

DELEUZE AND GUATTARI'S ENCOUNTER WITH BECKETT WITHIN  
THE CONTEXT OF DESIRING MACHINES

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BESTE ÖZTÜRK BAKACAK

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---

Prof. Dr. Meliha Altunışık  
Director

I certify that this thesis satisfies all the requirements as a thesis for the degree of Master of Science.

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Prof. Dr. Ayşe Saktanber  
Head of Department

This is to certify that we have read this thesis and that in our opinion it is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Science.

---

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Erdoğan Yıldırım  
Thesis Supervisor

**Examining Committee Members**

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Erdoğan Yıldırım (METU, SOC) \_\_\_\_\_

Assist. Prof. Dr. Ersan Ocak (BİLKENT, COMD) \_\_\_\_\_

Dr. Barış Mücen (METU, SOC) \_\_\_\_\_



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Name, Last name : Beste Öztürk Bakacak

Signature :

## ABSTRACT

### DELEUZE AND GUATTARI'S ENCOUNTER WITH BECKETT WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF DESIRING MACHINES

Öztürk Bakacak, Beste

M. Sc, Department of Sociology

Supervisor: Assoc. Prof. Dr. Erdoğan Yıldırım

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In this thesis Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari's social theory, which is based on their conceptualization of desiring machines, is analyzed within the references to Samuel Beckett's works in two volume *Capitalism and Schizophrenia*. Focusing on Beckett's works play a key role to comprehend the new ways that Deleuze and Guattari's desiring machines introduced, within their perspective against the traditional approach to desire which handles it in the context of lack. Besides, in this thesis a new interpretation on Beckett's works is offered. Beckett's selected works are presented within the social and political consequences of the conceptualization of desiring machines, and its implications on the notion of the subjectivity that is set forth in this framework. Thus, a new and radical reading is made that is stayed out of the mainstream when 'Beckett's Studies' is viewed.

Keywords: Gilles Deleuze, Felix Guattari, Samuel Beckett, Desiring Machines, Desire Theory

## ÖZ

### DELEUZE VE GUATTARI'NİN ARZULAYAN MAKİNELER KAPSAMINDA BECKETT'LE KARŞILAŞMASI

Öztürk Bakacak, Beste

Yüksek Lisans, Sosyoloji

Tez Yöneticisi: Doç. Dr. Erdoğan Yıldırım

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Bu tezde, iki ciltlik *Kapitalizm ve Şizofreni* kitaplarında Samuel Beckett'e yapılan referanslar temel alınarak, Gilles Deleuze ve Felix Guattari'nin arzulayan makineler kavramsallaştırmasına dayanan sosyal teorileri incelenmiştir. Beckett'in yapıtlarının merkeze konulması, arzuyu eksiklik üzerinden okuyan geleneksel arzu kuramının karşıtı bir perspektifle, Deleuze ve Guattari'nin arzulayan makineler kavramsallaştırmasının açtığı yeni yolların kavranmasında önemli bir rol oynamıştır. Öte yandan, bu tezde Beckett'in yapıtlarına yeni bir yorum getirilmesi amaçlanmıştır. Arzulayan makineler kavramsallaştırmasının toplumsal ve siyasal sonuçları ile bu çerçevede ortaya konan öznelğin çıkarımları Beckett'in seçilen çalışmaları ile yorumlanmıştır. Böylelikle, 'Beckett Çalışmaları'na bakıldığında ana akımın dışında kalmış olan, yeni ve radikal bir okuma yapılmıştır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Gilles Deleuze, Felix Guattari, Samuel Beckett, Arzu Makinesi, Arzu Kuramı

To my love  
Extraordinary reader,  
intimate friend, and great  
companion, who many years  
ago joined me on a stage  
where we first read  
Beckett...



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## CHAPTER I

### INTRODUCTION

#### 1.1 Preliminary: The Importance of Beckett's Works for Deleuze and Guattari's Social Theory

It is obvious from the opening pages of *Anti-Oedipus* that literature is very important to Deleuze and Guattari - the literary references always outnumber the clinical references when it comes to exemplifying what schizophrenia is like: for every Schreber there is an Artaud...and a Beckett; for every Wolf-Man there is a Nerval...and a Büchner, and so on.<sup>1</sup>

If the schizophrenia is the universal, the great artist is indeed the one who scales the schizophrenic wall and reaches the land of the unknown, where he no longer belongs to any time, any milieu, any school.<sup>2</sup>

Within the dominant tradition of Western thought, literature<sup>3</sup> has always been

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<sup>1</sup> Ian Buchanan, *Deleuze and Guattari's Anti Oedipus*, (London: Continuum, 2008), 33

<sup>2</sup> Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, *Anti Oedipus*, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1983), 69

<sup>3</sup> In this study, literature is addressed in the context Terry Eagleton defines it. In his essay *Literary Theory: An Introduction* Eagleton challenges the well established definitions of literature. He criticizes the distinction of 'fact' and 'fiction', and concludes that literature cannot belong to one of these distinctions. He mentions that "if the literature is 'creative' or

faced to criticism as regards to its role in effecting the social facts and call for social change. In this view, the literature is thrown to the side of ‘fictional’ or ‘imaginary’, while sociology, philosophy or the other sciences are regarded as depending on ‘facts’ or ‘truth’. Not only its relation with social facts attracted much debate, but it has been also regarded as a distinct sphere from philosophy, and between these separated spheres there is always a hierarchy in which the literature is given a lower status. In this context, Plato saw no sin while he was talking about expelling the poet from the *polis*<sup>4</sup>, and mainly his attitude has

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‘imaginative’ writing, does this imply that history, philosophy, and natural science are uncreative and unimaginative?” Terry Eagleton, *Literary Theory: An Introduction*, (USA: University of Minnesota, 2008), 2. He also challenges the definition of literature that views it as a ‘writing’ which “transforms and intensifies ordinary language, deviates systematically from everyday speech.” Eagleton, *Literary Theory*, 2. He argues that considering literature as a highly valued kind of writing is also open to criticism because values are not objective, instead they are unstable and subjective. Eagleton concludes that there is no fundamental essence that makes ‘writing’ literary. Instead, literature is a construction built on the “assumptions by which certain social groups exercise and maintain power over others.” Terry Eagleton, *Literary Theory*, 14.

<sup>4</sup> There is an ongoing discussion about the differences and similarities between literature and philosophy, and the possibility of their interaction. Actually, Plato's position guides the theoretical frame about the relation between literature and philosophy since he wrote on this issue in detail. In *Republic*, Plato mentioned this relation as “an ancient quarrel between philosophy and poetry” (*Republic*, 607b). Plato made a distinction between the poet that “have met with the imitators and been cheated, and on seeing their productions, have failed to perceive that they are three removes from being” (*Republic*, 599) whose productions “are appearances and not realities” (*Republic*, X, 599) and the poet who “really have knowledge of those subjects of which their descriptions are approved by common opinion” (*Republic*, 599). As seen in this quotation, he adopts an indecisive position regarding the situation of poet. If the poet is not philosophically educated, and cannot remove the mask in front of the truth, he is an imitator; his nature “is third from the king and from the truth” (*Republic*, 597). For the painter draws the appearance of the bed which is done by the manufacturer, and this bed, made by the manufacturer, is just an imitation of the Idea of the bed. The importance of that description comes from the connection with desire and poetic imitation. He stated that “sexual desires, and anger, and all feelings of desire and pain and pleasure in the soul, which we say follow all our actions ... poetic imitation produces all these effects in us.” (*Republic*, 606), and going one step further he proposed to “expel poetry from the *polis*”. It should be indicated that these are not valid for the poet only, but also applicable for the painters, and actors. For Plato, the art in general and literature in particular is the imitations of the imitations of Ideas. It can be said that his approach to literature has dominated Western tradition. As it is also reflected on the studies on Beckett's works where the tension arises whether Beckett is a philosopher or a literary figure. Robert Eaglestone, in his essay *Beckett in the Wilderness: Writing about (Not) Writing about Beckett*, gives detailed information on different perspectives concerning the relation of Beckett's works with the philosophy. He handles the views of ‘Literature as a Philosophy’, ‘Literature as a Parody of Philosophy’, ‘Literature as an Influence on Philosophy’ and finally



determined the perception seeing literature as a fundamentally separated domain.

However, when the works of contemporary thinkers are subjected to such an analysis to observe their relations with literature, it can be seen that there is an ongoing effort to break down these well established borders. Particularly interesting in that regard are the works of Gilles Deleuze, Felix Guattari, Alain Badiou, and Michel Foucault among others most of whom belong to the post-war French intellectual circles. Yet despite their attention to literary concerns, these thinkers did not offer a comprehensive theory of literature. Instead, their thinking on literature is an attempt to engage certain theoretical issues developed through an encounter with the literary works. What is common to these thinkers' view on literature is that, they thought literature holds something revolutionary in its dynamics if it is to be entrusted in the true hands.

In such a context, Beckett's oeuvre emerges as a mark in almost all of the post-war French intellectuals' works. The social facts confronted by Beckett which were reflected in his works are also confronted by a whole generation of thinkers and this confrontation brought them to point out more or less the common themes within different disciplines. Moreover Beckett's works hold such an important place for these thinkers that they all referred to Beckett's works as analogous to their fundamental concerns. He attained such a place in Western thinking that, for instance when Jacques Derrida was asked about why he have not written anything on Beckett since he mentioned that Beckett's writing is already so deconstructive<sup>5</sup>, Derrida answered that he cannot write on

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that the philosophical and literary texts are just texts which we impose upon them genre distinctions. For detailed discussion on this topic please see in Robert Eaglestone, "Beckett in the Wilderness: Writing about (Not) Writing about Beckett" in *Beckett and Philosophy*, Lane, Richard, ed. (New York: Palgrave, 2000), 40-53.

<sup>5</sup> Victor E. Taylor and Charles E. Winquist, (ed.), *Postmodernism: Critical Texts*, (New York:

Beckett because,

This is an author to whom I feel very close, or to whom I would like to feel myself very close; but also too close. Precisely because of this proximity, it is too hard for me, too easy and too hard. I have perhaps avoided him a bit because of this identification.<sup>6</sup>

In addition to Derrida's inspiring position on Beckett, Michel Foucault also stated that Beckett's famous play *Waiting for Godot* was the one that constitutes his radical rupture from the leading philosophical movements of his period.<sup>7</sup> Different from Derrida, Foucault employed<sup>8</sup> Beckett's celebrated novel *Molloy* in his analysis of discourse and 'truth'. However, it was primarily Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari that gave utter importance to Beckett's works and used Beckett's characters and cases intensively. In *Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, they built their social theory on desire guided on the examples from Beckett.

Undoubtedly, there is a striking proximity between the thinking of Deleuze and Guattari and Beckett's works. And this is accepted in *A Thousand Plateaus* as "Take an arbitrary list of authors we are fond of: Kafka once again, Beckett, Ghérasim Luca, Jean-Luc Godard."<sup>9</sup> In this context, it will be argued that Deleuze and Guattari's references to Beckett rise the possibility of

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Routledge Press, 1998), 110

<sup>6</sup> Taylor and Winquist, *Postmodernism: Critical Texts*, 109

<sup>7</sup> James Miller, *The Passion of Michel Foucault*, (USA : Harvard University Press, 2000), 65

<sup>8</sup> Michel Foucault, "The Discourse on Language" in *The Archaeology of Knowledge and The Discourse on Language*, (New York: Pantheon Books, 1972), 215-28

<sup>9</sup> Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, (London: Athlone Press, 1987), 108

understanding their social theory which is based on the analysis of the ways that the different types of social machines code the flows of desire, and their schizoanalysis to destroy this repression of desire, and therefore of the subject.

Besides this opportunity, I believe that comprehending Deleuze and Guattari's social theory which is mainly the subject of *Capitalism and Schizophrenia* and reading Beckett's works within their social theory, will enable us to make a new interpretation on Beckett which is somehow thrown to the periphery within the field of study which is called 'Beckett studies'.

"Is it our fault that Lawrence, Miller, Kerouac, Burroughs, Artaud, and Beckett know more about schizophrenia than psychiatrists and psychoanalysts?"<sup>10</sup> This was Deleuze's answer to the question considering why they attached great importance to literature and used intensively literary references, especially from Beckett, rather than contemporary theories. He indicated that the positions of these literary figures are close to their understanding of schizophrenia. This does not mean to say that these writers are writing directly about what the schizophrenia is or created a theory about it, nor the writers are schizophrenic. Rather, it means that their works are like the process of schizophrenia, which has a revolutionary potential against the internal dynamics of the capitalist machine, as it will be described in detail in the last chapter.

[A]n author is great because he cannot prevent himself from tracing flows and causing them to circulate, flows that split asunder the catholic and despotic signifier of his work, and that necessarily nourish a revolutionary machine on the horizon. That's what style is, or rather the absence of style - asyntactic, agrammatical: the moment when language is no longer defined by what it says, even less by what makes it a

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<sup>10</sup> Gilles Deleuze, *Negotiations*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990), 23

signifying thing, but what it causes it to move, to flow, and to explode - desire. For literature is like schizophrenia: a process and not a goal, a production and not an expression.<sup>11</sup>

Since literature is a process, a production, and is like schizophrenia, the literary figures are their allies<sup>12</sup> who collaborate with them to “shatter a wall, the capitalist barrier.”<sup>13</sup> However, Deleuze and Guattari argue that among the people who belong to the realm of literature, only a few ones accomplish the break of “schizophrenic wall or limit”, and state that “the majority draw near the wall and back away horrified. Better to fall back under the law of the signifier, marked by castration, triangulated in Oedipus.”<sup>14</sup> These works, which failed to afford the break the schizophrenic wall, are enslaved ones; they are written in the *Oedipal form*<sup>15</sup> which reduces the literature to an object of consumption.

The importance Beckett has for them firstly comes from Beckett’s own history. Deleuze mentions that “What we find in great English and American novelists is a gift, rare among the French, for intensities, flows, machine-books, tool-books, schizo-books. All we've got in France is Artaud and half of Beckett.”<sup>16</sup> The emphasis on *half of Beckett* indicates his position of writing in French as being born in Ireland. Beckett, whose native language was English, preferred to write his important works in French. After writing his last novel in English,

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<sup>11</sup> Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti Oedipus*, 133

<sup>12</sup> Deleuze, *Negotiations*, 22

<sup>13</sup> Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti Oedipus*, 133

<sup>14</sup> Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti Oedipus*, 135

<sup>15</sup> Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti Oedipus*, 134

<sup>16</sup> Deleuze, *Negotiations*, 23

*Watt*, which he started to write in Paris on 1941, he began to write in French<sup>17</sup>. This was because, as he claimed, it was easier to write "without style" in French.<sup>18</sup> Undoubtedly, this does not mean that Beckett's works have no style. Rather, this means that by writing in French, he broke his chains with the literary glory which he could oblige himself to use if he would write in his native language. He would have thought that he was avoiding the risk of falling into the logic of one's own language, as well as refraining from using unconsciously accepted meanings hidden in the words.

In addition to escaping his own language's limits, and writing in French, he also invented a new language within the language of French which enabled him to "concentrate on a more direct expression of the search for 'being'"<sup>19</sup> This intention to create his own style within the language can be observed in his works. It can be seen how Beckett gradually minimalizes the words used in his plays through the end of his career. In these latest works the characters talk just a few words and these words are used repetitively. By this way, in Beckett's works the human condition can be shown at its very limits.

As Deleuze and Guattari mention, writing without style means writing asyntactic, agrammatical which means that the language "communicates with its own outside."<sup>20</sup> It provides a questioning of the exclusions by the language itself. It enables to communicate with the *outside*, with the *void*, with the

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<sup>17</sup> The practical reason for Beckett to turn to French is that his first works, especially *Murphy* and *Watt*, were rejected many times by the publishers. Therefore, he had chosen a new reader and audience in France.

<sup>18</sup> James Knowlson, *Damned to fame: The Life of Samuel Beckett*, (London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 1996), 357

<sup>19</sup> Knowlson, *Damned to fame*, 357

<sup>20</sup> Gilles Deleuze, *Essays Critical and Clinical*, (UK: Verso, 1998), iv

*nothingness* which is desired to be left behind since the Ancient Greeks. Deleuze argue that “Beckett spoke of 'drilling holes' in language in order to see or hear 'what was lurking behind’”.<sup>21</sup> By drilling the holes in language, Beckett could give the impression that nothing happens throughout *Waiting for Godot* as summarized in the opening of the play “Nothing to be done.”<sup>22</sup> or the feeling of nothingness as Clov prefers to use intensely as 'zero'.

What does Beckett's style signify for Deleuze and Guattari? What do they refer to when they situate his works opposite to the ones written in *Oedipal form*? The context they use Beckett's works gives important clues for the answers of these questions at first sight. Beckett appears for the first time in *Anti Oedipus* just in the second page under the title of *Desiring Machines* as an example of 'stroll of a schizo'.<sup>23</sup> Just in this first part of the book, they make reference to Beckett six times. These references enable them firstly to point machinic elements and to analyze the desiring machines, and secondly to indicate in what ways the schizophrenia they are talking about is different from the schizophrenia as an illness, showing the revelation of the schizophrenic process.

However, most of all Deleuze and Guattari employ Beckett's works to show the pure potentiality of art and literature. They think Beckett's oeuvre have a revolutionary potential which cause decoded and deterritorialized flows to circulate in the socius. Therefore, trying to reveal the ways Beckett's works used in *Capitalism and Schizophrenia* and share the importance of such a reading of Beckett will be the main concern of the following chapters.

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<sup>21</sup> Deleuze, *Essays Critical and Clinical*, iv

<sup>22</sup> Beckett, *Waiting for Godot*, 1

<sup>23</sup> Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti Oedipus*, 2

## 1.2 Methodology, Outline, and the Scope of the Thesis

The methodology of this study is to use primary and secondary resources together. The primary sources are Beckett's famous prose as *Molloy*, *Malone Dies*, and *The Unnamable*, and his plays *Waiting for Godot*, *Endgame*, and *Happy Days*. However, throughout the thesis, Beckett's other works like *Quad*, *Texts for Nothing* and *Come and Go* will also be used intensively from time to time.

The other primary sources will be Deleuze and Guattari's collaborated works *Anti Oedipus* and *A Thousand Plateaus* which form *Capitalism and Schizophrenia*. Keeping in mind Deleuze and Guattari's contribution to philosophical field in their sole works, Deleuze's and Guattari's own contributions to their theory on desiring machines will also be used.

As mentioned below, relating Beckett's oeuvre with their theory of desire, which stands in the center of their social theory, will bring about a double sided contribution to a better understanding of Beckett's and Deleuze and Guattari's works. The references to Beckett throughout the *Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, which are used intensively, as Timothy Murphy argues<sup>24</sup> will open the way for a better understanding of their philosophy, while creating a possibility for a new interpretation of Beckett's works. However, since *Capitalism and Schizophrenia* is an extremely complex work based on a wide range of sources, it can not be treated in full within the scope of this study.

In addition to this, it is worthwhile to mention here that Deleuze and Guattari's

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<sup>24</sup> Ian Buchanan and John Marks, (ed.), *Deleuze and Literature*, (Edinburgh: Edinburgh

references to Beckett are particularly focused on his novels and his television projects, rather than his plays. The reason for this, as Mary Bryden states, is Deleuze's attitude towards live theatrical events. Therefore, in their analysis they ignore the plays. In this thesis, going one step further, beyond their specific commentaries on Beckett, the plays will also be analyzed.

What Beckett tried to attain through *assassinating* the conventional way of narration in its traditional form will be put in the center of the analysis in connection with Deleuze and Guattari's fundamental aim of destroying the Oedipal construction. Therefore, what Deleuze and Guattari's theory on desire have to do with the works of Beckett's is the main question that will be handled in this thesis. And in the light of this question, the significance of the content of Beckett's works in general, his characters and their environments in particular, will be discussed. In this sense, Deleuze and Guattari's conceptualization of desiring machines, schizophrenization process and the description of the schizoanalysis, and their relation with the works of Beckett will be the scope of this thesis.

The chapters are designed as follows. The second chapter will be dedicated to the presentation of the highlighted themes of Beckettian writing which will contribute to establish a general understanding of his works since the whole thesis stands on them. In addition, a preliminary approach to Deleuze and Guattari's theory will be attempted.

After such an introductory chapter, the third chapter will focus on the different approaches to *desire* which is necessary since Deleuze and Guattari's theory is fundamentally built on the criticism of these approaches. In this sense, there are basically two distinct approaches to desire in the traditional Western thought



one handling desire in the context of *acquisition* of a lack and the other in the context of production. However, within chapter only the first approach will be analyzed in detail guided by the works of Plato, Sigmund Freud and Jacques Lacan.

This chapter will be followed by an analysis of the desire which is positioned in the *production* as Deleuze and Guattari see it. In this sense, the fundamental concern of forth chapter will be a discussion of the concept of *desiring machines* which is profoundly handled in *Anti Oedipus*. In this chapter, following this discussion the focus will shift to the main concern of the thesis by elaborating on the ways Beckett's works contribute and enrich Deleuze and Guattari's approach, and the question of the possibility of reading selected works of Beckett as examples of desiring machines. To be able to do this the analysis will proceed by connecting the three synthesis of desire as the connective synthesis, disjunctive synthesis and conjunctive synthesis, with Beckett's works.

In the fifth chapter, first of all what Deleuze and Guattari meant by the process of schizophrenization will be underlined within the context of desiring machines, particularly concentrating on Beckett's *Trilogy*. Thus, the employment of schizophrenia with regard to Deleuze and Guattari's formulation of desire will be examined. Beckettian characters and their cases will be analyzed as if they are in a *process* as it is conceptualized by Deleuze and Guattari. Lastly, based on their views regarding the literature that it is akin to schizoanalysis, their introducing of this *material psychiatry* will be analyzed in connection with its social and political effects.

Finally, in the conclusion chapter the overall conclusion of what have been discussed from the beginning of this study, and the key aspects of the analysis

of Deleuze and Guattari's encounter with Beckett within the context of desiring machines will be drawn out.

## CHAPTER II

### SAMUEL BECKETT IN CONTEXT

#### 2.1 Introduction

The aim of this chapter is to introduce Beckett's position in the literary field<sup>25</sup> and the fundamental features of Beckett's works, for in the following chapters the analysis will be based on these themes. In addition to this, a preliminary approach to Deleuze and Guattari's social theory regarding desire will also be presented.

Therefore, this chapter will be built on three main pillars. First of all, the main purpose of this chapter is to explain Beckett's position in literary context. This will be followed by an introduction of the themes he used intensively in his oeuvre. And finally this chapter will conclude with a discussion of Deleuze and Guattari's contributions to the social theory as well as the theory of desire.

#### 2.2 Beckett's Position in the Literary Field

Every writer is a sellout. The only literature is that which places an explosive device in its package, fabricating a counterfeit currency, causing the

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<sup>25</sup> The term *literary field* is used in the context of Pierre Bourdieu describes it: “[T]he literary field is a space of objective relations between positions - between that of the celebrated artist and that of the avant gardiste, for example.” Pierre Bourdieu, “Flaubert's Point of View, (trans.) Priscilla Parkhurst Ferguson, *Critical Inquiry*, 14.3(1998), 544

superego and its form of expression to explode, as well as the market value of its form of content.<sup>26</sup>

The conditions for literary creation, which emerge only unpredictably, with a slow turnover and progressive recognition, are fragile. Future Becketts or Kafkas, who will of course, be unlike Beckett or Kafka, may well not find a publisher, and if they don't nobody (of course) will notice.<sup>27</sup>

Samuel Beckett, born in Ireland and lived between 1906 and 1989, is considered as “arguably, the twentieth century's most important playwright”<sup>28</sup>. He had published more than a hundred pieces of literary work throughout his life among which there are plays, novels, poems, and texts for radio and television. Although he wrote affluently throughout his life, he published his major works, the first *Trilogy* which is consisted of *Molloy* (1951), *Malone Dies* (1951), and *The Unnamable* (1953), and his famous plays *Waiting for Godot* (1949), *Endgame* (1957), *Krapp's Last Tape* (1958), *Happy Days* (1961), *Play* (1963), *Not I* (1972) after the post-war period when he returned back to Paris in 1945.

His importance in the literary field is based on his radical rupture from the traditional way of writing of both play and prose. In his famous play *Waiting for Godot*, Beckett accomplished such an important act that he practically destroyed the traditional meaning of the play. But to be able to appreciate Beckett's role in this transformation we need to understand how Beckett could deconstruct the constitutive principles of play in its traditional form. Aristotle,

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<sup>26</sup> Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti Oedipus*, 134

<sup>27</sup> Deleuze, *Negotiations*, 128

<sup>28</sup> Lois Oppenheim (ed.), *Samuel Beckett Studies*, ( New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 1

in his book *Poetics*<sup>29</sup>, set the rules of this field thousand years ago. Although, his rules have been subjected to criticism among the playwrights especially in the twenty-first century, Aristotle's *Poetics* has a great impact on play writing even today.

In *Poetics* Aristotle says that "Every Tragedy ... must have six parts, which parts determine its quality – namely, Plot, Character, Diction, Thought, Spectacle, Song"<sup>30</sup>. He argues that the first one of these, the plot, is the most important and constitutive part of the tragedy and it must be a whole, with a perfectly constructed beginning, middle, and end. The most important thing that establishes the plot is the *unity of action* for Aristotle. He writes that "Tragedy is the imitation of an action"<sup>31</sup>. Aristotle's drama in its general form and tragedy in particular, is built upon *action*. For the action imitates what happens in real life, Aristotle argues, there must be a cause - effect chain of actions. Furthermore, the diction and thought must be compatible with the action.

In *Waiting for Godot*, like in Beckett's other plays, there is no climax, or conflicting action. There is no rationally constructed beginning or end that can create a kind of *catharsis*. Instead, there are repetitive actions<sup>32</sup> throughout the play. The two acts of the play are constructed in a similar manner; the two acts proceed in the *same place, same time* in which Vladimir and Estragon do the

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<sup>29</sup> Aristotle, *Poetics*, (USA: Dover Publications, 1997)

<sup>30</sup> Aristotle, *Poetics* 11

<sup>31</sup> Aristotle, *Poetics*, 11

<sup>32</sup> Although, coming on to the stage of the characters are repetitive, there are some differences especially in their physical appearances in the act two. This will be mentioned a few pages later.

same things as they did before; in the second act Pozzo and Lucky come back on stage as in the first act, and the boy appears in the end of the act two as he does in the act one. The dialogue has no role to convey the meaning. There is no shared meaning. There is disunity between the speech and the action, as it can be clearly seen in their dialogues:

**VLADIMIR:** Well? Shall we go?

**ESTRAGON:** Yes, let's go.

*They do not move.*<sup>33</sup> (Emphasize added)

Not only his plays, but also prose of Beckett symbolizes a break from Aristotelian prescription. "If *Waiting for Godot* removed the drama from drama" says Jonathan Boulter, *Trilogy* "removed all comfortable signposts from narrative: coherent plot, stable character, events occurring in identifiable space and time."<sup>34</sup> For instance, in *The Unnamable*, the third book of the *Trilogy*, Beckett explicitly assaulted the "conventions of all traditional narration"<sup>35</sup>. As Alfred Alvarez argues for the same work that it is "stage by stage assassination of the novel in all the forms in which it is traditionally received."<sup>36</sup> Like in the play writing, the features of the novel in its traditional form can be traced back to Aristotle. In *Poetics* Aristotle mentions,

As to that poetic imitation which is narrative in form and employs a single meter, the plot manifestly ought, as in a tragedy to be constructed on dramatic principles. It should have for its subject a single action, whole and complete, with

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<sup>33</sup> Samuel Beckett, *Waiting for Godot: A Tragicomedy in Two Acts*, (London: Faber & Faber, 1971), 59

<sup>34</sup> Jonathan Boulter, *Beckett: A Guide for the Perplexed*, (London: Continuum, 2008), 3

<sup>35</sup> Brian Richardson, *Unnatural Voices: Extreme Narration in Modern and Contemporary Fiction*, (USA: Ohio State University Press, 2006), 102

<sup>36</sup> Alfred Alvarez, *Samuel Beckett*, (London: Fontana, 1992), 68

a beginning, a middle, and an end. It will thus resemble a living organism in all its unity, and produce the pleasure proper to it.<sup>37</sup> (1459a)

In most of the Beckett's novels one cannot find the "rationally" constructed plot. There is no traceable cause - effect relationship between the exposition of the situation, rising action through conflict, turning point, falling action or resolution. This does not mean that his works contain none of these features of traditional writing. The emphasis here is on that, Beckett does not write in compliance with the features of writing that Aristotle put forth having a profound effect on literature. In Beckett's prose there is no beginning, middle or end in a way that they sequentially follow each other. For instance in *Molloy*, the second book of *Trilogy*, the story is set in an indeterminate place and time, and the reader has not given any clue about the characteristic features of the protagonists since throughout the novel they are not stable.

This difference in content is also reflected in the form of the novel. There is no conventional understanding of opening new paragraphs in most of his works. For example *Molloy* is comprised of two parts. The first part is consisted only of two paragraphs. While the first paragraph is just one page, the second one is consisted of eighty three pages.

These features of his works caused them to be hardly comprehensible. And it is obvious that the assassinating of the traditional narrative made the reader uncomfortable, since this type of literature bring the reader face to face with unfamiliar questions. In this context, Terry Eagleton argues that "Classical narrative of the realist kind is on the whole a 'conservative form', which slides our anxiety at absence under the comforting sign of presence; many modernist

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<sup>37</sup> Aristotle, *Poetics*, (USA: Dover Publications, 1997), 47

texts, such as those of Brecht and Beckett, remind us that what we are seeing might always have happened differently, or not happened at all.”<sup>38</sup>

This new vision in play writing, no matter how sophisticated it was, was so much influential among the theater circles that it becomes the undeniable turning point at the history of theater for the later play writers.<sup>39</sup> Not only his plays have become significant, his prose also attracted so much attention that their reputation has become known outside of the literary field. The result of the indeterminacy of his works is that, there emerged a considerable secondary literature on his oeuvre which related the themes used in his works with a wide range of philosophical approaches.<sup>40</sup>

Among these approaches, following the post-war years existentialism came to the fore<sup>41</sup>. In those years, thanks to preeminent writers like Jean Paul Sartre and Albert Camus, existentialism became a significant literary movement and

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<sup>38</sup> Eagleton, *Literary Theory*, 161

<sup>39</sup> Jonathan Boulter states that; “Playwrights like Harold Pinter (who acknowledges Beckett as his master), Edward Albee, Sarah Kane, are all massively influenced by the plays: their experiments with form and staging are all responses to Beckett’s elaborate and relentless critique of dramatic convention. And equally we need to recognize the influence of Beckett’s prose on twentieth-century fiction...Paul Auster...J.M. Coetzee, and John Banville all claim an artistic inheritance from Beckett’s singular vision.” Boulter, *Beckett*, 4

<sup>40</sup> Charles Carpenter in his book *The Dramatic Works of Samuel Beckett* gives a detailed account of works on Beckett’s works drawing on philosophical and aesthetic approaches. These works include a range of writers from Badiou to Adorno. Charles Carpenter, *The Dramatic Works of Samuel Beckett: A Selective Bibliography of Publications About his Plays and Their Conceptual Foundations*, (London: Continuum, 2011), 191

<sup>41</sup> In the book *Beckett and Philosophy*, a wide array of works on Beckett ranging from the ones within Nietzschean perspective to the ones adopting Heideggerian thinking are all reviewed. Richard Lane, (ed.), *Beckett and Philosophy*, (New York: Palgrave, 2000). However, I will focus only on existentialism which is primarily constructed by Jean Paul Sartre; because, in my view, it became a challenge in Beckett's studies and still pops up very often in articles relating Beckett's works from a philosophical perspective. And to exonerate Beckett's works, this view should be eliminated.



philosophical tradition especially in Paris. It was considered to be one of the most illustrative movements of the human condition in those days, and had influenced the Paris circles profoundly. The post-war years found a very diverse range of writers who are said to be related with existentialism. Thomas Flynn says that “certainly, authors like Dostoevsky and Kafka, playwrights like Beckett and Ionesco, and artists like Giacometti and Picasso exemplify many of the defining characteristics of existentialist thought.”<sup>42</sup> However, it should be mentioned that Beckett's name was not mentioned among the philosophical movement, he is considered to belong in the literary side of existentialism.

However, it was Foucault who warned that Beckett's works should not be related with existentialism. He said that, “I belong to that generation who, as students, had before their eyes, and were limited by, a horizon consisting of Marxism, phenomenology, and existentialism. For me the break was first Beckett's *Waiting for Godot*, a breathtaking performance.”<sup>43</sup> Foucault attributed such a significant meaning to Beckett's works that for him Beckett's play symbolize a kind of a rupture from the movements which dominated his age. His words also witnessed that there was a line of thought which distinguished itself from existentialism in Paris circles, and as Foucault indicated Beckett's works differ from his contemporaries.

However, this is not to say that Beckett's works are not related with existentialism in a certain way. His works can be related with some of the existentialist themes (keeping in mind the criticism whether Heidegger is an existentialist writer), especially with Heidegger's idea of ‘thrownness’. “Heidegger's idea, worked out fully in *Being and Time*... is that to be means

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<sup>42</sup> Thomas Flynn, *Existentialism*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), 16

<sup>43</sup> Miller, *The Passion of Michel Foucault*, 65

simply to have been thrown, without guidance or aid, into existence and told to live.”<sup>44</sup> Actually, this theme is all common to Beckett's plays and prose. Yet, as Foucault argues, seeing his works as the examples of existentialist writing, limits and bounds his works to a philosophical and literary tradition and causes to ascribe them concrete meanings. Furthermore, Beckett rejects his works to be attributed specific meanings. As Christopher Innes argues; “Beckett consistently refuses to limit the connotations of his plays by elucidating them except in gnostic ambiguities”<sup>45</sup> Beckett himself makes his answer on this topic very clear in the last sentence of *Watt* as ‘no symbols where none intended.’<sup>46</sup>

In addition to this, there are some differences between the literary examples of existentialism and his works. So in what ways Beckett can be separated from the assumptions of existentialism? Martin Esslin in *The Theater of Absurd* argues that “the theme of the plays of Beckett, Adamov, Ionesco, and Genet” are different from “the works of dramatists like Giraudoux, Anouilh, Salacrou, Sartre, and Camus.”<sup>47</sup> Esslin continues that the latter ones “present their sense of the irrationality of the human condition in the form of highly lucid and logically constructed reasoning,” while the previous ones “strive to express its sense of the senselessness of the human condition and the inadequacy of the rational approach by the open abandonment of rational devices and discursive thought.”<sup>48</sup>

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<sup>44</sup> Jonathan Boulter, *Beckett: A Guide for the Perplexed* (London: Continuum, 2008), 30

<sup>45</sup> Christopher Innes, *Holly Theatre: Ritual and the Avant Garde*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 210

<sup>46</sup> Samuel Beckett, *Watt*, (USA: Grove Press, 1953), 214

<sup>47</sup> Martin Esslin, *The Theater of the Absurd*, ( USA: Vintage Books, 2001), 24

<sup>48</sup> Esslin, *The Theater of the Absurd*, 24

This difference can also be found in the form Beckett uses. Esslin says that “While Sartre or Camus express the new content in the old convention,” Beckett goes “a step further in trying to achieve a unity between its basic assumptions and the form in which these are expressed.”<sup>49</sup> However, this new approach as regards the form and content was criticized on the ground that it was not understandable and clear. Against these criticisms Beckett argued that;

Here is direct expression - pages and pages of it. And if you don't understand it, Ladies and Gentlemen, it is because you are too decadent to receive it. You are not satisfied unless form is so strictly divorced from content that you can comprehend the one almost without bothering to read the other. This rapid skimming and absorption of the scant cream of sense is made possible by what I may call a continuous process of copious intellectual salivation. The form that is an arbitrary and independent phenomenon can fulfill no higher function than that of stimulus for a tertiary or quaternary conditioned reflex of dribbling comprehension.<sup>50</sup>

He criticized the traditional approach to the relation of content and form where they were separated from each other. In contrast to this argument, he thought that form and content cannot be separated. The formation of his attitude towards form and content was much related with the inspiration of Joyce had on him. Beckett argues about Joyce's *Work in Progress* that “Here form is content, content is form. You complain that this stuff is not written in English. It is not written at all. It is not to be read – or rather it is not only to be read. It is to be looked at and listened to. His writing is not about something; it is that

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<sup>49</sup> Esslin, *The Theater of the Absurd*, 24

<sup>50</sup> Samuel Beckett, 'Dante ... Bruno. Vico...Joyce' in *Our Examination round his Factification for Incamination of Work in Progress*, (Paris: Shakespeare & Co., 1929) , 13

something itself.”<sup>51</sup> Although this is Beckett’s comment on Joyce's writing, this quotation summarizes the main position he tried to reach throughout his career.

It appears that, Deleuze and Guattari referred to this side of Beckettian writing when they stated that the literature is the one that causes the superego and its form of expression to explode, without caring about its market value.

### **2.3 The Determining Themes of Beckett's Works**

Beckett lived in Paris in such a period when the impact of the Second World War was still heavily felt. He was a witness of the great destruction of this war. Here the term witness is being used in its second meaning as Agamben refers: “In Latin there are two words for 'witness'. The first word, *testis*, from which our word 'testimony' derives...The second word, *superstes*, designates a person who has lived through some thing, who has experienced an event from beginning to end and can therefore bear witness to it.”<sup>52</sup> Beckett is the *superstite* of the century that can be described as a catastrophic atmosphere in which modern man suffered to a great extent from the repercussions of the destroying experience of the war.

He witnessed the social, political and economic crisis of Europe in the 20<sup>th</sup> century. It was a time in which “Europe was caught up in what have come to be political clichés: Iron Curtain, Cold War, social unrest, political upheaval, the nuclear age.”<sup>53</sup> While on the one side there stood the truth of the death camps,

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<sup>51</sup> Samuel Beckett, *Disjecta*, (New York: Grove Press, 1984), 27

<sup>52</sup> Giorgio Agamben, *Remnants of Auschwitz: The Witness and the Archive*, (New York: MIT Press, 1999), 17

<sup>53</sup> Deirde Bair, *Samuel Beckett: A Biography*, ( London: Vintage, 1990) , 389

on the other side the growing conflict between the West and Soviet Union had reminded people constantly the nuclear destruction. Such an experience made people to lose their belief in universal norms and feel themselves in a meaningless void. The values they had were emptied, and there remained nothing at all to compensate this void. It was a period which radically influenced the intellectual life, and as Kristin Ross states, leading to the production of new categories which opened and new discussions.

World War II has, in fact, “produced” the memory industry in contemporary scholarship, in France and elsewhere, and the parameters of devastation, catastrophe, administrative massacre, atrocity, collaboration, genocide— have in turn made it easy for certain pathological psychoanalytic categories—“trauma,” for example, or “repression”—to attain legitimacy as ever more generalizable ways of understanding the excesses and deficiencies of collective memory.<sup>54</sup>

One of the reasons why the contemporary scholarship has to turn to the issue of memory can be revealed by a passage from Camus’ *The Myth of Sisyphus*;

A world that can be explained by reasoning, however faulty, is a familiar world. But in a universe that is suddenly deprived of illusions and of light, man feels a stranger. He is an irremediable exile, because he is deprived of memories of a lost homeland as much as he lacks the hope of a promised land to come.<sup>55</sup>

Ross argues that the notion of memory has been formulated as a matter of “reinforcing *identity*: reweaving the threads that have unraveled between

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<sup>54</sup> Kristin Ross, *May 68 and its Afterlives*, ( Chicago: The University of Cambridge Press, 2002), 2

<sup>55</sup> Albert Camus, *The Myth of Sisyphus* (Paris: Gallimard, 1942), 18

generations so as to firm up the continuity of this or that subgroup or subculture; strengthening the received dispositions, habits, ways of life, bodily practices that bolster a particular social identity”<sup>56</sup> . The description of Ross and the observation of Camus on memory is a crucial theme in Beckett’s works. In his prose and plays he depicted human beings who have dimmed memories, can only remember few things from their past and therefore have no hope for a better future. The characters are caught up in their past experiences which can be very little recollected. The characters cannot find a mainstay from their personal past, or from the memory of society. All they have is the devastation.

[M]emory is seen as the property of social bodies, something one can possess, or if it has been taken away, something that can be injected back into the group to enforce its identity. Memory is mobilized in the service of a conquest or a reconquest of identity, and in recent times, increasingly, of an ever more narrowly conceived ethnic or regional identity.<sup>57</sup>

Beckett’s characters have no memory, or at most have a fragmented one. They are stuck in the present moment. Although, they struggle to remember things from past, they cannot succeed. This means that Beckett’s characters cannot be conquered or re-conquered by the social memory and that they have no fixed identity which is grafted by this social memory. Beckett's characters hardly remember their past. For example Molloy cannot remember his mother's name, Estragon cannot remember what he did last day. In *The Unnamable*, the character have no name, a fixed identity or whatsoever that determines his

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<sup>56</sup> Ross, *May 68*, 3

<sup>57</sup> Ross, *May 68*, 2

position; in the *Three Dialogues* (1949) the characters have no name but letters as B and D.

The characteristics of Beckett's time pushed him to observe the death of humanism which is promoted since the Renaissance, and the human situation in the world. In his works besides the characters lost memories, their needs are all reduced, the places they live in are portrayed as there is nothing as if "there's no more nature"<sup>58</sup>. The human relationships revolve around the repetitive themes of birth and death and emotions like despair. Furthermore, in some of his works, like *Malone Dies*, *The Unnamable* and *Krapp's Last Tape* there is no relation with society at all, the characters mostly are left alone.

In addition to this, what is common to all is that his characters have difficulties in mobility; like Mahood's jar in *The Unnamable* for example, or the bins occupied by Nell and Nagg in *Endgame*. The ones that can move have all physical pains. In *Waiting for Godot* Vladimir has prostate, and Estragon has problems with his foot which make them complain throughout the play. The other characters Pozzo and Lucky, who appear twice in the play, are not less absurd than Vladimir and Estragon. Pozzo and his slave, Lucky, become physically changed in the Act two. Pozzo becomes blind and Lucky becomes dumb. In *Endgame*, there are the descriptions of bodily obstacles again. However, this time the characters are much more physically handicapped. In this depressive room Hamm's family Nell and Nagg live in trash bins, they have no legs. Hamm cannot stand and he is blind; Clov cannot sit;

**CLOV** (*returning to his place beside the chair*): If age but knew!

**HAMM**: Sit on him!

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<sup>58</sup> Samuel Beckett, *Endgame*, (New York: Grove Press, 1958), 11

**CLOV:** I can't sit.  
**HAMM:** True. And I can't stand.  
**CLOV:** So it is.  
**HAMM:** Every man his specialty.<sup>59</sup>

The physical experiences which Beckett used in his plays can be also found in his proses. To give an example from *Trilogy*, Molloy's leg is stiffened, and at the end of the story he crawls; Malone is inseparable from his bed, and the character in *The Unnamable* is immobile.

Besides these themes, the environment described in Beckett's works, point to a devastated world. In *Waiting for Godot*, Vladimir and Estragon wait on a deserted road, where there is only a dried tree. Undoubtedly, this dried tree has a symbolical meaning. Mircea Eliade argues that the plant is sacred because it represents a transcendental reality; "the plant is the expression of reality and the manifestation of self-renewing life"<sup>60</sup> The usage of the dried tree in the play is a reference to the symbolical meaning of the tree which signifies the notions of reality and life. The characters feel themselves obliged to endure this environment, as they feel obliged to wait for Godot who never comes.

**ESTRAGON:** Charming spot. (He turns, advances to front, halts facing auditorium.) Inspiring prospects. (He turns to Vladimir.) Let's go.  
**VLADIMIR:** We can't.  
**ESTRAGON:** Why not?  
**VLADIMIR:** We're waiting for Godot.<sup>61</sup>

This conversation is being used many times throughout the play as if Beckett

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<sup>59</sup> Beckett, *Endgame*, 10

<sup>60</sup> Mircea Eliade, *Dinler Tarihine Giriş*, (İstanbul: Kabalcı Yayınevi, 2000), 317

<sup>61</sup> Beckett, *Waiting for Godot*, 8



wants to scratch to the reader or the audience the characters' inability to move. They are acting in the boundaries of waiting, the play stages "the anticipation of action rather than action itself."<sup>62</sup> When the other masterpiece of Beckett compared with *Waiting for Godot*, *Endgame* is much darker. Adorno says that *Endgame* symbolizes the "final history of the subject."<sup>63</sup> In *Endgame*, "the open road of Godot is replaced by a prison-cell-like room that has two tiny windows with views of an almost dead universe."<sup>64</sup> This room and the universe in which Hamm and Clov live, is described as under a gray light.

**HAMM:** And the horizon? Nothing on the horizon?

**CLOV** (*lowering the telescope, turning towards Hamm, exasperated*): What in God's name could there be on the horizon? (Pause.)

**HAMM:** The waves, how are the waves?

**CLOV:** The waves? (*He turns the telescope on the waves.*)  
Lead.

**HAMM:** And the sun?

**CLOV** (*looking*): Zero.

**HAMM:** But it should be sinking. Look again.

**CLOV** (*looking*): Damn the sun.

**HAMM:** Is it night already then?

**CLOV** (*looking*):No.

**HAMM:** Then what is it?

**CLOV** (*looking*): Gray. (*Lowering the telescope, turning towards Hamm, louder.*) Gray! (*Pause. Still louder.*)  
**GRRAY!** (*Pause. He gets down, approaches Hamm from behind, whispers in his ear.*)<sup>65</sup>

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<sup>62</sup> Jonathan Boulter, *Beckett: A Guide for the Perplexed*, (London: Continuum, 2008), 2

<sup>63</sup> Theodor Adorno, 'Trying to Understand Endgame' in Shierry Weber Nicholzen (trans), *Notes to Literature*, Volume 1, (New York : Colombia University Press, 1991), 271

<sup>64</sup> Andrew Kennedy, *Samuel Beckett*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 47

<sup>65</sup> Beckett, *Endgame*, 31

They are leaving in a disaster; in a post – Holocaust world<sup>66</sup> as Adorno mentions, which can be understood from the details of their conversations throughout the play. Everything is described as corpsed.

**CLOV:** (*He looks, moving the telescope.*) Zero... (*he looks*) ...zero... (*he looks*) ...and zero.

**HAMM:** Nothing stirs. All is---

**CLOV:** Zer---

**HAMM** (*violently*): Wait till you're spoken to! (*Normal voice.*) All is... all is... all is what? (*Violently.*) All is what?

**CLOV:** What all is? In a word? Is that what you want to know? Just a moment. (*He turns the telescope on the without, looks, lowers the telescope, turns towards Hamm.*) Corpsed. (*Pause.*) Well? Content?<sup>67</sup>

As it is in the case of Vladimir and Estragon, Clov and Hamm cannot go anywhere. As Deleuze and Guattari state “in their trash can or on their bench, Beckett's characters stake out a territory.”<sup>68</sup> Even Clov in the end of the play dresses up as if he desires to go outside, he cannot go. He stands in the doorway while Hamm makes his long speech. “Enter Clov, dressed for the road. Panama hat, tweed coat, raincoat over his arm, umbrella, bag. He halts by the door and stands there, impassive and motionless, his eyes fixed on Hamm, till the end.”<sup>69</sup> These characters and the catastrophic world portrayed by Beckett are not only specific to these two mentioned plays. Such themes emerge in *Happy Days* in a much more absurd fashion, insomuch as this time the characters cannot even move. Beside these physical obstacles, the dialogue almost disappears.

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<sup>66</sup> Adorno, *Trying to Understand Endgame*, 271

<sup>67</sup> Beckett, *Endgame*, 29 – 30

<sup>68</sup> Deleuze, and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, 503

<sup>69</sup> Beckett, *Endgame*, 66

In the *Happy Days*, there are two characters called Willie and Winnie who sleep and wake according to the command of a bell. Winnie is buried up to her waist in the first act, in the second one; she is buried up to her neck. There is no indication of how she is buried in this mound. The situation is so pessimistic that, Winnie is described as she is somehow happy with her small belongings (a comb, a toothbrush, toothpaste, a bottle of patent medicine, lipstick, a nail file, a revolver and a music box). Willie, who lies on ground, seldomly speaks throughout the play, so the play is sustained by Winnie's monologues. There are only sounds to make Winnie happy, for she cannot move or cannot live according to her bodily needs. The sounds and the words, gives her a comfort, as in the case of other plays,

**WINNIE:** What would I do without them? (Pause.) What would I do without them, when words fail?... They are a boon, sounds are a boon, they help me ... through the day. (Smile) The old style! (Smile off.) Yes, those are happy days, when there are sounds.<sup>70</sup>

What is common to these plays as well as the other works of Beckett is that deficiency of bodily experiments, which can either be a pain like Estragon's feet or in the incapability of moving as in the case of Hamm and Winnie, the words emerge as an indispensability. However, this does not mean that there is a shared rational meaning. Gontarski states that “language generally in Beckett’s world is not a means of conveying the shared meaning”<sup>71</sup>. It is a redemptive tool for the characters to make them be on the stage, to make them sustain the play. The dialogue between Vladimir and Estragon give them the

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<sup>70</sup> Samuel Beckett, *Happy Days*, (London: Grove Press, 1970), 40

<sup>71</sup> Stan Gontarski , *Beckett's Happy Days: A Manuscript Study*, (Ohio: The Ohio State University Libraries, 1977), 25

impression that they exist<sup>72</sup>, so they cannot stay silent;

**VLADIMIR:** (*sententious*). To every man his little cross.  
(*He sighs.*) Till he dies. (*Afterthought.*) And is forgotten.

**ESTRAGON:** In the meantime let us try and converse calmly, since we are incapable of keeping silent.

**VLADIMIR:** You're right, we're inexhaustible.

**ESTRAGON:** It's so we won't think.<sup>73</sup>

However, there is an important difference among *Waiting for Godot* and the other mentioned plays. In *Waiting for Godot*, Vladimir's and Estragon's situation is slightly different. They act on the stage referring to Godot. This gives an opportunity to meet on a shared meaning which is Godot himself. Although, Estragon barely remembers him by the help of Vladimir, it emerges somehow as certain signified however absent in the play. Nevertheless, the situation in *Endgame* and *Happy Days* are much more different. In these plays, the signifiers act without any signified (signification). There is nothing signified by the signifiers, they signify nothing at all. But again, to speak or to sustain dialogue is to exist. It is the thing that makes Clov endure. It is the dialogue that keeps Clov near Hamm;

**CLOV:** What is there to keep me here?

**HAMM:** The dialogue. (*Pause.*)<sup>74</sup>

In *Waiting for Godot* and *Endgame* there still exist the opportunity of maintaining a dialogue. In *Happy Days*, however, even if there are two characters in the play, Winnie talks by herself. There is a possibility for a

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<sup>72</sup> Beckett, *Waiting for Godot*, 63

<sup>73</sup> Beckett, *Waiting for Godot*, 91

<sup>74</sup> Beckett, *Endgame*, 48

dialogue, but it barely happens. Therefore, Winnie indicates that she would remain helpless in the absence of the words. Yet, the importance given to speech does not mean that there appear a perfect dialogue between the characters, or understandable monologues do exist. There is no better example than a piece of Lucky's long tirade in that regard:

**LUCKY:** Given the existence as uttered forth in the public works of Puncher and Wattmann of a personal God quaquaquaqua with white beard quaquaquaqua outside time without extension who from the heights of divine apathia divine athambia divine aphasia loves us dearly with some exceptions for reasons unknown but time will tell and suffers like the divine Miranda with those who for reasons unknown but time will tell are plunged in torment plunged in fire whose fire flames if that continues and who can doubt it will fire the firmament that is to say blast hell to heaven so blue still and calm so calm with a calm which even though intermittent is better than nothing but not so fast and considering what is more that as a result of the labors left unfinished crowned by the Acacacademy of Anthropopometry of Essy-in-Possy of Testew and Cunard...<sup>75</sup>

The tirade of Lucky becomes so intolerable for Vladimir, Estragon and Pozzo that they begin to protest violently, and find the remedy in stopping his monologue by throwing themselves upon him. No matter how incomprehensible they are, Beckett in his plays mostly provides an opportunity for the dialogue for the continuation of the play. (For instance in *Krapp's Last Tape* or *Play* there is no dialogue). His characters are speaking, as if there is nothing to speak of. However, in his proses the characters are embedded into the requirement of speaking, as the character in *The Unnamable* says, "I have to speak whatever that means. Having nothing to say, no words but the words of

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<sup>75</sup> Beckett, *Waiting for Godot*, 45

others, I have to speak.”<sup>76</sup>

It seems Beckett became obsessed with this issue. And nothing but his sentence summarizes his point on it, and also the other themes that can be found in his writing; “There is nothing to express, nothing with which to express, nothing from which to express, no power to express, no desire to express, together with the obligation to express”<sup>77</sup>.<sup>78</sup> It seems that all the major themes lie in this sentence; the theme of failure which he indicates as “I’m not interested in stories of success, only failure.”<sup>79</sup>, the desire to go on, but the inability to go on as expressed in the last sentence of *The Unnamable* “You must go on, I can’t go on, I’ll go on”<sup>80</sup>, and his minimalist and paradoxical enunciation.

To be able to understand Beckett’s attitude towards language, when he is showing the impossibility of shared meaning and what is set forth through the monologue of Lucky one perhaps needs to look at what he wrote in “German letter of 1937” that;

It is indeed becoming more and more difficult, even senseless, for me to write an official English ... As we cannot eliminate language all at once, we should at least leave nothing undone that might contribute to its falling

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<sup>76</sup> Samuel Beckett, “Unnamable” in *Trilogy*, (London: Gresham Press, 2003), 316

<sup>77</sup> In *Molloy* there is a very similar sentence. “Not to want to say, not to know what you want to say, not to be able to say what you think you want to say, and never to stop saying, or hardly ever, that is the thing to keep in mind, even in the heat of composition.” Samuel Beckett, “Molloy” in *Trilogy*, (London: Calder Publications, 2003), 23

<sup>78</sup> Samuel Beckett, *Proust and Three Dialogues with Georges Duthuit* (London: John Calder, 1965), 103

<sup>79</sup> Deirde. *Samuel Beckett: A Biography*, 349

<sup>80</sup> Beckett, *Unnamable*, 418

into disrepute ... Or is literature alone to remain behind in the old lazy ways that been so long ago abandoned by music and painting? ... so that through whole pages we can perceive nothing but a path of sounds suspended in giddy heights. ...At first it can only be a matter of somehow finding a method by which we can represent this mocking attitude towards the words, through words... An assault against words in the name of beauty.<sup>81</sup>

The constitutive feature of literature is undoubtedly words, and Beckett seems to be rolled up his sleeves to disrepute it since he is neither a painter nor a musician, and as a writer his work to play with the words and produce a literary work by this way. So his writings become an assassination of novel and play in their traditional senses, as mentioned above.

However, his attitude towards language is criticized by some thinkers. David Weisberg claims that what Beckett has attempted is not a coherent attitude. Weisberg states that; "language is both the 'veil' and the means of tearing it apart; words must be 'misused' so that 'literature' may approach 'music and painting'; words are both non communicative and nonrational, 'a path of sounds' which nevertheless need to 'represent this mocking attitude' and all of this 'in the name of beauty.'"<sup>82</sup>

Contrary to Weisberg's view claiming that Beckett's position is not coherent; it can be argued that Beckett tried to accomplish a difficult position. What he tried to do is to deconstruct the words, and their hidden meanings inside the language. And it should not be forgotten that because the words are the only tools of a writer, Beckett's task was not an easy one. By pushing to the language

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<sup>81</sup> Samuel Beckett, *Disjecta*, (New York: Grove Press, 1984), 172-173

<sup>82</sup> David Weisberg, *Chronicles of Disorder : Samuel Beckett and the Cultural Politics of the Modern Novel*, (New York: State University of New York, 2000), 17

to its limits, he placed an explosive device in the center of it as Deleuze and Guattari asserted. And this unbearably opens a space for his oeuvre within the radically constructed and expressed works in literary field. As Weisberg argues later “instead of mandarin elitism, impotent formalism, or bourgeois individualism, Beckett’s reputed escape from the order of representation now stood, theoretically, for a radical, liberating indeterminacy.”<sup>83</sup>

#### **2.4 The Contemporaries of Beckett: Deleuze and Guattari**

It was in the same century Beckett lived and wrote, Gilles Deleuze (1925-1995) was writing effectively striking from the early 1960s to his death. Together with Felix Guattari (1930-1992) they published their famous two volume *Capitalism and Schizophrenia* in 1972 and 1980 respectively. Even Deleuze, Guattari and Beckett lived in Paris during the same period, shared the same publisher, Jerome Lindon, of Editions de Minuit; Beckett seemed to read Deleuze very little<sup>84</sup>. He did not mention Deleuze or Guattari in any of his interviews or books. On the other hand, Deleuze and Guattari read Beckett's works carefully and attentively enabling them to refer to his books frequently.

Among them it was especially Deleuze who focused on Beckett’s prose writings and television projects. He dedicated two essays to Beckett which are named as *The Exhausted* and *The Greatest Irish Film* collected in the book *Essays Critical and Clinical*. However, it would be wrong to say that Guattari did not give importance to Beckett's works. On the contrary, Guattari was so much attracted by Beckett. Garcin Morrou in her book *To Be or Not to Be*

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<sup>83</sup> Weisberg, *Chronicles of Disorder*, 2

<sup>84</sup> Anthony Uhlmann, *Beckett and Poststructuralism* (UK: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 9



*Socrates: Introduction to the Translation of Felix Guattari's Socrates*<sup>85</sup> mentions that among Guattari's six plays<sup>86</sup> which he wrote in the years between 1980 and 1990, the play entitled *Psyche Ghost Town* is analogous with *Waiting for Godot*. However, it was in their collaborated works that they attribute Beckett's writing a very significant place,

Both in his solo writing and in his productive partnership with the psychoanalyst Felix Guattari, Deleuze had long demonstrated his own admiration for, and engagement with, Beckett's writing. In the mighty *Capitalisme en schizophrénie ...* Deleuze and Guattari made manifest their view of Beckett's work as a space hospitable to their own concepts of the mobile, deterritorialized flow of desire.<sup>87</sup>

As Beckett, Deleuze and Guattari were also deeply affected by the political environment, especially from the impacts of the rising fascist regimes in Europe. Among them, Guattari was more actively involved in the politics. He engaged in the struggle for “the decolonization of Algeria, the improved treatment of prisoners in French prisons, the improved treatment of the mentally ill in French insane asylums, the establishment of free radio, to Gay rights and Green politics.”<sup>88</sup>

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<sup>85</sup> Garcin Flore Marrou, *To Be or Not to Be Socrates: Introduction to the Translation of Félix Guattari's Socrates*, (UK: Edinburgh University Press, 2012)

<sup>86</sup> According to Trahir's interpretation these plays are named as, The Moon Master (Le Maître de Lune), Socrates (Socrates), Psyche Ghost Town (Psyche Ville Morte), Aimed at the black man killed the white one (Visa le noir tua le blanc), The Affair of the Lancel Handbag (L'Affaire du sac de chez Lancel) and Night time, the End of Possibilities (La Nuit, la fin des moyens).

<sup>87</sup> Mary Bryden, “The Schizoid Space: Beckett, Deleuze and L'Épouse” in *Samuel Beckett Today /Aujourd'hui*, Volume 5, (Amsterdam : Rodopi 1996), 85

<sup>88</sup> Ian Buchanan, *Deleuze and Guattari's Anti Oedipus*, (London: Continuum, 2008), 5

They tried to constitute their way of thought after coming together in 1969 for the first time. In this context, it has been argued that their books represent the features of the social movement of May '68. Guattari state that “May '68 came as a shock to Gilles and me, as to so many others: we didn't know each other, but this book, now, is nevertheless a result of May.”<sup>89</sup> It can be argued that they were excited about the possibilities that could emerge and this shaped their theory of desire. However, they were skeptical about it too, as Buchanan argues “Deleuze and Guattari were stirred by the possibility for change May '68 seemed to betoken, namely the liberation of desire itself, but they were also highly skeptical of the doctrinal turn that accompanied it, which seemed to them to promise the incarceration of desire all over again.”<sup>90</sup> The reason for that was the belief of people that these social movements would install “a new state apparatus”.<sup>91</sup> Contrary to this orientation, their approach to desire has nothing to do with a political or state apparatus. On the contrary, their notion of desire was designed to break down these institutions, as Guattari stated “It would be strange to rely on a party or state apparatus for the liberation of desire.”<sup>92</sup>

In their collaborated works, Deleuze and Guattari made a criticism of the state philosophy.<sup>93</sup> Uhlmann argues that there were ongoing discussions in the post-

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<sup>89</sup> Deleuze, *Negotiations*, 15

<sup>90</sup> Buchanan, *Deleuze and Guattari's Anti Oedipus*, 8

<sup>91</sup> Buchanan, *Deleuze and Guattari's Anti Oedipus*, 8

<sup>92</sup> Felix Guattari, *Chaosophy*, (ed.) Sylvere Lotringer, (New York: Semiotext, 1995), 62

<sup>93</sup> Brian Massumi in the opening of the book *A Thousand Plateaus* writes that “State philosophy,” is a word used “for the representational thinking that has characterized Western metaphysics since Plato” . Deleuze argues that, “[R]epresentation fails to capture the affirmed world of difference. Representation has only a single center, a unique and receding perspective, and in consequence a false depth. It mediates everything but mobilizes and moves nothing.” Brian Massumi argues that this philosophy has two main features. One of them is an

war period about the nature of being “one which required an understanding of the nature of the decentered subject” and “one which had become aware of the fundamentally fascistic nature of judgments dependent on the concept of the unified subject.”<sup>94</sup> These discussions on the subject came to the fore in *Capitalism and Schizophrenia*. Their attempt on *Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, which is consisted of *Anti Oedipus* (1972) and *A Thousand Plateaus* (1980), can be considered as their response to Reich's question concerning fascism: “how could the masses be made to desire their own repression?”<sup>95</sup> In these volumes, they problematized the central position of the subject and criticized the grand narrative of modernity which dominated the theory and everyday life, and “attempt[ed] to decenter and liquidate the bourgeois, humanist subject.”<sup>96</sup>

The first book, *Anti Oedipus* was mainly a critique of psychoanalysis, theories of representation, the modern subject, the tyranny of signifier, the party worshiping of Marxism, and finally the major enemy, fascism. In this book, they introduce the notion of schizo subjects and desiring production. In a way, this book can be considered as a historical analysis of the different paths in which desire is controlled by different social machines. While in the first half of the book, how subjectivity is formed in the context of desiring machines is analyzed, in the second part of the book the course of universal history that the social forms takes place and canalize and repress desire is analyzed.

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assumption of a thinking subject and the concepts which are created by this subject. And the other characteristic is the attribution of sameness and constancy to the subject. While state philosophy's reflections on individual bodies reposes on identity, it emerges as a political rule of fascism in collective body.

<sup>94</sup> Uhlmann, *Beckett and Poststructuralism*, 35

<sup>95</sup> Brian Massumi, “Translator’s Foreword: Pleasures of Philosophy”, in *A Thousand Plateaus*, (London: Athlone Press, 1987) , xi

<sup>96</sup> Steven Best and Douglas Kellner, *Postmodern Theory: Critical Interrogation*, (London: Macmillan Press, 1991), 78

In the second book, *A Thousand Plateaus*, these thoughts were developed by going one step further. For instance, they introduced linguistic theories. It can be argued that they accomplished the point of rhizomatic<sup>97</sup> writing in *A Thousand Plateaus* where each plateau can be read starting anywhere.

However, it should be noted that before Deleuze and Guattari's *Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, there were some attempts to relate the political theory of Karl Marx with the psychoanalytic theory of Sigmund Freud to enable a new perspective. The reason for this attempt was that Marxism had been facing criticism as if it was insufficient to understand the capitalism's impacts in individuals' lives. And also psychoanalysis was also Marcuse had already mentioned that "the factual situation of capitalism is characterized not merely by economic or political crisis but by a catastrophe affecting the human essence."<sup>98</sup> Besides the transformation of capitalism, both the inadequacy of the

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<sup>97</sup> Deleuze and Guattari described rhizome as "[U]nlike trees or their roots, the rhizome connects any point to any other point, and its traits are not necessarily linked to traits of the same nature; it brings into play very different regimes of signs, and even nonsign states. The rhizome is reducible neither to the One nor the multiple...It has neither beginning nor end, but always a middle (*milieu*) from which it grows and which it overflows. It constitutes linear multiplicities with  $n$  dimensions having neither subject nor object, which can be laid out on a plane of consistency, and from which the One is always subtracted ( $n - 1$ )...The rhizome is an antigenealogy. It is a short-term memory, or antimemory. The rhizome operates by variation, expansion, conquest, capture, offshoots. Unlike the graphic arts, drawing, or photography, unlike tracings, the rhizome pertains to a map that must be produced, constructed, a map that is always detachable, connectable, reversible, modifiable, and has multiple entryways and exits and its own lines of flight. It is tracings that must be put on the map, not the opposite. In contrast to centered (even polycentric) systems with hierarchical modes of communication and preestablished paths, the rhizome is an acentered, nonhierarchical, nonsignifying system without a General and without an organizing memory or central automaton, defined solely by a circulation of states. What is at question in the rhizome is a relation to sexuality—but also to the animal, the vegetal, the world, politics, the book, things natural and artificial—that is totally different from the arborescent relation: all manner of "becomings." Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, 21

<sup>98</sup> Herbert Marcuse, *the Foundation of Historical Materialism*, (Boston: Beacon Press, 1972), 113

struggle of the left against fascism in the capitalist countries, and the failures faced in the Soviet Union led to the emergence of culture revolutionaries and critical Marxists. These thinkers tried to overcome the ongoing division between the individual and political. In this context, psychoanalysis was taken to the stage.

Bruce Brown argues in his book *Marx, Freud and the Critique of Everyday Life* (1973) that after the World War One the leftist psychoanalysis, in the works of Wilhelm Reich, Erich Fromm and others attempted to wake the social, historical and critical side of psychoanalysis. The reason for this attempt was to demonstrate how capitalism internalized by individuals and to introduce a revolutionary theory that integrate the political reality with the individual's psychic reality. They criticized Freud and his orthodox fans as their theory is extremely bourgeois in morality. They tried to relate the unconscious with the social and economic order. Brown argues that, Reich, Fromm and others suggested that the unconscious may vary depending on the history, society etc. Furthermore, they criticized the universality claim of Oedipus complex. These psychoanalysts argued that each historically specific social order has its own model of libidinal organization which is appropriate to their own social and economic structure.

All these arguments revealed that on the basis of the repressive society there is a sexual repression and this repression serve to strengthen the authoritarian administration. In this sense it was claimed that the conditions for the sexual revolution must be searched. However, as Bruce argues, these initiatives which make a synthesis between Marx's thinking and psychoanalysis were harshly criticized both by the orthodox Marxists and psychoanalysts and under the repressions of fascist and Stalinists regimes, they lost their vitality.

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It was post World War Two period that the theory of desire in the context of desire's role in society came to the fore again. In those years, the issue of desire had become an attractive subject. In this field, Foucault's and Deleuze – Guattari's works have become prominent. However, it was Deleuze and Guattari's perspective that the traditional approach to desire was undermined. Their fundamental question was Reich's question investigating the conditions which make masses desire their own repression. Guided by this question, they began to analyze the role of the socius within the process of desiring production, and searched for the possible ways to eliminate its repression.

## CHAPTER III

### CRITIQUE OF THE TRADITIONAL APPROACH TO DESIRE

#### 3.1. Introduction

Given the literature on desire, it is evident that there are two distinct approaches. The first one deals with this notion through the question of *acquisition* of a lacking object. This review is developed by the works ranging from Ancient Greeks Plato and Aristotle to psychoanalysts Sigmund Freud and Jacques Lacan. This approach has dominated the Western philosophy for thousands of years, and can be best summarized with the Aristotle's famous statement "[O]ne aims at what he happens to need"<sup>99</sup> [1159b14-15].

However, especially after the social turbulences of 1968, this approach has been facing with rigorous criticisms which are concentrated on Foucault's argument as these theories have been constructed with the categories of Negative<sup>100</sup> (law, limit, castration, lack etc.).

Within these critiques new approaches to the concept of desire have emerged. Moving along with these criticisms, the notion of desire began to be located within the process of *production*, in Deleuze and Guattari's works under the influence of Baruch Spinoza and Friedrich Nietzsche. However, it should be

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<sup>99</sup> Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, trans. Robert C. Bartlett and Susan D. Collins, (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2011), 176

<sup>100</sup> Foucault, "Preface" in *Anti Oedipus*, xiii

noted that the *affirmative* approach to desire have received less attention compared to the first approach.

In this sense, the aim of this chapter is to introduce the crucial definitions in this field which will facilitate a better understanding of the arguments in the following chapters. In this chapter, considering the fact that Deleuze and Guattari's works are full of references to a deep intellectual heritage, prominent thinkers' points on desire will be set forth, and then, in this context Deleuze and Guattari's critique of these theories will be analyzed. It is a necessity since their book *Anti Oedipus*, where they directly address the question of desire, is primarily a profound critique of the Oedipal construction of desire.

Considering the fact that, there is a huge literature written on this issue, in this chapter I will deal with only those works that have had a great influence on Deleuze and Guattari's work. Therefore, here I will discuss only Plato's, Freud's and Lacan's views respectively.

Beginning with Plato, his two reference books which are very crucial for Western philosophical tradition regarding desire, *the Symposium* and *the Republic*, will be mentioned. This will bring the discussion to the mainstay of *Anti Oedipus*, the Oedipal desire on which Freud wrote pages. This part will focus on *The Interpretation of Dreams* and *An Outline of Psychoanalysis* written by Freud in which he dealt with the theory of desire and Oedipus complex. Nevertheless, it should be noted that these mentioned books are not the only ones which he handled this theory. Instead, in his different books, ranging from *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego*<sup>101</sup> (1922) to *The*

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<sup>101</sup> Sigmund Freud, *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego*, (trans.) James Strachey, (New York: Boni and Liveright, 1922)



*Ego and The Id* (1923)<sup>102</sup>, Freud analyzed this issue.<sup>103</sup> However, as a detailed analysis of Freud's theory is not the aim of this thesis, I limit my discussion with the above mentioned works. And finally, bearing in mind Lacan's profound impact on Guattari's rejection of the orthodox psychoanalysis, Lacan's approach to desire in the context of the Other will be presented. And following the discussion of the above approaches, after each mentioned part, Deleuze and Guattari's critique will be analyzed in detail.

### **3.2 Plato's Theory of Desire**

#### **3.2.1 Desire in the Context of Lack: *Symposium* and *The Republic***

In *Anti Oedipus* the criticism of Deleuze and Guattari concentrated on what they called *the traditional logic of desire*. According to them, one of the most crucial names among this logic's representatives is Plato. Therefore, to comprehend the way through which Deleuze and Guattari handled desire, Plato's theory will be helpful to review. Besides, his theory is very crucial because it has a great influence on the successors who worked in this field.

Plato set the framework of the theory of desire thousands of years ago, and even it has been criticized his approach still dominates the way of thinking on desire today. He brought this issue mainly in his books *Symposium* (385–380 BC) and *The Republic* (around 380 BC). What is so important in his approach to desire is that, Plato sees desire closely related with the political and social order of the *polis*. However, this does not mean that Plato made a profound

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<sup>102</sup> Sigmund Freud, *The ego and the id*, (trans.) J. Strachey, ( London: Hogarth Press, 1961)

<sup>103</sup> In these books, it can be observed that, Freud was trying to change some contents of the theory of Oedipus complex step by step. For detailed information please see René Girard, *Violence and the Sacred*, (London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1979), 169 – 193

social and political analysis regarding the desire's role in society. Instead, he emphasized its role in the individual soul. Based on the analysis of the soul, he touches upon to mention the importance of desire for the organization of *polis*.

*Symposium*, as a short text among the other books of Plato, is a conversation taken place among Phaedrus, Pausanias, Eryximachus, Aristophanes, Agathon, Socrates and Alcibiades on the nature of *eros*. However, as the conversation progresses, desire's relation with the ethical behaviors that must be adhered by the virtuous citizens in *polis* is revealed.

After the monologues of the mentioned characters regarding *eros*, Plato made Socrates take the floor. Socrates says to his friends that “consider whether it isn’t necessarily true that, that which desires, desires what it lacks, or, put another way, there is no desire if there is no lack. That seems to me, Agathon, an inescapable conclusion.”<sup>104</sup> [200b] After receiving the approval of the Agathon, Socrates says that “that a man who was already strong also wished to be strong, or a fast runner also wished to be fast, or a healthy man healthy: in these and all similar cases you might perhaps imagine that people who are like this and have these particular attributes also desire to have the attributes they have (and I am saying all this because I don’t want us to get the wrong idea).” And asks “If you think about it, Agathon, it must be the case that these people already possess their respective attributes whether they want to or not, and why would they also desire to have what they have?”<sup>105</sup> [200c] The answer is again related with desire’s role within the realization of a lack.

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<sup>104</sup> Plato, *Symposium*, ed. M. C. Howatson and Fresbee C. C. Sheffield, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 35

<sup>105</sup> Plato, *Symposium*, 35.

It seems that Plato gave a great effort to associate desire with the things or features that one lacks. And in addition to that if one has that something and still desires for it, just like in the above question of Socrates, it means that one is in a situation of thinking that he might not have it in future. For instance, if one, who is healthy, desires to be healthy in the future, it is a desire what he<sup>106</sup> has at present to be preserved in the future. He knows that he is healthy now, but given the possibilities that he might lose his health, he desires it for the future. So, he desires to have something that he might not have in the future. Or, in Socrates words, “Then this man and everyone who feels desire, desires what is not in his possession or presence, so that what he does not have, or what he is not, or what he lacks, these are the sorts of things that are the objects of desire and love.”<sup>107</sup> [200e]

According to Plato happiness is the final target of desire and “there is no need to ask further why anyone wishes to be happy.”<sup>108</sup> [205d] However, it should be reiterated that Plato handled desire in the context of *eros* in *Symposium*. In this sense, Plato further analyzed the notion of desire in the *The Republic*, in which he handled desire without relating it with *eros*.

In *The Republic* he says that not all desire is directed towards the good things. Actually in Ancient Greek the word *epithumia*, which is translated as desire in English, means “a strong wish or desire.”<sup>109</sup> Therefore, in Plato’s analysis desire sometimes can be the motive toward bad things. As Howatson and

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<sup>106</sup> Plato used the pronoun “he” to represent humankind in *Symposium*. Therefore, it is preferred to keep this pronoun in examples given.

<sup>107</sup> Plato, *Symposium*, 36

<sup>108</sup> Plato, *Symposium*, 42

<sup>109</sup> Plato, *Symposium*, 66

Shelfield says, Plato “*only committed to the claim that eros is that area of desire concerned with the acquisition of good things and happiness. It may well be the case that there are other desires (more basic appetitive ones, that might better be called drives, e.g. hunger), that are not instances of eros, nor thereby of a broad desire for good things and happiness.*”<sup>110</sup> To sum up, it was *The Republic* that Plato made an analysis of the other desires.

Another important point about the role of the desire for Ancient Greeks is its relation with the temperance and order which is very crucial for the wisdom as one of the cardinal virtues. Plato wrote that temperance is a control of pleasures and desires [196b – 196d].<sup>111</sup> To be a wise man, for Plato, one has to control his desires, so that one adheres himself to the search for truth.

Given his thoughts regarding desire in *The Republic*, Plato situated desire as a determining character of one type of the soul. Plato proposed that the soul is composed of three parts which are the logical, spirited and appetitive. Socrates says that “there are in a city and in the soul of each individual the same three kinds.”<sup>112</sup> [441c]. Depending on which part of the soul is dominant, the social categories also differ.

Socrates says that “The first, that with which the soul reasons, we shall call the rational part; the second, that with which it loves, and hungers, and thirsts, and flutters round the other desires, we shall call the irrational and desiring part, the companion of various indulgences and pleasures.”<sup>113</sup> [439d]. And Socrates adds

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<sup>110</sup> Plato, *Symposium*, xvi

<sup>111</sup> Plato, *Symposium*, 30

<sup>112</sup> Plato, *Republic*, (London: The Aldine Press, 1954), 130

<sup>113</sup> Plato, *Republic*, 128

that “the soul” has also a “third element of spiritedness, which is the natural auxiliary of the rational”<sup>114</sup> [441a]. The social classes which correspond to these types of the soul are producing class, warrior class and counseling and guardian class<sup>115</sup> [434b]. Plato mentions that it is the most destructive thing for a *polis* if there is an interchange between these classes.<sup>116</sup> [434b]

However, it should be noted that there is a difference between the social classes in terms of their desires. The rational part and spirited part also have desires, because, as mentioned above, desire is something which contingently moves people to act towards the lack. Although desire is immanent in each type of soul, human beings act according to what they lack, and this is determined according to the types of the soul. For instance, while the rational soul desires the truth and knowledge, the spirited soul desires for honor. What is dangerous is the desires of the producing classes. It can be said that for Plato the destructive thing is the appetitive desires which cannot be kept under reins. Plato writes clearly the ones that are not capable of controlling these desires are the most destructive people for society.

Contrary to the man whose soul is dominated by logical part and knows how to control his pleasures, there are the ones who are excluded from the public space of the *polis*. “We may say that further that of desires and pleasures and pains, the many and diverse will be found especially in children and women and slaves, and in the vulgar herd among nominal freemen.”<sup>117</sup> [431c]. To say it in

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<sup>114</sup> Plato, *Republic*, 130

<sup>115</sup> Plato, *Republic*, 121

<sup>116</sup> Plato, *Republic*, 121

<sup>117</sup> Plato, *Republic*, 118

another way, these listed ones, is represented by the dark horse in his *Chariot Allegory*<sup>118</sup> [246a – 254e] which represents the ones whose soul is driven by the appetites, and bodily desires.

The analysis of desire in *Symposium* is extended in *The Republic*. In *The Republic*, Plato made a detail analysis of desire that is all common and immanent for human. However, throughout Plato's books, it can be noticed that his attitude towards this notion is that desire should be controlled for the sake of *polis*, at least, in the case of those who do not have wisdom.

### **3.2.2 Deleuze and Guattari's Criticism against Plato's Theory of Desire as Lack**

Deleuze and Guattari's point on the logic of the desire set forth by Plato was primarily targeting the idea of acquisition as its defining concept. As mentioned above, they located Plato on what they called the traditional logic of desire. In this logic, desire is towards something that is not yet possessed, because it terminates when the desired thing is achieved or owned. This makes desire a paradox and the lack becomes something absolute. This logic is one of the two major perspectives on desire within the Western philosophical tradition. Deleuze and Guattari argued that;

To a certain degree, the traditional logic of desire is all wrong from the very outset: from the very first step that the Platonic logic of desire forces us to take, making us chose between *production and acquisition*. From the moment that we place desire on the side of acquisition, we make desire an idealistic (dialectical, nihilistic) conception, which causes us to look

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<sup>118</sup> Plato, *Phaedrus*, (UK: Cambridge University Press, 1952), 69

upon it as primarily a lack: a lack of an object, a lack of the real object.<sup>119</sup>

They stated that desire is positioned in the field of idealism when it is interpreted from the perspective of *acquisition*, and even when Kant made a revolutionary change from the Platonic view, he again contributed to the theory of lack, and handled desire as an idealistic conception. Therefore, Kant's return from the Platonic approach, they argued, that it changed nothing essential at the end.

In *The Metaphysics of Morals*, Kant argued that "The faculty of desire is the faculty to be, by means of one's representations, the cause of the objects of these representations. The faculty of a being to act in accordance with its representations is called life."<sup>120</sup> [6: 212] So in Kantian theory, the faculty of desire is the causation through the mental representations and related with becoming the cause of objects corresponding to these representations. As it is well known, Kant in *Critique of Pure Reason*<sup>121</sup>, analyzed the representations in a detailed way, and concluded that representations are the subjective act of forming the object. And in *The Metaphysics of Morals*, it is seen that Kant gave utter importance to desire.

As Wilson Ross writes "not just that the faculty of desire is a being's ability to be the cause of the reality of the objects of its representations, but rather to be

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<sup>119</sup> Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti Oedipus*, 25

<sup>120</sup> Immanuel Kant, *The Metaphysics of Morals*, (trans.) Mary J. Gregor, (UK: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 211

<sup>121</sup> Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, (trans.) N. Kemp Smith, ( London: Macmillan, 1929)

that cause 'by means of [*durch*] ' those representations."<sup>122</sup> There is a dual structure of the way Kant positioned desire, and it should not be overlooked. The representation of the reality of an object was constructed by desire which enables the subject to be by means of the representations of objects. By this way, Kant attributed productivity to desire, because it is the natural empirical motive. Desire plays such an important role that in the construction of representations for representations "are not mere abstractions from real objects but that they are granted, here at least, some sort of dynamic, or at least, instrumental role in the economy of life and of the faculty of desire." Following this argument, Kant differentiated between the higher and lower faculties of desire, and the higher faculty of desire is the capacity to have desire without being affected by an object. "The higher faculty of desire is a power to desire something from ourselves independently of objects."<sup>123</sup>

Deleuze and Guattari criticized Kant's position that in this theory the reality of object is a psychic reality, and his theory constructed desire, even though there are traces of productivity, around the concept of lack. What Kant did for them, was that he examined desire and contributed to its relation with lack more carefully. In a way, it can be said that Kant advanced Plato's productive side of the theory of desire seeing as immanent to all human. However, the construction of the desired object still remained a *psychic* reality. It was on this point Deleuze and Guattari built their main criticism because they thought that the production of desire is real. This assertion about the reality will further be elaborated later where Lacanian approach will be discussed.

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<sup>122</sup> Ross Wilson, *Subjective Universality in Kant's Aesthetics*, (Switzerland : Peter Lang, 2007), 114

<sup>123</sup> Immanuel Kant, *Lectures on Metaphysics*, (UK: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 48



Plato's influence on his successors leaving just two options of *production* and *acquisition* in explaining desire, led Deleuze and Guattari built their theory of desire on the idea of *production* which they saw as affirmative. However, this choice had very important consequences, because the overall conceptualization of desire in the Western philosophical tradition, except figures like Epicurus, Spinoza and Nietzsche was built on a logic that approached desire as lack. It is very evident that since Plato, most of the questions concerning desire are posed in a Platonic context. It is natural that in this divergence from the traditional path of thinking Deleuze and Guattari would look for allies both from the philosophical and literary field. And Beckett would be their one of the most important support as it will be analyzed in the following chapters.

### **3.3 Freud and the Oedipal Desire**

#### **3.3.1 Freud's Theory of Desire**

In their two volume work, *Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, Deleuze and Guattari extensively referred to Freud's works. Freud's psychoanalysis and its implications are the main point of criticism. Therefore, at least some of Freud's important points in connection with his approach to desire should be analyzed in general. In particular, Freud's text on judge Schreber, *Psychoanalytic Notes on an Autobiographical Account of a Case of Paranoia*<sup>124</sup> (1911), must be touched upon, because it is one of the most provocative texts for Deleuze and Guattari's comprehension of schizophrenia. However, it will be analyzed in another chapter referring directly Schreber's own book *Memoirs of My Nervous Illness*<sup>125</sup>.

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<sup>124</sup> Sigmund Freud, *Psychoanalytic Notes on an Autobiographical Account of a Case of Paranoia*, trans. by J. Strachey, (London: Hogarth Press, 1958)

<sup>125</sup> Daniel P. Schreber, *Memoirs of my Nervous Illness*, ( USA: Harvard University Press, 2000)

Indeed, the line of thought that has dominated the Western philosophy in the field of desire reached a new point with Freud. Freud was a doctor of psychiatry, therefore in his theory; desire is handled from a psychic point of view.

Between the publication of *Studies on Hysteria*<sup>126</sup> in 1895 and *The Interpretation of Dreams*<sup>127</sup> in 1899, his theory of psychoanalysis was already matured. In these books, Freud positioned desire as the one's desire for a lost object, the implications of which differentiate between the sexes. In general in his psychoanalytic theory, to have something (i.e. phallus) does not recover one from desiring. Instead, it leads one to obey the powerful and authoritarian personalities and the submission to their laws, like in the case of the boy who obeys the law of father.

In his book *An Outline of Psychoanalysis*, Freud argued that “sexual life does not begin only at puberty, but starts with clear manifestations soon after birth.”<sup>128</sup> His main assumption was that the infantile has a sexual life and based on this assumption he developed his theory of infantile sexuality where each stage represented the development of certain sexual pleasures in the infant leading towards the building of the self.

The first stage is the *oral stage* with its emphasis on the mouth. The breast of the mother is the source of pleasure at this stage. This stage is described as

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<sup>126</sup> Sigmund Freud, *Studies on Hysteria*, (trans.) J. Strachey, (USA: Hogarth Press, 2000)

<sup>127</sup> Sigmund Freud, *The Interpretation of Dreams*, (trans.) A. A. Brill, ( New York: The Macmillan Company, 1913)

<sup>128</sup> Sigmund Freud, *An Outline of Psychoanalysis*, (New York: Norton, 1949), 9

sexual because Freud argued that “the baby's obstinate persistence in sucking gives evidence at an early stage of a need for satisfaction which, although it originates from and is stimulated by the taking of nourishment, nevertheless seeks to obtain pleasure independently of nourishment and for that reason may and should be described as *sexual*”<sup>129</sup>. For Freud, like the sexual pleasure the baby has with the breast, each stage represents a sexual reference. The second stage is the *anal stage* which is related with infant's control of the bladder and the bowels voluntarily. The third stage is the *phallic stage* in which the sexual pleasure is focused on the genital, and sexual difference is discovered by infant. However, it is important to note that Freud mentions “what comes in question at this stage is not the genitals of both sexes but only those of the male (the phallus). The female genitals long remain unknown.”<sup>130</sup>

Freud's radical theory of Oedipus complex begins in this stage. The three stages of oral, anal and phallic lead on to the final challenge facing the individual child – overcoming the demands of what Freud called the Oedipus complex.”<sup>131</sup> The boy enters the Oedipal phase during the phallic stage. Freud argues that at this period the child fears his father; because he is fantasizing sexuality with his mother.<sup>132</sup> This led him to be jealous of his father, and to fantasize to kill him. He fantasizes his father to know his desires towards the mother, and he knows that if the father understands this desire, he will castrate him. The only way to get rid of the castration for him, is to abandon the desires towards the mother as a sexual object. This leads the boy to repress his

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<sup>129</sup> Freud, *An Outline of Psychoanalysis*, 28

<sup>130</sup> Freud, *An Outline of Psychoanalysis*, 11

<sup>131</sup> Nick Rennison, *Freud and Psychoanalysis*, (UK: Cox&Wyman, 2001), 36

<sup>132</sup> Freud, *An Outline of Psychoanalysis*, 25

incestuous desires, and by this way he harmonizes with the reality principle. The boy identifies with the father and by doing so he identifies with the symbolic role of manhood.

On the other hand, Freud says that the girl's way forward is very different from the boy. Girl's process is described much more problematic when compared to the boy. She enters the Electra phase in the phallic stage. What determines this phase for Freud is that she envies the penis. As in the boy's case, she also desires her mother, and fears from the father. However, the important issue for the girl is that she discovers that she is already castrated, she becomes aware of the fact that she lacks a penis, and this makes her to turn her back on the castrated mother. She directs her desires towards her father. When this objective fails, she returns again to the mother and identifies with her feminine role.

Following this phallic phase the period of latency begins where sexual development comes to a halt<sup>133</sup>. And finally, in the last stage which is called the genital stage, the coordination of sexuality towards pleasure is completed. However, Freud argues that passing the stages is not so easy. Every stage is needed to be fixated by the infant and if errors occur in the development of these stages, it results in either homosexuality or sexual perversions<sup>134</sup>.

As mentioned above, in Freud's theory, the mother is the first object of desire both for the girl and the boy. Directing this desire from mother as a sexual object to another object is crucial for the becoming of self. Basically, it can be mentioned that the Oedipus complex delivers desiring processes to the

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<sup>133</sup> Freud, *An Outline of Psychoanalysis*, 23

<sup>134</sup> Freud, *An Outline of Psychoanalysis*, 27

dominance of a new logic of tragedy. The complex codes desire towards the castration and the loss of the main desired object for the boy. And girl's desire is encoded through the lack of the penis by Freudian psychoanalysis. Showing the penis in a privileged situation and addressing it as an authority that determines the desire processes are the fundamental movements of the Freudian logic of desire.

### **3.3.2 Deleuze and Guattari's Criticism against the Freudian Theory of Desire**

Since Freud wrote on the Oedipus complex, it became the subject of several controversies. The debates are mainly concentrated on the topics briefly mentioned above as well as the issues like the desire to murder the father, the role of incest in the development of sexuality, and the way Freudian theory is addressing to desire. These notions were exactly the points which make psychoanalysis scandalous for the commentators. For example, one of the important criticisms towards Freud's logic of desire came from René Girard, a contemporary of Deleuze and Guattari. His criticism was concentrated on the mimetic aspect of desire<sup>135</sup>. He also analyzed differences in Freud's approach to desire among his different texts. He concluded that Freud's theory of desire is very problematic. He even criticized Deleuze and Guattari's approach to desire by saying that they exaggerated the importance of Oedipus, and indeed it is aggrandized<sup>136</sup> by them. However, Girard could not escape the *Anti Oedipus'*

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<sup>135</sup> Girard, *Violence and the Sacred*, 169

<sup>136</sup> François Dosse, *Gilles Deleuze & Felix Guattari Intersecting Lives*, (USA: Colombia University Press, 2010), 213

terminology; and refers to the terms<sup>137</sup> like deterritorialization in his critique of Oedipal desire.

It is evident that Deleuze and Guattari's points are very crucial in the field of the desire, and the criticism of Freud's psychoanalysis constitutes one of the crucial building blocks on the way to their own approach. Taking into consideration that *Anti Oedipus* is a critique of *Oedipal* desire entirely, only the specific points will be touched upon here. These points are the mainstay of their own approach about desire, and therefore they will lead us step by step to confront their desire theory.

Deleuze and Guattari's main criticism focuses on Freud's addressing desire in a negative context, and the mythical plane that Freud located it. Given the terms used by Freud, castration, the penis envy, neurosis etc., it can be said that Freud's theory of desire is negatively determined. In another words, the teleology of desire in Freudian terms is established in a negative way. It is negative; because desire is condemned to the longing for a tragic loss. Oedipal representation disconnects desire from the process of becoming and locates it in the negative determination of deficiency. The desiring processes are linked to the lack of an object, and desire's practical connections are ignored. Oedipal desire's objective is to produce a compensative object (a substitute, a supplement) which would take the place of the lost one (i.e. phallus). In this theory, desire acts towards an objective, which cannot be realized, and though it remains unfulfilled, it encounters with a substitute object of desire. By this way, the object of desire is detached from the desire, and it is forever imprisoned in an essential lack.

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<sup>137</sup> Girard, *Violence and Sacred*, 190

In addition to the critique of this negative context of the Freudian theory on desire, Deleuze and Guattari also criticized the Freudian psychoanalysis from various perspectives, and these criticisms are the building blocks of creating their own desire theory. First of all they argued that “for what Freud and the first analysts discover is the domain of free syntheses where everything is possible: endless connections, nonexclusive disjunctions, nonspecific conjunctions, partial objects and flows.”<sup>138</sup> As Deleuze and Guattari argued it is true before developing the theory of Oedipus complex, Freud did not settle the infant's desire towards a specific object. Therefore, he did not code direction of the desire. As Terry Eagleton says on the experience of going through the phallic stage,

The drives themselves are extremely flexible, in no sense fixed like biological instinct: their objects are contingent and replaceable, and one sexual drive can substitute for another. What we can imagine in the early years of the child's life, then, is not a unified subject confronting and desiring a stable object, but a complex, shifting field of force in which the subject (the child itself) is caught up and dispersed, in which it has as yet no center of identity and in which the boundaries between itself and the external world are indeterminate. Within this field of libidinal force, objects and part-objects emerge and disappear again, shift places kaleidoscopically, and prominent among such objects is the child's body as the play of drives laps across it. One can speak of this as an 'auto eroticism', within which Freud sometimes includes the whole of infantile sexuality: the child takes erotic delight in its own body, but without as yet being able to view its body as a complete object. Auto-eroticism must thus be distinguished from what Freud will call 'narcissism', a state in which one's body or ego as a whole is 'cathected', or taken as an object of desire.<sup>139</sup>

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<sup>138</sup> Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti Oedipus*, 54

<sup>139</sup> Eagleton, *Literary Theory*, 133

However, in Freudian theory these endless connections of the infant's desires end up in the Oedipal stage. "This will all be lost, or at least singularly compromised, with the establishment of sovereign Oedipus."<sup>140</sup> It appears that in the early periods of the psychoanalysis, desire and machines of desire are indeed discovered under the name of libido. It is a drive that has the potentiality to invest everything. However, psychoanalysts choose to push back the libido into a representational field within the Oedipus complex. Deleuze and Guattari say that in Freud's analysis;

There's the whole aspect of machinery, the production of desire, production lines. But then there's the other aspect, of personifying these apparatuses (as Superego; Ego, and Id), a theatrical *mise-en-scene* that substitutes merely representative tokens for the true productive forces of the unconscious. So desire's machines become more and more like stage machinery: the superego, the death instinct, becomes a *deus ex machina*.<sup>141</sup>

Therefore, for them psychoanalysis, had a revolutionary aspect at the earlier periods of its development. However, it took a turn and became something repressive. This tendency of decay in psychoanalysis is resembled to the Russian Revolution: "psychoanalysis is like the Russian Revolution, we don't know when it started going bad."<sup>142</sup> They argue that psychoanalysis reduces the desiring production to representation, and the Oedipus complex becomes an apparatus for repressing all kinds of desiring machines. So when did the psychoanalysis go wrong? Some may say that in the formation of Oedipus triangle. However, on the contrary;

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<sup>140</sup> Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti Oedipus*, 54

<sup>141</sup> Deleuze and Guattari, *Negotiations*, 16

<sup>142</sup> Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti Oedipus*, 55



To be sure, we have never dreamed of saying that psychoanalysis invented Oedipus. Everything posits in the opposite direction: the subjects of psychoanalysis arrive already oedipalized, they demand it, they want more. ... No psychoanalysts invent nothing... all that they do is to reinforce the movement... What they do is merely to make the unconscious speak accordingly to the transcendent uses of synthesis imposed on by other forces.<sup>143</sup>

Therefore, they were not talking about the invention of Oedipus by the psychoanalysis, but rather, about the formation of a certain social field which, only later, involved by psychoanalysis. Psychoanalysts enslave the libido to the familial triangle, and therefore bind desire to a lack of the baby who cannot access to his mother because of the furious father. “By joining sexuality to the familial complex, by making Oedipus into the criterion of sexuality in analysis – the test of orthodoxy par excellence – Freud himself posited the whole of social and metaphysical relations as an afterwards or a beyond that desire was incapable of investing immediately.”<sup>144</sup>

Therefore, for Deleuze and Guattari, rather than inventing something new in the field of desire, psychoanalysts coded what was happening in the social field through the usage of the myth of Oedipus. And it was through this coding, psychoanalysts were able to claim that Oedipal complex was something universal. Here, there emerges the requirement of raising the important question of the values in forming psychoanalysis; what is the relation between the incest taboo and psychoanalysis' Oedipal complex? This question refers to a complicated historical, sociological and political background. Besides, it is

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<sup>143</sup> Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti Oedipus*, 120

<sup>144</sup> Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti Oedipus*, 58

related with the above mentioned thesis of Deleuze and Guattari that psychoanalysis coded the flows of desire.

In their analysis of universal history which is said to be the history of contingencies<sup>145</sup>, not the history of necessities, they analyze three formations of socius<sup>146</sup>. These are the primitive - savage formations, imperial - barbaric formations and civilized - capitalist formations of socius. First of all, they analyzed the kinship structures in the primitive societies, and this led them to raise questions about the ways of the possible existence of Oedipal triangle in these societies, in relation to the incest taboo. The primitive stage is characterized by the *connective synthesis* through which the coding is acted on the immanent unity of the earth.

Although, in this stage everything is possible on behalf of the endless connections, nonexclusive disjunctions, nonspecific conjunctions, partial objects and flows, it is also in this stage that the coding emerges. Because the socius is identified by its capability to be inscribed where the essential thing is to mark and to be marked<sup>147</sup>, the socius of the primitive stage is also subjected to coding. Indeed, it is the unique area of *coding* because in this stage, the *connective synthesis* forms an infinite chain. However, the results of this coding differ according to the legitimate and illegitimate use of the connective synthesis. While the 4+n formula is used for the legitimate usage, the illegitimate use of this synthesis refers to 3+1 formula which highlights Oedipal family. The highlighting in the second formula is on the signifier. As Deleuze and Guattari say;

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<sup>145</sup> Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti Oedipus*, 140

<sup>146</sup> Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti Oedipus*, 139 - 262

<sup>147</sup> Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti Oedipus*, 142

This signifier acts as the formal cause of the triangulation—that is to say, makes possible both the form of the triangle and its reproduction: Oedipus has as its formula  $3 + 1$ , the One of the transcendent phallus without which the terms considered would not take the form of a triangle.<sup>148</sup>

The important difference of illegitimate and legitimate use of the connective synthesis is that the objects which are partial and detachable are transformed into a detached complete object in the illegitimate use. While the connected partial objects are immanent on the same plane (in the  $4+n$  formula), the detached complete object, like the signifier, operates in a hierarchical field. As an example, this takes the form of the phallus in Oedipal triangle. “That is indeed what disturbs us, this recasting of history and this “lack” attributed to partial objects.”<sup>149</sup>

They argued that the primitive stage consists in the following: *the declension of alliance and filiation*.<sup>150</sup> The analysis of the boy's relation with his mother and this relationships extension to the sister, the alliance and the filiation, in brief the ground for the family, lead to the conclusion that incest is not the issue in this stage; because it is not coded yet. The familial structures that code the issue in that way do not exist yet. “What is desired is the intense germinal or generative flow, where one would look in vain for persons or even functions discernible as father, mother, son, sister, etc., since these names only designate intensive variations on the full body of the earth determined as germen.”<sup>151</sup> It is

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<sup>148</sup> Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti Oedipus*, 73

<sup>149</sup> Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti Oedipus*, 73

<sup>150</sup> Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti Oedipus*, 146

<sup>151</sup> Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti Oedipus*, 162

argued that incest requires both the persons and names; like mother, father, sister. However, in this stage this one characteristic that is needed for the perception of incest to emerge is always missing.

In this discussion, the Oedipus comes into stage in relation to incest. Inspired by the anthropological and ethnological studies<sup>152</sup> used in *Anti Oedipus*, they argued that the prohibition of incest is not connected with the Oedipus but “the noncoded flows that constitute desire, and to their representative, the intense prepersonal flow.”<sup>153</sup>

Things would be simpler if the libido or the affect were repressed, in the most general sense of the word (suppressed, inhibited, or transformed) – at the same times as the supposed Oedipal representation. But such is not the case; most ethnologists have clearly noted the sexual nature of affects in the public symbols of primitive societies, and this nature remains integrally lived by the members of these societies, even though they have not been psychoanalyzed, and in spite of the representation.<sup>154</sup>

Under the light of these quotations, it can be argued that, even if the agents of the family has not been coded yet in the primitive societies, there is the marking of sexual codes in the public sphere, and this has nothing to do with the Oedipal representation. Therefore, the repression is not on the Oedipal representation, but on the desiring production. Incest taboo is just another way of coding the uncoded, like the Oedipus. There is no coding of the taboo of incest in primitive societies. This taboo is produced by capitalist societies. In

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<sup>152</sup> In *Anti Oedipus* there are a wide variety of anthropological and ethnological studies were used. For example, the works of Georges Devereux, Pierre Clastres and Bronislaw Malinowski are among the referred sources.

<sup>153</sup> Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti Oedipus*, 173

<sup>154</sup> Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti Oedipus*, 172

the primitive societies, this repression is made on the representations again like the psychoanalysts' representational model of Oedipus. The first representation is the filiation which conditions all the representation, or as they mention it is the *representative of desire*<sup>155</sup> However, it should be noted that it is still the phase of noncoded flows. Since the germinal influx of the intensities conditions all representation, it shows the socius limit. The second representation is alliance, which is called the *repressing representation* of desire. Deleuze and Guattari argue that the marriage that forms the alliance relation is the repression of a homosocial desire among men. "Male homosexuality is therefore the representation of alliance that represses the ambiguous signs of intense bisexual filiation."<sup>156</sup> Finally, there comes the Oedipus that emerges as the effect of filiation and alliance. It is the last phase of the territorial primitive society: "territorial representation comprises these three instances: the repressed representative, the repressing representation and the displaced represented."<sup>157</sup> With the displaced represented the Oedipus emerges.

Therefore, the psychoanalysts' assertion that the Oedipus complex is universal in history is disproved in *Anti Oedipus*. However, they agree with the psychoanalysts that this mentioned complex is the main mechanism in capitalist societies, and it is just a product of the repression that operates in capitalist societies.

Deleuze and Guattari also criticize the Freudian psychoanalysis for its clinical practices which, as they claim, produce assimilated subjects who internalize the

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<sup>155</sup> Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti Oedipus*, 164

<sup>156</sup> Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti Oedipus*, 165

<sup>157</sup> Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti Oedipus*, 166

Oedipal triangle and the figure of authority as imposed by the representation of the father. Furthermore, beyond this critique of representation, there are practical issues in psychoanalysis which they see as problematic. For instance, they criticize the psychoanalysts' positioning of the doctor / patient relation because it produces a continuous hierarchy.

And last but not least, they criticized Freud for his limitation of desire ultimately to a loss of sexual enjoyment. The subjective echo of this cultural and social prohibition is the Oedipus complex. By this way the desire is limited to the individual level where the connection of desire's unconscious investment of the social field is cut off.

After pages of criticism and description of the repression of desiring production, Deleuze and Guattari try to open a door open for the possibility of the anoedipal nature of desiring machines<sup>158</sup> by the schizoanalysis which has two crucial aspects. One of them is to destruct the expressive pseudo forms of the unconscious, and the other is the discovery of desire's unconscious investments of the social field.<sup>159</sup> It is in this connection Deleuze and Guattari clearly refer to Beckett's works and his character's usage of the partial objects (bicycles or stones) when they expose the psychoanalyst's perspective.

Leave your desiring machines at the door, give up your orphan and celibate machines, your tape recorder and *your little bike*, enter and allow yourself to be oedipalized.<sup>160</sup> (Emphasize added.)

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<sup>158</sup> Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti Oedipus*, 55

<sup>159</sup> Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti Oedipus*, 167

<sup>160</sup> Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti Oedipus*, 56

### 3.4 Lacan's Theory of Desire

#### 3.4.1 Desire towards the Other

The concept of desire is central to Lacan's psychoanalysis. While the main criticism was directed to Freud in *Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, Jacques Lacan's theory of desire gets its share out of this critique as well. It was particularly Felix Guattari's past that introduced the critique of Lacanian desire into their collaborated books. Lacan's impact on Guattari cannot be ignored, for he was a student of Lacan. Later on Guattari worked at the psychiatric clinic named La Borde as a trained and practiced psychoanalyst until his death in 1992. In this clinic, Guattari acquired the knowledge and experience necessary to undertake a through attempt to theorize schizoanalysis.

It must be admitted that, it was primarily Lacan's teachings that introduced the conceptualization of desire in the context of psychoanalysis. At this point, it should be noted that although Deleuze and Guattari made a profound criticism of Lacan's approach to desire, they also accepted his theories' innovative sides. In several ways they mentioned that they "owed so much to Lacan"<sup>161</sup>.

Therefore, it is important to discuss Lacan's theory of desire in the context of need, demand and desire triad. To comprehend this theory, the Lacanian idea of the Mirror Stage should be elaborated because it is in this stage that the important component of Lacan's theory of desire lies when the starts to develop a sense of the self and the other.

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<sup>161</sup> Deleuze, *Negotiations*, 13

There are some advantages to begin with Lacan's famous triad of Imaginary – Symbolic and Real. Because this theory is immanent in every point of *le moi's* development and it is also very crucial for his theory of desire. But, because it is a very complicated one, here only some of its general aspects will be touched upon.

According to Lacan, the Imaginary, the Symbolic and the Real are all related with our sensational world. Furthermore, they are all related at one side, and they are independent on the other, for they refer to different meanings. This trio is also related with Freud's theory of the infantile sexuality, in particular Oedipal phase, and the unconscious processes. Alan Sheridan says that, although "Of these three terms, the 'imaginary' was the first to appear, well before the Rome Report of 1953"<sup>162</sup>, Lacan moved on to focus on the Symbolic.

The imaginary is related with the construction of the *le moi* in the Mirror Stage. As it will be analyzed in detail later, in this phase the infant encounters with his/her totality. Behind this encounter, there lies the fragmented body of the infant. The image that the infant is confronted serves as a coherence image which makes the infant and the other things around as complete subjects. Therefore, the imaginary refers to completeness, rather than fragmentedness. The imaginary is the relation between *le moi* and its image. It can be summed up as the internalization of the image of the *Ideal I*.

The Symbolic icons the involvement of the language and signifying apparatus in Lacan's theory. Lacan mentioned that his fundamental task is to demonstrate that the Freudian concepts “take on their full meaning only when oriented in a

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<sup>162</sup> Alan Sheridan, "Translator's Note", Jacques Lacan, *The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psycho-Analysis* (London: The Hogarth Press, 1994), 279



field of language, only when ordered in relation to the function of speech.”<sup>163</sup> As it is apparent in the quotation, it is associated with Saussure's theory of signification and the distinction of speech and language. The Symbolic is associated with the importance of language for the subject. As mentioned above, Lacan gave the primacy to the Symbolic especially since his article “*The Function and Field of Speech and Language in Psychoanalysis*” which is well known as Rome discourse in 1953. However, this does not mean that, Lacan introduced language in his theory only after 50s. As early as the Mirror Stage in 1949, he emphasized the importance of language. However, it was after 50s that he focused on the Symbolic. In this sense, it can be argued that Lacan gave the priority to the Symbolic over the imaginary. In 1950s Lacan emphasized that the Symbolic was constituted prior to the imaginary which emphasized the structuring image of the *le moi*. He highlighted the language's (and also speech's) relation with the Other, and manifested that “the Other is symbolic by nature.”<sup>164</sup> Lacan also stressed that the entire system demonstrates an endless chain of signifiers, signifieds and associations. And these signs are determined by the symbolic Other, or the symbolic phallus. The subject is constructed through these language systems and the order of the signs.

Finally, the Real is the “limit of experience resisting symbolization”.<sup>165</sup> Its structure is far different from the Imaginary and the Symbolic. Since the Real is neither Imaginary nor Symbolic, it has no relation with the fantasy. Therefore, it resists representation. For Lacan the Real is unattainable, since the infant is

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<sup>163</sup> Lacan, “The Function and Field of Speech and Language in Psychoanalysis” in *Écrits*, 205

<sup>164</sup> Jacques Lacan, *Seminar III: The Psychoses [1955-56]*, trans. R. Grigg, (New York: W.W. Norton, 1993), 56

<sup>165</sup> Jacques Lacan, *Seminar I, Freud's Papers on Technique [1953-54]*, ed. J.-A. Miller, trans with notes by J. Forrester, (New York: W.W. Norton, 1991), 66

signified in a language field, or to say it in other words “the Real is what is expelled when a signifier becomes attached to some morsel of reality: it is the bit that the signifier fails to capture.”<sup>166</sup> However, the Real is dependent on the existence of the Imaginary and the Symbolic. If these orders exist, then the Real exists too. So, only after birth, the infant is closed to this psychic reality. (Or maybe, this order can only be possible before birth.) As it will be noticed, the baby at this phase cannot recognize the limit of his body and his/her mother, or the other subjects. But when the language begins to mean something to the infant (for example the infant's understanding his/her name, or realizing that when he/she does certain movements he is met with his needs), the Real disappears. Because, he/she goes through the world which is fragmented by the language through the signifieds/signifiers.). Contrary to the Symbolic, the Real stays always at the same place. “The character of the Real, being unsymbolisable, is that of absolute terror or absolute enjoyment – both impossible states. Its existence can be postulated by its manifestations.”<sup>167</sup>

Bearing in mind these three psychic realms, it will be proper now to move on to present the Mirror Stage, which will contribute to our comprehension of the theory of desire. Lacan's theorization of the Mirror Stage was presented in the Fourteenth International Psychoanalytical Congress at Marienbad in 1936. According to Lacan it was in the Mirror Stage that the infant recognizes of itself as *le moi* for the first time. Between six and eighteen months the infant sees an image on the mirror, and realizes that it is his/herself<sup>168</sup>. However, he/she also recognizes that this is an image, not the reality. Therefore, it can be

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<sup>166</sup> Lionel Bailly, *Lacan: A Beginner's Guide*, (Great Britain: Oneworld Publication, 2012), 98

<sup>167</sup> Bailly, *Lacan: A Beginner's Guide*, 100

<sup>168</sup> Lacan changed his views about this issue, and latterly argued that the Mirror Stage is not a period which is specific for the infant, but rather a part of the permanent process of subjectivity.

said that the Mirror Stage is where the relation between the image and the subject takes place. Lacan argues that because human beings are premature when they are born and this continues through the Mirror Stage when the infant is accompanied with an adult who is in particular the mother who involved in the construction of the identity of the infant.

However, before this physical confrontation with the mirror, the infant realizes that he/she is different from the mother. Actually, mother is the first mirror that the infant is introduced with his/her own identity. Because in this primordial stage, the infant knows that the mother sees something when looking at him/her. This also enlightens Lacan's usage of the mirror. Mirror is both used in a metaphorical and a real sense by Lacan. Lacan referred mirrors as shiny reflective surfaces. However, this is not a limitation of the mirror in the context of a physical presence he was talking about. Instead, other's expressions, speeches and so on stand as mirrors, in front of which one encounters with an image of oneself. Therefore, the mother's orientation towards her baby with her gaze etc. is a perfect example of a mirror. This also means that, before the mirror stage, infant has the conception of subject. And this primordial phase is what facilitates the infant to fix her/his identification with the image.<sup>169</sup>

Lacan argues that the infant in the Mirror Stage is in the position of “the symbolic matrix in which the *I* is precipitated in a primordial form, prior to being objectified in the dialectic of identification with the other, and before language restores to it, in the universal, its function as subject”<sup>170</sup> He calls the

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<sup>169</sup> In *Écrits* Lacan analyzed the failure of the Mirror Stage in detail. This failure can occur because of the absence of the mother, or her failure to function as a mirror, or some other reasons that cause the failure of the infant's mental leaping from the fragmented body to the wholeness of the self.

<sup>170</sup> Jacques Lacan, “The Mirror Stage as Formative of the I Function” in *Écrits: The First Complete Edition* in English, trans. Bruce Fink in collaboration with Héloïse Fink and Russell

infant's form at this stage as the “Ideal-I”<sup>171</sup>. In the Mirror Stage, the infant's encountering with his/her image presents an ideal image of him/herself which has nothing to do with the infant's present experiential reality. “The specular or mirror image is a lure: an unreal character that is also symmetrically opposed to reality (right becomes left and vice versa)”<sup>172</sup> The infant recognizes her/himself in the mirror, and knows that this image is not real. However, through this unreality infant recognizes him/herself. Making a connection with this image through identification, the infant corresponds wholly with this Ideal-I.

After this process of self recognition, through which the infant identifies itself as Ideal-I, the fixation of the *le moi*<sup>173</sup> proceeds with the acquisition of language. Language is there before the birth, so even the infant sensing his/her body as fragmented, can hear the Other's language. The infant both sees his/herself at the mirror, and he/she also hears his/her own name from the mother (this can be someone else in different occasions where it is not the mother who practically takes care of the baby , but Lacan centralizes the mother in his analysis). Although, the infant has heard the name before (in the primordial stage), this time he/she has the possibility to fixate this name with

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Grigg, (New York: W. W. Norton, 2006), 76

<sup>171</sup> Lacan, *Écrits*, 76

<sup>172</sup> Bailly, *Lacan: A Beginner's Guide*, 98

<sup>173</sup> Lacan uses the term “le moi” as a correspondence to the “das Ich” which Freud used in German. However, there is a small but very important difference that lies between the English translation of “das Ich” as “the ego” and “le moi” [the me]. Freud's first book to be translated into English was *The Interpretation of Dreams*, and it was translated by Abraham Brill. He translated “das Ich” into the Latin word “ego”. This resulted in a loss of the inherent meaning of “das Ich”. Being a French speaker, Lacan did not affected by this translation problem. However, in French there also appears some problems. While “le moi” is much more closer to the original, Lacan argues that it is objective and it does not carry the subjectivity of “je”. However, Lacan preferred to use “le moi” and worked to reestablish the hidden meaning in the subjectivity of “je”. Lacan defines subject as something with no objective existence. Subject is the totality of the signifiers that forms it. Therefore, it can be said that the subject is not equal to the objective le moi. Instead, le moi is the product of the subject's relation with the image.

the image of him/herself. “Our image gives us a (necessary) illusion of unity, while at the same time casting our sense of ourselves to an outside reference point (the mirror, the Other). The subject identifies both with his/her specular image (other), and with the lack in the Other. This image is a distortion, a defense, and yet it is our reality; it casts the subject in both imaginary and symbolic terms.”<sup>174</sup>

In this sense, Lacan’s conceptualization of the subject is closely related with the otherness. Lacan distinguishes between the other with small initial, and the Other with a big initial. The other emerges from the infant’s reflection in the mirror. In addition to this, infant can see the other people as the other, for example his mother is one of the others for the infant. It is something ‘imaginary’. On the other side, there is the Other which is beyond the imaginary other. For Lacan, this Otherness comes from the major discourses as language, society and the Law etc. This Other is ‘symbolic’. It can be mentioned that the subject of Lacan is determined in relation with both the other and the Other. It is in this context of the *otherness* that Lacan establishes his theory of desire. He argues that,

Desire is what manifests itself in the interval demand excavates just shy of itself, insofar as the subject, articulating in the signifying chain, brings to the light his lack of being with his call to receive the complement of this lack from the Other – assuming that the Other, the locus of speech, is also the locus of lack.<sup>175</sup>

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<sup>174</sup> Huguette Glowinski, Zita M. Marks, and Sara Murphy (ed), *Compendium of Lacanian Terms*, (London: Free Association Books, 2001), 10

<sup>175</sup> Lacan, “The Direction of the Treatment and the Principles of its Power” in *Écrits*, 524

As it can be seen in the passage below, Lacan located his theory of desire in the triadic context of demand, need and lack. In this way, Lacan made an important contribution to the quotation used from Aristotle, “*one aims at what he happens to need.*”<sup>176</sup> Since the infant is incapable of providing his/her own biological needs, these needs can only be satisfied via the maternal Other. “What is thus the Other’s job to provide – and, indeed, it is what he does not have, since he too lacks being- is what is called love, but it is also hate and ignorance.”<sup>177</sup> Because the infant is premature in fulfilling the bodily needs, he/she articulates his/her needs through pre-verbal forms (screaming, crying and so on). This necessity traps the subject in language. The adults are involved in the process of the infant linking his/her needs with an expression. Therefore, the infant is born into a discourse and social bond which he/she must adhere. Actually before grasping the importance of language, the infant born into this discourse in which the Other determine his/her name, the place in the discourse of the social gender and so on. The subject “enters into a system of exchanges”<sup>178</sup> in which he/she satisfies the needs temporarily, and is subject to the demands of the Others.

The first Other for the infant is the mother who is a very important figure as she plays a very crucial role to convey the acquiring language of the infant. The mother which is the other at the mirror stage also represents the Other. Because she is also in a signifying apparatus. Lacan argues that “primary identification ... occurs on the basis of the mother’s omnipotence – namely, the one that not only makes the satisfaction of needs dependent upon the signifying apparatus,

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<sup>176</sup> Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, 176

<sup>177</sup> Lacan, “The Direction of the Treatment and the Principles of its Power” in *Écrits*, 524

<sup>178</sup> Jean Michel Rabaté (ed), *The Cambridge Companion to Lacan*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 110

but also those fragments, filters, and models those needs in the defiles of the signifier's structure."<sup>179</sup> As Lacan emphasizes the mother transmits the inherited signifying apparatus in which the signifiers and the signification processes are all hidden to the baby.

While the needs of the infant are satisfied, the other process which is very significant perpetuates. This satisfaction is the proof of the other's love, and this symbolizes the *demand* for Lacan. While the infant wants to be satisfied his/her needs, he/she also demand love. "Furthermore, the satisfaction of need appears here only as a lure in which the demand for love is crushed."<sup>180</sup>

To sum up, the need symbolizes the biological needs which are common for both animals and human. (i.e. need for food). However, demand is beyond necessity. It is the "desire for absolute and unshared signifiers of the desire of the Other, in other words his/her love. Thus 'satisfaction' (of the need and of the demand) always leaves a trace of disappointment: there is something missing in the object that the other offers. It is never enough (satis)"<sup>181</sup>

Desire is directed towards completing this lack which is impossible to attain. "[D]esire is a constant search for something else and there is no specifiable object that is capable of satisfying it, in other words extinguishing it."<sup>182</sup> By this way, Lacan attaches an eternity to the subject's desire in the context of lack. The subject is aware of the fact that the satisfaction of the needs or the

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<sup>179</sup> Lacan, "The Direction of the Treatment and the Principles of Its Power" in *Écrits*, 517

<sup>180</sup> Lacan, "The Direction of the Treatment and the Principles of its Power" in *Écrits*, 524

<sup>181</sup> Rabaté (ed), *The Cambridge Companion to Lacan*, 110

<sup>182</sup> Bruce Fink, *The Lacanian Subject: Between Language and Jouissance*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), 90

demand for love is something impossible. For instance, the infant only knows a few words that seems to be understood by the others. However, what he/she really needs is something else. “But these signifiers have predetermined signifieds imposed by language, and so the baby has to accept these as the solution to its need, however unsatisfactory.<sup>183</sup> So the baby’s needs are satisfied in accordance to the relation between these signifiers and signifieds. And this continues as the infant grows, and learns the language. Because according to Lacan, the subject’s needs and also the language become much more complicated.

As mentioned below, the mother – as the representative of the Other- is the most crucial subject in the infant’s development. The infant’s desire is directed towards the mother. The primordial relation between the baby and the mother also represents the infant’s helpless dependency upon the Other. When the baby grows up, the mother necessarily cuts this relation with the child. The child is thrown back into this helplessness. This enables the child to question the lack he/she has for the reason of which he/she cannot fulfill the needs of the mother. The child begins asking the space he/she is occupying for the (m)Other. And this unanswerable question triggers anxiety; because the infant does not know what the (m)Other wants exactly. “The desire of the Other for something which cannot be provided is revealed in the castration of the maternal Other, which institutes the phallus as signifier of this desire.”<sup>184</sup>

In Lacanian analyses there is no object of desire. Because there is no specific object that can satisfy the desire. However, the only object (different from the other objects) that Lacan connects with desire is the *objet petit a* which means

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<sup>183</sup> Bailly, *Lacan: A Beginner's Guide*, 112

<sup>184</sup> Rabaté (ed), *The Cambridge Companion to Lacan*, 110



“the object which can never be attained, which is really the cause of desire rather than that towards which desire tends”<sup>185</sup> The article 'a' represents other (in French *autre*). Lacan wanted this term never to be translated into any other language. It represents the most inaccessible object for desire as the remainder of the symbolic castration. *Object a* belongs “to the register of what Lacan calls the real, and resist imaginization and symbolization”.<sup>186</sup>

### 3.4.2 Deleuze and Guattari's Critique of Lacan's Theory

As mentioned in the previous part, Deleuze and Guattari admitted that they owed so much to Lacan. What they owed is profoundly related with Lacan's notions of the Reality in the context of *object a* and his approach to signifier – signified relation in the context of *le moi*. In addition to these, they appreciated Lacan's piercing the “fundamental premises of classical thought” with regard to the subject by involving the Other which made an emphasis on both the individual and the social level as well as on the process of the construction of subjectivity. Lacan argued that this approach has dominated thinking “from a certain period in Greek history on”<sup>187</sup> as it could be best shown by his sentence “We are told that man is the measure of all things. But where is his own measure? Is it to be found in himself”<sup>188</sup> As it will be analyzed in the following chapters, this sentence also represents Deleuze and Guattari's position in relation to the subject.

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<sup>185</sup> Dylan Evans, *An introductory dictionary of Lacanian psychoanalysis*, (London: Routledge, 1996), 128

<sup>186</sup> Fink, *The Lacanian subject: between language and jouissance*, 92

<sup>187</sup> Jacques Lacan, *Seminar II: The Ego in Freud's Theory and in the Technique of Psychoanalysis* [1954 – 1955], (trans.) Sylvana Tomeselli, (USA: W.W. Norton & Company), 68

<sup>188</sup> Lacan, *Seminar II: The Ego in Freud's Theory and in the Technique of Psychoanalysis*, 68

However, such an indebtedness did not prevent Deleuze and Guattari to develop a thorough critique of Lacan's theory. They approached to his theory of desire as one the barriers in front of their material schizoanalysis. In *Negotiations* Deleuze says that,

I felt it would all work even better if one found the right concepts, instead of using notions that didn't even come from Lacan's creative side but from an orthodoxy built up round him. Lacan himself says "I'm not getting much help." We thought we'd give him some schizophrenic help. And there's no question that we're all the more indebted to Lacan, once we've dropped notions like structure, the symbolic, or the signifier, which are thoroughly misguided, and which Lacan himself has always managed to turn on their head to bring out their limitations.<sup>189</sup>

As seen in the passage, their attitude towards Lacan has a double edge. On the one side, they vehemently reject the orthodox interpretations of his theory. On the other side, as in the case of their taking Freud's libido and reintroducing it in a different context, some of the initiative notions which are introduced by Lacan, are borrowed from his theory. Actually, this passage taken from *Negotiations*, also demonstrates the complicated attitude of Deleuze and Guattari to psychoanalysis. It seems rather that, working on to raze this theory, they are operating on revolutionizing it by reversing the main points like desire or unconscious and so on. Only by removing the barriers which are set by this theory, they can create the conditions that would enable the introduction of their schizoanalysis.

Firstly, what Deleuze and Guattari's critique focuses on Lacan's presentation of desire is the very context of lack, as in the Freud's case. However, this does not

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<sup>189</sup> Deleuze, *Negotiations*, 13 – 14

mean that they totally reject his theory of desire. “Lacan’s admirable theory of desire appears to us to have two poles: one related to ‘the object small *a*’ as a desiring-machine, which defines desire in terms of real production, thus going beyond any idea of need and any idea of fantasy; and the other related to the ‘great Other’ as a signifier, which reintroduces a certain notion of lack.”<sup>190</sup> This passage is a very clear explanation of which sides do they appreciate and criticize. As seen in the quotation, although their attitude is positive for the involvement of the Other in the Lacan's development of subjectivity, they criticize his point on desire formulated as, “Desire is the desire of the Other”<sup>191</sup>. Because, as it was shown previously in the previous parts, when desire is constructed on the idea of the acquisition, it tends to become an idealistic concept.

What is more, in *Anti Oedipus* the Imaginary and the Symbolic realms of Lacanian theory is degraded, while the Real is taken and developed in a new direction. Deleuze summarized their approach to Lacan’s conceptualization of the Symbolic and Imaginary by saying that “*Anti-Oedipus* was about the univocity of the real, a sort of Spinozism of the unconscious [...] The people who hate ’68, or say it was a mistake, see it as something symbolic or imaginary. But that’s precisely what it wasn’t; it was pure reality breaking through.”<sup>192</sup> By criticizing Lacan's distinction of the Symbolic, Imaginary and Real, they also intent to liberalize *object petit a* from the context of lack, and locate it in a revolutionary place as an energy called flow.

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<sup>190</sup> Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti Oedipus*, 27 (in footnote)

<sup>191</sup> Jacques Lacan, *The Seminar Book XI: Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis*, The International psycho-analytical library, no. 106, (London: Hogarth Press, 1977), 235

<sup>192</sup> Deleuze, *Negotiations*, 144-45

For Deleuze and Guattari, the real is not impossible, as Lacan argued. Instead “within the real everything becomes possible.”<sup>193</sup> In their theory, it is desire itself that which produces reality. It functions as a locomotive to produce the real. The real is the plane where everything comes as possibility. And through the machine's connecting and then breaking down, the flow of desire produces reality. This reveals one of the crucial points of their theory of desire as something real.

In addition to this, because they argue that “there is no such thing as the social production of reality on the one hand, and a desiring production that is mere fantasy on the other.”<sup>194</sup> they say that the desiring production and the social production is the one and the same thing.<sup>195</sup> This quotation also emphasizes another crucial aspect of their theory of desire as well; opposite of the Freudian and Lacanian views seeing desire as related with psychic operations, in *Anti Oedipus* they claim that desire is social.

Furthermore, their fundamental attack is related with Lacan's interpretation of the relation of subject with the molar desire: “As the subject gradually emerges through the “mirror stage” ... it is increasingly fragmented and divorced from the Real—the unformed abyss of primordial non-being.”<sup>196</sup> As analyzed in the previous part, the infant is a part of the signifying apparatus, and his/her needs and demands are determined in the signified – signifier relationships. The

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<sup>193</sup> Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti Oedipus*, 27

<sup>194</sup> Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti Oedipus*, 28

<sup>195</sup> Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti Oedipus*, 30

<sup>196</sup> Luke Caldwell, “Schizophrenizing Lacan: Deleuze, [Guattari], and Anti-Oedipus”, *Intersections*, Volume 10, Number 3, 21-30 (Autumn 2009), 21

needs met through this determination are mostly far away to satisfy the infant. The subject is structured through the internalization of these unsatisfactions, and fragmented desires. This approach is what Deleuze and Guattari called a molar construction of desire which takes the form of a unified self. In their theory “desire does not express a molar lack within the subject; rather the molar organization deprives desire of its objective being.”<sup>197</sup> As it will be mentioned in the next chapter, Deleuze and Guattari construct the subject as a residuum in its relation with desire.

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<sup>197</sup> Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti Oedipus*, 27

## CHAPTER 4

### THE REALIZATION OF THE DESIRING MACHINES IN BECKETT'S OUEVRE

#### 4.1 Introduction

Deleuze and Guattari frequently mentioned that their starting point for *Anti Oedipus* was the idea of *desiring machines*. Deleuze clearly manifested that this idea came from Guattari who wanted to escape from the assumptions of the traditional psychoanalysis' for he highly involved in it as a student of Lacan. When Guattari came with the ideas of the *desiring machine*, *the unconscious as a machine*, and the *schizophrenic unconscious*, Deleuze mentioned that, he was solely working with concepts and Guattari's proposals were not closely familiar to him too.<sup>198</sup> However, given the circumstances of May '68, they highly engaged in what was happening in the social and political fields, and they were aware of the fact that current theoretical perspectives were not sufficient to analyze this process.

The meeting of Deleuze and Guattari having different intellectual backgrounds resulted in an interdisciplinary study. In such a context, they searched for the ways of a new discourse which has political and social aspects. Their main point was that they "were both of the view that a mode of analysis that insists on filtering everything through the triangulating lens of daddy-mommy-me could not hope to explain either why or how May '68 happened, nor indeed

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<sup>198</sup> Deleuze, *Negotiations*, 13

why it went the way it did.”<sup>199</sup> And this view set them in motion about the way desire has been handled through the Western tradition, and enabled to make their contribution on desire relating it with the social.

Deleuze and Guattari's preference of the positive, multiple and difference over uniformity and flows over unities<sup>200</sup> will be analyzed within the context of *desiring machines*. In this context, first the conceptualization of *desiring machines* will be elaborated briefly, and then the main concern of the thesis that what ways do Beckett's works contribute and enrich their approach, and the possibility of reading the selected works of Beckett as exemplification of desiring machines will be analyzed one by one in connection with the three synthesis of desire.

For this purpose, not all of Beckett's works but only those which can contribute to our discussion will be taken into consideration. These works are mainly the ones to which Deleuze and Guattari have already referred in *Anti Oedipus*. However, besides these, the ones that were not mentioned in *Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, like *Quad*, *Text for Nothing* and *Come and Go* will also be discussed.

#### **4.2 The Context of *Desiring Machines***

The artist is the master of objects; he puts before us shattered, burned, broken down objects, converting them to the regime of desiring machines; breaking down is part of the very functioning of desiring machines; the artist presents paranoiac machines, miraculating

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<sup>199</sup> Buchanan, *Deleuze and Guattari's Anti Oedipus*, 39

<sup>200</sup> Foucault, "Preface" in *Anti Oedipus*, xiii

machines and celibate machines as so many technical machines, so as to cause desiring machines to undermine technical machines. Even more important, the work of art is itself a desiring machine.<sup>201</sup>

As discussed earlier, Deleuze and Guattari criticized the traditional perspective of desire which located desire within the economy of lack in particular, for, according to them such a conceptualization causes desire to be misunderstood as either an insatiable internal lack or as a process whose goal is dissolution in pleasure<sup>202</sup>. Moving from this criticism, they introduced their own theory and conceptualization, and this was not an easy job since the terms and the themes used in this field are all evolved and introduced within the preceding prominent philosophers' and psychoanalysts' works in the tradition. But how could they overcome this tradition which is surrounded by the categories of Negative?

In *'What is Philosophy?'*<sup>203</sup> Deleuze and Guattari claimed that the most crucial task for a philosopher is to produce new concepts, but this production does not mean to create a new concept which will again contribute to the metaphysics of transcendence. With these concepts, the philosopher should not intend to build new tools for praising the transcendental; rather, the concepts should just help to uncover the problematic, and therefore should just be buried in the changing state of things. They argued that "To criticize is only to establish that a concept vanishes when it is thrust into a new milieu, losing some of its components, or acquiring others that transform it. But those who criticize without creating, those who are content to defend the vanished concept without being able to

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<sup>201</sup> Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti Oedipus*, 32

<sup>202</sup> Adrian Parr (ed.), *The Deleuze Dictionary*, (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2005), 64

<sup>203</sup> Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, *What is Philosophy?*, (London: Verso Press, 2003)



give it the forces it needs to return to life, are the plague of philosophy.”<sup>204</sup> Obviously, *desiring machine* is the most important example of this production which was formulated both to challenge the traditional way of thinking desire, and to open a new possibility to approach this notion with a different aspect.

As it is seen, this new conceptualization is consisted of two terms as *desire* on the one hand, and *machine* on the other. However, it can be argued that what gives the meaning of this concept as an indicator of a unique theory is the machine part. Therefore, first what they were referring to when they employ the notion of machine will be analyzed, and then the notion of the desiring machines will be discussed.

At the very beginning of *Anti Oedipus*, Deleuze and Guattari wrote that “Everywhere it is machines – real ones, not figurative ones: machines driving other machines, machines driven by other machines, with all the necessary couplings and connections.”<sup>205</sup> These omnipresent machines are not used metaphorically in their works. Instead they argued that, the machine itself is real and the machinic production produces the real which has nothing to do with the representation of an object or subject. In this sense, they wrote that the machines are not “metaphors”<sup>206</sup>. The reason why they underlined this theme just in the beginning of the book is, that as it was analyzed in the previous chapter within the context of desire, their fundamental objection was towards to the representational theories in general and its implications on the notion of desire in particular. For this reason it can be argued that, to overcome this problem, just in the beginning of the book, they warned the reader to be

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<sup>204</sup> Deleuze and Guattari, *What is Philosophy?*, 28

<sup>205</sup> Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti Oedipus*, 1

<sup>206</sup> Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti Oedipus*, 2

cautious that what he/she would be exposed to a new conceptualization of desire. But to be able to appreciate the value of this new conceptualization first requires an insight on what Deleuze and Guattari mean when they say they use the term machine not *metaphorically* but *in its real sense*.

The contribution of machine into their theory of desire came from an early work<sup>207</sup> by Guattari. His approach to the notion of the machine was fundamentally inspired by what Pierre Levy said: “trying to break down the ontological iron curtain between being and things”<sup>208</sup>. Living in the late 20<sup>th</sup> century, it is obvious that, Guattari has faced a fundamental technological transformation, which has also had a great impact on society. However, in his book *Chaosmosis*<sup>209</sup>, he observed that the prevailing context tended to see machines within the framework of technology only. Instead, contrary to the common usage that suggested the machines as a subset of technology<sup>210</sup>, he argued that machines were the prerequisites of technology, and the relation of machine and human had always been an issue of philosophy since the time of the ancient Greeks<sup>211</sup>. However, development arrived at such a phase that

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<sup>207</sup> Felix Guattari, ‘Machine et structure’, in *Psychanalyse et transversalité*, (Paris: Maspéro, 1972)

<sup>208</sup> Felix Guattari, “On Machines”, in *Complexity: Architecture/Art/Philosophy*, trans. Vivian Constantinopoulos, (London: Academy Editions, 1995), 8

<sup>209</sup> Felix Guattari, *Chaosmosis: An Ethico Aesthetic Paradigm*, trans. Paul Bains and Julian Pefanis. (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1995)

<sup>210</sup> Felix Guattari, *Chaosmosis: An Ethico Aesthetic Paradigm*, trans. Paul Bains and Julian Pefanis. (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1995), 33

<sup>211</sup> At this point Guattari referred to Aristotle’s views on *techne*, and he wrote that “Aristotle thought that the goal of *techne* was to create what nature found impossible to accomplish. Being of the order of “knowledge” and not of “doing”, *techne* interposes a kind of creative mediation between nature and humanity whose status of intercession is a source of perpetual ambiguity.” Guattari, *Chaosmosis*, 33

technology and the role of the machines were began to be discussed as whether they led the human beings to a situation of inhumanity. Guattari wrote that in order to break down this iron curtain and “in order to overcome this fascination with technology and the deathly dimension it sometimes takes, we have to re-apprehend and re-conceptualize the machine in a different way”<sup>212</sup>. In a century of such profound developments in technology and scientific discovery, Guattari argued that the distinction between the human and machine should be reviewed, and the only way to re-apprehend this relation was to review the definitions and relations of the machine and the human subject. In this review his fundamental aim is “to consider that in the machine, and at the machinic interface, there exists something that would not quite be of the order of the soul, human or animal, *anima*, but of the order of a proto-subjectivity.”<sup>213</sup>

At the same place, Guattari points out that his approach to the notion of the machine refers to a different conceptualization from the first meaning that is commonly known and which is given in the dictionaries. In the Oxford Dictionary, machine is described as “an apparatus using mechanical power and having several parts, each with a definite function and together performing a particular task”<sup>214</sup>. Although, Guattari’s usage evokes some aspects of this lexical meaning of the term, his theory is based on the critique of the view which describes machine with mechanics. Guattari argues that “‘Mechanist’ conceptions of the machine empty it of everything that would enable it to avoid a simple construction *partes extra partes*.”<sup>215</sup> He argues that there is an important distinction between the machinic and mechanical as “One must never

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<sup>212</sup> Guattari, *On Machines*, 9

<sup>213</sup> Guattari, *On Machines*, 8

<sup>214</sup> *Oxford Dictionary of English*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 1061

<sup>215</sup> Guattari, *Chaosmosis*, 33

confuse here machinism and mechanism. Machinism...implies a double process – autopoietic-creative and ethico-ontological – which is utterly foreign to mechanism.”<sup>216</sup> In this sense, by adding the idea of machinism to that of the machine, he tried to enrich this concept and built a new way to re-conceptualize the term which would pave the way to contribute to their new conceptualization of subjectivity.

First of all, it must be reminded that, there are some similarities between the technological machine and this new conceptualization of machine. Guattari argued that the ontogenetic element<sup>217</sup> and the phylogenetic element<sup>218</sup> are what gives an opportunity to link technological machines with other machinic systems which are not themselves technological. Guattari argued that the ontogenetic element implies the elements of machine which are deterritorialized to be combined with other elements to make the machine function. This theme is also found in his conceptualization of the machinic. Guattari argued that the machinic systems underlie their environments that are formed of machinic assemblages<sup>219</sup>. “The term assemblage does not imply any notion of bond, passage or anastomosis between its components. It is an

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<sup>216</sup> Guattari, *Chaosmosis*, 108

<sup>217</sup> Guattari, *On Machines*, 9

<sup>218</sup> In 'Treatise on Nomadology-The War Machine' part in Deleuze and Guattari's *A Thousand Plateaus*, there is a definition of machinic phylum, and assemblages as; “At the limit, there is a single phylogenetic lineage, a single machinic phylum, ideally continuous: the flow of matter-movement, the flow of matter in continuous variation, conveying singularities and traits of expression. This operative and expressive flow is as much artificial as natural: it is like the unity of human beings and Nature. But at the same time, it is not realized in the here and now without dividing, differentiating. We will call an assemblage every constellation of singularities and traits deducted from the flow—selected, organized, stratified—in such a way as to converge (consistency) artificially and naturally; an assemblage, in this sense, is a veritable invention.” Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, 406

<sup>219</sup> Guattari, *On Machines*, 9

assemblage of possible fields, of virtual as much as constituted elements, without any notion of generic or species' relation."<sup>220</sup> These assemblages are formed of deterritorialized elements which are made uniform in order to be formed into machinic shapes. However, this uniformity does not contribute to totality, for these machines are continuously breaking down as it will be discussed later. So, the first inference is that the essence of the machine consists of the procedures of deterritorialization of the elements, and the machines are the productive assemblages of components. For Guattari, the machinic is an ontogenetic concept that can bring itself into being. However, it is important to notice that, being does not precedes the machinic, instead the process of machinic essence precede the being.

The second element of the technological machine is phylogenetic element. For Guattari "technological machines are caught in a 'phylum' which is preceded by some machines and succeeded by others."<sup>221</sup> In this sense, he argued that within this phylum each technological generation opens the virtuality of other machines to come; and particular elements within these machines also initiate a meeting point with all the machinic descendants of the future.<sup>222</sup> The elements of machines can be a part of the machinic descendants of the future. This second feature of the technological machines is applicable to his conceptualization of machinic too. As it will be analyzed within the context of desiring machines, each desiring machine has a relation with the others within the Body without Organs (BwO). This relation can emerge as a breaking off from or connecting to.

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<sup>220</sup> Guattari, *Chaosmosis*, 35

<sup>221</sup> Guattari, *On Machines*, 10

<sup>222</sup> Guattari, *On Machines*, 10

Within these two categories, Guattari argued that, there can be built a link among the features of the technological machine and the other machinic systems which are not technological; like cities as mega machines, linguist theory as abstract machines which Chomsky introduced<sup>223</sup>, or their desiring machines or abstract social machines as primitive/savage territorial machine, barbarian despotic machine and civilized capitalist machine.

It was this assumption of the machinic which formed the background of Deleuze and Guattari's work on *desiring machines*. Their fundamental point is the existence of the order of a proto-subjectivity both immanent in this machinic interpretation of machines and subjects, and which would enable them to build a new relation within these notions. In this sense, after receiving this meaning from Guattari's early works, the machine gained a central position in *Capitalism and Schizophrenia* both for its non-subjective aspect which emphasizes the difference from the human subjects, and its relation with the nomadic subject which reveals this strange subject as an adjacent to desiring machines. There is a very fine line here that under their distinct characters, among the machine and the subject (and also the nature) there are given no hierarchical positions. The production which also makes an emphasis on proto-subjectivity is what makes them equal since it is both immanent in machines and subjects.

To open this argument further, one example from Beckettian writing would be appropriate. This example is the usage of the bicycle in Beckett's works which holds a very crucial place on his oeuvre. For Beckett, bicycles were always a great concern, and he used this theme nearly in all of his works. It emerges as a tool for the characters' opening him/herself to outside world which gives

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<sup>223</sup> Guattari, *On Machines*, 10

mostly happiness depending on their physical conditions. For instance in the short story of *Fingal*<sup>224</sup> in *More Picks Than Kicks*, the bicycle appears as a source of happiness for *Belacqua* which is described as,

It was a fine light machine, with red tires and wooden rims. He ran down the margin to the road and it bounded alongside under his hand. He mounted and they flew down the hill and round the corner till they came at length to the stile that led into the field where the church was. The machine was a treat to ride, on his right hand the sea was foaming among the rocks, the sands ahead were another yellow again, beyond them in the distance the cottages of Rush were bright red. Belacqua's sadness fell from him like a shift.<sup>225</sup>

However, there are much more complicated relations between the bicycle and the human being as it is shown in *Molloy*. On the way to visiting his mother, Molloy decides to go there by bicycle. His setting forth on a journey to his mother is dependent on this technological machine, and it is a very difficult task since it brings forth two problems. First of all Molloy has some physical problems, he is described as cripple, and his knees are described as too stiff to bend. Furthermore, this bicycle is “a chainless bicycle, with a free-wheel, if such a bicycle exists”<sup>226</sup> which constitutes the second obstacle for it seems it is impossible to ride such a bicycle. However, even it looks impossible, Molloy manages to ride it. He describes his machine which enables his mobility with a great pleasure as,

Dear bicycle, I shall not call you bike, you were green, like so many of your generation, I don't know why. It is a pleasure to

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<sup>224</sup> Samuel Beckett, “Fingal” in *More Picks Than Kicks*, (New York: Grove Press, 1972), 31

<sup>225</sup> Beckett, “Fingal” in *More Picks Than Kicks*, 31

<sup>226</sup> Samuel Beckett, “Molloy” in *Trilogy*, (London: Gresham Press, 2003), 16

meet it again. To describe it at length would be a pleasure. It had a little red horn instead of the bell fashionable in your days. To blow this horn was for me a real pleasure, almost a vice. I will go further and declare that if I were obliged to record, in a roll of honor, those activities which in the course of my interminable existence have given me only a mild pain in the balls, the blowing of a rubber horn-toot!- would figure among the first.<sup>227</sup>

As it is known bicycle is a human made technological machine which can only function with the help of the human energy. Or to say it from the perspective of Deleuze and Guattari, bicycle is a machine which can only work when it is connected to another machine. It is made up of pedals, wheels and the mechanism which enable it to work. However, it is not connected to another machine, when it is not ridden; it becomes something other than a vehicle. “When it connects up with a cyclist, it becomes a vehicle; when is placed in a gallery, it becomes an artwork.”<sup>228</sup> This is to mean that the relation between the strange subject (Molloy) and the technological machine (bicycle) determine the bicycle’s utilization. With this example of bicycle, an important inference can be made regarding the relations of machines. As is written in *Anti Oedipus*, ‘the self and non-self, outside and inside, no longer have any meaning whatsoever’<sup>229</sup>, this implies the relational character of the machinic process. The given categories like self, nonself, I, she, it etc, has no separate meanings at all, they are all determined in relations with each other. The relations among the machines determine their role as desiring machines. For instance, a mouth can be just an organ machine, but if it enters into coupling with the stone machine, than it becomes a sucking machine. When the relation of sucking interrupted, it can be an eating machine or breathe taking machine and so forth.

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<sup>227</sup> Beckett, “Molloy” in *Trilogy*, 16

<sup>228</sup> Peta Malins, *Machinic Assemblages: Deleuze, Guattari and an Ethico – Aesthetics of Drug Use*, Janus Head 7 (1), 85

<sup>229</sup> Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti Oedipus*, 2



Beckett, who seems well aware of these facts, determined to break down the fully functioning technical machine. What is more, the physical obstacles of Molloy are similar to the lacks of the machine. Therefore, it can be argued that there is an irony in the construction of this relation. In the union of Molloy and the bicycle, the two machines as celibate and technological machine, there is always a breaking process. This usage of machines is also an answer to the views which argues that Beckett is a Cartesian writer.

In 'The Cartesian Centaur', Hugh Kenner considers the bicycles that appear in many of Beckett's works and suggests that Beckett's ideal state is represented by a man riding a bicycle. In the union of man and machine (the 'Cartesian Centaur'), the body works as a perfect machine independently of the mind. But in reality, the body and the bicycle are always defective or disintegrating in Beckett so that the ideal remains an unachievable dream. Kenner shows how, in the course of the trilogy, the ideal of the 'Cartesian Centaur' is dismembered.<sup>230</sup>

It seems that, Beckett used the motif of bicycles metaphorically as to break the harmony of the connected machines. It is obvious that such a machine cannot function; because its fundamental parts are not complete, or even if it is fully functioning Molloy's physical conditions do not allow riding such a machine. In this sense, by undermining the functioning of technical machine, he reveals another feature which gives the possibility to read his bicycles as desiring machines which become a part of the subject.

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<sup>230</sup> Yoshiki Tajiri, *Samuel Beckett and the Prosthetic Body: The Organs and Senses in Modernism*, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 19

This is the context that Deleuze and Guattari use the term machine in their conceptualization of *desiring machines*. In this sense, it can be mentioned that a *desiring machine* is an arrangement of diverse components by which the flow of energy is produced, and consumed. It can be connected, disjointed or conjoined in different ways with other machines to allow this flow of energy, as they mention just in the beginning of *Anti Oedipus*; “Machines driving other machines, machines being driven by other machines, with all the necessary couplings and connections.”<sup>231</sup> It is not an end or thing in itself. The relations of machines are not constant; there can be continuous connections with other *desiring machines* and also interruptions among them. There is always another machine connected to the interrupted one, and this situation brings out a tension; because “desiring-machines work only when they break down”<sup>232</sup>

This emphasis on breaking off the processes is the most crucial part of their conceptualization which reveals the definition of machine as “a system of interruptions or breaks.”<sup>233</sup> There are three kinds of breaks within the desiring production which creates the connective synthesis of production, the disjunctive synthesis of inscription and conjunctive synthesis of consummation. The first break performs the connective synthesis which introduces connecting by cutting. “[E]very machine functions as a break in the flow in relation to the machine to which it is connected, but at the same time is also a flow itself, or the production of a flow, in relation to the machine connected to it.”<sup>234</sup> This first synthesis lays the law of *production of production*. The second break creates the disjunctive synthesis in which the machines perform to detach the

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<sup>231</sup> Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti Oedipus*, 1

<sup>232</sup> Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti Oedipus*, 8

<sup>233</sup> Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti Oedipus*, 36

<sup>234</sup> Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti Oedipus*, 36

associative chains. This second synthesis lays the law of production of recording. And finally comes the third break which is called the residual break<sup>235</sup> that produces the subject that function “as a part adjacent to the machine”<sup>236</sup> This last conjunctive synthesis emphasized the law of production of consumption. This three breaks or synthesis will be analyzed one by one in the next parts.

As it is seen, their machinic conceptualization of *desiring machine* underlies the notion of *production*. The whole process is a part of production, even the consumption directly determine production. In their theory the production is not an end in itself, it is understood in relation to process in three different ways;

1. Production is immediately consumption and recording process, without any sort of mediation, and the recording process and consumption directly determine production, though they do so with the production process itself.<sup>237</sup>
2. Production as process overtakes all idealistic categories and constitutes a cycle whose relationship to desire is that of an immanent principle.<sup>238</sup>
3. Process must not be viewed as a goal or an end in itself, nor must it be confused with an infinite perpetuation of itself.<sup>239</sup>

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<sup>235</sup> Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti Oedipus*, 40

<sup>236</sup> Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti Oedipus*, 40

<sup>237</sup> Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti Oedipus*, 4

<sup>238</sup> Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti Oedipus*, 5

<sup>239</sup> Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti Oedipus*, 5

By highlighting *desiring machines* in relation with production, Deleuze and Guattari recover desire from the context of lack. Desire is all about production. And it has no relation with lack, as it is interpreted in Plato's, Freud's or Lacan's theories. Rather, "Lack is created, planned, and organized in and through social production"<sup>240</sup>. For here, lack is just a result, it is not a cause. It is just a function of market economy which is "an art of a dominant class."<sup>241</sup> In this sense, it can be argued that, wherever the term *desire* is seen in *Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, it should be thought as *desiring machines*. Ignoring the idea of machine in connection with desire, their approach to desire becomes nonsense. This also constitutes the main difference between Deleuze and Guattari's theory from both Plato's view which search the desire's effect for *polis* beginning with the individual soul, and Freud and Lacan's approaches where desire was placed in human psyche.

The machinic interpretation of desire also underlies a second crucial point for *desiring machines*: the identical nature of desiring production and social production. Desire produces reality as does the social production. They are identical in nature, though their regimes are different. "It is not possible to attribute a special form of existence to desire, a mental or psychic reality that is presumably different from the material reality of social production. Desiring machines are not fantasy machines or dream machines, which supposedly can be distinguished from technical and social machines."<sup>242</sup> Therefore, when the desiring machines are discussed, its relation with the social production must be taken into consideration.

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<sup>240</sup> Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti Oedipus*, 28

<sup>241</sup> Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti Oedipus*, 28

<sup>242</sup> Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti Oedipus*, 30

Given the passage from *Anti Oedipus* at the beginning of this chapter, it is seen that Deleuze and Guattari give utmost importance to the works of art for they think that these works are the best indicators of the regime of *desiring machines*. In this context, looking at Beckett's oeuvre, it can be seen that there are lots of examples for the inscription of desiring machines. These inscriptions are always a remarkable concern in Beckett's works. For instance, the combination of the five biscuits by Murphy<sup>243</sup>, the arrangements of the feeding the dogs by Watt<sup>244</sup> are just the two examples of this inscription.

For instance, *Watt* is mentioned in the opening of *Anti Oedipus* with a different example from the feeding scene, without mentioning the novel's name directly. Beckett's mentioned novel is about a man called Watt and his stay for service in Mr. Knott's house, his departure from there and at the end his residence in an insane asylum. One of the points that attracted Deleuze and Guattari in this novel is Beckett's formulation of the character's act when he gets off the train and walks through Mr. Knott's house. Beckett writes,

Watt's way of advancing due east, for example, was to turn his bust as far as possible towards the north and at the same time to fling out his right leg as far as possible towards the south, and then to turn his bust as far as possible towards the south, and at the same time fling out his left leg as far as possible to north, and then again to turn his bust as far as possible towards the south, and then again to turn his bust as far as possible towards the south and then again to fling out his left leg as far as possible towards the north, and so on , over and over again, many many times, until he reached his destination, and could sit down.<sup>245</sup>

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<sup>243</sup> Samuel Beckett, *Murphy*, (New York: Grove Press, 1957), 96 – 97

<sup>244</sup> Beckett, *Watt*, 77 - 81

<sup>245</sup> Beckett, *Watt*, 24

In this example the character's own body is depicted as a machine by Beckett. "Let us compare what happens when Samuel Beckett's characters decide to venture outdoors. Their various gaits and methods of self locomotion constitute, in and of themselves, a finely tuned machine."<sup>246</sup> Watt's walking emphasizes his desire for a possible movement while at the same time preventing the easiest and rational way to reach the place of destination. In his walking style, there is a unefficiency. This is what makes his experience of walking a parody for rational thought; he tries to get Mr. Knott's house, but he is strolling where he is. He has no aim to reach Mr. Knott's house the shortest way. His breast, right leg and left leg are all deterritorialized as elements which form a machinic assemblage. These organ machines are deterritorialized from the full body of the human, and formed as a bust - leg machine in which the mission of the leg is no more to walk directly to the destination point, and the bust's no more to be a cage of the organs. They are coupled in a different way, to enable the energy to flow.

Watt's way of walking also shows the difference of the real human existence in every day life, and the description of it in narrative.<sup>247</sup> This is what Deleuze and Guattari find very crucial in art works. Because art "invents mutant coordinates and takes them to extremes, thereby engendering unpredictable and unforeseen qualities of being."<sup>248</sup>

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<sup>246</sup> Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti Oedipus*, 2

<sup>247</sup> American conceptual artist Bruce Nauman directed and played 60 minute of show playing the walking of Watt, named Slow Angle Walk (Beckett Walk) dated 1968.

<sup>248</sup> Colin Gardner, *Beckett, Deleuze and the Televisual Event*, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan Press, 2012), 166-67

In this context, taken into consideration their approach to art and literary works, Beckett's selected works will be used to analyze the three synthesis of desire which is central to their notion of *desiring machines*.

### **4.3 Molloy's Sucking Stones and Connective Synthesis**

The above mentioned framework being their context, when Deleuze and Guattari were talking about desire, as just in the second page of the *Anti Oedipus*, they take recourse to some examples from Beckett's works. Therefore, it can be said that Beckett's oeuvre played a key role for setting an outline of the three synthesis of desire. In this context, just in the second page of the *Anti Oedipus*, the first example comes from *Molloy*, whose name is not cited directly in the book.

Given the examples of the bicycles and the character's relations in almost all of his works, the elaborate system of Molloy's stones and language of Watt when he attends to feed the dogs can be interpreted as the most crucial example of the desiring machines. Actually, among them *Molloy* and his sucking stones remain as incomprehensible, but at the same time very provocative for many commentators. And among them, it seems that Deleuze and Guattari are quite confident to use it as an example of desiring machines. The stones of Molloy can be considered as an inscription of the machinic assemblage, and opening up their points on the example of the sucking stones can pave the way to understand the *connective synthesis* of desire.

It is obvious that Beckett likes to connect his characters with stones, bicycles or other things. In *Molloy*, this time the relation between Molloy and stones are given the central position. The protagonist Molloy has a collection of stones that he time to time sucks. His main endeavor is to form the best way to arrange

the sixteen stones among his trousers and greatcoat. He distributes the stones over the four pockets. However, he has a problem that makes him uncomfortable; it may always be the same four stones he sucks, instead of the sixteen stones;

I took advantage of being at the seaside to lay in a store of sucking-stones. They were pebbles but I call them stones. Yes, on this occasion I laid in a considerable store. I distributed them equally between my four pockets, and sucked them turn and turn about. This raised a problem which I first solved in the following way. I had say sixteen stones, four in each of my four pockets these being the two pockets of my trousers and the two pockets of my greatcoat. Taking a stone from the right pocket of my greatcoat, and putting it in my mouth, I replaced it in the right pocket of my greatcoat by a stone from the right pocket of my trousers, which I replaced by a stone from the left pocket of my trousers, which I replaced by a stone from the left pocket of my greatcoat, which I replaced by the stone which was in my mouth, as soon as I had finished sucking it. Thus there were still four stones in each of my four pockets, but not quite the same stones. And when the desire to suck took hold of me again, I drew again on the right pocket of my greatcoat, certain of not taking the same stone as the last time. And while I sucked it I rearranged the other stones in the way I have just described. And so on. But this solution did not satisfy me fully. For it did not escape me that, by an extraordinary hazard, the four stones circulating thus might always be the same four. In which case, far from sucking the sixteen stones turn and turn about, I was really only sucking four, always the same, turn and turn about. But I shuffled them well in my pockets, before I began to suck, and again, while I sucked, before transferring them, in the hope of obtaining a more general circulation of the stones from pocket to pocket. But this was only a makeshift that could not long content a man like me. So I began to look for something else.<sup>249</sup>

So after feeling dissatisfaction of this method, Molloy thinks that the only way

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<sup>249</sup> Samuel Beckett, "Molloy" in *Trilogy*, (London: Gresham Press, 2003), 69



to overcome this problem is that he should have sixteen pockets, “each with its stone, I could never reach the goal I had set myself, short of an extraordinary hazard.”<sup>250</sup> Nevertheless, one day an ingenious idea comes to Molloy's mind that he might achieve his aim without increasing the number of his pockets, or reducing the number of the stones, but “simply by sacrificing the principle of trim.”<sup>251</sup> And at the end this is what he finds as a solution;

Good. Now I can begin to suck. Watch me closely. I take a stone from the right pocket of my greatcoat, suck it, stop sucking it, put it in the left pocket of my greatcoat, the one empty (of stones). I take a second stone from the right pocket of my greatcoat, suck it put it in the left pocket of my greatcoat. And so on until the right pocket of my greatcoat is empty (apart from its usual and casual contents) and the six stones I have just sucked, one after the other, are all in the left pocket of my greatcoat. Pausing then, and concentrating, so as not to make a balls of it, I transfer to the right pocket of my greatcoat, in which there are no stones left, the five stones in the right pocket of my trousers, which I replace by the five stones in the left pocket of my trousers, which I replace by the six stones in the left pocket of my greatcoat. At this stage then the left pocket of my greatcoat is again empty of stones, while the right pocket of my greatcoat is again supplied, and in the right way, that is to say with other stones than those I have just sucked. These other stones I then begin to suck, one after the other, vand to transfer as I go along to the left pocket of my greatcoat, being absolutely certain, as far as one can be in an affair of this kind, that I am not sucking the same stones as a moment before, but others. And when the right pocket of my greatcoat is again empty (of stones), and the five I have just sucked are all without exception in the left pocket of my greatcoat, then I proceed to the same redistribution as a moment before, or a similar redistribution, that is to say I transfer to the right pocket of my greatcoat, now again available, the five stones in the right pocket of my trousers, which I replace by the six stones in the left pocket of my

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<sup>250</sup> Beckett, *Molloy*, 71

<sup>251</sup> Beckett, *Molloy*, 71

trousers, which I replace by the five stones in the left pocket of my greatcoat. And there I am ready to begin again. Do I have to go on?<sup>252</sup>

The question is; what is the importance of this scene for Deleuze and Guattari, and what aspect of desiring machines do sucking stones emphasize? In *Anti Oedipus*, they define the connective synthesis with reference to *Molloy*. But what do they mean by synthesis? The theory of synthesis is Deleuze's contribution to their conceptualization of desire. In *Difference and Repetition*<sup>253</sup>, Deleuze worked on Immanuel Kant's synthesis as he handled this issue in *Critique of Pure Reason*. According to Kant, "our experienced world of time and space is possible only because there is a subject who experiences and who connects (or synthesizes) received impressions into a coherent order."<sup>254</sup> However, Deleuze argues that instead of a subject who synthesizes, the subjects are the result of the process of synthesis. Moving from this point, they made a detailed analysis of synthesis by imposing social and political significance to it. There are three synthesis which are called connective synthesis of partial objects and flows, disjunctive synthesis of singularities and chains and conjunctive synthesis of becomings and intensities<sup>255</sup>. It is important to mention that, the three synthesis of desire also correspond to the three synthesis of social machines in *Anti Oedipus*, among which the primitive savage machine is mentioned in the previous chapter.

The first synthesis of desire, the *connective synthesis*, is the coupling that takes place between partial object and flows. As mentioned above, machines are

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<sup>252</sup> Beckett, *Molloy*, 74

<sup>253</sup> Gilles Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, (Great Britain: The Athlone Press, 1994)

<sup>254</sup> Parr (ed.), *The Deleuze Dictionary*, 77

<sup>255</sup> Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti Oedipus*, 338

connected to other machines which interrupt or draw off part of the flows. By this way, there is always a flow producing machine. So the desiring machines both involve flows and redistribution. The connective synthesis links one element to another as follows:

... [E]very machine is a machine of a machine. The machine produces an interruption of the flow only insofar as it is connected to another machine that supposedly produces this flow. And doubtless this second machine in turn is really an interruption or break too. But it is such only in relationship to a third machine that ideally-that is to say relatively-produces a continuous, infinite flux. For example; the anus machine, and the intestine machine, the intestine machine and the stomach machine and the stomach machine and the mouth machine, the mouth machine and the flow of milk of a herd of dairy cattle. (and then... and then... and then...)<sup>256</sup>

The connective synthesis of production produces connections between desiring machines. And this is why the connective synthesis is also called the productive synthesis. However it is very important to notice that the emphasis given to bodily functions in the above mentioned quotation – shitting etc. - is just an example. The synthesis is virtual in nature. This is also true for the desiring machines – like the examples of the mouth machine and breast machine. The crucial thing is the relation between them that forms machinic assemblages. This is why art in general, or Beckett's works in particular are so important to them, as indicated above in the case of the example of Watt.

Returning back to sucking stones, Molloy's stones involve flows of desire which are cut into and then redistributed again. To open this argument, in Molloy's formulation, he wants to suck a stone only once, and put it again to its

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<sup>256</sup> Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti Oedipus*, 36

place. He wants to make sure that each of the sixteen stones are sucked in order and only once. He wants each stone to be sucked to be the new one, but at the same time he wants them equally distributed into his pockets back again. So for this aim, Molloy finds solutions, but he always suspends them. Then he again searches for another solution. He does not derive a satisfaction from what he finds as a solution. Anyway, at the end he concludes with the admission that “deep down it was all the same to me whether I sucked a different stone each time or always the same stone, until the end of time. For they all tasted exactly the same”<sup>257</sup>

Stones appear in the arrangement as a component through which the flow of desire is produced, and consumed. Stones are connected, disjointed or conjoined in different ways to allow the flow of desire. The stones are cut into and redistributed again, without being organized successfully. By this way, the elements, both the hands to the pocket, a stone to another stone and a stone to Molloy's mouth are all linked as pocket-stone-mouth machine. In this process of the circuit of distribution, the mouth, as an organ machine, plays a role as the stone-sucking machine. And through these machines the desire flows, and man and stones combined in one construction, “with its sense of purposeless efficiency”<sup>258</sup>. And once Molloy wants to rearrange them the flow is interrupted, and the other possible combination of machines is realized again. The elements or partial objects of the desiring machines are independent from each other. They are what make up the desiring machine. However, they are in a state of dispersion<sup>259</sup> which is to mean that each partial object is continuously referred to another desiring machine, and because of this act towards the other

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<sup>257</sup> Beckett, *Molloy*, 74

<sup>258</sup> Gardner, *Beckett, Deleuze and the Televisual Event*, 167

<sup>259</sup> Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti Oedipus*, 323

machines this dispersion should not be interpreted in connection with lack. Instead, it “constitutes their mode of presence in the multiplicity they form without unification and totalization.”<sup>260</sup>

However, there is a similarity between Deleuze and Guattari’s particular objects and Lacan’s *object a*. As it is discussed earlier, *object a* is the unattainable object of desire. Lacan argued that *object a* belongs to the Real, and cannot be captured by the Symbolic realm, or to say more concretely it is the residue of the Symbolic, therefore he argued that it is unrepresentable. This is the point where the similarity can be established. Deleuze and Guattari’s partial objects are real, and desire is what makes them real. “Desire is the set of *passive synthesis* that engineer partial objects, flows and bodies, and that functions as units of production.”<sup>261</sup>

These partial objects are the ultimate elements of the unconscious which forms multiplicities without totalization, and it is the passive nature of the synthesis that enables these machinic regimes. In this context, it can be argued that while in Lacanian psychoanalytic theory desire is towards the object or specifically *object a*, in *Anti Oedipus* there is no object outside the machinic process. Its relation with desire is immanent; “desire and its object are one and the same thing: the machine, as a machine of a machine.”<sup>262</sup>

Within this context, Beckett’s usage of partial objects are praised by Deleuze and Guattari: “Such is the case in the schizoid sequences of Beckett: stones, pockets, mouth; a shoe, a pipe bowl, a small limp bundle that is undefined, a

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<sup>260</sup> Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti Oedipus*, 324

<sup>261</sup> Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti Oedipus*, 26

<sup>262</sup> Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti Oedipus*, 26

cover for a bicycle bell, half a crutch.”<sup>263</sup> In this usage, the partial objects and the nomadic subject; stones and the character function in such a circuit that it emanates to the social and political realm. The body, which is approached in the context of “erogenous body” by the psychoanalysts come to the fore in this theory as a designation of “an emission of preindividual and prepersonal singularities, a pure dispersed and anarchic multiplicity, without unity or totality, and whose elements are welded, pasted together by the real distinction or the very absence of a link.”<sup>264</sup> Molloy and his sucking stones, Estragon and his shoes, Pozzo and his pipe bowl are all examples for the nomadic subject’s becoming part of the assemblage which have no bearing on the traditional understanding of desire.

In this sense, the important outcome of the desiring machine of sucking stones is indicated with a question “where in this entire circuit do we find the production of sexual pleasure?”<sup>265</sup> It can be argued that this example from Beckett shows Deleuze and Guattari's disaffirmation of the Freudian view that relates every aspect of desire with sexual pleasure. It is mentioned in the previous chapter that Freud related each phase of the self’s development with sexuality. For instance, in the oral stage, which the emphasis is on the mouth, the infant's feeding by mother is interpreted as the infant's seeking to obtain sexual pleasure via sucking. The sexuality is directed towards mother here.

It is obvious that Beckett's Molloy act turn out this fiction. The mother's breast is replaced by stones. And it is obvious that there is no sexual pleasure directed towards a primary mother, and there is no lacking. In Beckett's works desire is

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<sup>263</sup> Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti Oedipus*, 324

<sup>264</sup> Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti Oedipus*, 324

<sup>265</sup> Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti Oedipus*, 3

not constructed in the daddy-mummy-me triangle, its references are far from this trap. As Gregg Lambert argues, Beckett's aim is to construct "a mode of couple in thought without sinking back into the puerile associations and clichéd assertions 'about' sexuality, which only construct a way of thinking the couple or even of becoming a couple via castration (separation, sexual division, lack, extrinsic relationship between desire and its object.)"<sup>266</sup> Therefore it can be said that Beckett winked Freud and made a reference to his description of oral stage and he discovers a couple, different from mother-me, which is nonfamilial.

Lastly, it is worthwhile to mention here that there are legitimate and illegitimate uses of each three synthesis. The illegitimate use of the synthesis implies the step by step formation of Oedipus. In this context, while the legitimate use of connective synthesis indicates the partial and nonspecific use, the illegitimate one make an emphasis on the global and specific use. In the illegitimate use of connective synthesis, desire at the same time receives a fixed subject, an ego specified according to a given sex, and complete objects defined as global persons.<sup>267</sup> Therefore, the mainstay of the conditions of formation of Oedipus emerges. But it is the illegitimate use of the disjunctive synthesis, which the Oedipus and its triangle will emerge.

#### **4.4 *Enough* and Disjunctive Synthesis**

As it has been suggested earlier, Beckett's machines are intensively used in *Anti Oedipus*. The examples taken from Beckett can be found throughout the entire book. This time, *Enough* (1966) is on the stage as an example of the *disjunctive*

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<sup>266</sup> Gregg Lambert, *In Search for a New Image of Thought: Gilles Deleuze and Philosophical Expressionism*, (USA: University of Minnesota Press, 2012), 85

<sup>267</sup> Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti Oedipus*, 70

*synthesis*. *Enough* is a comparatively understandable work of Beckett's, which is just six pages, and by this feature it is considered as one of his prose which is close to the essentialist constructions of traditional writing. This prose is about a relationship which ended. Given Beckett's works in which human feelings are reduced, this prose seems oppositely constructed in which the narrator's intense emotions which can be regarded as romantic, are given.

What attracts Deleuze and Guattari in *Enough*<sup>268</sup> is the depiction of the two organ machines; the description of the feet that walks and the mouth that does not intend to talk, and the way of Beckett's usage of the words. This is the part of the prose that they mention in *Anti Oedipus*;

He sometimes halted without saying anything. Either he had finally nothing to say or while having something to say he finally decided not to say it.<sup>269</sup>

Other main examples suggest themselves to the mind. Immediate continuous communication with immediate redeparture. Same thing with delayed redeparture. Delayed continuous communication with immediate redeparture. Same thing with delayed redeparture. Immediate discontinuous communication with immediate redeparture. Same thing with delayed redeparture. Delayed discontinuous communication with immediate redeparture. Same thing with delayed redeparture.<sup>270</sup>

It should be mentioned here that, the example given from *Enough* for the disjunctive synthesis, is left a little ambiguous in *Anti Oedipus*. Looking at the quotation above, it is seen that some words used repetitively like *continuous*,

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<sup>268</sup> Samuel Beckett, 'Enough' in *Complete Short Prose 1929-1989*, (New York: Grove Press, 1995), 186

<sup>269</sup> Beckett, *Enough*, 189

<sup>270</sup> Beckett, *Enough*, 189



*discontinuous, communication and redepture*. It seems that these words are used to evoke a reference to semiotic theory which is well known as one of Beckett's determining themes that he liked to handle. However, this passage alone does not expose the features of the disjunctive synthesis. So, to comprehend their reference, the parts that they analyze the disjunctive synthesis should be touched upon, and then the passage from *Enough* will be revisited.

Returning back to connective synthesis, it is mentioned that, it is the coupling that takes place among the partial objects and continuous flows. It accentuates the connection between the machines which are connected to other machines which form "binary series that are linear in every direction."<sup>271</sup> Because of these linear series the *desiring machines* suffer from being organized in this way, from "not having some sort of organization, or no organization at all."<sup>272</sup> Because, they better work only when they are continually breaking down. It is the role of the disjunctive synthesis to interrupt these connections made by the connective synthesis. In this sense, while the legitimate use of the connective synthesis is "and...and...and...", the disjunctive synthesis emphasizes "or...or...".

Disjunctive synthesis interrupts, breaks the connections that are already made, and makes possible new connections. This is why it is still mentioned among the synthesis. To make it concrete, as Eugene Holland mentions, the disjunctive synthesis counters "to the connective synthesis, which may otherwise lock the organism into instinctual or habitual patterns of connection", it "allows a given set of organ-machine connections to be broken and other connections made in

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<sup>271</sup> Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti Oedipus*, 5

<sup>272</sup> Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti Oedipus*, 8

their place, only to be broken in turn and replaced with others, and so on ad infinitum”<sup>273</sup>

It is very important to emphasize that; the disjunctive synthesis symbolizes the anti-production. As it is mentioned, desiring machines produce resistance to the organization that they have been through. All this coupling and resisting of the desiring machines are coded and recorded in a plane called BwO. BwO is defined as an egg, “it is crisscrossed with axes and thresholds, with latitudes and longitudes and geodesic lines, traversed by gradients marking the transitions and the becomings, the destinations of the subject developing along these particular vectors.”<sup>274</sup> BwO is both an effect of desiring machines, and at the same time “it is the condition of possibility that precedes the functioning of the desiring machines, the grid of potential circuits that any given chain of desiring machines might actualize at a specific time.”<sup>275</sup>

To make it clear, one example from the infant can be useful. As it has been stated throughout the analysis of desiring machines, the emphasis is laid on the relational structures between the machines. This has been also analyzing in the context of connective and disjunctive synthesis of the unconscious. This is to say that, no separate or distinct circuit of desiring machines exists in isolation; each desiring machine either connects to the other one, or the process of the connection is left half finished and this will be recorded by the disjunctive synthesis. Eventually, each of them connects to the other one on a given condition. The totality of these circuits forms the BwO. Take the example of

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<sup>273</sup> Eugene Holland, *Deleuze and Guattari's Anti-Oedipus: Introduction to Schizoanalysis*, (New York: Routledge, 1999), 28

<sup>274</sup> Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti Oedipus*, 19

<sup>275</sup> Ronald Bogue, *Deleuze on Literature*, (New York: Routledge, 2003), 62

the infant; “the infant's alimentary circuit for example, being connected to ocular circuits (the infant's eye machine focused on a living room lamp, say), olfactory circuits (the nose machine coupled to flows of kitchen odors), tactile circuits (epidermal machines in touch with heat, fabrics, flesh, mists, air currents)”<sup>276</sup> The BwO is consisted of these flows. So as it is very clear that BwO does not refer to any empirical body, or full body. Its implications are beyond the empirical one; because as it is mentioned BwO consists of different types of machines outside one's organ machine. For instance, it consists of the circuits between the mother's breast or the stones, or the bicycles and the subject etc. It is a virtual entity, like the desiring machines or the synthesis.

While the legitimate use (either...or...or) of disjunctive synthesis implies nonrestrictive and inclusive use, the illegitimate use (either/or) emphasizes the restrictive and exclusive usage. “A disjunction that remains disjunctive, and that still affirms the disjoined terms, that affirms them throughout their entire distance, *without restricting one by the other or excluding the other from the one*, is perhaps the greatest paradox. ‘either...or...or,’ instead of ‘either/or’”<sup>277</sup> Oedipus is the example of this exclusive and restrictive side of this mentioned synthesis. “When Oedipus slips into the disjunctive synthesis of desiring-recording, it imposes the ideal of a certain restrictive or exclusive use on them that becomes identical with the form of triangulation: being daddy, mommy or child.”<sup>278</sup> On the other hand, the context of “either...or... or” is the schizophrenia's state as will be analyzed in the next chapter. Holland makes clear this context as; “He belongs precisely to both sides, man on the side of men, woman on the side of women... [He] is not both at once, but each of the

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<sup>276</sup> Bogue, *Deleuze on Literature*, 61

<sup>277</sup> Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti Oedipus*, 76

<sup>278</sup> Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti Oedipus*, 75

two as the terminal point of a distance over which he glides. He is [. . .] or [. . .], not both, but the one at the end of the other, like the two ends of a stick in a nondecomposable space”<sup>279</sup>

Deleuze and Guattari pointed out Beckett’s works as an example of the legitimate use of disjunctive synthesis. Deleuze and Guattari mentioned as,

The schizophrenic is dead *or* alive, not both at once, but each of the two as the terminal point of a distance over which he glides. He is child *or* parent, not both, but one at the end of the other, like the two ends of a stick in a nondecomposable space. This is the meaning of the disjunctions where Beckett records his characters and the events that befall them: *everything divides, but into itself*. Even the distances are positive, at the same time as the included disjunctions.<sup>280</sup>

Beckett’s characters and events imply the possibility of being either that or this or...; but not in a fixed place, not in a fixed self. This is the meaning of “everything divides, but into itself”. For instance take the famous sentence of Moran at the end of the novel *Molloy* “It is midnight. The rain is beating on the windows. It was not midnight. It was not raining.”<sup>281</sup>; the narrator’s statement in *Texts for Nothing* “I couldn’t stay there and I couldn’t go on”<sup>282</sup> or his description of himself “Where would I go, if I could go, who would I be, if I could be, what would I say, if I had a voice, who says this, saying it’s me?”<sup>283</sup>

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<sup>279</sup> Holland, *Deleuze and Guattari's Anti-Oedipus: Introduction to Schizoanalysis*, 76

<sup>280</sup> Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti Oedipus*, 76

<sup>281</sup> Beckett, *Molloy*, 176

<sup>282</sup> Samuel Beckett, ‘Texts for Nothing 1’ in *Complete Short Prose 1929-1989*, (New York: Grove Press, 1995), 100

<sup>283</sup> Beckett, ‘Texts for Nothing 4’ in *Complete Short Prose 1929-1989*, 114

There are a bunch of these examples in his different works which show that Beckett was constantly referring to a point within all of these diverse works. And this was what makes these works difficult when they are approached from the stand point of traditional authorship. The sentences refer to the immanent principle of becoming continually where the differentiating and identifying processes take place together.<sup>284</sup> This principle can be found in Deleuze and Guattari's analysis of the coupling and breaking off process of machines. The coupled desiring machines, which are not comfortable to be organized in this way, are interrupted continuously. However, they again connect to other machines. The legitimate usage consists the nonrestrictive and inclusive use of the desire as unconscious. In this context, there is no possibility for Oedipus to rise. Everything divides, but the divided can freely get through the ordinary distinction of entities or persons; contrary to the constructed social roles as the daddy-mummy-me.

Yoshiki Tajiri summarized Deleuze and Guattari's point in their approach to Beckett's *Enough*;

When Deleuze and Guattari quote that passage, they have in mind all the features in Beckett that relate to inclusive disjunction, particularly his disposition for permutation. They do not exclusively focus on how the organs are confused and equated in Beckett, though their idea that the organ-machines come under the law of inclusive disjunction on the body without organs surely points to this phenomenon. That passage in *Enough* was more useful to them than other passages that explicitly describe confusion of the organs, because it not only concerns the organ-machines but also the permutation of words. The idea of inclusive disjunction is so

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<sup>284</sup> In *Difference and Repetition*, the philosophy of immanence is reviewed in ontological context through the Works of Dons Scotus, Spinoza and Nietzsche. For further information please see, *Difference and Repetition* and *Nietzsche and Philosophy*.

comprehensive that it can bridge the physical and textual aspects of Beckett, which are often considered separately.<sup>285</sup>

As it is mentioned in the above quotation, Deleuze and Guattari used the passage from Beckett's *Enough* to illustrate two points. The first one shows the permutation of the two organ machines, foot and mouth, as walking machine and speaking machine. To be sure, there can always be established organic links between these organs. However, taken into consideration Beckett's usage of this two organ machines, it is not in this sense that they are used. The second quotation demonstrates permutation of words, by which Beckett exhausts all the possibilities with conjoining and then disjoining them. Between these possible permutations like "delayed continuous communication with immediate redeperature", "immediate continuous communication with immediate redeperature" or "immediate discontinuous communication with immediate redeperature" and so, there emerge nothing out of these permutations; it always amount to the same. None of them comes forward as the ultimate action of the character. What is at stake for Deleuze and Guattari is that between the series of possibilities there is no exclusion. "The realization of the possible always proceeds through exclusive distinction: you do one thing by excluding other possibilities. The exhaustion of the possible through the process of permutation, however, involves inclusive disjunction, and this requires renouncing all order of preference or organization of goal, all signification."<sup>286</sup> In this context, given the example from *Enough*, it both designates the exhaustion of the words with different permutations, and also the two organ machines relation.

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<sup>285</sup> Tajiri, *Samuel Beckett and the Prosthetic Body: The Organs and Senses in Modernism*, 69

<sup>286</sup> Anthony Uhlmann, *Samuel Beckett and the Philosophical Image*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 44

It should be noted that Deleuze and Guattari attribute the legitimate use of the disjunctive synthesis to all of Beckett's works. These permutations that are recognized by Deleuze and Guattari can be found in his works ranging from the short play *Come and Go*<sup>287</sup> where the binary seating arrangements of the characters Flo, Vi and Ru unceasingly change during the game to the narrator's exhaustion of all the possibilities in *The Unnamable*. It is in this context that they refer to *Malone Dies* by saying "Thus the schizophrenic, the possessor of the most touchingly meager capital – *Malone's belongings*, for instance – inscribes on his own body the litany of disjunctions, and creates for himself a world of parries where the most minute of permutations is supposed to be a response to the new situation or a reply to the indiscreet questioner."<sup>288</sup>

Moreover, Deleuze also wrote on Beckett's works on his own. For instance, he wrote an essay on Beckett named *Exhausted*<sup>289</sup> in which Deleuze continued to refer Beckett in the context of inclusive disjunctions. In his essay, Deleuze argued that within these permutational series, all the possibility of fixed

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<sup>287</sup> Samuel Beckett, "Come and Go" in *The Collected Shorter Plays*, (New York: Grove Press, 1984), 191

<sup>288</sup> Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti Oedipus*, 12

<sup>289</sup> In the essay *Exhausted* Deleuze uses the terms "Language I", "Language II" and "Language III" for the language used in the works of Beckett. Language I is used for the atomic language in Beckett through which he placed combinations; for instance in the biscuit scene of *Murphy*, the sucking Stones scene in *Molloy*, and the permutations in *Watt*. Deleuze wrote that if one hope to exhaust the possible with the words, one equally hope to exhaust words themselves, and this can be done by using a metalanguage. Language II is used for the exhausted voices as in the case of *Unnamable*. Finally Language III is used in the works of Beckett in which "'no longer a language of names or voices but a language of images, resounding and coloring images' are available. Not I, *Quad* or the other television plays of Beckett can be given as an example of this category. Gilles Deleuze, *Essays Critical and Clinical*, (trans.) Daniel W. Smith and Michael A. Greco, (London: Verso, 1998), 156-159.

existence is exhausted. For instance he gave an example form *Texts for Nothing* as “Yes, I was my father and my son.”<sup>290</sup> It is an example of the disjunction which is inclusive, like in the case of Moran who says it is night, it is not night. And as a result of this functioning of the *conjunctive synthesis* all the strange subjects; all the Molloy, Moran or the other mentioned characters of Beckett are produced.

#### 4.5 Quad and Conjunctive Synthesis

Given the Beckett’s play texts, it can be observed that towards the end of his career he began to prefer a much leaner and minimal way of expression. In those latest plays, the characters were lapsed into silence and the dialogues were reduced. For instance there is only a moving mouth with a face in the darkness in *Not I* (1972)<sup>291</sup>, there are three women sitting side by side in a dark place talking only a few words in *Come and Go* (1965)<sup>292</sup> and there are four performers walking in a specific order without talking in *Quad* (1981)<sup>293</sup>. It seems that in these works nothing additional is left other than the performance on the stage. Or to say it more concretely, Beckett collapsed the traditional way of thinking on play, as in its traditional form besides the performance, the stage decor is given very importance to create the ambiance. By emphasizing the performance, as Enoch Brater argues, the physical apparatus itself achieves a

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<sup>290</sup> Beckett, ‘Texts for Nothing 1’ in *Complete Short Prose 1929-1989*, 103

<sup>291</sup> Samuel Beckett, “Not I” in *Collected Shorter Plays of Samuel Beckett*, (USA: Grove Press, 1984)

<sup>292</sup> Samuel Beckett, “Come and Go” in *Collected Shorter Plays of Samuel Beckett*, (USA: Grove Press, 1984)

<sup>293</sup> Samuel Beckett, “Quad” in *Collected Shorter Plays of Samuel Beckett*, (USA: Grove Press, 1984)



metaphysical resonance<sup>294</sup>. Given Beckett's plays, the pure performance has attracted much more attention, because the viewer or reader is left with the holes which he/she shall think on them.

In this sense, *Quad* is undoubtedly Beckett's one of the most important plays that received much attention from the philosophical, literary and linguistic circles<sup>295</sup>. Although, this play is not mentioned in *Anti Oedipus*, in this part it will be used as an example of the conjunctive synthesis of desire.

On this four page play, there have emerged many views among which the most interesting one is reading it as an example of a type of *desiring machine*. In this sense returning back to the synthesis of desire, it is very important to emphasize that, desiring machines produce resistance to be organized in a certain way, and within this organization their couplings and resistances produce a plane called BwO.

Deleuze and Guattari used a specific term for each of the three types of desiring machines according to their interactions with BwO. This relation among the desiring machines and the BwO reveal the *paranoiac machine*, *miraculating machine* and *the celibate machine*. Because BwO is a machine of anti production, in the connective synthesis, "an apparent conflict arises"<sup>296</sup> between BwO and the coupled desiring machines. BwO repels desiring machines, since it can no longer tolerate their connections. As a result of this relationship, *paranoiac /repulsive machines* emerge as an avatar of the desiring

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<sup>294</sup> Enoch Brater, *Beyond Minimalism*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), 4

<sup>295</sup> For the linguistic view of *Quad* please see Herta Schmid, "Samuel Beckett's Play, *Quad* : An Abstract Synthesis of The Theater", *Canadian – American Slavic Studies*, 22, 1-4, Spring, Summer, Fall, Winter 263-87 (1988)

<sup>296</sup> Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti Oedipus*, 9

machines. In the disjunctive synthesis, the *miraculating machine*<sup>297</sup> succeeds the *paranoiac machine*. “The repulsion of these machines, as found in the paranoiac machine of primary repression, gave way to an attraction in the miraculating machine.”<sup>298</sup> Because in this synthesis, the BwO attracts desiring machines. Although it is said that the *miraculating machine* succeeds the first one, the *paranoiac machine* and the *miraculating machine* are non sequential since the BwO is the plane where both the circuits of connections and disjunctions take place at the same time. These two machines “constantly fed back into one another.”<sup>299</sup>

Before moving on to the *celibate machine*, however, it will be quite helpful to discuss briefly what Deleuze and Guattari meant when they were talking about “conjunctive synthesis”, since each of the specific types of machines emerges in relation with a certain type of synthesis, and the *celibate machine* is related with the conjunctive synthesis.

In *Anti Oedipus*, the conjunctive synthesis is analyzed under the part named “The Subject and Enjoyment” which gives a clue about its relation with the subject. As it can be expected, the conjunctive synthesis is related to the previous forms. Between the coupling “and...and..” of the connective synthesis, and breaking off “or...or...” of the disjunctive synthesis there emerges a conflict. In this context, the opposition between the forces of repulsion and attraction

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<sup>297</sup> This term is derived from the work of the judge Schreber's book *Memoirs of My Nervous Illness*. In this book, Schreber repetitively indicates that his body was miraculated by the rays of God.

<sup>298</sup> Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti Oedipus*, 17

<sup>299</sup> Bogue, *Deleuze on Literature*, 62

pave the way for this synthesis.<sup>300</sup> Deleuze and Guattari warn about these oppositions that these are the oppositions of the forces, not of the intensities. Instead, they argue that intensities are all positive. “In a word, the opposition of forces of attraction and repulsion produces an open series of intensive elements, all of them positive, that are never an expression of the final equilibrium of a system, but consist, rather, of an unlimited of stationary, metastable states through which a subject passes.”<sup>301</sup>

As stated at the beginning of this chapter, within the conjunctive synthesis it is seen that Deleuze and Guattari position the subject as a result of the processes of syntheses. The subject passes through the intensities while the connections and disjunctions of desiring machines acts upon it. “It is a matter of relationships of intensities through which the subject passes on the body without organs, a process that engages him in becomings, rises and falls, migrations and displacements.”<sup>302</sup> In this sense, the conjunctive synthesis emerges on the surface of BwO to produce the subject “through a localization and consumption of the sensual pleasure”<sup>303</sup>.

In this context, while the connective synthesis is “and..and..”, the disjunctive synthesis' is “either..or..or”; the conjunctive synthesis' is “They are me! So it's me!”<sup>304</sup> About the *celibate machine* Deleuze and Guattari wrote that,

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<sup>300</sup> Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti Oedipus*, 18

<sup>301</sup> Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti Oedipus*, 19

<sup>302</sup> Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti Oedipus*, 84

<sup>303</sup> Nicholas Thoburn, *Deleuze, Marx and Politics*,(New York: Routledge, 2003), 152

<sup>304</sup> Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti Oedipus*, 21

Let us borrow the term “celibate machine” to designate this machine that succeeds the paranoiac machine and the miraculating machine, forming a new alliance between the desiring machines and the body without organs so as to give birth to a new humanity or a glorious organism.<sup>305</sup>

The *celibate machine* is the one that produces intensive quantities which is experienced purely by the schizophrenic experience, and which comes from the opposition of the two preceding forces. The term celibate machine is appropriated from Michel Carrouges book *Les Machines Célibataires* in which he “draws analogies among several twentieth century works of art to disclose the emergence of a new myth symptomatic of the modern condition” which was called the “myth of the celibate machine”<sup>306</sup> through which he found four tragedies as “the Gordion knot of the interferences of machinism, of terror, of eroticism, and of religion and anti-religion.”<sup>307</sup> It can be argued that the reason why they named the third machine as celibate is both related with its meaning and the four tragedies Carrouges found in the analyzed art works. In French célibataire means “simply an unmarried male or he can be a man who is chaste or celibate.”<sup>308</sup> Actually, the English word does not cover the two meanings, and when Deleuze and Guattari’s various books is considered it can be seen that, they both used bachelor machine<sup>309</sup> and celibate machine to refer to this third machine. In this connection, Bogue argues that “when Deleuze and Guattari adopt the term *machine célibataire*, they stress the anticonjugal and

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<sup>305</sup> Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti Oedipus*, 17

<sup>306</sup> Brendan Moran and Carlo Sanzani (ed), *Philosophy and Kafka*, (UK: Lexington Books, 2013), 244

<sup>307</sup> Bogue, *Deleuze on Literature*, 69

<sup>308</sup> Bogue, *Deleuze on Literature*, 73

<sup>309</sup> Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, *Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature*, trans. Dana Polan, (USA: University of Minnesota Press, 1986), 70

antifamilial nature of desire, which ignores distinctions of legitimate and illegitimate sexual relations.”<sup>310</sup> But it can be said, Deleuze and Guattari’s adoption of this term goes well beyond this meaning, because given the Carrouges analysis it also points to the “return of the repressed”.<sup>311</sup> Deleuze and Guattari wrote that,

The celibate machine first of all reveals the existence of a much older paranoiac machine, with its tortures, its dark shadows, its ancient Law. The celibate machine is not a paranoiac machine, however. Everything about it is different: its cogs, its sliding carriage, its shears, needles, magnets, rays. Even when it tortures and kills, it manifests something new and different, a solar surface.<sup>312</sup>

For instance, Carrouges in his analysis of Kafka’s Penal Colony, concluded that “once efficacious means of delivering divine commandments has given way to a meaningless ritual of terror and pain”.<sup>313</sup> It is this context, that Deleuze and Guattari adopt the term celibate machine. The celibate machine reveals the paranoiac machine, however its features is still very different. The celibate machine is produced as a remnant of the paranoiac and miraculating machine, and while carrying the features of them, its very different. ”The eddy of a self is formed in this conjunctive synthesis – multiple, vagabound ipseities, here today, gone tomorrow, circulating on the surface of the BwO. These intensive events do not represent the climax of the whole system or the culminating

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<sup>310</sup> Bogue, *Deleuze on Literature*, 73

<sup>311</sup> Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti Oedipus*, 17

<sup>312</sup> Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti Oedipus*, 18

<sup>313</sup> Moran and Sanzani (ed), *Philosophy and Kafka*, 244

moment of the system become a whole; they are points at which a surplus, a residue is consumed.”<sup>314</sup>

This is the point where *Quad* should be located. *Quad* was firstly broadcast in Germany in 1981. When Beckett saw the television technicians checking the colors of *Quad* on black and white monitor, he was very impressed from what he saw, and he decided to create *Quad II*. Actually, there is no written text for *Quad II*. But to mention, Beckett wanted the sound of the shuffling feet to be emphasized, the neutral light to be used and the motion to be much more slower than *Quad I*<sup>315</sup>. In the second version, the center is also forbidden for performers as in the first version. “Beckett defines *Quadrat I* and *II* as ‘A piece for four players, light and percussion’ giving equal billing to each element, and treating no element as more important – let alone more ‘human’ – than the other”<sup>316</sup>.

In *Quad* there are four performers (A, B, C, D) who are dressed<sup>317</sup> in colorless gowns, and each of them is accompanied by a different percussion instrument. Beckett wrote that the performers’ physical appearance should be similar as

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<sup>314</sup> Alphonso Lingis, *Libido: The French Existential Theories*, (USA: Indiana University Press, 1985), 98

<sup>315</sup> Gardner, *Beckett, Deleuze and the Televisual Event*, 157

<sup>316</sup> Graley Herren, *Samuel Beckett's Plays on Film and Television*, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 127

<sup>317</sup> Quad’s cameraman Jim Lewis mentions that, although the original plan was to dress all the performers in white and differentiate them with coloured lighting, it turned out to be something which can not be done technically. So in the television versions of *Quad* the performers dressed in different colours of robe (white, red, blue, yellow). For detailed information please see, Martha Fehsenfeld, ‘Beckett’s Late Works: An Appraisal’, *Modern Drama*, 25:3, September, 355-62 (1982).


possible, and the gowns' should cover their faces. By this way, the performers' faces are hidden and the appearance is made seemingly interchangeable from each other. In the stage the characters emerge as indifferent subjects or they appear as "strange subjects"<sup>318</sup> with no fixed identity that can be signified. Beckett made the characters walk in a given direction, without deviation and without touching each other in a synchronized manner in a square stage. They are alternately entering to and existing from the stage. This can be interpreted as the Body without Organs through which the conjunctions and disjunctions flow and break off, and over which the strange subjects wander.

As seen in the below figure<sup>319</sup>, which was drawn by Beckett, the performers made to avoid the center of the square which is indicated as point E. This point is described as the *danger zone*,

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<sup>318</sup> Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti Oedipus*, 16

<sup>319</sup> Beckett, "Quad" in *Collected Shorter Plays of Samuel Beckett*, 293



**FIGURE 1: The Figure of Quad**

The point E acts as a desiring machine to which the subjects remain peripheral. This is to mean that “the subject is produced as a mere residuum alongside the desiring-machine”<sup>320</sup> This subject is genderless, as supported by Beckett himself when he described for the players as “Sex indifferent”.<sup>321</sup> It is obvious that Beckett made an effort to emphasize a crucial thing by this ‘sex indifference’. His point implies more than a “gender neutrality: it is a deliberate strategy to move beyond a familiar (and familial) Oedipal economy in which desire can be cathected along specific libidinal channels.”<sup>322</sup> By constructing *Quad* in this way, Beckett made it functioning as a *celibate*

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<sup>320</sup> Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti Oedipus*, 17

<sup>321</sup> Beckett, “Quad” in *Collected Shorter Plays of Samuel Beckett*, 293

<sup>322</sup> Gardner, *Beckett, Deleuze and the Televisual Event*, 167



*machine* through which a consummation is achieved and which product is the subject (and the players in Beckett). Although, the subjective processes emerge within the conjunctive synthesis of consummation, they are productive too. As it is mentioned in the beginning of this chapter, Deleuze and Guattari argued that production is immediately consumption and recording process. The consumption is incorporated within the production.

In this context, *Quad* stands as an example of a celibate machine, in which the nomadic subjects “function in apersonal, ahuman circuits that permeate nature and the sociopolitical real.”<sup>323</sup> It is an excellent play that Beckett prevented any kind of individualization of the protagonists in the stage.

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<sup>323</sup> Bogue, *Deleuze on Literature*, 74

## CHAPTER V

### THE TRACES OF THE SCHIZOPHRENIC PROCESS IN BECKETT'S WORKS

#### 5.1 Introduction

In this chapter, first of all what Deleuze and Guattari meant by the process of schizophrenization will be summarized. Secondly, especially concentrating on Beckett's *Trilogy*, in which "the plot is contracting, the characters are ascertainable and so the space and time"<sup>324</sup>, the employment of schizophrenia with regard to Deleuze and Guattari's formulation of 'desire' will be examined.

In this context, the characters of Beckett's works and their cases will be analyzed as if they are in a *process* as it is understood by Deleuze and Guattari. And lastly, drawing on their views on the literature and schizoanalysis, their *material psychiatry* will be analyzed in connection with their social and political effects.

#### 5.2 What is Schizophrenia?

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<sup>324</sup> Felix Constantin Goldbach and Ilia Bilbie Georgescu, "Berio's interpretation and integration of Beckett's *The Unnamable* in *Sinfonia*", *International Journal of Mathematical Models and Methods in Applied Science*, 2011, Issue 5, Volume 5, 907

The little joy lies in schizophrenization as a process, not in the schizo as a clinical entity.<sup>325</sup>

In *Anti Oedipus* Deleuze and Guattari stated that “A schizophrenic out for a walk is a better model than a neurotic lying on the analyst's couch.”<sup>326</sup> Their understanding of schizophrenia is different from the one that can be found in the mental institutions. The basic difference between their handling of schizophrenia and the one which is treated as a mental illness is that the second one is created by “putting an end to process or prolonging it indefinitely”<sup>327</sup>

We make a distinction between schizophrenia as a process and the way schizophrenics are produced as clinical cases that need hospitalizing: it's almost the same thing in reverse. The schizophrenics in hospitals are people who've tried to do something and failed, cracked up.<sup>328</sup>

The schizophrenic who emerges as an independent entity and who becomes the target of the psychiatry with an obsession to make a treatment is not what they want to refer. Then in which ways their notion of schizophrenia can be differentiated from the schizophrenia of psychiatry and psychology? First of all, contrary to this psychiatric approach that views schizophrenic as a phenomenon and relates the problem of schizophrenia with the ego, they argued that schizophrenia is the universe of productive and reproductive desiring machines.<sup>329</sup>

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<sup>325</sup> Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti Oedipus*, 113

<sup>326</sup> Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti Oedipus*, 2

<sup>327</sup> Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti Oedipus*, 5

<sup>328</sup> Deleuze and Guattari, *Negotiations*, 23

<sup>329</sup> Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti Oedipus*, 5

Every time that the problem of schizophrenia is explained in terms of the ego, all we can do is "sample" a supposed essence or a presumed specific nature of the schizo, regardless of whether we do so with love and pity or disgustedly spit out the mouthful we have tasted. We have "sampled" him once as a dissociated ego, another time as an ego cut off from the world, and yet again—most temptingly—as an ego that had not ceased to be, who was there in the most specific way, but in his very own world, though he might reveal himself to a clever psychiatrist, a sympathetic superobserver—in short, a phenomenologist.<sup>330</sup>

It should be mentioned that although the terms they used – like schizophrenia, paranoia, unconscious etc. - evoke psychiatry, their concern is not to build a new psychiatric theory at all. However, this does not mean that their understanding of schizophrenia has nothing to do with the psychiatric one. Their understanding of schizophrenia at least partially covers this psychiatric category because it is their starting point. However, what they want to achieve is this term's political and social implications through their approach on desire as the schizophrenia is the process of production of the desiring machines. In this sense, against the psychoanalysis' assumptions considering schizophrenia, they mentioned that “There is no need to distinguish here between producing and product. We need merely note that the pure 'thisness' of the object produced is carried over into a new act of producing”<sup>331</sup> It can be stated that schizophrenia is the producing while schizophrenic is the production.

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<sup>330</sup> Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti Oedipus*, 24

<sup>331</sup> Deleuze and Guattari, *Negotiations*, 7

This process of schizophrenia is what they link with the revolutionary movements, contrary to the ones that are closely related with the capitalist machine.

We're considering a problem to do with the close link between capitalism and psychoanalysis on the one hand, and between revolutionary movements and schizoanalysis on the other. We can talk in terms of capitalist paranoia and revolutionary schizophrenia, because we're not setting out from a psychiatric understanding of these words but rather from their social and political determinations, from which their psychiatric application follows only in specific circumstances.<sup>332</sup>

As shown in the passage their fundamental concerns are capitalism and its relation with psychoanalysis in particular within the context of schizophrenia, unconscious and Oedipalization on the one hand, and the introduction of schizoanalysis as a new and alternating method as against psychoanalysis. Therefore, to open their argument on schizophrenia, the schizo which is a product of capitalist machine in its relation to psychoanalysis needs to be briefly discussed.

As mentioned previously, Deleuze and Guattari's adoption of machinic assemblages into their theory of desire led them to a historical analysis of the ways in which desire is controlled by different social regimes which are primitive/savage territorial machine, despotic machine and capitalist machine. This analysis is related with the three synthesis of desire as they stated that "[W]e can say that the savage territorial machine operated on the basis of connections of production, and that the barbarian despotic machine was based

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<sup>332</sup> Deleuze and Guattari, *Negotiations*, 24

on disjunctions of inscription derived from the eminent unity. But the capitalist machine, the civilized machine, will first establish itself on the conjunction.”

In the background of this analysis lays their argument that the fundamental concern of the socius (the social machine or socius may be the body of the Earth, the body of the Despot, the body of Money<sup>333</sup>) is to repress desire which also reveals their standpoint to social field as it is a historically determined product of desire. Its fundamental function is to make sure that there are left no flows which are non-channeled, non-regulated or non-coded. Within this context, as it was mentioned in second chapter, each social regime has its own type of codes made by primitive machine. The primitive/savage machine operates by *coding* the desiring productions. The fundamental function of the despotic machine is to overcode all this coded flows, and subject the order of signs to a despotic signifier, as the “... [D]espotic signifier aims at the reconstitution of the full body of the intense earth that the primitive machine had repressed, but on new foundations or under new conditions present in the deterritorialized full body of the despot himself<sup>334</sup> who can be interpreted as God or king. Finally, the capitalist machine’s function is to decode all these overcoded flows.

What is important in the context of the notion of schizophrenic is that, Deleuze and Guattari argued that schizophrenic is the product of capitalist machine. In *Anti Oedipus* social regime of capitalism is defined as “a continuous process of production” which decodes and deterritorilazes the flows. And as said above, schizophrenia is produced by the capitalist machine. The feature of capitalist

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<sup>333</sup> Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti Oedipus*, 33

<sup>334</sup> Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti Oedipus*, 210

machine as its fundamental function is decoding, it continually draw near to its own limit.

What we are really trying to say is that capitalism, through its process of production, produces an awesome schizophrenic accumulation of energy or charge, against which it brings all its vast powers of repression to bear, but which nonetheless continues to act as capitalism's limit. For capitalism constantly counteracts, constantly inhibits this inherent tendency while at the same time allowing it free rein; it continually seeks to avoid reaching its limit while simultaneously tending toward that limit.

There is a double process functioning within the capitalist machine. On the one hand, it decodes the overcoded flows made by the despotic machine through which the desiring production is freed from the despotic signifier. In a sense it corresponds to the call of the Nietzsche "God is dead!"<sup>335</sup> However, on the other hand, through its internal mechanisms it prevents any kind of revolutionary effect of desiring production. And it is fundamentally the role of the family to repress the revolutionary side this production. "In particular, the family comes to function as a private domain in which desiring production is kept from manifesting its real nature as social production."<sup>336</sup>

In this machine schizophrenic is the subject of recoded flows on the body without organs. It is the one whose revolutionary side has taken away in the name of Oedipus. In this sense, on the one side, capitalist machine produces schizophrenic energy, while on the other it represses or recodes these energy flows. The capitalist machine manages to recode the schizophrenic by

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<sup>335</sup> Friedrich Nietzsche, *Thus Spoke Zarathustra: A Book for All and None*, trans. Adrian Del Caro, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2006), 3

<sup>336</sup> Andrew Cutrofello, *Continental Philosophy: A Contemporary Introduction*, (New York: Routledge Press, 2005),167

inventing new artificial territories; like fascism, nationalism or social genders, and by the government bureaucracies and forces of law and order.

In the aggregate of departure there is the boss, the foreman, the priest, the tax collector, the cop, the soldier, the worker, all the machines and territorialities, all the social images of our society; but in the aggregate of destination, in the end, there is no longer anyone but daddy, mommy, and me, the despotic sign inherited by daddy, the residual territoriality assumed by mommy, and the divided, split, castrated ego.

Therefore their understanding of the schizophrenic is the process of production of desiring machines which is the contrary of the mental state that made him/herself through accepting the capitalist machines mechanisms which is supported by the psychoanalytic treatment in the name of the unified ego. The capitalist machine's schizophrenic has made him/herself an artificial person by these processes.<sup>337</sup> However, in the process of schizophrenia there is a magnificent revolutionary side; because the schizo always seeks the very limits of the capitalist socius.

Against psychoanalysis, they brought forward schizoanalysis which sets out to undo the Oedipal inscription on the schizophrenia. Because this subject "is always artificial, repressive and repressed, mediated by the family, in order to attain the immediate productive unconscious."<sup>338</sup> The schizoanalysis aims to destruct the Oedipal unconscious, and discover the unconscious investments of desire of the social field. The deconstructed Oedipal subject yield its central place to the schizophrenic and more generally the subject of becoming that is described as strange or nomadic subject, "a subject that escapes social

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<sup>337</sup> Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti Oedipus*, 24

<sup>338</sup> Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti Oedipus*, 113



integration as it is defined in terms of its own desires and passage through time which is not in a central position.”<sup>339</sup>

### 5.3 Schizophrenia and *Molloy*

In this part, the mentioned framework regarding schizophrenia will be analyzed by the help of Beckett’s characters. In this context, following Deleuze and Guattari’s argument about Beckettian works; the notion of schizophrenia can be further analyzed.

[W]e have had a look at this stroll of schizo, let us compare what happens when Samuel Beckett's characters decide to venture outdoors. Their various gaits and methods of self locomotion constitute, in and of themselves, a finely tuned machine. And then there is the function of the bicycle in Beckett's works: what relationship does the bicycle – horn machine have with the mother – anus machine? <sup>340</sup>

In *Anti Oedipus*, the first example they relate the schizophrenization process with Beckett's oeuvre comes from *Molloy*. Actually, *Molloy* has been the issue in the thesis under different topics. However, it has not yet been addressed in detail. Therefore, some of the essential themes of this prose will be touched upon to open the way to realize the possibility of relating this crucial prose with the process of schizophrenia.

*Molloy* consists of two parts. The first part of this novel is about a vagabond, Molloy, who has difficulties in remembering his name. He is living in his mother's room, but he does not know how he got in there. He knows only a

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<sup>339</sup> Residar Due, *Deleuze*, (UK: Polity Press, 2007), 10

<sup>340</sup> Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti Oedipus*, 2

man who comes every week, and gives him money. He cannot recognize or remember nearly anything; his mother's name, the town he lives in, and everything else that take place around him; "Yes, there were times when I forgot not only who I was, but that I was, forgot to be."<sup>341</sup>

On the other hand, the second part of the book is about Moran who is a detective having religious sensitivities. Like a detective seeking of his object, Moran's task is to seek, and find Molloy. However, he cannot find Molloy; because he falls into the depths of his consciousness. As he scrutinizes Molloy, Moran's process of becoming like Molloy takes place. "Then I was nothing but uproar, bulk, rage, suffocation, effort unceasing, frenzied and vain. Just the opposite of myself in fact. It was a change. That is the kind of man I have become."<sup>342</sup> He begins to talk himself as another person "It was then unheard of sight was to be seen of Moran making ready to go without knowing where he was going."<sup>343</sup>

The first character, Molloy cannot define a fixed situation in any case. "I am perhaps confusing several different occasions, and different times, deep down, and deep down is my dwelling, oh not deepest down, somewhere between the mud and scum."<sup>344</sup> The distinction between the self and other has blurred for him. "In any case I have her [Molloy's mother] room. I sleep in her bed. I piss and shit in her pot. I have taken her place. I must resemble her more and more.

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<sup>341</sup> Beckett, *Molloy*, 49

<sup>342</sup> Beckett, *Molloy*, 114

<sup>343</sup> Beckett, *Molloy*, 123

<sup>344</sup> Beckett, *Molloy*, 14

All I need now is a son. Perhaps I have somewhere. But I think not.”<sup>345</sup> And he says that “people pass too, hard to distinguish from yourself.”<sup>346</sup>

He does not know his mother whether she is dead or alive. He has forgotten her true name, and says that he calls his mother Mag, and she calls him Dan. Furthermore, as mentioned in the previous chapter he starts to a journey to find his mother, but he does not remember the village’s name where her mother lives. He begins his journey with his bicycle; it is the one throughout his part which gives him pleasure. In this journey Molloy encounters with different events. He runs over a dog whose owner’s name is Sophie or Mrs. Loy or Lousse; he stays with her for a while he does not exactly know how long, he meets with Ruth that he thinks he was in love with her, and he encounters with a charcoal burner. His bicycle is taken away from him, and he continues his journey on foot. Afterwards, his physical pains emerging from his leg begin to increase and he crawls for a while. At the end he lies immobile in a ditch.

However, Beckett does not allow his readers to continually think that Molloy’s journey is exactly a real one. It can be an “unreal journey” too. <sup>347</sup> Actually, given the chainless bicycle and his physical obstacles this journey seems to be impossible. It can be either a physical journey or a feeling Molloy has been through, as it is put in sentence like this; “A little dog followed him, a pomeranian I think, but I don’t think so.”<sup>348</sup> And what is important is that Deleuze and Guattari argued that there is no reason to oppose the interior and exterior voyage.

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<sup>345</sup> Beckett, *Molloy*, 8

<sup>346</sup> Beckett, *Molloy*, 9

<sup>347</sup> Beckett, *Molloy*, 17

<sup>348</sup> Beckett, *Molloy*, 12

R. D. Laing is entirely right in defining the schizophrenic process as a voyage of initiation, a transcendental experience of the loss of the Ego, which causes a subject to remark: "I had existed since the very beginning . . . from the lowest form of life [the body without organs] to the present time, ... I was looking . . . —not looking so much as just feeling—ahead of me was lying the most horrific journey." When we speak here of a voyage, this is no more a metaphor than before when we spoke of an egg, and of what takes place in and on it—morphogenetic movements, displacements of cellular groups, stretchings, folds, migrations, and local variations of potentials.<sup>349</sup>

This voyage is not a metaphor for Deleuze and Guattari. Molloy's journey is real "but where the reality of matter has abandoned all extension, just as the interior voyage has abandoned all form and quality, henceforth causing pure intensities—coupled together, almost unbearable—to radiate within and without, intensities through which a nomadic subject passes."<sup>350</sup> By subjecting *Molloy* to such a reading, the second part of the novel begins to make sense. Because in the second part of the novel, everything commingles to the point of the forcing the reader to the question of *who is Molloy or Moran is?*

The second part of the book begins with the story of the detective Moran. At first he seems self referent. "My name is Moran, Jacques. That is the name I am known by."<sup>351</sup> He says he is a principled man, and continues to mention about his sensitivity to religion. Hugh Kenner argues that on the first pages Moran

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<sup>349</sup> Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti Oedipus*, 84

<sup>350</sup> Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti Oedipus*, 84

<sup>351</sup> Beckett, *Molloy*, 92

tells about how he became “a good bourgeois”.<sup>352</sup> As his quest progresses, Moran becomes more and more like Molloy. He says that prior to this task Molloy is somehow already in Moran's head. At the end of the story the senses of past, present, and future collapse as summarized in the last sentence of Moran; “It is midnight. The rain is beating on the windows. It was not midnight. It was not raining.”<sup>353</sup>

Beckett's choosing a detective story for discussing this subject is not a coincidence at all. By destroying the constituent properties of detective story, Beckett does what he did in *Waiting for Godot* for play writing. As Jonathan Boulter declares, by doing so Beckett decomposes much more than just deterritorializing the detective stories;

The detective story assumes a fundamental epistemology: there is a clear distinction between subject (detective) and object (criminal). This basic assumption is one that governs and dictates how the world is seen and interpreted according to the logic of oppositional thinking; we define ourselves, more precisely, against that which we are not: there is good and there is evil, black and white, man and woman, past and present, detective and criminal, Moran and Molloy.<sup>354</sup>

Beckett blurs the subject / object distinction and makes the reader get stuck in the middle. This again led the reader to search for concrete meanings (or more concretely, approach Beckettian writing from a *paranoiac content* of view) as in the case of *Waiting for Godot*. Especially after the premiere of this play on January 5<sup>th</sup>, 1953 in Paris, there have been questions like; “*What is Godot?*”,

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<sup>352</sup> Hugh Kenner, *A Reader's Guide to Samuel Beckett*, (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1973), 97

<sup>353</sup> Beckett, *Molloy*, 176

<sup>354</sup> Boulter, *Beckett*, 111

“Does it refer to hope, death, or a new beginning?” or “Is it a symbolic expression of God?”<sup>355</sup> Undoubtedly, Beckett himself gave the most significant and ironic response to these questions. When Alan Schneider, one of the directors of *Waiting for Godot* asked about the meaning of the Godot, Beckett answered him saying ‘If I knew, I would have said so in the play.’<sup>356</sup> In this context, Martin Esslin argues that, “this is a salutary warning to anyone who approaches Beckett's plays with the intention of discovering the key to their understanding, of demonstrating in exact and definite terms *what they mean*.”<sup>357</sup> It can be said that trying to give exact meaning to the *unknown* in Beckettian oeuvre is the most exhausting effort which can result depleting the richness of the content. However his sophisticated works are always subjected to an effort, like in the case of *Molloy*.

When looking at literature, the question of “*are Molloy and Moran the same person with different aspects?*” is not undeniable. Hugh Kenner says that,

[I]t has even been suggested that Molloy is Moran, a later stage of Moran, and that the two parts of the novel have been transposed from their chronological order, the whole tracing one man's descent from garden and wicker chair to utter alienation. This suggestion contains a truth that Moran at the end of his episode is as disoriented as Molloy at the beginning of his, but it is nevertheless surely false since it reduces Beckett's most powerful effect to the level of a trick. For the eerie power of the book arises surely from the mysterious hold of Molloy, whom he has never seen, on Moran's imagination, and the mysterious psychic

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<sup>355</sup> See, for example; Mary Bryden, *Samuel Beckett and the Idea of God*, (Basingstoke: Mackmillan Press, 1998)

<sup>356</sup> Alan Schneider, *Waiting for Beckett*, (New York : Chelsea Review , 1958)

<sup>357</sup> Esslin, *The Theater of the Absurd*, 12

disintegration that is perhaps a consequence of this hold, or perhaps its accidental concomitant.

As Kenner mentions, although it is true that Beckett gives the impression that there is an intermingled relationship between Molloy and Moran, the mentioned question has no one answer. It is undeniable that the reader is tempted to wonder if Moran's story is chronologically the beginning of Molloy's. However, it can be said that considering Beckett's usage of other dichotomies throughout the novel, he points to a process of schizophrenization as Deleuze and Guattari put it. Otherwise what the conclusion of the first part tries to tell is totally meaningless. In the conclusion, Molloy finds himself in a forest, wondering that if he crawled around in a circle he would actually go straight from the forest.

Molloy is in the state of either...or...or relation with the things around himself which was analyzed in the previous chapter and can be summarized as "The 'either...or...or' of the schizophrenic takes over from the 'and then'"<sup>358</sup> The objects or situations that can be put between either..or...or.. do not imply a hierarchic position, and furthermore they are not immutable terms. Schizophrenia in their case, do not attribute 'things' sameness. On the contrary, the schizophrenic, as being aware of the things as they are different, can make no hierarchy between them. "Whereas the 'either/or' claims to mark decisive choices between immutable terms (the alternative: either this or that) the schizophrenic 'either... or...or' refers to the system of possible permutations between differences that always amount to the same as they shift and slide about."<sup>359</sup> It is a process of becoming-Moran or becoming-Molloy no matter which one is the departure and destination point (and in their stories there are

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<sup>358</sup> Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti Oedipus*, 12

<sup>359</sup> Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti Oedipus*, 12

more to be found like becoming-A or C). It does not make any sense whether “Moran...is like an earlier stage of Molloy, telling the tale of how he began a good bourgeois, parish priest and all, and became a bum.” as Kenner argues. This attitude is the one that has been criticized since from the beginning.

It is not a coincidence that Deleuze and Guattari referred to Becket's *Molloy* and *Malone* together with Büchner's *Lenz* and the case of the Judge Schreber<sup>360</sup>. The case of Schreber is related with *Molloy*. Contrary to Freud's view that Schreber's case of turning “into a woman...indicated repressed homosexual love for his father in the shape of the asylum director Flechsig”,<sup>361</sup> for Deleuze and Guattari, Schreber felt something and produced it, and connect to reality in his way. In the case of the talking birds emerging as inner voices<sup>362</sup> of him or soul-murder threat<sup>363</sup> there are different intensities along which he moves among them. This has nothing to do with the oedipal family, or state as in the case of Freud. In the *Memoirs of My Nervous Illness* Schreber explained this process as “everything that happens is in reference to me”.<sup>364</sup> He imagined himself “as man and woman in one person having intercourse with”<sup>365</sup> himself.

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<sup>360</sup> Daniel Paul Schreber (1842-1911) served as the chief justice of the supreme court of the state of Saxony, Germany before his mental collapse. He began psychiatric treatment in 1884, and spent his rest of life in and out of mental institutions. He published his famous book *Memoirs of My Nervous Illness* in 1903.

<sup>361</sup> Rosemary Dinnage, “Introduction” in *Memoirs of my Nervous Illness*, ( USA: Harvard University Press, 2000), xiv

<sup>362</sup> Daniel P. Schreber, *Memoirs of my Nervous Illness*, ( USA: Harvard University Press, 2000), 200

<sup>363</sup> Schreber, *Memoirs of my Nervous Illness*, 308

<sup>364</sup> Schreber, *Memoirs of my Nervous Illness*, 233

<sup>365</sup> Schreber, *Memoirs of my Nervous Illness*, 250



Like in the case of *Molloy* in which there is an operation “to dismantle the logic of oppositions.”<sup>366</sup> or the intermingled relation between Molloy and Moran.

The schizophrenic, for Deleuze and Guattari, is not bounded with the imaginary desires of oedipal family. He or she is the one who can create new subjectivities by the operation of the dynamic unconscious. For the intensities are not fixed, schizophrenic becomes whatever he/she feels to be. Like Beckett’s references to woman clothes on Molloy, there is no hierarchically chosen preferences for the schizophrenics as in the case of Molloy’s realizing that he “was wearing a nightdress, very flimsy.”<sup>367</sup>

The schizophrenic is dead *or* alive, not both at once, but each of the two as the terminal point of a distance over which he glides. He is child *or* parent, not both, but the one at the end of the other, like the two ends of a stick in a non decomposable space. This is the meaning of the disjunctions where Beckett records his characters and the events that befall them: *everything divides, but into itself.*<sup>368</sup>

Molloy or Moran, no matter their names are, Beckett divided the characters, but into itself. First of all it looks like there are two characters in the novel. But following Beckett's usage of Moran's situation, it seems that although Beckett divided his novel into two adventures of the two characters, at the end they divided into itself. There is no dichotomy among them; and no subject/object relation. Actually, asking whether they are one or two distinct people is totally meaningless in such a novel, because there is no specific clue to answer it. Furthermore, the emphasis is not on that point. It is on the process; on the

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<sup>366</sup> Boulter, *Beckett*, 111

<sup>367</sup> Beckett, *Molloy*, 38

<sup>368</sup> Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti Oedipus*, 76

process of becoming - mother Mag, becoming-Molloy, becoming – one with the nature. There are intense becomings as mentioned in *Anti Oedipus*;

(I feel that) I am becoming God, I am becoming woman, I was Joan of Arc and I am Heliogabalus and the Great Mongol, I am a Chinaman, a redskin, a Templar, *I was my father and I was my son*. And all the criminals, the whole list of criminals, the decent criminals and the scoundrels: Szondi rather than Freud and his Oedipus. (Emphasis added for Deleuze and Guattari taking it from the prose *Texts for Nothing* by Beckett)<sup>369</sup>

This is the context; Deleuze and Guattari gave few examples from Beckett's characters as well as from Lenz and his relation with nature just in the beginning of the *Anti Oedipus*. The schizophrenia realizes everything within the desiring machines and in this relation there is no place for man – nature dichotomy, as well as the other dichotomies. "There is no such thing as either man or nature now, only a process that produces the one within the other and couples the machines together."<sup>370</sup> In this sense, given the schizophrenia's attitude towards dichotomies in the context of man and nature, Deleuze and Guattari argued that the "schizo" is both *Homo natura*<sup>371</sup> and *Homo historia*. They bring forward this issue by taking Nietzsche as an example,

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<sup>369</sup> Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti Oedipus*, 85

<sup>370</sup> Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti Oedipus*, 2

<sup>371</sup> Nietzsche uses this term in his book *Beyond Good and Evil* when writing: "In effect, to translate man back again into nature; to master the many vain and visionary interpretations and subordinate meanings which have hitherto been scratched and daubed over the eternal original text, HOMO NATURA; to bring it about that man shall henceforth stand before man as he now, hardened by the discipline of science, stands before the OTHER forms of nature, with fearless Oedipus-eyes, and stopped Ulysses ears, deaf to the enticements of old metaphysical bird-catchers, who have piped to him far too long: "Thou art more! thou art higher! thou hast a different origin!"—this may be a strange and foolish task, but that it is a TASK, who can deny!" Friedrich Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 203.

There is no Nietzsche the-self, professor of philology, who suddenly loses his mind and supposedly identifies with all sorts of strange people; rather, there is the Nietzschean subject who passes through a series of states, and who identifies these states with the names of history: “every name in history is I...” It is not a matter of identifying with various historical personages, but rather identifying the names of history with zones of intensity on the body without organs; and each time Nietzsche as subject exclaims: “They’re me! So it’s me!” No one has ever been as deeply involved in history as the schizo, or dealt with it in this way. He consumes all of universal history in one fell swoop. We began by defining him as *Homo natura*, and lo and behold, he has become *Homo historia*.

In what sense they use *Homo natura* and *Homo historia*? It seems easier to explain what they do not mean anything by it. They do not mean schizophrenia is the one who is interested in nature. “[W]e are [not] attempting to make nature one of the poles of schizophrenia. What the schizophrenic experiences, both as an individual and as a member of the human species, is not at all any one specific aspect of nature, but nature as a process of production.”<sup>372</sup> It is not Molloy’s special interest in rocks, Lenz interest in waters and plants or Schreber’s interest in the sounds of the birds, or the sun that make them schizophrenic, instead the relations they produce with nature.

Everything is a machine for the schizophrenic. “Celestial machines, the stars or rainbows in the sky, alpine machines – all of them connected to those of his [Lenz] body. The continual whirr of machines.”<sup>373</sup> It is the relation between machines and the schizophrenic that define the schizophrenia for Deleuze and

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<sup>372</sup> Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti Oedipus*, 3

<sup>373</sup> Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti Oedipus*, 2

Guattari. For the schizophrenic the dichotomy of man-nature is neither constituent nor important. The schizophrenic put him/herself,

[B]ack to a time before the man-nature dichotomy, before all the coordinates based on this fundamental dichotomy have been laid down. He does not live nature as nature, but as a process of production. There is no such thing as either man or nature now, only a process that produces the one within the other and couples the machines together. Producing machines, desiring machines everywhere, schizophrenic machines, all of species life: the self and the non-self, outside and inside, no longer have any meaning whatsoever.<sup>374</sup>

In this sense, the schizophrenic is *Homo Natura* for he/she is beyond the limit of the dichotomies, becomes the part of the nature. He/she does not approach nature as something which can be dominated. Instead he/she becomes the part of the production process which “overtakes all idealistic categories and constitutes a cycle whose relationship to desire is that of an immanent principle.”<sup>375</sup> On the other hand, he/she is at the same time *Homo Historia*, because, as in the case of Nietzsche, as the schizophrenic passes through a series of states, he passes through the history. Like in the case of Moran who passes through a new state, the state of becoming Molloy, as he searches for him. His object of research becomes what he is through the end of the novel.

#### **5.4 Schizophrenia versus Paranoia in the Context of *Malone Dies***

The second book of the *Trilogy* is named *Malone Dies* by Beckett which evokes the reader that the character of the text is dying, as it is mentioned just in the opening sentence, this will take place soon: “I shall soon be quite dead in

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<sup>374</sup> Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti Oedipus*, 2

<sup>375</sup> Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti Oedipus*, 5

spite of all. Perhaps next month. Then it will be the month of April or of May. For the year is still young, a thousand little signs tell me so.”<sup>376</sup> To be able to make Deleuze and Guattari’s argument on schizophrenia and paranoia more explicit, I will employ *Malone Dies* as an example of the *schizophrenic form of content* contrary to the most widespread conviction that tries to handle this novel from a paranoiac point of view. This approach will also contribute to a better understanding of the relation of Malone with the characters he is becoming throughout his own writings.

It is mentioned that the fundamental concern of the socius is to repress the flows of desire, and each type of the social machine has its own method. In addition to this, it is also argued that different from the previous social machines, capitalist machine acts through two contradictory processes by which it deterritorializes the desiring production on the one hand and reterritorialize them once again on the other. Actually, this is the most crucial difference of capitalist socius from the other two forms. Capitalist mode of inscription (or recoding) on the social, functions within these two processes: it entails both deterritorialization and reterritorialization. Related with this approach, in *Anti Oedipus* it is argued that there are two different kinds of investments which correspond to each specific side of capitalist inscription that are the deterritorializing of the overcoded flows on the one hand and repressing a these flows artificially anew on the other.

This undoubtedly means that, there is another pole of the social libidinal investment under capitalism different from schizophrenia. Schizophrenia emerges within the deterritorializing and decoding process and its relation is legitimate with the desiring production. This side represents the *molecular form*

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<sup>376</sup> Samuel Beckett, “Malone Dies” in *Trilogy*, (London: Gresham Press, 2003) , 179

of the investment of desire, and it is regarded as revolutionary.<sup>377</sup> On the other hand, the paranoia is related with the reterritorializing and recoding process through which the deterritorialized codes are artificially recoded again. This *molar form* of the paranoid refers to the illegitimate usage of the synthesis of desire, and it is considered as reactionary, and fascisizing pole.<sup>378</sup> Although they borrowed the term paranoia from psychiatry, as schizophrenia, it should be reiterated again because each psychic investment is also a social investment, and therefore they are no more mere psychic terms in their works.

The two poles are defined, the one by the enslavement of production and the desiring-machines to the gregarious aggregates that they constitute on a large scale under a given form of power or selective sovereignty; the other by the inverse subordination and the overthrow of power. The one by these molar structured aggregates that crush singularities, select them, and regularize those that they retain in codes or axiomatics; the other by the molecular multiplicities of singularities that on the contrary treat the large aggregates as so many useful materials for their own elaborations. The one by the lines of integration and territorialization that arrest the flows, constrict them, turn them back, break them again according to the limits interior to the system, in such a way as to produce the images that come to fill the field of immanence peculiar to this system or this aggregate, the other by lines of escape that follow the decoded and deterritorialized flows, inventing their own nonfigurative breaks or schizzes that produce new flows, always breaching the coded wall or the territorialized limit that separates them from desiring-production.

In *Anti Oedipus* following the argument regarding Beckett's various characters relation with the objects, an example from *Malone Dies* is given. It is about an

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<sup>377</sup> Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti Oedipus*, 366

<sup>378</sup> Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti Oedipus*, 366

elderly man, *Malone*, who writes stories till he dies. He lies in the bed in a mental hospital, or as he feels not there; “It is not a room in hospital, or in a madhouse, I can feel that ... No, this is just a plain private room apparently.”<sup>379</sup> As in the case of Molloy, Malone does not know how he got in there, “in an ambulance perhaps.”<sup>380</sup> He says that “while waiting I shall tell myself stories, if I can.”<sup>381</sup> Before *Malone* begins to write his stories, he says that he will play hereafter, like people and animals do;

This time I know where I am going, it is no longer the ancient night, the recent night. Now it is a game, I am going to play. I never knew how to play, till now. I longed to, but I knew it was impossible. And yet I often tried. I turned on the lights, I took a good look all round, I began to play with what I saw. People and things ask nothing better than to play, certain animals too... But it was not long before I found myself alone, in the dark. That is why I gave up trying to play and took myself for ever shapelessness and speechlessness, incurious wondering, darkness, long stumbling with outstretched arms, hiding. Such is the earnestness from which, for nearly a century now, I have never been able to depart. From now on it will be different. I shall never do anything any more from now on but play.<sup>382</sup>

*Malone*'s insistence on playing and its conclusions evoke the conceptualization of *Homo Ludens*. By beginning to play, he decides to be *Homo Ludens* again who enters the field of becoming both the *Homo Natura* and *Homo Historia*. To open up this argument a little more it will be proper to note that, Johan Huizinga in his book *Homo Ludens* said that *play* prioritizes culture. “In culture

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<sup>379</sup> Beckett, *Malone Dies*, 183

<sup>380</sup> Beckett, *Malone Dies*, 183

<sup>381</sup> Beckett, *Malone Dies*, 180

<sup>382</sup> Beckett, *Malone Dies*, 180 – 181

we find play as a given magnitude existing before culture itself existed, accompanying it and pervading it from the earliest beginnings right up to the phase of civilization we are now living in.”<sup>383</sup> Huizinga states that play is not special to human, and it is not rational: “since the reality of play extends beyond the sphere of human life, it cannot have its foundations in any rational nexus, because this would limit it to mankind.”<sup>384</sup> The primarily important thing in the case of Malone too is that, it is not “ordinary”, and that it is “based on the manipulation of certain images, on a certain "imagination" of reality (i.e. its conversion into images)”.<sup>385</sup> To contribute this theory of Huizinga from the perspective of Deleuze and Guattari, it can be said that the subject who plays passes from the zones of intensity and this does not manipulate reality, instead it produces the very real.

Returning back to Malone, it seems that after he begins to play he enters into the field of becoming. Although, Malone can only tell the story about a man; he says that he will tell himself “four stories, each one on a different theme. One about a man, another about a woman, a third about a thing, and finally one about an animal, a bird probably.”<sup>386</sup> By this way, he returns back to the field of play which he is deprived of, because as he says he finds himself, alone in the dark. What is so important is Malone's emphasis on shapelessness and speechlessness when he gave up playing for nearly a century now.

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<sup>383</sup> Johan Huizinga, *Homo Ludens: A Study of the Play Element in Culture*, (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1980), 4

<sup>384</sup> Huizinga, *Homo Ludens*, 3

<sup>385</sup> Huizinga, *Homo Ludens*, 4

<sup>386</sup> Beckett, *Malone Dies*, 245



Malone begins to talk about the room where he waits for dying, and it is not his home (even if he feels it as his home, Malone admits to kill six people; so it is more likely that it should be a place where he is kept by force). He is deprived of his freedom. And actually it is significant that Beckett chose such a venue for such a content; it could also be a prison, but he preferred an asylum to imply metaphorically the protagonist's internal and external disability (which, in the final instance does not matter according to the schizophrenia for Deleuze and Guattari). However, somehow Malone realizes that he can again start the process which is halted involuntarily. This time it will not be physical, but by writing stories, he will again try to play. As in the case of Molloy's journey, it makes no sense whether it is an inner journey or not, this time it makes no difference whether Malone's introduction of the characters are different human subjects other than himself or not. The only crucial and revolutionary thing is that, from the moment he determines that he should make stories, he drags himself in the field of play. He feels something; he begins to create something, as he moves on. He again tries to become *Homo Ludens*. He begins to play; he begins to make up stories while waiting for his death. A similar case can be found in *Waiting for Godot*. This time, just like Malone, Vladimir and Estragon invent plays while waiting for Godot;

**VLADIMIR:** It's for the kidneys. (*Silence. Estragon looks attentively at the tree.*) What do we do now?

**ESTRAGON:** Wait.

**VLADIMIR:** Yes, but while waiting.

**ESTRAGON:** What about hanging ourselves?

**VLADIMIR:** Hmm. It'd give us an erection.

**ESTRAGON:** (*highly excited*). An erection!<sup>387</sup>

The idea of playing liberalizes the desires (in this example the sexual ones) of Vladimir and Estragon. As in the case of Didi and Gogo, or in the case of Clov

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<sup>387</sup> Beckett, *Waiting for Godot*, 25

and Hamm, Malone begins to tell stories about a boy whom he called Sapo. At first Malone creates Sapo having a mother and father whose aim is to raise him as a successful child. However, later Sapo's family is changed by Malone, whose family name is given as Lambert, and contrary to the first family they are living in a rural place and they specialize in pig slaughtering. There is no indication of why he changed the family. After a while, he changes Sapo's name as Macmann, because he thinks that Sapo is not suitable for an adult.

Like the questions that are raised in *Molloy* whether Molloy and Moran is the same person, this time Beckett confronts the reader questioning him/herself whether they are the past memories of Malone or not. And some thinkers seem pretty sure when they give answers to these questions. For example, John Fletcher mentions that "it is fairly evident that these stories are memories and a way of reviewing his declining life."<sup>388</sup> Francis Doherty mentions that the stories of Malone "are himself writing out himself."<sup>389</sup> This view represses the bunch of possibilities that Malone has been through, and furthermore there is no trace that Malone makes an attempt to represent his memories either of his own or somebody else's. Against this simple conclusion that the stories made up by Malone are of his past, there are contrary views too. Leslie Hill states what is interesting in the relation of Malone and Sapo/Macmann as;

The loss of distinction between Sapo and the narrator. The relationship is not ... one of stable contrast or similarity, but one in which the two characters are both same and different, different and the same. The text blurs and effaces not only the clarity and distinctness of the relation of one to the other but

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<sup>388</sup> John Fletcher, *Samuel Beckett's Art* (London: Chatto & Windus, 1967), 91

<sup>389</sup> Francis Doherty, *Samuel Beckett* (London: Hutchinson University Library, 1971), 71

also, more worryingly, the clarity and distinctness of their relationship with themselves.<sup>390</sup>

As the story of Malone unfolds, the border between Malone and Sapo/Macmann begins to blur. Malone's control on the story begins to disappear. He tries to control becoming Sapo, but he cannot totally succeed in this task that there are sudden ruptures in which he becomes Malone again. Malone interrupts continuously, and in a gradually increasing way. Whose story is being told begins to commingle and the limit of the fiction of Malone begins to blur. "What tedium. And I call that playing. I wonder if I am not talking yet again myself".<sup>391</sup> His playing serves as an instrument of disposal of the dichotomies of Malone/Sapo, narrator/protagonist. It enables a creative machine processing between the possible states of becoming. It is in this sense, Deleuze and Guattari discuss the schizophrenic to identify both Malone, and Sapo/Macmann and his friends in the asylum. There is no difference or hierarchy between any of these becomings as Malone or Sapo or Macmann or Lemuel.

In *Anti Oedipus*, it is mentioned that "At the end of *Malone Dies*, Lady Pedal takes the schizophrenics out for a ride in a van and a rowboat, and on a picnic in the midst of nature: an infernal machine is being assembled."<sup>392</sup> This time the schizophrenic experience does not emerge as in the case of Lenz. The experience of the schizophrenics with nature, this time assembles the infernal machine. At the end of *Malone Dies*, the nurse of the hospital, named St. John's of God to which Sapo/Macmann has been taken, Lemuel is assigned to take

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<sup>390</sup> Leslie Hill, *Beckett's Fiction: In Different Worlds* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 60

<sup>391</sup> Beckett, *Malone Dies*, 189

<sup>392</sup> Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti Oedipus*, 3

five inmates including Sapo/Macmann on a trip to a nearby island. The five inmates, Lady Pedal and two colossi named Ernest and Maurice leave the grounds of the hospital. And when Lady Pedal with Ernest goes of the boat to the island for finding a suitable picnic place, Lemuel, kills Maurice and when Ernest comes back to get them from boat to the island Lemuel kills Ernest. And when Lady Pedal sees the situation, she falls, and breaks *perhaps* her hip. The story ends as follows;

Lemuel is in charge, he raises his hatchet on which the blood  
will never dry, but not to hit anyone, he will not hit anyone,  
he will not hit anyone any more, he will not touch anyone any  
more, either with it or with it or with it or with or  
or with it or with his hammer or with his stick or with his fist  
or in thought in dream I mean never he will never  
or with his pencil or with his stick or  
or light light I mean  
never there he will never  
never anything  
there  
any more<sup>393</sup>

The end of *Malone Dies* is a provocative one. It can be said that, when the novel ends, Malone is dead or maybe he cannot write for some reason or maybe his process is halted again and he fall into the same situation like he describes as the speechlessness and shapelessness. There are many tricky points that Beckett prevents reader to make certain conclusions about this novel. For instance, in the beginning of the part it is said that the novel begins with a surprising introduction of Malone's ending. If this ending is interpreted as the protagonist's dying, than what do all of these indicators refer in the text? Or if the characters mentioned by Malone is interpreted as "a disguised form of autobiography"<sup>394</sup> then where would Beckett's making Malone to describe

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<sup>393</sup> Beckett, *Malone Dies*, 289

<sup>394</sup> Thomas Cousineau, *After the Final No: Samuel Beckett's Trilogy*, (London: Associated

himself without referring to a precise image or a concrete situation of himself as “I shall go on doing as I have always done, not knowing what it is I do, nor who I am, nor where I am, nor if I am”<sup>395</sup> be situated? Are these characters imply “the tactic of assigning different names to earlier forms of himself [Malone] foregrounds the unreality of the self”,<sup>396</sup> or are they zones of intensities which foregrounds the very reality of the becomings through which the nomadic subject passes?

These questions can be answered by the help of the Beckett’s construction of the relation between Malone and his objects. From the beginning of the novel, Malone takes a position regarding the invention of possessions: “For then I shall speak of the things that remain in my possession that is a thing I have always wanted to do. It will be a kind of inventory.”<sup>397</sup> We are told that his “possessions are in a corner, in a little heap.”<sup>398</sup> However, as the pages progress, the reader lose his/her hope to find a clue about Malone himself being guided by his belongings. He fails to tell what these objects are or what are their relations with him; he cannot remember what he has. “I feel I am perhaps attributing to myself things I no longer possess.”<sup>399</sup> For instance he finds a pipe, but he cannot recollect any memory of it “I note on the other hand, in the heap, the presence of two or three objects I had quite forgotten and one of which at

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University Press, 1999), 102

<sup>395</sup> Beckett, *Malone Dies*, 226

<sup>396</sup> Cousineau, *After the Final No: Samuel Beckett's Trilogy*, 102

<sup>397</sup> Beckett, *Malone Dies*, 181

<sup>398</sup> Beckett, *Malone Dies*, 184

<sup>399</sup> Beckett, *Malone Dies*, 251

least, the bowl of a pipe, strikes no cord in my memory.”<sup>400</sup> Contrary to approaching Malone’s relation with his belongings in terms of an old man’s forgetfulness, Deleuze and Guattari argued that;

Thus the schizophrenic, the possessor of the most touchingly meager capital – Malone’s belongings, for instance- inscribes on his own body the litany of disjunctions, and creates for himself a world of parries where the most minute of permutations is supposed to be a response to the new situation or a reply to the indiscreet questioner.<sup>401</sup>

Deleuze and Guattari draw attention to the schizophrenic’s/Malone’s relations with the objects. “Far from directing itself toward an object, desire can only be reached at the point where someone no longer searches for or grasps an object any more than he grasps himself as a subject.”<sup>402</sup> Malone’s belongings do not refer to a subjective center “and, stranger still, there exists a whole family of objects, having apparently very little in common, which have never left me, since I have been here.”<sup>403</sup> Beckett defeats the reader who waits an identifiable relation with Malone and his belongings. What is more, Malone cannot refer to the distinguished features of the objects concretely among which there is a bed he lays on, or the plate he eats his meals and so on. Malone’s declaration in the beginning that he will mention some of his possessions, end up with a weakening view of him that Beckett metaphorically depicted as “It is my possessions have weakened me, if I started talking about them again I shall weaken again, for the same causes give rise to the same effects.”<sup>404</sup> The object

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<sup>400</sup> Beckett, *Malone Dies*, 197

<sup>401</sup> Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti Oedipus*, 12

<sup>402</sup> Gilles Deleuze and Claire Parnet, *Dialogues*, (London: Athlone Press, 1987), 89

<sup>403</sup> Beckett, *Malone Dies*, 251

<sup>404</sup> Beckett, *Malone Dies*, 253

has no exterior relation with the schizophrenic. The object and the subject have no meaning at all. They are all machinic assemblages of the desiring machines where desire "is a machine, and the object of desire is another machine connected to it."<sup>405</sup>

Given all the mentioned features of the *Malone Dies*, it can be argued that approaching Malone as an elderly man waiting for his death, and his characters as his past memories which he tend to forget, amount to what Deleuze and Guattari state as *paranoiac form of expression* and *Oedipal form of content* which "The productive breaks projected onto the enormous unproductive cleavage of castration, the flows that have become flows of 'corrugated iron,' the openings blocked on all sides. And perhaps this, as we have seen, is where we find the commodity value of art and literature."<sup>406</sup> Beckett was well aware of the commodity form of literature and he chose to be not belong to this side of it. There is so many clues in his works in general, and in *Malone Dies* in particular that he stands on the other pole, the schizorevolutionary pole in which "the value of art [and also literature] is no longer measured except in terms of the decoded and deterritorialized flows that it causes to circulate beneath a signifier reduced to silence, the conditions of identity of the parameters, across a structure reduced to impotence..."<sup>407</sup>

Furthermore, in *Malone Dies*, like the intermingling of the becoming of Malone with his characters Sapo/Macmann and so, Beckett confuses the distinction between the protagonist (Malone) and the author (Beckett) having

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<sup>405</sup> Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti Oedipus*, 26

<sup>406</sup> Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti Oedipus*, 370

<sup>407</sup> Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti Oedipus*, 370

Malone speak from Beckett's mouth. Just as in the case of the grey zone where Malone begins (and where Sapo ends), this time the reader is confronted with the weak distinction of Beckett the author and Malone the protagonist. "And yet I write about myself with the same pencil and in the same exercise book as about him. It is because it is no longer I ... but another whose life is just beginning."<sup>408</sup>

At the end of the novel, till the process is halted, the principle vehicles of the traditional writing as object, subject and space are all intermingled, and the *Unnamable*, the third novel of *Trilogy*, begins with the questions "Where now? Who now? When now?"<sup>409</sup> as if expressing the questions the readers have thinking about Malone.

### **5.5 Impenetrable Self and Unself: *The Unnamable***

Beckett's last novel of the *Trilogy*, *The Unnamable*, begins as if someone is questioning the end of Malone (or the narrator), and afterwards throughout the novel a flow of thought pop up which from time to time touch upon the other characters of Beckett, like Murphy, Mercier and Camier, Molloy and Malone. Undoubtedly, it is one of the most difficult novels written by Beckett, and cannot be easily interpreted. This is why there are not many interpretations on it. However, it is perhaps one of the most crucial works of Beckett.

It can be argued that Beckett's usage of the narrator/author in *Malone Dies* makes it peak in *The Unnamable*, and it becomes a fundamental principle in this novel in which the traditional narration was collapsed. In this work,

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<sup>408</sup> Beckett, *Malone Dies*, 208

<sup>409</sup> Beckett, *Unnamable*, 293



Beckett uses the first person narration such a way that, the reader confronts with a mystery concerning the narrator. The narrator or Unnamable<sup>410</sup> does not know some important things as what kind of space it occupies, or how he got there (an in the case of Molloy and Malone). All is known is that Unnamable lives in limbo where it is surrounded by *they*.

In this part, *The Unnamable* will be analyzed as it demonstrates the double side of a coin. First of all, there is the narrator Unnamable whose feelings and thoughts we are reading, and on the other side there is Beckett as the narrator who gives clues about his other works as a continuation of the narrator and author relation which was mentioned in the previous part. As it is argued in the case of Malone and his stories that they begin to intertwine each other, it will be argued that in *The Unnamable* the author (Beckett) and the narrator (Unnamable) engages from time to time, and this relation leads to a tension in two levels. First between the author and the Unnamable, and than between the Unnamable and Malone, Molloy, Murphy, Mahood etc, as it can be summarized in the sentence: “I seem to speak, it is not I, about me, it is not about me”.<sup>411</sup>

Throughout the prose it seems that Beckett as author is involved in the text. He makes some confessions about his older works. For instance he writes “where do these words come from that pour out of my mouth, and what do they mean, no, saying nothing, for words don’t carry any more, if one can tell that waiting, when there is no reason for it...”<sup>412</sup> It can be argued that in this sentence there

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<sup>410</sup> It is quite important to mention that it is referred to the prose when *The Unnamable* is used, and it is referred to the character of the prose when it is used as Unnamable.

<sup>411</sup> Beckett, *Unnamable*, 293

<sup>412</sup> Beckett, *Unnamable*, 373

is a reference to *Waiting for Godot* and the action of waiting. Is it a coincidence that there is a sentence as follows; “all these Murphys, Molloy and Malones do not fool me. They have made me waste my time, suffer for nothing, speak of them when, in order to stop speaking, I should have spoken of me and of me alone.”<sup>413</sup> Needless to say reading this as Beckett's own confessions and not the Unnamable's is not correct. The point is that Beckett completely demolished the wall which separated the narrator and the character.

In the *Trilogy* the themes related with traditional writing which are mentioned in the first chapter, are not disappearing in an increasing way, and in *The Unnamable*, this reached a peak. In this novel, there is no character that can be marked; there is no description of a place, time, or no trace of a plot, no motivations which can be found in *Molloy* and *Malone Dies* even at a minimal level. (At least the reader knows the characters names in the earlier ones.) Unnamable's ontological status does not provide a unity; instead it seems that it is totality of the characters, which of course, are the creations of Beckett.

What does become clear to the reader is that this text will not tell any coherent story, will not offer even the stuttering failing narratives of *Malone Dies*, will not offer the aporetic narratives of *Molloy* or *Moran*.<sup>414</sup>

If the *Trilogy* would be seen as a line whose first sentence is “I am in my mother's room”<sup>415</sup>, what would Beckett possibly have planned to invoke when *The Unnamable* starts with “Where now? Who now? When now?”<sup>416</sup>

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<sup>413</sup> Beckett, *Unnamable*, 305

<sup>414</sup> Boulter, *A Guide for the Perplexed*, 125

<sup>415</sup> Beckett, *Molloy*, 7

<sup>416</sup> Beckett, *Unnamable*, 293

Undoubtedly it is a line which arrives at the zero point. *The Unnamable* cannot be summarized or the traces of thoughts or feelings cannot be traced. However what is so crucial about this work is that it is so provocative and despite his one of the most difficult tasks, it is also the piece where Beckett uses *I* so intensively.

This dilemma is not easily resolved, as the two opposed positions collapse in on one another. Basil is rechristened Mahood, and the narrator states that “his voice continued to testify me, as though woven into mine, preventing me from saying who I was, what I was.” New variables enters this bizarre drama of identity and nonidentity, as basic narrative relations of distance, priority, hierarchy, existence, self and other are raised and then utterly obscured. Every conceptual opposition, every statement of difference, is immediately collapsed or negated. The notion of the self is entirely undermined, and Descartes’ *cogito ...* is controverted by the Unnamable.<sup>417</sup>

Perhaps the best point to start with is the second sentence. “I, say I. Unbelieving”.<sup>418</sup> Although there is no name, or nothing whatsoever that clarifies the narrator, at least there is one who can say *I* even if it does not have a self referent. This ironic usage comes to a point where even Unnamable denies *I*, it is achieved by using *I* which is deprived of any essence: “who is I, who cannot be I, of whom I cannot speak, of whom I must speak.”<sup>419</sup> And when Unnamable speaks of the physical position, it is done through feelings:

I of whom I know nothing, I know my eyes are open because of the tears that pour from them unceasingly. I know I am

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<sup>417</sup> Richardson, *Unnatural Voices: Extreme Narration in Modern and Contemporary Fiction*, 98

<sup>418</sup> Beckett, *Unnamable*, 293

<sup>419</sup> Beckett, *Unnamable*, 308

seated, my hands on my knees, because of the pressure against my rump, against the soles of my feet? I don't know. My spine is not supported. I mention these details to make sure I am not lying on my back, my legs raised and bent, my eyes closed.<sup>420</sup>

Unnamable mentions that "I shall have to speak of things of which I cannot speak, but also, which is even more interesting, that I shall have to, I forget, no matter. And at the same time I am obliged to speak. I shall never be silent. Never."<sup>421</sup> Like in the case of Vladimir and Estragon that their dialogue gives them the impression that they exist, or Hamm and Clov that makes Clov stay near Hamm, this time the monologue makes Unnamable to *be*.

I'm the air, the walls the walled-in-one, everything yields, opens, ebbs, flows, like flakes , I'm all these flakes, meeting, mingling, falling asunder, wherever I go I found me, leave me, go towards me, come from me, nothing ever but me, a particle of me, retrieved, lost, gone astray, I'm all these words, all these strangers, this dust of words, with no ground for their settling, no sky for their dispersing, coming together to say, fleeing one another to say, that I am they, all of them, those that merge, those that part, those that never meet, and nothing else...<sup>422</sup>

As it speaks, Unnamable passes through the states, from Malone to Basil, to Mahood to Worm.

Perhaps it is time I paid a little attention to myself, for a change. I shall be reduced to it sooner or later. At first sight it seems impossible. Me, utter me, in the same foul breath as

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<sup>420</sup> Beckett, *Unnamable*, 304

<sup>421</sup> Beckett, *Unnamable*, 294

<sup>422</sup> Beckett, *Unnamable*, 386

my creatures? Say of me that I see this, feel that, fear, hope, know, and don't know? Yes, I will say it, and of me alone...Malone revolves, a stranger forever to my infirmities, one who is not as I can never not be. I am motionless in vain, he is the god. ... I alone am man and all the rest divine.<sup>423</sup>

Unnamable's case resembles what Deleuze and Guattari give an example from Schreber's becoming woman, and argue that his feelings about his body shows a band of intensity on his BwO. Deleuze and Guattari stated for Schreber's experience;

The actual, lived emotion of having breasts does not resemble breasts, it does not represent them, any more than a predestined zone in the egg resembles the organ that it is going to be stimulated to produce within itself. Nothing but bands of intensity, potentials, thresholds, and gradients. A harrowing, emotionally overwhelming experience, which brings the schizo as close as possible to matter, to a burning, living center of matter.<sup>424</sup>

The schizophrenic experiences this burning center of matter on its BwO. The Body without Organs is the “zero degree of intensity, a neutral and non-spatio-temporal stage on which various kinds of subjects can be constructed and on which those subjects experiment with their polymorphously perverse identities, desires and affects.”<sup>425</sup> And as it was mentioned in the previous chapters, what they refer with intensity can be summarized as, “a matter of relationships of intensities through which the subject passes on the body without organs, a

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<sup>423</sup> Beckett, *Unnamable*, 302

<sup>424</sup> Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti Oedipus*, 19

<sup>425</sup> Deleuze, *Negotiations*, 149

process that engages him in becomings, rises and falls, migrations and displacements . . .<sup>426</sup>

Murphy argues that intensities are not “only the fundamental components of subjects and their states, but also the ultimate goal of Deleuze and Guattari's ethical imperative to deterritorialize or destabilize and dismantle the ossified structures and constraints of the social world.”<sup>427</sup> As it has been mentioned Deleuze and Guattari legitimize the process of their nomadic subjects which passes through these intensities using examples from Beckett. Before giving an example from Unnamable, they summarize the process,

The point of disjunction on the body without organs from circles that converge on the desiring-machines; then the subject – produced as a residuum alongside the machine, as an appendix, or as a spare part adjacent to the machine-passes through all the degrees of the circle, and passes from one circle to another. This subject itself is not at the center, which is occupied by the machine, but on the periphery, with no fixed identity, forever decentered, defined by the states through which it passes. Thus the circles traced by Beckett's Unnamable: “a succession of irregular loops, now sharp and short as in the waltz, now of a parabolic sweep.” with Murphy, Watt, Mercier etc., as states, without the family having anything whatsoever to do all of this.<sup>428</sup>

Deleuze and Guattari approach Beckett's characters, Molloy, Moran, Malone and the others as they are all in a process. It is a process of being in different states through which they passes. Their experiences are not related with the

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<sup>426</sup> Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti Oedipus*, 84

<sup>427</sup> Timothy Murphy “Only Intensities Subsist: Samuel Beckett's Nohow On” in Ian Buchanan and John Marks (ed), *Deleuze and Literature*, (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2000), 231

<sup>428</sup> Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti Oedipus*, 20

mental illness; Molloy's forgetting his mother's name have nothing to do with the views that relates his position with the lost mother figure in the Oedipal triangle, or Malone does not rewrite his past again, he is not Sapo in his youth. They are just the intensities they pass through. They are the virtual intensities that only have intensions which is indeterminate in our spatiality<sup>429</sup> as Brian Massumi says.

This theme is not specific to Beckett's novels, it can be found in his play works too. For instance, in *Not I* which is a short monologue of a woman, it can be observed that narrator also intermingles with what she tells. In *Not I* the stage is described as having no light, only the mouth of the woman is lighted. The mouth speaks some disconnected words and jumbled sentences. As mentioned in the first chapter, when Beckett asked about the references of the words to concrete meanings, he answered that "How could you think of such a thing! No, no, not at all – it wasn't that at all."<sup>430</sup> Here it is a short passage from the text;

MOUTH: . . . out . . . into this world . . . this world . . . tiny little thing . . . before its time . . . in a godfor– . . . what? . . . girl? . . . yes . . . tiny little girl . . . into this . . . out into this . . . before her time . . . godforsaken hole called . . . called . . . no matter . . . parents unknown . . . unheard of . . . he having vanished . . . thin air . . . no sooner buttoned up his breeches . . . she similarly . . . eight months later . . . almost to the tick . . . so no love . . . spared that . . . no love such as normally vented on the . . . speechless infant . . . in the home . . . no . . . nor indeed for that matter any of any kind . . . no love of any kind . . . at any subsequent stage . . . so typical affair . . . nothing of any note till coming up to sixty when– . . . what? .

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<sup>429</sup> Brian Massumi, *A User's Guide to Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, (USA: MIT Press, 1993), 66

<sup>430</sup> Bair, *Samuel Beckett: A Biography*, 664

. seventy?. . good God! . . coming up to seventy . . . wandering in a field . . . looking aimlessly for cowslips . . . to make a ball . . . a few steps then stop . . . stare into space . . . then on . . . a few more . . . stop and stare again . . . so on . . . drifting around . . . when suddenly . . . gradually . . . all went out . . . all that early April morning light . . . and she found herself in the--- . . . what? . . who? . . no! . . she! . . [*Pause and movement I.*] ...<sup>431</sup>

As shown in the text, the Mouth refer herself as the third person, as “she” when saying "What? . . . Who? . . . No . . . She!". This is a repetitive theme throughout Beckett’s works. The talking “I” becomes “she”, moves from “self” to “unself”. It also becomes the tool for the Mouth to flow the words, to interrupt the loneliness when silence comes. From moving silence to speech, the Mouth also exists between her "self" and others. Nothing, but Beckett himself explains these metaphors. Knowlson writes that Beckett once said to Morton Feldmen that there was only one theme in his life. Beckett wrote: "To and fro in shadow, from outer shadow to inner shadow. To and fro, between unattainable self and unattainable non-self." However, then he decided to change some words and send it to Feldmen. Beckett wrote the theme titled as *Neither* on a postcard and send it to Feldmen; “to and fro in shadow, from inner to outer shadow, from impenetrable self to impenetrable unself, by way of neither.”<sup>432</sup>

## 5.6 The Task of Schizoanalysis: The Case of *Molloy*’s Interrogation

The theme of the impenetrability of the self and unself’s implication on social theory will be tried to analyzed within the confrontation of the schizophrenia

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<sup>431</sup> Samuel Beckett, *The Collected Shorter Plays*, (New York: Grove Pres, 1984), 213

<sup>432</sup> Knowlson, *Damned to fame*, 631



with a cross examination of the one of the social image's of the capitalist society. The importance of schizophrenia lies in the analysis of this situation which also leads the issue to the task of schizoanalysis. What is important for Deleuze and Guattari regarding schizophrenia is that it is the biggest enemy of capitalism. Although it emerges within the dynamics of the capitalist socius, schizo experiences the capitalist machine dynamics at the very limits that it becomes unbearable for the schizo. "The schizophrenia is not the identity of capitalism, but on the contrary its difference, its divergence, and its death."<sup>433</sup> The schizophrenic halts the decoding system of capitalism by not involving as father – mother - me triangle.

As a psychic decentering process whereby subjects escape from the bourgeois reality principle, its repressive ego and superego constraints, and its Oedipal traps, the schizophrenic process poses a radical threat to the stability and reproduction of capitalism. But capitalism attempts to block its revolutionary potential as decoded flow.<sup>434</sup>

As it is mentioned from the first chapter, it is the capitalist machine of a certain stage of history insists on oedipalization and put forward an imaginary system of desire and represses the decoded flows. Even though the schizophrenic process brings out the true nature of the desire, and destroy the dichotomies which are defined as totally different things, like woman-man; it is important to notice that it is a product of a capitalist machine.

[U]nlike previous social machines, the capitalist machine is incapable of providing a code that will apply to the whole of the social field. Capitalism tends toward a threshold of decoding that will destroy the socius in order to make it a

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<sup>433</sup> Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti Oedipus*, 246

<sup>434</sup> Steven and Douglas, *Postmodern Theory*, 90

body without organs and unleash the flows of desire on this body as a deterritorialized field. It is correct to say that in this sense schizophrenia is the product of the capitalist machine, as maniac depression and paranoia are the product of the despotic machine, and hysteria the product of the territorial machine.<sup>435</sup>

It can be said that, capitalism invents its biggest enemy in its own internal mechanisms. For Deleuze and Guattari, “the schizophrenic process is the basis for a postmodern emancipation, which is to say, emancipation from the normalized subjectivities of modernity.”<sup>436</sup> It can be mentioned that this is the fundamental task of schizoanalysis; “To overturn the theater of representation into the order of desiring-production”<sup>437</sup>

Nothing but *Molloy* shows this schizophrenic emancipation from the power, and the social inferences of this emancipation. It is very interesting how Molloy *can not* even reply to the questions asked by those who represent power;

What are you doing there? [the police] said. I'm used to that question, I understood it immediately. Resting, I said. Resting, he said. Resting, I said. Will you answer my question? He cried. So it is always when I'm reduced to confabulation, I honestly believed I answered the question I am asked and in reality I do nothing of the kind. I won't reconstruct the conversation in all its meanderings. It ended in my understanding that my way of resting, my attitude when at rest, astride my bicycle, my arms on the handlebars, my head on my arms, was a violation of I don't know what, public order, public decency...But there are not two laws, that was the next thing I thought I understood, not two laws, one for the healthy, another for the sick, but one only to which all

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<sup>435</sup> Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti Oedipus*, 33

<sup>436</sup> Steven and Douglas, *Postmodern Theory*, 90

<sup>437</sup> Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti Oedipus*, 271

must bow, rich and poor, young and old, happy and sad.<sup>438</sup>

As seen in the passage, Molloy is questioned by a police, and he cannot answer to the questions. He only answer the question of “what are you doing there?” as “resting”, and surely this cannot satisfy the police. (Later, in the second part of the novel, Moran says “If there is one question I dread, to which I have never been able to invent a satisfactory answer, it is the question what I am doing”<sup>439</sup>), he seems suspicious so the police takes Molloy to the police station. In the station, this time he is questioned by a sergeant. The questioning does not also go well.

He [the sergeant] listen to his subordinate's report and then began to interrogate me in a tone which, *from the point of view of civility*, left increasingly to be desired, in my opinion. Between his questions and my answers, I mean those deserving of consideration, the intervals were more or less long and turbulent. I am so little used to being asked anything that when I am asked something I take some time to know that. And the mistake I make then is this, that instead of quietly reflecting on what I have just heard, and heard distinctly, not being hard of hearing, in spite of all I have heard, I hastened to answer blindly, fearing perhaps lest my silence fan their anger to fury.<sup>440</sup> [Emphasize added.]

He cannot even remember his name, and after having been asked five times about his mother's name by the police, Molloy hardly answers that her name must be Molloy too,

Your name is Molloy, said the sergeant. Yes, I said, now I remember. And your mother? Said the sergeant. I didn't

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<sup>438</sup> Beckett, *Molloy*, 20

<sup>439</sup> Beckett, *Molloy*, 173

<sup>440</sup> Beckett, *Molloy*, 22

follow. Is your mother's name Molloy too said the sergeant, is your mother's- Let me think! I cried. At least I imagine that's how it was. Take your time, said the sergeant. Was mother's name Molloy? Very likely. Her name must be Molloy too, I said. They took me away, to the guardroom I suppose, and there I was told to sit down. I must have tried to explain.<sup>441</sup>

The schizo's interrogation is continued to be asked from the depths of the Oedipal triangle. But the nomadic subject cannot give a satisfactory answer to these questions. Foucault described a very similar situation in *Discipline and Punish*. He wrote a confrontation between a man called Béasse and a judge who represent 'civilization'<sup>442</sup>, like Molloy's sergeant. Béasse cannot give answers to the judge that the judge wishes to get. The judge's questions are asked in the assumption that 'one must have a station in life, a recognizable identity, an individuality fixed once and for all.'<sup>443</sup> There is always introversion when faced with questions, so he cannot build a conversation. There is "indiscipline of language: incorrect grammar and the tone of the replies indicates a violent split between the accused and the society."<sup>444</sup>

As Foucault mentions for Béasse, there is a difference in the plane of the language, a continuous rupture in communication, a split between Molloy, and the others which represents power such 'malefactors, policeman, lawyers, and priests'<sup>445</sup> These mentioned characters attain the negative task of the schizoanalysis as to destruct the Oedipus and its reflections in the social

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<sup>441</sup> Beckett, *Molloy*, 23

<sup>442</sup> Michel Foucault, *Discipline and Punish*, (Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group, 1977), 291

<sup>443</sup> Foucault, *Discipline and Punish*, 291

<sup>444</sup> Foucault, *Discipline and Punish*, 292

<sup>445</sup> Beckett, *Molloy*, 23

regimes. However, it is not an easy task since the psychoanalysis and the state apparatus are tightly linked to each other. “As to those who refuse to be oedipalized in one form or another, at one end or the other in the treatment, the psychoanalyst is there to call the asylum or the police for help. The police on our side!—never did psychoanalysis better display its taste for supporting the movement of social repression, and for participating in it with enthusiasm.”<sup>446</sup>

This is also valid for Lucky's situation in *Waiting for Godot* when no body understands what he is talking about, and when Pozzo, Vladimir and Estragon are disturbed by this because they cannot make coding. Let it be Molloy or Lucky, Beckett's most of the characters cannot talk in the domain of the power. They cannot sustain a dialogue with the representatives of power. There is no shared meaning in most of his works. “There is no doubting the fact that the schizo is constantly subjected to interrogation, constantly cross-examined. Precisely because his relationship with nature does not constitute a specific pole, the questions put to him are formulated in terms of the existing social code: your name, your father, your mother?”<sup>447</sup> By this way schizo escapes from the domination of power. This is the revolutionary side of schizoanalysis, to learn from the schizo how to get rid of the Oedipus and the effects of power which will enable the desire to flow without being repressed, and to discover in a subject of his/her desiring machines;

What are your desiring-machines, what do you put into these machines, what is the output, how does it work, what are your nonhuman sexes?<sup>448</sup>

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<sup>446</sup> Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti Oedipus*, 81

<sup>447</sup> Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti Oedipus*, 14

<sup>448</sup> Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti Oedipus*, 322

Deleuze and Guattari pointed out this aspect of Beckett's works when they appraised his placing an explosive device in its package, fabricating a counterfeit currency, causing the superego and its form of expression to explode, as well as the market value of its form of content.<sup>449</sup> His works contribute to what Deleuze and Guattari struggled in *Capitalism and Schizophrenia*; they are a contribution to this struggle against capitalist hegemony, and the internal procedures of the socius which repressed the flows of desire and cause a repression on the subjects to form a fixed one<sup>450</sup>. Within questioning the traditional narration and using the language as a tool to generate new perspectives in the literature, he struggled against the literary representation. And this stance peaks in *The Unnamable* throughout which the protagonist intensively uses *I* who speaks on behalf of *them*.

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<sup>449</sup> Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti Oedipus*, 134

<sup>450</sup> Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti Oedipus*, 26

## CHAPTER VI

### CONCLUSION

The capability of literary works on affecting the socius and the opportunity that they give us to trace the forms of experiences that occur at a certain time and place, is what makes these works open to sociological research. This openness relies on the basis that literature (and art in general) is not constructed externally to history which means that the literary text holds a critical function with respect to what takes place in society.

Because literary works do not necessarily depend on elaborate factual description of characters and cases which is based on ordinary men and women in everyday situations, the literary figures have the possibility to push the problematic to its very limit. In this context, the posture of Deleuze and Guattari on the literary figures, as they are (only a few ones) the allies in constructing their theory, is an appropriate move. Since, the social and political critique which is presented in *Anti Oedipus* required a new conceptual framework, Deleuze and Guattari sample from Beckett's works to legitimize their theory. However, this does not mean that they distorted Beckett's works. Instead, throughout the study it was seen that the texts used from Beckett's oeuvre and Deleuze and Guattari's mentioned works intertwine each other flawlessly. In this sense, while at the beginning of this study Beckett's works are used to reveal Deleuze and Guattari's theory of desiring machines, as the study progresses, it is observed that this theory also offers a new interpretation to Beckett's works, as in the case of reading *Quad* in the context of conjunctive

synthesis and *The Trilogy* in the context of schizophrenization process.

One of the reasons of this interaction is that the social and historical conditions witnessed by Beckett were also confronted by Deleuze and Guattari. As it was already mentioned Beckett wrote in the aftermath of the Second World War which consequences felt in his works thoroughly. In those years Deleuze and Guattari were also affected by the social turbulences of May '68, and came together in such a time that the theories on subjectivity were pop up. In this sense, the main themes of the *Anti Oedipus* as historicizing the repression on desire, and also problematizing the reason, is found in Beckett's works as a determinate theme in constructing his characters. Therefore, Deleuze and Guattari's conceptualization to reformulate the subject as a process in the name of "schizo" is analogous to Beckettian characters.

It was argued that the schizo is the co-occurrence of two contradictory forces as deterritorialization and reterritorialization. It was mentioned that the resistance to the process of repressing desire which is called deterritorialization and recoding these already territorialized flows of desire which is called reterritorialization takes place on the BwO of the schizo. The schizo dissolves all the fixed forms and symbols which can be mentioned as molar aggregates into molecular forms. In Deleuze and Guattari's presentation the schizo is not the one who lost the reality as interpreted in psychoanalysis. Instead, schizo is the one who is very close to the reality, who is in direct contact with it. Actually, Deleuze and Guattari's idea of schizo which emerged in *Anti Oedipus*, came up as the notion of the nomadic subject in *A Thousand Plateaus* who is presented as the pure intensity and a mobile status of becomings.

In this context, the schizo subject is analogous to their definition of capitalism since it is a social machine which is concomitant of deterritorialization and



reterritorialization. The schizo is the one who feels the very limits of the capitalist machine. However, in my opinion, interpreting the schizo as the subject who assimilate the repressive discourse of capitalism and therefore deprived of a revolutionary potential is not a right view.

Instead, this presentation of a new subjectivity has political and social implications. It implies the micro politics of desire which is summarized as “A micro-politics can be defined as an attempt to dismantle various forms of micro-fascism embedded in the practices of everyday life such as family, school, office, and other local institutions.”<sup>451</sup> This new subjectivity implies a micro politics which underlines politics of revolutionary desire. Within this notion of the nomadic subject, the fascist desire is undermined by the revolutionary desire. However, it should not be forgotten that, this nomadic subject is a residuum of the processes of the desiring machines. Instead of the construction of the notion of subject who is given the center, the nomadic subject or the schizo is made to be produced as a residuum alongside these desiring machines.

Guided by this perspective, in this study, my point on Beckett’s schizo characters was that Beckett presents a revolutionary framework within his characters and the cases that they encounter. These characters resist the fascist mechanisms of discipline techniques, as this was sampled from various examples like in the case of Molloy’s confrontation with the police. In almost all his works, Beckett used such themes, and showed that the attempts to regulate the protagonist’s behaviors through these micro-fascist forms serve no

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<sup>451</sup> Hyung-Chul Chung, *The Art of the Possible: A Collection of Critical Essays*, (USA: iUniverse Inc, 2002), 143

purpose. The protagonists are unable to be articulated by these mechanisms. They cannot be involved in the discourse of the power.

In this context, Beckett's schizos in the *Trilogy* were analyzed in detail. This gave the opportunity to comprehend Deleuze and Guattari's nomadic subject. Besides, in each part it was gradually seen that how Beckett discarded the conventional narration which was mentioned as the *conservative form* of literature in the introduction chapter. Beckett's works demonstrated that there is another possibility of narrating. And by this way, he caused the Oedipal form of expression and content to explode. In his works, there is no fixed signifier which comforts the reader. Instead, within this discomfort, these works give the possibility to actively involve in them.

Within this context, in this study, Deleuze and Guattari's encounter with Beckett gave the opportunity to a double sided analysis. On the one side of the coin, revealing Beckett's place in Deleuze and Guattari's theory enabled to comprehend their theory of desire. However, the usage of Beckett did not make this purpose easier, because Beckett's works are such sophisticated ones. Therefore, on the other side of the coin, Deleuze and Guattari's theory of desire gave the opportunity to make a new interpretation on Beckett's works. As it was mentioned, 'Beckett studies' concentrated on the same themes for years. Therefore, in my view, innovative and radical approaches that can make a contribution to his works are needed.

This was a hard task, since sampling Beckett's works within the context of Deleuze and Guattari's desire theory is totally a new one, and contrary to this new approach there are well established borders around Beckett's works which have dominated Beckett studies. It was a shared destiny with Deleuze and Guattari, because they confronted these borders when they started to work on

*desire*. As mentioned, their task was not an easy one since the notion of desire has been constructed around the categories of Negative, and this view have dominated the Western tradition of thinking on desire. In this sense, to *shatter this wall* they had to introduce new concepts, as *desiring machines*, which constituted the base of their social theory.

Within this scope, the thesis started with an introduction of the position of Beckett in the literary field. In this context, it was seen how Beckett gradually assassinated the conventional way of writing that its rules were set up thousand years ago by Aristotle. Guided by his radical rupture from the traditional novel and play writing, his works' radical difference from existentialism was also put forth, because since the studies on his works were analyzed, it was seen that there is a great effort to relate Beckett's works with the existentialist thought. It was the fundamental task to expose his oeuvre from the domination of this philosophical perspective, because it is well known that Beckett extremely opposed the approaches which limit his connotations. This was also a necessity, because Beckett's works had to be revealed from this dominant approach in order to unleash the possibility that they hold.

This was followed by presenting the fundamental features of Beckett's works. Since the whole thesis is built on his works, to build a common sense as regards to his oeuvre had to be given. In this sense, the highlighted features of his works that came to the fore were mentioned as having dimmed memories, the physical inabilities of the characters, the loss of the shared meaning that can be observed from both the dialogues in his plays and the disastrous description or as Adorno mentioned the post – Holocaust world that the protagonists live in. It was argued that these themes of his works had led to criticisms as regards to being not easily comprehended. However, on the other side, it was these characteristics of his works that was appraised by the renewed thinkers.

Like the different characteristics of Beckett's writing from the other literary figures, Deleuze and Guattari's *Capitalism and Schizophrenia* also emerged as a totally different two volume book from their contemporaries', since they were written in a rhizomatic way of writing. They paved the way to a deeper thinking process or better to say it in Beckett's words: "This is something I can study all my life, and never understand."<sup>452</sup> In this sense, Deleuze and Guattari's contribution to the French intellectual era was touched upon briefly to make an introduction on their theory.

In this sense, it was revealed that Deleuze and Guattari's thinking and Beckett's writing were strikingly analogous to each other. One of the reasons for this proximity was interpreted as the context of the historical framework. Beckett, Deleuze and Guattari were all the witnesses of the great destruction of the Second World War, and this can be easily traced in their works. They all stood against the meta-narratives of modernity. It was seen that Deleuze and Guattari's criticism was centered in the notion of the fixed subjectivity which they regarded as a conclusion of a great repression of the socius. And since they were the witnesses of the destruction of the fascism, their fundamental concern was the reason why people desire their own repression. This stance against the meta-narratives were also found in Beckett's works, as he deconstructed the language within his approaching to this issue as language has no role to convey the common meaning at all.

After such an introductory chapter, the third chapter was based on the desire theories of Plato, Freud and Lacan. This chapter was a necessity since especially *Anti Oedipus* was full of references to a deep heritage of intellectuality on this field and Deleuze and Guattari's theory on desire were

based on the criticisms of these thinkers' crucial approaches as regards to desire. Therefore, to pave the way for comprehending Deleuze and Guattari's *desiring machines*. It is worthwhile to mention once again here, it is well known that there is a huge literature written on this issue, however, as the scope of the thesis was not analyzing the notion of desire, only the ones that effected Deleuze and Guattari's theory were handled.

In this sense, the priority was given to Plato's *Symposium* and *The Republic* that are very crucial for Western philosophical tradition regarding desire which approach it in the context of *lack*. This brought the discussion to the mainstay of *Anti Oedipus*, the Oedipal desire on which Freud wrote pages of texts. In this context, *The Interpretation of Dreams* and *An Outline of Psychoanalysis* were analyzed since he dealt with the desire theory and Oedipus complex in these books intensively. And finally, given Lacan's profound impact on Guattari's critical rejection of orthodox psychoanalysis, Lacan's approach to desire in the context of the Other was referred.

These different analyses of desire, and Deleuze and Guattari's criticisms towards them pave the way to introduce *desiring machines*. In this context, the first part of forth chapter was dedicated to the conceptualization of *desiring machines* which was the idea of Guattari. Undoubtedly, it was argued that this idea came from him who wanted to escape from the psychoanalysis' assumptions for he highly involved in it as a student of Lacan. This new approach to desire was considered as a necessity by Deleuze and Guattari since the theoretical perspectives on desire were not seen as sufficient to analyze the circumstances of May '68. It was mentioned that, in such a context, they searched for the ways of a new discourse which has political and social aspects. Their main point was that they were radically opposed to the Oedipal

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<sup>452</sup> Beckett, *Molloy*, 170

construction of desire which filter everything through the triangulating lens of daddy-mommy-me. In this context, they opened a new way of thinking on desire which the emphasis was made in the social aspect of the term. (Since it was handled as a psychic term by psychoanalysis.)

After giving the conceptual framework of the term *desiring machines*, the main concern of the thesis that, what ways do Beckett's works contribute and enrich their approach on desiring machines, and what is the possibility of reading the selected works of Beckett as an example of desiring machines, were analyzed one by one with the three synthesis of desire. In this context, for each synthesis one of the Beckett's works were selected, and just to be mentioned again, some of these works were not even handled in in *Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, like *Quad*, *Texts for Nothing* and *Come and Go*. Within this scope, the outstanding examples from Beckett's oeuvre which used as samples for desiring machines were the *Molloy's* usage of his sucking stones; the description of the organ machines and the permutation of words used by Beckett in *Enough*, and the protagonist's movement who were avoided to touch the point *E* in *Quad*.

In this context, guided by Deleuze and Guattari's usage of Beckett's works, the fundamental features of desiring machines were also revealed. First of all, Deleuze's turning Kant's synthesis up side down was touched upon. Contrary to Kant's understanding of synthesis through which the subject connects received impressions into a coherent order, Deleuze argued that instead of a subject who synthesizes, the subject is the result of the process of synthesis.

Secondly, it was seen that, the analysis of the three synthesis of desire corresponded to the three synthesis of social machines in *Anti Oedipus*, which were mentioned as primitive savage machine, despotic machine and the capitalist machine. This correspondence was immanent to their approach to

desire as it is social. In their view, desire was not identified with lack, instead it is approached with the desiring production which is social. Furthermore, what was so interesting was that in *Anti Oedipus* it was argued that the fundamental business of *socius* was to repress the decoded flows, and schizoanalysis' task was to destroy this repression.

This analysis revealed the fact that Deleuze and Guattari were highly influenced from Beckett's plays and novels, such that Beckett's characters and also cases gave Deleuze and Guattari a spectacular ground to exemplify their own approaches to the notion of *desiring machines*, and the three synthesis of unconscious desire. And on the other side, it was seen that Deleuze and Guattari's framework also provides an advantage for Beckettian writing that it enables to approach his works from a very different perspective other than they were analyzed traditionally. In this sense, throughout the thesis, Beckett's works were not limited to what Deleuze and Guattari made use of. Instead, the attention was given to use a range of different works of Beckett.

Finally, this brought the issue to the notion of schizophrenia. In the fifth chapter, it was argued that even the term schizophrenia was borrowed from its psychiatric roots, they attributed it a revolutionary meaning. In this context, the basic difference between their handling of schizophrenia and the one which is treated as a mental illness was analyzed. They argued that the schizophrenia is the process of production of desiring machines.

In this sense, Beckett's *Trilogy* was used as an example of this process of schizophrenization. In the beginning, first novel of the *Trilogy*, *Molloy* was used to clarify the employment of schizophrenia with regard to their desiring machines. Because in the previous chapter the sucking stones of Molloy was analyzed in detail. In this part Molloy and Moran's relation was given

centrality. And also as it was the first novel of the *Trilogy*, Beckett's broke up with the traditional narration was also mentioned.

Secondly, putting into center the argument on paranoia and schizophrenia *Malone Dies* was handled both in the context of Malone's relation with the characters he made up, and Beckett's relation with his protagonists. Guided by the readings on the mentioned novel, it was argued that approaching Malone as an elderly man waiting for his death, and his characters as his past memories which he tends to forget, amount to what Deleuze and Guattari mentioned as *paranoiac form of expression* and *Oedipal form of content*. And the impossibility of reading Beckett's works in that context, was demonstrated with the last novel of *Trilogy*, *The Unnamable*.

The mentioned work of Beckett was analyzed as it demonstrated the double side of a coin. First of all, there is the narrator Unnamable whose feelings and thoughts we are reading, and on the other side there is Beckett as the narrator who gives clues about his other works as a continuation of the relation of narrator and author which was mentioned in the part dedicated to *Malone Dies*

Last but not least, based on their views regarding the literature that it is analogous to schizoanalysis, Deleuze and Guattari's introducing of the schizoanalysis was touched upon. It was seen that the task of schizoanalysis was akin to Beckett's assassinating the narration of the novel. Bearing in mind its social and political effects, what they tried to achieve with the introduction of the schizoanalysis was touched upon by the interrogation scene of Molloy by the policeman.

As a conclusion, this thesis argues two points fundamentally. Firstly, contrary to the argument which approaches literature in the context of entertainment,



Deleuze and Guattari's employing of Beckett's works showed that if the explosive device in its package was located, literature become the ally of the philosopher. In the example of Deleuze and Guattari it is observed that Beckett's characters contributed profoundly to *Capitalism and Schizophrenia*. They pave the way to introduce the schizoanalysis to struggle against capitalist hegemony, and the internal procedures of the socius which repressed the flows of desire and cause a repression on the subjects to form a fixed one. Beckett's questioning the traditional narration and using the language as a tool to generate new perspectives in the literature contributed to the questioning of the fundamental features of capitalist machine by Deleuze and Guattari.

And secondly, the thesis argues that Deleuze and Guattari's social theory which made the emphasis on desire and comprehends the subject as a residuum of the desiring machines, introduces a new and radical interpretation of Beckett's works. This new interpretation is seen related with what Beckett tried to do when he challenged the fundamental structures of the traditional narration.

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## APPENDICES

### APPENDIX A

#### TURKISH SUMMARY

Bu çalışmada, iki ciltlik *Kapitalizm ve Şizofreni* kitaplarında Samuel Beckett'e yapılan referanslar temel alınarak, Gilles Deleuze ve Felix Guattari'nin arzulayan makineler kavramsallaştırmasına dayanan sosyal teorileri incelenmiştir. Beckett'in yapıtlarının merkeze konulması, arzuyu eksiklik üzerinden okuyan geleneksel arzu kuramının karşıtı bir perspektifle, Deleuze ve Guattari'nin arzulayan makineler kavramsallaştırmasının açtığı yeni yolların kavranmasında önemli bir rol oynamıştır.

Öte yandan, bu çalışma Beckett'in yapıtlarına yeni bir yorum getirmeyi amaçlamıştır. Arzulayan makineler kavramsallaştırmasının toplumsal ve siyasal sonuçları ile bu kapsamda ortaya konan öznelğin çıkarımları Beckett'in seçilen çalışmaları ile yorumlanmıştır. Böylelikle, 'Beckett Çalışmaları'na bakıldığında ana akımın dışında kalmış olan, yeni ve radikal bir okuma yapılmıştır. Bu kapsamda, Beckett'in karakterleri ve yapıtlarındaki belli başlı olaylar arzulayan makineler ve göçebe özne kavramsallaştırmaları bağlamında yorumlanmıştır.

Çalışma kapsamında arzu kavramına dair belirleyici geleneksel kuramsal yaklaşımlar ele alınmış, bu kuramsal yaklaşımlar ile Deleuze ve Guattari tarafından esas olarak *Anti Oedipus*'ta ortaya konan arzulayan makinelerin kurucu dinamikleri arasındaki farklılıklar incelenmiştir. Çalışma boyunca esas varsayım, Deleuze ve Guattari'nin geleneksel arzu kuramı karşısındaki tavırlarının, evrensel olduğu iddiasını ortaya koyan batı felsefi düşüncesine karşı radikal bir duruş arz ettiği olmuştur. Bu kapsamda, Deleuze ve

Guattari'nin bu felsefi geleneğin dışında veya ötesinde yer aldıkları belirtilmiştir. Bu çerçevede, iki düşünür *Kapitalizm ve Şizofreni* eserlerinde genel kabul görmüş felsefi varsayımları eleştirirler ve bu temsili düşünce sistemine karşı arzulayan makineler kavramsallaştırmasının da temeline oturan içkinlik düzlemi denilen bir imge ortaya koyarlar.

Batı düşüncesinin egemen geleneği içinde, toplumsal olgular ile ilişkisi göz önünde bulundurulduğunda edebiyata ikincil bir rol verildiği gözlemlenmektedir. Bu düşünce izleğinde, sosyoloji ve felsefe gibi bilim dalları araştırma nesnelерinin 'hakikat'i üzerine kurulu kabul edilirken, edebiyat 'kurmaca' ya da 'hayali' olanın tarafına atılır. Edebiyatın toplumsal gerçeklikle etkileşimi temelinde ortaya konan bu eleştiriler yüzyıllar öncesinde Platon'un *Devlet* adlı eserinde, sanat eserlerine ve sanatçılara karşı aldığı tavırda açıkça gözlemlenmektedir. Platon, anılan kitabında sanatı *polis*in düzeni ile bağlantılandırmaktadır. Platon'a göre sanat eğer gerçekliğin bilgisine erişebilen filozofun ellerinde değilse, gerçekliğin yanıltıcı bir kopyası olarak ortaya çıkar. Platon'un söz konusu eserinde ayrıntılı bir biçimde ele aldığı bu yaklaşım yüzyıllardan beri Batı düşüncesinin genel olarak sanata, özel olarak edebiyata karşı tavrını biçimlendirmiştir.

Bununla birlikte, edebiyat ile etkileşimleri temelinde çağdaş düşünürlerin eserlerine bakıldığında bu kavrayışın değiştiği gözlemlenmektedir. Denilebilir ki, Platon'dan beri düşün yapısını etkileyen bu yaklaşım söz konusu düşünürlerin metinlerinde alışılagelmiş edilmektedir. Bu konuda özellikle Fransız entelektüellerinin yapıtları önemli bir yer tutmaktadır. Bu yapıtlar arasında öne çıkanlardan bazıları Gilles Deleuze, Felix Guattari, Alain Badiou ve Michel Foucault'nun eserleri olarak sayılabilir. Şüphesiz ki anlatılmaya çalışılan şey, adı geçen düşünürlerin edebiyat teorileri üzerine sayfalar yazdıkları ya da birer edebiyat eleştirmeni oldukları değildir. Bunun yerine, anılan düşünürlerin



çalışmalarında yer verdikleri kuramsal ve teorik hususlar bir takım edebi eserlerden alınan örnekler ile geliştirilmiş ve zenginleştirilmiştir. Bu kapsamda söz konusu düşünürler yapıtlarında edebiyat eserlerini geniş biçimde kullanmışlardır. Bu düşünürlerin edebiyat karşısındaki genel tavırları edebiyatın kendi dinamikleri içinde devrimci bir yanı olduğu kanısıdır.

Bu bağlamda, Beckett'in eserlerine İkinci Dünya Savaşı sonrası Fransız düşünürlerinin çalışmalarında yoğunca yer verilmiştir. Bu karşılaşmasının önemli bir nedeni Beckett tarafından karşı karşıya kalının sosyal gerçekliklerin, dönemin düşünürleri tarafından da deneyimlenmesi olarak yorumlanabilir. Beckett'in eserlerinde işlenen temalar anılan düşünürlerin kaygılarına benzerlik göstermektedir. Bu kapsamda, farklı disiplinler içinde olsa bile tarihsel, siyasal ve sosyal konjonktürün etkileri bu dönem çalışmalarında sürülebilmektedir.

Bu çerçevede gerek Deleuze ve Guattari'nin beraber kaleme aldığı *Kapitalizm ve Şizofreni* adlı kitaplarında, gerekse de söz konusu düşünürlerin kendi başlarına yazdıkları eserlerinde Beckett'in çalışmalarına büyük bir önem verildiği anlaşılmaktadır. Hatta öyle ki, arzu kuramı üzerine inşa ettikleri sosyal teorilerinin Beckett eserlerindeki olaylardan yararlanılarak zenginleştirildiğini söylemek mümkündür. Bu kapsamda, Deleuze ve Guattari çağdaş kuramsal akımlardansa Beckett, Artaud ve Kafka gibi edebi figürlerin eserlerinin kendi teorilerine çok daha yakın bir bağlamda olduklarını açıkça belirtmekten çekinmezler; çünkü edebiyat bir üretim olarak arzuyu harekete geçirmeyi olanaklı kılmaktadır. Edebiyat verili imgeleri aşmak adına önemli bir potansiyele sahiptir, bu kapsamda anılan figürler, kapitalist hegemonyanın engellerini aşmak için müttefik kabul edilmişlerdir.

Burada önemli bir nokta, bütün edebiyat eserlerinin bu özelliklere haiz olmadığı düşüncesidir. Tam tersine, kapitalist piyasa koşulları içerisinde birçok

edebi eser bir tüketim nesnesine dönüşmüştür. Bu tür eserler Oedipal biçim ve içerik olarak nitelendirilen eserlerdir ve şizofrenik limiti aşmak hususunda başarısız olmuşlardır. Oysa Deleuze ve Guattari'nin referans verdikleri bu edebi figürler Oedipal arzuların ve dolayısıyla öznenin yıkılması yönünde bizatihi politik olanı açığa çıkarmaktadır.

Bu bağlamda ele alındığında Beckett'in eserlerinin *Kapitalizm ve Şizofreni*'deki yeri ilk olarak Beckett'in kendi hikayesinden gelmektedir. Beckett İrlanda'da doğan ve ana dili İngilizce olan bir yazar olmasına rağmen, 1941 yılından sonra Fransızca yazmaya başlamıştır. Bunun en önemli nedenlerinden birisi, Beckett'in eserlerinde ortaya çıkan ve içeriğe dair temel unsurlardan biri olan boşluk, hiçlik gibi temaların biçim düzeyinde de desteklenmesidir. Beckett, Fransızca yazmaya başlayarak bir nevi güzelleme sanatından kaçmaya çalışmıştır. Beckett'in bu duruşu, çalışma boyunca temel bir varsayım olarak kabul edilen, Beckett'in neden varoluşçu bir yazar olmadığı yönündeki savı da destekler niteliktedir.

Beckett'in eserlerinin anlam zenginliği, eserlerinin birçok farklı felsefi akım ile yorumlanmasına neden olmuştur. 'Beckett Çalışmaları'na bakıldığında, bu yorumlar arasında Beckett'in varoluşçu bir yazar olduğu ve varoluş felsefesinin temalarının Beckett'in eserlerinin ayrılmaz bir parçası olduğu düşüncesi öne çıkmıştır. Varoluşçuluğun kökenleri İkinci Dünya Savaşı öncesine kadar gitse de, bu akım esas olarak savaş sonrası dönemde Fransız entelektüel çevresi tarafından ilgi görmüştür. Bu kapsamda, Beckett'in eserlerinde yer alan varoluşçu felsefe temaları nedeniyle Beckett günümüzde hala etkisini sürdürerek varoluşçu bir yazar olarak ele alınmıştır. Oysaki bu tanımlama Beckett'in çalışmalarındaki anlam zenginliğini köreltmüş ve temaların tek bir akımla ele alınmasına sebep olmuştur. Ayrıca, Jean Paul Sartre gibi bu akımın kurucularının metinlerine bakıldığında, Beckett'in eserlerinden farklılık arz

ettiği ortadır. Söz konusu eserlerde işlenen temalar benzerlik gösterse de, bu eserler arasında biçim açısından büyük farklılıklar mevcuttur. Değinildiği gibi, Beckett kullandığı temaları yansıtabilmek için anadilinde yazmaktan vazgeçmiş ve *biçimi olmayan* bir yazım tekniği arayışlarını bu yeni dil içinden yürütmüştür.

Çalışmada, Beckett'in dil karşısındaki bu tavrı, Deleuze ve Guattari'nin “minör edebiyat” dediği arzu üretimi süreçleri ile oluşan bir edebi duruşa örnek gösterilmektedir. Bu kapsamda, *varlığın* ana unsurları arayışı içerisinde Beckett dili olabildiğince yalın kullanmaya çalışır. Öyle ki, kariyerinin sonuna doğru oyunlarında karakterlerin kullandığı kelimeler gittikçe azalır. Özellikle son eserlerinde, Beckett oyunun kurucu unsurlarını minimize eder. Karakterin tiratları anlamsızlaşmaya başlar, kullanılan az sayıda kelime tekrar etmeye başlar. Bütün bu özellikleri ile Beckett'in eserleri izleyici ve okuyucuya farklı bir edebi deneyim sunmaktadır. Bu deneyim Deleuze ve Guattari tarafından övgüye karşılanacak ve Beckett'i eserlerinin ayrılmaz bir unsuru yapacaktır.

Bu kapsamda, çalışmada ilk olarak Beckett'in edebi alan içindeki rolü ve eserlerinde öne çıkan temel özelliklere yer verilmiştir. Beckett'in eserlerinin, çerçevesi yüzyıllar önce Aristoteles'in *Poetika* kitabında ortaya konmuş olan ve günümüzde eleştirilerle karşı karşıya kalsa dahi hala bu alandaki eserlerin özelliklerini belirleyen edebi yazım türünden nasıl farklı bir yaklaşımla ortaya konduğuna değinilmiştir. Bu farklılık Beckett'in oyunlarında ve romanlarında gerek biçim gerekse de içerik açısından kendini açıkça göstermektedir. Geleneksel yazım türünden söz konusu kopuşun nedenlerinden başlıcası Beckett'in yaşadığı tarihsel dönemin koşulları ile yakından ilgilidir. Beckett en önemli eserlerini İkinci Dünya Savaşı sonrası Paris'te yazmıştır. Beckett savaşın neden olduğu büyük yıkım sürecinin tanığıdır. İki büyük dünya savaşı arasındaki dönemde ve sonrasında Avrupa'nın sosyal, siyasal ve ekonomik kriz

ortamında birey ve birey kavramının dayandığı normlar sorgulanmaya başlanmıştır. Bu tür bir deneyim sonrası insanlar evrensel normlara karşı inançlarını kaybetmişler ve kendilerini aşkının olmadığı anlamsız bir boşlukta bulmuşlardır. İşte bu dönemin atmosferi Beckett'in eserlerinde ana tema olarak ortaya çıkmaktadır.

Aynı yıllarda Deleuze ve Guattari dönemin en önemli sosyal hareketlerinden biri olan 1968 toplumsal hareketinin dinamiklerini anlamak için bir araya gelmiştir. 1968'de Fransa başta olmak üzere dünya siyasal ortamı radikal bir hareket yaşamış ve Deleuze ve Guattari'nin yaklaşımına göre, bu hareket mevcut kuramsal yaklaşımlar ile anlaşılammıştır. Bu toplumsal hareketin etkisiyle siyaset felsefesi, sosyoloji kuramı gibi alanlarda yeni düşünce akımları ortaya çıkmıştır. Kuşkusuz ki, *Kapitalizm ve Şizofreni*'de ortaya konan düşünceler bu dönemin dinamikleriyle yakında ilgilidir. Bu kapsamda, Deleuze ve Guattari Wilhelm Reich'ın yıllar önce cevabını aradığı, kitlelerin kendi baskılanışlarını nasıl arzuladıkları hususunu sorunsallaştırmışlar ve bu bağlamda kendi arzu teorilerini geliştirmişlerdir. Deleuze ve Guattari'ye göre iktidar arzuyu bastırmakla birlikte, aynı zamanda kendisi de bizatihi arzunun yapıcı ve dönüştürücü süreçlerinden etkilenmektedir. Ne var ki, arzuya dair böylesi bir kuram ortaya atmak pek de kolay değildir; çünkü Antik Yunanlılardan beri arzu eksiklik ve ihtiyaç bağlantısının çizdiği sınırlarda değerlendirilmektedir. Bu yaklaşım, alandaki bütün terminolojiyi belirlemiş ve birçok düşünürün kuramsal yaklaşımlarında yeniden yaratılarak güçlenmiştir. Bu düşünürler Antik Yunan'da Platon ve Aristoteles'ten, psikanaliz alanında Sigmund Freud ve Jacques Lacan'a kadar uzanmaktadır.

Bu çerçevede, çalışmada Deleuze ve Guattari'nin arzulayan makineler kavramsallaştırmasının ayrıntılı bir analizi yapılmadan önce, ilk olarak adı geçen üç düşünürün arzu kuramlarına yer verilmiştir. Bu bölüm bir gereklilik

olarak ortaya çıkmıştır; çünkü değinildiği üzere esas olarak *Anti Oedipus*'ta karşımıza çıkan arzulayan makineler, bu geleneksel yaklaşımın eleştirisi üzerine kurulmuştur.

Bu itibarla, ilk olarak Platon'un *Şölen ve Devlet* kitaplarında bahse konu husus hakkında yazdıkları ele alınmış, ardından Deleuze ve Guattari'nin bu yaklaşıma temel eleştirisine yer verilmiştir. Bu eleştiriye göre, Platon arzu kavramına en başından beri yanlış yaklaşmakta ve dahası kendinden sonra bu alanda çalışan düşünürleri de arzu kavramına yaklaşımları temelinde bir ayrımla karşı karşıya bırakmaktadır. Bu ayrımın bir tarafında, arzuyu *bir şeyin* eksikliği üzerinden okumak, diğer tarafında ise arzuyu *üretim süreci ile ilişkilendirmek* vardır. Platon'un bu alanının sınırlarını çizmesinin ardından, arzu kavramı çoğunlukla eksiklik üzerinden okunmuştur. Öyle ki Immanuel Kant'ın söz konusu kavrama kazandırdığı içkinlik kurgusu bile son kertede eksiklik ve ihtiyaç kurgusuna katkı sağlamıştır.

Geleneksel yaklaşımın bir diğer önemli figürü Freud'dur. Bu kapsamda, *Anti Oedipus*'ta Deleuze ve Guattari'nin esas eleştirisi Freud'un Oedipal arzu kavramsallaştırmasına olmuştur. Platon'dan devraldığı eksiklik yaklaşımı temelinde arzuyu öznenin gelişimi için belirleyici bir nosyon olarak ele alan Freud, bu kapsamda cinsellik teorisinin üç aşaması ile arzunun bebeğin bir özne olarak ortaya çıkması sürecinde nasıl biçimlendirici bir rolü olduğunu incelemiştir. Deleuze ve Guattari *Anti Oedipus* ile, 1960 ve 1970'lerde özellikle Fransız toplumsal ve entelektüel hayatında önemli bir yer tutmuş olan psikanaliz ile bu yöntem ve teorinin varsaydığı Oedipus kompleksine karşı güçlü bir savaş açmıştır. Deleuze ve Guattari'nin başlıca eleştirileri, Freud'un arzuyu sadece cinsellikle bağlantılı görmesi ve aynı zamanda bu kavramı baba-anne-ben üçgeni içerisinde ele almasıdır. Ayrıca, Oedipal kompleks arzu üretimini toplumsal baskı vasıtasıyla köleleştirmektedir. Bunun yanı sıra,

Freud'un Oedipal kompleksi evrensel bir gerçeklik gibi sunması da eleştirilmiştir. Bununla birlikte, Freud'un ortaya koyduğu en önemli kavramlardan biri olan *bilinçdışı* Deleuze ve Guattari tarafından da takdir edilmiş ve kendi kuramlarında da kullanılmıştır.

Bu bölümde son olarak Lacan'ın *Écrits* adlı eseri merkeze konarak "Ayna Evresi" ve "İmgesel – Sembolik – Gerçek" üçlemesi kapsamında arzunun, öznenin oluşmasındaki etkileri incelenmiştir. Anılan diğer düşünürlerin kuramlarına karşın, Lacan'ın teorisinin arzu makineleri kavramsallaştırmasında önemli bir yer tuttuğu anlaşılmıştır. Deleuze ve Guattari tarafından Lacan'ın *imgesel* ve *sembolik* alan ayrımı eleştirilmekle birlikte, *gerçek* alanı kavramsallaştırılmasının izleri Deleuze ve Guattari'nin teorisine derinden işlemiştir. Lacan'dan devralınan simgeselleştirilmesi mümkün olmayan ve gösterilenden mahrum *gerçek*, arzulayan makinelerin temel dinamiklerinden birini oluşturmuştur.

Söz konusu eleştirilerden yola çıkarak, dördüncü bölümde arzulayan makineler kavramı Beckett'in eserlerinden alınan örneklerle incelenmiştir. Arzulayan makineler kavramı, Deleuze ve Guattari'nin felsefenin yeni kavramlar yaratma sanatı olduğu yönündeki savlarına uygun bir biçimde ortaya konmuştur. Antik Yunan'dan beri arzu kavramının eksiklik üzerinden okunması sebebiyle, Deleuze ve Guattari'nin ortaya koydukları üretken arzu yeni bir kavramsal bütün ile ortaya konmuştur. Bu tasarım, Friedrich Nietzsche'nin güç istenci ve Baruch Spinoza'nın içkinlik teorilerinden beslenerek oluşturulmuştur.

Bu kapsamda, anılan kavrama esas olarak anlamını veren kısmın makine kavramı olduğu tartışılmıştır. Söz konusu makine kavramı, genel geçer kullanımdan farklılık arz etmekte olup, asamblaj kavramı ile birlikte ele alınmalıdır. Çalışmada, makine kavramına dair esas olarak Guattari'nin

*Chaosmosis* adlı eserinde incelediği insan ve makine ayrımı ele alınmıştır. Tam bu noktada, Beckett'in birçok eserinde farklı tasarımlarla karşımıza çıkan bisiklet imgesi arzulayan makinelerin, teknolojik makinelerden ne gibi farklılıklar arz ettiği bağlamında kullanılmış ve karakterler ile bisiklet arasında kurulan bağda Beckett'in okuyucuya ne sunduğu araştırılmıştır.

Deleuze ve Guattari'nin ortaya koyduğu arzulayan makineler üreticidir; ama bu üretimin bir telosu yoktur. Arzulayan makineler, kendilerinden başka makinelerle birleşirler; ama unutmamak gerekir ki bu birleşme tek yöne değildir. Hatta öyle ki, arzulayan makineler tam anlamıyla kopuşlarda çalışmaktadır. Bu arzulamanın temel özelliğini oluşturur; akışı oluşturmak, akışı oluşturan zincirlerden kopmak, bütün potansiyelleri tüketene kadar seçimler yapmak. Bu noktada, Freud'un bilinçdışı kavramı devreye girmektedir. Deleuze ve Guattari'ye göre bilinçdışı üreticidir, ama bu üretim Freud'un Oedipal kuramında karşımıza çıktığı gibi temsil edilemez. Bilinçdışı üretmektedir, bu üretim Lacan'ın bahsettiği gerçektir. Bilinçdışı arzulayan makineler ile işlemektedir.

Bu çerçevede *Kapitalizm ve Şizofreni*'de ortaya atılan en önemli söylemlerden biri sosyal makinenin temel özelliğinin arzu üzerinde yaptığı kodlama olduğudur. Bu noktada, Deleuze ve Guattari birçok post-yapısalcı düşünürden farklı olarak, evrensel bir tarih anlayışı ortaya koyarlar. Burada önemli bir husus, ortaya konan üç temel sosyal makinede de (ilkel makine – despotik makine ve kapitalist makine) her ne kadar farklı yöntemlerle de olsa arzu üzerindeki kodlama yapılmasıdır. Fakat kapitalizm kendisini önceleyen diğer sosyal makinelerden daha farklı çalışmaktadır. Kapitalizmin şizofrenik bir yapısı vardır; bu makinede bir yandan yeniden yurtlulaştırma hareketi devam ederken, öte yandan yurtsuzlaştırmaya devam edilmektedir. Bu hareket kapsamında, ilkel makine ve despotik makine tarafından biçimlendirilen

kodlamalar yerinden edilmekte ve çok daha baskıcı bir biçimde geri dönmektedir. İşte bu sebeple kapitalizmin mantığı şizofrenik limitinde aranmalıdır.

Bu açıdan bakıldığında, *Anti Oedipus*'ta ortaya konan yaklaşım kapitalizmin dinamiklerinin şizofrenik özne aracılığıyla en uç limitinde anlaşılabilir. Şizofreni üretken özne üretken arzuyu en etkin biçimde dışa vuran göçebe öznedir. Fakat önemle belirtmek gerekir ki, bu özne organsız beden üzerinde hareket eden sentezlerin kuruculuğuyla mümkün kılınmıştır. Bu noktada, Deleuze ve Guattari Kant'ın sentez kuramını alışıya ederek, tam tersi biçimde öznenin sentezlerin bir atığı olarak ortaya çıktığını savunurlar. Bu sentezler, birleştirici, ayırıcı ve bağlayan sentezlerdir. İlk kodlama birleştirici sentez yoluyla meydana gelmektedir. Organsız beden üzerinde hareket eden bu kodlama yolu ile kısmi nesnelere birbirine bağlanır ve akışlar kodlanır. Fakat arzu makineleri bu şekilde kodlanmaktan istemez, bu şekilde ayırıcı sentez yoluyla farklı bağlanmaların yolu açılmış olur. Bu iki sentezin gerilimden ortaya bir özne çıkmaktadır. Bu özne bir tür 'göçebe özne' olup arzulayan makinelerin bir yan ürünü olarak ortaya çıkar. Sentezlerin birbiriyle kurduğu gerilimli ilişki sonucunda ortaya çıkan özne ile kısmi nesnelere arasında arzulayan makineler yoluyla hiyerarşik olmayan bağlantı ve kopuş ilişkileri kurulur.

Bu bağlantılar, Beckett'in seçilen eserlerinde kimi zaman karakterlerin ortaya konan özellikleri kimi zaman ise kısmi nesnelere kurdukları ilişkiler temelinde örneklenmiştir. Bu kapsamda, birleştirici sentezin işleyişine yönelik olarak Beckett'in *Molloy* adlı eserinde yer alan Molloy karakterinin taşlarla kurduğu ilişki ayrıntılandırılarak ağız – cep ve taş makinesi betimlenmiş ve öznenin bu makine içinde kurucu bir unsur olmadığı ortaya konmuştur. Ayırıcı sentez kısmında ise *Yeter* adlı kısa öyküde karakterin vücudu ve kelimeler ile kurduğu



ilişki örnek verilmiştir. Bu kapsamda son olarak, *Quad* adlı oyun metninde ortaya konan öznellik tasvirinin, Deleuze ve Guattari'nin ortaya koyduğu göçebe özne kavramı ile yakından ilişkisi olduğu ortaya konmuştur.

Göçebe özne ya da bir diğer ifadeyle şizofrenik özne bir arzulama makinesi olarak potansiyelini sürekli değiştirme ve tüketme yetisini taşıyan öznedir. Bu kapsamda, Deleuze ve Guattari'nin ortaya koyduğu şizofrenik tıbbi literatürdeki hastalıkla alakalı olmayıp, kapitalizmin dinamiklerini en limitinde hisseden ve iktidar tarafından kodlanamayan öznedir. Şizofreni tedavi gerektiren bir hastalık olmayıp üretken arzunun potansiyellerini özümsemiş bir etkin bir oluşturmaktadır. Bu özne, belirli kategorilere sokulamaz, anlara bağlı olarak yaşamaktadır. Bu bağlamda, her özne iki kutup arasında yaşamaktadır; bunlar şizoid arzu ve paranoid arzu kutupları olarak karşımıza çıkar. Şizoid arzu, potansiyellerin sürekli olarak tüketildiği, akışların birleşmeler ve kopuşlarla sınırsız bir oluş içerisinde bulunduğu, kodlanamayan arzudur. Bunun tersinde ise toplumsal kodlamaları tabii olan ve kendi kodlanmasına rıza gösteren paranoid arzu vardır.

Bu kapsamda, Beckett'in *Üçleme* adlı eserini oluşturan *Molloy*, *Malone Ölüyor* ve *Adlandırılmayan* eserleri şizoid arzu tasarımında ortaya konan göçebe özne kavramsallaştırmasını örneklemek üzere kullanılmıştır. Beckett'in bu üç eserinde ortaya koyduğu karakterler, kendinden önceki birçok edebi eserde yazar tarafından ortaya konan karakterlerden farklılık arz etmektedir. Bu kapsamda, *Üçleme*'de ilerledikçe metne hakim olan yazar kurgusu yok olur. Nesnesini arayan özne konumundaki Moran, eyledikçe Molloy'un içinde kaybolur; Malone yazdıkça o antik oyunun kurallarına dahil olur ve Sapo / Macmann'e dönüşür ve son olarak Beckett, yazan bir özne olarak kendi yarattığı Adlandırılmayan karakteri ile iç içe girer. Artık kimin yazdığı sorusu önemli değildir. Ortaya çıkan metin toplumsal bir deneyimin dışı vurumudur.

Özneyi merkeze alan temsili düşünme sistemi, Deleuze ve Guattari'nin yaptığı gibi; ama bu sefer 'edebi' bir şekilde yerle bir edilir.

Bu örneklemelerde ortaya konduğu üzere göçebe özne kavramı mikro siyaset ile yakından ilgilidir. Mikro siyaset, aile, okul ve diğer kurumlar gibi günlük hayatın uygulamalarına gömülü olan mikro faşizm biçimlerini ortadan kaldırmaya yönelik bir politikadır. Bu yeni öznellik kurgusu şizoid arzu alanına yaptığı vurgu ile mikro siyasetin olanaklılığını vurgular. Göçebe özne, faşist - paranoid arzuların boyunduruğunu devrimci arzuyu içselleştirmesi ile yıkar. Ancak yine de, bu öznenin arzulayan makinelerin bilinçdışı işleyen sentezlerinin bir atığı olduğu unutulmamalıdır. Bu özne merkezi işgal etmez.

Bu çerçevede, çalışmada Beckett'in karakteri göçebe özneler olarak ortaya konulmuştur. İncelenen karakterlerin ortak yanları disiplin tekniklerine karşı oluş süreçlerinin vurgulanmasıdır. Bu kapsamda, son bölümde Molloy karakterinin polis tarafından sorgulanması örneği temelinde göçebe öznenin iktidarın söylemsel ve disiplin pratiklerini yıktığı incelenmiştir. Bunun yanı sıra, söz konusu bölümde incelenen üç eser ile Beckett'in geleneksel yazım biçimini nasıl yıktığı gözlemlenmiştir. Deleuze ve Guattari'nin bizatihi Oedipal içerik ve biçimde yazılmış olduğu için eleştirdikleri edebi ürünlerin aksine, Beckett'in eserlerinin başka bir anlatım tarzını mümkün kıldığı ortaya konmuştur. Beckett, bu yolla Oedipal yazım biçimini yerle bir eder. Eserlerinde okuyucu/izleyiciyi rahatlatan hiçbir sabite yer yoktur.

Denilebilir ki, Deleuze ve Guattari'nin vurguladıkları *göçebe düşünce*nin izlekleri, Beckett'in eserlerinde görüldüğü üzere, diğer disiplinlerde bulunabileceği gibi sanat ve edebiyat alanında da varlığını sürdürür. Hatta öyle ki, sanat yapıtları başlı başına bir arzulayan makinedir. *Kapitalizm ve Şizofreni*'de edebiyat ve sanata yapılan referanslar rizomatik yazım tekniği

içinde uğraklar olarak ortaya konmuştur. Bu kapsamda, edebi ve edebi olmayan arasındaki ayrım adeta yapay bir kurgu olarak karşımıza çıkar. Öyle ki, Deleuze ve Guattari için Beckett'in veya Artaud'un metinleri edebiyat alanında olduğu için daha az değerli değildir; çünkü bu eserler kalıpları önceden çizilmiş olan bir izleni ortaya koymazlar. Tersine, bu yapıtlar sonu kestirilemeyen birer serüvendir. Bu anlamda, edebiyat bir biçim değil, arzunun üretken akışının sınır tanımadığı üretilimdir. Deleuze ve Guattari böylece, edebi ve edebi olmayan söylem arasındaki *yapay* ayrımı ortadan kaldırır. Buna ek olarak, temsili düşünce sistemine açtıkları savaşta müteffikleri olan Beckett'in eserlerine de toplumsal ve siyasal çıkarımları olan bir yorum sunar.

Bu kapsamda çalışmada Beckett'in eserlerinin ve Deleuze ve Guattari'nin teorisinin birbirlerini olumlayacak biçimde iç içe geçtiği ortaya konmuştur. Bu ilişkinin en önemli nedeni, tarihsel, sosyal ve siyasal deneyimlerin adı geçen metinlere yansımalarıdır. Bu bağlamda, Beckett'in incelenen eserleri *Kapitalizm ve Şizofreni*'yi oluşturan iki ciltte ortaya konan toplumsal ve tarihsel bir söylemsel bütünün içinde anlam kazanır. Deleuze ve Guattari'nin sunduğu, temsili düşünme sistemi içerisinde hapsolmuş imgelerin özgürleştirilmesidir. Esas sorunsal, bu düşünce sistemi içerisinde kurulan öznelliğin eleştirisidir. Bu kapsamda düşünülmemenin duyumsanması için Beckett, Deleuze ve Guattari'nin müteffiki olmuştur.

## APPENDIX B

### TEZ FOTOKOPİSİ İZİN FORMU

#### ENSTİTÜ

Fen Bilimleri Enstitüsü

Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü

Uygulamalı Matematik Enstitüsü

Enformatik Enstitüsü

Deniz Bilimleri Enstitüsü

#### YAZARIN

Soyadı : Öztürk Bakacak

Adı : Beste

Bölümü : Sosyoloji

TEZİN ADI (İngilizce) : Deleuze and Guattari's Encounter with Beckett within the Context of Desiring Machines

TEZİN TÜRÜ : Yüksek Lisans

Doktora

1. Tezimin tamamından kaynak gösterilmek şartıyla fotokopi alınabilir.

2. Tezimin içindekiler sayfası, özet, indeks sayfalarından ve/veya bir bölümünden kaynak gösterilmek şartıyla fotokopi alınabilir.

3. Tezimden bir (1) yıl süreyle fotokopi alınamaz.

TEZİN KÜTÜPHANEYE TESLİM TARİHİ: