoning, Erdoğan was indirectly accused of accommodating, if not collaborating with, the military bureaucracy.

According to the journalistic account of Cengiz Çandar, Erdoğan received a tacit consent from the military, before the opening of TRT-6 (Kurdish broadcasting channel of official state television) on 1 January 2009.[184] The broadcasts of TRT-6 created important ramifications both internally and externally. The mainstream opposition parties CHP and MHP were vocally critical of TRT-6; while DTP seized the opportunity to push for a change in the constitution, in parallel to the Kurdist political demands. The most striking reaction came from the PKK/KONGRA-GEL. The head of PKK's military faction, Fehman Hüseyin, accused all of the Kurds working either in AKP or in the TRT-6 with betrayal. This showed

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[181] "PKK Attacks Prompt Security Cooperation between Turkey and Iraq's Kurdish Regional Government," *Terrorism Focus* 5, no. 36, 22 October 2008. <http://www.jamestown.org/> 6 August 2011.

[182] "AK PARTİ Genel Başkanı ve Başbakan Erdoğan Hakkari Merkez İlçe Kongresi'nde Konuştu," <http://www.rte.gen.tr/> 10 January 2009.

[183] Mehveş Evin, "AKP'nin Dili Değişti," *Akşam*, 18 November 2008.

[184] Cengiz Çandar, *Mezopotamya Ekspresi: Bir Tarih Yolculuğu (Türkiye-Kürtler-Ortadoğu-Batı)*, (İstanbul: İletişim, 2012), 38, 44, 45.

that PKK became nervous about losing its psychological influence over the Kurdish population.[185]

In the end, the fight between Turkish security forces and PKK has been for winning the hearts and minds of Kurdish people. Elements of soft power have to be used in order to win the information warfare. That is not to say that coercive measures against the PKK threat would unlikely to continue.[186] Quite the contrary, social and ideational efforts will be complemented with military and diplomatic steps. In the post-2003 period, Ankara's particular diplomatic and military moves between 2009 and 2011 gave important signs of a new chapter in Turkey's Iraq policy. After the opening of Basra General Consulate on 18 March 2009, the Turkish-Iraqi bilateral military cooperation (framework) agreement was signed on 9 June 2009.[187] As far as the research commitments undertaken by this study in general, for this chapter in particular, Erdoğan's official inauguration of Erbil General Consulate on 29 March 2011[188] marks the episodic end of Turkey's post-war Iraq policy.

Given the pre-war historical background and discursive context, occurrence of this event was almost unimaginable. In those days, Turkish foreign policy makers were trying to make reasons for (re)establishing military, rather than diplomatic, presence in northern Iraq. Incorporation of utilitarian and ideational modes of reasoning paved the way for the development of a new discursive logic in Ankara to fully embrace Erbil. After the war, Turkey's making of this major foreign policy change was made possible through the rhetoric of comprehensive cooperation with Iraq.

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[185] Cevdet Aşkın, "TRT 6 DTP'de Kafa Karıştırdı, Kandil'e Askeri Baskı Arttı," *Referans*, 6 January 2009, <http://www.referansgazetesi.com/> 10 January 2009. "TRT'nin Yeni Kürtçe Kanalı TRT 6, PKK'yı Şişledi," <http://www.ekoayrinti.com/> 10 January 2009.

[186] It was disclosed that Turkey, Iraq and the US would establish a "joint intelligence coordination center" in Erbil. Hilal Köylü, "Erbil'de PKK'ya Karşı Üçlü Komuta Merkezi," <http://www.voanews.com/turkish/2009-01-23-voa9.cfm> 28 January 2009.

[187] "Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Genelkurmay Başkanlığı ile Irak Cumhuriyeti Savunma Bakanlığı Arasında Askeri Alanda Eğitim, Teknik ve Bilimsel İş Birliği Mutabakat Muhtırası (İmza Tarihi)," <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/sub.tr.mfa> 25 April 2011.

[188] "Erdoğan, Erbil Başkonsolosluğu'nu Açtı," 29 March 2011, <http://www.dunyabulteni.net/> 25 May 2012.

5.4. Conclusion: Episodic Findings

In the post-Gulf War period, Turkey's discourse of cooperation with Iraq was based on security rationale. This reasoning was largely a response to the dyadic contextual changes emerged in the aftermath of the Gulf War. The implementation of northern no-fly zone over the thirty sixth parallel and its enforcement by the Operation Northern Watch (ONW) created a power vacuum in northern Iraq. Since Baghdad lost most of its military control over Erbil, KDP and PUK found more favorable environment to realize their political aspirations. They moved in the direction of achieving federal governance and/or regional autonomy. In addition to dealing with this political challenge, Ankara had to address the military threat posed by the PKK in northern Iraq.

In 1996, Turkish General Staff (TGS) was tasked to coordinate Turkey's northern Iraq policy. By then the prevention of political-military threats emanating from northern Iraq became the main reason driving Turkish foreign policy makers. Based on the balance of threat rationale, Ankara sided with Baghdad and KDP against the rapprochement between Iran, PUK and PKK. Up until the US invasion in 2003, reshuffling of alliances and contextual moves have marked the logic of security in making of cooperation and non-cooperation in Turkish-Iraqi relations. Yet, security reasoning did not help Turkey to strengthen its cooperation with Iraq. Quite the contrary, it prevented Ankara to take and implement well-coordinated political decisions.

Before the US invasion, Ankara was mainly concerned about protection of political, military and economic interests. Balancing of the PKK threat and elimination of the Kurdish statehood were two dominant frames that rationalized the utility of cooperating with Washington against Baghdad. To a certain extent, Ankara was also interested in hindering of military cooperation between Washington and Erbil. In this regard, predominantly security rationale has provided the discursive basis for the Gül government to initialize military cooperation (parliamentary approval of the first motion for site survey and base modernization) with the US, notwithstanding the domestic public and political opposition emerged even within their own ranks. In terms of Turkey-US cooperation, the crisis of 1 March 2003 (parliamentary disapproval of the second motion for land-air transit rights) was clearly a bargaining failure. One of the main reasons of this incident was misrepresentation of Turkey's bargaining position. Despite the grave domestic financial problems, discursive framing of economic interests did not constitute a good reason to enter into war together with the US side. That is to say, the motion crisis demonstrated the difficulty of cooperating with

Washington against Baghdad. It re-presented the significance of both domestic veto players and audience costs for Turkey's discourse of non-cooperation with Iraq.

In spite of this fact, parliamentary approval for the third motion (opening of the airspace) was framed within the logic of alliance with the US. It was preconceived that Turkey would be in the Coalition, but not in the war. Discursive rationality implied dueling presuppositions, which can be summed up in one counterintuitive (and perhaps somehow counterproductive) proposition: *Turkey could support its ally (the US) without abandoning its neighbor (Iraq).*

By the beginning and in the midst of war, the indispensability frame dominated Turkey's foreign policy discourse and implied geopolitical reasoning. This predetermined logic dictated that the opening of northern front was indispensable for the US. In this rationale, it was presumed that support for the US would also alleviate Ankara's security concerns emanating from northern Iraq. In exchange for the opening of its airspace, Turkey would enter into northern Iraq in order to prevent rise of PKK terrorism and mass migration. This could be regarded as a major reason that made the third motion discursively defensible, and perhaps politically possible, for the AKP government. After the third motion, "alliance with the US" and "national security interests" have been re-deployed into the governmental discourse as basic frames of presupposition. In this instance, Ankara faced both coordination and credibility problems. On the one hand, the Turkish political-military officials ought to resolve command-control issues with their US counterparts. On the other hand, Turkish military should not give the impression of occupation or annexation by acting alongside the Coalition forces.

As framed by Erdoğan, Ankara faced a "dual trap" after the US-led war in Iraq. Turkey could not take the risk of neither active involvement nor passive non-intervention during the US invasion of Iraq. According to him, Turkish government acted along the realities on the ground. They did not take an opportunistic pro-war stance, but took a position to protect Turkey's security interests. In the end, Turkey's security cooperation with the US and probable entry into northern Iraq was justified by discursive framing of humanitarian reasons.

In fact, pro-governmental discursive frames already hinted that there had been a fledgling appeal towards ideational modes of reasoning, notwithstanding the resilience of utilitarian rationality. This was more salient in framing of post-war dyadic context. First and foremost the Iraqi people, not the Iraqi state, were taken as Turkey's dyadic other. In turn, the Iraqi people have been portrayed as neighbor, brother and relative. Apparently, the pro-governmental discourse displayed a certain level of identity consciousness by appealing to Arab, Kurd, Turkmen and other constituencies of Iraq. While explaining the causes and

consequences of the Iraq war, Turkish policy makers resorted to ideational predispositions, i.e. humanitarian, ethical, legal frames. Towards the end of war, especially right after the visit of Powell, the significant frame was "being both in the Coalition and out of the war," which reflected the double-faced nature of Turkey's Iraq policy discourse. Moreover, Turkey was preconceived as a Janus-like figure that could simultaneously cooperate with the US and its regional rivals (Iran and Syria).

By the end of war, utilitarian and ideational modes of reasoning seemed to predetermine the discursive path for Turkey's post-Saddam Iraq policy. In this regard, classical vocabulary of alliance making with the US (national interest and security, balance of power/threat lexicon) was broadened with ideational rhetoric, i.e. prevention of humanitarian disaster, providing regional peace and justice, building of democratic and free Iraq with the constituents of Arabs, Kurds, Turkmen and other peoples.

In the post-war period, Turkey's utilitarian discourse of cooperation with Iraq has been broadened by ideational frames. In addition to the long-established and widely utilized security rationale, the traditional bureaucracy adopted identity frames in addressing the Kurdish issue. Together with security and economic interests, identity plays a prominent role in the minds of Turkish foreign policy makers in devising their relations with Iraq. In a sense, ideational mode of reasoning has surpassed a rhetorical threshold and became part of the discourse of comprehensive cooperation with Iraq.

On the other hand, the implications of this discourse for the dyadic context still remain elusive. That is to say, discursive change has created lingering (both positive and negative) influence on the actual dynamics of Turkish-Iraqi (Ankara-Baghdad and Ankara-Erbil) relations. As Turkey's eventual relations with Iraq move towards the first centennial, current paradoxes (like ensuing ethnic-sectarian strife and the uncertain fate of Kirkuk) are yet to be resolved by a critical event, in order to (re)analyze Ankara's logic of cooperating with or against Baghdad.

CHAPTER

6. CONCLUSION

It is taken for granted that achieving "more cooperation is often better than less."[1] The historical (and the current) state of Turkey's cooperation discourses with Iraq do not neatly fit into this received wisdom. When Turkish governments had aimed to achieve more cooperation with Baghdad, they faced dyadic costs. That is to say, more cooperation with Iraq has been a real challenge for Turkey. The Saadabad Pact of 1937 had been portrayed as pro-Eastern and pro-peace entente with Iraq. But it turned out to be a virtual cooperation affair, which (perhaps unintentionally) led to sudden dyadic political costs, i.e. the immediate fall of pro-Turkish government in Baghdad. By 1955, Ankara once again bargained hard for making a defense pact with Baghdad. This time, Turkey's cooperation discourse unleashed regional polarization particularly between Cairo and Baghdad, which gradually led to the fall of pro-Western Iraqi monarchy in 1958. At that time, the regime change in Baghdad was definitely an undesired political outcome for Ankara. When Baghdad had entered into contextual trouble, like the wars in 1991 and 2003, Ankara (perhaps unwillingly) turned towards less cooperation and again faced with relatively high costs.

Despite considerable level of material (border trade, oil-water dependency) and ideational (socio-cultural ties) inter-connectedness, the Turkish government officials have not yet fully achieved their goal of comprehensive cooperation with their Iraqi counterparts. Theoretical and empirical excavation of this lingering puzzle formed the main research aim for this study. This dissertation sought to bring a narrative explanation for comprehending

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[1]   Robert Axelrod and Robert O. Keohane, "Achieving Cooperation Under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions," *World Politics* 38, no. 1 (October 1985): 254.

contextual reasons and agential reasonings that constituted the ensuing paradoxes of cooperation and non-cooperation discourses in Turkey's Iraq policy.

Since episodic findings were presented in each chapter, the conclusion provides cross-episodic and overarching findings. In the cross-episodic findings section, cooperation episodes and non-cooperation episodes are assessed under two separate headings. The main aim of this endeavor is to analyze the implications of contextual-discursive commonalities and differences. Under the overarching findings section, long-term contextual-discursive continuity and change in Turkey's Iraq policy is evaluated. The thesis is put to end with the third section in which research recommendations and final remarks are presented.

6.1. Cross–Episodic Findings: Commonalities and Differences

By looking at the contextual-discursive evidence emerged from the pre-event, event and post-event analyses, the episodic findings were collected in the conclusion section of each chapter. While presenting the episodic findings, contextual-discursive reasons and consequences were assessed from a holistic perspective. The episodic conclusions also followed the narrative explanation (beginning-middle-end) order and the discussion was kept relatively compact.

Since the task of this section is to discuss cross-episodic commonalities and differences, some analytical separations have to be made. The analytical division of contextual reasons-discursive reasonings-contextual consequences can help to better understand main dynamics of divergence and convergence between the episodes. For analytical purposes, basic contextual reasons and consequences need to be divided into global/regional environment, dyadic/local conditions, and domestic circumstances. Discursive reasonings should be distinguished according to dominant ontological modes and rhetorical models.

6.1.1. Cooperation Episodes

The general finding on pact episodes asserts that dyadic uncertainty in Baghdad and ambiguous discursive reasoning (ontological-rhetorical ambivalence) in Ankara led to less cooperative political outcomes in Turkish-Iraqi relations. In the cooperation episodes,

Turkey mainly faced short/mid-term dyadic political costs. Simply put, discourses of cooperation ended up with undesired regime changes in Iraq.

6.1.1.1. Basic Contextual Reasons

Global/regional environment: Saadabad (1937) and Baghdad (1955) pacts were born in different global/regional contexts. Before the emergence of Saadabad Pact, global/regional environment was relatively facilitating and permissive for enhancing the political cooperation between Turkey and Iraq. In the second episode, global/regional conditions were seemingly more enforcing and assertive for building defense cooperation between Ankara and Baghdad.

In the first cooperation episode, global environment was shaped by the tightening of international power struggle between Britain-France entente, Germany-Italy axis and the Soviet Russia. Particularly the rivalry between Britain and Germany created repercussions for Middle Eastern politics. Apparently, London was more concerned about preserving its regional hegemony. On the other hand, Berlin was attempting to find ways to achieve regional primacy. Most of the regional countries, including Turkey, were trying to get the most out of the changes in the global/regional context. In terms of regional affairs, Hatay was still a burning issue of Turkish-Arab relations. The weakening position of France over Syria created a favorable environment for Ankara to take Baghdad on its side. To a large extent, the pre-event global/regional context did not enforce a certain reason for Ankara to enhance its political cooperation with Baghdad. This does not imply that global/regional actors did not play any role. In fact, the grim picture of future was certainly created by them. Noticeably, the imminence of conflict and war permeated into the pre-event global/regional context. Thus, the shadow of conflict/war could be regarded as a contextual reason that facilitated the emergence of Saadabad Pact.

In the second cooperation episode, bipolarity was the defining feature of global context. In the early Cold War period, Middle Eastern affairs were under the impact of rivalry between the Anglo-American axis and the Soviet Union. Against probable territorial aggression of the USSR, Turkey enhanced its defensive position by becoming NATO member in 1952. At that time, Britain and the US were more concerned about containing Soviet and Egyptian revisionist influence over the Middle East. In this sense, Turkey's membership to NATO was conditioned by its further commitment to Middle Eastern defense against the Soviet infiltration. Before the event, the key players, particularly Britain (and the US) assumed assertive positions for expanding regional defense cooperation. To a certain

extent, the pre-event global/regional context enforced, if not imposed, the establishment of Baghdad Pact.

Dyadic/local conditions: In both cases of cooperation, dyadic/local conditions played a significant role. The pre-event context in both instances displayed common characteristics. Before the Oriental Entente (1937), pro-Turkish government of Iraq was in a weakening domestic position. By re-aligning with Ankara, Baghdad could hope to preserve the domestic political status quo against the pan-Arabist opposition. By 1955, the Iraqi government did not hold adequate domestic power to sustain pro-British/Western foreign policy posture. Against the undermining impact of pan-Arabist and communist forces, alignment with the West (and Turkey) was a way of achieving regime security for Baghdad. In both episodes, dyadic/local contextual reasons created necessary conditions for making Turkish-Iraqi cooperation possible. The conditions of possibility were largely shaped by the bilateral drive for the continuation of dyadic/local status quo.

Domestic circumstances: With regard to the situation in Ankara, political-military and economic circumstances have to be evaluated. In both cases of cooperation, the Turkish governments did not face strong political opposition. At the time of *Şark Misakı*, Dersim revolt did not pose a serious military risk for Ankara. It was oil shortage and Soviet trade hegemony that challenged the country. During the time of Baghdad Pact, Ankara deeply needed financial assistance to alleviate dire economic circumstances. Arguably in both cases, domestic economic reasons created sufficient conditions for Turkey to enhance cooperation with Iraq.

6.1.1.2. Dominant Discursive Reasonings

Ontological modes: On the part of Turkey, utilitarian reasoning was the predominant ontological mode in the making of Saadabad and Baghdad pacts. In both episodes, global and regional environment was portrayed in power/threat terms, and the logic of cooperation explained by presuppositions on the rationality of power/threat balancing. Geopolitical framings were also pervasive in both instances.

The main issues (goals) of cooperation were framed in terms of political-military utility. For the Oriental Entente, main ontological reason was framed as political (diplomatic and psychological) prestige. On the other hand, Baghdad Pact did rest on *raison d'être* of defensive military alliance. In both cases, economic interests were manifested only secondarily.

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In terms of ontological conception of dyadic context, the two pacts represented striking commonality. Iraq was portrayed as an "all Arab" state during these two events. Neither Turkmen nor Kurds were taken as constituents of Iraq. Kurdish issue was not presented as Turkey's primary reason of cooperation with Iraq.

Rhetorical models: Even though utilitarian mode dominated ontological reasoning in Ankara, pro-governmental rhetoric did hardly appeal to mutual utility and material reciprocity in framing the cooperation with Baghdad. Instead, ideational rhetoric became more prevalent. In the case of *Şark Misakı*, shared Eastern solidarity and normative ideal of peace dominated the rhetorical agenda. Ideological (anti-communist) rhetoric was more influential in the making of Baghdad Pact. Rhetoric of social-cultural ties (friendship, neighborhood, brotherhood) was commonly utilized in both cases.

During the Saadabad Pact, Turkish government did not create any rhetorical linkage between domestic Kurdish (Dersim) issue and its cooperation with Iraq. In 1955, even though communism was rampant among the Iraqi Kurds, Ankara turned a blind eye on this linkage and opted for rhetorical silence. In both cases, pro-governmental rhetoric managed to de-link Turkey's cooperation with Iraq from its position vis-à-vis the Kurds residing in both sides of the common land border.

6.1.1.3. Basic Contextual Consequences

Global/regional environment: Saadabad Pact did not generate any significant impact on regional and global context. In fact, it remained as a virtual cooperation affair for Turkey. By the beginning of Second World War, Oriental Entente did lose its *raison d'être*.

In contrast, regional and global polarization increased after the formation of Baghdad Pact. Soviet and Egyptian (Nasserist) propaganda was discharged, rather than uncharged. Communist and pan-Arabist penetration into the region was intensified. Consequently, Suez (1956) and Syria-Lebanon-Jordan (1957) crises proved that the pro-Western/anti-communist regional defense pact brought *in*security for the Middle East. Baghdad Pact, as an institution, handed little or no help to Turkey to overcome these crises.

Dyadic/local conditions: *Şark Misakı* incurred immediate dyadic costs. Ankara caught off guard by the sudden fall of pro-Turkey government in Iraq. Change of status quo in Baghdad was not the intended outcome for Turkey.

The Iraqi domestic opposition was strengthened after the formation of Baghdad Pact. Especially after the Suez crisis, (pan)Arab nationalists and communist Kurds posed a serious

challenge for the security of Iraqi regime. Resorting to authoritarian rule only exacerbated the situation and did not prevent weakening of the Iraqi government against the opposition. By 1958, the Iraqi opposition molded to bring about the fall of pro-Western Hashemite monarchy. Ostensibly, the regime change in Iraq was not a desired consequence for Ankara.

Domestic circumstances: Bargaining and enforcement of Saadabad Pact did not bring any kind of domestic burden to the Turkish government. In fact, *Şark Misakı* did not entail any significant commitment from Ankara. Perhaps, more importantly, there was not any domestic opposition or player to veto Turkish government's policy of cooperation with Iraq.

Bargaining for the Baghdad Pact had little or no domestic audience costs for Ankara. This was mainly because of the fact that domestic opposition and veto players gave their consent. In the enforcement phase, Turkey's domestic situation was slightly different. After facing with acute regional crises in 1956 and 1957, the Turkish government inadvertently found itself in a very delicate domestic position. The sense of domestic weakening was further exacerbated by the Iraqi revolution in 1958.

6.1.2. Non-Cooperation Episodes

The general argument on war episodes affirms that the shadow of future dyadic conditions emerged as the basic contextual reason for Ankara to sever ties from Baghdad. Discourses of non-cooperation reflected ontological and rhetorical ambiguity. Liminal discursive reasoning primarily brought domestic and dyadic political-military costs. Put bluntly, Turkey was confronted with the challenge of Kurdish problem and security threat of the PKK on both side of the border. Non-cooperation episodes were marked by unintended but enduring consequences for Turkish-Iraqi relations.

6.1.2.1. Basic Contextual Reasons

Global/regional environment: The Gulf crisis emerged by the end of the Cold War. Any other global power was not in a position to challenge the US hegemony over the Middle East. But the global context did not reflect conditions of unipolarity. In fact, all of the crisis decisions (implementation of political, economic, and military sanctions against the Iraqi

aggression of Kuwait's sovereignty and territorial integrity) were endorsed by the UN Security Council resolutions. The enforcement of non-cooperation with Iraq was certainly binding for all UN members. The pre-event global contextual reasons left the Turkish government with a single choice that was siding with the UN against the Iraqi regime. In terms of regional context, most of the Arab countries (prominently Egypt, Syria and Saudi Arabia) stood against the Iraqi aggression. Fragmentation of inter-Arab unity created a more favorable environment for Ankara to sever ties with Baghdad. Regional conditions made Turkey's abandonment of Iraq easier.

In the second non-cooperation case, the international context was under the influence of US-led global war on terror. In 2002, the Iraqi regime was declared as belonging to the "axis of evil" by the US President. Since then the US administration intensified its effort for a regime change in Iraq. Nonetheless, the UN Security Council did not give any mandate that could justify a war against Iraq. Hence Washington sought to build international coalition to invade Iraq. The unilateral war decision of the US sparked significant international and regional reaction. To a certain extent, international opposition strengthened Turkey's hand to resist to the US-led invasion of Iraq for some time. In this episode, global and regional environment enabled Ankara not sever its cooperation with Baghdad too early too soon.

Dyadic/local conditions: The Kirkuk-Yumurtalık oil pipeline, which became operational in 1977, could be an important material reason for constituting conditions of (non)cooperation between the two countries. By 1988, Iraq was Turkey's most important trading partner. This could make the Turkish government to think twice before taking a decision of non-cooperation with Baghdad. In addition to oil and trade, sharing of transboundary water resources in the Tigris Euphrates basin turned out to be a key material reason that determined the dyadic circumstances of non-cooperation. Water issue became more contentious in the period between 1977 and 1990. Divergence over the water issue set the non-cooperative context of Turkish-Iraqi bilateral relations right before the Gulf crisis.

The second reason that created dyadic conditions of non-cooperation was related to the Kurdish issue. During the 1980's, Baghdad became a security partner for Ankara to eliminate PKK terrorist activities in cross-border areas. Turkish-Iraqi security cooperation was designed to balance the collaboration among major Kurdish forces (PKK, PUK, and KDP) and key local players (Syria, Iran). By the end of the Iran-Iraq war, the local context forced the Turkish government to cease its cooperation with the Iraqi regime. In 1988, the violent suppression of the Kurdish opposition by the Iraqi security forces caused a cross-border refugee crisis. These circumstantial changes constituted the beginning of isolation for Baghdad. In this sense, local contextual reasons did pave the way for the Turkish government to non-cooperate with the Iraqi regime.

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Dyadic and local context was quite different before the US invasion. After the capturing of its head (Öcalan) in 1999, PKK's cross-border terrorist activities were relatively diminished. In contrast, Kurdish groups (KDP and PUK) enhanced their local standing in northern Iraq. Before the invasion of Iraq, Kurdish forces were accepted as local collaborators within the US-led war coalition. Hence the future status of Kirkuk and the safety of Turkmen population became more salient issues for Turkey. The shadow of future dyadic conditions, particularly the impending local uncertainty in 2003, gave Ankara an important reason for cooperating with Washington rather than Baghdad.

Domestic circumstances: Domestic public opinion was against Turkey's involvement in the Gulf War. Parliamentary opposition and civil-military veto players prevented the government from making more extensive military commitment (i.e. troop contribution) to the war coalition formed against Iraq. In other words, domestic contextual reasons enabled Ankara not to further set apart itself from Baghdad.

Before the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, civil-military veto players were more concerned about the costs of non-cooperation with Washington. To a large extent, they were supportive of Turkey's political-military cooperation with the US. On the other hand, public and parliamentary opposition to the war was too strong and presented a challenge for Turkish foreign policy makers. In comparison to the Gulf War case, political-economic position of the incumbent government in Ankara was much more inexperienced and manifestly weak. For these domestic circumstantial reasons, the government had to tie its hand to remaining liminal betwixt (non)cooperation with Washington, Baghdad and Erbil.

6.1.2.2. Dominant Discursive Reasonings

Ontological modes: To a large extent, Turkey's ontological mode in the Gulf War and the US invasion were conceived in terms of material (political, military and economic) interests. This ontological position presupposed the utility of power/threat balancing in world and regional affairs. Due to the preconception of US primacy, Ankara framed its war positions as an extension of its relations with Washington. In this regard, it was presupposed that these wars would consolidate the alliance between Turkey and the US. Turkish policy makers were primarily concerned about compensation of their economic losses emerging due to the sanctions and the war. Secondly, perhaps more importantly, they sought to enhance Turkey's position by receiving modern US weapons (fighter jets, air defense missiles etc.)

and/or economic-financial aid on better terms. In addition, these wars were viewed as a contextual opportunity to increase Turkey's geopolitical influence. In both instances, current and/or future local status quo was seen as the key reason for Ankara to extend its influence over Erbil. With this utilitarian mode of reasoning, it was presumed that Turkey could have a more influential position in northern Iraq and prevent Kurdish political aspirations towards statehood.

Rhetorical models: Despite the dominance of utilitarian reasoning, Turkish government turned to ideational rhetoric to justify its position in the Gulf War. By appealing to UN Security Council Resolutions, pro-governmental rhetoric deployed normative and moral frames that made non-cooperation with the Iraqi regime lawful and righteous. More importantly, framing of the dyadic status quo as the innocent peaceful Iraqi people (Arabs, Kurds, Turkmen and others) vs. the guilty authoritarian ruler (Saddam) made it easier for Ankara to legitimate its political-military support to the war coalition. However, the utility of cooperation with Washington against Baghdad was hard to sell rhetorically. Thus government's ambivalent rhetorical framings (being neither in nor out of the war) weakened its position vis-à-vis parliamentary opposition and public opinion.

Ankara's rhetorical ambivalence was deepened by the end of Gulf War. Discursive prepackaging of post-war regional-local order as more peaceful, inter-dependent, stable and integrated was really illusive. This delusion went further as to preconceive a better dyadic status quo (democratic, modern, civilized Iraq). Yet the ideational rhetoric did not resonate well with the political context. The best Ankara could expect to get was a return to the status quo ante, i.e. territorially compact Iraq or Iraq without a Kurdish state. Even this rhetorical framing inevitably remained elusive, since it was based on the presupposition of imagined danger (Kurdish state), rather than the real threat posed by the PKK. Unrealistic and wishful rhetoric of Turkish policy makers could not prevent undesired outcomes. Particularly political and military consequences of the Gulf War would only exacerbate in the coming years.

In the post-Gulf War era, Turkey's red lines rhetoric oriented towards the prevention of threats that might challenge the preservation of dyadic status quo. Elimination of the PKK and pre-emption of further Kurdish ambitions particularly against the status of Kirkuk and the safety of Turkmen population constituted the backbone of security-based rhetoric. Before the invasion of Iraq, governmental rhetoric attempted to frame economic interests (financial problems) as a good reason for Turkey to side with the US. This rhetorical attempt backfired. The motion crisis of 1 March 2003 (parliamentary disapproval for extending land-air transit rights to US forces) demonstrated the significance of domestic audience costs.

War-time rhetorical performance of the Turkish government gave extra signs of strain. First and foremost, Ankara returned to political-military interest frames (national security and geopolitical indispensability of Turkey, importance of alliance with the US) in order to justify parliamentary approval for the opening of Turkish airspace. Within the rhetoric of national security, Turkey was portrayed in the Coalition, but not in the war. This ambivalent rhetoric was merely designed to alleviate Ankara's post-war security concerns, like PKK terrorism and mass migration in cross-border areas, without giving the impression of military occupation. In the end, humanitarian reasons were deployed for rhetorical justification of Turkey's (re)entry into northern Iraq. By the end of war, more ideational frames were incorporated into pro-governmental discourse. Rhetorics of utility and security were broadened by the use of ideational frames, i.e. prevention of humanitarian disaster, providing regional peace and justice, building of democratic and free Iraq with the constituents of Arabs, Kurds, Turkmen and other peoples. After the US invasion, Turkey's combined rhetoric progressed gradually and paved the way for the discourse of comprehensive cooperation with Iraq.

6.1.2.3. Basic Contextual Consequences

Global/regional environment: The US regional hegemony was enhanced in the post-Gulf War era. Regional and international isolation of Baghdad was deepened as a result of the US containment policies and the UN sanctions. By hosting the OPC and then the ONW Turkey played a key role in the enforcement of northern no fly zone over the north of the 36th parallel. Internationally created safe heaven unleashed de facto conditions for Kurdish regional autonomy and KDP/PUK self-rule in northern Iraq. In this period, Kurdish issue was internationalized. International political climate gave greater ease to the PKK to manipulate regional-local relations between Ankara, Baghdad, Damascus, and Tehran. As a result, regional instability deepened.

Contextual consequences of the Iraqi invasion were slightly different. Military cooperation between the US and the Kurdish groups in northern Iraq became quite disturbing for Turkey. As a result of the "hood incident" on 4 July 2003, Ankara-Washington relations deteriorated. Especially in the first years of US occupation, Iraq became a failed state living under conditions of civil war. As a result of the insecurity emanating from Iraq, political-military (security) interests dominated the regional agenda. The US was faced with the challenge of sectarian (ethno-religious) strife and militant insurgency until 2007. By 2007,

the US managed to provide security in at least Baghdad and began to make plans for troop withdrawal. In this regional environment, Turkey and the US signed a cooperation agreement for the sharing of military intelligence vis-à-vis northern Iraq. The withdrawal of US combat forces from Iraq was completed in 2009-2011 period. The US withdrawal process could not guarantee security in Iraq and hence brought regional instability.

Dyadic/local conditions: After the Gulf War, the Central Iraqi Government (CIG) lost its political-military control over northern Iraq. The PKK terrorist activities in cross-border areas dominated the security agenda of Ankara. Consequently, Turkish military conducted large-scale cross-border operations. In order to root out the PKK camps in northern Iraq, the Turkish army needed local collaboration of Kurdish forces. However, KDP and PUK held parliamentary elections and declared the establishment of Kurdish Federated State (KFS) in 1992. The emergence of KFS could pave the way for fragmentation of Iraq. In response, Turkish government pursued political-military engagement with Erbil. Additionally, Ankara re-turned to cooperation with Baghdad in 1993, notwithstanding Washington's opposition. More or less, bilateral context moved back to the square one. This was quite paradoxical, given the enormous dyadic costs paid by Turkey during and after the Gulf War.

As soon as the US invasion began in 2003, the first thing Turkey did was to declare *de jure* end of the ONW. Nonetheless, Turkey faced similar political-military challenges in the immediate aftermath of the US invasion. First and foremost, Kurdish (PUK-KDP) groups embarked on pursuing their deep-seated ambition towards the oil-rich city of Kirkuk. This was a quite alarming development for Turkey. Secondly, the rise of PKK terrorist activities in cross-border areas became a serious concern for the security establishment in Ankara. Later on, Turkey began to assert its ability to shape the dyadic context. Turkey's comprehensive policy aimed to demonstrate a non-sectarian stance by reaching out all ethnic and religious groups. By the end of 2005, the Turkish government played a key role in integrating Sunni Arabs into the Iraqi domestic political processes. In 2006, Turkey began to enhance its economic ties with the KRG. Turkey's Mosul General Consulate was re-opened in 2007.

Almost four years after the US invasion, Ankara and Baghdad have agreed to enhance bilateral cooperation, particularly in areas of security (fight against terrorist organizations) and economy (natural gas sector). In 2008, Turkey and Iraq signed a joint political declaration to form a high level strategic cooperation council, which would be tasked with the improvement of bilateral relations. Following these developments, Turkey's Basra General Consulate was opened in 2009. In that year, Turkey and Iraq signed bilateral military cooperation (framework) agreement. The new cooperation chapter in Turkey's Iraq policy culminated in 2011 as Turkey's Erbil General Consulate was opened. Positive and

negative implications of comprehensive cooperation left lingering influence on Turkish-Iraqi (Ankara-Baghdad and Ankara-Erbil) relations.

Domestic circumstances: After the Gulf War, the Turkish military gained upper hand in devising Turkey's Iraq policy. Security-based approach to northern Iraq adversely affected the Kurdish problem in Turkey. The presumed partition of Iraq provoked the age-old phobia about the establishment of Kurdistan. These fears fed into unstable domestic conditions that ensued up until the capturing of PKK's head in 1999.

Between 1999 and 2003, the PKK did not pose a significant threat. But the power vacuum emerged after the US invasion fashioned favorable conditions for the PKK to regain its former position in northern Iraq and Turkey. Therefore, cross-border operations dominated domestic political debates. The PKK incursions of Dağlıca (2007) and Aktütün (2008) unleashed serious domestic ramifications. While the Turkish military was dealing with the PKK militants, the government addressed political, cultural and economic dimension of Kurdish issue. In this regard, the opening of TRT-6 (Kurdish broadcasting channel of official state television) in 2009 constituted an important development. By 2011, official diplomatic presence in Erbil helped the Turkish government to usher a more positive environment for the easing of domestic Kurdish problem.

6.2. Overarching Findings: Continuity and Change

The long durée tracking of Turkey's Iraq policy discourses has to be concluded with a collection of overarching findings. Episodic characteristics of continuity and change revealed both contextual and discursive dimensions. Even though these two dimensions co-constituted a seamless web, overarching findings are separated into two analytical headings.

6.2.1. Contextual Continuity and Change

6.2.1.1. Formative Historical Context and Security Reasoning

The formative historical context (Sèvres-Lausanne period) has an enduring impact on Turkey's thinking on Iraq. In the first episode, Turkish foreign policy on Iraq has been formed as a response to the historical (international-regional) developments. Foremost, internationalization of the Kurdish question during the resolution of Mosul dispute (Mudros,

Sèvres, Lausanne, and after) in 1918-1926 period has had a formative influence on Turkey's *raison d'état*. As a result, even the planning of a British backed "Kurdish government" in northern Iraq was conceived as a threat by Ankara.

From the very beginning, Mosul was publicly portrayed as a territorial (*memleket meselesi*) and ethnic (*Kürtlük meselesi*) issue, notwithstanding Turkey's material (oil) interests. Deployment of foreign incitement (*harici tahrik*) frame in the Sheikh Said rebellion (1925) demonstrated the deep impact of Sèvres syndrome among the founders of Turkey's foreign policy. The conspiratorial fear from the establishment of Kurdistan permeated into later episodes (Gulf War-1991 and US Invasion-2003). Largely due to the anachronistic enhancement of this phobia, Turkey's security reasoning over Iraq gained public resonance as well.

6.2.1.2. International Context and Rationality of Power Politics

International context has a direct bearing on Turkey's ontological and rhetorical rationale towards Iraq. Given the role of British colonialism in the invention of Iraq, Ankara had to rationalize its policy towards Baghdad along power-based reference frames. Due to the external great power (British, Western) penetration into the formation of Hashemite monarchy, conceptions on balance of power (*muvazenet*) left a historical legacy on Turkey's Iraq policy. Since then Turkish governments reflected a reasoning which tended to view Iraq within the framework of Turkey-Great Power relations.

Non-regional, externally driven, contextual rationale of the trilateral (Turkey-Britain-Iraq) border agreement (1926) constituted the discursive ground for the molding of power balancing rationale in the coming decades. Because of this reason, viewing of Iraq from a global power perspective has persisted throughout the four episodes. Pro-governmental discourses on especially Baghdad Pact, Gulf and Iraq Wars manifested a power-based logic that was primarily driven by Turkey's making of power relations with the West (read Britain and the US). That is to say, Turkey's Iraq policy was primarily conceived as an extension of policies towards Western powers.

6.2.1.3. Regional Context and Discursive Uncertainty

Changes in regional context feed Ankara's discursive ambivalence on cooperation with or against Baghdad. In 1937, Oriental Entente (*Şark Misakı*) was formed under the

shadow of a (great power) war in the (Middle) East. Yet regional conditions changed in such a pace that Saadabad Pact lost its *raison d'être* in almost two years time. The inter-Arab rivalry between Cairo and Baghdad, and Nasser's bid for regional hegemony helped to galvanize pro-Western Turkish-Iraqi cooperation in 1955. But it was largely Arab nationalists and Nasserites who brought about the departure of Iraq from the Baghdad Pact, after the fall of Hashemite monarchy in 1958.

The Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988) unleashed regionalization of the Kurdish question. In this period, the PKK exploited the power vacuum in northern Iraq and posed a security threat for Turkey. Reshuffling of alignments among PKK, PUK and KDP in northern Iraq, enabled Ankara to rationalize security cooperation with Baghdad in 1984. Nonetheless, security-based cooperative logic was constrained by the cross-border Kurdish refugee crisis of 1988. Regional contexts brought about by the wars in 1991 and 2003 added up more uncertainty into Turkey's already ambivalent discourse of (non)cooperation with Iraq. On the one hand, Ankara was forced to pursue UN-US led sanction-containment policies against Baghdad; on the other hand it was faced with the need to coordinate regional policies with the neighbors of Iraq, most prominently Iran and Syria. Contextually binding and in tandem cooperation with Washington and its regional rivals (Tehran and Damascus) could only breed discursive uncertainty in Ankara.

6.2.1.4. Dyadic Context and Dual Discourse

Dyadic context between Turkey and Iraq implicates a dual (material and ideational) discourse. Almost in all episodes, mutual material interests (oil, trade and water) and common ideational factors (geographical neighborhood, cultural-religious association and ethnic kinship) have formed a relatively stable dyadic context for the making of Turkey's (non)cooperation with Iraq. Therefore Turkish foreign policy makers had good reasons to appeal to dual ontology while reasoning on Iraq. In most episodes, the analytical divisions (material and ideational) were penetrated rhetorically.

6.2.1.5. Domestic Context and Ambivalent Rationales

Turkey's domestic context reinforces ambiguous reasoning, especially in episodes of non-cooperation. In 1991, domestic political opposition and civil-military veto players pushed the framings of government further towards inconsistency. Liminal (neither in nor

out) framing of Turkey's Gulf War position exacerbated discursive ambiguity. Due to the domestic public opinion against the US invasion in 2003, Turkish government could not articulate a coherent rhetoric in the making of war motions. The motion crisis of 2003 was a consequence of domestic ambivalence.

6.2.2. Discursive Continuity and Change

6.2.2.1. Geopolitical Framing as Conventional Wisdom

Geopolitical framing has been a persistent feature of pro-governmental discourse. In 1937, Oriental Entente (*Şark Misakı*) was framed like a geopolitical unit: a great state extending from the Himalayas to the Mediterranean, a regional (political-economic) bloc having a significant influence on world politics. Baghdad Pact was portrayed as a geopolitical accomplishment in Turkey's backyard. During the Gulf War episode, Ankara prepackaged its regional positions with geopolitical terms like a reliable, strong country vis-à-vis America, Europe and the Middle East. The geopolitical indispensability thesis (without Turkey's indispensable support, the US could not invade Iraq) constituted a major frame of presupposition for public justification of war policies in 2003.

6.2.2.2. Co-Constitutive Framings of State Reason and Kurdish Question

By the beginning of formative episode, Sèvres syndrome was seeded into Turkey's *raison d'état*. Hence Mosul (by extension Kurdish) issue was portrayed as a matter of survival. In the pre-Saadabad period, security rationale implicated preconception of Kurdish question with frames of national interest (or their cognates), like internal order (*sükûn*) and domestic safety (*asayiş*). Framing of Kurdish issue with security reasons implied a threat-based logic of cooperation with Britain and Iraq.

In fact, Ankara's security cooperation with Baghdad was crucial in eliminating the Iraqi Kurdish (Barzani) uprisings by July 1935. Security rationale also constituted public justification in dealing with domestic Kurdish problem. Ankara turned to coercive frames,

such as punishment (*tedib*) and repression (*tenkil*). In June 1937, the framing of Dersim (Tunceli) revolt in pro-governmental discourse implied that Turkey could control Kurdish tribal dissent with domestic security means.

The constitutive frame nexus between Turkey's conceptions of state reason and Kurdish question was less clear during the Baghdad Pact episode. In 1946, security logic of bilateral cooperation was at work. Balancing of both Soviet regional influence and Kurdish threat paved the way for a comprehensive bilateral cooperation agreement between Turkey and Iraq. This was a rapid response to the establishment of pro-Soviet Kurdish Republic of Mahabad in Iran. After the hasty dissolution of Mahabad, Kurdish nationalist movements lost their *raison d'être* in the 1950-55 period.

On the other hand, Kurdish nationalism did not die down, but began to appeal more towards socialist, anti-colonial, and anti-imperialist causes. In fact, Iraqi Kurdish communists, together with Pan Arabists and Nasserites, instigated the revolution in 1958. The Counter-Subversion Committee of the Baghdad Pact could not do anything about it. Due to the ambivalent framings of state wisdom, Ankara could not foresee the Kurdish implications of communism in Iraq. The episode resulted with undesired outcomes for the government in Ankara. Neither the communist regime in Baghdad nor the Soviet infiltration into the Middle East was desirable end states for Turkey.

In the post-Baghdad Pact period, Kurdish question endured, and perhaps revived, to condition Turkey's logic of cooperation with Iraq. Between 1960 and 1970, Ankara had good reason to remain cautious about the situation in northern Iraq. Recurrent Kurdish uprisings had the potential of spill over to the Turkish side of the border. Demonstration effect unleashed serious domestic ramifications for Ankara. In the 1970's, most Kurdish political movements turned into semi-secret, outlawed or disbanded Marxist groups. Within the political climate of late 1970's, PKK emerged. Due to the security threat posed by the PKK, the Kurdish problem was re-framed with presupposition of foreign incitement. By the mid-1980's, in the midst of Iran-Iraq war, balance of threat reasoning enabled Ankara enhance security cooperation with Baghdad. Until 1988, Turkey's framings of the Kurdish question and its policy rationale towards Iraq reflected security oriented mode of reasoning.

This reasoning began to change after the opening of borders to the Iraqi Kurds during the 1988 refugee crisis. For humanitarian reasons, Ankara ceased to cooperate with Baghdad. The logic of cooperation with Erbil implied the recognition of Kurdish identity in Turkey. Earlier, the Kurdish issue was generally addressed in economic terms, like regional underdevelopment and integration. Identity dimension was almost out of the government's agenda. Despite a limited turn towards ideational reasoning, Ankara could not give up political-military rationales during and after the Gulf War. Prevention of a Kurdish state in

Iraq was still a frame of presupposition in governmental discourse. Dual discursive framing (protection and prevention of Kurds) was a reflection of Turkey's liminal rationale during the Gulf War episode. Discursively dueling strategies towards Baghdad (prevention of Kurdish statehood) and Erbil (protective role over the Kurds) could only lead to politically paradoxical results.

Co-constitutive makings of state reason and Kurdish question were more apparent in the last episode. In the 1990's, political-military rationales prevailed to orient Turkey's policies, particularly towards northern Iraq. But after the US invasion, the discursive logic of Turkey's cooperation with Iraq and its framing of the Kurdish question have changed quite dramatically. Ankara's cooperative engagements with both Baghdad and Erbil have become more salient than ever before. Yet, establishing rhetorical coherence in between Kurdish question and Iraq policies has still formed a major predicament for Turkey's comprehensive cooperation discourse.

6.3. Research Recommendations and Final Remarks

This dissertation provided a narrative explanation for four episodes of (non)cooperation in Turkey's relations with Iraq. The synopsis of conclusions is presented in Table 3. The conclusions reached by the thesis are pertinent for academic and political fields. First and foremost, this study applied an established theory (of narrative) to a novel case (of Turkey's Iraq policy discourse). By so doing it made an important empirical contribution to critical constructivist literature in IR and FPA. It also demonstrated scholarly significance of long-term and episodic discourse tracing in TFP and MES.

The analytical approaches developed for this research can be implemented in other cases as well. Detailed analyses of Turkey's oppositional and non-governmental (civil society) narratives on Iraq could certainly complement this study. It would be interesting to examine episodes of (non)cooperation in Turkey's policies towards other Middle Eastern countries, particularly Iran, Syria, and Israel. It would be especially enriching to have access to a narrative explanation coming from the other side of the border. The same episodes (pacts and wars) could well be studied by Iraqi scholars to make sense of (non)cooperation discourses in *Iraq's Turkey policy*. These scholarly endeavors might gradually pave the way for the opening of a new research space, which could be broadly defined as comparative discourse-narrative analyses in TFP and/or MES.

In terms of policy relevance, this dissertation explained what went wrong in Turkey's discourse of (non)cooperation with Iraq. It reiterated the fact that talking on Iraq has never been a cheap affair for Turkey's Iraq policy makers. The analysis of pragmatics in Turkey's discursive practices showed the implications of what could be achieved *in* and *by* saying or not saying something about Iraq. The overall findings helped to raise analytical awareness about the likely impact of discursive strategies (like contextual resonance, ontological coherence and rhetorical consistency), while devising and deploying political narratives and frames in current and future cases of Turkey's (non)cooperation with Iraq.

Table 3: Synopsis of Conclusions

Conclusions	Episodes			
	Cooperation (Pacts)		Non-Cooperation (Wars)	
	Saadabad Pact (1937)	Baghdad Pact (1955)	Gulf War (1991)	Iraq War (2003)
	pro-Eastern (pro-peace) entente with Iraq	pro-Western (anti-communist) alignment with Iraq	severance of ties from Iraq under the UN auspices	abandonment of Iraq due to the US invasion
Basic Contextual Reason	the shadow of regional conflict/war	the impact of global/regional rivalry (Anglo-American axis vs. the Soviet Union-Egypt entente)	the shadow of future dyadic/local conditions (regional/cross-border political-military uncertainty emanating from Kurdish aspirations and the PKK threat)	
Dominant Ontology	utilitarian (political power-diplomatic prestige)	utilitarian (threat balancing)	utilitarian (political, military and economic interests)	
Dominant Rhetoric	shared solidarity-ideal of peace	shared ideology	mutual utility/material reciprocity (alliance with the US)	
			shared norms (UN membership)	political-military security (prevention of Kurdish ambitions-elimination of PKK)
Basic Political Consequence	the fall of pro-Turkish government in Iraq	the fall of pro-Western monarchy in Iraq	dyadic/local political-military instability	

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APPENDICES

A: CURRICULUM VITAE

PERSONAL INFORMATION

Surname, Name: Kumral, Mehmet Akif
Nationality: Turkish (TC)
Date and Place of Birth: 8 July 1971, Tokat
Marital Status: Single
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EDUCATION

Degree	Institution	Year of Graduation
MA (with Distinction)	Naval Post-Graduate School-Department of National Security Affairs (Middle East Regional Studies), Monterey-CA (Thesis Title: Hashemite Survival Strategy: The Anatomy of Peace, Security and Alliance Making in Jordan)	2000
BA	Turkish Army Academy, Ankara	1993
High School	Kuleli Military High School, İstanbul	1989

WORK EXPERIENCE

Year	Place	Enrollment
1994-1996	Akçakale-Şanlıurfa	Team Commander.
1996-1998	Nicosia-TRNC	
2000-2004	Turkish General Staff, Bilateral Military Relations and National Military Strategy Branches.	Middle East Desk Officer (Distinguished Service Award).
2004-2006	Adaklı-Bingöl	Company Commander.
2006-2009	Turkish Land Forces Command, Border Security Branch.	Coordination Officer for the Integrated Border Management (EU Project-IPA Program).
2009-2012	Turkish Land Forces Command, Strategy, International Military Relations and Military Agreements Branches.	Coordination Officer for Military Agreements, Orders and Publications.

FOREIGN LANGUAGES

Advanced English

B: TURKISH SUMMARY

Türkiye'nin birçok yönden Irak ile bağlantılarının bulunduğu genel olarak kabul edilen bir husustur. İki ülke arasındaki güçlü bağları oluşturan faktörler maddi (ekonomik, coğrafi) ve maddi olmayan (sosyal, kültürel) nitelikler taşımaktadır. Anılan karşılıklı bağlantılar dikkate alındığında, Türkiye-Irak ilişkilerinde iş birliğinin hâkim olması beklenmektedir. Oysaki Ankara-Bağdat ve Ankara-Erbil hatlarında yaşanan tarihsel gelişmeler böylesine net bir durumu yansıtmamaktadır. Teorik-ampirik olarak karmaşıklık arz eden söz konusu durumun bağlamsal ve söylemsel boyutlarının araştırılması, bu çalışmanın temel amacını oluşturmuştur.

Yapılan araştırma sonucunda, Türkiye'nin Irak politikasına ilişkin iş birliği ve iş birliksizliği söylemlerindeki süreğen karmaşıklığı üreten bağlamsal gerekçelerin ve söylemsel uslamlamaların kavranmasına yönelik anlatısal bir açıklama sunulması hedeflenmiştir. Hidemi Suganami tarafından da belirtildiği üzere, anlatısal açıklamalar bağlamsal gerekçeler ile söylemsel uslamlamalar arasındaki dinamik etkileşimi ortaya çıkarmaktadır. Genel yapısı itibarıyla, anlatısal açıklamalarda zamansal bir akış seyri izlenmektedir: başlangıç/giriş (ilk koşullar-girdiler), gelişme (süreç-eylemler) ve sonuç (son koşullar-çıktılar).

Bu doktora tezinde, bilinen bir teorinin yeni bir alana uygulaması yapılmıştır. Anlatı teorisine ilave olarak, bu çalışmada Uluslararası İlişkiler (Uİ), Dış Politika Analizi (DPA), Orta Doğu Çalışmaları (ODÇ), Türk Dış Politikası (TDP), söylem analizi ve retoriksel eleştiri gibi farklı alanlarda elde edilen bulgulardan yararlanılmıştır. Giriş, sonuç ve dört vaka çalışması bölümünden oluşan bu tezde, "eleştirel inşa" araştırma çerçevesi içinde hareket edilmiştir. Eleştirel inşa araştırmalarının önemli bir gündem maddesini, dış politika söylemlerindeki rasyonelleştirme süreçlerinin incelenmesi oluşturmaktadır. Jutta Weldes gibi eleştirel inşa kuramcılarının belirttikleri en önemli husus, ebedî evrensel geçerliliğe sahip bir devlet aklından (*raison d'état*) bahsedilmesinin mümkün olamayacağıdır. Rasyonalite, kamusal alanda devlet adına konuşanların, büyük oranda hükûmetlerin, söylemleriyle inşa ettiği bir kavramdır. Bu nedenle, hikmet-i hükûmet değişir. Devlet aklındaki bu değişim, dış politika olaylarının kamusal alanda anlamlandırılmasında kullanılan siyasal anlatılara da yansır. Hükûmet yanlısı söylemlerde kullanılan varsayım (ön kabul) çerçeveleri devletin akıl yürütme biçimine önemli ölçüde ışık tutar.

Bu yaklaşım içinde hazırlanan araştırma soruları şunlardır: Türkiye'nin Irak ile iş bir(liksiz)liğine yol açan bağlamsal gerekçeler nelerdir? Irak ile iş bir(liksiz)liğinin söylemsel mümkünlük koşulları, Türk hükûmetleri tarafından uygulanan hangi uslamlama pratikleri ile oluşturulmuştur? İş bir(liksiz)liği söylemlerinin siyasi sonuçları nelerdir? İş(birliksiz)liği dönemlerinde karşılaşılan ortak yönler ve farklı hususlar nelerdir? Bağlamsal ve söylemsel dinamikler Türkiye'nin Irak politikasındaki uzun erimli dönüşümleri nasıl şekillendirmiştir?

Anılan sorular çerçevesinde, dört örnek olay incelemesi yapılmıştır. Birinci ve ikinci bölümlerde Saadabad (1937) ve Bağdat (1955) Paktları, ikinci ve üçüncü bölümlerde ise 1991 ve 2003'te meydana gelen savaşlar etrafında şekillenen hükûmet yanlısı söylemler irdelenmiştir. Bu kapsamda yapılan vaka çalışmalarında, hükûmet yanlısı anlatıların dört farklı dönemine ilişkin analizler yapılmış, Türkiye'nin Irak politikasına ilişkin iş bir(liksiz)liği söylemlerindeki dönüşümün söylemsel-bağlamsal gerekçeleri ve sonuçları ortaya çıkarılmıştır. Her bölüm kendi içinde üç kısma (olay öncesi, olay ve olay sonrasına) ayrılmıştır. Olay öncesi kısmında, tarihsel arka plan ve söylemsel bağlam açıklanmıştır. İkinci kısımda olay sırasında hükûmet yanlısı olan gazetelerde [*Cumhuriyet* (8 Temmuz-17 Ağustos 1937), *Milliyet* (12 Ocak-24 Şubat 1955), *Sabah* (15 Ocak-27 Şubat 1991), *Yeni Şafak* (20 Mart-9 Nisan 2003)] yayımlanan politik anlatılardaki varsayım çerçeveleri incelenmiştir. Bu kısımda, Türkiye'nin Irak'a yönelik iş bir(liksiz)liği söylemlerindeki akıl yürütme pratiklerinin pragmatik sorgulaması yapılmıştır.

Bahse konu sorgulamaya esas olan bağımsız değişken (hükûmet yanlısı anlatısal uslamlamaların çerçevelenmelerindeki değişim) ile bağımlı değişken (Türkiye'nin Irak politikası söylemindeki değişim) tespit edilmiştir. Bu değişkenler ile uyumlu olarak, iki hipotez temel alınmıştır: (1) Türkiye hükûmetleri Irak ile iş bir(liksiz)liğine yönelik kararlarını en azından bir gerekçeye istinat ettirmiştir. Diğer bir ifadeyle, Türkiye'nin iş bir(liksiz)liği politikaları bir ussallık zeminine dayandırılmıştır. (2) Anılan akıl yürütme zemini, aynı zamanda bağlamsal gerekçelerin yorumlanmasına esas teşkil etmiştir. Söz konusu zemini oluşturan ontolojik modların, retorik modellerin ve uslamlama çerçevelerinin analiz edilmesi, Türkiye'nin Irak'a yönelik iş bir(liksiz)liği politikasının söylemsel ve bağlamsal etkilerinin anlaşılması açısından önemlidir.

Bu iki ana hipotezden hareketle iş bir(liksiz)liğinin ussallığına ilişkin iki alt hipotez kurulmuştur: (1) İş bir(liksiz)liğinin mantığı maddi (güç-tehdit dengeleme, karşılıklı bağımlılık-hegemonya, jeopolitik etki) veya maddi olmayan (kimlik, ideoloji, normlar, idealler) ön kabullere dayandırılabilir. (2) Bu temel gerekçelere bağlı olarak iş bir(liksiz)liğinin ana hususları (hedefleri) çerçevelendirilebilir. Faydacıl ön kabullerin çerçevelerini politik (rejim güvenliği, diplomatik prestij), askerî (ulusal güvenlik ve

savunma) ve ekonomik (ticaret, kaynaklar) çıkarlar oluşturabilir. Tasavvurcu (kavrayışsal) ön kabuller, soyal-kültürel-ideolojik hedeflerin (dayanışma, aidiyet) ve normatif hususların (meşruiyet, barış, demokrasi, insan hakları) çerçevelenmesinde kullanılabilir.

Faydacıl akıl yürütme biçiminde iş birliği maddi yarar ve maliyetlerin değişimi olarak ele alınır. Bu uslamlamaya paralel retorik modelde karşılıklı fayda ve maddi karşılıklılık gibi unsurlar ön plana çıkarılır. Diğer modda ise iş birliği tasavvur edilen etkileşimler (maddi olmayan kazanç-kayıplar) üzerine inşa edilir. Ortak kültür, sosyal paylaşım ve ideolojik dayanışma gibi maddi olmayan hususlara vurgu yapan bir retorik model, tasavvurcu ontolojinin yansıtılmasını sağlar. Her iki (faydacıl ve tasavvurcu) akıl yürütme biçiminde, iş bir(liksiz)liği zaman (önceki konjonktür, mevcut zaman ve geleceğin gölgesi) ve/veya mekân (küresel-bölgesel ortam, yerel-iç koşullar) yönlerinden de çerçevelenebilir.

İş bir(liksiz)liği söylemlerinin irdelenmesinin ardından, üçüncü kısımda olay sonrasına ilişkin analiz yapılmıştır. Elde edilen dönemsel bulgular, her bölümün sonuç kısmında sunulmuştur. Çalışmanın son bölümünde ise vaka incelemelerinden elde edilen bulgular arasındaki ortak ve farklı yönler tespit edilmiş, bağlamsal-söylemsel devamlılık ve değişim dinamikleri ortaya konmuştur.

Bahse konu pakt olayları (öncesi ve sonrasındaki gelişmeler ile olay sırasındaki hükûmet yanlısı söylemler birlikte) analiz edildiğinde, Bağdat'taki bağlamsal belirsizliğin ve Ankara'daki ontolojik-retoriksel açıdan ikircikli söylemin, Türkiye-Irak ilişkilerinde daha az iş birliğine yol açan sonuçları ortaya çıkardığı bulgusuna ulaşılmıştır. İş birliği (pakt) dönemlerinde, Türkiye temel olarak Irak iç politikasına ilişkin kısa-orta vadeli siyasi maliyetlere maruz kalmıştır. Basit bir biçimde ifade etmek gerekirse, Türkiye'nin iş birliği söylemleri Irak'ta istenmeyen rejim değişiklikleri ile sonuçlanmıştır. Savaş dönemlerine ilişkin bulgular ise ilişkileri oluşturan ikili koşulların gelecekteki hâline yönelik beklenti ve endişelerin, Ankara'nın Bağdat ile ilişkilerini koparmasına zemin hazırlayan esas bağlamsal gerekçeyi teşkil ettiğini göstermiştir. İş birliksizliği söylemleri, Ankara'nın ontolojik ve retoriksel kararsızlık hâllerini yansıtmıştır. İki arada (eşikte) kalan söylemsel uslamlama, Türkiye'ye iç işleri ve ikili ilişkileri açısından politik-askerî maliyetler yüklemiştir. Daha açık bir ifadeyle, Türkiye sınırın her iki tarafındaki Kürt sorunu ve PKK tehdidi ile mücadele etmek durumunda kalmıştır. Türkiye-Irak ilişkilerindeki iş birliksizliği dönemleri, öngörülemeyen ancak kalıcılık kazanan sonuçlar ile belirginleşmiştir.

Türkiye hükûmetleri, Bağdat ile iş birliğini artırmaya yönelik bir çaba içine girdiklerinde, Irak'ın iç bağlamına ilişkin maliyetler ile yüzleşmek durumunda kalmıştır. Genel geçer sezgilerin aksine, Irak ile daha fazla iş birliği Türkiye açısından zorlu bir mücadele hâlini almıştır. Aslında Doğucu ve barış yanlısı bir antant olarak tanımlanan Saadabad Paktı, psikolojik amaçlı bir iş birliği görüntüsüne dönüşmüştür. Bu durum,

Bağdat'taki Türkiye yanlısı hükûmetin beklenmedik bir biçimde düşürülmesinin önünü açmış ve ikili ilişkiler açısından pahalı olabilecek bir sonucu (belki de istemsiz olarak) ortaya çıkarmıştır. Ankara, 1955 yılına gelindiğinde Irak ile tekrar savunma paktı kurmak için ciddi bir pazarlık sürecine girmiştir. Türkiye'nin bu defaki istençli iş birliği girişimi ise 1958'deki Irak darbesiyle sonuçlanmıştır. Anılan dönemde Bağdat'ta meydana gelen bu rejim değişikliği, Ankara açısından istenmeyen siyasi bir sonuç olmuştur. Bağdat 1991 ve 2003'teki savaşlarda olduğu gibi bağlamsal sorunlar içine girdiğinde, Ankara (istemeyerek de olsa) daha az iş birliğine yönelmiş, ancak yine göreceli olarak yüksek bedel ödeme durumu ile karşılaşmıştır.

Türkiye'nin Irak politikası söyleminin uzun vadeli olarak gözlenmesi sonucunda, hükûmet yanlısı anlatılar ile tarihsel (olay öncesi/sonrası) bağlamların, Türkiye'nin Irak'a yönelik dış politika söylemini müştereken kuran unsurlar olduğu anlaşılmıştır. Tezin sonuç bölümünde, dönemler arası belirginlik taşıyan ve dönemlerin üzerinde devamlılık arz eden nitelikler açıklanmış ve ileride yapılabilecek araştırmalara ilişkin öneriler sunulmuştur.

1. Dönemler arası belirginlik taşıyan hususlar

a. İş birliği dönemleri

(1) Temel bağlamsal gerekçeler

Küresel-bölgesel ortam: Saadabad Paktı dönemindeki çok kutuplu ve çatışmaya açık küresel-bölgesel ortam, Türkiye ile Irak arasında siyasi iş birliğinin artırılmasını nispeten kolaylaştırmıştır. Bağdat Paktı döneminde ise iki kutuplu ortam, Türkiye'yi Irak ile savunma alanında iş birliğine zorlamıştır.

İkili-yerel durum: Doğu Antantı (1937) kurulmadan önce, Türkiye yanlısı Irak hükûmetinin pan-Arap milliyetçilerinden oluşan iç muhalefet karşısında zayıf durumda olduğu bilinmektedir. Benzer bir durum 1955'te de söz konusu olmuştur. O dönemde ise Batı ve İngiliz yanlısı Irak yönetimine karşı, pan-Arap milliyetçileri ve komünistler güçlü bir muhalefet oluşturmuştur. Her iki durumda da Bağdat açısından Ankara ile iş birliğinin güçlendirilmesi, iç muhalefet karşısında rejimi koruma amacıyla atılmış bir adım olarak görünmektedir.

İç koşullar: Her iki iş birliği durumunda da Ankara'daki hükûmet iç kamuoyunda herhangi bir siyasi muhalefet ile karşılaşmamıştır. İç koşullar açısından her iki dönemin en belirginlik özelliği, iç ekonomik durumun iyi olmamasıdır. İç askerî duruma bakıldığında, Şark Misakı döneminde meydana gelen Dersim isyanı ciddi bir risk yaratmamıştır.

(2) Hâkim söylemsel uslamlamalar

Ontolojik modlar: Her iki örnek olayda faydacıl akıl yürütme biçimine yaygın olarak başvurulmuştur. İş birliğinin ontolojisi, güç-tehdit dengeleme ön kabulü üzerine oturtulmuştur. Her iki olayın mantıksal gerekçesi, politik-askerî fayda çerçevesi ile

açıklanmıştır. Kürt sorunu, her iki iş birliği vakasında açık bir ontolojik gerekçe teşkil etmemiştir.

Retoriksel modeller: Faydacıl ontolojik zeminde oluşturulan iş birliği durumlarında, retoriğin tasavvurcu modele doğru savrulması dikkat çekmiştir. Şark Misakı'nın söylemsel kuruluşunda, Doğu dayanışması ve barış ideali gibi çerçeveler ön plana çıkarılmıştır. Bağdat Paktında ise ideolojik (anti-komünist) söylem baskın gelmiştir. Dostluk, komşuluk, kardeşlik gibi sosyal-kültürel bağlara vurgu yapan her iki söylemde, Kürt sorunu ile retoriksel düzeyde herhangi bir bağlantı kurulmamıştır.

    (3)   Temel bağlamsal sonuçlar

Küresel-bölgesel ortam: Saadabad Paktı, küresel-bölgesel nitelik taşıyan önemli bir sonuç yaratmamış ve İkinci Dünya Savaşı başlamadan önce varlık gerekçesini yitirdiği anlaşılmıştır. Bağdat Paktı ise Sovyet ve Mısır (Nasır) yanlısı propaganda faaliyetlerine neden olmuş, komünist ve pan-Arap milliyetçisi siyasi akımların güçlenmesine yol açmış, bölgesel ve küresel gerilimi artırmıştır. Yaşanan bölgesel krizlerde (Süveyş-1956, Suriye/Lübnan/Ürdün-1957), Bağdat Paktı Türkiye'ye olumlu yönde önemli bir katkı sağlamamıştır.

İkili-yerel durum: Şark Misakı'nın hemen ardından Bağdat'ta siyasi statükonun beklenmedik bir biçimde bozulması (Türkiye'ye müzahir hükûmetin düşürülmesi) Ankara açısından maliyetli bir durum yaratmıştır. Türkiye açısından istenmeyen politik sonuçlar Bağdat Paktı'nda da yaşanmıştır. Irak'ta 1958 yılında yaşanan devrim, ikili iş birliğinin siyasi zeminini zayıflatmıştır.

İç koşullar: Türkiye iç politika yönünden her iki paktın müzakere sürecinde önemli bir maliyet yaşamamıştır. Bağdat Paktı'nın uygulama sürecinde yaşanan bölgesel krizler, Ankara'da politik hassasiyete yol açmıştır. Irak'taki rejim değişikliği, Türk hükûmetinin içerideki güç kaybını hızlandırmıştır.

    b.   İş birliksizliği dönemleri

    (1)   Temel bağlamsal gerekçeler

Küresel-bölgesel ortam: Körfez krizi, küresel alanda Soğuk Savaşın sona erdiği ve Orta Doğu'da ABD'nin bölgesel üstünlük kurduğu bir ortamda meydana gelmiştir. Bununla birlikte, krizin sonuçlandırılmasına ilişkin kararlar (Kuveyt'in siyasi egemenliğini ve toprak bütünlüğünü ihlal eden Irak rejimine yönelik yaptırım uygulanması) Birleşmiş Milletler Güvenlik Konseyi (BMGK) tarafından alınmıştır. Anılan kararların bağlayıcılığı nedeniyle, Türkiye BM'nin yanında ve Irak rejiminin karşısında yer almak zorunda kalmıştır. Başta Mısır, Suriye ve Suudi Arabistan olmak üzere, Arap ülkelerinin Saddam rejiminin saldırganlığına karşı tutum göstermeleri, Türkiye'nin Irak ile iş birliğini bırakmasını kolaylaştırmıştır.

İş birliksizliğine ilişkin ikinci durumunda ise uluslar arası ortam ABD liderliğinde yürütülen terörizmle küresel savaşın etkisiyle şekillenmiştir. ABD Yönetimi, özellikle 2002 sonrasında, Irak'ta rejim değişikliğini savaş yoluyla gerçekleştirme hedefine yönelmiştir. Ancak bu defa BMGK Irak'a karşı savaş yapılmasını onaylayıcı mahiyette herhangi bir karar vermemiştir. Buna rağmen, Irak'ı işgal etmek için koalisyon kuran ABD'ye yönelik uluslar arası tepkiler artmıştır. Uluslar arası alanda gelişen bu durum, belli ölçüde Türkiye'ye zaman kazandırmış ve Ankara'nın Bağdat ile ilişkilerini erkenden koparmasına mani olmuştur.

İkili-yerel durum: Bağdat yönetiminin 1988 yılında Kürt muhalefetini şiddet kullanarak bastırmasının ardından ortak sınır bölgesinde oluşan mülteci krizi ve sonrasında yaşanan gelişmeler, Türkiye-Irak arasındaki güvenlik temelli iş birliğini ortadan kaldırmıştır. Körfez krizinin öncesinde, sınır aşan sular konusunda yaşanan siyasi gerginlik, Ankara'nın Bağdat'tan politik olarak uzaklaşmasına yol açmıştır. Irak'ın kuzeyindeki yerel belirsizlik ve PKK terör örgütünden kaynaklanan güvenlik riskleri, Türkiye'nin Körfez Savaşındaki tutumunu belli ölçüde etkilemiştir. Bu durum, ABD'nin Irak'ı işgali öncesinde daha fazla belirginlik kazanmıştır. ABD'nin Kürt gruplar ile özellikle askerî alanda iş birliği yapması, Kerkük'ün statüsü ve Türkmenlerin güvenliği gibi konularda Türkiye'nin kaygılarını artırmıştır. Sonuç olarak, ikili-yerel durum Ankara'yı Vaşington'a yaklaştırmış, dolayısıyla Bağdat'tan uzaklaştırmıştır.

İç koşullar: İç kamuoyu Türkiye'nin Körfez Savaşı'na katılımına karşı tutum sergilemiştir. Parlamento'daki muhalefetin ve sivil-askerî bürokrasinin tavrı, Türkiye'nin savaşa yapacağı katkı düzeyinin belirlenmesinde (birlik gönderilmemesi) etkili olmuştur. Sivil-askerî bürokrasi, Irak'ın işgali öncesinde farklı bir tutum benimsemiş, ABD ile iş birliği yapılmaması durumunda ortaya çıkacak zararları vurgulamıştır. Nispeten siyasi tecrübe eksikliği bulunan Türk hükûmeti, Parlamento'daki ve kamuoyundaki güçlü savaş karşıtı muhalefetin etkisiyle, Vaşington-Bağdat-Erbil arasında kararsız kalmıştır.

(2) Hâkim söylemsel uslamlamalar

Ontolojik modlar: Türkiye'nin Körfez Savaşı ve ABD İşgali sırasındaki ontolojisi, maddi (politik, askerî ve ekonomik) çıkarlar ile güç-tehdit dengeleme ön kabullerinden hareketle faydacıl modda şekillenmiştir. Ankara savaşlarda aldığı konumları Vaşington ile ittifak ilişkilerinin uzantısı olarak çerçevelemiştir. Her halükârda, Türkiye maddi kazanç-kayıp dengesini gözetmiştir. Bu açıdan, Irak ile iş birliksizliğinin getireceği muhtemel ekonomik kayıpların, ABD'den alınacak mali ve askerî yardımlar ile telafi edilmesi hedeflenmiştir. Her iki savaş sırasında görevde bulunan hükûmetler, Türkiye'nin Irak'ın kuzeyindeki etkinliğini artırma fırsatından yararlanarak, savaş sonrasında Kürt grupları kontrol altında tutabileceğini öngörmüştür.

Retoriksel modeller: Faydacıl uslamlamanın baskınlığına rağmen, Türk hükûmeti Körfez Savaşındaki konumunu tasavvurcu retorik kullanımlarla meşrulaştırmıştır. Bu retoriksel manevralarda, Irak ile iş birliği yapılmamasının hukuki ve adil gerekçelere (BMGK Kararlarına) dayandığı vurgulanmıştır. Irak bağlamının, "suçlu otoriter lider" karşısında çaresiz kalan "suçsuz barışçıl halkı" olarak çerçevelenmesi suretiyle, Ankara'nın savaş koalisyonuna destek vermesine haklılık kazandırılmaya çalışılmıştır. Ancak, Bağdat karşısında Vaşington ile iş birliği yapılmasının retoriksel olarak pazarlanması zannedildiği kadar kolay olmamıştır. Kamuoyu ve siyasi muhalefet karşısında zor durumunda kalan hükûmet ikircikli çerçevelemelere (ne içindeyiz savaşın, ne de büsbütün dışında) başvurmuştur.

Körfez Savaşı sona ererken, Ankara'nın söylemlerindeki karışıklık daha da belirginleşmiştir. Savaş sonrasında daha barışçıl, istikrarlı ve entegre bir bölgesel düzenin kurulacağı, Irak'ın demokratik, modern ve medeni hâle geleceğine ilişkin retoriğin siyasal bağlam ile örtüşmediği görülmüştür. Ankara savaş sonrasında kendisi açısından olabilecek en iyi durumun, savaş öncesindeki statükonun tekrar tesis edilmesi olacağını geç de olsa anlamış, Irak'ın toprak bütünlüğünün korunmasını ve PKK'nın elimine edilmesini esas alan kırmızı çizgiler retoriğine yönelmiştir.

Irak'ın işgaline kadar devam eden süreçte, ikili düzeyde mevcut statükonun korunmasına yönelik, güvenlik merkezli kırmızı çizgiler söylemi sürdürülmüştür. İşgal öncesinde, ABD tarafında yer almanın gerekçesi olarak ekonomik çıkarların (mali problemlerin) gösterilmesine dayanan retorik ikna edici olmamıştır. Tam aksine 1 Mart 2003'teki tezkere krizini tetiklemiştir.

Savaş başladıktan sonra, Türk hükûmetinin retoriksel performansında ilave gerilimler yaşanmıştır. Türkiye'nin konumunun Koalisyonun içinde, ama savaşın dışında olarak tasvir edilmesi, iki arada (eşikte) kalmışlık hâlini yansıtmıştır. Ankara bir taraftan PKK eylemlerini ve toplu göç olaylarını önleme gerekçesiyle Irak'ın kuzeyine girebilmeyi, diğer taraftan da işgalci olarak görünmemeyi istemiştir. Son çare olarak, Türkiye'nin Irak'ın kuzeyine giriş retoriği insani gerekçelere yaslandırılmıştır. Savaş sonrası iş birliği söyleminin kuruluşunda ise Türk hükûmeti faydacı ve güvenlikçi ön kabullerden vazgeçmeden tasavvurcu çerçeveler (Arap, Kürt, Türkmen ve diğer unsurlardan oluşan demokratik Irak) kullanmıştır. İşgal sonrasında giderek gelişen ve genişleyen bu retorik, Türkiye'nin Irak'a yönelik kapsamlı iş birliği söyleminin oluşturulmasına katkı sağlamıştır.

(3)   Temel bağlamsal sonuçlar

Küresel-bölgesel ortam: Körfez Savaşı sonrasında BM tarafından uygulanan yaptırımlar ve ABD tarafından uygulanan çevreleme politikaları Bağdat'ın uluslar arası alandaki izolasyonunu derinleştirmiştir. Irak'ın kuzeyinde uygulanan uçuşa yasak bölge,

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Kürt gruplar (KDP-KYB) açısından fiili otonomi ve özerk yönetim koşullarını sağlamıştır. Yerel düzeyde oluşan bu ortamı istismar eden PKK, bölgede istikrarsızlık yaratarak Kürt sorununu bölgesel ve uluslar arası alana taşımıştır.

Irak'ın işgali sonrasında yaşanan gelişmelere bakıldığında, Türkiye açısından ABD ile Kürt gruplar (KDP-KYB) arasındaki askerî iş birliği özellikle Kerkük'te istenmeyen sonuçlara yol açmıştır. Etnik-dinsel çatışmalar ve direnişçi militanların eylemleri karşısında zorlanan ABD işgalin ilk yıllarında iç istikrarı sağlayamamış, Irak sivil savaş koşullarına sürüklenmiştir. ABD, 2007 yılından itibaren Bağdat'ta göreceli olarak güvenliği temin etmiş ve Irak'tan çekilme planlarını yapmaya başlamıştır. ABD'nin Irak'ın kuzeyinde Türkiye ile istihbarat iş birliğine yönelmesi bu dönemde olmuştur. ABD'nin Irak'taki muharip unsurlarını 2009-2011 yılları arasında geri çekmiştir. Anılan geri çekilme süreci, Irak'taki ve bölgedeki istikrarsızlığı önleyememiştir.

İkili-yerel durum: Körfez Savaşı sonrasında, Irak Merkezî Yönetimi (IMY) 36'ncı paralelin kuzeyinde siyasi ve askerî kontrolünü kaybetmiştir. Oluşan bu güç boşluğundan yararlanan PKK militanlarınca sınır bölgelerinde yapılan terörist eylemler Türkiye açısından güvenlik tehdidi oluşturmuştur. Kürt grupların (KDP-KYB), 1992 yılından itibaren federatif bir siyasi yapı kurma yönünde ilerlemeleri, Ankara'yı etkileyebilecek bir politik risk teşkil etmiştir. Ortaya çıkan ikili-yerel durum karşısında, Türkiye Irak'ın kuzeyi ile politik-askerî angajmanlarını artırmış ve Vaşington'un itirazlarına rağmen Bağdat Büyükelçiliğini 1993 yılında tekrar açmıştır. Bununla birlikte, Körfez Savaşı'nın getirdiği maliyetler asla unutulmamıştır.

Körfez Savaşı'nın yarattığı ve Türkiye açısından sorunlu statükonun düzeltilmesi, ABD'nin 2003 yılında Irak'ı işgaline kadar mümkün olmamıştır. Türk hükûmeti, Irak'ın kuzeyindeki uçuşa yasak bölgeyi denetlemek maksadıyla, İncirlik Hava Üssünden yürütülen uluslar arası askerî operasyonların (Kuzeyden Keşif Harekâtı) hukuken son bulduğunu işgal başlar başlamaz ilan etmiştir. Ancak, Irak'ın işgali özellikle yerel düzeyde olumsuz gelişmelere yol açmıştır. Kürt grupların (KDP-KYB) Kerkük'e yönelik siyasi emellerini hayata geçirme girişimleri ve PKK'nın terörist eylemleri Ankara'daki politik-askerî kaygıları artırmıştır. Daha sonraki dönemde, Türkiye bütün etnik-dinsel gruplar ile ilişki kurarak Irak'ta etkin olma çabası içine girmiştir. Iraklı Sünni Arapların 2005 yılı sonunda siyasi sürece entegre edilmesinde Türkiye etkin bir rol üstlenmiştir. Ankara, 2006 yılından itibaren Erbil ile ekonomik ilişkilerini artırmıştır. Türkiye'nin Musul Başkonsolosluğu 2007'de tekrar açılmıştır.

Ankara-Bağdat ilişkileri açısından 2008 yılı önemli bir dönüm noktasını teşkil etmiştir. Türkiye ve Irak imzaladıkları ortak siyasi bildirge ile "Stratejik İş Birliği Konseyi" kurma kararı almıştır. Anılan Konsey, başta güvenlik ve ekonomi olmak üzere ikili ilişkilerin

bütün boyutlarıyla geliştirilmesi hususunda görevlendirilmiştir. Bu gelişmelere paralel olarak, Türkiye'nin Basra Başkonsolosluğu 2009'da açılmıştır. Aynı yıl içinde, iki ülke askerî iş birliği (çerçeve) anlaşmasını imzalamıştır. Ankara-Bağdat ilişkilerinde yeni açılan kapsamlı iş birliği dönemi, 2011 yılında Türkiye'nin Erbil Başkonsolosluğunu açmasıyla farklı bir noktaya doğru evrilmiştir.

İç koşullar: Körfez Savaşı sonrasında, Türkiye'nin Irak politikası esasen güvenlik bürokrasisi tarafından şekillendirilmiştir. Kuzey Irak'a yönelik güvenlik temelli politikalar, içerideki Kürt sorunu üzerinde olumsuz etkiler bırakmıştır. Bu durum, PKK elebaşının 1999 yılında yakalanmasına kadar devam etmiştir. PKK, 1999-2003 döneminde Türkiye'ye yönelik ciddi bir tehdit oluşturmamıştır.

ABD işgali sonrasında değişen statüko, PKK terör örgütünün tekrar toparlanması için elverişli koşulları yaratmıştır. Özellikle Dağlıca (2007) ve Aktütün (2008) saldırıları, Irak'ın kuzeyinde barınan PKK militanlarından kaynaklanan güvenlik risklerinin göz ardı edilemeyeceğini ispatlamıştır. Bu dönemde, Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri tarafından sınır ötesine yapılan askerî operasyonlar, Irak'ın kuzeyindeki PKK varlığını zayıflatmıştır. PKK terör örgütüne karşı yürütülen askerî mücadeleye paralel olarak, Türk hükûmeti Kürt meselesini özellikle sosyal ve kültürel boyutlarıyla ele almaya çalışmıştır. Bu bağlamda, Kürtçe yayın yapan devlet televizyonu kanalı TRT-6'nın 2009 yılı başından itibaren faaliyete geçirilmiştir. Ankara-Erbil arasındaki ilişkilerin gelişmesi, içerideki Kürt meselesinin çözümünü olumlu yönde etkilemiştir.

2. Dönemlerin üzerinde devam eden ve değişen hususlar

a. Kurucu tarihsel bağlam ve güvenlikçi uslamlama

Kurucu tarihsel bağlam (Sevr-Lozan), Türkiye'nin Irak'a ilişkin düşünüşü üzerinde kalıcı etkiler bırakmıştır. Türkiye'nin Irak'a yönelik dış politika yapım süreci, kuruluş döneminde ortaya çıkan tarihsel (uluslararası-bölgesel) gelişmelerin karşılığında oluşmuştur. Bu gelişmelerin en önemlisi, 1918-1926 döneminde Musul meselesinin (Mondros, Sevr, Lozan ve sonrasında) çözümlenmesi sırasında Kürt sorununun uluslararası bir niteliğe bürünmesi olmuştur. Bu durum, Türkiye'nin devlet aklının (hikmet-i hükûmetinin) kuruluşu üzerinde kalıcı etkiler yaratmıştır. Başlangıçtan itibaren Ankara, Irak'ın kuzeyinde İngilizlerin himayesinde bir "Kürt hükûmeti" kurulması planını dahi tehdit olarak algılamıştır.

Bunun sonucunda, Türkiye'nin maddi (petrol) çıkarlarına rağmen, Musul problemi kamusal alanda bir toprak (memleket) meselesi ve etnik sorun (Kürtlük meselesi) olarak tanımlanmıştır. 1925 yılında meydana gelen Şeyh Sait isyanı sırasında dolaşıma sürülen 'harici tahrik' çerçevesi ise Türkiye'nin Sevr korkusunu artırmıştır. Kurucu dönemde yaşanan bu gelişmeler sebebiyle, güvenlikçi söylem çerçeveleri kamusal bir yankı kazanarak daha sonraki dönemlere de (Körfez Savaşı-1991 ve ABD İşgali-2003) aksetmiştir.

b. Uluslararası bağlam ve güç siyasetinin rasyonelliği

Uluslararası bağlam, Türkiye'nin Irak'a yönelik söylemini oluşturan akli zemini doğrudan etkilemektedir. Irak'ın yaratılmasında İngiliz sömürgeciliğinin rolünü hesaba katan Ankara'nın, Bağdat'a yönelik siyasetini güç-merkezli referans çerçeveleriyle rasyonelleştirmesi dikkat çekmektedir. Haşimi krallığının kuruluşuna Batılı büyük dış güçler (İngiltere gibi) tarafından nüfuz edilmesi, Türkiye'nin Irak politikasının oluşum süreci üzerinde, güç dengesi (muvazenet) kavramsallaştırmasının tarihsel iz bırakmasına neden olmuştur. Müteakip dönemde göreve gelen Türk hükûmetleri, Irak'a 'Büyük Güçler' ile ilişkiler penceresinden bakma eğilimde olan bir söylemsel uslamlamayı yansıtmıştır.

Türkiye, İngiltere ve Irak arasında 1926 yılında imzalanan üçlü sınır anlaşmasını meydana getiren ve bölge dışı, harici yönlendirmelerle şekillenen rasyonelleştirmeler, müteakip on yıllarda güç temelli anlatıların yer edinmesinin söylemsel zeminini teşkil etmiştir. Bu nedenle, Irak'a küresel güç dengesi üzerinden yaklaşan bakış açısı dört dönemin söylemi üzerinde egemen olmuştur. Özellikle Bağdat Paktı, Körfez Savaşı ve ABD İşgali dönemlerindeki hükûmet yanlısı söylemler, Türkiye'nin temel olarak Batı (İngiltere ve ABD) ile güç ilişkilerini esas alan bir mantıkla hareket ettiğini göstermiştir. Bir başka ifadeyle, Türkiye'nin Irak politikası, Batı'ya yönelik politikalarının bir uzantısı olarak kavranmıştır.

c. Bölgesel bağlam ve söylemsel belirsizlik

Bölgesel bağlamdaki değişiklikler, Ankara'nın Bağdat'a yönelik iş birliği söyleminde ikircikli durumların oluşmasına yol açmaktadır. Şark Antantı (Şark Misakı), büyük güçler arasında Orta Doğuda çıkabilecek bir savaşın gölgesinde 1937 yılında kurulmuştur. Ancak bölgesel koşullar öylesine bir hızla değişmiştir ki Saadabad Paktı varoluş mantığını yaklaşık iki yıl içinde kaybetmiştir. Kahire ve Bağdat arasındaki Arap liderliği mücadelesi ve Nasır'ın bölgesel egemenlik iddiası, Türkiye ile Irak arasındaki Batı yanlısı ittifakın bölgesel anlam kazanmasına yardımcı olmuştur. Bununla birlikte, 1958 yılında Haşimi krallığının sonunu hazırlayan ve Irak'ın Bağdat Paktından çekilmesini tetikleyen de yine Arap milliyetçileri ve Nasırcılar olmuştur.

İran-Irak Savaşı (1980-1988), Kürt sorununun bölgeselleşmesine yönelik dinamikleri hızlandırmıştır. Bu dönemde, Irak'ın kuzeyinde oluşan otorite boşluğunun PKK terör örgütü tarafından istismar edilmesi, Türkiye'nin güvenliğine karşı bir tehdit oluşturmaya başlamıştır. PKK, KDP ve KYB arasındaki karmaşık ittifak ilişkileri, 1984 yılında Ankara'nın Bağdat ile güvenlik alanında iş birliğinin rasyonelleştirilmesini kolaylaştırmıştır. Diğer taraftan, 1988 yılında Irak-Türkiye sınırında meydana gelen Kürt mülteci krizi, iki ülke arasında kurulan güvenlik-temelli iş birliği mantığını kısıtlamıştır. 1991 ve 2003'teki savaşlar, Türkiye'nin zaten ikircikli olan anlatılarını daha da çelişkili hâle getirmiştir.

ç.   İkili bağlam ve çift kullanımlı söylem

Türkiye ile Irak arasındaki ikili bağlamın, çift kullanışlı (maddi ve maddi olmayan öğelere aynı anda vurgu yapan) bir söylemin oluşmasını gerekli hâle getirdiği düşünülmektedir. Bütün dönemlerde var olan müşterek maddi çıkarlar (petrol-su kaynakları ve ticaret olanakları) ve ortak maddi olmayan değerler (iyi komşuluk, kültürel-etnik akrabalık bağları) göreli olarak istikrarlı sayılabilecek bir ikili bağlam oluşturmaktadır. Bu bağlam, Türkiye'nin Irak ile iş birliği yapmasını hem kolaylaştırmış hem de zorlaştırmıştır. Türk dış politikasını yapanlar da Irak üzerinde akıl yürütürken ikili göndermelerde bulunmak için makul sebeplere sahip olmuştur. Bütün dönemlerde, analitik ayrımlar (maddi-maddi olmayan) retoriksel bir akılla anlamsızlaştırılmıştır. Böylelikle dönemsel söylemlerdeki ontolojik çelişkiler artmıştır.

d.   İç politik bağlam ve muğlâk gerekçeler

Özellikle Irak ile iş birliğinin yapılmadığı dönemlerde, Türkiye'nin iç politik bağlamının muğlâk uslamlama eğilimini kuvvetlendirdiği anlaşılmıştır. İç politik ve bürokratik (askerî) muhalefet, hükûmeti 1991 yılındaki çerçeve kullanımlarında daha tutarsız noktalara sürüklemiştir. Türkiye'nin Körfez Savaşındaki konumunun, eşikte (ne içinde ne de dışında) olarak çerçevelenmesi, söylemsel muğlâklığı artıran bir öğe olmuştur. Türkiye'deki iç kamuoyunun, 2003 yılında ABD'nin Irak işgaline karşı tutum sergilemesi sonucunda, Türk hükûmeti savaş tezkerelerinin gerekçelendirilmesine esas teşkil edebilecek tutarlı bir kamusal anlatı geliştirememiştir. Bu dönemde meydana gelen tezkere krizi, Türk dış politikasındaki yaygın kararsızlık hâlinin bir yansıması olmuştur.

e.   Jeopolitik çerçevelemeler ve geleneksel akıl

Jeopolitik çerçeveleme, hükûmet yanlısı söylemin değişmez nitelikleri arasında yer almıştır. 1937 yılında dünya üzerinde etkili olabilecek bir jeopolitik blok olarak çerçevelenen Şark Antantı'nın Himalayalar'dan Akdeniz'e uzanan büyük bir devlet olduğu iddia edilmiştir. Benzer şekilde, Bağdat Paktı Türkiye'nin arka bahçesinde gerçekleştirilen jeopolitik bir başarı olarak sunulmuştur. Körfez Savaşı döneminde, Ankara bölgesel konumu jeopolitik terimlerle süsleyerek takdim etme yoluna gitmiştir. Türkiye'nin jeopolitik vazgeçilmezliği tezi, 2003'teki Irak işgali döneminde sıkça kullanılan önemli bir ön kabul çerçevesi olmuştur.

3.   Araştırma önerileri ve son hususlar

Bu doktora tezi, Türkiye'nin Irak ile ilişkilerinde iş birliği olan ve olmayan dört döneme ilişkin anlatısal bir açıklama yapmıştır. Araştırma sonucunda elde edilen bulgular akademik ve politik alanlarda yürütülen çalışmalar açısından anlamlıdır. Akademik yönden not edilmesi gereken en önemli husus, bu çalışmada bilinen bir teorinin (anlatı teorisi) yeni bir alana (Türkiye'nin Irak politikası söylemi) uygulanmasıdır. Anılan uygulama ile Uİ ve

DPA'daki eleştirel inşa yazınına ampirik düzeyde önemli bir katkı yapılmıştır. Ayrıca, TDP ve ODÇ araştırma alanlarında uzun erimli söylem takibi yönteminin yararlılığı gösterilmiştir.

Bu çalışmada geliştirilen analitik yaklaşımların, diğer örnek olay incelemelerinde kullanılabileceği kıymetlendirilmektedir. Türkiye'deki siyasi muhalefetin ve sivil toplumun Irak'a ilişkin ürettiği anlatıların detaylı olarak incelenmesi suretiyle bu araştırmayı tamamlayıcı nitelikte bulgulara ulaşılabilecektir. Türkiye'nin diğer Orta Doğu ülkeleri (İran, Suriye, İsrail gibi) ile yaşadığı iş bir(liksiz)liği dönemlerinin analiz edilmesinin faydalı sonuçlar ortaya çıkarabileceği düşünülmektedir. Özellikle Iraklı akademisyenler tarafından, *Irak'ın Türkiye politikası* hakkında yapılacak anlatısal açıklamaların karşılıklı akademik etkileşimin artırılmasını kolaylaştırabileceği mütalaa edilmektedir. Zaman içinde geliştirilecek bu bilimsel çabaların, TDP ve/veya ODÇ'de karşılaştırmalı söylem-anlatı analizi olarak ifade edilebilecek bir araştırma alanının açılmasına katkı sağlayabileceği değerlendirilmektedir.

Dış politika uygulamaları yönünden bakıldığında, bu tezde Türkiye'nin Irak ile iş bir(liksiz)liği dönemlerinde yanlış giden hususların bağlamsal ve söylemsel boyutları açıklanmıştır. Bu açıklamalar, Türk makamları açısından Irak üzerinde konuşmanın zannedildiği kadar ucuz bir mesele olmadığı gerçeğini ortaya çıkarmıştır. Türkiye hükûmetlerinin söylemsel pratiklerinin pragmatik analizi, Irak hakkında bir şeyler söylemenin zorluklarına ilişkin politik farkındalığın gelişimine yarar sağlayacaktır. Her hâlükârda, Türkiye'nin Irak üzerinde konuşması bedeli yüksek bir eylem olmaya devam edecektir. Bu bağlamda, Irak ile iş bir(liksiz)liği dönemlerinde, Türkiye'nin söylemleriyle (sözsel eylemleriyle) yarattığı etkilerin göz önünde bulundurulmasının yararlı olacağı düşünülmektedir. Son tahlilde, siyasi öykülerin kurulumuna esas teşkil eden çerçevelerin kullanımında, özellikle bağlamsal uygunluk, ontolojik tutarlık ve retoriksel uyum gibi hususlara ilişkin farkındalığın artırılmasının, Türkiye'nin Irak politikasına analitik yönden katkı sağlayabileceği değerlendirilmiştir.