

PERCEPTION OF HOMELAND AMONG CRIMEAN TATAR  
DIASPORA LIVING IN TURKEY AS REFLECTED ON THE  
DIASPORA JOURNAL EMEL

A THESIS SUBMITTED TO  
THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES  
OF  
MIDDLE EAST TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY

BY

FEYZA TOPRAK

IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS  
FOR  
THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF SCIENCE  
IN THE DEPARTMENT OF EURAISAN STUDIES

SEPTEMBER 2013

Approval of the Graduate School of Social Sciences

---

Prof. Dr. Meliha Altunışık  
Director

I certify that this thesis satisfies all the requirements as a thesis for the degree of Master of Science.

---

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Pınar Akçalı)  
Head of Department

This is to certify that we have read this thesis and that in our opinion it is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Science.

---

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Ayşegül Aydıngün  
Supervisor

**Examining Committee Members**

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Pınar Akçalı (METU, POLS) \_\_\_\_\_

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Ayşegül Aydıngün (METU, SOC) \_\_\_\_\_

Prof. Dr. Ismail Aydıngün (BAŞKENT, PSIR) \_\_\_\_\_

**I hereby declare that all information in this document has been obtained and presented in accordance with academic rules and ethical conduct. I also declare that, as required by these rules and conduct, I have fully cited and referenced all material and results that are not original to this work.**

Name, Last name: Feyza TOPRAK

Signature :

## ABSTRACT

### PERCEPTION OF HOMELAND AMONG CRIMEAN TATAR DIASPORA LIVING IN TURKEY AS REFLECTED ON THE DIASPORA JOURNAL *EMEL*

Toprak, Feyza

M.S., Department of Eurasian Studies

Supervisor: Assoc. Prof. Dr. Ayşegül Aydingün

September 2013, 140 pages

This study concentrates on the changing discourses on homeland in the Crimean Tatar diaspora journal *Emel*. The research is carried out on the basis of articles and poems published by the diaspora intellectuals, authors, and poets, namely diaspora activists. The historical context, which is the reference point for these discourses, covers the period between the years 1960 and 1994 during which, as deemed *Emel* accomplished its primary mission attributed. Moreover, the study explores how the diaspora elite constructed their national identity in three and a half decade by using the term homeland and the national sentiments attached to it. This study also focuses on other discursive elements than homeland utilized in *Emel* to forge a distinct national identity among Crimean Tatar diaspora living in

Turkey. It also determines the continuities and ruptures in the themes used by the diaspora elite groups to reconstruct their transnational identities. In addition, the study analyses how the identity consciousness that occurred in the diaspora community turned out to be diaspora nationalism in these thirty four years.

**Key Words:** *Emel* Journal, Crimean Tatars, Diaspora, Nationalism, Homeland.

## ÖZ

### KIRIM TATARLARININ DİYASPORA DERGİSİ *EMEL* 'DE TÜRKİYE'DEKİ KIRIM TATARLARININ ANA VATAN ALGISI

Toprak, Feyza

Yüksel Lisans, Avrasya Çalışmaları Bölümü

Tez Yöneticisi: Doç. Dr. Ayşegül Aydıngün

Eylül 2013, 140 sayfa

Bu çalışma Türkiye'de yaşayan Kırım Tatarları'nın diaspora dergisi *Emel*'i inceleyerek diaspora eliti tarafından yazılan ve yayınlanan makale ve şiirleri temel alarak yıllar içinde değişen anavatan söylemine odaklanmaktadır. Çalışmanın çerçevesini oluşturan tarihi dönem, *Emel*'in Türkiye de ilk defa yayınlandığı tarih olan 1960 yılından başlatılmakta, derginin kendisine atfedilen görevi tamamlandığı düşünülen bir döneme karşılık gelen 1994 yılına kadar sürdürülmektedir. Çalışma aynı zamanda otuz dört yıl içerisinde diaspora elitinin anavatan kavramı ve buna bağlı milli duyguları mobilize ederek gerçekleştirdiği ulusal kimlik inşası sürecini incelemektedir. Çalışmada, son olarak, *Emel* dergisinde (Türk kimliğinden) bağımsız bir ulusal kimlik oluşturmada kullanılan diğer söylem alanlarına da odaklanılmaktadır. Ulus aşırı kimliğin tekrar inşası için kullanılan

söylem devamlılıklarının ve kesintilerinin belirlenmesi ise analizin önemli bir parçasını teşkil etmektedir. Bununla birlikte çalışma, ‘kimlik farkındalığının’ otuz dört yılda diaspora milliyetçiliğine dönüşüme hikayesini çözümlenmektedir.

**Anahtar Kelimeler:** *Emel* Dergisi, Kırım Tatarları, Diaspora, Milliyetçilik, Anavatan.

To My Parents



## ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to express my deepest gratitude to Assoc. Prof. Dr. Ayşegül Aydıngün, my thesis supervisor, for her advice, guidance, constructive criticism, encouragement and insight throughout the entire work of my thesis. It was an ineffable experience to work with her. I am grateful for her endless patience and understanding. My special thanks go to other committee members, Assoc. Prof. Dr. Pınar Akçalı, who provided me with basic theoretical considerations and Prof. Dr. İsmail Aydıngün from Başkent University who contributed markedly to this study with his suggestions and comments.

I am especially grateful to the members of the Association of Culture and Solidarity of Crimean Turks for providing me with guidance and support. I also recognize Assoc. Prof. Dr. Hakan Kırımlı from Bilkent University who helped me insight into the content of this study. Without his help, I would not perceive the peculiarities of the Crimean Tatar diaspora living in Turkey. I would also like to thank Prof. Zühal Yüksel from Gazi University for her support. I would like to acknowledge Zafer Karatay from TRT, Tuncer Kalkay and Mükremin Şahin from the Association of Culture and Solidarity of Crimea for their invaluable contribution. By their help I experienced the discovery of invaluable facts about the *Emel* movement. In addition, I really appreciate the assistance given by Safiye Olgun. Without her support, I would not obtain the journal issues.

A heart-felt thank goes to Ayşem Karadağ Ötkür for diligently proof-reading the drafts.

Finally, I am quite thankful to my family, Nuran, Cevad, Eymen, Şeyma Toprak for their existence and spiritual support.

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

PLAGIARISM .....	iii
ABSTRACT .....	iv
ÖZ .....	v
DEDICATION .....	vi
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS .....	vii
<b>CHAPTER</b>	
<b>1. INTRODUCTION .....</b>	<b>1</b>
1.1 Introducing the Study .....	1
1.1.1 A Contextual Overview of the Crimean Tatar Diaspora in Turkey 1	
1.1.2 Background and Review on <i>Emel</i> .....	6
1.2 Methodology .....	11
1.3 Organization of the Thesis .....	13
<b>2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: CONSTRUCTION OF A NATIONAL IDENTITY IN DIASPORA .....</b>	<b>16</b>
2.1 Different Theoretical Approaches to Ethnic/National Identity .....	16
2.2 Diaspora, Transnationalism and Hybrid Identities .....	28
2.3 Homeland and Diaspora Nationalism .....	36
<b>3. THE HISTORY OF CRIMEAN TATARS AND THE ROLE OF HISTORY IN SHAPING THE NATIONAL IDENTITY AMONG THE DIASPORA MEMBERS.....</b>	<b>42</b>
3.1 Crimean Tatars from Ancient Times Till the End of the Golden Horde .....	42
3.2 Crimean Khanate .....	45
3.2.1 Historical Dynamics of the Crimean Khanate and Ottoman Empire Relations Up Until Russian Annexation and its Reflections.....	45
3.2.2 Discussions on “Sovereignty” of the Khanate .....	49

3.2.3 The Commonly Shared Acquisitions in Social Life .....	52
3.3 The Period of Russian Annexation to the Crimean Khanate and Migrations to Ottoman Land .....	53
3.3.1 Patterns of Emigration .....	55
3.3.2 The Circumstances Waiting for the Migrants .....	59
3.3.3 Emergence of Diaspora Nationalism and Identity at the Edge of the Ottoman Empire.....	61
3.4 Deportation of the Crimean Tatars from Homeland in 1944 .....	68
<b>4. A COMPREHENSIVE ANALYSIS OF A DIASPORA</b>	
<b>JOURNAL <i>EMEL</i> .....</b>	<b>74</b>
4.1 Thematic Evaluation in <i>Emel</i> between the 1960 and 1983 .....	81
4.1.1 Contradictions in Articulation of National Identity Up to 1983 ...	92
4.2 Thematic Evaluation and Changing Discourse of the Publications in <i>Emel</i> after 1980 .....	.98
4.3 An Overall Examination of the Changing Discourse in Diaspora Nationalism in the Literary Works .....	111
<b>5. CONCLUSION.....</b>	<b>117</b>
<b>REFERENCES.....</b>	<b>124</b>
<b>APPENDICES</b>	
<b>A. TEZ FOTOKOPİSİ İZİN FORMU .....</b>	<b>138</b>



## CHAPTER 1

### INTRODUCTION

#### 1.1 Introducing the Study

Conducting a research on *Emel*, a single path diaspora journal, can be likened to going on a trip to a realm of inner discussions, outer debates, and deep insight that shape the communal change and evolution of that diaspora community. It helps form invaluable facts, which would otherwise be difficult to obtain.

##### 1.1.1 A Contextual Overview of the Crimean Tatar Diaspora in Turkey

According to unofficial estimates, there are three to five million Crimean Tatars or Tatar descent citizens living in Turkey.<sup>1</sup> Most ancestors of the diaspora are migrants who migrated from Crimean Peninsula to the Ottoman Empire after the Treaty of Jassy (1872). Considering the Russian Ottoman border, Crimea was the *dar al Islam* of the Ottoman Empire, i.e., adobe of Islam, which changed into *dar al harb*, or adobe of war, throughout time. At this point, it is noteworthy that ‘Islam’ in Crimean Tatar history has a determinant role in the development of Crimean Tatar identity before modernization.

Following the time when the Ottoman Empire had no other chance than but recognize the Russian authority over Crimean peninsula by the Treaty of Jassy, the first mass immigration from the peninsula to the Ottoman Empire

---

<sup>1</sup> Williams, Brian Glyn (2001). *The Crimean Tatars*. Leiden: Koninklijke Brill NV, p. 227.

occurred by the 60.000 immigrants.<sup>2</sup> Nonetheless, the year 1860 was notable in terms of numbers. Some 200.000 Crimean Tatars left the peninsula and came to the Ottoman Land under difficult conditions. It was estimated that the number of Crimean Tatars who immigrated to the Ottoman lands between 1783 and 1922 was about 1.800.000.<sup>3</sup> According to another estimate, during the first decade of the Russian Rule, nearly 75 % of the Crimean Tatars emigrated from Crimea to the Ottoman lands. Even *Giray* Dynasty, the ruling elite of the Crimean Khanate, emigrated in that period.<sup>4</sup>

In the 19<sup>th</sup> century, the number of Crimean Tatars who left Crimea to come to other Ottoman regions far exceeded the number of those who stayed.<sup>5</sup> This was important because it directly affected the sense of territory appropriation; those who stayed in Crimea perceived themselves as the potential emigrants.<sup>6</sup> Since the Crimean Tatars who did not migrate to Ottoman lands is out of scope of the study, the present study does not dwell on their national and homeland perceptions. However, it is important to note their feeling of being temporary residents on their own lands ended up in their incapability of resisting the 1944 deportation. Hakan Kırımli asserts that it was one of the most important factors which hampered the development of territory defined nationhood among the Crimean Tatars.<sup>7</sup> Obviously, the behavioral pattern of Crimean Tatars who chose to migrate to safer Ottoman lands as well had been adversely affected by this attitude; their national identity in the modern sense lagged behind that of being Muslim Ottomans and citizens of Republic of Turkey for a long time.

Today, the main branch of the Crimean Tatar diaspora lives in Turkey, particularly in İstanbul, Ankara, Eskişehir, Konya, Çorum, Bursa, Kütahya,

---

<sup>2</sup> Allworth, Edward. (1998). *The Tatars of Crimea: Return to the Homeland: Studies and Documents*. Durham: Duke University Press, p. 228.

<sup>3</sup> Kırımli, Hakan (1996). *National Movements and National Identity Among the Crimean Tatars, 1905-1916*. New York: E.J. Brill Leiden, p. 7.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 127

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 7

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 8

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 8

Tekirdağ, Adana, and Balıkesir.<sup>8</sup> The thesis focuses on how homeland was perceived and treated by Crimean Tatars in *Emel* circles, looking into *Emel* published between 1960- 1994. I leave off the period at the 1994 because, as mentioned by Hakan Kırmırlı during the interview, in the mentioned years *Emel* completed its mission that was attributed to it, when this elite movement spread towards grass roots.<sup>9</sup> Evidence comes from the number of diaspora organizations that increased from two to thirties between the early 1950s and 1990s.<sup>10</sup> The publication of the magazine ceased between 1998 and 2009. Since the editions up to 1994 provided adequate ground to the identity consciousness of the diaspora community turned out to be diaspora nationalism, the publications of *Emel* after 1994 was not included in the specific analysis placed in the fourth chapter of the study.

*Emel*, as a diaspora journal and a tool of diaspora nationalism, which is the departure point of this thesis, was not the sole and the first attempt at awakening diaspora consciousness. The first diaspora organization is known to have been established in 1908 in Istanbul by the 19<sup>th</sup> century migrants with the name of *Tatar Charitable Society (Tatar Cemiyet-i Hayriyesi)*, which represented a sub-ethnic group in the Ottoman Empire rather than a Crimean Tatar society per se.<sup>11</sup> Not surprisingly the society could not define a distinct ‘Crimean Tatar’ identity. They aimed to keep the cultural consciousness limited by the traditional Muslim folk culture of the Crimea. They also aimed to uphold the religious and ethnic character of brothers who had been living in the Ottoman Empire, showing little interest in the territory of the Crimea.<sup>12</sup> The *Tatar Charitable Society* published two diaspora journals. Both were published in Istanbul, ‘Venus’ (*Çolpan*) in 1909, and ‘first born child’ (*Tonguç*) in 1910. They were not too different from an ordinary Ottoman newspaper, except for the minor touches on the

---

<sup>8</sup> Andrews, Peter Alford. (1989). *Ethnic Groups in the Republic of Turkey*. Wiesbaden: Ludwig Reichert, p. 308.

<sup>9</sup> In-depth interview with Hakan Kırmırlı May 2011, Ankara

<sup>10</sup> In-depth interview with Hakan Kırmırlı May 2011, Ankara

<sup>11</sup> Kırmırlı, 1996, p. 162

<sup>12</sup> Kırmırlı, Cafer Seydahmet (1993). “Bazı Hatıralar”. *Emel*. (6), p. 58.

Crimean Tatar immigrants and Muslims in Russia.<sup>13</sup> Both *Tonguç* and *Çolpan* emphasized *Tatarness* in their issues especially by referring to the dialect and folkways of the Crimean Tatar immigrants instead of making a territorial definition. Nonetheless, neither of them mentioned the ‘all-Turkic scheme’.<sup>14</sup>

The 1908 Revolution triggered new ideas among Ottoman intellectual circles, varying from Westernism, Islamism, and Ottomanism to Turkish, and other nationalisms.<sup>15</sup> Under the new circumstances the Tatar Charitable Society was far from providing solutions to Crimean youth in Istanbul. Since they were largely influenced by the Young Turks, they shared the revolutionary and nationalist spirit and founded the Society of Crimean Students (*Kırım Talebe Cemiyeti*) in 1909.<sup>16</sup>

In 1909, after the Society of Crimean Students, the Crimean Tatar nationalist students established an illegal organization, the Fatherland Society (*Vatan Cemiyeti*).<sup>17</sup> It has a particular importance for this study because one of the prominent leaders of the society, Cafer Seydahmet, is also the founder of *Emel*. They aimed at ‘liberation’ of their ‘nation’ Crimea.<sup>18</sup> By proclaiming self determination, Cafer Seydahmet and Çelebi Cihan (the other founders of fatherland society) became the leaders of the Crimeans living both in homeland and in Turkey. In this endeavor they gathered several young intellectuals such as Müstecip Ülküsal, who would be the second prominent name for *Emel*, around their movement from the diaspora.<sup>19</sup>

---

<sup>13</sup> Kırmımlı, 1996, p.164

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 164

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 143

<sup>16</sup> Kırmımer, 1993, p. 58

Society of Crimean Students collaborated with students from Volga-Ural region. In 1912, both were united under the same umbrella named Association of Students from Russia (*Rusyalı Talebe Cemiyeti*). Hatif, Osman Kemal (1998). *Gökbayrak Altında Milli Faaliyet: 1917 Kırım Tatar Milli İstiklal Hareketinin Hikayesi*. Hakan Kırmımlı (eds). Ankara: Kırım Türkleri Kültür ve Yardımlaşma Derneği Genel Merkezi Yayınları, p. 11.

<sup>17</sup> Kırmımer, 1993, p. 59

<sup>18</sup> Kırmımlı, 1996, p. 169

<sup>19</sup> Ülküsal, Müstecip (1999). *Müstecip Ülküsal: Kırım Yolunda Bir Ömür (Hatıralar)*. Ankara: Kırım Türkleri Kültür ve Yardımlaşma Derneği Genel Merkezi, p. 74-80.



The second organization was established by diaspora intellectuals again in İstanbul in 1918. It was named Crimeans' Charitable Society (*Kırımlılar Cemiyet-i Hayriyesi*.)<sup>20</sup> Their bimonthly Crimean Journal (*Kırım Mecmuası*) was devoted to the Crimean Tatar national movement. As Edige Kırimal stated in *Emel*, it was published by the Crimean Turks living in Turkey in order to support even fight for the interests of the newly founded Crimean Republic (1917), and all "Crimean Turks"<sup>21</sup> were forced to live outside of Crimea.<sup>22</sup> As they had shared values and spirit, some shortened versions of Kırimal articles were publicized in *Emel*.

Another diaspora organization and publication was *Promethee*. It was established by the diaspora members living in İstanbul, Warsaw, Paris, and Berlin. It was an organization whose members had had common political and personal bounds ever since 1917.<sup>23</sup> Their émigré serials were issued in Turkey and Europe during 1920s. With the Polish financial backing, eligible authors and close contacts with the homeland, it had a special place among the other publications of the emigrants.<sup>24</sup>

The diaspora intellectual movement that began in 1910s decreasingly continued in 1920s. After 1920s, the political climate of Turkey gradually evolved into anti-communist Turkish nationalist fractions. In line with that, only the publications that promote nationalist policies of the newly founded Turkish government were permitted.<sup>25</sup> 'Turkish' national identity came to fore, suppressing articulation of 'Tatarness' and confining it to a cultural identification up to 1980s. Following the restrictions on the publications implemented by the 1931, 1932 and 1938 Laws, associations were rendered

---

<sup>20</sup> Kırimer, Cafer, Seydahmet (1993). "Bazı Hatıralar". İstanbul: Emel Vakfı, p. 312.

<sup>21</sup> As it will be explained in detail in the following chapters, Crimean Tatars defined themselves as Crimean Turks in *Emel* up to the 1980s.

<sup>22</sup> Kırimal, Edige (1961). "Kırım Türklerinin Milli Basını" *Emel*. (6), p. 5.

<sup>23</sup> Copeaux, Etienne (1997). "Prometeci Hareket." In Semih Vaner (eds.) *Unutkan Tarih: Sovyet Sonrası Türkdilli Alan*. İstanbul: Metis Yayınları, p. 20.

<sup>24</sup> Bezanis, Lowell (1994). "Soviet Muslim Emigrés in the Republic of Turkey". London: *Central Asian Survey*, 13 (1), p. 59-180, p. 70.

<sup>25</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 77

unable to broadcast and distribute diaspora journals.<sup>26</sup> They were categorized in the separatist activity by the eyes of new nation, so most of the nationalists continued their activities in adjacent territories.

### 1.1.2 Background and Review on *Emel*

*Emel* was first published in January 1<sup>st</sup> 1930 in Pazarçık, *Dobruca* by the leadership of Cafer Seydahmet for a period of 5 years (*Dobruca* were in the territories of Romania before it was incorporated in Bulgaria). Initially, it represented Turkish nationalism in the sense of Pan Turkism, which mainly sought the rights and the living conditions of the Crimean Tatars in *Dobruca*. However, Cafer Seydahmet made it an official organ of ‘Crimean Tatar national cause’.<sup>27</sup> Then, it moved to Constanza, where Müstecip Ülküsal was in charge of directing the Constanza branch of *Promethee*.<sup>28</sup> Up to the World War II, together with Müstecip Ülküsal, Cafer Seydahmet was in charge of the publication. *Emel* ceased its publication in 1941, when Romania was invaded by Hitler and Müstecip Ülküsal moved to İstanbul.

When he came to Turkey, the conditions were more moderate than those of single party rule the diaspora to organize their activities and perform publications, in a very limited scope as they are. The Federation of Turkish Immigrant and Refugee Associations (*Türk Göçmen ve Mülteci Dernekleri Federasyonu*) was founded in 1954. The Crimean Turk Culture Association (*Kırım Türk Kültür Derneği*), which is established by a group of Crimean Tatars, including Şefika Gaspıralı (İsmail Gaspıralı’s<sup>29</sup> daughter), cooperated with this federation.<sup>30</sup>

---

<sup>26</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 75

<sup>27</sup> *Emel*, 1960 (1), p. 4.

<sup>28</sup> Akiş, Ali (1996). “Türk Dünyasının Üç Büyük Kaybı: Sadık Ahmet, İsa Yusuf Alptekin ve Müstecip Ülküsal”. *Kırım*, 14(2), p. 1

<sup>29</sup> He was one of the first Muslim intellectuals in the Russian Empire, who articulated the need for education and cultural reform in Turkic and Islamic world and worked for modernization of those communities.

<sup>30</sup> In-depth interview with Hakan Kırımlı May 2011, Ankara

The second diaspora organization after the single part rule of the Republic of Turkey, ‘Aid Society of Crimean Turks’ (*Kırım Türkleri Yardımlaşma Cemiyeti*), was founded by Müstecip Ülküsal in 1954. Cafer Seydahmet, who was aged with poor health, entrusted his place to Müstecip Ülküsal in 1955. It made him the natural leader for the national cause of Crimean Tatar diaspora in Turkey. He started to republish *Emel* in 1960.<sup>31</sup>

The first eleven issues of the second *Emel* were published in Ankara, by Mahmut Oktay (1912 İstanbul-1974 Ankara); Halil Beşev (1896 Crimean-1973 Ankara), and Niyazi Kırıman (who financed the journal, 1911 Bulgaria-1967 Ankara) with the contribution of the national center<sup>32</sup> in İstanbul.<sup>33</sup> Then, it was transferred to İstanbul, and owned by İsmail Otar. The editorials of *Emel* were drawn by Müstecip Ülküsal up to 1983. Among the other prominent authors of the journal were M. Altan, N. Ağat, A. Soysal, A. Aktaş, and S.Taygan.<sup>34</sup>

The other members of the 1960 *Emel* cadre were Yusuf Uralgiray, Edige Kırimal, Emin and Şevki Bektöre, İsmail and İbrahim Otar, and, Ali Kemal Gökğiray, Sabri Arıkan, Nurettin Mahir Altuğ.<sup>35</sup> Emin Bektöre, in the meantime, established the Association for Aid Culture and Folklore of Crimean Turks in Eskisehir (*Kırım Türk Kültür, Folklor ve Yardımlaşma Derneği*). Due to the convergent nature of the diaspora movement, all associations and the journal were shaped and directed by almost the same cadre and followed the same path, and *Emel* became the symbol of diaspora national activism throughout a period of approximately 40 years.

---

<sup>31</sup> In-depth interview with Hakan Kırımlı May 2011, Ankara

<sup>32</sup> Cafer Seydahmet founded “Crimean Tatar National Center” in 1950s as a national organization of the Crimean Tatars in diaspora. Ülküsal, Müstecip (1980). *Kırım Türk-Tatarları (Dünü-Bugünü-Yarını)*. İstanbul: Baha Matbaası, p. 323.

<sup>33</sup> *Emel*, 1978, (109), p. 5.

<sup>34</sup> The names are written in the abbreviated form just as they appear on the cover page of the *Emel* up to the mid 1980s.

<sup>35</sup> In-depth interview with Zafer Karatay, Ankara August 2011 and Mükremin Şahin, Ankara February 2011.

The second *Emel* (i.e., the version published after 1960) characterized itself as the continuation of the first *Emel* published in *Dobruca*.<sup>36</sup> However, in every editorial of the journal, Müstecip Ülküsal repeatedly underlined that they aim to contribute to independence of all Turkic peoples, not only Crimean Tatars. The second *Emel* was pan-Turkist at first. While the second was an intellectual and cultural journal, the first *Emel* was a political, economic and literary one. It aimed to foster historical, cultural, scholarly articles and poems. The historical and cultural symbols, such as homeland, national heroes, anthem and flag were systematically used. In addition to these translations of *samizdat* meaning, some underground Soviet opponent publications, were given place to inform the diaspora community about the condition of the exiled brothers. News of the dissenter public demonstrations were circulated and petitions for returning homeland were signed. Religious ceremonies and public conferences constituted another thread of these activities. Captive Turks, memorial of 1944 deportation, cruelty of Soviet Russia were among the issues repeatedly handled.

*Emel* has two primary purposes, both of which are reflected effectively by the journal organization. First, it uses the language of history of the Crimean Tatars ever since they appeared in Crimea until today. The journal has offered several series of narratives regarding the Crimean Tatar history and Crimea as homeland including their political, economic and cultural life in homeland. Second, the main theme handled in the journal was evidence of a distinct Crimean Tatar identity. This part was problematic in discourse and in use of language due to some limitations stemming from the political constraints pushed up by Turkish national identity, which will later be discussed in the study. In terms of the rhetoric used by the journal to define identity, certain expressions evolved over time.

According to Yasemin Soysal, diasporas are “tightly bounded communities and solidarities between places of origin and arrival.”<sup>37</sup> She stresses the

---

<sup>36</sup> *Emel* 1960, (1), p. 3.

<sup>37</sup> Soysal, Yasemin Nuhoglu (2000). “Citizenship and Identity: Living in Diasporas in Post-War Europe?”. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*. 23(1), p. 3.

common ethnic and cultural references that lead to an exclusive identity and ethnic otherness. Indeed, in the eyes of the diasporean community, host land can only be perceived as an extensional place bounded up with the homeland. Therefore, diasporas assume they live within a national territory in a deterritorialized place.<sup>38</sup> However, the question is how the national territory can be shaped. The famous work of Benedict Anderson 'Imagined Communities' (1991) provides an answer to this. As cited in Chatterjee, he says the nation is an imagined community as the members of the community cannot recognize all members of the society. This concept of nation is enhanced by some technological tools and institutions. For example, the printing technology (print capitalism) leads to an industry that makes the national literature, newspapers and novels widespread. In other words, the newly emerging institutions and technologies make the imagination of the society a social reality.<sup>39</sup>

Benedict Anderson's sense of imagined communities, i.e., materializing a nation in the minds of people, is a matter of construction of collective national memory, which is promoted through historically, culturally and politically orchestrated landscapes and local spaces.<sup>40</sup> Thus, as Hall claimed, 'national identity' becomes a system of cultural representation. A nation is a symbolic community 'which accounts for its power to generate a sense of identity and allegiance'.<sup>41</sup> It suggests that national identity is constructed by using the facilities expressed by Anderson's 'print capitalism' (which convince people to believe that they are part of a national community, and connect the members of that nation with each other). *Emel* intended to not only carry out publication activities but also run a movement within the context of diaspora. Initially, however, it only attempted at providing socio-

---

<sup>38</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 3

<sup>39</sup> Chatterjee, Partha (1986). *Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World*. London: Zed Books Limited, p. 3.

<sup>40</sup> Hedetoft, Ulf (2004). "Discourses and Images of Belonging: Migrants Between New Racism, Liberal Nationalism and Globalism", in Flemming Christiansen and Ulf Hedetoft (eds.), *The Politics of Multiple Belonging: Ethnicity and Nationalism in Europe and East Asia*. Burlington: Ashgate Pub., p. 3-43.

<sup>41</sup> Hall, Stuart (1992). "The Question of Cultural Identity", in Stuart Hall; David Held and Tony McGrew (eds.), *Modernity and Its Futures*. London: Polity Press, p. 292.

cultural transformation and promoting homeland consciousness to keep national identity alive in diaspora.

This study analyzes how, due to the historical causes, discourse of self image and perception of homeland has evolved among Crimean Tatars, but in each possible instance it is used as a tool to construct the Tatar national identity. The self image of the Crimean Tatar diaspora emerges as a kin group/brothers of Turks, yet it has a distinct identity, which is conveyed by the *Emel*. A series of analysis of poems and narratives of the journal revealed a theme varying from being a ‘Crimean Turk’ which refers to the members of the same ethnic group sharing the same homeland to ‘Crimean Tatar’ who has brotherhood link with the Turks referring to Turkish citizens with Tatar origin and different historical homeland. The statement of ‘we are brothers, we have lived together but we are still different’ was quite dominant in the discourse from the beginning up to late 1980s. The reason why similarities were emphasized between 1960 and 1985 will be elaborated in second and third chapters of the thesis. We witness that messages on distinctness were used commonly after 1990s.

According to Shain, diaspora is comprised of people who share a common national origin and who regard themselves, or regarded by others, as “members or potential members of their country of actual or claimed origin.”<sup>42</sup> In backward reading, he reveals the importance of promotion of the territorial homeland for the physical embodiment of the diaspora community by saying that “their identity-based motivation should therefore be an integral part of the constructivist effort to explain the construction of national identities.”<sup>43</sup>

---

<sup>42</sup> Shain, Yossi (Winter 1994-1995). “Ethnic Diasporas and US Foreign Policy”. *Political Science Quarterly*. 109(5), p. 813.

<sup>43</sup> Shain, Yossi and Barth, Aharon (2003). “Diasporas and International Relations Theory” *International Organization*. 57(3), p. 451.

The working hypothesis is that ‘homeland’ is perceived and presented, by *Emel* circles, as a concept that facilitates the construction of a national identity among Crimean Tatar diaspora. The publication policy of the single path diaspora journal *Emel* has an identity-based motivation in the period which is the focus of the study. It aims to construct a national identity in Crimean Tatar diaspora living in Turkey. The treatment of ‘homeland’ as a marker of national identity constitutes an integral part of *Emel*. For this reason, in every instance themes regarding ‘homeland consciousness’ and ‘national imagination’ are revitalized to build a distinct national identity. Secondly, the study hypothesizes that the discourse changes parallel with the changing political conditions of country where diaspora live. The study demonstrates how the content and style of the discourse on homeland was reproduced over time with different but parallel effects in the changing political circumstances.

## **1.2 Methodology**

In this thesis, fundamental literature on diaspora, diaspora nationalism and national identity is reviewed. The historical literature of Crimean Tatars and Relations with the Ottoman Empire are analyzed to understand the dual identity dilemma (contradiction) of Crimean Tatar diaspora in contemporary Turkey. The qualitative research methods are used within the framework of documentary research.

The main method used for the interpretation of publication is thematic inquiry and discourse analysis. Discourse analysis is used for practical purposes; it effectively depicts the ways of articulation of ideologies in a certain period. The other is thematic inquiry which shows discursive strategies that were used by the *Emel* to define a distinct Crimean Tatar identity. The Tatar identity vis a vis the Turkish national identity was important for the route of the study because of its capacity to yield another dimension, which restricts the construction of a distinct Tatar identity in the grassroots. Thus, the dynamics behind the Turkish national identity and the

special circumstances of Turkey in the specific period of focus are also discussed. Special attention, however, is paid to discourse, discursive elements and the role of ideology in this study. The thesis concentrates on the changing discourses in Crimean Tatar diaspora living in Turkey and their constitutive themes/elements in positioning the self image. This analysis, as indicated above, is carried out on the basis of the narratives and poems produced by the intellectuals/authors of the diaspora.

The historical context that is taken as the reference point for these discourses covers the period from 1960 to 1994. 1960 is the publication year of the *Emel*, and mid 1990s are accepted as the time when *Emel* completed its mission.<sup>44</sup> Furthermore, the study explores how the Crimean Tatar diaspora identity was constructed and which discourses were the leading ones through history. It also intends to determine the continuities and ruptures in the use of themes by the diaspora to construct the Crimean Tatar national identities.

To this end, the study's objectives are to define the main discursive elements used by the *Emel* to (re)construct Tatar identity as well as analyze and interpret the hidden meanings used in discursive elements. In the study, the absences and silences in the discourses are examined. Absences in the discourse reveal the meaning of the unsaid theme. In other words, making reading on the absences forged a meaningful part in the thesis. They are not considered as limitations of the study.

The substantial amount of factual information obtained, the possible layers of analysis including features and meaning, and the hardships faced in organizing the data were overwhelming in the study. Since the main aim was to examine the construction of Crimean Tatar identity and role of homeland in it, the thesis also focuses on the poems in the journal. The thesis presents only a cross-section of the poems as literary works written by

---

<sup>44</sup> In-depth interview with Hakan Kırımlı May 2011, Ankara



Crimean Tatar diaspora writers over the past (approximately) thirty years, and it overviews the thematic evaluation. It does not claim to examine every single page written in the journal throughout the thirty-four year period, but every theme and basic features are searched. The poems were selected according to the content that represents the best example of its kind. In translating excerpts from poems, the original syntax was preserved. When it is difficult to translate the original wording, however, the texts were slightly changed to better reflect the idea conveyed.

In addition to close reading of the *Emel*, expert interviews were conducted. The experts included scholars who are also diaspora activists, authors of the journal, members of the *Emel* movement (as they name it), who are also either active or passive members of the Crimean Tatar Association of Culture and Mutual Aid. Initially, the interview questions were far more structured. However, over time it became evident that less structured conversations are more informative, so the interview strategy was changed. Conversing with the experts helped better contextualize the spirit of *Emel*. The findings of the interviews will be referred to throughout the thesis in relevant sections.

As a final note, along the period which is the focus of the study Crimean Tatar diaspora nationalism did not go beyond being an elite movement,<sup>45</sup> and *Emel* aimed to spread the national consciousness to the grass roots. Neither *Emel* nor the activists represents the majority of the diaspora. Therefore, the findings of the research are not claimed to relate to whole Crimean Tatar diaspora society.

## **1.2 Organization of the Thesis**

The thesis is composed of six chapters. After the introduction, in the second chapter, a theoretical framework is established on ethnic and national

---

<sup>45</sup> In-depth interview with Hakan Kırımlı, Ankara, May 2011

identities, transnationalism, hybrid identities, diaspora nationalism and homeland. The Crimean Tatar diaspora provides the basic information on ethnic identities and nationalism is required to discuss the definition and construction of their identities. In this theoretical framework, this chapter examines, after a brief review of theoretical elaborations on Crimean Tatar ethnic Identity, the three main approaches explaining ethnicity and ethnic/national identity, namely primordialism, modernism (instrumentalism,<sup>46</sup> and constructionism) and new approaches (among which the ethno symbolism is elaborated under the post-modernist school of thought) are consecutively examined.<sup>47</sup> The approaches are not elaborated in detail, but only particular considerations that are related to the context are handled. In this examination, theoretical views on nationalism which have specific references to the case of Turkey are elaborated. Particularly, Gellner (1983), Smith (1992), Anderson (1990), Hobsbawbn (1990), Gellner (1964), Brass (1991), Weber (1948), Renan (1882), Hall (1992), Roosens (1994) and Barth's (1969) arguments regarding nationalism, ethnicity, national and ethnic identity are discussed. Then, concepts of 'diaspora', 'transnationalism', 'hybrid identities', and 'diaspora nationalism' are discussed with specific reference to Tölölyan (1991) Safran (1991), Cohen (1997), Gilroy (1993), Clifford (1994), Brubaker (1996), Vertovec (2009), Hall (1990), Smith (2010), Appadurai (1995), Drobizheva (1990), Lahneman (2005), Shaffer (1986) and Adamson (2012).

The third chapter provides the historical background of Crimean Tatars in Turkey. To understand the spirit of *Emel*, the unique characteristics of the journal, and identification process with homeland of Crimean Tatar diaspora of Turkey, one should understand the historical transitions of events and the

---

<sup>46</sup> As it is reflected on the second chapter, by some scholars, the term 'instrumentalism' is synonymously used as 'circumstantialism'

<sup>47</sup> Smith and Breuilly give many classifications of nationalism in their articles titled respectively. "Nationalism and the Historians" and "Approaches to Nationalism", (which are edited in (1999). 'Mapping the Nation' by Gopal Balakrishnan and Benedict Anderson). Categorization of approaches in the literature of nationalism in this study has mainly been based upon the classification and denomination made in those articles.

conditions that were conducive to the emergence of Crimean Tatar diaspora. As the present study is not directly related with history, meaning of events are considered more important than the historical events and chronological developments in terms of the construction and perception of Crimean Tatar identity. This part discusses historical inquiry together with the theoretical dimension.

The fourth chapter explicates the analysis of the narratives and poems in the *Emel*. It concentrates on the changing discourses in essays and poems. The journal's constitutive themes are also elaborated. The elements that are used in positioning the self definition of the diaspora, i.e., the Crimean Turk or the Crimean Tatar, are discussed. The historical context is taken as the reference point for these discourses. Furthermore, the study explores how the Crimean Tatars living in Turkey constructed their national identities in the time specified for the study and how the concept of homeland is treated in line with that. It analyzes the types of the leading discourses, also focusing on the continuities and ruptures in the use of themes by the journal to construct diaspora's national identity. The outputs of the expert interviews were used where it is appropriate. In this chapter the leading discourses in literary works are analyzed in two periods: 1960-1983, and 1983-1994. Mainly, the study endeavors to examine how Crimean Tatars have constructed and consolidated their national identity in comparison with the Turkish national identity. At this point, a comparative analysis is considered to be appropriate because, as Burke states, it puts forward a particular absence, and helps understand social phenomena.<sup>48</sup> Similarly, Oyen maintains that a social fact can only be understood comparatively and that a social phenomenon should not be isolated from other related ones.<sup>49</sup> The last chapter, after giving a brief review of the study, comments on the findings.

---

<sup>48</sup> Burke, Peter (1992). *History and Social Theory*. Cambridge: Polity Press, p. 23.

<sup>49</sup> Oyen, Else (1990). *The Imperfection of Comparison in Comparative Methodology: Theory and Practice in International Social Science Research*. London: Sage, p. 1-68.

## CHAPTER 2.

### THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: CONSTRUCTION OF A NATIONAL IDENTITY IN DIASPORA

This part delves into the concepts of ethnic/national identity, diaspora, transnationalism, homeland, and diaspora nationalism. As homeland perception and national identity construction are based on a triadic relationship between the perception regarding ethnic/national identity (self image) among diaspora community, level of national awareness in host state/society and the stance of diaspora community vis a vis the elite movement within that diaspora community, these concepts deserve to be discussed.

#### 2.1 Different Theoretical Approaches to Ethnic/National Identity

To better comprehend the theoretical discussions on national/ ethnic identity, the development of nationalism as a political doctrine should be traced back. The explanation on nationalism is twofold. The advocates of primordialism, which will be elaborated below, claim the antiquity of nations and nationalism do not clearly separate ethnic identity from national identity. For them, nations have always existed and age of modernity just highlighted the extensions of their medieval counterpart.<sup>50</sup> For modernists, it is the secular surrogate of religion that is emerging during the transition to modernity.<sup>51</sup> By contrast, primordialists assert that nations are based on religious, ethnic, dynastic or linguistic solidarities.<sup>52</sup>

---

<sup>50</sup> Özkırmı, Umut (2000). *Theories of Nationalism: A Critical Introduction*. New York: St. Martin's Press, p. 74.

<sup>51</sup> Smith cited in Özkırmı, 2000, p. 14.

<sup>52</sup> Chatterjee, Partha (2001). "Nationalism:General", *International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences*. p. 10336.

As implied above, the earliest paradigm on nations and nationalism is named as primordialist. As a primordialist, Shils stresses the “place of origin” and “natal kin groups” of communities. He claims that, even when there is a lack of emotional attachment, it is the kinship that inspires loyalty.<sup>53</sup>

According to Geertz, the primordial attachment stems from the culture, which is associated with being a member of a religious community or speaking a particular language. He believes in power of customs, speech and blood in coerciveness within nations.<sup>54</sup> Cultural primordialists stress the beliefs and perceptions as ‘givens of social existence’ that generate strong attachments of people around sacred values.<sup>55</sup> Apart from this, Geertz maintains that culture holding a set of symbolic system is a significant component of coerciveness as well.<sup>56</sup>

It is possible to see diversification among primordialists. The most radical group among them is the biologists/naturalist primordialists, who claim that national identities are just a natural part of all human beings. Therefore, nations and ethnic groups are completely same entities. Since there is no difference between being born into a family and nation, the common destination and place of origin are important.<sup>57</sup> In the other explanation, the culturalist primordialists assert that it is the culture that, on the one hand, determines identity and, on the other hand, shapes the perception of reality as regards the “concepts of ethnic identity then arise from the experience of difference among such meaning system”.<sup>58</sup> Shils and Geertz are two culturalist primordialist theoreticians. On the other hand, ethnicity is at the

---

<sup>53</sup> Tilley, Virginia (1997). “The Terms of Debate: Untangling Language about Ethnicity and Ethnic Movement”. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*. 20(1), p. 502.

<sup>54</sup> Geertz, Clifford (1973). *Thick Description: Toward an Interpretive Theory of Culture* in *the Interpretation of Cultures Selected Essays*, New York: Basic Books, p. 259.

<sup>55</sup> Özkırımlı, 2000, p. 74

<sup>56</sup> Sewell, William, H., Jr. “Geertz, Cultural Systems, and History: From Synchrony to Transformation” in. Ortner, Sherry B. (eds.).(1999). *The Fate of “Culture” Geertz and Beyond*. Los Angeles: University of California Press, p. 17.

<sup>57</sup> Smith, Anthony., D., (1995). *Nations and Nationalism in a Global Era*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 31.

<sup>58</sup> Tilley, 1997, p. 499

centre of discussions in the sociobiological mode of primordialism. By observing animals' social behaviors, they emphasize the strength of ethnic identities. For them, kin selection and concept of kinship is part of the main genetic mechanism of human beings like animals.<sup>59</sup>

In primordialists' approach to ethnicity, ethnic identity is a "basic group identity" that "consists of the ready-made set of endowments and identifications". It is the "primordial attachments" and the assumed "givens of social existence".<sup>60</sup> Every single individual shares those givens with others by birth and adapts to the identity first in family than in society.<sup>61</sup>

Some of discussions among the primordialist scholars ended up with diversification within the school. The naturalist/biologist primordialists representing the extreme type of the school suggested that national identities are a natural part of all human beings. They do not draw any distinction between nations and ethnic groups and assert that people are born into a nation just as they are born into a family.<sup>62</sup> In line with that, a common destiny, natural frontiers and a specific place of origin are very significant for them.<sup>63</sup>

According to the psychological school of primordialism, ethnic bonds reflect human attachments "to the natal community, even to the natal geographic location, an orientation imbued from birth".<sup>64</sup> Members of the culturalist school (of primordialism) claim that "human culture shapes the meanings which constitute human perception of reality; concepts of ethnic identity then arise from the experience of difference among such meaning system".<sup>65</sup>

---

<sup>59</sup> Özkırımlı, 2000, p. 70

<sup>60</sup> Geertz, 1963 and Shils, 1957 cited in Cornell, Stephan and Hartman, Douglas (1998). *Ethnicity and Race: Making Identities in a Changing World* Thousand Oaks, California: Pine Forge Press, p. 48.

<sup>61</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 48

<sup>62</sup> Smith, 1995, p. 31

<sup>63</sup> *Ibid.*, p.31

<sup>64</sup> Tilley, 1997, p. 500

<sup>65</sup> *Ibid.*, p.500

Nevertheless, the primordialist approach to ethnic identity is subject to a number of strong criticisms. As Freeman argues:

... identities and attachments are natural, ancient, prior to social interaction and ineffable is said to have been refuted by sociological evidence. This shows that ethnic identities and attachments persist only as a result of continuing social interaction. They are subject to innovation, revision and revitalization. Primordialism is also incentive to the structural and cultural differences among those societies in which ethnic revivals have occurred; it underemphasizes the role of manipulation in ethno political mobilization; and it ignores the fact that individuals risk their lives for collectivities that are not primordial such as those based on class or ideology. Primordialism leaves ethnic sentiments mysterious, it is said, and therefore lacks explanatory power.<sup>66</sup>

Van den Berge's approach to primordialism is more rational. He distinguishes ethnicity and ethnic behaviors and says:

... ethnicity is primordial, but the ethnic behavior is variable, because humans are intelligent, self conscious organisms capable of learning from their interactions with their environment , who often manipulate ethnic boundaries and engage in ethnic 'commuting', moving from ethnicity to ethnicity when it suits them. Culture has therefore some explanatory autonomy from genetic evaluation. The value of sociobiology in explaining ethnic behavior is consequently limited.<sup>67</sup>

All in all, primordialists claim that the "power of ethnicity had derailed the assimilation train", ethnicity is relatively "fixed and unchanging", as well as

---

<sup>66</sup> Freeman, Michael (1998). "Theories of Ethnicity, Tribalism and Nationalism", in Christie Kenneth, (eds.), *Ethnic Conflict, Tribal Politics: A Global Perspective*. Great Britain: Curzon Press, p. 19.

<sup>67</sup> Cited in *Ibid.*, p. 24

being a “timeless aspect of social life”. Therefore, ethnic identities are “irreducible and basic.”<sup>68</sup>

On the other hand, modernism emerged as a reaction to the primordialist approach. For modernists, nationalism was a component and product of modernism.<sup>69</sup> Scholars such as Benedict Anderson, Eric Hobsbawm and Ernest Gellner claimed that an imagined horizontal community, a homogeneous national culture and standardized language were the prerequisites of a modern nation-state. In concordance with that, the national identity is explained as a matter of sovereignty.

Here, the scholars dealing with the transformation in the nature of politics in the modern bureaucratic state are called as instrumentalists. The most prominent scholars of this approach are Paul Brass, Eric Hobsbawm, and Karl Deutch. Instrumentalists assert that ethnic and national identities are constantly reconstructed and redefined. For them, ethnicity is a political phenomenon. The instrumentalists do not interpret culture as a contributor and component of ethnic identity. Instead of this, they say “ethnic platforms use selected customs as emblems to legitimize ethnic claims in the public domain”.<sup>70</sup> While economic and political interests constitute the main motivation for these political groups, common symbols are considered as the tools to manipulate the masses in order to achieve these interests.<sup>71</sup>

Brass, elaborates the “variability of ethnic identities” by saying “there is nothing inevitable about the rise of ethnic identities and their transformation into nationalism among the diverse peoples of the contemporary world.” Ethnic identity formations are “the conversion of cultural differences into bases for political differentiation between peoples”.<sup>72</sup> He has three

---

<sup>68</sup> Anderson, Benedict (2001). “The Complexity of Ethnic Identities: A Postmodern Reevaluation, Identity”. *An International Journal of Theory and Research*. 1(3), p. 213.

<sup>69</sup> Breuilly, John, (1999). “Approaches to Nationalism”, *Mapping the Nation*. in Gopal Balakrishnan and Benedict Anderson. (eds.) London: Verso, p. 156.

<sup>70</sup> Tilley, 1997, p. 507

<sup>71</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 507

<sup>72</sup> Brass, Paul R. (1991). *Ethnicity and Nationalism Theory and Comparison*. London: Sage Publications, p. 329.



theoretical foci. The first one counterargues the primordialists' assumption that ethnic identities are fixed and given by saying that the elite competition is a result of political and economic environment rather than cultural values of the ethnic groups.<sup>73</sup> Besides, persistence of ethnic identity is provided by values, cultural forms, and practices that are used for getting economic and political advantage within the society in question. According to Brass, "the process of ethnic identity formation and its transformation into nationalism is reversible". He also stresses that, in some political and economic circumstances, the elites may downplay the symbolic manipulation of cultural practices, values and forms to seek cooperation with the state authorities.<sup>74</sup>

As Brass, Hobsbawm asserts that the elites play an important role for ethnies in the foundation of nationalism. For him, the national symbols and nationalism are a product of the 'social engineering', and "invented traditions" are a set of practices, "normally governed by overtly or tacitly accepted rules."<sup>75</sup> On the other hand, Deutsch presents a slightly different approach with "communication approach" in instrumentalist school, which is considered to be a variant type in that school.<sup>76</sup> He asserts that a community has complementary habits and facilities communication provided by habits, symbols, memories and operating preferences.<sup>77</sup> While Brass and Deutch focus on language, Hobsbawm highlights the invented traditions as a mediator for continuity of a nation. Hardin supports the above mentioned ideas articulated by Brass, Hobsbawm's and Deutch by saying that:

Individuals have an interest in joining ethnic groups  
which provide them with such goods as security,

---

<sup>73</sup> Ibid., p. 13.

<sup>74</sup> Brass, 1991, p. 16

<sup>75</sup> Hobsbawm, Eric, J., and Ranger, Terence. (eds). (1983). *The Invention of Tradition*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 1.

<sup>76</sup> Cited in Hutchinson, John., and Smith, Anthony. D, (eds.) (1994). *Nationalism*. Oxford Hyman: London: Oxford University Press, p. 26.

<sup>77</sup> Cited in Hutchinson and Smith, 1994, p. 27

esteem, companionship, sense of purpose, economic opportunity and feeling of superiority or actual power over others. Group membership lowers the cost and increases the probability of leading a good life. Identification with and or membership of an ethnic group is much of the time pleasurable and cheap. Individual members of such group have an interest in the group's solidarity and power.<sup>78</sup>

Herhter contributes to rational individuals who would participate in the collective ethnic action. He claims that “only if they believe that such action is likely to be successful ... the group can monitor the contribution of all its members, that is likely to reward them fairly for their contributions, and that the risk of harm to the individual is low.”<sup>79</sup>

Furthermore, Cornell and Hartman state that, while primordialists see ethnicity as an almost timeless aspect of social life, instrumentalists see it as fluid and contingent and ephemeral. Onto refute the primordialists' claim on ethnic identities ‘to be irreducible and basic’, “circumstantialists<sup>80</sup> see them as manifestations of other forces or label them as false consciousness.”<sup>81</sup>Therefore, the “ethnic ties can be used as the basis of collective, political mobilization or of claims of certain resources.”<sup>82</sup> In other words, ethnicity can be viewed as “instrumental ideas, organized as means to particular ends.”<sup>83</sup>

However, there is a middle way between primordialism and instrumentalism.

ethnicity can be shifted upwards and downwards to more inclusive to narrower levels to meet situational exigencies. Ethnic and national groups can similarly

---

<sup>78</sup> Cited in Freeman, 1998, p. 28

<sup>79</sup> Cited in *Ibid.*, 1998, p. 29

<sup>80</sup> Cornell and Hartman synonymously uses the term ‘circumstantialist’ with ‘instrumentalist’..

<sup>81</sup> Cornell, Stephan and Hartman, Douglas (1998). *Ethnicity and Race: Making Identities in a Changing World*. Thousand Oaks, California: Pine Forge Press, p. 67.

<sup>82</sup> Cornell and Hartman, 1998, p. 57

<sup>83</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 59

fuse or split apart. Such processes may combine 'primordial' sentiments and strategic calculations<sup>84</sup>

As Cornell and Hartman claim,

Ethnic and racial groups, in this account, may be influenced by circumstantial factors, including the claims that others make about them, but they also use the raw materials of history, cultural practice, and pre-existing identities to fashion their own distinctive notions of who they are.<sup>85</sup>

In general terms, the instrumentalist has been criticized for failing to explain the pre-modern ethnic ties and the existence of people who are ready to die for their nations. It overemphasizes the place of elites in shaping the national identities and considerations that are developed at the expense of others.<sup>86</sup>

Other two modernists, Gellner and Anderson, stress the importance of socio-cultural transformations in societies. As mentioned in the Introduction, Anderson believes that nationality and nationalism are forms of cultural existence that evolves throughout the time. He asserts that nation is an imagined political community in the minds of people.<sup>87</sup> He is criticized for being a cultural reductionist. His theory fails to explain the relationship between nationalism and religion.<sup>88</sup> According to Gellner, nations can only exist when the necessary social conditions were fulfilled in the age of nationalism. According to him a nation:

. . . is, essentially, the general imposition of a high culture on society, where previously low cultures had taken up the lives of the majority, and in some cases of the totality, of the population ... It is the

---

<sup>84</sup> Horowitz cited in Freeman, Michael (1998). "Theories of Ethnicity, Tribalism and Nationalism". in Christie Kenneth, (ed.). p. 21.

<sup>85</sup> Cornell and Hartman, 1998, p. 79

<sup>86</sup> Özkırmılı, 2000, p. 125

<sup>87</sup> Anderson, Benedict (1991). *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*. London: Verso, p. 6.

<sup>88</sup> Özkırmılı, 2000, p. 153

establishment of an anonymous, impersonal society, with mutually substitutable atomized individual, held together above all by a shared culture of this kind.<sup>89</sup>

Gellner is criticized for his failure to explain the resurrection of nationalist and ethnic feelings within industrialized societies.<sup>90</sup>

The next approach within modernism, constructionism, does not imply 'heart' (as it is primordialism), but the 'mind' as the source of ethnicity. The constructionist approach retains the primary assumptions of instrumentalism concerning the contextual importance of power relations in terms of ethnicity embodiment. It also entails human behavior as the determinant factor of ethnicities' occurrence and its perception by the ethnic group members. In addition, it introduces the 'actor' on the table. As Cornell and Hartman argue, constructionists believe in the interaction among "ascription by the circumstances", "assignment of the other", and the "assertion of the group or the individual". Identity is something shaped by the effect of "reciprocal fluxion" within a "continuous change". The basic norm of sociology claims that "we need to understand both how people interpret and negotiate their lives in ethnic or racial ways, and how larger historical and social forces organize the arenas and terms in which those people act, encouraging or discouraging the interpretations they make, facilitating some forms of organization and action and hindering others."<sup>91</sup>

According to them, the process of construction is an interactive one. Identities are made, but instrumental (circumstantial) or human assignments interact on the one hand and ascertain on the other. Construction involves both the passive experience of being made by external forces, including not only material circumstances but the claims that other persons or groups make about the group in question, and the active process by which the group makes itself. The world around us may tell us we are racially distinct and/or

---

<sup>89</sup> Gellner, Ernest (1983). *Nations and Nationalism*. Oxford:Blackwell, p. 57.

<sup>90</sup> Özkırıklı, 2000, p. 139

<sup>91</sup> Cornell and Hartman, 1998, p. 13

our experience at the hands of circumstances may tell us that we constitute a group, but our identity is also a product of the claims we make. Hence, ethnic identities are constructed, but they are never finished. Ethnicity is “a creative component, rescuing ethnicity from the prison of circumstances.”<sup>92</sup>

Since the 1980s the theoretical debates have entered a new stage. As modernization theories used meta-narratives to explain the nation building process, they were unsuccessful to tackle the problems of analysis and newly emerging ethnic conflicts. Ethno-symbolism is evaluated under the category of new approaches as it combines nationalism together with ethnicity. Contrary to modernism, ethno symbolism considers the “earlier symbols, earlier myths, symbols, values and memories in many parts of the world and their continuing significance for large numbers of people.”<sup>93</sup> Furthermore, it cast light upon “the symbolic legacy of pre-modern ethnic identities for today’s nations.”<sup>94</sup> Smith and Connor are prominent figures in ethno-symbolist approach.

Smith indicates that nationalism necessitates the restitution and rediscovery of the nation’s cultural identity. As a matter of fact, he explains the act of return to the authentic roots of historic culture community of ancestral homeland. For him, the nation’s members are aware of their cultural unity and national history, and they cultivate their identity in vernacular customs, languages, arts and landscapes through national education and institutions.<sup>95</sup> He defines the nation as “a named population sharing a historic territory, common myths and historical memories, a mass, public culture, a common economy and common legal rights and duties for all members.”<sup>96</sup> It evident that, with its collective identities (religious, ethnic, or class), national identity is such a complex notion that it cannot be reduced to a single

---

<sup>92</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 80

<sup>93</sup> Smith, Anthony D. (1996). ”Opening Statement: Nations and their Pasts”. *Nations and Nationalism*, 2(3), p. 361.

<sup>94</sup> Smith, Anthony D. (1998). *Nationalism and Modernism*. London: Routledge. p. 224.

<sup>95</sup> Smith, Anthony D. (2001). *Nationalism: Theory, Ideology, History*. Cambridge: Polity Press, p. 34.

<sup>96</sup> Smith, Anthony D. (1991). *National Identity*. Reno: University of Nevada Press, p 14.

element.<sup>97</sup> Smith somewhat stresses the significance of ethno-historical myths in providing the political society with the sense of collective identity and destiny. Smith argues that the changing needs have a power to shift ethnic identities.<sup>98</sup> Ethnic identities are durable.<sup>99</sup> He suggests that:

*ethnie* are differentiated by one or more elements of 'culture' which both help to bind members together and to separate them from outsiders. The most common shared and distinctive traits are those of language and religion but customs, institutions, laws, folklore, architecture, dress, food, music and the arts, even color and physique, may augment the differences or take their place.<sup>100</sup>

Cultural sharings are significant in terms of ethnicity. As Smith points out:

the *ethnie* in question should appear to be, not only distinctive, but incommensurable, either by having a language which is unrelated to other languages, or a religious community entirely to itself, or because among a host of ethnic cultures it stands out by virtue of a cultural characteristic all its own, such as color or institutions, or because the combination of its otherwise cross-cultural traits is unique.<sup>101</sup>

From the perspective of the Crimean Tatars, under the circumstances of the time when mass migration occurred on the Ottoman lands, the concept of nation as an 'abstract shelter to protect their existence and ensure their survival' was dualized. They were stuck in between the romantic nostalgia of homeland and the cold reality of the circumstances they had adapted in the host land.

In the early times of the foundation of modern Turkey, the primordialist paradigm inspired the intellectuals, and it ended up with degeneration of ethnic and or national identities. When the elite of Turkish republic

---

<sup>97</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 14

<sup>98</sup> Smith, Anthony D. (1986) *The Ethnic Origins of Nations*, Oxford: Blackwell, p. 87.

<sup>99</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 87

<sup>100</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 26

<sup>101</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 27

perceived the inherited multi-ethnic social structure as a threat to nation-state formation, there were no room to develop distinct identities. Meanwhile, ethnic groups that were not conceived as religious (e.g. Jews, Greeks, Armenians), or ethnic (e.g. Kurdish) minorities in the newly established state enjoyed greater equality among the other groups considered equal. They were allowed to preserve their customary life-styles and traditions under the newly established Turkish national identity. Because of their origins, Crimean Tatars counted as ‘Turk’ and enjoyed the comfort of this identity at the cost of partial assimilation.

Since ethnic diversity is seen as threat to the integration within state, nation-building process has a tendency to eliminate ethnic diversity.<sup>102</sup> The history showed that ethnic consciousness challenged modernization albeit the modernization approach claimed that it would lessen ethnic disharmony in favor of the nation state and diminish ethnic consciousness. For Guibernau, when the ‘nation’ and ‘state’ do not coexist, it creates either assimilation or armed struggle.<sup>103</sup> For Crimean Tatars, the terms ‘state’ and ‘nation’ did not completely overlap, but it was not much differentiated either. Since their partial and smooth assimilation was the end product of perfect integration with the society and freedom from forced measures, they held dual national and territorial identity as it was reflected on *Emel* journal.

To sum up, the formation of Crimean Tatar identity up to mid 1980s can mainly be explained by instrumentalism and primordialism. Instrumentalism emphasizes the flexibility and malleability of ethnicities. Ethnic groups are considered as “subgroup of a larger society”, and ethnic identity is “a means of obtaining jobs and resources.”<sup>104</sup> It describes the period of “defining Crimean Tatar” identity as “being Crimean Turk” up to mid 1980s. As it

---

<sup>102</sup> Connor, Walker (1994). *Ethnonationalism The Quest for Understanding*. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton Univ. Press, p. 234.

<sup>103</sup> Guibernau, Montserrat (1996). *Nationalisms the Nation- State and Nationalism in the Twentieth Century*. Cambridge: Polity Press, p. 61.

<sup>104</sup> Allen, Tim, and Eade, John, (eds.) (2000). “*The Politics of Identity*”, *Poverty and Development into the 21st Century*. Oxford: The Open University Press and Oxford Press, p. 492.

was mentioned for the instrumentalist ethnic groups survive due to their fluidness, superficiality, and changeability, and due to being the end-result of the circumstances of the moment, while for the primordialist the acquisition ‘given’ to ethnic groups by birth maintain their existence.<sup>105</sup> Primordial definition of ethnicity and nationalism was at the heart of the Crimean Tatar diaspora nationalists, still they instrumentally define themselves upto mid 1980s as ‘Crimean Turks’.

Beside this, in between the instrumentalist and primordialist approaches, the “ethno symbolic and mythical” approach (Smith) was adopted by the *Emel* editors from the beginning of its publication in order both to turn the migrant society into a diaspora community and maintain diaspora community’s ‘original’ identity. For Conner, who defines diaspora as the “segment of people living outside the homeland”,<sup>106</sup> homeland holds supra-rational genealogical meaning that is called as ancestral land which is imbued with an emotional dimension.<sup>107</sup> He considers “homeland psychology” is a factor that distinguished the diasporas from other groups living out of their homeland.<sup>108</sup> After 1983, the ‘homeland’ and elements constituting the ‘homeland psychology’ were systematically used by *Emel* cadres to construct the diaspora identity. All in all, it was observed throughout the research that the *Emel* editorials instrumentally defined themselves as “Crimean Turks” and they instrumentally used the notion of ‘homeland’ as one of the primordial markers of ethnic and national identity to revive and construct the national identity among the diaspora community.

## **2.2 Diaspora, Transnationalism and Hybrid Identities**

To begin with a prologue to generic diaspora literature, the twinned terms ‘homeland’ (which will be conceptualized below under the next subtitle)

---

<sup>105</sup> Anderson, 2001, p. 211

<sup>106</sup> Conner, Walker (1986). “The Impact of Homelands upon Diasporas” in Gabriel Sheffer (eds.) *Modern Diasporas in International Politics*. London: Croom Helm, p. 16.

<sup>107</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 16

<sup>108</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 28



and ‘diaspora’ have been in common use for many years, even centuries.<sup>109</sup> The interpretation of ‘diaspora’ has changed over the years, and literary studies proceed on two opposite orientations.<sup>110</sup> Some notable analysts including Safran (1991), Cohen (1997), and Tölölyan (1991) define diasporas in a descriptive manner, thereby distinguishing them from other categories of persons “on the move”, while others such as Gilroy (1993), Clifford (1994), and Brubaker (1996) apply the term to the groups (e.g. migrants, exiles, expatriates, refugees, tourists, ethnics, sojourner transnationals) as a process.<sup>111</sup>

According to Kalra et al., even though Cohen does not apply these divisions in a simplistic fashion, some parts overlap and need modification.<sup>112</sup> They argue that Cohen’s typology demands too much from the term ‘diaspora’ and utilizes too little the analytical aspect of the category. For example, they cite the case of reducing the Indian diaspora to labour migration. It immediately anticipates that this is the key factor in shaping the contours, cultures and settlement of the entirety of that diaspora.<sup>113</sup> The opponents of this ‘over ambitious’ definition claims the following:

If there is a useful aspect to this kind of grand narrative, it is to provide detailed historical material and to point out issues that are worth exploring and that can be taken up in other context. For example the historical longevity of the diasporic construct is one that predates the modern formation of the nation. In this sense, diaspora could be utilized to indicate transnational forms, formations and processes that take into account larger geo political shifts and historical patterns of struggle (civilizational clashes, changes of mode of production, etc.) Diaspora is not limited to any particular historical period in that we have examples

---

<sup>109</sup> Levy, André and Weingrod, Alex (2005). *Homelands and Diasporas Holy Lands and Other Places*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, p. 3.

<sup>110</sup> Levy, and Weingrod, 2005, p. 5

<sup>111</sup> Kalra, Virinder S. Kaur, Raminder and Hutnyk, John (2005). *Diaspora and Hybridity*. London: Sage Publication, p. 3.

<sup>112</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 12

<sup>113</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 12

of pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial diasporas (even while privileging this as a historicizing framework). Cohen's work is a useful starting point because he offers many examples and case studies which provide at least a base from which to think about diaspora.<sup>114</sup>

As opposed to Cohen's long list, James Clifford simply defines being a diaspora as something in the minds and a sense of identity of people who are away from their homeland. He suggests that "diaspora consciousness lives loss and hope as a defining tension"<sup>115</sup>, while Gilroy refers to a duality of diasporic individuals' awareness of decentred attachments, and being simultaneously 'home away from home', or 'here and there'.<sup>116</sup> Clifford's diasporic consciousness is a complete consequence of histories and cultures in controversy and consent.<sup>117</sup> Diasporic subjects are carriers of a consciousness which provides an awareness of difference. This sense is basic to self identity for diasporic subjects. Diasporic consciousness, then, forms a part of what Stuart Hall (1990) calls 'the work of identity production and reproduction' through transformation and difference.<sup>118</sup> It is by recognizing difference, rather than denying it; hence, it is an attempt to be part of a homogeneous whole where diasporic consciousness may emerge.<sup>119</sup>

Brubaker has raised debates on Cohen's<sup>120</sup> and Armstrong's "mobilized diasporas" (based on "relations with homeland"). He puts the "people crossing boundaries" and "boundaries crossing the people" discussions on

---

<sup>114</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 12

<sup>115</sup> Clifford, James (1994). "Further Inflections: Toward Ethnographies of the Future". *Cultural Anthropology*. 9 (3), p. 312.

<sup>116</sup> Gilroy, Paul (Winter 1990/1991) "It Ain't Where You're From, It's Where You're At . . . The Dialectic of Diasporic Identification." *Third Text*. 13, p. 3-16.

<sup>117</sup> Clifford (1994) cited in Kalra, Kaur, Hutnyk, 2005, p. 30

<sup>118</sup> Kalra, Kaur, and Hutnyk, 2005, p. 30

<sup>119</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 30

<sup>120</sup> For Cohen "diaspora" has been "rediscovered" and expanded to include "businessmen, refugees, gastarbeiter, students, traders, migrant workers, "expatriates, expellees, political refugees, alien residents, immigrants, ethnic and racial minorities tout court." Cohen, Robin (1997). *Global Diasporas: An Introduction*. Cornwall: UCL Press, p. 21.

the agenda.<sup>121</sup> In addition to many dilution, Anderson (1998) analyzes some emigrant groups who were characterized as “long distance nationalist”. He treats them as diaspora owing to their involvement with homeland politics.<sup>122</sup> This, ultimately, causes Shaffer (2003) to conceive the labor immigrants as diaspora due to their capacity to maintain emotional and social ties with homeland.<sup>123</sup>

Upon this, Smith makes the following comment:

The concept of diaspora, whose analysis will preoccupy us, is for my purpose related to that of ethnic or ethno cultural community, although it has in recent decades on ever more numerous meanings as the range of phenomena included under its rubric has been almost incidentally extended; to such an extent that we may speak, with Rogers Brubaker, of a “diaspora” diaspora, in which dispersion of everyone and everything becomes the sole remaining criterion. This threatens to empty the term of any meaning, let alone scientific use, and we need to heed Khachig Tölölyan’s call for greater rigor in this field. In this spirit, I have restricted the concept to refer to those populations claiming to constitute ethno cultural communities whose members are presently located in more than one state, one of which is viewed as the homeland country of that community” whether or not it has its own state. The members of these communities, as Gabriel Sheffer reminds us, reside in several states as a result of forced or voluntarily migrations and constitute fairly stable minorities in their host societies.<sup>124</sup>

For Vertovec, the term diaspora refers to any transnational or deterritorialized population. He categorizes the meaning of transnationalism

---

<sup>121</sup> Adamson, Fiona (2012). “Constructing the Diaspora: Diaspora Identity Politics and Transnational Social Movements.” in Peter Mandaville and Terrence Lyons. (eds.) *Politics from Afar: Transnational Diasporas and Networks*. New York: Columbia University Press, p. 6.

<sup>122</sup> Cited in Brubaker, Rogers (2005), “The Diaspora”. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*. 28 (1), p. 2.

<sup>123</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 2

<sup>124</sup> Smith, Anthony D. (2010). “In The Call of the Homeland: Diaspora Nationalisms Past and Present”. Allon Gal, Athena S. Leousi. (eds) Leiden: Koninklijke Brill NV., p. 4.

into three: social morphology, type of consciousness and mode of cultural reproduction.<sup>125</sup> The discussions made in the present study hinge on a kind of “diaspora consciousness”, marked by dual or multiple identifications. Thus, this study concentrates on the depictions of individuals’ awareness of decentred attachments, the feeling of being “home away from home”, or “here and there”.<sup>126</sup>

From the social morphologist point of view, transnationalism:

consists of specific social relationships related to common origins and migration routes. Secondly there is a tension of political orientation between loyalty to homeland and to that of the host country. Thirdly there are particular economic strategies that mark certain diasporic groups in terms of mobilizing collective resources. The context in which these aspects are played out are also threefold. (I) the global stage upon which transnational ethnic ties are maintained (II) the local state in which settlement has taken place; and (III) the homeland states, or where forebears come from.<sup>127</sup>

As regards this type of consciousness, Clifford (1994) makes the following point:

The empowering paradox of diaspora is that dwelling here assumes a solidarity and connection there. But there is not necessarily a single place or an exclusivist nation... (it is) the connection (elsewhere) that makes a difference (here).<sup>128</sup>

Robin Cohen (1996) attracted attention to the times of cyberspace, and says “transnational bonds no longer have to be cemented by migration or by exclusive territorial claims. In the age of cyberspace, a diaspora can, to some degree, be held together or created through the mind, through cultural

---

<sup>125</sup> Vertovec, Steven (2009). *Transnationalism*. New York: Routledge. p.3.

<sup>126</sup> Vertovec, 2009, p. 6

<sup>127</sup> Totoricagüena, Gloria (2004). *Identity culture and politics in Basque Diaspora*. Reno: University of Nevada Press, p. 13.

<sup>128</sup> Cited in Vertovec, 2009, p. 6

artifacts and through a shared imagination.”<sup>129</sup> It results from the fact that “awareness of multi locality stimulates the desire to connect oneself with others both ‘here’ and ‘there’ who share the same ‘routes’ and ‘roots’.”<sup>130</sup>

On the other hand, Basch et al. conceptualized migrant transnationalism in their following words:

The process by which immigrants forge and sustain multi-stranded social relations that link together their societies of origin and settlement...many immigrants today build social fields that cross geographic, cultural, and political borders. Immigrants who develop and maintain multiple relationships-familial, economic, social, organizational, religious, and political-that span borders we call transmigrants.<sup>131</sup>

For Basch “transnationalism is a process by which migrants, through their daily life activities and social, economic, and political relations, create social fields”.<sup>132</sup> Furthermore, Arjun and Breckenidge make this suggestion:

Whatever their form of trajectory, diasporas always leave a trail of collective memory about another place and time and create new maps of desire and of attachment. Yet these are often collective memories “whose archeology is fractured”. Compounding the awareness of multimodality, the “fractured memories” of diaspora consciousness produce a multiplicity of histories, “communities” and selves – a refusal of fixity often serving as a valuable resource for resisting repressive local or global situations.<sup>133</sup>

---

<sup>129</sup> Cited in *Ibid.*, p. 6

<sup>130</sup> Gilroy cited in *Ibid.*, p. 6

<sup>131</sup> Basch, Linda, Schiller, Glick N. and Szanton, Blanc C. (1994). *Nations Unbound: Transnational Projects, Postcolonial Predicaments, and Deterritorialized Nation-States*. Amsterdam: Gordon and Breach Science Publishers. p. 7.

<sup>132</sup> Basch et al, 1994, p. 27

<sup>133</sup> Cited in Vertovec, 2009, p. 6-7

They add that “complex traditional flows of media in particular, the politics of desire and imagination are always in contest with the politics heritage and nostalgia”.<sup>134</sup> On the other hand, as Hall argues:

Diaspora refers to the scattering and dispersal of people who will never literally be able to return to the places from which they came; who have to make some difficult settlement with the new, often oppressive cultures with which they were forced into contact, and who have succeeded in remaking themselves and fashioning new kinds of cultural identity by, consciously or unconsciously, drawing on more than one cultural repertoire.<sup>135</sup>

Similar to Arjun, Breckenidge and Hall, Aydın provides insight into Crimean Tatar national identity:

On such a sociological basis, the discourse of Crimean Tatar diaspora nationalism has an eclectic appearance: A little bit of Crimea and a little bit of Turkey. It is like a child whose mother is Crimea and father is Turkey. Then it is possible to understand how appropriate the name “Crimean Turk” or “Crimean Tatar-Turk” is for the Crimean Tatars in Turkey. I believe there is a lot one can learn by observing how communities call themselves. Identities are formed in accordance with time and place. So they are relational, situational, and contextual. Actually the identity of “Crimean Turk” is unique as defined by the diaspora nationalists in Turkey. They can not choose between Crimea and Turkey.<sup>136</sup>

The Crimean Tatars in Turkey were not perceived as an exiled society by Crimean Tatars and Turks. It may be due to the level of integration of migrants to the host society from the beginning. However, a diaspora endeavor still existing today to preserve distinct identity may be because

---

<sup>134</sup> Cited in *Ibid.*, p. 7

<sup>135</sup> Hall, Stuart (1995), “The Whites of Their Eyes - Racist Ideologies and the Media” in Dines, Gail and Humez, Jean M., *Gender, Race and Class in Media - A Text Reader*. Sage Publications, Thousand Oaks, London and New Dehli, p. 10.

<sup>136</sup> <http://www.iccrimea.org/scholarly/aydin.html>

they differentiate the principle homeland (an ancestral fatherland) from the ‘motherland’, on which they had lived and persevered. In other words, they have formed a hybrid culture that has not resulted in the loss of national identity.

The awareness of multi locality stimulates the desire to connect oneself with others, both here and there, who share the same ‘routes’ and ‘roots’.<sup>137</sup> For Stuart Hall, the condition of diaspora, or transnationalism, comprises ever-changing representations that provide an “imaginary coherence” for a set of malleable identities.<sup>138</sup> Robin Cohen (1996) develops Hall’s point in a way that “transnational bonds no longer have to be cemented by migration or by exclusive territorial claims. In the age of cyberspace, a diaspora can, to some degree, be held together or recreated through the mind, through cultural artifacts and through a shared imagination”.<sup>139</sup> *Emel* assumed responsibility for what Cohen claimed. After the mid 1980s, it tried recreate a new diaspora identity to help their relatives return home. *Emel* also took action in order to control the “new ethnicity” frame on behalf of the Tatar community in Turkey and homeland. As Hall (1991) said:

The production of hybrid cultural phenomena manifesting “new ethnicities” is especially to be found among transnational youth whose primary socialization has taken place within the cross-currents of differing cultural fields.<sup>140</sup>

About the idea of the hybrid identity, Gilroy claims that diaspora is an alternative to the stern discipline of kinship and rooted belonging.<sup>141</sup> By this way, he delinks location and identity, and it disrupts bounded notions of culture and racialized bodily attribution. Paul Gilroy suggested that the

---

<sup>137</sup> Gilroy cited in Vertovec, 2009, p. 6

<sup>138</sup> Cited in *Ibid.*, p. 6

<sup>139</sup> Cited in Cohen, Robin (1996). “Diasporas and the State: from Victims to Challengers” *International Affairs* 72 (3), p. 509

<sup>140</sup> Cited in Vertovec, Steven (1999). “Conceiving and Researching Transnationalism” *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 22.(2) University of Oxford, p. 452.

Available at <http://www.transcomm.ox.ac.uk/working%20papers/conceiving.PDF>

<sup>141</sup> Cited in Kalra et al, p. 123

diasporas are the alternative to the rooted belonging and kinship.<sup>142</sup> The idea of the “contingency of commemoration and shared memory” should be revisited. Hybridity can become both a positive eventuality for some, and a constructed anchoring device for others.<sup>143</sup> As Kalra et.al. said, “the very idea of a ‘host’ and an ‘arrive’ culture assumes a degree of non- hybridity, which is difficult to sustain unless there is an insistence on an unbridgeable difference between the here and the there.”<sup>144</sup>

However, hybridity does not solve the problem for diasporas. They must also have a definite identity to exist. Pattie puts this so eloquently:

Otherwise how are we to identify them? Cultures change via, but not exclusively via, mixtures say nothing about separation as such, which is social issue and not one of cultural content..... The treat of diaspora is not culture but social differentiation, the potential of fragmentation of a larger unity.<sup>145</sup>

Referring to Boyarin, Pattie argues that the diasporic cultural identity teaches us that cultures are not preserved by resisting “mixing”. On the contrary, they probably can only exist as a product of mixing culture. Cultures, as well as identities are constantly remade,<sup>146</sup> as it is transparently seen throughout the *Emel* journal.

### **2.3 Homeland and Diaspora Nationalism**

As mentioned in the previous sections, Anderson asserted that the mass migration and mass communications in advanced capitalist societies make long-distance nationalism possible. Concerning the long distance nationalist, Anderson argues that:

---

<sup>142</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 123

<sup>143</sup> Kalra et. Al, 2005, p. 87

<sup>144</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 88

<sup>145</sup> Cited in Levy and Weingrod, 2005, p. 144.

<sup>146</sup> Cited in Levy and Weingrad. 2005, p. 144.



...they are deeply rooted in a consciousness that his exile is self-chosen and that the nationalism he claims on e-mail is also on the ground on which, he embattled ethnic identity is to be fashioned in the ethicized nation state that remains determined to inhabit. That same metropole that marginalizes and stigmatizes him simultaneously enables him to play, in a flash, on the other side of the planet, national hero.<sup>147</sup>

Long distance nationalism cannot be isolated from ‘stateless diaspora groups’, which have a collective identity based on mostly national or ethnic grounds but which are not linked to a state. In Sheffer’s terms, “the stateless diasporas are those dispersed segments of nations that have been unable to establish their own independent states.”<sup>148</sup> Stateless diasporas are more strongly attached to their past and more active in their homeland politics than other diasporas. They are likely to engage in political movements in the host countries or any matter of struggle for secession in their homeland. According to Sheffer, under those circumstances, any diaspora community will be on the horns of dilemma between recapturing the past and reconciling with the norms of the host countries.<sup>149</sup>

On the bases of Anderson’s long distance nationalism, Skrbis’s book, in which a comparative, ethnographic study of Slovenian and Croatian diasporas in Australia is made, conceptualizes the long distance nationalism as both a form of practice and an attitudinal disposition.<sup>150</sup> According to Skrbis, the idea of homeland has the power to evoke memories and place them into learned attitudes. He points at a relationship between the intensity of attachment and spatial/ temporal proximity to homeland in his discourse. In his explanation of these dimensions, “the temporal aspect is not to be

---

<sup>147</sup> Anderson, Benedict (1998). *The Spectre of Comparisons: Nationalism, Southeast Asia and the World*. New York: Verso, p. 74.

<sup>148</sup> Sheffer, Gabriel (2003). *Diaspora Politics. At Home Abroad* New York, Cambridge University Press, p. 73.

<sup>149</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 153

<sup>150</sup> Skrbis, Zlatko (2001). *Nationalism in a Transnational Context: Croatian Diaspora, Intimacy and Nationalist Imagination*. available at <http://postjugo.filg.uj.edu.pl/baza/files/153/04-Skrbis.diaspora.pdf>

measured solely in terms of the years elapsed since the dislocation of the individual or a group from the homeland. Like temporal aspect, spatial aspect is not to be measured only by considering physical distance from homeland.”<sup>151</sup> The paragraph at length written by Skribis is worth studying here:

Spatial factors fluctuate around temporal ones- they are in habitual and symbiotic relationship. The same spatial and temporal distance does not necessarily produce the same effects. It is also necessary to consider such factors as the historical conditions and migrant flows which contributed towards the constitution of these settings, the individuals’ psychological constitution, the individual’s embeddedness and dependency on diaspora networks and other related issues.<sup>152</sup>

Therefore, the meaning of homeland may change from one individual to another. While it may be a romantic goal for some, it functions as a mental shelter for the others.<sup>153</sup> Similarly, the relationship between ethnic group members, their homeland and its political establishment is a sign of connectedness with their ethnic past.<sup>154</sup> Besides, the terms ‘rootedness in the past and successful integration into new society are not necessarily mutually exclusive variables.<sup>155</sup>

On the other hand, diaspora may have participated in the homeland as a result of their motivation to keep the emotional attachments of solidarity and kinship.<sup>156</sup> Diaspora consciousness and solidarity are defined based on willingness to continue relationship with the homeland and their

---

<sup>151</sup> Skribis, Zlatko (1999). *Long-distance Nationalism: Diasporas, Homelands and Identities*. Brookfield: Ashgate Publishing Company, p. 39.

<sup>152</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 39

<sup>153</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 40

<sup>154</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 40

<sup>155</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 41

<sup>156</sup> Yossi, Shain and Barth, Aharon (2003). “Diasporas and International Theory”, *International Organizations*. 57(3), p. 465.

commitment to restore its 'nation'.<sup>157</sup> The Ancestral homeland has a symbolic importance for those groups. As Vertovec says:

Belonging to diaspora entails a consciousness of, or emotional attachment to, commonly claimed origins and cultural attributes associated with them. Such origins and attributes may emphasize ethno-linguistic, regional, religious, national or other features. Concerns for homeland developments, and the plight of co-diaspora members in other parts of the world flow from this consciousness and emotional attachment.<sup>158</sup>

Moreover, the diasporas always keep the issue of 'returning to the homeland' on their agenda. This provides them with legitimacy in interfering with the homeland politics. While the idea of a 'secure homeland' significantly shapes their behavior, when it comes to returning, they are reluctant to leave the hostland they live on.

The other factor explaining the diaspora involvement in homeland politics can be the political system in the host land. In liberal political systems, the diaspora groups find more room to influence the domestic or foreign policy matters of the homeland. Therefore, how the diaspora community is organized among itself and communicates with homeland actors depend on the the feature of the regime in the homeland.<sup>159</sup> Nielsen states that hostlands, which lay down the rules and constraints in diaspora's political attempts to influence homeland politics, are not just midwives but also gatekeepers.<sup>160</sup>

---

<sup>157</sup> Safran, William, 1991. "Diasporas in Modern Societies: Myths of Homeland and Return". *Diaspora*. 1,(1) ,p. 83-99; and Gillespie, Kate; Riddle, Liesl; Sayre, Edward; Sturges, David, 1999. "Diaspora Interest in Homeland Investment". *Journal of International Business Studies*. 30 (3), p. 623-634.

<sup>158</sup> Vertovec, Steven (2005). *Political Importance of Diasporas*. University of Oxford, Centre of Migration, Policy and Society Working Paper. No. 13, p. 2.

<sup>159</sup> Shain and Barth, 2003, p. 463

<sup>160</sup> Ostergaard-Nielsen, Eva (2006). "Diasporas and Conflict Resolution: Part of the Problem or Part of the Solution?". *DIIS Brief*, March. p.8. Available at [http://subweb.diis.dk/graphics/Publications/Briefs2006/%F8stergaard-nielsen\\_diaspora\\_conflict\\_resolution.pdf](http://subweb.diis.dk/graphics/Publications/Briefs2006/%F8stergaard-nielsen_diaspora_conflict_resolution.pdf)

In addition to this, as regards the transnational political activities that are undertaken by ethnic diasporas, Cohen argues that “awareness of their precarious situation may also propel members of diaspora to advance legal and civic causes and to be active in human rights and social justice issues.”<sup>161</sup> Appadurai (1995) discusses the new patriotism:

These new patriotism are not just the extensions of nationalist and counter nationalist debates by other means, through there is certainly a good deal of prosthetic nationalism and politics by nostalgia involved in the dealings of exiles with their erstwhile homelands. They also involve various rather puzzling new forms of linkage between diasporic nationalisms, delocalized political communications and revitalized political commitments at both end of the diasporic process.<sup>162</sup>

Among questions and criticisms concerning the transnational lens on migration, the important matter is how the members of the second and subsequent generations are influenced by transnationalism. It is commonly viewed that transnational practices of second generation are currently minimal and likely to dwindle further in the course of time.<sup>163</sup>

On the other hand, Levitt and Wates suggest:

Strong influence in the transnational social fields in which the second generation is embedded. This view stresses the importance of the sending country individuals, resources and ideas that are constant presence in the lives of the second generation and holds that even selective, periodic, transnational practices can add up.<sup>164</sup>

All in all, the second generation individuals in Crimean Tatar diaspora had a strong motivation to turn migrant generations into a diaspora community in

---

<sup>161</sup> Cited in Vertovec, 2009, p. 10

<sup>162</sup> Cited in *Ibid.*, p. 10

<sup>163</sup> Vertovec, 2009, p. 75

<sup>164</sup> Cited in Vertovec, 2009, p. 42

a transnational context. The discourse of *Emel* displays the way those practices of diaspora nationalism are redefined and revisited by subsequent generations.

## CHAPTER 3

### THE HISTORY OF CRIMEAN TATARS AND THE ROLE OF HISTORY IN SHAPING THE NATIONAL IDENTITY AMONG THE DIASPORA MEMBERS

#### 3.1 Crimean Tatars from Ancient Times Till the End of the Golden Horde

To better perceive the characteristics of the national identity of Crimean Tatar diaspora of Turkey, to understand the present day characteristics of this diaspora, and to see in what ways it differs from other diasporas, one should first attempt to study the history. Thus, to start out by presenting the origins of the Crimean Tatars will make sense. This part will help us to understand the historical corner points that shape the ‘Crimean Tatar’ identity and demonstrate how the national identity is constructed and instrumentally shaped by those developments throughout time.

Though most of the Soviet scholars describe the Crimean Tatars as the direct descendants of Nomadic Mongol Horde, and thus implicitly stress their arrival in the peninsula from Eurasian plains as recent as the 13<sup>th</sup> century, some historians draw the line for finding the origins of Crimean Tatars to much earlier times, hence furnishing a foundation for Crimean Tatar’s claim that they are ‘indigenous people’ of the Crimean peninsula along with the Karaims<sup>165</sup> and the Krymchaks.<sup>166,167</sup>

---

<sup>165</sup> The Karaims were the members of this small Turkic group who were adherents of a minor branch of Judaism. <http://www.eki.ee/books/redbook/karaims.shtml>

<sup>166</sup> Krymchaks are also known by the name Crimean Jews. [http://www.eki.ee/books/redbook/crimean\\_jews.shtml](http://www.eki.ee/books/redbook/crimean_jews.shtml)

<sup>167</sup> The Crimean Tatar literature (including poetry), from ninth and tenth centuries that were not written in Mongol but in Crimean Tatar supports this claim. İzmirlı, İdil P. “Return to the Golden Cradle: Post Return Dynamics and Resettlement Amongst the Crimean Tatars” in Buckley, Cynthia J., Ruble Blair A., Hoffman, Erin T. (eds.) (2008). *Migration, Homeland and Belonging in Eurasia*. Baltimore, Maryland: The John Hopkins University Press, p. 230.

Still some other approaches, however, assert that, unlike many (non Crimean) Tatar peoples of the Russia such as those who had been living in Central Asian steppes and Volga, the Crimean Tatars do not have any significant Altaic genetic heritage.<sup>168</sup> Therefore, the Mongol conquerors are not ancestors of them; they are indigenous people of Crimea.<sup>169</sup> Nevertheless, the approach claiming the intermixture of native peoples of the peninsula (Tavris, Scythians, Sarmatians, Goths) with the Turkic tribes (Khazars, Pechenegs, Kipchacks) and the Mongols is the -to a great degree- accepted version of Crimean Tatar history view.<sup>170</sup>

The latter argument was supported by Milner:

The term Tatar is very misleading, having long since lost all ethnographic signification, even before it was known in Europe, though popularly considered synonymous with Mongol. It originally denoted a few obscure tribes on the Chinese frontier who rising to independence and powder under Genghis Khan, took the proud little of the Celestial Mongols, rejecting the old name of *Tata*, as it implied “subjection” in their language, and was no longer applicable. But, upon the Mongols extending their domination westward to the shores of the Caspian and east of the Europe, they applied the discarded name to the subjugated nations, as it etymologically expressed their condition.<sup>171</sup>

An analysis of the antique Crimea and its middle ages reveals that the Scythians after Cimmerians, who are known as the first civilization, had been established.<sup>172</sup> The Scythians founded their state at the north of the Black Sea and existed from the eighth to fourth century BC. Even after the conquest of their state by Sarmatians (who are Iranic people), the Scythians continued to

---

<sup>168</sup> Tanner, Arno (2004). *The Forgotten Minorities in Eastern Europe. The History and Today of Selected Ethnic Groups in Five Countries*. Helsinki, Finland: East West Books, p. 15.

<sup>169</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 15

<sup>170</sup> İzmirli, 2008, p. 230

<sup>171</sup> Milner, Thomas (1855). *The Crimea, Its Ancient and Modern History*. London: Oxford University Press, p. 120.

<sup>172</sup> Tanner, 2004. p. 14

live and have influence in Crimea.<sup>173</sup> In 700-500 BC, the coastal areas of the peninsula became part of the Greek World before the northern coast of the Black Sea came under Roman influence in the last century BC.<sup>174</sup> During the Justinian reign, Europe was acquainted with the name of Turk, the denomination of a great family.<sup>175</sup> The Khazars, a Turkish tribe, were first heard of on the northern shores of the Caspian and then in the countries north of the Black Sea. As Millner stated, “They subjugated the plains of the Crimea at the commencement of the seventh century, and gave their name to the greater part of the peninsula. It was called Khazaria, while the south coast chain retained the designation of Gothia”.<sup>176</sup> Furthermore, according to a view proposed before Khazaria, “the initial appearance of Crimean Tatars who are generally thought to descend from the Turkic people is recorded as sixth century.”<sup>177</sup>

The coasts of the Crimea were largely Christianized by 625 AD, and after the devising of the Roman Empire, Crimea became part of the Byzantine world.<sup>178</sup> Turkic Khazars incorporated Crimea to the religiously Jewish Khanate of Khazaria in around 900 AD.<sup>179</sup> Later on, the Macedonian Greek Emperors of Byzantium conquered the coasts of Crimea to win it back for Constantinople around 1070. In the medieval times, Greek Byzantine influence prevailed around the coasts of Crimea, while the island was inhabited by Tatars.<sup>180</sup>

The year 1240 is important in that it is traditionally accepted as a turning point in the history of Eastern Europe. Indeed, it is the time when “the Mongols captured the city of Kiev and ... the Kievan Rus is considered to have ceased to exist”. According to many historians, the ‘Tatar Yoke’ began,

---

<sup>173</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 14

<sup>174</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 16

<sup>175</sup> Milner, 1855, p. 110

<sup>176</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 111

<sup>177</sup> Tanner, 2004, p. 15

<sup>178</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 15

<sup>179</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 15

<sup>180</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 15



then.<sup>181</sup> As Fisher said while “Turkic nomads had intermittently passed through the northern Black Sea area for centuries, they gained firm political control of the area only in the mid thirteenth century by Mongol Tatar invasion”.<sup>182</sup> In the mid thirteenth century, during the invasions by the armies of Batu Khan -who is the founder of the Golden Horde-, these Turkic nomads gained political dominance on the lands on which Slavic and Italian populations had settled.<sup>183</sup>

Briefly, between 1240-1443, during the period of the Mongol Golden Horde, the sedentary Gothic farmers of the south Crimean mountains were culturally and linguistically Islamized and Turkified, and “by the breaking up of the Mongol Golden Horde in the early 1400s, these people formed an independent state known as the Crimean Khanate, on the adjacent areas of the south Ukrainian steppe in the Crimean Peninsula.”<sup>184</sup>

## **3.2 Crimean Khanate**

### **3.2.1 Historical Dynamics of the Crimean Khanate and Ottoman Empire Relations Up Until Russian Annexation and Its Reflections**

In the 16<sup>th</sup> century, the Ottoman rulers based their claims to power on three historical causes. The first of them was Islamic. They controlled holy places in Arabia and Palestine, and their Empire had been formed in the process of religious warfare against the Christian world. Second of them was the Byzantine-Roman tradition. They possessed the capital of Byzantium with the imperial prerogatives, and they conquered almost all of the lands that had been within the Byzantine Empire. The third of them was the Turkic one. At

---

<sup>181</sup> Magocsi, Paul Robert (2010). *History of Ukraine*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, p. 105.

<sup>182</sup> Fisher, Alan (1970). *The Russian Annexation of Crimea 1772-1783*. London: Cambridge University Press, p. 1.

<sup>183</sup> Fisher, Alan (1978). *The Crimean Tatars*. Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, p. 2.

<sup>184</sup> Williams, Brian Glyn (2001). *The Crimean Tatars*. Leiden: Koninklijke Brill NV, p. 325.

that point the Crimean Tatars had a special importance for Ottoman politics due to their historical connections with Genghiz Khan.<sup>185</sup> Their imperial title was khan, and *Padşah-ı Desht-i Kipchak* (Sovereign of the Kipchak Steppe). Those symbols included sovereignty of Crimean Tatars in the eyes of Ottomans. In fact, this element in the Ottoman political ideology was one way to prove the legitimacy of political authority over the Turkic steppe that reached into Central Asia. In accordance with that, the relationships between the Crimean Tatars and the Ottoman Sultans were built on two main foundations. First of them was the political ideology based on historical and legendary traditions, and second of them was a political necessity.<sup>186</sup>

The events that took place during the foundation of the Crimean Khanate give important clues for the reasons for the proximity of Crimean Tatar identity to the Turkish national identity. First, it hints at the causes of easy integration of Crimean Tatars with Turks and suggests why it was difficult for the Crimean Tatar nationalist movements to establish a distinct national identity for Crimean Tatar diaspora living in Turkey.

The Crimea was part of the Golden Horde that was established in the 13th century. Prior to the decay of the Golden Horde at the beginning of the 16<sup>th</sup> century<sup>187</sup>, the Crimean Khanate had differentiated from it and become a separate political entity. In 1420, by the leadership of Hacı Giray, it became a separate administrative unit. Subsequently by the disintegration of Golden Horde, Hacı Giray proclaimed himself to be an independent ruler in 1449.<sup>188</sup> The Crimea was seen as a refuge for the leaders who had failed in their bid for power in Golden Horde. Their fled gave rise to the subsequent Crimean

---

<sup>185</sup> Fisher, 1978, p. 13

<sup>186</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 13

<sup>187</sup> The disintegration of the the Mongol Empire was not dramatic, but a gradual process in the 1300s. As Tanner said “After the Kipchak khanate disintegrated in turn, the area was split into several east Slavic principalities in the North, and three powerful Tatar Khanates in the South: Crimea, Kazan, Astrakan. Crimean Tatars split from the Golden Horde” Tanner, 2004, p. 16

<sup>188</sup> Magoesi, 2010, p. 172

view that their rulers were direct descents of Genghiz Khan.<sup>189</sup> One of these displaced leaders, Hacı Giray, had formed an independent government.<sup>190</sup>

Despite the pressure coming from Khans of Golden Horde to recognize their supervision, he established alliances with Moscow and the Polish-Lithuanian state and expanded his administration's territory between Dnieper and Don. When he died in 1466, his two sons Mengli Giray and Nurdevlet struggled for power.<sup>191</sup>

Following the death of Hacı Giray in 1466, the Ottoman Empire became a front in the middle of the brother's struggles for rule. In order to eliminate the peninsula's Italian commercial colonies and annex the southern coast of the Crimea (*Kefe*) as Ottoman sub-province, the Ottoman Empire took advantage of the distraction caused by the struggle for power.<sup>192</sup> After the fall of Byzantium in 1453, Sultan Mehmet II was determined to extend his realm up to the north of the Black sea in order to transform it into a Turkish Lake.<sup>193</sup> The events in Crimea are explained by İnalcık as follows:

First Nurdevlet succeeded in achieving the throne. He received a *yarlık* from the Golden Horde recognizing his authority in the Crimea. Mengili Giray was forced to take refuge in *Kefe* where he remained until 1468. It is possible that Mengili did not receive official support from the Geneose since *Kefe* had many Tatar inhabitants at that time. In 1468 Mengili gained control of part of the peninsula and established himself on the throne in *Kırkyar* with the help of the ŞirinBey Mamak and the Geneose. Mangili's main opposition, the golden horde helped thrust him into a policy of friendship with Muscovy and hostility toward Poland- a fact that, according to Muscovy histography Mengili Giray one of the most

---

<sup>189</sup> Hacı Giray (1426-56) a descendant of Genghiz Khan's grandson Toka Temür Agoston, Gabor and Masters, Bruce (2009). *Encyclopedia of the Ottoman Empire Facts on File*. New York: INC, p. 149.

<sup>190</sup> *Ibid.*, p.149

<sup>191</sup> *Ibid.*, p.149

<sup>192</sup> Agoston and Masters, 2009, p. 149

<sup>193</sup> Magoesi, 2010, p. 173

outstanding khans. 1469, Mengili Giray also sent a letter to Sultan Mehmet II addressing him as a friend.<sup>194</sup>

However, in early 1475, when Nurdevlet had been acting in close agreement with the Genoese, Şirin Bey<sup>195</sup> requested that Sultan Mehmet II attack *Kefe* and bring it under his sovereignty.<sup>196</sup> At that point, the historiography brings a question on how the Ottoman Empire and the Crimean Khanate came together. This question is important because the answer determined the dynamics of the relations for the rest. Even though the Russian and Western historians believe that, in 1478, Mengili Giray and Mehmet II signed a treaty, Halil İnalçık has proven that such a treaty could not have existed in the 15<sup>th</sup> century and that it probably never existed at all.<sup>197</sup> Based on Western sources, this so-called treaty stated the following:

- 1) The Khan had complete internal power and could appoint his civil and military officials;
- 2) The “Crimean population” was to “choose” the khan from Giray family the royal princes;
- 3) As supreme sovereign of the Crimea, the Ottoman Sultan could summon the khan to participate in military campaigns as the khan had no authority to declare war or to conclude peace on his own initiative;
- 4) As Caliph, the Sultan was granted the privilege of having his name read in the Friday noon prayers (*hutbe*) and engraved on Crimean coinage. Both of these latter rights were traditional Islamic signs of sovereignty.<sup>198</sup>

---

<sup>194</sup>Cited in Fisher, 1978, p. 9

<sup>195</sup>The traditional Tatar hierarchical system governed the relations between the various clans and between the clan leaders and the Khan. As Fisher said the system was under constant change, as various clans gained in importance at the expense of other. Yet, “throughout the Khanate’s existence, the Şirin Clan always occupied the first position”. Fisher, 1978, p. 21 From the beginning of the Khanate, when the Şirin Bey, Eminek Mirza supported Mengili Giray at the Ottoman Court, the Şirin’s desires were always taken into special account by the Ottoman Sultan. Fisher, 1978, p. 22

<sup>196</sup> Cited in Fisher, 1978, p. 10

<sup>197</sup> Cited in *Ibid.*, p. 11

<sup>198</sup> Fisher, 1970, p. 3

Regardless of the presence of treaty, this nature in relations brings a discussion on “sovereignty” of the khanate. In any case, in 1475, Ottoman *Vezir Gedlik Ahmed Pasha* reached Crimea, seized many seaside towns of the peninsula, and left there the Ottoman Empire’s garrisons. For the next 3 years, Mengli Giray was kept in the Ottoman Court. In 1478, Mengli Giray was given the status of khan as a vassal of Ottoman Sultan. It means that the Crimean Kahante, as first state experiment of Crimean Tatars, to set early historical conditions of being a nation and developing national identity, was established under the aegis of the Ottoman Empire. This point is important for this study because this proximity ended up with proximity in Crimean Tatar and Turkish national identity as well, and prepared the ground for such a Crimean Tatar identification as the ‘Crimean Turk’.

### **3.2.2 Discussions on ‘Sovereignty’ of the Khanate**

The responses provided to the question ‘to what extent the Crimean Khanate and Crimean people became dependent upon the Ottoman Empire’ are important for this study. They are important not only because they are meaningful for the Crimean Ottoman relations, but also they yield the core that shapes the self-understanding of the Crimean Tatars, which in turn affects the present Tatar diaspora perception of their identity in Turkey. Thus, the events of the 1466-1478, which at the same time coincided with Hacı Giray’s death<sup>199</sup> and Mengili Giray’s offering him, the obedient servant of his sovereign, the Ottoman *padişah*, are examined. Within this scope, the development of political and economic relations as well between the Ottomans and the Crimean Tatars are analyzed in this part.

Hobsbawm’s approach focusing on the theoretical dimensions of ethnicity and nationalism explains this part of the history very well. Hobsbawm questions the differences between ethnicity and nationalism, and says

---

<sup>199</sup> “The death of Hacı Giray in 1466 produced a struggle for succession that raises serious questions about the existence of a dynasty. There were two contenders of the throne: Nurdevlet and his brother Mengili Giray. Fisher 1978, p. 8.

ethnicity has worked as “horizontal dividers as well as vertical ones”, dividing, when necessary, a social strata within a community before transition to modern nationalism. He adds that social mobility or mass migration made the situation all the more complicated. Moreover, “‘visible’ ethnicity tends to be negative, in as much as it is much more usually applied to define ‘the other’ than one’s own group.”<sup>200</sup> He concluded that the ethnic differences had not played a considerable part in the roots of modern nationalism.<sup>201</sup>

After emphasizing that little importance was given to ethnic differences in forming modern nationalism, and thus explaining to some degree the reasons for smooth adaptation of Crimean Tatar diaspora to Turkish national identity, the study takes Gellner’s starting point: a sociological analysis of Durkheim. Durkheim claimed that a “religious worship society adores its own camouflaged image”,<sup>202</sup> Gellner stresses that “in nationalist age, societies worship themselves brazenly and openly, spurning the camouflage”<sup>203</sup>. Instead of using religious forms, a cultured society “celebrates itself in song and dance, which it borrows from a folk culture which it fondly believes itself to be perpetuating, defending, and reaffirming.”<sup>204</sup> He places an emphasis on the importance of a shared high culture. It was the ‘Islam’ that played an important role by providing a shared high culture in the integration of Crimean Tatar diaspora into Turkish nationalism in modern times after the 19<sup>th</sup> century.

In addition to that, back to the middle ages, one can assert that the Crimean Khanate formed with the discretion of the Ottoman Empire. In other words, from the outset, the Ottoman Empire manipulated the Giray family, who ruled the Crimean Khanate. At this point, it makes sense to seek answers to two

---

<sup>200</sup> Hobsbawn, Eric J. (1990). *Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 65.

<sup>201</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 67

<sup>202</sup> Gellner, Ernest (1964). *Nationalism, Thought and Change*. London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, p. 48.

<sup>203</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 48

<sup>204</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 49

questions: What was the political status of the Khanate? Was the Khan's power merely a reflection of the power of Ottoman *Sultan*?

For Fisher, the answer is not that easy. He accepts that the Ottoman Empire played a role in the choice of Khan, but he also notes that the Empire acknowledged the selection made by the Crimean aristocracy in traditional Crimean Tatar *Kurultay* fashion. Fisher draw attention to the contemporary documents proving that such choices were made 'by the Tatar notables (who) assembled together', and he adds that the procedure had been an occasional source of dispute. While the clan leaders viewed the Ottoman perception as limited to confirmation (*tasdik*) of their selection, Ottoman Empire insisted on their right of appointment (*tayin*).<sup>205</sup>

Sovereignty can be questioned according to conduct of diplomacy and financial transactions. As the conduct of diplomacy is one of the prerogatives of a sovereign state, it can be concluded that the Crimean dependence upon the Ottomans was incomplete. Fisher says that khans attached great importance to prerogatives which they had received from their Genghizid heritage. They used *tamga*, i.e., Genghizid seal, as one of the most significant symbols of their sovereignty in their correspondence with neighbors including the Ottomans.<sup>206</sup> The related literature also shows that, under the Ottoman rule, the khans preserved their right to maintain diplomatic relationship with Muscovy and Poland.<sup>207</sup> Finally, financial evidence indicate that the khans were neither independent or nor subject to the Ottoman sultans, except *Kefe* province, which was directly under the Ottoman rule. In *Kefe*, the Ottoman Empire appointed officials to collect the taxes and assigned revenues just as the same way they did in the other areas of their empire.<sup>208</sup>

---

<sup>205</sup> Fisher, 1978, p. 12

<sup>206</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 14

<sup>207</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 14

<sup>208</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 14

### 3.2.3 The Commonly Shared Acquisitions in Social Life

The lands of Golden Horde including Crimea were Islamized during the 14<sup>th</sup> century. Ottomans and Crimean Tatars were sharing the same interpretation of Sunni Islam, Hanafi *madhab* (Hanafi sect) besides the same paradigm and instruments to justify it. Therefore, for the Ottoman elite, Crimean Tatars were inseparable for a bigger Islamic community, and the relations between the two states were based on rhetoric of Islamic brotherhood. The positive perception of Ottomans about Crimean Tatars can be resumed in: ‘Muslim brother’, ‘ally against infidels’ and ‘economic partner’. The Crimean Tatars perceived Ottomans in almost the same way.<sup>209</sup>

Following the Islamization of the lands of Golden Horde, the Crimean Tatar identity was closely associated with the Islamic faith, and the most salient feature in this people's collective identity was their shared sense of belonging to the world of Islam. As Williams says:

As in most pre-modern, Muslim societies, Islam functioned as more than just a religion in the Crimea, it formed the basis for most of the Tatars' legal, cultural and social customs. Most of the Tatar *ulema* were thought in Ottoman Turkey and Islamic nomenclature were highly influenced by Ottoman Orthodox interpretation of Islam. The educational organization which aimed at reproduction and dissemination of Islamic paradigm among people and generations was organized in a similar way as that of the Ottoman Empire. Islam had all necessary instruments to build an identity based on its paradigm. There were approximately 1600 mosques and mektebs (religious schools) and control over much of the land in the Crimea, Islamic *ulema*, the village *mullahs* and *imams*, exerted a tremendous influence over virtually every aspect of life among the khanate's Muslim population.<sup>210</sup>

---

<sup>209</sup> Williams, 2001, p. 234

<sup>210</sup> Williams, 1997, p. 22



The Ottoman influence was greater among Tatar elites than on the nomads of the *Desht-i Kipchak*, who had a less convenient lifestyle and thus more likely to adopt the Ottoman urban culture. The Crimean Khans and the members of the Giray dynasty, the members of the Crimean nobility and merchants, craftsman and artisan were interested in the art products of high Ottoman culture. Even some of them were writing the poems and composing musical work in the Ottoman style. Gazi Giray I (1554-1607) is a good example of these Crimean Tatar elites who are not only interested in but also inspired by the Ottoman culture. He was both a poet in Ottoman Turkish and a very successful compositor of Ottoman classical music. For example, the poem below was written by him in *divan* literature style:

We are in love with the flag instead of the figure of the seducing darling  
We fell in love with the tail (*Tuğ*) instead of the nice perfumed hair of the  
darling  
Instead of the beautiful adorable lady with eyes of the gazelle  
We love flying horse on the way of the Jihad like blow<sup>211</sup>

### **3.3 The Period of Russian Annexation to the Crimean Khanate and Migrations to Ottoman Land**

The 1768-1774 Russo-Turkish War resulted in the defeat of the Ottomans by the Russians. After the war, the Treaty of *Küçük Kaynarca* (1774), which granted Crimea her independence, Ottomans renounced their political right to protect the Crimean Khanate. The treaty of *Küçük Kaynarca* was incapable of providing the structures of independent states. As a result, it caused a social and political mess which characterized the life in the peninsula. Tsarina Catherina II (the Great) tried to solve the Black Sea problem by separating Crimean Khanate from the Ottoman Empire, but she constantly found herself facing rebellion from the *ulema*, who were pro-Ottoman, and from the clan *beys*, who fought to preserve their own tribal political prerogatives. A client

---

<sup>211</sup> “Raayete meylederiz kaamet-i dil-cu yerine  
Tuuğa dil bağlamışız kakül-ü hoş bu yerine  
Severiz esb-i hünermend-i sabah-reftarı  
Bir peri-şekl sanem, bir gözü ahu yerine” (translated by the author)  
Maksudoğlu, Mehmet (1996). *Kırım Türkleri*, İstanbul: Ensar, p. 29.

ruler who was accepted by the parties was the Khan Şahin Giray. He took the Russian modernizers as model, but he failed to bring a relative stability to Crimea.<sup>212</sup> In the meantime, the growing Crimean Tatar diaspora played a leading role in lobbying the Ottoman government to support the efforts to liberate their homeland from Russian infidel and their Khan Şahin Giray.<sup>213</sup> The efforts paid by the Ottoman government, tribal *bey*s and *ulema* were successful. For Russia, there was no option other than annexing Crimea to its lands. The Russian Prince Grigorii Potemkin convinced Tsarina Catherine, who was unwilling to annex the peninsula, by the letter which reads the following:

Look what others acquired without opposition: France took Corsica; the Austrians, without war, took more from the Turks in Moldavia than we did. There are no powers in Europe that would not divide Asia, Africa and America among themselves. The acquisition of the Crimea can neither strengthen nor enrich you, but it will give you security. It will be a heavy blow, to be sure, but to whom? To the Turks.<sup>214</sup>

The century following the Russian annexation of the Crimean Khanate by Tsarina Catherine the Great was painful for Crimean Muslims. While the winds of nationalism blew in Balkan Christian peoples and while most of the ethnic groups around them redefined themselves on a national basis and fought for their independence, the Crimean Tatars transformed into a politically passive community of peasants and began to abandon their ancestral lands in a series of migrations to the lands of their traditional “suzerain/allies” and “coreligionists” Ottoman Empire.<sup>215</sup> For the Crimean Tatars, the year of Russian annexation to Crimea (1783) was a date of national mourning. This period is important in that it constituted a suitable ground for Crimean Tatar identity to converge to Muslim Ottoman identity vis a vis Russian infidels.

---

<sup>212</sup> Williams, 2001, p. 78

<sup>213</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 79

<sup>214</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 80

<sup>215</sup> Williams, 1997, p. 227

After that time, the Crimean Tatars began a tragic series of migration to the lands of the Ottoman Empire. Those who resisted migration found themselves as the new minority groups of their own ancestral land.<sup>216</sup> The Crimean Tatars encountered threat towards not only their cultural existence but also material welfare, which made them recognize migration as salvation.<sup>217</sup> Even though there was no official Russian policy of driving these Muslims from their homes, the new Christian governments imposed in the Crimea (1783) made thousands of Muslims so uncomfortable that they had to migrate -without special permission or attraction- into Ottoman territory.<sup>218</sup> Therefore, several waves of mass expulsions changed Crimean Peninsula's ethno-demographic structures significantly.

### 3.3.1 Patterns of Emigration

Except for the 1944 deportation, the 1783-1883 period can be considered as the worst period of the time that Crimean Tatar history had ever seen.<sup>219</sup> In that age indigenous people of Crimea were either forcefully converted to Christianity or made to migrate to an obscurity.<sup>220</sup> The Crimean Tatars were living in the land ruled by infidels, and they chose the religiously glorified action of '*hijra*' (emigration for the sake of God) towards the seat of the Caliph.<sup>221</sup> Their action had an Islamic connotation.

Due to the complexity of the migration patterns and the occurrence of remigrations, little reliable statistical data exists especially during the earlier

---

<sup>216</sup> Karpat, Kemal H. (2002). *Social, Economic and Political Studies of the Middle East and Asia*. Leiden; Boston; Köln: Brill Academic Pub., p. 691.

<sup>217</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 691

<sup>218</sup> Shaw, Stanford J and Ezel Kural (eds.) (2002). "Reform, Revolution and Republic. The rise of Modern Turkey (1808-1975)" *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey Vol II*. United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, p. 115

<sup>219</sup> Kırımlı, 1996, p. 7

<sup>220</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 7

<sup>221</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 8

periods.<sup>222</sup> Researchers resorted to Russian and Crimean Tatar sources for numerical Estimates and Ottoman sources for settlement patterns. As cited in Gözaydın,<sup>223</sup> founded on the statements of Baron de Tott, who was the advisor to the Khan, the population of the Khanate was 2 to 5 million between 1768 and 1769. Between 1783 and 1853, according to Özenbaşı, 500.000 people emigrated from Crimea, while the numbers are reduced to 300.000 by the Russian sources.<sup>224</sup> For Gözaydın, 1785-1788, 1789-1790, 1812, and 1828 were the years of the mass migrations.<sup>225</sup>

Nogais was the first to be deported from the peninsula in 1784. Later in 1778, 30.000 Crimean Tatars were expelled from Crimea, and between the years 1783 and 1791, some 100.000 were forced to flee with the fear of imprisonment.<sup>226</sup> Throughout the 19th century, the Tatars who were regarded hostile, experienced one of the most heavy-handed policies of Russification and encouraged to migrate.<sup>227</sup> The migrations fostered the Tsarist Russian systematic government policy.<sup>228</sup>

After the Crimean war (1853-1856), in which the Crimean Tatars were accused of collaborating with Ottoman Turks, 100.000 to 150.000 more Tatars were exiled from the peninsula. Between 1860 and 1862, 192.360 Tatars were forced to leave Crimea, and they migrated to the Ottoman Empire. Due to the ongoing colonization and reestablishment policies of the imperial Russia, the relative size of Crimean Tatar population sharply decreased while Slavic immigration started to increase on the peninsula.<sup>229</sup>

---

<sup>222</sup> Eren, Nermin (1998). "Crimean Tatar Communities Abroad" in Edward Allworth, (eds.), *Tatars of*

*the Crimea: Their Struggle for Survival*. Durham: Duke University Press, p. 325.

<sup>223</sup> Gözaydın, Ethem Feyzi (1948). *Kırım Türklerinin Yerleşme ve Göçmeleri*. İstanbul: Vakıf Matbaası, p. 27.

<sup>224</sup> Özenbaşı, Ahmed (1997). *Kırım Faciası: Saylama Eserler. İsmail Kerim and Meryem Özenbaşı*. Simferopol: Tavrida Basmahanesi, p. 65.

<sup>225</sup> Gözaydın, 1948, p. 103

<sup>226</sup> İzmirli, 2008, p. 230

<sup>227</sup> Pinson, Mark (1972). "Russian Policy and Emigration of Crimean Tatars to the Ottoman Empire: 1854-1862". *Güneydoğu Avrupa Araştırmaları Dergisi*. 1( 1), p. 44.

<sup>228</sup> Fisher, Alan (1982). "The Ottoman Crimea in the Sixteenth Century." *Harvard Ukrainian Studies*. 5(2), p. 135–170.

<sup>229</sup> İzmirli, 2008, p. 230

During the post Crimean War emigration of 1856-1861 to *Dobruca* and Anatolia, two thirds of the Crimean Tatar population of Crimea left their homeland in horrendous circumstances. It is also claimed that, of the total migrating population of 180.000, some 60.000 Crimean Tatars died while they were transiting to Ottoman lands.<sup>230</sup> Up to today, the next generations of the migrants have grown up hearing the sad stories told by the people who actually experienced the migration. These stories were about the hundreds of Crimean Tatar bodies on a daily basis washed up on the shores of the Black Sea.<sup>231</sup> As Shaw suggests:

We do not have overall figures of the total numbers of refugees entering the Empire at this time, but from individual accounts we can assure that the number was immense. Some 176.700 Tatars from the Nogay and Kuban settled in central and southern Anatolia between 1854 and 1860. Approximately a million came in the next decade, of whom a third were settled in *Rumeli*, the rest in Anatolia and Syria. From Crimea alone from 1854 to 1876, 1.4 million Tatars migrated into Ottoman Empire. According to the official statistics compiled by the Refugee commission, over 1 million refugees entered the empire between 1876-1895.<sup>232</sup>

For the average Crimean Tatar peasant, the best thing to do was to leave his home and dream about a new life on the land under Ottoman domination. Migration in a way became institutionalized in the 19<sup>th</sup> century. The Crimean Tatar identity of today's Turkey was shaped in those tragic days, in which the Tatar peasants emigrated to the 'dreamed' land of the Ottoman Empire.<sup>233</sup>

At the end of the Crimean War, the Ottoman Empire assisted those who had decided to emigrate. The Ottoman *Sultan* Abdulmecid who ruled from 1839 to 1861, aimed to fill the empty lands and thus increase the diminishing state

---

<sup>230</sup> Williams, 1997, p. 229

<sup>231</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 229

<sup>232</sup> Shaw, 2002, p. 116

<sup>233</sup> Williams 1997, p. 229

population at all costs.<sup>234</sup> This need for more inhabitants was clearly evidenced by the call for immigration made in 1857 via the major European newspapers.<sup>235</sup> In this appeal, the government urged Europeans to settle in the Ottoman realm, promising them land for agriculture, tax exemptions, and variety of religious and cultural incentives.<sup>236</sup> By the refugee code of 1857, immigrant families and groups (with a minimum amount of capital stipulated at 60 gold *mecidiye* coins, about 1500 French francs at that time) were given lands with exemption from taxes and conscription obligations for 6 years if they settled in Rumeli and 12 years if Anatolia.<sup>237</sup> To process the requests and settle the refugees, a refugee commission (*Muhacirin Komisyonu*) was established in 1860 at first in the ministry of trade, which was restructured as independent agency in July 1861.<sup>238</sup> After 1880, the new enlarged commission was headed by *Sultan*.<sup>239</sup> Consequently, after 1856, a huge campaign to migrate to Ottoman lands started. As Williams cited:

The Turkish agents, who were well dressed with large amounts of money in their pockets, moved through the (Crimean) cities and countryside relating how 'wonderful' and 'fortunate' life was in Turkey. The agitators were helped by the mullahs who had speculated on the religious devotion of the common Tatars. 'The *gavurs*' (unbelievers) are robbing you' they said 'it is not necessary to endure this any longer; God himself has led you to resettle in Turkey'<sup>240</sup>

---

<sup>234</sup> Karpat, 2002, p. 206

<sup>235</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 206

<sup>236</sup> *Ibid.*, p.206

<sup>237</sup> As Karpat said, "The act of mass migration, which was experienced in common by both the lowest and the highest ranking Muslim of the communities as well helped to increase the sense of Muslim communal solidarity and to bring down those social barriers that had separated the migrants in their original homes concrete changes in their economic and social conditions resulted in greater equality". *Ibid.*, p. 699

<sup>238</sup> Shaw, 2002, p. 115.

<sup>239</sup> Karpat, 2002, p. 692

<sup>240</sup> Williams, Brian Glyn (1997). "A Community Reimagined. The Role of "Homeland" in the Forging of National Identity, the Case of the Crimean Tatars", *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs*. 17(2), p. 228.

The establishment of a city, *Mecidiye*, for immigrants<sup>241</sup> was a direct consequence of these developments.<sup>242</sup> The official establishment of the town of *Mecidiye* in *Dobruca* through an imperial decree issued in 1856 was an interesting and unusual case of Ottoman neo-urbanism and settlement.<sup>243</sup> However, during the Turko-Russian war of 1877-1878, many Crimean Tatars, who had settled in *Dobruca*, had to retreat with the Ottoman armies to settle in Anatolia.

Based on the Ottoman sources, between 1854 and 1864, approximately 600.000 migrants mostly from the Crimea emigrated, and 120 000 of them were settled in *Dobruca*.<sup>244</sup> Following the 1877-1978 Turko-Russian War, another massive forced migration took place between 1891 and 1902. According to the 1897 census, the Crimean presence in Crimea diminished by at least one half, and its ratio to the total population fell to 35.1 %.<sup>245</sup> According to Gözaydın, between 1793 and 1914, the number of emigrants reached 5 million, and only 238.000 of them were left in the Crimea.<sup>246</sup> In the famine of 1920, forced migrations were followed by 50.000 Crimean Tatars fleeing to Romania. All in all, as Karpat states, between 1783 and 1922, at least 1.8 million Crimean Tatars migrated to Ottoman lands.<sup>247</sup>

### 3.3.2 The Circumstances Waiting for the Migrants

The ethnic cleansing campaign run to the Muslim population of Balkan countries (Bulgaria, Greece and Serbia) between 1821 and 1922 coincided with the reforms in the Ottoman Empire. According to Karpat, “those reforms

---

<sup>241</sup> It was built on the basis of a city plan prepared by technical offices of the Trade Ministry (*Ticaret Nezareti*) and Building council (*Abniye Meclisi*) specifically to accommodate refugees from Crimea and to serve as a center for the economic development of Central Dobruca. Karpat, 2002, p. 202

<sup>242</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 206

<sup>243</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 206

<sup>244</sup> Karpat, Kemal H. (Winter 1984-1985). “Ottoman Urbanism: The Crimean Emigration to Dobruca and the founding of Mecidiye, 1856-1878”. *International journal of Turkish Studies*. 3(1), p. 7.

<sup>245</sup> İzmirli, 2008, p. 230

<sup>246</sup> Gözaydın, 1948, p. 103

<sup>247</sup> Karpat, 1984, p. 66

began chiefly with Sultan Mahmut II (1808-1839), who started a new phase in the Tanzimat Era (1839-1876), and finally took an entirely different course after 1876 under Abdulhamid II.”<sup>248</sup> The Sultan Abdulhamit era is the particular focus for it determined the forging Crimean Tatar diaspora identity.

In the time of Abdulhamid II (1876-1909), the reforms were Islamic in character. As maintained by Karpas, “it was the migration of Muslims from the periphery of the Muslim world that forced him to adopt his so called ‘Islamic’ policy, and to follow a political course different from that of his predecessor.”<sup>249</sup> He says that this policy named as Ottomanism brought a new concept of state, nationhood, territory, and Islamic identity. Ottomanism had little in common with the classical Islamic ideas of state, government and territory.<sup>250</sup> When Sultan Abdulhamid came to throne in 1876, he prioritized, to maintain the six centuries old dynasty, the existing Ottoman territory. To this end, he had the aspiration to strengthen the Islamic creed (*akide*) in whatever way was necessary to assure the mutual survival of dynasty, state and faith.<sup>251</sup> Therefore, Islam was the only marker for identification for the subjects of the Ottoman State:

Ottoman primary schools after 1880 shows that those were written primarily to foster a sense of Ottoman Muslim identity in the pupils. .... On the other hand, the reform movement in 1880s brought about a need for education and other literature, which was almost unavailable in Crimea, provided in Turkey.<sup>252</sup>

The Ottoman Empire embraced the ethnic differences. According to Brass, what had been pursued by Ottoman Empire was:

..to prevent the maintenance of separate identities or to limit the influence of ethnic groups range from the most extreme forms of repression, including genocide

---

<sup>248</sup> Karpas, 2002, p. 692

<sup>249</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 692

<sup>250</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 692

<sup>251</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 705

<sup>252</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 705



and deportation, policies designed to undercut potential bases or ethnic group mobilization through assimilation in the schools or through the integration or cooperation of ethnic group leaders into the structures of power and wealth in the society.<sup>253</sup>

Brass brought up an issue important for the study. The policies pertaining to Crimean Tatar ethnic group mobilization through assimilation in the schools and Crimean Tatar groups leader transmission towards the structures of power (i.e political branches of the newly established Republic of Turkey) directly affected the Crimean Tatar immigrants psychological stance vis a vis Turkish national identity. Crimean Tatars, who are one of the closest ethnic group to Turks, were promptly integrated into the Turkish society.

According to Kırımlı, the Ottoman approach was quite welcoming towards the migrants. As a result, “in addition to well known historical religious linguistic and geographical bonds, the relations between the Muslim Turkic population of the Crimea and Turkey acquired new patterns after the Russian invasion of the Crimea in 1783.”<sup>254</sup> Traditionally, the primary interest of the average Crimean Tatar of religious nature, as this was also the principle basis of his own self-identification. As Kırımlı said:

No doubt, the Ottoman Empire, as the seat of the Caliph, held a certain mystical significance for him. Under the conditions of isolation from Russian society during the first century of Russian rule, for many Crimean Tatars the “outside world” meant Turkey though for the most part was a one way street.<sup>255</sup>

### **3.3.3 Emergence of Diaspora Nationalism and Identity at the Edge of the Ottoman Empire**

For Weber, without an economic origin, nationalism is based on sentiments of prestige, “which often extend deep down to the petty bourgeois masses of

---

<sup>253</sup> Brass, Paul R. (1991). *Ethnicity and Nationalism Theory and Comparison*. London: Sage Publications, p. 50.

<sup>254</sup> Kırımlı, 1996, p. 150

<sup>255</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 150

political structures rich in the historical attainment of power-positions.”<sup>256</sup> This prestige is significant in that it breeds strong faith in the responsibility towards the next generations. Being the specific partners of a specific culture which diffused among the members of the polity, under the influence of these circles, the naked prestige of power unavoidably transformed into other special forms of prestige and especially into the idea of the nation.<sup>257</sup>

There exist two flows that had been affected by the Crimean Tatar nationalist sentiments in the diaspora. The first was Gaspıralı’s pan-Turkism, and the second one was Young Tatar’s idealistic and revolutionary nationalist movement. As a follow up of these two, the third flow ‘Fatherland Society’ that was founded by the independent Crimean Tatar Republic developed their ideas in İstanbul by the *émigré* Crimean Tatar students.<sup>258</sup>

The first group was Gaspıralı’s pan-Turkic and pan-Islamic followers who acted within the All-Russian Muslim Congresses and organized ‘Union’ (*İttifakı Muslimin*) with other Muslim nations to join in First Duma activities after 1905.<sup>259</sup> According to Gaspıralı, the only way of maintaining the Crimean Tatar existence in the Crimea was to make coalition with the other Muslim population of the Empire. For Gaspıralı, the problem could not be reduced to Crimean Tatar cause. All Turko Muslim worlds had suffered from the same problem. The Crimean Tatars issue is not a local one in nature and

---

<sup>256</sup> Weber (1948) cited in Hutchinson, John., and Smith, Anthony, D.,(eds), (1994). *Nationalism*, Oxford Hyman: London: Oxford University Press, p. 21.

<sup>257</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 21

<sup>258</sup> Kırımal, Edige (1982). “Kırım Türklerinin Milli Mücadelesi II”. *Emel*. (125), p. 29.

<sup>259</sup> *Ibid*, p. 29

In 1883 by the “Tercüman” meaning interpreter, which was widely circulated around whole Muslim world, İsmail Gaspıralı initiated “national awakening” both in the Crimea and among the Muslim Turko population of the Russian Empire. Kırımer,1996, p. 74

Gaspıralı developed a system called “*Usul-ü Cedid*” (New Method) in order to bring the backward Muslim Turk society to the level of contemporary civilizations. He opened more than 5000 schools in the Crimea, Caucasus İdil-Ural and Central Asiai in which new method invented by him had been implemented. Kırımer,1996, p. 11

His motto was “Unity in language, idea and work.” He committed himself to find a way to use a common Turkish language which will provide a basis for the cultural unity of all Turko/Muslim people. Kırımer, 1996, p. 41

Kırımer, Cafer Seydahmet (1996). *Gaspıralı İsmail Bey: ‘Dilde, Fikirde, İşte Birlik*. İstanbul: Avrasya Bir Vakfı Yayınları, p. 2.

should not be singled out from the total.<sup>260</sup> In other words, as a national identification, there was no term such as “Crimean Tatar”. As Kırımlı said “Tatar identification was not the primary one for the Turkish speaking Muslim inhabitants of the Crimea. It was only one of the Turko-Muslim populations of the Russian Empire, such as Volga Tatars, Uzbek Tatars, Caucasian Tatars, and Turkmen Tatars.<sup>261</sup> According to Gaspıralı, ‘Tatar’ is identified by Russians according to their ‘divide and rule’ politics. Although previously he used “Turk”, “Turko-Tatar,” “Tatar” and “Muslim,” interchangeably, after 1905, he mostly used “Turks”.<sup>262</sup>

The second group mentioned above was the Young Tatars, who aimed to transform Gaspıralı’s apolitical idealistic stance to a politically conscious and national one.<sup>263</sup> They were neither pan-Turkic nor pan-Islamic, rather they focused on struggle against the autocratic system of Tsarist Russia by providing social and political liberation to Crimean Tatars. Since they were educated in Russian Schools, Russian revolutionaries influenced them. In Crimean Tatar political literature, the concept of “Fatherland” in the sense of ‘patria’ for the first time treated by their newspaper called Servant of the Fatherland (*Vatan Hadimi*) (1906-1909) in the sense of “an ethno-religiously and territorially defined setting.”<sup>264</sup> By means of *Vatan Hadimi*, the initiative contributed to the emergence of national consciousness among the Crimean Tatars.<sup>265</sup> At the end of its first decade, autocratic measures of Russia undermined their existence in Crimea while continuing the revolutionary underground organizations that provided the base for the future nationalist movement of 1917.<sup>266</sup>

The third wave is particularly important because, as said above, it found its roots in Istanbul as an illegal Crimean Tatar student organization under the

---

<sup>260</sup> Kırımlı 1996, p. 40

<sup>261</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 36

<sup>262</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 40

<sup>263</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 76

<sup>264</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 85

<sup>265</sup> Kırımlı, Edige (1982). “Kırım Türklerinin Milli Mücadelesi II”. *Emel.* (125), p. 29.

<sup>266</sup> Kırımlı, 1996, p. 101

leadership of Numan Çelebi Cihan and Cafer Seydahmet. This organization aimed at the liberation of the Crimean Tatar nation.<sup>267</sup> The interesting thing was that their actions were backed by the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) and the intelligence service of the CUP *Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa*. As there was a lack of connection between Bahçesaray and Istanbul between the years 1914 and 1917, together with other Turkish *émigrés* and with the initiative of the CUP, they organized an ad hoc ‘society for the defense of the rights of Turko-Tatars in Russia’, which appealed to neutral states such as the United States, Scandinavian states and the allied powers by raising self-determination issue for the Muslim Turks in the Russian Empire.<sup>268</sup> In 1916, this “Society” participated in the “League of the Alien Peoples of Russia”, which appealed to Wilson in the name of Russian nationalities and demanded help.

After the collapse of the Russian Empire, CUP decided to send a national intellectual cadre, mostly constituted by Crimean Tatar diaspora volunteers, to the Crimea.<sup>269</sup> At that time Numan Çelebi Cihan and Cafer Seydahmet were already in Crimea with the proclamation of self determination. They called all the Crimean Tatars who were outside of the fatherland to make a contribution to the days of independence of the Crimea. Ülküsal, the leader of the second *Emel* Movement, was also among these young people.<sup>270</sup>

Before the March 1917 revolution in Russia, the Fatherland Society had recruited the other nationalist revolutionary cells in an organization. In April, an all-Crimean Muslims Congress was upheld, and a Central Executive Committee was formed.<sup>271</sup> By declaring autonomy, they opened the Crimean Tatar National Parliament, *Kurultay*, in *Bahçesaray* on 9 December.<sup>272</sup> The

---

<sup>267</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 169

<sup>268</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 203

<sup>269</sup> Bowman, İnci (1996). “Kırımlı Bir Eğitim Savaşçısı Fevzi Elitok Altuğ (1878-1934)” *Emel*. (165), p. 5.

<sup>270</sup> Ülküsal, Müstecip (1999). *Müstecip Ülküsal: Kırım Yolunda Bir Ömür (Hatıralar)*. Ankara: Kırım Türkleri Kültür ve Yardımlaşma Derneği Genel Merkezi, p. 77.

<sup>271</sup> Kırımlı, 1996, p. 209

<sup>272</sup> Fisher, 1981, p. 20

first Crimean Tatar government was headed by Çelebi Cihan (Cafer Seydahmet were appointed as the Minister of War). In January 1918, Bolsheviks crushed the Crimean Tatar *Kurultay* government and killed Çelebi Cihan.<sup>273</sup>

By the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, the number of Europeanized pan-Turkist urban Crimean Tatar who spoke a hybrid Turkic language that is closer to Ottoman Turkish and who had the notion of a ‘Turkic Homeland’ had increased. On the other hand, by the turn of the century, when the followers of Gaspıralı began to focus on the idea of improving the political and social unity of Turkic world, some new voices were raised for a more narrowly defined community of Tatars in the Crimea.<sup>274</sup> As William’s says:

These students, teachers, and members of a intelligentsia who had been inspired by Russian nationalists and the Young Turk movement in the Ottoman Empire, began to think of their Crimean branch of Tatars as a distinct nation. A local version of Tatar nationalism with a newly formulated emphasis on the Crimean peninsula as the Tatars’ sacred *vatan* (Homeland) began to be formulated by this new social stratum in the final days of the Russian empire.<sup>275</sup>

In Kırımli’s words:

It was the Young Tatars who manifestly introduced the territorially-bound and-defined Crimean Tatar national concept. For them the Crimea was the Fatherland of the Crimean Tatars, who had unalienable historical rights upon it.<sup>276</sup>

This part will be dwelled on further due to its capacity to reflect the spirit of *Emel* after 1980s. Parallel with the developments, after the notion of the

---

<sup>273</sup> Kırimer, Cafer, Seydahmet (1993). *Bazı Hatıralar*. İstanbul: Etam A.Ş, p. 298.

<sup>274</sup> Williams, 1997, p. 230

<sup>275</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 231

<sup>276</sup> Cited in *Ibid.*, p. 232

nationhood had been crystallized in the minds of activists of both Crimean and Crimean Tatars of Turkey, some diaspora organizations started to be built up. However, after the foundation of the modern Turkey, the Crimean Tatars bound their self-identity with the Turkish meta-identity; their diaspora identity development was not followed by the process that had been expected by Young Tatars.

In the view of Renan, the requirements for being a nation are a true glory in definition with race, language or religion, common heroic past, and common great leaders. A nation, for Renan, is a 'soul', or it is a 'spiritual principle'. He emphasizes the 'past' and 'present' by saying that only two things can constitute this soul; "one is the possession in common of a rich legacy of remembrances; the other is the actual consent, the desire to live together, the will to continue to value the heritage which all holds in common."<sup>277</sup> For him, a nation is the end product of sacrifice, devotion, and work<sup>278</sup> A heroic past and a great men of a glory are the social principles of the national idea. In order to be a nation, a community must have common glories in the past, a common will in the present, accomplishments of great things, and the desire to do so again.<sup>279</sup> By the modern era, nationalism had been a political principle, which has become a sociological necessity.<sup>280</sup> Gellner explains nationalism as follows:

. . .the general imposition of a high culture on society, where previously low cultures had taken up the lives of the majority, and in some cases of the totality, of the population ... It is the establishment of an anonymous, impersonal society, with mutually substitutable atomized individual, held together above all by a shared culture of this kind.<sup>281</sup>

---

<sup>277</sup> Renan, 1882 cited in Hutchinson, J., and Smith, A., D., (eds). 1994. "*Nationalism*, Oxford Hyman: London: Oxford University Press, p. 17

<sup>278</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 17

<sup>279</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 23.

<sup>280</sup> Gellner, Ernest (1983). *Nations and Nationalism*. Blackwell: Oxford, p. 6.

<sup>281</sup> Gellner, 1983, p. 57

As a matter of fact, both Crimean ethnic and national identities went under the domination of Turkish nationalism, which took the above mentioned path to nationalism. Even the disintegration of the Russian Empire in 1917 and a (short) Crimean semi-independence on the peninsula could not change this picture. On the other hand, with the formation of modern Turkey on 29 October 1923, the destiny of Crimean Tatars of Turkey was cut down from those left behind in the Crimean Peninsula. As mentioned by Waxman, “since the ‘motor’ for Turkish modernization, has been the state and its narrow governing clique, the state elite are seen as the architects of Turkish national identity and ethnic differences were undermined”<sup>282</sup>. As Hakan Yavuz mentions, “the determination of national identity, in particular after 1925, was made strictly at the level of the statist Republican elite and pointedly excluded the mass of society”, and as Çağlar Keyder states, “Turkish nationalism is an extreme example of a situation in which the masses remained silent partners and the modernizing elite did not attempt to accommodate popular sentiment. The masses in Turkey generally remained passive recipients of the nationalist message propounded by the elite.”<sup>283</sup> Gellner claims that Kemalism makes a rare example to nationalism in the Muslim world, by excluding religion and creating common national identity.<sup>284</sup>

To sum up, the foundation of the Turkish Republic broke the Islamic/Turkish history and endeavored to open a new chapter in the minds of the Ottoman people. As Öktem argued:

The formative power of the official historical discourse remained largely uncontested until the end of the cold war era, when internal and external changes opened the way for a re-consideration of the frozen official historiography of contemporary Turkey. After the nationalist reassertion of the 1980 coup d’état, the 1990s were characterized by the

---

<sup>282</sup> Waxman, Dov. (2000). “Islam and Turkish National Identity: A Reappraisal”. *Turkish Yearbook of International Relations*. No. 30. p. 6.

Available at <http://dergiler.ankara.edu.tr/dergiler/44/670/8527.pdf>

<sup>283</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 22

<sup>284</sup> Gellner, Earnest (1996). *Encounters with Nationalism*. Blackwell: Oxford. Chapter 7

emergence of a plethora of writers and researchers questioning nationalist interpretations of history.<sup>285</sup>

Converting a multi-ethnic and religious state to an ethno-national secular one took time and led to repression. The newly established Turkish Republic waited until 1946 to pass to a multi-party political system. However, repression on any kind of differences extended up to mid 1980s. As stated earlier, the changing discourse of *Emel* became the product of that process after 1980s. Discourses of Crimean Tatar national activists were directly affected by the changing political circumstances.

### **3.4 Deportation of the Crimean Tatars from Homeland in 1944**

The Crimean Tatars who resisted migrating to Ottoman lands and chose to stay at their homeland experienced a rarely sorrowful event. At the night of 17-18 May 1944, Soviet soldiers of the NKVD (People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs)<sup>286</sup> forced their way into the homes of Crimean Tatars. As Ayşe Seymuratova said, sleeping children, old men and women whose fathers, sons and husbands had been on the front during World War II. were declared as traitors against the motherland and exiled in perpetuity to Central Asia and Siberia to spend their lives in special settlements.<sup>287</sup>

Starting from the deportation, the Crimean Tatar National Movement in exile went through a number of phases that were associated with different types of resistance. The modes of resilience changed and were adjusted in parallel with the rejection shown by the Soviet authorities. Uehling explains those phases as follows:

---

<sup>285</sup> Öktem, Kerem (2003). *Creating the Turk's Homeland: Modernization, Nationalism and Geography in Southeast Turkey in the Late 19th and 20th Centuries*. Oxford: Oxford Press, p. 4.

<sup>286</sup> the Soviet police and secret police from 1934 to 1943: the police from 1943-1946 forced their way into the homes of Crimean Tatars

<sup>287</sup> Cited in Allworth, 1998, p.155



The first, “ideational” phase was one in which the idea of return was cultivated even as the people’s efforts were devoted to their physical survival... This was followed by a nascent phase beginning in 1956 in which Tatars tentatively began to write letters...An intellectual phase followed in the 1960s in which activists or initsiativniki (or initsiatory) were inspired by the history they rediscovered. The expansive phase began in 1967 with the exculpation (that failed to win them the right to repatriate)... In the 1960s, the first demonstrations were held and activists cultivated contact with the dissident movement of the Soviet Union...The mass social movement phase begins in 1987 with the advent of glasnost and perestroika, and is characterized by the active involvement and repatriation of Crimean Tatars from all segments of society in one of the largest movements on the territory of the Soviet Union. A sixth phase of reframing in the Crimean homeland is still in progress<sup>288</sup>

The 1989 was a remarkable date in history for Crimean Tatars who had lived in Central Asia on the nationalist level. Migration of the Crimean Tatars was the direct consequence of the growing ethnic turmoil during the summer and autumn of 1989. As Williams says:

From 1989 to 1994, a quarter of a million Crimean Tatars migrated from Central Asia, predominantly from Uzbekistan, to the Crimean Peninsula. In many ways this migration was a symbolic victory for the traditionally passive Crimean Tatars who had been brutally deported from their homeland by Stalin during the Second World War. For almost half a century this exiled people of no more than half a million had been denied the right to express its ethnic identity, to speak its language or to return to its cherished villages and homeland on the distant shores of the Black Sea. It was only towards the end of Mikhail Gorbachev's presidency of the USSR that this liberalizing leader decided to rectify one of the greatest injustices carried out by his predecessors and

---

<sup>288</sup> Uehling, Greta (2004). *Beyond Memory*. New York. Palgrave Macmillan, p.138.

allow the exiled Crimean Tatars to return to their ancient homeland.

By the 1990s, there were 1.6 million Russians in Crimea and 620,000 were largely Russified Ukrainians.<sup>289</sup> Nevertheless, Crimean Tatars who had been deported to the Central Asia were attempted to resettle in the Crimea after the 1960s.

In 1966, when the 23<sup>rd</sup> Congress of the CPSU (Communist Party of the Soviet Union) was to take place, initiative groups and activists in the national movement submitted a collection of documents on the destruction of Crimean Tatar People in 1944- 1945, the participants in the World War II, the barbarism of the German fascists in Crimea. Their purpose was to convince Soviet authorities of their innocence. In parallel with the congress, they collected 130.000 signatures for applying to return their homeland.<sup>290</sup>

In the course of the events the 1967 decree which absolved them from the accusations of wartime collaboration with the Germans and granted them the right to “reside in every territory of the Soviet Union” did much to deter their campaign.<sup>291</sup> From the perspective of the Soviet Union “the citizens of the Tatar nationality formerly resident in Crimea” had plainly “settled in the Uzbek and other Union republics” there was therefore no need for them to return to Crimea. Although thousands attempted to go to Crimea in 1967-1968, nearly all were came back.<sup>292</sup>

In 1970s the long standing protest campaigns became a pattern for Crimean Tatars, which later on brought advantage to take urgent action under perestroika<sup>293</sup>. In 1987 they were at Moscow to present their wishes. At the time of the incidence Gorbachev set up a commission under Andrei Gromyko

---

<sup>289</sup> Williams, 1997, p. 243-244

<sup>290</sup> Seytmuratova cited in Allworth,1998, p.163

<sup>291</sup> Wilson cited in Allworth,1998, p. 281

<sup>292</sup> *Ibid.*, p.281

<sup>293</sup> Wilson cited in Allworth, 1998, p. 281

to study the Tatars's problem despite his 1988 report recommending the removal of 'unjustified obstacles to change the residence' by Tatars.<sup>294</sup> The National Movement of Crimean Tatars appeared in 1987 was the moderate parental organization whose leaders believed in peaceful protests and had been protested since 1960s. The more radical initiative 'Organization for he Crimean Tatar National Movement' whose leaders are the main actors of the expected national salvation succeeded it.<sup>295</sup>

Since 1917 for the first time the Second Crimean Tatar National Parliament assembled in Simferopol on 26-30 June 1991. Here a 33-member executive board, the Crimean Tatar National Mejlis, was formed and Mustafa Cemilev was elected as its first chairman. The Crimean Tatar's national anthem and national flag were adopted.<sup>296</sup>

In 1991, the Crimean Tatars proposed a draft constitution for the Crimea which would allow for the creation of a bicameral Crimean parliament. The lower house was to have 100 members elected on a territorial basis and the upper chamber would have 50 members representing "the indigenous population of the Crimea"<sup>297</sup>. The Crimean Tatars had, by 1993, accepted an allotment of 14 seats out of a parliament of 96.<sup>298</sup> In 1996, the Ukrainian constitution stated that Crimea would have autonomous republic status, but that legislation must be aligned with that of Ukraine. Crimea was allowed to have its own parliament and government.<sup>299</sup>

The sad history of Crimean Tatars who were subjected to deportation affected the diaspora consciousness in Turkey. Although they could not receive any news from their kin for quite a long time, they all knew that the political and ethnic outlook of the Crimea had changed drastically after the World War II.

---

<sup>294</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 282

<sup>295</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 283

<sup>296</sup> <http://www.unpo.org/members/7871>

<sup>297</sup> Williams, 1997, p. 245

<sup>298</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 246

<sup>299</sup> *Ibid.*, p.246

As in the 1783 and consecutive migrations, their kin deported to Central Asia were tried (in ethnic and national terms) to be cleaned off from pages of the history. They were well aware that all references associating peoples of Crimea with the 'homeland' were banned in Central Asia; furthermore, subsumed under the general category under "Tatarness" they were dissolved as a distinct ethnic group. They were informed that until the collapse of the USSR (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) in 1991, the Crimean Tatars were excluded from Soviet statistics and were not listed as a separate census category. The state sanctioned definition referred to them as "Tatars who previously lived in Crimea and are now based in Uzbekistan,"<sup>300</sup> albeit without giving a reason for their 'resettlement'.<sup>301</sup> It was only in 1994 that the Supreme Soviet of Crimea under Mykola Bahrov restored the name of the Crimean Tatars and asked the Ministry of Internal Affairs to make the appropriate changes in passports and other documents.<sup>302</sup>

Globalization led to better cultural interpenetration processes, as a result of which cultural differences among the groups started to be well received by the states. In this frame diaspora activities increased in number and deepened in content. Much of the struggle today among Crimean Tatars nationalists of the Turkish diaspora and those in the Crimea has been focused on politically mobilizing the five million partially inactive Crimean Tatars of Turkey and instilling in this community a more active link to their former homeland and their parent community in the former Soviet Union.<sup>303</sup>

The leaders of the Crimean Tatar Parliament, which is the self proclaimed parallel government of Crimean Tatars made frequent calls to their kin in Turkey to support them in their disputes with the local authorities.<sup>304</sup> They made reference to five million Crimean Tatar diaspora in Turkey in their

---

<sup>300</sup> Sasse, Gwendolyn (2007) *The Crimea Question: Identity, Transition, and Conflict*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, p 45.

<sup>301</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 45

<sup>302</sup> Allworth, 1998, p. 13-14

<sup>303</sup> Williams, 2001, p. 228

<sup>304</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 229

confrontations with local Crimean Authorities who attempted to prevent them from settling on the land in the Crimea.<sup>305</sup> In Turkey, the elites of diaspora community today have found themselves in the same position with the Jews. That is, approximately a quarter of a million Crimean Tatars of the Crimean peninsula have larger diaspora populations living beyond the borders of their historic homeland than within. According to Mükremin Şahin salvation is based on being well organized. If 5 million diaspora members committed themselves to buy lands in Crimea, they and their kin are bound to retain their historic homelands.<sup>306</sup>

Today although many members of the Tatar immigrant community in Turkey did become partially assimilated over time, many attempts are still made to foster a diaspora mentality. Instrumental use of rhetoric on homeland was the most prevalent of those attempts. Crimean Tatars have been migrating to Anatolia for centuries and level of identification with Crimea as a homeland among these descendants of these migrants has varied according to the historic circumstances surrounding their migrations. Since conditions of migration to Anatolia and the sequent period have never been as devastating as those of 1944 deportation, experienced by their kins, their identification with homeland has never been as strong as their kins'.

Despite the differences resulted by decades that passed under different state systems, there is a strong feeling of kinship between the Tatars of Commonwealth of Independent States<sup>307</sup> and Turkey. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Crimean Tatars needed the help of the Tatar community of Turkey when they were struggling for the rights in the Crimea. *Emel* frequently conceptualized this aspect in order to both construct diaspora identity among Crimean Tatars living in Turkey and mobilize Crimean Tatar diaspora in Turkey for the benefit of their kins in homeland and the Central Asia.

---

<sup>305</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 229

<sup>306</sup> In-depth interview with Mükremin Şahin, March, 2011,. Ankara.

<sup>307</sup> Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) was built up in December 1991. It unites: Azerbaijan, Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Ukraine on the basis of sovereign equality.

## CHAPTER 4

### A COMPREHENSIVE ANALYSIS OF A DIASPORA JOURNAL

#### *EMEL*

Publication of *Emel* has four major goals: dissemination of news that is of interest to diaspora community, and dissemination of semi scholarly information to crystallize the diaspora identity, development and distribution of quality resources about Crimean Tatar history, and presentation of valuable articles and poems<sup>308</sup> to provide profound information and arouse sentiment for the Crimean Tatar diaspora. Prior to the research, several interviews were conducted with *Emel* activists (two of whom were academicians) in order to have good insight into the journal. The primary aim of these interviews was to collect information to help contextualize *Emel* in time and space and conceptualize its meaning.

*Emel* had a unique place among the other diaspora journals published by Crimean Tatar diaspora groups in Turkey. Therefore, the study endeavors to find out what gives *Emel* its unique position in diaspora. All the interviewees agreed that while other journals bear features of a typical bulletin published in sporadic times, *Emel* is a much more systematic periodical with a specific aim and academic quality. They all agreed that it was also an important resource of information for the academic realm. For Kırımlı, *Emel* remained a unique example among the diaspora press all throughout its publication life. He stressed the difference and uniqueness of the periodical with these words: “To compare *Emel* with other diaspora periodicals is like to compare mango with grape.”<sup>309</sup> Kırımlı thinks that, from the beginning, *Emel* was geared towards meeting all of the needs of the diaspora, but it only managed to meet some of them due to various constraints it faced. Nevertheless, he added that he and his colleagues

---

<sup>308</sup>Both the poems and the articles reflected on the thesis are translated by the author.

<sup>309</sup> In -depth interview with Hakan Kırımlı May 2011, Ankara.

followed all publications issued at national level in Turkey and reflected all of them onto *Emel* within the period which is focus of the study. For example, in 1980, when a local newspaper in Adana released a news about Crimean Tatars, it was analyzed in *Emel*. He said that, unlike today, “at those times access to the information was too limited... A news published in Adana about Crimean Tatars was as much valuable as gold, and worth to be analyzed throughout pages.”<sup>310</sup>

Other Crimean Tatar diaspora activities in Turkey between 1960 and 1994 were also significant for this study to better understand *Emel's* uniqueness. On this issue, Kırımlı states:

Tatar diaspora in Turkey has its own peculiarities. Northern Nogais and those from Southern Yaliboyu Klan are really different in many aspects. Tatars coming from different cultures are settled in Anatolia and engaged with other different cultures. The difference is not merely limited with that. There were mass immigrations in 1780, 1810, 1840, 1855, 1860, 1874, 1880 and 1905. While those who came first were living in the same villages for 200–250 years, last waves of immigration were dispersed. Furthermore, taking into consideration the existence of the immigrants coming during Second World War, we can argue that there is no fundamental character of a diaspora.

Under these conditions, the first association for Crimeans was found by Fahrettin Kerim Gökay in 1952 in İstanbul and a branch was opened in Ankara in 1955. Its branch in Eskişehir opened in 1972. Their function was limited with organizing Crimean nights. If you put aside *Emel*, the only diaspora activity was limited with those till the beginning of 1980s. Because *Emel* was a single path diaspora movement for a long time.<sup>311</sup>

Zafer Karatay maintains that all Tatar associations with varying ethnic aspirations were closed by the restrictive association law between the two

---

<sup>310</sup> In-depth interview with Hakan Kırımlı, May 2011, Ankara

<sup>311</sup> In-depth interview with Hakan Kırımlı, May 2011, Ankara

military coups. There being no other association, *Emel* worked like an unofficial association. The journal promoted and propagated the Crimean case. Karatay optly narrates how their cultural awakening turned out to be diaspora nationalism:

We were organizing spring fest called “Tebrech”. In 1981, we organized these fests with the participation of Crimean Tatar youth in one bus. A year later it happens in two buses. In 1982, while going to the fest by bus, we said “One day we will arrange these fests in Crimea”. At those times it was an utopia. But it became real.

After 1980s *Emel* started to act as a systematic organ of the diaspora. While we have still no premises to come together, we were meeting either at a café called *Geniş Müdür* in Kolej district of Ankara or in the clinic of Aunt Çiçek who is the mother of Hakan Kırmılı and the wife of Ali İhsan Kırmılı. There, me, Hakan Kırmılı, Mükremin Şahin and Ünsal Aktaş, we were talking about our cause till the midnight. What should have been done? First we had to learn Cyrillic alphabet. Then, we formed a stock of articles of the publications of Tatar diaspora. We were collecting the articles from Gafur Gulam Publications in Tashkent. “Lenin Flag” issued as from 1957 and *Yıldız* (Star), the periodical of art and literature, which were authorized by USSR in 1980 were our other resources.

Then we loaned an apartment of 30 square meters in *Bahçelievler, Eser Sitesi*, near the oil station at the 8<sup>th</sup> street. We supplied our office furniture from Uncle Müstecip. We started to the activities to establish an association there. We were publishing the periodical there in the beginning of 1980s.<sup>312</sup>

In the meantime, however, the journal suffered from financial limitations. For some time, the center for American Cultural Association in Ankara functioned as one of the activity places.<sup>313</sup> Then, the Foundation of Crimean Tatars was founded for the sake of financing the periodical, but it was not

---

<sup>312</sup> In- depth interview with Zafer Karatay, August 2011, Ankara.

<sup>313</sup> In -depth interview with Hakan Kırmılı, May 2011, Ankara.



always successful in this end. The success of *Emel* continued to be dependent on the individual efforts of the activists.<sup>314</sup>

Regarding periodisation that has been set from the beginning of the study, all the interviewees agreed upon the time division of 1960–1983 and 1983–to 1994. Regarding the articulation of 'Crimea' as a homeland in the journal, all the responses pointed at the period starting in mid 1980s. However, the present research revealed that Crimea constituted the substance of the journal from the beginning. However, the way it was articulated was indirect and roundabout up to mid 1980s as it is seen in the way homeland Crimea is amalgamated into Turkish nationalism in the prologue published in the first issue of *Emel*:

*Emel* was first published on January 1st, 1930 by ten young Crimean Tatars from *Pazarçık*, a town in Romania. The purpose of its publication was stated in the first page of 1930 publication as 'to pave the way to the unity in thought and ideal of the Turkic peoples living in distant parts of the world and speaking different Turkish dialects'.

...*Emel* continued to appear for five years in *Pazarçık* and six years in *Köstence*. Its eleven volumes of 5000 pages included more than 300 articles and many literary writings which now constitute a most reliable source of information for the independence movement and cultural developments of the Crimea and other Turkic people.

...Now *Emel* is appearing again in the same spirit in Ankara in the happy atmosphere created by the May 27, 1960 Revolution.<sup>315</sup>

Nevertheless, till mid 1980s, Crimea was the building stone of an identity which could not be expressed loudly. As a result, within this period, it was materialized through round away ways. For example, it pervaded the painful

---

<sup>314</sup> In -depth interview with Zuhale Yüksel, September 2011, Ankara.

<sup>315</sup> "Yeniden Çıkarken", 1960, *Emel*, (1), p. 2.

memories. After the mid 1980s, *Emel* became the address of the homeland oriented proactive stance, acting as an instrument of changing the political environment in the globalizing world.

Globalization, spreading ideas and resources all over the world, created the conditions for localization, in which national or group identities tended to be stronger than ideological or economic loyalties. That is, globalization shook Gellner's cultural emphasis on nationhood. He said that, for the persistence of a society, people should "breathe and speak and produce...the same culture."<sup>316</sup> Thus, identity crises may be associated with globalization.<sup>317</sup> In other words, the idea of homogenizing a national identity creating the "imagined community" for the nation-states was rocked.<sup>318</sup> This change in political circumstances in the globe and Turkey inevitably was reflected in the discourse of the journal. The *Emel* editors were well aware of that discourses on homeland play an important role in groups' expressions of their belonging, identities, and political affiliations. They used the changing circumstances to forge national identity.

The changing discourse throughout decades by the effect of the changing political conditions accounts for the multiple identities that are of fluid quality throughout the life of the journal *Emel*. Because diaspora groups are not empowered to draw the boundary lines as they wish, they have a tendency to shape themselves within the limits of what is allowed by the dominant political system in Turkey. The purpose of the journal is to maintain and reshape the identities ascribed by the host country the Republic of Turkey, which are embodied by the diaspora community.

Since the historical context focuses on the socially and politically changing years of the Republic of Turkey as well, the traces of influx affiliations and

---

<sup>316</sup> Gellner, Ernest (1983). *Nations and Nationalism*. Oxford: Blackwell, p. 38.

<sup>317</sup> Friedman, Jonathan (1994). *Cultural Identity and Global Process*. London: Sage, p. 86.

<sup>318</sup> Herzfeld, Michael (1997). *Cultural Intimacy: Social Poetics in the Nation-State*. New York: Routledge, p. 11.

the current discourse were reflected onto the pages of the journal. Particularly at the early period between 1960 and 1983, the journal mainly aimed to preserve the memories from earlier generations in an attempt to keep the national identity alive amid the context of present values and identifications. The diaspora elite constructed and reconstructed the diaspora identity by means of the journal. Hall's widely known phrase eloquently explains the limitations of the diaspora elite, namely *Emel* editorials, in their cause between 1960 and 1983: "men make history, but only on the basis of conditions which are not of their own making."<sup>319</sup> He claims that identity is not "a finished thing"<sup>320</sup>, but an on-going entity arising "from a lack of wholeness which is 'filled' from outside us, by the ways we imagine ourselves to be seen by others."<sup>321</sup> The publication of *Emel* was an attempt to retain the floor, or prevent the 'others' from constructing an identity for the Crimean Tatar diaspora living in Turkey.

After 1983, a somewhat general thematic frame remained with some additions for a certain period. In that period, the concept of national identity, diaspora consciousness, and 'belonging to the homeland' were elaborated tacitly or explicitly by the editors of *Emel*. After 1983, the nation as 'home' was increasingly conceptualized parallel with Anderson's sense of imagined community instead of nostalgia directed to an utopic and romantic land, which had been over emphasized in the former period. Between 1983 and 1994, new parts were added for the classical thematic construction of the journal in order to reshape the 'national memory' of the Crimean Tatar diaspora.

Various changes occurred in 1983, when the new cadre came in charge of the publication of *Emel*. First, the outlook of the magazine changed. The new cadre colored the cover of *Emel* with azure blue of the Crimean Tatar

---

<sup>319</sup> Hall, Stuart, (1992) "The Question of Cultural Identity", in Stuart Hall; David Held and Tony McGrew (eds.). *Modernity and Its Futures*, Polity Press. p. 285.

<sup>320</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 287

<sup>321</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 287

flag, and used the Crimean map on the cover page. Secondly, they promoted the magazine with the motto “The Voice of Crimean Turks”. These developments were overwhelming for the old cadre as *Emel* activists, Hakan Kırımlı, Mükremin Şahin, and Zafer Karatay, stated during the interviews.<sup>322</sup>

The change in content came gradually. First, the term ‘Crimean Turk’ was replaced with ‘Crimean Tatar’ after mid 1980s. Later on, the content of the ‘news’ section became more diverse with the addition of translations of samizdat (underground Soviet publications) and foreign news obtained from sources such as Radio Liberty. The translated works were related to as varied issues as “the return” and other literary works, including those of Crimean Tatar authors. Furthermore, the previous authors of *Emel*, such as Hakan Kırımlı, Zafer Karatay, Nail Aytar, Ertuğrul Karaş, and Zuhâl Yüksel, and many other young authors started to write in 1990s particularly with the serials titled ‘From Our Youth in the Diaspora’ and ‘From Our Villages in the Diaspora’. The magazine gave up dealing with the political agenda of Turkey unlike its previous version. The writers of *Emel* focused on the matters of Crimean Tatars who mostly stayed in the former USSR. They chose to identify themselves as the ‘Crimean Tatars’. By doing so, the new cadre made diaspora closer to the homeland community. For instance, the first Crimean Tatar flag was published in the 185th issue of the *Emel* in 1991 with the belief in disciplining and even dominating diaspora by the homeland. According to Kırımlı, “the role of homeland in preserving diaspora identity is essential. Unless a diaspora is dominated by its homeland, the risk of disappearance and assimilation is just a matter of time.”<sup>323</sup>

---

<sup>322</sup> In-depth interview with Hakan Kırımlı. May, 2011, Ankara; Mükrem Şahin, February 2011, Ankara; Zafer Karatay, August 2011, Ankara.

<sup>323</sup> In-depth interview with Hakan Kırımlı. May, 2011, Ankara.

#### 4.1 Thematic Evaluation in *Emel* between 1960 and 1983

Since the present study leaves from the idea that the narratives of the *Emel* reflect a developing consciousness of the diaspora, it elaborates the nationalism theories to capture the insights embedded in the articles and poems of the journal. In 1991, Benedict Anderson said that “to adapt *Imagined Communities* to the demands of these vast changes in the world and in the text is a task beyond my present means. It seemed better, therefore, to leave it largely as an ‘unrestored’ period piece, with its own characteristic style, silhouette, and mood.”<sup>324</sup> After 1990s, the studies of nationalism fell under the post-modernist school of thought.<sup>325</sup> In 1999, as a response to the modernists, Smith wrote his seminal book titled *Myths and Memories of the Nation*, in which a new term ethno-symbolism was brought to the nationalism literature. Together with the “imagined community” of Anderson, “ethno-symbolism” constituted two key terms in understanding the journal *Emel*. The argument here is that *Emel* used “ethno-symbolism” in order to construct an “imagined community” in the minds and hearts of the diaspora community. The crucial point here is that the trend in publication policy goes forward the style adopting ‘ethno-symbolism’ as time progressed. As Smith says:

What gives nationalism its power are the myths, memories, traditions, and symbols of ethnic heritages and the ways in which a popular *living past* has been, and can be, rediscovered and reinterpreted by modern nationalist intelligentsias. It is from these elements of myth, memory, symbol, and tradition that modern national identities are reconstituted in each generation, as the nation becomes more inclusive and as its members cope with new challenges.<sup>326</sup>

---

<sup>324</sup> Anderson, Benedict (1991). *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*. London: Verso, 1991, p. xii.

<sup>325</sup> Between 1980 and 1990 the works fell under the modernist spell. The modernists saw the nations as uneven effects of capitalism. Hobsbawm defined nations as ‘invented traditions’ by ruling elites and political forces to channel the mobilization of the masses and Anderson defined it as a ‘imagined community’ as a modern ‘cultural artifact’.

<sup>326</sup> Smith, Anthony D. (1999). *Myths and Memories of the Nation*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 9.

Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, the periodical revolved around a couple of themes. One was the disaster that came with subsequent migrations of Crimean Tatars. Namely, the trauma caused by Soviet colonization, Bolshevik invasion, Balkan Wars (less frequently) and World War II. was used to raise diaspora consciousness among Crimean Tatar diaspora living in Turkey. For instance, in an essay titled “The Colonialism and the Colonist Russia” -written by Müstecip Ülküsal- the trauma was presented to the society in the form of a lecture. By describing the concept of ‘majority’ and minority issues and raising a political issue, Ülküsal aims to sow the seeds of identity based thinking. Indeed, he depicts the imperialism in the minds of diaspora community. He, at the same time, keeps the memories of the trauma fresh. By his lecture style, he depicts the history of colonialism in the world as follows:

According to Madariaga<sup>327</sup>: Spain colonized with religious ambigious, France to disseminate intellectualism, England with the drive to expand over the world. Later colonialism meant to deprive peoples of their freedom and of the right to determine their destinies that is their political liberties, to leave masses uncultivated; and to populate the colony with the people of the colonizers in order to reduce the majority of the natives into minority. This form of colonialism is blended with imperialism.<sup>328</sup>

Another prevalent theme was news from all around the world about their Crimean Tatar cause and the diaspora. This theme was also exploited whenever possible. The passage below exemplifies how, in the same article, before the introduction of the regular content of the issue, Ülküsal informed the diaspora society:

In October 1960, in the fifteenth session of the general assembly of the United Nations, the topic ‘to grant immediate and complete freedom to colonies’

---

<sup>327</sup> Salvador de Madariaga y Rojo (Spanish historian, 1886-1978)

<sup>328</sup> Ülküsal, Müstecip. (1961). “Sömürgecilik ve Soviyet Rusya”. Emel. (2), p. 7.

was included in the program to be discussed by the proposal of Nitika Krutchev, the Soviet premier.<sup>329</sup>

Bolshevik invasion was another recurring theme. It was important as the national disaster came with mass migrations. Mass migration dispersed the Crimean Tatars and enabled them to protect their homeland. Concerning the Bolshevik invasion, he revived the matter of diminishing population of the homeland due to the mass migrations. He said that population in Crimea was reduced from 5.5 million to 350.000 after the Bolshevik invasion. If the mass and consecutive migrations had not hampered the situation in terms of the population growth in the peninsula throughout a period of 134 years, the population would have increased from 5.5 millions to 25- 30 millions.<sup>330</sup>

As underlined above, narrating the history was most characteristic to *Emel* between 1960 and 1983. The aim was to inform diaspora members about the events that shaped the Crimean Tatar people's destiny, and to establish a distinct ethnic identity, which was planned to be used as a basis of a national consciousness in the minds of people.

The other prominent heading was narratives about the *Kurultay* and Crimean Khanate periods. As illustrated below, the former is significant because it vividly shows the state-building process in the modern sense:

In the time of 1917 revolution, 1500 Crimean Turk representative of the Crimean Turks assembled at Akmescit (Simperepolis) city and chose the Administrative Committee of the Crimean Muslims (date: March 20,1917).

The committee made the following preliminary decisions:

1. To have two Crimean delegates elected for the Constitutional Parliament of the Soviet Russia.

---

<sup>329</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 7.

<sup>330</sup> Ülküsal, Müstecip. (1962). "Kırım Türklerinin Faciası ve Kurtuluş Davası". *Emel*. (11), p. 5.

2. To have the management of the educational activities and institutions of the Crimean Turks.
3. To have the management of the Crimean Moslem foundations.
4. To have the management of the relations between the Crimean Turks and other political institutions in the Soviet Russia.<sup>331</sup>

The content of the decisions made by the committee must be considered as a declaration of a ‘bill for independence’. As often happens, diaspora was informed about the modern state building practice of their ancestors.

The other point is the capital city. *Bahçesaray* was given special importance for being the symbol of Crimean Khanate. Being one of the homeland identifiers, the Khan’s capital *Bahçesaray* was situated at the center of the Crimean Tatar culture and political life. Khan palace was constructed in 1503, a year after Mengli Giray Khan defeated the Great Horde in a battle to dominate the tribes of the Kipchak, who is the most substantial figure used to portray the homeland Crimea.

The capital of the Khanate, the Bahçesaray was in the Crimean Peninsula, which had a mild climate was covered by many vineyards and gardens. It also had abundant places for agriculture and husbandry.<sup>332</sup>

Certain details about the palace were also treated to create an imaginal anchor in the readers’ minds. The entrance of the palace, the Great Portal-Iron Gate, *Or Kapı*, and its trident shaped architecture were used as the national icons in the paragraphs.<sup>333</sup>

The journal also intended to etch onto the memories of the readers other cities such as *Gözleve*, *Karasu Bazar* (Black Water Market), *Akmescit* (White Mosque) *Kapı* and *Kefe* (Kaffa). They are considered as the

---

<sup>331</sup> Alaç, M. (1960). “Kurultay ve Kırım Parlementosu”. *Emel*.(1), p. 7.

<sup>332</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 5

<sup>333</sup> Ağat, Nurettin. (1962) “Bağımsız Kırım Hanları”. *Emel*. (12), p. 9.



important towns of the Khanate. Gözleve is a western port city well-known for *Cuma Cami*, an elegant mosque constructed by the Ottoman architect Sinan Pasha on the model of Süleymaniye mosque in İstanbul. *Karasu Bazar*, an eastern city, was the center of cattle trade. Akmescit was the administrative center for Khanate and the seat of the heir to the Crimean throne. *Kapı* (Golden Gate) is the northern Crimea frontier fortress, a center for the thriving salt trade with Ukraine. Although Kefe is not comparable with these cities as regards size and magnificence, it was a multiethnic capital on the Golden Hord and the main economic center for trade between the peoples of the Northern Black Sea and Anatolia.<sup>334</sup>

The Khanate epoch was important also with its “skilled warriors and fastest cavalymen to be found among the Crimeans and the masters of science, art and justice.”<sup>335</sup> It was a symbol of an accomplishment in the building state experience. As Müstecip Ülküsal said, the Crimean Tatars constructed schools, mosques, palaces, caravan lodgements, roads and bridges.<sup>336</sup> These were among prosperities of the Khanate, which constructed both militaristic and civic structures. As Ülküsal said:

The Crimean Khanate lasted for 363 years, from 1420 to 1783, and 45 Khans that reigned during this period. During that period, the Crimean Turks formed a strong state organization and a disciplined army, they secured peace tranquility and security in their country.<sup>337</sup>

Reading between the lines of the journal, one can perceive the message that the Crimean Khanate was a state that embraced different Tatar sub-groups within it. In other words, the cultural richness they had was emphasized while the diaspora is informed of the cities where their ancestors had settled.

---

<sup>334</sup> Aġat, Nurettin. (1968) “Kırım Şehirleri”. *Emel.* (46), p. 29.

<sup>335</sup> Kırım, Metin. (1982) “Kırım Hanlığı İhlakı ve 1944 Sürgünü”. *Emel.* (130), p. 40.

<sup>336</sup> Ülküsal, Müstecip (1962) “Kırım Türk’ünün Faciası ve Kurtuluş Davası”. *Emel.* (11), p. 9.

<sup>337</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 5

Tat<sup>338</sup> settled in Bahçesaray, Karasubazar, and numerous villages in the southern mountains or Ottoman coasts.<sup>339</sup> They called the coastal population of the Crimea as *Yalıboyu*, Sea Shore. They are coastal Tats from the Ottoman province of Kefe that went under strong Anatolian influence. The following paragraph illustrates this:

In the mountains region there were sedentary Tats. Sedentary Tats provided the Crimean Khanate with the majority of its artisans, bureaucrats, farmers in a word they gave Crimea an administrative core. They were Tatars of Gothic, Alan, Genoese, Armenian, Greek and Anatolian- Turkish descent who lost their clan ties and constitute a separate Crimean Tatar identity.<sup>340</sup>

There were also ‘Some Memories’ by Cafer Seydahmet including the childhood and school memoirs of 1920s. One of the aims of *Emel* was converting ‘nostalgia’ to ‘memory’. Memory is an act of remembering that can create new understandings of both the past and the present.<sup>341</sup> Memories are an active process by which meaning is created; they are not mere depositories of fact. Gile distinguishes nostalgia, which she sees as static, and remembering, which is more radical and transformative activity.<sup>342</sup> As Dermott (2002) stated:

Whereas “nostalgia” is the desire to return home, “to remember” is “to bring to mind” or “think of again” to be mindful of” “to recollect”. Both remembering and “re-collecting”, suggest a connecting, assembling, a bringing together of things in relation to one another...Memory may look back in order to move forward and transform disabling fictions to

---

<sup>338</sup> The Crimean Tatars are subdivided into three sub groups: The Tats who used to inhabit the mountainous Crimea; the Yalıboyu who lived on the southern coast of the peninsula; the Nogay retaining some Mongoloid physical appearance who are considered former inhabitants of the Crimean steppe.

<sup>339</sup> Bala, Mirza. 1966. “Kırım”. *Emel*. (35), p. 16.

<sup>340</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 15

<sup>341</sup> Agnew, John (2005). *Hegemony: The New Shape of Global Power*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, p. 13.

<sup>342</sup> Cited in Agnew, Vijay (2005). *Diaspora, Memory and Identity: A Search for Home*. University of Toronto Press, p. 13.

enabling fictions, altering our relation to the present and future.<sup>343</sup>

Similar to Giles, Agnew claims that the diasporic individual often has a double consciousness, a privileged knowledge and perspective that is constant with post modernity and globalization. The dual or paradoxical nature of diasporic consciousness is one that is caught between here and there, or between those who share roots and who are shaped through multimodality. The consciousness and identity of diasporic individuals may focus on their attachment to the symbols of their ethnicity, and they may continue to feel emotionally invested in the 'homeland'. However, such attachments and sentiments are experienced simultaneously with their involvement and participation in the social, economic, cultural, and political allegiances to their homes in the diaspora.<sup>344</sup>

Cafer Seydahmet Kırımer stories in the work of *Nurlu Kabirler* and his memories in 'Some Memories' were used by the editors in the journal as the main instrument to raise awareness and homeland consciousness. By giving a considerable place in the first 20 years (approximately from 1960s to early of 1980s) in the journal, the editors aimed to revive the national struggle and deterioration memories to the sons of emigrants in order to keep alive the national sentiments of the diaspora members.

Heroic tales were ghostwritten by the imaginary hero *Kurt Veli* (Cafer Seydahmet Kırımer). Using memories, the writer aimed to fill the gap in national feelings. Memories were real, which is why sometimes they were less effective than myths. Memories, symbols and myths were used as the raw material for the construction of identity. Müstecip Ülküsal, who was leading the editorial activities under different capacities, knew very well that the markers of identity would endure and be fit for mobilization only if they resonate. Due to that reason he never stopped publishing the stories of pride,

---

<sup>343</sup> Cited in *Ibid.*, p. 9

<sup>344</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 14

essays about the capital city or other beautiful cities of Crimea, and war memorials.

The other popular topic repeated almost in every publication was the 1944 deportation. The analyses made on the preconditions pointed at a common ground for deportation. The editors of *Emel* stress that the Crimean Tatars would have been numerically capable of building and maintaining a strong state if they had not been forced to migrate or exiled. It resembles the classical rhetoric on population decrease after the Bolshevik invasion. This is shown below:

It is not possible to give a correct estimate of the Crimean population at that date, because there was no proper census system then. However, the Crimean Khans could gather 200.000 and even 400.000 mounted men during military campaigns and wars. One mounted soldier was taken from every four family group (*Koranta*) in order not to upset the general living conditions and not stop the works in the field, wine yards and gardens. If we admit that every family must have been composed of at least 4 persons, the population of the Khanate must have been approximately 3 to 3.5 million.<sup>345</sup>

These considerably vast numbers were repeated many times. By referring to Özenbaşı's following words, Ülküsal aims at raising awareness on mass migration and its devastating effects: "the population of the Khanate at that period was of 5.5 million at least."<sup>346</sup> In this way, he also tacitly implies that 'you, the reader, are a member of that massive diaspora community, and you should be aware of yourself and not lose your identity'.

Almost in every publication there is a section on the shared history, friendship, brotherhood, kinship between the Ottoman Empire and Crimean Khanate or, in a broader sense, the Turkish and Crimean communities. The

---

<sup>345</sup> Ülküsal, Müstecip (1962). "Kırım Türklerinin Faciası ve Kurtuluş Davası". *Emel*. (11), p. 9.

<sup>346</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 9

editors see the ‘Russian Colonial Empire’, ‘Bolsheviks’ and (less frequently) ‘Balkan infidels’ as a common enemy and name it as the ‘other’. Being a Muslim was equated with being a Turk, and being a Turk was the common name of the Central Asia that originated from the non-Christian population. However, the reality lies behind the political circumstances of Turkey, which were, in that time, characterized by the restriction on ethnic diversity. Under the political constraints of the time in Turkey, Crimean Tatars articulated them as Turks. Nevertheless, when doing that, in every possible occasion, they did not refrain from articulating the names of their national heroes such as İsmal Bey Gaspıralı, presented as the leading figure of national consciousness. The following paragraph exemplifies this:

The Russian Colonial Empire attempted to reach the warm climates of India and the Mediterranean. To carry this attempt into effect, Russia made 28 wars in 200 years against the Ottoman Empire and thus the major part of the Russian Empire invaded Turkish lands. Czarist Russia led a particular colonizing policy against Turks or Muslims in general terms. It strengthened and activated the natural tribal behaviour among Turks and forced them to migrate, put an end to their national and religious activities, controlled all their cultural life, settled non Turks in the Turkish villages. This policy reached its goal by decreasing physical and moral power of Turkish people. In spite of these political ideals, Turks have had their own national consciousness as a result of the activity of such men as Şahabeddini Mercani, İsmail Gaspıralı, Ahuntzade Fatalı and liberal parties.<sup>347</sup>

This part ends with a poem, for it beautifully reflects all of the features of the journal published between 1960-1983. Since the poem written by Araslı summarizes the period in question, and exemplifies how the idea of homeland was utilized without any mention of ‘Crimea’ in the journal, it is presented on the page at length.

---

<sup>347</sup> Ülküsal, Müstecip (1960). “Sömürgecilik ve Sovyet Rusya”. *Emel*. (2), p. 8.

Do not condemn us for migrating to the homeland brothers,  
We are different neither in language nor tradition or descendance  
We are babies whose feet are dependant to the land,  
Babies of the raiders flying to another country in each season.

Vardar basin, Kosovo is the garden of tulip during summer,  
Imperial edict of Gülhane does not smell like tulip but like blood,  
There is powder in the soil of beautiful lands  
Watered by blood of our grandfathers, smell like Balkans

The defeat of Balkans which is the black spot in our spotless history  
We signed the contract of our slavery,  
After the consecutive world wars  
Shepherds of yesterday became our lords

They wanted to erase our ego with pleasure and passion,  
We were patient for years while hopping,  
They could not make us to forget our Turkishness  
Neither my father nor me or my naive boy

Red epidemic starting to spread over the globe  
In our birthplace, like northwest wind it blowed  
Even thinking and speaking were too much for us according to them  
We became a Karagoz in the shadow play of the “Iron Curtain”

Houses where we were born are fulfilled by foreigners  
Who occupied the fields we have cultivated for five hundred years  
Like the tales’ enchanted room number forty  
Our mouths locked up by an invisible key

Now, the fear is the harvest of the fields which are right of conquest,  
Fruits of the gardens full of work were forgotten.  
The fruits decorating in each meal our garden  
Are swallowed by greedy time in a single bite.

We are different from them dominating us for 40 years  
In terms of religion, language and blood  
We are untroubled and free children of the raiders  
The raiders who do not turn back from fatal borders.<sup>348</sup>

---

<sup>348</sup> Özyurda göçtük diye yadırgamayın kardeşler,  
Ne dilde, ne gelenekte, ne de soyda ayırınız.  
Her mevsim bir ülkeye uçmuş akıncıların,  
Ayakları toprağa bağlı yavrularınız.

Vardar boyu, Kosova lale habçesidir ilk yazın,  
Gülhane fermanı lale kokmaz kan kokar,  
Dedelerimizin kanyla sulanmış güzelim yerlerin  
Toprağına barut sinmiş Balkan kokar.

The poem narrates history; it gives messages of sameness with differences; for this time, it condemns Balkan infidels for the ethnic cleansing campaign they ran against the Balkan Muslims and the USSR Communists, who at the same time were conceptualized as common enemy. It overestimates linguistic, traditional, and religious values shared with the Ottoman Empire, thus with (Anatolian) Turks. Even though it does not mention the name of the 'Crimea', in this instance, it produces (roundabout) ethno-symbolism with the name of a city from Balkans, using its connotative link to the 'Crimea'. It uses 'the trauma' to preserve the national identity; it develops Tatar nationalism under the pan-Turkist umbrella. This is exactly why the 1970 poem titled 'Song of the Immigrant' (1912-1953) is thought to be meaningful at this point of the thesis. By the name of the poem, the poet

---

Ak tarihimizin kara sayfası Balkan yenilgisinde  
Kölelik buyruğunu imzaladık kendimiz,  
Ardarda gelen dünya sanvaşlarında  
Dünkü çobanlar oldu değişen efendimiz.

Zevkle şehvetle silmek itediler benliğimizi,  
Yıllar yılı sabrettik birşeyler uma uma,  
Ne babama unutturabildiler Türülüğünü  
Ne bana, ne de gün görmemiş oğluma

Yer yuvarlağını sarmaya başlayan kızıl salgını  
Gün geldi kara yel gibi esti doğduğumuz yerede  
Düşünmek konuşmak bile çok görüldü insanlığa  
Birer canlı karagöz olduk "demir perdede" de

Yabancılarla dolduruldu doğdumuz evler,  
Alını elimizde beşyüzyıl sürdüğümüz tarla,  
Masallardaki tılsımlı kırkıncı oda gibi  
Kiltlendi ağzımız görünmez anahtarla.

Artık fetih hakkı tarlaların ürünü korku,  
Alınları bahçelerin meyvesi unuttu.  
Her öğün soframızı süsleyen meyveleri  
Aç gözlü zaman bir lokmada yuttu.

Tam kırk yıldır bize hükmedenlerle  
Hem dinde, hem dilde, hem de kanda ayırız.  
Can pazarı serhatlerden dönmeyen akıncıların  
Çilesi tükenmiş özgür yavrularımız.

Araslı, Altan (1970). "Kırım Türklerinin Muhacir Türküleri ve Halk Destanları". *Emel*. (56), p. 26-27.

reminds the reader that they are all migrants, thus the members of the diaspora.

The rhetoric gradually changed after 1983, and the journal completely turned out to be a diaspora journal after 1990. Before passing to the changing discourse after 1983, the contradiction in articulation of the national identity up to 1983 deserves to be analysed separately.

#### **4.1.1 Contradictions in Articulation of National Identity Up to 1983**

In 1960s and 1970s, the periodical published articles emphasizing themes such as Turk and Tatar brotherhood, their historical solidarity, the glory and honour of being an ally of the Ottoman Empire that ruled the world for as long as 600 years, and being a nation of heroes dedicating their lives to the revival of the Crimean state that was perished by the Treaty of Jassy after the Russo–Ottoman War (1787-1792) in the unfortunate period of its history.

However, it was difficult to define the periodical as a ‘diaspora periodical’ during the 1960s. The issues like the myth of homeland, returning to the homeland and other real political matters were almost never dealt with. In this period, including 1970s, the periodical is observed to bring the Turkish nationalism in the foreground, glorifying the Ottoman Empire and Republic of Turkey in a way that appears like ‘the complex of diaspora’ and satirizing Russian imperialism and USSR communism. This gives the impression that its publication policy aimed at getting support and sympathy of the political establishment in Turkey.

Usually a diaspora periodical is expected to diffuse and impose information emphasizing the ethno-national identity of an ethnicity. It is supposed to do it through messages linking the homeland and individual of the diaspora in a way to prevent assimilation. However, while giving information that can be



easily found in a mediocre official history book in a style underlining the Turkish nationalism and national identity, *Emel* sacrificed the purpose of reinforcing the Tatar ethnic identity to get the support and sympathy of the political establishment and ruling class. The term '*Ak Toprak*' (White Land) were defined many times with many dimensions. Furthermore, both the name and the meaning were repeatedly blessed as a divine term in the periodical. One typical statement, for example, is "*Ak Toprak* has a special meaning in Crimean Tatar dialect: *Ak Toprak* is Turkey."<sup>349</sup> Besides, the emphasis on the term *Ak Toprak* and its meaning in this definition express the feelings of eternal loyalty of the Crimean people towards Turkey and render the Tatar identity dependent on the Turkish one.

In the same period (1960–1983), the term homeland was used ambiguously. It covered both Crimea and '*Ak Toprak*'. Still, it is important to state that the authors also reflected a hesitant and cautious sentiment to diaspora community about the migration process and sacred *Ak Toprak* itself as a new homeland. For instance, in the following article, the author questions the conditions of immigration at the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century:

...Immigration affair was promoted via bizarre methods. Those who were the puppets of the Russians were making the propaganda of the immigration by stating that there was no resort other than immigration, but Russians would not give the permission for this. After the preparation of people for the immigration by this kind of news, suddenly the drums beaten were declaring the permission for the immigration given by the Czar who is gracious and merciful.<sup>350</sup>

Then, he challenges the idea of currently ascribing homeland the *Ak Toprak* by saying that skeptic mullah had come to Turkey in those days. He had observed the bad situation of Crimean immigrants and explained this in his poem as follows:

---

<sup>349</sup>A.K. (1962). "Ak Toprak". *Emel*. (8), p. 8.

<sup>350</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 8.

What is the use of the Ottoman Mosque  
As there are impious people inside it  
As they are digging deep holes for us, poors.<sup>351</sup>

Up until early 1980s, the term “Tatar” identity had again been tabooed in the periodical. The ‘diaspora’ did not articulate themselves as diaspora. The rationale behind that approach was both ideological and psychological. As mentioned in the first and third chapter, the Crimean Tatar diaspora is a *sui generis* one in which the out group differences are undermined while the sameness with dominant group was overemphasized. Due to the nonexistence of a remarkable rivalry between the Tatars and other social groups in the Turkish society, their ethnic identity did not sharpen. Roosens asserts that the boundary between an ‘us’ and a specified concrete ‘them’ is essential for the emergence of an ethnic identity.<sup>352</sup> Fredrik Barth as a constructionist supports the existence of alternative ethnic identities in the process of individuation of any ethnic identity. According to him, ethnic identities function as categories of inclusion/exclusion and of interaction, about which both ego and alter must agree if their behavior is to be meaningful.<sup>353</sup> If social and national divisions do not coincide, and if there are no inter-ethnic conflicts and tensions, membership in a national community becomes for the individual something less important to attribute.<sup>354</sup> Since, up to 1980s, the in-group differences were ignored in Turkey, and since the Crimean Tatars constituted the so called main stream Turkish identity, the diaspora masses cannot find a suitable ground to feel and articulate their distinctness. By altering the way explanations are made

---

<sup>351</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 26

*Osmanlı'nın camisinden ne fayda  
İçindeki adamları azganson  
Biz garipke terin çukur kazganson*

<sup>352</sup> Roosens, Eugene (1994). “The Primordial Nature of Origins in Migrant Ethnicity”, in Vermeulen, Hans and Cora, Govers (eds.). *The Anthropology of Ethnicity-Beyond Ethnic Groups and Boundaries*. The Netherlands: Het Spinhuis, p. 85.

<sup>353</sup> Barth, Fredrik (eds.) (1969). *Ethnic Groups and Boundaries*. Long Grove, Illinois: Waveland Press, Inc., p. 38

<sup>354</sup> Drobizheva, Leokadia. M. (1990). “National Self-Awareness” in Martha Olcott B., Lubomyr Hajda and Anthony Olcott (eds.). *The Soviet Multinational State: Readings and Documents*. Armonk, N.Y. : M.E. Sharpe, p. 203.

and the discourse is used, the *Emel* activists constituted the diaspora elite endeavor.

The strained interpretations on the Tatar language were also dealt with. Though Tatar language is considered a Turkic language, which is considered different from the Turkish language by linguists, as well as by the majority of the Tatar people, the ‘Crimean Turkish’ list of words was a popular section of the periodical till 1980s.

The same attitude can be seen in the many articles written especially during the 1960s and 1970s, explaining the common glorious history of the Crimean Khanate and Ottoman Empire, which was a kind of vassal–suzerain relation. This creates a complex Turks/Turkey perception among the Tatar individuals and creates the impression that Turks are big brothers protecting Tatars just like they made it to Turkic groups. This discourse was a deficiency in the design of Tatar ethnic identity. A poem written by Öcal and published in 1966 reflects shades of ethno centrism under the shadow of ‘Turkism’.

Working hard for the union in Language, Idea and Action  
Glorious Crimea is cooling our souls!...  
Adopting the idea of “Turkism”  
It displays us the reality and the beauty!...

As the voice of the string of the kopuz coming from the past,  
In my mind the wind of the liberty blows,  
Rosebuds flowering in Bakhchesaray and Or,  
Are harvested by the brutal hands of treacherous Muscovites!...

How should I not shed my tears?  
I am troubled like Yalta, Akyar, Kızıltash;  
Your duty is to reach your target my friend,  
Gaspıralı, Kırimmer show us the target.<sup>355</sup>

---

<sup>355</sup> Öcal, F. Cemal Oğuz. 1966. “Şanlı Kıırım”. *Emel*. (34) , p. 19

Dilde, Fikirde, İste birlik için didinen  
Şanlı Kıırım ruhlara bir serinlik veriyor!...  
“Türkçülük” kendine bir mefkure edinen  
Doğru, güzel ne varsa önümüze seriyor!...

It indicates that, in the 1960s, the Crimean Tatar poets felt obliged to write on Turkism or at least pan-Turkism, even if they aimed to write prides on being a Tatar in their ‘Glorious Crimea’. Within the framework of Turkism, the poem also aims at constructing a strong sense of symbolic attachment to the homeland. It builds a hybrid identity while it stresses the names of the cities that link the diaspora with the homeland.

Emel concentrated on the literature based on Islamist pan-Turkist content. Indeed, this is the rhetoric of pan-Turkist/Turkish Nationalist political views that became concrete in political concepts like Turkish Nationalist Movement, Turko Islamic Synthesis and Idealist Movement *Ülkücü Hareket*. The following poem titled ‘the Voice of Adhan’ shows the peculiarities of the discourse articulated by the nationalists in 1965.

The voice of the adhan is echoing in the evening,  
And calling the troubled people to the throne of the Lord.  
The voice of the adhan is spreading from minarets,  
Being distressed and exhausted, it is rising to heaven,  
A grandfather sitting near a stream  
Is rubbing his shaking arms with cold water.  
The voice of “Allah!” is pleasing, white foreheads are touching earth and  
rising

I am poor, I have no prayer room to enter into...  
To touch my face to its altar...  
The voice of adhan cannot come here...  
And cannot touch to my ear softly...

Our neighbor, white bearded muezzin, is he still alive?  
Is he still starting his words with the name of Allah?  
If he says “Allah” are there any who listen to him?

---

Ses verdikçe maziden maziden kopuzumun telleri,  
Esiyor başımda hürriyetin yelleri,  
Bahçesaray’da Or’da açan gonca gülleri,  
O vahşi elleriyle hain moskof deriyor!...

Nasıl akmasın gözlerimden kanlı yaş?  
Dertlidir- bencileyin- Yalta, Akyar, Kızıldaş;  
Ulaşmaktır vazifen hedefine arkadaş,  
Gaspıralı, Kırımmer hedefi gösteriyor.<sup>355</sup>

Is his mosque is full of people saying “Lord, save us”?  
Or are they still damning each other,  
And crying for burning each other?  
Are there anyone forgetting himself and embracing the homeland  
Anyone whose voice is getting hoarse by crying “Homeland!”  
What do you mean by saying “Rights” for the sake of the homeland?  
Is it in favour of a few devilish worm eroding the homeland?

The voice of Adhan cannot come here...  
And can not touch to my ear softly...

Before the closure of the mosques in a night,  
Before the death of the old muezzins in secret...  
Let be united, without missing the voice of the adhan,  
Without overflowing your sins like the river of Salgır,  
Raising your hands to heavens being homespun,  
Put your heads over hard earth and do not hesitate,  
And wish the prosperity of homeland from our Lord!  
And a good death for yourself..

The voice of Adhan cannot come here...  
And cannot touch to my ear softly...<sup>356</sup>

---

<sup>356</sup> Çobanzade, Bekir Sıtkı (1965). “Ezan Sesi”. *Emel*. (26), p. 32.

Akşam üstü ezan sesi yankı yapıyor,  
Dertlileri hak katına çağırıyor.  
Ezan sesi minareden yayılıyor,  
Göke çıkıyor; bunalmış, yorgun bayılıyor...  
Çay yanında aksakallı dede  
Titrek kolunu serin suda çoğalıyor.  
Derinde Allah sesi hoş geliyor, Ak alınlar yere değip yükseliyor.

Ben garibim mescitim yok girecek...  
Mihrabına bedbaht yüzüm sürececek...  
Ezan sesi bu tarafa gelemiyor...  
Tatlı tatlı kulağıma değemiyor...

Aksakallı komşu müezzin yaşıyor mu?  
Yine Allah diye sözüne başlıyor mu?  
“Allah” dese işitenler oluyor mu?  
“Tanrım kurtar” diye camisi doluyor mu?  
Yoksa yine birbirini lanetliyor,  
Birbirini mi yaktırmak için ağlıyorlar?  
Kendini unutup zavallı, yurda sarılan.  
Var mı “Yurdum!” diye sesi bağırırmaktan kısılan  
“Hak” dendiğinde ne hisediyorsunuz yurt için?  
Yurt kemiren birkaç mel’un kurt için?

Ezan sesi bu taraflara gelemiyor,  
Tatlı tatlı kulağıma değemiyor...

Bütün camiler öylece kapanmadan bir gece,

Budapest, 16 May 1918

Bekir Sıtkı Çobanzade

The above poem also invites us to rethink the relation between homeland, diaspora, and religion. The poet attempts to integrate the diaspora's religious practices and Islamic identities into the modern time national identity articulated through the concept of 'homeland'. It is noteworthy that the Islamic identity was utilized to produce a diasporic consciousness among Crimean Tatar diaspora communities because the historical period of Turkey necessitated it. In other words, Crimean Tatar diaspora elite mobilized the religion as a cultural resource for diaspora interests.

#### **4.2 Thematic Evaluation and Changing Discourse of the Publications in *Emel* after 1980s**

From the mid 1980s, the Crimean ethno-national diaspora was giving greater attention to what is happening on both their homeland and the host land-Central Asia. They were initiating much closer formal official and informal connections with the entities of their agnate. *Emel* had a dual purpose when it presented the unprecedented struggle of Crimean Tatar diaspora of mainly Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan for homeland. While it aimed to show the importance of the territory, it sought support from passive masses of diaspora in their dispute. According to Tuncer Kalkay,<sup>357</sup> the ex- secretariat general for the Crimean Turks Association of Solidarity

---

İhtiyar müezzinler ölmeden önce gizlice..  
Toplanmış, ezan ssini kaçırmadan,  
Günahınızı Salgır ırmağı gibi taşırmadan,  
El kaldırıp ak yürekle göklere,  
Başınızı çekinmeden koyup sert yere,  
Hak katında yurt sağlığını dileyiniz!  
Kendinize eyi ölüm isteyiniz..

Ezan sesi bu taraflara gelemiyor,  
Tatlı tatlı yüreğime değemiyor..<sup>356</sup>

Budapeşte, 16 Mayıs 1918

Bekir Sıtkı Çobanzade

<sup>357</sup> In-depth interview with Tuncer Kalkay, February, 2011, Ankara.

and Aid, they are activists who devoted their lives to the Crimean Tatars case. Being an organization that gathered around the *Emel*, they sent millions of dollars to the Tatar community of Crimea so that they could build health facilities and houses for their kin, whose financial resources melted day by day due to the inflation that swept the economy of the former Soviet Union. As Kırımlı said, they tried to reveal the tragedies of the Crimean People in their ancestral homeland.<sup>358</sup>

From the beginning of the 1990s, the ties between the Crimean Tatars in the Crimea and diaspora in Turkey strengthened. From the mid 1980s till 1990s, *Emel* gave much more news about the current situation in homeland Crimea and Crimean diaspora in Central Asia. Unlike the 1960s and 1970s, when the periodical usually released information of superficial nature reflecting the nationalist/conservative political sentiments of the right wing populist perceptions of an ordinary Turkish citizen, as of 1983, more political and critical news were published in the journal. They focused on the various aspects of socio-economic, cultural and political life in Crimea and addressed the individuals of the Crimean Tatar diaspora in Turkey. Aware of their ethnic conscious and mental ties with homeland, they quit such self identifications as ‘Crimean Turk’. Put differently, following the liberalization of the world politics and Turkey, the reformist/revisionist policies in Soviet Union and the collapse of this country, the publication policies of the periodical became less ‘Turkified’ and more ‘Tatarised’. This, indeed, reflects the age of the revival of the ethnic identity and micro-nationalism nourished by liberal democratic ideas and the cultural effects of globalization as well as the reveal of the frozen ethnic disputes of pre-revolutionary era in the ex-socialist countries.

Below are some headings and parts from the articles of the *Emel* that are good examples of the above mentioned change in the publication policy of the periodical about the Crimean issue. These articles focusing on the

---

<sup>358</sup> In-depth interview with Hakan Kırımlı May 2011, Ankara

political struggle of Crimean Tatars in the USSR and the Crimean diaspora around the world reveal the change in the tendency towards the Crimean issue and Tatar ethnic identity. For example, an heading that reads ‘Breaches of Helsinki Accord after the 10<sup>th</sup> anniversary: the Turks in Bulgaria and the Crimean Tatars in Crimea’<sup>359</sup> strikes the reader at first sight. The term ‘Tatar’ has been more frequently used than it was in the past, besides the term ‘Crimean Turk’, which is still used in a way that it places smaller emphasis on the Turkish identity. As seen in the examples below, which focus on the real issues and facts and which have an analytical rhetoric compared to the sentimental and populist rhetoric of the past, the references to the Tatar identity become more politicized and socialized. Turkification of Tatar identity was challenged somewhat hesitantly in some articles.

In this article the author focused on the violation of the Helsinki Accord by USSR. As it can be seen in the title of the article, “Turks in Bulgaria and Tatars in Crimea”, two identities were completely differentiated. This title, and the article itself, is the confession of the editors about their approach to Turkishness of Tatars. While they claimed Turkish identity for the Turks who had been officially named as ‘Bulgarian Muslims’ by Bulgarian authorities, they are expecting the same respect for the Crimean Tatars from Turkish ones.

After 1983, perception of homeland became far more realistic, political and analytical in the articles and news published by *Emel*. They focused on the real and current problems of the homeland, the people in the homeland, and Tatar diaspora. Contemporary subjects like fundamental rights, political liberty and environment were more conceptualized. Thus, homeland and its resolvable problems were perceived as tangible facts. The content of quasi lecture style remained over, but the content of the lecture style in the articles

---

<sup>359</sup> “İmzalanmasının Onuncu Yıldönümü’nde Helsinki Anlaşmasının İhlalleri: Bulgaristandaki Türkler ve Kırımdaki Tatarlar”. 1985. *Emel*. (150), p. 4 -8.



changed from ‘Ottoman Crimean Khanate’ relations to ‘national movement in homeland or in Central Asian diaspora’. The following article is presented at length because its content reflects the lecture style used in the issues on the return struggle of Crimean Tatars of USSR. This was a prevalent theme especially after 1983.

After the exile, the leaders of Crimean Tatars launched a massive campaign encompassing the whole adult Crimean population, for a petition requesting to turn back Crimea in 1957. The pioneer leaders of this movement were soldiers, partisans and old members of the government (17 persons). All of them were persecuted, fired and expelled from political party. Under a petition written in 1966 addressed to the 13th Congress of the Communist Party, there were the signatures of 130.000 Crimean Tatars. Although the members of this movement have been taken to the labor camps, they had been replaced by others.

In July 1967, 20 delegates met with high rank Soviet officials, among whom there was Ministry of Interior Nikolay Scholokov and the head of KGB Yuriy Andropov. The decree has been published in September 1967 and the nation (Crimean Tatars) has been officially rehabilitated.

In November 1983, Mustafa Cemilev was arrested in Tashkent. He was judged with the false accusation against the state in 1984 and he was sentenced to camp punishment for 3 years. The reason was to send post cards dispersing false accusations to his friends in New York and to try to transfer the tomb of his father to the Crimea.

In 1984, one of the members of the national movement of the Crimean Tatars, Engineer Celal Chelebiev was arrested third time, because of violating passport rules. Before that he spent 3 years in labour camp because of false accusation against the state. In 1979, following his attempt to be settled in Crimea, he was deported from Crimea and his properties were confiscated.<sup>360</sup>

---

<sup>360</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 4 -8

Another change is the ‘politization of the Crimean Tatar identity’. The news about the Crimean Tatars’ requests of the authorities in USSR for the exculpation and return to the homeland and the demonstrations of Tatar diaspora in western countries, and the analyses about the violations of agreements on human rights display the fact that Crimean Tatar identity was perceived as the center of a political issue. It mainly originated from the violation of fundamental rights by the editors of the periodical as of 1983. Thus, Crimean Tatar identity became the object of more concrete political discussions and a matter of fundamental human rights. All these news show the increase in the interest of Crimean Tatar elite in Turkey towards the homeland, the Crimean Tatars living in homeland and other countries. For example, the article written in 1985 titled “The Appeal of 240 Crimean Turks” gives news about their kins who request the exculpation and return to the homeland:

Crimean Turks living in Uzbekistan and other republics of USSR has not given up the idea of returning to the homeland. New information reached to the West revealed that Crimean Turks met in Semerkant city of Uzbekistan in order to bring this issue into the agenda again...

We learnt that 240 Crimean Turks living in Krasnodarski Kray submitted a request to the Central Presidium of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. In the petition they request the exculpation and return to the homeland.<sup>361</sup>

Another article is about the meetings of the 18th of May demonstrations, in which Crimean Tatars lost almost half of their population. In the demonstrations of Crimean Tatars in front of the UN premises in the 41<sup>st</sup> anniversary of the exile, they wanted to “explain their national tragedy to other peoples in the globe”. A decisive stance vis a vis homeland cause, and appropriation of the “fight for return” were performed by their kins and

---

<sup>361</sup> Nadir. Devlet, (1985). “240 Kırım Türkü’nün Müracatı”. *Emel*. (146), p. 4–12.

shown on the banners of the demonstrators. Some banners read, for example, “let Crimean Tatars return their homeland Crimea” “save Crimean Tatars from annihilation”, “release Mustafa Cemilev, Yuriy Osmanov, Nurfet Muharas, and Celal Çelebi”, “give their rights back to the small peoples”, “Crimea is the homeland of Crimean Tatars”, and “put an end to the exile of the Crimean Tatars from Crimea”.<sup>362</sup>

The following paragraph written in 1985 tells about Musa Mahmut, who set himself on fire in 1978, thus draws the attention to sparking nationalist sentiment:

On 5 September 1967, after 23 years, in the end the Presidium of Soviets accepted the truth and with the aim of withdrawing the accusations against the Tatar population, proclaimed a decree that it is unfair to charge them of treason and collaboration (with Nazis during World War II) and there is no pretext for the massive exile. But, it does not permit to turn back Crimea and the persecution is still continuing...

...Following continuous oppression, menace and persecution and the refusal of his request to settle in Crimea, to protest the Soviet persecution against his compatriots Musa Mahmut set fire himself on 23 July 1978.<sup>363</sup>

The editors of the journal lay stress on the protests of Musa Mahmut as a symbol of national resistance movements towards USSR. About the lawsuit against the ethnic Russians, who supported the Crimean Tatar cause, the journal gave news about those authorities (namely Sharov and Orlov), who harbored the Crimean Tatar nationalist activists during the demonstrations. By using salient elements, the editors shed light onto the return project of their kins, and turbulent events accompanying it. The news published in 1985 wrote as follows:

---

<sup>362</sup> Ayşe, Seytmuratova (1985). *Emel*. (148), p. 5.

<sup>363</sup> Kırımlı, Yürter, Fikret. (1985) “ Kırım Tatarlarının Kötü Durumu”. *Emel*. (148), p. 7

A little later, the court decision will be declared. The decision is reflecting the socio-political views of the propaganda centers of the administrators in Kremlin.

...They would even sentence their own girls, if these (girls) have not said the same things as they said. Upon the immoral and arbitrary acts of the Crimean authorities, to protest them Musa Mahmut set fire to himself. But the consciences are silent. SHAROV and ORLOV defended the rights of Crimean Tatars, for his reason they have been subject to the psychiatric treatment...<sup>364</sup>

And some news with a hybrid character combining both politics and environment was given place. Environmental problems in homeland were given special emphasis after the mid 1980s. Environment problems of Crimea peninsula of 'Ukraine' were announced as a national dilemma:

Chernobyl catastrophe is of course an exemplary event for the entire world. It is a news declaring the collapse of the Soviets and decreasing the prestige of Soviet bureaucrats who are working for the assimilation of non-Russian peoples of USSR...

With the collapse of the USSR, divine justice will be revealed and by this the captive Turks and their lands from Volga to Urals will reach their liberty that they were familiar.<sup>365</sup>

In another article it was stated that:

Till 2000, the number of the tourists visiting the shores of Azov and Black Seas will exceed 6 million. This burden is too big for the peninsula (Crimea) to overcome.<sup>366</sup>

After the 1990s, more concrete subjects were dealt with as if they were aid campaigns for Crimean immigrants, announcements, lobbying in the realm of foreign policy and the interest on the Tatar national movement.

---

<sup>364</sup> Kırımoğlu, Mustafa Abdülcemil (1986). "Son Söz". *Emel*. (152), p. 7.

<sup>365</sup> "Çernobil'in Öğrettikleri" (1986). *Emel*. (155), p. 25.

<sup>366</sup> Yıldırım, İbrahim. (1986). "Kırım'da Jeolojik Çevre Koruması". *Emel*. (156), p. 7.

Throughout the 1990s, *Emel* began to use modern methods of a diaspora periodical in a western country. It became a media organization with political networks both inside and outside of Turkey, more active in the homeland Crimea, as well as Crimean Tatar diaspora in other countries. The content shift reflected the thematic outline of the journal.

The *Emel* activists organized aid companies to raise communal conscious awareness, and to establish solidarity and synergy. For instance, some news provided a sort of consciousness of being a member of diaspora who are sentimental about the homeland, e.g, “a large house have been bought by the money collected in ‘Give Our Home Back to Us’<sup>367</sup> or “Crimean Tatar youth will make their military service in Crimea. Following the negotiations between Crimean Tatar National Assembly and Ukrainian government, it was agreed that Crimean Tatars could perform military service in Crimea”<sup>368</sup>

Under this heading, there was also news that were supporting the Crimean Turks of all ages and demanding “Give our home back to us”, an aid campaign was launched in close cooperation between the The *Emel* Crimean Foundation as well as the Association of Culture and Solidarity of Crimean Turks.”<sup>369</sup> The target of the campaign was to help the destitute families who turned back to Crimea and had lived there under miserable conditions in the shelter tents, and families who would turn back to Crimea and be deprived of the necessary material resources in building premises for national school, mosque and other social facilities.<sup>370</sup>

Also significant in the same news was regarding diaspora lobbyism. The heading “Delegation of the Crimean Tatar National Assembly has Participated in the Ceremonies for the 72th Anniversary of Grand National

---

<sup>367</sup> “TBMM’nin 72. Açılış Yıldönümü Törenine Kırım Tatar Milli Meclisi Heyetide de Katıldı” (1992). *Emel*. ( 189) , p. 31.

<sup>368</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 31

<sup>369</sup> *Emel*, (1991). (187), p. 3.

<sup>370</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 3

Assembly of Turkey.”<sup>371</sup>, explains very well the dramatically increasing political activism in *Emel* circles. The journal presented the following news to show that diaspora activism had gained legitimacy in the eyes of the authorities of the host land. A paragraph selected from this article shows the expansion of diapsora in terms of lobbying activities:

The president of the Crimean Tatar National Assembly Mustafa Abülcemil Kırımoğlu, his wife Safinaz Kırımoğlu, head of department for economical affairs of the assembly Server Ömer and head of department for financial affairs Halil Mustafa came to Turkey on 5 February 1992 as being invited by the Foundation of Emel Crimea and the Association of Culture and Solidarity of Crimean Turks.

During the conversation with Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel, Demirel stated: As the represents of government and state, we will help Crimea and Crimean Turks. This help will be of great amount. Crimean Turks will absolutely turn back to the glorious days of their history.<sup>372</sup>

On the other hand, conceptualization of the ‘chosen trauma’ had been shifted from migration period to Anatolia along the 19<sup>th</sup> century to the 18 May 1944 deportation to Central Asia. Even by itself, it summarizes the stance of the editors who prefer the realistic approach to the romantic and nostalgic one. The following quotation exemplifies this:

The catastrophic exile of 18 May has been memorized via songs, poems and a representation performed in the Reşat Nuri Theatre by İstanbul branch of the Association of Culture and Solidarity of Crimean Turks...<sup>373</sup>

---

<sup>371</sup> *Emel*, 1992. (189) , p. 31.

<sup>372</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 3

<sup>373</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 36

In the same article it was stated that an Islamic ceremony has been performed for those who were dead in the exile of 18 May.<sup>374</sup>

Political activism, which *Emel* displayed, was focusing on three pillars: networks with governments in Turkey, cooperation with non-governmental organization in Crimea, and other countries where a considerable Tatar diaspora is found. On the other hand, awareness raising activities targeted at Turkish public opinion in general and Tatar diaspora of Turkey in particular. Like a modern non-governmental organization, *Emel* started struggling in the political area applying various tools like networks with governments in Turkey, cooperation with unofficial political organizations in the homeland and launching campaigns and organizing social artistic and religious events in collaboration with other associations in Turkey.

The striking point was that, after the 1990s, the new generation of Crimean Tatars disregarded the term ‘Crimean Turk’ and were actively calling themselves as Crimean Tatars. *Emel* showed the ways in which young ‘Crimean Turks’ are encouraged to identify with the Crimea as a homeland. A section of many issues is devoted to the article entitled “From Our Youth in Diaspora”. Diasporic nationalism takes the presentation of the individual's ethnicity a step further. As Lahneman conceptualized, “The prevailing definition of diaspora seems to be a group that recognizes its separateness based on common ethnicity/nationality, lives in a host country and maintains some kind of attachment to its home country or homeland.”<sup>375</sup> Lahneman claims that diaspora groups are “self-identified”, who exhibit a dynamic behavior. This means that historical or present events, which affect their country of origin, could cause a person of a given ethnic descent living in a “host” country to be self-identified as members of their home country's

---

<sup>374</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 39

<sup>375</sup> J. Lahneman, William (2005). *Impact of Diaspora Communities on National and Global Politics: Report on Survey of the Literature*. College Park, MD: CISSM, University of Maryland, p. 1.

diaspora when they might not have considered themselves as such previously.<sup>376</sup>

The articles that appeared under the heading of ‘our youth from diaspora’ best exemplify this. The growing identification with the ‘Crimean Homeland’ and ‘Crimean Tatariness’ among young Turkish citizens of Crimean Tatar descent were commonly conceptualized under these headings. In an article entitled “Thinking of the Crimea in Kırıkkale”,<sup>377</sup> for example, a young Crimean Tatar relates a typical story of his first visit to the local “Crimean Turk Cultural and Assistance Organization”. Here the young writer Deniz Altay learned the Crimean Tatar national anthem *Ant Etkenmen* that is written by Crimean Tatar Nationalist Numan Çelebi Cihan during the years of World War I.<sup>378</sup>

---

<sup>376</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 6-7.

<sup>377</sup> Altay, Deniz. (1994). “Kırıkkale’de Kırım’ı Düşünmek.”. *Emel*. (202), p. 29.

<sup>378</sup> *I pledged*

I pledged to heal the wounds of Tatars,  
Why should my unfortunate brothers rot away;  
If I don't sing, don't grieve for them, if I live,  
Let the dark streams of blood of my heart go dry!  
I pledge to bring light to that darkened country,  
How may two brothers not see one another?  
When I see this, if I don't get distressed, hurt, seared,  
Let the tears that flow from my eyes become a river, a sea of blood!  
I pledge, give my word to die for (my nation)  
Knowing, seeing, to wipe away the teardrops of my nation  
If I live a thousand unknowing, unseeing years, If I become  
a gathering's chief (Khan of a Kurultay),  
Still one day the gravediggers will come to bury me!  
[www.iccrimea.org/literature/celebicihan.html](http://www.iccrimea.org/literature/celebicihan.html)

#### *Ant Etkenmen*

Ant etkenmen milletimniñ yarasını sarmağa  
Nasıl olsun eki qardaş birbirini körmesin?  
Onlar için ökünmesem, muğaymasam, yaşasam  
Közlerimden aqqan yaşlar derya-deniz qan bolsun.  
Ant etkenmen şu qaranğı yurtqa şavle sepmege,  
Nasıl bolsun bu zavallı qardaşlarım iñlesin?  
Bunu körüp buvsanmasam muğaymasam, yanmasam  
Yuregimde qara qanlar qaynamasın, qurusun.  
Ant etkenmen, söz bergenmen millet için ölmege  
Bilip, körüp, milletimniñ köz yaşını silmege.  
Bilmey körmey, biñ yaşasam, qurultaylı han bolsam,  
Kene bir kun mezarçılar kelir meni kömmege.  
<http://www.vatankirim.net/yazi.asp?yazino=156>



To conclude, the journal had a unique spirit after 1990. Below are two quotations from ‘our youth from diaspora’ and ‘our villages from diaspora’. As these headings indicate, *Emel*, the name of diaspora nationalism, accomplished its attributed mission. The following parts reflect this spirit. The 203<sup>rd</sup> issue published in July-August in 1994 reveals an attempt by Zuhale Yüksel to transform a Crimean Tatar village into a ‘diaspora village’ in the diaspora community, who are most probably not fully aware of such concepts. She binds the leading figures of the settlement to their past:

The founders of this village are Sarı Mehmet and his relatives from Çongar region of the Crimea, Taymaz family, Ablaz Hacı and Nasbullah Kalkay from Saraymen village of the Crimea, Ebu Hacı and his brothers from Durasılar village of Dobruca, Hacı Yusuf, Evirgen family and Şabadiy Avdan from Crimea. The majority of the village population is composed of a few families like Taymaz, Durası, Şongar, Kalkay and Umay.

Due to deportation, Hacı Saday Börü from Saraymen village of the Crimea has now his brothers in different parts of Crimea and Turkestan. His sons, daughters and grandsons went to Crimea and found their uncles and aunts there. They are frequently meeting now. Unfortunately Hacı Saday who lived in sorrow and homesick during his whole life, could not see these good days and died in yearning for his homeland, parents and brothers.

The migration of Hacı Saday was a real adventure. He could not bear persecution committed in Crimea and said that “I can not live in a land occupied by Russians, I will go to the land of truth (Turkey), I will find my relatives there.” Then he came to Samsun and Karayavşan Village, where he owned house, properties, sons and daughters...<sup>379</sup>

Çelebi Çevik repeats that we are aware of our identity and ready for whatever is necessary. As mentioned earlier in the study, the branches of the

---

<sup>379</sup> Yüksel Zuhale, (1994). “Karayavşan Köyü”. *Emel*. (203), p. 30.

Crimean Turk Cultural and Assistance Organization play an important role in those articles, which repeat every issue after 1990. For example:

We were living unaware of the pain of the Crimean Tatar people before getting together under the same roof of an association. Thereafter we had a good grip of the miserable situation of Crimean men and women.

We were delighted to experience the efforts of Crimean Tatars living in Sungurlu, who initiated the establishment of an association. Because, the ties between Crimean Tatars are about to detach. But with the help of Allah, we oathed to help our compatriots living in our homeland Crimea. We regret to say that we do not know the place that our ancestors come from in Crimea. Even our fathers and grandfathers do not know their hometown. We accuse previous generations of their ignorance and indifference about their hometowns in Crimea, previous generations who have not made any research about their origins. They are now regretful about this situation, accepting their faults and are happy about the studies that we make.

I believe that Crimean people will definitely be free of the difficulties they experience and will live within prosperity. This will be ensured by all Crimean Turks feeling the sorrows of the Crimean people in their own hearths.

As Crimean Diaspora we believe in that: We are obliged to claim the rightful cause of the Crimean Turks till the end and support them in every circumstance...<sup>380</sup>

To recap, *Emel* after 1990 decisively undertook a diasporization mission. When every individual with a diasporic identity is territorialized on a host state, *Emel* attempted to reveal how their homeland and diaspora had been embedded in the country they live on. It can possibly be explained by the fact that, after 1990, these manifestations in discourse have institutionalized

---

<sup>380</sup> Çevik, Çelebi (1994). “Sungurlu’dan: Köyümü Bilemiyorum”. *Emel*. (204), p. 29.

the distinctively ethnic Crimean Tatar diaspora identity beyond *Emel* circles.

### 4.3 An Overall Examination of the Changing Discourse in Diaspora Nationalism in the Literary Works

Up to 1983, Crimean Tatars in diaspora were far from articulating a distinct identity. *Emel* almost never used the term ‘homeland’ in the narratives and articles up until mid 1980s, but the poems were an exception. The following part from a poem written by Azmi Güleç depicts this:

.....

Green mountains wear blood  
Troubled mothers are crying: “My son...my son!”  
Where is Farabi and Ibn Sina  
A great fatherland is crying inside me

The wolf has been sacrificed for a bear  
The land of Mete, Tighins and Cenghis  
Why have you been occupied by Red Army  
A great fatherland is crying inside me

Türk cannot be put to the silence, his tongue cannot be cut  
Türk is only the slave of *Allah*  
Let the route of my ancestor Oguz Khan be open  
A great fatherland is crying inside me.<sup>381</sup>

---

<sup>381</sup> Güleç, Azmi, (1961). “İçimde Bir Büyük Vatan Ağlıyor”. *Emel*. (5), p. 18

Kanlara bürünmüş yemyeşil dağlar  
Dertli oğul oğul diyen analar  
Nerede Farabi, İbni Sinalar  
İçimde bir büyük vatan ağlıyor

Bir ayıya kurban ettiler kurdu  
Mete'nin Tekin'in Cengiz'in yurdu  
Neden sarsın seni kıp Kızıl Ordu  
İçimde bir büyük vatan ağlıyor

Türk susturulmaz, kesilmez dili  
Türk ancak Allahın kulu  
Açılsın Oğuz- Han'atamın yolu  
İçimde bir büyük vatan ağlıyor.

In the previous poem, the use of the term ‘homeland’ and its presentation, which reflect the dual identity in diaspora, is worth considering profoundly. In the poem, by addressing to Islam, Turkish identity and pan-Turkist ideals, Tatar identity became barely perceptible under the shadow of Turkish identity. This poem is a good example to show the articulation dilemma of Crimean Tatar diaspora along all the issues up to mid 1980s. While crying for the homeland, the poem endeavors to hide the real national identity. It reflects the influence of Turkification in general and of the ideology of Turko-Islamic Synthesis in particular. The images and heroes used in the poem are the same, and the rhetoric is in conformity with the main pillars of the ideology of Turko- Islamic Synthesis. The ‘wolf’, a political symbol of the Turkish Nationalist Movement, is an animal from which, according to legend, the Oghuz people descended from. In Turkish nationalism, Mete is one of the first known Turkish rulers, and the name is used in the memory of him. ‘Oghuz Khan’ was a legendary and semi-mythological Khan of Turks. Peoples that are descendants of Oghuz tribes use this legend to describe their ethnic origins and the origin of the system of political clans used by Turkoman, Ottoman, and other Oghuz Turks. ‘Tighins’ are the princes of the Gok Turk confederation found by Turks in the 6<sup>th</sup> Century AD. The Crimean Tatar version of Tighin is, in fact, Kalgay (the eldest son of the Khan) and Nureddin (candidates for being Kalgay). Among all the symbols and images used in this poem, the only image used by Crimean Tatars to define their ethnic identity is “ancestor Genghis Khan”, the founder of the Mongolian Empire. The others are not original images, myths or symbols of the Tatar ethnic identity, and they are all borrowed from Oghuz legends and myths of Turkish nationalism.

Another noteworthy point is about the other literary works. The novels written by the popular Crimean Tatar writer Cengiz Dağcı, who made his way from Crimea to London at the end of the World War II, and who kept the memory of Crimea alive in the Western diaspora,<sup>382</sup> had never been

---

<sup>382</sup> Williams, 2001, p. 256

published in *Emel* approximately up to 1990s. This may be because longing for and belonging to homeland issues were not conceptualized in the same manner in any classical diaspora up to mid 1980s. Any mention of “belonging” implied ‘belonging to Turkey’, and “longing” implied ‘longing for Crimea’; it was something truly romantic and sentimental, and never political. In 1960s and 1970s, homeland was hidden beyond the ballads celebrating the sacred *Ak Toprak* (if a few implications made hesitatingly mentioned above not considered) as a symbolic reference to the Ottoman Empire, Turkism or Islam. These ballads pointed at the role of religious identification as the strongest bond among the Crimean Muslims in the near history.

Unlike the 1960s and 1970s, the examples of Crimean Tatar literature expressing the Crimean Tatar identity depending on homeland and the sorrows of the past frequented the periodical in the 1990s. A paragraph of Cengiz Dağcı’s paragraph from a tale titled “Babies Pending in the Branches of the Almond Tree” was published for the martyr of homeland:

...Apparently there are so many friends of this dead Tatar. The rabbits sorted out of their holes in the wine yards dressed by the sun of July and they said “Amen!”. Confused sparrows in the eaves of the houses said “Amen!”. Cows, lambs, dogs and cats said “Amen!” in chorus. Almond tree had been cut years ago, but its roots have been emanated new buds. The silence will be saved by the scarecrow settled by Sarı Çömez, till a new miracle occurs. All crows were under oath, while I am sleeping, no one of them will break the silence in the vicinity of the almond tree...<sup>383</sup>

It is well known that the Soviet deportation and repression diminished the role of religion in the Crimean Tatars’ identity construction living in Crimea, who were later deported to Central Asia in the 20<sup>th</sup> century. The

---

<sup>383</sup> Dağcı, Cengiz (1992). “Badem Dalında Asılı Bebekler”. *Emel*. (192), p. 29.

perception of homeland in the minds of these people was far from a religious one or *Ak Toprak*, but it was purely territorialized. For that reason, *Emel* in those years, never spared a place to poems that were popular in the European Tatar diaspora, as it was mentioned the previous paragraph in the case of Cengiz Dağcı. For example, a search of the traces of identity articulation of Crimean Tatars in Turkey over time revealed poems written by the Tatar poet and educator Mehmet Niyazi. Below is one of them:

Though the Crimea is very close to us  
We could not receive news from her for a long time,  
Even though our eyes we filled with tears for longing,  
We could not find a way to the Green Homeland.<sup>384</sup>

Instead of such poems, we come across, for instance, a poem written by the same poet dedicated to the fallen stars, “those who are deported by Bolsheviks and died as expatriates”. *Emel* chose to the following poem to publish:

I am hearing: destroying the humanity,  
Impoverishing the humanity with humanity  
Reading the knowledge of black force  
After the oppression.stopped the fresh water;  
This water is our blood Turkish youth!  
Its colour is red, the reason is:  
They are sucking the girl of the homeland;  
A day comes and  
A sun removes this blood;  
Then comes long feasts in the homeland  
Those who remember the past become idea...  
Oh, you fallen stars! Who falls in weddings  
Old Turkish youth will drop tears  
For you, crying and smiling  
You stars, the homeland of dropping dried tears!<sup>385</sup>

---

<sup>384</sup> Cited in Glyn Williams, Bryan, 2001, p. 284

<sup>385</sup> Niyazi, Mehmet. (1966). “İşidiyorum”. *Emel*. ( 33), p. 18.

İşidiyorum: İnsanlığı parçalayan,  
İnsanlığı insanlarla fakirleştiren  
Kara kuvvet bilgileri okumayı  
Ezdikten sonra ... Durdurmuş akan suyu;  
O su bizim kanımızdır, Türk genci!  
Şu sebepten renkleri kırmızıdır.

In exile, a small but active circle of Crimean Tatar writers, poets, and composers created forceful images of an oppressed community and a lost homeland. These homeland images involved the hope of return and restoration. The reality of Crimean Tatar diaspora in Turkey was far from that. Instead of imposing images from a lost homeland and giving a perspective for return, they only tried to keep alive the history of Crimea with ethnic and nationalistic symbols.

Following the year 1983, the poems published by *Emel* were much more “homeland oriented”, and as of 1990s, *Emel* published the poems emphasizing the beauty and the glorious memory of Crimea. After 1983, the editors of *Emel* became much more eager to publish the examples of their national literature. A poem written by İsmail Bey Gaspıralı is a good example of this.

The Sublime Çatırdağ, they call it “Green Island”,  
One side is desert, the other side is garden and vineyard

Water comes from plateaus, how beautiful is its basins  
Fields have golden harvest, lambs and clans

Birds are singing day and night, the summer becomes a garden of rose  
Wherever you look at, there are golden harvest, vineyard and garden ware

Its water and air is too beautiful, spring and stream, stream and spring  
Ancient towns are Karasu and Bakhchesaray.<sup>386</sup>

---

Emdikleri anayurdun kızıdır;  
Gelir bir gün; o kanları bir Güneş  
Yok eder; yurttan uzun günler toy- düğün olur.  
Geçmiş günü hatırlayan “düşünce” olur..

Şu düğünlerde, ey siz düşmüş yıldızlar!  
Sizin için Türkün ihtiyarı genci  
Dökecek ağlayarak, gülerken göz yaşı...  
Düşen damla kurumuş Yurdu Yıldızlar!<sup>385</sup> Mehmet Niyazi,  
<sup>386</sup> Gaspıralı, İsmail Bey. “Kırım”. *Emel*. (191), p. 23.

Buna “yeşil Ada” derler, yüce maali Çatırdağ,  
Bunun bir tarafı çöldür, bir tarafı bahçe bağ

Keldir sular yaylardan, ne güzeldir boyları  
Altın aşlık tarlaları kuzuları boyları

The editors achieved ethno-symbolism through the words of famous Russian poet. The Fountain of *Bahçesaray* materialized the historical capital city of Crimean Tatar identity. ‘Kırım Giray, a Crimean Khan, requested an architect from *Bahçesaray* (in other resources, an architect from Iran, Ömer Usta) to build a fountain in the memory of his dead wife, Dilara Bikeç, whom he loved a lot. He made this request in these words: “Let this fountain cry like me as the world lives.”<sup>387</sup> In 1822, a famous Russian poet and writer Aleksander Sergeyevich Pushkin, was touched by this story and wrote his famous poem “Fountain of *Bahçesaray*” during his years of exile in *Bahçesaray*. This poem became famous in Europe and Russian Czardom, in this period.’<sup>388</sup> The publication of the following poem is important in that it shows how the homeland was perceived in 1990s. It was more than a sacred place then. The romantic tools started to be used as promotion elements. In the poem, the name of Pushkin was used to promote the homeland in the eyes of diaspora.

What made him enter into his grave so fast?  
Worry of this desperate captivity?  
Illness or another reason?  
Who knows? He left this world quickly.<sup>389</sup>

In conclusion, utilization of concepts such as ‘diaspora’, ‘homeland’, and ‘national identity’ characterized the period after 1983. The above poem is

---

Öter kuşlar sabah akşam, olur yazda gülistan  
Er ne taraf göz idersen altın aşlık, bağ bostan

Pek güzeldir ab- avası, yay ve cay, cay ve yay,  
Şehirlerin eskileri karasu, Bahçesaray.

<sup>387</sup> Pushkin, Alexander Sergeyevich. (1992). “Bahçesaray Çeşmesi”. *Emel*. (189), p. 10.

<sup>388</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 10

<sup>389</sup> *Ibid.*, p.10

Translation excepted in

[http://www.poemhunter.com/i/ebooks/pdf/alexander\\_serveyevich\\_pushkin\\_2012\\_6.pdf](http://www.poemhunter.com/i/ebooks/pdf/alexander_serveyevich_pushkin_2012_6.pdf)

*Onı şay tez mezarına ne kirsetti?  
Bu ümitsiz esirliğin kaygısı mı?*

*Hastalık mı, yoksa diğer bir illet mi?  
Kim bile? O bu dünyanı tez terk etti.*



another vivid example revealing the path and scale of diasporization project of *Emel* circles. Ambitious for their cause, they wanted to make the promotion of their homeland by a worldwide known author.

## CHAPTER 5

### CONCLUSION

This study examines the articles and selected literary works published in the Crimean Tatar diaspora journal *Emel* to determine how the concept of ‘homeland’ was positioned and how the Crimean Tatar diaspora elite, who gathered around the journal, defined the self-image of the Crimean Tatar diaspora in Turkey between the years 1960 and 1994. The thesis also makes an analysis in discourse and reveals how changing political conditions shaped the discourse of the journal. The study reveals that *Emel*, as a single path diaspora journal up to 1990s, played a crucial role in transforming and constructing national identity in the diaspora.

According to most estimates, there are 3 to 5 million citizens in the republic of Turkey, who trace their origins back to 18<sup>th</sup> and 19<sup>th</sup> migrations from Crimea to Balkans and Anatolia.<sup>390</sup> At the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, while the majority of the Crimean Tatars slightly assimilated in the Ottoman Empire, a small minority kept contact with homeland.<sup>391</sup> The *Emel* movement was devoted to Crimean Tatar nationalism in diaspora, and its journal comes from this tradition, which today has turned out to be the address of Crimean Tatar diaspora nationalism.

The Crimean Tatar diaspora is characterized by its development in a rapidly changing society. The Republic of Turkey was established on the ruins of the multi-ethnic Ottoman Empire, and the newly established Turkish secular nation could not recognize the diverse ethnic background of Muslim peoples of the collapsed Empire. In this political environment, the Crimean Tatars found it easy to tie their future to the nation building process of the new republic and together with other Muslims communities from the Balkans

---

<sup>390</sup> Williams, 2001, p. 227

<sup>391</sup> Williams, 2001, p. 248-249

and Russia. The Crimean Tatars of Turkey played a crucial role in forming the modern Turkey. Convergence of the Crimean Tatar identity to the Turkish one after the foundation of modern Turkey was not a surprising development, considering the fact that Crimean Tatars and Turks of Anatolia had common cultural, religious, and linguistic features. Crimean Tatars easily adapted themselves into Turkish national identity and for a long time could not openly express their own distinct ethnic/national identity. For that reason, for some time, they held a dual feeling of territorial belonging in terms of 'homeland'. The sense of belonging in diasporas is mainly described through connection with the homeland. A member of a diaspora community who is deeply rooted in a country other than 'origin', may naturally experience duality about belonging to home territory. *Emel* was an endeavor of the diaspora intellectuals to revive the almost forgotten national identity. The use of image of ancestral 'homeland' was the primary tool to do it.

At that point, it is important to note that the identity formation process of the Crimean Tatar diaspora in Anatolia over the course of "Turkification" extended into the Republican era, the age of globalization, and the very long interlude period between the two periods that shaped and reshaped the Crimean Tatar diaspora identity. Consequently, it produced different levels of attachment with the homeland Crimea. In other words, for a certain part of the diaspora community, the process produced new forms of identities that transcend the territorially and ethnically defined homeland attachment. They can identify the term homeland as 'Turkey' However, others, such as the elite diaspora groups that gathered around *Emel*, perceived loyalty to the home-country 'Crimea' as a matter of life and death.

Kellas points out that an 'ethnic group' that has not achieved the status of a 'nation' describes a quasi-national kind of 'minority group' within a state.<sup>392</sup>

Depending upon the Khanate and a *Kurultay* experience, the Crimean Tatar

---

<sup>392</sup> Kellas, James G. (1998). *The Politics of Nationalism and Ethnicity*, Second Edition, New York: St. Martin's Press, p. 5

elite group is well aware of their distinct national identity; however, it was not enough for the development of 'national consciousnesses' among diaspora community in masses. *Emel* took an initiative to transform the existing quasi-national kind of migrant group into a diaspora group having national consciousness. The journal made this transformation through concepts such as the themes regarding 'ethnicity', 'homeland' and 'diaspora' by changing discourses through those concepts along the time in different political contexts.

A body of statement, discourse produces knowledge through language. Its nature is not certain, but fluid. It may also produce a common sense and a normative idea regarding identity.<sup>393</sup> The early discourse which emerges in the period between 1960 and 1985, constantly repeats itself in the themes of "migration flows", "emergence of national movement at the beginning of the 20th century", and origins of "Crimean Turkishness". In this period, the journal announced that the Crimean Tatars left their homelands to lose their homes. The messages reminding the readers to 'be aware of ancestral homeland' increasingly provided a sort of psychological appropriation of 'homeland' among the diaspora community. The events and people symbolizing the national existence and devastation were reminded on all possible occasions. For example, whenever they could, they mourned for their relatives who had lost their life in exile. They were 'Crimean Turks'. Despite the missed homeland, it was implied in the primary period that, by virtue of migrating to 'white soil' and 'adobe of Islam', they were not a lost generation. This indicates that the idea of ethnic/national identity, thence homeland, was under estimated in that period. Instead, the shared religion and sect were emphasized on the basis of shared values. The memory of the Crimea was refreshed in the articles and literature. Crimea was referred to as homeland on the basis of the emotional bonds to the present time Christian land, where the Crimean Tatars had originated from. A sense of national consciousness and seeds of spirit of diaspora perception as a self-definition

---

<sup>393</sup> Carabine, 2001, p. 269

were tried to be given. Attempts at building consciousness were not geared towards political outputs, nor did they go beyond the matter of identity and belonging.<sup>394</sup> They remained as a naive but preliminary attempt to put the Crimean Tatar national identity vis a vis supra national Turkish identity. Following this period, after 1983, *Emel* gradually became more analytical with the discussions made in the pages. For example it focused on the reasons for the exile decisions and effects of its implementation patterns instead of descriptive and sentimental narrations of the past. That period was characterized by the essays devoted to the search for the self-identification other than “Turkishness”. In the poems, the leading figures and elements of Crimean Tatar national identity were promoted. Literary works appealed to longing for the past, and placed emphasis on the lost homeland.

Examination of the concepts pertaining to the attachments of a diaspora community with its homeland revealed most frequently long-distance nationalism, transnational loyalties, and hybrid identity formation. These concepts paved the way to understanding the different attachment levels within the same diaspora community to the homeland. Understanding the role of homeland in national identity enables us to perceive its significance in diaspora activities particularly for a stateless diaspora. Besides, attachment and loyalty to the homeland cannot be thought without considering the political and historical dynamics in the host land particularly in Crimean Tatar case. The cultural and historical proximity of ‘Crimean Tatars’ to the Ottoman Empire which is explained below, is a serious obstacle to transforming a partially assimilated Crimean Tatar identity to a conscious diaspora identity. However, this does not explain the whole picture. Demmers says that “as it has become increasingly hard to settle and assimilate in the host land, diasporas are more likely to continue to focus on their erstwhile homeland.”<sup>395</sup> As a matter of fact, the *Emel* movement

---

<sup>394</sup> I selectively used the term that ‘it tried to be done’, because of the political limitations in terms of liberties as it was mentioned in the previous chapters.

<sup>395</sup> Demmers, Joell (2002). “Diaspora and Conflict: Locality, Long-Distance Nationalism, and Delocalization of Conflict Dynamics”. *The Public*. 9 (1), p.88.

functioned as a mediator for spreading diasporas consciousness in the grassroots.

In the past, the term “diaspora” was unrestricted to Armenians, Greeks, Jews, and Africans. In time, its definition expanded to include any community that migrated from its homeland. To limit it with ethnicity, for example, Sheffer identifies “diaspora” as ethnic minority of a migrant residing in host countries while maintaining strong sentimental and material links with their homeland.<sup>396</sup> However, Safran defines diaspora as a segment of people living outside the homeland.<sup>397</sup> This division is important for this study because the perception of homeland and diaspora among the *Emel* editorials shaped the spirit of the journal and characteristics of *Emel* movement, which aims to construct national identity by using homeland marker among Crimean Tatars living in Turkey.

The main ambiguity in the term stems from the debates on the nature of ethnic/national identities, which in turn determines diasporic identities. Diaspora is a primordial or a constructed status of a migrant community. At that point, essentialists claim that diaspora is a term related to an ethnic community of the kin and common descent in the home country. This approach assumes a monolithic explanation of diasporas, which is not widely supported by constructionist.<sup>398</sup> For constructionists, diaspora is an elite mobilized political project; therefore, the diaspora identity is a created consciousness. The heterogeneity of diaspora groups proves the validity of the constructionist approach. Some scholars argue in their seminal works that diaspora is a constructed entity.<sup>399</sup> It is a matter of strategic identity

---

<sup>396</sup> Sheffer, Gabriel (eds.) (1986). “Modern Diasporas in International Politics”, London and Sydney: Croom Helm, p. 3.

<sup>397</sup> Safran, William (1991). “Diasporas in Modern Societies: Myths of Homeland and Return”. *Diaspora*, 1 (1), pp. 83-99.

<sup>398</sup> <http://www.diaspora-centre.org/DOCS/MobilisingAfricanD.pdf>

<sup>399</sup> Adamson in “Constructing the Diaspora”; Anderson in “Long-distance Nationalism”

creation mechanism that is run by elite groups who generate this mechanism.<sup>400</sup>

After singling out this prevalent debate about the concept of diaspora, it is important to note that, along the thesis, the evaluations are mostly made in line with the constructivist point of view. The primordialism as an approach is also important in the study, as *Emel* attempts to construct primordial attachments and primordial understanding in diaspora community. The journal instrumentally and pragmatically uses the ‘homeland’ marker as a tool to construct national identity among Crimean Tatar diaspora community. The fourth chapter shows how *Emel* movement utilizes the ‘journal’ as a political project and uses ‘homeland’ as a tool to construct a distinct Crimean Tatar national identity. Therefore, the existence of *Emel* and its endeavor demonstrates that diaspora is not a natural result of mass migration. The *Emel* editors in every occasion show the reader that there is a difference between a migrant community and diaspora group, implicitly and explicitly inviting the readers to be aware of this conscious and to be part of the nationally conscious community.

In this endeavor, the feeling of belonging to homeland no matter whether the homeland is an existing state or an imaginary one plays crucial role in this project called *Emel*. That is, at the same time, it explains the reason why ‘homeland’ was chosen as leading marker amongst the other primordial features especially for ‘stateless diasporas’. As Sheffer argues, “the stateless diasporas are those dispersed segments of nations that have been unable to establish their own independent states”, diasporas and they are considered the most attached variety among other diasporas with their past and the most active in homeland politics.<sup>401</sup> Long-distance nationalism of the stateless Crimean Tatar diaspora appears to be an important variable in shaping the

---

<sup>400</sup> See Adamson, Fiona. (2012). “Constructing the Diaspora: Diaspora Identity Politics and Transnational Social Movements.” In: *Politics from Afar: Transnational Diasporas and Networks*. New York: Columbia University Press.

<sup>401</sup> Sheffer, Gabriel. (2003). *Diaspora Politics. At Home Abroad* New York, Cambridge University Press, p. 73.

future political environment in terms of ethnic discourse in Turkey. It can be expected that the *Emel* movement, in the future, may awake the indifferent and silent diaspora community members who are currently not very much interested in ethnic and national debates and identifications for today. The prominent diaspora journal *Emel* may incorporate the presently indifferent population of diaspora to the nationalist and activist fronts of diaspora in the years to come.



## REFERENCES

Adamson, Fiona (2012). "Constructing the Diaspora: Diaspora Identity Politics and Transnational Social Movements." in Peter Mandaville, and Terrence Lyons, (eds.) *Politics from Afar: Transnational Diasporas and Networks*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Akiş, Ali (1996). "Türk Dünyasının Üç Büyük Kaybı: Sadık Ahmet, İsa Yusuf Alptekin ve Müstecip Ülküsal". *Kırım*. (14).

Agnew, John (2005). *Hegemony: The New Shape of Global Power*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.

Agnew, Vijay (2005). *Diaspora, Memory and Identity: A Search for Home*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

Agoston, Gabor and Masters, Bruce (2009). *Encyclopedia of the Ottoman Empire Facts on File*. New York: INC.

Allen, Tim and Eade, John (eds.) (2000). "The Politics of Identity", *Poverty and Development into the 21st Century*. Oxford: The Open University Press and Oxford Press.

Allworth, Edward (1998). *The Tatars of Crimea: Return to the Homeland: Studies and Documents*. Durham: Duke University Press.

Anderson, Benedict (1998). *The Spectre of Comparisons: Nationalism, Southeast Asia and the World*. New York: Verso.

Anderson, Benedict (1991). *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*. London: Verso.

Anderson, Benedict (2001). "The Complexity of Ethnic Identities: A Postmodern Reevaluation", *Identity: An International Journal of Theory and Research*, 1(3), pp. 209-223.

Andrews, Peter Alford (1989). *Ethnic Groups in the Republic of Turkey*. Wiesbaden: Ludwig Reichert.

Barth, Fredrik (eds.) (1969). *Ethnic Groups and Boundaries*. Long Grove, Illinois: Waveland Press, Inc.

Basch, Linda, Schiller, Glick N. and Szanton, Blanc C. (1994). *Nations Unbound: Transnational Projects, Postcolonial Predicaments, and Deterritorialized Nation-States*. Amsterdam: Gordon and Breach Science Publishers.

Bezanis, Lowell (1994). "Soviet Muslim Emigrés in the Republic of Turkey" *London: Central Asian Survey* 13 (1), pp. 59-180.

Brass, Paul R. (1991). *Ethnicity and Nationalism Theory and Comparison*. London: Sage Publications.

Breuilly, John, (1999). "Approaches to Nationalism", *Mapping the Nation*. in Gopal Balakrishnan and Benedict Anderson. (eds.) London: Verso

Brubaker, Rogers (2005), "The Diaspora". *Ethnic and Racial Studies*. 28(1), pp. 1- 19.

Burke, Peter (1992). *History and Social Theory*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Chatterjee, Partha (1986). *Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World*. London: Zed Books Limited.

Chatterjee, Partha (2001). "Nationalism: General", *International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences*.

Clifford, James (1994). "Further Inflections: Toward Ethnographies of the Future". *Cultural Anthropology*, 9 (3), pp. 302-338.

Cohen, Robin (1997). *Global Diasporas: An Introduction*. Cornwall: UCL Press.

Robin, Cohen (1996). "Diasporas and the State: from Victims to Challengers" *International Affairs* 72 (3), pp 507–20.

Connor, Walker (1994). *Ethnonationalism The Quest for Understanding*. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton Univ. Press.

Copeaux, Etienne (1997). "Prometeci" Hareket" in Semih Vaner (eds.), *Unutkan Tarih: Sovyet Sonrası Türkdilli Alan*. İstanbul: Metis Yayınları.

Cornell, Stephan and Hartman, Douglas (1998). *Ethnicity and Race: Making Identities in a Changing World* Thousand Oaks, California: Pine Forge Press.

Demmers, Joell (2002). "Diaspora and Conflict: Locality, Long-Distance Nationalism, and Delocalization of Conflict Dynamics". *The Public*. 9 (1), pp. 85 -96.

Drobizheva, Leokadia. M. (1990). "National Self-Awareness" in Olcott, Martha Olcott B., Lubomyr Hajda and Anthony Olcott (eds.). *The Soviet Multinational State: Readings and Documents*. Armonk, N.Y. : M.E. Sharpe.

Eren, Nermin (1998). "Crimean Tatar Communities Abroad" in Edward Allworth, (eds.), *Tatars of the Crimea: Their Struggle for Survival*. Durham: Duke University Press.

Fisher, Alan (1982). "The Ottoman Crimea in the Sixteenth Century." *Harvard Ukrainian Studies*, 5 (2), pp. 135–170.

Fisher, Alan (1970). *The Russian Annexation of Crimea 1772-1783*, London: Cambridge University Press.

Fisher, Alan (1978). *The Crimean Tatars*. Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press.

Freeman, Michael (1998). "Theories of Ethnicity, Tribalism and Nationalism", in Christie Kenneth, (eds.), *Ethnic Conflict, Tribal Politics: A Global Perspective*. Great Britain: Curzon Press.

Friedman, Jonathan (1994). *Cultural Identity and Global Process*. London: Sage.

Geertz, Clifford (1973). *The Interpretation of Cultures Selected Essays*. Basic Books: New York.

Gellner, Ernest (1964). *Nationalism, Thought and Change*. London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson.

Gellner, Ernest (1983). *Nations and Nationalism*. Blackwell: Oxford.

Gellner, Ernest (1996). *Encounters with Nationalism*. Blackwell: Oxford.

Gillespie, Kate; Riddle, Liesl; Sayre, Edward and Sturges, David (1999). "Diaspora Interest in Homeland Investment", *Journal of International Business Studies*, 30 (3), pp. 623-634.

Gilroy, Paul (Winter 1990/1991) "It Ain't Where You're From, It's Where You're At The Dialectic of Diasporic Identification." *Third Text* (13), pp 3-16.

Gözaydın, Ethem Feyzi (1948). *Kırım Türklerinin Yerleşme ve Göçmeleri*. İstanbul: Vakıf Matbaası.

Guibernau, Montserrat (1996). *Nationalisms The Nation- State and Nationalism in the Twentieth Century*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Hall, Stuart (1992). "The Question of Cultural Identity", in Stuart Hall; David Held and Tony McGrew (eds.), *Modernity and Its Futures*, London: Polity Press.

Hatif, Osman Kemal (1998). *Gökbayrak Altında Milli Faaliyet: 1917 Kırım Tatar Milli İstiklal Hareketinin Hikayesi*. Hakan Kırımlı,(eds). Ankara: Kırım Türkleri Kültür ve Yardımlaşma Derneği Genel Merkezi Yayınları.

Hedetoft, Ulf and Christiansen, Flemming (eds.) (2004). *The Politics of Multiple Belonging: Ethnicity and Nationalism in Europe and East Asia*, Burlington: Ashgate Pub.

Herzfeld, Michael (1997). *Cultural Intimacy: Social poetics in the Nation-State*. New York: Routledge.

Hobsbawn, Eric J. (1990). *Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Hobsbawn, Eric, J. and Ranger, Terence (eds.) (1983). *The Invention of Tradition*, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge.

Freeman, Michael (1998). “Theories of Ethnicity, Tribalism and Nationalism”, in Christie, Kenneth, *Ethnic Conflict, Tribal Politics: A Global Perspective* Great Britain: Curzon Press.

Hutchinson, John and Smith, Anthony, D., (eds), (1994). *Nationalism*, Oxford Hyman: London: Oxford University Press.

İzmirli, İdil P. (2008) “Return to the Golden Cradle: Post Return Dynamics and Resettlement Amongst the Crimean Tatars” in Buckley, Cynthia J., Ruble Blair A., Hoffman, Erin T. (eds.) (2008). *Migration, Homeland and Belonging in Eurasia*. Baltimore, Maryland: The John Hopkins University Press.

Kalra, Virinder S. Kaur, Raminder and Hutnyk, John (2005). *Diaspora and Hybridity*, London: Sage Publication.

Karpat, Kemal H. (2002). *Social, Economic and Political Studies of the Middle East and Asia*. Leiden; Boston; Köln: Brill Academic Pub.

Karpat, Kemal H. (1984). "Ottoman Urbanism: The Crimean Emigration to Dobruca and the founding of Mecidiye, 1856-1878". *International journal of Turkish Studies*. Winter 1984-1985. 3 (1), pp. 1- 25.

Kellas, James G. (1998). *The Politics of Nationalism and Ethnicity*. New York: St. Martin's Press.

Kırimer, Cafer Seydahmet (1996). *Gaspıralı İsmail Bey: 'Dilde, Fikirde, İşte Birlik*. İstanbul: Avrasya Bir Vakfı Yayınları.

Kırimer, Cafer, Seydahmet (1993). *Bazı Hatıralar*. İstanbul: Etam A.Ş.

Kırımlı, Hakan (1996). *National Movements and National Identity among the Crimean Tatars, 1905-1916*. New York: E.J. Brill Leiden.

Kırımlı, Hakan (1998). *Gökbayrak Altında Milli Faaliyet: 1917 Kırım Tatar Milli İstiklal Hareketinin Hikayesi*. Ankara: Kırım Türkleri Kültür ve Yardımlaşma Derneği Genel Merkezi Yayınları.

Kreindler, Isabelle (1986). "The Soviet Deported Nationalities: A Summary and Update". *Soviet Studies* 38(3), pp. 387-405.

Levy, André and Weingrod, Alex (2005). *Homelands and Diasporas Holy Lands and Other Places*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Magocsi, Paul Robert (2010). *History of Ukraine*, Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

Maksudoğlu, Mehmet (1996). *Kırım Türkleri*, İstanbul: Ensar.

Milner, Thomas (1855). *The Crimea, Its Ancient and Modern History*, London: Oxford University Press.

Nalçaoğlu, Halil (2002). "Vatan: Toprakların Altı, Üstü ve Ötesi". *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce*. (4). İstanbul: İletişim Yay, pp. 293-308.

Oyen, Else (1990). *The Imperfection of Comparison in Comparative Methodology: Theory and Practice in International Social Science Research*. Else. Oyen, London (eds.) Sage.

Öktem, Kerem (2003). *Creating the Turk's Homeland: Modernization, Nationalism and Geography in Southeast Turkey in the late 19th and 20th Centuries*. Oxford : Oxford Press.

Özenbaşlı, Ahmed (1997). *Kırım Faciası: Saylama Eserler. İsmail Kerim and Meryem Özenbaşlı*. Simferopol: Tavrida Basmahanesi.

Özkırımlı, Umut (2000). *Theories of Nationalism: A Critical Introduction*. St. Martin's Press: New York.

Levy, Andre and Weingrod, Alex (2005). *Homelands and Diasporas: Holy Lands and Other Places*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

Pinson, Mark (1972). "Russian Policy and Emigration of Crimean Tatars to the Ottoman Empire: 1854-1862". *Güneydoğu Avrupa Araştırmaları Dergisi* (1), pp.37-55.

Safran, William (1991). "Diasporas in Modern Societies: Myths of Homeland and Return". *Diaspora*, 1 (1), pp. 83-99.

Sasse, Gwendolyn (2007) *The Crimea Question: Identity, Transition, and Conflict*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Sewell, William H, Jr. (1999). "Geertz, Cultural Systems, and History: From Synchrony to Transformation" *The Fate of "Culture" Geertz and Beyond*, p 17 edited by Sherry B. Ortner, Los Angeles: University of California Press.

Sheehy, Ann and Bohdan Nahaylo (1980). *The Crimean Tatars, Volga Germans and Meskhetians: Soviet Treatment of Some National Minorities*. London: Minority Rights Group Report.

Shain, Yossi (Winter 1994-1995). "Ethnic Diasporas and US Foreign Policy". *Political Science Quarterly*. 109 (5), pp. 811-841.

Shain, Yossi and Barth, Aharon (2003). "Diasporas and International Relations Theory" *International Organization*. 57( 3), pp. 449-479.

Shaw, Stanford J and Ezal Kural (eds.) (2002). "Reform, Revolution and Republic. The rise of Modern Turkey (1808-1975)". *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey Vol II* . United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press.

Sheffer, Gabriel (eds.) (1986). "Modern Diasporas in International Politics", London and. Sydney: Croom Helm.

Sheffer, Gabriel (2003). *Diaspora Politics. At Home Abroad*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Skrbis, Zlatko (1999). *Long-distance Nationalism: Diasporas, Homelands and Identities*. Brookfield: Ashgate Publishing Company.

Smith, Anthony D. (1986) *The Ethnic Origins of Nations*, Oxford: Blackwell.

Smith, Anthony D. (1991). *National Identity*. Reno: University of Nevada Press.

Smith, Anthony D. (1995). *Nations and Nationalism in a Global Era*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Smith, Anthony D. (1996). "Opening Statement: Nations and their Pasts". *Nations and Nationalism*, 2 (3), pp. 358-65.

Smith, Anthony D. (1998). *Nationalism and Modernism*. London: Routledge.

Smith, Anthony D (1999). *Myths and Memories of the Nation*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.



Smith, Anthony D (1999). "Nationalism and the Historians", *Mapping the Nation*. in Gopal Balakrishnan and Benedict Anderson. (eds.) London: Verso.

Smith, Anthony D. (2001). *Nationalism: Theory, Ideology, History*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Smith, Anthony D. (2010). *In The Call of the Homeland: Diaspora Nationalisms Past and Present* Allon Gal, Athena S. Leousi(eds). Leiden: Koninklijke Brill NV.

Soysal, Yasemin Nuhoğlu (2000). "Citizenship and Identity: Living in Diasporas in Post-War Europe?" *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 23( 1), pp. 1-15.

Tanner, Arno (2004). *The Forgotten Minorities in Eastern Europe. The History and Today of Selected Ethnic Groups in Five Countries*. Helsinki: East West Books.

Tilley, Virginia ( 1997). "The Terms of Debate: Untangling Language about Ethnicity and Ethnic Movement". *Ethnic and Racial Studies*. 20 (1), pp. 497-522.

Toticagüena, Gloria (2004). *Identity Culture and Politics in Basque Diaspora*. Reno: University of Nevada Press.

Uehling, Greta (2004). *Beyond Memory*. Palgrave: Macmillan.

Ülküsal, Müstecip (1999). *Müstecip Ülküsal: Kırım Yolunda Bir Ömür (Hatıralar)*. Ankara: Kırım Türkleri Kültür ve Yardımlaşma Derneği Genel Merkezi.

Ülküsal, Müstecip (1980). *Kırım Türk-Tatarları (Dünü-Bugünü-Yarını)*. İstanbul: Baha Matbaası.

Vermeulen, Hans and Govers, Cora (eds.), *The Anthropology of Ethnicity-Beyond Ethnic Groups and Boundaries*. The Netherlands: Het Spinhuis.

Vertovec, Steven (2005). *Political Importance of Diasporas*, University of Oxford, Centre of Migration, Policy and Society Working Paper, (13).

Vertovec, Steven (2009). *Transnationalism*. New York: Routledge.

William J. Lahneman (2005). *Impact of Diaspora Communities on National and Global Politics: Report on Survey of the Literature*. College Park, MD: CISSM.

Williams, Brian Glyn (2001). *The Crimean Tatars*. Leiden: Koninklijke Brill NV.

Williams, Brian Glyn (1997). "A Community Reimagined. The Role of "Homeland" in the Forging of National Identity, the Case of the Crimean Tatars.", *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs*. 17 (2), pp. 225-252.

### ***Emel***

Ağat, Nurettin (1962). "Bağımsız Kırım Hanları" *Emel*, (12).

Ağat, Nurettin (1968) "Kırım Şehirleri". *Emel*, (46).

A.K. (1962). " Ak Toprak", *Emel*,(8).

Altay, Deniz (1994). "Kırıkkale'de Kırım'ı Düşünmek." *Emel*, (202).

Araslı, Altan (1970). "Kırım Türklerinin Muhacir Türküleri ve Halk Destanları" *Emel*,(56).

Alaç, M. (1960). "Kurultay ve Kırım Parlamentosu", *Emel*, (1).

Bala, Mirza (1966). "Kırım" *Emel*, (35).

Bowman, İnci (1996). "Kırımlı Bir Eğitim Savaşçısı Fevzi Elitok Altuğ (1878-1934)" *Emel*, (165).

“Çernobil’in Öğrettikleri”, (1986) *Emel*, (155).

Çevik, Çelebi (1994). “Sungurlu’dan: Köyümü Bilemiyorum” *Emel*, (204).

Çobanzade, Bekir Sıtkı (1965). “Ezan Sesi”. *Emel*, (26).

Dağcı, Cengiz (1992). “Badem Dalına Asılı Bebekler”. *Emel*, (192).

Devlet, Nadir (1985). “ 240 Kırım Türkü’nün Müracatı”. *Emel*,. (146).

*Emel*,1960 (1).

*Emel*,1978 (109).

*Emel*, 1960 (1).

*Emel*, 1992, (189).

*Emel*, 1991 (187).

*Emel*, 1992, (188).

Gaspıralı, İsmail Bey (1992). “Kırım”. *Emel*. (191).

Güleç, Azmi (1961). “İçimde Bir Büyük Vatan Ağlıyor”. *Emel*.(5).

“İmzalanmasının Onuncu Yıldönümünde Helsinki Anlaşmasının İhlalleri: Bulgaristandaki Türkler ve Kırımdaki Tatarlar”, 1985, *Emel*, (150).

Kırım, Metin (1982). “Kırım Hanlığı İhlakı ve 1944 Sürgünü”. *Emel*. (130).

Kırimal, Edige (1961). “Kırım Türklerinin Milli Basını,” *Emel*.( 6).

Kırimal, Edige (1982). “Kırım Türklerinin Milli Mücadelesi II”. *Emel*. (125).

Kırimer, Cafer Seydahmet (1993). “Bazı Hatıralar”. *Emel*. (6).

Kırımoğlu, Mustafa Abdulcemil (1986). “Son Söz”. *Emel*. (152).

Niyazi, Mehmet (1966). “İşitiyorum”. *Emel*. (33).

Öcal, F. Cemal Oğuz (1966). “Şanlı Kırım”. *Emel*. (34).

Pushkin, Alexander Sergeyevich (1992). “ Bahçesaray Çeşmesi”. *Emel*. (189).

Seytmuratova Ayşe (1985) .*Emel*. (148).

“TBMM’nin 72. Açılış Yıldönümü Törenine Kırım Tatar Milli Meclisi Heyetide de Katıldı.”, *Emel*, 1992 (189).

Ülküsal, Müstecip (1960). “Sömürgecilik ve Sovyet Rusya”. *Emel*.( 2).

Ülküsal, Müstecip (1962). “Kırım Türklerinin Faciası ve Kurtuluş Davası”. *Emel*. (11).

“Yeniden Çıkarken”, 1960, *Emel*, (1).

Yıldıran, İbrahim. (1986). “Kırım Jeolojik Çevre Koruması”. *Emel*. (156).

Yurter, Fikret Kırmılı (1985) “Kırım Tatarlarının Kötü Durumu”. *Emel*. (148).

Yüksel Zuhul (1994) “Karayavşan Köyü” *Emel*. (203).

## Web Sites

“Alexander Sergeyevich Pushkin”

[http://www.poemhunter.com/i/ebooks/pdf/alexander\\_sergeyevich\\_pushkin\\_2012\\_6.pdf](http://www.poemhunter.com/i/ebooks/pdf/alexander_sergeyevich_pushkin_2012_6.pdf). (03.08.2013).

“Crimean Turk-Tatars: Crimean Tatar Diaspora Nationalism in Turkey”

<http://www.iccrimea.org/scholarly/aydin.html>. (27.08.2013).

“Crimean Jews” [http://www.eki.ee/books/redbook/crimean\\_jews.shtml](http://www.eki.ee/books/redbook/crimean_jews.shtml). (11.05.2013).

“Constructing the Diaspora: Diaspora Identity Politics and Transnational Social Movements”

[http://citation.allacademic.com//meta/p\\_mla\\_apa\\_research\\_citation/2/5/1/1/7/pages251176/p251176-4.php](http://citation.allacademic.com//meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/2/5/1/1/7/pages251176/p251176-4.php) (27.08.2012).

“Diasporas and Conflict Resolution - Part of the Problem or Part of the Solution?” Eva Østergaard-Nielsen DIIS Brief, March 2006.

[http://subweb.diis.dk/graphics/Publications/Briefs2006/%F8stergaard-nielsen\\_diaspora\\_conflict\\_resolution.pdf](http://subweb.diis.dk/graphics/Publications/Briefs2006/%F8stergaard-nielsen_diaspora_conflict_resolution.pdf) (27.08.2013).

“Milli Marşımız – ANT ETKENMEN”

<http://www.vatankirim.net/yazi.asp?yazino=156> (27.08.2013).

“Mobilising African Diaspora for the Promotion of Peace in Africa”

<http://www.diaspora-centre.org/DOCS/MobilisingAfricanD.pdf> (27.08.2013).

“Numan Çelebicihan (1885-1918)”

<http://www.iccrimea.org/literature/celebicihan.html> (27.08.2013).

“Stateless Diaspora”

[http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/14820/Baser\\_Swain\\_StatelessDiaspora36-59.pdf](http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/14820/Baser_Swain_StatelessDiaspora36-59.pdf)<http://postjugo.filg.uj.edu.pl/baza/files/153/04-Skrbis.diaspora.pdf>. (16.07.2013).

Skrbis, Zlatko (2001). Nationalism in a Transnational Context: Croatian Diaspora, Intimacy and Nationalist Imagination.

Available at <http://postjugo.filg.uj.edu.pl/baza/files/153/04-Skrbis.diaspora.pdf> (27.08.2013).

“The Karaims” <http://www.eki.ee/books/redbook/karaims.shtml> (27.08.2013).

Waxman, Dov. (2000). “Islam and Turkish National Identity: A Reappraisal”. *Turkish Yearbook of International Relations*, (30), pp. 1- 22. Available at <http://dergiler.ankara.edu.tr/dergiler/44/670/8527.pdf>. (16.07.2013).

Vertovec, Steven (1999). “Conceiving and Researching Transnationalism” *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 22.(2) University of Oxford pp 447-462. Available at <http://www.transcomm.ox.ac.uk/working%20papers/conceiving.PDF> (16.07.2013).

## APPENDICES

### A. TEZ FOTOKOPİSİ İZİN FORMU

#### ENSTİTÜ

Fen Bilimleri Enstitüsü	<input type="checkbox"/>
Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Uygulamalı Matematik Enstitüsü	<input type="checkbox"/>
Enformatik Enstitüsü	<input type="checkbox"/>
Deniz Bilimleri Enstitüsü	<input type="checkbox"/>

#### YAZARIN

Soyadı: TOPRAK

Adı: FEYZA

Bölümü: AVRASYA ÇALIŞMALARI

**TEZİN ADI** (İngilizce) : PERCEPTION OF HOMELAND  
AMONG CRIMEAN TATAR DIASPORA LIVING IN TURKEY  
AS REFLECTED ON THE DIASPORA JOURNAL EMEL

**TEZİN TÜRÜ** : Yüksek Lisans

Doktora

1. Tezimin tamamından kaynak gösterilmek şartıyla fotokopi alınabilir.

2. Tezimin içindekiler sayfası, özet, indeks sayfalarından ve/veya bir bölümünden kaynak gösterilmek şartıyla fotokopi alınabilir.

3. Teziden bir bir (1) yıl süreyle fotokopi alınamaz.

**TEZİN KÜTÜPHANEYE TESLİM TARİHİ:**