

CULTURAL PRODUCTION AND URBAN LOCALITY
IN THE FIELDS OF JAZZ AND FASHION DESIGN:
THE CASE OF KULEDİBİ, İSTANBUL

A THESIS SUBMITTED TO
THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
OF
THE MIDDLE EAST TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY

BY

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IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS
FOR
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
IN THE DEPARTMENT OF SOCIOLOGY

SEPTEMBER 2013

Approval of the Graduate School of Social Sciences

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ABSTRACT

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September 2013, 230 pages

This study aims to analyze the relationship between cultural producers in Istanbul and the wider processes of neoliberal urban restructuring that takes in their surroundings. The study uses a Bourdieusian framework to uncover such relationships between cultural producers and external influences on their respective fields. By focusing on the case of two fields (jazz and fashion design) as located in Kuledibi, Galata, the study aims to establish a localized perspective to the relationship between the cultural producers and broader field of power. With 30 in-depth interviews with cultural producers and participant observation as the main data collection methods, the perspective of the cultural producers is reflected in their relationships with a multiplicity of actors within and outside their respective fields. This study tries to explicate both *fields* in order to uncover *positions*, and *strategies* as well as forms of symbolic profit in each field

This study establishes the presence of an ‘artistic mode of production’ in a neoliberal background. This introduces new actors (corporate and real estate capital, as well as local government) to field of power, and its relationships (in the form of sponsorships or local state support for cultural activity) to fields of cultural production in question. Moreover, these relationships are mediated by the use of urban space, and cultural producers’ strategies are also contextualized in the urban space. Finally, despite the various interventions from a local political and business elite, each field (of cultural production) in this analysis manages to reflect the internal demands of their respective fields in formulating their strategies.

Keywords: artistic mode of production, the field of cultural production, fashion design, jazz, Kuledibi/Galata/Istanbul

ÖZ

CAZ VE MODA TASARIMI ALANLARINDA KÜLTÜREL ÜRETİM VE KENTSEL MEKAN İLİŞKİSİ: KULEDİBİ, İSTANBUL ÖRNEĞİ

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Eylül 2013, 230 sayfa

Bu çalışmada İstanbul'daki kültürel üreticiler ve çevrelerinde meydana gelen neoliberal kentsel (yeniden-)yapılanma süreçleri arasındaki ilişki incelenmiştir. Bu ilişkilerin kültürel üreticiler ve ait oldukları *alanlar* üzerindeki dışsal etkileri Bourdieuvvari bir çerçeve kullanılarak ortaya çıkarılmıştır. Bu çalışma, Kuledibi (Galata) bölgesinde yer aldıkları haliyle, caz ve moda tasarım *alanlarına* odaklanarak kültürel üreticilerin daha kapsamlı güç alanı ile ilişkilerine yerleşmiş bir bakış açısı getirmektedir. Otuz adet derinlemesine mülakat ve katılımcı gözlem yöntemleri ile toplanan veriler, kültürel üreticilerin, kendi alanlarında ve diğer alanlar bulunan çok sayıda aktör ile ilişkilerine bakış açısını yansıtmaktadır. Bu çalışma her iki alanda mevcut *konum*, *stratejiler* ile *sembolik kar* biçimlerini ortaya çıkarmayı hedeflemiştir.

Bu çalışma neoliberal bir arka planda 'sanatsal üretim biçimi'nin varlığını ortaya koymaktadır. Bu üretim biçimi güç alanına sermaye ve yerel hükümet gibi yeni failler dahil etmekte, bu alanın sözkonusu kültürel üretim alanlarıyla sponsorluk ya da yerel hükümet desteği gibi yeni ilişkilerini tanımlamaktadır. Dahası, bu ilişkiler kentsel mekânın kullanımı üzerinden gerçekleşmekte ve kültürel üretim alanındaki faillerin stratejileri de kentsel mekân üzerinde gerçekleşmektedir. Yerel politik ve ekonomik elitin müdahalelerine rağmen, konu alınan kültürel üretim alanlarının her biri kendi içsel taleplerini stratejilerine yansıtabilmektedirler.

Anahtar Kelimeler: sanatsal üretim biçimi, kültürel üretim *alanı*, moda tasarım, caz, Kuledibi/Galata/İstanbul

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I am thankful to TÜBİTAK-BİDEB for awarding 2211 Ph.D. scholarship, which gave me motivation and concentration in my study.

I would like to thank my advisor Assoc. Prof. Dr. Helga Rittersberger-Tılıç for helping me to clear my mind and put this study together with her valuable and equally efficient directions. I also would like to thank Assoc. Prof. Dr. Tahire Erman from Bilkent University for her valuable support throughout my graduate study starting from my years in Bilkent University and sparing her valuable time to help me with her guidance. I also would like to thank other members of the thesis committee Assoc. Prof. Dr. Sibel Kalaycıođlu, Assoc. Prof. Dr. Erdođan Yıldırım, and Asist. Prof. Dr. Eminegöl Karababa from Middle East Technical University for their valuable comments and criticisms.

I would like to thank my family and friends for being very patient with my painful stress throughout my study.

I also would like to thank all the respondents for sparing their valuable times for lengthy interviews.

I also appreciate the staff of Department of Sociology and Institute of Social Sciences for their help, especially Selma Şahindokuyucu and Sündüs Aydın for their support and guidance throughout the program.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AKP	Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (Justice and Development Party)
AMP	Artistic Mode of Production
CHP	Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (Republican People's Party)
ECoC	European Capital of Culture
İKSV	İstanbul Kültür Sanat Vakfı (İstanbul Foundation for Culture and Arts)
İTKİB	İstanbul Tekstil ve Konfeksiyon İhracatçı Birlikleri (Istanbul Textile and Apparel Exporter Associations)
MHP	Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi (Nationalist Movement Party)
MTD	Moda Tasarımcıları Derneği (Fashion Designers' Association)
TOKİ	Toplu Konut İdaresi (Housing Development Administration of Turkey)
UDP	Urban Development Project

CHAPTER 1

Introduction

As the largest city of Turkey, with its population of 13.7 million as of 2012, Istanbul is also the cultural capital of the country hosting the bulk of cultural industries, the center of many sectors including TV broadcasting, printed press, film, music, publishing and fashion. Despite the outward growth of the city since 1950s, Beyoğlu has remained the center of cultural activity and remained as one of the most attractive areas to not only tourists but also its local residents.

Since the 1980s, the shift in the larger economy from a controlled to neo-liberal regime, also found its reflections in the local politics, with the shift from populist policies to neo-liberal ones. Between 1984 and 2002, this shift was relatively slow and gradual; yet following the economic crisis of 2001 and Justice and Development Party's (AKP) takeover of government marked the transition to a neoliberal urban regime. This period was marked by the formation of a real estate market in the largest cities of Turkey, most notably in Istanbul. Shopping malls, residential developments, and high rise office buildings flourished around the city (Erkip, 2000).

Most remarkable was the initiation of several large scale urban development projects, some of which surrounded the cultural core of Beyoğlu (Taksim Pedestrianization Project, Galataport, Haliçport and Tarlabaşı Urban Transformation Project), which would inevitably affect the social composition of residents, visitors and the businesses serving to their needs such as restaurants, hotels etc. These projects are aimed at promoting the city's image in order to attract corporate investors, to real estate and capital markets, as well as to encourage foreign direct investments. On the other hand, the appointment of Istanbul as the European Capital of Culture in 2010, with the support of both local and central governments, is an evidence of the government's discovery of culture-based regeneration strategies not only to promote the city with its 'unique' culture (Keyder, 2010), but also frame it in relation to the cultural production activities it hosts.

The period from 1980s and onwards also marked the increasing participation of corporate capital in the cultural activities found in the city. This participation took several forms including sponsorships to cultural events (such as festivals, concerts, workshops etc.) and spaces of cultural production including jazz venues and concert halls. Some key companies in the banking and finance sector even opened their own art galleries, museums, performance spaces, cultural centers, publishing houses, throughout the city, but mostly concentrated around Istanbul's cultural core, Beyoğlu. Some corporations created foundations to support and patron cultural activities, including festivals specialized on particular field within the cultural production, including film, theater, and jazz. These forms of support from the corporate capital, and its owners, can be evaluated from a corporate 'social responsibility' perspective, or can be considered as philanthropic acts as such capital-holders are also known to be keen-followers of the particular fields of arts they have been supporting. Yet, the key corporations subsidizing such cultural activities are also prominent players in the real estate market, some of them even have medium to large scale investments in the immediate surroundings of the city's cultural center.

Also significant is the increasing participation of local government in sponsoring and facilitating cultural activities, from fashion weeks to musical festivals, in order to promote the city, neighborhoods or districts as more inhabitable for both existing and potential residents or the property in these areas as more investable for both place entrepreneurs (who make capital gains from acquiring property and selling it for a higher prices) and businesses, often in order to increase local tax revenues and/or the amount of government subsidies. Especially after the European Capital of Culture Experience in 2010, Istanbul's local governments found the support for cultural activities as a viable alternative for local development and improving image (Aksoy, 2010).

All these developments suggest the presence of an "Artistic Mode of Production"(AMP)—as Zukin (1982) calls it—whereby local economic and political elite, support the presence and growth of a local infrastructure of arts and other cultural activities to ensure real estate valorization in specific parts of the city. Based on her empirical research of the artists' conversion of manufacturing lofts to low cost live/work spaces, she traced the material conditions of the concrete events that took place in the SoHo district of NYC during 1960s and 1970s, and resulted in the gentrification of the area. In her study, she discovered how the American upper class (or patricians as Zukin

prefers to refer to them) switched to a new mode of accumulation by investing on the arts infrastructure of New York, which resulted in substantial capital gains from the valorization of urban districts due to artists' presence in a number of spaces, including art galleries, museum, as well as 'alternative spaces,' artists' lofts, theaters, and public places which host large-scale 'public art' installations. "[U]sing artists' studios or lofts to housing markets and raise property values, was an unanticipated effect of encouraging artistic careers" (Zukin, 1995: viii), which later turned to a deliberate effort by local governments and upper class to drive urban valorization, particularly gentrification, when accompanied with an ever-expanding tide of cultural consumption by the middle class.

Zukin's formulation of AMP is a comprehensive framework that captures the essence of the process of transformation of urban space from manufacturing to service-sector use, in the face of deindustrialization and shift to service economy, "by establishing a built-environment for the performance, display, sale, and production of cultural symbols" (Ley, 2003). Yet, despite her initial formulation, she later abandoned the use of the term in its entirety, and the term began to simply denote the support of local government and upper classes to local artistic activities, which results in the valorization of real estate in the areas the same elite also had stakes in investment terms.

Also significant, for me, was the ongoing gentrification of Galata (or Kuledibi) area which has been in progress since 1990s. Personally, I was involved with the issue of gentrification in Istanbul's urban back in 2002, when I was doing a field study covering the gentrification process in a nearby district, Cihangir. Compared to Cihangir, the process in Galata was slow paced due to a number of obstacles such as overwhelming presence of small businesses which make inhabitation relatively less comfortable, and the ownership issues regarding the existing property due to differences in displacement patterns specific to the area. Moreover, compared to Cihangir's almost purely residential gentrification (at least in the initial phases), the Galata area was more associated with the culturally productive activity—such as painters' and musicians' workshops and designer stores—also signaled a possible difference between the gentrification patterns of these two areas. While Cihangir's gentrification was a result of residential preferences of a group of pioneers mostly employed in the city's cultural industries, the process in Galata seemed more related to the needs of the cultural production, as the area was put into potential gentrifiers' radars with the presence of such activity.

At the early phase of gentrification—which was still going on in the first half of 2000s—a local jazz venue opened by a prominent jazz musician and his wife started to appear in newspaper columns and weekend supplements of major newspapers, along with a number of new businesses—mostly restaurants catering to the needs of tourists and Istanbul’s creative and/or corporate workforce. As the area began the target of residential gentrification, it has also become a destination for Istanbul’s local residents where they would enjoy quality food and music.

In the second half of 2000s, the area came to be associated with another sector within the cultural (or creative) industries: fashion design. Starting from 2006, with the cooperation of Beyoğlu Municipality and Fashion Designers’ Association, the organization of a fashion week, associated the area with a cultural sector once again. Especially, with the opening of designer boutiques in the Serdar-ı Ekrem Street starting from 2009, increased the media coverage regarding the cultural activity in the area. This time, the presence of fashion event brought many fashion-conscious Istanbulites to the area, increasing its appeal to a more mainstream visitor profile, compared to neighborhood’s (then-)present bohemian image. The clustering of a small number of designer shops (especially in Serdar-ı Ekrem Street), and their growing popularity also encouraged some of the key players in fashion design (and high-end ‘ready-to-wear’ clothing) created a demand for the scarce space resulting in significant rises in rent levels, eventually displacing some of the pioneer designer boutiques.

Finally, after the general elections of 2011, the government announced that it will execute several megaprojects—some of which were directly related to the urban core of Istanbul (such as ‘Galataport’, ‘Haliçport’, Tarlabaşı Urban Transformation Project and Taksim Pedestrianization Project)—created a significant boom in the real estate markets of surrounding areas, including Galata. Especially, the ‘Galataport’ project, which involves the building of a cruiser home port in the nearby Karaköy coast, attracted large scale investors—some of whom have been also supporters of arts and cultural amenities present in the area—who wanted to build hotels, restaurants and other amenities catered for international tourists.

What was intriguing me as a social researcher was the triangle of gentrification, the growth of the local real estate market, and the presence of cultural activities in the area, which suggested the presence of an ‘artistic mode of production’ in Zukin’s terms. Especially the corporate support for jazz—sponsoring festivals, venues, workshops and other events—and the local government’s support for fashion designers clustering was

sufficient evidence for me to consider the presence of an arts/culture based development scheme in Galata (and wider Beyoğlu district). Yet, what were missing in the picture were the cultural producers' (fashion designers and jazz musicians) own locational preferences, favoring the Kuledibi district. Neither government and corporate support, nor the demands and preferences of cultural producers were likely to present a complete picture of the process. Despite its practicality in explaining how local governments and corporate capital can drive urban growth through investment in arts and culture infrastructure, AMP framework fails to account for the internal dynamics of material production of culture in the urban setting, that is, how the cultural production—as it takes place in an urban setting—is tried to be controlled, influenced, altered and catered for this purpose by the a local 'patrician' elite, policymakers, or the 'growth coalition' in general. It also fails to explain how local cultural producers respond to, resist or cope with such interventions. What is required was an extensive framework also covering cultural producers' side (their own motivations, preferences, and demands), which needed a complementary framework to AMP thesis.

Bourdieu's framework of the 'field of cultural production', on the other hand, offered a powerful methodological tool as it covered any field of cultural production in its entirety—including the *positions/position takings, strategies and trajectories* of agents within the *field*) as well as interventions' of the dominant groups (the field of power) and cultural producers' strategies to respond to them. By and large, strategies of cultural producers also reflect decisions, conflicts, and actions that are related to the use of urban space. Incorporating the AMP framework with Bourdieu's *field* analysis, also requires developing the latter with a geographical dimension—by situating a field in a particular locality—to see how social space interacts with the physical or geographical one. Bourdieu's field theory presents a one way relationship between the social space and physical space (the 'reified social space') (1993b: 124), and this objectification of social space can be explained by studying a particular *field* within social space to a specific *field* in physical space. Moreover, it helps us to uncover if the reverse—the translation of physical space to a social one—is even possible. To do this, it is important to uncover (1) how positions within the *field* may be defined also in relation to physical space, (2) how strategies of the cultural producers within one field involve the use of physical space (often in the form of capital—economic, cultural, social or symbolic), and (3) how interventions from the *field* of power may relate to the use of physical space and how strategies against such interventions, again, make use of physical space.

In this sense an extended ‘artistic mode of production’ can be outlined, which involves artists and other cultural producers as an active part of the system, not external to it, as outlined in Zukin’s original conceptualization.

The research analyzes two different sectors within the *field* of cultural production, can be mapped and identified on different positions within the Bourdieu’s social space. First one consists of ‘jazz sector’ in Istanbul which relies heavily on performance to survive, as recording is a rare and unprofitable practice among cultural producers (i.e. musicians). The reliance on performance requires the use of urban space to stay within the reach of jazz audience, hence there is a clustering of performance venues in the urban core, mostly Beyoğlu. With its own global network among cultural producers (musicians as well as venue owners and intermediaries such as columnists, musical critics etc.), the relation of jazz to global circuits of capital is weaker than the ‘fashion design’ sector, the second sector in this research. Again, with a strong clustering tendency within Beyoğlu, fashion design sector is also different than the ‘jazz sector’ in that it requires also close relations with both domestic and international capital as it provides input to mass (unrestricted) production, in Bourdieu’s conceptualization. It also needs a local consumer constituency to develop and flourish, which requires the activities as well as producers to remain visible in the urban sphere, to stay within the access of local consumers. Such ties to locality help the sector to improve a ‘local’ cultural capital, or ‘subcultural’ capital defined by connections to a locality, to establish itself as a distinctive site of production of both goods and symbols.

Each sector lies on a different location, both within the field of production and with respect to wider field of power: for example, while fashion design is more associated with mass (unrestricted production, and consumption), jazz is closer to the other end of the continuum, which lies the subfield of restricted production (production for producers, ‘art for art’s sake’ in Bourdieu’s terms. Jazz has a unique position, as “a hybridization by popular musicians of popular idioms and popular practices with high art performance practices and claims to high art aesthetics” (Lopes, 2000: 165). This differentiation between two different areas of cultural production is expected to reveal the particularities of each sector within the field of cultural production, to provide a profound and multifaceted analysis of relations of production, as well as its ties to the locality.

These two sectors are analyzed also within the boundaries of a particular locality, Kuledibi district in Beyoğlu. An area which has been subject to a slow paced

gentrification since the beginning of 2000s, Kuledibi hosts both sectors at different extents. With a gentrification process of over a decade, Kuledibi area hosts a famous jazz club Nora since the end of 2002. Kuledibi also hosted a cluster of fashion designer shops in Serdar-ı Ekrem Street starting from 2009. I tried to analyze both phenomena in the light of these two separate fields' own internal dynamics, as well within the broader field of cultural production in relation to Kuledibi. This revealed how urban space has been a major factor influencing the field of cultural production and an arena that hosts numerous conflicts between the field of cultural production and the field of power, as well as within the field of cultural production.

1.1. The aim and scope of study

The aim of this study is to understand how the geography of cultural economy of city is affected by the changes in economic, political and social spheres which result from increasing influence of neo-liberal agenda on urban scene of Istanbul. Based on the experiences of local cultural producers as clustered in Kuledibi district, the particular focus is on the role of agency of cultural producers in shaping these geographies. A major aim is to counter the purely structuralist accounts that treat cultural producers (or artists) as one of the tools in the urban regenerations schemes of key forces in the urban growth regimes. Such a view regards artists as avant-garde, whose presence in the urban space is a driver of growth in particular districts, mainly in the form of gentrification, as such groups are considered as role models for a fraction of the middle class. Using a Bourdieusian framework, this study seeks to extend AMP thesis to introduce the agency of cultural producers as active agents in the process of urban transformation; not assigning them a passive role against the urban 'growth coalitions' who seek urban growth as an accumulation strategy but as interested stakeholders who try negotiate and contest the targets and strategies of the dominant forces from the field of power. This task can be translated into a set of research questions:

- 1. Who are the institutional and individual agents involved in this process, and what are the particular strategies used by these agents in the economic and political field as embodied and cultural and urban policies, again, as perceived by cultural producers?*
- 2. As part of the dominant class, how do they establish their presence and influence over an artistic mode of production in the urban space, in relation to other institutional and individual agents within the field of power?*

3. *What are the strategies of cultural producers within these two fields, in order to continue their productive activity and presence in the urban core? How are these dynamics (positions, position takings and strategies internal to the field of cultural production reflected in urban space?*

Introduction of spatial dimension to the field of cultural production also enables us to see a change in the actors' *positions* and *position-takings* that can only be made sense of when analyzed in relation to a particular locality. With such an approach, the *field of cultural production* may also have other implications for urban space, as it is fundamental in understanding the internal dynamics of the field, including conflicts between different genres within the same field as this conflicts determine for what purposes the sites of cultural production will be utilized (especially galleries and venues), what 'alternative spaces' will emerge in order to circumvent around the existing conventions within the field. These are all significant factors in defining the economic values of artists' spaces, and their surrounding development by determining who works there and who comes to visit (Molotch and Treskon, 2009).

Including this introductory chapter, which briefly lays the groundwork of this study including major theoretical and methodological considerations, as well as the context, there are a total of eight chapters included in this dissertation.

The next three chapters present the theoretical framework of the study, as the first chapter focuses on the intersections of city and culture, from the works of classical urban sociologists Simmel and Wirth to the more contemporary scientists Castells and Zukin. The chapter is divided into three parts, one focuses on the idea of a distinctive 'generic city' culture—as studied in the classical urban sociology. The second part of the second chapter explains another intersection of culture with the urban setting, and elaborates the city as the center of cultural production. The third part briefly elaborates of culture based regeneration strategies and place-marketing efforts, focusing on place/city marketing, as well as cultural strategies which involves the use of culture—both as a product of the city, and as a product produced in the city—as an instrument to (re)frame or (re)brand the city.. The third chapter, the second chapter on literature, focuses on the concept of neoliberalism and its product neoliberal urbanism, and elaborates the major tools of neoliberal urban planning such as use of large scale urban development projects and generalized (state-led gentrification). The third chapter on literature (Chapter 4) focuses on Sharon Zukin's AMP framework, Pierre Bourdieu's theory of the "field of cultural production," and how these two are incorporated to offer

a holistic view of the field of cultural production in relation to a (or any particular locality).

The fifth chapter is dedicated to the description of the context, starting with the history of neoliberal policies in Turkish context, which dates back to 1980s and the production of a neoliberal ‘urban regime’ in Istanbul, along with other major cities, through a number of legislative reforms. The second part of this chapter focuses on the gentrification of Kuledibi/Galata district, based on the previous study on the area’s gentrification and the findings of this study.

The sixth chapter is on the research methods employed in this research. It starts with an explanation for the need of a qualitative research, instead of a quantitative one, and it explains the details and logic of sampling as a crucial part of the research design.

The seventh and eighth chapters focus on the findings of the field research, defining the fields of jazz and fashion design respectively. In these two chapters, I tried to stick to an identical scheme in order to enable a comparison between the two fields, to be able to compare and contrast the two with respect to the positions and position takings of cultural producers, and the resulting strategies within each field which had implications for the use of urban space.

The ninth chapter summarizes the findings as it provides an account of how the findings from each field are related to the framework of cultural production and AMP thesis.

CHAPTER 2

City and Culture

The term *culture*, in its early use, “was a noun of process: the tending *of* something,” “natural growth, and then by analogy, a process of human training” (Williams, 1958: xiv). This changed in time, by the 19th century, as it came to mean, (i) “a general state of or habit of the mind, having close relations with the idea of human perfection,” (ii) “the general state of intellectual development, in a society as a whole,” (iii) “the general body of the arts” and (iv) “a whole way of life, material, intellectual and spiritual” (Ibid.: xiv). In his later work, Williams elaborates on the three modern uses of the term (1978, 1985: 90): The first one is “the independent and abstract noun which describes a general process of intellectual, spiritual and aesthetic development,” which is used from 18th century and onwards. The second one was “the independent noun, whether used generally or specifically, which indicates a particular way of life, whether of a people, a period or a group, or humanity in general;” and finally “the independent and abstract noun which describes the works and practices of intellectual and especially artistic activity,” such as “music, literature, painting and sculpture.” As Williams draws attention to the ambiguity in these uses, as the first and the third uses are ‘close’ and “indistinguishable,” he also points out how different disciplines use the term to refer to different reality: for example, in cultural anthropology, the term culture refers “primarily to material production, while in history and cultural studies the reference primarily to signifying or symbolic systems” (1985: 91). We will see how these different meanings are used in different aspects, in linking cultural production, culture and the city. Zukin (1995) also warns us about the alternative uses, means, and forms culture can take, from street culture to culture industries, and these differences should be paid great attention by the social researcher.

Broadly, the keywords ‘culture’ and ‘the city’ come together in three different intersections in the current literature. One is, as prominent sociologists Simmel and Wirth argued, the city as producing a distinct culture, an ‘urban culture’ which stands in opposition with the culture of other settlements, different from the culture of the modern city spatially and/or temporally. This view criticized by a number of scholars including

Herbert Gans and Manuel Castells. Second intersection, following Castells's view that "cities have been throughout history, and in our time, the sources of *cultural creativity*, technological innovation, material progress, and political democratization" (Castells, 1999: 367) designates city the center of cultural activity. In these two different intersections, the first one corresponds to Williams's first and second definitions, while the second intersection resembles to first and third definitions of culture. The third intersection of culture and the city becomes evident in cultural policies (or culture-based growth strategies) which have become more significant especially , in the context of neoliberal urbanism. For the first part, I will start with the views of early sociologists and the criticism of their conceptualization of a distinct urban culture. In the second section, I will start with defining culturally creative activity, then extricating its relation to the urban setting, identifying cities as places where these activities extensively take place. And the final part focuses on culture's central role on place marketing efforts.

2.1. Defining Urban Culture

This approach is exemplified by the work of German and Chicago and German Schools, most notably the works of prominent sociologist George Simmel and Louis Wirth. The major difference between the two is that, while Wirth tried to define an urban culture in contrast to a rural one, Simmel's definition of urban culture stands in contrast to both rural settings and small town of an earlier era.

In his classic essay, "The Metropolis and Mental Life," Simmel (1903) depicted city as the site for lonely, isolated individual with weak social bonds and he contended that the metropolis shapes the mental structure of the individual (the metropolitan) who lives there, resulting in four distinct characteristics of the urban dweller. According to Simmel, the 'metropolitan' (1) uses his "intellectuality," in reacting to the external phenomena (Ibid.: 410); (2) is 'calculative' (Ibid.: 410), as he evaluates the consequences of his actions, comparing the negative outcomes with the positive ones, (3) has a 'blasé' attitude (superficial, alienated and indifferent) (an irreversible effect of metropolitan setting on individuals' minds) and (4) reserved behind a screen of protection to stand overwhelming rate of psychological stimulus.

Thirty-five years later, influenced by Simmel's work, Wirth published his essay, *Urbanism as a Way of Life* (1938). It was an attempt to define an urban culture as a function of three independent variables—size, density, and heterogeneity—which are actually traits of urban life, as only cities had large numbers of dense and heterogeneous

social relations. At first sight, there is a similarity between Wirth's and Simmel's claim, that the size of the settlement and the huge number of interactions caused these cultural forms. For Savage and Ward (1993), Simmel was not distinguishing between a rural culture and urban one, and similarly he was not comparing an urban dweller with their rural counterparts. His theory focused on contemporary cities and the towns of earlier times, especially the antiquity, thus he distinguished between urban dwellers with the rural dwellers of the earlier periods. He based his theory on a link between 'money economy' and the city, and the effects of culture of money economy were most evident in the city, where it was in its most developed form.

Wirth built his argument on early work in sociology, most notably Toennies's distinction between *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft* (translated as community and society), which also distinguishes between urban and rural. Yet Toennies's distinction is not a spatial distinction, like Wirth intended, rather it was a temporal one, like Simmel's, as Toennies was trying to provide an account of historical change from a traditional society to a modern one. In Simmel's theory, cities were central only because they were emblematic of the modern society. It follows; the culture of the city, as at the same time, the culture of modernity.

Influenced by Louis Wirth, Robert Redfield (1947) introduced a similar opposition between rural and urban, describing the latter as impersonal, heterogeneous, secular and disorganizing. In his article, "The Folk Society," he described the folk community of the rural as highly personalistic, homogeneous and secular, in contrast to the urban culture. It only had a basic form of division of labor based on the differentiation of sex roles, with the means of production shared within the community, in which the economic activity was strictly contained (Saunders, 1986).

Wirth's work was criticized on several grounds, including its spatial determinism (e.g. cities host predominantly lonely and isolated people), false urban-rural typology (e.g. there were integrated communities in the cities and the social life in the country side was not always harmonious), and it ignored subcultures (which was found abundantly in urban setting, making it impossible to identify any dominant type of social relations).

Particularly important was the second line of criticism, which held that the distinction between urban and rural ways of life is fallacious. While some scholars pointed out the existence of a rural 'way' of life in large cities, other found urban ways of life in the countryside. Regarding the former, Young and Willmott (1957) found close kinship and

neighborhood ties that were seen as characteristic of the rural life in Bethnal Green in London. Gans (1962) arrived at a similar conclusion with the Young and Willmott, in his study of a working class community in the West End of Boston, and coined the term 'urban village' to refer to how such traits of the rural life were also evident and dominant in an urban setting. Abu-Lughod (1961), based on her study of Cairo also witnessed as the continuous flow of migrants to the city brought together the culture of the countryside, resulting in what she call "ruralization of the city" (p.23). Lewis (1951), on the other hand, observed the reverse in the Mexican village of Tepoztlan—which was the subject of Redfield's earlier study where he conceptualized the small, sacred and homogeneous 'folk society'—where he found prevalent fear, envy and distrust in personal relations.

Gans (1968) also criticizes Wirth's analysis on three grounds: first, he argues, the findings of a study conducted in the inner city cannot be generalized to the metropolitan area. Second, the relationship between the independent variables—size (or the number), density and heterogeneity—and the dependent variable of urban culture (with its own social structures and cultural patterns) as characterized by Wirth is dubious. Finally, a significant proportion of urban inhabitants will be isolated from this urban culture, is there is such a relationship exists. Gans argues, Wirth's these variables are less effective when people have a choice on their residential location and the way of life they lead.

Weber opposed the idea that size as a basis for defining the city, as suggested by Simmel, Wirth, Redfield, and others, Weber stressed the centrality city in the economic and political organization. In terms of economy, he argued that the presence of an established market system, and in political terms the presence of a partial political economy is a defining feature. With respect the economic criterion, a city can be a 'consumer', a 'producer', or a 'commercial' city. With respect to the political dimension, it can be a "patrician city", run by an assembly of notables," or a "plebeian city", run by an elected assembly of citizens" (Saunders, 1986: 16-7).

Dewey also finds the size of the settlement an irrelevant factor, with the variables proposed by Simmel, and found in the works of others, and instead of a dichotomy of urban versus rural, he proposes a rural—urban continuum as "variations in the size of human settlements do tend to be reflected in the degree of anonymity, differentiation, heterogeneity, impersonality and universalism of social relationships within them" (Ibid.: 74)

In his groundbreaking work, *The Urban Question* (1977), Castells criticized earlier urban studies for ignoring the wider processes of society as whole, instead focusing on the city and the urban as a theoretical object of urban studies. In addition to this, for him, also missing in the previous urban studies was the specificity of capitalist society—with its inherent class contradictions and uneven development. Castells rejected the idea of the sociological treatment as city as a ‘cultural form,’ as ‘urban culture’ was “neither a concept nor a theory” (p.83), and treating urban culture as a product of the city “suggest the hypothesis of a production of social content (the urban) by a trans-historical form (the city)” (p.89). For Castells, there was no casual relationship between social and spatial variables, and it follows, social relations could not possibly be deduced from spatial ones. Space also had no meaning by itself, rather it was merely an expression of the social. “[T]he link between space, the urban and a certain system of behavior regarded as typical of ‘urban culture’ has no other foundation than an ideological one: it is a question of ideology of modernity, aimed at masking and naturalizing social contradictions” (Ibid.: 431) as the city created ‘nothing’. Rather, it was a “myth [which] provides the key-words of an ideology of modernity, assimilated, in an ethnocentric way, to the social forms of liberal capitalism,” (Ibid.: 441) and “from this point of view, the problem of the definition (or redefinition) of the urban does not even arise...such a tendency helps to reinforce the strategic role of urbanism as a political ideology and as a professional practice” (p.463).

Castells (1977: 111) concluded “(1) that there is no cultural system linked to a given form of spatial organization; (2) that the social history of humanity is not determined by the type of development of the territorial collectivities; (3) that the spatial environment is not the root of a specificity of behavior and representation.” This conclusion left no theoretical subject for the urban sociology, and he started to build a ‘new urban sociology’ with an identifiable urban object as its theoretical subject. Based on Althusser’s Marxist epistemology, he started with the capitalist mode of production, yet since the urban did not belong to the sphere of consumption, he focused on the sphere of reproduction of labor power. As he identified ‘urban system’ as a functioning part of the total system, and its function being the process of consumption towards the reproduction of labor power, the theoretical object of the ‘new urban sociology’ becomes the ‘collective consumption’.

Castells was also critical of “Lefebvre’s utopian concept of an urban society which he sees as in some ways a left version of Wirth’s culturalist conception of urbanism” as

both regarded city as restructuring social relations, rather than the opposite (Saunders, 1986: 116). In Lefebvre's theory, human development proceeds in three major stages: The agrarian, the industrial and the urban society, each stages are related to 'need', 'work' and 'pleasure' respectively. Castells finds Lefebvre's thesis "close to Wirth's ... [i]t is the density, the warmth of concentration that, by increasing actions and communication, encourage at one and the same time a free flowering, the unexpected, pleasure, sociability and desire." "City creates nothing, but by centralizing creations, it enables them to flower [...] as if there were no social and institutional organization" external to the space"(Castells, 1977:90).

2.2. Cities as Centers of Cultural Production

In this second section, I focus on the culturally productive activity as a feature of urban setting as most of the cultural industries (or creative industries as a more up-to-date and comprehensive term) is located in major urban centers such as New York, London, Paris, and Berlin. I start with the classical conceptualization of 'culture industry' by Frankfurt School, I trace the evolution of term to 'creative industries' in late 1990s to define the boundaries such culturally productive activity.

A traditional starting point would be Adorno and Horkheimer's (1979/1944) term 'culture industry'¹, as part of their critique of false legacies of enlightenment (Hesmondhalgh and Pratt, 2005) which was used to refer to the intensified commercialization of cultural production (or commodification of art) in those societies which had made the transition from feudalism to capitalism, by the turn of early twentieth century (Williams, 1981; Bourdieu, 1996). The duo introduced the term polemically opposing then-dominant mass society theorists, who saw the problems of mass culture and the relationship between ideology and capitalism either in elite/mass or a base/superstructure distinction, . In elite/mass distinction, commercialization of mass culture meant vulgarization of high culture, which meant that mass-produced form

¹ Adorno and Horkheimer's usage, 'culture' referred to the German idealist notion of culture, following Herder, "as the expression of the deepest shared values of a social group, as opposed to civilization, which was merely the meretricious and superficial taste and social practices of an elite, and of art as the realm of freedom and as the expression of utopian hope" (Garnham, 2005: 17). The term 'industry' referred both to Marxist economic concepts of commodification , commodity exchange, capital concentration and worker alienation (at the workplace), and to the Weberian concept of rationalization (Ibid.). In the later uses of the term, cultural industries resembles the third definition presented by Raymond Williams's (1978).

developed lacked the artistic and spiritual features that are thought to characterize art works, due to the mass's lack of education. In the latter, base/superstructure distinction, the problem with the mass culture was it was seen as ideological manipulation of cultural production which are disseminated to a passive audience—numbed and alienated by the industrialization—resulting from the bourgeois control of channels of communication. Despite their approval of both strands of criticism, for Adorno and Horkheimer, the problem was rather one of commodification and alienation; as cultural products were commodified, cultural producers were alienated as wage laborers within the ranks of increasingly concentrated large-scale corporations (i.e. corporate cultural producers). The nineteenth and twentieth century use of the term culture—in its ideal state—was equated with art as a special and exceptional form of human creativity, and art was a form of critique of the rest of life, providing a utopian vision for a better life, following the Hegelian philosophy (Hesmondhalgh, 2002). In their analysis, Adorno and Horkheimer held that the commodification of art (and culture) stripped itself from its capacity to act as a utopian critique, and instead of being opposites culture and industry were collapsed into one, in the context of modern capitalist democracy (Ibid.). The attention shifted from the content of culture to its forms, and from the cultural product itself to the relationship between the cultural producers and consumers (Garnham, 2005).

The term gained popularity in the late 1960s, both in academic, political and policy discourse as a result of revival of Western Marxism with its central focus on ideology and hegemony rediscovering Frankfurt School, making the use of the term culture industry especially by left-wing students and intellectuals in their criticism against the perceived limitations and problems of the modern cultural life (Hesmondhalgh, 2002). The wider 'cultural turn' in sociology also helped the popularity of the term with the shift of attention from the analysis of social structure and class, towards the analysis of culture (Garnham, 2005). The widespread use of the term among French sociologists (such as Morin, Miege and Huet), helped the popularize its use in plural (*industries culturelles*)—as a rejection of its original use in singular, which suggested a 'unified field' where different forms of cultural production coexisted and operated under the same logic—in order to emphasize the complexity of cultural industries logic and to "identify the different logics at work in different types of cultural production" (Hesmondhalgh, 2002: 16). French sociologists, particularly Miege (1989, in Hesmondhalgh 2002), also rejected Adorno and Horkheimer's pessimism that introduction of industrialization and new technologies into cultural production led to

commodification of culture, and eventually the surrender of culture to the industrial logic. Mieke Bal accepted the commodification of culture claim, but viewed the terrain of cultural industries as a contested one, as industrialization in cultural production created opportunities for new directions and innovations enriching everyday lives of people (Hesmondhalgh, 2002).

Its new usage also differed from the original term in the sense that those who used the term did not necessarily embrace the elitist, cultural pessimism of the Frankfurt School or the underlying Marxist economics, causing major theoretical and policy disagreements. Two alternative approaches emerged, which were separated from each other in terms of relative weight given to 'cultural' and 'industries' components. On the one hand, the 'cultural studies' developed in the sociology of culture and media argued for a shift away from base/superstructure approach to problems of ideology and hegemony as well as the economistic focus on production and work; in favor of increased focus on culture as a relatively autonomous sphere for social practice and the key locus of hegemony (Garnham, 2005). This position brought about a replacement of traditional working class-politics (based on the point of production) with a cultural politics, moving the site of oppositional conflict "from factories, trade unions and political parties to the home, the rock concert [...] and the classroom" (Garnham, 2005: 18). With a decisive rejection of cultural pessimism of the Frankfurt School along with the social-democratic critique of (especially American) commercial culture, the cultural studies approach moved towards positive revaluation of popular culture. The analysis also shifted away from press and news broadcasting (their possible political influence, the relationship between their ideological content and structures of ownership and control) to entertainment industries of music, film and television. For the 'political economy school', on the other hand, the weakness of Frankfurt School's analysis was not its cultural pessimism; rather it was the superficiality of its economic analysis. The political economy school has given much more emphasis on the term 'industries' and tried to apply a more profound Marxist economic analysis and more mainstream industrial and information economics (contrary to the Frankfurt School's references to a very general model of the capitalist economy as a whole) to the analysis of the production, distribution and consumption of symbolic forms (Garnham, 2005). Hesmondhalgh (2002) seeks to incorporate both approaches underlining common concerns, using an 'eclectic methodology' to produce 'a political economy approach' informed by empirical sociology of culture, communication and cultural studies. This

approach emphasizes the centrality of symbolic artifacts (cultural products) along with the financing and organization of their production.

Over the years, the term later evolved as cultural industries—in plural—to designate a number of sectors which employ the characteristic modes of production and organization of industrial corporations to produce and disseminate symbols in the form of cultural goods and services (Garnham, 1987), with ‘aesthetic and semiotic content’ (Scott, 1997) and ‘socially symbolic connotations’ (Bourdieu, 1971, in Scott, 2004), whose subjective meaning (i.e. sign-value) to the consumer is higher than its utilitarian value (Lash and Urry, 1994; Scott, 2004). Cultural industries as a descriptive term, used along with other terms such as ‘creative industries’², ‘cultural economy’, ‘copyright industries’ (or ‘intellectual property industries’)—as part of the ‘knowledge industries’ (or ‘knowledge-based industries’³), ‘information industries’, ‘new economy’ (or ‘information economy’)—to refer to (a more or less) identical set of sectors for which the main input is (often artistic) human creativity, along with terms such as ‘creative class’ (Florida, 2002; 2005) or ‘creative city’ (Landry, 2000) to point out to the intersection of culture and the economy; as Sayer observes (1997) more to the ‘economization of culture’ than ‘culturalization of the economy’ (Lash and Urry, 1994; Leadbeater, 1999; Castells, 2000; Scott, 2000; Amin and Thrift, 2004).

² Garnham (2005) observes a shift in terminology from cultural to creative industries for the purposes of cultural policy formulation in the United Kingdom, comparing the Arts and Media Policy documents offered by ‘New Labour’ (British Labour Party) before and after its election victory in 1997. As Pratt (2005) observes, the term ‘creative industries’ was first used in the first mapping document by UK Creative Industries Task Force in 1998 (DCMS), to refer to a similar domain of policy and activity, previously covered under the heading cultural industries (O’Connor, 2004; Garnham, 2005). Creative industries is defined as “...those industries which have their origin in individual creativity, skill and talent which have a potential for job and wealth creation through the generation and exploitation of intellectual property” (‘Creative Industries Mapping Document’, DCMS, 2001), to which ‘old’ arts and *cultural* industries have now become a subset (Work Foundation, 2007). For Hesmondhalgh and Pratt (2005), the term cultural industries was an amorphous one sometimes referring to commercial activities sometimes excluding them and the shift in terminology is not mere semantics but highly political: output, export and employment measures gave what had been regarded as “arts” some credibility in an era of downward pressure on policy funds and a results-driven mode of government in the UK. Politically, creative industries could be distanced from the cultural industries : the former indicating New Labour, and the latter Old Labour. Garnham (2005) further argues tha the choice of the term ‘creative’ over ‘cultural’ is “a shorthand reference to the information society and that set of economic analyses and policy arguments to which that term now refers” (p.20).

³ The difference between knowledge and knowledge-based industries is that, while the former regards knowledge as the output, the latter accepts knowledge as the input to create value.

In his detailed analysis of cultural industries, Hesmondhalgh (2002) tries to differentiate cultural industries from other industries since it is possible to argue that all industrial are cultural industries in the sense that they are all involved in the production and consumption of culture, based on the definition of culture as a “‘whole way of life’ of a distinct people or other social group” (Williams, 1981: 11), which practically includes almost every product from cars to furniture, from clothing to food into the realm of culture, hence cultural production. In order to narrow down the definition, Hesmondhalgh employs another definition of culture, again by Williams, “the *signifying system* through which necessarily [...] a social order is communicated, reproduced, experienced and explored (Williams, 1981:13 original emphasis, in Hesmondhalgh, 2002). Based on this definition, for Hesmondhalgh, cultural industries only include profit-making companies as well as non-profit organizations and state institutions which are involved in the ‘production of social meaning’. Hesmondhalgh also offers a distinction between *core* and *peripheral* cultural industries: The core industries include broadcasting, print and electronic publishing, film and music industries, the content aspects of the Internet industry, video and computer games, and advertising/marketing. The peripheral industries also involved in the cultural production of symbols (or *texts* as Hesmondhalgh prefers to call them), yet the production (or reproduction) in these sectors do not take on an industrial character.

Despite the popularity of the term cultural industries in sociology, it is less popular in geography and urban planning. Terms such as ‘cultural economy’ (Scott, 1997, Gibson and Kong, 1997; Du Gay and Pryke, 2002; Amin and Thrift, 2004), ‘creative economy’ (Kong et al., 2006; Wei and Jian, 2010) and ‘creative industries’ (Hartley, 2005; Yue, 2005; Gu, 2010) are preferred more since it is easier to conceptualize cultural production activities linked to place (thus, to the policy issues), than it is for ‘cultural industries’, as the latter only includes industrial forms of cultural production and excluding non-industrial (e.g. artisanal) and semi-industrial activities, but most importantly the cultural consumption as a crucial component. The term ‘cultural economy’ is particularly handy in that it also involves non-industrial and semi-industrial activities, which can or cannot be regarded as part of the cultural industries (both localized and internationalized in scope and scale) through mostly horizontal integration of a large number of culturally creative activities, often clustered around a particular locality. In other words, cultural economy encapsulates the entire ‘symbolic economy’ (Lash and Scott, 1994; Zukin, 1995) operating within a particular locality. In this sense, the term cultural economy is

also more useful when developing cultural (or culture-oriented) policies and urban development or regeneration plans for a given locality.

2.3. Defining The Cultural Economy

Gibson and Kong (2005: 542) prefer the term ‘cultural economy’ to emphasize the ‘cultural turn in economic geography, as the terms has been used to “describe a particular approach to non-neoclassical economic – a ‘new’ economic geography influenced by post-structuralist epistemologies.” From a sectoral approach⁴, cultural economy is a collectivity of sectors⁵. It is concerned with the specific types of economic activities that should be included within the confines of the ‘cultural economy’ as well as offering a comprehensive list of sectors that should be regarded as cultural industries (or with the later usage, creative sectors) or ‘cultural-products’ industries (Scott, 2001). From another viewpoint, cultural economy is defined with respect to the actual

⁴ Different authors proposed what they would regard as comprehensive list of sectors to identify cultural industries, under different categorizations. For example, Pratt (1997) identified a list of sectors under ‘Cultural Industries Production System’ (CIPS) including performance, fine art and literature (and their reproduction), books, journal magazines, newspapers, film, radio, television, (music and other) recordings as well as activities that link together various art forms (e.g. advertising). Also included are the production, distribution, and display of printing and broadcasting as well as museums, libraries, theatres, night clubs, and galleries. Evans (2009) uses the term ‘cultural industries’ (print and broadcast media, music, design, art markets, and digital media) to identify only a part of the ‘cultural sector’; the other two parts being cultural tourism (art venues, heritage sites, events and festivals) and arts amenities (subsidized and local arts, provided for the public good). Scott makes a further distinction using the term ‘cultural-products industries’ to refer to (1) services focusing on entertainment, edification, and information (e.g., motion pictures, recorded music, print media, architectural services or museums) and (2) manufactured products through which “consumers construct distinctive forms of individuality, self-affirmation, and social display (e.g., fashion clothing, furniture, musical instruments, toys and sporting goods, fragrances or jewelry)” (2004: 463).

⁵ The cultural economy, for Scott (2004), constitutes a rather incoherent collection of industries, which are bound together by three important common features. First of all, these sectors are all concerned with the creation of aesthetic and semiotic content (Lash and Urry, 1994). These are the sectors of economy with “substantial artistic and creative input, and whose primary purpose is to transmit meaning in commodity form (record, broadcasting, design, architecture, industrial design)” (Montgomery, 2007: 43). The cultural economy involves goods and services that “serve as instruments of entertainment, communication, self-cultivation, ornamentation, social positionality, and so on, and they exist in ‘pure’ distillations, as exemplified by film or music, or in combinations with more utilitarian functions, as exemplified by furniture and clothing” (Scott, 2001: 11). Second, they are generally subject to the effects of Engels’ Law, that is, as disposable income rises consumption of these products (and services) increase disproportionately when compared to ‘necessities’ such as food. As Lash and Urry (1994) remarks, over the last decades both use value and exchange value have always been sign-values in cultural industries, contrary to other manufactured goods exchange value is only in the last decades. Third, they are subject to both national and global competitive pressures that reinforce agglomeration tendencies among individual firms in specialized (cultural) clusters or industrial districts, while their products freely circulate in global markets, often taking advantage of this clustering.

production process, its organization with respect to space and the labor market, which are interwoven as a result of post-Fordist production principles that dominates the cultural economy. When compared to the other areas of (mostly material goods) production, the widespread use of Fordist production principles in cultural industries⁶ had to wait until 1920s in the United States and, 1940s in the United Kingdom (Lash and Urry, 1994). The spread of Fordist production⁷ in 1960s with driven by expanding base of mass consumption—as a result of the development of mass youth market for record industries and with the increasing mass ownership of TV sets for broadcasting (Ibid.). The shift to post-Fordism was an outcome of slow-down of growth and recurrent recessions starting from the mid-1970s, more specifically after the 1973 Oil Crisis which led to underconsumption and, hence, falling rate of profit for capitalist system (Harvey, 1989). The result was what Piore and Sabel (1984) calls as the ‘crisis of mass production’ which had to be resolved through introduction of flexible production techniques, to answer (or create) a demand for non-standardized short-shelf life products with higher quality, is matched by the emergence of non-specialized and highly flexible manufacturing technologies (both electronic and non-electronic) and flexible work practices, enabling smaller batch production without loss of economies of scale or efficiency favoring historically disadvantaged small firms. The outcome of this shift was the reversal of market and technological circumstances in the industrial paradigm, from Fordist mass production techniques to post-Fordist flexible production techniques favoring craft production (Amin, 1994).

Even as early as late 1980s, Scott (1986) observed a widespread tendency towards vertical disintegration in many sectors, including those within the broader framework of cultural economy, even in previously oligopolistic or mass markets, such as cinema. As part of what Scott (2004: 462) regards as the ‘new economy’, along with significant segments of high-technology manufacturing, business and financial services, , the

⁶ One exception for that was the cinema sector which was dominated by a small number of large companies (or studios), which hosted a large number of technical and artistic jobs on a full-time basis, producing a sufficient number of products (i.e. films) to be distributed through a vertically integrated process involving production and distribution—through a large number of studio-owned theaters, which exclusively showed films made by that studio (Storper and Christopherson, 1987; Aksoy and Robins, 1992).

⁷ The production processes were considered Fordist with respect to three different aspects: first, the *production process* (which involved short-cycle job tasks with dedicated labor and dedicated tools); second, the *products* (which were manufactured in large batches of a very few formulaic models), and *firm morphology* (typically vertically integrated firm structure to achieve economies of scale and scope by cutting overhead costs (Lash and Urry, 1994).

cultural economy constitutes “a collection of manufacturing and service sectors whose operating features involve a high level of organizational and technological flexibility, transactions-intensive interfirm relations, and the production of design-intensive outputs.” External economies of scope and decreasing transaction costs due to new information and communication technologies favored externalization, as a less risky way of dealing with shifting market trends due to new technologies and changes in consumer preferences, while at the same time offsetting the positive returns by internal economies of scale. Such vertical disintegration resulted in a ‘transaction rich network of firms’ and ‘transaction rich nexus of (self employed) individuals’ who also happened to be firms (Lash and Urry, 1994). The transition towards specialization and emergence of horizontal inter-firm networks had two important implications, one for the structure of the labor market (allowing firms and individuals to take part in flexible production⁸ networks on a sub-contractual basis), and the second relates to the spatial organization of production (encouraging agglomerative tendencies).

The organization of industrial districts was first conceptualized as “the concentration of specialized industries in particular localities”, by Alfred Marshall as early as 1890s . Yet, he failed to predict the importance of such clusters as he regarded them as a thing of the past, conceiving them as a product of a specific phase resulting from the effects of the division of labor upon technological innovation, processes, and organization. Witnessing the evolution of transport and the widening of the labor market at his time, he believed that industrial districts would become increasingly less significant and less competitive form of organization of production. Standard neo-classical economics envisioned the leveling of local peculiarities in the long run, as all industrial sectors will converge while seeking for cost efficiencies. In other words, the search for cost-

⁸ For Lash and Urry (1994) flexible production is also reflexive production for several reasons. First, shorter product runs require employees to make decisions regarding the most suitable processes to produce new products. Second, it is design intensive; much of the effort is focused on design of the new products and the optimal production processes. Third, it is also reflexive with regard to individualization (in the workplace) as employees—as agents—take on individual responsibility as a result of slimmed down organizational hierarchy. This sort of reflexive economic actor is freed from the constraints of structure (the rules and resources of the shopfloor), and distanced from them, searching for alternative rules and resources. While the post-Fordist production is reflexive production in the sense that the shopfloor is empowered with a larger role in innovation component, paradoxically shopfloor plays a less important role in innovation altogether as value-added labor is shifted towards professional-managerial workers (employed in R&D departments), especially in conceptualization sectors involving high-tech industries and advanced consumer and producer services). Particularly in cultural industries, while the R&D (i.e. the writing of the book, the composition of music and recording by the artist) is the main activity, production⁸ (the printing of the book, pressing of the CDs) has a second degree importance (Garnham, 1987).

minimizing techniques is expected to reveal universal solutions, thereby negating the idiosyncrasies of individual localities (Santagata, 2002).

Despite the improvements in communication, information and transportation technologies which were expected to diminish the importance of place in production, the ever changing circulation of information required to stay competitive in volatile markets (not only for cultural products, but also for other consumer and industrial goods) brought about by the very same factors that would render place unimportant. Storper and Venables (2004) identifies three main forces encouraging conglomeration of agents: (1) backward and forward linkages of firms (including access to markets) usually in the form of face-to-face contacts for the purposes of deal-making, evaluation and relationship adjustment; (2) clustering of the workforce, largely because of the increasing demand for a flexible pool of workers with specialized skills; and (3) localized interactions between agents promote technological innovation as their spatial proximity improve flows of information upon which agents depend for innovations, creating technological spillovers—often caused by frequent exchange of personnel.

As Storper and Venables (2004) remarks the tendency to co-locate is even stronger in the case of cultural production, as “outputs that are rich in information, sign value and social meanings are particularly sensitive to the influence of geographic context and creative milieu” (Power and Scott, 2004: 7). It is the production of idiosyncratic goods based on creativity that defines the cultural districts, as they are inspired by some cultural link to the local community (Santagata, 2002) where the presence of ‘tacit knowledge’ (Polanyi, 1958)—a form of knowledge that that can be found within a geographical or communitarian space, and can only be delivered effectively through regular and intensive contacts among actors who possess that knowledge. The desired result is achieved when an outcome (a cultural product category) emerges as the product of context-specific interactions among the actors involved in the production, becoming clearly distinguishable from the products of other districts, which provides an opportunity for of differentiation to gain a competitive advantage (Scott, 2000). This is often reinforced by what Amin and Thrift (1995) call ‘institutional thicknesses’—a ‘soft infrastructure’ consisting of a localized network of supporting organizations such as chambers of commerce, marketing and business support agencies, financial institutions, governmental agencies, cultural intermediaries, centralized distributors and educational institutions.

Another way to define the cultural economy is via the use of ‘creativity index’ approach as developed by Florida (2002), which basically argues for a situation in which creativity becomes central across all industries, even outside the cultural sector. In his popular work, Florida (2002) coins the term ‘creative class’ to point out to a new, distinctive group of workers including scientists and engineers, university professors, poets and architects, as well as “people in design, education, arts, music and entertainment, whose economic function is to create new ideas, new technology and/or creative content” (Ibid.: 8), as a product of “a *new new* economy, in which human creativity has become the defining feature of economic life (Ibid.: 21), which has become the ‘dominant class’ within the society⁹.

The most attractive dimension of Florida’s theory is that he identifies this creative class as a motor of growth for urban regions and suggests companies and cities to establish the right ‘people climate’ to attract the creative class, the members of which need the right kind of space to actualize their identities in accordance with their values. For Florida, the creative class needs tolerant, diverse and open communities, offering a diverse array of cultural and entertainment amenities for the workers to achieve a work-life balances. So far, what seems like David Brooks’ comic sociology in *Bobos in Paradise* takes a different character as Florida explains how the concept of creative class can be used to understand and achieve urban growth in particular localities. Roughly, what Florida proposes is that now that the era of people chasing jobs is over, cities must attract creative class of workers (by providing them the right kind of environment) who would attract companies which seek a specialized—and flexible—pool of workers; and eventually the coming of corporate capital would result in urban growth. What is particularly attractive about Florida’s framework (despite its methodological

⁹ As Pratt (2008) criticizes Florida’s framework as revival of high tech boosterism and place marketing efforts, the distinctive aspect of creative class theory is that it differs from the previous versions in terms of target audience: while the earlier ones targeted tourists and chief executives of corporations, Florida’s strategy tries to use creative class as a magnet to attract high-tech industries, thereby generating growth. A major drawback in Florida’s framework is also evident in its ranking of cities, as creative capitals like San Francisco or New York ranks below Las Vegas and Memphis on measures like employment and population growth, and the rate of formation of high-growth companies (Peck 2005). The problem of reverse causality is also a problem in Florida’s framework (Ibid.) as what Florida regards as causes of economic growth (for example, street-level cultural innovation and conspicuous consumption of creative workers) are likely to be the outcomes of it. As an approach to define cultural economy, it fails to cover the complexity of cultural production by reducing it to numerical indices (Gibson and Kong, 2005).

shortcomings) is that it helps city officials, local governments and urban ‘growth coalitions’ to see the rank of their cities, with respect to a tool based on 3Ts (technology, talent and tolerance indices).

Summing up these different approaches (which often overlap in terms of scope), the cultural economy consists of outcomes (products and services as final product) and activities (production and circulation) in the cultural industries, ‘core’ cultural industries being music, film, television, art, design, books, and magazines (Throsby, 2001), related activities with ‘semiotic’ or ‘symbolic’ element including fashion, advertising and architectural services (Scott, 1997). It also includes where intellectual property (copyrights) is a common feature of the outcomes and a commodity itself (Pratt, 1999, Howkins, 2001) such as music, software (video games as well as smartphone applications), and web design.

It is also evident that cultural economy is almost exclusively urban in character, as part of the symbolic economy (Zukin, 1995; Sassen and Roost, 1999), with a tight interweaving of place and production system as “one of the essential features of the new cultural economy of capitalism” (Scott, 2001). As never before, the wider urban and social environment and the apparatus of (cultural) production merge together in potent synergistic combinations (New York, Los Angeles, Paris, London, or Tokyo). Cultural districts within these cities are characterized by “a more or less organic continuity between their place-specific settings (as expressed in streetscapes, shopping and entertainment facilities, and architectural patrimony), their social and cultural infrastructures (museums, art galleries, theaters, and so on), and their industrial vocations (advertising, graphic design, audiovisual services, publishing, or fashion clothing, to mention only a few)” (Power and Scott, 2004: 166). Pratt (2008) finds the use of the term cultural industries as it has a firm basis in production, which is a socialized concept itself, involving webs of relationships between different social actors (Amin and Thrift, 1995) embedded in a production chain. For cultural industries, as it more than for other industries, the city is the social context for such production.

Cultural production activity takes place in urban settings either as clustered around major metropolitan centers often localized in cultural districts—specialized on a particular cultural production (e.g. fashion design, film or music production) or service (e.g. performance arts such as theater and music) activity—or turning the entire inner city of a major metropolitan city to a center of cultural production (Scott, 2000), or a

“city of culture¹⁰” (which resembles a ‘metropolitan cultural district’ in Santagata’s terms) as “a spatial agglomeration of buildings dedicated to performing arts, museums, and organizations which produce culture and related goods, services and facilities,” (2002: 11) which serves two distinct demands: the *external* demand (of tourists and foreign buyers) and the *internal* demand (of residents) for improving the quality of life within the district (or the larger area). Regarding the former, the district must become the locus of industrial activity in the audiovisual sector (in TV, music and film production), and in the creation and production of design-based goods. As for the latter, the district looks after the residents’ needs for cultural services of theater, museum, cafeterias, restaurants, and art galleries. It is important to note that what Santagata views as two distinct set of demand by two different groups are interrelated as the development of cultural industry repertoire within a district (or city) improves the quality of life of its residents by creating jobs and economic viability, while the amenities that are expected improve the quality of life of residents would prove to be useful in attracting tourists. The cultural economy¹¹ of a city includes jobs in **cultural industries** (e.g. print and broadcast media, music, design, art markets, and digital media), **cultural tourism** (e.g. art venues, heritage sites, events and festivals), and **arts amenities** (subsidized and local arts, and civic provision for the public good) (Evans, 2001). Note that, these jobs are not

¹⁰ Santagata differentiates between *City of Art* and *City of Culture*, as the former is a rich repository of historical monuments, architectural artefacts (palaces, churches and museums) and tradition and the like (e.g. Venice or Florence), inclined to show itself to both tourists and residents. A *City of Culture*, on the contrary, is rather poor in terms of historic and artistic artefacts, but is able to generate culture—which is produced “by artists, composers and creative people, who all need a place to work, a space in which to distribute their works of art and support for marketing and communication” (Santagata, 2002: 19). In this sense, the metropolitan cultural district could be the best and most efficient means of producing culture through a visible agglomeration of artistic capital and organizations.

¹¹ There are several sets of sectors that can be used to identify the sectors involved in the cultural economy. First one is creative sectors (*Creative Industries Mapping Document*, 2001), which are advertising, architecture, arts and antique markets, crafts, design, designer fashion, film, interactive leisure software, music, television and radio, performing arts, publishing and software. Scott (2004) uses the term ‘cultural products industries’ as an ensemble of sectors offering (1) services focusing on entertainment, edification, and information (e.g., motion pictures, recorded music, print media, architectural services or museums) and (2) manufactured products through which “consumers construct distinctive forms of individuality, self-affirmation, and social display (e.g., fashion clothing, furniture, musical instruments, toys and sporting goods, fragrances or jewelry)”(463). Scott (2000) also identifies three types of cultural products and services: (1) *Products* produced in traditional manufacturing sectors (e.g. clothing, furniture, jewelry); (2) *Services*: personalized transactions or production and transmission of information (e.g. tourist services, live theatre, advertising); and (3) *Hybrids* of services and manufacturing (e.g. music recording, book publishing, film production).

confined to creative jobs; it involves menial tasks, manufacturing, cleaning, clerical assistance as well as producer services such as human resources and accounting.

2.4. Cultural Policy, Planning and City Marketing

As early as 1990s, Bianchini observes that cultural policy has become an increasingly significant component of economic and physical regeneration strategies in many west European cities (1993: 1). This was a “cultural renaissance of European non-capital cities,” such as Glasgow, Bilbao, Hamburg, Liverpool and Bologna, brought by increasing decentralization of powers to regional or local governments as well as the demands from the public against the negative effects of economic restructuring policies of 1970s and 1980s. For decision makers, cultural policies was a tool to diversify economic base of the cities—against the backdrop of industrial job losses—by capitalizing on expanding sectors such as leisure , tourism, the media and other cultural industries (such as fashion and design) and increase social cohesion. Apart from a focus on production, there was a particular focus on consumption—“a lively, cosmopolitan cultural life [...] as a crucial ingredient of city marketing and internationalization strategies (Ibid.: 2).

Zukin also sees a heightened role of culture since 1980s, (1995: 269) “culture has become a fiercely explicit battleground in struggles that used to be considered political or economic... (which) signals a both an ideological and a behavioral revolution—but one without overarching goals, movement and shifts of power.” As much of the new service jobs created “involves the creation and management of visual and emotional images,” Zukin also observes a “change in the social context of culture in the late 20th century that account for its instrumental importance,” (Ibid.: p. 268) as it becomes “a euphemism for the city's new representation as a creative force in the emerging service economy” (Ibid.: 263).

Papadopoulos (2004: 36) defines place marketing as “the broad set of efforts by country, regional and city governments and by industry groups, aimed at marketing the places and sectors they represent.” It may involve cities, whole nations, regions within nations, or supra-national territories. A foremost aim is to enhance the image of the region’s exports, as entangled with the image of the region itself in relation to the feature (build-quality, reliability, design, technology etc.) of the product, in the eyes of the consumers. As consumers make use of symbolic cues, such as ‘product-country image’ (or country-of-origin), as a shortcut in consumer decision making (in selecting products among

different alternatives), promoting the place of production becomes a powerful tool in marketing to claim superiority over products from other regions (Peterson and Jolibert, 1995). This way, the exports of the region can be protected by the similar products from other regions (both national and international), creating a competitive advantage, and even charging premium prices for the exports of the region.

A second aim is to promote the region to retain or attract important inputs, such as financial investment and qualified workforce, in the related area of economic activity by creating a hospitable climate for both. It includes attempts of local interest groups as ‘growth coalitions’ to acquire financial gains from the intensified use of land as well as the efforts to attract talent (i.e. qualified workers), members of so-called ‘creative class’ in Florida’s (2002, 2005) terms to attract corporate capital. A related concept, is ‘place branding’ (or city branding) which involves the use of branding techniques borrowed from marketing practice in order to create a distinctive place image to attract visitors (as a tourist destination), at the same time creating a shared identity—hence developing a loyalty—among residents. ‘Place (city) branding’ is also more appropriate term than ‘place marketing’ for Karavatzis (2004), when it comes to promoting places to attract visitors or capital investment, since what is marketed is the city’s image, which is not the product but the brand, as the representation of the city itself. It includes tangible and intangible attributes of the place that are used to represent the way in which the place (the city) is to be perceived (Kavaratzis and Ashworth, 2005). Pasquinelli (2010) also emphasizes that it should be understood as ‘re-branding,’ as places (cities) already have an often vivid image in the eyes of its audience.

The first generation place marketing efforts emerged in 1980s, in attempt to achieve local economic growth by manipulating symbolic assets available locally (Scott, 2004). With the loss of jobs and businesses as a result of the decline in manufacturing, local administrators initially concerned with upgrading and redeveloping cultural resources at hand, with a specific focus on emphasizing local cultural heritage including historic and cultural attractions—such as festivals, carnivals, and celebrations (Kearns and Philo, 1993). While the basic aim was to attract visitors by creating tourist attractions, and generating revenues for local businesses, a more important goal was to enhance the image of particular places to attract real estate investors and businesses and skilled high-wage workers.

The most successful, and hence the most famous, case is the marketing of NYC starting in 1977, with the collaboration of investment bankers and corporations, who had stakes in city's real estate market, forming an entity named Downtown Business Partnership. The campaign, with the wider goal of reviving the city's economy, particularly aimed at establishing NYC as a destination for anyone interested in culture, by endorsing cultural institutions such as Museum of Modern Art, Broadway, and other institutions that would help establish the city as a tourist destination. The cultural economy of the city was seen as a way out of the continuing decline of the city's economy, with the losing of jobs and companies to suburbs as well as to the American South, which eventually led to bankruptcy in 1975. With the property market crashed in 1973, after the real estate boom created by what Harvey calls 'surplus capital,' resulting in a large number of idle or underused buildings in the city including the World Trade Center. The underutilization of WTC buildings created public dissent as funds needed to support growing underclass population due to loss of manufacturing jobs, were directed at supporting the building which cannot cover its monthly maintenance costs, let alone its construction cost. Starting in the late 1970s, the 'growth coalition' of real estate investors, financiers and city officials decided to go for a mass marketing campaign, in order to "package and sell the image of New York as a global brand" (Greenberg, 2003: 393). Originally intended to be used for a period of several months, "I Love New York" logo was introduced to symbolize the advertising campaign involving the use of TV and print media. It was printed on plain white T-shirts and mugs as a souvenir for visitors. The campaign has become increasingly popular throughout the 1980s, becoming a global phenomenon thanks to the widespread use of logo in visual cultural products such as movies, music clips and photographs. According to the content analysis by Greenberg (2003) the most common visual elements in the advertising campaign were the Fifth Avenue shopping, Broadway Theater and the new downtown nightlife emerging around WTC. The images of life and urban culture above 96th Street and across the East River were largely omitted. The campaign brought a huge success, number of visitors in tourist attractions increasing by 56% from 1976 to 1977. The success of the campaign encouraged city officials to spend more on marketing, the budget of the campaign increasing to \$15 million in early 1980s. Despite the growing popularity of the campaign, and its evident success, not everyone embraced the idea of promoting a city image in the presence of a large number of vivid problems. Opposition groups introduced alternative campaigns, and alternative brands names for the city, in order to draw attention to the problems in infrastructure, security, and education, and force the

authorities to take action to correct the problems. Among those ‘Default City’, ‘Fear City’ (by the laid off police and fire department personnel), ‘Stink City’ (by the sanitation unions) and ‘Stupid City’ (by teachers’ unions) were the most popular ones. The ‘Fear City’ movement has become increasingly influential as it prepared a pamphlet named *Welcome to Fear City: A Survival Guide for Visitors to the City of New York* (1975) to be distributed to visitors in airports. Furthermore, being the media capital of the country helped the overexposure of viewers to crime stories in evening news. To cope with the negative imagery, the ‘growth coalition’ decided to increase spending on marketing rather than trying to solve the problems indicated by the unions and other NGOs.

With stock market crash and the recession between 1989 and 1992, the city’s tourist revenues faced a dramatic decline, which brought a new wave of marketing campaign, this time led by corporations (Greenberg, 2003). This new, corporate-led phase received the support of the media, which was the largest private sector producer of new jobs as a multi-million dollar industry. With the support of Republican mayor Rudolph Guiliani and the governor (George Pataki), the campaign stressed the ‘quality of life’ approach, focusing intensively on cleaning and policing public spaces to prevent the appearance of disorder, even at the cost of police brutality on numerous occasions. During this period, WTC came to the fore as one of the most vivid symbols of the city, especially for the visitors and tourists. After the 9/11 WTC attacks, beyond the loss of WTC as a physical structure and a symbol of American power, the city has lost more than 150,000 jobs and \$83-100 billion, requiring a new phase of branding necessary. The city officials embraced the same strategy as they did some 25 years ago, again using public funds for the marketing and re-branding of the city. The original “I Love NY” campaign was also revived after 9/11 WTC attacks, the original designer Milton Glaser revised the original design with the slogan “I Love New York More Than Ever” with a little black spot on the heart to symbolize the attacks (Harvey, 2007). The city officials asked Glaser to pull back his revised design, and used instead the original design in order to suppress the negative image associated with the attacks, yet introduced a multi-million dollar “ground zero” observation deck, which attracted twice the number of visitors, when compared to the observation deck of WTC towers.

Second generation strategies, however, focused more on supporting local cultural production complexes (i.e. cultural clusters) —similar to Marshallian districts, specialized in manufacturing and providing particular symbolic forms (cultural products

and services), with a competitive advantage resulting from physical agglomeration of a large number of small firms (access to shared resources such as technology, know-how, a local pool of skilled workforce) and authenticity (Molotch, 2003). Initially, cultural quarters were defined as the areas in a city or town which hosts the “highest concentration of culture and entertainment” (Wynne, 1992: 19) to locations such as London’ SoHo, New York’s Lower East Side, or the Left Bank and Montmartre in Paris which attracted artists and cultural entrepreneurs (Montgomery, 1998). During the Post-Fordist era, cultural quarters emerged as a natural by-product of “the cultural economy of capitalism now appears to be entering a new phase marked by increasingly high levels of product differentiation and polycentric production sites” (Scott, 2001: 11), and as a major tool for urban regeneration by public administrators, by not only sites of cultural production and consumption to attract visitors, also as a major source of revenue.

This second stage strategies are also underlined in Zukin’s extensive framework of ‘artistic mode of production,’ which has become more relevant within the current language of neoliberal urbanism. This framework will be described in detail in the following chapter, after laying down the basics of neoliberalism and its reflection in the urban sphere, neoliberal urbanism.

CHAPTER 3

Neoliberal Urbanism

This chapter starts with a brief history of neoliberalism, its historical trajectory as a term, from its implementations in the urban scene as a ‘new urbanism’ identified by Smith (2002). The term neoliberalism was coined as early as 1938 by the German scholar Alexander Rüstow¹² at the *Colloque Walter Lippmann*¹³, although with a slight difference from the contemporary use of the term. The defining features of this earlier version of neoliberalism were “the priority of the price mechanism, the free enterprise, the system of competition, and a strong and impartial state” (Mirowski and Plehwe, 2009: 13-14). The term promoted a new liberalism, rejecting classical liberalism’s *laissez-faire* policies, as well as putting an emphasis on humanistic values (Boans and Gans-Morse, 2009). Broadly, the disengagement from the classical liberalism came with the requirement for state intervention, a demand for a strong state in order for the free market to realize its theoretical potential to the full extent.

The term was fairly neglected until 1960s, when it was migrated to South American context as Chilean intellectuals from Chicago School (known as Chicago Boys) offered it as an economic reform program in post-coup Chile, under Pinochet’s rule, particularly in the second half of 1970s. The program was characterized by rapid and extensive privatization, deregulation and reduction of trade barriers, reducing the role of state while infusing competition and individualism into areas such as labor relations, pensions, health, and education were introduced. While Chile served as the first case of neoliberal ‘shock treatment,’ neoliberalism was heralded by Thatcherism and

¹² As a member of Freiburg School, Rüstow used the term neoliberalism to mark a distinction from classical liberalism. He also laid the foundations of ordoliberalism, sometimes used in synonymously with neoliberalism. Rüstow occupied an academic position at the Istanbul University between 1935 and 1950, upon fleeing from Nazi Germany.

¹³ *Colloque Walter Lippmann* (the Walter Lippman Colloquium) was a scholarly conference in Paris, in August 1938. With the declining interest in classical liberalism in the 1920s and 1930s, Colloque Walter Lippmann aimed to construct a new form of liberalism by rejecting classical (*laissez-faire*) liberalism as well as collectivism and socialism.

Reaganism as a political project, then spreading to other contexts such as Canada, New Zealand, Germany, the Netherlands, France, and Italy.

In the late 1970s, neoliberalism first gained prominence “as a strategic political response to the declining profitability of mass production industries and the crises of Keynesian-welfarism [...] [i]n response to the breakdown of accumulation regimes and established systems of governance” (Peck et al. 2009: 50). With a belief in an open, competitive and unregulated market’s ability to present the optimal background for socio-economic development (Harvey, 2005), national (and local) governments in the industrialized world began ‘roll-back’ the “basic institutional components of the postwar settlement and to mobilize a range of policies intended to extend market discipline, competition and commodification throughout society” (Brenner and Theodore, 2005: 351). Neoliberal doctrines were deployed to justify, *inter alia*, the deregulation of state control over industry, assaults on organized labor, the reduction of corporate taxes, the downsizing and/or privatization of public services and assets, the dismantling of welfare programs, the enhancement of international capital mobility, and the intensification of interlocality competition. It was then the term gained its negative connotations, observing the side effects of such policies with its attack on trade unions and welfare services, then spread throughout the world as the dominant political and ideological form of capitalist globalization (Peck et al., 2009). These side effects have been evident at different of spatial scales, including the city in the form of uneven development and resulting social and spatial polarization, as well as at a national and even at a global scale producing ‘persistent’ “economic stagnation, intensifying inequality, destructive interlocality competition, wide-ranging problems of regulatory coordination and generalized social insecurity” (Ibid. p.50).

Neoliberal policies were first deployed to counter the crisis of Fordist-Keynesian capitalism, yet they were alter modified to “confront a growing number of governance failures, crisis tendencies and contradictions, some of which were endogenous to neoliberalism as a politico-regularity project itself” (Brenner and Theodore, 2002: 362). For Brenner and Theodore (2005, 2007), rather than being a fixed end state and condition, neoliberalism is a process of market driven social and spatial transformation (thus called neoliberalization). Moreover, neoliberalism does not produce identical economic, political and spatial outcomes in every context, rather its results are path-dependent in the sense that “place-, territory-, and scale-specific neoliberal projects collide with inherited regulatory landscapes, contextually specific pathways of institutional

reorganization crystallize that reflect the legacies of earlier modes of regulation and forms of contestation” (Brenner and Theodore; 2005: 102).

While the defining features of contemporary neoliberal policies were clear for many—including “an orientation to export-oriented, financialized capital; a preference for non-bureaucratic modes of regulation; an antipathy towards sociospatial redistribution; and a structural inclination toward market-like governance systems or private monopolies” (Peck et al., 2009: 55)—for Harvey, (2005: 19) neoliberalism is more than these individual features, rather it is “a political project” a process “to reestablish the conditions for capital accumulation and to restore the power of economic elites,” yet, “it also inevitably creates more fissures in which urban resistance and social change can take root” (Keil, 2002: 579).

For Brenner and Theodore (2002) there is no such thing as a pure form of neoliberalism, as it comes in many guises, articulated on multiple spatial scales, and moves through divergent historical trajectories. Rather, there is “a contextual *embeddedness* [...] defined by the legacies of inherited institutional frameworks, policy regimes, regulatory practices, and political struggles” (Brenner and Theodore, 2002: 349); “it is always articulated through historically and geographically specific strategies of institutional transformation and ideological rearticulation” (Brenner and Theodore, 2005: 102). In other words, neoliberalism—like globalization—is not a “monolithic affair” that imposes itself onto states of different scales (local, regional and national), civil societies, and economies. Instead, it exists through the practices and ideologies of variously scaled fragments of ruling classes, who impose their specific projects onto respective territories and spheres of influence” (Keil, 2002: 582). For Keil (Ibid.: 580), neoliberal project “refers to a more or less coherently defined *era* of recent developments in world capitalism; and in debates among critical social theorists and activists, it is a *keyword* with a history of its own.” In this sense, neoliberalism denotes a period within the history, started with the Reagan and Thatcher governments in 1980s, in which it ‘swept aside’ the objections to free market utopianism “... with its mantras of private and personal responsibility and initiative, deregulation, privatization, liberalization of markets, free trade, downsizing of government, draconian cutbacks in the welfare state and its protections” (Harvey 2000:176). During this period, to which Peck et al. (2009) refers as the ‘roll-back moment’ of neoliberalism, characterized by the dismantling of postwar Fordist-Keynesian-welfarist mode of regulation with an all-out assault against the major institutions, particularly trade unions and the government, that stop in its way

(Harvey, 2000). The “roll-out period,” on the other hand, marked the active creation of new institutions and regulations of the state and society (Peck and Tickell, 2002; Peck et al. 2009). For Brenner and Theodore (2005: 102) neoliberalism does not simply involve the ‘rolling-back’ of state regulation and the ‘rolling-forward’ of free market mechanisms, instead “it generates a complex reconstitution of state-economy relations in which state institutions are actively mobilized to promote market-based regulatory arrangements.” For Smith (2002:429), compared to the twentieth century American liberalism—as championed by Woodrow Wilson, Franklin Roosevelt and John F Kennedy—“emphasizing social compensation for the excesses of market and private property,” the twenty-first century neoliberalism is closer to the original assumptions of liberalism of the eighteenth-century, “that the free and democratic exercise of individual self-interest led to the optimal collective social good; and that the market knows best: that is, private property is the foundation of this self-interest, and free market exchange is its ideal vehicle.” A new neoliberalism, “galvanized by an unprecedented mobilization not just of national state power but of state power organized and exercised at different geographical scales” (Ibid.: 429).

Some scholars proposed the term ‘actually existing neoliberalism’ to counter the view of orthodox neoliberal ideology that “market forces are assumed to operate according to immutable laws no matter where they are “unleashed”” (Brenner and Theodore, 2002: 349), a ‘one-size-fits-all’ model of neoliberalism. Peck et al. (2009: 50), for instance, uses the concept to draw attention to the “contextual embeddedness and path-dependency of neoliberal structuring projects,” in order to offer an analytical basis to the analysis of the production of these projects “within distinctive national, regional, and local contexts defined by the legacies of inherited institutional frameworks, policy regimes, regulatory practices and political struggles” (Brenner and Theodore, 2002: 349).

As an analytical tool to uncover the path-dependent interaction between existing institutional forms and emergent neoliberal projects, Peck et al. (2009: 55) propose to analyze actually existing neoliberalisms with reference to “two dialectically intertwined but analytically distinct moments—first, the (partial) *destruction* of extant institutional arrangements and political compromises through market oriented reform initiatives; and second, the (tendential) *creation* of a new infrastructure for market-oriented economic growth, commodification and capital centric rule.” In this sense, neoliberalism should not be regarded as a coherent successor of Keynesian-welfarism in Atlantic Fordist

countries, or the developmentalist states in the global South or elsewhere. Rather, concrete programs of neoliberalism are absorbed with “the long-run and always-incomplete task of dismantling inherited institutional forms” and “the challenge of managing the attendant economic consequences and social fallout from previous programs of neoliberalizations (Ibid.: 55-56).

Scholars attributed a key role for the city as they have begun to interpret contemporary urban transformations as expressions and outcomes of broader neoliberalization process (Brenner and Theodore, 2005: 103). In this sense, they observed a process of “urbanization of neoliberalism,” as “cities have become strategic targets and proving grounds for an increasingly broad range of neoliberal policy experiments, institutional innovations and political projects. Under these conditions, cities have become the incubators for, and generative nodes within, the reproduction of neoliberalism as a ‘living’ institutional regime (Peck et al, 2009). Similarly, Keil (2002: 578) sees “the urban everyday” as “the site and product of the neoliberal transformation.

During the Keynesian-Fordist period, the *national* scale was the preeminent geographical basis for accumulation as well as for the regulation of political-economic life during (Swyngedouw, 1997). During the early 1970s, however with the shattering of the link between national *mass* production and national *mass* consumption—due to a number of factors “including the declining profitability of Fordist sectors; the intensification of international competition; the spread of deindustrialization and mass unemployment; and the abandonment of Bretton Woods system of national currencies” (Brenner and Theodore, 2002: 359)—gave way to pressures and crisis tendencies, responded by a radical transformation of the forms of territorial organization of the Keynesian-Fordist era. This radical destabilization of the Fordist accumulation regime resulted in a “reshuffling of the hierarchy of spaces” (Lipietz, 1994: 36), which pushed forward the urban scale at the expense of the national one.

During 1970s, in the initial phase of ‘proto-neoliberalism’ cities have become the center for major economic dislocations as well as various forms of socio-political struggle, especially in the sphere of social reproduction. In this context, according to Brenner and Theodore (2002) cities became the battlegrounds in the conflict between preservationists and modernist alliances in giving direction to the economic restructuring process. While “the postwar growth regime was systematically undermined throughout the older industrialized world [...] local economic initiatives were adopted in many older

industrial cities in order to promote renewed growth from below while maintaining established sociopolitical settlements and redistributive arrangements” (Brenner and Theodore, 2002: 373). Liberal urban policy—which have been influential since the end of 19th century in parts of Europe, and since Roosevelt’s New Deal in United States—was systematically eliminated beginning with the economic crises of the 1970s and 1980s conservative national administrations (Smith, 2002). In the ‘roll-back’ period of 1980s, municipalities quickly assumed new principles of neoliberalism to cut back their costs of administration, capitalist production and social reproduction within their jurisdictions, and thereby to accelerate investment. While the support for traditional Fordist-Keynesian forms of localized collective consumption were minimized by national governments, indirect subsidies to large corporations and privatization of social reproduction functions have become “best practices” for promoting a good business climate within major cities. The results of this cost-cutting version of urban entrepreneurialism had highly polarizing consequences for significant portions within local, regional and national populations (Keil, 2002). The ‘roll-out’ neoliberalism of early 1990s, for Brenner and Theodore (2002: 374) may be regarded as “an evolutionary reconstitution of the neoliberal project in response to its own immanent contradictions and crisis tendencies.” While the city space, along with other scales, was mobilized as a ‘purified’ “arena for capitalist growth, commodification, and market discipline remained the dominant political project for municipal governments” (Peck et al., 2009: 63)[...] as the state institutions became more involved in the creative destruction of the urban built environments, 1990s introduced a new neoliberal localization that actively addressed the problem of nonmarket forms of coordination and cooperation thorough which to sustain the accumulation process” (Brenner and Theodore, 374).

Sassen (1991, 1996, 1998, 2000) repeatedly emphasizes the significance of local place in the new globalism as cities are the sites for concrete operations of the economy—they are the ‘command and control centers’ of the global economy, as well as major production sites for the new information industries—the “central places where the work of globalization gets done” (Sassen, 2002: 8). With the economic shift from production to finance in the 1960s, “the weight of economic activity over the last fifteen years has shifted from production places, such as Detroit and Manchester, to centers of finance and highly specialized services” (Sassen, 1991: 325) Global cities began to emerge—as “a new type of city (Sassen, 1991: 4)—in 1970s, as global financial system began to expand internationally, following the industrialization of the Third World countries at the expense of in dismantling of industrial centers in USA, UK, and then Japan. As

foreign direct investment was no longer dominated by the capital invested in productive functions (moving to developing countries), rather by capital moving in and out of capital markets across advanced capitalist countries. This led to an expansion of ancillary producer services (financial, legal and management services, as well as design, innovation, development, and advertising) in ‘command and control’ centers, resulting in new urban forms characterized by polarization of wealth and poverty. For Smith (2002), Sassen’s explanation is vague about how the places are constructed, and as containers within containers (nations), “the urban” is also being redefined like the global: “the old conceptual containers—our 1970s assumptions about what “the urban” is or was—no longer hold water. The new concatenation of urban functions and activities vis-à-vis the national and the global changes not only the make-up of the city but the very definition of what constitutes—literally—the urban scale” (Ibid.: 431).

At the turn of the twenty-first century, what remains ‘new’ about the globalization is the production capital—not commodity capital, not financial capital, and definitely not the circulation of cultural images—as “the new globalism can be traced back to the increasingly global—or at least international scale—of economic production” (Ibid.: 432). Up until 1970s, most consumer commodities were manufactured within the boundaries of one national economy—for either domestic consumption or export—but by 1990s this model has become obsolete. In a number of different industries including autos, electronics, garments, computers, and biomedical; production has become organized across national boundaries. In other words, global trade has become intrafirm—that is, it takes place within the production networks of single corporations—“the idea of ‘national capital’ makes little sense today” (Smith, 2002: 433).

For Brenner and Theodore (2002), the process of institutional ‘creative destruction’¹⁴, (Harvey, 2008), is evident at all spatial scales, yet they are occurring more intensely at the urban scale, as “cities have become strategically important arenas in which neoliberalizing forms of creative destruction have been unfolding” (Peck et al., 2009:50). While the interlocality competition is intensified in the face of high levels uncertainty surrounding the cities, due to speculative movements of financial capital and

¹⁴ Peck et al. (2009: 64) also talk of neoliberalism’s “*contradictory creativity*—“its capacity to repeatedly respond to endemic failures of policy design and implementation through a range of crisis-displacing strategies, fast-policy adjustments, and experimental reforms”

global location preferences of transnational capital, local governments respond to this “global-local disorder” (Peck and Tickell, 1994) by engaging in short term strategies for interspatial competition, place marketing and regulatory measures hoping to attract investment and jobs (Leitner and Sheppard, 1998) in the face of new fiscal constraints in the form of major budgetary cuts from the central governments. In this sense, cities and their suburban regions have become “important geographical targets and institutional laboratories for a variety of neoliberal policy experiments, from place marketing, enterprise and empowerment zones, local tax abatements, urban development corporations, public private partnerships, and new forms of local boosterism to workfare policies, property redevelopment schemes, business incubator projects, new strategies of social control, policing and surveillance, and a host of other institutional modifications within the local and regional state apparatus” (Brenner and Theodore, 2002: 368).

Neil Smith observed a changing relationship between neoliberal urbanism and globalization in 1990s, as the “neoliberal state becomes a consummate agent of—rather than a regulator of—the market, the new revanchist urbanism that replaces urban policy in cities of the advanced capitalist world increasingly expresses the impulses of capitalist production rather than social reproduction” (2002: 427).

As Swyngedouw et al. (2002:548) observe, since the late 1980s local authorities, often in collaboration with the have strongly relied on the planning and implementation of large-scale urban development projects (UDPs) as “emblematic examples of neoliberal forms of urban governance,” “as part of an effort to re-enforce the competitive position of their metropolitan economies” in “a context of rapidly changing local, national, and global competitive conditions.” These UDPs include museums, waterfronts, exhibition halls and parks, business centers, and international landmark events, which are often supported by a majority of the local constituency, and in some cases central governments became the leading developers, “setting aside both local authorities and constituencies.” Moreover, authors also observe “a shift from a social to spatial definition of development, as with the shift from universalist to spatially targeted and place-focused approaches in the 1990s” (Ibid. 569). Rather than focusing on social development projects, targeting usually the improvement of social reproduction functions such as public transportation, housing and education; public funds are increasingly spent on projects developing specific places such as waterfronts, dilapidated neighborhoods and old industrial buildings and zones in order to extract rent from the underused urban space, through revalorization. In this new period, the logic of

development also changes as “it is places that need to be integrated, not citizens; it is places that need redevelopment, not people that require jobs and income” (Ibid.: 569).

In their study of thirteen large scale urban development projects (UDPs) in twelve European countries, Swyngedouw et al. (2002) arrive at several important conclusions: First, these large scale UDPs generally depend on ‘exceptionality’ measures in planning and policy-formation stages. These ‘exceptionality’ measures include “freezing of conventional planning tools, bypassing statutory regulations and institutional bodies, the creation of project agencies with special or exceptional powers of intervention and decision-making, and/or a change in national or regional regulations” (p.548). There emerges an erosion of “traditional relays of local democratic accountability” (Brenner and Theodore, 2002: 369) as decision making is ‘elitized’, making it easier for business elites to influence development decisions. With a “new choreography of elite power,” the local democratic participation is undermined , with “the imagin(eer)ing of the city’s future” (Ibid. 548) reflects local elite’s “power of vision,” its ability to frame a work of art, a street, a building or an image of the city in an aesthetically coherent way (Zukin, 1995). Consequently, these projects have been and often still are arenas that reflect profound power struggles and position-taking of key economic, political, social, or cultural elites.” Moreover, these projects are poorly integrated into the wider urban process and planning with the replacement of comprehensive *plan* with the *project*. The former being the classic policy instrument of the Fordist age, the latter:

the large, emblematic Project—has “emerged as a viable alternative, allegedly combining the advantages of flexibility and targeted actions with a tremendous symbolic capacity.... Essentially fragmented, this form of intervention goes hand in hand with an eclectic planning style where attention to design, detail, morphology, and aesthetics is paramount. The emblematic Project captures a segment of the city and turns it into the symbol of the new restructured/revitalized metropolis cast with a powerful image of innovation, creativity, and success. (Swyngedouw et al., 2002: 567)

State is one of the major actors in these projects as these UDPs are usually state-led, or often-state financed, contrary to the neoliberalist discourse’s superficial dependency of market mechanisms and entrepreneurial activity. Often state assumes all the risks given the “speculative nature of real estate-based projects, the private capital needs reassurance as projects may go bankrupt. Even if they prove to be successful, such projects create social polarization through the mechanisms of local real estate markets, as islands of extremely valorized urban land neighboring dilapidated, depressed areas occupied by lower classes.

3.1. Gentrification as a neoliberal tool

Contrary to its emergence as sporadic, demand led process in the 1960s as identified by Ruth Glass; starting from 1990s, gentrification has also “evolved ... into a crucial urban strategy for city governments in consort with private capital in cities around the world” (Smith, 2002: 440).

The term ‘gentrification’ was first introduced by Ruth Glass in 1964 to refer to the process whereby a new urban ‘gentry’ transformed working-class quarters in London. The process of gentrification is defined as a process “by which poor and working-class neighborhoods in the inner city are refurbished by an influx of private capital and middle-class homebuyers and renters” (Smith, 1996: 7). Historically, “gentrification emerged on the heels of the urban renewal, slum clearance, and post-war reconstruction programs implemented during the 1950s and 1960s in most advanced capitalist nations” (Schaffer and Smith, 1986: 347). Since then the process became a global phenomenon, larger in scale, more systematic and widespread, being synchronized with larger economic, political, and social changes (Zukin, 1987).

Hackworth (quoted in Smith, 2002) identifies three waves of gentrification through its existence. The *first wave* was what Ruth Glass observes as a sporadic and quaint process of urban renewal in the 1950s, and the *second wave* of 1970s and 1980s – *the anchoring phase* as Hackworth labels it – became entangled with wider processes of urban and economic restructuring. At the same time, gentrification became a global phenomenon which is evident in many cities around the world, as well as smaller cities in the advanced capitalist world. Hackworth identifies the final wave of gentrification, which has been occurring since the 1990s, as ‘*generalized gentrification*’ since it became a generalized process as part of a neoliberal urban strategy, as “liberal urban policy were systematically disempowered or dismantled at the national scale, and public policy constraints on gentrification were replaced by subsidized private-market transformation of the urban built environment” (Smith, 2002: 440). The last wave of gentrification is generalized, “its incidence is global, and it is densely connected into the circuits of global capital and cultural circulation” (Ibid.: 427).

For Smith and Defilippis (1999:446) this last wave of plays a pivotal role in neoliberal urbanism in two ways:

First, it fills the vacuum left by the abandonment of twentieth-century liberal urban policy.
Second, it serves up the central- and inner-city real estate markets as burgeoning sectors

of *productive* capital investment: the globalization of productive capital embraces gentrification. This was neither inevitable nor accidental. Rather, as cities became global, so did some of their defining features. The emerging globalization of gentrification, like that of cities themselves, represents the victory of certain economic and social interests over others, a reassertion of (neoliberal) economic assumptions over the trajectory of gentrification.

Smith (2002) identifies five interrelated characteristics of the generalization of gentrification: First, pertains to the role of state, as “between the second and third waves of gentrification, the role of the state has changed dramatically (Hackworth and Smith 2001). The relative withdrawal of the national state subsidies for gentrification in 1980s was compensated by the intensified partnership between private capital and local state. The outcome was large-scale, more symbolic, and more expensive projects (large scale UDPs as Swyngedouw would call it). This also shows an urban policy which “no longer aspires to guide or regulate the direction of economic growth so much as to fit itself to the grooves already established by the market in search of the highest returns, either directly or in terms of tax receipts” (Smith, 2002: 441). Equally important was the increasing penetration of global finance, embodied in both large megadevelopments as well as small, neighborhood scale projects (Smith and DiFilippis, 1999). A third dimension was the changing levels of opposition from loosely linked antigentrification movements and organization to a heightened level of repression of such movements, as real estate investment becomes more central to urban economies, the measures of the ‘revanchist city’ (Smith, 1996) become more aggressive, protests and demonstrations are oppressed with heavy use of police power. Moreover, as Slater (2006) observes, there is a withdrawal of scholars from the critical perspectives of gentrification, such as focusing on gentrification as ‘displacement’ as more and more universities become dependent on private and public funding. Fourth, this new wave of gentrification is geographically more dispersed, not limited to the urban centers but also prevalent in the metropolitan areas including suburbs and former industrial sites. Final characteristic of this latest wave of gentrification is its ‘sectoral generalization’ from the public sector led first wave to the third wave, which involves public and private sector partnerships, consolidated and warranted by state-power.

CHAPTER 4

Artistic Mode of Production and the *Field* of Cultural Production

In this final chapter on theoretical framework, I focus on Zukin's framework of "artistic mode of production" as an urban development strategy. In the Second section, I briefly introduce Bourdieu's "field of cultural production" with key concepts and principles. The last section explains how these two frameworks were incorporated to lay down the basic theoretical framework of this study.

4.1. Artistic Mode of Production

For the purposes of this research, I find Sharon Zukin's concept of 'Artistic Mode of Production' (AMP) as a fruitful starting point. It is a comprehensive framework that captures the essence of the process of transformation of urban space from manufacturing to service-sector use, in the face of deindustrialization and shift to service economy, "by establishing a built-environment for the performance, display, sale, and production of cultural symbols" (Ley, 2003).

Zukin first coined the term 'Artistic Mode of Production' in her book *Loft-living: Culture and Capital in Urban Change*¹⁵, in which she traced the material conditions of the concrete events that took place in the SoHo district of NYC during 1960s and 1970s, and resulted in the gentrification of the area. She observed how the American upper class (or patricians as Zukin prefers to refer to them) switched to a new mode of accumulation by investing on the arts infrastructure of New York, which resulted in substantial capital gains from the valorization of urban districts due to artists' presence in a number of spaces, including art galleries, museum, as well as 'alternative spaces,' artists' lofts, theaters, and public places which host large-scale 'public art' installations. "[U]sing artists' studios or lofts to housing markets and raise property values, was an unanticipated effect of encouraging artistic careers" (Zukin, 1995: viii), which later turned to a deliberate effort by local governments and upper class to drive urban

¹⁵ *Loft* refers to the relatively large, generally open space on each floor in multi-story industrial buildings and warehouses in the United States (Zukin, 1982).

valorization, particularly gentrification, when accompanied with an ever-expanding tide of cultural consumption by the middle class¹⁶.

Recognizing the presence of structures that surround cultural production (state aegis, corporate capital's and its holders interest in artworks as well as the implications of developing an arts infrastructure in terms of land valorization, and the role of cultural institutions, such as museums and galleries), Zukin regards arts infrastructure as something that can be 'implanted' in or near devalorized districts, a strategy that has been emulated to spur urban regeneration in numerous cases in the United States—including cities such as Los Angeles, Phoenix, San Francisco and Seattle to cope with urban decline due to deindustrialization.

As she continued to elaborate on her examination of culture and capital in the city of New York, in *Cultures of Cities*, she dropped the use of the AMP concept—uttered only twice in the entire book—despite frequent remarks to the same phenomena pointed out by the concept. The concept remains practically useful when considered against a backdrop of shifting economic base of cities, from an industrial to a post-industrial one—but the attention shifts from the material production of culture to more on the consumption side (Zukin, 1995; Ley, 1996; Brooks, 2001) and public policy issues on how urban decline can be reversed or cities can be promoted using culture (Florida 2002, 2004; Mommaas, 2004), also from a wider geographical perspective from valorizing neighborhoods or districts to wholesale valorization of cities through place marketing and branding (Harvey, 2007).

As late as 1970s, lofts were occupied by small manufacturing firms (specialized in mostly in garments since the beginning of the 20th century. However, with the shift of production to modern plants a large number of such businesses had to close down leaving a significant vacant space that constitutes the supply side¹⁷ of the loft market.

¹⁶ The valorization of urban space through investment in art infrastructure, however, needs a constituency of middle class consumers who would create economic value through cultural consumption. In other words, AMP transforms an urban setting only when there is a sufficiently strong demand from middle class, to what is supplied by the patricians. In this sense, there are two key social groups who are involved in the process of urban transformation: patricians and the middle class.

¹⁷ Also important in contributing to the unprivileged position of small businesses were the “increasing dispersal of manufacturing activity from established urban centers, the flight of investment capital from the northeastern United States” (accelerated after 1965) and the decline of the national economy as a result of the recession in 1973-74 (Zukin, 1982: 13).

With their high ceilings, unrestrained interiors due to lack of internal walls, and large windows that allow natural light in, lofts presented a suitable place for the production and display of visual arts. Besides their low rents as a plus side, these buildings were situated in less attractive parts of the city away from basic amenities such as grocery stores, and more importantly, still neighbored by small businesses creating noise and dirt. First generation of artists moved to the lofts as early as the beginning of 1960s, and by 1970s “the economic and aesthetic vestures of ‘loft-living’ were transformed into bourgeois chic” (Zukin, 1982: 2) as city governments and press praised loft living as part of the urban resurgence, the conversion of lofts for residential use began to attract real estate developers and builders, instead of owner occupiers and tenants.

For Zukin (1982), three conditions were required for the formation of the market, like any other commodity market: *availability* of the product, *acceptability* of the product and *acceptability* of a model that promotes the product’s use. While the declining profitability of small scale manufacturing, with the continuing deindustrialization of New York, made the lofts as a commodity, *available*; the *acceptability* of lofts (as an alternative to other products in the housing market) by the intended consumers (i.e. middle class urban residents) was determined by a set of changes in cultural and social values such as elevated status of the artisan the art in 1960s, rising ecological awareness, and growing interest in historic preservation. Finally, the New York’s growing hegemony in artistic production guaranteed the visibility of the model of loft living due to positive publicity surrounding the artists’ loft-based lifestyles.

As the first stage of the formation of the loft market—albeit a minor one—completed, as the decline of small businesses created a *supply* of lofts, which in turn created the demand by artists. As artists moved to the lofts for higher rents compared to previous use, more and more lofts were made available to artists’ use. The formation of a larger market, as a second stage, involved middle-class people who had no connection with the production of arts. Moreover, landlords began to increase the supply of lofts, yet the demand was still very high causing a significant increase in rent values. Compared to first generation loft-dwellers, artists, the second generation began to pay higher rents, the ‘market rent.’

The demand side of the loft market also requires a closer attention. In New York, artists inhabited lofts since 1930s, yet the lofts had become a popular housing option only in the 1970s. Zukin (1982: 173) attributes the growing demand in the new loft market to a

“change in dominant aesthetic mode,” characterized by “appreciation of industrial design, domestic appropriation of industrial products; the social and existential appeal of loft-studios” for middle- and upper-middle class people, as a result of the elevated “social position of the arts and the financial viability of the art work,” and “ increase in the availability of middle-class investment capital” for both housing and artworks. She identifies an “aesthetic conjuncture,” while artists lifestyles had become a cultural model for middle class (Ley, 1996) as more and more people adopted the artistic (and bohemian) lifestyle (Grana, 1964; Brooks; 2001; Florida, 2002) with the elevated status¹⁸ of artist in the society especially in 1960s (Zukin, 1982; Lloyd, 2002; Eikhof and Haunschild, 2006), its incorporation into middle-class patterns of consumption (Zukin, 1982; Featherstone, 1991) and its embodied form in the loft housing; “old factories became a means of expression for a “post-industrial” civilization” with a heightened sensitivity to art and history cultivated by the mass media (Zukin, 1982: 15). Through the mid-1970s revitalization of the SoHo continued, with widespread media coverage, and loft buildings adapted for residential conversion one by one. What “started as a trend, turned into a “movement,” and finally transformed the market” (Ibid.: 12).

The market for lofts is also formed by individual and institutional actors that are not directly involved in market competition like landlords, tenants, small developers¹⁹ and local businesses. These are the state, banks, and upper class patricians; all of which are interlinked in the sense that there is no clear-cut definition among the ruling elite in belonging to either one of them. For example, the owners or shareholders of banks may be coming from the wealthy families who constitute the patricians. Similarly, especially in the case of New York, the local politicians often belonged to such families (e.g. Rockefellers), or they had close relationships with them (e.g. Robert Moses and Rockefellers).

¹⁸ In 1960s, works of art and artist were incorporated to the mainstream culture as high prices of artworks increased the artists’ standard of living. State also played an important role by increasing the number of art jobs in state-sponsored educational and cultural institutions, as well as by offering grants for arts activities. In this sense, 1960s artists stood in contrast to its counterparts on nineteenth century Paris, bohemianism has become a “transitional stage, mostly youthful and accepted socially” (Zukin, 1982: 97)

¹⁹ Despite the growth in the market for rents, many large scale constructors were hesitant to enter the market due to legal status of loft buildings and adjacent areas. Finally, in 1975, the Real Estate Board of New York pointed to the hazards of keeping manufacturing facilities in the loft buildings realizing that the area’s industrial bases had been eroding and there were no signs of recovery to allow industrial activity in the area (Zukin, 1982).

City officials were particularly content with this type of development which did not require public subsidy as the lost tax base of the city due to the absence of manufacturing businesses, was recovered by the increasing number of artists. Moreover, as loft living also attracted many middle class households to return to the city center, it had to be the reversal of fortune for the inner city, countering the negative effects of suburbanization. The residential conversion of formerly industrial urban space was benignly accepted by the city officials as irreversibly marking the end of such industrial activity in the inner city, a final stage in the deindustrialization of the city. The formation of a loft market changed the loft space itself “from sites where production took place to items of cultural production” as “the residential conversion of manufacturing lofts confirms and symbolizes the death of an urban manufacturing center (Zukin, 1982:3).

Zukin identifies three clear-cut benefits that business and political elite in exchange for their support for arts activities. First one is the creation of service-sector jobs in the arts, where jobs may be lower in terms of salary but higher in terms of prestige, which is desirable for many graduates of arts related institutions. Yet, despite their professionalization the jobs in arts still suffer from the lack of well defined career trajectories and hierarchies (Ekynsmith, 1999). Second, depending on the type of support, and the target cultural form of this support, political and business leaders are credited by the artists and their audience. For example, NYC Mayor Wagner discovered the artists’ not as a large group of constituents but as a means of reaching and pacifying politically significant patricians as well as middle class citizens. On the other hand, they expect to receive, in return, support from the recipients in particular political issues. For business elite or corporations, this support can also be considered as part of the social responsibility concept as corporations support environmental, cultural and social events, or issues, in order to create or maintain a positive image in the eyes of their stakeholders. And thirdly, tax deductions is also an encouraging factor both corporations and the owning elite, as supporting cultural activities with donations and sponsorship result in significant tax deductions.

The needs of the *investment capital*²⁰ was equally important in shaping the built environment, hence the loft market. Such needs influence the “trends of capital flight or

²⁰ By investment capital, Zukin refers to real estate investment capital workings of which effect the real estate market in the following way: As profits decline from investment in one region, the

capital disinvestment” as capital moves from one region or sector to another. Short term economic cycles are also influential as investment capital moves from sector to sector—from office space to housing construction— yet the more important factor in determining the fate of SoHo was the ambiguous investment climate²¹. State intervention is also a key determinant of the process, no matter how the creation of the loft market—often referred to as *loftsteading*²²—is regarded and presented to lack such intervention. The changes in the federal tax structure, local tax incentives for urban redevelopment plans, the growth of state employment for artists as well as increased state support for arts, local laws regarding zoning and building codes contributed to the formation of real estate market formation, as “no real estate market develops without state intervention²³” (Zukin, 1982: 17). As real estate activity in such financial centers becomes lucrative, international capital also seeks opportunities in local real estate markets as a new means of capital accumulation (Harvey, 2007; Zukin, 1982).

Zukin (1982: 37) also accords an important role to what she calls the ‘local patrician elite’,²⁴ “whose old wealth was based on urban real estate, whose new wealth came from

investment moves elsewhere by liquidating their assets here (i.e. by selling property) and the value of real estate property declines in this area. This *devalorization* deepens with the retreat of investment, yet the decline in real estate value puts the area into the radar of investment capital as further capital gains can be made in the future, due to the low prices. Equally important was the disinvestment by banks and the local government. Banks’ disinvestment took place as banks withdraw their loans from lofts (mortgages and construction loans) and direct them to the construction of suburbs between the late 40s and late 50s. Local government disinvestment in the transportation networks on which small business in SoHo depend also had a negative effect.

²¹ Between 1956 and 1972, New York’s financial community and patrician elite planned the redevelopment of Lower Manhattan, based on ‘slash-and-burn’ tactics which faced major opposition from several fronts, including middle class homeowners defending neighborhood preservation and central government opposing virtually unlimited authority of the Urban development Corporation (UDC) especially in terms of public financing of the projects.

²² A word derived from the associating the pioneering loft residents with homesteaders.

²³ State intervention “involves making proper use of space” (Zukin, 1982: 51). Most common tools are zoning, designation of building codes and rent controls. “the rationale of zoning practices conforms to the logic of capital accumulation. The advantage of zoning over unregulated land use is that in minimizes the risk that real estate investment will be threatened by the proximity of value-decreasing use”

²⁴ In Istanbul, identifying a local patrician elite is also possible. Istanbul’s local patrician elite mostly emerged in the Republican era, and unlike their counterparts in New York their fortune depends mostly on industrial activity during the first half of the 20th century, as a national bourgeois class was born due to expanding industrial base in the economy. American upper class were those who developed the first urban plan of America, as early as 1929, for an upgrading of Manhattan by pushing industrial activity and working class housing to Outer Boroughs (Brooklyn, the Bronx, and Queens), to make profits from land development by upgrading Manhattan. As they would be able to buy out small business and tenement owners, they replaced

industry and railroads, and whose members predominated at the apex of banking and legal communities.” They not only wanted to make profits from the land development they also “saw the arts as a way of re-establishing cultural and political hegemony, and a means of absorbing unemployment,” as “arts offered a replacement for the unproductive and aimless activities that new leisure time and new affluence had spawned” (Zukin, 1982, 106). The alliance of urban patricians (like Rockefellers) and their politicians (Robert Moses) supported alternative uses for urban space, displacing small manufacturing and opening the way for loft living, “hoping for a spill-over of demand from highly competitive middle class housing markets elsewhere in the center city to exert pressure on the loft market... this expectation encouraged small scale middle class investors to enter the loft area and conversion to residential use... in turn enhancing the value of patricians; large development projects and the properties that they owned nearby” (Ibid.: 174)

For Zukin (1982), AMP has five groups of visible effects: First, “by an adroit manipulation of urban forms, the AMP transfers urban space from the ‘old’ world of industry to the ‘new’ world of finance, or from the realm of productive economic activity to that of nonproductive economic activity” and artists serve by “activating a mechanism of revalorization that destabilizes existing uses and their markets” (p. 178). Second, as “it provides a material base in the built environment, the AMP restructures local labor markets around low-wage, service sector activity, part-time work and working at home” (Ibid.: 178). Third, as it helps to lower expectations of the people in work force, by holding more prestigious but lower paid jobs. The individualized consumption patterns with which loft living has become identified—in a passage from ascetism to the new cult of domesticity—are costly to maintain. Also, the residential conversion of manufacturing lofts implies getting used to a more intensive use of urban

these buildings with more profitable and ‘better’ uses, such as office buildings, upscale stores and housing for upper- and upper-middle class residents. Even during the depression—with the help of state funds, and the investment by national corporations, large commercial banks and real estate developers—the local elite prepared for a new post-industrial infrastructure, which came to life in the following decades. One such family was Rockefellers who made their fortune in late 19th and early 20th century in oil industry and ornamented New York numerous monumental buildings including Rockefeller Center, One Chase Manhattan Plaza, World Trade Center (WTC), Museum of Modern Art (MoMA), The Cloisters, and Lincoln Center for the Performing Arts; as well as religious and educational buildings, and housing developments. Such families also had stakes at politics, as many members of the family took active positions in the governing institutions. Most importantly, Nelson Rockefeller held the mayoralty position in New York between 1969 and 1973. New York’s current mayor, Michael Bloomberg is also another member of the local patrician elite—he is serving his third terms since 2001, while being ranked as the 7th richest person in United States.

space. Fourth, “through the expansion of an ethos of historic preservation, it extricates the built legacy of the industrial city from the social matrix of industrial production.” When the lofts as sites of industrial production becomes into a cultural artifact, the image that their economic function is dead is reinforced. And finally, and related to the fourth one, AMP renders it impossible to “return to any version of the old urban-industrial infrastructure” as it “destroys the ideological basis of the old built environment, it also implies that the accumulation strategy that was vested there has been thoroughly exhausted... with a complete conversion of the infrastructure and the economy, to non-productive activity” (p.180). The fourth and fifth points especially make sense in the loft market, compared to purely residential gentrification, as the remnants of the industrial past are irreversibly transformed for non-productive use, not as artists’ live-and work places—which obviously hosts a productive activity with an economic value—but as middle and upper class housing.

State and corporate support in arts production may be direct or indirect. Corporations or (local patricians) may transfer funds directly in the form of purchases of artworks—often by preordering them—or direct sponsorship to cultural events, venues or performances. At other times, corporations may invest in cultural production through an intermediary government body (such as National Endowment for the Arts) or through an NGO (such as IKSIV), or an agency to oversee the management of a particular activity (such as ECoC agency). Such aid can also be an indirect subsidy for housing or a direct subsidy for arts production. Zukin (1982) observes a shift from the former to latter, as indirect housing subsidies helped cultural producers to claim a particular place in the city, and when the time comes for real estate investors to start their projects towards the valorization of the area, artists may resist or contest their plans.

For Zukin (1982: 174), “the real significance of loft living lies on a deeper level than that of the market,” rather “on the level of an underlying terrain that represents a space, a symbol and a site under contention by major social forces.” In this sense, “the market in living in lofts appears as the newest battlefield in the struggle over control over the city” in contrast to usual account of the rise of loft living, which is regarded as the spontaneous result of market forces, the presence of supply of vacant or underused loft units adapted by artists, and the middle- and upper-middle class who are inspired by them. There are two contradictions in this usual account, which can be resolved only by considering what the loft market means in the larger contest over urban terrain. First, loft living began as a marginal phenomenon but in time it became ‘chic’ among urban

middle- and upper-middle classes. Second, artists who moved in the lofts lacked the economic capital to protect the spaces they acquired, yet they managed to win access to such desirable urban space.

What is really at stake on this terrain is the heart of the city: the reconquest of the downtown for high-class users and high-rent uses. While corporations—mostly expanding service sector—want to increase their office size, and enhance the surrounding amenities for employees, investors and clients; their demand for space conflicts with those of other urban groups—especially the small businesses, environmentalists, historic preservationists, and other groups among urban residents. Corporations and the wealthy elite also to make financial gains from the properties they own in the city as revalorization of land and other property can be possible by transforming the city as a whole for a ‘higher’ use, a “streamlined city,” by converting it into a financial capital.

Particularly the expanding base in banking and financial services generates both a demand for spatial expansion and the capital to carry it through the creation of new urban forms. Different from 1970s, from the ban point of view, reinvestment and displacement clears the terrain for a new use. The outcome result is “a nonproductive, profitable white-collar world” and “it is the terrain not the space or the form of lofts, that invests the loft market with significance” (Zukin, 1982: 3). The loss of industrial jobs due to deindustrialization, had to be compensated with the creation of new jobs. The residential conversion of formerly industrial production space sets the end of such activity in the lofts, as the most fundamental part of a mode of production—the space where actual production takes place—to a whole different use. Yet this new use neither related to the reproduction of labor for industrial activity, as the housing for proletariat served in an industrial city.

The “new means of production”—in modern offices—are now surrounded by their own ‘working class districts; of high-rise apartment houses, brownstones and converted loft buildings. Insofar as the converted loft space remains in mixed productive and residential use, it provides facilities for an “artistic mode of production,” that is, for a crafts industry that follows rather precedes industrial production (Zukin, 1982: 19).

Often found as a provocative concept, the ‘artistic mode of production’ argument understood broadly “as a mechanism for understanding how ‘capital’ incorporates ‘culture’ to ‘open up’ devalorized industrial land markets to ‘more market forces’, culture being understood as ‘arts-related investment’ and ‘heritage preservation’ (Podmore, 1998: 283),. In Zukin’s definition, in a narrow sense of the term, AMP

simply refers to the crafts production involved in the arts production, which replaces the industrial mode of production that replaced all forms of crafts production. Similarly, this ambiguity continues in others scholars' works. For example, Ley (2003), perhaps misled by his loyalty to the Marxist use of the term "mode of production" oversimplifies the concept of 'artistic mode of production,' reducing it to the relationships between different producers and employs Bourdieu's conceptualization of the "field of cultural production" to systematically uncover these relationships. Both Zukin's, later usage of the term (1987, 1996) points a broader meaning in which the development of cultural infrastructure is used—by (mostly) local governments and surrounding 'growth coalitions'—to trigger gentrification, or urban growth through cultural policy—which is a very common theme in urban planning. In my reading, I arrived at a much broader understanding of 'artistic mode of production' as it relates to a larger phenomenon of a relationship between culture and urban growth, influenced by a shift in the dominant class's accumulation strategy due to deindustrialization of urban centers in the advanced capitalist countries replaced by a post-industrial urban economic base. In this sense, artistic mode of production is another capitalist 'mode of production' that is intended for extraction of surplus, this time from the urban built environment of the urban; and the final product is not the output of artistic activity, but the space itself.

4.2. The *Field* of Cultural Production

Bourdieu turned his attention to the field of cultural production in the 1960s, starting with a series of seminars held, first, at the *Ecole Normale Supérieure* and, later, at the *Ecole des Hautes Etudes* (Johnson, 1993). Recognizing the failure of both subjectivism (as evident in phenomenology, rational action theory, and certain forms of interpretive sociology, anthropology and linguistic analysis) and objectivism (as found in Saussurean semiology, structural anthropology and Althusserian interpretation of Marxism) to account for what he calls the 'objectivity of the subjective' (as while subjectivism fails to recognize the social ground that shapes consciousness, objectivism fails to recognize the importance of conceptions and representation of individual actors that shape social reality) Bourdieu develops a framework featuring *habitus* and *field* as fundamental concepts.

In his theory of the field of cultural production, Bourdieu opposes the 'hagiographic' account of the cultural producer's biography (Fowler, 1997) or the 'charismatic ideology of "creation,"' which "directs the gaze towards the apparent producer – painter,

composer, writer – and prevents us from asking who has created this “creator” and the magic power of transubstantiation with which the “creator” is endowed” (Bourdieu, 1996/1992: 167). Instead he introduces his own theory of the *field* and *habitus* in order to situate the artist and the work of art in social space.

Bourdieu defines the *habitus* as:

the system of durable, transposable dispositions, structured structures predisposed to function as structuring structures, that is, as principles which generate and organize practices and representations that can be objectively adapted to their outcomes without presupposing a conscious aiming at ends or an express mastery of the operations necessary in order to attain them. Objectively 'regulated' and 'regular' without being in any way the product of obedience to rules, they can be collectively orchestrated without being the product of the organizing action of a conductor (1990: 53).

“As society written to the body,” (Lau, 2004: 374) *habitus* serves as a ‘feel for the game,’ or a ‘practical sense’ (*sens pratique*) “that inclines agents to act and react in specific situations that is not always calculated and that is not simply a question of conscious obedience to rules,” (Johnson, 1993: 5) rather it is “the way society becomes deposited in persons in the form of lasting dispositions, or trained capacities and structured propensities to think, feel, and act in determinate ways which then guide them in their creative responses to the constraints and solicitations of their extant milieu” (Wacquant, 2005: 316). These dispositions are ‘durable’—that is, they last for the lifetime of the agent,—they are ‘transposable’—that is, they are reflected in practices in different fields,—and they are ‘structuring structures’—“in that they inevitably incorporate the objective social conditions of their inculcation” (Johnson, 1993: 5). This explains the similarity between the *habitus*es from similar class backgrounds. And finally, these dispositions are ‘structuring structures’ in their capacity to “generate practices adjusted to specific situations.

For Wacquant (2007: 261) “habitus is also a principle of both social continuity and discontinuity.” It is continuity in the sense that it engrains “social forces into the individual organism and transports them across time and space,” and discontinuity as it can be modified when new dispositions are acquired, and “because it can trigger innovation whenever it encounters a social setting discrepant with the setting from which it issues.” The concept of *habitus* does not leave out the possibility of strategic action by the agent, rather, “as a present past that tends to perpetuate itself into the future,” it ensures “the principle of the continuity and regularity which objectivism sees in social practices without being able to account for it” (Bourdieu, 1990; 54).

The concept of *field*, on the other hand, is “a structured space of positions that imposes its specific determinations upon all those who enter it” (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 2003: 85), and “its own relations of force independent of those of politics and the economy, except, obviously, in the cases of the economic and the political field” (Johnson, 1993:6). Bourdieu (1993b: 72) argues:

fields as different as the field of politics, the field of philosophy or the field of religion have invariant laws of functioning. (That is why the project of a general theory is not unreasonable and why, even now, we can use what we learn about the functioning of each particular field to question and interpret other fields, so moving beyond the deadly antinomy of monographic idiography and formal, empty theory) .

Any social formation is structured by way of a hierarchically organized series of fields (the economic field, the educational field, the political field, the cultural field etc.) ... as each field is relatively autonomous but structurally homologous with the others. Its structure , at any given moment, is determined by the relations between the positions that agents occupy in the field. A field is a dynamic concept in that a change in the agent’s positions necessarily entails a change in the fields’ structure” (Johnson, 1993: 6).

For Johnson (1993), what Bourdieu calls a *relational* mode of thought to cultural production, his formulation of the field of cultural production in 1990s is a break from his substantialist perception of intellectual field back in 1966, where each element in the social world was perceived “in terms of its relationship with all other elements in a system from which it derives its meaning and function” (p. 6). “[A]gainst both Kantian notions of the universality of the aesthetic and ideologies of artistic and cultural autonomy from external determinants,” his analytical model reintroduces the concept of agent, through the concept of *habitus*, yet he still avoids the “conception of the artist as creator (or *subject*)” against the idealism of contemporary literary and art criticism (Ibid.: 2). The concept of the *field*, at the same time, helps him posit the actions of the agent within objective social relations, without falling victim to the “mechanistic determinism of many forms of sociological and Marxian analysis” (Ibid. p.2). In his attempt, he tries to restore the objective positions of art and other cultural activity in the field of social relations.

Bourdieu’s understanding of ‘cultural production’ involves a very broad understanding of culture, including science, law and religion, as well as expressive-aesthetic activities such as art, literature and music. However, his work on cultural production focuses particularly on two sub-fields of cultural production that are primarily expressive-aesthetic: literature and art (Hesmondhalgh, 2006).

4.2.1. Relationships with the *Field of Power*: Autonomy of the *Field*

External (i.e. social and economic) determinants can only have an effect on the field only through the transformation of the structure of the field, rather than a 'short circuit' effect that "posit a direct connection between the art and social structure," as the *field* "refracts, much like a prism, the external determinants in terms of its own logic, and it is only through such refraction that external factors can have an effect on the field. The degree of autonomy of a particular field is measured precisely but its ability to refract external demands into its own logic," and this ability is governed by the specific forms of symbolic capital (Johnson, 1993:14).

Bourdieu (1993a) formulates a *field of cultural production*²⁵ mapping the dominated fraction of the dominant class, thereby closely associated with the *field of power*. Separating the field of cultural production from the rest of the *field of power* are the differential levels of two types of capital: *economic* and *cultural capitals*. It is positioned within the *field of power* because of its possession of high levels of symbolic forms of capital (e.g. academic and cultural capital), but it is dominated because of its lack of economic capital when compared to dominant fractions of dominant classes. The field of cultural production is structured by an opposition between two sub-*fields*: the sub-field of small-scale production (or 'restricted production' which basically involves canonical arts) and the sub-field of large-scale production (*grande*/or mass production, which equals to the cultural industries). While the sub-field of small scale-production is autonomous from the field of power, although not to the fullest extent, the sub-field of large scale production is heteronomous—again, not to the fullest extent. The sub-field of small scale production consists of cultural producers who are involved with the 'pure' artistic products—such as high arts—catered to the tastes of those with high cultural capital, which become a 'production for producers.' The sub-field of large-scale (mass) production, on the other hand, involves the production of cultural products that constitute the object of popular culture. With larger sales revenue from its products, this sub-field is closer to the field of power, when compared to the sub-field of small-scale production, in terms of its possession of economic capital. The downside of this

²⁵ In his two related studies, *The Field of Cultural Production* (1993)—which is a collection of essay on the subject, published between 1968 and 1983—and *The Rules of Art* (1996). While there is a significant overlap between two works, Hesmondalgh (2006) sees the latter as Bourdieu's consolidation of his earlier work.

possession is the resulting autonomy from the field of power, hence a lower ‘symbolic profit’ (e.g. a profit of disinterestedness, or the profit one gathers from not being seen as seeking or making profit as a result of cultural production) which is equal to accumulated prestige from the cultural production activity. The sub-field of small scale production is further diversified into two poles, identifying a consecrated avant-garde with even higher symbolic capital than the rest of the field, as defined by the presence of awards, honors and academic titles. A bohemian avant-garde, on the other hand, even defies such symbolic capital, as the rest of the sub-field of small production rejects economic capital (Johnson, 2003).

Hesmondhalgh (2006: 222) criticizes Bourdieu’s work on several grounds. First of all, Bourdieu’s lack of interest in cultural industries, his sole focus on literature and art, and later journalism. Second, he criticizes Bourdieu’s differentiation between restricted and mass production, as there is a “a huge amount of cultural production taking place on the boundaries between sub-fields of mass and restricted production; or, perhaps better still, that restricted production has become introduced *into* the field of mass production.” Moreover, Hesmondhalgh also criticizes Bourdieu’s referring to the sub-field of restricted production as ‘production for producers’—meaning that cultural producers within this sub-*field* basically offer products for each other as they reject the market—on the grounds that much of the ‘production for producers’ is in fact by others who are not producers at all.

4.2.2. Positions, position-takings, and strategies

The cultural *field* is also structured with respect to “the distribution of available positions (e.g. consecrated artist vs. striving artist, novel vs. poetry, art for art’s sake vs. social art) and by the objective characteristics of the agents occupying them” (Johnson, 1993: 16). The position can be a genre (e.g. the novel), a subcategory (e.g. science fiction), “a review, a salon, or a circle;” and “each position is objectively defined by its objective relationship with other positions, or in other terms, by the system of relevant (meaning efficient) properties which allow it to be situated in relation to all others in the structure of the global distribution of properties” (Bourdieu, 1993a: 231). As “the dynamic of the field is based on the struggles between these positions” (Johnson, 1993: 16), this struggle most usually takes the form of “the conflict between established, and dominant, traditions within the field and the challenging of new modes of cultural practice—explained by the term ‘position-takings’ (*prises de position*)—“the structured

set of the manifestations of the social agents involved in the field” (Bourdieu, 1993a: 30). These include artistic works as well as political acts, manifestos, or polemics. “Every position-taking is defined in relation to the space of possibles which is objectively realized as a problematic in the form of the actual or potential position-takings corresponding to the different positions’ (Bourdieu, 1993a: 30). Space of possibles (or ‘space of creative works’) is not a space of endless possibilities, rather only positions defined within “a system of differential stances in relation to other possible position takings, past and present” (Johnson, 1993: 17) are possible. They show what is do-able or possible, as well as the impossible and unthinkable, to individual agent. They can be internal or external to the field. The relationship between space of position-takings and the space of positions in the field, is that “conflicts between different position takings in fact constitute particular manifestations of the structure of the latter” (Ibid.: p. 17). This relationship is mediated by the dispositions of individual agents, or their habitus.

In his study of American modern jazz of the 1950s, Lopes (2000) posits these positions and position-takings on a dimension of race; that is the difference between the ‘artistic strategies of black jazz musicians to from those of white jazz musicians. Historically being a ‘black’ genre, the immersion of the white musicians led black musicians to assert that there remained a distinct ‘black’ jazz. This assertion produced debates in the jazz press regarding the differences between ‘black’ and ‘white’ jazz, and the presence of such a distinction was championed mostly by black musicians and record companies. Eventually, this led to the acceptance of “black jazz musician as the dominant artists in the jazz art world” (Ibid.: p.179); not only securing the position of black artist within the jazz, but also a tool to legitimize black culture within the American society in the 1950s.

Two interrelated key concepts in the theory of cultural field are *strategy* and *trajectory*. *Strategy* refers to “a specific orientation of practice” (Johnson, 1993: 17); it is a product of habitus, not conscious calculations. It emerges from the unconscious dispositions of the agent toward practice, and depends on the objective position of the agent within the field. It is also determined by the stakes of struggle within the field—‘legitimate problematic,’ the issues around which the struggle takes place—and orients the agent for a possible action. Bourdieu introduces a notion of the agent (e.g. cultural producers: fashion designers, jazz musicians etc.), "who have entirely real interests in the different possibilities available to them as stakes and who deploy every sort of strategy to make one set or the other prevail" (Bourdieu, 1993a: 34). *Trajectory*, on the other hand, refers

to the series of successive positions within the field, occupied by the same agent/producer “in the successive states of the literary field, being understood that it is only in the structure of a field that the meaning of these successive positions can be defined. Trajectory also is one of the ways with which the relationship between the agent and the field is objectified” (Johnson, 1993: 18)

As an “arena of struggle through which agents and institutions seek to preserve or overturn the existing distribution of capital” (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 2003: 85), a field hosts agents who occupy the diverse available positions (often creating new ones) compete “for control of the interest or resources which are specific to the field in question” (Johnson, 1993: 6). For example, in an economic field, the agents compete for economic capital by using different strategies, i.e. investment by using already accumulated economic capital. In the field of cultural production, the competition is not for economic capital, rather for symbolic capital related to reputation, recognition and prestige. Especially in the field of restricted cultural production, *symbolic power*—forms of capital which are not transformable to economic capital such as academic capital and linguistic capital. Particularly important in the field of cultural production are the symbolic—“the degree of accumulated prestige, celebrity, consecration or honor and is founded on a dialectic of knowledge (*connasissance*) and recognition (*reconnaissance*)” (Johnson, 1993: 7) —and cultural capital—“forms of cultural knowledge, competence and dispositions” (Ibid.: 7). For Bourdieu (1993a: 39), within the field of cultural production (mostly in the sub-field of restricted cultural production), there is a “systematic inversion of the fundamental principles of all ordinary economies”—such as profit is not the ultimate goal—renders the field as “an economic world reversed.” Worldly success and fortune in the world of art does not necessarily bring consecration and success, rather there is a “‘winner loses’ logic” (Johnson, 1993: 8), especially in the field of restricted production. That is, winner in economic terms, loses in terms of symbolic power. This characteristic of the field of cultural production “explains the failure of all economisms, which seek to grasp this anti-economy in economic terms, to understand this upside-down economic world²⁶” (Bourdieu, 1993a: 40). The subfield of large scale production covers mass or popular culture—privately owned television, popular cinema, radio, music industry, mass produced literature--or 'cultural industries'

²⁶ Here, warns Johnson (1993), Bourdieu’s extensive use of economic terminology does not mean that this account is one of economic reductionism, in fact, Bourdieu “sees the economic field per se as simply one field among others, without granting it primacy in the general theory of the fields (p.8).

in Adorno and Horkheimer's sense of the term. Its success depends on maximizing its audience—to profit from direct sales of books, magazines, records, as well as concert and theater tickets, or from advertising revenue in the case of radio and television.

Bourdieu introduces two principles of hierarchization to address the stakes of the struggle within the field. The autonomous principle—based on specific interests of the producers—and the heteronomous principle—based on external factors. In addition to this fundamental opposition, there are also other oppositions within the field. These include oppositions between different genres or differences in approach to same genre²⁷, For example, in the field of jazz, such an opposition exists between classical (or mainstream) jazz and ‘free jazz’. In fashion, the example would be the opposition between haute couture (high fashion of custom fitted clothing) and prêt-à-porter (ready to wear) clothing. Both haute couture and free jazz, as subfields, operate under the autonomous principle, while prêt-à-porter and mainstream jazz subsumes to external demands, that of economic profit, at variable degrees.

As ‘an economic world reversed’, the subordination to the demands of economic capital, as the field of large-scale production does is evaluated negatively; whereas the domination of the demands of symbolic capital is evaluated positively. Not all the field of cultural production is divided into two, between the field of restricted production and the field of large scale production (Johnson, 1993). According to their submission to the demands of different degrees of symbolic and economic capital, different fields lay in a different point within the broader field of cultural production, hence the field of power. For example, while popular music, prime time TV and Hollywood movies lie within the field of large-scale cultural production; opera, classical music, most ethnic music, and jazz (all in a commercial form) lies closer to the field of restricted cultural production.

Bourdieu’s model does not reduce cultural production into a purely internal analysis of cultural texts or, similarly a purely external reading. Johnson (1993:9) calls Bourdieu’s theory of the field of cultural production as a “radical contextualization” in the sense that this theory does not only take into account “the works themselves, seen relationally within the space of available possibilities, but also the producers of works in terms of their strategies and trajectories, based on their individual and class habitus, as well as

²⁷ Bourdieu gives the example of the opposition between bourgeois art (theatre), Social art and art for art’s sake. Social art “appeals to external functions (like bourgeois art) while at the same time rejecting (like art for art’s sake) the dominant principle of hierarchy in the field of power” (Johnson, 1993: 16).

their objective positions within the field” (p. 9). The theory of the cultural field also involves an “analysis of the structure of the field itself,” including the positions occupied by producers themselves; as well as the positions “occupied by all the instances of consecration and legitimation which make cultural products for what they are” (Ibid.: p.9). Moreover, it also entails an analysis of the field with respect to broader field of power.

As an extremely demanding analytical method covering the whole set of social conditions of the production, circulation and consumption of symbolic goods, the cultural field theory holds “the full explanation of artistic works is to be found neither in the text itself, nor in some sort of determinant social structure; [r]ather it is found in the history and structure of the field itself, with its multiple components and the relationship between that field and the field of power” (Johnson, 1993:9). Bourdieu's methodology attempts to incorporate three levels of social reality: (1) position of the artistic field in question within the *field of power* (i.e. the ruling classes in the society), (2) the structure of the field itself (this includes not only the "structure of the objective positions occupied by the agents competing for legitimacy in the field," but also the objective characteristics of the agents themselves" (Johnson, 1993: 14)), and (3) "the genesis of the producers' habitus" (Ibid.: 14).

Equally important is the *cultural intermediaries*, as Bourdieu refers to them as the core of the ‘new petite bourgeoisie’, a new social class with distinctive tastes and cultural practices. Cultural intermediaries are the occupations which involve “presentation and representation (sales, marketing, advertising, public relations, fashion, decoration and so forth) and in all the institutions providing symbolic goods and services” (Bourdieu, 1984/1979: 359). For Hesmondhalgh (2006), Bourdieu intended to refer to a particular type of new petite bourgeois profession, identifying ‘new cultural intermediaries’ involved in cultural commentary in the mass media; ‘the producers of cultural programs on television or radio or the critics of “quality” newspapers and magazines and all the writer-journalists and journalist-writers’ as ‘the most typical’ of this group (Ibid.:p.315). Zukin and Costa (2004) also offer a similar definition to Bourdieu, as they regard cultural intermediaries are “relatively well-educated, art-seeking, but not wealthy, middle-classes who are often either self employed or employed in the city’s educational and cultural institutions and in business services that work with the arts, such as advertising and publishing” (p.102). For Nixon and Du Gay (2002) such occupation based definitions emphasize the occupational shift—not only in France but in other

Western societies—since 1960s and the rise of educated and salaried employment in both private and public sector. Especially with the “bourgeoning of the consumer sectors of the economy and the associated consolidation of large broadcasting and media organizations” (ibid, 497), he accords a role to the new cultural intermediaries, of “‘ethical retooling’ (Bourdieu, 1984: 365) of consumer capitalism and its promotion of a ‘morality of pleasure as duty’ (ibid, 371). Through their positions within cultural institutions, “these groups of workers are able to exert ... a certain amount of cultural authority as shapers of taste and the inculcators of new consumerist dispositions” (Nixon and Du Gay, 2002: 597).

Hesmondhalgh also differentiates between ‘old’ cultural intermediaries, who acted as *critics* (or experts) “legitimate culture in the pre-mass media age” (2006; 226) and the ‘new’ intermediaries; the basic point of distinction being the type of art, as both new and old cultural intermediaries ‘mediate’ between producers and consumers. However, there is some confusion regarding how this mediation occurs. ‘New’ cultural intermediaries, for Featherstone (1991) are ‘the new petite bourgeoisie’ itself, who act as intermediaries between cultural producers (and intellectuals) and the rest of the society, transmitting the ideas and styles of the cultural producers to the rest of the society. Nixon and Du Gay (2002) opposes the use of the term ‘new,’ as the occupations referred by Bourdieu are not new jobs, in fact, they were decreasing in number since the 1960s.

While the term was embraced, thanks to popularity of Bourdieu, it became a widely used term despite the ambiguity in its definitions. While some put forward a definition based on the occupations that they see central to cultural mediation and change, some only referred to their functions. For example, Negus (2002), refer to personnel in the music industry who contribute to the form and content of cultural products, and uses the term intermediary to emphasize their contribution which also takes place between the cultural producers and the audience. For Nixon and Du Gay (2002) it is important to uncover these intermediary occupations, and their role in ‘cultural circulation’ for several reasons. As a substantial part of scholarly attention on the commercially produced culture focuses on the ‘moment of consumption,’ it is important to analyze the links between consumption and production.

Using a Bourdieusian framework, I tried to employ a different method to approach and identify cultural intermediaries. Since cultural intermediaries are the ones mediating between cultural production and consumption, they are at least partially involved with

the production of cultural products, and therefore, they should also appear in the radar of the field of cultural production—that is, social space schemas of the field of cultural production. Moreover, since each field of cultural production differs in terms of its relationship with the field of power, as we shall see in the next chapters—in the cases of fields of fashion and jazz—with different levels of autonomy; cultural intermediaries for each field also should differ in terms of relation to the field of cultural production, hence should occupy different positions in the social space.

4.3. Artistic Mode of Production as a *Field*

Despite its usefulness in explaining how local governments, corporate and real estate capital can drive urban growth through investment in culture, and the outcomes of this process, AMP fails to comprehend the internal dynamics of material production of culture in the urban setting, that is, how the cultural production—as it takes place in an urban setting—is tried to be controlled, influenced, altered and catered for this purpose by the a local ‘patrician’ elite, policymakers, or the ‘growth coalition’ in general. It also fails to explain how local cultural producers respond to, resist or cope with such interventions. In order to overcome this limitation, I propose to incorporate of Bourdieu’s framework of the ‘field of cultural production’ to the AMP thesis, with a specific attention on a spatial component. A localized version of the ‘field of cultural production’ is necessary as both interventions’ of the dominant groups and cultural producers’ reflexive strategies, by and large, involve decisions, conflicts, and actions are related to the use of urban space. Incorporating the AMP framework with Bourdieu’s *field* analysis, also requires developing the latter with a geographical dimension, which has been relatively overlooked²⁸ in the original formulation of *field* theory by Bourdieu.

It is mostly in gentrification research, Bourdieu’s conceptualization of various types of capital is utilized to understand the motives and capabilities of both artists and middle

²⁸ This is not to say Bourdieu altogether omits physical space in his field theory. For Bourdieu (1993b), “social space translates to physical space,” yet this translation is always ‘blurred’ as “the power over space comes from possessing various kinds of capital takes the form in appropriated physical space of a certain relation between the spatial structure of the distribution of agents and the spatial structure of the distribution of goods and services, public and private. An agent’s position in the social space is expressed in the site of physical space where that agent is situated ... and by the relative position that their temporary localizations (for example, honorific places, seating regulated by protocol), and especially the permanent ones (home address, and business address) occupy in relation to the localization of other agents” (124).

class gentrifiers. On the one hand, middle class gentrifiers are identified by a distinctive *habitus*, as evidenced by their lifestyle preferences and resulting residential choices. In this sense, gentrification is the social and spatial manifestation of such distinctive *habitus* (Zukin, 1987). Ley (2003), on the other hand, analyzes the process by conceptualizing it as a *field*, the ‘*field* of gentrification,’ with its specific agents and relationships within the *field*, by extensive use of Bourdieu’s conceptualization of the *field* of cultural production. His primary focus lays on the relationship between *economic* and *cultural* capitals various agents possess, and how artists (or cultural producers) with ample *cultural* but low *economic* capital, use their aesthetic dispositions to valorize the mundane products (neighborhoods, in the case of gentrification) later to be commodified by market forces (i.e. city boosters, place entrepreneurs), all of whom serve as cultural intermediaries defining what is cool and what is not.

Despite their polar placement in Bourdieu’s social space diagrams, with respect to their differential possessions of cultural and economic capitals, artists and commercial entrepreneurs have a parallel orientation: the creation of value (Ley, 2003). Yet, the difference between them lies in the anti-bourgeois and anti-conformist dispositions of cultural producers, which produce disdain for the market system and its commodification of everything, including art, which “dumbs down the creative act into the language of the filthy lucre” (Ley, 2003: 2530). In the case of urban space, ‘the stylization of life’ or ‘aestheticization of everyday life’ (Featherstone, 1991) as fully realized by artists, determines which spaces are to be occupied and valorized. With their possession of ample cultural capital, artists have a special position in the middle class, through which they “its imagination, its desires, even its practices, beyond its norms and conventions” (Ibid.: 2533). While serving as the ‘avant-garde’ within the middle class, cultural producers cooperate with those in real estate, travel, cuisine, home decoration (Bridge, 2001; Ley, 1996) to act as cultural intermediaries within the game of gentrification (Ley, 2003), transmitting a group of cosmopolitan followers the practical knowledge about neighborhood sites and the rules, rituals and practical aspects of the gentrifiers’ lifestyle.

Both approaches alone fail to capture both internal dynamics of the field of cultural production, and the external demands from the field of power, in a given locality. The analysis of cultural production in relation with a particular locality is necessary in that, both the interventions from the field of economy and political field (as the dominant fraction of the dominant class) to the field of cultural production (as the dominated

fraction of the dominant class) mostly involves spatial practices such as zoning resolutions by the local government, the real estate developments by the corporate capital, or urban regeneration schemes by the central government. The reflexive actions by cultural producers, in response to the interventions from the political and economic fields also has implications for the urban space, as cultural producers' capacity to create, alter and negotiate the meaning of urban space, through its use for both cultural production and cultural producers' own consumption as the avant-garde cultural intermediaries. Cultural producers also has the capacity to shape public culture, which Zukin sees as "socially constructed on the micro level [...] by the many social encounters that make up daily life in the streets, shops, and parks – the spaces in which we experience public life in cities" (Zukin, 1995: 11). Zukin also believes that those who have the economic and political power, also have the opportunity to shape the public culture with their control over the building of the city's public spaces, which are inherently democratic, those who occupy public spaces also define the public culture, therefore city's image, which is often a contested ground among cultural producers and the political and economic forces.

A further implication of the incorporation of Bourdieusian framework to Zukin's AMP also helps us to analyze the actions of artists and other cultural producers as part of the field of power. According to Bourdieu (1993a) cultural producers are closely associated with the field of power, as "dominated fraction of the dominant class." Separating the field of cultural production from the rest of the *field of power* are the differential levels of two types of capital: *economic* and *cultural capitals*. It is positioned within the *field of power* because of its possession of high levels of symbolic forms of capital (e.g. academic and cultural capital), but it is dominated because of its lack of economic capital when compared to dominant fractions of dominant classes. Bourdieu identifies two sub-*fields* within the *field of cultural production*: the sub-field of small-scale production (or 'restricted production' which basically involves canonical arts) and the sub-field of large-scale production (*grande*/or mass production, which equals to the cultural industries). While the sub-field of small scale-production is autonomous from the field of power, although not to the fullest extent, the sub-field of large scale production is heteronomous—again, not to the fullest extent. The sub-field of small scale production consists of cultural producers who are involved with the 'pure' artistic products—such as high arts—catered to the tastes of those with high cultural capital, which become a 'production for producers.' When incorporated within the AMP framework, this subfield hosts the group of cultural producers that are used to valorize

the land by the patrician class. However, when regarded against the backdrop of neo-liberal economy, and tied to a particular locality (as part of Istanbul's symbolic economy), this group of cultural producers gain prominence in the urban economy as producers and disseminators of meaning within the symbolic economy. Often regarded as the victims of urban regeneration process, in fact, this group of cultural producers is more powerful than ever, as their potential of creating economic value in the urban environment. They are closer to the dominant fraction of the dominant class with regard to this potential, more capable of transforming their cultural production into economic value. Yet, this comes at a price, as even the subfield of restricted production is not that autonomous as they can only subsist their presence, and hence their cultural activity in the urban setting by coming to terms with the field of power as represented by corporate capital, patrons from upper class, and individual and institutional agents from the local and central governments, as well as NGOs often backed up by the capital and government. Many painters, poets, writers, musicians (from ethnic, jazz and classical genres) are increasingly dependent upon corporate or state sponsorship of some kind; either in the form of direct financial support for the production or performance of arts, or by gaining access to the market via state or corporate sponsored institutions such as galleries, publishing houses, venues, events (like the Istanbul Biennale, ECoC, music and film festivals) and journals. Moreover, the cultural producers have to remain visible, not only for the economic valorization of an area in which cultural production takes place, but in order to attract a large population that will alter its spending patterns to patronize arts and other cultural activity (Markusen, 2006). For Istanbul's cultural producers, this means that they have to remain in the urban core, within the Beyoğlu area if they can, for which a substantial support is received from the individual and institutional agents within corporate capital and local governments. Aside from corporate-sponsored art galleries, performance venues and other sites of cultural production, cultural producers often rely on the support of local government to continue their existence, as it is the case in GalataModa Festival. Often cultural producers had to counterbalance the pressures from local (and central) governments and/or real estate capital with support from corporate capital, or other local governments, trying to maintain a balance to remain within the field of power. However, the more cultural producers come to terms with the individual and institutional agents within the field of power, the more they lose their autonomy and become part of the field of power. As part of the dominant class, cultural producers are also benefiting from the gains which are considered as spared for the patrician class in AMP framework, most often at the

expense of losing their autonomy. In the case of urban regeneration, cultural producers may benefit from expanding customer base (for example, due to the increase in the number of well-educated middle class households as a result of government's promotion of Istanbul as financial capital, which also involves the moving of a large number of individuals from Ankara to Istanbul who are employed in state owned banks which were previously located in Ankara) as well as capital gains from acquired properties before the valorization of gentrified neighborhoods. Being the dominated fraction of the dominant class, cultural producers often hold a dual position within the field of power, while benefiting from the accumulation-oriented strategies of the actors within the field of power, they are also subject to the negative effect of the accumulation-oriented practices; being displaced by more affluent middle and upper-middle class gentrifiers (i.e. followers) in the process of residential gentrification, or by more lucrative businesses in the case of commercial gentrification. In the case of urban regeneration schemes, the most likely negative outcome is the disturbance of their social and cultural habitats by the development projects championed by real estate capital (e.g. Galataport Project) or the projects carried out by the local government itself (e.g. the renewal of Taksim Square). In order to continue their existence in the urban scene, cultural producers try to achieve a balance between the benefits and the harms, either by cooperating with the individual and institutional agents within the field of power, or by actively resisting the interventions by emerging as political actors.

CHAPTER 5

Gentrification of Kuledibi, Istanbul and Neoliberalism

This chapter starts with the description of the research site, its historical trajectory paving way to its gentrification. The second part of the chapter deals with the broader neoliberal policies influencing the city since 1980s and their effect on Kuledibi, Beyoğlu and Istanbul.

5.1. Gentrification of Kuledibi

Kuledibi area covers the area around Galata Tower²⁹, starting from Galata Square and including nearly ten streets surrounding it. It is nearly 500 meters below Tünel Square, at the end of the Beyoğlu's main artery İstiklal Street, and tied to the square with three streets. One of the streets is the main pedestrian walkway of Galip Dede Street, named after a Mevlevi Dervish Lodge in the Street. The street hosts a cluster of music instruments shops, all of them are national distributors of world famous brands, and this part of the street is a major attraction for many musicians. The other path opening to the area from İstiklal Street is through Şahkulu Bostanı Street which hosts Tarık Zafer Tunaya Cultural Center as well as Deutsche Schule Istanbul along with several building converted for upscale residential use. The pedestrian traffic in Şahkulu Bostanı Street has increased after the completion of the Şişhane Subway line, which has an opening to this street. Şahkulu Bostanı Street opens to the Serdar-ı Ekrem Street, which hosts famous *Doğan Apartmanı*. Serdar-ı Ekrem Street has undergone a massive residential and commercial gentrification as nearly 80% of the stores were switched to luxury cafes, designer boutiques and other stores that target tourists, domestic visitors and gentrifiers.

Galata is located on the northern part of the Golden Horn, at the opposite of the historic peninsula of Istanbul (Stamboul), on the slopes of a hill. As one of the oldest settlements near the Bosphorus it was known to host a Jewish population as early as 390, yet the area had become a Genoese colony in the 12th century, then to be surrounded by walls to appear as a separate city at the intersection of the Golden Horn and Bosphorus.

²⁹ It was built by the Genoese in 1348, at the apex of the walls surrounding the settlement. During the Ottoman Era, the Tower served to spot fires as the highest building in the area.

According to 1455 census (İnalçık, 1977), the population of Galata prior to Ottoman era included four main groups: Genoese, Greeks, Armenians, and Jews; with only only twenty Muslims living in Galata. By the early sixteenth century, the Muslim population of Galata has grown considerably due to controlled migration started after the conquest. Towards the end of Mehmet II's reign, there recorded 531 Muslim homes, versus 592 Christian (Greek) homes and 332 Frank homes. By the sixteenth century, population was composed of 35% Turks, 39% Greeks, 22% Levantines, and 4% Armenians. (Akın, 1998) Towards the end of nineteenth century, the number of Muslims in the area was clearly higher but they still constituted the minority of the population in Galata. According to 1882 census, the population of Galata was 237,293—whereas the total population of İstanbul was 875,000—including 17,589 Greeks, 26,559 Armenians, and 22,865 Jews. Another 111,545 residents were listed as foreign subjects, most of whom were not European expatriates but native Ottomans who had obtained embassy protection. The Muslim population counted as much as only one-fifth to one-fourth of this total population (Rosenthal, 1980).

Already a major center of East Mediterranean trade during the Byzantine era, the area preserved its privileges as *Magnifica Communita di Pera* (or *Peyra*) during the Ottoman rule, until the *Tanzimat* era. Starting from the fifteenth century, the controlled migration during Mehmet II's reign, the Genoese population began to decline and losing its effect over the area, yet the area continued to serve as a center of overseas trade. With the rapid expansion as a center of trade, the coastal area expanded as a harbor, pushing residential areas up the slope. Prior to that, the Jews were recorded as living in the coastal section while the Genoese and the rest of the population were residing around the Tower. This is why current building stock of the Kuledibi district hosts the heritage buildings from all these different groups.

Beginning from the sixteenth century, European states appointed ambassadors in the Ottoman Empire. Under the Ottoman rule, Galata—and its extension Pera—had been quarters in which the Europeans and Levantines constitute the majority of the population. Levantines were mostly Italian and French, who had come to İstanbul and sometimes resided in the city for generations. They were usually married to other foreigners or members of local minority communities. From these marriages a new type of Westerners was born. With their languages, outlooks, tastes and habits, they were quite different from the population in other parts of the city. Their distinctive lifestyles and tastes echoed especially in their architecture, and with the physical environment

they created; Galata and Pera³⁰ resembled a European town standing in contrast to the historic peninsula.

Muslims' disinterestedness in commerce, the foreign trade of the empire had been run by Greeks, Armenians and Jews. The native Europeans who resided within Galata were protected by the Capitulations, granted by Suleyman in the 17th century. Capitulations were the privileges – known as extraterritoriality – which rendered those minorities immune to the Ottoman government and subject to their own countries' laws as interpreted by their local embassy. They were conferred on native Greeks, Armenians, and Jews who had some commercial connection with the embassy or who had been able to purchase such protection (Rosenthal, 1980). As a result of these privileges, Galata had become one of the most important trade centers in Mediterranean. In this century, many French merchants moved their businesses to Galata because they perceive Galata to be safer than Marseilles. In the Ottoman era, "Galata continued to live a life of its own with a culture, architecture, commerce, language, and religion distinct from those of the Ottoman world surrounding it," (Mitler, 1979: 90) in other words, Galata had become a distinct town within a town. Embassies being the nucleus, minorities formed several communities in the Galata district.

After the French revolution in 18th century, this situation had changed, and the harbor of Galata lost its significance. "After the 17th century, the hill of Pera became the more fashionable district and the fortunes of Galata began to decline. Until recent times Galata continued to serve as the chief emporium and clearinghouse for foreign goods and was the Ottoman Empire's principal window to the West" (Mitler, 1979: 72). During the mid-sixteenth century, stimulated by outbreaks of plague, most of the embassies – except for the Iranian embassy – moved from either Stambul or Galata to Pera. From 18th century onwards Pera started to become an important extension of Galata. As the number of embassies in the area increased, especially in the 19th century, Pera had become the heart of the Levantine settlement in İstanbul. Especially by the mid-nineteenth century, Levantines, Greeks, Armenians, Jews and foreigners who usually dealt with trade had their workplaces in Galata and residents in Pera. In the same era, Galata had been accessible not only to non-Muslims but also the Westernized Turks. Nevertheless, the wealth was in the hands of Levantines and other minority population who were protected by the privileges resulting from capitulations.

³⁰ Pera meant other side as it referred to the top and other side of the hill where Galata resides.

In the 19th century, the scenery in Galata was very different from that of Pera. In contrast to Pera's elegant physical and social environment (shops, residences, embassies, and educational facilities represented the 'aristocrat' pretense of the wealthy Levantines), Galata hosted narrow streets surrounded by taverns and nightclubs that are filled with people of different nationalities. The maritime businesses, activities related to shipping or businesses that are unsafe for the health – or simply dangerous – were concentrated near the harbor of Galata. Old Galata houses were demolished in order to open new roads or widen the existing roads in the area (Akin, 1998).

With the abolition of capitulations as a result of Lausanne Treaty of 1923, the moving of state's capital from Istanbul to Ankara marked the end of this brilliant version of Galata (and Pera). Particularly, with the founding of a new republic, the population was began to be 'Turkified,' not so much as a result of the Lausanne Treaty—which also required the exchange of the Greek population in Turkey with the Turkish population in Greece, as the agreement excluded the Greeks in İstanbul. The most influential were the 1942's controversial Wealth Tax Legislation (*Varlık Vergisi*), which was allegedly targeted the minorities who increased their wealth during the Second World War by benefiting the dire position the country was in. Although the legislation did not openly target minorities, in practice, it was imposed unjustly to punish the wealthy minority, like the Greeks, Armenians and Jews (Aktar, 2000). The establishment of the State of Israel in 1948, many Jewish residents left Turkey to move to their new country (Bali, 2003). The most severe blow took place in September 1955, as a riot that ruled the area for two days, against the Greeks in İstanbul, threatened not only their properties, but also their lives. As a result many Greeks left İstanbul to move to In 1964³¹, as a result of the rising tension between Greece and Turkey over Cyprus, Turkey terminated the agreement on residence, commerce and travel between two governments. Within two years, 30,000 people – mostly Greeks and their relatives residing in Beyoğlu – had to leave the country. The final blow came in 1974, as a result of the increased tension between Greece and Turkey following the conflict in Cyprus which led to Turkey's sending troops to the island. Many Greek residents left the country in worrying about their security.

The gentrification of Galata district had begun in late 1990s but progressed at a very slow pace, as it is still in progress in 2013. The process has been facilitated by several large-scale UDPs (Swygedouw et al., 2002) implemented in the wider Beyoğlu and

³¹ The 1964 deportations had been more influential in Tarlabası and Cihangir.

neighboring areas during the late 1980s, and throughout 2000s, as well as sectoral transformation of the local and national economy starting from the 1980s. During this time period, the process also changed nature, transformed from a first-to-second phase gentrification, to a third phase ‘generalized gentrification’ (Hackworth and Smith, 2002)—or ‘super gentrification’ as Lees (2003) calls it—due to pouring investment in real estate sector since the 2000s. In this section, these large scale UDPs are briefly described in relation to the gentrification of Galata, then comparing the process with the one in Cihangir which was—more or less—triggered by the same set of factors in order to uncover the peculiarities of the process in Galata.

Paving the way to the earlier gentrification of Galata district, were two interrelated urban development projects: One of them is Mayor Dalan’s project to rehabilitate Haliç and its surroundings—including the Beyoğlu district with large scale construction project—and the other one is a small scale redevelopment project for Galata Tower and its surroundings. The first project had a large but indirect impact on areas early gentrification as it led to the rehabilitation of Taksim-Tünel axis over the long term, eventually resulting in the gentrification of the areas surrounding Istiklal Street—Cihangir and Galata. The second one was a rehabilitation project directly for the Kuledibi district.

During his mayoralty, Dalan undertook a massive urban transformation plan to rehabilitate Haliç and which was appointed as the industrial center of the city in the Prost plan. The agglomeration of industrial activity in the area also gave way to the development of squatter housing areas in neighboring areas. In part of a larger plan to rehabilitate the area, Dalan constructed of a new motorway from the coast of Golden Horn to Taksim (Tarlabaşı Boulevard) demolishing thousands of historic buildings, and the displacement of industrial complexes in the area, also demolishing a large part of the industrial heritage of the city. He also undertook a massive environmental rehabilitation project to cleanse the waters of Golden Horn, subject to massive pollution due to the hazardous waste from surrounding industrial activity, with a project that was funded by the World Bank.

The demolitions took place between 1984 and 1986, and the boulevard was opened in 1989, aiming to develop a touristic site one side of the road and a commercial zone on the other. It also coincided with the activities of a neighborhood association which also aimed to revitalize the area. Founded in 1984 by a local businessman Vitali Hakko, Beyoğlu Beautification Foundation aimed the social and physical rehabilitation of

Beyoğlu, starting from its main artery İstiklal Street, in order to revive its golden era. The plan included the physical rehabilitation of building facades, as well as cleaning the streets from garbage and other threats to sanitation and quality-of life in the area. İstiklal Street was pedestrianized³² in 1990, and was given its ‘nostalgic’ tramway, which is still in operation today.

This Project, resembling of the projects by Haussmann in Napoleonic France or Robert Moses’s Project against which Jane Jacobs hastily rebelled was heavily debated at the time³³. Dalan saw Beyoğlu as a place that needs cleaning and rehabilitation, and if it was necessary to demolish parts of it for this purpose, so be it. For Dalan, the proposed road in Tarlabası would serve a double goal; it would solve the problem of heavy traffic and save the district from demons of prostitution and drug-dealing. Dalan condemned any opposition against the project as an opposition to İstanbul’s development, and thereby its becoming a ‘world city’.

Introduced by the Beyoğlu Municipality in 1987, a project to reorder the surroundings of Galata Tower involved the transformation of the area as a tourist attraction, with the restoration of 131 heritage buildings for accommodation to generate capacity for 4,895 beds. The round floors of the buildings were to be reserved for food and entertainment as well as cultural amenities. The project also required pedestrianization of the Galata Square and the surrounding streets and the restoration of the remainders of Genoese

³² In 1999, some members of the foundation argued that the pedestrianization of İstiklal Street led to a loss in its dynamism and vitality. Some argued that even the buildings lost their lively colors, and using before-and-after photographs taken by a world-renown local photographer, Ara Güler, they tried to creat positive publicity for their cause. (<http://webarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/1999/02/16/96859.asp>)

³³ The opposition to the demolishment undertaken in the area was articulated by a nongovernmental organization, ‘the Chamber of Architects and Engineers.’ Their argument was that the city was being parceled and *sold* to multinational corporations. The valuable land in inner-city was prepared for the use of capital. Moreover, they were concerned by the racism that was indicated by the discourse of Dalan and municipality employees. The buildings that were torn down had been built and used by Greeks and Armenians who were once resided in the area. In the demolishment, bulldozers carried Turkish flags, and one of the city officials gave a speech on one of the bulldozers. Furthermore, some of the architects were concerned about the historical and architectural value of the buildings. As one architect remarked, “this is neither European architecture nor Ottoman. It’s Levantine architecture” (Bartu, 2000: 48). Another proponent of the demolishment was the leftist community. In their view, the area represented the heritage of the colonists in the Ottoman period. In fact, Ottoman Empire had never become a colony however, with the capitulations appointed for them, the minorities enjoyed their privileges and made a fortune with commerce. Galata and Pera, being the residential districts of those who dealt with finance and commerce, have come to symbolize the capitulations and its cost to the Empire, and its people.

walls³⁴. The plan also required regulations regarding the physical outlook of the surrounding structures, including the removal of unauthorized additions to the buildings, yet the plan was not executed at the planned scale (Islam, 2003), other than the pedestrianization of the square.

With the switch to a market-oriented and open growth economy in the Özal era, introducing the liberal economic policies that replace ‘protectionist and important-substitution’ growth strategies. This new era was characterized by a more positive approach to foreign capital, growth and variety of consumer goods, and restructuring of domestic retail industry” (Erkip, 2000: 408). The influx of foreign direct investment in 1980s and 1990s, and the sectoral shift from manufacturing to service, there emerged a new high-income wage earner group employed mostly in this sector (Güvenç and Işık, 2001; Erkip, 2000).

With the pedestrianization of the Istiklal Street, Beyoğlu began to host an increasing number of cultural amenities especially the section of the Istiklal Street between Taksim and Galatasaray, then expanding to Asmalimescid, and finally and to Tünel and Galata. The 1994 local elections was also another significant milestone in the area’s history as Welfare Party’s local elections victory also included the Metropolitan Municipality of Istanbul as well as the Municipality of Beyoğlu. As many secularists feared that the new mayor of Beyoğlu will block the growth of the entertainment businesses which were showing a parallel growth to the cultural amenities in the area. New mayor Nusret Bayraktar (1994-1999) initially banned the bars and restaurants from putting tables to the streets to hide the undesirable view of public alcohol consumption, he later used his position as a chance to show the Ottoman-inspired tolerance of the Welfare Party to secularist lifestyles. The construction of a mosque to Taksim was also another debated issue, as the metropolitan mayor Recep Tayyip Erdogan believed that the presence of a mosque in such a vibrant point of the city mosque would help tourists to realize they were in a Muslim country (Çınar,1997).

The next mayor of Beyoğlu was Kadir Topbas (1999-2004), who is currently in office of Metropolitan Mayoralty. He also developed a plan to revive Beyoğlu, with the Beautiful

³⁴ The project also entailed the demolition of a building known as Keresteciler Binası, which is still intact. The ground floor of the building hosts a national market chain, which serves a large number of tourists who stays in the surrounding hotels as well as daily or weekly rented apartments. The rest of the building hosts a large number of stores selling clothing, sound and musical equipments, and other electronics. It is still rumored that this building is lined up for demolition, yet there is no present plan regarding the timing.

Beyoğlu Project (Güzel Beyoğlu Projesi) in 2001. The project is still claimed by Topbas and his successor in the Beyoğlu Municipality office Ahmet Misbah Demircan. It is an extensive plan involving restoration of individual buildings, rehabilitation of a number of areas including streets and squares³⁵. One of the first achievements of the project was to introduce uniform signs for the stores in İstiklal Street, with brass letters in the same font character and size, on a wooden background. Later on, as the project continued, many areas such as Talimhane and a large number of individual buildings were rehabilitated.

In its prolonged period of gentrification, Kuledibi entered a new phase since the end of 2000s, which I personally had the chance to observe very closely. This latest phase of gentrification was characterized by the more widespread entrance of large-scale real estate capital, mostly due to the Galataport project, as an instance of neo-liberal gentrification (Smith, 2002). Moreover, following the expansion of subway line to Şişhane, there emerged an instance of a small scale gentrification in Serdar-ı Ekrem Street—in parallel with the overarching ‘neoliberal gentrification’ in the wider district—with the influx of fashion designers and apparel companies. This phase of ‘neoliberal gentrification’ as it takes place in Galata is explained in the following section, with specific attention to Galataport project. It is followed by a brief description of micro-gentrification as it took place in Serdar-ı Ekrem Street, and it will be explained further in the findings section as I believe it reflects the internal dynamics of the field of fashion design. Despite the common factors effecting these concurrent instances of gentrification within the same locality, their co-existence is also important in showing how gentrification can be realized as a result of seemingly irrelevant dynamics operating at various scale, from global movements of people and capital to internal dynamic of a cultural field. Moreover, it is also intriguing to observe the process’s transformation through time, from its start in 1990s to its latest phase starting from late 2000s, as different economic and social factors enter the picture to restructure the process of gentrification in a single locality.

³⁵ Talimhane, Meşrutiyet Street, Kızılay Square, İstiklal Street, Bankalar Street, Gümüşsuyu Street, Sıraselviler Street, Tarlabası Boulevard, Bahriye Street, Boğazkesen Street, Cihangir Balık Pazarı (fish market), Dolapdere Furniture Manufacturers Site, Ömer Hayyam Street, Karaköy Kemankuş area, Şişhane Square, Mete Street (adjacent to Taksim Gezi Park), Kalyoncukulluğu, and Defterdar Street.

Until the late 2000s, the gentrification in Galata district was similar to the process in Cihangir³⁶. It was driven by artists, employees and executives in cultural industries

³⁶ Comparing Galata's gentrification with the process in Cihangir will be fruitful as in both processes same factors are often in progress. Compared, to Cihangir's gentrification, the process in Galata is slower and it took place in a later time period. In early 2000s, the gentrification on Galata was in its early phases and it is still not complete in 2013. On the other hand, gentrification of Cihangir was nearly complete; at least the property prices were very high and there were a shortage of housing to suggest that the process was at its peak. In 2003, residential gentrification of Cihangir was complete yet the commercial gentrification which involves a similar process for small businesses in the area was in its infancy. Especially after 2003, Cihangir had become famous with its cafés and restaurants which were opened first by local residents to serve the needs of local residents (i.e. gentrifiers). These businesses had immediately become popular due to several reasons: the first one was the need of gentrifiers to reach quality food, as a significant proportion within them were single households who did not want to cook for themselves, or could not cook because of the small kitchen spaces especially in historical buildings. Moreover, the food vendors in the area offered a wide range of products from 'home-made' meals to Italian style pizzas, and to gourmet soups on which gentrifiers can express their quest for distinctive tastes to build on their distinctive lifestyle (Zukin, 1995). Second factor was their motivation to socialize within the neighborhood, and soon these businesses had become the places where the neighborhood identity and the 'Cihangir Cumhuriyeti' discourse was produced and reproduced (İlkuçan, 2004). Thirdly, such businesses were also utilized for business meetings as the majority of gentrifiers were employed in creative sectors which valued face-to-face (F-2-F) contacts despite the advances in communications technology (Storper and Venables, 2004; Mizzau and Montanari, 2008). Other businesses catering the need of gentrifiers, such as pet shops, organic and gourmet food retailers, laundry and dry cleaning services also increased in number throughout the process of gentrification.

My first encounter with the area dates back to 2002 when I started my research on Cihangir's gentrification. Back then, while Cihangir's gentrification was in a later phase and the progress was relatively fast despite the post-recession economy; the progress in Galata was in an early phase and it had a slow-paced progress compared to Cihangir. Judging from the housing stock and neighborhood's physical appearance, it was clear that Galata was one of the neighborhoods next in line. When I asked the real estate agents and experts if this might be the case, they argued for the contrary stating that Galata's buildings had ownership problems and it was slowing down the process. There were also several testimonies from pioneer gentrifiers of Cihangir, who also sought to find a suitable place in Galata, to replicate the capital gains they acquired from their early move in Cihangir. First of all, it was rumored that the property in Galata was owned by wealthier members of the minorities who fled to Israel, Greece or any other country, and unlike their middle class counterparts in Cihangir they did not feel the urgency to cash in their property before leaving the country. The descendents of the owners of many buildings were wealthy, and they did not need feel the need to sell their estate in Turkey. Compared to Cihangir, the buildings in Galata were also larger in area, they had a larger number of apartments for each building and, more importantly, they were originally designed to host a wealthier consumer segment. On average, Galata's building were slightly older than Cihangir's buildings; as most of the buildings in Galata were constructed in the second half of the 19th century—after several conflagrations hit the area around that time—Cihangir's buildings were built throughout the first half of 20th century in turn-of-the-century architecture as well as *art deco* style.

Again, in comparison to Cihangir, the gentrifiable housing stock in Galata district—especially historic buildings—was different in scale. While Cihangir's gentrification took place in apartment by apartment by small investors, as there were only several buildings wholly vacant, Kuledibi district still has wholly vacant buildings attracting large-scale investors. Moreover, at the beginning of 2000s, the rehabilitation of Beyoğlu's main artery, İstiklal Street, was far from complete. Despite the efforts for transformation, the area was not as lively as today in late 1990s and early 2000s. In early 2000s, the gentrification of Asmalimescid—and area known to host a number of *meyhanes*—took place with the opening of a popular music venue, Babylon, the

including media and education, as well as middle and upper middle class professionals (Islam, 2003), pursuing distinctive urban lifestyles (Zukin, 1987). They displaced working class households in the neighborhood by increasing rents to a level the former groups can no longer afford.

As it is in many cases of gentrification, the role of a local neighborhood association in managing and orienting the trajectory of gentrification cannot be ruled. Founded in 1994, Galata Derneği, has assumed an active role in shaping the process by organizing various activities in the neighborhood. The most prominent of these activities is the *Galata Şenliği*³⁷, which has been taking place since 1990³⁸. The festival features local artists' exhibitions workshops, concerts, seminars and other cultural activities in Galata.

The association also undertook a cultural project as part of the ECoC 2010 program, Istanbul-Pori Music Networking Project, which targeted Istanbul's cultural heritage to

gentrification gained pace with the municipality's termination of manufacturing licenses of textile workshops present in the area. With the traffic created by the venue, the surrounding areas later transformed to cafés, bars and restaurants to serve the audience of the concerts taking place in the venue, before and after the shows (Babylon Kitap, 2009; İnce, 2011). The process in Asmalimescid was also driven by the opening of artists' workshops (Ince, 2006) and resultantly the rehabilitation of Beyoğlu district moved further from Taksim to near Tünel, and eventually Kuledibi district.

Islam (2003) also points out to the then-current use of buildings and shops in Galata as an impediment to the area's gentrification. Contrary to Cihangir—which hosted mostly residential units and small businesses (such as grocery shops, small food vendors, butcher shops, and hairdressers) prior to gentrification—Galata district hosted a large number of small manufacturing businesses (such as furniture or carpenter workshops), which discouraged gentrifiers from coming to the neighborhood for several reasons. First, such businesses were a barrier for residential expansion because of their noise and physical pollution. Second, as Islam observed, they made some permanent changes to the physical layout of the stores under the buildings in order to fit their large equipment or expand their working space by removing walls or other carrier elements.

Islam also argues that the accessibility of Cihangir by private vehicles, due to its wider streets and more orderly vehicle traffic routes compared to Galata. I should also add another transportation-related impediment to Galata's gentrification; its distance to public transportation networks. In my research (Ilkucan, 2004), gentrifiers stated Cihangir's proximity to major transportation hubs located in Taksim—as well as Kabataş and Karaköy—as a major motivation in their residential preferences. Among 18 respondents, only five of them had private vehicles (cars or motorcycles) and even they relied heavily on public transportation for their daily commute. Kuledibi district is close to Karaköy, connected through Istanbul's oldest subway line known as Tünel, and connected to Taksim through tramway route on the İstiklal Street. However, Galata's gentrification gained pace with the opening of Şişhane-Taksim line (as an extension of the M2 line between Taksim and Hacıosman). Especially the Serdar-ı Ekrem Street linking the Galata Square to the subway's Şişhane exit is an influential factor in helping the micro gentrification that took place in the street, started right after the opening of the line.

³⁷ The foundations of the festival began with first generation pioneer gentrifiers' opening of their workshops to local residents for and visitors. They also organized workshops for the arts training for local kids from low-income families.

³⁸ In 2013, the event was cancelled due to Taksim Gezi uprisings.

be oriented to musical activities and develop a mutual musical understanding under EU framework. The project was supported by Galata Association, IKSIV, Pori Jazz 66 (a non-profit festival organization in Pori, Finland) and local Nora Jazz Club. The project entailed live performance during Galata Festival, exchange of musicians from Finland and Turkey for mutual performance in Nora Jazz Club and Jazz Café in Pori, a performance of Pori Symphony Orchestra with the participation of guest jazz musicians from Turkey, musical and instrument making workshops

Recently, the government pushed for several projects of various scales that is expected to have an effect on the wider Beyoğlu area and Galata. The first, and the most relevant one for the Kuledibi district is the planned transformation of already active Karaköy Harbor³⁹ to an upscale tourist attraction by constructing a cruise home port with shopping malls, hotels and recreational facilities. Commonly known as Galataport⁴⁰, the project's planning phase was initiated in 1998, as it was part of the 1995 Istanbul Metropolitan Area Master Plan, as a cruise port and tourism center. In 1993, however, the site was declared a "special tourism area" by the central government, making any of the developments impossible for the local government. The first auction for the project was made in August 2005, and awarded to the local partnership of an international cruise company which outbid its rivals. The project involved a coastline of 1,200 meters with a 100,000 square meter area dedicated for the project.

The value and the terms for the tender were later criticized by numerous opponents including columnists, urban planners, and the members of the opposition party, RPP (Mert, 2005; Şafak, 2005). For one thing, the value of the tender was very low according to critics. Awarded under the build-operate-transfer model, the total value of the tender

³⁹ The actual name of current harbor is Port of Istanbul and it is owned by Türkiye Denizcilik İşletmeleri A.S. It consists of two adjacent docksides, Galata and Sali Pazari. The first one was built in as early as 1900, the second one was built in 1957. The port served as a cargo port until 1986, when it was transformed to a cruise home port hosting more than 800 ships and 250 thousand passengers on average, annually.

⁴⁰ I first heard about the project when I was doing my research on Cihangir's gentrification back in 2003. The project was brought to my attention by a lawyer who was a resident of Cihangir, an activist member of Cihangir Beautification Foundation. At that time, neighborhood activists were concerned about the potential valorization that would be caused by the presence of such an upscale project near Cihangir. Many expressed fears that the project will cause rents and real estate values to skyrocket, eventually displacing even the follower gentrifiers who have ample economic capital. Both Cihangir and Galata neighborhood Associations objected the Project arguing that it would impede the access of residents of these two neighborhoods to coast, so the area should be left for public use (Erbil and Erbil, 2001).

was \$4.3 billion⁴¹ and the duration of operation was 49 years. The company would not pay a significant amount until 2040 (that is, 37 years after the initiation of the project), as for the first 10 years the company would pay only \$35 million⁴².

For Swygedouw et al. (2002) such large scale UDPs, for their success, rely heavily on “exceptionality” measures “such as the freezing of conventional planning tools, bypassing statutory regulations and institutional bodies, the creation of project agencies with special or exceptional powers of intervention and decision-making, and/or a change in national or regional regulations” (p.548). In Galataport project, too, such ‘exceptionality measures’ can be said to be in operation. An earlier legislation was introduced to offer some privileges for the Galataport project, but it was later nullified by the Council of State. The legislation was later passed as it was included in an omnibus bill (*torba yasa*) which allowed a specific law to be put into effect for the fate of the area, freeing it from the limitations of coastal law and its designation as a preservation site. This allowed the developers to include in the plans, a high rise residential building for upscale customers to generate extra revenues. The legal authority over the project—along with another controversial project—was also removed from local government (i.e. the Metropolitan Municipality of Istanbul) to the Ministry of Public Works and Housing (which was later renamed as the Ministry of Environment and Urbanization).

In 2006, the Council of the State nullified the development plan prepared by the Ministry of Culture and Tourism that allowed the execution of the project, which meant the end for the project. The project was to be put into auction once again, shortening the duration of period during which the winning company would operate the complex. In April 2011, right before the general elections, Prime Minister Erdogan counted Galataport among the projects that would be completed before 2023⁴³, along with equally controversial Haydarpasaport project and his ‘crazy project’ involving a water channel to connect the Black Sea and Marmara Sea, to be built on the the West of the Bosphorus. The auction was renewed in May 2013, this time the winning bid was presented by Doğuş Holding—a local conglomerate which operates in banking, finance,

⁴¹ <http://arsiv.sabah.com.tr/2005/09/18/eko101.html>

⁴² <http://arsiv.sabah.com.tr/2005/09/20/altayli.html>

⁴³ <http://www.ntvmsnbc.com/id/25203563/>

media, as well as marina management—with a total value of \$702 million, for a duration of 30 years.

The new plan⁴⁴ also receives criticism on several issues, despite the improvements from the previous version. These improvements include a more detailed designation of areas and buildings within the plan, compared to the ambiguous planning in the first project. Second, it reserves rooms for recreational facilities—which was missing from the first plan. Yet, it is accepted to be worse in several aspects. First, it entails the construction of an underground parking lot, which is objected by historians and urban planners on the grounds that the site hosts a large number of historic artifacts and digging the land to build a parking lot will destroy them. Second, the new plan also entails filling the sea with land to expand the area, which is objected for environmental concerns. Some critics also argue that the location of the project is not suitable for hosting increased cruiser traffic than it actually does, as cruisers will have difficulties in boarding the harbor and will cause sea traffic to slow down. Finally, and more importantly, the project is expected to create a barrier between the city's inhabitants and the sea, as it is reserved for the use for more privileged groups such as tourists, business people and other local elite.

While the project has been known by many for over a decade its effects on the real estate market had become visible only during the last five years. The property prices in its immediate surroundings rose rapidly as large scale investors began to enter the market searching for spots to build hotels in the area. As of April 2013, there were 26 hotels under construction in the area adjacent to Galataport site⁴⁵, most of them being luxury hotels (including 5- and 6-star hotels). Especially attractive is the area between the Galataport site and Golden Horn. The area currently hosts a large number of commercial buildings including centers of corporations as well as *işhanıs* which host large number of small companies. There are also small manufacturing workshops as well as a growing number cafés attracting employees and executives of creative industries, as well as a large number of gentrifiers from surrounding Cihangir and Galata districts.

⁴⁴ It involves a development site of 100,280 square meters, and an additional 11.867 square meters will be obtained by filling the sea with land. 85,208 square meters will be reserved for the cruise home port, 13,941 square meters for recreational facilities, 12,107 square meters for the cultural facilities. The Project entails 99,256 square meters of new construction.

⁴⁵ <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/ekonomi/23044899.asp>

The district is now facing a major wave of valorization, with the completion of the tender of Galataport project, as corporate capital (mostly in real estate and tourism services) increased its demand for properties in the district. In the last three years, rents recorded a 60% increase according to a real estate agent dealing with the area, when it would normally register a maximum increase of 30%.

The project's effect on the Kuledibi district is also becoming more visible as investors of all scales try to acquire property in the area to convert it for 'better' and more profitable use. As Galip Dede Street, connecting the Tünel Square (the southern end of Istiklal Street) to the Karaköy coast, is expected to be closed to vehicle traffic to become a pedestrian walkway connecting the main street of Beyoğlu, Istiklal Street, to the new harbor. As it is expected to be the major route for tourists to reach from the port to the cultural and touristic center, Beyoğlu, the property values in this section is growing rapidly. Moreover, many companies involved in the food-services sector, including both local and international chains, are seeking suitable spots to open restaurants, cafés, bars, coffeehouses etc. to serve the tourist, the number of which is already high to secure revenues making such investments viable. The executives or representatives of such firms are offering existing businesses a large sum to leave the property (called *devir parası*) which can reach to well over \$200,000 depending on the location, size, and other relevant features. Such large scale investors are also known to take over buildings occupied by other businesses, such as musical instruments or electronic devices wholesalers/retailers to convert the property to boutique hotels or restaurants. Currently, there are numerous businesses trying to resist such pressures from large scale investors. While some business owners try to remain in the area to receive higher offers as the property market boosts, some use their legal rights to remain in the area, by prolonging the displacement process.

Currently, the displacement process also takes place at another level. In the recent years, there is a growing market of daily rental homes in Istanbul. As hotel rates increase rapidly over the next decade, renting apartments on a daily, weekly, or monthly (or even seasonal) basis has become a more feasible option for tourists, as well as Erasmus students. Many small scale investors try to acquire apartments in the areas surrounding Beyoğlu (including Çukurcuma, Cihangir, Kalyoncukulluğu, Tarlabası and Galata) to rent to visitors via websites (such as airbnb.com). Such small scale investment began to create pressures on the middle class gentrifiers who only use their properties for

accommodation. It also created a significant opportunity for landlords, to make more income from short terms, rather than traditional long term rentals.

The boost in the Galata's real estate market is still confined to immediate surroundings of the Galata (like Galip Dede Street and Serdar-ı Ekrem Street connecting the area to the Subway's Şişhane exit), as the back streets like İlk Belediye Street is still away from such pressures. The lack of a concrete plan regarding the area's future also creates ambiguities on the part of both investors and current users.

Apart from Galataport, there are several large scale UDPs in the areas surrounding Beyoğlu, such as Haliçport, transformation of Tarlabası and Taksim Pedestrianization Plan; as well as relatively small scale transformations in the adjacent districts such as Demirören Shopping Mall and the controversial construction of a new shopping mall in the premises of a historic landmark, *Emek* Theater. However, currently none of these projects seem to have created a direct effect on the Kuledibi district. Eventually, with the completion of the other projects, the social composition of both residents and visitors from both other parts of the city is expected to change as such projects is expected to change the composition and nature of cultural amenities and other services offered to the inhabitants.

In the summer of 2011, right after the general elections the Mayor of Beyoğlu took an action to remove all the tables—used by cafés, bars and restaurants to increase their serving capacity—from the streets. The action started from Asmalimescid⁴⁶ area, where the narrow streets have become clogged with the presence of the tables especially at weekend nights, when a large number of people comes to the area for such entertainment facilities. The using of streets or sidewalks was already permitted by law at the time, the businesses were allowed to put tables in the streets by paying TL40-80 per table. Even a month before the removal of tables form the streets, the municipality workers visited the area and drew borders on the streets to show the businesses where to put their tables. Especially after the banning of indoor smoking in 2009, many businesses relied on this permission to use the streets as part of their stores. The situation was so normalized that, rent values of the stores were determined according to the area they could use including the streets, not just the area of store itself. Many

⁴⁶ At the time when the ban started, there was a very prevalent rumor that just before the ban was started, Prime Minister Erdogan passed from the area in his car and ordered the Mayor of Beyoğlu to clear the streets from this occupation.

businesses exclusively relied on their access to streets by using a small store with ample space on the front to expand into the streets.

The ban immediately spread to the other areas within the vicinity of Municipality's jurisdiction. The media coverage was extensive as many columnists and reporters, even from the mainstream media, were frequenters of the businesses in Beyoğlu. Very striking visuals of the municipality police raids to the streets were made to evening news, as police pulled tables and chairs under the tourists who were sitting on them a minute ago and enjoying their meals. As many restaurants lost a significant portion of their businesses, they started to lay off their workers—mostly waiters with low job qualifications—to cut the costs. In some areas, the businesses serving to hundreds young male waiters—such as barbershops—had to lay off their workers. For example, in Nevizade Street alone, there were more than 500 waiters employed in the small restaurant businesses which used the space on the streets to expand their otherwise in sufficient capacity.

Many people were concerned that this was a sign of a much greater plan to evict the entertainment from the Beyoğlu, to open up avenues for further investment⁴⁷. Even the Mayor Demircan himself, admitted that the presence of such businesses blocked the investment for the buildings which hosted such businesses at the street level. In fact, this was an objective statement accurately describing the situation in Beyoğlu. With the increasing number of such businesses in Beyoğlu's back streets—which were displacing relatively less profitable businesses such as repair shops, small manufacturers, bookstores, and other small businesses—the flats in these streets were becoming unfeasible to use as residence or offices. This discouraged not only individual investors, but also large scale investors from focusing on such areas, impeding further valorization of real estate in Beyoğlu.

⁴⁷ A relatively larger group, on the other hand, believed that this was an intervention to people's lifestyles and it was a step towards banning alcohol. This was a concern which was fuelled in 2012 and 2013 with the restriction of sales of alcohol. First, on September 2012, the debate was fuelled by the organization of a festival by a domestic beer manufacturer in Santral Istanbul, a former industrial site used by Bilgi University as a campus. The area's closeness to Eyup, a religiously conservative neighborhood hosting the tomb of a significant historic figure, Eyup Sultan, was brought to attention by Islamist newspaper. In response to rising protests from Islamists, the university administration was warned by a member of the government not to allow the sales of alcoholic drinks in the premises. The campus was already hosting several restaurants serving alcohol, with the ban those two businesses also left the premises. In June 2013, a new legislation (Law No.: 6487) was passed limiting the sales of alcohol, banning the sales altogether in some areas (for example, within 100 meter perimeters of schools and religious buildings) and restricting the sales to 6:00 and 22:00.

In the summer of 2012, the municipality also banned the public consumption of alcohol in the Galata Square. Prior to that, especially on weekends, a large crowd local and foreign youth (mostly tourists and Erasmus Students) used to gather in the square in the evening, and consume alcohol. At the later hours, as the amount of alcohol consumed topped, the crowd used to began chanting and shouting which was a major disturbance for the residents—both gentrifiers and older residents of the neighborhood. Unlike the popular belief that the ban was imposed from the top, that is the municipality, there were numerous complaints from residents to ban the gathering of crowds in the area. As several gentrifiers in the area were members of the press, articles began to appear on the newspapers asking the municipality to take action against the problem⁴⁸. They were mostly complaining about the noise from chanting, which often accompanied by a small band of musicians. Apart from noise, with the lack of public restrooms in the area—at least within those time interval—people were using streets as toilets resulting in unbearable odor for residents. Several protests were organized around the social media, under the name *Galata için isyan vakti*, against the ban and met by heavy police intervention.

During the field research, the crowds were allowed to gather in the area but the consumption of alcohol was only possible in the streets opening to the Square due to presence of police units near the tower. The police also decorated the surrounding with barriers to remind its presence. By June, the police began to allow consumption of alcohol in the Square as long as there was no noise to disturb the local residents. Of all the respondents who resided and/or had their workplaces in the area, none of them complained about the ban. They not only complained from the noise or pollution, they were also disturbed by the instances of fights and sexual harassment they witnessed and defended municipality's action to restrict the public consumption of alcohol in the area.

Starting from 2009, there began a new wave commercial gentrification in the Serdar-1 Ekrem street. The street was already popular among gentrifiers for hosting Doğan Apartment⁴⁹, due to there was already a commercial gentrification at the street level.

⁴⁸ Amberin Zaman, *Galata Kulesi Altında Entel Rezillik*
<http://www.haberturk.com/polemik/haber/754099-galata-kulesi-altinda-entel-rezillik>
Ayşe Arman, *Galata'da her gece toplu taciz*
<http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/haber.aspx?id=18517443&yazarid=12&tarih=2011-08-18>

⁴⁹ Doğan Apartment is a large Italian style building built in 1895. The apartment was owned by Kazım Taşkent, the founder of Yapı Kredi Bank, and named after his son Doğan, who died in a skiing accident in Switzerland. Located in Serdar-1 Ekrem-1 Ekrem street te building consists of

There were several designer stores and café standing next to grocery stores, butchers, small workshops remaining from the pre-gentrification era. With the opening of Şişhane extension of the existing M2 subway line, the street became more attractive to new businesses with the growth in pedestrian traffic. One of the entrances of the subway was located in Şahkulu Bostan Street—a steep street that connects the Serdar-ı Ekrem Street to the main artery Istiklal Street. The other entrances were placed on the other side of the Istiklal Street, at the Şişhane district which also witnessed a similar commercial gentrification, hosting a large number of restaurants the street level, and many offices on the upper floors.

The presence of boutiques was not new to the Kuledibi area, as there were several stores Büyük Hendek, Camekan and Galata Kulesi Streets—all three opens to the Galata Square near the Galata Tower. These were usually stores where a number of hip brands are offered to the customers. Although they were very few in number, they quickly become popular as they received press coverage. Usually such coverage not only relates to the shop itself, authors—who most often serve as trendsetters or tastemakers—also praise the neighborhood making it worthwhile for their readers to visit the area.

Kuledibi district was actually discovered by fashion designers in 2006, when MTD (Fashion Designers' Association) organized the first of the GalataModa Fashion Weeks, which was held twice a year. It was not until 2009—by then, the location for the organization was changed, and moved to Tarlabaşı area—fashion designer shops began to open one by one. The first one was, L. (on Galip Dede Street, fifteen meters below Serdar-ı Ekrem Street's entrance) by two designers Y.Ö. and Ö.T. It was more like a cooperative designers' business, hosting five more designers' works at the same time as they rented a small spot in the store. Then came several others including apparel brands—which are accused of increasing the rents in the area by their aggressive search for a spot regardless of price. With the increase in rents, several designers had to shut down their stores and moved to less visible streets where the rents are still affordable.

51 apartment units and two stores. The building has become one of the monuments of gentrification of Galata, as in 2001, the building saw a major restoration and with the new additions it has become a luxurious historical building. The building was used in a number of popular culture products including music videos and feature films, including Yavuz Turgul's *Muhsin Bey* (1987). While, its appearances in cultural products created short-lived waves of demand for the building, it hosted a low to moderate income household population. In the 2000s, with its elegant look and sea view it became one of the first trophies of the gentrification process. Especially with Okan Bayülgen's purchase of multiple apartments in the building its popularity was skyrocketed along with the prices of apartments.

This latest wave of gentrification will be analyzed in further detail in the seventh chapter.

5.2. Building the Neoliberal Urban Regime in Istanbul

For Theodore and Brenner (2002: 368) “patterns of neoliberal localization in any national or local context can be understood adequately only through an exploration of their complex, contested interactions with inherited national and local regulatory landscapes.” In this section we briefly analyze the particularities of the neoliberalization process as it took place in Turkey, and its reflection on Istanbul.

In Turkey, neo-liberal policies began to dominate the national economy in the mid-1980s, after Motherland Party’s taking over the government following the *coup d’etat* of 1980. Its implications in the urban policy had also become visible as Motherland Party candidate Bedrettin Dalan won the local election for Istanbul in 1984. Empowered with the new legal framework⁵⁰ for the institution of metropolitan municipalities in Istanbul, Ankara, and Izmir, he quickly took off to execute large scale infrastructure and development projects in order to make Istanbul a ‘world-city’⁵¹ (Keyder and Öncü, 1994; Ekinci, 1994). As the post-military rule government introduced a set of measures aimed at increasing deregulation and the diminution of the role of the state in order to promote a free-market economy, in the so-called ‘rolling back’ phase of neoliberalization, the national economy also shifted its basis from import substitution models to a more open one pushing for export growth and attracting global capital. During this period, the government introduced two urban policy innovations with regard to the administration of metropolitan areas (Enlil, 2011). First, a new legal framework allowed local governments to generate revenues from taxes, by introducing new taxes or increasing existing ones. This helped local governments to justify large scale infrastructure or development projects. And second, new legislation on metropolitan administration introduced a two-tiered governance model for large cities such as Istanbul, Ankara and Izmir. Apart from the metropolitan municipalities, district

⁵⁰ Law No. 3030 (1984) “The law on Greater Municipalities”

⁵¹ Dalan’s most significant projects were related to the rehabilitation of Golden Horn district, and the neighboring Beyoğlu area in mid-1980s, which will be dealt in detail later in this chapter. Dalan also undertook a series of controversial projects including the construction of a motorway near the Bosphorus especially on the coasts Arnavutköy and Sarıyer. He was also known for his reckless attitude in developing and executing projects, “with rapid action preceding bureaucratic paperwork, and little patience for legal procedure or for canons of historical preservation” (Keyder and Öncü, 1994: 408).

municipalities in the second tier were endowed with substantial planning powers which were translated to a growing role in the shaping of the built environment (Keyder and Öncü, 1994). This transformation in the governance logic invited the ‘big capital’ into real estate sector, leading to a growth in the number of high-rise office buildings, shopping malls, mass housing projects as well as gated communities and new transportation networks (both public and private) throughout Istanbul (Bartu-Candan And Kolluoğlu, 2008).

This neoliberal transformation lost its momentum as Dalan was replaced by social-democrat Nurettin Sözen in the local elections of 1989. Throughout 1990s, none of the mayors of Istanbul received such strong support from the central governments, especially during a period of coalition governments between 1991 and 2002. It was only after the economic downturn of 2001, with the application of economic stability program dictated by IMF and the World Bank, and neoliberalism has become a permanent turn as AKP took the power in 2002 elections. As the party singlehandedly governed the country since then, the neo-liberal urban policies gradually replaced the populist practices (Cizre and Yeldan, 2005), especially in the housing market where low income groups were previously allowed to appropriate mostly state-owned land for settlement (Keyder, 2000) with the help of frequent ‘building amnesties’ in return for the votes of this growing population in both local and national elections. This informal provision of housing benefited all the parties in the game; industrialists required cheap labor, which can settle in the inner city or outskirts with minimal cost due to governing parties’ permissions to appropriate land, and vote for them in return for the building amnesties. This transition marked the replacement of patronage relationships between local/central governments and the urban citizens, with large scale urban regeneration schemes—often coordinated by Mass Housing Administration in Turkey (TOKI)—especially in the second half of 2000s.

With the opening of the Turkish economy to the international arena, Istanbul had become the showcase of Turkey through which this integration would be achieved and maintained. This entailed an overall policy to enhance the image of the city, to re-brand it in the international markets for tourism, business conference traffic, high profile international organization (Enlil, 2011). In order to prepare the city for such economic activity, the real estate capital began to focus on constructing high-rise office buildings, luxury hotels and convention centers, along with public project such as building a second airport (and then followed by a third one) in the city. With the increasing foreign

direct investment (FDI) in Turkey, particularly in Istanbul⁵², there has been a vivid shift from manufacturing to business services (Erkip, 2000) in the economic base⁵³ of the city (Özdemir, 2002; Aksoy, 1996). This entailed the expansion of the CBD from its traditional centers of Karaköy and Eminönü to the northern parts of the city, mostly to the Büyükdere-Maslak axis (Hacısalihioğlu, 2000; Özdemir, 2002) due to the planned expansion of the city northwards as a result of the second bridge which was opened in 1989. Starting from 1990s, high-rise buildings for hotels and office space were erected one by one especially in the Levent-Maslak axis.

Until 1980s, Istanbul's socio-spatial geography was a fairly straightforward one, as thin belts of upper- and upper-middle class houses and apartments buildings were spread to the shores of Marmara Sea and the Bosphorus, a second one stuck between this belt and the then new E-5 highway, and a third belt beyond the E-5 hosting a large number of squatter housing occupied by lower income migrants (Enlil, 2011). With the post-1980s transformation, this socio-spatial geography began to take a different form, mostly due to rapidly increasing population of Istanbul—at a pace of nearly 3 million every decade between 1980 and 2000—which had to be met by either legal or illegal housing production. In 1981, with the Mass Housing Act, the government introduced the Mass Housing Association which constructed 100,000 units, in Istanbul alone, between 1983 and 1993 (Keyder and Öncü, 1993). In contrast to the *yap-sat* (build and sell) model, which involved small scale constructors to acquire land—often occupied by an old house or a small lot—from several owners in return for several dwelling units in the newly built apartment, these large construction projects attracted capital to the real estate business. The city's middle and upper-middle class residents' flee to outskirts of the city to avoid pollution and social heterogeneity dates back to 1970s and 1980s (Öncü, 1997), yet the change in terms of scale and nature—from middle class apartments carried out by housing cooperatives, middle- and upper-middle residential

⁵² Between 1980 and 1998, FDI in Turkey grew by 3200% in dollar terms, reaching \$11,234 million. Between the same period, the share of manufacturing in FDI fell from 91.5% to 62%, as the share of the service sector has grown from 8.4% to 36.7%. By 1999, there were 4,656 foreign firms in Turkey, with 72% of them specialized in services, while only 25% operates in manufacturing (Özdemir, 2002).

⁵³ From 1980 to 1990, the employment in producer services, consumer services and retailing grew by 170%, 65.5% and 77.5% respectively. In financial services the employment recorded a 37% growth, with an 36% growth in insurance sector. In 1990s, the growth in financial and consumer services ensued with 90% growth in the employment in banking and insurance companies (Özdemir, 2002).

developments, often gated communities (Bartu-Candan and Kolluoğlu, 2010)—has become significant in 2000s.

The neo-liberal policies of the period starting from 2002 simply meant the provision of a legal framework that embraced the incorporation of private capital and the decentralization of administrative authority, shifting from central to the local government. While the impact of globalization has been felt in Istanbul since 1983, the urban regeneration/renewal strategies have become a systematic policy tool in the last decade (Kuyucu and Ünsal, 2010). Throughout 2000s, AKP government passed a number of laws enabling neo-liberal urban policies, which have substantial effects on the urban landscape. The empowerment of metropolitan mayor was consolidated with two new laws in 2004⁵⁴ and 2005⁵⁵ on the regulation of the authorities of the metropolitan municipalities⁵⁶. This consolidation was welded with another law, “Law on the Conservation through Renewal and Preservation through Use of Decrepit Historical and Cultural Assets” (No. 5366), enacted in 2005, entailed definition and identification of renewal areas which consisted of dilapidated assets of historic value, and the redevelopment of these areas for contemporary purposes. With a new set of laws limiting the spread of squatter housing⁵⁷, expanding the authority of Mass Housing Administration (MHA)⁵⁸ in order to create a significant transformation in urban (and suburban) land market. Along with these set of legal alterations, restructuring of the

54 The law no: 5216. “The law of Greater Municipalities”

55 The law no: 5393

56 These new authorities include “(1) broadening the physical space under the control and jurisdiction of the greater municipality; (2) increasing its power and authority in development (imar), control and coordination of district municipalities; (3) making it easier for greater municipalities to establish, and/or create partnerships and collaborate with private companies; (4) defining new responsibilities of the municipality in dealing with “natural disasters”; and (5) outlining the first legal framework for “urban transformation,” by giving municipalities the authority to designate, plan and implement “urban transformation” areas and projects” (Bartu-Candan and Kollouğlu, 2008: 13)

57 Law No. 5237 (2004) in the Criminal code, defining squatter construction as a criminal offence to be punished with a five-year prison sentence.

58 Laws No. 4966 (2003), 5162 (2004), 5582 (2007), and 5793 (2008). This series of laws appoints MHA for regulation of zoning and the sales of state-owned land, as they also grant MHA the authority to undertake for-profit construction projects (on state-owned land) either by its subsidiary firms or public-private partnerships to raise funds used in other housing projects. The MHA is also armed with the power over planning/zoning decisions and expropriation of property in squatter areas. As a result of these laws, MHA is appointed to accomplish two key goals of “constructing a formal land/housing market for low income households and privatizing valuable state-owned land” (Kuyucu and Ünsal, 2010: 1485).

housing finance sector (with Law No. 5582) in 2007, introducing Turkish households with long-term loans (mortgages) was the last building block on the way to creating a “a fully formalized and commodified urban regime that creates vast opportunities for state agencies, private developers and credit institutions” (Kuyucu and Ünsal, 2010: 1485). Finally, in the aftermath of the Van Earthquake in October 2011, the government has decided to pass a new law to renew and rehabilitate areas and individual buildings that are vulnerable to earthquakes, and replace them with earthquake-prone buildings even without the content of dwellers. The Law on Redevelopment of Areas under Disaster Risk” (Law No. 6306) was put into effect in May 2012, involving the demolition and construction of more than 5 million dwelling units in Istanbul alone. Along with the “Law on the Conservation through Renewal and Preservation through Use of Decrepit Historical and Cultural Assets” (No. 5366), this law also expanded to authority of local government to introduce projects which have a major impact on the inner urban areas, such as Sulukule⁵⁹ and Tarlabası. Fener-Balat and Süleymaniye areas are said to be the next in line, with numerous urban regeneration plans are scheduled to proceed in other areas in Istanbul and other cities across Turkey, starting this year.

The 2000s period also marked a shift of planning authority from central to local government; although the decentralization process began in 1980s during ANAP rule with the introduction of new legal provisions increasing the authority of local governments to collect and increase their tax revenues, and the introduction of a new two-tiered municipality organization for large cities—including a metropolitan municipality for the wider city and distinct municipalities for sub-regions. While this helped the transfer of authority for planning and administration to local municipalities, which eventually had a growing role in shaping the urban built environment (Keyder and Öncü, 1994), as the effects of these reform were felt more strongly during AKP government with the further decentralization of authority (Enlil, 2011). According to Dinçer, these projects mark a transition to a new phase, where the inner city has become the main source of capital accumulation and municipalities, under AKP governance, are the agents in the process as an exemplar of “entrepreneur municipality model” (2011: 59). For Tonkiss (2000), while the local government views the inner city as an ‘object of government’, the market forces (i.e. the private capital) regards it as an ‘object of

⁵⁹ Displacing 3,500 residents in Sulukule, a massive urban regeneration project has been underway 2006, resulting in a ten-fold increase in property values. Despite opposition from local residents mobilized by Sulukule Roman Derneği, with support from UNESCO and local NGOs, the project has become near completion by the mid-2012.

speculative desire’ and for 2000’s Istanbul, the local government’s vision embodies both motives with collaboration with not only real estate capital (both domestic and international), but other corporations operating in other areas of business, including private banks and large corporations.

In case of Istanbul, neo-liberalism produced a ‘growth coalition’—in Molotch’s (1976) terms—of local government, corporate capital (both in real estate and other areas of business including banking), NGOs (often backed up again by corporate capital), and their media representatives, which aims to ‘market’ (or sell) Istanbul in accordance with a gentrified vision of the whole city to foreign capital (Keyder, 2010), as well as local residents. With this ‘growth coalition’ in action, urban growth strategies demonstrated an unseen and unexpected consistency to improve the city’s image, as the coalition finds unexpected allies among central government officials which prefer to serve towards same end (*Ibid.*), albeit with different motivations—usually expressed in terms of capital gains from real estate exchange.

During this period, Istanbul emerged as a natural resource, a city to be marketed in order to attract foreign capital both in real estate and other business areas, to preserve and attract a well trained workforce, as a center of cultural production and consumption, with ample resources of cultural heritage. The idea of marketing (or selling) Istanbul is not a novel idea (Keyder, 1993), as many projects have been considered or undertaken throughout its history, including World’s Fairs in 1863 and 1894, Prost’s plan for 1953 International Exposition along with his more comprehensive plans for Istanbul’s candidacy for Olympic Games, for which Istanbul bid for 2000, 2004, 2008, 2012 and 2020 Olympic Games (Bilsel and Zelef, 2011).

As the most controversial large scale UDP in terms its consequences⁶⁰, it intended to pedestrianize the most significant square in Turkey by moving vehicle traffic to

⁶⁰ In June 2012, Taksim Solidarity (or *Taksim Dayanışma Bileşenleri Platformu*) was formed to resist the project and started to hold public meetings. In August 2012, the tender of project was auctioned, and the winning bid was TL51.5 million was Kalyon Insaat. The construction started in October 2012, and in March 2013 Taksim Solidarity founded *Taksim Gezi Parkı Koruma ve Güzelleştirme Derneği* in order to continue a more organized resistance to the project. On the night of May 27th, as the completion rate of the project reached 50%, the construction firm started a small scale demolishing one of the walls bordering Gezi Park. Around fifty environmentalists and activists raided the area, The police raided a small group of protesters with heavy use of force, including extensive use of tear gas sprays. On May 31, two days after officials’ uncompromising stance a group of nearly 200 hundred protesters were raided by the police, and their tents were put on fire by municipality personnel. On the evening of May 31,

underground tunnels⁶¹. The plan would provide a 100,000 square meter open public space, through which they could walk without any intervention from the vehicle traffic. The project was accepted in the Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality Assembly in September 2011, with the votes of both ruling AKP's and opposition members' (from RPP and NMP) votes. Yet in a separate voting session, the ruling AKP's members also passed a new rule to rebuild a demolished historic building, Ottoman Artillery Barracks, which was replaced by Taksim Gezi Park in 1939, according to Henri Prost plan of 1937⁶². The building was planned to host multiple functions including a small shopping mall, exhibition halls, as well as residential units. The opponents of the project believed that the building construction would swallow the existing park, and it would require the cutting of some 600 trees. Many also believed that with the completion of the project, will render gathering for protests or celebrations in Taksim Square⁶³ impossible.

For Korhan Gümüş⁶⁴ (2011) the project was the latest example of an ongoing process since 1950s, where the public space has been swallowed by the private sector, leading to

various opposition groups organized rallies around the country to support the resistance in Taksim, The increasing use of police force in both Taksim and other cities escalated the events, turning to a popular unrest continuing—on-and-off for more than a month.

⁶¹ The project was inspired by a pedestrianization plan prepared for Taksim Square, which had won a hastily organized planning competition during Dalan era. After Dalan's term, the project was revised and offered in his successor Nurettin Sözen in late 1980s. The project caused opposition from various segments within the society yet its developers tried to persuade the mayor by introducing an underground shopping mall, the revenues from which would be used in Istanbul's current subway system, which was one of Sözen's top priority projects. However, even this failed to convince Sözen, and he did not go for the Project (Gümüş, 2013).

⁶² The plan entailed the construction of a large park between Taksim and Nişantaşı, replacing the army barracks which was built in 1806. The barrack served as the headquarters of March 31 Uprising in 1909, and received heavy artillery fire from the guns of the army forces who raided from Salonika to take control of situation. In the following years occupied by the World War and Turkish Independence War, the barracks were not repaired and finally turned to a stadium in 1922. In 1939, the structure was demolished as it was too costly to restore it and turned to a park.

⁶³ Taksim Square has a symbolic meaning especially for left wing politics, as the square hosted Turkish history's one of the most violent attacks towards the left movement in International Workers' Day of 1977, leaving 34 dead and 128 injured. The Square had been closed to Workers' Day celebrations until 2010, as in fact, the holiday was canceled in 1980's *coup d'état*, which was designated as holiday in 2007, by the ruling AKP. In 2010, despite government's ban, more than 100,000 workers marched to the Square, and in 2011 and 2012, the government allowed the Worker's day to celebrate in the Square. In 2013, the government closed the square once again arguing that it was still a construction site and the entrance of such a crowd would result in numerous casualties. In May 1, 2013 hundreds of demonstrators pushed forward to enter the Square, but they were stopped by the police using tear gas shells.

⁶⁴ His speech at the seminar "*Taksim'i Ne Yapmalı?*" (What to do with Taksim?) took place on November 29, 2010 (full seminar footage is accessible at

the ‘privatization of public space.’ In fact, the area spared for a park—which resembles New York’s Central Park—from Taksim to Nişantaşı was taken by private capital piece by piece starting from 1952, with the construction of the first Hilton Hotel (opened in 1954, expanded in late 1950s in order to increase capacity) in Turkey. In 1975, another five-star hotel was erected to the area, Sheraton (Ceylan Intercontinental) hotels⁶⁵.

Another major project undertaken in the area is the Tarlabası Urban Transformation project. Previously occupied by the Armenian and Greek citizens until the middle of the 20th century, the neighborhood became the home to immigrant Kurds, Africans, as well as socially excluded groups such as transsexuals and Romans. The area remained one of the most important central locations in Istanbul, promising a substantial rent-gap in Smith’s (1987) terms. With a 71% tenant population, Tarlabası has been another exemplar of the decaying historic neighborhoods, despite the residential and commercial gentrification that took place in the surrounding areas, including Cihangir (Uzun, 2001; İlkuçan, 2004), Asmalımescid (İnce, 2006) and Galata (İslam, 2003, Behar and İslam, 2006). The earliest project to revive the area began in 1986, featured the opening of a new boulevard (Tarlabası Boulevard) to bring vibrancy to the area, developing a touristic site one side of the road and a commercial zone on the other. Nevertheless, the area continued its decay as the road cut the lower parts of the area from the more vibrant and commercially active upper parts.

In April 2007, GAP İnşaat won the bid for the redevelopment Project, leaving 42% of the total area of 20,000 squaremeters. The plan entails the rehabilitation of 278 buildings, in order to be prepared for a better use, which has different requirements compared to its existing use. While the primary logic of the project is explained by rehabilitation and restoration of existing historic building stock, by the direct intervention of the local government⁶⁶, the project also entails a change in the social composition, which will require new functions such as parking lots, office and

<http://www.arkitera.com/haber/index/detay/yillar-sonra-tekrar-gundemde--taksim-meydani-yayalastirma-projesi-/5054>

⁶⁵ *Gezi Parkı Bütünlüğünü Nasıl Kaybetti?* (http://www.arkitera.com/haber/index/detay/gezi-parki-butunlugunu-nasil-kaybetti_/14974)

⁶⁶ Ahmet Misbah Demircan, the mayor of Beyoğlu, explains this need with the lack of occupants power to make required changes. (<http://www.dunya.com/tarlabasi-buyuk-donusume-hazirlaniyor-190118h.htm>)

residential space and recreational areas for upper middle class use. The website⁶⁷ of the project provides a vision of the life after transformation with a series of pictures that depicts white-collar workers in suits and apparently creative workers in their more casual outfits, with their western-looks, as well as cafés, office spaces and residences which are fashionably decorated and hosting new occupants of the area once hosted a diverse working or even underclass population, by offering what Zukin calls “pacification by cappuccino” (1995, p. 28). In 2008, the plan was met with a strong and well-organized resistance, with the establishment of an association of tenants and landlords to oppose the project (Kuyulu and Ünsal, 2010). Yet, the demolitions have begun in early January 2012, following the displacement of more than 5,000 residents according to unofficial estimates.

Widely referred to as Haliçport, the third large scale project planned for Istanbul’s Beyoğlu area entails the construction of two marinas, two 5-star hotels, shops, restaurants, convention centers, a mosque, theaters, and other recreational/cultural facilities, to the Northern coast of Golden Horn. The project was again planned as a build-operate-transfer mode with a duration of 49 years, four of which was reserved for the construction phase of the project.

The area currently hosts two historic shipyards, one of which was opened by Istanbul’s conqueror Mehmed II. For TMMOB (Union of Chambers of Turkish Engineers and Architects) the project is part of a wider plan to integrate Tarlabası renewal, Galataport, along with adjacent Okmeydani urban transformation projects. The tender was auctioned in July 2013, and the winning bid of \$1.346 billion was offered by a consortium of three companies; Sembol International Investment, Ekopark Tourism and Fine Hotels.

Another significant development of the 2000s, has been the recognition of ‘culture,’ by both central and local governments, as a means to successfully implement its neo-liberal policies aimed at global integration (Aksoy, 2009). Especially in the second half of the 2000s, AKP government began to differentiate itself from the previous governments with its pragmatic approach to produce immediate results by using culture for the promotion of the country, in general, and branding of cities or other localities, in particular. Moreover, a second point of distinction in the AKP period is that, the

⁶⁷ www.tarlabasi360.com

government also aims to benefit from the private sector's expertise in producing immediate and successful results, by inviting the capital to take an active part in the cultural scene by mediating cultural production and consumption. Starting from 1980s, local corporations already began investing in culture, by opening galleries (Aksanat by Akbank), performance halls (İşsanat by İş Bank), universities (Koç and Sabancı Universities, by Koç and Sabancı Holdings respectively, as well as Bilgi University which was also funded by private capital), publishing houses (YKY by Yapı ve Kredi Bank), along with sponsorship in cultural events such as the Biennale, and big ticket events such as pop and rock concerts. One of the most active corporately funded cultural institutions is İKSV (Istanbul Foundation for Culture and Arts), which is founded in 1973 by a group of industrialists and art enthusiasts to undertake festivals and other cultural activities in Istanbul. The foundation currently undertakes the organization of several respected festivals including Istanbul Film Festival, Filmekimi, and Istanbul Jazz Festival. During AKP's reign, corporate investment in culture is endorsed by both local and central government as PM Recep Tayyip Erdoğan himself, personally interfered in several issues relating corporate capital to the cultural production. For example, Erdoğan personally gave the order to let the vacant warehouse which now hosts a privately funded culture complex, IstanbulModern in Karaköy, to İKSV, which had a long lasting dispute with social democrat mayor of Istanbul, Nurettin Sözen prior to 1994⁶⁸. Similarly, Erdoğan also personally offered the old industrial building complex, Silahtarağa Power Plant, to the privately funded Bilgi University in order for the university to use as a campus as well as a cultural complex hosting exhibitions, concerts, and a museum.

The investment by corporate capital in cultural activities and arts is not only a public relations effort that would enhance their corporate image and bring about public visibility, with longer lasting effects compared to advertising's spontaneous and striking effects on its audience (Yardımcı, 2001). For Zukin (1995), the capital aims to establish itself as a patrician class by mediating the production of culture. Besides the support for restricted cultural production, such as modern and canonical arts, many corporations actively involved in the production of mass cultural products in order to enhance their

⁶⁸ Feshane district was offered to İKSV by mayor Bedrettin Dalan (ANAP), even before a proper agreement was signed with the foundation until 1989, when Dalan lost the elections to Nurettin Sozen (SHP). Sozen did not allow İKSV to use Feshane for cultural purposes, instead wanted to keep the property for municipality's own purposes. Having made a substantial investment to the physical restoration of the complex, İKSV had to abstain from its rights to use Feshane without a signed contract in their hands (Bezmez, 2008).

image. Furthermore, many members of the bourgeoisie became active patrons of art, collectors and connoisseurs by establishing long term relations with individual artists, gallery owners and curators.

A civil initiative set out to apply for the European Capital of Capital (ECoC) for the year 2010, later gaining the support of local and central government along with a capital-driven cultural initiative named IKSIV, formed a coalition which successfully won the title for 2010 with Essen (Germany) and Pecs (Hungary). Introduced in 1985, ECoC has been a title given by The Commission of the European Union, first to famous European capitals such as Paris, Berlin, Athens, Madrid and Lisbon, then to smaller and less well known European cities Cibus, Graz, Cork, Lille and Pecs as an opportunity to link local cultures to provide depth and richness to the European culture. Starting from 1999, non-European cities' candidacies were allowed and in 2005, with the initiation of Human Settlements Foundation in corporation with History Foundation and Açık Radyo, Istanbul's candidacy for ECoC had been underway. In 2006, Istanbul's designation as ECoC 2010 was announced and it was mostly due to the civil society's taking the initiative for the candidacy (Öner, 2010). Despite conservative-right tradition's lack of sympathy for canonical high art forms and shallow understanding of culture represented mostly as cultural heritage with Islamic and/or Turkish references, ECoC has been a crucial turning point in AKP's approach to art and culture in several aspects. ECoC is Turkey's first large scale, 'global marketing project' of a city based on culture involving civil society, cultural producers, both metropolitan and district municipalities, along with corporate capital. It also marks AKP administration's realization of the opportunities arising from marketing Istanbul's modern, attractive, and cosmopolitan image for its neo-liberal agenda (Aksoy, 2010).

In case of Istanbul, there is no clear cut identification of the members of the growth coalition, as identified by Keyder (2010), involved in the marketing ('selling') of the city. The local government, real estate and finance capital (especially landed capital including major corporations), related corporate media, several ministries within the central government, as well as NGOs may be included in the growth coalition. Furthermore, when it comes to branding, there are no coordinated efforts, plans developed in collaboration with marketing professionals as the efforts are only limited to half-baked statements by local government officials and members of the central

government. For example, the CEO of Kültür A.Ş.⁶⁹ Nevzat Bayhan states that “What makes, and will make Istanbul a brand is culture and arts. Sure, this (brand) has a dimension of security and finance; but these will make more sense when they are developed in parallel to culture and arts” (Aksoy, 2010: 35).

With the discovery of AKP government that it can use culture to promote Istanbul (Aksoy, 2010), besides its traditional conception of equating culture with historic/cultural heritage, has opened new avenues in the relationships with cultural producers, especially artists. With the appointment of Istanbul as the European Culture of Capital (ECoC) in 2010, both local and central government stressed the importance of culture, not only in terms of cultural heritage but in terms of the importance of a vibrant and rich local cultural scene involving both cultural production and consumption. While the aim of ECoC programme is to contribute to the European identity by creating new links, and reinforcing existing ones, between the selected cities and European culture, the Istanbul version of the revealed to be a marketing strategy and while it appears like it is celebrating multiplicity, it introduced urban regeneration schemes (Göktürk et al., 2010). With such a path, place branding can be detrimental to urban culture by contributing to the uneven development within the city (Pike, 2007) by focusing on more economically vital areas and neglecting or destroying areas, such as Sulukule and Tarlabası that do not add economic value or stand in the way of intended image of the brand, by the political elite. As Zukin (1995: 7) points out, “building a city depends on how people combine the traditional economic factors of land, labor and capital. But it also depends on how they manipulate symbolic languages of exclusion and entitlement. The look and feel of cities reflect decision about what—and who—should be visible and what should not, on concepts of order and disorder, and on uses of aesthetic power.” In this sense, during the selective process of creating an Istanbul image, there is a selective process of making cultural artifacts, such as Islamic heritage visible, accompanied by a process of removal, by making undesired subcultures and related artifacts invisible. For several critiques, the ECoC 2010 event was used to implement such massive urban regeneration policies, and culture was used as an excuse, or a cover to, minimize resistance from the intelligentsia and civil society. As Öner (2010) remarks, ECoC programme requires the formulation of a ‘participative cultural policy’, which ideally

⁶⁹ A subsidiary company of Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality, undertaking cultural activities such as publishing, and management of museums and tourist attractions including Miniaturk and Crystal Istanbul.

targets the inclusion of local cultural groups, as well as cultural producers, local governments and civil society. These participative processes may serve two different purposes: ‘participation to legitimize’ and ‘participation to transformation.’ In the former, those who promote participative practices do so in order to strengthen the basis and justification of their policy goals and interests, while in the latter, the aim is to strengthen the capacities of citizens to suggest and negotiate change and achieve transformation. In 2007, the government issued a new law for the formation of a distinct board, Istanbul Capital of Culture Agency, which is responsible for the organization of activities and directing funds throughout the project. The board involved members from both local and central governments, NGOs such as ISO (Istanbul Chamber of Commerce), ITO (Istanbul Chamber of Industry), TURSAB (Association of Turkish Travel Agencies), Architects’ Association, and academicians from local universities. Throughout the project, there had been several controversies surrounding the issues such as the collection and Oğuz Öner observed, there has been a shift from ‘participation to transform’ to ‘participation to legitimize’ during the course of negotiations between civil society and government bodies, as government representatives overpowered other members in deciding for the direction of policies as project proceeded.

Despite inconsistent and proper branding efforts, the marketing of Istanbul to attract real estate investment poses some problems for the cultural producers, who believe, that the legitimacy of their work and its cultural and economic value, in international circles, is tied to the ‘image’ of Istanbul as perceived by their audiences. So far, AKP’s attempts to enhance Istanbul’s image has been centered around supporting *grand projets* (bid for Olympics), big ticket entertainment (Formula 1 Grand Prix between 2005 and 2011), and a number of large-scale urban regeneration projects such as Galataport, Haydarpaşa Port, the transformation of Taksim Square (by rebuilding the old military building which was demolished in 1940s), the Kartal-Pendik Urban Regeneration Plan developed by world famous architect Zaha Hadid⁷⁰ and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s ‘crazy project’ involving the building of a second Bosphorus to the north-west of the actual straits along with the construction of two new cities in Anatolian and European sides of the Bosphorus. None of these projects come into being not as a result of protests and initiation of legal action by civil society including the Chamber of Architects and Engineers and individual cultural producers, and broadly the local intelligentsia, but as a result of AKP’s lack of commitment to completing such symbolic projects related to

⁷⁰ <http://www.zaha-hadid.com/masterplans/kartal-pendik-masterplan> (accessed on 16.06.2012)

Istanbul. While AKP tries to benefit from Istanbul's marketing to promote an intensified use of land (and the city) by inviting investors to come to the city, encouraging investment from real estate and other capital (mostly financial); some cultural producers depend on Istanbul as a vivid source of inspiration, adding symbolic value to the cultural products or arts emanating from this city, thus serving as a 'place-of-origin,' much similar to the country-of-origin concept, as a 'valorization of the milieu' (Amin and Thrift, 1992).

Against central government's first generation strategies--involving place marketing efforts aimed at attracting visitors and investors and thereby generating revenues from intensified use of land, and 'speculative' increases in the real estate values, and attracting corporate and individual investors in both real estate and other areas of business—the Metropolitan Municipality takes on a more realistic and up-to-date approach by introducing Istanbul Metropolitan Strategic Plan by identifying a self-evolving cultural triangle between Şişli, Fatih and Kadıköy hosting three distinct cultural industries—art and cultural festivals, film and fashion design industries—which has to be preserved and supported as a deliberate policy for urban regeneration (Enlil et al., 2011). At a more local level, Beyoğlu Municipality endorses the GalataModa Fashion Festival, which is held twice a year as a fashion week, allowing a local fashion scene to flourish around Kuledibi, with an increasing number of stores often run by fashion designers themselves.

CHAPTER 6

The Research

This study was aimed at understanding the relationship between the neoliberal urban policies and the field of cultural production (in the examples of two fields jazz and fashion design) as experienced in a particular locality of Kuledibi. As this requires uncovering the effects of the neoliberal policies on the local cultural production in Kuledibi, it is important to objectively uncover the scale and scope of these policies in general, and how the local cultural producers perceive their effects on their productive activity. This two-fold research aim requires two different research methods: for the first task, the secondary data from newspapers, magazines, and official sources are analyzed and for the second task, qualitative research methods were employed to uncover the cultural producers' own perspectives. This chapter explains these research methods in detail, analyzing the fit between each method and the research questions. This chapter begins with the justification of the employment of qualitative research methods in this study. What follows next is the details of data collection methods such as site selection, sampling decisions and other considerations. The concerns for validity and reliability are addressed in the next section. The final section is a brief description of data analysis methods employed in the evaluation of the data gathered in the field study.

The subject matter of social research differs from that of natural sciences, and unlike atoms, molecules, particles etc. the subject matter of the former, the people, can attribute meanings to the events taking place in their environment (Schutz, 1962). This premise encourages qualitative researchers try to understand the meaning for participants of events, situations, actions they are involved, as well as of the accounts that they give regarding their lives and experiences. For Patton (1990: 13) qualitative methods allow the researcher "to study selected issues in depth and detail." As qualitative researchers usually study a small number of individuals or situations, they are able to preserve the individuality of each of these situations. This gives the opportunity to grasp how events, actions and meanings are shaped by the unique circumstances under which they occur. Moreover, qualitative research allows scholars to understand the particular context within which the participants act, and the influence of this context on their actions. This

requires qualitative researcher to focus on the description of the context, a “thick description” as Geertz (1973) calls it. However, Lofland and Lofland (1995) warns the qualitative researchers from becoming drowned in the details of the context, in a case of “descriptive excess,” in which the richness of details hampers the analytical capacity of the researcher.

Another feature of qualitative research is its focus on processes and how they unfold in social life over time. This requires the use of ethnographic methods—such as in-depth interviews and participant observations, and longitudinal immersion of the social scientist within the field. In this sense, qualitative inquiry is more suitable for understanding the *process* by which events and actions take place, rather than the *outcomes*. Through its focus on the processes, qualitative research also offers the flexibility of incorporating unanticipated phenomena and influences into the theory (Maxwell, 1996). This flexibility enables the researchers to generate new grounded theories on the influences of these phenomena, on the basis of a ‘constant comparative analysis’ (Glaser and Strauss, 1967), which requires not only going back and forth between the theory and the data, and a continuous alteration of the theory on the basis of the latter, but also a modification of the incoming data depending on the theory. In this sense, grounded theory methodology can be defined as “theory that was derived from data, systematically gathered and analyzed through the research process” (Strauss and Corbin, 1998: 12) and it views generating theory and doing social research as two interrelated parts of the inquiry (Strauss and Corbin, 1994).

Based on these features of qualitative research, I viewed qualitative research methods to fit the purposes of this study. First of all, both theoretical concepts, ‘field of cultural production’ and ‘artistic mode of production’ are dynamic concepts, and their relationship to neoliberalism as well as to each other cannot be grasped by quantitative research methods alone. Locality is also a dynamic construct, and the lack of available secondary data census data in this area, and the burden of constructing primary data from scratch make the use of a quantitative methodology impossible. Secondly, as my focus is on the perceptions of the cultural producers themselves, the use of qualitative research in this study is more than justified.

Given the exploratory nature of the study and the small number of potential informants in each field which required a detailed and in depth understanding experiences of each respondent, qualitative research methods are employed in this study. The data was collected in a field study in two separate phases: the first one was a pilot research

conducted between December 2010 and June 2011, in order to identify the relevant sectors to the theoretical approach, and the second phase was completed between April and June 2013. Also important was the gathering and analysis of secondary data such as reports in newspapers. The field data were also supported by video and photographic documentation.

6.1. The Field

The primary data collection method of this study is *in-depth interviews* as I tried to uncover the meanings as constructed by the informants, thus tried to unfold participants' own perspectives' (Maxwell, 1996). A major focus was on the illumination of the *emic* categories as depicted by participants themselves (Denzin and Lincoln, 1994). A second method *participant observation* was used for further understanding of the internal dynamics of each *field* explore the circumstances under which positions are depicted, position-taking were revealed and cultural producers' strategies are constructed and employed. Participant observation was also valued for its 'unobtrusiveness', as it removed the researcher from the set of interactions or events being studied (Denzin, 1970). The introduction of a second method also helped the purposes of 'data triangulation' (Denzin and Lincoln, 1994) which involves the use of different data collection methods to check for their consistency—that is, by the comparison of the data produced by each method related to the same phenomenon. Employment of multiple data collection techniques also secures the theoretical validity of the findings (Kirk and Miller, 1986), as Berg (1998: 4) emphasizes "every method is a different line of sight directed toward the same point, observing social and symbolic reality."

A third method, the use of secondary data from newspapers and other sources, had three purposes. It helped to outline the neoliberal policies as evident Istanbul, along with the scope of the projects and their timeframes. It also provided guidance and a basis for interviews, as well as participant observation. Finally, secondary data from newspapers and other sources provided a basis to challenge the validity of the findings from other data collection techniques helped to conceptualize, categorize contextual data in a comprehensible and meaningful manner.

In the next section, I will explain the rationale behind focusing on Kuledibi as the research site and how each method is used for the purposes of this study in detail.

6.1.1. Selection of the Research Site

As the largest city of Turkey, Istanbul hosts a significant portion of cultural industrial activity, and historically, Beyoğlu has been the center of much of this activity. The area hosts a large number of theaters, performance venues, publishing houses, along with other sectors. The area is also expected to be influenced by the recent neoliberal urban policies, mostly large scale urban development projects such as Taksim Pedestrianization Project, Tarlabası Urban Transformation Project, Haliçport, and Galataport. Yet, because Beyoğlu was so large an area for any particular field of cultural production could be studied in relation to urban space the selection of a much smaller area within the vicinity of Beyoğlu, for the purposes of a field study Kuledibi district, in this sense, is a more feasible selection as it hosts several fields within the broader field of cultural production at even at first sight. Moreover, Kuledibi area was particularly important as it was experiencing a long period of gentrification since 1990s, which also changed character due to the introduction of an old project nearby, involving the transformation of the old harbor to a large cruiser port. As gentrification has been one of the emblematic processes of neoliberal urbanism especially since the turn of the millennium, Galata's gentrification has undoubtedly become a neoliberal type of gentrification with the introduction of Galataport project, attracting both domestic and international corporate investors of various scales. The presence of gentrification in the area, and its transformation to a neoliberal one with the introduction of Galataport project makes Kuledibi the most suitable area to study the relationship of cultural production and locality in a neoliberal context. These two fields (jazz and fashion) were also selected to reflect this relationship, as two of the most visible sectors operating in the area. Moreover, these fields' presences in the area also coincide with two different phases in the gentrification of the area. While the field of jazz locates the area in the early stage of gentrification during early 2000s, the entrance of the field of fashion coincides with the latest phase of gentrification, towards the end of 2000s.

6.1.2. Selection of Informants

In this study, a 'purposive sampling' strategy (Patton, 1990; Berg, 1995) was employed, in order to achieve required diversity and variability in informant composition. Following McCracken's (1988) suggestions the 'sample' size was determined to be 8 to 10 informants for each of the fields, in order to understand how each field operates, and to explore the available *positions* and *position takings* and the relationships among

these *positions*, as well as the relationship of field to the wider social space, particularly the field of power.

I tried to construct a respondent pool based on contrast of age, status, and education. Yet, since the field of fashion design is female-dominated domain (McRobbie, 1998) and almost all the designers in relation to Kuledibi district were female⁷¹ there is a bias toward female respondents from the field of fashion design. In the field of jazz, there is an increasing number of female cultural producers in the recent years, yet despite my attempts I managed to conduct interviews with mostly male musicians. The only female respondent was the co-owner of a jazz venue (see Appendix A for a complete list of informants).

Interviewees were allowed to choose the setting in which the interviews would take place, as well as the timing of the interviews. All informants chose public spaces such as restaurants as well as their workplaces. Interviewees were not offered any premium for participating in the study, only in some cases I bought drinks or meals as a sign of my gratitude for their participation.

The interviewees for the field of fashion design, were mostly fashion designer who were located in the Galata Kuledibi area, where agglomeration tendencies occur for designer boutiques. Since the number of boutiques were less than 10 at any given point in time, old occupants as well as those who only sold their products in the stores without opening one were also interviewed. A fashion blogger and a fashion designer who had no relationship with the area were also interviewed to gain insight.

In the field of jazz, cultural producers (usually musicians) were interviewed with a special focus on performance artists, as well as three venue owners were interviewed gain isight to the field of jazz.

In addition to 12 interviews conducted between December 2010 and June 2011, in order to identify the relevant sectors to the theoretical approach, a total of 18 interviews were conducted between April and June 2013. There has been a selective focus on cultural producers who would provide the maximum amount of relevant input based on their experience with the way they conduct business.

For all the informants a different set of questions from a single interview guide were asked in order to provide a match between the experience and position of the respondent

⁷¹ All the designer boutiques in Kuledibi are owned by female designers, yet in GalataModa Fashion event there are numerous male designers participating the event regularly.

with the focus of this study. In most of the interviews, I did not strictly follow the interview guides in order to relax the informants and tried to conduct the interviews in a chat-like, warm and friendly manner. I only interrupted the informants when they were obviously driven out of the topic. Yet, I managed to maintain a continuous and uninterrupted flow of narrative, in an 'unobtrusive and non-manipulative' manner (Patton, 1990: 40). The interviews were recorded with a digital voice recorder, and transcribed by a professional help as soon as possible to combine field notes with the raw interview data. The interviews lasted between 35 minutes and 195 minutes, depending on the respondents' availability, talkativeness and interest in the topic. The average time of an interview is 63 minutes.

Interview questions were focused on several key topics in addition to biographical information regarding the respondents. During the selection process, information regarding the potential respondents were sought over the Internet and almost all respondents (except for two) had information regarding their educational and professional background (either in their own websites or third-party sites). The first group of questions helped to uncover the critical decisions made by the respondents in their career paths, and as these decisions (as pointed by the informants) point out when and where the field-specific strategies were developed and implemented. The second group of questions particularly aimed to understand the collective and individual habituses of respondents, and how locational preferences are influenced by them, as reflected by the strategies employed by the respondents. Locational preferences were regarded central to the artistic mode of production; as the valorization (or re-valorization) of an area is closely connected with the cultural activity (both production and consumption) that takes place. It is also important to uncover the extent to which these cultural producers (especially cultural entrepreneurs who run businesses or simply have live-work places in these areas) had the freedom to choose locations, and how this choice is restricted by the actions of other players in the urban scene, namely the field of power.

Push and pull factors are also revealed for their locational preferences by pointing out how other agents both within the field of power and the field of cultural production (and their intersection) create and preserve a suitable habitat for cultural producers, which is the key to AMP if it exists. Pull factors may include anything to benefit culturally productive activity in a district such as imposing rent controls and facilitating pedestrian access (by building walkways, ensuring security with better lit and monitored streets) or physical renovation/improvement of buildings and streets in the area. In our case, for

example, the construction of walkways in the Kuledibi area, the Beyoğlu municipality's supports for the organization of fashion week by local designers are pull factors. Push factors include any support for an activity that competes for the same piece of urban space, any interventions to the public spaces in surrounding areas, as well as rent pressures arising from the demand from other uses of land and buildings. In case of Istanbul, the transformation of the Taksim Square, the restrictions imposed on Kuledibi and Asmalimescid can be regarded as push factors.

Locational preferences also needs further clarification to understand how reputations of cultural districts (in this case, Beyoğlu in general and Kuledibi, Asmalimescid in particular) serve as push factors in inviting cultural producers, and how these reputations (i.e. representations) are constantly negotiated and altered by cultural producers to their advantage, against other agents' representations of the same space.

It was also important to uncover other actors involved in the urban transformation, as perceived by the cultural producers. In other words, it questions the presence of a growth coalition, again as perceived by cultural producers, that is willing to extract profit through land valorization, either by supporting and sustaining an artistic mode of production or through slash-and-burn tactics to develop unused or underutilized land. The presence of an artistic mode of production is only possible when there is a deliberate support from other agents to the proliferation of cultural activity (both production and consumption) in a given locality. The conflict over the control of urban space (both in terms of use, and the creation of meaning for urban space, and mediating public culture) is a major theme to be uncovered.

Within a total duration of 33 days in three months, the sites of cultural production (streets as well as jazz venues) were visited in order to gather observation data. This included three separate visits to GalataModa Festival in 2009 and 2010, attendance in Jazz Day activities on April 30th, 2013 including movie and documentary screenings in Salt Beyoğlu, as well as multiple attendances to jazz performances in three different venues: Nora, 60m2 and Mitanni. The visual documentation of venues and streets where cultural production takes place, as well as surrounding areas were made, in order to give the readers an idea of the research site.

An ‘unsystematic analysis’⁷² of news reports from newspapers on relevant issues regarding cultural production, cultural policies, and other issues. The particular focus will be on Radikal which offers ample resources on the issue, as well as other newspapers were also covered in order to grasp contrasting stances over same issues. In addition to newspapers, personal blogs, social networking (Facebook, Twitter etc.) profiles of cultural producers (including but not limited to respondents), where they frequently comment on relevant issues such as cultural and other policies.

6.2. The Difficulties and Limitations of the Field Study

The major limitation of this study was to have access to the informants in both fields as well as the field of power. As the major focus of this study is on the experiences and perceptions of cultural producers themselves, I tried to reach most relevant agents within the field whose experiences and opinions would add much to my understanding of their respective fields. This required a screening of almost all available producers within the field through a careful study of already available material on the Internet as well as other producers’ accounts on how such agents might be relevant to my study. In the field of jazz, where the producers have been plenty, I was lucky enough to reach a large number of musicians and venue owners, all of whom provided detailed and sincere accounts of their experiences within the field. In the field of fashion, since the number of fashion designers relevant to the Kuledibi district was limited, I tried to reach every one of them through emails or shared contacts to make appointments for the interviews. In both fields, many potential respondents accepted to arrange interviews but many of them also declined or became unresponsive in the later phases of communication.

When approaching them, I fully disclosed my intentions and my focus of study in order to achieve rapport among respondents, yet this full disclosure often backfired in my approach to institutional agents (i.e. employees of the corporate sponsors) who might have thought their personal opinions would contradict or harm the institutions they represent. Despite the particular focus of this study on cultural producers themselves, I also wanted the voice of relevant agents from the field of power to be heard but my attempts proved futile as many potential informants could not spare a time for interview within their busy schedules.

⁷² The term ‘unsystematic analysis’ is used in contrast to content analysis, defined as “the analysis of documents and texts that seeks to quantify content in terms of predetermined categories and in a systematic and replicable manner (Bryman, 2004).

Another difficulty I faced during the field research was the detailed and overly sincere accounts of the producers in both fields. Many respondents presented me more information than I asked for, including rumors or detailed accounts on the actions of other agents within the field acted on particular issues. This required me to impose a self-censorship in order not to harm any agent, as well as not to jeopardize their relationships with other agents within the field. I also chose not to disclose any personal information regarding the identity of respondents apart from their specific positions within their respective fields in order to offer full confidence.

CHAPTER 7

The *Field* of Jazz

The particular focus of this study is on the strategies of cultural producers within the *field* of jazz and fashion. This first chapter of findings is dedicated to the *field* of jazz. The chapter starts with a brief history of jazz in the world and Turkey, to lay some historical groundwork before delving any further towards the *field* of jazz. Then, using a Bourdieusian framework the positions within the *field* is extricated based on empirical data, with particular attention to the *forms of capital*—*economic, cultural, social* and *symbolic*—that operates within the *field* (just like any other *field*). Yet this exercise demonstrates how these forms of capital work together in combination to define the *positions* of cultural producers within the *field*, and how this mapping situates the *field* of jazz within the *field* of power. For the latter task, the rest of the field of power—the dominant fraction of the dominant class—in relation to the field of jazz is outlined since, as part of the field of cultural production, the field of jazz is also positioned within the field of power, as the dominated fraction of the dominant class.

Further extraction of the data will also reveal the *position-takings* and the *strategies* cultural producers use to improve or consolidate their position within their own *field*, and against the *field* of power. The uncovering of these strategies shifts our focus to the use urban space, as such *strategies* employed by the producers rely heavily on the use of space, against both other cultural producers within the field and other agents outside the field. The role of such agency is particularly significant in a neoliberal context, as previous studies on gentrification or culture-based urban regeneration attributes a rather passive role to the cultural producers often as gentrifiers (Zukin, 1982, 1989, 1996; Ley 1994), responding to the external demands from the field of power—namely the interests of corporate capital, local political and patrician elite as Zukin (1982, 1995) prefers to call them. Cultural producers are often depicted as the victims of the gentrification processes they started (Zukin, 1982; Smith, 1996; Ley, 1994) due to their lack of financial resources (i.e. economic capital) to preserve the grounds—they rendered attractive to middle and upper-middle class followers (or admirers) seeking distinction from the mainstream culture—due to rising rent levels as a result of gentrification. In the case of Kuledibi's gentrification, as one of the contributors to the

process of gentrification through the creation of a visible and distinctive neighborhood identity, cultural producers within the field of jazz also succeeded in applying their own strategies responding to internal demands from the field itself.

The history of jazz in Turkey dates back to 1920s, by Leon Avigdor who received formal training in classical music, and formed a jazz band (Ronald's) upon witnessing the jazz scene in Paris. He formed a number of bands, performing to various audiences—usually circles of West European and American expatriates in Istanbul. By 1940s, the genre gained recognition with the spread of radio broadcasting, and in 1950s, the genre gained popularity as American military personnel started playing and circulating their records in Ankara nightclubs, injecting the love of jazz to local youth. It was also in 1940s, local musicians began to show interest in this novel genre, and in 1950s a number of musicians (including Emin Fındıkoğlu, Okay Temiz, Arif Mardin and İsmet Sıral⁷³). (Meriç, 1998)

In 1950s, Turkey was a stop in United States State Department's "Jazz Ambassadors"⁷⁴ Program which involved tours of jazz musicians in a number of different countries including Greece, Poland, Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, Ceylon, Congo and many others. In 1950s, jazz had become one of the areas that came to the fore during the post World War II, as part of the capitalist propaganda for postwar American liberalism that in a "Free World" even the state sponsored art would be free, unlike the 'Socialist Realist' system that produces only hollow, rhetorical, academic *art official*. In response to the Soviet "peace offensive" launched in the early 1950s, private institutions such as MoMA and the Rockefeller Brothers Fund, sponsored the art works and funding for travelling exhibitions to enhance American image using modern art. Jazz, with fine arts, was one of the cultural forms (Davenport, 2009; Saunders, 2000) because of the predominance of black musicians in the cultural production to promote United States as a "jazzocracy"—a democratic country unified racially and politically through the arts and jazz [...] not only in an effort to convey the core liberal values of social justice, egalitarianism, and democracy but also to create sympathy for the U.S. position in the

⁷³ Emin Fındıkoğlu and Okay Temiz are still very active members of the jazz community in Istanbul. Arif Mardin had become one of the most influential figures in American music industry, working for the largest production companies including Atlantic Records and EMI, as a producer. İsmet Sıral performed in different venues in Istanbul including Hilton Hotel, between 1961 and 1973. He tried to integrate different genres, especially *tasavvuf* music, for a local language of jazz and tried to establish a school of music in Marmaris.

⁷⁴ <http://www.the-american-interest.com/article.cfm?piece=102>

http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/29/arts/music/29kapl.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0

world” (Davenport, 2009: 84). Fine arts, on the other hand, were chosen because of their association with high culture. “[T]hese forms proved to be a subtle, and thus effective, means of reaching social groups in foreign countries that might be expected to harbor cynicism about, and even opposition to, American political and economic goals” (Zukin, 1982: 102). In Turkey, performances of legendary musicians such as Dave Brubeck, Louise Armstrong, Benny Carter and Dizzy Gillespie created much enthusiasm among Turkish jazz lovers.

In 1964, the first vinyl jazz single⁷⁵ was recorded and sold in Turkey, followed by several others, yet with the politicization of popular culture in late 1970s jazz began to lose its significance in Turkey. This led to the closing of jazz venues, yet, 1980s brings about the birth of jazz festivals and some of the most significant jazz concerts—by famous musicians such as Chet Baker, Chick Corea, and Miles Davis—in Turkey. In 1990s, jazz regains its popularity with the opulent works of a large number of musicians including Önder Focan, Tuna Ötenel, Kerem Görsev, İlkin Deniz, Erkan Oğur, Yıldız İbrahimova, and Sarp Maden. Various production companies including Ada, Diskotür, Kalan, Trikont, Balet, and Doublemoon produces numerous albums by these prominent musicians (Meriç, 1998). In 1980s and 1990s, Bilkent and Bilgi University’s began offering formal education in jazz, followed by Hacettepe University in late 2000s.

The jazz has become a fragmented genre of music, yet the term jazz is used to denote various genres which share common characteristics. There are various sub-genres within the jazz, under different influences from a variety of sources in different musical genres and styles, emerged at different points in time. First emerged as a distinctively Afro-American music, combining different influences from sub-Saharan music to Latin music. In 1930s, jazz became very entangled with the swing, which was, at the same time, a ‘dance music’. In early 1940s, jazz wanted to break free from this association and produced *bebop*, as a response, evolving from a dance music to a more technical, ‘musicians’ music.’ At about the same time, under the influence of Cuban music, Afro-Cuban jazz (*cu-bop*) was born. The late 1940s introduced the *cool* jazz, with Miles Davis’s *Birth of the Cool* album. In the mid 1950s, *hard-bop*, as an extension of bebop, was a response to the vogue of *cool* jazz. Then followed the *modal* jazz in the later 1950s, and *free* jazz as an avant-garde stream of the genre, rose to popularity in 1960s.

⁷⁵ Doruk Onatkut Orchestra featuring Tülay German, Burçak Tarlası/Mecnunum Leylami Gördüm from Ezgi Plak.

Later years, witnessed the birth of new sub-genres such as *soul* jazz, Latin jazz, Afro-Brazilian jazz, *psychedelic* jazz, jazz-fusion (jazz-rock and jazz-funk), well as the revival of Afro-Cuban jazz. Despite this richness and variety of sub-genres, contemporary jazz is simply divided into two sub-genres, ‘mainstream’ jazz and ‘free’ jazz. While the mainstream jazz consists of classical jazz regardless of the sub-genre (or ‘jazz standards’ as musicians call them), free jazz rests more on experimentation and extensive improvisation, and almost exclusively instrumental contrary to the vocal content of mainstream jazz.

7.1. Explicating the *Field of Jazz*

Identifying the field-specific types of capital—economic, cultural, social, and symbolic—within the field of jazz is the first step towards positioning the field within the broader field of cultural production (and the field of power). Moreover, it helps us to identify key positions agents can assume (and their position takings), though the differential possession of the types of capital.

Economic capital basically translates to economic worth; which includes income both from the activities of cultural production⁷⁶ (within and outside the field), it may as well be other income from other economic activity. This type of capital is the least field-specific type of capital, as it can be objectively transferred from one field to other (for example, from the field of power to any other field, within or without the cultural field of production) and its ample possession gets the agents (or the total field) closer to the field of power. Among the respondents, only one (**RJ#6**) is living of the income from the gigs, while others had different income sources—some worked in other fields within the broader field of cultural production, such as playing for more popular artists within or outside jazz, composing scores for popular TV series or movies, or working in other

⁷⁶ The income from the performances comes from entrance fees or tickets, while the venue makes money from the meals and drinks sold in the venue. In several occasions, the entrance fee is called *müzik parası* by the venue owners, or *kapı* by the musicians themselves; and the total amount collected by the venue each night is then distributed to the members of the band. This practice was mostly referred to as *kapıyı almak* (getting the door) by musicians. No matter how the amount of payment is determined, venue owners call this payment *kaşe*, a term commonly used in performance based cultural sectors, including TV series production and popular music performances. For a gig, a musician receives usually a small payment, often as low as TL25-30 depending on the venue and the number of people in the audience. The amount is usually calculated as total entrance fee collected, divided equally among band members. In some clubs, the fee is predetermined by the negotiations between the venue owner and musicians, and paid regardless of how many people are in the audience. Often, some venue owners cancel the gigs when there are very few people in the audience, convinced that the revenue will not cover the musicians’ fee.

sectors outside the field of cultural production. Three respondents (RJ#1,4 and 7) were earning their livelihood by giving personal lessons in the instrument they are specialized. Each had between 3-to-10 students, only one of these two musicians were giving lessons in an institution. Another two of them (RJ# 7 and9) were earning additional income by playing for more popular figures in jazz or popular music, especially in album recordings where talent really matters.

As Bourdieu does not provide a field specific definition of **cultural capital** in relation to the field of cultural production, his broader definition of three forms of cultural capital allows us to elaborate such a definition. *Objectified* state of cultural capital in the field of jazz includes works of art within the field of jazz, such as compositions, recordings, as well as live performances—which are recorded. Apart from the cultural products produced within the field of jazz, there are also other products that can be considered as signifiers of this objectified state: instruments. Often regards as cultural products themselves, instruments have a fundamental role in the field of jazz—which is also valid for other genres—with the way these instruments are used. Many musicians used modified instruments, often custom made by specialist small scale manufacturers (such as *luthiers*). In addition to the instruments themselves, musicians use auxiliary products such as effect pedals, amplifiers etc. to achieve their unique signature sound. Often, musicians are approached by a medium or large scale instrument manufacturer, to endorse their products. In some cases, the instrument brand manufactures a signature model, named after a musician, in other cases, the manufacturer offers free merchandise for the musician to use. *Institutionalized* state basically refers the type of education related to the field and outside the field. In the field of jazz, there are several institutions from which musicians can receive degrees. Traditionally, most of the jazz musicians in Turkey were graduates—or drop outs of—conservatories, which did not—and still do not—offer any degree in jazz, as they were originally conceived as offering more canonical genres, like classical music. Students are not encouraged to play jazz, rather playing jazz was stigmatized in the conservatories as it was regarded as an impediment to improve one’s playing style—especially in piano. A significant portion of younger generation musicians have degrees from Bilgi University (Department of Music) in Istanbul and Berklee College of Music in Boston.

Until 2000s, the only formal training available for jazz musicians were the classical music programs in universities and state conservatory. The opening of Bilgi University’s music department made available a program in jazz music with the help of Turkey’s key

figures in jazz, including Neset Ruacan, Aydin Esen, Can Kozlu, and Ali Perret as instructors. Many of those figures had formal training in classical music, in state conservatory and switched to jazz following which had significant resemblances to classical music in terms of rigor in the composition and performance of the genre. Yet, aspiring to pursue a musical career in jazz was widely stigmatized in classical music schools, as many musicians tell stories regarding how they received disciplinary punishment when caught by their teachers as they were playing in jazz style. Bilgi University music department gave its first graduates in 2001, yet its effect on the *field* of jazz was not limited to supplying more than 50 musicians actively playing gigs and making records within the field of jazz. The students were encouraged by their instructors to play gigs, often with their instructors in ensembles wherever they find available. Along with a small number of jazz enthusiasts, their performances were followed by their fellow classmates this puts the field of jazz, in the sub-field of restricted cultural production as outlined by Bourdieu, where cultural production takes place for other cultural producers, in other words, it becomes ‘production for producers.’ The institutionalization of jazz training with the founding of department of music is mostly responsible for creating such a network of musicians, including both students and instructors.

Social capital in the *field* of jazz includes the relationships with the network of influential patrons along with other cultural producers within or outside the field, including cultural intermediaries, and sponsors. In jazz, perhaps more than it is for any other genre, networks among musicians and venue owners—as well as other cultural intermediaries and an even extended network of sponsors and some members of the audience—is very closely knit. The relatively small size of the field with respect to the number of agents within it is one contributing factor. Musicians perform as bands, in different combinations and different numbers⁷⁷, depending on their perceived fit of musical styles. Musicians often substitute for each other in more gigs, when a regular member is not available for the gig. Musicians appear in different bands and projects, with a different content. Often the same band performs under two different names, depending on the content of the gig. Traditionally, bands are named after the band leader, whose compositions are performed during the gig, yet in Turkish context band

⁷⁷ For example, a two person band is called duo, for three persons its trio, quartet for four, and quintet for five persons.

leaders may play under other musicians' bands in order to promote even younger musicians.

Symbolic capital refers to the reputation within the field of cultural production, as well as honor in terms of loyalty to field, and other agents within the field (Fowler, 1997). For example, a musician with ties to the popular music industry may possess ample economic capital, but loses in terms of symbolic capital. Similarly, a musician with strong ties to cultural intermediaries within the field, including sponsors, (i.e. high in terms of social capital) may possess both higher economic capital and symbolic capital due to his/her activities within the field.

In the field of jazz, the basic cultural product is musical compositions which are usually transmitted to the audience via the live performances (or gigs) and the recordings through which such cultural products are objectified. Unlike other many other genres in the world of music, live performances are central to the process of cultural production in jazz. For other genres within popular music and canonical high-art musical forms such as classical music, the live performance is basically the performance of previously composed music to the live audience. In jazz, however, live performances are where and when composition of the musical piece begins, hence it is a phase in the actual process of cultural production. As the genre primarily rests on the principle of improvisation by individual band members, in a harmonious fashion of course, musicians improve their previously conceptualized musical compositions by taking into account the feedback by the audience. As jazz gigs takes place with small audiences, the constant interaction between musicians and the members of the audience produces fruitful inputs to the creative process of composition. Moreover, musicians also discuss their collective and individual performances, instruments, sounds and tones during and after the gigs. This helps them to build and improve their distinctive styles and personal sounds over time. Often members bring different instruments or accessories to the performances to hear the opinion of other members and audiences.

Neither live performances nor sales of recordings create significant revenues for musicians. On average, according **RJ#4**, a successful record in the genre sells about 2,000 copies⁷⁸ including downloads from Internet. Jazz musicians hardly receive any

⁷⁸ During the time of the research, a female singer who recently published a new record of a popularized version of jazz surprised the respondents as the album sold more than 5,000 copies within a couple of weeks.

media attention to promote their albums, aside from websites dedicated to jazz, such as *cazkolik.com*, or *Jazz Dergisi* which help musicians to announce their album releases.

In the *field* of jazz, recording an album, then, is not aimed at making economic gains, rather it is a form of registering musicians' cultural products, and registering their musical capabilities as an artifact. While prominent musicians can make record deals with several recording companies, they are not given the opportunities and time that is given to pop musicians, to record their album. For example, one of the respondents has recorded his second album with a recording company, which also carries his popular singer girlfriend, only in two days when the studio was idle between two popular projects. Nor he did use recording practices prevalent in the recording of popular music, where each song is recorded bit by bit, until the final product reached a desired point by the producer. Within such a limited time, musicians did their best by recording each song as a band, for three times (or 'takes' as it used in the music industry) and chose the best version to put into record. Other musicians who lack the financial resources or personal connections to make a record, often record their songs in their home studio, and broadcast over the Internet. These recordings are also followed by other musicians in the field.

Basically, there are several key *positions* in the *field* of jazz. First one is the general *position* of the musician (both newcomers and established musicians) which has a broadly identified position in the social space, but may differ from the actor to actor depending on the types of *field*-specific capital they possess. The second one is the established musician, —and closer to the field of power though their mediating role between production and consumption—is that of *cultural intermediaries* including columnists, venue owners, individual and institutional organizers and sponsors.

The *position* of the musician, however broadly defined, is the basic to field of cultural production, as they are putting out the cultural products from this field. Of course, the differential ownerships of these types of capital determine the producers' position within the field. For example, the ample ownership of economic capital—even from the activities within the field of jazz—does not secure a respected position within the field. Being a genre of 'restricted production,' the cultural production aimed at acquiring higher levels of economic capital is not disdained, but in the 'reverse world' of such artistic production. Yet, the reverse is hailed by other producers in the field and emerges the cultural producer doing 'art for art's sake.'

Yet, since economic capital is the key to survival, none of the respondents, negatively evaluated cultural producers endeavor to make income from other activities, as long as the producer continues to culturally productive activity within the field of jazz without compromising its quality⁷⁹. Yet, totally abandoning the field for higher economic gains is negatively evaluated. Making money from other sources is seen as a key condition for musicians to continue playing jazz in return for such minimal economic gains, they receive from their gigs or albums. **RJ#7**, a prominent guitar player who is known to make his living only through gigs, explains how the field jazz is very poor in terms of economic capital (as income). He explains how his fellow band members make their living.

RJ#7: I mean he is playing several gigs, what does it make in total, lets it's 150 liras a week and 600 liras a month, therefore people (musicians) are engaged in other stuff, if they are making money from music, it is something more commercial... for example, E* composes scores for TV dramas, D plays with a singer named BT*... A* is something like manager in a multinational corporation, E* only plays jazz but he is a very talented saxophonist and because everybody wants to play with him, and he is giving private lessons in a school, in a school where rich kids attend, he is teaching them how to play, by getting up at 6 A.M. in the morning, that's how he tries to make a living. Therefore, it is something like tightrope walking, you have something that you like to do, something that you do with love but, at the same time, they also have to experience things they would not otherwise prefer... *(Yani hani birkaç akşam diyelim çalıyor böyle nolcak o zaman haftada kazandığı para diyelim ki 150 lira ayda 600 lira ,, dolayısıyla insanlar başka şeyler yapıyorlar yani müzikten para kazanıyorsa ticari bir şey yapıyor mesela E* dizi müzikleri yapıyor D* BT* diye bir şarkacı var onla çalıyor, Alper çok uluslu bir şirkette müdür gibi bişi E* sadece caz çalıyor ama E* hani çok özel bir saksafoncu o yüzden herkes onla çalmak istediği için bi şekilde hani artı bi de bir okulda ders veriyor kenarda hani hep böyle zengin çocuklarının gittiği bir okulda hani çocuklara saksafon gösteriyor hani sabahın 6sında kalkıp falan öyle yaşamaya çalışıyor dolayısıyla hani böyle biraz ip cambazlığı gibi yani hem işte severek yaptığın bir şey var yani bu insanların hepsinin aslında aşkla yaptığı bir şey hani bu yani hani ama aslında mecbur olmasalar tercih etmeyecekleri şeylerden yaşamak zorundalar)*

As **RJ#7** summarizes most of the musicians need additional sources of income to make their living as the *field* of jazz has a very restricted access to economic capital. The lack of economic capital from the activity within the *field* also makes venues less profitable business ventures, and they need spaces that are economically accessible yet in locations where there is a potential for business, in terms of audience's access.

⁷⁹ Two of the informants held academic positions in a university, in department of music. Only one of the respondents made his living through jazz performances, this bestowed him a respected position in the field as he was solely focused on improving his style by playing at least two gigs a week. One of them held an executive position in an international financial services company, yet he managed to play four gigs on average in different venues with different band members.

Cultural capital as exemplified by formal education in the field of jazz, or in another area within the broader field of music. Yet, education alone does not account for claiming cultural capital, or converting it to symbolic capital in the field of jazz as many respected jazz musicians may not even have a formal training in music. Three of the respondents—two of them are the most prominent guitarists of the current jazz scene—had degrees outside music (two of them had engineering degrees; one of them had a philosophy degree). A term used for artists who lacked formal training, *alaylı*, is not used in the field of jazz due to respect for such musicians. On the other hand, jazz music's heavy reliance on live performances for the purposes of cultural production shows itself in the education aspect of the field. While formal training in music meant very little without a consistent and fruitful performance career; such a performance career can also be substituted for the lack of formal training. When asked about their careers, jazz musicians begin with a list of musicians, usually starting with the seniors who introduced them to the field, or discovered their talent in a jam session. For example, **RJ#7**: A saxophonist, who was living in Izmir later moved to Istanbul to join the jazz network. He only had one acquaintance in Istanbul, who invited him to a jazz event named *Balık, Ekmek Caz* (Fish, Bread, and Jazz). When the concert turned into a jam session, he played a couple of songs with the band and he exchanged phone numbers with the other members, thereby making his entrance to the local network of musicians. Similarly, **RJ#3** also joined several jam sessions when he moved to New York, to be able to access the local network of jazz musicians.

Moreover, training through private lessons from respected senior musicians also helps to compensate for the lack of formal training in the field of jazz. Indeed, before the opening of Bilgi University's Department of Music, many musicians who had a formal degree in music, had to seek private training to improve their genre-specific capabilities towards the performance or composition of jazz. Apart from formal education and training, networks (or jazz circles) are also important for jazz musicians. Musicians are identified with the other musicians they played with, as playing with respected musicians adds to symbolic capital of musicians. Especially, playing with international world renowned jazz artists is a distinguishing feature for local jazz musicians, as it means being honored and recognized for their own talent by a key player within the field. Considering the hardships musicians faced to break through as a jazz player in the local scene—the lack of financial resources and institutionalized training in Turkey, as well as proper venues to perform—being introduced to international circle is a source of prestige, especially for younger generation of musicians. This can be accounted for

contributing to both cultural and social capital, in either case, turned to symbolic capital to improve the position by the producer within the field.

As with all the fields within the *field* of cultural production, the *position* of the ‘newcomer’ is a major one, just like the *position* of the established cultural producer (‘old-timer’ or the ‘master’ in the classical sense). The relevant *strategies*—to improve their *positions* for the former and consolidate their *positions* for the latter—of these two positions will be dealt next.

Trying to improve his/her position, the newcomer tries to enter the network through personal acquaintances—who are also producers within the *field*—or jam sessions which allows new players to introduce themselves to the network. Contrary to Bourdieu’s analysis, the *position* of the newcomer is not defined in opposition to the established musician. Rather they cooperate as the latter enjoys the honor of introducing new members to the local circle. For example, **RJ#8** is a venue owner, who is also an established musician in the *field*, introduced various musicians to the local circle by arranging them gigs. One of the respondents, **RJ#11** was indebted to him as he was sent to a local jazz festival in Norway, where he got an honorary public’s choice award.

Cultural intermediaries also play an important role in the field of cultural production. The general confusion in defining and identifying cultural intermediaries can be overcome by identifying and defining them at different levels, again by using Bourdieu’s theory of cultural field. This also requires such identification to be made with respect to each field within the field of cultural production. In their differential positions within the social space some cultural intermediaries are closer to the artistic field in question, with their possession of ample symbolic capital; while some others are closer to the field of power and often belong to the realm of field of power. In this respect, cultural intermediaries can be divided to those within the artistic field—in this case, the field of jazz—and outside the field. While the first group involves primarily venue owners, jazz critics, columnists within the media, the second group consists of institutional and individual actors—sponsors, festival organizers, wealthy patrons. There are also those cultural intermediaries who are outside the field of jazz, but within the

boundaries of another subfield (i.e. journalistic field) such as columnists and critics within the field of cultural production, within other fields of music⁸⁰.

On the one hand, there are cultural intermediaries who are internal to the field of jazz. This type of cultural intermediaries include the venue owners, record company executives, who operate exclusively within the field of jazz as part of the field, with their own standing in the social space of positions that corresponds to the field. These are jazz club owners, organizers of the jazz festivals and record labels which exclusively work with jazz musicians. They often act as gatekeepers who decide which musicians and what music, should have access to public performance.

Venue owners decide which musicians are allowed to play in their clubs—depending not only on the capabilities or talents of the musicians but also their seeking a perceived fit with the policy of the club (or its image among musicians and the audience)—as well as what type of music will be played depending on their perception of the expectations of the audience. For example, for a strict jazz audience consisting of genuine jazz followers, playing ‘jazz standards’ (a term used to denote jazz classics, including masterpieces of jazz) appears as the right thing to do. Depending in the audience, a jazz singer who is promoting her newly released album can be asked by venue owners to play several jazz standards in her gig, because there are many foreigners in the audience who seem to know a lot about jazz.

Venue owners in this field are usually jazz musicians (such venues are called *müzişyen mekanları/kulüpleri*) or lovers of the genre (Tekelioğlu, 2011) —who wanted to do something related to jazz, to occupy a position within the field using their not cultural, but economic and social capital. The former category hosts mostly musicians who are frustrated with the way performances are organized within the field and their relationships with other venue owners. In most cases, their problems are not related to economic issues, such as low fees or late payments, but their freedom to play as they like, and whenever they want. This switch from the *position* of ‘musician’ to ‘entrepreneur’ will be discussed in detail, later in this chapter.

The second category of venue owners usually have other—and ample sources—of income, such as a successful business enterprise, and they gained access to the network

⁸⁰ Often these two fields, journalistic field and the field of jazz, overlap—like it is in the case of jazz related press, including jazz magazines and websites.

of musicians by establishing long term relationships with them by attending live performances or personal connections. They try to hold a position within the field using their economic capital and social capital, and less with their cultural capital which usually takes the form of knowledge of the genre. Compared to the first group of owners, their symbolic capital is usually lower, as in the reverse field of restricted cultural production, economic capital is not the one that matters. Yet, still, their business background (as reflected by their *habitus*) gives them a competitive edge in organization and funding issues; which still may not translate to symbolic capital as such strategies are likely to be found out of place by other cultural producers within the field.

Of the two versions of venue owners, the former stands closer to the *field* of jazz, with its low economic capital, and high social and cultural capital. The latter, on the other hand, is closer to the field of power with its ample economic capital, and relatively low cultural capital.

Also included in the cultural intermediaries in the *field* of jazz are the record companies. There are several record labels offering jazz musicians to record and distribute their albums, including AK Music, Ada Music, and Kalan Music. Record companies decide which musicians are allowed to reach a wider audience through the sales of hard copies in record and bookstores, as well as through the online channel.

In addition to cultural producers, jazz musicians, there are also ‘old’ *cultural intermediaries* in Bourdieu’s sense, including columnists and critics, who suggest which musicians should be followed and which venues should be visited. These include jazz critics on the radio—including radio jazz show hosts—as well as print and online media—columnists not only writing on jazz or music in general, but also lifestyle issues including recreational and cultural activities. Such cultural intermediaries point out what is ‘tasteful’ jazz, as well as ideal places where such music can be accessed. They not only create demand for certain cultural products (i.e. performances) they also put neighborhoods into the radars of cultural consumers of the ‘new’ middle class, who by their consumption activities create buzz around a neighborhood and fuel gentrification.

Bourdieu also identifies a group of ‘new’ cultural intermediaries--as the core of the ‘new petite bourgeoisie’, a new social class with distinctive tastes and cultural practices, holding occupations which involve “presentation and representation (sales, marketing, advertising, public relations, fashion, decoration and so forth) and in all the institutions providing symbolic goods and services” (Bourdieu, 1984/1979: 359). Such ‘new’

cultural intermediaries, also unquestionably part of the Florida's (2005) "creative class" or Brooks' (2001) *Bo-bos* (bohemian bourgeois) not so much mediate cultural consumption and production with their productive activity—within a field of restricted production where lean production mechanism is at work, rendering the presence of such occupations unnecessary or unaffordable—as they do with their cultural production.

Moreover, the intrusion of corporate capital into the field of cultural production, through sponsorships and other financial supports, gives way to a new breed of cultural intermediaries. These can be institutional or individual actors; corporations or NGOs (usually backed by corporations), and their top-level management of related departments who orchestrate the tasks related to organization and funding of the festivals, as well as individual events (such as the Jazz Day celebrations in Turkey). They are the ones who not only mediate between cultural production and consumption, they mediate also between different aspects within the field of cultural production: between financial resources to support cultural activity and the cultural producers who would perform such activity; and between the infrastructure (performance venues, as well as festivals) that is required for the cultural production and the cultural producers themselves. Thus, in a way, these cultural intermediaries stand between the field of power and the field of jazz, but belong more to the field of power than they do to the field of cultural production not with their ample possession of economic capital but control over it. In the field of jazz, cultural intermediaries—due to their position in the social space—also serve as the buffer to refract the demands external to the field, preserving its autonomy or similarly translate external demands into the field of jazz in order to facilitate the appropriation of the cultural field, towards the needs of field of power. In order to identify this 'new breed' of cultural intermediaries, it is crucial to identify the relationships of the field of jazz with the broader field of power. Being a relatively autonomous field on the surface, the field of jazz is expected to have limited ties to field of power.

The most prominent relationship with the *field* of power is through sponsorship agreements, through which economic capital from the field of power enters the field of jazz. Sponsorships are essential for the functioning of the field, when additional funds are needed to organize festivals and events which cannot be afforded by any of the players in the field. In Istanbul there are two important jazz festivals IKSIV's Istanbul Jazz Festival and Akbank Jazz Festival, still continued to this day. The first jazz festival in Turkey was organized by again Emin Fındıklıoğlu who ran 1980s and 1990s famous venue, Bilsak which was located in Cihangir. The festival was first organized in 1985,

and continued until 1989. In 1991, Turkey's one of the largest banks Akbank, started Akbank Jazz Festival, followed by IKSv in 1994 to start Istanbul Jazz Festival, which is sponsored⁸¹ by another bank, Garanti. Akbank, IKSv and Garanti are all prominent players in Turkey's art and cultural activities scene, and their support is not limited to jazz. Akbank has introduced a center of arts and culture in Beyoğlu, Aksanat, as early as 1990 in a building nearby the Tünel side of the Istiklal Street. Both IKSv and Garanti have centers for art and culture in the area.

The relationships with the field of power, for individual players, are mediated by *cultural intermediaries*, employed as organizers and advisors to the festivals. They are the one who decide who will perform in the festivals, and under what terms. There are also NGOs specifically founded to support cultural activities, such as IKSv, which play an important role in supporting cultural activities in Istanbul by directing funds to festivals in different areas of cultural production (including film, theater and jazz), biennales, as well as by directly offering performance venues or galleries.

By selecting who will receive sponsorship funds, and who will appear in sponsored events such as festivals, organizers and sponsors often restrict the cultural producers access to such event. Often the intervention of the field of power, as exemplified by corporate capital's sponsorship to the events is received with mixed reactions among cultural producers. Some of the cultural producers approve such interventions as sponsorships help the field to compensate for its lack of economic capital:

RJ#8: without those sponsorships it is hard, or even impossible to organize a festival in Turkey because there is no state support. I don't know where they have such a support but I know for a fact that sponsorships make such things happen. Without them (the state) there is only one bank, which supports everything and that's the way things work... Of course, I don't know what good it does to us, but I get to listen to international stars in jazz thanks to them (the sponsors) ("*O sponsorluklar olmadan bir festival düzenlemek çok zor hatta imkansız bir şey Türkiye'de çünkü devlet desteği yok. Nerde var nerede yok onu bilmiyorum hani Amerika'da devlet desteği var mı işte İngiltere'de devlet destek açıkçası onları bilmiyorum ama orada da hani sponsorluklar sayesinde birçok şeyin döndüğünü. Bir tane örneği de öyle banka var bir tane o destekliyor her şeyi ve öyle yürüyor işler tabi yani onlar olmadan.. Tabi bize bunun ne getirisi var ne getirisi yok onu bilmiyorum hani ben hani dünya yıldızlarının cazdaki turnak içinde o insanları onlar sayesinde dinliyorum*")

⁸¹ Although the festival is sponsored by Garanti, under its *Caz Yeşili* brand, Eczacıbaşı Holding 's listed as the leading sponsor. There are also other sponsors such as Turkish Airlines, DHL, Vodafone, Matraş, Mercek and Amplio.

Other respondents view such interventions as reducing the *field's* autonomy, to the extent that they restrict cultural producers' access to the resources:

RJ#5: a private enterprise should not have a claim in relation to a city, nor it should appropriate some aspect of the city... If an institution goes on to say that it is organizing a jazz festival, if I am resident of this city, I for one find it strange when it tries to do something on behalf of me... I'm against that, if someone tries to organize a jazz festival on behalf of the city... because they are defining a field for themselves, they appropriate it and they restrict your access to the field as a musician." (*özel bir kuruluşun hiçbir şehir bazında genel bir iddiaları ve sahiplenmeleri olmamalı. Şimdi bir tane kuruluş çıkıp da ben Caz Festivali düzenliyorum dediği zaman, ben bu şehrin eğer bir ferdiysem benim adıma bu şehirde bir şey yapmasını ben garipsiyorum. Dolayısıyla da ben genel olarak hani yok böyle şehrin adına caz festivali falan o tarz şeylere çok karışıyım. Çünkü kendilerine bir alan tanımlıyorlar o alanı tapuluyorlar... ve senin müzisyen olarak da ulaşımını kısıtlıyorlar*)

RJ#9: in other countries, festivals has to host local musicians... in Europe, as far as I know, there is a 30% limit, in Norway, when there is a festival, 30% of the musicians hosted should be local ones... What happens in Turkey, they put local musicians to a small venue, they use them (local musicians) within that 30% but the budget they spared for local musicians are really funny. (*yurtdışında yerel müzisyen bulundurmamak zorunda festivaller. Avrupa'da caz bildiğim kadarıyla %30'luk bir şeyi olması gerekiyor. Norveç'te festival olduğu zaman, bir caz festivali % 30 yerel müzisyen bulundurmamak zorunda. Türkiye'de ne oluyor, salona atıyorlar, [...] onları kullanıyorlar o %30'un içerisinde onu gösteriyorlar ama sana verdikleri bütçe çok komik baya komik*)

These two accounts by jazz musicians show how the intervention of capital (either directly in the form of sponsorships or indirectly as organizers) threaten the autonomy of the field.

Apart from festivals, venues also receive sponsorship, but given the limited amount of funds spared by the sponsors to support the activities, the funds received by the venues are also limited. Several venues in Istanbul are sponsored by a prominent player in the banking sector, which already has an established position as sponsor, due to its ongoing support for the jazz activities such as festivals and individual events. For example, Nora hosted numerous international jazz musicians with the help of sponsors. The club does not seem to rely on any of these sponsorships for its financial survival. Rather, the club uses the sponsorship funds to organize prestigious gigs which the owners regard as their duty to the local jazz community. By bringing famous international jazz musicians to Istanbul, Nora's owners reward their clientele for their loyalty to the club over the years, adding to their symbolic capital.

Despite the reliance on sponsorship funds for major events, personal connections of venue owners are also important. Back in the days of first Naima, the owner only had minor sponsors to offer symbolic gestures, which only had a small financial value for the sponsors:

RJ#4: the sponsor was Cumhuriyet newspaper, they helped us to publish a magazine, and there was Amiga, ommodore (as a sponsor)... But their was not like the sponsorships of today, I borrowed a loan from S****bank, it was like 30 thousand liras, (which) I used for construction and I paid it back, but as a favor I wrote their name in the seats and put them in the garden... that was sponsorship for me, it wasn't like this back then, there is a habit now, we need to find sponsors for everything... after my return in 2002, I say let's do this, they say we need sponsors for that... without a sponsor they could not go to dinner, people started saying we need sponsors, I was very surprised but I know what this means now (*Sponsor şeydi ya Cumhuriyet gazetesi, işte bi dergi çıkarmak için onda sponsor şeyyaptı, bi amiga vardı Commodore. Ama onların öyle bi şey gibi değildi, şimdiki sponsorluklar gibi bişeyden bahsetmiyoruz yani. S****bank falan filan öbürlerinden kredi almıştım ondan sonra 30 bin lira mı ne? İnşaatı falan kullanmıştım ondan sonra geri ödedim ben de işte onlara hoşluk olarak onu şey yaptım sponsor... isimlerini banka yazdım koydum bahçeye... Oydu yani benim sponsor oydu yani böyle bi sponsor şeyi de yoktu o zaman ya yani böyle bi alışkanlık bilmemne herşeye sponsor bulun bulmak lazım, ben bu son 2002 dönüşünden sonra ya şöyle bişey yapalım bilmemne diyorum mesela yapsak ya, abi sponsor lazım abi diyor, bişey diyorsun sponsor lazım, ya oğlum hani neredeyse bir rahat rahat nevizadeye gidemiyor sponsor lazım abi yahu herşeye sponsor demeye başlamış millet yani baya şaşırmıştım ama anladım ne anlama geldiğini...*)

The importance of sponsorships for the jazz is acknowledged by almost all the players within the field. Venue owners think it is crucial for the activities to be supported by the sponsors as the profit margin from the activities is very narrow and sponsorships help the venues to survive in the long term. Musicians, on the other hand, also value the sponsorships because such support enables world-class musicians to come to Istanbul and reach their local audience. Often local players find the chance to meet their 'heroes' and play along with them. In this sense, sponsorships are valued for both economic and symbolic reasons. Yet, almost all the informants complained about the way sponsorship funds are received and distributed. It follows that having a control over how these funds are received, distributed and used moves agents within the field of jazz closer to the field of power to the extent that have a control over these sponsorship relations with the corporate capital.

Corporations' preferences for sponsorship usually depends on their perceived fit of the cultural event—in this case a jazz festival or a single gig—with their corporate identity. Providing funds for less popular genres associated with a high symbolic value also translates as an enhancement of prestige for the supporting party. In Turkey, as jazz is more associated with a distinctive and elite taste, it usually serves to enhance corporate identity. In this sense, such support for cultural events can be considered within the

boundaries of ‘corporate social responsibility’ concept. Such sponsorship helps corporations to polish their image in the eyes of various stakeholder groups, including individual and institutional (business-to-business) customers, as well as their employees. Tickets for events are often distributed to important customers as non-financial perks to enhance loyalty, or awarded to employees to increase their motivation.

For Zukin (1989:176) “shifts in dominant class’s accumulation strategy generally invoke new cultural norms in order to justify and facilitate the exercise of unaccustomed forms of social control [...] as current linkage of accumulation in urban forms is more paradoxical than most historical examples: the use of art and historic preservation is the basis of an AMP, which represents an attempt for large-scale investors in the built environment to ride out and to control a particular investment climate.” She also observes a close connection between accumulation and cultural consumption, in late industrial capitalism, with sectoral shifts in investment in the economy as a whole, the corporate capital supports to build up for the urban infrastructure for art and culture. Also evident is the individual decisions of business elites to build up an art collections, personally or through their corporations.

Banking and finance capital in Istanbul, tries to present this investment climate by supporting the arts or other forms of cultural production, in order to attract foreign investment to Istanbul, eventually leading to a growth in banking and financial services sectors’ customer base. Several respondents in the field of jazz, including venue owners, considered their field to be very small and insignificant in terms of economical value, and in terms of number of stakeholders involved.

They also believed that neither capital nor political forces (that is, from the field of power) may have plans to intervene with their field (of jazz). Yet, as Bourdieu writes in the Postscript to *the Rules of Art* “the increasingly greater interpenetration between the world of art and the world of money” threatens the autonomy of the field of jazz, as “new forms of sponsorship . . . and new alliances between certain economic enterprises . . . and cultural producers” (1996/1992: 344). Whether it is support from the financial capital, in terms of sponsorship or patronage, or employment and income opportunities from the field of popular music; the field of jazz is not immune to the threats against its autonomy. In this case, the position takings of the individual actors, strategies to defend or improve their positions within the field and against the field of power, may be inspired by the positions from the field of power. Nora’s owners’ and Selcuk’s turn to

entrepreneurship, a position borrowed from the field of economy, to resist the forces from the field of power of the field of jazz.

At another level, the relationships with the field of power do not solely involve the relationship regarding the culturally productive activities themselves. While getting support from banking and finance capital, cultural producers are threatened by the real estate capital's slash-and-burn tactics of the urban renewal, with an appetite for large sites for redevelopment in the urban core, such as Taksim Square, Tarlabası, Sulukule, and Galataport. As the field of jazz, like any other field of cultural production that needs a space in the city for the continuity of the culturally productive activity is subject to pressure from the field of power. For example, while the choice of Kuledibi for Nora was mostly due to economic reasons, this advantage gradually lost over time as gentrification created upward pressures on rent levels, due to gentrification of the area. The legal position of the building and the protective measures by the local government created a shield around Nora, helping owners to resist the pressure by the real estate market. Recently, landlord put the property on sale in order to benefit from the growing demand for property in the district.

An important aspect of Bourdieu's field theory is the various *strategies* cultural producers—as agents employ to improve or defend their positions within the field (Johnson, 1993; Bourdieu, 1993a). These strategies may relate to interventions from the field of power—such as over-commercialization of arts (Zukin, 1982)—or cultural producers desire to gain ground against other cultural producers within the field (Lopez, 2000). For the field of jazz, such strategies include receiving formal training or additional training to excel on the musical instrument and/or vocal technique, or establishing relationship with other producers within and outside the field to improve chances for joint cultural production which may have economic and/or symbolic returns. These strategies often have consequences related to space, for example, moving to another place to get closer to the desired circles within the field. Several respondents changed their locations to get closer to the places where other cultural producers within the same field are densely concentrated. This is often an outcome of the presence of institutions related to training of producers within the field, such as a music school, or a well-established production network and market for the cultural field in question. These strategies depend of positions occupied by the cultural producers within the field, and like positions and position-takings they are field specific, and defined within a space of possibles (Bourdieu, 1993a). For example, 'newcomers' try to gain ground within the

field by making acquaintances, often using their existing ones, to expand their network. In this sense, jam sessions help newcomers to receive the necessary introduction to a local network (or circle) of jazz musicians to secure work arrangements. ‘Old timers’ also have their own strategies, to defend their ground in the field. The basic aim of such strategies is to build on symbolic capital by protecting revered position among fellow players. This often requires helping young musicians to have access to the network of players and venues, by introducing them through gigs or other forms of cultural production. For both positions, individual talent and mastery is a key that opens all doors, yet Bourdieu’s rejection of ‘hagiographic’ accounts of artistic success does not help us to situate such dispositions in our analysis.

7.2. The *field*-strategies, agency and urban space

In this section, such strategies for different position will be briefly described. Particular attention will be given to the strategies that are *reflexive* in nature—that is, they are employed to modify the relevant field—and have significant consequences related to the use of urban space. One such strategy, in close relationship to urban space, is the opening of alternative spaces of production or to facilitate access to the market (or an audience). This strategy is not only a response to the internal factors from within the field—the inhibition of access to market/audience by more institutionalized ‘mainstream’ institutions—and external demands—mostly economic ones—from the field of power.

Zukin observes such strategies through which cultural producers—in her case painters and sculptors in SoHo—can resist the market dynamics by “forming their own alternative channel to the marketplace,” artists’ “cooperative galleries (co-ops)” or “alternative spaces” (Zukin, 1982; 92) or “artists’ initiatives” (İnce, 2006; Tan, 2006). Such spaces, for instance off-Broadway theater and jazz lofts, not only offer alternative spaces for the production, display or performance of cultural forms but they are “adjuncts to dominant urban forms.” Broadway and Madison Avenue, where mainstream art markets reside. These may be short-lived as more successful artists were selected from the co-ops by professional dealers and agents, or seeing the success of the gallery—or the venue—in this case it may become mainstream, as co-ops themselves hire professional managers to improve the position of the co-op in the market place. Like loft living, the use of alternative spaces is also identified with needs of artists for spaces at a low cost. Bourdieu, too (1993a: 252) points out to the birth of *Salon des refuses* in 1863, by the state, when Impressionist were not allowed to display their work in the

salon of classical art controlled by the *École des Beaux-Arts* which had the mission “as the guardian of true and exclusive principles of beauty.” Such alternative spaces, where alternative artworks are displayed and performances are held “represent a way of circumventing either official taste or “the market” and the pressures applied by them to the avant-garde” (Zukin, 1982: 182).

The early 1970s ‘Loft Jazz’ movement is another exemplar of the growth and commercialization such alternative spaces and genres. The musicians who played ‘free jazz’ began to play in the lofts, instead of bars and concert halls. This was partly because their work was unmarketable due its distance from the mainstream jazz, and partly because they preferred to play in the lofts to avoid commercialization of the genre and as black Muslims⁸², they wanted to stay away from the corrupt atmosphere of the jazz clubs. The movement partly started as an entrepreneurial activity⁸³, as these “young and impoverished, educated, ambitious [...] would-be performers lacked a place to operate” (Zukin, 1982: 119). They not only used lofts as performance venues but rented them to other musicians for rehearsal, and helping. The entrance fees were low, they were known since they appeared in entertainment guides and with the reception of government subsidies the organization of performances became more institutionalized (Ibid.). Despite their popularity and government support, these entrepreneurs could not survive the pressure from residential use, eventually evicted to replace residential tenants who could afford a higher rent. Like the arts presence in SoHo and the West Village, their presence helped “to make their neighborhoods more visible and more acceptable to the general public,” yet, “with the live-in musical performers as “anchor,”” their landlords slowly converted their buildings for residential use” (Zukin, 1982, 120). The use of ‘alternative spaces,’ in this sense, may emerge as a result of difference between artistic styles or expressions within the genre. It may well reflect a difference in approach to the performance or display of cultural products, trying to break free from the dominant logic within the market. Over the years, as jazz had been associated with

⁸² In fact, ‘free jazz’ or ‘loft jazz’ movements were an outcome of the Black Arts (or Aesthetics) Movement, as a product of New Black Music (Baskerville, 1994; Neal, 1987), and the major motivation behind musicians’ preference for lofts is their avoidance of club atmosphere. The ‘loft jazz’ movement lasted for over a decade that faded out with the rest of Black Arts movement in late 1970s. By the end of 1970s, although loft jazz died as a musical movement, jazz continued to be performed in the lofts.

⁸³ They even went further to organize their own festival, alternative to the ‘mainstream’ Newport Jazz Festival. With the raising of state funds to support the alternative festival, the following year, their festival was incorporated to the Newport Festival program.

an upscale and Western-oriented audience in the Turkish context, as a genre performed in upscale bars, night clubs, and venues, giving way to a Q Jazz Model dominating the jazz scene over the decades.⁸⁴ The Q – Jazz concept—as identified by Tekelioğlu (2011) in his work on jazz venues of Istanbul, from 1940s and onwards—as a jazz club model for which the “the customer (not ‘audience’) should be of upper-middle class, would not mind high entrance fee and prices of drinks, and finally should be dressed in a manner that fits the nobility of jazz. ‘Jazzlover’ of such qualities, in return, would listen to jazz in a ‘comfortable’ atmosphere; comfortable meaning a high acoustic quality, a fancy venue, a nice view and jazz musicians who looks like ‘jazz musicians’” (Tekelioğlu, 2011: 111, translation mine).

In fact, this concept of Q-Jazz has roots in the historical development of jazz venue concept in Turkey. As the reflection of an Western-oriented elite taste, jazz performances had usually been hosted in various types of elite spaces including *gazin*os, *pavyon*s⁸⁵, and night clubs bars—often hotel bars including those in international five star chains such as Hilton, Sheraton, and Taksim Intercontinental, along with bars in upscale neighborhoods such as Bebek, Levent, and Elmadağ-Harbiye area near Nişantaşı⁸⁶. This model also dictated a dominant working arrangement limit most of the musicians from performing live in jazz venues. The most common type of job agreement between jazz musicians and venues were to contract a band of musicians to play in a single venue (may be a 5-star hotel bar, or an upscale venue), three-to-four nights a week for a month. Often contracts were extended to cover an entire season, often as long as three months depending on the expectations of the venue and the musicians. The deal usually included an amount of monthly payment agreed upon by the musicians and the venue owner, as well as other benefits including free (mostly

⁸⁴ Q Jazz is not a different sub-genre in the jazz music, rather it is a jazz bar concept named after Q Jazz Club-Bar which served between 1995 and 2006 in the premises of a luxury hotel, Çırağan Kempinski Hotel, in Kuruçeşme (on the coast of Bosphorus). The building is a former Ottoman Palace built in 1860s, then taken over by a Japanese corporation in late 1980s and renovated as a five-star hotel.

⁸⁵ *Gazino* and *pavyon* in Turkish context mainly refers to entertainment venues, where live music performances—mostly classical Turkish music and other genres including jazz—were made. In addition to the performances, alcoholic drinks and/or food is served to the customers (Beken, 2003).

⁸⁶ There were also numerous bars or jazz venues in Beyoğlu (between Galatasaray and Tünel) in 1950s and 60s. Rundown neighborhoods such as Tarlabaşı rarely hosted jazz venues despite its proximity to cultural core Beyoğlu. For example, in the early 1990s İstanbul Sanat Merkezi was opened in the area, but after numerous muggings of both players and customers the place had to be shut down for security reasons (Tekelioğlu, 2011).

alcoholic) drinks to the members of the band. Considering the limited number of venues in Istanbul, this left many jazz musicians without a potential to earn income by performing jazz.

The first club to break free from such model was Naima (1989-1991), opened by a musician in a family heirloom historic house in Arnavutköy⁸⁷. The owner allowed jazz musicians to play 5-to-6 nights a week, in combinations under different band names. The agreements with the musicians were made on a monthly basis allowing multiple musicians to play within the same season, spanning from September to June even July. Considering the small number of active jazz musicians at the time, Naima was a turning point of Istanbul's jazz scene. It was the first exemplar of jazz club, the type that can be found in jazz capitals of the world, including New York, Chicago and Paris. It was attended by a mostly upper middle-class clientele, and a 'new' middle class emerging in the 1980s Turkey. Nevertheless, despite its economic success—which can be translated as its ability to survive solely by using the income generated by the club itself—and its groundbreaking role in the field of jazz the club had to shut down in 1991. The closure was attributed to the external factors by the owner, (as Iraq's invasion of Kuwait increased the concerns regarding a possible armed conflict in the area, resulting in the downturn of the entertainment economy as middle- and upper middle-class members of the clientele withdrew from participating such activities).

The same musicians also tried to open a new venue in Kuruçeşme in late 2000s, with the same name. As a location, he chose the coast of Bosphorus again, this time in Kuruçeşme. At that time, the area was hosting a number of upscale night club and a middle scale concert venue (Kuruçeşme Arena) after the removal of a large coal storage area in late 1980s⁸⁸. However, by late 1990s, many cultural activities were starting to cluster in the old cultural core of the city, Beyoğlu and the owner soon found out that the coasts of Bosphorus was no longer a suitable area. Because the area hosted upscale night clubs, the rents were high for a jazz club to cover. Moreover, changing rules of the business due to the growing significance of social media and advance in the telecommunication technologies required venue owners to be more aggressive in pursuing customers instead of musicians:

⁸⁷ Arnavutköy had undergone a wave of gentrification starting from late 1980s.

⁸⁸ Since the turn of the 20th century, both the coastal area and a small island near the coast was used to store coal arriving to the city. The removal of coal storage areas was planned since the second half of 1950s, yet the execution of the plan had to wait until 1986.

RJ#5: people are now going to Taksim and the surrounding area, the Bosphorus area was no longer suitable, Arnavutkoy was successful at first, I thought it was still 'suitable' but it wasn't any more...I tried to promote it but people were sending short messages for invitation, but this is jazz, you can't go to hunt customers, they should know (the club's) place and they will come... there aren't 100 jazz clubs, you can either go there or come here, nothing else (*insanlar hep taksim ve taksim civarina şey yapıyorlar pek boğaz tarafına yani ilk Arnavutkoy'de tuttuğu için hala o dönem o şeydeyiz zannediyordum öyle değilmiş ondan sonra tanıtım şeylere müdahale edeyim herkes cep telefonu listelerine ceplere mesaj at bilmem ne yap onu çağır falan bunu çağır falan caz müziği bu yav yani müşteri avına çıkılır mı yav yerini bilecen gidip oturulur gidip herkes 100 tane caz klübü yok ki ya oraya gidersin ya buraya gidersin ya da 3. varsa bi tane de ona yani başka yok*)

Despite its economic failure, Naima helped the owner to gain a respected position within the field (an increased symbolic capital), as he is still revered for his enterprise. He was the first one to introduce an ideal jazz club format for many musicians, as he tried to break free from the authority of the venue owners, limiting the autonomy of the musician by interfering in the actual process of cultural production. As a musician he was discontented with the venue owners' interventions to the content (i.e. the repertoire to be played by the band) and the musicians themselves in their physical outlook and behavior during the 'gigs.' This example also shows how a producer even within a 'field of restricted cultural production' may employ a *strategy* (or a *position-taking*) that is neither *field-* nor *position-*specific. Rather, the producer as a social agent, assumes a *strategy*, to occupy a *position*—the *position* of the 'entrepreneur'—defined for a different field (the economic field) than the 'cultural field' to improve his status within the field of jazz. Such a strategy helped him to 'accumulate' even more 'social capital' by becoming the centre of cultural activity, a form of 'capital' the possession of which allowed him to attain such a strategy within the field. Despite its failure to survive, being a failure in economic terms, in "an economic world reversed," he managed to turn this attempt into symbolic capital.

After the closure of Naima, jazz musicians were left without a suitable venue to play gigs, mostly in the form of jam sessions. Although, regular performances continued to take place in hotel bars and Q-jazz clubs, musicians longed for a venue which offered the relaxed atmosphere like what they found in the Naima. They temporarily used a café in Galatasaray segment of the Istiklal Street: Gramofon Café. After several years of performance in here, the rising rents in the Beyoğlu marked the end of Gramofon, as the spot was taken over by a chain food vender. With the closure of Gramofon, Nora's owners' residence in Cengelkoy became the center of jam sessions for several years. In the meantime, Nora's owners made several attempts to open their own jazz club and sought for a suitable place in Beyoğlu, and they were anchored by the Galata

Association, to Kuledibi area whose members were trying to orient the slowly but steadily progressing gentrification in the second half of 1990s. Despite their attempts, they could not rent the place in 1990s⁸⁹, yet they managed to rent the place after several years of search for a suitable spot.

Their interest in the area was, above all, triggered by the low rent values in the area back in the second half of 1990s. Even when they rented the place in 2002, the rent levels was still very low, compared to similar spots in Beyoğlu. They also found a perceived fit with the image of jazz and that of the neighborhood, as the owner states: “Jazz is played in dirty plaes like this, not in tall buildings or skyscrapers” (“*Caz böyle pis yerlerde yapılır, yüksek binalarda, gökdelenlerde değil*”) referring to the jazz venues that can be found in the cities regarded as capitals of jazz. Contrary to the ‘polished,’ upscale image of jazz in Turkish context, jazz venues in New York⁹⁰, Paris, and Boston are usually less

⁸⁹ As they sought for a place in Kuledibi, they found the very same building that Nora is located now. However, the landlord did not let them the building as it had two different sections and Nora’s owners only wanted to rent one of them. Thinking that he would not be able to rent other section alone, he wanted Nora’s owners to rent this place altogether, of course with a higher rent Nora’s owners are willing to pay for. Eventually, the landlord did not change his mind, and Nora’s owners kept on looking for a new spot. One day, a friend of them offered the basement of a large building he owns, which is occupied by nearly a dozen of small businesses. They went on to check for the place, and found it feasible for a jazz club yet they realized that each small business in the building were asking for a lump sum payment to forgo their stores. It was then Nora’s owners realized that their friend was trying to get rid of those small businesses by offering the basement to Nora’s owners. Eventually, this place proved to be unfeasible too. As they could not find a proper place, they slowed down the search for a place. With lack of suitable alternatives to open a jazz venue, Nora’s owners called off the search and the musicians continued to gather in Nora’s owners’ house for several years until when a decisive moment came to encourage them to continue their search for a place. On the new year’s eve, 2000, when Nora’s owners and their friends was doing a jam session to celebrate the new year, they had a group of visitors to ring the door and asked if they could join. These visitors were actually frequenters of Gramofon, and sought for a proper place to listen jazz and someone told them Nora’s owners’ residence was the only place in town, they could find this kind of performance. This event motivated the Nora’s owners who still had doubts about whether it makes sense to open a jazz club or not, and they started looking for a place once again. Fortunately, Nora’s owners came across the landlord, who did not let them Nora’s building several years ago, on a street in Galata. This time the landlord asked Nora’s owners to rent the spot as he discovered there was a historical edifice, a *kümbet*, in the middle of the section he was trying to rent to Nora’s owners. This historical structure could not be demolished and it was preventing the landlord from letting the building altogether. Eventually, Nora’s owners only rented the section they want to rent in the first place, and there started the story of Nora⁸⁹, which will last over a decade.

⁹⁰ This comparison is also evident in the case of Nublu, a jazz club owned by Turkish saxophone player İlhan Erşahin. Originally opened in NYC’s East Village, the venue is described as “From the outside the club appears to be just another shuttered and somewhat grotty East Village storefront, and the interior, with its scarred wooden floor and graffiti-daubed walls, isn’t any more impressive,” in a New York Times article

glamorous in terms of atmosphere; they are places where people come to listen to quality music.

Not all venues are products of deliberate strategies by agents in the field, yet the same field-specific demands from both within and outside the field of jazz still evident in shaping such strategies. For example, the manager of a new jazz venue in Taksim (more than a kilometer away from Kuledibi), explained his decision to transform an existing café to a jazz venue in relation to coincidences. First, he took over the café from a family friend and transformed into a venue for live music performances in addition to being a café the rest of the day. The venue was used by alternative rock bands, and attended by mostly foreign students living in the nearby districts. One day, a prominent jazz guitar player (**RJ#7**), who also lives in nearby Cihangir neighborhood entered the venue upon the music he heard when he was passing by. The venue manager offered him to play in the venue, and upon his request **RJ#7** did not only start playing in the venue but he also invited some of his friends to play there:

RJ#6: here is a place with fifteen years of history but it is like this since four years ago. Since then, we have music, the concept is like this. Before that it was a boutique café where you could eat, it still is, but now music has entered the scene. I started playing here, playing with friends, but two years ago, several jazz musicians wanted to play here as well, they started playing here, we started to offer music regularly and asked 5 liras for entrance (as music charge), it is still 5 liras. We discussed it with **RJ#7**, we liked him very much and asked if he could also play, because he was already coming here, taking a look at the players but he never played back then... over time we improved our equipment quality and he started playing here, he claimed the place, we ended up with such a relationship, we owned the place at last. We are not merchants who are pursuing gains, it was not our intention... I was available, I was thinking about what to do and I started doing this. (*Burası 15 yıllık bir yer ama 4 yıldır bu şekilde, 4 yıldır müzik var ve bu, bu konsept oldu, yoksa önceden böyle butik bir kafeydi, yine öyle ama müzik girdi işin içine benle birlikte, eş dost biz çalışıyorduk, önceden hep böyle yapıyorduk ama 2 yıl önce birkaç cazcı burada çalmak istediler, onlar çalmaya başladılar derken böyle düzenli bu sefer müzik yapmaya başladı işte kapıya almak için işte 5 lira yazdık, işte 2 yıldır 5 lira yani onu hiç arttırmadık, ama gün ki (**RJ#7**) ile konuştuk hani çok dinliyoruz seviyoruz zaten yıllardır, işte abi gel gelir misin çalar mısın hani geliyordu buraya uğruyordu çalanlara böyle biraz bakıp gidiyordu falan ama hiç çalmıyor işte, sen de çal falan dedik işte biraz da zamanla ekipmanımızı biraz daha böyle düzeltince (**RJ#7**) çalmaya başladı sağ olsun o bir çok insanı davet etti buraya yani bir çok iyi müzisyeni buraya çağırdı hala çağırmaya devam ediyor, yani, sahiplendi hani biz de öyle bir ilişkimiz oldu yani, bizim oldu burası yani biz böyle çok para kovalayan tüccar adamlar falan değiliz öyle bir niyetle de girmedik hani ben boşa duruyordum, ne yapacağım diye düşünürken girdim*)

(<http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/09/arts/music/nublu-an-east-village-club-where-everything-goes.html? r=0>). The İstanbul branch, which was opened in 2012, was regarded as ‘chic’ and ‘very stylish’ by musicians. This was attributed to the difference in the target audience in both clubs, as well as the difference between the jazz audience in two contexts.

Both Naima's and Nora's births can be interpreted as *strategies* by cultural producers, responding to the internal demands within the field of jazz. Yet, these strategies are not only shaped by internal dynamics within the field (i.e. types of capital that cultural producers possess) but also constrained by factors external to the field (e.g. the dynamics of the real estate market in Istanbul). In the case of Nora, for example, the low level of economic capital particular to the field of restricted cultural production requires the cultural producers to head for low cost areas near the urban core. The success of such strategies depends on the conjuncture; an expanding jazz audience, Kuledibi's being on the verge of gentrification, the building's legal status that discourages 'place entrepreneurs' and other entrepreneurs with more lucrative business plans, cultural entrepreneurs' (in this case Nora's owners') work ethic discipline, the institutionalization of jazz education in Istanbul and the local government's positive attitude are the key factors in the success of Nora.

The strategy depends on the use of urban space, hence becomes a spatial reflection of the *strategies* employed by the cultural producers. Yet, the relationship of field, its strategies and the urban space is a dialectical one. The gentrification of the area, as well as being very close to a tourist attraction (Galata Tower) ensures a steady demand from a 'critical mass' of customers, contributing to the club's visibility and profitability. With the increasing visibility of the club, it becomes one of the key attractions not only for tourists, but also many *Istanbulites* working in the service and professional jobs who seek cultural amenities. Among them, some became gentrifiers. With the presence of Nora in Kuledibi district, musicians and frequenter of the club began to move to the area to be close to the amenity.

When Nora was opened in the late 2002, the neighborhood was in the early phase of gentrification⁹¹, with only minimal changes in the physical outlook of the neighborhood. Unlike other areas that faced gentrification in the late 1990s and early 2000s, Galata Kuledibi has always been a center of attention due to the presence of one of the most

⁹¹ In the Spring of 2003, when I was doing my research on gentrification in Cihangir, I had a chance to discuss Istanbul's potential candidates for future gentrification with several real estate agents. Unanimously, they considered Galata district as an up-and-coming neighborhood in terms of physical and social qualities, yet the problems with the ownership of the real estate were expected to slow down the process. Unlike Cihangir, owners of the real estate in Galata were living abroad and 'place entrepreneurs' were unable to reach them. While Cihangir had been a middle class neighborhood in the past, Galata used to host a wealthy population throughout its history, until its decline in the middle of the 20th century. The middle class households were more eager to sell their property before or after they fled abroad, whereas Galata's wealthy families did not choose to sell their property.

symbolic buildings of Istanbul, the Galata Tower. The tower attracted thousands of local residents, domestic and foreign tourists to the area offering a panoramic view of the Bosphorus and the Golden Horn. There were several cafes and restaurants surrounding the Galata Tower as early as 2000s, which are aimed to serve visitors who came to visit the tower. In terms of residential gentrification, the Kuledibi district offered a large number of historic apartment buildings at affordable prices. With the rising apartment rents in Cihangir, Galata was one of the areas offering a refuge for many pioneer gentrifiers from Cihangir. Galata resembled Cihangir with its ample historic building stock, yet it lacked the social qualities offered by Cihangir in terms of social composition and residential density. Galata hosted a large number of small manufacturers or artisanal workshops, which discouraged many potential gentrifiers from moving to the area. As Nora's presence in the area coincided with the period of gentrification in Kuledibi district, it had a dialectical relationship with the dynamics of gentrification over its lifetime. In other words, Nora both contributed to the gentrification of the area, while benefiting from the process itself. Nora's presence in the area contributed to the neighborhood image, by offering a rather prestigious form of enterprise that attracts an audience with a refined taste in music. The presence of Nora in the district also encouraged some of the musicians to move to that area, as well as frequenters from different backgrounds.

The gentrification of the district, on the other hand, offered the club an ample supply of patrons living in the neighboring streets. Moreover, the improving physical quality of the neighborhood attracted more domestic and foreign visitors, expanding the club's customer base, spreading the reputation of the club globally through Internet. Nora started to rank one of the top live music venues to be visited in Istanbul by plenty of domestic and international sources. Especially on weekends, the audience is dominated by international guests, including tourists as well as expatriates working in Istanbul. The inflow of tourists help the club to utilize its full capacity (for 120 visitors) on weekends, and it also helps smoothen out the seasonality effects on demand by Turkish consumers. Nora also benefits from the presence of a handful of upscale hotels in the district, including nearby Anemon Galata Hotel, which was opened in late 2003. The visitors of these hotels visit Nora at least once in their visits. Travel tours also provide the club with ample visitors, club often responding to tour operators' requests regarding the content.

The opening of Nora also generated a hope among landlords who own street level stores and buildings to receive higher rents. Previously occupied by small artisanal workshops (such as hardware stores, carpenters, plumbers and the like) these stores now promised businesses with higher incomes, hence higher rents. After even one year of service in the neighborhood, the owners witnessed evacuated store spaces which were put in to the market asking higher rents. This transformation of retailscape was also supported by the municipality, as one of the owners **RJ#3** observed how the mayor of Beyoğlu treated her when she visited the mayor's office for a problem they faced the very first year:

RJ#3: I went there, told about my problem, he called for his deputy, and told him “do whatever this lady asks from now on, without telling me... she is exactly the type of business manager we are looking for (*Gittim işte anlattım derdimi, yardımcısını çağırdı, bu hanım bundan sonra ne isterse yapın, bana sormadan yapın dedi... tam da bizim istediğimiz, aradığımız işletmecisi dedi*)

This account shows how new type of businesses were welcome both by landlords and the local government, both expecting to obtain monetary gains from the transformation process. As early as 2002 and 2003, the district was not showing visible signs of gentrification yet the entrance of different businesses to the district should have alerted the landlords who are seeking more prosperous tenants. For the founders of Nora, the building's rent was lower compared to more central spots in the Beyoğlu district, but compared to other stores in Kuledibi it was relatively high. Despite the lower profit margin of such clubs, as it is in the case of Nora, they were able pay higher rents compared to other businesses in the area.

With frequent appearances in weekend editions of major newspapers, numerous references by columnists who are also frequenters of the club, and a permanent place in city guides and lifestyle corners of magazines jazz (and Nora) became one of the key words that used to describe city's new hip neighborhood, Kuledibi. In addition, the frequent participation of jazz musicians to Galata Festival⁹², organized by Galata Association, along with other 'resident' cultural amenities in the area including artists' studios and galleries also helps establish jazz as one the values of Kuledibi that inscribes jazz to the image of Kuledibi. The presence of cultural producers and production, and more visible artist-entrepreneurs play a key role in creating a distinctive neighborhood reputation for performing and consuming difference (Zukin, 2008; Zukin and Braslow, 2011). Presence of art galleries, cafés, restaurants, bars, theaters, jazz clubs and the like

⁹² Not to be confused by Tünel Feast, a part of IKSŞV's Istanbul Jazz festival, held in Tünel Square since 2010.

“create an impression of the whole neighborhood as different from others,... emerges as a permanent carnival in the Bakhtinian sense , reversing the worlds of work and play, day and night, normativity and deviance (Zukin and Braslow, 2011: 136). The neighborhood’s creative reputation is than commodified to become a marketing tool for more affluent cultural consumers as well as place entrepreneurs, giving way to further gentrification.

The positive effect of gentrification was also witnessed in Naima’s case, the opening of which coincided with the speeding up of a process in Arnavutkoy. Starting from late 1980s, many creative workers began to inhabit the low priced stand-alone houses previously occupied by working class households (who inhabited the buildings left vacant by the Greeks after their leaving the country in 1960s and 1970s) (Keyder, 2000). This also underlines the importance of having a local consumer constituency for the commercial success of clubs, as the first ‘genuine’ jazz club of Istanbul, 306 (1956-1960) in Bebek, was frequented by Robert College students until its closure due to family issues. One of the founders reopened the club, as *Klüp Fa*, in Büyükparmakkapı Street in Beyoğlu. The business was not as nearly as good as before, and the owner transformed the club into a tavern, which proved to be a sound business decision (Tekelioğlu, 2011). Starting from 1990s, there was also a shift in the center of entertainment in Istanbul, from the coasts of Bosphorus to the new cultural core Beyoğlu, which also explains the failure of the second Naima.

CHAPTER 8

The *Field of Fashion*

Simmel (1957[1904]) defines fashion as

a form of imitation and so of social equalization, but, paradoxically, in changing incessantly, it differentiates one time from another and one social stratum from another. It unites those of a social class and segregates them from others. The elite initiates a fashion and, when the mass imitates it in an effort to obliterate the external distinctions of class, abandons it for a newer mode—a process that quickens with the increase of wealth (p.541).

In this sense, fashion arose as “a form of class differentiation, in a relatively open class society... where “the elite class seeks to set itself apart by observable marks or insignia, such as distinctive forms of dress” (Blumer, 1969: 277). This ‘insignia’ of differentiation is then copied by the members of the subjacent classes; as this insignia goes down the class pyramid, elite loses its distinguishing power and needs to invent another insignia, which is also to be copied by the classes below. This cycles “for Simmel, was the nature of fashion and the mechanism of its operation” (Ibid. 278).

To understand what is meant by fashion-design now, it is necessary to understand how it evolved in the 19th century France. At the beginning of the 19th century, right after the French Revolution, clothing was predominantly focused on “made-to-measure” rather than “ready-to-wear” model yet as the bourgeoisies had begun to take over the initiative in fashion, the aristocracy to the bourgeoisie, initiating “its own system of fashion, replacing the old model, which had been built on an aristocratic monopoly of luxury” (Wollen, 2003: 133). This new fashion system “required an ability to discriminate, to make judgments of taste,” as “wealth rather than rank as such became important, but also the ability to deploy wealth, through fashion, as a form of symbolic capital, one that attracted both attention and envy, as well as respect” (Ibid.: 133).

Before the revolution, in the ancient regime, dress making and selling was separated by the guild rules. Tailors were only supposed to sew dresses, they could not sell or stock clothes, and the drapers were not allowed to sell clothes. Over time, tailors became well known among the bourgeoisie, making names in the circles surrounding the palace, and opened workshops and boutiques in Rue Saint-Honoré—a street that still hosts Paris’s most prestigious boutiques even today. At the lower end of the market were merchants

selling used clothes, a demand for which triggered the ready-to-wear clothing production in the first half of the 19th century. Using cheap labor (in prison workshops or sweatshops), the ready-to-wear manufacturers began to attract lower income customers, forcing low-priced tailors out of business, reaching customers through ‘fancy goods stores’ (later turning into department stores), creating a polarized market between upscale fashion houses. Between 1860s and 1880s, the ready-to-wear clothing saw extensive industrialization, and began to imitate models and styles of expensive fashion houses, the ‘high’ fashion (*haute couture*⁹³) (Ibid.).

Until 1940s, Paris remained as the capital of fashion setting the rules of the game. With the outbreak of the war, it was a turning point in the high fashion industry (Rantisi, 2004). As New York’s high end ready-to-wear designers began to hijack the attention of American fashion magazines Vogue and Harper’s Bazaar, to which Parisian designers no longer had access. After the war, while Paris took back its prestigious position in North America and the rest of the world, the heightened focus of American ready-to-wear clothing on design, the elevated status of American designer, the shifting focus of advertising from “homogenization of interests” to the formation of new interests by which consumers can distinguish themselves,” (Ibid.: 100) and the growth in local manufacturing capabilities due to supportive public policy initiatives by the local government led to the rise of New York fashion. The success of New York fashion also changed the rules of the ‘game’ for the high-end of the fashion industry, encouraging Parisian *haute courtiers* introduce their own ready to wear brands, imitating the marketing methods of New York “high-end” ready-to-wear.

8.1. Explicating the *Field* of Fashion Design

The *field* of fashion design, is only one of the *fields* within the broader field of fashion, which is only partially situated within the field of cultural production. Some fields

⁹³ Haute couture is an extreme end in this division, as it is a very distinctive trademark to denote the most prestigious fashion houses in the world. The trademark is under the supervision of *Chambre syndicale de la haute couture* (*The Trade Union of High Dress Making*), and has 18 members, as only those fashion houses which can meet certain conditions can officially use the label. These include French brands (Adeline André, Gustavo Lins, Chanel, Christian Dior, Christophe Josse, Franck Sorbier, Givenchy, Jean Paul Gaultier, Maurizio Galante, and Stéphane Rolland) as well as foreign designers (including Elie Saab, Giorgio Armani, Valentino, Giambattista Valli and Versace). Most of these fashion houses also have *prêt-à-porter* (ready to wear) brands manufactured using mass production principles to increase revenues.

within the *field* of fashion—like the *field* of mass fashion where the primary actors are giant international apparel companies—is more closer to the *field* of power as a sub-*field* of large scale cultural production. There is also the *field* of *high* fashion (such as *haute couture*) as a restricted field of cultural production, which belongs more the cultural field. What puts—even if partially—fashion design within the field of cultural production is the aesthetic dimension, and its possession of symbolic value over function. For Mc Robbie (1998: 14), ‘fashion design’ is

“the application of *creative* thought to the conceptualization and execution of items of clothing so that they can be said to display a formal and distinctive *aesthetic* coherence which takes precedence over *function*, and which is recognized as such by those whose expertise allows them to categorize and evaluate work according to criteria established as part of a professional repertoire of meaning and judgement” (emphasis mine).

Bourdieu and Delsaut (1975:22) situate the field of fashion to “an intermediary position between the ‘artistic’ field and the ‘economic’ field” (cited in Entwistle and Rocamora, 2006: 739). As it is a “field that is designed to organize succession, like the field of bureaucratic administration, where the agents must by definition be interchangeable, and a field in which people are radically irreplaceable, such as the field of artistic and literary creation or prophetic creation,” (Bourdieu, 1993b: 137) it also resembles to the political field.

Bourdieu’s consistent neglect of mass cultural production in his works⁹⁴, as well as his failure to include in this framework “the specificity of epochs” (Calhoun, 1995:67), as the boundaries between ‘high’ fashion and ‘mass’ fashion transgresses (Rocamora, 2006)—as the latter emulates the works of the former for commercial success (Bourdieu, 1993a). The field of fashion design, like the broader field of cultural production, can be divided into two broad subfields: the subfield of restricted cultural production (e.g. high fashion, like *haute couture*) and the subfield of ‘mass’ cultural production (i.e. ready-to-wear or *prêt-a-porter*).

⁹⁴ In *Le Couturier et sa Griffe* (1975), even before this theory of field of cultural production matures, Bourdieu focuses on the field of French high fashion (*haute couture*), which he equates with high culture (1995). Bourdieu’s work is relatively less known in the English-speaking academia as it was never translated to English. It is one of his first works related to the field of cultural production and it only has some common elements with his later work. His analysis of the high fashion in France had become somewhat outdated by the time he developed his theory of the field of cultural production, as the boundaries between ‘high’ and mass fashion became blurred. The term *haute couture* (‘high’ or ‘elegant’ ‘dress making’, or simply ‘high fashion’) basically refers to custom dress making using high quality materials and workmanship.

The subfield of restricted production, in the fashion design, is characterized by a combination of high cultural capital (CC+) and high economic capital (CE+), due to the rarity of the end product, in much resemblance to the field of high art. The subfield of mass production has even higher economic capital (CE++) due to the nature of the economic activity involved, with a larger scale compared to restricted production. Yet, it involves lower cultural capital, judging from the product, since it is deemed as popular. For Bourdieu, there is a match between the position of the fashion-designer and the position of consumers in the field of class relations. (Bourdieu, 1993b, in Rocamora 2006). There is also a similar match between classes of products and classes of consumers (Bourdieu, 1993b), “precisely because a cultural object is the objectification of the already constituted taste of the producer, homologous to the taste of his or her consumer, that it is spontaneously adjusted to the consumers’ demand” (Rocamora, 2006: 351).

The *field* of fashion design, as we observe in the Kuledibi district involves small designer boutiques usually selling the works of one designer (or often more than one) under a brand name (which is usually the name of the designer herself). As a commercial activity, it also involves a usually small scale labor intensive production activity (ranging from 2 to 12 workers), only to supply an amount of merchandise to match the sales made in the store. Often designers expand their production capacity to offer their products using different sales channels, such as other stores and online retailing.

Apart from seasonal collections (that is, Fall-Winter and Spring-Summer), the flexible production techniques allows designers to introduce frequent additions to the collections, also offering an incentive for the consumers to visit the store more often (and of course, purchase more often)⁹⁵. The designer boutique allows the designer to monitor consumer preferences more closely, and the small scale of flexible production allows catering its activities to the observed consumer preferences.

We have to remark, as with any other field, players within the field of fashion design are equipped with differential levels of field-specific capital. Rocamora (2002) introduces the term ‘fashion capital’ to refer to the specific capital at play in the field of high fashion, “which consists essentially of familiarity with a certain milieu and of the quality

⁹⁵ This is similar to the fast fashion approach in the large scale (or mass) production, introduced by international companies such as Zara and Mango, yet it is much smaller in scale compared to the operations such large companies.

conferred by the simple fact of belonging to it” (Bourdieu and Delsaut, 1975: 16 cited in Rocamora, 2002: 343). By *field*-specific capital, what Bourdieu seems to refer to is in practice a symbolic capital (which is field specific), which is a combination of different levels of economic, cultural and social capital, all of which takes on a different version depending on the field. In other words, it is these different forms of capital that becomes specific to the field (for example, a form of cultural capital which is important for a particular field, but not for any other field), as he does not define a new type of capital in operation within the field. It is through differential possession of these forms of capital, and their transformation to the symbolic capital, agents occupy different positions in the social space.

Just like any other field, the field of fashion design dictates *field*-specific species of capital, which can be regarded as versions of basic types of capital—economic, cultural, social, and symbolic—within the Bourdieusian framework. The uncovering of these types of capital based on empirical data allows us to, first, locate the field of fashion-design in the social space to see what is at stakes in the field. This helps us to understand what the desired positions within the field are, and the strategies employed by the cultural producers to attain such positions. In the last section, the strategies within the field and their relationship with the physical space will be reviewed.

In the field of fashion design, the possession of *economic capital* varies between different cultural producers. Rather than the level of economic capital possessed by the individual actors, the consideration should be given to how economic capital is accumulated as a result of the culturally productive activities within the field, and how differential possession of economic capital is evaluated within the field.

In the *field* of fashion design, the economic capital has a secondary position compared to other forms of capital. While the talent as measured by academic institutions (starting from entrance exams), awards in the field, and recognition by key figures; economic capital is often a necessary—but not sufficient—resource for entrance to the field. One can try to build cultural capital in the form of training through the use of economic capital, or to open a store in a vibrant district or even establish a small-to-medium scale business in the field of fashion, yet this—almost never—translates to symbolic capital. As we can see in a fashion designer’s account, she clearly distinguishes between those who open a store in Kuledibi district as a result of success in the field (field-specific capital such as reputation as a designer) and those who transfer their economic capital

from outside the field (therefore, not a field specific capital). This distinction becomes clearer when they come together in particular locality:

RF#3 there are those who continue their business with the support of their families or spouses, not necessarily everyone has to make money from fashion design, or make a living out of it... it is regarded as a prestigious line of work, it gives the chance to get to know a lot of people, with that prestige also comes a sort of fame, these make fashion design a sector attracted those with money... it is not only fashion design that aroused interest, nowadays everything is design and everyone is a designer, there are those who can draw and can't draw, they all enter the sector... among the members of high society, once there were a large number of accessory designers, now if someone has the courage, who is willing to spend a little more effort are inclined towards fashion design... The only difference is that there re a lot of parameters, materials, sizes there are number of variables to be considered in the application of design, and this makes it a more challenging area but there are still those inclined towards it. I don't think they shouldn't, I wouldn't but I'm not happy with them wandering around saying "I'm a designer," and they not only lack proper designs but also proper education... nevertheless, it is not like that there is a huge market and they are stealing shares, their customers are different and so is mine... (*Şimdi burada bu işi ailesinin eşinin yardımıyla sürdüren de var, illa ki burada herkes bu işten para kazanacak ya da buradan kazandığıyla geçinecek diye bi durum da yok.... Biraz prestijli bi iş olarak görüldüğü, insanlara çevre yapma şansı verdiği, biraz da belki o prestijle beraber ün de getirdiği için özellikle bu zengin kesimden ilgi gören bi alan oldu moda tasarımı. Sadece moda tasarımı da değil, şimdi herşey tasarım herkes tasarımcı ya, çizmesini beceren ya da beceremeyen de var bu işe atılıyor. Sosyetiklerden bi ara tonla takı tasarımcısı çıkıyordu ya, biraz daha cesareti olan, biraz daha uğraşmaya niyeti olan da moda tasarımına niyetlenebiliyor. Yalnız daha çok parametre olduğu için, malzeme beden vesaire bi çok değişkeni bi arada ölçüp biçip uygulaman gerektiği için bu daha zor bi alan ama yine de meyleden var. yapmasınlar demiyorum, demem de ama tasarımcıyım diye gezmeleri, doğru düzgün tasarımları olmasını bırak eğitimini de almamış olmaları hoşuma gitmiyor. Yoksa büyük bi pazar var da oradan pay kapıyolar gibi bi durum yok, onun müşterisi ayrı benimki ayrı)*

As we have discussed in the previous chapter, the *cultural capital* take three forms: *institutionalized state*, *objectified state*, and *embodied state* (Bourdieu, 1986). In the field of fashion-design, the easiest to define is the *institutionalized state*; which is field related formal education, as well as awards rewarded in the field (such as in a respected competition), or recognition by an established member of the field through a mentor-protégé (*usta-çırak*) relationship. However, there are also variations for each sub-type of institutional cultural capital. For example, in Turkey, there are nearly 20 universities offering fashion design programs, and certainly there is a hierarchy among them measured in relation to various factors including the composition of the academic staff (whether there are prominent members of the field are teaching or not), the contents of the curriculum (those which are offering a 4-year program versus 2-year programs), and the achievements of current students and alumni (as measured by market success and awards by prestigious institutions). Moreover, there are also international options such

as well-known Domus Academy in Milan, which is offering only post-graduate program, to receive further education.

Most of the university programs in Turkey are offered under the fine arts departments, sealing the position of the field within the boundaries of the field of cultural production. Moreover, the requirement of formal education helps to establish the field emphasizes its being “difficult, abstract and theoretical, not an extension of the world of entertainment,” by enhancing its cultural capital in Bourdieu’s sense (McRobbie 1998:42). Moreover, for McRobbie (Ibid.: 68), “fashion has only managed to create a place for itself within the field of the dominant arts and legitimate culture ... by disavowing any traces of manufacture or labour. This process is symbolized in the proclamations of the students that they ‘can’t sew’. In Turkey, it’s the exact opposite. Not only fashion-designers stress that they ‘can sew,’ it has taken a form of cultural capital; as to be able to sew (along with other related manual tasks such as measuring, cutting etc) shows the level of proficiency in field-related knowledge and skills:

RF#2: At first, it seemed unnecessary to me (to learn how to sew), when they said sewing I thought are we gonna be tailors, what’s the deal but I understood it in time...you should know how to sew in order to see how the design in your head turns to a piece of garment... you should think of it as the difference between theory and practice (*Başta lüzumsuz geldi, dikiş deyince terzi mi oluyoruz ne alaka dediysem de zamanla anladım niye dikiş de öğrenmem gerektiğini. Dikiş bilmen gerekiyor ki kafadaki tasarımın bi parçaya dönüştüğünde neye benzeyeceğini bile-bi-le-sin. Teorik bilgiyle pratik bilgi arasındaki fark gibi düşünmek lazımmiş bunu*).

Similarly, many fashion designers are extremely familiar with the manufacturing process and details, as the process mostly takes place in their own workshops—often set apart from the shop, in a low-rent area.

The *objectified* state, in the field of fashion-design, finds itself in the works of the designer as a reflection of institutionalized cultural capital and taste. It serves as a reference for his/her capabilities and success in the field. In this sense, it also includes other artifacts which are also capable of manifesting taste. The selection of the neighborhood, the design and decoration of the shop, as well as its layout is all part of the objectified state. Such objectified state is a reflection of a collective habitus—as opposed to the individual habitus dominating the embodied cultural capital—which finds itself as the habitus of the fashion designer, not a class habitus. For instance, the locational preference –both the neighborhood and store—seeks to fit the ‘image’ of the fashion designer, the agent has in mind; as it has become a reification of collective *habitus* of the fashion designer.

Unlike the field of jazz, the field-specific cultural capital in the field of fashion design has a strikingly dominant *embodied* form; in the appearance of the store, the designer, which is expected to constitute a consistent match with that of the ‘design’. To succeed in the field, the designer had to establish herself as a person of very good taste—a taste that was accumulated in years as a cultural capital, as a part of the designer’s *habitus*—of which not only the design, but the designer herself has become a product as embodied form of the cultural capital. In this case, the designer becomes a showcase on foot, not wearing his-her own designs, but wearing his/her *taste* as embodied in his/her outfit. Not only there has to be a fit (or homology) between the person and the occupation, but there should also be a homology between the designer and the locality which hosts the designer’s store. For example, **RF#5** mentions how, as a designer in Kuledibi, she should present the proper image of a designer in Kuledibi:

RF#5: Of course, they want to show a designer image when they come to this store... you design yourself like you design the store, he /she who comes to this store does not want to see you eating *simit*, with a newspaper full of sesame on it... you have to be in the places that suits you, like cocktail parties, or stylish bars or pubs that we have in this very street, with a glass of red wine in your hand... when I was living here, I tried to wear some stylish stuff, like a shawl or a pair of glasses even when I was going out to the grocery store... it feels like you cannot be seen in weatpants and with a 5-liter PET bottle in your hand” (*Ya tabi, bi tasarımcı imgesi görmek istiyolar bu mağazaya geldiklerinde... mağaza tasarlar gibi kendini tasarlıyorsun, yani buraya gelen adam kadın herneyse seni masanın üstünde gazeteyle, üstü susam dolmuş gazeteyle elinde simit yerken görmek istemiyor haliyle... senin sana yakışan olarak bi kokteylde ya da buradaki, bu sokakta da çok var, bu ‘tarz’ mekanlarda, café olur pub olur, elinde kırmızı şarap kadehiyle görünmen lazım. Ben burada oturuyoken bakkala bile çıkarken üstüme başıma uygun bişeyler, bi şal atıp gözlük falan takip çıkıyordum, öyle altında eşofmanla elinde 5 litrelik pet şişeyle bakkaldan çıkarken de görülmeyeceksin gibi geliyor*)

Social capital, as a field-specific type of capital usually translates to the number of influential connections not only in the field of fashion design, but also in the broader field of fashion including editors⁹⁶, writers in the fashion magazines and editors/hosts of fashion programs on national TV (also including similar occupations from the field of mass media, such as writers of lifestyle magazines, or columns in newspapers and other magazines, who may help to raise awareness for the designers name/brand name by giving public exposure). Also included are the influential patrons from other cultural fields, mostly from the mass (or popular culture) such as pop stars, actors and other famous people who serve to promote designers products⁹⁷. Even for an established

⁹⁶ Same overlapping in the field of jazz show itself here as well. The fashion magazines, for example, is a field of intersections, both belonging to the field of fashion and the journalistic field.

⁹⁷ For many fashion designers, having their designs worn by pop stars or actors, in socially visible occasions—including award ceremonies, video clips, or as part of the costumes in movies

designer, one of his/her designs worn by a famous person to a prestigious event or a respected position by the younger designers in return for his/her help and guidance may easily translate to symbolic capital.

Despite being a field characterized by the possession and display of high cultural capital, the field of fashion design (as studied in Kuledibi) is not an ‘anti-economy.’ Economic gains may not be the ultimate goal, yet it is often regarded as a measure of success. Economic gains from the activity within the field, is a sign that one is qualified to occupy a position within the field, as long as this income is deserved in return for talent and hard-work that was put into field. In other words, economic capital, in the form of income from the activities within the field, only matters when it is converted from cultural capital (education and training) and talent. Economic capital alone, private income or income from activities outside the field does not help one to advance his/her position in the field. Rather, possession of such capital pushes the possessor to the boundaries of the field. Economic capital is valued insofar as it is transformed from field-specific profit.

RF#2: the economic dimension of (fashion) design may be a little bit symbolic... I don't know how to tell it but it is like that... I mean, if your design is worth something because it's *your* design, if in a three-lira product category, your design is worth 5 liras I can say there is a return (of value) in that... I don't know if I were able to tell it but it is similar to being a painter, like a painting or sculpture...if the work you created has an economic dimension it shows that you are successful... of course, this is the quality of the design, it is not easily measured like the quality of the material (*Tasarımcılığın ekonomik boyutu biraz da sembolik olur belki... bunu nasıl anlattırım bilmiyorum ama böyle... yani bi yerde tasarımın senin olduğu için para ediyorsa yani 3 liralık bir ürün kategorisinde senin markanı yazdığın zaman, bu 5 lira oluyorsa orada bi geri dönüş var demektir... yani anlatabildim mi bilmiyorum ama aynı ressamlık, resim heykel gibi... yaptığın eserin ekonomik boyutta bi değeri olursa o senin başarılı olduğunu da gösteriyor gibi. Tabi bu sadece tasarımın kalitesi malzemenin kalitesi ile ölçülecek gibi bişey, basit bişey değil*)

Designers also recognize themselves as entrepreneurs, belonging to the field of economy and business (or commerce), as they also belong to the artistic field. This is not a rare position to be, as many field within the cultural (or creative) industries share the same position. As another fashion designer who sold her designs in the Kuledibi district through various means underlines the importance of economic aspect of this line of work.

and popular TV series is a chance to reach a larger audience. Fashion and lifestyle magazines, and lifestyle sections of newspapers cover such instances, often through the request of designers. In such cases, designers often help this occasion to be heard by their followers in the social media by posting relevant visual material.

RF#3: it is important that this has to be a job with economic gains, because it has its own costs, its own economy... you have to cover the costs so that you can continue working, if you want to do it like a hobby you need another source of income... that makes it an expensive hobby... in the end, this is a (business) enterprise... you don't enter this field to have a store, or with a 'if I cover the utilities, I can bring food to home' target, but you are not obsessed with owning a factory, a chain of stores in shopping malls. It's something in between, (economic) gains are important but the work has a title on its own, this is why it is significant. If you enjoy this job, you are not concerned with other aspects... but you are an entrepreneur and the enterprise should be successful. The fact that your designs are successful does not bring entrepreneurial success... you have to be aggressive as an entrepreneur (*Ekonomik getirisi olması önemli çünkü masrafları olan, ekonomisi olan bi iş. Yani masrafları çıkarman lazım ki devam edebilesin, hobi gibi yapılabilmesi için başka bi kaynağı olması lazım. O zaman da pahalı bi hobi olur. Eninde sonunda bi girişim bu... Yani bu alana bi mağazam olsun, kirayı elektriği suyu çıkarsam üstüne de eve biraz ekmek götürsem gibi bi kaygı-hedefle girmiyosun ama işi büyütüyüm fabrikam olsun, büyük büyük markalarım mağazalarım olsun avmlerde gibi bi takıntı da olmuyor. İkisini arasında bi yerde, getiri elbette önemli ama biraz da işin kendi adına bi titri var, o açıdan belki önemli. Keyifli ve severek de yaptığın bi işse o kısmına pek bakmıyorsun. Ama bi yerde girişimcisin ve girişimi de tutturman lazım. Tasarımlarının başarılı olması girişimde de başarıyı getirmiyor. Girişimci olarak biraz girişken olman lazım*)

As entrepreneurs, they also acknowledge that economic success is a measure for recognition within the field of business. In this overlapping position between the field of fashion design (as an artistic field) and the field of business, they seek the desired rewards from both fields, by not subsuming to the requirements of any of the fields. That is, fashion designers seek a balanced position between economic gains (as valued highly in business field) and the symbolic gains (what counts in the artistic field). Yet, the acquisition of each type of reward (economic and symbolic) is respected in the other field. For example, a fashion designer who is successful in the business—given he/she is also successful with respect to the rules of their own field—is revered. Similarly, coming from a field of high cultural capital, an entrepreneur who is also a very respected fashion designer also counts in the field of business. Contrary to what Bourdieu (1993b) argues—and what McRobbie observes in her study of the field of British fashion, (1998: 105) that “poor performance in business confirms the legitimacy of fashion as a practice which possesses high cultural capital through its existence also as an anti-economy.”

Skov (2010:566) also finds a similar context-specific entrepreneurship pattern in her study of Hong Kong's fashion designers. In contrast to 'old' entrepreneurs of Hong Kong who built the export oriented garment industry, these 'new' entrepreneur fashion designers reject formers' "short-term profit orientation and instrumentality." Voluntarily embracing the market mechanism to diffuse their products, they also choose the path of entrepreneurship for social mobility.

Either because it was closely associated with the “world of work and manufacture,” or “female interests” and “domesticity” fashion design has “occupied a position of consistently low status,” refraining the members of the bourgeoisie from participating in the field of fashion design (McRobbie, 1998:32). At the same time, the harsh conditions of the field of cultural production for individual agents—like any other artistic field—in terms of income opportunities also limits the access to the field other than those who are able to rely on private income (not derived from occupational activities) (Bourdieu, 1993b). This dual pressure results in the dominance of a class dimension in the field of fashion design, making it a mainly middle class endeavor.

Following Bourdieu’s conceptualization of the field of cultural production, there are several key *positions* within the field of fashion design including the *positions* of the ‘newcomer’, the ‘established’ designer (with often a relationship of *protégé* and mentor between the two, depending on the latter’s expertise), the avant-garde (vs the mainstream) and entrepreneur (again borrowing from the economic/business field). Note that, in this study, I did not stick to the original uses of the term as used by Bourdieu in “*Haute Couture and Haute Culture*” (1995) and *Le Couturier et sa Griffes* (1975), where he refers to the new players in the field of *haute couture* as ‘newcomers’ and old couturiers as the established designers. In my study, newcomer refers to those who had access to the field of fashion design (similar to Bourdieu’s use) but established designer refers to those designers who made themselves an established position’ by making themselves as name within and outside the field, proven by economic success or accumulation of symbolic capital within the field. Similarly, strategies by newcomers are usually employed to reach the market, to achieve an ‘established’ position. The strategies for the fashion designers in Kuledibi, relates to the conflict between them (as avant garde) and the mainstream fashion designers—as a battle fought on the physical space by appropriating the meanings derived from the use of physical space, and inscribed back to the struggle in social space.

The ‘newcomer’ is usually young, fresh graduate of a fashion design school (often from another area within fine arts such as painting, architecture graphic design; and again licensed with an academic degree in those areas where institutional training can be transferred to the field of fashion design). Currently, there are nearly 20 universities in Turkey offering formal education in fashion design and their graduates have several career options. The aim of newcomer is, first, to reach the market, to establish him/herself as a fashion designer, and to do that, there are several strategies that can be

followed to reach the *position* of an ‘established’ fashion-designer. One of them is starting with an internship or assistant position with an established fashion designer, or to find a similar position in an apparel company. The established designers often build a mentor-protégé relationship with their assistants, transferring field specific skills and knowledge (as cultural capital), introduce them to related circles within and outside the *field* (as social capital) and show them the rules of the *game* within the *field*. Such positions are rarely paid positions in monetary terms, yet the newcomer accepts the deal for the sake of accumulating other forms of capital, or the symbolic capital that can be obtained from working with such a designer.

Alternatively, newcomers also may assume positions in apparel firms of different scales, to improve their design skills, to get a better grasp of the manufacturing process. Given the creative nature of the fashion design, this working arrangement is less acceptable for many fashion designers as they aspire to establish their own names as strong and famous brand names just like popular fashion designers such as Karl Lagerfeld, Ralph Lauren, Donna Karan and Giorgio Armani, or domestic examples of Arzu Kaprol, Bahar Korçan, Hüseyin Çağlayan and Atıl Kutoğlu. They are also willing to take risk by avoiding standard employment practices such as regular pay, social security and insurance, in order to work in more relaxed work arrangements, which will endow them with the type of atmosphere that allows them to achieve their full creative potential.

Freelancing (or project based employment) is also a common practice in the fashion industry, like other cultural industries. Many designers start working in large apparel companies to learn the rules of the trade, to improve their work-related capabilities though experience and training offered by the company. Employment in such companies also offer them the opportunities to enter the network of both local and international producers, both institutional and individual, which will help them to make new business arrangements in the future. For others, jobs offered by designer brands, or fashion designers themselves help them to improve their capabilities and talent, as well as make sound connections to improve their standing in the area of fashion design. Following Beck’s (1992) conceptualization, these are *reflexive* biographies (or reflexive career paths when related to employment) which are characterized by the release of agency from structure. Such biographies are freed from traditional structures of employment,

such as fixed working hours and traditional gender roles⁹⁸. With the demise of traditional structures, workers need to construct their own biographies based on their own risk assessments, by purposefully avoiding predetermined patterns of employment and gender roles. Allen and Henry (1997) contend that many workers with tradable skills higher up the income scale regard such flexible arrangements as an opportunity than threat for workers in the cultural industries as they are more likely to end up being ‘reflexivity winners,’ instead of ‘reflexivity losers’ due to their possession of ample cultural capital.

‘Established’ designers often serve as gatekeepers by deciding who gets access to the market, not by blocking the access, but by facilitating the access of a small number of ‘fresh’ designers to the market. This facilitation takes the form of paid or unpaid employment, as we have discussed above, or providing access for young designers’ product to reach the market by helping distribution. Young (and ‘talented’) newcomers are often asked to design particular categories in designers’ product portfolio (such as accessories) or they are allowed to showcase and sell their own designs in the shops of established designers. Often large apparel companies also allow young designers to sell products in their stores, in return for a commission. Of course, in both cases, there is a selection process which determines who gets access to the market and who does not. Even when they have access to the market, young designers may not be content with terms of such arrangements due to a number of issues starting from the payment policy and the way the products are displayed in the store.

In the field of fashion design, there are also various types of *cultural intermediaries* (individual and institutional) both from within and outside the field of fashion. These include individual intermediaries such columnists and reporters, critics (including influential fashion bloggers) in fashion press—print and online media—as well as those holding academic positions in related educational institutions.

The first group of intermediaries involves editors, columnists and reporters in fashion and lifestyle magazines, as well as national newspapers (and TV channels) who critique products (i.e. designs) by fashion designers. These are cultural intermediaries resembling to what Bourdieu calls ‘old’ cultural intermediaries. Some of them are very

⁹⁸ In fashion design, women dominate the field in terms of number. For example, in Kuledibi district none of the fashion designers are male, although there are numerous related shops (like boutiques, mixed designer stores) owned by men.

close to the field of fashion design, with their possession of field-specific cultural capital (even though they are not designers themselves) which put them into a position to help consumers decode the cultural products . Yet more importantly, as Bourdieu (1993b) argues, they do the writing (or reporting) not for the consumers and the readers, but for the cultural producers (fashion designers), as such intermediaries position themselves closer to the designers, to “feel as if they can share something of the aura of the artist” (McRobbie, 1998).

In a similar position, there are also ‘fashion bloggers’ who are mostly young, ‘fashionable’ women, who start up their own internet blogs to show how they creatively combine different products (often mass produced, at other times second hand products, or more fashionably called as ‘vintage’, as well as family heirlooms) in their outfits, serving also as ‘models’ with usually a text describing the where the products are found, is a pseudo-editorial format similar to fashion magazines. Over time, depending on the socio-cultural background of the blogger and her connections, topics covered expand to include other lifestyle issues such as entertainment, food, as well as other areas where ‘taste’ also matters such as furniture, fine arts, and popular music. Over time, depending on the number of followers, and bloggers’ personal connections in the field of fashion and media, they may be gradually be recognized by other players within the field, including the press, trade associations, individual designer and corporate apparel brands—who seek additional coverage and praise in the new media through what McQuarrie et al. (2013) calls “megaphone effect”. For example, during Istanbul Fashion Week, organizers invited tens of bloggers to various ‘runway’ shows for publicity purposes. Yet, in such a case there emerges a conflict between ‘old’ cultural intermediaries (editors, columnists and reporters from the ‘old’ media) and these emerging groups of cultural intermediaries dominating the new media. One blogger, told how the editor of one of the most influential magazines left the event, when she discovered she was seated in the same row as fashion bloggers. Fashion bloggers often enter the field of fashion-design as producers with their own designs, usually with a chance granted them by a mass fashion producer to capitalize on their role as cultural intermediaries.

The case of fashion bloggers also point out to a situation noticed by Melloy and Larner (2010), who argue that the fashion industry is one of the areas in which the boundaries between production, consumption, and mediation gets blurred. In the field of fashion, cultural mediation through consumption is always possible, as ‘taste’ is also a form of

cultural capital that can be transformed to both symbolic and economic profits. Bloggers are another new breed of cultural intermediaries, who gain access to a *position* within the field of fashion, through their possession of production related cultural capital (such as a formal degree in fashion design, or even journalism) but through their ‘knowledge’ of the field, which can mediate consumption. Such intermediaries also include other groups such as influential popular culture figures—including singers, actors, and other role models—who also serve as cultural intermediaries through their consumption. As mentioned above, wearing a fashion-designer’s product on a high-profile event, or locating it in another form of visual cultural products such as a TV drama or feature film also helps the fashion-designer to reach wider audiences, obtain symbolic profit in the form of recognition, and resulting economic profit. Often, fashion designers invite such influential figures to their runway shows to be seated in the ‘front row’ both to increase media coverage and draw the attention of their followers or fans⁹⁹.

Universities and other educational institutions offering degrees in fashion design constitute another group of cultural intermediaries. Often, in the universities that select their students on the basis of ‘talent tests’, the academic personnel responsible for the selection may be regarded as cultural intermediaries by deciding who will have access to the market, by receiving formal training. Academic personnel may be often influential in shaping students careers after graduation by offering them career paths in the fashion industry, through personal connections. Also influential are the trade associations that organize, or sponsor fashion events, similar to the corporate sponsors in the field of jazz. One such example is ITKIB (Istanbul Textile and Apparel Exporter Associations), which in corporation with Turquality Program, organized fashion events abroad to promote Turkish apparel industry and fashion designers, by sponsoring a runway show by one-or-more fashion designers. In a much smaller scale, MTD’s role in the field of fashion design also resembles the former effort, yet MTD serves much like a ‘market intermediary’ (or a middlemen) as no selection process is involved, and decision to participate belonged to the designer.

Molloy and Lerner (2010) also argue that producers and retailers may be cultural intermediaries themselves. Referring to Bovone’s (2005, cited in Molloy and Lerner,

⁹⁹ In New York Fashion Week, for example, such influential figures are often paid to attend the shows, as high as \$20 thousand for just one show. In Turkey, no one testified for the existence of such an exchange, yet there were several celebrities attended to the shows of internationally renowned fashion designers.

2010) research on fashion district in Ticinese Milan fashion designers and retailers are consumers of trendy lifestyles themselves, becoming one of the most attractive products of the quarter. This account shows how cultural producers (and retailers) can become cultural intermediaries through their consumption—Zukin and Kosta's (2004) research on a shopping district in the East Village, where landowners and retailers purposefully orchestrated the composition and quality of goods sold in order to elevate district's cultural capital to serve the well-educated and art-seeking middle classes—show that how cultural mediation can take place within the boundaries of production. Similarly, fashion designers in Kuledibi are also, cultural intermediaries in their own right. This is not only because they hold one of the occupations in the symbolic economy—which involve “presentation and representation (sales, marketing, advertising, public relations, fashion, decoration and so forth) and in all the institutions providing symbolic goods and services” (Bourdieu, 1984: 359)—related to the production, but by their consumption. The object of such consumption is not only limited to the products offered by the fashion industry, it also covers the consumption of culture (food, entertainment etc.) and space. Fashion-designers, as cultural producers, are at the same time cultural consumers, practices of whom are emulated by the ‘new’ middle class (Featherstone, 1991; Brooks, 2001). Through their consumption in and of urban space, they set what is fashionable and hip, inspiring the urban consumers.

8.2. The field-*strategies*, agency and urban space

In the field of fashion design, designers are likely to go for an entrepreneurial strategy which involves opening his/her own store which enables him/her to have access to the market. This strategy is very common in the field of fashion design, (McRobbie, 1998; Skov, 2006; Molloy and Larner, 2010) as it also shows some characteristic of the field of business in relation to the value of entrepreneurship. However, applying such a strategy is not easy for many newcomers, along with other producers within the field who lack the necessary resources—social capital in the form of networks, and economic capital—for starting a business and /or opening a store. In the case of fashion designers in Kuledibi, this strategy finds itself in two different versions involving two key agents, two fashion designers. Moreover, both versions involve the use of urban space in Kuledibi.

One particular strategy involving both ‘established’ and ‘newcomer’ designers to reach the market was the foundation of MTD (Fashion Designers’ Association) and its

organization of the GalataModa Fashion week in Galata Square. This particular strategy was executed with pioneering ‘established’ designers, who also wanted to remove the barriers for ‘newcomers’ to have access to the market. Especially one established designer, Bahar Korcan, as the president of the association also assumed a role of intermediary between the local municipality and the fashion designers. Her role brought the support needed by fashion designers, as the local municipality provided them the most important resource they needed, a space where can they set up runways and pavilions to create a market.

In 2006, MTD was founded by eight key fashion designers, bringing together a total of 40 fashion designers in Turkey. The aim of the association was to introduce a Turkish design *ecol * in order to facilitate creation of local fashion brands. This goal was also in line with the *Turquality*¹⁰⁰ program introduced in 2004, dedicated to the creation “10 world brands in 10 years’, as the pilot sector for Turquality program was fashion design and textiles. The association stated its aim as establishing Turkish design sector as one of the schools determining global fashion flows, building on the strong textiles and apparel infrastructure in Turkey¹⁰¹.

The association started with a few small organizations that led the way to the initiation of GalataModa Fashion Week in 2006, which offered young designers under the MTD’s roof a chance to directly reach the customers without having to deal with intermediaries, as one of the founders and the president of the association puts it in an interview:

Actually, it arose out of necessity because in Turkey, fashion designers’ brands and names were already acknowledged but their products cannot be accessed. There was no market for that and not everyone could open stores (to sell their products)... we said we should create a domain, we should access the street, open the gates and people should buy designer products at affordable prices... we wanted to reach our own customers, that’s what I mean by it arose out of need. (*This arose out of necessity. İhtiyaçtan doğdu*)

¹⁰⁰ Among those selected by the program were prominent fashion designers such as Hüseyin Çağlayan, Dice Kayek, Atıl Kutoğlu, Hakan Yıldırım, Arzu Kaprol, and Özlem Süer. In 2004, the program started with three fashion shows, by selected designers, in Moscow, Paris and New York. In 2006, 33 brands were chosen for TURQUALITY® Support Program and 22 brands were included in Brand Support Program. By the end of 2012, the number of brands for support program increased to 97 (by 85 different companies) and 37 (by 34 companies) to brand support program (<http://www.turquality.com/15.aspx>). The program also worked close collaboration with İTKİB (İstanbul Tekstil ve Konfeksiyon İhracatçı Birlikleri) which later supported and sponsored MTD events.

¹⁰¹ Press release dated April, 12 2006.

aslında çünkü Türkiye’de moda tasarımcılarının markaları, isimleri biliniyordu fakat ürünlerine ulaşamıyordu, bir pazar yoktu, hepimiz mağazalaşamıyorduk. Bu ihtiyaçtan doğdu...dedik ki sakın bir şekilde biz bir alan yapalım. Sokağa inelim kapılara açılalım. Satın alınabilir fiyata tasarım ürünlerini satın alsın insanlar. Kendi müşterilerimize kavuşmak istedik aslında ihtiyaçtan doğdu dediğim bu)

Creating access to individual fashion designers was one of the major aims of the GalataModa Fashion Week, and it was clearly a strategy by the influential agents within the field to enhance the economic side of the field, and it entailed the use of urban space (Galata Square). The show attracted media attention due to close relationship of designers with the members of the press from reporters to columnists in the national newspapers along as well as the fashion press. The event proved to be a successful at both collective and individual level. At the collective level, the event managed to achieve its goals by attracting thousands of visitors and generating substantial amount of sales, especially for fresh designers who were experiencing their first ever contact with the market. A young fashion designer **RF#3** who attended the event summarizes her experience:

RF#3: I didn’t already have a store and presented my products for the first time there, it was a beginning for me because I was working with a workshop, and within the first day I sold whatever I produced, and I went back to the workshop and started producing again, and never stopped producing after that, it had this benefit for me. It was a good event [...] for that moment it enabled me to reach my designs to the customers, because if a design would not reach to the customers it makes no sense at all, your designs need to be used, preferred, liked and used by others... it was very good in that aspect (*benim daha mağazam yoktu ve ürünlerimi ilk orda sundum ve benim için bir başlangıçtı yani çünkü ben bir atölyeyle çalışıyordum, ve ben böyle ilk gün bütün yaptığım herşeyi sattım bitti ve üretim, tekrar gittim atölyeye hani deli gibi üretim yapmaya başladım, ondan sonra da üretim yapmayı hiç bırakmadım yani o açıdan bana bir faydası oldu, bence güzel bir etkinlikti [...] o an için hani bence insanın kendinin yaptığını değerlendirebileceği müşteriyle buluşturmanı sağlayacak, çünkü bir tasarım müşteriyle buluştuktan sonra satılmadıktan sonra bir anlamı yok yani, hani sonuçta yaptığın şeyi birilerinin kullanması tercih etmesi beğenisi, beğenmesi kullanması gerekiyor o yüzden de kendini böyle bir yeni bir alandı o açıdan güzeldi yani)*

Another fashion designer explains how this experience helped her to improve her insights regarding the market, in other words, how she came to recognize the rules of the *game*:

RF#5: I can say that there was a festive mood there, we displayed the products and we were in direct contact with the buyers (customers)... which designs by which designer draw attention, or which one of my designs were appreciated, I had a chance to observe and experience them simultaneously. I can say that it was a cheap way to do market research, I had the chance to receive very insightful feedback, and honestly it was not possible to receive such profound feedback without it... from pricing to model selection... the way of displaying, presenting we saw them all... it introduced the market to us and, introduced us to the market. (*Şimdi orada bi panayır havası vardı diyebilirim, yani sergiledik ürünleri ve doğrudan alıcı ile kontak içindeyiz... hangi tasarımcıların hangi ürünleri dikkat çekiyor, e benim ürünlerimden neler beğeniliyor onların hepsini bi arada*

görme yaşama fırsatı oldu. Ucuz yoldan pazar araştırması diyebilirim, o açıdan, güzel feedback alma şansım oldu, açıkçası başka bi şekilde de o kadar zengin bi feedback alabilmem mümkün değildi... fiyatlandırmasından tut, model seçimine kadar... sergilemesi, sunması onları da görmüş olduk... pazarı bize tanıttı, pazara da bizi tanıttı o şekilde)

Through the years the organization was hosted within the district of Beyoğlu, the local government was the sole sponsor of the event. Designers were also paying a fee for participation, in addition to the annual fees for membership to the association, which were also used to fund the organization. The support from the local government was most vivid in opening of such a vibrant place to designers. The support from the local government was also materialized in the municipality's website, as GalataModa was placed as one of the 'brands' (the term the local government uses to denote its sponsored activities) of Beyoğlu Municipality.

GalataModa Fashion Week¹⁰² was the first organization to be introduced by the MTD. It involved a marketplace for designer clothes, where consumers can see, try on and purchase try the clothes and accessories. The organization was held twice every year, one in the Spring and the other one is in December, in order to benefit from New Year shopping frenzy. Starting from its first year, the revenues from the sales of merchandise grew steadily, along with the number of participants. As one of the key members of the foundation puts it, the event proved successful in creating the desired outcomes also emphasizing the role of local government:

In Turkey, the fashion design sector created itself, its own power, and beyond that, it began to give birth to events such as these. It became followed by others. Year after year, each event presented higher sales potential. One of the most significant issues was our choosing of Galata as a domain. The Beyoğlu Municipality and mayor Demircan has a valuable support for us. This is a a result of an ongoing cooperation [...] eventually, we gave birth to a significant area for shopping [...] our aim was to reach the consumer realistically and intimately and we achieved this. (Türkiye'de moda tasarım sektörü kendi kendini oluşturdu kendi gücünü yarattı ve kendi gücünü yaratmanın ötesinde bu gibi organizasyonlar doğurmaya başladı. Artık takip edilir oldu. Gitgide her bir GalataModa'da satış potansiyeli yükselir oldu. En önemli işaret ettiğimiz işlerden biri de Galata'yı kendimize bir alan olarak seçmemiz. Burada Beyoğlu Belediyesi'nin ve Sayın Başkan Demircan'ın tabi ki çok bize desteği var. Hep işbirliğiyle yürüyor bu iş [...] Böylelikle ciddi bir alışveriş alanı doğurmuş olduk. Ben geçenlerde şeyi de düşündüm, Shopping Festival dediğimiz iş aslında GalataModa'lardan sonra doğdu. Neticede sahici

¹⁰² I attended the GalataModa organization three times in 2010 and 2011, when it was held in Tepebasi parking lot. I also had a chance to attend one of the 'after-party' events sponsored by an international vodka brand. In all occurrences, GalataModa festival consisted of one giant rectangular tent with two main hallways.

*ve samimi bir şekilde müşteriye ulaşmak, amacı buydu ve amacımıza da ulaştığımızı düşünüyorum.)*¹⁰³

This account also reveals the role of agency of cultural producers within the field of fashion design and how they take the advantage of their connections with local government (the field of power) to take on strategies that respond to the internal demands of their field (e.g. reaching the customers through the use of a physical market). The event took place in Galata Square between 2006 and 2009, then moved to the parking lot nearby TRT building in Tarlabası by the Beyoğlu municipality. Compared to Galata district, this area was relatively less attractive at first sight, located near one of the most unattractive buildings in the area. Yet, the district also hosted a number of upscale hotels—including famous Pera Palas, and a five star hotel The Marmara-Pera—and restaurants. The association stated that the reason for their move was the relative accessibility of the area compared to Galata. In terms of public transport, both areas were equally accessible yet, it turns out, Tarlabası district was easy to reach using private vehicles. The spot was on a multi-storey parking lot, providing ample space for those who come with their cars. In Galata, there were only few small parking lots in the area, which were far from meeting the demand for parking space. Yet, this move did not cause any significant increases or decreases in the number of visitors.

The reason for the move, as stated by the mayor of Beyoğlu, Ahmet Misbah Demircan, was the complaints by citizens and local retailers, during an interview on national news channel NTV:

*In Galata Square we organized a lot of activities but then the day came our citizens and shopkeepers told us that this activity is giving them harm and we no longer organized an activity in the Square. Sometimes if something is gone out of hand, you need to seek the balance. For example, we used to organize GalataModa here, we moved it to Tepebaşı. The aim was to keep the chic and niceties by maintaining balance, and not disturbing others” (“Galata Meydanı’nda çok etkinlik yaptık ama bir gün geldi ki vatandaşımız ve esnafımız “sayın başkanım bu etkinlikler artık bize zarar veriyor” dedi ve biz bir daha orada etkinlik yapmadık. Bazen bazı şeyler eğer maksadını aştıysa orada o dengeyi de bulmak gerekiyor. Mesela; GalataModa yapardık onu Tepebaşı’na aldık. Amaç, şıklığı ve güzelliği tadında tutmasını bilmek birini rahatsız etmeden dengesini sağlamak.)*¹⁰⁴

According to shopkeepers in the area, the event did not cause disturbance, rather it created extra revenues for the restaurants and cafés, as well as other shops in the area.

¹⁰³ Interview with the designer, accessible at <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kPIArMRLNzQ>

¹⁰⁴ Interview with the Mayor of Beyoğlu Ahmet Misbah Demircan, dated August 18, 2011 accessed at July 22, 2013 at <http://video.ntvmsnbc.com/muzisyenlere-izin-sarti.html>.

Many believed that the municipality had other plans for the square, so it had to remove such an attraction from the area. After several events in Tarlabası parking lot, in 2011, the event was moved outside the boundaries of Beyoğlu municipality and undertaken in locations under the jurisdiction of the municipality of Sisli. This move also attracted the attention of the press, as moving a fashion event named after a district, was odd enough when it was moved to Tepebaşı. Now it was being moved outside the borders of the Beyoğlu Municipality. Some of the designers, as well as other local businesses, accused the municipality for raising the ground rents in order to drive away the event. In fact, it was argued, the municipality raised the rents in Galata Square offering a low cost location in Tarlabası parking lot. With limited funds available, the association had no choice but to accept the terms and moved the event to Tarlabası. Later, the rents for Tarlabası area were also raised and this time the municipality did not offer an alternative space for the event to take place, forcing the event to move to another district. The Municipality of Beyoğlu announced that it was the association's decision to move the event to Akaretler, and it had nothing to do with a change in municipality's policy against the event. For one respondent, it was normal to move the event from one place to another as the event also took place outside Istanbul, in Bodrum, Çeşme and Antalya throughout its lifetime. In fact, the wings in the logo of GalataModa exactly symbolized this characteristic of the festival:

RF#3: If you look carefully to the logo of GalataModa you will notice the wings, which alone indicates that we are not pro-status-quo. As fashion designers we are always in the quest for the new, different and unusual. We don't want to be confined with a single locality. One of the targets of our project is to move it beyond borders. In the coming seasons, GalataModa will be held in totally different and unexpected locales. *(GalataModa'nın logosuna dikkat ederseniz kanatlar gözünüze çarpacaktır. Bu bile statükocu olmadığımızın göstergesi. Moda tasarımcıları olarak her zaman yeninin, farklının, sıra dışının arayışı içerisindeyiz. Bir mekanla sınırlı kalmak istemiyoruz. Projemizin hedeflerinden bir tanesi de yurt dışına açılmak. GalataModa gelecek sezonlarda bambaşka ve beklenmedik mekanlarda gerçekleştirilecek)*

For one respondent, it was a deliberate strategy of the local government to support a fashion event in Galata, to attract new visitors who previously did not have much to do with Galata and Beyoğlu in general:

RF#7: Maybe they sought something like this, they tried to attract those who haven't been here before, who had nothing to do with here, and who would consider coming here for the designs...to me, it feels like they came here... maybe later, in order for them to access more easily Tepebaşı seemed like a more suitable place...for the people here (Beyoğlu) Tarlabası and Galata may be the same (in terms of access) but they managed to attract a more wealthy group, those living in upscale neighborhoods, and doing their shopping in Nişantaşı... other than that the municipality does not organize any other events here I guess. *(Belki de şöyle bir şey gözettiler, buraya daha önceden uğramayan burayla işi olmayan ama moda bahanesiyle, tasarım bahanesiyle buraya gelmeyi düşünebilecek bir insan grubunu buraya getirebiliriz diye düşündüler... geldiler de gibi geliyor... belki*

sonra onlar daha rahat gelebilsin diye Tepebaşı daha da uygun geldi...yani buraya gelen buranın insanı olan için Tepebaşı Galata aynı şey olabilir farketmez belki ama daha belki zengin, daha lüks yerlerde yaşayan Nişantaşı'nda alışveriş eden bi kitleyi de buraya taşımayı başardılar. Onun dışında zaten belediye buralarda pek de bişey düzenlemiyor galiba)

These last accounts point out to a process by which the local government supports cultural activity to aestheticize or polish up the image of a particular area, making it available to a new group of cultural consumers and potential investors. From a Bourdiesian framework, this is facilitated by the close relationships between the field of fashion design (through particular, powerful agents) and the field of power (the local government). This is also very similar to the Zukin's (1995:10) observations regarding New York Fashion held in Bryant Park where

enormous white tents and a canopied walkway set the scene for spring and fall showings of New York Fashion designers. Twice a year, the park is filled by the fashion media, paparazzi, store buyers, and supermodels doing the business of culture and reclaiming Bryant Park as vital, important place. We New Yorkers become willing participants in the drama of the fashion business. As cultural consumers, we are drawn into the interrelated production of symbols and space.

The association also undertook a series of new events first started as Istanbul Fashion Days in 2009, which was renamed later Istanbul Fashion Week. This was an attempt to establish Istanbul as one of the emerging centers of fashion to gain a worldwide recognition. The associations's relationship with Turquality program and ITKIB also continued. The government support also continued, as the opening ceremony of Istanbul Fashion Days were honored by the attendance of the Minister of Economy, Zafer Çağlayan, who took over the responsibility from his predecessor Kürşat Tüzmen and continued government support for Turquality program. Although there are many problems related to the organization of the event, it proved to be very successful and attracted as many as 25 thousand visitors only in three days. In 2010, the organization's name was changed to Istanbul Fashion Week and received support from ECoC program to be incorporated to the ECoC activities in 2010. The event is still held every year, in ITU's Taşkışla building. In 2013, the event was sponsored by a car brand which is the main sponsor of fashion events in New York, London, Milan, Sydney, Berlin, Miami, Tokyo, Zurich, Mumbai and Toronto.

The event surely attracted a group of upscale visitors to the area, creating a period in Galata's near history when it began to be associated with fashion, first through the presence of event, and later with the influx of fashion designers to the Serdar-ı Ekrem Street since 2009. In the following section, the dynamics of this influx with respect to

the internal demands of the field of fashion design will be discussed alongside the gentrification of the street.

GalataModa Fashion Week's commercial and symbolic success also suggested fashion designers a new address to cluster. In Istanbul, most of the fashion designer stores and upscale international apparel brands are clustered in Nişantaşı district. The popularity of the GalataModa Fashion show and successful sales figures beyond the individual designers and organizers encouraged fashion designers to consider Kuledibi as a potential district. First and foremost, the reason why several fashion designers began to open workshops or boutiques in the district was economic. The area offered stores with low rents, a visitor and resident profile who are offered potential for economic success, and the popularity of GalataModa among a wider fashion audience. In this sense, Galata offered fashion designers a cheap space, where they could reach both avant-garde and mainstream customers. The area also offered a landscape, which seemed to designers' image of a fashion district, resembling other streets of Paris. This can be regarded as the second phase of the *strategy* by the fashion designers to reach the market. The phase of organizing GalataModa Festival was successful in establishing Galata as an emerging fashion district in Istanbul, the second phase helped to consolidate it.

Similar to the early gentrification literature, there are also pioneers and followers in the commercial gentrification of Serdar-ı Ekrem Street. The pioneers in the process are several fashion designers, who were attracted by the low rents and attractive landscape (including the architecture of the buildings). They were both newcomers and established designers in the field of fashion design. Their success in consolidating Galata's reputation as a fashion district, with the help local government by creating a 'clean' atmosphere by renewing the infrastructure, was also endorsed by frequent coverage by fashion and lifestyle magazines, as well as mainstream newspapers. The emergence of Galata as a new fashion district encouraged those agents with higher economic capital, several 'high-end' ready-to-wear manufacturers as well as fashion designers with ample economic capital. They not only tried to increase their market coverage by investing in a new store in a up-and-coming district, but also—for respondents—tried to benefit from the 'alternative' and 'bohemian' image constructed by the pioneers.

In 2009, **RF#1**, a young designer who studied architecture later pursuing a career in fashion design has become one of the pioneers in the area. She can be classified as a newcomer to the field; she has been working as a designer for only three years and she

only had a minor experience in reaching to the market. while she was living in another gentrified neighborhood, Cihangir—which had seen enormous increases in the prices of real estate in the last decade—she realized how low the rents were in Galata and moved to Galata. After her sales success in GalataModa Festival in 2007, she began to think about opening a store in the area. Her experience in the festival helped her to take this action by revealing her Galata’s unexpected success in hosting a festival, attracting many visitors from the other parts of the city. Moreover, she also sought a retail arrangement which she could reach the customers personally, as she did in the festival, cutting the market intermediaries. She took over a hardware store, of which the business owner was also the land lord and started a new business. As she was finished with the restoration and decoration of the store, which had to start from almost scratch as the spot was used as a hardware store—and have not received any sort of restoration in the last decades—she ran out of funds to pay the rents. She proposed five of her designer friends—who were actually looking for a retailer to sell their designs—a spot in the store where they can display and sell their merchandise in return for their share of the rent. This provided designers with a chance to have easy and low cost access to the market, initiated by a fellow designer. This store has become one of the anchors of fashion designer’s move to the neighborhood; the sales in the store was more than satisfactory as the area offered a large number of potential consumers due to its rising popularity.

Another anchor of the movement was an ‘established’ and popular designer—who also had leading role in initiating GalataModa Festival—who already had a workshop in one of the backstreets of Galata. She started from scratch as a designer in one of the leading companies in high-end ‘ready-to-wear’ clothing, and made herself a name through the years. As she previously had a workshop/store in Nişantaşı, and became a household name in fashion design when she provided one of the most significant popstars in Turkey, his stage costumes in late 1990s. When she decided to open her boutique in Serdar-ı Ekrem Sokak, there were already several boutiques in the area, including Laundromat but they were mostly located in other streets near the Galata Tower. Korcan’s boutique was opened in November 2009. Two days before the opening, Korcan wrote a message to Twitter: “Serdar-ı Ekrem street in Galata will change a lot... we’ll see who will be there, who will come, let’s see it together¹⁰⁵” as she was also

¹⁰⁵ “In Galata, Serdar Ekrem street will change a lot... let’s see who will be there and who will come, let’s see it together” (“*galatada Serdar-ı Ekrem-ı sok çok değişecek ...bakalım kimler*”

expecting others to join her in the Serdar-ı Ekrem Street. When she opened the store in 2009, there were only several shops that could be related to the gentrification process. In 2011, she noticed that there were 12 new stores and a new hotel opened on Serdar-ı Ekrem Street since she opened her store in 2009.

After GalataModa Festival, the area began to attract several fashion designers for several reasons. First of all, as early as 2009, the rent levels were very low compared to Istanbul's other popular districts designer boutiques clustered, mostly Nişantaşı and to some extent Bağdat Street on the Anatolian side of the city. The account of this respondent shows the motives for her choice of Kuledibi in economic terms:

RF#3: I can say that the rents were low... compared to Nişantaşı it was cheap... there are no space available in main streets, if you can find one it is 3-4 times higher than they are here (in Kuledibi)... it was cheaper but the stores were dilapidated, which was still cheaper when you include the money needed for restoration (*E ucuzdu diyebilirim kiralar... yani mesela Nişantaşı ile yanyana koyduğunda ucuzdu, zaten orada ana caddelerde dükkan yok, olsa da kiralar buranın en az 3-4 katı... burası ucuzdu ama burada da dükkanlar çok bakımsızdı, o masrafı da gözönüne aldığında yine de ucuz kalıyordu*)

In addition to the economic constraints, the symbolic character of the area is also important when setting up a business for fashion designers. As several respondents pointed out, Galata not only offered cheap store space, but also it offers an attractive landscape with historic buildings and narrow streets that resembles a European city, due to its colonial past during the ottoman era. When asked about their motivations to choose Serdar-ı Ekrem Street for their stores, several respondents pointed out the physical features and how it fits the designer boutique image—and the relevant neighborhood image—they had in their minds:

RF#2: the space is very important for me, the feeling of that space I love that soul that old buildings have, their high ceilings and I also love the area, Galata area... for example, I never believed that my job fitted the places like Nişantaşı, Bağdat Street, places seems like 'hit' but to me they are fake with cinderella's and other stuff, I don't like the artificiality of those places. The way I'm do my job is design oriented, closer to the artistic side, and this is the main reason I chose this area. I loved the way that this area was not succumbed to the fashion fever, and the feeling of this place, that's why (I chose this area) (*mekan çok önemli bişey benim için mekanın hissi çok önemli yani atıyorum o binaların o şeyini yani çok seviyorum o eski binaların ruhunu o tavan yüksekliğini o yüzdende bide bölgeyi seviyorum galata bölgesini, mesela benim yaptığım işle hiçbir zaman şey örtüştüğüne inanmadım ben hani nişantaşı, bağdat caddesi hani böyle hit görünen ama oralar bana böyle çok sahte ve şey geliyor böyle bir sindirellalar işte bilmemneler oranın yapmacıklığı hoşuma gitmiyor. Böyle hani benim işin durduğum tarafı daha böyle tasarım ağırlıklı, daha böyle sanatına yakın bir tarafında durduğum için hani benim bölgeyi*)

orada olacak kimler gelecek beraber izleyelim [sic]" Twit from her personal account @baharkorcan, on November 3, 2009, accessible at (<https://twitter.com/baharkorcan/status/5387029750>)

seçmemde en büyük etken oydu. ... işte bu bölgenin o modaıyla böyle yanıp tutuşmamış kavrulmamış halini ve o mekanın o hissini çok sevdim o yüzden...”)

This may also relate to a *field-specific habitus* that becomes evident in the locational preferences of fashion designers, seeking a fit between the field and the physical space it is located in. These aesthetic dispositions has become a part of the field specific habitus as many designers imagine Paris as the Mecca of fashion design, and the physical characteristics of the city has been inscribed to such dispositions. At first look, shops in the Serdar-ı Ekrem Street resemble their counterparts in the Paris, with large windows, high ceilings, hardwood floor coverings, spot lightings, and other furniture as well as merchandise. In their locational preferences, from neighborhood to the actual store itself, fashion designers seek to replicate these images of Parisian boutiques:

RF#3: when you take a look at this street it feels like Paris to me... a narrow street, historic buildings on each side, and there is not a sign of over-restoration... it looks like it was preserved well, and if we don't take grocery stores into account...you get that feel I think... The store names are in foreign language, there are cafés and such, and the people sitting at the tables, all make you feel like it is not Turkey... I don't mean that this feel is right, rather being in turkey and grasping this feeling in Turkey is even better. On the one side of the street, there are buildings hosting lower class, or low-income families, their buildings are preserved poorly and there are clothes hung put to dry, this is what makes here unique. (*Şimdi mesela bu sokağın başından baktığımda, bi Paris sokağı havası veriyor hence. Dar bi sokak, sağlı sollu tarihi binalar ve öye aşırı restore edilmiş bi yerler de yok. İyi korunmuş gibi duruyor, tekel bayilerini saymazsak ilk baktığımda bi o havayı sen de almışsındır. Dükkan isimleri de yabancı, cafeler falan da var, orada masalarda oturanlara baktığımda da bi Türkiye değilmiş havası var. olmaması iyi anlamında demiyorum bunu, yani Türkiye'de olmak ve bunu yakalamak daha güzel. Bi taraftaki apartmanlarda hala daha alt sınıf, alt sınıf demeyelim de dar gelirli insanlar, aileler oturuyor, onların evleri bakımsız ve camlarda çamaşırlar asılı... bu da buraya özgü bişey, sen burada bu işi yapıyorsun orda da o çamaşırlar asılı, o da buranın kendini özgü yani*)

These aesthetic dispositions are also reflected in the decoration of stores, as seen in several examples still found in the street:

RF#5: in making decoraton, we discussed it with the architect, evaluated and we naturally had those types of boutiques in our mind... we also looked at the pictures we could find, but I cannot say that we directly copied the design... we were inspired, what should stay where, and what type of frame should look better, and especially for the type of lighting we used... but the major concern was on the language of (my) design, my view of life which is also reflected in the designs, and we wanted (store design) to reflect this... if the homeland of this business is Paris, to imitate that is very natural, when you think about it, it is the image you have in your mind... and its practicality was tested, the racks and hangers on the side, and the spot lights hanged above them... because the celinings are high you need to hang the lights from above.. the store space also resembles (to them), narrow and deep, with a narrow façade and high ceilings... it proves successful when you apply the forms tested there, and it looks good too.” (*E dekorasyonu yaparken, iç mimarla da bunu tartıştık, değerlendirdik, elbette aklımızda o tarz butikler vardı... bulabildiğimiz fotoğraflara da baktık, ama doğrudan da kopyaladık diyemem. Esinlendik, ne nerde dursa iyi olur, nasıl bi çerçeve koysak daha güzel durur, özellikle ışıklandırma konusunda çok fikir verdi o fotoğraflar... ama asıl kaygı tasarımın da dilini, benim kendi*

hayata bakışımı ki bu da tasarıma yansımakta, bunları da yansıtsın istedik... zaten bu işin anavatanı Paris ise, bi öykünme gayet doğal, yani düşününce zaten kafadaki imge bu... bi de pratikliği denenmiş tescillenmiş yani kenarda askılar raflar, onlara tepeden inen spotlar... tavanlar yüksek olduğu için sarkıtman şart ışıkları... yani mekan da boş haliyle de benziyor, ince uzun dükkânlar... dar cepheli ve yüksek tavanlar, bi şekilde orada denenmiş şeyleri uyguladığında başarılı oluyor, güzel de görünüyor)

In her study of high-end fashion-designers in New York, Rantisi (2004) identified architecture, art exhibits, opera and theatre as the primary sources of inspiration, for designers. Moreover, many found local consumers—as well as people on the streets or in local nightclubs and parties—as key sources of influence. Same is always true for designers in Serdar-ı Ekrem Street, as several of them cited the old buildings found in the area, the narrow streets, and the people around them as major sources of inspiration. Yet, respondents' choice of Kuledibi also reflects their urge to stay away from Nişantaşı area, where clustering of a large number of designer boutiques in Nişantaşı, which attracts a large number of fashion-conscious customers to the area. Such clustering was evaluated negatively by two respondents. **RF#3** argued that this creates an overstimulation of her senses, a situation which is not present in Galata, and how its lack positively influences her creativity:

RF#3: I feel much better, more relaxed in from different aspects, for example if I had an office in Nişantaşı I would be looking from a different angle, a position in amidst all that mess, surrounded by a lot of brands and clothing—for example, I like the way I'm not in a continuous dialogue with the clothing, I like the way that there are not many stores here, because, otherwise it influences one's approach and mind. I mean, for example, when I go out I don't like seeing those stores, those brands, because to me, it relaxes me... because you are continuously stimulated by them, what I mean by that is when you go out to Istiklal, I feel shattered in places like that, similarly shopping malls and Nişantaşı also do that to me... because there aren't many visual stimulants I can relax, that makes me more creative, makes me think better, and I start not liking those brands, that world... the calmness of here makes me more creative, that's what I think. *(ya böyle kendimi daha böyle şey hissediyorum mesela u hani kafamın daha rahat, yani şöyle birkaç açıdan var aslında örnek olarak Nişantaşı'nda bir ofis olsaydı kesinlikle daha farklı bakıyor olurum yani orda bi şey konumdaydı o hengamenin içerisinde o sürekli işte orda birsürü markaların olması bir sürü kıyafet- ya mesela o yani sürekli kıyafetle diyalog olmama halini de seviyorum burada, bir sürü mağazaların olmama halini seviyorum çünkü diğer türlü olduğunda hani sürekli onunla ilişki içerisinde olmak da çok etkileyen bir şey insanın yaklaşımını ve düşüncesini. Yani oranın mesela çıktığım zaman işte mağazalar görmemek, markalar görmemek hoşuma gidiyor mesela ve şey olarak beni burası rahatlatıyor görsel olarak rahatlatıyor yani çünkü hani insan sürekli ya benim öyle oluyor hani çıktığım zaman sürekli olarak görsel olarak uyarılıyorsun ya sürekli uyarılıyorsun, yani uyarılıyorsun dediğim yani ne biliyim bi istiklale çıkıyorsun o bu şu falan darmadağın oluyorum yani öyle yerlerde (gülüyor), avm şu bu falan beni mahvediyor yani nişantaşı odur budur. Yani burda görsel olarak çok fazla uyaran olmadığı için daha sakinleşebiliyorum ve kesinlikle beni daha yaratıcı kılıyor bu durum yani daha iyi düşünmemi sağlıyor çünkü o hengame o şey beni mahvediyor yani, ve o işte o markalar o şey yani dünyayı sevmemeye başlıyorum o yüzden hani buranın o sakinliği beni daha yaratıcı kılıyor diye düşünüyorum)*

RF#4: (like Nişantaşı), the people here are conscious about their styles, and they follow fashion (trends) but compared to Nişantaşı, here is far away from being local... by far, by local what I mean is a la turca... you can't see them in these streets, because they don't come here, even when they do they don't come to the store, not after what they saw in the display... not all of them are like this, there are those who are incredibly chic but for them, I guess, we are not wellknown enough or expensive enough (*burada da gayet tarzına dikkat eden, modayı takip eden insanlar var ama Nişantaşı ile karşılaştırıldığında biraz daha yerellikten uzak sanırım. Uzak derken, yani yerel derken kastettiğim biraz alaturkalık... yani Nişantaşı'da gördüğün o canım tasarımları tuhaf bi şekilde kombinleyen kadınlar burada yok, alaturkalık bu aslında... burada sokağa çıktığında onlardan göremiyorsun çünkü buralara gelmiyorlar gelseler de kapıdan içeri girmezler vitrinde gördüklerinden sonra. Hepsi öyle değil tabi, inanılmaz şık giyinimler de var ama sanırım onlar için yeterince tanınmış ya da yeterince pahalı değiliz*)

These last statements also show how the designers in Kuledibi positioned themselves in the market, in relation to Nişantaşı's 'high end' designers. This positioning seems to be developed over time, as fashion designers in the district slowly began to capitalize on a sub-cultural identity, which helps to distinguish themselves from what they regard the mainstream designers located in Nişantaşı. Especially with the coming of followers, the agents with ample economic capital, this identity had become more important, as it served as the base of a new *strategy* of pioneers to distinguish themselves from the followers. It also helped them to position themselves in the market for designer fashion, against the mainstream.

With the Serdar-ı Ekrem Street's renovation (which took place concurrently with Bahar Korcan's opening of her store in the street) other designers followed. In 2010 and 2011, according to the respondents the street has reached its peak in terms of the number of shops and visitors. Yet the increasing popularity of the Street among fashion designers, and the increasing media coverage (mostly created thorough designers' own personal connections in the media) put the district in the radars of not only visitors and customers, but also some of the key players in fashion design and high-end ready-to-wear brands. Especially, when one of the high-end brands aggressively sought a spot in the Street, the rent prices increased very rapidly, restraining small scale designers such as those who anchored the designer boutiques in the street. Such valorization usually takes place as potential tenants with ample economic capital push for a spot in the area almost regardless of price, and usually reaches its goal by displacing one of the low income businesses in return for a large payment (named *devir*). This draws the attention of other landlords in the area (like it was the case, when Nora's opening alerted other landlords, at the earlier phase of gentrification) and they try to displace their existing tenants by legal or illegal methods (see Islam, 2003, for strategies for the displacement of home tenants), to make their property available for 'better' and more profitable uses.

In other cases, landlords often push for extracting higher rents from their existing tenants, who agree to increase the rents above the legal rate (equivalent inflation rate) in order to continue occupying the spot. In the long term, such rent increases causes the displacement of lower income businesses including designer boutiques. Moreover, for new business owners, who accepted the high rent values, it takes only several months to realize that they would not be covering the costs of business—even only rents—and go out of business or move to another (usually cheaper location). Some of the shops in the streets were occupied by three different tenants successively, even within a time period of one year.

According to one respondent, there was a growing interest in these bohemian lifestyles and values, which was responsible for the growth of demand in Galata. This aspect of Kuledibi, for designers, was something that they would capitalize on in building their distinctive strategy against the ‘mainstream designers’:

RF#5: the examples of this can be seen in many European cities, there;s a tendency towards bohemian (values), a tendency towards the production of the rare, I think this a designer concept became popular because of this tendency toards the bohemian... I observed such a tendency in people, people come here to lead more bohemian lives, those who make their regular shopping and those who are willing to spend their time here, the woman who normally shpops in Nişantaşı comes here to live that here. It’s like you go to Morocco to experience Moroccan atmosphere, because it has become trendy, it’s something like that... but I think it is temporary, it is like this, here it will not lose its popularity because here it has the Galata Tower, a historic place, I don’t think it will lose its dynamism or energy (*mesela yani Avrupa kentlerinde de öyle bişey var, hani u biraz o boheme olan bir eğilim var, işte az olan üretime bir eğilim var, hani daha böyle tasarımcı kavramı, yani o bohem şeyine bir eğilim olduğu için popolaritesi arttı diye düşünüyorum. Yani genel olarak insanlarda öyle bir eğilim gözlemledim ben mesela, hani insanlar daha bohem bişey yaşamak için bu noktaya geliyor, yani şey olarak da hani normal alışverişini yapan insan ya da zaman geçirmek isteyen insan [...] yani bu dönem içerisinde bunun trend olma eğilimi yani Nişantaşı’nda alışveriş yapan kadın onu yaşamaya geliyor, hani atıyorum hani Fas’a gidersen de Fas’ın atmosferini yaşar dönersin çünkü o hani trend o olmuştur ya onun gibi bişey aslında bana göre burda diye düşünüyorum. Fakat ya ben şey açısından geç- yani o anlamda şey olarak geçici olduğu düşünüyorum şimdi şöyle, burası popolaritesini kaybedecek bir alan değil çünkü burda Galata Kulesi var yani tarihi bir yer var ve o yüzden de hiçbir zaman yani o şeyini kaybedeceğini düşünmüyorum, hareketini ve enerjisini kaybedeceğini düşünmüyorum*)

For respondents, the “bohemian” image of the neighborhood which was created by presence of diverse groups of people in creative jobs including musicians¹⁰⁶, journalists,

¹⁰⁶ Two of them particularly pointed to the presence of jazz musicians, in relation to Nora’s presence in the neighborhood (along with another, recently opened jazz venue and Okay Temiz’s “Ritm Atölyesi”)—yet, in fact the number of jazz musicians living in the Kuledibi district is less than expected. However, their constant presence in the neighborhood due to gigs in Nora and for the purposes of socialization makes jazz musicians a visible group in Galata streets.

writers, fine artists and architects. This bohemian image of the neighborhood is very well inscribed to the designers' identities, to distinguish themselves from mainstream designers located in Nişantaşı. For example, G* G*, who has her atelier in the İlk Belediye Street puts emphasis on the historic character of the neighborhood, along with 'her bohemian character' and how this intersection is embodied in her brand EC, in her company website¹⁰⁷.

For Bourdieu (1999:124-5), as "reified social spaces", the value of different physical spaces is defined in relation to "the distribution of agents and the distribution of goods in social space." As social oppositions are also objectified in physical spaces (such as Paris versus the provinces), these oppositions tend to be reproduced in thought and in language as oppositions constitutive of a principle of vision and division, as categories of perception and evaluation or of mental structure" (Ibid.: p.125) (Parisian/provincial, chic/not chic, Nişantaşı/Kuledibi¹⁰⁸ etc.). Thus, the factual opposition between the 'Left Bank' versus the 'Right Bank' in Paris¹⁰⁹, Broadway (the bourgeois art) versus off-

¹⁰⁷ "EC is an expression of designer G.G.'s appeal to the bohemian artist and world traveler. The Istanbul-based designer earned her university degree in graphic design and studied communication design at Central Saint Martin's College in London. Influenced by the old city's 19th century metropolitan character, sophisticated knitting ateliers and spirited art in the old Galata District, Gül Gürdamar transfers this intensity into her eclectic knitwear collection, aptly named E.C." Designer profile in the company website accessed on 23.04.2013, at http://www.e**c***.com/profile.

¹⁰⁸ This finding is similar to my study of gentrification of Cihangir, where gentrifiers socially constructed a shared *Cihangirli* image, (as embodied in *Cihangir Cumhuriyeti* discourse, a mythical identity which was reproduced within the neighborhood by both gentrifiers and old residents, and served as a set of shared values to guide social conduct within the neighborhood). Similarly, gentrifiers compared Cihangir not with suburban areas, as one would expect judging from the gentrification's traditional opposition with suburbanization. They contrasted Cihangir with Nişantaşı, which they believed to host a more superficial, more materialist, group of residents, with ample economic but lower cultural capital. Interestingly, Nişantaşı is associated with the old bourgeois (those of the early Republican era) as well as neo-liberal eras *nouveau riche*, while Cihangir (a traditionally middle class neighborhood) and Galata (known for wealthy minorities of the Ottoman era).

¹⁰⁹ In *Le Couturier et sa Griffe* (1975) Bourdieu also underlines a similar distinction between old and consecrated designers of French high fashion, and (then-)new comers'. Analogous to the field of politics, he identifies left and right wings within the high fashion; as new comers such as Paco Rabanne and Emanuel Ungaro constitute the 'left'; and Pierre Balmain and Christian Dior were on the on the 'right' wings, (the middle was also occupied by Yves Saint Laurent). This duality was also reflected in the locational preferences of these two opposing wings; as 'right' wing designers were located in Paris's right bank (the old bourgeois area), 'left' wing designers were located in the avant-garde left bank. They also differ in their strategies of struggle, while the new comers use the strategy of subversion, the old *couturiers* prefer the strategy of conversion. The strategy of subversion aims "to devalue the specific capital set by the established *couturiers* ... by defining new values for the legitimation of a new specific capital," (Rocamora, 2002: 344) in contrast to the old *couturiers* who choose to 'play safe.' What is at stakes here is "the

Broadway (avant-garde art), is also reflected in the minds of potential spectators(visitors) as well as designers who conduct business in Kuledibi. The displacement of pioneer designers by more powerful followers, is also a spatial reflection of conflicts between agents occupying different *positions* within the *field*. In other words, the process of displacement is the ‘reification’ of such conflict between different producers whose *strategies* to improve their *positions* within the field, intersects in the physical space, in a given locality: Kuledibi. As the conflict between mainstream designers (or brands) and the avant-garde designers who pioneered the commercial gentrification in Serdar-ı Ekrem Street, the latter group assumes a new *strategy* by presenting themselves as the rightful occupants of the area by putting forward a perceived fit between neighborhood’s bohemian image and their own designs (and a similar lack of fit with ‘bourgeois’ designs). This is constructed by establishing a ‘homology’ between the people in the streets of Kuledibi (not only residents, but—mostly—visitors, both foreign tourists and local residents from other areas in the city).

As Rocamora (2002) underlines, Bourdieu assumes a ‘structural correspondence’ (1993a)—a ‘homology’—a between the position of designers in the field of fashion and the position of consumers in the field of class relations. In other words, producers and consumers are adjusted to each other; “the old consecrated *couturiers* are structurally adjusted to the old bourgeoisies, whereas the new designers are structurally adjusted to the new bourgeoisie” (Bourdieu, 1975: 30 cited in Rocamora, 2002: 351). There is also a similar homology between classes of products (objects) and consumers, (Bourdieu, 1975 cited in Rocamora, 2002:351-352), assisted by a various institutions, who play the role of ‘cultural intermediaries’ (Ibid.). Yet, in the case of Kuledibi, the homology between producers and consumers was constructed with the mediation of physical space. That is, it is the physical and social characteristics of Kuledibi, that attracts both groups—designers and their visitors—and plays an intermediary role in their coming together in the physical space and the market. More importantly, the physical space, as a cultural product (like an avant-garde picture, a political manifesto, a newspaper, a piece of garment) becomes the objectification of the already “constituted taste,”

exclusive power to constitute and impose the symbols of legitimate distinction on the subject of clothes” (Bourdieu, 1975:15, cited in Rocamora, 2002).

a taste which has been raised from the vague semi-existence of half-formulated or unformulated experience, implicit or even or even unconscious desire, to the full reality of the finished product, by a process of objectification which, in present circumstances, is almost always work of the professionals” (Bourdieu, 1984: 231)

In other words, the physical space (Kuledibi) becomes the manifestation of taste of the fashion-designer, which is reflected in the designs or products of these designers, another cultural product. The measure of this fit becomes market success as observed in Kuledibi—not survival of the business in the district it depends on other sources, such as designers’ possession of ‘private income’ (other than their economic activity within the *field*) or other sources—as measured by the popularity of the stores among Kuledibi’s visitors. In other words, the designer boutiques which manage to attract customers are accepted to be rightfully belong to Kuledibi as one respondent puts it:

RF#1 when you think about it those designers or large companies who do not fit the soul of Galata, they came here too... for example, G* a brand that sells its products to the Russian market, who has nothnign to do with fashion design at all, fashion or art, it is not brand belonging to this culture, it is totally commercial and grew in the Russian market, it is a sloppy brand that dominates the Russian market, even it came here to open a store[...] A*K* (a designer store) also does not have any customers but opened the store just for prestige, and I think this growth was related to the popularity of this place, it immediately became popular... otherwise, the people that fit this place’s soul, they don’t exist here, for the time being (*çünkü baktığın zaman aslında galatanın ruhuyla örtüşmeyen tasarımcılar da büyük firmalar da gelip mağaza açtı, örnek veriyorum G* mesela hani bugün işte Rusya’ya satış yapan hani son derece rüküş bir marka, tasarımla alakası yok, tasarım ya da sanatıyani öyle bir kültürden gelen marka değil, tamamen ticari olarak kurulmuş ve rusyada büyümüş, ve rus piyasasına hükmeden bi varoş bir marka yani, ve o bile mağaza açtı, [...] A*** K*** mesela onun da müşterisi yok ama prestij için mağaza açtı, dolayısıyla ben o büyümeyi birazcık buranın popularitesine bağlıyorum açıkçası yani o bi anda çok popüler olmasının getirdiği bişey, yoksa gerçek anlamda buranın ruhuyla örtüşen çok fazla insan aslında var olmuyor burada yani şu an yok*)

In other words, the reason, they believe, that they get to survive in Kuledibi is the characteristics of the shoppers—high in cultural capital, embodied in taste and lifestyle choices—in the area, in contrast to the shoppers in Nişantaşı—who possess higher levels of economic capital, but lower levels of cultural capital.

This demand was peaked in 2010 and 2011, and began to fade away by 2012 and onwards, which resulted in a decline of designer boutiques in the area. A designer who still has her store in the area thinks the days of Galata as a place where fashion designers clustered are over:

RF#5: I feel that it is in a decline, that thing about fashion designers, it is in decline, I feel that because in 2010 it was incredible, there were fashion designers and people were coming here to see them, mostly Turkish (people) and they were asking us, because we were in the middle of the square [...] they were coming here in crowds to see them but if you ask about now, people don’t come anymore. Now, the ones who make here liveable

are the residents Turks and foreign tourists, other than that this place is not an attraction to locals anymore, the thing about designers is now over, there is a huge difference when we compare it with 2010, 2011 with today (*ben onun düştüğünü hissediyorum, o hani modacılar tasarımcılar bilmemne o bi şey yaptı, o mesela bi düşünüşe geçti, onu hissediyorum çünkü 2010 senesinde örneğin inanılmaz böyle bir tasarımcılar vardı bir sürü insan gelirdi, Türk ve bize çok soruyordu, biz tam meydanda olduğumuz için mağaza, [...]yani buraya alışveriş yapmaya tasarımcıları görmeye kitleler bile gelirdi akın akın ama şu an sorarsan kimse gelmiyor, yani şu an burayı bu hale getiren burada yaşayan Türkler ve yabancı turistler, yoksa onun dışında burası Türklerin uğrak bir yeri değil ve o şey açısından o tasarımcıların o şeyi mesela bitti, acayip bir fark var yani 2010 2011 senesiyle şu anı karşılaştığımızda*)

Not only the avant-garde fashion designers, but some of the ‘big shot’ followers had to leave the street due to high rents, and increasing pressure from the real estate market in the wake of a large scale urban development project Galataport. In the case of Kuledibi, those designers which inhabited the area, especially, Serdar-I Ekrem Street with the support of the local municipality, were displaced by the agents from within their own *fields*. The support of the local municipality to fashion designers may be aimed at displacing less desirable occupants from the area, such as small workshops and businesses which create disturbance to the surrounding real estates, and declining their potential value. Moreover, upon complaints of the residents, the municipality and the police have been imposing a strict policy to ban consumption of alcohol in the public space—that is, Galata Square—in order to prevent crowds gathering and entertaining themselves in the area. Once such small obstacles were removed, it was time for further valorization with the advent of Galataport project. Respondents were split in the issue of what this project would bring about for the remaining designers in the area. There are at least two buildings on sale, and several other were already bought by large investors, and this is expected to bring more wealthy tourists and high income residents to the area. According to a respondent, the municipality has already begun its efforts to evacuate existing tenants in the area by creating disturbances, such as banning restaurants to put tables on the sidewalks and by introducing long term construction projects in the area:

RF#5: the stores in this area suffered the most [...] I also suffered in that period and began to think that they were doing this deliberately... first, the tables were gone [...] second, this street was under construction for 6-7 months, and right in front of my store there was a hole and that hole was dug all the way through Galipdede Street, think about it, the first day, I came here and couldn't pass through it, I looked at other people, and they were using wooden bridges to pass the hole. I also bought a wooden bridge, but people didn't come here... the road was like that for a couple months, then it was filled but after one week, it was dug once again, because there was a fault, it was closed once again, and dug once again, exactly three times... I witnessed that [...] isn't this intriguing? (*olan gerçekten esnafa oldu yani [...] o dönem çok büyük sıkıntı yaşadım ben o dönem artık bir şeyleri bilinçli yapıyorlar diye düşünmeye başladım. Ya birincisi masa sandalye kalmadı [...] ikincisi o yol 6-7 ay boyunca yapım aşamasındaydı, ve benim mağazanın tam önünde bir çukur var ve o çukur bütün Galipdede caddesi boyunca devam ettiğini*)

düşün o çukurun, bi gün böyle geldim mağazaya geçemedim çünkü bir çukur var, sonra millete baktım millet nasıl geçmiş diye, herkes hemen bir köprü yaptırmış şeyden, [...] böyle gittim ben de o köprüden yaptırдыm koydum geçmeye başladım ama tabi insanlar gelmedi, o yol 1-2 ay boyunca öyle çukurdu sonra oralar yapıldı kapandı orası e bir hafta sonra hata var diye tekrar kazıldı ve tekrar kapandı ve tam 3 kere kazıldı orası yani ben buna şahit oldum [...] çok ilginç değil mi yani bunun böyle olması)

This ‘small’ construction—coupled with the removal of tables from the sidewalks resulted in restaurants and other businesses to lose their income, laying off their workers in order to lower the costs of operation. Interestingly, this time neither complaints nor press coverage triggered the response by the local government.

The respondents expect the completion of Galataport will bring more significant (and financially more powerful) players to the area, as they would be the only ones capable of paying such high rents. Some of them are more realistic after a clear exit strategy by benefiting from this process:

RF#5: many brands and investors are newly discovering the area, moreover, the projects within Galataport also adds value to this street... there are many people seriously looking for a place in the street. Back in 2011, they gave 100 thousand, 200 thousand liras to evacuate the store (*bir çok marka ve yatırımcı yeni yeni keşfediyor bir de tabi o Galataport'taki yeni projeler bilmemne bu sokağın bu caddenin değerini kat be kat arttırıyor dolayısıyla şu an cidden çok fazla yer arayan bir insan var mesela örnek veriyorum. Bana 2011 senesinde 100 bin 200 bin dolar mı ne teklif edildi mesela benim mağazadan çıkıp burasını kapatmam için bana*)

CHAPTER 9

The Field, Agency and Locality in an Artistic Mode of Production

This chapter starts with a brief summary of the findings based on the analysis of the two fields within the broader field of cultural production, as located in Kuledibi Galata. The second part is dedicated to the discussion of these findings in relation to the research questions presented in the introductory chapter of this thesis.

The primary focus of this thesis was on the relationship between the cultural producers as located in particular geography in urban space, and their relationships to wider processes of neoliberal urbanism (Smith, 2002). In this case study, a research site has been identified as Kuledibi, a neighborhood which has been witnessing a slow paced gentrification process for over a decade. It hosted a number of cultural sectors including fine arts, jazz and fashion design. Moreover, it was surrounded by a number of “large scale urban development projects” (UDPs) that are emblematic of neoliberal urbanism of 2000s (Swyngedouw et al, 2002). The main research focus arose from the relationship of cultural producers as located in Kuledibi to such wider neoliberal restructuring process that became more visible in Istanbul over the years. Being spatially proximate, an interaction between artists’ enclave of Kuledibi and a nearby large scale UDP has become especially important as the introduction of the project created new pressures on the real estate market which was expected to affect local cultural production in the area. Following Pierre Bourdieu’s formulation of a *field*, a ‘spatialized’ *field* analysis was employed to define a local ‘artistic mode of production’ (Zukin, 1982), whereby a local powerful elite supported cultural activity to induce real estate valorization in the urban space. A localized perspective to the *field* was deemed necessary to locate cultural producers (in two fields of cultural production as located in Kuledibi, jazz and fashion design) *vis-à-vis* to a field of power in relation to a particular locality, spanning from local to global actors (including local and central governments as well as banking, finance and real estate capital of various scales). By locating the field (social space) in a geographical space, this study sought to understand the relationship between social space and physical space, particularly focusing on how dynamics internal to *field* of cultural production were reflected in the urban space, and

how external demands from the *field* (from the *field* of power) were refracted to the *field* through the mediation of urban space.

There are three key findings of this study besides the identification of an AMP and its key actors. The first one is related to the gentrification of Kuledibi, despite the fact that gentrification was not the primary focus of this study. A gentrifying neighborhood that hosts plenty of culturally productive activity was chosen in order to provide a possible link between wider processes influencing gentrification and the local cultural production. The gentrification of Kuledibi (and the wider area of Galata) has been going on since 1990s, and at a slower pace, due to several obstacles slowing down the gentrification process. In time, however, while the gentrification continued in a steady progress, its character has changed due to major transformation in the ‘urban regime’ of Istanbul. The process first started with a small number of pioneer gentrifiers (Ley, 1996) who sought low-cost housing with distinctive aesthetic qualities, in an area close to the urban core—where cultural amenities they valued were abundant. The process was driven by a fragment of the ‘new’ middle class (Ley, 1994), who valued cultural and social diversity, and aestheticized urban lifestyles and, most importantly, a distinctive practice that would separate them from the ‘mainstream’ consumption practices. Over time, with the growing influence of the mechanisms of a neoliberal ‘urban regime’ on Istanbul, the gentrification process took a different shape recently. Especially local government’s support for a small-scale clustering of fashion-designers in the Serdar-ı Ekrem Street, and the enormous investment potential due to the finalization of the bidding for nearby Galataport project helped the gentrification process to step up gear. Its current situation creates ambiguities for the cultural producers as well as other occupants in the area, as extensive property transfers have been going on in the key streets, and every day, new items are put to the market hoping to make capital gains. The inclusions of even larger real estate investors to transform the area to a center of tourism services—including hotels, restaurants, entertainment and other amenities, put many cultural producers out of the game due to their limited economic capital.

The second finding, is central to the purposes of this research, basically to uncover the role of cultural producers in relation to gentrification, as they are the ones to be attributed a major role in triggering the process. So far, such explanations focused on mostly lifestyle choices of cultural producers (Zukin, 1989, 1996; Ley 1994) and their demands from the physical infrastructure for production purposes at individual level (Zukin, 1989; İnce, 2006). In this study, I investigated the internal dynamics and

properties of two separate *fields* within the broader *field* of cultural production (*field* of jazz and the *field* of fashion design) as outlined by Bourdieu. The analysis of the *positions* (and *position-takings*) of cultural producers (identified their differential possession of the types of capital—economic, cultural, social, and symbolic—both at collective and individual levels) in these *fields* allowed me to uncover what is really ‘at stakes’ (Bourdieu, 1993a) in these two fields. This exercise also helped me to position each field within the social space, in relation to broader field of power. Having identified that, the particular strategies followed by cultural producers are uncovered. Again following Bourdieu’s basic premise that regards physical spaces as “reified social spaces” (1993b: 124), I tried to uncover how each *field*—along with the *positions*, *position-takings* and *strategies*—was ‘reified’ in the physical space.

A common and overriding theme for these two *fields* was the producers to reach the markets (audiences for the field of jazz or buyers for the field of fashion) not only for economic gains, but for symbolic ones. For the cultural producers in the *field* of jazz, reaching the market was instrumental in advancing their *positions* within the field. Reaching the market in the field of jazz means playing as much as possible in gigs and jam sessions to increase musical techniques (cultural capital), expand the network of musicians within the genre (social capital), both of which translate to symbolic capital. Of course, there are also economic gains from reaching the market, but these gains are very minimal. Moreover, as a ‘*field of restricted cultural production*’ (with the principle of reversed economy), economic gains does not translate to improved position within the field. For the field of fashion, which carries the properties of both restricted production and large-scale (mass) production), accessing the field and making economic gains from the cultural activity is a central to improving cultural producers’ *positions* within the field. Besides purely economic gains, having an economic value in the market is an important symbolic gain especially for ‘newcomers’. Yet this symbolic success is inscribed to fashion designers names (as brand names), which adds to the brand value, and transformed to further market success (in terms of economic and symbolic gains).

Both fields share a more-or-less common strategy of creating ‘alternative spaces’ to reach the market, by circumventing the mainstream practice dominating it. This involves the cultural producers to assume the position of ‘entrepreneur’—a position which is not defined to the field of cultural production. In the local field of jazz, in Istanbul, the emergence of Kuledibi as one of the vibrant scenes of jazz depends on jazz musicians’ urge to create venues that will enable them to reach their target audience (a ‘true’ jazz

audience) as well as offer them desired playing arrangements. In response to the jazz's increasing seclusion to upscale hotels and jazz bars (can be summarized by the term Q-jazz), which also blocked many players access to the market due to exclusive work arrangements, musicians started their own places as exemplified in the cases of Naima, and then Nora.

In the case of the field of fashion design, the designers founded a professional association (MTD) to anchor a movement to open both young and established designers' access to the market. In collaboration with the local government, the association chose Galata to start a fashion festival (which is still held twice a year), which helped to associate the district with fashion-design. It also encouraged fashion designers to open stores in Galata, a low cost location compared to the center of fashion-design, Nişantaşı. Not only Nişantaşı was too expensive for many upcoming designers to open stores, it was also very crowded with designer-boutiques which would make it harder for them to stand out. As fashion-designers gradually created an 'alternative' fashion district in Galata, they also constructed a distinctive identity based on the areas 'bohemian character'. This character was socially constructed as gentrifiers and other visitors which preferred the area for its cultural and entertainment amenities were mostly the creative types, such as musicians, architects and artists.

These two examples show how such *strategies* to access the market was reflected only the internal dynamics of the respective fields, but mediated by the external factors such as the support of sponsors and local municipality, as well as the dynamics of real estate market—which opened both opportunities and constraints from the cultural producers. Cultural producers' *position-takings* within these two fields and the resulting *strategies* to improve their *positions* within the field also involve the use of urban space. At the surface, what seems as a mainly economic decision making for cultural producers to choose low cost locations, such as Kuledibi, proves to be a strategy by different cultural producers to use symbolic aspects of space to claim distinction within the broader field they are a part of. For the field of jazz, in addition to being a low cost area near the city's cultural core; Kuledibi's initially dilapidated, then gentrified landscape, helps to claim a distinctive identity against the 'snob' and polished image of mainstream jazz dominating the field. Similarly, the choice of fashion designers to move to the area is very much affected by the low rents in the area, but more importantly, the distinctive character of the neighborhood is transferred to the symbolic capital of the designers

themselves and to their brands, through a perceived ‘homology’ between designers, their product and their customers, which was also mediated by the space.

The strategy of using ‘alternative spaces’ to acquire access to the markets also has reflections in the urban space; as such alternative spaces (of both cultural production and consumption) become attractions in the urban environment, helping for the revalorization of the surrounding area. This links us back to the framework of “artistic mode of production” as there emerges a double-sided market formation tied to a particular locality, and the relationship between market formation in two separate areas (i.e. arts market and real estate market). However, in Zukin’s analysis, there is rather a one-way relationship between the formations of two markets, as the formation of an art market triggers the formation of a real estate market. In my analysis of two separate fields within the field of cultural production with varying degrees of ties to a locality, Kuledibi, I arrived at a different conclusion: first, the separate relationships between the real estate market versus the fields of jazz and the field of fashion-design is rather a dialectical one. In the analysis of field of jazz, the gentrification—hence the related real estate market formation—is a factor intervening to the process of market formation in the field of jazz. The physical and social changes in the district—improved infrastructure, the rehabilitation of old buildings changing demographic composition and transformation of the retailscape are contributing factors to the success of Nora, flagship of the field of jazz in Istanbul. Despite pressures from the real estate markets, which only resulted in significant growth in rents in Kuledibi, Nora managed to survive thanks to the protective legal measures limiting the use of the building for other purposes. Being also a contributor to the process of gentrification, by enhancing the neighborhood image by its presence, the club also benefited from the process as neighborhood became aesthetically more attractive and less dangerous for visitors at night (an important point considering the average ending time of live performances, mostly after 1 a.m. even in weekdays). The opening of other businesses with an aesthetic appeal, art galleries, boutiques, cafés and restaurants in the surrounding area made Kuledibi an area which one can spend hours by participating in different activities, visiting different places. This helped Kuledibi to establish itself as an attractive destination in Istanbul, adding extra qualities to it, in addition to hosting one of the most significant tourist attractions in Istanbul, Galata Tower.

In the field of fashion, the formation of ‘alternative spaces’ led to a clustering tendency—this time supported by the local government—in the Kuledibi district starting

from 2009, which was also in a dialectical relationship with the real estate market formation due to gentrification. Since 2006, GalataModa Festival both benefited from the area's enhanced image, while itself enhancing this very image by offering a powerful symbolic attraction in the area. Starting from 2009, encouraged by the low rent levels in the area, a group of 'avant-garde' fashion designers began to open stores in the Serdar-ı Ekrem Street, displacing a number of small businesses. Within a short time-period Kuledibi, especially Serdar-ı Ekrem Street has become associated with the presence of several avant-garde designers thanks to the media coverage and growing attention by fashion-conscious consumers. There emerged a common, sub-cultural identity among these designers, which stood in contrast with the 'mainstream' fashion designers located in old bourgeoisie neighborhood Nişantaşı, which hosted a large number of local and international designer-boutiques. Central to this identity was the perceived characteristics of the people in the streets of Galata, including tourists, local residents and visitors from other parts of town. Contrary to Nişantaşı's *nouveau rich* visitors, a 'hip', 'creative', crowd, with high cultural capital, was filling the streets of Kuledibi. The avant-garde fashion designers of Kuledibi created a 'homology' between that crowd and their own designs, through the former's appreciation of Kuledibi. This 'homology' was mediated by a specific locality, a physical space (the "reified social space"), and its image was used to improve avant-garde designers' position within the field. In this sense, their presence in Kuledibi has added to the symbolic capital of avant-garde designers, inscribing the 'physical space' back in 'social space'. As several large players within the field of fashion design and apparel companies also discovered the area to benefit from its symbolic potential, this struggle over space has become a 'reification' of the struggle within the *field* of fashion-design. The followers coming to the area resulted in enormous rise in rent levels, gradually displacing fashion designers as well as other businesses in the area. The pioneer movers to the Serdar-ı Ekrem Street were thus displaced by the players they tried to distance themselves from, by moving to the area and embracing the neighborhood identity. Yet their failure to remain in the street (due to the imbalance of costs versus revenues, or in short economic failure) was also used by avant-garde designers to emphasize the lack of fit between large and mainstream brands with a place hosting people of high cultural capital. This also gave them an opportunity to claim themselves as the righteous owners of the street, even when they were replaced by large players or other businesses due to the rising popularity of the area.

This study has shown that the strategies of cultural producers to improve their positions does not always involve struggle among producers, thus their options were not limited to *conservation* and *subversion*, as both newcomers and established producers, presented in oppositional positions in Bourdieu's work, often cooperate for the same goal. For both fields, established producers and newcomers cooperate in their collective aim to access to an existing market, or creating a new one. Established cultural producers in both fields helped the newcomers to have access to the field. Their strategies not only helped newcomers to have access to the market, which brought more symbolic than economic gains, but they also made symbolic profits to elevate their *positions*. Such entrepreneurial activity often pays off in terms gains in economic capital, yet it elevates or consolidates the position of the 'cultural' entrepreneur with returns in terms of symbolic profits—which is mostly the case in jazz. In the field of fashion, such entrepreneurial activity is not, *per se*, evaluated positively by other producers unless the entrepreneur in question has already proven herself (since all the producers in our study are women) by other rewards within the field—such as recognition by a respected producer within the field, or some kind of institutional recognition embodied in an award or scholarship; or at least a relevant degree in one of the respected institutions.

Although, it was not one of the aims of this study, despite their physical proximity in urban space, there emerged no significant interaction between cultural producers in these two fields, jazz and fashion. Being one of the first to come to the district in early 2000s, Nora—as the landmark of jazz in Kuledibi district—had already consolidated its position in the neighborhood. The emergence of fashion designers starting from 2006 with GalataModa festival, and the later gentrification of Serdar-ı Ekrem Street did not have a negative influence on neither the venue nor the field of jazz for two reasons: first, the part of the district Nora is located had already undergone a mild wave of commercial gentrification before the fashion designers arrived at the neighborhood. This part hosted a number of small boutiques, designer and souvenir shops as well as food vendors targeting the tourists visiting this section of the city. Fashion designers clustered in the Serdar-ı Ekrem Street, where a number of small businesses they could more easily displace by convincing business and landowners. On a different level, however, the fashion designers built on the neighborhood image created by previous gentrifiers, among whom jazz musicians were predominantly visible, therefore responsible for the bohemian image of the neighborhood.

The third, and the last finding relates to direct relationships with the field of power; namely corporate capital and local government in the case jazz and fashion design. Besides, the role of local government in opening Galata for the fashion designers, there are also institutional sponsors supporting such cultural activities within the fields of jazz and fashion. In terms of corporate sponsorship, the field of jazz is more blessed compared to the field of fashion design. There are several institutional actors such as banks, as well as the key player in Istanbul's cultural activities: IKSU, which is also funded by corporate capital. While the forms of sponsorship vary from event to event, sponsorships do not create economic gains for the cultural producers. Rather, both receiving such funds and taking part in the activities using these funds may have returns as symbolic profits to the cultural producers. This set of ongoing relationships with the sponsors gives rise to a new breed of *cultural intermediaries*, who mediate between cultural producers and the corporate capital. In addition to the new *petite bourgeois* cultural intermediaries who are involved with the "presentation and representation (sales, marketing, advertising, public relations, fashion, decoration and so forth) and in all the institutions providing symbolic goods and services" (Bourdieu, 1984: 359), these cultural intermediaries resembles the old cultural intermediaries who intermediate between producers and consumers. This new breed of cultural intermediaries, as found, in the fields of jazz and fashion design, mediate between cultural producers and their sponsors or the wider field of power. They are the ones who decide how the funds from sponsors will be distributed and to whom, among cultural producers. They belong to the field of cultural production, often as cultural producers themselves, and represent the field of power within the field of cultural production. In social space, they are situated between the field of cultural production and field of power, yet their relationships with the sponsors move them closer to the field of power. Mostly they are equipped with the field-specific knowledge (as a form of cultural capital) on the practices within the field, as they may well be cultural producers themselves. These cultural intermediaries not only mediate the relationship between the field of power and the field of cultural production with their knowledge of the rules of the both games, for the particular field of cultural production, they also have an active role to protect or surrender field's autonomy.

Finally, as the changing character of the gentrification process in the area due to the speeding up of a nearby large scale urban development project (Swyngedouw, et al., 2002) shows, the field of cultural production—as exemplified in the two field in our study—is more open to interventions from the field of power (real estate capital, place

entrepreneurs of different sizes, the local and central governments). When a field of cultural production is linked to a particular locality, such as Kuledibi, the interventions from the field of power involves the mediation of urban space, as the pressures from the real estate market pushes cultural producers to come up with different *strategies*. As the central government reintroduced a 15-year old plan to build a new home port for cruisers in a nearby area, pushing the local real estate market into a very dynamic phase (and producers from both fields of jazz and fashion design are on the verge of displacement). Especially, producers from the field of fashion are trying to manage the transition by benefiting from the real estate boom. Some of them, mostly tenants are trying to delay their exit from the area as much as they can in order to receive economic benefits in return from handing over their place to businesses with ample financial capital. Some others are hopeful that the transition will bring create business for them, and regard this transition as a chance to increase their economic and symbolic profits (in the form of recognition of their names or brands in the market). Producers in the field of jazz are also optimistic as they think their *field* (or market) is too small to attract negative impact from real estate boom in the area. Despite the real estate investors endangering their venues, they believe they would still find a place for themselves to continue their cultural production.

In sum, this study revealed that an ‘artistic mode of production’ exists Galata, near Beyoğlu where arts and cultural amenities presence is most concentrated and the nearby areas are nominated for rapid (revalorization) with the help of four large scale urban redevelopment projects. Yet, cultural producers in these two fields are also part of this artistic mode of production, as a result of their own *strategies* and they are involved in the process insofar as their *field*-related strategies required them get involved. They are the beneficiaries of the support from the local government and local corporate capital, but this support helps them to execute their strategies to improve their position in the field.

This study started with several concrete research questions in order to uncover the relationship of the field of cultural production within a particular locality (of Kuledibi), with the broader processes of neoliberal urban restructuring as it takes place in Istanbul. Zukin’s ‘artistic mode of production’ thesis was employed to connect wider neoliberal dynamics to local cultural production. This analysis involved three interrelated steps. One is the identification of an artistic mode of production in Istanbul, particularly in Kuledibi district. Zukin’s (1982) formulation of artistic mode of production investigates

the relationship between a local arts market and real estate market. The process of gentrification in the Kuledibi district, with several cultural sectors becoming evident, and the heightening demand for real estate due to several large scale UDPs surrounding the area was investigated from this perspective. This helped to outline the broader field of power by identifying key actors such as local political and economical elite, ‘patricians’ as Zukin (1982) would have called them.

The second step was to uncover the role of cultural producers from two *fields* (jazz and cultural production) within this artistic mode of production by incorporating Bourdieu’s theory of *field of cultural production*. This second step entailed uncovering each *field* with their respective agents and their *positions* (and *position-takings* within their fields) and the specific *strategies* they employed to improve their positions within the fields. Explicating each field also required their positioning in relation to the broader *field* of power (or the *field* of artistic mode of production) and their relationships with (the agents in) the field of power (Johnson, 1993). The final step was the incorporation of the first two steps, situating each field within a wider field of power linked to a particular locality, a ‘field of artistic mode of production.’ This exercise helps us to concretely identify the agents involved in each field of cultural production and the broader field of power, and the relationships among them (along with the strategies of cultural producers) from the perspective of a particular locality. Such strategies may be aimed at improving (or preserving) producers’ positions within their own fields, as well as to resist the demands external to the field (from the field of power). These strategies are also in close relationship with the urban space for several reasons. First, some of the strategies employed by cultural producers involve the use of urban space—such as their locational preferences to get ahead in the ‘game’, in order to distinguish themselves, improve their positions within their respective fields. Second, some of the strategies are responses to interventions from both the field of power and within their respective *fields*, as such interventions infiltrate the field through urban space. That is, such interventions are materialized (and perceived by the cultural producers as such) only when the field is tied to a particular locality. These include the demands from the real estate capital, the support from local government and corporate capital, as well as locational preferences of other players within the same field (as well as other fields) that result in heightened competition for urban space. Finally, these strategies employed by cultural producers may be embodied in the urban space as it happens in the case of gentrification, whereby the settlement of cultural producers in a particular district causes real estate valorization in nearby quarters (Zukin, 1982; Ley, 1996, 2003).

The result is a localized field of power, a ‘field of artistic mode of production’, defined from the viewpoint of two specific fields (jazz and fashion design), localized in Kuledibi. In other words, the resultant framework is a snapshot of the field of power, a bottom up view from a specific locality, and the agents within two sub-fields of cultural production that is located in Kuledibi. This framework is different in Bourdieu’s original formulation in several aspects. First, contrary to his use of national scale to define the *field of power*, this formulation involves all scales from neighborhood level to global level. This reach from local to global does not only involve cultural producers with their connections to global networks of cultural producers within their own *field* (through international fashion weeks or jazz festivals), it also involves the investment capital or other corporate capital the influence of which is felt not just at national or urban scale, but also neighborhood scale (Smith, 2002). Even in a small district such as Kuledibi, a significant amount of place entrepreneurs are large scale real estate companies from different parts of the world. Large scale UDPs (such as Galataport) have also been attractive targets for international capital, through ventures with local capital. While Zukin’s ‘artistic mode of production’ was analytically focused on urban scale, incorporation of Bourdieu’s theory of the cultural field helps expand it to national or even international level defining a much broader field of power influencing a particular locality.

Moreover, regardless of the field of cultural production, the analysis of the field from a particular locality also reveals that each field (and its surrounding field of power) presents a different picture based on the locality. For example, analyzing the field of fashion design from Kuledibi, reveals a much different picture when it was analyzed from Nişantaşı (or Istanbul versus London or Paris). In each locality, the field is surrounded with a different field of power (with different actors and different relationships between sub-fields) and the extent to which the field in a given locality is influenced by the field of power also differs. For example, the field of fashion design as located in Nişantaşı is not influenced as strongly as Kuledibi from neoliberal urban policies. Similarly, the field of jazz as located in Kuledibi is much more influenced by the shifts in local estate market compared to the field of jazz elsewhere. Not only such interactions with the field of power are ‘context dependent’, position of a sub-field within the cultural production in relation to the wider field of power (Johnson, 1993) is also context dependent. This ‘contextuality of the field’ (of cultural production) enables us to narrow down the actors from both the field itself and the wider field of power, and

the relationships in detail, especially in a time when the “space of flows” (Castells, 1989) converges with the “space of places” (Castells, 1999).

Such an analysis would produce different findings from the viewpoint of any other field situated in a different locality. The snapshot of the field of power in a neoliberal perspective would also be revealed by an analysis of the social field from the viewpoint of a squatter or distressed area such as Tarlabaşı or Sulukule. The perspective acquired from the viewpoint of a gentrifying district such as Kuledibi (which hosts several fields within cultural production) helped to grasp a wider spectrum of events compared to other areas in Istanbul which are under the influence of neoliberal policy for two reasons: first of all, the ongoing gentrification of the area and its changing nature over time helped us to observe a multiplicity of ways in which neoliberal processes can be felt in a given locality. Moreover, the perspective of the two sub-fields within the field of cultural production helped to uncover the experiences of the members of the dominant fraction of the dominant class. These agents, compared to the urban poor, have a diverse array of strategies at their disposal by being part of the dominant fraction.

This localized notion of the field (of any field) introduces new actors to the field of power who have been previously absent in Bourdieu’s analysis, moreover, it juxtaposes multiple sub-fields within cultural production which are situated in the same locality. In other words, any locality is a point in space where multiple fields intersect, even those who have been distant in the social space according to Bourdieu’s formulation. Their co-presence in this particular physical space, often, is a result of the ‘homology’ between the separate fields (Bourdieu, 1998), based on the premise that physical space brings together the equivalent fractions within respective fields, in terms of their possession of symbolic capital. What brings international investment capital, jazz musicians and fashion designers together in this particular locality, however, is not this ‘homology’ between fields, rather it is the artistic mode of production which tries to benefit from the presence of culturally creative activity in order to valorize urban space with a ‘better’ and more profitable—use (Smith, 1996).

Against a neoliberal backdrop, placing the field of cultural production within the wider field of artistic mode of production situates both the wider field of cultural production and the fields within it amidst a different set of relationships with the field of power, compared to Bourdieu’s original formulation. These relationships often incorporate ‘new’ institutional (and individual) agents to the field of power, and these relationships

are different in nature. In the case of Kuledibi, the fields of jazz and fashion design have been linked with different set of actors, from the field of power, they would otherwise have no relation at all. There is also a homology between the field of jazz and fashion, in that the avant-garde, the alternative in each field came together in a place that is produced as an alternative to the mainstream. This does not only include the relationships with the sponsors from corporate capital, also included is the relationships with the real estate –or ‘investment capital’ to use Zukin’s (1982) terms—which are indirect in nature and mediated by the use of (or competition over the use of) urban space. The first set of relationships (with the sponsors) fits Bourdieu’s original framework and may be considered as interventions from the field of power to the field of cultural production. This type of relationship is not new to the field of cultural production; rather it is the latest phase in a historical relationship between the bourgeoisie and the cultural producer (bohemian) in which the former supports the latter, despite their antagonistic location in the social space (Bourdieu, 1966, 1993b; Lloyd, 2006). This set of ongoing relationships with the sponsors gives rise to a new breed of *cultural intermediaries*, who mediate between cultural producers and the corporate capital. In social space, they are situated between the field of cultural production and field of power, yet their relationships with the sponsors move them closer to the field of power. Mostly they are equipped with the field-specific knowledge (as a form of cultural capital) on the practices within the field, as they may well be cultural producers themselves. These cultural intermediaries not only mediate the relationship between the field of power and the field of cultural production with their knowledge of the rules of the both games, for the particular field of cultural production, they also have an active role to protect or surrender field’s autonomy. At the same time, they translate the demand from the fields of power to the field of cultural production. For each field within the cultural production they have a unique position in the social space, in relation to the field of cultural production in question and the field of power surrounding it.

The second set of relations with the field of power, for the field of cultural production, is with the ‘investment capital’ or ‘place entrepreneurs’ (Zukin, 1982) of different sizes who try to extract profit from the use of urban space (Harvey, 2009). The relationships with such agents involve the use of urban space—rather a competition for the use of urban space (Zukin, 1995)—hence it takes place through physical space. While this type of relationship is also not a novelty, it has become intensified in a neoliberal context especially in the case of Kuledibi, where a nearby neoliberal project is exerting

pressure on the local cultural production through the real estate market, as a result of a new phase in area's gentrification. Compared to earlier examples where cultural producers and investors competed for urban space, this is much larger in scale, and more intensified than ever. Compared to the first set of relationships with the field of power, this is enacted on physical space, rather than social space, as strategies of both cultural producers and agents within the field of power are enacted on space.

These novel relationships with the *field* of power relates to another issue that arises studying the field of cultural production in a neoliberal context is the degree of *autonomy*—"i.e. the capacity it has gained, in the course of its development, to insulate itself from external influences and to uphold its own criteria of evaluation over and against those of neighboring or intruding fields" (Wacquant, 1998: 222). In a neoliberal context, the intrusion from the field of power to any sub-field of cultural production which becomes the part of an artistic mode of production the degree of *autonomy* declines. An artistic mode of production introduces new players to the *field* of power—which were absent in Bourdieu's formulation of the field of cultural production—also new are the types of intervention from the field of power. Moreover, any sub-field may encounter intrusions from other sub-fields within the field of cultural production or within the broader field of power. These fields may not be neighboring the particular sub-field in social space, yet they may be closer and intrusions may be more intensely felt by the agents in the field as situated in a particular locality.

Moreover, in a neoliberal context (as outlined in chapter 3), within the limits of the first set of relationships outlined above, some fields within the broader field of cultural production (or some fractions within each field) may receive support from local government and corporate capital. This growing support for arts as part of an artistic mode of production creates new hierarchies and results in new inequalities among both cultural producers and the fields they belong to. As corporate capital and local government decide which sub-fields of cultural production helps to valorize urban space through its presence, the resources are distributed unevenly resulting in changes in the distribution of various *species of capital* among producers and/or their fields as a whole. The privileges granted to particular sub-fields such as local government's support to cluster in certain districts in the city, open new avenues for economic and symbolic profit for cultural producers, and helps them to improve their positions in their respective fields. Moreover, such support may also help producers to resist the demands or pressures from other agents within the field of power, by strategically using the

support from one fraction of the field of power (e.g. corporate capital, local government) against the demands of another fraction (e.g. real estate capital, place entrepreneurs).

Having identified the field of power and relationship of the field of cultural production to it in a neoliberal context, and from a local perspective, this brings us to the discussion of strategies cultural producers—as agents—have in their arsenal. It is important to remind that Bourdieu's theory of social action is not a utilitarian one “in which individuals consciously strategize to accumulate wealth, status, or power” (Wacquant, 1998: 226) Rather, what counts is the “justification ... sought in the judgment of others, this major principle of uncertainty and insecurity but also, and without contradiction, of certainty, assurance, consecration” (Bourdieu 1997/2001: 237). In the field of cultural production, just like any other field, the actors try to improve their *positions* (which are objectively defined) within the field, by improving their possession of various *species of capital* by employing various *strategies*. As it is the symbolic capital (and *symbolic profit*) that counts, in the field of cultural production, producers (agents) are bound with *field-specific* strategies that would enable them to access such capital. While these field-specific strategies impose determinations of the field over the positions (hence, their occupants), agents are also offered with a different set of strategies that are tied to the field's relation with a particular locality.

When tied to a particular locality, any field (like the field of cultural production) is surrounded by a different field of power with different agents; hence the position of the field in relation to the field of power may be different. In addition to the determinism the locality or place has over the relationships between the field of cultural production and the rest of the field of power, locality is inscribed in the *positions* and *strategies* within any subfield within the wider field of cultural production. Moreover, the boundaries of a localized field is more specific compare to the field as defined by Bourdieu's original formulation; the positions within the field and their occupants' strategies to improve them may also be mediated by factors specific to physical space. The locational preferences of cultural producers are, indeed, reflections of the strategies (of conservation, subversion or subordination) that allow them to improve their hand in the 'game'. These strategies are not place-specific, rather urban space mediates the limitations imposed upon such strategies through the workings of the real estate market. For example, the producers' (within the fields of jazz and fashion design) use of alternative spaces may be considered as strategies of subversion, to challenge the dominant positions in their respective fields. Such strategies are an attempt to approach

the local market by circumventing the mainstream producers within their respective fields. For the avant-garde fashion designer or venue owner, the selection of a particular locality for productive activity may be affected by economic factors, as a reflection of the internal dynamics of the real estate market, but it is at the same time symbolic. As cultural producers seek a homology between the physical and social character of the neighborhood (and buildings) and the perceived image of their cultural activity within the field, their locational preferences value neighborhoods that are rich in terms of historic and social content. Their selection (as field-specific strategies) is also in line with the *habitus*, and claim belonging according to it (Savage et al., 2005). Their field-specific *habitus* is reflected in their selection, from belonging to the field of jazz or fashion design, maybe more that is true for any other field within social space. They not only select neighborhoods that have the potential of hosting or attracting their target audience, but also for symbolic reasons such as historic and current social and physical character because of the symbolic content of their line of work. In this sense, selection of physical space (for work or residential purposes) in addition to being a practice to claim and maintain ‘distinction’ from the ‘pretenders’ (Bourdieu, 1996), it also becomes the tool for the ‘*avant garde*’ in the strategy of the ‘subversion’ the values of the dominant fraction of the field. Over time, if the strategy of subversion of the dominant values of the field proves to be successful, the *avant garde* establishes its dominant position in relation to the locality. It claims a type of ‘rightful ownership’ because of a perceived homology between the *avant garde*’s differential possession of particular *species of power*—which turned to symbolic profit within the field. This homology is between the space and fraction of the field, not between the producers and the consumers who occupy homologous positions within their own field as Bourdieu (1993b) argues. Within the perspective of a specific locality, *avant garde* becomes the dominant fraction in the localized-field despite its dominated position in the overall field. This is when the formerly *avant garde* tries to employ strategies of ‘conservation’ (Bourdieu, 1996) to consolidate its position in the localized field, and often the overall field, through inscribing the social and physical features of the particular locality to the field as a type of capital. In other words, the rules of the game changes when the field is situated in a particular locality; different fractions of the field employ different set of strategies that are not available to them in a field analyzed in urban, national or even international scale. To sum up, not only a field-specific *habitus* directs cultural producers to the particular locality, the co-presence of cultural producers in a given

locality results in a place-specific *habitus* that shapes the strategies and positions in this fraction of the field bounded by the particular locality.

The revelation of these strategies brings us to the issue of agency. In such a “spatialized” approach to a field, there are various factors shaping, restricting and facilitating strategies determined by cultural producers in addition to those relate to the field of cultural production itself. For example, there is a field-specific *habitus* that accounts for the locational preferences of cultural producers within each field (while jazz musicians value the bohemian chic of the neighborhood, fashion designers value the resemblance of the physical characteristics of the neighborhood—its streets and the individual stores—to the examples they can find in France). Apart from economic reasons, the locational preferences of cultural producers are determined to a large extent by their perceived fit between the neighborhood image and the content of their culturally productive activity. Moreover, agents’ *positions* within their respective *fields*, and the position of the *field* with respect to the field of power also helpful in understanding strategies employed within the field. For example, in the field of fashion design—which stands in the intersection of the field of fashion as cultural production and the field of business—agents’ taking of entrepreneurial strategies is more common compared to the field of jazz, which belongs to the restricted field of cultural production. Secondly, the interventions from the field of power (the support from corporate capital and the local government), and the workings of the forces outside the field of cultural production (such as the pressures from the real estate market) also mediate the strategies by which cultural producers try to improve their positions. Like the field of cultural production, the field of power is also dynamic and evolving and so does the real estate market. There is a constant interplay between the field of cultural production and rest of the field of power: as conditions change cultural producers also alter their strategies to adapt to the new and ‘modified’ conditions outside their field. The locality also changes as the social relations that it hosts changes. In this sense, any field within the field of cultural production is far from being homogeneous when linked to a particular locality. As locality is a factor that defines the positions, position takings and strategies of cultural producers; it is at the same time defined by the same (but evolving positions, position takings and strategies of cultural producers). For example, the field of fashion design may present a completely different picture when analyzed from the locality of Kuledibi, compared to the perspective from Nişantaşı. Not just because Nişantaşı hosts what Kuledibi designers call ‘mainstream’ designers in general, but because in different localities different agents from the field of power becomes influential in the field of

cultural production. In Kuledibi the avant garde becomes the mainstream, the dominant fraction within the field, setting the rules for the game, reversing the relationship between strategies of ‘distinction’ versus ‘pretension’. If physical space is the ‘reified social space’, as Bourdieu asserts, the difference between Nişantaşı and Kuledibi—as physical spaces—will be accounted for the differences between the social space each hosts. Moreover, as cultural producers’ strategies are mediated—along with other factors—through the particular locality they are situated, different cultural producers in different localities will be equipped with different set of strategies, mediated by the particular locality they are situated.

When tied to a particular locality, it is easier to define the boundaries of the field and “where the effects of the field cease” (Bourdieu, 2001: 100). The particular locality, a field is situated also provides other resources that have not been previously available to the agents within the field. These resources are not field-specific, they are locality-specific only when viewed from the perspective of the field. For example, the stores (with their physical and aesthetic dimensions) in Serdar Ekrem Street are only valuable—thus, become a resource—for the field of fashion design, where there is a perceived fit between the field and the outlook of the stores (as they resemble the stores in Paris). For the field of fashion design, these stores become a valuable ‘market asset’ through which a fashion designer can claim ‘distinctiveness’ from the ‘mainstream’ fashion designers. Same stores may not serve as assets when it comes to other fields, including the field of jazz, or other cultural fields. Moreover, the locality itself also becomes a ‘strategic market asset’ (Bourdieu, 2005) with its physical and social characteristics, inscribed into the field and positions within the field, often as a field-specific capital. Again in the case of fashion design, the district was inscribed in the *positions* of the designers within the field, as a field-specific capital. Designers’ preferences for locating in Kuledibi was motivated by both economic (such as the low rents) and symbolic reasons (the historic character of the neighborhood and the store space). Yet, their locational preference itself were later transformed to a ‘strategic market asset’—establishing a homology between their standing in the field of fashion design with the neighborhood’s social character—in order to improve their position in the broader field of fashion design, and preserve their position in the field of fashion design as located in Kuledibi. This also shows another aspect of incorporating locality to the field analysis: the avant garde of field of fashion may find itself as the mainstream, from the viewpoint of the field from Kuledibi.

The relationship of the locality and the field operates at different scale levels. One of them is the neighborhood scale we have briefly explored above. Locational preferences of cultural producers are strategies related to the field, often imposed by the collective habitus of the field and subject to the impositions, restrictions and demands external to the field. For example, when a cultural producer selects a particular location for cultural activity (or to settle), this decision may be influenced by the perceived homology between the area's social or physical character, as well as the restrictions imposed by the field of power through the workings of the local real estate market, or other interventions (including those of the local government). Especially in a neoliberal context, when the cultural producers' locational preferences and real estate capital's demand for space intersect in the same locality, each locational decision by cultural producers takes the form of an encounter with the field of power. Similarly, when the corporate capital or local government encourages cultural producers in one or more fields to settle in a locality, in order to improve neighborhood image to make it an attractive target for investment, such encounters also exist.

To sum up, this study first showed that an 'artistic mode of production' exists in Istanbul; judging by the increasing participation of corporate capital in sponsoring cultural activities throughout the city, particularly in the urban core of Beyoğlu, as well as local and central governments increasing role in the provision and orchestration of 'place marketing' efforts signals the presence of a 'coalition' of a powerful political and business elite oriented towards a grand plan to promote Istanbul. In the area of culture, several key corporations—or their philanthropic extensions—offer various cultural amenities in the urban core. These include building a number of cultural centers that host various cultural activities (such as galleries, exhibitions, seminars, and arts performances), sponsoring a variety of festivals specialized in different fields of arts and other cultural production (music, film, theater, fashion and more specifically jazz). Also important is the heightened interest of local governments in Istanbul, particularly those closer to the actual sites of cultural production, especially after the European Culture of Capital event that took place in 2010. Started as a civil society initiative, the event received full support of local and central governments, as they expressed their belief in the instrumental role of culture in promoting Istanbul to attract foreign investment especially to banking/finance and real estate sectors. Following the elections of 2011, the central government also announced that it will execute several large scale urban

development projects which also signaled an alternative path to ‘place marketing.’ Four of these projects—Galataport, Haliçport, Tarlabası Transformation Plan, and Taksim Pedestrianization Plan—are expected to have a significant effect on the cultural core of Beyoğlu in terms of their proximity to the area, as well as the scale of expected changes in the physical characteristic and social composition of both visitors and residents, along with the businesses which serve them.

Within this artistic mode of production, analyzed from a Bourdieusian perspective, the field of cultural production is also posited as part of the field of power yet the intensity and the nature of their relationships with the rest of the field of power are mediated by the presence of a neoliberal urban regime.

In addition to the artistic mode of production’s strategies to frame space (neighborhood) around cultural activities or the presence of cultural producers (or artists), it is important to consider how other bases of framing space works against or complementary to such strategies. For example, other groups in the area may frame the same space in accordance with the presence of ethnic or religious minorities and their cultural heritage as framing the space. The alternative strategies by other groups or their contestation of local business and political elite’s as well as cultural producers’ framing urban space in a given locality such as Kuledibi may be subject to further enquiry.

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX A. INTERVIEW GUIDE

1. Bana bugüne kadar nasıl geldiğinizi anlatır mısınız? (*Hayatta yaptığınız hangi seçimler sonucunda kendini burada buldunuz? Kimlerden etkilendiniz? Kimler destek oldu, ne tür güçlüklerle karşılaştınız? Güçlükleri aşmak için hangi yollara başvurdunuz? Kimlerden destek gördünüz?*)
2. Sizi İstanbul/Beyoğlu/Kuledibi'ne getiren nedir? (*Hayat tarzınıza uygun olması mı Emlak fiyatları, mahallenin/binaların/sokakların fiziksel karakterleri mi? Başka kültürel üreticilerin varlığı (burada yaşamaları ve üretim yapmaları mı?)*)
3. Bu civarda başka ne tarz işyerleri var/vardı? Başka kültürel üretim mevcut mu? Bunları kimler tüketiyor/ziyaret ediyor? Burada kimler yaşamıyor? Kimler gelmiyor? (Eğer mekan sahibiyse) Diğer mekan sahipleri ile ilişkileriniz nasıl? Olumlu/olumsuz örnekler.
4. Hedef kitleniz kim? (*Sizi kim dinliyor, takip ediyor?*) (ve/veya) Kimlerle iş yapıyorsunuz? Onlara ulaşmanız açısından İstanbul'da/Beyoğlu'nda bulunmanızın önemi nedir? Yerel, ulusal ve uluslararası ağlara ulaşmanızda bulunduğunuz yerin önemi nedir? Bunun dışında burada bulunmanın (*geniş anlamda İstanbul, dar anlamda Beyoğlu, Kuledibi*) yaptığınız işe katkısı nedir (sembolik/fonksiyonel)?
5. Buradaki kültürel aktivitenin varlığı/sizin varlığınız sizce burayı nasıl etkiliyor? Size göre bir dönüşüm var mı? Siz geldikten sonra mı başladı, geldiğinizde halihazırda bir dönüşüm var mıydı?
6. İstanbul'da/Beyoğlu'nda/Kuledibi'nde son 5-10 yılda olumlu/olumsuz ne gibi değişiklikler gözlemlediniz? Bunları neye bağlıyorsunuz, önümüzdeki 5-10 yılda ne gibi değişiklikler bekliyorsunuz?
7. (*Önceki sorularla bağlantılı olarak*) Bu işi alternatif olarak (*İstanbul içi/dışı ve Türkiye/yurtdışı*) nerelerde yapabilirdiniz? Burasıyla karşılaştırdığımızda avantajları/dezavantajları ne olurdu? Eğer bir gün burada yapamayacak olsanız nereye gidersiniz?

(Soru 8,9,10 mekan sahipleri için yukarıdaki sorulara ek olarak sorulacak)

8. Bu mekanı açmak ne zaman aklınıza geldi? Bu mekan bu civara/İstanbul'a sizce ne katıyor? Ne yapmayı amaçladınız, ilham aldığınız başka mekanlar var mıydı? Zaman içinde amaçlarınızda ve içerikte ne gibi değişiklikler oldu? Bunu neye bağlıyorsunuz?
9. Bugüne kadar gelen süreçte ne gibi zorluklarla karşılaştınız (belediyeyle, diğer mekan sahipleri/esnaf/yerel halkla)? Bunları nasıl çözdünüz, destek gördüyseniz kimlerden destek gördünüz? Görmediyseniz kimlerin desteğine ihtiyaç var?
10. Burayı dönüştürme/geliştirmeye çalışan başkaları var mı? Varsa kimler ne amaçlıyor? Bunu olumlu/olumsuz nasıl değerlendiriyorsunuz? Olumlu ise destek veriyor musunuz? Olumsuz ise bir mücadele vermeniz gerekiyor mu? Bunu nasıl yapıyorsunuz?
11. Belediyelerin Beyoğlu ve İstanbul ile ilgili politikaları sizi ve yaptığınız işi olumlu/olumsuz nasıl etkiliyor? Olumlu/olumsuz örnekler verebilir misiniz? Proje bazında, genel politikalar anlamında... Kentin kültürüne/imaajına katkısı veya zararları neler? Neler yapılabilir?
12. Şirketler kültürel aktivitelere destek oluyorlar mı? Nasıl destek oluyorlar (*Örnekler*)? Bunu nasıl değerlendiriyorsunuz? Onlardan beklentileriniz neler?
13. Sizce kentin kültürel ortamını yaratmakta kimler daha baskın? Kim dışında kalıyor? Kültürel üreticiler, yerel ya da merkezi yöneticiler, sermaye... bunlar arasında nasıl farklılıklar var? Örnek olarak: Kültür Başkenti Projesi hakkında ne düşünüyorsunuz? Ne amaçlandı? Nasıl sonuçlandı? Yapılanları nasıl buluyorsunuz?
14. Türkiye'de kültürel üretim yapmanın (tasarımcı/sanatçı/müzisyen olmanın) zorlukları neler? Nelere ihtiyaç duyuyorsunuz (Altyapı, çevre, maddi destek vb.) Bunları aşmak için neler yapılabilir? Kimler nasıl yardımcı oluyor ya da olabilirler (sermaye, yerel/merkezi yönetim, NGO'lar)?

APPENDIX B. LIST OF INFORMANTS

Pilot Research

Code	Occupation	Date of Interview
R1	Writer/Academician/Publisher	12.12.2010
R2	Freelance Industrial Designer	15.12.2010
R3	Self Employed Industrial Designer	16.12.2010
R4	Fashion Blogger	23.03.2011
R5 (RF#1)	Jazz Musician	25.03.2011
R6	Photographer	26.03.2011
R7	Radio DJ/ Columnist	17.04.2011
R8	Journalist	16.06.2011
R9	Chef	17.06.2011
R10	Painter	19.06.2011
R11	Sculptor	21.06.2011
R12 (RF#2)	Jazz Musician	22.06.2011

Field of Jazz

RF#3	Venue Owner	18.04.2103
RF#4	Jazz Musician	19.04.2013
RF#5	Musician/Venue Owner	23.04.2013
ZF#6	Musician/Venue Owner	24.04.2013
RF#7	Jazz Musician	02.05.2013
RF#8	Jazz Musician	05.05.2013
RF#9	Musician/Venue Owner	08.05.2013
RF#10	Jazz Musician/Academician	09.05.2013
RF#11	Jazz Musician	17.05.2013

Field Of Fashion Design


RF#1	Fashion Designer/Store Owner	03.05.2013
RF#2	Fashion Designer	05.05.2013
RF#3	Fashion Designer/Store Owner	06.05.2013
RF#4	Fashion Designer	08.05.2013
RF#5	Fash. Des. Atelier Owner in Kuledibi	19.05.2013
RF#6	Fashion Designer	22.05.2013
RF#7	Fashion designer/Freelance	23.05.2013

APPENDIX C. VISUAL DATA

1. Satellite view of Kuledibi, Galata




2. Map view of Kuledibi, Galata



3. Galatamoda Fashion Week in Tepebaşı Parking Lot (December 2010)



4. The flyer for Galatamoda (December 2010)



5. The e-flyer for 4th Galatamoda Fashion Week held in Kuledibi (by Burhan Derdiyok <http://burhanderdiyok.blogspot.com/2009/11/galatamoda-haftas.html>)



6. On the left: Preparations for a designer store in Serdar-ı Ekrem Street. On the right: An historic building on the same street (November 2009)



7. Serdar-ı Ekrem Street (April 2009)



8. Serdar-ı Ekrem Street (Façade of Doğan Apartment on the Right)



9. On the right: The window of a store in Serdar-I Ekrem Street. On the left: A parking lot, now a construction site in Serdar-I Ekrem Street



CURRICULUM VITAE

PERSONAL INFORMATION

Surname, Name: İlkuçan, Altan
Nationality: Turkish (TC)
Date and Place of Birth: 16 June 1977, İstanbul
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EDUCATION

Degree	Institution	Year of Graduation
Ph.D.	METU, Sociology	2013
MS	Bilkent University, Management	2004
BS	Bilkent University, Management	2000
High School	Özel Namık Sözeri High School, Bursa	1995

WORK EXPERIENCE

Year	Place	Enrollment
2010	TOBB-ETÜ	Part-Time Instructor
2006	Bilkent University	Part-Time Instructor
2004-2006	Atılım University	Part-Time Instructor
2001-2004	Bilkent University Faculty of Business Administration	Research Assistant

FOREIGN LANGUAGES

Advanced English

PUBLICATION

İlkuçan, A. and Sandıkcı, Ö. (2005) "Gentrification and Consumption: An Exploratory Study" in *Advances in Consumer Research*, Vol. 32: 474-79.

SCHOLARSHIPS

TÜBİTAK-BİDEB 2211 Scholarship	2006-2010
Bilkent University Graduate Scholarship	2001-2004
Bilkent University Undergraduate Success Scholarship	1999-2000

TURKISH SUMMARY

Türkiye'nin en büyük şehri olmanın yanısıra, ülkenin televizyon yayıncılığı, yazılı basın, sinema, müzik, yayıncılık ve moda gibi kültürel sektörlerinin de büyük bir kısmına evsahipliği yapan İstanbul 1980'lerden itibaren ekonominin neoliberal rejime geçmesiyle bu tür politikaların da hedefi haline geldi. On İki Eylül Darbesi sonrasında başlayan bu geçiş 1984 yılından 2000'lere kadar görece yavaş ilerlese de, özellikle 2001 krizinin ardından Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi'nin iktidara gelmesiyle hızlandı. Genel ekonomi yönetimindeki bu değişiklik kentlerde de kendini yeni neoliberal bir rejimin ortaya çıkmasıyla, özellikle İstanbul, Ankara, İzmir ve Bursa gibi büyük şehirlerde gayrimenkul piyasasının hareketlenmesine yol açtı. Özellikle bu dönemde kentlerin çevresinde alışveriş merkezler, konut projeleri ve yüksek ofis binaları inşa edilmeye başlandı.

İstanbul ise bu gelişmelerden payını fazlasıyla alan şehirlerden oldu. Özellikle şehrin Avrupa kısmında, kültürel merkez Beyoğlu'nu da çevreleyen alanda birden çok büyük ölçekli kentsel geliştirme projesi hayata geçirilmek istendi. Bunların arasında Taksim Yayalaştırma Projesi, halk arasında bilinen adıyla Galataport, Haliçport, ve Tarlabası Kentsel Dönüşüm Projeleri'ni de sayılabilir. Neoliberal kent rejiminin alamet-i farikası olan bu tarz projelerin ortak özelliklerinden bir tanesi de yer aldıkları çevredeki gayrimenkul pazarında normalin ötesinde hareketlenme sağlamaları kadar alışılmamış kentsel planlama prensiplerine aykırı olmaları ve gerçekleşmeleri için hukuki ve bürokratik kısıtlamalarının yerel ve merkezi hükümet marifetiyle ortadan kaldırılmasıdır (Swygedouw ve diğerleri, 2002). Bu tarz projeler görünürde kentin imajına olumlu katkıda bulunmak için tasarlanmış gibi görünseler de neoliberal kent rejimlerinde esas olan gayrimenkul üzerinden rant yaratma rolünü üstlenirler. Bu sebeple de bu projeler ancak bu amaca hizmet edebildikleri derecede başarılı sayılırlar. Sonuçta ise gayrimenkul piyasasında yarattıkları hareketlenme ile birlikte kendilerini çevreleyen sosyal ve fiziksel doku üzerinde büyük ölçekli etkiler yaratır, çevrelerine daha varlıklı ve daha farklı tüketim kalıplarına sahip bir nüfus ve bunlara hizmet eden lokanta, kafe, otel gibi işyerlerini toplarlar.

Kentler, neoliberal politikaların en somut olarak gözlemlendiği yerlerdir. Özgün olarak 1930'larda ortaya atılmış bir kavram olmasına rağmen neoliberalizm asıl olarak 1970'lerin sonunda bir fikir olarak yayılmaya başlandı (Peck ve diğerleri, 2009). Açık, rekabetçi ve düzenlenmeyen bir pazar fikrine olan inançla desteklenen bu anlayış sosyo-

ekonomik kalkınma için ideal bir zemin oluşturmaktaydı (Harvey, 2005). Bu yüzden endüstrileşmiş ülkelerin merkezi ve yerel hükümetleri birbiri ardına İkinci Dünya Savaş'ı sonrası uygulanmaya başlanan Keynesci politikaları bir bir geriye sarıp, onların yerine sanayi üzerinde devlet kontrolünü hafifleten, organize iş gücünü zayıflatan, özelleştirmeye öncelik tanıyan ve uluslararası sermaye hareketlerini kolaylaştıran bir politikalar bütününe uygulamaya koyuldu. Brenner ve Theodore'a (2002) göre neoliberalizmin saf bir hali yoktur, aksine pratikte uygulanan hali bağlamla ilişiktir. Bu açıdan, aynı küreselleşme örneğinde olduğu gibi, neoliberalizm kendini farklı ölçeklerde hissettiren yekpare bir olgu değil, kendilerine özgü projeleri kendi hakimiyet ve etki alanlarına uygulamak isteyen hakim sınıfların pratik ve ideolojileri bütünüdür (Keil, 2002). Bu bağlamda şehirler ve bu dönemde geçirdikleri dönüşümler, daha kapsamlı neoliberal politikaların hedefi oldukları ölçüde etkilerinin gözlemlenebileceği ölçek olarak ortaya çıkmaktadır (Brenner ve Theodore, 2005). Bu şartlar altında şehirler neoliberalizmin canlı bir kurumsal rejim olarak yeniden üretildiği (Peck ve diğ., 2009), neoliberal dönüşümün hem sahnesi, hem de ürünü olarak görülmektedir (Keil, 2002). Keynesci/Fordist dönemde ulusal ölçeğin sermaye birikimi ve politik-ekonomik yaşamın düzenlendiği coğrafi temel olması (Jessop, 1999), 1970'lerin başından itibaren kitlesel üretim ve tüketimin arasındaki bağın kopmasıyla beraber kent ölçeğinin ulusal ölçeğin yerini almasıyla sonuçlanmıştır (Lipietz, 1994).

Neoliberal kent politikalarının bir başka boyutu da kentin daha çok yatırımcı çekmek amacıyla pazarlanmasıdır (Harvey, 2007). Kentin pazarlanmasında amaçlanan kenti hem turistik hem de iş ortamı açısından görünür ve çekici kılmak, dünyanın farklı ülkelerindeki şehirler arasında yatırım çekme yarışında diğer şehirlerin önüne geçmek olarak özetlenebilir. Bu da neoliberal politikaların, kentlerin sanayi altyapısını kaybettiği ve yeni bir ekonomik altyapı yaratma peşinde olduğu yeni ekonomi dönemine özgü bir olgudur. Bu dönemde en yaygın görünen pratiklerden biri de kentlerin sahip olduğu kültürel özelliklerin ön plana çıkartılarak sunulmasıdır. Böylelikle Florida'nın (2002) "yaratıcı sınıf" (*creative class*) olarak adlandırdığı, yeni ekonomiye (*new economy*) ya da yaratıcı sektörlere dahil iş kollarında çalışan iyi eğitilmiş iş gücüne çekici kentler sunma arzudur. Sonuçta hem şehrin ekonomik altyapısı geliştirilip istihdam yaratılacak, bu faaliyetin vergilendirilmesiyle hem yerel hem merkezi hükümetin vergi geliri artacak ve dahası şehrin gayrimenkul piyasası hareketlenip bu alanda faaliyet gösteren şirketler ve yatırımcılara kazançlar sağlayacaktır. Bu amaç yerel siyasi ve iş dünyasına mensup 'elit' arasına taraftar bulmaktadır. İstanbul örneğinde de bu amaca yönelik bir çalışma göze çarpmaktadır. Bir yandan kenti büyük ölçekli kentsel dönüşüm

projeleriyle donatman planları yapılırken bir yandan da kültürel faaliyetler marifetiyle kent daha çekici hale getirilmeye çalışılmaktadır. Örneğin, 2010 İstanbul Kültür Başkenti projesi bir sivil toplum girişimi olarak başlamış olsa da yerel ve merkezi yönetim tarafından ivedilikle desteklenmiş, yerel sermaye işin içine katılmış ve çıkarılan yasalarla gerekli finansman sağlanmıştır. Benzer bir kararlılık yine İstanbul'un 2020 Yaz Olimpiyatları adaylığı sürecinde sergilenmiş ancak başarılı olunamamıştır. İstanbul Kültür Başkenti'ni projesinin ardından yerel hükümetin kültürel faaliyetlere ve sektörlerle sunduğu olanaklar artmış, şehrin veya mahallelerin mevcut ve potansiyel sakinleri, değişik ölçeklerde yatırımcılar ve iş sahipleri için daha çekici kılınabilmesi için moda haftası, festivaller ve konserler gibi etkinlikler desteklenir hale gelmiştir.

Bu tarz büyük çaplı etkinliklerin yanı sıra, özellikle 1980'lerden itibaren bankacılık, finans, inşaat ve medya gibi çeşitli alanlarda faaliyet gösteren sermaye grupları şehirde kültürel üretime destek için hatırı sayılır miktarda maddi destek sağlamaktadır. Konserlerden, sinema, müzik ve tiyatro gibi alanlarda sürdürülen festivallere, konser salonu, müze, sanat galerisi gibi mekanlara kadar bir çok alanda ülkenin önde gelen şirketleri etkin olarak rol almaktadır. Yine aynı şirket ve kurumlar özellikle Beyoğlu'nda, Tünel-Şişhane-Karaköy bölgesinde konser ve sergi faaliyetleri için kullanılan kültür merkezlerinin kültürel üreticilerin ve takipçilerini hizmetine sunmuşlardır. Her ne kadar bu tarz destekleri şirketlerin sosyal sorumluluk programları çerçevesinde değerlendirmek gerekse de bu şirketlerden bazılarının aynı zamanda bu çevrede gayrimenkule dayalı yatırımları da olması, yerel hükümetin de sunduğu olanaklar göz önünde bulundurulduğunda, akla Zukin'in 1982 tarihli *Loft Living* adlı çalışmasında ele aldığı "sanatsal üretim biçimi" kavramını getirmektedir. Zukin, 1960 ve 70'ler boyunca New York'un SoHo bölgesinde bulunan ve önceden küçük çaplı endüstriyel faaliyetler için kullanılan binaların önce sanatçılar tarafında ev/atölye olarak kullanılmasıyla civarda başlayan dönüşümü (soylulaştırma) derinlemesine incelediği çalışmasında ortaya attığı bu kavramla yerel politik ve iş dünyası ileri gelenlerinin yerel sanatsal altyapıyı destekleyerek şehrin belli kısımlarında emlak değerlenmesini sağladıkları olguyu işaret etmektedir. Buna göre Amerikan şehirli üst sınıfı yeni bir 'birikim tarzı'na geçiş yapmış ve bu amaçla sanatçıların ve sanatsal faaliyetlerin varolabileceği alanlar yaratarak emlak değerlenmesi sayesinde ciddi kazançlar elde edebilmişlerdir. Burada işaret edilen "sanatsal üretim biçimi" (*artistic mode of production*) sanatçıların kendi alanlarında kullandıkları zanaat tarzı üretim tekniklerinden daha çok sanatçıların da dahil olduğu ve mekanın kendisini üretmeye yönelik bir üretim biçiminden bahsetmektedir. Sonraki yıllarda yapılan çalışmalarda,

Zukin'in kendisi dahil "sanatsal üretim biçimi" kavramını, kentin ileri gelenleri ve sanat/sanatçılar arasındaki bu tek yönlü ilişkiyi vurgulamak için kullanmıştır. Bu ilişkide kültürel üreticilere gayet pasif bir rol biçilmiştir. Bunun dışında ayrıca yerel bir sanat eseri piyasasının yaratılmasının yine aynı yerde bir emlak pazarı üretilmesi üzerindeki etki tek yönlü olarak işlenmiştir. Görünürde basit olan bu ilişki aynı zamanda kentin endüstriyel olan ekonomik tabanının endüstriyel sonrasına evrildiği dönemde, endüstriyel faaliyetin yerini alan başka kazanç ve istihdam kapılarının ortaya çıkmasının da altını çizmektedir. Günümüzde örnekleri İstanbul'da da görüldüğü gibi sermaye sahipleri, bir zamanlar endüstriyel amaçlarla kullanılan bina ve alanları kültürel faaliyetlere ev sahipliği yapan kültür komplekslerine dönüştürerek aynı zamanda kentin endüstriyel geçmişine dönüşüne ket vurmaktadır.

Zukin siyaset ve iş dünyasının kültür ve sanat faaliyetlerine verdikleri desteğin yararlarını ise şöyle sıralar. Birincisi, kültür-sanat ve ilgili alanlarda hizmet sektörüne dair istihdam yaratılması ve bu pozisyonların ücretleri düşük olsa da sembolik getirisi olduğu için tercih edilmesidir. İkincisi, desteğin türü ve hedefine bağlı olmakla beraber bu tarz faaliyetlere katkıda bulunan kurum ve şirketlerin (ve dolayısıyla yöneticilerinin) hem halk hem de sanatçılar tarafından takdir edilmeleridir. Özellikle yerel yönetimler bu destekleri karşılığında hem halktan hem de kültürel üreticilerden yerel politikalarına destek bulabilirler. Şirketler ise bu tarz destekleri sosyal sorumluluk projeleri kapsamında destekleyip paydaşları gözünde olumlu bir izlenim yaratmayı amaçlarlar. Bu noktada destekledikleri kültür-sanat faaliyetleri ile yaratmaya çalıştıkları kurumsal kimlik arasında paralellik kurmak isteyebilirler. Son olara, bu tarz desteklerin yarattığı vergi avantajları da düşünülebilir. Bu destekler şirketler ya da hükümetler tarafından doğrudan kültürel üreticilerin kendilerine de yapılabildiği gibi bu tarz destekler için yaratılan fonlar ya da bu işlevi yürütecek yan kuruluşlar aracılığıyla da sürdürülebilir. Yerel hükümetler aynı zamanda çıkardıkları yasalar veya sundukları hizmetler ile de dolaylı yoldan bu tarz faaliyetlere destek olabilirler. Örneğin, kültür-sanat faaliyetlerinin kümelenmesi amaçlanan bölgelerin alt yapısı düzenlenebilir, ulaşımı kolaylaştıracak ve güvenliği arttıracak düzenlemeler yapılabilir. Kültür-sanat faaliyetlerinin varlığıyla amaçlanan emlak değerlenmesin önünde duran engelleri kaldıracak düzenlemeler yapılabilir. Örneğin, Asmalımescit örneğinde olduğu gibi bölgede bulunan atölye ve imalathanelerin ruhsatları iptal ederek yerlerine şehirli orta sınıf için daha çekici işletmelerin açılması sağlanabilir.

Yatırımcı sermayenin ihtiyaçları da kültüre dayalı dönüşüm planlarında önemli rol oynar. Bu ihtiyaçlar sermayenin kaçma ya da hareket etme eğiliminin kontrolünde etkindir. Kısa dönem iktisadi dalgalanmalar da bu sermayenin sektörler arasında geçiş yapmasına sebep olabilir. Genel yatırım iklimleri de bu geçişleri yönünü tayin edebilir. Devlet müdahalesi de bu sermayenin davranışı üzerinde etkili olabilir. Bu müdahale doğrudan sermaye ya da emlak piyasaları üzerinden gerçekleşebileceği gibi devletin kültür ve sanata verdiği destekle de bağıntılı olabilir. Zira Zukin'e (1982) göre hiçbir emlak piyasası devlet müdahalesi olmadan oluşamaz. Özellikle finans merkezlerinde emlak piyasası hareketlendikçe bu piyasa sermayenin birikim için yeni gözdesi haline gelir (Harvey, 2007).

Sermaye içinde önemli bir kesimi de Zukin'in 'asilzadeler2 yakıştırması yaptığı emlak zengini, malvarlığını endüstriyel ve demiryolu gibi faaliyetlere borçlu olan zengin aileler oluşturur. Bu grup sadece emlak piyasalarındaki hareketliliği servetlerini arttırmak için kullanmak istemez, kültür ve sanat faaliyetlerine destek vererek kendi kültürel ve siyasi üstünlüklerini pekiştirmenin de peşindedir. Dahası bu sayede gelişmiş ülkelerde kentleri terk etmekte olan endüstriyel faaliyetlerin alıp götürdüğü istihdamı telafi etmeyi de umarlar. Genelde yerel ve bazen merkezi hükümetle işbirliği için de bulunan bu kesim zaman zaman bu konuda bazı imtiyazlar da elde edebilirler. İstanbul'da doğrudan bu tarz bir kitleyi parmakla gösterebilmek mümkündür. Bu kesim Cumhuriyet'in ilk yıllarıyla birlikte ortaya çıkmış ve Amerikalı türdeşleri gibi endüstriyel faaliyetlerle servet elde etmişlerdir.

Zukin'e göre sanatsal üretim biçiminin beş adet gözle görülür sonucu vardır. İlk olarak, kentsel mekanı 'eski' endüstriyel dünyanın kullanımdan kurtarıp 'yeni' finansal dünyanın kullanımına açar; ilkinin üretken iktisadi faaliyeti yerine ikincisinin üretken olmayan faaliyetine adar. Bu anlamada sanatçılar (ya da kültürel üreticiler) eski kullanım türünün düzenini sarsan mekanizmayı harekete geçirme rolünü üstlenirler. İkinci olarak, yerel işgücünü düşük ücretli, bazen yarı zamanlı hizmet sektörü etrafında yeniden yapılandırır. Üçüncüsü, bu mesleklere sembolik anlamlar yükleyerek işgücündeki beklentilerin aşağıya çekilmesini, düşük ücretli mesleklerle kanaat edilmesini kolaylaştırır. Dördüncüsü, tarihsel koruma söylemi arkasına saklanarak endüstriyel faaliyetin kentteki somut mirasını endüstriyel üretimin elinden çekip alır. Eski fabrikalar, antrepolar, tersaneler ve güç santralleri kültürel miras ilan edildiği anda iktisadi fonksiyonları da ortadan kalkar. Bununla da ilintili olarak, bu üretim biçimi eski endüstriyel düzene geri dönüşü de imkansız kılar.

Bu tezin amacı, Zukin tarafından bu sanatsal üretim biçiminin parçası olarak gösterilen kültürel üreticilerin rolünü sorgulamak, bu dönüşüm sürecinde failer olarak ne gibi roller üstlendiklerini anlamak olarak özetlenebilir. Özellikle giderek belirginleşen bu neoliberal kent düzeninde, kendileri de faaliyetleri için mekana ihtiyaç duyan kültürel üreticilerin bu süreçten nasıl etkilendiklerini, hem kendi hedeflerine ulaşmak hem de bu düzenin yarattığı yeni şartlara uyum sağlamak için ne gibi yollara başvurduklarını ortaya çıkarmak bu çalışma açısından aynı derecede önemlidir. Bu amaca ulaşmak için de Bourdieu'nun "kültürel üretim alanı" (*field of cultural production*) tezinden faydalanılarak kültürel üreticiler ve yerel siyasi/ekonomik güç sahipleri arasındaki ilişkiler anlaşılabilir.

Bourdieu'nun son dönem çalışmalarında özellikle üzerinde durduğu bu teze göre kültürel üreticiler, sosyal alanda güç alanının bir parçası olmakla beraber, iki tip sermaye bu iki alanı—güç alanı (*field of power*) ve kültürel üretim alanı—birbirinden ayırır: ekonomik ve kültürel sermaye. Fazlasıyla sahip olduğu sembolik (örneğin, akademik ve kültürel sermaye), bu alanın güç alanı içerisinde bulunmasına olanak verir. Öte yandan bu alanın bir parçası olmasına rağmen hükmedilen konumundadır, zira hakim sınıfın hükmeden kesimine göre görece daha az ekonomik sermayeye sahiptir. Kültürel üretim alanı ayrıca kendi içinde iki alt alan içerir: küçük ölçekli (ya da kısıtlı) kültürel üretim alt-*alanı* (*sub-field of restricted cultural production*) ve büyük ölçekli (ya da kitle-sel) kültürel üretim alt-*alanı* (*sub-field of mass cultural production*). Bunlardan ilki güzel sanatlar içerisindeki 'kanonik' alanları kapsarken ikincisi kültürel sektörlere denk düşmektedir. Küçük ölçekli (ya da kısıtlı) üretim alt-*alanı*, mutlak derecede olmasa da güç alanından özerk (otonom) bir yapıdır. Büyük ölçekli kültürel üretim alt alanı ise, yine mutlak derecede olmasa da, güç alanına yaderk (heteronom) bir yapıdır. Küçük ölçekli kültürel üretim alt-*alanı* içerisinde safi kültürel ürünleri üreten kültürel üreticiler bulunur, bunlar yüksek seviyede kültürel sermaye sahibi olan bir küçük bir grubun zevklerine hitap eden ürünler üretirler; bu anlamda bu alan içindeki faaliyet için "(kültürel) üreticiler için üretim" tanımı uygun düşer. Büyük ölçekli kültürel üretim alt-*alanı*ndaki ürünler ise aynı zamanda popüler kültürün objesi konumundadır. Bu ürünlerin satışından elde edilen gelir sayesinde bu alt-*alanın* ekonomik sermaye açısından oldukça zengin olduğu görülür, bu da onu güç alanına yakınlaştırır. Bu alt-*alan* ekonomik sermaye açısından zenginliğinin bedelini özerkliğini kaybederek öder, bu açıdan kısıtlı üretim alt-*alanına* göre daha düşük sembolik kara sahiptir. Sembolik kar ise kültürel üretimden bir kar/kazanç güdüyor olmamanın ya da böyle görünmenin sonucudur ve kültürel üretim yaparak biriktirilen bir saygınlığın

eşitidir. Kısıtlı kültürel üretim alt alanı kendi içerisinde de ikiye bölünür. Bu alt alanın gerisinden ayrılan ‘kutsanmış’ öncü bir kesim bulunur. Bu kesimdeki kültürel üreticiler ödülleri veya akademik titrler vasıtasıyla daha da fazla sembolik sermayeye (*symbolic profit*) sahiptirler. Bir diğer kesim ise bu tarz sembolik sermaye kaynaklarını bile elerinin tersiyle iterler (Johnson,1993).

Kültürel üretim alanı ayrıca uygun konumların (*position*) ve bu konumları işgal eden failerin nesnel özellikleri üzerinden de yapılanmıştır (Johnson, 1993). Bu konumlar sanatın bir türü (roman veya şiir), veya bunun bir alt türü (bilimkurgu romanı veya serbest şiir) olabilir. Alan içindeki her konum diğer konumlarıyla olan nesnel ilişkileriyle ve bu konumlar arasındaki mücadeleyle tanımlanabilir (Bourdieu, 1993). Bu mücadele sıklıkla alan içindeki yerleşik ve hakim geleneklerle bunları sorgulayan ve yerinden etmeye çalışan yeni kültürel pratik tarzları arasında yer alır. Bu durum konum alma (ya da duruş) terimiyle açıklanır. Bunlar sanatsal çalışmalar olduğu kadar politik hareketler, manifestolar ve polenlikler olarak da ortaya çıkabilir. Alınabilecek konumlar da aynı konumların kendisi gibi belirli ve sınırlıdır. Bourdieu’nun kültürel alan kuramında yer alan ve birbirleriyle ilintili iki ayrı kavram da *strateji* (*strategy*) ve *yol* (*trajectory*) olarak ortaya çıkar. Strateji pratiğin belirli bir yönlendiği olarak açıklanabilir, habitusun bir ürünüdür yani bilinçli hesaplamalarla varılmaz (Johnson, 1993). Ancak failin bilinçli olmayan eğilimleri sonucunda ortaya çıkar ve failin *alanında* kapladığı nesnel *konuma* (bağlıdır. Yol ise alan içerisinde aynı failin *alan* içinde üstlendiği ardı ardına gelen *konumlardır*.

Belirlenen bu amaçlara ulaşabilmek için kentin kültürel merkezi Beyoğlu üzerinde odaklanılmış, bahsedilen neoliberal politikaların etkilerinin en yoğun olarak hissedildiği Galata/Kuledibi alanı araştırmanın amaçlarına uygun bulunmuştur. 1990’lardan beri yavaş da olsa bir soylulaştırma sürecine maruz kalan bu alan, ayrıca genel olarak Beyoğlu’nun aksine daha az sayıda *kültürel üretim alanına* ev sahipliği yaptığı için de daha çalışılabilir bir çerçeve sunmaktadır. Tarihi Galata Kulesi ve onu çevreleyen meydana çıkan sokaklarla sınırları çizilebilecek bu alanda sayıları fazla olmasa da baskın bir şekilde caz, moda tasarımı ve resim ve heykel gibi alanlara mensup kültürel üreticiler ve bunları üretim mekanları yer almaktadır. Örneğin, 2002 yılında bu alanda açılmış Türkiye’nin en köklü ve kurumsal caz kulübü sayesinde Kuledibi denince ilk akla gelen kelimelerden biri caz olmuştur. Özellikle soylulaştırma sürecinin en başlarında düzenlenen Galata Festivali’nde yer almaları sonucunda hem caz hem güzel sanatlar mahalle imajının ayrılmaz bir parçası haline gelmiştir. Öte yandan 2006

yılından itibaren yine Galata Meydanı'nda düzenlenmeye başlanan GalataModa Festivali ile birlikte Galata ile özdeşleşen başka bir kültürel üretim alanı da moda tasarımı olmuştur. Festivalin artık mahallede düzenlenmediği 2009 yılından itibaren ise özellikle alanı Şişhane Metro çıkışına bağlayan Serdar-ı Ekrem Sokak kısmında kümelenmeye başlayan ancak sayıları çok fazla da artamayan moda tasarımcısı butikleri ise özellikle basında fazlaca yer aldıkları için mahallenin sembolik ekonomisinin ayrılmaz bir parçası haline gelmiştir. Bu çalışmanın amaçlarına uygun olarak caz ve moda tasarım *alanları* mercek altına alınmış, öncelikle bu *alanlara* mensup kültürel üreticilerin bakış açısından söz konusu *alanların* iç yapısı ortaya çıkarılmaya çalışılmış ve sonuçta bu alanların kentsel mekan ile ne gibi bir ilişki içerisinde oldukları ortaya konmak istenmiştir.

Araştırmada konu edilen her iki alan hem genel *kültürel üretim alanı* içerisinde hem de daha geniş olan *güç alanı* içerisinde farklı konumlarda bulunmaktadır. Örneğin; moda tasarımı alanı daha çok “kitlesele kültürel üretim” alanına yakın dururken, caz alanı “kısıtlı kültürel üretim” alanına ait durmaktadır. Araştırmanın sonuçları da bu tespiti doğrular niteliktedir. Caz alanı kültürel üreticilerin kendileri ve aynı alandaki diğer üreticiler için yaptıkları üretimi temel alırken (‘sanat için sanat’ ya da kültürel üreticiler için üretim), moda tasarımı alanında üretim daha geniş bir kitleye ulaşmak için yapılmaktadır. Ekonomik sermaye bakımından görece daha zayıf olan caz alanı, aynı Bourdieu'nun (1993a) betimlediği gibi “tersine dönmüş bir ekonomidir,” yani bu alanda ekonomik alanda geçerli olan sermaye tipi (yani ekonomik sermaye) faillerin arttırmayı amaçladığı ya da artırılmasının faillerin *sembolik karına* olumlu katkısı olan bir sermaye tipi değildir. Ekonomik sermayenin önemi yadsınmamakla birlikte asıl önemli olan eğitim veya müzikal anlamda yetkinlik şeklinde kültürel sermaye ve alan içindeki diğer faillerle ilişkilerin oluşturduğu sosyal sermayedir. Ancak bazı failler bu alanla güç alanı arasında aracılık yaparak, güç alanından gelen destekleri caz alanı içerisinde yönlendirerek güç alanı ve caz alanı arasında bir konum elde ederler. Moda tasarımı alanı ise melez bir alandır: bir kültürel üretim alan olması ve bu alana dair konumları içermesinin yanı sıra ekonomi alanı ile de benzerlikler gösterir. Örneğin, bu alanda ekonomik başarı önemlidir ancak bu alan içinde başarının bir ölçütü olduğu süreçte sembolik kar olarak sayılabilir. Sadece ticari kaygılarla ya da alan dışındaki faaliyetlerden kaynaklanan ekonomik sermaye alan içindeki aktörler tarafından olumsuz karşılanır.

Bu çalışmada kültürel üretim alanı fiziksel olarak belirli bir kent mekanı ile sınırlı tutulduğu için Bourdieu'nun alan teorisi de bu belirlenen alan üzerinden kurulmaya çalışılmıştır. Bir başka deyişle, sosyal yapı içerisinde bulunan herhangi bir alan sınırları belirli bir yerellik üzerinden anlatılmaya çalışılırsa, bu hem araştırmaya konu olan faillerin fiziksel olarak mevcudiyetlerini sürdürdükleri, hem de alanın fiziksel mekana temas ettiği mekan olduğu için ister istemez mekana bağlı bir bakış açısının yansıtılması kaçınılmaz olacaktır. En yalın haliyle, failin fiziksel olarak bulunduğu yerden sosyal alanı tarife girişmesiyle sosyal alan ancak failin belli bir fiziksel konumdan bakarak açıkladığı bir sosyal alan olacaktır. Dahası, bu açıklama da yerele bağlıdır, yani bir aynı sosyal alanın tanımlanması bir mekandan diğerine farklılık gösterebilir. Öte yandan, eğer sosyal alan bir fiziksel alan ile temas içinde irdelenirse, fiziksel alan “cisimleştirilmiş sosyal alan” (Bourdieu, 1993b) olmanın yanı sıra sosyal alanı tanımlamakta etkili olabilir. Örneğin, fiziksel bir alanla sınırlandırılmış bir sosyal alanda hem alana dair failer hem de alanın etkileşimde olduğu güç alanına dahil failer daha kısıtlı ve somut olarak belirlenebilir. Örneğin, Kuledibi’nde yer aldığı haliyle *caz alanı*’na bakıldığında hem alana dair failer yerelden ulusal hatta ulusötesine kadar genişletilse de sınırlıdır. Onların doğrudan veya dolaylı ilişki kurdukları güç alanı içindeki bireysel ve kurumsal failer de aynı şekilde sınırlıdır. Bu açıdan bakıldığında caz alanına yerel müzisyenler, onların ilişkide olduğu yabancı müzisyenler, yerel mekan sahipleri, etkinlik sponsorları ve Bourdieu’nun ayrıca önem atfettiği kültürel araçlar dahil iken, aynı yerellikten bakıldığında özgün kuramda yer almayan yerel hükümet, yerel ve uluslar arası gayrimenkul sermayesi gibi güç alanına dahil olarak düşünebileceğimiz failere de yer vermek gerekliliği kaçınılmazdır. Dahası, yine özgün kuramın dışında olmak üzere, güç alanı işe süregelen bu ilişkiler doğrudan sosyal alan üzerinden değil, fiziksel alan aracılığıyla ve üzerinden gerçekleşmektedir. En basit haliyle. Normalde sosyal alanda yan yana gelmeyecek farklı aktörler (ve alanlar), fiziksel alan üzerinden yaklaşıldığında gayet yakın ve son derece yoğun ilişkiler içerisinde olabilirler. Özellikle neoliberal bir bağlamda incelendiğinde kültürel üretim alanına genel olarak destek kapsamında fazlasıyla dahil olan sermaye ve yerel hükümetin yanı sıra kültürel üreticilerin kapladığı kentsel mekanı daha farklı ve görece daha karlı bir amaç için kullanarak değerlendirmek isteyen girişimcileri de incelemeye dahil etmek gerekliliği ortaya çıkabilir. Aynı şekilde Kuledibi’nden moda alanına bakıldığında yerel hükümet Bourdieu’nun özgün kuramında yer almayacak bir aktörken, bu fiziksel alan kapsamında moda haftası ve moda butiklerinin mahallede yerleşmesini destekleyerek alana bir şekilde varlığını hissettirmektedir.

Kuledibi’nde yaşanan soylulaştırma süreci ayrıca buradaki kültürel üretim ile ilişki halindedir. Örneğin burada faaliyet gösteren bir caz kulübünün açılışı soylulaştırma sürecinin 2000’li yılların başında yaşanan ilk aşamalarına denk gelmektedir. Kulübün açılışıyla birlikte mahalleye gelen müstakbel soylulaştırıcılar gelmiş, hatta aralarında müzisyenler de olmak üzere bazıları mahalleyi mesken tutmuştur. Öte yandan mahallede bir caz kulübünün varlığı, mahallenin kültürel sermayesine katkıda bulunmuş, bu sayede soylulaştırma sürecine olumlu katkısı olmuştur. Ancak bu mekânın tek başına soylulaştırma sürecine yön verecek ya da süreci hızlandıracak kadar etkisi olmadığını da vurgulamak gerekir. Öte yandan, aynı caz kulübünün hem turistik bir alan olan, hem de soylulaştırma süreci geçiren bu mahallede yer alması kendi başarısı açısından da olumlu sonuçlar doğurmuştur. Daha önce yıllarda açılan caz kulüplerine bakıldığında (Tekelioğlu, 2011) kulüplerin lokasyon seçimlerinin özellikle ticari başarıları için önemli olduğu görülmüştür. Bu tarz işletmelerin çevresinde kendilerini düzenli olarak besleyecek müşteri kitlesinin de barınması bu açıdan önemlidir. Benzer bir durum 1990’ların başında Arnavutköy’ün soylulaştırma sürecinde mahallede bir caz kulübünün açılması örneğinde de gözlemlenmiştir. Mahalleyi mesken tutan iyi eğitilmiş, çoğu reklam, televizyon ve basın gibi yaratıcı sektörlerde istihdam edilmiş soylulaştırıcıların bu tarz eğlence kültürüne olan ilgisi sayesinde bu tarz mekânlar giderek artan kiralara rağmen görünürlüklerini sürdürebilecekleri mahallelerde tutunabilmiştir. Ancak yine Kuledibi örneğinde, mahallenin popüleritesinin artması ve özellikle Galata Kulesi’nin varlığı sayesinde bir turist ziyaret noktası olması kulübe gelen müşteri kitlesinin kompozisyonunu ve niteliğini etkilediği gözlemlenmiştir. Cazı iyi bilen ve bu yüzden de mekânda klasik caz çalınmasını tercih eden müşterilerin varlığı zamanla müzisyenleri kendi farklı projelerini daha özgürce yürütebilecekleri “alternatif mekânlar aramaya yöneltmiştir. Bilgi Üniversitesi’nin 1990’ların sonundan itibaren bir prestij projesi olarak başlattığı caz eğitimi süresince ortaya çok sayıda yerel müzisyenin çıkması sonucunda müzisyenlerin istedikleri sıklıkta sahneye çıkamamaları da bu eğilimi kuvvetlendirmiştir. Yine şehrin kültürel merkezi olan Beyoğlu içerisinde seçilen bu alternatif mekânlar, özellikle performans yoluyla gelişen bir müzik türü olan cazın gelişiminde önemli rol oynarken, zaten çoğunluğu geçinmek için farklı işler yapan caz müzisyenlerinin seyirci ile buluşup kurdukları ilişkiyle müziklerini geliştirmelerine yardımcı olmaktadır.

Benzer bir piyasaya ulaşma amacı moda tasarımı alanındaki kültürel üreticilerin mekansal tercihlerini de etkilemektedir. Moda Tasarımcıları Derneği öncülüğünde Galata Meydanı'nda düzenlenmeye başlanan ve 2006-2009 yılları arasında da aynı yerde düzenlenmeye devam eden Galatamoda etkinliği tasarımcıları müşteriler ile kısayoldan buluşturma amacıyla düzenlenmiştir. Öncesinde tasarımlarını ancak başka araçlar sayesinde piyasaya ulaştırabilen çoğunlukla genç tasarımcılar bu sayede kendi tasarımlarını müşteriyle buluşturmuş, etkinlik ise özellikle medyada sıkça yer alan haberler sayesinde Galata'ya daha önceden aşına olmayan bir kitleyi de getirmeyi başarmıştır. Beyoğlu Belediyesi tarafından desteklenen etkinlik 2009 yılında önce yine Beyoğlu belediyesi sınırları içerisindeki Tepebaşı'nda bulunan katlı otoparkın üzerindeki alanda, sonra da Şişli Belediyesi sınırları içerisinde çeşitli alanlarda düzenlenmeye başlamıştır. Etkinliğin özellikle ilk yıllardaki başarısı, tasarımcıların Galata'ya gelmesini beklemedikleri zengin bir müşteri kitlesini de mahalleye çekebilmesi bazı tasarımcıların burada butik açmasını cesaretlendirmiştir. Yine 2009 yılından itibaren sayıları hiçbir zaman çok fazlalaşamayan tasarımcı butikleri özellikle Serdar-ı Ekrem Sokak'ta kümelenmeye başlamıştır. Sokakta ilk tasarımcı butiklerinin açılmasıyla eşzamanlı olarak belediye sokağın altyapısını düzenlemeye başlamış, sokaktaki asfalt kaplamanın yerini Arnavut kaldırım almış ve sokağın ışıklandırması değiştirilmiştir. Yine tasarımcıların ifadelerine göre 2009 ve 2011 yılları arasında basında yer alan haberlerin de etkisiyle mahalleye moda tasarımcılarını görmek ve alışveriş etmek amacıyla gelen ziyaretçi sayısının fazlalığı, aralarında büyük markalarında bulunduğu oyuncular sokakta yer kapmak için çalışmış, sonuçta dükkan kiralarının artmasına sebep olmuştur. Artan kiralar hem moda hem de başka alanlarda faaliyet gösteren bazı işletmecilerin sokaktaki yerlerinden edilmesiyle sonuçlanmıştır. Ancak yine de sokakta bakkal, manav kasap türü küçük işletmelerle beraber az sayıda moda tasarımcısı barınmayı başarmıştır. Yine kendi ifadelerine göre 2011 yılından sonra mahalledeki moda tasarımcılarına olan ilgi azalmıştır.

Hem caz hem de moda tasarımı alanları neoliberal düzenin şekillendirdiği bir kentsel dönüşümün yaşandığı bu mahalleye kendi alanlarına özgü bazı ihtiyaçların ve kısıtlamaların sonucunda geliştirdikleri alana-özgü stratejiler sonucu gelmiş ancak bunu yaparken de yine neoliberalleşmenin kendilerini yan yana getirdiği, güç alanına dahil başka faillerden yardım görmüşlerdir. Örneğin moda tasarımcılarının mahallede yerleşip çoğalmasına yerel hükümetin desteği önayak olurken, caz alanındaki failer sermayeden destek görmüşlerdir. Kendi dinleyici/müşterilerine ulaşmak isteyen failer bu desteklerin de yardımıyla bu mahallede yer bulabilmiş, ancak mahalledeki soylulaştırma sürecinin

başka bir karaktere bürünmesiyle çetinleşen emlak piyasası şartlarıyla varlıkları tehlikeye girmiştir. Batı'daki soylulaştırma olgularında sıklıkla rastlanan öncü soylulaştırıcıların takipçiler tarafından yerlerinden edilmesi durumuna Kuledibi'nde de rastlanmıştır. Ancak bu durumda bile, özellikle moda alanındaki kültürel üreticiler, alanlarındaki konumlarını savunacakları stratejileri geliştirirken yine mekanı kullanmaktadırlar. Bir başka deyişle, mekanı kendi alanları içerisinde kullandıkları farklılık kurgusu için temel olarak kullanmaktadırlar. Böylelikle kentsel mekânın bir parçasının, yani mahallenin, sosyal ve fiziksel dokusu ile kendi alanlarında bulduklarını düşündükleri konum arasında denklik kurmaktadırlar. Bourdieu fiziksel alanların sosyal alanın maddeleşmiş hali olarak farklı alanlarda bulunan faillerin birbirlerine denk olanlarının bir araya geldikleri yer olduğunu öne sürer. Örneğin, bir mahallede farklı alanlardan bir araya gelen failer, kendi alanlarında birbirine benzer veya denk konumdadırlar. Kuledibi örneğinde de görüldüğü gibi, bu mekanda bir araya gelmiş her iki alana (caz ve moda tasarımı) mensup kültürel üreticilerin, kendilerinin “ana akım” olarak algıladıkları ve söz konusu alan içinde olup alanın bütününe hükmeden failerin olduğu kesime alternatif olarak duruş sergiledikleri görülmektedir. Özellikle, moda tasarımcılarının kendi alanlarında ana akım olarak gördükleri kesimden ayrı durmak için Kuledibi'ni seçtikleri gözlemlenmiş, bu ayrı duruşu pekiştirmek için mekân aracılığıyla Kuledibi'nde yaşayan veya orayı ziyaret eden kitle ile aralarında denklik kurdukları görülmüştür. Bu denklik algısı kurulurken yine aynı mahallede varlıkları sürdürememiş, moda tasarım alanına dair üreticilerin mahallede tutunamaması temel alınır. Bu şekilde fiziksel olarak sınırlı bir *alan* algısından söz edilebilir ve bu anlamda alan tanımlanırken fiziksel mekâna bağlı olarak yerellikle bağıntılı olarak farklı bir alan algısı sunulabilir. Örneğin, moda tasarımı alanına Kuledibi'nden bakmakla ana akım tasarımcıların bulunduğu belirtilen Nişantaşı'ndan bakmak arasında fark vardır. Fiziksel mekânla bağıntılı olarak farklı alan içi konumlar ve stratejiler belirlenebilir, yani oyunun kuralı yeni baştan belirlenir. Genel anlamda alanda azınlıkta kalan ve ana akım oyuncularla mücadele eden öncü (*avant garde*) oyuncular Kuledibi'nde oyunun kurallarını baştan yazarlar, burada ana akım onlardır ve stratejileri de pozisyonlarını korumaya yöneliktir. Özetle kültürel üreticilerin failer olarak geliştirdikleri stratejiler hem mekanı kullanır hem de mekân tarafından şekillendirilir. Dahası, bir mekanda yerleşmiş herhangi bir sosyal alanın stratejileri, aynı alanın başka bir mekâna yerleşmiş haliyle farklılık gösterebilir. Bu hem, alan içerisinde, aynı mekâna yerleşmiş oyuncuların mekândan mekâna farklılık göstermesiyle anlaşılabilir hem de onları çevreleyen güç alanının (özellikle neoliberal arkaplan düşünüldüğünde) farklı olmasıyla

açıklanabilir. Örneğin, Kuledibi'ndeki moda tasarımcıları Nişantaşı'daki moda tasarımcılarına göre, alan içerisinde farklı bir kesimi temsil edebilirler. Dahası Nişantaşı'nı çevreleyen etkenler ile Kuledibi'ni çevreleyen etkenler farklılık gösterebilir. Kuledibi'nin yanbaşındaki Galataport Projesi'nin tamamlanma beklentisinin gayrimenkul piyasasında yarattığı hareketlenmesi Kuledibi'ndeki moda tasarımcılarını farklı şartlar ile karşı karşıya getirebilir. Bu şartların farklılığı da bu civarda konumlanmış moda tasarımcılarının geliştireceği stratejilerin, başka bir yerde konumlanmış moda tasarımcılarına göre daha farklı olmasına yol açabilir. Bu açıdan kültürel üreticilerin (ya da failerin) başvurdukları stratejiler sadece soysal alanda dahil oldukları alanlar ve bu alanlar içindeki konumlar tarafından tanımlanmaz. Stratejiler mekan aracılığıyla, güç alanının izin verdiği ölçüde geliştirilir ve yine mekan üzerinden uygulanabilir. Bu açıdan stratejiler alana özgü fakat mekana bağlı olarak değerlendirilebilir.

Dahası, özellikle neoliberal bir düzende, kültürel üreticiler güç alanından gelen müdahale ya da baskılara karşı güç alanından başka aktörlerle işbirliği yapabilirler. Örneğin, moda tasarımcıları, mekan seçimlerini yansıtan stratejilerini uygularken güç alanından bir aktör olan yerel hükümetin desteğini almıştır. Caz alanındaki kültürel üreticiler ise sermayeden gördükleri finansal destek ile stratejilerini uygulamakta, kendileri içi gittikçe daralan kentsel mekanda belirgin bir şekilde varlıklarını bu destekler sayesinde sürdürebilmektedirler. Her iki alanda da güç alanından gelen destekler sadece destekleri doğrudan alan aktörlere değil, alanın neredeyse bütününe fayda sağlamaktadır. Ancak bu desteklerin varlığı bir yandan yeni anlamda kültürel araçların ortaya çıkmasına sebep olurken aynı zamanda destek gören kültürel alanlar ile bu destekten mahrum kalan alanlar arasında hiyerarşik uçurumlar olabilir. Caz ve moda gibi kentin ya da mahallenin imajına doğrudan olumlu katkısı olabilecek alanlara katkı, görünürlüğü ve dolayısıyla mekanın pazarlanması adına etkisi daha az olabilecek alanlardan esirgenebileceği için kültürel üretim açısından olumsuz etkiler yaratabilir.

Özetle İstanbul'da özellikle kentin neoliberal projelerinin yakınında yer alan Kültür merkezi Beyoğlu genelinde olmasa da Kuledibi ve civarından bir sanatsal üretim biçimi'nin varlığından bahsedilebilir. Bu fiziksel sınırlar dahilinde faaliyet gösteren bazı kültürel üretim alanlarının da bu üretim biçiminin bir parçası olduğunu söyleyebiliriz. Ancak bu üretim biçimine dahil olan aktörlerin kentsel mekanı anlamlandırma ve onu çerçeveleyip sunma konusunda yalnız ve rakipsiz olduklarını söylemek için erkendir. Tarihsel olarak bu mekanları kullanan ya da söz sahibi olmak isteyen başka aktörler,

kentsel mekanı etnik kimliğe veya başka kültürel öğelere dayalı olarak anlamlandırmak isteyebilir.

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YAZARIN

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Adı : Altan
Bölümü : Sosyoloji

TEZİN ADI : Cultural Production and Urban Locality in the Fields of Jazz and Fashion Design: The Case of Kuledibi, İstanbul

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