

NIETZSCHE ON FATE AND FREEDOM

A THESIS SUBMITTED TO

THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES

OF

MIDDLE EAST TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY

BY

SEDEF BEŞKARDEŞLER

IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS

FOR

THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS

IN

THE DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY

NOVEMBER 2013

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ABSTRACT

Nietzsche on Fate and Freedom

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November 2013, 79 pages.

At face value, Nietzsche's approach to the *problem of free will* may seem contradictory since he rejects both free will and determinism. However, a detailed analysis of Nietzsche's texts will show that, while he uncovers the traditional and psychological background of both the belief in free will and unfree will, he develops his unique understanding of freedom and fate. To state more precisely, Nietzsche repudiates both an understanding of free will which is claimed to be *a priori* possessed and also an idea of complete determinism in human action which relies on the causal interpretation of nature. Rather, what Nietzsche does is to propose a strong love of fate while trying to convince his reader of the inseparability of necessity and freedom. Moreover, by means of the notions of yes-saying and no-saying, Nietzsche advances a healthy attitude towards life, which is one of the main concerns of his philosophy. In this case, the matter would be to explore and differentiate what is necessary from what is contingent. Thus, the possibility of a more *naturalistic* approach to the matter of human freedom and necessity will be shown where the way is also open for an *affirmative* life.

Keywords: Nietzsche, *amor fati*, free will, yes-saying, no-saying.

ÖZ

Nietzsche Felsefesinde Yazgı ve Özgürlük

Beşkardeşler, Sedef

Yüksek Lisans, Felsefe Bölümü

Tez Yöneticisi: Doç. Dr. Barış Parkan

Kasım 2013, 79 sayfa.

İlk bakışta, Nietzsche'nin hür irade problemine yaklaşımı çelişkili görünebilir, çünkü kendisi hem hür iradeyi, hem de belirlenimciliği reddeder. Ancak, Nietzsche metinlerinin detaylı bir analizi gösterecektir ki, Nietzsche, hür iradenin varlığını ya da yokluğunu destekleyen tarafların dayandığı geleneksel ontolojik ve psikolojik zemini reddederken, kendi özgürlük anlayışını kurar. Daha açık ifade etmek gerekirse, Nietzsche hem *a priori* olarak sahip olunduğu iddia edilen bir hür irade anlayışını, hem de doğanın nedensel yorumuna dayalı olan ve insan eyleyişinde tam bir belirlenimciliği savunan anlayışı reddeder. Bunun yerine Nietzsche, güçlü bir yazgı sevgisini desteklerken, aynı zamanda okuyucusunu da özgürlük ve zorunluluğun ayrılamaz olduğuna ikna etmeye çalışır. Ayrıca, "evet-deme" ve "hayır-deme" kavramları aracılığıyla, Nietzsche hayata karşı sağlıklı bir tutumun ipuçlarını verir ki bu Nietzsche felsefesinin temel dertlerinden biridir. Bu durumda mesele, neyin zorunlu neyin şartlı olduğunu keşfetmek ve ayırt etmek olacaktır. Böylece, insan özgürlüğü ve zorunluluk konusuna daha *doğalcı* bir yaklaşım sergilenirken, olumlayıcı bir hayatın da yolu açılacaktır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Nietzsche, yazgı sevgisi, hür irade, evet-deme, hayır-deme.

To My Mother,

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

First and foremost, I would like to express my deepest gratitude to my supervisor Assoc. Prof. Dr. Barış Parkan for her guidance, encouragement and comments throughout the development of this study. She has been the best supervisor to me with her sincerity and endless patience. I would also like to thank to my examining committee members Assoc. Prof. Dr. Elif Çırakman and Assoc. Prof. Dr. Nazile Kalaycı for their valuable comments and suggestions.

Thanks to my friends Selda and Ali Motameni Tabatabaei, for always providing me the necessary means and motivation to complete my thesis. Their support has been indispensable to me. I am also thankful to my friends Beyhan Erkurt and Sedat Ilgaz Günay for conveying their experience to me and being there whenever I needed. Thanks to Cemali Kılınc for sharing a life with me. He knows I cannot find the adequate words for how to thank to him. I also would like to thank to my friends Aycan, Nadiye, Tuğba, Bilge, Tuna, Necdet and Madalina, whose company I have felt in joy and stress.

Special thanks to Dr. Ali Bayramoğlu who opened me a new way which I was before unfamiliar with. I know his encouragement will always be with me whatever step I dare to take throughout my life.

Last but not least, I would like to thank to my family for their enduring love and sympathy. I feel stronger for they always stand by me.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AC	The Anti-Christ
BGE	Beyond Good and Evil
BT	The Birth of Tragedy
EH	Ecce Homo
GM	On the Genealogy of Morals
GS	The Gay Science
HH	Human All Too Human
TI	Twilight of the Idols
TL	On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense
WP	The Will to Power
Z	Thus Spoke Zarathustra

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

An average Nietzsche reader may easily get confused trying to make sense of what Nietzsche's position would be regarding the traditional debate on free will and determinism. At face value, Nietzsche's approach to the issue may seem contradictory if the theoretical frame remains traditional. In the traditional frame, the notion of free will is typically opposed to the idea of determinism. According to the advocates of free will (i.e. libertarians), humans are endowed with a special faculty called "the free will" which enables them to act according to their own choices and purposes, independently of any external factors. Determinists, on the other hand, emphasize that every event that happens has its cause and human actions are no exception to this rule. The determinist will point to the metaphysical oddity involved in the notion of free will: if everything that exists is causally connected in a space-time framework, so do human agents. The libertarians want to attribute a special characteristic to human agency, the ability to initiate an action without there being sufficient causes that determine that initiation. An outcome of this difference in the two positions is that while libertarians believe that human beings are fully responsible for the acts they commit, the determinist position would have to imply that ultimately human beings are not really responsible for who they are and what they do. Hence, the free will debate has both an ontological and a moral dimension.

Responses to or judgments on this issue may vary, for sure, but it is not the goal of my thesis to engage in the traditional debate. Rather, what I want to discuss is Nietzsche's stance on the question of free will, which undermines the traditional debate since it is cast in a different and non-orthodox ontological framework. Unless one understands

and appreciates this different background, he/she will remain puzzled by Nietzsche's declamations on the issue and continue to find them self-contradictory.

In this thesis, I will first try to lay bare Nietzsche's attitude towards the problem of determinism and free will in light of the philosopher's own texts as well as his commentators' views and interpretations. After a delineation of Nietzsche's approach towards the concept of free will, I will attempt to reveal Nietzsche's own understanding regarding freedom and fate.

I want to begin by noting some of the key passages where Nietzsche seems to be declaring his opinion on the question of the freedom of the will, some of which appear to contradict each other.

In *On the Genealogy of Morals*, Nietzsche seems to give a determinist and strict impression when he uses the example of "lambs and large birds of prey". It is supposed that the lambs [*slave types*] say among themselves that 'these birds of prey are evil' and 'whoever resembles them as little as possible should be good'. On the other hand, the birds of prey [*noble types*] might be looking down and saying to themselves: 'we bear no ill will to the lambs; instead we love them: there's nothing tastier than them'¹ By means of this allegory, Nietzsche engages in a genealogical pursuit on the notions of good and evil.

Nietzsche proceeds with the above-cited passage as follows: "[t]o demand of strength that it should *not* express itself as strength, that it should *not* be a will to overcome, overthrow, dominate, [...] makes as little sense as to demand of weakness that it should express itself as strength"². Asserting that the relation between lambs and birds of prey could not have been otherwise, "the strong is strong and the weak is weak", Nietzsche's position here seems to leave no room for notions such as "freedom", "choice" and even more radically "the self". What remains seems to be to love our fate.

¹ GM, "First Essay", §13.

² Ibid.

On the other hand, one of the most quoted passages by Nietzsche says: “*What does your conscience say?* — ‘You should become who you are’”³

The feeling of urgency expressed in the above-mentioned quotation is not limited to that one in Nietzsche’s writings. He also creates notions such as *Übermensch* and *revaluation of values* towards which one feels a kind of calling, responsibility and the spur for self-recognition.

So, the question then becomes whether these seemingly contradictory attitudes of Nietzsche’s undermine each other or support each other in a peculiar way. My assertion is that, Nietzsche’s understanding of the issue is envisioned through his unique criticism of traditional morality which places his compass beyond the metaphysical understanding of the “free will problem”.

According to Nietzsche, freedom finds its very cradle within the notion of fate and *amor fati*. Grillaert illustrates that point as follows:

Nietzsche’s conception of free will turns out to be rooted in his concept of *amor fati*. By accepting and willing the necessity of one’s own fate as it is and will always be, [...] the individual will becomes free⁴.

So, we will ask and attempt to answer some questions as follows: What kind of a relation is there, between loving your fate and creating yourself and/or values? In short, how are we to understand self-creation and *revaluation of values* in relation to the ‘highest affirmation of life’?

In this thesis, I proceed as follows: in Chapter 2, I try to justify my claim that Nietzsche’s stance on the question of free will can only be understood in a non-traditional ontological and moral framework. To this end, I present the traditional arguments for libertarianism and determinism and show how Nietzsche’s criticisms of them strike at their ontological foundations. Therefore, in the second part of Chapter 2, I present Nietzsche’s understanding of will to power. I argue that, Nietzsche’s understanding of will to power is closely associated with valuation and interpretation.

³ GS, §270.

⁴ Grillaert, 2006, p. 57.

In other words, Nietzsche's critique of the framework in which the traditional debate is cast involves understanding the related parties in this debate as representing different perspectives, interpretations and even ontological attitudes as manifestations of will to power. Then I present Nietzsche's genealogical account of the origin of free will as further undermining the traditional debate and casting the problem in a totally new light.

Having thus distinguished Nietzsche's approach from the traditional one, in Chapter 3, I reintroduce the question of exactly what then Nietzsche's position on freedom and necessity, self-creation and fatalism is. In the first section of Chapter 3, I explain Nietzsche's fatalism and *amor fati* as a kind of yes-saying. I also argue, following Robert C. Solomon, that fatalism is different from determinism and make use of ancient Greek tragedies and Nussbaum's interpretation of Agamemnon in particular, to substantiate this claim.

After presenting the main differences of fatalism from determinism, I also point out to the Dionysian *image* which is for Nietzsche a symbol of affirmation. In the later section, I briefly discuss Nietzsche's doctrine of the 'eternal recurrence of the same' and its significance with respect to the other key notions for my thesis.

Turning back to the discussion of fatalism, we find however that, this discussion we have referred is not sufficient for resolving the seeming contradictions in Nietzsche's writings. If Nietzsche speaks of *amor fati* and saying yes, he also speaks of 'philosophizing with a hammer' and destroying much of the traditional values. In trying to make sense of this seeming tension between Nietzsche's exhortation to saying yes, and a no saying attitude displayed in his writings, I reformulate the question concerning free will and determinism as follows: are we supposed to merely accept life as it is or are we supposed to try to change it?

To try to answer this question, I make use of Nietzsche's discussion 'on the three metamorphoses' in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* which presents the soul as going through stages which must display both the yes saying and no saying attitudes to reach a final satisfactory stage of life affirmation and creativity. As a preliminary to this

metamorphosis, I also first present Nietzsche's notion of free spirit in distinction from the traditional notion of free will.

Finally in Chapter 3, I try to present what I believe to be Nietzsche's solution to the seeming contradictions. I argue that the distinctive criterion which determines to what degree we should affirm life and to what degree we should reject it, or to what degree we should see ourselves as fated and to what degree a product of our own creation is a naturalistic one. Further, Nietzsche uses the example of artistic creation to show what kind of a connection there might be between freedom and necessity.

CHAPTER II

NIETZSCHE'S REJECTION OF THE TRADITIONAL DEBATE

“belief in freedom of will is a primary error committed by everything organic”⁵

Having formulated the problem of this thesis as Nietzsche's stance on the question of free will and determinism, in this chapter, I will present an argument for the case that Nietzsche is neither a determinist nor a believer in free will. Rather, as I will argue in Chapter 3, he is a fatalist who exhorts us to become what we are. To show how Nietzsche is neither a determinist nor a believer in free will, I will first present his arguments against the libertarianists and determinists.

Nietzsche repudiates the notion of a free will by means of several arguments. Here, I will group them into two types. There is, firstly, a critique that points out the logical absurdities in the notion of free will, followed by ontological analyses which deconstruct the concepts of agency and subject that are presupposed by the notion of 'free will as a faculty'. This deconstruction amounts to no less than a radical critique of the tradition of Western metaphysics. It is on the basis of this deconstruction of the basic presuppositions of Western metaphysics that Nietzsche is able to also repudiate determinism. His rejection of determinism is based on uncovering those presuppositions that are involved in the mechanic understanding of causation that determinism stems from. The elaboration of this analysis involves the critique of what he calls the 'soul atomism', which in turn is based on the critique of substance metaphysics. Thus, as we shall see, Nietzsche's rejection of both free will and unfree will find their grounding on the same repudiation of a certain ontological model.

⁵ HH, "Volume 1", §18.

Secondly, this ontological critique is accompanied by psychological arguments whereby Nietzsche probes into the motivations of not only the believers in free will (as well as the motivations of the determinists), but more importantly, of those who invented the concept of free will. Thus the psychological arguments are developed through a genealogical/ historical account. Further, the ontological refutation and the genealogical analysis are tied together by the notion of will-to-power.

Thus, in this chapter, I will proceed as follows: In section 2.1, I will present Nietzsche's ontological arguments against free will and determinism. In section 2.1.1., I will take up libertarianism. In section 2.1.2., I will treat Nietzsche's rejection of determinism. To ground Nietzsche's objections, I will make use of Richard Taylor's account of libertarianism as representative of the type of conception of free will that Nietzsche clearly argues against. Then, I will show how Nietzsche's objections point in the direction of a deconstruction of the traditional substance paradigm in ontology and the accompanying notion of agency. I will present this deconstruction in terms of Nietzsche's critique of language. After presenting Nietzsche's rejection of determinism in terms of his critique of atomism, I will introduce Nietzsche's understanding of will to power as the basis of his own ontology which he presents against substance ontology and which is crucial for us to make sense of how and why he is neither a libertarian nor a determinist.

Having presented Nietzsche's alternative ontological framework, I will proceed to Nietzsche's 'psychological' arguments. In this transition, I hope it will have become clear that Nietzsche's 'psychologizing' is closely related with his understanding of will to power as engendering different types of valuations. In section 2.2., I go into the genealogy of different valuations and different conceptions of good and evil as presented in Nietzsche's *On the Genealogy of Morality*. It is also here that Nietzsche traces the origin of the concept of free will. In reading Nietzsche's *Genealogy*, I will make use of Foucault's interpretation of Nietzsche.

2.1. Ontological Arguments

Because Nietzsche's rejection of both the free will and unfree will have the same ontological bases, I will treat his arguments against libertarianism and determinism in

interaction with each other. In doing so, I will also try to present a summary of the basic arguments that believers in free will and unfree will put forth. I will begin with libertarianism.

2.1.1. Against Free Will

Libertarianism is the view that assumes human beings to be endowed with a special faculty called “free will” which enables them to act according to their own choices and purposes, independently of any external factor. Defenders of libertarianism often resort two main arguments: the first is the claim that we *experience* free will in our daily activities; the second is that, if we didn’t have free will there could be no moral responsibility. These arguments appear quite intuitive and common-sensical but, as we shall see, it is precisely this ‘common sense’ that Nietzsche will challenge.

2.1.1.1. The Concept of Free Will

Our daily experience of free will, as we have noted above, is one of the main *evidences* that libertarians resort to in arguing for their case. Obviously, in our daily life, we quite often feel ourselves free to choose one or the other amongst countless possibilities. Likewise, we also feel that the decision is up us at some of the most crucial moments of our life. While having no objection to the claim that we do experience such kind of ‘decision-making’ processes as described above, Nietzsche would object to the libertarians’ conclusion that, these kinds of experiences show that we are actually endowed with free will. For Nietzsche, this conclusion is simply an illusion and it resembles the feeling we have when we see a waterfall:

When we see a waterfall, we think we see freedom of will and choice in the innumerable turnings, windings, breakings of the waves; but everything is necessary; each movement can be calculated mathematically. Thus it is with human actions; [...] The acting man’s delusion about himself, his assumption that free will exists, is also part of the calculable mechanism⁶.

⁶ HH, “Volume 1”, §106. It can be argued that, this example of Nietzsche’s is open to a deterministic interpretation, especially when he talks about the “calculable mechanism”. We agree with that criticism annotating that, this is an early passage from *Human, All Too Human*, one written while Nietzsche may not be mature enough to style his distinct views.

Nietzsche's response to the second main argument of the libertarian (the argument based on moral responsibility) will be discussed in section 2.2., below. We will now turn to Nietzsche's attack on the conception of free will itself.

The main characteristic of a standard free will theory is the appeal to the notion of a *causa sui*. In fact, objecting to this notion is one of the basic arguments which Nietzsche puts forth against free will. Nietzsche argues that, the conception of the agent as *causa sui*⁷ is self-contradictory:

The *causa sui* is the best self-contradiction that has ever been conceived, a type of logical rape and abomination. But humanity's excessive pride has got itself profoundly and horribly entangled with precisely this piece of nonsense. The longing for "freedom of the will" in the superlative metaphysical sense (which, unfortunately, still rules in the heads of the half educated), the longing to bear the entire and ultimate responsibility for your actions yourself and to relieve God, world, ancestors, chance, and society of the burden – all this means nothing less than being that very *causa sui* and, with a courage greater than Münchhausen's, pulling yourself by the hair from the swamp of nothingness up into existence.⁸

In the quotation above, Nietzsche points out to the absurdity of the metaphysical understanding according to which the 'agent' is isolated from its very context, whether it be social, physical, environmental, historical and so on. The isolated 'agent', in turn, is posited as something like an 'underlying cause' of the action.

The libertarians typically distinguish between human action and mere behaviour. They want to attribute a special characteristic to human agency, the ability to initiate an action without there being sufficient causes that determine that initiation. A good example of this approach is Richard Taylor's account of libertarianism. In *Metaphysics*, Taylor addresses his version of libertarianism as a 'theory of agency'. According to him, an agent is a being who can sometimes be the cause of his/her own behaviour, and this self-caused behaviour of an agent is called an *action*⁹. As Taylor himself admits, this conception of action "involves an extraordinary conception of causation according to which an agent, which is a substance and not an event, can

⁷ Cause of itself.

⁸ BGE, §21.

⁹ Taylor, p.295, cited in Stumpf and Abel, 2002.

nevertheless be the cause of an event”. In this case, even though the agent may have a reason to perform this particular action, it is not the agent’s reason that causes the action itself; but the agent himself/herself – ‘the person as a whole’¹⁰. As a matter of fact, the causation involved here is so unlike the way we understand causation in other scientific events that Taylor feels obliged to find another name for it. He thus says that human beings *originate* actions rather than causing them¹¹.

According to Taylor, people are “sometimes, but of course not always” self-determining beings¹². When I believe to have done something, Taylor says, “I do believe that it was *I* who caused it to be done, *I* who made something happen, and *not merely something within me*, such as one of my own subjective states, which is not identical with myself”¹³.

Taylor proceeds that, the behaviour caused by ‘external’ or even ‘internal’ events (such as a nerve stimulus) cannot be regarded as one’s actions; what can be counted as actions are not under those affections. It seems that, according to Taylor, human beings have the ability to distinguish and identify what belongs to them ‘as agents’ from what is ‘merely something within them’. Then, one - as an *agent* - is able to possess a bird’s eye, independent from all the desires, motivations, drives and so on, until there remains no affects but merely the pure agency of *free will*.

In addition, “in the case of an action that is free”, Taylor says, “it must not only be such that it is caused by the agent who performs it, but also such that no antecedent conditions were sufficient for his performing just that action”¹⁴.

In his article “The Paradox of Fatalism and Self-Creation in Nietzsche”, Leiter interprets Nietzsche’s point against this notion of a *free will* as follows: according to the libertarian conception of human agency, human actions result from choices which, in turn, emanate from the will. This act of will is supposed to be *causa sui*.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Ibid, p.298

¹² Ibid. p.297.

¹³ Ibid. Emphasis mine.

¹⁴ Ibid. p.297.

But if the will is a human faculty, it is determined by human nature. In that case, human actions are not caused by the agent as such, but rather are conditioned by the way the agent is¹⁵.

However, the libertarian could easily rebuff this objection as it is reformulated by Leiter. It is precisely the idea of the will being determined by anything, *including human nature* that the libertarian denies. I think Leiter's mistake is that he tries to get Nietzsche to argue with the libertarians on their terms—the traditional ones—whereas what Nietzsche really does is to point out the fundamental absurdities that traditional conceptions rely on.

2.1.1.2. Against Agent Metaphysics

In a great variety of relevant arguments, including the one on the agent as *causa sui*, it can be seen that, 'agent metaphysics' and its proximate connotations occupies a central place within Nietzsche's criticisms against *free will*. Nietzsche's criticisms against agent metaphysics, in turn, stem from his discussion of the relation between language and metaphysics.

Considering the notions and expressions Nietzsche puts forward, I think we can fairly say that language is the very cradle of the basic metaphysical errors and the belief in free will. Having emerged at the time of the most primitive form of psychological and scientific knowledge, language has made us think in certain ways such as postulating the will as the cause of our actions, and a unified 'I' as substance which stands at the very centre of being¹⁶. To put it simply, words and notions have developed in such a way that people have forgotten their empirical grounding and have begun to posit certain 'metaphors' as 'real'¹⁷. As Nietzsche expresses, "we do not only *designate* things with them [the words and the concepts], we think originally that through them we grasp the *true* in things"¹⁸.

¹⁵ Leiter, 2001, pp. 281–321. Cited from Nel Grillaert.

¹⁶ Pearson and Large, 2006, p. xxxi.

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ HH, "Volume II", Part 2, §11.

Indeed, for Nietzsche, language is not the adequate expressions for things at all. Rather, it is a set of arbitrary designations and totally subjective stimulations¹⁹. For Nietzsche, those who claim that language is logical and it is derived from the essence of things are greatly mistaken. Contrary to that view, Nietzsche claims that all words are **metaphors** which correspond in no way to original entities²⁰. To illustrate, Nietzsche refers to the transference of a nerve stimulus into an image, as the first metaphor, and then the transference of this image to an imitation in a sound: second metaphor and that's finally what we encounter as a word²¹.

The above points Nietzsche makes constitute a great challenge to western metaphysics, considering a wider debate than the submission of our thesis. Our appeal to them is to make clear how the emergence and metaphysics of language led to the reification of certain notions such as free will, which is our main focus.

In the famous passage from *On the Genealogy of Morals* concerning the lambs and birds of prey, which we have already discussed in the introduction, Nietzsche writes:

For just as the popular mind separates the lightning from its flash and takes the latter for an *action*, for the operation of a subject called lightning, so popular morality²² also separates strength from expressions of strength, as if there were a neutral substratum behind the strong man, which was *free* to express strength or not to do so. But there is no such substratum; there is no “being” behind doing, effecting, becoming; “the doer” is merely a fiction added to the deed—the deed is everything²³

Interpreting the quotation above in “How One Becomes What One Is” Nehamas says that, the argument underlying Nietzsche’s view “must have been something like the following”²⁴: first, we tend to isolate the content of each idea, desire or conception so that each mental act is supposed to pose a distinct mental content, which in turn is independent from all other such acts. Having made this isolation, we later distinguish

¹⁹ TL, p.3.

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ Ibid.

²² “popular” or slave morality.

²³ GM, “First Essay”, §13.

²⁴ Nehamas, 1983, p.397.

the content of each act from the act that intends it. So, one's operation of *thinking about* comes to be taken as distinct from what it is about. Then, we tend to attribute an underlying, a unified self who is the *owner* of all these isolated thoughts.²⁵

To get deeper, we should note that, even though language “is a set of arbitrary designations,” there are still factors which more or less result with *that* kind of language. For Nietzsche, this situation stems from the intensification of slave-type judgments which, full of ill will and malice, wish that strength would not express itself as strength and which divide the continuous flux of life into units as cause-effect and/or agent-act. This is the tendency which makes the most of the structure of language²⁶.

A similar argument against the metaphysical errors committed through the misleading character of language is found in a famous section of *Beyond Good and Evil* where Nietzsche engages in a criticism of Descartes' conclusion that ‘he exists’. “For once and for all, we should free ourselves from the seduction of words!” says Nietzsche, pointing out the ‘I think’ which has been taken for granted as being immediately known and assured²⁷. For Nietzsche, the notion of “immediate certainty” which is said to have taken place in Descartes' reasoning, contains *contradictio in adjecto*²⁸ as well as the notions of “absolute knowledge” and the “thing in itself”. Trying to undermine the ‘immediate certainty’ of the ‘I think’, Nietzsche states as follows:

When I dissect the process expressed in the proposition ‘I think,’ I get a whole set of bold claims that are difficult, perhaps impossible, to establish, – for instance, that *I* am the one who is thinking, that there must be something that is thinking in the first place, that thinking is an activity and the effect of a being who is considered the cause, that there is an ‘I,’ and finally, that it has already been determined what is meant by thinking, – that I *know* what thinking is²⁹.

²⁵ Nehamas, p.398.

²⁶ See section 2.1.3., below.

²⁷ BGE, §16.

²⁸ Reduction to an absurdity (contradiction).

²⁹ BGE, §16.

In addition to the points Nietzsche puts forth above, he also emphasizes that, it is “a *falsification* of the facts to say that the subject ‘I’ is the condition of the predicate ‘think.’ It thinks: but to say the “it” is just that famous old ‘I... [is] by no means an ‘immediate certainty’”³⁰. Thus, Nietzsche concludes that: “a thought comes when ‘it’ wants, and not when ‘I’ want”³¹. Here as elsewhere, people follow their grammatical habits through which they conclude that thinking is an activity behind which there lies an active thinker.

The ontological presumption behind this grammatical habit is that “if there is a property or an activity, there must be a substance displaying that property or activity”. For Nietzsche on the other hand, each ‘thing’ is just the sum total of all its effects or *qualities*³² as the above-cited passage from the *Genealogy* illustrates. Stating the deed is a fiction and the doer is only a ‘second derivative’, Nietzsche seems to believe that, “because we commonly fail to take the contents of our mental acts into account”, we are tempted to take the self as *substance*. The invalidity of this assumption becomes more apparent if we consider that we recognize ourselves differently over time; even though what we call the ‘I’ keeps changing, we still assume it to be something constant³³.

In *The Twilight of the Idols* also, Nietzsche refers to the belief in ‘agent metaphysics’, as ‘the most ancient and long-established psychology’³⁴. In the eyes of this psychology, “every event was an action, every action the result of a will; in its eyes the world became a multiplicity of agents, an agent (a ‘subject’) foisting itself onto every event”³⁵.

Moreover, Nietzsche says that, “people projected their three ‘inner facts’ out of themselves and onto the world – the facts they believed most fervently, the will, the

³⁰ BGE, §17.

³¹ Ibid.

³² Nehamas, p.398.

³³ Nehamas, p.400.

³⁴ TI, “The Four Great Errors”, §3.

³⁵ Ibid.

mind, and the I”³⁶. In other words, deriving the notion of ‘being’ from the notion of the I, human beings have in turn postulated the existence of ‘things’ after their own image: the position of the I as a cause³⁷.

2.1.2. Against Determinism

“I laugh at your free will, and your unfree will as well”³⁸

It is on the basis of the deconstruction of the basic presuppositions of Western metaphysics that Nietzsche is able to also repudiate determinism. His rejection of determinism is based on uncovering those presuppositions that are involved in the mechanic understanding of causation that determinism stems from. The elaboration of this analysis involves the critique of what he calls the ‘soul atomism’. Thus, as we shall see, Nietzsche’s rejection of an unfree will finds its grounding on the same repudiation of a certain ontological model as does free will.

2.1.2.1. Determinism

To describe briefly, determinism is the overall philosophical term for various theories that share the belief that for every fact there is a condition that necessarily causes the fact and excludes all alternative manifestations of this fact³⁹.

Contemporary theories of determinism are heavily influenced by the progress in physical science, especially in seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The search for reliable, inviolable and unchanging laws of nature has been the chief motivation of this process. But this idea is not new; the outlook that everything consists of solid, impenetrable atoms can be found in ancient Greek thinkers such as Leucippus and Epicureans⁴⁰.

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ KSA, 10.348. *Sämtliche Werke. Kritische Studienausgabe in 15 Bänden (KSA)*. All KSA references are cited from N. Grilleart.

³⁹ Grillaert, p.46.

⁴⁰ Taylor, 1967, in *Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, p.10.

The idea of physical determinism had no difficulty finding itself a place within traditional philosophy. Whether it be the Platonic good or the God of theological or ethical determinism or the mechanistic laws of scientific determinism, the idea of an ultimate principle lying at the basis of and determining everything, including human actions, remained prevalent. Such a view brought about the idea that, if everything, including human *soul*, consists of material particles, and is resolvable into atoms, then human behaviour is analyzable and explainable via basic principles that explain material processes, in particular, in terms of the behaviour of atoms⁴¹.

The system of Thomas Hobbes' stands as a classical example of physical determinism within modern philosophy. His philosophy represents a profound attempt to portray human nature according to the basic suppositions of the science of bodies, viz. physics. Then, human behaviour can be explained via the same principles that we apply to matter, for it is indeed the behaviour of matter. We can say that, modern deterministic theories owe much to the *model* and the understanding Hobbes puts forward, for they have adopted his views with little modifications.

So, having given an overview of the common basis of deterministic theories, which reveals itself mostly in what we may call physical (or scientific) determinism, we need now to put forward how Nietzsche argues or would have argued against the basic ground or the outlook the deterministic theories have built upon.

2.1.2.2. Against Cause and Effect

Nietzsche's critique of determinism extends his critique of substance ontology so as to problematize the concepts of cause and effect. As is well known, Hume has already presented a powerful criticism of our belief in causation. According to this critique, we are the ones who attribute the notions of cause and effect to events, whereas all we can experience is a constant succession of these events. Thus, when we see two things following one another, we denote the former as 'cause' and the latter as 'effect'. Nietzsche's criticism of the notions of cause and effect echoes

⁴¹ Ibid.

Hume's criticism. However, Hume still remains within the confines of traditional metaphysics since he conceives of events in terms of disjoint snapshots.

Nietzsche also argues that determinism stems from a wrong comprehension of cause and effect. But he goes beyond Hume when he points out that this comprehension is in turn closely connected to misconceptions of mechanical physics and ontologies that are modelled on it. He illuminates the point as follows:

We should not erroneously *objectify* "cause" and "effect" like the natural scientists do [...] in accordance with the dominant mechanistic stupidity which would have the cause push and shove until it "effects" something; we should use "cause" and "effect" only as pure *concepts*, which is to say as conventional fictions for the purpose of description and communication, *not* explanation⁴²

Putting forward the above citation, Nietzsche points out to the fact that *we* are the ones who invented necessity, causality, freedom, purpose, etc. Once again, these explanations are 'human, all too human'. "In real life", Nietzsche expresses, there is neither free nor unfree will; it is just a matter of *strong* and *weak* will⁴³.

The belief in atomism, for Nietzsche, is another abuse of the scientific framework. "The belief in "matter," in the "material," in the residual piece of earth and clump of an atom [...]" is the symptom of the "atomistic need" and still has affects on people as the more famous "metaphysical need"⁴⁴. Nietzsche proceeds criticizing the "atomistic need" and dares to declare war against one of the most widespread kinds of it: the *atomism of the soul*, the Christian gospel which indoctrinated the indestructibility, indivisibility and eternity of the soul, which is seen as a monad, i.e. an *atomon*⁴⁵.

Nietzsche criticizes atomism because he sees in the conception of an 'atom', as in the conception of a soul the residue of a tradition that tries to establish reality outside the world of change, in a static conception of Being as opposed to Becoming.

⁴² BGE, §21.

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ Ibid. §12.

⁴⁵ Ibid.

2.1.3. Will to Power

As quoted above, “in real life”, Nietzsche claims, “there is neither free nor unfree will; it is just a matter of *strong* and *weak* wills”⁴⁶.

I think this expression is like a pinpoint summary of Nietzsche’s understanding of the so called problem of free will. Whatever kind of a thing the will is, it must be understood beyond freedom or un-freedom since both of these notions are loaded with metaphysical presuppositions. In trying to understand agency and selfhood, Nietzsche makes use of the notions of strength and weakness, which are more naturalistic.

According to Nietzsche, the assumption of an ‘I’ as a substance and its projection onto other entities in the form of a substance metaphysics should be thrown out of science as the path lies open for more sophisticated accounts of the ‘I’: “mortal soul”, “soul as multiplicity” or “soul as a society constructed out of drives and affects”⁴⁷. For Nietzsche, underlying what is assumed to be an ‘I’ as a substance is nothing but a struggle of dominance between ‘competing’ character traits, or rather, a multiplicity of drives and affects until one becomes superior and assumes the role of a subject.

More generally, organic life consists of not a static condition but “a dynamic and chaotic process of creation and decay, of overpowering and becoming overpowered, of suppressing and being suppressed”⁴⁸: life is essentially will to power⁴⁹. A common misunderstanding of will to power as the basic life instinct would be to think of that life instinct as a self-preservation instinct *a la* Hobbes or Darwin. Nietzsche is in fact quite critical of this Darwinian interpretation of biological life as the ‘struggle

⁴⁶ Ibid. §21.

⁴⁷ Ibid., §12.

⁴⁸ Rolf-Peter Horstmann, 2002, p. xxv.

⁴⁹ BGE, §13.

for existence'. He says that, the 'instinct of self-preservation' is only one of the indirect and most frequent consequences of will to power⁵⁰, an exception and a temporary *mode*, 'a restriction of the will to life'⁵¹.

For Nietzsche, every organic being, whether strong or weak, is in need of expressing itself as it is, i.e. *discharging* its force – this is the unrestrainable principle of the will to power. As much as the political organization of the society has tried to protect itself from the harmful effects of the very basic instincts, those instincts were internalized: "[h]ostility, cruelty, joy in persecuting, in attacking, in change, in destruction – all this turned against the possessors of such instincts"⁵². Nietzsche also points out this process as the emergence of *bad conscience*. In fact, this is a case which Nietzsche calls 'the will turning against itself', that is, the very natural and life-enhancing instincts are rejected and instead, life-negating values are *embraced*.

Referring to the same process of internalization in *Beyond Good and Evil*, Nietzsche writes: "the 'wild animal' has not been killed off at all; it is alive and well, it has just – become divine"⁵³

In short, as Nietzsche points out, the agent/act division has emanated so vastly and deeply to our perception that we almost always think in terms of that division, including both the daily, basic events and relatively intellectual phenomena. Thus, the weak individual, "prompted by an instinct for self-preservation and self-affirmation in which every lie is sanctified", *needs* to believe in a neutral subject behind every deed. This 'neutral subject', in turn, is taken to be "*free* to express strength or not to do so"⁵⁴.

In order to make better sense of will to power in relation to our subject matter, i.e., Nietzsche's rejection of the traditional ontological and psychological grounds of the problem of free will, we should return to our famous passage from *On the Genealogy*

⁵⁰ WP, §650.

⁵¹ GS, "Book Five", §349.

⁵² GM, "Second Essay", §16.

⁵³ BGE, §229.

⁵⁴ GM, "First Essay", §13.

of *Morals*. There, it is supposed that the lambs say among themselves that ‘these birds of prey are evil’ and ‘whoever resembles them as little as possible should be good’. On the other hand, the birds of prey might be looking down and saying a little ironically: “we don't dislike them at all, these good little lambs; we even love them: nothing is more tasty than a tender lamb”,⁵⁵.

By means of the passage we have referred above, Nietzsche points out to the understanding and emergence of the conception of ‘goodness’ by people of *ressentiment*. This kind of morality perceives both weakness and strength as a matter of preference stemming from one’s free will. Then, those so-called preferences were marked as *good* and *evil*, respectively.

The subject (or, to use a more popular expression, the *soul*) has perhaps been believed in hitherto more firmly than anything else on earth because it makes possible to the majority of mortals, the weak and oppressed of every kind, the sublime self-deception that interprets weakness as freedom, and their being thus-and-thus as a *merit*.⁵⁶

However, Nietzsche clarifies that, “[t]o demand of strength that it should *not* express itself as strength, that it should *not* be a desire to overcome, a desire to throw down, a desire to become master, a thirst for enemies and resistances and triumphs, is just as absurd as to demand of weakness that it should express itself as strength”,⁵⁷.

This statement of Nietzsche’s is one of those contentions of his that is most likely to evoke immediate objections. Surely it seems, *prima facie*, that there is a fundamental sense in which expecting me to do things that surpass my strength is not the same kind of thing as expecting me to withhold from doing something that I am capable of doing.

A proper response to this objection can be given only after we present Nietzsche’s genealogical account of the emergence of free will. For now, we will content

⁵⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁷ Ibid.

ourselves only with pointing out that the basic will to power in nature, the need to discharge itself cannot be eliminated, it can only be *internalized*. Nietzsche says that, when the instincts don't discharge themselves outwardly, they *turn inward*; that's how the phenomenon which human beings later called *soul* was **developed**⁵⁸. Hence, “[t]he entire inner world, originally as thin as if it were stretched between two membranes, expanded and extended itself, acquired depth, breadth, and height, in the same measure as outward discharge was *inhibited*”⁵⁹.

Nietzsche's critique of determinism has less of a psychological character than his critique of libertarianism. Nevertheless he makes a few observations concerning what the belief in a free or unfree will implies in terms of someone's *predisposition* towards life. He claims that whenever one feels or complains about some kind of “compulsion, need, having-to-follow, pressure, unfreedom in every “causal connection” and “psychological necessity””, there is an underlying hint about his/her tendency; viz. strength or weakness⁶⁰.

2.2. Psychological Arguments

As the discussions in the previous section (1.3) indicate, Nietzsche's understanding of will to power engenders different types of valuations. Thus Nietzsche investigates belief in free will as well as belief in determinism as symptomatic of different manifestations of will-to-power, different forms that manifestations of will to power take. This investigation takes him to a genealogical study of the origins of the notion of free will, and even the emergence of free will as a phenomenon itself. To show how the notion of will to power bridges Nietzsche's ontological refutation of the notion of free will to his psychological and genealogical analyses, I will first make use of Deleuze's interpretation of Nietzsche's understanding of will to power in section 2.1. Then, in section 2.2., I will present the genealogical investigation into the notion of free will. Here I will make use of Foucault's interpretation.

⁵⁸ GM, “Second Essay”, §16.

⁵⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁰ BGE, §21.

2.2.1. Interpretation and Valuation

As mentioned above, Nietzsche asserts that, the belief in determinism, as the belief in free will, is closely related with one's *perspective* towards life. It is based on how one interprets or which interpretation he/she feels closer to, about the fundamental things in life.

But it should be noted that, Nietzsche does not see those different interpretations as mere 'preferences' but an aggregate of various factors which together characterize who one is. This seems to be the very point where Nietzsche may seem to give a deterministic impression for some readers or scholars.

According to Nietzsche *we* manipulate and believe in the way we need. Indeed, the whole life lying before us is predisposed by our very human needs and instincts. To be more specific, the kinds of constructions, causes, classifications etc. we've invented has to do with the notion that he calls will to power.

Most importantly, creating or imposing values is a very important aspect and manifestation of will to power, a notion which he expresses as "the innermost essence of being"⁶¹.

The crucial point Nietzsche maintains is to explore the psychological elements in the process of invention of values. "The standpoint of 'value' is the standpoint of conditions of preservation and enhancement for complex forms of relative life-duration within the flux of becoming"⁶².

According to Nietzsche, values do not have objective standing; they are forces which are in turn controlled or dominated by countless other forces. The significance or *meaning* of a certain value depends on the certain dominating force(s) at that certain

⁶¹ WP, §693.

⁶² WP §715.

time, under which it has the right to possess itself as a value⁶³. “The sense of something” says Deleuze⁶⁴, “is its relation to the force which takes possession of it, the value of something is the hierarchy of forces which are expressed in it as a complex phenomenon”.

In other words, Nietzsche unburdens values of their metaphysical and stable meaning and uncovers them as organic and orientational forces.

Understood that way, Nietzsche says, “value is the highest quantum of power that a man is able to incorporate”⁶⁵. Indeed, the imposition of our value-laden forms upon ‘becoming’- i.e. upon the great complexity and chaos of *reality* – is just a manifestation of the very notion Nietzsche calls will to power: ‘to impose upon becoming the character of being’ – that is the greatest will to power⁶⁶.

Hence, for Nietzsche, there are many diverse perspectives within life which all correspond to the subjugation and resignation of different forces within will to power. In connection with this, Deleuze says, “to interpret is to determine the force which gives sense to a thing. To evaluate is to determine *the will to power which gives value a thing*”⁶⁷. And the special method Nietzsche applies for exploring the meaning and history of not only values but also various life forms is genealogy. “A value always has a genealogy on which the nobility or baseness of what it invites us to believe, feel and think depends”⁶⁸, and only a genealogist- who knows how to manage the *differential element*- is able to discover what sort of life forms (whether nobility or baseness) find their expression in a certain value. Here, the will to power

⁶³We should also note that, Nietzsche’s account on the issue is by far more complex and delicate than those who emphasize on utility when values or in general morality is the subject matter. Instead, Nietzsche sees phenomena, and so the morality, in the light of his genealogical account, which we will be discussing soon.

⁶⁴ Deleuze, 2002, p.8.

⁶⁵ WP, §713.

⁶⁶ WP, §617.

⁶⁷ Deleuze, p.54. Emphasis mine.

⁶⁸ Ibid.

is seen as the genealogical element from which senses acquire their meaning and values their value⁶⁹.

2.2.2. Genealogy

According to Nietzsche, the notion of free will was invented and is generally endorsed by theologians for the purpose of burdening people with moral responsibility and legitimizing after-life judgment and punishment.

Here, Nietzsche touches a central theological problem by making the following critique: as far as it is presented and understood, the Christian concept of God is essentially good, omnipotent and omniscient so that God also preconditions human fate. This position poses some problems. First, if humans are predestined, they don't have final control in their deeds and thereby they cannot be held responsible and punished. A second crucial problem is that, how is the presence of "evil" in the world going to be explained? If God controls everything, should not he also be responsible for evil? So, according to Nietzsche, in order to solve these theological riddles, Christian theologians created the concept of free will⁷⁰.

Then, that concept of free will has begun to be used by humans who have an instinctual urge to judge others. Nietzsche puts this issue forward as follows:

I shall give here simply the psychology behind every kind of making people responsible. – Wherever responsibilities are sought, it is usually the instinct for *wanting to punish and judge* that is doing the searching. Becoming is stripped of its innocence once any state of affairs is traced back to a will, to intentions, to responsible acts: the doctrine of the will was fabricated essentially for the purpose of punishment, i.e. of *wanting to find guilty*⁷¹

Here, we are confronted with a "backward reading" of a historical phenomena, the style of which quite fits Nietzsche's genealogical attitude. So, contrary to common consent, Nietzsche maintains that, moral responsibility does not follow from the fact that humans are endowed with free will; they had to be counted to be endowed with

⁶⁹ Ibid.

⁷⁰ Grilleart, p.45.

⁷¹ Pearson and Large, p.472.

free will in order to be burdened with moral responsibility. “People were thought of as ‘free’ so that they could be judged and punished – so that they could become *guilty*: consequently every action *had* to be thought of as willed, the origin of every action as located in consciousness”⁷²

Nevertheless, Nietzsche maintains, “free will” is far from being the *true* addressee of the notions of guilt or responsibility. In *On the Genealogy of Morals* Nietzsche points out to the emergence of responsibility and how it begun to be perceived as a characteristic of self-mastery and sovereignty. We will be discussing that point in detail in this section.

As we have noted before, for Nietzsche, values are organic phenomena which have a history that supposes the perpetual struggle of forces and which must be inquired genealogically, which is quite different from the metaphysical traditional understanding of history. Even though genealogy is something related to history, it differs from the traditional understanding of history in many aspects. At this point, to get a better understanding of how genealogy pursues its way, how it differs from the ordinary understanding of history and also the search for origin, we will now have a close look at Foucault’s detailed analysis in “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History”.

To begin with, Foucault pays great attention to Nietzsche’s choice of terms, and says that, in Nietzsche, we find two uses of the word *Ursprung*⁷³ – one is unstressed and the other is stressed. On those places he uses it unstressed, he refers to the same notion interchangeably by using the words such as *Ursprung*, *Entstehung*, *Herkunft*, *Abkunft*, *Geburt*. However, occasionally, Nietzsche uses the term as stressed. Foucault claims that, beginning with the *Genealogy*, Nietzsche tried to validate an opposition between *Herkunft* and *Ursprung* that did not exist earlier⁷⁴.

Then, Foucault directs the question of why Nietzsche challenges the search for an origin [*Ursprung*], at least on those points when he is genuinely a genealogist. And

⁷² Ibid.

⁷³ origin.

⁷⁴ Foucault, 1977, p.141.

for him, the answer lies in the traditional historical method's effort to grasp the exact essence of things, the purest possibilities, and the deliberately kept identities. In addition, this kind of search presumes the existence of fixed forms and it is directed at "that which was already there", an image of a *prehistorical* truth⁷⁵.

On the other hand, the genealogical analysis is directed to show that, there is no essence, no stable or hidden origin of things; instead "what is found at the historical beginning of things is not the inviolable identity of their origin; it is the dissention of other things. It is disparity"⁷⁶.

Then, Foucault says that, Nietzsche's usage of *Entstehung* and *Herkunft* are more exact than *Ursprung* for grasping the true sense of genealogy. Hence, Foucault attempts to explain those two notions in relation with Nietzsche's understanding of 'origin'.

In order to make sense of the *origin* in the genealogical sense, Nietzsche applies to the notion of *Entstehung*, which designates *emergence*, the moment of arising. For example, the emergence of the 'soul' which we briefly discussed above in section 1.3 exemplifies nicely what Foucault is getting at with his discussion of the notion of emergence in Nietzsche's genealogy. Foucault makes it clear that emergence "stands as the principle and the singular law of apparition"⁷⁷. Here Foucault warns that, we should avoid thinking of emergence as a final state of the historical development. To exemplify, Foucault says, "the eye was not always intended for contemplation, and punishment has had other purposes than setting an example"⁷⁸. Thus, the point where the metaphysician errs is to project our present-day understanding and use of a concept onto the very origin of that concept while what he/she takes to be the culmination is only a current episode within a continuity of dominations and subjugations (which again implies the *will to power*) – ie. which will keep changing and evolving.

⁷⁵ Ibid. p.142.

⁷⁶ Ibid.

⁷⁷ Ibid., p.148.

⁷⁸ Ibid.

The other notion Nietzsche makes use of is *Herkunft*, which is “the equivalent of stock or descent; it is the ancient affiliation to a group, sustained by the bonds of blood, tradition, or social class”⁷⁹. Although the analysis of *Herkunft* involves an examination of race or social type, the characteristics it attempts to identify are not the generic characteristics of an individual, an attitude or an idea which allow us to sort them out ‘German’ or ‘Greek’; instead, Foucault says, the analysis of *Herkunft* “seeks the subtle, singular, and subindividual marks that might possibly intersect in them to form a network that is difficult to unravel”⁸⁰

Furthermore, the analysis of descent [*Herkunft*] does not try to restore an unbroken chain of events to pretend that the ‘past actively exists in the present’ but it seeks to figure out the errors and the false estimations that gave birth to those values and evaluations that exist today. It also shows the heterogeneity and fragmentation of the ‘foundation’ which our common-sense anticipates as unified and consistent.

The way Nietzsche traces the marks of metaphysical concepts in unexpected places - - such as the body—can be seen in his account of the emergence of ‘memory’ which is closely related to the notion of free will, moral responsibility and bad conscience.

The human animal, Nietzsche tells, naturally had the capacity for forgetfulness, like a digestion system which serves for ‘having done’ with the past. Once seen a sign of a robust health, forgetfulness today counts as a weakness and unreliability especially within certain cases, that is where promises are made. Then, for the sake of promise-giving and responsibility, the human animal had to develop a counter force – memory – and that was emerged under the cruelest implementations, for “if something is to stay in the memory it must be burned in: only that which never ceases to *hurt* stays in the memory”⁸¹ Nietzsche reveals that, in the end, like a ‘ripest fruit’ of a tree, there emerges modern, sovereign individual. However, there is hidden so much cruelty, terror, blood and torture under the ripest fruit. In order for memory to develop from its

⁷⁹ Ibid. p.145.

⁸⁰ Ibid.

⁸¹ GM, “Second Essay”, §3.

opposite, which is forgetfulness, and turn into an instinct today, the human animal had been subject to the worst inflictions.

Here, Nietzsche clarifies that, possessing ‘free will’ is a very late presumption for being judged or punished, viz. for being *responsible*. In other words, what seems so natural to us today, the possibility that we “could have acted otherwise” was not always the basis for holding someone responsible or guilty. The *premodern* basis of responsibility, which in turn required memory, emerged from the relationship between the debtor and creditor. Whenever a debtor [*Schuldner*] were incapable of, or ignorant of repaying the debt, it was guilt [*Schuld*] of him/her. Needless to say, the creditor *had to* compensate for his lost possession; he/she needed an equivalent for the damage done. The debtor had no money, but he had other things to compensate, such as his body, his wife, his freedom and even his life. *For justice’s sake*, the creditor had the right to inflict every kind of torture upon the body of the debtor for only that way the creditor felt his loss compensated. By time, the debtor would have to learn how to keep promises and pledge his word, he had to learn to be responsible, to stay the same throughout events; all in all, he had to become calculable.

As Foucault says, “descent attaches itself to the body”⁸² in the sense that the body and whatever touches it, as diet, climate, nourishment, soil and so on is the realm of *Herkunft*. Here, we can see the basic will to power of the body and within the body when Foucault says: “these elements may join in a body where they achieve a sudden expression, but as often, their encounter is an engagement in which they efface each other, where the body becomes the pretext of their insurmountable conflict”⁸³. Considering body as the “inscribed surface of events (traced by language and dissolved by ideas), the locus of a dissociated self (adopting the illusion of a substantial unity) [...]”, genealogy, being an analysis of descent, is thus positioned within the articulation of the body and history, having the task of exposing the body imprinted by history⁸⁴.

⁸² Foucault, p.147.

⁸³ Ibid. p.148.

⁸⁴ Ibid.

As descent has to do with the strength or weakness of a value or an instinct and the inscription of it on the body, emergence specifies a place of confrontation as an ongoing field of struggle among the hierarchical forces⁸⁵. Understood that way, the authority of certain groups over others brings about a differentiation of values. For example, in Nietzsche's words, "class domination generates the idea of liberty; and the forceful appropriation of things necessary to survival and the imposition of a duration not intrinsic to them account for the origin of logic"⁸⁶.

Thus we have referred to the long prehistory of the human animal: how it was bred so as to make promises. Moreover, it is shown how the notions of responsibility and guilt emerged in a way we are unlikely to think of: from a material relation between the creditor and debtor. Again, this is the story of the strangeness of the emergence of memory out of its opposite and the sovereign individual after the infliction of much torture. Once again, Nietzsche keeps his eye on what is uncanny, strange and subtle and makes clear how the notion of free will originated and begun to be associated with responsibility⁸⁷.

In sum, Nietzsche is neither a libertarian nor a no-freedom theorist. Still, concerning him as a *compatibilist* is one of the manners which seems to be most *un-Nietzschean*⁸⁸. At that point, I would like to specify my point as follows: asking whether Nietzsche defends free will or determinism may be an initial point for a philosophical study. However, trying to categorize Nietzsche's manner in one of the traditional forms (including compatibilism) would be a matter of misinterpretation. "The purported analyses of self-making tend to track one or another of the "determinist-compatibilist-libertarian" resolutions of the free-will problem and this leads to the entire issue getting sucked into the black hole of the very metaphysics Nietzsche so clearly denounces"⁸⁹: "I laugh at your free will, and your unfree will as well"⁹⁰

⁸⁵ Ibid. p.150.

⁸⁶ Ibid.

⁸⁷ GM, "Second Essay".

⁸⁸ Grillaert is one of those who refers to Nietzsche as a compatibilist (p.57).

⁸⁹ Robert C. Solomon, 2002, p.76.

⁹⁰ KSA, 10.348.

What we have noted above signifies for our subject-matter is that, for Nietzsche, both free will and unfree will are superficially-made conceptions of what really have to be interpreted as basic instincts through will to power. In other words, the debate on 'freedom of the will' is to be understood as a psychological one having to do with the ongoing struggle between various forces until some become dominant for a period and access right to be associated with that certain phenomenon under a name. Hence, whether one is a strong defender of free will or in a strict opposition to it, what Nietzsche sees here is the predisposition of that person about the basic conditions of life, i.e. under what kind of basic affections and instincts the thought and action of that person is manipulated.

CHAPTER III

NIETZSCHE'S WAY: BECOMING WHO YOU ARE

In the previous chapter, while explaining why Nietzsche's position on the question of free will cannot be understood within the traditional framework, we also presented a brief sketch of his notion of will to power and valuation. In this chapter, we will try to see if it is now easier to make sense of Nietzsche's seemingly contradictory declamations on the issue. While our task may still be no easier, the account of will to power and valuation presented in the previous section, as well as Nietzsche's unique understanding of the human soul as something that is not static but evolving, revealed in the genealogical account of section 2.2.2., are indispensable as the background to our discussion in this chapter.

In this chapter, I will present Nietzsche's fatalism as something distinct from determinism. His fatalism is motivated by his insight into the notion of moral responsibility and wanting to find guilty that is so intrinsic to traditional morality and libertarianism acquired through the genealogical analysis described in the previous chapter. Another crucial conceptual tool from the previous chapter is the notion of will to power which helps us in understanding not only slave morality and resentment but also Nietzsche's understanding of fate and necessity. In the second section of this chapter, I will try to make sense of the persistence of the appearance of contradictory attitudes in Nietzsche's writings, this time couched in terms of the apparent contradiction between yes saying and no saying. Finally, I will present how I believe these contradictions can be explained away.

3.1. *Amor Fati*: Yes-Saying

“*Our fate* -- it was the fulness, the tension, the storing up of powers”⁹¹

Hitherto, we discussed Nietzsche’s rejection of libertarianism and determinism on the basis of a rejection of the traditional ontological paradigm, and we tried to present the fundamentals of Nietzsche’s ontology: will to power and perspectivism that comes with the related evaluations and interpretations of will to power. However, this is not enough to clarify what Nietzsche’s stance on the issue is. In other words, some of his statements concerning our freedom still appear contradictory even in light his ontological framework, or, at least, the clarification of the apparent contradictions requires further elaboration. For example, in some contexts Nietzsche seems to attribute a positive connotation to the notion of free will. On the other hand, he often urges people to love [their] fate (*amor fati*). Yet again in many of his writings he puts a strong emphasis on self-mastery, revaluation and even self-creation. Similarly, while the notion of *amor fati* is strongly connected with a yes-saying attitude (affirmation of life), Nietzsche’s writings are full of criticisms and ‘no’s that seem to amount to strong no-saying attitude and even nihilism. How are these inconsistencies to be resolved?

To gain a better understanding of Nietzsche’s position here, we need to elaborate on first his understanding of *amor fati* (which is a kind of fatalism, distinct from determinism) and second, his understanding of self-creation (which is distinct from libertarianism and related to the question of revaluation). Only then can we address the question which is the core of our thesis: is there an inconsistency between Nietzsche’s exhortations to *amor fati* as well as to self-creation, a seeming inconsistency that becomes most patent in his formulation “you shall become who you are”. We will argue that his understanding of self-creation is in tune with his fatalism.

⁹¹ AC, “Preface” §1.

3.1.1. Determinism vs. Nietzsche's Fatalism

To grasp Nietzsche's understanding of fatalism, it may be useful to touch on the notions of fate and fatalism that came before Nietzsche, and to point out the difference between determinism and fatalism.

For some readers at first, Nietzsche's famous notion of *amor fati* may seem to imply determinism; however, *amor fati* implies fatalism which is an ancient notion and not determinism which is a modern notion. As Robert C. Solomon's says in "Nietzsche on Fatalism and 'Free Will'", "[...] fatalism is not determinism, and Nietzsche's acceptance of the former has almost nothing to do with the latter. It is rather a harking back to the ancient Greek notion of *moira*, or fate, and has little to do with modern scientific thinking"⁹². Rather, fatalism is an *aesthetic* thesis which does not imply a specifiable causal chain but grants only the notion of a necessary outcome and the *narrative* in which that necessity becomes evident⁹³.

However, in modern thought, fatalism is usually dismissed as being superstitious whereas determinism is respected by certain thinkers or groups as the scientific thesis. Our aim is not to position these two as incompatible opposites; yet we still would not reduce one to the other⁹⁴. The notions of fate and fatalism have a history millennia older than determinism. For instance, the ancient Greeks had the concept of *moira*; before them, the Chinese had *ming*; and even before them the early Indian philosophers contemplated on *karma*⁹⁵. Moreover, 'God's will' has been the basic explanation of misfortune and disaster for ancient Jews and then for the Christians and Muslims. Doubtless, what the notions signify among different cultural groups manifest great differences: the difference between fate and fatalism; differences in how fate stands in relation to 'God's will'; differences in the extent and degree as well as the

⁹² Solomon, 2002, p.64.

⁹³ Ibid.

⁹⁴ We also would like to note that, our engagement with determinism is limited to showing how Nietzsche's various thoughts should not be read in the category of modern deterministic thought.

⁹⁵ Robert C. Solomon, 2003, p. 437.

nature of necessity that fate involves; and differences between the interpretations of how one is to *operate* fate⁹⁶.

To describe briefly, “fatalism is the idea that what happens (or has happened) in some sense *has* to (or *had* to) happen”⁹⁷. This definition inevitably implies necessity; however, the kind of necessity that fatalism involves is not a causal (as in determinism) or a logical one. As Solomon says, the necessity that fatalism implies is rather a kind of ‘narrative necessity’, which resembles the “‘logic’ of a novel or movie plot”⁹⁸. Thus, if we were to consider our lives as a novel with an ongoing scenario, what fatalism implies is the inevitability of certain events or outcomes which may turn out to be quite different from those we would have imagined. In this sense, appealing to fatalism (or fate) “is nothing than to insist that in terms of the overall plot (whatever that may turn out to be) an act or event has considerable significance”⁹⁹.

Moreover, fatalism also differs from any kind of Judeo-Christian understanding of ‘God’s will’, the belief which also comes up with the notion of ‘free will’. According to most of the Christian thinkers, fatalism implies paganism, which puts it in strict opposition to their perception of theology.

As we have noted above that, there is also a difference between fate and fatalism. As Solomon defines in “On Fate and Fatalism”, “[f]ate is a more ancient and therefore often more personalized version of fatalism”¹⁰⁰. However, we would like to note that, this “personalized” account need not be any sort of mysterious agency. We can also say that the distinction may have a linguistic ground more than a philosophical one, since fate serves as an explanation whereas fatalism is a doctrine¹⁰¹. Thus, even though the notion of fate seems to invoke a kind of agency, it is possible to take it merely as a linguistic derivation, without referring to any kind of personification.

⁹⁶ Ibid.

⁹⁷ Ibid. p.435.

⁹⁸ Ibid. p.438.

⁹⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid. p.442

¹⁰¹ Ibid.

Nietzsche owes a lot to the ancient tragedies (especially Homer's *Iliad*) in his understanding of fatalism. In Homer's usage, there is seen no specific difference (or at least an emphasis on the difference) between fate and fatalism: there is no agent, but only the inevitability of certain events. According to this ancient understanding of fatalism, fate cannot be avoided, even by the gods – e.g. Zeus¹⁰². Nietzsche, in line with ancient Greeks, talks of fate but what he really means is fatalism: “[t]hat is, he urges us to appreciate the necessity and significance of outcomes without reference to any mysterious agency”¹⁰³.

To make better sense of Nietzsche's fatalism, Solomon argues that, one should consider Heraclitus' expression of “Character is fate”, which is a perfectly plausible notion of fate and also compatible with what Nietzsche has in mind¹⁰⁴. In order to make good sense of fatalism, one need not cling to any fancy metaphysical outlook since *character* is a perfectly natural and intelligible home for fate. Understood that way, there is room for individual self-making without invoking such terms as ‘free will’. To support his point, Solomon exemplifies the high school reunions where people see each other after many years. There, the positions people occupy, their lifestyle and even the “opportunities” or “misfortune” they confront are mostly no surprise to each other. “What is so shocking is how *little* most of one's classmates have changed after ten, twenty, and even forty years” says Solomon¹⁰⁵. Thus, we see that, character gives early hints for one's “fate” which is far from mystery.

Furthermore, emphasizing on the *character*, Nietzsche's notion of fatalism also differs from determinism as it [fatalism] considers the outcome as in some sense necessary, given the nature of the person's character, which by time supposes a protracted narrative that, all things considered, encloses the whole of that person's life, culture, and circumstances¹⁰⁶. In other words, fate would not make somebody do what he/she

¹⁰² Solomon, 2002, p.70

¹⁰³ Ibid.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid. p.66.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid. p.67.

would not otherwise do¹⁰⁷. So, one might fairly say that, for Nietzsche, “**character is agency** and thus embodies both freedom and necessity”¹⁰⁸.

Martha Nussbaum’s discussion of the Greek play *Agamemnon* would be useful in understanding the relation between character and agency, on the one hand, and necessity and external forces beyond one’s control, on the other.

In this tragedy, Agamemnon, the Greek king, finds himself in the middle of a terrible dilemma. In return of an expedition, Agamemnon is told that, the whole expedition will ‘remain becalmed’ if he does not obey the order of the gods. However, the order is more than just severe, which is the sacrifice of Agamemnon’s daughter, Iphigenia. How can one kill his own daughter and how can one endure this? On the other hand, if he does not, everyone will die, including his daughter. If the latter happens, “[h]e will also be abandoning the expedition and, therefore, violating the command of Zeus. He will be a *deserter*”¹⁰⁹, which would amount to being impious. Nussbaum notes that, in this dilemma, the sacrifice of Iphigenia seemed preferable –no matter how hard was it – “both because of consequences and because of the impiety involved in the other choice”¹¹⁰.

In this case, Agamemnon seems to be ‘allowed to choose’ from one of the cases; he is not physically forced to choose either one. However, the situation allows no *desirable* choice; both options bring guilt and sorrow. At the same time, this is a specific case where necessity and *free* choice complement each other to such a degree that they become one and the same thing. Thus, it is told that, although Agamemnon’s first response is anger and despair, as time goes by and he makes his decision – which is the ‘lesser of two evils’ – the dichotomy between choice and necessity begins to dissolve. Agamemnon, who first suffers under the great burden and responsibility of the command, at the end comes to a point where he begins to *collaborate* with

¹⁰⁷ Solomon, 2003, p. 445.

¹⁰⁸ Solomon, 2002, p.70. Emphasis mine.

¹⁰⁹ Nussbaum, 1996, p.765.

¹¹⁰ Ibid. p.765.

necessity. In other words, Agamemnon now begins to arrange his feelings so as to accord with his fate, which makes him *strangely* turn into “a willing victim”¹¹¹.

Thus, one of the main aspects of ancient Greek tragedy that Nietzsche most admired was this willingness of the tragic hero to embrace his ‘fate’. We can say that, the notion of *amor fati* is basically about having this attitude.

In light of all this, it becomes all the more clear that ‘character’ in this sense is not a metaphysical subject endowed with free will but is nevertheless an agent manifesting will to power.

Solomon also asserts that, Nietzsche’s notion of fatalism is *teleological* rather than causal. He supports his point saying that, Nietzsche strictly criticizes teleology as a mode of explanation but what he exactly rejects is the idea of a God at the background who inflicts purpose on earthly happenings. To put it simply, he rejects ‘theological teleology’¹¹² while admitting purposes evident in every animate things. Then Solomon proceeds saying that, Nietzsche’s notion of Will to Power would have been unintelligible without teleology in this sense as well as his talk of ‘drives’ and ‘instincts’¹¹³. Here, it is crucial to grasp that “a drive is not just a physiological ‘push’. It is also a push toward something, a goal that presumably will provide some sort of satisfaction”¹¹⁴.

Even though Solomon’s explanations above make sense, there is some point which would have been better to put forth differently. I think the term teleology is loaded with various associations, such as an explainable logic and a defined direction of history, we would not want to call forth; so it would have been better to use the notion of *intentional* instead. Thus, we should think of Nietzsche’s understanding of will to power as intentional, rather than teleological.

¹¹¹ Ibid. p.766.

¹¹² Solomon, 2002, p.67.

¹¹³ Ibid.

¹¹⁴ Ibid. pp.67f.

In Nietzsche's philosophy the necessity involved in fatalism is understood in terms of this will to power and its all-pervasive, unavoidable, and final character. Thus, the seemingly external necessity in events is internalized even more convincingly in Nietzsche's conceptual framework than it is in ancient Greek tragedy.

3.1.2. Dionysus as a Symbol of Affirmation

"Saying yes to life, even in its strangest and hardest problems; [...] that is what I called Dionysian"¹¹⁵

The Greek God Dionysus¹¹⁶ has been a great symbol of affirmation for Nietzsche, though *his* Dionysus may be slightly different from the historical figure of Dionysus. In Nietzsche's understanding of the Dionysian spirit, the *tragic* meaning of life and especially suffering is stressed in contrast to the Christian meaning of these notions, which sees suffering as a kind of *evil* that must be avoided as much as possible. However, in the *tragic* meaning, suffering is affirmed as a main component of a satisfactory and healthy life. At this point, Nietzsche makes clear that, the problem about suffering is not the suffering itself but "that of the meaning of suffering: whether a Christian meaning or a tragic meaning...The tragic man affirms even the harshest suffering"¹¹⁷.

Another point we should take into consideration is that, at many points, Nietzsche identifies Dionysus with Zarathustra. So we may fairly claim that, what is pointed out later in Nietzsche's works about the great affirmation Zarathustra has towards life, is also applicable to Nietzsche's understanding of the *Dionysian*. To exemplify, in BT, Nietzsche refers to Zarathustra as the 'Dionysian monster'¹¹⁸. Moreover, in

¹¹⁵ TI, "What I Owe The Ancients", §5.

¹¹⁶ "Dionysus, the son of Zeus and Semele, daughter of Cadmus, king of Thebes, is traditionally the god of wine and tragedy. His worship was associated with intoxication and loss of identity, sometimes leading to sexual excess and violence, and he is frequently represented in animal form as half-goat." Cited from Pearson and Large, p.42.

¹¹⁷ Kaufmann, 1989, p. 209.

¹¹⁸ BT, p.9.

EH, when Nietzsche calls Zarathustra as the supreme yes-sayer and no-sayer at the same time, he also adds that “*this is the concept of Dionysus himself*”¹¹⁹.

For Nietzsche, Dionysus is also the ‘contrast image’ of the Jesus of the gospels who excludes change and becoming, and who is in the eyes of Nietzsche the symbol of the *curse* on and *disgust* of the body and bodily instincts¹²⁰. As one of Nietzsche’s philosophical aims is to glorify life, change and becoming against the *ideality* of permanence and being, he follows this image of the Dionysian affirmation, against that of the *crucified*. This attitude is so central to Nietzsche’s thought that he concludes EH as follows: “Have I been understood? — *Dionysus versus the Crucified* —”¹²¹

3.1.3. Eternal Recurrence: A Test of Affirmation

If one is to survey the philosopher’s attitude towards fatalism and affirmation in Nietzsche’s philosophy, the doctrine of eternal recurrence occupies a crucial place. Among the various references he makes to the *doctrine*, the most noteworthy passage seems to be the following:

The Heaviest weight. – What if some day or night a demon were to steal into your loneliest loneliness and say to you: ‘This life as you now live it and have lived it you will have to live once again and innumerable times again; and there will be nothing new in it, but every pain and every joy and every thought and sigh and everything unspeakably small or great in your life must return to you, all in the same succession and sequence — even this spider and this moonlight between the trees, and even this moment and I myself. The eternal hourglass of existence is turned over again and again, and you with it speck of dust!’¹²²

Doubtless, the idea seems *radical* as well as agitating, and I think this is what Nietzsche really aimed at, in the first place¹²³. Here as elsewhere, Nietzsche urges us

¹¹⁹ EH, p.306.

¹²⁰ Kaufmann, 1989, p.207.

¹²¹ EH, p. 335.

¹²² GS. §341.

¹²³ There have been different interpretations about that doctrine: a cosmological hypothesis or a psychological test, to name but two. Our concern here is related to the interpretation which takes the doctrine of eternal recurrence as a *psychological test*.

to examine ourselves and lives, this time by imagining ourselves in such an ever-returning cycle. And under the *heaviest weight* of this *experiment*, one is challenged to *see* his/her life in light of the question follows: “do you wish all that happen again and again, an innumerable number of times?” So, for the subject matter of this thesis, the most important aspect of this doctrine is its being a *psychological test* of affirmation. This attitude of Nietzsche’s is clear in the continuation from the passage we have referred above. Here, for Nietzsche, there are basically two responses to the ‘demon’:

Would you not throw yourself down and gnash your teeth and curse the demon who spoke thus? Or have you once experienced a tremendous moment when you would have answered him: ‘You are a god, and never have I heard anything more divine’¹²⁴

I think this point is also related with what we have called Nietzsche’s ‘yes-saying’ and ‘no-saying’ attitudes. So, it’s a matter of saying ‘yes’ or ‘no’ to life, considered as a *totality* with its joy and suffering. Karl Jaspers seems to consider the same point when he stresses on *the connection of everything with everything else*¹²⁵ in Nietzsche’s understanding. So, according to this thought, whenever one wishes a single joy to recur at any time, he/she is *prompted* to affirm also every moment of suffering and life in its eternity¹²⁶:

Did you ever say Yes to one joy? O my friends, then you said Yes to *all* woe as well. All things are chained and entwined together, all things are in love; if ever you wanted one moment twice, if ever you said: ‘You please me, happiness, instant, moment!’ then you wanted *everything* to return!¹²⁷

Then, as we have tried to make clear, the doctrine of the *eternal recurrence of the same*, as well as *amor fati*, embodies a strong form of affirmation of life. These two notions also stand as the *cornerstones* of an affirmative life, which Nietzsche so much glorifies. Moreover, these are together the key elements of the relation between fate and freedom in Nietzsche, which is our main concern. So, while it seems perplexing,

¹²⁴ GS, §341.

¹²⁵ Jaspers, 1997, p.360.

¹²⁶ Ibid.

¹²⁷ Pearson and Large, p.290.

original enough is the relation of freedom and fate when they merge through the notion of *amor fati* and the doctrine of eternal recurrence as expressed below:

By accepting one's fate and the necessity of the eternally recurring circle of time and all being, that is, the highest necessity of all that is, and by merging into the necessary whole of all being, the individual will paradoxically preserve its autonomy. The willing individual accepts and loves his own fate (both past and future) and eternally re-creates his fate by incorporating everything that by chance falls to him¹²⁸

All in all, in this section, I have briefly referred to this important doctrine with respect to its importance of our subject matter. However, I will not go into a detailed discussion on this issue. I have two basic reasons for this. Firstly, I thought it would have been beyond the limits of a master's thesis to analyze both *amor fati* and *eternal recurrence* in detail in relation to the problem of free will, in which case both would have remained *shallow*. Secondly, I really could find no interpretation of the doctrine of the eternal recurrence yet, which really answered my questions and fulfilled my expectations. That is, I had the idea that, whereas they all gave me a good general *outlook* on the doctrine, almost none of the interpretations I have read on the issue were sufficient for really apprehending this 'strange' doctrine. And that's why I decided to just refer to it briefly while avoiding a deep discussion on it. Thus, I decided to focus on *amor fati*, on which I believe to have found better discussions and interpretations.

3.1.4. *Amor Fati*: A Remedy to *Ressentiment*

Nietzsche's emphasis on the love and affirmation of fate occupies a crucial place in his philosophy in so far as a healthy attitude towards one's life and interaction within the world is one of Nietzsche's main concerns, and much of his work is about the problematization of certain attitudes in modern culture such as nihilism, which he diagnoses as sickly and degenerate. Rather than going into a comprehensive discussion of all these phenomena, in this section, we will focus on the feeling of *ressentiment* as a key concept that Nietzsche zeroes in on when trying to understand these phenomena. Thus a healthy attitude towards life has mainly to do with

¹²⁸ Löwith, 1997, p.79. Cited from Nel Grillaert.

‘freedom from’ and ‘enlightenment about’ *ressentiment*¹²⁹. In addition, we shall see that, this discussion of Nietzsche’s is framed in terms of a *physiological* outlook, with plenty of references to physiological facts and observations.

We should begin by noting that, instead of using the English term resentment, Nietzsche preferred *ressentiment*, which is French. The reason of this preference was pointed as German’s lacking any close equivalent to the French term, and the translators’ wanting to remain loyal to Nietzsche’s choice¹³⁰. Thus, what is lacking in ‘resentment’ is provided by the adaptation of the notion of *ressentiment*, which is defined as follows: “[a] generalized feeling of resentment and often hostility harbored by one individual or group against another, *especially chronically and with no means of direct expression*”¹³¹.

For Nietzsche, the main condition that intensifies *ressentiment* is being deprived of an immediate response and so *accumulating* anger or hostility inwards. This is a sign of a weak predisposition. At this point, Nietzsche proposes *amor fati* as a **remedy** for the sick and the weak, since he believes that “[n]othing burns one up faster than the affects of *ressentiment*”¹³².

At many points, Nietzsche identifies *ressentiment* with what he calls ‘slave morality’. Since the slave is deprived of instant reaction and consummation, he/she gets more and more poisoned by *ressentiment* and become sneaky and sick day by day.

[T]he man of *ressentiment* is neither upright nor naive nor honest and straightforward with himself. His soul *squints*; his spirit loves hiding places, secret paths and back doors, everything covert entices him as *his* world, *his* security, *his* refreshment; he understands how to keep silent, how not to forget, how to wait, how to be provisionally self-deprecating and humble¹³³

¹²⁹ EH, 1989, p.229.

¹³⁰ Kaufmann, 1989, p.5.

¹³¹ The American Heritage Dictionary, 1982, cited in Meltzer and Musolf, 2002, p. 243.

¹³² EH, p.230.

¹³³ GM, “First Essay”, §10.

Nietzsche also states that, the slave revolt in morals begins when *ressentiment* itself becomes creative which in turn gives birth to values¹³⁴. From that time on, the morality of the crowds is for Nietzsche, the slave morality. In a typical case in which *ressentiment* is the main actor, *reaction* is the main action. The *slave* immediately says ‘no’ to what is ‘outside’, what is ‘different’, and this ‘no’ in turn is his/her creative deed¹³⁵.

An objection that is often raised against Nietzsche’s criticism of slave morality is that he doesn’t sufficiently empathize with the weak who feel oppressed by and naturally react to the strong. Objections of this type also point out that, at the end of the day, *ressentiment* is also an expression of will to power. It is precisely at this point that the distinction Nietzsche makes between yes saying (affirmation) and no saying (negation) becomes informative. For example, we can consider Nietzsche’s example of the Russian soldier who finally lies down in the snow and stops reacting at all when the conditions of war have become too severe for him: “No longer to accept anything at all. no longer to take anything, no longer to absorb anything---to cease reacting altogether”¹³⁶. Nietzsche continues by noting that, this fatalism is not only the courage to die; it can also be life-preserving under certain conditions by slowing down the metabolism, “as a kind of will to hibernate”¹³⁷. Thus, this type of fatalism which Nietzsche calls *Russian fatalism*, exemplifies how one can display a yes saying attitude even when one is physiologically weak¹³⁸.

We have noted that, Nietzsche’s emphasis on the harms of *ressentiment* and suggestions for liberating oneself from it, stems from physiological grounds, as we have noted above. This approach can be seen in the following passage:

Nothing burns one up faster than the affects of *ressentiment*. Anger, pathological vulnerability, impotent lust for revenge, thirst for revenge, poison-mixing in any sense – no reaction could be more disadvantageous for

¹³⁴ Ibid.

¹³⁵ Ibid.

¹³⁶ EH, p.230.

¹³⁷ Ibid.

¹³⁸ Ibid.

the exhausted [...] *Ressentiment* is what is forbidden *par excellence* for the sick – it is their specific evil– unfortunately also their most natural inclination¹³⁹

Thus, in certain cases, affirming fate and accepting oneself as if fated is reasonable and also serves as a remedy: “It is not morality that speaks thus; thus speaks physiology”¹⁴⁰

Proposing *amor fati*, what Nietzsche also applies is to put forward the matter in a personal way, that is, he presents ‘snapshots’ from his childhood, his family, his sickness and so on¹⁴¹. By means of a semi-autobiographical narrative, Nietzsche tells how he had gone through various difficulties in his life and how he has genuinely *affirmed* them. Kaufmann, in his *introduction* to *Ecce Homo* as an editor, explains this affirmation as follows: There is neither “if only” in this autobiography, nor are there any excuses¹⁴². A man, who was in intense physical pain much of his life and alerted by the doctors not to read or write much if he wants to protect his half-blind eyes, does not once complain. He is grateful to his illness and expresses how it made his life better¹⁴³.

Hence, by means of the discussions above, it must be clear that, Nietzsche does not put forward *fatalism* as an *ascribed* scientific or theological form of the universe: that he is not a determinist. The best way to make sense of *amor fati* throughout Nietzsche’s work, then, is to interpret it as an ethical exhortation rather than as a (hidden) metaphysical thesis about how much of the world is necessary or determined¹⁴⁴. Rather, what Nietzsche does is to affirm and promote us to affirm what is necessary and to *love* it, for a strong affirmation and love of fate is the only

¹³⁹ Ibid.

¹⁴⁰ Ibid., p.231.

¹⁴¹ Those autobiographic ‘data’ can be found through various pages of *Ecce Homo*.

¹⁴² EH, p.206.

¹⁴³ Ibid.

¹⁴⁴ Ridley, 2005, p. xvii.

possible path through the great art of giving style to one's character¹⁴⁵, which both includes annihilation and creation, and which is an essential feature of a *free* person.

3.2. Revaluation: No-Saying

“The formula of our happiness: a Yes, a No, a straight line, a goal...”¹⁴⁶

Underlining Nietzsche's commendation of life affirmation which is also often referred to as a yes-saying attitude, however, should not lead us to overlook the other side of the picture. Given the close relation between nihilism and saying no to this life or the fact that Nietzsche referred to the slave's attitude as a no-saying attitude, one may think that the matter is as simple as distinguishing between yes-saying and no-saying; commending one and condemning the other.

However, one cannot hold on to such a simplistic formulation of Nietzsche's philosophy for long. One need only make the observation that Nietzsche's critique of slave morality, modern culture, the western tradition, etc. is clearly a rejection of a large portion of our daily lives. So one can easily ask, “is Nietzsche not displaying the ‘no-saying’ attitude himself?” Thus, the question of whether Nietzsche is contradicting himself or whether an account that resolves the seeming contradiction can be given crops up again in our attempt to resolve the seeming contradiction between free will and determinism. In this light, we can formulate our problem also as follows: are we supposed to merely accept life as it is because we cannot change it, or are we supposed to try to change it? In this section, I will try to make sense of the relation between yes-saying and no-saying in Nietzsche's writings.

Nietzsche's ‘No-saying’ is closely associated with what he calls the *revaluation of all values*. At many points, Nietzsche declared his task as an attempt of a *revaluation of all values*¹⁴⁷, which was his “formula for an act of supreme self-examination on the part of humanity”¹⁴⁸. As Nietzsche reminds us, among different cultural and

¹⁴⁵ GS, §290.

¹⁴⁶ AC, “Preface”, §1.

¹⁴⁷ Anti-christ and WP; attempt at a revaluation.

¹⁴⁸ EH, p.326.

historical periods the meaning designated by certain terms have ‘shifted’. A good example of this is what Nietzsche calls ‘the slave revolt in morality’¹⁴⁹. Kaufmann states that Nietzsche’s revaluation is “meant to undo the damage done by a previous revaluation”¹⁵⁰- that is the revaluation of slave morality. Nietzsche refers to the slave revaluation as “an act of the most spiritual revenge” of the Jews who inverted the knightly-aristocratic value equation “(good = noble = powerful = beautiful = happy = beloved of God)” to a case in which it is only the poor, the wretched who are the good; the deprived, the suffering and the sick are the only pious ones and to be blessed by God; thus, the contrary, the powerful, who is ‘other’, what is ‘different’ is evil¹⁵¹. According to Nietzsche, the slave revolt is a revaluation in the way of *decadence*. Being deprived of self-esteem and instant response, the slave-type *found* their way through the *revaluation* of the very basic notions such as good and bad, turning them into ‘another’ good and evil. In other words, as Kaufmann states, “values have been stood on their head” and Nietzsche wants to turn them “right-side up again”¹⁵².

For centuries, what has been disguised under the name of ‘morality’ is now being uncovered, and the way is open for a more naturalistic and ‘honest’ approach to our very being. It is now time to combat the “degeneration and diminution of humanity into a perfect herd animal”¹⁵³ which requires that we recognize “humans are *the still undetermined animals*”¹⁵⁴ and that “[m]an is a rope, fastened between animal and Overman – a rope over an abyss”¹⁵⁵.

Historically, the *transition* to No-saying from Yes-saying, which Nietzsche indicates as his own path, corresponds to a period which we can call Nietzsche’s maturity. “After the Yes-saying part of my task had been solved, the turn had come for the No-

¹⁴⁹ GM, “First Essay”, §7.

¹⁵⁰ Kaufmann, 1989, p.333.

¹⁵¹ Ibid.

¹⁵² Ibid.

¹⁵³ BGE, §203.

¹⁵⁴ BGE, §62.

¹⁵⁵ Pearson and Large, p.250.

saying, *No-doing* part: the revaluation of our values so far, the great war [...]”¹⁵⁶. In *Ecce Homo*, Nietzsche points out his *Beyond Good and Evil* as the beginning of a transition from Yes-saying to No-saying/doing. However, in a passage from *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, which we will examine below, in section 2.2., we see that Nietzsche assumes the ‘no-saying’ stage prior to the ‘yes-saying’. This may have been a matter of debate; that is, which one is prior and the other later. Nevertheless, we will not get into this discussion. What concerns us for the time being is that, each approach has its unique place on the way to one’s creating himself/herself and new values.

Nietzsche announces that the time has come for a strong No-saying, in the sense of “[a] change in values – that means a change in the creators of values. **He who has to be a creator always has to destroy**”¹⁵⁷. Elsewhere, he says that “whoever wants to be a creator in good and evil, must first be an annihilator and break values”¹⁵⁸. Just as in *Yes-saying* there lies the greatest affirmation, in the No-saying there is the strongest annihilation and *creation*, and still lies hints for the stage to *philosophise with a hammer*¹⁵⁹. All in all, ‘Yes-saying’ and ‘No-saying’ in Nietzsche’s philosophy complement each other and draw the path for the self-creation within a fatalistic vision. Where *Yes-saying* may count as a formula in a fatalistic outlook, *No-saying* consists of annihilation, *revaluation* and the creation aspect of *becoming who one is*.

Thus, it must be explicitly understood that, far from the fictitious predication of *free will* and its evocations to human beings, Nietzsche does propose a strong sense of execution, almost to the degree of profession over one’s character and the values one displays: “[n]o people could live without evaluating; but if it wishes to maintain itself it must not evaluate as its neighbour evaluates”¹⁶⁰. Moreover, what is also worth noting here is that, Nietzsche himself is far from coming up with easy and ready models/formulas for the way one becomes himself/herself. He uncovers what has

¹⁵⁶EH, p.310

¹⁵⁷ Pearson and Large, p. 265. Emphasis mine.

¹⁵⁸ EH, p.327.

¹⁵⁹ The subtitle of *Twilight of the Idols*.

¹⁶⁰ Pearson and Large, p.265.

been usually disguised under the name of morality and points at other, more *healthy* and natural ways/opportunities. A famous speech of Zarathustra speaks: “You had not yet sought yourselves, then you found me. All believers do this; that’s why all faith amounts to so little. Now I bid you lose me and find yourselves; and only when you have all denied me will I return to you”¹⁶¹.

3.2.1. Free Will vs. Free Spirit

So, how are we to understand this ‘evaluating self’ in distinction from the traditional subject endowed with free will? In attempting to answer this question, we should begin by noting that in many places in his writings, Nietzsche seems to endorse the notion of free will. In the Preface to *Human, All too Human*, the “will to free will” is addressed as the first outbreak of power, the will to self-determination and the autonomous creation of values – all necessary conditions for breaking free from the traditional morals and becoming a free spirit¹⁶². In another fragment, “freedom of the will” is again equated with self-determination and both are still defined as qualities of a free spirit¹⁶³. In a fragment in the *Nachlass*, free will is said to be “the feature of the *higher* humankind”¹⁶⁴. So, in Nietzsche’s understanding this time free will is equal to self-determination, to the autonomous determination and creation of one’s own values¹⁶⁵.

Then, how should one interpret these statements we have addressed above, considering Nietzsche’s rejection of free will? Is there a problem or conflict here? Firstly it must be emphasized that, though Nietzsche uses the word “free will” at some points, he nowhere understands this free will as a supernatural and an *a priori* faculty (unless he is using the term to refute it). Thus I argue that, Nietzsche’s usage of the notion at some points doesn’t undermine his criticisms on the typical usage and connotation(s) of it. Unlike the *free will* in the common sense, Nietzsche’s approach

¹⁶¹ Z, p. 59.

¹⁶² KSA 2.16-17.

¹⁶³ KSA 3.83.

¹⁶⁴ KSA 9.628.

¹⁶⁵ Grillaert, p.47.

must be seen as an opportunity which has to be elaborated in a process of becoming oneself; so it's not a metaphysical faculty humans are *a priori* endowed with at all¹⁶⁶. Thus, it can be fairly argued that the question of whether humans have free will or not is misformulated for Nietzsche. The problem is better understood as an existential one, a matter of autonomy and self-mastery and/or self-creation which an individual may or may not attain to certain degrees.

At this point, it will be useful to remind the reader of Foucault's discussion of the importance of 'emergence' in Nietzsche's genealogical method and that Nietzsche discusses the emergence of free will and bad conscience as the outcome of a process described in natural and physiological terms. It would be particularly useful to remember the metaphor of the 'ripest fruit' of a tree which Nietzsche uses to characterize the sovereign individual which was mentioned in Chapter 2.

In that sense, the notion Nietzsche proposes can be said to be 'free spirit' rather than 'free will'. The capacity for autonomy is not an *a priori* faculty but something that emerged as the outcome of a long and painful process of taming the human animal. Identifying the different sense and significance the notions possess, Amy Mullin, in *Nietzsche's Free Spirit* remarks on the difference between free will and free spirit. She tells that, Nietzsche addresses his idea of free spirit in radical distinction from the traditional metaphysical conception of free will¹⁶⁷. Having made an introduction to the difference between free will and free spirit in the sense of Nietzsche's understanding, Mullin also attempts to make clear that, far from being in contrast with necessity, being a free spirit is a product of it. Indeed, for the possibility of the freedom of the spirit, an apprehension of the illusory nature of the free will is needed. Because free spirits begin as fettered spirits, they need to pass through several stages in the way to becoming free spirits¹⁶⁸.

¹⁶⁶ Ibid.

¹⁶⁷ p. 385. Furthermore, Mullin claims that, little attention was paid so far on the certain kind of difference between what Nietzsche honoured in the past: nobility or the master, what he honours now: the free spirit and what he expects to be in the future: the philosophers of the future or the Übermensch

¹⁶⁸ Ibid.

Nietzsche makes it clear that, “the free spirit is a relative concept”¹⁶⁹: one is called a free spirit if he/she thinks otherwise than expected, based on his/her origin, class, position, etc. or the popular/common viewpoint of the time being. In this sense, the free spirit is the one who is an exception¹⁷⁰. For being a free spirit, one should attempt to free himself/herself from the bounds of the faith and tradition as much as he/she can. So, once again for Nietzsche, anything having to do with freedom, supposes a long path lying before one, which does not imply free will as a kind of an *a priori* faculty at all.

For Nietzsche, the notion of ‘spirit’ “resembles a stomach more than anything”¹⁷¹. Then, the spirit, when it is strong, is able to assimilate the new to the old and facilitate what is compound in the service of growth and power. However, it also knows what not to digest, when to close it off from external stimuli¹⁷².

3.2.2. *On the Three Metamorphoses : A Sacred Yes-Saying*

I think the part entitled “On the Three Metamorphoses” in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* is a good beginning in order to see how we might understand the evolution of a free spirit towards a synthesis of greater freedom and necessity. This is a metaphorical narrative by means of which Zarathustra presents how revaluation of values is a necessary part of the process of affirming life. In this narrative, the various phases of the spirit are represented by first a camel, then a lion, and finally a child¹⁷³. Now, we will have a close look at the narrative and then discuss what it may signify in relation to our subject matter.

At the first stage, the spirit is like a camel. A camel has a hump on its back, a thin, long inflected neck, giving it a sickly, afflicted appearance. The hump can also be seen as a symbol of the cause its affliction: the camel is the carrier of an unreasonable burden. In Zarathustra’s story, this unreasonable burden represents traditional moral

¹⁶⁹ Pearson and Large, p.181

¹⁷⁰ Ibid.

¹⁷¹ BGE, §230.

¹⁷² Ibid.

¹⁷³ Z, p.16.

values, and the camel represents the dutiful and devoted individual, who does not question why they should be *burdened* with the heavy requirements of morality. ‘What is heavy?’ asks the carrying spirit, loaded with reverence. Let the duty be whatever it may, this individual undertakes it. The unreasonable and life-denying nature of these values adapted by the ‘camel’ are expressed as follows:

[Is it not this:] lowering oneself in order to hurt one’s pride? Letting one’s foolishness glow in order to mock one’s wisdom? [...] Or is it this: being ill and sending the comforters home and making friends with the deaf who never hear what you want? [...] Or is it this: loving those who despise us, and extending a hand to the ghost when it wants to frighten us?¹⁷⁴

This stage of the beast of burden also seems to imply *asceticism*, the appropriation of these self-denying moral values without complaint, and even with pride. However, the symbol of the camel also represents a stage of the spirit that has a potential to transform itself into something better, since it is strong. It is the strength that wants what is heaviest.

If this spirit were to transform itself into something better it would first have to say ‘no’ to this burden. Thus in Zarathustra’s story, the heavy-loaded camel charges itself and hurries into the desert where the second metamorphoses takes place. Here the spirit becomes a lion, demanding to possess its freedom and be the master in its own desert. It seeks its last master; ‘the great dragon’, the last god to battle with. And this great dragon is indicated as “Thou Shalt”. Nietzsche’s indication of the Thou Shalt as the last god to battle with is significant. Envisioning morality, the last god to battle, in the form of a living creature which must be killed, Nietzsche tries to identify its vital unit, the principal element of morality which Nietzsche really objects to and wants to destroy. In defiance of the dragon’s ‘Thou Shalt!’ the lion keeps saying “I will”. The dragon replies back: “[a]ll value has already been created, and the value of all created things – that am I”¹⁷⁵. The lion’s resistance to the command Thou Shalt with the ‘I will’ pits Nietzsche’s emphasis on self-mastery and autonomy against the externally given nature of morality. The ‘will’ in ‘I will’ is also more congenial than the Shalt in Thou Shalt. In contrast to the extraneous and

¹⁷⁴ Ibid.

¹⁷⁵ Z. p.17

obligatory nature of morality, what the lion expresses with the 'I will' points to something more intrinsic and compelling.

So Nietzsche, in the name of Zarathustra now, asks: why does the spirit demand the lion? "Why does the beast of burden, renouncing and reverent, not suffice?"¹⁷⁶ And the answer is provided as follows:

To create new values – not even the lion is capable of that: *but to create freedom for itself for new creation* – that is within the power of the lion. To create freedom for oneself and also a sacred *No to duty*: for that, my brothers, the lion is required¹⁷⁷

This time, in the name of a brutal animal, which is seeking its own mastery and freedom, a new way is indicated, which is the way for the creation of new values. The lion, with its great power indeed, is capable of opening the way for new values, by saying 'No' to the old ones. However, the lion still lacks the ability to *create*; because it is a 'No-saying' and a destroying spirit. Thus, there is the need of a new stage, which is identified as 'a new beginning'. And for this, the innocence of the child is needed:

The child is innocence and forgetting, a new beginning, a game, a wheel rolling out of itself, a first movement, a sacred *yes-saying*. Yes, for the game of creation my brothers a sacred yes-saying is required¹⁷⁸

Throughout the famous narrative above, there are many points worth considering which will shed light on our subject matter. First, one can precisely see that Nietzsche does allow for a sense of transition within one's character. To put it more literally, there is a strong sense of *becoming*, a making-oneself through experience. Here, Nietzsche points out to the basics of the *metamorphoses* that one encounters in the way of *becoming who you are*. One becomes the reverent camel, the preying lion and the innocent child: one endures what is heaviest, one takes on freedom and mastery and one gives birth to what is new; one creates and happens to be the

¹⁷⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷⁷ Ibid. Emphasis mine.

¹⁷⁸ Ibid. Emphasis mine.

becoming itself. Furthermore, throughout the passage, we can see Nietzsche's 'no-saying' and 'yes-saying' attitudes, each occupying their specific place and serving in the way of styling one's character.

3.3. Self-creation: Interplay of Freedom and Necessity

In this section, we will try to clarify in more detail when and how the yes saying and no saying attitudes (affirmation and denial) have their proper place and contribute to self-creation. By pursuing some of his most famous and influential texts and aphorisms, as well as relatively less popular ones, we will attempt to get a good grasp of how Nietzsche puts forward the issue.

One of the most quoted aphorisms of Nietzsche is: "What does your conscience say? – You should become who you are"¹⁷⁹. At first, this expression seems contradictory: Is not one already what one is- yes, it is, literally. However, being is not a static state; as Nehamas explains, what Nietzsche has in mind is a continual process without a final state of being. In Nietzsche's words, "Becoming does not aim at a final state, does not flow into 'being'"¹⁸⁰. Thus, being what one is always involves becoming what one is.

Seen in this light, becoming what one is is firstly, to see oneself in light of all of one's actions, to acknowledge that everything one does at the same time shows what one is. However, in the sense of genuine self-creation, it's a long path lying before one, which is hard as well as being peculiar to each. "In the ideal case, it is also to fit all this into a coherent whole, and to want to be everything that one is: it is to give style to one's character; to be, if you will allow me, becoming"¹⁸¹. Following from that, Nehamas states that "This is a process of a greater integration of one's mode, customs and norms of interaction with the world"¹⁸².

¹⁷⁹ GS. §270. Also the subtitle of *Ecce Homo*: "How One Becomes What One Is".

¹⁸⁰ Nehamas, p. 385.

¹⁸¹ Nehamas, p.411.

¹⁸² Nehamas, p.404.

However, it is crucial to note that, the *path* does not always presume a conscious process of *choosing*: “[t]hat one becomes what one is presupposes that one does not have the remotest idea *what* one is”¹⁸³. Following from this point of view, even the *blunders* of life, including all kind of ‘modesties’, ‘wrong paths’, delays and so on, have their own meaning and value.

“One thing is needful” announces Nietzsche, “[t]o ‘give style’ to one’s character – a great and rare art!”¹⁸⁴ And then he adds: “It is practiced by those who survey all the strengths and weaknesses that their nature has to offer and then fit them into an artistic plan until each appears as art and reason and even weakness delight the eye”¹⁸⁵

First, it should be noted that Nietzsche’s stance on the issue is a naturalistic one. Those who want to give style to their character first need to attempt to explore what is natural. Only by *exercising* this first step can one begin to create oneself. This approach of Nietzsche’s is apparent in the quote follows:

We, however, want to *become who we are* – human beings who are new, unique, incomparable, who give themselves laws, who create themselves! To that end we must become the best students and discoverers of everything that is lawful and necessary in the world: we must become *physicist* in order to be creators in this sense¹⁸⁶

This passage provides the key to the question of what to affirm and what to deny, how to negotiate Nietzsche’s “affirmation of life” with his “philosophizing with a hammer”. The crucial step here seems to be to differentiate what is natural from what is not, whether in things or one’s character. It will only lead to resentment to be in denial concerning “what is lawful [natural] and necessary in the world.” These must be affirmed. This way, what is not necessary and is also “ugly”, weak and life-denying should be removed or changed. What is ugly and necessary should be either

¹⁸³ Pearson and Large, p. 507.

¹⁸⁴ GS, §290.

¹⁸⁵ Ibid.

¹⁸⁶ GS, §335.

concealed or ‘reinterpreted’ so that one can begin to see it as beautiful and affirm it¹⁸⁷. This point is implicit also in the following passage:

I want to learn more and more how to see what is necessary in things as what is beautiful in them – thus I will be one of those who make things beautiful. *Amor fati*: let that be my love henceforth! I do not want to wage war against what is ugly. I do not want to accuse; I do not even want to accuse those who accuse. *Looking away* shall be my only negation. And all in all and on the whole: some day I wish to be only a Yes-sayer¹⁸⁸.

In Nietzsche’s thought, as we have attempted to make clear, there is a distinctive manifestation of the relation between self-creation and necessity. And this is the very point that Nietzsche claims to be obstructed by ‘morality’, that is, on the one hand, there had been constructed a ‘superlative metaphysical sense’ of free will, whereas on the other hand ‘necessity’ was meant to be “something of constraint, need, compulsion to obey, pressure and unfreedom”¹⁸⁹.

All in all, one should understand that, first, we are just animals rather than all-rational creatures and the world we dwell in is Godless¹⁹⁰. In addition to that, we are something more *interesting*¹⁹¹ than animals: we have a ‘second nature’ produced by culture. That is why we commonly misunderstand ourselves; the difficulty lies in *reading* both the natural and cultural codes and differentiating them where necessary. Thus, in order to become who we are, we must be honest with ourselves, not only to acknowledge our being animals in an undesigned world but also as animals possessing a ‘second nature’ whose state of affairs and character are considerably formed by culture¹⁹².

Nietzsche makes his naturalistic approach as treating the necessities of various kinds as something to be undertaken and affirmed. Actually, he regards them as *conditions*

¹⁸⁷ AC, p.xiii.

¹⁸⁸ GS, §276.

¹⁸⁹ BGE, §21.

¹⁹⁰ Ridley, p. xi.

¹⁹¹ GM, “First Essay”. §6.

¹⁹² Ridley, pp. xif.

of effective performance, rather than restrictions. In other words, freedom and necessity are intrinsic to each other¹⁹³.

Nietzsche makes use of the example of the artist, the way artists style their life and works, to explain the intrinsic relation of freedom in connection with necessity: artists are the ones who know very well that their sense of freedom, acumen and mastery, of creation and pattern only peaks when they have ceased doing anything “voluntarily” and rather do everything necessarily— they indeed know that, for them, necessity and “freedom of the will” have grown into one¹⁹⁴.

“I contradict as has never been contradicted before and am nevertheless the opposite of a No-saying spirit”¹⁹⁵.

Nietzsche’s statement above serves as a quite precise *summary* of the approach we have been trying to put forward so far. Here, he points out to the difference between his No-saying attitude and being a ‘No-saying spirit’. No-saying, which Nietzsche proposes as an approach, brings with itself a kind of evaluation (‘genealogy’ in Nietzsche literature) which in turn opens the path for creating new values and the *style* to one’s character. To put it simply, this approach is *active* in the sense of creativeness. On the other hand, the type Nietzsche points out as ‘a No-saying spirit’ is *reactive* at the very beginning.

Elsewhere, Nietzsche refers to Zarathustra as the supreme Yes-sayer and No-sayer:

The psychological problem in the type of Zarathustra is how he that says No and *does* No to an unheard-of degree, to everything to which one has so far said Yes, can nevertheless be the opposite of a No-saying spirit; how the spirit who bears the heaviest fate, a fatality of a task, can nevertheless be the lightest and most transcendent — Zarathustra is a dancer — how he that has the hardest, most terrible insight into reality, that has thought the “most abysmal idea,” nevertheless does not consider it an objection to existence, not even to its eternal recurrence—but rather one reason more for being himself

¹⁹³ Ibid.

¹⁹⁴ BGE. §213.

¹⁹⁵ EH. p.327.

the eternal Yes to all things, “the tremendous, unbounded saying Yes and Amen¹⁹⁶.

So, once again, one must love his/her fate, this time for one cannot always foresee what an event or a case would bring forth. What may seem ‘bad’ in a certain case may bring forth ‘good’ in the long run. Nietzsche also exemplifies that side of *amor fati* individually:

I should not be possible without a countertype of race, without Germans, without *these* Germans, without Bismarck, without 1848, without "Wars of Liberation," without Kant, even without Luther. — The great crimes committed against culture by the Germans are justified in a *higher* economy of culture. — I want nothing differently, not backward either—I was not permitted to want anything differently.—*Amor fati*. — Even Christianity becomes necessary: only the highest form, the most dangerous, the one that was most seductive in its No to life, provokes its highest affirmation—me¹⁹⁷

Kaufmann, interprets “On the Three Metamorphoses” as in the way Nietzsche points out to the *necessity* of what has happened or will happen. As Nietzsche himself admits even the necessity of Christianity, Kaufmann takes our attention to the necessity of *stages* one must experience, in order to become a *creator*: without gaining a bad conscience, without thoroughly being unsatisfied with ourselves, we cannot envision higher norms, a novel state of being. Without ascetic ‘values’, without self-restrain and ruthless self-discipline, we cannot gain the self-mastery that Nietzsche greatly regards. However, to settle down with bad conscience, to remain as an ascetic and humiliate oneself, is to ‘fail’ Nietzsche’s ‘Dionysian’ vision. Thus, what Nietzsche glorifies is neither the camel nor the lion but the child as the creator¹⁹⁸.

¹⁹⁶ EH, p.306.

¹⁹⁷ EH, p.343.

¹⁹⁸ Kaufmann, 1989, p.12.

CHAPTER IV

CONCLUSION

In this thesis, my aim was to shed light on Nietzsche's approach to the issue which is famously known as the problem of free will. In various debates, this problem has generally been treated as one having to do with a basic 'either-or' stance. That is, if there *is* free will, human beings are morally responsible for the acts that they commit. On the other hand, if everything is determined, including human behaviour, we cannot be hold responsible for our deeds since there is no free will. The first position is held by the libertarians such as Richard Taylor. The second point is the determinist stance which takes its most popular form in the physical determinism represented by Thomas Hobbes. A brief study on the main arguments of libertarianism and determinism can be found in chapter 2 of the thesis.

As can be seen in the basic formulation which is addressed above, the problem of free will has both an ontological and a moral aspect. Firstly, there is made an ontological assumption about the 'human being' within the cosmos which is in turn accompanied by a *derivation* from this first assumption. While the first assumption tries to postulate an ontological fact about the human beings, the second assumption mostly has a moral character which either charges human beings with or absolves them of moral responsibility. Traditionally, the second 'derivation' is thought to be the inevitable result of the first 'postulate', and this same *method* is applied by both libertarians and determinists.

However, in my thesis, I tried to make clear how Nietzsche's understanding of this problem extends beyond the limits of the traditional metaphysical treatment of the issue, both philosophically and methodologically. To this aim, in Chapter 2 of the thesis, I attempted to clarify how Nietzsche both rejects the understanding of a free

will and also unfree will. In other words, I tried to assure that Nietzsche does not pretend to choose his ‘party’ between the given positions which are libertarianism and determinism (and also compatibilism which is assumed to be a middle way between these two). Rather, what Nietzsche fundamentally does is to uncover the basic assumptions of both the believers in free will and determinism. In my thesis, these assumptions are grouped as ‘ontological’ and ‘psychological’ ones¹⁹⁹.

Nietzsche’s ontological critiques against the notion of free will as an endowed faculty, which I discussed in chapter 2, are grounded on his repudiation of the traditional western metaphysics in a wider sense. At this point, we turned our attention to the understanding of the self as a kind of *causa sui*, that is, something that is self-caused. the cause of its own behaviour. Isolating the *doer* from the *deed*, this kind of understanding – the traditional western metaphysics – postulates a *free* agent behind the *doer*, which is assumed to be free to do a certain thing or not to do so. In my thesis, I have discussed this criticism of Nietzsche’s by providing a relevant passage from the *Genealogy* where Nietzsche points to the absurdity of this kind of outlook when it takes an *extreme* form trying to dissociate the strength from the expression of it. When discussing this passage, I also referred to Nietzsche’s discussion on the metaphysics of language in relation to our subject matter. Thus, I attempted to make clear how Nietzsche unfolds the connection of our basic ‘grammatical habits’, such as the division of agent and act which are grounded in the structure of language, to our moralistic judgements. So, for Nietzsche, the metaphysics of language both *justifies* and *intensifies* our human perception and evaluation of things. That is, in a world of chaos and perpetual struggle, language had so far been one of the main means for us to hold on to the *illusion* of constancy and *security*. More importantly, also by means of the grammatical structure of language – which divides the ‘continuous flux of life’ into units such as agent/act or cause/effect – the phenomenon which Nietzsche calls ‘the blaming perspective’ found its *rationalization*. To clarify, what strengthens the hands of a free will defender is the assumption that every kind of deed is voluntary or chosen, so the doer

¹⁹⁹ At this point, we should note that, this separation points to a formal difference for the sake of clarity; which does not aim at any level aim to treat these assumptions as *really* distinct ones, which would also have been a distorted interpretation of Nietzsche.

can be either praised or blamed since he/she is the one who *performed* the action and he/she 'could have done otherwise'.

While the assumption we referred to above has been one of the cornerstones of the libertarians, Nietzsche would *condemn* it as another canny *invention* of theologians and the people who have an urge to blame. Nietzsche asserts that, most people have strong desires for finding someone or something guilty in events rather than just accepting life as it is; that is, they seek deliberate and responsible individuals behind everything that befalls them.

Another point that the defenders of free will has relied on is a theological one. That is, the Christian conception of a perfect God was problematic in explaining the presence of evil in the world. Hence, 'free will' had been the easy answer to these quests, and the metaphysics of language the justification of them.

After making clear how Nietzsche rejects the notion of a free will, I tried to show how he also rejects the idea of a complete determinism in human behaviour, in section 2.1.2. of my thesis. As I had noted in this section, Nietzsche's criticisms of determinism are based on the repudiation of the same ontological model as that of free will. Briefly, Nietzsche opposes the interpretation of human behaviour in terms of a 'cause-effect model'. In my thesis, it is pointed out that, Nietzsche follows David Hume's ideas in his rejection of causation, while advancing him in many points. Thus, for Nietzsche, while 'causation' may well be used for the sake of description and communication, it is a falsification to attribute it to nature and human behaviour and coming up with the result, as the determinists say, 'there is no freedom'.

All in all, an important sub-conclusion of my thesis is that, Nietzsche is neither a libertarian nor a determinist²⁰⁰. Rather, he interprets the seeming problem of free will as a misformulated one. As we have indicated in many points of the thesis, Nietzsche himself puts forward the matter as one having to do with strong or weak wills. Thus, in relation to this point, in section 2.1.3. of my thesis, I referred to 'will to power' as Nietzsche's fundamental ontology. In this section, I attempted to clarify how

²⁰⁰ We have already noted that, seeing Nietzsche as a 'compatibilist' would have been a misunderstanding.

Nietzsche justifies his stance on 'strong or weak wills' instead of the *artificial* character of 'free or determined wills'.

According to Nietzsche, life is essentially will to power. In a world of ongoing struggle and chaos, everything is in need of expression, domination and discharging force. Here, we should also note that, at many points in my thesis, I referred to Nietzsche's emphasis on *physicality*, which is also apparent in his discussions of will to power. So, I have tried to make clear how Nietzsche interprets the different views on human freedom as diverse manifestations of will to power. For a better apprehension of this notion, I appealed to Deleuze's interpretations, which brought us to the 'moral' arguments Nietzsche makes use of in relation to our subject matter.

In section 2.2.1., I presented a brief explanation of the meaning and 'value' of values for Nietzsche, with the help of Deleuze's texts. This section on 'interpretation and valuation', taken together with the section on will to power, was planned as a bridge between Nietzsche's rejection of the traditional debate on free will and his own ontology and suggestion on the issue. In other words, beginning with section 2.1.3., until the end of Chapter 2, I have attempted to show how Nietzsche himself evaluates certain phenomena such as free will (or freedom, in a more general sense). To this aim, in section 2.2.2., I have referred to Nietzsche's notion of genealogy. Here, we have attempted to find the true addressee of the notion of free will and responsibility in the sense of Nietzsche's genealogical method. At this point, Michel Foucault's interpretation on Nietzsche's understanding of genealogy has been an indispensable component of the thesis. So, by means of Foucault's interpretation also, we have searched into the *true origin* of the notion of free will and attempted to discover its *emergence*. According to Nietzsche, unlike what the *enlightened* minds would expect, the notion of free will emerged through a material relationship between the creditor and the debtor, which has been subject to the cruellest implementations.

Thus, in Chapter 2 of the thesis, we have seen how and why Nietzsche rejects the traditional debate on free will. Then, we have also tried to make a transition, by means of a study on will to power and genealogy, to how Nietzsche draws his own way towards an understanding of freedom.

With the beginning of Chapter 3, various crucial questions had become inevitable, some of which are as follows: first, how were we to understand Nietzsche's own declamations regarding freedom and fate? How did he so strongly defend a kind of freedom while he repudiated free will? Then how could he also appeal to fate in his texts (as in *amor fati*) so much while repudiating determinism? What is more, could we correlate his remarks on freedom, with that of fate? How could Nietzsche both be a dedicated yes-sayer and no-sayer at the same time?

In order to understand Nietzsche's stance on freedom and fate in light of the questions above, I first made a preliminary study regarding the differences of the notions Nietzsche brings forward, from the ones he had rejected. To that end, I first introduced *amor fati* as a way of yes-saying, and then, I put forward fatalism with regards how it differs from determinism. At this point, I appealed to Robert Solomon's interpretations on Nietzsche's fatalism. Thus, by means of his interpretations, we came to an understanding that Nietzsche's fatalism has nothing to do with determinism; but rather a harking back to his beloved pre-Socratic Greek tragedies²⁰¹. Therefore, as we have indicated, Nietzsche's love of fate implies an *aesthetic* or a *narrative* necessity, in the sense of the inescapability of some events and the importance of them within the overall narrative. To get a better understanding of Nietzsche's *amor fati*, I also referred to the Greek play *Agamemnon*, with Martha Nussbaum's interpretation of it. Thus, in light of the tragic hero's willingness to accept fate and orient himself in accordance with his fate, we discover an unfamiliar phenomenon: the dissolving of the *contradiction* between necessity and freedom. And this seemed to be the very point Nietzsche had in mind throughout his discussions on fate and freedom.

Thereafter, I referred to the Greek god Dionysus as a symbol of affirmation for Nietzsche, as is Agamemnon's enthusiastic embrace of his fate for Nussbaum. After that, I have briefly outlined the doctrine of *eternal recurrence of the same*, as another key notion to understand Nietzsche's affirmation (or yes-saying) to life. Thus, I have made an introductory reference to this issue while avoiding a detailed discussion on it. I have provided my reasons for this decision, on the relevant section of my thesis.

²⁰¹ Solomon, 2002, p.66.

In section 3.1.4., I have pointed out that, Nietzsche also glorifies *amor fati* as a remedy to *ressentiment*, for he thinks that a healthy physiology, which would bring a healthier psychology, is possible only if one frees herself/himself from the affects of *ressentiment*.

After a study on Nietzsche's yes-saying attitude, I attempted to manifest 'the other side of the picture', which is the no-saying attitude. To this aim, I first handled Nietzsche's famous notion of the 'revaluation of values'. There, I noted that, *revaluation* can be made in different directions and have different aims. However, Nietzsche's revaluation is 'meant to undo the damage done by a previous revaluation'²⁰², which is the revaluation done by Christianity and directed by *ressentiment*. Then, in section 3.2.1., I have attempted to identify how Nietzsche understands the "free spirit" in comparison to free will. I have put forward that, basically, being a free spirit is a *relative* concept, i.e. a matter of degree. Moreover, it is gained; not *a priorily* endowed. For Nietzsche, one needs to pass through some phases if one is to become a free spirit. Thus, I have also made use of the passage called 'On the Three Metamorphoses' from *Zarathustra*. There, we have identified the phases of the spirit as a camel, a lion and then a child; each phase specifying certain values and the fundamental *component* of one's being which corresponds to that characteristic phase. Where the camel basically symbolized the ascetic and enduring individual, the last phase, which is symbolized as the child, is identified as 'a sacred yes-saying', which follows from the 'no-saying' lion, which seeks its mastery.

After that section, my attempt has been to 'put together' what we have studied so far. Thus, in section 3.3., I have brought forward an argument which is to be the overall implication and conclusion of my thesis: for Nietzsche, the understanding of a possible freedom cannot be taken apart from that of necessity. At that point, I have appealed to Nietzsche's understanding of *becoming who you are* as a statement which embodies a form of necessity which should be discovered, with that of a *naturalistic* freedom, which is far from superstitious or idealistic attributions.

²⁰² EH, p.333, Editor's footnote.

Moreover, in light of Nietzsche's motto – "you should become who you are" – I have also referred to *creativity* as an essential element of self-making.

As I have referred to the *interplay* of necessity and freedom, I have also attempted to present the attitudes of yes-saying and no-saying in relation to each other. After having assured how these notions "work" in Nietzsche's philosophy, I have come to the result that these two can be compatible with each other; where the real matter is to *discover* when and what to say yes or no to. Likewise, one should explore what is necessary in his/her life and nature, and love it, but at the same time should be the determined warrior symbolising the *rise*, against the *decadence*.

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX A: TURKISH SUMMARY

Bu çalışmada ilk olarak, Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche'nin 'hür irade problemi' karşısındaki tavır ve düşüncelerini anlayabilmek amaçlanmıştır. Basitçe tanımlamak gerekirse, 'hür irade problemi' olarak adlandırılan mesele, yapıp etmelerimizde özgür olup olmadığımızın sorgulanmasından doğar. Bir diğer deyişle, eylem ve davranışlarında kontrol ve sorumluluk kişinin kendisinde midir, yoksa insan, doğa ya da başka güçlerce (örneğin Tanrı) tamamen belirlenmiş durumda mıdır? Tarih boyunca bu problem karşısındaki tutum genelde birbirine karşıt iki düşünce ve grup şeklinde olmuştur: insanın hür irade sahibi olduğunu savunan libertaryanlar, örneğin Richard Taylor; ve diğer yanda ise olup biten her şeyin belirlenmiş olduğunu savunan deterministler, örneğin Thomas Hobbes. Bu noktada yapılmış olan varsayımdan hareketle de ahlaki çıkarımlar yapılmış ve mesele böylece ontolojik olmasının yanı sıra ahlaki bir boyut da kazanmıştır. Burada 'ahlaki boyut' ile kastedilen, insanların yapıp ettiklerinden ahlaki olarak sorumlu tutulup tutulamayacakları sorunsalıdır. Libertaryanlara göre, insan hür irade sahibi olduğundan dolayı, yapıp etmelerinde ahlaki yükümlülük taşır. Deterministlere göre ise, olup biten şeyler bizim gücümüz ve kontrolümüz altında olmadığından, eylemlerimizden dolayı ahlaki yükümlülük taşıyamayız²⁰³.

Peki, Nietzsche, bu taraflardan hangisine yakın olabilir? Nietzsche bir özgür irade savunucusu mudur yoksa ona göre insan ve eylemleri belirlenmiş midir? İşte bu çalışmanın başlangıç sorunsalı bu konuyu açıklığa kavuşturmak olmuştur. Zira ilk

²⁰³ Şüphesiz, burada değindiğimiz, bu düşüncelerin en 'uç' temsilidir ve iki tarafın da alabildiği ara biçim ve söylemler olmuştur ki bu da 'uyumculuk' (*compatibilism*) olarak bilinir.

bakışta Nietzsche'nin bu meseleye yaklaşımı çelişkili gibidir. Öyle ki, Nietzsche metinlerine hızlı bir bakış gösterecektir ki onlar her ne kadar güçlü bir özgürlük ve öz-yaratım çağrısı barındırıyor, aynı zamanda bir o kadar da zorunluluk, kaçınılmazlık vurgusu ve buna karşı çıkmanın manasızlığını içerirler. Öyleyse Nietzsche'nin bu konudaki tavrı ve iddiaları çelişkili midir?

Yukarıda ortaya çıkan soruya cevap bulmak amacı ile başlattığımız çalışma ilerledikçe gördük ki, Nietzsche'nin hür irade problemi karşısındaki tutumu çelişkili değildir. Aksine, Nietzsche bu sorun karşısındaki geleneksel tutumları kökten reddederken özgürlük ve zorunluluk konusuna da kendi özgün yaklaşımını geliştirir. Bahsettiğimiz yaklaşıma geçmeden önce, yine tezde yapmış olduğumuz gibi, Nietzsche'nin hür irade probleminde geleneksel yaklaşımları neden ve nasıl reddettiğini temel hatları ile görelim.

Öncelikle belirtmeliyiz ki, Nietzsche'nin libertaryanlara da deterministlere de olan eleştirileri, farklı biçimler olsa da, özünde aynı zeminden temelini alır ve gerekçelendirilir. Şöyle ki, Nietzsche'nin eleştirisindeki temel hedef, Yahudi-Hristiyan geleneğini devralmış olan Platonizm ve sonrası batı metafiziğidir. Bu eleştiriler, tezimde 'ontolojik' ve 'psikolojik' kategorileri altında ele alınmıştır²⁰⁴. Bahsettiğimiz batı metafizik felsefe geleneğine yönelik Nietzsche'nin eleştirisindeki bizim için en temel nokta herhalde 'özne metafiziği' olarak ifade edebileceğimiz düşünce yapısıdır. Burada kısaca, bağlamından koparılmış ve yapıp etmelerinin *bilinçli* nedeni olan birey anlaşılmalıdır. Yani, 'özne metafiziği' temelli bakış açısında birey, eylemlerin bilinçli eyleyeni ve bir anlamda başlangıç noktasıdır. Öyle ki, sanki tüm bir hayat, en merkezde özneler ve onların yapıp etmeleri şeklinde bir ikilemde algılanmaktadır. İşte bu bakış açısı da şüphesiz güçlü bir hür irade savunusunu beraberinde getirmiştir. Eylemlerinin nedeni olarak algılanan birey, tabii ki bu eylemlerden sorumlu tutulacaktır, en temelde de ahlaki olarak.

²⁰⁴ Bu kategorilendirme, netlik adına yapılmıştır, yoksa, hem Nietzsche'nin eleştirileri, hem de zaten eleştirmiş olduğu varsayımlar psikolojik ve ontolojik olarak birbirinden ayrı düşünülemez.

Yukarıda ortaya serilen düşünce yapısı Nietzsche için en basit anlamda absürddür. Burada öznenin bir çeşit ‘causa sui’²⁰⁵ olarak algılanması, dolayısıyla sosyal, tarihsel vb. bağlamlarından koparılması ve pür bir bilinçli neden ya da bilinçli eyleyen haline *yüceltilmesi* söz konusudur. Tezimde alıntılanmış olduğum ilgili pasajda da, Nietzsche bu algı biçiminin çelişik yapısını vurgular. Psikolojik açıdan ise, Nietzsche’ye göre bu algı biçiminde kendini açık eden şey, insanın kendini hayatta merkez varsayması ve bunun altında yatan aşırı gururdur. Anlaşılacağı gibi, Nietzsche’nin ‘causa sui’ eleştirisi, daha geniş çaptaki ‘özne metafiziği’ eleştirisinin bir parçasıdır.

Bu algı biçimini yaratan ve besleyen çok sayıda faktörden söz edilebilir. Eğer bunun nereden doğduğunu soracak olursak burada Nietzsche literatüründe ‘soy kütük’¹ (*genealogy*) araştırması diyebileceğimiz yöntem devreye girer. Bu metoda ise tezimin ilerleyen bölümlerinde değindim. Ancak tezimde bundan önce, konunun gidişatı gereği, bu ‘özne metafiziği’ olarak adlandırdığımız temsili, özel olarak da hür irade savunusunu besleyen faktör nedir sorusunun görünen en güçlü cevabı ‘dil’ olmuştur, daha doğru bir ifade ile – *dilin metafiziği*. Tezimde, burada ne kastedildiğini en iyi anlattığını düşündüğüm bazı Nietzsche metinlerinden alıntılar kullandım. Bu aydınlatıcı örneklerden bazılarını yine yer verelim:

nasıl ki popüler zihin şimşek ve onun çakmasını (ışığını) birbirinden ayırır ve bir sonrakini eylem, yani ‘şimşek’ öznesinin edimi olarak görüyorsa, popüler ahlak da gücü ve gücün ifadesini birbirinden ayırır – sanki güçlü insanın arkasında o gücü ifade etmeyi ya da etmemeyi seçebilen nötr bir dayanak varmış gibi²⁰⁶.

İşte bu durumun bize son derece doğal ve içsel gelmesinin Nietzsche’ye göre en büyük nedeni dilin yapısıdır. Başka bir ifadeyle, olayları özneler ve onların edimleri olarak algılamak bir çeşit dilbilgisel alışkanlıktır. Çünkü dilin metafiziksel yapısı en temelinde özne ve yüklem/edim olarak kurulmuştur. Ve söz konusu alışkanlığın bu kadar içselleşmiş olması da hür irade savunucularına şüphesiz en güçlü dayanaklarından birini sunmuştur. Öyle ki, onlara göre özneler, öyle ya da böyle eylemekte özgürdürler ve eylediklerinden dolayı da yükümlüdürler.

²⁰⁵ Latince. “Kendi kendinin nedeni” anlamında.

²⁰⁶ GM, “Birinci Makale”, §13. Çeviri tarafıma aittir.

Bu noktada karşılaşılabilecek bir yanlış anlamayı önlemek adına açıklayalım. Nietzsche'nin hür/özgür irade adı altında savunulan kavrama eleştirisindeki esas nokta, öyle ya da böyle hür olamayacağımız, her türlü durum ve seçimin farklı kuvvetlerce belirlenmiş olduğu şeklinde bir karşı koyuş değildir, ki zaten öyle olsaydı Nietzsche'nin rahatça determinist bir düşünür olduğunu söyleyebilirdik. O zaman, Nietzsche'nin hür irade kavramına esas eleştirisi, daha çok onun *a priori* olduğu varsayılan yapısındır. Yani Nietzsche'nin eleştirisindeki temel hedef, daha çok, biz insanların hür irade bahşedilmiş varlıklar olduğumuz iddiasıdır. Bu iddia şüphesiz çeşitli tek Tanrılı dinlerce de yüzyıllarca kullanılmıştır. Hatta Nietzsche'ye göre, bahsettiğimiz biçimde bir hür iradenin varlığının iddiası biraz da en başta Hıristiyan din adamlarınca yaratılmıştır. Şöyle ki, mutlak iyi bir Tanrı tarafından yaratılmış bir dünyada kötülüğün varlığı bir problem demektir. Felsefe literatüründe 'kötülük problemi' olarak bilinen meseleye de, insanlara hür irade bahşedilmiş olduğu fikri bir anlamda çözüm getiriyordu. Böylece, 'mutlak iyi' bir Tanrı fikri zedelenmeden dünyadaki kötülüğün varlığı da açıklanmış oluyordu. 'Kötü' olan insanlardı; onlara Tanrı tarafından hür irade verilmişti ve bu kötülüğü yapıp yapmamak insanların elindeydi. Burada Nietzsche'nin 'suçlayıcı perspektif' dediği şeyin dini bir yapıya da bürünerek, deyim yerindeyse iyice katmerlenmiş bir hal aldığını görürüz. Yani, insanlar özgür iradeleriyle verdiği kararların sonucunda ilahi bir otorite tarafından cezalandırılacak ya da ödüllendirileceklerdir. İşte Nietzsche'nin hür iradenin reddine yönelik eleştirilerinin bir dayanağı da, onun dini anlamda kurnazca bir buluş olduğunu gözlemlemesinde yatar.

Toparlamak gerekirse, Nietzsche'nin hür irade kavramını reddindeki büyük payı, onun taşıdığı metafizik yüklemeler oluşturuyor diyebiliriz. Yani burada hedef, batı metafizik tarihinin insanı bir çeşit *causa sui* ya da bilinçli töz olarak algılamasıdır diyebiliriz. Her olayı bir eylem – ve arkasında bir eyleyen olarak görmek, beraberinde de bir anlamda suçlayıcı/yargılayıcı yaklaşımı getirmiştir. Ya da aslında Nietzscheci anlamda ifade edecek olursak, suçlayıcı içgüdü, hür irade savunusunu kendine kalkan olarak kullanmıştır.

Nietzsche'nin hür irade reddini ele aldıktan sonra, aynı şekilde onun determinist bir hayat görüşünü de nasıl reddettiğini tezimde ele aldım. Burada da genel hatlarıyla

hatırlatacak olursak, Nietzsche'nin determinizm reddi en temelde nedenselliğe olan eleştirisiyle ilgilidir. Bu bağlamda Nietzsche David Hume'un nedensellik reddini izler – yani, doğaya nedensellik atfedenin bizler olduğumuz savını. Hume'a göre, doğada tek gözlemleyebildiğimiz ardışıklık iken, bizler bunun belli bir tekrara dayanmasından yola çıkarak, bu ardışıklıkta öncel olana neden, bunu izleyene ise sonuç gözüyle bakıyoruz; halbuki tek gözlemleyebildiğimiz tekrar eden ardışıklık zinciri içinde aslında bağımsız parçalardır.

Nietzsche de Hume'un bu eleştirisine katılmakla beraber onu bir adım ileri taşımıştır. Yani, aslolan parçalar değil, tüm bir akıştır. Ve fiziksel determinizm anlayışı bir şekilde bu akışı değil, birbirine neden-sonuç ile bağlandığı varsayılan parçaları öne çıkarmaktadır. Kısacası, Nietzsche'nin determinizm reddindeki temel dayanaklarından biri, nedensellik reddidir. Nedensellik bir tanımlama ya da basitleştirme olarak başvurulabilir olsa da doğaya tümünden bir nedensellik atfetmek, bunu bir gerçek olarak sunmak, ve böylece de 'özgürlük yoktur' gibi bir sonuca varmak Nietzsche için kabul edilebilir bir yaklaşım değildir.

Nietzsche'nin bu konudaki bir diğer argümanı, tezimde de ele almış olduğum gibi, atomizm eleştirisi temellidir. Yani, yine bu özetin başında dile getirdiğimiz gibi, Nietzsche 'atomist ihtiyaç' olarak adlandırdığı bakış açısında da, kaotik bir akışın parçalanmış algılanışını hedefine koyar. Burada da arayış, sabit olan, değişmeyen ve yine ayrık olandır (Leibniz'ci anlamda *monad*). Bu durumun bir diğer yansıması da Nietzsche'nin de 'ruh atomizmi' olarak adlandırdığı şeydir – yani ruhun tek, bölünemez ve sonsuz bir töz olduğu görüşü. Yine atomist algılayışta da, 'oluş'un karşısına 'olma' konmuş; bir anlamda 'empoze edilmiş'tir²⁰⁷ Devinim içindeki bir dünyada sabit bir gerçeklik inşa etmeye çalışan böyle bir düşünce de Nietzsche'nin eleştirel anlamda hedefinde olmuştur.

Böylece, ara bir sonuç olarak artık rahatlıkla diyebiliriz ki, Nietzsche bir libertarian ya da bir determinist değildir²⁰⁸. Onun tavrı, hazır pozisyonlardan birini benimsemek

²⁰⁷ 'Being as opposed to Becoming'.

²⁰⁸ Bu iki yaklaşımın arası sayılan 'uyumculuk' tavrının da Nietzsche için neden uygun olamayacağını tezimde açıkladım.

yerine, bu pozisyonların bir anlamda ontolojik ve psikolojik olarak yapısökümünü gerçekleştirmek olmuştur. Nietzsche'ye göre zaten, hür irade var mıdır yok mudur sorusu yanlış formüle edilmiştir; bunun yerine esas mesele ise, güçlü ya da zayıf irade sorunsalıdır. İşte bu noktayı açıklamak için tezimde Nietzsche'nin *güç istenci* kavramına başvurdum. Tezimin 2.1.3. numaralı bu bölümünde Nietzsche'nin yapay bir 'hür ya da belirlenmiş irade' tartışmasının karşısında kendi ontolojisini nasıl 'güçlü ya da zayıf irade' savunusu ile desteklediğini açıklamaya çalıştım.

Nietzsche'ye göre, hayat en temelinde güç istencidir; ya da güç istenci hayatın kendisidir. Yine burada düşünülmesi gereken bir hata, güç istencini öznelerin gücü istemesi şeklinde anlamak olacaktır ki bu kendimizi yeniden 'özne metafiziği' temelli bir ontolojide bulmak olurdu. Nietzsche'nin güç istenci kavramı bir anlamda Darwin'ci biyoloji ve buradan temelini alan sayısız felsefenin hayatın temelini 'ayakta kalma' olarak yorumlamasına bir tepki ve bir alternatiftir. Çünkü Nietzsche'ye göre salt hayatta kalma içgüdü, tüm bir hayatın ve dürtülerin sadece kısmi bir yorumu olabilir. Bundan daha sık rastlanan ve daha güçlü olansa, süregelen bir mücadele içinde ve kaotik bir evrende dışavurum ve domine etmedir. Yani en temelde güç, deşarj olma ihtiyacı olan bir şeydir. Bunun organik varlıklardaki hali ise, bir şeyi *kendinden* yapma, o şeye ya da ortama rengini verme, onu kendince ifade etme/kendine benzetme gibi sayısız şekillerde ortaya çıkabilmektedir. Burada güç istenci kavramının tek başına ele alınmasından çok, konumuzla olan ilgisi önemlidir. Tezimde, Gilles Deleuze'ün de yorumlarından faydalanarak, Nietzsche'nin farklı fenomenleri nasıl güç istenci kavramı aracılığıyla anlamlandırdığını açıklamaya çalıştım.

Nietzsche'ye göre hür iradeye inanmak ya da inanmamak da güç istencinin aslında farklı göstergeleridir. Hatta bu ve bunun gibi kavramların yaratılması ve bu kavramlar temelinde düşünülmesi bile güç istencinin bir göstergesidir. Bu konuyu daha iyi anlayabilmek güç istenci bölümünün bir sonraki 'soykütük' bölümü ile beraber okunması ve düşünülmesi ile mümkün olabilecektir. Tezimde de ardı ardına ele aldığım bu iki bölüm, hem Nietzsche ontolojisinin temel olarak anlaşılabilmesi bakımından hem de Nietzscheci anlamda değerlerin kökeninin anlaşılabilmesi bakımından önem taşımaktadır. Ayrıca 'güç istenci' ve 'soykütük' başlıklı bu iki

bölüm, Nietzsche'nin geleneksel hür irade tartışmasını reddi ve özgürlük ve zorunluluk konularına kendi bakış açısının işlenmesi arasında bir köprü niteliği taşıması açısından önemlidir.

Bu vesile ile 'soykütük' bölümünü de nasıl işlediğimize temel hatları ile değinelim. Bu bölümde kendi okumalarımın yanısıra Michel Foucault'un konuyla ilgili yorumları hayati bir öneme sahiptir. Böylece bir anlamda Foucault'un yol göstericiliğinde Nietzsche'nin soykütüksel metodunun önemini ve geleneksel tarihsel metotlardan farklılığını ortaya koymaya çalıştım. Burada, tezimde de belirttiğim 'doğuş'[*emergence*] ve 'köken'[*descent*] kavramları soykütüksel araştırmada anahtar kelimelerimizdir.

Öyleyse Nietzscheci anlamda hür irade kavramının soykütüğüne gidecek olursak orada ne buluruz? İşte bu noktada, belki de beklentilerimizin tam aksi bir şeyle karşılaşırız. Şöyle ki, Nietzsche'ye göre, bireylerin yargılanabilir ve cezalandırılabilir olduğu ile onların hür irade sahibi olduğu şeklindeki bir düşünüş yapısı oldukça *geç* bir eşleşmedir. Daha temelde ise, bugün sorumlu ve hür irade sahibi birey olarak gördüğümüz şeyin altyapısında Nietzsche'ye göre çok daha materyal bir ilişki yatmaktadır: bu da borçveren ve borçlu arasındaki ilişkidir. Nietzsche'nin anlattığı 'modernite öncesi' ilişkide, borcunu öde(ye)meyince en amansız cezalara maruz bırakılması hak olarak görünen borçlu, zamanla sözünü tutmayı ve sorumluluk sahibi olmayı öğrenmek, hatta beynine kazımak durumunda kalmıştır. Zaten doğal olarak unutmaya yeteneğine sahip olan 'insan hayvanı'nda bir hafıza gelişmesi de ancak bu tür yöntemlerle mümkün olabilmiştir der Nietzsche.

Bu hikayenin antropolojik olarak ne kadar gerçeğe tekabül edebileceği sorunsalından çok, burada bizim için önemli olan nokta, aklımıza en azından şu şüphenin düşebilmiş olmasıdır: insanları eylediklerinden (ya da eylemediklerinden) dolayı yargılamak ve cezalandırmak aslında 'başka türlü de yapmış olabilirdi' varsayımının eşleşmesi olmayabilir mi?

Böylece bir anlamda Nietzsche'nin geleneksel yaklaşımları nasıl reddettiğini ele aldıktan sonra kendi özgürlük anlayışını nasıl kuracağı sorunsalına altyapısal anlamda bir geçiş yapmış olduk. Böylece belli soru ve problemleri tartışarak

geldiğimiz Üçüncü Bölümün başında da yeni bazı sorular kendini dayatır oldu. Bunlar arasında en temelleri şu şekilde sıralanabilir: Nietzsche determinizmi bu kadar güçlü reddediyorsa onun kendi metinlerinde yer yer karşılaştığımız zorunluluk vurgusuna ve hatta zorunlu olanın sevilmesi çağrısına (*amor fati*) nasıl anlam vereceğiz? Nietzsche hür iradeyi bu kadar şiddetle reddediyorken kendi bahsettiği özgürlük, öz-yaratım, değerlerin yeniden değerlendirilmesi (*revaluation*) gibi kavramları ne şekilde kavramalıyız? Peki ya Nietzsche'nin zorunluluk ve özgürlük temalı, ya da yıkmak/değiştirmek ve kabul etmek temalı düşünceleri birbiri ile çelişkili mi?

İşte bu sorular ışığında Nietzsche'nin özgürlük ve zorunluluk – daha özelde de yazgı – konularına yaklaşımını anlamak için ilk başta Nietzsche'nin ortaya koyduğu kavramların 'geleneksel' olarak ele aldığımız yaklaşımlardan farklarını ortaya koymaya çalıştım. Bunun için, Nietzsche'de yazgısevgisi olarak ifade edebileceğimiz *amor fati* kavramını bir olumlama (evet deme) yolu olarak temel hatlarıyla tanıttım. Bu bağlamda, Nietzsche'deki *yazgıcılık* anlayışının determinizmden farklarını temel olarak inceledim. İlgili bölümün sonunda geldiğimiz sonuç, Nietzsche'nin öne çıkardığı yazgıcılık anlayışının determinizm anlamına gelmediği, hatta determinizmle çok da alakası bulunmadığı yönünde oldu. Bunun yerine, Nietzsche'nin yazgıcılıktan anladığı, onun çok sevdiği Sokratik-öncesi antik Yunan tragediyalarını yad etmek ve anlamlandırmak şeklindedir. Böylece, Robert C. Solomon'un yorumunu dikkate alarak tezimde de işaret ettiğim gibi, Nietzsche'de yazgıcılığın varsaydığı zorunluluk, daha çok *estetik* ya da *öyküsel* bir zorunluluktur. Burada öne çıkan, fiziksel determinizmin içerdiği neden sonuç ilişkisi biçimde bir şey değil; ancak belli bir konsept içindeki belli olayların kaçınılmazlığıdır. Nietzsche'nin yazgıcılık ve yazgı sevgisi kavramlarını daha iyi algılamak için Yunan tragedyası Agamemnon'u Martha Nussbaum'un yorumu ile beraber ele aldık. Bu tragedyada bizim dikkatimizi çeken, trajik kahramanın yazgısını kucaklamaktaki rızası, hatta hevesi ve bir anlamda duygularını da yazgısı doğrultusunda biçimlendirmesidir. Bunun ışığında, daha önce düşünmeye çok da alışık olmadığımız bir şekilde, özgürlük ve zorunluluk arasındaki *çelişkinin*, bu kavramların bir ve bütünlüğünde çözümler hale gelmesi, konumuz adına hayati önem taşır.

Daha sonra tezimde deđindiđim konu, bir kabul sembolü olarak Dionysus oldu. Burada öne çıkan noktalardan biri ise acı çekmenin Hristiyan anlamına karşı Dionysusçu ya da trajik anlamı idi. Yine daha sonra tezde deđinecek olduđum Zarathustracı olumlama ile Dionysusçu trajik kabul arasında da var olan benzerlikler bu bölümde vurgulanmıştır.

Bu bölümün hemen sonrasında ise ele aldıđım konu, Nietzsche'nin ünlü *Bengi Dönüş* kavramı oldu. Bu kavramı mevcut tez içinde genel bir çerçeve içinde işleyerek, Nietzsche'nin yazgı sevgisi kavramı ile beraber nasıl güçlü bir olumlama yolu olduđunu ortaya koymaya çalıştım. Çok sayıda farklı yorumun yanı sıra, konuyla alakalı olarak benim kendimi daha yakın hissettiđim yorum, Bengi Dönüş'ü bir psikolojik test olarak ele almak oldu. Şöyle ki, Nietzsche bu *doktrin* aracılığı ile kişinin hayata olan yaklaşımını gerçek anlamda test edebilmesini ve bundan bir anlamda sarsılmasını amaçlamış olabilir. Bunun ne anlamda ve nasıl bir test olabileceđi ve de bir kişiyi hangi yönü ile sarsabileceđi gibi sorulara tezimde yanıt bulunabilir.

Bir sonraki bölümde ise, Nietzsche'nin yazgı sevgisini aynı zamanda hınç (ya da garez) duygusuna karşı nasıl bir alternatif, adeta bir panzehir olarak ortaya koyduđunu tartıştım. Şüphesiz hınç da doğal bir duygudur ancak Nietzsche'ye göre kişi kendini en azından bunun daha kötü olabilecek etkilerinden arındırabildiđi ölçüde hayata karşı daha sağlıklı bir yaklaşım içinde olabilir. Burada Nietzsche'nin *fizyolojik* olarak adlandırdığımız yaklaşımı öne çıkar: hınç en başta fizyolojik ve bununla bağlantılı olarak da psikolojik olarak kişiyi zayıflatan, bir anlamda yiyip bitiren bir duygudur. Bu nedenle kişi, belli katı ve sođuk zorunlulukları yazgı olarak algılayabildiđi ölçüde kendisine, çevresine ya da bir bütün olarak hayata hınç duymaktan kurtulabilecektir.

Nietzsche'nin yazgı sevgisi kavramı ile beraber ele aldıđımız 'evet deme' kavramlarını işledikten sonra, resmin bir de diđer yanına dikkatimizi çevirdik, ki bu da olumsuzlama ya da diđer bir ifade ile 'hayır deme' yaklaşımıdır. Öyle ki, Nietzsche her ne kadar olumlama ve kabul yaklaşımlarını gündeme getirse ve önerse de, onun felsefesi aynı zamanda bir o kadar olumsuzlama ve 'hayır'larla doludur.

Kendi deyimi ile o ‘çekiçle felsefe yapma’nın yollarını ve olanaklarını aramıştır, bu da en başta yıkım demektir.

Nietzsche felsefesinin temel konularından birisi hiç şüphesiz değerlerdir. Nietzsche’ye göre daha sağlıklı bir yaşam için, eski (değerler) yıkılmalı ve hayatı yücelten değerler kurulmalıdır. Bu bir değerlerin yeniden değerlendirilmesi süreci olacaktır²⁰⁹: metafizik yüklü ve hınç içgüdüleriyle kurulmuş değerler yerine daha *yaşamcıl* olanları getirebilmek – Nietzscheci anlamda bir yıkım ve yeniden değerlendirme en basit anlamda budur. Bu da içinde olumsuzlama, yani hayır demeyi gerektirir. Bu bölümle bağlantılı olarak bir sonraki bölümde Nietzsche’nin ‘özgür ruh’ olarak ortaya koyduğu kavramın ‘özgür irade’den farklarını inceledim. Özgür ruh, en temelde göreceli bir kavramdır, yani özgür irade gibi doğuştan verili olduğu varsayılmaz; yani daha çok, belirli derecelerde kazanılabilen bir özelliktir. Örneğin mevcut koşullarda verili değerlerden daha farklı bir değerlendirme ya da algılama içine girebiliyorsak, bu özgür ruh olabilmeye dair bir eğilim olarak görülebilir.

Buna ek olarak, Nietzsche’ye göre, özgür olabilmek bir anlamda belli fazları geçmeyi gerektirir. Bunu bir sonraki bölüm olan ‘Üç Metamorfoz Üzerine: Kutsal Bir Evet Deme’ başlığı altında inceledim. Burada Nietzsche’nin *Böyle Buyurdu Zerdüşt* kitabının ilgili bölümünün detaylı denebilecek bir incelenmesi ile, ‘üç faz’ı ve bunların neye tekabül edebiliyor olabileceğini açıklamaya çalıştım. İlk başta hürmetkar bir deve, sonra özgürlüğünü ilan eden bir aslan, ve sonra da masum bir çocuk... Tezimde ortaya koyduğum şekliyle ilk fazda öne çıkan çileci ve ‘sorumluluk sahibi’ bireydir; taşıyabileceğinden de fazlasını yüklenmek adeta onun marifetidir. İkinci fazda ‘hayır deme’ zamanıdır. Önüne çıkabilecek en güçlü rakibi arayan ve onu altetmek için savaşılan aslan sembolünde yine aynı şekilde özgürlüğü için savaşılan birey figürü öne çıkartılır. Aslan krallığını ilan etse de, özgür sayılabilmek için hala bir eksik vardır, bu da ancak bir çocuğun masumiyetinde bulunur. Çünkü hayatı kucaklayabilmek ve evet diyebilmekten uzaktır aslan, şartlar gereği hala fazlaca negatif ve ‘hayır’cıdır. Oysa artık ‘kutsal bir evet’ gerekmektedir ki bunu yapabilecek olan da ancak bir çocuktur.

²⁰⁹ “revaluation of values”.

Tezimde bu noktadan sonra ise yönelimim bir anlamda şimdiye kadar tartıştığım ve ortaya koyduğum argüman ve çıkarımları bir araya getirmek oldu. Burada Nietzsche'nin zorunluluk ve özgürlüğün bütünleştiği bir nokta olarak ortaya koyduğu sanatçılık örneğine de değindik. Daha önce sorduğumuz bir soru olan güçlü bir evet deme ve bir o kadar güçlü bir hayır demenin bir aradalığı sorunsalını ise daha çok Nietzsche'nin Zarathustra şahsında verdiği örneklerle anlamlandırabiliyoruz: Zarathustra şimdiye kadar görülmemiş ölçüde bir olumsuzlayıcı olmasına rağmen yine de 'hayır'cı bir ruh değildir. O, varoluşun en acıklı, en ağır ve en korkunç içgörüsüne ulaşmış, yine de bunu varoluşa bir itiraz olarak görmemiştir.

İşte tezim boyunca farklı tartışmalar altında vurgulamaya ve anlamlandırmaya çalıştığım her şey belki de Zarathustra şahsında bu vasıfta toplanmıştır. Zorunlu ve korkunç olanın tümünden, kaçınmaksızın bir farkındalığı ve bununla beraber yaşama her defasında daha güçlü bir sarılma: *kutsal bir evet*.

APPENDIX B: TEZ FOTOKOPİSİ İZİN FORMU

ENSTİTÜ

Fen Bilimleri Enstitüsü

Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü

Uygulamalı Matematik Enstitüsü

Enformatik Enstitüsü

Deniz Bilimleri Enstitüsü

YAZARIN

Soyadı : Beşkardeşler

Adı : Sedef

Bölümü : Felsefe

TEZİN ADI (İngilizce) : Nietzsche on Fate and Freedom

TEZİN TÜRÜ : Yüksek Lisans Doktora

1. Tezimin tamamından kaynak gösterilmek şartıyla fotokopi alınabilir.
2. Tezimin içindekiler sayfası, özet, indeks sayfalarından ve/veya bir bölümünden kaynak gösterilmek şartıyla fotokopi alınabilir.
3. Tezimden bir bir (1) yıl süreyle fotokopi alınamaz.

TEZİN KÜTÜPHANEYE TESLİM TARİHİ: