

CRITICAL APPROACH TO TURKEY'S DEFENSE PROCUREMENT
BEHAVIOR: 1923-2013

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ABSTRACT

CRITICAL APPROACH TO TURKEY'S DEFENSE PROCURMENT BEHAVIOR: 1923-2013

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This research provides a critical analysis of Turkey's defense procurement behavior since 1923. The main goal behind focusing on such a long period is to find out the differences and sources of change behind the Turkey's behavior and ideas that justified certain set of behavior. However, mainstream approaches – Defense Economics, Politics of Defense and Political Economy Defense – do not provide necessary tools for such a historical analysis mainly because they are problem solving theories that operate within system that arises at certain historical moment. Furthermore, these theories, although having different focus points, operate within the liberal political economy, which assumes economics and politics are separate spheres and share various assumptions. Consequently, to address limitation of existing theories, this research adopts Gramscian historical materialism and develops Gramscian defense procurement theory. The research focuses on how hegemony is established, maintained and spread among different communities and how interaction between hegemonic structures reflect upon defense procurement behavior. Through application of such theoretical

framework, the history of Turkey's defense procurement behavior is examined in three different periods (1923-1945, 1945-1980 and 1980-2013) where international structure showed different characteristics in terms of form of production, ideas and institutions as well as historical blocs and rivalry between blocs. The main argument of this research is that Turkey's defense procurement behavior is shaped the level of integration of structure in Turkey to the hegemonic structure at the international level. Consequently, defense procurement decision are taken within the boundaries of the structure.

Key Words: Defense Procurement, Historical Materialism, Defense Industry, Gramsci, Political Economy of Turkey

ÖZ

TÜRKİYE'NİN SAVUNMA TEDARİKİ DAVRANIŞLARINA ELEŞTİREL YAKLAŞIM: 1923-2013

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Bu araştırma, 1923 yılından günümüze kadar olan Türkiye'nin savunma tedariki davranışlarına eleştirel bir analiz sunmaktadır. Analizin uzun bir tarihsel sürece odaklanmasındaki temel amaç ise Türkiye'nin davranışlarındaki farklılıkları bulmak, bu farklılıkların yaratan değişim süreçlerini incelemek ve farklı davranışların meşrulaştırıldığı fikir tabanını ortaya çıkarmaktır. Fakat, varolan kuramlar – Savunma Ekonomisi, Savunma Siyaseti ve Savunmanın Ekonomi Politikası – böyle bir tarihsel analiz için gerekli olan araçları sağlayamamaktadırlar, çünkü bu kuramlar özde sistem içinde sorun çözmeye odaklıdır. Ayrıca, farklı odak noktalarına sahip olmalarına rağmen, liberal ekonomi politikasının belirlediği sınırlar içerisinde varılmaktadır. Farklı bir deyişle, ekonomiyi ve siyaseti farklı alanlar olarak varsaymaktadırlar. Bu araştırma mevcut kuramların kısıtlamalarını aşmak üzere Gramsci'nin tarihsel materyalizmini benimsemiş ve bu method üzerinden savunma tedariki kuramı geliştirmeyi hedeflemiştir. Araştırma hegemonya nasıl kurulur, kendini yeniden nasıl üretir ve farklı topluluklar

arasında nasıl yayılır sorularına bakarken, farklı toplulukların bu düzlemdeki etkileşimlerinin savunma tedarikine olan etkisini analiz eder. Bu kuramsal çerçeveden yola çıkarak, Türkiye savunma tedariki davranışları üç farklı dönem (1923-1945, 1945-1980 ve 1980-2013) içinde incelenmektedir. Analizi farklı dönemler üzerinden yapılmasının en önemli nedeni ise, her dönem kendi içinde uluslararası yapı ve Türkiye'deki yapı üretim tarzı, fikirler ve kurumlar bağlamında tutarlılık göstermektedir. Bu araştırmanın temel savı ise Türkiye yapısının uluslararası hegemonik yapıya eklemlendiği derecede Türkiye'nin savunma tedariki davranışları bu yapı ile bir araya gelmenin oluşturduğu çerçeve içerisinde gerçekleştirilmektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Savunma Tedariki, Tarihsel Materyalizm, Savunma Sanayi, Gramsci, Türkiye'nin Ekonomi Politikası

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

In 1995, Turkey decided to initiate attack and reconnaissance helicopter project, ATAK, to meet *Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri* (TSK – Turkish Armed Forces) capability gap in attack helicopters. The ATAK project was expected to be completed in 2000, hence the delivery of the selected weapon system would start in 2003. However, ATAK Project was cancelled in 2001 and the new ATAK Project (ATAK-2) initiated. In the end, the decision has been reached in 2007, 12 years after; Turkey selected AgustaWestland T-129 among contestants of American Bell AH-1Z King Cobra, Boeing AH-64D Longbow Apache, Eurocopter Tiger and Kamov Ka-50. T-129 is the TAI version of AgustaWestland A-129 International (AW-129) with modifications on the rotor blades, improved motor, indigenous navigation and targeting pods etc. which, would make the helicopter more suitable for operating in Turkish terrain. However, Turkey have to wait for its new helicopters because of time needed for modification and testing of T-129 and its indigenous components. Consequently, Turkey's capability gap persists; the very reason why the project initiated in the first place. Turkey searched for other options to meet the gap until new helicopters are delivered, by signing a memorandum of understanding in 2008 with the US government to procure US Marines Corps' AH-1W SuperCobra helicopters, which would be taken out of commission as an interim solution¹. On November 2011, the US Congress approved the potential sale of only three of requested 12 AH-1W

1 Hakkı Aris, "Hikayeler, Gerçekler Ve Hayaller...", *Savunma Ve Havacılık*, 2010.

SuperCobra, because the US military's shortage of attack helicopters². In order to meet the urgent need for attack helicopters, Turkey decided for the early delivery helicopters, 9 AW-129 attack helicopters, which would not have the planned modification of T-129, for USD 300 million³. These helicopters have not been delivered as of 2013, thus capability gap would continue. Therefore, why making a decision took this long and failed to meet its goal? While long procurement process is acknowledged when developing a new weapon system because of technical and technological uncertainties, the basis of ATAK project is merely choosing an already existing technology that would be reproduced in Turkey with national capabilities.

Furthermore, why did Turkey select AgustaWestland? Boeing AH-64D is accepted as the best attack helicopter in world. We assume the main reason why it is not chosen is that production of this helicopter in Turkey and even sale of it would be problematic. Second best contestant, then, was AH-1Z King Cobra – the continuation of Cobra attack helicopter family– which Turkey has been using effectively and it was the King Cobra could have been the winner of ATAK-1, despite Savunma Sanayii Mustersarligi (SSM – Undersecretariat for Defense Industries) recommended procurement of IAI/Kamov Ka-50-2 Erdogan. Negotiations for the procurement of AH-1Z came across some obstacles on development, co-production and technology transfer.

Consequently, Turkey opened negotiations with IAI/Kamov Ka-50-2. The design of Kamov Ka-50, which was the base platform of the variant Ka-50-2, derived from the Soviet experiences in Afghanistan and used in Russia's war in Chechnya, which had similar landscape characteristics with Turkey. Thus, the system was build for the mountainous terrain with the possibility of taking small arms fire; the reason why the Ka-50 has protective armor around the cockpit. IAI/Kamov Ka-50-2 would be the mix of Russian design with Israeli

2 Lale Sariibrahimoğlu, "Turkey Receives Three Additional AH-1Ws from US," *Jane's Defence Weekly* 49, no. 42 (September 26, 2012), <http://search.proquest.com/docview/1080845857?accountid=12492>.

3 NTVMSNBC.com, "TSK 300 Milyon Dolar 9 Helikopter Alıyor," 2009.

IAI electronic systems, like glass cockpit. According to a senior IAI executive, IAI/Kamov offered constructing a helicopter factory in Turkey⁴.

On the other hand, the main factor for choosing AgustaWestland, as argued, is that Turkey have the license of T-129, which would enable Turkey to sell T-129 to other states except to UK and Italy, could make any changes it wants and it would be produced domestically.

A quick glance on the ATAK Project shows that development/improvement of national defense industrial base and its capabilities plus, to some extent, export possibility are the significant factors in choosing the weapon system. The general understanding for such behavior is usually based on arms embargo after the Cyprus Peace Operation in 1974, which facilitated Turkey's realization that it needs to develop its own national defense industry. *Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri Güçlendirme Vakfı* (TSKGV - Armed Forces Foundation) was formed in order to facilitate establishment of national defense; thus enterprises like ASELSAN, HAVELSAN and ASPILSAN was founded through donations. However, it was realized that TSKGV was not enough to establish national defense industry. More solid steps taken in 1985 with the foundation of SSM. The agency would be responsible for (1) overseeing the establishment of national defense industry and (2) managing TSK's modernization projects.

On the other hand, there are some puzzling issues about the Turkey's attempt for establishing defense industry. First, although the idea of the need for an independent national defense industrial base first appeared in 1970s, the initiative of 'build your own plane', it did not really take off before the 1980s, despite the fact that there have been offers to build an aircraft factory since 1975. TUSAS struggled to build an aircraft factory until Turkey decided to procure F-16 Fighting Falcon, which was an early example of co-production among different nations.

4 IAI Senior Executive, IAI Representative, interview by Çağlar Kurç, 2009.

Second, the idea of having independent national defense industry actually dates back to foundation of Republic of Turkey, when Turkey had a promising start in establishing defense industry. Turkey was able to produce indigenous planes as early as 1924. Vecihi Hürkuş was the pioneer in Turkish aircraft industry; he produced Vecihi K-VI two person reconnaissance airplane from the remnants of Greek planes and Vecihi XIV bi-plane, which acquired flight certificate in 1931 from Prague⁵. In 1925, TOMTAS (Tayyare Otomobil ve Motor Türk Anonim Sirketi - Airplane, Automobile and Engine Turk Joint Stock Company) was established jointly with the German Junkers Company. Although, TOMTAS was short lived as a company, Kayseri and Eskişehir Aircraft Factories remained as its legacy. Kayseri Aircraft Factor was able to build a total of 112 aircraft of different types under foreign license between 1928 to 1939⁶. In 1936, another pioneer Nuri Demirağ decided to enter aviation sector. He was able to produce two indigenously designed NuD-36 and NuD-38⁷. These initiatives were the result of an understanding, a vision, that Turkey needs national defense industry in order to prevent the Ottoman experience happening again. Yet, these initiatives have failed because of lack of support; Nuri Demirağ went bankrupt due to lack of orders, Vecihi Hürkuş was unable to continue production of planes due to lack of funding, Kayseri Aircraft Factory was initially bought by American Curtiss Airplanes and then shut down and Eskişehir Aircraft Factor was turned into Air Force Maintenance Factory.

Consequently, this begs the question why infant but promising Turkish aircraft industry was not supported? Why Turkey needed an arms embargo to realize the necessity of national defense industry, while it had already experienced perils of dependency on foreign sources with the Ottoman experience? Why did Turkey wait for 1980s to invest in defense industry while there have been callings for establishment since 1970? The conventional answer for these

5 Tansel Zeynep Akalın and Nadir Bıyıklıoğlu, *The History of Turkish Defense Industry* (Ankara: Imge Tanıtım Danışmanlık, 2010), 128–32.

6 Ibid., 117–27.

7 Ibid., 133–40.

questions is that the NATO membership enabled pouring of foreign weapons systems as well as military aid to counter Soviet threat rendered national production of weapons system, in other words attempting to produce, economically unwise. Some industry observers even argue that Turkey did not have industrial support base for the defense industry; point out the need for small subcontractors. Therefore, maintenance of aircraft industry had become a burden for Turkish economy under these circumstances.

Certainly, NATO membership was significant for TSK. Membership resulted in full integration of TSK to Western military doctrines and weapons system. Turkey received variety of weapons systems from its NATO allies through either military aid or grants for strengthening Turkey's capabilities for possibility of armed conflict with Soviet Union, although Turkish inventory included some modern, but mostly near obsolete systems by the 1980s. This situation made necessary the initiation of modernization program for TSK during the 1980s, which continued well into 2010s.

In quest for acquiring new capabilities and modernizing TSK, one of the many puzzling decisions was the procurement of Unmanned Aerial Vehicle. Turkey was one of the early adopters of UAV. Following the UAV tender in 1991, Turkey acquired 6 General Atomics Gnat-750 MALE (medium-altitude long-endurance) UAVs, which were delivered in 1994. However, the problem was, TSK did not have military doctrines for the effective use of UAVs. UAVs were given to the army, where UAVs were deployed in Artillery Command. The command experienced problems with training, maintenance and logistics of UAVs. Consequently, TSK could not use these early UAVs effectively⁸. Only after the intensification of fight against PKK in the Southeast Anatolia during mid-1990s and the United States and NATO countries such as the United Kingdom perfected use of UAVs, Turkey re-operationalize UAVs and began to use them relatively effectively. Consequently, Turkey again decided to acquire UAVs, which caused some problems also. Therefore, why did

8 Hakkı Aris, "Turkiye'den Insansiz Hikayeler..." *Savunma Ve Havacılık*, 2007.

Turkey decide to buy UAVs, when TSK had no military doctrine on how to use them effectively?

Turkey's procurement practices have many puzzles since 1923 and one can keep asking questions on why is the particular decision made, why is it chosen system most efficient, why did Turkey buy weapon systems from particular state etc. However, these discussions, though important, are answered within the confines of a particular weapon system and historical moment that the decision was made. Consequently, the research made certain assumptions about the foundations of about the certain principles and not critical about it. As a result, seemingly contradictory explanations arise. In other words, the difficulty arises to point out why certain set of ideas dominates –such as development of national defense industry in decision to procure T-129– at one decision, while at other instances –the need for modernization in decision of buying off-the-shelf UAVs– dominates decisions. Therefore, focusing on the mechanics and the form of the procurement process, yet certainly relevant, yield results that seem to override or contradict with defined and declared principles of defense procurement, which could range from economic feasibility to military effectiveness or in terms of balancing these two goals.

Furthermore, focusing on particular decision or decisions made during particular historical moment yields different approaches to defense procurement, where each approach looks at the same issue but through different lenses, thus expresses different set of factors that shapes the procurement decision. When the literature is examined, three main approaches come to fore, which at times disconnected from each other mostly because of the reasons of parsimony and sometimes because of the researcher's choice of theoretical framework. These three approaches are Defense Economics, Politics of Defense and Political Economy of Defense. Consequently, each approach has something to say about defense procurement and arms exports and linking them to different issues. Yet, these

approaches includes different models in examining the issues, while sharing the similar foundational assumptions.

Consequently, Defense Economics problematize the efficiency of the defense procurement, thus focuses on the incentives and economic determinants of the process, while acknowledging the effect of politics as a source for inefficiency. On the other hand, Politics of Defense focuses on the behaviors of the actors such as bureaucrats in defining the defense policy, foreign policy and/or procurement policies, or political relations between different actors, while again acknowledging the impact of economic, yet choose to leave that aside. Political Economy of Defense binds aforementioned approaches into one research area and accepts certain set of assumption that are made by them, while rejecting the assumption that 'economics' and 'politics' could be studied separately. So, it converges the research being done two approaches in an uncritical way. We will deal with these approaches and critique of them in more detail in Chapter 2.

The central question of this study is a basic one and shared by many: Why do states procure weapons that they do⁹? In our quest for answer, we adopted a different theory and a methodology than the 'mainstream' approaches and focus on a country – Turkey – which was understudied and tried to be understood from the perspective of the mainstream. Consequently, this study is also about whether we could take the initial steps towards establishing a different theoretical approach to defense procurement departing from what we could learn from the case of Turkey.

The main argument is that class struggle affects the weapon systems that a country, in this case Turkey, procures. Class struggle is a theoretical anchor that arise from an ideal model, thus enabling examination of divisions within a particular society both in terms of inter-class and intra-class. Class struggle happens in territorially based human communities, which have different definition, thus it could be a tribe, a city, particular region or country. Out of

9 For example: James R Kurth, "Why We Buy the Weapons We Do," *Foreign Policy* (1973): 33–56.

class struggle arises structures, which might or might not be hegemonic. These structures are based on three pillars – ideas, material capabilities and institutions – that affect each other and in constant relation with each other. Material capabilities signifies mode and form of production and social relations that arise out of that relations. Ideas that act as a legitimizing agent of the material capabilities are culturally and inter-subjectively defined. Institutions, on the other hand, act as the supporter and propagator of the ideas through intellectuals and, if necessary, coercive means. Consequently, hegemonic structure, which was led by a hegemonic class and supported by various groups –historical bloc (hegemonic bloc)– was established in a particular human community when three pillars support each other. However, the structure is not independent of human actions, thus each particular structure involves its particular set of ideas that shaped the members of the community. Therefore, the results of human behaviors are shaped by the characteristics of the structure.

While every community has its unique structure born out of their relation with the natural environment, thus follow a different development path, uneven development, certain hegemonies bid for becoming global. Human communities are inescapably connected to each other, though with few exceptions. Relations between human communities enable sharing and spread of ideas as well as modes and forms of production. Consequently, communities affect each others development paths, thus development of communities were combined but never the same because of the historical unevenness. In the end, certain hegemonies spread through consent and coercion and force other communities to take the similar development path. In capitalist societies, states are the principle institutions that manage relations between communities, though do not have total control over every venue of establishing relations.

Hegemonic structure, under the leadership of particular hegemonic class (or state(s) at international level), spread around the globe via connecting

different communities to each other on the basis of shared ideas, forms of production and institutions. The level of integration to the global hegemonic structure, consequently, shapes the behavior of the particular state. However, the structure is not something deterministic and connectedness is a matter of acceptance either through consent or being disciplined via coercion by the hegemonic state.

Consequently, states' threat perceptions, defense policies, force structures etc is the reflection of their hegemonic structure. If the hegemonic structure in a particular community is integrated to global hegemonic structure, it's defense behavior is shaped within the framework of the structure. Consequently, all the defense related issues, therefore defense procurement, of a particular states are defined by community's connectedness to global structures and acceptance of the ideas of the structure.

In the end, the approach adopted by this research seeks to organize complex relations between various factors, but does not attempt to establish a causality between different set of factors, and show how different factors come into play at different historical moments and how their effects varies at both international and national levels. Consequently, this research is not parsimonious, it tries to show the complexity that evolves through time and the particularity of the communities as well as the shared foundational ideas. Thus, the more detailed discussion on theory is represented in Chapter 3.

Turkey has been chosen as the case study for the attempt to develop a different approach to defense procurement as well as to reach a better understanding of choices that the case in question made. Although the military had a significant place in Turkish society, only certain aspects of it have been put under critical study; such as military-industrial complex¹⁰ and

10 İsmet Akça, *Türkiye'de Askeri-İktisadi Yapı: Durum, Sorunlar, Çözümler*, TESEV Demokratikleme Programı Siyasa Raporları Serisi (İstanbul: TESEV, 2010); Suat Parlar, *Silahlı Bürokrasi'nin Ekonomi Politikası*, 2nd ed. (İstanbul: Mephisto, 2005); Ömer Süvari, *Ekonomide "Gizli El" Askeri Sanayi Kompleksi*, Özgür Üniversite Defterleri 4 (Ankara: Maki Bas. Yay. Ltd. Sti, 2000).

defense budget¹¹. Very few research on the Turkish defense industry and defense procurement exists¹², yet these researches are founded on the mainstream approaches or journalistic accounts that do not have theoretical foundations. Consequently, while they are very valuable, they lack the complexity and do not account for the sources of change and particularity.

In order to find out the how did change happen and what are the sources of particularity, this research investigates Turkey since its inception in 1923 until today. Although this time period is very long and necessitated a very large ground to cover, it is necessary for the purposes of the study because focusing on a certain period –such as between 1975 until today–results in taking certain structures as given and presents certain ideas as a result of one particular event –arms embargo–, whereas certain ideas have always been there –investment in defense industries in the 1920s and the 1930 as well as in 1970– but only under certain structures it reinstated such as Turkey's desire to invest in national defense industrial base after 1975 despite the negative experience on dependence to foreign suppliers existed prior to 1975.

Consequently, development path of Turkey and choices in defense procurement is investigated in three periods; Kemalist Hegemony (1923-

11 See Jülide Yıldırım and Selami Sezgin, "Military Expenditure and Employment in Turkey," *Defence and Peace Economics* 14 (2003): 129–139; Erdal T. Karagöl and Aziz Turhan, "External Debt, Defence Expenditures and Political Business Cycles in Turkey," *Defence and Peace Economics* 19 (2008): 217–224; Gülay Günlük-Şenesen, *Türkiye'de Savunma Harcamaları Ve Ekonomik Etkileri 1980-2001*, 1c Politika Serisi II (Istanbul: TESEV, 2002); Nadir Öcal and Jülide Yıldırım, "Arms Race Between Turkey And Greece: A Threshold Cointegration Analysis," *Defence and Peace Economics* 20 (2009): 123–129.

12 Some examples are: Aziz Akgül, *Savunma Sanayi İşletmelerinin Yapısı Ve Türk Savunma Sanayi* (Ankara: Başbakanlık Basımevi, 1986); Ömer Karasapan, "Turkey's Armaments Industries," *MERIP Middle East Report* (1987): 27–31; Betül Uncular, *Ses Duvarındaki Generaller* (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1990); Nezih Tavlaş, *Casa Olayı: Bir Alternatif Skandal Önerisi*, İnceleme ve Arastırma Dizisi (Ankara: Ekin Yayınları, 1990); Aytekin Ziylan et al., *Savunma sanayii ve tedarik : Ülkemizin bilim ve teknoloji yeteneğinin yükseltilmesini esas alan bir yaklaşım*, TUBITAK BTP 98/01 (Ankara: TUBIKTAK, 1998); Mustafa Oğuz, "Turkey's Defense Policy Making Process and Its Effects on Weapons Procurement" (Middle East Technical University, 2009); Önder Aytaç, *Heron İhaneti: Vecdi Gönül Mü, İlker Başbuğ Mu?* (Istanbul: Populer, 2010); Ahmet Nuri Yüksel, *Türkiye'de İnsansız Uçak Aldatmacası* (Istanbul: Bilge Kültür Sanat, 2012).

1945 – Chapter 4), Americanization of Hegemony in Turkey (1945-1980 – Chapter 5) and Neoliberal Hegemony (1980-2013 – Chapter 6). Periodization is used to present how structures at international and national level arises, how they relate to each other and therefore how this relation is reflected upon the choices that Turkey made. The periodization is based on the dominant forms, their rise and crisis, thus provide a certain level of consistency; that is the ideas, material capabilities and institutions have reached a balance where every pillar supports each other. However, this does not mean that there is a clear cut separation between periods. Different periods overlaps because (1) demise of one dominant structure happens while another structure is rising and (2) harbingers of the new structure exists under different structures but they are dormant.

This study adopts qualitative methods because people's perceptions and assumption about the world and self determines their actions and nothing else. Thus, the research is interested in identifying the effect of structure that involves certain set of ideas, acceptance of those ideas and culture. Consequently, interviews, historical newspapers, archives, autobiographies, trade magazines and official documents are used to construct and examine "spirit of the time" and how certain set of ideas have become the "common sense" at particular historical moment.

The examination of the defense procurement choices are mainly limited to the conventional weapon systems such as fighter planes, fighting ships and tanks because of the ease of following the trade of such major weapons systems. Furthermore, written materials about weapon systems, depending on their popularity, is relatively easier to find as compared to light weapons such as rifles, pistols and hand grenades. Consequently, this research depends on sources such as SIPRI Arms Trade Database and Jane's Almanacs on the arms trade and national inventories, when the information is unavailable through governmental means, which arise out of the secrecy that engulf the subject and governments desire not to disclose. In the end, this

research is an attempt to reach a critical understanding of defense procurement, which we will take on in the following pages.

CHAPTER 2

ECONOMICS, POLITICS AND POLITICAL ECONOMY OF DEFENSE PROCUREMENT

Scholars from different disciplines have been attracted to the defense questions and each brought their unique approach to it. Consequently, different pockets of study areas with different approaches appeared within the defense studies. Although, the unity of defense issues is recognized by many, the problem is that research have become too focused on certain issues while missing the bigger picture that defense procurement decision are being taken. The issue of defense procurement is not immune to this separation of issues within defense. Colin Gray points out the holistic nature of defense, but focusing on one aspect of it when he says “Defense preparation and war do involve technology, but they also involve politics, economics... and a host of other factors... my central theme is weapons and military technology and their relations with policy and strategy”¹³.

Consequently, defense procurement is being studied and investigated by three main disciplines: (1) Defense Economics, (2) Politics of Defense Procurement (Arms Trade, Military-Industrial Complex etc.) and (3) Political Economy of Defense (PED). However, these main disciplines represent a house of theories. Accordingly, there are different approaches within each discipline, but different approaches have been united in certain set of

13 Colin S. Gray, *Weapons Don't Make War: Policy, Strategy and Military Technology* (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1993), 5.

assumption and priorities that united them into one discipline. Defense Economics and Politics of Defense are reflection of separation between economics and politics within capitalist society and therefore theories within these schools do not pose critiques of each other but acknowledge each other. On the other hand, PED stresses the unity of politics and economics of defense and presents a disciplinary critiques towards other two. However, most of the theories in PED align the assumptions of politics and economics of defense rather than presenting a critical approach with an only exception of study of military -industrial complex. Therefore, while each approach recognizes the value of the other, they still pursue separate areas of study, although PED approach tries to bridge the gap between economics and politics.

What is significant about these approaches is that at certain levels they share similar assumptions about the political-economic structure of the international system and operate within liberal political economy. In other words, the mainstream approaches are problem solving approaches that do not question the system, except research that focuses on military-industrial complex and arms trade. Consequently, while the mainstream use different tools, they have similar aims; to resolve problems within the defense procurement mechanism or point out the problems to reach 'effective' and 'optimum' result.

In this chapter, thus, our aim is to introduce differences and similarities between these different disciplines and theories within them. We argue that problem solving theories do not represent totality of defense procurement and its relations to other policy areas and the general structure that these decisions happen. While, critical approaches question the system and unearth hidden aspects of the system, they also remain too focused. Furthermore, although various approaches claim to be universal, they fail to explain certain occurrences in different states because they are mainly based on the experiences of states that have certain level of defense industry.

Furthermore, some theories claim to universality, hence they are ahistorical and overlooks how change occurs within the system and how it relates to defense procurement.

2.1 Defense Economics

Defense economics founded on the formulas in analyzing the behaviors of decision making institutions; state or national procurement agencies. Consequently, the bulk of analysis within the Defense Economics is about arguments on how certain set of formulas best explain procurement, technology development and production. In order to do this type of research, economists make certain set of assumptions on the nature of defense market and decision points. In this section, we will evaluate shared and specific assumptions of and within the Defense Economics rather than looking at the formulas used by economists, believing that the assumption are core of any analysis and significantly determines the outcome of the research.

2.1.1 Shared Assumptions

Defense economics approaches the issue as a problem of efficient allocation of scarce resources among alternative uses or ends, thus it is concerned with scarcity and choice¹⁴. Consequently, defense economics is about “how economic principles can be applied to defence issues [and] the principles are sufficiently general to be applicable to other nations”¹⁵. As the scholars of defense economics argues, the field does not have any ideological presumption but interested “in understanding the dynamics of arms expenditures, conflict, and the associated economic aspects of military sector.”¹⁶ Therefore, the defense economics aims “to achieve the 'best' or

14 Todd Sandler and Keith Hartley, *The Economics of Defense* (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1995), 3.

15 Keith Hartley, *The Economics of Defence Policy* (London and Oxford: Brassey's, 1991), 1.

16 Sandler and Hartley, *The Economics of Defense*, 5.

'optimum' allocation of resources"¹⁷ under capitalist market conditions¹⁸. Gavin Kennedy also acknowledges that "emphasis of the defense debate has shifted from almost exclusive concerns of defense management to resource allocation inside and outside the defense budget"¹⁹.

Defense economics assumes an ideal model of the defense procurement process, which is divided various points of decision making. Thus, deficiencies of the procurement process would be analyzed with reference to this model. Keith Hartley summarizes the decision set for procurement agencies as follows²⁰:

1. *What to buy?* Government has to decide upon the need and performance requirements of the weapon system, which are "vague, change and evolve over time and differ between stakeholders"²¹. Specifications are key to determining the technical progress, risks and uncertainties of the procurement²².
2. *When to buy?* Timing is about when the desired weapon system is to be delivered, planning of a life-cycle procurement (how long the production would last etc.) and determining deadlines for the each step of development and production.
3. *Who to buy from?* "A contractor has to be selected where the options are between using competition and direct negotiation with a preferred supplier"²³. Selection of preferred supplier also involves decision about

17 Keith Hartley, *NATO Arms Co-operation: A Study in Economics and Politics* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1983), 12.

18 Defense economics operates within liberal tradition, thus they do not talk about, mention or question the mode of production, capitalism

19 Gavin Kennedy, *Defense Economics* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983), viii.

20 Hartley, *The Economics of Defence Policy*, 76–7.

21 Ron Smith, *Military Economics: The Interaction of Power and Money* (Hampshire & New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 126.

22 Keith Hartley, "Arms Industry, Procurement and Industrial Policies," in *Handbook of Defense Economics*, ed. Todd Sandler and Keith Hartley, vol. 2 (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 2007), 1161.

23 *Ibid.*, 1162.

the nature of the contractor; which could be a national firm, foreign firm or national and foreign partnerships.

4. *How to buy?* The choice could be made somewhere between two extremes. One extreme is to buy already existing product, off-the-shelf and direct procurement. The other extreme is to develop and produce something that does not exist. The choice of how to buy is also includes the type of contract. Decision on the contract type ranges between "the extremes of firm/fixed prices and cost-plus contracts and the 'intermediate' case of target cost incentive contracts"²⁴, which all have different types of risk associated.

However, politics is usually left out of the economic analysis of defense procurement, except with the recognition that politics is the main source of inefficiency within the procurement system. This attitude can be observed when Hartley argues:

*In selecting projects and contractors, the procurement agency has to decide whether to base its choices on military criteria such as cost, quality and delivery dates, or on the basis of wider economic and industrial criteria (e.g. jobs, technology, exports). There is related issue of who chooses: the procurement agency or ultimately, the government with its concerns about the local jobs and re-election?*²⁵

Furthermore, Hartley sees the state's inherent involvement in defense market as one of the main causes for the market failures because governments can use their power in the market to award contracts to "national champions" and/or choose to award contracts on 'non-price' factors. In addition, interactions between governments and firms and firms within the market result in deviation from competitive market²⁶. Consequently, the 'politics' is seen as something external to the operation of market that had a negative impact.

24 Ibid.

25 Ibid., 1166.

26 Keith Hartley, "Collaboration and European Defence Industrial Policy," *Defence and Peace Economics* 19 (2008): 307.

Consequently, defense economists argue that market characteristics of defense are different than civilian market; main reason being that state is an integral part of the market, which differentiates it from civilian market from the perspective of liberal economics, where state has minimum/no role. Consequently, as come to assumed by many defense economists, differentiating characteristics of defense market are:

1. *A single buyer (a monopsony) - defense agency*
2. *A few, relatively large, suppliers (oligopoly)*
3. *Extensive barriers to entry and exit (reduces competition)*
4. *Highly specialized products (heterogeneity)*
5. *Prices determined by negotiation not costs (security of payment versus profitable risks)*
6. *Extremely long lead times for products (dependence on buyer for progress payments)*
7. *Strong preference for domestic purchases (national security)*
8. *Market 'size' determined by government budget (no speculative production to meet demand)*
9. *Technological imperative dominates policies (innovate or perish!)²⁷*

However, some characteristics of defense market tend to show variance depending on time and space. The relationship between the state (buyer) and defense firm (supplier) tend to be different in different states as the number of national and international companies tend to change and different set of dependencies are constructed.

Furthermore, the number of supplier tend to change in certain state. For example, the number of defense industry firms proliferated in the United States during the Second World War, but began to decrease in the 1970s. While before 1970s there have been many aerospace companies in the United States, after 1970s and with a greater impetus in 1990s, only few aerospace companies left in the United States; Lockheed Martin and Boeing. Barriers to entry also tend to show variance. For example since the 1990s, civilian technologies increasingly being used in defense sector, which made

²⁷ Kennedy, *Defense Economics*, 164.

civilian companies to enter defense sector easily. For example, iRobot, which manufactures robot cleaners and does not have any defense sector experience, began to manufacture bomb defusing robots for the United States Army, when its know-how on robotics can be applied to defense sector.

Last but not least, the characteristic of defense market also varies throughout different states. For example, the market in the United States, which has an established and strong defense industrial base, is not the same for states, such as Turkey or Greece, which have to buy their weapon systems from other sources. Therefore, while, aforementioned characteristics, in a general sense, is used as a point of departure in analyzing and differentiating defense market by defense economist, it also usually assumed.

On the other hand, defense economists are also aware of the changes in the defense sector that came about during the 1990s. Accordingly, this had an impact on the research agenda of defense economics; a realization of multiple actors. This change is defined as the globalization, which encompasses “enhanced cross-border flows of all kinds (e.g. capital and labor flows, ideas and goods) including the spillovers of benefits and costs associated with public goods and externalities”²⁸. Globalization has altered both threat perceptions and defense industries, thus blurring the distinction between domestic and international. While globalization created a rationale for states to act together, states are not inclined to sacrifice their autonomy. Furthermore, globalization yielded a significant international threat, terrorism, which translated into multiplication of actors (or agents) in the system. Consequently, the research agenda of defense economics has to change by incorporating various institutions and agents and different types of states as well as different types of conflicts²⁹. But, new security environment made defense economics more relevant than ever, because states are more aware

28 Todd Sandler and Keith Hartley, “Defense in a Globalized World: An Introduction,” in *Handbook of Defense Economics*, ed. Todd Sandler and Keith Hartley, vol. 2 (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 2007), 609.

29 Ibid., 611–14.

of the guns-versus-butter tradeoff, seeking budget cuts, searching 'efficiency improvements and imported equipment replacing arms bought from a national defense industrial base³⁰. Therefore, "defense economics can no longer represent merely effective self-serving defense resource allocations by Western countries... a major task... is to identify the economic and strategic incentives by which rational calculation may lead to new fault lines in security of countries and their defense"³¹.

Defense economists, while agreeing upon above mentioned assumptions, use different theories in analyzing defense procurement. These different theories can be summarized as:

1- principle-agent, 2- transaction costs and contract theory, 3- information asymmetries - adverse selection, moral hazard and risk sharing, 4- game theory, 5- not profit maximizers, 6- contest ability determines the performance, 7- Public choice and economic models of regulation³²

However, principal-agent model is the predominantly used theory of defense economics within the contemporary literature and the theory have incorporated certain aspects of other contenting theories as shown in the following section. Consequently, next section will look at principal-agent (incentive) model.

2.1.2 Principal-Agent Model (Incentive Model)

The point of departure of principal-agent model for arms procurement is that there is an information gap between the government (principal) and the firm (agent) because of the nature/characteristics of arms market. While "defense firms have private information and not all their actions can be monitored"³³,

30 Ibid., 614.

31 Martin C. McGuire, "Economics of Defense in a Globalized World," in *Handbook of Defense Economics*, ed. Todd Sandler and Keith Hartley, vol. 2 (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 2007), 625.

32 Sandler and Hartley, *The Economics of Defense*, 127–8.

33 William P. Rogerson, "Incentive Models of the Defense Procurement," in *Handbook of Defense Economics*, ed. Keith Hartley and Todd Sandler, vol. 1 (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 1995), 311.

government tries to get the most benefit out of this information asymmetry. Moreover, the government is the sole buyer of the arms, monopsonic principal, while there are only limited number of firms present that could provide desired weapon system, which are monopolistic or oligopolistic agents, depending on the complexity of the weapon system. Therefore, limited number of suppliers also mean that there is limited competition or if the supplier is monopolistic, no competition in the procurement process. Thus, "market system in its entirety can never exist for the acquisition of weapons"³⁴. Consequently, "defense projects are dominated by strategic interactions of principals (states) and agents (firms), rather than by normal market forces"³⁵

Principal-agent model holds that the principal (state) has certain set of interests, which are "to compel firms to provide innovative solutions to military requirements at as low a cost as possible"³⁶, while agent has its own set of interest, which are "to maximize profits, minimize risks and improve long-term position in the market"³⁷. Therefore, "the principal's problem is to construct a set of incentives to ensure that the interests of principle and agent is aligned, so that the agent acts in principal's interest"³⁸. Consequently, the compromise between the principal's and agent's interests is established through the contractual agreement, which is the focus of the most economic analysis of the arms procurement because it seems to be the place in which the incentive problem is resolved, to certain extent at least.

According to Rogerson, "the incentive problem between government [principal] and defense firms [agent] is shaped by four underlying economic

34 Merton S. Peck and Frederic M. Scherer, *The Weapons Acquisition Process: An Economic Analysis* (Boston: Division of Research, Graduate School of Business Administration, Harvard University, 1962), 55–97.

35 Marc R. De Vore, "The Arms Collaboration Dilemma: Between Principal-Agent Dynamics and Collective Action Problems," *Security Studies* 20 (2011): 631.

36 Ibid.

37 Ibid.

38 Smith, *Military Economics: The Interaction of Power and Money*, 124.

characteristics"³⁹. First characteristic is the research and development; arms procurement is the constant search for technological advancement which would translate into improved performance and capabilities, and even acquiring new capabilities. However, "innovation is an inherently difficult product to purchase, and this creates the need for providing incentives for innovation"⁴⁰. Second characteristic is the uncertainty due to technological unknowns, which create unforeseen problems during the development stage of new weapons system (internal uncertainty⁴¹) and the possibility of changes in external threats, substituting with another system or change of heart of the government in purchasing the system (external uncertainty⁴²). Due to these uncertainties, procurement agency does not find long-term fixed priced contracts feasible, because in case of unanticipated changes contract have to be renegotiated⁴³. Third characteristic is the economies of scale in production. The price per unit is determined by how much of the cost in the development phase would be reflected to the unit price. The higher number of units purchased, higher the number of cost is divided upon the single unit, hence the lower level of unit price. Fourth characteristic is that government is the sole buyer of the defense products. "The government has a role as a major or sole buyer and regulator, and could be a source of anti-competitive behaviour"⁴⁴. It has the power to influence the national defense industrial base through its choice of supplier, or encouragement of mergers and acquisitions. Consequently, firms have many worries at different stages of weapons development and production. They may worry about not recovering their sunk cost in research and development, their investment in new capabilities to produces certain system and the investment being done to human resource, especially the design team, which has no use in other

39 Rogerson, "Incentive Models of the Defense Procurement," 321.

40 Ibid., 312.

41 Peck and Scherer, *The Weapons Acquisition Process: An Economic Analysis*.

42 Ibid.

43 Rogerson, "Incentive Models of the Defense Procurement," 313.

44 Ibid.

applications⁴⁵. Consequently, the state bears most of the costs at different stages of development, and during the production of a new weapon system, from financing the R&D to buying some of the physical assets and providing guarantees for recovering costs from investments⁴⁶.

Furthermore, information asymmetry between principle and agent complicates what should be bought as the "buyers know more about their demand; the sellers know more about the potential technology and materials"⁴⁷. This situation mostly results in incomplete contracting, which complicates the relationship between principle and agent with the issues of adverse selection, moral hazard and risk sharing⁴⁸. Adverse selection occurs during competitive bidding, where the government "cannot discover information private to selling firm and may select wrong supplier"⁴⁹. "Moral hazard problems arise because of costs and quality are determined by the effort of the seller, which the buyer cannot monitor"⁵⁰. Risk sharing is an important part of the weapons procurement as the government "may be risk averse because of the political fall-out from the failures [and] the firm may be risk averse because the project is large relative to the firm"⁵¹ and as mentioned above principle and agent have to reach a compromise in risk sharing.

Departing from above mentioned principles and assumptions, the main goal of economic research on defense and defense procurement seeks to find optimum outcomes through application of mathematical methods. However, we will not consider those mathematical modeling and equations here since we believe that such models are just a representations of certain principles

45 Ibid., 314.

46 Ibid.

47 Smith, *Military Economics: The Interaction of Power and Money*, 126.

48 Hartley, "Arms Industry, Procurement and Industrial Policies," 1162.

49 Smith, *Military Economics: The Interaction of Power and Money*, 131.

50 Ibid.

51 Ibid., 130.

and assumptions, hence yield results within the framework of those. Consequently, our evaluation of economics of defense is based on the roots of the approach, not the tools that emanates from those roots.

2.1.3 Arms Trade and Procurement

The transformation of defense industries, especially during the 1990s, caught the attention of defense economics as the distinctions between national and international become difficult to define and previous focus on Western defense industry was limited in understanding global procurement practices. Although, there is a recognition of the influences of various actors, economic analysis of arms trade and spread of production are still based on the state-centric view. For example, Levine and Smith base their model on arms trade on the assumption that individual governments are fully informed with well-defined objective functions, which contain both economic and security arguments. Economic and security outcomes depend on the strategic interaction between the set of buying (countries involved in regional arms race) and selling governments (large producers of modern weapon systems)⁵². However, decision process is also influenced by realpolitik consideration and lobbying or bribery and unauthorized transfer⁵³.

Consequently, the incentive for arms exports lies in governments' (or states') desire to increase production runs, lower unit costs and maintain defense industrial base. But, the competitive pressure from the globalized defense market with new players would force some nations to cancel indigenous weapons program and rely more on imports, while domestic production move towards specialization to niche markets and supply-chain integration⁵⁴.

52 Paul Levine and Ron Smith, "The Arms Trade: Winners and Losers," *Economic Policy* 12 (1997): 339.

53 Ibid., 339–340.

54 Charles H. Anderton, "Economics of Arms Trade," in *Handbook of Defense Economics*, ed. Todd Sandler and Keith Hartley, vol. 1 (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 1995), 533; Jurgen Brauer, "Arms Industries, Arms Trade and Developing Countries," in *Handbook of Defense Economics*, ed. Todd Sandler and Keith Hartley, vol. 2 (Amsterdam: Elsevier,

On the other hand, developing countries invest in national defense industrial base with the hope that it would stimulate domestic economy through (1) arms export earnings and export-promotion industrialization, (2) foreign exchange savings, (3) increasing employment and (4) benefit to domestic economy at large by military and non-military technology transfer through co-production agreements. But, there is no empirical evidence that these goals have been reached⁵⁵. On that point, Brauer argues that (1) development of indigenous arms industries depend on the established civilian capabilities thus defense industrialization would not cause general industrialization and (2) evidence on foreign-exchange earning often appear overstated, costs are never fully counted and nonexistence of uncontroversially convincing case on net foreign-exchange effect in favor of arms exports⁵⁶. Yet, Brauer also argues that “developing nations can graduate to higher levels of arms production sophistication as the underlying civilian capabilities increase and as they become more integrated into transnationalization of arms production efforts”⁵⁷.

Consequently, based on above motivations, defense economics seeks to provide an answer on how defense procurement process work on the international level. Thus, for this end there are several models that try to explain different aspects of the above mentioned motivations such as supply-demand model, neoclassical trade model, trade models with economies of scale and learning economies, models on defense industrial base and

2007), 983; Maria D.C. Garcia-Alonso and Paul Levine, “Arms Trade and Arms Races: A Strategic Analysis,” in *Handbook of Defense Economics*, ed. Todd Sandler and Keith Hartley, vol. 2 (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 2007), 948–49.

55 Brauer, “Arms Industries, Arms Trade and Developing Countries,” 983; Also see: Stephen Martin, “Countertrade and Offsets: An Overview of the Theory and Evidence,” in *The Economics of Offsets: Defense Procurement and Countertrade*, ed. Stephen Martin (London & New York: Routledge, 1996), 15–48.

56 Jurgen Brauer, “The Arms Industry in Developing Nations: History and Post-Cold War Assessment,” in *Arming the South: The Economics of Military Expenditure, Arms Production and Arms Trade in Developing Countries*, ed. Jurgen Brauer and Paul Dunne (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 122.

57 *Ibid.*, 123.

employment and 'political economic' synthesis⁵⁸. Yet, development of an exhaustive model is very difficult because it is argued that the trade is too complex and even the attempts to create core model has its limitations⁵⁹. Therefore, defense economics is limited in reaching a grand picture of defense industries and arms trade, but able to provide model based on relations between certain factors. On the other hand, defense economists provide an insight into debunking some of the 'economics' arguments used by the governments.

2.2 Politics of Defense Procurement

Research on the politics of defense, thus defense procurement, represents the other end of the spectrum. While, defense economics seeks to find answers in its restricted realm, politics of defense seeks to find answers on its own realm, hence put more importance on the politics with limited recognition of what defense economics contributes to the debate. As Keith F. Snider argues “it would be a mistake, however, to see all of acquisition policy as forming a rational, coherent, stable, or comprehensive architecture for decisions and actions. Rather, policy is guided largely by politics: therefore, public policy necessarily has a political component”⁶⁰. However, politics of defense also has different approaches to the issue of defense and procurement while sharing the primacy of politics in decision making process.

2.2.1 Primacy of Strategy

One of the main approaches to defense procurement is the investigation of the issue from a strategy perspective. Colin Gray defines “four corners” for

58 For more detailed discussion of different approaches and models on arms trade see: Anderton, “Economics of Arms Trade.”

59 Levine and Smith, “The Arms Trade: Winners and Losers,” 350.

60 Keith F. Snider, “Defense Acquisition’s Public Policy Imprint,” in *Management of Defense Acquisition Projects*, ed. Rene G. Rendon and Keith F. Snider (Reston, VA: American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Inc., 2008), 18.

defense procurement; policy, strategy, acquisition and technology. These four issue areas have distinctive functions, though in practice they may seem to overlap. A good practice, therefore, is the balance of four corners, where they support each other. In other words, as Gray puts it “policy decides what should be achieved; strategy explains how means can be applied to secure ends; weapons acquisition provides the military means; and technology is the process of scientific discovery and engineering improvement”⁶¹. In the case of imbalance, that is one of the corners having problems, the whole enterprise of defense procurement will be affected negatively⁶². As Colin Gray argues:

- *If policy is unset of unclear, then strategic guidance for weapon acquisition becomes a guesswork, because planners will not know what they are to accomplish.*
- *If strategy is missing or incompetent, then policy goals will not be achieved and weapons acquisition process will lack authoritative direction.*
- *If weapons acquisition process is grossly inefficient, then what should be attainable policy goals and sensible strategy will be vitiated by lack of ready and suitable weaponry. In addition, the country’s technology base will not be exploited to anywhere near its optimum potential.*
- *If the technology base is neglected or is subjected to foolish investment decisions, the weapons acquisition process will lack the technological qualities to exploit in timely and effective support of national military strategy and policy*⁶³.

Colin Gray understands policy guidance as a dynamic interaction between well-established principles and the shifting climate of opinion, thus the result of policy guidance studies by looking at the five sources of nourishment. First, policy is influenced by the experiences and legacies of the past, or as Gray says “inertia from the past”⁶⁴. This means that policy makers rarely make radical shifts in military posture or sway away already established practices, until the need for change cannot be overlooked. The need for

61 Gray, *Weapons Don’t Make War: Policy, Strategy and Military Technology*, 65.

62 Ibid.

63 Ibid., 65–6.

64 Ibid., 70.

change though can be ignited by the course of events in security politics, which is the second source for policy guidance. Hence, policy guidance flows from or is a response to security politics defined by “popular and congressional attitudes toward new weapons and force size, which are expressed in a greater or smaller scale of budgetary provision, are shaped by at the margin by a volatile climate of opinion”⁶⁵. Third source of policy guidance is the geographically conditioned strategic culture, which signifies established perceptions about the country's neighborhood and strengths and weaknesses emanating from the geography of the state. Fourth source is the strategic beliefs of policy makers, both executive and legislative. In other words, while Gray argues that policy guidance should not be informed by uncompromising attitudes, in reality, people's strategic ideas become ideologies that restricts open-minded approach to weapons acquisition⁶⁶. Finally, “policymakers and commentators are predisposed to look with a favor or disfavor upon new weapon technologies without understanding ... their strategic implications”⁶⁷.

Policy should be informed by strategy to make it substantive. Otherwise, “without strategy, policy is a merely idle vision”⁶⁸. Strategy should answer the questions of what, how and with what instruments to the goal set by the policy. In doing so, strategy should take various factors into account. First, is the enemy. Strategy should be constructed in accordance with the one of enemy, aim to counter it. Without such consideration, strategy would fail to reach its desired effect, in most of cases if not all the time. Second, while strategy informs which instruments are needed to reach desired political goal, strategy should not seek for the silver bullet. This point is also connected to the development of new technologies. Colin Gray argues that technology by itself neither “deter war nor wage and win wars”⁶⁹. The usefulness of

65 Ibid., 70–1.

66 Ibid., 71.

67 Ibid.

68 Ibid., 66.

69 Ibid., 77.

technology is dependent on (1) people that uses it and (2) the tactical environment in which it is put into action. On the other hand, “unless there are unusually powerful offsetting factors, it is generally true that weapons technology molds tactics and suggests operational style”⁷⁰. However, strategy should not ask for “impracticable demands upon the tactical instrument available”⁷¹.

As far as the mechanism of procurement goes, Gray argues that the problems within the system can be traced back to belief of policy maker and legislators and their expectations and reductions of what procurement should work like, but also behaviors of primary contractors. As Gray argues:

*Many legislators and commentators on national defense appear to believe that masterpieces of the weapon-maker’s art can be produced to order, on time, and at predicted and agreed price. With few exceptions, though, the American system of weapons acquisition virtually guarantees that most major weapons programs will be high-risk enterprises with reference to technical performance, dollar cost, and delivery time... the U.S. weapons acquisition process places a premium on innovation and all but requires prospective prime contractors to overpromise on performance, cost and delivery schedules*⁷².

While, parametric decisions should be made before and during the development process, U.S. policy bodies are more concerned about debating rather than taking decisions⁷³.

In the end, Colin Gray’s analysis of defense procurement decision making and its results are mostly dependent upon the effects of policy and strategy with an eye on the technology development. He recognizes problems associated with technology and procurement system. Consequently, his analysis devotes more time on arguing about policy guidance and strategy than looking at in depth of mechanism of defense procurement or system itself.

70 Ibid., 78.

71 Ibid., 79.

72 Ibid., 84.

73 Ibid., 84–5.

2.2.2 Bureaucratic Politics

While Colin Gray focuses on the strategic choices and relation of certain set of choices to strategy and each other, various scholars approach the issue with a focus on actors. In other words, how struggles and/or cooperation between different actors yield defense procurement decisions. Gordon Adams focuses on the cooperation between groups of actors in reaching desired objectives. He focuses mostly on how coalitions are formed and provides answers for set of questions about the mechanism of defense procurement; such as how contractors are selected, why the need for certain weapon platform arises and who are the significant player etc. Adams investigates the relationship between government bureaucracy (the Pentagon), legislative branch (Congress) and the private interest (the Defense Contractors/Companies), which is defined as the “iron triangle”⁷⁴. The “iron triangle” denotes the intertwining of interests of different parties and sharing common values, interests and perceptions. Furthermore, individual’s tend to move between different realms of these relations, for example government official becoming representative for a firm. In the end, an impenetrable web of relations occurs, where the distinction between public and private disappears and decisions are taken by a group of people guided by their shared interests rather than public good⁷⁵.

The iron triangle is investigated on by looking at two issues; the structure of weapons business and ways of constructing and maintaining influence. The structure of weapons business is composed of institutions, peoples and roles that each play. Defense companies, as a whole, are surely significant actors in defense procurement but officers and members of the board are critical agents in operations of defense company. “Top managers and members of the board bring... wide range of knowledge and impressive networks to ties to

74 Gordon Adams, *The Politics of Defense Contracting: The Iron Triangle*, 3rd ed. (New Brunswick & London: Transaction Books, 1986), 24.

75 *Ibid.*, 24–6.

positions of influence, giving them a significant role in contractor's Government relations strategy"⁷⁶. Furthermore, defense companies continuously hire civilian contractors that have worked for the government, and retired military officers, who bring in their knowledge about ways of government. However, the flow of people is not one way. People from private sector also move to public sectors. In the end, this 'revolving door' enables both private sector and public sector to have an insight of how each other operate and also facilitates construction of shared ideas and values⁷⁷.

Second actor is the financial institutions and auditors, which act as subtle connection between defense company and government. Financial institutions occupies a significant place in state's economy. They have the power to influence the fate of companies through credit rating and credit approval and affect local and national economy through their loans to government agencies. Thus, financial institutions have a significant network of connections and defense companies that have good relations with financial institutions can devise its business and government strategy through the information and cooperation that it gets from these institutions⁷⁸.

Another issue that brings public and private sector together and intertwines each others interest is the research and development (R&D) activity. Defense companies spend significant amounts of money on R&D to keep their technological lead, but money spend on R&D is usually subsidized by the government. In order to acquire government money for R&D, defense companies have to persuade government to (1) the new technology is necessary for the future military capability and/or (2) the desired capability should be parallel to what certain defense companies are capable of. Consequently, defense companies take active role in defining and shaping new weapons program, technological feasibility and on estimated development cost. On the flip side, government official believes that private

76 Ibid., 57.

77 Ibid., 77–9.

78 Ibid., 65–6.

partnership on these issues are valuable and necessary. In the end, new weapons program and military requirements are decided in joint basis, which constructs common interests between public and private⁷⁹.

However, establishing and maintaining above mentioned structure requires continuous influencing of policy makers to sustain shared interest based on common values and perceptions. One strategy is backing the candidates during their campaigns through significant amounts of donations so that when the candidate get elected, defense company would have a supporter within the executive and/or legislative branch⁸⁰. Second, defense companies establish contact offices in the capital to (1) gather information about trade, procurement preferences and all the data about government officials and (2) apply pressure through lobby activity that goes well beyond the capital and includes wide range of parties – for example, employees of certain plant, shareholders and local community⁸¹. Third, defense policy-makers and industry employees spend their off-work hours through socializing with each other, which could facilitate favoritism, improper influence and possibility of corruption. Furthermore, defense decision are taken by a small group of people within the iron triangle, defense procurement decision may be taken with the concerns of looking after interests of both parties within the social system⁸². Fourth, defense companies also draws citizens into the influence game through taking ad campaigns in military magazines and urging people to sign petitions to take action against undesirable policies of the government – defense budget cuts for example⁸³. Finally, defense companies tend to make questionable payments to government officials to influence them in buying their products. However, due to secretive nature of this matter, it is very difficult to reach make conclusive remarks⁸⁴.

79 Ibid., 95–100.

80 Ibid., 105–28.

81 Ibid., 129–35.

82 Ibid., 175–6.

83 Ibid., 185.

84 Ibid., 199.

On the other hand, Lauren Holland argues that the “iron triangle” does not constitute a consistent and cooperative alliance between actors from beginning to end of the procurement process. Iron triangle does not consider the relative power and influence of the actors during the procurement process, which tend to change at different stages of the process. Holland argues that there is a power asymmetry between actors. While, military services enjoy disproportionate influence during the preliminary stages of the process, influence of defense contractors increases during the conception and R&D stages. As the process move to production, deployment and operation, influence of Congress becomes more visible. Furthermore, the relations between actors, such as legislative-executive, committee-industry and industry-military, are not always cooperative but at times it is conflictual, which affects decisions issues such as number of units procured, performance capabilities and timely deployment of military hardware. Finally, the relationship between the industry and government is not always reciprocal. In other words, campaign donations do not necessarily yield decision taken in favor of donator⁸⁵.

Departing from Holland's criticism of the “iron triangle”, Christopher M. Jones and Kevin P. Marsh proposes refinement of the “iron triangle” approach. They argue that the approach should be based on three modified propositions:

Proposition One: Political power in the weapons procurement process is concentrated in the hands of a tripartite alliance of armaments manufacturers, the armed forces, and Congress. Power within the tripartite alliance shifts from the armed forces and arms industry to Congress as the procurement process proceeds from research and development to procurement and deployment.

Proposition Two: Policy-making may be nonconflictual within the weapons procurement subsystem, but substantial political conflict may occur between the legislative and executive branches during the procurement and deployment process.

Proposition Three: The weapons procurement subsystem is sustained and supported by an exchange of benefits, favors, logrolling, coalition-building, and other forms of political behavior. Specific factors may prove highly influential in these exchanges, including the intended strategy of the weapons system, the

85 See Lauren Holland, “Who Makes Weapons Procurement Decisions?,” *Policy Studies Journal* 24, no. 4 (1996): 607–624.

*designated service branch that will employ the system, prevailing political and economic conditions, and constituency size*⁸⁶.

Davis Sorenson's analysis provides on how different actors utilizes certain set of tactics to reach their desired objectives. Sorenson's analysis on what drives weapons acquisition is based on three propositions, which are the point of departure on evaluating which actor is influential. First, direct and clearly articulated interests are more effective than vaguely future threats and values ones. Second, tangible short-term benefits from acquisition is more influential than intangible long-term benefits. Third, domestic politics are more influential than international politics, though Sorenson acknowledges the significance of international politics on arms sales⁸⁷. Therefore, which ever actor successfully formulate their position in accordance to above propositions, their influence in weapons acquisition is higher.

Consequently, he defines four factors, which represent the area that specific actors operate and struggle for influence. These factors are, (1) Bureaucratic Politics Factor, (2) Civil-Military Relations Factor, (3) The Congressional Factor and (4) The Military-Industrial Complex Factor. Bureaucratic politics factor points out constant struggle between the services for scare resources to keep what each service perceives as its own core mission, thus the resource allocation to this core mission would be much more greater than perceived non-core missions⁸⁸. Civil-Military factor presents the struggle between civilian authority and the military in structuring the weapons acquisition process and military doctrine⁸⁹. In other words, this is the struggle on who says the last word which weapon to buy, how it should be used and even how should military operates. Congressional factor is about how

86 Christopher M. Jones and Kevin P. Marsh, "The Politics of Weapons Procurement: Why Some Programs Survive and Other Die," *Defense & Security Analysis* 27, no. 4 (2011): 371–2.

87 David S. Sorenson, *The Process and Politics of Defense Acquisition: A Reference Handbook* (Westport, Connecticut and London: Praeger Security International, 2009), 88.

88 *Ibid.*, 92–101.

89 *Ibid.*, 101–6.

Congress uses its power over funding to influence the weapons acquisition process⁹⁰. Finally, Military-Industrial Complex factor is the framework for how defense industry tries to manipulate/influence the decision in its favor, though sometimes this means adversarial relations between military and firms⁹¹. In the end, Sorenson argues that each actor tries to influence force development choices according to their own perceived interests.

2.2.3 Military-Industrial Complex

Close relationship between defense companies and the government is the result of certain political developments in the world history and the effects of this relationship extend beyond the domestic setting. Consequently, unlike Adams, military-industrial complex literature puts defense firms at the core of its analysis and focuses on the defense firms and their influence in shaping state policies. The main questions of this research area are how did military-industrial complex come about, how did defense firms become powerful enough to influence, and how does this relationship extend beyond the domestic setting. In other words, military-industrial complex sets agenda for military procurement both at the level of national and international.

The military-industrial complex, which denotes the high influence of the defense firms in state affairs, argued to be born sometime between the Second World War and Korea War. Lens Sidney argues that "In the orthodox scenario, the military-industrial complex originated with the WW2 and the sophisticated weaponry needed to win it."⁹² But, Carroll Pursell argues that "salient features (military domination of the federal budget, armed adventures and interventions abroad, political influence of prominent military officers etc.) date from the very origins of the nation"⁹³. However, it is generally accepted

90 Ibid., 106–14.

91 Ibid., 114–5.

92 Sidney Lens, *The Military-Industrial Complex* (Philadelphia: Pilgrim Press, 1970), 15.

93 Carroll W. Pursell Jr., "Introduction," in *The Military-Industrial Complex*, ed. Carroll W. Pursell Jr. (New York, N.Y.: Harper & Row, 1972), 1.

that the military-industrial complex came in to existence in the post-World War 2 environment, thus affecting two major policy of the United States. First, military-industrial complex influenced the military policy, and therefore, procurement practices of the United States. As Samuel Huntington argues:

*Nonetheless the great bulk of the defense industry which works primarily for defense is primarily concerned with strategic weapons system. As a result, this industry constitutes not just a natural lobby for a strong military policy but also natural lobby for a military strategy in which strategic weapons play a major role*⁹⁴.

Second, military-industrial complex also affects the foreign policy of the United States and the policy tools that it used. The military-industrial complex extends its influence on the international level by relying on (1) “A system of aid and loans aimed at stabilizing the economies of our [US] allies, but also at keeping them moored to the ‘American way’” and (2) “A system of military alliances, military training and support, as well as use of the CIA, and AFL-CIO labor leaders, to assure that the governments we [US] consider friendly remain in power”⁹⁵. As a consequence, military-industrial complex does not just influence states that they flourished, the United States, but expand their influence through the hegemony of the United States and affected procurement decisions of other states.

Arms transfers, therefore, are used as a tool for keeping states under the hegemony of the United States as well as a source of income for the military-industrial complex. States that procure their weapons systems from the United States, or the Soviet Union for Warsaw Pact countries, become depended on their supplier states, which is usually one supplier⁹⁶, which holds for the Cold War period. Beyond sole dependency on military hardware, arms transfers create a situation whereby client militaries, usually

94 Samuel P. Huntington, “The Defense Establishment: Vested Interests and the Public Interests,” in *The Military-Industrial Complex and US Foreign Policy*, ed. Omer L. Carey (Washington: Washington State University, 1969), 11.

95 Lens, *The Military-Industrial Complex*, 26–7.

96 David Kinsella, “Arms Transfer Dependence and Foreign Policy Conflict,” *Journal of Peace Research* 35 (January 1, 1998): 8.

Third World militaries, adopt and transfer “military organization, military strategy, even the very definition of national security have been 'imported' along with weapons systems.”⁹⁷. Consequently, the defense procurement decisions of client states have already been decided by the political structure that they become part of.

2.3 Political Economy of Defense

The point of departure of political economy of defense, like political economy field itself, is the belief that economics and politics cannot be separated from each. Although, the connectedness of economics and politics are implicit in above mentioned approaches, researchers tend to focus more on one aspect or another. Consequently, PED represents a critique towards defense economics and politics of defense approaches and argues that sole focus on either economics or politics misses the bigger picture and thus becoming too narrowly focused. As Andrew Ross puts it “[t]he pervasive conceptual distinction between politics and economics is empirically false... Allocation, efficiency, distribution, employment... and price stability are components of political as well as economic reality”⁹⁸. Consequently, PED aims to construct a more balanced understanding of defense issues and defense procurement with an open appreciation of economics and politics are bounded. At this point, we have to point out that the separation of realms of economics and politics are constructed in other areas of human activity as their interaction is less visible. However, as we already mentioned above, in the defense area, the separation is very difficult to maintain because state and the defense market are tightly interwoven and the relation is more visible than the civilian market.

97 Ibid.

98 Andrew L. Ross, “The Political Economy of Defense,” in *The Political Economy of Defense: Issues and Perspectives*, ed. Andrew L. Ross (New York, Westport & London: Greenwood Press, 1991), 2.

Consequently, PED aims to expand to scope of study by looking at three broad categories of research while incorporating assumptions and research done in different areas of defense. Three broad categories are defined as “(1) the political dimensions of economic actions in the defense realm; (2) the economic dimensions of political actions in the defense realm; and (3) the security dimensions of political economic actions”⁹⁹. While these three categories are shared by the researchers of political economy of defense, both the focus and at times approaches differs. For example, first category of inquiry incorporates issues of “the military’s role in the national economic planning, the effect of regime type and varying levels of political influence of the armed forces on spending for national defense”¹⁰⁰ etc. Second category would include “the impact of war on economic and industrial development, the economic bases of political military power, the mobilization of societal resources for the military purposes of the state...”¹⁰¹ etc. Third category involves “traditional international conflict and security research but is more firmly grounded in the interaction of the three dimensions [economic, political and security]”¹⁰². Consequently, we try to represent both convergence and differences in approaches in the following paragraphs.

Political economy of defense bases its theoretical foundations on liberal political economy with a pinch of Mercantalism/Realism¹⁰³. Although the contribution of Marxist approaches are appreciated, Kapstein argues that “Liberalism is a philosophy of political economy that encourages competition, entrepreneurship, and trade on the basis of comparative advantage ... [which are] of value in the defense no less than the commercial economy”¹⁰⁴. While Kapstein openly declares his theoretical standing, assumptions and world

99 Ibid., 8.

100Ibid., 9.

101Ibid.

102Ibid., 10.

103Ethan Barnaby Kapstein, *The Political Economy of National Security: A Global Perspective* (New York & London: McGraw-Hill, 1992), 10.

104Ibid.

view of liberal political economy exists in PED research although those assumptions are not openly declared.

On the issue of defense procurement, political economy of defense reaches a more comprehensive outlook on the issue through recognition that procurement practices and markets operate differently at domestic and international setting as well as developed and developing states. In other words, political-economy recognizes the variance within the defense economics assumptions on the characteristics of the defense market by differentiating level of analysis and differences among group of states. At the national level, arms market is defined similar in the lines of economics of defense; the market is generally defined as monopsony with one buyer and several sellers¹⁰⁵. However, as Harvey Sapolsky argues, “the defense monopsony is unusually complex, because the government is both a single customer and also a small clique of customers at the same time.”¹⁰⁶. For example, despite a unified budget for defense spending, different branches of U.S. military act as small buyers, each pursuing their own procurement agendas and relations with contractors. Consequently, this creates a market structure with small number of buyers and small number of sellers, an oligopsony, which again do not allow perfect competition and distorts the market. Furthermore, the variance within the structure of market can arise as the state may be left with one contractor in production of major weapons system; market becomes duopoly. While such structure do not arise in the United States, it is certainly the case for developing states, which are seeking to establish domestic defense industry and have only one contractor for certain defense products, and European states, where defense industries are being concentrated¹⁰⁷. Consequently, at the national level, as Ross argues,

105Andrew L. Ross, “The International Arms Market: A Structural and Behavioral Analysis,” in *The Political Economy of Defense: Issues and Perspectives*, ed. Andrew L. Ross (New York, Westport & London: Greenwood Press, 1991), 114; Harvey M Sapolsky, Eugene Gholz, and Caitlin Talmadge, *US Defense Politics: The Origins of Security Policy* (New York and London: Routledge, 2009), 74.

106Sapolsky, Gholz, and Talmadge, *US Defense Politics: The Origins of Security Policy*, 75.

107Ross, “The International Arms Market: A Structural and Behavioral Analysis,” 114.

the market tends to take the form of monopsony-oligopoly or monopsony-monopoly¹⁰⁸. However, whatever the market structure is “the buyer in the defense business is unusually powerful compared to the sellers... and if the contractors do not please those few customers, they have little recourse to find alternative consumers for their wares”¹⁰⁹.

Consequently, state’s unusual power, as compared to civilian market, shapes defense procurement practices in terms of relations between state and firms and how decisions are made. Defense firms must know about preferences, desires and how their customers behave, because there are so few and failure to recognize peculiarities of their customer would result in failure of the defense firms¹¹⁰. Therefore, defense firms try to gain an insight to their customer through the means and practices mentioned earlier by Adams.

Defense procurement is also poised by two important uncertainties; technological and political. Technological uncertainty arises when buyer's requests can only be meet with technologies that are not available yet. Hence, it is unclear whether invented technologies would work as required. Furthermore, political uncertainty also increases the technological uncertainty as buyer’s request would not remain the same through the weapon development process. Buyer’s requirement tend to evolve, politicians perceptions of what is needed and strategic environment changes, budget constraints arises and lack of communication between officials at procurement agency and military creates misconceptions of what is required¹¹¹.

While technological challenges are resolved through more research and development, political uncertainties are resolved through bureaucratic politics. Thus, bureaucratic politics involves various strategies in sustaining

108Ibid.

109Sapolsky, Gholz, and Talmadge, *US Defense Politics: The Origins of Security Policy*, 75.

110Ibid.

111 Ibid., 84–5.

the project. These strategies would be constant persuasion of decision makers at different agencies and level that the project is needed, inclusion of different agencies in order to create larger support base, moderation on the capabilities so that other agencies would not perceive the project as a threat and managerial innovation¹¹².

On the other hand, James R. Kurt argues that strategic reasoning and bureaucratic politics are not enough for understanding why states buy weapons that they do. Official imperatives for weapons procurement would involve the determination of the need for new weapons system and followed by solicitation with several companies; thus awarding the contract to most cost-effective design. However, Kurth argues that there is another imperative at work: follow-on imperative. Follow-on imperative seeks for sustain production of already existing production facilities through awarding new major contract under the similar terms with the old contract, follow-on contract, to these facilities some time before the end of current production line and the new design would not be much different than its predecessor. Consequently, competition for new design would be peripheral for the award of the contract. Political imperatives also support follow-on imperative since the continuous production would bring electoral support. In the end, we might expect that most of the awards for new weapon system would be follow-on contract that aims to keep production facilities going on¹¹³.

At the international level, however, defense market takes a different shape. On the demand side, states do not have the power arise from monopsony, because “there are a vast number of potential customers and the demand of any one customer can be considered a negligible proportion of total demand”¹¹⁴. However, this condition of the market only applies to third-tier

112 See Harvey M Sapolsky, *The Polaris System Development: Bureaucratic and Programmatic Success in Government* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1972).

113 Kurth, “Why We Buy the Weapons We Do”; James R Kurth, “The Political Economy of Weapons Procurement: The Follow-on Imperative,” *The American Economic Review* 62 (1972): 304–311.

114 Ross, “The Political Economy of Defense,” 114.

states that have limited or none defense production capabilities and to some extend second-tier states that can produce high technology defense products¹¹⁵. Consequently, demand side of the international arms trade mostly composed of third-tier states. On the supply side, international arms market show a continuum between oligopoly and pure competition because, while the market shows some of the characteristics of oligopoly¹¹⁶, market has become a more competitive environment due to transformation of the international market since the 1970s and the 1980s by the entrance of new suppliers that breaks the monopoly of certain states¹¹⁷.

Especially developing and third world states are motivated to procure weapons system, as intuitively argued, for reasons of security and political influence. Furthermore, the new comers to international arms market are motivated to build up domestic defense industries for economic growth, solvency and budgetary allocations as well as political reasons. However, as Pearson argues, state that decide to build national defense industry and export are motivated to produce arms for the reasons of not solely because of commercial trade concerns but because the leaders started to see technology as a key to security. Thus, leaders of the Third World perceive threats, real or imagined, emanating from international power structures and even if they do not have enemies, they do not want to fall behind the technological and military developments¹¹⁸.

Furthermore, Davina Miller introduces the interconnectedness of arms trade and broader economic system within the international relations. She makes

115For detailed account for tiered defense production analysis see Keith Krause, *Arms and the State: Patterns of Military Production and Trade*, 1st Paperback (Cambridge, New York, Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 1995).

116Characteristics on international arms market that conforms with the oligopoly theory are defined and argues as follows: (1) Nature of products, because they are neither exclusively homogenous nor differentiated; thus while there are some unique products, there also exists very close substitutes for them, and (2) predominance of non-price. See Ross, "The International Arms Market: A Structural and Behavioral Analysis."

117Ibid., 129–30.

118Frederic S. Pearson, *The Global Spread of Arms: Political Economy of International Security*, Dilemmas in World Politics (Boulder, San Francisco & Oxford: Westview Press, 1994), 47–8.

four main proposition on the issue by focusing on the behavior of the United Kingdom. She argues that (1) British arms exports are primarily driven by a more general desire to export what is produced, (2) Britain is motivated by overlapping reasons of foreign policy, (3) it refuses arms transfer exclusively on political grounds and (4) its willingness of supply defense goods becomes the price for acquiring access to the wider civilian market¹¹⁹. Therefore, the procurement decision is the negotiation between suppliers' motivations and customers' desires that take shape within the broader economic system and international relations.

2.4 The Critique

While three area of research make significant contributions to our understanding of defense procurement, each has its own weaknesses and shortcomings, especially when states other than developed world is considered. However, they have a shared limitation. First, defense economics and politics of defense are founded on the separation of economics and politics. Furthermore, PED, despite arguing about the connectedness of economics and politics, it threats economics and politics as externally related spheres. The separation of 'economic' and 'political' spheres is the result of particular historical moment of production relationship in human history, thus the separation has its meaning only in capitalist mode of production. As Wood argues "[t]o speak of the separation of the political and economic in capitalism means not only that there is an autonomous economic sphere such as never existed before but also that there is a distinctive kind of political sphere"¹²⁰. Hence, sphere of 'economy' satisfies two conditions. First "all economic actors ... dependent on the market for the conditions of their self-reproduction, and hence subject to the specifically

119 See Miller Davina, *Export or Die: Britain's Defense Trade with Iran and Iraq* (London & New York: Cassell, 1996).

120 Ellen Meiksins Wood, "Logics of Power: a Conversation with David Harvey," *Historical Materialism* 14 (2007): 16.

'economic' imperatives of competition and accumulation"¹²¹. Second appropriation is distanced from the direct coercion means and takes place through economic means that is based on the selling of the labour power to the capital¹²². On the other hand, political refers only to enforcement of coercive means, not for appropriation, but for sustaining the stability and rule of law. Consequently, political from this perspective is "like other social forms in capitalism (rent, interest etc) is seen as a 'thing' standing apart from other 'things' rather than as a historically determined form of the social relation of capital"¹²³. Therefore, when we examine defense economics researches, 'political' factors are deemed as non-technical and 'economic' analysis is the 'technical'. As Wood argues, the separation is the unique characteristic of capitalism that while it needs coercion, it could detach itself from direct coercion¹²⁴.

The literature is mainly based on the experiences of developed states and especially of the United States and the United Kingdom, which makes application of the assumptions and tools to other states very difficult. Consequently, when the international defense production transformed and become a more integrated system, existing models of procurement failed to provide exhaustive understanding. Furthermore, some theories of defense economics and follow-on imperative can only be applied if the state in question have a defense industry. Moreover, any analysis that approaches to defense procurement as a synonym for weapons development suffers from the same limitation. As we seen above, defense economics reluctantly points out the political aspects of defense procurement, as it had become difficult to overlook, but still focuses on the economic models to understand the process and simplify the analysis, thus failing to understand the effects of political

121Ellen Meiksins Wood, "Global Capital, National States," in *Historical Materialism and Globalization*, ed. Mark Rupert and Hazel Smith (London and New York: Routledge, 2002), 18.

122Ibid.

123John Holloway and Sol Picciotto, "Capital, Crisis and the State," in *The State Debate*, ed. Simon Clarke (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 1991), 102.

124Wood, "Logics of Power: a Conversation with David Harvey," 18.

incentives and how those incentives could change the whole decision about procurement.

On the other hand, politics of defense literature aims to present the other side of the story and open the inclusion of some aspects of economics to its analysis; e.g. the influence of defense firms on the decision making process. However, politics of defense research fails to appreciate the effects of market structure on the decisions. Consequently, political economy arises as the compromise between these two approaches. In the end, as can be observed above, no matter how economics and politics try to carve out their distinctive conceptual domains in analysis of procurement, the unavoidable connection between these two realms makes its presence felt.

Consequently, political economy of defense aims to construct a framework that would bridge the gap between economic and politics and inclusive of most of the states. Political economy of defense research, while providing a deeper understanding, still shares the assumptions of economics and politics research. The literature assumes market structures that are provided by liberal economic theory and modes of behavior within that structure from politics research. However, the problem arises because of their assumption of market structure. The literature do not question why certain market structures came into being, whether there is a chance for change in the structure and why does change happen. Although the change within the market structure is recognized, international market structure but not in domestic setting, the reason for the entrance of new player within that structure remains superficial. The analysis is superficial because the reasons provided for new actors and desires for establishing national defense industry have been there for a long time and probably shared by many states but we do not see an analysis why some states are successful in establishing national defense industry while others failed.

Furthermore, new actors have become a part of international arms market at certain historical moment, mostly during the 1970s and the 1980s.

Consequently, the question is why new actors do not enter the market before these years? In other words, what makes these years special that various states decide to build national defense industrial base? Although, various explanations exist in different areas of research, political economy of defense literature seems to fail to integrate those research in its analysis. This is mostly because of acceptance of liberal economy assumptions. Consequently in the next chapter, we would attempt to construct a framework that would go beyond the existing literature and provide deeper and more connected understanding.

CHAPTER 3

HISTORICAL MATERIALISM ON DEFENSE PROCUREMENT

Mainstream research on defense procurement focuses on certain relations and their outcomes, yet fails to reach a comprehensive outlook at procurement, which would provide an explanation on the sources of change and peculiarities of states. Each approach tends to provide an account of defense procurement with different models, yet they all share certain set of assumptions. While a group of approaches are founded on the assumption that economics and politics are separate fields, despite sustaining that separation becomes very difficult in defense related issues, PED approaches are far from investigating the inner workings of the mode of production. The general acceptance of liberal values raises intellectual obstacles on questioning factors behind why the system is structured in such a way. Consequently, the mainstream research mainly focuses on the structure of defense market and production with no or little attention of the overall change and drivers of mode and form of production.

Furthermore, mainstream research on defense tends to establish and discriminate highly specialized research domains, for example, Defense Procurement, Strategy, Military Doctrine, Arms Trade, Military-Industrial Complex, Defense Industrial Base etc. and so few connections between those highly specialized fields are established. However, defense procurement is not only about how production and procurement mechanisms

work, it is also about military doctrine, foreign relations, military-state-industry relations and modes of production, and how seemingly different issues are interrelated in shaping choices and preferences of particular state. Consequently, procurement decisions are the result of the interplay of multitude of factors that are shaped by structures, which arise during specific time and space and forms of production. Therefore, the framework for research should be able to integrate and account for different areas of research into one coherent approach and for the change in structures and varying significance of factors that are affecting the decision making process.

Consequently, this chapter will introduce a different theoretical approach to defense procurement; historical materialism. Historical materialism could bring together different factors that are involved in defense procurement decision making process and what seems to be different domains of research into a coherent framework. Hence, this theory could account for changes and peculiarities of and within the structure. Although, historical materialism is based on Karl Marx's works, Marx's never elaborated his understanding on historical materialism. Consequently, the theory have been drawn from his works by various Marxist intellectuals, which resulted in different interpretations of the theory. While core values of the theory, which is the focus on modes of production and social structures, are shared, different interpretations of Marx lead to different branches of historical materialism. Consequently, this chapter will deal with the roots of the historical materialism and different approaches. Among the different approaches to historical materialism, Gramscian approach is adopted and applied to defense procurement. Therefore the aim of this chapter is to introduce theoretical foundations of a critical understanding defense procurement, which could be linked to defense area in general.

3.1 Gramscian Historical Materialism

The basic foundations of historical materialism is that it brings together two focus points to the examination of social world. 'Historical' allow us to focus on conditions and implications of structures of specific moments in social relations and how those structures came about through time. "Materialism" focuses on the "historically specific material conditions of social reproduction"¹²⁵. However, Marx never defined the theory of historical materialism and he never used historical materialism in a coherent way. Consequently, as Callinicos argues "[b]ecause of Marx's own inconsistencies and ambiguities, much turns on which part of his writings one chooses to focus on"¹²⁶, hence the different interpretations of the theory of historical materialism. Many scholars tend to use Marx's 1859 *Preface to A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy* as the initial point of departure, where Marx argues:

In the social production of their existence, men inevitably enter into definite relations, which are independent of their will, namely relations of production appropriate to a given stage in the development of their material forces of production. The totality of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society, the real foundation, on which arises a legal and political superstructure and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness. The mode of production of material life conditions the general process of social, political and intellectual life. It is not the consciousness of men that determines their existence, but their social existence that determines their consciousness. At a certain stage of development, the material productive forces of society come into conflict with the existing relations of production or – this merely expresses the same thing in legal terms – with the property relations within the framework of which they have operated hitherto. From forms of development of the productive forces these relations turn into their fetters. Then begins an era of social revolution. The changes in the economic foundation lead sooner or later to the transformation of the whole immense superstructure.¹²⁷

¹²⁵Wood, "Global Capital, National States," 18.

¹²⁶Alex Callinicos, *Making History: Agency, Structure, and Change in Social Theory*, 2nd revised edition, Historical Materialism Book Series (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2004), 41.

¹²⁷Karl Marx, *Grundrisse: A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy* (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1977), <http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1859/critique-pol-economy/preface.htm>.

Here Marx introduces foundations of historical materialism. First, social structure arises out of productive relations that people get in, and hence mode of production and material forces of it has a primacy on the establishment of any structure, be it economic or political. Second, people's consciousness is the result of class that they are in; that is at which part of the productive relations people are located. The change in society is the result of crises or conflict. Here, though, Marx seems to establish a preeminence on 'economic structure' over legal and political superstructure. In other words, only change in base results in the change in politics or, in general terms, ideas do not matter in social change. This attitude can also be observed in Engels's definition of historical materialism:

The materialist conception of history starts from the proposition that the production of the means to support human life and, next to production, the exchange of things produced, is the basis of all social structure; that in every society that has appeared in history, the manner in which wealth is distributed and society divided into classes or orders is dependent upon what is produced, how it is produced, and how the products are exchanged. From this point of view, the final causes of all social changes and political revolutions are to be sought, not in men's brains, not in men's better insights into eternal truth and justice, but in changes in the modes of production and exchange. They are to be sought, not in the philosophy, but in the economics of each particular epoch. The growing perception that existing social institutions are unreasonable and unjust, that reason has become unreason, and right wrong, is only proof that in the modes of production and exchange changes have silently taken place with which the social order, adapted to earlier economic conditions, is no longer in keeping. From this it also follows that the means of getting rid of the incongruities that have been brought to light must also be present, in a more or less developed condition, within the changed modes of production themselves. These means are not to be invented by deduction from fundamental principles, but are to be discovered in the stubborn facts of the existing system of production.¹²⁸

The means of production is primary factor in historical development of social structures according to Engels, just as it is for Marx. However, what is more important to point out here is that Engels does not think that ideas have any effect in the change of social structures. He establishes a deterministic view

128Fredrick Engels, *Socialism: Utopian and Scientific*, vol. 3, Marx/Engels Selected Works (Progress Publishers, 1880), <http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1880/soc-utop/ch03.htm>.

of social change, which is only dependent on the change in modes of production and only in that. This puts the study of economic base to primacy in understanding social relations and structures¹²⁹, thus understanding of class struggles on the level of production, while the role and impact of ideas and culture within the class struggle are to back burner or their significance is overlooked. In addition, assigning primacy of 'economic' over 'political' paves the way for assumptions on different logics, for example logic of economy, logic of politics and logic of territoriality, through different interpretations of Marxism.

The separation of 'economic' and 'political' spheres is an instrumental separation under capitalist mode of production, thus has an operational use and meaning within capitalist system. However, this instrumental separation does not signifies the unity of economic and political in productive and social structures, thus analytical approach to these structures should base on the unity. Furthermore, as Holloway and Picotto argues, "the economic and the political are both forms of social relations, forms assumed by the basic relation of class conflict in capitalist society, the capital relation"¹³⁰. According to them, what Marx tried to do is "to show that class struggle assumes different historical forms in different historical societies"¹³¹. Gramsci argues that deterministic understanding of historical materialism "does not allow for the possibility of error, but assumes that every political act is determined, immediately, by the structure, and therefore as a real and permanent (...) modification of the structure"¹³². Consequently, mode of production does not dictate laws of change in a deterministic way, but they are tendential laws that "govern development of relations of production"¹³³. Departing from this

129Peter Burnham, "Class, States and Global Circuits of Capital," in *Historical Materialism and Globalization*, ed. Mark Rupert & Hazel Smith (London and New York: Routledge, 2002), 115.

130Picciotto, "Capital, Crisis and the State," 108.

131Ibid., 98.

132Antonio Gramsci, *The Gramsci Reader*, ed. David Forgacs (New York: NYU Press, 2000), 191.

133Simon Clarke, "Marxism, Sociology and Poulantzas's Theory of the State," in *The State*

point, the crisis of capitalism, hence the social change, is the result of internal contradictions of productive relations and class struggle¹³⁴.

The way in which class struggle happens, what kind of forces acts on the struggle and how the struggle is shaped and directed is provided by Gramsci's philosophy of praxis. Gramsci argues that "the philosophy of praxis 'detaches' the structure from the superstructures when, rather, it conceives their development as intimately connected and necessarily interrelated and reciprocal"¹³⁵. Consequently, ideas and material condition, in Gramsci, is bound together, ideas cannot exist without finding their meaning in material conditions, but also, ideas could shape forms that arises out of material conditions. Material conditions, as Cox puts it, "include both the social relations and the physical means of production. Superstructures of ideology and political organization shape the development of both aspects of production and are shaped by them"¹³⁶. Thus, "[ideologies] are real historical facts which must be combatted and their nature as instruments of domination revealed, not for reasons of morality etc., but for reasons of political struggle"¹³⁷.

Ideologies, and supporting ideas, are socially constructed and ideas that are able to become 'common sense' in a society becomes the foundations of established social structure and relations. Human experiences that are rooted in their interaction with the environment and with each other are the source of ideas, which are attempts to give meaning to human experiences. Consequently, ideas have their roots in the material conditions. Ideas, as Cox argues, has two forms. One form consists of intersubjective meanings "or those shared notions of the nature of social relations which tend to

Debate, ed. Simon Clarke (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 1991), 84.

134Picciotto, "Capital, Crisis and the State," 118–9.

135Gramsci, *The Gramsci Reader*, 193.

136Robert W. Cox, *Approaches to World Order*, Cambridge Studies in International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 132.

137Gramsci, *The Gramsci Reader*, 196.

perpetuate habits and expectations of behavior"¹³⁸. And the other form of ideas is "collective images of social order held by different groups of people (...) differing views as to both the nature and the legitimacy of prevailing power relations, the meanings of justice and public good ... collective images may be several and opposed"¹³⁹. However, very different sets of ideas could exist on a given moment in history, but only those set of ideas that provide a justification and legitimacy to mode of production with power realize dominance over other sets of ideas, hence reaching to a level of 'common sense' that rests at the core of hegemonic structure.

Hegemony, unlike the established notion in the field of International Relations, is not founded on only coercive/military power, but it is the dominant form of structure that arise from the fit between on certain form of production, hence social relations, coupled with certain set of ideas, which could shape ways of doing things and behavior. This dominance is reached through both consent and coercion. Hence, the role of ideas, that has become 'common sense' within a certain society, is to achieve consent, thus legitimizing the form of production and social relations. Consequently, 'common sense' would help the control of class struggle, as if society accepts certain forms of social relations as normal and natural, then it would be difficult to establish points of struggle. However, this hegemony is also supported or aided with coercive instruments, be that state apparatus or feudal power, to subdue possible opposition.

As Gramsci argues, hegemony cannot be attained without a hegemonic class. Hegemonic class could be defined as the class that constructs cohesion and identity within a bloc through propagation of common culture¹⁴⁰. Hence, hegemonic class is the main driving force behind the 'historical blocs', which is "the complex, contradictory and discordant ensemble of the superstructures is the reflection of the ensemble of the social relations of

¹³⁸Cox, *Approaches to World Order*, 98.

¹³⁹Ibid., 99.

¹⁴⁰Ibid., 132.

production”¹⁴¹. A new bloc occurs when “a subordinate class (...) establishes its hegemony over other subordinate groups”¹⁴². However, ascendancy of a new bloc is dependent on the class struggle and crisis. Crisis, which represent the break down or weakening of existing bloc, enables opposition to strongly challenge ideas and forms of production that have become ‘common sense’ in the society, which is the basis of the dominance. Hence, during the crisis different groups struggle for dominance and at the end the successful group might establish hegemony. While class struggle is a continuous process that pose challenge to hegemony, the hegemonic class reproduce hegemony through instating new set of ideas and alliances that legitimize the form of production and social relations. Consequently, the new bloc defines and shapes everything else that emanates as a result of new hegemonic structure (form of political structure, military and police power etc.) until the next crisis¹⁴³. “The struggle is not just an economic struggle but a struggle aimed at the reorganization of the whole complex of social relations of production”¹⁴⁴. The next crisis occurs when hegemonic class was no longer able to reproduce the system and new blocs bid for dominance.

However, it is necessary to recognize that ‘historic bloc’ and hegemony cannot be understood in terms of homogenous class. The crisis is born out of capitalism inner contradictions and struggle is “primarily between capital and labour, but flowing from that, also between different capitals and fractions of the capitalist class”¹⁴⁵. Consequently, working class, in practice, is also divided among itself, which is the function of inability to reach class consciousness. As Holloway and Picotto argues “the outcome of these struggles that the restoration of accumulation, and the new pattern of accumulation relations, will depend”¹⁴⁶. Historic bloc is, then, an alliance of

141Gramsci, *The Gramsci Reader*, 192.

142Cox, *Approaches to World Order*, 132.

143Ibid., 131–33; Gramsci, *The Gramsci Reader*, 189–209.

144Picciotto, “Capital, Crisis and the State,” 120.

145Ibid.

146Ibid.

different capitals and fraction of capital, which could also include some fractions of working class, against other capitals and working classes.

Intellectuals, according to Gramsci, play a key role in construction of historic bloc, thus hegemony. Intellectuals “perform the function of developing and sustaining the mental images, technologies, and organizations which bind together the members of class and of a historic bloc into a common identity”¹⁴⁷. Intellectuals play a mediator role between extreme positions, devise compromises between and ways out of extreme solutions¹⁴⁸. In a way, they help advancement of leading class by incorporating subgroups interest into the leading class interests, or construct a discourse that seemed to incorporate those interest, into universally expressed ideologies. Thus, universally expressed ideologies would be seen as a part of specific class but seems to be satisfying other groups interests¹⁴⁹. Therefore, the dominance of certain groups, and their supported ways of operating and forms of production attains certain legitimacy within a society.

Institutions, consequently, enables universalization of dominant class ideology through embodying ideas in an organizational structure and detaches ideas from the realm of society, while creating an area of expertise and neutrality while holding historical bloc together. Hence, institutions act as nodes of legitimacy of ideologies because they neutralize and universalize ideas. As Cox argues “institutionalization is a means of stabilizing and perpetuating a particular order. Institutions reflect the power relations prevailing at their point of origin and tend, at least initially, to encourage collective images consistent with these power relations”¹⁵⁰. Institutionalization can be realized through establishment of particular organizations, i.e. World Trade Organization and NATO, and through state, which is composed of ministries, police force, military etc. These organizations would oversee and

147Cox, *Approaches to World Order*, 132.

148Gramsci, *The Gramsci Reader*, 206.

149Cox, *Approaches to World Order*, 133.

150Ibid., 99.

implement ideologies arise out of political structures. However, unlike Cox, institutions are not a struggle ground, which could be dominated by various groups and used to alter the structure. They are the result of class struggle and their form and function is determined by it.

While institutionalization and intellectuals are instrumental for the consent of the hegemony, it is also dependent on coercive power in shaping struggle and enforcing institutionalized ideologies. Gramsci distinguishes two levels in understanding coercive power: military level and politico-military. Military level denotes technical capabilities in strict terms: that is which weapons, which technologies, how many soldiers etc. Politico-military level denotes integration of political goals, which could take various forms¹⁵¹. Military level can be determinant on way the force is applied, but it cannot be instrumental by itself. Politico-military level is what directs and give meaning to application of force. In other words, politico-military level determines the ends to be reach with the use of force. Consequently, the two levels are in relation with each other, and appears in variety of combinations. Although, Gramsci restricted his analysis to war between nations (national independence wars to be precise), hence the focus on military, his approach can be expanded to include all coercive tools, like police force and private security firms, because their existence and operations can also be understood in terms of their technical capabilities (e.g. pepper sprays) and to what end they are serving (e.g. control and oppress labour movements). Hence, the form of coercive tools tend to change in terms of material capabilities, ideas and the ends in which they are used to accommodate the constituted production relations and social structures of hegemony.

3.1.1 Hegemony, State and International

Until this point we tried to refrain from limiting Gramsci's approach to historical materialism and his concept of hegemony in order to present

¹⁵¹Gramsci, *The Gramsci Reader*, 207.

foundational ideas and underlying mechanisms of his approach. However, two questions remain; on which level that analysis should be based and what should be the unit of analysis. Hegemony should be understood both in terms of specific territory/-ies and global. Territoriality of hegemony arises due to territoriality of human communities and their relation with the natural environment. Pijl argues, “the community must occupy, however fleetingly and precariously, a space which it claims for itself and which the other community/-ies must acknowledge.”¹⁵² Communities, however, define their territoriality, which could be tribe, neighborhood, city, region, state, etc. and engage in production relation within certain confines of territory. Communities’ relation to their natural environment (their material conditions arising from constraints of natural environment) define both the production relations and social structures, which also includes culture. Such variation on the natural environment is the source the uneven development of communities. Rosenberg, following the work of Eric Wolf, based the point of departure of the source of unevenness in geography, in other words the natural environment that communities settled in. Consequently, the geological and climatic variation results in different forms of human subsistence – such as hunting, pastoral and agricultural – in different places, which gave rise to variety of organizational and cultural structures and behaviors. Thus, communities had developed a variety and different approaches to their environment in terms of practical knowledge of natural processes and the 'new needs' generated by the exploitation of the environment. In the end, different projections of development give rise to different historical lives of communities¹⁵³. Consequently, uneven development results in different and various trajectories of the communities,

152Kees van der Pijl, “Historicising the International: Modes of Foreign Relations and Political Economy,” *Historical Materialism* 18 (2010): 20.

153Justin Rosenberg, “Basic Problems in the Theory of Uneven and Combined Development. Part 2: Unevenness and Political Multiplicity,” *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 23, no. 1 (2010): 36; Justin Rosenberg, “Why Is There No International Historical Sociology?,” *European Journal of International Relations* 12, no. 3 (2006): 313–19.

where communities adopt different modes and forms of the production and social structures.

Yet, human development does not happen in isolation, thus communities enter into relations with each other, which are then separated by their territoriality and structures that arise out of their production relations and definition of self. This gives rise to what Trotsky called as 'combined development'. Green summarizes the point as:

*Trotsky argued that backward countries could assimilate 'all the material and intellectual conquests of the advanced countries'. However, this did not mean that they would attempt to replicate fully all the prior developmental stages of advanced countries. Instead, backward countries would adopt their own historically unique path of development that would proceed in a different order to that experienced by the advanced countries. Backwardness could even accord a sort of 'privilege' to developing countries as they would be able to adopt, almost immediately, the most advanced technologies and machinery, skipping a succession of intermediate stages in the process... Combined development occurs as the backward culture, 'under the whip of external necessity', is induced to 'make leaps'. The resultant 'combination' of different moments of development leads to a 'drawing-together of the different stages of the journey, a combining of the separate steps, an amalgam of archaic with more contemporary forms.'*¹⁵⁴

Uneven and combined development of communities, which occupy a separate defined spaces with varying definitions of self and culture, "enter into foreign relations – relations between communities occupying separate spaces and considering each other outsiders"¹⁵⁵, yet the form of foreign relations is various, multiple and subject to change depending on the structures. "Foreign relations develop within the contradiction between the separate community/ society and the unity of the humanity"¹⁵⁶. Consequently, the form of foreign relations, arising from its inner contradiction, "defines a community's tasks in the field of protection whilst simultaneously requiring it to regulate the exchanges with others, thus sets the limits within which these

154Jeremy Green, "Uneven and Combined Development and the Anglo-German Prelude to World War I," *European Journal of International Relations* 18 (2012): 351.

155Pijl, "Historicising the International: Modes of Foreign Relations and Political Economy," 6.

156Ibid., 25.

relations develop”¹⁵⁷. Therefore, the form could range from hostile encounter between communities (gunboat diplomacy) to more peaceful encounters both institutional (diplomacy, United Nations etc) and non-institutional (trans-national linkages) forms, depending on social and production relations and structures arising from it. For example, capitalist societies likely to establish peaceful relations with each other as compared to pre-capitalist societies, which history shows that the relation is more hostile.

On the point of how communities encounter each other, David Harvey and Alex Callinicos points out different logics of power, where relations are the function of dominance of one logic over another. They believe that the behavior of ‘political’ (the state) is governed by the capitalist and territorial logic of power, which one or the other dominate in certain historical-territorial moment¹⁵⁸. Two separate logics arise from the assumption that capitalist and political leaders operate under different circumstances and have different, at times contradicting interests; for example, as Harvey argues, while capitalists seek individual advantage and responsible to on-one (maybe shareholders), political leaders seek collective advantage and constraint by many factors¹⁵⁹. Two logics of power have differentiable characteristics and have different projections, thus “the relation between these two logics should be seen, therefore, as problematic and often contradictory (that is dialectical) rather than as functional or one-sided”¹⁶⁰. However, different logics of power is based on the idea that the political (the state) represents an autonomous entity from the capital, which could influence capital behavior.

On the other hand, the form of encounter is the reflection of mode of extraction and projections of power that are determined the by the mode of production and how social structures established accordingly. Justin

157Ibid., 26.

158David Harvey, *The New Imperialism* (New York & Oxford: Oxford UP, 2003), 26–33; Alex Callinicos, “Does Capitalism Need the State System?,” *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 20 (2007): 539.

159Harvey, *The New Imperialism*, 27.

160Ibid., 30.

Rosenberg argues that the principle means of extending power externally lay via territorial expansion because of non-differentiation of the public and private in precapitalist societies, thus precapitalist relations were predominantly expansion and collapse of territorial empires¹⁶¹. On the other hand, when the differentiation of the public and private was introduced in capitalist society, “the social relations through which surplus extraction is organized can be extended outwards without political-territorial expansion”¹⁶². Consequently, the way in which hegemony spreads depends and tools on mode of production and the social relations that were brought with it.

Furthermore, state, as an institution, acts as a factor of cohesion in a territorially bounded communities¹⁶³, it is an important form under capitalist mode of production as state (1) enables the separation of economic and politics, thus assumes overt coercive tools for disciplining the society and (2) sustains hegemonic structure through both coercive and consensual means such as education and propagation of nationalism. Poulantzas argues that “the states themselves assume responsibility for the interests of the dominant imperialist capital in its extended development within the 'national' formation”¹⁶⁴. Consequently, the form that state take and its behaviors are the reflection of the form class struggle¹⁶⁵ and therefore sustainer of the hegemonic structure that arise out of the struggle and an agent in making global hegemonic structures.

Consequently, the forms of relations of communities are the reflection of the forms of territorial hegemonic structures and are subject to change depending on modes of production and class struggle as well as the part it

161 Justin Rosenberg, “Globalization Theory: A Post-Mortem,” *International Politics* 42, no. 1 (2005): 42.

162 Ibid.

163 Bob Jessop, “Recent Theories of the Capitalist State,” in *The State: Critical Concepts*, ed. John P. Hall, vol. 1 (London & New York: Routledge, 1994), 83.

164 Nicos Poulantzas, “Internationalization of Capitalist Relations and the Nation-State,” in *The Poulantzas Reader: Marxism, Law and the State*, ed. James Martin (London & New York: Verso, 2008), 245.

165 Ibid., 249.

takes within the global structure. Thus, it is one of the significant institutions within capitalist mode of production in shaping and taking part in territorial and global hegemonies. Burnham argues that “states are an aspect of the social relations of production - a differentiated form of those relations”¹⁶⁶. Thus, they are political nodes or moments in the global flow of capital, whose form is determined by the class struggle.

Furthermore, capitalism, as the mode of production, benefits from territoriality of communities, which part of capital immobilizes itself to give greater flexibility to remaining capital in movement¹⁶⁷. This immobilization in return creates incentives for immobile capital, for example land and property owner, developers and builder etc, to protect and promote local/territorial interests¹⁶⁸. As a result, both capital and labour movements are fragmented, hence, class struggle takes different forms in certain territories. Although, Marx argued that capitalism had a tendency for indefinite expansion, which would increase the scope and volume of transnational relations, and deepens spatio-temporal integration through means of technology, thus yielding a perfect image of itself around the globe¹⁶⁹, Rosenberg argues “at any given historical point, the human world has compromised a variety of societies, of differing sizes, cultural forms and levels of material development”¹⁷⁰. Consequently, although capitalism tend to create similar images of itself in every community, different reflections of the capitalist mode of production and social relations continue to exist even if certain aspects of capitalism is implemented. Therefore, territory is the initial point in understanding establishment of hegemony and the spread as well as in understanding particularities within the class struggle and structures arise from it.

166Peter Burnham, “Globalisation: States, Markets and Class Relations,” *Historical Materialism* 1 (1997): 153.

167David Harvey, *The Limits to Capital*, First (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1982), 419–20.

168Ibid., 420.

169Rosenberg, “Globalization Theory: A Post-Mortem,” 21–2.

170Rosenberg, “Why Is There No International Historical Sociology?,” 313.

Consequently, the state within the capitalist mode of production is useful in understanding territoriality of the relations and mechanisms for spread of capitalist mode of production, its re-generation of itself and establishment of global hegemony through control of communities. States act as limiting and regulator factor in foreign relations, though they cannot restraint all relation between communities, states have capability to severely limit the relations. As Lacher argues “individual states can use their political power to structure international competition... They can use their borders and currencies to mediate the competition between the multitude of individual capitals”¹⁷¹. They are instrumental in allowing flow of capital, while limiting labour movement; hence “[state] 'power' derives from the ability to reorganize labour/capital relations within and often beyond their boundaries”¹⁷². Coercive tools of state is significant for states’ ability to organize labour/capital relations beyond their boundaries, when peaceful ways fail to establish consensual participation in global hegemony; that is adopting certain social and production relations. The use of coercive tools in maintaining global hegemony creates the condition in which “the project of policing a global system of multiple states has generated [an] open-ended militarism which displays to the world a constant threat of war, any time anywhere, with no clear objective or end-game”¹⁷³. Within capitalist societies, state functions as “a means of creating and sustaining the conditions of accumulation at arms length, maintaining the social, legal and administrative order necessary to accumulation”¹⁷⁴. Consequently, territoriality of communities, thus state structures that is dependent on it, enables the construction and existence of local economies, differentiated capitalist and labour class and different forms of class struggle. Territorial state, therefore, acts as an organizing and regulatory

171Hannes Lacher, “Making Sense of the International System: The Promises and Pitfalls of Contemporary Marxist Theories of International Relations,” in *Historical Materialism and Globalization*, ed. Mark Rupert Smith and Hazel Smith (London and New York: Routledge, 2002), 161.

172Burnham, “Globalisation: States, Markets and Class Relations,” 153.

173Ellen Meiksins Wood, “A Reply to Critics,” *Historical Materialism* 15 (2007): 166.

174Wood, “Logics of Power: a Conversation with David Harvey,” 25.

structure/institution for capital both locally by creating compliant labour class, and globally by maintaining compliant regimes/states.

Accordingly, the international system is the function of modes of foreign relations of communities, which is exercised through both institutional and non-institutional structures that are formed in accordance with the modes and forms of production. While inter-state relations, and organizations arising from it, represent the institutional relations between communities and under capitalist mode of production, transnational relations represent the non-institutional relations. In other words, while institutional relations are based on the territoriality of communities, non-institutional relations tend to transcend territoriality and establish relations on shared consciousness of groups. Thus, consensual spread of global hegemony tend to depend on both institutional and non-institutional relations, through construction and spread of shared ideas and meanings. Ideas and ideologies that are created in one community transferred to others with non-institutional relations through intellectuals. However, institutional relations could also facilitate spread of ideas and ideologies, through international organizations (NATO, WTO, IMF, etc.), which also creates its own intellectuals (i.e. experts) provided that the relations are peaceful and open for intellectuals from other communities. On the other hand, formal relations are more involved in antagonistic relations between communities, because antagonist relations between communities tend to minimize informal relations.

While, foreign relations between separate communities enables flow of ideas and spread of particular mode of production, social structure and struggle, the form that struggle and structure take are defined by the particularity of the community. While, territorial hegemony tends to spread to globe through foreign relations and become global, its reflections on different territorial settings shows variance. As Cox argues,

Historically, hegemonies ... are founded by powerful states which have undergone a thorough social and economic revolution. The revolution not only modifies the internal economic and political structures of the state in question

*but also unleashes energies which expand beyond the state's boundaries. A world hegemony is thus in its beginnings an outward expansion on the internal (national) hegemony established by a dominant social class. The economic and social institutions, the culture, the technology associated with this national hegemony become patterns for emulation abroad.*¹⁷⁵

Territorial hegemony/-ies could expand beyond its (or their if simultaneously occurs) territorial confines to other territories to become global. However, even global domination cannot be fully realized. Differences in material conditions and ideas would result in different social structures. Even though mode of production could realize full global domination, certain ideas that support certain mode of production would be dropped to make it more suitable for certain community, thus resulting in competitive and opposing forms and structures. Therefore, communities and their structures shows variance in their adoption of ideas and form of production of global hegemony and different levels of integration, which could potentially lead to opposition to global hegemony.

Even if communities got integrated to global hegemony and emulation have been observed, integration never yields the exact reflection of the global hegemony. Intensification of relations between different communities tend to push development of communities into similar trajectories. However, development is never the same. The mode of production could spread around the world as 'the whip of external necessity' however, the form of the production relations and social structures tend to differ; 'an amalgam of archaic with more contemporary forms'. Different communities adopt aspects of hegemony in a way that they change to fit the conditions and historical experience of the community thereby creating similar at core but different mechanisms of social and production relations. For example, the form that labour/capital relation take in Europe differs greatly from that of China. Another example would be, the difference between healthcare systems in the United States and European states. Consequently, even though capitalist

¹⁷⁵Cox, *Approaches to World Order*, 136–7.

mode of production and social relations arising from it has a dominance around the world, there are differences in forms and relations; thus the ideas and ideologies. Out of those minuscule differences, born different ideas, which yield competition within certain classes and challenges to global hegemony, which reaches its high points and bid for establishing a new historical bloc during times of crisis, which exhausts pillars of incumbent hegemony depends.

Particularities within the territorial hegemonies that depend on the historical experiences and culture of particular people within the territory are the source of possible resistance to global hegemony. Consequently, establishment of global hegemony is dependent on the integration of other territorial hegemonies into global hegemonic structure, which realized through integration of interests of territorial hegemonies into global one and modification of the set of ideas that legitimize the mode of production in certain territorial settings, which enables aligning territorial hegemonies with the core hegemony. As a result, while, the core of the structure shows similarities with the integrated global hegemony, each setting encompasses differences and variety, which is allowed within the global hegemony as long as differences do not evolve into opposition. And any opposition that threatens global hegemony various coercive tools are used in order to discipline the opposition, which could be represented by a state or class within a state.

3.2 Defense and Procurement

Defense procurement is about the forms and means of coercive tools that take shape in accordance with the hegemonic structure. While, defense procurement research is mostly interested in what Gramsci calls as military level, this section seek to point out the relationship between acquired technologies, weapon systems, organization of military and ways it operates

and the hegemonic structure that born out of the relation between ideas, material capabilities and institution (here it is the military). Engels argues:

*Armament, composition, organisation, tactics and strategy depend above all on the stage reached at the time in production and on communications. It is not the "free creations of the mind" {D. Ph. 43} of generals of genius that have had a revolutionising effect here, but the invention of better weapons and the change in the human material, the soldiers.*¹⁷⁶

Although the role of modes and forms of production is significant as Engels argues, it is not the only factor that shapes military level. Resources, ideas and institutions should be inquired in order to get a better sense of types of weapons acquired as well as doctrines and organizational structure. In terms how forms of production effect, Marx argues that production creates consumption immediately "1) by creating the material for it; (2) by determining the manner of consumption; and (3) by creating the products, initially posited by it as objects, in the form of a need felt by the consumer"¹⁷⁷. Thus, in terms of defense production, 'material for consumption' can be viewed as the military technology, which includes raw and composite materials to build an equipment to sub-systems, night vision goggles, IR-sensor etc. In other words, the first instance of arms production is the development of technologies whether there is a defined need or not.

As for the determining the manner of consumption; Marx argues that "the object is not an object in general, but a specific object which must be consumed in a specific manner, to be mediated in its turn by production itself"¹⁷⁸. In Marx's analogy, while the need is the same (hunger), the ways of satisfying the need changes according the products that are available; that is eating cooked meat with a knife and fork is different than eating raw meat with hands. Consequently, waging war with precision strike munitions and drones yields a different type of war and organizational structure as opposed to not having those technologies. On the other hand, the way in which

¹⁷⁶Frederick Engels, *Anti-Dühring. Herr Eugen Dühring's Revolution in Science*, 1947, <http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1877/anti-duhring/ch15.htm>.

¹⁷⁷Marx, *Grundrisse: A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*.

¹⁷⁸ibid.

technology is being used depends on the ideas, culture of the particular institutions and social relations. During the peace time, certain technologies, take hold in particular institutions through construction of doctrines, which justifies and directs the use of certain technologies but not the others. And during the war, development and production of military technology and weapon systems are based on the certain set of ideas that determines the design choices. Consequently, the way wars are fought dependent on what type of military technology took hold in particular institutions, how that institution is organized and how certain design choices are made, which is the reflection of the general structure within a particular state (or community). Although institutions (military as general or specific branches) might resist adoption of certain technologies, due to invested interests of particular bloc within certain hegemonic structure, eventually adoption of new technologies would come through resolution of crisis either through defeat and experienced problems in warfare or new bloc would take hold the production and social structures, thus institution would reflect the change in the society.

The effect of military technology should not be seen as deterministic to doctrine and structure of military and acquired type of weapon systems but one of the areas that struggle takes place. Sociological studies argue that “the introduction of new technology is never simply a question of the best technology being the victor over inferior products, but is always complicated by economic, political and organizational interest”¹⁷⁹. As Theo Farrell and Terry Terriff argues design of particular weapon system is not all about which design is technologically advanced and militarily efficient where the inferior design is eliminated but selection of design is the function of social networks that surround the particular design¹⁸⁰. Consequently, “it is the social process, whereby debate closes around a dominant design, not design efficiency, that

179Moelker Rene, “Technology, Organization and Power,” in *Handbook of the Sociology of the Military*, ed. Giuseppe Caforio (New York: Kluwer Academic / Plenum Publishers, 2003), 386.

180Theo Farrell and Terry Terriff, “The Sources of Military Change,” in *Sources of Military Change: Culture, Politics and Technology*, ed. Theo Farrell and Terry Terriff (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002), 13.

shapes the technological development. In this way, new military technologies are socially constructed”¹⁸¹.

Accordingly, the concept of “better equipment” is also reflection of cultural inclining of particular community that is the reflection of the local and global structures. For example, during the Second World War, Nazi Germany opted for complex designs of weapons systems, believing that more complicated the weapon system better it is. Such belief took root in Wilhelmine Germany that better design and eloquence was the reflection of high quality, which was later adopted by Nazi Germany to showcase the German superiority. Consequently, Tiger Tank exemplified such behavior, which was an excellent tank and technically the best tank of Second World War but because of its complexity, the production level was far less than the allied tanks. On the other hand, Allied countries opted for less complicated weapon systems, which could be produced fast and in vast numbers such as T-34 and Sherman tanks¹⁸².

Tendency to procure certain weapon system is influenced by global and local hegemony and depends on blocs that favor certain relations. Blocs that promote particular design, new technologies and even certain ways of doing arms procurement includes a broad range of actors; including defense firms (both national and foreign), military and political elites, scientist-entrepreneurs and even foreign government seeking both influence upon receiver state and ways of increasing export sales. These actors establish relations in accordance with the form of foreign relations established with the global hegemony. Consequently, we could observe a struggle between dominant bloc and opposing bloc to gain access to defense markets. However, when we dissect the hegemony, although the bloc shares common identity and interest, certain capital compete with each other. Hence, the result of competition is determined by whether or not certain bloc could

181Ibid.

182Chris Wilson, “Blueprints for War,” Documentary, *The Genius of Design* (United Kingdom: BBC, July 6, 2010), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=su9_FEPnsL8.

integrate local production and institutions for its end. That is higher the level of integration between capitals and institutions along different states, higher the likelihood of their product would be sold in particular state.

The final stage, production creates the actual weapon system that states procure. The consumption of the weapon systems occurs when procured systems are included to the inventory of the military rather than the actual use in warfare. Furthermore, the modes of production (i.e pre-industrial, capitalist) and forms of production (i.e. fordism, neo-liberalism) affect global defense production, trade as well as the organization of militaries and ways of fighting. Shaw makes this point more concrete when he says:

Military technology in the first half of the twentieth century required large workforces to produce its weapons, and large quantities of basic raw materials to make them with. Weapons and military vehicles were often similar in kind to non-military commodities (hence conversion from peace to war and war to peace was easier). Now, at the end of the twentieth century, military industries have become capital-intensive, use highly specialised materials and are often producing items of a kind which have little affinity with civilian production. Military industry may still affect the civilian economy, but often by producing distorted reflections of its own requirements rather than creating employment (as in earlier periods).¹⁸³

The way in which defense industry operates is that blocs within the same hegemonic structure compete to sell their products or the idea of a product by altering the institutions' (that is military, procurement agency and Ministry of Defense) understanding of what is needed. Mary Kaldor argues that "the military capabilities of a particular weapons system, which define its role in a particular military unit, reflect the manufacturing capabilities of a particular defense company"¹⁸⁴ So, conflict in this situation is not a necessary factor. The possibility of conflict is a sufficient condition for continuous production and development of weapon systems in parallel to manufacturing capabilities of defense industry. The question of what is needed is the function of ideas rather than 'real' threats. Threats, thus the capabilities that needed to counter

¹⁸³Martin Shaw, *Dialectics of War: An Essay on the Social Theory of Total War and Peace* (Pluto Press, 1988), www.theglobal.ac.uk/press.

¹⁸⁴Mary Kaldor, *The Baroque Arsenal* (London: Andre Deutsch, 1982), 15.

the threat, are socially constructed ideas. Processes seek to align threats and the type of weapons are and would be produced within the hegemonic structure. For example, production of tanks, warships, fighter planes and similar systems need a rival/threat that has or could have similar capabilities. Such as during the Cold War military production was geared toward an ideational, maybe possible, confrontation between two major superpowers, thus development efforts were focused on how to disable each others military forces rather than focusing on how to engage non-state actors. Consequently, in the post-Cold War era, especially after wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, production has shifted to light units such as Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) that could operate in safe air space. Thus, changes in threat perception, either through experience and/or change in the global structure, which could be war or crowd control in the urban terrains that outright threatens the interests of the hegemonic class. Consequently, we sometimes observe that states decide on weapon systems that are not compatible with their particular needs and the military doctrine or defense policy initially, yet decide to procure in belief that they would be useful perceived threats in parallel to hegemonic structure. In such cases, military doctrine is either crafted in accordance to newly gained capability or the new weapon systems cannot be used properly until necessary military doctrine is created, either from inside or outside.

Uneven and combined development could also be seen in militaries. Military technology spreads, as the forms of production and ideas spread, under capitalism as hegemonic bloc bid for global hegemony. As other states become part of global hegemony, they coordinate their coercive structures with those of hegemon. Thus, technologically less developed nations could acquire and assimilate military technology and doctrines from hegemonic states. However, despite acquiring and assimilating technology and doctrine from other states, there will always be an uneven development along military structures and production as long as the receiver state accepts its role in the

division of labor, both in terms of global economy and military level; it would not transcend the ideas of the hegemony and continue to operate under the constructed framework believing that it is the best they could do. This would put receiver states always in pursuit of the developed state(s). We should not see this continuous uneven development as separated from particular state's form of production and social relations.

Thus, spread of military technology and doctrines are predominantly realized through foreign relations between states. Foreign governments try to alter the 'common sense' of receiver state mostly through alliance organizations, where hegemony creates its own intellectuals to carry the message in their respective states. Shifting the receiver state's idea of what is needed lies within the shaping of the military doctrine.

At this point, we reach a difference between mechanisms at play depending on the material capabilities of the states. While developed states with highly capable defense industries, resources, number of defense firms and capabilities play a more determinant factor in its relation the military doctrines. In other words, military doctrine of developed states, depends on what they can produce. On the other hand, developing and less developed states, which have limited material capabilities and limited/no defense industry, depend on developed states to acquire military technology. Hence, what type of weapon system that these state procure is mostly dependent on their ideas about military effectiveness and threat, thus which type of weapon system could meet those threats. At this point, we should note that while local bloc in strong states, which have developed arms industry and have established global hegemony, craft military doctrine and what is needed to reach the goals of the doctrine in relation with local structures, the same rule does not apply to developing and small states. As Kjell Inga Bjerga and Torunn Laugen Haaland argues:

The first is that small countries have limited freedom to develop a separate way of thinking about the use of their military forces. Their dependence on allies and international institutions precludes any such attempts. Second,

*small states also have constricted institutional capacity to develop their own military thinking and doctrines. Their research capacity is limited, and their military academies are relatively small with only rudimentary competence in many fields... small countries' doctrines will be heavily influenced by the thinking taking place in major powers; only to a limited extent will they address particular national security concerns.*¹⁸⁵

From this point, we can draw some conclusions on how receiver state develops its approach to arms procurement. First, effects of military doctrine lie within what would be done and what would be expected of the weapon system which determine the particular characteristics of weapon system to be procured. The effect of military doctrine on determining the supplier is higher for the countries that are entrenched in military alliances, like NATO, than countries, which could stand outside of such arrangements or have the ability to realize their particularity. As the level of integration to hegemonic structure, control is realized through the idea of compatibility and ability to communicate with other allied militaries. In addition, military and security alliances use means like joint procurement agencies and joint procurement programs in determining the supplier of the weapon system by entrenching state to the system and limiting its options. Furthermore, significant changes in military doctrine within the alliance, like Network Centric Warfare, in itself determines a different type of need, which can only be supplied by particular states and with particular systems.

Yet, we need to point out that the form of the defense market is also shaped by the forms of production and the characteristics of hegemonic structure. Consequently, the transformation in production and hegemonic structure could shape the way in which control is sustained. For example, during the Cold War era military relations were more direct as the world had been separated into contending blocs, thus receiver states were firmly integrated to the hegemonic centers. On the other hand, post-Cold War era had opened and widened cooperation and possible suppliers in defense market. Yet, the

185Kjell Inge Bjerga and Torunn Haaland Haaland, "Development of Military Doctrine: The Particular Case of Small State," *Journal of Strategic Studies* 33 (2010): 506.

control and influence remain intact but the form changes. In other words, the threats and military doctrine continued to be influenced but through more indirect ways. Therefore, defense market and defense relations transform in parallel to general structure and adopt control and influence mechanisms that are reflection of the characteristics structure.

Second, developing states seek to emulate other militaries; generally the militaries that they perceived to be ally or have higher prestige, which is constructed through links between intellectuals in different states. In other words, emulation of certain military organizations is the function of global hegemony; that is the belief that certain ways of doing things are better. While emulation of coercive forms have always been there, as communities adopt other communities' ways of doing things as they engage with each other; within the capitalist mode of production, global hegemony seeks to create military institutions that share the similar outlook and similar equipments. Because, as mentioned before, capitalism has distinctive drive for homogeneity in terms of modes and forms of production and social structure so that accumulation could be done globally. Consequently, as Farrell and Terriff argue "Military emulation has a more pervasive and profound impact on military practice in developing states"¹⁸⁶. Consequently, developing states seek to buy weapon systems that are in use of the military they are seeking to emulate. For example, "the F-20 export fighter program, which was intended to provide low-cost, high reliability jet fighter designed specifically to meet the needs of newly industrialized countries"¹⁸⁷ failed to find buyers due to "it lacked the legitimating imprimature of USAF ownership"¹⁸⁸.

¹⁸⁶Farrell and Terriff, "The Sources of Military Change," 9.

¹⁸⁷Dana P. Eyre and Mark C. Suchman, "Status, Norms, and the Proliferation of Conventional Weapons: An Institutional Theory Approach.," in *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics*, ed. Peter J. Katzenstein (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 93.

¹⁸⁸Ibid.

On the other hand, spread of military technology and emulation of other militaries do not create similar military structures around the globe, even if states share similar doctrines due to being part of global hegemony. As mentioned before, this is due to what Trotsky calls as uneven and combined development. Although states acquire certain technologies and conceptual/doctrines from other states, their structure – material conditions, social structures and historical experience – is different than each other and also their relation to the environment that these societies live in. Consequently, even if the doctrines and technologies are transferred from hegemonic state, we observe variance and particularities in application of technologies and military structures. However, we should not forget that global hegemony only allows certain flexibility in terms of differences and peculiarities of military structures. As long as the states are part of the global hegemony, which do not pose an opposition and it act according to division of labor, they are allowed to be different, or have their own niche markets in global defense production. As mentioned before, variance and particularity, or in other words different trajectories of development of military structures could only arise as an opposing bloc if those peculiarities lead to different modes of production and social structures. Consequently, global hegemony seeks to control these differences and particularities through various means and this is why defense procurement issues are reflection of the level of integration between global hegemony and local hegemony.

For example, within the Cold War structure both military/economic aids and grants are a way to establish a foothold and control receiver states, which in time shape the 'common sense' and create a some kind of a product loyalty that is the shared understanding of defense and military issues. In this case, receiver states demand weapon systems from the particular supplier and no other. While organizational preference could not be diminished to one particular firm, it can be observable on the orientation towards buying certain systems from one particular state. In addition, depending the level of dominance, during the Cold War certain receiver states even refuse to

develop their own defense industry capabilities because it accepts the world view presented by the global hegemon and accepts global hegemony's interest as its own.

However, in order for above processes to happen, foreign relations play a critical role in opening the doors for influence. At the very basic level, foreign relations determines which states can be supplier and which cannot be because arms procurement is not merely buying a weapon system, but also way to deepen the relations between two states both in terms of institutional and non-institutional. One cannot establish defense relations, where foreign relations are conflictual. This limits the receiver state's options, if not in terms of number of firms, but the number of state, which increases the influence over the receiver. If the receiver has to buy from a restricted group of suppliers, it has to comply what supplier states ask from them, hence rendering receiver's bargaining power to minimum. This could turn into a vicious cycle, as the receiver increasingly dependent on a group of suppliers, which in return increases hegemonic bloc's influence, rendering increasing dependency and limiting of receiver choices. On the other hand, if receiver is not restricted to a particular group of supplier states, then receiver has more bargaining power over suppliers and influence over the receiver would be minimum. Yet, dependency is the function of how much a certain state is embedded in hegemonic structure. Consequently, it is difficult to talk about shifts in state's procurement behaviors without considering its relation to the hegemony.

However, receiver state could have some level of flexibility and this flexibility could be used in as a tool for foreign relations, thus force other suppliers to concede some of the terms of the receiver state, for example persuading others to invest in receiver state's material capabilities. In these type of cases, weapon systems may have no particular place in the military doctrine, or in general defense posture of the state, but it has been procured to signal other states; for example procurement of refueling tanker plane just to prove

that state does not need its neighbors airspace to conduct air operations in distant places.

Consequently, decision to develop and support local industrial base also is either taken as an opposition to the established hegemony or the global hegemony allows construction of such industrial base in order to keep other state within its bloc. However, these are again should be seen in relation to the forms of productions. Thus, the spread and investment of local defense industrial base around the globe, coincides with the change of form of production in developed states. Shift towards post-fordist form of production and neoliberalism, which have intensified sub-contracting and spread of production facilities in around the globe enabled the establishment of local defense industrial bases, which would in reality support hegemonic production. In other words, Fordist form of production, which has all the capacity to build the product within one production site, translates into direct sale of weapons. On the other hand, the post-Fordist form of production, with increasing rate of outsourcing, enables development of local defense industries in receiver states, as the developed states' defense firms find the opportunity to outsource some of the production, hence decreasing the cost and increasing their accumulation. Consequently, we observe that foreign firms that integrates local firms to global hegemonic structure are more likely to be chosen in procurement. Increasing integration of user's defense firms to the supply chain of international firms, increases the likelihood of selection of those particular firms in procurement decisions. As a gain for the firms that operates internationally, they could lower their production costs, use their partnership with the domestic firms to sell systems in other states via using the relationship between buyer state and supplier state. Furthermore, such relationship between firms, increases the likelihood of future sales, but also increases the influence of hegemonic state over the receiver states, as long as the receiver's firms depend on foreign firms for technology transfer and trade relations. Consequently, such arrangements prejudices the

procurement decisions by nesting interests with particular group of suppliers. Hence, such is the new form of control in the neoliberal era.

Yet, defense production, as capitalism in general, has its own contradictions, thus crises arising out of these contradictions. The major contradiction arises out of the competition between perceived offensive and defensive military technologies, which in return increases the cost of weapon system incredibly and in return decreases the utility in war. As Engels puts it “competitive struggle between armour-plating [defensive] and guns [offensive], the warship is being developed to a pitch of perfection which is making it both outrageously costly and unusable in war”¹⁸⁹. Consequently, as soon as the new weapon system developed and produced, it has to undergo series of upgrades to meet the challenge of threats posed to particular weapon system. In the end, the use of that system would not make any sense. Mary Kaldor also points out the similar point by arguing that “baroque technical change consists of largely improvements to a given set of 'performance characteristics’”¹⁹⁰. Accordingly, improvement in performance begets other set of improvements that would also reflect upon other weapon system families, which would result in increasing effort on smaller improvements in military effectiveness¹⁹¹.

Furthermore, this competition and defense capitals’ drive for more accumulation would reach to a point where societies would not able to fund such endeavor. According to Engels, this would bring “like every other historical phenomenon, is being brought to its doom in consequence of its own development”¹⁹². However, defense production has found the way to escape from its own contradiction through technology. First, incremental improvements in performance –in terms of firepower, protection, mobility, communications and intelligence– could, at times could lead to significant

189Engels, *Anti-Dühring. Herr Eugen Dühring's Revolution in Science*.

190Kaldor, *The Baroque Arsenal*, 19.

191Ibid., 20–23.

192Engels, *Anti-Dühring. Herr Eugen Dühring's Revolution in Science*.

change in the way military fight¹⁹³. Second, certain technologies, disruptive technologies, could nullify the utility of previous systems and knowledge to produce them, as disruptive technologies open a new wave of production cycle that resets accumulated problems of previous cycle and inventing new ways of fighting. For example, unusable warships that Engels points out, most famously known as Dreadnoughts, were replaced by aircraft carriers in during the inter-war period and since then naval warfare has been shaped around these platforms. Yet, utility of aircraft carriers in the contemporary world have become questionable since their cost is so high that losing one would be a disaster, which in return affects their use in war theaters.

Furthermore, defense production is also affected by the crises of capitalism and takes the reinvented form of capital production as it reinvents itself after every crisis. With every crisis, capitalism constructs a different form of thinking that justifies continuation of the system by other means. In other words, every crisis creates an opportunity for a new hegemony to arise with its own new set of ideas and forms of production. Although defense production can be seen as relatively protected from crisis of capitalism (crises that civilian industries experience), crises affects the whole structure, and therefore, whole system so we cannot differentiate civilian and defense, though defense industry and market work rather differently, as being more integrated to political structure, but still affected by the mode of thinking that crises creates new ways that capitalism develops in exploitation. For example post-Fordist production and neoliberalism that increased the flexible working and sub-contracting is one them. So even if defense industry, which was seen different and more apparent relationship with the state, its form is also influenced and shaped by the changing capitalist form of production and new hegemony that brings its own values on efficiency, quality and profitability.

193Barry Buzan and Eric Herring, *The Arms Dynamic in World Politics* (Boulder & London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998), 10–20.

In the end, defense procurement is the reflection of the global and local hegemonic structures that have certain set of ideas on the concept of design, force structure, doctrine, threats and way of fighting. As the structures tend to transform, the form that military takes transforms in parallel. Thus, defense is inherently linked to the structures. In the following chapters, we will examine Turkish defense procurement in parallel to global and local hegemonic structures and how relations between structures reflect at the outcomes.

CHAPTER 4

HEGEMONY IN MAKING: 1923-1945

This chapter will deal with the interaction between international structure and structure in Turkey and how this interaction shape defense procurement behavior of Turkey between 1923 and 1945. The first section will deal with the crisis and struggle within the international structure and the arise of rival blocs and their characteristics. The inter-war years are characterized by the search for re-establishment of pre-war order, when the pillars that supported the pre-war order were destroyed during the First World War. Furthermore, post-World War environment was very different than the pre-war environment. Many empires were dissolved due to the war, new nation-states have emerged. Production and commercial relations have been hampered. The hegemonic leader of the old order, the United Kingdom, have been exhausted, both in terms of its economy and military. In addition, the new environment had a new but a shy actor: the United States, which would rise as a creditor and the supported of old order, however, lacked necessary willingness to expand and sustain hegemony.

Despite the economic boom in the 1920s and the hopes that old order can be established, the farce has ended with the great depression of 1929 that started in the United States spread across to Europe. The crisis of post-World War capitalist accumulation and shattering of the old order created a vacuum for alternative bids for hegemony to arise. The old order was left and world started to experiment with three alternatives: Economic Autarky-

Fascism, Communist Autarky and Social Democracy/New Deal. Consequently, inter-war years were years of capitalist crisis and bid for hegemony, which was resolved through Second World War.

However, inter-wars years cannot be understood by looking at the power struggle between different states. These years were also defined by the transformation of form of production and social relations. During these years, world have been introduced to the Fordist form of production, where corporations gathered the every aspect of the production under one big roof. Furthermore, corporations have projected their influence over various geographies through direct investment and acquisitions; hence multi-national corporations began to rise. Yet, these transformations were not enough to shape the form that next hegemonic structure would take and it would be concluded by Second World War.

In the second section, structure in Turkey will be dealt in elaborate fashion with an aim to show how hegemonic structure in Turkey was established and how hegemonic bloc interacted with the rival blocs for establishing international hegemony. While international hegemonic struggle was under way, a different type of hegemonic structure was being established in Turkey. The founder of the new Republic of Turkey was building a country that was devastated by Balkan Wars, First World War and finally the War of Independence. Turkey, after winning its independence, had nothing to build upon. Consequently, the founders initiated efforts, which also had connections to its Ottoman past, to transform production and social relations that transformed the society. Republicanism, nationalism, populism, secularism, statism and revolutionism defined the pillars of Kemalist hegemony that was in making. The process involved use of coercion and bids to create consent through inclusion of contradictory interest of different groups, which also reflected in the behaviors. This period also was characterized by Turkey's search for its place within the European and world order. The struggle of global hegemony both helped and hampered attempts

in Turkey to transform its society into a capitalist society. Turkey utilized that struggle both in terms of transformation of its economy and society and pursuing foreign policy goals. On the other hand, economic crisis severely restricted industrial development of Turkey and especially during the Second World War, Turkey struggled to stay out of the war. Although it managed to stay out of the war, Turkey ended up straining relations with the victors.

Third section aims to present how interaction between international and domestic structures reflected in defense procurement decision. Defense relations also reflected the spirit of the time. While the 1920s started with the mood of peace and disarmament, which was signified with Washington Naval Conference, intensified rivalry also affected developments towards disarmament. Although, Second London Naval Treaty brought restrictions on naval forces, the 1930s was the period of re-armament. The re-armament initiated by the rival blocs to the old order, led by Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy. They were followed by Soviet Union and reluctantly by France and the United Kingdom.

During this period, Turkey, which is also focused on the preservation of its independence sought to strengthen its military. Two initiatives were taken during the 1920s and 1930s. First, initial steps have been taken to establish national defense industry, which would be followed in tandem with general industrialization of the country. Second, short and medium term needs for the defense of the country would be supplied by outside sources until investments in national defense industries would yield its fruits. Consequently, during these periods we observe that Turkey acquired its weapon systems from various sources, which showed similarities with Turkey's foreign and economic relations with other states.

Ottoman legacy on the military was also important during this period. Despite being a new state, Turkish military officers had been socialized within the experiences of the Ottoman Empire and various different foreign military traditions, which the German military tradition in the late periods become

more dominant. Yet, Turkish military tradition was an amalgam of different foreign traditions that were fused with characteristics of Turkish society and Ottoman experiences. Consequently, in the absence of a dominant global hegemony, Turkey sought to continue its amalgam of military traditions, which could be observed in Turkey's attempts to create an indigenous approach to defense and war and multiple foreign experts and weapon suppliers. In the end, Turkish defense procurement was defined by Turkey's balancing acts within the period as rival powers struggle for international hegemony and Turkey's own attempts to establish a new hegemony within.

4.1 International Structure

4.1.1 Return to Old Order with New Dynamics

After the First World War, both businesspersons and governments believed that pre-war economic system could be re-established and they could continue to operate and prosper during the days before 1914¹⁹⁴. Despite the setbacks and uneven development in early-1920s, –for example Germany and newly established states spend the 1920 to recover¹⁹⁵– European economy seemed to be recovered by 1924¹⁹⁶. Economic recovery of allied powers were faster than those of Axis powers and newly established states, which had to rebuild their economies from nothing. While allied powers, even Belgium and France which experienced the most destruction, embarked upon rapid expansion of their economies. Even though the volume of economic activities reached pre-war levels shortly after the end of the First World War, economic progress in Western Europe was hit by sharp

194Eric Hobsbawm, *The Age of Extremes: A History of the World, 1914-1991* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1994), 89.

195Albert Carreras, "The Twentieth Century - from Break with the Past to Prosperity (II): The Great Stages," in *An Economic History of Europe: From Expansion to Development*, ed. Antonio Di Vittorio (London & New York: Routledge, 2006), 295.

196Jeffry A. Frieden, *Global Capitalism: Its Fall and Rise the Twentieth Century* (New York & London: W.W. Norton & Company, 2006), 139.

recession in 1920 and 1921. But, European states were able to level of its consequences by 1922. Although, Germany and other newly established states were struggling in the early-1920s mostly due to burdens worked by the allied powers –especially France’s insistence on keeping Germany weak. In the end, European states during 1920 sought the establish the old economic structure.

To this end, restoring of the gold standard and pre-war international trade system were primary. European monetary conferences for the restoration of gold standard, Brussels in 1920 and Genoa in 1922, received significant support and slowly states started to return to gold standard. Germany returned to gold standard in 1924, followed by the United Kingdom in 1925, Italy in 1927 and France in 1928¹⁹⁷. On the other hand, restoring free trade regime proved to be difficult as many governments had imposed trade barriers at some levels, even the United Kingdom had retained some of the trade barriers that it imposed during the war, despite the fact that it prospered by sustainment of laissez-faire before the war. Furthermore, newly established states in Central and Easter Europe were more protectionist¹⁹⁸. However, despite protectionist tendencies of post-war governments, as Frieden says “an orgy of outward looking international economic activity erupted”¹⁹⁹. Between 1925 and 1929, Europe reached 8.5 per cent growth, exports were doubled compared to pre-war levels and the rate of international investment was on par with the heydays of the early twentieth century²⁰⁰.

However, the “twenties roar” was a precarious boom that depended highly on credits, investment and market of the United States without the structural support of the previous epoch. This set the stage for a major crisis. The First

197Carreras, “The Twentieth Century - from Break with the Past to Prosperity (II): The Great Stages,” 298; Frieden, *Global Capitalism: Its Fall and Rise the Twentieth Century*, 139.

198Frieden, *Global Capitalism: Its Fall and Rise the Twentieth Century*, 139.

199Ibid., 140.

200Ibid.; Carreras, “The Twentieth Century - from Break with the Past to Prosperity (II): The Great Stages,” 297.

World War had dire effects on belligerents and left Europe devastated. During the war, belligerent parties turned inwards and oriented their economies towards war, which hampered their trade within the global system. Especially, Germany was cut off from its oceangoing trade due to British naval blockade and ceased to play any significant role within the world trade. On the other side, Allied Power's need for raw material, food and inputs for war material had risen to the extent that they liquidated existing capital and manufactured goods, investments and reserves; hence started to borrow from the United States. While the United Kingdom's international economic leadership slipped away, the United States had transformed from world's biggest debtor to its biggest lender from 1914 to 1919²⁰¹. Consequently, post-war reconstruction of the Europe was possible as long as the United States provided financial, commercial and diplomatic leadership.

The problem with the dependence on the United States for the sustainment of the system was that the United States was not ready to assume what the United Kingdom had been doing until the war. The United States neither had necessary structures to support nor had the willingness for such a role. "In the 1920s, the Federal Reserve System, established only in 1913, was still a loose and inexperienced body incapable of exercising with minimal effectiveness even its domestic functions"²⁰². While the Federal Reserve Bank of New York and its close international bankers in Wall Street, who coordinated their efforts in global economic affairs, were "remained entirely subordinated to London both organizationally and intellectually"²⁰³, London's attempts to recover its pre-1914 role have failed. Furthermore, the structure of American economy was different than the British economy. It was "less dependent on foreign commerce and much less integrated into the world economy, protectionist-inclined ... fluctuating much more vividly in its booms

201Frieden, *Global Capitalism: Its Fall and Rise the Twentieth Century*, 129–32.

202Giovanni Arrighi, *The Long Twentieth Century: Money, Power and the Origins of Our Times*, Updated (London & New York: Verso, 2010), 280.

203Ibid., 281.

and busts”²⁰⁴. Kennedy, therefore argues that given the situation of US economy and how it is managed, “the international financial and commercial system revolved around a volatile and flawed central point”²⁰⁵.

Furthermore, the United States was not willing to play the international role of stabilizer and maintainer of the classical liberal structure as the United Kingdom did. While the United States was influential in peace dealings in the post-war environment, the isolationist tendencies defined the United States' role at the international arena. While Wall Street, many farmers and some of the country's leading industries were involved in international economic relations, the significant part of the American industry was concerned about the domestic market; hence they remained protectionist²⁰⁶. Furthermore, as Hobsbawm argues “the USA did not need the world, because after the First World War it needed to import less capital, labour [the United States decided to restrict the immigration in 1919 by implementing quotas, which used to be free²⁰⁷] and (relatively speaking) fewer commodities than ever – except for some raw materials”²⁰⁸. Consequently, despite the willingness to play an international role, the United States chose to isolate itself from the international arena as the Congress prohibited the U.S. administration to officially involved in international discussion of economic issues, did not ratified Versailles Treaty and refused to join League of Nations. In the end, as Hobsbawm says “the USA did not bother to act as a global stabilizer”²⁰⁹.

The problem with the 1920s economic system cannot be solely understood by the US isolationism. European affairs during the 1920s were another significant source of problem. In addition to appearance of new European

204Paul Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000* (New York: Random House, 1987), 282.

205Ibid.

206Frieden, *Global Capitalism: Its Fall and Rise the Twentieth Century*, 147.

207Carreras, “The Twentieth Century - from Break with the Past to Prosperity (II): The Great Stages,” 299.

208Hobsbawm, *The Age of Extremes: A History of the World, 1914-1991*, 99–100.

209Ibid., 99.

states, which sought to develop their economies through protectionist means, the war had created deep antagonism between states and people. Frieden defines post-war Europe as:

Those who characterized the interwar period as one pan-European civil war were also optimistic, as it became a global war before it abated. Countries that had been allies became bitter enemies. Parties and classes that had worked together embarked on murderous crusades against one another. Nations and ethnic groups that had grown closer as the world economy tied them together found unimaginable ways to rid themselves of one another. Polarization at home fed antagonism abroad, and international conflict led to domestic extremism.²¹⁰

In the post-World War era, none of the would-be-hegemony were able to construct a project that would incorporate interests of many, there by pacify any kind of opposition via integration. The early manifestation of antagonism was the Treaty of Versailles in 1919, which was imposed heavy conditions on Germany in terms of territorial, economic and military. Economically strained and considerably indebted Allied Powers, required Germany –and other axis powers– to pay “astronomical sums to compensate for the economic damage that they had suffered”²¹¹. Allies, especially France, that dependent on German reparations to build up their economies, included clauses such as immediate payment of \$5 billion in cash or in kind, France was to receive large quantities of coal for destroyed mines in east France and the United Kingdom seized much of German merchant fleet²¹². The total amount of reparations were not decided at the time of signing of the treaty. When it was decided in 1921, the amount was fantastic: 132 billion (thousand million) Gold Marks²¹³. When confronted by Germany’s inability to make payments, France occupied the rich west German mineral ore deposits to recover payments in kind, which German government resisted by urging people not to work and made payments by printing more money. This lead to

210Frieden, *Global Capitalism: Its Fall and Rise the Twentieth Century*, 128.

211Carreras, “The Twentieth Century - from Break with the Past to Prosperity (II): The Great Stages,” 296.

212Henry Kissinger, *Diplomacy* (New York & London: Simon & Schuster, 1994), 240.

213Hobsbawm, *The Age of Extremes: A History of the World, 1914-1991*, 98.

hyperinflation and brought about downward spiral of the German economy. Money ceased to be used for trading and barter became the main mode of trading. European reconstruction, which was dependent on Germany's ability to pay reparations, could be sustained when the United States involved in restructuring the reparations via linking it to that of allied debts to the United States. Hence, Following the Dawes Plan in 1924, which fixed a real sum for Germany to pay annually and enabled Germany to receive credit from the United States, European economy reached a relative stability. Furthermore, France – and those who wanted to keep Germany weak – insisted on reparations to be paid in cash rather than “goods out of current production, or at least out of the income from German exports, since this would have strengthened the German economy against its competitors”²¹⁴. Consequently, Germany, with the opening of US credit, heavily borrowed and became dependent on credit rather than expanding its exports. Thus, Germany ability to pay reparations and sustainment of its economy as well as European economic stability continued as long as the United States was able to lend²¹⁵.

France's insistence on keeping Germany weak went beyond the economically hampering Germany. In military area, the Treaty required Germany reduce its military to 100,000 volunteers, its navy to six cruisers and a few smaller vessels. It was forbidden to acquire offensive weapons and its General Staff was dissolved²¹⁶. Many German officers found jobs in other countries such as Turkey. Furthermore, France sought to establish security relations with the United States and the United Kingdom in particular as well as creating a European Federation to control Germany²¹⁷. When the United States did not ratified the Treaty of Versailles, France turned towards the United Kingdom. Although, the United Kingdom provided security assurances to France, the British government did not want to make binding agreement

214Ibid., 99.

215Ibid.

216Kissinger, *Diplomacy*, 239.

217See Dilek Barlas and Serhat Güvenç, “Turkey and the Idea of Regional Integration in Europe: The Interwar Experience, 1923-1939,” 10, 589–595.

with France during the 1920s. Hence, France's constant search for security and keeping Germany weak strained relations with the United Kingdom and allies had disagreements on issues concerning Germany²¹⁸.

At the end of the day, this situation affected the system in a more fundamental way; consensus that made the old system worked had disappeared. John Maynard Keynes argued that the stability of classical gold standard relied on strong support from France and Germany and smaller European nations, despite the United Kingdom was the leader. In times of crisis of the gold standard, each of the participants of the system helped in stabilizing and the continuation of the system because all benefitted from the established system²¹⁹. Consequently, as Keynes argued that return to old order without restoration of Germany's economy cannot be possible²²⁰. However, consent and cooperation that had kept the classical gold standard and *laissez-faire* system were absent in the 1920s. As mentioned before, the United Kingdom was weak to discipline others into behaving for the benefit of the system and the United States did not see any stake in sustaining a system that was not theirs. Furthermore, an alternative system had already been on the scene: Soviet Communism, which will be dealt later. Even though Germany, during the 1920s, behaved as the Allies wanted, it has already been planning to challenge to system. As a consequence, during the "twenties roar" states frequently pitched into monetary wars with each other and erected protectionist barriers for trade. The system was maintained as long as the United States was able to provide credit. In the end, dream of returning to old system has ended with the Great Depression.

4.1.2 Rise of Alternatives and Struggle for Hegemony

218Kissinger, *Diplomacy*, 246–65.

219Frieden, *Global Capitalism: Its Fall and Rise the Twentieth Century*, 142.

220Hobsbawm, *The Age of Extremes: A History of the World, 1914-1991*, 99.

The Great Depression of 1929 has initiated the struggle for new hegemony in the World. Although, the conditions for the new structure has already been underway before the First World War, it was the beginning of the end for the *laissez-faire* and gold standard. The Great Depression was the catalytic event that unleashed the forces of change by destroying remains – especially intellectual basis of the old order thus, marked the end of the British hegemony. The world has entered into a struggle, where three alternatives sought to dominate and concluded with the Second World War.

European economic reconstruction and the 1920s boom was also initiated the events towards the Great Depression. Economies outside Europe experienced a significant increase in their agricultural capacities and produce the traditional manufactures of the European industry during the First World War. Because, European mobilization withdraw many peasants and workers from production, factories were shifted towards military production and war has devastated once fertile land. Consequently, products of these economies have replaced in the markets what used to be European products. However, as the European economies revived with the help of credit from the United States, a problem of overproduction has emerged because production capacities of non-European countries had increased significantly. Non-European economies had to compete with European production in agriculture and manufacture –though increasing tariff protection helped non-European manufacture products. Structural deflation had occurred, while markets were flooded with excessive supply, demand were decreasing, thus causing suppliers to become helpless in sustaining prices²²¹. States that were dependent on agricultural products got hit by the decrease of prices and the economies of major European and non-European states slowly fell into recession in 1928.

As the European and other major economies fell into recession, the United States continued to enjoy economic growth. Thus, American capital started to

221Carreras, “The Twentieth Century - from Break with the Past to Prosperity (II): The Great Stages,” 298–9.

come back to the United States because the investment in other economies less attractive. Flight of American capital exacerbated the situation in economies of Europe, which were dependent on American credit, because credit started to dry out. Frieden points this situation as “in the first half of 1928 new American lending to foreigners averaged \$140 million a month. This declined by half to \$70 million between mid-1928 and mid-1929”²²². Capital that were withdrawn from the Europe and other economies were started to build in stock markets.

While the rest of the world entered into a serious economic crisis, the stock market in the United States entered into a phase that was more speculative with the belief that the economic growth would continue²²³. However, due to protectionist policies and flight of American capital, the disparity between the American market and European markets increased and resulted in decrease in trade between the United States and Europe. American firms, then, turned into domestic economy, saturating the market with goods, which in the end slowed down the economic growth. Slowing down of the United States’ economy ran counter to expectations, thus resulted in a rush of sales on the New York stock exchange at the end of October 1929 –Black Friday and Black Tuesday.

The impact of crisis multiplied by two factors: the credit in the stock market and the management of the crisis. The money that was invested through buying stocks were on credit, which was mainly supplied by banks. When the insolvency problem occurred, banks responded by reclaiming credits, some of which they would not normally recall because everyone wanted to sell and nobody wanted to buy stocks. Thus, reclaiming of credit went all directions to all customers, which included European banks, enterprises and administrations. Hence, European economies that were heavily dependent on the American credit felt the blow of the stock market crash.

²²²Frieden, *Global Capitalism: Its Fall and Rise the Twentieth Century*, 174.

²²³Carreras, “The Twentieth Century - from Break with the Past to Prosperity (II): The Great Stages,” 300.

As for the management of the crisis, the United States and other industrial governments acted in accordance with the wisdom of pre-war order: the recession would correct itself so they did not intervene to the situation. The Federal Reserve used monetary tools to impose austerity with the belief that “the crisis affected marginal enterprises that had been overrated and banks that had taken excessive risks”²²⁴. Consequently, assets had been liquidated with the belief that liquidation would force prices and wages to decrease and excess would be taken out of the economy, which would initiate the economic recovery as happened before. However, results were worse than expected. Because, another destructive mechanism was in motion during as the stock market crisis turned into global crisis.

While previous order was dependent on free trade, the Great Depression increased protectionist behaviors. The United States, unable to reach the desired effects of liquidation, turned inwards and responded to the situation by substantially increasing trade barriers by introducing the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act in 1930. What was important at this point was that the bill was introduced despite pleas from foreign trade partners and a petition from 1,028 American economists²²⁵. As mentioned above, while some parts of the American bourgeoisie integrated to international trade, the substantial part was more concerned about the domestic economy and they were not really interested in international trade, which would have caused the introduction of high trade barriers. Consequently, other countries responded in raising their tariffs against American products and the countries turned inwards as the trade wars increased between them, which also marked a new trend in international economics.

The Great Depression, as Frieden puts it “was unprecedented in its depth and breadth”²²⁶, which can be seen by looking at the level of decrease in global production, trade and increase in unemployment would give an idea

224Ibid.

225Frieden, *Global Capitalism: Its Fall and Rise the Twentieth Century*, 177.

226Ibid., 173.

about the breath and depth of the crisis. Industrial production in the United States fell by about a third from 1929 to 1931 and similar decrease was observed in Germany²²⁷. Economy of the United Kingdom was also took a downturn taking the Scandinavian and Baltic countries, which were in its commercial orbit²²⁸. World trade have fell by 60 per cent between 1929 to 1933. Unemployment increased in drastically reaching the levels of 22-23 per cent in the United Kingdom and Belgium, 24 per cent in Sweden, 27 per cent in the United States, 29 per cent in Austria, 31 per cent in Norway, 32 per cent in Denmark and no less than 44 per cent in Germany at the worst period of the depression (1932-33)²²⁹. States that dependent on agriculture took an incredible hit as the prices for wheat and rice plummeted.

The effect of the Great Depression was more than just economic indicators, but it marked the end of the lassies-faire economy and, as Hobsbawn says, “the Great Slump destroyed economic liberalism for half a century”²³⁰. In other words, the Great Depression destroyed the ideal and material basis of the pre-war hegemony, thus created an environment that different parties would bid for hegemony. Hobsbawn argues “the Great Slump confirmed intellectuals, activists and ordinary citizens in the belief that something was fundamentally wrong with the world they lived in”²³¹. Classical liberalism and the United Kingdom was collapsed because of the absence of any solutions with in the framework of classical economy to the problems that were posed by the Great Depression and the United Kingdom’s weakened position as the sustainer of the hegemony.

Consequently, a new form of capitalism and hegemony started to brew. The main pillars of the previous order was one-by-one abandoned by states. In 1931, the United Kingdom abandoned both the gold standard, which was the

227Hobsbawm, *The Age of Extremes: A History of the World, 1914-1991*, 91.

228Frieden, *Global Capitalism: Its Fall and Rise the Twentieth Century*, 176.

229Hobsbawm, *The Age of Extremes: A History of the World, 1914-1991*, 93.

230Ibid., 95.

231Ibid., 102.

symbol of stability, normality and affluence of pre-war year, and Free Trade, which was the linchpin of the 'Empire'²³². Other countries followed the suit, the United States, Canada and all of Scandinavia abandoned it in 1931-31, Germany in 1933 and finally France, Belgium and Netherlands in 1936. Furthermore, governments went beyond putting tariffs to protect agriculture from foreign competition but started to subsidize agricultural products by guaranteeing farm prices, buying up surpluses or paying farmers not to produce²³³.

Another consequence of the Great Depression was that the idea of "full employment" started to take hold in the economic thinking, rising to the level of primary objective of economic structuring. Because, mass unemployment as seen as economic issue as well as political one. On the economic side, Keynesians argued that "the demand, which incomes of fully employed workers must generate, would have the most stimulating effect on depressed economies"²³⁴. On the political side, mass unemployment was believed to be politically and socially explosive. Consequently, during this period many governments increasingly became more involved in the economy and installed safety nets. During this period labour gained more rights and working conditions relatively improved.

However, a different trend was also underway during the 1930s, which signified the change in the production relations: rise of modern corporations and the built of Fordism. The defining characteristic of these corporations was that "they brought together in one enterprise disparate activities – research, design, production, distribution, advertising– that had previously been carried out separately"²³⁵. Vertical integration of production was the defining characteristics of push towards the big corporations. Although, trend

232Ibid., 95; Carreras, "The Twentieth Century - from Break with the Past to Prosperity (II): The Great Stages," 301.

233Hobsbawm, *The Age of Extremes: A History of the World, 1914-1991*, 95.

234Ibid.

235Frieden, *Global Capitalism: Its Fall and Rise the Twentieth Century*, 161.

for big corporations started in 1850s in Germany and the United States, which showed similar industrialization and business organization yet different social relations, big corporations took off in the 1930s with the help of dismantling of the British system that dependent on middle and small businesses. Consequently, vertical integration and gathering every business operation under one roof started to crush the small businesses, which had a fighting chance in mid- to late-1800s²³⁶. The rise of the big corporations also meant a change in production relations, which brought forward different labour relations that seemed to strengthen labour movements.

The shift towards big corporations and very large factories facilitated unionization of labour because concentration of people made it easier to organize and bourgeoisie could not use personalistic ties with employees to mitigate their dissidence as in the small enterprises²³⁷. Big corporations seemed to be tolerant towards labour unions and labour rights, especially to social security schemes following the Great Depression despite the certain level of strife. There were several reasons for this behavior. For capital-intensive companies, sustaining the stability and high-quality labor is important because labor wages were the small part of their total cost and they needed reliable and motivated workers. Furthermore, tolerance to labor unions and rights and the support for social security policies, especially from part of bourgeoisie who owned big corporations, was a way to control and mitigate labor opposition and it was a way to re-integrate to the system²³⁸. Because, strikes and protests became important tools within for the working class, especially after the 1880s, and concentration of the work force in very large factories made it more feasible²³⁹. Thus, especially following the Great Depression, where workers received the hardest blow and the dissidence of workers reached to significant levels, re-integration to the system had

²³⁶Peter N. Stearns, *The Industrial Revolution in World History* (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 2007), 60–6 & 171.

²³⁷Frieden, *Global Capitalism: Its Fall and Rise the Twentieth Century*, 169.

²³⁸Ibid., 244–7.

²³⁹Stearns, *The Industrial Revolution in World History*, 177–9.

became a priority, as mentioned above as a political priority for the governments.

However, the push towards big corporations started to squeeze small businesses and farmers in the industrialized countries and the reaction of these groups had been another source for the hegemonic rivalry. Technological and organizational structure of big corporations increased the production capabilities, thus rendering small businesses unable to compete. Land owners, on the other hand, experienced the competition from large-scale machinery intensive farming in Europe. Even though small businesses proliferated during the 1920s, they were dependent on big corporations for supplies and orders²⁴⁰. Small business owners and land owners were increasingly pushed aside with the emerging form of production. However, they would play an important role in the hegemonic struggle, where they had become the base for fascist hegemonies²⁴¹.

Transformation that initiated with the Great Depression took different forms in the different country settings. Following the collapse of British hegemonic structure, although many countries took similar policies, e.g. protectionism and state intervention, hegemonic structures and the blocs that arise for the struggle were different from each other because the ideal basis and the experiences of communities at the center of these hegemonic projects were different. Three states were at the center for the struggle for the global hegemony: the Soviet Union, Germany and the United States.

4.1.2.1 Soviet Communist Alternative

As Hobsbawm says “for a large part of the Short Twentieth Century, Soviet communism claimed to be an alternative and superior system to capitalism, and once destined by history to triumph over it”²⁴². However, before making

240Ibid., 171; Frieden, *Global Capitalism: Its Fall and Rise the Twentieth Century*, 171.

241Frieden, *Global Capitalism: Its Fall and Rise the Twentieth Century*, 172.

242Hobsbawm, *The Age of Extremes: A History of the World, 1914-1991*, 56.

that claim, Lenin's Bolsheviks had to establish their hegemony over the lands of Russia and rebuild war-torn country and its communities. Tsar had already lost his power during the First World War, when its most loyal soldiers refused to suppress a general strike and an invasion of the centre of the capital for demands for bread that arise out of a demonstration of working-class women combined with an industrial lock-out of Putilov metalworks. Tsar had lost his coercive means to continue his hegemony and left his place to provisional government. However, establishing an order in Russia was difficult as in the absence of hegemonic power, different groups started to struggle for the power. What made Bolsheviks different than the other rivals was their understanding of the demands of peasants of Russia, who totaled the 80 per cent of the population and integrated peasants demands to Bolshevik hegemonic project. As the Provisional Government fail to establish order, Bolsheviks, who were supported by mainly workers in the major cities, especially in the capital Petrograd and Moscow, seized government and entered into a civil war with the counter-revolutionaries (White), who were supported by the Allied Powers. Bolsheviks were able to reach victory by late 1920. The success of the Bolshevik revolution dependent their ability to integrate interests of different groups into their hegemonic project. Patriotic Russians, such as the officers without whom Red Army would not exist, supported Bolshevik project because Bolsheviks deemed to be the only government to keep Russia together and without this perception, patriotic Russian would have been politically hostile to Bolsheviks. Russian peasants – core of the state as well as of its army – supported because they taught Bolsheviks would let them to keep the lands that were taken during the initial revolution²⁴³.

During the 1920s, the Bolsheviks initiated the transformation of the Russian economy and the Russian society through state sponsored heavy industrialization, which skipped the stages of development as compared to other industrial societies. The proletariat dictatorship, guided by Marxist

243Ibid., 60–5.

ideals, aimed at universal emancipation and the construction of a better alternative to capitalist society²⁴⁴. Hence, the Bolsheviks (Soviets) embarked upon constructing that idea within the Russia. Industrialization of Russia, which industrial capacity and infrastructure had been heavily reduced by the First World War and the loss of Poland, Finland and the Baltic States²⁴⁵, was one of the priorities. However, the majority of the population was composed of farmers, thus the proletariat basis for the Soviet rule was weak and it was limited to the cities, where there had been low level industrialization. Furthermore, Russia had been cut off from the international trade both because of the civil war in Russia and the decreased levels of production during these times and by choice as Soviets sought for self-sufficiency. Hence, the Soviets initially employed a hybrid economic program with New Economic Program of 1921, which allowed private farms and small business sector, while state controlled heavy industry, finance and utilities²⁴⁶. In addition, the Soviets invested in both expansion –with inclusion of women– and education of its labour force –either in factory schools or in technical schools and expansion of universities– in an unprecedented way²⁴⁷. Consequently, the Soviet Union’s economy experienced a rapid growth and reached pre-war levels by 1926. However, its modernizing effect was limited to the cities, hence, the modernization and Soviet ideals for its society had not been reached to the rural areas. Also, private ownership of the farming seen as a latent threat to the Soviet ideal and the rule.

Consequently, Stalin’s rise to the power in 1927 also marked the spread of Soviet project to Russia’s rural areas and increased rate of industrialization. In 1928, Stalin announced the first five year plan of 1928-1933, which increased the state control on the economy and increased investment in

244Ibid., 72.

245Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000*, 321.

246Stearns, *The Industrial Revolution in World History*, 136; Frieden, *Global Capitalism: Its Fall and Rise the Twentieth Century*, 216.

247Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000*, 322–3.

heavy industrialization. In addition, Stalin sought to collectivize agriculture through brutal methods aimed at farmers, who had own their means of production. Collectivization of agriculture enabled the Soviet government to control prices of agricultural production, thus making agriculture undesirable because of the low prices and brutality associated with collectivization. Thus, this enabled creation of a new labour force for the heavy industry as low prices drove people out of agriculture and mechanization of agriculture in collective farms decreased the demand for farmers. In the end, throughout the 1930s, the Soviet Union reached an impressive levels of industrialization, rising among its capitalist counterparts.

While the Soviet industrial production levels had increased from 5 per cent of world's manufactured products in 1929 to 18 per cent in 1938, the Soviet Union also seemed to be immune to the effects of the Great Depression that turned capitalist societies upside down²⁴⁸. The Soviet Union, through its resilience to the Great Depression and economic growth, became an object of interest to foreign observers of all ideologies. During the 1930-35 period, the Soviet Union received "a small but influential flow of socio-economic tourists to Moscow"²⁴⁹.

However, although the Bolsheviks tried to spread their revolution through international network of socialist parties and groups, the idea of continuous revolution disappeared when Stalin came to power. While, the International had been a platform for spreading its hegemony, Stalin choose to further the Soviet Union's interest during the Third International rather than seeking universal ideals of the revolution. This limited the revolution to the Soviet Union and preparation had begun for the eventual attack of capitalist states on the Soviet Union.

4.1.2.2 Fascist Alternative

248Hobsbawm, *The Age of Extremes: A History of the World, 1914-1991*, 96.

249Ibid.

Following the end of the First World War, radical Right movements have been on the rise as in parallel with the demise of liberalism, which especially fastened following the Great Depression as the old hegemonic order that dependent on liberalism failed to control contending movements. However, radical Right did not always transformed into Fascist rule, though they have forged alliances and close relationship with Germany, radical Right wing and Fascism showed difference in their roots and the way the hegemonic structure was constructed.

Radical Right movements appeared as the response to the possibility of a revolutionary social change. As the First World War destroyed the preexisting forms of control of dissidence, which was also followed by economic hardships, radical right governments sought to control dissidence of within the societies through becoming authoritarian and hostile to liberal political institutions. Radical right governments banned political parties, but not all of them. Nationalism was the shared basis for radical right governments, as Hobsbawm argues, “partly because of resentment against foreign states, lost wars, or insufficient empires, partly because waving national flags was a way to both legitimacy and popularity”²⁵⁰. However, radical right movements, although they had established alliances and close relationships with fascist governments, were different than fascists.

Although, the rise of radical right movements and governments usually argued as a response to the Bolshevik revolution and labour movements, they were against all forms of social change. They were rather conservative movements that sought to maintain the order. On the other hand, fascist movements sought to transform the society as well as the international status of their respective countries. Thus, Fascist utilized popular mobilization of masses from the below, unlike other authoritarian governments, which tried to suppress popular movements for change. Consequently, fascism did not took hold in the countries, where elites of the old regime were able to

250Ibid., 113.

maintain their hegemonic rule. Hobsbawm argues that “fascists were revolutionaries of counter-revolution: in their rhetoric, in their appeal to those who considered themselves as victims of society, in their call for a total transformation of society”²⁵¹.

There was a peculiar mix of social relations and production relations that brought about Fascism and made it a powerful challenger, mostly due to Germany’s material capabilities, to the liberal and communist alternatives. Germany was the main force behind fascist bloc, as earlier fascist movements, such as Italy, would not have reached to a challenger level without Germany’s economic and military capacity. The main driving force behind the fascist movement in Germany was small business owners, landowners and farmers, who shared the resentment towards big businesses and the rising mass labor movements²⁵². These groups of people felt that their place and position in the social order was undermined by these two forces. Big corporations had already been squeezing small business owners out of the market since the late-1800 and early-1900, but the pressure increase during the 1920s, as mentioned above. Furthermore, labour movements were threatened the break down of old order where these groups have enjoyed primacy. Because of this, conservatives were always against movements that could replace them in the social order. However, as mentioned above, big business was more capable of including labour movements desires to its own hegemonic project, than those of small businesses. Consequently, fascism arouse out of middle strata’s fear that perceived liberal society that enabled labour movements and all its values as a threat to their existence²⁵³.

Furthermore, fascist movements also received support from disgruntled nationalist soldiers and young men, who felt that their chance of heroism was robbed after November 1918. Fascist movements utilized disappointments of

251Ibid., 117.

252Ibid., 119; Frieden, *Global Capitalism: Its Fall and Rise the Twentieth Century*, 211.

253Hobsbawm, *The Age of Extremes: A History of the World, 1914-1991*, 123.

these young men through the imagery of 'front-line soldier' towards anti-war and anti-militarist movements of the Left and liberal movements²⁵⁴. Thus, disappointments and imageries were institutionalized through groups like Italian *squadristi* and German *freikorps*, where these young men had become one of the coercive tools of the fascist movements while they struggle to establish their hegemony in their domestic settings.

The rise of fascism had been also facilitated by the collapse of the old hegemony that kept social forces at bay and crisis of global economy. Hobsbawm argues that fascism did not take hold in the countries that the old order and hegemony retained its power, such as in Britain, where conservative Right remained in power and in newly independent countries that a new nationalist ruling class or group establish their control²⁵⁵. However, the optimal condition for fascist to gain control arouse when hegemony was lacking or none of the groups were unable to contain people's wishes, who had been disenchanted, disoriented and disconnected and unable to relate themselves to any structures or groups and where there was a nationalist resentment against the peace treaties of 1918-1920²⁵⁶; such as in Germany. Thus, when the Great Depression hit Germany in 1929, it destroyed the frail structure of Weimar Republic, which was the result of Allied, but especially France's, engagement with Germany to keep it weak. Weimar Republic was supported by Germany's export industry and finance capitalist, who were in alliance with the Socialists and aided by Anglo-American loans²⁵⁷. When the Great Depression severed international trade and American loans, the basis of the Weimar Republic had been loosened. While, National Socialist did not 'conquer the power', they took the advantage of weakness of the old ruling elites and conservative rights, which aided in their rise to power.

254Ibid., 125.

255Ibid., 126.

256Ibid., 127.

257Frieden, *Global Capitalism: Its Fall and Rise the Twentieth Century*, 210.

When fascist came to power, they sought to establish their hegemony with in the domestic setting through use of coercion to suppress opposition and consent by mobilizing the people's resentments. While National Socialism in Germany dismantled old regime's structures and institutions, replacing them with their own institutions –such as Nazi labor fronts and fascist “corporations” (industry guilds), they also brutally repressed labour movements, eliminated labour unions and other limitations on the rights of management to manage its workforce, which created a suitable environment for recovering the economy²⁵⁸. “All this gave capitalist strong reasons to catch up on a backlog of profitable investments. They brought money out of mattresses and foreign bank accounts and sank it into a now-hospitable business climate”²⁵⁹. While big corporations were against the rise of Nazis in Germany, later they started to cooperate with the fascist bloc in Germany. During this period, all resources were put into investment for industrialization, modernization and militarization with increasing break from the international trade and high level of state control of the economy²⁶⁰.

While Nazis were able to have an economic boom with full employment, despite the stagnation in mass living standards, their economic system was a predatory one, especially when a considerable amount of industrial production was devoted to the Germany's massive rearmament program. German fascism, once established its hegemony in Germany, started to plan for its expansion in Europe. Expansionist ideals were in parallel with the resentments towards to Versailles Treaty and what followed afterwards. Hence, Germany needed a strong military in expansion of Germany and Nazi hegemony in Europe and possibly to the world. For this end, Hitler initiated a massive armament program, which put stress on Germany's raw material resources as well as its economy. However, Germany lacked foreign exchange reserves, which were drained by the cost of the First World War,

258Ibid., 211; Hobsbawm, *The Age of Extremes: A History of the World, 1914-1991*, 131.

259Frieden, *Global Capitalism: Its Fall and Rise the Twentieth Century*, 212.

260Ibid., 213.

reparations and collapse of its traditional export trades²⁶¹. Consequently, Germany established an elaborate preferential trade system which included a barter system with a network of countries without having the need for making payments in gold or foreign currency²⁶². This trade network was used for the import raw materials for the Germany economy and armament, but it was also used for spreading the influence of Germany within these countries. In addition, expansionism was aimed at decreasing the strain upon the German economy and it was a bid to increase its reach to raw materials. For example, annexation of Austria brought some iron ore and oil fields as well as \$200 million in gold and foreign-exchange reserves²⁶³. In the end, Nazi hegemony in Germany arose as anti-liberal and anti-labor movement that relied on a nationalism, which mobilized people's resentments. It was coercive and expansionist, which resulted with the clash of other hegemonic alternatives.

4.1.2.3 New Deal and Keynesian Alternative

As mentioned above, laissez-faire political-economy have been crumbling and precarious during the 1920s, despite the efforts to resuscitate the old system. During this period, even the United Kingdom moved away from the governing principles of laissez-faire political economy by intervening the economy and establishing public monopolies²⁶⁴. However, the Great Depression and the following incapability of old structures to deal with the crisis, paved the way for a new set of ideas to take hold in the liberal capitalist world. Thus, a new liberal bloc was started to develop under the leadership of the United States.

261Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000*, 307.

262Ibid.; Frieden, *Global Capitalism: Its Fall and Rise the Twentieth Century*, 204.

263Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000*, 308.

264Eric Hobsbawm, *Industry and Empire*, Revised (London and New York: Penguin Books, 1999), 221.

Keynesian economics had become the main set of ideas that would define the New Deal alternative. Keynesian economics have argued for the direct state intervention to economics because the market economy would not right itself, especially in the times of crisis when expectation of capitalist determines how they behave and if they expect stagnation, there will not be any investments, which would revive the economy. Consequently, during times of crisis, state could re-activate stagnant economies by promoting and subsidizing new investment with heavy borrowing and spending. This would alter capitalists' expectations, hence they would start investing, which in the end revive the economy. Furthermore, Keynesian economics envisioned a solution to unemployment, thus state guidance would create favorable environment for something close to full employment²⁶⁵.

While state interventionism to economy was conceived and practiced by the other alternative hegemonic projects, what made Keynesian alternative was how it integrated labour movements and coordinated interests of labors with big business capitalists. Governments were not only expected to intervene in economics and sustain near full employment, it was also expected, in liberal democracies to provision social insurance and basic social policies²⁶⁶ and “a deliberate element of social equity into public policy”²⁶⁷. Thus, as the welfare system worked towards incorporating labor movements into the Keynesian form of capitalist system, bourgeoisie did not opposed it. Moreover, the arising bourgeoisie in the United States that organized the production in new corporate forms supported the welfare state, because quality and stability of the work force was key in the newly arising capital-intensive production²⁶⁸.

During the 1930s, the United State slowly started to leave its isolationism, and shifted towards internationalism as its economy grew and gained power. The election of Franklin D. Roosevelt in November 1932 was the

265Frieden, *Global Capitalism: Its Fall and Rise the Twentieth Century*, 237–41.

266Ibid., 191.

267Hobsbawm, *Industry and Empire*, 224.

268Frieden, *Global Capitalism: Its Fall and Rise the Twentieth Century*, 247.

encouraging start for the internationalist²⁶⁹, which were composed of financial elites of Wall Street and big corporations. While the United Kingdom centered world economy crumbled, the United States would not be willing to restore the old system in the 1930s, which could be observed by Roosevelt's sabotage of the London Economic Conference in July 1933 that aimed to restore some order in regulation of world money and devaluation of the dollar relative to gold to support US farms²⁷⁰. The United States had reached impressive economic growth with the New Deal structure. "In 1938 US national income was already about the same as combined incomes of Britain, France, Germany, Italy and the Benelux countries, and almost three times of the USSR"²⁷¹. Furthermore, the characteristic of the historical bloc that formed in the United States was prone to internationalism. Labor and socialist movements supported internationalism and free trade to ensure cheap food and other consumption products for urban workers. Big corporations, on the other hand, were technologically advanced and internationally competitive, thus supportive of free trade, which they would benefit²⁷². In addition to the domestic determinants of internationalism, the existence and perceived threat of Fascism and Communism also facilitated cooperation between liberal democracies, but also paved the way for US hegemonic expansion.

4.2 Making of Kemalist Hegemony

After a decade-long war, the transformation of Turkish society into a capitalist one, started with the victory in the War of Independence and the reign of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk to the center stage of Turkish politics to build upon reformative movements during the Ottoman Empire, but to reach a different result. While the transformation was initiated by the Young Turks and *İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti* (The Committee of Union and Progress - CUP), because of

²⁶⁹Ibid., 186.

²⁷⁰Arrighi, *The Long Twentieth Century: Money, Power and the Origins of Our Times*, 288.

²⁷¹Ibid., 284.

²⁷²Frieden, *Global Capitalism: Its Fall and Rise in the Twentieth Century*, 247–8.

wars that continuously followed each other –The Tripolitanian War (1911-1912), the First Balkan War (1912-1913), the Second Balkan War (1913) and the First World War (1914-1918)– it was never fully realized. Although Atatürk’s vision of modern Turkey took advantage of what had been done and tried to be done by the Young Turks and CUP, transformation of Turkey took a different route following the War of Independence. Atatürk sought to establish a new structure; the one that signified a break, a new start, from Ottoman rule and its institutions, which was modern, Western and secular. Consequently, the process of establishment of new hegemonic structure in Turkey, hence transformation of the society, defined this period.

Reconstruction of Turkey was not an easy task to do. Years of wars and revolution took its toll on the population and the economy. As Stanford Shaw and Ezel Kural Shaw point out “most non-Muslims were gone, with the Greek community reduced from 1.8 million to 120,000 the Armenians from 1.3 million to 100,000. No less than 2.5 million Turks had died during the war, leaving a population of 13,269,606 in Anatolia and eastern Thrace”²⁷³. Furthermore, the Ottoman Empire’s integration to world capitalist system as an open market and supplier of raw materials had ruined its economy²⁷⁴ and departure of non-Muslims, who were the principal agents and link to capitalist world economy of the Ottoman Empire, left a nascent Turkish bourgeoisie, who were “cowed and uncertain, inexperienced, and without accumulated capital”²⁷⁵ because of the exploitation of foreign capitals and minorities.

Atatürk, similar to the Young Turks, followed the path to create indigenous bourgeoisie and industrialize Turkey. Because, industrialization was perceived to the way to emancipate Turkey from domination of developed industrialized state, hence create a material basis for independence and national

273Stanford J. Shaw and Ezel Kural Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey: Volume II:Reform, Revolution and Republic: The Rise of Modern Turkey, 1808-1975*, vol. 2, Digital (Cambridge & New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 373.

274Zülküf Aydın, *The Political Economy of Turkey* (London and Ann Arbor, MI: Pluto Press, 2005), 26.

275Shaw and Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey: Volume II:Reform, Revolution and Republic: The Rise of Modern Turkey, 1808-1975*, 2:389–90.

sovereignty²⁷⁶. This perception was rooted in the Young Turks bid for creating indigenous bourgeoisie. The Young Turks perceived non-Muslim bourgeoisie, Greek and Armenian, as carriers of the logic of market, agents of capitalist social system which would eventually replace traditional ruling class and internal supporter of imperialism²⁷⁷. Consequently, the Young Turks tried to neutralize non-Muslim bourgeoisie and create and strengthen indigenous bourgeoisie, which Muslim Turks were fitted their conception of bourgeoisie. However, the Young Turks were not successful in their quest due to continuous wars. The environment after the War of Independence was more suitable for establishing an indigenous bourgeoisie as compared to previous eras, because the society was comparatively more homogenous society due to the flight and population exchanges and there were not wars to interrupt the development. Consequently, the state had become the main instrument in establishing a capitalist society in Turkey, pushing it to skip development stages to catch up with the industrialized Western states.

Turkey followed a mixture of private enterprise and governmental supervision and participation in the economy, which responded and changed in accordance with development in the world and alliances with others to strengthen Kemalist hegemony. State had followed a principle “that state should develop those sectors of the economy which private sector could not finance. Elsewhere private capital should be encouraged to develop and expand by being left to its own devices”²⁷⁸. In quest for industrialization and modernization of Turkey, Atatürk favored different groups between big merchants, big landlords, commercial bourgeoisie and industrial bourgeoisie, despite the bourgeoisie was dependent on the state to flourish and

276 Sencer Ayata, “Poverty, Social Policy and Modernity in Turkey,” in *Turkey's Engagement with Modernity: Conflict and Change in the 20th Century*, ed. Celia Kerslake, Kerem Öktem, and Philips Robins (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 194.

277 Çağlar Keyder, *State and Class in Turkey: A Study in Capitalist Development* (London & New York: Verso, 1987), 64.

278 Hüseyin Ramazanoğlu, “A Political Analysis of the Emergence of Turkish Capitalism: 1839-1950,” in *Turkey in the World Capitalist System*, ed. Hüseyin Ramazanoğlu (Aldershot and Brookfield, VT: Gower, 1985), 58.

accumulate. While, big merchants and big landlords were favored at the end of Izmir Economic Congress in 1923, the state started to put its weight in supporting bourgeoisie with the establishment of İş Bankası (the Business Bank) in 1924, which was aimed to provide financial support for the bourgeoisie to develop factories and businesses²⁷⁹. Thus, the most important support for the industrial bourgeoisie came with the “Law of the Encouragement of Industry” in 1927, where the industrial bourgeoisie was given priority over the commercial bourgeoisie²⁸⁰.

Despite encouragement for the industrialization, this sector grew slowly as compared to the agricultural sector, which remained strong and the largest sector. During the 1920s, the agricultural sector provided impetus for economic growth through its connections with the world economy and favorable conditions. The agricultural sector, however, had to be modernized too. Consequently, *Ziraat Bankası* (the Agricultural Bank) was reorganized in 1924 to support mechanization of agriculture and meet the increasing demand for credit²⁸¹. Furthermore, the infrastructure of experts and institutions – e.g. *Ziraat Odaları* (the Agricultural Societies) – that remained from the Young Turks were used in education of rural areas for the modernization of agriculture as well as agricultural and veterinary institutions established in Ankara²⁸².

Another significant development for the agriculture of Turkey came through tax and land reforms in 1920s. The state had abolished *öşür* (the land tithe) in 1925 and replaced by a new tax “on produce set at 6 kuruş per thousand, including the old shares set aside for education and public works”²⁸³. However, this new tax was replaced by a tax on agricultural income, which cultivators paid less compared to previous tax. Second, new set of laws

279Ibid., 56–8.

280Ibid., 58–9.

281Ibid., 59.

282Shaw and Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey: Volume II: Reform, Revolution and Republic: The Rise of Modern Turkey, 1808-1975*, 2:388–9.

283Ibid., 2:388.

introduced to appropriate landholding of religious foundations to the state, which improved the level of peasants on them to other cultivators, and state-owned and recently appropriated lands were sought to be distributed to landless peasants throughout the 1920s. While, these measures aimed at improving the conditions of cultivators and the agricultural sector, it was also a way to incorporate and gain consent large portion of population to transformation of the society.

Atatürk embarked upon a major transformation of the society that would be parallel to change in the mode of production in the new Turkey. Feroz Ahmad argues that “the Kemalists wanted to adopt the materialism of the West, its technology and its modern weapons, along with its ideas, so that society would be transformed in broadest sense”²⁸⁴. Political and social transformation of Turkey was happened on the lines of secularization, nationalism and populism. Secularization was realized in three broad areas: secularization of state, education and law, the replacement of religious symbols with the symbols of European civilizations and secularization of social life²⁸⁵. Secularization of state, education and law, which as Zurcher argues started with Sultan Mahmut and had been almost completed by CUP, finalized with “the abolition of the sultanate and caliphate, the proclamation of the republic and the new constitution in 1922–24... and the seal was set... with the removal from the 1928 constitution of the clause that made Islam the state religion of Turkey”²⁸⁶. These were also accompanied by “abolishing the ancient office of “Şeyh-ül-İslam” and the Ministry of Sharia, closing separate religious schools and colleges... abolishing the special Sharia courts in which theologian-judges had administered the Holy Law.”²⁸⁷. New laws that were replaced the previous laws were Swiss civil code and Italian penal code. In

284Feroz Ahmad, *Turkey: Quest for Identity* (Oxford: One World, 2003), 84.

285Erik J. Zurcher, *Turkey: A Modern History*, 3rd ed. (London & New York: I.B. Tauris, 2004), 186.

286Ibid., 187.

287Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey* (London & Oxford & New York: Oxford University Press, 1968), 265.

tandem to these, a series of reforms were enacted to replace religious symbols with European ones, which aimed at breaking Turkey from its Ottoman and Islamic past. To this end, traditional head gear for men was banned and religious attire were limited to prayer services in the mosques in 1926. In addition to these reforms, the Western clock and calendar in 1926, Western numerals in 1928 and Western weight and measures in 1931 was adopted, which made communication with the West easier. The position of the women was aimed to be changed through formal emancipation (right to vote) and promoting the new image and role models for women, e.g. professional women, women pilots, opera singers and beauty queens. The Latin alphabet adopted in 1928 and compulsory use were enacted in 1929, which was followed by drive for education of the society and increase the literacy. Secularization of social life came in the form of suppression of tarikat (the dervish orders) in 1925, which went beyond the institutional religion and touched upon vital elements of popular religion as dress, amulets, soothsayers, holy sheiks, saints' shrines, pilgrimages and festivals²⁸⁸.

Nationalism, on the other hand, played the role of uniting people and creating a national identity that was devout of religion and it played a significant role in foundation for capitalist society in Turkey. Liah Greenfeld argues that "nationalism locates the source of individual identity within a 'people', which is seen as the bearer of sovereignty, the central object of loyalty and the basis of collective solidarity"²⁸⁹. Furthermore, nationalism in capitalist society depended on the basic assumption of equality brings the social mobilization based on the merit of individuals, mostly gained through education and knowledge²⁹⁰. During the War of Independence, Turkish nationalism dependent on the notion of citizenship, which was defined by the residence within the borders of the emerging state defined by *Misak-ı Milli* (the National

288Zurcher, *Turkey: A Modern History*, 187–92.

289Liah Greenfeld, *Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992), 3.

290Liah Greenfeld, "The Emergence of Nationalism in England and France," *Research in Political Sociology* 5 (1991): 341–52.

Pact)²⁹¹. However, Turkish nationalism had shifted towards a description that involved assertions of “the Turks were the direct descendants of the world’s greatest conquering race, that they had played a leading role in the origins and development of world civilization, and that it was the Turks who had contributed most to what had been great in the Ottoman Empire”²⁹². Thus, ‘Turkish historical thesis’ aimed to “give Turks a sense of pride in their history and national identity, separate from the immediate past ... It was one of the means whereby the Kemalist leadership tried to construct a new national identity and strong national cohesion”²⁹³. Thus, the Turkish nationalism was spread through institutions such as *Türk Ocakları* (the Turkish Hearth), *Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi* (CHP - Republican People’s Party)²⁹⁴, various branches of government, schools, the press and *Türk Tarih Kurumu* (the Turkish Historical Society), which constructed main assertions of Turkish nationalism. Furthermore, adoption of the Latin alphabet and foundation of *Türk Dil Kurumu* (the Turkish Language Society) enforced creation of Turkish national identity by Turkification of the language by replacing Arabic and Persian scripts and words from the language, thereby aiming “to cut young Turks off from Ottoman past and to replace conservative mentality of the past with a modern and liberal one”²⁹⁵.

The idea of equality of citizens had been reached by the doctrine of Populism (*Halkçılık*), which dependent on two basic premises. The first premise was that all the citizens of the Republic were equal regardless of class, rank, religion or occupation. Second premise asserted that government was by and for the people, which was the reflection of the doctrine of Republicanism

291Ahmad, *Turkey: Quest for Identity*, 81.

292Shaw and Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey: Volume II: Reform, Revolution and Republic: The Rise of Modern Turkey, 1808-1975*, 2:375.

293Zurcher, *Turkey: A Modern History*, 191.

294It was founded in 1923 as *Halk Fırkası* (People's Party – Legion), changed its name to *Cumhuriyet Halk Fırkası* (Republican People's Party – Legion) in 1924 and to *Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi* (Republican People's Party) in 1935.

295Shaw and Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey: Volume II: Reform, Revolution and Republic: The Rise of Modern Turkey, 1808-1975*, 2:376.

(*Cumhuriyetçilik*) that sought to connect people to the Republic by arguing that people's interest were identical with those of Republic since 'Sovereignty Belongs to the Nation'²⁹⁶. As a result, Kemalist attempted to counter the effects of class struggle on the hegemonic structure via rejecting the existence of class at the ideational level and thereby established foundational ideas of the hegemonic structure that would mobilize the society for capitalist form of production.

Consequently, Kemalist hegemony rejected the existence of labour classes as argued and defined in the conception of nationalism and populism. Thus, bourgeoisie class was preferred for the industrialization and transformation of the society. The pressure on the working class, through rejection of its existence, intensified following the Great Depression, which heavily affected Turkish economy due to its connectedness to world economy through its agricultural supply. In the 1930s, the state did not allowed organization of working class²⁹⁷, unionization was prohibited and strikes were declared illegal, wages of workers allowed to plummet, especially during the Second World War, while cartelization and vertical integration of industry was encouraged by the state policies²⁹⁸.

In the 1930s, Turkey, similar to other agricultural states, experienced the shock of the Great Depression and again like other states, trade barriers were erected and state's role on the economy increased. During this period, Turkey adopted *etatism*, which brought together different aspects of existing alternatives rather than emulating one of the three alternatives mentioned above and increased state's role in capital accumulation. During the 1920s, Turkey was forced to keep trade tariff low because European capital wanted to keep its pre-eminence and influence in Turkey, but also it was an attempt to restore old free trade order. Consequently, during the 1920s, foreign

296Ibid., 2:375–8.

297Aydın, *The Political Economy of Turkey*, 89.

298Çağlar Keyder, "The Political Economy of Turkish Democracy," *New Left Review* 115 (1979): 14.

investment in Turkey was prominent in the areas of both trading and manufacturing. Foreign capital became instrumental in shaping Turkish economy into export-oriented agricultural economy through establishing trading ventures, merchant houses and banks. In the manufacturing, the foreign investment was double that of Turkish capital²⁹⁹. Turkish bourgeoisie, on the other hand, were happy with the activities of the foreign capital as Turkish merchants took the role of non-Muslims during the Ottoman period and what little they received from the unbalanced relation with foreign capital kept them content and able to accumulate. Consequently, Turkish bourgeoisie chose the easy way of accumulation, invested in commercial activities and failed to support establishment of national infrastructure and industrialization –quick short term profits rather than long-term development of the country³⁰⁰.

When the Great Depression brought world trade to a halt and every state erected trade barriers with decreasing market value of agricultural produces, Turkish commercial bourgeoisie were hit hard. Thus, statism (*Devletçilik*), which was similar to Keynesian approach, aimed industrialization and growth of the Turkish economy through increased state supervision, control and direction of industrial production³⁰¹. As mentioned in CHP program:

*The determination of which specific areas the state will enter is dependent on the needs of the situation. If it is determined that such intervention is needed, and there are private enterprises operating in the area, the taking-over of the latter will be governed by a special law in each case.*³⁰²

Thus, state control in economic activities had increased during the 1930s, yet it allowed existence and operation of bourgeoisie and as mentioned above,

299Keyder, *State and Class in Turkey: A Study in Capitalist Development*, 93–4.

300Ahmad, *Turkey: Quest for Identity*, 89; Tevfik F. Nas, *Tracing the Economic Transformation of Turkey from the 1920s to EU Accession* (Leiden & Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2008), 10.

301Nas, *Tracing the Economic Transformation of Turkey from the 1920s to EU Accession*, 13; Shaw and Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey: Volume II: Reform, Revolution and Republic: The Rise of Modern Turkey, 1808-1975*, 2:392.

302Shaw and Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey: Volume II: Reform, Revolution and Republic: The Rise of Modern Turkey, 1808-1975*, 2:390.

the state took necessary steps to ensure capitalist accumulation by suppressing labor movements.

Statist policies in Turkey was manifested itself in two Five-Year Plans. The first Five-Year Plan was influenced by the Soviet Union, which was largely followed the report, which was written by Soviet delegate that visited Turkey in 1932³⁰³. The first Five-Year Plan aimed for development of industrial development and involved the use of government capital, enterprise and control in developing the new industries. However, unlike the Soviet model that allocated all its resources to heavy industry, Turkey diverted its resources to industries that would provide consumer goods and low level of machinery production for heavy industry because of country's low standard of living. Furthermore, first Five-Year Plan aimed to reduce imports, establish a favorable trade balance and create an internal market for country's raw materials³⁰⁴. During the first Five-Year Plan, various banks had been established to support economic development; *Sümerbank* (1933) for credit to light to heavy industry, *Etibank* (1935) for co-ordination and development of natural resources, *Emlak ve Kredi Bankası* for providing credit to both public and private construction projects and *İller Bankası* (1933) to encourage provincial and projects at village and municipal levels³⁰⁵. During this period, industries for the production of chemical products, iron, paper, sulphur, sponge, cotton and wool textiles had been developed. The second Five-Year Plan, in 1938, saw introduction of *Toprak Mahsulleri Ofisi* (The Land Products Office) –responsible for the stability of agricultural products– , and *TEKEL* (The State Monopoly Company) –responsible for manufacture and control of tobacco products, alcoholic drinks, spirits, matches, tea and salt– and involvement of *İş Bank* in development of railways, lumber, coal,

303Zurcher, *Turkey: A Modern History*, 197.

304Shaw and Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey: Volume II:Reform, Revolution and Republic: The Rise of Modern Turkey, 1808-1975*, 2:391.

305Ramazanoğlu, "A Political Analysis of the Emergence of Turkish Capitalism: 1839-1950," 63.

sugar, textiles, electricity and insurance³⁰⁶. In terms of commerce, the state involvement had shifted the main benefactor of the trade from small and retail merchants to large government approved traders and manufacturers, because during the 1930s bilateral trade agreements, especially with Germany, had become the main practice for trade.³⁰⁷

During the 1930s, Turkey was able to attract loans and investments from various states that were from different rival blocs and established trade relations, which was also reflected to its foreign policy. Although foreign investment from different countries were present during the 1920s, relations during the 1930s had a different meaning due to trade relations mostly meant a path for alliance in the upcoming hegemonic rivalry between three power centers. Consequently, Çağlar Keyder argues that Turkey's high level of trade with Nazi Germany or its allies, which was about the 50% of all Turkey's trade³⁰⁸, during the 1930s was a reflection of Turkey's authoritarianism and sympathy for fascist regimes³⁰⁹. However, focusing on the trade relations with Germany without considering relations with other states and possible influencers would result in underestimating Turkey's ability to exploit the hegemonic struggle between different blocks for the survival of the state and establishment of Kemalist hegemony. Consequently, during the 1930s, Turkey managed to receive support from multitude of sources and efforts to have cordial relations with each bloc. Turkey received an American loan in June 1930, one from the Soviet government in 1934 for the Five-Year Plan and various loans from the United Kingdom, France and Germany, which enabled Turkey to nationalize railway and utility companies, thus eliminating foreign control of the major public works and services³¹⁰. Furthermore, while the Soviet Union contributed advice and financial help for

306Ibid., 64.

307Keyder, *State and Class in Turkey: A Study in Capitalist Development*, 102.

308Zurcher, *Turkey: A Modern History*, 199.

309Keyder, *State and Class in Turkey: A Study in Capitalist Development*, 111–2.

310Shaw and Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey: Volume II: Reform, Revolution and Republic: The Rise of Modern Turkey, 1808-1975*, 2:392.

the first Five-Year Plan, the United Kingdom was participated in the development of the second³¹¹.

Consequently, Turkey aimed to have cordial relations with other states and even attempted to create a web of security, friendship and non-aggression pacts with various states since 1923 despite some problems. The relationship between Turkey and the United Kingdom, following the Lausanne Treaty, suffered some set backs because of the unresolved issue of the ownership of Mosul. During the Lausanne conference, Turkey claimed that Mosul was part of Turkey, as determined by the *Misak-ı Milli*, while the United Kingdom argue that it should be the part of Iraq, which was under British mandate. However, the problem was not resolved during the conference decided to be resolved afterwards. After various deliberations with the United Kingdom and League of Nations, which resulted in favor of the United Kingdom, Turkey yielded its arguments and an agreement was reached in 1926. The relations improved, when Italy took an aggressive and expansionist attitude in eastern Mediterranean, Turkey and the United Kingdom signed Mediterranean Agreement in 1936. As the Second World War approached, Turkey-the United Kingdom and France signed Tripartite Agreement, which parties agreed on cooperation in an event that would cause a war in Mediterranean³¹².

Just like the relations with the United Kingdom, Turkish-French relations started on a wrong foot. The main issues were payment of the Ottoman Debts and the province of *İskenderun* (Alexandretta). Unlike other states, which were also concerned about Ottoman debts, France was more insisted on its payments, similar to its insistence on Germany's war reparations. Deliberations continued until 1928. In the end Turkey accepted to pay 63% of pre-1912 and 73% of post-1912 debts of Ottoman Empire. Although, Turkey made the first payment, following payments were stopped because of the

311 Ibid., 2:392–3.

312 Baskın Oran, *Türk Dış Politikası: Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar*, vol. 1, 14th ed. (Istanbul: İletişim, 2009), 258–77.

Great Depression. The problem of debt payment was resolved in favor of Turkey when a new agreement had been reached in 1933. On the question of Iskenderun, Turkey argued that it belonged to Turkey, while France argued it belonged to Syria, which was under French mandate. After long deliberations and because of the looming war in Europe, the problem was resolved in favor of Turkey. This would enable the above mentioned tripartite agreement³¹³.

Unlike the United Kingdom and France, the relations between Soviet Union and Turkey has started on a good footing. Turkey and Soviet Union signed Friendship and Neutrality Agreement in 1925, Trade Agreement in 1927, extension of 1925 Agreement in 1929, extension of 1925 Agreement for ten years in 1939. During this period, Turkish-Soviet relations remained cordial, Turkey and Soviet Union realized their differences, when Atatürk banned Communist Party in Turkey. Furthermore, Montreux Conference, where Turkey regained its sovereign rights on the Straits and allowed to militarize, the paths of two states started to break away³¹⁴.

Turkey's relations with the fascist bloc, on the other hand, was based on attaining non-aggression. Turkish-Italian relations was friendly, mostly due to rapprochement between Turkey and the United Kingdom, until Mussolini came to power and Italy increasingly became aggressive towards eastern Mediterranean and Balkans. Thus, Turkey tried to fend off Italian aggression. On the other hand, Turkish-German relations started with Turkish-German Friendship Agreement in 1924 and cooperation between two states increased for the rest of the 1920s. However, when Hitler came to power, despite increasing trade relations, Turkey was threatened with Nazi Germany's expansionism. Thus, Germany was unhappy with Balkan Pact, which was signed between Turkey, Greece, Romania and Yugoslavia in 1934 against possible

313Ibid., 1:277–92.

314Ibid., 1:314–24.

aggression in Balkans, and Montreux Agreement in 1936. Though, Turkey promised to remain neutral in case of war with Germany³¹⁵.

Turkey did not become a part of any rival bloc during the 1930s for various reasons. Atatürk aimed to mould and transform the society in a more radical way than its predecessors within the Young Turks and CUP to reach a capitalist society that would be similar to that of the West. As Feroz Ahmad says “not being conservative, he [Atatürk] feared neither secular modernism nor liberal democracy, though he saw the latter as a brake on his own radicalism”³¹⁶. However, Turkey established relationship with the United Kingdom, France and the United States at certain levels and the relations were intensified during the Second World War. Consequently, while Turkey collaborated with liberal bloc on certain issues such as arms reduction and limitation conferences, there were various problems with the United Kingdom and France, and the United States was not interested in international politics at the time. Furthermore, the United States was in no position to support and increase relations with Turkey during the interwar years, especially after the Great Depression, despite desire to increase trade volume. While Turkey had high volume of trade relationship with the Germany, Atatürk aimed to establish a country that would be democratic and liberal. Thus, Nazi Germany did not fit this model. Furthermore, as Haluk Gerger argues, Kemalism was against the fascism because, first it was perceived as belated imperialism and aware of the threat –especially Italy– that it posed. Second, Kemalism perceived itself as an ideology that supports oppressed people. Third, Kemalism was also aware of the class based nature of the fascism in Europe and since it rejected the concept of class, the fascism may hamper its bid to create bourgeoisie class³¹⁷. As the Soviet Union, despite cooperation between the Turkey and the Soviet Union during the Turkey’s War of Independence and early-1920 because of the shared anti-imperialist and

315Ibid., 1:297–307.

316Ahmad, *Turkey: Quest for Identity*, 93.

317Haluk Gerger, *Türk Dış Politikasının Ekonomi Politikası : “Soğuk Savaş”tan “Yeni Dünya Düzeni”ne* (Istanbul: Belge Uluslararası Yayıncılık, 1998), 18.

revolutionary aims, Atatürk had rejected the Communist ideology in Turkey. Because, as can be seen above, Kemalism aimed to transform Turkey into a capitalist society and ideology that was based on class and class conflict was appeared to be a strong alternative to Kemalist hegemony. Yet, Atatürk and Kemalists after him, followed a pragmatic approach in their relations with different power centers to reach their goals in the domestic setting.

4.3 Defense Procurement in Turkey

Having a modern military had been an aim since the Sultan Selim III, when he wanted to reform Ottoman Empire and its military, despite modernization efforts had been prevented and slowed due to successive reform and anti-reform movements until the First World War. The founders of the new Republic of Turkey had the same goal in establishing the new modern Turkish military, which was to be built on the remnants of the Ottoman military after the First World War. Although, Turkish military was able to win the War of Independence, with the money and military supplies that were sent by the Soviet Union, it was clear to Atatürk and others that the new Turkey needed new modern weapons as well as an indigenous/national defense industry to avoid the hardships and dependency that were experienced during the Ottoman period.

The defense procurement policy of Turkey from 1923 to the Second World War aimed at establishing national defense industry and modernizing Turkish military. Both Ministers' of National Defense (*Mudafaa-i Milliye Vekili*) Kazım Paşa (Özalp) (10.01.1922 - 21.11.1924 and 01.03.1935 - 18.01.1939) and Recep Bey (Peker) (04.03.1925-01.11.1927) argued for the necessity of establishment of defense industry in Turkey³¹⁸. Both Ministers' point of departure for the significance of the defense industry was the experiences of the Ottoman Empire and War of Independence, where Turkey was

318 *T.B.M.M. Gizli Celse Zabıtları* (Ankara: T.B.M.M., 1924); *T.B.M.M. Gizli Celse Zabıtları* (Ankara: T.B.M.M., 1925).

dependent on foreign military supplies –Axis powers during the First World War and the Soviet Union during the War of Independence. During the secret session of the naval budget, Kazım Paşa (Özalp) made the argument that buying capital ships and torpedo boats do not make much difference in the case of war when there is no national defense industry to maintain these ships and built new ones if necessary. Therefore, priority should be given to establishing the defense industry³¹⁹. Recep Bey (Peker) argued within the same lines with Kazım Paşa (Özalp), but he pointed out three principles on Turkish defense policy as building defense industry, buying modern weapon systems from foreign suppliers until national defense industry begins production and bringing the Turkish military to modern standards³²⁰. Recep Bey (Peker) was aware that establishing defense industry without the development within the other sectors of industry –steel and brass foundries, copper production and ethyl alcohol factory– would be unsuccessful, hence he made remarks on the cooperation between Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Trade in industrialization. The emphasize put upon the industrialization and modernization was the reflection of the dominant values of the Kemalist hegemony that were being established.

In an attempt to reach desired ends for defense industrialization and modernization, similar to civilian industrialization, Turkey followed a mixed approach that aimed at building national bourgeoisie and industrialization through foreign capital and loans from other states. One of the early attempts to establish defense industry was the establishment of *Tayyare Otomobil ve Motor Türk Anonim Şirketi* (TOMTAS – Aircraft, Car and Motor Turkish Joint-Stock Company) at Kayseri with Germany Junkers company – Turkey’s first aircraft factory. The path that lead to TOMTAS started during the trade talks between Germany and Turkey in 1925 when Turkish authorities inquired on the willingness of German companies to establish munitions and weapons

319 *T.B.M.M. Gizli Celse Zabıtları*, 1924, 395–6.

320 *T.B.M.M. Gizli Celse Zabıtları*, 1925, 542.

factories in Turkey³²¹. Despite the economic hardships of other companies that opened branches in Soviet Union, Junkers decided to invest in Turkey, believing that German government would support the endeavor through loans. On the other hand, French firm, the Compagnie Franco-Roumanie, was also interested in establishing an aircraft factory in Turkey³²². Despite the financial problems of Junkers and ambiguities on the support of German government, Turkey decided to go along with German proposal although the process of signing the agreement and construction of the factories took some time because of mentioned problems Junkers company and conflict with other aircraft producers in Germany, who argued that government provided subsidies to Junkers but not the others³²³. Because of the pressures from other aircraft producers, German government withdrawn its support from the Junkers company, which was in financial difficulties. However, when the project in Turkey threatened, German government intervened and bought the shares of Junkers in TOMTAS. Furthermore, Turkey had placed orders of twenty-three airplanes and *Türk Tayyare Cemiyeti* (later to be called as *Türk Hava Kurumu* - THK - Turkish Air Association) ordered thirteen to main factory of Junkers in Dessau to save the project³²⁴. Despite the financial problems Junkers were able to complete the company in 1926. TOMTAS remained operational until 1929, when Turkish government decided to buy the company from Junkers, because Junkers was still experiencing financial difficulties and there have been disagreements between Turkish government and Junkers. The factory turned over THK. It remained closed but continued to do maintenance work for aircrafts. When the commercial activities of THK abolished and its holdings transferred to Ministry of National Defense, the

321Werner E. Braatz, "Junkers Flugzeugwerke A. G. in Anatolia, 1925–1926: An Aspect of German-Turkish Economic Relations," *Tradition: Zeitschrift Fur Firmengeschichte Und Unternehmerbiographie* 19 (1974): 32, doi:10.2307/40697340.

322Ibid., 34.

323Ibid., 38.

324Werner E. Braatz and Manfred Simon, "Junkers Flugzeugwerke A. G. in Anatolia, 1925–1926: An Aspect of German-Turkish Economic Relations (Part II)," *Tradition: Zeitschrift Fur Firmengeschichte Und Unternehmerbiographie* 20 (1975): 39, doi:10.2307/40697345.

company had changed its name to *Kayseri Tayyare Fabrikası* (Kayseri Aircraft Factory). The factory continued its operations when Turkish government reached an agreement in 1932 with American Curtiss Aeroplane and Motor Company to procure modern aircrafts that Turkey needed³²⁵.

Turkish bourgeoisie also made attempts to establish defense industry in Turkey. Most notable attempts were made by Vecihi Hürkuş and Nuri Demirağ in aircraft production and Şakir Zümre in munitions production. Vecihi Hürkuş, who was a successful pilot during First World War and War of Independence, decided to built indigenous aircraft that would have the same specifications with its European counter parts following the visit to European aircraft production facilities as a part the committee send by the new Republic. He made the first test flight in 1925 but punished for flying with unapproved aircraft. Later he joined THK and worked at TOMTAS. Following the closure of TOMTAS, he built another aircraft, called “Vecihi XIV, in a small workshop while on leave from his work at THK. Because of technical incapacibilities at the time, he could not get certification for this plane from Turkey, so he went to Czechoslovakia to acquire certification. He got certification for the plane in 1931 and started to tour Turkey to get additional funding for the production, which had to be ended half way because of the problems of organization and lack of funding on the part of THK. He resigned from THK and established *Vecihi Sivil Tayyare Mektebi* (Vecihi Civilian Aircraft School) and continued to design and built aircraft under auspices of the school. He build “Vecihi XVI”, also known as “Nuri Bey”, a closed canopy airplane and 4 passenger civilian planes. However, he could not continued designing and producing aircrafts because of the lack of funding and orders from Turkey³²⁶.

Nuri Demirağ, who was famous and accumulated capital for building railroads in Turkey, entered aircraft production in 1930 with the belief that modern

325Bülent Yılmaz, *Türkiye’de Havacılık Sanayii Tarihi* (Ankara: Monch Yayıncılık, 2012), 39–41.

326Ibid., 42–3.

indigenous planes can be built as compared to those that had been procured from foreign countries. In 1935, he produced armed reconnaissance plane “Alan-2”, which was based on “MMV-1” plane, in Eskisehir aircraft maintenance factory. Later, the specifications of the planes had changed according to the THK requirements and made “NuD-36” at *Nuri Demirağ Tayyare Fabrikası* (Nuri Demirağ Aircraft Factory). However, NuD-36 crashed while landing in 1938, killing its pilot Reşit Alan, which created a pretext for THK to opt for French made Hanriot 187. Undeterred by the THK’s choice, Nuri Demirağ continued research and development in aircraft production and started to develop “NuD-38”, which was a double motor 6 passenger-capacity plane that could be used as light bombardment plane. Although the project started in 1938, it could only be completed by 1944, because German engineers left Turkey with the start of the Second World War. Nuri Demirağ’s factory was shut down because of the low level of orders³²⁷.

Şakir Zümre entered munitions production, among other things like heating stove, coin box and motor, in 1925. Şakir Zümre had close connection within Atatürk since 1914, when Atatürk was military attache in Sofia. He was also instrumental in arms transfer from Bulgaria and Macedonia during the War of Independence. Following the end of the War of Independence, Şakir Zümre applied to Turkish government for establishing munitions factory in 1924. In 1925, he was given old “Fuze Factory” in Istanbul, hence he established *Şakir Zümre Harp Sanayi Fabrikası* (Sakir Zümre War Industry Factory) in 1925. As of 1939, he had built bombs ranging from 50 kg up to 1000 kg and he was able to export bombs to Greece in 1937³²⁸.

Alongside with attempts to build national defense industry, Turkey was seeking to procure modern weapons from foreign sources as the Turkish defense industries mature. Guvenc and Barlas argue that aircrafts and submarines were the choice of weapon for Turkish military during the 1920s, hence Turkey sent committees to the United Kingdom, France, Germany and

327Ibid., 43–5.

328See Atilla Oral, *Şakir Zümre* (Istanbul: Demkar Yayıncılık, 2012).

Italy to buy aircraft and France, the Netherlands and Sweden to buy submarines³²⁹. The interest in procurement of aircrafts was the result of Ottoman experiences during The Tripolitanian War, Balkan and First World War and the use of aircrafts during the War of Independence both against fighting with Greece and rebellions that occurred during the course of war³³⁰. Furthermore, Turkish officials were impressed with the United Kingdom's use of aircrafts in repressing rebellions in Iraq³³¹. Turkey was also got interested in buying surface ships by the late-1920s and early-1930s³³².

Turkey's defense procurement decisions between the 1920s and 1930s were determined by Turkey's ability to use differences between hegemonic blocs that was informed by the desire to modernize as well as necessities that were imposed by Turkey's trade relations. Consequently, Turkey was able to procure weapons from different sources. However, Ottoman legacy of dependency on Prussian military doctrines and training had a certain level of influence. The new *Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri* (TSK – Turkish Armed Forces) was built upon the remnants of the Ottoman military and it was not a clean break from its predecessor but with the difference. It had pro-Republican credentials due to War of Independence.

The Prussian military culture gained predominance within the Ottoman Empire during Sultan Abdülhamid's period, when Major Colmar von der Goltz came to Ottoman Empire as a new German military advisor in 1883. Although, von der Goltz came to Ottoman Empire for a short term of service, but he remained until 1895 and returned several times afterwards. As Uyar and Erickson argue, "had it not been for the presence of von der Goltz, the German military mission and its successors would certainly have failed to

329Serhat Güvenç and Dilek Barlas, "Atatürk's Navy: Determinants of Turkish Naval Policy, 1923–38," *Journal of Strategic Studies* (January 1, 2003): 9.

330Robert Olson, "The Kurdish Rebellions of Sheikh Said (1925), Mt. Ararat (1930), and Dersim (1937-8): Their Impact on the Development of the Turkish Air Force and on Kurdish and Turkish Nationalism," *Die Welt Des Islams* 40 (2000): 75–6.

331Ibid., 73–4.

332See Dilek Barlas and Serhat Güvenç, "To Build a Navy with the Help of Adversary: Italian-Turkish Naval Arms Trade, 1929-32," *Middle Eastern Studies* 38 (2002): 143–169.

achieve the immense effect that they actually had on the Ottoman military”³³³. Thus, the increasing effect of the Prussian military culture was reflected on military procurement practices as the Ottoman Empire increasingly bought Prussian weapons, alongside with French and British weapons³³⁴. However the main influence of was felt in Ottoman military training as the effective use of weapons was dependent on the contemporary military knowledge, training and practice, which Prussia was more willing to extend to Ottoman Empire. Consequently, TSK inherited certain Prussian practices of the Ottoman military. As one Turkish General, who graduated in 1940, recalls his education at the military as “We just had an intense military training. The German education system had been taken over as a whole and put into practice with certain changes”³³⁵. Consequently, Turkey employed German advisors, some of whom were unemployed because of the shrinking of German military after the World War, for training and advising the Turkish military³³⁶. Gencer Özkan argues that this has created certain tendency and sympathy towards Germany within the Turkish military as well as feelings of comradeship arising from brotherhood from the First World War³³⁷. As a consequence of Turkish officers' tendency towards Germany, Turkey was more prone to buy weapons from Germany. As Güvenç and Barlas point out this factor by discussing Turkish Navy's decision to buy submarines from Dutch shipyard, which was selling German U-Boat design and founded by three German companies – Krupp Germaniawerft (Kiel), A.G. Weser

333Mesut Uyar and Edward J. Erickson, *A Military History of the Ottomans: From Osman to Atatürk* (Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger Security International, 2009), 206.

334For more detailed account of arms trade between Ottoman Empire and Germany see: Fahri Türk, *Türkiye ile Almanya Arasındaki Silah Ticareti 1871-1914: Krupp Firması, Mauser Tüfek Fabrikası, Alman Silah Ve Cephane Fabrikaları* (İstanbul: IQ Kültür Sanat Yayıncılık, 2012).

335Mehmet Ali Birand, *Shirts of Steel: An Anatomy of the Turkish Armed Forces*, trans. Saliha Peker (London & New York: I.B. Tauris, 1991), 31.

336Gencer Özkan, “Türkiye’de Cumhuriyet Dönemi Ordusunda Prusya Etkisi,” in *Türkiye’de Ordu, Devlet Ve Güvenlik Siyaseti*, ed. Evren Balta Paker and İsmet Akça (İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2010), 13.

337Ibid., 200 & 203–8.

(Bremen) and Vulkanwerft (Hamburg and Stettin) –, against the competition from two French and one Swedish companies³³⁸.

German influence upon Turkish military corps during the inter-war years cannot be underestimated, yet the sole focus on German influence is not enough to explain Turkish procurement during inter-war years, which showed a great variance and a certain level of flexibility, similar to the Ottoman Empire until the early-1900s. First, Germans were not the only advisors employed by Turkey. French and Czech advisors, whose contracts, along with Germans, were cancelled in 1935 but with the realization of the necessity of foreign advisor replaced by British³³⁹. This had created a basis for having multiple military cultures within the Turkish military.

Second, Turkey was mostly motivated by modernization of the military, but the decision had been shaped by the resource capabilities of the country, consequently others' willingness to extend credits and fund Turkish initiatives was an important factor. Decisions were result of a negotiation between desire and resource necessities. When Turkey wanted to procure surface ships by the 1929 and 1932, it had opted for Italian companies, because (1) Italy at the time was the first adopter of emerging military technologies, thus one of the first country to rearm itself, which made it attractive as far as procuring modern weapons despite the problems associated with being the early adopter and (2) Italy was more willing to extend financial aid to Turkey, which was needing financial aid for both building its economy and military. For example, Italy included the payments done by the Ottoman Empire for two apprehended ships by Italy during the First World War for the negotiated price for ships as opposed to financially unyielding United Kingdom³⁴⁰. The financial hardline could be explained by the financial crisis of Vickers that

338Güvenç and Barlas, "Atatürk's Navy: Determinants of Turkish Naval Policy, 1923–38," 12–3.

339Gary Leiser, "The Turkish Air Force, 1939–45: The Rise of a Minor Power," *Middle Eastern Studies* 26 (1990): 383.

340See Barlas and Güvenç, "To Build a Navy with the Help of Adversary: Italian-Turkish Naval Arms Trade, 1929-32."

started in 1920, mitigated at some level with rationalization of its business and merger with Armstrongs in 1929³⁴¹ (which was resolved with the British rearmament in 1934) and the British banks' skepticism on Turkey's ability to pay its bills despite the support of the British government in 1929³⁴².

Furthermore, when TSK was considered as a whole, rather than focusing on specific branches at specific times as Barlas and Güvenç did, the variance of military equipment became increasingly apparent. For example, in 1926, Turkey procured 20 Breguet (France), 10 Junkers (Germany), 30 Caudron (France) and 17 Savoias (Italy)³⁴³. In 1929, Turkey purchased 75-mm anti-aircraft guns from Vickers-Armstrongs (UK)³⁴⁴. In 1932, as mentioned above American Curtiss Aeroplane and Motor Company bought Kayseri aircraft factory and in 1933 Turkey decided to buy American fighter airplanes³⁴⁵. Moreover, Turkey topped the list of US arms sales in both April and October 1937 by spending respectively 1,904,551 USD and 2,670,000 USD for military aircrafts³⁴⁶. Turkey also procured armored vehicles for the Soviet Union; procurement involved 60 T-26 Model 1933 tanks, 5 T-27 tankettes and 60 BA-6 armored cars in 1935³⁴⁷ and BT-2 armored cars in 1936³⁴⁸. Such

341For more detailed account of Vickers and its merger with Armstrongs see: J.D. Scott, *Vickers: A History* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1963), 143–168.

342CAB 24/202/22 : CPMemorandumCP 72 (29), February 21, 1929, The National Archives, Kew, <http://discovery.nationalarchives.gov.uk/SearchUI/Details?uri=D7728015>.

343Olson, "The Kurdish Rebellions of Sheikh Said (1925), Mt. Ararat (1930), and Dersim (1937-8): Their Impact on the Development of the Turkish Air Force and on Kurdish and Turkish Nationalism," 78.

344Scott, *Vickers: A History*, 189.

345"U.S. Fighting Planes Win Favor in Turkey," *The Washington Post (1923-1954)*, January 22, 1933, 150455360, ProQuest Historical Newspapers: The Washington Post (1877-1996).

346"Turks Buy Most U. S. Arms - Special to The New York Times.," *New York Times (1923-Current File)*, May 6, 1937, 102166513, ProQuest Historical Newspapers: The New York Times (1851-2009); "Turkey's \$2,670,000 Aircraft Tops U.S. October Arms Sales," *Wall Street Journal (1923 - Current File)*, November 5, 1937, 129749697, ProQuest Historical Newspapers: The Wall Street Journal (1889-1995).

347Leland Ness, *Jane's World War 2 Tanks and Fighting Vehicles: The Complete Guide* (London: Harper Collins Publishers, 2002), 227.

348Peter Chamberlain and Chris Ellis, *Tanks of the World: 1915-1945*, 2002nd ed. (London: Cassell, 1972), 240.

variance continued during the Second World War, where Turkey received British Hurricane Mark I and Spitfire Mark I, American P-40 Tomahawk and German Focke Wulf 58 and Heinkel 111³⁴⁹ and tanks such as Renault R-35, British Light Mk VIB, M3 Stuart, Valentine, Sherman, PzKw III, PzKw IVH and Bishop SP 25pdr³⁵⁰.

Furthermore, as the war in Europe approached and its relations with the United Kingdom and France improved and had been threatened by expansionism of Italy, Allied interest in Turkey, which translated into grants, reflected on Turkish procurement. In March 1939, Turkey ordered four "Ay" Class submarines from Vickers-Armstrongs³⁵¹. Turkey received 240,000,000 USD loan from France and the United Kingdom in October 1939³⁵², prior to ratification of mutual assistance pact with France and the United Kingdom³⁵³, because Turkey requested financial aid, which some amount of it (25 millions GBP) would be used a credit for purchase of armaments but not necessarily expended in the United Kingdom, in as a condition of signing the treaty³⁵⁴.

However, Turkey and Germany had close, at some point very binding, bilateral trade agreement and when the German rearmament and its full mobilization of its economy towards this end, it should not be surprising to see Turkey procuring weapons from Germany, as the weapons were the

349Olson, "The Kurdish Rebellions of Sheikh Said (1925), Mt. Ararat (1930), and Dersim (1937-8): Their Impact on the Development of the Turkish Air Force and on Kurdish and Turkish Nationalism," 86.

350Ness, *Jane's World War 2 Tanks and Fighting Vehicles: The Complete Guide*, 228.

351Names of the submarines were Burak Reis, Murat Reis, Oruc Reis and Uluc Ali Reis Francis E. McMurtrie, *Jane's Fighting Ships: 1939* (London: Sampson Low, Marston & CO., LTD., 1939), 463.

352Lloyd Lehrbas, "Turkey Reported Reinforced by Allied Loan, Arms," *The Washington Post* (1923-1954), October 22, 1939, 151120446, ProQuest Historical Newspapers: The Washington Post (1877-1996).

353"Turkey Ratifies Arms Pact With England, France," *Chicago Daily Tribune* (1923-1963), November 9, 1939, 175427699, ProQuest Historical Newspapers: Chicago Tribune (1849-1989).

354CAB 65/1/16 : CPConclusionWM (39) 16N, September 15, 1939, 16, The National Archives, Kew.

main item of export. Furthermore, Germany was more willing to invest in Turkish defense industry as seen in the example of TOMTAS and the help extended by Germany for constructing a submarine building shipyard in Istanbul, where by 1938 two submarines were built³⁵⁵. Yet, Turkey did not hesitate to nationalize Krupp owned shipyard in 1940³⁵⁶. We should point out that during the war, warring blocs used arms trade to persuade Turkey to enter into war, if not, prevent Turkey to undermine their efforts and Turkey skillfully used this to procure somewhat modern weapons and to reach its main goal; staying out of the war.

However, Turkey was not able to break the conservatism of its military despite Turkey acquired somewhat modern weapons and acquired training from various sources as seen above. Turkish military thinking and behavior remained somewhat similar to First World War thinking, as the Chief of General Staff Fevzi Çakmak established defensive positions similar to First World War military³⁵⁷, because he was reluctant in changing the defense concept, hence the concept of static defense was implemented³⁵⁸. The inability to break such conservatism rested on two factors. First, Turkish military culture demanded firm discipline and obedience to superiors, although Atatürk argued that junior officers could and should disobey superiors commands if the circumstances dictates otherwise³⁵⁹. Although

355“Turks Seek to Buy Armaments Here,” *New York Times (1923-Current File)*, February 23, 1938, 102616726, ProQuest Historical Newspapers: The New York Times (1851-2009).

356“Many Germans Quitting Turkey; Krupp Plant Is Taken by Marines - Special Cable to The New York Times. Wireless to The New York Times.,” *New York Times (1923-Current File)*, February 9, 1940, 105161249, ProQuest Historical Newspapers: The New York Times (1851-2009).

357Nurettin Tursan, *Anılar* (İstanbul: Arma Yayınları, 2009), 172–3.

358George S. Harris, “The Role of the Military in Turkish Politics,” *Middle East Journal* 19, no. 1 (1965): 60.

359See Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, *Zabit Ve Kumandan İle Hasbihal* (İstanbul: İS Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2006).

such culture is argued to be linked to the German influence³⁶⁰, it is the reflection of the Turkish society. Gareth Jenkins argues:

*Turkish society tends to be hierarchical, patriarchal and authoritarian, with an emphasis on collective rather than individual rights and values. The result is a society which is both more cohesive and more restrictive than those in Western democracies. But both the cohesion and the restrictions owe more to traditional values and social pressure than to legislation.*³⁶¹

Consequently, TSK was very hierarchical and disciplined institution where junior officers do not oppose the decisions of their superiors, which made Marshal Çakmak's decisions and wisdom undisputed. Second, Turkish military was haunted by the Ottoman experiences, thus decisions have been taken in line with the those experiences, such as not building railroads that connects strategic centers. These two factors made it very difficult to challenge the ideas of victorious generals of War of Independence, and their memories continued to shape Turkish military culture. As we will argue in the next chapter, the Ottoman legacy continued to influence TSK and Turkish defense decisions under different structures, which were the one of the factors of the particularity of the TSK.

Therefore, despite Turkey's modernization efforts of its military, Turkey never reached its desired goal. As mentioned above, desires of Kemalist hegemony had to be negotiated with the resources of the country. Thus, Turkey did not have the means to construct strong modern military by itself, so it needed foreign help. But both pre-war and during the Second World War procurements such as show that Turkey used multiple sources without getting firmly committing to any alliances, which was in parallel with the general structure in Turkey.

360See Serhat Güvenç, "ABD Askeri Yardımı Ve Türk Ordusunun Dönüşümü: 1942-1960," in *Türkiye'de Ordu, Devlet Ve Güvenlik Siyaseti*, ed. İsmet Akça and Evren Balta Paker (İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2010), 255–284.

361Gareth Jenkins, "The Military and Turkish Society," *The Adelphi Papers* 41, no. 337 (2001): 11.

CHAPTER 5

AMERICANIZATION: 1945-1980

In similar fashion with previous chapter, this chapter will examine the period between 1945 and 1980 by looking at the international structure that arose after the Second World War. The main focus would be on the basis of liberal hegemony; its apogee and its crisis, vis-a-vis rival Soviet bloc, which challenged the liberal hegemony of the United States, yet failed to establish Communist hegemony.

After examination of the international structure, the second section will look at the transformation of the hegemonic structure in Turkey. Turkey joined the liberal bloc in parallel to developments in hegemonic rivalry after the Second World War. However, Turkey's both acceptance and participation in liberal bloc was far from being smooth. Active neutrality policy of Turkey during the Second World War had angered both Allies and the Soviet Union, believing that the policy only worked in favor of Nazi Germany. Despite, Turkey declared war on Nazi Germany just before the end of the war, Allies were hesitant about accepting Turkey to their bloc and the Soviet Union was angry enough to threaten Turkey. Consequently, a combination of events had shifted liberal bloc's view on Turkey. First, Turkey and Iran had become a major issue between the rival blocs because the Soviets perceived to be not playing according to the rules of the game and challenging the division of spheres of influence. Hence, perceived aggressiveness of the Soviet Union towards Turkey – i.e. territorial demands on Eastern Turkey and military base

at Straits – created a pretext for the liberal bloc’s acceptance of Turkey. Second, Turkey’s participation in Korea War showed Turkey’s willingness of becoming the part of liberal bloc.

Although, the foundations of Turkey’s leaning towards the capitalist system had been established during the Kemalist hegemony, Turkish bourgeoisie had found the chance to take a leading role in shaping the structure in Turkey and connecting Turkey to the liberal bloc after the Second World War. In other words, Turkish bourgeoisie acquired enough capital and power during the Second World War that it could dislodge itself from Kemalist hegemony to create another hegemonic bloc in parallel and connected to the United States’ hegemonic structure. Thus, the reflection was the establishment of Democrat Party, which gained the power in 1950.

Although, political process seemed to be damaged with military coups in 1960 and 1971, overall hegemony benefitted the military’s interventions in the political process. Thus, rather than dislodging post-Kemalist hegemony that was formed in 1950, military coups were the coercive means that kept Turkey within the liberal bloc by shifting the political structure that was necessary in sustaining means of capital accumulation. Despite the changes in political actors, we observe a continuity in Turkey’s relation to liberal bloc. Thus, military coups were happened when coercive tools like police and gendarmerie were unable to sustain its legitimacy –create consensual basis for the hegemony– and control over the dissident and opposing forces into submission to the hegemony. As a result no matter how the political area was shaped, Turkish hegemony’s connectedness to the liberal bloc in general and the United States in specific remained cordial, despite the problems and disagreements.

While Turkey and the United States enjoyed very close relationship during the 1950s and Turkey had streamlined its policies in accordance to the hegemonic power’s need, starting from the 1960s the relations soured due to incompatibilities between the foundations of hegemony in Turkey and the

international hegemony. Although, Turkey's threat perceptions were shaped in accordance to the Cold War, Turkey possessed threat perceptions of its own; it perceived Greece and Greek Cypriots as a threat. Consequently, this had created problems between the liberal bloc and hegemonic bloc in Turkey; mainly arising out of Turkish nationalism that hegemony in Turkey based on. Because of this difference and the clash of interest, the relation between Turkey and the United States increasingly strained during the 1960s and evolved into full fledged disagreement when Turkey intervened in Cyprus in 1974, which also negatively affected perceived Turkish loyalty to the liberal bloc. Though Turkey continued to stay within the liberal bloc, the influence of the bloc weakened both due to differences and liberal blocs' ability to coerce Turkey to behave in certain way.

Following the examination of international and domestic structure, the third section will deal with the effects of the interaction between different structures and connectedness of Turkey to liberal bloc on defense procurement decision and why attempts to re-build national defense industry failed during this period. Turkey's connectedness to the liberal bloc reflected upon its choices for defense; thus procurement of weapons. Starting with the Truman doctrine and intensified with the membership to NATO, Turkish Armed Forces transformed into an amalgam of the United States military and Ottoman military traditions. Although, Turkey received military supplies and equipment from the United States, TSK kept certain behavioral characteristics of the Ottoman military; for example being highly hierarchical and very disciplined. However, ease of acquiring weapons from the United States and other allied nations, which were usually surplus weapons, TSK lost its ability to independently assess its needs and create military doctrines and training.

Yet, military dependence also showed variations in parallel to Turkey's connectedness to liberal bloc. Hegemonic bloc in Turkey did not questioned the military dependency and perceived it as a necessary means for modernization during the 1950s, which resulted in disappearance of national

defense industrial base in a significant way. However, Turkey started to question the dependency as the influence of the liberal bloc weakened starting mid-1960s and reached its lowest point in the 1970s. Thus, the idea that Turkey needed to establish its own defense industry began to arise. However, the shift in attitudes towards the dependency on the United States hegemony would bring minor changes in the defense acquisition and procurement would only diversify within the liberal bloc, yet firmly stayed with American equipment. Both material and intellectual connectedness to the United States would manifest itself in procurement of weapons systems that had actually minimum benefit for the TSK. Consequently, in this chapter, we will deal with the relationship between international structure and hegemony in Turkey and its reflection on the Turkish defense procurement decision, where we'll discuss hegemony in Turkey in more detail.

5.1 International Structure

A new international structure was born with the conclusion of the Second World War. The world economic system, as well as the political, had divided between two rival blocs; one was under the leadership of the United States and the other was under the Soviet Union. However, the confrontational relationship between two blocs did not appear right away. Between 1945 to 1947, both rival blocs sought for the certain level of agreement and the division of the spheres of influence. Both sides were tired because of the Second World War and none of the blocs sought for another antagonistic encounter. Hobsbawm argues “[USSR] emerged from war in ruins, drained and exhausted, its peacetime economy in shreds, its government distrustful of a population much of which, outside Great Russia, had shown a distinct and understandable lack of commitment to the regime”³⁶². Furthermore, Geoffrey Robert argues “the Soviets were concerned about the dangers of a postwar division of the world into opposing blocs, but were not hostile to

³⁶²Hobsbawm, *The Age of Extremes: A History of the World, 1914-1991*, 232.

geographic blocs per se, only antagonistic ones which could threaten Soviet interest³⁶³. American loans and grants could help Soviet reconstruction, thus participating in world economic system, which could only be realized in the framework of a friendly and stable relations³⁶⁴. On the other side, both the United States and the United Kingdom accepted the de facto division in Eastern Europe.

The coming of the Cold War, however, was marked by the disagreements on the separation of the other parts of the world and the economic aids. Marc Trachtenberg argues that the dispute over Turkey and Iran played a triggering role in demarkation between blocs, which led to transformation of the American policy towards the Soviet Union and its policy on the German question³⁶⁵. The Soviet Union was making certain demands over certain parts of the world such as trusteeship over one of the former Italian colonies in the Mediterranean, a zone of occupation in Japan, control over northern Iran and military bases on the Turkish Straits. Such moves could be bargaining moves on the part of Soviets, where some of the demands did not meant to be taken seriously, to see what they could get in separation for the spheres of influence³⁶⁶. However, the United States, its allies and countries that would like to become part of the liberal bloc took Soviet demands as a pretext to solidify the hegemonic structure that was defined in terms of antagonistic struggle, thus the policy of containment and Truman doctrine have appeared.

On the other hand, economic issues have contributed in defining the nature of the relation between the blocs. The significant event was the break up of the negotiations on the US economic aid for the European reconstruction, Marshall Plan. The Soviet Union was invited to participate in the Marshall Plan and Soviet delegation met with the representatives of French and British

363Geoffrey Roberts, *The Soviet Union in World Politics: Coexistence, Revolution and Cold War, 1945-1991* (London & New York: Routledge, 1999), 20.

364Ibid., 17.

365Marc Trachtenberg, *A Constructed Peace: The Making the European Settlement, 1945-1963* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999), 35.

366Ibid., 36.

governments to discuss the joint response to the United States' offer. However, the negotiation broke because the Soviet Union had to share information about its economy and accept the precondition of the aid. Furthermore, when Czechoslovakia and Poland attempted to join Marshall Plan, it was blocked by the Soviet Union³⁶⁷. While the Soviet Union was unmoved by the declaration of Truman Doctrine in 1947 and continued to negotiate with the United States on the matters of the future of Austria and Germany, break down of Marshall Plan negotiations in July 1947 consolidated the separation between blocs, and coupled with the Truman Doctrine, the nature of the relations have turned into antagonist encounters³⁶⁸.

Consequently, the international structure was built upon the antagonistic relations between two blocs, struggling for increasing their influence by different means. The Soviet Union exercised control over the zone occupied by the Red Army and/or other communist armed forces at the end of the war and did not attempt to extend its influence further by direct military force³⁶⁹, but supported other communist regimes, in their struggle against the liberal bloc, such as Stalin's help of North Korea in orchestration of the invasion of the South Korea³⁷⁰. On the other hand, the United States became the leader of the liberal bloc and inherited what remained of the old imperial hegemony of the former colonial powers³⁷¹. Decolonization process, on the other hand, opened up a new venue of struggle between the blocs, where the United States built an image of "protector and benefactor of the weak new governments of the Third World"³⁷², while the Soviet Union projected the

367Barry J. Eichengreen, *The European Economy Since 1945: Coordinated Capitalism and Beyond* (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2007), 68.

368Roberts, *The Soviet Union in World Politics: Coexistence, Revolution and Cold War, 1945-1991*, 22–5.

369Hobsbawm, *The Age of Extremes: A History of the World, 1914-1991*, 226.

370Lawrence Freedman, *The Cold War: A Military History* (London: Cassell & Co, 2001), 36.

371Hobsbawm, *The Age of Extremes: A History of the World, 1914-1991*, 226.

372William L. Hosch, ed., *Korean War and the Vietnam War: People, Politics, and Power*, 1st ed., America at War (New York, N.Y.: Britannica Educational Publishing, 2010), 202.

image of a “state that stood for peace in the face of capitalist and imperialist warmongering”³⁷³. Yet, the means and mechanism of spreading the influence and control within respective blocs differed.

The Soviet Union predominantly used coercive tools to keep opposition suppressed both within the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact and keep other states in line with the strict Soviet foreign policy interest. The Soviet Union has transformed the structure of the states within its immediate reach. The economic relations with the liberal block was limited, thus “the socialist part of the world was largely separate”³⁷⁴. Consequently, Eastern Europe, where the Soviets have considerable control, tried to be transformed into an image of the Soviet Union. Single-party control was established through ousting liberal and center parties while socialist parties forced to merge with communist party, state-owned and controlled economies with centralized planning and direction, forced collectivization of agriculture and regimes were dominated by a single idolized party leader³⁷⁵. However, development trajectories of the states remained different, thus different structures have occurred, while being connected to the Soviet Union.

However, the Soviet Union was unable to construct a hegemonic structure that incorporated the interests and demands of the states within the Communist bloc, thus making the communist bloc unstable and fragile. Such nature of the structure manifested itself in Soviet invasion of Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968, the Yugoslav-Soviet split in 1948 and Sino-Soviet split in 1960, where Albania sided with China³⁷⁶.

On the other hand, liberal bloc, under the leadership of the United States founded the hegemonic structure through both consent and coercion. The basis of the consent within the liberal bloc was the belief that “most effective

373Roberts, *The Soviet Union in World Politics: Coexistence, Revolution and Cold War, 1945-1991*, 36.

374Hobsbawm, *The Age of Extremes: A History of the World, 1914-1991*, 269.

375Roberts, *The Soviet Union in World Politics: Coexistence, Revolution and Cold War, 1945-1991*, 27.

376Ibid., 30.

productive unit was the giant corporation, which at the limit integrated in one physical structure the activities of independent firms in the industrial districts”³⁷⁷. Fordist production, with post-war boom, gained its legitimacy through Keynesian welfare policies, such as unemployment-insurance programmes and guaranteeing minimum levels of purchasing power for persons with no income and aim of full employment, which acted as the basis of consent among working class.

Fordist production and Keynesian policies was organized and spread through the institutional settings and agreements within the liberal bloc, where the United States assumed the leadership and dominant in the international trade and economic regimes. The Bretton Woods and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) system were critical in the institutionalization of the liberal hegemonic structure and propagation and sustainment of the structure's ideas. The Bretton Woods system introduced pegged but adjustable exchange rates, where the US Dollar became the reserve currency and accounting unit for the international trade. Thus, the United States declare a par value against gold, while others declare par values against the dollar. It also introduced controls to limit international capital flows. Finally, the system established the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which was created for the monitoring of national economies and extend balance of payments financing to countries at risk³⁷⁸, and International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (later becomes the World Bank). Consequently, the system coupled with GATT, aimed to trade liberalization, which gave the United States control over the pace and direction of the trade structures³⁷⁹.

377 Charles F. Sabel, “Flexible Specialisation and the Re-emergence of Regional Economies,” in *Post-Fordism: A Reader*, ed. Ash Amin, Digital (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2003), 102.

378 Barry J. Eichengreen, *Globalizing Capital: A History of the International Monetary System*, Second (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2008), 91–2.

379 Arrighi, *The Long Twentieth Century: Money, Power and the Origins of Our Times*, 72.

In addition to the new economic structure, the United States tried to lock in various states into its hegemonic structure via institutionalized security/military relations that enabled the spread of the US military power around the globe. Manifestations of such arrangement were North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1949, Central Eastern Treaty Organization (CENTO) in 1955, South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) in 1954 and The Australia, New Zealand, United States Security Treaty (ANZUS). The foundational idea behind these security organizations was the Communist scare to keep members in line with the US policies despite varied integration to the liberal structure. Yet, because of the variance in integration and communist scare was not sufficient to bind, institutional arrangements, except for NATO and ANZUS, either dissolved or lost their functions as the members began to veer away from the liberal structure, which was the function of liberal block's inability to bring together and facilitate common interest among certain members.

The liberal bloc, as compared to the communist bloc, was more willing to provide certain flexibility with the structure as long as behaviors do not undermine the foundations of the structure. Consequently, the structure manifested itself different at different states. During the 1950s, European reconstruction efforts aimed that re-establishing the industrial base through promoting the form of production that was pioneered by the United States³⁸⁰, but the efforts in developing countries mainly aimed limited industrialization and focused on agricultural production within the division of international labour that promoted under the free trade. However, economic problems of the developing countries forced the structure to make necessary alteration, such as limiting the free trade and allowing developing countries for “segregated and planned industrialization by substituting their own production for imported manufactures”³⁸¹.

380Eichengreen, *The European Economy Since 1945: Coordinated Capitalism and Beyond*, 89–90.

381Hobsbawm, *The Age of Extremes: A History of the World, 1914-1991*, 269.

In Europe, different structure, yet connected to US hegemony, arose with a set of institutional arrangements that met the desired interests of the parties and binding them together, which also worked for the general strength of the liberal structure. The Marshall Plan and Monet Plan was based on the belief that the European market could not function properly when Germany would not be allowed to industrialize because of the fear emanating from the both World Wars and because European production was inherently connected. Furthermore, the institutional integration among European countries that included Germany would act as (1) integrator of Germany to Europe and relieve France's security and economic concerns and (2) enable Germany to rebrand itself and gain international respectability³⁸². Consequently, the long march for European integration began with European Coal and Steel Community (1952), European Defense Community (1952 – never put in effect), Western European Union (1954 – as a predecessor of EDC) European Economic Community (1957), European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom – 1957). Furthermore, Germany (Federal Republic of Germany at the time) was allowed to rearm and invest in its defense industry, as the suspicions on Germany diminished by its integration and the perceived necessity to oppose Soviet Union. Slowly, Germany became the pacesetter and driver of the European economy. Yet, the integration process was slow between its inception and 1970s. However, the integration would gain momentum in the neoliberal era. Consequently, initial six European integrator, France, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxemburg and Germany, began to establish a new group within Europe, which would increase its power and become a significant center in the liberal bloc.

On the other hand, the United States utilized its coercive tools to protect the interests of the liberal structure. Such utilization of coercive tools by the United States that involved participation in Korea and Vietnam wars, covert operation such as Pay of Pigs Invasion in 1961 and instigation of military

382Eichengreen, *The European Economy Since 1945: Coordinated Capitalism and Beyond*, 164, 112, 109, 69.

coups such as Iran 1953 to install pro-western government³⁸³ as well as the proxy wars with the Soviet Union. In addition, the United States utilized its hegemonic power to keep the members of the liberal bloc in line, such as opposing France and the United Kingdom during Suez Crisis in 1956.

However, the liberal hegemonic structure began to weaken by mid-1960s as the capitalist accumulation started to suffer because Fordist production and Keynesian policies have reached their limits as well as the United States' power weakened mostly due to Vietnam War and fell into crisis with the late-1960s and the 1970s, which was observable with the rising the popular opposition. Jessop argues that the expansion of the welfare state, which shifted the balance of class forces towards the organized labor, undermined some of the conditions that sustained Fordist production³⁸⁴. During the golden era of the Fordist production (1945- mid-1960s), organized labor had a central place in the production relations, as the Fordist production needed the consent of the workers to function and grow. Consequently, the Fordist production yielded significant outputs and economic development in states where labor was organized and the in the absence of organized labor, the economic investment and productivity growth was low and lagged behind the others such as the United Kingdom and Ireland in the post-war environment³⁸⁵. The organized labor should be incorporated to the structure so that it would not stage an opposition. Accordingly, labor unions that could pose threat to the liberal structure was pressured and phased out, while labor organization that were integrated to the structure were supported. For example, labor unions that had connections with the Communist Party of the United States were disciplined through anti-communist laws, such as Taft-Hartley, and kicked out of the umbrella organizations, such as American

383Saeed Kamali Dehghan and Richard Norton-Taylor, "CIA Admits Role in 1953 Iranian Coup," *Guardian*, August 19, 2013, <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/19/cia-admits-role-1953-iranian-coup>.

384Bob Jessop, "Post-Fordism and the State," in *Post-Fordism: A Reader*, ed. Ash Amin, Digital Print (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2003), 256.

385Eichengreen, *The European Economy Since 1945: Coordinated Capitalism and Beyond*, 90.

Federation of Labour (AFL) and Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO), which acted to as the propagators of the liberal structure³⁸⁶.

However, labor, empowered with welfare state, organization and tighter labour market, began to oppose the structure in 1968-1969 and demand more from the hegemonic classes, which yielded rising wages than the productivity. This resulted in squeezing of profits and reduction in the availability of retained earnings for capital accumulation³⁸⁷. Labor opposition usually came in connection with the social rights and anti-war movements. In France, workers joined to student protests against the inefficiency of university system in May 1968. In the United States, opposition to the structure began with the anti-war protests that have erupted after the Tet Offensive of the Communists in Vietnam.

Throughout the 1960s, the United States was experiencing payment deficits mostly because of spendings associated with Vietnam, world wide defense, military installations in Germany, aid to underdeveloped countries and military aid³⁸⁸, thus it was under pressure to decrease its military spending by cutting down its military forces in Central Europe³⁸⁹. Although, American and South Vietnamese forces won the battle and Communist failed to reached their goals, the Tet Offensive damaged US hegemony, as American youth “sought to avoid the draft and engaged in increasingly radical protests, challenging not only the war, but the Cold War assumptions behind it and the political system that had allowed these assumptions to take hold”³⁹⁰.

386Ellen Schrecker, “Labor and the Cold War: Legacy of McCarthyism,” in *American Labor and the Cold War: Grassroots Politics and Postwar Political Culture*, ed. Robert W. Cherny, William Issel, and Kieran Walsh Taylor (New Brunswick, NJ and London: Rutgers University Press, 2004), For more detailed account see: AFL and CIO was merged in 1955 and become the blueprint for labor organizations in states that were integrated to liberal structure.

387Eichengreen, *The European Economy Since 1945: Coordinated Capitalism and Beyond*, 223.

388Francis J. Gavin, *Gold, Dollars, and Power: The Politics of International Monetary Relations* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2004), 4.

389Marc Trachtenberg, *The Cold War and After: History, Theory, and the Logic of International Politics* (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2012), 161–2.

390Freedman, *The Cold War: A Military History*, 105.

Furthermore, the impending crisis started to develop in the Bretton Woods system, which was the core of economic structuring of the liberal bloc. The Bretton Woods system dependent on the US economy performance and the participants willingness to support US dollar, where the United States declare a par value against the gold and other declare par values against the dollar. The United States could run payments deficits in the amounts that foreign governments and central banks demand and by changing interest rate, it could manage dollar demand. Eichengreen summarizes the stress on the system as “the greater the reluctance to adjust the peg and to raise interest rates and taxes, the larger the credits. And the more rapid the relaxation of capital controls, the greater the financing needed to offset speculative outflows”³⁹¹. The system assumed to reach symmetry once the Europe completed its recovery and the adjustment system through IMF would satisfy the world's demands for liquidity. However, “the system grew less symmetric as the dollar solidified its status as the leading reserve currency”³⁹². Thus, the United States continued to supply the world economy with dollars, which surpassed the US gold reserves in 1960 and US liabilities to foreign monetary authorities in 1963.

Furthermore, when the economic productivity of Europe and Japan surpassed the US economy –coupled with the US military spending–, the United States was put into permanent deficit. Consequently, Europe and Japan were able to run higher inflation rates enabled by the faster growth. Rather than forcing the United States to devalue, foreign banks absorbed dollar, thus allowing their inflation rates rise further. 1971 saw a significant flight from the dollar, which was followed by France and the United Kingdom's plan for converting dollars to gold, as the system had already undermined by the US dollars exceeding its US reserves and foreign liabilities. Nixon administration blocked the convertibility of dollar to gold and suspended the commitment to provide gold to official foreign holders. The

³⁹¹Eichengreen, *Globalizing Capital: A History of the International Monetary System*, 112.

³⁹²*Ibid.*, 113.

Bretton Woods system was collapsed when flight from the dollar continued and European countries floated their currencies beyond the negotiated boundaries in 1972 and 1973³⁹³.

Therefore, the liberal economy entered into a period of crisis in the 1970s characterized by stagnation and inflation. The foundational ideas of the structure have been questioned by social bases that manifested itself through strikes and anti-war and social movements. The United States hegemony began to decline, though not uniformly in all fields, especially after the US withdrawal from the Vietnam. The crisis was compounded with the Oil Crisis of 1973 when the OPEC members decided to increase the value of oil by decreasing the production.

Consequently, international structure and hegemonic rivalry were shaped by crisis of the liberal bloc. The weakened power of the United States also meant that the control over the participants within the liberal bloc weakened. Therefore, members began to veer from the US foreign policy positions, which was exemplified by France's attempts of detente with the Soviet bloc and Germany's Ostpolitik in 1969. The United States also followed the path opened by France and Germany and the period of detente began between the United States and the Soviet Union in 1971.

5.2 Americanization of Hegemony in Turkey

Turkey was a willing participant of the liberal hegemony following the Second World War. Kemalist hegemony had already been leaning towards liberal West within its founding ideas and the main goal of transformation of the society was becoming a capitalist society with Western values. However, Turkey did not aligned itself with any bloc during the inter-wars years because of the hegemonic rivalry, crisis of capitalism and introvert characteristic of liberal bloc. As a consequence, Turkey was able to harness

393Ibid., 126–132.

hegemonic rivalry and kept its distance to rival hegemonies and focused more on the establishing Kemalist hegemony and survival of the Turkey.

At the end of the Second World War, on the other hand, both international structure and domestic structure in Turkey had changed. The establishment of a new hegemonic bloc and structure had begun at the end of the war because Kemalist hegemony was weakened during the war, thus strengthened bourgeoisie required a different ideational basis for its capital accumulation. During the Second World War, Turkey had to sustain a large military to defend itself in case of aggression. This created incredible stress on the Turkish economy³⁹⁴ and undermined the economic development that were made in 1930s³⁹⁵ despite the flourishing foreign trade³⁹⁶. Consequently, Turkey passed the 'National Defense Law' in 1940, which increased state's control over the economy that had already been in place by the statist policies "to counter the hoarding, profiteering and shortages that had resulted since the outbreak of war"³⁹⁷. However, government was unable to prevent war-profiteering "partly because of tax evasion, but mostly because of absence of any effective modern system of tax assessment and collection, these fortunes [gained by war-profiteering] were substantially exempt from taxation or the control of the government"³⁹⁸. Thus, merchants, brokers and agents in Istanbul made great fortunes, which disturbed the industrial bourgeoisie, who had scant possibility of profiting from the war³⁹⁹.

In an attempt in controlling war-profiteering by taxing previously untaxed commercial wealth within Turkey and to curb inflationary spiral⁴⁰⁰, *Varlık Vergisi* (Capital Tax or Wealth Tax) was introduced in 11 November 1942.

394Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, 296.

395Ahmad, *Turkey: Quest for Identity*, 97.

396Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, 296–7.

397Ahmad, *Turkey: Quest for Identity*, 98.

398Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, 297.

399Keyder, *State and Class in Turkey: A Study in Capitalist Development*, 112.

400Shaw and Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey: Volume II: Reform, Revolution and Republic: The Rise of Modern Turkey, 1808-1975*, 2:398.

The tax was administered by “special local committees of government financial experts and local property owners appointed by and responsible to the municipality”⁴⁰¹ because of the difficulties in acquiring honest capital estimates from capital holders. Furthermore, the decisions of the committee cannot be appealed. However, the assessment and collection of the tax had become mainly directed towards the non-Muslim community of Turkey. This arbitrariness of the application of tax forced many non-Muslims to sell their assets (real estate, factories etc.), which were bought by the Turkish bourgeoisie at very low prices, thereby enriching this class⁴⁰². However, the tax failed to reach its proposed aim, thus making even worse for those who had to live through the ever expanding black market, shortages and closure of legitimate business⁴⁰³. Moreover, the tax also facilitated the alienation of Turkish bourgeoisie from the Kemalist hegemony⁴⁰⁴. Therefore, at the end of the war, the consensual basis of Kemalist hegemonic bloc had been shaken both in the eyes of masses, whom Kemalist hegemony was unable to penetrate and suffered from inflation and shortages during the war.

Kemalist hegemony was unable to reproduce itself for various reasons. First, as Zurcher argues, the Kemalist hegemony had failed to change the lives of rural population, especially small farmers, who did not experience improvements in their standard of living, in health, education or communication. Second, rural communities despised and feared from coercive power of the state (Gendarmerie and tax collectors), which created resentment against the state. Third, although the number of factory workers increased from 25,000 in 1923 to somewhere between 300,000⁴⁰⁵ to 330,000⁴⁰⁶, their number remained minimal compared to approximately 20

401Ibid., 2:399.

402Ahmad, *Turkey: Quest for Identity*, 298; Keyder, *State and Class in Turkey: A Study in Capitalist Development*, 113.

403Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, 301.

404Zurcher, *Turkey: A Modern History*, 207.

405Shaw and Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey: Volume II: Reform, Revolution and Republic: The Rise of Modern Turkey, 1808-1975*, 2:401.

406Zurcher, *Turkey: A Modern History*, 207.

million population and their power was restricted by the prohibitions on labor organizations, trade unions and right to strike until 1945. Workers had also been badly hit by the war time conditions⁴⁰⁷. As Zurcher points out “İsmet Pasha İnönü’s government had become deeply unpopular, even hated, by the large majority of the Turkish population for variety of reasons”⁴⁰⁸.

Furthermore, Turkey also alienated Allied Powers during the war because of the application of arbitrary capital tax against the non-Muslims and following the policy of ‘active neutrality’. During the war, Turkey resisted pressures from warring parties to take part in the conflict and had altered its position vis-a-vis the winning party at the different times of the conflict to protect itself from possible entry to the war. For example, In 1940, Mutual Assistance Treaty, which was signed between France-United Kingdom-Turkey in 1938, was nullified when France had collapsed against the Nazi Germany and Turkey refused, mutually agreeing with the United Kingdom, to enter the war by invoking Protocol No. 2, which might provoke Soviet aggression⁴⁰⁹. Consequently, this entailed some cooperation with the winning party at the particular moment during the war, while keeping the other side content. For example, when the Nazi Germany invaded Balkans before engaging to invasion of the Soviet Union, Turkey had signed Treaty of Territorial Integrity and Friendship with Germany in 18 June 1941. Although, warring parties were satisfied with the neutrality of Turkey during the period of mid-1941 to mid-1943, the pressure of Turkish entry into the war increased when Italy was knocked out of the war and the Mediterranean was safe from Axis Powers. Yet, Turkey resisted in entering the war, while there were still German soldiers at its border. Thus, Turkey’s neutrality had been questioned by the allies⁴¹⁰. Consequently, at the end of the war, allies were disappointed

407Ibid., 206–7.

408Ibid., 206.

409Joshua Walker, “World War II: The Foundation of the Modern American-Turkish Relationship, 1939-1947,” in *American Turkish Encounters: Politics and Culture, 1830-1989*, ed. Nur Bilge Criss et al. (Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2011), 165–6.

410Ibid., 167.

about Turkey's neutrality when they were winning, believed that Turkey's active neutrality worked in favor of the Nazi Germany. Thus, the liberal bloc after the war questioned the dependability and compatibility of Turkey.

As a result, the bourgeoisie class realized the opportunity to construct a new hegemonic structure in Turkey for both the continuation of capital accumulation within the borders of Turkey through connecting with the newly establishing liberal order. Thus, while Kemalist hegemony dissolved slowly despite İnönü's attempts to control dissidence via incorporating their interests and requests to the Kemalist hegemony, a new hegemonic bloc transcended the control of former hegemonic structure in Turkey with the help from favorable environment that was created by the liberal bloc of the United States. Dissidence tried to be incorporated into the existing hegemonic structure through constituting multi-party system. However, İnönü expected that establishment of opposition party would provide certain level of control over government and airing of the dissidence, but would not challenge Kemalist hegemony in a significant way. It would act as some kind of safety valve. Consequently, İnönü and Celal Bayar, who subscribed to the fundamental tenet of secularism, worked closely in the establishment of *Demokrat Parti* (DP - Democrat Party), which was established by the former CHP members –including Adnan Menderes, Fuat Köprülü and Refik Koraltan– and officially registered in January 1946. Feroz Ahmad defies the general attitude in CHP toward DP as: "Initially Democrats were seen as another loyal opposition, created by men who came out of RPP [CHP]. After all, its founding members were all Kemalists of long standing and offered virtually the same political and economic programme as the ruling party"⁴¹¹. Thus, the close relationship between CHP and DP at the initial stages and transfer of some representatives from CHP to DP could explain at certain level why other political parties that existed at the time were unable to attract any attention despite the similarities in their calls for new system in Turkey. For example, *Milli Kalkınma Partisi* (National Development Party), which was

411 Ahmad, *Turkey: Quest for Identity*, 100.

founded by Nuri Demirağ, called for liberalization of the economy and development of free enterprise, yet its influence was very limited⁴¹². On the other hand, political parties that would not be incorporated to the hegemonic structure was banned and suppressed as it was done during the early years of the Republic. For example, *Türkiye Sosyalist Emekçi ve Köylü Partisi* (the Socialist Workers' and Peasants' Party of Turkey) , which was founded in 20 June 1946 and led by a Communist Dr. Şefik Hüsnü Değmer, was closed in 1 December 1946⁴¹³. In a short period of time, DP would prove that it was more than a safety valve for the Kemalist hegemony, but harbinger of the new hegemonic structure in Turkey.

İnönü tried to incorporate masses to the hegemonic structure and form a support base through inducements. The first attempt was made through land reform legislation, the Land Distribution Law, which aimed to “provide adequate land for farmers who had none or too little by distributing unused state lands, lands from pious endowments (evkaf), reclaimed land, land without clear ownership and land expropriated from landowners who owned more than 500 donum”⁴¹⁴. However, the law was far from solving the problems of the small farmers, which composed the 99.75 per cent of the landownership, because the problem of farmers was not the lack of access to the land, but lack of access to means of production as large landowner or an affluent city dweller supplied the seeds and equipment to farmers and took from a quarter to a half of the harvest in return, which forced small farmers to live at the level of subsistence⁴¹⁵. Another attempt was made to incorporate the working class to the hegemony. Although the population of workers were small compared to general population, their numbers were increasing as mentioned above. Consequently, Ministry of Labour was established on 7 January 1945, followed by the repealing the ban on class organizations in

412Zurcher, *Turkey: A Modern History*, 211.

413Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, 310; Zurcher, *Turkey: A Modern History*, 213.

414Zurcher, *Turkey: A Modern History*, 210.

415Ibid.; Keyder, *State and Class in Turkey: A Study in Capitalist Development*, 126.

1946, which facilitated the formation of trade unions. However, as mentioned above, anything that could be a direct opposition to the hegemony was continued to be suppressed, thus some of the trade unions were prosecuted due to accusations of Communism. In the end, the legal position of unions were defined by the “Workers’ and Employers’ Unions and Regional Federations Law” in 1947, which still withheld the right to strike but allowed free formation of unions and confederations⁴¹⁶.

These shifts within the hegemonic structure in Turkey was also influenced by the changes within the international structure and Turkey’s explicit attempt to become part of that structure. Consequently, Turkey become part of the Bretton Woods system during the Second World War when the Allied victory was almost assured. During the initial post-war environment while the line were being drawn between two hegemonic blocs, Turkey felt the need to become closer to the liberal bloc because of the intrinsic values of the hegemonic structure and perceived Soviet aggression, which created the pretext for both Turkey and liberal bloc to form an alliance. Furthermore, Turkey, as Zurcher argues, “was desperate for American financial assistance”⁴¹⁷. In order to connect with the liberal bloc and the United States, Turkey had to make certain changes. Consequently, Inonu tried to reconstruct hegemonic structure in parallel to ideal basis of the liberal bloc, hence succeeded in gaining support and certain level of acceptance from the United States and therefore the liberal bloc. This acceptance by the liberal bloc sustained as when the Truman doctrine was declared, Turkey started to receive military aid and training, which was followed by Marshall Plan in 1947 and Turkey’s admission to Organization for European Economic Cooperation in 1948, thereby paving the way for greater influence of the United States in Turkey and its structure.

The trend towards the increased connectedness of the Turkish structure to and synchronization with the liberal bloc was also effective in sidelining

⁴¹⁶Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, 477.

⁴¹⁷Zurcher, *Turkey: A Modern History*, 215.

forces that were against the certain aspects of the liberal bloc and wanted to sustain Kemalist hegemony as it was. For example, when the Kemalist hegemony realized the increased acclaim of DP, CHP and the state apparatus tried to prevent DP's rise to power by making the election one year earlier in 1946 than the proposed date in 1947. When Recep Peker came into power following the election in 1946, he sought to increase state control over the economy and authoritarian rule over the dissidence, but his attempts to restore old order was failed with the intervention from İnönü⁴¹⁸. The change of the hegemonic structure had already been underway, attempts to keep the structure as it was was futile, as the new historical bloc formed around DP and the Kemalist structure with statism was incompatible with the liberal bloc. Turkish bourgeoisie –merchants that accumulated great wealth during the war and industrialists– and dissident labors and peasants joined together against the Kemalist hegemonic structure. Thus, DP won the general elections in 1950, which marked the beginning of the Americanization of hegemonic structure in Turkey.

The victory of DP brought the new hegemonic structure in Turkey but not in terms of the economic policies and mode of production. Because, the economic policies and connectedness to global economic structure that was supported by the United States had already started with CHP and through Marshall aid. This was the main reason why there had been no difference, except the attempt of Recep Peker, between either in foreign policy or economic policies, although DP was more vocal about the free market, between DP and CHP. What DP and the new bloc brought Turkey was the constitution of consensual basis for the new hegemonic structure, which presented a shift from Kemalist structure. CHP had started to relax the control on religion following the transition to multi-party system by reintroduction of religious education and training establishments for preachers, establishment of Faculty of Divinity at Ankara University and

418Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, 307–9.

reopening of religious tombs and shrines⁴¹⁹. DP furthered what had been started by CHP by restoring the call to prayer in Arabic and the language of the constitution to its Ottoman original⁴²⁰. Furthermore, DP recognized and accepted the existence of autonomous religious organizations and legitimized them when DP sought support from Nurcu movement in 1954 and 1957 elections⁴²¹. Consequently, DP incorporated the traditional culture of masses by relaxation of secularism and making Islam more prominent in everyday life in the cities to its hegemonic structure, thus gaining the support of masses for pursuing the spread of capitalist mode of production in Turkey.

Another significant change during the DP period was interlocking the hegemonic structure in Turkey to the structure in the United States and the liberal bloc. Convergence between two hegemonic structures started with the end of the Second World War as could be observed with the changes mentioned above. During the DP period, Turkey had willingly gave away of its flexibility within the international structure by firmly placing itself to institutional arrangements with the liberal bloc that went beyond political-economic institutions. Thus, Turkey's membership to NATO had solidified Turkey's place within the liberal bloc and limited its flexibility within the system. Although, the United States committed to Turkey in its economic development and integration to capitalist world economy –through Bretton Woods system and Marshall Funds–, Turkey perceived that the United States did not firmly committed to the defense of Turkey in case of the Soviet invasion, despite Truman doctrine created the possibility of aiding Turkey. As Ahmad mentions “Inonu wanted a firm commitment from Washington and not just military and economic aid”⁴²². Thus, when NATO was established and Turkey was not a founding member, both CHP and DP tried to threaten the United States with Turkey's neutrality in case of confrontation between the

419Zurcher, *Turkey: A Modern History*, 233.

420Ahmad, *Turkey: Quest for Identity*, 108.

421Zurcher, *Turkey: A Modern History*, 234.

422Ahmad, *Turkey: Quest for Identity*, 106.

Soviet Union and the NATO and use this threat to facilitate Turkey's membership to the organization⁴²³. Turkey's attempts to enter NATO was reach to fruition after Turkey decided to send Turkish soldiers to Korean War, where 25,000 Turkish soldiers fought throughout the war and suffered more than 6,000 casualties⁴²⁴. Finally, Turkey became a full member of NATO in 18 February 1952.

However, Turkey's attempts to enter NATO was more than the perceived threats from the Soviet Union, but it was the reflection of the desire to become Western and modern that had been entrenched within the hegemonic structures of Turkey. Yücel Bozdağlıoğlu argues that "membership in NATO went beyond military considerations and was regarded as the key step towards becoming a European state"⁴²⁵. Although, the Soviet Union took a threatening stand in 1945, it abstained from any action that would pressure Turkey since August 1946 and after the death of Stalin, the Soviet Union renounced former claims on Turkish territories and declared the wish to establish ties of friendship⁴²⁶. However, Turkey's firm and uncompromising attachment to the liberal bloc and its founding ideas –i.e. perceiving the Soviet Union as the ultimate threat– prevented any rapprochement between the Soviet Union and Turkey in the 1950 and early-1960s.

Consequently, during the 1950s, the influence of the United States constantly increased as Turkey increasingly integrated to liberal hegemony. This integration did not only happen via structuring the Turkish economy in accordance to expert views and where Turkey should be located in the division of international labour and the political and military policies, but also happen culturally. The American way of thinking had already been entering to

423Hüseyin Bağcı, *Türk Dış Politikasında 1950'li Yıllar* (Ankara: METU Press, 2001), 14.

424Zurcher, *Turkey: A Modern History*, 235.

425Yücel Bozdağlıoğlu, *Turkish Foreign Policy and Turkish Identity: A Constructivist Approach*, Studies in International Relations (New York & London: Routledge, 2003), 59.

426Ibid., 59–60.

Turkey by the Marshall Fund and machines and experts sent for the administration of the fund and training for the new machinery. But, the mode of thinking move beyond training Turkish official and sought for institutional footing of the American mode of thinking. Consequently, this institutional footing was established by introducing public and business administration education through exchange of scholars, establishment of *Türkiye ve Orta Doğu Amme İdaresi Enstitüsü* (TODAIE - The Institute of Public Administration for Turkey and the Middle East) and founding of *İşletme İktisadi Enstitüsü* (IIE - Institute of Business Administration). Furthermore, U.S. oriented higher education institution, *Orta Doğu Teknik Üniversitesi* (ODTÜ - the Middle East Technical University), was founded in 1956⁴²⁷. On the other hand, hegemonic structure in Turkey had kept its particularities despite the increased American influence, which created contradictions and resistance to American mode of thinking and ways of doing things. Burcak Keskin-Kozat illustrates the difficulties between experts of the European Cooperation Agency, which was founded for the overseeing of the use of Marshall Plan funds in recipient states, and Turkish bureaucrats that arises out of Turkish nationalist pride –making Turks unusually difficult in accepting advice from outside–, the Pasha mentality –rigid centralization of administrative units and high level hierarchy within the unit– and patronage politics. However, Keskin-Kozat also shows the similarity in mode of thinking between foreign experts and Turkish intellectuals, even with ‘leftist’ intellectuals, who were against the Americanization of Turkey but agreed in the necessity of expert help in modernization⁴²⁸. Burcu Sarı Karademir also stresses the non-partisan nature of efforts to transforming Turkey into little

427Behlül Üsdiken, “Transferring American Models for Education in Business and Public Administration to Turkey, 1950-1970,” in *American Turkish Encounters: Politics and Culture, 1830-1989*, ed. Nur Bilge Criss et al. (Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2011), 319–23.

428Burdak Keskin-Kozat, “Reinterpreting Turkey’s Marshall Plan: Of Machines, Experts, and Technical Knowledge,” in *American Turkish Encounters: Politics and Culture, 1830-1989*, ed. Nur Bilge Criss et al. (Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2011), 196–203.

America, which made American culture and lifestyle as popular objects of desire in Turkey⁴²⁹.

Turkey, therefore, experienced a significant transformation and exceptionally liberal trade regime in early-1950s due to favorable market conditions for agricultural products and foreign aids. The increased agricultural output was translated into increased volume of exports and increased GDP. Then, exports earnings and foreign aid were mainly used to buy tractors, road-building machinery, construction materials and motor vehicles and very small portion of the earning were put into buying consumer goods⁴³⁰.

However, favorable terms for agricultural exports came to an abrupt end when weather conditions and world prices shifted unfavorably. Consequently, despite the shifts in international markets made an economic growth that was based on agricultural exports and cheap funds, DP continued to pursue economic expansion through adopting some statist measures of control and inflationist policies, thus also increasing the dependency of foreign funds⁴³¹. Import restriction were put into place, which created opportunities for domestic industrialist bourgeoisie to produce for the domestic market at favorable terms. Consequently, industry started to grow after 1955 when the imports restrictions were imposed. Industrial rate of growth had passed the rate of growth of the agriculture and increased the share of industrialists up to 14% within the general economy⁴³².

Increasing industrialization of Turkey and changes in the international market, consequently, required a different way of control and stability of the market

429For example, on 21 October 1957 President Celal Bayar addressed to people at Taksim: "We are emulating the development stages of America. Thirty years from now, this country will become a little America with 50 million people" Burcu Sarı Karademir, "Turkey as a 'Willing Receiver' of American Soft Power: Hollywood Movies in Turkey During the Cold War," *Turkish Studies* 13, no. 4 (2012): 637.

430Keyder, *State and Class in Turkey: A Study in Capitalist Development*, 132–3.

431Ibid., 134; İsmet Akça, "Ordu, Devlet Ve Sınıflar: 27 Mayıs 1960 Darbesi Örneği Üzerinden Alternatif Bir Okuma Denemesi," in *Türkiye'de Ordu, Devlet Ve Güvenlik Siyaseti*, ed. Evren Balta Paker and İsmet Akça (Istanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2010), 373.

432Keyder, *State and Class in Turkey: A Study in Capitalist Development*, 134.

and social forces that DP increasingly unable to provide. DP's inflationary economic growth policy and resistance to listen its international partners in how to allocate resources had become a liability in the eyes of the bloc that supported the DP's rise to the power⁴³³. Furthermore, as DP loses its capacity to fulfill necessary conditions for capital accumulation, it had become increasingly authoritarian in a bid to keep the hegemonic structure. This alienated traditional support base of DP; the middle class that was appeared during the 1950s and increasing labor class⁴³⁴. The criticism of the middle class was based on the unplanned nature of DP's economic policies, impoverishing effects of social unbalance and inflationist environment and authoritarianism of both political and public spheres⁴³⁵. On the other hand, DP was unable to make necessary changes to embed labor's to the hegemonic structure by providing the rights that had already been given in Fordist mode of production and necessary to the sustain that system. In the end, DP had failed to conform with the hegemonic system that created it and the international system that sustained it.

Consequently, 1960 military coup was aimed at the political actor that was unable to sustain the hegemonic structure, hence losing the consensual basis necessary for sustaining the hegemonic structure in Turkey. Thus, while the hegemonic structure did not change as the consequence of the coup, it made the necessary changes that would govern the social relations and institutionalize the government of those social relations that arouse due to the form of production that was taking hold in Turkey. Furthermore, these changes were in parallel to the international hegemonic structure that Turkey was integrated. Therefore, the 1960 Constitution was the reflection of the needs of the hegemonic structure. One of the reflection was the integration of the working class to the hegemonic structure as its numbers grew through

433Ibid., 134 & 143.

434Akça, "Ordu, Devlet Ve Sınıflar: 27 Mayıs 1960 Darbesi Örneği Üzerinden Alternatif Bir Okuma Denemesi," 372–77.

435Ibid., 374.

allowing a degree of organizations and contestation⁴³⁶, which had been the part of the Fordist mode of production, which had already took shape within the liberal bloc. Thus, the integration of working class to the hegemonic structure was important for the capital accumulation of the bourgeoisie class of Turkey, especially manufacturing bourgeoisie, which benefitted significantly with trade tariffs that were placed in mid-1950s and import substitution industrialization that Turkey shifted towards in 1960s with the support from the liberal bloc. Furthermore, as Keyder argues, “that section of the manufacturing bourgeoisie which captured the rent of import substituting industrialisation was willing to go along with this scheme, as long as it did not threaten profits”⁴³⁷. Institutionalization was realized through the establishment of *Devlet Planlama Teşkilatı* (DPT - State Planning Office), which was given the task of planning the economy, social and cultural spheres together with foreign consultants⁴³⁸. DPT was expected to act to sustain regeneration of capital accumulation and keep the hegemonic bloc together and at the same time sustain the consent of working class for the structure through social planning and social justice⁴³⁹. The only peculiar result of the coup was creating an institutional basis for military’s direct participation in the economy with the establishment of *Ordu Yardımlaşma ve Dayanışma Kurumu* (OYAK – Turkish Armed Forces Assistance (and Pension) Fund).

Yet, apart from these changes, neither Turkey’s relation to the liberal bloc and the United States, nor the foundational connectedness of Turkish economy to liberal bloc did not change. *Milli Birlik Komitesi* (MBK - National Union Committee) followed the footsteps of DP in engaging the United States, which made it very difficult to differentiate between two. As Keyder argues “in

436Keyder, *State and Class in Turkey: A Study in Capitalist Development*, 160.

437Ibid.

438Zurcher, *Turkey: A Modern History*, 265.

439Akça, “Ordu, Devlet Ve Siniflar: 27 Mayıs 1960 Darbesi Ornegi Uzerinden Alternatif Bir Okuma Denemesi,” 395.

investigating the sources of capital accumulation in Turkey, what immediately emerges as of paramount importance is the extend of foreign funding”⁴⁴⁰.

Consequently, the behavior of Turkish official remained the same when the need for loans from the United States for the economic development continued. Furthermore, the similarities between the MBK and DP in terms of their engagement with the structure pushed MBK to construct a basis for differentiation between themselves and DP through trial of DP representatives for treason.

On the other hand, 1971 military coup was directed at the opposition to the hegemonic structure, which started to weaken during mid-1960s when Fordist mode of production reached its limits in integrating dissent forces in societies within the liberal bloc as well as in Turkey. Consequently, 1971 military memorandum marked, as Ramazanoğlu argues, the “turning point in the development of Turkish capitalism, when import-substitution and inward-looking economic strategies reached the limits of their usefulness”⁴⁴¹ as well as the changing relation of the hegemonic structure in Turkey vis-a-vis liberal bloc. Consequently, the signs of change and crisis were began to arise in the 1960s that evolved into full fledged crisis of the hegemonic system both in Turkey as well as the liberal bloc, which required the reinvention of the hegemonic structures.

At the height of the relations between the liberal bloc and Turkey, Turkey’s foreign policy was fully aligned with the bloc. As Bağcı points out “Menderes administration perceived West’s interests in Near and the Middle East as identical to Turkey’s security interests”⁴⁴². Consequently, Turkey chose to side with liberal bloc states while making important foreign policy decisions during the 1950s. Some notable choices of Turkey includes it efforts to undermine

440Keyder, *State and Class in Turkey: A Study in Capitalist Development*, 177.

441Hüseyin Ramazanoğlu, “The Politics of Industrialization in a Closed Economy and the IMF Intervention of 1979,” in *Turkey in the World Capitalist System*, ed. Hüseyin Ramazanoğlu (Aldershot and Brookfield, VT: Gower, 1985), 82.

442Bağcı, *Türk Dis Politikasında 1950’li Yıllar*, 37.

establishment of a neutral bloc by some developing conference, arguing for the alignment with the liberal bloc at the Bandung Conference in 1955, voting against the Algerian independence with France at the United Nation in 1957-58, supporting the Western states against Egypt's sovereign rights at Suez Canal, following pro-Israel relations and helping establishment of military/security networks like CENTO and SEATO for the infusion of the influence of liberal bloc⁴⁴³.

While, Turkey began to experience divergence of perceived interests in foreign affairs with the liberal bloc in the 1960s and the 1970s, it was unable to transcend the limits that were imposed on Turkey by the liberal hegemonic structure. Thus, Turkey pursued its perceived foreign policy goals within the confines of the structure and the strength of the structure to control and coordinate different elements within it. Certain episodes was influential in changing attitudes in Turkey vis-a-vis the United States and how security relations were aligned. First instance was the withdrawal of Jupiter nuclear missiles during the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962-63 as a result of deal struck between the United States and the Soviet Union. While Jupiter missiles were outdated in 1963 and potentially made Turkey less safer by putting Turkey into crosshairs of possible Soviet nuclear attack, Turkish governments perceived the existence of Jupiter missiles as the firm commitment of the United States in protection of Turkey as well as making Turkey an equal partner in security relations by putting the use of nuclear weapons under the goodwill of Turkey⁴⁴⁴. Consequently, withdrawal of missiles from Turkey without any consultation with Turkey damaged the perception of aligned interests and dependability of the United States when Turkey is in danger.

Second instance was the disciplining of Turkey by the United States when Turkey threatened unilateral use of force, as a last resort, to protect Turkish

443Ibid., 45–6 & 79; Bozdağlıoğlu, *Turkish Foreign Policy and Turkish Identity: A Constructivist Approach*, 65.

444Nur Bilge Criss, "The American Cold War Military Presence in Turkey," in *American Turkish Encounters: Politics and Culture, 1830-1989*, ed. Nur Bilge Criss et al. (Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2011), 289–90.

minority in the island against the Greek Cypriot militants, who massacred Turkish Cypriots in an attempt to deter emigration to the island. To prevent unilateral action by Turkey and show the limits of Turkish autonomy within the structure President Lyndon B. Johnson sent a letter to Prime Minister İnönü, which pointed out that the United States and other NATO allies would not help Turkey if the unilateral action invoke Soviet attack on Turkey. Nur Bilge-Criss argues that while the letter saved İnönü from an unwanted intervention by helping him to save face for the inaction of Turkey against massacres, the wording of the letter showed that interests of Turkey and the United States were not necessarily confluent⁴⁴⁵. However, the real affect of the letter was felt on the consensual foundation that linked two hegemonic structures. Intellectuals in Turkey started to question Turkey's alignment with the United States and NATO in foreign policy and security relations⁴⁴⁶, which had weakened perception of shared interests between liberal bloc and Turkey.

Consequently, as the perception of shared interest weakened, Turkey followed a more flexible existence within the liberal hegemonic structure. Turkey had diversified its relations with other countries with construction of Turkey's own set of interests. Turkey had already applied for the European Economic Community in July 1959, but Turkey began to search for closer relation with the European states and the European Economic Community, which were perceived as the economic axis the liberal bloc, when the problems with the United States increased⁴⁴⁷. Furthermore, despite the hesitance, Turkey shifted its foreign policy behavior to establish good relations with Muslim neighbors, which were alienated because of Turkey's choices during the 1950s. Consequently, throughout the 1960s and the 1970s, Turkey took increasingly pro-Arab stance in the Middle East politics, discarded its strict neutrality in Israel-Arab Conflict by not allowing the United

445Nur Bilge Criss, "A Short History of Anti-Americanism and Terrorism: The Turkish Case," *The Journal of American History* 89 (2002): 475.

446Bozdağlıoğlu, *Turkish Foreign Policy and Turkish Identity: A Constructivist Approach*, 63–4.

447Ibid., 69.

States to use military bases in Turkey to ship arms to Israel in 1967 and 1973 and involved in Organization of the Islamic Conference⁴⁴⁸. Yet, Turkey remained within the framework of the liberal structure, thus failing to materialize detente between two blocs. However, the only instance that Turkey challenged the limits of the liberal structure was its military intervention in Cyprus in 1974, which was made possible by the ensuing crisis of the liberal structure but severely punished by the United States through arms embargo in 1975.

The change of Turkey's foreign policy was not only the reflection of disappointments and realizations of that Turkey should not depend on one state for its security. It was also a reflection of the changes within the social relations and the upcoming crisis of the Fordist mode of production and import-substitution industrialization (ISI). Turkey experienced rapid industrialization during the initial years of the ISI. The annual economic growth rate of Turkey during the 1960s was 7-8 per cent, which was one of the highest in the newly industrializing countries. Manufacturing bourgeoisie benefitted the most from the industrialization. This resulted in domination of large scale production over the small units, which compromised the majority of the Turkish productions, and the Turkish economy was increasingly dominated by large monopolies and holding companies. Hence, small local firms either become part of the big manufacturers or they went bankrupt⁴⁴⁹. Moreover, foreign capital, at some instances, took over already existing local production capabilities in Turkey⁴⁵⁰. Small farmers were also affected by the increased industrialization and accumulation of capital by handful people, thus they started to lose their holding to capitalist farmer. Finance sector started to concentrate in the hands of big bourgeoisie, which made acquiring loans difficult for the small enterprises during the 1960s. Unable to reach

448Ibid., 121–23.

449Ramazanoğlu, "The Politics of Industrialization in a Closed Economy and the IMF Intervention of 1979," 84.

450Feroz Ahmad, "Military Intervention and the Crisis in Turkey," in *Turkey in the World Capitalism*, ed. Hüseyin Ramazanoğlu (Aldershot & Brookfield, VA: Gower, 1985), 200.

sufficient capital for their existence, bourgeoisie of the small enterprises started to leave the historical bloc that sustained the structure, thereby breaking the alliance and weakening the hegemonic structure in Turkey.

Consequently, the changes in the form of production in Turkey affected the social structure in two ways. First, the migration from countryside to towns and cities had increased, resulting in proliferation of *Gecekondu* (squatter) settlements. *Gecekondu* settlements had become more permanent and established settlements in the 1950s⁴⁵¹, which signified a significant group for any would-be-hegemon within the structure in Turkey. The significance of the group was due to break from the old patron-client relationship that existed in villages, where people voted in accordance with the local leader's preferences whom they economically dependent. The new form of relation have been established between the people of *gecekondu* and ruling class, where *gecekondu* could enter a bargaining process and support the ruling class as long as their material needs are met. Thus, when the demands of *gecekondu* could not be met by the ruling class during the 1970s, *gecekondu* became another venue for the rival blocs for gaining their support⁴⁵², hence the weakening of liberal hegemony in Turkey. Furthermore, the increase in the surplus labour force enabled Turkey to export labour to booming economies of the West, especially to Germany⁴⁵³, which established a foothold in the relations between Germany and Turkey. Consequently, the relations between Turkey and Germany intensifies in mid-1960, due to social communications, as Turkish workers start to send their saving to Turkey and helping Turkey to mitigate foreign currency problems. In addition, the United States encouraged Germany and European allies to take the responsibility of supporting Turkey since the 1960s.

451Neslihan Demirtaş and Seher Şen, "Varoşidentity: The Redefinition of Low Income Settlements in Turkey," *Middle Eastern Studies* 43, no. 1 (2007): 88.

452See Ş. İlgü Özler, "Politics of the Gecekondu in Turkey: The Political Choices of Urban Squatters in National Elections," *Turkish Studies* 1, no. 2 (2000): 39–58.

453Ahmad, "Military Intervention and the Crisis in Turkey," 201.

Second, the industrialization created a large labour force, who started to seek for their rights as the structure unable to control their dissidence. Labour class wanted more representation as their numbers increased. Yet, Turk-Is, which was structured in parallel to AFL-CIO of the United States and worked for the control of the labour movements by integrating them to the structure, remained outside of the political process. Its apolitical stance resulted in division in labour movement, thus *Türkiye Devrimci İşçi Sendikaları Konfederasyonu* (DISK – Confederation of Progressive Trade Union of Turkey) was established. Its establishment paved the way for out right dissidence towards the structure, which translated into politicization of laborers. Consequently, the dissidence towards the structure intensified with the crisis of capitalism in 1968-69 and cooperation between labour movements and students, which created an unstable environment for the capital accumulation.

As a result, 1971 military memorandum directed against the dissidence towards the hegemonic structure and establish the necessary stability for the capital accumulation. Consequently, the target of the memorandum was the labour movement, thus their activities were restricted. However, the memorandum was unable to control the dissidence because the source of the dissidence was not only the labour movement but the crumbling hegemonic structure. During the 1970s, several dissident movements appeared. While the labour movement gathered around *Türkiye İşçi Partisi* (TIP - Labour Party of Turkey) and CHP, who by the time moved towards the social democracy –left of the center– and small bourgeoisie started to gather around the conservative movements, like *Milli Selamet Partisi* (MSP – the National Salvation Party) of Necmettin Erbakan, which brought an opposition to capitalism and the hegemonic structure from Islamic perspective. Consequently, the 1970s marked the crisis of the hegemonic structure in Turkey as well as the international capitalism.

Weakening of the hegemonic structure in Turkey also meant that the weakening of Turkey's integration to the liberal bloc. Oil Crisis of 1973 enabled Turkey to diverge from the liberal bloc foreign policies, which had already started in the 1960s. In addition, the crisis of the liberal bloc meant that the relaxation of control placed upon Turkey. As a result, Turkey could challenge the control and pursue perceived interests arising out of the struggle within Turkey. The reflection of this struggle was Ecevit's election victory and implementation of "determined" policy. One of the reflection of the "determined" policy was Turkey's decision to unilaterally intervene in Cyprus in 1974, which was enabled by international structure in 1970s and weakening of the control of the liberal bloc. However, before the Cyprus intervention, Prime Minister Ecevit repealed opium production ban – a ban that hampered livelihood of many farmers – in Turkey, which was forced upon Turkey by the United States. Cyprus intervention, coupled with the frustration of the Congress over opium production in Turkey, resulted in the US arms embargo on Turkey to punish and discipline Turkey⁴⁵⁴. Turkey entered in open contest for establishing a new hegemonic structure that included increased tensions within the society and clashes between different groups. Thus, the violence remained until the 1980 military coup, which marked the new epoch in Turkey that was in line with the advancement of neoliberalism.

5.3 Dependency of Defense

Turkey's main objective in shaping its military during this period was the modernization of the force, just as it was during the inter-war years. Although Turkey received military supplies from both Allied Powers and Germany during the war, it did not complete its modernization. Because, military equipment that were delivered between 1939 to 1942 became obsolete as the war progressed and those that were received after 1943 were "all tired vehicles from the Middle East and Persia/Iraq theaters, and 34 Shermans

⁴⁵⁴Süha Bölükbaşı, *Barışçı Çözumsuzlük: Ankara'nın ABD Ve BM İle Kıbrıs Macerası* (Ankara: İmge Kitabevi, 2001), 221–3, 263–73.

that were no longer fit for service”⁴⁵⁵. Initial American equipment were entered Turkey in 1942 under the framework of Lend-Lease Agreement through the United Kingdom. However, new American equipment were withheld by the British for their own needs during the war, hence used equipment were handed down to Turkey, thus considerable amount of American equipment, e.g. Jeeps, GMC trucks and Sherman tanks, were entered to Turkish inventory⁴⁵⁶. Furthermore, the military technology was rapidly advancing during the Second World War and continued afterwards. Consequently, Turkey’s attempt to become integrated to the liberal bloc had its effects on the general structure of TSK and its procurement practices.

TSK began to receive U.S. military aid and military training for the received equipment as part of the Truman Doctrine in 1947. The initial military aid was excess and surplus stocks of Second World War equipment in the US Army and the Air Force, which could be repaired and was not assigned for higher priority needs⁴⁵⁷. Arrival of the US equipment initiated the transformation of Turkish military, in terms of force structure, planning, doctrine, mode of thinking and culture, into a U.S. style military organization, which progressed in parallel with the transformation of the hegemonic structure. Yet, as we will argue below, TSK created an amalgam culture of US military and reflections of its historical experiences and reflections of the Turkish society.

The military aid to Turkey was provided in accordance to the role assigned to TSK by the United States in case of war with the USSR. The defined role of the TSK was to prevent Soviet penetration to Turkey and if it failed, TSK should aim to impose maximum losses on the Soviet forces and prevent a complete Soviet victory as long as possible⁴⁵⁸. So, TSK acquired its role in

455Ness, *Jane’s World War 2 Tanks and Fighting Vehicles: The Complete Guide*, 228.

456Güvenç, “ABD Askeri Yardımı Ve Türk Ordusunun Dönüşümü: 1942-1960,” 260.

457*Supply Priorities Greece, Turkey and Iran*, Background Files to the Study “The U.S. Army and the Mutual Assistance Program [MAP]”, Compiled 1956 - 1960, Documenting the Period 1945 - 1960 (Department of Defense / Department of the Army / Office of the Chief of Military History, November 1947), Record Group 319: Records of the Army Staff, 1903 - 2009, National Archives at College Park, MD.

458*Report by an Ad Hoc Committee Composed of Representatives of the Army, Navy and Air*

the division of labor within liberal bloc. However, despite the role of TSK was shared by all the Departments that were involved in the military aid program in Turkey, how TSK would realize these goals with which type of weapons and how the military aid to Turkey should be spent had become a debate among these Departments without the consultation with TSK. Each Department had different views in. For example, Department of State, Department of Army and Joint Chiefs of Staff were argued for different levels of the allocation of military aid between the military branches of TSK for the military aid in FY 49. While Department of State argued for the higher percentage of the military aid in FY 49 (\$36,000,000 of \$75,000,000) should be allocated to *Türk Hava Kuvvetleri* (TuHK - Turkish Air Force), Department of Army and Joint Chiefs of Staff argued that majority of the funds (\$45,000,000 and \$40,500,000 respectively) should be allocated to *Kara Kuvvetleri* (KK - Turkish Land Forces)⁴⁵⁹. While the different allocations of funds were the result of each Department's understanding of how TSK deficiencies of military equipment could be overcome without putting too much burden on the Turkish economy, such discussions hints that restructuring of TSK was not integral to Turkey's own perceptions and assessments of needs even when there was no firm commitment between Turkey and the United States. However, TSK transformation into a modern military force could not be reached with the military aids during the initial phase of Truman doctrine. Ambassador of the United Kingdom in Ankara mentions the state of the TSK in 1952 as follows:

a) *The Korea War proved the fighting strength and morale of the Turkish*

Force, Background Files to the Study "The U.S. Army and the Mutual Assistance Program [MAP]", Compiled 1956 - 1960, Documenting the Period 1945 - 1960 (Department of Defense / Department of the Army / Office of the Chief of Military History, 1948), Record Group 319: Records of the Army Staff, 1903 - 2009, National Archives at College Park, MD.

459A.C. Wedemeyer, *Memorandum for the Secretary of Army: Military Assistance to Turkey - FY 1949*, Background Files to the Study "The U.S. Army and the Mutual Assistance Program [MAP]", Compiled 1956 - 1960, Documenting the Period 1945 - 1960 (Department of Defense / Department of the Army / Office of the Chief of Military History, June 22, 1948), Record Group 319: Records of the Army Staff, 1903 - 2009, National Archives at College Park, MD.

soldier and boosted Turkish soldier's prestige. Despite this, "1914 mindset" still dominates Turkish military

b) Although certain improvement was achieved with Truman Doctrine in the military field, big gaps still exists. The quality of Turkish military weapons are 'second rate weapons.'⁴⁶⁰

The turning point in TSK's transformation was reached when Turkey participated in the Korean War. Turkish participation in Korea paved the way for Turkish membership to NATO, which was long desired by both Inonu and Menderes governments. As mentioned above, NATO membership meant commitment of the United States to Turkey as well as westernization and modernization of Turkey. On the other hand, NATO membership resulted in ever increasing dependency of TSK to the United States and NATO structure, thereby TSK was unable to develop its own capabilities to construct doctrines and assess its own needs outside of the NATO framework. Mehmet Ali Birand describes the behavior of TSK following the NATO membership as;

Almost everything had been left in the hands of United States and NATO... Armies were deployed in accordance with NATO strategy, and instead of national policies concerning the acquisition of arms, Turkey made do with what the Americans provided.⁴⁶¹

Consequently, as Turkish military fully integrated to the NATO structure with great affinity to U.S. military, Military Assistance Program (MAP) had become the main source for Turkish defense procurement, as the TSK lost its ability to assess its future needs, thereby depend on the US military planning for its force structure, equipping the forces and logistics. Such dependency on the United States was summarized with in quote from Birand's book:

Every year we used to submit a list of our needs to the USA. These lists were unnecessarily long, covering everything from helmets to batteries, from ropes to tanks or anti-aircrafts. The rule was to ask for as much as possible. The main reason was that we had no armament policy of our own, nor any national objectives, nor even any idea of what we really needed. The Americans shipped over whatever they thought necessary and, regardless of their use, we were too pleased to be at the receiving end. What's more, everything was donated. ... For instance, the M-48 tanks that were replaced by the M-60 in the US Army were shipped to Turkey. Two thousand Reo trucks and 10,000 jeeps,

⁴⁶⁰Bağcı, *Türk Dis Politikasında 1950'li Yıllar*, 45 trans. Kurc.

⁴⁶¹Birand, *Shirts of Steel: An Anatomy of the Turkish Armed Forces*, 194.

even if they dated from World War I, were also welcome. ... We had so little planning that we had to be reminded by the Americans which part in the warships or aircraft to replace and when. All the details were recorded in their computers which alerted them, for instance, replacements had to be made on the F-100s and the warships. Sometimes we would get huge boxes, and we wouldn't know what to do with them until the replacement instructions arrived⁴⁶²

Although, TSK increasingly Americanized during the period between 1947 and early-1960s, as the general structure in Turkey, it had never really become a carbon copy of the US military but created an amalgam of its old ways and new American way of warfare and equipment. TSK had resisted certain changes that were brought with the American military aid and training. For example, Chief of General Staff Field Marshal Fevzi Çakmak based Turkish defense strategy on First World War thinking that occupying forces should be slowed down with the lack of transportation infrastructure, thus Turkey would defend itself with stable defensive lines, because he did not envision a mobile defensive strategy even though that thinking disproved during the Second World War. Consequently, he demanded that roads and railroads, which were being built since the foundation of Turkey, should not be build on the border areas and there should not be any bridges that could allow easy access to occupying forces⁴⁶³. When the Joint American Military Mission Aid to Turkey (JAMMAT) decided to build roads on the routes Edirne-Iskenderun and Erzurum-Iskenderun, Turkish officers resisted the idea, which was in parallel with Fezvi Çakmak's ideas, by arguing that country could not be defended⁴⁶⁴. Serhat Güvenç argues that the resistance towards American programs and proposals was the result of the clash between Prussian military culture and American military culture⁴⁶⁵. However, while Prussian military culture certainly have some effect on the old guard with in the Turkish military, who had their military training under Prussian system, the

⁴⁶²Interview with unnamed General at TSK quoted: Birand, *Shirts of Steel: An Anatomy of the Turkish Armed Forces*.

⁴⁶³Güvenç, "ABD Askeri Yardımı Ve Türk Ordusunun Dönüşümü: 1942-1960," 278.

⁴⁶⁴Ibid.

⁴⁶⁵See Güvenç, "ABD Askeri Yardımı Ve Türk Ordusunun Dönüşümü: 1942-1960."

main issue that defined the behaviors and decisions of the old guard was the experiences of the late Ottoman period and military defeats, where railroads enabled fast occupation of Turkey.

Furthermore, as mentioned before, Turkey had been under influence of many military cultures, thus the effects of Prussian culture in the other branches of the military was not observed as much as in the KK. TuHK military training was provided by mostly British advisors. Thus, transitioning from British training and practices to American did not create any problems. Furthermore, different military cultures were co-existing in Turkey before the Second World War. Thus, the United States utilized the existence of different military cultures via training young officer, who had British or French military education and sidelining Prussian educated officers, in the United States and in other NATO countries to reach a generational shift.

However, most of the characteristics of the Turkish military was, and still is, a reflection of the Turkish societal relations. Despite the generational and educational change in the Turkish military, certain aspects of how Turkish military operated, in general sense, remained the same. As one Turkish General puts it:

While the system has been Americanized [the present educational system in the Turkish Military Academies embodies the changes wrought by Truman aid to Turkey, Turkey's involvement in Korea conflict and its entry to NATO] from 1950s onwards, it is founded on German, or even old Prussian, principles: absolute loyalty to motherland, rigid discipline, blind belief in the commanders and unquestioning obedience. ... The system currently [1980] in practice was derived by adapting to Turkish conditions [more correctly, by translating them into Turkish terms] and is peculiar to Turkey.⁴⁶⁶

Although, above mentioned principles are argued to be Prussian/German principles, they are in fact the reflection of Turkish society in general sense. Principles of absolute loyalty to motherland, rigid discipline, blind belief in the commanders and unquestioning obedience continue to persist, because, as shown in the previous chapter, Turkish society is an unquestioning

⁴⁶⁶Birand, *Shirts of Steel: An Anatomy of the Turkish Armed Forces*.

hierarchical society, which from time to time manifest itself as intolerance against the criticism at every level. Second, Turkish nationalism and military culture in the Republic was based on the idea of sacrifice for the nation and the motherland, which was typified by praise of Atatürk's order at the initial stages of the Gallipoli Campaign during the First World War. Atatürk ordered 57th Infantry Regiment, who was out of ammunition and had only bayonets, to hold their ground and die if necessary until reinforcements arrives⁴⁶⁷.

Consequently, despite the Americanization of the certain aspects of the system, Turkish military remained a conservative entity, which was stuck between modernizing movement of the United States and old days of the Turkish military. For example, when the JUSMMAT proposed the delivery of M-1 rifles⁴⁶⁸ to Turkish military in 1963, Turkish officials required bayonets to be delivered with the M-1 rifles because they believed "victory in the battle lies at the point of a bayonet"⁴⁶⁹. We might have hard times in understanding why Turkish officials were still believing the utility of the bayonet in the modern warfare, at the time, which would be fought with assault rifles. However, Turkish military culture was shaped with the heroism at the Gallipoli Campaign and War of Independence, where bayonet had a significant emotional and cultural value to Turkish military officials. Consequently, despite the changes in the modern warfare, Turkish official were still thinking in terms of previous wars and experiences. Therefore, TSK became an

467See Edward J. Erickson, *Ordered to Die: A History of the Ottoman Army in the First World War*, Contributions in Military Studies (Westport, Connecticut and London: Greenwood Press, 2000).

468M-1 Rifle was standard US service rifle between 1936-1957. Delivery of M-1 rifles to Turkey should not be seen as an attempt to modernize Turkish military in 1963 when semi-automatic and automatic assault rifles had already been produced by the United States and the Soviet Union, e.g. AK-47.

469*Report from Francis T. Williamson, Rear Admiral, USN, Acting Chief, Joint United States Military Mission for Aid to Turkey, Office of the Chief, to Robert J. Wood, General, Director of Military Assistance, Military Assistance Program Files, Compiled 1961-1966* (Department of Defense. Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs). Office of the Director of Military Assistance. (ca. 1959 - ca. 1966), January 2, 1963), Record Group 330: Records of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, 1921 - 2008, National Archives at College Park, MD.

amalgam of American military culture that was fused with reflections of Turkish society and conservatism of the Turkish military culture.

Yet, Americanization of the Turkish military reflected in the procurement practices of Turkey. Between 1950 and 1965, Turkey procured its weapon systems predominantly from the United States, which was a reflection of both dependence on Military Assistance Program and conscious desire to procure American weapon systems. This intensified the in the erosion of nationaldefense industrial base that concentrated on the development of high technology systems like aircrafts. Although, Turkey kept certain military production capabilities, such as Makine ve Kimya Endustrisi Kurumu (MKEK - Mechanical and Chemical Industry Cooperation) that produced ammunition, shells, missiles and rifles –most of them under the license–, it had lost its ability produce high technology complex systems.

When Turkey received weapons from other NATO countries supplied, where the volume was low compared to American transfer level, they were predominantly American systems⁴⁷⁰. Despite the influx of weapons through MAP, Turkish military had always fall behind the current developments in military technology. In 1962, General Robert J. Wood, Director of Military Assistance, described the situation of Turkish military in a letter concerning MAP approvals for FY 63 as:

Approval of the full amount of the Turkish Program (\$171.3 million) is necessary to meet force maintenance and commitments made during the Vice President's trip. Even under this level it is impossible to achieve an adequate degree of modernization of the Turkish armed forces. Existing ships, aircraft, wheeled and tracked vehicles have long since outlived their useful life. The combat effectiveness of this equipment is dangerously below that of the USSR, and suffers in comparison with that possessed by Bloc countries.⁴⁷¹

470SIPRI Arms Transfers Database (SIPRI, 2013), SIPRI Arms Transfers Database.

471Robert J. Wood, *Comment on Aid Approval of the FY 63 MAP*, Military Assistance Program Files, Compiled 1961-1966 (Department of Defense. Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs). Office of the Director of Military Assistance. (ca. 1959 - ca. 1966), November 23, 1962), Record Group 330: Records of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, 1921 - 2008, National Archives at College Park, MD.

Furthermore, Americanization of Turkish military created tendency to buy American-only (or product loyalty to American systems), without analyzing other alternatives or the utility and quality of the system. Hence, such loyalty, although, difficult to prove vis-a-vis American systems because they were usually the better systems during the Cold War, it could be observed by Turkey's decision and insistence on buying F-104G Starfighter in 1963 and turning down proposals, both from the United States and Federal Germany, to buy Fiat G-91, which was a daytime ground attack plane and would have been useful for Turkey. Furthermore, Turkey stuck with F-104G/S's even when better alternatives, for example Mirage 3 in 1960s and F-4 Phantom, F-5 Freedom Fighter and Mirage F-1C during 1970, were available. Consequently, in the following part, we will investigate story of F-104 Starfighter and attempt to show that Turkey insisted on this plane because of its belief in US systems, even though US itself was not willing to use particular weapon system.

5.3.1 The Curious Case of F-104 Starfighter

The development philosophy of F-104 was based on the Air Force pilots' experience in the Korean War and desire on the part of Lockheed Aircraft to produce aircrafts that could sustain a huge production programme to succeed the F-80/F-94 family by being low cost and less complex. Because at the time, the belief that current aircrafts had become too big, too heavy, too complex and too costly⁴⁷². On the other hand, Air Force and pilots, who fought in the Korean War demanded more speed and more height from the next generation of airplanes⁴⁷³. Clarence L. Johnson, then the chief engineer of Lockheed Aircraft Corporation, describes his meeting with Air Force pilots and their demands from a new aircraft as follows:

Going around and talking to the pilots who were just returning from their

⁴⁷²Bill Gunston, *Early Supersonic Fighters of the West* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1976), 184.

⁴⁷³*ibid.*, 185.

*missions, they said time and again how they wanted an aeroplane that, for once, would put them higher and faster than the enemy. In fact, they were insulted because the Russian had high-altitude Charlies sitting upstairs, and they would train the Chinese pilots, talking to them and saying, 'Don't be afraid of the Americans. If you get in trouble, come up here, they can't get up here.'*⁴⁷⁴

However, Air Force did not learn from all the experiences of the Korean War. In 1948, the United States abolished Tactical Air Command (TAC) and transferred its functions to a newly established Continental Air Command, believing that "air force capable of achieving strategic success in the first decisive phase of a conflict would be equally capable of tactical operations in the follow-up phase. Retention of a specialized tactical arm was, therefore, rendered unnecessary"⁴⁷⁵. Despite, the rapid advance of North Korean forces and the lack of large-scale targets in Korea, which necessitated the use of tactical campaigns that resembled those in the northwest European campaigns in Second World War, military decision makers thought that the Korean War was a special case that would not be replicated⁴⁷⁶. Consequently, the idea of F-104 was based on the principles that it would be an interceptor with more speed (Mach 2) and more height and it would be less complex and cheap. In addition, the belief that lightweight aircraft would perform better when compared to the heavy aircrafts was common at the time, thus became main driver of development in the early 1950s, which shaped the development of several other aircrafts like A-4 Skyhawk and Fiat G-91.

By 1953, the general design of the F-104 appeared as "having an extremely small and thin unswept wing and a large body housing a single engine and all fuel"⁴⁷⁷. Lockheed made an agreement with the Air Force for the further research and development of F-104 in March 1953. According to the

474 Arthur Reed, *F-104 Starfighter* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1981), 8.

475 Tony Mason, "The Air Warfare Requirement," in *The Modern War Machine: Military Aviation Since 1945*, ed. Philip Jarrett, Putnam's History of Aircraft (London: Putnam Aeronautical Books, 2000), 15.

476 *Ibid.*, 16–7.

477 Gunston, *Early Supersonic Fighters of the West*, 188.

agreement, Air Force agreed to fund development of two prototypes of a day interceptor that exceed Mach 2 and have a combat ceiling over 60,000 feet. This initiated the plagued development phase of F-104, which resulted in veering off from the initial principles that F-104 was based due to changes in Air Force requirements on the way and conception of future air warfare.

There have been several problems during the development phase of F-104, which resulted in veering off the initial principles for stripping every equipment that made an aircraft heavier. The main problem was the pitch-up problem that was suffered by all high speed aircrafts. Gunston provides variety of reasons for the pitch-up problem as:

Its cause may be that an increase in angle of attack (due to pulling g, or reducing speed) puts the horizontal tail in violently turbulent downwash from the wing; it may be due to strong vortices from the front fuselage or engine duct or in a swept-wing design may be caused by tip stall.⁴⁷⁸

The solution that Lockheed came up with was the installation of high irreversible T-tail with “[Auto Pitch Control] system having two angle of attack vanes and a rate-gyro amplifier feeding a stick shaker and auto pitch actuator driving the tail”⁴⁷⁹ that made the airplane more complex than it was first envisioned. Another problem was with the type of engine that was installed on the early F-104A. The J79 engine was plagued with compressor stalls and incorrect fuel scheduling that caused flame-out or loss of power⁴⁸⁰. Furthermore, during the development phase, the requirement of the Air Force began to change. Eisenhower administration’s desire to limit defense budget and focus more on the delivery of nuclear weapons⁴⁸¹.

During 1956, the desire to strip the airplane to make it lighter was vanished. Thus, Lockheed began to transform F-104 from an interceptor to all-weather multi-mission aircraft, which put great stress on Lockheed in transforming F-104A, which needed structural redesign and additional equipment and

478Ibid.

479Ibid., 189.

480Ibid., 196.

481Mason, “The Air Warfare Requirement,” 16.

systems. In addition to F-104A, Lockheed developed F-104C fighter-bomber aircraft, which had a different engine (GE-7), a probe for in-flight refueling and capable of carrying nuclear weapons, for TAC, which was reestablished in 1950.

By 1955, Air Force began to place orders for F-104A, while the development and transformation of the aircraft to an all-weather multi-mission aircraft continued. Thus, Air Force bought interim aircrafts while the modifications for the new aircraft took almost two years and exceeding the time and cost projections for the project. First F-104As were delivered to Air Force in January 1958 with continuing problems that were caused by the J79 engine and 'dead stick' landing problems. However, F-104A was grounded in April 1958 and were withdrawn from Air Defense Command (ADC) in 1959. Most of the F-104A were transferred to Air National Guard. F-104A were reinstated to ADC with an unexpected decision to fill up fighter interceptor squadrons of ADC. In 1968-71, surviving F-104As were re-engined with a more powerful engine (GE J79-19). The C model served in TAC until 1965 when it was re-equipped with Phantoms. At the end of the development story, as Tony Mason argues:

The need for a highly agile, high-performance fighter to contest air superiority with the MIG family, disclosed in Korea, was lost in production of the F-104, which combined Mach 2 speed, a high rate of climb and a ceiling of 58,000 ft: excellent attributed for an interceptor of bombers but insufficient for an air-superiority fighter.⁴⁸²

In the end, the United States did not adopted F-104 as a primary interceptor or all-weather multi-purpose aircraft, but it was one of many equipments that did not matched the expectations and surpassed by better aircrafts such as F-4 Phantom. Having lost its domestic market, Lockheed turned its attention to the international markets and found very lucrative markets in Germany, Canada and Japan. Germany was especially important for the Lockheed and the future of F-104. First, as a result of Germany rearmament, Germany was

482Ibid., 17.

seeking to reestablish Luftwaffe through procurement of modern jet fighters. Hence, Germany was planning to buy 2000 aircraft to be distributed to 20 wings over five year period according to ambitious plans drawn in 1955 and 1956⁴⁸³. Furthermore, Germany sought for procurement of an aircraft that would be produced in Germany to rebuild their manufacturing capabilities in airframes, engines and systems⁴⁸⁴. Although, Germany received F/RF-84 and F-86 through Mutual Defense Assistance Program, these aircrafts were considered as interim solutions. Consequently, this made the German market very lucrative and big. Second, Lockheed believed that if it could sell F-104 in Germany, it could also conquer the European market, which proved to be correct.

Thus, Germany opened a tender for one aircraft that could replace all fighter, fighter-bomber and reconnaissance planes in 1957⁴⁸⁵. The contending parties were the Dassault Mirage IIIA, Grumman F11F-1F Super Tiger and Lockheed Starfighter. The Lockheed representatives flooded Bonn in 1958 to sell their aircraft to Germany, while their biggest contender Dassault, which had a better multi-role aircraft, better in dogfights and more suitable for ground attack due to larger wing area, remained half-hearted and resisted any attempts to change the aircraft into an all-weather tactical nuclear strike aircraft⁴⁸⁶. Nuclear strike capable aircraft was an important aspect of German aspirations, along with the desire to rebuilt manufacturing capabilities, as they did not want to be the only European state that did not have nuclear strike capabilities⁴⁸⁷. In the end, Lockheed won the German tender with its proposal to built F-104 in Germany with German specifications and manufacturers, hence F-104G.

483Klaus Kropf, *German Starfighters: The F-104s in German Air Force and Naval Air Service*, English Edition (Hinkley and North Branch, MN: Midland Publishing, 2002), 15.

484Gunston, *Early Supersonic Fighters of the West*, 199.

485Kropf, *German Starfighters: The F-104s in German Air Force and Naval Air Service*, 16.

486Gunston, *Early Supersonic Fighters of the West*, 85–6.

487Reed, *F-104 Starfighter*, 46.

F-104G represented another shift from the original idea that F-104 was based. The main modifications were the new internal structure to house newly developed technologies (new air-to-air and air-to-ground radar), a new engine (J79-GE-11A), increased drag chute, larger tyres on the main wheels, fully powered brakes of increased capacity controlled anti-skid system and an airfield arrester hook under the rear fuselage. In addition, Lockheed had to make F-104G, which had sharp limits to what was practical due to small area of its wings, to carry nuclear weapons, which was enabled by putting 2,000 lb rack on the centerline. These modification increased the weight of the aircraft from 22,400 lb to 28,780 lb. In the end, F-104G was “a nuclear delivery system of minimal size, great penetrative capability, mission radius marginally adequate for most of the chief Luftwaffe targets, and well equipped for precision navigation in all weathers”⁴⁸⁸.

Despite modifications and structural adjustments to make F-104 more accommodating to its new role, F-104G, and its other versions, remained an unforgiving aircraft at the hand of inexperienced pilots. As Gunston argues:

It [F-104G] was undeniably going to demand constant good flying by its pilot, and recovery in bad weather or after engine failure appeared to call for exceptional pilot skill and experience. A Lockheed pilot frankly said of the G ‘This is an absolutely straight aeroplane; it will not forgive you a single mistake that you make.’⁴⁸⁹

The unforgiveness of the F-104G became apparent after the first delivery of F-104G to Germany in 1961⁴⁹⁰. F-104G suffered heavy loss-rate for peacetime operation, which nobody was prepared for:

In 1961 the rate was 80 per 100,000 hours and in 1962 it went to a shocking level at 139. In 1963, though it fell to 30, partly because of far more hours were flown, the actual number of losses rose. In 1964 the figure was 62, and in 1965 84.5, with a Starfighter write-off every ten days. In an unacceptably

⁴⁸⁸Gunston, *Early Supersonic Fighters of the West*, 202.

⁴⁸⁹Ibid.

⁴⁹⁰Lockheed signed the contract for development and license manufacture with Federal Germany on 18 March 1959, followed by Canada on 17 September 1959., Japan on 29 January 1959, the Netherlands on 20 April 1960, Belgium on 20 June 1960, the US Air Force for MAP aircraft on 18 February 1961, Italy on 2 March 1961 and the US Air Force for additional MAP aircraft in June 1962.

*high proportion of the crashes the pilot was killed.*⁴⁹¹

Thus, the F-104G got its nicknames as The Widowmaker and the Flying Coffin. On the other hand, good pilot training and increased experience seemed to be the cure of F-104Gs loss-rate.

However, by 1965 German Luftwaffe declared that F-104G in the interceptor squadrons does not meet the Luftwaffe requirements in performance, radar, weapons and all-weather capabilities. Thus, this declaration marked the search for a new type of aircraft for the 1970s, which did not involve an interest in F-104S, which was an improved and modified version of F-104G by Italy. F-104s began to be phased out when a new generation of aircrafts like F-4 Phantom and F-5E Tiger II became available in mid-1960s and the 1970s.

Turkey was one of the NATO allies that procured F-104G during the 1960s. Turkey, seeking to modernize its air force as well as other military branches, insisted on acquiring F-104Gs while refusing offers for Fiat G-91 by both the United States and Germany, which was also building Fiat G-91⁴⁹². Fiat G-91 actually reflected the dominant belief after the Korea War that simple and light aircrafts were better than the complex ones. Thus, as a reflection of this design principle, Fiat G-91 was a low weight and low cost subsonic ground attack aircraft that possessed all the ground support capabilities of much more expensive American aircrafts that were in production in the mid-1950s and could be operated from highways or grass meadows. Yet, since it lacked electronic equipment, it is effective for daylight low-level attack and support in clear weathers. NATO chosen Fiat G-91 among a competition from 11 designs as the NATO common equipment⁴⁹³.

491Gunston, *Early Supersonic Figthers of the West*, 207.

492“Bonn Will Build Military Planes - Special to The New York Times.,” *New York Times (1923-Current File)*, March 1, 1959, 114676581, ProQuest Historical Newspapers: The New York Times (1851-2009).

493Waldo Drake, “Fiat Fighter Plane Gets Approval From NATO,” *Los Angeles Times (1923-Current File)*, June 21, 1958, 167324752, ProQuest Historical Newspapers: Los Angeles Times (1881-1989).

In 1961, then Minister of Foreign Affairs Selim Sarper, pointed out to General Norstad at Shape that Turkish Chief of Staff did not want G-91, which had very short range, conventional capability only, and is limited to close support role and instead, Turkey wanted F-104s. As a response, General Norstad expressed that they hoped that Turkey would acquire F-104s eventually, Turkey had clearly accepted procurement of G-91 as early as 1958 and most of the project had already paid for, where the cost of G-91 was about 1/7th cost of F-104⁴⁹⁴. Yet, Turkey pursued for the procurement F-104s. Between 1961 to 1963, Turkey and Germany negotiated on a barter agreement, in which Turkey would produce ammunition for Germany and in return for Turkey's procurement of G-91 from Germany. However, negotiations between Germany and Turkey had also failed due to Turkey's refusal of G-91. In the end, Turkey had received its first batch of F-104G through MAP in 1963. The most striking feature of this episode was while Turkey was insisting on F-104s, Germany was suffering dearly from the problems of F-104G and F-104s have already been out to secondary missions by the United States.

Turkey continued to receive F-104G more than any other type of aircraft, mostly through military aid programs between 1963 to 1979. During this period Turkey procured 289 F-104G/S, 108 F-5A Freedom Fighter, 80 F-4E Phantom 2 and 47 F-102A Delta Dagger⁴⁹⁵. Furthermore, Turkey continued to procure F-104G even if there have been an awareness of better aircrafts exists, not to mention Mirage III, which also reflected to the newspaper articles, but not through officials. For example, in 1964 journalist Fikret Otyam wrote that "Americans had already played out F-104G, they already built better aircrafts... We will manage with these until better ones arrive"⁴⁹⁶.

494 Glenn W. LaFantasie, ed., *Eastern Europe; Cyprus; Greece; Turkey*, vol. XVI, Experimental E-Book vols., Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963 (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Historian, 1994).

495 SIPRI Arms Transfers Database.

496 Fikret Otyam, "Saatte 2.500 Kilometre Giden F-104 Ile de Uçmak Istiyorum!," *Cumhuriyet*, 1964.

Although, this idea was never expressed by the Turkish official, who continued to argue that TuHK was on par with Greek Air Force, which acquired multiple types of aircrafts including Mirage F-1C in 1974.

One of the main reason that Turkey chose F-104 and stuck with it is that Turkey was highly dependent on the United States and the military aids. As mentioned above, Turkey had lost its defense planning capabilities when it integrated its military structure to the United States and NATO. Consequently, Turkey's defense procurement decisions were mostly taken in accordance to what was available through MAP and other countries military aid to Turkey. Thus, although Turkey initially accepted to procure G-91, it refused to buy it when acquisition of F-104 became a possibility with German procurement decision. When source of all aircrafts that were procured by Turkey during 1960s and 1970s were analyzed, a considerable amount were acquired through MAP except for F-104S, which were bought from Italy, and F-4E Phantom 2, which were procured through Foreign Military Sales.

Furthermore, the dependence on the United States required that Turkey should use American equipment so that it could receive spare parts and weapons from the United States. As mentioned above, even the maintenance was scheduled by the United States and could be done when spare parts with the instructions were delivered. This could also explain why Turkey did not choose for other alternatives like Mirage III, which was proved itself under the Israeli Air Force, during the 1960s.

Furthermore, Turkey had developed an affinity towards American made equipment and believing that they were better than other sources. Thus, when the United States imposed arms embargo on Turkey after 1974 Cyprus intervention, Turkey decided to buy Italian F-104S –first batch was delivered in 1975 and second batch was delivered between 1976 and 1977, thereby becoming the only country that bought F-104S, while every other state phasing out F-104s. When the arms embargo imposed, France (Mirage F-1C), Italy (F-104S) and the United Kingdom (Jaguar) were offered to sell

aircrafts to Turkey. Among the contenders, Mirage F-1C was the best aircraft, yet Turkey decided to procure F-104S from Italy. One TuHK official justified the procurement on the grounds that Turkey had already owned F-104s, thus if other aircrafts were to be procured, they could only enter active combat duty by 1976 because of the necessary time for pilot training⁴⁹⁷. While, such explanation can be understandable for the first batch, as one could argue that procurement was necessary for the replacement of aircrafts that were lost during the Cyprus intervention, it is not acceptable for the second batch, which was delivered in 1976 and 1977. On the other hand, there have been allegations of corruption in the selection of F-104S after the arms embargo. The allegations assert that Lockheed bribed TuHK officials via their representative in Turkey, who had personal connections within the Turkish Air Force. Yet, these allegations were never proven⁴⁹⁸.

In the end, the procurement of F-104 shows that Turkey's defense procurement have been shaped by certain factors. First, Turkey had been fully integrated to US military system, which brought with it the belief that US weapons systems were better even if that system did not necessarily accepted by the US and had several development problems. Second, while Turkey was depended on the foreign military aids and grants for its military development and modernization, decision makers do not really care about the cost of an aircraft as long as it is supplied through military aids. This was why Turkey did not want to procure Fiat G-91, when F-104 were available through US military aid. Third, while Turkey believed that modernization could be reached through procurement of US weapon systems that deemed to be the best and modern, efforts have never been realized because military aids rarely provided state-of-the-art weapon system, rather it provided second rate equipments, which also showed inability to recognize the problems associated with certain type of weapon systems.

497"Fransa Mirage, İngiltere Jaguar Satmak İstiyor," *Cumhuriyet*, 25.

498See Uncular, *Ses Duvarındaki Generaller*.

5.3.2 Towards Limited Autonomy

Turkey began to diversify its procurement channels especially after 1965, following the event in Cyprus and Johnson Letter that prevented procurement of military equipment from the principle supplier the US for Turkey's national interests. However, moving beyond this widely used reasoning, there were other factors that enabled Turkey to diversify its procurement sources. Since the beginning of 1960s, the United States was asking other NATO allies share the burden in supplying military equipment to allied nations, for example Turkey. Because, the United States was diverting its resources to the war in Vietnam. In this environment Germany had risen to be the suitable partner because of its willingness in developing its own defense capabilities and communal connection between Turkey and Germany due to migrant workers.

In the early-1970s, European states increased their participation in Turkish defense procurement as the influence of the United States began to decrease, just as in the other areas. However, Turkey continued to procure American weapon systems despite diversification of the supplier. Between 1966 and 1980, while the volume of arms transfer from European states, mostly Italy and Germany, increased the number of European made systems remained minimal as compared to American systems that were procured from European sources⁴⁹⁹.

On the other hand, the arms embargo of 1974 was the second turning point for the Turkish defense procurement practices as the idea of producing own weapons gained some support, yet failed to be realized due to limitation of both materials and ideas under the current structure. Although, arms transfers from the United States to Turkey continued after the declaration of the embargo, which was progressively withdrawn, the enactment of arms embargo enabled the re-constitution of the idea of that dependency on arms procurement would not allow Turkey to seek its own interest and there was a

499SIPRI Arms Transfers Database.

need to build up national defense industrial base. However, the need for indigenous defense industry, aircraft industry to be more specific, was expressed as early as 1970 by Chief of Air Force Muhsin Batur. This is why we argue that such idea gained some support but not enough to take off.

The movement towards establishing national aerospace industry manifested itself when there have been changes in the production relations in general. Consequently, the composition of the defense industry was also changing in the 1970s, where defense firms began to merge to form bigger companies, while spreading their production to different geographical locations and small companies. Therefore, it should not be surprising that Turkey took some initial steps building national defense industrial capability, when international defense companies were willing to spread their production to other countries. In addition, the United States was supporting establishment of national defense industries in 1970s, because it was planning to withdraw from its heavy involvement in aid programs, both military and civilian, to allied countries, thus encouraging them to share the burden of collective security. However, Turkey could only started realize its decision to build national defense industrial base after 1980s, when a new set of ideas were introduced with the neoliberal hegemony was established. The effects of the neoliberal transformation will be discussed in the next chapter in relation with the changes happened in the 1970s.

CHAPTER 6

NEOLIBERAL HEGEMONY: 1980 – 2013

This chapter will examine the period that is marked by the apogee of neoliberalism and how transformation at the international level reflected on Turkey. First section will deal with the transformation at the international structure. This section argues that the 1980s represent the high point of the coming structural change within the global capitalism, hence in the capitalist/liberal block. Out the crisis of Keynesian governance and Fordist form of production in the 1970s, neoliberalism was born, which was the reinvention of the capitalist mode of production and its answer to its crisis. Thus, neoliberalism entailed the new balance between the new form of production – post-Fordism – and the ideas that justified and normalized the social relations that born out of the new form of production. Consequently, Keynesian ideas and institutions that aimed the control the dissidence, had been replaced, rather forcefully, by the neoliberalism.

The neoliberal turn in the United States – Reaganism – and the United Kingdom –Thatcherism – also marked the renewed imposition of the liberal hegemony, which had been in the state of malaise following the economic crisis during the 1970s and the United States' withdrawal from Vietnam. The United States became more aggressive assertive in the international politics, both in shaping international institutions, like making IMF to adopt neoliberal policies, and engaging the Soviet Union both friendly means –through nuclear arms reduction agreements– and hostile means – supporting

Mujaheddin in Afghanistan and investing in development of anti-ballistic missile defense system known as Strategic Defense Initiative. The United States' intensified military investment and assertiveness met by the Soviet Union's attempt to match the capabilities of the United States, which put great stress on the Soviet economy, thus instigated the crisis within the Soviet block.

While liberal block was reinventing itself in moving out of its crisis, the Soviet Union plunged into its own crisis. The Soviet economy had been put under stress by huge military production to catch up the with the United States as well as military and economic support given to the Soviet clients. Furthermore, the Soviet Union got bogged down in the war in Afghanistan, which hampered its ability to sustain communist hegemony; just as Vietnam War affected the liberal block and the United States' hegemonic role. Michael Gorbachev attempted to reinvent the communist hegemonic structure by introducing glasnost (openness) and perestroika (restructuring). However, interestingly enough, the attempts of reproducing the Communist hegemony in Soviet Union brought an end to the Soviet challenge at international level.

Thus, the end of the Cold War paved the way for the global dominance of the neoliberal hegemony and the liberal bloc; though the assertiveness of the United States subsided when the threat of contenting hegemony disappeared and the use of coercion in spreading the neoliberal hegemony lost its utility while the international institutions like IMF, World Bank and WTO were very effective in spreading the neoliberalism through consent. Consequently, a new power center arose within the liberal bloc; the European Union. Although the making of the European Union dated back to the end of the Second World War and economic integration of the European countries continued during the Cold War, neither European countries nor the new institution of European Economic Community showed a great variance from the United States and NATO policies –the only exception was the French decision to withdraw from NATO's military wing. When the existential treat of the Soviet

Union and its hegemony vanished, the European states strived for more integration among themselves and realized that the new international structure provided an opportunity for more freedom from the United States. Consequently, European Union, despite having a coherent and overarching foreign policy, was able to represent the consensual part of the liberal hegemony through promotion of certain set of ideas and the United States came to represent the coercive part of the hegemony. Thus, the United States was more willing to use its military apparatus in peacekeeping and peace-enforcing missions, while the European states, like France and Germany, opted to use European Union to assert influence on other states. As a result, the liberal bloc, while agreed on the basic tenets of the neoliberalism, had become a loser coalition as compared to during the Cold War.

Consequently, neoliberalism – a detailed definition and discussion will be made in first section – became the *modus operandi* around the globe yet within each different community the mechanisms of control varied. For example, neoliberalism in China manifested itself within the authoritarian rule and have not changed much about the control mechanisms of the state while the form of production changed significantly.

Second section of this chapter will examine the transformation of structure in Turkey and how the neoliberal structure is established and able to reproduce itself, despite brief weakening during the 1990s. Neoliberalism was introduced to Turkey through the coercion of military coup in 1980 and evolved into a seemingly democratic system while the authoritarian mechanisms within the structure have been veiled behind the discourse of democracy, which was utilized by the political parties in post-coup Turkey. Military coup in 1980 represents the use of coercion to suppress dissident movements within the society toward the capitalist mode of production. Consequently, forceful suppression of dissidence of the 1970s and stabilization of the country paved the way for the neoliberal turn in Turkey

because there had been no viable opposition left in Turkey to oppose neoliberal policies.

Furthermore, religion became an important mechanism for neoliberal hegemony in Turkey in controlling the class struggle. The military coup had introduced the element of political Islam and conservatism mostly coincided with the term Turkish-Islam synthesis. Thus, Islamic values, though varying degrees, were utilized by mainly from the government to bourgeoisie of the small enterprises. The incorporation of political Islam also represents the attempts of incorporating another dissident movement into neoliberal project, since political Islam in Turkey had its roots in anti-capitalist discourse. Consequently, as long as the political Islam worked in parallel with the neoliberal project, it was allowed to participate in the system. Hence, this marks the main difference with Refah Partisi (RP – Welfare Party) and Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi (AKP – Justice and Development Party). The former represents the critique of capitalist system, though not as harsh as during the 1970s, the latter had reached a perfect combination of political Islam and neoliberal policies. Consequently, RP was shut down, though on the grounds of it represented a threat to secularism, AKP had been strived in Turkish political system for more than a decade and commanded the new hegemonic structure in Turkey.

Furthermore, end of the Cold War and the global hegemony of the neoliberalism provided a certain amount of flexibility to the foreign relations of states. As mentioned above, the flexibility within the system was one of the reason of the rise of European Union as a power center within the liberal bloc. In the case of Turkey, it was more willing to establish relations with the Russian Federation and newly independent Central Asian states. The dynamics of the Middle East had also changed after the Cold War, thus Turkey established close relations with Israel, which was similar to relation in 1950s. In the end, the post-Cold War environment enabled more interaction between states/communities that was very limited. However, the 9/11 attacks

played as a restrictive agent within the international structure as it was undesirable to have good relations with the “axis of evil”.

On the other hand, while the system allowed greater area of movement in communities engaging each other, Turkey much more remained anchored to European Union and, to the lesser extend but still very significantly, the United States well into 2010s. Turkey, since 1980s, put significant priority to the membership to the European Union, which was opposed by the Turkish bourgeoisie during the 1970s. On the other hand, the United States continued to be the main source that Turkey rely on defense and security issues, more than the states within the European Union. Consequently, despite the problems with both the European Union (e.g. issues of human rights violations) and the United States (e.g. not providing access to Turkish territory in the invasion of Iraq), the relations with the center of the liberal bloc had never reached the point of break or severely decreased.

Final section will examine how Turkey's defense procurement behavior changed in parallel to the neoliberal turn and took a different form of connectedness and dependency to the United States and NATO. Turkey's integration to the neoliberal hegemony is also reflected to the choices made within the defense and defense industry policies. Although, as mentioned in previous chapter, the idea of establishing an aircraft manufacturing capabilities had been put forward in 1970 by General Muhsin Batur, the resistance to investment in defense sector was partially broken following the US arms embargo. Although, there have been various offers from aircraft manufacturers, e.g. Northrop for F-5 Tiger II and Lockheed for CL-1200 Lancer, the significant steps in establishing aircraft manufacturing capabilities, and greater investment in defense production capabilities, had been taken during the early-1980s with a decision to acquire F-16 Fighting Falcon, which was co-produced in Europe. Consequently, Turkish defense sector began its transformation towards production indigenous weapon system.

Yet, this transformation in the Turkish defense industry is mainly the result of the opportunity created by global change in the form of production and international politics that also created a level of flexibility in production of weapons. Post-Fordist production practices enabled spread of production to both smaller units and geographically than before. Although defense industry, shows many variations from the civilian industry, in time production of weapon systems have also spread to different manufacturing units in various locations. Consequently, this created an incentive of defense companies to invest in defense production in customer states. On the other hand, states started to ask for investment on production capabilities. Yet, the main driving force behind the growth of the Turkish defense industries is the Turkish defense companies ability to integrate themselves to the global production of weapon systems, either production certain sections of the system or supplying certain sub-systems. This integration of Turkish defense industries to global weapons production was the function of the shift from import-substitution industrialization to export oriented industrialization within the Turkish economic structure, which is the reflection of the neoliberal transformation in Turkey. Therefore, the following section will elaborate the points mentioned above.

6.1 International Structure

6.1.1 Post-Fordism and Neoliberalism

The neoliberal hegemonic structure is the result of changes in the form of production that started in the 1970s and rise of the classical liberal (neo-classical liberalism) ideas to the dominance. In other words, neoliberal hegemonic structure founded on the fit between the new form of production and set of ideas –on how politics, economics and society should be– that helped capitalism to reinvent itself and get over the crisis of Fordist

production and Keynesian ideas. However, the transformation of the form of production was not a clean break from its past, neither the ideas that supported it. Bob Jessop argues:

Without significant discontinuity, it would not be post-Fordism; without significant continuity, it would not be post-Fordism. This double condition is satisfied where: (a) post-Fordism has demonstrably emerged from tendencies originating within Fordism but still marks a decisive break with it; or (b) the ensemble of old and new elements in post-Fordism demonstrably displaces or resolves basic contradictions and crises in Fordism - even if it is also associated with its own contradictions and crisis tendencies in turn”.⁵⁰⁰

The coupling of Internationalization –also referred as globalization– flexibility is the defining characteristic of post-Fordist form of production that represents the break from the Fordist form of production. Internationalization of production was realized through the spread and fragmentation of production processes to the varying locations around the globe and establishment of networks between multitude of producers (networking). Amin and Malmberg defines the process of networking as “a process of collaboration between large competitors, leading to the creation of global oligarchies dominated by the TNCs, with their ‘loose-tight’ webs of partners and subcontractors”⁵⁰¹. While major actors within the same or a related sector establish long-term and multidimensional global partnership “involving joint R&D, technology transfer... and coproduction as an attempt by firms to spread risks and costs and prevent market failure”⁵⁰², small and medium enterprises, in different locations, are integrated to the global networks of big transnational corporations that also allowed “the parent corporation often transforms itself into a holding company, and treats its subsidiaries as quasi-independent companies”⁵⁰³. Thus, we observe that while capital accumulation is being concentrated on certain groups of capitalist, the process of

500 Jessop, “Post-Fordism and the State,” 257.

501 Ash Amin and Anders Malmberg, “Competing Structural and Institutional Influences on the Geography of Production in Europe,” in *Post-Fordism: A Reader*, ed. Ash Amin, Digital (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2003), 238.

502 Ibid.

503 Sabel, “Flexible Specialisation and the Re-emergence of Regional Economies,” 118.

production is fragmented and spread around the globe. As a result, internationalization process drives the a new division of labour on the international level, where it “enforced industrialization in former peripheral regions (‘threshold countries’ or ‘new industrializing countries’) go along with the deindustrialization of metropolitan regions”⁵⁰⁴. Consequently, while manufacturing and mass production relocated to the new industrializing countries, the capitalist centre restructures its economy towards the service sector and finance.

Although, the global reach of the capital and international division of labour are not new phenomena under the capitalist mode of production, what makes the post-Fordist model different in terms of global reach is that above mentioned structuring becomes the dominant form. Thus, corporations at the hegemonic centers withdraw from the manufacturing process, or in other words remove themselves from factory floor, while encouraging developing states to assume the majority of the manufacturing. Yet, the manufacturing integrated to a greater production process, thereby subdued to the control of the hegemonic centers, which control the both finance that is necessary for functioning of the manufacturing. However, this had not been done by establishing new factories around the globe, as it had been done during the Fordist era. The fragmentation and internationalization of production were realized either through mergers and acquisitions or simply subcontracting. Consequently, it entailed reshuffling of already existing assets, rather than creating new ones.

While the internationalization of production also involved the flexibility of production and labour process, which defined the new form of production. Flexibility of the production is based on the possibility to make rapid shifts in output⁵⁰⁵, which can be realized through the capability to utilize different machines or systems and workforce and the ability to shift between them as

504Josef Esser and Joachim Hirsch, “The Crisis of Fordism and the Dimensions of ‘Post-Fordist’ Regional and Urban Structure,” in *Post-Fordism: A Reader*, ed. Ash Amin, Digital (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2003), 79–80.

505Sabel, “Flexible Specialisation and the Re-emergence of Regional Economies,” 102.

rapidly as possible. However, the rapid change of machines or system cannot be possible under the Fordist form of production, where the manufacturer needs to make a long-term investment on machines and system. Hence, the fragmentation of producing process and the spread to different localities, which was enabled by the technological advancements in microelectronics based information and communication systems that resolved the problem of control from distances and standardization of products, allowed “varying aspects of location to be exploited flexibly (cheap or qualified workforce, ‘highest’ capacity environment - ‘worldwide sourcing’)”⁵⁰⁶. Consequently, the accumulation is dependent on the supply-side innovations or changes in terms of organizations, machines and/or systems in response to changes within the worldwide demand.

Post-Fordism, therefore, is a response to problems of Fordism that born out of the contradictions of Fordist production. Fordist production had two major problems. First, Fordist production the increased power of the workers because of the benefits provided to control and integrate workers to the hegemonic structure. Thus, workers were increasingly resisting the will of the bourgeoisie. Second, the mass production had reached its limits of capital accumulation, hence, during the 1970s, stagnation, the relative saturation of markets for standardized mass produced goods and inflation had put the system into crisis⁵⁰⁷. The first problem was resolved through the fragmentation of production to different locations and different geographies, which divided and weakened the labour power that were based on the organization of large amount of workers within the big factories. While, as mentioned above, big capital removed itself from the factory floor, it also externalized the both labour resistance to other parts of the world and the fixed costs of manufacturing. Consequently, labour resistance had been broken by spatially dividing workers into smaller units around the globe. In

506 Esser and Hirsch, “The Crisis of Fordism and the Dimensions of ‘Post-Fordist’ Regional and Urban Structure,” 79–80.

507 Jessop, “Post-Fordism and the State,” 257–8.

addition, limiting the production or mimicking the structure of small and medium enterprises brought in a different set of control mechanisms of the labour, which depend on the interpersonal relations between the worker and the bourgeoisie. Consequently, the unity between the labour movements had been diluted, thus making workers more vulnerable and divisive within the newly emerging production relations.

The problem of capital accumulation under the Fordist production was resolved by financialization of capital at the hegemonic centres. In late-1960s and the 1970s, capital accumulation under the Fordist production had reached its limits as a result of strong resistance of the labour movements against the intensification of work and attempts to reduce wages which also made the exploitation of labour much too expensive⁵⁰⁸. Along with the development of transforming the form of production, the capital at the hegemonic centers withdraw itself from the manufacturing, thus the capital increasingly moved to financial sector. The novelty of the shift towards the financial sector was that it aimed to decouple itself from the real economy, manufacturing, and reached a high degree of independence⁵⁰⁹. First, the shift towards the financial sector created large amount of available credit as well as high level of flexibility in terms of investment. Thus, financialization aimed to change dynamics of control. Rather than confronting working class at the factory floor, financialization liberated the capital from the factory floor and enabled control over labor movements via provision of credits and interests that were provided to manufacturing. This created the need for open markets for easy flow of capital from one place to another, seeking more rent and profits out of real economy. Second, financialization established an indirect control over the working class along side with flexibility and internationalization of production. Consequently, the amount of available

508Werner Bonefeld and John Holloway, "Conclusion: Money and Class Struggle," in *Global Capital, National State and the Politics of Money*, ed. Werner Bonefeld and John Holloway (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 1995), 211.

509John Bellamy Foster, "The Financialization of Capitalism," *Monthly Review* 58, no. 11 (April 2007): 6.

credits enabled boosting of the stagnant economy through extending credits to the working class despite the stagnant real wages so that people would continue to maintain their life styles and continue to purchase commodities betting on their future earnings.

Neoliberalism, the cluster of ideas and policies that are founded in the reinvention of economic liberalism as a form of political economy and as a political ideology⁵¹⁰, constructs the ideas that would form the basis for normalization of post-Fordist form of production and enabling incentives for its expansion and control. In other words, neoliberalism denotes the foundational ideas for the emerging form of production in sustaining the consent for the new hegemonic structure.

The primacy of free market and reducing the role of the state in market economy to minimum to none sits at the core of the neoliberal thinking. The primacy of the free market is grounded on the political ideas of individual liberty and freedoms, thus neoliberal intellectuals argue that “without ‘the diffused power and initiative associated with [private property and the competitive market] it is difficult to image a society in which freedom may be effectively preserved’”⁵¹¹. Furthermore, neoliberalism aims to construct market-based populist culture of differentiated consumerism and individual libertarianism through emphasizing “the liberty of consumer choice, not only with respect to particular products but also with respect to lifestyles, modes of expression and a wide a range of cultural practices”⁵¹², which would ground policies, which increases the power of certain block, on a moral high-ground there by hiding the source of power within the structure.

When the role of the state is considered within the neoliberalism, we observe a contradiction and division within the neoliberal thinking. Gamble argues,

510 Andrew Gamble, “Two Faces of Neo-Liberalism,” in *The Neo-Liberal Revolution: Forging the Market State*, ed. Richard Robison (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 20.

511 David Harvey, “Neo-Liberalism as Creative Destruction,” *Geografiska Annaler: Series B, Human Geography* 88, no. 2 (2006): 146.

512 David Harvey, *A Brief History of Neoliberalism* (Oxford & New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 42.

one strand, *laissez-faire*, of the neoliberal approach argues that the state has the role of removing obstacles to the way in which market functions, while the other strand, social market, argues that the state has the role and the responsibility to intervene to create right kind of environment and institutional frameworks within which market functions⁵¹³. While the *laissez-faire* strand is wary of state interventions, believing that it would do more harm than good and outcomes of the market that was left alone would be as benign as it could be in an imperfect world, the second strand expects wide range of state intervention, from structural adjustments to welfare safety nets to environmental protection. Consequently, neoliberalism involves a contradiction within itself as having different approaches to the role of state. Yet, the contradiction creates an opportunity for constructing a range of different discourses⁵¹⁴.

Consequently, neoliberalism aimed at constructing the conditions for post-Fordist form of production to thrive. To reach this end, neoliberal policies are directed towards constructing the environment for internationalization, flexibility and financialization to happen while minimizing the resistance. At the core of the policy agendas included “privatization, flexible labor markets, financial de-regulation, flexible exchange rate regimes, central bank independence (with inflation targeting), fiscal austerity, and good governance”⁵¹⁵ so that both financial institutions and TNCs could exploit uneven development of the regions.

On the other hand, in practice, neoliberalism presented a different picture. First, the actors that brought neoliberalism and created the environment for post-Fordist production practices usually aligned with conservative values that infringe upon individual liberty and freedoms in sustaining the control over the dissidence. Consequently, neoliberalism took different shapes at

513Gamble, “Two Faces of Neo-Liberalism,” 21–2.

514Ibid., 22.

515Ümit Cizre and Erınç Yeldan, “The Turkish Encounter with Neo-liberalism: Economics and Politics in the 2000/2001 Crises,” *Review of International Political Economy* 12, no. 3 (2005): 388.

different location in varying degrees, which shows the inherent contradiction. Neoliberalism based its control on the conservative moral values like religion and family during the periods of Thatcher in the United Kingdom and Reagan and Bush Sr. in the United States, thus making neo-conservatism a defining political discourse. Consequently, the neoliberalism rather than encouraging individual liberty and freedom, which actually necessitated diversity and tolerance, aligned itself with a unified view of society, thus incorporated a level of authoritarianism the structural transformation project⁵¹⁶.

Authoritarian reflexes of neoliberal transformation do not end in the discourse that is adapted by the actors of the project. State and international institutions played a significant role in the transformation in an undemocratic manner. While the issues concerning the economy have been put outside of the public debate, thereby constructing the image of the universality of economic policies, key decisions have been increasingly made by unaccountable institutions such as the Central Banks (or the Federal Reserve) and/or the IMF⁵¹⁷. Furthermore, businesses and corporations started to play an increasing role in shaping legislations, determining public policies and setting regulatory frameworks that are mainly advantageous to themselves via institutional framework of public-private partnerships⁵¹⁸.

Consequently, institutions played a significant role in spreading neoliberal ideas and policies around the globe. The IMF and the World Bank, once the messenger of Keynesian political economy, were integrated to neoliberal project, thus extension of credits to the states that are in need were connected to the structural adjustments –such as cuts in welfare expenditures, more flexible labour market laws and privatization – of the particular state economy to open the market for post-Fordist production. “for example, the opening of capital markets is now a condition of membership of

516 Zeynep Gambetti, “İktidarın Dönüşen Çehresi: Neoliberalizm, Şiddet Ve Kurumsal Siyasetin Tasfiyesi,” *IU Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Dergisi* 40 (March 2009): 152.

517 Harvey, *A Brief History of Neoliberalism*, 69.

518 *Ibid.*, 76–77.

the IMF and the [World Trade Organization]⁵¹⁹. The WTO, which was the result of Uruguay Round that started in 1986, aimed to structure global economy in parallel to neoliberal standards for opening up “as much of the world as possible to unhindered capital flow (though always with the caveat clause of the protection of key 'national interests') ... to extract tribute from the rest of the world”⁵²⁰. Regional institutions such as NAFTA and European Union supplemented the role of WTO in the spread of neoliberal ideas as regional extensions. In addition to international institutions, G-8 and World Economic Forum summits have also become the agents for the spread of neoliberal agenda.

State apparatuses, despite the neoliberal discourse, played a critical role in flourishing the neoliberalism, both at the national and international level. For example, “one of the tasks for the military regimes of the eighties was to end party politics and establish a basis for economic development under the influence of ‘global market forces’ or globalization.”⁵²¹. It was the state that implemented neoliberal policies and structural adjustments while suppressing any opposition to the transformation.

At the international level, the United States played a critical role in the dominance of the neoliberalism and post-Fordism because neoliberalism had become the new foundation for the US hegemonic power, which had already controlled the part of the world despite the weakening in the 1970s. Consequently, the neoliberalism vitalized the hegemonic structure of the liberal bloc, making the United States, the principle actor, to pursue expansionist policies. In addition to galvanized US hegemony, the dissolution of the Soviet alternative boosted the spread by both disarming possible opposition at the level of ideas and removal of an opposition force that closed part of the world to capital accumulation.

519Ibid., 72.

520Ibid., 93.

521Ahmad, *Turkey: Quest for Identity*, 158.

The projection of neoliberalism initiated, rather differently from other epochs, at the outside of the hegemonic center; in Chile. Democratically elected Salvador Allende was ousted by General Pinochet through a military coup in 1973, which was backed by US corporations, the CIA and the US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. This opened the gates for neoliberal experimentation in Chile. Initially, the social movements and political organizations of the left were violently suppressed, hence the possible opposition to experimentation was eradicated. However, the military coup had different views on how to revive the Chilean economy. The struggle between General Gustavo Leigh, who was a Keynesian, and General Pinochet was concluded in 1975 with Pinochet victory. A group of neoliberal economists, who trained in University of Chicago in neoliberal policies, worked alongside with the IMF in implementing neoliberal policies. The transformation was realized through opening up of natural resources to private and unregulated exploitation, privatized social security and facilitation of foreign direct investment and free trade. Export-led growth became the dominate strategy for economic revival as opposed to import-substitution⁵²². Although the economic revival of the Chilean economy was short-lived, with the Latin America financial crisis in 1982, neoliberal policies rose to the capitalist orthodoxy as it found it's way to centers of liberal bloc.

While Chilean example, and later Turkey, shows how neoliberalism spread through coercive apparatuses, in other instances it successfully utilized the economic crisis of Keynesian policies in both the central states of the liberal bloc and also in other states in expanding its influence. One of the initial application of neoliberal polices in the United States came with the economic crisis of New York City. The gap between revenues and outlays in the New York City budget gathered pace with the recession, which was also aided with the diminishing federal aid to the cities that started in the early-1970s. Although the financial institutions were ready to bridge the gap, they soon decided not to follow through in 1975 and refused roll over the debt. This

⁵²²Harvey, *A Brief History of Neoliberalism*, 7–9.

pushed the city into technical bankruptcy. Consequent bail-out plan was followed the footsteps of neoliberal principles that resulted in claim on the city's income to pay off bondholders, wage freezes, cutbacks in public employment and social provisions, impose of user fees and requirement from the municipal unions to invest their pension funds in city bonds⁵²³. While, much of the social infrastructure of the city diminished and physical structure deteriorated due to lack of investment, financial bankers moved in for creation of a 'good business climate in New York by restructuring the economy around financial services. The management of the city turned into entrepreneurial with public-private partnership and decision had been increasingly taken behind the closed doors⁵²⁴. The New York fiscal crisis and the management of the crisis accelerated spread of neoliberal policies.

Encouraged by the events in Chile and the management of the New York City fiscal crisis, neoliberalism expanded to the federal level in the United States, first through the Federal Reserve policies then reign of Reagan administration and it found proponents in other states, most significant of all was Margaret Thatcher in the United Kingdom. Remaining principles of the New Deal, Keynesian fiscal and monetary policies that aimed for full employment, was dismantled in 1979, when Paul Volcker, chairman of the US Federal Reserve Bank under President Carter, adopted monetary policy that aimed for anti-inflationary fiscal responsibility. The neoliberalism was solidified with the victory of Ronald Reagan, who followed policies of deregulation, tax cuts, budget cuts and attacks on trade union and professional power that increased the power of corporations and deindustrialization⁵²⁵. In the same fashion, Margaret Thatcher followed the similar policy implementations and attacks on the labour unions. Thatcher opened up the United Kingdom to foreign competition and investment, employed non-union workers, who would be willing to work in flexible and

523Ibid., 45.

524Ibid., 46–7.

525Ibid., 23–6.

precarious working conditions, furthered budget cuts and privatization of all publicly owned enterprises⁵²⁶.

The global spread of the neoliberalism came through increased role of the international organizations such as the IMF and the World Bank. These organizations capitalized on the financial crisis of the states and their debts to alter the structure in various states. Mexico was the first of many states that would be drawn into the web of financial aids in return for the neoliberalization of its economy. The opportunity came when Mexico was driven to default in 1982-4. Reagan administration took this opportunity to transform the IMF and the World Bank, which meant the purge of all Keynesian influenced within the IMF. Thus, Mexico crisis was resolved when US Treasury and the IMF united their forces in resolving the problem in return for the policies such as cuts in welfare programs, flexible labour markets and privatization⁵²⁷. Consequently, increasing amount of states were driven into the neoliberal hegemony through financial crisis and subsequent debt reliefs, which opened the markets for capital accumulation.

Consequently, the expansion was made possible by reproduction of hegemonic bloc under the leadership of the United States, whose influence was weakened during the 1970s. The United States, once again, became an assertive power in shaping the global hegemonic structure with the help of the United Kingdom, which was followed by the other central states. However, the existence of Soviet alternative still posed a threat to the spread of neoliberalism. Thus, under the Cold War framework, the United States involved the engagement of the Soviet Union, which could be defined by both animosity and friendship. During the 1970s, the liberal hegemony lost ground in mainly disputed areas mainly because of weakening of the leading state –withdrawal from Indochina in 1975, Cuban intervention with Soviet advisors in Angola and Ethiopia and invasion of Afghanistan, to Communist

526Ibid., 59–62.

527Ibid., 29.

block and anti-American movements that were successful in ousting pro-American governments⁵²⁸. This has altered the patronage balance. Thus, the United States, which felt that its hegemony was weakened, initiated, what has been called as 'Second Cold War', fighting against the Soviet influence through proxies⁵²⁹. One of the significant support was extended to Mujaheddins in Afghanistan, who were fighting against the Communist government and the Soviet Union, in an attempt to create 'Vietnam experience for the Soviet Union'. In addition, Reagan administration initiated Strategic Defense Initiative, popularly known as Star Wars, to increase anti-ballistic missile defense capabilities of the United States, as well as increased military spending. This has aimed to put stress on the Soviet Union, which had depended on the ballistic missiles to keep the balance with the United States, as well as it was a part of Reagan's militant anticommunist discourse⁵³⁰. On the other hand, while proxy war with the Soviet Union continued and the United States took aggressive military stance, Reagan also engaged the Soviet Union in a more peaceful fashion, especially following the reign of Gorbachev. Kissinger argues that "during the Reagan's second term, an East-West dialogue of a scope and intensity not seen since the Nixon period of detente took place"⁵³¹.

On the other hand, the Soviet Union, although it was not heavily involved in revolutions in the 'Third World' during the 1970s, it nevertheless extended support to the governments that had become closer to its block in the disputed areas between the blocks despite slowing down and the weakening of the Soviet economy. Philip Hanson describes the 1970s and the Soviet behavior as "this was a period when, unusually, the Soviet leaders sanctioned military adventures of some substance"⁵³². Consequently, the

528Kissinger, *Diplomacy*, 763; Hobsbawm, *The Age of Extremes: A History of the World, 1914-1991*, 449–56.

529Hobsbawm, *The Age of Extremes: A History of the World, 1914-1991*, 452.

530Kissinger, *Diplomacy*, 767.

531Ibid., 769.

532Philip Hanson, *The Rise and Fall of the Soviet Economy: An Economic History of the*

military spending of the Soviet Union increased because of the occupation in Afghanistan in 1979 and extending military aid to friendly governments. On the one hand, the Soviet economy was declining but the regime was stopped trying to do anything about the problems but to use bribery and corruption to keep economy functioning⁵³³, while imports from the liberal bloc increased and main source of income had become the windfall of the high oil prices⁵³⁴. Consequently, the greater integration with the capitalist world economy made the Soviet economy more susceptible to the shocks of the 1970s, thus forcing the Soviet economy, and the structure, to face both its insoluble systemic problems and problems of changing and problematic world problems⁵³⁵.

While, increased military spending, stagnating economy and shocks of the world economy that were coupled with “acute political and cultural ferment among the Soviet elite”⁵³⁶ and increasing opposition to Soviet Union in Eastern European countries created conditions for crisis both within the Soviet bloc and inside the Soviet Union. Yet, these were not necessary conditions for the collapse of the Soviet Union. The necessary condition, the disappearance of both ideas and the institutions that supported the hegemonic structure, for the collapse was occurred with the reforms of Mikhail Gorbachev. He sought to reform the Soviet system to make it more robust in the face of transforming rival hegemonic structure and world economy as well as to resolve stagnation and rooted corruption with in system but failed to reproduce Soviet hegemonic system.

Gorbachev's reforms had two pillars: *glasnost* (freedom of information or openness) and *perestroika* (restructuring of both economy and political structure). *Glasnost* sought to incorporate the broader group of the society

USSR from 1945 (London & New York: Longman - Pearson Education, 2003), 131.

533Hobsbawm, *The Age of Extremes: A History of the World, 1914-1991*, 473.

534Hanson, *The Rise and Fall of the Soviet Economy: An Economic History of the USSR from 1945*, 132.

535Hobsbawm, *The Age of Extremes: A History of the World, 1914-1991*, 473.

536Ibid., 476.

into political system, to mobilize support for the reforms against possible resistance from the groups that benefit from the current system, through dismantling the control mechanisms on the public debate and individual freedom of thought⁵³⁷. However, glasnost opened the gateways for criticism of the Soviet system, thus weakened its grounds of legitimacy, and enabled the promotion and advocacy of neoliberal ideas – free markets in place of planning and private ownership in place of state or worker ownership⁵³⁸. Consequently, the spread of neoliberal ideas resulted in “the growing shift of the Soviet intelligentsia, and particularly the economists, toward the support for capitalism [which] was an important factor in the eventual demise of state socialism”⁵³⁹.

Perestroika, on the other hand, aimed the restructuring of the political and economic structures. For the political part, it envisioned “introduction, or re-introduction, of a constitutional and democratic state based on the rule of law and the enjoyment of civil liberties as commonly understood”⁵⁴⁰. This entailed the democratization of Party as well as the State, through implementing elections at all levels of the Party and the State. For the economic part, the vision was to reaching a balance between socialism and capitalism, however it was not clear, at the time, how this would be reached. Yet, the basic principles of the transformation of the Soviet economy included certain level of free market, de-centralization and private ownership. Consequently, the transformation of the Soviet economy started with introduction of small-scale individual and cooperative enterprises in 1986. The system incrementally moved towards capitalism by the progressive loosening of the state control over the economy⁵⁴¹. Yet, as the system loosened the debate on the future of

537David Kotz and Fred Weir, *Revolution from Above: The Demise of the Soviet System* (London & New York: Routledge, 1997), 63–4.

538Ibid., 66–70.

539Ibid., 71.

540Hobsbawm, *The Age of Extremes: A History of the World, 1914-1991*, 481.

541Kotz and Weir, *Revolution from Above: The Demise of the Soviet System*, 79.

the economy moved towards the system in the capitalist bloc, which was pushed by newly occurring capitalist-bloc in the Soviet Union.

However, the reformers of the Soviet system failed to establish new institutions in place of the institutions, which held together the Soviet system and reformers as well as the capitalist-bloc dismantled through the process of glasnost and perestroika. In the end, the whole process of reformation of the Soviet structure amounted into disintegration of authority and destruction of mechanisms that made the system work, thus lead to eventual collapse of the system⁵⁴². Consequently, the collapse of the Soviet hegemonic structure initiated when the communist governments were ousted in Eastern Europe and finalized when the Soviet Union dissolved as its constituting republics declared independence.

The dissolution of the Communist alternative, which was coupled with the United States triumphalism, boosted the neoliberal hegemony and increased the speed of its spread. Neoliberalism firmly established itself as the new orthodoxy in shaping the global economy and politics. The absence coherent and united of opposition to the neoliberal hegemony enabled it to maintain and reproduce itself in against the economic crisis that had been experienced in the 1980s and the 1990s.

Furthermore, neoliberalism, while its core ideas and the form of the production remained the same, it took different forms, in terms of mechanisms of control, in different societal settings. Consequently, this enabled as well as the new international division of labour and the absence of existential threat appearance of regional centers within the structure that could oppose to and show variations from the hegemonic leader, the United States. In other words, an element of flexibility was introduced to the system in terms of policies through formation of regional hegemonies.

The European Union is one of the regional bloc. Interlinkages and networked relation between the European states, which have been consolidating

⁵⁴²Hobsbawm, *The Age of Extremes: A History of the World, 1914-1991*, 483.

through the incentives of member states and the institutions of European Union, could have the possibility of creating a European economy at least as large and as powerful as that of the United States⁵⁴³. Although the European Union reached certain level of economic integration as well as social and political integration among its member states and have the capability to influence its regional societies, it did not signify a break from the structure, since the members of the Union, with varying degrees, are still connected to the hegemonic structure through NATO and neoliberal rules and institutions despite the construction of new institutions. China appears to be another regional hegemon, which is usually seen as a competitor to the United States. Neoliberalism in China manifested itself rather differently in terms of political form, yet the economy is fully integrated to neoliberal global structure. Although, Chinese economy is growing and some amount of the accumulated capital is translated to military spending, China is far from being an alternative to neoliberal hegemony as its economy mainly depends on the manufacturing, thus it need the American and European markets to flourish. Consequently, China had become main supporter of the neoliberal hegemony through extending credits to the United States whenever it needed. In the end, regional hegemonies show possible fault lines within the bourgeoisie in sharing the global capital accumulation, yet this does not mean cracks within the liberal bloc.

6.1.2 Restructuring of International Defense Industry

Defense industries occupy a special space within the analytical examinations as well as in the political discourse. This special space, the characteristic that made defense industries different than the civilian sector, is defined as “outside the bounds of free-market economics, and the typical free market standards of open competition, efficiency, and even profitability were secondary to guaranteeing that a nation could internally mobilize the material

⁵⁴³Harvey, *The New Imperialism*, 82.

resources it required for its national defense”⁵⁴⁴. Since defense industries are important for the national defense, they had to be national. On the other hand, such view is the reflection of ideas of a Fordist production and shaped through the past experiences. However, the form that defense industries take is also affected by the general structure. Consequently, as Lavalley argues, it is logical that defense industries would follow the transformation of form of production⁵⁴⁵ and restructure itself in parallel to the post-Fordist production and neoliberalism.

Consequently, in parallel to emergence of neoliberalism, and post-Fordism, the defense industry began to restructure through capitalizing on the opportunities created by the emergence of transnational defense markets and corporate structure, especially after the end of the Cold War –yet the process can be traced to the late-1970s. Collaboration in arms production and various mechanisms to produce certain types of weapons system, as Bitzinger says, existed for several decades⁵⁴⁶. However, what makes the transformation of defense industries during the neoliberal structure, similar to the civilian sector, is the increasing level, depth and complexity of global industrial integration of national defense industries through operations of international supply chains and foreign direct investments⁵⁴⁷. Offset sales – sales involving some domestic sourcing of components or sub assemblies– played significant role in the establishing international supply chains through different means such as setting up a separate final assembly lines, co-production agreements and subcontracting manufacturing of parts for a weapon system⁵⁴⁸.

544Richard A. Bitzinger, “The Globalization of the Arms Industry: The Next Proliferation Challenge,” *International Security* 19, no. 2 (1994): 173.

545Tara Lavalley, “Globalizing the Iron Triangle: Policy-Making Within the US Defense Industrial Sector,” *Defense & Security Analysis* 19, no. 2 (2003): 151.

546Bitzinger, “The Globalization of the Arms Industry: The Next Proliferation Challenge,” 171.

547Keith Hayward, “Globalization of Defense Industries,” *Survival* 42, no. 2 (2000): 115.

548*ibid.*, 124.

F-16 Fighting Falcon is a good example for cooperation in defense industries that represent the initial phases of the changes in defense industries. F-16 Fighting Falcon was winner of the Lightweight Fighter Program of the United States, which was searching for cheaper fighter plane that could supplement the force of F-15 Eagle, which is better but also expensive⁵⁴⁹. Initiated in 1972, Northrop and General Dynamics asked to participate in the program. Northrop developed twin-engine YF-17 Cobra, which would become F/A-18 Hornet, and General Dynamics developed YF-16. In 1975, the competition concluded with YF-16's victory, hence F-16 Fighting Falcon was born⁵⁵⁰. The Netherlands, Belgium, Denmark and Norway got interested in procurement of F-16 to replace F-104s in their inventory. Four European countries formed European Consortium for the co-production of F-16 in Europe, which would expanded in time. While the Netherlands (Fokker) and Belgium (Societe Anonyme Belge de Constructions Aeronautiques (SABCA)) made the final assembly, Denmark and Norway, as well as late participants to the consortium Turkey and Greece, were guaranteed a work share in sub-assemblies for the entire European and US production⁵⁵¹. F-16 production evolved in time, where Turkey started to manufacture F-16s for third party buyers such as Egypt and Pakistan.

While government-to-government agreements such as F-16 co-production project, was the initiator of many defense industry collaborations until the early-1980s, industry-to-industry defense collaborations began to expand with the beginning of mid-1980s⁵⁵². Industry-to-industry collaborations,

549John G. Fredriksen, *Warbirds: An Illustrated Guide to U.S. Military Aircraft, 1915-2000* (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC Clio, 1999), 140.

550“F-16 Fighting Falcon: History,” *GlobalSecurity.org*, July 7, 2011, <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/aircraft/f-16-history.htm>.

551“F-16 Fighting Falcon: International Users,” *GlobalSecurity.org*, March 30, 2013, <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/aircraft/f-16-fms.htm>; Bitzinger, “The Globalization of the Arms Industry: The Next Proliferation Challenge,” 177; Andrew D. James, “The Prospects for a Transatlantic Defense Industry,” in *Between Cooperation and Competition: The Transatlantic Defense Market*, ed. Burkard Schmitt, Chaillot Paper 44 (Paris: Institute for Security Studies, Western European Union, 2001), 101.

552Bitzinger, “The Globalization of the Arms Industry: The Next Proliferation Challenge,” 182.

encouraged by governments and by corporations own initiative, manifested itself through various forms. One of the forms is the consolidation of the defense sector through mergers and acquisitions. European defense industry consolidation preceded the consolidation wave in the United States with 'national champions' such as British Aerospace (BAe) and General Electric-Marconi in the United Kingdom, DASA in Germany, Saab in Sweden, Aerospatiale-Matra and Thomson-CSF in France, CASA in Spain and the various holdings on Finmeccanica in Italy in the 1980s⁵⁵³. The consolidation wave in the United States, on the other hand gathered impetus in 1993 when then Deputy Secretary of Defense William Perry met with defense industry representatives, what is called as "the Last Supper" to inform defense budget cuts and therefore encouraging the industry to consolidate⁵⁵⁴. Consequently, since the 1990s, though with varying intensity, defense industry consolidated into a select group of major prime contractors and a select group of semi-primes and specialist high-level subsystem suppliers with connections that goes well beyond the national borders, which was not only limited to the US and European corporations but also Asian defense companies and the Russian industry⁵⁵⁵. Thus, to name some, the select group of prime contractor that are transnational consists of BAE Systems (formerly BAe), Thales (formerly Thompson-CSF), EADS (European Aeronautic Defense and Space Company – born out of merger of DASA, CASA and Aerospatiale Matra), Lockheed Martin, Boeing, Raytheon, General Dynamics and Northrop Grumman⁵⁵⁶.

553Gordon Adams, "Fortress America in a Changing Transatlantic Defence Market," in *Between Cooperation and Competition: The Transatlantic Defence Market*, ed. Burkard Schmitt, Chaillot Paper 44 (Paris: Institute for Security Studies, Western European Union, 2001), 23.

554Russel V. Hoff, "Analysis of Defense Industry Consolidation Effects on Program Acquisitions Costs" (Master of Business Administration, Naval Postgraduate School, 2007), 2.

555Hayward, "Globalization of Defense Industries," 117; Adams, "Fortress America in a Changing Transatlantic Defence Market," 24; Lavalley, "Globalizing the Iron Triangle: Policy-Making Within the US Defense Industrial Sector," 161.

556For formation and acquisitions in defense sector in Europe and the United States see J. Paul Dunne, "Developments in the Global Arms Industry from the End of the Cold War to Mid-2000s," in *The Modern Defense Industry: Political, Economic, and Technological*

Other forms of the spread of defense production are to establish supply-chains system that incorporate peripheral producers such as Turkey, Poland and Brazil and pursue cooperative projects with wide range of manufacturers. For example, Raytheon has forged partnerships with Turkish defense companies Aselsan, Roketsan, Havelsan, Ayesas and Pagetel in support for the Patriot Air and Missile Defense System, in which Roketsan is producing Patriot GEM-T missile control-section assemblies and Aselsan is producing the Mobile Antenna Mast Group. Hence, Raytheon included parts from Roketsan and Aselsan for the Patriot system that was intended to be sold to United Arab Emirates⁵⁵⁷.

The expansion of the defense production is not only limited to the Europe and the United States, but it is also global just like other sectors of the global economy. Consequently, many prime defense corporations that had become transnational have vested interest that went beyond their Cold War structures. For example, as Andrew James puts it “UK companies, such as BAE Systems, Rolls-Royce and Smiths Group, have established strong positions within the US defense industrial base and BAE Systems has established itself in global markets as diverse as Australia, Saudi Arabia and South Africa”⁵⁵⁸. Defense companies, just like other corporations, had become export-oriented, though the intensity of search for more markets

Issues, ed. Richard A. Bitzinger (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC Clio, 2009), 18–20; Javier Irastorza Mediavilla, “EADS and BAE Systems Merger Talk,” *The Blog by Javier*, September 16, 2012, <http://theblogbyjavier.com/2012/09/16/2040/>.

557“Raytheon Picks Roketsan in Turkey as Patriot Missile Partner,” News, *UPI*, May 5, 2009, http://www.upi.com/Business_News/Security-Industry/2009/05/05/Raytheon-picks-Roketsan-in-Turkey-as-Patriot-missile-partner/UPI-17561241538687/; “Raytheon Names Roketsan Key Supplier for Patriot Missile Assembly,” Company Website, *Raytheon*, April 29, 2009, <http://raytheon.mediaroom.com/index.php?s=43&item=1254>; “Turkey, Raytheon Enter Patriot System Deal,” News, *UPI*, October 26, 2010, http://www.upi.com/Business_News/Security-Industry/2010/10/26/Turkey-Raytheon-enter-Patriot-system-deal/UPI-51411288093783/; “Raytheon Leaders Emphasize Productive Relationships with Turkey,” Company Website, *Raytheon*, July 3, 2012, http://www.raytheon.com/newsroom/feature/rtn12_amturkish/.

558Andrew James, “Comparing European Responses to Defense Industry Globalization,” *Defense & Security Analysis* 18, no. 2 (2002): 126.

varies according to defense budget of their main buyer. As Gordon Adams puts it:

As in the past, when the U.S. market tails off, the big contractors prepare to leave the country, hoping that international markets will make up for the loss in sales volume in the United States. The latest straw in the wind is an increasingly aggressive industry push to make up overseas for the sales that are declining at home. And the U.S. defense industry has products it urgently wants to sell overseas⁵⁵⁹.

Furthermore, as a logical consequence of spreading the production and horizontal integration, the defense industry had also changed how a weapon system is produced, in parallel to the developments of civilian sector and enabling effect of the end of the Cold War. Defense industry companies increasingly relied on off-the-shelf-technologies (COTS), of commercial and/or defense origin, in weapon systems through integrating components that could be used for multiple (or dual) purposes, which disaggregated the product or platform technologies into more discrete components, which could be applied in a modular fashion to any number of purposes⁵⁶⁰. Consequently, this enabled defense firms to establish networks with non-defense companies, enter into civilian sectors, especially in the field of IT, and widen the product variety such as enabling Lockheed Martin to build ships even though it does not have any experience before. This trend meant that the entry into defense market on certain areas became easier, thus civilian sector companies started to participate in the defense market such as iRobot, which mainly produces robotic home appliances company but also manufactures bomb diffusing robots for the US Army. Consequently, defense companies do not really built the whole weapon system, they could either operate as system integrator or supply components and sub-components to another

559Gordon Adams, "U.S. Defense Industry Flees the Country," *Foreign Policy* (June 21, 2013), http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/06/21/us_defense_industry_flees_the_country

560Kathleen A. Walsh, "The Role, Promise, and Challenges of Dual-Use Technologies in National Defense," in *The Modern Defense Industry: Political, Economic, and Technological Issues*, ed. Richard A. Bitzinger (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC Clio, 2009), 134.

system integrator and could participate in civilian sectors, especially in IT related areas. In the end, defense and civilian markets merged at certain areas.

Blurring lines between civilian and defense market also intensified with the privatization of security. Privatization of security entailed privatization of certain services that once assumed to be the one of the main role of the states such as securing military installations, maintenance of weapon systems and military logistics in a conflict zone. Consequently, a new type of companies appeared especially during 1990s but intensified and widely accepted during 2000s, as neoliberal ideas spread and accepted. Private Military and Security Companies (PMSC) increasingly assumed what state coercive tools, military and police were doing. Consequently, defense companies such as Lockheed Martin and L-3 Communications also started to provide security services. Defense companies expanded their services to upgrades and programmed technology insertion over the lifetime of a weapon or defense system as well as training, simulation and logistics management⁵⁶¹. Although, defense companies did not necessarily leave the manufacturing, they also followed the turn towards service industry, in the same fashion that many US and European companies did.

In parallel to structural changes in defense industry and markets, international organizations began to encourage convergence of defense procurement with the participants of institutional frameworks in accordance with the new military doctrine of Network Centric Warfare (NCW), which was accepted at least presented as Revolution in Military Affairs. The United States was the leading actor in military transformation, which required a new type of weapon systems and NATO had been the principle institution that encouraged procurement of similar systems and/or joint production for the reasons of interoperability and military transformation. The concept of NCW, which was translated to Network Enabled Warfare in Europe, envisioned a

⁵⁶¹Hayward, "Globalization of Defense Industries," 122.

battlespace where all units are connected to each other and share the information that is gathered through advanced sensor technologies for C4I (Command, Control, Communications, Computer Applications and Intelligence). Consequently, all units will be networked via the information domain, just as the American business model, which necessitated change in the military organizations⁵⁶². Although, the concept of NCW had been evolved with the experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan, the core idea of networking military units and information sharing stayed within the military doctrines. Consequently, the goal of military transformation to network enabled military structure aimed to be reached through procurement of new weapon systems as well as making existing systems network enabled through upgrades. To this end and also in parallel with the developments in Europe, new institutional arrangement arose in Europe such as Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union for alignment of security and military policies and OCCAR (Organisation Conjointe de Coopération en matière d'ARmement) for common procurement between six members (Belgium, France, Germany, the United Kingdom, Italy and Spain) and 6 participant members (Finland, Sweden, Poland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Turkey).

Consequently, the structural transformation in military and defense production that resulted in integration to the liberal bloc deepened and widened to an unprecedented level in the defense sector. As Stale Ulriksen argues “[the process of integration] consisted of a web of cooperative project, each with its own dynamics and motivation, rather than a planned and controlled process. It was a process of decentralized military integration, or military integration by default”⁵⁶³. However, the level of integration also

562See William A Owens, “The Emerging US System of Systems,” *Strategic Forum* no. 63 (February 1996), http://www.ndu.edu/inss/Strforum/SF_63/forum63.html; Arthur K. Cebrowski and John H. Garstka, “Network-Centric Warfare: Its Origin and Future,” *Proceeding Magazine* 124, no. 1 (January 1998), <http://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/1998-01/network-centric-warfare-its-origin-and-future>; David S. Alberts et al., *Understanding Information Age Warfare* (DoD Command and Control Research Program, 2001).

563Stale Ulriksen, “European Military Forces: Integration by Default,” in *Denationalisation of*

extended to the non-members of institutional arrangements such as NATO, through integration of production as well as the emulation of US military doctrines as it perceived as the successful model. In the end, the global defense practices converged through this process.

As a result of this transformation, and the interdependence that arose out of it, subtle ways of control emerged as opposed to more overt controls that were practiced during the Cold War. As Caverley argues:

A closer look at defense interdependence reveals its severe asymmetry and the active role the United States plays in encouraging it; the world's preeminent military power is also the dominant weapons supplier. Such lopsidedness has a pacifying effect, not because of mutual dependence for weapons, but because it extends U.S. power more cheaply than would conquest. The United States need not run the tables; defense liberalization helps it to run the world⁵⁶⁴.

However, the mechanism arose out of defense interdependence does not peculiar to the defense as such, but it is the extension of the hegemonic structure. The control in defense and integration is another reflection of the neoliberal hegemony.

6.2 Domestic Structure

6.2.1 Act 1: Introduction of Neoliberalism in Turkey

Neoliberal transformation in Turkey began with the 12 September 1980 military coup, which came as a response to the crisis of hegemonic structure in Turkey during the 1970s. Although the resolution of hegemonic crisis through neoliberal policies first came to Turkey through stand-by agreements with IMF in 1978 and 1979, the transformation gathered momentum with the harsh stability program, which was initiated by then Undersecretary of Office

Defense, ed. Janne Haaland Matlary and Øyvind Østerud (Hampshire & Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2007), 48.

564. Jonathan D Caverley, "United States Hegemony and the New Economics of Defense," *Security Studies* 16, no. 4 (2007): 599.

of Prime Ministry Turgut Özal on 24 January 1980. Hence, the transformation was made possible by the military coup's ability to crush and discipline labour and societal opposition, without which could not be done⁵⁶⁵.

The interim government, established by the *Milli Güvenlik Konseyi* (National Security Council), speedily implemented virtually any measure it wished without encountering any opposition in parliament or from the press and it had the extraordinary legislative power of the Konsey⁵⁶⁶. Because the shift from import substitution industrialization to export-oriented economy through neoliberal models necessitated an authoritarian regime⁵⁶⁷, which continued even after the military coup, as could be observed by Turgut Özal's reliance on Cabinet Degrees rather than the parliament to take decisions quickly and not to be obstructed by opposition⁵⁶⁸. One of the actions that was taken by the Konsey was the Constitution of 1982, which “was designed to concentrate authority with the executive and limit the social rights previously granted concerning activities of labour unions and interest associations”⁵⁶⁹ to prevent any threats to implementation of neoliberal transformation. Furthermore, the constitution banned previous political parties and their leaders, strict requisites were placed for membership to political parties and electoral system was revised in such a way that political parties, which fall below 10 percent electoral threshold, were excluded from the parliament. In addition, Konsey was authorized to decide eligibility of political parties for participating in general election in 1983⁵⁷⁰.

565Pınar Bedirhanoğlu, “Türkiye’de Neoliberal Otoriter Devletin AKP’li Yüzü,” in *AKP Kitabı: Bir Dönüşümün Bilançosu*, ed. İlhan Üzgel and Bülent Duru, 2nd ed. (Ankara: Phoenix, 2010), 47; Gambetti, “İktidarın Dönüşen Çehresi: Neoliberalizm, Şiddet Ve Kurumsal Siyasetin Tasfiyesi,” 148.

566Ahmad, *Turkey: Quest for Identity*, 183.

567Aylin Özman and Simten Coşar, “Reconceptualizing Center Politics in Post-1980 Turkey: Transformation or Continuity?,” in *Remaking Turkey*, ed. E. Fuat Keyman (Plymouth, New York & Toronto: Lexington Books, 2007), 205.

568Ziya Öniş, “Turgut Ozal and His Economic Legacy: Turkish Neo-Liberalism in Critical Perspective,” *Middle Eastern Studies* 40, no. 4 (2004): 120.

569Ziya Öniş, “The Political Economy of Islamic Resurgence in Turkey: The Rise of the Welfare Party in Perspective,” *Third World Quarterly* 18, no. 4 (1997): 749.

570Özman and Coşar, “Reconceptualizing Center Politics in Post-1980 Turkey:

While the Konsey exerted pressure to nearly every movement, only Turgut Özal got the free pass from the Konsey. Turgut Özal, in this sense, was a significant agent in the neoliberal transformation of Turkey. He had been brought in by the Konsey, because he had close ties within the IMF and the World Bank, earned management degrees from American and German universities and great admirer of Reagan and Thatcher and he was able to “convince” the leaders of the military coup that structural adjustment of Turkey had to be done quickly⁵⁷¹. Furthermore, Özal's political party, Anavatan Partisi (ANAP – the Motherland Party) was permitted to run in the 1983 elections, despite the Konsey supported another party, mostly due to strong support from the actors of the neoliberal bloc, especially financial circles⁵⁷². Because, the military coup was aimed to put Turkey in parallel with neoliberal hegemony as it implemented “economic policy virtually dictated from Washington, the 12 September regime also adopted a foreign and military policy designed to serve Western interests in the region reeling from the impact of the revolution in Iran”⁵⁷³.

Consequently, Turkey adopted the export oriented economy, which dependent on wage suppression, depreciation of the domestic currency, extremely generous export subsidies and opening up financial sector that was in accordance with the structural adjustment in the 1980s. Although, economic policies stumbled on crisis, such as financial scandal in 1982 that created an initiative for regulation, the transformation, though gradual, aimed to establish liberalized financial system⁵⁷⁴. Thus, with every economic crisis since the 1980s, Turkey adopted neoliberal policies that were prescribed by

Transformation or Continuity?,” 205.

571Zurcher, *Turkey: A Modern History*, 286; Ahmad, *Turkey: Quest for Identity*, 183.

572Ahmad, *Turkey: Quest for Identity*, 189.

573Ibid., 183.

574Korkut Boratav and Erinc Yeldan, “Turkey, 1980-2000: Financial Liberalization, Macroeconomic (In)Stability, and Patterns of Distribution,” in *External Liberalization in Asia, Post-Socialist Europe and Brazil*, ed. Lance Taylor (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2006), 421–2.

and/or in parallel to ideas of the IMF and the World Bank despite the different governments.

Consequently, the application of neoliberal policies throughout different political parties shows the de-politicization of economy, similar to the development at the international level, hence taking economic policies out of democratic debate. Neoliberalism acts as the common denominator for nearly all mainstream political parties –ANAP, DYP, CHP, DSP and AKP – since the 1980s, although political parties showed minute differences on application of the policies and add-on social and political discourse such as degrees of nationalism used to provide legitimacy on applied neoliberal policies⁵⁷⁵. Tansu Çiller's words are representative of de-politicization of economic policies when she argued “I pursue above politics policy. I took decisions for my nation. I promised not to engage in politics. And I will do what I know right. I entrusted myself to people. I work for them. I do not engage in politics”⁵⁷⁶. Furthermore, de-politicization was institutionalized throughout the neoliberal transformation of Turkey. In 1983, *Hazine ve Dış Ticaret Müsteşarlığı* (HDTM – Undersecretariat of Treasury and Foreign Trade) was established, which assumed the relations of treasury, which used to be under *Maliye Bakanlığı* (MB – Ministry of Finance), with international economic and commercial relations. In 1993, the HDTM was divided into Undersecretariat of Treasury and Undersecretariat of Foreign Trade. Thus, establishment of institutions that would take economic relations out of political debate and present it as working according the rules of economy, not politics, continued throughout the 1990s and 2000s –such as *Bankacılık Düzenleme ve Denetleme Kurumu* (BDDK – Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency), *Enerji Piyasası Düzenleme Kurumu* (EPDK - Energy Market Regulatory Authority), *Kamu İhale Kurumu* (KİK – Public Procurement Authority), *Rekabet Kurumu* (Turkish Competition Authority), *Şeker Kurumu*

575Özman and Coşar, “Reconceptualizing Center Politics in Post-1980 Turkey: Transformation or Continuity?,” 211–214.

576Ibid., 212.

(The Turkish Sugar Authority), *Tasarruf Mevduatı Sigorta Fonu* (TMSF – Savings Deposit Insurance Fund)⁵⁷⁷. Consequently, neoliberalism increasingly dominated Turkey and became the new orthodoxy in governing the economy, just as at the international level, social democratic, populist and leftist alternatives deemed implausible and “public discussion of [any economic policy or program] was framed in the technical language of how the nation would be adjusted to the discipline of monetary and fiscal imperatives. The dominant mode of political imagination became technical know how as technocrats replaced the politicians”⁵⁷⁸.

Neoliberal transformation, thus Turkey's integration to neoliberal structure, reproduced hegemonic structure in Turkey, while allowing concentration and relevance of small and medium enterprises in Turkey. Small and medium enterprises (SMEs) presented a significant fit with the developments in the new international division of labour that shifted production from all encompassing factory to spread of production to small and medium enterprises all around the world. Consequently, SMEs in Turkey “managed to establish themselves as significant exporters of manufactures to the world market, while at the same receiving little or no subsidy from the state for this purpose”⁵⁷⁹. However, the rise of SMEs have also encouraged by the government policies in post-1980 environment, as governments took active role in constructions of organized industrial districts, where SMEs are concentrated⁵⁸⁰. On the other hand, SMEs have utilized the informal private sector development, where women and family-work-shop production in some poor neighborhoods of Istanbul, and in some Anatolian cities such as Denizli,

577 Bedirhançoğlu, “Türkiye’de Neoliberal Otoriter Devletin AKP’li Yüzü,” 53–4.

578 Cizre and Yeldan, “The Turkish Encounter with Neo-liberalism: Economics and Politics in the 2000/2001 Crises,” 399–400.

579 Öniş, “The Political Economy of Islamic Resurgence in Turkey: The Rise of the Welfare Party in Perspective,” 759.

580 Haldun Gülalp, “Globalization and Political Islam: The Social Bases of Turkey’s Welfare Party,” *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 33, no. 3 (2001): 437.

Gaziantep and Şanlıurfa are integrated to the global economy through layers of subcontracting⁵⁸¹.

Consequently, the relevance of the SMEs in Turkey is not all about their integration to the global economic structure, and export-oriented nature, but SMEs are also significant in fragmenting labour movements both in terms of space and how SMEs utilize cultural ideas in disciplining workers. As Cizre and Yeldan argue “a significant characteristic of these firms is that they hire mainly unskilled, unorganized (marginal) elements of the labour force, for low pay”⁵⁸². Only a fraction of workers in SME are unionized. Furthermore, the disciplining of labour in SMEs are sustained predominantly through interpersonal relations between the bourgeoisie and workers and at the core of the interpersonal relations lies the utilization of Islamic culture. The workers exploitation have been balanced with cultural gestures such as praying at the same mosques with their workers, giving candies during Bayrams (religious holidays) and workers thinking that Allah is testing them with poorness while boss is tested with richness⁵⁸³. Consequently, SMEs constitute a significant driving force in conservatism and political Islam in Turkey, which works as a disciplining discourse in Turkey’s adoption in neoliberalism.

Although, SMEs constituted significant base for the Islamist parties during the late 1960s and 1970s, neoliberalism provided increased volume and depth of Islamic business activity and empowerment of provincial businessmen who were dependent on Islamist political parties⁵⁸⁴, through adoption of “Turkish-Islamic Synthesis” as a part of both controlling Turkish society and defusing

581Ibid.; Ümit Cizre Sakallıoğlu and Erinç Yeldan, “Politics, Society and Financial Liberalization: Turkey in the 1990s,” *Development and Change* 31, no. 2 (2002): 500.

582Cizre Sakallıoğlu and Yeldan, “Politics, Society and Financial Liberalization: Turkey in the 1990s,” 500.

583See Yasin Durak, *Emeğin Tevekkülü: Konya’da İşçi-İşveren İlişkileri ve Dinamikleri*, 2nd ed. (İstanbul: İletişim, 2012).

584Cihan Tuğal, *Passive Revolution: Absorbing the Islamic Challenge to Capitalism* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2009), 50; Öniş, “The Political Economy of Islamic Resurgence in Turkey: The Rise of the Welfare Party in Perspective,” 757–8.

Islamic critique of capitalism. Islamic critique of capitalism emerged during the 1970s, which was represented by *Milli Nizam Partisi* (MNP - National Order Party) and *Milli Selamet Partisi* (MSP – National Salvation Party) in Turkey and many other states in the Middle East. In addition to Islamist parties of MNP, followed by MSP, *Aydınlar Ocağı* (the Hearths of the Enlightened), which was founded in 1970 to break the monopoly of left-wing intellectual on the issues of social, political and culture, established the intellectuals basis of bringing together of Turkish nationalism and Islam. They argued that, as Zurcher puts it, “Islam held a special attraction for the Turks because of a number of (supposedly) striking similarities between their pre-Islamic culture and Islamic civilization...[it entailed] a deep sense of justice, monotheism and a belief in the immortal soul, and a strong emphasis on family life and morality”⁵⁸⁵. While, Islamism had been used to thwart socialist movements as an American policy in the Middle East during the 1970s, Iranian Revolution “shook the accustomed identification between Islam and obedience, and redefined Islamist politics as the revolutionary struggle of the *mustazafin*—the oppressed. This was an electrifying message for the impoverished young workers streaming towards the cities in hope of jobs”⁵⁸⁶.

Consequently, military coup in 1980 provided an opportunity to integrate Islam to the neoliberal hegemony in Turkey, but it could also provide a model to other societies in the Middle East. While military junta closed MSP, it encouraged Turkish-Islamic synthesis. Mustafa Şen argues,

For the coup’s leaders, whose main aim was to solve the hegemony and rationality crises of the 1970s, the only way to end sociopolitical clashes, to discipline the working class and trade unions, to oppress highly politicized youth movements, and to hamper the rise of the leftist and socialist movements was to restore “national unity and solidarity.”As suggested by the synthesis, in order to reinstate “national unity and solidarity” the military rule attempted to reorganize society and polity around “national culture” and “Islamic values,” regarded as internal and constitutive components of “national culture.”⁵⁸⁷

585Zurcher, *Turkey: A Modern History*, 288.

586Tuğal, *Passive Revolution: Absorbing the Islamic Challenge to Capitalism*, 10.

Military junta engaged in a close relationship with *Aydınlar Ocağı*, whose ideas were also shared by Özal and many in ANAP, to impose Turkish-Islamic Synthesis as a “safety valve against separatist tendencies of communist and ethnic configurations”⁵⁸⁸. Beginning with the military coup, conservatism had become the one of the main discourses of mainstream right wing parties, where ANAP decorated its nationalism with liberalism and conservatism, while DYP was more outspokenly nationalist-conservative party under Tansu Çiller⁵⁸⁹. In addition to conservative leanings of the right wing political parties, transformation of the state institution had been progressed as the new generation of civil servants, who are conservative and/or nationalist, had been employed during the 1990s, which had also intensified during AKP government, as a part of increasing the efficiency of the government through flexibility of working conditions of civil servants⁵⁹⁰.

Consequently, neoliberalism in Turkey encouraged development of Muslim bourgeoisie, through creating favorable environment for flourishing of SMEs. It entailed, as mention above, establishing organized industry zones. In addition to this, as Öke puts it, “Özal, towards that end, encouraged Islamic banking and joint ventures with Middle East capital and tried to create opportunities to make Turkey attractive for the savings of the Turks living abroad”⁵⁹¹. Hence, this provided an opportunity for especially Saudi capital to take advantage of liberal economic environment, especially in financial sphere⁵⁹². The extended financial help from Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries, enabled Turkish Islamist bourgeoisie grow, which included financial

587Mustafa Şen, “Transformation of Turkish Islamism and the Rise of the Justice and Development Party,” *Turkish Studies* 11, no. 1 (2010): 65.

588Mim Kemal Öke, *Dervish and Commander: Turkey’s Identity Question, 1983-2004* (New York, N.Y.: Nova Science Publishers, 2005), 38.

589Özman and Coşar, “Reconceptualizing Center Politics in Post-1980 Turkey: Transformation or Continuity?,” 207.

590Bedirhanoğlu, “Türkiye’de Neoliberal Otoriter Devletin AKP’li Yüzü,” 54.

591Öke, *Dervish and Commander: Turkey’s Identity Question, 1983-2004*, 47.

592Öniş, “The Political Economy of Islamic Resurgence in Turkey: The Rise of the Welfare Party in Perspective,” 758.

services firms, insurance companies, consumer products concerns and medium- to large-sized holding entities⁵⁹³.

Neoliberalism in Turkey is coupled with state's withdrawal from societal and welfare "responsibilities", thus paving the way for autonomous groupings within the society that encouraged to take care of themselves with minimal help from the state. For example, poverty reduction had become the responsibility of philanthropic bourgeoisie and cemaat (religious community), who were seen as protector and encourager of the poor, through discourses that were inspired by morality, conscience and religion⁵⁹⁴. Society had been divided into autonomous committees, which have their distinct social support bases, economic activities and cultural identities. Consequently, cemaat structures and Muslim bourgeoisie, which were supported by the dominant conservatism, filled the gap that had been opened by the neoliberal policies and withdrawal of state from welfare and other social safety nets. As Cihan Tuğal argues "others, including... Gülen community, acted as a bulwark against the populist and revolutionary interpretations of Islam, but used the cultural-political space opened by the manipulative strategy of the state for nonconfrontational Islamicization of society and state"⁵⁹⁵. Consequently, the power of cemaats' increased with the neoliberal transformation, as they became the principle agent for establishing the consent for the hegemonic structure. For example, the Gulen Movement, which was active during the late 1970s, found support for its activities and gained momentum under the favorable environment after the military coup, because of its pro-coup position and support to Turkish-Islamic Synthesis⁵⁹⁶.

593 Steven A. Cook, *Ruling But Not Governing: The Military and Political Development in Egypt, Algeria, and Turkey* (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2007), 108.

594 Ahmet Haşim Köse and Serdal Bahçe, "'Hayırsever' Devletin Yükselişi: AKP Döneminde Gelir Dağılımı ve Yoksulluk," in *AKP Kitabı: Bir Dönüşümün Bilançosu*, ed. İlhan Üzgel and Bülent Duru, 2nd ed. (Ankara: Phoenix, 2010), 494.

595 Cihan Tuğal, "Islamism in Turkey: Beyond Instrument and Meaning," *Economy and Society* 31, no. 1 (2002): 93.

596 Burcu Koyuncu Lorasdağı and E. Fuat Keyman, "Globalization, Modernization, and Democratization in Turkey: The Fethullah Gulen Movement," in *Remaking Turkey* (Plymouth, New York & Toronto: Lexington Books, 2007), 156.

In parallel with growing influence of cemaats on social and cultural space, Muslim bourgeoisie organized under *Müstakil Sanayici ve İşadamları Derneği* (MUSIAD – The Independent Industrialists' and Businessmen's Association), which was founded in 1990. MUSIAD represents the growing power of Muslim bourgeoisie; a group mainly composed of SMEs in the Anatolian heartland that grow with the neoliberal transformation of Turkey. MUSIAD also includes some very large companies such as Kombassan in Konya, which constitutes a network of firms with combined capital of more than 30,000 shareholders⁵⁹⁷. MUSIAD was also organized as a counter group to TUSIAD, whose power was dependent on the import substitution industrialism in Turkey since 1947. Consequently, as MUSIAD's power grew, in parallel with cemaats, they strated to put their weight in to the political structure in Turkey, supporting political parties that increasingly used discourses of political Islam.

However, neoliberal hegemony in Turkey came across with challenges and resistance, which are mostly related to the poverty of structure, where its agents, mainstream right wing political parties and social democrat parties, were unable to establish control over challenges and resistance that arouse out of increasing corruption and Kurdish demands. As Tuğal argues, privatizations in Turkey coalesced with the existing patronage mechanisms that provided advantage to certain elite groups, which resulted in wide range corruption⁵⁹⁸. People became dissatisfied with the corruption, as well as economic crises, where some of the dissatisfaction channeled into CHP and its offshoots (*Sosyal Demokrat Halkçı Parti* (SHP – Social Democratic Populist Party) and *Demokratik Sol Parti* (DSP – Democratic Left Party)). Although they inherited 'social justice' message of the Left⁵⁹⁹, they remained unsuccessful since they had already assumed neoliberalism with minor differences. Furthermore, Kurdish people began to challenge the hegemonic

597Öniş, "The Political Economy of Islamic Resurgence in Turkey: The Rise of the Welfare Party in Perspective," 758.

598Tuğal, *Passive Revolution: Absorbing the Islamic Challenge to Capitalism*, 41.

599Ibid., 42.

structure via identity-based politics, which have always been there but operated within Leftist movements in the 1960s and 1970s. In 1978, PKK (*Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan – Kurdistan Workers' Party*) was established and adopted the tactic for propaganda of deed, thus followed the tactics of hit-and-run and sabotage. Yet, PKK struggled to gain support from Kurdish people in late-1970s. However, military coup paved the way for a stronger position for PKK. The military coup crushed the leftist movements, thus the rivals of PKK, and prevented Kurdish people to air their demands for recognition and cultural rights. The military junta and preceding agents of hegemonic structure tried to incorporate Kurdish people to the structure via “Turkish-Islamic Synthesis” and when it failed, the state began to use coercion to sustain hegemonic structure, which was met by PKK via violence and terror activities, thus began the “low intensity conflict” in Turkey⁶⁰⁰.

Consequently the rise of *Refah Partisi* (RP – Welfare Party) and *Milli Görüş Hareketi* (MGH – National Outlook Movement) can be traced against a backdrop of transformation and challenges in Turkey. RP can be understood as a challenge to the structure in Turkey and a certain break from the liberal bloc, not just only to corruption of the mainstream political parties. It represented a challenge to Western modernity and a critique of capitalism, to a certain level, through introduction of Islamic ethnical norms such as social solidarity and the prevention of wasteful expenditures⁶⁰¹. MGH's critique of capitalism, and neoliberalism, was complicated, at times contradictory. MGH criticized class inequalities, low share of labour in national income, exploitation of labour, monopolies in Turkish economy and elite's betrayal of economic nationalism as well as prohibitions against bank interests in its ideological program *Adil Düzen* (Just Order). RP portrayed a Keynesian

600For military history of the conflict see: Ümit Özdağ, *Türkiye’de Düşük Yoğunlu Çatışma Ve PKK* (Ankara: 3 OK Yayıncılık, 2005); Ümit Özdağ, *Türk Ordusunun PKK Operasyonları* (İstanbul: Pegasus Yayınları, 2007).

601Kenan Çayır, “The Emergence of Turkey’s Contemporary ‘Muslim Democrats’,” in *Secular and Islamic Politics in Turkey: The Making of the Justice and Development Party* (London & New York: Routledge, 2008), 67.

alternative –universal wages, full employment, insurance and unionization– with an Islamic discourse. On the other hand, RP criticized taxation⁶⁰² and argued for increased autonomy of the central bank, more effective privatization policies, prevent waste and enabling the restructuring of the state⁶⁰³. While Tuğal argues that RP represented to be both antiliberal and neoliberal⁶⁰⁴, Cook perceives RP as both populist and neoliberal⁶⁰⁵. In the end, RP was not necessarily a revolutionary alternative to neoliberal hegemony, but it represented Turkey's break from the core of the neoliberal bloc, which aimed for a political Islam that was integrated to neoliberalism counter the threat posed by Iranian revolution.

Consequently, MGH's Third Worldist discourse that involved attack on Western values and imperialism, represents the attempt to break from the core of liberal bloc. The critique of MGH on the foreign relations was directed to both Western states and mainstream parties in Turkey⁶⁰⁶. Consequently, MGH believed that extensive ties with Europe and the United States placed Turkey at a distinct disadvantage⁶⁰⁷, thus argued for the intensified relations with Muslim countries and expressed intentions to create the Islamic equivalent of the United Nations, NATO and the EU⁶⁰⁸. As a result, RP sought to loosen relations with the United States, Europe and Israel, while

602Tuğal, *Passive Revolution: Absorbing the Islamic Challenge to Capitalism*, 50; Cook, *Ruling But Not Governing: The Military and Political Development in Egypt, Algeria, and Turkey*, 107.

603Cook, *Ruling But Not Governing: The Military and Political Development in Egypt, Algeria, and Turkey*, 110.

604Tuğal, *Passive Revolution: Absorbing the Islamic Challenge to Capitalism*, 50.

605Cook, *Ruling But Not Governing: The Military and Political Development in Egypt, Algeria, and Turkey*, 110.

606Öniş, "The Political Economy of Islamic Resurgence in Turkey: The Rise of the Welfare Party in Perspective," 753.

607Cook, *Ruling But Not Governing: The Military and Political Development in Egypt, Algeria, and Turkey*, 109.

608Burhanettin Duran, "The Justice and Development Party's 'New Politics': Steering Toward Conservative Democracy, A Revised Islamic Agenda or Management of New Crises?," in *Secular and Islamic Politics in Turkey: The Making of the Justice and Development Party* (London & New York: Routledge, 2008), 83.

strengthening ties with Pakistan, Egypt, Indonesia and Iran⁶⁰⁹. This was a significant attempt to reverse in Turkey's relations with other states as Turkey's foreign policy is usually anchored to liberal bloc. For example, the transitional government under the military regime lifted Turkey's veto on Greece's return to the NATO's military wing due to US demands⁶¹⁰. Consequently, RP seemed to be veering off course from its role in neoliberal hegemony by getting closer to a perceived threat to neoliberal hegemony, Iran.

Furthermore, RP's eagerness to loosen relations with the core of the liberal bloc, hampered its ability to establish a new bloc in Turkey, which would follow the desired 'third way'. Industrialist bourgeoisie of Turkey resisted, to closer association with Europe, mostly with a fear of losing their privileged position in Turkish economy, when Özal applied for full membership in 1987. However, attitudes towards integration with the European Union began to change in 1990s, and industrialist bourgeoisie put their weight behind the EU project, thus Customs Union, which was also supported by the export-oriented SMEs⁶¹¹, which was also the main support base of RP. Consequently, RP foreign relations limited its appeal as an agent for industrial Turkish bourgeoisie. The bloc represented by RP remained weak and unable to change/challenge hegemonic structure in Turkey, which was established on close relations with the Western states and utilized Islam as a way to control the society against the opposition to neoliberal transformation as well as a safety valve against ideas of Iranian revolution. So, when RP was threatened to leave the office in a post-modern coup of 28 February, they did not find support for their position, even Fetullah Gülen criticized policies and actions of RP. Thus, RP was ousted from the government and shut down. Shutting down of RP paved the way for another strand of political Islam that was more cordial with neoliberalism.

609Cook, *Ruling But Not Governing: The Military and Political Development in Egypt, Algeria, and Turkey*, 113.

610Ahmad, *Turkey: Quest for Identity*, 150.

611Çağlar Keyder, "The Turkish Bell Jar," *New Left Review* no. 28 (2004): 78.

6.2.2 Act 2: Rise of AKP and Neoliberal Hegemony

The closure of RP initiated a new process in the ranks of MGH, while Turkey continued to be governed by unstable coalition governments of mainstream political parties. The process was the reproduction of MGH as a viable alternative to the mainstream political parties. But, reproduction of the MGH was realized through an internal conflict between two groups; the traditionalists and the modernists, who were lead by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Abdullah Gül, under the banner of *Fazilet Partisi* (FP – Virtue Party). FP showed shifts in the attitude towards Turkey's relations with Europe. FP adopted modernity, democracy and multiculturalism as universal values rather than extensions of Europe, thus discarded anti-European stance of the RP and moved towards a more moderate position in relation to Europe. However, this moderate stance was not enough for modernists, who wanted a much more liberal (read neoliberal) and democratic discourse⁶¹². While modernists lost their bid to gain control in FP, the closure of FP in 2001 paved the way for a break within the MGH and establishment of a party that could act as the unifying agent for neoliberalism and political Islam; *Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi* (AKP – Justice and Development Party).

From the very beginning, AKP was highly successful in combining neoliberalism and Islam through using American (neo-conservatives) and European (christian democrats) templates for integrating religion into individual liberties and freedoms. AKP emphasized “the benefits of the market, the need to reform the state in the direction of a post-developmental regulatory state... its commitment to EU membership and the associated set of reforms”⁶¹³. Furthermore, in parallel with Christian Democrats, AKP stressed liberal democratic values and the rights of the individual, where EU membership process made it easier to implement these principles as the EU

612William Hale and Ergün Özbudun, *Islamism, Democracy and Liberalism in Turkey: The Case of the AKP* (London & New York: Routledge, 2010), 10–11.

613E. Fuat Keyman and Ziya Öniş, *Turkish Politics in a Changing World: Global Dynamics and Domestic Transformations* (Istanbul: Istanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2007), 185.

presented the road map of liberal reforms⁶¹⁴. Since AKP came to power in 2002, similarities between Christian Democrats and US conservatives compounded; such as “AKP's policies on religious education mirror those adopted by Christian democrat parties in Europe”⁶¹⁵ or calling abortion as murder resounded US conservative and pro-life NGOs discourses.

The ability to unite neoliberal orthodoxy with a more accommodating version of political Islam hidden behind the values of individual liberties and freedoms, AKP had become the perfect agent for advancing neoliberalism, which was able to connect different groups within the society. While, MUSIAD and SMEs provided support for the rise of AKP, hence became a crucial element⁶¹⁶, TUSIAD had also supported AKP's bid for power. In addition, cemaats provided significant support as well as liberal and various social democrat intellectuals, who presented AKP as the force of democratic change in Turkey. With its emphasis on individual liberties and freedoms, coupled with Islamic values without showing direct opposition to secularism enabled gather support from various segments of the society. Ability to form wide ranging coalition resulted in formation of a resilient hegemonic bloc that was represented by AKP, hence AKP rose to the power as a single party and continued ever since.

During the reign of AKP, neoliberal policies have intensified. Privatization and liberalizations gained momentum, while bourgeoisie gained more influence on economic affairs through new institutional frameworks such as *Yatırım Danışma Konseyi* (YDK – Investment Consultation Council) and *Yatırım Ortamını İyileştirme Koordinasyon Kurulu* (YOIKK – The Coordination Council for the Improvement of Investment Environment). The recommendations of IMF, the World Bank and foreign investors as well as Turkish bourgeoisie organizations *Türkiye Odalar ve Borsalar Birliği* (TOBB –

614William Hale, “Christian Democracy and the AKP: Parallels and Contrasts,” *Turkish Studies* 6, no. 2 (2005): 302.

615Ibid., 304.

616Keyman and Öniş, *Turkish Politics in a Changing World: Global Dynamics and Domestic Transformations*, 185.

The Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey), TUSIAD, *Türkiye İhraçatçılar Meclisi* (TIM – Turkish Exporters' Assembly) and *Uluslararası Yatırımcılar Derneği* (YASED – International Investors Association) have been put into practice through the forum enabled by YOIKK⁶¹⁷.

Consequently, the close relationship between bourgeoisie and AKP government reflected upon Turkey's foreign policy. Ziya Öniş points out the difference in AKP's understanding of national, therefore national interest, as “AKP's style nationalism is an outward-oriented nationalism, where integration into global markets and building co-operative links at the regional and global level could bring about significant benefits, clearly consistent with a broader understanding of national interest”⁶¹⁸. Consequently, AKP's definition of broader national interest reflects upon Turkey's foreign policy. Turkey became a more active actor in Balkans, the Middle East, Transcaucasia, Central Asia and Africa to open the markets for its export-oriented bourgeoisie, while keeping close ties and cooperation with the United States and European Union. In a way, Turkey assumed some responsibilities of the core states of the liberal bloc in advancing neoliberal policies. AKP's foreign policy activism was also in line with Gulen Movement's expansion to Africa and Central Asia through establishing schools to spread Turkish culture in the young generations, who would become the natural allies of Turkey that speak the same language and share the same common cultural values⁶¹⁹. Consequently, Turkey became a principle agent in encountering Muslim nations for the liberal bloc.

AKP engaged opposition through fragmentation and polarization of the society via using certain discourses. Opposition movements, be it for educational reform or health reform, portrayed as obstacles to Turkey's

617Bedirhanoğlu, “Türkiye’de Neoliberal Otoriter Devletin AKP’li Yüzü,” 55–6.

618Ziya Öniş, “The Triumph of Conservative Globalism: The Political Economy of the AKP Era,” *Turkish Studies* 13, no. 2 (2012): 146.

619Koyuncu Lorasdağı and Keyman, “Globalization, Modernization, and Democratization in Turkey: The Fethullah Gulen Movement,” 158.

economic development as well as democratization process, while AKP policies have been portrayed as the improvements of individual liberties and economic status of society. The society have been fragmented under AKP on various lines that could be shifted according the problem at hand. The division varied from nationalisms such as Turkish vs Kurdish, to a level of service provider vs customer such as Doctors vs Patients. The fragmentation of the society hampered the opposition's capability to resist neoliberal hegemony in Turkey as opposition had an ad hoc nature. When the polarizing discourse failed, AKP utilized the coercive tools, mainly police force, to hamper down the opposition. Consequently, until June 2013, the neoliberal bloc that is represented by AKP was able to dominate Turkey in every aspect and advanced neoliberal policies.

6.3 Building Turkish Defense Industry

Turkey's interest in establishment of a sound national defense industry coincides with the global change in the arms production, as well as the changes in the global production practices. Spread of production to other states as well as export-oriented nature of global economics as well as the arms production created an opportunity for Turkey to draw investment to Turkish defense industrial base. In addition, export oriented outlook had shifted rigid approaches to economic development. Thus, one of the best examples of this change can be observed with procurement of F-16 Fighting Falcon, which signifies the change in Turkish attitudes.

The common knowledge takes 1974 arms embargo, following the Cyprus Operation, as the starting point of attempts to build national defense industrial base, starting with the aerospace industry. Such an approach is valid, as the initiative had gained momentum and broke some resistance to such efforts, yet it was not the initial point of the efforts and it was not the reason behind the successful establishment of aerospace and defense industry. The idea of building national aerospace industry have been around

in Turkey before 1974 arms embargo. In 1970, Turkish Air Force started a campaign called “Build Your Own Airplane” for the encouragement of establishing aerospace industry in Turkey. The initiative was taken under the auspices of *Türk Hava Kuvvetleri Güçlendirme Vakfı* (THKGV – Air Force Foundation), which followed the path of *Deniz Kuvvetleri Güçlendirme Vakfı* (DKGV – Navy Foundation) and preceded *Kara Kuvvetleri Güçlendirme Vakfı* (KKGV – Army Foundation). The foundation had two priorities: first direct procurement of advanced fighter aircrafts and second establish national defense industry through collecting endowments from people. The initial steps were taken by the foundation of jet accessories and spare part plant in Eskişehir military factory in 1972 for the ultimate purpose of producing indigenous airplane⁶²⁰. However, the submission of a ministerial bill for establishment of aerospace industry and approval of it was realized three years after the Air Force called for action⁶²¹. The approval of the bill initiated the establishment of *Türk Uçak Sanayii Anonim Ortaliğı* (TUSAS – Turkish Aeroplane Industry) in 1973. However, the government did not allocate necessary resources for airplane production in the fiscal year of 1974, which only came partially after the Cyprus Operation⁶²².

However, even the realization of the need for a national defense industry did not materialized into action. Following the arms embargo, Turkey began to search for fighter planes to replace its losses during Cyprus Operation as well as to reach parity with Greece. In 1975, Turkey had plenty of choices such as Italian F-104S, French Mirage F-1F, British Jaguar and American F-5, YF-17 and Lancer. Both Lockheed (Lancer) and Northrop (F-5 and YF-17) mentioned the possibility of establishing aircraft factory in Turkey⁶²³. At the same time, also Turkey got interested in YF-16 and wanted to take part in co-

620Haşmet İnöntepe, “Jet Aksesuar Atelyesi Hizmete Giriyor,” *Cumhuriyet*, July 8, 1972.

621Muhsin Batur, *Anılar ve Görüşler: Üç Dönemin Perde Arkası*, 2nd ed., 47 (Istanbul: Milliyet Yayınları, 1985), 445–52 & 464.

622Muhsin Batur, “Uçak Sanayi Kurmak mı, Uçak Almak mı?,” *Milliyet*, October 31, 1974.

623“ABD Askeri Yardımının Kesilmesinde Savaş Uçağı Yapımcılarının Katkısı Bulunduğu Öne Sürülüyor,” *Cumhuriyet*, October 3, 1975; “Fransa Mirage, İngiltere Jaguar Satmak İstiyor.”

production project⁶²⁴, which four other NATO states were interested and seeking co-production agreement with the United States. However, Turkey did not become the part of joint co-production of F-16 in Europe, the reason why was not clear. Consequently, Turkey opted for F-104S, plans for domestic production of aircraft moved to the training aircraft rather than fighter plane.

However, production of the trainer aircraft also failed to materialize. In 1976, TUSAS opened an international tender for jet trainer production in Turkey because of the limitation placed on Turkish pilots, who were trained in other countries. Thus, production of jet trainer was found more feasible as compared to production of fighter plane. Four competitors – F-5F (USA), Alpha Jet (Germany), Hawk (UK) and Macchi MB-339 (Italian) – submitted serious proposals, in which they agreed production in Turkey that would lead to eventual production of a fighter plane⁶²⁵. TUSAS selected MB-339 in 1977, while *Milli Savunma Bakanlığı* (MSB – Ministry of National Defense) opposed the TUSAS's decision and wanted British Hawk⁶²⁶. However, the procurement stopped by then Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel on the grounds that TUSAS had behaved hastily in its decision and it cannot decide by itself, the decision had to come from the government⁶²⁷.

Turkey's failure to build an aircraft factory, despite the willingness of various foreign companies shows that the lessons learned from the arms embargo did not really affect decisions taken in 1970s. Thus, the decision making process was still operated in accordance with the structure that formed after the Second World War. The resistance to establishment of aircraft factory through co-production, which was justified on the grounds that co-production would bring heavy financial burden and damage economic development

624“Türkiye'nin YF-16 Savas Uçaklarıyla İlgili Ortak Projeye de Katılmak İstedığı Belirtiliyor,” *Cumhuriyet*, November 18, 1975.

625Aytekin Yıldız, “TUSAS, Yabancı 10 Büyük Firmadan Teklif İstedi,” *Milliyet*, December 13, 1977.

626Aytekin Yıldız, “TUSAS, İtalyanlara ‘Evet’ Diyor,” *Milliyet*, December 14, 1977.

627Aytekin Yıldız, “Yerli Uçak Sanayiinin Kurulması Şimdilik Donduruldu,” December 15, 1977.

initiatives, was broken by the decision of procurement of F-16 Fighting Falcon in 1983⁶²⁸, despite such attitudes were apparent during the selection of aircraft and negotiations with the United States. During the Peace Onyx negotiations, senior civil servants in Turkey argued that Turkey's technological base was not enough for production of F-16 and money could be better spend on large infrastructure projects. Such a view was also shared by U.S. Military advisors, who argued for the procurement of less sophisticated F-5G⁶²⁹. In the end, co-production of F-16 preceded other concerns and from this point on, Turkey continued to re-negotiate the terms of agreements and procurement of additional F-16s with a possibility of export.

Consequently, Turkish aerospace industry, and in parallel to it defense industry, have evolved through re-negotiations of Peace Onyx agreement and following F-16 procurements. Peace Onyx agreement foresaw the building of an aircraft factory, where 152 of 160 F-16 will be assembled, which would enable technology and know-how transfer. In realizing the terms of agreement, first TUSAS-*Türk Havacılık ve Uzay Sanayii A.Ş.* (TAI – Turkish Aerospace Industries Inc.) were founded in 1984 with Turkish (TUSAS - THKGV) and US partners (Lockheed and General Dynamics). Second, *TUSAS Motor Sanayi A.Ş.* (TEI – TUSAS Engine Industry Inc.), which would produce engine parts for F-16, was founded in 1985 with TAI and General Electric⁶³⁰. Peace Onyx agreement limited to production of some parts and assembly of F-16 for Turkey. However, as the production progress with good results, Turkey realized the export capability and pushed hard for increasing the work share of TAI in F-16 production by acquiring some of responsibilities of European manufacturers with Peace Onyx II

628Necip Torumtay, *Orgeneral Torumtay'ın Anıları*, 176 (Istanbul: Milliyet Yayınları, 1993), 83–4.

629Michael Robert Hickok, "Peace Onyx: A Story of Turkish F-16 Co-production," in *International Military Aerospace Collaboration: Case Studies in Domestic and Intergovernmental Politics*, ed. Pia Christina Wood and David S. Sorenson (Aldershot & Brookfield, VA: Ashgate, 2000), 158.

630"Uçak Motorunda İlk Adım," *Milliyet*, June 25, 1985.

agreement, which was decided during First Gulf War without the completion of Peace Onyx I. General Dynamics was forced to change global manufacturing structure for F-16 in 1991 to meet the demands of Turkey. Consequently, the increased work share meant that Turkey had acquired some of the responsibilities of European manufacturers in global production of F-16, which allowed TAI to participate in co-production of 46 F-16 for Egyptian Air Force between 1994 and 1995⁶³¹.

TAI was the experimentation of Turkey in building national defense industry, which was enabled by the transformation of production in defense industries. TAI's success in increasing its capabilities and reaching to an export capable firm created a template for the future projection of other defense industry companies. During 1990s, TAI have diversified its production and breath of international cooperation such as co-production of Cougar helicopters with Eurocopter, development UAV and construction of CN-235 parts. Thus, it enabled the breaking the resistance to establishment of defense industries on economic grounds, which was replaced by the possibility (or idea) of reaping economic benefits from exports. Turkey had become more demanding in co-production and work share in arms procurement.

Although, Turkey was committed to development of its defense industries, especially in 1990s, the development suffered from significant deficiencies of Turkish defense and industry planning. As argued in the previous chapter, dependence on the United States in military planning and material procurement had damaged the Turkey's capability of independent defense planning and procurement. When, the arms embargo put into force, it severely damaged TSK's materiel as Turkey was unable to acquire modern weapons and inventory dangerously became obsolete. The problem was recognized, however it took some time for Turkey to create those capabilities. Consequently, during the 1980s Turkey initiated a modernization program for its armed forces. For this end, new institutions were established for

631Hickok, "Peace Onyx: A Story of Turkish F-16 Co-production," 172.

encouragement of defense industries, management of procurement and acquisition of planning capabilities. Initially, *Savunma Donatım İşletmeleri Genel Müdürlüğü* (SDIGV – Defense Equipment Directorate) was founded in 1983 with the belief that existing resources and procurement policies would not be adequate for meeting the demand of TSK for modernization⁶³². Although, military foundations planned to be disbanded and their holdings (including TUSAS, ASELSAN, HAVELSAN) would be transferred to SDIGV in 1985⁶³³, within months of this decision, SDIGV disbanded and *Savunma Sanayii Geliştirme ve Destekleme İdaresi* (SaGeB – Administration for Improvement and Support of Defense Industries) was founded alongside with *Savunma Sanayii Destekleme Fonu* (SSDF – Defense Industry Support Fund) with law 3238 on 7 November 1985⁶³⁴. In 1989, SaGeB would become *Savunma Sanayii Müsteşarlığı* (SSM – Undersecretariat for Defense Industries). In parallel with civilian institutions, TSK established *Kara Kuvvetleri Eğitim Komutanlığı* (KKEK – Land Forces Training Command) in 1985⁶³⁵, which would become *Kara Kuvvetleri Eğitim ve Doktrin Komutanlığı* (EDOK – the Training and Doctrine Command) in 1994. The primary responsibility of EDOK, which was modeled after US Army's Training and Doctrine Command and had several US officers, was to develop a new doctrine to prepare TSK for the 'information wars of the 21st century'⁶³⁶.

However, these new institutions and the structure that was envisioned was plagued with problems during 1980s and 1990s. While SSM was given the responsibility for the oversight, planning and coordination of TSK

632Hülya Toker, "Dünden Bugüne Savunma Sanayii," 23, accessed August 5, 2013, <http://resmitarih.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/DNDEN-BUGNE-SAVUNMA-SANAY.pdf>.

633"Silahlı Kuvvetler Vakıfları Kalkıyor," *Milliyet*, August 20, 1985.

634*Savunma Sanayii Geliştirme Ve Destekleme İdaresi Başkanlığının Kurulması Ve 11 Temmuz 1939 Tarih Ve 3670 Sayılı Milli Piyango Teşkiline Dair Kanunun İki Maddesi İle 25 Ekim 1984 Tarih Ve 3065 Sayılı Katma Değer Vergisi Kanununun Bir Maddesinde Değişiklik Yapılması Hakkında Kanun*, 1985.

635" Türk Kara Kuvvetleri Tarihçesi," Government Site, *Kara Kuvvetleri Komutanlığı*, accessed August 5, 2013, <http://www.kkk.tsk.tr/GenelKonular/Tarihce/icerik.asp>.

636Christopher F Foss, Ian Kemp, and Lale Sariibrahimoğlu, "Turbulent Times for Forces in Transition," *Jane's Defence Weekly* (September 10, 1997): 39.

modernization program in accordance with the general strategy that was approved by the government and decide upon necessary procurement method in accordance with Strategic Goal Plan of *Genelkurmay* (Turkish General Staff), TSK continued to have separate procurement agencies and resisted transfer of major weapons system procurement responsibilities to SSM. This created a duplication of projects, where MSB (read *Genelkurmay*) mostly favored direct procurement, where SSM sought for joint projects for the development of national defense industries. Consequently, in 1997, MSB made a bid to replace SSM with a National Armaments Directorate (NAD), which would be under the control of the TSK. The case was made on the grounds that SSM failed to provide local input required to establish a more self-sufficient industry and its budget, which was dependent on SSDF, was increasing. In addition, TSK argued that the new NAD would have a new strategy that was aimed at opening up to international markets and making more cost-efficient decision. However, in the end MSB and TSK decided not to go through with their plans⁶³⁷. Therefore, the institutional in fighting on the control of procurement and multiplicity of procurement practices hampered following a consistent path. This also shows that the new institutional frameworks were not mature enough to establish total control.

Furthermore, the defense policy and procurement planning, despite the declared programs, failed to reach a consistency during the 1990s, which would also continued in 2000s with a lesser degree. The declared policy of procurement was done in accordance to *10 Yıllık Tedarik Programı* (OYTEP – 10 Year Procurement Plan) that born out of Strategic Goal Plan. However, practice of procurement usually showed any signs of a planned approach. For example, attack and reconnaissance helicopter project (ATAK), which was initiated in 1995 to meet the capability gap of TSK, took 12 years (final decision was made in 2007) to reach a conclusion, where the first tender was

637Lale Sariibrahimoğlu, "Military Bid for Turkish Agency," *Jane's Defence Weekly* (October 22, 1997): 10; Lale Sariibrahimoğlu, "Turkish Agency `should Remain Autonomous'," *Jane's Defence Weekly* (December 3, 1997): 12; "Turkish Military Backs Off from SSM Takeover Plan," *Jane's Defence Weekly* (January 21, 1998): 11.

cancelled in 2001. In a similar fashion, the Main Battle Tank project was initiated in 1997 with two procurement options; either off-the-shelf purchase of existing tanks or development of a design jointly with a foreign partner and co-production in Turkey under license⁶³⁸. The competing tanks were Giat Leclerc (France), KMW Leopard 2A5 (Germany), Vickers Defence Systems Desert Challenger (UK) and General Land Systems M1A2 Abrams⁶³⁹. After 10 years, in 2007, Turkey decided to built its indigenous tank; Altay. Aytekin Ziylan et al. explains the difference between declared intentions and practice by pointing out the major problems of Turkish defense industry policy and strategy in the 1990s as absence of strategy document and R&D based procurement and incapability to make medium to long-run planning⁶⁴⁰.

While, major problems in defense procurement show the lack of capability on the part of Turkey that reflected on the practice, there had been external obstacles that some times derailed Turkish procurement. During the 1990s, Turkey's suppliers attempted to control Turkey and its management of the "low intensity conflict" with PKK through enforcing conditions on the use of weapon systems that were procured from European countries and undeclared embargo that entailed not suppling spare parts or approving sale of certain systems. For example, Bundessicherheitsrat (BSR – Federal Security Council) did not allow delivery of spare parts for 125 howitzers to Turkey because they could be employed in fighting the PKK, whereas the possible sale of Leopard 2's were approved on the grounds that they could not be used in the difficult terrain of southern Turkey in 1999⁶⁴¹. In a similar fashion, German government refused to allow demonstration of Tiger attack

638"Turkey Wants Share in New Design MBT," *Jane's Defence Weekly* (June 4, 1997): 5.

639"Bidders Line up for Turkish Tank Contest," *Jane's Defence Weekly* (January 29, 1997): 5.

640Aytekin Ziylan et al., *Savunma Sanayi ve Tedarik: Ülkemizin Bilim ve Teknoloji Yeteneğinin Yükseltilmesini Esas Alan Bir Yaklaşım*, trans. Bilim ve Teknoloji, Strateji ve Politika Çalışmaları (Ankara: TUBITAK, 1998), 135–38.

641Heinz Schulte, "Leopard 2 Approved for Turkish MBT Contest," *Jane's Defence Weekly* 032, no. 017 (October 27, 1999): 1.

helicopter in Turkey, again on the grounds that these helicopters, if sold, could be used against PKK⁶⁴².

Although suppliers' refusal to sell certain weapon systems affected Turkish procurement decisions and processes, it was effective mostly because of the weapon systems in the inventory but also Turkey's integration to the western bloc at level of ideas that translated into affinity towards weapons systems that came from certain suppliers. In other words, Turkish defense procurement mainly followed the United States and European countries in terms of doctrine and types of weapons systems. This manifested itself in various ways. One of the manifestation is that Turkey procured weapon systems without having doctrines for effective use. For example, Turkey procures 6 General Atomics Gnat-750 MALE (Medium-Altitude Long-Endurance) UAV in 1994 as a result of UAV tender initiated in 1991 in an attempt to modernize. However, TSK did not have military doctrine for the effective use of UAVs. Army deployed UAVs in Artillery units as for forward observation role but experienced problems with training, maintenance and logistics. Consequently, many UAVs were put into depots⁶⁴³, while indigenous development attempts by TAI and EES were overlooked. Turkey began to use UAVs effectively only after the United States and the United Kingdom developed effective use of UAVs, thus its interest in UAVs re-ignited again in the late 1990s. As we can see with this example, it becomes doubtful whether Turkey plans procurement on exclusively on its military needs or follows the lead of the United States and other NATO allies.

Another manifestation would be Turkey's insistence on a specific weapon system, thus detailed definition of requirements follows the specific system that were chosen in ways that are not open and clear. For example, Turkey's decision to procure CH-47 Chinook Heavy Lift Helicopter. Turkey's interest in CH-47 Chinook began in 1989, when Turkish government inquired about

642Lale Sariibrahimoğlu, "Last Offers for Turkish Attack Helicopter Contest," *Jane's Defence Weekly* 032, no. 007 (August 18, 1999): 1.

643Aris, "Turkiye'den İnsansız Hikayeler..."

building CH-47D Chinook helicopters (between 50 and 100) in Turkey under some form of co-production agreement⁶⁴⁴. In 1996, Turkey opened a bid for procurement of eight heavy-lift helicopter, where CH-47 Chinook, Sikorsky CH-53 Super Stallion and Russian Mi-26 'Halo' participated⁶⁴⁵. The tender was cancelled in the same year. Then, Turkey announced its intentions to buy initially four CH-47 Chinook helicopters because, as reported by Jane's Defence Weekly, it was doubtful that any other helicopter would meet the requirements⁶⁴⁶. Next year, the decision to buy Chinook was cancelled on the grounds that USA has applied an unofficial arms embargo against Turkey and therefore Turkey decided to launch a competition for 16 helicopters, in which candidates were CH-47 Chinook, Sikorsky CH-53 Super Stallion and the Russian Mi-26 'Halo'⁶⁴⁷. The competition was cancelled again and decision of direct procurement of CH-53 Super Stallion was made, which was again cancelled. A new tender for eight helicopters were opened in 1998⁶⁴⁸. In 1999, Turkey chooses Sikorsky CH-53E Super Stallion for Turkey's urgent heavy-lift helicopter requirement⁶⁴⁹. However, Turkey did not follow through this decision. Deliberation for heavy-lift helicopter continued well into 2000s. In 2010, US Congress approved sale of 14 CH-47F Chinook helicopters, as well as associated parts, equipments, training and logistical support and Department of Defense announced the sale but contract announcement was expected to be done in 2013⁶⁵⁰.

644"Boeing, Turks Hold Talks to Build Chinook Copters.," *Wall Street Journal*, September 18, 1989, 1923 - Current File, <http://search.proquest.com/docview/135396155?accountid=12492>.

645 See Appendix A for technical comparison

646"Turkey to Buy Chinooks, Popeyes," *Jane's Defence Weekly* (November 6, 1996): 3.

647"Turkish Helicopter Competition Rebuffs USA," *Jane's Defence Weekly* (March 19, 1997): 5.

648Lale Sariibrahimoğlu, "Turkey Wants Open Contest for Heavy Helicopters," *Jane's Defence Weekly* 030, no. 020 (November 18, 1998): 1.

649Lale Sariibrahimoğlu, "Turkey Makes Decision on Heavy-lift Helicopter," *Jane's Defence Weekly* 032, no. 019 (November 10, 1999): 1.

650Gareth Jennings, "Turkey and UAE to Get CH-47F Chinooks," *Jane's Defence Weekly* 50, no. 30 (June 26, 2013), <http://search.proquest.com/docview/1372286594?accountid=12492>.

However, the transformation in the global economy, and therefore in defense industry, along side with the end of the Cold War, provided an opportunity for Turkey. The opportunity was the ability to multiply suppliers both in terms of direct procurement and establish defense cooperation so that Turkish defense industry would benefit. During the 1990s, three notable partner countries have arose; Israel, Russia and China. Israel provided weapon systems that are close to American systems and compatible without the conditionality and restrictions that were put on the US systems. Furthermore, Israel was more willing to sell systems and share technology with Turkish defense industry because Israeli defense industry was highly export oriented as mentioned by both a senior executive from Israel Aerospace Industries and Mr. Yossi Bar from Raphael Advanced Defense Systems⁶⁵¹, thus the defense relations was perceived as business. Despite Necmettin Erbakan's desire for military co-operation and joint production with Indonesia, Malaysia and Pakistan⁶⁵², Turkey increasingly cooperated with Israel. As a result, Israel won on modernization projects of F-4 Phantom and F-5 Freedom Fighter planes and M-60 tanks, able to sell Popeye I and II air-to-surface missiles (Popeye II was produced in Turkey under license) and Heron UAVs.

Russia also showed a similar willingness as Israel to cooperate with Turkey on defense relations, but Turkey's tendency towards US and European systems did not allowed high level of cooperation. As early as 1992, Turkey signed military and technical cooperation agreement with Russia. Following the agreement, Turkey procured ex-Russian BTR-60PB and BTR-80 Armored Personnel Carriers and 19 Mi-17TV-1 utility helicopters for *Jandarma* (Gendarmerie) to be used in southeast Turkey. These systems were procured as repayments of Eximbank credits by Russia⁶⁵³. Yet,

651 Özer Çetinkaya and Çağlar Kurç, "Israeli-Turkish Defense Cooperation: Building Bridges with Bullets," *Eurasia Critic* no. June (2009): 55.

652 "Asian Trio in Co-production Talks with Turkey," *Jane's Defence Weekly* (September 4, 1996): 19.

653 Zülfikar Doğan, "Savunmada Sıkıntı," *Milliyet*, August 25, 1994.

helicopters proved to be unreliable and maintenance became a serious problem.

Russia remained as the last choice for Turkey when Western suppliers, especially from the United States, and close replacements of Western systems failed to meet Turkish demand. ATAK and Anti-Tank Missile tenders are good examples of this. During the ATAK-1 tender, Russia joined forces with Israel and entered to the competition with IAI/Kamov Ka-50-2, which would be configured according to Turkey's specifications and NATO standards. To this end, Ka-50-2 Erdogan had a new cockpit arrangement, where pilots sit in tandem rather than side-by-side as in the original Ka-50. NATO compatible 20mm Giat turret with 700 rounds has replaced Russian 30 mm 2A42 with 460 rounds and when in the air the cannon is lowered beneath the fuselage, thus it can be rotated 360 degrees. The options for anti-tank missiles included 12 Russian laser guided Vikhrs (AT-12), 16 electro-optical Israeli Rafael NT-D or US Hellfire missiles⁶⁵⁴. In addition, Russia was willing to establish a helicopter factory in Turkey. In 2000, Bell Helicopter Textron AH-1Z King Cobra was declared as the preferred bidder for ATAK, yet negotiations with Bell ran into difficulty in 2002. At the same time, Turkey initiated parallel negotiation with Kamov. In 2003, then Undersecretary of SSM Prof. Dr. Ali Ercan recommended procurement of Kamov Erdogan on the grounds that it was less expensive and included a more satisfactory technology transfer package. However, TSK remained strongly in favor of procurement of AH-1Z King Cobra arguing in terms of performance, commonality with existing inventory of AH-1P Cobra and AH-1W Super Cobra helicopters and other criteria, which was not clear and resisted SSM's recommendation⁶⁵⁵. In the end, negotiations with Bell failed in 2004 and a new tender, ATAK-2 was initiated in 2005.

654Piotr Butowski, "Turkey to Trial New Ka-50 Variant," *Jane's Defence Weekly* 032, no. 001 (July 7, 1999): 1.

655Anonymous, "Turkey's 'Year of the Helicopter'," *Military Technology* 29, no. 4 (April 2005): 68–70.

ATAK-2 tender was initiated under a new Tender Law, passed December 2004, that stipulated submission of a formal bid for programmes, such as ATAK, automatically implies full and unconditional acceptance of all provision and conditions as being set by in Request for Proposal (RfP). Bell Textron declared that it would not compete in the new tender, though they were willing for direct off-the-shelf sale of AH-1W King Cobra. This meant the elimination of Bell Textron from the tender⁶⁵⁶. The remaining competitors were Boeing AH-64D Apache Longbow, Eurocopter Tiger, AugustaWestland A-129 Mangusta, Kamov Ka-50 and Denel CSH-2 Rooivalk. Four companies submitted their Best and Final Offers (BAFOs) by the mid-June 2006 and Eurocopter and Kamov were eliminated on cost and technical grounds. South African Denel (1 billion USD) and AugustaWestland (1.4 billion USD) remained in the competition⁶⁵⁷. ATAK-2 tender was resulted in the victory of AugustaWestland⁶⁵⁸.

In the Anti-Tank Missile project, Russia and Israel were the main competitors. Israel offered Rafael Spike missile, which was the 4th generation anti-tank missiles and had not lost any tender that it competed. On the other hand, Russia offered 9M133 Kornet (AT-14) anti-tank missile, which was a 2nd generation missile. The project concluded with the victory of Kornet in 2008, mostly because Russia allowed the modification of its system by ASELSAN, rather than Turkey's attempt to signal the United States and European states through Israel that Turkey does not to procure "Western" systems.

Last, the corruption in decision making was a serious problem during the 1990s; a reflection of the general system. Although, the allegations of corruption was never proved, the controversies around decision makers haunted Turkish defense procurement and the institutions that managed it. In 1988, Turkey decided to procure 1698 Advanced Infantry Fighting Vehicles (AIFV) from American FMC, which agreed on the production in Turkey

656Ibid.

657Anonymous, "ATAK Final Contenders Named," *Military Technology* 30, no. 8 (2006): 85.

658 See Appendix A for technical comparison of ATAK bidders

through FNSS (FMC-Nurol Savunma Sanayii A.S.) –a joint-venture of Nurol Construction and Trade (%49) and FMC (%51). The representatives of KWM, producer of Puma IFV, cried foul play in the selection process because, they argued that Puma was the winner of the overall evaluations⁶⁵⁹, yet FMC, which was third in general evaluation was selected⁶⁶⁰. However, the selection became controversial when initial batch of 87 vehicles were riddled with problems. Some of the problems were vehicles leaked water inside during water test, acceleration was lower than expected, night vision system's performance was poor, turret revolution speed was under specification and the vehicles could not be tested for armor strength and speed⁶⁶¹. Despite the problems TSK remained silent while then Undersecretary argued that they have been working on resolving the problems and SSM would make the same choices if they had to decide again because Puma was on the prototype phase⁶⁶².

Another controversial decision was the procurement of CASA CN-235 Light Cargo Planes. In 1981 Turkey began to search for Light Cargo Plane because C-47 or C-130, which were in the inventory at the time, were not suitable for an operation in Greek islands if the occasion arises. Aeritalia, CASA, SAC North America and De Havilland responded to the RfP. Initial evaluation of the proposal was done by looking at the proposal dossiers, intelligence reports and observations of users of each planes. Thus, Aeritalia, CASA and SAC North America were decided to be worth of evaluation. Later SAC North America was eliminated when the DHC-5D Buffalo was crashed during the landing at Farnborough Air Show, thus Aeritalia G-222 and CASA CN-235-100 remained. Tests were conducted in 1989, where CASA was participated with two models: CN-235-10 and CN-235-100. This represented

659 According to representatives of KWM breakdown of specific evaluations and standings were as follows; technical and tactical evaluations: 1- GKN 2-Puma 3-FMC, investment opportunities: 1- Puma 2- FMC and export test: 1- GKN 2-Puma

660 Mehmet Aktan, "Zirli Icin Kim Dogruyu Soyluyor?," *Milliyet*, June 22, 1991.

661 Celal Pir, "Zirhli Aracin 9 Ozru Cikti," *Milliyet*, June 13, 1991.

662 Celal Pir, "İşte Reddedilen Zirhliler," *Milliyet*, June 14, 1991; "Ordu Çürük Çıkan Zirhli Araçlar İçin Susuyor," *Milliyet*, June 15, 1991.

an odd situation as the configurations of these two types were different and each plane would be used in different tests. Following the tests, G-222 performed better than CN-235 models, despite CASA received some help such as leveling of the landing strip when it should have remained rugged to test the ability to land rugged areas. Despite the reports favoring procurement of G-222, CASA CN-235-100 was selected through ties of CASA representatives to ruling party ANAP and Spain's promise of supporting Turkey EU bid if CASA were procured⁶⁶³. Interestingly enough, whenever a European country wanted to sell weapon system, they always promised a support for Turkey in European Union matters. For example, it is alleged that Tansu Çiller approved procurement of 30 Eurocopter Cougar Utility Helicopters in 1997 following French President Francois Mitterrand's request on procurement of additional Cougars in return for France's positive opinion on Turkey's accession to Customs Union⁶⁶⁴.

Problems in management of defense procurement, and industry, attempts made during the 1980s and 1990s did not reach the desired goals such as increasing participation of domestic firms and export. However, the face of the defense industry began to change and consistency have been reached, up to a level, during AKP government. AKP, unlike previous political parties, integrated defense industry to its hegemonic structure. Defense industry and national products have become the source of national pride and symbols of AKP's success in making Turkey a leading power. This can be observed in AKP's In 2023 Political Vision (with a motto of "Great Nation, Great Power: Target 2023"):

National Defense

One of the requirements of our vision to become a regional leader and global player is to make our military defense system more efficient, deterrent and modern. Our national defense industry needs to further develop so that our armed forces can maximize its military capabilities.

⁶⁶³For more detailed analysis of CASA procurement see: Tavlaş, *Casa Olayı: Bir Alternatif Skandal Onerisi*.

⁶⁶⁴"Kuşukulu Firmayla İmza," *Milliyet*, February 14, 1997.

Our defense industry has vastly expanded under AK Party governments. Gone is the time when Turkey was unable to manufacture even a simple rifle; today, we are capable of producing our own tanks.

We have established the infrastructure for a national tank called "ALTAY". We have also begun test flights for our nationally produced UAVs called "ANKA" that can go up to 10 thousand meters and stay on the air for 24 hours.

Part of our 2023 Turkey Vision is to be able to manufacture our major defense needs by ourselves.⁶⁶⁵

Furthermore, AKP has realized utility of defense industry not only for the domestic purposes, but also projecting influence to other states, as it could be observed from the above caption. Ahmet Davutoğlu, who is a Foreign Minister of Turkey since 2009 and served as a chief advisor to Prime Minister Erdogan, argues that historical heritage of Turkey could compel Turkey to get involved in the conflicts outside of the Turkish territory, such as Bosnia and Kosovo. When such occasion arose in the past, Turkey was unable to participate effectively in those regions, such as F-16 that operated in Bosnia could remain in Bosnian airspace only for couple of minutes. Having realized this problem Turkey leased KC-135 Stratotanker from the United States. However, this showed the lack of strategic planning that plagued the 1980s and 1990s. Consequently, Davutoğlu argues that a new strategic plan, which would blend society's political, economic and mental accumulation, should be devised and defense industry should be re-evaluated in order to dynamically reinterpret constant power factors and evoke variable power potential⁶⁶⁶.

Consequently, organizational culture at SSM began to transform and this transformation could be observed by its publications. In 2007, SSM published first strategic plan (Strategic Plan for 2007-2011) for the management defense procurement and defense industries, which was followed by Strategic Plan for 2012-2016. In 2009, Defense Industry Sectoral Strategy

⁶⁶⁵"2023 Political Vision," *AKPARTI ~ Justice and Development Party*, accessed October 25, 2013, http://www.akparti.org.tr/english/akparti/2023-political-vision#bolum_ Quotation was taken directly from the website and researcher did not correct any mistakes within the text.

⁶⁶⁶Ahmet Davutoğlu, *Stratejik Derinlik: Türkiye'nin Uluslararası Konumu*, 43rd ed. (Istanbul: Kure Yayinlari, 2010), 41–4.

Document for 2009-2016 was published. Two road maps were published; UAV Road Map 2011-2030 and Technology Management Strategy 2011-2016, which provided a detailed road map for technology acquisition and industrial management. Therefore, defense procurement under AKP set forth certain set of goals and the procurement had reach a degree of consistency.

While the specifics of the goals varies in strategic plans and road maps, the core principles remains the same. One of the core principle is the increasing the share of domestic products in weapon systems and moving towards the domestic designs. In Strategic Plan 2007-2011 (ver. 1.2), Strategic Aim 2.1 set the bar for meeting TSK needs at 50% domestic production⁶⁶⁷. Consequently, the domestic production has set to be increased, however, 100% domestic production have not been envisioned.

In order to increase domestic production capabilities and technology acquisitions, SSM institutionalized industry participation in defense procurement, while enabling networking between defense industry and civilian industry and universities. Main defense industry companies encouraged to spread their production to SMEs, where technology transfer between defense sector and civilian sector would be facilitated due to flexible production enabled by the SMEs. Second, Excellence Networks have been established, which constituted a framework for co-operation and coordination between defense industry and universities and research centers. Furthermore, defense companies increasingly become more involved in defense procurement and industry strategies through new institutional frameworks such as *Türkiye Savunma Sanayii Meclisi* (TSSM – Turkish Defense Industry Assembly) that was founded in 2006 under TOBB and *Savunma ve Havacılık Sanayii İhracatçıları Birliği* (SSI – Defense and Aerospace Industry Exporters' Association) that was founded on 2011 under the umbrella organization of *Orta Anadolu İhracatçı Birlikleri* (OAIB – Central

667“Stratejik Plan 2007-2011 (VER 1.2) Güncellenen Hedefler” (SSM, 2007),
http://www.ssm.gov.tr/anasayfa/kurumsal/sp/Documents/STRATEJIK_PLAN_%202007_VER_1%202.pdf.

Anatolian Exporters Union) in addition to *Savunma ve Havacılık Sanayii İmalatçılar Derneği* (SaSaD – Defense and Aerospace Industry Manufacturers Association)⁶⁶⁸. Consequently, involvement of defense firms, just like their civilian sector counter parts, determining the defense policies and strategies have been institutionalized. Such integration of defense firms into policy making can be observed in ARAMA Conference, where SSM and defense industry representatives discussed about the future of Turkish defense industry and sought for common grounds in strategic planning⁶⁶⁹.

In addition to increasing domestic production, Turkey also pursued export-oriented approach in weapon system production. Thus SSM encouraged defense firms to pursue such approach and helped their business endeavors in other countries. Orhan Peker, representative from BMC, argues that producing new weapon systems and export is a must for a defense company to exist and market in Turkey is not enough⁶⁷⁰. Consequently, when Turkish defense firms seek to international clients, SSM assists defense firms in their relations with other states. Orhan Gencer, Marketing Coordinator at Yonca-Onuk, states that meeting with officials in other countries are much easier when SSM is involved⁶⁷¹. Lale Sariibrahimoğlu argues that AKP government seeks to increase export levels of Turkey, hence such attitude also reflects in defense industry policies⁶⁷². Consequently, the targeted revenue of exports and defense industries have increased steadily between two strategic plans. Furthermore, competitiveness of Turkish defense industry in international market have become one of the strategic goal in Strategic Plan 2012-2016. Consequently, this has reflected on Turkish defense exports. During the late-

668 SaSaD was established by 12 companies in 1990s with the encouragement of MSB. At the time it was called Savunma Sanayii Derneği (Defense Industry Manufacturers Association). Its scope of the SaSaD has widened with the inclusion of civilian aerospace manufacturers in January 2012.

669 "The Defense Industry Met in Search Conference to Ascertain a Course of Action," *The Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey*, December 16, 2011, <http://www.tobb.org.tr/Sayfalar/Eng/Detay.php?rid=1126&lst=MansetListesi>.

670 Orhan Peker, Representative, BMC, interview by Çağlar Kurç, May 13, 2011.

671 Orhan Gencer, Marketing Coordinator at Yonca-Onuk, interview by Çağlar Kurç, May 12, 2011.

672 Lale Sariibrahimoğlu, JDW Correspondent, interview by Çağlar Kurç, May 9, 2012.

1990s, Turkey exported to Georgia (ex-Turkish AB-25 Patrol Craft), Jordan (CN-235-100 on lease), Kazakhstan (ex-Turkish AB-25 Patrol Craft), Pakistan (Shorland APV) and Maldives (Cobra APV). On the other hand, the rate of exports have increased in 2000s, especially after AKP, which included states such as Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Columbia, Egypt, Georgia, Iraq, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Nigeria, Pakistan, Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Slovenia, Turkmenistan and UAE⁶⁷³. Turkey's defense industry focus on these states also showed a parallel with both Turkey's economic policies and foreign policy. Consequently, we observe that SSM and Turkish government is actively involved in the promotion of Turkish defense industry products.

Yet, the most important aspect of the defense industry strategy, hence defense procurement, of Turkey is the international cooperation both at the level of governments and industry-to-industry. Murad Bayar, Undersecretary of SSM, points out the principles behind the selection of parties for international cooperation as follows:

*First priority is to meet TSK needs through our own R&D and designs. We should do design and development. Yet, this is not possible in every area, there are areas, which are beyond our capability. At these issues, we are looking for cooperation. This could be USA or Europe. These are natural preferences because we are a member of NATO... But, it is not limited to USA and NATO members, we have relations with other geographies. At some point, it is about opportunities. It is about how opportunities develop. Relations could change. In Asia, we are more determining.*⁶⁷⁴

Therefore, Turkey actively sought increased work share in multinational projects under OCCAR, European Defense Agency and NATO, encourage Turkish defense firms to participate in NATO Research and Technology Organization as well as Aerospace and Defense Industries Association of Europe. At the governmental level, Turkey sought bilateral agreements to increase defense cooperation. For example, Turkey and Indonesia have signed a protocol for armored vehicle development as well as outlining the

673For more information see: *SIPRI Arms Transfers Database*.

674Murad Bayar, Undersecretary of SSM, interview by Çağlar Kurç, July 20, 2012.

joint development of a software-defined radio (SDR) system and encourages strengthening of defense industrial relations through exchanges of information and technologies⁶⁷⁵. Another example is South Korea. South Korea and Turkey signed agreements that centered on improving trade across all sectors as well as enhancing defense science and technology collaboration with a view to joint production of South Korean-made materiel⁶⁷⁶. Defense firms also established connections with other firms at the global level without the involvement of the state. One example, as mentioned earlier, ASELSAN and ROKETSAN's cooperation with Raytheon in Patriot production. Another example is Havelsan – Booz Allen Hamilton Master Teaming Agreement which sought collaboration “on global and local opportunities to provide advanced technical and other services to governments and commercial clients”⁶⁷⁷. Furthermore, Turkey have maintained certain level of cooperation with China since the mid-1990s, as Turkey procured WS-1 302 mm self-propelled MRL (Turkish designation: T-300 Kasirga) and B-611 surface-to-surface missile (Turkish designation: J-600T Yıldırım); both systems were produced in Turkey by ROKETSAN⁶⁷⁸.

As a result of these trends, Turkey has devised a consistent defense procurement practice under AKP government. Turkey seeks maximum domestic participation in defense production with an eye on export markets. Consequently, national defense participation alone would not result on selection of certain weapon systems, but it needed to promise export opportunity or Turkey should have right to export to third parties. Yet, the

675Jon Grevatt, “Indonesia and Turkey Announce Armoured Vehicle Development Agreement,” *Jane’s Defence Weekly* 50, no. 24 (May 15, 2013), <http://search.proquest.com/docview/1352792072?accountid=12492>.

676Jon Grevatt, “South Korea Signs Defence Collaboration Agreements with India, Turkey and Thailand,” *Jane’s Defence Weekly* 49, no. 16 (March 28, 2012), <http://search.proquest.com/docview/952899910?accountid=12492>.

677Matthew Smith, “Havelsan, Booz Allen Hamilton Sign Teaming Agreement,” *Jane’s Defence Weekly* 50, no. 27 (June 5, 2013), <http://search.proquest.com/docview/1364919606?accountid=12492>.

678Arda Mevlütoğlu, “Siyah Gri Beyaz: Yüksek İrtifa, Uzun Menzil, Karışık Kafalar - II,” October 2, 2013, <http://www.siyahgribeyaz.com/2013/10/yuksek-irtifa-uzun-menzil-karsk-kafalar.html>.

crucial aspect of this procurement practice is the integration of Turkish defense industries to global arms production practices, which facilitated flow of technology and design of systems, R&D collaboration and export opportunities.

Consequently, what usually presented as indigenous weapon system is usually the result of international collaboration, which sometimes could go around from foreign policy crises. For example, Turkey's indigenous Altay main battle tank acquired some of its design aspects from South Korea's Hyundai Rotem K2 MBT⁶⁷⁹. MILGEM Corvettes (National Ship) share design concept and mission profile that is similar to Lockheed Martin's the Littoral Combat Ship though MILGEM is more heavily armed⁶⁸⁰. While Altay MBT's diesel engine MTU-883 is directly bought from Germany, T-129 ATAK has T-800 Turboshaft from the United States. Also, seemingly Turkish BMC 350-16 Kirpi Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicle is actually a version of Israeli Navigator MRAP⁶⁸¹. Consequently, in the case of Kirpi, industrial relations went around the foreign policy crisis between Israel and Turkey. Therefore, while international collaboration enables states to increase their domestic production capabilities, it integrates defense industries at the level of sub-systems, components and technologies as opposed to dependency and integration reached through direct procurement of weapon systems. In the end, while production capability and ability to develop and integrate of certain technologies increased, the dependence on the level of sub-systems and components remained. While, SSM plans to reduce this dependency by focusing more on the R&D and increasing capability to produce certain set of sub-systems, components and technologies, the fundamental problem remains.

679Grevatt, "South Korea Signs Defence Collaboration Agreements with India, Turkey and Thailand."

680"Milgem Class, Turkey," News, *Naval-technology.com*, accessed August 8, 2013, http://www.naval-technology.com/projects/Milgem_Class_Corvett/.

681 See Appendix B for Design comparisons of Altay MBT and K-2 MBT and BMC's products with Israeli Hatehof.

That fundamental problem is that Turkey would still remain integrated to the US and European structure, thus the influence of the United States would continue both in terms of military doctrine and choice of weapon systems and technologies. Russ Martin, Military Advisor at MBDA, argues that Turkey is seeking too much cooperation from the United States, focusing on what Turkey could do to enhance/increase relationship with the United States⁶⁸². Turkey prioritizes procurement from and cooperation with the United States, as long as certain criteria have been met by the United States. For example, Lütfi Varoğlu, Department Head of International Cooperation at SSM, points out that Turkey initially wanted to procure Predator UAVs, but when the United States refused to sell, Turkey turned to Israel and procured Heron UAVs⁶⁸³.

Moreover, while, globalization of defense production created an opportunity for other states to build defense industry and increase their capabilities, the technology shared in this form of production remains limited. In other words, the United States still have the upper hand in state-of-the-art technology and the technology that spread to other states through collaboration would not at the level of US military. Consequently, certain technologies and weapon systems are not for sale or share with other states such as armor plating of Abrams and F-22 Raptor. Thus, the hierarchy of defense industries remains. Consequently, the indigenous designs, usually and in the case of Turkey, remain the iterations of existing technologies. For example, Turkish indigenous ANKA UAV, though has similarities with MQ-9 Reaper UAV, has better technical specifications than MQ-9. However, while Turkey pursues development of an iteration of MQ-9 Reaper, General Atomics, the developer of MQ-9 Reaper, moved to development of a stealthy UAV, Predator C⁶⁸⁴. Furthermore, the United States has been developing Unmanned Combat Air Vehicles, such as X-45. Therefore, defense production that is based on

682 Russ Martin, Military Advisor at MBDA, interview by Çağlar Kurç, May 12, 2011.

683 Lütfi Varoğlu, Department Head, International Cooperation (SSM), interview by Çağlar Kurç, April 24, 2012.

684 See Appendix A

iterations of existing technology and absence of military doctrines that is born out of Turkey experiences would continue to play catch-up with the new technologies that are developed by the United States, hence the dependency on the American and European firms.

CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSION

The examination of Turkish defense procurement behavior over a long period of time reveals the inherent relationship between decisions and the structures that certain decisions have been taken. Defense procurement decisions are taken within a certain international structure, which could be hegemonic, and despite the existence of debate surrounding the decisions, the final result has always been within the confines of the structures that arouse certain historical moments. For example, Turkey decided to procure F-16 Fighting Falcon in the 1980s, despite the resistance from various actors. But the decision to procure F-16 Fighting Falcon, which enabled establishment of aircraft factory in Turkey and had the possibility of integration and work share on other sales, was consistent with the arising post-Fordist production and neoliberal hegemony. In similar fashion, establishment of an aircraft factory only materialized when the neoliberal transformation have begun, despite the idea has been around since 1970. Another example, as presented in this research, Americanization of structure in Turkey muted past experiences of dependency on foreign sources because the new structure installed an unquestioned belief to the United States.

Consequently, decisions have been taken in relation to the national structure, which was shaped with the relation to the international structures. During the Kemalist hegemony, Turkey was not integrated to any rival bloc, thus followed a path that benefited from different blocs. As a result, weapon

systems as well as the military training are acquired from various sources and investment in national defense industrial base was realized, though with some problems. On the other hand, as Turkey increasingly integrated to the liberal structure, it adopted the liberal ways and internalized the ideas of the structure. Thus, procurement has become heavily dependent on the US systems. The integration of Turkish structure continued after the neoliberal transformation of the international structure under the United States' leadership, hence Turkey's decision continued to favor American systems and firms despite the form has changed. Rather than procuring weapon systems off-the-shelf or through American military aid, in the neoliberal structure, Turkey had integrated itself to the global production weapon systems. Consequently, while Turkey acquired certain set of capabilities in development and production of weapon systems, the dependency on state-of-the-art technologies and the United States persisted. This manifested itself in different forms; such as adopting design, acquiring sub-systems and components, and following the US doctrines.

However, structures that this research was based on did not limited to the military structures and the relations between different military organizations and structures. The foundational argument is that the structure encompasses the overall of the community. In other words, 'defense' is inherently connected to 'civilian'. The hegemonic structures arise out of the interrelationship between material capabilities, which denotes mode of production and social relations that arise out of it, ideas, which establishes the consensual basis for certain mode of production, and institutions, which sustains and propagates material capabilities and ideas. The hegemonic structure arises out of the balance between the pillars. And certain structures become the international hegemonic structure that affects the national structures. Consequently, Turkey utilized the ideas from rival hegemonic structures during the 1920 and 1930s to reach its perceived goals. Turkey received aid and investment in its economy from the Soviet Union, the liberal bloc –the United States, the United Kingdom and France, and the Fascist

bloc –Nazi Germany and Italy. After the 1945, Turkey integrated to the liberal bloc, hence its economic development followed the role that it was given under the international division of labour and later moved to ISI, again in line with the development of the international structure. As mentioned above, defense procurement followed the suit.

However, integration to an international hegemonic structure does not necessarily create the similar image at the national structure. Communities are bounded by the limitations of natural environment –such as resources– that they live in. And communities are territorially defined, though this definition of territory is subject to change in accordance with the mode of production and social relations that emanate from it. Consequently, territoriality could be defined as the city, region or the state, which arose to the dominance in capitalist mode of production. Boundedness to natural environment results in uneven development of the communities, thus construction of different cultures as it is one of the ways that human societies adopt to their environment. On the other hand, development of communities do not happen in a vacuum, with some exception in secluded areas, thus each community enter relations with each other, where they learn from each other and adopt each others ways. This creates a combined development of communities, though combined development do not translate into similar images of each other because of the unevenness that has differences. Consequently, adoption of different way and emulation of others happen in relation to the historical experiences and culture of the community in question. In the end, an amalgam of old ways and new ways arises, which is the source of particularity and differences of communities.

Although, capitalist mode of production encourages certain level of similarity between communities, such as adoption of industrial production and capital accumulation, each community adopts it in a different way. Furthermore, certain level of difference is acceptable under the capitalist mode of

production as long as it facilitates the capital accumulation for the international hegemonic bloc.

Consequently, differences in structures arouse, which were reflected upon the ways the control in a given society is established. Furthermore, ways of doing things have the reflections of the culture of the community. Such is also true for the defense. Although, Turkey procured somewhat modern weapons during the 1920s and 1930s, the military thinking stuck in the First World War military thinking. It took sometime and dismay of the United States to alter Turkish military thinking into modern warfare. Yet, even the Americanization was failed to change certain things in Turkish military culture such as TSK insistence of bayonets in 1960s, strict discipline, hierarchy and indifference to the casualties. Although, these characteristics are argued to be the reflection of the Prussian military culture, they remained even if the Prussian educated military officers were phased out, American military training and doctrines were instigated. The characteristics of Turkish culture in overall reflect upon the Turkish military culture despite its integration to liberal bloc and adoption of modern weaponry and the culture that comes with it. Even in contemporary Turkey, we could observe, in general, the existence of hierarchy, discipline and obedience.

While, such source of difference could yield better ways of doing things, which could potentially challenge and surpass the international hegemonic structure, the possibility of realization particularity of a community and built upon it is also dependent on the level of integration to the international hegemonic structure. In the case of Turkey, the inherent need for catching up with the West and modernization have become an obstacle in front of Turkey's ability to build upon its particularity. During the 1920s and 1930s, Turkey was able to build upon its particularity and desire to be independent from any hegemonic structure that yielded production of indigenous aircrafts and weapons, which some of them were better than their European counter parts. Yet, intrinsic belief that the West is better than Turkey and the lack of

self-confidence, despite Atatürk's attempts to instill that confidence, resulted in failure of aircraft factories. Furthermore, the inclination of becoming the part of the West resulted in Turkey willing integration of to the liberal bloc after the Second World War, which resulted in more obstacles in realization and building upon Turkey's particularity.

In terms of defense in general and defense procurement, the integration to liberal bloc after the Second World War resulted in losing certain set of abilities on the part of TSK. The more Turkey integrated to liberal bloc and the hegemonic leader the United States, TSK lost its capabilities to plan its material needs and develop military doctrines that was suitable for its needs. Yet, this research showed that TSK accepted whatever presented by the United States and the military institution NATO, both in terms of military hardware and defense policy. As a result, the United States defined the needs and composition of the TSK and its perspective role in case of a war with the Soviet Union, while TSK only negotiated only certain details of weapon procurement. The effects of the lost capabilities persisted after the neoliberal transformation and the end of the Cold War. Although, today, Turkey seems to be more independent, its strategic concepts, military doctrines and force structure still follows what have been produced in the United States. For example, Turkey has been fighting against mine warfare and ambushed since 1984. However, full scale of adoption of MRAP came only after the experiences of the United States in Iraq and Afghanistan, despite the fact Turkish defense industry showed its capability to produce mine resistant vehicles, Cobra. This example shows that Turkey is unable to built upon its particular experiences.

In connection to above point, the integration to international hegemonic structure creates a certain level of affinity to the weapon systems produced in the leading state; belief that those weapon systems are better than the others. Turkey developed a deep affinity to American weapon systems as a result of the Americanization of structure in Turkey as compared to Kemalist

hegemony, where the search is for the modern weapons systems that Turkey could get from any source. Although, it has been argued that during the 1920s and 1930s, Turkey had an affinity to German weapons system because of the closeness of the hegemonic structures in both states as well as the comradeship in the First World War, both Turkey's relation to rival hegemonies and defense procurement showed otherwise. However, Americanization brought an affinity towards American weapons systems, which made US systems Turkey's primary choice. Turkey sought to procure US weapon systems even if the system in question is unnecessary for Turkey, had no doctrinal value and/or there are better alternatives. Such behavior is observable in Turkey's insistence on procuring F-104 Starfighter and continued to procure even when other states have moved to better systems and better systems were offered to Turkey. Such priority of American system continued after the neoliberal transformation and after the Cold War, where Turkey began to built its own weapon systems. Priority of American systems had only changed in form, but its effects in selection in sub-systems and industry-to-industry relations remains predominantly American. Yet, the investigation between 1945 until 2013 reveal that Turkey procured from Europe and other suppliers when the United States did not meet the demands of Turkey –such as export possibility and modification etc–, which are also defined within the structure.

Consequently, the form of production is significant in defining what could be done and the nature of the product, which is also applicable to the defense industry. Fordist form of production was based on the mass production of simple products in factories that vertically integrated. Consequently, the production happened in particular factory, though this does not necessarily mean that production had not been supported by SMEs and sub-contractors. Consequently, weapon system production happened in countries where there have already been a defense industrial base such as the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, France, Germany etc. Thus, other countries have imported weapons from them. Furthermore, Fordist

production did not have the incentive to spread the production of particular weapon around different geographical locations. Consequently, when certain weapon system is agreed to be produced in certain state, all the steps of the production happened in one geography. Consequently, production of weapon system in different places under Fordist form of production happened through licensing agreements. On the other hand, post-Fordist production, where production was spread through different location and sub-contractor, enabled participation of different states at different instances of production of particular system and collaborate on production and development more effectively. Consequently, this created an opportunity to every actor within the new neoliberal structure. Turkey received investment in its defense industry and became integrated to the United States and European weapon production processes, thereby changed the form of dependency. However, this also created an opportunity to collaborate with different states other than the core of the liberal bloc such as Israel, Korea and the Russian Federation. However, as mentioned before, certain level of affinity remained intact. Turkey seeks to buy American systems, if not systems that are close to American systems, which seems to be one of the reasons why Turkey collaborated with Israel and Korea. Furthermore, post-Fordist production enabled representation of weapon systems as indigenous that enabled the utilization for the sustaining hegemonic structure via linking it to certain set of ideas, such as nationalism and national pride.

As mentioned above, different factors came into play in defense procurement at different historical moments when structures shift the ideas that they depend. During the Kemalist hegemony, national independence both in terms of economy and defense procurement was one of the principle ideas that the hegemony dependent. Consequently, defense procurement and defense industrial policies aimed at establishing defense industries as well as the industrial capabilities that could support it, while at the interim period procuring weapons from multiple sources. Americanization of the hegemony brought the ideas that Turkey had to be protected against “the Soviet

aggression”, thus it needed the United States and NATO. An industrial Turkey with its own national defense industrial base did not deemed necessary under the liberal structure, though ISI was implemented after a while. Foreign relations rise to primacy in determining defense procurement, Turkey procured weapons from the liberal bloc. In the neoliberal transformation, industry-to-industry relations and becoming export oriented gained the primacy. Consequently, possibility of export became an important factor in defense procurement choices. But also, post-Fordist production decreased the significance of foreign relations, as long as the states remained in the same bloc, because industry-to-industry could circumvent the observable institutional relations. For example, BMC produced Kirpi MRAP through licensing from an Israeli firm despite the severed relations between Turkey and Israel.

In the end, hegemonic structures, which are subject to change due to class struggle, define the confines in which state made decisions about defense, thus defense procurement. Consequently, the mechanisms of defense procurement and defining the needs are significant, the outcome is determined in relation to dominant ideas or “common sense” within the structure. Thus, each historical moment has its own particular means of control and dependency.

7.1 Future of Turkish Defense Procurement

This research has shown that the level of integration to global hegemonic structure hampers the community's ability to realize their particularity and therefore enter into a vicious circle of following the developments and changes within the global hegemonic structure. The communities fail to realize their particularity because their mode of thinking, the foundational assumptions and ideas about how things work, is shaped by the structure and therefore unable to challenge and transcend the structure. Therefore, the initial step towards breaking the vicious circle of dependency is the

disengage from the global hegemonic structure, if not totally but to decrease the level of integration.

Consequently, Turkey should challenge its affinity to the United States and decrease its dependency on the US military outlook and doctrines. This could only be reached through instituting capabilities, which will allow creation of ideas that are founded on the experiences of Turkey. Consequently, Turkey should seek to develop its own particular ideas about strategy, force structure, military doctrines and defense industry policy.

This necessitates an investment in military sciences that would be studied by civilians and should not only be limited to the engineers. Our study about the Turkish defense procurement showed that Turkey focuses on the development of a certain set of technologies without considering in which circumstances and scenarios that these systems would be utilized. Also, we observed that Turkey was unable to build on its own experiences in guiding the development of weapon systems. Consequently, this could be changed by the more transparency on the part of TSK about its future aims and how it perceives the future and critical evaluation of TSK aims and experiences through research centers and universities, which again necessitates increasing the amount of research in military sciences.

Furthermore, development of the new technologies, though connected to the development in the other sectors, should be geared for the disruptive technologies that would significantly alter the utility of existing technologies rather than focusing on catching up and making limited improvements on the existing technologies as observed with the development of MBT and UAVs. As this research has argued that even if the states could catch up with the United States on certain military systems and be able to build indigenous weapon systems, (1) the United States is always in the lead of developing new technologies, thus putting other states in constant need to catch up and (2) these states' indigenous design and technology choices are always informed

through what the United States does. Therefore, change in the United States puts others at disadvantage.

Consequently, these problems could only be resolved through experimenting on the new technologies and military doctrines that are different, at times, from the developments at the leading state. Such attempts may lead to development of military technologies that could be used right away and possibly yield more failure than success. Yet, in every failure, Turkey would increase certain set of knowledge and capabilities, which would become the foundation of a disruptive technology.

However, Turkey should transform its culture, both as a whole society and military as a reflection of general change. Throughout this research, we observed that TSK has always left behind the military developments, not necessarily the in terms of equipment, but how TSK fought and how Turkey structures its defense posture. Consequently, TSK showed certain amount of resistance to change and different ways of doing things, thus showed great conservatism. On the other hand, such attitude has to change if Turkey aims to increase capabilities of the defense industrial base, break the dependency on the other sources and able to create technologies and military doctrines that are different than others, thus realizing its own particularity. Openness to change would enable and encourage the experimentation that we mentioned above.

7.2 Limitations and Future Work

This research attempted to construct a different approach to defense procurement. In doing so, this research tried to connect different factors and how they tend to change both at different historical moments and communities. Although, the research made the initial attempt, the researcher is aware that the theory development is highly influenced by the experiences of Turkey. Consequently, this creates a limitation and question about the

applicability of the approach to the experiences of other states. Therefore, there is a need for further studies on other states. In other words, the approach has to be tested. We expect that the approach performs better in countries that have similar characteristics with Turkey. On the other hand, refinement to the approach is necessary if we are to examine states such as the United States.

Second, while the research attempted to connect different issues and showed the relation between them, the deeper analysis on certain issues lacked because main focus is the defense procurement. Further research could be pursued in this area by examining how forms of production affect the way wars are fought, the sources of states particularity in choosing certain way of warfare despite the similarity in form of production, how the military culture is shaped by the relation between material capabilities and cultures that are based on the historical experiences and continue to persist despite the changes in structures etc. The approach of this study provides necessary analytical framework for such study, yet further investigation is needed, both by focusing on Turkey and other states.

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX A – TECHNICAL COMPARISONS

Table 1.1 - Heavy Lift Helicopter Comparison




Photo		 <p>Boeing CH-47D military transport helicopter with additional side view (lower) of MH-47E special forces' variant (James Goulding)</p>	 <p>Sikorsky CH-53E Super Stallion heavy-lift helicopter (Paul Pezart)</p>	 <p>Mil Mi-26 multipurpose heavy-lift helicopter (Paul Jackson) 1151996</p>
Name		CH-47D (SD) Chinook	CH-53 Super Stallion	Mi-26 Halo
Weights and Loadings	Weight Empty	11,550 kg	15,071 kg	29,000 kg
	Max Payload, internal or external	12,944 kg (12,700 kg max)	13,607 kg (internal) – 14,515 kg	20,000 kg

Table 1.1 (Cont'd)

		underslung load)	(external)	
	Normal T-O Weight			49,600 kg
	Max T-O Weight	24,494 kg	31,638 kg (internal) – 33,339 kg (external)	56,000 kg
Performance	Max level speed	287 km/h	315 km/h	295 km/h (A) – 270 km/h (c)
	Normal cruising speed	259 km/h	278 km/h	255 km/h (A-C)
	Service ceiling	3,385 m	5,640 m	4,600 m (A) – 5,900 m (B) – 4,300 m (C)
	Hovering ceiling	2,835 m	3,520 m (IGE at max power) 2,895 m (OGE at max power)	1,800 m (A) – 2,800 m (B) – 1,520 m (C)
	Range	1,207 km (12,558 kg payload)	2,075 km (at optimum cruise condition for best range)	A: 500 km (at 2,500 m ISA + 15 C with 7,700 kg payload) B: 500 km (at 2,500 m ISA + 15 C with 13,700 kg payload)

Paul Jackson, ed., Jane's All the World's Aircraft 2009-2010 (Surrey: IHS, 2009)

John W. R. Taylor, ed., Jane's All the World's Aircraft 1982-83 (London: Jane's Publishing Company, 1982)

Table 1.2 - Attack Helicopter Comparisons











								
Name		Ka-50-2 Erdogan	AH-1Z King Cobra	AH-64D Longbow	Apache	Eurocopter Tiger (HCP)	Denel Rooivalk	CSH-2 T-129 ATAK (based on A 129C)
Weights and Loads	Empty	7,800 kg	5,579 kg	5,352 kg		4,200 kg	5,730 kg	-
	Max external stores	3,000 kg	2,615 kg	-	-	-	2,032 kg (with 1,000 kg fuel)	-
	Normal T-O	9,800 kg	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Max T-O	11,300 kg	8,391 kg	9,525 (-701 engines)	5,925 kg (normal)	8,750 kg	5,000 kg	
Performance	Max Speed (level flight)	300 km/h	282 km/h	265 km/h	278 km/h	278 km/h (A) 241 km/h (B)	269 km/h	
	Cruising Speed	270 km/h	265 km/h	265 km/h	230 km/h	-	-	

Table 1.2 (Cont'd)

	Rate of climb	600 m/min (at 2,500 m)	850 m/min	736 m/min	690 m/min	334 m/min	274 m/min
	Service Ceiling	5,500 m	More than 6,100 m (AH-1W)	5,915 m	-	6,100 (A) 5,150 (B)	6,095 m
	Hovering Ceiling	4,000 m	4,495 m	4,170 m	3,500 m	IGE: 5,850 m (A) 3,110 m (B) OGE: 5,455 m (A) 2,410 m (B)	3,995 m (IGE) 3,050 m (OGE)
	Range	450 km (combat) 520 km (max internal fuel) 1,160 km (with 4 auxiliary tanks)	232 km (with 1,134 kg payload) 685 km (with standard fuel, 20 min reserves)	407 km (30 min reserves) 476 km (no reserves)	800 km (internal fuel) 1,280 km (with ferry tanks)	704 km (A with max fuel, no reserve) 940 km (B with max fuel, no reserve)	561 km (internal fuel – no reserves)
	Endurance	1h 40 min (standard fuel, 10 min reserves) 2h 50 min (2 auxiliary tanks)	3h 30 min (with standard fuel)	1h 50 min (at 1,220 m at 35 C) 2h 44 min (internal fuel) 8h 00 min (internal and external fuel) 2h 30 min (mission endurance no reserves)	2h 50 min (operational mission) 3h 25 min (max internal fuel)	3h 36 min (A with max internal fuel, no reserves) 4h 55 min (B with max internal fuel, no reserves)	3 h
	g limit	+3.5	+2.8/-0.5	+3.5/-0.5		+2.6/-0.5	

Paul Jackson, ed., Jane's All the World's Aircraft 2009-2010 (Surrey: IHS, 2009)
 Paul Jackson, ed., Jane's All the World's Aircraft 2002-2003 (Surrey: Jane's Information Group, 2002)

Table 1.3 - UAV Comparison

Photo					
Name	Predator UAS**	MQ-9 Reaper (Predator B UAS)	Predator C Avenger UAS	Heron***	TAI Anka****
Max Altitude	25,000 ft	50,000 ft	50,000 ft	30,000 ft	30,000 ft
Max Endurance	40 hr	27 hrs	18 hrs	> 40 hrs	24 hrs
Max Airspeed	120 KTAS*	240 KTAS	400 KTAS	-	> 75 knots

*Knots true airspeed

**General Atomics Aeronautical Website: <http://www.ga-asi.com/products/aircraft/predator.php> Accessed: 28 August 2013

*** IAI Malat Division Website: http://www.iai.co.il/34402-16382-en/Groups_Military_Aircraft_MALAT_Products_Heron_1.aspx Accessed: 28 August 2013

**** TAI website: <https://www.tai.com.tr/tr/proje/anika> Accessed: 28 August 2013

Table 1.4 - 2nd Generation Aircraft Comparison




						
		Fiat G-91	F-104S	Mirage III-E	Jaguar	Mirage F-1C
Weights and Loading	Weight Empty	-	6,760 kg	7,050 kg	7,000 kg	7,400 kg
	T-O Weight	-	9,840 kg	9,600 kg	10,954 kg	10,900 kg
	Max T-O Weight	3,130 (with external tanks)	14,060 kg	13,700 kg	15,700 kg (with external stores)	16,200 kg
	Max Wing Loading	-	540 kg/m ²	393.1 kg/m ²	649.3 kg/m ²	648 kg/m ²
Performance	Max Speed	1,045 km/h (low altitudes)	Mach 2.2	Mach 2.2	Mach 1.1	Mach 2.2
	Max Cruising Speed	-	981 km/h	Mach 0.9	-	-
	Radius	1,300 km	1,247 km (with max fuel)	1,200 km (combat, ground attack)	Typical attack radius, internal fuel only: 852 km (hi-lo-hi)	-

Table 1.4 (Cont'd)

					537 km (lo-lo-lo)	
	g limits	-	-	-	+8.6/+12 (ultimate)	-
Dimensions, External	Wing Span	8.61 m	6.68 m	8.22 m	8.69 m	8.40 m
	Length Overall	12.00 m	16.69 m	15.03 m	15.52 m	15.00 m
	Height Overall	4.00 m	4.11 m	4.50 m	4.89 m	4.50 m
Area	Wings, Gross	-	18.22 m ²	35.00 m ²	24.18 m ²	25.00 m ²

Leonard Bridgman, ed., Jane's All the World's Aircraft 1959-60 (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1959)

John W. R. Taylor, ed., Jane's All the World's Aircraft 1974-75 (London: Macdonald and Jane's, 1974)

John W. R. Taylor, ed., Jane's All the World's Aircraft 1982-83 (London: Jane's Publishing Company, 1982)

APPENDIX B – DESIGN COMPARISONS

Table 2.1 Altay vs Rotem K2 Comparison

	Altay MBT	Rotem K-2 MBT
Front	 A front view of an Altay MBT tank, showing its turret and main gun. The tank is olive green and is positioned on a paved area with buildings in the background.	 A front view of a Rotem K-2 MBT tank, showing its turret and main gun. The tank is olive green with camouflage patterns and is positioned on a paved area.
Side	 A side view of an Altay MBT tank, showing its turret and main gun. The tank is olive green and is positioned on a paved area.	 A side view of a Rotem K-2 MBT tank firing its main gun. The tank is olive green with camouflage patterns and is positioned on a snowy field.
Back	 A back view of an Altay MBT tank, showing its turret and main gun. The tank is olive green and is positioned on a paved area.	 A back view of a Rotem K-2 MBT tank, showing its turret and main gun. The tank is olive green with camouflage patterns and is positioned on a paved area.

Table 2.2 BMC ve Hatehof Product Comparison

	BMC (Turkey)	Hatehof (Israel)
Kirpi 350-16 vs Navigator		
Kirpi 350		
Xtream		
Vuran vs Hurricane		

APPENDIX C – TURKISH DEFENSE PROCUREMENT PROCESS AND R&D SCHEMES

Defense Procurement Process (Domestic Procurement)




Figure 1. Technology Management Process




Figure 2. Example of Technology Acquisition Road Map Break Down




Figure 3. MUKNET (Excellence Networks)

APPENDIX D - CURRICULUM VITAE

Çağlar Kurç

Middle East Technical University, Department of Political Science and
Public Administration, Ankara, TURKEY.

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EDUCATION

Ph.D. Middle East Technical University; Ankara, Turkey — 2008- 2013

Graduate School of Social Sciences, Department of International Relations.
Dissertation Topic: Culture and Political Economy of Defense Procurement and
Defense Industry: The Case of Turkey.

**M.A. King's College London, University of London; London, the United
Kingdom — 2006-2007**

School of Social Science and Public Policy, Department of War Studies, M.A. in War
Studies. *Dissertation Topic:* The Security Market and Private Military Companies:
Values, Beliefs and Perceptions

B.A. Bilkent University; Ankara, Turkey — 2002-2006

Faculty of Economics, Administration and Social Sciences, Department of
International Relations. Graduated with High Honor, CGPA: 3.87/4.00

**I.B. TED Ankara College Foundation High School; Ankara, Turkey —
1999-2002**

Bilingual Diploma of International Baccalaureate

Experience

**V.R.S. Massachusetts Institute of Technology; Cambridge, MA, the United
States — 2012-2013**

Fulbright Visiting Research Scholar at MIT Security Studies Program

**Research Assistant, Middle East Technical University; Ankara, Turkey — 2010-
2013**

Responsible for managing IT infrastructure of the Department of Political Science
and Public Administration. Maintaining Department's website. Research on Defense

Industry, Defense Procurement, International Security and Private Security Companies.

Assistant Editor, Eurasia Critic News Agency; Ankara, Turkey — 2008-2010

Responsible for contacting with authors, translate articles from Turkish to English, aiding editor for topic selection, subscriber relations, proof-reading selected articles, controlling the magazine before publishing, research on Defense Industry relations between states (concentrating on Turkey and Israel), Peace Operations and Private Security Companies.

Intern, National Security Strategies Research Institute (TUSAM); Ankara, Turkey — Aug-Sep 2006

Research on the nature of insurgency in Iraq and coalition counterinsurgency operations

Fellowships, Honors and Awards

Fulbright Scholarship — 2011

TEV - British Chevening Postgraduate Scholarship — 2006

Bilkent University Merit based Scholarship — 2004 & 2005

Publications

Kurc, C. "Saudi Arabia" *Encyclopedia of Military Science* Ed. G. Kurt Piehler, Sage Publications (2013)

Kurc, C. "Operations, Air" *Encyclopedia of Military Science* Ed. G. Kurt Piehler, Sage Publications (2013)

Kurc, C. "Halliburton" *Encyclopedia of Military Science* Ed. G. Kurt Piehler, Sage Publications (2013)

Kurc, C. "The Need for Strong International Regulation for Private Military and Security Companies" *EurasiaCritic* (Nov. 2009), pp. 50-4

Cetinkaya, O and Kurc, C. "Israeli-Turkish Defense Cooperation: Building Bridges with Bullets" *EurasiaCritic* (June 2009), pp. 52-6
http://www.academia.edu/227959/Israeli-Turkish_Defense_Cooperation_Building_Bridges_with_Bullets

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Kurc, C. "Yeni Asimetrik Silahlar: Irak'taki Çatışmalar ve Dogaçmala Patlayıcı Aygıtlar" *Cumhuriyet Strateji* (25 September 2006)
http://www.sendika.org/yazi.php?yazi_no=7782

Kurc, C. "ABD'nin Karsı Direnis Operasyonları" *Cumhuriyet Strateji* (23 October 2006)

Papers Presented in Conferences / Workshops

Kurc, C. "How Military Technology Became a Tool for Justification for Military Interventions" Hitting the Target? How New Capabilities Are Shaping Contemporary International Intervention. Institute of Advances Studies, University of Surrey. Guildford, the United Kingdom. 12-13 July 2012

Kurc, C. "The Role of Culture and Politics in Arms Procurement" Sixteenth Annual International Conference on Economics and Security. American University in Cairo. Cairo, Egypt 21-22 June 2012

Kurc, C. "Silah Tedarikinin Siyaseti: Türkiye Örneği" 1. Doktora Öğrencileri Çalıştayı Orta Doğu Teknik Üniversitesi. Ankara, Turkey. 23-25 May 2012

Kurc, C. "Incorporating Private Military/Security Companies in Peace Operations" 6th Global Conference on War, Virtual War and Human Security. Budapest, Hungary 1-3 May 2009 . <http://www.inter-disciplinary.net/wp-content/uploads/2009/04/www6kurc.pdf>

Language Skills

Turkish: Mother Tongue; English: Proficient; French: Basic; Russian: Basic

Volunteer work

Member of Organizational Communication Group, TED Ankara College Alumni; Ankara, Turkey — 2010-Present

Debater and Debate educator, Bilkent Debate Club; Ankara, Turkey — 2002-2006

Tutor, Bilkent Volunteer Educators; Ankara, Turkey — 2002-2006

APPENDIX E — TURKISH SUMMARY

TÜRKİYE'NİN SAVUNMA TEDARİKİ DAVRANIŞLARINA ELEŞTİREL YAKLAŞIM: 1923-2013

1995 yılında Türkiye, Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri'nin saldırı helikopteri ihtiyacını karşılamak üzere saldırı ve keşif helikopteri ihalesini (ATAK-1) açmaya karar verdi. ATAK projesinin 2000 yılında karara bağlanması ve 2003 yılında ilk helikopterin teslimi beklenmekteydi. Fakat, 2001 yılında ATAK projesi iptal edilerek, yeni ATAK-2 projesi başlatıldı. Süreç, ilk projesinin başlatılmasından 12 yıl sonra, 2007 yılında, Türkiye'nin AgustaWestland T-129 seçmesiyle sonuçlandı. T-129'un bu ihale sürecinde Bell AH-1Z King Cobra, Boeing AH-64D Longbow Apache, Eurocopter Tiger ve Kamov Ka-50'yi yenmeyi başarmıştır. T-129, AgustaWestland A-129 ihraç versiyonunun TAI tarafından millileştirilmiş versiyonudur. Bu millileştirme rotorların geliştirilmesi, güçlendirilmiş motor takılması ve milli navigasyon ve hedefleme podları takılması gibi değişiklikler içermektedir ki böylece alınan helikopterler Türkiye coğrafyasına daha uygun hale getirilmiştir. Fakat, Türkiye bu helikopterlerin teslimi için beklemek zorunda kalmıştır çünkü değişikliklerin yapılması ve milli sistemlerin geliştirilmesi ve test edilmesi zaman gerektirmektedir. Bundan dolayı, helikopter ihalesinin gidermeye çalıştığı kabiliyet ihtiyacı devam etmektedir. Yeni helikopterlerin envantere girinceye kadar geçecek olan süreçte Türkiye geçici çözüme arayışına girmiştir ve 2008 yılında Amerikan hükümetiyle Amerikan Deniz Piyadeleri'nin envanter dışına çıkaracakları AH-1W SuperCobra helikopterlerini almak için memorandum imzalamıştır. Fakat Kasım 2011'de Amerikan Kongre'si talep edilen 12 helikopterden sadece 3 tanesinin satışına onay vermiştir, bunun içinde Amerikan ordusunun

helikopter açığını neden göstermişlerdir. Türkiye kabiliyet ihtiyacını karşılamak için bir başka yöntemi daha devreye sokmuş, 9 adet AW-126 Erken Duhul (T-129 helikopterlerinin değişime uğramamış hali) helikopterleri 300 milyon dolara almaya karar vermiştir. 2013 yılına gelindiğinde ise bu helikopterler hala TSK envanterine girmemiştir ve kabiliyet ihtiyacı devam etmektedir. Bundan çıkardığımız ilk soru şudur: karar alma süreci neden bu kadar uzun sürmüştür ve belirlenen ihtiyaç karşılanamamıştır? Yeni platformların geliştirilmesinde uzun tedarik süreçleri teknolojik ve teknik belirsizliklerden dolayı kabul edilebilir bir durumken, ATAK sadece halihazırda varolan bir teknolojinin, ki sadece aynı teknoloji Türkiye'de yeniden üretilecek, seçimidir.

Dahası neden Türkiye AgustaWestland'ı seçmiştir? Boeing AH-64D dünyanın en iyi saldırı helikopteri olarak kabul edilmektedir. Bu helikopterin seçilmemesinin ana nedenlerini Türkiye'de üretiminin ve Türkiye'ye satışının sorunlu olmasını varsayıyoruz. İhaledeki en iyi ikinci helikopter ise AH-1Z olarak öne çıkmaktadır ki, bu helikopter hem Türkiye'nin de envanterinde olan Cobra helikopterlerinin devam versiyonudur, hem de ATAK-1 ihalesinin, Savunma Sanayii Müsteşarlığı'nın Rus Kamov Ka-50-2 Erdoğan'nın alınmasını tavsiye etmesine rağmen, kazananıdır. Fakat, Bell helikopterler yürütülen görüşmelerde helikopterin ortak geliştirilmesi, ortak üretimi ve teknoloji transferi konusunda anlaşmazlıklar olmuştur.

AH-1Z üzerinde olan görüşmeler tıkanmaya başladığı noktada, Türkiye IAI/Kamov ile görüşmelere başlamıştır. Ka-50-2'nin geliştirildiği ana platform Ka-50 Sovyetler Birliği'nin Afghanistan'daki tecrübeleri baz alınarak tasarlanmış ve Rusya'nın Çeçenistan savaşında kullanılmıştır ki bu iki ülkenin coğrafyası Türkiye coğrafyasına benzerlikler taşımaktadır. Sonuçta, Ka-50 platformu dağlık alanlarda yürütülen operasyonlar için tasarlanmış, küçük silah ateşine dayanıklı olması için kokpit bölümüne koruyucu zırh konulmuştur. Ka-50-2 Rus designının İsrail elektronik sistemleriyle

buluşmasından ortaya çıkmıştır. Kıdemli IAI yetkilisine IAI/Kamov Türkiye'de helikopter fabrikası bile kurmayı teklif etmiştir.

Diğer yandan, AgustaWestland'ın seçilmesindeki ana nedenler ise Türkiye'nin T-129 üçüncü ülkelere satış hakkına sahip olması, helikopter üzerinde istenilen her türlü değişikliği yapabilmesi ve yerli olarak üretimi olarak öne çıkmaktadır.

ATAK projesinin gelişiminin hızlıca incelenmesi Türkiye'nin tedarik kararlarını alırken milli savunma sanayii tabanının ve kabiliyetlerinin geliştirilmesi/iyileştirilmesi ve ihraç olasılıklarının önemli etkenler olarak öne çıktığını göstermektedir. Bu davranışın ortaya çıkmasını yerleşik anlayış Kıbrıs Harekati'ndan sonra Amerika Birleşik Devletleri'nin Türkiye'ye uyguladığı silah ambargosu olarak gösterilmektedir. 1974 tarihinden sonra Türkiye milli savunma sanayiinin geliştirilmesinin önemini anlamış ve bu yönde belli adımlar atmıştır.

Fakat, bu yerleşik anlayış sorgulamaya açıktır ve tarihsel olgular içinde kafa karıştırıcıdır. İlk olarak, milli savunma sanayiinin geliştirilmesi fikri, ambargodan önce, 1970 yılında "kendi uçağını kendin yap" inisiyatifiyle ortaya çıkmış, Türkiye ile ortaklık kurmak isteyen firmalar olmasına rağmen, uçak üretimi ancak 1980 yılında F-16 Savaşan Şahin ile mümkün olmuştur. Neden uçak üretimi için harekete geçmek 10 yıl sürmüştür?

İkinci olarak, milli savunma sanayinin geliştirilmesi düşüncesi Cumhuriyet'in kuruluşunun ilk yıllarına dayanır, ki o yıllarda Türkiye'nin gelişmekte olan savunma sanayiisi gelecek vaad etmektedir. Sonuçta neden Türkiye'nin gelecek vaad eden savunma sanayii desteklenmemiştir? Türkiye, savunma sanayiinin geliştirilmesi gerekliliğini neden silah ambargosunda anlamıştır? Neden uçak sanayiinin gelişimi 1980 yılında başlamıştır, fakat 1970'lerde gelişmesi için yol alınmamıştır?

Bu soruların cevabı, yerleşik anlayışa göre Türkiye'nin NATO üyeliğinde saklıdır. NATO tarafından Sovyet tehdidine karşı sağlanan silahlar, Türkiye'de milli olanaklarla silah üretimini ekonomik olarak mantıklı bir yaklaşım olacağı

söylenmektedir. Dahası, bazı uzmanlar o dönemlerde Türkiye'de savunma sanayiinin desteklenmesi için gerekli olan küçük ölçekli firmaların olmamasına bağlamıştır.

Tabi ki, Türkiye'nin NATO üyeliği çok önemli bir gelişmedir. Üyelikle birlikte TSK Batı askeri doktrinlerine ve silah sistemlerine bütünüyle entegre olmuştur. Türkiye, NATO müttefiklerinden askeri yardım ve kredilerle bir çok farklı silah sistemi tedarik etmiştir, her ne kadar 1980'lere gelindiğinde Türkiye'nin envanterini bazıları modern olmakla birlikte çoğunlukla miyadını doldurmuş sistemlerle oluşturmaktadır. Tabi bu da 1980lerden başlayıp 2010 yılına kadara devam edecek olan bir modernleşme sürecini başlatmıştır. Fakat, bu noktada bile, şunu sorgulamamız gerekmektedir, Osmanlı Devleti'nden edindiğimiz deneyimlere rağmen Türkiye neden yine müttefiklerine tam bağımlı bir savunma politikası ve silah tedariki izlemiştir? Ekonomik nedenler, bu deneyimlerden çıkan derslerden neden üstün olmuş ve kabul görmüştür?

Türkiye'nin savunma tedarik kararları, yukarıda da görüldüğü üzere, bir çok bilmece içermektedir ve belli dönemlerde belli düşünceler daha baskın çıkmaktadır. Cumhuriyet'in ilk dönemlerinde savunma sanayiinin geliştirilmesi öncelik iken, Soğuk Savaş döneminde müttefiklere tam bağımlılığa dönüşmüş, ancak 1980 yılından sonra yeniden savunma sanayiinin gelişmesi bir öncelik olarak yeniden doğmuştur. Fakat son dönem incelendiğinde bile bu kararların belli bir tutarlılık içerisinde olmadığını da görüyoruz. Örnek olarak Türkiye'nin insansız hava aracı tedarikine bakabiliriz. Türkiye, dünyada ilk insansız hava aracı kullanan ülkelerden biridir. Fakat ne aldığı Gnat İHA'ları verimli bir şekilde kullanabilmiştir ne de o dönemde yerli olarak geliştirilen İHA'lara destek vermiştir. İHA'lar üzerindeki istek 2000'li yıllarda yeniden canlanmıştır fakat ancak Heron İHA'larla yaşanan sorunlardan sonra yerli üretime geri dönülmüştür. Yine alan yazıda bu konuyla ilgili bir çok açıklama bulunmaktadır. Fakat bu açıklamalar, tek bir alım kararına ve belli bir tarihsel dönem içinde yapıldığından, açıklamalar çok kısıtlı kalmaktadır.

Mesela neden Türkiye belli sistemleri yerli üretmeye çalışırken, belli sistemlerin yerli muadilleri olmasına rağmen dışarıdan almıştır? Dahası, bu açıklamalar belli tarihsel dönemler içinde kaldığından, diğer dönemleri açıklamakta ya da neden belli başlı değer değişimleri olduğuna anlamakta kısıtlı kalmaktadır.

Bu nedenlerden dolayı, bu araştırma daha genel bir soru ile savunma tedariki davranışlarını oturma bileceğimiz teorik çerçeveyi incelemeyi hedeflemektedir. Bu bağlamda, bu araştırmanın ana sorusu şudur: ülkeler aldıkları silahları neden alırlar? Bu soruya cevap vermek için bu araştırma alan yazıda bulunan ana akım teorilerden farklı bir teorik çerçeve ve method kullanmıştır. Teori olarak bu araştırma Gramsci'nin tarihsel materyalizmini benimsemiş, sınıf çatışmasının, silah tedarikini nasıl şekillendirdiğine odaklanmıştır. Bunu yaparken farklı tarihsel dönemler belirlemiş ve bu tarihsel dönemlerde ortaya çıkan yapılarıdaki baskın üretim şekillerinin, düşüncelerin ve kurumların kararları nasıl etkilediği incelenmiştir.

Method olarak tek vaka analizi benimsemiş ve Türkiye'ye odaklanmıştır. Türkiye vakasını ise uzun bir tarihsel süreçte (1923-2013) mercek altına almış ve farklı tarihsel süreçlerde değişen yapıların nasıl savunma tedariki kararlarına yansıdığını incelemiştir. Bu bağlamda, araştırma nitel methodları kullanmıştır. Bu metodun seçilmesindeki en önemli neden ise insanların algılarının ve dünya ve kendileri hakkındaki varsayımlarının hareketlerini ve kararlarını belirlediği varsayımdır. Bu bağlamda bu araştırma mülakatlar, devlet ve gazete arşivleri, hatıralar, sanayi dergileri ve resmi belgeler kullanmıştır. Savunma tedariki kararları ise konvansiyonel silahlara odaklanmıştır çünkü bunların takibi açık kaynaklardan yapılabilmektedir. Bunu yaparken de SIPRI Silah Ticareti Veritabanı ve Jane's yıllıkları kullanılmıştır.

Savunma Tedarikinin Ekonomisi, Siyaseti ve Ekonomi Politikası

Savunma tedariki literatüründeki ana akım yaklaşımlar incelendiğinde bunların üç ana disiplin altında gruplandığı görülmektedir. Bu üç ana disiplin

şunlardır: Savunma Ekonomisi, Savunmanın Siyaseti ve Savunmanın Ekonomi Politikası. Tabii ki, bu ana disiplinler kendi içlerinde farklı yaklaşımlar bulundurmaları birlikte, farklı yaklaşımların paylaştığı ana varsayımların birlikteliğini göstermektedir.

Savunma Ekonomisi, savunma tedariki konusuna sınırlı kaynakların alternatif kullanım ve amaçlara verimli dağıtılması sorunu olarak yaklaşmaktadır ve bundan dolayı kısıtlı kaynaklar ve seçimlerle ilgilenir. Bu noktadan hareketle savunma tedariki ekonomik – liberal ekonomik – prensipler çerçevesinde incelenir ve ekonomik modellerin uygulanmasıyla savunma tedarik süreçlerinin nasıl daha verimli hale getirilebileceğini tartışılır. Bu araştırma alanı, ekonomik modellerin evrensel olduğu varsayımından yola çıkar ve bütün devletlere uygulanabileceğini iddia ederler.

Savunma Ekonomisi savunma tedariki analizini ideal bir modelden başlatır, ki bu ideal model dört adet karar alma noktasından oluşur, ve gerçekliğin bu idealden uzaklaştığı noktaları ve nedenleri inceler. Bu ideal modeller göre kararlar şu ana sorular çerçevesinde alınır: Ne alınmalı, ne zaman alınmalı, kimden alınmalı ve nasıl alınmalı?

Fakat, Savunma Ekonomisi alanı siyaseti karar alma süreçlerine dışsal bir alan olarak görmektedir. Her ne kadar siyasetin kararlar üzerindeki etkisi belli bir noktaya kadar kabul edilse de, genel olarak bu etki sistemin verimliliği bozan bir etki olarak görülür. Bu bağlamda, Savunma Ekonomisi siyaset alanına çok fazla değinmeden analizi yapar.

Savunma Ekonomisi alanında ise en baskın analiz modeli ise principal-agent modelidir. Bu modele göre savunma tedarikindeki sorunlar hükümet (principal) ve şirketler (agent) arasındaki bilgi asimetrisinden kaynaklanmaktadır. Bilgi asimetrisinden dolayı hükümetler, şirketlerin yaptıklarını denetleyememektedir. Bundan dolayı hükümetler, şirketlerin hükümetin çıkarları doğrultusunda çalışması için bir takım teşvikler oluşturmaktadır. Öte yandan da şirketler kendi çıkarlarını takip etmektedirler. Bu model içerisindeki araştırmalar, hükümetler ve şirketlerin nasıl verimli

çalışabileceklerini liberal ekonomi düşüncesinin sağladığı modeller üzerinden bulmaya çalışır.

Savunma Siyaseti ise, Savunma Ekonomisi'nin tersine, savunma tedarikine etki eden siyasal faktörlere odaklanmaktadır. Her ne kadar Savunma Siyaseti, savunma tedarikinde ekonomik faktörlerin etkisini kabul etse de, bu alan siyasal faktörleri araştırmalarının merkezine oturturlar. Bu alan içinde öne çıkan yaklaşımlar şunlardır: Strateji ağırlıklı yaklaşım, bürokratik siyaset ve askeri-sinayii kompleks. Strateji ağırlıklı yaklaşım, savunma tedariki kararlarının ülkenin savunma politikalarının ve stratejisi açısından incelemektedir. Bir başka deyişle, bir ülkenin savunma politikasının temelleri nedir, savunma stratejisiyle uyumu var mıdır, tedarik edilen sistemler politika ve strateji ile ne kadar uyumludur soruları üzerine yoğunlaşır.

Bürokratik siyaset ise savunma alımlarını kurumlar arası rekabet ve savunma şirketlerinin bu rekabet içerisindeki edindikleri rol bağlamında inceler. Bu yaklaşımın ana odağı devlet içi çıkar odaklarının nasıl oluştuğu, hangi grupların baskın hale geldiğine ve savunma şirketlerinin bu çıkar grupları içerisinde oynadığı rollere bakar, ve savunma tedarik kararlarının bürokratik rekabet sonucu belirlendiğini savunurlar.

Askeri-sinayi kompleks yaklaşımı ise, savunma tedarik kararlarının savunma şirketlerinin devlet üzerinde olan etkisinin bir yansıması olarak görür. Bürokratik siyasetten farklı olarak, bu yaklaşım savunma şirketlerini analizin merkezine oturtması ve bu şirketlerin toplu olarak devletin savunma tedariki kararlarını nasıl etkilediğine bakarlar. Bu alanın sorduğu ana sorular şunlardır: askeri-sinayi kompleks nasıl ortaya çıktı, savunma şirketleri nasıl bu kadar güçlü ve etkili oldular ve devletle şirketler arası ilişki nasıl yerelden uluslararasına uzanıyor.

Savunma Ekonomi Politikası ise, Savunma Ekonomisi ve Savunma Siyaseti'nin tek bir alana odaklanmalarının eleştirisi olarak ortaya çıkmıştır ve ekonomi ve siyaset alanlarının birbirleriyle etkileşim içinde olduklarından dolayı, analizde herhangi birine daha fazla ağırlık vermenin yanlış ve eksik olduğunu

savunurlar. Buradan yola çıkarak, aslında bu alanın yaptığı Savunma Ekonomisi ve Savunma Siyasetinin varsayımlarını birleştirmek olmuştur. Fakat, diğer alanlardan farklı olarak, Savunma Ekonomi Politikası, savunma tedariki süreçlerinin ve kararlarının yerel ve Uluslar arası düzeylerde farklılıklar gösterdiğini savunmaktadır. Dahası gelişmiş ve gelişmekte olan ülkelerinde savunma tedariki süreçlerinin ve etkileyen faktörlerin farklı olduğunu iddia eder. Bu bağlamda, Savunma Ekonomi Politikası, diğer alanlara göre daha kapsamlı ve farklılıklara yer verecek şekilde inceleme alanını genişletmektedir.

Fakat, her ne kadar yukarıda bahsedilen üç disiplinin savunma tedariki alanına yaptıkları katkı çok önemli olsa da, bu disiplinlerin hem kendilerine özgü hem de ortak zayıflıkları bulunmaktadır. Ortak zayıflıklarından en önemlisi ise ekonomi ve siyaseti farklı alanlar olarak kabul etmeleridir. Savunma Ekonomisi ve Savunma Siyaseti bunu ayrımı açıkça yaparken, Savunma Ekonomi Politikası bu ayrımı kabul eder fakat diğerlerinden farklı olarak bu iki ayrı alanın etkileşimine bakar. Fakat, ekonomi ve siyasetin ayrımı belli bir tarihsel süreç içinde kapitalizmle birlikte ortaya çıkmıştır ve ekonomi ve siyasetten birbirinden farklı olmaksızın, birbirine içseldir.

İkinci olarak, bu alanlar farklı derecelerde de olsa, gelişmiş ülkelerin deneyimlerinden yola çıkarak oluşturulmuş teorilere ve varsayımları dayanmaktadır. Bu da çoğu zaman, Türkiye gibi ülkelerin savunma tedariki kararlarının bu çerçeveden içerisinden görülmesine neden olmaktadır. Örnek olarak, savunma sanayiisi gelişmemiş bir ülke için Savunma Ekonomisi alanının, o ülke davranışlarını anlamak bağlamında çok fazla bir katkı yapabileceği şüphelidir.

Dahası, ana akım teoriler belli bir tarihsel dönem içinden analizlerini ve varsayımlarını oluşturmaktadırlar. Sorun çözme odaklı bu teoriler genel olarak sistem içindeki değişimin kaynaklarını analize katmazlar. Sistem değiştiği noktada, teoriler revizyon geçirselerde, bu teoriler genel olarak sistemin neden değiştiğini ve bunun süreçlerini inceleyemezler. Ya da neden

farklı tarihsel dönemlerde, farklı faktörlerin daha etkin hale geldiği ve diğerlerinin bırakıldığını sorgulamazlar. Belli bir tarihsel dönem içinde oluşan baskın düşünceler çerçevesinde yapılan analiz ise her zaman eksik ve zayıf kalacaktır. Bundan dolayı, bu araştırma farklı bir teorik çerçeve benimsemiştir.

Savunma Tedarikine Tarihsel Materyalist Yaklaşım

Tarihsel materyalist method sosyal dünyanın araştırılmasında iki ana noktayı bir araya getirmektedir. Tarihsellik sosyal ilişkilerde belli tarihsel dönemlerde oluşan yapıların şartların and sonuçlarına odaklanmamıza ve bu yapıların nasıl ortaya çıktığı incelememizi sağlar. Materyalizm ise sosyal yeniden üretimin tarihsel olarak özgün materyal şartlarına odaklanmamızı sağlar. Tarihsel Materyalist method Karl Marx'ın çalışmalarından çıkarılmasına rağmen, Marx'ın özel olarak bu method üzerine yazmamasından dolayı, farklı Marxist düşünüler tarihsel materyalist metodun farklı yorumlamışlardır. Bu çalışma Gramsci'nin tarihsel materyalist metodunu temel almış ve savunma tedarikine Gramsci'nin teorik yaklaşımını benimsemiştir.

Bu yaklaşımın ana savı ise şöyledir: sınıf çatışması bir ülkenin savunma tedarikini belirler. Burada sınıf çatışması ideal bir modelden ortaya çıkan teorik bir dayanak noktası oluşturmaktadır. Bu dayanak noktası toplum içindeki sınıflar arası ve sınıf içi ayrışmaları incelememizi sağlar. Sınıf çatışması yerelliği içinde barındıran insan toplulukları içinde gerçekleştirmektedir. Buradaki yerellik farklı şekillerde tanımlanabilir; aşiret, şehir, bölge ya da ülke. Bu sınıf çatışmasından belli yapılar ortaya çıkar, ki bu yapılar hegemonik olabilir. Yapılar ise üç temel denge üzerine kurulur. Bu temeller fikirler, materyal kabiliyetler ve kurumlardır ve bunlar sürekli olarak birbirleriyle etkileşim içindedirler. Materyal kabiliyetler üretim tarzı ve belli tarz içindeki formlarla, bu üretim tarzının ortaya çıkardığı sosyal ilişkileri ifade eder. Fikirler ise materyal kabiliyetleri meşrulaştırıcı araç olarak ortaya çıkarlar ve kültürel ve öznelarası tanımlanırlar. Kurumlar ise fikirlerin yayılmasını ve devamlılığını entellektüeller üzerinden sağlar, gereken

durumlarda işlevini güç kullanarak yapar. Hegemonik yapılar, hegemonic sınıf tarafından yönlendirilen ve belli grupların rızasını kazanmış olan, bu üç temelini birbirini desteklediği durumlarda insan topluluklarında kurulurlar. Fakat, bu yapılar insanlardan bağımsız değildir, belli yapılar insanların davranışlarını belirleyen bir grup düşünce setini içinde barındırır. Sonuçta, insanların hareketleri yapının karakteri içinde şekillenir.

Her topluluğun doğal çevreleriyle olan ilişkilerinden doğan özel yapıları vardır ve bundan dolayı her toplum farkı bir gelişim yolu izler, bu da eşitsiz gelişmeye yol açar. Fakat bazı yerel hegemonik yapılar, küresel yapı olmaya çalışır. İnsan toplulukları aynı zamanda birbirleriyle kaçınılmaz şekilde etkileşim içerisindedirler. Bu etkileşim birbirleri arasında fikir paylaşımı ve belli fikirlerin yayılmasını sağlar. Bu durum aynı zamanda belli üretim tarzının da yayılmasında rol oynar. Böylelikle toplumlar birbirlerinin gelişim yollarını etkilerler ve gelişimleri birleşik olur fakat tarihsel eşitsizlikten dolayı hiç bir zaman birbirlerinin birebir aynısı olmazlar. Sonuçta bazı hegemonyalar rıza ve zor kullanımının dengesinde diğer toplumları kendi gelişim yollarına sokmaya çalışırlar. Kapitalist toplumlarda ise devlet toplumlar arasındaki ilişkileri kontrol eden, her ne kadar bütün ilişkilerin gerçekleştiği alanları kontrol altında tutamasa da, ana kurum olarak ortaya çıkmaktadır.

Belirli hegemonik sınıfın (uluslararası düzeyde devletlerin) liderliğinde olan hegemonik yapılar küresel olarak yayılmalarını farklı toplumları paylaşılan fikirler, üretim tarzı ve kurumlar aracılığıyla gerçekleştirirler. Küresel hegemonik yapıya olan entegrasyonun seviyesi devletlerin davranışlarını belirler. Fakat, bu yapı deterministik değildir ve yapıya olan bağlılık ya rızayla ya da zor kullanımıyla disipline edilmesiyle sağlanır.

Buradan yola çıkarak, devletlerin tehdit algıları, savunma politikaları, silahlı kuvvetlerinin yapılanmaları vb. hegemonik yapının bir yansımasıdır. Bir ülke içindeki hegemonik yapı küresel hegemonik yapıya entegre ise, onun savunma davranışları hegemonik yapının oluşturduğu çerçeve içinde gerçekleşir. Sonuçta, savunma ile ilgili olan bütün konular toplumun küresel

hegemonik yapıya olan bağılılıkları ve bu yapı içinde varolan fikirleri kabul ettikleri oranda belirlenir.

Savunma alımları belli askeri teknolojilerin kullanımının öngöröldüğü doktrin ve yapıları savunan grupların karar süreçlerini seçimleri etkilemesinin sonucu olarak ortaya çıkar ve bu etkileme süreci çoğunlukla dolaylı olur. Bir devlerin kabul ettiğı savunma yapısı ve askeri doktrinler zaten bu belirlenen çerçeve için ne tür askeri teknolojilerin ve silah sistemlerinin uygun olacağını önceden belirlemiş olur. Bu bağlamda, savunma alımları yaparken değerlendirmenin “nesnel” kriterlere göre yapıldığını söylemek imkansızdır. Değerlendirmeler varolan çerçeve içerisinde, çerçevenin belirlediğı özelliklere göre yapılır. Bundan dolayı da, belirli bir tarihsel dönemde akılcı davranış olarak görölen hareketler (mesela savunma alımlarının ABD'den yapılması ve yerel üretimin ekonomik olarak görölmemesi), farklı bir tarihsel dönemde “akılcı” kabul edilmez. Belli tarihsel süreçlerde ortaya çıkan yapılar silah sistemleri için kabul edilen design kararlarına kadar etkilidir, ve belli devletler içinde buldukları yapı içinde üretilen sistemlerin diğerlerine göre daha iyi olduğunu düşünürler.

Fakat, her ne kadar savunma yapılanmaları bağılı olunan yapı içerisinde şekillense de, ölkelerin eşitsiz gelişmelerinden dolayı, her ölkenin askeri yapısı ve ordularının davranışları, hegemonik ölkenin ya da baskın ölkenin ordusuyla aynı olmaz. Toplulukların kültürel davranışları ordunun yapılanmasına, davranışlarına ve tedarik ettikleri sistemlere yansır. Bu da ölkelerin tedarik ettikleri silah sistemlerini kendi sistemlerine entegre etmekte farklılıklar ortaya çıkarır. TSK her ne kadar NATO ve ABD ordusunun bir yansıması olsa da, TSK'nin yapılanması, savaşma şekli ve tedarik ettikleri belli noktalarda farklılık gösterir. Örnek olarak TSK'nın, ABD'nin önerisine rağmen asker sayısını azaltmamasını gösterebiliriz.

Öte yandan, hegemonik yapıya olan bağılılık ve askeri doktrinlerin başka ölkelerden gelmesi, o ölkenin kendi özgünlüğünün getirdiğı farklılıkları ve bundan doğacak olan gelişmeleri farkedememesine ve yaratıcı olmamasını

sağlar. Çünkü, belli yapılara ve ülkelere bağımlılık, yaratıcılığın gelişeceği ve özgünlüğün farkedileceği altyapıların ve kabiliyetlerin gelişmesini engeller. Bu da sürekli olarak lider ülkeyi takip etme, ona benzeme çabası yaratır. Bunun sonucu ise, belli sistemlerin alınması ancak lider ülke gerçekleştirdikten sonra yapılmasına yol açar. Mesela Türkiye mayın savaşıyla uzun süredir mücadele etmesine rağmen Mayına Dayanıklı, Pusu Korunmalı araçları ancak ABD Irak ve Afghanistan'da sorunlar yaşayıp, kendi ordusunda kullanmaya başladıktan sonra tedarik etmeye başlamıştır ki, ABD'nin bu davranışından çok önce bu tür araçlar Güney Afrika ordusu tarafından kullanılmaktaydı. Türkiye'nin kendi sorunlarına özgün çözümler yaratmaması hem çözüm yaratacak yaratıcı kabiliyetlerinin eksikliği hem de ABD'yi sürekli takip etmesinden kaynaklanmaktadır.

Sonuçta, savunma tedariki küresel ve yerel hegemonik yapıların paylaştıkları hangi design daha iyidir, güç yapısı nasıl olmalıdır, askeri doktrin, tehdit algıları ve savaş tarzlarına dair fikirlerin bir yansımasıdır. Bir ülke belirlenen çerçevenin dışına çıkması durumunda, yapı içindeki grupları o ülkeyi çerçeve içinde hareket etmesi için zorlar. Yapıların değiştiği oranda, ordularda değişim gösterir. Sonuç olarak, savunma doğası gereği bu yapılara bağlıdır.

Sonuçlar

Türkiye'nin savunma tedariki davranışı uzun bir dönemde incelendiğinde kararlar ve yapılar arasında doğal bir ilişki ortaya çıkmaktadır. Savunma tedariki kararları belli hegemonik yapılar içinde alınmıştır. Kararlar hakkında münazara olmasına rağmen, son kararlar her zaman belli tarihsel dönemlerde ortaya çıkan yapının belirlediği çerçeve içinde olmuştur. Mesela, Türkiye, 1980'lerde bazı aktörlerin karşı çıkmalarına rağmen F-16 Savaşan Şahin almaya karar vermiştir. Fakat, Türkiye'de uçak fabrikası kurulmasının sağlayan ve diğer ülkelere satışlarda genel üretime entegre olma ve iş bölümü olasılığını doğuran F-16 tedarik kararı neoliberal hegemoni ve post-Fordist üretim tarzı ile uyum içindedir. Benzer bir çizgide, uçak fabrikası kurulması ancak Türkiye'de neoliberal dönüşüm başladıktan sonra

gerçekleşmiştir. Bu da neden 1970'de ortaya atılan fikrin, bu projeye katkıda bulunmak isteyen yabancı firmaların olmasına rağmen gerçekleştirilemediğini açıklamaktadır. Bir diğer örnek ise, bu araştırmada gösterildiği üzere, Türkiye yapısının Amerikanlaşması yabancı ülkelere bağımlılığın yarattığı sorunlardan ortaya çıkan deneyimlerinin susturulmasına neden olmuştur çünkü bu yeni yapı ABD karşı sorgulanmaz bir inanç getirmiştir.

Dahası, alınan kararlar yerel hegemonyanın, uluslararası yapıyla olan ilişkisini de ortaya çıkarmaktadır. Kemalist hegemonya döneminde, uluslararası hegemonik bir yapının eksikliği, Türkiye'nin dünyada ortaya çıkan güç rekabatinden uzak kalmasını sağlamış, bundan dolayı da farklı blokların varlığından yararlanan bir yol izleyebilmiştir. Sonuç olarak, silah sistemleri ve askeri eğitim farklı kaynaklardan alınmış, bazı sorunları olmasına rağmen ulusal savunma sanayii altyapısını geliştirilmiştir. Öte yandan, Türkiye liberal hegemonik yapıya entegra olduğu derecede, liberal yollarını edinmiş ve yapı içinde varolan fikirleri benimsemiştir. Sonuçta, savunma tedariki ağırlıklı olarak Amerikan sistemlerinden yana yapılmıştır. Türkiye yapısının entegrasyonu ABD'nin liderliğinde uluslararası yapının neoliberal dönüşümden sonra da sürmüş, Türkiye'nin savunma tedariki kararları yapının değişmesine rağmen Amerikan sistemlerini tercih etmeye devam etmiştir. Dolayısıyla, her ne kadar Türkiye silah sistemlerini geliştirmede ve üretmede belli derecede kabiliyetler kazanmış olsa da, en yeni teknolojilerin elde edilmesinde ABD'ye bağımlılığını devam ettirmiştir. Bu bağımlılık kendini farklı şekillerde ortaya çıkarmaktadır; mesela yerel üretimde Amerikan designlarının kopyalanması, alt sistemlerin ve komponentların Amerikan alınması ve Amerikan askeri doktrinlerinin takip edilmesi.

Fakat, bu çalışmanın temel aldığı yapılar sadece askeri yapılara ve farklı ordular arasındaki ilişkilerle kısıtlanmamıştır. Bu araştırmanın temel savı yapıların bütün bir toplumu kapsadığı ve etkilediği üzerinedir. Bir başka deyişle, “savunma” kaçınılmaz olarak “sivil”le alakalıdır ve bağlıdır. Hegemonik yapılar materyal kabiliyetlerin (yani üretim tarzı ve ondan doğan

sosyal ilişkiler), fikirler (belli bir üretim tarzının varlığı için rıza altyapısını oluşturan) ve kurumların (materyal kabiliyetleri ve fikirleri yayıp devamlılığını sağlayan) aralarındaki ilişkiden doğar. Hegemonik yapılar bu sütunların dengeye ulaşmasından doğarlar. Ve yerel yapıların bazıları genişleyerek uluslar arası hegemonik yapıya dönüşürler, ki bunlar diğer ülkelerin yapıları etkiler. Mesela, Türkiye 1920 ve 1930'lu yıllarda küresel hegemonya rekabetine girmiş olan farklı blokların fikirlerini kendi amaçları içerisinde kullanmıştır. Türkiye bu dönemde Sovyetler Birliği'nden, liberal blok – ABD, Birleşik Krallık ve Fransa – ve Faşist bloktan – Nazi Almanyası ve İtalya – ekonomisinin gelişmesi için yardım ve yatırım almıştır. 1945 yılından sonra Türkiye liberal hegemonik yapıya entegre olmuştur ve bu yapı altında uluslar arası iş bölümü dahilinde bir ekonomik gelişme politikaları uygulamış, sonradan ithal ikameci sanayileşmeye, yine yapının belirlediği koşullar altında, geçiş yapmıştır. Yukarıda belirtildiği üzere savunma tedariki bu değişikliklerle aynı çizgide ilerlemiştir.

Fakat, küresel hegemonik yapıya entegrasyon yerel hegemonik yapının birebir küreselin aynısı olmasını beraberinde getirmez. Topluluklar yaşadıkları doğal çevrenin sınırlamalarına bağlıdır ve toplumlar kendilerini bölgesel olarak tanımlarlar, ki bölgenin nasıl tanımlandığı üretim tarzı ve bundan doğan sosyal ilişkiler bağlamında farklılık gösterir. Dolayısıyla bölgesellik şehir veya devlet sınırları şeklinde tanımlanabilir. Toplulukların yaşadıkları alanlara bağlılıklarından dolayı ve doğal çevrenin kısıtlamalarından dolayı ortaya çıkan eşitsiz gelişme, toplumların farklı kültürler oluşturmasını sağlar. Öte yandan toplumların gelişmesi bir vakum içinde gerçekleşmez. Farklı topluluklar birbirleriyle etkileşim içine girerler ve bu etkileşimden dolayı birbirlerinden öğrenip, birbirlerinin bazı özelliklerini kendilerine adapte ederler. Bu da toplulukların birleşik gelişmelerine yol açar fakat birleşik gelişme topluluklarının birbirinin aynısı olması anlamına gelmez çünkü eşitsiz gelişme topluluklar arasında farklılıkları yaratır. Sonuçta, başkalarının tarzlarını alma ve onları taklit etme, topluluğun tarihsel deneyimlerine ve kültürünü göre

gerçekleşir. Sonunda eski yöntemlerle yeni yöntemlerin bir amalgamı ortaya çıkarır ki, bu da toplumların özel durumlarını ve farklılıklarını yaratır.

Her ne kadar, kapitalist üretim tarzı topluluklar arasında belli oranda benzerliği teşvik etse de, mesela endüstriyel üretim ve sermaye birikimi gibi, her topluluk farklı şekillerde kendilerine uygular. Dahası, kapitalist üretim tarzı altında belli seviyelerde farklılık küresel hegemonik blok için sermaye birikimini sağladığı derecede kabul edilebilir bir durumdur.

Dolayısıyla, toplumu kontrol mekanizmalarına da yansıyan farklı yapılar ortaya çıkar. Dahası davranışlardaki farklılıklar toplumun kültürel yönelimlerinin bir yansımasıdır ve bu savunma için de geçerlidir. 1920 ve 1930'lü yıllarda Türkiye modern sayılabilecek silahlar aldıysa da, askeri düşüncesi Birinci Dünya Savaşı askeri düşünce tarzında takılmıştı. Bu düşüncenin değişmesi ve Türkiye'nin modern savaş düşüncesine yönelmesi belli bir zaman geçmesi ve Amerikan danışmanların büyük uğraş vermesi gerekmiştir. Fakat, Amerikanlaşma bile Türk ordusunun kültüründe bazı davranışları değiştirememiştir; mesela 1960'larda ordunun alınan tüfeklerde süngü olması ısrarı, katı disiplin, hiyerarşi ve kayıplara önem vermeme gibi. Her ne kadar bu özellikler Prusya askeri kültürünün yansıması olarak tartışılabilirse de, bu davranış modelleri Prusya eğitimi almış subayların sistemin dışına çıkarılmasından (nesil değişimi) ve Amerikan askeri eğitimin ve doktrinlerinin yerleştirilmesinden sonra da devam etmiştir. Aslında bu Türkiye toplumunun kültürel modellerinin orduya yansımasıdır, ve Türkiye'nin liberal blok içinde yer alması ve modern silahların ve onlarla gelen kültüre rağmen değişmemiştir. Günümüz Türkiye'sinde bile hiyerarşi, disiplin ve biat'ı görebilmekteyiz.

Yukarıda belirtilen toplulukların aralarında farklılıkları oluşturan kaynaklar aynı zamanda küresel hegemonik yapıya meydan okuyacak ve onların yerini alacak modelleri potansiyel olarak yarabilecekken, bu potansiyelin farkına varılması ve bunun üstüne bir yapı inşa edilebilmesi yine belli bir topluluğun küresel hegemonik yapıyı ne derece içselleştirdiklerine bağlıdır.

Türkiye vakasına baktığımızda, Türkiye yapısının içsel olarak Batı'yı yakalama ve modern olma arayışı, Türkiye'nin kendi özgünlüğü üzerine yeni bir yapı inşa etmesinin önünde bir engel olmuştur. 1920 ve 1930'lu yıllarda Türkiye kendi özgünlüğü üzere belli bir yapı inşa etmeyi başarmış ve rekabet halinde olan blokların düşüncelerini içelleştirmeden dolayı özgün uçak ve silahlar üretmeyi başarmış, hatta bu üretilen silahların bazıları Avrupalı denklemlerini de geri bırakmıştır. Öte yandan, içsel bir şekilde Batı'nın Türkiye'den daha iyi olduğu inancı ve özgüven eksikliği, ki Atatürk bu durumu değiştirmek için uğraşmıştır, bir nevi ilk dönemlerdeki uçak fabrikalarının çökmesinin nedeni olmuştur. Dahası, Batı'ya dahil olma yöneliminden dolayı İkinci Dünya Savaşı'ndan sonra Türkiye liberal bloka kendi isteği ile entegre olmuştur ve bu da Türkiye'nin kendi özgünlüğünün farkına varması önünde engeller oluşturmuştur.

Genel olarak savuma politikaları, ve özelde de savunma tedariki, konularında İkinci Dünya Savaşı'ndan sonra Türkiye'nin liberal bloka entegre olması, TSK'nın belli kabiliyetleri kaybetmesiyle sonuçlanmıştır. Türkiye'nin liberal bloka ve lider ABD'ye entegrasyonu arttıkça, TSK kendi materyal ihtiyaçlarını planlamakta ve Türkiye şartlarına uygun askeri doktrinler geliştirme kabiliyetlerini kaybetmiştir. Bu araştırma TSK'nın ABD ve NATO tarafından önerilen neredeyse bütün silahları ve savunma politikalarını benimsediğini göstermektedir. Bundan dolayı, ABD, TSK'nın ihtiyaçlarını ve yapısını belirleyici rol oynamış, TSK'ya Sovyetler Birliği'ne karşı kendi belirlediği rolü vermiştir. TSK ise savuma tedarikinde bazı detaylar üzerinde ABD ile müzakare etmiştir. Kabiliyet kaybının etkileri neoliberal dönüşüm ve Soğuk Savaş'ın bitişinden sonra da devam etmiştir. Her ne kadar günümüzde Türkiye daha bağımsız bir görünüm sergilese de, stratejik kavramları, askeri doktrinleri ve güç yapısı hâlâ ABD'de üretilenleri takip etmektedir. Mesela, Türkiye, 1984 yılından beri mayın sorunuyla mücadele etmektedir. Bu soruna çözüm yaratılabileceği Otakar tarafından üretilen Kobra zırhlı araçlarıyla gösterilmiş olmasına rağmen, Mayına Dayanıklı Pusu Korunmalı (MRAP) araçların yaygın bir şekilde envantere

girmesi ancak ABD'nin bu tür araçları Irak ve Afganistan'da kullanmasından sonra olmuştur. Bu örnek aynı zamanda Türkiye'nin kendi deneyimlerinden yola çıkarak sorun gidermedeki eksikliğini göstermektedir.

Yukarıdaki belirtilenin bir devamı olarak şunu da söyleyebiliriz; küresel hegemonyik yapıya olan entegrasyon, bu yapı içindeki lider ülkenin ürettiği silah sistemlerine karşı bir yakınlık yaratmaktadır. Bir başka deyişle o ülkede üretilen sistemlerin diğerlerine kıyasla her zaman daha iyi olduğu inancı oluşur. Türkiye yapısının Amerikanlaşmasından dolayı Amerikan silahlarına karşı Türkiye bir yakınlık ve bağlılık geliştirmiştir. Fakat, Kemalist hegemonyada olduğu gibi, Türkiye yapısının herhangi bir bloka dahil olmadığı durumlarda, silah alımları bir çok farklı kaynaktan yapılmıştır. Fakat, 1920 ve 1930'lu yıllarda Türkiye'nin Alman silah sistemlerine hem yerel yapılarının benzerliğinden hem de Birinci Dünya Savaşı'ndaki silah arkadaşlığından dolayı yakınlığı olduğu tartışılabilir, Türkiye'nin diğer bloklarla olan ilişkileri ve savunma alımları bu tartışmaların tersine göstermektedir. Türkiye yapısının Amerikanlaşmasından dolayı Amerikan sistemleri Türkiye'nin öncelikli seçimi olmuştur. Bundan dolayı da Türkiye, ihtiyacı ya da askeri doktrin bağlamında bir yeri olmasa da ve/veya daha iyi sistemler alabileceği durumlarda, Amerikan sistemlerini tedarik etmekte ısrarcı olmuştur. Türkiye'nin bu ısrarcı davranışını F-104 Starfighter tedarikinde görebiliriz ve bu uçağı alan diğer ülkeler farklı uçaklarla değiştirmeye başladığında, Türkiye F-104 almaya devam etmiş ve daha iyi olan diğer uçakları geri çevirmiştir (örnek: Mirage F-1F). Amerikan sistemlerinin önceliğı Türkiye'nin kendi sistemlerini üretmeye başladığı neoliberal dönüşüm ve Soğuk Savaş sonrası da devam etmiştir. Fakat, Amerikan sistemlerinin önceliğı bu yeni dönemde form değişikliğine uğramıştır; Türkiye bir çok sistemi kendisi üretirken, bu sistemler için gerekli olan alt sistemleri ve bileşenleri Amerikan almakta ve şirketler arası işbirliğinde Amerikan şirketleri daha fazla yer almaktadır. Avrupa ülkeleri ise ABD Türkiye'nin isteklerini karşılamadığı noktada devreye girmiş ve

Türkiye'ye silah sistemleri satmışlardır, fakat bu da aslında sistem içinde bir davranıştır.

Dahası, üretim tarzı nelerin üretileceğini ve ürünün doğasını belirlemede önemlidir ve aynı durum savunma sanayi içinde geçerlidir. Fordist üretim tarzı dikey olarak entegre edilmiş büyük fabrikalarda basit ürünlerin seri üretimi üzerine kurulmuştur. Bundan dolayı da, üretimin bütün adımları belli bir fabrikada gerçekleşmektedir. Fakat, bu durum üretimin alt-yükleniciler ya da küçük ve orta ölçekli şirketler tarafından desteklenmediği anlamına gelmez. Bu üretim tarzında silah üretimi endüstriyel altyapısını olan ülkelerde gerçekleşmiş ve diğer ülkelerde bu merkez ülkelerden silahlarını almak zorunda kalmışlardır. Dahası, Fordist üretim tarzının, belli bir silah sisteminin üretimini farklı coğrafi bölgelere yayma gibi bir yönelimi de bulunmamaktadır. Bundan dolayı da, her ne kadar bazı silah sistemleri farklı ülkelerde üretilmiş olsa da, üretimin bütün aşamaları tek bir coğrafyada gerçekleşmiştir. Fordist üretim tarzında farklı coğrafyalarda aynı ürünün üretilmesi, ortak üretimden daha çok, lisans altında üretimle sınırlıdır. Öte yandan, üretimi farklı bölgelere yayan ve alt-yüklenicilere dayanan post-Fordist üretim tarzı silah sistem üretiminde farklı ülkelerin üretim aşamasının farklı noktalarında üretime dahil olmalarını sağlamış, bu esneklikten dolayı da üretimde ortak çalışma ve ortak ürün geliştirme daha verimli hale gelmiştir. Dolayısıyla, yeni neoliberal yapının içinde yer alanlar için bu durum bir fırsat yaratmıştır. Türkiye bu yeni dönemde hem Amerikan hem de Avrupa şirketleri tarafından savunma sanayiisine yatırım çekebilmiş ve bunun bir yansıması olarak Amerikan ve Avrupa silah üretim süreçlerinin bir parçası haline gelmiştir ki bu da yeni bir bağımlılık formu yaratmıştır. Öte yandan, üretimin dağılması farklı ülkeler arasında da işbirliği olanaklarını da ortaya çıkarmıştır ve bunun bir yansıması olarak Türkiye, İsrail, Güney Kore, Rusya ve Çin gibi ülkelerle savunma alanında işbirliklerine gitmiştir. Fakat, önceden belirtildiği üzere, Türkiye'nin Amerikan sistemlerine yöneliminde fazla bir değişiklik olmamıştır. Türkiye, tek başına üretilmediği ya da teknolojik olarak eksiklikleri olduğu alanlarda öncelikli olarak Amerika'dan sistemleri almak istemektedir ve İsrail ve Güney

Kore ile yaptığının işbirlikleri arkasında yatan bir neden de bu gösterilebilir, çünkü bu iki ülke Amerika ile yüksek işbirliği bulunmaktadır. Dahası, post-Fordist üretim tarzı, üretilen silah sistemlerinin yerli üretim olarak resmedilmesine olanak sağlamıştır, bu da silah sistemlerinin milliyetçilik ve toplumsal gururla birleştirildiği noktada yerel hegemonyanın kontrol mekanizmalarından biri haline gelmesini sağlamıştır.

Yukarıda belirtildiği üzere, savunma tedarikinde belli tarihsel dönemlerde farklı faktörler devreye girmektedir çünkü yapının dayandığı fikirler değişmektedir. Kemalist hegemonya sırasında hem ekonomik hem de savunma bağlamında bağımsızlık hegemonyanın dayandığı temel düşüncelerden biriydi. Bundan dolayı da savunma tedariki ve savunma endüstri politikaları savunma sanayii oluşturulması ve onu destekleyecek endüstrilerin geliştirilmesi yönündeydi, ve bu amaca ulaşılincaya kadar geçecek sürede ara çözüm silahlar farklı kaynaklardan alınmıştır. Türkiye yapısının Amerikanlaşmasını takiben, Türkiye'nin "Sovyet tehlikesinden" korunması ortaya çıkarılmış ve bu bağlamda Türkiye'nin ABD ve NATO'ya ihtiyacı olduğuna dair bir inanış ortaya çıkmıştır. Liberal yapı içinde kendi savunma sanayii altyapısına sahip endüstriyel bir Türkiye gerekli görülmediğinden, 1950'li yıllarda ekonomik gelişmede tamsal alana ağırlık verilmiş, bu yaklaşım belli sorunlar yaşamaya başlayınca ithal ikameci endüstriyeleşmeye geçilmiştir fakat Cumhuriyet'in ilk yıllarında oluşturulan savunma sanayii altyapısı ortadan kalkmıştır. Soğuk Savaş döneminde dış ilişkiler savunma tedarikinde önemli bir faktör olarak öne çıkmış, ve bu bağlamda Türkiye savunma tedarikini liberal blok içinden yapmıştır. Neoliberal dönüşümde ise endüstri içi ilişkiler önem kazanmış ve ihracatın önemi artmıştır. Bundan dolayı, ürünlerin ihrac edilebilirliği savunma tedariki kararlarında önemli bir faktör olmaya başlamıştır. Aynı zamanda, post-Fordist üretim ve Soğuk Savaş'ın sona ermesi, dış ilişkilerin savunma tedariki üzerinde etkisini azaltmış, her ne kadar iki ülke arasında sorunlar yaşansa da, bu iki ülke aynı blok içinde yer aldıkları sürece şirketler yaşanan sorunların etrafından dolaşarak ortaklıklarına devam etmişlerdir. Mesela,

Türkiye ve İsrail arasındaki ilişkilerin gerginleştiği dönemlerde BMC firması İsrail Hatehof firmasından lisans alarak Kirpi MRAP üretilip, TSK'ya satmıştır.

Sonuç olarak, sınıf çatışması tarafından değişime uğrayan hegemonik yapılar ülkelerin savunma tedariki kararlarını alabilecekleri çerçeveyi belirlerler. Her ne kadar savunma tedariki karar ve ihtiyaç belirleme mekanizmaları önemli olsa da, sonuç yapının dayandığı baskın düşüncelerle uyumlu olacaktır. Sonuçta, her tarihsel an, kendine ait belli kontrol ve bağımlılık mekanizmalarını içerir.

APPENDIX F — TEZ FOTOKOPİSİ İZİN FORMU

ENSTİTÜ

Fen Bilimleri Enstitüsü

Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü

Uygulamalı Matematik Enstitüsü

Enformatik Enstitüsü

Deniz Bilimleri Enstitüsü

YAZARIN

Soyadı : Kurç

Adı : Çağlar

Bölümü : Uluslararası İlişkiler

TEZİN ADI (İngilizce) : Critical Approach to Turkey's Defense Procurement Behavior: 1923-2013

TEZİN TÜRÜ : Yüksek Lisans Doktora

1. Tezimin tamamından kaynak gösterilmek şartıyla fotokopi alınabilir.

2. Tezimin içindekiler sayfası, özet, indeks sayfalarından ve/veya bir bölümünden kaynak gösterilmek şartıyla fotokopi alınabilir.

3. Tezimden bir (1) yıl süreyle fotokopi alınamaz.

TEZİN KÜTÜPHANEYE TESLİM TARİHİ: