

ANTI-AMERICANISM IN TURKEY:
A COMPARISON OF BUSH AND OBAMA PERIODS

A THESIS SUBMITTED TO
THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
OF
MIDDLE EAST TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY

BY

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IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS
FOR
THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF SCIENCE
IN THE DEPARTMENT OF
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

SEPTEMBER 2013

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ABSTRACT

ANTI-AMERICANISM IN TURKEY: A COMPARISON OF BUSH AND OBAMA PERIODS

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September 2013, 169 pages

This thesis aims to explore the course of anti-Americanism in Turkey which dramatically increased during the presidency of George W. Bush. It will analyze the continuity or change in anti-Americanism from Bush's period to his successor Barack Obama's term on the basis of Turkish-American relations and American foreign policy. It will first elaborate on the concept of anti-Americanism, then cover the historical background of bilateral relations, and finally analyze the periods of President George W. Bush and President Barack Obama. This thesis will essentially compare Turkish anti-Americanism during the presidencies of Bush and Obama, who are seen by many as having rather different foreign policy approaches. In doing so, it will focus on critical American foreign policy issues, such as Iran, Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as their impact on bilateral relations between Turkey and the US.

Keywords: Anti-Americanism, Turkish-US Relations, George W. Bush, Barack Obama, Turkish Foreign Policy

ÖZ

TÜRKİYE’DE AMERİKAN KARŞITLIĞI: BUSH VE OBAMA DÖNEMLERİ KARŞILAŞTIRMASI

Asma, Gizem

Yüksek Lisans, Uluslararası İlişkiler

Tez Danışmanı: Yrd. Doç. Dr. Tuba Ünlü Bilgiç

Eylül, 2013, 169 sayfa

Bu tez, Başkan George W. Bush döneminde yükselen Amerikan karşıtlığının sonraki başkan Barack Obama dönemindeki seyrini incelemeyi ve iki dönem arasındaki farkı Türk-Amerikan ilişkileri ile Amerikan dış politikası temelinde incelemeyi hedeflemektedir. Bu tez sırasıyla, Amerikan karşıtlığı terimini, iki ilişkilerin tarihi arka planını, George W. Bush ve Barack Obama dönemini inceleyecektir. Birbirlerinden çok farklı dış politika yaklaşımları olduğu iddia edilen Bush ve Obama döneminde Türkiye’de mevcut Amerikan karşıtlığını kıyaslayan bu çalışma, İran, Irak ve Afganistan başta olmak üzere önemli Amerikan dış politikası meselelerine ve bunların ikili ilişkiler üzerindeki etkilerine odaklanmak suretiyle konuyu irdelemeyi amaçlamaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Amerikan karşıtlığı, Türk- Amerikan İlişkileri, George W. Bush, Barack Obama, Türk Dış Politikası

*To my precious mother Aysun Asma
and my father Nevzat Asma*

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

There are many people that I want to thank for their support in the writing process of this thesis. First and foremost, I would like to express my deepest gratitude to my advisor Assist. Prof. Dr. Tuba Ünlü Bilgiç who has broadened my vision and my academic perception with her cautious, patient and highly valuable feedback after each draft. Her constructive and academic criticism helped me to conclude this thesis. I would also like to thank warmly to Assoc. Prof. Dr. Bestami Sadi Bilgiç and Assist. Prof. Dr. Işık Kuşçu Bonnenfant for sparing the precious time for reading my thesis and for their constructive criticism during the jury.

My deepest and special are given to my dear family. Without their support, endless love and encouragement throughout my whole life, it was not possible for me to become who I am today. I owe more than thank to my mother Aysun Asma for her unconditional support and love all my life. My gratitude also goes to my father Nevzat Asma for his endless love and guidance in my entire life. I present my deepest appreciation to my lovely sister Ecem Asma without her I would have felt so lonely not only in long library days but also in my life.

I especially want to thank to Aylin Çakıroğlu Çevik who is not only one of my relative but also is a best friend to me. As a precious academic in the future, she helped me a lot during the writing process of this thesis with her valuable academic knowledge and moral support.

I want to thank also to Ceren Arslan Tüysüz, İpek Gümüşsoy and Merve Sare Baykal for their valuable support and putting a smile on my face during the most difficult times of the study.

I also wish to express thanks to Beste Öztürk Bakacak for her moral support and sharing the same destiny with me as a student of METU who is writing her master dissertation, as well.

I take this opportunity to record my sincere thanks to all members of the Bilateral Relations Department of Ministry of Customs and Trade for enabling me to run both study and work.

I have a lot of people to thank and I do not want to miss anyone out but I know that I could not mention every single person that has helped me on the process of my thesis. You know who you are and you should also know that every contribution you have made has meant a world to me. I thank you with all my heart.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PLAGIARISM.....	iii
ABSTRACT.....	iv
ÖZ.....	v
DEDICATION.....	vi
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS.....	vii
TABLE OF CONTENTS.....	ix
LIST OF TABLES.....	xii
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS.....	xiv
CHAPTER	
1. INTRODUCTION.....	1
2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK OF ANTI – AMERICANISM.....	6
2.1 Introduction.....	6
2.2 The concept of Anti-Americanism.....	7
2.3 Types of Anti-Americanism.....	13
2.3.1 Katzenstein and Keohane’s categorization.....	14
2.3.2 Brendon O’Connor’s categorization.....	17
2.4 Indicators of Anti-Americanism.....	19
2.5 Consequences of Anti-Americanism.....	20
2.6 Anti-Americanism in Turkey	22
2.7 Conclusion	27
3. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND.....	29
3.1 Introduction	29
3.2 Establishment of the Relations.....	29
3.3 Evolving Relationship from the Second World War to the 1960s.....	31
3.4 Relationship between the 1960s and the 1980s.....	35
3.5 Relations between 1980 and 2003 Iraq War.....	41

3.6 Conclusion.....	46
4. THE TERM OF PRESIDENT GEORGE W. BUSH.....	50
4.1 Introduction.....	50
4.2 The Doctrine of George W. Bush.....	50
4.3 George W. Bush's policy towards Turkey.....	54
4.4 George W. Bush's policy towards Iran.....	57
4.5 George W. Bush's policy towards Afghanistan	62
4.6 George W. Bush's policy towards Iraq.....	67
4.7 Anti-Americanism in Turkey during the Term of President George W. Bush.....	74
4.8 Conclusion.....	88
5. THE FIRST TERM OF PRESIDENT BARACK OBAMA.....	90
5.1 Introduction	90
5.2 The Doctrine of Barack Obama.....	90
5.3 Barack Obama’s policy towards Turkey.....	96
5.4 Barack Obama’s policy towards Iran.....	103
5.5 Barack Obama’s policy towards Afghanistan.....	108
5.6 Barack Obama’s policy towards Iraq.....	117
5.7 Anti-Americanism in Turkey during the Term of President Barack Obama.....	114
6. CONCLUSION.....	126

LIST OF REFERENCES.....	136
APPENDIX.....	170

LIST OF TABLES

TABLES

TABLES

Figure 1 The concept of anti-Americanism.....	10
Table 1 The distribution of favorable and unfavorable news and articles.....	25
Table 2 Economic Assistance of the US to Turkey.....	33
Table 3 Support for US-led War on Terror in Turkey (2002-2007).....	65
Table 4 The US Favorability (1999/2000-2013).....	75
Table 5 Favorable Opinions of the US (1999/2000-2006).....	76
Table 6 Favorable Views of the United States in Turkey (2002-2013).....	77
Table 7 Danger to World Peace in 2007.....	78
Table 8 US Could Be a Military Threat to Our Country.....	79
Table 9 What is the Problem with the US?.....	79
Table 10 Confidence in World Leaders in 2005.....	80
Table 11 What is the problem with the US in Turkey? (2005).....	81
Table 12 Confidence in World Leaders in Turkey (2005).....	81
Table 13 Reactions to Bush's Reelection (2004-2005).....	82
Table 14 Favorable View of Americans (2002-2012).....	83
Table 15 Favorable View of the US and Confidence in the US President in Turkey (2000-2009).....	116

Table 16 Confidence in World Leaders (2010).....	117
Table 17 Confidence in World leaders in Turkey (2009).....	117
Table 18 Confidence in the US President in Turkey (2008-2009).....	118
Table 19 Confidence in the US President (Bush 2003-2008, Obama 2009-2012).....	118
Table 20 Views towards the US in Turkey (2007/2008-2009).....	120
Table 21 Seeing the US as a Partner (2008-2009).....	120
Table 22 Do Turks view the US as a Partner, an Enemy or Neither? (2009).....	120
Table 23 US Favorability (1999/2000 – 2013).....	121

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

BBC	British Broadcasting Corporation
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
EU	European Union
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
ISA	Iran Sanctions Act
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NPT	Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
OSCE	Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
SCR	Senior Civilian Representative- NATO
SOFA	Status of Forces Agreement
UN	United Nations
UNGA	United Nations General Assembly
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
USA	United States of America
USD	United States Dollar
US	United States
USSR	The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

PKK	Kurdistan Workers' Party
TNGA	Turkish National Grand Assembly
WMD	Weapon of Mass Destruction

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Anti-Americanism has become a particularly popular subject in recent years. The main reason for this is the dramatic increase of anti-Americanism worldwide during the last decade. Studying Turkish American relations and Turkish anti-Americanism is also attractive when high level of anti-Americanism in this loyal ally of the US is taken into consideration.

Furthermore, even though there are a number of studies, which scrutinize anti-Americanism in Turkey during the presidency of George W. Bush¹, President Obama's term has not been examined yet in details. Since many observers have argued that the major reason for Turkish anti-Americanism was the Bush administration and its policies and that Barack Obama and his administration have carried out a highly intensive diplomatic campaign which aim to fix both the bilateral relations and the American image in Turkey, as in all over the world, the question comes to mind: Did all these efforts and charismatic and popular leadership of Barack Obama achieve to be effective in decreasing anti-American sentiment in Turkey? Motivated by this question, this study aims to fill that particular gap in the literature. By comparing two presidents, one Republican and one Democrat, whose foreign policies are expected to differ, the thesis targets to answer the main research question, whether the level of anti-Americanism in Turkey has changed after President Barack Obama took office in Washington, and what are the reasons for continuity or change.

In assessing the reasons for Turkish anti-Americanism, this study will first focus on the US foreign policy towards Turkey and how it has affected public's perception of

¹ For instance, Füsün Türkmen, Ömer Taşpınar, Nur Bilge Criss, Aylin Güney, Marc Grossman, Steven A. Cook

the US. Then it will explore three American foreign policy issues that seem to concern Turkish public most, tracing their influence on bilateral relations and questioning whether they have had any impact on people's attitude towards the US.

These policy issues are Iran, Iraq, and Afghanistan. Furthermore, thorny issues in bilateral relations, such as the Armenian issue, will also be discussed. By doing so, traces of recent anti-Americanism in Turkey will be followed.

In this context, it is first necessary to define the concept of anti-Americanism. Therefore, the second chapter will focus on the definition and varieties of anti-Americanism and the implications and reflections of it in Turkey. While there are various anti-Americanism definitions and there is an obvious conceptual problem in clarifying the concept, this study will define the term as the expression of negative attitudes toward the United States.² This study analyzes anti-Americanism by recognizing that there are two main trends in the literature to account for the phenomenon. Different definitions and varieties of anti-Americanism can actually be grouped based on this distinction: whether the reason for anti-Americanism is "what the US does" or "what the US is." The former view embraces that Anti-Americanism shows itself in reactions to the US policies, behavior and implementations of foreign policy issues. The latter view maintains that anti-Americanism is more deep-rooted and shows itself in reactions to the US identity and values.

This study will also use two main categorizations of different varieties of anti-Americanism, which were established by Peter J. Katzenstein and Robert O. Keohane and Brendon O'Connor. These are liberal, welfarist, sovereign-nationalist and radical anti-Americanisms as identified by Katzenstein and Keohane in addition to O'Connor's anti-Americanisms as dichotomy, tendency, pathology, prejudice, and ideology. These categorizations reveal that there is not only one anti-Americanism, but various anti-Americanisms. Turkey, as a case study, will be analyzed based on these categorizations. When all types are taken into consideration, Turkish anti-Americanism would be sovereign-nationalist one which implies that national identity and pride are the main identifiers to shape foreign policy of Turkey.

² Peter J. Katzenstein and Robert O. Keohane, *Anti-Americanisms in World Politics*, Cornell University Press, New York, 2007, p. 2

The third chapter will focus on historical background of the bilateral relations between Turkey and the US to have a better grasp of the current situation of relations. While focusing on the background of the relationship, ups and downs of the relations and their impact on anti-American sentiment will be examined. In this regard, this chapter will try to figure out how Johnson letter, Jupiter missiles, 1974 Cyprus issue and the subsequent arms embargo shaped the course of the relations and how anti-American sentiment spread and became entrenched among the Turkish public. The bilateral relations between Turkey and the US are going to be analyzed through four main periods. The first period will be from 1947 Truman Doctrine to 1960, while the second one will cover between 1960 and the 1980 military coup, the third period will extent from 1980 to 2003 Iraq war, while the forth one will be from Iraq war to the present. In the first period, relations were mainly focused on security and economic issues. Truman Doctrine and Turkey's inclusion into the Marshall plan were the key events. Given the Soviet threat that Turkey perceived, the US was seen as a guarantor for Turkey's security. On the other hand, strengthening Turkey against the Soviet threat was regarded as a strategic priority from the US perspective. During the second term, disappointment at US policies started to be experienced by Turks. The Johnson letter, the crisis with regard to the Jupiter missiles and 1974 arms embargo were the key events that Turkish politicians and people alike felt disappointment at the US policies. During the third term, following the 1980 military coup in Turkey, the bilateral relations between Turkey and the US improved. Two countries cooperated during the Gulf War. The last period will be analyzed in two separate chapters; one on the term of President George W. Bush and another one on the term of President Barack Obama.

After having established history of the bilateral relations, the fourth chapter will concentrate on the US foreign policy towards first Turkey, and then towards Iran, Afghanistan, and Iraq during the presidency of George W. Bush in order to trace the impact of these policies on Turkish anti-Americanism. The main incidents and decisions, such as March 1 Bill and 2003 Iraq war, are going to be analyzed.

Similarly, the fifth chapter will also focus on the US foreign policy towards first Turkey, and then towards Iran, Afghanistan, and Iraq, but this time during the

presidency of Barack Obama. The impact of Obama's discourse and policies on anti-American sentiments in Turkey is going to be explored in order to assess whether so-called policy shift in the US helped to decrease anti-Americanism in Turkey.

Finally, the concluding chapter will compare Bush and Obama periods suggesting that US policies are not the products of presidents alone. Instead, the formulation of a policy is a joint venture by the politicians, advisors, bureaucrats, legislatures, interests groups and people.

The methodology of this study is to use primary and secondary resources together. Secondary resources such as the ones on the theory of anti-Americanism, US-Turkish bilateral relations or the US foreign policy will be utilized. In addition to that, primary resources, such as opinion poll data, will be used extensively. In this sense, Pew Research Center's "Global Indicators Database"³ and German Marshall Fund's "Transatlantic Trends"⁴ datasets will constitute the main data that this study will rely on. Pew Research Center describes itself as a non-partisan fact tank, which receives funding from the Pew Charitable Trusts. The main aim of this research center is to provide information on issues, attitudes and trends, which affect the US and the world. Pew Research Center's has conducted public opinion surveys within the context of the Global Attitudes Project since summer 2002. So far, 330.00 interviews in sixty countries have been conducted.⁵ On the other hand, German Marshall Fund's Transatlantic Trends is an annual survey that aims to explore public opinion in the US, twelve member states of the EU (Bulgaria, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom), Russia and Turkey. Transatlantic Trends has been conducted since 2003 to examine growing challenges facing the world.⁶ Finally, statements of President George W. Bush and Barack Obama will also be used.

³ "Opinion of the United States", <http://www.pewglobal.org/database/indicator/1/country/224>, (accessed on 15.08.2013)

⁴ "Transatlantic Trends 2012 Partners", <http://trends.gmfus.org/files/2012/09/TT-2012-Key-Findings-Report.pdf>, (accessed on 12.08.2013)

⁵ "About the Project", <http://www.pewglobal.org/about/>, (accessed on 30.08.2013)

⁶ "About" Transatlantic Trend", <http://trends.gmfus.org/about/>, (accessed on 12.07.2013)

It is quite popular to study bilateral relations between Turkey and the US. As a result, there are many valuable resources in the literature. However, studies on Barack Obama and his administration are relatively rare, since Obama administration dated back to 2009, which is quite a recent date. Therefore, this study aims to contribute to the field by exploring whether anti-Americanism in Turkey is volatile and changeable fully depending on presidents and their policies.

CHAPTER II

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK OF ANTI – AMERICANISM

2.1 Introduction

The main aim of this chapter is to define the concept of anti-Americanism, explain the roots and varieties of anti-Americanism. The chapter will try to constitute a framework of general theory of anti-Americanism. Finally, it will discuss how Turkish anti-Americanism can be accounted for.

Anti-Americanism is not a new concept, quite the opposite, anti-Americanism was born in Europe, particularly in the continent in the 18th century.⁷ At that time, some European writers believed that everything in the Americans was degenerated.⁸ Max Paul Friedman claims that it was possible to find the word being used even before there was a United States of America arguing that anti-Americanism dates back at least to 1767.⁹ He emphasized that at that time, anti-Americanism was different from today's understanding: "It was limited to oppose to the interests of the residents of Britain's North American colonies or their desire for independence."¹⁰ Americans are often seen as uncultured materialists, seeking individual personal advancement without concern for the arts, music, or finer things of life. Or they are viewed as

⁷ Andrei S. Markovits, "Western Europe's America Problem", *Historically Speaking*, Vol. 8, No. 6, July/August 2007, p. 43

⁸ Andrei S. Markovits, "The Anti-Americanism Mindset" in *Anti-Americanism: History, Causes And Sources Vol. 1*", ed. Brendon O'Connor, Greenwood World Publishing, 2007, p.31

⁹ Max Paul Friedman, *Rethinking Anti-Americanism: The History of an Exceptional Concept in American Foreign Relations*, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2012, p. 21. Also see Peter J. Katzenstein and Robert O . Keohane, "Anti-Americanisms", *Policy Review*, October-November 2006, p. 26

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 21

excessively religious and, therefore, insufficiently rational.¹¹ According to Füsün Türkmen, many intellectuals in Europe found fault with Americans for their lack of civility, taste or manners. She stated that “anti-Americanism started as a form of cultural condescension based on the self-perceived superiority of the Europeans over Americans”¹² She also explains that early European anti-Americanism was philosophical, it is understood as a reaction of an American revolution and it was a product of romanticism.¹³

Although it is correct to point out that anti-Americanism was born in Europe, it did not remain where it was born. Contrary to this perception, anti-Americanism has spread all over the world. It gradually spread to pre-World War II Japan, in Latin American and African countries and the Arab world as well.¹⁴ In this manner, to protest America by burning American flags or boycotting American products became popular. Furthermore, anti-American rhetoric was also being used during election campaigns throughout the world.¹⁵

2.2 The concept of Anti-Americanism

From the point of view of Katzenstein and Keohane, anti-Americanism is the expression of negative attitudes towards the United States. They argue that anti-Americanism is heterogeneous and multi-dimensional.¹⁶ According to Paul Hollander, anti-Americanism is defined as follows: “an unfocused and largely irrational, often visceral aversion towards the United States, its government,

¹¹ Peter J. Katzenstein and Robert O. Keohane, *Anti-Americanisms in World Politics*, Cornell University Press, New York, 2007, p. 37

¹² Füsün Türkmen, “Anti-Americanism as a Default Ideology of Opposition: Turkey as a Case Study”, *Turkish Studies*, September 2010, Vol. 11, No. 3, p. 330

¹³ *Ibid.*, 330

¹⁴ James W. Ceaser, “A Genealogy of Anti-Americanism”, *The Public Interest*, Summer 2003, p. 4

¹⁵ Ivan Krastev, “The Anti-American Century?”, *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 15, No.2, April 2004, p.5

¹⁶ Peter J. Katzenstein and Robert O. Keohane, “Types and Sources of Anti-Americanism: A Framework for Analysis” *Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences*, 2005, p. 17

domestic institutions, foreign policies, prevailing values, culture, and people.”¹⁷ In addition, James W. Ceaser defines anti-Americanism as the idea that “something associated with the United States, something at the core of American life, is deeply wrong and threatening to the rest of the world.”¹⁸

In a similar vein, Rubinstein and Smith define anti-Americanism “as an hostile action or expressions that become part and parcel of an undifferentiated attack on the foreign policy, society, culture and values of the United States.”¹⁹

According to Füsün Türkmen, “anti-Americanism is seen as a reaction to the imbalance of power created by American might, a backlash against globalization that many identify with the United States, and an antithesis to the values being generated and exported by American culture.”²⁰ Indeed, the unbalanced American power and the way the US exercises it have been emphasized by many authors. Some argued that the basic reason for people’s hatred of America is American power. According to Brendon O’Connor, America’s military, economic and technological primacy together with its political and cultural superiority cause fear, dislike and hate.²¹

As can be seen anti-Americanism is a very broad and vague concept. In order to overcome this problem, Katzenstein and Keohane try to clarify the concept more. They make a basic distinction in considering negative attitudes towards the US; whether it is about “what the United States is” or “what the United States does”. The question of “what the United States is” is related to the fundamental values and attitudes of the US society. On the other hand, the question of “what the United States does” is much more about the US policies, especially its foreign policies. The former one is not something changeable as the policies of the US change. But the

¹⁷ Paul Hollander, *Anti-Americanism: Critiques at Home and Abroad 1965-1990*, Oxford University Press, New York, 1992, pp. 334-335

¹⁸ James W. Ceaser, “A Genealogy of Anti-Americanism”, *The Public Interest*, Summer 2003, p. 4

¹⁹ Alvin Z. Rubinstein and Donald E. Smith, “Anti-Americanism in the Third World”, *American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 1988, Vol. 497, p. 35

²⁰ Füsün Türkmen, “Turkish–American Relations: A Challenging Transition”, *Turkish Studies*, March 2009, Vol. 10, No. 1, p.124

²¹ Brendon O’Connor, “A History of Anti-Americanism from Buffon to Bush” in *Anti-Americanism : History, Causes, Themes: Vol. 2*, ed. Brendon O’Connor, Greenwood World Publishing, 2007, p.1

latter one is because it's related to policies of the US. When the policies are changed, the negative attitudes toward the US are likely to alter. Indeed, when we examine results of the polls year by year, especially after a critical event we can easily see that negative attitudes toward the US can change.²²

Therefore, Katzenstein and Keohane argue that “people who are negative about the United States itself are more likely to be biased than those who are critical only of a set of American policies. It is particularly important, therefore, in an investigation of anti-Americanism, to distinguish between is and does, and between opinion and bias.”²³

According to Türkmen, there are two types of reactions through which anti-Americanism expresses itself. The first one is objective or rational; the second one is subjective or irrational. The first one is associated with concrete American policies, implementations, misbehavior in certain situations; hence it is possible to categorize it as a “form of justifiable critique”.²⁴ On the contrary, second type of anti-Americanism is related to senses, perception, bias almost identical with anti-Semitism and racism. Türkmen states that “it has two components: (a) cognitive, a set of attributes that the person understands as inherent in the object, and (b) affective, representing like or dislike of the focal object”²⁵ based on Pierangelo Isernia's distinction which also contains (c) action-oriented as a third component.²⁶

The assumption of seeking anti-American sentiments in “what the United States does” is also supported by Higgot and Malbasic. They argue that the major source of anti-Americanism is the US policy and the attitude. To support this idea, they give

²²Peter J. Katzenstein and Robert O. Keohane, *Anti-Americanisms in World Politics*, Cornell University Press, New York, 2007, p. 20

²³ Peter J. Katzenstein and Robert O. Keohane, *Anti-Americanisms in World Politics*, Cornell University Press, New York, 2007, p. 10

²⁴ Füsün Türkmen, “Anti-Americanism as a Default Ideology of Opposition: Turkey as a Case Study”, *Turkish Studies*, September 2010, Vol. 11, No. 3, p. 332

²⁵ Füsün Türkmen, “Anti-Americanism as a Default Ideology of Opposition: Turkey as a Case Study”, *Turkish Studies*, September 2010, Vol. 11, No. 3, p. 341

²⁶ Pierangelo Isernia, “Anti-Americanism in Europe during the Cold War” in *Anti-Americanisms in World Politics*, ed. Peter Katzenstein and Robert O. Keohane, Cornell University Press, 2007, p. 59

the relationship between the US and its traditional security allies such as Australia and Canada as the prime example. Even though it is expected that anti-Americanism would be negligible among these countries, anti-American sentiments can still be found in these close allies.²⁷

On the contrary to this assumption, Paul Hollander claimed that anti Americanism is driven by what the US is rather than what the US does.²⁸ According to him, the major reason is American modernity itself, rather than its foreign policy.²⁹

According to Friedman, the concept of anti-Americanism can be categorized as follows;




FIGURE 1: The Concept of Anti-Americanism³⁰

²⁷ Richard Higgot and Ivona Malbasic, "The Theory and Practice of Anti-Americanism-A Brief Introduction", in *The Political Consequences of Anti-Americanism*, ed. Richard Higgot and Ivona Malbasic, Routledge, 2008, p. 10

²⁸ Paul Hollander, *Anti-Americanism: Irrational and Rational*, Oxford University Press, 1992, p. 337

²⁹ Paul Hollander, *Understanding Anti-Americanism: Its Origins and Impact at Home and Abroad*, Chicago, 2004, pp. 16-22

³⁰ Max Paul Friedman, *Rethinking Anti-Americanism: The History of an Exceptional Concept in American Foreign Relations*, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2012, p. 10

This figure aimed to identify America as a concept. Max Paul Friedman basically tried to make a distinction between the definition of the US by left and right wings abroad with the help of overlapping attitudes towards the US. These symbolic meanings were observed in various literatures such as travel literature, political commentary and fictions. For instance, seeing America as a materialist Mammon or industrial Moloch were common in both left and right in the nineteenth century. American industrial capability was accused of damaging communal values of the world. Furthermore, the left was also uncomfortable with the power of finance capital and military activities of the US while the right disliked women's, black and Jewish influences.

In this manner Friedman claimed that anti-Americanism could derive from the opposition to modernity. He claimed that America has often served in other countries as a symbol of a variety of issues such as capitalism, technology, gender roles. In this sense, America could have paved the way for other countries to follow the US and its values. For instance 'American conditions' or 'the American model' have often been used as a concept that one can position itself being pro or against this model.³¹

Furthermore, people showed the same feelings both for the US and American society at the same time. For instance, if one is ambivalent about the US, that person likes or dislikes the same characteristics of the American society. It is called as ambivalence or as attitudinal multidimensionality.³²

In general, there is a possibility that these two types of anti-Americanism may exist in total isolation from each other. But still different expressions of anti-Americanism may have some joint features. Sometimes, the negative feelings towards the US are directly related to the US policies in the past and today. Some other times, it derives from the gap between American idealism and the implementations of its policies. Hence, Katzenstein and Keohane maintain that "At every level, there is so much

³¹ Max Paul Friedman, *Rethinking Anti-Americanism: The History of an Exceptional Concept in American Foreign Relations*, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2012, pp. 8-11

³² Peter J. Katzenstein and Robert O. Keohane, *Anti-Americanisms in World Politics*, Cornell University Press, New York, 2007, p. 16

variation by country and region that it would be better to speak of Anti-Americanisms than of Anti-Americanism.”³³

Similarly, Brendon O’Connor emphasizes that “there is no single form of anti-Americanism. Anti-Americanism may be the product of nationalist socialist or conservative thought, or it may more simply be a reactive, knee-jerk response.”³⁴ By the same token, the style and focus of anti-Americanism in different countries and regions vary significantly across time, depending on historical relations with the United States. Given this variety of opinion and reaction, distinguished scholars writing on the subject have suggested that there is not one coherent anti-American ideology but, in fact, a number of different anti-Americanisms.³⁵

According to Max Paul Friedman, anti-Americanism in its most serious form is assumed as a prejudice with negative implications for the United States, which exists when there is a combination of blanket rejection of American society, hostility to American values, and dislike of Americans. He thinks that this way of thinking, brings a normative rejection of any the US policy because it is American, regardless of what the policy is.³⁶

Despite the attempts to clarify the concept, there are still conceptual problems. For instance, Friedman argues that there is less anti-Americanism than we think, and often criticism of America is not about America at all. It is easier for nationalist politicians in places such as Cuba, Iran, and Venezuela to use anti-Americanism to mobilize their constituencies, especially when the United States responds with increased vehemence. But in the cases anti-Americanism counts as political

³³ Peter J. Katzenstein and Robert O. Keohane, “Types and Sources of Anti-Americanism: A Framework for Analysis” *Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences*, 2005, p. 17

³⁴ Brendon O’Connor, *Anti-Americanism: History, Causes, Themes Vol.3: Comparative Perspectives*, Greenwood World Publishing, 2007, p. xiii

³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. xiii

³⁶ Max Paul Friedman, “Anti-Americanism and US Foreign Relations”, *Diplomatic History*, September 2008, Vol. 32, No. 4, p. 499

instrumentalization and in that case anti-Americanism cannot be regarded as an ideology either.³⁷

From this perspective, explaining it with the help of “ism” may constitute a conceptual error. Because, there is no coherent body of anti-American thought let alone a movement. Using the concept of anti-Americanism means there are stereotypes of America, consisting of assumptions, claims and caricatures about American values and institutions.³⁸

Being aware of the conceptual and definitional problems, this study defines anti-Americanism as expression of negative attitudes towards the US. Throughout this study, it is aimed to shed light on whether Turkish anti-Americanism has been caused by “what the US does” or “what the US is”.

2.3 Types of Anti-Americanism

Due to the problems explained above, it is most helpful to categorize the types of anti-Americanism. The categorization that is used in this chapter will be based on the works by Peter Katzenstein and Robert Keohane and Brendon O’Connor.

Katzenstein and Keohane, for instance, base their discussion of anti-Americanism on a four-type model: liberal, welfarist, sovereign-nationalist and radical.³⁹ Whereas, O’Connor offers five categories to conceptualize anti-Americanism namely, anti-Americanism as one side of a dichotomy; anti-Americanism as a tendency; anti-Americanism as a pathology; anti-Americanism as a prejudice; and finally anti-Americanism as an ideology.

³⁷ Ibid., p. 502

³⁸ Graeme Orr, “American Democracy and Anti-Americanism Since 2000” in *Anti-Americanism: History, Causes And Sources Vol.1*, ed. Brendon O’Connor, Greenwood World Publishing 2007, p.164

³⁹ Peter J. Katzenstein and Robert O. Keohane, “Types and Sources of Anti-Americanism: A Framework for Analysis” *Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences*, 2005, pp. 18-19

2.3.1 Katzenstein and Keohane's categorization

Liberal Anti-Americanism: At the first glance it could seem controversial since the US is established on liberal ideals. But liberal anti-Americans believe that the US itself does not realize all requirements of liberalism especially outside the country. Liberal anti-Americans criticize American support to the dictatorial regimes around the world during the Cold War and even in today.⁴⁰ They believe that by carrying out such policies means that the US does not live up to its idealism and its political tradition. It is also believed that the War against Terrorism has helped the US to give support to undemocratic regimes from Pakistan to Central Asia. The criticism is not only directed against politics but also economic issues. For instance, since the freedom of trade and laissez faire economy are at the center of liberal theory, the US should not use protective measures in agriculture against the developing countries. However, the US also seeks extensive patent and copyright protection for its own drug firms which is also subject to criticism by liberals.

Katzenstein and Keohane write that the supporters of liberal anti-Americanism can be found in advanced industrialized countries that Great Britain influenced or colonized in the past. It is also identifiable in the Middle East among secular, western-educated elites.⁴¹

Welfarist Anti-Americanism: According to Katzenstein and Keohane, welfarist anti-Americanism can be called social anti-Americanism, as well.⁴² Life, liberty and pursuit of happiness are the significant values that provide common ground for people or create value conflicts if there are many differences. These value conflicts could appear in terms of death penalty, desirability of comprehensive social protections, selection of multilateral approaches instead of unilateral ones, regarding international agreements as valuable. But value conflicts are usually not big because welfarist anti-Americans have a common sense of democracy with the United States.

⁴⁰ Ibid., pp. 19-20

⁴¹ Ibid., p. 20

⁴² Peter J. Katzenstein and Robert O. Keohane, *Anti-Americanisms in World Politics*, Cornell University Press, New York, 2007, p. 31

The prime examples of welfarist/social anti-Americanism are Nordic or other European social democratic welfare states in addition to industrialized states in Asia, like Japan.⁴³

Sovereign-nationalist Anti-Americanism: This type of anti-Americanism is based on three different concepts namely nationalism, sovereignty, and seeing one's state as a potential great power. There are two values that this type of anti-Americanism concentrates on. Firstly, it is believed that the policies which are related to world politics are significant. Secondly, collective national identities are primarily important.⁴⁴

In this type of anti-Americanism, national identities are regarded as one of the most significant political values in current world politics. Therefore, both strong and weak perceptions of national identities can provide basis for anti-American feelings.⁴⁵ Sovereignty is also one of the most important values that is to be protected since it is gained by hard-won battles against the imperial powers. This perception can be observed in the Middle East, Asia, Africa and even in Latin America. With regard to seeing one state's as a potential power, it is argued that opposing America and its policies help those states to strengthen themselves as great powers. Thus, those states may position themselves in opposition to the dominant states.⁴⁶

Radical Anti-Americanism: According to this point of view, American identity in terms of interior economic and political power relations and institutional practices has been considered antagonistic to the values, practices, and institutions in other places in the world. Therefore, American financial position and its society

⁴³ Peter J. Katzenstein and Robert O. Keohane, "Types and Sources of Anti-Americanism: A Framework for Analysis" *Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences*, 2005, p. 21

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 22

⁴⁵ Peter J. Katzenstein and Robert O. Keohane, *Anti-Americanisms in World Politics*, Cornell University Press, New York, 2007, p. 32

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 32

should be subject to transformation either from inside or outside to reach a level of a better world.⁴⁷

Radical anti-Americanism has been prevalent in Marxist-Leninist states until recently. Some countries such as North Korea and Cuba still have this kind of perceptions.⁴⁸ It is not fair to limit radical anti-Americanism only to Marxist-Leninist thought. Today, especially within radical Islamist groups, we can see extremely radical anti-Americans. Their primary enemies are American values, American politics and the way of life. By definition radical anti-Americanism advocates “weakening, destruction, or transformation of the political and economic institutions of the United States.”⁴⁹

In short, liberal Anti-Americans are concerned with relatively minor identity differences. They promote almost the same values with Americans. Their criticism begins when they believe that the United States itself does not follow mentioned values. Although welfarist Anti-Americans agree with some core American values, respecting others is the subject that they differentiate themselves. Sovereign-nationalist anti-Americans try to protect their nation and culture from spreading of American culture and American values. Finally, for radical anti-Americans, the US position in the world affairs must be lessened or eliminated to live in a better world.

But, of course, it is possible for one to locate himself/herself somewhere between these categorizations or to create another configuration.⁵⁰

Katzenstein and Keohane also add two more categories which they maintain cannot be merged into the above four categories. They are elitist anti-Americanism and legacy anti-Americanism. They show French anti-Americanism as the prime example of elitist anti-Americanism which is a tendency particularly among the elite

⁴⁷ Peter J. Katzenstein and Robert O. Keohane, “Types and Sources of Anti-Americanism: A Framework for Analysis” *Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences*, 2005, p. 24

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 21

⁴⁹ Peter J. Katzenstein and Robert O. Keohane, *Anti-Americanisms in World Politics*, Cornell University Press, New York, 2007, p.33

⁵⁰ Peter J. Katzenstein and Robert O. Keohane, “Types and Sources of Anti-Americanism: A Framework for Analysis” *Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences*, 2005, pp. 18-19

to look down on American values and culture. Legacy anti-Americanism can be observed in Mexico, for instance, who accused of the US for its past wrongs including the US military attacks on this country.⁵¹

2.3.2 Brendon O'Connor's categorization

O'Connor, on the other hand, builds another model where he offers five understandings of how the term is used such as anti-Americanism as a dichotomy, a tendency, a pathology, a prejudice, and an ideology.⁵²

Anti-Americanism as a Dichotomy: He explains anti-Americanism as one half of a dichotomy. He argues that people, groups or nations are perceived as either pro-American or anti-American. The prime example of this could be Bush's famous motto "either with us or against us". This understanding does not leave a room for a middle position between being pro-American or anti-American.

Anti-Americanism as a Tendency: For O'Connor, being pro-American or anti-American relies upon the issues, the time and the place. From this perspective, public polls provide a clear picture. For instance, the global positive public opinion towards the US decreased after 2003 Iraq War which illustrated the tendency throughout the world.

Anti-Americanism as a Pathology: If we accept anti-Americanism as a pathology, then being anti-American is directly related to express a blanket rejection of all things American. In this type of anti-Americanism, people do not hesitate to hate the US itself and the implementation of its policies. A true anti-American in accordance with this definition is quite rare. However, Bin Laden could be the prime example of being anti-American within the framework of this definition.

⁵¹ Peter J. Katzenstein and Robert O. Keohane, *Anti-Americanisms in World Politics*, Cornell University Press, New York, 2007, p. 37

⁵² Brendon O'Connor "What is Anti-Americanism" in *Anti-Americanism: History, Causes And Sources Vol.1*, ed. Brendon O'Connor, Greenwood World Publishing 2007, pp. 7 - 20

Anti-Americanism as a Prejudice: In anti-Americanism as a prejudice, undifferentiated, one-sided or biased views of America and Americans are concerned.

Anti-Americanism as an Ideology: In O'Connor's categorization, anti-Americanism as ideology is the most problematic issue. It is especially because ideology itself does not have clear-cut definition. He argues that more research is needed in order to comprehend ideological nature of anti-Americanism. According to him, the critical point in this definition is whether it is possible to credit anti-American comments as a distinct ideology.⁵³ He gives Fidel Castro's anti-Americanism as the prime example of anti-Americanism as an ideology.

From a different point of view, Barry Rubin highlights that 'self interest' is the concept which is constantly underestimated at the discussion of anti-Americanism. Various groups and nations including dictators, intellectual and cultural figures, Europeans and Middle Easterners make use of the ideology of anti-Americanism to legitimize their attitudes and behaviors. Rubin also states that

dictators use anti-Americanism to convince their subjects to support them. Intellectuals and cultural figures have been the main carriers of anti-Americanism as a weapon against a country whose products compete with their work. Moreover, the spread of the American model would greatly reduce their power and prestige. For Europeans and Middle Easterners, albeit in far different ways, anti-Americanism seems a good slogan to unite around.⁵⁴

Similar to this assumption, Giacomo Chiozza states that there is a growing sense that the opposition that we observed in the 2000s is more than just a momentary dissatisfaction with the United States or the administration in power. Anti-Americanism is viewed as the new ideology that shapes the political discourse after the end of all ideologies.⁵⁵

⁵³ Ibid., pp. 7 – 20

⁵⁴ Barry Rubin, "Understanding Anti-Americanism", *American Diplomacy*, 2004, Vol. IX, No.3, http://www.ciaonet.org/olj/ad/ad_v9_3/rub01.html, (accessed on 04.07.2013)

⁵⁵ Giacomo Chiozza, *Anti-Americanism and the American World Order*, The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 2009, pp. 10

Yet, even if anti-Americanism can be conceptualized as an ideology or as a political mobilization tool, the critical point is that it can indeed mobilize some societies or groups.

2.4 Indicators of Anti-Americanism

After having drawn the general framework of the anti-Americanism concept, it might be helpful to turn to the question “How could we measure anti-Americanism?” The most basic and direct way of measuring anti-Americanism is through polls.

According to Katzenstein and Keohane, there are three set of indicators to measure the anti-American sentiment with the first set of questions, respondents are asked what they feel toward or what opinion of the United States they have. There are two styles to ask these questions. First and more frequent one is a standard likert-scale question. In this format, opinion of the United States on a scale ranging from very good to very bad is asked to respondents. This format can also have an alternative category like- neither good nor bad. The second format is called feeling thermometer. The second set of questions asks about the level of trust in the American people. The third one can be described as being the clearest one. Because with at this set of questions, respondents are asked “How would you describe your feelings toward the US?” The answers include strongly anti-American, strongly pro-American or neither pro- nor anti-American.⁵⁶ The poll questions which are used in this study are as follows:

- 1- Do you have a favorable or unfavorable view of the US?
- 2- Do you have a favorable or unfavorable view of the American people?
- 3- How much confidence do you have in the US President George W. Bush/ Barack Obama?
- 4- What is the problem with the US in Turkey?
- 5- Is the US a partner, an enemy or neither?

⁵⁶ Peter J. Katzenstein and Robert O. Keohane, *Anti-Americanisms in World Politics*, Cornell University Press, New York, 2007, p. 61

2.5 Consequences of Anti-Americanism

Once we have data on anti-American sentiments, the next question is: so what? What are the political, if not social and economic, consequences of such sentiments? Do they make any difference in countries' policies towards the US? Or not?

Katzenstein and Keohane emphasize that there is a significant difference between anti-Americanism and being opposed to the US policies. For instance, opposition to War in Iraq does not necessarily mean anti-Americanism. Otherwise, many loyal Americans would be regarded as anti-Americans. According to them, second distinction should be made among opinion, distrust and bias. It is believed that distrust is as an intermediate category between unbiased opinion and systemic bias. Therefore, it is argued that the most of systemic information that we have is related to opinion instead of bias.⁵⁷ Obviously, to make a distinction between opinion based on policy disagreements and opinion based on distrust and bias is quite difficult. In this sense, it is argued that in due course, the critical opinion evolves into distrust and distrust evolves into bias. Thus, when critical opinion spread in the country, it shows itself in short time while it provides a ground for distrust and bias in longer term.⁵⁸

They also focus on the possible consequences of anti-American sentiments in three distinct political domains. First one of them is the effects of anti-American opinion on the War against Terrorism. It is said that "anti-Americanism could make it harder to fight terrorism. Such an impact could be exerted in one of two ways. Anti-Americanism could provide "breeding ground for terrorism" by helping terrorist organizations recruit activists and by creating a pool of sympathizers and supporters of terrorism."⁵⁹ Second assumption is that anti-Americanism may cause the US fail to achieve important political objectives which require broad international

⁵⁷ Robert O. Keohane and Peter J. Katzenstein, "The Political Consequences of Anti-Americanism" in *Anti-Americanisms in World Politics*, ed. Peter J. Katzenstein and Robert O. Keohane, Cornell University Press, 2007, p. 273

⁵⁸ Robert O. Keohane and Peter J. Katzenstein, "The Political Consequences of Anti-Americanism" in *Anti-Americanisms in World Politics*, ed. Peter J. Katzenstein and Robert O. Keohane, Cornell University Press, 2007, p. 274

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, 273

cooperation. This could be related to the idea that there is an inverse relation between soft power and anti-Americanism which will be examined below. Thirdly, anti-Americanism can have negative economic consequences which show itself by boycotting American products.⁶⁰

Another consequence of anti-Americanism can be seen at voting in the United Nations. A survey found that “a statistically significant, positive relationship between favorable attitudes toward the US and voting alignment within the United Nations General Assembly.”⁶¹ The study argues that voting parallel with the US at UNGA and public approval of the US are directly and positively related to each other.⁶² So, the real life consequence would be that a ten-percent increase in approval of the US might cause nearly a five-percent increase in voting alignment with the US.⁶³

Another consequence of anti-Americanism might concern the soft power of the US. Joseph Nye defines soft power as being able to get others to want the outcomes you want. Soft power is related to the ability to shape the preferences of others.⁶⁴ According to him there are three sources of soft power: a country’s culture, its political values and its foreign policies. Country’s culture shows itself in places where it is attractive to others. The popularity of American movies, fashion, its mass culture are the prime examples of this. Many people across the world seem to be affected by American popular culture. Yet Paul Hollander warns that increasing anti-Americanism and the popularity of American culture are contradicted to one another and it is required more exploration and explanation.⁶⁵ The soft power of a country is especially effective when the country lives up to its political values at home and

⁶⁰ Ibid., 275

⁶¹ Monti Narayan Datta, “The Decline of America’s Soft Power in the United Nations”, *International Studies Perspectives*, August 2009, Vol. 10, Issue 3, p. 1

⁶² Ibid., p. 13

⁶³ Ibid., p.17

⁶⁴ Joseph S. Nye, “Soft Power: The means to Success in World Politics”, *Public Affairs*, 2004, p. 5

⁶⁵ Paul Hollander, *Understanding Anti-Americanism: Its Origins and Impact at Home and Abroad*, Chicago, 2004, p. 11

abroad. Final source of soft power is the country's foreign policy. When the country's foreign policy is accepted as legitimate and having moral authority, soft power becomes influential and instrumental.⁶⁶

From this perspective, there is an inverse relationship between anti-Americanism and soft power. Nye contends that as anti-Americanism has increased in recent years and as a result of that United States' soft power is in decline.⁶⁷ In other words, "it certainly seems plausible that if others dislike the United States, they will be less willing to defer to the US wishes and support the US policy."⁶⁸

2.6 Anti-Americanism in Turkey

Against this theoretical background, we can now better assess Turkish anti-Americanism. As in the world, anti-Americanism in Turkey is not a new phenomenon either. It has been present in Turkey since the early years of bilateral relations but it became widespread at the beginning of the 1960s. Füsün Türkmen describes Turkish anti-Americanism as sovereign-nationalist anti-Americanism in accordance with Katzentein and Keohane model.⁶⁹ By the same token, according to Nur Bilge Criss, anti-Americanism was caused by the will to preserve sovereignty in addition to ideological commitments of Turkish left.⁷⁰

Katzentein and Keohane argue that this type of anti-Americanism is widespread at the nations who have a history of hard-fought wars of national liberation. In this manner, sovereignty is viewed one of the crucial characteristics of the state that

⁶⁶ Joseph S. Nye, "Soft Power: The means to Success in World Politics", *Public Affairs*, 2004, p. 11

⁶⁷ Joseph S. Nye, "The Decline of America's Soft Power: Why Washington Should Worry", *Foreign Affairs*, 2004, Vol. 83, p.16

⁶⁸ Robert O. Keohane and Peter J. Katzenstein, "The Political Consequences of Anti-Americanism" in *Anti-Americanisms in World Politics*, ed. Peter J. Katzenstein and Robert O. Keohane, Cornell University Press, 2007, p. 278

⁶⁹ Füsün Türkmen, "Anti-Americanism as a Default Ideology of Opposition: Turkey as a Case Study", *Turkish Studies*, September 2010, Vol. 11, No. 3, p. 342

⁷⁰ Nur Bilge Criss, "A Short History of Anti-Americanism and Terrorism: The Turkish Case", *The Journal of American History*, September 2002, p. 472

cannot be sacrificed easily. In addition to that, in this type of anti-Americanism states view their states as potential great powers.⁷¹ Indeed Turkey seems to fit to this definition. The War of Independence (1919-1922) was a hard-won war which provided the basis for the new Republic. It can also be argued that due to its Ottoman past, Turkey has always been suspicious about the real intentions of the Western states. Furthermore, seeing Turkey as a potential great power has become common in recent years. Many politicians, officials and intellectuals put forth that Turkey is a regional power. For instance Minister of Foreign Affairs Ahmet Davutoğlu once claimed that “Turkey is the natural heir to the Ottoman Empire that once unified the Muslim world and therefore has the potential to become a trans-regional power that helps to once again unify and lead the Muslim world.”⁷² Furthermore, Turkish elite and public seem to be quite nationalist and sensitive to Turkish sovereignty. Anti-Americanism in Turkey increased at times when there was common belief among the public that policies pursued by the US threatened Turkey’s sovereignty. For instance, 1964 Johnson Letter, 1974 arms embargo, 2003 Sulimaniyeh incident were cases in point.

Some scholars claim that Turkish anti-Americanism is related to the Sevres Syndrome that is deep-seated suspicion and mistrust of the West due to the role played by the Western powers in the collapse and dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire”.⁷³ Sevres Syndrome has a deep affect in Turkish perception in evaluating Western powers. According to Aras, it can be described as a mentality that started to find its way at the time of transformation from Ottoman Empire into nation-state. Since the main aim of the Treaty of Sevres was dividing Ottoman Empire after the

⁷¹ Peter J. Katzenstein and Robert O . Keohane, “Anti-Americanisms” *Policy Review*, October-November 2006, p. 30

⁷² Joshua W. Walker, “Turkey's Global Strategy: Introduction: the Sources of Turkish Grand Strategy -‘Strategic Depth’ and ‘Zero-Problems’ in Context” *LSE Ideas*, 2011, p. 7

⁷³ F. Stephen Larrabee, “Troubled Partnership US-Turkish Relations in an Era of Global Geopolitical Change”, *Rand Corporation*, 2010, p. 44

loss of World War I, “the Sevres Syndrome regards the notion that the country is surrounded by enemies and constantly faces the danger of break-up or partition.”⁷⁴

In this manner, as a part of the West or symbolizing “the West” itself, the United States is regarded by many Turks as having a history of being against Turkish national interests. It is claimed that “anti-Americanism is driven by a perception that America has been supporting Kurdish self-determination and political Islam as part of its broader plan for the Middle East politics.”⁷⁵ Thus anti-Americanism has deeper and more-sophisticated political and cultural origins in Turkey comparison to Europe.⁷⁶ Examples of the US acting against Turkish interests can be diversified extending such as the deportation of Jupiter missiles from Turkey, opium issue and so on. Moreover, one of the most recent perceptions which have dramatically increased the anti-American feelings in Turkey was the reluctance of the US to take direct military action against PKK or to allow Turkey to struggle efficiently against terrorism.⁷⁷

As in other sovereign–nationalist anti-American countries, the nationalist ego and pride are one of the key elements that influence Anti-American sentiments in Turkey. Those kinds of feelings are easily manipulated by various conspiracy theories.⁷⁸ It further feeds anti-Americanism sentiments. For instance, the 2006 movie called *Kurtlar Vadisi* (Valley of the Wolves: Iraq) which was the most expensive movies ever made by that time, and the best-seller book called *Metal Fırtına* (Metal Storm) which was about the fictional war between Turkey and the US can be examples of those sentiments. They also demonstrate how the society is open to manipulation.

⁷⁴ Bülen Aras, “Turkey’s Rise in the Greater Middle East: Peace-Building in the Periphery”, *Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies*, 2009, Vol. 11, No.1, p. 32

⁷⁵ Forest Watson, “Mitigating Anti-Americanism in Turkey through Public Diplomacy” (Master diss., Bilkent University, 2007)


⁷⁶ F. Stephen Larrabee, “Troubled Partnership US-Turkish Relations in an Era of Global Geopolitical Change”, *Rand Corporation*, 2010, p. 44

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 42

⁷⁸ Füsün Türkmen, “Anti-Americanism as a Default Ideology of Opposition: Turkey as a Case Study”, *Turkish Studies*, September 2010, Vol. 11, No. 3, p. 342

The media is also an important contributor to spread of anti-Americanism in Turkey. Lisa Blaydes and Drew A. Linzer examined daily newspapers in Turkey (Zaman and Hurriyet) to find out balance in the tone of references to the US in politics and economic affairs in the period of January 1- March 31, 2007. They concluded that the US was referenced in an unfavorable manner in more than half of the articles both in Zaman (fifty-two percent) and Hurriyet (sixty-one percent). Below table demonstrated the distribution of favorable and unfavorable news and articles.⁷⁹

TABLE 1- The distribution of favorable and unfavorable news and articles



* Lisa Blaydes, Drew A. Linzer, “Losing Muslim Hearts and Minds: Religiosity, Elite Competition, and Anti-Americanism in the Islamic World

Their findings suggest that the positive tone was more prevalent in news on trade, American development programs and the US role in international diplomacy. The articles and news concerning the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq or other US foreign policy implementations that raised criticism referred to the US negatively.⁸⁰

Furthermore, Ömer Taşpınar states that the fact that vast majority of Turks identify themselves as anti-American, blaming Washington and the US policies for every domestic issue is also a “kind of national hobby.”⁸¹ He also highlights that in the

⁷⁹ Lisa Blaydes and Drew A. Linzer, “Losing Muslim Hearts and Minds: Religiosity, Elite Competition, and Anti-Americanism in the Islamic World” (paper presented at the annual meeting of the Theory vs. Policy? Connecting Scholars and Practitioners, The Loews New Orleans Hotel, New Orleans, LA, 17.03.2010) p. 23

⁸⁰ Ibid., p. 26

⁸¹ Ömer Taşpınar, “The Rise of Turkish Gaullism: Getting Turkish-American Relations Right”, *Insight Turkey*, 2011, Vol. 13, No. 1, p. 15

Arab world and increasingly in Turkey, anti-Americanism is mainly related to American policies not to its values, democratic tradition or culture. As a proof, he states that majority of the population in Muslim words and Turkey prefer to watch American movies, enjoy American food, and also send their children to study in the US: “Long lines in front of American Embassies and growing applications for ‘Green Cards’ tell the same tale: ‘We love your country, but we hate your policies’.”⁸² From this perspective, Turkish anti-Americanism fits to “what the United States does” category rather than “what the United States is” targeting the US policies more than its identity.

It can be argued that anti-Americanism in Turkey derives from particular the US foreign policies. The perception of double standard is quite widespread generating anti-American feelings. Generally, Turkish people believe that the US violated international law, weakened international institutions and harmed world peace.⁸³

All in all, anti-Americanism in Turkey can be considered a benign one instead of an aggressive and destroying force. In this manner, the expression of Turkish anti-Americanism is limited to attitudes, verbal expression and demonstration.⁸⁴ The main reasons for benign and peaceful character of Turkish anti-Americanism could be Turkey’s democratic identity and the government’s preference to maintain collaboration with the US.⁸⁵

To sum up, it is fair to claim that since sovereign-nationalist anti-Americanism generally shows itself in the US involvements in regional issues Turkish anti-

⁸² Ömer Taşpınar, “The Anatomy of Anti-Americanism in Turkey”, 15.11.2006, <http://www.brookings.edu/~media/research/files/articles/2005/11/16turkey%20taspinar/taspinar20051116.pdf>, (accessed on 02.01.2013)

⁸³ Nasuh Uslu, Metin Toprak, İbrahim Dalmaş, Ertan Aydın, “Turkish Public Opinion Towards the United States in the Context of the Iraq Question”, *Middle East Review of International Affairs*, 2005, Vol. 9, No.3, p.77

⁸⁴ Christine Chianese, “Anti-Americanism in the Middle East: An Examination of Benign and Virulent Foreign Public Opinion Against America”, (Master diss., Georgetown University, 2002), p. 49

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 37

Americanism increased during the times when the US intervened in national or regional issues at the expense of the Turkish interests. In the 1960s, policy-makers in Turkey were blamed for making Turkey a satellite state of the US. Among the leftist groups the US policies were regarded as tools of imperialism and met with anger. This eventually created anti-American sentiment in Turkey and with the help of further policies of the US, the anti-American sentiments spread and entrenched in the country. As mentioned above, national ego and pride plays important role in anti-American sentiments.

Parlak and Kılıçarslan argue that “national identity is constructed upon national pride and trust in order to get rid of the state of mind of being oppressed and humiliated.”⁸⁶ This definition actually is a good starting point to comprehend the perception behind anti-American sentiments in Turkey. When the Turkish public perceives that their country is being oppressed and humiliated by American policies, the reaction obviously occurs on the ground of pride-based sovereign-nationalist anti-Americanism.

Yet it is worth mentioning that Turkish anti-Americanism does not contain animosity towards American individuals. It is generally agreed by Americans who visited Turkey, as well.⁸⁷ This is mainly because Turkish anti-Americanism is usually caused by American policies.

2.7 Conclusion

In this chapter, varieties, indicators and consequences of anti-Americanism were analyzed. The main source to understand the types of anti-Americanism is the categorization of Katzenstein and Keohane namely, liberal, welfarist, sovereign nationalist and radical anti-Americanism and Brendon O’Connor’s five understandings of how the term is used such as anti-Americanism as a dichotomy, a tendency, pathology, a prejudice, and an ideology. These distinctions provide a basis

⁸⁶ İsmet Parlak and Özlem Kılıçarslan, “The West or the EU as ‘The Other’ from the Perspective of National Pride” *South-East Europe Review for Labour and Social Affairs*, 2006, No.3, p. 145

⁸⁷ Ian O. Lesser, *Beyond Suspicion: Rethinking US–Turkish Relations*, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington, 2007, p. 12

for categorizing Turkish anti-Americanism, as well. When the features of sovereign nationalist anti-Americanism are examined, it is sensible to classify Turkey as such. Even though, it is benign and does not target American people, Turkish anti-Americanism is fed by fears and concerns related to loss of sovereignty and American interference as well as the US' acting against Turkish interests.

CHAPTER III

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

3.1 Introduction

This chapter examines the general background of the relationship between Turkey and the US. The main purpose is not dealing with all historical details of the relationship; instead, the cases that constitute major turning points of the relationship are analyzed. Looking into every historical detail is beyond the scope of this study. Consequently this chapter focuses on only the background of relations when they are especially close or sour. The significant events in Turkish-American relations are examined by focusing on their influences on anti/pro-American views in Turkey.

This study will analyze the history of bilateral relations under four periods. The first period will be from 1947 Truman Doctrine to 1960, whereas the second period will be from 1960 to the 1980 military coup, the third one will cover between 1980 and 2003 Iraq war, while the fourth one will be from Iraq war to the present.

3.2 Establishment of the Relations

The origins of the Turkish-American relations are generally accepted to date back to the visit of the frigate George Washington in 1800 and the signing of the first bilateral treaty of commerce in 1830.⁸⁸

Even before the first diplomatic relations were established, Ottoman Sultan Abdülmecid contributed to building of the Washington monument by sending marble plaque which was placed on the Monument in Washington D.C. in 1855 and on

⁸⁸ Şuhnaz Yılmaz, introduction to *Studies in Atatürk's Turkey*, by George Harris and Nur Bilge Criss, Brill, 2009, p. 1

which there was an inscription saying “so as to strengthen the friendship between the two countries.”⁸⁹

The first diplomatic relationship between Turks and Americans was established with the opening of Ottoman and the US legations in 1867 and 1901 respectively.⁹⁰ Yet, it is fair to say that there was not a good image of Turks in the US. Before the foundation of new Turkish Republic in 1923, “Terrible Turks” stereotype had been created in the US. The missionary and Armenian groups aimed to keep the tragedy of Armenians’ deportation still fresh in people’s memories.⁹¹ From this perspective, the activities of adventurers, diplomats and missionaries negatively affected the course of the relations.⁹²

Relations between two states were cut off during the First World War. The US recognized the Turkish Republic as a state in 1927. At that time, relations were limited due to the negative effects of the perception of ‘Terrible Turks’⁹³. This perception continued to affect the relationship for a while. During the interwar era, there were efforts by both the US and Turkey to improve the image of Turkey in the eyes of Americans. Moreover, development of economic relations between two states and reforms in Turkey helped to contribute to improve the relations at that period.⁹⁴

Nevertheless, the relationship between the two states started to get better after the World War II. According to Bülent Aliriza and Bülent Aras, the reason for this delay might be due to the lack of geographical, cultural, or economic foundations of the relations. The relations improved at the beginning of the Cold War, as a result of

⁸⁹ Domestic Gift to America Sign of Friendship”, http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/english/domestic/11386555_p.asp, (accessed on 02.03.2013)

⁹⁰ Bülent Aliriza and Bülent Aras, “U.S.-Turkish Relations a Review at the Beginning of the Third Decade of the Post–Cold War Era”, *Center for Strategic & International Studies*, November 2012, p. 1

⁹¹ Şuhnaz Yılmaz, “Challenging the Stereotypes: Turkish–American Relations in the Inter-war Era”, *Middle Eastern Studies*, March 2006, Vol. 42, No. 2, p. 224

⁹² Mustafa Aydın and Çağrı Erhan, *Turkish American Relations: Past, Present and Future*, Routledge, London, 2004, p. 10

⁹³ Şuhnaz Yılmaz, “Challenging the Stereotypes: Turkish–American Relations in the Inter-war Era”, *Middle Eastern Studies*, March 2006, Vol. 42, No. 2, p. 224

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 225

urgent strategic needs. When the World War II was about to end, two states realized that they had common national interests and regarded the Soviet Union as a threat.⁹⁵

3.3 Evolving Relationship from the Second World War to the 1960s

The watershed in relations was the end of the Second World War which noticeably changed the structure of Turkey's relations with both the Soviet Union and the United States. On March 19, 1945 the Soviet Union gave a notice to Turkey stating its intention to terminate the bilateral 1925 Treaty of Friendship and Non-Aggression. Later, the Soviet Union demanded some eastern provinces of Turkey (Kars, Ardahan). In addition to that, the USSR wanted to modify the Montreux Convention which aimed to control the passage through the Straits (Bosphorus and Dardanelles).⁹⁶ This Soviet threat was regarded as strategically important by the US as well, due to the fact that Soviet expansion into the oil-rich Middle East conflicted with the interests of the US. In 1946 the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) evaluated the importance of Turkey as follows, "strategically Turkey is the most important military factor in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East" and that "the Soviet expansion would have a serious impact on the vital interests of the US."⁹⁷ By the same token, the US started to see Turkey's territorial integrity as essential. Therefore, Turkey started to be considered as a partner against Soviet expansionism. In Edward J. Erickson's words: "Turkey was an extremely important Cold War partner in the maintenance of containment and deterrence against the Soviet Union during peacetime."⁹⁸

⁹⁵ Bülent Aliriza and Bülent Aras, "U.S.-Turkish Relations a Review at the Beginning of the Third Decade of the Post-Cold War Era", *Center for Strategic & International Studies*, November 2012, p. 1

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, p.1

⁹⁷ Michael A. Palmer, *Guardians of the Gulf*, Rockefeller Center, New York, 1999, p. 267

⁹⁸ Edward J. Erickson, "Turkey As Regional Hegemon-2014: Strategic Implications For the United States", *Turkish Studies*, 2006, Vol. 5, No. 3, p. 26

Because of Turkey's newly-found importance, the US sent battleship Missouri to Istanbul in 1946 and the US started to focus on security concerns and ignore all other issues like Turkey's debt stemming from Lend and Lease Agreement.⁹⁹

Following the Missouri's visit, the US took very important steps announcing to the world that Turkey was now becoming a strategic ally under the US protection. First the Truman Doctrine was declared then Turkey was included in the Marshall Plan. Then came Turkey's membership in 1952 thanks to its participation in the Korean War. After Turkey became a NATO member, exceptional relations were established between this country and the US. Through bilateral agreements Turkey granted immense economic and military rights to the US. The Military Facilities Agreement signed in 1954 formalized the opening of the US military bases in Turkey.¹⁰⁰

At the beginning of the cold war, the bilateral relations between Turkey and the US were based on economic and military assistance given by the US in order to make Turkey stronger against the Soviet threat. Turkey which was in dire need of such aid benefited greatly from the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan. In this period, the US assumed Turkey as a strategic partner.

The below chart shows the economic assistance by the US to Turkey. It consisted of grants, loans, and other forms between 1948 and 1965 in million dollars.¹⁰¹

⁹⁹ George S. Harris, "Turkish American Relations Since the Truman Doctrine" in *Turkish American Relations: Past, Present and Future*, ed. Mustafa Aydın, Çağrı Erhan, Routledge, 2004, p. 66

¹⁰⁰ Aylın Güney, "An Anatomy of the Transformation of the US-Turkish Alliance: From "Cold War" to "War on Iraq", *Turkish Studies*, September 2005, Vol. 6, No. 3, p. 342

¹⁰¹ Baskın Oran, "1945-1960: Batı Bloku Ekseninde Türkiye", *Türk Dış Politikası*, Cilt. I (1919-1980), Baskın Oran (ed.), İletişim Yayınları, İstanbul, 2005, p. 553

TABLE 2: Economic Assistance of the US to Turkey

Economic Assistance of the US													
1948-1952	1953	1954	1955	1956	1957	1958	1959	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965
197.1	46.2	92.3	68.1	99.9	96.9	85.7	103.3	84.4	101.9	135.0	130.5	101.6	152.1

During the Cold War era, the quality of the relations between two allies was not equal. According to Güney, “Turkey played the role of a smaller and weaker ally bound to the help of a superpower in military and security terms in order to protect itself from outside threats and therefore exposed its dependency on the US military aid and support.”¹⁰²

Against this background, the Truman Doctrine can be seen as the starting point to study the Turkish-American relations. On March 12, 1947, Harry S. Truman stated that “it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or outside pressures”.¹⁰³ After the Second World War, the USSR’s and the US’ interests started to clash. Even if they were allies against Hitler’s expansionism throughout the Second World War, a new balance of power appeared after the war. They were the winners of the war. Following, the USSR’s demands on Turkish straits and territory, eventually the US made its position against the USSR and its demands. The Truman Doctrine was declared at this time. The Truman Doctrine emerged as a result of developments in Turkey, Greece and Iran.¹⁰⁴ It could be categorized as a device of the containment policy. The US government was convinced by Loy W. Henderson, the US

¹⁰² Aylin Güney, “An Anatomy of the Transformation of the US–Turkish Alliance: From “Cold War” to “War on Iraq”, *Turkish Studies*, September 2005, Vol. 6, No. 3, p. 344

¹⁰³ John Lewis Gaddis, “Reconsiderations: The Cold War Was the Truman Doctrine a Real Turning Point?”, *Foreign Affairs*, 1974, p. 386

¹⁰⁴ <http://history.state.gov/milestones/1945-1952/TrumanDoctrine>, (accessed on 16.02.2013)

ambassador to Turkey, about the need for technical assistance to Turkey since its capability was not enough to stand out against the USSR on its own.¹⁰⁵

After the Truman Doctrine, Turkey succeeded to benefit from the Marshall Plan thanks to its intense diplomatic efforts. Afterwards, Turkey sent 15.000 troops to the Korean War in 1950. With the help of its participation to the Korean War, Turkey was accepted as a NATO member with active support of the US¹⁰⁶ in spite of strong opposition coming from the other Western powers. Ever since, the NATO connection has become the main determining factor of the Turkish-American strategic relations.¹⁰⁷

In general, the 1950s are considered as the best years of bilateral relations. Close bilateral political and military relations had their ramifications for multilateral relations as well. For instance, under the umbrella of the UN, Turkey voted almost the same as the US voted particularly about the Middle East policies.¹⁰⁸ According to Nasuh Uslu, the results of Turkey's relations with the US shaped Turkey's Middle East policies in parallel with the US's policies. Turkey acted together with the US on almost every issue which took place in the Middle East region in order to benefit from American assistance on economic and military issues.¹⁰⁹

Nasuh Uslu argues that one of the main requirements of the Northern Tier Defense Project, which was developed by Americans and aimed to strengthen the containment policy, was an organization that would include strategically important states in the region. So, the Baghdad Pact was established in 1955 with the participation of Iraq, Iran, Pakistan, Turkey and the United Kingdom.¹¹⁰ Turkey

¹⁰⁵ "Oral History Interview with Loy. W. Henderson", 1973, <http://www.trumanlibrary.org/oralhist/hendrson.htm>, (accessed on 01.03.2013)

¹⁰⁶ Steven A. Cook and Elizabeth Sherwood-Randall, "Generating Momentum for a New Era in U.S.- Turkey Relations", *Council On Foreign Relations*, 15.06.2006, p. 6

¹⁰⁷ Giray Sadık, *American Image in Turkey: U.S Foreign Policy Dimensions*, Lexington Books, 2009, p. 16

¹⁰⁸ Nasuh Uslu, *Türk Amerikan İlişkileri*, 21. Yüzyıl Yayınları, Ankara, 2000, pp. 102 – 104

¹⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 132

¹¹⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 111 – 116

wanted to see the US as a member in order to strengthen and maintain the Pact. For the US, however, to be a member of the Pact would possibly damage for its global interest in the greater Middle East. So, the US chose not to be a member of the Pact, never signed the Pact formally. Instead the US supported the Pact externally. From the US perspective, this Pact was helpful to contain the Soviet Union, so the US was the most powerful sponsor of the Pact from the beginning till the end.¹¹¹ But this policy was met with disappointment by the member states like Turkey.

Briefly, the policy was carried out by Turkey in the 1950s was to become a member of military alliances which were established by the Western States, the US most importantly. Turkey's economic and military assistance demands from the US and Turkey's general policy of integration with the West were among the most important reasons why Turkey supported the US' policies in the Middle East.

Although in the 1950s the American presence in Turkish territory did not create an anti-American wave as bad as the one in the 1960s, there was still disappointment and frustration among certain groups.¹¹² However, in the later period, the sympathy for American people started to decline as it became evident that Americans used the Turkish bases for wrong purposes, and that they abused judicial and economic privileges and partly as a result of the inequality of life standards between the Turkish and American officials.

3.4 Relationship between 1960 and 1980

At the beginning of the 1960s, the first important issue in the bilateral relations was the Jupiter missiles. As a matter of fact, before the Cuban missile crisis occurred in 1962, President Kennedy had already given instructions to examine the possibility of removing Jupiter missiles. During the Cuban missile crisis, using the Jupiter missiles as an issue of negotiation was not welcomed by Turks. They thought it violated the spirit of the NATO alliance. From the Turkish perspective, those missiles were seen as the guarantee for the 'nation's security', and for that reason, great amount of

¹¹¹ William Hale, *Turkey, the US and Iraq*, London Middle East Institute-SOAS, 2007, p.21

¹¹² Tuba Ünlü Bilgiç, "Türkiye-ABD İlişkileri: Amerikan Karşıtlığının Kökenleri 1945-1960", BILIG, forthcoming

money was invested in installation of the missiles. Hence, Turks took it personally and the trust and reliability of the commitments in the alliance were subject to question.¹¹³ It is also perceived that the US could sacrifice the interests of its allies for its own safety. While Turkish officials supported the American policies during the Cuban missile crisis, they were strongly uncomfortable with the fact that Turkey and Cuba were compared and that Jupiter missiles were made a bargaining chip to solve the ongoing crisis.¹¹⁴

At the beginning of the crisis, the suggestion of Khrushchev to bargain on the basis of the Cuban missiles and the Jupiter missiles were met with anger by the Turkish public and newspapers. When news spread world-wide, the American officials denied this kind of bargain. But later, when the rumors spread more and more, Turkish public considered that the US, for the sake of its own interests, could easily sacrifice the interests of others. It was obvious that Turkey was treated as a satellite state at the time of conflict, whose interests could easily be ignored.

Therefore, it is not unrealistic to assume that the US policy to remove Jupiter missiles without asking Ankara was the watershed in the bilateral relations and afterwards the problems between allies started to occur.¹¹⁵

According to Nasuh Uslu, perhaps, for the first time in the history, Turkish statesmen have realized that the more military power does not always mean the more safety. On the contrary, being a member state of NATO and having nuclear weapons cannot protect Turkey from the act of hostile state; instead, it sometimes could invite the hostile states to attack Turkey. The Cuban missile crisis taught Turkish officials to be more careful about the military relations with the US. It also contributed to feeling of disappointment at American officials' policy.¹¹⁶

¹¹³ Aylin Güney, "Anti-Americanism in Turkey: Past and Present", *Middle Eastern Studies*, May 2008, Vol. 44, No. 3, p. 472

¹¹⁴ Nasuh Uslu, *Türk Amerikan İlişkileri*, 21. Yüzyıl Yayınları, Ankara, 2000, pp. 154 – 164

¹¹⁵ Aylin Güney, "Anti-Americanism in Turkey: Past and Present", *Middle Eastern Studies*, May 2008, Vol. 44, No. 3, p. 472

¹¹⁶ Nasuh Uslu, *Türk Amerikan İlişkileri*, 21. Yüzyıl Yayınları, Ankara, 2000, p. 166

The famous Johnson Letter of July 5, 1964 became a real watershed both in bilateral relations and for the rise of anti-Americanism in Turkey. American President Lyndon Johnson sent a very tough-worded letter to Prime Minister İsmet İnönü in order to prevent Turkey from sending troops to Cyprus during the Cyprus crisis of 1963/1964. The letter said “NATO allies have not had a chance to consider whether they have an obligation to protect Turkey against the Soviet Union if Turkey takes a step which results in Soviet intervention without the full consent and understanding of its NATO allies.”¹¹⁷ It further wrote “the United States cannot agree to the use of any United States supplied military equipment for a Turkish intervention in Cyprus under present circumstances”.¹¹⁸ In short, Johnson warned that the United States might not come to Turkey’s defense if Turkish intervention in Cyprus provoked a Soviet response. It led to changes in Turkish officials’ minds about the idea and image of the NATO alliance. Stephen Larrabee argued that the letter came as a shock to Turks. Therefore, Turkey realized the negative consequences of being so much dependent on the US and tried to reduce its dependence and extend its security ties.¹¹⁹ In short Johnson letter was the most critical event to that date which increased anti-Americanism in Turkey. Haluk Şahin writes that it is hard to find a second record in Turkish diplomatic history which has affected the country so deeply.¹²⁰

The flight of the U-2 plane was another event that affected bilateral relations and exacerbated anti-Americanism. Turkey allowed flights of the U-2 planes, which were based in Adana/İncirlik base, for scientific research aims. But in 1960 when a U-2 plane, which took off from İncirlik was shot down over the territory of the USSR, the situation changed. Suddenly, U-2 flights started to be questioned. When this event took place, Turkish leaders insistently indicated that the Turkish government did not give any authorization to the US to collect intelligence information from the territory of the USSR. Later in 1965 another intelligence flight that took off from İncirlik base

¹¹⁷ <http://www.cyprus-conflict.org/materials/johnsonletter.html> (accessed on 14.03.2013)

¹¹⁸ Mustafa Aydın, *Turkish Foreign Policy Framework And Analysis*, Center for Strategic Research, 2004, p. 39

¹¹⁹ F. Stephen Larrabee, “Troubled Partnership US-Turkish Relations in an Era of Global Geopolitical Change”, *Rand Corporation*, 2010, p. 31

¹²⁰ Haluk Şahin, *Johnson Mektubu*, Gendaş Predikat, 2002, p. 11

fell accidentally to international waters in the Black Sea. The Prime Minister Demirel demanded the US to stop all U-2 flights from Turkish bases.¹²¹

Throughout the 1960s, Turkish public had suspicion about the American presence in their territory. The rights that Americans obtained with regard to judicial, economic and customs matters started to disturb the Turkish people. Especially after the Jupiter missile incident, Johnson letter and U-2 flights, Turkish public started to feel disappointment and bias towards the presence of Americans and their behaviors. Particularly left-wing groups began to make their voice heard. At that time student movements were common because of the rise of left wing.¹²² When the US 6th Fleet visited Istanbul in 1968, university students' protests increased. Some American sailors were thrown into the Bosphorus.¹²³ In the eyes of left-wing groups, there was direct connection between being satellite state and the visit of 6th fleet.¹²⁴ In 1969 Robert Kommer, the US Ambassador to Ankara, who had a bad reputation because of his service in Vietnam during the war, wanted to visit Middle East Technical University but leftist groups of students objected citing anti-imperialist arguments. When he ignored the objections and came to the campus, his car was overturned and burned by the students, an event which became one of the symbols of anti-Americanism in Turkey. In those days, the Workers Party of Turkey called for withdrawal from NATO and cutting all relations with the US.¹²⁵

In the meantime, another problem came up in bilateral relations between Turkey and the US: that of the poppy issue. Some even claim that "Turkey's biggest problem with the United States during 1966-1974 was the cultivation of opium poppies in Turkey and the reaction of the United States to that cultivation."¹²⁶ American

¹²¹ Nasuh Uslu, *Türk Amerikan İlişkileri*, 21. Yüzyıl Yayınları, Ankara, 2000, pp. 182 – 186

¹²² Füsün Türkmen, "Turkish–American Relations: A Challenging Transition", *Turkish Studies*, March 2009, Vol. 10, No. 1, p.112

¹²³ Nur Bilge Criss, "A Short History of Anti-Americanism and Terrorism: The Turkish Case", *The Journal of American History*, September 2002, p. 477

¹²⁴ Nasuh Uslu, *Türk Amerikan İlişkileri*, 21. Yüzyıl Yayınları, Ankara, 2000, pp. 189 – 190

¹²⁵ William Hale, *Türk Dış Politikası: 1774-2000*, Mozaik, 2006, p. 155

¹²⁶ Mustafa Aydın, *Turkish Foreign Policy Framework And Analysis*, Center for Strategic Research, 2004, p. 43

demands to end poppy cultivation were met with indignation among Turkish people.¹²⁷

Illegal drugs became one of the main problems of American society at the beginning of the 1960s. The presidential candidate Richard Nixon pledged that he would end the war in Vietnam and he would solve the illegal drugs problem.¹²⁸ After Nixon became president in 1968, tensions in Turkish-American relations generated by the opium issue began to rise.¹²⁹ In this context, Turkey, as an opium producer, was accused of being one of the main reasons for American's drug problem by some columnists and even senators and hence by the public. The administration allowed this anti-Turkish campaign. Since the American administration supposed that they could score well in the eyes of the public by forcing Turkey to ban the opium production. When Turkey was requested to prohibit the opium production, the government of Demirel did not accept it. Although Demirel government took measures to gradually decrease the production, they could not risk losing votes by prohibiting the cultivation which was a source of income for huge numbers of families especially in Western Anatolia. But in 1971, the government of Nihat Erim, a technocrat government of the 1971 coup d'etat, accepted to cease the opium production on the grounds of helping humanity and protecting Turkey's prestige in the eyes of the international community.¹³⁰ Turkish public perceived poppy ban as another example of how interests of Turkish people could easily be sacrificed to the interests of Americans.¹³¹ Therefore, the cultivation of opium poppies issue between Turkey and America can be accepted as another turning point. The fact that, Turkey

¹²⁷ Ilter Turan, "The United States and Turkey: Limiting Unilateralism", in *Hegemony Constrained: Evasion, Modification, and Resistance to American Foreign Policy*, ed. Davis B. Bobrow, 2008, p. 85

¹²⁸ Nasuh Uslu, *Türk Amerikan İlişkileri*, 21. Yüzyıl Yayınları, Ankara, 2000, p. 227

¹²⁹ Ilter Turan, "The United States and Turkey: Limiting Unilateralism", in *Hegemony Constrained: Evasion, Modification, and Resistance to American Foreign Policy*, ed. Davis B. Bobrow, 2008, p. 84

¹³⁰ Nur Bilge Criss, "A Short History of Anti-Americanism and Terrorism: The Turkish Case", *The Journal of American History*, September 2002, p. 475

¹³¹ Nasuh Uslu, *Türk Amerikan İlişkileri*, 21. Yüzyıl Yayınları, Ankara, 2000, p. 242

banned opium production due to the American pressure, contributed to anti-Americanism in Turkey.¹³²

In addition to the said problems such as Johnson letter, the removal of Jupiter missiles and the opium issue, anti-Americanism increased in Turkey due to some domestic developments in this period. Turkish government felt pressure because of some problems stemmed from American interference. The issues related to American military bases on Turkish territory, American installations, perceptions regarding the CIA activities in Turkey, the US interference to domestic policies and insufficient military aid by the US were the key pressures on Turkish government. Because of these pressures, Turkish government was needed to reevaluate the relations with the United States.¹³³

Yet with the 1974 Cyprus Crisis, opium issue became secondarily important. In 1974, the Turkish-American relations highly deteriorated due to the fact that Turkey sent its military troops to the Northern Cyprus. As a consequence of this military decision, military assistance to Turkey was suspended by the US Senate despite President Ford's veto, in order to force the Turkish military to withdraw from the island. Notwithstanding the military suspension against Turkey, the Greeks continued to receive American military assistance. Turkish military force was negatively influenced by this decision.¹³⁴ Arms embargo, which lasted for three years, damaged Turkey's economy, weakened its defense capacity especially in the southern flank of NATO.¹³⁵ As a reaction to the arms embargo, Turkey closed down all American military installations on its territory such as air bases, naval facilities, early warning radar stations and intelligence gathering facilities directed towards the Soviet Union which can be evaluated as the realization of its one-dimensional policy

¹³² Mustafa Aydın, *Turkish Foreign Policy Framework And Analysis*, Center for Strategic Research, 2004, p. 43

¹³³ *Ibid.*, p. 40

¹³⁴ Edward J. Erickson, "Turkey As Regional Hegemon-2014: Strategic Implications For the United States", *Turkish Studies*, 2006, Vol. 5, No. 3, p. 26

¹³⁵ Murat Karagöz, "US Arms Embargo against Turkey - after 30 Years An Institutional Approach towards US Policy Making", *Perceptions*, Winter 2004 – 2005, p. 130

and its dependence on the US military aid.¹³⁶ In addition to closing down all American military installations, Turkey tried to find a way to diversify its foreign policy orientation by exploring closer relationship with both the USSR and neighboring countries. According to Edward J. Erickson, the US recognized its failure and the importance of Turkey as a secular pro-western Islamic state in the Middle East, and finally lifted the embargo and sanctions in 1980. But in the meantime, great damage was done to the alliance.¹³⁷ Now it is generally accepted that arms embargo harmed the confidence of Turkish people towards the United States to a great degree, increasing anti-Americanism in Turkey dramatically.¹³⁸ The public perceived it as an intervention in Turkey's domestic affairs because Americans determined with whom Turks could fight even if Turkey's national interests were at stake.

3.5 Relations between 1980 and 2003 Iraq War

In 1980, Turkey experienced a military coup one more time. Although the coup deteriorated Turkey's relations with Europeans, the relations with the US did not degenerate. Quite the opposite, the Turkish-American relations rapidly improved and reached its normal balance.¹³⁹ A new Defense and Economic Cooperation Agreement signed between two countries at the same year. Some even claimed that following the coup, policies of the two countries were harmonized more. They showed similar reaction to world problems. From that time on, America looked up Turkey as "a reliable ally in the problematic region".¹⁴⁰

¹³⁶ Aylin Güney, "An Anatomy of the Transformation of the US-Turkish Alliance: From "Cold War" to "War on Iraq", *Turkish Studies*, September 2005, Vol. 6, No. 3, p. 343

¹³⁷ Edward J. Erickson, "Turkey As Regional Hegemon-2014:Strategic Implications For the United States", *Turkish Studies*, 2006, Vol. 5, No. 3, p. 27

¹³⁸ Murat Karagöz, "US Arms Embargo against Turkey - after 30 Years An Institutional Approach towards US Policy Making", *Perceptions*, Winter 2004 – 2005, p. 130

¹³⁹ Ömer Göksel İşyar, "An Analysis of Turkish-American Relations from 1945 to 2004: Initiatives and Reactions in Turkish Foreign Policy", *Turkish Journal of International Relations*, 2005, Vol. 4, No. 3, p. 29

¹⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 30

Because of the renewed Cold War, strategic considerations gained more importance and hence Turkey's importance. Therefore, bilateral relations improved even more. In this relatively unproblematic period, military and economic aid to Turkey increased mainly because of the US strategic calculations.¹⁴¹

From this perspective politics at international level was one of the most noticeable factors that helped to strengthen and reinforced the relations between two allies. Détente between the US and Soviet Union ended after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the Iranian Revolution. This also contributed to the Turkish-American relations.¹⁴² As a result, the United States of America tried to keep the relations with Turkey at high levels during the 1980s. America acted very carefully with respect to the Kurdish problem and the "genocide" thesis because the US was afraid of raising the anti-American sentiment in Turkey. It was probably because Washington still regarded the Soviet Bloc as the number one threatening enemy.¹⁴³

Of course, relations were not totally smooth. Uslu argues that Turkish- Greek friction over Cyprus and the Aegean issues and Turkey's reluctance to participate in Western states' initiatives towards the Middle East due to its increasing tendency to side with the Muslim world as the conservative groups gained strength within Turkey proved to be problematic issues. But still, the relationship between Turkey and the US was closer and more powerful in the 1980s than it was in the 1970s.¹⁴⁴

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the character of the relationship between Turkey and the United States changed. The relations have become more complex since the Cold War parameters changed dramatically. From the US perspective, this was a new period that there was not a certain enemy apart from uncertainty and

¹⁴¹ Mustafa Aydın, *Turkish Foreign Policy Framework And Analysis*, Center for Strategic Research, 2004, p. 59

¹⁴² Aylin Güney, "An Anatomy of the Transformation of the US-Turkish Alliance: From "Cold War" to "War on Iraq", *Turkish Studies*, September 2005, Vol. 6, No. 3, p. 343

¹⁴³ Ömer Göksel İşyar, "An Analysis of Turkish-American Relations from 1945 to 2004: Initiatives and Reactions in Turkish Foreign Policy", *Turkish Journal of International Relations*, 2005, Vol. 4, No. 3, p. 32

¹⁴⁴ Nasuh Uslu, *Türk Amerikan İlişkileri*, 21. Yüzyıl Yayınları, Ankara, 2000, p. 274

instability as George H. W. Bush declared in 1990.¹⁴⁵ The US decided to cut down the military aid to some countries including Turkey since the US priorities changed. From then on, the agenda of the US–Turkish relationship was dominated by regional security problems.¹⁴⁶

Even though, Turkey was regarded as a strategically important country from the US perspective, at the outset of the post-cold war era, there was a common fear across Turkey that the new dynamics of world could cause Turkey to lose its strategic significance in the eyes of the Americans compared to the Cold War. However, time showed that it was a groundless fear. For Stephen Larrabee for instance, “since Turkey stood at the nexus of four geographic areas of growing strategic importance in the post–Cold War era: the Balkans, the Middle East, the Caucasus/Central Asia, and the Persian Gulf region, in each of these areas, Turkey’s cooperation was critical for achieving the US policy goals.”¹⁴⁷

Similarly, İdris Bal emphasizes that the US believed that Turkey could play an important role in the struggle against regional as well as global problems in the post Cold War era for a variety of reasons. The US put Turkey in an important position especially to deal with developments in Eurasia. The fact that Turkey was an influential power in the region strengthened Turkey’s position.¹⁴⁸

On the other hand, Former Ambassador Faruk Loğoglu underlines the changing character of bilateral relations:

This shift entails a relative decrease in the importance of the military-defense-security or “hard power” dimension of the relationship and an increase in the importance of energy issues and matters of civilization, culture, religion,

¹⁴⁵ Ted Galen Carpenter, *America Entangled: The Persian Gulf Crisis and Its Consequences*, Cato Institute, 1991, p. 13

¹⁴⁶ Sabri Sayarı, “Turkish-American Relations in the Post-Cold War Era: Issues of Convergence and Divergence” in *Turkish American Relations: Past, Present and Future*, ed. Mustafa Aydın, Çağrı Erhan, Routledge, 2004, p. 95

¹⁴⁷ F. Stephen Larrabee, “Troubled Partnership US-Turkish Relations in an Era of Global Geopolitical Change”, *Rand Corporation*, 2010, p. 5

¹⁴⁸ İdris Bal, “Turkey-US Relations and Impacts of 2003 Iraq war”, *Turkish Foreign Policy in Post Cold War Era*, Brown Walker Press, 2004, p. 125

democracy, secularism, and gender equality, or “soft power” factors in the relationship.¹⁴⁹

Some also assessed this shift as Turkey’s moving from sidelines to a strategically central location. During this period, Turkey proved to be functional for the US strategy. For instance, bases in Turkey were used for combat operations in Iraq in 1990.¹⁵⁰ In this regard, Iraqi issue became crucial in the redefinition of Turkish-American relations after the Cold War.¹⁵¹ The Gulf War together with the end of the Cold War were the major events affecting Turkish-American relations in the 1990s.

At the same time, some scholars emphasized the differences and disagreements between two countries. Meliha Benli Altunışık for instance claimed that during the post-Cold War era, Turkey pursued more independent policies and therefore conflicted with the US. Iraq issue was a major example. During the Gulf War, Turkey allowed the US to use İncirlik Air Base for Operation Provide Comfort and later played an important role for continuation of the post-Gulf war regime. The Rapid Reaction Force (so called ‘the Hammer Force’) was permitted to be launched in Turkey. Turkey also complied with all the UN resolutions taken against Iraq,¹⁵² even though; they were not in total harmony with Turkish interests. Yet, later, Turkey felt disappointment at the US policies towards Iraq which could cause security problems with regard to its own Kurdish issue and which caused Turkey to lose its important trading partner.¹⁵³

¹⁴⁹ O. Faruk Loğoğlu, “The State Of U.S.-Turkey Relations: A Turkish Perspective”, *The Evolution of U.S.-Turkish Relations in a Transatlantic Context*, ed. Frances Gale Burwell, Strategic Studies Institute, 2008, pp. 33 - 34 29-42

¹⁵⁰ Edward J. Erickson, “Turkey As Regional Hegemon-2014:Strategic Implications For the United States”, *Turkish Studies*, 2006, Vol. 5, No. 3, p. 28

¹⁵¹ Meliha Benli Altunışık, “Turkish- American Security Relations: The Middle East Dimension” in *Turkish American Relations: Past, Present and Future*, ed. Mustafa Aydın, Çağrı Erhan, Routledge, 2004, p. 10

¹⁵² Ömer Göksel İşyar, “An Analysis of Turkish-American Relations from 1945 to 2004: Initiatives and Reactions in Turkish Foreign Policy”, *Turkish Journal of International Relations*, 2005, Vol. 4, No. 3, p. 33

¹⁵³ Meliha Benli Altunışık, “Turkish Foreign Policy in the 21st Century”, *CIDOB International Yearbook*, 2011, p. 196

Moreover, Turkey felt the necessity to convince both domestic opinion and the Arab regimes that Turkey's alliance with the West did not constitute a threat directed to its Middle Eastern neighbors. The government was aware of the danger of pro-American image. Therefore it had to take measures which would prevent Turkey from being seen or acting as America's policeman in the Middle East.¹⁵⁴

In short, in the 1990s, Washington's relations with Ankara were essentially determined by Turkey's strategic importance for American interests in the Middle East. During the terms of George W. H. Bush and Bill Clinton, Turkey was considered important because of its strategic position. Turkey was regarded as a front-line ally in the Middle East. Therefore, there were efforts to strengthen Turkey's military capabilities. After the Gulf War, bilateral relations between Turkey and the US were established on this basis.¹⁵⁵ Furthermore, energy issues played a crucial role in the Turkish-American relations in the 1990's. Washington and Ankara shared common views and intention to cooperate in energy development and security, especially with regard to the Caspian region.¹⁵⁶

After 1991, Turkish American partnership started to be called as 'enhanced partnership'. Enhanced partnership meant extended cooperation in the political field together with more diplomatic relations and stronger economic partnership. The new emphasis was supposed to fill the vacuum opened by the declined importance of security and defense-related matters.¹⁵⁷

The year of 1999 was the beginning of a term of much closer relations. There were many intensive contacts including President Demirel's and Prime Minister Ecevit's visits to the United States and President Clinton visit to Turkey in order to attend the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe's (OSCE) Summit and to

¹⁵⁴ William Hale, "Turkey, the Middle East and the Gulf Crisis", *International Affairs*, 1992, Vol. 68, No. 4, p. 682

¹⁵⁵ Ekavi Athanassopoulou, "American-Turkish Relations since the End of the Cold War", *Middle East Policy*, 2001, Vol. 8, No. 3, p. 145

¹⁵⁶ Sabri Sayarı, "Turkish-American Relations in the Post-Cold War Era: Issues of Convergence and Divergence" in *Turkish American Relations: Past, Present and Future*, ed. Mustafa Aydın, Çağrı Erhan, Routledge, 2004, p. 99

¹⁵⁷ Aylin Güney, "An Anatomy of the Transformation of the US-Turkish Alliance: From "Cold War" to "War on Iraq", *Turkish Studies*, September 2005, Vol. 6, No. 3, p. 345

organize international aid campaign for the 1999 İzmit earthquake. Especially President Clinton's visit four months after the İzmit earthquake, which caused 17,000 people's death, was highly appreciated by many Turks.

As a result of all these efforts, the relations were promoted to a new level and called as 'Strategic Partnership' by President Clinton. According to Robert Pearson, the US ambassador to Turkey, during this period, both executive and legislative branches of the US government realized that Turkey's regional and global responsibilities from Europe to the Caucasus and the Middle East began to increase. It is also recognized that if Turkey succeeds to integrate into the global economy, has further relations with Europe and can contribute to stabilize its region, the US could take advantage of this ability.¹⁵⁸

In short, there were several crucial moments that affected bilateral relations and the public's attitude towards the US including the Johnson letter, Jupiter missile, opium issue, and 1974 arms embargo. These specific policy issues caused anti-Americanism to increase in Turkey. The Gulf War also caused Turkish public to suspect from the US's real intentions with regard to Turkey's Kurdish problem. But it did not generate an anti-Americanism wave as bad as the one emerged after 2003 Iraqi war, as will be explained in the following chapter.

3.6 Conclusion

In this chapter, ups and downs of the relations between Turkey and the US were analyzed. It seems helpful to periodize the relations. The first period which is called as the honeymoon period¹⁵⁹ extends from 1947 to 1960. In this period, the Turkish-American relations were based on military and economic assistance, many bilateral agreements were signed, and technical and military personnel were exchanged. Furthermore, following its participation in the Korean War, Turkey became a member to NATO. Yet, as emphasized above, even in this honeymoon period, we witness the early signs of anti-Americanism which already started to burgeon. The

¹⁵⁸ Ibid., p. 347

¹⁵⁹ Füsün Türkmen, "Turkish–American Relations: A Challenging Transition", *Turkish Studies*, March 2009, Vol. 10, No. 1, p. 111

second period covers the years between 1960 and the military coup in 1980. The relations deteriorated in this term due to series of issues including, the Johnson letter, demands to cut the cultivation of opium poppies, Cyprus crisis of 1974 and the subsequent arms embargo. The third period extends from the very outset of the military coup till 2003 Iraq War. The final period is from 2003 Iraq War to present, and it will be examined in chapter 4 and chapter 5 chronologically.

After having covered nearly 60 years of bilateral relations we can conclude that increase or decrease in anti-American sentiments in Turkey seem quite related to the American policies. Turkish people's perception of certain incidents cause anti-Americanism to increase as O'Connor's "anti-Americanism as tendency" foresees. For instance, once the Turkish public became aware of the Johnson letter, the public sentiment towards this country totally changed as well as the language of the media. Newspapers even called Johnson as "cowboy" implying his rude and unrefined manner.¹⁶⁰

By the same token, after the removal of Jupiter Missiles, Turkish people felt the same disappointment at their number one ally. Turkish public perceived that the Turkish interests could easily be sacrificed for the US own safety. Furthermore, being NATO ally did not actually prevent the violation of Turkish interests as the Johnson letter and 1974 arms embargo examples demonstrated. From the Turkish perspective, dependence on America was caused by the perception of the Soviet threat following the World War II. This dependence mostly showed itself in the areas of economic and military aid. While Turkey took advantage of American military and economic aid, its foreign policy began to be shaped in accordance with the American interests in the region. However, as a result of the disappointment among Turkish people and to some extent in the governments, American image began to change since the Johnson letter and there was a growing anti-American sentiment in Turkey. Even before the Johnson letter there were some early signals of anti-Americanism like the public reaction caused by the presence of American military personnel in Turkish soil and their misbehavior. However, it is fair to argue that Johnson letter was the first shower effect in the bilateral relations.

¹⁶⁰ Metin Toker, "Aptal dostu olmaktansa" *Akis*, 1969.

While providing background information on bilateral relations, this chapter also aimed to examine why events or issues like Johnson letter caused an increase in anti-Americanism. Overall, Turkish sensitivity to sovereignty comes to mind as the first answer. The definition of sovereign nationalist anti-Americanism as provided in Chapter two helps to explain the reasons of Turkish people's behavior. The national pride is seen primarily important in Turkey like other sovereign nationalist states. Therefore, American policies such as the removal of Jupiter missiles without prior consultation with Ankara was perceived as damage to the national pride by Turkish public. Similarly, the fact that Turkish the Prime Minister received such a letter with such humiliating content was also insulting for the Turkish people and politicians alike. American policies were also perceived as a limitation on the Turkish sovereignty which was primarily important for the Turkish people. From the Turkish perspective, Turkish sovereignty was won after a hard-fought war, so it must be protected at all costs and events which are seen as limitation to sovereignty consequently cause anti-Americanism to grow in Turkey. In the 1960s, although anti-Americanism began to spread, protests were mainly organized by leftist groups. Turkish government was strongly criticized because of being and acting as a satellite state. The protests reached a peak when the US Ambassador to Ankara Robert Komer's car was overturned and burned during his visit to METU¹⁶¹, an event which became one of the symbols of anti-Americanism in Turkey. Turkish public was aware of the limitation of Turkish sovereignty and was uncomfortable of the presence of Americans in Turkey, the misuse of Turkish bases, the periodic visits of 6th fleet, economic and political privileges granted to the US. In this regard, economic and judicial rights that American people had in Turkey disturbed Turkish people and Turks perceived it as a threat to sovereignty.

While this was the sentiment during the Cold War, the public perception that Turkey's national interests were sidelined by its major ally has not been radically changed in the post-Cold War era, and has kept being the main reason for anti-Americanism in Turkey.

¹⁶¹ "ABD Elçisinin Arabası Yakıldı", *Cumhuriyet Gazetesi*, 15965, 07.01.1969

Turkey became strategically important for the US after the World War II, Turkey's strategic location led the US to shape its foreign policy towards this country by mainly taking its location into consideration. Throughout the Cold War, the fundamental principal of the US foreign policy was the containment of the Soviet Union. Turkey's strategic location and its role as the southern flank of NATO helped the US implement this policy. However, NATO's role changed after the collapse of the USSR. NATO redefined its role in world politics in response to "complex new risks to Euro-Atlantic peace and security, including oppression, ethnic conflict, economic distress, the collapse of political order, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction."¹⁶² With this redefinition of NATO's aims and role in the world, the US and Turkey remained as strategic partners and continued to cooperate in variety of issues that have ranged from Central Asia to the Middle East. However, while they remained as allies, the superpower barely took into consideration of the interests of the medium-sized states. This lack of consideration showed itself in various policies of the US and led to another phase of increase in anti-American sentiment in Turkey. Against this background, this thesis argues that anti-Americanism in Turkey has historically been caused by the Turkish perception that the US acted unilaterally ignoring its close ally's interests and imposing its own will on Turkey. From this perspective, Turkish anti-Americanism can be defined as sovereign-nationalist anti-Americanism of as a "tendency". Having covered historical developments, the following chapters aim to trace anti-American sentiments in Turkey during the terms of George W. Bush and Barack Obama administrations respectively.

¹⁶² "A Short History of NATO", <http://www.nato.int/history/nato-history.html>, (accessed on 24.05.2013)

CHAPTER IV

THE TERM OF PRESIDENT GEORGE W. BUSH

4.1 Introduction

This chapter aims to examine how bilateral relations between Turkey and the US and specific foreign policies of the US under President George W. affected the level of anti-Americanism in Turkey. This chapter will offer an explanation of how anti-Americanism in Turkey increased to an unprecedented level during Bush presidency through an analysis of bilateral relations and three policy issues that seem to have the highest impact on Turkish people's negative perceptions towards the US. Since the primary research question is about a comparison of the periods of President George W. Bush and President Barack Obama, the chapter will provide a basis for comparison with Obama's presidency.

4.2 The Doctrine of George W. Bush

George W. Bush became the 43rd president of the United States in 2001, defeating Al Gore, the Democratic Party's nominee. Initially, he mainly focused on domestic issues instead of international ones. In the meantime, his discourse about international issues reflected a willingness to carry out unilateral policies and the idea of 'America first.' In this regard, his first foreign policy decision was his refusal to revive the Kyoto Protocol on global warming which had been signed during Clinton's presidency in 1998 but not ratified by Congress. This decision was criticized by Europeans and opened the way of criticisms that the US acted unilaterally. George W. Bush was not free from Congressional criticism either. Before 9/11 he was subjected to a certain degree of criticism in Congress over issues

ranging from the commitment to National Missile Defense to the general unilateralist drift of policy.¹⁶³

Following 9/11, however, Bush's foreign policy took a completely different turn. The "war time president"¹⁶⁴ declared his own foreign policy doctrine, which would shape the next eight years.

Most of the US presidents have declared their own doctrines. The doctrine of a president helps a lot to comprehend the mentality, which plays an important role to constitute foreign policy. In this regard, National Security Strategy Reports, which were published in 2002 and 2006, are the main resources for identifying the Bush Doctrine. The National Security Strategy Report published in 2002 begins with the remarks of George W. Bush made on June 1, 2002.

Our Nation's cause has always been larger than our Nation's defense.
We fight, as we always fight, for a just peace—a peace that favors liberty.
We will defend the peace against the threats from terrorists and tyrants.
We will preserve the peace by building good relations among the great powers.¹⁶⁵

According to Michael Williams and Brian Schmidt, the Bush Doctrine has four elements. Firstly, there is a belief that the United States is now the only super power in the world and tries to preserve its hegemonic power. Second element is setting ground for the preemptive use of military force. Third element is embracing the unilateralism. The last one is democracy promotion.¹⁶⁶

Robert Jervis makes a similar analysis in underlying the main points of the Bush Doctrine: state's domestic regime is regarded important in shaping its foreign policy, new and vigorous policies such as preventive war are needed to defeat great threats,

¹⁶³ John Dumbrell, "Unilateralism And 'America First'? President George W. Bush's Foreign Policy", *Political Quarterly*, 2002, Vol. 73, No. 3, p. 281

¹⁶⁴ <http://www.whitehouse.gov/about/presidents/georgewbush>, (accessed on 04.06 2013)

¹⁶⁵ National Security Strategy 2002, <http://nssarchive.us>, (accessed on 13.01.2013)

¹⁶⁶ Michael C. Williams and Brian C. Schmidt, "The Bush Doctrine And The Iraq War: Neoconservatives Vs. Realists", *Security Studies*, 2008, Vol. 17, No. 2, pp. 195 – 198

acting unilaterally is preferable if required, there is a strong belief that the United States is required in world politics to maintain peace and stability.¹⁶⁷

Renshon offers a not so different definition: “American primacy, assertive realism, stand-apart alliances, a new internationalism, and democratic transformation.”¹⁶⁸

Indeed, before anything else, the Bush Doctrine is an attempt to declare American primacy. It is generally claimed that neo-conservatism was the driving force behind the US foreign policy under President George W. Bush. Some even claimed that “the Bush doctrine is essentially, a synonym for neoconservative foreign policy.”¹⁶⁹ For instance Paul Wolfowitz, a leading neoconservative, was appointed as Deputy Secretary of State. Mr. Wolfowitz was known as one of the brains and architects behind the Iraq war.¹⁷⁰ Richard Perle worked as the Chairman of the Defense Policy Board Advisory Committee between 2001 and 2003. Dick Cheney, known to be associated with neoconservatives, served as Vice President of the US from 2001 to 2009. Therefore, it is fair to say that neoconservatives gained power in the Bush administration, particularly after 9/11 events. Neoconservatives under the Bush administration found the opportunity to demonstrate American military competence and primacy and fulfill a moral obligation to transform countries through democracy promotion.

The Bush Doctrine did not accept deterrence and containment as useful strategies. Once, Bush said “preemptive attack now is deterrence”. He declared in his speech at West Point, “yet the war on terror will not be won on the defensive. We must take the battle to the enemy, disrupt his plans, and confront the worst threat before they emerge. In the world we have entered, the only path to safety is the path of

¹⁶⁷ Robert Jervis, “Understanding The Bush Doctrine”, *Political Science Quarterly*, 2003, Vol. 118, No. 3, p. 365

¹⁶⁸ Stanley Renshon, *National Security In The Obama Administration: Reassessing The Bush Doctrine*, Routledge, New York, 2009, p. 40

¹⁶⁹ Michael C. Williams and Brian C. Schmidt, “The Bush Doctrine And The Iraq War: Neoconservatives Vs. Realists”, *Security Studies*, 2008, Vol. 17, No. 2, p. 194

¹⁷⁰ Paul Reynolds, “Wolfowitz to Spread Neo-con Gospel”, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/4358045.stm>, (accessed on 24.04. 2013)

action.”¹⁷¹ Later his administration formalized the idea of preemptive attack and labeled three states namely Iran, North Korea and Iraq as ‘axis of evil.’¹⁷²

As a result of the Bush Doctrine, American foreign policy was considered as ‘aggressive unilateralism’.¹⁷³ John Hammond provides examples of this aggressive unilateralism. For instance, the US refused to adopt the Kyoto Treaty on global warming; did not recognize the authority of the International Criminal Court; withdrew from the ABM treaty with Russia; did not recognize the status of the fighters imprisoned in Guantanamo as prisoners of war; supported Israel in its occupation on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip despite the Security Council resolutions.¹⁷⁴

As it is mentioned above, the fourth dimension of Bush doctrine is democracy promotion. It is argued by Jonathan Monten that

the promotion of democracy is central to the George W. Bush administration's prosecution of both the war on terrorism and its overall grand strategy, in which it is assumed that the US political and security interests are advanced by the spread of liberal political institutions and values abroad.¹⁷⁵

It is also understood from one of Bush’s statements in which he argued “as in Europe, as in Asia, as in every region of the world, the advance of freedom leads to peace.”¹⁷⁶

After having outlined the general guiding principles of the Bush’s foreign policy, the following section will focus on American foreign policy towards Turkey.

¹⁷¹ West Point Speech

¹⁷² Mel Gurtov, *Superpower On Crusade: The Bush Doctrine In US Foreign Policy*, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2006, p. 39

¹⁷³ John L. Hammond, “The Bush Doctrine, Preventive War, And International Law”, *The Philosophical Forum*, March 2005, Vol. 36, No. 1, p. 97

¹⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 98

¹⁷⁵ Jonathan Monten, “The Roots of the Bush Doctrine: Power, Nationalism, and Democracy Promotion in U.S. Strategy”, *International Security*, 2005, Vol. 29, No.4, p.112

¹⁷⁶ "Remarks by the President at the 20th Anniversary of the National Endowment for Democracy", 6.11.2003, <http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/11/20031106-2.html>, (accessed on 10.06.2013)

4.3 George W. Bush's Policy towards Turkey

It is better to examine Bush's policy towards Turkey by categorizing it in two parts. The first one, which is a relatively short period, lasted till September 11, and the second one was the post September 11 era. George W. Bush inherited what Clinton described as "strategic partnership" with Turkey in 1999. Before the election, George W. Bush declared that he would carry out a more "humble" foreign policy.¹⁷⁷ At the outset of the President George W. Bush administration, the relationship with Turkey was regarded as a lower priority, but after 9/11 events, the priorities of the President changed and "the immediate effect was to enhance rather than damage the 'strategic partnership'".¹⁷⁸ Therefore, the US attempted to deepen the relations further.

It is generally agreed that after 9/11 events, Turkey has started to be regarded a strategically important country again, a position which it lost with the end of the Cold War. Turkey as a majority Muslim country whose political system is based on democracy and secularism was presented as a successful model of modernization, democratization and globalization. Moreover, being such a model has helped to be disproved the discourse of "clash of civilizations" thus, the importance of Turkey has increased.¹⁷⁹ In other words, according to Ömer Taşpınar, in the past, Turkey was regarded as important just because of its strategic position. Its identity features were not significant for the US. However, for the first time in history, the US realized that Turkey had some features such as being a successful model for the modernization theory as a Muslim state. These features were interpreted as a contribution to its strategically important position. Taşpınar also argues "in an environment where the Arab geography appeared as a fundamental problem, Turkey's democratic, secular and Western presence was accepted as a "model" by the neoconservative group."¹⁸⁰

¹⁷⁷ Adam Wolfson, "Conservatives and Neoconservatives", *The Public Interest*, Winter 2004, No. 154, p.217

¹⁷⁸ William Hale, *Turkey, the US and Iraq*, London Middle East Institute-SOAS, 2007, p. 91

¹⁷⁹ Meliha Benli Altunışık, "Turkish Foreign Policy in the 21st Century", *CIDOB International Yearbook*, 2011, p. 195

¹⁸⁰ Ömer Taşpınar, "The Anatomy of Anti-Americanism in Turkey", 15.11.2006, <http://www.brookings.edu/~media/research/files/articles/2005/11/16turkey%20taspinar/taspinar20051116.pdf>, (accessed on 02.01.2013)

During his visit to Turkey in 2004 for NATO summit, President W. George Bush summarized Turkey's importance in the following statement:

[Turkey] has always been important for its geography — here at the meeting place of Europe, Asia, and the Middle East. Now Turkey has assumed even greater historical importance, because of your character as a nation. Turkey is a strong, secular democracy, a majority Muslim society, and a close ally of free nations. Your country, with 150 years of democratic and social reform, stands as a model to others, and as Europe's bridge to the wider world. Your success is vital to a future of progress and peace in Europe and in the broader Middle East and the Republic of Turkey can depend on the support and friendship of the United States.¹⁸¹

In some political circles, being regarded as a model by the US was not welcomed.¹⁸² For instance, during the visit of George W. Bush, Turkish President Ahmet Necdet Sezer revealed his discontent by emphasizing that although the majority of the population in Turkey consisted of Muslims, Turkey was a secular country. The president said “religious and state affairs are definitely separate from one another. Islamic countries can analyze Turkey but it is wrong to launch Turkey as an Islamic state.”¹⁸³ Still, Turkey's strategic position was regarded important by Bush administration. Particularly, after 9/11 events, Turkey's support to fight against global terrorism and its cultural, historical and military features were seen precious by the US administration.

Due to these reasons, Turkey's relations with the US, as well as European and neighboring countries began to be shaped again.¹⁸⁴ Turkey was an important actor in the fight against terrorism by supporting international coalition against Taliban and the al-Qaeda. When international community made sure that 9/11 events had

¹⁸¹ Marc Grossman, “The U.S. - Turkish Partnership”, *The Disam Journal*, Winter 2004-2005, p. 67

¹⁸² Ömer Taşpınar, “The Anatomy of Anti-Americanism in Turkey”, 15.11.2006, <http://www.brookings.edu/~media/research/files/articles/2005/11/16turkey%20taspinar/taspinar20051116.pdf>, (accessed on 02.01.2013)

¹⁸³ [Http://Www.Hurriyetdailynews.Com/Turkish-Press-Scanner-June-29-2004.aspx?Pageid=438&N=Turkish-Press-Scanner-June-29-2004-2004-06-29](http://Www.Hurriyetdailynews.Com/Turkish-Press-Scanner-June-29-2004.aspx?Pageid=438&N=Turkish-Press-Scanner-June-29-2004-2004-06-29), (accessed on 30.07.2013)

¹⁸⁴ Hüseyin Bağcı and Şaban Kardeş, “Turkey's Strategic Future Post 11 September Impact: The Strategic importance of Turkey revisited”, A Joint initiative of CEPS and the IISS, Turkey's Strategic Future in ESF Working Paper No.13, May 2003, ISBN 92-9079-452-6P, p. 46

originated from Afghanistan and was ready for military campaign, Turkish parliament quickly gave parliamentary authorization in October 2001 to contribute troops to the US campaign even though there was a general public opposition to allow the stationing of foreign troops on Turkish territory and permit the use of Turkish airspace and airbases at that time.¹⁸⁵ In the meantime, the US' fight against terrorism gave hope to many that the US would also support Turkey in its own fight against terrorism; i.e. against PKK. Turkey tried to connect its fight against PKK to the US-led global fight against terrorism. But eventually, Turkey was disappointed at the US' unwillingness to support Turkey's struggle against PKK. On the other hand, thanks to its long-standing fighting experience against PKK Turkey was regarded as a great contributor to the US' war against terrorism. Some Turkish officials and scholars even likened the geographical features of Afghanistan to Turkey's southern region.¹⁸⁶ However, Turkey did not support the US with combat troops in Afghanistan. Apart from Turkey's unwillingness to fight in a fellow Muslim country; one reason behind this policy might be Turkey's disappointment at the lack of expected support for its fight against PKK. Furthermore, the nature of Bush's foreign policy, especially unilateralism as a fundamental principle of its foreign policy, made cooperating with the US difficult for Turkey as it did with the rest of the world.

Another important foreign policy issue, perhaps the most important, between Turkey and the US was the US-led war in Iraq under the administration of George W. Bush which will be analyzed in detail below.

Armenian issue, which proved to be thorny issue during Obama's presidency, did not constitute a big hurdle for bilateral relations during the Bush era. President Bush never used the term of genocide during his tenure. He mentioned that 1.5 million were killed under Ottoman Empire and called the event a massacre. Furthermore, he underlined the importance of rapprochement between Turkey and Armenia. It is fair to claim that similar to previous Republican Party administrations, Bush administration took sides with Turkey on the Armenian issue. For instance in 2007,

¹⁸⁵ Ibid., p. 34

¹⁸⁶ Alaeddin Yalçınkaya, "Siyasi Sınırlar ve Teröre Etkisi:Kandil Dağı ve Svat Vadisi", *Uluslararası Güvenlik ve Terörizm Dergisi*, 2012, Vol. 3, No. 2, pp. 43-54

he urged the Congress to reject a resolution describing the deaths of Armenians in 1915 as genocide. He argued that if the resolution passed, this would damage the relations with a key ally in NATO.¹⁸⁷

4.4 George W. Bush's Policy towards Iran

The US policies towards Iran during the term of President George W. Bush did not cause anti-Americanism to increase in Turkey on its own. But it is still necessary to provide background information on the topic because during Obama period the issue of Iran exacerbated Turkish anti-Americanism. Therefore, in order to offer a sound comparison between the periods of two presidents, it is essential to touch upon Bush's Iran policy.

Iran was one of the closest allies of the US during the rule of Mohammed Reza Shah Pahlavi. However, the US and Iran were not in good terms since the Iranian Islamic Revolution in 1979 and the hostage crisis (1979-1981). After this crisis the United States broke its diplomatic relations with Iran in 1980. From that time on,

the two nations' relations have been characterized by mutual recriminations in which Iran accuses America of arrogance and double standards, and America accuses Iran of supporting terrorism and attempting to acquire weapons of mass destruction.¹⁸⁸

From the US point of view, Iran's would-be nuclear capacity is perceived as something cannot be tolerated on the grounds of US security interests. From Ayatollah Khomeini to President Mahmoud Ahmedinejad, many Iranian officials have repeated that "Israel must be wiped off the map."¹⁸⁹ In this context, particularly, when the US - Israeli close relations are taken into consideration, nuclear-armed Iran was definitely inconsistent with the US' regional and global interests. Due to this kind of threat perceptions, sanctions against Iran have been imposed from the President Jimmy Carter to current president Barack Obama. Since 1979 the US has

¹⁸⁷ "Bush urges Congress to reject Armenian genocide resolution", http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/10/world/europe/10iht-10turkey.7834745.html?_r=0, (accessed on 18.07.2013)

¹⁸⁸ H.E Chehabi, "Sport Diplomacy Between The U.S And Iran", *Diplomacy and Statecraft*, 2001, Vol. 12, No.1, p. 89

¹⁸⁹ [Http://News.Bbc.Co.Uk/2/Hi/Middle_East/4378948.Stm](http://News.Bbc.Co.Uk/2/Hi/Middle_East/4378948.Stm), (accessed on 03.07.2013)

imposed sanctions on Iran by targeting oil industry in Iran in particular. In 1987 the Reagan administration imposed further sanctions on oil imported from Iran to the US. After the Iran- Iraq war, the Clinton administration imposed total embargo and put into effect the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act in 1996. Following the Clinton administration, Bush administration continued the pressure and implemented Clinton's sanctions policy.¹⁹⁰

Bush administration's policies -without actually imposing Iran Sanctions Act (ISA), instead using the threat of sanctions- led to slow Iran's energy development.¹⁹¹ Under the Bush administration, American policy toward Iran dramatically deteriorated especially after 9/11 events. Iran was regarded as persistent and troublesome threat and was accused of providing long-standing support for terrorism and being critical to American policies in the Middle East. At the beginning of the Bush administration, policies toward Iran aimed to impose isolation, through sanctions and diplomatic activity. At this time engagement was not on the table to solve the problem.¹⁹² Thus, "the United States repeatedly froze the assets of people, groups, and businesses identified as helping Iran sponsor terrorism, destabilize Iraq, or work on weapons program. The U.S also froze the assets of foreign entities believed to helping Iran in those areas."¹⁹³

Furthermore, when we compare to 2002 and 2006 National Security Strategies, while 2002 the National Security Strategy labels Syria and Iraq as major threats, the 2006 National Security Strategy writes that "Iran (together with Syria) continues to harbor terrorists at home and sponsor terrorist activity abroad."¹⁹⁴ Moreover, Iran was mentioned at the same document with regard to weapons of mass destruction. "We

¹⁹⁰ Daniel Robicheau, "Sanctions On Iran: What's Missing From Obama's New Dialogue", *Monthly Review*, March 2010, p. 34

¹⁹¹ Kenneth Katzman, "The Iran Sanctions Act (ISA)", *Congressional Research Service*, 2009, p. 3

¹⁹² John Dumbrell, "The Bush Administration US Public Diplomacy And Iran", Working Paper, *Durham University, School of Government and International Affairs*, June 2007, p. 7

¹⁹³ Steve Jones, "A History Of U.S. Sanctions Against Iran", [Http://Usforeignpolicy.About.Com](http://Usforeignpolicy.About.Com) (accessed on 07.07.2013)

¹⁹⁴ [Http://Georgewbush-Whitehouse.Archives.Gov/Nsc/Nss/2006/Index.Html](http://Georgewbush-Whitehouse.Archives.Gov/Nsc/Nss/2006/Index.Html), (accessed on 18.03.2013)

may face no greater challenge from a single country than from Iran.... This is not only because of its attempts to develop nuclear weapons, but also because of broader concerns. The Iranian regime sponsors terrorism; threatens Israel; seeks to thwart Middle East peace; disrupts democracy in Iraq; and denies the aspirations of its people for freedom.”¹⁹⁵

Official American position toward Iran with WMD can be summarized as follows:

The United States has long-standing concerns over Iran’s nuclear program, sponsorship of terrorism, and human rights record. Numerous sanctions have been imposed on Iran by the United States and the international community to compel Iran to engage seriously in discussions with the international community and address concerns over its nuclear program.¹⁹⁶

In addition to the sanctions against Iran that were imposed by the US, the US has been working for years to gain support for tougher sanctions from the international community aimed in order to prevent the country from developing nuclear weapons. So the US wanted the international community to get involved and impose sanctions against Iran and expected nations to vote for sanctions against Iran in the United Nations.

Therefore, one of the main problematic areas in Turkish - American relations in terms of Iran was Iran’s would-be nuclear weapons capability. Turkish and American policies toward Iran on this issue have had significant differences. First of all, it is apparent that having a neighbor with nuclear weapons is not in Turkey’s interest.¹⁹⁷ Moreover, Iran’s nuclear weapons capability can create direct imbalance between Turkey and Iran in terms of military power. Iran with nuclear weapons is contrary to Turkish strategic interests. According to Mustafa Kibaroglu “the presence of nuclear weapons in the Iranian military arsenal will upset the delicate balance that has existed between the two nations since the Treaty of Kasr-i Shirin in 1639, in favor of

¹⁹⁵ [Http://Georgewbush-Whitehouse.Archives.Gov/Nsc/Nss/2006/Index.Html](http://Georgewbush-Whitehouse.Archives.Gov/Nsc/Nss/2006/Index.Html), (accessed on 18.03.2013)

¹⁹⁶ [Http://Www.State.Gov/R/Pa/Ei/Bgn/5314.Htm](http://Www.State.Gov/R/Pa/Ei/Bgn/5314.Htm), (accessed on 18.03.2013)

¹⁹⁷ Mustafa Kibaroglu and Baris Caglar “Implications of a Nuclear Iran for Turkey”, *Middle East Policy*, Winter 2008, Vol. 15, No. 4, p. 59

Iran.¹⁹⁸ Furthermore, it is stated by Chief of General Staff İlker Başbuğ that nuclear-armed Iran was an important security risk for Turkey.¹⁹⁹ In short, Turkey has huge stakes in a solution of the Iranian problem. On the other hand, it supports Iranian right to possess nuclear power for civilian purposes. “Many in Turkey also feel that the reason why Iran is so intent on its nuclear program is out of fear of attack and national survival; thus Turkey is pursuing a policy that is non-confrontational and seeks to mitigate this fear through engagement and diplomacy.”²⁰⁰

Official Turkish position towards Iran’s nuclear weapons capability is summarized as follows;

Turkey supports the establishment of nuclear weapons free-zone in the Middle East and encourages countries in this region towards the attainment of this goal. In this framework, pursuing a principled approach regarding the Iranian nuclear issue, Turkey believes that a solution to the issue should recognize the right of every country respectful of Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) obligations to peaceful uses of nuclear energy, while at the same time addressing the concerns of the international community regarding the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.²⁰¹

In this context, Turkish government saw diplomatic solution to this issue as the only viable option. Turkey tried to bring the Western countries and Iran together. For instance, the meeting between Chief Nuclear Negotiator Ali Laricani and the European Union's High Representative Javier Solana was held in Ankara on 26 April 2007.²⁰²

Even though both countries agreed on the basic fact that Iran with nuclear weapon could create danger not only for these two countries but also for the world, they

¹⁹⁸ Mustafa Kibaroglu, “Acceptance And Anxiety Turkey (Mostly) Embraces Obama’s Nuclear Posture”, *The Nonproliferation Review*, 2011, p. 206

¹⁹⁹ [Http://Yenisafak.Com.Tr/Arsiv/2005/Haziran/07/P10.Html](http://Yenisafak.Com.Tr/Arsiv/2005/Haziran/07/P10.Html), (accessed on 09.02.2013)

²⁰⁰ Anthony H. Cordesman, Bryan Gold, Robert Shelala and Micheal Gibbs, “U.S. and Iranian Strategic Competition Turkey and the South Caucasus”, *CSIS*, July 2013, p. V

²⁰¹ [Http://Www.Mfa.Gov.Tr/Questions.En.Mfa](http://Www.Mfa.Gov.Tr/Questions.En.Mfa), (accessed on 23.03.2013)

²⁰² Bayram Sinkaya, “İran Nükleer Programı Karşısında Türkiye’nin Tutumu Ve Uranyum Takası Mutabakatı”, *Ortadoğu Analiz*, July 2010, Vol. 2 No. 18, p. 68

disagreed about how to solve the problem.²⁰³ In this regard, Turkey supported a policy, which did not include coercive measures, but instead relied on diplomacy. Turkey has disagreed with pressuring Iran with harsh sanctions and the threat of military force because Ankara was worried that these kinds of threats could increase Iranian need of a nuclear deterrent.²⁰⁴ As a result of this perception, Turkey disagreed with American policies on Iran especially, which enforced economic sanctions or any measure that might increase the tension. Accordingly, Turkey agreed to abide by UN Security Council sanctions but not the additional US and EU financial measures.²⁰⁵

In the meantime, Turkey and Iran developed better relations. The rapprochement between Turkey and Iran was not limited to nuclear issues. There were various areas from trade to energy that the two countries were cooperating. Turkish- Iran trade increased from \$1.25 billion in 2002 to \$16.5 billion in 2011.²⁰⁶ According to Kibaroglu and Çağlar, Turkish-Iranian relations passed the new phase after the American invasion of Iraq in 2003. Two countries had similar concerns about the future of Iraq. These similar concerns might have provided ground for further rapprochement between Turkey and Iran concerning the regional political issues.²⁰⁷

In brief, under Bush Administration diverging from the US policy Turkey tried to encourage the parties actively in order to solve the problem via diplomatic means, instead of harsh economic sanctions.

²⁰³ Anthony H. Cordesman, Bryan Gold, Robert Shelala and Micheal Gibbs, “U.S. and Iranian Strategic Competition Turkey and the South Caucasus”, *CSIS*, July 2013, p. 45

²⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, p. V

²⁰⁵ Bülent Alırıza, Jon B. Alterman and Andrew C. Kuchins, “The Turkey, Russia Iran Nexus: Driving Forces And Strategies”, *CSIS*, March 2013, p.11

²⁰⁶ Anthony H. Cordesman, Bryan Gold, Robert Shelala and Micheal Gibbs, “U.S. and Iranian Strategic Competition Turkey and the South Caucasus”, *CSIS*, July 2013, p. IV

²⁰⁷ Mustafa Kibaroglu, Barış Çağlar “Implications of a Nuclear Iran for Turkey”, *Middle East Policy*, Winter 2008, Vol. 15, No. 4, p. 60

4.5 George W. Bush's Policy towards Afghanistan

After 9/11 attacks, President George W. Bush announced that the US was in global war against terrorism and the terrorist organizations such as Al-Qaeda and that Al-Qaeda's leader Osama Bin Laden were responsible from these attacks. In addition, Taliban Regime in Afghanistan was accused of being a safe haven for those terrorist organizations that have created a crucial threat to America's safety and world peace in general.

Right after the events, the director of the CIA announced "the attacks were almost certainly the work of Al-Qaeda."²⁰⁸ Al-Qaeda had already held other terrorist activities against the US. Immediately afterwards, Bush addressed the nation stating that the attacks were "acts of war," that there "would be a monumental struggle between good and evil" in which "good will prevail," and that the United States would "make no distinction between the terrorists who committed these acts and those who harbor them."²⁰⁹

Therefore, the US started a military campaign in Afghanistan to defeat Al-Qaeda and Taliban. The Bush doctrine provided a basis for going into firstly Afghanistan and then Iraq.²¹⁰ In this regard, George W. Bush's policies towards Afghanistan were part of the War on Terrorism. National Strategy Report in 2006 stated that Afghanistan and Iraq were "front lines in the war on terror", and "winning the war on terror requires winning the battles in Afghanistan and Iraq."²¹¹ On 7 October 2001 the US-led Operation called Enduring Freedom started in Afghanistan and was initially supported by Afghan Northern Alliance. After the US-led coalition forces' operation, Taliban were driven from power in 2001. However, they were still effective especially in the country's rural southern regions and started to fight back from 2003

²⁰⁸ Fred I. Greenstein, "The Leadership Style Of George W. Bush" (paper delivered at the conference on "The Bush Presidency: An Early Assessment," Woodrow Wilson School, Princeton University, April 25-26, 2003) p. 14

²⁰⁹ Ibid., p. 14

²¹⁰ Norman Podhoretz, "Is The Bush Doctrine Dead?", *Commentary*, September 2006, p. 18

²¹¹ Christine Gray, "The Bush Doctrine Revisited: The 2006 National Security Strategy of the USA", *Chinese Journal of International Law*, 2005, Vol. 5, No. 3, p. 557

on. Thus situation began to worsen for the US. Taliban regained power and instability and insecurity occurred. Taliban-led violence spread to the rest of Afghanistan by January 2007, suicide bombing increased in seven fold.²¹² Barnett R. Rubin shows that “even with opium production at record levels, slowing economic growth is failing to satisfy the population’s most basic needs”.²¹³ This situation demonstrates that US’ reconstruction efforts failed. Furthermore, as US troops’ casualties increased, public opinion changed from supporting to opposition.

Initially Turkey gave all its support to the US’ war on terrorism. Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs expressed immediately the condolences to American people. Following the events, Turkish officials regularly declared how global terrorism could damage the peace in the world and countries must stand together and cooperate with each other against the global terrorism. Turkey obviously showed that its stance was with the US on fighting against terrorism. To prove this stance, Turkey sent ninety Turkish Special Forces operators to Afghanistan by accepting Washington’s request. Their duty would be providing technical assistance. Yet the importance of Turkey’s role in Afghanistan increased after Taliban regime fell down.²¹⁴

In this manner, Turkey provided 1.400 of the total 4.500 ISAF troops in Afghanistan from July 2002 to January 2003.²¹⁵ Turkey is the only country, which twice led the ISAF in 2002 and 2005. Since Turkey has deep historical and cultural connections with Afghanistan, Turkey’s role in Afghanistan has been welcomed. In addition to that Hikmet Çetin was appointed as the NATO Senior Civilian Representative (SCR) for Afghanistan in 2003.²¹⁶ Turkey’s contribution is not limited to military personnel in Afghanistan. According to Turkish General Staff, so far approximately 18.000

²¹² “The war in Afghanistan”, http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/the_war_in_afghanistan, (accessed on 23.08.2013)

²¹³ Barnett R. Rubin, “Saving Afghanistan”, *Foreign Affairs*, 2007, Vol. 86, No. 1 p. 57

²¹⁴ Steven A. Cook and Elizabeth Sherwood-Randall, “Generating Momentum for a New Era in U.S.- Turkey Relations”, *Council On Foreign Relations*, 15.06.2006, p. 8

²¹⁵ Füsün Türkmen, “Turkish–American Relations: A Challenging Transition”, *Turkish Studies*, March 2009, Vol. 10, No. 1, p.114

²¹⁶ <Http://Www.Nato.Int/Cv/Scr/Cetin-E.Htm>, (accessed on 16.05.2013)

Afghan personnel have been trained by Turkish troops in Afghanistan. In addition to that Turkey has granted more than 423 million USD for military and civilian assistance to Afghanistan.²¹⁷ Currently, 1.036 troops are serving in Afghanistan in the framework of ISAF.²¹⁸

Turkey's role in Afghanistan has been limited to be a member of NATO. As a member of NATO, Turkey was asked to send additional troops as combat forces. For instance in 2006, under the Bush administration, Turkey was invited to contribute to Afghanistan more militarily. But in response the Chief of General Staff said that no single Turkish soldier would go there for such a mission.²¹⁹ However, Turkey increased the number of Turkish troops in Afghanistan from 475 in October 2006²²⁰ to 1.500 in April 2007.²²¹ Even though Turkey sent additional troops to Afghanistan, Turkey repeatedly made its position clear that its forces would not serve as combat forces. Gradually, Turkey managed to find common ground with the United States and developed a working relationship with the Alliance in Afghanistan. Over time Turkey's emphasis on training of Afghan police and army was acknowledged by the United States as a valuable contribution.²²²

From the beginning, Turkey made its position clear. From Turkish perspective, non-military instruments should be used to solve the Afghan problem. In addition to that all Afghan groups should be included in the political process.²²³

²¹⁷http://www.tsk.tr/ing/4_international_relations/4_1_contribution_of_turkish_armed_forces_to_peace_support_operations/contribution_of_turkish_armed_forces_to_peace_support_operations.htm, (accessed on 16.05.2013)

²¹⁸ <http://www.nato.int/isaf/docu/epub/pdf/placemat.pdf>, (accessed on 16.05.2013)

²¹⁹ <Http://Www.State.Gov/Documents/Organization/131741.Pdf>, (accessed on 19.07.2013)

²²⁰ "Afganistan'da 475 Türk askeri var", <http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/ShowNew.aspx?id=5204699>, (accessed on 19.07.2013)

²²¹ "TSK Kabil'de NATO komutasını devralıyor", <http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/ShowNew.aspx?id=6273743>, (accessed on 19.07.2013)

²²² Şaban Kardaş, "Turkey's Regional Approach In Afghanistan: A Civilian Power In Action", *SAM*, No.6, April 2013, p. 21


²²³ *Ibid.*, p. 8

Turkey contributed to Afghanistan not only in the field of military but also in social and economic issues.²²⁴ In socio-economic field, construction, furnishing and repairing activities were carried out and 41 schools, dormitories, 4 hospitals were built. In this context, 200 million dollars were spent for fulfillments of these activities.²²⁵

In short, Turkey preferred to pursue the policy that included non-military solutions as much as possible. Even though Turkey’s military contribution helps to reconcile its relations with the US, Turkey preferred to stand in this issue as a supportive power and repeatedly pointed out that Turkish troops in Afghanistan were not combat troops. Turkey sent additional troops particularly during the time of Turkish command.

According to the Pew Global Research center survey in 2007, opposition to the US and NATO military operation was quite high in Turkey, seventy-four percentages of the respondents opposed to military operations in Afghanistan whereas eighty-six percentages of the respondents opposed to military operations in Iraq. By the same token, Turkish people’s support for the US-led war on terror was not high between 2002 and 2007 demonstrating a general trend of decline.²²⁶

TABLE 3: Support for US-led War on Terror in Turkey (2002-2007)



*Pew Research Center

²²⁴ “Turkish Contributions To Security And Development In Afghanistan”, 2007, [Http://Www.Un.Int/Turkey/Page167.Html](http://Www.Un.Int/Turkey/Page167.Html), (accessed on 02.08.2013)

²²⁵ “Turkish Contributions To Security And Development In Afghanistan”, 2007, [Http://Www.Un.Int/Turkey/Page167.Html](http://Www.Un.Int/Turkey/Page167.Html), (accessed on 02.08.2013)

²²⁶ <http://www.pewglobal.org/2007/06/27/chapter-1-views-of-the-u-s-and-american-foreign-policy/>, (accessed on 28.03.2013)

As it was mentioned above, Taliban started to fight back against coalition forces from the beginning of 2003. Actually, the number of insurgent activities increased from September 2002. At the beginning, attacks were concentrated in certain areas such as the rural southern regions. However, by time the number of attacks increased, they became widespread and the content of the attacks became complex. In 2006, it was reported that insurgent activities were seen even in the northern part of the country where Taliban had not been powerful previously. The insurgent groups mainly targeted the presence of coalition forces and ISAF in Afghanistan and the government of Karzai. The number of suicide attacks also increased. For instance, it reached a peak in 2007 with 142 attacks per year.²²⁷ Instability and insecurity spread in the country, Afghanistan turned into a more dangerous, insecure and instable place than before. Therefore, the US has frequently been blamed for causing this situation. Moreover, George W. Bush's strategy focusing not only on Afghanistan but also enlarging the scope of the war to Iraq was criticized harshly. This strategy was shown as the reason of the current negative situation in Afghanistan. Sustainable security and stability could not be maintained. Afghanistan had variety of longstanding problems from economy such as unemployment to socio-economic such as refugees or gender²²⁸ even before the US invasion to Afghanistan. Therefore, it is not wrong to argue that the US-led war on terrorism deepened all these long-standing problems.

Since the targets of reconstruction, nation-building and stability were not achieved, the support for the US-led war on terrorism gradually declined throughout the world as it did in Turkey. There was another reason for decreasing support in Turkey. Since the 9/11, Turkey expressed its support to the US and Turkey argued for close resemblance between its war against PKK and the US-led war on terrorism. Turkey repeatedly claimed that terrorism was an international problem that international community should cooperate on. For instance Prime Minister Tayyip Erdoğan stated

²²⁷ Anne Stenersen, "The Taliban Insurgency in Afghanistan – Organization, Leadership and Worldview", *Norwegian Defence Research Establishment*, 2010, pp. 24 – 26

²²⁸ For detail analysis of Afghansitan situation before US-Led war, See: Adam Pain and Jonathan Goodhand, "Afghanistan: Current Employment And Socio-Economic Situation And Prospects" *Recovery And Reconstruction Department*, Geneva, March 2002, pp. 2 – 77

that “we are working not just to fight against terrorism; we're working together to establish peace in the world in general. For this we worked together in Somalia and Bosnia, Herzegovina and Kosovo. We are currently engaged in a similar effort in Afghanistan. And we are of the opinion that it is necessary to continue to work to fight against international terrorism.”²²⁹

At the beginning Turkey hoped that its support to the US might eventually led to the US support for its fight against PKK. So long as Turkey did not get more support from the US, the support for global war on terrorism declined. Thus, Turkey did not send combating troops to Afghanistan. Above table showed how the support decreased from 2002 to 2007.

4.6 George W. Bush's Policy towards Iraq

In accordance with the Bush Doctrine, the US decided to fight a “preemptive war” in Iraq.²³⁰ Soon after, Turkish–American relations started to deteriorate. The Iraq issue was one of the most problematic areas between Turkey and the US throughout the President George W. Bush administration. There are many reasons behind the deterioration including different political and national interests on Iraq issue. Iraq’s sovereignty, stability, political unity and territorial integrity have been among the priorities of Turkish foreign policy.²³¹ Because, Turkey did not want to see an independent Kurdish state beyond its border. According to Meliha Benli Altunışık, “Iraq has constituted a significant foreign policy challenge for Turkey, with equally important domestic implications.”²³² Iraq’s stability and territorial integrity were seen as being closely related to Turkey’s own security and stability. A disintegrated Iraq might lead to the establishment of an independent Kurdish state which is directly related to Turkey’s territorial integrity. Turkey also gave importance to Turkish

²²⁹ “President Bush and Prime Minister Tayyip Erdoğan Discuss Global War on Terror” 05.11.2007, <http://www.tc-america.org/files/news/pdf/whitehouse.pdf>, (accessed on 10.01.2013)

²³⁰ John M. Murphy, “Our Mission And Our Moment: George W. Bush And September 11th”, *Rhetoric And Public Affairs*, 2003, Vol. 6, No. 4, p. 607

²³¹ [Http://Www.Mfa.Gov.Tr/Relations-Between-Turkey-And-Iraq.En.Mfa](http://Www.Mfa.Gov.Tr/Relations-Between-Turkey-And-Iraq.En.Mfa), (accessed on 23.03.2013)

²³² Meliha Benli Altunışık, “Turkey’s Security Culture and Policy towards Iraq”, *Perceptions*, Spring 2007, p. 87

minority in Kirkuk region. Turkey also wanted to see stable Iraq, because of its economic relations with Iraq. Turkey's economic relations became complicated after 9/11 attacks and the US invasion of Iraq. For instance "The border trade with Iraq was completely halted on September 18, 2001 leading to significant income losses for the region."²³³

Shortly, from the Turkish point of view, new risks and dangers such as the fragmentation of Iraq, establishment of Kurdish state and change of Kirkuk's status in Iraq generated a crisis of confidence.²³⁴ In addition, there was a widespread belief in Turkey (even among the intellectuals) that Washington supported the establishment of a Kurdish state in Iraq. "The ones who did not necessarily believe that Washington pursued this policy on purpose were nevertheless inclined to think that America's policies would eventually result in a similar scenario."²³⁵ This fear had already been there even before the Iraqi War, Athanassopoulou wrote about the persistent Turkish suspicion about the American plans of independent Kurdistan in 2001.²³⁶

The refusal of the March 1st Bill was a watershed in bilateral relations. The Turkish public became more and more critical of the US' war plans in Iraq. In this regard, the majority of Turkish people opposed to war in Iraq. In December 2002, eighty-six point seven percent of Turkish people opposed to intervention. A month later this figure rose to more than ninety percent.²³⁷ Such opposition was apparently motivated in part by feelings of solidarity with other Muslims and by fear that the American

²³³ Mustafa Aydın and Damla Aras, "Political Conditionality of Economic Relations between Paternalist States: Turkey's Interaction with Iran, Iraq, and Syria", *Arab Studies Quarterly*, Winter/Spring 2005, Vol. 27, No. 1-2, p. 30

²³⁴ Ramazan Gözen, "Turkish-American Relations in 2009", *Perceptions*, 2010, Vol. 15, No. 3-4, p. 52

²³⁵ Ömer Taşpınar, "The Anatomy of Anti-Americanism in Turkey", 15.11.2006, <http://www.brookings.edu/~media/research/files/articles/2005/11/16turkey%20taspinar/taspinar20051116.pdf>, (accessed on 02.01.2013)

²³⁶ Ekavi Athanassopoulou, "American-Turkish Relations since the End of the Cold War", *Middle East Policy*, 2001, Vol. 8, No. 3, p. 160

²³⁷ Nasuh Uslu, Metin Toprak, İbrahim Dalmış and Ertan Aydın, "Turkish Public Opinion Towards the United States in the Context of the Iraq Question", *Middle East Review of International Affairs*, 2005, Vol. 9, No. 3, p.75

invasion would lead eventually to an independent Kurdistan.²³⁸ In this context, Turkish parliamentarians refused to authorize the deployment of the US troops to Iraq by using Turkish territory despite the heavy pressure from the Bush administration on the new Justice and Development Government.²³⁹ It can be argued that such negative public opinion might have played a crucial role in preventing Parliamentarians' from voting in favor of the March 1 Bill. It was interpreted as a cold shower effect in Washington, especially at Pentagon.²⁴⁰

Subsequently, the US administration and the Congress harshly criticized Turkey and the Turkish response was as harsh as those of Americans. Thus the future of the fifty years old alliance began to be questioned.²⁴¹ Many senior officials including Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz and Defense Undersecretary for Policy Doug Feith declared their disappointment with Turkish Parliament's decision and criticized Turkey harshly. Wolfowitz stated that "Let's have a Turkey that steps up and says, 'We made a mistake. We should have known how bad things were in Iraq, but we know now. Let's figure out how we can be as helpful as possible to the Americans,'"²⁴²

In addition to all these criticisms, President George W. Bush voiced their disappointment with Turkish decision in his speech on NBC television channel on April, 24 2003. He mainly declared that if Turkey accepted to open up the northern front to Iraq, the military intervention would not be unsuccessful.²⁴³ Furthermore, Bush wrote in his book "Decision Points" that "when the Turkish parliament held a

²³⁸ Ibid., p. 75

²³⁹ Bülent Aliriza and Seda Çiftci, "The US-Turkish Alliance at the Iranian Junction?", *CSIS*, 2006, p. 1

²⁴⁰ TÜSİAD, "Rebuilding A Partnership: Turkish-American Relations For A New Era Turkish Perspective", Chapter 3, *TÜSİAD Publication*, April 2009, No-T/2009-04/490, p. 38

²⁴¹ Bülent Aliriza and Seda Çiftci, "The US-Turkish Alliance at the Iranian Junction?", *CSIS*, 2006, p. 1

²⁴² <http://www.nytimes.com/2003/05/07/international/worldspecial/07cnd-turk.html>, (accessed on 14.02.2013)

²⁴³ Ömer Göksel İşyar, "An Analysis of Turkish-American Relations from 1945 to 2004: Initiatives and Reactions in Turkish Foreign Policy", *Turkish Journal of International Relations*, 2005, Vol. 4, No. 3, p. 41

final vote on March 1, it came up just short of passage. I was frustrated and disappointed. One of the most important requests we had ever made, Turkey, our NATO ally, had let America down.”²⁴⁴ This is the only statement, which is related to Turkey throughout the book.

According to Lindley and Kayhan, there were two reasons why the Turkish parliament did not let American troops use Turkish territory. The first one was unpopularity of the US’ war efforts in Turkey and the difficulty for the AKP to ignore widespread negative opinion as a newly elected party. Secondly, there was reluctance on part of the major Turkish political and military actors to involve Turkey in the US’ war against Iraq. There were two sides of the coin; the first side covered the concern of political leaders and military officers about the legitimacy of such a war. On the other side of the coin, they were uncomfortable with possible consequences of the war. In their opinion, Iraq would find itself in instability and chaos which would badly affect Turkish interests.²⁴⁵

Similarly, according to Cook and Sherwood-Randall, Bush administration had two sins with regard to Iraq problem. Firstly, the US ignored Ankara’s warnings about the outcomes of invading Iraq. Secondly, Washington did not take Turkey’s security concerns into account especially concerning independent Kurdistan and regional balance.²⁴⁶

On July 4, 2003 was a new low point of bilateral relations in which 11 Turkish officers were arrested by the American army at the Turkish Special Forces Headquarter in Sulimaniyeh, Iraq. Turkish soldiers were accused of plotting to have the Kurdish mayor of Kirkuk assassinated.²⁴⁷ The Turkish soldiers were treated very badly by throwing black hood over their heads. Later this treatment would be

²⁴⁴ George W. Bush, *Decision Points*, Crown Publishers, New York, 2010, p. 250

²⁴⁵ Özlem Kayhan and Dan Lindley, “The Iraq War and the Troubled US-Turkish Alliance: Some Conclusions for Europe,” in *Turkey and the European Union: Internal Dynamics and External Challenges*, ed. Joseph S. Joseph, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2006, p. 216

²⁴⁶ Steven A. Cook and Elizabeth Sherwood-Randall, “Generating Momentum for a New Era in U.S.- Turkey Relations”, *Council On Foreign Relations*, 15 June 2006, p. 10

²⁴⁷ Edward J. Erickson, “Turkey As Regional Hegemon-2014:Strategic Implications For the United States”, *Turkish Studies*, 2006, Vol. 5, No. 3, p. 40

compared with the treatment of prisoners in the US custody at the Abu Ghraib prison. After two days in the US custody in Baghdad, the Turkish military personnel were released unharmed following intensive telephone diplomacy between Washington and Ankara.²⁴⁸

The incident was disseminated quickly in the Turkish press and hit the headlines for weeks. The movie *Valley of the Wolves-Iraq* and bestselling book *Metal Storm*, both of which were intensely anti-American, occupied the Turkey's agenda for months. With the effects of Sulimaniyeh incident and with the contribution of this movie and book, positive opinion towards the United States began to decline even further. Moreover, it led to further deterioration of Turkish-American relations. "The trust and the long-lasting cooperation between the respective militaries were seriously damaged."²⁴⁹ Füsün Türkmen, who defines anti-Americanism in Turkey as episodes of contention, points at 2003 Sulimaniyeh incident as one of the two most important episodes, the other one being 1964 Johnson letter.²⁵⁰

In Iraq, after Saddam was removed from power, insurgent activities started. The first incident was the destruction of the Jordanian Embassy in Baghdad in August 2003.²⁵¹ It is generally agreed that the US did not expect and was not ready for insurgency. As a result of the insurgency which spread to the whole country, the US found itself on the verge of answering difficult question whether it would send more American troops to deter the insurgency operations. By the autumn of 2003, there were 35 attacks a day across Iraq.²⁵² Many thought that the US bogged down in Iraq, even though, Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld claimed to the contrary in national

²⁴⁸ Stephan J. Flagan and Samuel J. Brannen, "Turkey's Shifting Dynamics: Implications for U.S.-Turkey Relations: A Report of the U.S.-Turkey Strategic Initiative", *CSIS*, March 2009, p. 85

²⁴⁹ TÜSİAD, "Rebuilding A Partnership: Turkish-American Relations For A New Era Turkish Perspective", Chapter 3, *TÜSİAD Publication*, April 2009, No-T/2009-04/490, p. 38

²⁵⁰ Füsün Türkmen, "Turkish-American Relations: A Challenging Transition", *Turkish Studies*, March 2009, Vol. 10, No. 1, p.124

²⁵¹ Steven Metz, *Learning From Iraq: Counterinsurgency in American Strategy*, Strategic Studies Institute, 2007, p. 19

²⁵² Steven Metz, *Learning From Iraq: Counterinsurgency in American Strategy*, Strategic Studies Institute, USA, 2007, p. 36

television.²⁵³ It is the fact that, the Iraqi war was one of the most deadly and controversial military operations after the Vietnam War²⁵⁴ which raised the public outrage.

The situation in Iraq deteriorated even more and the US started to give serious losses. The number of deaths increased between 2003 and 2006 and reached a peak in 2006. According to Iraq Coalition Casualty Count, almost three-thousand American people died which means the US lost more than half of its total casualties in this era.²⁵⁵ According to Iraq Body Count Database, the number of civilians' death reached almost sixty nine thousand which included Iraqi civilians and regular local police forces and excluded police commando units who worked under the Interior Ministry.²⁵⁶

In the meantime, the chaos and instability that prevailed in Iraq further deteriorated Turkish-American relations. Furthermore, the US' unwillingness to take into account Turkey's views on Iraq and other regional problems have created deep crisis in bilateral relations.²⁵⁷

Meanwhile, Washington needed to reformulate its Iraqi policy. Baker-Hamilton Iraqi Report dated December 2006 aimed to correct the situation. The report suggested that the US should change its policy in Iraq to reverse the process in a positive direction. One of the dimensions was to start cooperation with Iraq's neighboring countries, especially with Turkey.²⁵⁸

In this regard, it can be argued that the Bush administration realized the importance of Turkey's key role in the restructuring of Iraq and as a factor that would facilitate

²⁵³ <http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=28476> (accessed on 01.09.2013)

²⁵⁴ Christopher Gelpi, Peter D. Feaver, and Jason Reifler, "Success Matters Casualty Sensitivity and the War in Iraq", *International Security*, Vol. 30, No. 3, 2005-2006, p. 7

²⁵⁵ <http://icasualties.org/Iraq/Index.aspx>, (accessed on 20.07.2013)

²⁵⁶ <http://www.iraqbodycount.org/database/>, (accessed on 20.07.2013)

²⁵⁷ Ramazan Gözen, "Turkish-American Relations in 2009", *Perceptions*, 2010, Vol. 15, No. 3-4, p. 52

²⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 52

withdrawal of the US forces from Iraq. Subsequently, the Bush administration accelerated rapprochement with Turkey.²⁵⁹

Concordantly, a meeting between Prime Minister Erdoğan and President George W. Bush was held in November 2007 at the White House. This meeting was interpreted as an attempt to fix bilateral relations and start of a new era of cooperation between the two countries. After this meeting, the US pledge to provide actionable intelligence on PKK and tried to reassure Turkish counterparts about its goodwill with regard to the territorial integrity of Iraq.”²⁶⁰ Furthermore, George W. Bush declared PKK as a terrorist organization and emphasized Turkey’s importance as a strategic partner.²⁶¹

In short, the events took place in Iraq negatively affected the Turkish-American relations. But at the same time, according to William Hale, it is not wrong to argue that both side had a more realistic perception of its limitations as a result of the events. Turkey comprehended its limitation to influence the US policy whereas the US understood not to take the Turkish support for granted and that the scope of the relations had serious limits.²⁶²

Therefore, in the post-9/11 period, the dynamics of the Turkish–American alliance have shifted. Turkey has been regarded as a country which has pursued relatively more independent and assertive policy. Turkey also seemed to consider carefully its national security interests in terms of allowing the use of its bases during operations in the Middle East. All these signs can be considered that Turkey had a claim to become an independent security actor in its region.²⁶³

²⁵⁹ Ibid., p. 52

²⁶⁰ Sinan Ülgen, “In Search of Lost Time: Turkey-US Relations After Bush”, *US – Europe Analysis Series*, Brookings, 19.02.2009, p. 1

²⁶¹ [Http://2001-2009.State.Gov/P/Eur/RIs/Rm/94642.Htm](http://2001-2009.State.Gov/P/Eur/RIs/Rm/94642.Htm), (accessed on 01.03.2013)

²⁶² William Hale, *Turkey, the US and Iraq*, London Middle East Institute-SOAS, 2007, p. 179

²⁶³ Aylin Güney, “An Anatomy of the Transformation of the US–Turkish Alliance: From “Cold War” to “War on Iraq”, *Turkish Studies*, September 2005, Vol. 6, No. 3, p. 356

4.7 Anti-Americanism in Turkey during the term of President George W. Bush

Anti-Americanism in Turkey increased dramatically during the term of President George W. Bush. While favorable opinion of the US was 52 percent in 1999/2000, it dropped to 9 percent in 2007.²⁶⁴ The surprising rise in the anti-American sentiment led to debates such as “Who lost Turkey?” in the early 2000s.²⁶⁵ After the War in Iraq started, favorable opinions towards the US kept declining until 2007 and confidence in Bush dropped to a strikingly low levels. According to surveys, the policy shift and rapprochement between two allies in 2007, including high-level meetings between Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and President George W. Bush, the US’ recognition PKK as terrorist organization, providing additional military equipment to Turkey in order to help its fight against terrorism, led to only minor decrease in the anti-American sentiment in Turkey. Because of a growing crisis of confidence between two states, such joint efforts led to very little improvement. Turkey kept its position as one of the most anti-American countries in the world.²⁶⁶ So, “the Turkey-US relationship became at best ineffective, and at worst dysfunctional.”²⁶⁷

Yet it is necessary to situate Turkish anti-Americanism into the global context in order to better grasp it. In order to do so, this study is going to use Pew Research Center’s “Global Indicators Database”²⁶⁸ and German Marshall Fund’s “Transatlantic Trends”²⁶⁹ datasets.

²⁶⁴ <http://www.pewglobal.org/2013/07/18/chapter-1-attitudes-toward-the-united-states/>, (accessed on 25.07.2013)

²⁶⁵ Kılıç Buğra Kanat, “Turkish-American Partnership 2.0?”, 25.12.11, http://www.todayszaman.com/newsDetail_getNewsById.action?newsId=266628, (accessed on 01.03.2013)

²⁶⁶ F. Stephen Larrabee, “Troubled Partnership US-Turkish Relations in an Era of Global Geopolitical Change”, *Rand Corporation*, 2010, p. 17

²⁶⁷ Sinan Ülgen, “In Search of Lost Time: Turkey-US Relations After Bush”, *US – Europe Analysis Series*, Brookings, 19.02.2009, p. 2

²⁶⁸ <http://www.pewglobal.org/database/indicator/1/country/224/>, (accessed on 25.07.2013)

²⁶⁹ <http://trends.gmfus.org/transatlantic-trends/key-findings/>, (accessed on 25.07.2013)

During the early years of the Bush administration, we fail to see a ‘global anti-Americanism’. According to Pew Research Center’s 2002 poll²⁷⁰, for instance, 43.3 percent of the respondents had “somewhat favorable opinion” and 21.3 percent of the respondents had “very favorable” opinion of the US. Overall, majorities in 34 of 42 countries expressed favorable views. In general between 2000 and 2002, anti-American sentiments were not common and high. From this perspective, Turkey presents a different picture. In Turkey, as in some other countries, such as Argentina, and Jordan, more than fifty percent of the respondents had unfavorable opinion of the United States.²⁷¹ Below table shows that, in 2002, 30 percent had a negative opinion of the US. So, Turkey presented a different case from the general world trend.²⁷²

TABLE 4: The US Favorability (1999/2000-2013)

U.S. Favorability													
	1999/ 2000	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Canada	--	72	63	--	59	--	55	--	68	--	--	--	64
Britain	83	75	70	58	55	56	51	53	69	65	61	60	58
France	62	62	42	37	43	39	39	42	75	73	75	69	64
Germany	78	60	45	38	42	37	30	31	64	63	62	52	53
Italy	76	70	60	--	--	--	53	--	--	--	--	74	76
Spain	50	--	38	--	41	23	34	33	58	61	64	58	62
Greece	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	35	39
Poland	86	79	--	--	62	--	--	61	68	67	74	70	69
Czech Rep.	77	71	--	--	--	--	45	--	--	--	--	54	58
Russia	37	61	37	46	52	43	41	46	44	57	56	52	51
Turkey	52	30	15	30	23	12	9	12	14	17	10	15	21
Egypt	--	--	--	--	--	30	21	22	27	17	20	19	16
Jordan	--	25	1	5	21	15	20	19	25	21	13	12	14
Lebanon	--	36	27	--	42	--	47	51	55	52	49	48	47
Palest. ter.	--	--	0	--	--	--	13	--	15	--	18	--	16
Tunisia	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	45	42
Israel	--	--	78	--	--	--	78	--	71	--	72	--	83
Australia	--	--	59	--	--	--	--	46	--	--	--	--	66
China	--	--	--	--	42	47	34	41	47	58	44	43	40
Indonesia	--	--	--	--	38	30	29	37	63	59	54	--	61
Japan	77	72	--	--	--	63	61	50	59	66	85	72	69
Malaysia	--	--	--	--	--	--	27	--	--	--	--	--	55
Pakistan	23	10	--	21	23	27	15	19	16	17	12	12	11
Philippines	--	90	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	85
S. Korea	--	52	46	--	--	--	58	70	78	79	--	--	78
Argentina	--	34	--	--	--	--	16	22	38	42	--	--	41
Bolivia	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	55
Brazil	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	62	62	61	73
Chile	--	--	--	--	--	--	55	--	--	--	--	--	68
El Salvador	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	79
Mexico	68	64	--	--	--	--	56	47	69	56	52	56	66
Venezuela	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	53
Ghana	--	83	--	--	--	--	80	--	--	--	--	--	83
Kenya	--	80	--	--	--	--	87	--	90	94	83	--	81
Nigeria	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	81	--	--	--	69
Senegal	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	81
S. Africa	--	65	--	--	--	--	--	60	--	--	--	--	72
Uganda	--	74	--	--	--	--	64	--	--	--	--	--	73

1999/2000 survey trends provided by the U.S. Department of State.
PEW RESEARCH CENTER Q9a.

²⁷⁰ The poll was made with more than thirty thousand people in forty-two countries asking the question whether they have favorable or unfavorable opinion of the USA.
<http://www.pewglobal.org/2002/12/04/chapter-4-global-publics-view-the-united-states/>, (accessed on 25.07.2013)

²⁷¹ Giacomo Chiozza, “Disaggregating Anti-Americanism: An Analysis of Individual Attitudes toward the United States” in *Anti-Americanisms in World Politics*, ed. Peter J. Katzenstein and Robert O. Keohane, Cornell University Press, 2007, p. 96

²⁷² <http://www.pewglobal.org/2013/07/18/chapter-1-attitudes-toward-the-united-states/> (accessed on 25.07.2013)

However, anti-Americanism increased dramatically worldwide in 2003 and 2004.²⁷³ The favorable opinion of the US decreased sharply especially after the consequences of the Iraqi invasion started to be experienced. For instance, even in Great Britain, the closest ally of the US, the percentage of the favorable opinions of the US was seventy five in 2002 but it dropped to seventy percent in 2003. In Germany, in 1999-2000 seventy eight percentages of respondents had favorable opinions of the US, whereas forty five percentages of respondents had favorable view of the US in 2003. There was a dramatic decrease in Indonesia from seventy five percentages to fifteen percentages within 3 years.²⁷⁴

TABLE 5: Favorable Opinions of the US (1999/2000-2006)

	Favorable Opinions of the U.S.					
	1999/ 2000	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006
	%	%	%	%	%	%
Great Britain	83	75	70	58	55	56
France	62	63	43	37	43	39
Germany	78	61	45	38	41	37
Spain	50	--	38	--	41	23
Russia	37	61	36	47	52	43
Indonesia	75	61	15	--	38	30
Egypt	--	--	--	--	--	30
Pakistan	23	10	13	21	23	27
Jordan	--	25	1	5	21	15
Turkey	52	30	15	30	23	12
Nigeria	46	--	61	--	--	62
Japan	77	72	--	--	--	63
India	--	54	--	--	71	56
China	--	--	--	--	42	47

1999/2000 survey trends provided by the Office of Research, U.S. Department of State

275

*Pew Research Center


²⁷³ Peter J. Katzenstein and Robert O. Keohane, "Types and Sources of Anti-Americanism: A Framework for Analysis" *Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences*, 2005, p. 12

²⁷⁴ <http://www.pewglobal.org/2007/03/14/americas-image-in-the-world-findings-from-the-pew-global-attitudes-project/>, (accessed on 25.07.2013)

²⁷⁵ <http://www.pewglobal.org/2007/03/14/americas-image-in-the-world-findings-from-the-pew-global-attitudes-project/>, (accessed on 25.07.2013)

The drop in Turkey was sharper than most of the countries. The percentage of the favorable opinions of the US, which was thirty in 2002, decreased by half to fifteen percentage in 2003.

TABLE 6: Favorable Views of the United States in Turkey (2002-2013)²⁷⁶



Although anti-Americanism has spread all over the world, it is in the strongest level in the Muslim world. Below chart points out how people in fourteen countries see the most important issues in world politics as a danger to world peace. The situation in Turkey is worth mentioning as sixty percentages of the respondents see the presence of the US in Iraq as a danger to world peace whereas sixteen percentages of respondents see Iran and only six percentages of respondents see North Korea as a danger to world peace. According to Pew research center, with the Iraq war anti-Americanism spread to parts of the Muslim world where the US had previously been relatively popular, like in Turkey. Furthermore, after the Iraqi War, the US was seen as a threat to Islam, as well.²⁷⁷

²⁷⁶ <http://www.pewglobal.org/database/?indicator=1&survey=14&response=Favorable&mode=table> , (accessed on 25.07.2013)

²⁷⁷ <http://www.pewglobal.org/2007/03/14/americas-image-in-the-world-findings-from-the-pew-global-attitudes-project/>, (accessed on 25.07.2013)

TABLE 7: Danger to World Peace in 2007²⁷⁸


	Dangers to World Peace			
<i>% saying 'great danger'</i>	<u>Iran</u>	<u>US in Iraq</u>	<u>North Korea</u>	<u>Israeli-Palestinian conflict</u>
U.S.	46	31	34	43
Great Britain	34	41	19	45
France	31	36	16	35
Germany	51	40	23	51
Spain	38	56	21	52
Russia	20	45	10	41
Indonesia	7	31	4	33
Egypt	14	56	14	68
Jordan	19	58	18	67
Turkey	16	60	6	42
Pakistan	4	28	8	22
Nigeria	15	25	11	27
Japan	29	29	46	40
India	8	15	6	13
China	22	31	11	27

2005 Pew surveys put forth that in five majority Muslim countries namely Indonesia, Pakistan, Turkey, Jordan, and Lebanon, people believed that the US might be a military threat to their country. The situation in Turkey is especially interesting because in a longstanding NATO ally, sixty five percentages of respondents believed that the US could be a military threat to the country someday.²⁷⁹

²⁷⁸ <http://www.pewglobal.org/2007/03/14/americas-image-in-the-world-findings-from-the-pew-global-attitudes-project/>, (accessed on 25.07.2013)

²⁷⁹ <http://www.pewglobal.org/2005/06/23/chapter-4-views-of-americas-role-in-the-world/>, (accessed on 25.07.2013)

TABLE 8: US Could Be a Military Threat to Our Country



*Pew Research Center

Unfavorable opinions were not only about the US as a country but also about its leaders. When asked “what is the problem with the US”, majority of people answered “President Bush” in a 2005 poll.²⁸⁰

TABLE 9: What is the Problem with the US?

	Mostly Bush %	America in general %	Both (VOL) %	DK/Ref %	
Spain	76	14	7	3	(N=374)
2003	50	37	12	2	
Germany	65	29	5	1	(N=424)
2003	74	22	3	1	
Netherlands	63	30	6	1	(N=403)
France	63	32	5	1	(N=429)
2003	74	21	4	*	
Pakistan	51	29	10	10	(N=730)
2003	62	31	2	5	
Britain	56	35	8	1	(N=285)
2003	59	31	8	3	
Canada	54	37	9	0	(N=188)
2003	60	32	6	2	
Lebanon	47	32	19	1	(N=572)
2003	51	32	16	1	
Turkey	41	36	17	6	(N=671)
2003	52	33	12	3	
Indonesia	43	42	0	15	(N=577)
2003	69	20	7	4	
India	35	35	14	16	(N=349)
Jordan	22	37	41	1	(N=798)
2003	42	28	30	*	
China	16	34	42	8	(N=1,197)
Poland	27	49	14	10	(N=236)
Russia	30	58	9	3	(N=401)
2003	43	32	15	10	

*Based on those with an unfavorable opinion of the U.S.

*Pew Research Center

²⁸⁰ <http://www.pewglobal.org/2005/06/23/chapter-1-image-of-the-united-states/>, (accessed on 25.07.2013)

President George W. Bush was regarded as one of the least confidential leaders in the world. Below table shows the confidence in world leaders in certain countries including Britain, Spain, Russia, Egypt, Turkey, India and China in 2006.²⁸¹

TABLE 10: Confidence in World Leaders in 2005



*Pew Research Center


In Turkey, 41 percent saw President Bush as the source of the problem, whereas for the 36 percent the problem was rooted in “America in general”.²⁸² Moreover, as can be seen at the below table, in 2006 Turkey had one of the lowest levels of confidence, with a mere 3 percent, in George W. Bush.²⁸³

²⁸¹<http://www.pewglobal.org/2006/06/13/i-americas-image-and-u-s-foreign-policy/>, (accessed on 25.07.2013)

²⁸²<http://www.pewglobal.org/2005/06/23/chapter-1-image-of-the-united-states/>, (accessed on 25.07.2013)


²⁸³<http://www.pewglobal.org/2006/06/13/i-americas-image-and-u-s-foreign-policy/>, (accessed on 25.07.2013)

TABLE 11: What is the problem with the US in Turkey? (2005)



*Pew Research Center

TABLE 12: Confidence in World Leaders in Turkey (2005)



*Pew Research Center


Furthermore, BBC World Service Poll from November 15, 2004 to January 3, 2005 questioned how respondents see the reelection of George W. Bush whether it is positive or negative for peace and security in the world. On average fifty-eight percentage said negative. Below charts demonstrate the situation in which six percentage of respondents said positive and eighty- two percentage of respondents said negative in Turkey.²⁸⁴

²⁸⁴ http://www.globescan.com/news_archives/bbcpoll.html, (accessed on 25.07.2013)

TABLE 13: Reactions to Bush's Reelection (2004-2005)

Bush Reelection

As you may know, George Bush has been reelected as President of the United States. Do you think this is positive or negative for peace and security in the world?



The white space in this chart represents "Depends/Neither," and "DK/NA."


Overall, the available data in 2005 tell us that the problem that people perceive with regard to the US derived not only from President Bush and his administration, but also from a broad discomfort with unique American power.²⁸⁵

Against this backdrop, Iraqi invasion and the US policies surrounding the Iraqi War seem to be a critical turning point in the increase of anti-Americanism. Before the war there was a quite positive tendency towards America and its policy in terms of fight against terrorism particularly afterwards 9/11 events. Yet after the invasion unfavorable views against the US increased. Therefore, the anti-American sentiments appear to be directly related to “what the United States does” to use Keohane and Katzenstein’s terminology. Anti-American feelings can increase and decrease due to American policies especially its foreign policy all over the world.

²⁸⁵ <http://www.pewglobal.org/2007/03/14/americas-image-in-the-world-findings-from-the-pew-global-attitudes-project/>, (accessed on 25.07.2013)

Yet according to Pew Research Center's surveys, there are four features of contemporary anti-Americanism: a) Its global character, b) Its being strongest in Muslim countries, c) Its intensity, d) It is also directed against American people as negative opinion.²⁸⁶ The last feature of anti-Americanism tells us that it is getting deep-seated and firm. Currently, favorable opinions of Americans have decreased in countries such as Spain, Jordan and Turkey.²⁸⁷ In this context below chart demonstrates the situation in Turkey in terms of negative opinion towards Americans themselves from 2002 to 2012. The numbers are in parallel with the favorability of the US.

TABLE 14: Favorable View of Americans (2002-2012)²⁸⁸



In 2002 and following two years, thirty percent of the respondents had favorable views of American people. As of 2005 favorable opinions of American have decreased and in 2012 only fifteen percent of respondents had favorable opinion of American people.

2005 Pew poll also demonstrates that suicide attacks against Americans in Iraq are regarded justifiable by many in the Muslim countries. For instance in Turkey, where

²⁸⁶ <http://www.pewglobal.org/2007/03/14/americas-image-in-the-world-findings-from-the-pew-global-attitudes-project/>, (accessed on 25.07.2013)

²⁸⁷ <http://www.pewglobal.org/2007/03/14/americas-image-in-the-world-findings-from-the-pew-global-attitudes-project/>, (accessed on 25.07.2013)

²⁸⁸ <http://www.pewglobal.org/database/?indicator=2&survey=14&response=Favorable&mode=table>, (accessed on 25.07.2013)

neither Bin Laden nor terrorism was popular, one out of four people believed that suicide bombings against Americans and Westerns in Iraq could be justified.²⁸⁹

It is better to firstly mention the effects of Iraqi invasion on anti-American sentiments. After 9/11, there was sympathy towards the US and its policies based on war against global terrorism. But later, American claims that Iraq had nuclear weapons and the following war invoked criticism of the US. During this period, the rhetoric of George W. Bush helped a lot to spread of anti-American feelings throughout the world. The role of America and its unilateral policies in world politics began to be questioned broadly in Europe and elsewhere. Thus, anti-Americanism obviously increased in the US' European allies after 2003 Iraqi invasion.²⁹⁰ According to the survey of Transatlantic Trends 2003, disapproval of the US foreign policy increased by 20 percent in all European countries.²⁹¹ On the other hand, in Arab and Muslim world, the debate on the war itself and the invasion of Iraq led to dramatic increase in anti-Americanism. Violent protests were held in the Muslim world.²⁹² It is even claimed that anti-American feelings consequently pushed people to take up arms in Iraq and led to Iraqi insurgency after the invasion.²⁹³ As it was already mentioned Turkish public deeply criticized the war questioning its legitimacy. In this manner, Lindberg and Nossel claimed that anti-American sentiments showed itself in local politics through March 1st Bill.²⁹⁴ Many

²⁸⁹ <http://www.pewglobal.org/2007/03/14/americas-image-in-the-world-findings-from-the-pew-global-attitudes-project/>, (accessed on 25.07.2013)

²⁹⁰ Gregory Johnston and Leonard Ray, "Balancing Act? Anti-Americanism and Support for a Common European Foreign and Security Policy" paper presented at the annual meeting of the Southern Political Science Association, Inter-Continental Hotel, New Orleans, LA, 2004, p. 21

²⁹¹ Hubert Verdine, "On Anti-Americanism", *Brown Journal of World Affairs*, 2004, Vol. 10, No. 2, p. 119

²⁹² Reuven Paz, "Islamists And Anti-Americanism", *Middle East Review of International Affairs*, 2003, Vol. 7, No. 4, p. 53

²⁹³ Tod Lindberg and Suzanne Nossel "Report of the Working Group on Anti-Americanism", *The Princeton Project on National Security*, September 2005, p. 12

²⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 22

intellectuals claim that March 1st Bill was the prime example of a tangible reaction which derived from anti-American sentiments among the Turkish public.²⁹⁵

Even though the Iraqi Invasion appears to be the culprit, of course, a phenomenon like anti-Americanism cannot be accounted by one factor alone. There are multiple reasons for anti-Americanism at various levels. We can argue that anti-American sentiments derive from five main perceptions. The first one is the US' unilateralist policies throughout the world. It is globally believed that the more the US acts unilaterally, the more people subscribe to anti-Americanism. Bush's policies and discourses, which expect global approval to unilaterally taken policies, highly contributed to this perception. His famous statement "either with us or against us" can be the best example of this mentality.

The second reason might be the global perception that the US replaced the old enemy "Soviet Union" with a new one "Islamist terrorism" in order to maintain its hegemony around the world. After the Soviet Union was dissolved, the famous motto spread the world: end of history which described by Francis Fukuyama as "the end point of mankind's ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government."²⁹⁶ In the absence of certain enemy such as communism or the USSR itself, the US found itself in searching or creating the new enemy/ies. After 9/11, many argues that the US found the much-needed enemy in the form of "Jihadist terrorism" and "war against communism" was replaced by "war against terrorism". So that, the US would use the fear of terrorism as a tool to impose its primacy and hegemony.

Third reason of anti-Americanism is the perception of the war on Islam among Muslim countries in particular. Bush's rhetoric made a contribution to this perception. He once claimed that "Islamofascism" was an "ideology that is real and profound" and later he stated again "Islamic fascists... will use any means to destroy

²⁹⁵ Ioannis N. Grigoriadis, "Friends No More?: The Rise of Anti-American Nationalism in Turkey", *The Middle East Journal*, Winter 2010, Vol. 64, No. 1, p. 56

²⁹⁶ Francis Fukuyama, "The End of History?", *The National Interest*, 1989, p. 2

those of us who love freedom."²⁹⁷ In 2001, he even described the war on terrorism as a crusade.²⁹⁸

Fourth reason of anti-Americanism could be the perception that the US ignored the global problems or the problems of other countries. It is also generally accepted that the U.S has not met the expectations to help solving the world's leading problems. The US has been accused of paying no attention to environmental problems such as global-warming or hunger for the third world countries. In this regard, Bush's refusal of the Kyoto Protocol on global warming is a proper example. According to the 2008 Pew Global Attitudes Project, in Turkey, forty-six percentages of the respondents believed that the US was the country who hurts the environment most.²⁹⁹

Fifth reason of anti-Americanism might be its contribution to global income gap. It is believed that the policies are conducted by the US contribute to the gap between rich and poor countries. According to Pew Research Center, in 2002, majorities in 38 of 43 countries, including a majority of Americans, said the US policies add to the rich-poor divide.³⁰⁰

All these reasons are also valid for Turkey under the Bush administration. It is fair to say that the US' intervention in Iraq and Afghanistan were not welcomed in Turkey. According to the Transatlantic Trends survey in 2012, in Turkey, twenty-three percentage of the respondents view that intervention in Iraq was the right thing to do, whereas only nineteen percentage of the respondents view the intervention in Afghanistan as the right thing to do.³⁰¹ Furthermore, just like many people around the

²⁹⁷ "Bush's language angers US Muslims" <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/4785065.stm> (accessed on 09.04.2013)

²⁹⁸ "Remarks by the President Upon Arrival", 16.09.2001, <http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010916-2.html> (accessed on 09.04.2013)

²⁹⁹ <http://www.pewglobal.org/2008/12/18/global-public-opinion-in-the-bush-years-2001-2008/>, (accessed on 25.07.2013)

³⁰⁰ <http://www.pewglobal.org/2007/03/14/americas-image-in-the-world-findings-from-the-pew-global-attitudes-project/>, (accessed on 25.07.2013)

³⁰¹ <http://trends.gmfus.org/transatlantic-trends/key-findings/>, (accessed on 25.07.2013)

world the most of the Turkish people believed that the US fought a war in Iraq not for justifiable causes but for oil. For instance, according to Pew survey in 2004,

When respondents in Turkey who felt that the main reasons given by the US for this war were insincere are queried about the real reasons, sixty-four percent of them stated that the main motivation was to control Middle East oil. Sixty-one percent believe it was “to dominate the world”, forty-seven percent “to target Muslim governments” and forty-five percent “to protect Israel.”³⁰²

However, even a more important reason was the Turkish perception of the US as an unreliable and hypocritical country. It can be argued that impacts of the War in Iraq and the widespread perception among the Turkish people that the US directly or indirectly supports PKK played a major role in increasing anti-Americanism in Turkey. Larrabee, for instance, argues that the main reason lies with the Iraqi War.³⁰³ According to him, anti-Americanism was a reaction to what the US did in Iraq and that the US provided a safe haven for PKK by not carrying out a military operation against them or by not letting Turkey do so. He writes “many Turks saw these refusals as evidence of a double standard and tantamount to tacit the US support for the PKK against Turkey.”³⁰⁴

Indeed, PKK became an important factor affecting the American image in Turkey. Eligur states that Turks no longer consider the US as a “thrust worthy ally” mainly because Americans followed a double standard policy of anti-terrorism targeting the groups they choose but ignoring others, like PKK.³⁰⁵ Overwhelming majority of people did not believe that the US would close down the PKK camps in the northern Iraq.³⁰⁶

In addition, Giray Sadık emphasized the economic dimensions of Turkish anti-Americanism. He found some positive correlation between increasing U.S military

³⁰² Emre Erdoğan, “The Missing Element: Turkish Public Opinion towards the US”, *Turkish Policy Quarterly*, 2005, Vol. 4, No. 1, p. 13 [online edition, page numbers refer to pdf download]

³⁰³ F. Stephen Larrabee, “Troubled Partnership US-Turkish Relations in an Era of Global Geopolitical Change”, *Rand Corporation*, 2010, p. 42

³⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 42

³⁰⁵ Banu Eligür, “Turkish-American Relations Since the 2003 Iraqi War: A Troubled Partnership”, *Middle East Brief*, May 2006, No. 6, p. 2

³⁰⁶ 2006 International Strategic Research Organization (USAK) poll cited in Eligur p.2.

assistance to Turkey and rise of favorable Turkish public opinion toward the US on the one hand and declining military and economic assistance and declining levels of favorable Turkish public opinion toward the US on the other hand.³⁰⁷ He concludes that while military assistance had a strong positive effect between 2002 and 2006 the economic instruments had a limited and inconsistent effect on Turkish public opinion. The study confirms “the security-based framework of the US –Turkish relations and the very limited capacity of economic instruments.”³⁰⁸

4.8. Conclusion

In the literature, on the one hand, some scholars argue that the anti-Americanism sentiments directly affect decision making processes of countries. On the other hand, it is claimed that “there is little evidence that the remarkable rise in anti-Americanism registered by the Pew and other surveys since 2003 has translated into significant unwillingness on the part of states to co-operate with the US.”³⁰⁹

In the Turkish case, even though negative public opinion had huge impact in the Parliament’s rejection of the March 2003 Bill refusing to send American troops to Iraq by using Turkish territory or in the unwillingness to send additional military troops to Afghanistan, the following activities of the Turkish government, such as the Parliament’s approval of a second bill which enabled the US aircraft to use Turkish airspace during the Iraqi campaign mere 20 days after the March Bill seem to be supporting the second line of argument.

In this regard, anti-American sentiments in Turkey does not lead to “axis shift” in the Turkish position against the Western powers or specially against the US or it does not turn into hatred against American people and the US itself. Instead, Turkey keeps its enhanced linkage with the US in all significant cooperation areas from military assistance to energy issues. At the time of crises such as March 1 decision or

³⁰⁷ Giray Sadık, *American Image in Turkey: U.S Foreign Policy Dimensions*, Lexington Books, 2009, pp. 75 – 88

³⁰⁸ Ibid., p. 88

³⁰⁹ Michael Wesley, “The Consequences of Anti-Americanism: Does it Matter?” in *Anti-Americanism: History, Causes, Themes Vol. 4*” ed. Brendon O’Connor and Martin Griffiths, Greenwood World Publishing 2007, p. 222

implementation of embargo against Iran, it can be said that Turkey has felt free to act relatively independent with the help of anti-American sentiments which has spread to the majority. By the same token, these policies can be interpreted as unwillingness to cooperate with the US in every single issue as it had done so in the past.

CHAPTER V

THE FIRST TERM OF PRESIDENT BARACK OBAMA

(January 2009 – January 2013)

5.1. Introduction

This chapter will examine how bilateral relations between Turkey and the US and specific foreign policies of the US under President Barack Obama have affected the level of anti-Americanism in Turkey. The chapter will first provide a general outlook of Obama's foreign policy, then will focus on bilateral relations, and lastly, analyze certain critical foreign policy issues that seem to have an impact on Turkish anti-Americanism. Finally, it will offer an analysis on the general trend and development of anti-Americanism in Turkey during Obama's presidency through a comparison to the Bush period.

5.2 The Doctrine of Barack Obama

Barack H. Obama was elected the 44th President of the United States on November 4, 2008, and sworn in on January 20, 2009. His election was significant for many reasons. First of all, his famous slogan 'change we can believe in' attracted many people around the world and gave them hope. With the new concept of "change and hope" the new administration aimed to fix the American image in the world. In this regard, his election created a positive atmosphere not only in the US but also throughout the world. Bush's policies were so disturbing that even the mere fact that he left power created such a positive atmosphere. Many people disliked the policies that George W. Bush pursued, such as unilateralism, ignorance of the world's serious problems such as climate change, and the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Obama

seemed aware of this antipathy and pledged to change the Bush's policies.³¹⁰ For example, to end the war in Iraq was one of Obama's pre-election promises. Cutting taxes for American people, expanding health care and continuing "the real war on terrorism" were other clear promises made by Obama during his election campaign. It is also argued that being the first African-American president may have contributed to the belief that 'change' could be realized. Secondly, he gave a clear sign that he would pursue a different policy than his predecessor regarding the US's major foreign policy challenges, such as Iran's nuclear program or North Korea's nuclear tests. His announcement that he would give priority to dialogue and diplomacy was appreciated by many in the world who disapproved Bush's unilateral rhetoric. Therefore, it is quite necessary to compare George W. Bush's and Barack Obama's foreign policies to analyze whether change or continuity characterizes Obama's period.

Obama defined the four pillars of his administration's foreign policy during his speech at the United Nations General Assembly in 2009 as nonproliferation and disarmament; the promotion of peace and security; the preservation of our planet; and a global economy that advances opportunity for all people.³¹¹ Although Obama has no officially declared doctrine³¹² as his predecessors, many scholars attempted to define one. For instance, Masoud Kazemzadeh bases his definition on six elements. The first one is the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Obama stated in his April 2009 Prague speech that "America's commitment to seek the peace and

³¹⁰ Barkın Kızılkaplan, "Obama, Değişim ve Yeni Dünya'da Türkiye Analizi", *Bilgesam*, 2009, http://www.bilgesam.org/tr/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=382:obama-degisim-ve-yeni-dunyada-turkiye-analizi&catid=98:analizler-abd&Itemid=135, (accessed on 02.07.2013)

³¹¹http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-by-the-President-to-the-United-Nations-General-Assembly, (accessed on 02.07.2013)

³¹²For instance Indyk et. al. state that "In our view there can be no concise definition of an Obama Doctrine to rival George Kennan's 'containment,' John Kennedy's 'bear any burden', Richard Nixon's détente, Ronald Reagan's 'morning in America,' or George W. Bush's preemption paradigm ad freedom agenda." Martin S. Indyk, Kenneth G. Lieberthal, Micheal E. O'Hanlon, *Bending History Barack Obama's Foreign Policy*, Brookings Institution Press, Washington DC, 2012, p. 275

security of a world without nuclear weapons.”³¹³ In another speech at the UN Security Council in 2009, he remarked that:

A nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. And no matter how great the obstacles may seem, we must never stop our efforts to reduce the weapons of war. We must never stop until all – we must never stop at all until we see the day when nuclear arms have been banished from the face of the Earth.³¹⁴

This policy shows itself in the attempt to prevent nuclear-armed Iran or to prevent North Korea from selling its nuclear technology to the other states. The proliferation of nuclear arms was aimed to be realized through both bilateral agreements with Russia and multilateral pacts with other nations.

Second pillar is fighting against violent extremist groups such as Al Qaeda with the aim of dismantling, disrupting and defeating Al Qaeda in Afghanistan and elsewhere. Thirdly, it has given priority to multilateral strategies to realize American objectives since the current international system is regarded as multipolar. According to President Obama, a rule-based international system is preferable. He has highlighted the importance of international law, norms and institutions. He once stated that “international law is not an empty promise, and treaties will be enforced.”³¹⁵ By saying this Obama proves that in his tenure, international law and peaceful international relations would be on the top of his list. Nuh Yılmaz states that one of the major features of Obama’s diplomacy is prominence given to dialogue and communication. In this manner, it can be put forward that Barack Obama brings courtesy back to the American diplomacy.³¹⁶ Yet it should be remembered that not everyone in the US is happy with Obama’s multilateralist policies. For instance, Feith and Cropsey argue that “as the American approach to countering the Soviet

³¹³ http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-By-President-Barack-Obama-In-Prague-As-Delivered (accessed on 02.07.2013)

³¹⁴ <http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2009/09/24/international-law-not-empty-promise> (accessed on 02.07.2013)

³¹⁵ <http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2009/09/24/international-law-not-empty-promise>, (accessed on 02.07.2013)

³¹⁶ Nuh Yılmaz, “Obama 2009 Diplomasi Açılımı”, <http://www.setav.org/public/HaberDetay.aspx?Dil=tr&hid=19994&q=obama-2009-diplomasi-acilimi>, (accessed on 12.01.2013)

menace came to be known as the “doctrine of containment,” the Obama Doctrine may come to be known as the “doctrine of self-containment.” Or, perhaps more fitting, given the echo of the foreign-policy approach that governed the Cold War, the “doctrine of constraintment.”³¹⁷

Fourth, the primary tactic of the Obama administration is called bigger carrots and bigger sticks. It means that on the one side of the coin, the new administration aims to give much more place to others than previous governments did. But on the other side of the coin, it means that if a state does not follow the rules, it would face harsher punishments until it becomes well-behaved and respects international rules.³¹⁸

Fifth one is promotion of soft power and pursuing policies and adopting a rhetoric to enhance “soft power”. As it is discussed in chapter two, anti-Americanism and soft power are reasonably related to each other. Therefore, the administration has worked hard on reducing anti-Americanism around the world and restoring American image by using soft power. There are numerous examples on this issue including his speech in Cairo University and Turkish Grand National Assembly in which Obama highlighted that the US was not a war with Islam and the Muslim world. As Kalin says “in many ways, President Obama is starting with regaining America’s moral legitimacy by using elements of soft power.”³¹⁹

Finally, the new administration has embraced the role of democracy, freedom and human rights as integral parts of American foreign policy.³²⁰ Obama seems to adopt Democratic Peace Theory which contends that democracies do not go to war with one other. He addressed in Nobel Prize Speech that America has never fought a war

³¹⁷ Douglas J. Feith and Seth Cropsey, “The Obama Doctrine Defined”, *Commentary*, July /August 2011, p. 12

³¹⁸ Masoud Kazemzadeh, “The Emerging Obama Doctrine”, *American Foreign Policy Interests*, 2010, No. 32, p. 194

³¹⁹ Ibrahim Kalin, “ US-Turkish Relations under Obama: Promise, Challenge and Opportunity in the 21st Century”, *Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies*, March 2010, Vol. 12, No. 1, p. 95

³²⁰ Masoud Kazemzadeh, “The Emerging Obama Doctrine”, *American Foreign Policy Interests*, 2010, No.32, p. 195

against a democracy, and our closest friends are governments that protect the rights of their citizens.³²¹

In the light of these elements, one can easily argue that under President Obama, the United States would no longer attempt to dictate its interests to others or act unilaterally, assuming that other states would simply fall in line. In making more room for other powers, Obama would also seek to reform American power. There would be a greater focus on diplomacy and engagement, including with rouge states such as Iran and North Korea.³²²

Some scholars defined Obama's approach as "moderate realism."³²³ It is because when he deals with the issues, he prefers to use the means of politics and diplomacy instead of military or other means of hard power. On the other hand some believed Obama's foreign policy is a combination of the realist's pragmatic approach and the idealist's progressive approach which makes him a hybrid president.³²⁴ This can be called as progressive pragmatist. His efforts to reduce nuclear danger, fight against climate change and poverty make him progressive. Shortly, Obama has proven to be progressive where possible but pragmatic when necessary.³²⁵

According to Henry Nau, in his first year Obama tried to address way too many foreign policy crises on the globe. He followed a start over policy with Russia, has dealt with Afghanistan, Iraq, North Korea, and Iran. He aimed to reconcoliate the US relations with the Muslim world- a prime example of this was his Cairo speech. He has also dealt with economic recovery, climate change. "He rarely indicated which

³²¹ http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/2009/obama-lecture_en.html, (accessed on 12.01.2013)

³²² Martin S. Indyk, Kenneth G. Lieberthal, Micheal E. O'Hanlon, *Bending History Barack Obama's Foreign Policy*, Brookings Institution Press, Washington DC, 2012, p. 12

³²³ Lusane Clarence "We Must Lead the World: The Obama Doctrine and the Re-branding of U.S. Hegemony", *The Black Scholar*, Spring 2008, Vol. 38, No. 1, p. 35

³²⁴ Martin S. Indyk, Kenneth G. Lieberthal and Micheal E. O'Hanlon, *Bending History Barack Obama's Foreign Policy*, Brookings Institution Press, Washington DC, 2012, p. 3

³²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 3

problem was more important than another and bounced from topic to topic and region to region. In this sense, Obama is clearly pragmatic.”³²⁶

This assessment is supported by Feith and Cropsey as well. They highlight that “Obama’s national-security policies seem to be an ideological hodgepodge—sometimes philosophically “realist” (emphasizing power and practical interests) and sometimes “idealist” (supporting the spread of freedom).”³²⁷ In this manner, it is also set forth that Obama is component pragmatist.³²⁸

In this regard, Obama has spoken openly about the task of relationship rebuilding, but while his words may suggest a multilateral approach, his focus has been very much on US global leadership³²⁹

To explain this view, it is better to have a look at Obama’s speech that he gave in 2007,

To renew American leadership in the world, I intend to rebuild the alliances, partnerships, and institutions necessary to confront common threats and enhance common security. Needed reform of these alliances and institutions will not come by bullying other countries to ratify changes we hatch in isolation. It will come when we convince other governments and peoples that they, too, have a stake in effective partnerships . . . America cannot meet the threats of this century alone, and the world cannot meet them without America . . . We must lead the world, by deed and by example.³³⁰

According to Allan Watson, notwithstanding all idealist and progressive speeches and actions due to the need for the emergence of a new world order, because of decline in the US hegemony, economically and politically, “it is difficult to see how one man, no matter how well supported, can change well-practiced unilateral US foreign policies or solve deep-rooted national anxieties. Therefore the fundamental

³²⁶ Henry R. Nau, “Obama’s Foreign Policy”, *Policy Review*, April-May 2010, No. 160

³²⁷ Douglas J. Feith and Seth Cropsey, “The Obama Doctrine Defined” *Commentary*, July-August 2011, p. 16

³²⁸ Martin S. Indyk, Kenneth G. Lieberthal and Micheal E. O’Hanlon, *Bending History Barack Obama’s Foreign Policy*, Brookings Institution Press, Washington DC, 2012, p. 23

³²⁹ Allan Watson, “US Hegemony and the Obama Administration: Towards a New World Order?”, *Antipode*, Vol. 42, No. 2, p. 243

³³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 243

principles of US engagement with the rest of the world will change very little under an Obama-led US administration.”³³¹

Similar to this argument, some claimed that there is much in common between Barack Obama and his predecessor; “many policies have been sustained or modified only modestly, notwithstanding Obama’s determination to set a different course.”³³²

It can be argued however that, Obama aimed to bring a new breath to the US foreign policy. But it seems that “change” was more in rhetoric rather than in action or implementation of foreign policy. However, the world problems cannot be solved easily due to change in just the rhetoric of the world’s most powerful state’s leader. Yet the confidence in Obama has declined across the world. Many people believe that he did not meet the expectations.

5.3 Barack Obama’s Policy towards Turkey

In national security strategy paper, which is signed by newly elected Barack Obama in 2010, it is stated “We will continue to engage with Turkey on a broad range of mutual goals, especially with regard to pursuit of stability in its region.”³³³

Apparently, Barack Obama gave priority to repair highly damaged US – Turkish relations. Many saw Obama’s visit to Turkey in 2009 as the last stop of his trip to Europe as a sign of this policy. He stated the importance of Turkey as follows:

I came here to reaffirm the importance of Turkey and the importance of the partnership between our two countries. I came here out of my respect to Turkey's democracy and culture and my belief that Turkey plays a critically important role in the region and in the world.³³⁴

In analyzing the reasons for why Obama included Turkey to this important trip, Bal claimed that it was because of the importance of Turkey’s geostrategic position, the

³³¹ Ibid., p. 245

³³² Martin S. Indyk, Kenneth G. Lieberthal and Micheal E. O’Hanlon, *Bending History Barack Obama’s Foreign Policy*, Brookings Institution Press, Washington DC, 2012, p. 259

³³³ National Security Strategy, May 2010, <http://nssarchive.us/NSSR/2010.pdf>, (accessed on 12.02.2013)

³³⁴ http://turkey.usembassy.gov/statements_040709.html, (accessed on 12.02.2013)

way Turkey dealt with the problems in its region and its ability to say no when the events took place against its interests.³³⁵

During this trip, according to Larrabee, Obama succeeded in setting a new tone in bilateral relations and displayed a strong appreciation of the complexity of the domestic and foreign policy challenges that Turkey faced.³³⁶ Ömer Taşpınar claimed that Obama's visit to Turkey proved that, in political sense, the new administration would respect Turkish need such as being treated as a very important ally by the US.³³⁷ Furthermore according to Şanlı Bahadır Koç, this visit can be interpreted as a shift from Bush administration's policy on Turkey. Since the relations between two countries during the Bush administration was one of the lowest periods in bilateral relations which then reflected the public opinion as well, with highest anti-Americanism rates.³³⁸

For some, one of the reasons for Obama administration's new Turkey policy was economic problems. Since Obama took the office, the US was in one of the most crucial financial and economic crisis in its history. To overcome this trouble, they tried to reduce public spending which included foreign expenditures, such as the cost of Iraq and Afghanistan wars. Therefore multilateral policies and efficient diplomacy were seen the most preferable tools to balance the economy.³³⁹

During this visit while giving a speech at the Grand National Assembly of Turkey on April 6, 2009, Obama called the Turkish-American relationship as "model partnership":

³³⁵ İhsan Bal, "Obama Türkiye'de", 06.04.2009, <http://www.usakgundem.com/yazar/1159/obama-t%C3%BCrkiye%E2%80%99de-.html>, (accessed on 12.02.2013)

³³⁶ F. Stephen Larrabee, "Troubled Partnership US-Turkish Relations in an Era of Global Geopolitical Change", *Rand Corporation*, 2010, p. 135

³³⁷ http://www.brookings.edu/multimedia/video/2009/0331_turkey_taspinar.aspx, (accessed on 30.08.2013)

³³⁸ Şanlı Bahadır Koç, "Obama'nın Türkiye Gezisi ve Türk-Amerikan İlişkileri", 21. Yüzyıl Türkiye Enstitüsü, 19.03.2009, <http://www.21yyte.org/uzmanlar/sanli-bahadir-koc?page=3&pp=10>, (accessed on 30.08.2013)

³³⁹ Sedat Laçiner, "Obama Döneminde ABD'nin Türkiye Politikası", 10.03.2009, www.usak.org.tr, (accessed on 30.08.2013)

I think where there's the most promise is in the idea that Turkey and the United States can build a model partnership in which a majority Christian and a majority Muslim nation, a Western nation and a nation that straddles two continents -- that we can create a modern international community that is respectful, secure and prosperous. This is extremely important. One of the strengths of the US is that we have a Christian population, but we feel ourselves a nation of citizens. Modern Turkey was built on similar values as a secular country respecting religious freedom, rule of law and all freedoms. We are going to deliver this message to the world.³⁴⁰

Afterwards, Turkish Prime Minister Erdoğan used the concept twice in his speech at the meeting with Obama on December 7, 2009. He said:

The fact that the President visited Turkey on his first overseas trip and that he described and characterized Turkish-US relations as a model partnership have been very important for us politically and in the process that we all look forward to in the future as well. And important steps are now being taken in order to continue to build on our bilateral relations so as to give greater meaning to the term model partnership. Of course, there are many sides to the development of this relationship, be it in the economic area, in the areas of science, art, technology, political areas, and military areas.³⁴¹

In explaining what model partnership is Nuh Yılmaz argued that although it is not a clear-cut and well-developed concept, it signals the need to change the old framework as the old model, i.e. strategic partnership had damaged bilateral relations. According to him, the model does not symbolize current relations but “‘model partnership’ is the ‘will to redefine’ bilateral relations. As such, I will treat it as an ‘empty signifier,’ i.e. ‘a signifier without signified’.”³⁴²

On the other hand, Stephen J. Flanagan, argued that the model partnership shows that countries have convergent interests. He stated that the stability in the Middle East is for the benefit of the two countries. Additionally both countries aim to counter terrorism and extremism, secure energy flows and continue to fruitful relations with Europe. Furthermore, stability and sovereignty in the Caucasus and Central Asia are

³⁴⁰ http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-By-President-Obama-To-The-Turkish-Parliament, (accessed on 20.05.2013)

³⁴¹ “Remarks by President Obama and Prime Minister Erdoğan of Turkey after Meeting”, 07.12.2009, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-obama-and-prime-minister-erdogan-turkey-after-meeting>, (accessed on 10.03.2013)

³⁴² Nuh Yılmaz, “U.S.- Turkey Relations: Model Partnership as an ‘Empty Signifier’”, *Insight Turkey*, 2011, Vol. 13, No. 1, p. 20

among the priorities of the two. However, he reminded that mistrust and suspicion during Bush years which was mainly caused by the Iraqi war prevented two countries to act on mutual interests.³⁴³

The character of the partnership is expressed by Mehmet Yegin as follows, although there are many non-consensus issues between two countries, they constitute a framework in which the allies continue to cooperate in areas that overlap with common interests. In this manner, the partnership can be called as “selective partnership” which is carried out through concentrating on common interests by isolating problematic areas. So that, while two countries have different approaches with regard to Iran and Israel, they can still continue to cooperate in areas such as transformation in Arab world, combating terrorism and NATO’s missile shield project.³⁴⁴

Nevertheless, according to many intellectuals, improvement in relations between two countries which is even described as model partnership did not reach the level expected. Due to the deterioration in relations between Israel and Turkey, so called Mavi Marmara crisis in particular, and more importantly policies pursued by Turkey regarding Iran’s nuclear program which has not overlapped with the Western countries led to deterioration in relations. In this manner, according to Çağrı Erhan, Iran and Israel have become the two sources that poison the relations between two allies. He even claimed that the concept of model partnership is about to become obsolete.³⁴⁵

Mavi Marmara Flotilla incident was one of the critical events that harmed Turkish-American relations during Obama’s presidency. On May 31, 2010 a crisis occurred when Turkish Humanitarian Relief Fund’s six-ship flotilla sailed to transport humanitarian assistance to Gaza. The ships were prevented by the Israel naval special

³⁴³ Stephen J. Flanagan, “The United States and Turkey: A model Partnership”, *Center for Strategic and International Studies*, 14.05.2009, p.1

³⁴⁴ Mehmet Yegin, “Obama, Türkiye’ye Predatörleri Vere(bile)cek mi?”, 30.09.2011, <http://www.usakgundem.com/yazar/2251/obama-t%C3%BCrkiye%E2%80%99ye-predat%C3%B6rleri-vere-bile-cek-mi.html>, (accessed on 10.03 2013)

³⁴⁵ Çağrı Erhan, “Model Ortaklık Demode Oluyor”, 17.06.2010, http://www.usak.org.tr/analiz_det.php?id=6&cat=365781#.UjysY9Lwn1w, (accessed on 10.03 2013)

forces from reaching Gaza. Israeli forces took over the control of the ships as a result of a raid, and killed nine Turkish citizens in international waters.³⁴⁶ Right after the incident, President Obama conveyed his condolences by calling Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. However, Turkish public was not satisfied with the American attitude. Turkey felt disappointment with the US. Many evaluated the incidents that the US was torn between Turkey and Israel and it was time to choose one of them. In this regard, the Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu claimed that “We expect full solidarity with us. It should not seem like a choice between Turkey and Israel. It should be a choice between right and wrong, between legal and illegal.”³⁴⁷ It was a real turning point in the relations between Turkey and Israel. In addition to that, after the incident, the US – Turkish relations became more complicated.³⁴⁸

In addition to problems with Israel, the Armenian issue caused deterioration in relations between Turkey and the US. Especially during Obama period, the issue seemed quite a challenge for Turkey. The Armenian issue is a sensitive one especially when we consider that Obama described the events as genocide during his election campaign. For that reason it is necessary to examine his policy on the Armenian issue in some detail.

When Foreign Relations Committee of the US House of Representatives approved the resolution about Armenian genocide by a vote of 23 to 22 in 2010,³⁴⁹ it was interpreted by Turkey as a behavior which did not suit to the model partnership. Moreover, before Obama took the office, he without any hesitation claimed that the events which took place in 1915 was obviously genocide, he stated that “America

³⁴⁶ Carol Migdalovitz, “Israel’s Blockade of Gaza, the Mavi Marmara Incident, and Its Aftermath”, *Congressional Research Service*, 23.06.2010, p. 1

³⁴⁷ Mark Landler, “U.S. Tries to Keep its Balance between Turkey and Israel,” *New York Times*, 01.06.2010, (accessed on 01.09.2013)

³⁴⁸ Aaron Stein, “Resetting U.S.-Turkish Relations: Charting a New Way Forward”, *Journal of Strategic Security*, Spring 2011, Vol. 4, No. 1, p. 1

³⁴⁹ “Ermeni Tasarısına Onay”, <http://www.ntvmsnbc.com/id/25065074/page/2/>, 05.03.2010, (accessed on 10.03.2013)

deserves a leader who speaks truthfully about the Armenian genocide and responds forcefully to all genocides.”³⁵⁰

Actually history shows us that many American leaders have given pledges to Armenians, before they came to power. But when they came into power, they realized that the issue had many important dimensions and that it was not easy to decide whether events could be labeled as genocide or not. Eventually, they mostly preferred not to use the “genocide” term.

Many in Turkey were afraid that Obama might use the “genocide” term during the traditional April 24 Armenian Commemoration Day speech because of his speeches before he took the office as it was mentioned above. Some interpreted Obama’s visit to Turkey between March 31 and April 7, 2009 as a sign that he would not use the term.³⁵¹ As Obama said at the Turkish Assembly, he did not want to intervene the relations between Armenia and Turkey, but the only thing which Obama administration can expect was normalization of relations. It was obvious that the new administration would make an effort to normalize relations and encourage the parties to try to find a common ground for bilateral relations.

On April, 24 2009 Obama’s first 24 April after he came to power, he indeed did not use the word genocide. Instead, he said “Ninety four years ago, one of the great atrocities of the 20th century began. Each year, we pause to remember the 1.5 million Armenians who were subsequently massacred or marched to their death in the final days of the Ottoman Empire. The Meds Yeghern must live on in our memories, just as it lives on in the hearts of the Armenian people.”³⁵² Since Meds Yeghern (great catastrophe) is the original Armenian term for the events in 1915, the speech did satisfy Turks. Nor did it satisfy Armenians because he refrained to use the term “genocide”.

³⁵⁰ “Obama Declares Turkey Model Partner of Values”, 07.04.2009, <http://www.todayszaman.com/news-171722-obama-declares-turkey-model-partner-of-values.html>, (accessed on 01.09.2013)

³⁵¹ Aybars Görgülü, “Towards a Turkish Armenian Rapproachment?”, *Insight Turkey*, 2009, Vol. 11, No. 2, p. 27

³⁵² “What did President Obama Say on Armenian Remembrance Day of 1915 Events”, 25.04.2009, <http://www.turkishweekly.net/news/74132/what-did-president-obama-say-on-armenian-remembrance-day-of-1915-events.html>, (accessed on 01.09.2013)

In the meantime, there were major steps by the US to help rapprochement between Turkey and Armenia. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton managed to bring the parties together on October 10, 2009. Afterwards some experts argued that it would be more difficult for Obama to use the term genocide because “it would also undermine the recent rapprochement between Turkey and Armenia by emasculating the AKP government’s efforts to normalize relations”³⁵³

In the following years, in all of his statements, Obama described the events as great catastrophe, *Meds Yeghern* in Armenian. For instance on April, 23 2011 Obama said “We solemnly remember the horrific events that took place ninety-six years ago, resulting in one of the worst atrocities of the 20th century. In 1915, 1.5 million Armenians were massacred or marched to their death in the final days of the Ottoman Empire.”³⁵⁴ But at the same time, he underlined the importance of rapprochement between parties in terms of bilateral relations and he also emphasized the USA would support the rapprochement. He also advised both parties to remember their common history.

Apart from traditional April 24 speeches, which could have possibly caused a crisis with Turkey, the most important incident was the resolution on Armenian genocide. It brought the relations to another low point. Before the resolution came to the Foreign Relations Committee of the US House of Representatives and during the voting, Turkey increased its diplomatic efforts in order to prevent the resolution. Many top officials announced that if the resolution passed, it might strain the relations between traditional allies. After the US vote on Armenian genocide, Foreign Minister Davutoğlu declared that describing the 1915 Armenian killings as genocide was an insult to Turkey’s ‘honour’.³⁵⁵ Recalling Namık Tan back to Ankara, Turkish ambassador to Washington, was one of the consequences of the resolution.

³⁵³ Aybars Görgülü, “Towards a Turkish Armenian Rapprochement?”, *Insight Turkey*, 2009, Vol. 11, No. 2, p. 27

³⁵⁴ “Statement by President Obama on Armenian Remembrance Day”, 23.04.2011, http://turkey.usembassy.gov/statements_042311.html, (accessed on 02.03.2013)

³⁵⁵ Robert Tait and Ewen MacAskill, “Turkey Threatens ‘Serious Consequences’ after US vote on Armenian Genocide”, 05.03.2010, <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/mar/05/turkey-us-vote-armenian-genocide>, (accessed on 01.09.2013)

Increasing anti-American sentiment in Turkey was another consequence of the resolution.

5.4 Barack Obama's Policy towards Iran

At the outset of his first election campaign, Obama gave signal that he would prefer to pursue a different policy from his predecessor with regard to Iran's nuclear program by even promising to meet with Iranian leaders. This policy shift apparently intended to repair the damage to America's reputation.³⁵⁶

At his first speech at the UN General Assembly on September 23, 2009, he made clear his understanding with regard to Iran's nuclear program by mentioning Iran and North Korea at the same pot. He stated that:

In their actions to date, the governments of North Korea and Iran threaten to take us down this dangerous slope. We respect their rights as members of the community of nations. I've said before and I will repeat, I am committed to diplomacy that opens a path to greater prosperity and more secure peace for both nations if they live up to their obligations. But if the governments of Iran and North Korea choose to ignore international standards; if they put the pursuit of nuclear weapons ahead of regional stability and the security and opportunity of their own people; if they are oblivious to the dangers of escalating nuclear arms races in both East Asia and the Middle East -- then they must be held accountable. The world must stand together to demonstrate that international law is not an empty promise, and that treaties will be enforced.³⁵⁷

The National Security Report published in 2010 stated the Obama administration's position towards Iran as follows:

The United States will work to prevent Iran from developing a nuclear weapon. This is not about singling out nations—it is about the responsibilities of all nations and the success of the nonproliferation regime. Both nations face a clear choice. If Iran meets its international obligations on its nuclear program, it will be able to proceed on a path to greater political and economic integration with the international community. If it ignores its international obligations, we

³⁵⁶ Suzanne Maloney, "Tehran and Washington A Motionless Relationship?", 2011, http://www.brookings.edu/~media/research/files/articles/2011/11/iran%20maloney/11_iran_maloney.pdf, (accessed on 23.08.2013)

³⁵⁷ http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-by-the-President-to-the-United-Nations-General-Assembly, (accessed on 23.08.2013)

will pursue multiple means to increase its isolation and bring it into compliance with international nonproliferation norms.³⁵⁸

Obama has tried to keep the door of dialogue with Tehran open.³⁵⁹ At the first year of Obama's presidency, he exerted enthusiastic effort to engage Iran with comprehensive diplomatic means.³⁶⁰ He even sent a symbolic message directly to the Iranian citizens and the leaders of the Islamic Republic of Iran to celebrate newroz. In his statement he pointed out that "the USA wants the Islamic Republic of Iran to take its rightful place in the community of nations. You have that right -- but it comes with real responsibilities..." while he mentioned the true greatness of the Iranian people and civilization.³⁶¹

By time, Barack Obama administration has tended to shift its policies on Iran from engagement to coercive measures including so-called "smart-sanctions".³⁶² In 2009, the Congress and the Obama administration approved a new set of US sanctions. It was called the Iran Refined Petroleum Sanctions Act of 2009, which was an amendment to the Clinton-era Iran Sanctions Act of 1996.³⁶³ So, by the end of his first term, Obama returned to pursue harsh economic sanctions against Iran. Therefore, some claimed that "in its embrace of pressure and effort to construct a robust regime of economic sanctions on Iran, the Obama administration built upon a foundation established by the Bush administration. Despite some stylistic differences, the Obama administration has retained the second-term Bush policy

³⁵⁸ National Security Strategy, 2002, <http://Nssarchive.U.S>, (accessed on 13.01.2013)

³⁵⁹ F. Stephen Larrabee, "Troubled Partnership US-Turkish Relations in an Era of Global Geopolitical Change", *Rand Corporation*, 2010, p. 64

³⁶⁰ Suzanne Maloney, "The Challenge of a Nuclear Iran", January 2010, <http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/up-front/posts/2010/01/14-halls-obama#maloney>, (accessed on 23.08.2013)

³⁶¹ <http://www.whitehouse.gov/video/The-Presidents-Message-to-the-Iranian-People/>, (accessed on 23.08.2013)

³⁶² Ömer Taşpınar, "Iran and Turkish-American Relations", February 2010, <http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2010/02/01-turkey-iran-taspinar>, (accessed on 23.08.2013)

³⁶³ Daniel Robicheau, "Sanctions On Iran: What's Missing From Obama's New Dialogue", *Monthly Review*, March 2010, p. 36

framework for Iran.”³⁶⁴ In 2012, just few months before the presidential election, Obama announced new sanctions against Iranian energy and petrochemical sectors by accusing Iranian governments of not meeting its international obligations.³⁶⁵

Bradley A. Thayer summarizes the reasons of Obama’s attempt to prevent nuclear-armed Iran as such “a nuclear-armed Iran will be harder for the United States to coerce. Also, it will be a threat to Washington interests and to the US military and allies in the important Persian Gulf region and will serve as a potential ‘proliferation conduit’ in the future, sharing nuclear technology, fissile material, and nuclear knowledge with other states or terrorists.”³⁶⁶

Turkey and the US remained to have different points of view during the term of President Barack Obama as they did during the period of his predecessor. Turkey kept its position to solve the problem through diplomatic means.

Ömer Taşpınar points to strategic disconnect between Washington and Ankara. According to him, the US regarded sanctions as one way to bring Iran to the table, seeing this as coercive diplomacy. On the contrary, Turkey has regarded sanctions as a path to war which reminds the situation in Iraq started with sanctions and gradually evolved into war.³⁶⁷

In this context, Turkey involved actively in the Iran’s nuclear program issue, after the Director of International Atomic Energy Agency Mohamed El Baradei’s speech on television on November, 8 2009.³⁶⁸ He stated that “until Tehran is supplied with enriched nuclear fuel, Iran’s enriched uranium could be transferred to Turkey, a

³⁶⁴ Suzanne Maloney, "Progress of the Obama Administration’s Policy Toward Iran", 2011, <http://www.brookings.edu/research/testimony/2011/11/15-iran-policy-maloney>, (accessed on 23.08.2013)

³⁶⁵ “Statement on Sanctions Against Iran”, 31.07.2012, <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/DCPD-201200609/html/DCPD-201200609.htm>, (accessed on 23.08.2013)

³⁶⁶ Bradley A. Thayer, “The Continued Relevance of Realism in the age of Obama”, *American Foreign Policy Interests*, January 2010, Vol. 32, No. 1, p. 4

³⁶⁷ Ömer Taşpınar, at the conference on “Turkey and Iran: Assessing the New Regional Diplomacy”, *Brooking Institute*, June 2010

³⁶⁸ Bayram Sinkaya, “İran Nükleer Programı Karşısında Türkiye’nin Tutumu Ve Uranyum Takası Mutabakatı”, *Ortadoğu Analiz*, July 2010, Vol. 2, No. 18, p. 70

country trusted both by Iran and the West.”³⁶⁹ Subsequently, Baradey’s suggestion was supported by Russia and the US. Turkey welcomed this suggestion, as well. Minister of Foreign Affairs Ahmet Davutoğlu made six official visits to Tehran and his counterpart Muttaki performed five official visits in order to find a solution to uranium exchange issue. Furthermore, there were many telephone conversations between Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and President Obama, Chancellor of Germany Angela Merkel and Iranian officials. Obama restated his support for a proposal by the International Atomic Energy Agency that would try to steer Iran into developing nuclear energy for peaceful, civilian purposes.³⁷⁰

On April 20, 2009 Obama wrote a three-page letter with regard to initiative to the President of Brazil, Lula da Silva, who got involved mediation process between Iran and the West in order find a solution to Iran’s uranium exchange issue.

In the meantime, Prime Minister Erdoğan emphasized that Ankara did not want to see any nuclear weapons in the Middle East. He noted that Israel should sign Non-Proliferation Treaty and go nuclear-free in his interview with Christiane Amanpour on April 13, 2010. He stated that;

I have raised this issue several times...If we are going to employ a policy of justice in order to achieve peace, we must talk about these matters and every country must handle this issue in a fair manner. Iran cannot be the only country on the agenda, just like Israel cannot be the only country on the agenda.³⁷¹

Thanks to all diplomatic efforts by Turkey and Brazil; Turkey, Iran and Brazil signed the Joint Declaration on May 17, 2010 in Tehran, reinstating the commitment to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and in accordance with the related articles of the NPT. According to this declaration, the Islamic Republic of Iran agreed to deposit 1200 kg low-enriched-uranium in Turkey.³⁷²

³⁶⁹ <http://www.todayszaman.com/news-192403-iaea-chief-iran-should-store-enriched-uranium-in-turkey.html>, (accessed on 01.08.2013)

³⁷⁰ http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/25/world/americas/25brazil.html?_r=0, (accessed on 01.08.2013)

³⁷¹ “CNN’s Amanpour: An Interview with the Turkish Prime Minister”, 13.04.2009, <http://edition.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/1004/13/ampr.01.html>, (accessed on 01.08.2013)

³⁷² <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/questions.en.mfa>, (accessed on 01.08.2013)

New York Times argued that the letter from Obama to Lula prepared the ground for the Tehran initiative.³⁷³ However, subsequently, the US criticized the Joint Declaration and proposed new sanctions against Iran at the United Nations. On July 9, 2010 Turkey and Brazil as rotating members of the UN Security Council voted against the UN Security Council Resolution 1929 which imposed further sanctions on Iran. On the same day, Vienna group³⁷⁴ gave its official answer to Iran and IAEA pointing that the Joint Declaration was positive step but it was not enough. Thus, they refused the Tehran Declaration.³⁷⁵ On the one hand, these reactions caused disappointment in Turkey and Brazil. Turkey accused the US of not involving actively to diplomatic solution. On the other hand, Turkey was criticized by the US due to its vote at the UN. Noam Chomsky argued that

Obama had praised the initiative in a letter to Brazil's president Lula da Silva, apparently on the assumption that it would fail and provide a propaganda weapon against Iran. When it succeeded, the US was furious, and quickly undermined it by ramming through a Security Council resolution with new sanctions against Iran that were so meaningless that China cheerfully joined at once – recognizing that at most the sanctions would impede Western interests in competing with China for Iran's resources.³⁷⁶

Nevertheless, Barack Obama's policy was different from Bush's policies towards Iran, which focused only on increasing sanctions. On the contrary to Bush's approach, Obama attempted to engage Iran regarding its nuclear program.³⁷⁷ But from the Turkish perspective, American actions following the Turkish-Brazilian deal were disappointing to say the least. For instance, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan said that the UN Security Council Resolution 1929 was a mistake, and that

³⁷³ "Obama Silva'ya Nisan'da Mektup Gönderdi", 28.05.2010, <http://www.haberturk.com/dunya/haber/518522-obama-silvaya-nisanda-mektup-gonderdi>, (accessed on 01.08.2013)

³⁷⁴ The Vienna Group consists of the United States, Russia, and France and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)

³⁷⁵ Bayram Sinkaya, "İran Nükleer Programı Karşısında Türkiye'nin Tutumu Ve Uranyum Takası Mutabakatı", *Ortadoğu Analiz*, July 2010, Vol. 2 No. 18, p. 77

³⁷⁶ "Misinterpreting Obama's Letter to Lula da Silva on the Tehran Declaration", 01.06.2010, <http://www.jeremyhammond.com/2010/07/01/misinterpreting-obamas-letter-to-lula-da-silva-on-the-tehran-declaration/>, (accessed on 01.05.2013)

³⁷⁷ Kenneth Katzman, "The Iran Sanctions Act (ISA)", *Congressional Research Service*, 2009, p. 3

he intended to continue to pursue a diplomatic solution to the crisis.³⁷⁸ Minister of Foreign Affairs claimed “I would not describe the Tehran Joint Declaration as a matter of success or failure. It was rather a missed opportunity on the part of the international community in achieving a breakthrough in the longstanding diplomatic rift with Iran.”³⁷⁹

5.5 Barack Obama’s Policy towards Afghanistan

Obama gave many promises during the election campaign. One of his promises was restarting the “War on Terror.” He reiterated that the new administration would not embrace the rhetoric of previous administration and its policies. Instead, the new administration would focus on a new counterterrorism strategy, which was “more morally acceptable, more focused and more effective.”³⁸⁰ He also promised during his election campaign that he would end the ‘distraction’ of the Iraq war. In his speeches, he compared Iraq war to Afghanistan war, arguing that the former war was unnecessary, whereas the latter one was necessary and important in order to be safe at home. For instance, in 2008 he stated that the war in Iraq was a "dangerous distraction", so emphasis must be placed on the battle in Afghanistan.³⁸¹

In other words, Obama made a clear distinction between war in Afghanistan and the war in Iraq. For him, the war in Afghanistan was a war of necessity. He also made clear that the war in Afghanistan could not be won by military power alone but diplomacy, development and good governance were needed as well.³⁸² Yet he immediately decided to increase the number of troops in Afghanistan. Obama signed

³⁷⁸ Yitzhak Benhorin, “US disappointed in Turkey, Brazil vote”, 06.11.2010, <http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3903541,00.html>, (accessed on 01.05.2013)

³⁷⁹ http://www.mfa.gov.tr/interview-by-mr_-ahmet-davuto%C4%9Flu-published-in-auc-cairo-review-_egypt_-on-12-march-2012.en.mfa, (accessed on 01.05.2013)

³⁸⁰ Trevor Mccrisken, “Ten Years on: Obama's War on Terrorism in Rhetoric and Practice”, *International Affairs*, July 2011, Vol. 87, No. 4, p. 781

³⁸¹ “Obama Calls Iraq War a 'Dangerous Distraction'”, 15.07.2008, <http://edition.cnn.com/2008/POLITICS/07/15/obama.iraq/>, (accessed on 01.08.2013)

³⁸² Elizabeth Williamson and Peter Spiegel, “Obama Says Afghan War 'of Necessity'”, 17.08.2009, <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB125054391631638123.html>, (accessed on 01.08.2013)

an order on February 18, 2009 to send 17.000 additional troops to Afghanistan announcing that the situation in Afghanistan needed urgent attention.³⁸³

The decision of sending additional troops to Afghanistan were interpreted as a sign that military-based solutions were still seen as primary for the region as they were in George W. Bush term. With the second surge, he increased the number of troops even more. Obama made a speech on December 1, 2009 at United States Military Academy at West Point. During his speech he mentioned innocent people who were killed in 9/11 events, the US efforts to end this war responsibly, how the Iraq war led to worsen the situation the war in Afghanistan. The most important part of his speech was the part that he announced additional 30.000 troops to Afghanistan to help Afghan forces establish security. He stated that these troops would deploy in the first part of 2010. He also claimed that some of US allies have already approved to send additional troops to the Afghanistan³⁸⁴, which meant the US, would continue to work together with international actors to solve the problem in Afghanistan. After this call, NATO's Secretary General announced that NATO would contribute 5.000-7.000 additional troops to Afghanistan.³⁸⁵

In the meantime, Obama administration designed a new strategy considering Afghanistan. Obama's Security Advisor James Jones declared AfPak strategy on March 27, 2009 which meant that the US would focus on Pakistan, along with Afghanistan, in fighting against terrorism in the new era.³⁸⁶ He emphasized that "we will pursue intensive regional diplomacy involving all key players in South Asia and engage countries in a new trilateral framework as – at the highest levels of the countries, being Afghanistan, Pakistan and the United States. "Together in this trilateral format, we will work to enhance intelligence sharing, military cooperation along the border, and address common issues such as trade, energy and economic

³⁸³ Andrew Gray, "Obama Orders 17,000 U.S. Troops to Afghanistan", 18.02.2009, <http://uk.reuters.com/article/2009/02/18/us-usa-afghan-troops-idUKTRE51G6F920090218>, (accessed on 01.08.2013)

³⁸⁴ <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-address-nation-way-forward-afghanistan-and-pakistan>, (accessed on 01.08.2013)

³⁸⁵ Sevinç Alkan Özcan, "Turkish Foreign Policy Towards Afghanistan: 2009-2010", *Perceptions*, 2010, Vol. 15, No. 3-4, p. 138

³⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 137

development.”³⁸⁷ In this strategy, the future of Afghanistan was seen directly related to the future of its neighbor Pakistan. Obama announced clearly the main aim of the US in the region: “we have a clear and focused goal: to disrupt, dismantle and defeat al Qaeda in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and to prevent their return to either country in the future.”³⁸⁸

Furthermore, in the National Security Strategy Report in 2010, Obama summarized his Afghanistan strategy by stating “in Afghanistan, we must deny al-Qaida a safe haven, deny the Taliban the ability to overthrow the government, and strengthen the capacity of Afghanistan’s security forces and government so that they can take lead responsibility for Afghanistan’s future.”³⁸⁹

President Obama embraced a new expanded version of CIA’s drone programs and placed this policy at the center of his counterterrorism policy. The number of drone strikes dramatically increased under Barack Obama presidency.³⁹⁰ These drone attacks caused death of many innocent civilians and met with anger in local communities and increased anti-American sentiment among the Pakistani public.³⁹¹ According to the Pew Research Center’s survey, sixty-eight percent of the respondents in Pakistan opposed to the US drone strikes and seventy-four percentages of the respondents believed that these attacks killed too many innocent people.³⁹²

³⁸⁷ “What’s New in the Strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan”, <http://www.marshallcenter.org/mcpublicweb/MCDocs/files/College/usafgpakwpe.pdf>, (accessed on 01.05.2013)

³⁸⁸ “Remarks by the President on a New Strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan”, 27.03.2009, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-by-the-President-on-a-New-Strategy-for-Afghanistan-and-Pakistan, (accessed on 01.05.2013)

³⁸⁹ National Security Strategy, 2002, [Http://Nssarchive.Us](http://Nssarchive.Us), p. 20, (accessed on 13.01.2013)

³⁹⁰ “The Drone War in Pakistan”, <http://natsec.newamerica.net/drones/pakistan/analysis>, (accessed on 13.01.2013)

³⁹¹ Hillel Ofek, “The Tortured Logic of Obama’s Drone War”, *The New Atlantis*, Spring 2010, p. 38

³⁹² <http://www.pewglobal.org/2013/05/07/on-eve-of-elections-a-dismal-public-mood-in-pakistan/>, (accessed on 25.06.2013)

Therefore, Obama was accused of not keeping his promises regarding not to implement his predecessor's immoral policies on countering global terrorism.³⁹³

Meanwhile, in accordance with the "2001 Authorization for the use of Military Force-AUMF", the US Special Forces started to be more active in the region in the framework of kill/capture mission.³⁹⁴ As a prime example of this, ten years after 9/11 events the leader of Al-Qaeda, Osama Bin Laden, was killed as part of the kill-capture missions on May 2, 2011.³⁹⁵

Subsequently, Obama declared in June 2011 that the US troops would leave Afghanistan, 10,000 US troops was scheduled to leave Afghanistan by the end of the year, and an additional 23,000 by 2012.³⁹⁶ Eventually, the remaining troops are expected to leave by the end of 2014.³⁹⁷

Obama seemed to realize fighting against terrorism was not unilateral process, instead, cooperation with international actors and getting them involved in Afghanistan problem could provide better results for American policies. In this regard, Obama called for international community and NATO allies' more active involvement to the war in Afghanistan. When compared with his predecessor Bush's unilateral policies, the Obama administration seemed to follow more cooperative policies in international politics in general and in Afghanistan in particular.

Within this context, from the beginning of the Obama administration, Turkey was asked to take part in armed conflicts in Afghanistan. It was one of the most critical foreign policy issues for Turkey at the outset of Obama administration. Turkey was first asked to send additional combat forces to Afghanistan during the NATO

³⁹³ Hillel Ofek, "The Tortured Logic of Obama's Drone War", *The New Atlantis*, Spring 2010, p. 35

³⁹⁴ Jonathan Masters, "Targeted Killings", 23.05.2013, <http://www.cfr.org/counterterrorism/targeted-killings/p9627>, (accessed on 16.06.2013)

³⁹⁵ "Remarks By President on Osama Bin Laden ", 02.05.2011, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2011/05/02/osama-bin-laden-dead>, (accessed on 16.06.2013)

³⁹⁶ "The war in Afghanistan", http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/the_war_in_afghanistan, (accessed on 23.08.2013)

³⁹⁷ "Remarks by President Obama in Address to the Nation from Afghanistan", 01.05.2012, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/05/01/remarks-president-address-nation-afghanistan>, (accessed on 16.06.2013)

Summit in Washington and Obama's visit to Turkey in 2009 within the framework of AFPak Strategy. In the same year, the US Ambassador to Turkey, James Jeffrey stated that the US and Turkey discussed to send more Turkish troops to Afghanistan by highlighting that every soldier in Afghanistan was combat soldier in the sense that everybody had to carry a weapon. He also added "We're expecting flexibility on the definition of the mission Turkish troops will undertake."³⁹⁸ Moreover, Secretary of State Hilary Clinton answered to the question whether the US demanded additional troops from Turkey during an interview with Mehmet Ali Birand during her visit to Turkey in 2009.

We are going to discuss that, and that's something that will be up to the Turkish Government. But I remember the first time I went to Afghanistan as a senator in 2003; I was met by a Turkish general. And Turkish soldiers have been very courageous and have fought and died with American soldiers in Afghanistan.³⁹⁹

Turkey's position regarding the war in Afghanistan was not to take part in combat fighting. Turkey as a NATO ally contributed training activities and reconstruction of Afghanistan. As a response to this request, Turkey did not change its previous position and emphasized that 1.750 Turkish troops had already deployed in Afghanistan. Turkey was determined not to send combat troops to Afghanistan.⁴⁰⁰ Instead, Turkey tried to establish peace and stability in the region by increasing its diplomatic efforts in 2009 and 2010. So, Turkey remained loyal to its policy not to provide additional troops for military operation while allowing the USA to use Turkey's airspace and airports.⁴⁰¹ Moreover, Turkey cooperated with the US and allied forces in training activities and construction of number of civilian facilities. Turkey always repeated that "if a military operation were to happen, instead of

³⁹⁸ Ibon Villeda, "Iran, Afghanistan to Test Turkish-U.S. Ties", 04.12.2009, <http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/12/04/us-turkey-usa-idUSTRE5B24OE20091204>, (accessed on 17.08.2013)

³⁹⁹ "Interview with Mehmet Ali Birand of Kanal D TV", 07.03.2009, <http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2009a/03/120125.htm>, (accessed on 17.08.2013)

⁴⁰⁰ Sevinç Alkan Özcan, "Turkish Foreign Policy Towards Afghanistan: 2009-2010", *Perceptions*, 2010, Vol. 15, No. 3-4, p. 144

⁴⁰¹ *Ibid.*, p. 134

providing troops, it would provide military education and intelligence aid to the Northern Alliance forces.”⁴⁰²

5.6 Barack Obama’s Policy towards Iraq

Barack Obama built his election campaign against Bush’s policies in general and his policy towards Iraq in particular. He strongly criticized the war in Iraq by describing it as unnecessary. He declared that “we will begin to responsibly leave Iraq to its people.”⁴⁰³ Following his inauguration, he directed his national security team to start to work on Iraq. During his first visit to Iraq as Commander in Chief he stated “it is time for us to transition to the Iraqis. They need to take responsibility for their country and for their sovereignty.” In August 2010, Obama announced that it was the end of combat mission in Iraq and the US would remove all its troops from Iraq by the end of 2011. He promised a responsible withdrawal from Iraq and that the US would help Iraqi people to build a stable Iraq as he pointed out in his every speech.⁴⁰⁴

In fact, the decision of withdrawal from Iraq was made by Bush administration in 2008 based on the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA). Therefore it is fair to say that the new Obama administration sustained and speeded up the decision to withdraw from Iraq that had already been made.

From the Turkish perspective, after 2003 US-led war in Iraq, the relations between Turkey and Iraq deteriorated. Turkey did not easily have diplomatic relations with Iraq because of President Celal Talabani’s Kurdish identity and his position towards PKK which were deployed in the northern Iraq. Since 2009, Turkey changed this policy orientation and started to work and cooperate with Iraq in order to help its reconstruction and stabilization. In this regard, intensive and high level visits began including President Gül’s, Erdoğan’s and Davutoğlu’s visits to Baghdad in 2009.⁴⁰⁵

⁴⁰² Ibid., p. 135

⁴⁰³ <http://www.whitehouse.gov/iraq#third>, (accessed on 01.12.2013)

⁴⁰⁴ <http://www.whitehouse.gov/iraq#third>, (accessed on 01.12.2013)

⁴⁰⁵ Ramazan Gözen, “Turkish-American Relations in 2009”, *Perceptions*, 2010, Vol. 15, No. 3-4, p. 63

The reason of the policy shift in Turkey might be the need for protecting its interests after the expected withdrawal of the US military forces.⁴⁰⁶

Turkey's main concerns on Iraq issue were establishment of an autonomous Kurdish State beyond its border and the PKK problem. The willingness to solve the latter one was demonstrated by Iraqi leaders. During Abdullah Gül's visit to Baghdad, Celal Talabani said that there were two options for PKK, either laying down their arms or leaving Iraq.⁴⁰⁷ He also stated that "Iraq's Constitution forbids the existence of armed groups, the PKK along with others, and we are currently working towards this aim on the tripartite committee" which was consisted of Iraq, Turkey and the United States.

The formation of a Turkey-US-Iraq Trilateral Security Mechanism was an important sign that proved Turkey and the US would cooperate in the Iraq's future. It actually showed that the US and Turkey was working on Turkey's long-standing PKK problem. In addition to the cooperation between Turkey and the US, Iraq government started to get involved into this cooperation.⁴⁰⁸

5.7 Anti-Americanism in Turkey during the term of President Barack Obama

From the very outset of the Obama administration, the US policy towards Turkey focused on fixing bilateral relations, which were highly damaged in the previous term and on winning Turkish hearts and minds. In his speeches, Obama highlighted that he was aware of the deterioration and the loss of confidence between the US and Turkey. For instance, in his visit to Turkey, at Turkish Grand National Assembly,

⁴⁰⁶ Mesut Özcan, "Turkish Foreign Policy Towards Iraq in 2009", *Perceptions* 2010, Vol. 15, No. 3-4, p. 115

⁴⁰⁷ Paul de Bearn, "Disarm or Leave, Iraq's Talabani Tells PKK", 23.03.2009, <http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/03/23/us-iraq-turkey-idUSTRE52M38O20090323>, (accessed on 13.08.2013)

⁴⁰⁸ Mesut Özcan, "Turkish Foreign Policy Towards Iraq in 2009", *Perceptions* 2010, Vol. 15, No. 3-4, p. 117

Obama declared “I know there have been difficulties these last few years. I know that the trust that binds the United States and Turkey has been strained.”⁴⁰⁹

There were many high-level meetings between Turkish and the American officials during the first term of President Barack Obama. During these visits, leaders declared the presence and the importance of long-standing strategic partnership between countries. They even described this partnership as ‘model partnership’ as it was discussed in detail above. Leaders emphasized a range of areas that two countries might cooperate, including fight against terrorism, cooperation in Iraq and the wider Middle East. At the press conference after the speech at TGNA, Obama stated that “I think that Turkey is a critical strategic partner with the United States -- not just in combating terrorism, but in developing the kind of economic links, cultural links and political links that will allow both countries to prosper and I truly believe the entire region and the world to prosper.”⁴¹⁰

Nevertheless, positive reaction among the Turkish people to the efforts of rapprochement was not high, even though Obama’s presidency was welcomed with great enthusiasm. Even during his election campaign, Barack Obama was popular among quite a number of Turkish people and observers. For instance, Cengiz Çandar, a well-known columnist, once titled his article as “Obama or the birth of a new America” in a mainstream newspaper in Turkey.⁴¹¹ In another article, he claimed that the election of Obama was the realization of American dream by stating that he would be very pleased if Obama was elected as the President of the US.⁴¹² Obama’s

⁴⁰⁹ “Remarks By President Obama to the Turkish Parliament”, 06.04.2009, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-obama-turkish-parliament>, (accessed on 13.08.2013)

⁴¹⁰ “Remarks By President Obama And Turkish Prime Minister Erdoğan After Meeting”, 06.04.2009, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-and-pm-turkey-after-meeting>, (accessed on 13.08.2013)


⁴¹¹ Cengiz Çandar, “Obama ya da 'Yeni Amerika'nın Doğuşu”, 07.11.2008, <http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/ShowNew.aspx?id=10303062>, (accessed on 08.07.2013)

⁴¹² Cengiz Çandar, “İşte 'Amerikan Rüyası': Kepçe Kulaklı Sıska Siyah”, 05.11.2008, <http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/ShowNew.aspx?id=10284467>, (accessed on 08.07.2013)

election was even celebrated by sacrificing 44 sheep in one village in the southeastern Turkey.⁴¹³

Yet as Larrabee says “regaining support for the US policy in Turkey is likely to take longer and prove more difficult than elsewhere in Europe.”⁴¹⁴ The statistics also supported this argument. According to Pew Research Center survey, while overall ratings for the US increased throughout the world, Turkey remained one of the most anti-American countries. Only fourteen percentages of Turks had positive opinion of the US in 2009. Below table demonstrates the situation in Turkey by 2009.⁴¹⁵

TABLE 15: Favorable View of the US and Confidence in the US President in Turkey (2000-2009)



*Pew Research Center

The above table also reveals that Turkish people’s favorable views of the US changed very slightly whereas confidence in the US president increased dramatically. It might be a sign that ‘Obama bounce’ affected Turkey, as well.


⁴¹³ “Turkish Village Sacrifices 44 Sheep to Mark Obama Win”, 08.11.2008, <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/english/domestic/10309760.asp?gid=243>, (accessed on 08.07.2013)

⁴¹⁴ F. Stephen Larrabee, “Troubled Partnership US-Turkish Relations in an Era of Global Geopolitical Change”, *Rand Corporation*, 2010, p. 43

⁴¹⁵ Richard Wike and Erin Carriere-Kretschmer, “Negative Views of U.S. Unchanged in Turkey”, 03.12.2009, <http://www.pewglobal.org/2009/12/03/negative-views-of-us-unchanged-in-turkey/>, (accessed on 25.06.2013)


Overall, attitudes towards the US and its president became comparatively more positive from the beginning of Obama’s presidency. Actually, the confidence in Barack Obama was relatively high compared to other key international actors throughout the world. The Pew Research Center surveyed the confidence in world leaders as follows.⁴¹⁶

TABLE 16: Confidence in World Leaders in 2010



*Pew Research Center

TABLE 17: Confidence in World leaders in Turkey (2009)




In Turkey, thirty-three percentages of the respondents had confidence in Barack Obama, which was alternated with Merkel and Medvedev in whom only seven

⁴¹⁶ <http://www.pewglobal.org/2012/06/13/chapter-5-rating-world-leaders/>, (accessed on 25.06.2013)

percentage had confidence. The fact that the confidence in Barack Obama was the highest compared to other international actors. To move one step further, it is better to compare President Bush to President Obama. Below table shows the confidence in the US leaders in Turkey from 2003 to 2012.


TABLE 18: Confidence in the US President in Turkey (2008-2009)



*Pew Research Center

In 2008, just two percentage of the respondents had confidence in George W. Bush while thirty-three percentage of the respondents had confidence in Barack Obama in 2009, which clearly demonstrates how the change in the US administration had a direct impact on Turkish people’s perception. However, Turkish people’s confidence in Obama did not stay high for so long. Below table also reveals that the confidence in Obama has been decreasing since then.

TABLE 19: Confidence in the US President (Bush 2003-2008, Obama 2009-2012)



*Pew Research Center


Apart from the rising confidence in Obama himself, his coming to power had a positive effect on Turkish people's perception of the US. Even though, Turks still do not see the US as a partner, the confidence seems relatively high compared to the Bush period. In 2008, eight percentage of the respondents saw the US as a partner whereas in 2009 eighteen percentage of the respondents saw the US as such. Although the change was in positive direction, the rise was not dramatic.⁴¹⁷

It is fair to argue that Turks have more positive opinion towards the US because of Barack Obama. Obama's success in the presidential elections together with his charismatic leadership generated positive opinions all over the world. The same positive feelings revealed in Turkey, too. Furthermore, his intense diplomatic efforts on Turkey also created a positive atmosphere. Turkish people started to answer the questions with regard to the US and its policies more positively compared to the Bush period. For instance, less people were opposed to American anti-terror policies after Obama came to power. It was seventy-nine percentage in 2007/2008 and fifty-five percentage in 2009. Fifty-four percentage of people thought that the US could be a military threat in 2009, whereas seventy-six percentage of the respondent did so in 2007/2008. People who believed that the US was an enemy were seventy percentage in 2007/2008 and forty in 2009, which was a dramatic decrease.⁴¹⁸

⁴¹⁷ <http://www.pewglobal.org/2009/07/23/chapter-1-views-of-the-u-s-and-american-foreign-policy-2/>, (accessed on 25.06.2013)

⁴¹⁸ Richard Wike and Erin Carriere-Kretschmer, "Negative Views of U.S. Unchanged in Turkey", 03.12.2009, <http://www.pewglobal.org/2009/12/03/negative-views-of-us-unchanged-in-turkey/>, (accessed on 25.06.2013)

TABLE 20: Views towards the US in Turkey (2007/2008-2009)




*Pew Research Center

TABLE 21: Seeing the US as a Partner (2008-2009)

	2008 %	2009 %	Change
Brazil	34	59	+25
Indonesia	23	47	+24
Mexico	48	64	+16
India	40	56	+16
Argentina	25	41	+16
Nigeria	67	80	+13
Turkey	8	18	+10
Poland	48	54	+6
Lebanon	23	27	+4

Question 54.

TABLE 22: Do Turks view the US as a Partner, an Enemy or Neither? (2009)



*Pew Research Center

Notwithstanding a few promising signs, Turkey’s ranking as being an anti-American country did not change from George W. Bush to Barack Obama. Turkey is still one of the most anti-American countries around the world. Below table demonstrates the

US favorability between 1999/2000 and 2013.⁴¹⁹ While in 1999/2000, fifty-two percentage of the respondents had favorable opinion of the US, the number dropped to the lowest level in 2007 with nine percentage. After Obama came to power, the US favorability began to increase in Turkey; however, by the end of his first term just fifteen percentage of the respondents had favorable opinion of the US.

TABLE 23: US Favorability 1999/2000 - 2013

U.S. Favorability													
	1999/ 2000	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Canada	--	72	63	--	59	--	55	--	68	--	--	--	64
Britain	83	75	70	58	55	56	51	53	69	65	61	60	58
France	62	62	42	37	43	39	39	42	75	73	75	69	64
Germany	78	60	45	38	42	37	30	31	64	63	62	52	53
Italy	76	70	60	--	--	--	53	--	--	--	--	74	76
Spain	50	--	38	--	41	23	34	33	58	61	64	58	62
Greece	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	35	39
Poland	86	79	--	--	62	--	61	68	67	74	70	69	67
Czech Rep.	77	71	--	--	--	--	45	--	--	--	--	54	58
Russia	37	61	37	46	52	43	41	46	44	57	56	52	51
Turkey	52	30	15	30	23	12	9	12	14	17	10	15	21
Egypt	--	--	--	--	--	30	21	22	27	17	20	19	16
Jordan	--	25	1	5	21	15	20	19	25	21	13	12	14
Lebanon	--	36	27	--	42	--	47	51	55	52	49	48	47
Palest. ter.	--	--	0	--	--	--	13	--	15	--	18	--	16
Tunisia	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	45	42
Israel	--	--	78	--	--	--	78	--	71	--	72	--	83
Australia	--	--	59	--	--	--	--	46	--	--	--	--	66
China	--	--	--	--	42	47	34	41	47	58	44	43	40
Indonesia	--	--	--	--	38	30	29	37	63	59	54	--	61
Japan	77	72	--	--	--	63	61	50	59	66	85	72	69
Malaysia	--	--	--	--	--	--	27	--	--	--	--	--	55
Pakistan	23	10	--	21	23	27	15	19	16	17	12	12	11
Philippines	--	90	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	85
S. Korea	--	52	46	--	--	--	58	70	78	79	--	--	78
Argentina	--	34	--	--	--	--	16	22	38	42	--	--	41
Bolivia	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	55
Brazil	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	62	62	61	73
Chile	--	--	--	--	--	--	55	--	--	--	--	--	68
El Salvador	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	79
Mexico	68	64	--	--	--	--	56	47	69	56	52	56	66
Venezuela	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	53
Ghana	--	83	--	--	--	--	80	--	--	--	--	--	83
Kenya	--	80	--	--	--	--	87	--	90	94	83	--	81
Nigeria	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	81	--	--	69
Senegal	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	81
S. Africa	--	65	--	--	--	--	--	60	--	--	--	--	72
Uganda	--	74	--	--	--	--	64	--	--	--	--	--	73

1999/2000 survey trends provided by the U.S. Department of State.
PEW RESEARCH CENTER Q9a.

⁴¹⁹ <http://www.pewglobal.org/2013/07/18/chapter-1-attitudes-toward-the-united-states/>, (accessed on 25.06.2013)

To conclude, although the US favorability and confidence in its leader increased from Bush to Obama, Turkey remained where it stood in terms of being one of the most anti-American countries all over the world.

One of the major reasons of this situation was that Turkish people were still concerned about the unilateralist policies of the US. Forty-three percentage of the respondents in Turkey believed that Obama would not seek international approval for the use of military force whereas only twenty- three percentage of the respondents believed that he would look for international approval. By the same token, when Turkish people were asked whether Obama would take into account the Turkish interests, only twenty-two percentage of the respondents said yes whereas forty-eight percentage said no which means that almost the half of the respondents did not believe the US would take Turkey's interests into consideration. Furthermore, just nineteen percentage of Turkish people believed that Obama would be fair in the Middle East.

Some specific foreign policy initiatives of Obama evaluated positively in Turkey, for instance half of the respondents approved his idea of closing Guantanamo. Therefore, his failure to do so caused more discontent. Withdrawing from Iraq took the same rating, fifty-five percentage of the respondents approved it. About sending more troops to Afghanistan, a policy that was not popular among Turkish people, almost the half of the respondents disapproved it.⁴²⁰

Overall Obama could not meet expectations in Turkey, as in other places of the world. When he came to office, the world expected that the US policies together with the rhetoric of its leader would change. Turkey was in the same expectation. However, as the major foreign policy issues examined in the previous and this chapter reveal Obama's policies caused disappointment in Turkey. For instance, Turkey expected that dialogue would primarily be on the table to find a solution to Iran's nuclear program. Due to this perception, Turkey got involved actively in the diplomatic dialogue process as a mediator together with Brazil. These diplomatic initiatives resulted in the Tehran Declaration. Many Turkish officials interpreted it as

⁴²⁰ <http://www.pewglobal.org/2009/07/23/chapter-2-views-of-president-barack-obama/>, (accessed on 25.07.2013)

a significant step in solving the problem. However, the US disregarded the declaration by claiming that it was inefficient to solve the problem. Turkish side greatly disappointed. Voting against the UN Security Council Resolution 1929, which imposed further sanctions on Iran, can be seen as a proof of this disappointment. On the other hand, the US administration criticized the decision to vote “no” in the UNSC, some officials even claimed that this decision was not suitable for a model partner. The cooperation on Iran’s nuclear program between Turkey and the US deteriorated compared to the Bush period. Glenn Kessler reminds that under Bush’s presidency there was not a single dissenting vote regarding Security Council resolutions on Iran.⁴²¹

In this regard, when Obama refused to act on Turkish-Brazil initiative and instead followed a more aggressive policy, he not only offended Turks but also caused his sincerity to be questioned. It has become a common belief among Turks that the US was not acting fairly concerning the Iranian issue. Many high-level officials including Prime Minister Erdoğan compared Israel to Iran in terms of having nuclear weapons and criticized double-standard policies. Even though the possible negative consequences of nuclear-armed Iran were realized by many Turkish officials and academics, the majority of Turkish people did not believe that as a friendly Muslim country, Iran, would threaten Turkey with nuclear weapons today and in the future. In 2007, only sixteen percentage of Turkish people saw Iran as a danger.⁴²² Additionally many people in Turkey regarded Iran’s ability to have nuclear weapons as a victory against the US and Israel.⁴²³ All in all, Turkey supported the diplomatic means for the solution of the problem of Iran’s nuclear program. It is highlighted by high-level officials that on the grounds of NPT, every country has a right to have and improve nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. But from the Turkish perspective

⁴²¹ Glenn Kessler, “U.N. Vote on Iran Sanctions not a Clear-Cut Win for Obama”, 09.06.2010, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/06/09/AR2010060903742.html>, (accessed on 25.07.2013)

⁴²² <http://www.pewglobal.org/2005/06/23/chapter-1-image-of-the-united-states/>, (accessed on 25.07.2013)

⁴²³ Mustafa Kibaroğlu, “Ortadoğu’da Nükleer Teknolojinin Yayılması ve Türkiye’nin Olası Yanıtları”, *EDAM*, Kasım 2012, No. 5, p. 20 1-48

it proved to be a conflicting issue between Turkey and the US since the US has had different ideas to solve the problem.

Considering the Afghanistan and Iraq issue, Turkey's and the US' policies did not overlap fully under Obama's presidency. The US was blamed of causing deaths of thousands of people both in Afghanistan and Iraq. In addition to that from the Turkish perspective, withdrawing from Iraq was not a responsible policy, as argued by Obama. Indeed, Turkey accused the US of leaving the country in turmoil, which was regarded as an obvious failure and a sign of insensitivity towards local people in Iraq. This strengthened the idea that the US fights just for its own interest. The rhetoric of global terrorism subjected to be question all over the world. Turkey had also its own experience to criticize the US policies on terrorism. Because while the US defined global terrorists based on its own threat perception and fought against them, it ignored other states' claims of anti-terror fights, as with Turkey's fight against PKK. By the same token, the insecurity and stability in Iraq after the US withdrawal was contrary to the interests of Turkey. Turkey, which always supported unity and territorial integrity of Iraq, was scared that lack of the central authority's control over the Northern Iraq would cause stability to spill over to Turkey.

The US policy towards Afghanistan also dissatisfied many in Turkey. The drone attacks were criticized since it caused deaths of many innocent civilians. The reason behind the criticism was also related to high expectations of Obama's multilateral rhetoric. Even if Obama embraced multilateralism and highlighted the importance of diplomacy in solving entrenched problems, he showed that his administration would not give up the blunt use of force and use the US' military power as a tool in foreign policy.

Obama created disappointment in other areas as well. For instance, Turks feel that he did not keep many of his promises that he gave in his Cairo speech in 2009 right after he took the office, which created a great positive atmosphere. He stated that "We have the power to make the world we seek, but only if we have the courage to make

a new beginning."⁴²⁴ However, he did almost nothing with regard to have a new beginning and the resolution of long standing Israel-Palestinian conflict.

Last but not the least, for Turks, Obama did not show much sensitivity towards Turkish interests with regard to the Armenian issue. Even if he did not use the “genocide” term, he defined the events as great catastrophe referring the events as *Meds Yeghern* in each 24 April speech. He was also accused of not getting involved to prevent the passing of Armenian resolution in the US House Foreign Relations Subcommittee as Davutoğlu criticized “the picture shows that the US administration did not put enough weight behind the issue.”⁴²⁵

Overall, during the Obama administration, the US was still seen by Turks as non-reliable ally, a unilateral hegemonic country, which could easily sacrifice others’ interests for its own safety and well-being.

⁴²⁴ “Remarks By The President On A New Beginning”, 04.06.2009, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-by-the-President-at-Cairo-University-6-04-09, (accessed on 01.08.2013)

⁴²⁵ Robert Tait and Ewen MacAskill, “Turkey Threatens 'Serious Consequences' after US vote on Armenian Genocide” 05.03.2010, <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/mar/05/turkey-us-vote-armenian-genocide>, (accessed on 01.09.2013)

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

This thesis aimed to compare the periods of President George W. Bush and Barack Obama from the perspective of anti-Americanism in Turkey. Since Bush and his administration's policies are generally regarded as the main culprit for rising anti-Americanism, this study questioned whether Obama's policies have generated any change.

The thesis started with a discussion of the concept of anti-Americanism. Defining the concept as "the negative attitudes towards the US", it explored types, indicators and consequences of anti-Americanism.

Anti-Americanism is not a new phenomenon either in Turkey or in the world. It dates back to the 18th century in Europe where it was born. At that time, Americans were generally criticized and looked down due to their lack of civility, taste or manners. Eventually, anti-Americanism has spread to the rest of the world. In the literature, there are two main tendencies to assess anti-Americanism. The first one sees anti-Americanism as related to "what the US is" and the second one associates anti-Americanism with "what the US does". The former one finds sources of anti-Americanism in American identity and the way of life, whereas for the latter one anti-Americanism concerns American policies and its implementations. Based on this distinction while some scholars see American foreign policy as the cause, some believe that anti-Americanism is more deeply rooted and US' modernity, power and ideas might be the reasons of anti-Americanism. All definitions and comments regarding the anti-Americanism were analyzed based on the distinction of "what the US is/does" in this study.

Furthermore, in order to further clarify the already vague and broad concept of anti-Americanism, different categorizations of the term were utilized. As a result, Turkey's anti-Americanism was categorized as sovereign-nationalist anti-Americanism as a tendency.

Against this theoretical background, the study tried to answer the question "how could we measure anti-Americanism?" The main questions that were used within the framework of this study include "Do you have a favorable or unfavorable view of the US?", "How much confidence do you have in the US President George W. Bush/Barack Obama?"

Next, the study tried to figure out the consequences of anti-Americanism. The main consequences become apparent as anti-Americanism makes the fight against terrorism more difficult, harms international cooperation resulting in US' failure to achieve important political objectives, such as during voting in the United Nations, and decreases US' soft power.

Afterwards, Turkish anti-Americanism was examined comprehensively. As in other countries, anti-Americanism in Turkey is not new. Even though, there were early signs of anti-Americanism in the early years of the relations, widespread and substantial anti-Americanism starts with 1964 Johnson letter. The reason for anti-Americanism might be found in history. In this regard, the Sevres Syndrome is a good starting point to comprehend the sociological background that shapes Turkish people's perceptions. From the Turkish perspective, due to the importance of Turkey's strategic position, the Western countries have always had intense ambitious to take advantage of Turkey's unique features, like geographical, cultural and human resources capacity. In Turkey negative attitudes are generally prevalent towards the Western States and the organizations in which Western states are relatively powerful. For instance, favorability of the EU and the UN are not high in Turkey and decrease year after year. In this sense, one should take into account that negative attitudes, perhaps, prejudices are widespread among Turkish public towards Western countries or Western organizations. Although Turkey had no such tainted history with the US, anti-Americanism could be analyzed against this background.

Yet since the 1960s the reasons for anti-Americanism in Turkey have generally derived from the US' policies and the Turkish publics' unmet expectations by the US. By the same token, Turkish anti-Americanism especially increases when the public thinks that the US gets involved in regional or domestic issues at the expense of the Turkish interests. Therefore, from Johnson letter to the present, the reasons for anti-Americanism have been mostly related to "what the US does" and anti-Americanism appeared as a "tendency", since specific incidents caused the Turkish anti-Americanism to increase. When US' certain policies created frictions, the anti-American sentiments increased and protests became pandemic. Still, even when there are widespread anti-American feelings in Turkey, Turkish anti-Americanism can be considered as a benign one instead of an aggressive one. It is mainly because; it does not contain animosity towards the American people.

The following chapter analyzed the general historical background of the relations between two states. Since focusing on every historical detail between Turkey and the US is beyond the scope of this study, the specific events with real impact on bilateral relations and people's perceptions were examined.

Even though the roots of the Turkish-American relationship date back to the Ottoman times, this thesis took the 1947 Truman Doctrine as the starting point of bilateral relations. The relations were categorized into four main periods. The first one is honeymoon period which extends from the Truman Doctrine to 1960. The rapprochement between Turkey and the US started especially after the World War II due to the perception of common threat from the USSR. From that time on, Turkey's strategic position has been regarded as significant by the US. The Soviet demands from Turkey were unacceptable both for Turkey and the US. From the US perspective if the Soviet Union had gotten such advantages, it would have damaged the US interests in the wider region. Many American top officials emphasized the importance of Turkey for the advancement of the US' objectives. In this honeymoon period, as a strategic ally, Turkey received protection through the Truman Doctrine, was included to the Marshall Plan, and became member of NATO. Furthermore, Turkey benefitted highly from the US economic and military assistance. Although there was not widespread anti-Americanism at that time, there were some specific

events that demonstrated people's negative attitudes towards the US. By time, the sympathy towards American people in Turkey began to decrease and the Turkish public started to perceive that the presence of Americans and their judicial and economic privileges created inequality in Turkey.

Second period is dated from 1960 to 1980 which represents the time of deterioration in the relations. In this period, a number of specific events caused Turks to feel disappointment at the US policies. One of them was the removing of the Jupiter missiles as a result of bargaining during the Cuban missile crisis. This event led to the spread of the perception that the US could easily sacrifice the other states' interests for its own safety and Turks took it personally and questioned the reliability of the partnership. But, the most important event in this period was probably the notorious Johnson letter by which Prime Minister İsmet İnönü was strongly warned against sending troops to Cyprus. After this shocking event, anti-Americanism dramatically increased and Turkey further questioned the reliability of the alliance and its NATO membership. It is believed that Turkey began to seek a way to change its foreign policy orientation following the Johnson letter. After the U-2 flight incident, Turkey continued to question its partnership and the misuse of military bases in Turkey. Eventually, Turkish public had strong suspicions concerning the presence of Americans on the Turkish territory and Americans' behaviors in Turkey. Turkish government was accused of being a satellite state. The protests were spread among especially left-wing groups. In addition to the said events, Turkish-US relations were significantly damaged due to the opium crisis, the 1974 Cyprus crisis and the subsequent arms embargo. As a result of all these events, anti-Americanism increased in Turkey. Turkish public perceived American interference to Turkey's sovereignty.

The third period begins with the 1980 military coup and lasted till 2003 Iraq war. The 1980 coup d'état in Turkey paved the way for a new phase of the relations. The US reaction to the military coup was not like that of the Europeans. The relations did not deteriorate. Quite the opposite the relations began to normalize. In this period, however, the cold war parameters shifted. Turkey and the US found new areas to cooperate. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the newly emerged Republics,

energy issues, regional security problems were on the agenda of Turkish-American relations. In this regard, the Gulf War was one of the important events that affected Turkish-American relations in this period. Turkey's continuing strategic importance was the main determinant of the relations. George W. H Bush and Bill Clinton seemed to pay attention to this factor. Turkey was first called as an "enhanced partner" and then "strategic partner" by these administrations. The fourth period which extends from 2003 Iraq war to the present were analyzed in the following two separate chapters.

In chapter four, the term of George W. Bush was analyzed on the basis of bilateral relations and three important foreign policy issues between the US and Turkey namely Iran, Iraq and Afghanistan. Ups and downs of the relations were examined to figure out when and under what conditions anti-Americanism increased in Turkey. In order to better understand the US foreign policy during the presidency of George W. Bush, his doctrine was explored. The doctrine had four main elements: embracing the perception that the US is the only superpower, preemptive use of military force, unilateralism and democracy promotion. It is also fair to admit that neo-conservatism was the driving force of President Bush administration's foreign policy. George W. Bush's policies towards Turkey can be analyzed in two periods, before and after 9/11 events. Although the nature of partnership was seen as strategic partnership before 9/11, the relations were considered as having "lower priority". But after 9/11, the relations deepened further. In this period, Turkey was evaluated on the basis of not only where it was located but also what it is. Turkey's democratic, secular identity together with its majority Muslim population were considered as a prime example of modernization and could be showed as a model to many Muslim countries in the world.

When the US-led global war against terrorism was taken into consideration, one of the main expectations of Turks from the Bush administration was direct support to Turkey's war against PKK. But, Turkey could not be able to find the support it expected. Turkish people began to question the real intention of the US. Many in Turkey believed that the US directly or indirectly supported PKK for its own interests. Or at least, it is believed that the US was unwilling to support Turkey's war

against PKK. Therefore, anti-American sentiment increased to the degree that seventy percentage of Turkish people regarded the US as an enemy.

The Iranian issue did not cause a specific increase in Turkish anti-Americanism during Bush's term. Yet the problem between the US and Turkey with regard to Iran's nuclear program lied mostly in the method, in other words, in finding a way to solve the problem. Turkey advocated diplomatic means, whereas the US aimed to impose harsher sanctions with the help of international community. Still Turkey voted in parallel with the US. However, it did not support the additional US and EU financial measures.

As far as the war in Afghanistan is concerned, Turkey cooperated with the US during George W. Bush's term. Following Bush's famous statement in which he declared that states were either with the US or against the US in the fight against terrorism, Turkish parliament quickly gave an authorization in October 2001 to contribute troops to the US campaign. The only policy difference was Turkey's reluctance to send combat troops to the region. Since the beginning, Turkey seemed determined to support the global war against terrorism with its non-combat forces to help the reconstruction and training activities of Afghan people. However this policy was evaluated negatively by Bush administration at the very outset. By time, the situation in Afghanistan worsened, insurgent activities spread all over the country, US casualties increased the resemblance between Afghanistan and Vietnam began to be discussed both in the US and in the world. As the situation in Afghanistan mired, the conflict spread to Pakistan and living conditions deteriorated even more for civilians in the region Turks started to question American policy and the Turkish support. One of the major causes of disturbance was the perception that the US did not help Turkey in its fight against PKK. The support to the US-led war on terrorism in Turkey decreased from thirty percentage in 2002 to nine percentage in 2007.

During President George W. Bush's term, issues related to Iran and Afghanistan did not spread anti-Americanism as the Iraq issue did. The War in Iraq was a real watershed in the bilateral relations. Turkey and the US had totally different points of view concerning Iraq. Turkey always supported the stability, territorial integrity, sovereignty in Iraq, whereas the US policies included Iraq into global war on

terrorism and occupied Iraq on the basis of preemptive use of force doctrine. The US' unwillingness to take Turkey's concerns regarding Iraq into account caused distrust and bias among the Turkish public and anti-American sentiments increased in Turkey. As a result of the widespread dissatisfaction with the American policy, Turkish parliamentarians refused to adopt the famous March 1st Bill, which was supposed to authorize the deployment of the US troops to Iraq through Turkish territory. This decision was harshly criticized in the US. Many top officials declared their discontent at Turkey. Following March 1st decision, another event took place when 11 Turkish officers were arrested and treated badly by the American army in Sulimaniyeh. They were released within two days but the incident had a deep-rooted impact on the Turkish public. The movie Valley of the Wolves-Iraq and the book Metal Storm which both might easily be called as anti-American became so popular in Turkey. On the other hand, Turks had suspected that the real intention of the US in Iraq was to secure the establishment of an independent Kurdistan in addition to its aim to seize Iraqi oil and to protect Israeli interests.

As the statistical data provided by the Pew Research Center's "Global Indicators Database" and German Marshall Fund's "Transatlantic Trends" datasets reveal anti-Americanism dramatically increased during President George W. Bush's period as US favorability dropped from fifty-two percentage in 1999/2000 to thirty percentage in 2002 and to nine percentage in 2007 in Turkey. In addition, favorability of President Bush was very low in Turkey. The confidence in Bush was only three percentage in 2006 which was the lowest level in the world. This study argues that the main causes for this dramatic increase of anti-Americanism in the world were the US' unilateralism, creation of a new enemy which targeted the Muslim world, perceived War on Islam, ignorance of global problems, its contribution to the global income gap. In Turkey, the reasons could be cited as the US' unilateralism, unwillingness to support Turkey's fight against PKK, ignorance of global problems, axis of evil rhetoric, Bush's rhetoric which depicted the War on Terrorism as "Crusade", hence "War against Islam" and the perception that US has been pursuing selfish or double-standard policies.

Afterwards, the period of Barack Obama were analyzed on the basis of the same important foreign policy issues between the US and Turkey namely Iran, Iraq and Afghanistan. The chapter first provided an explanation of why the whole world and Turks alike expected a great change in American policies together with Obama's presidency. Second, it examined Barack Obama's foreign policy approach pinpointing the divergent methods and styles from Bush presidency.

When Barack Obama took power in 2009, it can be said that he and his administration were aware of the damage done to the bilateral relations during Bush's presidency and aimed to fix the relations. Even though, Obama administration declared Turkey "model partner", bilateral relations have not been free from problems. For instance, the Armenian issue proved to be problematic as Obama's April 24 speeches and Foreign Relations Committee's approval of the Armenian genocide resolution were met with disappointment in Turkey.

Mavi Marmara incident caused deterioration in the relations as well. Turkey could not find the support expected from the US. Even though, President Obama conveyed his condolences to Turkey, Turks expected the US to take a side with Turkey and a more active policy from the Obama administration that would force Israel to apologize from Turkey.

The Iranian issue caused friction as well. Different preferences for solution to the Iranian nuclear problem became more apparent. Tension reached a peak when Turkey voted against harsher economic sanctions against Iran in the UN General Assembly.

With regard to the War in Afghanistan, the US continued to force Turkey to contribute combat troops. However, Turkey maintained its position. Despite sending additional troops to Afghanistan, no combat troops were assigned. Concerning Iraq, even though the US troops were withdrawn as Obama had promised, the ongoing security problems and the dire situation in Iraq caused Turks to think that Americans came to the region for their own interests –mostly oil and to support Israel and left the country and people in ruins when they got what they wanted. In both Afghan and Iraq wars, the US was seen as a selfish power which has pursued its own interests

unilaterally with total disregard to local people's or even to its allies' interests and as an aggressive hegemon which used force to secure its own interests.

The US policy towards Afghanistan also caused dissatisfaction in Turkey. Troop surges and use of drones were regarded as having contradicted Obama's multilateral rhetoric. Furthermore, his failure to ameliorate relations with the Muslim world and to fulfill his promises concerning the Palestinian problem spoiled his image.

On the one hand, Obama clearly gave priority to fix the relations with Turkey. On the other hand, the "change" and "hope" rhetoric were generally admired and welcomed in Turkey, rendering people ready to open a new page in Turkish-American relations. However, Obama's policies both towards Turkey and worldwide, especially towards the conflict-ridden areas generated disappointment. The general perception has been that either Obama has failed to achieve his policy objectives or that the powerful American state apparatus would not let one man change the course of foreign policy anyway. It should also be taken into consideration that making of American foreign policy is a complex process, where many agencies and actors are involved. Only presidents' decisions are not enough to formulate foreign policy. In this regard, foreign policy emerges with the help of contribution of politicians, advisors, bureaucrats, legislatures and even lobbies. Therefore, it is also subject to question whether President Obama by himself will ever be enough to change the systemic structure of the US policy making. American foreign policy decision-making is a multi-layered process which cannot easily be changed by one person alone.

In conclusion, the main finding of this thesis is that anti-Americanism in Turkey is induced by "what the US does" and it emerges as a "tendency". It can increase and decrease due to policy and interest clashes between two countries or when people perceive that US acts unilaterally ignoring Turkey's concerns or that US imposes its will on Turkey. For instance, at the time of Iraq war, anti-Americanism reached a peak in Turkey due to the perception of threat to Turkey's sovereignty. Therefore, historically Turkish anti-Americanism demonstrates a sovereign-nationalist character. Especially since the Johnson letter, Turkish people seem not to have much confidence to the US and its policies. This perception seems to be corroborated by popular conspiracy theories, most of which are directly related to the US and its

ambitions in the Middle East and Turkey in particular. In this context, Bush's rhetoric and policies highly contributed to increase negative feelings toward the US. To use Katzenstein and Keohane's term, the "critical opinion" transformed into "distrust" due to the Bush administration's policies. Turkey became as one of the most anti-American countries in the world. This picture has not been totally changed during Obama's presidency. As Soner Çağaptay and Yurter Özcan claimed efforts by Obama administration to win Turkish hearts and mind caused very little progress.⁴²⁶ Even if the favorability of the US and the popularity of Obama have increased, Obama administration's policies did not alter Turkey's high ranking among the most anti-American countries.

As a conclusion, this thesis argues that since the US' grand strategy did not change from George W. Bush to Barack Obama, it has not made a big difference even though the rhetoric of the US president has shifted and has become more multilateral and more humble. Therefore, Turkish people are still concerned about the unilateralist policies of the US and by the same token they still have deep-rooted suspicions about the real intentions of this country.

⁴²⁶ Soner Çağaptay and Yurter Özcan, "Persistent Anti-Americanism in Turkey: External or Internal Causes?", 29.07.2009,

<http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/persistent-anti-americanism-in-turkey-external-or-internal-causes>, (accessed on 23.08.2013)

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