NATIONALISM AND RELIGION

IN THE TEXTBOOKS OF THE EARLY REPUBLICAN PERIOD IN TURKEY

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This is to certify that we have read this thesis and that in our opinion it is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

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ABSTRACT

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This study focuses on a detailed analysis of the relationship between nationalism and religion (Islam) in textbooks taught in Turkish education system between 1924 and 1950. It can be regarded as a re-assessment of general assumptions in the literature presuming the dominance of an authoritative secular nationalism in the textbooks of the whole early republican period. In this respect, the textbooks used at primary, middle and high school levels as part of the history, citizenship, sociology, and religion courses in this period are analyzed in terms of the relations between nationalist and religious discourses, mostly from a qualitative perspective. Accordingly, the early republican era can be divided into three sub-periods when the continuities and varieties of the discourses in textbooks are specifically considered. The dominant discourse, found in textbooks of the first sub-period between 1924 and 1931, is based on the idea that Islam and Turkishness are the two complementary components forming the basis of national identity and nationalism. Against the common view, a strictly secular nationalism is found in textbooks only in the second period between 1931 and 1939. Thus, in definition of Turkish identity and nationalism in textbooks, they did not in any way make reference to any religious belief. During the third and last sub-period between 1939 and 1950, reference to religion in textbooks has gained power once again. Hence, the strict secularism of the second sub-period is replaced with a Turkish identity in strong association with Islam similar to the first period.

Keywords: Nationalism, Religion, Education, Textbooks, Turkey

ÖZ

TÜRKİYE'DE ERKEN CUMHURİYET DÖNEMİ DERS KİTAPLARINDA MİLLİYETÇİLİK VE DİN

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Bu çalışma, Türkiye'de erken Cumhuriyet döneminde okutulan ders kitaplarında milliyetçilik ve din (İslam) arasındaki ilişkileri ayrıntılı biçimde incelemeye yönelmektedir. Dolayısıyla, bu girişim, bu dönemin tüm ders kitaplarına otoriter nitelikli seküler bir milliyetçiliğin hâkim olduğuna dair literatürdeki yaygın varsayımın yeniden bir değerlendirmesi olarak görülebilir. Bu kapsamda, çalışmada, 1924-1950 yılları arasında örgün öğretimin farklı kademelerinde verilen tarih, yurt bilgisi, sosyoloji ve din bilgisi derslerinde okutulmuş ders kitapları, milliyetçilik ve din arasındaki söylemsel ilişkilere odaklanılarak, içerik/söylem analizi tekniğiyle analiz edilmektedir. Buna göre, yirmi altı yıllık bu dönemin ders kitaplarında milliyetçilik ve din arasındaki söylemsel ilişkileri, dönemsel süreklilik ve farklılıklar çerçevesinde, birbirini takip eden üç alt-döneme ayırarak değerlendirebilmek mümkün görünmektedir. Bunlardan 1924-1931 yıllarını kapsayan birinci dönemde, ders kitaplarında, Müslümanlıkla harmanlanmış bir Türk milliyetçiliği anlayışı baskın söylemi oluşturmaktadır. Bunun yanında, literatürdeki yaygın kanının aksine, laikliğin katı bir yorumuna dayanan milliyetçilik anlayışı ders kitaplarında sadece 1931-1939 yıllarını kapsayan ikinci dönemde hâkim olmuştur. Böylece, bu dönemin kitaplarında İslam, Türk kimliğinin tanımlanmasındaki asliliğini kaybeder. Son olarak, 1939-1950 yılları arasındaki üçüncü dönemde okutulan ders kitaplarında ise, milliyetçi söylemde Türklüğün yanı sıra İslam'ın tekrar önem kazandığı görülmektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Milliyetçilik, Din, Eğitim, Ders Kitapları, Türkiye

To my wife, Nur Işıklı Babahan

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES

TABLES

LIST OF FIGURES

FIGURES

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Traces of the history of religion, or belief in the wider understanding, are found even in the very first human societies. It has been one of the main sources, and perhaps the primary one, of reference for thousands of years in shaping the structure of individual and social development. On the other hand, some believe that nationalism, widely defined today as the political principle of a nation to self-governance has already discredited religion in this respect and has become the predominant paradigm. Certainly, to what extent religion has lost its impact on societies is open to debate. Nevertheless, nationalism has undoubtedly achieved a world-wide acknowledgement as a discourse/ideology, movement or a basic principle of social organization within a short period of time as one of the by-products of the modernization process. To quote Berman's analogy for modernity, "it is like a maelstrom that sucks in everything on its way to mercilessly transform/adapt to its own will."[1] The fact that we cannot assess any "social" phenomena of global scale today outside its "national" context (as well) is a clear sign of its power.

Considering the "classical secularization thesis," which foresees weakening of religion in the course of modernization, the growing impact and power of nationalism indicate that nationalism will not only replace religion but it will also assume its various social functions. Based on a Western-centered; thus, modernist and secularist approach, this view has remained the predominant paradigm of the nationalism literature until recently. Hence, it will not be an exaggeration to say that religion and nationalism have rarely been associated with each other in scholarly works until the 1990s. For instance, religion hardly ever gets mentioned in the leading works of contemporary nationalism literature such as *Nations and Nationalism* (1983) by Ernest Gellner, *Imagined Communities* (1983) by Benedict Anderson, and *Nations and Nationalism Since 1780: Programme, Myth and Reality* (1990) by Eric J. Hobsbawm. These studies, which strive to clearly determine the

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[1] See, Marsahall Berman, *All That Is Solid Melts Into Air: The Experience of Modernity,* New York: Penguin Books, 1988.

factors that have an impact on the development of nationalism in Europe within the framework of modernization process(es), indeed, have mostly disregarded the relationship between nationalism and religion..

Similar to the Western case, there is much controversy about the relationship between nationalism (Turkish nationalism) and religion (Islam) in the present Turkey. According to Çetinsaya, questions which mostly have led debates in this field are as follows:

> Did or should Islam constitute one of the integral components of Turkish nationalism? Are intellectual initiatives aimed at a combination of Islam and nationalism in order to deal with Turkey's existing social and cultural problems? For example, are the "Turkish-Islamic Synthesis" initiatives in the 1970s and '80s heretical in the tradition of Turkish political thought, or do they represent the mainline?[2]

Especially from a Kemalist/leftist viewpoint which can be interpreted as the Turkish version of classical modernization thesis, Turkish nationalism and Islam are believed to be "inherently in opposition."[3] Therefore, the idea of "Turkish-Islamic Synthesis" is an artificial concept.[4]

Nevertheless, since the 1990s, a number of contemporary researchers around the world prefer to adopt a more moderate/pluralist approach that acknowledges the possibility of various and ambivalent relationship patterns between nationalism and religion, as opposed to a strict and generalizing one. This approach, supported by the findings of a number of studies on various societies is usually based on an "alternative modernity" paradigm that allows for diversity and dynamism in terms of modernity experiences rather than considering modern societies to be of a uniform and stable nature.[5]

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[2] Gökhan Çetinsaya, "Rethinking Nationalism and Islam: Some Preliminary Notes on the Roots of Turkish-Islamic Synthesis in Modern Turkish Political Thought", *The Muslim World*, Vol. LXXXIX, No. 3-4, July-October 1999, p. 350.

[3] *Ibid.,* p. 350-351.

[4] *Ibid.,* p. 350.

[5] For examples of this view, see. Fred Halliday, *Nation and Religion in the Middle East*, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2000; P. van der Veer and H. Lehmann (Eds), *Nations and Religion: Perspectives on Europe and Asia*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999; Mark Juergensmeyer, *The New Cold War?: Religious Nationalism Confronts the Secular State*, California: University of California Press, 1993; Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby (Ed.s), *Religion, Ethnicity, and Self-Identity: Nations in Turmoil*, Hanover: University of Press of New England, 1997; Adrian Hastings, *The Construction of Nationhood: Ethnicity, Religion, and Nationalism*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997; Anthony D. Smith, *Chosen Peoples,* New York: Oxford

These studies propose three fundamental forms/patterns of relationship based on numerous studies around the world. The first one is conceptualized as *secular nationalism* and it is based on the construction of nationalism through a secular discourse. The second one is *religious nationalism*, which is based on integration of traditional and modern forms by the articulation of a nationalist discourse to an existing religion/sect in a society. More specifically, it represents the systematic political effort to nationalize an existing religion/sect. The third model can be defined as *civil religion*, *secular religion*, or *pseudo-religion*, indicating the construction of a nationalist discourse in a religious form. Still, it has to be emphasized that there is much controversy about the third one in the literature. Hence, I use first two patterns as a model in my analysis of the textbooks.

The literature on Turkey in regard to the same relationship has also developed in recent years; and a fruitful number of studies criticizing classical secularism have provided an insightful contribution to this debate.[6] They mostly assert that in Turkey, as in rest of the world, these relations have been varied in the course of history. According to their findings, since the foundation of the republic, the Turkish

University Press, 2003; Lisa Greenfeld, *Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992; Barbara-Ann J. Rieffer, "Religion and Nationalism: Understanding the Consequences of a Complex Relationship," *Ethnicites,* vol. 3, no.2, 2003, p. 215-242; Roger Brubaker, "Religion and Nationalism: Four Approaches", *Nations and Nationalism*, 18(1), 2012, p. 2-20; John Coakley, "Religion and Nationalism in the First World", in *Ethnonationalism in the Contemporary World: Walker Connor and the Study of Nationalism*, ed. Daniele Conversi, London: Routledge, 2002; Willfried Spohn, "Multiple Modernity, Nationalism and Religion: A Global Perspective," *Current Sociology*, Vol. 51(3/4), May/July 2003, p. 265-286; Philip W. Barker, *If God Be For Us: Religious Nationalism in Modern Europe*, Unpublished PhD Dissertation, Colorado: University of Colorado, 2001.

[6] For examples of studies in this field, see, Elisabeth Özdalga, "Islamism and Nationalism as Sister Ideologies: Reflections on the Politicization of Islam in a *Longue Dureé* Perspective", *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 45, No. 3, May 2009, 407-423; Erwin I. J. Rosenthal, "Islam and Turkish Nationalism", in *Islam in the Modern National State*, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009; İlter Turan, "Siyasal İdeoloji Olarak İslam ve Milliyetçilik", *Çağdaş Türkiye'de İslam: Din, Siyaset, Edebiyat ve Laik Devlet*, Richard Tapper (ed.), İstanbul: Sarmal Yayınevi, 1993, p. 39-70; Binnaz Toprak, "Islam and Nation-Building", *Islam and Political Development*, Leiden: E. J. Brill Pub., 1981, p. 35-58; Süleyman Seyfi Öğün, "Türk-İslam Sentezi: İdeolojik Bir Süreklilik mi Kesinti mi?", *Modernleşme, Milliyetçilik ve Türkiye*, İstanbul: Bağlam Yayıncılık, 1995, p. 177-194; Birol Akgün ve Şaban H. Çalış, "Türk Milliyetçiliğinin Terkibinde İslamcı Doz: Tanrı Dağı kadar Türk, Hira Dağı Kadar Müslüman", in *Türkiye'de Siyasal Düşünce: Milliyetçilik*, 4.ed., İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2009; Soner Çağaptay, *Türkiye'de İslam, Laiklik ve Milliyetçilik: Türk Kimdir?*, (tra.) Özgür Bircan, İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2009; Tanıl Bora, *Türk Sağının Üç Hali: Milliyetçilik, Muhafazakarlık, İslamcılık*, 5.ed., İstanbul: Birikim Yayınları, 2008; Halil İbrahim Yenigün, *Islamism and Nationalism in Turkey: An Uneasy Relationship, (Paper read at 2nd Annual Graduate Student Conference of the Dept. Of Politics, March 28, 2005 at the University of Virginia, Charlottesville)*; Dov Waxman, "Islam and Turkish National Identity: A Reappraisal", *Turkish Yearbook of International Relations*, no. 30 (2000), 1-22; Sami Zubadia, "Turkish Islam and National Identity", *Middle East Report*, No. 199, Turkey: Insolvent Ideologies, Fractured State (Apr. – Jun. 1996), p. 10-15; Sami Zubadia, "Islam and Nationalism: Continuities and Contradictions", *Nations and Nationalism*, 10 (4), 2004, p. 407-420; Yıldız Atasoy, "Islam, the State and Nation-Building in Turkey (1839-1945)", Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the ASA, Philadelphia, USA, Aug. 12, 2005, Çetinsaya, "Rethinking Nationalism and Islam…

state and civil agents have not produced only the nationalist discourses holding secular tendencies; but also the ones assuming Islam as being a significant component of Turkish nationalism and national identity.

Taking these theoretical debates as a point of departure, this study, in a general sense, aims at determining the role attributed to religion in the official discourse of nationalism. More specifically, I analyze the various relationship patterns between Islam and Turkish nationalism in the official discourse(s) developed during the early Republican era in Turkey. For this aim, one of the prominent apparatuses in the reproduction of the official discourse, social science and religion textbooks of formal education of the 1924-1950 period is assessed.

In this regard, stating the reasons for choosing education as the field and textbooks as the unit of analysis appears to be appropriate. As a general statement, it can be emphasized that today mass education and schools are the main determinants apart from families in the socialization of the young generations. The foundations of this trend laid in Europe and the USA during the late eighteenth century when education became a public service provided predominantly by the state. Certainly, this development was a consequence of the wide ranging modernization process which also brought about the emergence of industrialization, nationalism, and modern state structures. Gradually, this process became widespread around the world by the twentieth century.[7] Hence, as a worldwide trend,

> [s]tate intervention in education caused a strict regulation in the curriculum, textbooks, methods of education and educational activities. States not only provide financial support to educational institutions but also to a great extent, dictate in their own interest what will be taught in schools and how.[8]

In this framework, sociological studies with a critical approach often prefer to analyze mass education with respect to its ideological content and functions aiming

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[7] See. John W. Meyer, Francisco O. Ramirez, ve Yasemin Nuhoglu Soysal, "World Expansion of Mass Education, 1870-1980", *Sociology of Education*, Vol. 65, No. 2 (Apr., 1992), p. 128-149; Peter V. Meyers, "Education", in *Encyclopedia of Social History*, (Ed.) Peter N. Stears, New York; London: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1994, p. 290-295; Andy Green, "Education and State Formation in Europe and Asia," in *Citizenship Education and the Modern State*, (ed.) Kerry Kennedy, London: Falmer Press, 1997; Robert J. Havighurst, "Social Foundations of General Education", in *The Fifty-First Yearbook of the National Society for the Study of Education-Part I General Education*, (Ed.) N. B. Henry, Illinois: University of Chicago Press, 1952.
[8] Kemal İnal, *Eğitim ve İktidar: Türkiye'de Ders Kitaplarında Demokratik ve Milliyetçi Değerler*, Ankara: Ütopya Yayınevi, 2004, p. 46.

to legitimize and reproduce social structure and performing social control over society.[9] These studies explain that it is the textbooks through which ideological function of education policies in general and school curriculum in particular is achieved. Indeed, various studies from all around the world claim that textbooks are essentially biased in favor of capitalism, nationalism, ethno-centrism, patriarchy and religiocentrisim.[10] Taking this general assumption as a point of departure, this study aims at a critical analysis of the ideological content of education in Turkey in regard to the ideological/discursive relations between religion and nationalism in the official discourse.

In line with the trends in the world, numbers of various critical studies in Turkey analyzing the relationships between the official ideology and education system in general, and social science textbooks in particular have increased by the 1990s. These studies suggest that Turkish nationalism is undisputedly determine "the context and language of education"[11] within the framework of the authoritarian

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[9] For examples of this view, see, Michael W. Apple, *Ideology and Curriculum*, New York: Routledge, 1977; Samuel Bowles ve Herbert Gintis, *Schooling in Capitalist America*, New York: Basic Books, 1976; Peter McLaren ve R. Farahmandpur, *Teaching Against Global Capitalism and the New Imperialism* Lanham, MD.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005; Paulo Freire, *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*, New York: Continuum, 1989; Louis Althusser, *On Ideology*, London, NY: Verso, 2008; Henry A. Giroux, *Disturbing Pleasures: Learning Popular Culture*, New York: Routledge, 1994; Peter McLaren, *Life in Schools: An Introduction to Critical Pedagogy in the Foundations of Education*, Boston, MA: Pearson Allyn & Bacon, 2007; Pierre Bourdieu and Jean Claude Passeron, *Reproduction in Education, Society and Culture*, London: Sage Publications, 1977.

[10] For examples, see. Miklos Szabolcsi, "Ethnocentrism in Education: A Comparative Analysis of Problems in Eastern and Western Europe", *Prospects: Quarterly Review of Education*, Vol. XIX, No.2, (70), 1989, p. 149-162; Riad Nasser, "Exclusion and the Making of Jordanian National Identity: An Analysis of School Textbooks", *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics*, 10, 2004, 221-249; Joseph Zajda ve Rea Zajda, "The Politics of Rewriting History: New History Textbooks and Curriculum Materials in Russia", *International Review of Education*, 49 (3-4), 2003, p. 363-384; Majid Al-Haj, "National Ethos, Multicultural Education, and the New History Textbooks in Israel", *Curriculum Inquiry, 35*(1), 2005, p. 48-71; Luke Terra, *Conflict and the Adoption of Civic Norms: A Textbook Analysis of Civic Identity in Northern Ireland*, Unpublished MA thesis, Stanford University, 2008; Tang Shuk Ching, *A Content Analysis of the Certificate Level History Textbooks in Hong Kong*, Unpublished MA thesis, University of Hong Kong, 1998; Anamaria Dutceac Segesten, *Myth, Identity and Conflict: A Comparative Analysis of Romanian And Serbian Textbooks*, Unpublished PhD dissertation, University of Maryland, College Park: 2009; Amy L. Sellin, *Critiquing the Nation, Creating the Citizen: A Century of Educational Discourse in Venezuela*, Unpublished PhD dissertation, Brown University, Rhode Island: 2008; Yoonmi Lee, *Modern Education, Textbooks and the Image of the Nation: Politics of Modernization and Nationalism in Korean Education, 1880-1910*, Unpublished PhD dissertation, University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1997; Douglas Mpondi, *Educational Change and Cultural Politics: National Identity-Formation in Zimbabwe*, Unpublished PhD dissertation, Ohio University, Ohio: 2004; Gerard Giardano, *Twentieth-Century Textbook Wars: A History of Advocacy and Opposition*, New York: Peter Lang Pub., 2003.

[11] For examples, see İsmail Kaplan, *Türkiye'de Milli Eğitim İdeolojisi ve Siyasal Toplumsallaşma Üzerindeki Etkisi*, İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1999; Fatma Gök (Ed.), *75 Yılda Eğitim*, İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı, 1999; Mete K. Kaynar, "Türk Milli Talim ve Terbiye Sistemi", *Özgür Üniversite Forumu – Eğitim Neye Yarar?*, Sayı: 23, Temmuz-Eylül 2003, p. 24-42; Ayşe Kadıoğlu, ''The Paradox of Turkish Nationalism and the Construction of Official Identity", *Middle Eastern Studies*, 32:2, 1996, p. 177-196; İsmail Güven, *Türkiye'de Devlet, Eğitim ve İdeoloji*, Ankara: Siyasal Kitabevi, 2000; Faith J. Childress, *Republican Lessons: Education and the Making of Modern Turkey*, Unpublished PhD dissertation, University of Utah, Utah: 2001.

tradition of the state; thus, "the dominant discourse in the textbooks"[12] since the beginning of the Young Turk government in the last period of Ottoman Empire. This nationalist inclination has certainly maintained its dominance in determining the content and discourse of textbooks also in the Republican era in modern Turkey. According to the findings of these studies, heroic expressions encouraging absolute loyalty to the state, homeland, nation, and flag are dominating in the majority of the textbooks with prominent references to the Turkish ethno-culture and nation as a homogenous structure.

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[12] For examples, see. Etienne Copeaux, *Tarih Ders Kitaplarında Türk Tarih Tezinden-Türk İslam Sentezine (1931-1993)*, 2.ed., İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 2000; Büşra Ersanlı, *İktidar ve Tarih: Türkiye'de Resmi Tarih Tezinin Oluşumu (1929-1937)*, 2.ed., İstanbul: AFA Yayınları, 1996; Ayşe Gül Altınay, *The Myth of the Military Nation: Militarism, Gender and Education in Turkey*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004; Tanıl Bora, "Ders Kitaplarında Milliyetçilik", *Ders Kitaplarında İnsan Hakları: Tarama Sonuçları*, (Ed.) Betül Çötüksöken, Ayşe Erzan, Orhan Silier, , İstanbul: Tarih Vakfi Yayinlari, 2003, p. 65-89; Tanıl Bora, "Ders Kitaplarinda Milliyetçilik: Siz Bu Ülke İçin Neler Yapmayı Düşünüyorsunuz?", *Ders Kitaplarinda Insan Haklari II: Tarama Sonuçlari*, (Ed.) Gürel Tüzün, İstanbul: Tarih Vakfi Yayinlari, 2009, p. 115-141; İsmet Parlak, *Kemalist İdeolojide Eğitim: Erken Cumhuriyet Dönemi Tarih ve Yurt Bilgisi Kitapları Üzerine Bir İnceleme*, Ankara: Turhan Kitabevi, 2008; Kemal İnal, *Eğitim ve İktidar: Türkiye'de Ders Kitaplarında Demokratik ve Milliyetçi Değerler*, Ankara: Ütopya Yayınları, 2004; Kenan Çayır, "Preparing Turkey For The European Union: Nationalism, National Identity and 'Otherness' in Turkey's New Textbooks", *Journal of Intercultural Studies*, 30:1, 2010, p. 39-55; Füsun Üstel, *Makbul Vatandaş'ın Peşinde: II. Meşrutiyet'ten Bugüne Vatandaşlık Eğitimi,* İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2004; Mustafa Çapar, *Türkiye'de Eğitim ve "Öteki Türkler"*, Ankara: Özgür Üniversite Kitaplığı, 2006; Barak Aaron Salmoni, *Pedagogies of Patriotism: Teaching Socio-Political Community in Twentieth Century Turkish and Egyptian Education*, Unpublished PhD dissertation, Harvard University, Cambridge & Massachusets: 2002; Avonna Deanne Swartz, *Textbooks and National Ideology: A Content Analysis of the Secondary Turkish History Textbooks Used in the Republic of Turkey Since 1929*, Unpublished PhD dissertation, University of Texas, Austin: 1997; Şefika Akile Zorlu-Durukan, *The Ideological Pillars of Turkish Education: Emergent Kemalism and The Zenith of Single Party Rule*, Unpublished PhD dissertation, University of Wisconsin-Madison, Wisconsin: 2006; Nihat Gürel Kahveci, *Teaching "Europe" in Turkey: An Analysis of Secondary History Textbooks 1956-2005,* Unpublished PhD dissertation, University of Illinois, Urbana-Illinois: 2007; Tuba Kancı, *Imagining the Turkish Men and Women: Nationalism, Modernism and Militarism in Primary School Textbooks (1928-2000)*, Unpublished PhD dissertation, Sabancı Üniversitesi, İstanbul: 2007; Başar Arı, *Religion and Nation-Building in the Turkish Republic: A Comparison of the High School Textbooks of 1930-1950 and 1950-1960*, MA Thesis, Ankara: METU, 2010; Arı, Başar. "Religion and Nation-Building in the Turkish Republic: A Comparison of High School Textbooks of 1931-1941 and of 1942-1950", Turkish Studies, Vol. 14, No. 2, 2013, p. 372-393; Jale Baysal, "Din Kültürü ve Ahlak Bilgisi", *Türkiye'nin Ders Kitapları: Ortaöğretim Ders Kitaplarına Eleştirel Bir Yaklaşım* içinde, (Ed.) Şeyda Özil ve Nilüfer Tapan, İstanbul: Cem Yayınevi, 1991, p. 275-281; Ergün Yıldırım, "Din Dersi Kitapları Deneyimi (1923-1950)", in *Türkiye'de Sivil Toplum ve Milliyetçilik*, (Ed.) Stefanos Yerasimos, İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2001; İştar Gözaydın, "Türkiye'de "Din Kültürü ve Ahlak Bilgisi" Ders Kitaplarına İnsan Hakları Merceğiyle Bir Bakış", *Ders Kitaplarında İnsan Hakları II: Tarama Sonuçları* içinde, (Ed.) Gürel Tüzün, İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yayınları, 2009, 167-193; Bülent Akdağ, "Türkiye'de Din Öğretimi Kitaplarında İnsan Hakları Problemleri", in *Ders Kitaplarında İnsan Hakları: Tarama Sonuçları*, (Ed.) Betül Çötüksöken, Ayşe Erzan, ve Orhan Silier, İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yayınları, 2003, p. 240-263; Recep Kaymakcan, "Christianity in Turkish Religious Education", *Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations*, Vol.10, No.3, 1999, p. 279-293; Sam Kaplan, ""Religious Nationalism": A Textbook Case from Turkey", *Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East*, Vol.25, No.3, 2005, p. 665-676; Buket Türkmen, "A Transformed Kemalist Islam or a New Islamic Civic Morality? A Study of "Religious Culture and Morality" Textbooks in the Turkish High School Curricula", *Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East*, Vol.29, No.3, 2009, p. 381-397; Özlem Altan, "Turkey: Sanctifying a Secular State", in *Teaching Islam: Textbooks and Religion in the Middle East*, (Ed.) Elenaor Abdella Doumato and Gregory Starrett, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2006; Emine Keskiner, "Türkiye'de Din Derslerinde Vatandaşlık Eğitimi", *Değerler Eğitim Merkezi Dergisi*, Yıl. 1, Sayı. 3, 2008, p. 38-41.

When these studies are evaluated with respect to the relationship between nationalism and religion in modern Turkey, most of them hypothesize the hegemony of a secular nationalist discourse within the textbooks up to the 1950s. Accordingly, this was replaced by a subtle combination of nationalism and Islam gradually after the 1950s; a trend which gained further prominence with the 1980 military coup. In this respect, it seems that most of those studies in the field, at least the ones covering the textbooks used during the early Republican period, undoubtedly reproduce the classical secularization thesis. According to this group of works, it is assumed that an authoritarian/strict secularism was reproduced via textbooks during the thirty years of Republican People's Party rule. They argue that, it was a reflection of a policy implemented during the first decades of the Turkish state, similar to the eighteenth century French model, keeping state apart from religion. It is claimed that a series of systematic political decisions involving various dimensions of social life were put into action by force, and that a new understanding of society and politics was adopted where contours were set for Islam. Hence, daily life and politics as well as education and textbooks were restructured within the framework of a non-religious reference, including nationalism. In the literature on Turkey, there are only two works, i.e. Arı's and Yıldırım's, which propose analytical evidences that indicate the existence of discursive examples of religious nationalism in the textbooks of the early Republic.[13] Still, due to their limited scope in terms of analyzed material, it still needs the appearance of comprehensive studies in this field in order to clarify the situation.

In my opinion, principally, the popular assumption about the dominance of a single paradigm on religion in a period of nearly thirty years can be questioned on various grounds. First of all, this approach is based on an over-generalizing view disregarding usual diversity and change within any given official discourse over time. Besides, it can be argued that the possible reactions or resistance to this radical shift from a traditional/Islamic Empire to a new and modern regime which was imposed upon the population has been overlooked. Furthermore, even though each of the founding members of the republic shared and advocated the same views in their

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[13] Arı, *Religion and Nation-Building in the Turkish Republic…;* Başar. "Religion and Nation-Building in the Turkish Republic…; Yıldırım, "Din Dersi Kitapları Deneyimi (1923-1950)…

whole careers – which is known to be rare– political inconsistencies arising from pragmatic necessities are sure to be expected. Therefore, in one sense, I seek traces of such ideological/discursive inconsistencies within the official discourse in regard to relations between nationalism and religion through analysis of the textbooks in this period.

In this context, I assert that the early Republican era can be divided into three sub-periods when the varieties of the discourses in textbooks are specifically considered. The dominant discourse, found in textbooks of the first sub-period between 1924 and 1931, is based on the idea that Islam and Turkishness are the two complementary components forming the basis of national identity and nationalism. This, I believe, can be referred to as more of a Turkish-Islamic Synthesis. Against the common view, a strictly secular nationalism is found in the textbooks only in the second period between 1931 and 1939. All supernatural beliefs were assumed to be products of the human mind, and traditional religions disclaimed from being the source of legitimacy in this period. Thus, while defining Turkish identity and nationalism in textbooks; they did not in any way make reference to any religious belief. During the third and last sub-period between 1939 and 1950, reference to religion in textbooks has gained power once again. Hence, the strict secularism of the second sub-period is replaced with a Turkish identity in strong association with Islam. This third period closely resembles the first one, where Turkish-Islamic Synthesis becomes the dominant discourse once again.

At this stage, it is appropriate to give a brief explanation about the methodology that I persue in analyzing textbooks. As a nodal point, it has to be emphasized that textbook analysis is a complicated process which usually necessitates an interdisciplinary approach including history, social sciences (geography, sociology, and political science), educational sciences, linguistics, and even psychology.[14] Despite the increase in the number of studies conducted in this field recently, there is still an obvious ambiguity and lack of clarity regarding the techniques to be used.[15]

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[14] Katalin Morgan, Elizabeth Henning, "Designing a Tool for History Textbook Analysis", *Forum: Qualitative Social Researc*h, Vol. 14(1), Art. 7, January, 2013, p. 3; Pingel, *op.cit.,* p. 43.

[15] For a general assessment on this topic, see. Jason Nicholls, "Methods in School Textbook Research", *International Journal of Historical Learning, Teaching and Research*, Vol. 3 (2), July 2003, p. 1-17; John Issitt, "Reflections on the Study of Textbooks", *History of Education*, Vol. 33(6), November 2004, p. 683-696; W. E. Marsden, *The School Textbook: Geography, History and Social Studies*, London: Woburn Press, 2001; Morgan et

For instance, while "content analysis" technique is the most commonly preferred tool by the researchers working in this field, there is a strong debate about whether it is a qualitative or quantitative technique.[16] Nevertheless, the literature is not totally devoid of studies for guidance. Among the most prominent ones is Pingel's guide where the author identifies the methodological foundations for pursuing analytical comparisons between textbooks of various countries.[17] Methodological proposals stated in the guide also provide a significant standard for some studies of narrow scope (those limited to the textbooks of a single country).

According to Pingel, the first step in the textbook analysis is to determine the number and the type of textbooks to be analyzed. It is recommended to use official data and statistics to determine the sampling. In addition, Pingel suggests that information collected from teachers and publishers could give an idea on which textbooks are preferred over others.[18] In the same framework, the author recommends to follow a *vertical analysis* method when researching the change in ideologies in textbooks over time or the level of stability in approaching the history, geography or political system of a given society.[19] Otherwise, he suggests *horizontal analysis* with as wide a scope as possible if the researcher is more interested in new approaches and exciting ideas adopted by textbooks.[20]

Furthermore, Pingel puts forward two basic alternatives for selecting a research technique. The first approach is *didactic analysis* developed for the analysis of the use of textbooks as an educational tool by teachers and students. This technique focuses more on underlying pedagogy rather than the text itself. However, the second one which is called *content analysis*, deals with the content of the text and how it is conveyed to the reader.[21] The author particularly emphasizes that the first approach is

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al, *op.cit.*; Pingel, *op.cit.*; Egil Johnsen, *Textbooks in the Kaleidoscope: A Critical Survey of Literature and Research on Educational Texts*, Trans. Linda Sivesind, Tønsberg: Vestfold College, 2001.

[16] For a discussion on various definitions of 'content analysis' see. Daniel Riffe, Stephen Lacy, F. G. Ficko, *Analyzing Media Messages: Using Quantitative Content Analysis in Research*, 2nd ed., Mahwah, New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 2005, p. 23-39; Klaus Krippendorf, *Content Analysis: An Introduction to Its Methodology*, 2nd ed., Thousand Oaks, California: Sage Publications, 2004, p. 18-43; Kimberly A. Neuendorf, *The Content Analysis Guidebook,* Thousand Oaks, California: Sage Publications, 2002, p. 1-25.

[17] See Pingel, *op.cit.*, p. 42.

[18] *Ibid., p.* 30.

[19] *Ibid.*

[20] *Ibid.*

[21] *Ibid., p.* 31.

generally preferred by educators while the second one is usually referred to by social scientists.

Pingel explains that in studies focusing on the content of a text, a further differentiation is required between qualitative and quantitative approaches. According to him,

> [q]uantitative methods [including techniques] like *frequency and space analysis* measure the text and determine: how many times a term is used or a person or people are mentioned; how much space is allotted to a country or topic, etc. This can tell us a great deal about where the emphasis lies and about selection criteria, but nothing about values and interpretation. [On the other hand,] [q]ualitative methods such as *hermeneutic analysis* reveal underlying assumptions that cannot be measured: [W]hat does a text tell us, what messages does it transmit? They [also] give insight into the mode of presentation: multiperspectivity vs. monocausal explanation, results of scientific studies vs. didactic reduction in textbooks.[22]

Additionally, for him, the latter strives to find answers to questions like in what context does the terminology or people mentioned in the text appear. It is important to quote Pingel's remark about methodology:

> Reviewers checking the content coverage of a topic should at least discern between different levels of presentation such as information vs. explanation or depth vs. breadth. Herlihy proposes three categories: *expository-descriptive, explanatory, investigative-argumentative.*
>
> *Linguistic investigation* offers insight into how messages are characterized and transmitted, as well as into examining the facts, events, persons and processes mentioned in the text. Linguistic analysis can show whether certain peoples or groups or world regions are portrayed in a way that creates invariable images of them. Such images often are linked to common opinion and can foster already existing stereotypes. A simple method is to list the adjectives attributed to characters, and social or ethnic groups: are they emotionally loaded, do they have pejorative or positive connotations? A story about the same event can often be told from opposing perspectives, i. e. from the point of view of the victims or from the standpoint of the perpetrators. The author can incorporate these different perspectives and leave it to the reader to evaluate them.
>
> Linguistic analysis can also reveal *who the characters or protagonists are*. Long textbook passages are often written in the passive voice. The subjects are mainly social groups, bodies or institutions, and only rarely individuals. On the other hand, other passages might portray a number of famous historical figures to whom we attribute great achievements. As a rule, these figures are either good or bad, but not "normal." To examine whether authors *concentrate on structures or personalities* in their history or civics textbooks can reveal their

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[22] *Ibid., p.* 67-68.

underlying conception of what the *most influential forces in history and society are*.

Discourse analysis has also developed useful instruments for textbook research. It attempts to find out what the author regards as important, what he or she feels needs to be explained and what he or she takes for granted. Which topics are supported by visuals, which are summarized and which are selected for inclusion in the exercises for students?[23]

While the issues Pingel has underlined so far provide a basic framework for the textbook analysis, Nicholls claims that it is "deprived of examples to provide researchers with detailed instruction on how to analyze a textbook, especially from a qualitative standpoint."[24] Thus, while researchers follow the guidance of this framework, they should also resort to approaches taken by the studies of wider scope for the textual analysis. At this point, it would be appropriate to discuss the characteristics of the content analysis as a general tool widely used by the researchers in textual analysis.

Franzosi has pointed out that the content analysis was first used only as a quantitative technique, but was further developed over time to cover qualitative inferences.[25] Similarly, Abrahamson underlines the possibility of using content analysis in studying any communication type from both a quantitative and qualitative approach.[26] It can thus be concluded that the approach/ technique can be used for a quantitative measurement of words or phrases or for a qualitative measurement based on interpretation in a text such as discourse analysis or hermeneutics, depending on the purpose of research.[27] Furthermore, as Smith points out, it is possible to use both approaches simultaneously in a content analysis study.[28] In this regard, Franzosi states that content analysis is "a collection of various approaches used in the analysis of any text or even message, rather than a single technique."[29]

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[23] *Ibid.* p. 70-71.
[24] Nicholls, *op.cit., p.* 5.
[25] See Roberto Franzosi, "Content Analysis", Michael S. Lewis-Beck, et al. (Ed.s.), in *The SAGE Encyclopedia of Social Science Research Methods*, Thousand Oaks, California: Sage Publications, 2004, p. 186
[26] M. Abrahamson, *Social Research Methods*, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1983, p. 286 cited in Bruce L. Berg, *Qualitative Research Methods for the Social Sciences*, 4th ed., Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 2001, p. 241.
[27] Parlak, *op.cit.*, p. 151.
[28] H. W. Smith, *Strategies of Social Research*, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1975, p. 218 cited in Berg, *op. cit.*, p. 241.
[29] Franzosi, *op. cit.*, p. 186

After combining common traits of all definitions regarding the method/approach, content analysis can be defined as a "multi-dimensional and wide-scope research method that enables the researcher to reach a meaningful, valid and objective conclusion regarding the content and its context by means of a systematic analysis of explicit and/or implicit content of a given text."[30] The concept of "text" as Neumann argues, can be "anything written, visual, or spoken that serves as a medium for communication" while "content" is basically comprised of all kinds of words, meanings, pictures, symbols, ideas, themes or messages conveyed to the reader.[31] Furthermore, as the definition suggests, it seems possible to classify the content of a text as manifest or latent. According to Berg, "manifest" content includes all elements that are physically there in the text and that can be counted, while "latent" content basically represents the symbolism behind physical data that calls for an interpretive approach.[32] In the light of the discussion so far, it can be concluded that content analysis method can be used in studying books, magazines, advertorials, speeches/interviews, TV programs, official documents, movies, lyrics, pictures, works of art, and textbooks.[33]

Lasswell explains that researchers who choose to use this method basically aim to determine "what a person says, how and why."[34] In this regard, according to Scott, to do this, one needs

> to identify clear and coherent categories that highlight salient aspects of the message conveyed and to use objective and reliable methods of calculating their relative significance in the overall message. The categories used will vary from study to study, according to the nature of the material and the theoretical presuppositions of the researcher. Categories in content analysis will, therefore, include such diverse things as positive, negative and neutral expressions concerning political parties, women, medical treatment, asylum seekers, God and street crime. Very often, the aim is to devise categories that grasp favorable or unfavorable attitudes or representations of these.[35]

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[30] Riffe et al, *op. cit*; Krippendorf, *op.cit.*; Neuendorf, *op .cit.;* Franzosi, *op. cit.*; Berg, *op. cit.*

[31] W. Lawrence Neuman, *Social Research Methods: Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches*, 2nd ed., Boston: Allyn & Bacon, 1994, p. 262.

[32] Berg, *op. cit.*, p. 242.

[33] *Ibid.*; John Scott, "Content Analysis", Victor Jupp (Ed.), in *The Sage Dictionary of Social Research Methods*, London: Sage Publications, 2006; Emily S. Adler, Roger Clark, *An Invitation to Social Research, How It's Done*, Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, Cengage Learning, 2011, p. 367; Krippendorf, *op. cit.*; Neuendorf, *op. cit.*.

[34] H. D. Lasswell, "Detection: Propaganda Detection and the Courts", H. Lasswell et al. (Ed.), in *The Language of Politics: Studies in Quantitative Semantics*, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1965, p. 12.

[35] Scott, *op. cit.*, p. 40.

Parlak also points out that it is possible to detect the explicit or implicit nature of the message conveyed in a given text through content analysis. In other words, for him, it is possible to identify whether the message is conveyed implicitly or through other (underlying) meanings.[36]

In this respect, content analysis technique is preferred for the analysis of textbooks since it provides a good combination of qualitative and quantitative aspects. Nevertheless, while there will be some quantitative comparisons in the study, I mainly adopt a qualitative approach, i.e. Van Dijk's (critical) discourse analysis, in evaluation of the ideological/discursive content of the textbooks. For this aim, in this section, I should clarify the process of Van Dijk's technique specifically as one of the qualitative approaches of analyzing the textual/ideological content of textbooks.

As a starting point, I assume ideology as "a form of social cognition shared by the members of a group, class, or other social formation."[37] Below, Van Dijk explains further this conceptualization of ideology:

> [It] is a complex cognitive framework that controls the formation, transformation and application of other social cognitions such as knowledge, opinions, and attitudes, and social representations, including social prejudices. This ideological framework itself consists of socially relevant norms, values, goals and principles which are selected, combined, and applied in such a way that they favor perception, interpretation and action in social practices that are in the overall interest of the group. In this way, an ideology assigns coherence among social attitudes, which in turn codetermine social practices. It should be stressed that ideological social cognitions are not systems of individual beliefs or opinions, but essentially those of members of social formations or institutions. Similarly, according to this analysis, we do not use terms such as "false" in order to denote specific "biased" ideologies. All ideologies (including scientific ones) embody an (re)construction of social reality.[38]

Within this framework, ideologies are principally related with "the characteristic properties of a group, such as their identity, their position in society, their interests and aims, their relations to other groups, their reproduction, and their natural environment."[39] Van Dijk assumes that most ideologies have a "schema-like" nature,

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[36] Parlak, *op. cit.,* p. 151
[37] Teun A. Van Dijk, "Structures of Discourse and Structures of Power", in *Communication Yearbook 12*, J.A. Anderson (Ed.), Newbury Park, CA: Sage, 1989, p. 24.
[38] *Ibid.,* p. 24-25.
[39] Van Dijk, *Ideology and Discourse: A Multidisciplinary Introduction*, English version of an internet course for the Universitat Oberta de Catalunya (UOC), July 2000, p. 12.

"that is, consist of a number of conventional categories that allow social actors to rapidly understand or to build, reject or modify an ideology."[40] The categories of ideology schema which organize the social beliefs of a group are as follows:

> Who are We? Who do (do not) belong Us?
>
> What do We do? What are Our activities? What is expected of Us?
>
> What are the goals of these activities? [What do we want? Why do we do it? [41]]
>
> What norms and values do We respect in such activities? [What is good or bad for us?[42]]
>
> To which groups are We related: Who are Our friends and enemies?
>
> What are the resources We typically have – or do not have- (privileged) access to?[43]

They not only provide a cognitive framework to individual members of a specific social group to make sense of the world they are living in, but also they guide their social attitude and behavior.[44] According to Van Dijk,

> [as individuals] [w]e learn most of our ideological ideas by reading and listening to other group members, beginning with out parents and peers. Later we 'learn' ideologies by watching television, reading text books at school, advertising, the newspaper, novels or participating in everyday conversations with friends and colleagues, among a multitude of other forms of talk and text.[45]

In the same context, Van Dijk basically relates discourse to the verbalization of ideologies and their reproduction. According to him, discourse is a specific textual form of language use within a certain social context; it functions as a crucial tool through communication for the reproduction and transformation of ideologies.[46] Hence, the content of any discourse and the way it is stated bear traces of the ideology (explicit or implicit) behind it.

Van Dijk considers discourse as a concept principally related with power (authority) and hegemonic groups within society. Discourse, in this regard, first of all, is a way

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http://www.discourses.org/OldBooks/Teun%20A%20van%20Dijk%20-%20Ideology%20and%20Discourse.pdf
[40] *Ibid.,* p. 17.
[41] *Ibid.*
[42] *Ibid.*
[43] Van Dijk, "Ideological Discourse Analysis," *New Courant* (English Dept, University of Helsinki), 4, 1995, p. 146.
[44] Van Dijk, *Ideology and Discourse…,* p. 8-9.
[45] *Ibid.,* p. 9.
[46] *Ibid.*; Van Dijk, "Structures of Discourse and Structures of Power…, p. 25.

of practicing authority by hegemonic groups. Thus, discourse analysis connotes the analysis of power relations between hegemonic groups and other social formations in this approach. Therefore, at this section, his conceptualization of power should be stressed briefly.

Van Dijk basically defines social power/authority as an asymmetrical relationship between various groups, classes and other social formations. Similar to Weber[47], Van Dijk conceptualizes power as a mode of social control that a group exercises over another group in a way the latter's freedom of action is restrained.[48] In this framework, Van Dijk insists that power is usually actualized through control/manipulation of cognitive/mental conditions of other groups' actions by hegemonic groups. He asserts, "social power is usually indirect and operates through the 'minds' of people, for instance by managing the necessary information or opinions they need to plan and execute their actions."[49] In the same context, discourse is nothing more than an instrument in the exercise, maintenance, or legitimization of power for the writer.[50]

When Van Dijk attempts to analyze the concept of discourse, he begins with the classification of the hegemonic groups, namely power elites. The author classifies elites as small groups having exclusive social control over society into four groups consisting of socio-cultural, economic, political and military power groups.[51] Among them, it is socio-cultural power groups, i.e. intellectuals, who mostly control material production, articulation, distribution and influence of discourses. Referring to Bourdieu, Van Dijk entitles the group which comprises of journalists, writers, artists, directors and scholars as "symbolic elites" since they exercise power in terms of symbolic capital.[52] They control and determine topics, style and presentation of discourses via channels of mass media and education. Hence, "[t]hey are the

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[47] For Weber's conceptualization of "authority" see. Max Weber, *Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology*, Ed. Guenther Roth, Claus Wittich, Berkeley, LA, London: University of California Press, 1978.

[48] Van Dijk, "Structures of Discourse and Structures of Power…, p. 20.

[49] *Ibid.*

[50] *Ibid.*

[51] *Ibid.,* p. 23, 26.

[52] *Ibid.,* p. 22. For a detailed analysis of "symbolic capital" see. Pierre Bourdieu, *Outline of a Theory of Practice*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977; Bourdieu, *Homo Academicus*, Trans. Peter Collier, Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1988; Paris: Minuit, 1984; Bourdieu and J. C. Passeron, *Reproduction in Education, Society and Culture*, Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, 1977; David Swartz, *Culture and Power: Sociology of Pierre Bourdieu*, Chicago, London: The University of Chicago Press, 1997.

manufacturers of public knowledge, beliefs, attitudes, norms, values, morals, and ideologies."[53]

Nevertheless, Van Dijk highlights that symbolic elites rarely exercise this ideological power independently/freely since most of these elites are managed by the state or private corporations. Therefore, even though there may exist conflicts among hegemonic groups, the voice of intellectuals are usually nothing more than the voice of their corporate or institutional masters, i.e. political, military or economical elites.[54] Due to such dependence among power groups, "only a few groups (e.g., novelists and some academics) have the possibility to exercise counter power, which must still be expressed within the constraints of publication."[55]

From a similar perspective, Gutek also assumes media and education kept under control of hegemonic groups as important tools of ideological (re)production. According to him, through these tools they manipulate the foundations of ideologies which comprise of beliefs and opinions.[56] In this regard, pertinent to my study, Gutek states the determining power of these groups in the ideological content and function of education as follows:

> [They] (1) determine education policies as well as its targets, aims, and outcome; (2) set and reinforce the rules for behavior at school environment and values to be established; (3) have significant impact in the determination of knowledge and skills to be delivered by official school curriculum.[57]

Macro level policies regarding the aim, subjects, methods, and strategies for education are determined by the hegemonic groups, which at the same time have vast impact on the school curriculum, content, textbooks, and other educational materials.[58]

Considering the indications of above mentioned studies, it can be stated that ideologies are constructed and become widespread via such tools as media and mass education as reflections of a complicated web of power relations. Therefore, for Van

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[53] Van Dijk, "Structures of Discourse and Structures of Power…, p. 22.
[54] *Ibid.,* 23.
[55] *Ibid.,* 23.
[56] *Ibid.*
[57] Gerald L. Gutek, *Eğitime Felsefî ve İdeolojik Yaklaşımlar*, trans. by. Nesrin Kale, 3.ed., Ankara: Ütopya Yayınevi, 2006, p. 181.
[58] Van Dijk, "Structures of Discourse and Structures of Power…, p. 26.

Dijk, the first step for a discourse analysis of any text is a thorough evaluation of the power system within which the specific text and discourse is constructed and how this system determines the power relations between hegemonic groups and others from a macro perspective. Solely by analyzing the text with relation to its broader contextual background, the ideology behind the discourse can be clarified.[59]

After analyzing the macro structures, one can deal with the comprehensive analysis of the discourse within the text. According to Van Dijk, as cited above, most ideologies present suppositions about membership, activities, aims, rules, relations, and resources of the group which they represent. Thus, a practical "heuristic" method to analyze discourse is considering the answers it provides for the questions related with the reconstruction of group identity, i.e. who are we?, what is expected of us?, etc.[60] Van Dijk states that these answers are usually organized in the polarized terms such as "Us vs. Them". The essential part of this polarization is assuming a higher status for "Us" against "Them".[61] According to the writer, it is usually expressed through a common strategy which most ideological discourses follow:

-Emphasize positive things about Us
-Emphasize negative things about Them
-De-emphasize negative things about Us
-De-emphasize positive things about Them[62]

Hence, "Us" is usually identified by positive attributions whereas "They" is typically cited with opposite characteristics in the text. Van Dijk calls this conceptual strategy as an "ideological square" and states that it can be pursued to the analysis of all levels of discourse structures.[63]

Accordingly, Van Dijk suggests various ways for following the ideological traces within any discourse. The first is clarifying the themes and topics which are preferred to be narrated in the text since "[they] represent the gist and most important information of a discourse, and tell us what a discourse 'is about'."[64] For instance, in

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[59] Van Dijk, *Ideology and Discourse…,* p. 38.
[60] *Ibid.,* p. 43.
[61] *Ibid.*
[62] *Ibid.,* p. 44.
[63] *Ibid.*
[64] *Ibid.,* p. 45.

the textbooks, it is usual to topicalize positive attributions such as nobility or bravery of our nation and negative characteristics such as fearfulness and disloyalty of other nations. On the contrary, bad things about Us and good things about Them are detopicalized.[65]

In addition to the careful selection of topics and themes, the way of narrating events also has a crucial importance. The authors conscientiously decide which events will be narrated in detail or in an abstract manner and which will be narrated through clear expressions or implications:

> [P]eople tend to leave information implicit that is inconsistent with their positive self-image. On the other hand, any information that tells the recipient about the bad things of our enemies or about those we consider our outgroup will tend to be explicitly expressed in text and talk.[66]

Furthermore, Van Dijk points out other components of discourse structures as follows: causal relationships between various facts or events[67], synonymity or antonymity relations between various concepts or propositions[68], specific examples and illustrations developed for supporting arguments and statements, sentences beginning with a denial of adverse feelings against another group but ending up with negative expressions (e.g. "I have nothing against X, but…")[69], sentences expressing one or more propositions (e.g. "Refugees are bogus")[70], homogenization or generalization of actors (e.g. "the Turks", "the Turk")[71], modalities (e.g. "It is necessary that…", "It is known that…")[72], arguable evidences in order to proof beliefs (e.g. "You read about it in the newspaper everyday")[73], hedging and vagueness of negative or inappropriate statements[74], stereotypical expressions for argumentation (e.g. "[Immigration is] a 'burden' for our country (economy, social services, education, etc.), if not a 'threat' of the welfare state, or of Our Western

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[65] *Ibid.*
[66] *Ibid.,* p. 47.
[67] *Ibid.,* p. 47-48.
[68] *Ibid.,* p. 48-49.
[69] *Ibid.,* p. 49-50.
[70] *Ibid.,* p. 50-51.
[71] *Ibid.,* p. 51.
[72] *Ibid.,* p. 51-52.
[73] *Ibid.,* p. 52.
[74] *Ibid.*

Culture")[75], sentence syntax (e.g. "The police arrested the demonstrators", "The demonstrators were arrested by the police", "It was the demonstrators who the police arrested", "the demonstrators were arrested", "The arrest of demonstrators.")[76], and etc. To sum up, these are the subjects which should be elaborated in a discourse analysis of any text. In this regard, I follow the methodology developed by Van Dijk in my analysis of textbooks.

In this methodological framework, the basic unit of analysis will be the whole texts in the textbooks belonging to the period between 1924 and 1950. For this aim, the textbooks approved by the Ministry of Education for the curricula of primary, middle and high school grades as part of the history, citizenship, sociology, and religious instruction courses in the period starting with 1924 will be analyzed critically. The period marks an important milestone in the control of the political regime over education, which continued until the Democrat Party regime in 1950.

The reason why I have chosen the textbooks of the courses listed above is that the contents of these books are directly related to my research subject. In addition, the impact of these courses on the reproduction of the official discourse is growing stronger in Turkey today. Confirming this view, Aslan states that the Ministry of National Education of the Early Republican period distributed all courses/textbooks within two separate categories in line with their formal functions for the education system. Accordingly, "cultural lessons" (Turk. *kültür dersleri*) consisted of "Turkish language, history, citizenship, geography, instruction of motherland (Turk. *malumat-ı vataniye*), sociology, philosophy, psychology, logic, and religious instruction courses."[77] The second group named as "basic sciences" (Turk. *temel bilimler*) included "geometry, calculation, math, physics, chemistry, [and] biology lessons…"[78] As explained by Aslan, the first group of courses/textbooks, structured in accordance with the founding ideas and principles of the regime, were assumed to shape the national and humanistic dimensions/characteristics of children. Thus, for the author, the state always considered the preparation and writing of these textbooks

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[75] *Ibid.,* p. 53.
[76] *Ibid.,* p. 54-55.
[77] Aslan, "Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nin İlk Ders Kitapları…, p. 219.
[78] *Ibid.*

as important.[79] For this reason I choose these textbooks, similar to the other studies in this field. However, the scope of my study is broader in terms of the courses, i.e., history, citizenship, sociology and religion, in which analyzed textbooks are used since similar studies usually focus on a single course.

There were nearly 110 textbooks excluding re-prints used in the four courses taught in primary, middle and high school grades during the period covering 192 until 1950. Some of those were published by the state and some by private publishers. I have reached the names of the textbooks from *Tebliğler Dergisi* (Ministry of National Education Bulletins) where the list of textbooks approved by *Talim ve Terbiye Dairesi* (the Board of Education and Discipline) was regularly published, and some other researches and publications in this field. I have attained most of the textbooks through the National Library in Ankara. Besides, I have collected some others from second-hand book sellers. The total number of textbooks I have used for analysis is seventy-seven. This represents a high ratio, which is approximately seventy per cent of the total textbooks used during the period. A full list of the analyzed textbooks is listed in Appendix-A, B and C.

I have identified some categories/themes for my analysis of the relationship between religon (including Islam, Judaism and Christianity), Islam and secularism, and Turkish nation/national identity in the textbooks. I discuss how and from which points textbooks of this period defined those subjects; what the characteristics of the language and discourse used in the instruction of those categories were; what the similarities and variations within the discourses in terms of authors, courses, and publication years were; and, what is the ideological relation between the macro politics of this period and discourses within the textbooks.

The following chapter will be a general assessment of the theoretical discussions in the literature with regard to nationalism and religion in general and between secular nationalism and religious nationalism in particular.

In Third Chapter, following Van Dijk, I will begin my analysis with a detailed evaluation of the hegemonic groups and their political and ideological inclinations, their relations with other groups, and their approaches on nationalism and religion in

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[79] *Ibid.*

the last period of the Ottoman Empire to the Early Turkish Republic. In the related section, I specifically focus on the development and characteristics of two dominant ideological groups, modernists/Westernists and modernist traditionalists whom principally dominated the sources of cultural and educational reproduction in those decades.

Following the assessments about the shifting ideological patterns in Turkish politics and education policies/textbooks in the pre-Republic period, fourth, fifth and sixth chapters will analyze the textbooks of the early Republican era. Collected textbooks will be analyzed in three separate chapters since the three sub-periods that I have identified in textbooks reflect a certain discourse belonging to each sub-period during the years between 1924 and 1950.

The first sub-period is the one between 1924 and 1931, which marks a period when the founders of the new state led by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk philosophical/ideological foundations of the new regime. During this period nationalism considered Islamic and Turkish identities as complementary and as founding elements of national identity. Analysis of textbooks within the framework of this discourse suggests that being a Turk and a Muslim were not two mutually exclusive categories since people were united under a single (Turkish) nation and religion (cutting across various religious sects). This becomes evident in the focus on Turkish-Islam period in history books together with explicitly or implicitly approving statements about Turkish-Islamic identity. Although Copeaux uses the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis concept for the post-1980 period, I use the same concept to name the discourse of the early republican period since the content of the books is in line with the definition provided by Copeaux. In other words, Turkish-Islamic Synthesis dominates the textbooks of this first sub-period.

The second sub-period covers the textbooks used between 1931 and 1939. In this period, the fundamental principles of Kemalism were considered as the official doctrine of the regime. These principals were defined in detail and were institutionalized. However, a paradigmatic shift is observed in the discourse on nationalism dominating the textbooks; the dominant secular-nationalist discourse replaced the former discourse. This discourse was partly based on the idea that all supernatural beliefs are products of the human mind with the effort to repeal the

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power of traditional and religious values which were seen as the legitimate sources of national identity. The same discourse, on the other hand, overemphasized the Turkish nation and the values associated with it. Loyalty to the nation appeared to be replacing the guiding role of religion. Hence, it can be argued that Turkish identity was defined in the textbooks during this period as a worldly concept. It was tied to political, territorial and cultural elements and even at times, to ethnicity with a racist inclination.

The third and last sub-period to be analyzed is the years between 1939 and 1950. This was when the Republican People's Party attempted to revise its policies with the newly rising political conjuncture. Following the death of Atatürk in 1938, there was a shift in international power balance. During this period, coupled with the growing country-wide opposition against the state, reference to religion increased once again in textbooks. This time, strict secularism of the second period was replaced by a discourse emphasizing Turkish identity which was strongly associated with Islam. Thus, this sub-period was similar to the first sub-period, where Turkish-Islamic ideology once again became dominant.

The concluding chapter will provide an overall summary and a discussion of the findings and conclusions reached in this study.

At this point it is necessary to provide some information on education statistics of the period. According to official National Census data, the total population of Turkey was 13.648.270 in 1927; 16.158.018 in 1935; 17.820.950 in 1940; 18.790.174 in 1945; and 20.947.188 in 1950.[80] Information about the number of schools and students at primary, middle and high school levels over the years is provided in the table below. It has to be noted that until 1997 children in Turkey were obliged to take five years of education in primary schools (after 1997 compulsory education became eight years). Before 1997, secondary and high school education lasted three years each.

According to Table 1, there was a rapid increase both in the number of schools and students at all three levels of education between 1923 and 1950. Especially at the primary level, the rate of students which was 3,5 per cent of the total population in

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[80] *İstatistik Göstergeler 1923-2011*, Ankara: Türkiye İstatistik Kurumu, 2012, p. 5.

1927 rose to 7,5 per cent during the early-1950s. It could be assumed that some of those who were primary school students during the early-1920s became part of the political elite after 1950s. As a last note, another study which would specifically deal with the intellectual/ideological impacts/traces of the textbooks of 1924-1950 on those generations could be interesting as a contribution to my study.

Table 1: Numbers of Schools and Students between 1923 and 1950[81]

Years	Primary School		Secondary School		High School	
	Number of schools	**Number of students**	**Number of schools**	**Number of students**	**Number of schools**	**Number of students**
1923-1924	4.894	341.941	72	5.905	23	1.241
1927-1928	6.043	461.985	78	19.858	42	3.819
1930-1931	6.598	489.299	83	27.093	57	5.699
1940-1941	10.596	955.957	238	95.332	82	24.862
1949-1950	17.106	1.591.039	381	65.168	88	21.440

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[81] This table is adapted from the official data cited in *İstatistik Göstergeler 1923-2011…*, p. 64, 66, 68. Data on vocational and technical schools are not included.

CHAPTER 2

NATIONALISM, RELIGION AND EDUCATION:
A THEORETICAL ASSESSMENT

In this study, while analyzing the relationship between nationalism and religion in the textbooks of the early decades of Republic of Turkey, it would be wise to first focus on the definition of the two concepts and give a general overview of the theoretical approaches to various relationship patterns between them. In this perspective, nationalism and religion could be defined as two phenomena providing socio-cultural and ideological/discursive frameworks through which people define themselves and their relationship with others. Thus, it would not be wrong to advocate that both have a strong impact on individuals as well as social formations. In this chapter, theories first on religion and then on nationalism will be analyzed, to be followed by various relationship patterns between the two phenomena.

2.1. Religion

By proof of historical records, religion is a social phenomenon since the first human civilizations.[82] Assuming its ancient history, it is quite amazing that religion remained as the main source of legitimacy until recently (at least until the modernization process) in all human societies both in terms of giving meaning to life at the individual level as well as structuring of social identities and socio-political organizations. Accordingly, the difficulty of fully identifying the functions religion has fulfilled (or lost) and its re-interpretation in different spatio-temporal settings becomes evident. In this framework, it does not seem probable to reach a comprehensive definition to cover the whole variety of discourse and practices with regard to religion. Discussions in the literature support this view. Nevertheless, researchers have not totally given up on their efforts to define religion around certain characteristics. This effort has resulted in the development of two fundamental

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[82] For evolutionist biology, establishment of social inclinations which can be called 'religious' emerged at an early stage of the evolution of *Homo Sapiens*. See. Robert N. Bellah, *Religion in Human Evolution: From the Paleolithic to the Axial Age*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011, p. 44-116.

approaches with regard to conceptualization of religion especially in the field of social sciences. The first approach focuses on its essence while the second one on explaining the functions it serves.[83] All definitions of religion so far are generally based on one of these approaches.

The most popular paradigm among the substantive approaches based on a comprehensive point of view to determine the commonalities among all religions is the one that defines religion with reference to "sacred and profane" dichotomy. Emile Durkheim and Mircea Eliade are the pioneers of this approach. Historian of religions, Eliade focuses on the mystic relationship/experience with a metaphysical source from a religious phenomenological approach.[84] However, Durkheim, as a sociologist, was more interested in the social dimensions of the relationship with the sacred (and profane).[85] Since Durkheim's theory provides a sociological explanation, it would be appropriate to take his views as a starting point for our analysis.

In this framework, according to Durkheim, forms of the religious categorization of "sacred-profane" may vary from religion to religion, but the concept itself remains a universal aspect of all religions.[86] He believes that this dichotomy embodies two separate worlds in regard to their relation with divinity which are so deeply disparate and in total opposition to each other. One (sacred) is identified with all positive (divinely) aspects like reality, purity, brightness, and livelihood while the other (profane) characterized with negative (worldly) attributions like hollowness, uncleanliness, darkness, and death.[87] Anyway, he sees the description of all things through this dichotomy as the backbone of all religions in the history of mankind.

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[83] For further details on conceptualization of religion, see. Inger Furseth, Pal Repstad, *An Introduction to the Sociology of Religion: Classical and Contemporary Perspectives*, Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing, 2006; Michele Dillon (ed.), *Handbook of the Sociology of Religion*, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003; Jack David Eller, *Introducing Anthropology of Religion: Culture to the Ultimate*, New York, London: Routledge, 2007; H. Rodrigues, J. S. Harding, *Introduction to the Study of Religion*, New York, London: Routledge, 2009; Malory Nye, *Religion: The Basics*, 2nd ed., New York, London: Routledge, 2008; Brian Morris, *Din Üzerine Antropolojik İncelemeler: Bir Giriş Metni*, (trans.) Tayfun Atay, Ankara: İmge Kitabevi, 2004; Bryan S. Turner, *Religion and Social Theory*, 2nd ed., London: Sage Publications, 1991; Grace Davie, *The Sociology of Religion*, London: Sage Publications, 2007.

[84] For futher details on Eliade's theories see. Mircea Eliade, *Kutsal ve Dindışı*, trans. Mehmet Ali Kılıçbay, Ankara: Gece Yayınları, 1991; Mircea Eliade, *Dinler Tarihine Giriş*, trans. Lale Arslan, İstanbul: Kabalcı Yayınları, 2003; Mircea Eliade, *Ebedi Dönüş Mitosu*, trans. Ümit Altuğ, Ankara: İmge Kitabevi, 1994*;* Mircea Eliade, *Dinin Anlamı ve Sosyal Fonksiyonu,* trans. Mehmet Aydın, Ankara: Kültür Bakanlığı Yayınları, 1990.

[85] Refer. Emile Durkheim, *The Elementary Forms of Religious Life*, Trans. Karen E. Fields, NY: The Free Press, 1995.

[86] *Ibid.,* p. 34-36.

[87] *Ibid.,* p. 36.

Colpe is in agreement with Durkheim, explaining that these two concepts (sacred-profane) have been adopted into Western languages from Latin where originally *sacer* and *profanus* point to two separate worlds.[88] The first one was used by Ancient Romans to define "belongings of the gods or their power" or objects "inside the temple", while the latter simply represented everything outside the temple.[89] Thus, the concept of sacred points to the godly, those related to the gods or filled with godly powers/attributes. Contrarily, profane stands for the exact opposite, those lacking godly powers in other words, are worldly. I need to note that the godly feature Durkheim talks of does not have to be a metaphysical being. His concept of divinity points to, in an Otto like description, any higher being that incurs respect/awe in the individual mixed with excitement/fear.[90] In the framework of such an approach simply all types of special relationship/experience at individual or collective level through sacred things can be defined as a religious relationship.[91]

I believe the information given regarding substantive definition of religion is sufficient for our subject matter. Since this research shall focus on the relationship between nationalism and religion, to reach a definition that will allow for a same level comparison shall serve our purpose. In my opinion, this can be achieved in an approach that tends to define both concepts through references to their similar social attributes or functions. In this respect, Brubaker talks of three levels/functions where religion and nationalism (and ethnicity) can be studied in the same context. The first one defines religion as one of the principles social organizations are structured around as a framework organizing social relationships.[92] Secondly, it is probable to interpret religion as one of the fundamental cognitive or ideological/discursive sources through which people structure their perception of the world.[93] Thirdly, according to Brubaker, religion –in fact as an extension of the first two- can be defined as the source/grounds for the political demands of a social group.[94] At this stage, it would be helpful to analyze the various theoretical approaches to define

[88] Carsten Colpe, "Sacred and the Profane, The", in Lindsay Jones (Ed.), *Encyclopedia of Religion (vol. 12*, 2nd ed., Detroit: Macmillan Reference USA, 2005, p. 7964.
[89] *Ibid.,* p. 7964.
[90] Durkheim, *The Elementary Forms…,* p. 191, 210.
[91] Eliade, *Dinin Anlamı ve Sosyal Fonksiyonu,* p. viii.
[92] Roger Brubaker, "Religion and Nationalism: Four Approaches", *Nations and Nationalism*, 18(1), 2012, p. 4.
[93] *Ibid*
[94] *Ibid.*, p. 5.

religion from a functional point of view (meaning its various dimensions/levels) in regard to three dimensional frameworks.

One of the most fundamental functions of religion is uniting/connecting individuals under the single roof of a specific group of society. Such a definition falls in line with the etymological roots of the term *religion* in English. According to Derrida, the first suggestion widely accepted with regard to the roots of the word identifies it with the Latin term *legere* meaning "gathering, uniting" and the other one with *ligare*, meaning "connecting, forming a bond between".[95] (We need to keep in mind that the suffix *"re'"* is used to give the meaning "once again, repeat". With reference to its Latin roots, the word religion is generally interpreted as a bond that reconnects (or reunites) the individual to a divine source/wholeness.[96]

Specifically speaking for Islam as the core of my study, the concept of *ed-din* used in the same context in Arabic is largely different to the meaning in English as it bears a multi-dimensional character. According to Attas, the primary meaning of this word of *d-y-n* roots in Arabic can be categorized under four attributes namely "being in debt", "state of submission", "judging power", and "natural inclination or tendency".[97] Despite the differences in meaning with the term used in the English language, these meanings also focus on the qualities of the relationship the individual establishes with a being/source of a higher level. We could add to these the meaning of "submission to Allah" (Turk. *teslimiyet*) as the most fundamental meaning of the term *Islam*.[98] Thus, taking into consideration the substantive definition as well, the most fundamental function of religion can be generally determined as binding the individual to a higher (and sacred) being/source (and divine qualities) –not necessarily a metaphysical power.

In Durkheim's approach, this relationship is primarily based on its central role/function with regard to the establishment of and maintaining social organization/order (and social legitimization to a certain extent). In this perspective,

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[95] Jacques Derrida, "İnanç ve Bilim", in *Din* , J. Derrida, G. Vattimo (der.), (trans.) D. Kundakçı vd., Ankara: Dost Kitabevi, 2011, p. 42.
[96] Gregory D. Alles, "Religion: Further Considerations", *Encyclopedia of Religion (vol. 11)*, ed. Lindsay Jones, 2nd ed., Detroit: Macmillan Reference USA, 2005, p. 7702.
[97] S. Nakib Attas, *İslâm, Sekülerizm ve Geleceğin Felsefesi*, trans. Mahmud Erol Kılıç, İstanbul: İnsan Yayınları, 2003, p. 73-74.
[98] *Ibid.*, p. 77-83.

religion(s) above all forms the basis of social unity and organization. He assumes that social groups are living organisms with specific objectives to be achieved through the individuals making up the society. From this perspective, society is considered to force individuals into hardship, deprivation, and self-devotion in order to maintain social order.[99] Still, according to Durkheim, as these objectives cannot solely be achieved through material enforcement, societies have established a spiritual/moral power to maintain dominance over their individual members.[100] In this regard, society's capability to suppress and keep apart the thoughts threatening its presence and to provide the practices supporting order originates from the "spiritual/moral authority" enforced at the individual level.[101] Durkheim reaches the conclusion that the divine god in any religion is nothing but the society itself. In other words, the divine authority through which the whole religious system of prohibitions and commandments bind individual members to the group is an image of the society itself.[102] Thus, for Durkheim, the society does not only establish itself through assuming a divine attribute, but it also attempts to assure the sustainability of social order by means of various discourses, commandments, prohibitions, beliefs, and worshipping in relation with the sacred-profane classification. In this context, Durkheim formally defines religion as follows:

> [a] religion is a unified system of beliefs and practices relative to sacred things, that is to say, things set apart and forbidden—beliefs and practices which unite into one single moral community called a Church, all those who adhere to them.[103]

Taking into consideration this approach, it can be concluded that one of the historical-social functions of religion is setting the foundations of all social relationships including social organization and thus, institutions like politics and economy. In this respect, religions indeed have the power to restructure both belief and worship at individual level, as well as society, politics, and world as a whole, by the (social organization of the) relationship between sacred and profane.[104] While

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[99] Durkheim, *The Elementary Forms…,* p. 208-210.
[100] *Ibid.*
[101] *Ibid.,* p. 210.
[102] *Ibid.,* p. 208-209.
[103] *Ibid.,* p. 44.
[104] Aziz Al-Azmeh, *İslamlar ve Moderniteler*, (trans.) Elçin Gen, İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2003, p. 119.

this fact can be generalized for all religions, Islam as a specific religion, claiming "dominance on all aspects of life", actually fits this definition.[105] This means that living in a social world structured by religious values brings social identities/roles as well concrete economic, political and sentimental relations and support for individuals.[106]

Interestingly the school of Eliade follows the view that religion(s) should be seen as "a traditional way of being and living." [107] For Eliade, for a *homo religious* (believer) "living is indeed a religious practice".[108] In this perspective, religion is also assumed to provide a cognitive template to perceive/interpret and legitimize/understand the universe and life since Eliade sees no difference between knowing (epistemology) and being/living (ontology). This, in a sense, supplements Berger's definition of religion with connotation to Weber[109], as "a humanitarian attempt to establish a meaningful cosmos in the eyes of the believers."[110] In the same framework, Brubaker explains that he sees religion (with ethnicity and nationalism) alongside its other dimensions as one of the "basic sources and forms of social and cultural identification, [a]s such… [it is a] way… of identifying oneself and others, of construing sameness and difference, and of situating and placing oneself in relation to others."[111] In this perspective, these concepts are not "things" in this world but

> cognitive/ideological perspectives… provid[ing] a way of identifying and naming fundamental social groups, a powerful framework for imagining community and a set of schemas, templates and metaphors for making sense of the social world (and, of course, the supra-mundane world as well).[112]

Eventually, this approach allows me to comprehend the "ideological/discursive" dimension of religion in respect to Van Dijk's definition of ideologies as socially structured cognitive frameworks.[113] Considering this dimension, religion(s) may well

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[105] Attas, *İslâm, Sekülerizm ve Geleceğin Felsefesi…*, p. 92.
[106] Scott Mann, *İdeoloji Olarak Din: Kalpsiz Bir Dünyanın Kalbi*, (trans.) Hülya Osmanağaoğlu, İstanbul: Aykırı Yayıncılık, 2004, p. 9.
[107] Eliade, *Kutsal ve Dindışı...,* p. xii.
[108] Eliade, *Dinin Anlamı ve Sosyal Fonksiyonu…*, p. *vii-ix.*
[109] See. Max Weber, "Dünya Dinlerinin Sosyal Psikolojisi", *Sosyoloji Yazıları*, (trans.) Taha Parla, İstanbul: Deniz Yayınları, 2008, p. 355-400.
[110] Peter L. Berger, *Kutsal Şemsiye: Dinin Sosyolojik Teorisinin Ana Unsurları*, (trans.) Ali Coşkun, 4th ed., İstanbul: Rağbet Yayınları, 2011, p. 81.
[111] Brubaker, "Religion and Nationalism: Four Approaches…, p. 4.
[112] *ibid.*
[113] Refer to the related section in 'introduction' of this study.

be defined as "real historical phenomena which have great impact on people's perceptions of themselves and the world both in individual and collective levels."[114] Both Eliade and Berger, as explained above, especially stress that most of the believers perceive, assess, and even experience the world in a religious point of view. Despite his relatively negative ideas regarding religion, Marx's definition of religion is, in a way, similar to this view. He believes that through religion "false/reversed consciousness" –Marx is referring to the concept of "ideology"- is imposed to the general population (by dominant social groups) to manipulate their ability to see the very reality of productive relations.[115] While he does not approve this method, he agrees that religion fulfills a fundamental function in terms of establishing an awareness/interpretation of the world by believers.[116] Hence, such an approach towards religion gives us an opportunity to compare it against nationalism as an ideology and explain their relations at the discourse level.

Religion can also be analyzed in a third dimension, closely related with the first two: As a source/ground for political demands of social groups. In this perspective, Brubaker states

> claims made in the name of religion – or religious groups – can be considered alongside claims made in the name of ethnicity, race or nationhood… [since they are all] made for economic resources, political representation, symbolic recognition or cultural reproduction.[117]

In this context, Brubaker considers religion as the fundamental source of various political demands and an extension of a more general phenomenon that can be called "politicized ethnicity (or politicization of culture/ethnicity)".[118] According to him, we have come across this phenomenon often in developed and developing countries around the world in the past century through national, racial, regional, or other

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[114] Mann, *İdeoloji Olarak Din…,* p. 10.

[115] Karl Marx, *Hegel'in Hukuk Felsefesinin Eleştirisi*, (trans.) Kenan Somer, Ankara: Sol Yayınları, 1997. For further references to religion in Marx other works see. Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels, *Din Üzerine*, (trans.) Kaya Güvenç, 3rd ed., Ankara: Sol Yayınları, 2002.

[116] In addition to the references offered in the footnote above for the discussion on Marx's theory on religion, see. Andrew M. McKinnon, "Opium as Dialectics of Religion: Metaphor, Expression and Protest", *Marx, Critical Theory, and Religion: A Critique of Rational Choice*, (ed.) Warren S. Goldstein Mann, Leiden, Boston: Brill, 2006, p. 11-29; *İdeoloji Olarak Din…;* Daniel L. Pals, *Eight Theories of Religion*, 2nd. Ed., New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006, p. 118-148.

[117] Brubaker, "Religion and Nationalism: Four Approaches…, p. 5.

[118] *Ibid.*

similar culture based identities. Hence, in the specific case of religion, "a politicized religion" will include "both demands regarding sources, representation, recognition and re-production and expectations of restructuring the public life around religious principles."[119]

After a general overview of religion, it would be appropriate at this stage to note several features of Islam as a relatively original historical-cultural form of religion and one of the core themes of my analysis. I would like to quote Atay, as I believe, he clearly summarizes the points of reference:

> Islam is the last one of the three big monotheist religions originating in the Middle East. It is characterized with its rich discursive tradition and variety of practices in terms of moral, legal and sociopolitical theses. '*Umma*' or the group of people who reflect and proselytize their belief established by Prophet Mohammed's struggle to establish a new religion, assure its presence and sustainability and the new governing organization which has set the fundamental characteristics of this religion constitute Islam's socio-political framework. It takes only a short while for a legal system (the Sharia) to establish, with the emergence of a set of rules regulating the new socio-political formation and the actors to enforce them. Individual-psychological needs give rise to mystic insight (sufism and religious orders), intellectual sensitivity and search to philosophical- ideological developments (*Mutezile, Es'arism, Maturidiye*) and political-financial conflicts to sectarian strife (Sunni –Shia). Hence, a diversity of institutions shaping human social interaction from morals to politics have found fertile ground in 'Islam' to flourish and develop. [120]

As Atay points out in the last statement, the power of religion to rule all aspects of social life is present in Islam to the same degree as other religions. I need to note that Islam has articulated into politics (and politics into Islam) from the early periods of its establishment.[121] One other nodal point is the pluralistic character of Islam both at discursive and practical levels. This is a result of various historical, geographical and

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[119] *Ibid.*
[120] Tayfun Atay, *Din Hayattan Çıkar: Antropolojik Denemeler*, İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2004, p. 30.
[121] For more information on Islam and politics, see. John L. Esposito, *Islam and Politics*, 4th ed., New York: Syracuse University Press, 1998; Antony Black, *Siyasal İslam Düşüncesi Tarihi: Peygamberden Bugüne*, (trans.) S. Çalışkan, H. Çalışkan, Ankara: Dost Kitabevi, 2010; Nazih Ayubi, *Arap Dünyasında Siyaset*, (trans.) Yavuz Alogan, İstanbul: Cep Kitapları, 1993; Edition, *İslam'da Siyaset Düşincesi*, (trans.) Kazım Güleçyüz, İstanbul: İnsan Yayınları, 1995; Amr G. E. Sabet, *Islam and the Political: Theory, Governance and International Relations*, London: Pluto Press, 2008; Bernard Lewis, *İslam'ın Siyasal Söylemi*, (trans.) Ünsan Oskay, Ankara: Phoenix Yayıncılık, 2007; Jan Erik Lane, Hamadi Redissi, *Religion and Politics: Islam and Muslim Civilization*, 2nd. Ed., Farnham, Burlington: Ashgate Publishing, 2009; L. Carl Brown, *Religion and State: The Muslim Approach to Politics*, New York: Columbia University Press, 2000; Süleyman Uludağ, *İslam Siyaset İlişkileri*, 2nd ed., İstanbul: Dergah Yayınları, 2008; Sami Zubaida, *İslam Dünyasında Hukuk ve İktidar*, (trans.) B. K. Birinci, H. Kacak, İstanbul: Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2008; Julius Wellhausen, *İslamiyetin İlk Devrinde Dini - Siyasi Muhalefet Partileri*, (trans.) Fikret Işıltan, Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 1989.

cultural adaptations of Islam in addition to the multi-dimensional nature of religions in general. This inclination also paves the way for Islam to blend in with other discourses/practices in different contexts, including nationalism.[122]

2.2. Nationalism

Kedourie states that there is a widespread agreement among individuals at present that "humanity is naturally divided into nations, that nations are known by certain characteristics which can be ascertained, and that the only legitimate type of government is national self-government."[123] Gellner, who has provided the most frequently quoted definition in the literature, takes this assumption as a starting point and defines nationalist movements to emerge in line with a group of people's desire to rule their destiny in a state of their own.[124] In this regard, "nationalism" is "primarily a political principle, which holds that the political and national unit should be congruent."[125] The crucial point of his definition is that the writer clearly highlights the objective of integrating nation and state for a movement to be considered as nationalist. Accordingly, by the term "state" the author refers to a central political authority responsible for a developed specialization and organization towards establishing and maintaining public order in a society.[126] Besides, Gellner defines "nation" as a group of people sharing a common culture as "a system of ideas and signs and associations and ways of behaving and communicating" as well as "recognizing each other as belonging to the same nation."[127]

While Gellner's approach may lead the way into the discussion, quoting Connor, there is "terminological chaos" of definitions and forms of nationalism in the contemporary literature.[128] This complexity seems to be related with the concept's multi-dimensional and multi-functional character, similar to religion.[129] In this

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[122] For an example of this approach, see. Al-Azmeh, *İslamlar ve Moderniteler…*
[123] Elie Kedourie, *Nationalism*, London: Hutchinson & Co., 1961, p. 9.
[124] Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1983, p. 1-5.
[125] *Ibid.*
[126] *Ibid.,* p. 3-5.
[127] *Ibid.,* p. 7.
[128] Walker Connor, *Ethnonationalism: The Quest for Understanding*, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1994, p. 90-117.
[129] Walter Schnee, "Nationalism: A Review of the Literature", *Journal of Political and Military Sociology*, vol. 29, Summer 2001, p. 2. Greenfeld also focuses especially on formal/functional similarities between religion and

regard, according to various authors, nationalism could be analyzed in the form of an idea, ideology, discourse, emotion, political movement, identity, principle, or doctrine with regard to its various functions.[130] Keeping this complexity in mind, Smith analyzes nationalism under five different titles:

> 1. [T]he whole process of forming and maintaining nations or nation-states
> 2. [A] consciousness of belonging to the nation, together with sentiments and aspirations for its security and prosperity
> 3. [A] language and symbolism of the 'nation' and its role
> 4. [A]n ideology, including a cultural doctrine of nations and the national will and prescriptions for the realization of national aspirations and the national will
> 5. [A] social and political movement to achieve the goals of the nation and realize its national will.[131]

Despite the differences in the definition, emergence of nations and nationalism is undoubtedly a result of the radical transformation in economical, ideological, political, and socio-cultural dimensions throughout the modernization process that set the foundations of social life in the West today. In this perspective, there is a general agreement in the contemporary literature that both nations and nationalism have emerged at the end of the eighteenth century. This is assumed to be appeared in a process primarily led by Western societies where traditional social structures have evolved into new forms of society.[132] Greenfeld underlines a summary of theories which perceive nationalism as a cultural-psychological function of the modernization process. In this regard, nationalism is closely related with the distinctive characteristics of modernity, described as a brand new way of existence by the

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nationalism. Liah Greenfeld, "Nationalism: The Modern Religion?", *Nationalism and the Mind: Essays on Modern Culture*, Oxford: Oneworld Publishing, 2006, p. 93-114.

[130] Umut Özkırımlı, *Milliyetçilik Kuramları: Eleştirel Bir Bakış*, Ankara: Doğu Batı Yayınları, 2008, p. 73-74; Smith, *Millî Kimlik…*, p. 119; Craig Calhoun, *Milliyetçilik*, (trans.) Bilgen Sütçüoğlu, 2nd ed., İstanbul: İ. Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2009, p. 3.

[131] Anthony D. Smith, *National Identity*, London: Penguin Books, 1991, p. 72.

[132] For examples of recent studies on nationalism as a modern phenomenon see. Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism…*; Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism*, Rev. Ed., London, New York: Verso Pub., 1991; Eric J. Hobsbawm, *1780'den Günümüze Milletler ve Milliyetçilik: Program, Mit, Gerçeklik*, trans. Osman Akınhay, İstanbul: Ayrıntı Yayınları, 1993; E. Hobsbawm & Terence Ranger (Eds.), *The Invention of Tradition,* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000; Kedourie, *Nationalism...*; Miroslav Hroch, *Social Preconditions of National Revival in Europe: A Comparative Analysis of the Social Composition of Patriotic Groups among the Smaller European Nations*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985; Calhoun, *Milliyetçilik…*; Liah Greenfeld, *Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity*, Cambridge: Harvard University Pres, 1992; Partha Chatterjee, *Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World: A Derivative Discourse?*, 2nd ed., London: Zed Books, 1993.

writer, like "social mobility, modern state, bureaucratization and centralization; industrialization or capitalism; and secularization."[133]

Still, as a complementary statement, I need to note the fact that "[i]f nationalism is part of the 'spirit of the age', it is equally dependent upon earlier motifs, visions and ideals."[134] According to Smith, it seems possible to see this issue, to a certain extent, as nationalism's inclination to cover the past in addition to its focus on the present and the future.[135] In this respect, all nationalisms claim their roots in ancient historical elements. Nevertheless, various studies in this field have rarely revealed this a valid claim. Therefore, Anderson suggests to comprehend nationalism and related phenomena as "special cultural artefacts"[136] while Hobsbawm, in a similar sense, treats them as "social engineering exercises."[137] This perspective underlines their artificial and modern nature, and assumes that most of the traditions which are identified with nations, have originated in the process of modernity. Accordingly, Hobsbawm defines nationalism as a process of inventing traditions led by the governing elite, in the effort to create a nation around common sentiments and objectives as a way of maintaining an order and solidarity among the masses. For my analysis, it would be useful to assess the author's theory in more detail since it provides a significant contribution to the discussion.

Hobsbawm points out that appealing to traditions "[is] not confined to so-called 'traditional' societies, but also has their place, in one form or another, in 'modern' ones."[138] According to the author, the fundamental characteristic of any tradition, whether it is invented or not, is its invariance; thus, its claim to have roots in an ancient past.[139] He talks of the presence –or the need- of three founding dimensions of tradition in order to sustain this claim: First, tradition involves the adoption of implicit and/or explicit set of rules; secondly, a 'ritualistic', in other words, ceremonial and symbolic dimension; and thirdly, repeated practices to create a

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[133] Liah Greenfeld, "Modernity and Nationalism", G. Delanty and K. Kumar (eds.), *The Sage Handbook of Nations and Nationalism*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006, p. 160.
[134] Smith, *National Identity…*, p. 71.
[135] Anthony D. Smith, "The 'Sacred' Dimension of Nationalism", *Millenium: Journal of International Studies*, Vol. 29, December 2000, p. 802-803.
[136] Anderson, *Imagined Communities…*, p. 4.
[137] Eric Hobsbawm, "Introduction: Inventing Traditions", in *The Invention of Tradition…*, p. 13.
[138] *Ibid.,* p. 5.
[139] *Ibid.*, p. 2.

natural feeling of sustainability from the past.[140] In this framework, the author explains that the traditions-he calls ritualized practices- could be readily grafted on old ones[141] or a contemporary invention.[142] Nevertheless, they serve the same function; "[against] the constant change and innovation of the modern world… [traditions] attempt to structure at least some parts of social life within it as unchanging and invariant.[143]

When the author goes on to explain the concept of invented traditions, he claims that it mostly takes place in periods of fast social transition when most of those old methods do not work for these societies.[144] It is for this reason that invention of tradition, defined by the author as a process of "formalization and routinization with reference to the past", has accelerated in the West in the past 200 years, especially between the years of 1870-1914.[145] In this framework, Hobsbawm observes an intense effort to establish new traditions in various Western countries starting with the industrial revolution until World War I. This was an effort to come up with a solution to dissolving and dividing of masses as a result of the political, financial and social transformations of the time. According to him, this has been done by official institutions and non-official groups at different instances.[146]

For Hobsbawm, this was also a political process, in which "the state increasingly defined the largest stage on which the crucial activities determining human lives as subjects and citizens were played out."[147] Thus, "the standardization of administration and law within it, and, in particular, state education, transformed people into citizens of a specific country: [for instance] 'peasants into Frenchmen'…"[148] According to the author, invention of new traditions or distortion of existing ones through re-interpretation is a fundamental characteristic of nationalism as it is for a number of other modern political institutions, ideological

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[140] *Ibid.*, p. 1-2.
[141] *Ibid.*, p. 6.
[142] *Ibid.*, p. 1.
[143] *Ibid.*, p. 2.
[144] *Ibid.*, p. 4-5, 8.
[145] *Ibid.*, p. 4-5; Hobsbawm, "Mass Producing Traditions: Europe, 1870-1914", in *The Invention of Tradition…,* p. 263.
[146] *Ibid.*
[147] *Ibid.*, p. 264.
[148] *Ibid.*

movements and groups.[149] In fact, he sees invention of new traditions as an act with especially close relationship to concepts like nation, nationalism, nation-state, and similar national phenomena.[150] Through the emphasis on its "natural" and "ancient" character, such movements hope to sustain the unity and legitimization of the nations they represent by means of creating a historical past for themselves with a feeling of continuity.[151] This, of course, involves reference to history. This reference, however, is done by means of distorting the truth or totally inventing a new history, as defined earlier, an exercise of social engineering. According to this view,

> all historians, whatever else their objectives, are engaged in this process inasmuch as they contribute, consciously or not, to the creation, dismantling and restructuring of images of the past which belong not only to the world of specialist investigation but to the public sphere of man as a political being…
>
> [Hence] …the history which became part of the fund of knowledge or the ideology of nation, state or movement is not what has actually been preserved in popular memory, but what has been selected, written, pictured, popularized and institutionalized by those whose function it is to do so.[152]

Hobsbawm quotes the views of the folklorist Rudolf Braun explained in his study on the nineteenth century Swedish nationalism, as an example of the effort to establish a historical connection with the ancient past:

> Existing customary traditional practices – folksong, physical contests, and marksmanship – were modified, ritualized and institutionalized for the new national purposes. Traditional folksongs were supplemented by new songs in the same idiom, often composed by schoolmasters, transferred to a choral repertoire whose content was patriotic-progressive…, though it also embodied ritually powerful elements from religious hymnology… The statuses of the Federal Song Festival… declare its object to be 'the development and improvement of the people's singing, the awakening of more elevated sentiments for God, Freedom and Country, union and fraternization of the friends of Art and the Fatherland'.
>
> A powerful ritual complex formed round those occasions: festival pavilions, structures for the display of flags, temples for offerings, processions, bell-

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[149] Hobsbawm, "Introduction…, p. 7.
[150] *Ibid.*, p. 13.
[151] *Ibid.,* p. 2, 12-14.
[152] *Ibid.,*p. 13.

> ringing, tableaux, gun-salutes, government delegations in honor of the festival, dinners, toasts and oratory.[153]

In this regard, most symbols identified with nationalism generally assumed to have a long history are not as "old" as they are believed to be. For instance, the first national anthem, a must for all nation-states today, was invented by Brits in as late as 1740.[154] Similarly, national flags identified with nations were invented from 1790-1794 onwards as different versions of the three colors of the French Revolution.[155] Standard national languages deemed by some to be essential identifiers of nations are defined by the author as fiction created in recent times.[156] Lastly, for Hobsbawm, certain figures seen as official or un-official symbols of a nation such as "Marianne", "Germania", "John Bull", "Uncle Sam", or "German Michael" are also recent inventions.[157]

Nevertheless, it is also important to highlight the fact that the alleged process of inventing traditions is not single dimensional. Traditions which are produced by the nationalist elite to be imposed upon the society can sometimes be rejected or re-interpreted by the masses themselves. In this respect, there is always possibility for nationalism or national identities to undergo big changes or integrate with other ideology and identities in the course of time.[158]

At this stage, another point that I should mention is the difference between various types of nationalism. To this end, it is appropriate to resort Smith's contribution. Smith agrees with many other nationalism theoreticians in that the first examples of nationalism were seen in modern Western Europe, mainly in France and the United Kingdom. This process, emerging as a result of what he calls the "triple revolution" namely economical (transition from feudalism into capitalism and change in division of labor), political (development of a central state mechanism that operates on rational principles) and cultural (especially with the popularization of mass education

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[153] *Ibid.,* p. 6.
[154] *Ibid.,* p. 7.
[155] *Ibid.*
[156] *Ibid.,* p. 14.
[157] *Ibid.,* p. 7.
[158] Hobsbawm, *1780'den Günümüze Milletler ve Milliyetçilik...,* p. 25.

and creation of a homogeneous and secular culture) transformations has proved to set a successful model over time and expanded into other regions and continents.[159]

With this expansion process, Smith suggests the formation of two fundamental types of nation-state in relation with the specific conditions of different countries: "Territorial/citizenship nationalism" emerging in Western Europe, and "ethnic nationalism" in Central and Eastern Europe.[160] According to Smith, the first model "takes its basis from a sense of territory, and from the effects of interaction within clear-cut geographical boundaries" and citizens' relationship regulated by laws alongside a common culture.[161] However, in the second model, in his own words, "nations were gradually or discontinuously formed on the basis of pre-existing *ethnie*s and ethnic ties," thus they are usually defined with reference to a specific people and emphasis on historical ties and traditional culture.[162]

At this point, I need to underline that the concept of *ethnie* sets the foundations of Smith's theory of nationalism. The author defines *ethnie* as "named human populations with shared ancestry myths, histories and cultures, having an association with a specific territory and a sense of solidarity."[163] Different from a number of modernist researchers, the author is an advocate of the "ethno-symbolic approach", claiming the basis of the majority of modern nations to be previously existing *ethnie*s. Still, it should also be added that Smith does not perceive nations as essential structures. In fact, he underlines the fact that even in groups organized under a common ethnicity, fundamental traits considered to specifically define and unite *ethnie* are transformed and re-produced. Since, he believes that they are always reinterpreted by the interaction of individuals in the group.[164] Hence, although nationalist movements claim to present a cultural continuity, in reality, this means the production of a new (modern) identity.

Furthermore, Smith adds that even though the relative continuity relationship between ethnicity and nation seems to be distinctive traits of ethnic nationalism,

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[159] Anthony D. Smith, *The Ethnic Origins of Nations*, Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 1988, p. 131-134.
[160] *Ibid.,* p. 135-137.
[161] *Ibid.,* p. 135.
[162] *Ibid.,* p. 137.
[163] *Ibid.,* p. 32.
[164] *Ibid.,* p. 22.

actually all nation-states are a mixture of the territorial and ethnic models.[165] According to him, this situation mainly results from the general inclination of any nation-state to mobilize people over a specific *ethnie* towards legitimizing the regime and achieving social-cultural integrity.[166] According to Smith,

> [a]lthough in each case appeal was made to historic territories and political memories of former independence… [establishment process of a nation-state] had to be supplemented by the rediscovery and revitalization of ethnic ties and sentiments — by the tracing of alleged pedigrees (often through kinship, chronicles and philology), by popular mobilization, by the elevation of vernacular culture (religion, language, customs and institutions), and by a rewriting of history from a 'nativist' standpoint (emphasizing the unique collective past and destiny, and the autonomous collective will).[167]

Therefore, "seek[ing] to create those myths of descent, those historical memories and that common culture which form the missing elements of their ethnic make-up, along with a mutual solidarity" becomes an important dimension of any national program.[168]

Here, a brief evaluation of racism as an extremist form of nationalism should also be appropriate for the coming debate in my analysis of texbooks. In its classical form, racism is an ideology postulating moral and intellectual superiority based on biological characteristics.[169] In this regard, stratificational differences among groups are essentially legitimized through genetic/biological explanations in spite of referring material or historical conditions.[170] Racist inclinations are usually in conjunction with discriminative behavior or policies against groups which are assumed to be racially inferior.[171] In modern times, it was 1930s when racist policies gained a widespread prominence/popularity throughout the world. Refering ideas of some Enlightenment philosophers on the racial superiority of Europeans (especially Arians) and alleged scientific evidences, Hitler in Germany and Mussolini in Italy

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[165] *Ibid.,* p. 149.
[166] *Ibid.,* p. 147-149.
[167] *Ibid.,* p. 145.
[168] *Ibid.,* p. 147.
[169] Mehmet Taş, *Avrupa'da Irkçılık*, Ankara: İmge Yayınları, 1999, p. 41.
[170] *Ibid.*
[171] *Ibid.,* p. 42.

led the cruelest manifestations of this ideology in these years by commiting genocide of different groups.[172]

After a general assessment of theories attempting to explain concepts of religion and nationalism, I now analyze the theoretical approaches identifying the relationship between these two phenomena based on historical examples.

2.3. Relationships between Religion and Nationalism

Due to the social indicative character of religion and nationalism emphasized so far, they have always received much interest from researchers in the field of social sciences. Still, as a result of their connection with certain historical and social conditions —to state it more openly, due to religion being associated with the traditional world and nationalism with the modernization process— they were considered impossible to league together for a long time. Until recently, they were rather treated as phenomena substituting one another.[173] The small number of studies focusing on their intersection at an ideological as well as organizational level in various social formations is a proof of this.

A typical example of the approach mentioned above would be the studies attempting to explain nationalism based on the thesis of classical secularism. The thesis of classical secularism is based on the works of the founding leaders of sociological theory which were developed under the impact of the Enlightenment paradigm especially in the Western world. They simply identify the process of modernization with secularization. Hence, for them, religion lost most —if not all- of its dominance over the society in the modernization process. In this regard, it is usually assumed that in all societies who experience modernization, beliefs and practices corresponding to "old/traditional" forms of solidarity and mentality should lose

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[172] For a detailed analysis of racism see. Ali Rattansi, *Racism: A Short Introduction*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007; Steve Garner, *Racisms: An Introduction*, London: Sage Publications, 2010; George M. Fredrickson, *Racism: A Short History*, Princeton & Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2002; Robert Miles and Malcolm Braun, *Racism*, 2nd ed., London & New York: Routledge Taylor & Francis, 2003.

[173] For a detaied criticism on this approach see. Peter van der Veer and Hartmut Lehmann (Eds.), *Nations and Religion: Perspectives on Europe and Asia,* Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999; Barbara-Ann J. Rieffer, "Religion and Nationalism: Understanding the Consequences of a Complex Relationship," *Ethnicities*, vol. 3, no.2, 2003, p. 215-242; Anthony D. Smith, *Chosen Peoples*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2003; Liah Greenfeld, "Modernity and Nationalism…; Brubaker, "Religion and Nationalism: Four Approaches…

ground to be replaced by rational/modern thinking and organizational models of a secular nature.[174] For this reason, it would not be wrong to state that, according to the studies adopting this approach, religion indeed has lost its feature of being an influential source of reference in explaining social reality.

In the same context, nationalism, as a component of the modernization process, has been directly associated with secularism. Thus, most of the researchers in this field, including Gellner and Anderson, have left religion out of the picture until recently.[175] Van der Veer and Lehmann define this approach as an ideological component of the (classical) "Western discourse of modernity."[176] According to them,

> …Social theory as well as Western common sense have often been content to assume an ideological a priori distinction between the nationalist and the religious imagination. As the argument goes, nationalism belongs to the realm of legitimate modern politics. Nationalism is assumed to be "secular", since it is thought to develop in a process of secularization and modernization. Religion, in this view, assumes political significance only in the underdeveloped parts of the World-much as it did in the past of the West. When religion manifests itself politically in the contemporary world, it is conceptualized as fundamentalism. This term, derived from early-twentieth-century American evangelicalism, is now taken by scholars and media as an analytical term to describe collective political action by religious movements. It is almost always interpreted as a negative social force directed against science, rationality, secularism –in short, against modernity.

> The dichotomy between religion and nationalism is an ideological element in the Western discourse of modernity. It functions not only in the Western perception of the non-West, but also in the way the West understands itself. The most influential philosophical exposition of that self-understanding appears in Hegel's *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte*. Based partly on his philosophical notion of the rationality of the West is the current but much less sophisticated idea that Western Europe and the United States have had a unique historical experience of secularization, whereas Asia (and South Asia in

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[174] For furter details on the concept of Secularism, see. David Martin, *A General Theory of Secularization*, Oxford: Blacwell Publishing, 1978; Steve Bruce, *Religion in the Modern World*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996; Steve Bruce, *God is Dead: Secularization in the West*, Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2002; Bryan R. Wilson, *Religion in Sociological Perspective*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982; Bryan R. Wilson, *Religion in Secular Society*, London: C.A. Watts, 1996; Peter L. Berger, *Kutsal Şemsiye: Dinin Sosyolojik Teorisinin Ana Unsurları*, trans. Ali Coşkun, 4 ed., İstanbul: Rağbet Yayınları, 2011 (Orj. *The Sacred Canopy: Elements of a Sociological Theory of Religion*, New York: Anchor Books, 1969); Peter L. Berger, *The Social Reality of Religion*, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1973; Jose Casanova, *Public Religions in the Modern World*, Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1994; S.S. Acquaviva, *The Decline of the Sacred in Industrial Society*, Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1979.

[175] For similar examples, see. John Breuilly, *Nationalism and the State*, Chicage: University of Chicago Press, 1994; Charles Tilly, "The State of Nationalism", *Critical Review: A Journal of Politics and Society*, 10(2), p. 299-306; Michael Hechter, *Containing Nationalism*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000.

[176] P. van der Veer and H. Lehmann, "Introduction", van der Veer and Lehmann (Eds), *Nations and Religion…*, p. 3.

particular) had a history of dangerous politicization of religious difference. This impression is plainly wrong, since it perpetuates the old, mistaken view of the great divide between the modern West and the backward Rest…[177]

Brubaker highlights this discourse's "blind eye to religion" has not always remained limited to the explanation of European nationalist movements since some researchers have also adhered the same perspective to other examples in today's non-Western world.[178]

Nevertheless, there has been a notable increase in the number of studies analyzing various articulation patterns between religion and nationalism with the diversity emerging in social sciences especially from 1990s onwards both in terms of approach and areas of study.[179] These have generally been based on an "alternative modernity paradigm" allowing for diversity and dynamism with regard to experiences of modernity. They principally oppose to the strict and generalizing approach of the classical modernist paradigm which sees modern societies as uniform/static structures. Zawadzki summarizes the essence of these studies, especially the ones about Europe, based on the idea that different social experiences may lead to the emergence of different modernity types:

> Considering the past couple of centuries in European history, we come across a wide variety of experiences comprised of similarities, endless conflicts and supplementary components [between religion and nationalism]. From the West to the East, examples of Ireland, France, Poland, Serbia and Romania present the dynamics resulting from nation based religious structures or depending on the conditions and period, instrumentalization of religious roots with nationalist motives. At times, nationalists attempt to instrumentilize religion and at times it

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[177] *ibid*, p. 3-4.

[178] Brubaker, "Religion and Nationalism…, p. 15.

[179] For further examples, see. Fred Halliday, *Nation and Religion in the Middle East*, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2000; P. van der Veer and H. Lehmann (Eds), *Nations and Religion: Perspectives on Europe and Asia*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999; Mark Juergensmeyer, *The New Cold War?: Religious Nationalism Confronts the Secular State*, California: University of California Pres, 1993; Martin E. Marty ve R. Scott Appleby (Eds), *Religion, Ethnicity, and Self-Identity: Nations in Turmoil*, Hanover: University of Press of New England, 1997; Adrian Hastings, *The Construction of Nationhood: Ethnicity, Religion, and Nationalism*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997; Anthony D. Smith, *Chosen Peoples,* New York: Oxford University Press, 2003; Liah Greenfeld, *Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity*, Cambridge: Harvard University Pres, 1992; Barbara-Ann J. Rieffer, "Religion and Nationalism: Understanding the Consequences of a Complex Relationship," *Ethniticites,* vol. 3, no.2, 2003, p. 215-242; John Coakley, "Religion and Nationalism in the First World", *Ethnonationalism in the Contemporary World: Walker Connor and the Study of Nationalism*, ed. Daniele Conversi, London: Routledge, 2002; Willfried Spohn, "Multiple Modernity, Nationalism and Religion: A Global Perspective," *Current Sociology*, Vol. 51(3/4), May/July 2003, p. 265-286; Philip W. Barker, *If God Be For Us: Religious Nationalism in Modern Europe*, Unpublished PhD Dissertation, Colorado: University of Colorado, 2001; Geneviéve Zubrzycki, *The Crosses of Auschwitz: Nationalism and Religion in Post-Communist Poland*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006.

is the opposite. Some cases uncover the conflicts between national regionalism and universal religion. Others reveal such conflicts to be the founding stones of both religious and national identities. And others still prove religion to reinforce nationalist emotions, local culture and languages.[180]

Thus, the examples even only from Europe's recent history reveal a noteworthy diversity in terms of the relationships between nationalism and religion contrary to the assumptions in classical modernist approaches.

Close analysis of this diversity reveals the possibility of forming an analogical categorization based on the similarities and differences between relationship patterns. Establishing an explanatory typology will shed light onto the changing relationships between religion and nationalism about the discourse in the textbooks used in the early Republican era in Turkey. In this respect, it is important to refer to Kedourie as one of the relatively early period authors of nationalism theory. Smith argues that Kedouire has adopted three different approaches regarding the relationship between religion and nationalism. According to Smith, the different models adopted by Kedouire over time can be summarized as follows:

> 1. The first and dominant one is what we may call the 'secular replacement' approach, which, in *modernist* mode, holds that a secular, revolutionary nationalism progressively replaces religion in the modern epoch. Though not all modernists share this position, for many of those who hold that nations are modern, 'religion' is a basic component of a 'traditional society' and will disappear along with other features of that kind of society. Nationalism, on the other hand, is an intrinsic element of modernization, and the participant nation is essential to a modern 'progressive' type of society and is likely to flourish in those areas where modernization has penetrated…

> 2. The second position we can term 'neo-traditional'. It envisages a return to 'religion', albeit of a transformed and radicalized kind. Religion is viewed in more *perennialist* terms as persisting into modernity from earlier epochs, and hence as a possible ally and support for nationalism. Nationalism in turn plays on the atavistic sentiments of the masses and shares with chiliastic religions similar populist and messianic features, as well as similar techniques of mass mobilization, incitement, and terror, especially in Asia and Africa...

> 3. A Third position, which views nationalism as a secular version of millennial 'political religion', can also be discerned in Kedourie's work. The most complex of the three, this model depicts nationalism as a new *ersatz* and

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[180] Paul Zawadzki, "Milliyetçilik, Demokrasi ve Din", *Milliyetçiliği Yeniden Düşünmek: Kuramlar ve Uygulamalar* , A. Dieckhoff & C. Jaffrelot (ed.s.), (trans.) Devrim Çetinkasap, İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2010, p. 209-210.

> heterodox religion, opposed to conventional, traditional religions, yet inheriting many of their features –symbols, liturgies, rituals, and messianic fervor- which now come to possess new and subversive political national meanings. This may help to account for the predominantly secular content but religious forms of so many nationalisms, as well as for their ability to transmute the values of traditional religion into secular political ends…[181]

Taking these models as a starting point, it seems possible to build a triple model regarding the shifting relationship patterns between nationalism and religion. The first one is a "secular nationalism" based on a secular (worldly) discourse. The second one is "religious nationalism," which integrates conventional and modern forms representing the effort to articulate the nationalist discourse to an existing religion/sect, or in other words, nationalization of an existing religion/sect. In addition, a third model, which may be called "civil religion", "secular religion", or "pseudo-religion" is defined based on sacralization of the nationalist discourse (in other words becoming a worldly religion) often accompanied by a strict interpretation of secularism. In this study, since there is much controversy about the third one in the literature[182], I prefer to take the first two patterns as models.

2.3.1. Secular Nationalism

The first model that I can refer to in my analysis of textbooks is secular nationalism, in Rieffer's words, which "often ignore religion or reject a specific religious tradition."[183] According to her, leaders advocating this model generally spent notable efforts to keep their programs away from religious inclinations and emphasized the secular nature of their movements.[184] Although the classical secularist thesis generalizes this model to almost all types of nationalism, it has in fact flourished only under relatively unique historical-social conditions limited to certain parts of the world and at certain periods in the history of a nation. From this perspective, before I

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[181] Smith, *Chosen Peoples…*, p. 13-14.
[182] For the debate about considering nationalism as a (modern) religion see. Liah Greenfeld, "Nationalism: The Modern Religion?," *Critical Review* 10 (2), 1996, p. 169–91; Brubaker, "Religion and Nationalism: Four Approaches…; Smith, *Chosen Peoples…*; Jose Santiago, "From "Civil Religion" to Nationalism as the Religion of Modern Times: Rethinking a Complex Relationship", *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion*, 48(2), 2009, p. 394–401.
[183] Rieffer, "Religion and Nationalism…, p. 231.
[184] *ibid.*

proceed with the example of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries France, it will be useful to refer to the theories of Gellner and Anderson. Both authors make a valuable contribution to the discussion of this model since, I believe, they indeed focus on the first examples of secular nationalism appeared in the West.

Gellner attempts to explain the emergence and development of nationalism essentially in the context of a historical transformation in the Western world including the relative decline in the impact of religion on social life. In his classical work, the existence of nationalism is deemed to be related with the emergence of a culturally homogeneous society based on the circumstances brought on by the new (secular) ideology as well as market conditions and industrial division of labor.

In this framework, Gellner examines the rise of nationalism giving priority to the analysis of cognitive processes. For him, industrialization as a component of modernization process performs an accelerating role in the development of nationalism. According to the author, as Weber also pointed out, "rationalism" embedded with the notions of orderliness and productivity is the prominent distinctive quality of industrialized societies.[185] This new intellectual/mental paradigm named by Gellner as a "modern understanding/spirit of analysis", perceives the reality as a secular, stable, single/unifying, and homogenous entity as opposed to a religious framework based on the differentiation between the sacred and profane.[186]

According to Gellner, technical and financial developments emerging as an outcome of industrialization have supplemented this intellectual approach. In this framework, the most fundamental traits of the new economy have been instability, rapidly changing division of labor, and a need for vocational mobility.[187] The author underlines that in the context of these developments, a variety of strict stratificational barriers could no longer be constructed.[188] Hence, under these circumstances the necessity for establishing a relative equality among various social groups to

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[185] Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism…*, p. 19.
[186] *Ibid.,* p. 20-23.
[187] *Ibid.,* p. 24-25.
[188] *Ibid.,* p. 25.

overcome deep cultural differences, in other words, a common language for the people to communicate, has emerged. [189]

For Gellner, the most prominent tool for popularizing such cultural homogeneity, alongside providing for the minimum qualities necessitated by new jobs, is "mass education", a concept emerging at around the same time. He believes that citizens in industrialized nations can only acquire the basic knowledge and skills required by specialization and the new structure of division of labor through a standard and homogeneous mass education.[190] Distinctive knowledge for specialized jobs shall then be taught at higher education..[191] Thus, for the author, education is the basis of the modern social order.[192] At this point Gellner adds that only a centralized government structure can achieve such a wide-scale and complex objective.[193]

Considering the advantages of belonging to a common culture offered to the individual, one can see the reasons behind the gathering of masses of different cultural origins around common signs, values, and symbols officially registered under national identity.[194] Thus, similar to Durkheim's religion theory, the society begins to deify itself openly and pushfully under the name of nationalism.[195] Nevertheless, Gellner adds that in modern times this cannot be deemed a religious act.[196]

Finally, Gellner also makes significant observations regarding the tradition building dimension of the nationalist movements in creating nations. According to the author, despite the prominence of a "high culture" based on literacy and exclusive to the ruling elite, the process of building nations has never been too simple. While some of the existing cultures are transformed to benefit from their cultural heritage, some "[d]ead languages can be revived, traditions invented, quite fictitious pristine purities restored."[197] In fact, a new culture will be established. For Gellner, this invented (or at least "transformed" from the original) culture is blessed as a "national culture"

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[189] *Ibid.*
[190] *Ibid.*, p. 26-27.
[191] *Ibid.*
[192] *Ibid.*, p. 27, 35.
[193] *Ibid.*, p. 37-38.
[194] *Ibid.*, p. 43-50.
[195] *Ibid.*, p. 56-57.
[196] *Ibid.*
[197] *Ibid.*, p. 56.

once it is identified with the political unit. This process also includes the establishment of nations which he calls as modern fiction.[198] For Gellner, nationalism alone is responsible for the transformation of different groups in the society into a homogenous nation, either willingly or by force: "It is nationalism, which sometimes takes pre-existing cultures and turns them into nations, sometimes invents them, and often obliterates pre-existing cultures."[199]

Anderson, on the other hand, focuses primarily on the concept of nation in his theory. For him, nations are (above all in the eyes of their members) "imagined political communities".[200] Although the author believes that "…all communities larger than primordial villages of face-to-face contact (and perhaps even these are imagined); he suggests that distinctive qualities of nations are based on "the style in which they are imagined."[201] In this respect, Anderson emphasizes two characteristics determining the act of imagining, namely being bound to limits and sovereignty. The first aspect is in a way the fate of all communities as all are surrounded by populations belonging to other communities and have finite boundaries.[202] On the other hand, the author suggests, imagining a sovereign nation has to do with the conditions of the era. For him, at a time when Enlightenment and the French Revolution opened the door for questioning of the traditional legitimacy of the rule based on the dynasty and replacing it with a sovereign, modern state, nationalism came to be defined over sovereignty.[203]

Following his explanations regarding the definition of a nation, Anderson proceeds with the analysis of the historical process in which nationalism emerges. For him, three main factors have had a significant impact on the development of nationalism in the West: Religion losing its prominence in social life, change in the masses' perception of time, and capitalism stepping into the publishing sector.[204]

Anderson suggests that the first one of these factors is religion losing its prominence in social life with the advent of the Enlightenment Era. As religious discourse began

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[198] *Ibid.,* p. 48-49, 53.
[199] *Ibid.,* p. 49.
[200] Anderson, *Imagined Communities…,* p. 6.
[201] *Ibid.,* p. 6.
[202] *Ibid.,* p. 7.
[203] *Ibid.*
[204] *Ibid.,* p. 36.

to lose ground in Western Europe from the eighteenth century onwards, religion also began to lose its power as a source of legitimizing communities, languages and race.[205] This, coupled with the sacred language Latin losing its prominence, resulted in the dissolving of religious communities as well as the weakening of the religious elite and dynasties with respect to their legitimacy. With the contribution of other factors, nationalism became the rising star of this process which gave the masses the power to do what religion did for centuries through a sacred system in a worldly one. In other words, it was nationalism which "brought about secular transformation of fatality into continuity, [and] contingency into meaning."[206] This, in a way, means that nationalism replaced religion as the fundamental source of legitimacy giving meaning to life and things.

For Anderson, the second factor, and perhaps the most important one is the radical changes in the people's perception of time as a unique way of understanding the world. The new (secular) perception of time which the author calls "horizontal/temporal, transverse time" is different than the traditional/religion based societies' understanding of "cyclical/Messianic time."[207] Indeed, the secular perspective views time as "an endless chain of cause and effect or of radical separations between past and present", while time is deemed in the latter as simultaneity of past and future in an instantaneous present."[208] In this regard, for Anderson, the new understanding of time has enabled nations to be imagined as mass communities moving from the past into the future.[209] The author also considers the contribution of geographic discoveries which offered a new perspective to cultural and social plurality/diversity in the minds of the Europeans.[210] Hence, combining the impact of the two developments, the author argues that 'being bound by limits' is one of the fundamental qualities of a nation; this is how the idea of a nation settles in the minds of the people both in terms of time and place.

The third factor enabling nationalism to flourish has been the developments in the printing/publishing industry. Anderson defines the "book" as "the first modern-style

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[205] *Ibid.*, p. 10-12.
[206] *Ibid.*, p. 11.
[207] *ibid.*, p. 24.
[208] *ibid.*, p. 23-24.
[209] *Ibid.*, p. 26.
[210] *Ibid.*, p. 16.

mass-produced industrial commodity."[211] He explains with reference to Febvre and Martin that the printing sector, especially in 16th Century Europe, has become "a great industry under the control of wealthy capitalism… [m]ore than at any other time."[212] In this historical stage, as the small Latin market became saturated, publishers who initially moved with the motive to make more profit turned to markets serving larger population groups speaking local languages or dialects.[213] Anderson refers to a narrowing of the use of sacred Latin since certain languages among many others became standardized and popularized.[214] Hence, the development of print-capitalism has not only enabled the emergence of new stable languages over time through which a nation could be imagined, but it also set the ground for the establishment of a unified communication and exchange among some communities.[215] In this respect, for Anderson, "[this development] made it possible for rapidly growing numbers of people to think about themselves, and to relate themselves to others, in profoundly new ways."[216]

All these factors combined together have paved the way for a new inclination as "a new way of linking fraternity, power and time meaningfully together seen first in Western Europe then other parts of the world."[217] Hence, in spite of common stratificational and exploitative relational patterns within all nations, communities imagined as deep and horizontal companionships by their members once established, they began to spread around the world.[218]

Having explained Gellner and Anderson's contributions to the analysis of the historical conditions giving rise to secular nationalist movements in the West, it will be useful to shortly touch upon some specific manifestations of this pattern. Since there is a general agreement regarding the eighteenth century French nationalism, it will be beneficial to take a closer look at the relationship between religion and nationalism in this context.

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[211] *Ibid.*, p. 34
[212] *Ibid.*, p. 38.
[213] *Ibid.*, p. 37-38.
[214] *Ibid.*, p. 18-19, 43-44.
[215] *Ibid.*, p. 36.
[216] *Ibid.*
[217] *Ibid.*.
[218] Anderson, *Hayali Cemaatler…*, p. 4, 7.

Hayes explains the development of eighteenth century French nationalism as a consequence of the Enlightenment process. According to him, this process can be defined by the emergence of rational skepticism against traditional/metaphysical religion coupled with contemporary inventions and speculations in natural sciences. Hayes suggests that these developments originating from the Enlightenment reinforced the materialist-positivist assumption based on the idea that the whole truth is nature (and this world) alone; thus, making the need to turn to religion and to divine authority in explaining acts of nature redundant.[219] With the popularization of these ideas, the author suggests, "deism" based on the belief in a god as the creator of the rules of nature without being involved in the material world on the one hand and "atheism" as an alternative based on the idea that nature does not need a creator on the other hand, began to spread among the Western intellectuals especially in France.[220] In this context attacks against traditional Christianity (Roman Catholicism in the French case) intensified while nationalism eventually replaced traditional bonds. The author adds that the majority of the French Revolutionists shared this view along with philosophers of the Enlightenment era such as Voltaire, d'Holbach, and Raynal.[221]

At this point, Hayes notes a development specific to France. The founding elite initially put efforts into settling the dispute between the nationalism and traditional Christianity in France. The objective was to oblige the Church to the national state through enforcement of *the Civil Charter for Ecclesiastics* (1791). Nevertheless, their efforts failed as the church refused to make the required concessions.[222] As a result of the changing policies, priests who have opposed to the civil charter were harshly punished, even executed at the guillotine.[223] Hence, as the French poet Marie-Joseph de Chénier stated that, addressing *the Convention of Fall* (1793), nationalism has been praised as a separate entity from Christianity as a secular/profane and even anti-religious concept.[224] This approach had an impact on

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[219] Carlton J. H. Hayes, *Milliyetçilik: Bir Din – Batı Siyasal Düşüncesinde "Ulusalcılık" Tasavvuru*, (trans.) Murat Çiftkaya, 2 ed., İstanbul: İz Yayıncılık, 2010, p. 59.
[220] *Ibid.*, p. 60-61.
[221] *Ibid.*, p. 61-62.
[222] *Ibid.*, p. 71.
[223] *Ibid.*
[224] *Ibid.*, p. 72.

the definition of the idea of nationalism for the ruling elite of the early Republican Turkey. I will be discussing the Turkish case further in the following chapter.

2.3.2. Religious Nationalism

As pointed out earlier, the second pattern between religion and nationalism is conceptualized as religious nationalism. This model emerges as a result of the integration of a nationalist discourse or movement with a religion or sect considering that they are inseparable.[225] This may be through nationalization of an existing religion (or sect) or sanctification of elements associated with a specific national identity.[226] In Rieffer's words, in these movements "…we see people not only demanding their own nation and sovereignty, but asserting that their nation is religiously based. They want political autonomy *and* recognition of their religion."[227] Similarly, Baker suggests that in order to identify any discourse or movement with religious nationalism, religion needs to be cited at top –if not the first one- of the list of the components that make up national identity.[228] As Baker argues,

> religious nationalism may focus equally on religion and language, but the individuals engulfed by the religious and linguistic markers are one and the same. For instance, the Greek language may be central to modern Greek identity. However, the Orthodox Church is central as well, and the two concepts are coterminous in that Greek speakers are assumed to be Orthodox as well.[229]

Hence, for this model, a specific religion and nation/nationalism are generally considered to be two complimentary and inseparable parts of a whole.

It is evident that theories discussing the integration of religion and nationalism can be analyzed through two models in regard to their approaches about the antiquity of nationalism and nations. Those that fall into the first model based on the studies of perennialists/ primordialists, consider ancient ethnic groups as proto-nations. Thus, religion, for them, is the essential or complementary component of national (ethnic)

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[225] Rieffer, "Religion and Nationalism…, p. 225
[226] On this issue, I was inspired by Al-Azmeh's observation that "the positive bond between Islam and Arab nationalism in the context of Islam falls in the area of sanctification while in the context of Arab nationalism, it becomes a topic of Arabization." *İslamlar ve Moderniteler*, p. 120.
[227] Rieffer, "Religion and Nationalism…, p. 225. Emphasis belongs to the author.
[228] Barker, *If God Be For Us…,* p. 24.
[229] *ibid.*

identity since ancient times. Salo Wittmayer- Baron's study is a good example supporting this view.[230] The second model attempts to explain the process of articulating nationalism with religions as a modern development. Examples of the authors in support of this view are Wilfred Spohn, Mark Juergensmeyer, P. Van der Veer, and H. Lehmann.[231]

The main argument of the studies in the first group is that religious and ethnic attachments were inseparable components of group identity for many populations throughout history. According to Wittmayer- Baron, the first examples of this interaction can be found even among ruling populations during the antique age. In his opinion, as religious and ethnic elements were integrated in societies of the time, religion served as a complementary in integrating various tribes together like modern nationalism would does in the present.[232] Wittmayer- Baron emphasizes that this model is essentially based on the experiences of ancient Israelites, Hellenes, and even Phoenicians to some extent and had a strong impact on all civilizations to follow.[233] As the scope of my analysis focuses essentially on the modern age, the brief summary I have presented with regard to the close relationship between religion and ethnicity as a form of proto-nationalism will be sufficient to set the scene.

Studies on modern societies where religion and nationalism were integrated through various patterns essentially fall in the second model. In this section, I begin with Spohn's general observations regarding religious nationalist movements in the modern world. Then, I will concentrate on the differentiation of various models of religious nationalism.

Spohn takes the rise of both religious and nationalist movements around the world especially since the 1980s, as a starting point in contrast to the assumptions of classical secularization theories mentioned above. In his point of view, in a world where both of these concepts are gaining importance, we are witnessing developments like ethnic nationalism, resurrection of religion, popularization of

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[230] Salo Wittmayer-Baron, *Modern Milliyetçilik ve Din,* trans. Mehmet Özay, İstanbul: Açılım Kitap, 2007.
[231] Willfred Spohn, "Multiple Modernity, Nationalism and Religion: A Global Perspective", *Current Sociology*, May/July 2003, vol. 51 (3/4); Juergensmeyer, *The New Cold War?…*; P. van der Veer and H. Lehmann (Eds), *Nation and Religion: Perspectives on Europe and Asia,* Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1999.
[232] Wittmayer-Baron, *Modern Milliyetçilik ve Din…,* p. 18.
[233] *Ibid.*, p. 34.

religious fundamentalism, and various forms of religious nationalism.[234] Spohn argues that various theoretical approaches, most of which have been developed by Marxist and postmodernist theoreticians, are in an attempt to overcome the shortsightedness of the classical modernization paradigm on this issue. According to these newly emerged theories, the rise of religious and nationalist movements especially in the Third World countries is essentially a response to widespread globalization and global powers, to international political structures, and to a global secular culture.[235] Nevertheless, from a historical-sociological point of view, Spohn believes that these and similar paradigms of macro inclination carry the same prejudices at a methodological level. For him,

> …they essentialize either the nation-state system or the global system and directly correlate within each unit political, socioeconomic and cultural phenomena and dimensions, instead of considering the local, national and transnational macro-micro linkages, relations and interactions.[236]

For this reason, Spohn suggests analyzing nationalist movements in the non-Western world are the outcomes of multiple modernities, (multiple) modernization and (multiple) democratization processes. At this point, it is necessary to explain Eisenstadt's conceptualization of multiple modernities.

The term multiple modernities coined by sociologist Shmuel N. Eisenstadt in the early 2000s and has become popular especially during the attempts to describe various modernity experiences taking place in the non-Western World. In fact, Eisenstadt criticizes the assumptions of classical modernization theories that generalize the experiences of Western countries to the other parts of the world. He argues that these assumptions have failed to meet the expectations in regard to modernity experiences in the post-World War II period around the world since these experiences differed considerably from each other.[237] To quote him:

> …While a general trend toward structural differentiation developed across a wide range of institutions in most of these societies –in family life, economic and political structures, urbanization, modern education, mass communication,

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[234] Spohn, "Multiple Modernity, Nationalism and Religion…, p. 265.
[235] *Ibid.*, p. 266.
[236] *Ibid.*
[237] See S. N. Eisenstadt, "Multiple Modernities", *Daedalus*, Winter 2000, 129 (1), p. 1.

and individualistic orientations- the ways in which these arenas were defined and organized varied greatly, in different periods of their development, giving rise to multiple institutional and ideological patterns. Significantly, these patterns did not constitute simple continuations in the modern era of the traditions of their respective societies. Such patterns were distinctively modern dynamics and modes of interpretation, for which the original Western Project constituted the crucial (and usually ambivalent) reference point. Many of the movements that developed in non-Western societies articulated strong anti-Western or even anti-modern themes, yet all were distinctively modern. This was true not only of the various nationalist and traditionalist movements that emerged in these societies from about the middle of the nineteenth century until after World War II, but also,… of the more contemporary fundamentalist ones.[238]

According to Eisenstadt's, the diversity and large number of cultural programs re-structured by various societies of the contemporary world allows us to discuss the concept of multiple modernities.[239] This process works as described below:

These ongoing reconstructions of multiple institutional and ideological patterns are carried forward by specific social actors in close connection with social, political, and intellectual activists, and also by social movements pursuing different programs of modernity, holding very different views on what makes societies modern. Through the engagement of these actors with broader sectors of their respective societies, unique expressions of modernity are realized. These activities have not been confined to any single society or state, though certain societies and states proved to be the major arenas where social activists were able to implement their programs and pursue their goals. Though distinct understandings of multiple modernity developed within different nation-states, and within different ethnic and cultural groupings, among communist, fascist, and fundamentalist movements, each, however different from others, was in many respects international.[240]

Eisenstadt states that the most significant contribution of these different experiences and of the concept of multiple modernities to the literature is that "modernity and Westernization are not identical; Western patterns of modernity are not the only 'authentic' modernities, though they enjoy historical precedence and continue to be a basic reference point for others."[241]

I believe that this argument provides a significant contribution in discussing the still prominent status of various historical bonds and traditions such as religion and

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[238] *Ibid.*, p. 1-2.
[239] *Ibid.*, p. 2.
[240] *Ibid.*
[241] *Ibid.*, p. 2-3.

ethnicity in modern societies. To go back to Spohn's article, he also states that it is possible to explain the prevailing roles of Judaism, Christianity, Islam, Buddhism, and many other religions or traditions even in modern societies through the concept of multiple modernities.[242] In this context, Spohn defines the global world as a place where "an intensification of interactions between differing civilizations with varying combinations of ethnic, national, political, civic, religious and cultural components takes place."[243] From this perspective, he develops the following approach to explain various social models in the contemporary world:

> Globalization processes are not to be seen simply as a growing dissemination and imposition of western market capitalism, democratic nation-state and secular culture, but rather as multiple, though hierarchical and uneven, encounters of varying types of modernities in their economic, political, religious and secular cultures on a global scale… Western modernity and its globalizing dissemination are not simply coterminous with the universal model of secular modernity, but are shaped by specific forms of capitalism, democracy, predominantly Christian as well as Christian-based secular cultures. Non-western varieties of modernity are not simply an adaptation of non-western civilizations to western modernity, but an incorporation of western impacts and influences in non-western civilizational dynamics, programs of modernity and modernization processes. As a consequence, an explanation of the contemporary global rise of ethnic and religious nationalism has to consider the internal dynamics as well as external forces of nation-state and national identity formation within the various civilizations of the globe.[244]

In this regard, Spohn adopts a comparative- civilizational approach in order to explain the overlap between religious and national identities.[245] According to this approach, the general institutional and cultural diversity of Europe today is based on two fundamental heritages. The first one is the Roman Empire background and the new political organization following its disintegration.[246] The second one is Christianity, bearing traces of Judaism, Greek-Hellenistic and pagan beliefs which over time experienced denominational differences partly caused by ethnic and regional issues.[247] Hence, contemporary European civilization is the result of a

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[242] Spohn, "Multiple Modernity, Nationalism and Religion…, p. 269.
[243] *Ibid.*, p. 270.
[244] *Ibid.*
[245] The author points to Shmuel Noah Eisenstadt, *The European Civilization in Comparative Perspective*, Oslo: Scandinavian University Press, 1987 as a preliminary work anayzing European societies from such perspective.
[246] Spohn, "Multiple Modernity, Nationalism and Religion…, p. 272.
[247] *Ibid.*

process of transformation through modernization which is associated with the emergence of the modern nation-state, democratization of political regimes, creation of a relatively homogeneous national cultures, transformation of the state-church relationship, and establishment of secular cultures with the impact of Enlightenment.[248]

Today, in Spohn's view, while secularization becomes dominant in many aspects of social life in Europe, religious institutions and their components still influence modern nationalism and national identities to a certain degree.[249] He indeed asserts that

> [i]n all European cases, even in the French one, the church or churches remain important institutions and actors in the nation-state; religious cultures and values exert a continuous influence on national cultures; national and state symbols retain religious components; and national identities continue to entail not only secular and secular religious, but also religious forms of identification.[250]

In this regard, Spohn argues that even Western nationalisms which are based on complex historical-social experiences comprised of variable combinations of religious and secular discourses. Therefore, they cannot be considered as homogeneous national models where secularism fully replaces religion.[251] This diversity is evident when examined on the basis of different countries or regions:

> In the Western European zone of early organic nation-state formation, the formulated relations between secularization patterns and national identity appear in their purest form. The Protestant part of Great Britain and Scandinavia is characterized by a pluralizing Protestant, increasingly secular national identity, whereas the Catholic part of France, Spain and Portugal integrated in their national identities a sharp clerical–anticlerical divide combining strong secularist with weaker Catholic layers. In the Western Central zone of long-lasting imperial impacts and late unifying nation-state formation, the imperial component has an additional effect... In the predominantly Protestant, but confessionally mixed case of Germany, national identity formation bridged the Catholic–Protestant and religious–secularist divide, resulting today in religious and secular components; whereas in the Catholic cases of Austria and Italy the

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[248] *Ibid.*, p. 273.
[249] *Ibid.*, p. 271.
[250] *Ibid.*
[251] *Ibid.*

Catholic–secularist divide has been weaker and the Catholic components stronger against the secularist components than in Western Europe.

In contrast to Western and Western Central Europe, the East Central European zone with peripheral, late-late nation-state formation lacked for a long time period independent statehood and state churches and therefore the secularization process as well as the religious–secularist division characteristic of monopolistic forms of organized religion were considerably weaker… Already in the pre-Communist era, the various Christian religions were closely linked to peripheral nation-building, nationalism and national identity formation, whereas the secular and secularist components were much less influential. In the Communist period, a secularist ideocratic regime was established, partially superimposed from outside by the Soviet Communist empire, partially by domestic secularist-Communist elites. As a consequence, religion, nation-building and nationalism fused even more and hence the breakdown of Communism was characteristically accompanied by not only a revival of nationalism but also a strengthening of religion and religious nationalism... In the Eastern European empire contracting zone with tsarist Russia, finally, the evolving state reform of autocracy and imperial nationalism was connected with a strong anticlerical and secularist movement against Orthodox Christianity. On this basis, in the Soviet Union Marxist-Leninist ideocracy replaced Orthodox caesaropapism, yet this totalitarian state secularism was unable to promote also societal secularization. On the contrary, it provoked a strong religious and nationalist revival now breaking through in post-Soviet Russia…[252]

This complexity of the modernization process, in Spohn's point of view, has been the pattern in the non-Western World as well. The author underlines the need to base discussions around these societies similarly on a comparative perspective centered on civilization. To do this, one should take into consideration following issues:

the specific modernization dynamics in the non-European civilizations; their imperial legacies and religious cores; the intra-civilizational forms of state formation, nation building and democratization; the different forms of religious transformation and secularization; as well as the impacts on these civilizations through the interactions with European and western modernity in the eras of colonialism and post colonialism.[253]

The author's fundamental argument to understand non-Western societies based on such framework is

…the present world-wide rise of ethnic and religious nationalism in non-European world regions is to be seen as a corollary of the global guest for

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[252] *Ibid.*, p. 273-274.
[253] *Ibid.*, p. 275.

national homogenization and democratization against the elite imposition of a secular (either western liberal or eastern socialist) nation-state model in predominantly multiethnic and religious, only partially pluralized and secularized societies.[254]

In this perspective, Spohn attempts to interpret experiences of the non-Western World in regard to relationships between religion and nationalism. At this point, I shall briefly summarize his observations.

In his observation, North American nationalism is based on a civil collective identity of multi-*ethn*ic and multi-religious composition, while Evangelical elements as well as civil-religious and civil-democratic components continue to exist in a popularized manner.[255] Spohn describes Latin American experience essentially as an authoritarian-populist inclined movement based on more pluralistic-religious ideology than secularism.[256]

For Spohn, due to the different historical, ideological and colonial impacts in Islamic societies, secular, Islamic and national identities have articulated into authoritarian nation-state ideologies which gradually liberalize over time.[257] The Jewish society is another element of the same geography. According to the author, although they are deemed as the first representative of the "religious nation" concept in history, civil-secular and ethnic-religious national identities has developed simultaneously in modern Israel.[258]

On the other hand, Spohn points out that we are faced with a much more complex picture with regard to African societies. For him, the current situation exhibits an environment encouraging the dissolution of nations by means of encouraging religious and ethnic identities.[259] In his viewpoint, India and Pakistan present a generally similar picture where religious nationalist civil movements gain power over time against the governing secular-pluralist nationalists.[260]

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[254] *Ibid.*
[255] *Ibid.*, p. 275-276.
[256] *Ibid.*, p. 276.
[257] *Ibid.*, p. 277-278.
[258] *Ibid.*, p. 278.
[259] *Ibid.*, p. 279.
[260] *Ibid.*, p. 279-280.

Lastly, Spohn analyzes societies of Eastern Asia. The communist regime in China has evolved into an imperial-secular ideology supporting religious plurality.[261] In Japan, on the other hand, despite the emergence of religious-sectarian and secular-Marxist movements of a more radical nature, essentially a national identity defined by regional religious traditions such as Shintoism and Tokugawa has maintained its prominence.[262]

Spohn's work provides a structural-historical perspective to our subject through its comprehensive observations on various regions of the world and societies. At this stage, it would be wise to take a closer look at the issue from the view point of the actors as a supplement to broaden our perspective. In this framework, I could analyze religious nationalist movements in terms of their emphasis either on religion or nationalism under two groups: The first group is comprised of movements that emphasize religion; while in the second, nationalism becomes more prominent.

Those in the first group can be explained with examples that Juergensmeyer identifies in his comprehensive field study in various parts of the world covering the second half of 1980s up until the mid-1990s. He essentially considers various religious nationalist movements as an opposition against the hegemony of the West and Western political system, although they are also developed in the process of modernity.[263] In his work including various societies of Eastern Europe, Middle East and Asia, the author concludes, based on his interviews with political leaders, that despite their various disagreements, they all assume Western secular nationalism an unsuccessful model. For them, religion is deemed the only source as a hopeful alternative for criticism and change against any policy, alongside local cultural/ethnic symbols and moral values.[264] Therefore, these leaders as well as the mass populations consider secular nationalist regimes devoid of moral and sentimental values and principles since they do not concern themselves with religious legitimization. The author quotes from a Ukrainian official that secular ideologies are bound to die off, because "they are not able to 'touch the heart' the way ethnic and

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[261] *Ibid.*, p. 280-281.
[262] *Ibid.*
[263] Juergensmeyer, *The New Cold War?…,* p. 5.
[264] *Ibid.*, p. 2.

religious identities do."[265] Juergensmeyer points out that this statement briefly summarizes the common view of the leaders of the movements of such type.

According to Juergensmeyer, the gravest mistake secular elite made in these societies prominently based on traditional tendencies, above all, is to adopt a policy that separates the fields of religion and politics as in the West.[266] In this respect, the majority of these people are in full agreement with the Palestinian leader Sheik Ahmed Yassin's point of view: "there is no clear distinction between religion and politics and that the distinction itself is a mark of Western ways of thinking."[267] Hence, the common view shared by masses around the world articulating nationalism into their religious belief, be it Islam, Judaism, Christianity, Buddhism, Hinduism or Sikh is that traditional religion is a structure to cover all aspects of like including politics.

At this point, within the framework of their political reflexes, Juergensmeyer attempts to define these groups that place religion in the center of their nation's political and social fate. He argues that supporters of these groups can be defined as "anti-modernist", "anti-Westernist" or "alternative modernist" as well as the general term "religious nationalist".[268] In his point of view, it is interesting that these people are "in most cases religious activists, while opposing the values of modernism, are themselves very modern persons."[269] Some of these people have lived in the West for certain periods and refuse to refrain from the various issues, tools or habits modernization have introduced into their everyday life. The author defines their modernity as "such that it also allows them to embrace traditional religious values and reject secular ones."[270] The author further explains this attitude:

> This anti-Westernism has at heart an opposition to a certain kind of modernism – its secularism, its individualism, its skepticism. Yet, in a curious way, by accepting the modern notion of the nation-state and by adopting the technology and financial instruments of modern society, many of these movements of religious nationalism have claimed a kind of modernity on their own behalf.

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[265] *Ibid.*, p. 133.
[266] *Ibid.*, p. 13.
[267] *Ibid.*, p. 6.
[268] *Ibid.*, p. 5; Mark Juergensmeyer, "Global Antimodernism", in *Reflections on Multiple Modernities: European, Chinese & Other Interpretations*, (Ed.s) Dominic Sachsenmaier et al., Leiden: Brill Publications, 2002, p. 101-102.
[269] Juergensmeyer, *The New Cold War?…,* p. 5.
[270] *Ibid.*

Understandably, then, these movements of anti-Western modernism are ambivalent about modernity – about whether it is necessarily Western and always evil. They are also ambivalent about the most recent stage of modernity (or post modernity): globalization. On the one hand these antimodern political movements are reactions to the globalization of Western culture. They are responses to the insufficiencies of what is often touted as the world's global standard: the elements of secular, Westernized urban society that are found not only in the West but in many parts of the former Third World, and which are seen by their detractors as vestiges of colonialism. On the other hand, these new ethno religious identities are alternative modernities with international and supranational aspects of their own. This means that in the future some forms of antimodernism will be global, some will be virulently antiglobal, and yet others will be content to create their own alternative modernities in ethno religious nation-states.[271]

According to Juergensmeyer, such eclecticism, though it may seem in conflict with the anti-secular character of these movements, exhibits itself in their partial rejection of the political instruments of the modern nation-state. From this perspective, the author explains that these groups are not against the modern state, but are rather "concerned about the rationale for having a state, the moral basis for politics, and the reasons why a state should elicit loyalty."[272] Thus, followers of these movements are not against the idea of a nation based political solidarity or organization, provided that it derives its legitimacy from religion. In fact, they are mobilized through this ideology. As suggested by the Polish Cardinal Stefan Wyszynski's statement that "next to God our first love is Poland," nationalism is an inseparable component of such discourse or identity with deep rooted beliefs regarding the sacred, despite its secondary status to them.[273] In this context, Juergensmeyer interprets Ira Lapidus's observation arguing that "the capacity of Islam to symbolize social identity has been merged into national feeling" as a result of this situation.[274] It should also be noted that the author sees this trend to be a global one, not limited to Islamic movements alone.

Instrumental pious nationalism, a term coined by Rieffer, can be considered as a second type of religious nationalism. In fact, the author offers this model as an independent type with secular nationalism and religious nationalism in her three type

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[271] Juergensmeyer, "Global Antimodernism…, p. 101-102.
[272] Juergensmeyer, *The New Cold War?…,* p. 7.
[273] *Ibid.*, p. 135.
[274] *Ibid.*, p. 47.

categorization of the relationship patterns between nationalism and religion. However, I prefer to assume it as a kind of religious nationalism with Juergensmeyer's model. Since, I believe, they are both combinations of nationalist and religious discourses even one emphasizes nationalism while the other highlights religion in a religious nationalist discourse.

According to Rieffer, in examples of instrumental pious nationalism, religion is not as central or vital as in the first model. It is rather used as an instrument to legitimize and reinforce nationalist discourses or to unite a specific population.[275] Hence, similar to Kedourie's view,[276] religion in fact is in a secondary status and considered a tool by leaders of the nationalist movement to legitimize their objectives and unite masses in an instrumentalist approach. In this regard, Rieffer argues that such movement or discourse may develop in the need for mobilizing masses as a whole against any enemy or at times of crisis to assure support of the population.[277] Although they did not bear a close affinity to religion, Milosevic in former Yugoslavia, Saddam Hussein in Iraq and several leaders in Russia have added traces of religion to their nationalist discourse; thus, their political inclinations should be assessed with reference to this model.[278] Rieffer specifically focuses on the post-Soviet Russia example, arguing Gorbachev and all Russian leaders to follow have attempted to make use of the power of the Orthodox Christian Church alongside their nationalist policies in a population of 75 per cent Orthodox Christian.[279] Hence, developments in religious freedom in social life and state officials' close relations with religious leaders should be considered as new steps taken towards assuring the support of the masses and legitimizing the regime.[280]

In fact, to differentiate between two types of religious nationalism, as will be discussed in the next chapter, could be helpful for observing the differences between religious nationalism of the New Ottomans or Abdülhamid the Second and that of early Republican period administrators. However, the most evident criticism towards both models should be that their differentiation is referenced by subjective markers

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[275] Rieffer, "Religion and Nationalism…, p. 229.
[276] Smith, "The 'Sacred' Dimension of Nationalism…, p. 793.
[277] Rieffer, "Religion and Nationalism…, p. 229.
[278] *Ibid.*
[279] *Ibid.*
[280] *Ibid.*

difficult to prove such as intentions of government officials or political leaders. Especially in a context where the grounds for a nationalist discourse to exhibit religious inclinations cannot be determined –for instance, textbooks are unlikely to comment on the intentions of government officials – it will not be possible to make this differentiation. Hence, based on a subjective assessment of the researcher a religious nationalist inclination that can be interpreted as instrumental for some may mean exactly the opposite to others. For this reason, in the following chapters where I assess textbooks in Turkey, I will call all discursive examples combining religion and nationalism as religious nationalism.

2.4. Nationalism and Religion in Mass Education and Textbooks

At this stage, pertinent to my study, it is appropriate to mention the role of mass education and textbooks in popularization of official discourses among nationalism and religion. As mentioned before, mass education and schools are considered to be the main apparatuses of states apart from families in the socialization of the young generations in modern soscieties. Within the same framework, mass education is usually asserted to be a transporter of ideological trends established by official instruments, especially in the literature of nationalism. As already quoted earlier from Gellner, Anderson and Hobsbawm, popularization of education during the period when nation-state structures developed, indeed, made it a fundamental tool in establishing nationalism as well as forming the beliefs and traditions when establishing nations. Therefore, a national curriculum and its various educational tools assume a founding role, alongside other functions, before the nation-state:

> Individuals become members of a national group through education/schooling. National identity and sentiment are a result of adopting common knowledge, norms and values. A (national) education system established in the process of national integration provides children/students with a feeling of national identity, knowledge of their common history which flourishes patriotism in future generations directly or indirectly… Each nation state strives to create its myths based on the past/ history to achieve national integration.[281]

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[281] İnal, *op. cit.*, p. 61.

In this regard, mass education has played a significant role in transforming "peasants into the French, Bavarians into Hessians or Westfalians into the German; the British, Irish and Welsh into Brits; the Irish, German, Mexican and Chinese into Americans", in other words, the creation of the French, German, British, and American nations.[282]

There are also studies evaluating ideological content and functions of mass education pertinent to its role in transmitting the official interpretation(s) of religion(s) in various countries.[283] These studies claim that religion classes/courses are a means of popularizing the state supported dominating ideology in countries where religious education is governed by the state or at least where religion courses are included in the official curricula of state schools.

Keeping in mind the views discussed so far, ideological content of textbooks, as one of the prominent pedagogical instruments is directly related with the impact of official ideology on education policies in general, and on school curriculum in particular. According to Sleeter and Grant, the role assigned to school curriculums by dominating social groups in any state is to

> represent the view point constituting significant information and a legitimate philosophy and assume the function of supervision at large. Furthermore, they legitimize the status of the dominant groups as well as the current social relationships. By doing so, they reject the existence of alternative views other than those supported by the dominating groups.[284]

In this framework, it is the textbooks through which this function of the curriculum is achieved. Hence, although the impact of textbooks "varies from country to country,

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[282] Hanna Schissler, Yasemin Nuhoğlu Soysal, "Introduction: Teaching Beyond the National Narrative," in *The Nation, Europe, And The World: Textbooks And Curricula In Transition*, (ed.) Schissler & Soysal, New York and Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2005, p. 1.

[283] For studies in this field, see. Marien de Souza, et. al. (ed.) *International Handbook of the Religious, Moral and Spiritual Dimensions in Education,* Dordrecht: Springer, 2008; Kath Engebretson, et al., (ed.) *International Handbook of Inter-Religious Education,* Dordrecht: Springer, 2010; (ed.s.) Lynne Broadbent, Alan Brown, *Issues in Religious Education*, London, New York: RoutledgeFalmer, 2005; (ed.) Wolfram Weisse, "Religion in Education – a Contribution to Dialogue or a Factor of Conflict?", *The REDCo-project: Presentation in the European Parliament*, 2008; (ed.) Brannon M. Wheeler, *Teaching Islam*, New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003*;* James W. Fraser, *Between Church and State: Religion and Public Education in Multicultural America*, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999; Anne F. Bayefsky, Arieh Waldman, *State Support of Education: Canada versus the United Nations*, Leiden, Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2007; Joseph P. Viteritti, *The Last Freedom: Religion from the Public School to the Public Square*, Princeton, Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2007; Evie Zambeta, "Religion and national identity in Greek education", *Intercultural Education*, Vol. 11, No. 2, 2000, p. 145-155.

[284] Christine E. Sleeter and Carl A. Grant, "Race, Class, Gender and Disability in Current Textbooks", Michael W. Apple & L. K. Christian-Smith (ed.s), *The Politics of the Textbook*, New York: Routledge, 1991, p. 80 cited in İnal, *op. cit., p.* 88.

sometimes even from school to school"[285]; they are often regarded as an integral part of mass education and curricula. In this regard, they are vital tools of education that (re)produce and popularize the ideologies of the dominant groups, and main transporters of the official discourse, engraving social and political roles, rules and traditions in the minds of young generations.[286]

In this context, İnal brings a strict definition to textbooks. He defines them as pedagogical tools through which "information and values that fall in line with the official ideology adopted and legitimized by the political government are transferred and re-produced."[287] Similarly, Pingel points especially to textbooks to "teach not only subject matter but also to disseminate ideologies and promote specific political viewpoints by legitimizing them through historical evidence based on the ideology."[288] For instance, history and geography textbooks in particular are designed to explain "our roots, how and why we happen to be living in a certain place and how that place can be described and characterized – in other words, who we really are."[289] Hence, it can be concluded that "although textbooks are written by individual authors and reflect their subjectivity, they are not works of an individual-author but rather a reflection of a specific social class, interest group or an ideology-in particular the official ideology."[290] For this reason, critical reading of a textbook necessitates "interpretation of the content through its related institutional applications and social structures at a larger and more comprehensive scale as part of a ruling government framework."[291]

Considering the importance of textbooks as tools with functions explained above, numerous studies around the world have analyzed textbooks in a variety of subjects as fundamental educational materials reproducing official ideologies.[292] Studies

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[285] Pingel, *op. cit*, p. 42
[286] H. Schissler, "Limitations and Priorities for International Social Studies Textbook Research", *The International Journal of Social Education*, C.4, 1989-1990, p. 81.
[287] İnal, *op. cit.*, p. 11-12.
[288] Pingel, *op. cit.*, p. 8.
[289] Ibid., p. 7.
[290] İnal, *op. cit.*, p. 88-89.
[291] Stanley Aronowitz and Henry A. Giroux, "Textual Authority, Culture and the Politics of Literacy", Apple & Christian-Smith (ed.s), *op. cit.*, p. 215 cited in İnal, *op. cit.*, p. 89.
[292] For examples from other countries, see. Miklos Szabolcsi, "Ethnocentrism in Education: A Comparative Analysis of Problems in Eastern and Western Europe", *Prospects: Quarterly Review of Education*, Vol. XIX, No.2, (70), 1989, p. 149-162; Riad Nasser, "Exclusion and the Making of Jordanian National Identity: An Analysis of School Textbooks", *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics*, 10, 2004, 221-249; Joseph Zajda ve Rea Zajda, "The Politics of Rewriting History: New History Textbooks and Curriculum Materials in Russia", *International*

analyzing the textbooks from different countries not only provide interesting examples, but also offer a productive platform for a comparative approach. For instance, in his work assessing various discussions on the textbooks in the US in a historical approach, Giardano states that public criticism towards textbooks is generally two dimensional. The first dimension he calls "routine criticism" is based on the price and pedagogical content of textbooks. The second dimension is based on "ideological criticism", questioning the objectivity of their content in terms of nationalistic, racist, sexist and religious propaganda.[293]

As a last remark, one also needs to keep in mind that the relationship between politics/official ideology and education-textbooks is not a single-sided, static one. In fact, selecting and regulating educational content is a complicated and dynamic process. First of all, it is shaped around the continuous conflicts and contradictions between the dominant and subordinate groups within the society and even within the governing elites. Hence, as a result of the efforts toward achieving a balance/agreement between different social classes or groups, one needs to approach the determining power of political elites and official ideology on the education system with caution.[294] Second, education also exerts a power in shaping the political framework by means of contributing to the establishment of new political targets, trends, and views.[295] Therefore, in my analysis, I adopt a comprehensive perspective which considers the complexity and reciprocity of the relationship between politics and education.

Review of Education, 49 (3-4), 2003, p. 363-384; Majid Al-Haj, "National Ethos, Multicultural Education, and the New History Textbooks in Israel", _Curriculum Inquiry, 35_(1), 2005, p. 48-71; Luke Terra, _Conflict and the Adoption of Civic Norms: A Textbook Analysis of Civic Identity in Northern Ireland_, Unpublished MA thesis, Stanford University, 2008; Tang Shuk Ching, _A Content Analysis of the Certificate Level History Textbooks in Hong Kong_, Unpublished MA thesis, University of Hong Kong, 1998; Anamaria Dutceac Segesten, _Myth, Identity and Conflict: A Comparative Analysis of Romanian And Serbian Textbooks_, Unpublished PhD dissertation, University of Maryland, College Park: 2009; Amy L. Sellin, _Critiquing the Nation, Creating the Citizen: A Century of Educational Discourse in Venezuela_, Unpublished PhD dissertation, Brown University, Rhode Island: 2008; Yoonmi Lee, _Modern Education, Textbooks and the Image of the Nation: Politics of Modernization and Nationalism in Korean Education, 1880-1910_, Unpublished PhD dissertation, University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1997; Douglas Mpondi, _Educational Change and Cultural Politics: National Identity-Formation in Zimbabwe_, Unpublished PhD dissertation, Ohio University, Ohio: 2004.

[293] Gerard Giardano, _Twentieth-Century Textbook Wars: A History of Advocacy and Opposition_, New York: Peter Lang Pub., 2003.

[294] İnal, _Eğitim ve İktidar…,_ p. 50-51.

[295] Falk Pingel, _op.cit.,_ p. 62.

CHAPTER 3

NATIONALISM, RELIGION AND EDUCATION IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE TO THE EARLY PERIOD OF THE TURKISH REPUBLIC

This study focuses on the period from the foundation of the Republic of Turkey on 29 October 1923 until the Democrat Party rule in the 1950s, called as the *Early Republican Period*. A process of modernization initiated in the late Ottoman period and War of Independence in the land of modern Turkey after the collapse of the Empire lies in the background of this era. The most prominent characteristic of the period is the process of political, cultural, and economic establishment led by the sole initiative and dominance of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and his comrades. Despite the fact that the state regime was called republic, it was a single party reign with strong oppression on the opposition, where the majority of the candidates were determined by top administrators of the ruling party. Under such circumstances, the political system allowed only for limited involvement and participation on the people's side for decisions. Therefore, researchers of Turkish political history called this period an authoritarian single party rule that was identified with the governing *Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi* (Republican People's Party - RPP).

Undoubtedly, viewpoints and discourse(s) dominating textbooks of the period were shaped within the framework of political, ideological, and cultural tendencies of the ruling government. For this reason, before analyzing textbooks, I need to touch upon the intellectual/ideological currents of the state, and religion and nationalism in the official discourse of the period. Here I will follow the "Late Ottoman Empire – Early Republic of Turkey continuity perspective" adopted by a number of scholars on Turkish history.[296] In this context, it would be appropriate to start with the analysis of

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[296] Zubaida expresses the situation in this way: "Most of the states in the Middle East are the successors of Ottoman Empire (1299-1922) and her culture including law left a permanent mark on them. As well as reform movements in 19th and 20th centuries, reactions to them were evolving in this state structure. Most of the marks of today's discussion topics can be viewed through these reforms." Sami Zubaida, *İslam Dünyasında Hukuk ve İktidar*, (trans.) B. K. Birinci, H. Kacak, İstanbul: Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2008, p. 163. To see the traces of contiuity specifically for Republic of Turkey in the works of Feroz Ahmad, *Modern Türkiye'nin Oluşumu*, (trans.) Yavuz Alogan, 5.ed., İstanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, 2006; Çağlar Keyder, *Türkiye'de Devlet ve Sınıflar*, İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2005; Erik Jan Zürcher, *Modernleşen Türkiye'nin Tarihi*, (trans.) Yasemin Saner, 23.ed., İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2009; Kemal H. Karpat (Ed.), *Osmanlı Geçmişi ve Bugünün Türkiye'si*, (trans.) Sönmez Taner, 2.ed., İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2005; Aykut Kansu, *1908 Devrimi*,

changes in the nationalist and religious discourses in Turkish history and their impact on educational issues from the late Ottoman period.

3.1. Modernization Policies in the Late Ottoman Empire and their Impact on Intellectual and Political Life

The modernization process in the Ottoman Empire starting from the eighteenth century onwards brought a transformation of ideological foundations that shape the ruling regime as well as having strong impacts on different dimensions of social life. Although this process was initiated as a solution to the series of military defeats before the Western forces at the beginning, the reform movement resulted in noteworthy socio-cultural and political/ideological outcomes in the course of two centuries. Nationalism's introduction to the political agenda and its interaction with religious discourse are two of them. Here, I will shortly dwell upon this modernization process in the Ottoman Empire (then Turkey) and its impact on intellectual and political life.

The need for reform felt by the rulers of the Empire from the eighteenth century onwards was a response to threats from abroad and the internal turmoil. For Karpat, the main factors making the West an external threat were "[a]dvanced technology, an economic system relying increasingly upon industry, new techniques of government and of study culminating in military power."[297] On the other hand, internal issues were mainly caused by "[t]he search for autonomy in the provinces and a series of conflicting demands for order and security and regulatory action, couched often in moralistic and religious terminology."[298] To quote the author:

> Actually, this latter challenge was a by-product of Western technological, economic, and intellectual forces, which reflected themselves upon everyday life in society in the form of expanded trade, change in land tenure, and intensified communication. The ensuing dichotomy between society and government, long in the making in the Ottoman state, was rooted in the

(trans.) Ayda Erbal, İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1995; Selim Deringil, "Namık Kemal'den Mustafa Kemal'e Kemalist Milliyetçiliğin Osmanlı Kökenleri", Trans. Saliha Nilüfer, *Simgeden Millete: II. Abdülhamid'den Mustafa Kemal'e Devlet ve Millet* , 2.ed., İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2009, p. 263-296.
[297] Kemal H. Karpat, "The Transformation of the Ottoman State, 1789-1908", *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol. 3, No. 3 (Jul., 1972), p. 245.
[298] *Ibid.*

following situation. Society developed and differentiated into new occupational groups with new thoughts and demands corresponding more or less to the technological and economic stimuli, and expected a change in government functions accordingly. However, the government, consisting of the throne and the central bureaucracy and considering itself synonymous with the state and subject to its own traditions of authority, was unable to understand and cope functionally with the problems created by change. Nevertheless, the bureaucracy attempted to educate itself in the rudiments of functional government, to acquire a blue print of modernization in its frequent but superficial contacts with the West, and to mould society according to its own image of modern statehood.[299]

Hence, over time, as Aktar claims, two fundamental targets emerged for the rulers: "securing political unity and (re)strengthening the central role of patrimonial state."[300] For this aim, they initially attempted to take some steps towards strengthening the military area coupled with complementary financial measures beginning from the early eighteenth century onwards. However, a reform program of a much wider range that called for a general restructuring of the institutional and ideological structure of the Empire came in the nineteenth century. Zubaida mentions three basic sub-periods of this reform movement:

First sub-period is marked by the initial reforms during the reign of Mahmud the second. The emperor and his followers embraced the new ideas around the state, institutions, and legal system in this period. Tanzimat Reform Era comes as the second sub-period, during which the state adopted administrative, legal, and financial reforms under pressure of Europe, followed by the third one marking a period of harmonization with and adaptation to fundamentals of European legal codes and practices.[301]

Alkan also analyzes this period in three sub-periods, although the differentiation is made based on internal characteristics:

The first period is marked by the 'bureaucratic' and 'official' modernization adopted by the Tanzimat *pashas*; second is the 'monarchic' or 'sultan-like' modernization during the reign of Abdülhamid, and third is the 'constitutional'

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[299] *Ibid.*

[300] Cengiz Aktar, *Türkiye'nin Batılılaştırılması*, (trans.) Temel Keşoğlu, İstanbul: Ayrıntı Yayınları, 1993, p. 26.

[301] Zubaida, *İslam Dünyasında Hukuk ve İktidar…*, p. 195.

modernization through a parliament and constitution, a process offered and tested by the Young Turkish Party.[302]

Specifically, some of those prominent developments during the modernization process could be recounted such as improving existing military schools and establishing modern military education units, hosting European specialists and teachers in these schools for guidance, establishing a modern army, making military service compulsory, sending students to Western countries for education purposes, establishing middle and high level education institutions (in the fields of medicine and social sciences) that followed a Western (secular) curriculum, allowing for the establishment of schools for non-Muslims and foreign states, making public education compulsory, introducing the Empire into the global capitalist economy through improvements in the finance sector, developments in transport and communication infrastructure, establishing resident embassies in Europe, political-legal-social regulations for non-Muslims, adopting revolutionary changes in the legal system based on Western models, taking the first steps towards the establishment of a secular judicial system, restructuring and modernizing commercial and bureaucratic organizations, adoption of a constitution and transformation into a constitutional monarchy.[303] However, I will not go into details regarding this reform process as it is not pertinent to my study. What I am more interested in is the ideological/intellectual outcome of the modernization process, especially with respect to the shifts in the official discourse.

Undoubtedly, the steps towards modernization in the field of education and printed/published media had a huge impact in the existence and popularization of new ideas, ideologies, and social identities of Western origin. In the background of this development, sending a group of young people into Europe for education

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[302] Mehmet Ö. Alkan, "Resmi İdeolojinin Doğuşu ve Evrimi Üzerine Bir Deneme", (der.) Tanıl Bora, Murat Gültekingil, *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce (Cilt I) – Cumhuriyet'e Devreden Düşünce Mirası: Tanzimat ve Meşrutiyet'in Birikimi* , 8.ed., İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2009, p. 380.

[303] For a detailed evaluation of modernization process and steps see, Niyazi Berkes, *Türkiye'de Çağdaşlaşma*, (ed.) Ahmet Kuyaş, İstanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 2.ed., 2002; Bernard Lewis, *Modern Türkiye'nin Doğuşu*, (Trans.) Metin Kıratlı, 8.ed., Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 2000; Stanford J. Shaw, Ezel Kural Shaw, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu ve Modern Türkiye (Cilt 2)*, (trans.) Mehmet Harmancı, 3.ed., İstanbul: E Yayınları, 2010; Roderic H. Davison, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda Reform (1856-1876)*, (trans.) Osman Akınhay, İstanbul: Agora Kitaplığı, 2005; İlber Ortaylı, *İmparatorluğun En Uzun Yüzyılı*, 32.ed., İstanbul: Timaş Yayınları, 2011; Karpat, *Osmanlı'da Değişim, Modernleşme ve Uluslaşma…*; M. Şükrü Hanioğlu, *A Brief History of the Late Ottoman Empire*, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2008.

purposes coupled with the establishment of military and civil schools in the Empire teaching a modern curriculum also had their role. In this way, a generation (and others to follow) was raised under a Western/secular curriculum at these schools. Most of them paid close attention to developments in Europe through the improved press and media and became fervent followers of Western politicians, philosophers, and academics.[304] New regulations during the modernization process of bureaucracy enabled these people to hold high-level positions in the government of Empire. This allowed them to assume an active role in the determination of policies adopted by the state (and thus the official discourse) with the aim of securing and maintaining the existence/unity of the Empire. Therefore, as Alkan points out, "Ottoman Empire's official ideology and its official history, an integral part of it, emerged in a systematic, new and different way" as an outcome of the same process.[305]

Intellectual groups in the general sense (and bureaucrats of the time in a more specific sense) were influenced by different ideological traditions of Western origin and a wide variety of views and ideas in the relatively long period from Tanzimat Era to foundation of the Republic. The general view in relevant literature is that the French, German, to some extent Anglo-Saxon and even Russian as well as Eastern/Islamic intellectual traditions had an impact on the ideology and views of new generation bureaucrats and intellectuals.[306] In this context, well-educated

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[304] For a detailed description of advancement in the field of education and its diverse consequences in the last period of the Empire see, Osman Nuri Ergin, *Türkiye Maarif Tarihi Cilt II-IV*, İstanbul: Eser Matbaası, 1977; Yahya Akyüz, *Türk Eğitim Tarihi (Başlangıçtan 1988'e)*, 3.ed., Ankara: A.Ü.E.ed.F. Yayınları, 1989; Erdal Ceyhan, *Türk Eğitim Tarihi Kronolojisi*, 1299-1997, Edirne: Ulusal Bellek Yayınları, 2004; Selçuk Akşin Somel, *Osmanlı'da Eğitimin Modernleşmesi (1839-1908): İslamlaşma, Otokrasi ve Disiplin*, (trans.) Osman Yener, İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2010; Benjamin C. Fortna, *Mekteb-i Hümayûn: Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nun Son Döneminde İslâm, Devlet ve Eğitim*, (trans.) Pelin Siral, İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2005; Necdet Sakaoğlu, *Osmanlı Eğitim Tarihi*, İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1991; Bayram Kodaman, *Abdülhamit Devri Eğitim Sistemi*, 2.ed., Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 1991; Mehmet Ö. Alkan, *Tanzimat'tan Cumhuriyet'e Modernleşme Sürecinde Eğitim İstatistikleri 1839-1924*, Ankara: T.C. Başbakanlık D.İ.E. Yayınları, 2000; Emine Önhan Evered, *The Poltics of Late Ottoman Education: Accomodation Ethno-Religious Pluralism and Imperial Disintegration,* Ph.D. Dissertation, Arizona: University of Arizona, 2005; Mustafa Gençoğlu, *Osmanlı Devleti'nde Batı'ya Eğitim Amacıyla Gönderilenler (1830-1908): Bir Grup Biyografisi Araştırması*, PhD Dissertation, Ankara: Hacettepe Üniversitesi, 2008; Roderic H. Davison, "Westernized Education in Ottoman Turkey", *The Middle East Journal*, 15(3), 1961, p. 289-301; Mehmet Ö. Alkan, "İmparatorluk'tan Cumhuriyet'e Modernleşme ve Ulusçuluk Sürecinde Eğitim", Karpat (Ed.), *Osmanlı Geçmişi ve Bugünün Türkiye'si...* , p. 73-242.
[305] Alkan, "Resmi İdeolojinin Doğuşu…, p. 378.
[306] See for example, M. Şükrü Hanioğlu, *The Young Turks in Opposition*, New York; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995; M. Şükrü Hanioğlu, *Atatürk: An Intellectual Biography*, Princeton, Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2011 (ePub); Murtaza Korlaelçi, *Pozitivizmin Türkiye'ye Girişi*, İstanbul: İnsan Yayınları, 1986; Şerafettin Turan, *Atatürk'ün Düşünce Yapısını Etkileyen Olaylar, Düşünürler, Kitaplar*, 4.ed., Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 2006; Doğu Perinçek, *Kemalist Devrim-5: Kemalizmin Felsefesi ve Kaynakları*, 2.ed., İstanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, 2011; Lewis, *Modern Türkiye'nin Doğuşu...*; Berkes, *Türkiye'de Çağdaşlaşma...;* Hilmi Ziya Ülken,

intellectuals in the late Ottoman period were introduced to concepts such as constitutionalism, nationalism, patriotism, liberalism and democracy as well as positivism, scientism, intellectualism, progressivism, evolutionism, naturalism, materialism, atheism and deism, through the works of Western intellectuals. Some of the leading intellectuals who affected the ideologies of the young intellectuals in the Ottoman Empire were Jean Jacques Rousseau, Voltaire, Turgot, Condorcet, Spinoza, Charles Darwin, Auguste Comte, Baron d'Holbach, Francis Bacon, Helvétius, Montesquieu, Adam Smith, David Ricardo, Ludwig Büchner, John William Draper, Maximin Isnard, Schopenhauer, François-Vincent Raspail, Emil Littré, Ernest Renan, Pierre Laffitte, Claude Bernard, Gustave Le Bon, and Charles Letourneau.[307] Some works by these intellectuals were also translated into Turkish by the state institutions in the Republican period. This development strengthens my assumption that there is some level of intellectual continuity between generations of Ottoman Empire and Republican Era. Hence, popularization of Turkish nationalism among the intellectuals of the late Ottoman period and later among the intellectuals of the Republican regime was an outcome of this process and of popularization of western ideologies in Turkey.

On the other hand, I have to emphasize the fact that the new elites emerging as an outcome of the modernization process was not a homogeneous group. In the real sense, their responses to the ideas and authors they were following largely varied. This can be seen not only in the general differences of their approaches towards the concepts like modernity and modernization, but also towards nationalism. Thus, modernization process, as Neumann points out, brought traditional social groups of

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Türkiye'de Çağdaş Düşünce Tarihi, 3.ed., İstanbul: Ülken Yayınları, 1992; Cemal Güzel, "Türkiye'de Maddecilik ile Maddecilik Karşıtı Görüşler", Murat Gültekingil (Ed.), *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce (Cilt 8): Sol* , 2.ed., İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2008, p. 49-67; Doğan Özlem, "Türkiye'de Pozitivizm ve Siyaset", Uygur Kocabaşoğlu (Ed.), *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce (Cilt 3): Modernleşme ve Batıcılık* , 4.ed., İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2007, p. 452-464; Ali Ergur, "Türkiye'de Siyasî Düşüncenin Gelişmesinde Fransız Etkisi", Ömer Laçiner (Ed.), *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce (Cilt 9): Dönemler ve Zihniyetler* , İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2009, p. 927-944; Suavi Aydın, "Türk Düşüncesinde Alman Etkisi", *Dönemler ve Zihniyetler* , p. 947-969; Mehmet Akgün, "1839-1920 Yılları Arasında Türkiye'de Aydınlanmanın Uzantısı Olarak Temsil Edilen Felsefî Akımlar", *Ankara Universitesi Ilahiyat Fakultesi Dergisi*, 40(1), 1999, p. 475-497; Robert F. Spencer, "Culture Process and Intellectual Current: Durkheim and Atatürk", *American Anthropologist*, 60(4), August 1958, p. 640-657; Emre Kongar, "Auguste Comte ve Mustafa Kemal Atatürk", *Türk Dili Dil ve Edebiyat Dergisi*, XLII (353) Atatürk Özel Sayısı, Mayıs 1981, p. 744-752.
[307] See the same works cited in the previous footnote about the resources that the new generation bureaucrat and intellectuals were inspired. Writers express that, young people of that period were informed by the ideas of those names either by reading their books in their own language, or by following them from Ottoman/Turkish translations or by the third party texts bearing those ideas.

the "rulers" and "subjects" closer, while putting a wider gap between the rulers, who then had opposing views.[308]

From this perspective, numerous studies in this field categorize the differences among the ruling group based on Ziya Gökalp's classification of prevailing ideologies of the time in his book published in 1918 entitled, "Turkization, Islamization, and Westernization."[309] It is clear that this classification gives some idea about the development of various ideological movements in the modernization process in Turkey. However, it is not sufficient for my study in terms of explaining the articulation/interaction patterns among different ideologies. Thus, I prefer to follow another classification developed in the works of Karpat and Hanioğlu.[310] This classification presents an analysis frame that allows an understanding of intersections alongside clashes with regard to ideological/discursive stances of the sub-groups within the Ottoman/Turkish intelligentsia. According to this classification, it is possible to distinguish three main intellectual (or political) sub-groups who started a struggle to gain power in the government and clearly stated their position in the nineteenth century Turkey: Traditionalists, modernist traditionalists, and Westernists/modernists.[311] Nevertheless, due to the decisive impact of the latter two groups on politics from the second half of the nineteenth century to mid-twentieth century, I will attempt to analyze continuity and changes in the discursive relationship between nationalism and religion at the official level in reference to those two groups, modernist traditionalist, and Westernists/modernists respectively. This approach will also help to understand better the intellectual/ ideological context of the textbooks which I will analyze in the following sections.

At this stage, a discussion on the historical development of Turkish nationalism and its relationship with Islamic and secular discourses would be worthwhile. For this

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[308] Christoph K. Neumann, "Ahmed Cevdet Paşa'nın Tarihçiliğine Yansıyan Zihniyet Dünyası", *Osmanlı'dan Cumhuriyet'e Problemler, Araştırmalar, Tartışmalar* , 1st International History Congress Presentations (May 24-26, 1993), 2.ed., İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 1999, p. 69.

[309] It is known that articles in this book are originally published in *Türk Yurdu* magazine between 1912 and 1913. See Ziya Gökalp, *Türkleşmek, İslamlaşmak, Muasırlaşmak,* (ed.) Mustafa Koç, M. Sabri Koz, *Ziya Gökalp Kitaplar 1*, İstanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 2007, p. 39-88.

[310] See Kemal H. Karpat, *İslam'ın Siyasallaşması: Osmanlı Devleti'nin Son Döneminde Kimlik, Devlet, İnanç ve Cemaatin Yeniden Yapılandırılması*, (trans.) Şiar Yalçın, 5.ed., İstanbul: Timaş Yayınları, 2013; Karpat, "Tarihsel Süreklilik, Kimlik Değişimi, ya da Yenilikçi, Müslüman, Osmanlı ve Türk Olmak", Karpat (ed.), *Osmanlı Geçmişi…* , p. 19-50; M. Şükrü Hanioğlu, *The Young Turks in Opposition*, New York; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995.

[311] *İbid.*

aim, I will follow Karpat's classification of three periods with regard to the emergence and development of Turkish nationalism. As for this classification, the first period from 1839 to 1908 was the establishment process of historical-cultural identification of the nation, the second period from 1908 to 1918 was the development process of statist-ethnic nationalism or the articulation stage of Turkish nationalism, and the third period between 1919 and 1950 was the Republican (or *Kemalist* in more popular terminology) nationalism.[312] Hence, I can proceed with the analysis of the emergence and popularization of nationalism at this stage of Turkish history.

3.2. The First Period of Turkish Nationalism and Islam between 1839 and 1908

As pointed out in the previous chapter, nationalism, while originating in Western Europe, became a modern ideology/movement that had an impact on a number of traditional societies around the world over time. As one of the close neighbors of Europe, Ottoman Empire, who managed to keep control over different ethnic and religious groups in the vast piece of land it ruled for centuries could not escape from this impact. Indeed, nationalism began to affect the people of the Empire from the nineteenth century onwards. Accordingly, especially the Balkan population of the state led by the Slavic people became strong supporters of this ideology and made nationalism their flag for independence. Hence, with the political and financial unrest following its Classical Era, the state had to confront numerous *ethnie*s claiming their national unities. Nevertheless, it needs to be emphasized that Turkish nationalism was among the late developing nationalist movements in the Empire.

The first signs of Turkish nationalism emerged in the second half of the nineteenth century, although limited to a small group of Ottoman intellectuals, as a result of the search for a (new) identity based on Turkish language and history that valued awareness of Turkishness. According to Özdoğan, this search was two-dimensional both internally and externally. The first dimension has to do with numerous Ottoman intellectuals' willingness to re-explore their ethnic history under the impact of other nationalist movements developing in the West and the abundance of cultural and

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[312] Kemal H. Karpat, *İslam'ın Siyasallaşması*, (trans.) Şiar Yalçın, 5.ed., İstanbul: Timaş Yayınları, 2013, p. 574.

scientific studies on the Turkic people at the time. The author explains the other, external dimension as "a defense mechanism [or reflex] against humiliation before the expansionism of the West."[313] Kushner also mentions the complementing works of Joseph de Guignes, Arthur Lumley Davids, (an immigrant from Poland) Mustafa Celaleddin Pasha, Arminius Vambery, Léon Cahun, A. I. De Sucy, W. Radloff, E. D. W. Gibb, and V. Thompson on Turks beginning to flatter the Turkish readers' national pride.[314] According to him, these studies paved the way for a new and more comprehensive meaning with political, historical, racial, and cultural references for the word *Turk*, which until then had negative connotations in the Empire (and even outside the empire).[315] Özdoğan, on the other hand, defines the initial "cultural nationalism" developing under such impact as "a derivative of the romantic nationalism" prevailing in Central and Eastern Europe at the time.[316] In fact, they also approached nationalism with respect to defining national unity and identity as well as references made to history, culture, and ethnicity.[317]

According to Kushner, as national awareness and sentiments (Turk. *millî şuur ve duygular*) gradually developed among a group of intellectuals; they took it as a duty to "read their own history, researching works of their relatives living outside the Empire borders to develop the Turkish language and culture."[318] Karpat also points out that in the same period some factors including "increase in the number of schools and published newspaper and magazines, translation of works of Western authors into Turkish, expansion of bureaucracy made Turkish the main tool for communication in provinces, in other words, the public language."[319] In addition, researches and papers on pre-Islamic Turkish history, which was not a popular subject in traditional Ottoman historiography rapidly increased. From this perspective, works by authors in the second half of the nineteenth century including Ahmed Cevdet Pasha, Ahmed Vefik Pasha, Ahmed Hilmi, Süleyman Pasha, and Ali

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[313] Günay Göksu Özdoğan, *"Turan"dan "Bozkurt"a: Tek Parti Döneminde Türkçülük (1931-1946)*, (trans.) İsmail Kaplan, 3.ed., İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2006, p. 41.

[314] David Kushner, *Türk Milliyetçiliğinin Doğuşu (1876-1908)*, Trans. Zeki Doğan, İstanbul: Fener Yayınları, 1998, p. 17-19.

[315] *Ibid.*, p. 29-38.

[316] Özdoğan, *"Turan"dan "Bozkurt"a…*, p. 41.

[317] *İbid.*

[318] Kushner, *Türk Milliyetçiliğinin Doğuşu…*, p. 38.

[319] Kemal H. Karpat, "Giriş: Millet, Milliyetçilik Kavramlarının Tarihi Gelişimi", *Ortadoğu'da Millet, Milliyet ve Milliyetçilik*, (trans.) Recep Boztemur, İstanbul: Timaş Yayınları, 2011, p. 32.

Suavi on the status and role of Turks in history marked a significant milestone.[320] Thus, Kushner states, the growing interest in history of the Turks especially in the reign of Abdülhamid the Second began to "infuse into the Turkish population the reality that Turkish history is the history of their nation."[321]

Kushner claims that history books of the period –including textbooks- emphasized the "significance of Turks as a nation in world history", "Turkic tribes settled in Central Asia being the ancestors of Ottomans", "Bulgarians and Crimeans being Turkic tribes", "the Huns being the first Turks migrating into Europe", "Turks being an ancient nation whose origin goes back to prophet Abraham", "Turks having founded a number of powerful states long before Islam including Oghuz Khan State" or "The Turkish and Mongolians are relatives".[322] It may be useful to share Kushner's views and findings at this stage as some would also be partially valid for the early Republican period:

> According to historians, Turkish nation was not a new one, but an ancient race that established various states around the world in the course of time. Turkic tribes were known to interact with the Persian, Ancient Greek, and Israelites. They had conquered already India, Turan, Iran, and Babylon thousands of years before Islam. They established strong relationships with civilization centers of the time and acted as a bridge between the different cultures of various nations. When they settled in Turkistan, they assumed a facilitator role in cultural, economic and transportation relations between China and Iran. In addition, they established similar relationships between Egyptians, Assyrians, and Babylonians. Thus, the Turks were capable of establishing relations with other nations and modernization. They adopted good practices they observed in other civilizations successfully to their own life style and national traditions. Quoting Necip Asım: "If it weren't for the Turks, Iran, China, or Arabs would be confined to their borders in the immense land of Asia." Still, Turkish nation did not only adopt other cultures, but they also established their own civilizations within the framework of their culture and tradition.

> An article published in *İkdam* Newspaper lists a number of criteria to compare different nations with each other such as patience, courage, and ability to modernize. The whole world is in an agreement that the Turkish nation holds these three traits. In a similar spirit, Necip Asım writes: "A comparison between civilized nations of today and the Turkish/Mongolian nations of their time, clearly points out the superiority of the Turkish in terms of morals and other traits. The Turkish do not present any of the adverse traits found in early Roman, Greek, and Arab tribes."

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[320] Kushner, *Türk Milliyetçiliğinin Doğuşu…,* p. 39-41; Karpat, "Tarihsel Süreklilik…, p. 43.
[321] Kushner, *Türk Milliyetçiliğinin Doğuşu…,* p. 41.
[322] *Ibid.*, p. 40-42.

> …New explorations are better proof of the contributions of the Turks to the world civilization. For instance, Turkish people taught their alphabet to Assyrians.[323]

Kushner thus points out that Turkishness as an identity began to draw the attention of Ottoman intellectuals from the second half of the nineteenth century onwards, which then became popular among wider circles especially through publishings and educational activities.

On the other hand, in the framework of this leading wave of identity awareness, religious and ethnic identities were intertwined, resembling the national movements of non-Muslim citizens in the Ottoman Empire. Regarding being Ottoman, Muslim and of Turkish descent as complementary components of the national/collective identity was the characteristic of the new political discourse.[324] Before I analyze further religion and nationalism being nested in each other as a modern development, it would be appropriate to have a closer look at the relationship between religion and politics in the Ottoman Empire.

In reality, articulation of religion with politics in Turkish history goes back a long while before the rise of the modernization process (and thus nationalism). For this reason, much like the preceding Muslim-Turkish states, there was a dual government and legal system in the Ottoman Empire: One through religious law based on Islamic sources (the *Sharia*) and the other through worldly law (*Kânun*) based on tradition and customary procedures that covers everyday/practical issues. In this framework, the impact of worldliness and religion (Sunni Islam) on politics varied over six hundred years of the Ottoman reign, depending on the circumstances of the time. Scholars generally agree that, against the popular belief, the Caliphate represented by the Ottoman Empire since the reign of Selim the First, rarely had a significant impact on politics.[325]

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[323] *Ibid.*, p. 44-45.
[324] Kushner, *Türk Milliyetçiliğinin Doğuşu…*, p. 54-55. Also see. Deringil, "Namık Kemal'den Mustafa Kemal'e…, p. 263-296; Karpat, "Tarihsel Süreklilik…, p. 19-50; Karpat, *İslam'ın Siyasallaşması…*, p. 571-652; Özdoğan, *"Turan"dan "Bozkurt"a…*, p. 42; Karpat, "Giriş: Millet, Milliyetçilik Kavramlarının…, p. 27-32.
[325] For a detailed information on ideological structure of the state and its relation with religion in the Ottoman Empire see for example, Halil İnalcık, *Devlet-i Aliyye - Osmanlı İmparatorluğu Üzerine Araştırmalar-I Klasik Dönem (1302-1606): Siyasal, Kurumsal ve Ekonomik Gelişim*, 48.ed., İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2010; Halil İnalcık, *Osmanlı'da Devlet, Hukuk, Adalet*, 2.ed., İstanbul: Eren Yayıncılık, 2005; Halil İnalcık, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu Klâsik Çağ (1300-1600)*, (trans.) Ruşen Sezer, 15.ed., İstanbul: Yapı Kredi

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The articulation of religion with nationalism within the same political discourse took place in the modernization process when certain intellectual groups began to support Turkish nationalism. The majority of these intellectual groups followed an eclectic view, which could be called *modernist traditionalism*.[326] This group, which can be positioned between pro-modernist West-leaning intellectuals and anti-modernist wing of the *ulema*, based on their ideological tendencies, was comprised of intellectuals and government officials striving to harmonize traditional values and beliefs with modern developments. Indeed, they were in favor of emphasizing the difference between *civilization* and *culture* against traditionalists and Westernists who usually supported the unified identity of both concepts. Relatedly, members of the intellectual group calling themselves New/Young Ottomans as well as Sultan Abdülhamid the Second and many other government officials could be included in this cluster based on their ideology and practice.[327] Another issue that is open to far less discussion is, as pointed out by Karpat, that modernist traditionalism was the dominant ideology at least until 1908.[328]

Yayınları, 2010; İlber Ortaylı, *Türkiye Teşkilat ve İdare Tarihi*, 3.ed., Ankara: Cedit Neşriyat, 2008; Stanford J. Shaw, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu ve Modern Türkiye (Cilt I)*, (trans.) Mehmet Harmancı, 3.ed., İstanbul: E Yayınları, 2008; Hakan T. Karateke, Maurus Reinkowski (ed.s), *Legitimizing the Order: The Ottoman Rhetoric of State Power*, Leiden, Boston: Brill, 2005; Colin Imber, *The Ottoman Empire, 1300-1650: The Structure of Power*, Hampshire, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002; Rıfa'at Ali Abou-El-Haj, *Modern Devletin Doğası: 16. Yüzyıldan 18. Yüzyıla Osmanlı İmparatorluğu*, (trans.) Oktay Özel, Canay Şahin, Ankara: İmge Kitabevi, 2000; Şerif Mardin, "Türkiye'de Din ve Laiklik", *Türkiye'de Din ve Siyaset* , (der.) M. Türköne, T. Önder, 11.ed., İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2005, p. 35-77; Mehmet V. Seyitdanlıoğlu vd., "Osmanlı Merkezi İdare Sistemi", ve, Yümni Sezen vd. "Devlet İdaresi ve Din", (ed.) Güler Eren, *Osmanlı 6. Cilt: Teşkilat*, Ankara: Yeni Türkiye Yayınları, 1999, p. 17-76; Ahmet Yaşar Ocak, "Din", ve "Düşünce Hayatı", (ed.) Ekmeleddin İhsanoğlu, *Osmanlı Devleti ve Medeniyeti Tarihi*, İstanbul: IRCICA, 1998, p. 109-194; Ahmet Yaşar Ocak, "Osmanlı Resmi İdeolojisi", *Yeniçağlar Anadolu'sunda İslam'ın Ayak İzleri: Osmanlı Dönemi – Makaleler - Araştırmalar*, İstanbul: Kitap Yayınevi, 2011, p. 193-202; Norman Itzkowitz, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu ve İslami Gelenek*, (trans.) İsmet Özel, 2.ed., İstanbul: Şule Yayınları, 1997.
[326] Karpat, *İslâm'ın Siyasallaşması…*, p. 146.
[327] For a detailed assessment of groups' social/cultural/intellectual worlds see, Şerif Mardin, *Yeni Osmanlı Düşüncesinin Doğuşu*, Trans. Mümtazer Türköne, vd., İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1996; Ahmed Cevdet Paşa, *Ma'rûzât*, (ed.) Yusuf Halaçoğlu, İstanbul: Çağrı Yayınları, 1980; Carter V. Findley, *Bureaucratic Reform in the Ottoman Empire: The Sublime Porte, 1789-1922*, Princeton, NJ.: Princeton University Press, 1980; Nazile Abbaslı, *Ali Suavi'nin Düşünce Yapısı – Yıldız Sarayı Baskını*, İstanbul: Bilge Karınca Yayıncılık, 2009, Suraiya Faroqhi, "Alafranga Toplum Eleştirisi ve Domatesler: Osmanlı Üst Tabaka Kültüründe Değişim (1840-1914)", *Osmanlı Kültürü ve Gündelik Yaşam: Ortaçağdan Yirminci Yüzyıla* , (trans.) Elif Kılıç, 7.ed., İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 2001; Ahmet Şimşirgil, Ekrem Buğra Ekinci, *Ahmed Cevdet Paşa ve Mecelle*, 2.ed., İstanbul: İhlas Gazetecilik, 2009; Sultan Abdül Hamit, *Siyasi Hatıratım*, 3.ed., İstanbul: Dergah Yayınları, 1975; Carter V. Findley, *Ahmet Midhat Efendi Avrupa'da*, (trans.) Ayşen Anadol, İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 1999; Karpat, *İslâm'ın Siyasallaşması…*, Neumann, "Ahmed Cevdet Paşa'nın Tarihçiliğine…; and the same resources can be further referred for an evaluation of the results of Ottoman modernization process.
[328] Karpat, *İslâm'ın Siyasallaşması…*, p. 578.

A group of intellectuals envisioning an Ottoman identity with a mixture of Islam, Turkishness and modernism, entitled "Imperial nationalism" by Ersanlı[329], in this period called themselves *New* (or *Young*) *Ottomans*. Traces of this tendency can be found in various statements and articles of the group members. Mardin defines this group led by Ziya Pasha, Namık Kemal, Mustafa Fazıl Pasha, İbrahim Şinasi, and Ali Suavi, which gained prominence especially between 1867 and 1878 as "the first philosophers to both lay the grounds for the intellectual proficiency of the people who could read Turkish … and to try to harmonize these ideas with Islam."[330] Members of this group received modern education and most of them took active role in various positions in the bureaucracy, making them products of the modernization process in the Empire. In essence, they opposed both to the cultural alienation caused by *Tanzimat* policies and to the absolutist tendencies of the Sultan. Mardin summarizes the political targets of the group in their opposition as follows: "Establishment of a national representative body, elimination of foreign interference in Turkey's internal affairs, settling the reform issue in line with Ottoman and Islamic tradition."[331]

In line with this definition, to quote Karpat, Namık Kemal was the man "whose ideology was shaped by Muslim-Turkish characteristics concerning the way to get masses into action and identify their identities."[332] Karpat writes about the intellectual orientation of the author/poet as follows: "Namık Kemal's ideology was almost completely based on homeland, in other words *umma* (community), that associates citizenship with the state founded on a piece of land. Although this call for nationalism replaced Christian values with Islamic ones, it is based on the Western practices of the concept and ideology."[333] According to Karpat, Namık Kemal regarded "Turkification of all Ottoman Muslims" as a salvation recipe for the Empire.[334] Mardin names Namık Kemal to be "the person among authors of the time to conceptualize a unique political philosophy,"[335] which in general "was based on

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[329] Büşra Ersanlı (Behar), *İktidar ve Tarih: Türkiye'de 'Resmî Tarih' Tezinin Oluşumu (1929-1937)*, İstanbul: Afa Yayıncılık, 1996, p. 65-68.
[330] Mardin, *Yeni Osmanlı Düşüncesinin Doğuşu…* , p. 10.
[331] *Ibid.*, p. 58.
[332] Karpat, "Osmanlı'da Değişim, Modernleşme ve Uluslaşma…, p. 45.
[333] *Ibid.*, p. 45.
[334] Karpat, *İslâm'ın Siyasallaşması…*, p. 577.
[335] Mardin, *Yeni Osmanlı Düşüncesinin Doğuşu…*, p. 319.

two different sources, namely Islamic and Western/secular."[336] It is true in the sense that his ideology regarding fundamental issues of political theory such as power/authority, sovereignty/government, legitimacy, and representation is partly based on the traditional Islamic law/political philosophy while carrying traces of ideas introduced by Western intellectuals of the time.[337] The use of certain key words reflecting different ideological traditions are identified by Mardin as *vatan* (homeland), *Osmanlı* (Ottoman), *umma* (Islamic nation), *millet; kavim* (nation), *Türk* (Turkish) and *mezheb* (denomination) in Namık Kemal's comments about patriotism is a typical example of this eclecticism.[338] Thus, in his own words, "isn't it the Turkish nation who raised Fârabi, Avicenna, Gazzali, and Zemahsheri in its *madrasah?*" Namık Kemal regarded being Ottoman, Turkish, and Muslim as inseparable components of the same identity in his works. [339] From this perspective, Mardin and Karpat are in agreement that his play called *Vatan* (or *Vatan yahut Silistre*) (1873) carries a historical value as one of the leading works of literature combining various Turkish and Islamic themes.[340] For Karpat, this play "is a propaganda to popularize the idea of an Ottoman motherland among the Muslim population, and especially the Turkish."[341] He says, "in Namık Kemal's ideology, 'Ottoman' had become a synonym for 'Muslim' and 'Turkish', excluding non-Muslims."[342]

On the other hand, it was the journalist İbrahim Şinasi to use the concept of "Ottoman nation" that coincides with the same meaning of the word "nation" in the Western world, which was used earlier in the Empire to mean different religious communities.[343] I must add that the concept was used by the Ottoman intellectuals in a dual meaning until the beginning of the twentieth century, including both religious and national references.

At this stage, it would be appropriate to mention some examples pertinent to this approach uniting Turkishness with religious themes. From this perspective, one of

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[336] *Ibid.*, p. 325.
[337] *Ibid.*, p. 319-372.
[338] *Ibid.*, p. 362-363.
[339] *Ibid.*, p. 364.
[340] *Ibid.*, p. 367; Karpat, *İslâm'ın Siyasallaşması*, p. 533-540.
[341] Karpat, *İslâm'ın Siyasallaşması…*, p. 537.
[342] *Ibid.*, p. 536.
[343] Lewis, *Modern Türkiye'nin Doğuşu…*, p. 333-334.

the most common patterns found in various works of the period is being proud of the Muslim identity of Turks and their contributions to Islam. Quoting Kushner for an example of this theme:

> Turks made valuable contributions to Islam, as they made to ancient civilizations. They not only proselytized but also protected Islam from various threats... Arabs were defined in an article in *Basiret Gazetesi* as follows: A nation devoid of law and order, with chronic internal conflict and hasty/impatient people. Turks on the other hand are depicted as capable of organization, well-balanced people who take their time before they make a decision and obey law and order…

> Ebuzziya Tevfik, accused of harming Arabic due to his views on developing and simplifying the language said "…Those who fluttered the glorious Ottoman flag on the Indian Ocean were not Arabs but Turks. Those who reigned hundreds of nations were not Arabs but Turks. Those who restored justice and goodness in the land, that turned into violence and hostility in the hands of the Umayyad Dynasty were again not Arabs but Turks." …

> Turks did not only restore political power in the history of Islam, but also served Islamic civilization. Authors of pre-Islamic Turkish history put aside the image of Turks as nomadic warriors and based their works on the cultural achievements of this nation and race.

> According to Turkish nationalists, the role of the Turks in spreading Islam around the world and establishing Islamic civilization was an output of their skill in establishing civilizations. A medical doctor wrote: "Turks who ruled a state for centuries once upon a time, beyond the Caspian Sea and Transoxania (Turk. *Maveraünnehir*), shedding the light of knowledge from Asia to the rest of the world. It was the Turks who raised genius authors of Islamic civilization such as Avicenna, Fârabi, Muhammad b. Ebubekir Razi and Ulug Bey. Although philosophers like Avicenna were raised at Arab madrasahs, their ancestors are of Turkish origin who they contributed to the development of medicine and civilization for many generations."[344]

Here the crucial point is that above themes are the basis of a specific paradigm/doctrine which would be developed in the name of *Turkish-Islamic Synthesis* since 1970s onwards. Indeed, it was coined and doctrinized by *Aydinlar Ocağı* organization that was found in 1970 in order to "propogate the idea of nationalism by promoting national culture and consciousness."[345] According to Bora and Can, as an eclectic and vulgar discourse, Turkish-Islamic Synthesis assumes Turkishness and Muslimness as inextricable components of social identity and

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[344] Kushner, *Türk Milliyetçiliğinin Doğuşu…*, p. 47-50.
[345] Çiler Dursun, "Türk-İslam Sentezi İdeolojisinin Failini Tanımak", *Radikal İki*, 28.05.2006: http://www.radikal.com.tr/ek_haber.php?ek=r2&haberno=5895

ideology.[346] In this framework, Turks' exclusive contribution to the spread of Islam and development of Islamic civilization, and integrating role of Islam in making Turks a nation are both praised.[347] Nevertheless, despite the mutual interdependence of Turkishness and Islam, the latter is essentially considered as superior against the former. Thus, Islam is glorified as the religious, moral and identity basis of Turkish personality.[348] In this respect, according to the advocates of this synthesis, "Turkishness is only possible and sustainable by being Muslim."[349] This doctrine has become the official ideology of Turkish state with the military coup in 1980; thus, began to designate the hegemonic discourse in mass education.[350]

Even though this paradigm is formally doctrinized in recent times, there are a plenty of studies claiming the beginning of the idea of synthesizing Turkishness and Islam traces back even to the last period of Ottoman Empire.[351] For instance, Çetinsaya introduces Young Ottomans as the pioneers of such kind of thinking.[352] In this respect, it would not be inappropriate to assert that the ideas of modernist traditionalists of both the Imperial and Republican periods about articulating Turkishness and Islam within a single ideological discourse and identity can be taken as variations of the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis.

Although similar ideas attracted the attention of a number of government officials at around the same time (at more of an individual level), it became the official statement during the reign of Abdülhamid the Second. The period marks both the transformation of an ideology uniting Islam and Turkishness into the dominant discourse of the state and popularization of this ideology by mass education and

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[346] Tanıl Bora and Kemal Can, *Devlet, Ocak, Dergâh: 12 Eylül'den 1990'lara Ülkücü Hareket*, 6.b., İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2000, p. 161.
[347] Dursun, "Türk-İslam Sentezi…; Copeaux, *Türk İslam Sentezinden…*, p. 56.
[348] Copeaux, *Türk İslam Sentezinden…*, p. 56-57.
[349] Dursun, "Türk-İslam Sentezi…
[350] For detailed analysis of Turkish-Islamic Syntehis see. Bozkurt Güvenç et al., *Türk-İslam Sentezi*, 2.b., İstanbul: Sarmal Yayınevi, 1994; Çiler Dursun, Ideology and Subject: Turkish-Islamic Synthesis, Ankara: Ankara Üniveristesi, 2002; Erhan Akarçay, *Bir Muhafazakarlaştırma Projesi Olarak Türk-İslam Sentezi*, MA Thesis, Eskişehir: Anadolu Universitesi, 2008.
[351] For instance see. Özdalga, "Islamism and Nationalism as Sister Ideologies…; Rosenthal, "Islam and Turkish Nationalism…; Turan, "Siyasal İdeoloji Olarak İslam ve Milliyetçilik…, Toprak, "Islam and Nation-Building…; Öğün, "Türk-İslam Sentezi… ; Akgün and Çalış, "Türk Milliyetçiliğinin Terkibinde İslamcı Doz…; Çağaptay, *Türkiye'de İslam, Laiklik ve Milliyetçilik: Türk Kimdir?*..; Bora, *Türk Sağının Üç Hali…;* Yenigün, *Islamism and Nationalism in Turkey…;* Waxman, "Islam and Turkish National Identity…; Zubadia, "Turkish Islam and National Identity…; Zubadia, "Islam and Nationalism: Continuities and Contradictions…; Atasoy, "Islam, the State and Nation-Building in Turkey…; Çetinsaya, "Rethinking Nationalism and Islam…
[352] Çetinsaya, "Rethinking Nationalism and Islam…, p. 351-352.

official indoctrination (with special emphasis on the school textbooks). At this stage, it would be useful to have a closer look at the developments of the time pertinent to my study.

The official discourse based on religious nationalism, during the reign of Abdülhamid the Second united Islam and Turkishness to establish an Ottoman identity as opposed to the general view that this was an Islamist movement.[353] While agreeing that fusion of Muslim and Turkish identities was the dominant characteristics of the official discourse of the period, the author points out to the dominance of Islam over being Turkish.[354] According to Alkan, the official discourse in the era of Abdülhamid the Second "regarded being Turkish as a secondary identity that only becomes meaningful with Islamic identity."[355] Karpat mentions that Abdülhamid the Second, "the most Muslim sultan to rule the Ottoman Empire in his view… meticulously nationalized, idealized and Turkified the society through a series of traditions (Islamic and Turkish) re-shaped in this period."[356] The Sultan himself united Islam and Turkishness to define Ottoman identity as follows:

> Great Ottoman Empire became a state based on religion following the conquest of the Caliphate by Yavuz Selim. Nevertheless, as this state was founded by Turks, it is a Turkish state. Since its founder Osman the Great, the state was based on four principles: The state is ruled by an Ottoman Sultan, it is governed by the Turks, its religion is Islam, and its capital is İstanbul. Weakening or

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[353] The specific case of the development of Islamism in Turkey is beyond the scope of this study. Therefore, in my opinion, here it would be adequate to state the fact that it was the reign of Abdulhamid the Second when Islamism was wielded as a political ideology in its modern sense in order to maintain the territorial integrity of the Empire. For Karpat, "the Sultan aimed to unify the religious community and convert it into a political community or a proto-nation by using Islamism as an ideological tool." (Karpat, *İslam'ın Siyasallaşması…*, p. 301.) For me, this also made it possible for Islam to combine with nationalism in the political discourse. For a detailed assessment of Islamism see. Jacob M. Landau, *Pan-Islam Politikaları: İdeoloji ve Örgütlenme*, (trans.) Nigar Bulut, İstanbul: Anka Yayınları, 2001; Karpat, *İslam'ın Siyasallaşması…*; İsmail Kara, *Türkiye'de İslamcılık Düşüncesi: Metinler / Kişiler (2 Cilt)*, 4.ed., İstanbul: Dergah Yayınları, 2011; İsmail Kara, *İslamcıların Siyasi Görüşleri 1: Hilafet ve Meşrutiyet*, 2.ed., İstanbul: Dergah Yayınları, 2001; Tarık Zafer Tunaya, *İslamcılık Cereyanı (3 Cilt)*, İstanbul: (Cumhuriyet Gazetesi) Y.H.A. Basın ve Yayıncılık, 1998; Mardin, "İslamcılık: Tanzimat Dönemi", "İslamcılık: Cumhuriyet Dönemi", *Türkiye'de Din ve Siyaset …*, p. 9-21, 23-34.
[354] Alkan, "İmparatorluk'tan Cumhuriyet'e Modernleşme…, p. 113-159.
[355] *Ibid.*, p. 133.
[356] Karpat, *İslâm'ın Siyasallaşması…*, p. 368. For a detailed assesment about the process of 'inventing (new) traditions' and the ideological dimension beyond it during the reign of Abdulhamid the Second, see. Selim Deringil, *The Well Protected Domains: Ideology and the Legitimation of Power in the Ottoman Empire 1876-1909*, London, New York: I.ed. Tauris Pub., 1999; Selim Deringil, "Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda 'Geleneğin İcadı', 'Muhayyel Cemaat' ('Tasarımlanmış Topluluk') ve Pan-İslamizm", "II. Abdülhamit Dönemi Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda Simgesel ve Törensel Doku: 'Görünmeden Görünmek'", *Simgeden Millete…*, p. 19-52, 53-92; Hakan T. Karateke, *Padişahım Çok Yaşa! Osmanlı Devletinin Son Yüz Yılında Merasimler*, İstanbul: Kitap Yayınevi, 2012; Yusuf Tekin, *Osmanlı Devleti'nin Son Döneminde Modern Ulus Devlete Yönelik Girişimler*, PhD Dissertation, Sivas: Cumhuriyet Üniversitesi, 2002.

dissolving of any one of these principles will shake the foundations of the state.[357]

Implementing new policies in mass education was another component of the re-structuring and popularization of an official discourse that conflated Islamic and Turkish identities. In line with the modernization of education, numerous modern educational institutions were established where educational materials became subject to state control. In fact, the first tendency toward this practice emerged during the Tanzimat reforms. A historical step in this respect, was the foundation of *Encümen-i Daniş* (Academy of Arts and Sciences[358]) in 1851 to prepare textbooks to be used at the new military-civil, state-private, girls-boys and mixed primary schools, junior high schools, high schools, and colleges established with the aim of modernizing education.[359] Although this council lost its intended function over time, the state intervention in selecting the content of educational material gradually increased. Aslan refers to two books prepared in this period, namely *Kavaid-i Osmaniye* (1850), a history course book by Ahmet Cevdet Pasha and Keçecizade Fuat Pasha, and *Nuhbet-ül-etfal* (1852) by Dr. Mehmet Rüştü Bey for teaching the Turkish alphabet as the first professional textbooks in Turkey comparable with Western examples.[360]

Other significant steps taken towards popularization and control of education were the establishment of *Maarif-i Umumiye Nezareti* in 1857 (Ministry of Public Education) and the adoption of *Maarif-i Umumiye Nizamnamesi* in 1869 (General Education Act) which aimed at regulating education as a whole.[361] *Telif ve Tercüme Nizamnamesi* (Copyright and Translation Act) adopted in 1870 in accordance with this act determined "official rules and regulations governing copyrights and translation of books to be used in schools as training material."[362] In light of all these developments, the source of information was changed from a guide (master) in the

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[357] Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi, Yıldız , bölüm 18, dosya 39, 1858 cited in Karpat, *İslâm'ın Siyasallaşması...*, p. 541.
[358] Mardin, *Yeni Osmanlı Düşüncesinin Doğuşu…*, p. 254.
[359] Alkan, "Resmi İdeolojinin Doğuşu…, p. 385.
[360] Erdal Aslan, "Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nin İlk Ders Kitapları", *Eğitim ve Bilim*, Cilt: 35, Sayı: 158, 2010, p. 217. Ersanlı, quoted from Akçura, gives the name of Ahmed Vefik Paşa as the first writer of texbooks for the new schools opened in 1860s. Büşra Ersanlı (Behar), *İktidar ve Tarih: Türkiye'de 'Resmî Tarih' Tezinin Oluşumu (1929-1937)*, İstanbul: Afa Yayıncılık, 1996, p. 57.
[361] Alkan, "İmparatorluk'tan Cumhuriyet'e Modernleşme…, p. 86, 98-99.
[362] *Ibid.*, p. 108.

conventional education system to textbooks published under state control in the new one.[363]

Similar steps followed during the reign of Abdülhamid the Second, who gave special importance to activities towards modernization and popularization of education in state policy and, thus; earned his title of "educationist."[364] During his reign, a significant rise in schooling rate was achieved.[365] According to Alkan, "the sultan's tendency was a result of his realization that education is the fundamental institution for transfer of ideology and development of the state and society."[366] In this framework, the process was not only limited to the establishment of new, modern schools but it also encompassed modernization of education system and its tools. Alongside the establishment of new schools providing education to a wider group of the society, modern classrooms, tables and chairs, blackboards, maps, and even globes became standard tools of education. This new approach in education was called *usûl-ü cedit* (new method).[367] In addition to the efforts to transform the educational system based on this new approach, the attempts to publish new (modern) textbooks for various courses were also maintained. A significant development was the establishment of *Matbaa-i Osmaniye* (Ottoman Printing House) in 1878 by the state for publishing of official material including sacred scriptures and textbooks. Interestingly, this official printing house continued its initial function in the Republican era (and even today) under the name of *Milli Eğitim Basımevi* (National Education Printing House). Karpat considers this an evidence of institutional continuity in the transition from the Ottoman Empire to Republic of Turkey.[368]

The last development underlined by Karpat as part of the structuring of an official discourse and its popularization through education is the establishment of *Tarih-i Osmani Encümeni* (Commission on Ottoman History) in 1909 by Sultan Mehmed the Fifth. This institution served as the state's tool to structure an *official history thesis*

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[363] Mardin, "Türkiye'de Din ve Laiklik…, p. 56.
[364] Alkan, "İmparatorluk'tan Cumhuriyet'e Modernleşme…, p. 113.
[365] For a detailed assessment about the steps taken for education in that period, resources given for the advancement in education in the last period of the Empire can be checked.
[366] *Ibid.*, p. 195.
[367] *Ibid.*, p. 115.
[368] Karpat, *İslâm'ın Siyasallaşması…*, p. 371.

by leading Ottoman-Turkish historians and authors.[369] Among the members of this commission were authors who wrote the textbooks used in the period. To quote Karpat, "although the 'nation' was called Ottoman, members were using the terms 'Ottoman' and 'Turkish' as synonyms. In the end, the Commission began to regard Ottoman history as part of the whole Turkish history and published some important documents in this issue."[370] The author explains that this institution continued to exist in the Republican era, first under the name of *Türk Tarih Encümeni* (Commission on Turkish History, 1923-24), then *Türk Tarihi Tetkik Cemiyeti* (Turkish History Research Association, 1931-32), and finally, *Türk Tarih Kurumu* (Turkish History Institution).[371]

Alkan states that alongside all these developments in the field of education in general, and more specifically in determining and popularizing the contents of textbooks, "an official ideology was structured for the first time in Ottoman history within the framework of an official history concept."[372] Thus, various religious nationalist themes explained above with examples from modernist intellectuals of the time began to take priority in the official textbooks published first time by the state according to the curriculum determined.[373]

While analyzing various textbooks used during the reign of Abdülhamid the Second, Alkan mentions coming across numerous examples of emphasis on the Muslim-Turkish identity. From this perspective, the author claims, this loose and pragmatic ideology was emphasized especially in Islamic history, Ottoman history, and general history textbooks"[374] with two main themes: Turks being the ancestors of the Ottomans, and the Ottomans' function as the carrier of Islam.[375] Quoting Alkan:

> One of the religious/mythological sources used in Islamic history books by the political regime to legitimize itself was that "The Turks come from the line of Yafes, one of the sons of Prophet Noah". When explaining the origins of the Ottoman State, birth of Islamic religion was taken as the starting point, then establishment of the Ottoman state was explained, with a mention to Ottomans' Turkish ancestors. The main narrative was based on Islam. Turks were depicted

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[369] *Ibid.*, p. 590; Ersanlı (Behar), *İktidar ve Tarih…*, p. 81-82.
[370] Karpat, *İslâm'ın Siyasallaşması…*, p. 590.
[371] *Ibid.*, p. 591.
[372] Alkan, "İmparatorluk'tan Cumhuriyet'e Modernleşme…, p. 81,
[373] Alkan, "Resmi İdeolojinin Doğuşu…, p. 391.
[374] Alkan, "İmparatorluk'tan Cumhuriyet'e Modernleşme…, p. 132.
[375] *Ibid.*

as a rebellious and disobedient tribe before their adoption of Islam, who became civilized as an outcome of this adoption. Ottoman State was honored for the conquest of Istanbul, and especially of the Caliphate, giving the Sultan a sacred identity as leader of Muslims.[376]

Alkan also points out that the emphasis on Turkishness was more prominent in the textbooks of military schools, causing the nationalist movement to spread more vehemently among the young generation enrolled at military schools compared to others.[377]

One last comment regarding the dominant discourse embedded in the textbooks is that Islamic identity paired with Turkishness referred to *Sunni* Islam in line with the official Islamic view of the classic period. According to Deringil, *Hanafism*, one of the Islamic legal schools, became more prominent in the reign of Abdülhamid the Second as the dominant component of the official discourse.[378] As a result, Alkan states that majority of Islamic themes found in textbooks referred to *Hanafite-Sunni* Islam. Similarly, Sultan Selim's slay of the Shi'a was praised by the use of verbs like "purged/cleansed" (Turk. *temizledi*) or "slaughtered" (Turk. *kılıçtan geçirdi*) and it was reflected as a "historical event serving a sacred purpose of establishing unity in Islam and the Ottoman state by putting an end to the disintegration among Muslims."[379]

To summarize, the initial development of political and cultural themes regarding Turkish nationalism which would vary over time, took place in a framework of religious nationalism uniting Ottoman and Muslim identities, as it was developed by Ottoman intellectuals, and spread initially among traditionalist/conservative circles. Within this framework Islamic connection was emphasized followed by Turkishness. In the following section, I will discuss the second stage of the development of Turkish nationalism and the characteristics of the secular derivative of this movement in the efforts to popularize the official discourse.

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[376] *Ibid.*
[377] *Ibid.*, p. 144.
[378] Deringil, "Osmanlı'dan Türk'e...", p. 96.
[379] Alkan, "İmparatorluk'tan Cumhuriyet'e Modernleşme…", p. 149-150.

3.3. The Second Period of Turkish Nationalism and Islam between 1908 and 1918

Politicization of national ideology and its transformation into a national awakening through organizations and publications took place in the beginning of the twentieth Century. According to Georgeon, there were three significant issues underlying this development. The first one was the proclamation of the second Constitutional Monarchy, "a patriotic move led by military officers aiming to maintain unity of the Empire and achieve modernization, as they believed Abdülhamid's regime was the reason for disintegration and collapse of the state."[380] The author explains that this revolution was an explicit response of the provinces to the cosmopolitan policies of the capital. Besides, considering the characteristics of the military officers supporting this revolution, it can be seen as a response mainly from the Muslim population, more specifically from the Turkish population.[381] According to the author, one of the most significant outcomes of this revolution was the return of thousands of political exiles and intellectuals to the Empire from Europe and Russia. They were encouraged by the environment of freedom it created, many of whom would become the leaders of Turkish nationalism over time.[382]

Georgeon argues that the second factor which had an impact on the development of Turkish nationalism was the Empire's loss of large lands during World War I and the developments afterwards. As discussed in the quote below, this had a three dimensional impact:

> First, hostility towards Europe gradually increased among the governing officials and among the population due to Europe's direct and/or indirect involvement in the dissolving of the Empire… Second, the Turkish population in Anatolia had to bear the essential weight of wars (Turco-Italian War, Balkan Wars, Rebellions in Albania and Yemen etc.)… Third, such events were a major blow on the highly favored ideologies and political systems: 'Ottomanism' (the dream of an Ottoman nation was shattered), Pan Islamism which was weakened by the rebellions in Albania and by the rise of Arab

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[380] François Georgeon, "Osmanlı Devletinde Türk Milliyetçiliğinin Yükselişi (1908-1914)", *Osmanlı-Türk Modernleşmesi (1900-1930): Seçilmiş Makaleler*, Trans. Ali Berktay, İstanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 2006, p. 24.
[381] *Ibid.*, p. 24-25.
[382] *Ibid.*, p. 25.

nationalism, and Westernism hard pressed against Europe's aggressive policies took their share in these blows.[383]

For Georgeon, the third factor feeding the development of Turkish nationalism in the beginning of the twentieth century was the control of economic wealth mostly owned by non-Muslim groups emanating from their dominant position in foreign trade with Europe.[384] According to the author, the primary outcome of this development was the conflict emerged between the political and financial powers of the Empire. Combined with Europe's destructive attitude toward the Empire's economy, the author concludes, the gap between Christians and Muslims became much deeper.[385]

Relatedly, Poulton points out five historical factors underlying national movements across the world except for Western Europe, which he believes play a role in the development of Turkish nationalism as well: (1) emergence of an intellectual minority with little chance for advancement, (2) economic and social constraints, (3) existence of mixed population groups in the area, (4) state of war, and (5) a common language as a tool to unite different population groups.[386]

Turkish nationalism as a political ideology and movement began to permeate among the intellectual circles in the Empire since the beginning of the twentieth Century and it became diversified when articulated to different discourses. Amongst such variety, a meaningful shift for my study is the emergence of a secular version of nationalism which also developed alongside Enlightenment ideals. In this way, the second phase of the development of nationalism in Turkey marks a problematical period with conflicts between a nationalism based on Turkish-Muslim identity versus a secular nationalism both in the discourse of the state and among the intellectuals. I have discussed various characteristics of the groups supporting religious nationalism in the previous section: I now will focus on the discourse of the Modernists/ *Westernists* (or; Turk. *Garbçılar*). Comprised of the intellectual, political, and military elite, members of this group not only played a significant role in the last period of the Empire, but they also shaped the policies of the early Republican era.

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[383] *Ibid.*, p. 26.
[384] *Ibid.*, p. 26-27.
[385] *Ibid.*, p. 27.
[386] For a detailed description see, Hugh Poulton, *Silindir Şapka, Bozkurt ve Hilal*, trans. Yavuz Alogan, İstanbul: Sarmal Yayınevi, 1999, p. 15-21.

The first generation of Westernists, who emerged as an outcome of the modernization process in the late Ottoman era, were mainly composed of young Ottomans sent abroad for education during the *Tanzimat* period. They were largely affected by Western lifestyle and culture, feeling that their own civilization was inferior compared to the Western world.[387] Mardin defines some members of this leading elite group as "super-westernized elite,"[388] who started to define the world in a non-religious way and put this approach into practice.[389] What made the process a turning point in the Ottoman intellectual history was that some of the intellectuals deemed civilization (an indispensable part of culture) as a whole and believed, contrary to modernist traditionalists, that Western lifestyle should be adopted in all fields of social life.[390] Thus, as this modernist wing gained power over the government, Western ideologies intruded into Ottoman political traditions.

From this perspective, in addition to the names I cited above, Hanioğlu recites four authors influencing the West-leaning group, who are going to be the founders of the Turkish Republic, especially the members of the Young Turks movement. The first one of these authors was the socialist scientist François-Vincent Raspail, who supported the view that "religion should be replaced by science."[391] The second author was a Darwinist physiologist Claude Bernard calling for "rescuing scientific method from the effects of all philosophical systems."[392] The third one was Ludwig Buchner, who explicitly pointed to (traditional) religion as the biggest obstacle before human development, i.e., against a "science centered materialist" theory defined by Marx, Engels, and Lenin as "vulgar materialism" (*Vulgärmaterialismus*).[393] Hanioğlu states that Buchner's book entitled, *Kraft und Stoff* (*Force and Matter)* (1855), outlined his anti-religious theory and became the sacred book for Ottoman intellectuals, especially among the Young Turks.[394] The last author cited by Hanioğlu was the materialist social psychologist Gustave Le Bon,

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[387] Hanioğlu, *The Young Turks in Opposition…*, p. 8.
[388] Şerif Mardin, "Tanzimat'tan Sonra Aşırı Batılılaşma", *Türk Modernleşmesi* , 2.ed., İstanbul: İletişim, 1992, p. 21-79.
[389] Hanioğlu, *The Young Turks in Opposition…*, p. 10.
[390] *Ibid.*, p. 9; Fay Kirby (Berkes), *Türkiye'de Köy Enstitüleri*, (trans.) Niyazi Berkes, 3.ed., İstanbul: Tarihçi Kitabevi, 2010, p. 32-34.
[391] Hanioğlu, *The Young Turks in Opposition…*, p. 20.
[392] *Ibid.*, p. 21.
[393] *Ibid.*
[394] *Ibid.*

who deemed the intellectuals' physiological superiority over the general population (based on the differences between size/structure of the skull); thus, laying on them the social and political burden of liberating the society.[395] In addition, Alkan mentions the French Enlightenment philosopher Jean Jacques Rousseau and social Darwinist Herbert Spencer..[396]

It is crucial to note the role of modern schools teaching a secular curriculum during the reign of Abdülhamid the Second with regard to the popularization of the ideas among the young population of the period. With regard to Alkan's findings, "higher education institutions… assumed the role of the main source and platform for political activities" in this period.[397] Two main characteristics of the "political socialization" among the young population, according to Alkan, was that "it started at high-school level and increased at college level and it developed to a larger extent at state schools compared to private institutions".[398] The author also underlines that the Young Turks was initiated as a student movement, with very few members outside the circle of students and alumni associations of the "military and civil schools of Medicine, Military Academy, Artillery School, Engineering School, School of Pharmaceutical Sciences, Navy School, Business School, Law School, Veterinary School, [and] School of Civil Services."[399]

According to Hanioğlu, one of the outcomes of the impact of Western ideologies and thinkers on the Ottoman intellectuals starting with the establishment of Constitutional Monarchy was the surge in "scientific," "anti-religious," and "elitist" tendencies. Hence, he concludes that, especially for the intellectual group that regarded modernization as an inevitable solution for the Empire, "science" and "progress" were the key factors that accounts for the superiority of the West.[400] The author states that this deep interest in modern science accompanied by progress(ivism) which became widespread among the Ottoman intellectuals from the second half of the nineteenth Century onwards gradually took precedence over

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[395] *Ibid.*, *p.* 22-23.
[396] Alkan, "İmparatorluk'tan Cumhuriyet'e Modernleşme…, p. 166.
[397] *Ibid.*, p. 159.
[398] *Ibid.*
[399] *Ibid.*, p. 159-160.
[400] Hanioğlu, *The Young Turks in Opposition…*, p. 10.

traditional Ottoman ideology based on religious authority.[401] In this way, a number of intellectuals did not feel the need to base intellectual issues on religious evidence anymore and adopted instead a "scientific" approach based on a "biological-materialist and Darwinist" interpretation..[402]

On the other hand, Hanioğlu underlines the fact that science became "an issue of belief" for some modernist intellectuals over time replacing their religious beliefs; thus, assumed an indisputable status.[403] According to the author, for some intellectuals science was regarded as a guide for humanity in a way to replace religion and these two concepts were frequently used in opposition to each other in various platforms. This, for him, resulted in an inevitable conflict between "science" and "Islam." Thus, criticizing "superstitions" also became the mask for questioning religion by the scientific circles.[404]

Rising authority of Young Turks in the Ottoman government was a key factor in the dominance of West-leaning ideas and policies in the beginning of the twentieth century. This political movement was indeed established by the participation of bureaucrats and military officers trained in the modern/secular military and civil schools founded in the period mentioned above.[405] Like their modernist brothers, this generation was also largely affected by political views of Western origin and they strongly opposed to the authoritarian regime forced by Abdülhamid the Second. Although the movement was repressed for a while, it became institutionalized in 1895 in Paris by the foundation of the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) (Turk. *İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti)* under the leadership of Ahmet Rıza. Over time, it grew strong enough to gain dominance in the Ottoman government.

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[401] *Ibid.*, p. 11-12.
[402] *Ibid.*, p. 11.
[403] *Ibid.*
[404] *Ibid.*, p. 12.
[405] For detailed information about *The Young Turks* and İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti see, Şerif Mardin, *Jön Türkler'in Siyasî Fikirleri: 1895-1908*, 15.ed., İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2008; M. Şükrü Hanioğlu, *Bir Siyasal Örgüt Olarak Osmanlı İttihad ve Terakki Cemiyeti ve Jön Türklük (1889-1902)*, İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1985; M. Şükrü Hanioğlu, *Bir Siyasal Düşünür Olarak Abdullah Cevdet ve Dönemi*, İstanbul: Üçdal Neşriyat, 1981; Hanioğlu, *The Young Turks in Opposition…*; Ernest E. Ramsaur, *Jön Türkler ve 1908 İhtilali*, (trans.) Nuran Ülken, İstanbul: Sander Yayınları, 1972; Yuriy A. Petrosyan, *Sovyet Gözüyle JönTürkler*, (trans.) Mazlım Beyhan vd., Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1974; Zürcher, *Milli Mücadelede İttihatçılık*, Trans. Nüzhet Salihoğlu, 3.ed., İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2005; Feroz Ahmad, *İttihat ve Terakki: 1908-1914*, Trans. Nuran Yavuz, 4.ed., İstanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, 1995; Feroz Ahmad, *İttihatçılıktan Kemalizme*, (trans.) Fatmagül Berktay, İstanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, 1996. Information given in the paragraph is compiled from these resources.

Hanioğlu argues that the Young Turks shared similar ideologies with the preceding modernists and especially "popular science and materialism" constituted a basic perspective for their social analysis. The author claims that the majority of the members of the movement's institutional organ CUP, including the founders themselves, were either students or alumni of the educational institutions cited above and that this was a sound proof of this relationship.[406] In such a cultural and intellectual context, the views of this wing about religion and nationalism are directly relevant to my analysis.

To start with the views of this group with regard to religion, as shown by various examples so far, some of the West-leaning intellectuals adopted a Protestant-like approach towards Islam, suggesting that it should go through a reform process; thus, be "modernized" and even "nationalized."[407] On the other hand, some combined a strict positivism with atheism or deism.[408] Clearly, West-leaning intellectuals started a deep quest for developing the right relationship with religion both on an individual and political-social level. For a number of intellectuals this quest took a similar path; they experienced fluctuations similar to the ones experienced by French intellectuals, as explained by Hayes in the previous chapter. Hence, while many displayed a relatively positive attitude toward Islam at the beginning of their career, for instance, making frequent references to the Qur'an to call upon Islamic recommendations and commandments to maintain social order and unity, later they became supporters of anti-religious policies.[409] Hanioğlu states that the School of Medicine had an especially strong impact on the popularization of positivist and materialist views among students. An interesting example of this observation was Abdullah Cevdet, who started school as an "extremely pious" person and then becoming a fierce "scientific materialist" by the end of his sophomore year, ending up publishing the first magazine in the Empire criticizing Islam.[410]

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[406] Hanioğlu, *The Young Turks in Opposition…*, p. 18.
[407] For examples see, Mehmet Akgül, *Türk Toplumunun Değişim Sürecinde Din Anlayışları: Tanzimat Sonrası Örneği*, PhD Dissertation, Konya: Selçuk Üniversitesi, 1996, p. 96, 116. (This thesis, *Türk Modernleşmesi ve Din*, Konya: Çizgi Kitabevi, 1999 is pubished as a book with this specific identification) Citations within this work are from the thesis itself.
[408] Alkan, "İmparatorluk'tan Cumhuriyet'e Modernleşme…, p. 167.
[409] For examples see, Akgül, *Türk Toplumunun Değişim Sürecinde…*, p. 105.
[410] Hanioğlu, *The Young Turks in Opposition…*, p. 20.

In his efforts to define a framework with similar tendencies, Akgül observes that a number of Young Turks "initially tried to impose a social function to religion, failing at it, then attempted to criticize the common understanding of religion, and finally made religion itself… a topic of discussion."[411] As this transition penetrated through the West-leaning intellectuals of the period, most of them decided to take a materialist and anti-religious stance, for Hanioğlu. Gradually, this view became so widespread among the Young Turks that they were defined as "an atheist group" by the government..[412]

Nevertheless, merging secularist tendencies with Turkish nationalism in a "secular nationalist" discourse did not materialize until the beginning of the twentieth century, contrary to the expectations, and even delayed as late as the Republican period. Indeed, the increasing power of the CUP, with a majority of Westernists, over the government as of 1910 marked the first steps towards a secular political setting. Still, an indicative milestone was the establishment of the Kemalist regime in the early 1920s. Hence, the second post-Constitutional Monarchy period can be seen as a transition period, witnessing the struggle between the ideas of Enlightenment and religious nationalism at the official level. At this point, I present an assessment about the development of Turkish nationalism in regard to the views and ideas of this group.

As stated earlier, channels for spreading the modernist views popular among the Ottoman intellectuals during the late Ottoman period were usually the same. For instance, the school of Medicine, which assumed a major role in spreading the West-leaning ideas of the time, also became a center for spreading nationalism among the youth.[413] Accordingly, the young intellectuals who studied in these schools played a significant role in the development of Turkish nationalism as a systematic ideology and movement. The special role of the CUP members in spreading nationalism as well as other ideas associated with the Enlightenment should also be emphasized.[414] Close relationship between the names including Hüseyinzade Ali (Turan), Ahmed Agayef (Ahmet Ağaoğlu), Ziya Gökalp, Akçuraoğlu Yusuf (Yusuf Akçura), and

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[411] Akgül, *Türk Toplumunun Değişim Sürecinde…,* 105-106.
[412] Hanioğlu, *The Young Turks in Opposition…*, p. 21.
[413] Georgeon, "Osmanlı Devletinde Türk Milliyetçiliğinin…, p. 30; Karpat, *İslam'ın Siyasallaşması…*, 493.
[414] Poulton, *Silindir Şapka, Bozkurt ve Hilal…*, p. 84.

Mois Kohen (Munis Tekinalp/Tekin Alp) with nationalism on the hand and with the CUP on the other can be taken as a sound evidence of this connection.[415] In this scope, the prominent role of Yusuf Akçura in presenting Turkish nationalism as a "political project" for the first time in Turkish history has to be underlined. In addition, various associations and organizations established in big cities throughout the Empire mostly led by the members of this organization and their publishing played a fundamental role in spreading Turkish nationalism. Organizations like *Türk Derneği* (1908), *Türk Yurdu Cemiyeti* (1911), *Türk Ocağı* (1911/12), *Türk Bilgi Derneği* (1913/14), and *Türk Gücü Derneği* (1913)[416], and their publications including *Türk Derneği Dergisi* (1911), *Genç Kalemler Dergisi (1910)*, *Türk Yurdu Dergisi* (1911), *Bilgi Mecmuası* (1913), *Halka Doğru Dergisi* (1913), and *Türk Sözü Dergisi* (1914) were some of the leading examples.[417] It is also quite interesting to

[415] For detailed descriptions see, Ali Haydar Bayat, *Hüseyinzade Ali Bey*, Ankara: Atatürk Kültür Merkezi Yayınları, 1998; Sevil Garaşova, "XX. Yüzyıl Azerbaycan Fikir Tarihinde Ali Bey Hüseyinzade'nin Yeri", *Selçuk Üniversitesi Türkiyat Araştırmaları Dergisi*, Sayı 16, Güz, 2004, p. 297-314; A. Holly Shissler, *Between Two Empires: Ahmet Ağaoğlu and the New Turkey*, N.Y.: I.ed. Tauris, 2002; Fahri Saka, *Ağaoğlu Ahmed Bey*, Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1999; Ayşe Gün Soysal, *The Life and Thought of a Turkish Nationalist During 1908-1918*, Yüksek Lisans Tezi, İstanbul: Boğaziçi Üniversitesi, 1995; Uriel Heyd, *Türk Ulusçuluğunun Temelleri*, Trans. Kadir Günay, Ankara: Kültür Bakanlığı Yayınları, 2002; Enver Behnan Şapolyo, *Ziya Gökalp, İttihadı Terakki ve Meşrutiyet*, (Ed.) Nevzat Kızılcan, İstanbul: İnkılap Kitabevi, 1974; Taha Parla, *Ziya Gökalp, Kemalizm ve Türkiye'de Korporatizm*, 3.ed., İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1999; İsmayil Hakkı Baltacıoğlu, *Ziya Gökalp*, İstanbul: Yeni Matbaa, 1966; Ziya Gökalp, *Kitaplar 1 (Bütün Eserleri)*, (ed.) Ş. Beysanoğlu, vd., İstanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 2007; Orhan Karaveli, *Ziya Gökalp'i Doğru Tanımak*, İstanbul: Doğan Kitap, 2008; François Georgeon, *Türk Milliyetçiliğinin Kökenleri: Yusuf Akçura (1876-1935)*, Trans. Alev Er, 2.ed., İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 1996; Kemal Şenoğlu, *Kemalizmin İdeoloğu Yusuf Akçura*, İstanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, 2009; Yusuf Akçura, *Üç Tarz-ı Siyaset*, 5.ed., Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 2007; Yusuf Akçura, *Türkçülük*, 2.ed., İstanbul: Toker Yayınları, 2006; Jacob M. Landau, *Tekinalp: Bir Türk Yurtseveri (1883-1961)*, Trans. Burhan Parmaksızoğlu, vd., İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1996; Liz Behmoaras, *Bir Kimlik Arayışının Hikayesi*, İstanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 2005; Yıldız Akpolat, *Tekin Alp ve Türkleştirme*, Erzurum: Fenomen Yayıncılık, 2005; Tekinalp, *Kemalizm*, Trans. Çetin Yetkin, Ankara: Toplumsal Dönüşüm Yayınları, 2004.

[416] For detailed assessment see. Cüneyd Okay, *Türk Derneği*, Ankara: Akçağ Yayınları, 2006; Masami Arai, *Jön Türk Dönemi Türk Milliyetçiliği*, Trans. Tansel Demirel, 4.ed., İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2008; Füsun Üstel, *İmparatorluktan Ulus-Devlete Türk Milliyetçiliği: Türk Ocakları (1912-1931)*, 2.ed., İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2004; Zafer Toprak, "Türk Bilgi Derneği (1914) ve Bilgi Mecmuası", *Osmanlı İlmî ve Meslekî Cemiyetleri 1. Millî Türk Bilim Tarihi Sempozyumu* (Bildiri Kitabı), Ekmeleddin İhsanoğlu (Ed.), İstanbul: Edebiyat Fakültesi Basımevi, 1987, p. 247-254; Fevziye Abdullah Tansel, "Türk Gücü Derneği", *Atatürk Üniversitesi Edebiyat Fak. Yay. Ed. Fak. Arş. Dergisi - Ahmet Caferoğlu Özel Sayısı*, Cilt 1(10), 1979; Yunus Yılmaz, *Turancı Sosyalist Ethem Nejat*, İstanbul: İleri Yayınları, 2012.

[417] For a detailed descripton see, Okay, *Türk Derneği...*; Arai, *Jön Türk Dönemi Türk Milliyetçiliği...*; İsmail Arda Odabaşı, *II. Meşrutiyet Dönemi Basın ve Fikir Hayatında Genç Kalemler Dergisi*, PhD Dissertation, İstanbul: Marmara Üniversitesi, 2006; *Genç Kalemler Dergisi*, (ed.) İsmail Parlatır & Nurullah Çetin, Ankara: Türk Dil Kurumu Yayınları, 1999; Hüseyin Tuncer, *Doksanıncı Yılında Türk Yurdu Bibliyografyası (1911-2001)*, Ankara: Türk Yurdu Yayınları, 2002; Toprak, "Türk Bilgi Derneği (1914) ve Bilgi Mecmuası...; Fatih Sakallı, *Bilgi Mecmuasının Fikrî ve Edebî Bakımdan Değerlendirilmesi*, MA Thesis, Ankara: Gazi Üniversitesi, 2005; Orhan Güdek, *"Halka Doğru" Dergisi, (Tahlilî Fihrist, İnceleme, Seçme Metinler)*, MA Thesis, İstanbul: Fatih Üniversitesi, 2007; Mehmet Özden, "Bir Halkçı Münevverler Platformu: Halka Doğru Dergisi (1913-1914)", *Milli Folklor*, Yıl 23, Sayı 89, 2011, p. 109-119; H. Ayşe Erhan, *Türk Sözü (Tahlilî Fihrist, İnceleme, Metin)*, MA Thesis, Konya: Selçuk Üniversitesi, 2006.

come across the same names as the ones cited above when discussing the founders of these associations and/or the publishers.

Nationalists of the West-leaning wing generally shared similar views about religion although a variety of ideas about the form of nationalism were discussed in the published material. Those ideas were varying from a more pluralist approach in terms of defining homeland as a synonym for Anatolia and Turkishness to an irredentist and racist-ethnic stand based on pan-Turanist ideals. Although they previously treated religion as a supporting component in defining Turkish identity, most of them adopted a secularist interpretation of nationalism over time. In fact, according to Georgeon, initially the "majority of the Turkish nationalists made references to *Qur'an* and *hadith*s in an attempt to prove the presence of nationalism in Islam."[418] In addition, the fact that a number of (West-leaning) nationalists who especially focused on the idea of "nationalization of Islam" in some period of their career, although each had a different understanding of this concept, can be seen as an evidence that religion was deemed as an indispensable component of nationalist theories.[419] However, the early 1920s -foundation years of the new regime- marked a turning point for their ideas (or statements) on religion. Accordingly, most of these intellectuals notably lost their interest in religion, and even began to believe that it prevented national awareness.[420] This change in their approach can well be explained with the intellectual transformation many modernists went through in this sphere. It may also be an outcome of a pragmatic approach in search for a policy that would work in the new socio-political conjuncture.

In this context, Gökalp sets a good example for this transformation. While some define him as one of the modernist traditionalists, a close study on his works will reveal the controversial nature of this view.. According to Heyd, his initial views were based on religion, especially on Sufism.[421] For instance, his articles published in *Türk Yurdu* between 1912 and 1913 on the developments of the late Ottoman era, defined Islam as a supplementary component of nationalism. To quote Gökalp:

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[418] Georgeon, *Türk Milliyetçiliğinin Kökenleri…*, p. 47.
[419] *Ibid.*, p. 106.
[420] For this reason it is important to underline the fact that all three writers usually do not have a good reputation in the eyes of today's religous/conservative writers.
[421] Heyd, *Türk Ulusçuluğunun Temelleri…*, p. 77.

It is not only that there is no opposition between Turkification and Islamization; the need for modernization is not in opposition to either of these ideals… Thus, we need to define the role of each one of these ideals, or better still, comprehend that they are three different ways of meeting the same need to establish a 'modern Islamic Turkishness'[422].

According to Heyd, Gökalp did not differentiate between Turkishness and Islam in this period of his career: "[Gökalp] defined Turkish nation as all Turkish speaking Muslims. In his opinion, Turkey was Islam's grand castle and national awakening of the Turks would trigger a religious awakening for Islam."[423] Mardin underlines that Gökalp's ideas toward uniting Islam, Turkishness and modernism still play a significant role in establishing the foundations of nationalist-Islamist synthesis in modern Turkey today.[424]

Nevertheless, Gökalp's views on religion completely fell into the effect of Durkheim's sociological theory over time. Quoting Mardin, he tended to focus on "not so much Islamic theology, but instead its social function".[425] From a sociological point of view, Gökalp began to see Islam as "a historical concept dependent on social conditions" in this phase. Thus, he assumed it as a (man-made) normative system in order to maintain social solidarity which needed to be reformed to adapt to changing conditions.[426] In this context, even when he defined nation as "a population with a common language, religion, morals, and understanding of esthetics," he considered religion as being a social/normative and worldly source of solidarity.[427] Actually, Gökalp explained in the following paragraph that the definitive factor for conceptualizing a nation did not rest on the components of identity listed above, but rather on "having experienced the same socialization processes."[428] The author's view, similar to Durkheim's, was based on the understanding that any society's god in fact was nothing more than a personified image of the community or the nation, making religion a synonym of "society worshipping" (Turk. *cemiyetperestlik*).

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[422] Ziya Gökalp, *Türkleşmek, İslâmlaşmak, Muâsırlaşmak*, (der.) Osman Karatay, Ankara: Akçağ Yayınları, 2006 [1912-13], p. 17.

[423] Heyd, *Türk Ulusçuluğunun Temelleri…*, p. 98.

[424] Şerif Mardin, "19. ve 20. Yüzyıllarda Osmanlı'da ve Türkiye'de İslam", *Türkiye, İslam ve Sekülarizm* , (der.) E. Gen, M. Bozluolcay, İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2011, p. 76.

[425] Şerif Mardin, "Forum"a katkı, *Ziya Gökalp* (Aralık 1974), Cilt I, no. 1, p. 148-149 cited in. Parla, *Ziya Gökalp, Kemalizm…*, p. 79.

[426] Parla, *Ziya Gökalp, Kemalizm…*, p. 80.

[427] See. Ziya Gökalp, *Türkçülüğün Esasları,* (der.) Mustafa Koç, *Ziya Gökalp, Kitaplar 1 …* [1923], p. 184.

[428] See. *Ibid.*

According to him, with regard to their social integrative function, religions should be specific to a society, in other words, should have a "national" characteristics. He sustained this approach based on positivist and functionalist ideologies not only in his analysis of Islam, but also ancient Turkish religions.[429]

In the final stage of his intellectual development, the author inclined toward the theory suggested by Comte. In this way, he adopted the idea that religions belonged to the early stages of historical development of humankind and would diminish in more advanced stages when their functions would be replaced by positive sciences.[430] In the last years of his life, Gökalp espoused a strictly secular policy stance in state affairs.[431]

Ağaoğlu, another leading nationalist of the period, followed a similar path to Gökalp's in his intellectual/ideological development. For instance, while initially advocating the view that "Islam is the religion of Turks, it is their national religion,"[432] he adopted over time the idea that religion, which he defined as a "foreign element", alienated the Turks from their essential characteristics.[433] In 1920s, Tekin Alp similarly criticized the inhibiting characteristics of religion with regard to the establishment of a national identity: "Some suggests that common religion is a significant component of establishing a national identity. However, we observe the opposite for the Turkish nation".[434] He further explained:

> Religion does not evoke nationalism; on the contrary, it inhibits the process. Masters of Turkish nationalism should know this better than anyone else. Is it not the dominance of religion over everyday life in the Ottoman era that kept awareness of a Turkish nation under cover? Under such dominance of religion, the Turks not only failed to establish their own culture or produce any work of literature, but they also totally ignored their national identity.[435]

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[429] For example see. Ziya Gökalp, *Türk Medeniyeti Tarihi*, (der.) Yusuf Çotuksöken, *Ziya Gökalp, Kitaplar 1 …* [1925], p. 339-391.
[430] Heyd, *Türk Ulusçuluğunun Temelleri…*, p. 80.
[431] *Ibid.*, p. 86-91. On the other hand, for a detailed discussion of Gökalp's view on religion and, that discussion about Heyd's findings see Andrew Davison, *Türkiye'de Sekülarizm ve Modernlik*, (trans..) Tuncay Birkan, İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2002, p. 143-211.
[432] Ahmet Agayef, "İslam'da Da'vayı Milliyet" (Babanzade Ahmet Naim'e Cevap), *Türk Yurdu*, Yıl: 3, C. VI, No: 10, 1914. (Article, Kara, *Türkiye'de İslamcılık Düşüncesi…*, pubished wth Turkish leters in p. 521-533. Cited from, p. 532 of this text)
[433] Ahmed Ağaoğlu, *Üç Medeniyet*, İstanbul: Doğu Kitabevi, 2013 [1919-1920].
[434] Tekin Alp, *Türkleştirmek*, (ed.) Özer Ozankaya, Ankara: T.C. Kültür Bakanlığı Yayınları, 2001 [1928], p. XI.
[435] *Ibid.*, p. 46-47.

On the other hand, we find West-leaning nationalists like Yusuf Akçura and Halil Nimetullah (Öztürk), who deemed religion as a personal/conscientious choice or experience rather than adopting totally an anti-religious approach. Nevertheless, even in this mild approach, we find traces of a quest for nationalizing religion, although it lost its characteristics of being an indispensable component of nationalist discourse.[436] Thus, secularism, excluding religion from the field of politics, was a policy that West-leaning nationalists generally agreed.[437] To quote Karpat:

> In the eyes of some Turkish nationalists, the real enemy was not the oppressive foreign powers, but the Empire and the dark forces of ignorance, in other words religious order and even religion itself. This was the biggest obstacle before Turks to adopt contemporary civilization. Rejection of historical reality became the founding stone of Turkish nationalism. Ideologists of Turkish nationalism – including Ziya Gökalp and governments of the early Republican era – intentionally rejected the new Turkish nations historical ties with the Ottomans and Seljuks in the hope to rid themselves of the humiliation Europeans placed upon everything associated with "Ottomans", "Turkish" and "Muslim", prevent the nation to be affiliated to the Empire, completely eradicate irredentism and guide the nation into the future. Thus, the state separated the nation from its history and for George Orwell, erased history to maintain control over the present.[438]

Within the framework of such ideological inclinations adopted by the leaders of nationalism, activities of the CUP from 1908 onwards marked a significant development with regard to the reflections of a secular nationalism in state policies when compared with the past.[439] In this regard, Poulton defines the main objective of the Young Turk leaders as "Turkifying and modernizing the state."[440] Thus, making Turkish nationalism institutionally the basis of the state's official ideology for the first time in Ottoman history. On the other hand, Hanioğlu claims that, due to the conditions of the time, Turkism has been kept behind closed doors for the most part of the CUP government.[441] In addition, the modernization project of the period involved keeping religion (in the traditional sense, Islam) separate from state affairs

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[436] See Yusuf Akçura, *Üç Tarz-ı Siyaset*, Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 1976 [1904]; Halil Nimetullah, "İnkılabın Felsefesi: Din Müessesesi", *Milli Mecmua*, 10 Ağustos 1927, No: 96, p. 1478-1479'dan alıntılar için see. Akgül, *Türk Toplumunun Değişim Sürecinde…*, p. 214, 217, 238-239, 256-257.
[437] Akgül, *Türk Toplumunun Değişim Sürecinde…*, p. 206.
[438] Karpat, *İslâm'ın Siyasallaşması…*, p. 569-570.
[439] *Ibid.*, p. 597.
[440] Poulton, *Silindir Şapka, Bozkurt ve Hilal…*, p. 85.
[441] Hanioğlu, *Bir Siyasi Örgüt Olarak Osmanlı…*, p. 7.

and public life - although gradually.[442] Hence, the first steps of a secularist and nationalist modernization project associated with the Kemalist Republic was actually taken earlier by the CUP government. Some examples of such policies could be rephrased as follows: Establishment of a secular legal system and bureaucracy to replace the preceding authority of the religious legal system and *ulema*, secularism of some education institutions and foundations, decisions and practices aiming at secularizing daily life, taking legal/political steps towards women's participation in social/financial life (despite religious rules inhibiting this practice), precautions aiming at Turkifying the economy, state support provided to various national associations, and policies encouraging the popularization of Turkishness and Turkish language among the population.[443] It is significant for my analysis that Berkes points to Ziya Gökalp as the originator of these policies, who determined a framework for the state to achieve a reform program regarding religion.[444]

Nevertheless, taking into consideration the dynamics of "real politics" and conditions of the period, the CUP government could not produce a strictly anti-religious policy. On the contrary, Doğan explains that Islam was emphasized even more profoundly in some areas than ever before based on the changing political conditions, especially following the Balkan Wars.[445] Kara also states that the CUP did not refrain from utilizing religion as "a tool for establishing authority, legitimization, achieving participation, weakening opposition [and] mobilization when necessary."[446] The author states the practice of Islamic memorial service (Turk. *mevlüt okutma*) at the CUP meetings and Islamic conferences and courses given by the *ulema* at various periods are examples of this practice.[447] There were also some examples of discriminatory practices towards non-Muslim populations, even involving violence at times. Indeed, including the much-debated forced mass migration of the Armenian population in Eastern Anatolia, the numerous adverse practices towards non-Muslims in this period cannot be explained solely by the Turkification policies of the

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[442] Poulton, *Silindir Şapka, Bozkurt ve Hilal…*, p. 85.
[443] For the progress in politics and law in that period see. Shaw & Shaw, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu ve Modern Türkiye (Cilt 2)…*, p. 365-370; Lewis, *Modern Türkiye'nin Doğuşu…*, p. 212-237; Berkes, *Türkiye'de Çağdaşlaşma…*, p. 429-468; Ahmad, *İttihatçılıktan Kemalizme…*, p. 34-80.
[444] Berkes, *Türkiye'de Çağdaşlaşma…*, p. 441-444, 458-461.
[445] Nuri Doğan, *Ders Kitapları ve Sosyalleşme (1876-1918)*, Ankara: Bağlam Yayıncılık, 1994, p. 116.
[446] Kara, *İslamcıların Siyasi Görüşleri…*, p. 61.
[447] *Ibid.*, p. 61-63.

government, with no involvement of the religious inclinations of the officials.[448] In addition, Arai gives significant information about a magazine published by the CUP from 1914 onwards to encourage reform in Islam. The author explains that *İslâm Mecmuası* (Journal of Islam) spent special efforts to translate Qur'an into Turkish.[449] This stands out as part of the efforts towards "nationalization of Islam" as opposed to an opportunist policy.

To sum up, this period can be defined as a two-fold process concerning the relations between religion and politics. The government strived to minimize the role of religion in the public life through modernization policies, while they also took some steps towards establishing a "modern Turkish Islam" to replace "traditional Arabic Islam."

Traces of this ambivalent policy led by the CUP government with regard to nationalism and religion can be found in education and especially in the textbooks. Before going on to details, I need to state the fact that despite financial issues, significant reforms implemented especially in primary school education towards developing the country. In this context, efforts of Nazır Emrullah Effendi and Sati Bey, both of whom assumed a prominent role in the organization of education to solve the primary education issue can be mentioned.[450] According to Kansu, especially in the post- Balkan War period, there was a general agreement among the intellectuals with regard to the importance of education to save the country, marked by a notable increase in the articles and publications on the concept of education.[451] Ziya Gökalp, İsmayıl Hakkı (Baltacıoğlu) and Selim Sırrı (Tarcan) were the leading names of the time writing on education and pedagogy. They developed the idea of structuring a "national educational system" based on national principles and ideas.

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[448] For examples see, David Gaunt, *Katliamlar, Direniş, Koruyucular: I. Dünya Savaşı'nda Doğu Anadolu'da Müslüman-Hıristiyan İlişkileri*, (trans.) Ali Çakıroğlu, İstanbul: Belge Yayınları, 2007; Fuat Dündar, *Modern Türkiye'nin Şifresi: İttihat Terakki'nin Etnisite Mühendisliği (1913-1918)*, 2.ed., İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2008; Taner Akçam, *'Ermeni Meselesi Hallolunmuştur'*, İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2008; Ahmet Efiloğlu, *İttihat ve Terakki'nin Azınlıklar Politikası*, PhD Dissertation, İstanbul: İstanbul Üniversitesi, 2007; Zafer Toprak, *Türkiye'de Millî İktisat 1908-1918*, İstanbul: Doğan Kitap, 2012; Rıfat N. Bali, *Toplu Makaleler I- Tarihin Ufak Bir Dipnotu: Azınlıklar*, İstanbul: Libra Kitapçılık, 2013, p. 13-56; Nuran Savaşkan Durak, *Non-Muslim Minorities and Turkish National Identity: A Research Through Armenian and Greek Literary Works*, PhD Dissertation, Ankara: METU, 2004; Gülçiçek Günel Tekin, *İttihat ve Terakki'den Günümüze Yek Tarz-ı Siyaset: Türkleştirme*, 2.ed., İstanbul: Belge Yayınları, 2011; Ahmad, *İttihatçılıktan Kemalizme…*, p. 112-173.
[449] Arai, *Jön Türk Dönemi Türk Milliyetçiliği…*, p. 127-143.
[450] İsmail Hakkı Tonguç, *İlköğretim Kavramı*, Ankara: Piramit Yayıncılık, 2004, p. 194-198.
[451] *Ibid.*, p. 198.

However, these authors cannot be said to be in full agreement in terms of including religion in national education.[452]

Alkan, who analyzed the characteristics of the dominant discourse in the textbooks, notes that religious nationalism still dominated secular nationalism in the textbooks.. Indeed, the author acknowledges the conflict between positivist/materialist philosophy and traditional/religious ideologies in state affairs and daily life while underlining the fact that nationalist discourse in textbooks was rather based on the doctrine of *Turkish-Islamic Synthesis*.[453] To quote Alkan, "this was a seemingly Ottoman discourse that became a Turkifying policy in practice supported by an Islamic content and method."[454] According to the author, pragmatic choices brought on by the political conjuncture of the period underlay this inclination.

For Alkan, transition in the education system and textbooks following the proclamation of the second Constitutional Monarchy can be analyzed in three sub-periods. To quote the author:

> The first one started with the proclamation of the Constitutional Monarchy and lasted until March 31st Rebellion that resulted in the dethronement of Abdülhamid; second one ending with the break of the Balkan War, and the third one covering the war years until the end of it. The following were the main characteristics of the three sub-periods: In the first period, no radical changes were seen in the school curriculum, but values supported by 'constitutional monarchy' began to flourish. Textbooks written in the period following the dethronement of Abdülhamid described his reign as a period of 'autocracy' and March 31st Rebellion as a 'pro-Sharia and reactionary' event. Balkan War on the other hand was emphasized with Turkish nationalism which was combined with a militarist content and an Islamic discourse as it bore an undoubted power of nationalism. Turkish nationalism became a prominent notion in textbooks with World War I.[455]

According to Alkan, in the period following the second Constitutional Monarchy, education became one of the prominent topics in the press and parliament and all parties agreed that education should be based on a national system. The ideological dimension of education for the time was "the use of Islamic and Turkish identities

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[452] *Ibid.*, p. 199-214.
[453] Alkan, "İmparatorluk'tan Cumhuriyet'e Modernleşme…, p. 198.
[454] *Ibid.*, p. 199.
[455] *Ibid.*

together with emphasis on Turkishness."[456] According to him, government officials'
hope to mobilize masses through Islam played a significant role in the flourishing of
such "novice" and "hasty" effort especially in the post- Balkan War period.[457] To
quote the author:

> There were two dimensions here. The first one to maintain the support of
> Muslims in the Ottoman state and abroad; second to sanctify concepts of
> nationalism like state, nation, homeland through Islamic values like Jihad, holy
> war veterans (Turk. *gazilik*) and martyrdom (Turk. *şehitlik*) in a militarist
> purpose. They aimed at making army service popular among the male
> population and increasing their willingness to join the army for a sacred
> purpose, improving their loyalty to their commander and decreasing number of
> deserters. In the same way, World War I pushed Unionists toward a Turkish-
> Islamic synthesis despite their strong nationalist inclinations. The call for Jihad
> is a typical example of this policy. Students were taught hymns as well as
> national verses with the purpose of raising 'pious and patriotic' generations.
> Political authority's 'nation and religion chemistry' (Turkish-Islamic synthesis)
> could be found in the primary school's aim to raise "pious, patriotic, nationalist
> intellectuals." This 'chemistry' was utilized during the War of Independence,
> which symbolized the transition from an Empire to nation-state. The emphasis
> in 'Turkish-Islamic Synthesis' was on Turkishness. Islam was only meaningful
> with and through Turkish identity and textbooks were prepared within this
> framework.[458]

Doğan, another researcher analyzing textbooks of the same period, agrees with
Alkan's view and emphasizes the Islamic trait of Turkish identity.[459] The author
analyzes the official discourse over different themes found in textbooks and uses
Ziya Gökalp's poetry which he comes across in a textbook as a concrete example of
the Turkish-Islamic synthesis: "Let not the Crescent fall before the Cross, Amen. Let
not the curtain fall down on the Turks. Amen."[460] The following quotation from the
same textbook reflects a similar approach: "Come along son, let me tell you who you
are. You are a Turk, a Muslim. You are the lasting backbone of religion."[461] Doğan
gives a number of similar examples to support his argument.

Alkan argues that the content and system based on a romantic and militarist
nationalism dominating military schools during the reign of Abdülhamid the Second

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[456] *Ibid.*, p. 200-201.
[457] *Ibid.*, p. 201.
[458] *Ibid.*, p. 201-202.
[459] Doğan, *Ders Kitapları ve Sosyalleşme…*, p. 92.
[460] Ahmet Cevad, *Resimli Osmanlı Lisanı*, İstanbul: 1330, p. 18-19 cited in Doğan, *Ders Kitapları ve Sosyalleşme…*, p. 116.
[461] A. Cevad, *Resimli Osmanlı Lisanı…*, p. 12 cited in Doğan, *Ders Kitapları ve Sosyalleşme…*, p. 116-117.

became a standard template for textbooks used in all state schools.[462] According to the author, Turkish nationalism became the dominant discourse in the textbooks especially during World War I. As a result, Turkish history became an emphasized topic in the textbooks.[463] Similarly, Turks were defined as one of the ancient peoples and civilizations with explicit emphasis on the Seljuk ancestry of the Ottomans.[464] For Alkan, nationalism of the period also included a "militarist" inclination based on praising military service and concepts associated with the military. In this respect, "for purposes of establishing an interest in the military, praising its virtues, and preparing the male population for military service, students received both direct training in target practice lessons and indirect training in gym lessons. Some of the reading material only consisted of military subjects."[465]

Nevertheless, Alkan also points out to an interesting development. Some themes and concepts of the Enlightenment began to flourish in the same textbooks. In this perspective, traces of the Enlightenment ideas could be seen in the new interest towards concepts and themes that defined the principles of the French Revolution. The ideas included "liberty", "equality", "fellowship", "justice", "homeland", "state", "union", and "national sovereignty" as a result of the progressive perspective towards history.[466] The author also states that history books especially dwelled on the French Revolution, the underlying reasons and conditions as well as the ideologies of the philosophers that lay the foundations of it.[467]

However, as Alkan adds, the Turkish-Islamic synthesis was emphasized in the use and legitimization of the concepts of "homeland" and "nation". According to this view, homeland was defined as "the whole country we were citizens of" and nation as "brothers and sisters living in the same country subject to the same rules and regulations."[468] Still, in a wider sense, Ottoman identity was also acclaimed as the totality of people who were "enslaved" in the lands lost to the enemy and the "free/independent" people living in the remaining land. Since, both were assumed to

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[462] Alkan, "İmparatorluk'tan Cumhuriyet'e Modernleşme…, p. 219.
[463] *Ibid.*, p. 218.
[464] *Ibid.*, p. 221.
[465] *Ibid.*, p. 218-219.
[466] *Ibid.*, p. 227.
[467] *Ibid.*, p. 219-220.
[468] *Ibid.*, p. 228-229.

"share a common history, religion, and language."[469] Thus, the responsibility of "loving the homeland as a whole and saving the enslaved regions" was given to students.[470]

According to Alkan, the official understanding of religion in textbooks was based on Sunni Islam, as in the reign of Abdülhamid the Second. To quote the author, the emphasis on "loyalty and subjection to the Emperor" and "identifying morals with religion" were abandoned in this period. However, the emphasis on "official order of faith being Sunni, and official order for Islamic law being Hanafi" continued especially in the textbooks used in religion classes.[471] In this framework, the author points out the traditionally discriminatory discourse against the Shi'a found in the textbooks of the Abdülhamid the Second era continued in the same manner.[472]

To summarize the discussion in this section, Turkish nationalism became the dominant paradigm between the periods from the proclamation of the second Constitutional Monarchy until the foundation of the Republic. Nevertheless, with the growing power of West-leaning generation widely effected by the ideas of the Enlightenment movement, a struggle/conflict flourished both about the interpretation of nationalism, and between the groups defending traditional practices or secularist tendencies in daily life. Although reflections of this conflict were observed to some extent in the field of education, according to Alkan, the dominant discourse in the textbooks, within the framework of political, social, and military developments of the time, still defined Islam and nationalism as supplementary identity components. Nevertheless, compared with the previous period, the author notes a significant difference about the secondary status given to religion, i.e., only a supporting component of Turkishness. At this point, I will proceed with the nationalist discourses in the textbooks written during the early Republican era and their relationship with religion.

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[469] *Ibid.*, p. 229.
[470] *Ibid.*
[471] *Ibid.*, p. 225.
[472] *Ibid.*, p. 222-223.

3.4. The Third Period of Turkish Nationalism and Islam between 1918 and 1950

Although a new political system was adopted in the Republican Era, people, ideas, and policies were closely related with the previous period. Acknowledging this relation, as stated by Hanioğlu, in any way does not reject the unique contributions of the founding leaders of the Republic. On the contrary, it allows us to assess these leaders as actors of a historical and contextual reality by demythologizing the process as much as possible.[473] It is important to note that majority of this generation received education at secular institutions established in line with the modernization process which began during the late Ottoman period. They achieved their "political socialization" during the reign of Abdülhamid the Second.[474] Moreover, most of them belonged to the West-leaning wing and were followers of the Young Turks movement; thus, the CUP.[475] Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the political leader of the new regime, is a typical example in this sense. Indeed, he can be identified as one of the West-leaning Ottoman elites as discussed in the previous chapter. Hanioğlu defines Atatürk as a member of the second generation Young Turks[476] and as an intellectual and social output of the process of late nineteenth century and early twentieth century with regard to the sources feeding his ideologies.[477] This definition could be expanded to cover the majority of the founding elites of the Republic both in terms of their education and intellectual environment, and of the views they adopted.

This connection with the previous period also allowed ideas, institutions, and policies to spread into the Republican era. In this perspective, during the single party regime of the RPP, as in the CUP era, nationalism, secularism, and modernization ideals had a significant impact on the policies of the period. As Mardin explains, the borderline between these two periods only appears with the "radicalization of the approach adopted by founders of the Republic… [and] conceptualization of the Republic of Turkey as a nation-state."[478] In this section, I explore the similarities and differences

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[473] M. Şükrü Hanioğlu, *Ataturk: An Intellectual Biography*, Princeton, Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2011. (ePub format)
[474] Alkan, "İmparatorluk'tan Cumhuriyet'e Modernleşme…, p. 162.
[475] To emphasize the relation in his work, Poulton writes that "85% of government officials and 95% of general staff officers of Ottoman Empire preserved their positions in the new republic". *Silindir Şapka, Bozkurt ve Hilal…*, p. 116.
[476] Hanioğlu, *Ataturk: An Intellectual Biography…*
[477] *Ibid.*
[478] Mardin, "Türkiye'de Din ve Laiklik…, p. 62.

further in an effort to underline the fundamentals of the relationship between nationalism and religion in the official discourse.

First of all, it has to be emphasized that Kemalist reforms were based on the idea of "Westernization" as a fundamental paradigm, which shaped the general policies as well as the reformers' understanding of nationalism, religion, and secularism. Indeed, West-leaning intellectuals of the time generally identified modernization with Westernization.[479] For instance, Oran states, Atatürk's statement in *Nutuk*, "We wish to modernize our country. We strive towards establishing a modern, and thus a western government. What nation, wishing to modernize, does not favor the West?" sets a clear example of this identification.[480]

In addition, I need to note that Atatürk and other West-leaning intellectuals rejected the distinction between "civilization" and "culture" which is generally identified with the modernist traditionalist inclination. They rather advocated the unity of these concepts. Atatürk's statement, "it is difficult and unnecessary to separate civilization from culture"[481] can be taken as an example of this view. In a more detailed speech, he made his stand clear:

> [O]ur objectives in the revolutions that we performed so far and those we continue to work on is to allocate a complete civilized lifestyle for the people of the Republic of Turkey in terms of both moral and material culture. This is the fundamental goal of our revolutionary efforts.[482]

Hence, the Kemalist reform program adopted a holistic and uniformed approach towards modernization. In fact, it refrained from developing an alternative modernity or civilizational model, laying the foundations for the principles, which would later constitute the RPP's party program based on the Western examples.[483] According to Oran, this approach was similar to that of the CUP government, except for one key difference. This difference was what carried the Republican project forward: Atatürk

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[479] Kazancıgil states that this hypothesis of Kemalism dates back to Ahmet Cevdet who, in 1913, writes that "civilization is what Europe's civilization is" in *İçtihad*. Ali Kazancıgil, "Türkiye'de Modern Devletin Oluşumu ve Kemalizm", *Türkiye'de Politik Değişim ve Modernleşme …*, p. 224.
[480] Baskın Oran, *Atatürk Milliyetçiliği: Resmi İdeoloji Dışı Bir İnceleme*, Ankara: Dost Kitabevi, 1988, p. 136.
[481] *Ibid.*, p. 212.
[482] Lewis, *Modern Türkiye'nin Doğuşu…*, p. 406.
[483] Reşat Kasaba, "Eski ile Yeni Arasında Kemalizm ve Modernizm", *Türkiye'de Modernleşme ve Ulusal Kimlik*, (Ed.) Sibel Bozdoğan, Reşat Kasaba, (trans.) Nurettin Elhüseyni, 2.ed., İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı, 1999, p. 20-25; Kazancıgil, "Türkiye'de Modern Devletin Oluşumu ve Kemalizm…", p. 208.

"did not see Westernization as a tool like the Ottoman officials…but instead as a goal."[484] In this perspective, the goal of the new state for progress was to follow the same route of the West throughout a historical process and in the form of a systematic political program. Kadıoğlu compares the Kemalist Westernization project with that of the Tanzimat reforms and outlines the following differences:

> What differentiates the Republican era from that of Tanzimat lies in the detail between the statements of progress for order and order for progress. The elite group of the Republican period emphasized 'will to civilization'. In other words, they did not want to suffice with settling for modernizing regulations to maintain the unity of the state, but put forward a will for a concrete 'system for progress' or establish a civilization. As a result, the Enlightenment process of the West became a project in Turkey.[485]

Indeed, purification of the West was so evident that in the process of structuring the new identity, state elites mostly refrained carefully from marginalizing Western states, although the War of Independence was fought against them as invaders of the country. It was probably related with the concern to avoid the general population from developing enmity against the West and the Westernization project. Instead, the Ottoman past had "the honor of marginalization."[486] Hence, as Bora cited from Hamdullah Suphi Tanrıöver, "in the eyes of the Turks, it was emphasized that European states were defeated, not the European civilization."[487] According to Bora, "Turkish national identity was established in a manner to incorporate the Western identity – and even individualizing it, claiming itself to be the essence and the most perfect example of Westernism, [in other words] the 'authentic Westerner'."[488] This legitimization attempt also paved the way for the reconciliation of Turkification (Turkish nationalism/identity) and Westernization.

The state realized a series of revolutionary reforms in the public life towards Westernization in the aftermath of the War of Independence. A significant sign of the state's determination in imposing this project and policies was evident in both

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[484] Oran, *Atatürk Milliyetçiliği…*, p. 212-214.
[485] Ayşe Kadıoğlu, "Cumhuriyetin Kuruluş Yıllarında Türk Milliyetçiliğinin Çelişkisi ve Seçkinlerin Tavrı", (ed.) Nuri Bilgin, *Cumhuriyet, Demokrasi ve Kimlik* , İstanbul: Bağlam Yayıncılık, 1997, p. 280.
[486] Tanıl Bora, "Cumhuriyetin İlk Döneminde Millî Kimlik", *Cumhuriyet, Demokrasi ve Kimlik* …, p. 53; Mete K. Kaynar, "Türk Milli Talim ve Terbiye Sistemi", *Özgür Üniversite Forumu – Eğitim Neye Yarar?*, Sayı: 23, Temmuz-Eylül 2003, p. 55.
[487] Bora, "Cumhuriyetin İlk Döneminde Millî Kimlik…, p. 58.
[488] *Ibid.*

Atatürk's statement, "if it is our principles in question, we would rather die than give up on them", and Recep Peker's statement, "if needed, the reforms shall be imposed upon the society by force."[489] Clearly, this process was not a response to the demands and expectations of the society, but one that adopted in a top down and elitist method/approach.[490] It was institutionalized as the state's official policy from 1930s onwards.

While Westernization set the ultimate goals, specific ideals guiding the reforms were generally formulated through the fundamental principles of Kemalism: Republicanism, Nationalism, Populism, Statism, Secularism, and Revolutionism. These principles were adopted at the General Assembly of the RPP on May 10, 1931. Some minor amendments were made in the party program of 1935 and they became permanent and irrevocable in the second Article of *Teşkilâtı Esasiye Kanunu* (the constitution) in 1937.[491] With regard to the Kemalist regime, especially the two principles "nationalism" and "secularism" were accounted for the founding stones of the Westernization project. Nevertheless, both were also the principles received the most intense opposition in the period.[492] Still, they were strictly advocated by the government authorities as they were necessary for Westernization. Indeed, the reformists of the Republic era had full faith "in establishing a secular and an ethnically homogeneous Republic as an end result."[493] At this point, it is crucial to analyze the regime's approach and practice towards religion and nationalism in particular.

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[489] Oran, *Atatürk Milliyetçiliği…*, p. 141; Ahmet İnsel, "'Devletin Bekâsı' İçin Yürütülen Çağdaşlaşma Sürecinin Toplumsal Sorunları", *Türkiye Toplumunun Bunalımı*, 5.ed., İstanbul: Birikim Yayınları, 2003, 47.

[490] Kılıçbay agrees with the administrators of the period. For him, Kemalist elites had no other chance than adopting a top-down approach as the political and philosophical heritage from Ottoman era in the homeland was very limited for a people- based reform process. See. Kılıçbay, "Atatürkçülük ya da Türk Aydınlanması…, p. 238-242.

[491] Levent Köker, *Modernleşme, Kemalizm ve Demokrasi*, 5.ed., İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2000, p. 133. For two imporant texts that asess these principles see. *ibid.*; Taha Parla, *Türkiye'de Siyasal Kültürün Resmî Kaynakları-Cilt 3: Kemalist Tek-Parti İdeolojisi ve RPP'nin Altı Ok'u*, İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1992.

[492] See for example, Hakan Özoğlu, *Cumhuriyet'in Kuruluşunda İktidar Kavgası*, (trans.) Zuhal Bilgin, İstanbul: Kitap Yayınevi, 2011; Cemil Koçak, *Tek Parti Döneminde Muhalif Sesler*, 2.ed., İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2011; Nurşen Mazıcı, *Belgelerle Atatürk Döneminde Muhalefet (1919-1926)*, İstanbul: Dilmen Yayınevi, 1984; Hıdır Göktaş, *Kürtler: İsyan ve Tenkil - 1*, İstanbul: Alan Yayıncılık, 1991; Hasan Şen, *Cumhuriyetin Modernleşme İdeolojisi ve Bir Muhalefet Söylemi Olarak İslâmî Gelenek: 1923-1960 Dönemi*, PhD Dissertation, İzmir: Ege Üniversitesi, 2008.

[493] Kasaba, "Eski ile Yeni Arasında Kemalizm ve Modernizm…, p. 13.

Lewis talks of a "strictly religious" nature of the Turkish War of Independence.[494] Rustow also explains that putting Islamic discourse to the forefront was a tactical move (similar to that of the Ottoman Government during World War I). Through such a discourse, Mustafa Kemal's resistance was usually interpreted as a "religious movement as much as a national one."[495] According to Rustow, this approach continued into the early years of the Republic, resulting in a large number of religious officials attending to the congress committees and the first parliament.[496] Mardin suggests that Atatürk was trying to benefit from "the Caliphate's (in other words religion's) prestige even at the stage he was about to abolish it."[497] Islam's registry as the state's official religion in the 1924 Constitution set a good example of this.[498] Rustow states that in line with this notion, "the most trustworthy and convincing symbol of the sprit that led the national movement" was the poem *Dedicated to Our Glorious Army* of Mehmet Akif (Ersoy).[499] It was adopted as the Turkish National Anthem by the parliament in 1921. Indeed, this poem reflected the "hatred" and "contempt" against the West while praising national and religious values. Especially the last verse "Independence is the right of our nation, who has already believed in the Right/Real/God" summarized religious and national themes.[500]

According to Rustow, in the period following the foundation of the new state, the regime took a totally different path with respect to its relationship with religion than what Mehmet Akif envisioned. The author states that in opposition to the dreams of some modernist traditionalists, Mustafa Kemal "did not follow a goal to establish a Turkish-National Islam. On the contrary, he adopted a policy as free from religion as possible."[501] Some authors, although they agree with this view, suggest that the Kemalist secularism aimed more than just separating religion from state affairs. In

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[494] Lewis, *Modern Türkiye'nin Doğuşu…*, p. 398.
[495] Dankwart A. Rustow, "Türkiye'de İslam ve Politika: 1920-1955", *Türkiye'de İslam ve Laiklik* , İstanbul: İnsan Yayınları, 1995, p. 59.
[496] *Ibid.,* p. 60.
[497] Mardin, "Türkiye'de Din ve Laiklik…", p. 61.
[498] See *T.C. 1924 Anayasası,* 2nd article.: "The religion of Republic of Turkey is Islam". (This article was changed in 1928.) In the following years, Atatürk himself declared the policy adopted in those years a tactical move in his Nutuk. Kemal Atatürk, *Nutuk Cilt 2: 1920-1927,* 9th ed., İstanbul: Milli Eğitim Basımevi, 1969, p. 717.
[499] Rustow, "Türkiye'de İslam ve Politika…", p. 61-62.
[500] *Ibid.*
[501] *Ibid.*, p. 65.

this perspective, Shaw and Shaw define secularism of the Republic as a multi-faceted and comprehensive principle. According to them,

> it was based not simply on separating the state from Islamic institutions but also on liberating the individual's mind from the traditional Islamic concepts and practices as well as modernizing the society and state which were regulated by Islamic concepts and traditions for centuries.[502]

Berkes, on the other hand, interprets this process as a comprehensive movement to "free social life from the rule of enshrined traditions… [and] establish contemporary rules determined by the needs/requirements of the time" (in other words "modernize").[503]

In line with these views, Toprak suggests such exclusive attitude towards religion was a result of religion's perception of being a strong enemy of westernization and of other ideologies related to it. The author also states that (West-leaning) Ottoman reformists had shared the same view in the past.[504] Jaschke holds a similar view as he asserts in his discussions specifically on Atatürk that he did not believe Islam would come to an agreement with modern civilization.[505] According to Toprak, behind these views was the fact that groups who preferred to identify themselves with a religious identity displayed the fiercest opposition against the reformist policies since late Ottoman era. Hence, the government officials of the Republic actually completed a process initiated by late Ottoman reformists through policies limiting the jurisdiction of religion; thus, religious bureaucracy.[506] Toprak claims that for this generation of officials secularism was radically identified with westernization. According to her, "to secularize [for them] meant to Westernize."[507] Mardin writes that this policy inclination with the decision of government officials at the time that Islam "[could not] act as a social enhancer for the Turkish population… or be a means of increasing social awareness."[508] According to the author, the new "awareness" of the Turkish nation would be shaped around "science" as Atatürk emphasized numerous times.

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[502] Shaw & Shaw, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu ve Modern Türkiye (Cilt 2)…*, p. 454.
[503] Berkes, *Türkiye'de Çağdaşlaşma…*, p. 17-23.
[504] Binnaz Toprak, "Islam and Nation-Building", *Islam and Political Development* , Leiden: E. J. Brill Pub., 1981, p. 39.
[505] Gotthard Jaschke, *Yeni Türkiye'de İslamlık*, (trans.) Hayrullah Örs, Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1972, 97.
[506] Toprak, "Islam and Nation-Building…, p. 38-39.
[507] *Ibid.*
[508] Mardin, "Türkiye'de Din ve Laiklik…, p. 65.

For him, the source of most genuine and valid information and attitude was science or in other words, the Western Civilization.[509] This meant for the leader of the new regime, achieving a cultural revolution to popularize a new and modern citizenship ethos. This would be provided through secular and universal political/legal reforms to replace the traditional (religious, Ottoman, local, or common) understanding of it.[510]

In this regard, Toprak includes four areas in the secularism project of the early Republican era:

> (1) *Symbolic secularization*, i.e., enforced changes in aspects of national culture or social life, which had a symbolic identification with Islam.
> (2) *Institutional secularization*, i.e., changes in organizational arrangements designed to destroy the institutional strength of Islam.
> (3) *Functional secularization*, i.e., changes in the functional specificity of religious and governmental institutions.
> (4) *Legal secularization*, i.e., changes in the legal structure of society.[511]

Hence, the abolishment of the Caliphate in 1924 was a turning point that marked the start of a strict secularization process excluding Islam from the law, politics, institutions, and education; in short, from many aspects of public life. With the reinforcement of secularism in a constitutional framework, some of the practices with impact of a large scope were as follows: Removal of religious expressions from the constitution, closing down of religious courts and schools, even removing religion courses from the school curriculum, adoption of the civil law and other secular laws, abolishment of religious orders, Islamic monasteries, dervish lodges and religious associations/communities, changes in clothing and appearance, adoption of the Latin alphabet, calendar and measurement units, abolishment of religious titles, and lastly adoption of the surname act.[512]

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[509] *Ibid.*, p. 65.
[510] *Ibid.*, p. 68-77.
[511] Toprak, "Islam and Nation-Building…, p. 40.
[512] For further explanation and asssesment about the policies towards expansion of secularism in the Early Republican Period see, Berkes, *Türkiye'de Çağdaşlaşma…*, p. 521-553; Lewis, *Modern Türkiye'nin Doğuşu…*, p. 256-291; Shaw & Shaw, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu ve Modern Türkiye (Cilt 2)…*, p. 441-466; Şerif Mardin, "Türkiye'de Din ve Laiklik", *Türkiye'de Din ve Siyaset* , (der.) M. Türköne & T. Önder, 11.ed., İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2005, p. 35-77; Jaschke, *Yeni Türkiye'de İslamlık…*, p. 19-37; Toprak, "Islam and Nation-Building…, p. 35-54.

From this point of view, as one of the leading intellectuals of the time, Adnan Adıvar states that the regime "did not in any way intend to give concession to Islamic ideology."[513] This view is undoubtedly correct to some extent. Taking it further, Adıvar argues that the understanding of religion by the Republic was like an "official atheistic dogma" and it was based on the political authority's inclination towards Westernism and positivism. He quotes H.A.R. Gibb, who argues that they made Turkey a "temple for positivism," replacing Islam with the new state dogma: "scientific positivism."[514]

On the other hand, Shaw and Shaw argue that such assertions are over exaggerated and the secular program never aimed at deserting Islam all together although it rearranged the role of religion in public life. According to them, the most important indicators of this were that worshipping at the Mosque was not banned and religious leaders were allowed to practice their religious functions.[515] While Shaw and Shaw are right, in my opinion, their assessment is incomplete in terms of revealing other dimension of the regime's relationship with religion. Indeed, despite a "militant" interpretation of secularism (for Lewis) based on an obvious tightening of religion's field of domination[516], Islam was never completely excluded from state policies even in this era.[517]

From this perspective, many examples can be given to argue for state's intervention to religion. To name a few most distinctive ones are the establishment of the Directorate of Religious Affairs to structure the state's "official Islamic discourse," making the call for prayer and performing the prayers in Turkish, and the translation of the Qur'an into Turkish. A more sensational example was a draft project aiming to reform Islam, prepared by a commission led by Mehmed Fuad (Köprülü) in 1928, which could not be realized due to strong opposition.[518] Bora interprets these as steps

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[513] Abdülhak Adnan Adıvar, "Türkiye'de İslâmî ve Batılı Düşüncelerin Etkileşimi", *Türkiye'de İslam ve Laiklik* …, p. 20. [Orj. Abdülhak Adnan Adıvar, "Interaction of Islamic and Western Thought in Turkey", in T. Cuyler Young (Ed.), *Near Eastern Culture and Society*, Princeton, NJ.: Princeton University Press, 1951, p. 119-129.]

[514] Adıvar, "Türkiye'de İslâmî ve Batılı Düşüncelerin Etkileşimi…, p. 20.

[515] Shaw & Shaw, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu ve Modern Türkiye (Cilt 2)*…, p. 457. For a similar claim see, Tunçay, *Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nde Tek-Parti Yönetimi'nin Kurulması*…, p. 213-214.

[516] Lewis, *Modern Türkiye'nin Doğuşu*…, p. 398.

[517] Rustow, "Türkiye'de İslam ve Politika: 1920-1955…, p. 58; İlhan Başgoz, "Türkiye'de Laikliğin Tarihsel ve Sosyal Kökenleri", *Bilanço 1923-1998: Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nin 75 Yılına Toplu Bakış Uluslararası Kongresi, I. Cilt: Siyaset, Kültür, Uluslararası İlişkiler* , (ed.) Zeynep Rona, İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yayınları, 1999, p. 61.

[518] For a detailed information about these steps, see, Jaschke, *Yeni Türkiye'de İslamlık*…; Dücane Cündioğlu, *Meşrutiyet'ten Cumhuriyet'e Din ve Siyaset*, 2.ed., İstanbul: Kapı Yayınları, 2012; Dücane Cündioğlu, *Türkçe*

towards an incentive to "nationalizing and modernizing Islam" inspired by Christian Protestantism.[519]

Moreover, there were more than a few examples of religion determining government policies. For the most part, they were shaped around the regime's discriminative approach and practices towards the non- Muslims. With regard to this, Lewis refers to the presence of indicators of a traditional kind of thinking that "identifies Muslim with Turk and non-Muslim with non-Turk despite the secularism and nationalism policy of the state [not only in public life but also in official affairs]."[520] Examples of this kind will be analyzed further during the discussion over the religious aspect of Kemalist nationalism.

Thus, the early Republican period government policies on religion, much like that of the CUP governments, represented a dual character.[521] This situation could be an extension of indecisiveness or transformation at the individual level, regarding the ideas of the West-leaning wing on religion as discussed earlier. It could also be explained by the existence of various groups in terms of their ideological stances among governing authorities. In addition, there could be pragmatic/conjectural reasons such as the socio-political conditions of the period or public reaction among others. In this regard, Rustow suggests that the big picture of the early Republican period would depict "a swift detrition of Islamic effects on public affairs in 1920s -

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Kur'an ve Cumhuriyet İdeolojisi, İstanbul: Kitabevi Yayınları, 1998; İsmail Kara, *Cumhuriyet Türkiyesi'nde Bir Mesele Olarak İslâm*, 4.ed., İstanbul: Dergâh Yayınları, 2010; İştar Gözaydın, *Diyanet: Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nde Dinin Tanzimi*, İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2009.

[519] Tanıl Bora, "Din ve Milliyetçilik: Lügat ve Gramer", *Türk Sağının Üç Hali: Milliyetçilik, Muhafazakarlık, İslamcılık*, 5.ed., İstanbul: Birikim Yayınları, 2008, p. 118-120.

[520] Lewis, *Modern Türkiye'nin Doğuşu…*, p. 354.

[521] In addition to footnotes above-mentioned, for further discussion see, Davison, *Türkiye'de Sekülarizm ve Modernlik…*; Ahmet T. Kuru, *Pasif ve Dışlayıcı Laiklik: ABD, Fransa ve Türkiye*, (trans.) Eylem Çağdaş Babaoğlu, İstanbul: İ. Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2011; Samim Akgönül (der.), *Tartışılan Laiklik: Fransa ve Türkiye'de İlkeler ve Algılamalar*, (trans.) Ceylan Gürman Şahinkaya, İstanbul: İ. Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2011; Sevgi Adak Turan, *Formation of Authoritarian Secularism in Turkey: Ramadans in the Early Republican Era (1923-1938)*, MA Thesis, İstanbul: Sabancı Üniversitesi, 2004; Edward Webb, *Civilizing Religion: Jacobin Projects of Secularization in Turkey, France, Tunisia, and Syria*, PhD Dissertation, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania, 2007; Nuray Mert, *Laiklik Tartışmasına Kavramsal Bir Bakış: Cumhuriyet Kurulurken Laik Düşünce*, İstanbul: Bağlam Yayınları, 1994; Zana Çitak, *Nationalism and Religion: A Comparative Study of the Development of Secularism in France and Turkey*, PhD Dissetation, Boston: Boston University, 2004; Umut Azak, *Islam and Secularism in Turkey: Kemalism, Religion and the Nation State*, London, New York: I. B. Tauris, 2010; Sultan Tepe, *Political Religion versus Secular Nationalism: A Comparative Analysis of Religious Politics in Israel and Turkey*, PhD Dissetation, Austin: The University of Texas, 2002; Hale Yılmaz, *Reform, Social Change and State-Society Encounters in Early Republican Turkey*, PhD Dissetation, Utah: The University of Utah, 2006; Alper Y. Dede, *Islamism, State Control Over Religion and Social Identity: Turkey and Egypt*, PhD Dissetation, Michigan: Western Michigan University, 2008.

1930s to be restored to a certain extent in the 1940s and 50s."[522] From this perspective, Lewis underlines the first sign of explicit religious opposition against strict secularism of the state surfacing at the beginning of the 1940s. Still, it was the second half of the 1940s that adversary ideas were voiced more dashingly as an outcome of the post-war conjuncture forcing the RPP to adopt a more moderate religious policy.[523] A sound result of this was the revision of the RPP's secularism program between 1947 and 1950, including the return of religion courses in the curriculum.[524]

At this point, I can now analyze the other dimension of the issue which is the approach of the early Republican regime towards nationalism and the reflections of this approach towards religion. If secularism was one of the founding stones of the Kemalist Westernization project, nationalism was surely the other one. Indeed, this principle, with secularism, provided the foundation of a new citizenship *ethos* which was the source for Turkish social identity and belonging. At this stage, according to Karpat's classification, it corresponds to the third stage of the development of nationalism in Turkish history. Here, one needs to note that developments peculiar to this period had their own impact on the re-structuring of the official nationalism discourse besides the ongoing influences of the former period.

A nodal difference in this stage was the transformation of Turkish nationalism from an elite-based ideology to a relatively popular one among the masses during the War of Independence conjuncture. Accordingly, Poulton states that the political reforms towards the nationalizing of the state were adopted by the majority of the population not by "force", but with "honor."[525] With the power of this mass support, the source of state's legitimacy was begun to be referred to a specific nation, similar to contemporary Western states. Assembling of the first National Parliament in 1920, adoption of the first constitution in 1921, abolishment of the Sultanate in 1922, and the proclamation of the Republic in 1923 could be stated among the institutional foundations of this issue. Alongside these developments, all symbols, institutions,

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[522] Rustow, "Türkiye'de İslam ve Politika: 1920-1955…, p. 57.
[523] Lewis, *Modern Türkiye'nin Doğuşu…*, p. 412-413.
[524] Binnaz Toprak, "Türkiye'de Dinin Denetim İşlevi", *A.Ü. S.ed.F.D.*, Cilt XXXIII, No: 1-2, Mart-Haziran 1978, p. 182.
[525] Poulton, *Silindir Şapka, Bozkurt ve Hilal…*, p. 118.

history (and traditions) identified with the state, in essence, were based on a specific "nation" defined as "Turk".

Taking into consideration the varying forms of nationalism, as discussed in the earlier sections, it is not easy to determine the exact type that characterizes official discourse of the early Republican state. Indeed, the RPP's approach to nationalism, like religion, over its thirty years of rule did not pose a single tendency. On the contrary, it had a complex character varying within a large scale from a moderate tone to racism. On this issue, as Yıldız points out,

> during the Kemalist construction of Turkish national identity there were three fundamental dimensions, namely legal, political, and ethnic. Although the dominant color of this identity varied over time in line with conjectural changes, these fundamental components were sustained.[526]

A number of works in this field similarly base Kemalist nationalism on an eclectic mixture of different types as opposed to singling out a specific type.[527] In this context, I will summarize the dominant characteristics of Turkish nationalism (and national identity) in its different stages.

At the onset of the War of Independence, political-military elites assumed a territorial nationalism through which nation was identified with the total population living on a land determined by *Misak-ı Millî* (the National Pact).[528] However, with rising military conflicts especially with Greeks in the west and Armenians in the east, the state took a different route emphasizing the religion factor in definition of national identity. Hence, a nationalist discourse was adopted prioritizing the "full brotherhood" of Muslim population in Anatolia in the following years. [529] Identification of nation with references to Islam in this period also paved a way to (a relative) ethnic pluralism.[530] In line with this view, "alliance among variety" became

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[526] Yıldız, *"Ne Mutlu Türküm Diyebilene…"*, p. 16.
[527] See. Bora, "Cumhuriyetin İlk Döneminde Millî Kimlik…, p. 53-70; Oran, *Atatürk Milliyetçiliği…*, p. 157-160; Parla, *Türkiye'de Siyasal Kültürün Resmî Kaynakları-Cilt 3…*, p. 203-211; Ersanlı (Behar), *İktidar ve Tarih…*, p. 62-63; Özdoğan, *"Turan"dan "Bozkurt"a…*, p. 44; Kadıoğlu, "Cumhuriyetin Kuruluş Yıllarında Türk Milliyetçiliğinin Çelişkisi ve Seçkinlerin Tavrı…, p. 278; Nazan Maksudyan, *Türklüğü Ölçmek*, 2.ed., İstanbul: Metis Yayınları, 2007, p. 7-8.
[528] Poulton, *Silindir Şapka, Bozkurt ve Hilal…*, p. 121.
[529] Bülent Tanör, *Osmanlı-Türk Anayasal Gelişmeleri (1789-1980)*, 5.ed., İstanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayıncılık, 2000, p. 254.
[530] Oran, *Atatürk Milliyetçiliği…*, p. 93; Yıldız, *"Ne Mutlu Türküm Diyebilene…"*, p. 98-100.

the motto of the period.[531] Within the framework of this discourse, in numerous meetings and documents "ethnic rights were enfranchised… at a legal-cultural level…"[532] Considering the importance of Islamic component in Turkish nationalism/identity, some authors call this discourse as "Islamic nationalism".[533] According to Yıldız, the reasoning behind adopting such a discourse was to make use of the existing power of Islam in bringing masses together against the "Christian enemy".[534] On the other hand, Oran claims that the leaders "chose not to deal with a Muslim nationalities problem while they were already in a struggle against [Christian] minorities, occupation forces, and the Sultan's army and internal conflicts."[535]

When the new regime began to institutionalize in the aftermath of the War of Independence, government officials were able to assert their ideological tendencies more openly. This caused fundamental changes in the nationalist discourse and practice. According to Toprak, the three objectives of the nationalist program developed by the builders of the state were as follows:

> (a) An ideology of the movement that would give political legitimacy to the nationalist regime and its goals; (b) state authority over both individual members of the society and ethnic, religious, or other groupings; (c) a national identity that would function as an agent of social mobilization.[536]

Özdoğan adds that alongside these ideological objectives, the new regime predominantly aimed at "diminishing nearly all ideological and cultural heritage of the Ottoman Empire."[537]

Taking the abolishment of the Caliphate in 1924 as the beginning of a new era, the state focused on policies towards secularism on the one hand, and steps towards Turkifying the society on the other. Hence, nationalism was integrated with a secular

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[531] Ergun Özbudun, "Millî Mücadele ve Cumhuriyet'in Resmî Belegelerinde Yurttaşlık ve Kimlik Sorunu", *Cumhuriyet, Demokrasi ve Kimlik …*, p. 64.
[532] Yıldız, *"Ne Mutlu Türküm Diyebilene…"*, p. 98.
[533] Tunçay, *Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nde Tek-Parti Yönetimi'nin Kurulması…*, p. 212; Erik Jan Zürcher, "The Vocabulary of Muslim Nationalism", *International Journal of the Sociology of Language*, vol. 137, 1999, p. 81-92; Bora, "Din ve Milliyetçilik: Lügat ve Gramer…, p. 117.
[534] Yıldız, *"Ne Mutlu Türküm Diyebilene…"*, p. 96.
[535] Oran, *Atatürk Milliyetçiliği…*, p. 98-99.
[536] Toprak, "Islam and Nation-Building…, p. 38.
[537] Özdoğan, *"Turan"dan "Bozkurt"a…*, p. 44.

discourse at the official level in the years to follow. In this respect, Yıldız defines the period between 1924 and 1929 as a process when a relatively secular nationalism was established as well as a process when religion was replaced with cultural themes as the new sources of national identity. In this period, the fundamental objectives of Kemalist nationalism were "establishing a homogenous Turkey without resorting to racial or religious irredentism and achieving development through crude force, administrative measures, legislation, and education."[538] Accordingly, Yıldız points out that Kemalist nationalism also began to emphasize the difference between "legal (objective)" and "political-cultural (subjective)" Turkishness.[539] The legal definition adopted a more comprehensive approach which assumed that all citizens of the Turkish state were Turk. Then again, the political-cultural definition emphasized that to be considered as Turk, individuals needed to carry certain qualifications such as "speaking Turkish," "being socialized in the Turkish culture," and "having loyalty to the Republican ideal."[540] The author adds that the second one, i.e., the political definition with cultural references, became more prominent in the public life compared to the first.[541]

These policies also paved the way for explicit state intervention in the private sphere. The objective was to assure adoption of the Republican ideal materialized via the existence of the Turkish state as well as the Turkish language and secular/Western life style by "rejecting the categorical differentiation between private and public areas."[542] Hence, with the emphasis on Turkishness in this institutionalization process of the new regime, various ethnic groups previously assumed to be attached through brotherhood, became subjects of Turkification through cultural assimilation policies.[543] This was clearly stated by İsmet İnönü, Prime Minister at the time, during his visit to *Türk Ocakları* (Turkish Hearths) in 1925:

> We are undoubtedly nationalists… and nationalism is the foremost component of our unity. Other minorities (ethnic groups) have no dominance against the Turkish majority. Our utmost goal is to Turkify all non-Turkish population living in the Turkish state, no matter the circumstances. We shall extirpate all

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[538] Yıldız, *"Ne Mutlu Türküm Diyebilene…"*, p. 102.
[539] *Ibid.*, p. 102.
[540] *Ibid.*, p. 16, 139.
[541] *Ibid.*
[542] *Ibid.*, p. 145-146.
[543] *Ibid.*, p. 155.

components opposing Turks and Turkishness. Under our rule, the single condition the state officials must fulfill to serve this country is to be Turk.[544]

This policy was an open statement of a transition from cultural diversification to homogeneity compared with the previous periods. İnönü's statement expressed the new regime's intolerance to those who rejected their Turkish identity. Still, taking into consideration the emergence of a genealogical nationalism in the following period, the fact that the state assented to Turkification of non-Muslims through cultural assimilation can be regarded as a relatively moderate policy. Indeed, with the genealogical definition gaining prominence in the following period, this option lost its function largely.

With steps towards reinforcing the cultural and ideological foundations of the regime gaining momentum in line with the authoritarian tendencies of the following period starting in the early 1930s, different strands in nationalism began to take place. It is also interesting that Atatürk personally began to focus more on socio-cultural reforms rather than daily politics. In addition, the state closed down non-governmental organizations such as Turkish Hearths during this period to monopolize the re-production of the nationalist discourse. The aim was to formalize a uniform nationalist discourse. In this context, one of the two dimensions of restructuring the official discourse of the period, as discussed in the previous chapter, was the production of (new) traditions through studies performed in the fields of history, ethnology and language. The second dimension was the popularization of these traditions among the masses by a national education system. At this point, I briefly discuss this process and its impact on the nationalist discourse.

Alongside the related departments at universities, Atatürk had the *Turkish History Research Society* (THRS) and *Turkish Language Research Society* (TLRS) founded with hopes to build the "scientific" foundations of the Turkish identity. He closely followed their publications. Comprehensive studies by both of these institutions were published during the early-1930s "determining" the "truest" Turkish history with the contributions of national and international scientists of the field. Accordingly, a new

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[544] Bilal Şimşir, *İngiliz Belgeleriyle Türkiye'de 'Kürt Sorunu' 1924-1938: Şeyh Sait, Ağrı ve Dersim Ayaklanmaları*, Ankara: Dışişleri Bakanlığı Basımevi, 1975, p. 58 cited in Yıldız, *"Ne Mutlu Türküm Diyebilene…"*, p. 155-156.

history thesis began to emerge as the state's official view on history; it was "invented" out of these studies. With respect to this thesis, Turks began to be regarded as a special group with impressive qualities. Turks were considered as the oldest civilization in history and strongly influenced other populations in different parts of the world with their civilization. This view is known as the "Turkish History Thesis" while claims regarding language were advocated as the "Sun-Language Theory."[545] In this process, a number of studies supported by the state in the field of ethnology were also growing.[546]

An interesting aspect of this process was the close relationship of scientists of the period –especially historians- with the government. Some of them were active politicians registered with the RPP. Indeed, leading names cited earlier such as Akçura, Gökalp, Ağaoğlu, and of a younger generation whose members were Fuat Köprülü, Şevket Aziz Kansu, Mahmut Esat Bozkurt, and Afet İnan were also prominent scientists giving us important clues about the function of history (science) with regard to politics.[547] A significant outcome of the studies, which link science to politics, was to "maximize Turkishness" and "minimize Ottoman and Islamic identities." This became the dominant tendency following the early-1930s.[548] As Poulton writes,

> the Kemalist state asserted that Kemalism was the only legal ethos of the idea of a single nation and the new state… where 'Turkish nationalism' according to

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[545] For primary resources about Turkish History Thesis and Sun Language Theory see for example Afet İnan vd., *Türk Tarihinin Ana Hatları*, İstanbul: Devlet Matbaası, 1930; Şemsettin Günaltay, *"Türk Tarih Tezi Hakkındaki İntikatların Mahiyeti ve Tezin Kat'i Zaferi"*, *Belleten*, Cilt 2, Sayı: 7/8, Ekim 1938, p. 337-365; Abdülkadir İnan, *Güneş-Dil Teorisi Üzerine Ders Notları*, İstanbul: Devlet Basımevi, 1936; *Birinci Türk Tarihi Kongresi Ankara: 2-11 Temmuz 1932 - Konferanslar, Müzakere Zabıtları*, Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 2010 [1932]; *İkinci Türk Tarih Kongresi İstanbul: 20-25 Eylül 1937 – Kongrenin Çalışmaları, Kongreye Sunulan Tebliğler*, Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 2010 [1943]. Bu teorilerin ayrıntılı değerlendirmeleri için see. İsmail Beşikçi, *Türk Tarih Tezi, Güneş-Dil Teorisi ve Kürt Sorunu*, 2.ed., Stockholm: Denge Komal, 1986; Ersanlı (Behar), *İktidar ve Tarih…*; Zafer Toprak, *Darwin'den Dersim'e Cumhuriyet ve Antropoloji*, İstanbul: Doğan Kitap, 2012; Yıldız, *"Ne Mutlu Türküm Diyebilene…;* Maksudyan, *Türklüğü Ölçmek…*, p. 55-71; Şefik Taylan Akman, "Türk Tarih Tezi Bağlamında Erken Cumhuriyet Dönemi Resmî Tarih Yazımının İdeolojik ve Politik Karakteri", *Hacettepe Hukuk Fakültesi Dergisi*, 1(1), 2011, p. 80-109.
[546] For evaluation see. Arzu Öztürkmen, *Türkiye'de Folklör ve Milliyetçilik*, 2.ed., İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2006; Agah Sırrı Levend, *Türk Dilinde Gelişme ve Sadeleşme Evreleri*, 2.ed., Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1960, p. 377-459.
[547] Poulton, *Silindir Şapka, Bozkurt ve Hilal…*, p. 128; Yıldız, *"Ne Mutlu Türküm Diyebilene…*, p. 184; Ersanlı (Behar), *İktidar ve Tarih…*, p. 13; Maksudyan, *Türklüğü Ölçmek…*, p. 71-85.
[548] Ümit Cizre-Sakallıoğlu, "The Ideology and Politics of the Nationalist Action Party of Turkey", *CEMOTI*, 13, 1992, p. 143 cited in Yıldız, *"Ne Mutlu Türküm Diyebilene…*, p. 195.

the Kemalist definition, was seen as a monolithic solution to all social, political, financial, and cultural issues.[549]

Similarly, Yıldız also identifies the "single state," "single nation," "single culture," "single leader," "single doctrine," and a "single party" as the political slogans of the period when the state was identified with the governing political party.[550]

On the other hand, the regime's view on nationalism was evolving into a less inclusive (or populist) one compared to the earlier periods. A significant contribution of this scientific effort was adding a racist-ethnic (genealogical) tone to the official nationalist discourse starting with the early-1930s. According to Yıldız, one of the reasons behind this policy shift was the "rise of racism in both Turkey and around the world."[551] Besides, this was also related to the "emergence of the need to add a new dimension to Kemalist secularism and republicanism which failed to politically spread among the masses as a popular identity."[552] The author states that racial issues started to attract the Kemalist elite from the 1930s onwards. Yıldız gives the following example: "a number of books and articles were published and scientific conferences held with the aim of developing national race improvement policies in order to create a healthy and high quality Turkish population."[553] Moreover, some of the papers presented at the 1st Turkish History Congress bearing a racist perspective emphasized "the beauty of the Turkish race."[554] Another example is one of Atatürk's statements made in 1932: "Turks are the world's most beautiful race."[555]

Settlement Law (1934) aiming for unity "in language, culture and blood-line" and *Physical Training Law* (1938) involving policies towards improvement of race were some of the legislative examples of the state's racist/ethnicist inclinations at the time.[556] In addition, perhaps the most important examples come from physical anthropology studies held in this period aiming to determine the true racial roots of Anatolian peoples (Turkish people). Actually, these studies aimed to "prove" that the

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[549] Poulton, *Silindir Şapka, Bozkurt ve Hilal…*, p. 127.
[550] Yıldız, *"Ne Mutlu Türküm Diyebilene…*, p. 195.
[551] *Ibid.*, p. 159.
[552] *Ibid.*
[553] *Ibid.*, p. 168.
[554] *Ibid.*, p. 170.
[555] *Ibid.*
[556] *Ibid.*, p. 237-238, 248-253.

Turks were related to Western races as opposed to Eastern ones and that different ethnic groups residing in Anatolia were in fact the decedents of the Turkish race.[557] In addition, policies to exclude, or isolate the Kurdish population can be assessed in the same framework.[558] Hence, as reflected in all these examples, a definition of Turkishness based on "a culture and life style associated with Turkish ethnicity" was further supported with a "common ancestry or blood-line."[559]

While a secular interpretation of nationalism constituted the dominant discourse of the regime, the rulers of the country were not able to develop a fully objective approach pertaining to religion throughout the thirty years of RPP rule. Indeed, "in practice, 'Turk' was frequently used as a synonym for 'Muslim'."[560] Bora agrees with this finding and argues that the regime's effort to establish a secular national identity was "limited to theory" as opposed to being "institutionalized through consistent and enforcing practices."[561] Özbudun also claimed "Non-Muslim minorities were not perceived as Turk in a sociological sense while they were subject to the same citizenship rights as the Muslim majority."[562] According to him, for some Kemalist intellectuals, religion was, and still is, a prominent component of Turkishness.[563]

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[557] This research became the scope of Ph.D. thesis submitted to Geneva University by Afet İnan, see *Türkiye Halkının Antropolojik Karakterleri ve Türkiye Tarihi*, Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1947. For a detailed assessment of the relations between regime's racist/ethnicist inclinations and anthropological studies of this period, see. Maksudyan, *Türklüğü Ölçmek…*; Toprak, *Darwin'den Dersim'e Cumhuriyet ve Antropoloji…*; Suavi Aydın, "Cumhuriyet'in İdeolojik Şekillenmesinde Antropolojinin Rolü: Irkçı Paradigmanin Yükselişi ve Düşüşü", *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasî Düşünce Cilt II: Kemalizm*, (der.) Tanıl Bora, Murat Gültegingil, Ahmet İnsel, 6.ed., İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2009, p. 344 - 369.

[558] For examples and detailed descriptions of policies towards Kurds in the Early Republican Period see. Beşikçi, *Türk Tarih Tezi, Güneş-Dil Teorisi ve Kürt Sorunu...;* İsmail Beşikçi, *Kürtler'in 'Mecburî İskân'ı*, İstanbul: Komal Yayınları, 1977; İsmail Beşikçi, *Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi'nin Programı (1931) ve Kürt Sorunu*, İstanbul: Belge Yayınları, 1991; İsmail Beşikçi, *Tunceli Kanunu (1935) ve Dersim Jenosidi*, İstanbul: Belge Yayınları, 1990; Göktaş, *Kürtler: İsyan ve Tenkil - 1…*; Mesut Yeğen, *Devlet Söyleminde Kürt Sorunu*, 3.ed., İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2006; Necmeddin Sahir Sılan, *Doğu Anadolu'da Toplumsal Mühendislik: Dersim – Sason (1933-1946)*, İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 2010; (Ed.) Tuba Akekmekçi, Muazzez Pervan, *'Doğu Sorunu': Necmeddin Sahir Sılan Raporları (1939-1953)*, İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 2010; (Ed.) Tuba Akekmekçi, Muazzez Pervan, *Dersim Harekatı ve Cumhuriyet Bürokrasisi (1936-1950)*, İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 2011; (Ed.) Tuba Akekmekçi, Muazzez Pervan, *Dersimliler'den Mektuplar*, İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 2012; Metin Heper, *The State and Kurds in Turkey: The Question of Assimilation*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007; David McDowall, *A Modern History of the Kurds*, London, New York: I.ed. Tauris, 2004, p. 184-213; Yıldız, *"Ne Mutlu Türküm Diyebilene...*, p. 238-248; Mustafa Çapar, *Türkiye'de Eğitim ve "Öteki Türkler"*, Ankara: Özgür Üniversite Kitaplığı, 2006, p. 214-227; Cemil Gündoğan, "Resmi İdeoloji ve Kürtler", *Resmi Tarih Tartışmaları – 8: Türkiye'de "Azınlıklar"* , Fikret Başkaya vd. (ed.), Ankara: Özgür Üniversite Kitaplığı, 2011 s. 41-118.

[559] Yıldız, *"Ne Mutlu Türküm Diyebilene...*, p. 145-146.

[560] Selçuk Akşin Somel, "Osmanlı'dan Cumhuriyet'e Türk Kimliği", *Cumhuriyet, Demokrasi ve Kimlik …*, p. 81.

[561] Bora, "Cumhuriyet'in İlk Döneminde Millî Kimlik…, p. 58.

[562] Özbudun, "Millî Mücadele ve Cumhuriyet'in Resmî Belegelerinde…, p. 67.

[563] *Ibid.*

122

Aktar argues that "being Turk" (instead of "being a citizen of Turkey") became a prerequisite for being a civil servant according to the *Civil Service Act* no 788 in 1926. During this period, employment opportunities for the non-Muslims were largely reduced in both public and private sectors, as a result of the prevailing policies.[564] Furthermore, similar to the reign of the CUP government, many steps were taken for further Turkification (as well as Islamization) of the population. These include forced migration of non-Muslims based on the *Settlement Law*, dated 1934 and Turkifying financial capital including the *Capital Levy (1942-44).*[565] Somel also points out to sending of the Turkish speaking Central Anatolian Greek Orthodox groups to Greece during the 1924-1925 population in an exchange between Turkey and Greece, while keeping the non-Turkish speaking Muslim population in Anatolia. This event is considered as an example of the religious references of the ruling groups in defining Turkish national identity.[566] The author gives another example; Turkish descendant Orthodox Christian Gagauzes were allowed to migrate to Turkey between 1931 and 1944.[567] Hence, considering all these examples above, Turkish speaking Christians, and even some Turkish origin Christian groups were seemed to be excluded from being a Turk, although secularism was one of the fundamental components of the regime.

One other dimension of religion integrated with national identity was, and still is, the identification of the state with Sunni Islam at the official level.[568] According to Çapar's study on the proceedings of the parliament in the first years of the Republic, some parliament members clearly deemed Islamic sects other than Hanafite-Sunni

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[564] Ayhan Aktar, *Varlık Vergisi ve Türkleştirme Politikaları*, İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2000, p. 118-121.

[565] For examples and detailed descriptions of discriminatory practices towards Non-Muslims in the Early Republican Period see. Yıldız, *"Ne Mutlu Türküm Diyebilene…"*; M. Çağatay Okutan, *Tek Parti Döneminde Azınlık Politikaları*, 2.ed., İstanbul: İ. Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2009; Soner Çağaptay, *Türkiye'de İslâm, Laiklik ve Milliyetçilik: Türk Kimdir?*, (trans.) Özgür Bircan, İstanbul: İ. Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2009; Rıfat N. Bali, *Cumhuriyet Yıllarında Türkiye Yahudileri: Bir Türkleştirme Serüveni (1923-1945)*, 2.ed., İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2010; Rıfat N. Bali, *1934 Trakya Olayları*, İstanbul: Libra Kitapçılık, 2012; Avner Levi, *Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nde Yahudiler*, İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1996; Samim Akgönül, *Türkiye Rumları*, (trans.) Ceylan Gürman, 2.ed., İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2007; Füsun Üstel vd., *Türkiye'de Ermeniler: Cemaat, Birey, Yurttaş*, İstanbul: İ. Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2009; Savaşkan Durak, *Non-Muslim Minorities and Turkish National Identity…*; Başkaya vd. (ed.), *Resmi Tarih Tartışmaları – 8…*; Tanıl Bora, "Türkiye'de Milliyetçilik ve Azınlıklar", *Birikim Dergisi*, Sayı: 71-72, Mart-Nisan 1995, p. 34-49; Çapar, *Türkiye'de Eğitim ve "Öteki Türkler"…*, p. 199-214; Tekin, *İttihat ve Terakki'den Günümüze Yek Tarz-ı Siyaset: Türkleştirme…*; Aktar, *Varlık Vergisi ve Türkleştirme Politikaları…*; Ayhan Aktar, *Türk Milliyetçiliği*, *Gayrimüslimler ve Ekonomik Dönüşüm*, İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2006; Murat Koraltürk, *Ekonominin Türkleştirilmesi*, İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2011.

[566] Somel, "Osmanlı'dan Cumhuriyet'e Türk Kimliği…, p. 81.

[567] ibid.

[568] For detailed discussion see Gözaydın, *Diyanet: Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nde Dinin Tanzimi…*, p. 288-300.

Islam to be pagan.[569] Ocak writes that the state "adopted Sunni Islam as the single legitimate and valid sect, certainly in practice if not explicitly in state policy, during the formative years of the Republic headed by Atatürk himself, overlooking Alevism."[570] Somel also states that since its establishment, the Directorate of Religious Affairs merely served as the "Directorate of Sunni Religious Affairs."[571]

The second leg of structuring the official history thesis was its popularization through mass education. An interesting issue was the continuing functions of institutions, laws, and regulations inherited from the Ottoman period. The purpose was to regulate and inspect education through same mechanisms under different names. The mission attributed to mass education and textbooks during the rule of Abdülhamid the Second to establish a modern state, to spread the idea of citizenship, and to indoctrinate the masses with the official ideology were the policies that continued during the early Republican period. In this respect, some of the steps taken in the field of education were as the following: founding of the *Ministry of National Education* in 1920 with the purpose of uniting all kinds of education activities under a single roof,[572] enforcement of the *Law on Organization and Duties of the Ministry of National Education* (1926)[573] defining the legal framework for the administration of this ministry, establishment of the *Head Council of Education and Morality* (1921)[574] with the purpose of determining the criteria for preparation, publishing and distribution of textbooks to be used in formal schooling, and founding of the *National Education Directorate of Print Works* (1927)[575] for publishing related official instructions, regulations and legal documents including textbooks, and the

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[569] Çapar, *Türkiye'de Eğitim ve "Öteki Türkler"…*, p. 232-233.
[570] Ahmet Yaşar Ocak, "'Türk Müslümanlığı' Tartışmaları, Resmî İdeoloji, Alevilik, Sosyolojik ve Tarihsel Gerçek", *Türkler, Türkiye ve İslam: Yaklaşım, Yöntem ve Yorum Denemeleri*, 4.ed., İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2001, p. 150.
[571] Somel, "Osmanlı'dan Cumhuriyet'e Türk Kimliği…, p. 81.
[572] The first name given to the Ministry was '*Maarif Vekaleti'*; in 1935, it was called '*Kültür Bakanlığı'* (Ministry of Culture); between 1941 and 1946 it was renamed as '*Maarif Vekilliği'*; and lastly, in 1946, it was named as '*Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı'* (Ministry of National Education). Ceyhan, *Türk Eğitim Tarihi Kronolojisi…*, p. 55.
[573] *Ibid.,* p. 72-73.
[574] As a department under the Ministry of National Education, the board was renamed as 'Telif ve Tercüme Dairesi'; in 1926 it was named as Millî Talim ve Terbiye Dairesi' (Board of National Education and Training) "Cumhuriyet'in İlk Dönemi Eğitim Kurumları (1921-1926) Telif ve Tercüme Heyeti", *Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı Talim ve Terbiye Kurulu Başkanlığı Web Sitesi*, 2003:
http://ttkb.meb.gov.tr/meb_iys_dosyalar/2012_06/06022003_heyeti_ilmiye.pdf
[575] Ceyhan, *Türk Eğitim Tarihi Kronolojisi…*, p. 76.

establishment of the *Turkish Historical Society* (1923-1924)[576] for the "scientific" structuring of the state's official view on history including textbooks.

There were of course some differences between the education system of the Empire and of the Republic. One of the two main differences was the centralization of the education system by uniting all educational activities under a single roof. The second was the adoption of the ideologies of secularism, nationalism, and capitalism (targeting to increase the workforce necessary for the capitalist market) as the markers in education. In light of these developments, it is now appropriate to discuss secularization and nationalization of the education system.

One of the ideological tendencies in education was the principle of secularism; the aim was to reduce the effect of religion in education. In fact, in the outset of the War of Independence, the new state's dominant approach was infusing religion with nationalism in the area of education as well, appropriate to the political context of the period.. Kaplan calls this approach as "Turkish-Islam and capitalism synthesis".[577] Nevertheless, from the second half of the 1920s onwards, this was replaced by a secular nationalist discourse in education in the statements of government officials.[578] Adoption of the *Unity of Education Law* in 1924 was the crucial step in this turn, coupled with the political/ideological steps towards reducing the effect of Islam on various levels of social life. In this context, the state initially decided to establish religious vocational schools around the country and the Faculty of Theology under *Dar'ül-Fünûn* (Istanbul University) in order to keep religion under state control as well as modernize and nationalize it. However, in the following years, all these schools were closed on the grounds that, in anyway, a secular state should not involve religious education. Similarly, religion lessons in the official education curriculum were totally dropped in the early 1930s. Hence, for the most part of the early Republican period, courses on religion were not provided in mainstream

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[576] Despite the fact that the first offical name of the institution was 'Türk Tarih Encümeni', later it was named as 'Türk Tarihi Tetkik Cemiyeti' (1931-32), then renamed as'Türk Tarih Kurumu' (1935). Ceyhan, *Türk Eğitim Tarihi Kronolojisi…*, p. 89-90.

[577] For details see, İsmail Kaplan, *Türkiye'de Milli Eğitim İdeolojisi ve Siyasal Toplumsallaşma Üzerindeki Etkisi*, 2.ed., İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1999, *p.* 152-160; Tonguç, *İlköğretim Kavramı…*, p. 226-227; Sakaoğlu, *Cumhuriyet Dönemi Eğitim Tarihi…*, p. 13.

[578] For details see. Kaplan, *Türkiye'de Milli Eğitim İdeolojisi…,* p. 161-196.

education.[579] Mixed education and adoption of the Latin alphabet in 1928 were the other concrete steps taken towards secularization.

Sakaoğlu suggests that the reason for people to remain non-reactive to all these developments should not be interpreted as a "heartfelt support to secularism and establishment of a national education system."[580] According to him, it was related with "their unconditional and imperious trust in the new government as an exhausted nation, oblivious to such developments in their desperate struggle to make a living during the post war conjuncture."[581] However, especially from the second half of the 1940s onwards, a mass dissatisfaction began to rise. Following the introduction of the opposition party in the parliament, religion classes were returned to the mainstream education in 1949 as an "extracurricular" and "optional" subject. In the year to follow, it was fully integrated with the system first in elementary schools (1950), then in middle schools (1956), and finally, in high schools (1967). With the adoption of 1982 Constitution, religious instruction became a compulsory subject in all school levels.[582]

In the same period, nationalism was another prominent ideology to shape the state's education policies. In this regard, education in Turkey was clearly structured around the idea of Turkish nationalism. This was the establishment of a system which aimed to carry this ideology forward to future generations. Even the name of the related Ministry itself, "National Education," reflected this ideological inclination. In the early years of the Republic, Atatürk stated that the new state would provide a unified national education as opposed to religious or international. According to him, this education would "inject" the idea of Turkish nationalism into the minds and souls of

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[579] For information and assessment of state's policy of religous education see. Ergin, *Türkiye Maarif Tarihi Cilt V...*, p. 1634-1734; Halis Ayhan, *Türkiye'de Din Eğitimi*, 2.ed., İstanbul: DEM Yayınları, 2004; Recai Doğan, "1980'e Kadar Türkiye'de Din Öğretimi Program Arayışları", *Din Öğretiminde Yeni Yöntem Arayışları Uluslararası Sempozyum Bildiri ve Tartışmalar* , 28-30 Mart 2001, İstanbul, Ankara: Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı, 2003, p. 611-646; Beyza Bilgin, "T.C. Devletinin Din Politikaları: Din Eğitimi", *Ülkemizde Laik Eğitim Sisteminde Sosyal Bilim Olarak Din Öğretimi Kurultayu Bildiri ve Tartışmalar* , 7-9 Nisan 2005, Malatya, Malatya: İnönü Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2005, p. 87-108; Jaschke, *Yeni Türkiye'de İslamlık...*, p. 81-93; Abdullah Akın, *Cumhuriyet Dönemi Din Eğitimi (1920-1950)*, PhD Dissertation, Bursa: Uludağ Üniversitesi, 2010; "Dosya: Din Politikaları ve Eğitime Etkileri", *Değerler Eğitimi (DEM) Dergisi*, Yıl: 1, Sayı: 2, Ekim Kasım Aralık 2007. Information given here is compiled of these specific resources.
[580] Sakaoğlu, *Cumhuriyet Dönemi Eğitim Tarihi...*, p. 25.
[581] *Ibid.*
[582] See the above sources for religious education in Turkey.

young generations.[583] In this framework, he defined the fundamental goal of education as "raising new generations who are compassionately loyal to the new Turkish state and nation and prepare them to tackle against all foes [(persons, institutions, ideas)]."[584] İsmet İnönü, who was the prime minister from 1924 to 1937, shared the same views with Atatürk about the national character of education. In one of his speeches regarding the importance of education in the new regime, he praises education "for its role in transforming the political Turkish nation into a full and united one in terms of its cultural, ideological, and social values."[585] Hence, he encumbered education with a mission of uniting a population of cultural, ideological, and social diversity under a common Turkish citizenship through the ideology of Turkification. Kirby states that such views were based largely on Gökalp, whom she defines as "the father of Turkish Pedagogy."[586]

Reflections of the founding leaders' ideas with regard to nationalization of education at the legal/institutional levels can be traced in the RPP party programs, laws and regulations issued in the field of education, and statements in parliamentary meetings and public speeches.[587] A significant step was making primary school education compulsory and free at state schools to all Turkish citizens as formally phrased in the 1924 Constitution.[588] Starting with the RPP's first Party Program in 1931, the objective of state policy on education was defined as "raising citizens compassionately pro-republic, nationalist and secular."[589] This clearly reflects the ideological role appointed to education. As an indicator of the state-party identification, the Ministry of National Education passed a number of circulars

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[583] Hasan Ali Yücel, *Türkiye'de Orta Öğretim*, Ankara: T.C. Kültür Bakanlığı, 1994, p. 19-21.

[584] *Ibid.*

[585] Kaplan, *Türkiye'de Milli Eğitim İdeolojisi...,* p. 143; Yücel, *Türkiye'de Orta Öğretim...*, p. 25.

[586] Kirby (Berkes), *Türkiye'de Köy Enstitüleri…*, p. 35-37, 49.

[587] For the evaluation of ideological quality of education in the Early Repulican period see Kaplan, *Türkiye'de Milli Eğitim İdeolojisi...*, p. 173-178; Ergin, *Türkiye Maarif Tarihi Cilt V...*; Fatma Gök (Ed.), *75 Yılda Eğitim*, İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı, 1999; Kaynar, "Türk Milli Talim ve Terbiye Sistemi…, p. 24-42; Ayşe Kadıoğlu, ''The Paradox of Turkish Nationalism and the Construction of Official Identity", *Middle Eastern Studies*, 32:2, 1996, p. 177-196; İsmail Güven, *Türkiye'de Devlet, Eğitim ve İdeoloji*, Ankara: Siyasal Kitabevi, 2000; Faith J. Childress, *Republican Lessons: Education and the Making of Modern Turkey*, PhD Dissertation, Utah: University of Utah, 2001; Çapar, *Türkiye'de Eğitim ve "Öteki Türkler"...*, p. 290-384.

[588] T.C. *1924 Anayasası*, 87. Md.

[589] *C.H.F. Nizamnamesi ve Programı*, Ankara: T.ed.M.M. Matbaası, 1931, p. 35. See. Mehmet Arslan, "Cumhuriyet Dönemi İlköğretim Programları ve Belli Başlı Özellikleri", *Milli Eğitim Dergisi*, Sayı: 146, Nisan-Mayıs-Haziran 2000.

reflecting the state's policy on education. The following statement was included in the 1936 school curriculum:[590]

> It is essential for all to have a national, worldly, modern, and democratic education in Turkey… What is meant by 'national' education is raising young generations in full compliance with a national society with all its institutions, ideas and ideals… 'Worldly' is meant for a secular education, clear of all types of religious impact narrowing ideas and breaching the right of conscience. The phrase 'modern' stands for the use of update scientific rules, methods and techniques in education, and 'democratic' for equality among all the citizens in terms of education opportunities and for removing all barriers in the field of education for young persons regardless of their social status and welfare to provide them with adequate training in line with their capacity and skills.[591]

Hence, taking into consideration its contribution to state economy alongside its role as an ideological tool, popularization of education became top priority for the government. Indeed, budget for education had the "largest share of the state budget ever, except for the *Düyun-u Umumiye* (public debts) inherited from the Ottoman era, National Defense and Public Works subventions."[592]

There were also remarkable developments with regard to the textbooks in this period. Textbooks used since the Tanzimat period were brought under strict state control. According to the decision of the *Second Educational Council* meeting in 1924, only a year after the proclamation of the Republic,

> The textbooks prepared under the influence of old schools have no place in modern schools established by the Republican regime. New school curriculum shall be determined in line with the current conditions of the day and textbooks shall be prepared accordingly.[593]

According to the *Law on Printing of Textbooks by the Ministry of Education* (1926), control and inspection of school textbooks were left to the responsibility of the Ministry of Education and *Head Council of Education and Morality*.[594] Since the

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[590] See. Mehmet Arslan, "Cumhuriyet Dönemi İlköğretim Programları ve Belli Başlı Özellikleri", *Milli Eğitim Dergisi*, Sayı: 146, Nisan-Mayıs-Haziran 2000.

[591] Yusuf Akçura, *Türk Yılı 1928*, İstanbul: Yeni Matbaa, 1928, p. 112 cited in Sakaoğlu, *Cumhuriyet Dönemi Eğitim Tarihi…*, p. 34-35.

[592] D. E. Webster, *The Turkey of Atatürk*, Philadelphia: The American Academy of Political and Social Science, 1939, p. 217 cited in Kirby (Berkes), *Türkiye'de Köy Enstitüleri…*, p. 51.

[593] Aslan, "Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nin İlk Ders Kitapları…, p. 218.

[594] Mesut Çapa, "Cumhuriyet'in İlk Yıllarında Tarih Öğretimi", *A.Ü.T.İ.T.E. Atatürk Yolu Dergisi*, Sayı: 29-30, Mayıs-Kasım 2002, p. 46.

adoption of this law, the Ministry of Education was the single authority to determine the official status of any textbook and of approval to be used in schools. The main criterion was the compliance of textbooks with the school curricula determined by the same institution. In this framework, school curricula determined for primary education in 1924[595], 1926, 1936, 1939, and 1948 alongside for middle school education in 1924[596], 1927, 1931-32, 1937-38, 1939, and 1949 set the framework for the pedagogical and ideological foundations of the textbooks to be used in schools.[597] Hence, Ministry approval of a book would determine its conformity with the official discourse in terms of language and content. In other words, by approving a book for use in schools, the Ministry stated that the text of the book was in conformity with the official discourse. Atatürk's personal involvement in the preparation of *History* and *Civics* textbooks in the beginning of 1930s can be interpreted as a sign of the importance that the state placed on textbooks.[598] In addition, the state took over monopoly of printing and distribution of textbooks as of 1933 and prevented the development of alternative discourses. It was decided to print a single textbook for each subject by the Ministry of Education at the 1939 Education Congress. Until 1945, the single textbook to be printed was elected through a competition.[599].

Finally, before the analysis of textbooks, an assessment of the current paradigm on related textbooks is necessary. Although there is a plethora of studies since the 2000s,[600] Copeaux's work, whose analytical contribution is mostly recognized by

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[595] After this curriculum, primary schools started to provide five years of education.

[596] After this curriculum, secondary schools were regarded as the first stage and high schools were regarded as the second stage, both provided three years education.

[597] Süleyman Karataş, *Batılılaşma Döneminde Ders Program Değişimi*, Unpublished MA Thesis, Afyon: Afyon Kocatepe Üniversitesi, 2002.

[598] For an evaluation of the role of Atatürk in the preparations of these books see Ergin, *Türkiye Maarif Tarihi Cilt V...*, p. 1792-1797; Afet İnan, *Atatürk Hakkında Hatıralar ve Belgeler*, Ankara: T. İş Bankası Yayınları, 1984, p. 304-305; İnan, *Medeni Bilgiler ve Mustafa Kemal Atatürk'ün El Yazıları...*

[599] Üstel, *Makbul Vatandaş'ın Peşinde...*, p. 154.

[600] Etienne Copeaux, *Tarih Ders Kitaplarında Türk Tarih Tezinden-Türk İslam Sentezine (1931-1993)*, 2.b., İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 2000; Ersanlı, *İktidar ve Tarih...*; Ayşe Gül Altınay, *The Myth of the Military Nation: Militarism, Gender and Education in Turkey*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004; İsmet Parlak, *Kemalist İdeolojide Eğitim: Erken Cumhuriyet Dönemi Tarih ve Yurt Bilgisi Kitapları Üzerine Bir İnceleme*, Ankara: Turhan Kitabevi, 2008; Füsun Üstel, *Makbul Vatandaş'ın Peşinde: II. Meşrutiyet'ten Bugüne Vatandaşlık Eğitimi*, İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2004; Fatma Gürses, *Kul, Tebaa, Yurttaş: Cumhuriyet'in Kuruluşundan Günümüze Ders Kitaplarında Yurttaşlık*, Ankara: Ütopya Yayınevi, 2011; Mustafa Çapar, *Türkiye'de Eğitim ve "Öteki Türkler"*, Ankara: Özgür Üniversite Kitaplığı, 2006; Barak Aaron Salmoni, *Pedagogies of Patriotism: Teaching Socio-Political Community in Twentieth Century Turkish and Egyptian Education*, Phd Dissertation, Harvard Univeristy, Cambridge & Massachusets: 2002; Avonna Deanne Swartz, *Textbooks and National Ideology: A Content Analysis of the Secondary Turkish History Textbooks Used in the Republic of Turkey Since 1929*, Phd Dissertation, University of Texas, Austin: 1997; Şefika Akile Zorlu-Durukan, *The Ideological Pillars of Turkish Education: Emergent Kemalism and The Zenith of Single Party Rule*, Phd

others, is still the main source to be referred to in this field. In his study covering the years between 1931 and 1993, the author argues that a secular nationalism dominated history textbooks during the Early Republican era. Starting with the 1980s, Turkish-Islamic Synthesis became the hegemonic ideology. According to him, the doctrine of Turkish-Islamic Synthesis was "in part, an anti-West-leaning reaction" and it was based on the ideology that considered being Turk and Muslim as two complementary components of the definition of national identity and history.[601] For Copeaux, it is possible to define it as a national ideology which on one hand "assumed Islam as an ideology" and on the other hand "declared its nationalism."[602] Hence, it "defines Turkish identity through Islam as a religious, moral, and identity source."[603] Moreover, he argues that majority of the texts adopting this discourse usually "emphasized the history of the periods and places that Turkishness and Islam coincided."[604] It is also worth mentioning that Copeaux contends, supporters of this synthesis were not necessarily in favor of a theocratic regime as well. In this regard, his Turkish-Islamic Synthesis concept harmonizes well with both "religious nationalism" analyzed in the second chapter and Alkan's conceptualization of the official discourse of the CUP period explained in this section.

Nevertheless, I should underline that my objection to Copeaux is about his analytical blindness to the various discourses in the textbooks used during the Early Republican period. Indeed, he generalized his findings pertinent to secular nationalist discourse in the textbooks of 1930s to the entire era; thus, missed examples of Turkish-Islamic Synthesis also existed in this period. In this context, my argument in the following chapters will revolve around the claim that the textbooks of early Republican period hold a discursive variety concerning the relations between religion and nationalism. In this regard, I argue that a secular nationalist discourse was only prevailing in the textbooks of 1931-1939 while the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis doctrine was hegemonic

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Dissertation, University of Wisconsin-Madison, Wisconsin: 2006; Tuba Kancı, *Imagining the Turkish Men and Women: Nationalism, Modernism and Militarism in Primary School Textbooks (1928-2000)*, Phd Dissertation, Sabancı Üniversitesi, İstanbul: 2007; Mehmet Anık, "Lise Sosyoloji Ders Kitapları Üzerine Eleştirel Bir Değerlendirme", *Sosyoloji Dergisi*, 3 (16), 2008/1; .Ergün Yıldırım, "Din Dersi Kitapları Deneyimi (1923-1950)" *Türkiye'de Sivil Toplum ve Milliyetçilik* içinde, (Ed.) Stefanos Yerasimos, İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2001.
[601] Copeaux, *Türk Tarih Tezinden Türk-İslam Sentezine…*, p. 56.
[602] *Ibid.*, p. 57.
[603] *Ibid.*
[604] *Ibid.*, p. 56.

in the textbooks of 1924 -1931 and 1939 -1950. I can now proceed with the analysis of the early Republican Era school textbooks.

CHAPTER 4

DOMINANCE OF TURKISH-ISLAMIC SYNTHESIS IN THE TEXTBOOKS BETWEEN 1924 AND 1931

This chapter with two subsequent chapters constitutes the analysis of textbooks of the Early Republican Era through the historical, sociological, and political/ideological background I reviewed in the preceding chapters. I will undertake this analysis by dividing the years between 1924 and 1950 into three sub-periods which, I contend, have ideological/discursive varieties. In this chapter, I will analyze the textbooks of the first period covering years 1924 until 1931. In this period, the cardinal characteristic of the dominant discourse in the textbooks is based on the allegation that Turkishness and Muslimness constitute a complementarity in the depiction of national identity. For this reason, I believe that the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis doctrine that would be developed years later to refer similar tendencies has the capacity to cover nationalist discourse of this period as well. This discursive inclination can be taken as a reflection of the religious nationalist ideology beginning in the early 1920s onwards over the textbooks of the period. Hence, as discussed in the previous chapter, it is observed that in parallel to a politics of nationalism beginning in the early 1920s –though not targeting a theocratic regime, but putting religion as a fundamental reference for diverse reasons- a discourse was developed in the textbooks of the period to narrate Turkishness and Muslimness as two complementary identity components. Therefore, a kind of "Turkish-Islamic Synthesis" has -contrary to general opinion- determined the dominant discourse over the textbooks of this period. In order to explore this, I will first introduce textbooks and their writers of the period then demonstrate how diverse textbooks define concepts such as religion, secularism, nation, national identity and nationalism. Finally, I will analyze in depth how these concepts designated role/meaning/value to Islam (and other religions) in defining Turkish nationalism.

4.1. General Information about the Textbooks of the Period

As noted towards the end of previous chapter, the textbooks that are going to be analyzed in this chapter are the books written with the decision taken in the *Second Education Council* in 1924 to publish textbooks pertaining to the ideology of the new regime. According to the curricula of primary and secondary education revised in the aftermath of the Council, history courses were taught in primary school grades 3rd, 4th and 5th, and in each three classes of secondary and high schools.[605] Civics was taught in the primary education for grades 4th and 5th in addition to grades 2nd and 3rd in the secondary education.[606] Sociology was taught in the 2nd and 3rd grades of high schools.[607] Lastly, religion courses were taught as a part of the official curriculum in primary school grades 3rd, 4th and 5th.[608] In this period, there was a plethora of publications, writers and publishers in terms of textbooks as many as we could not witness in the following two periods emanating from the inadequate financial and technical resources of the state. Moreover in those years, there was no monopolistic state predominant in the publishing area and private entrepreneurs were still effective in the book market.[609] At this point, total number of textbooks for the above-mentioned four courses (except for republications) could be counted as fifty. The number of books I could reach and analyze is thirty seven. The full list of the textbooks is enclosed as Appendix-A.

One of the constraints I have confronted in analyzing textbooks is that the books published before the Latin alphabet transition in 1928 were written in Ottoman Turkish. Nevertheless, I managed to include most of the textbooks in the curricula since 1924, as most of them were reprinted in Latin letters with minor additions from 1929.[610] Furthermore, some of the books that are not taught after 1929 are

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[605] Erdal Aslan, "Atatürk Döneminde Tarih Eğitimi-I: "Türk Tarih Tezi" Öncesi Dönem (1923-1931)", *Eğitim ve Bilim*, 37/164), 2012, p. 331-346; Yücel, *Türkiye'de Orta Öğretim…*, p. 164-169.

[606] Yücel, *Türkiye'de Orta Öğretim…*, p. 166-169.

[607] The course was given the name of 'Philosophy and Sociology' in the curricula of 1927. See. *ibid.* p. 165, 168.

[608] Religion courses were taught in primary and secondary schools by the curriculum of 1924. Starting from 1927, they were taught only in primary education. Doğan, "1980'e Kadar Türkiye'de Din Öğretimi Program Arayışları…, p. 612-617.

[609] Aslan, "Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nin İlk Ders Kitapları…, p. 218-220.

[610] See. *ibid.*; Fatma Gürses and Nilgün Gürkan Pazarcı, "Siyasal Gündemin Yurttaşlık Kavramına Etkileri: Ders Kitapları Üzerinden Bir İnceleme", *5. Karaburun Bilim Kongresi*, 2-5 Eylül 2010; Mehmet Anık, "Lise Sosyoloji Ders Kitapları Üzerine Eleştirel Bir Değerlendirme", *Sosyoloji Dergisi*, 3 (16), 2008/1.

republished today with the Latin alphabet.[611] I need to underline that I managed to include books whose first edition were before 1931 (even reprinted in 1931) within the scope of this chapter. On the contrary, I included books that were published firstly in 1931 and later, to the next chapter of my thesis.

Before content analysis, it is crucial to give some information about the curricula and textbook writers.. To start with the history courses, a noteworthy remark is that Mehmed Fuad (Köprülü), İhsan Şerif (Saru), Ahmet Refik (Altınay), Ahmet Halit (Yaşaroğlu) and Emin Ali (Çavlı), who wrote the history textbooks of the last period of Ottoman Empire, were the writers of the history textbooks in this period.[612] This means that the Ottoman historiography tradition exhibited continuities to some extent in this period through writers' approaches both to history in general and specifically to Turkish history. Yet condemned by some leading historians such as Mehmed Fuad of "just imitating Frankish books"[613], it should be noted that this tradition of historiography intended to "teach world history from a Turkish-Islamic perspective" through the textbooks of the new period in line with the basic principles of the new regime. Berktay indicates that this (new) historical paradigm shift of Köprülü would form the basis of a history doctrine that would later be promulgated as Turkish-Islamic synthesis.[614] In parallel to criticism widespread in this period, Aslan states that Turkish and Islam history held broader space in the history course curricula in the latter half of the 1920s compared to previous years.[615] In this chapter, the analysis will show how this is reflected into the textbooks of the period.

The continuity of history textbooks and writers of history textbooks between the Ottoman and Republican Era is relevant -to some extent- also for the Civics textbooks.. Actually, the history and textbooks of this course dated back to the last period of the Ottoman Empire.[616] The course was *Malumat-ı Medeniye* in

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[611] For example see. Ziya Gökalp, *Türk Medeniyeti Tarihi* [1925], (Eds.) Yusuf Çotuksöken, *Ziya Gökalp, Kitaplar 1,* İstanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 2007, p. 339-391; Fuad Köprülü, *Türkiye Tarihi*, (Eds.) M. Hanefi Palabıyık, Ankara: Akçağ Yayınları, 2005 [1923].

[612] Çapa, "Cumhuriyet'in İlk Yıllarında Tarih Öğretimi…, p. 45; Aslan, "Atatürk Döneminde Tarih Eğitimi-I…, p. 342.

[613] Köprülüzade Mehmet Fuad, *Milli Tarih*, İstanbul: Kanaat Kütüphanesi, 1337 (1921), p. 63 cited in Çapa, "Cumhuriyet'in İlk Yıllarında Tarih Öğretimi, p. 45.

[614] Halil Berktay, "Türklerin Tarihinde Temel Yanlışlar", *Türkiye Tarihi 1* (Eds.) Sina Akşin*, p. 42-46. For a detailed assessment of Berktay about Köprülü's historical approach see. Halil Berktay, *Cumhuriyet İdeolojisi ve Fuat Köprülü*, İstanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, 1983, p. 80-94.

[615] Aslan, "Atatürk Döneminde Tarih Eğitimi-I…, p. 339-344.

[616] Üstel, *Makbul Vatandaş'ın Peşinde…,* p. 155-156.

Constitutional Era II, *Malumat-ı Vataniye* before Republican Era and finally evolved to *Yurt Bilgisi* (Civics) in 1926. However, as stated in the Primary School Curriculum of 1926, the main objective of this course was conceptualized in the Republican Era as to "realign students, hereinafter, with (Turkish) homeland and nation" that were re-defined with the emergence of republican and nationalist ideology.[617] In addition to this, Gülmez states that the civics program of the period, compared to latter program, was "both more liberal…and giving much more place to rights and freedoms."[618] On the other hand, writers of civics textbooks in this period that I could identify are Muslihiddin Adil (Taylan), Mitat Sadullah (Sander), Mehmet Emin (Erişirgil), Muallim Abdülbaki (Gölpınarlı) and Ali Kâmi (Akyüz). While some of the writers were performing teaching profession in various fields, Mehmet Emin undertook the position of undersecretary of education; and Ali Kamî was in the Parliament towards the end of 1930s after his Darussafaka Directorate.

Sociology course was taught together with the philosophy course in the curriculum of 1924 and later became a single course in 1926. The objective of the course within aforesaid period could be rephrased as

> to make students think over social problems and to have a general idea about the evolution from [Ottoman Period to Republican Era], to demonstrate the relationship between legal and economic problems and to provide information about how they will be overcome along with the advance of the community.[619]

Accordingly, the program in 1924 -that would not be changed until 1935- included topics such as economics, sociology, family sociology, political sociology, social life and humanitarian ideas.[620] On the other hand, the first of three textbooks that were taught in sociology courses in this period was *Terbiye ve Ahlaka Müteallik Tatbikatıyla İçtimaiyat Dersleri* (1924), a book translated by Mehmet İzzet from French writers, A. Gleyse and A. Hesse. It was later followed by *Yeni İçtimaiyat* (1927) written by Mehmet İzzet himself and *İçtimaiyat* (1927) written by Ali Kami

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[617] T.C. Maarif Vekaleti, *İlkmektep Müfredat Programı*, İstanbul: Devlet Matbaası, 1930, p. 78-79 cited in Üstel, *Makbul Vatandaş'ın Peşinde…, p. 131-133.*

[618] Mesut Gülmez, "Cumhuriyet ve İnsan Hakları Eğitimi (1923-1948)", *Bilanço 1923-1998, "Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nin 75. Yılına Toplu Bakış" Uluslararası Kongresi*, I. Cilt (Eds.) Zeynep Rona, İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yayınları, 1999, p. 152.

[619] Beyhan Zabun, "Türkiye'de Sosyoloji Dersi Öğretim Programlarının Amaç ve İçeriklerinin Toplumsal Değişmeye Paralel Olarak Değişimi", *G.E.F.A.D.*, 32(1), 2012, p. 159.

[620] *ibid.*

(Akyüz). Anık states that because all these authors were mainly associated with Durkheim's sociological school, they approached various issues from a functionalist perspective.[621]

It is crucial to note that religious studies course was taught within formal education system only in this period different from succeeding periods. The course, dating back to the imperial-era again, was provided with the title 'Holy Quran and Religious Studies' (Turk. *Kur'an-ı Kerim ve Din Dersleri*) in 1924, and the title Religion Course (*Din Dersi*)() appeared in the curricula after 1926. This change in the title of the course brought several changes in terms of content and program as well. According to the primary school curriculum in 1924, the course was composed of headlines such as "teaching Qur'an (in Arabic), Prophet's life and the legends, cases from the lives of his companions, Islam and the conditions of faith, prayers and surah" were revised in 1926.[622] In respect to the new curriculum, the content included headlines such as "mosque, religion of the Turks today, Prophet's life, faith in God, principles of Islam, being a better person, working, trust, gratitude, tolerance, bigotry/fanaticism, hypocrisy, valuing mind above everything, no clergy between God and his followers, Turks as the nation who served Islam most".[623] In this context, the objective of the religion course in the same curriculum was rephrased as "to evoke feelings of gratitude and affection in children against God Almighty, make them espouse Islam and express all Muslims' faith in the unity of God."[624] Hence, the course which was once based on Qur'an and doctrinal theology was, in the long run, revised with a relatively pedagogical approach including daily issues as well as relations between Turkishness and Muslimness.

Yusuf Ziya (Yörükan), Ahmed Hamdi (Akseki), Muallim Abdülbaki (Gölpınarlı), Tüccarzade İbrahim Hilmi (Çığıraçan) and M. Ali Rıza were amongst the writers of religion textbooks. Remarkably, some names were also the writers of other textbooks. Amongst them, it is important to highlight İbrahim Hilmi who was one of the first publishers of the Republic and one of those who contributed Qur'an to be recited in Turkish by printing Turkish translations of Qur'an in his publishing

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[621] Anık, "Lise Sosyoloji Ders Kitapları Üzerine Eleştirel Bir Değerlendirme…, p. 150-166.
[622] Doğan, "1980'e Kadar Türkiye'de Din Öğretimi Program Arayışları…, p. 612-617.
[623] *ibid.*
[624] *ibid.* p. 615.

house.[625] Moreover, Ahmed Hamdi was another salient name, who served as the Director of Religious Affairs between 1947 and 1951.[626]

4.2. Religion and Secularism in the Textbooks

A general definition of 'religion' could not be encountered in history and civics course textbooks as well as in the religion course textbooks. However, quite a lot of information and assessments about many religions including Islam could be found especially in the textbooks of history and religion. Hence, it can be argued that writers presumed that all students nominally know religion as a general concept. In this period, a formal definition of religion is encountered only in the textbook written by Mehmet İzzet for the high school sociology course. Religion is simply defined as "a collection of beliefs and deeds (of rituals, practices that are mandatory and essential in the same degree related to beliefs)" in the book which seems to be written under the influence of Durkheim's sociological doctrine. Again, writer improves his definition underlining the necessity of "a community who accept these claims, who believe in them, who believe that this faith is essential" with reference to Durkheim.[627] According to İzzet, "distinguishing *mukaddes* (sacred) from *haram* (profane) is the most fundamental aspect that every religion shares."[628] He explains two cases directly quoting from Durkheim:

> Holy and sinful things are prohibited to be approached, touched or can only be touched in the contours religion commands. Believer believes in the esoteric forces in them that make him feel respect for them, worship them, love them mystically. That is to say, sacred things compel one to feel love and respect for it. We are afraid of them, yet we admire them with great love.[629]

It is important to highlight that İzzet stands at a different point from Durkheim about the origin of religion. While Durkheim points out social needs as the causes for the birth of religion, İzzet underlines the influence of "the material and spiritual realms

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[625] İsmail Erşahin, "Cumhuriyet'in İlk Yıllarında Kur'an Meali Yayıncılığı: İbrahim Hilmi Örneği", *Toplum Bilimleri Dergisi*, 5(9), Ocak-Haziran 2011, p. 149-160.

[626] İsmail Kara, "Ahmed Hamdi Akseki", *Türkiye'de İslamcılık Düşüncesi - Metinler/Kişiler 2*, 4.b., İstanbul: Dergah Yayınları, 2011, p. 808.

[627] Mehmet İzzet, *İçtimaiyat*, İstanbul: Devlet Matbaası, 1929 [1927], p. 210.

[628] *ibid.* p. 210.

[629] *ibid.* p. 210-211.

as well as the social life" for the emergence of religious feelings in people.[630] From here, one might reach a conclusion that the writer believes in the existence of a physical as well as a metaphysical reality of the world. To support his opinion, writer uses some expressions which reveal his sympathy towards religions with a divine origin and, specifically towards Islam in the same section where he shares his ideas about religion:

> Religions that are revealed shall resist strongly to foreign beliefs and rituals. In Beijing, Catholic missionaries collected not more than a few thousand adherents. Despite the efforts of missionaries for a long time in our country, they could not succeed injecting their belief into Islam.[631]

This comment can be recited as an example for writer's stance especially if it is read out with we-they distinction/dichotomy. Still, it should be noted that such cases that give us the impression of pointing to any specific religion are limited at least to this section. In this regard, writer states that he mainly tries to explain religion as a sociological matter like other institutions. Therefore, for him, no religion could be regarded as unnecessary or stupid since all societies must be founded upon a religious system in order to survive.[632]

Finally regarding religion, İzzet states that religions in the eyes of individuals today have become nothing but 'deeds (practices)' and 'ethics' rather than a resource to be referenced for discussion of events pertinent to universe.. According to him, this brings the limitation that religion is a subject related to individual conscience. In this manner, "[contemporary] believer feels the existence of God in his conscience [and] recognizes God as the builder of the universal moral order."[633]

İzzet delineates the contours of the hegemonic discourse of the period in his stance to adopt religiousness as valid and indispensable institution emanating from a metaphysical origin with social functions. Still, he assumes religion as a matter of individual conscience. Along with this, it is necessary to refer to different textbooks

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[630] *ibid.* p. 211.
[631] *ibid.* p. 209.
[632] *ibid.* p. 215.
[633] *ibid.* p. 216.

in order to make further comments on the various aspects of this discourse as the space Izzet allocates to religion is quite narrow in his book.

Even though I could not find a general definition of religion in the textbooks, I encountered with detailed descriptions of various religions. Among them, Islam holds unsurprisingly the paramount place. It can be contended that history textbooks (especially textbooks with general history theme/title) explains historical development of different religions with a rather objective style. Religion textbooks discuss only Islam and its principles. In the civics textbooks, reviews and assessments pertaining to a specific religion are not found except for the parts where secularism is articulated. In this part, I will firstly reflect how textbooks narrate other religions apart from Islam with different examples from the history and religion textbooks.

For the reason that most of the general history textbooks are written from the perspective of civilizational historiography rather than political historiography, religion is often referred when history of each society is narrated. In this context, three different stances are observed in the history textbooks.

The first group adopts an objective style in their narration of different religions including even polytheistic/pagan religions.[634] They provide descriptive historical information about the people and events related to that religion within a formal expression/language. They also hold a historical-sociological perspective looking from outside (neutral) as much as they could. For instance, the titles *hazrati* or *Hz.* (similar to *Saint,* or *St.,* in English) are not used for the prophets of monotheistic religions Judaism and Christianity. This can be interpreted emanating from the concern to look all religions from "outside" rather than a sign of disrespect. Relatedly, I did not come across expressions such as "silly," "unacceptable," or "irrational" for any religion, whether monotheistic or not, in these books. Still, even in these books, the objectivity in describing other religions is clouded with the implicit and explicit glorification of Islam. Examples for this will be given in the next section.

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[634] See for example Ali Reşat, *Umumi Tarih, Lise Kitapları: I. Sınıf*, İstanbul: Devlet Matbaası, 1929; Abdülbaki and Sabri Esat, *Yavrumun Tarih Kitabı: İlkmektep – Dördüncü Sınıf*, İstanbul: Tefeyyüz Kitaphanesi, 1930.

The second group glorifies the preponderance of monotheistic/Abrahamic religions. They emphasize the fact that humanity experienced an advanced spiritual/religious progress with Judaism. The first example for this could be given from Ahmet Refik: "Jews [Israelites] are quite advanced in the religion and music. They first understood that people need to worship God [in other words, doctrine of the Oneness of God]. They did not worship statues and stars like Egyptians, Chaldeans and Assyrians."[635] Ali Reşat can also be quoted here for an example of positing preponderance of the monotheistic religions over different religions. As understood, writer uses positive references for Judaism after comparing it with the preceding religions because it is a monotheistic faith and has brought a complex moral system: "The importance of Israelites in history comes from the superiority of their religion amongst the preceding religions. By establishing the unity of God, this religion provided the basis of brotherhood and freedom for people."[636]

Another feature is the sympathetic style used in describing the prominence of the monotheistic religions in the eyes of their adherents. For this aim, religions are usually narrated by the excerpts from their sacred texts. For example, history of Israel is narrated through quotations from the Old Testament in the books of Emin Ali:

> Hebrews immigrated to Palestine from the vicinity of the Chaldeans in Abraham's time. The Lord had said to Abraham, "Leave your country, your people and your father's household and go to the land I will show you. I will make you into a great nation." Abraham, "Oh my God! I am a seventy years old man."[637]

In further lines, Emin Ali continues to quote the same book for narrating the births of Ishmael and Jacob, Joseph and miracles of the prophet Moses. In another history book, Christianity is also narrated through Christian verses without referring the Holy Bible:

> Christianity appeared in the time of Emperor Tiberius. Jesus inspired affection for God, affection for people, purity and justice, rewarding the good and

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[635] Ahmet Refik, *Çocuklara Tarih Bilgisi: Eskizamanlar. Türkler*, 5.ed., İstanbul: Hilmi Kitaphanesi, 1932, p. 27.
[636] Ali Reşat, *İlk Mekteplere Tarih Dersleri: Sınıf 4*, İstanbul: Türk Neşriyat Yurdu, 1931, p. 54.
[637] Emin Ali, *Umumi Tarih: Birinci Kitap – Eskizaman ve Ortazaman Başlangıcı,* İstanbul: Kanaat Kütüphanesi, 1930-1931, p. 84- 85.

punishing the bad. He was thirty years old. He toured Palestine. Followed by two poor fishermen, he went from town to town influencing pure hearts, healing the sick, submitting several additional miracles. They blamed Christ, the head of Jewish Religion, for being unreligious. They crucified him in front of the Abbot of Jerusalem.[638]

The third group consists of the textbooks which depict religions except Islam negatively either implicitly or explicitly. In this context, a history textbook by Abdülbaki and Sabri Esat could be given as an example. This must be hard for Christians to read these statements about their religion: "Christianity was corrupted in a very short period as it is a religion founded much later on Jesus' behalf after he arose."[639] Writers also adopt a negative approach towards Christianity in the following lines (at least towards its historical practices). Another example could be given from Emin Ali who glorifies Islam after comparing it with other religions:

> Before Islam, Jews also believed in a God, but this God was a local one always busy with the Jews either protecting them or punishing them. Christians believed in Jesus as the Creator of all people and universe, but envisioned him as a god with a father and a mother. Islam accepts God unfettered by time and space, impossible to be described by any kind of sculptures and pictures- He is the only God, creator of the universe, and the judge of humankind.[640]

Following this explanation, Emin Ali specifically emphasizes that the most "rational" religion is Islam in respect to the idea of Allah, Muhammad had provided.[641] A plethora of examples like this could be encountered in different history textbooks.

Different approaches towards religions could come up in different history textbooks notwithstanding they are written by the same author. For instance, Ahmet Refik adopts a relatively objective style to religion in one of his books; then he uses a language that is quite unfavorable in another book. This could be extended to almost all writers of history textbooks. As it will be elaborated in the next section, all writers depict Islam positively in a relatively homogeneous style.

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[638] *Tarih, I. Kitap*, İstanbul: Devlet Matbaası, 1929, p. 140-141. The same expressions exist in Ahmet Refik, *Umumi Tarih: Eskizamanlar ve Ortazamanlar*, İstanbul: Hilmi Kitaphanesi, 1929, p. 228

[639] Abdülbaki, Sabri Esat, *Yavrumun Tarih Kitabı: İlkmektep – Beşinci Sınıf*, İstanbul: Tefeyyüz Kitapanesi, 1930, p. 21-22.

[640] Emin Ali, *Umumi Tarih: İkinci Kitap – Ortazaman*, İstanbul: Kanaat Kütüphanesi, 1930-1931, p. 95-96.

[641] *ibid.* p. 96.

It should be noted that religion course textbooks which promise to provide information on different religions -as might be expected from the course title - are focusing extensively on Islam. Therefore, explanations about other religions could rarely be found in these textbooks. One of the most cardinal points is that there is a specific reminder in a few books about the tolerance a Muslim needs to show towards adherents of other religions. M. Ali Rıza can be quoted here for an example:

> Our religion commands us not to interfere in other's faiths. It is not a problem for us to like or work with those if they belong to a religion other than us or if their faith is not the same as ours. We have no right to interfere in their lives. Everybody is free to choose any religion, have religious creed, beliefs to any religion they admire. It is not good to accuse someone for anything if he is from another religion. Our Prophet says 'There is no force, pressure in religion.' Actually, our prophet did not try to change anybody's religion in his time.[642]

Although the same case is recited similarly by different textbooks, it should be noted that an affirmative language is used to explain the allegedly preponderance of Islam over other religions. An example could be given from one of Muallim Abdülbaki's books:

> There is nothing irrational in Islam. In Islam, there is no place for a prophet who is neither a God nor a man (Turk. "*Allah mıdır insan mıdır belli olmayan bir peygamberin*"), or for unimaginable strange stories like a thousand-tongued angels with golden wings like in Christianity. Prophet in Islam is a human being like you and me. Our holy book Qur'an is the words of God born into the heart of the Prophet.[643]

Here, on one hand writer is glorifying Islam, on the other hand he is sarcastically insulting the fundamentals of Christianity. As following examples are generally related to Islam; they will be elaborated in the following section.

When it comes to Islam, the different stance is obvious in the history and religion textbooks. In this part, depictions of Islam will be evaluated with examples from the books of both courses. First of all, I will start with a quantitative comparison of the space allocated to Islam and other religions in the textbooks. In all religion

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[642] M. Ali Rıza, *Cumhuriyet Mekteplerine Din Dersleri İkinci Kitap Sınıf 4*, İstanbul: Türk Neşriyat Yurdu, 1929-1930, p. 14-15.
[643] Muallim Abdülbaki, *Cumhuriyet Çocuğunun Din Dersleri – İlk Mektep, Beşinci Sınıf*, İstanbul: Tefeyyüz Kitaphanesi, 1929-1930, p. 84.

textbooks, Islamic issues are dominant compared to other religions. This difference in favor of Islam could also be encountered in all history textbooks. *Table 2* shows the number of pages allocated to different religions in three generic history textbook sets. As revealed below, the space allocated to Islam in the history textbooks is at least 4-5 times more extensive than others.

Table 2 – A Comparison of the Pages Allocated to Narration of Different Religions in the History Textbooks

	Judaism	**Christianity[644]**	**Islam[645]**
Ahmet Refik, *General History* (Volume 1 and 2)	9	10	70
Ali Reşat, *General History* (Volume 1 and 2)	8	18	117
Emin Ali, *General History* (Volume 1 and 2)	12	6	77

Another point about the difference is much more related to style. Indeed, Islam is presented in most of the books with a style/language that is often not used for describing other religions. Indeed, Islam is sometimes praised through comparison and sometimes, not necessarily through comparison, but absolutely in an affirmative/glorifying way. Additionally, this religion is narrated through the first singular/plural pronouns i.e. *I* or *we* in all religion books including also some history books.

As stated previously, the most detailed information about Islam is found in the religion textbooks. In one of his books, M. Ali Rıza highlights that these books are written mainly to teach Islam to the readers.[646] Remarkably in these books, the reader as well as the narrator is unconditionally acknowledged as Muslim. This is noticeably revealed in almost every religion textbook with the expressions such as

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[644] Here, I only count the pages focusing on the first period of Christianity, i.e. the period from the appearance of Christianity to the beginning of Middle Ages.
[645] Here, I only count the pages focusing on the first period of Islam, i.e. the period from the appearance of Islam to the time Turks converted to be Muslim.
[646] M. Ali Rıza, *Cumhuriyet Mekteplerine Din Dersleri İkinci Kitap Sınıf 4…*, p. 5.

"We are Muslim," "We, the Muslims," "our religion Islam," "We are grateful to Allah who created us as Muslims." Therefore, expressions used in these books are generally written from the first singular/plural pronouns and written in a style that attributes Islam positive references. In this context, as a continuation of the previous quote, M. Ali Rıza explains the grounds of teaching religion through these books in the following way: "As we are Muslims, we must learn Islam. Henceforward, we will understand how well our religion, how true our religion."[647]

In this part, I will provide more examples about the narration of religion and religious people. This may primarily begin with the definitions related to Islam. Diverse definitions and principles pertaining to Islam are quoted below from numerous religious studies textbooks:

> Islam is the last and is most accurate of religions. Our religion is the force that protects us from all the bad things.[648]
>
> Islam is the belief in God and the prophet who taught Muslimness to us. [649]
>
> Children you see, Islam is the easiest and the most accurate religion of all.[650]
>
> Islam has many essentials. The person who cannot perform these should not say he is a Muslim…
>
> Man gives damage to other people's property with his own hands; one cannot be Muslim if he is a thief, or breaking heart, lying or slandering.[651]
>
> Islam: believing in God and Prophet, having a decent character, doing what God and Prophet say, not doing what God and Prophet say, this is in brief who Muslim is.[652]
>
> Muslims are the most true and pure-hearted people.[653]

As given above, similar expressions about Islam could be found in all textbooks.. Meanwhile, expressions including Allah- the god of Islam-, Muhammad the Prophet,

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[647] *ibid.*

[648] M. Ali Rıza, *Cumhuriyet Mekteplerine Din Dersleri – Birinci Kitap, Sınıf 3*, İstanbul: Türk Neşriyat Yurdu, 1929, p. 15.

[649] Muallim Abdülbaki, *Cumhuriyet Çocuğunun Din Dersleri – Sınıf: 3*, İstanbul: Tefeyyüz Kitapanesi, 1930-31, p. 17.

[650] *ibid.* p. 21.

[651] Muallim Abdülbaki, *Cumhuriyet Çocuğunun Din Dersleri – Sınıf: 4,* İstanbul: Tefeyyüz Kitapanesi, 1929, p. 47.

[652] İbrahim Hilmi, *Türk Çocuğunun Din Kitabı: İlk Mektep Sınıf: 5*, İstanbul: Hilmi Kitaphanesi, 1929, p. 3.

[653] İbrahim Hilmi, *Türk Çocuğunun Din Kitabı: İlk Mektep Sınıf: 3*, İstanbul: Hilmi Kitaphanesi, 1930, p. 37.

and Holy Qur'an are recited in the same style.. It would also be appropriate to give some examples here:

> God "almighty" created us, this universe. Even we do not completely know how this happened. He is the great…
>
> God is the greatest power and strength who created us, heavens, places and everything. All the power and strength in everything is his strength, his power. God is everywhere, but exists without a place. His strength is everywhere, in everything we see.[654]
>
> God is the Creator of heavens and the earth, the sun and the stars, humans and animals, grasses and trees. He is God, the one and only; and there is none like him. Vision perceives him not, but He perceives [all] vision. God is the all-knowing, omniscient. He is the one who shows the right way to us, he is the one who protects us from evil.[655]
>
> God is not perceived with eyes, we cannot know his place, but God is the knower of everything, our thoughts, actions and what is in our heart.[656]
>
> To show the right way, God sent us the Holy Qur'an and Prophet. Our Prophet is the *Hazrati* Muhammad. Our book is the Holy Qur'an. These are right and true.[657]
>
> *Hazrati* Muhammad is the last and greatest prophet of all...
>
> All good manners collected in a man…how our beloved prophet comes to mind for all these lovely temperament. A bad habit could not be seen anyway.[658]
>
> Our Prophet has come to teach all people of good.[659]
>
> Holy Qur'an is the book of all Muslims. Holy Qur'an is the most valuable of all religious books it is sent by God to our Prophet. Holy Qur'an tells us which good things we will do, which bad things we shall not do.[660]

In the light of above quotations, it should be noted that a very positive and glorifying language is used for Islam and Islamic concepts in all the religion textbooks.

Likewise, when it comes to Islam, history textbooks also adopt an affirmative/glorifying style akin to those in the religion textbooks. Nevertheless, this style is different from the one used in the religion textbooks on two-fold. Firstly, "I/we-centred" narrative is not preferred in the narrations of Islam in some of the

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[654] Muallim Abdülbaki, *Cumhuriyet Çocuğunun Din Dersleri – Sınıf: 3…*, p. 17, 40.
[655] İbrahim Hilmi, *Türk Çocuğunun Din Kitabı: İlk Mektep Sınıf: 3…*, p. 22.
[656] *ibid.* p. 36.
[657] M. Ali Rıza, *Cumhuriyet Mekteplerine Din Dersleri – Birinci Kitap, Sınıf 3…*, p. 16.
[658] *ibid.* p. 26, 30.
[659] İbrahim Hilmi, *Türk Çocuğunun Din Kitabı: İlk Mektep Sınıf: 3…*, p. 24.
[660] *ibid.* p. 27.

books. Besides, in order to create rather an objective atmosphere, the name of Muhammad is generally used without the title *hazrati*. Except these two, some implicit or explicit expressions come up in many history books emphasizing that writer is both Muslim and gratifying Islam. It would be appropriate to refer to different examples here. In the following lines, statements which are exclusively revealing writers' Islamic leaning are highlighted by me:

> Muslims call God as *Cenab-ı Hakk* [The Glorious God].[661]

> Starting with [Hz. Muhammad's] invitation of the people to Islam, the *light* of Islam spread over the places other than Mecca.[662]

> *Hazrati* Ali is a *martyr*, killed by his enemies.[663]

> …[Muhammad] has tried to make Arabs who were worshipping idols [previously] believe in the oneness of God. He tried to show them the *right way*.

> The Old Testament is the book of Moses, the Bible is the book of Jesus, and Muhammad's book is the Qur'an. Qur'an was written on leather at first. At that time, Arabs did not have paper. Then, words were memorized by Hafizes, *no verse was forgotten*. Anything required to be a devoted Muslim was written in Qur'an. Qur'an taught people the God, to work, to be honest, to earn, to love each other, to believe in God's unity. It showed the superiority of literacy, ability to read and write over everything. Anything could be achieved by working, through knowledge. He says, "If the knowledge is in the Far East China, go and look for it." There is no difference between people, God created people equal: He said "Cleanliness is prerequisite for faith". He taught people to be loyal to truth, not to ignore each other's rights. *By this way, Islam spread over everywhere*.[664]

> *Resulu Ekrem… Hazrati* Muhammad received his first revelation from God when he was forty; He started preaching these revelations when he was forty three.[665]

> [Muhammad] heard some voices while he was retreating in a cave in the surrounding mountains for the night. Because it was dark and quiet, he could not guess from where these voices come. He thought in fear he would die. *A voice in his ear said "read!"* Muhammad, very excited, answered: "I cannot read!" It was repeated three times, and Gabriel revealed the first revelation *of Qur'anic verses*.[666]

> *Koran instructs the unity of God before everything. In Surat al-Ikhlāṣ "Say, Allah, the One and Only; He begetteth not, nor is He begotten; And there is none comparable unto Him." Thus, the basic principle of Islam is stated. In*

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[661] Ali Reşat, *İlk Mekteplere Tarih Dersleri: Sınıf 4…,* p. 95.
[662] *ibid.* p. 100.
[663] *ibid.* p. 103.
[664] Ahmet Refik, *Çocuklara Tarih Bilgisi: Eskizamanlar…,* p. 77-78.
[665] Ali Reşat, *Umumi Tarih – İkinci Cilt…,* p. 23.
[666] Emin Ali, *Umumi Tarih: İkinci Kitap – Ortazaman…,* p. 33.

Surat Al-Fatiha, the essential creed of Islam is stated as God is "The Creator, Owner, and Sustainer of the Worlds".[667]

The unity of God was the basis of new religion. God is everywhere. No statue of him could be built, no icon could be drawn. There are no idols, no priests between God and believers. Gambling and wine are strictly forbidden. Family is essential. One should be straight in every step. 'Education' and 'cleanliness' are pillars of Islam. Man is commanded to read and work from cradle to grave. Woman and man are equal in this regard.[668]

As these citations clearly demonstrate, there is an explicit inclination not only in the religion textbooks but also in the history textbooks that often assume Islam as the best/the highest of all religions. In this respect, it is also necessary to add that there is no trace of a positivist-materialist stance in the books yet- which will be one of the cardinal characteristics of the next period. With regard to the examples, the textbook writers of both courses give the impression that they have a positive attitude towards God as the metaphysical creator/power as well as towards basic religious beliefs. Aside from all the expressions discussed, all religion textbooks are opened with *besmele* (the name of Allah in Arabic or Turkish- with the Latin letters-). This could also be interpreted as an example for the pious stance of the textbook writers.

Another common feature history and religion textbooks of the period share in terms of their approach to Islam is that religious leaning is often overlapping with their leaning towards Turkish nationalism. In other words, Turkishness is usually associated with Islam; both components are often juxtaposed as complementary elements. This point will be handled in depth in the following sections.

When it comes to secularism, I could not find much about the detailed narrations of this principle in civics and history textbooks. A few history textbooks describe the historical evolution of secularism specifically in Turkish context as well as in the European. Be that as it may, this situation will be completely changed for these textbooks when the next two periods are going to be analyzed. Contrary to my expectations, it is the religion textbooks that extensively pontificate secularism. Indeed, when their devotedly Islamic position is considered, it is quite interesting to see such an emphasis on secularism in these books. Writers seem somehow adopt to

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[667] *ibid.* p. 95.
[668] Abdülbaki and Sabri Esat, *Yavrumun Tarih Kitabı: İlkmektep – Dördüncü Sınıf*, İstanbul: Tefeyyüz Kitapanesi, 1930, p. 109.

such an eclectic, even ambiguous situation. In this section, I mainly elaborate upon the inclinations with regard to secularism in the textbooks.

In religion textbooks, secularism is defined, briefly, as the separation of government institutions from religious institutions. This definition is supported basically by the approach that perceives religion relatively as a matter of "conscience;" i.e. a relationship between God and human being. Accordingly, it instills to act in accordance with the requirements and conditions of the mind in public life as well as in politics. For that reason, first and foremost, it is necessary to underline that writers are far away from denigrating secularism as being against religion or being without any religion. As touched upon above, they acclaim Islam as the true religion and categorize it as one of the social areas individuals is involved. In different religion textbooks, it is often indicated that Islam is not a religion against secularism, even it promotes secularism. The following expression of M. Ali Rıza in one of his books offers a good summary:

> In Islam, public activities are free from religious beliefs. In life, we perform activities influenced by time and necessities. Our religious faith is one and only, and not changed. For example, we always believe in God's unity and Muhammad. Our faith is not changed by time or by place.
>
> Our practices in daily life are different. People and nations make laws for their necessities and relations. Sometimes these laws are not enough. In war times, they make other laws, in peace times they need others. So sometimes you need to give and take money with rates. If you do these, you could be successful.
>
> Religion does not interfere in these. Religion shows us the essentials of faith that never change. It says: "your intention should be good, you should be honest, and you should not lie and behave unjust."
>
> These are the requirements we should behave right. However we will act differently when it comes to business...
>
> Religion never interferes in what people eat, what people wear. If there are those who say the opposite, they never understand Islam.
>
> For public activities, there are rules and laws. People make their own rules. Laws can be made by people in accordance with their requirements and needs. Our activities are governed by science and education.

Islam gives value to intelligence and education. Islam says world is governed by intelligence and education.[669]

In another book, an occasion from the prophet's life is recited in order to "show" that it is acclaimed by religion itself that public life should be separated from religious tenets:

> One day the Prophet, who has seen people vaccinating the palm tree, intended to say something like 'Don't do it like this, do it like this.' But, when he understood that they were doing it rightly so, then he said 'You know this better than me.' As you know, religion is one; public life is quite another.[670]

In the same context, an alleged to-do-list is presented under the concept of "true Islam" in the religion textbooks in order to justify the idea that secularism is one of the prerequisites of Islam. In this manner, the authors formulate, in a sense, the concept of "acceptable/official" Islam. This is best expressed in the phrase "Republican period is the very time when genuine Islam could be lived."[671] Based on samples and expressions presented usually in a similar manner in religion textbooks, I contend that various features attributed to Islam are articulated to justify secularism as following: it is forbidden in Islam to interfere in others' religion, belief and way of life or what they eat, drink, wear; bigotry/ignorance is not tolerated in Islam, instead, innovation, progress, and civilization are promoted; believers are encouraged not only to worship but also to fulfil their daily works; valuing reason and knowledge, getting rid of superstition; avoiding class and gender difference; and designating no one in-between Allah and his followers. As mentioned, these points come up in every religion textbook as issues highlighted when recounting what Islam is and is not.

On the other hand, the distinction between true and corrupted Islam is similarly referred under the narration of the historical development of secularism in Europe. Accordingly, to some history textbooks of the period, teachings of Christianity were corrupted in Middle Ages, bigotry/ignorance became widespread, religious priests

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[669] M. Ali Rıza, *Cumhuriyet Mekteplerine Din Dersleri – Üçüncü Kitap, Sınıf 5*, İstanbul: Türk Neşriyat Yurdu, 1929-30, p. 16-19.

[670] Muallim Abdülbaki, *Cumhuriyet Çocuğunun Din Dersleri – İlk Mektep Beşinci Sınıf…*, p. 90.

[671] Muallim Abdülbaki, *Cumhuriyet Çocuğunun Din Dersleri – Sınıf: 4…*, p. 48.

and the clergy corrupted religion for the sake of their own personal interests.[672] For this, writers give examples such as the pressure of the church on the people, anti-scientific and anti-progressive approaches of the church, the priests selling heaven's land, forgiving sins in return for money, living in primrose path with illegally gained wealth, and their claim on administrative authority. "This disgrace in church affairs", as stated by the writer, is considered as a case "which hurt true *believers*."[673] In this respect, it should be highlighted that reformist Calvin and Luther are enshrined vehemently in the same textbooks. In fact, writers are almost celebrating the consequences of reformation movements in Germany and France such as the translation of Bible to national languages, removal of the parts that seem like an extension of the ignorance and bigotry out of religion, and recognition of no need for a mediator between God and his followers. Thus, they contend that the genuine Christianity was understood sooner or later: "Believers of Pope, worshippers of idols and icons are not real Christians. They are Pagans. *Genuine Christian's* salvation is there in the cleanliness of his heart, goodness of his conscience and purity of his faith."[674]

Writers posit similar stance in narrating the shift from the notion of Caliphate authority and the declaration of secularism in the Republican Era. As commonly seen in the history books, caliphate is depicted as a governmental system that has actually no root in Islam with the authority passing from father to son. The authors present evidences that even the Prophet Muhammad, as the head of the state, did not inform his followers about who would succeed him later. Therefore, the caliphs succeeding him were elected. What is more, the period of four Caliphs was reported as a kind of "republican" regime by a historian.[675] In view of that, deterioration of the system of the Caliphate was appropriated to Umayyad leaders -especially to Muawiyah. It is stated that within this period, an "absolutely, arbitrary and despotic" administration[676] "just like the Pope's"[677]; and "debauchery and immorality"

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[672] For example see. Abdülbaki, Sabri Esat, *Yavrumun Tarih Kitabı: İlkmektep – Beşinci Sınıf…*, p. 21-23, 32; Emin Ali, *Umumi Tarih: Üçüncü Kitap – Yenizamanlar ve Yakınzamanlar…*, p. 51-53, 57; Abdülbaki and Sabri Esat, *Yavrumun Tarih Kitabı: İlkmektep – Dördüncü Sınıf…*, p. 115-116.

[673] Emin *Ali, Umumi Tarih: Üçüncü Kitap – Yenizamanlar ve Yakınzamanlar*, İstanbul: Kanaat Kütüphanesi, 1930, p. 53. Italics made by me.

[674] *ibid.* p. 57. Italics made by me.

[675] Emin Ali, *Umumi Tarih: İkinci Kitap – Ortazaman…*, p. 97.

[676] *ibid.* p. 97-98.

extensively amongst the rulers of the Muslim Empire[678] began to emerge. In the history books, it is written that the Caliphate brought no gain for the Ottoman Empire. Hence, revolutionary reforms of the Republic such as closure of religious covenants and dervish lodges, abandoning superstitions, adoption of Western laws, secularism, laws on attire, and promotion of women's participation in social life are manifested as extremely positive steps.

Although positive references to secularism are encountered in all of the books, Muslims are advised particularly in the religion textbooks to live their everyday life-aside from religious practices- as commanded by religion. According to some, this crux could be a clear ambiguity. Indeed, all religious instruction textbooks have several expressions that God's commandments, provisions from Qur'an, Prophet's life and his words should necessarily be taken as the basic reference/legitimacy for all Muslims. Considering that these religious sources contain not only prayers but also private/daily life rules including politics, there is not a clear distinction for a good Muslim to separate religious rules and teachings from his daily activities and decisions. Another nodal point to support this claim is that religion and ethics are juxtaposed as identical concepts in the religion textbooks in a way as if they are inseparable; as if religious is ethical, ethical is religious.[679]

Such an inclination inevitably invokes an attitude that would evaluate almost all human behavior (even intending to serve the purposes of this life) through the lenses of religious provisions. Thus in all religion textbooks, writers articulate religious ground/legitimacy to all human behaviors accepted as ideal ranging from being clean, not drinking alcohol, showing respect for the opinions of others, working, being civilized to loving one's homeland. In this respect, one of the most remarkable examples could be given from İbrahim Hilmi. He mentions in his book that "religion and daily activities should indeed be separated"[680] and then he writes in the next page "it is a religious duty to obey the laws of government."[681] In the following lines, writer describes tasks/duties of the people against the government in detail such as

[677] Abdülbaki and Sabri Esat, *Yavrumun Tarih Kitabı: İlkmektep – Beşinci Sınıf…*, p. 34.
[678] Ali Reşat, *Umumî Tarih İkinci Cilt*, İstanbul: Kanaat Kütüphanesi, 1929, p. 56.
[679] İbrahim Hilmi, *Türk Çocuğunun Din Kitabı: İlk Mektep Sınıf: 4*, İstanbul: Hilmi Kitaphanesi, 1930, p. 9, 21.
[680] İbrahim Hilmi, *Türk Çocuğunun Din Kitabı: İlk Mektep Sınıf: 5…*, p. 21-22.
[681] *ibid.* p. 23.

"listening to all the commandments of the government", "obeying laws," "paying taxes," "fulfilling military service duty," "voting," and "making sacrifices for the homeland."[682] He further notes that "our religion clearly stressed that Muslims who neglect their deeds; not performing their [public] duties accurately will never be forgiven and regarded as sinful."[683] As this example apparently shows, it will not be an exaggeration to contend that textbook writers of the period are considerably confused about the principle of secularism.

4.3. Nation and Nationalism in the Textbooks

After the discussion about religion and secularism in the preceding section, it is crucial to overlook briefly how concepts related with nationalism are described in various textbooks. While formal definitions about nationalism and nation mainly exist in the civics and sociology textbooks; it can be said that history and religion textbooks are also abound in material.

First and foremost, I observe that a consensus is reached over the definition of nation in civics and sociology textbooks. In view of this consensus, a nation is reflected to consist of people who "speak the same language," "share the same feelings," "have common cultural characteristics," and "are centered around the same objectives, desires, or interests."[684] This definition draws attention to a shared culture instead of concepts such as race, common ancestry/ethnicity or land (territory).[685] In this regard, formal definition of nation in the textbooks could be considered as an outcome of a "cultural," "Eastern," or "romantic" type of nationalism.

However, there are some textbook writers who add "race"[686] notion in the conceptualization of nation, who elucidate nation covering "racial unity"[687], or who recount "racial/physical properties" of various communities in details. The following

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[682] *ibid.* p. 23-24.
[683] *ibid.* p. 24.
[684] Ali Kami, *Yurt Bilgisi – İlk Mektep Beşinci Sınıf*, İstanbul: Hilmi Kitaphanesi, 1931-32, p. 11; Mehmet Emin, *Yurt Bilgisi*, İstanbul: Kanaat Kütüphanesi, 1930, p. 15; Mitat Sadullah, *Yeni Yurt Bilgisi – Sınıf: 5*, İstanbul: Tefeyyüz Kitaphanesi, 1929, p. 14; Muallim Abdülbaki, *Yurt Bilgisi: Sınıf 5*, İstanbul: Türk Neşriyat Yurdu, 1927-28, p. 24; Mehmet İzzet, *İçtimaiyat…*, p. 146-152.
[685] Mehmet Emin is the only writer who added the notion of living on the same land apart from these features. See Mehmet Emin, *Yurt Bilgisi…*, p. 16.
[686] Ali Kami, *Yurt Bilgisi – İlk Mektep Beşinci Sınıf…*, p. 11.
[687] İbrahim Hilmi, *Türk Çocuğunun Din Kitabı: İlk Mektep Sınıf 3…*, p. 40.

quote from a history textbook describing the racial characteristics of the ancient Egyptians is an interesting example for this approach:

> Egypt's first inhabitants are Mediterranean peoples with long skulls. This people contain also the Sami society in Asia. Later, mountain people with round skulls came to Egypt. From this mix, a tall, broad-shouldered, chubby-faced race appeared.
>
> They are white-skinned, but sun-tanned. They do not have curly hair. They shave their hair and beard. Egyptians is a race different than Arabs or Afro-Americans. They are closer to Europeans.[688]

It appears that the most reasonable explanation about racial unity is made by Mehmet Emin who writes that a pure race cannot be found today since all communities were mixed with each other in time. However writer contends that individuals in a nation share the common belief/feeling "that they are of the same race" or "that they come from the same lineage."[689] Therefore, writer emphasizes the fact that this unity is a shared collective imagination or belief rather than a truth, as most of the contemporary anthropologists do.

Accordingly, it can be said that there are different strands in textbooks ranging from cultural nationalism composed of shared feelings and common language to ethnocentrism and even to racism which was a rising trend in Europe at that time. This plethora is compatible with the findings of several authors including Yıldız and Bora who point out the shift in the conceptualization of nationalism in the Early Republican era.

In addition, it should also be noted pertinent to my research that religion is not considered as one of the cultural elements that determine nation formally in any civics textbooks. However, there are clear marks that religion is seen as one of the main components of the nation both in religion textbooks as well as in many history textbooks. This point will be examined in detail later when I tackle exclusively with the relationship between nationalism and religion in the next section.

A remarkable point is that nation is conceptualized as a "perennial/primordial" phenomenon at least specifically for Turks. An assessment about this will be given in

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[688] Ali Reşat, *Umumi Tarih, Lise Kitapları: 1. Sınıf*, İstanbul: Devlet Matbaası, 1929, p. 5.
[689] Mehmet Emin, *Yurt Bilgisi…*, p. 17.

the following paragraphs when I analyze the narration of Turkishness.. Still, even some communities of the pre-modern era are recounted as nations. Therefore, as there is no explanation otherwise, it can be said that nations are considered as perennial/primordial facts in the textbooks of the period. Another nodal issue is the idea of essentiality -parallel to primordiality- in the definition of some nations' (unchanging) characteristics. Indeed, statements such as "Turks' innate/essential nature"[690] or "be thankful to God for creating us Turkish"[691] can be given as examples to support this viewpoint.

Nevertheless, one exception in this period is Mehmet Izzet who gripped the nations as the structures constructed by means of a particular social will.[692] His depiction of the continuing existence of a social contract[693] seems to be influenced by the ideas of –however not naming them- J.J. Rousseau for his definition of society in general, and Ernest Renan. Indeed, both were well-known in Turkey at that time. Moreover, Renan specifically defined the nations as "daily plebiscites."[694] Still, no matter what, this example should be kept in mind as an exceptional case -even for the intellectual history of Turkey- which undoubtedly defined nation as a constructed structure.

The only textbook that defined nationalism formally in the era was also Izzet's book. For him, the concept is simply defined as "the feeling, love, or longing that one senses for his nation."[695] In more detail, he describes nationalism as an "ideal… which postulates nation with its race, language, character and political organization to be a perfect and harmonious body within the civilization."[696] According to writer, builders of nations are mainly the individuals who, as mentioned above, come together around this ideal.[697]

On the other hand, it is possible to find some information regarding the historical development of nationalism in the history textbooks of the period. In this regard, they usually depict nation as a perennial phenomenon and nationalism as a modern

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[690] Ahmet Refik, *Umumi Tarih: Eskizamanlar ve Ortazamanlar…*, p. 90.
[691] M. Ali Rıza, *Cumhuriyet Mekteplerine Din Dersleri – Birinci Kitap, Sınıf 3…,*, p. 15.
[692] Mehmet İzzet, *İçtimaiyat…*, p. 152.
[693] *ibid.* p. 152.
[694] Ernest Renan, "What is a Nation?" [1882], in Eley, Geoff and Suny, Ronald Grigor, (ed.s), *Becoming National: A Reader*, New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996, p. 41-55.
[695] Mehmet İzzet, *İçtimaiyat…*, p. 152.
[696] *ibid.*
[697] *ibid.*

ideology. Indeed, they took nineteenth century as the period for the birth and spread of nationalism. The following excerpt presents a summary of the views on this subject in the history textbooks:

> In the nineteenth century, the nationhood feeling/consciousness emerged and became an important factor in the destiny of history. The personality and benefits of rulers were disappearing, instead the will and desire of nations replaced them. For this reason, that century was called as the century of nationhood.
>
> Nationhood appeared in politics as two folds. Either, nations living under the reign of different states came together to design their states and future; or they managed to design their future under a different nation.[698]

Within this context, Mehmet İzzet also indicates that Italians were the first of those who were caught up in the feelings of nationalism; they were, later, followed by the British and German.[699]

It is obvious that Turkish nationalism and Turks/Turkishness are paramount concerns in all textbooks of the period. Indeed, all subjects related to history, sociology, civics or religion, are explained with reference to Turkishness and somehow, in relation to Turks. As emphasized in the previous chapters, this stance could be contended as a typical example of the connection between the nation-state and education (textbooks) -even today. In this context, I will try to examine through textbooks how the term Turk is defined by the characteristics, references and "official" meanings attributed to Turkishness.

First and foremost, it would be appropriate to look at the density/weight of various parts reserved for Turks in the history textbooks in order to draw a quantitative picture. At least five out of 30 history textbooks taught in this period are written specifically on the Turks. These are *Türkiye Tarihi* (1923) and *Milli Tarih* (1924) by Köprülüzade Mehmed Fuad (M. Fuad Köprülü); *Türk Medeniyeti Tarihi* (1924/1925) by Ziya Gökalp; *Türkiye Tarihi* (1924) by Hamit (Ongunsu) and Muhsin (Eker); and *Çocuklara Türk İstiklal Harbi* (1929) by Ahmet Refik (Altınay).

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[698] Emin Ali, *Umumi Tarih: Üçüncü Kitap – Yenizamanlar ve Yakınzamanlar*, İstanbul: Kanaat Kütüphanesi, 1930, p. 247.
[699] Mehmet İzzet, *İçtimaiyat…*, p. 151-152.

Besides, it is observed that a large portion of the pages are allocated to Turks in the history books apart from above mentioned books. To give examples from a few books on this subject; the number of pages allocated to history of Turks (72 pages) in Ahmet Refik's book entitled *Çocuklara Tarih Bilgisi: Eskizamanlar, Türkler*, is almost equal to number of total pages allocated to the other communities (70 pages). In Ali Reşat's *İlk Mekteplere Tarih Dersleri: Sınıf 4*, I was able to count 100 pages that are allocated to Turks vis-à-vis 82 pages allocated to all other communities except Turks. This stance appears in the other history textbooks of the period as well. However, an exceptional case is observed in the first volume of three-volume high school history series. In each book by three writers (Ahmet Refik, Ali Reşat ve Emin Ali), I was able to count 10-20 pages that are allocated to Turks in the first volumes where the world history is narrated beginning from the first century to middle ages. (Each book has 300 pages; some of them more than that number.) Relatedly, more places are allocated to history of Turks in the second and third volumes.

At this stage, it is appropriate to elaborate on the qualitative side of the narrative about Turks. In this context, Turks are described in almost all history textbooks as a perennial community, as one of the oldest nations of history.[700] Still, no books give an exact date about the appearance of Turks in the history except Fuad Köprülü, for whom Huns set foot in this scene in the 3rd century BC.[701] All books describe Central Asia as the oldest homeland of Turks. Besides, there are writers referring to this region specifically as *"Turan"* or *"Turfan."*[702] Ahmet Refik describes the region inhabited by Turks in detail; there is "Siberia in the north, Manchuri and China in the east and China, Tibet and Iran in the south and Caspian Sea in the west."[703]

Yet in many books, there is not enough information except for a small number of accounts based on Chinese sources about the history of ancient Turks inhabiting this region. Accordingly, the first states in the region founded by Turks were *Hsiung-nu*

[700] For examples see. Ahmet Refik, *Umumi Tarih: Eskizamanlar ve Ortazamanlar…*, p. 89; Ali Reşat, *İlk Mekteplere Tarih Dersleri: Sınıf 4…*, p. 83; Ali Reşat, *Umumi Tarih, Lise Kitapları: 1. Sınıf…*, p. 97; Emin Ali, *Umumi Tarih: 1. Kitap…*, p. 160;
[701] Fuad Köprülü, *Türkiye Tarihi*, (Eds.) M. Hanefi Palabıyık, Ankara: Akçağ Yayınları, 2005 [1923] p. 75.
[702] Ziya Gökalp, *Türk Medeniyeti Tarihi…*, p. 334; Ahmet Refik, *Umumi Tarih: Eskizamanlar ve Ortazamanlar…*, p. 91; Ahmet Refik, *Çocuklara Tarih Bilgisi: Eskizamanlar. Türkler…*, p. 80.
[703] Ahmet Refik, *Çocuklara Tarih Bilgisi: Eskizamanlar. Türkler…*, p. 71.

(Hun), *T'u-chüeh* (*Tukiyu*) and Uygur States.[704] In the same books, it is expressed that Central Asia which is once a fertile land, drought with climate change; this, however, forced a large population of Turks to go in search of new lands towards the West for their survival.

Different stories are told about the origin of the name "Turk" in the history textbooks of the period. According to one of older Eastern legends Ali Reşat narrates, the name Turk could emanate from a son of Japheth (Noah's son); and was turned probably by Chinese to *Tukiyu*.[705] Ahmet Refik and Fuad Koprulu also state that *Tukiyu* is the first community to use the name Turk in history.[706]

Another crux about Turks is the question of race that they belong. It is seen that different answers were given to this question in the history textbooks of the period. In *Türk Medeniyeti Tarihi* (1924/1925) written by Ziya Gökalp in the early years of the period, race is associated with physical features such as "a long or flat skull, light brown or black hair, a beard and a moustache."[707] Writer, with reference to anthropologist Eugéne Pittard, states that Turk is an independent race (i.e. Turkish race).[708] Gökalp contends that Turks do not belong to Ural-Altaic race and their relationship with Mongolian, Tungus, Samoyed, Finova and Hungarian community is not a racial but rather a political and civil one.[709] Still, there are various explanations about the racial origins of Turks in the textbooks. M. Fuad states that Turks have been accepted as members of the yellow race up until now however they are more likely to be associated with Caucasians in line with recent researches. For him, any similarity with the above-mentioned communities may have originated from the crossbreeding over time.[710] Nonetheless, Ahmet Refik claims that Turks are from *Turanî* (*Turanlı*) or Ural-Altaic communities, and they were named after this region they lived in. Besides, he writes that with this name they were separated from

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[704] *ibid.*, p. 71-76; Ahmet Refik, *Umumi Tarih: Eskizamanlar ve Ortazamanlar…*, p. 89-99; Ali Reşat, *İlk Mekteplere Tarih Dersleri: Sınıf 4…*, p. 83-99; Ali Reşat, *Umumi Tarih, Lise Kitapları: 1. Sınıf…*, p. 95-119; Abdülbaki and Sabri Esat, *Yavrumun Tarih Kitabı: İlkmektep – Dördüncü Sınıf…*, p. 84-103; *Tarih, I. Kitap…*,p. 61-70; Fuad Köprülü, *Türkiye Tarihi…*, p. 73-86.
[705] Ali Reşat, *Umumi Tarih, Lise Kitapları: 1. Sınıf…*, p. 99, 106.
[706] Ahmet Refik, *Umumi Tarih: Eskizamanlar ve Ortazamanlar…*, p. 93; Fuad Köprülü, *Türkiye Tarihi…*, p. 78.
[707] Ziya Gökalp, *Türk Medeniyeti Tarihi…*, p. 335-336.
[708] *ibid.*
[709] *ibid,* p. 336.
[710] Fuad Köprülü, *Türkiye Tarihi…*, p. 59.

the European nations Aryan, Semitic, and Hindu.[711] In another book, Ahmet Refik reiterates his claim that the Turks are members of the race called *Turanlilar*.[712] Sharing the same opinion, Ali Reşat also states that Turks belong to the family of Ural-Altaic language and race family. Writer recounts Mongols, Manchus, Hungarians and also Finns as the other members of this family.[713]

On the other hand, Abdülbaki and Sabri Esat give an explicit description of physical appearance of Turks: "Ancient Turks were short, big-shouldered and strong men. Their cheekbones were sharp, their beard was rare."[714] Ali Reşat's description is a more detailed one:

> They had a sharp face with a large forehead, sharp chin. They had black hair, rare beard, dark brown skin, black eyes with black eyebrows, and eyelids in the almond shape. This big round head was placed in-between a fat neck and two big shoulders. The body was heavy, low and short. Legs were thin compared to body shorter just as in the tribes living their lives on horses. The height was short, rarely above. They were short people who shook the world.[715]

In the light of above quotations, I contend that it is a prevalent trend to include racial factors for defining Turkishness in the textbooks of this period. However, it should be noted again that this arguments moving around an ethnicist (Turk. *soycu*) line usually eluding the racist argument about inferiority-superiority of races.

Relatedly, depiction of Turkishness of Janissaries almost acts as a litmus-test-issue in revealing writers' ethnicist leaning in history textbooks of the period. In this respect, it is not enough for many writers to call Janissaries Turkish as they were not descended from the Turkish origin and converted to Turkish after intensive training (assimilation) over time.[716] Indeed, these writers emphasize Christianity of Janissaries whereas they emphasize "pure" Turkishness of *sipahi*s and Anatolian people. "*Devsirme children* were educated in Enderun… [while] *Turkish children*

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[711] Ahmet Refik, *Umumi Tarih: Eskizamanlar ve Ortazamanlar…*, p. 91.
[712] Ahmet Refik, *Umumi Tarih (Lise Kitapları: I. Sınıf)*, 3.b., İstanbul: Devlet Matbaası, 1929, p. 291.
[713] Ali Reşat, *İlk Mekteplere Tarih Dersleri: Sınıf 4…*, p. 87.
[714] Abdülbaki and Sabri Esat, *Yavrumun Tarih Kitabı: İlkmektep – Dördüncü Sınıf…*, p. 88
[715] Ali Reşat, *Umumi Tarih, Lise Kitapları: 1. Sınıf…*, p. 99.
[716] For examples see Ahmet Refik, *Umumi Tarih: Eskizamanlar ve Ortazamanlar…*, p. 119-120; Ali Reşat, *İlk Mekteplere Tarih Dersleri: Sınıf 5…*, p. 175; Abdülbaki and Sabri Esat, *Yavrumun Tarih Kitabı: İlkmektep – Dördüncü Sınıf…*, p. 142.

were educated in madrasah"[717] is a statement that belongs to Ahmet Refik who frequently expresses his dismay in different books of the period. He also notes "Greeks in Anatolia were sent to Greece, Turks in Greece was brought to Turkey."[718] In a condition where Greeks going from Anatolia could not speak Greek and many Turks coming from Greece could not speak Turkish, Ahmet Refik prefers to ignore language as a point of reference for national belonging. Instead, he calls those people by referring to their descent lines. The strongest statements related to ethnicism are found in the books of Abdülbaki and Esat:

> Narrating the last days of Kanuni's reign: "Sultan collaborated with his converted (Turk. *dönme*) wife and degenerated (Turk. *soysuz*) Grand Vizier in strangling his son before his eyes to make this woman's son heir to the throne."
>
> The generation from these sultans having relationships with women who are foreigners and not from our descendants is poor like their health.[719]

As these examples clearly demonstrate, it is relatively widespread among history textbook writers of the period that their understanding of nation is based on an ethnic origin/ancestry- not in the form of a systematic racism- rather than on cultural factors. As noted in the preceding section, for them, blood relationship is essential for a nation; as shared language alone is not enough to be Turkish. The only exception I have encountered is Emin Ali who writes that "Janissaries' education was so important; their image was so strong that Janissaries would have forgotten their breed and religion and be pure Muslim and Turkish."[720]

Another emphasis pertaining to Turks in the books is that "essential/natural" qualifications are attributed to enshrine this community. I have encountered such merits attributed to Turkish community as very "brave," "helpful," "strong," "warrior/hero," "decent/honest," "keeping his words," "respecting elderly," "independent-minded," and "fair."[721] Besides, militarism is stressed in many

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[717] Ahmet Refik, *Çocuklara Tarih Bilgisi: Eskizamanlar. Türkler…*, p. 120; Ahmet Refik, *Çocuklara Tarih Bilgisi: Orta, Yeni ve Yakınzamanlar…*, p. 96.

[718] Ahmet Refik, *Çocuklara Tarih Bilgisi: Eskizamanlar. Türkler…*, p. 138.

[719] Abdülbaki and Sabri Esat, *Yavrumun Tarih Kitabı: İlkmektep – Dördüncü Sınıf…*, p. 132-133.

[720] Emin Ali, *Umumi Tarih: Üçüncü Kitap – Yenizamanlar ve Yakınzamanlar…*, p. 147.

[721] See examples. Ahmet Refik, *Çocuklara Tarih Bilgisi: Eskizamanlar. Türkler…*, p. 81; İbrahim Hilmi, *Türk Çocuğunun Din Kitabı: İlk Mektep Sınıf: 5…*, p. 56; Mitat Sadullah, *Yeni Yurt Bilgisi – Sınıf: 5*, İstanbul: Tefeyyüz Kitaphanesi, 1929, p. 14-15; Abülbaki and Sabri Esat, *Yavrumun Tarih Kitabı – İlk Mektep Dördüncü Sınıf…*, p. 81, 88, 98; Emin Ali, *Umumi Tarih: İkinci Kitap – Ortazaman…*, p. 158; M. Ali Rıza, *Cumhuriyet Mekteplerine Din Dersleri Birinci Kitap Sınıf 3…*, p. 22.

textbooks of the period as one of the leading merits appropriated to Turks. It is also stated in a remarkable quote:

> Military service is esteemed by Turks. They would consider dying in the battlefield as a great honor as it is a shame to die in bed because of an illness. As a famous saying goes "Man is born at home, dies in the battlefield."[722]

Moreover, not only in the history but also in the civics and religion textbooks, there are expressions praising military service and stressing that lives of each Turk is owed to this country.[723] As far as the political and historical conditions of the period are considered, Alkan's argument about the predominant militarist discourse in the preceding period (Union and Progress) seems common and applicable for the textbooks of this period as well. The reasons for this continuity could be argued on the basis of fresh memories of the First World War and Independence War; the feeling of distrust towards international communities as if there is a forthcoming war at the door; the intellectual/ideological perspective of elites rooted in their military past; and the fascist political wave surrounding the West.

Another nodal emphasis about Turks is the claim that they have been a very "civilized" community since the beginning of their history. As Turkish tribes were living originally nomadic; they were civilized in the beginning and brought their civilization to where they spread out over time.[724] Most of the authors assume that this civilization was unique to Turks. It is also expressed in many books that Turks managed to preserve most of their customs even though they came in contact with different communities in the places where they immigrated.[725]

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[722] Ahmet Refik, *Çocuklara Tarih Bilgisi: Eskizamanlar. Türkler…*, p. 81.

[723] See examples. Abülbaki and Sabri Esat, *Yavrumun Tarih Kitabı – İlk Mektep Dördüncü Sınıf…*, p. 57; Ali Reşat, *Umumi Tarih, Lise Kitapları: 1. Sınıf…*, p. 103; *Tarih, II. Kitap…*, p. 47; Ali Kami, *Yurt Bilgisi – İlk Mektep Beşinci Sınıf…*, p. 11-12, 109; İbrahim Hilmi, *Türk Çocuğunun Din Kitabı: İlk Mektep Sınıf: 5…*, p. 24; Muallim Abdülbaki, *Cumhuriyet Çocuğunun Din Dersleri – 4…*, p. 53.

[724] See examples. Mitat Sadullah, *Yeni Yurt Bilgisi – Sınıf: 5*, İstanbul: Tefeyyüz Kitaphanesi, 1929, p. 14; Muallim Abdülbaki, *Yurt Bilgisi - Atatürk Dönemi Ders Kitabı*, 2.b., İstanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, 2007 [1927-28], p. 25; Ahmet Refik, *Çocuklara Tarih Bilgisi: Eskizamanlar. Türkler…*, p. 80; Ali Reşat, *İlk Mekteplere Tarih Dersleri: Sınıf 4…*, p. 85-86; *Tarih, II. Kitap*, İstanbul: Devlet Matbaası, 1929, p. 24; Muallim Abdülbaki, *Cumhuriyet Çocuğunun Din Dersleri – Sınıf: 4…*, p. 69; İbrahim Hilmi, *Türk Çocuğunun Din Kitabı: İlk Mektep Sınıf: 5…*, p. 67.

[725] See examples. Ahmet Refik, *Çocuklara Tarih Bilgisi: Eskizamanlar. Türkler…*, p. 80; Ali Reşat, *İlk Mekteplere Tarih Dersleri: Sınıf 4…*, p. 85, 94-95; Ali Reşat, *Umumî Tarih, Lise Kitapları: I. Sınıf...*, p. 97-98; Abdülbaki and Sabri Esat, *Yavrumun Tarih Kitabı: İlkmektep – Dördüncü Sınıf…*, p. 89, 91-92.

However, there is no official definition pertaining to civilization. In other words, it is not clear from writers' accounts what they understand from the concept of civilization in the textbooks. For example, Ali Reşat expresses that Turks have their own civilization in his remark about what they left behind was "large and magnificent buildings, sculptures, embroideries, books, and works of all sorts."[726] It can be argued here that writer accepts civilization akin to culture. In a similar vein, another example for the culture-civilization identification appears when Abdülbaki and Sabri Esat narrate as "Turks never forgot their nationalities, languages and customs"[727] as an extension of their civilization. Also in the books of Hamit and Muhsin, they assume that these concepts are identical: "Byzantine, Persian and Arab culture or civilizations were not anything else other than manifestations of Orient or more precisely various Asian civilizations."[728] In the light of similar examples, it can be claimed that writers, mainly, believed these two concepts are identical, or at least they are inclusionary.

Ziya Gökalp, an important figure of civilization-culture discussions in Turkey, is the only one who defined the concepts specifically. According to Gökalp, culture is simply a nation's unique (national) characteristics; while, civilization is the sum of characteristics shared by different nations.[729] However, this binary opposition is best described by the "body-soul" analogy used by writer himself. For him, a nation's inner (i.e., spiritual) and unique features that create its (national) culture are permanent. On the contrary, ideas, institutions and practices that constitute the outer (i.e., the body, material) side of a nation are adopted over time. Accordingly, for him, this side about civilization tends to change depending on circumstances.[730] Relatedly, Gökalp defends that every nation has a unique culture/soul; meanwhile civilization is international and pluralist.[731] Gökalp takes nation and national as spiritual phenomena. He also states that it is very hard to see and understand the feelings that constitute national culture because they are inner and intimate.[732]

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[726] Ali Reşat, *İlk Mekteplere Tarih Dersleri: Sınıf 4…*, p. 94-95.
[727] Abdülbaki and Sabri Esat, *Yavrumun Tarih Kitabı: İlkmektep – Dördüncü Sınıf…*, p. 91-92.
[728] Hamit and Muhsin, *Türkiye Tarihi*, Ankara: Maarif Vekaleti, 1930, p. 468.
[729] Ziya Gökalp, *Türk Medeniyeti Tarihi…*, p. 326-327.
[730] *ibid.* p. 327.
[731] *ibid.* p. 325.
[732] *ibid.* p. 327.

In addition to this, Gökalp distinguishes *medeniyet* (civilization) from *medenîlik* (civility). According to him, even "primitive" communities have their own civilization; however civility belongs to nations which have reached a maturity/perfectness.[733] In other words, civilization for Gökalp, in a sense, is the most advanced, most developed state of a nation.

After this conceptualization, Gökalp expresses three different civilization cycles Turks have gone through in the history: pre-Islamic as the first period; the transition from Islam to Western civilization as the middle period; and from Western civilization to present as the new period.[734] In brief, Gökalp is the one who presented definition of civilization in detail amongst textbook writers of the period. He seems to be advocating different ideas from the widespread opinions present in this era, as the other writers generally use civilization and culture synonymously in the examples I have come across.

It is striking to come across with an emphasis on the contention that "Turks have been a civilized community since the ancient times" in a period when the "Turkish History Thesis" has not been developed yet. The claim about the essential civility of Turks in the textbooks can be taken as an indication of a considerable discussion among the writers of the period on "barbarian" image of Turks in the West. Definitely, it is reminded irrelevantly everywhere even in the religious textbooks of the period that civility is as one of the natural merits of Turks and children must always remember this fact throughout their lives.

After discussing how official nationalist ideology defined Turks and Turkishness through the textbooks, it would be appropriate to elaborate how homeland which is one of the prominent elements of nationalist terminology is explained in the civics textbooks. Firstly, all civics textbook writers agree upon the criteria of homeland. According to them, homeland is the place where a nation lives, their ancestors' graves and works exist, the same language is spoken, and the nation's flag waves.[735] In this regard, the idea of Anatolia as the "motherland of Turks", where the ancient

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[733] *ibid.* p. 325.
[734] *ibid.* p. 326.
[735] Mitat Sadullah, *Yeni Yurt Bilgisi – Sınıf 5…*, p. 15-16; Ali Kami, *Yurt Bilgisi – İlk Mektep Beşinci Sınıf…*, p. 107-108; Mehmet Emin, *Yurt Bilgisi…*, p. 16; Muallim Abdülbaki, *Yurt Bilgisi…*, p. 24-25.

Turks from Central Asia came and settled extensively over time, is followed by a three-fold legitimization process in the books of the period.

The first strand consists of the emphasis that this land was richer and more fertile than Central Asia; thus, there was no other way for Turks other than to migrate and settle here. For this, in some of the history textbooks of the period, a detailed comparison is made between two regions emphasizing that Anatolia was almost a "paradise" compared to Central Asia.[736] Their common point is the allegation that Central Asia became an infertile land by time on the other hand Anatolia was a very fertile habitat in terms of climate, vegetation and natural resources. This quotation can be given as an example:

> Anatolia was very different than Central Asia. There were fertile lands, vineyards and orchards. The weather was fairly good. Green fields for sheep, large fields for cultivation.
>
> In Central Asia, there are hot desserts. Men live hardly there. There is not sea surrounding it. Therefore, people cannot take and sell their harvests to other countries. Roads are limited. Anatolia is not like this. She is surrounded by three seas. One can do shipping there. One can have relations with other countries, buy and sell and be rich there. One can make ships out of woods in her forests, own mines.[737]

The second strand in justification of Anatolia as the homeland of the Turks is based upon statements about Turkification of the land/territory in the course of time. An example could be given here from a book by Ali Resat:

> Turks settled in Anatolia long before Seljuks. Three thousand years before, Koman Turks established a state there, surrounding their cities with great walls.
>
> Later, when Muslim Turks were serving Abbasids army, they came to Tarsus, Adana and made this land a Turkish one.
>
> In this regard, some parts of Anatolia became Turkish long before Seljuks arrived.[738]
>
> The reign of the Anatolian Seljuk Empire lasted two hundred and fifty years and they made this territory a land of Turks…[739]

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[736] See Ali Reşat, *İlk Mekteplere Tarih Dersleri: Sınıf 4…*, p. 84-85; Ahmet Refik, *Çocuklara Tarih Bilgisi: Eskizamanlar. Türkler…*, p. 72-73.
[737] Ahmet Refik, *Çocuklara Tarih Bilgisi: Eskizamanlar. Türkler…*, p. 72-73.
[738] Ali Reşat, *İlk Mekteplere Tarih Dersleri: Sınıf 4…*, p. 120.
[739] *ibid.* p. 123.

Another strand of underlining that Turks are the owners of this land in various textbooks is referring to other communities other than Turks as "guests" of this land. Such an emphasis implies that these groups are "temporary" in this land, and they at least "need to know their place as visitors." In some books, this is reflected as best expressed in Ahmet Refik's statement: "Greeks, Armenians, and Jews [are] residents in *our* country..."[740]

The third and complementary strand is the emphasis that this land was taken back with life and blood shed during the Independence War. Indeed, many history and civics textbooks reiterate that the Turkish people controlled this land at the end of a great struggle by sacrificing their lives in the name for this cause in the past. Therefore, Turkish children should love their country, know its value, and even not avoid giving away their lives if necessary to protect their land again.[741] Hence it is underlined with such statements that this land belongs to Turks or it is Turks' homeland/country.

In this part, lastly, it is appropriate to give some information about what is written specifically about Turkish nationalism in the textbooks. First of all, it is important to highlight the fact that nationalism was recounted in textbooks of the period specifically neither among the fundamental principles of the state nor the duties of citizens. Nevertheless, with the declaration of RPP's six arrows in the next period, the situation would have significantly changed.

In this respect, "patriotism" is referred as a concept akin to nationalism even though two concepts are not identical. Mehmet Emin, the one and only writer who defined the concept in his book writes: "A patriot is the one who loves every place as much as his place of birth, consider every place as his home, accept the reign of orders by laws, and see any rape towards them as a rape against his home and family."[742]

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[740] Ahmet Refik, *Çocuklara Türk İstiklal Harbi (İlk Mektep)*, İstanbul: Hilmi Kitaphanesi, 1929, p. 7. Italics made by me.
[741] For examples refer to. Muallim Abdülbaki, *Yurt Bilgisi: Sınıf 5…*, p. 49-50; Ahmet Refik, *Çocuklara Tarih Bilgisi: Eskizamanlar. Türkler…*, p. 133; Abdülbaki, Sabri Esat, *Yavrumun Tarih Kitabı: İlkmektep – Dördüncü Sınıf...*, p. 57; İbrahim Hilmi, *Türk Çocuğunun Din Kitabı: İlk Mektep Sınıf: 5…*, p. 24; Ali Kami, *Yurt Bilgisi – İlk Mektep Sınıf 3*, İstanbul: Hilmi Kitaphanesi, 1930, p. 64, 66; Ali Kami, *Yurt Bilgisi – İlk Mektep Beşinci Sınıf…*, p. 107-109.
[742] Mehmet Emin, *Yurt Bilgisi…*, p. 17.

Besides, as noted previously, there are reminders in various books that Turks should love and protect their homeland.

In addition, textbook writers seem confused about the history of Turkish nationalism. One example comes up from the history textbooks when two expressions of Ahmet Refik are compared. Writer, in one book, states that national belonging/love is one of the ancient values of Turks.[743] He, in another book, writes that the idea of nationality is a modern phenomenon[744]; and Turks' nationality love was evoked after the nationalist movements of non-Muslim population in the Ottoman Empire.[745] The writer continues in the following lines: "[Hence] Turks began to spread their own nationality, taught national folk songs to children in schools, told the cruelty of their enemies…"[746] A similar example could be found in Ali Reşat's book. Writer states that Turks were aware of their nationality ever since Central Asia in one book[747], he claims in another book that the nationality feeling emerged amongst Turks as a result of modernism.[748] It is possible to come across with this approach in other writers as well.

4.4. Turkishness and Islam in the Textbooks

Even though religion is not pointed out in particular as one of the cardinal components of nationalism and national identity in various textbooks; religion and history textbooks are full of different examples that apparently conflate Turkishness and Islam/ Muslimness. Indeed, there is a common trend in all of these books that they treat both components as complementary features of national identity. In this respect, it is possible to consider nationalist discourse that dominates textbooks in that period as a typical example of Turkish-Islamic Synthesis discussed in the previous section. As stated by Copeaux, the discourse, ultimately not targeting a theocratic government, is based on identifying Islam as one of the key parameters of

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[743] Ahmet Refik, *Çocuklara Tarih Bilgisi: Eskizamanlar. Türkler…*, p. 81-83.
[744] Ahmet Refik, *Çocuklara Tarih Bilgisi: Orta, Yeni ve Yakınzamanlar. Türkler,* İstanbul: Hilmi Kitaphanesi, 1931, p. 9.
[745] *ibid.* p. 128.
[746] *ibid.*
[747] Ali Reşat, *Umumi Tarih, Lise Kitapları: Sınıf 1…*, p. 103.
[748] Ali Reşat, *İlk Mekteplere Tarih Dersleri – Sınıf 5…*, p. 245;

national identity/culture and history. In this section, I will elaborate on this approach with different examples from textbooks of the period.

Religion textbooks are unquestionably the progenitors in presenting religion as one of the cardinal components of national identity. In this regard, expressions are encountered in almost all textbooks of the period about the conflation of Turkishness and Muslimness. It would be appropriate to give a few examples here:

> The religion of Turks today is Islam. Thank God, we are Muslims. Turkish nation will always be ruler of the world because of its strong faith …
> Turkish people never avoid dying for their homeland and religion…
>
> …Turks, believe with their heart in tawhid '*Lailahe İllallah Muhammedün Resulullah*'.
>
> …Thank God, we are Turkish and Muslim. We should try to behave in accordance with the right Turkishness and Muslimness. Then we will achieve and live comfortably.[749]
>
> We, Turks, we are all Muslims, we are faithful to Islam… We, Turks, believe in God's unity, our Prophet as true Prophet and Qur'an as the words of God.[750]
>
> Our aim, our love, our religion are one and only.[751]
>
> I am a Turk and Muslim, I love my God, my duties are to help my government, my nation and take care of my responsibilities when I grow up… I will live with my national and religious faith…[752]
>
> All little children have pure good heart. If they have Muslim parents, they are luckier; because if you have Muslim parents, the child's soul will be clean; her heart pure. If the child is Turkish, he is the happiest; being Turkish is the supreme. If a child is both Muslim and Turkish, he will be the strongest, the purest and the rightest person in the world. His heart and his mind are filled with God's love.…
>
> …I am Turkish and Muslim. My father, my mother, my brother and my relatives are Turkish and Muslim. All Muslims love each other. I love my mother, my father, my brothers and my relatives. I love all my Muslim brothers. Above all, I love god mostly.[753]
>
> A Muslim Turk wants all citizens to be good and happy; his country to be in wealth and happiness always wishing the progress of his country. He is happy when he sees that his siblings and relatives are successful. He is proud when his

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[749] M. Ali Rıza, *Cumhuriyet Mekteplerine Din Dersleri Birinci Kitap Sınıf 3…*, p. 24-25.
[750] M. Ali Rıza, *Cumhuriyet Mekteplerine Din Dersleri Üçüncü Kitap Sınıf 5…*, p. 29.
[751] *ibid.* p. 31.
[752] Muallim Abdülbaki, *Cumhuriyet Çocuğunun Din Dersleri – Sınıf: 3…*, p. 46.
[753] İbrahim Hilmi, *Türk Çocuğunun Din Kitabı: İlk Mektep Sınıf: 3…*, p. 20-22.

religious fellows are advanced in education, art, civilization. He does not envy Turks. Instead, he helps and cares for them.[754]

Being Turkish is supreme. Muslimness is the truth. Land of Anatolia is the homeland of Turkish people. It is the most sincere place of Muslim worship. Turks are simple hearted, right, brave, heroic and generous people. Turks believe the strength of their morals, strength of their heart and faith.[755]

In light of the above expressions, I contend that this discourse is developed based on the allegation that Turks are attached not only by a national identity but also by religion. As pointed out by religion textbooks of the period, this approach aims to indoctrinate children that they are not only Turks but also Muslims. According to this approach, two inseparable identity and discursive components are defined in a way as they are interwoven, in other words, are complementary to each other –as if one will be missing in absence of the other- and as two basic sources of legitimacy. Hence, in these books, children are often instilled to thank God for creating them for both Turkish and Muslim, to cling tightly not only to their national duties but also their religious duties which would give them a big (physical and spiritual) strength.

As no boundaries are delineated between national and religious emanating from this discourse, duties that should be pertinent to this life in line with secularism principle such as love of homeland, state and nation are, as stated earlier, transformed into orders that religion commands. Indeed, in the same books, national duties such as being a good citizen, respecting to government, fighting against ignorance, celebrating national holidays, fighting for homeland if necessary, and donating to charity organizations such as *Tayyare Cemiyeti*, *Hilali Ahmer,* and *Himayei Etfal* are encouraged on the similar grounds with religious duties such as going to mosque, praying, fasting, sacrificing, reading Qur'an, celebrating religious feasts and fighting for Islam if necessary.

Another salient theme based on examples in which religion and nationality are infused is the specific emphasis of the allegation that Turks are Muslims and Sunnis as well. One of the ways to express this fact is explicitly writing that all Turks are

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[754] İbrahim Hilmi, *Türk Çocuğunun Din Kitabı: İlk Mektep Sınıf: 4…*, p. 16.
[755] İbrahim Hilmi, *Türk Çocuğunun Din Kitabı: İlk Mektep Sınıf: 5…*, p. 56.

Sunnis -as in the following examples. In this regard, interesting examples from two books could be given below:

> Today all Turks within the borders of Turkey are Muslims. They belong to Sunni Madhhab, Hanafite fiq.

> There are Turks living in other countries. They are Muslims. They are from Sunni Madhhab, Hanafite fiqh.[756]

> We, Turks, living in Turkistan are from Matüridi kalam, the imam of Tatars."[757]

> …Arabs are not from our madhhab, there are different madhhabs among them.

> Iranians are Shiites. Shiites are together under the same roof of Islam like us [Sunnis]. However they accept a successor to our Prophet. They call this successor 'Imam'. Shiites, say "After our Prophet *Hazrati* Ali should be the ruler and the imam". Indeed, Muslims elected in that time H. Ebubekir, H. Ömer, H. Osman, and later H. Ali as successors. They accept Ali as the rightful successor to Muhammad, and the first Imam. Be as it may, it is not an important point."

> …We also love Ali. We love his descendants. We love *Hazrati* Ebubekir, H. Ömer, H. Osman and other Islam scholars. Thanks to God, they had great service to Islam.

> Except this, there is Afghanistan in between Iran and India. People of Afghanistan are Sunnis like us.[758]

In the light of above citations, it is highlighted that all Turks living in Turkey and in other countries are Sunnis; and Shi'ism is unique to Iran. In a similar vein, the only difference between two denominations is the contention that Shiites is not recognizing caliph/imam other than Ali. Relatedly, it is emphasized that if the problem is to "love Ali" and his descendants, Sunnis love these people as much as Shiites. Thereby, the distinctness of Alevism vis-à-vis the Sunni Islam, one of the most contentious issues even today, is clearly masked.

A second way to emphasize the infusion between Turkishness and Sunni Islam is adhering to the tenets of Sunnism in describing the practices that Muslims are obliged to fulfil. In this respect, heterodox beliefs and practices such as Alevism, Bektashism, Kızılbas, Tahtacı, etc. do not appear in one single religion textbook of the period. What is more, content and language are used in such a way that

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[756] *ibid.* p. 58.
[757] *ibid.* p. 60-61.
[758] M. Ali Rıza, *Cumhuriyet Mekteplerine Din Dersleri Üçüncü Kitap Sınıf 5…*, p. 32-36.

designates Sunnism is the only true/genuine principle of Islam with reference to going to mosque, praying, sacrificing and fasting. As a result, Islam, fixed to Sunnism, was put forward as the other complementary elements in the conflation of Turkishness and Islam.

Turkish-Islamic Synthesis determined the hegemonic discourse- in conflict with secularist principle- not only in religion textbooks but also in history textbooks. Yet, this theme is seldom clearly revealed but rather remains hidden in the latter compared to the former. It is mainly related with the difference in the nature of courses as well as the writers' style/method. Referring to textbooks especially after 1980, Copeaux points out the allocation of larger space for mainly Turkish-Islamic states as one of typical characteristics of the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis. In this respect, the first road to find traces of Turkish-Islamic Synthesis in history textbooks will be calculation of page numbers of special sections allocated to Turkish-Islamic history (see *Table 3*) within the history of the Turks. For this aim, I will examine how much place Turkish-Islamic history holds compared to the pre-Islamic Turkish history in the general history textbooks of the period and the history of Turkey textbooks (specifically histories of Qarakhanids, Ghaznavids, Great Seljuks Empire, Anatolian Seljuks Empire and Ottoman Empire).

Table 3 – A Comparison of the Pages Allocated to Pre- Islamic Turkish History and Turkish-Islamic History in the History Textbooks

	Pre-Islamic Turkish History (page numbers)	Turkish-Islamic History (page numbers)
Ahmet Refik, *General History* (Volume 1 and 2)[759]	10	172
Ali Reşat, *General History* (Volume 1 and 2)[760]	24	189
Emin Ali, *General History* (3 Volumes)	22	235
History (3 volumes)	9	141
Fuad Köprülü, *Turkish History*	34	153
Hamit ve Muhsin, *Turkish History*	0	730

According to table, the number of pages allocated to Turkish-Islamic history is more than those allocated to the pre-Islamic Turkish history. This difference is ten times more; even it exceeds this number in some books. The difference strikingly appears in the books of Hamit and Muhsin. Their book entitled Turkish History is mainly devoted to Ottoman History. Ziya Gökalp's book is left outside this comparison because the writer planned to write two volumes but managed to write the first volume composed of pre-Islamic Turkish history. The second volume allocated to the Turkish-Islamic history was left incomplete.[761] Hence, as this table shows, Islamic period in the history of Turks is unquestionably the most prominent in the history textbooks. This leaning could be extended to primary school history textbooks.

Another supporting point is that this period has generally been articulated in an affirmative style in the same books. Before going into details, it is crucial to look through again history textbooks for the narration of how Turks adopted Islam. Although there is a general consensus on the contention that Turks have become

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[759] As I could not reach Ahmed Refik's General History set Volume 3, I refer to data of first two volumes for the table.
[760] As I could not reach Ali Reşat's General History set Volume 3, I refer to data of first two volumes for the table.
[761] See. Yusuf Çotuksöken, "Sunuş", *Ziya Gökalp Kitaplar…*, p. 323-324.

Muslims since the time of Caliph Osman, there are different opinions in the textbooks about how this happened. Indeed, for example, Ahmet Refik states in a book, that that they were "forced by Arabs" i.e. by violence[762]; and in another book says, this process was "sometimes by blood, sometimes softly."[763] Adopting the second opinion, Abdülbaki and Sabri Esat argue that Turks adopted Islam "willy-nilly".[764] Ali Reşat contends that this process is absolutely with the consent of Turks.[765]

Although they could not meet at a common point about the process; most of the history textbooks refer to a direct relationship between Turkishness and Islam. A quotation from Ali Reşat could be an example for this relationship:

> Some certain Turkish communities embraced religions of foreign civilizations when they had interactions with them. Christianity and religions of Chinese, Indians and Iranians spread over those Turkish groups. However none of them became the religion of Turks. Later, almost all Turks became Muslim.[766]

It is possible to provide more such examples from the other books.

Another example of the interwovenness of Turkishness and Islam is provided by using the word Turk instead of Muslim or in a sense covering it:

> The Janissaries were Christian children... *Sipahi*s were genuine Turks.[767]
>
> [In the last periods of Ottoman Empire] Sultans harmed both Turks and Christians.[768]
>
> After Malazgirt victory of Alp Aslan, Seljuqs conquered Anatolia so fast. In 1078, they were settled in İznik. Byzantine lost Anatolia forever. Anatolia became a Turkish land. This success of Seljuqs was a severe harm to Christian world. A Frankish writes "The loss of Anatolia was the biggest catastrophe for the Church ever since the foundation of Islam."[769]

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[762] Ahmet Refik, *Umumi Tarih: Ortazamanlar (Orta Mektep İkinci Sınıf)*, İstanbul: Hilmi Kitaphanesi, 1929, p. 25.
[763] Ahmet Refik, *Çocuklara Tarih Bilgisi: Eskizamanlar. Türkler…*, p. 79.
[764] Abdülbaki and Sabri Esat, *Yavrumun Tarih Kitabı: İlkmektep – Dördüncü Sınıf …*, p. 109.
[765] Ali Reşat, *İlk Mekteplere Tarih Dersleri: Sınıf 4…*, p. 108; Ali Reşat, *Umumî Tarih İkinci Cilt...*, p. 135.
[766] Ali Reşat, *İlk Mekteplere Tarih Dersleri: Sınıf 4…*, p. 95.
[767] Ahmet Refik, *Çocuklara Tarih Bilgisi: Eskizamanlar. Türkler…*, p. 119.
[768] *ibid.* p. 124.
[769] Ali Reşat, *Umumi Tarih İkinci Cilt…*, p. 202.

Another salient theme highlighting this interwovenness is the implicit emphasis of Turks' contributions to Islam, in accordance with Kushner's examples from the New Ottomans given in the previous section. It is possible to find many examples in the history textbooks. Below quotations are chosen as the most striking ones:

> …Turks advanced Islam.[770]

> …Turks were keen on the great war between Islamic world and Christianity between the East and West from the emergence of Seljuqian reign until now. Against West, they grabbed the authority of the Muslim world. There is no doubt in saying that the greatest epic story of general Islamic history was written with the pure blood of Turks shed around the world in the name of Islam.[771]

> The religious sovereignty of Caliphs was corrupted suddenly. Islamic state was devastated in a short period of time. Crusades became a nightmare of Islamic world. In these conflicting situations, poor caliphs could not do anything. Turks ran to help Islam's cry. Their sacrifices saved Muslims from destruction.[772]

> Turks played an important role in the progress of Islamic civilization. Education and art did not exist only in Bagdad, they were advanced in all over Turkish lands such as Bukhara, Samarkand, Belh, Merv etc. Turks raised great intellectuals, artists, poets and doctors. In the time of Abbasid and after them, Turkish intellectuals improved Islamic civilization. Because they wrote in Arabic and Persian, these works were recounted pertinent to Arabs.[773]

> There were Turkish intellectuals and artists among the intellectuals who constituted the Islamic civilization. Turks constituted almost the entire Muslim art and Islamic civilization.[774]

In the light of the above quotation, most of the developments in military, cultural and political fields are recounted in different textbooks as the major contributions of Turks to Islamic history. In this respect, going rather strong, it is possible to come across with writers who acclaim that Islamic civilization has been founded by Turks like Abdülbaki and Sabri Esat.

There are various examples for the same theme in religion textbooks.[775] Besides the emphasis on the Muslimness of Turks, it is commonly shared by the textbooks that if

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[770] Ahmet Refik, *Çocuklara Tarih Bilgisi: Eskizamanlar. Türkler…*, p. 79.

[771] M. Fuad Köprülü, *Türkiye Tarihi…*, p. 181.

[772] Ali Reşat, *İlk Mekteplere Tarih Dersleri: Sınıf 5…*, p. 32.

[773] Ali Reşat, *Umumi Tarih İkinci Cilt…*, p. 97.

[774] Abdülbaki and Sabri Esat, *Yavrumun Tarih Kitabı: İlkmektep – Beşinci Sınıf …*, p. 35.

[775] For examples see. İbrahim Hilmi, *Türk Çocuğunun Din Kitabı: İlk Mektep Sınıf: 5…*, p. 57; M. Ali Rıza, *Cumhuriyet Mekteplerine Din Dersleri Birinci Kitap Sınıf 3…*, p. 23.

the Turks had not been, Islam would not be advanced and perhaps there would have been no Islam.

As complementary to above stance, contributions of Islam are also recited in some books. An example for this could be cited from M. Ali Rıza's book:

> Turks belonged to another religion in the past times. At that time, they were living in scattered places. They were heroic, humanist and self-sacrificing people. However there was no force that would have brought them together. They often fought with each other. Blood of many brave men were shed by their own hands and swords.
>
> During the spread of Islam, Turks realized that this religion was not similar to any other one. They understood that this religion would suit their bravery, heroism and humanity; they would come together, unify with their brothers.[776]
>
> Turks benefited from Islam. After adopting Islam, they advanced so fast. Cruel states were terrified by the justice of Turks. Tyrannized nations felt relieved under the compassionate Turkish states.[777]

Based on these and further similar examples, the positive influences of Islam on Turks can be recounted such as creating social solidarity, giving strength and encouraging to follow the path of civilization and science.

Another way to follow nationalist discourse of Turkish- Islamic synthesis is studying the language used for the facts and events related with Turkish- Islamic history and identity. The use of "I/we-they/others" as the founder/reproducer of a group identity (therefore any discourse) is one of the instruments of such an assessment, as Van Dijk states. Accordingly, the Republican period is narrated in some history textbooks by the first singular/plural person. As an example, Abdülbaki and Sabri Esat state the development of nationalism from this perspective: "[During the WWI] [w]e understood that there was no friend of Turks other than Turks. Thus, *we* jumped in Turkish nationalism with both feet."[778]

Furthermore, some writers also use I/we subjects for narrating events in the Ottoman Empire. In a book by Ahmet Refik, it is stated "in Köprülü Era, Turkey began to be

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[776] M. Ali Rıza, *Cumhuriyet Mekteplerine Din Dersleri Birinci Kitap Sınıf 3…*, p. 22-23.
[777] *ibid.* p. 24.
[778] Abdülbaki and Sabri Esat, *Yavrumun Tarih Kitabı: İlkmektep – Dördüncü Sınıf…*, p. 159. Italics are made by me.

resurrected again. *Our* enemies began to be afraid of us… [and] *we* lost Hungary."[779] Ali Reşat also writes "[o]ur army marched to Syria; won the battle against Kolemens. Swiftly down to the south, all Syria passed into the hands of the Turks."[780] In another page, Ali Reşat states "navies of allied states united against us; attacked *our* navy. There was a major naval battle (1571)."[781] The use of such a language could be emanated from the affiliation with Turkish-Islamic history; however, it is also important to note that these historians were the intellectuals raised at the time of Empire.

Due to the fact that textbook writers often choose to tell the events in a formal language, they avoid the explicit uses of me/us and them/other. For this reason, we should pay careful attention to their affirmative or critical remarks about people, groups or events. In this respect, all periods of the Turkish history beginning from Central Asian past to present are usually narrated in a relatively positive style promoting political, military and cultural achievements of Turks in history textbooks of the period. Still, the Republican era holds the prominent place followed by Ottoman and Seljuk civilizations.

From this perspective, the Republican period is explained as the most "civilized", most "advanced" period of Turks; the period in which "enlightenment" (Turk. *aydınlık*) occurred after a previous "dark" period in the history textbooks of the period.[782] In these books, it is generally expressed that modern Turkey freed itself from religious superstitions and bigotry thanks to reforms. Besides, M. Kemal (Atatürk) is always depicted with the positive titles such as "great *Gazi*", "great guide", "brave/courageous", "patriotic", "hero", as the leader of the Independence War and Republic.[783]

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[779] Ahmet Refik, *Çocuklara Tarih Bilgisi: Eskizamanlar. Türkler…*, p. 111-112. Italics are made by me.
[780] Ali Reşat, *İlk Mekteplere Tarih Dersleri: Sınıf 5…*, p. 109. Italics are made by me.
[781] *ibid.* p. 121-122. Italics are made by me.
[782] For examples see. Ahmet Refik, *Çocuklara Tarih Bilgisi: Orta, Yeni ve Yakınzamanlar. Türkler…*, p. 147-152; Ahmet Refik, *Çocuklara Türk İstiklal Harbi…*, p. 35-37; Ali Reşat, *İlk Mekteplere Tarih Dersleri: Sınıf 4…*, p. 182-183; Ali Reşat, *İlk Mekteplere Tarih Dersleri: Sınıf 5…*, p. 279-280; Ali Reşat, *İlk Mekteplere Tarih Dersleri: Sınıf 4…*, p. 182-183; Emin Ali, *Umumi Tarih: Üçüncü Kitap – Yenizamanlar ve Yakınzamanlar…*, p. 324-347; Abdülbaki and Sabri Esat, *Yavrumun Tarih Kitabı: İlkmektep – Dördüncü Sınıf…*, p. 160-163; Hamit and Muhsin, *Türkiye Tarihi…*, p. 730-752.
[783] For examples see the same sources written in the previous footnote.

Nevertheless, less space is allocated to historical account of the Republic compared with the textbooks of the subsequent periods, since the textbooks of the first period were written in the first years of the Republic. For example, Emin Ali in 347 pages *General History (III. Cilt)* allocates only 23 pages to Independence War and afterwards. Abdülbaki and Sabri Esat in their 168 pages book entitled *Yavrumun Tarih Kitabı: İlkmektep – Beşinci Sınıf* allocate 14 pages. Lastly, Hamit and Muhsin in 752 pages book entitled *Türkiye Tarihi* allocate 21 pages for the same period. Similarly, keeping in mind the history textbooks of the subsequent periods, I find the scarcity of mentioning his name rather exceptional despite the prominent role of Atatürk in the new regime.

The history of Ottoman Empire is also expressed in a positive way. The Empire is referred as a Turkish Empire in all history textbooks.. However, books are relatively negative about the later periods of Sultan Suleiman (Kanuni)'s reign. Some books depict this period as the time of "imperial indulgence and decadence."[784] From this perspective, the reasons for the deterioration of the state following the death of Sultan -although it varies from book to book- can be stated such as "weaknesses at the administration level", "managers fond of pleasure", "bribery", "assigning incompetent people", "women having more voice", "not valuing science", and "violence against people".[785]

In this period, Abdulhamid II and Vahidettin are the two sultans narrated mostly with negative references. In the books, Abdülhamit is depicted generally as "the enemy of the people" and "barbarian/tyrant" while Vahdettin is usually recalled as "the betrayer".[786] In addition to these, the CUP, which is said to be created with "intimate emotions" in the beginning, is accused to lose its positive functions over time.

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[784] For example see Ahmet Refik, *Çocuklara Tarih Bilgisi: Eskizamanlar. Türkler…*, p. 108-111; Ahmet Refik, *Çocuklara Türk İstiklal Harbi…*, p. 3-4; Ali Reşat, *İlk Mekteplere Tarih Dersleri: Sınıf 4…*, p. 158; Ali Reşat, *İlk Mekteplere Tarih Dersleri: Sınıf 5…*, p. 176-177; Emin Ali, *Umumi Tarih: Üçüncü Kitap – Yenizamanlar ve Yakınzamanlar…*, p. 70; *Tarih, III. Kitap…*, p. 12-13.

[785] For examples see the same sources written in the previous footnote.

[786] For example see Ahmet Refik, *Çocuklara Tarih Bilgisi: Eskizamanlar. Türkler…*, p. 127; Ahmet Refik, *Çocuklara Türk İstiklal Harbi…*, p. 14-15; Ali Reşat, *İlk Mekteplere Tarih Dersleri: Sınıf 4…*, p. 168; Ali Reşat, *İlk Mekteplere Tarih Dersleri: Sınıf 5…*, p. 229-230, 255-256; Hamit and Muhsin, *Türkiye Tarihi…*, p. 682-687, 734.

Hence, it is usually described particularly with negative expressions in the history books.[787]

Based on the same perspective, it will be a complementary process to determine what/who constituted the "others" of national identity and discourse in this period. A strand of this process will be -like the former- to look at the meaning, both directly and indirectly, attributed to events, to various individuals and communities. In this regard, contrary to the relatively homogenous construction of "we", the "other" is a combination of various subjects. In this respect, the other of the Turkish-Muslim subject seems to be roughly grouped into two: Non-Muslims, and Muslims who are not Turks. In the textbooks of the period, it can be said that non-Muslims clearly appear among the two groups that constitute the other of Turkish-Muslim identity. Indeed, emanating from narratives in history textbooks as it is observed that negative statements about these groups are indisputably more in quantity and quality than other groups. In this section, I will demonstrate with the examples from different books of the period, specifically who designate these groups and what is written about them in the textbooks.

In the history textbooks, Christians among the Non-Muslims hold the first place against which most negative expressions are being used. In a similar vein, they are categorized as an extension of "external-internal enemies" including the Empire and the Christian European states. In this context, it would be appropriate to start firstly from the Christians in Anatolia because they are referred without exception in the most negative way in almost every history textbook.

From this perspective, the most remarkable point is the juxtaposition of Christianity and Turkishness in many textbooks, even though one is referring to a religion and the other to a nationality. To quote phrases further as typical examples, "…[Janissaries] were composed of Christian children… Sipahi was the name given to cavalry corps… They were genuinely Turkish."[788] or "…Sultans behaved badly to Turks and

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[787]For example see Ahmet Refik, *Çocuklara Tarih Bilgisi: Eskizamanlar. Türkler…*, p. 129, 131; Ali Reşat, *İlk Mekteplere Tarih Dersleri: Sınıf 4…*, p. 168-170; Ali Reşat, *İlk Mekteplere Tarih Dersleri: Sınıf 5…*, p. 233-234; Hamit and Muhsin, *Türkiye Tarihi…*, p. 705-707.

[788] Abdülbaki and Sabri Esat, *Yavrumun Tarih Kitabı: İlkmektep – Dördüncü Sınıf …*, p. 142.

Christians at the same time."[789] As noted previously, this could be an imprint of religion and nationality/nationalities.

In the same context, another recurring theme appears in the narratives about the "villainy" (Turk. *hainlik*), "hostility" (Turk. *düşmanlık*) and "cruelty" (Turk. *canilik*) of the Christian population including Greeks, Serbs, Bulgarians, and Armenians in the Empire.[790] This excerpt describing the British occupation of İstanbul would be a notable example:

> Greeks, Armenians and Jews living in our country were all enemies to us. They had been wishing for the fall of us. When they saw the troops of enemies, they freaked out all. Greek, Armenian, and Jewish schools took their children and went to welcome enemies with flags in their hands. They were clapping the soldiers of enemies.
>
> Greeks always had the flags of Greece at home and work, saying "They saved us from Turks", they put the picture of the Head of Greek state onto walls of their houses, putting candles and flowers around it. They made a cross to turn Hagia Sophia Mosque into a church. How many times they wanted to attack. They did not acknowledge Turkish government, they always insulted Turks.
>
> Armenians and Jews put the flags of the Kingdom. With British soldiers, Armenians captured Turkish children and took them to church saying: "They were converted to Islam by Turks." They tried to convert them to Christianity. Streets of İstanbul were filled with songs. In these songs, they were insulting Turkishness…[791]

In the textbooks, "massacre" of Turks by Non-Muslims is narrated with detailed descriptions especially with reference to Balkan Wars. The prevalent point of the descriptions pertinent to communities is portraying them as "unreliable" and "malicious" people-except not being Turkish-Muslim-.

In the same vein, another complementary emphasis is, as mentioned before, that "they" are living in an alleged country belonging to the Turks. As seen from the above quotation, it is underlined that all non-Muslims are living in a country originally belonging to Turkish-Muslim subjects. In this respect, they are seen as

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[789] Ahmet Refik, *Çocuklara Tarih Bilgisi: Eskizamanlar. Türkler…*, p. 124.
[790] For example see. Ahmet Refik, *Çocuklara Tarih Bilgisi: Eskizamanlar. Türkler…*, p. 113; Ahmet Refik, *Çocuklara Tarih Bilgisi: Orta, Yeni ve Yakınzamanlar. Türkler…*, p. 128; Ali Reşat, *İlk Mekteplere Tarih Dersleri: Sınıf 4…*, p. 153; Ali Reşat, *İlk Mekteplere Tarih Dersleri: Sınıf 4…*, p. 172-173.
[791] Ahmet Refik, *Çocuklara Türk İstiklal Harbi…*, p. 7-8.

"temporary" or "guests" in this land. Thus, they are expected to behave like a guest, or to leave this country as soon as possible.

Another Christian group that constitutes the other of Turkish-Muslim subjects is composed of Europeans. From this perspective, Christian and European are frequently used interchangeably in various books. A naval battle with the European countries in the Ottoman era can be a good example for the clear distinction based upon religion and nationality between "us-them":

> The invasion of Cyprus caused an alliance against the Turks in Europe.
>
> Allied states united their naval forces and attacked our fleet. A great battle took place. (1571)
>
> Turkish captains, soldiers fought against them bravely. However their navies were superior to ours. Our ships were burnt, ruined; our captains were martyrized (Turk. *şehit oldular*). Only 40 of them were saved.
>
> This caused happiness in Europe; Christian world celebrated this with feasts.[792]

Thus, a war between Turkish and European states is narrated at the same time as a battle between Muslims and Christians.

The most typical examples that denigrate entire Christian world are often found in the narrations of the Crusades.[793] In this context, it is underlined that the Crusades were conducted with personal interests –not with sincere religious feelings- of "ignorant", "bigoted" and even "crazy" groups. Relatedly, it is highlighted that the Islamic world was saved from those attacks thanks to Turks who lost their own lives in this cause.

Strikingly, it is very rare to encounter with negative depictions of Jews in the textbooks. An exception appears in Ahmet Refik's comment on the financial situation in the Ottoman Era: "The value of the money was often changing. Jews used to steal silver and gold money cropping them from corners."[794] In another expression, Refik refers to Jews negatively with regard to their behavior during the

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[792] Ali Reşat, *İlk Mekteplere Tarih Dersleri: Sınıf 5…*, p. 120-122.
[793] For examples see. Ahmet Refik, *Çocuklara Tarih Bilgisi: Orta, Yeni ve Yakınzamanlar. Türkler…*, p. 20; Ahmet Refik, *Umumi Tarih: Ortazamanlar…*, p. 119-123; Ali Reşat, *İlk Mekteplere Tarih Dersleri: Sınıf 4…*, p. 125; Abdülbaki and Sabri Esat, *Yavrumun Tarih Kitabı: İlkmektep – Dördüncü Sınıf …*, p. 116-117; Tarih, *II. Kitap…*, p. 32.
[794] Ahmet Refik, *Çocuklara Tarih Bilgisi: Orta, Yeni ve Yakınzamanlar. Türkler…*, p. 108.

occupation of Istanbul. In this context, another particularly salient example comes up in the context of the expelled Jews fleeing mainly to the Ottoman Empire following the Spanish Inquisition "Jews came to *our country* at that time."[795] The phrase "our country" is highlighting the incarnation of temporary and visitor status of Jews - previously of Christians- in the land of Turks.

In the textbooks, the others of Muslim-Turkish subject are the non-Turkish Muslims (in other words, not considered being Turkish). However, negative expressions about them are rather scarcely depicted than the first group. The one and only example of this negative approach appears in a religious education book written by Abdülbaki. Writer, in his book, states "…We [Turks] are not the only Muslims in the world. There are countries with Muslim populations in America, Europe, and Asia …"[796] and, "there are other nations who adopted Islam other than [us]."[797] These expressions could pave the way for a differentiation of "Muslims from us vis-à-vis Muslims not from us." Be that as it may, in some books there is a negative approach towards Arabs who were detached from the Empire during the First World War.[798] Accordingly, Arabs were depicted as a nation who "betrayed us" "despite being Muslim" with regard to the role they played in the dissolution of Empire (by fighting for their independence). This reaction to Arabs is also about "Turkification of Islam", which can be considered as one of the ways of constructing ties between Turkishness and Muslimness. This point will later be elaborated especially with reference to emergence of studies on Turkification of religious language.

Still, non-Sunni groups can also be regarded as the other of Turkish-Islamic identity based on the similar statements in the history and religion textbooks. Above, as noted previously about religion textbooks, expressions such as "all Turks are Sunni", or "we devotedly belong to Sunnism" necessarily question Turkishness of Non-Sunni Turks. However, it is occasional to come across with a specific emphasis to Sunnism

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[795] *ibid.* p. 30. Italics is made by me.
[796] Muallim Abdülbaki, *Cumhuriyet Çocuğunun Din Dersleri* [İlk Mektep Beşinci Sınıf], 2.b., İstanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, 2005 [1929-1930], 95.
[797] *ibid.* p. 99.
[798] For examples see. Ahmet Refik, *Çocuklara Tarih Bilgisi: Eskizamanlar. Türkler…*, p. 132; Ahmet Refik, *Çocuklara Tarih Bilgisi: Orta, Yeni ve Yakınzamanlar. Türkler…*, p. 128; Ali Reşat, *İlk Mekteplere Tarih Dersleri: Sınıf 4…*, p. 173; Abdülbaki and Sabri Esat, *Yavrumun Tarih Kitabı: İlkmektep – Dördüncü Sınıf …*, p. 159.

in the history textbooks unlike religion textbooks. A significant example is as following:

> [Qarakhaniards] were [s]incere Muslims… Showing a great courage, they defended Sunnism against Shiites during the Abbasid caliphate.[799]

> The official language of [Ottoman] Empire is Turkish, official religion is Islam, and official sect is Sunnism.[800]

> Shāh Ismāʿil wanted to deceive innocent people of Anatolia with saint stories and involve them in his own sect, and by this means strengthening his state, seize Anatolia. He was defeated in a battle so much that he could not resurrect again.[801]

Similar expressions appear in the history textbooks not common as much as they are in the religion textbooks. Nevertheless, this stance may play a functional role, to some extent, in readers' minds in terms of adopting the interwovenness of Turkishness, Sunnism and Muslimness.

Statements in favor of "nationalization of the religious language" can also be considered as examples for conflating Turkishness and Islam. These examples are predictably found in the religion textbooks.[802] For instance, the detailed descriptions below belong to Ibrahim Hilmi:

> The soul of the religious practices lies in love and intimacy. If the prayers, gratitude, condolence, begging are made to God in one's own language, no doubt, they become more open and intimate.

> [Hence] [o]ne knows what he says [while praying]. It will no doubt be sincere, from one's heart, not only in the mouth but paced in the mind and heart of him. If he does not know and understand what he says, his cry to God will also be weak.

> A Turkish child reads his religion book in Turkish, prays in his own language, and listens to verses in his language. He reads Turkish translations of Qur'anic verses in order to understand the words of our Prophet.

> *Cenabıhak*, does not prefer Arab to Turk or Persian, he does not posit the superiority of one nation over another, a language over another. Our prophet

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[799] Ali Reşat, *Umumî Tarih İkinci Cilt…*, p. 147.
[800] Emin Ali, *Umumi Tarih: Üçüncü Kitap – Yenizamanlar ve Yakınzamanlar…*, p. 139.
[801] Abdülbaki and Sabri Esat, *Yavrumun Tarih Kitabı: İlkmektep – Dördüncü Sınıf …*, p. 129-130.
[802] For examples see Muallim Abdülbaki, *Cumhuriyet Çocuğunun Din Dersleri…*, p. 101; M. Ali Rıza, *Cumhuriyet Mekteplerine Din Dersleri Üçüncü Kitap Sınıf 5…*, p. 45-46; İbrahim Hilmi, *Türk Çocuğunun Din Kitabı: İlk Mektep Sınıf: 5…*, p. 70-73.

gives free will to Muslims for nationality and language. He did not prefer a nation and language over another.

Turks cry to Allah: "Our language, our faith, our worship" and by this cry, they want to be more intimate. In their prayers, they say "Yarab! You gave me a language: therefore I will tell. You gave me an idea: therefore I will think. You gave me mind, therefore I will understand. You created me Turk; therefore I will talk to you in Turkish"[803]

As these quotations point out, an Islam appropriated to Turks is expected to be structured by Turkifying the language of religion. The central premise of this stance delineates the boundaries between Islam and Arabic culture; thus, trying to protect Turks from the "foreign" "harmful" effects. This stance, reminder of Gökalp's culture/civilization distinction, could be interpreted as an extension of official efforts to nationalize religion. This effort seems to be undertaken with the objective of "a national faith" through infusing divine creed and teachings with national culture. As the emphasis in the textbook quoted above, "our language, our faith, our worship"- rejecting to be a part of universal Islam community- stands as the basic manifestation of the official discourse over religion instilled to young generation in that period.

In conclusion, the textbooks of social sciences in the first period that covers the foundation of the Republic conceptualize Turks as an entity connected with national, religious (and also denominational) ties. In the light of the discourse based on the Turkishness and Muslimness as two identity components of a national belonging, I contend that students of the period were compelled to espouse being Turk at the same time being Sunni-Muslim. As evaluated in depth, this incarnation was articulated in the school textbooks - either explicitly or implicitly- on one hand, through history textbooks allocating quantitatively larger space to Turkish-Islamic history; on the other hand, through positive expressions pertaining to Turkish-Islamic identity. Most of the books were imbued with examples where Turkish-Muslim was accommodated as 'we' vis-à-vis Non-Muslim, Non-Sunni or Non-Turk as 'them/others'. I reach the acclamation that the religious-nationalist discourse hegemonic in the textbooks could be determined as Turkish-Islamic Synthesis.

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[803] İbrahim Hilmi, *Türk Çocuğunun Din Kitabı: İlk Mektep Sınıf: 5…*, p. 70-73.

CHAPTER 5

TRIUMP OF SECULAR TURKISH NATIONALISM IN THE TEXTBOOKS BETWEEN 1931 AND 1939

The second sub-group of textbooks to be analyzed pertinent to my study belongs to years between 1931 and 1939. In this period, the principles of the Kemalist doctrine were officially promulgated. The West-leaning wing with their positivist and materialist inclinations determined the culture and education policies of this period and they vehemently attempted to disseminate a secular nationalism through school textbooks. In this context, Islam lost its prominent place as the most fundamental factor in the definition of a national identity. The void was immediately imbued with secular nationalist themes including glorification of the Turkish nation with some unique and tremendous essential characteristics. Hence, despite the fact that there are some expressions reminiscent of the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis from the preceding period; they are not extensive vis-à-vis secular nationalism. In order to analyze the hegemonic discourse in this period, I will firstly provide general information about the textbooks of the period and then, analyze how similar themes and concepts are uncovered in the various textbooks. Lastly, I will make an in-depth assessment of the components of Turkish nationalism with regard to their meaning/role/value.

5.1. General Information about the Textbooks of the Period

The prominent feature of 1930s in Turkey was the emergence of the ideological/political institutionalization of a new regime beginning with the cultural and political reforms immediately after the National War of Independence. Ideological references that designated the shift in the official discourse could be found in the six principles adopted in the big congress of RPP in 1931. In addition to them, I could recount "Turkish History Thesis" and "Sun Language Theory" that

were engendered by THRS and TLRS in the aftermath of a process led by Atatürk himself.[804]

In this context, Hasan Ali Yücel, one of the leading politicians of the period, defined the basic objective of the new education as "to raise the future Turkish elite as genuine Turkish patriots."[805] One of the complementary strands of this ideological shift was the removal of religion courses from the official curriculum particularly by attributing a larger mission to history and civics textbooks. Yücel explained this shift on the following basis: "a secular state should have an equal distance to all religions, and therefore it cannot provide a course specific to any religion."[806] Hence, in conformity with the secularism principle, religion courses were removed from the curriculum in the early years; whereas history, civics and sociology courses were provided by state in the formal education for the same grades as in the preceding period. In a similar vein, transition to "one textbook for each course" motto in 1933[807] could be interpreted as an effort to disseminate a homogenous/standardized discourse on all courses including history, civics and sociology textbooks. This transition resulted in fewer textbooks; thus, total number of three courses' textbooks is fairly below the number of textbooks in the preceding period. I was able to reach and analyze all textbooks that were published in this period. The complete list of them is enclosed as Appendix -B.

First and foremost, I start with general information about the history textbooks. Primary, secondary and high school textbooks were acknowledged to be written by a plethora of authors who were THRS members such as M. Tevfik (Bıyıkoğlu), Afet (İnan), Yusuf (Akçura), Samih Rıfat, Reşit Galip, Hasan Cemil (Çambel), Sadri Maksudi (Arsal), Şemseddin (Günaltay), Vasıf (Çınar), and Yusuf Ziya (Özer).[808] Ersanlı contends that most of these authors were also members of the Parliament at that time.[809] Amongst them, West-leaning wing had a predominant place with an exceptional case of Günaltay, who was a well-known modernist traditionalist and

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[804] For a detailed analysis about them, see. Chapter III of this study.
[805] Yücel, *Türkiye'de Orta Öğretim…*, p. 227.
[806] Yücel, *Türkiye'de Orta Öğretim…*, p. 227.
[807] Aslan, "Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nin İlk Ders Kitapları…, p. 219.
[808] About the preparation and publishing process of works see. Doğu Perinçek, "Sunuş", *Tarih I: Kemalist Eğitimin Tarih Dersleri (1931-1941)* , 4.ed., İstanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, 2000 [1931], p. III-VII.
[809] Ersanlı, *İktidar ve Tarih…*, p. 102-103.

"Islamic."[810] The nodal point about the above list is that it strikingly includes no authors who wrote the preceding period's textbooks. Indeed, the authors of the preceding period seemed to lose their reputation in the eyes of the regime over time. Karpat comments on this with the example of Ahmet Refik Altınay. According to him,

> Altınay was not favored by the authorities [of the period] because of his stance in acclaiming Ottoman past as part of the Turkish culture… [Hence] falling from grace, he was removed from his position at the university in 1933 and spent his last years living in poverty selling his books and belongings.[811]

In this context, the objective of the THRS was (re)defined as "to rewrite Turkish history."[812] This objective was reiterated in the introduction of the work entitled, *Türk Tarihinin Ana Hatları* (1930), which was prepared by the Board composed of aforesaid authors:

> The role of Turks in the history of the world was reduced as a result of conscious and unconscious efforts in most of the history textbooks in our country as well as French history books. Such wrong information about their ancestors caused harmful damage in self-knowledge and self- identity of Turks. This book is the first step towards writing a national history for Turkish people who are awakened by national unity and solidarity. Hence, the objective of this book is to correct these mistakes for our nation who have lived with this knowledge until now. Therefore, we would like to pave the way that goes deep down to abilities of our nation, to demonstrate the mysteries of their intelligence, uniqueness and origins of race…[813]

As pointed out by the quotation above, the grounds that writers needed to write a new history book as well as their approaches towards Turkishness set the basic framework of the history textbooks of the period.

Relatedly, Toprak points out Atatürk's emphasis on "the necessity of removing spiritual (Turk. *uhrevi*) elements from the secular understanding of republic history."[814] Within this context, new history principle was directed towards

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[810] There will be a more detailed analysis about Günaltay in the next chapter of my thesis.
[811] Karpat, *İslam'ın Siyasallaşması…*, p. 589.
[812] Ersanlı, *İktidar ve Tarih…*, p. 96.
[813] M. Tevfik et al., *Türk Tarihinin Ana Hatları…*, p. 1.
[814] Zafer Toprak, "Darwinizm'den Ateizme: Türkiye'de Tarih Eğitiminin Evrimi", *Darwin'den Dersim'e Cumhuriyet ve Antropoloji* , İstanbul: Doğan Kitap Yayınları, 2012, p. 361.

"scientific" foundations with the support from archaeology and anthropology.[815] Different from the preceding period, this even brought sections specifically allocated to narration of "origin of species" with reference to theory of evolution in the history textbooks.

The paradigm shift and standardization in the textbooks, as quoted above, were also valid for the sociology and civics textbooks. In this regard, all these courses were revised in regard to, in Üstel's terms, "a goal to disseminate a state-centered militant citizenship…"[816] In the sociology courses, headlines remained as the same however the approach was completely changed. The headlines in the civics textbooks were also determined such as "essentials to understand present regime such as nation, state, democracy, republic, freedom, equality, tax, military service…"[817]

Within this context, it was decided to teach *Vatandaş İçin Medenî Bilgiler* (1931) which was partly dictated by Atatürk to Afetinan in the secondary school civics courses. For high school sociology courses, it was decided to teach *Sosyoloji* (1934) which was written by Necmeddin (Sadak). Besides, there was a relatively plethora of textbooks for only two years until 1934. While Sadak was preparing his book, the textbooks of the preceding period were taught in the curriculum. Similarly, books written by Kazım Sevinç and Celal Nuri (İleri) were taught in the primary schools until two volumes of *Yurt Bilgisi* (1934) were prepared. I can add *Yurt Bilgisi* (1934) written by Mitat Sadullah for grades 3rd as well.

Lastly, it is crucial to add my observation about the quality of textbooks. In this period, they included more pages with various photos, pictures and maps. For instance, high school history textbooks were published in a four-volume set approximately in 2000 pages with 400 pages in pictures. In addition, it is observed that their print quality is higher in this period than other two periods. Following general information, at this stage, I proceed to analyze textbooks of the period.

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[815] *Ibid.*
[816] Üstel, *Makbul Vatandaş'ın Peşinde…,* p. 136.
[817] Yücel, *Türkiye'de Orta Öğretim…*, p. 189.

5.2. Religion and Secularism in the Textbooks

In order to contextualize the upcoming discussion, I need to state that textbooks generally approach religion from a positivist and materialist perspective, and see religion as an outcome of social relations and needs. Indeed, they are particularly under the influence of Durkheimian sociology. All history and sociology textbooks that specifically focus on historical development of religions, on one hand reject a metaphysical source of life (espoused in many religions); on the other hand explain religion with references to social developments. The most clear and detailed depictions could be encountered in the sociology textbooks of the period.

Sadak defines religion in his book as nothing more than "a reflection of social facts into spiritual realm (beliefs/ideas)"[818] attributing it a social (moral) and an individual (psychological) glue function to keep the society together. In this regard, the writer emphasizes a direct link between structure of social organizations and formation of religions since the first communities. Besides, he contends that religions have been evolved in regard to social developments in communities over time.[819] For him, all activities in social life carried religious features in the beginning. Still, the distinctive appeal and influence of religions on communities assuaged due to complexity of rising needs over time. Accordingly, in the course of time, totemism was replaced by clan religions, city religions and lastly, by universal religions such as Christianity and Islam.[820] For Sadak, nationalism forms the basis of social solidarity today as a prominent force and, moral/legal judgments and institutions are designated around the nation's (secular/worldly) self-interests; therefore, religion is left to individual consciences. Writer argues that previous social functions of religions are now replaced by the political, legal, scientific and artistic institutions of secular and national states.[821]

Sadak advocates the evolutionary change in the idea of god in parallel with the changes in religions over time. The first formation of god in history, as noted by Durkheim, was nothing more than a reflection of society's spiritual power on

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[818] Necmeddin Sadak, *Sosyoloji*, 4.ed., İstanbul: Maarif Matbaası, 1939 [1934], p. 91.
[819] *Ibid.*, p. 86.
[820] *Ibid.*, p. 86-87.
[821] *Ibid.*, p. 92-97.

individual. Thus, also for Sadak, the elementary form of religion was totemism, a form of worshipping to the personified image of community and some natural phenomena.[822] With the developments in the communities, "this spiritual power conjoined with objects" was transferred "gradually to spirits and deities."[823] In the latter periods, he contends that the idea of divinity became more transcendental and supra-natural. In the last stage, God was conceived extremely as non-physical and "omnipresent."[824]

This sociological stance towards religion in Sadak's textbook is strikingly echoed in the history and civics textbooks of the period as well. Indeed, similar to the sociology textbook, they apparently represent materialist-positivist (therefore, rationalist and naturalist) viewpoints of theoreticians. One of the typical strands of this approach in the textbooks is primarily rejecting the metaphysical god conception. Instead, the books advocate that all reality consists of this life and what is more, history and nature are the causes of every possible occurrence including human thought, feeling, and action. Hence, the ideas and beliefs about god and religions are considered to be created by human beings/societies themselves. In this part of the study, I elaborate upon these efforts to "deconstruct" religion and god(s) with numerous examples from the textbooks.

For the discussion that reflect nature as the sole cause of life, I start examples from *Vatandaş İçin Medenî Bilgiler* (1931) which was published with the name A. Afetinan as the author –known to be originally dictated by Atatürk.[825] Besides being the president of the state, Atatürk was identified with the fundamental principles of the new regime. Therefore, it is necessary to show paramount care to lines written by him in this book as he is the supreme point of reference for this period. The first narration belongs to chapter entitled "Freedom", in which the contours of freedom are delineated for citizens. Atatürk defines "the nature is all there is, above everything…" and human being as "the creation of the nature", likewise the contours

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[822] *Ibid.*, p. 86.
[823] *Ibid.*
[824] *Ibid.*, p. 87.
[825] For detailed information about the preparation and publishing of this book see A. Âfetinan, "Giriş", *Medenî Bilgiler ve M. Kemal Atatürk'ün El Yazıları* , 3.ed., Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1998 [1931], p. 1-11. The parts writing in hand writing by Atatürk is enclosed as an attachment. Except this, the parts that belong to Atatürk has recently been published exclusively in, Atatürk, *Atatürk'ün Yazdığı Yurttaşlık Bilgileri*, Nuran Tezcan (Ed.), İstanbul: Cumhuriyet Kitapları, 1997.

for freedom are shaped by the laws of the nature.[826] This viewpoint that asserts human beings and the whole life are determined by the laws of nature seems to be developed under the influence of the Western-Enlightenment ideas. In this respect, it explains the secularization of sovereignty and development of human freedom in the course of time by the advancement of human thought.

According to Atatürk, human beings were initially ignorant about the source of their existence. They were possessed by diverse fears and driven firstly to natural forces, spirits of their progenitors and later to metaphysical god(s). In this period, devotion to god(s) was essential since it also formed the basis of states. Accordingly, rulers imagined a position above all individuals through a divine power allegedly emanating from god. For him, the last and the most advanced state of this process is the present time when individuals understand their true origin. In this period, individuals discovered that there was no metaphysical power or divinity over the nature; and they finally understood that it was the nature which created them with all qualifications and merits. This recognition consequently brought freedom for individuals.[827]

A systematic and comprehensive example for the abovementioned ideological inclination is observed in the history textbooks. They, indeed, provide a more detailed narration about the emergence of religion and idea of god in human mind. It is contended by writers that human beings are not created by a metaphysical god and instead, they are the products of nature and history.[828] This idea is extended to textbooks where the origin of species is explained in detail with reference to Darwinian evolutionary theory:

> *Probably we ought to understand that life is not supra-natural and the work of a cause other than the nature. Life is a necessary natural event like vaporizing of water or crystallization of some elements, warming of the soil and, whatever exists or happens is natural.*[829]

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[826] Âfetinan, *Medenî Bilgiler…*, p. 51.
[827] *Ibid.*, p. 50-52.
[828] *Tarih I…*, p. 2. As history textbooks of primary and secondary schools were prepared from 4- volumes high school history textbooks and subjects are narrated in more detail and in an organized way; related citations belong to those books. I refer to primary and secondary textbooks for striking examples.
[829] *Ibid.*, p. 5; italics added by me.

Relatedly by fixing reality limited to nature and natural laws, textbooks of the period reserves absolutely no place for a god or a divine power over the nature as the creator of universe. Instead, metaphysical gods are presented as the creations of human mind. According to them, God is not the creator of human beings; on the contrary God is created by human beings:

> ...*All beliefs and knowledge of human beings are the products of their own intelligence.* Intelligence stems from the brain. From this, it is understood that intelligence is the biggest resource and factor, and all supernatural concepts are made up by nothing more than human brain.[830]

> *The human intellect is the one which found the concept of divinity, discovered the secrets of this concept and who even today continue to explore.*[831]

Another expression reiterating this viewpoint could be encountered in the sociology textbook. There, Sadak similarly contends that religion is not a work of God; on the contrary, God (the idea of God) is an invention of religion.[832]

Another strand of explanations pertinent to religion in the history and civics textbooks is based on the emphasis of perceiving all religions as human creations. In a similar context, textbooks that see metaphysical gods as the products of human/social thought define religion as a phenomenon that comes up in different forms in societies with regard to specific historical, social developments and different circumstances. In line with this conceptualization, religion, as noted by Sadak, is conceived as a functional institution developed by human beings to meet historical/social and psychological needs that are emerged with the transition to social life.[833]

In the light of above points, typical examples for this approach could be encountered in the first volume of the history textbooks where the history of humanity is narrated. In the section pertinent to historical evolution of humanity, the emergence of the idea of religion in human beings is narrated in parallel to changes in the material life. In close affiliation to Atatürk's viewpoints about the historical evolution of religions, writers perceive religion like other institutions in social life. In this regard, primitive

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[830] *Ibid.*, p. 2; italics added by me.
[831] *Ibid.*, 24; italics added by me.
[832] Sadak, *Sosyoloji…*, p. 39.
[833] *Tarih I...*, p. 23, 24; italics added by the author.

man, who was once thought to be deprived of the idea of religion and related thoughts, reached to a state of thinking about religion and believing in a transcendental god in the course of the time in parallel to changes in the social and material life.[834]

In conformity with this background, same textbooks often explain why some communities were directed to particular religions through the specific conditions of these communities. No matter which religion is narrated in the textbooks; sociological, economic, political, even climate conditions of the period have a paramount place in the narrative. Hence, it is emphasized again and again that religion arises rather as a result of social life, not by metaphysical gods.

It seems that fixing religions to historical/social conditions paved the way for the questioning of their present functions in contemporary world. In the history textbooks, the following statement introduces the contention that people no more need to seek help from religion over time:

> In contemporary civilization, fragility and fright of human beings were diminished by the enlightenment of brains with the latest discoveries. And so, they began to see the truth. Human beings understood the paramount importance of the forces in themselves and their societies. *Hereinafter for them, society is the source of all development, peace and security.*[835]

One of the implications of this quotation is that scientific and technological developments showed the truth of things to individuals and by this way, they get rid of groundless fears and beliefs. It can be assertive to state that writers make a distinction between traditional religions and science. In the preceding periods when human knowledge was limited, religions acted as a psychological comfort for individuals' heart besides its social functions; but now, with the advanced knowledge, there is no need for them. According to this viewpoint, it is contended that science and (traditional) religion cannot meet at the same level as they are mutually exclusive categories.

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[834] *Ibid*., p. 20-23.
[835] *Ibid*., p. 24; italics added by the author.

Another nodal implication of the quotation is the prominent place attributed to society, therefore nation. It is understood that writers presumably see that all psychological and sociological supports which an individual needs could come from the society he is a member of not from a metaphysical god. This perspective is consistent with Sadak's argument that the function of religion is provided by secular institutions at the present time to a great extent. In most of the textbooks, it is highlighted that what is giving meaning/strength to individual in modern times is the nation itself. Therefore, the nation should be the final and sublime object of love, respect, and loyalty. The emphasis on this functionality brings attributing nation a supreme character named as "*millî vicdan/ruh*" (national conscience/spirit) or "*milletin manevî şahsiyeti*" (collective consciousness of the nation) in the context where metaphysical idea of god have been overthrown especially following the Enlightenment thinkers such as Rousseau and Durkheim. As I will refer to the examples later, it is observed that transcendent position and omnipotent capacity of the nation are reiterated several times in the textbooks. This narrative is followed by sanctifying homeland, state, and political actors as an extension or representation of nation.

At this point, it is appropriate to provide examples for these inclinations from the narrations of Buddhism and Confucianism in the textbooks. First, it should be highlighted that writers adopt rather positive approaches towards them. The reasons for writers' sympathy could be that both religions reject metaphysical reality and direct people towards their communities. In the textbook, Buddhism is acclaimed to be founded in the middle of the 6th century B.C. by Buddha who was from Saka Turks.[836] Writer promotes this religion on the grounds that it is interested in this world and not interested in the issue of afterlife, and it knows no reality other than nature.[837] After Buddha's death, some people came up claiming an "imaginary afterlife"; consequently, corrupted this religion causing its original true character to be lost.[838] Buddha's teaching is described by the writer as "putting an end to suffering through the elimination of worthless and selfish objectives with the

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[836] *Ibid.*, p. 76.
[837] *Ibid.*, p. 80.
[838] *Ibid.*, p. 80-81.

ultimate goal of attainment of the sublime state of Nirvana."[839] Writer further comments as follows: "It is also today's rule that we should give away ourselves for something greater than us. This greater body for Turks is the Turkish nation."[840] It is not clear that if Buddha implied such a comment. However writer contends that if an individual is in search of a transcendental force -this is understandable-, it is not the god in the sky but it should be the very nation one is a part of.

Another comment on religion could be observed in the section devoted to Confucius in the same book. Writer defines this religion as follows: "Confucius wanted to establish a moral philosophy instead of a religion that would overcome moral corruptions in his era. Types of moral merits set forth by him are so pure."[841] Writer finds philosopher's effort in constructing a secular moral system to regulate social life instead of a new religion emanating from a metaphysical god quite stunning. Why writer approaches positively to philosopher's teaching is obvious from the examples he chooses. For him, Confucius is considered to propose rules and responsibilities for individuals towards homeland, nation, state and rulers.[842] What is more, writer praises this religion on the grounds of including rarer supernatural essentials and being highly people-centered. Furthermore, highlighting that one of the principles of this religion is "People's voice is the God's voice"[843] could be a justification to offer religious/moral ground for respect and responsibility to society. In other words, writer states, an individual must show strict loyalty to his nation, to his state, because god is revealed in people (nation). This is a typical example of attributing supreme characteristics to nation. However, it is not intended to dignify a metaphysical goodness to nation. Lastly, writer states that Confucius's religion has played a prominent function in establishing a distinctive Chinese nation.[844] It can be asserted that a religion serving the national unity is acceptable in the eyes of the intellectuals of the period.

Similar references that attribute supreme characteristics to nation could also be encountered in the civics textbook dictated by Atatürk himself. The first element and

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[839] *Ibid.*
[840] *Ibid.*, p. 80.
[841] *Ibid.*, p. 60.
[842] *Ibid.*, p. 60-61.
[843] *Ibid.*, p. 61.
[844] *Ibid.*

also the basis of Republican regime is stated as the unconditional sovereignty of the people as a general principle.[845] In this respect, the founder of the Republic glorifies nation as the ultimate source of the regime and overall power of the state. Hence, this situation inevitably ensures the assumption that there is no power other than nation for legitimizing political sovereignty.

Within this context, Atatürk explains the source of sovereignty from historical perspective in-depth in the textbook. In the past, it was believed that kings and sultans took their legitimacy and sovereignty from god; in other words, it was assumed that "sovereignty given to those rulers by god."[846] Since 16th century, the source of power has not been god but nation itself. At the present time, this idea is institutionalized as the theory of national sovereignty. Atatürk explains this theory as follows:

> Sovereignty is based on the will of nation, above individual wills, as a collective personality. Therefore, the sovereignty is one, inseparable and this collective conscience/will, collective personality cannot be transferable to any other nation.[847]

In this respect, there is an unexceptionally negative approach in the textbooks against the regimes based on metaphysical god(s) instead of nation.[848]

In the same book, nation is also presented as the essential source of morality contrary to the textbooks of the preceding period which assume god/religion as the ultimate source. According to Atatürk, the necessity of a moral system stems from practical needs towards social order, security, and progress. It requires a power over individuals to constitute moral rules. Atatürk states that traditional societies were trying to lead a moral life based on the scriptures that they believed to come from a metaphysical source. In the contemporary world, individuals must comply with moral rules emanating from the nation itself, in parallel with the changes in the source of sovereignty along history.[849] In the further lines, it is seen that this moral

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[845] Âfetinan, *Medenî Bilgiler…,* p. 30
[846] *Ibid.*
[847] *Ibid.*, p. 30-31. Italics added by the author.
[848] For examples see. *Tarih II: Kemalist Eğitimin Tarih Dersleri (1931-1941)*, 3.ed., İstanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, 2001 [1931], p. 3; Âfetinan, *Medenî Bilgiler…*, p. 30-31, 33.
[849] Âfetinan, *Medenî Bilgiler…*, p. 20-21.

force is described in a manner that evokes Durkheim's findings about the relationship between individual and god in traditional communities. For Atatürk, the nation embodies such a force in order to establish social order and progress. In this regard, "interest, effort, dedication, and if necessary, gladly giving away his own being" are in all respects expected from individuals.[850] In his own words,

> in a nation that has reached a level of perfection in every way, members pursue the requirements of national morality by emotional motivation and heart, not by mind. This is the greatest national feeling and excitement.[851]

Along the lines of above arguments, it should be noted lastly that these books totally do not adopt an anti-Islamic position. Since writers of the textbooks point out the fact that they have no objection to a religion as long as it is limited to a bond of conscience between God and individuals, and not directing their social relations. The role of religion presented by history and civics textbooks will further be analyzed in next sections when I discuss Islam and secularism in more detail. Now, I proceed how textbooks of the period specifically narrate Judaism, Christianity and Islam.

First and foremost, I should underline the fact that as religion courses were not part of the official curriculum in this period, religions including Islam appeared only in the general history textbooks. Similar to the preceding period, religion holds a prominent place in the pages allocated to communities' social features. Different than the history textbooks in the preceding period, there is more space for faiths other than Abrahamic religions. In addition, it is crucial to note that writers emphasize moral values over religious practices. I will refer to depictions of Islam extensively in the next section; here, I focus mostly on narrations about Judaism and Christianity.

Before an in-depth analysis, it is important to draw a quantitative picture. In the General History set, faiths other than Abrahamic religions are narrated in one or two pages, while Judaism is narrated in nine pages; Christianity is narrated in four pages. When it comes to Islam, more than hundred pages are allocated solely to the history of Islam.

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[850] *Ibid.*, p. 20.
[851] *Ibid.*

Allocating more pages to Islam does not mean positing negative references to other religions in this period. In fact, it can be contended that writers' style is quite neutral and objective towards them. Expressions such as "our religion" or "their religion" are not found in the pages; thus, it is not possible to identify writers with any religion including Islam. Still, as noted above, it is apparent from glorifying references that writers have a positive approach towards religions which posit preponderance of moral values about public life and that enshrine the idea of becoming nation. One prominent feature about general history textbooks is that they emphasize moral values vis-à-vis religious practices. What is more, there are abound expressions that specifically praise nations and nationalism in the sections where religions are specifically narrated.

At this stage, it can be stated that more sympathetic language is used in the history textbooks towards Judaism than Christianity. Writer of this particular section especially notes that "Religion of the Hebrews is important… [and] Hebrew Bible is an important religious literary work..."[852] The teachings of Judaism are described more at length with direct quotations from the holy book of this religion. The author uses the following statements for this book:

> The Old Testament is a history, poetry book; a collection of revelations and hymns as well as a law book. It is composed of old time stories, God's commandments, history of Palestine and excellent psalms... These stories have inspired and continue to inspire poets and artists. They are absolutely prominent for literature and art…[853]

A nodal point about this citation is the writer's contention that the book includes God's commandments and it is a collection of revelations. Relatedly, writer does not engage in any questioning about the god of this religion in further pages. Even, he refers to *Ten Commandments* as "God' commandments which were received by Moses" with a manner not used for Prophet Muhammad in the part where Islam is narrated – probably written by a different writer.[854] In the following lines, writer recites stories of Joseph, Suleiman and Hebrews' exodus from Egypt directly quoting

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[852] *Tarih I...*, p. 162.
[853] *Ibid.*, p. 155-156.
[854] *Ibid.*, p. 158.

from the primary source. In a similar vein, it is reported to students that Joseph died at the age of 110 and Moses died at the age of 120.[855]

However in comparison with the above, it is seen that Christianity gets relatively negative treatment from the writers. With reference to the Bible, Jesus Christ is denigrated on the grounds that he is not a historical figure -that is in reality he does not exist- and all religious narratives about Virgin Mary and him are myths.[856] The only positive reference to Christianity is limited to church's role in raising some precious intellectuals. Sen-Jen is referred as one of those whose "wisdom…, ethics and character…, manner of speaking… and works are precious."[857] Thus, I contend that Judaism is treated exceptionally positively amongst other religions in the textbooks. At this stage, it would be worthwhile to look at what is written particularly about Islam in the textbooks.

Amongst all religions, Islam occupies quantitatively the prominent place in the textbooks. However there is no remarkable exaltation in terms of authors' approaches towards Islam. In parallel to positivist interpretation of religion in general, Islam is discussed with an approach that rejects its metaphysical basis. It is observed that on one hand, writers attempt to materialize this religion like other religions; on the other hand, the faith in this religion is fixed to a relationship between God and individuals. The objective could be to minimize the role of Islam as the founding core over social/ national identity and relations. This approach stands distinctively apart from the approach I noted for the preceding period.

In the textbooks of the period, Islam is portrayed as a religion engendered by Muhammad's individual initiations rather than revealed by a metaphysical source. In this regard, he is introduced as the person who "invented" this religion with his pure-heart and love for society.[858] Accordingly, Islam "is the new religion *invented by him* [Muhammad] at the age of forty" and the Qur'an "is the collection of principles *set by Muhammad.*"[859]

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[855] *Ibid.*, p. 157-158.
[856] *Ibid.*, p. 330.
[857] *Ibid.*, p. 337.
[858] *Tarih II*..., p. 89-90; italics added by me.
[859] *Ibid.*

In a similar vein, there is a detailed description in the history textbooks about the conditions of the Era in which Muhammad advanced this religion. According to this narration, Muhammad was actually a decent person who devoted himself to solving the problems of his society. In fact, he presented his solutions in the aftermath of an extensive retreat of intellectual reasoning. But, in a social setting where religions of Moses and Jesus were also known, he himself believed that his solutions were emanating from a metaphysical source. Thus, he revealed them as commandments of a new religion with the title "prophet."[860] The emphasis on "intellectual reasoning" points out the allegation that the Qur'an is not a book revealed into heart of Muhammad by the angel Gabriel. On the contrary, it is asserted to be produced by Muhammad in the aftermath of a rational process.

Another salient narration in the history textbooks is that prophet's teachings are reported as for "the interests of people" and "in line with the necessities and needs of the society". This is probably the answer to question why writers feel respect for Muhammad's teachings, even though they reject its metaphysical nature. As writers often put forward in the textbooks, every initiation rooted in and serving to society is considered precious by them. Furthermore, Muhammad is depicted as an individual motivated by collective conscience of his era even though he was not aware of this at that time. Within this context, this implicit connotation could be regarded as an evidence to writers' contention that Islamic prophet takes his power not from a metaphysical god but from his society's collective conscience. To quote further for example:

> …In his life, Muhammad managed Islamic society well by taking necessary precautions and positing appropriate solutions. If he had contacted with communities other than Arabs, he would probably have made paramount changes. Because, he had a progressive soul; he was ready to amend his system for the better.
>
> *Muhammad considered himself not to be bound by anything if reforms were needed in religious problems or social problems.* He always walked forward. His death caused a sharp end to this progress. The reasons for the recession and decline in the Islamic world shortly after Muhammad's death could be found in his caliphates' searches for the scriptures of him, not the soul of his profession.

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[860] For example see. *Tarih II*..., p. 91; *Tarih: V. Sınıf (İlkokul Kitapları)*, İstanbul: Devlet Basımevi, 1936, p. 26.

> This great fact is properly understood and perceived in the Turkish Republican Era.[861]

Above quotations draw a prophet portray inimical to common Islamic view. In the general Islamic context, Allah is conceived as the sole source of revelations, realities and moral obligations. Therefore, the prophet's duty was to declare revelations he received from God to human beings. A Muslim believer also accepts that he adapted these obligations to specific occasions, since he was the president of the state at the same time. Still, it is believed that even his adaptations are compatible with the general principles and obligations of Islam.[862] Moreover, according to the same citation, the scriptures –in fact referring to the Qur'an- are assumed to lose their validity in the course of time and expired. Hence, for the writers of above paragraph, it is crucial to follow the philosophy behind it –namely "pragmatism"- rather than the text. Writers praise this pragmatic approach so much that they clearly express that Turkish Republic implemented the same approach taking it as an example. In the light of these connotations, it can be acclaimed that the crux point is writers' endeavor for creating a secular religion and a worldly prophet.

In the same textbook, the prophet is often reiterated as a human being with no supernatural powers even though he is depicted with high qualities as a ruler or an army commander. Below excerpt is a typical example for the contention that he is the founder of Islam:

> It is necessary to overlook military activities of Muhammad in order to understand *how he is as a founder of the religion and a state ruler*. Otherwise, we would not be able to get rid of reducing Muhammad to an illiterate, ignorant, insensitive, and inactive person, taking everything from an angel and declaring to his surroundings. Muhammad, who proved to be an asset as a sensitive, thoughtful, and an initiator individual, is one of the great personalities amongst his contemporaries.[863]

It is manifested that Muhammad collected various qualities of an outstanding and brave commander. In the Battle of *Uhud*, it is narrated that the prophet fell into a bad

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[861] *Tarih II...*, p. 118; italics added by me.
[862] For discussions see Fazlur Rahman, *İslam*, (trans.) Mehmet Dağ, Mehmet Aydın, 9.b, Ankara: Ankara Okulu Yayınları, 2009, p. 53-142.
[863] *Tarih II...*, p. 93-94; italics added by me.

position but recovered in a short time and enabled Muslims to win the battle.[864] He is also praised for his military leadership and his strategic moves. According to authors, his talent and high intelligence as a tactical military genius are recounted as the main factors behind his success.[865] This emphasis is echoed in many places as follows, "Muhammad *above all gave importance to military movement and activity in order to* spread the power and influence Islam."[866] It can be asserted that Muhammad who is originally a messenger of the divine message by adherents of Islam depicted in the textbooks merely as a commander who lived and died as a hero. This emphasis is supported by talking very little about the teachings of prophet instead narrating more about the wars and his military tactics in pages.

After the emphasis on humanly features of the prophet, several expressions are put forward to advocate the allegation of humanly and historical creation of the Qur'an. It is asserted that provisions of the Qur'an could be collected under three headings. Amongst them, only the tawhid (oneness of God) principle is fundamental and indispensable. The other principles pertaining to law and history are appropriated to a specific knowledge and era, hence regarded as out of value and validity.[867] As pointed out by the following quotation, "Muhammad changed and extended his first teachings in an evolutionary manner"[868], writers adopt that *sura*s in the Qur'an are not unchangeable.

Along the lines of the arguments above, textbook writers seem skeptical about symbols and narrations that are treated with reverence in Islam along with the Qur'an. Comments about the Sacred House Kaaba could be given as an example here. According to Qur'an and Islamic tradition, it is believed to be made by the prophet Abraham in pre-Islamic period. However, in a textbook, it is narrated that Kaaba means "dice" (Turk. *tavla zarı*) in Arabic[869] in spite of the fact that it is named after its cuboid-shape. The description of the building has the same careless approach: "Indeed, Kaaba is in the shape of a dice and nothing more than four walls not higher than a human being; walls were without clad and made of ordinary (Turk.

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[864] *Ibid*., p. 99-102.
[865] *Ibid*., p. 94-95.
[866] *Ibid*., p. 102; italics added by me.
[867] *Ibid*., p. 92.
[868] *Ibid*.
[869] *Ibid*., p. 85.

adi) stone."[870] Religious narratives about the building are regarded as made up stories.[871]

The comments on the Islamic pilgrimage (the Hajj) also conflicts with traditional Islamic view. According to Islamic faith, the pilgrimage to Mecca is revealed by God as one of the five pillars of Islam.[872] Still, in the textbook, Hajj is explained as "a yearly huge street fair (Turk. *panayır*) rather than a religious gathering…"[873] Hence, performing pilgrimage to Mecca, which is a sacred journey of moral and spiritual significance for Muslims, is also discredited by writers.

To summarize, there is an explicit motivation in the textbooks of the period - strikingly different from the preceding period- to disgrace (or at least individualize) religions in general, Islam in particular. This could be considered as a result of the positivist- materialist stances of the writers as discussed previously. As might be guessed, they are not expected to be advocating a religion based on a metaphysical god and his revelations. Another reason for this could be their assertion of Islam as one of the obstacles in the development of Turkish nationalism. In this context, I undertake an in-depth analysis in the following sections for the role of Islam in the conceptualization of national identity.

While religion is not invoked as one of the defining components of national identity, secularism holds a large space notwithstanding minor variations in almost all textbooks. Accordingly, it is persistently expressed in the textbooks of this period that the state cannot engage in a relationship with any religion whereas individuals can believe in whatever they want within the freedom of conscience. In this regard, secularism as a principle is defined in the sociology textbook as follows: "state neutrality toward religion" and "leaving individuals free in their faiths, not interfering between god and his followers."[874] Sadak refers this political development as one of the consequences of modern times and argues that states were bound to religions in the past ever since they legitimized their authority through them. In spite of this, religion lost its social function over time and now it is limited to be a call to

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[870] *Ibid*.
[871] *Ibid*., p. 90.
[872] Rahman, *İslam…*, p. 63-64.
[873] *Tarih II*..., p. 109.
[874] Sadak, *Sosyoloji…*, p. 94.

individual's conscience. According to him, the reason for this shift is the change in societies and their needs. These dogmatic beliefs emanating from religions were not compatible with the changes in the course of the time. Hence, secular states were constituted thanks to the advent of scholarly/scientific thought, culture, ethics, and law independently from religion.[875] For Sadak, the cardinal outcome of this development is the freedom of mind. Moreover, he highlights particularly the long historical process and mass struggle behind this freedom.[876]

History and civics textbooks simply define secularism as the separation of state and religion.[877] Historical development of secularism in the Western societies is narrated in a more detailed way particularly in the related volumes of the history textbooks.[878] A distinctive narrative about the historical development of secularism is found in a high school history textbook with the contention that separation of religion from state and religious freedom were already achieved by Turks in the ancient periods.[879] The author also emphasizes that secularism is not "irreligiosity".[880] Atatürk further explains how this principle is reflected into the political and administrative structure of the Republic:

> Republic of Turkey has no official religion. Rules and regulations in the state administration are shaped and enforced by the principles of contemporary civilization in line with secular needs. As religion is associated with conscience, Republic sees the separation of religion from state as the prominent success factor in the contemporary progress of the Turkish society.[881]

As defined here, religion is asserted in the eyes of the writers of the period including Atatürk as a matter of conscience not of the state. In a similar vein with the preceding period's textbooks, it is highlighted that regulations of the state in Turkey are structured mainly in line with social needs, daily circumstances and practices. In other words, the functioning and contours of state administration cannot be defined

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[875] *Ibid.*, p. 94-95.
[876] Ibid., p. 95.
[877] For an example see. *Tarih IV: Kemalist Eğitimin Tarih Dersleri (1931-1941)*, 3.ed., İstanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, 2000 [1931], p. 187.
[878] See. *Tarih III*: *Kemalist Eğitimin Tarih Dersleri (1931-1941)*, 3.ed., İstanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, 2000 [1931], p. 80-113.
[879] *Tarih IV*..., p. 206.
[880] *Ibid.*, p. 187.
[881] Âfetinan, *Medenî Bilgiler…*, p. 56.

by any religion. In the same context, individuals are free in espousing religions and nobody can interfere in this realm. Atatürk argues,

> Every individual has the right and freedom to think and believe whatever they want, adopt any political inclination, [and] obey or disregard the requirements of his/her faith. Nobody can be forced for his/her thoughts or beliefs. Freedom of conscience is recognized as one of the indispensable cardinal rights of individuals.[882]

What is more, for Atatürk, individuals can perform their religious practices as long as they are not against the security of the state, traditions and political laws and order.[883] Be that as it may, the laws on attire, closure of dervish convents and lodges, abolishment of Caliphate, prohibitions on superstitions and heresies, fortune-telling, visitation of saints' tombs in the Republican era were not regarded as religious tenets but elements of real bigotry and ignorance.[884]

Although secularism holds a larger space in the textbooks, relatively similar statements are used in the conceptualization of the phenomenon with the preceding period. Still, textbooks generally have a consistent approach pertinent to secularism in this period since former textbooks were seeking legitimacy from Islam both in the formation of national identity and in the justification of secularism. Indeed, such ambiguous strand could not be observed in the textbooks of this period keeping in mind the fact that religion courses were not part of the official curriculum in this era.

5.3. Nation and Nationalism in the Textbooks

After religion and secularism in the textbooks, I embark upon an analysis of key terms of the discourse such as nation and nationalism in this part of the study. In all textbooks, these concepts hold a paramount place and are frequently glorified by writers. The nodal point is that textbooks adopt a common discourse in their approaches to nation in this period different than the preceding era. As noted before, this discourse appeared in the party program of RPP in 1931. Within this context, as

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[882] *Ibid.*
[883] *Ibid.*
[884] *Ibid.*

a general assertion, textbooks treat concepts of nation and nationalism as modern phenomena rooted in the past.

In order to understand the upcoming discussion, it is appropriate to start with Sadak's complicated approach of conflating two contradictory perspectives, modernism vis-à-vis essentialism. Indeed, it is possible to come across with expressions from both perspectives in the depictions of nations and nationalism in the textbooks as generic categorizations, and specifically Turkishness and Turkish nationalism. In this regard, first and foremost, nation is defined in the sociology textbook as following: "a political and social community that consists of citizens who share a common language, culture, sentiments, thoughts, [and] ideals."[885] This expression comes up not only in the textbooks of the period[886] but also in RPP's party program simultaneously in 1931.[887] Besides, nationalism is usually used interchangeably with the thought, sentiment or will of national belonging (Turk. *millet olma düşüncesi, hissi, iradesi*) in these textbooks. Keeping these definitions in mind, I contend that they are compatible with the definitions of the preceding period.

The profound break with the preceding period appears in the discussion about how far the history of nations and nationalism dates back. According to this paradoxical stance, it is seen that these concepts are regarded as modern phenomena in some places, while as ahistorical in other places. In order to clarify this stance, I elaborate upon what Sadak writes about the history of nations and nationalism in his book.

Sadak begins his discussion by writing about the emergence of nations in Modern Europe. According to writer, nation was determined as the new form of social unity/solidarity in order to sustain societies immediately after the end of monarchies. This new bond is articulated by him as "a public imagination and an idea (Turk. *kamusal bir tasavvur, görüş*) adopted by each individual constituting the nation."[888] Here, it is quite surprising to come across with an early model of Anderson's conceptualization of "imagined communities" in Sadak's narration.

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[885] Sadak, *Sosyoloji…*, p. 42.
[886] For examples see. Âfetinan, *Medenî Bilgiler…*, p. 18; *Tarih IV…*, p. 180; *Yurt Bilgisi (İlk Mektep Kitapları: IV. Sınıf)*, İstanbul: Türk Kitapçılığı Limited Şirketi, 1934, p. 4; Kazım Sevinç, *Türk Yavrularına Yurt Bilgisi – Sınıf: 5*, İstanbul: Ekspres Matbaası, 1931-32, p. 10.
[887] İsmail Beşikçi, *Cumhuriyet Halk Fırkası'nın Programı (1931) ve Kürt Sorunu*, İstanbul: Belge Yayınları, 1991, p. 14.
[888] Sadak, *Sosyoloji…*, p. 37.

In the following lines, Sadak undertakes an assessment of different theories about nations. In the beginning, he rejects the theory that defines nation by means of social contract under the influence of Rousseau on the grounds that it is not sociological but rather metaphysical.[889] Essentially, Mehmet İzzet, the author of the sociology textbook of the preceding period, defined nation exactly in a Rousseauan way. However, Sadak argues, this theory is based on the idea that collective conscience (will) is a sum of individual wills. On the contrary, he asserts that national conscience, which is born out of the society, exists as a unique, and independent reality beyond all individuals. According to him, collective, public conscience/will manifests itself via individual consciences.[890] In this respect, Sadak's understanding of society seems to be similar to Durkheim rather than Rousseau.

The nodal point is that Sadak also challenges theories that regard nations merely as products of the external factors and historical circumstances. Since, nations are flourished in the *a priori* feelings in the collective conscience. For him, "the will to national living were naturally present before the implicit or explicit consent of individuals."[891] With reference to Renan, writer argues that there are two components of nation; one is having a common history based on a shared life as a community, and second is the desire to preserve and sustain this inheritance. Within this context, writer reiterates what is noted by Renan as the essentials to be a nation: "having common glory and reputation in the past, having a common will today, attaining great achievements together, [and] maintaining the desire to achieve more…"[892]

It is understood from Sadak and textbook writers who reiterate the same definitions[893] that nations on one hand are modern phenomena; on the other hand, rooted in the ancient times. In this regard, present nations are essentially thought to be the successors of the perennial communities. Hence nations are believed to be gathered around the feelings, thoughts and ideals coming from the pre-existing collective experiences. This way of approaching nations and nationalism seems to be an early version of Smith's "ethno-symbolic" theory which was discussed in the

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[889] *Ibid.*, p. 38.
[890] *Ibid.*
[891] *Ibid.*, p. 39.
[892] *Ibid.*, p. 40.
[893] For an example see. Afetinan, *Medeni Bilgiler…*, p. 23-24.

second chapter of this study. Indeed, Sadak's claim that what differentiate present nations are pre-existing components such as symbols, myths, values and traditions[894] connotes the contemporary theory of "*ethnie*-nation persistence" even though he does not use the term *ethnie*. Within this background, textbooks perceive nations as modern developments based on historical cultural commonalities. In this part, I proceed with an in-depth analysis of how writers approached Turks and Turkish nationalism in the context of this perspective.

The main difference in this period is that writers discuss all subjects within a hegemonic discourse of secular Turkish nationalism. In other words, Turkishness constitutes the core of the discourse on the textbooks of the period, with no intention to share this prominent position with religion. Hence, history, civics and even sociology topics are narrated overtly in relations to Turks –de-emphasizing Islamic element. In this section first and foremost, I undertake a quantitative and qualitative analysis to show how Turks, Turkishness and Turkish nationalism are narrated in the textbooks of the period.

As a first step, I present a table below about the history textbooks. Table-4 demonstrates the quantitative comparison of pages allocated to Turks in high-school history textbooks vis-à-vis other communities.

Table 4 – A Comparison of the Pages Allocated to Narration of Turks and Other Communities in the History Textbooks

	Other communities	Turks	Total
Tarih I	304	38	342
Tarih II	158	182	340
Tarih III	138	172	310
Tarih IV	-	348	348
Total	600	740	

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[894] Sadak, *Sosyoloji…*, p. 38.

According to above table, it is obvious that narratives about Turks occupy larger space than other communities within the high school history volumes except for the first volume. The nodal point in narratives about other communities is that certain sections are still reserved for the relationships between them and Turks. For instance, more than half of the forty two pages in the second volume are about the relations of Turks with the Umayyad and Abbasids (either contributions of Turks or wars with Turks). More significantly, even in the first volume that seems to be written with a less focus on Turks, history of each community is narrated inevitably with references to Turks as progenitors of all civilizations.

Following the quantitative comparison, I proceed with the distinct manifestations of Turkish nationalism in the textbooks. The first crucial point is that the Republican period is narrated generally with the subject "we" in numerous textbooks. Hence, similar to textbooks of the preceding period, it could be contended that all students are assumed to be nominally as "Turks" –if not an assumption, an endeavor of instilling this identity is obvious. An example for the definition of "we" could be found in the following statement: "[our] fathers are from the nation, mothers are from the nation, siblings are from the nation, and all beloved ones are from the nation."[895] With this statement, writer attempts to invoke in students a feeling to be part of this extended family both through a kinship and a feeling with nation/Turks. This statement alone is not enough to put forward how Turkishness and Turkish nationalism are defined in the textbooks. It is necessary to overlook through numerous textbooks for an in-depth analysis.

In this context, one of the salient definitions is encountered in the civics textbook. Quoting from Atatürk, Turkish nation is defined as the "people of Turkey (Turk. *Turkiye halkı*) who founded the Republic of Turkey."[896] At first sight, blood connection and specific cultural elements seem to be de-emphasized in the definition vis-à-vis the emphasis on historical and political commonalities. In further pages, Atatürk recounts these natural and historical elements such as:

> a.) Political unity;
> b.) Unity of language;

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[895] *Yurt Bilgisi (IV. Sınıf)…*, p. 5-6.
[896] Âfetinan, *Medenî Bilgiler…*, p. 18.

c.) Unity of homeland;
d.) Racial and ancestral unity;
e.) Historical affiliation;
f.) Moral affiliation.[897]

It seems new elements are overtly added by him into this definition. It is observed that Atatürk contextualizes nationalism going far beyond the cultural nationalism of the preceding period. Now by this definition, Turks hold a unity not only in terms of culture, thought, and ideal but also by common political integrity, race and territory. Hence, it is obvious that the official Turkish nationalism is evolved to a larger context of political/territorial nationalism with an ethnicist inclination and racist tones besides cultural nationalism. Indeed, it is possible to encounter highly examples that can confirm this differentiation in the textbooks of the period. Keeping these examples in mind, three cardinal features of Turks are emphasized in the textbooks such as being perennial, having distinctive/unique essence, and belonging to a pure race. In this section, a detailed assessment of the discursive approach in defining Turks will be undertaken with reference to these components in the textbooks.

The first component is the emphasis on perennial existence of this community. Indeed, the textbooks of the period contend that Turks are unexceptionally one of the ancient people in the world as pointed out by Atatürk.[898] An exact date is not given for the beginning however it is stated in one textbook, "Turkish history starts with the first appearance of human beings in world history."[899] In another, it is stated that the oldest Turks crossed over to Paleolithic Age in twelve thousand years B.C.[900]

In the textbooks, Central Asia was stated as the original "homeland" of ancient Turks, which was "a great land extending from Aegean Sea to Japanese Sea; from Hint Ocean to Northern Baltic Sea…"[901] Although the region was full of fertile wetlands in ancient times, it became drought due to the wild winds from the northern

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[897] *Ibid.*, p. 22.
[898] For examples see. *Yurt Bilgisi (IV. Sınıf)…*, p. 4; *Tarih: IV. Sınıf (İlkokul Kitapları)*, İstanbul: Devlet Basımevi, 1936, p. 11-12, 106.
[899] *Tarih: IV. Sınıf …*, p. 69.
[900] *Tarih I…*, p. 10.
[901] *Ibid.*, p. 25.

east aftermath the Ice Age.[902] In parallel to these, climate and life conditions became worse and worse; thus, ancient Turks moved out of Central Asia through a series of migrations and inhabited different parts of the world at least nine thousands years ago.[903] In this regard, it is crucial to note that narratives about the history of the Turks in Central Asia are identical to those of the preceding period.

The notion of perennial existence is also emphasized in an endeavor to justify Anatolia as the present homeland of Turks. In Atatürk's definition, homeland is "the land in our contemporary political borders where Turkish nation inhibits with the works pre-existing in ancient history and territory."[904] Celal Nuri reports that Turkey belongs to "Turks since the oldest and darkest periods of history."[905] The common point of inhibiting this territory since older times is revealed as the reason why Turkey belongs to Turks. Ideological and historical basis of this belonging are shaped by the Turkish History Thesis which will be discussed in subsequent sections.

As noted, this emphasis about the ancient history of the Turks was prevailing in the textbooks of the preceding period however it is referred more systematically now. There are repetitive explanations of the Turks as being one of the ancient communities in the history. The key point is the continuity between perennial Turks and contemporary Turks within, as discussed previously, the context of Sadak's contextualization of the nation. In this regard, Turkish nation is regarded as a modern phenomenon; on the other hand, Turks are considered originally as a perennial community (*ethnie* or proto-nation) coming from Central Asia. Hence, the alleged continuity in terms of cultural traditions and racial unity constitutes one of the pillars of ethnic- nationalism. According to this understanding, what makes Turks unique and strong today is the historical bond extending from the ancient times. Therefore, based on this nationalist strand, students are reminded constantly to show utmost care for preserving the "sacred heritage" inherited from their great ancestors such as "Turkish language", "Turkish morality", "customs, traditions and interests."[906]

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[902] *Ibid.*, p. 26-27.
[903] *Ibid.*, p.26.
[904] Âfetinan, *Medenî Bilgiler…*, p. 19.
[905] Celal Nuri, *Vatandaşlık (Yurt Bilgisi): İlk Mekteplerin 5inci Sınıfları İçin*, İstanbul: İleri Kütüphanesi, 1931, p. 5.
[906] For examples see. Âfetinan, *Medenî Bilgiler…*, p. 19; *Tarih I...*, p. XI.

The second cardinal feature of Turks emphasized in the textbooks is having distinctive/unique essence. It is another similarity of two periods, even though it becomes more systematic and sophisticated in the textbooks of this period. These are "very strong and creative Turkish nation"[907], "proud and devoted [Turkish] nation"[908], 'Turkish nation with a natural power[909], "Great Turk with high honor, ability, and integrity"[910], "merciful and brave Turkish nation"[911], "heroic Turks"[912], "pure and great Turkish nation"[913], "compassionate/decent Turk"[914]. In a similar vein, Atatürk, in his book, describes Turks as a "unique nation in the world with no equivalent in greatness, perenniality, and pureness."[915] Among those qualifications, other prominent merits could be recounted such as creativity, powerfulness, uniqueness, fearlessness, intelligence, cleanliness, and heroism. More systematically than the preceding period, these elements are considered, in a sense, as Turk's national moral character and identity. Traces of this inclination could also be found in the statements such as

> Turkish nationalism, walking in harmony with contemporary nations, knows the necessity of preserving the *unique character* and *independent identity* of Turkish society. By this, it does not want the non-national (Turk. *milli olmayan*) influences to enter and spread in his own land.[916]

By assuming an "essential" Turkish identity, character, or ethos, writers accept that Turks and Turkishness are "naturally" associated with these credentials listed above. This inclination could also have a prominent role in reproducing the glorified status of the Turkish nation in the eyes of citizens.

In the same background, "military service" occupies a predominant place in the textbooks as one of the essential qualifications of Turks. Pro-militarist inclination continues in this period just like the preceding period. A salient example could be quoted from a primary education fourth grade civics textbook:

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[907] *Tarih IV...*, p. 14.
[908] *Ibid.*
[909] *Ibid.*
[910] *Ibid.*, p. 16.
[911] *Ibid.*, p. 36.
[912] *Tarih III...*, p. p. 3.
[913] *Yurt Bilgisi (IV. Sınıf)…*, p. 4.
[914] *Ibid.*, p. 44.
[915] Âfetinan, *Medenî Bilgiler…*,p. 18.
[916] *Tarih IV...*, p. 182; italics added by me.

Is there a nation other than Turks who have been soldiers for hundred years? Which nation does love soldiery so much, and has been soldier similar to Turks? If we see a soldier, our hearts beat, our tears shed. Our father was a soldier, or grandfather was a soldier, our grand grandfather was a soldier.

Nations in all over the world say how brave, how heroic soldier Turk is. Being a soldier is God's gift to Turk. Turk is the nation who is not terrified to die in the names of great and high ideals and sentiments...[917]

To be soldier means agreeing to kill and to be killed. A soldier runs reluctantly to death; he runs not to die but to kill; but in this run, there is also death. How noble, how sainted (Turk. *mübarek*) the ones who are ready to die for their homeland, nation are.

Therefore, military service is a preparation for the death that unites all citizens…[918]

Narratives about military service and dying for the sake of the homeland are reiterated in other textbooks as well. They are usually considered as the citizens' sacred debts against their nation/state. The nodal point in the quotation above is the depiction of death as a "sainted/sacred" element that unites all citizens apart from the religious references. As there is no hint of Islamic context in the statements, this inclination could be interpreted as an endeavor of a nonreligious sanctification.

Another similarity between the textbooks of two periods is the emphasis on the "civilized" characteristic of the Turkish essential personality/identity. Nevertheless, due to Turkish History Thesis that shapes the official history discourse in this period, narratives about this are evolved to a larger context and more systematically. Accordingly, Turks are defined as the community who developed the first civilization of humanity. Besides, they are also the ones served to emergence of other civilizations by bringing their cultural heritage from Central Asia to different parts of the world. Before moving on to examples, it should be noted that culture is understood at least from the formal definition in this textbook as a concept identical with civilization. For this, "when we say culture, we mean the combination of things a society can do in political life, intellectual life, economic life; civilization is nothing further."[919] However, there is ambiguity within some textbooks in regard to their approaches to culture and civilization similar to textbooks of the preceding

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[917] *Yurt Bilgisi (IV. Sınıf)…*, p. 66.
[918] *Ibid.*, p. 71.
[919] *Tarih I...*, p. 8.

period. For instance, Sadak separates these in his appeal to follow European civilization in the scientific and technical fields, but to keep national character and identity to preserve Turkish culture.[920] In a high school textbook, as noted in the previous paragraph, "Turkish nationalism, walking in harmony with contemporary nations… [is against] the non-national influences to enter and spread in his own land"[921]; shows that there is a separation in minds. Thus, I must say writers of textbooks have an ambivalent attitude towards this issue.

In the related parts of the history textbooks, the following expressions are used for the first steps of civilization by the Turks:

> While, people in the other parts of the world were living in wilderness in the holes of trees and rocks, Turks reached the Wood, Metal Ages in the homeland. The period that clearly separated humanity from animality, and domestication of animals was opened here; the first step of nature's surrender to human, namely farming began here. The origins of grains of barley, wheat, rye as well as animals such as sheep, goats, horses, camels were here…[922]

According to this narrative, all pre-historical periods were lived first and foremost by the Turks as well as farming, and ranching were carried out for the first time by them. In the same textbook, other Turkish innovations/inventions in the world history are listed as following: attire making; domestication of horse and dogs[923]; mining[924]; writing[925]; enforcing family system with official marriage[926]; (private) property[927]; religion[928]; calendar[929]; first art works[930], and etc…

In a similar vein, it is contended that the Turks brought civilization in the course of their movement to native populations living in various regions, including China, India, the Middle East, northern Africa, the Balkans, and other parts of Europe. Writers highlight this process in the following way:

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[920] Sadak, *Sosyoloji…,* p. 45.
[921] *Tarih IV…*, p. 182.
[922] *Tarih I…*, p. 26.
[923] *Ibid.*, p. 12.
[924] *Ibid.*, p. 13-14.
[925] *Ibid.*, p. 41.
[926] *Ibid.*, p. 46.
[927] *Ibid.*,
[928] *Ibid.*, p. 48-49, 53.
[929] *Ibid.*, p. 66.
[930] *Ibid.*, p. 3, 12.

> To find better climates, Turks spread to the four corners with the seeds of civilization at their hand; they looked for beautiful and rich water for farming. They fought with the primitive locals and at the end, they either had driven them away or civilized them. As they had superior intelligence and weapons, it was easy for them to dwell in and rule others. In the vast lands they found, they settled and became indigenous people of those lands.[931]

Relatedly, the first civilization that Turks founded outside of Central Asia is considered to be the Chinese civilization.[932] Indian civilization is another one allegedly established by the Turks. When Turks reached India, they drove away "the dark-skinned tribes which looked like monkeys" down to south; and there, established the Indian civilization "bringing it up to a higher level."[933] It is also narrated that Turks who went to the West established the civilizations in the front Asia, Mesopotamia[934], Egypt[935], Anatolia[936], and the Aegean-Mediterranean.[937] Apart from these, another Turkic group went to Europe and established the foundations of today's Western civilization.[938] It is described in detail that Turks who chose to stay in their homeland instead, also made great contributions to the development of the Central Asian civilization.[939]

Textbook writers seem to have found a valid reason for any objection about the historical remains of all these civilizations. For instance, the reason for no trace of the name, Turk, in the ancient written sources discovered in this region is explained by the writers as in the following citation: "[Those civilizations] were called with the names of the founding tribes or tribal chiefs or the lands where they [were]."[940] Similarly, it is also put forward that "the pronunciation of these names was changed over time to a greater extent; hence, it is not easy to understand at first sight if they are Turkish names."[941]

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[931] *Ibid*., p. 28; for more details see. *Ibid*., p. 54-62.

[932] *Ibid*.,

[933] *Ibid*., p. 29; for more details see. *Ibid*., p. 72-84.

[934] For details see. *Ibid*., p. 85-99.

[935] For details see. *Ibid*., p. 100-125.

[936] For details see. *Ibid*., p. 126-137.

[937] For details see. *Ibid*., p. 137-153.

[938] For details see. *Ibid*., p. 256-342.

[939] For details see. *Ibid*., p. 63-67.

[940] For details see. *Ibid*., p. 33.

[941] For details see. *Ibid*., p. 33.

The third nodal point comes to the fore in a more marked manner by the narratives about Turks through racial references. Even though race is not referred as a cardinal element in the generic definition of nation; writers seem to develop an inclination to use "Turk" with racist inclinations along with political and cultural. In this regard, it would be worthwhile to overlook textbooks for the definitions of and the narrations about race. In *Tarih I* textbook, diversity in climatic conditions is depicted as the reason for the racial differences.[942] Accordingly, the concept is defined as follows: "the uniformity of people who are from the same blood and alike in appearance."[943] Even though it is highlighted that brain (in a sense, mind/intellect) is more prominent than biological traits in the social development of states[944]; it is also echoed along the lines that the shape of the skull "created a fundamental difference amongst people who have come one after the other and have made history over the world."[945] Within this context, Turks are considered to be the "white-skinned" and "large-headed" (*brakisefal*) race.[946] Besides, as in Gökalp, "Turkish race" is recited in the textbooks with frequency as an independent race; thus, it is assumed that Turks constituted a nation as well as an independent race.[947]

After emphasizing the racial diversity as an essential difference amongst various nations, consequently, writers attribute superior qualities to Turkish race. I contend that below lines describing the purity and superiority of Turks as a unique race could be given as a key example:

> Turkish race which created the greatest movements of history is the only one preserved its nature very well. In the pre-historical and historical times, this race also mixed in with the neighbouring races while occupying large lands. In these mixtures, Turkish race never lost its origins as its original features always remained dominant. However some of them, which were exposed to mixtures for longer period and in masses, assimilated and could not preserve their names and languages.
>
> Language, the most precious product of the brain, was well preserved by the most Turkic race in the evolutionary chain of history. In the pre-historical and historical times, members of this race who established many societies,

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[942] *Ibid.*, p. 15.
[943] *Ibid.*, p. 18.
[944] *Ibid.*, p. 17, 19-20.
[945] *Ibid.*, p. 16-17.
[946] *Ibid.*
[947] For examples see *Tarih I...*, p. 18; *Tarih IV...*, p. 182; *Tarih: V. Sınıf…*, p. 188; Celal Nuri, *Vatandaşlık (5'inci Sınıf)…*, p. 5; *Ortamektep İçin Tarih I*, İstanbul: Devlet Basımevi, 1937, p. 21.

civilizations and states influenced each other through common language, culture and genetic qualifications created by their powerful brain.

As we see, the salient unity of the Turkish race in history with obvious structural (Turk. *organik*) qualities, with their powerful brains, with their languages, cultures and common historical memories is by far the best example for the definition of nation.

It is a privilege particularly in our times to see such a great race to be such a great nation in the history; many communities could not achieve this.[948]

Similar expressions are encountered in the primary education civics textbook: "Most nations are constituted later; but Turkish nation whose race has been living for ages is not a cross-breeding (Turk. *türeme*). This is why people from this race should stand so upright and so proud."[949] As could be seen above, it is evident that narratives of the official nationalism are now moving away from ethnicism towards an overtly racial purity and superiority.

In the textbooks, one of the extensions of this inclination is listing historical communities and figures that are believed to be descendants of Turkic origins. In this respect, different names are appeared in the textbooks. However, the crux point is that states known to be Turkic such as the Hun, the Göktürk, the Seljuk, or the Ottoman are recounted as well as many alleged communities whose Turkish descent is contentious today. Giving reference to studies of authors such as Jacques de Morgan, Alexandre Moret, Raphael Pumpelly and Eugene Pittard, below communities are asserted probably from Turkic descent: the *Topa*s, who established the strongest state in North China through half of the sixth century B.C.,[950] The Scythians (Turk. *İskitler*), who founded a great empire in Eastern Europe in the fifth century B.C.,[951] the Amazons, who are well-known with their women warriors,[952] the Mohenjo-Daro and Harappa, who established the first civilization in India in pre-historic times,[953] the Indo-Aryan, who came from Central Asia and inhibited in India at 1500 B.C.,[954] *Saka*s, *Yueçi*s and *Kuşhan*s, who lived in India for hundred years,[955]

[948] *Tarih I...*, p. 20.
[949] *Yurt Bilgisi (IV. Sınıf)…*, p. 4.
[950] *Tarih I...*, p. 66-67.
[951] *Tarih I...*, p. 68-69.
[952] *Ibid.*, p. 70.
[953] *Ibid.*, p. 74.
[954] *Ibid.*, p. 75.
[955] *Ibid.*, p. 77-78.

the Sumerians, the Elamites and partly the Akkadians, who were the progenitors of the Mesopotamian civilization,[956] the Tuareks, who were the oldest community and founder of the civilization in Egypt,[957] the *Ikesus*es, who invaded Ancient Egypt in Pharaoh times,[958] the Hittites, who established the first civilization in Anatolia,[959] the *Trak*s, who founded the city of Troy in the Aegean region,[960] Phrygians (Turk. *Frigler*), Misia, Bitinia and Paflagonia[961], Meonia, Sart, *Turşa,* and Lydians (Lidyalılar),[962] Phoenicians,[963] *Part*s,[964] Ancient Greek Civilizations such as Hellens, Akas (Turk. *Ege*), Mycenaeans (Turk. *Miken*), Tors (Turk. *Dor*), *Krak*s (Turk. *Grek*), Ionians, Phokaians, Spartans (Turk. *Isparta*), Athens, Macedonians[965], and the Etruscans (Turk. *Etrüskler*).[966] Apart from these, the Carthaginians (Turk. *Kartacalılar*), the *Ligür*s, the Kimris (Turk. *Kimerler*), the Gauls, the Iberians, the Celtics, the Belgaens (Turk. *Belçikalılar*), the Alans, the Suevs and the Vandals are considered to be Turkic.[967] In the textbooks, the Germanic people are reported to be from Central Asia as their west wing became German, Frank, and Anglo-Saxon communities, their east wing became the Got communities composed of the Visigoth and the Ostrogoth implicitly considered being descendant from Turkic origins.[968] In addition to these, the Bulgarians and the Hungarians are accepted to be from Turkic descent.[969] It is also reported that the *Berberî* tribes in Africa are Turkic.[970]

In a similar context, various names from the world history are recounted allegedly descended from Turkic origin. Many names are recounted such as: Fu-Hi, founder of the first state in China,[971] *Çenk* the first emperor of the Qing dynasty,[972] Buddha,[973]

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[956] *Ibid*., p. 88.
[957] *Ibid*., p. 103.
[958] *Ibid*., p. 112.
[959] *Ibid*., p. 126.
[960] *Ibid*., p. 137.
[961] *Ibid*., p. 137-138.
[962] *Ibid*., p. 141.
[963] *Ibid*., p. 146.
[964] *Ibid*., p. 178.
[965] *Ibid*., p. 185, 190, 199, 205, 210, 239.
[966] *Ibid*., p. 260-263.
[967] *Ibid*., p. 32-32, 275, 305; *Tarih II...*, s. 132.
[968] *Tarih II...*, p. 18, 31, 33.
[969] *Ibid*., p. 65, 69.
[970] *Ibid*., p. 131.
[971] *Tarih I...*, p. 56.
[972] *Ibid*., p. 57.
[973] *Ibid*., p. 76.

Confucius,[974] *Kanişka* of India,[975] Khian, the leader of Egypt,[976] Flabernas, the founder of Hittite state, and King Subbiluliyuma,[977] the Frig Kings, Midas and Gordiyos,[978] and Lydian King Gyges.[979] What is more, all political, literary, and philosophical figures of Ancient Greece,[980] Alexander the Great, the King of Macedonia,[981] Spartacus, the head of gladiators,[982] Aetyüs, the West-Rome governor,[983] *Berberî* commander, Tarık bin Ziyat,[984] the Sufi Mewlana Jalaluddin Rumi,[985] and the Soviet leader, Vladimir Illich Lenin are also considered to be Turkic.[986]

The aim of highlighting numerous states and names allegedly descended from Turkish race could be creating a motivation in students to feel privilege and sense of pride in carrying the same blood with this lineage. Therefore, in this context, such expressions could also be considered as an extension of racist inclinations of writers. A clear example for this appears as a summary in the following lines:

> There has been no race comparable to Turks in the history of humanity who has established so many and so great states. Since the first civilized society in the history (the Sumerian Empire, 4000 B.C.), dynasties, khans, khanates were founded in Asia and Europe by the Turks. Immediately after a Turkic state passed into history, several Turkic states appeared in the history scene one after another.[987]

In this regard, it can be stated that racist inclinations of nationalism also appears in the textbooks possibly under the influence of rising racist-fascist political-ideological trend in Europe. Nevertheless, it does not arrive at a militant approach which claims cleansing of other racial groups like Hitler adopted. Therefore, it can be considered

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[974] *Tarih: IV. Sınıf...*, p. 132.
[975] *Tarih I...*, p. 78.
[976] *Ibid.*, p. 115.
[977] *Ibid.*, p. 128-129.
[978] *Ibid.*, p. 139.
[979] *Ibid.*, p. 142.
[980] *Ibid.*, p. 200-203.
[981] *Ibid.*, p. 240.
[982] *Ibid.*, p. 300; For Spartacus, it is not explicitly stated that he is 'Turkic' but, in the former lines, it is pointed out that people of Trace are narrated as Turkish descendant. Hence, based on this assumption he is probably depicted as Turk.
[983] *Tarih II...*, p. 33.
[984] *Ibid.*, p. 133.
[985] *Ibid.*, p. 286.
[986] *Tarih IV...*, p. 6.
[987] *Ibid.*, p. 1.

as a tactical effort which distinctively aimed to eliminate the ideas claiming inferiority of Turks against Europeans.

After evaluation of the narrations about Turks, at this point, I discuss the statements about the state and Atatürk, two other salient components in Turkish nationalist discourse. In this regard, writers define both as the manifestations/extensions of the nation; hence, the state and the founder of the state share the sublime qualities once attributed to Turkish nation/race. In this part, I begin with the analysis of the expressions about the state in textbooks.

In this period, the state is accrued a special position as the personified body of sovereignty and collective conscience of the nation (Turk. *milletin hakimiyet ve iradesinin cisimleşmiş hali*). In this scope, *Medeni Bilgiler* textbook primarily portrays national sovereignty rather with a religious- mythological style as cited: "[it is a] divine light/fire (Turk. *nur*) in the face of which all the chains melt, crowns and thrones turn into ashes, and kings devastate."[988] Then, the relation between nation and state is explained through the first articles of *Teşkilatı Esasiye* (the Constitution):

> In our opinion, political power, national will and sovereignty belongs to the collective personality/conscience of the nation, which is one and cannot be separated. It is centralized in the nation as well as the parliament, the representative body. Thus, for us, this power cannot be divided. In this regard:

> The valid form of government is the contemporary form of administration for Turkish nation. By this, the Grand National Assembly performs the right of sovereignty in the name of the nation. The president of the Republic and deputies are elected among the members of the parliament. Sovereignty is one, absolutely belongs to the nation. This is the most successful form of government.[989]

In a similar vein, it is perhaps more understandable and expressed in a simple manner as following:

> We know that state is the nation itself. States are not the rulers of nations. Since the sovereignty belongs to nation. However, there are legal relations between the nation and administrators. From this relationship, the idea of representation is born. We can comment on what representation means:

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[988] Âfetinan, *Medenî Bilgiler…*, p. 35.
[989] *Ibid.*, p. 33-34.

Nation is the fundamental/primary (Turk. *asıldır*). Deputies can only be representatives. They run state affairs on behalf of the nation. The nation participates in state affairs through various means. Especially they elect these representatives.[990]

As above quotations point out, the source of the state authority and its associated forces is the nation itself. For Atatürk, in spite of nation's absolute power, this had to be deposited to specific people to work on behalf of the nation within a system called representative democracy. Since direct democracy is seemed impossible at present time.[991] For this reason, these representatives are elected by the public directly by elections.[992] Therefore, the legal power of states in representative democracies comes from the fact that individuals voluntarily transfer their sovereignty and will to state.

However, this transfer brings a paradox with itself. Although, in principle, the nation is the source of power, it is understood from the writers' inclination that the state also deserves as much respect and loyalty as the nation itself. Moreover, this power is practically collected in the state since people are able to use their rights only on certain days exclusively by participating in the elections. Indeed, Atatürk states this as follows: "the nation performs its sovereignty and its participation in state affairs only through giving vote when necessitated."[993] As a result, administration's identification with such a power actually brings the state to a position exceeding the status of nation. Thus, Atatürk, not surprisingly, delivers a position to the state over the nation in the further lines:

…The state must have a unique authority and power over the nation in order to provide individual freedom, and secure the future of the nation and the homeland.[994]

We call this power of the state as unique. Indeed, nobody gave this power to the state. It is such a political power that is inherent in the very idea of the state. Hence, the state has the right to perform this power over the nation and defend it against the other nations.

We call this political power as "the will, or sovereignty." [995]

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[990] *Ibid.* ,p. 83.
[991] *Ibid.*, p. 85.
[992] *Ibid.*, p. 32, 85.
[993] *Ibid.*, p. 32.
[994] *Ibid.*, p. 26.

As quotations put forward, influence and power of the state over individuals comes from the nation as the personified body performing the nation's sovereignty.

In line with this perspective, the supreme position of the state, on the other hand, determines inevitably the nature and quality of the relationship that will be established with the individuals. Relatedly, rights of the individuals are narrated predominantly with regard to the responsibilities of individuals against the supreme/divine state in the civics textbooks. Another nodal point is the duties of citizens such as voting, tax paying, and military services are instilled as the "sacred" duties in the same textbooks.[996] This inevitably encourages an unquestionable position for these duties. Thus, in this respect, I contend that this is an indicator for the glorification of the state (as a manifestation of the nation).

Atatürk, leader of the regime, is one of the other dominant components of the official nationalist discourse all textbook writers treat in harmony. Similar to the state, his supremacy is also considered to be a manifestation of nation's collective consciousness. This aspect is echoed in one statement as follows:

> Extraordinary power reserved in the yeast of the Turkish nation appears as heroes who changed the course of history, and manipulated (Turk. *ellerinde oynatan*) religions, and civilizations since the ancient past. When the Ottoman Empire was about to pass, Turkish power has again created such a representative: *Mustafa Kemal*.[997]

Different textbooks narrate Atatürk as an incarnation of the national existence such as: "Mustafa Kemal representing the Turkish nation,"[998] "*Mustafa Kemal,* the symbol of the nation, *the incarnation of the nation,*"[999] "*Mustafa Kemal* representing the power and life of the nation"[1000], etc.…

In all textbooks, Writers' inclination to depict Atatürk as the symbol of nation brings glorifying attributes for him just like the nation and the state. Adjectives such as "*hazretleri*", "*ulu gazi*", "*emsalsiz reis*"[1001], etc. are used every time he is mentioned.

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[995] *Ibid.*, p. 27.
[996] See. *Ibid.*, p. 79, 95.
[997] *Tarih IV...*, p. 14.
[998] *Ibid.*, p. 15.
[999] *Ibid.*, p. 16.
[1000] *Ibid.*,
[1001] *Ibid.*, p. 39.

What is more, writers regard him as the "chosen person" with a perfect nature. It is possible to give abound examples from textbooks for this:

> Gazi; he is *the sun-headed being* (Turk. *güneş başlı varlık*) who dismissed the darkness out of East.[1002]

> Gazi, *with his supreme existence above all individuals*, was leading the revolutions from the beginning to the end; he himself gave the orders and managed the process. We see him in the Abdülhamidian Era dealing with the tyranny. We watch him on the hills of *Anafarta* [and] on the sands of Tripoli like *an eagle tearing his enemies into pieces*. We see him in the valley of Jerusalem walking *like a prophet*. At last, *the world knows him as a figure vanished in history (*Turk*. tarihe karışmış) after fighting in every corner of Turkey as a Saviour*.[1003]

> Gazi, is the highest and greatest of all men on the Earth…[1004]

> We know that *he is awake while we are all sleeping*; *He is the one who is thinking every goodness, feeling every danger first*.[1005]

> Mustafa Kemal, today's greatest hero, had a bullet in the highest minute of the War of Dardanelles while he was standing very close to the enemy. He is wounded from the heart. However, the thing was that, *no wonder, our hero was still standing straight*. Because the bullet broke the watch on the hero's heart into pieces, and could not touch upon the heart carrying the great faith and brevity the Turkish nation.[1006]

> In the military high school, he attracted the attention of his teachers with his *high intelligence* (Turk. *ateşli zekası*), *extraordinary abilities, especially unprecedented talent* in maths. As he advanced in every way, his teachers needed to behave him as a mature, and one of his friends.[1007]

> …with his friendliness and high wisdom, Mustafa Kemal *built a spiritual influence over his friends* and they have loved him…[1008]

> Mustafa Kemal *was naturally born as a democrat*…[1009]

> *In the beginning of the war, he was able to see the end of it.* [1010]

> Enver Pasha, the vice commander, was timid towards this man *who always sees the right, who always says the right, who never misses the wrong ideas and moves of others and did never hesitate to reveal them, and was successful in everything* until that time.[1011]

[1002] Kazım Sevinç, *Türk Yavrularına Yurt Bilgisi – Sınıf: 4*, İstanbul: Ekspres Matbaası, 1931-1932, p. 80.

[1003] Sevinç, *Türk Yavrularına Yurt Bilgisi – Sınıf: 5…*, p. 36-37.

[1004] *Yurt Bilgisi (İlkmektep Kitapları: V. Sınıf)*, İstanbul: Türk Kitapçılığı Limited Şirketi, 1934, p. 19. In this part, Italics are added by me.

[1005] *Tarih IV. Sınıf…*, p. 16.

[1006] *Ibid.*, p. 32.

[1007] *Ibid.*, p. 17.

[1008] *Ibid.*

[1009] *Ibid.*, p. 20.

[1010] *Ibid.*, p. 21.

[1011] *Ibid.*

All the events to be narrated below will be the evidence for Atatürk's seeing the future clearly and evidently.[1012]

They did not show little sympathy to this genius that *sees the real meaning and nature of the events* (Turk. *durumların gerçek mana ve mahiyetlerini olduğu gibi görebilen).*[1013]

In glorification of Atatürk, it is obvious that some concepts are overtly borrowed from the vocabulary of Abrahamic religions, particularly Islam. As the merits attributed to him above are used in the holy books of the revealed religions for referring the prophets. For instance, the ability to see the real meaning and nature of the things (Turk. *eşyanın hakikatini bilme yetisi*) indicates the prophetic vision to understand/realize the exact divine name/power within that thing in Islamic terminology (especially in Sufism). According to religious context, this gift is unique to those chosen by God.[1014] Therefore, this can be considered as a connotation about his chosenness by God. Be that as it may, although Ataturk's exceptional merits exist in many textbooks, it should be noted that they are not stated with Islamic references. In this regard, writers essentially seem to be emphasizing his distinctive feature rather than pursuing an Islamic legitimation for him. Indeed in the textbooks, Atatürk's position is unique amongst all the other names including İnönü who are depicted with respect and reverence for their contributions to the establishment of the state.

After evaluating the constitutive components of nationalist discourse, in this section, I discuss the "others" of this discourse as narrated in the textbooks. In this regard, "the last period of the Ottoman Empire", "religious bigotry and ignorance," and "Caliphate and *Ulema"* are the themes which frequently invoked through negative expressions.

Similar to the textbooks of the preceding period, there is a compromise among writers about the start of decline in Ottoman Era through the last period of Sultan Suleiman. In line with this premise, it is argued that a period of arbitrariness, confusion, and anarchy emerged in the aftermath of the Sultan Suleiman reign similar to the textbooks of the preceding period. One of the textbooks portrays the

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[1012] *Ibid.,* p. 43.
[1013] *Ibid.,* p. 44.
[1014] Seyyid Hüseyin Nasr, *Bilgi ve Kutsal,* (trans.) Yusuf Yazar, 2nd. ed., İstanbul: İz Yayıncılık, 2001.

Ottoman sultans after him as follows: "[They] began to have a passive and closed life in the harem; they were rarely seen at the head of military; instead of strong, warrior rulers, they were replaced by unintelligent, unenergetic, lazy figures (Turk. *korkuluklar*)."[1015] Nevertheless, two sultans, Abdülhamid the Second and Vahdettin are evoked vehemently with hatred by the writers. In the eyes of the writers, Abdülhamid carries the flag of "evilness" forward compared to latter. Indeed, Abdülhamid is declared in almost all textbooks as the enemy of the nation, identified with villainy, and charged with creating a hellish environment.[1016] Hence, he is portrayed as if he is the only person responsible for all the devastations in the last period of the Empire. A specific example could be given from *Medeni Bilgiler*. In his comments on the period of Abdulhamid the Second while explaining the establishment of Republic, Atatürk associates all the goodness and beauties with the nation and the Republic; whereas the monarchy, and the Abdülhamid specifically, are identified with all the villainy, darkness, pain, and suffering.[1017] The abound depictions about sultans, sufferings and the dark period are compatible with the religious- mythological stories of the traditional societies, and highly effective with the images of the Evil and hell. It is also meaningful that Atatürk compares and contrasts the dark and hellish nature of the rule of sultan Abdülhamid with the light and power of civilized world. For him, civilized world is the highest rank for a nation as opposed to sultanate as the lowest. [1018]

Within the same context, religious bigotry (Turk. *taassup*), asceticism, and ignorance are also accommodated by negative treatment of the official discourse.[1019] It is asserted that bigotry appeared in the time of Bayazıd the Second. Below, writer explains this period further:

> …in the reign of Bayazıt there were reactionary attitudes in the politics and public life. The defeat of the Ottoman army in the Egypt effected Bayazıt's sick and weak spirit. This probably worsened these attitudes. "*Molla Arap*" and *Hatipzade* directed this opium addict ruler towards asceticism, dervishism and religious bigotry. In the time of Bayazıt the Second, *Tokatlı Lütfi* who was a

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[1015] *Tarih III*..., p. 62.
[1016] For examples see. *Tarih: IV. Sınıf…*, p. 17-18, 26-27; Sevinç, *Türk Yavrularına Yurt Bilgisi – Sınıf: 5…*, p. 14-15; *Yurt Bilgisi (IV.. Sınıf)…*, p. 14-16.
[1017] Âfetinan, *Medenî Bilgiler*..., p. 35-36.
[1018] *Ibid.*
[1019] For examples see Mitat Sadullah, *Yeni Yurt Bilgisi Sınıf: 3*, İstanbul: Türk Kitapçılığı Şirketi, 1934-1935, p. 67; *Yurt Bilgisi (IV. Sınıf)…*, p. 45-46; *Yurt Bilgisi (V. Sınıf)…*, p. 42.

great scholar was prosecuted for allegedly committing *kufr*. (1494, 1495).What is more, local and European artists were dismissed from the Palace; statutes and paintings, many art works were removed from walls and sold in the bazaar; holy places of Christians were turned into mosques; covenants were turned into *tekke*s, Eastern scholars and thinkers were regarded highly in the place. They also instilled asceticism, and they called the sultan as *Veli*. As in many states, the palace was considered to be the pioneer in the Ottoman land at that time as well; state actors were also pretending to be ascetic. In brief, there was a reactionary movement pertaining to the reign of Beyazıt in the Ottoman Era.[1020]

In the books, there is also a negative treatment towards the "Caliphate". A textbook writer looks down to caliphate and states that this title did not gain political power for sultans on the contrary, "was both an obstacle to progress and development and the reason for bigotry and ignorance in the Ottoman Era ..."[1021]

Relatedly, the clergy in the Ottoman Era is generally depicted negatively in the textbooks. It is possible to observe this negativity in the below lines. Writer's stance is as follows,

> The majority of the clergy was unaware of the general state of the world; thoroughly did not understand the needs of the century. Among them, there were some certain people who were broadly thinking, but most of them were *narrow minded and bigots.* They objected to some institutions and military regulations that were enforced in line with the European inventions. For example, fatwas were required to establish the printing press and implement quarantine in the Ottoman country. Even if the highest of them, Şeyhülislam declares fatwas for these aims, they object to him. A *Şeyhülislam* even prepared and directed a reactionary revolt against the military reform of Selim the Third. The clergy had a terrific gun at their hand: *Fatwa*. They could become an obstacle to everything; they could get rid of and dethrone queens, grand viziers, or even sultans. They were barriers in front of the free administration of the state...[1022]

Hence, writers affirms the process of minimizing this spiritual power over central authority as a part of modernist project since Mahmud the Second; and paved the way towards formation of an irreligous national identity. [1023]

After a detailed assessment of the elements that constitute the nationalist discourse over textbooks, I embark upon the historical development of Turkish nationalism in

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[1020] *Tarih III*..., p. 45.
[1021] *Ibid*., p. 47.
[1022] *Ibid*., p. 207.
[1023] *Ibid*., p. 204, 207.

the last section. The first salient point is that Turkish nationalism is accepted as a modern phenomenon whereas national sentiments of Turks are presented as pre-existent by the writers. It would be worthwhile to look at different textbooks for examples.

As an introduction, I start with the statements of Sadak. Author, indeed, reveals a detailed sociological picture on the development of Turkish nationalism. For him, Turkish nationalism occurs as a consequence of historical and social developments in the decline of the Ottoman Era. In this regard, writer sees the weakening of the Empire's central administrative structure cardinal for the spread of the idea of nationalism in individuals.[1024] Nevertheless, according to Sadak, national sentiments are also asserted to live in hearts of individuals till those ages. Therefore, he posits an important role specifically to the works of intellectuals writing about the Turkish history and culture in the transformation of national sentiments into a mass political movement in the last period of the Empire. In this context, as noted previously, Ahmet Vefik Pasha and Süleyman Pasha are amongst the names praised for their pioneering works in this field.[1025] Especially after the revolution in 1908, the ideas of "nation is Turk, language is Turkish" and "old and glorious past of the Turk"[1026] were spread to individuals through publications and organizations. Sadak also underlines the prominence of THRS and TLRS with regard to their roles in the development of national identity and unity in the Republican period. He denigrates the forms of Turkish nationalism based on religion, or the idea of *Turan* and clearly espouses a form of nationalism based on history, culture, and homeland/state.[1027] Sadak, lastly, asserts that Turkish nationalism is the product of the nation -"the great national conscience" as written by him- fighting with the same feelings, thoughts, and ideas in the War of Independence notwithstanding the impact of academic studies. For this reason, he contends Turkish nationalism as a principle, different from other examples, absolutely taking its strength from the people.[1028]

[1024] Sadak, *Sosyoloji…*, p. 43.
[1025] *Ibid.*, p. 43-44.
[1026] *Ibid.*, p. 44.
[1027] *Ibid.*, p. 45.
[1028] *Ibid.*, p. 45-46.

This narrative is reiterated in the civics and history textbooks as well. They generally perceive Turkish nationalism as a consequence of the modern era and know the prominence of the works of intellectuals during the last period of the Ottoman Era.[1029] Moreover, they also approach towards national sentiments, as in Sadak, as priori/ahistorical elements. To quote further: "There are bitter sweet feelings in people. Some of them are temporary; some of them are never ending just like the love for one's mother. National feeling is like this."[1030] As pointed out by the quotation, writers state that national sentiments naturally exist in every Turk. However, in the Ottoman Era, there was a social and ideological structure that tried to instil these sentiments. Still, revival of the national identity and character are provided by the Republic again.[1031] Similarly, Atatürk highlights the necessity of a mass mobilization (Turk. *kitlesel seferberlik*) for strengthening national sentiments. For this,

> the objective of the national education for the children of the nation by the mothers, fathers, teachers and the elderlies of the nation, at home, in school, in the military, in the factory, in everywhere and in every assignment shall be to strengthen that extraordinary national feeling.[1032]

After assessing how writers handled Turkishness and Turkish nationalism in the textbooks, I will focus in the upcoming section on the role of religion in the definition of Turkishness.

5.4. Turkishness and Islam in the Textbooks

The most significant difference that distinguishes textbooks from the preceding period's is that religion/Islam does not constitute the backbone of the dominant official discourse. In parallel to secularism principle of the regime, Islam no longer exists as the fundamental component in the formation of national identity. In my in-depth reading of materials of this period, I rarely encountered with the expressions that conflate Turkishness and Islam, even Sunnism. In this section, I first present a

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[1029] For examples see *Tarih IV…*, p. 181-183.
[1030] *Yurt Bilgisi (IV. Sınıf)…,* p. 5-6.
[1031] For examples see *Tarih: IV. Sınıf…,* p. 12; *Tarih IV…*, p. 183.
[1032] Âfetinan, *Medenî Bilgiler...,* p. 20-21.

quantitative assessment, and then focus on the narratives pertaining to the relationship between Turkishness and Islam in the textbooks.

In the high school textbooks, the pages allocated to pre-Islamic Turkish history and Turkish-Islamic history are presented in the below Table-5. In the textbooks, the Republican Era is handled as a secular regime; hence, I also added a third period to table beginning after the abolishment of Caliphate.

Table 5 - A Comparison of the Pages Allocated to Pre- Islamic Turkish History, Turkish-Islamic History, and Republican Era in the History Textbooks

	Pre-Islamic Turkish History (page numbers)	Turkish-Islamic History (page numbers)	Republican Era History (page numbers)
Tarih I	38	-	-
Tarih II	42	124	-
Tarih III	-	167	-
Tarih IV	-	155	179
Total	**80**	**446**	**179**

According to table above, it is observed that Turkish- Islamic history still occupies larger space in the history textbooks. However, it should be noted that Islamic elements hold a secondary place even in the narration of Turkish-Islamic societies/states. Hence, a qualitative analysis will be more meaningful to put forward the perspective of the nationalist discourse on religion.

Complementary to distanced stance toward metaphysical religions, Islam is not integrated into the secular nationalist discourse to define national identity in the textbooks. Different than the preceding period, Islam is not juxtaposed as one of the components of national identity. Besides, religious commitment is addressed as a factor that hampers the development of Turkish identity and nationalism. The most obvious example appears in *Medeni Bilgiler*. Here, Atatürk defines Turkish

nationalism particularly by keeping it separate from Islam. He further states that religion could be evoked by some as a component of national identity but this is not valid for at least the Turkish nation. For him, Islam is not empowering national belonging on the contrary, has a weakening effect. Below, Atatürk offers his stance:

> Turks were a great nation even before adopting Islam. After adopting, this religion had no influence for Arabs, Persians, and Turks to come together and form a nation. On the contrary, religion weakened the national belonging of Turkish people; even further numbed their national excitement and national sentiments. This was natural. Because the objective of the religion Muhammad formed was a politics of *ummah* over all nations.[1033]

In a similar vein, this inclination is observed in the history textbooks. In the prefaces, it is complained that the Christian historians always described Turkish history in a biased manner until that day. Besides, equally, "Turkish and Islamic historians merged Turkishness and Turkish civilization with Islam and Islamic civilization."[1034] Within this context, it is underlined that the latter *ummah*-leaning (Turk. *ümmetçi*) understanding specifically focused on a special effort to distract Turks from their Pre-Islamic past.[1035]

While Atatürk recites the weakening power of religion over the citizens; he eludes from recounting religion among the cardinal components of Turkish identity. It is foregrounded by Atatürk that any religion (Islam or any other) could have no prominence in the formation of Turkish nation and nationalism. His contention is compatible with the following statement: "After Christian and Jewish citizens who are living with us connect their destiny and fortune to Turkish nation voluntarily, they become a part of civilized Turkish nation."[1036] Therefore, even non-Muslim communities could be assumed as Turkish for Atatürk as long as they feel national sentiments and excitements and see themselves part of the Turkish existence – although it is quite uncertain that how this will be compatible with the issue of racial/ancestral unity.

[1033] *Ibid.*, p. 21. Toprak states that these lines did not appear in the textbook although Atatürk dictated them to Afet İnan. Toprak, "'Mukaddes'ten 'Temeddün'e Kültür Devrimi", *Darwin'den Dersim'e Cumhuriyet ve Antropoloji*…, p. 256.
[1034] *Tarih I*..., p. XI.
[1035] *Ibid.*
[1036] Âfetinan, *Medenî Bilgiler*..., p. 23.

Despite the explicitly negative attitude of textbooks towards religion, there are few statements that conflate Turkishness and Islam. In this section, I analyse them from a thematic viewpoint as in the previous chapter.

The first theme that associates Turkishness with Islam appears in the narration of contributions of the Turks' to Islamic civilization. Within this context, positive influences of the Turks are glorified effusively:

> In the Abbasid Era, Turks regained the highest position not only in military affairs, but also administrative and financial affairs. After that, Islam spread fast among Turks. Because, Muslim Turks were not considered to be slaves in the Abbasid period contrary to the Umayyad period. In fact, Turks dominated the Abbasid Empire, not Arabs.[1037]

> In the Islamic period, there was great progress in science and education. However, in this period, scholars engaged in science were not Arabs, they were from other societies. Islamic civilization was indebted to other nations, especially Turks and Persians. When Islam emerged, Turks already had a great and old civilization. After adopting Islam, they became one of the dominant actors in the development and spreading of this religion.[1038]

> The Seljuk state established the magnificent Muslim-Turk Empire extending from Easter Turkish land to Mediterranean, from Caucasus Mountains to Indian Ocean. Islamic world that was drowned with denominational conflicts came back to life under the reign of Seljuk sultans.[1039]

> Islam entered and spread to India thanks to Turks. If there are 70 million Muslims in India today, this is by the influence of Turks.[1040]

The common point of the above narrations is the preponderance of Muslim identity over Turkishness. In this regard, the importance of Islam emphasized through the contributions of Turks in the development of Islamic civilization.

In the textbooks, another theme for this stance comes up in the context of Ottoman Era at least pertaining to narrations of the classical period. In this regard, Mehmet the Second is treated with reverence among all sultans. Indeed, writers vehemently acclaim the cultural, artistic, and philosophical developments of his period.[1041]

[1037] *Ortamektep İçin Tarih II*, İstanbul: Devlet Matbaası, 1934, p. 81.
[1038] *Ibid.*, p. 83.
[1039] *Ibid.*, p. 117.
[1040] *Ibid.*, p. 161.
[1041] For examples see *Tarih II*..., p. 32-44.

Another theme for the conflation of Turkishness and Islam could be found in the narratives about Christians. Accordingly, negative treatment emerges in the expressions of the Crusades. In this respect, one of the reasons for the Crusades is depicted as the Turks having caused deep dismay in Europe. In one textbook, Crusades are defined as "the repetitive and long-running expeditions conducted by European Christians with the goal of regaining the control of Jerusalem from Turks."[1042] Along the lines, the same writer highlights that in the Ottoman Era, Turks' expansion to Balkans intimidated even Bulgarians and Hungarians, who were originally Turkic descent. Besides, he expresses his discomfort about their call for another crusade against Turks: "They were opposed to Muslim-Turks in the face of the danger of losing their lands and with Christian efforts rather than be pleased with this achievement."[1043] While narrating the Turkish Independence War, the same author states as follows: "Christians in the homeland implicitly or explicitly worked for their personal interests."[1044] He is, in a sense, keeping Christians apart from Muslim-Turkish identity and condemning them as betrayers.

Discriminative statements against Alevism/Bektashism constitute another theme which is also essential for our discussion. Indeed, this particular religious order is defined in some textbooks as heresy, or deviation from Islam; thus, it can be argued that Turkishness is associated with Sunni Islam. Below, the historical account of denominational separation among Turks is explained as following:

> [13th century Anatolia] As opposed to Sunnism in the cities, the religious life was shaped differently in villages and rural areas especially among Turkmen tribes: Besides assuming themselves genuine Muslims, Turkmen people were devoted to ancient Shaman practices; thus, their interpretation of Islam was quite different. Exclusion of women from general life contrary to ancient Turkish practices, prohibition of feasts (Turk. *şölen*s) with music and drinking by the Sharia, bringing of some compulsory provisions such as fasting, praying, pilgrimage, which were in conflict with Turkmen traditions, they did not suit to Turkmen way of living. In the meantime some Turkmen ascetics made a simple propaganda of Sufism; and invented an Islamic path fused with Shaman traditions. This was close to Shia belief rather than Sunnism; and it appeared in Anatolia with different names for centuries: This is all about the core of beliefs

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[1042] *Ortamektep İçin Tarih II…*, p. 123.
[1043] *Ibid.*, p. 167.
[1044] *Ibid.*, p. 169.

from 13th century onwards known such as the Babai, the Bektashi, the Kızılbaş, the Tahtacı, and the Çepni.[1045]

Writer thinks that nomadic rural Turkmen groups developed this particular form of belief, known in Turkey today as Alevism, articulating Shamanism with Islam conveniently for themselves. Along the lines, spread of such religious orders among Muslim Turks in Anatolia is regarded as a threat to spiritual unity of Anatolia – probably, implying spiritual unity of Turks- and hence, regarded as heretical.[1046] It is understood from writer's discomfort that he postulates Turks to be Sunni.

Due to the fact that such examples remarkably appear in the same textbooks, especially in the secondary school textbooks, I prefer to express this inclination bringing Turkishness and Islam (even Sunnism) together as individual strands of the authors making a breach in the dominant discourse. Therefore, considering the frequency of examples separating nation and religion from each other, it is not possible to generalize such an inclination for the other textbooks in the period.

In conclusion, between 1931 and 1939, the dominant discourse in the textbooks of civics, history, and sociology is secular nationalism different than the preceding period. Textbooks posit the preponderance of a positivist-materialist perspective as opposed to all religions including Islam and metaphysical God understanding. In parallel to this, they construct a nationalism seeking legitimacy from irreligious basis rather than religious sources. In the textbooks, Turkish identity is defined with political/territorial as well as cultural elements with racist tones. Besides, there are exceptional examples that juxtapose Turkishness and Islam; however, they are not extensive enough for a secular nationalist discourse. As a conclusion, I contend that textbooks of this period are, at discursive level, in conformity with the policies of the state in this period.

[1045] *Tarih II...*, p. 284
[1046] *Ibid.*, p. 284

CHAPTER 6

REVIVAL OF TURKISH-ISLAMIC IN THE TEXTBOOKS
BETWEEN 1939 AND 1950

The last sub-section of my dissertation covers the period from 1939 until 1950. The presidency of İsmet İnönü in the aftermath of Atatürk's death, and the accession to multi-party regime were the prominent political and historical developments of these years. As I discuss in depth previously, the various internal and external pressures accompanied by the international conjuncture escalated to a certain degree in these years. In the long run, the ruling party compelled to step back in certain matters including religion on the face of the growing public opposition. This historical conjuncture had important implications for the education system and eventually, for the school textbooks. First and foremost, there was a gradual shift from the dominant secular nationalist discourse towards the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis paradigm again. On the one hand, history textbooks for primary and secondary education were kept in the curriculum for some time; on the other hand, former high school textbooks of history and civics were abandoned straightaway. Then, new authors were appointed to write new textbooks for these courses. Besides, in 1947, Necmeddin Sadak's sociology textbook was replaced with *Sosyoloji* book by Nurettin Topçu. Another cardinal issue was the government's initial response to public criticisms by restoring the religion course in the curriculum. For this reason, a textbook entitled *Müslüman Çocuğun Kitabı* was written by Nurettin Artam and Nurettin Sevin in 1948. As we will see in the rest of the chapter, these were the harbingers of the shift in the official discourse.

In this chapter, I will discuss the components of the discursive shift on nationalism and religion particularly through textbooks of history, civics, sociology and religion.

6.1. General Information about the Textbooks of the Period

As touched upon previously, the school textbooks were shaped within the political conjuncture of İnönü's accession to power in the aftermath of Atatürk's death and the

growing public opposition against RPP policies by force of the multiparty regime. The ups and downs in the international setting throughout 1940s including the Second World War influenced the in-house restructuring policies of the state to a large extent. As I discuss in the third chapter, this transformation process brought a mild break with the former approaches towards religion and nationalism. Still, it is argued in numerous sources that this breaking point was reflected into the state policies since the mid-1940s. Be that as it may, it can be contended that the paradigm shift came up in the education context earlier than expected. Straightaway in the early 1940s, textbooks that reproduced the rigid secularist and nationalist discourse of the preceding period were withdrawn from the curriculum.

In a similar vein, we should keep in mind that the state commenced to select textbooks by competition method according to the decision taken at the Education Council Meeting in 1939.[1047] Therefore, a plethora of new authors as well as new textbooks in diverse fields emerged along with the ethos of the new era.

Initially, high school history textbooks and Afetinan's *Medeni Bilgiler* which were the fundamental textbooks of the Kemalist ideology were sacrificed in 1939- one year after Atatürk's death. The new textbook for the high school 1st grade was written by Şemsettin Günaltay, who was one of the prominent politicians/scientists of the regime and as well, the prime minister of late 1940s. His positive attitude towards religion distinguished him from the other textbook writers of the period. Some claimed that he was a pro-Islamic reformist; however I contend that he could be depicted a modernist traditionalist in favor of Turkish-Islamic Synthesis. Primarily, being faithful to Turkish History Thesis, he embraced an Islamic interpretation of nationalism along with his studies on Islam and Turkish history.[1048] As a continuation of his understanding, history textbook embodied remarkable differences from the former textbooks on twofold aspect. The first one is about the issue of 'evolution theory'. In his book, he was unconcerned with the theory which

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[1047] Füsun Üstel, "*Makbul Vatandaş"ın Peşinde: II. Meşrutiyet'ten Bugüne Vatandaşlık Eğitimi*, İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2004, p. 154.

[1048] For the discussions see Zafer Toprak, "'Mukaddes'ten 'Temeddün'e Kültür Devrimi", *Darwin'den Dersim'e Cumhuriyet and Antropoloji* içinde, İstanbul: Doğan Kitap Yayınları, 2012, p. 261-263; İsmail Kara, "M. Şemseddin Günaltay", *Türkiye'de İslamcılık Düşüncesi - Metinler/Kişiler 2*, 4.ed., İstanbul: Dergah Yayınları, 2011, p. 1057-1105; Bayram Ali Çetinkaya, *Türkiye'nin Modernleşmesi Sürecinde Şemseddin Günaltay*, Ankara: Araştırma Yayınları, 2003; Hilmi Ziya Ülken, *Türkiye'de Çağdaş Düşünce Tarihi*, 3.ed., İstanbul: Ülken Yayınları, 1992, p. 394-399.

was recited in the equivalent textbook of the preceding period. Relatedly, there was no reference to biological evolution of the species in his historical accounts. The second one is about the issue of religion and god. In his textbook, there is a shift from the narrations of former textbooks that set forth religion and god as the creations of human intellect.[1049] To be brief, aforementioned allegations would be the harbingers of the conservatism relatively dominant in this period.

Similar to the above, the former set of high school textbooks was withdrawn from the curriculum in 1942, three years after Topçu's book was published, and replaced by the textbooks written by authors such as Arif Müfid Mansel, Cavid Baysun, and Enver Ziya Karal. Later, a fourth book written by Karal, *Türkiye Cumhuriyet Tarihi,* was added to this set in 1944. The history textbooks written by Faik Reşit Unat and Kamil Su for primary education are also complementary to the above-mentioned. Henceforward, there is now a profound break with the preceding period's discourse on nationalism and religion through these textbooks that contain the fundamental examples of the dominant Turkish-Islamic Synthesis.

When it comes to secondary school textbooks, it should be noted that they were not completely rewritten, but merely revised in this period. In my analysis, I reach to conclusion that textbooks of the two periods remained contextually identical to a large extent. Be that as it may, previous anonymous textbooks were republished in 1941 with author names such as Faik Reşit Unat, Ali Haydar Taner, Sadri Etem Ertem and Kazım Nami Duru. It is crucial to point out that the textbooks were edited in line with the ethos of the new era. As in Günaltay, narratives about the evolutionary theory and the materialized religion/god were nullified; and what is more, some contentions emanating from the Turkish History Thesis were withdrawn from the textbooks. Among the textbooks of the preceding period, I contend that the books that carried the ethos of Turkish Islamic Synthesis doctrine were kept in the curriculum for some time. For this, it can be argued that the Board of Education probably had seen no offence in allowing back them in this period. My contention

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[1049] See Şemsettin Günaltay, *Tarih I*, İstanbul: Maarif Matbaası, 1939. For Toprak's brief assessment see Zafer Toprak, "Darwinizm'den Ateizme: Türkiye'de Tarih Eğitiminin Evrimi", *Darwin'den Dersim'e…,* p. 368-371.

could be supported by the information that Unat's textbooks were part of the curriculum with minor revisions until 1970s.[1050]

As noted above, another set of textbooks were written by Tezer Taşkıran for high school civics course in the early days of the period. Unlike the equivalent textbooks of the preceding period, these textbooks, akin to Günaltay, were unconcerned about the evolutionary theory. Similarly, Tarık Emin Rona and Bedia Ermat wrote the new civics textbooks for the primary education. It should be highlighted that these textbooks are generally more moderate than the preceding period towards nationalism.

For the sociology course, Sadak's textbook was replaced with a new one in 1947. However, his book was taught in the schools until the latter was disseminated. As noted previously, the new textbook was written by Nurettin Topçu who was a well-known conservative. According to Öğün, he was one of the prominent advocates of Turkish-Islamic Synthesis doctrine against the strand of racist/Pan-Turanist nationalism.[1051] For this reason, I included Topçu's textbook into my analysis.

Another cardinal shift in this period is the reintroduction of religion course into the school curriculum as a response to the growing public pressure. In the aftermath of a decision, the government started in 1948 to provide elective (not compulsory) religious (education) courses for the primary education grades 4th and 5th.[1052] In this period, *Müslüman Çocuğunun Kitabı* (1948) was one of the textbooks approved and published by the Ministry of Education. For the reason that the textbook received a large criticism, it is still unknown if it was taught or not in the curriculum. Notwithstanding, I also included this textbook into my analysis as it is approved by the Ministry, knowing that there is an ambiguity about this textbook.

[1050] Bahri Ata, "Tarihçi Faik Reşit Unat'ın Milli Eğitime and Tarih Eğitimine Katkıları", Türk Yurdu, Sayı: 260, Nisan 2009, p. 98.

[1051] See Süleyman Seyfi Öğün, *Türkiye'de Cemaatçi Milliyetçilik and Nurettin Topçu*, İstanbul: Dergâh Yayınları, 1992. For the assessment about the intellectual world of Topçu see Fırat Mollaer, *Türkiye'de Liberal Muhafazakarlık and Nurettin Topçu*, İstanbul: Dergâh Yayınları, 2008; A. Baran Dural, *Türk Muhafazakarlığı and Nurettin Topçu*, İstanbul: Kriter Yayıncılık, 2010.

[1052] For the related discussion on the issue see Halis Ayhan, *Türkiye'de Din Eğitimi*, 2.ed., İstanbul: Dem Yayınları, 2004, p. 93-151.

Within this context, I was able to analyze 19 textbooks in depth for the last sub-section covering the years from 1939 until 1950. The complete list is enclosed as Appendix-C.

Last of all, I need to underline that number of pages declined considerably in this period. For instance, the set of history textbooks had 2000 pages in the former period; now, the total number of the four-book history set is 800. The decline in the number of pages could be extended to all textbooks in this period. Similarly, the printing quality is lower.

After general information about the textbooks, I proceed with the analysis.

6.2. Religion and Secularism in the Textbooks

There is a clear shift from the previous narratives about religion and religious issues in this period. It is not possible to witness the former period's positivist-materialist influences over the discourse reproduced by the textbooks. The advent of conservative writers enforces a return to the preceding stance that explains religions (at least revealed ones) as metaphysical phenomena, in a similar vein with the first sub-section. Therefore, Abrahamic religions are explained to students in a more sympathetic and positive way.

First and foremost, the new textbooks of history and civics narrate religions within historical and sociological context. Particularly salient, evolutionary theory is nullified in the history textbooks. Even it was removed from the secondary school textbooks that were kept in the curriculum for some time.[1053] This could be an evidence for the shift from ideas advocated vehemently in the preceding period pertaining to the origin of nature, human beings, religions, and ultimately, God. My contention is supported by the observable sympathy towards monotheistic religions, primarily Islam. I will provide more examples for this issue in the upcoming section.

Sociology textbooks provide a detailed contextualization of religion as a social institution similar to what was set forth in the preceding periods. As noted above, it

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[1053] For example see Faik Reşit Unat, *Ortaokul İçin Tarih I*, İstanbul: Maarif Matbaası, 1941 could be compared with *Tarih I (Ortamektep İçin)*, Ankara: Maarif Andkaleti, 1934.

would be worthwhile to remind briefly Sadak's definition since his textbook was kept in the curriculum for a while. Influenced by Durkheim, he defines religion from a social aspect, as the most fundamental social institution performed once the moral and psychological functions that holds a society together. In parallel to his stance, Sadak explains god as the idea emerged from the spiritual force of society over individuals; he, without doubt, attempts to materialize these concepts with reference to Durkheimian terms.

Following the former tradition, Topçu's sociology textbook explains religion by being loyal to Durkheim to a large extent. In the related section, he prefers to summarize *The Elementary Forms of Religious Life,* and consecutively, defines religion simply by reiterating Durkheimian statements about the sacredness and the profane.[1054] Be that as it may, Topçu stands apart from him by slightly stepping towards phenomenological perspective (as discussed in the first chapter with the examples from Eliade). While acknowledging that religion embodies certain social functions, he explains its original function through the sacred driving force for individuals. According to Topçu,

> the pious… has more forces [in the face of the unbeliever]. Religion is the source of forces… Primitive men ran their practices to awaken high emotions in themselves. The social life emanating from religious thinking forced them to act in a new ways and gave them the sense of some hidden force driving them.[1055]

Writer asserts that even if all its functions are transferred to secular institutions; psychological/ mystical aspect of the religion will remain forever.[1056] Topçu defines the God (of Abrahamic religions) in regard to Christianity and Islam: "the Owner of the Universe… the Creator… the One, the All-Knowing, and the Omniscient".[1057] Also known for his proximity to Sufism, Topçu depicts religion and god, different than Sadak, as metaphysical and mystic realities. For this reason, Topçu's textbook is a good example for reflecting the ethos of the period. In the following section, I will be focusing specifically on this issue.

[1054] Nurettin Topçu, *Sosyoloji*, (ed.) Ezel Erandrdi, İsmail Kara, 4.ed., İstanbul: Dergâh Yayınları, 2013 [1948], p. 112.
[1055] *Ibid.,* p. 112-113.
[1056] *Ibid.,* p. 113.
[1057] *Ibid.,* p. 113.

As in the preceding period, I reach the relevant data about the historical accounts and doctrines of Judaism and Christianity by means of history textbooks. Firstly, it should be highlighted that number of pages allocated to these religions reduced in this period. Hence, it is observed that the topic of religious belief is explained briefly under the civilization section in the history textbooks. In the high school history textbook, one and a half pages are allocated to Judaism (together with the Hebrews), and three pages are allocated to Christianity (within the Roman Empire). The total number of the pages allocated to Buddhism, Taoism and Confucianism are apparently less than the preceding periods. Not unpredictably, Islam occupies the largest place; however in total, only thirty pages are allocated to Islamic History (with the Turks and Islam). Keeping in mind the affirmative language, this shortcoming could be explained through the decline in the total number of pages of all school textbooks in this period.

In terms of the language, I contend that history textbooks posit a secondary position for religions other than the Abrahamic ones. My contention is based on the writers' stance that asserts Buddhism, Taoism, and Confucianism merely as philosophies. In a similar vein, they are even considered as the moral systems that were set forth by Buddha, Lao-Çe and Confucius to regulate social lives of their periods.[1058] Thus, this stance brought an alleged categorization of religions. Another nodal point is that both Taoism and Buddhism are claimed to have 'lost their original true character' over time.[1059] For writers, these moral systems could be acceptable with their original forms to some extent; however they have been already corrupted in the course of the time.

By examining the history textbooks, it is witnessed that narrations of Judaism and Christianity are not associated with negative references. I need to add that it was impossible for me to draw any conclusion further about this issue owing to the scarcity of pages–for instance, the pages allocated to Judaism. Based on a very limited data, I have a few remarks to be noted for the stances towards both religions. The first salient point is that the title of '*hazreti*' is used neither for Moses nor for

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[1058] A. M. Mansel, C. Baysun, E. Z. Karal, *İlk Çağ Tarihi: Birinci Sınıf, İstanbul: Maarif Matbaası*, 1942, p. 24, 28; Şemsettin Günaltay, *Tarih I*, İstanbul: Maarif Matbaası, 1939, p. 57-58.
[1059] Mansel et al., *İlk Çağ Tarihi…*, s. 24, 29; Günaltay, *Tarih I…*, p. 57, 71.

Jesus.[1060] The only exceptional case which depicts him as "*Hazreti İsa*" comes up in the context of a primary education textbook for grade 5th.[1061] However, along with the history textbooks, writers refer both of them as important historical figures and prophets.

The second nodal point is that narratives about the historical accounts and doctrines of religions are provided by direct quotations from the holy books themselves in the set of high school history textbooks. As noted previously, the preceding textbooks were hesitant if Jesus existed historically or not. In this period, writers agree that he was born in "Nazareth of the Northern Palestine in the time of the Emperor Augustus".[1062] Throughout the analysis, the one and only negative statements emerged where the writer states that after Islam the Holy Trinity of Christians had overthrown and the national god of Jewish people became the international God.[1063] Apart from this exceptional remark, I have not encountered a distinctive feature pertaining to the narrations of both religions. Lastly, I should also highlight that Christianity and Judaism are nullified by the religion textbook just like in the first period.

History and religion textbooks posit the preponderance of Islam through both the size allocated -quantitatively- and the honorific style used –qualitatively-. In the textbooks of the third period, Islam is accepted as the genuine religion (Turk. *hak din*) and highly praised in a way not seen for any other religion. In this respect, I contend that discourse is constructed this time differently than the preceding period almost akin to the period from 1924 until 1931. Therefore, it would be worthwhile to focus on the examples that reproduce the specific discourse of this period.

To start with the history textbooks, the nodal point is that Prophet Muhammad appears with the title *Hazrati* in the narration of Islam, primarily, within the high school set and the rest.[1064] Along the lines, Muhammad is referred as the "founder of Islam" and, Islam as the religion revealed by God (Allah).[1065] What is more, the

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[1060] For example see. Mansel et al., *İlk Çağ Tarihi…*, s. 86, 214; Unat, *Ortaokul İçin Tarih I…*, p. 121, 123.
[1061] Faik Reşit Unat, Kamil Su, *Tarih – V. Sınıf*, İstanbul: Milli Eğitim Basımevi, 1948, p. 15.
[1062] Mansel et al., *İlk Çağ Tarihi…*, p. 213.
[1063] A. M. Mansel, C. Baysun, E. Z. Karal, *Orta Çağ Tarihi: İkinci Sınıf, İstanbul: Maarif Matbaası*, 1943, p. 29.
[1064] See for example Mansel et al., *Orta Çağ Tarihi…*, s. 29-32; Faik Reşit Unat, Kamil Su, *Tarih – IV. Sınıf*, İstanbul: Milli Eğitim Basımevi, 1948, p. 92-93.
[1065] Mansel et al., *Orta Çağ Tarihi…*, p. 29.

pompous manners of the preceding period seem to be eliminated. For instance, Muhammad's departure from Mecca to Medina is not recited as an "escape" but rather an immigration[1066]; his dead body was not forgotten somewhere over there in the aftermath of his death, but it had driven Muslims to mourning.[1067]

The preponderant status of Islam is echoed throughout the statements such as "the religion which is called Islam was recited by *Hazrati* Muhammad to humanity…" and "Islam, the genuine religion."[1068] It should be highlighted that these expressions are not invoked for any other religion in the textbooks. Relatedly, Islam is throned to its paramount place by the writer's acclamation that Islam removed the Trinitarian understanding of Christianity, the God of Jews and the paganism.[1069] It should also be noted that God is written as "*Allahütaalâ*" meaning "God, the supreme being of all"; and the Qur'an is resounded along the lines as "*Kur'an-ı Kerim*"; meaning both a revelation from God and which has the finest language.[1070]

Among the history textbooks, the only book that maintains the earlier approach towards Islam is Ali Haydar Taner's *Ortaokul İçin Tarih II*. In this regard, writer indicates that

> the moral values and customs of the Arabs were awful and Muhammad retreated in his corner for many years of a 'thinking process' with the aim to rearrange morality, religion and social life of this community. Consequently, he began articulating his verses.[1071]

Although writer once states that "Muslims believe that the words of God revealed to Muhammad through the archangel Gabriel,"[1072] his overall approach coincides with the preceding allegations that posit Islam as the invention of Muhammad. This example is unquestionably an exception; however, it should be underlined as noteworthy amongst the other history textbooks.

As might be guessed, the most striking examples could be found extensively in the religion textbooks that were published through the end of the period. In the narration

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[1066] *Ibid.,* p. 30; Unat and Su, *Tarih – IV. Sınıf…,* p. 63.
[1067] *Ibid.* p. 32.
[1068] *Ibid.* p. 29.
[1069] *Ibid.*
[1070] *Ibid.* p. 28-29.
[1071] Ali Haydar Taner, *Ortaokul İçin Tarih II*, İstanbul: Maarif Matbaası, 1940, p. 44.
[1072] *Ibid.* p. 44.

of Islam, the textbooks keep the same line with the religion textbooks of the first period in terms of content and use of I/we (me/us) language. One observation in this regard is that religion textbook is launched with the name of Allah. What is more, it is imbued with expressions that put forward the superiority of Islam and Allah. In a similar vein, Allah is depicted with various names such as "the One/Unique", "the Eternal", "the Absolute/Truth", "the Creator", "the All-Powerful", "the Omnipresent", and "the Omniscient", etc.[1073] It is also highlighted that "we" should be grateful to Allah for creating us as Muslims and "we" owe him for all of humanity and all the creatures; "even if there are impious ones, we believe in and praise the Great God who created the sky and the earth; the light and the darkness."[1074]

In the same textbook, Muhammad who is referred as either "our prophet" or "our master/lord" is generally depicted as "the beloved servant of God", "the one sent by God to correct the shortcomings of the previous religions", "the guide to the right path", "the messenger of Allah", and "the last prophet". [1075] Over all, his moral values that are considered to be emanating from the Qur'an are posited as an ideal for all Muslims.[1076] For instance, there are two pages devoted to the portrayal of his character and assets. The details of the below quotation by S. Yada are striking. In the last pages of the book, one can read the following:

By the Name of God the Merciful and the Judge

Messenger of God

Qualifications of our Prophet: He is medium-sized, close to tall. His figure is well with open forehead, large head; he has eye brows like crescent; he has a large face, beautiful large black eyes, long eyelashes, and fine nose. His eyebrows are close together, but in an open from. His shoulders are large; he has a long and smooth neck, like silver. He has thick shoulders. His arms, legs and wrist are long. He has long hands and fingers. His stomach is in the same line with his chest. Neither fat nor slim he is tight. His skin is like silk. He is big-boned, big-bodied. He is big and strong. His palms are like two holes. The seal of Prophet hood is placed between his two paddles. He is himself the seal of Prophet Hood. He is moderate; His posture stands still. Neither fast nor slow. He is

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[1073] Nurettin Artam, Nurettin Sevin, *Müslüman Çocuğunun Kitabı*, İstanbul: Milli Eğitim Basımevi, 1948, p. 5-16.
[1074] *Ibid.* p. 14.
[1075] *Ibid.* p. 19-93.
[1076] *Ibid.* p. 93.

friendly, sweet, soft, and humble. His dignity is high. Our salute is
for him.[1077]

After the narratives about the prophet, there are detailed explanations about how a Muslim child should live and what he should do. Similarly, fundamental principles of Islam are recounted such as the belief in Allah, in an afterlife, in destiny, in angels, in the holy books, and the prophets.[1078] Relatedly, lives and miracles of the former prophets are narrated in depth. In this regard, it is stated that all prophets are prominent personalities and sent by Allah.[1079]

In the religion textbook, moral values are identified with religious commandments in a similar manner with the discourse of the first period. Indeed, Muslims are instilled to live a life shaped by the commandments of the Qur'an; for the reason that Muslimness means above all high morality and decency. In the same way, students are instilled through various hadith examples to love their parents, not to make anybody sad, to be hard-working, and to take care of their health, etc.[1080] Contrary to the preceding period, it can be argued at least starting from the textbook of religion that a return to the identification of moral values with religion could be observed in this era.

The last part of the religion textbook is devoted to the Five Pillars of Islam. The pillars represent the basic religious duties of a Muslim: reciting the creed, praying five times a day, almsgiving, fasting during the month of Ramadan, and a pilgrimage to Mecca (Hajj).[1081] Particularly salient, writers do a thorough explanation about how and under what circumstances a prayer should be made. In this context, it should be noted that they seem to have agreed upon the Sunni principles of Islam. Not surprisingly, this is harmonious with the preceding periods. For this particularly salient point, I will conduct a detailed assessment in the following sections while discussing the relationship between Turkishness and Islam.

[1077] The text is from Artam and Sevim, *Müslüman Çocuğunun Kitabı…,* pages between 224 and 225 has no page number.
[1078] *Ibid.* p. 97-98, 100, 128-131, 133-134.
[1079] *Ibid.* p. 101-126.
[1080] *Ibid.* p. 139-155.
[1081] *Ibid.* p. 163-207, 216-221.

The emphasis on secularism and the development of secularism in Europe and Turkey are often reiterated in the textbooks of history, civics and sociology. However, it is interesting to see that the principle does not come up in the religion textbook context. In this section, I will overlook to the issue of secularism extensively through the examples from the aforementioned textbooks.

In the sociology textbooks, secularism is defined as "separation of state and religion; state neutrality towards religion and vice versa."[1082] Topçu explains further that secularism is a consequence of modernism and it does not mean irreligousity at all:

> A person could be on one hand secular in his public relations; it means his mind controls his social relations, on the other hand, he could be extremely pious in his spiritual life. In a similar vein, a state could practice secularism in politics by separating religion from public affairs and at the same time, tolerate strong piousness by not objecting to every idea in the religious life.[1083]

In a similar context, Topçu seems to be determined that "the genuine and mature devout individuals cannot be essentially attached to -even be near enough to- any material or political authority outside the religious field and spirituality"; and hence, the infusion of state and religion would inevitably result in negative consequences for each case.[1084] In order to prevent ignorance and bigotry, it is better that state regulates public life and law and religion regulates private life and moral values.[1085]

Keeping above in mind, it should be stressed that Topçu remains within the contours of the secularism that has been delineated since the foundation of the Republic. As discussed in the previous section, Sadak's work is another textbook taught in the curriculum during this period. It should be reminded that both textbooks share the common perspective towards the notion. Therefore, the conceptualization of secularism in this way indicates that there is continuity within three periods of the textbooks. At one point, Topçu reminds in his book that Islam unlike Christianity eludes a differentiation between religious and material life.[1086] However, he avoids further discussion and making any comments about the issue.

[1082] Topçu, *Sosyoloji…,* p. 100.
[1083] *Ibid.* p. 100.
[1084] *Ibid.* p. 101.
[1085] *Ibid.* p. 102.
[1086] *Ibid.* p. 100.

Above definitions of secularism are reiterated in a similar manner by the textbooks of history and civics. Within common perspective, textbook writers perceive religious creed belonging to individual conscience. In a similar vein, secularism is introduced as one of the fundamental principles of Turkish Republic; and, "freedom of conscience" is often pointed out. In other words, writers discuss that state is unconcerned if individuals believe in a religion or not, neither they are practicing religious commandments or not.[1087] Going rather strong, the issue of freedom of conscience is emphasized in such an exaggerated way that even Protestant reformists are referred with reverence on the basis of their following statements: "One can reach God with a deep faith rather than many ceremonies,"[1088] "[the creed] naturally exists in the soul of every individual".[1089]

The most detailed historical account of secularism both in Europe and Turkey could be found in the history textbooks. The binary opposition that posits the existence of the genuine piousness against the corrupted seems to be constructed akin to the narrations in the preceding periods. Likewise, for the European context, secularism is manifested as the emergence of reformist movement in the face of "the move away from genuine Christianity" of ignorant masses believing in the Christian clergy who deceived them maliciously for the sake of their self-interests. In this context, according to the authors, "the corruption in the Catholic clergy dismayed genuine priests."[1090] Similar expressions could be found in another textbook as following: "genuine pious *people is deeply saddened by this corrupt act in the name of God and was worried.*[1091] In this regard, the detailed narrations of the Protestant Reformation are formed around the theological, economic, scientific and technological progress.[1092]

[1087] See. Tezer Taşkıran, *Yurt Bilgisi I (Ortaokul Kitapları)*, İstanbul: Maarif Matbaası, 1939, 17, 28; Tezer Taşkıran, *Yurt Bilgisi II (Ortaokul Kitapları)*, İstanbul: Maarif Matbaası, 1939, p. 12-13; Bedia Ermat, Kemal Ermat, *Yurt Bilgisi Dersleri V. Sınıf*, İstanbul: Milli Eğitim Basımevi, 1945, p. 24-25; Sadri Ertem and Kazım Nami Duru, *Ortaokul İçin Tarih III*, Ankara: Maarif Matbaası, 1941,p. 245; Kamil Su, Kazım Nami Duru, *Ortaokul İçin Tarih III*, İstanbul: Milli Eğitim Basımevi, 1947, p. 215-220; Enandr Ziya Karal, *Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Tarihi (1918-1944)*, İstanbul: Milli Eğitim Basımevi, 1945, p. 113-114.
[1088] Su and Duru, *Ortaokul İçin Tarih III…*, p. 30.
[1089] Ertem and Duru, *Ortaokul İçin Tarih III…*, p. 41.
[1090] Unat and Su, *Tarih – IV. Sınıf...,* p. 72. Italics added by me.
[1091] Su and Duru, *Ortaokul İçin Tarih III…*, p. 29. Italics added by me.
[1092] A. M. Mansel, C. Baysun, E. Z. Karal, *Yeni and Yakın Çağlar Tarihi: Üçüncü Sınıf, İstanbul: Maarif Matbaası*, 1942, p. 77-78; Ertem and Duru, *Ortaokul İçin Tarih III…*, p. 40-42.

The emergence of secularism in the Turkish context is mainly associated with the developments in the last period of the Ottoman Era. The most detailed narration appears in Karal's work which is the last volume of the high school history textbook set and devoted to the history of Republic of Turkey. According to his official account (which is reiterated briefly by the other textbooks as well), the Islamic Caliphate began with the prophet Muhammad as the head of both religion and state in Arabs; and later, continued with the successors of Muhammad, who were elected for the same position. In his textbook, Karal underlines that the Caliphate was claimed to pass from father to son in the reigns of Umayyad, Abbasid, and the Ottomans since Selim I (Yavuz Sultan Selim). From then on, Ottoman sultans had two titles: "both the ruler of the people (tebaa) in the Empire and the imam of Muslims in the world." [1093] By identifying the caliphate with theocracy, Karal contends that although the institution of Caliphate was symbolic in the beginning, it caused considerable damage for the Ottomans over time. Akin to the European context, the institution became the core cause of decline in the state and religious affairs because of the clergy (ulema) who corrupted religion for the sake of their ambitions in the Era. In addition to this contention, writer presents certain Muslim communities gathering and fighting against the Ottomans in the First World War as an evidence for the inactive power of the institution.[1094]

Within the same context, Karal reports that Mustafa Kemal and his friends abolished the Caliphate in the newly formed Turkish Republic, as they had no intention to interfere in other communities by means of the institution. What is more, they even thought that religion would be an obstacle for the reforms and the institution of caliphate would not be well-matched with the new regime. While some Muslims proposed the title "Caliph" to Mustafa Kemal, he never accepted it. Kara depicts the abolishment process rather romantically as the last Caliph Abdülmecit and his adherents were "taken with ten cars and a truck to Çatalca to get on a train" on March 3, 1924 - two days after the constitution is accepted- in that very morning, "the sun saluted the new revolution in Turkey."[1095] Lastly, Kara praises the Grand

[1093] Karal, *Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Tarihi…*, p. 104-105.
[1094] *Ibid.* p. 104-105.
[1095] *Ibid.* p. 105-107.

National Assembly of Turkey for making 'new laws and legislations in accordance with the new life'.[1096]

Within the context of the above discussion, it should be noted that the narratives about the abolishment of the Caliphate and the promulgation of secularism are reiterated in the other history textbooks in the same way. To sum up, a brief note would be worthwhile about the emphasis that the issues are narrated through binary construction of genuine piousness against bigotry.

In most of the textbooks, it is claimed that, primarily, ulema and members of religious orders who were the leaders of religious field in the society explicitly directed poor ignorant people away from religion and piousness by deceiving them for a long time for the sake of their self-interests. For this reason, secularism is the key for people to live Islam in the correct way; and people now could build a connection with God from conscience without the need for any intermediary thanks to the Turkification of religion's language.[1097]

Lastly, in this part, I will pave the way to questioning how other textbooks reconcile the ideas advocated principally in the religion textbooks about secularism. As noted previously, provision of religion course by the state in a biased way could be regarded overtly as an ambiguity in theory. Keeping in mind the narrations about Islam as a religion covering all the spheres of life; the size of this ambiguity could be extended. It should be noteworthy to remember that these opinions are not acclaimed solely in the religion textbooks; similar claims are also made in the history textbooks as in the following: "the revealed Qur'an which regulates the religious and state affairs of Muslims…"[1098] Furthermore, as I will also discuss in the upcoming section, Turkishness is defined with the Islamic references by the religion textbooks in a similar vein. Therefore, apart from the reconciliation of Islam with secularism (as a Western notion); a problematic area seems to be inevitably produced by the provision of the courses and textbooks for a specific religion in a society where secularism is defined by the textbooks in this manner.

[1096] *Ibid.* p. 120-130.
[1097] For the examples see *Ibid.* p. 129-130; Unat and Su, *Tarih V. Sınıf…*, p. 204; Ertem and Duru, *Ortaokul İçin Tarih III…*, p. 259.
[1098] Mansel et al., *Orta Çağ Tarihi…*, p. 29; Italics added by me.

6.3. Nation and Nationalism in the Textbooks

After an assessment about religion, it would be worthwhile to embark upon an analysis about nation and nationalism in the textbooks. The first nodal point is that these generic concepts hold relatively less space in this period. At this time, textbooks prefer to discuss in detail Turkishness and Turkish nationalism. In this context, the most comprehensive accounts about nations and nationalism could be observed in the sociology textbooks. Another nodal point is that the nation definition by Ernest Renan that was commonly quoted in the preceding period influences the explanations of this period as well. Thus, the perspective that explains nation as perennial vis-à-vis nationalism as recent modern phenomenon continues to be the founding core of the dominant discourse.

To start with the sociology textbooks, Renan's definition of a nation has been extremely influential in Topçu's textbook just like Sadak's textbook, which was analyzed in-depth in the previous chapter. Topçu reiterates what Renan wrote about nation: "the entity constituted by the collective memories and thoughts (Turk. *temayül and tasavvurlariyle*)… in the past, at the present and in the future."[1099] He shares the contention of Renan that this entity has physical and spiritual elements. For him, the physical elements that constitute a nation are defined as the race, the territory and the labor; besides, spiritual elements as the language, the religion, and the desire.[1100] Topçu recites that the aforesaid elements do not necessarily suffice all together to make a nation. Furthermore, he underlines that every nation is constituted on diverse commonalities within its specific historical conditions.[1101] For this allegation, he gives the examples as follows:

> For the French, the common language played a prominent role first and foremost as the founding core of nationhood. Then, it was followed by the unity in the territory… However, the German nationhood was based on the racial unity.[1102]

[1099] Topçu, *Sosyoloji…*, p. 72.
[1100] *Ibid.*
[1101] *Ibid.* p. 72-78.
[1102] *Ibid.*

The most salient aspect of his definition is the inclusion of labor and economic unity into the above-listed elements that constitute a nation. Up until now, such an element has nullified in the textbooks. For Topçu, the economic unity has a two-fold effect on the formation of a nation. Firstly, the division of labor is designated by national interests of the society. In other words, it is possible that he means strengthening the nation (nation-state) with a national economic policy. The second aspect is the identification of some nations with a certain expertise. In this regard, he contends that "some nations are farmers; some nations are industrialists or merchants."[1103] This geographical identification, in fact, determines both the economic features of a nation and ultimately, the souls and moral characters. Below, Topçu offers his point:

> The continuity, stability and certainty in the works of farmer nations are reflected in their character. They are generally stable. Their characters are fixed; they are attached to their friends and self-sacrificing. They do not easily change in the face of external factors. They are introverted. Traders are always different characters on the contrary. They are very unreliable, whilst friendly, they may become just the enemy, and they are unfaithful to the homeland and friendships. They can easily change. They can accept the revolutions immediately. They can adapt to every place. They have no devotion to human beings and to their soil. You may notice there is a conflation between the unity of labor and national geography. People who are living in the uphill are engaged in farming. People who live by the sea are either tradesmen or fishermen.[1104]

As in the quotation above, writer provides no reference for his contentions about the association of territory/geography with economy, relatedly with national character/personality. It is likely that he is influenced by on one hand, intellectual heritage of İbn Haldun and Montesquieu, on the other hand, the discussions on the relationship between culture and personality existing within the literature of Western social sciences. It is acknowledged that Western scholars held discussions in the years between 1920 and 1950 over to what extent certain nations can be associated with certain character traits with regard to common geography as well as common socialization practices. It should also be noted the prominence of the discussion weakened in the second half of the century.[1105] Therefore, it is very interesting for me to encounter with such an example that I have not seen anywhere else other than

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[1103] *Ibid.* p. 75.
[1104] *Ibid.* p. 75-76.
[1105] For the discussions about the issue see Philip K. Bock, *İnsan Davranışının Kültürel Temelleri: Psikolojik Antropoloji*, trans. N. Serpil Altuntek, Ankara: İmge Kitabevi Yayınları, 2001, p. 87-190.

Topçu and that made me think that he was closely following the discussions at that time.

In the civics textbook written by Taşkıran for secondary education, it is claimed that nations could be constituted upon diverse commonalities such as descent, language, land, religion, history, sentiments, thoughts and ideals.[1106] As could be surmised, the author reiterates all the other elements that Topçu refers except for the unity in economy. In addition, Taşkıran puts forward the unity of sentiments, thoughts and ideals as the most prominent features. For him, a nation can be formed even if the others do not exist; but it is not possible to continue as a nation if this particular unity resolves. Thus, "in order to be a nation, individuals shall have the desire to live together and continue with the perennial work what we call nation."[1107] Based on this, he defines nation as "an entity consisted of people who have a common past, who speak the same language, who share the same feelings and thoughts, who have a common culture, who are devoted to a common ideal".[1108] As in the preceding period, this definition exists equally in the civics as well as in some history textbooks of the period.[1109] Therefore, when only the conceptualization of nation is considered, it can be claimed that textbooks adopt an understanding based on cultural nationalism at least at the level of the generic definition of the nation. However, we will soon see that there is more than that in the narration of Turkishness akin to the nationalist discourse of the preceding period.

The most detailed narratives about the history of nations exist in Topçu's textbook. Primarily, he undertakes a compare and contrast between the theories that explain nations as perennial/natural/ahistorical phenomenon and theories that regard nations as historical/sociological consequences. According to him, the common point shared by all theories is "individual's affiliation with nationhood is accepted as the result of conditions before him."[1110] He can be further quoted as: "These circumstances existed before the individuals of nation and they impose themselves over them.

[1106] Taşkıran, *Yurt Bilgisi I...,* p. 7-8.
[1107] *Ibid.* p. 8.
[1108] *Ibid.*
[1109] For the examples see Ertem and Duru, *Ortaokul İçin Tarih III…*, p. 242; Su and Duru, *Ortaokul İçin Tarih III…*, p. 209.
[1110] Topçu, *Sosyoloji…*, p. 78-79.

These circumstances occur in the course of the time."[1111] Topçu agrees with the example from Renan's approach as following; "continuation and reaching to future with the culmination of a long past of endeavors, sacrifice, and devotion".[1112] Writer recounts anarchists and humanists as the examples for the latter group that explain nations as the result of the evolution of human beings, he further states that they are insufficient to explain the truth.[1113] Therefore, Topçu sustains the continuity of primordialist perspective which contends that nations are ancient and natural phenomena. Keeping in mind the approaches towards Turkishness, it can be discussed that similar stance is adopted in the other textbooks of the era as well. I will elaborate this part in the upcoming section.

In the textbooks, the ideology of nationalism is regarded as a modern phenomenon. In this regard, it would be appropriate to refer to Topçu again for the reason that the most comprehensive assessments are found in his sociology textbooks. Writer defines nation as "being from one nation and the will to be attached to a national community"; nationalism as "to keep this will as an ideal".[1114] Along the lines, Topçu discusses nationalism with regard to Western context and he contends that the contentious Christian spiritualism and the great industrialism based on colonialism influenced the emergence of the movement. For this, he recounts Renaissance, Reform Movement, The French revolution, Romanticism and the scientific progress as the spiritual frontier. These, in various forms, enabled the development of nationality awareness in individuals.[1115] For Topçu, other factors are related to emergence of large-scale industry as a result of the widespread colonial ambitions mainly after the eleventh century. According to him, "the conflicts and the challenges that emerged in the great industrial life created the national economies."[1116]

Textbooks of history and civics are deprived of any remarkable context with regard to the nationalism in the Western world. The only explanation about the advent of nationalism appears in the third volume of the high school history textbook. There, it

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[1111] *Ibid.*
[1112] *Ibid.* p. 79.
[1113] *Ibid.*
[1114] *Ibid.* p. 78.
[1115] *Ibid.* p. 80-81.
[1116] *Ibid.* p. 81.

is regarded as a feeling and essential outcome of the French Revolution. According to the narrative, "the abolition of class and state privileges from the Medieval Age profoundly affected feelings of nationalism to protect the revolution against foreign danger."[1117] According to authors, these feelings spread over time to wider area through relations with the other European states, and hence nationalism became a basic principle to determine the direction of international politics since the nineteenth century.[1118]

In some civics textbooks, the historical account of nationalism is de-emphasized; instead, it is regarded as a feeling. National belonging is defined as a national feeling joy or regret from the goodness or evil that will happen to the nation[1119]; this feeling is depicted as "the greatest of all loves and feelings in the world."[1120]

As no example appears otherwise, nation is regarded in the textbooks as an ideal, and as a feeling from time to time; besides, nationalism is regarded as an outcome of diverse historical/social and economic developments in the modernization period in Europe. So the stance that accepts nation as perennial vis-à-vis nationalism as modern phenomena continues in this period. However, when it comes to Turkishness and Turkish nationalism in the following section, the dominant stance will be changed.

As noted previously, the explanations for nation and nationalism as generic categories occupy less space in the textbooks.. However, it should be emphasized that the scarcity is not valid for the narratives about Turks and Turkishness. In this respect, Turkish nationalism determines the dominant discourse in the school textbooks. As the influence of Turkish History Thesis still remains in this period, it can be contended that there is certain continuity within last two periods. However, there is a profound shift from the racist references of Turkishness. In this section, I will elaborate the narrations of Turks/Turkishness and Turkish nationalism through examples from the textbooks.

[1117] Mansel et al., *Yeni and Yakın Çağlar Tarihi…*, p. 138.
[1118] *Ibid.*
[1119] Ermat and Ermat, *Yurt Bilgisi IV. Sınıf…*, p. 15.
[1120] Rona, *Yurt Bilgisi Dersleri – IV. Sınıf…*, p. 16.

Within this context, it would be appropriate to make an introduction to the topic quantitatively. Table-6 draws a picture of the comparison for the pages allocated to diverse communities in the history textbooks.

Table 6 - A Comparison of the Pages Allocated to Narration of Turks and Other Communities in the History Textbooks

	Other Communities	The Turks	Total
Mansel et al., *İlk Çağ Tarihi*	207	9	218
Mansel et al., *Orta Çağ Tarihi*	76	56	132
Mansel et al., *Yeni and Yakın Çağlar Tarihi*	81	116	197
Karal, *Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Tarihi*	-	190	190
Total	364	371	737

According to the table, Turkish history occupies the largest place. However, one can easily observe the decrease in the proportions at least by overlooking to history textbooks. It should be noted that this difference is quite large in favor of the Turks in primary and secondary school history textbooks of the period.

Beyond doubt, the qualitative elements are at least as essential as quantitative data. The first contention is that the influence of Turkish History Thesis continues –in fact, down- in this period. Therefore, there are various similarities between the two periods on the basis of the need for identification of Turkishness, as well as the Turks in history.

The former trend of narrating Turkishness from the first person pronouns and with racial connotations could be extended to this period. Within this context, for instance, Rona, one of the civics textbook writers of the period acclaims the following: "they

call me TURK, they call my homeland as THE TURKISH LAND."[1121] A further quotation could be cited as: "Turkish nation is the unity of the people who are living on the Turkish homeland, speaking the Turkish language and carrying the blood of Turkish."[1122] In addition, writer underlines the following: "language, feelings, joys and sorrows of Turkish nation are one".[1123] Relatedly, Ermat and Ermat could be further quoted: "Turkish nation is the community of the people who are living in the land of Turks and whose name, language and desire is Turk."[1124]. The race notion seems to be de-emphasized in the quotations however along the lines, it comes in the following context: "To be born Turkish, to live Turkish, to die Turkish and happy *to leave Turkish descendants behind."*[1125] Taşkıran, writer of the high school civics textbook, recounts the five essential elements that constitute Turkish nation as: "1 – Territorial unity; 2 – Language unity; 3 –   unity of history; 4 – the desire to live together , unity of feelings and thoughts 'Cultural unity'; 5 –the unity with wishing to do more, 'Unity of Ideals".[1126] Here, he also seems to be nullifying racial unity however he later states that, "It is important to know that you are coming from the Turkish decent when saying that I am a Turk".[1127] Thus, historical, territorial, and cultural elements exist in the definition of Turkishness within this period as well. Maybe a little more timid than the previous period, racial unity is still an appropriate component of the definition.

A complementary point is that the perenniality of the Turks is often reiterated in the textbooks akin to the preceding periods. Besides, the racial affiliations of the previous period seem to be disappeared to a large extent. Instead, ethnicist inclination holds a larger space in the textbooks. In this part of the study, I will focus on the narratives about Turks through these components.

First and foremost, the doctrine of Turkish History Thesis continues its influence over the official discourse as the common characteristic of the last two periods. Accordingly, the allegation that the oldest civilization in history was founded in their

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[1121] *Ibid.* p. 14.
[1122] *Ibid.* p. 13.
[1123] *Ibid.* p. 12.
[1124] Ermat and Ermat, *Yurt Bilgisi Dersleri IV. Sınıf…*, p. 14.
[1125] *Ibid.* p. 15.
[1126] Taşkıran, *Yurt Bilgisi I…* p, 7.
[1127] *Ibid.* p, 5.

homeland, Central Asia, by the Turks as one of the oldest communities, unquestionably finds its place in the history textbooks. Before embarking upon narrations, it would be appropriate to put forward how the concepts of civilization and culture are defined in the textbooks. The detailed definitions of both concepts could be encountered again in the sociology textbooks. In this regard, the conceptualization of Topçu could be further referred. By adopting Gökalp's approach, he identifies civilization as the sum of common experiences of the nations' vis-à-vis culture as national structures. According to him, civilization is "the sum total of all outputs, technical works, all patters of living through all means adopted by a group of societies in certain historical periods."[1128] On the contrary, culture is defined as "the sum total of values made by a society within its individual history."[1129] Below Topçu offers his stance for the distinction between civilization and culture:

> a.) Civilization is common to a group of society that are interacting and living in a specific historical period; on the contrary, culture is peculiar to each society and keeps that society apart from other societies and nations.
>
> b.) Civilization is associated with the works of societies in the material realm through technical means; on the contrary, culture is the sum of all the values and judgements of a society. In other words, they are the spiritual, ethical, scientific, art and philosophical works created by that society.
>
> c.) All the members of a society live the life and requirements of the civilization that their society is attached to. Correspondingly, culture is not experienced by every member of society, but only by more or less cultured people. Anyone can have a civilized way of life, even though not everyone is cultured.
>
> Although people's connections with religion, morality, art (folklore) put forward a life of culture. It is necessary to mark these values as folk culture and keep them apart from high culture.
>
> d.) Apart from these differences, it should also be added that the civilization is common amongst societies. Therefore, it can be exchanged jointly between the societies. During this exchange, a common civilization occurs. So, each one of these communities can give and take works of civilizations. However, culture, is unique to every nation and every civilization, and it cannot be taken from another society, it is not ready-made. Culture is, in a sense, the character of each nation. The individuality in the culture reveals another importance: As, a society

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[1128] Topçu, *Sosyoloji…*, p. 191.
[1129] *Ibid.*

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that attains a personality by forming its own culture could enter into the circle of civilization thanks to culture and its guidance.[1130]

Hence, it can be contended that Topçu agrees with Gökalp's ideas in terms of associating civilization with the material realm vis-à-vis culture with the spiritual realm; civilization as international vis-à-vis culture as national. This stance seems to be widely accepted by the other authors, as further textbooks advocate a comparable viewpoint. For instance in the civics textbook, Ermat and Ermat points out that "we can get science from others, but we shall not forget our Turkishness… Our language is Turkish, our ethics is Turkish, our art is Turkish, and our breeding is Turkish."[1131] In a similar vein, Taşkıran puts forward that "we take things that are appropriate to our existence from [other nations], but when we do; we pay attention not to damage our existence"; and in this regard, he continues, "we should be possessive and careful about this issue".[1132]

In this context, almost all textbooks, as in the previous period, discuss that the oldest civilization was spread to world by the Turks. However, scientific evidence is presented for the first time by the textbooks of this period:

> An American scientific committee explored the kurgans in Anav near Ashkhabad, they found out traces of an ancient civilization belonging to the Turks. These revealed that when the other regions in the world were so primitive, the Turks were advanced in civilization. A village with plain and small houses made of branches and reed and plastered with mud was found in the lower floors of the Kurgans. In this village, there were mace heads, arrow heads, spindle whorls, hand grinders, tools made of stone and flint stone and next to them, there were the copper pins, rings and dagger-like metal artefacts and painted and embroidered pottery. Again, in the lower levels of the soil, the findings of human and animal figurines show that artistic feelings of the people had progressed. The coal grains of wheat throughout houses prove that these people were engaged in agriculture. It is understood from the upper floors of kurgans that this civilization entered a more mature state, as there were abundant copper works and vases prepared in lathe. The decoration is noticeable.[1133]

[1130] *Ibid.*

[1131] Ermat and Ermat, *Yurt Bilgisi Dersleri V. Sınıf…*, p. 22.

[1132] Taşkıran, *Yurt Bilgisi I. Sınıf…*, p. 28.

[1133] Mansel et al., *İlk Çağ Tarihi…*, p. 8. Günaltay also referred to the same excavations, and further, stated that Raphael Pumpelly led the excavation team of archaeologists since 1904. *Tarih I…*, p. 10-11.

In light of the above quote, it is assumed by the writers that the beginning of civilization in the region dates back to BC 5, based on these findings in Ashgabat within Syr-Darya region.[1134] In this regard, as stated by the Turkish History Thesis, it is narrated that the Turks passed the stage of civilization by taking the first steps in many areas primarily agriculture, animal husbandry, writing and the use of various metals.[1135]

Following this information, it is asserted that the founders of this civilization are forced to migrate to the four corners of the world at some stage in the history due to drought in the area caused by climatic changes, similar to the previous period. However, according to the authors, these migrations enabled them, before anything else, to bring their civilization where they went; and accordingly, new civilizations were founded upon this basis. One of the direct consequences of migrations is regarded as the establishment of the world's oldest and established civilizations of India, Mesopotamia and Egypt.[1136]

For the writers, another significant consequence of this migration is that Anatolia became the second homeland for the Turks since ancient times.[1137] As a result, the Turkish migration starting from the ancient times in the history appeared as a mass migration in 1071 with the Battle of Manzikert. With the succeeding migrations, "Anatolia was completely Turkified at the end of 11th century aside from the western-north part and some shores."[1138] The emphasis, as noted previously, is one of the foundations for justifying Anatolia as the homeland of the Turks. However, the descriptions of the same authors show that they are referring to cultural assimilation/Turkism rather than a racist Turkism. Along the lines, they offer:

> The Turks that came to Anatolia were not all nomadic. Peasants, city-dwellers, men of trade and arts together with traveler dervishes and the army coming after them settled in various parts of Anatolia; there, they gave Turkish names to mountains, cities, towns and villages. They Turkified the Persian, Mongol and Arab Muslims in a short period of time, they taught Turkish to Greeks and

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[1134] Mansel et al, *İlk Çağ Tarihi…*, p. 8 Günaltay states that agriculture rather than civilization was started in 8000 B.C., in the area with reference to Pumpelly. *Tarih I…*, p. 39.

[1135] See for example Mansel et al., *İlk Çağ Tarihi…*, p. 8, 10; Günaltay, *Tarih I…*, p. 10-11; *Tarih IV. Sınıf…*, p. 123-125; Unat and Su, *Tarih - IV. Sınıf…*, p. 11; Unat, *Ortaokul İçin Tarih I…*, p. 5-8, 14.

[1136] Mansel et al., *İlk Çağ Tarihi…*, p. 10; Günaltay, *Tarih I…*, p. 12, 27; *Tarih IV. Sınıf…*, p. 128-130; Unat and Su, *Tarih - IV. Sınıf…*, p. 13-14; Unat, *Ortaokul İçin Tarih I…*, p. 5-6, 15.

[1137] Mansel et al., *İlk Çağ Tarihi…*, p. 10.

[1138] Mansel et al., *Yeni Çağ and Yakın Çağlar Tarihi…*, p. 1.

Armenians. Therefore, Anatolia became Turkified with its stone, water, and folks…[1139]

Be that as it may, as discussed in the upcoming parts, some textbooks reiterate the narratives about the most ancient people of Anatolia as the descendants of Turks who migrated from Central Asia. In addition, another justification comes with the contention that millions of Turks who died for the sake of homeland lie under this land as millions of Turks live in the homeland.[1140] Therefore, it is indicated that apart from the blood, "homeland is indistinguishable [from] and as sacred as the nation and with the glorious victories, beautiful works of art, civilization monuments, and national memories [from past to present]."[1141] For writers, that is why Anatolia is the homeland of Turks. As in the textbooks of the preceding period, individuals are instilled to love her more than themselves and even rush to die for the sake of it if needed.[1142] In the following sections, this point will be addressed again in the discussion about the obligations with regard to military service.

The second nodal point about the definition of Turkishness is the various essential merits attributed to Turks. In the textbooks, Turks are depicted as a nation with virtues such as "more glorious and higher than all nations in the world as well as the future nations"[1143]; well-behaved, hard-working and courageous[1144]; "higher than all the nations and all the entities"[1145]; "with very high potential dignity and glory"[1146]; 'higher intelligence'[1147]; "brave heart"[1148], "with superior life force"[1149]; "with natural and eternal nobility and bravery…,"[1150] etc.

Similar to the preceding periods, "military service" is highly praised as one the essential merits associated with Turkishness. Even, one contention in this regard is

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[1139] *Ibid.* p. 3.
[1140] For example see. Rona, *Yurt Bilgisi Dersleri – IV. Sınıf…*, p. 2; Rona, *Yurt Bilgisi Dersleri – V. Sınıf…*, p. 37; Ermat and Ermat, *Yurt Bilgisi Dersleri IV. Sınıf…*, p. 10.
[1141] Ermat and Ermat, *Yurt Bilgisi Dersleri IV. Sınıf…*, p. 10-11; Ertem and Duru, *Ortaokul İçin Tarih III…*, p. 242.
[1142] Rona, *Yurt Bilgisi Dersleri – IV. Sınıf…*, p. 3.
[1143] *Ibid.* p. 14.
[1144] Ermat and Ermat, *Yurt Bilgisi Dersleri IV. Sınıf…*, p. 15.
[1145] *Ibid.* p. 22.
[1146] Taşkıran, *Yurt Bilgisi I…*, p. 21.
[1147] Unat, *Ortaokul İçin Tarih I…*, p. 15.
[1148] Ertem and Duru, *Ortaokul İçin Tarih III…*, p. 172.
[1149] Su and Duru, *Ortaokul İçin Tarih III…*, p. 74.
[1150] Karal, *Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Tarihi…*, p. 58.

that the phrases encouraging military service come about mostly in this period. This can be interpreted as an ideological/cultural continuity with the previous periods; or as an effect emanating from the tension of the Second World War. In this context, it is underlined in almost all textbooks that the Turks have a natural ability for the military from birth, yet necessary, it is underlined that every Turk gladly would give away their lives and blood for the sake of homeland, nation and state. In this section, it would be worthwhile to provide examples from different books to show the growing sensitivity in the period:

> I am Turkish! A Turk lives only for his homeland and nation. In order to save his homeland and flag, he offers his life without thinking for a second. It is my honorable wish to die for the sake of nation as much as to live…[1151]

> Children! Every Turkish citizen is voluntarily the determined soldier of the military that will save his nation… When it is time, we will give away our lives that nation entrusted to us, but we will not allow our enemies to live in our land.[1152]

> Every Turkish citizen is born a soldier, and dies as soldier.[1153]

> I am a Turkish child. I work for my country, I will die for it.[1154]

> Happy us! We are the children of Turkish with a glorious past. If needed, we will give our lives for our nation, our country, and our homeland.[1155]

> Military service is a sacred duty of every Turkish citizen.[1156]

> When it is your turn, you will be a soldier; you will wear that beautiful gown and have a gun like your father or your brother. Love your gun as much as you love your farming tools that help you to earn your bread, and respect the soldier.[1157]

> Many Arab writers sing praises for the Turks. One of them says the following: "Turkish cavalry ruins his enemies scattering them like hair, devastates them. Turk cannot be separated from his horse. He runs to the left and right, climbs the hills, turns the valleys upside down to catch the runaways and those flyaways. Turkish cavalry sees himself as the lion, his horse as deer and his enemy as the hunting. He never gives up, he makes them terrified. He does not attack unless someone else attacks him. Unless he does not do what he wants, he is never comfortable.

[1151] Rona, *Yurt Bilgisi Dersleri – IV. Sınıf…*,p. 17.
[1152] *Ibid.* p. 37.
[1153] Rona, *Yurt Bilgisi Dersleri – V. Sınıf…*, p. 39.
[1154] Ermat and Ermat, *Yurt Bilgisi Dersleri IV. Sınıf…*, p. 11.
[1155] Ermat and Ermat, *Yurt Bilgisi Dersleri V. Sınıf…*, p. 2.
[1156] *Ibid.* p. 34.
[1157] *Ibid.*p. 35.

Another Arabian tells: "Yelling of courageous Turks suppresses the noise of a lightning. They are such a nation; when they meet you, they are beautiful like angels; when they fight, they become severe like dragons."[1158]

Soldiery is based on the spiritual elements such as dignity, duty-esteem, and love of country, intelligence, perseverance, determination, heroism and self-sacrifice rather than the material goods. A good soldier is the one who finds these merits in himself and believes in the national superiority... Therefore a Turk is a good soldier.

… Turkish nation is the one that has the most advanced and mature military spirit.

Soldiery exists in the spirit of the Turkish nation; this soul is moulded by the bravery of thousands of the Turkish valiants who has fought for ages in the four corners of the world.[1159]

The organization was also very superior in the Seljuks as in every state Turks founded, since Turks are a soldier nation.[1160]

It is possible to provide more examples from the other textbooks of the period but, even the quotes above show adequately that expressions about the military skills, courage, heroism, and, sacrificing their lives for this country, hold an important place in the textbooks.

In addition to above, textbooks include several ethnicist references in the definition of Turkishness. However, it should be highlighted that they do not sound racist in this period. Along similar lines, the expressions about Turks as an independent race or glorification of the biological traits are not encountered. For that reason, references remain limited to ethnicist trend as in the first period.

Before moving onto examples, I should point out how race is defined in the textbooks. In the high school history set, race is defined as "the group of physically similar people from the same blood and speaking the same language…"[1161] Following this, writers state that racial differences are reflected by the contemporary scientists in three criteria. The first criteria is based on the alleged differences pertaining to skin color such as white, yellow, black and red. The second group is based on the linguistic differences such as the Sámi, the Hanil, the Aryans or the

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[1158] Unat and Su, *Tarih IV. Sınıf…*, p. 106.
[1159] Ertem and Duru, *Ortaokul İçin Tarihi III…*, p. 310-311; Su and Duru, *Ortaokul İçin Tarihi III…*, p. 263-264.
[1160] Mansel, et al., *Orta Çağ Tarihi…*, p. 65.
[1161] Mansel et al., *İlk Çağ Tarihi…*, p. 5.

Indo-Europeans, and the Asians. The third factor is based on the differences emanating from the measurement of skulls.[1162]

In his textbook, Günaltay contends that the first two criteria belonged to former times; whereas, scientists define the notion of racial differences over skeletons and skulls in his period.[1163] In this regard, they divided humanity into various different "races", spanning from the dolichocephalic to the brachycephalic (short and broad-headed) race. As a result of migrations, three basic races arose from the mixture of various races over time. They are recounted as the Alpine, the Mediterranean, and the Nordic.[1164] The book of the Mansel et al. refers to this grouping in the same order as the Highlander race, the Mediterranean race, and the Northern race.[1165]

Relatedly, both books provide similar examples and explanations for the racial segregation as follows,

> The Alpine or the Highlander brachycephalic: - Expanded head, straight or curved nose, sometimes like the eagle beaks, thick nostrils, and flat neck. This group included those who migrated from Central Asia to west such as the Elamites, Sumerians, Subari, Guti, Kasi, Hurrians, Mitanni, Proto-Hittites and the Hittite, the people in the Egyptian delta in the third millennium BC. In Europe, Alpen type with Ligurs, Celts, Etruscans, who brought Neolithic and Eneolithic civilization of the Central Asia to this continent, and established the palafitte civilization there, were members of the brachycephalic breeds. At present, Central Asia, Iran, Afghanistan, the people of Anatolia in general, Iraq, Syria and Egypt are partly brachycephalic type of people.
>
> The Mediterranean: - They are dolichocephalic with long-faced, dark skinned, medium or tall height, raven-nosed, and thin visage. The Nubian, Libyan, Birds, Kuşit, Hamid and Sami typically represent this race.
>
> The Nordic: - They are the members of this race who formed the northern type of Europe today with the long-face, brown-skinned, huge dolichocephalic people.
>
> The brachycephalic waves in Europe entered as a wedge between the two dolichocephalic races. Later, the Nordics expanded to south; The Mediterranean dolichocephalic people expanded to the north, by this way, the infusions occurred amongst the three races and hence, Europeans of today emerged.[1166]

[1162] Mansel et al., *İlk Çağ Tarihi…*, s. 4-5.
[1163] Günaltay, *Tarih I…*, p. 13.
[1164] *Ibid.* p. 14.
[1165] Mansel et al., *İlk Çağ Tarihi…*, p. 5.
[1166] Günaltay, *Tarih I…*, p. 14-15.

As could be surmised by the citation, the studies pertaining to race advanced over time, and hence, issues are handled by the books of this period in-depth. In this context, Turks are proclaimed as the members of the Highlander/Alpine brachycephalic race.[1167]

Topçu contends that there is a fourth strand in the classification of races. According to this, descents are divided into groups according to each arm is connected to the main lineages scattered on the earth and at the same time according to the climatic characteristics of the parent strain mingled with each other fused newly acquired characteristics."[1168] For writer, this classification has brought a plethora of races; within this context, the Turks, Indians, Chinese, Arabs, Latin, German and Anglo-Saxon are depicted as different strains/breeds.[1169] I contend that, - although the concept of descent is used as a synonym for racial strains by Topçu- the classification he refers is based on the cultural/ethnicist differences rather than physical or racist. Thus, Topçu should be talking about an ethnic group in his contention about Turks as a race.

In the textbooks of history, another proof for the contention that Turkish History Thesis doctrine remains as a valid component to a certain extent in this period comes in the context of recounting with biological and cultural references to numerous communities from Turkic descents. The kinship communities of the Turks are highlighted as follows: İskitler[1170], Amazons[1171], Saka[1172], Hun[1173], Veyiler (or Topalar)[1174], Sumerians[1175], (proto-)Hitites[1176], Luvi[1177], Hurri (or Subariler)[1178], Hiksos[1179], Urartu[1180], Lidians[1181], Aka[1182], and Etruscan.[1183] A nodal point is that

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[1167] Günaltay, *Tarih I…,* p. 14; Mansel et al., *İlk Çağ Tarihi…,* p. 8.
[1168] Topçu, *Sosyoloji…,* p. 73.
[1169] *Ibid.* p. 73.
[1170] Mansel et al., *İlk Çağ Tarihi…,* p. 11; Günaltay, *Tarih I…,* p. 41.
[1171] Mansel et al., *İlk Çağ Tarihi…,* p. 13.
[1172] Günaltay, *Tarih I…,* p. 17.
[1173] Mansel et al., *İlk Çağ Tarihi…,* p. 14; Günaltay, *Tarih I…,* p. 19.
[1174] Mansel et al., *İlk Çağ Tarihi…,* p. 21-22.
[1175] Mansel et al., *İlk Çağ Tarihi…,* p. 44; Günaltay, *Tarih I…,* p. 74.
[1176] Mansel et al., *İlk Çağ Tarihi…,* p. 49; Günaltay, *Tarih I…,* p. 141.
[1177] Mansel et al., *İlk Çağ Tarihi…,* p. 49.
[1178] Mansel et al., *İlk Çağ Tarihi…,* p. 59; Günaltay, *Tarih I…,* p. 92.
[1179] Günaltay, *Tarih I…,* p. 117.
[1180] Mansel et al., *İlk Çağ Tarihi…,* p. 62.
[1181] *Ibid.* p. 67.
[1182] Mansel et al., *İlk Çağ Tarihi…,* p. 102; Günaltay, *Tarih I…,* p. 237.
[1183] Mansel et al., *İlk Çağ Tarihi…,* p. 163.

though the contentions about the continuation in descent are still observed, the number of groups that are associated with Turkic descent is less this time, compared to the preceding periods. In addition to this, the emphasis about the historical figures allegedly from Turkic origin such as Buddha, Alexander the Great, and so on who appear in the books of the previous period nullified this time. Even though the similar trend continues in the narratives about the Turkish contributions into diverse civilizations, it is felt that the alleged relations of kinship get less attention (or treated more timidly) than the previous period.

In a similar vein, the glorification of racial/biological characteristics of the Turks commonly shared by the textbooks is almost disappeared in the textbooks this period. There are high examples for this:

> In my veins is the blood of the noble unique Turkish nation for thousands of years, in my heart is the utmost confidence and belief in the Turkish soldier.[1184]

> To be born a Turk, to live as a Turk, to die as a Turk and leaving children with Turkish descent. It is never enough to state how much I am proud of being Turk. Happy is the one who says I am Turk.[1185]

For the reason that the racism was losing reputation in the changing international conjuncture, the racist tendencies of the previous period are not found in these textbooks. In this period, it can be contended that a trend of cultural-political nationalism with racist leanings re-emerged.

At the same time, there is a shift from the approaches towards national unity, state, and Atatürk as the foundations of nationalist discourse. According to new paradigm, glorified narratives emerge, however the language shifted from sanctification to a generally more rational language. As an exception, I will provide two examples that posit sanctification for both the Republic regime and Atatürk (his spiritual being). In the first one, Republic regime is depicted as a transcendental entity as the sole cause of all positive things in the lives of citizens:

> …On October 29th in 1923 we founded our beloved, our unique Republic who will work only for the benefits of nation, for advancing it.

[1184] Rona, *Yurt Bilgisi Dersleri – IV. Sınıf…*, p. 51.
[1185] Ermat and Ermat, *Yurt Bilgisi Dersleri IV. Sınıf…*, p. 16.

In the government of the Republic, the nation choses with their own hands amongst themselves the most valuable people who will govern them. For this, Republic is the most useful, the best and the most beautiful of all presences.[1186]

Fellow citizen!

It is even not as much however you love the Republic so much. That considers only you and works for you. You can only pay off your debt against the Republic who brought comfortable living to you this day: keep him above all else, preserve him more than your life!..[1187]

MY REPUBLIC saved my beloved country from the slavery by strangling the enemies, taking my glorious flag beneath their dirty feet up to the sky and moving forward my nation to the highest and advanced state.

I can shout to the whole world proudly without fear, without hesitation: I am a Turk... I am proud of with my Turkishness, with my greatness, with my Republic![1188]

Secondarily, students are evoked to show their love and gratitude for Atatürk as he is considered to watch over them with his eternal presence:

Let's present our endless gratitude to Atatürk who entrusted the republic to Turkish youth at the end of Nutuk saying that 'Turkish Youth,…" and together, to İsmet İnönü, our Great National Chief, and let's promise that we will always perform our duties under any circumstances.[1189]

Nevertheless, these examples are not reiterated in the other textbooks; subsequently, I contend that these expressions could be written by the impulses of some authors.

In addition, another cardinal difference in the textbooks is about the positive expressions and pictures utilized for the President İsmet İnönü along with Atatürk. In this regard, Atatürk is remembered with reverence as the eternal chief; in a similar vein, İnönü is referred as the national chief.

I should also remark that I have encountered in civics textbook with a remarkable description about RPP and single-party regime as the institutions that are credited with positive value by the nationalist discourse. The enthusiastic expressions to justify or show single-party regime highly as ideal, notwithstanding it is contrary to

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[1186] Rona, *Yurt Bilgisi Dersleri – IV. Sınıf…*, p. 26-27.
[1187] *Ibid.* p. 49.
[1188] Rona, *Yurt Bilgisi Dersleri – IV. Sınıf…*, p. 78.
[1189] Taşkıran, *Yurt Bilgisi I…*, p. 27.

the idea of modern democracy, are what attracted my attention most about this narrative:

> There are several political parties in some countries. Each of these expresses their own wishes to execute nation's assignments. Each party wants his way to be kept ahead therefore, the progress and life of the nation is sometimes disrupted, and confusion occurs.
>
> Today we have one party: it is Republican People's Party which was established for the people and the people alone, cherishing the entire nation. That party is the property of all of us. It is the one who made us a unique nation, granting the beloved six arrows to us. Since the first day it was founded the six arrows put forward as the basic principles of People's Party was passed to the Law of Fundamental Organization on February 5th, 1937. The six arrows revealing the main commitments of the Republican People's Party became the basic principle of the government of the Republic of Turkey. So this means that the folks in the Republic of Turkey, the government and the party constitute an inseparable unity.[1190]

As it could be seen from the citation above, it is asserted that one party is fair enough for the Republic; and multi parties could even bring a political/ideological chaos. In addition to this, identification of the party with the state is considered as a positive development in the best interests of the nation. However, it is clear that such an initiative of justification is incompatible with the principles of modern democracy. It is high time I noted the concept of democracy is nullified in the books of this period. As touched upon previously, it was utilized (likely incorrectly) in place of republic or populism in the preceding two periods.

Lastly, I will proceed with the narratives about the historical development of Turkish nationalism in the textbooks. The ambivalent stance about the historicity of Turkish nationalism maintains its presence during this period as well. As discussed previously, one strand is carrying nationalist ideal/belonging out of history back to the birth of the nation; in the face of this, another strand is defining nationalism as an ideology/political movement pertaining to modern phenomenon. As noted, it is even possible to come across these ambivalent stances in the same books.

I referred previously to stances that adopt nationalism as a spiritual phenomenon pre-existing naturally in every Turk as the most powerful sentiment/ideal. For instance,

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[1190] Rona, *Yurt Bilgisi Dersleri – V. Sınıf…*, p. 26.

one of the manifestations appear in the lines that belong to Taşkıran: "it is obvious that there was a desire in Turks from the first time to stand by the nation and keeping national sovereignty above all."[1191] In some books, expressions come up in a similar context "the Turks live for the Turks"[1192] or "the Turks are attached to their nations more than any nation. To be a Turk means the one who loves his homeland."[1193] As mentioned, similar expressions are likely to come across in all textbooks of the period.

Alternatively, history textbooks seem to have a modernist approach especially towards Turkish nationalism as a political ideology/movement. In this regard, textbooks compromise about the Ottoman Empire in a similar manner to that of the previous period in terms of the hampering effect of the period over the idea of Turkishness. Textbooks highlight the prominent steps for the spread of the idea of Turkishness and the development of national identity in the aftermath of the Constitutional era. For them, these thoughts and feelings were invoked amongst Turks as a result of the particularly salient studies within the cultural field.[1194]

On the other hand, Karal underlines the prominence of the War of Independence as an important step in the transformation of a political nationalist movement, and implies that all subsequent steps were taken in the framework of nationalism. In this regard, he makes the following comment:

> After the Turkey Grand National Assembly was established, it fixed all the work in this direction. During the state- motivated Renaissance period in social and cultural fields, the contours of a national program were enforced for the politics and economics.
>
> By this way, the Turkish state which has lost its character in the Ottoman Era began to restore this character in every way. By positing nationalism, the Party facilitated a real foundation for the Turkish nation and the state during the period when many ideologies merged against nationalism.[1195]

Below, Karal summarizes the fundamental ideas of the Turkish History Thesis, which is the basis of the nationalist ideas and textbooks in this era as follows:

[1191] Taşkıran, *Yurt Bilgisi I…*, p. 18.
[1192] Rona, *Yurt Bilgisi Dersleri IV. Sınıf…*, p. 94.
[1193] Ermat and Ermat, *Yurt Bilgisi Dersleri IV. Sınıf…*, p. 10.
[1194] For the examples see. Karal, *Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Tarihi…*, p. 105, 141; Mansel, et al., Yeni and Yakın Çağlar Tarihi…, p. 175-177; Ertem and Duru, *Ortaokul İçin Tarih III…*, p. 158-159.
[1195] Karal, *Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Tarihi…*, p. 112.

1- The homeland of Turkish nation: Central Asia. Turkish nation is the oldest civilization in the world. Turks established and spread the oldest civilizations.

2- The Turkish nation: societies in the middle of anarchy have benefited from the Turkish civilization, law and order under the administrations which were established by hundreds the Turkish in the history and in various parts of the world.

3- The Turkish nation: At the end of First World War showed the world a Turkish miracle by declaring war of Independence against great states that wish to ruin and share his lands at the very moment seen as exhausted. Also, taught that the Turkish nation has a unique power to live and capability as in the older times.[1196]

As a final remark for this section, it would be worthwhile to embark on viewpoints of Topçu particularly about this issue. Amongst the three periods, writer ensures a unique account about the historical development of Turkish nationalism. After all, he makes an assessment, I have never encountered before, which consists of four periods of Turkish nationalism including Ottomanism and Islamism. In this part, the details of his views will be elaborated.

Topçu starts the discussion by stating that, "the case of nationalism is not born recently, as some others think. It is as old as our nation."[1197] In this respect, "builders" of the history of Turkish nationalism are the ones who worked for building a nation having a physical and spiritual unity in Anatolia from at least the Battle of Manzikert in the 11th century until the present day."[1198] In the following lines rather tangled, writer remarks that two forms of Turkish nationalism that are developed in a long period of time from the establishment of the Ottoman principality to end of the Empire as Ottomanism and Islamism .[1199] It is understood from Topçu's stance that state administrators targeted a national unity interwoven with Islamic culture in Anatolia since from the beginning. Therefore, writer consents that the period covering nine hundred years as a stage towards the movement of the Turkification of Anatolia. Nevertheless, he notes that many elements foreign to

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[1196] *Ibid.* p. 142-143.
[1197] Topçu, *Sosyoloji…*, p. 82.
[1198] Topçu, *Sosyoloji…*, p. 82.
[1199] *Ibid.* p. 82-83.

Turks in terms of races, languages, and religions have been involved in the nation in the course of long centuries. [1200]

Topçu defines the third stage of Turkish nationalism with reference to the movement of Turkism in the race and language set forth by intellectuals of the late nineteenth century. According to him, Turkism is developed in two strands: the first one is related to cultural nationalism that advocates that the nation should be gathered around spiritual elements. The second one is the Pan-Turanism which espouses Turkism based on race connecting this idea with a specific territory. Within this context, he recounts the following names amongst the pioneer Turanists of the period starting from Fethi Ali, Süleyman Paşa, Ali Suavi, Ziya Gökalp, Ahmet Agayef and Yusuf Akçura. [1201]

The fourth and the last stage of nationalism is the genuine and realist nationalism which is constituted by "the ones who understood that in national life, race has no culture but nation has a culture."[1202] For him, Remzi Oğuz Arık is the leading advocate of this idea quoted as "the one who targeted an ideal of nationality based on the idea of homeland and not leaving from the geography of the homeland".[1203] In the upcoming section, I will refer to acclaims of Topçu about Turkish nationalism's successful infusion of elements from religion and national culture. However, as can be understood from what is summarized until now, writer is lacking a certain consistency in his classification of nationalism at least as seen in other writers apart from being away from historicity. Taking his stance into consideration, he gives the impression that he is highly discretionary by showing Ottomanism and Islamism as variations of Turkish nationalism.

Be that as it may, I need to reiterate that this stance does not come up in any other textbooks. At this stage, finally, I will discuss the relationship between Turkishness and Islam in the textbooks.

[1200] *Ibid.* p. 83.
[1201] *Ibid.*
[1202] *Ibid.* p. 84.
[1203] *Ibid.*

6.4. Turkishness and Islam in the Textbooks

In order to contextualize the upcoming discussion, Table-7 presents a quantitative data about the pages allocated to three periods of history such as Pre-Islamic, Turkish-Islamic, and Republican. Similar to the preceding period, number of pages allocated to the Pre-Islamic Turkish history is limited to narratives about Central Asian history.

Table 7 – A Comparison of the Pages Allocated to Pre- Islamic Turkish History, Turkish-Islamic History, and Republican Era in the History Textbooks

	Pre-Islamic Turkish History (page numbers)	Turkish-Islamic History (page numbers)	Republican Era History (page numbers)
Mansel, et al., *İlk Çağ Tarihi*	9	-	-
Mansel, et al., *Orta Çağ Tarihi*	12	46	-
Mansel, et al., *Yeni and Yakın Çağlar Tarihi*	-	117	-
Karal, *Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Tarihi*	-	7	173
Total	**21**	**170**	**173**

According to the table, when the allocation is proportioned, pages that are allocated to Turkish-Islamic period are eight and a half times more than the pages allocated to narration of the Pre-Islamic period. As noted previously, this was only five times more in the preceding period. In other words, the number of pages allocated to Turkish-Islamic period is increased compared to the latter. However, quantitative data alone is not enough to comment further. Similarly, Turkish-Islamic history occupied the largest space in the textbooks of the second period where the secular nationalist discourse was dominant. Another prominent point is the growth in the

density of the narratives about the Republican Era. I contend that a quantitative comparison of three periods will not provide a meaningful data for the reason that in this period, the Republic turned 20 years old. Therefore, it would be worthwhile to proceed with the qualitative analysis.

For an in-depth assessment, I start with the history textbooks. As a general comment, narratives about Turkish-Islamic history are written (mostly) with positive references throughout the textbooks. In the high school set, it is asserted that Turks adopted Islam since the period of Abbasid as follows: "Islam was not spread among the Turks by force. After having interacted with Islam for a long time, they had a chance to understand it better. This religion was more appropriate to their spirits compared to the rest."[1204] The main narratives of the history textbooks in this regard are reiterated in the other textbooks as the Turks adopted Islam peacefully. By highlighting that Islam is the perfect religion for the Turks, this stance presents a clue for the interwovenness of Turkishness and Islam of this period.

The prevailing theme is constructed by the narratives about the contribution of the Turks to Islam in the fields of politics, military and civilization. In this context, it is explained that the Turks played greater role over time in spreading Islam and advancing Islamic civilizations after adopting Islam en masse in the time of Abbasids. There are numerous examples for this. In an elementary school history textbook in the early period, it is stated that "the Turks…took upon the mission of spreading and advancing Islam"[1205], and "the largest share in the formation of Islamic civilization belongs to the Turks."[1206] In a later textbook, it is highlighted that "Islam was a revealed religion of the Arabs. But after becoming Muslim, the Turks played a superior role than the Arabs in the spread of this religion and the birth of a new civilization."[1207] It seems the stance continued throughout this period. The same topic is also discussed in Mansel, et al as following:

> Becoming Muslims en masse ... that was a very important event for both Turkish and world history. Together with this, Islam became a world religion, and was saved from the danger. From then on, Turks became the protectors of

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[1204] Mansel et al., *Orta Çağ Tarihi…*, p. 44.
[1205] *İlkokul V. Sınıf,* İstanbul: Maarif Matbaası, 1944, p. 28.
[1206] *Ibid.* p. 30.
[1207] Unat and Su, *Tarih – IV. Sınıf…*, p. 106.

Islam. The uprisings against religion and nationality were avoided; Muslim Turks was heading the new conquests in the Islamic history…[1208]

Therefore, it could be emphasized that the history textbook authors share the same discourse on this issue.

Within the same context, highly flattering language is witnessed for the various societies under the category of the Turkish-Islamic states in the textbooks. The following quotations below offer examples for this:

> In the period of the Abbasid, Islam was spread amongst the Turks faster, and they overtook the head of Muslim world. The Qarahanid, Ghaznavids, Seljuk and Harezmshah were the great empires founded by Muslim- Turks.[1209]
>
> The Qarahaniads appreciated knowledge and scholars. They built many schools, mosques, palaces and bridges all over the country.
>
> Many valuable scientists were raised in the schools of Bukhara and Samarkand, and they served well to the Turkish-Islamic civilization.[1210]
>
> The Renaissance began in Italy for the first time. Since, Italy was adjacent to the Turkish-Islamic countries which had a highly developed civilization in the Middle Ages. This had an impact on Italy.[1211]
>
> The works of carving seen at the doors of many mosques and tombs reveal that the Turks highly advanced in the art of carving.[1212]
>
> After the battle of Manzikert, in 1071 Seljuks settled in Anatolia and after them, Ottoman Turks had brought here a new source culture with large civil works through the ages of Middle, Near and New.[1213]
>
> Madrasas were established in the major cities of the Muslim world, libraries were filled with valuable manuscripts. Turkish-Muslim states became the center of science. Hundreds of madrassa students of the era were lectured by the great scholars. Farabi and Ibn Sina were the scholars who had the most of students. The most important Madrasa was the Nizamiyya madrasa founded by Shah's vizier Nizam al-Mulk in Baghdad.[1214]
>
> The country of Harezm was very advanced in terms of civilization, as all Turkish-Muslim countries.[1215]

[1208] Mansel et al *Orta Çağ Tarihi…*, p. 44.
[1209] *Ibid.* p. 27.
[1210] Unat and Su, *Tarih – IV. Sınıf…*, p. 118.
[1211] Unat and Su, *Tarih – V. Sınıf…*, p. 68.
[1212] *Ibid.* p. 131.
[1213] Su and Duru, *Ortaokul İçin Tarih III…*, p. 1.
[1214] Mansel et al., *Orta Çağ Tarihi…*, p. 55.
[1215] *Ibid.* p. 68.

The acclamation of the Turkish-Islamic history is continued in the textbooks with the narrations of the Ottoman Empire. In the narratives, a language full of praises has been used differently than the previous period:

> Ottoman Turks were carrying the essential character of the Turkish race; they were brave, heroic and right. They felt respect for the elderly; they loved the siblings, they showed obedience to commandments…

> The Ottoman Turks, like all Turks that did not lose the essence of the characters are organized. For this reason, Ottoman state which was founded in 14th century and developed later became a great state. This state was shaped by the elements from Seljuk, Byzantine and Islamic governments; however Ottoman Empire was not a copy at all; and became a highly qualified modern state carrying a Turkish imprint, to grow and expand. These superior qualities could be seen in the structure of the Ottoman administration.[1216]

> The conquest of İstanbul by Turks was a great occasion not only in the Ottoman History but also in the world history. By this, an Era was closed and a new Era emerged. In the Ottoman history, this was called as the Rise of the Empire. In the period from the conquest of İstanbul in 1453 until the death of great statesman Sokullu in 1579, three great sultans- Fatih, Yavuz, and Kanuni- had lived. All of them were great commanders as well as powerful statesmen. The viziers appointed by them to run the state affairs were also as precious as them. In the aftermath of Kanuni's death, Sokullu who reigned the state for thirteen years was one of them. In this period, literature, science, art and trade were advanced to a large extent.[1217]

> [The handover for İstanbul] caused a deep excitement in the world. The Turkish and Islamic world was startled with happiness and joy; on the other hand, Christians felt deep grief.[1218]

> The reign of Kanuni was one of the most glorious periods of the Turkish history. In this period, many lands in Asia, Africa and Europe were occupied. Science and art were advanced by means of wars, prominent scholars and artists were raised in the country …[1219]

> The Ottoman Empire which proved its superior existence to all the states in Europe and Asia with all the glories, victories in the political field between the second half of the fifteenth century and sixteenth century were regarded of high prominence with the maturity and order in the military and administration as well as art and literature.[1220]

In addition, it is very interesting to see that the exalting statements once used for Atatürk are now used similarly for certain Ottoman sultans:

[1216] Mansel et al., *Yeni and Yakın Çağlar Tarihi…*, p. 8.
[1217] Mansel et al, *Ortaokul İçin Tarih III…*, p. 74.
[1218] Mansel et al., *Yeni and Yakın Çağlar Tarihi…*, p. 23.
[1219] Su and Duru, *Ortaokul İçin Tarih III…*, p. 16.
[1220] *Ibid.* p. 74.

In the Iranian expedition in 1514, soldiers had difficulties owing to lack of water. However, Yavuz did not turn back. Writer states: "Yavuz decided not to return for the disposition. He jumped to his horse violently and with loud voice said: "The ones who are comfortable in sitting next to their wives can go back. I can walk alone to face the enemy..." The magnificent army in the hills was deeply excited before this courageous hero...[1221]

Overall, another manifestation about the sympathy towards the Turkish-Islamic history, in particular to the Ottoman Empire comes up in addressing Turkish History in a continuum extending from the Seljuks to the Republic. As be surmised, the preceding period nullified any connection between the Ottomans and the Republic of Turkey. In this context, Mansel et al. contend that "Turks founded a great state that lasted up until now by taking Anatolia from the Byzantium in the second half of the 16th century."[1222] For writers, following "the establishment of the great state", it is possible to study history of Turkey in five periods. They are, "1- The conquest of Anatolia; 2- The reign of Seljuks in Anatolia; 3- The Anatolian principalities; 4- Ottoman Empire; 5-Republic of Turkey."[1223] As an indicator of the continuity, the below quoted Figure-1 was prepared for the textbooks. The chart portrays that four different states were established in the regions of Anatolia, Syria, Iraq and Kirmani after the Great Seljuk Empire; Anatolian principalities were founded out of them over time and in the aftermath, Ottoman Empire was born and ultimately, Republic of Turkey was established.

[1221] Su and Duru, *Ortaokul İçin Tarih III…*, p. 9.
[1222] Mansel et al., *Orta Çağ Tarihi…*, p. 90.
[1223] *İbid.*

The Great Seljuk Empire

| Anatolian Seljuks | Syria Seljuks | Iraq Seljuks | Kirmani Seljuks |

Anatolian principalitie

Ottoman Empire

Republic of Turkey

Figure 1. The Scheme about the Periods in the Turkish History[1224]

To reiterate my point, such a chart could not exist in the official discourse of the preceding period. Since the contention was that Republican Period symbolized a profound break with the Ottoman Era. Therefore, the approach to history of Turkey in this period directly or indirectly builds a connection with religion, apart from the advent of Turks in Anatolia. Another evidence for this connection could be that the Seljuks and the Ottomans are voiced as 'we' when Western Christian world is depicted as 'they' in some parts of the history textbooks.

Another important component of identification of Turkishness and Islam through Ottoman Empire is the specific parts allocated to explain what had particularly achieved on behalf of Turkification and Islamization in that period under the heading of culture and civilization at the end of each chapter within the high school set. In this context, the following excerpts are striking:

> In the 14th century, Ottoman Turks put great efforts to Turkify and Islamize Anatolia and Rumelian… In parallel to Turkification, they undertook to Islamize Anatolia and Rumelian. They converted Christian children to Muslims by raising them as the Janissary corps. Some of the Christians adopted Islam

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[1224] This chart is reproduced from the chart in *Ibid.* p. 91.

willingly for getting rid of taxes and being appointed to higher positions in the state, and in a very short period of time, they were infused with the Turks.

Turks Turkified the cities they took from the Christians. The imprint of Turkishness in the cities became the mosques, madrasah and lodging houses (imaret) …[1225]

In the sixteenth century, many Christians living in the Ottoman territory and desiring the rightness of Turkish adopted Islam and participated in the Turkish-Muslim population...[1226]

As pointed out by the quotations above, Turkishness and Islam are conflated as two complementary identity components; and sometimes, they are interchangeably used as in the narrative about the imprint of Turkishness constructed through Islamic public symbols.

However, the negative attitude towards the last period of Ottoman Era continued in the textbooks of this period akin to the preceding period. Sultans of the last period were depicted as loose, fond of pleasures, not skilful, villain, crazy, and not caring his people.[1227] From this perspective, the biggest criticisms are directed towards Hamid II and Vahdettin, as in the previous period. However, it can be asserted that the dose of criticism substantially reduced in this period.

The narrations that posit the preponderance of Muslim Turks over pagan Turks could be another salient example for the identification of Turkishness with Islam. In a statement Mansel et al., recite Qarahaniads as "sincere Muslims"; by attributing leading role to them in protecting *Maveraunnehir* against the pagans.[1228] More on this subject comes with the narration of the Seljuk victory against pagan Turks:

In the 10th century, a hero named after Seljuk took over the Oguzhs. His father was from the Oghuz Turks who were prominent figures in the palace of Uigur khanate. Seljuk was the commander in the army of the Khagan. Then, he left the Uighur province together with the Oghuzs around him and came to the shores of the River *Seyhan*. He settled in the Cent and became a Muslim.

During that time, the Western Turkish province belonged to Samaniad Dynasty. This state was weak. The pagan Turks within the Oghuzs province were constantly attacking the territories under Samanid dynasty.

[1225] Mansel et al., *Yeni and Yakın Çağlar Tarihi…*, p. 11.
[1226] *Ibid.* p. 61.
[1227] For the examples see Rona, *Yurt Bilgisi Dersleri IV. Sınıf…*, p. 23; Taşkıran, *Yurt Bilgisi I…*, p. 21; Ertem and Duru, *Ortaokul İçin Tarih…*, p. 25; Mansel, et al., *Yeni and Yakın Çağlar Tarihi…*, p. 56, 89, 92, 172.
[1228] Mansel et al., *Orta Çağ Tarihi…*, p. 59.

The khans of Samanids were paying taxes to them. These Turks one day came to the city of Cent to as for taxes. Seljuk found it inappropriate for Muslims to pay taxes to pagans. He sent them back. Later, he attacked with his comrades to pagans. This achievement brought fame for Seljuk and all the Oghuz Turks called him *başbuğ*.[1229]

Apart from the distinction put forward Muslim Turks vis-à-vis pagan Turks, it is possible to come across with explicit discrimination between Muslim Turks and Christians. Within this context, it would be worthwhile to differentiate the stance for Christian population of Turkey from the stance for Western (European) Christians.

Accordingly, a negative language is used especially for the Greek and Armenian Christian population in the textbooks with regard to their attitudes in the establishment of the new regime. It is possible to give several examples:

> [Beside Sultans and the Caliph]… the Christian within the country are working wither explicitly or implicitly to realize their wishes.[1230]
>
> Christians were undervaluing the rights given to them in the last period of the Empire; they were targeting to leave from Turkey by establishing independent states.[1231]
>
> The activities of Christian components:
>
> Apart from this, the Christians in the country are working implicitly or explicitly for themselves. The committee in the İstanbul patriarchate (*Mavri Mira*) were collecting gangs in the provinces, making propaganda everywhere, the scouts in the Greek schools are prepared.
>
> The patriarchate of Armenian is also making preparations just like the Greeks…
>
> The Greek Pontus in the Black Sea is also working very hard.[1232]
>
> For centuries under the rule of tolerant Turks, minorities had easy and comfortable life, they began to perform their evil intentions attempting to benefit from opportunities on Turkish soil [1233]
>
> The Greeks stepped out İzmir along with the frenetic demonstrations of Greeks (*Rumlar*)… Many civics and officials were shot by the bullets of Greeks watching the demonstrations. When tragedy was happening in front of the Allied forces, Greeks (*Rumlar*) began to attack Turkish neighborhood and take

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[1229] Unat and Su, *Tarih – IV. Sınıf…*, p. 121-122.
[1230] Taşkıran, *Yurt Bilgisi I…*, p. 20.
[1231] Unat and Su, *Tarih – V. Sınıf…*, p. 161.
[1232] Ertem and Duru, *Ortaokul İçin Tarih III…*, p. 168.
[1233] Karal, *Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Tarihi…*, p. 1.

part in all kinds of murder. Both the troops and the folks started preparations for defense with the motto İzmir belongs to Turks.[1234]

The common point of the similar expressions supported by the recitations from Nutuk, as noted previously, is that anti-state actions meet at the common ground of Christianity and without exception, in a sense; almost all Christians are charged with being traitors. As in the preceding periods, Muslim-Turk students are imbued with the idea that Greeks and Armenians of Turkey (i.e Christians in Turkey) are not the communities to be trusted.

In a similar vein, another narration that can serve to the identification of Turks with Islam, appears in the following explanation: "[the period in the aftermath of the Congress in Sivas] people asked for the following: The places where Turks live will stay completely with the Turks, no concession will be given to those Christians who live in that places…"[1235] By putting Christian population opposed to the Turks, it could be contended that all the Muslim population living in Turkey are considered nominally as Turk; or alternatively all the Turks living in Turkey are regarded as Muslims. Therefore, this sentence can be given as an example to use the word Turk in place of Muslim. As in the first period, it is possible to come across with expressions that use Turkish covering Muslimness as binary opposition for Christianity, for instance Janissaries were depicted as "the Christian children… who were raised with Turkish education."[1236]

Another complimentary component of the same inclination could be seen in the examples from Karal's textbook entitled *Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Tarihi*. Relatedly, the emphasis is that the Turks are at the same time Muslims. A nodal point is that writer picks up some reading texts that prefer to identify Turks with Islam written in the War of Independence:

> As being the greatest Islam government in the East, the fairest nation of all, us that constitute the most innocent race shall declare all the truth today and that

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[1234] *Ibid.* p. 15-17.
[1235] Ertem and Duru, *Ortaokul İçin Tarih III…*, p. 190.
[1236] Unat and Su, *Tarih – V. Sınıf…*, p. 38. Similar expressions appear in Su and Duru, *Ortaokul İçin Tarih III…*, p. 77.

the Turks decided to shed blood for their homeland and nation. [İstanbul Sırrı Bey's Speech, 17-5-1919][1237]

The power of Turkishness –based on the right- comes from his religion, the clean and noble blood in his veins. His religion is everlastingly constant as his determination and power … As the delegation of Turkish and Islam; we are determined to strengthen this unity with our property, our lives, our religion and our honor… [*Heyeti Temsiliyenin Sivas'tan Ankara'ya Gelmesi Münasebetiyle "Ankara" Gazetesinde Çıkan Bir Yazı,* 1919][1238]

The brave cities of the French were digging the earth, hiding in the armors underneath the escalating fortifications. Quite the reverse, our defense arrangement was filled overtly with the Turkish patriotism and the faith of Islam. [Müfide Ferit Tek, "Gaziantebin Düşmesi", *Hakimiyeti Milliye*, Şubat 1920][1239]

There is no place for any hesitation or anxiety on the face of the enemy. The arms of the enemy extending to Anatolia come closer to their own graves; this new journey is the one for their death. With God's help, near future will show the results. [General Fevzi (Çakmak)'s speech, 1921][1240]

Besides, Karal implies that he sees all Turks as Muslims in his example about Sevres agreement. He notes that it is intended to create a Muslim minority amongst the Turks with targeting to divide nation.[1241]

In most of the history textbooks, Western/European Christians are depicted as the other of Muslim-Turk identity. The most typical examples are often encountered in the narratives about the Crusades. Accordingly, Mansel, et al recites the Crusades as "the expeditions of Western Christians to take Jerusalem from the end of eleventh century until the end of the thirteenth century."[1242] Unat and Su suggests as "attacks against Turkish-Islamic world".[1243] Similarly, Muslim-Turks states are highly praised for protecting Muslim world from the Christian invasion: "If Turks were not leading the Muslim world at that time, the attacks from the Byzantium and Latin, and lastly, Mongols could have sent Islam back to Arab Peninsula. Therefore, when Turks defeated Latin principalities and the Crusaders, they protected Islam."[1244]

[1237] Karal, *Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Tarihi…*, p. 20.
[1238] *Ibid.* p. 37.
[1239] *Ibid.* p. 58.
[1240] *Ibid.* p. 70.
[1241] *Ibid.* p. 56.
[1242] Mansel et al., *Orta Çağ Tarihi…*, p. 113.
[1243] Unat and Su, *Tarih – V. Sınıf…*, p. 18.
[1244] Mansel et al., *Orta Çağ Tarihi…*, p. 120.

In the history textbooks, the articulation of Turkish nationalism with religion at discursive level is constructed by the infusion of Turkishness with Sunnism, as in the first period. One of the purest examples of this comes in the process of Turkification and Islamization of the Anatolia as follows:

> Turkish tribes that came to Anatolia were all Sunni Muslims; in a very short period of time, Islam dominated the country and the friendly interactions with the Abbasid started. The Turks were very tolerant towards those who were not from their religion, so they were not engaged in rituals of other religions.
>
> The period starting with Seljuks, the religion tariqas were strengthened in Anatolia. Lodges were opened for the tariqas such as Kadirilik and Rufailik; Mevlevilik was founded by Mevlana Celalettin-i Rumi in Anatolia. Sunnism were dominant in the cities. Turkmen tribes did not abandon their Shaman practices with wine and singing even after they adopted Islam. The requisites of Islam faith such as fasting and praying were not appropriate to them. For this, pious ones invented a form of Islam compatible with Shamanism. As a result, a denomination emerged close to Shiism rather than Sunnism. This is the basis that forms the beliefs named The Babai, Bektashi, Kızılbaş, and Tahtacı. The Seljuks and Ottomans struggled with those denominations for the unity of Anatolia.[1245]

The writer of the lines above indicates that all the Turks who came from Central Asia to Anatolia were Sunni. Moreover, he states that the ones who had difficulty in compromising with the fundamentals of Islamic faith infused Shaman traditions with Islam and invented denominations close to Shiism such as the Babai, Bektashi, Kızılbaş, and Tahtacı. In this regard, it can be contented that these sects were considered as the deviations of Islam. At the same time, they create disunity for the national/regional/denominational complementarity of Anatolia. Therefore, it is highlighted that "Sunnî-Muslim-Turkic" Seljuks and Ottomans fought against them for a long time.

Another salient example for the identification of national identity and denomination emerges in the narratives about the battle of Chaldiran between Selim I and Shah Ismail. The first point is that the Turkishness of Shah Ismail, who was once recited as a Turkish descent by the textbooks of the preceding period, was ignored by the textbooks. Instead he is depicted with the title of Iranian Shah.[1246] Another textbook

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[1245] *Ibid.* p. 108-110.
[1246] For example see Unat and Su, *Tarih – V. Sınıf…*, p. 79; Su and Duru, *Ortaokul İçin Tarih III…*, p. 7; Mansel, et al., *Yeni and Yakın Çağlar Tarihi…*, p. 48.

which introduces him as the son of a Turkish *seyh* from Azerbaijan; it is explained that "he accepted the official Shi'a Islam of Iran… and he sent many missionaries to convert Anatolian people to his denomination".[1247] Relatedly, Mansel, et. al, underlines that he undertook a large Shii propaganda for Anatolia; and besides, "he targeted to disjoint the religious unity of Anatolia".[1248] Keeping this in mind, it is understood that entire Anatolian population is considered nominally as Sunni; besides the emphasis about the intrigues of these missionaries in Anatolia echoes as a negative treatment for Shiism. In a textbook, it is highlighted that "in the Eastern Anatolia, some notorious 40,000 Shiite were killed and others were imprisoned"; and, Selim I is throned as a hero.[1249] In the same textbooks, it is further stated that İsmail ran away from the battlefield leaving all his property, throne and his wife/his harem behind. As could be surmised, it is appropriate to contextualize these discussions as an extension of the identification of Turkishness with Sunnism.

As a last remark, it should be noted that although the religion textbook narrates Islam from Sunni paradigm, there are poems in the textbooks from the well-known poets of Heteredox belief such as Yunus Emre, Mevlana, Pir Sultan Abdal, Hacı Bektaş Veli, Hacı Bayram Veli, Abdülkadir Geylanî, Aşık Seyranî, Adem Dede, and Aşık Hatayî. Be that as it may, these poets seem to be chosen on the basis of Turkish descent, so this initiation could be regarded as an endeavor within the context of Turkish association.

In light of the above analysis, I contend that the textbooks of history, civics, sociology and religion in the period covering years from 1941 until 1950 meet at a common ground of Turkish-Islamic Synthesis. In other words, as in the preceding period, textbooks of the period conflate Turkishness and Muslimness as complementary components of national identity. On one hand, the principle of secularism is advocated in the books, as in all periods; nullifying the ambiguity, nation and religion are presented as supplementary elements with regard to some expressions and narrative styles. The most salient point is that Turkish Republic is depicted as the last chain of an extended Turkish-Islamic history starting from

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[1247] Ertem and Duru, *Ortaokul İçin Tarih III…*, p. 5-6.
[1248] Mansel et al., *Yeni and Yakın Çağlar Tarihi…*, p. 48.
[1249] *Ibid.* p. 48.

Anatolian Seljuks- particularly different from the other periods-. Relatedly, mostly glorifying and exalting positive language is used in the narrations of Seljuks as well as Ottoman Empire. Therefore, it can be discussed that although the liberalization towards religion at the state policy level started in the second half of the 1940s, this inclination reflected into the textbooks earlier. The dominant discourse in the period is nothing more than a revival of religious nationalism of the first period.

CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSION

In this dissertation, I have attempted to explain the relationships between nationalism and religion in the official discourse by an analysis of social sciences and religion textbooks in the early Republican era of Turkey. The common assumption in the literature so far is inclined to emphasize a secular nationalism in the official discourse along with the policies to institutionalize secularism in the aftermath of the establishment of the Republic of Turkey. What is more, it has been asserted until now that this inclination was maintained from the second half of 1920s until the last years of 1940s. Accordingly, religion was believed to be excluded from the dominant nationalist discourse specifically between 1924 and 1947. In support of this viewpoint, the existing studies with regard to analysis of civics and history textbooks contend that secular nationalist discourse was also dominant in the textbooks during the whole period.

The basic motivation behind my dissertation is the very idea that the dominance of a single paradigm on religion in a period of nearly twenty-five years is contentious on various grounds. First of all, this approach is based on an over-generalization disregarding any possible diversity or shifts over time within any given official discourse. In addition, it can be argued that possible reactions or resistance to radical shift from a traditional/Islamic Empire towards a new and modern regime which was imposed upon the population has been overlooked. Besides, even though each of the founding members of the Republic shared and advocated the same views throughout their careers –which is rarely the case–, political inconsistencies arising from pragmatic intentions are sure to be expected.

Keeping these in mind, I seek traces of such ideological/discursive inconsistencies within the official discourse in regard to relations between nationalism and religion through analysis of the textbooks. Therefore, I have examined the textbooks of the courses taught in the primary, secondary and high schools such as History, Sociology, Civics and Religion in the period covering the years from 1924 until 1950

by discourse analysis approach together with content analysis. In light of the preparatory desk review, I have reached approximately 77 books out of the published 110 textbooks in the aforementioned years.

In my analysis, I have benefited mostly from the critical technique Van Dijk proposed for discourse analysis. He sees discourses (written or verbal) as the main instruments for the reproduction and transformation of ideologies; and thus, a way of practicing authority by hegemonic groups. According to author, the aim hereby is to manipulate the cognitive/mental framework of masses through dissemination of discourses in order to make them to think and act in a certain way. For this, the impact and power of media and mass education (and textbooks) are mostly used in modern world. The active role in controlling and manipulating is given to socio-cultural (symbolic) elites; however, for Van Dijk, they rarely exercise this ideological power independently since most of these elites are managed by the state, military or private corporations (and elites).

Within this context, Van Dijk states that discourse analysis should start with a macro analysis of hegemonic relations in a certain society. This approach inevitably requires an analysis of the power relations between hegemonic groups and other social formations; and hence, an analysis of the structure and rationality behind the authority of dominant groups. In this regard as a first step towards my study, I have attempted to analyse diverse political inclinations, dominant groups that control these, ideological and intellectual resources and politics regarding religion and nationalism in the time frame starting from the last period of Ottoman Empire until the early Republican era. Henceforward, I have concentrated on the views and approaches of modernist traditionalists and Westernist/modernists who emerged as a return of the modernization process and two leading groups not only in the Imperial period but also in the Republican period.

I assert that modernist traditionalism which could be dated back to New Ottomans in the second half of the nineteenth century, attributed Islam a paramount role along with Turkishness in defining national identity. In a period when nationalism was regarded as a cultural problem, this approach represents the viewpoint that on one hand, defined Turkishness and Islam as two complementary identity components; on

the other hand, supported a liberal/constitutional regime in Western standards. Therefore, it could be contended that they, in a sense, attempted to synthesize modern and traditional institutions. In line with the contention Alkan and Çetinsaya suggested, this approach could be regarded as a pre-model of Turkish-Islamic synthesis doctrine which would be coined by members of *Aydınlar Ocağı* in 1970s and disseminated officially after 1980 military coup in Turkey.

Besides, the other dominant group of two periods is Westernists or Modernists who were composed of elites firmly adhered to a Westernist modernization idea. Even though most of them were emphasizing religion within their political discourses at the beginning of their careers; they adopted an approach to push religion out of political and public life overtime affected primarily by the French and German materialists and positivists. Within this framework, nationalism, which was politicized in the early twentieth century, was also perceived by this group as a secular ideology and movement that needs to be saved from the retardent effects of religion.

After 1908, during the government of CUP, growing ideological polarisation within hegemonic groups brought the intersection of secular nationalist and religious nationalist discourses in politics. Certainly, pragmatical preferences in relation with changing (political, economic and socio-cultural) conjuncture also forced political elites to adopt an ambivalent position about their nationalist policies in regard to religion and secularism.

With the promulgation of the Republic in Turkey, Turkish nationalism and secularism based on Westernization were identified as the founding principles of the regime. In this regard, according to the first principle, nationalism, the Sultanate regime based on a traditional dynasty was abolished and replaced by a nation state which was defined with a reference to Turkish nation. Within this period, Turkishness was defined sometimes with a common culture, ideal and feelings; sometimes political and territorial belonging, and rarely, with a common race. Therefore, the subject of "we" in defining group identity, as the target of all ideologies as stated by Van Dijk was shifted in time. In other words, the scope of Turk was larger when it was believed to be composed of the individuals who felt

themselves as Turk; however, it was limited to a narrow scope when it was based on subjective criteria of speaking Turkish, even coming from a Turkic descent.

In the mean time, secularism stands out as the other leading ideological foundation of the regime. Even though this principle could simply be defined as the separation of religion and state affairs; in fact, there is more of an ambivalent practice. On one hand, there were steps to minimize the influence of religion over public life; on the other hand, diverse policies that could in a sense mean the impact of religion over state administration or vice versa were enforced.

As an extension of ambivalent politics on religion, relationship of the official national ideology with religion had also ambiguity. Indeed, besides secular nationalist discourses, it is possible to encounter examples of nationalist discourses - akin to CUP period- that make references to Islam in defining national identity and seeking support with no objection to secular nature of the regime. I see this as a continuity of the existing ideological segregation among the dominant groups of CUP period. Even though there is a popular assumption in the literature to define power elites under a homogenous group of secular nationalists (Westernists); the duality amongst political (and military) and symbolic elites in their approaches towards the role of religion in national identity continued in the Republican era. Thus, the political strife and alliances in parallel to pragmatic concerns of the period between the Westernists and modernist traditionalists determined the politics of the early Republican era.

Within this context, Islam and specifically Sunni doctrine found a place in the nationalist discourse for the most of the period via modernist traditionalists existing among the dominant groups. In this regard, particular views of this group who defined culture and history (therefore, identity) over a Turkishness juxtaposed with Sunni Islam could be regarded as a typical example -pertinent to commonalities- of a paradigm which would later be called the Turkish-Islamic synthesis doctrine. It should also be added that this was not in contradiction with secularism principle since it was not targeting an Islamic regime at all. As pointed out earlier, I would like to reiterate that there are a few studies which focus on this specific part of the political regime of the early Republican era.

In my dissertation, following Van Dijk, I have proceeded with the textbook analysis as a second step of discourse analysis after a general assessment of political regime and ideological inclinations of dominant groups of the early Republican era. I contend that the period covering the years from 1924 until 1950 could be divided into three sub-periods based on the commonalities and differences in regard to the relationship patterns between nationalism and religion. The dominant discourse, in the textbooks of the first sub-period covering the years between 1924 and 1931, is based on the idea that Islam and Turkishness are the two complementary components forming the basis of national identity and nationalism. This, I believe, can be referred to as more of a Turkish-Islamic Synthesis. Subsequently, a strict secular nationalism is observed in the textbooks of the second period between 1931 and 1939. During the third and last sub-period covering the years between 1939 and 1950, reference to religion in textbooks has gained power once again. Hence, the strict secularism of the second sub-period is replaced with a Turkish identity in strong association with Islam. This third period closely resembles the first one, where Turkish-Islamic Synthesis becomes the dominant discourse once again. At this point, I would like to give an account of how I interpreted my findings in relation to political developments of the period.

In the aftermath of promulgation of the Republic, it is observed that state gave prominence to the efforts in disseminating education to masses. However, since material conditions were sufficient in the post-war Turkey, most of the textbooks were republished versions (with minor changes) of the textbooks of the Ottoman Empire. Besides, as there was no state monopoly over the publication of textbooks, there was a plethora of textbooks published by private publishing houses in the fields of history, civics, sociology and religious education published between 1924 and 1931. Therefore, it could be reclaimed that most of the textbook writers of this period were modernist traditionalists who sustained the ideological inclinations of CUP period. This inclination represents an endeavour of reconciliation of modernism (nationalism, secularism) with tradition (religion), similar to preceding period. This endeavour resulted in a discourse juxtaposing religion and nationalism dominant over the textbooks instead of secular nationalist discourse which would enlarge its scope in the political field after 1924.

Within this context, it is observed that textbook writers especially of religion and history courses attributed paramount importance to Islam among all other religions and accepted it as the truest religion. Some writers tried to adopt an objective stance however this was not a common trend. The quantitative comparison about the narration of different religions reveals the privileged position of Islam.

In the textbooks of the period, cultural nationalism is the dominant strand within the framework of Smith's classification pertinent to definitions of nationalism, nation and national identity. Typically, nation was defined with reference to cultural unity defined by a shared language, feelings and ideals instead of common ancestry, race or territory. Compared the latter periods, it can be acclaimed that this is a moderate position within a larger spectrum of nationalism. It is not difficult to anticipate that such an inclination is an extension of both the ideological influence of Imperial past over the textbook writers and a larger spectrum of nationalism that would cover the rest of population during the foundation of state.

When it comes to define Turkishness in the textbooks, it is observed that some specific themes are emphasized. The first point is the perenniality of Turks as a community. Despite the limited information, there was a general assumption that accepts the Huns, the Tikuyus and the Uygurs coming from Turkic origin. In addition, a special curiosity was advanced in this period about the racial assets of Turks; but it remained with the references to ethnic origin/descent.

Another nodal point is that numerous essential qualifications were attributed to Turks, not in a systematic way as in the latter periods. Among them, adjectives pertinent to bravery, self-sacrifice, and strength were reiterated in the textbooks as essential characteristics of Turks. Military talent was also one of the reiterated merits.

In the textbooks of the period, there is an ambiguity with regard to the historical development of Turkish nationalism. As it was defined by some textbooks as a feeling or conscience, nationalism was regarded as a characteristic pre-existing in Turks since the beginning of history. In some textbooks, it is regarded as an ideology emerged at the last period of the Ottoman Empire. According to them, the other

nationalist movements that spread among non-Muslim population had the ignition effect.

In terms of the relationship between religion and nationalism in the textbooks, it is observed in almost all history and religion textbooks that Islam and Turkishness were regarded as two complementary components forming the basis of national identity. As a third leg, Sunnism was also emphasized especially in regard to religion textbooks. Within this context, as stated by Van Dijk about the formation of identity, "we" was constructed as the "Sunni Muslim Turk". The nodal point is that religion was not specifically referred in the formal definitions of nation and national identity. However, textbook writers specifically referred to Muslimness when they talked about Turks. In this regard, there are expressions in most of the textbooks underlining how proud they are to be both Turk and Muslim. As the constitutive components of ideology (and identity), when Turkishness and Islam are used either together or separately, they are attributed with positive references as pointed out by Van Dijk.

There are various examples from the textbooks of the period pertaining to the identification of Turkishness and Islam. One of these is the popular trend of using Turk and Muslim in a way to replace one another. It is possible to encounter with such expressions that compare Turks with Christians in most of the textbooks. Another example is the references made proudly and in detail about the military, political and cultural contributions of Turks in the Islamic civilization. Particularly in the history textbooks, this approach is supported by allocating more space to Turkish- Islamic period compared to pre- Islamic period. Another example is the emphasis about the positive influence of Islam over the Turks.

Within the similar ideological perspective, the "others" are constructed again by conflating Turkishness and Islam together. The first group of others is composed of non-Muslims and the second group is composed of Muslims who are not Turk. Keeping in mind the expressions in the history textbooks, the first group receives directly more negative treatment compared to the other. Generally, they are regarded in the category of "internal and external enemies". The first group includes Greeks, Serbians, Armenians and Bulgarians whose "villainy", "hostility" and "atrocity" are

frequently highlighted with regard to the War of Independence. As a complementary account, their presence in the Turkish land is narrated as a temporary guest-like situation. The second group consists of Christian Europeans who are portrayed as the binary opposition of Turkish-Muslim since the Ottoman Empire. Therefore, all non-Muslims are seen as bad intentioned and not to be trusted.

The second sub-period covers the period between 1931 and 1939. In this period, the fundamental principles of Kemalism were promulgated as the official doctrine of the regime. These principals were defined in detail and were institutionalized. Accordingly, a paradigmatic shift is observed in the official discourse dominating the textbooks more systematically and homogenous than before. By giving prominence to this field, the regime had the monopoly in writing and publishing educational materials and official commissions were established to prepare textbooks. Therefore the diversity in quality and quantity about the textbooks could not be observed any more as one single book was published for each course.

When the textbook writers are taken into consideration, it is observed that the Westernists formed the symbolic elites of this period. Different than the preceding and the subsequent periods, most of them also held political positions in this period. It is also known that the leader of regime, Atatürk, was himself interested in textbook writing; even he dictated most of the textbook entitled *Medeni Bilgiler* written by Afet İnan. Thus, it is very difficult to make a clear distinction in this period between symbolic elites and political elites as they were overlapping.

As an extension, there is a clear parallelism observed between politics and education with regard to approach to religion and nationalism. Indeed, secular references instead of Islam determined the national identity in the official discourse at this time where the *Turkish History Thesis* is widely accepted as the ideology of the state. As a general comment, both in politics and education, there was a dominant inclination on one hand to secularize Islam and related concepts and reduce it to a matter of individual conscience; on the other hand, remove any Islamic influences from Turkishness as a social affiliation and identity. As a complementary effort, religion courses were removed from the official curriculum in the very beginning of the period.

In the textbooks, it is explained that reality consists entirely of natural phenomena (life) and what is more, history and nature are the causes of every possible occurrence including human thought, feeling and action. According to this view, there is no metaphysical creator of human beings or of universe. All reality is believed to consist of this world since metaphysical understanding of God and religion were rejected. In a similar vein, textbooks of history, civics and sociology narrated that the ideas pertinent to religions are explained as the outcome of the socio-cultural evolution of humanity. According to this, religions determined all thinking and judgements until recently, however in the contemporary states of time, human mind and advancements in science and technology, there is no need for belief in metaphysical divinity any more. If there is still a creator to be found, it is the nature herself.

In parallel to this inclination, it is emphasized that Islam is a creation of Prophet Muhammad. For writers, Islam is produced by Muhammad in the aftermath of a rational retreat, as a hope of salvation and progress in a response to chaos and decadence in his society. Hence, he is portrayed as a human being with no supernatural powers but as a brave military genius with his pure-heart and love for society; it is nullified that he is a messenger of the divine revelations.

In a similar vein with the inclination to secularize religion, nationalism became the one and only determinant of official discourse and identity. In defining nation, it is witnessed that especially Atatürk included political, territorial and even ethnicist an deven racial elements together with the cultural elements. Accordingly, three themes that determine the nationalism understanding of the period were highlighted in the textbooks systematically. Firstly, the perenniality of the Turkish nation is emphasized. Even though, nationalism is regarded as a modern phenomenon; Turkish nation is referred to as one of the ancient communities of history. I see this as an early example of Smith's ethno- methodological understanding of nations and nationalisms. Indeed as in Smith, textbook writers of the period state a systematic continuity between Central Asian Turkic communities and contemporary Turkish people –despite the fact that they did not use the term "ethnicity".

As the second theme in defining Turkishness, various essential qualifications are attributed to Turks. Accordingly, there is a plethora of positive attributes with a larger scope this time when compared with preceding period. Among them, the contention developed in accordance with the Turkish History Thesis that Turks are the founders of the civilization in the World inevitably is the most highlighted one. Different than the other periods, it is explained in detail that Turks both created the first civilization of humanity and served to emergence of other civilizations by bringing their cultural heritage from Central Asia to different parts of the World. Pro-militarist inclination also continues in this period just like the preceding period.

The third salient emphasis emerges in this period for the first time. This inclination is constructed by the narratives about the racial purity and superiority of Turks. Within this context, in the history textbooks it is claimed that the Turks belong to the white-skinned and large-headed (*brakisefal*) race which is usually identified with the Westerns. Following this, writers argue that the most advanced community in the world among all races is the Turks who preserved their dominant qualifications in terms of the evolution of the mind and culture. As evidence, prominent historical communities and figures that are believed to be descendent from Turkic origins are listed. Therefore, it is observed that many historical figures from Buddha to Alexander the Great, from Frigs to Guts are reported as descendant from Turkic origins.

In light of the references to purity and superiority of the race, the nationalist discourse of the period is going beyond the contours of ethnicism towards racism. There is no doubt that the common racist wave in the Western world during the 1930s had a great impact. Particularly Germany (Hitler) and Italy (Mussolini) formed the extremest examples of this wave; and it is not difficult to anticipate that they had influence over the political and symbolic elites in the region in those years. However, compared to aforementioned examples, I need to highlight that the discourse reflected into textbooks had no extreme intention for ethnic/racial cleansing of non-Turks. This is more an endeavour of the new regime to instill self confidence to Turks who were accepted to be inferior to Western world for years. Therefore, it should be highlighted that the concept of race is nothing more than a tool to reproduce a feeling of pride and glory in a new regime.

In the textbooks of the period, the nationalist discourse puts forward three values whereas Islam no longer exists as the cardinal component in the formation of national identity. They are nation, state and Atatürk. In this regard, nation and state, in a constant relation to each other, are pointed out as the supreme authorities for the citizens. In order to express the supremacy of nation, it is very interesting to see that writers compare this notion with the idea of God in Buddhism and Confucianism to justify their points. For writers, nation is the supreme power for citizens today to harbour and avoid every evil. In the civics textbooks, it is presented that the state also deserves at least as respect and loyalty as the nation itself since it is representing the will of citizens within the system called representative democracy.

Compared with the other periods, the glorification of Atatürk in the textbooks is more common and salient in the second period. Similar to the definition of state, Atatürk is portrayed as the appearence/representative of nation's sovereignty. Embodying all this power, extraordinary qualifications are attributed to him with metaphysical references such as "the sun-headed", "the one who can see the future", and "who can see the real meaning and context behind events". Although Ataturk's exceptional merits exist in many textbooks, it should be noted that they are not coming up in an Islamic context and carrying no Islamic references; instead, writers are in an endeavour to narrate him as a unique person different than other individuals.

Correspondingly, the implicit or explicit others of the "we" subject of Turkish nation are not defined by religious affiliations in this period. This time, they are the individuals, approaches, events or institutions associated with bigotry and ignorance. In a similar vein, the caliphate and the clergy in Ottoman Era are treated negatively in the textbooks. They are defined as the enemies for the progress of the mind, science and society.

The third and last sub-period covering the years between 1939 and 1950 begins in the aftermath of Atatürk's death. The negative treatment of religion in the textbooks of preceding period may have caused certain discomfort in the society that new textbooks were prepared and published gradually for all the courses pertinent to my

research. Within this context, *Tarih I* and Atatürk's *Medeni Bilgiler* were the first textbooks to be replaced by the new ones with no references to evolutionary theory.

In this period, modernist traditionalists became dominant among textbook writers similar to the first period. For instance, among them, writers such as Şemsettin Günaltay and Nurettin Topçu were well-known conservatist intellectuals. Besides, towards the end of the period, in an effort to respond to public criticisms by restoring the religion course in the curriculum, a religion textbook was published by the Ministry of Education. All these brought the stance juxtaposing nationalism with religion become dominant in the textbooks again.

There might be numerous reasons for the shift in the discourse of textbooks back to religion with regard to political conjuncture of the period. First of all, beginning from the early 1940s, there was growing public opposition about the rigid implementation of secularism. Furthermore, changing international conjuncture in post-War Europe enforced RPP liberalize its authoritarian political agenda. Be that as it may, it can be contended that the paradigm shift came up in education before they appeared in political field. Therefore, revival of religion in nationalist discourse, an inclination which would be later adopted by political elites; was adopted by the cultural elites in the early 1940s. Besides, as it is not possible to carry out such kind of paradigm shift without the approval of İsmet İnönü, the successor of Atatürk; it is understood that he reacted positively to this transformation. I need to underline especially that the assertions about İnönü who is still regarded by the conservatives as totally opposed to religion should be further questioned.

As a typical sign of shift, there is a return to stance in the textbooks that explains religions, primarily Islam, as metaphysical phenomena similar to the first period. In this regard, Abrahamic religions are explained in a more sympathetic and positive style. Relatedly, there is a shift from the stance of the preceding period back to the conceptualization of God as the Owner of the Universe and the Creator. Another salient point is that Prophet Muhammad appears with the title "Hazreti" different than the narrations of the preceding period where only his name was used. Besides, he is no more the creator of Islam, but the prophet who is the messenger of godly

revelations. What is more, his moral values that are considered to be emanating from the Qur'an are posited as an ideal for all Muslims.

In terms of the definition of nation and nationalism, the common stances continued in this period to a large extent as in the preceding period. For instance, racial unity was recounted along with the cultural, political and territorial commonalities in the definition of nation in both sociology and civics textbooks. However, references about racial superiority or purity appeared less frequently compared to the preceding period.

In the textbooks, there is still a stance that accepts nation as perennial vis-à-vis nationalism as modern phenomena. It should be highlighted that Turkish History Thesis preserves its influence and the trend of recounting various past communities as descendant from Turkic origin continued. As an extention of the same thesis, the allegation that the oldest civilization in history was founded in Central Asia by Turks still maintained. Military service is highly praised as one the essential merits associated with Turkishness similar to the other periods. Nevertheless, in this period, these references could be regarded meaningful especially when the tension of the Second World War that is at the door and would affect Turkey somehow was considered.

The expressions that glorify nation, state and Atatürk as the cardinal elements of nationalist discourse in Turkey both declined in quantity; and recovered from the sanctifying language. Different than the other periods, RPP and İnönü were escalated near these symbols.

When relations between nationalism and religion is considered, as mentioned, there is a return to the discourse which assumes Islam, with Turkishness, as one of the core components of national identity. In this regard, most of the discursive themes pertinent to juxtaposition of nationalism with religion are similar to the first period. For instance, notions such as exclusive contribution of Turks to Islam, Turkishness' perfect harmony with Islam, and expressions and examples about inseperability of Turkishness and Muslimness are repeated in the textbooks of this period. Furthermore, expressions on glorification of past Turkish-Islamic states rises in quantity. Besides, it is this period when, for the first time, Turkish Republic is

acknowledged as the successor of all previous Turkish-Islamic states beginning with the Great Seljuk Impire to the Ottoman Empire. This inclination clearly replaces modern Turkey in the context of Turkish-Islamic history. In addition, explicit identification of Turks as Sunni Muslims indicates that not only Islam in general but also Sunnism in particular is believed to constitute the national identity with Turkishness similar to the first period.

In the textbooks of this period, the other of the "we", the "Sunni Muslim Turks" is also the Non- Muslims just like the first period. Relatedly, Turkish non-Muslims and European Christians are identified with negative adjectives and by generalization; they are identified with being a non-Muslim.

Consequently, contrary to popular assumptions, this study establishes that secular nationalist discourse was only dominant in the textbooks between 1931 and 1939 related with the rising hegemony of modernists among socio-cultural elites. However, in the remained years which consist of 1924-1931 and 1939-1950, a religious nationalist discourse which brings Turkishness, Islam and even Sunnism together in constitution of national identity was hegemonic with the rise of the power of modernist traditionalists in the field.

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Zürcher, Erik Jan. *Modernleşen Türkiye'nin Tarihi*, (trans.) Yasemin Saner, 23.ed., İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2009.

APPENDIX A

ANALYZED TEXTBOOKS OF THE PERIOD BETWEEN 1924 and 1931

History Textbooks

1. Abdülbaki (Gölpınarlı) and Sabri Esat (Siyavuşgil), *Yavrumun Tarih Kitabı: İlkmektep – Dördüncü Sınıf*, İstanbul: Tefeyyüz Kitaphanesi, 1930.

2. Abdülbaki (Gölpınarlı) and Sabri Esat (Siyavuşgil), *Yavrumun Tarih Kitabı: İlkmektep – Beşinci Sınıf*, İstanbul: Tefeyyüz Kitaphanesi, 1930.

3. Ahmet Refik (Altınay), *Çocuklara Tarih Bilgisi: Eskizamanlar. Türkler (İlk Mektep)*, İstanbul: Hilmi Kitaphanesi, 1932. [1928]

4. Ahmet Refik (Altınay), *Çocuklara Tarih Bilgisi: Orta, Yeni ve Yakınzamanlar. Türkler (İlk Mektep),* İstanbul: Hilmi Kitaphanesi, 1931. [1928]

5. Ahmet Refik (Altınay), *Çocuklara Türk İstiklal Harbi (İlk Mektep),* İstanbul: Hilmi Kitaphanesi, 1929.

6. Ahmet Refik (Altınay), *Umumi Tarih: Eskizamanlar ve Ortazamanlar (Orta Mektep Birinci Sınıf)*, İstanbul: Hilmi Kitaphanesi, 1929 [1923].

7. Ahmet Refik (Altınay), *Umumi Tarih: Ortazamanlar (Orta Mektep İkinci Sınıf),* İstanbul: Hilmi Kitaphanesi, 1929 [1923].

8. Ahmet Refik (Altınay), *Umumi Tarih (Lise Kitapları: I. Sınıf)*, 3rd ed., İstanbul: Devlet Matbaası, 1929 [1926].

9. Ali Reşat, *İlk Mekteplere Tarih Dersleri: Sınıf 4*, İstanbul: Türk Neşriyat Yurdu, 1931. [1928]

10. Ali Reşat, *İlk Mekteplere Tarih Dersleri: Sınıf 5,* İstanbul: Türk Neşriyat Yurdu, 1931. [1928]

11. Ali Reşat, *Umumi Tarih, Lise Kitapları: 1. Sınıf*, İstanbul: Devlet Matbaası, 1929. [1923].

12. Ali Reşat, *Umumî Tarih İkinci Cilt*, İstanbul: Kanaat Kütüphanesi, 1929 [1923].

13. Emin Ali (Çavlı), *Umumi Tarih: Birinci Kitap – Eskizaman ve Ortazaman Başlangıcı,* İstanbul: Kanaat Kütüphanesi, 1930-1931.

14. Emin Ali (Çavlı), *Umumi Tarih: İkinci Kitap – Ortazaman*, İstanbul: Kanaat Kütüphanesi, 1930-1931.

15. Emin Ali (Çavlı), *Umumi Tarih: Üçüncü Kitap – Yenizamanlar ve Yakınzamanlar,* İstanbul: Kanaat Kütüphanesi, 1930.

16. Mehmed Fuad Köprülü, *Türkiye Tarihi*, (Eds.) M. Hanefi Palabıyık, Ankara: Akçağ Yayınları, 2005 [1923].

17. Hamit (Ongunsu) and Muhsin (Eker), *Türkiye Tarihi*, Ankara: Maarif Vekaleti, 1930. [1924]

18. *Tarih, I. Kitap*, İstanbul: Devlet Matbaası, 1929.

19. *Tarih, II. Kitap*, İstanbul: Devlet Matbaası, 1929.

20. *Tarih, III. Kitap*, İstanbul: Devlet Matbaası, 1929.

21. Ziya Gökalp, *Türk Medeniyeti Tarihi*, (Eds.) Yusuf Çotuksöken, *Ziya Gökalp, Kitaplar 1*, İstanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 2007 [1925].[1250]

Civics Textbooks

22. Ali Kami (Akyüz), *Yurt Bilgisi – İlk Mektep Sınıf 3*, *İstanbul: Hilmi Kitaphanesi, 1930.*

23. Ali Kami (Akyüz), *Yurt Bilgisi – İlk Mektep Dördüncü Sınıf,* İstanbul: Hilmi Kitaphanesi, 1931. [1926]

24. Ali Kami (Akyüz), *Yurt Bilgisi – İlk Mektep Beşinci Sınıf*, İstanbul: Hilmi Kitaphanesi, 1931-32. [1926]

25. Muallim Abdülbaki (Gölpınarlı), *Yurt Bilgisi - Atatürk Dönemi Ders Kitabı*, İstanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, 2007 [1927-28].

[1250] **History textbooks of this period that I could not reach are as follows:**
- Ahmed Halid (Yaşaroğlu), *Bizim Tarih, Üçüncü Sınıf*, İstanbul: Amedi Matbaası, 1924.
- Ahmed Halid (Yaşaroğlu), *Bizim Tarih, Dördüncü Sınıf*, İstanbul: Amedi Matbaası, 1924.
- Ahmed Halid (Yaşaroğlu), *Bizim Tarih, Beşinci Sınıf*, İstanbul: Amedi Matbaası, 1924.
- Ahmet Refik (Altınay), *Umumî tarih: Yenizamanlar (Ortamektep Üçüncü Sınıf)*, İstanbul: Hilmi Kitaphanesi, 1929 [1923].
- Ali Reşad, *Umumi Tarih: Lise İkinci Devre 3. Sınıf,* İstanbul: Devlet Matbaası, 1928. [1923]
- Emin Âli (Çavlı), *Türk Çocuklarına Tarih Dersleri, Dördüncü Sınıf,* İstanbul: Kanaat Kütüphanesi, 1930-31 [1927].
- Emin Âli (Çavlı), *Türk Çocuklarına Tarih Dersleri, Beşinci Sınıf*, İstanbul: Kanaat Kütüphanesi, 1931 [1927].
- İhsan Şerif (Saru), *Cumhuriyet Çocuklarına Tarih Dersleri, Üçüncü Sınıf*, İstanbul: Kanaat Kütüphanesi, 1926.
- İhsan Şerif (Saru), *Cumhuriyet Çocuklarına Tarih Dersleri, Dördüncü Sınıf*, İstanbul: Kanaat Kütüphanesi, 1926.
- İhsan Şerif (Saru), *Cumhuriyet Çocuklarına Tarih Dersleri, Beşinci Sınıf*, İstanbul: Kanaat Kütüphanesi, 1926.
- Köprülüzade Mehmed Fuad (Köprülü), *Milli Tarih (İlk Mektep Üçüncü Sınıf)*, İstanbul: Kanaat Kütübhanesi, 1924.
- Köprülüzade Mehmed Fuad (Köprülü), *Milli Tarih (İlk Mektep Dördüncü Sınıf)*, İstanbul: Kanaat Kütübhanesi, 1924.
- Köprülüzade Mehmed Fuad (Köprülü), *Milli Tarih (İlk Mektep Beşinci Sınıf)*, İstanbul: Amedi Matbaası, 1928.

26. Muallim Abdülbaki (Gölpınarlı), *Yurt Bilgisi: Sınıf 4*, İstanbul: Türk Neşriyat Yurdu, 1927-28.

27. Muallim Abdülbaki (Gölpınarlı), *Yurt Bilgisi: Sınıf 5*, İstanbul: Türk Neşriyat Yurdu, 1927-28.

28. Mehmet Emin (Erişirgil), *Yurt Bilgisi – Lise Birinci Devre*, İstanbul: Kanaat Kütüphanesi, 1930. [1926]

29. Mitat Sadullah (Sander), *Yeni Yurt Bilgisi – Sınıf: 4,* İstanbul: Tefeyyüz Kitaphanesi, 1929. [1924]

30. Mitat Sadullah (Sander), *Yeni Yurt Bilgisi – Sınıf: 5*, İstanbul: Tefeyyüz Kitaphanesi, 1929. [1924][1251]

Religion Textbooks

31. İbrahim Hilmi (Çığıraçan), *Türk Çocuğunun Din Kitabı: İlk Mektep Sınıf: 3*, İstanbul: Hilmi Kitaphanesi, 1930. [1928]

32. İbrahim Hilmi (Çığıraçan), *Türk Çocuğunun Din Kitabı: İlk Mektep Sınıf: 4*, İstanbul: Hilmi Kitaphanesi, 1930. [1928]

33. İbrahim Hilmi (Çığıraçan), *Türk Çocuğunun Din Kitabı: İlk Mektep Sınıf: 5*, İstanbul: Hilmi Kitaphanesi, 1929. [1928]

34. M. Ali Rıza, *Cumhuriyet Mekteplerine Din Dersleri – Birinci Kitap, Sınıf 3*, İstanbul: Türk Neşriyat Yurdu, 1929.

35. M. Ali Rıza, *Cumhuriyet Mekteplerine Din Dersleri İkinci Kitap Sınıf 4*, İstanbul: Türk Neşriyat Yurdu, 1929-1930.

36. M. Ali Rıza, *Cumhuriyet Mekteplerine Din Dersleri – Üçüncü Kitap, Sınıf 5*, İstanbul: Türk Neşriyat Yurdu, 1929-30.

37. Muallim Abdülbaki (Gölpınarlı), *Cumhuriyet Çocuğunun Din Dersleri – Sınıf: 3*, İstanbul: Tefeyyüz Kitapanesi, 1930-31.

38. Muallim Abdülbaki (Gölpınarlı), *Cumhuriyet Çocuğunun Din Dersleri – Sınıf: 4,* İstanbul: Tefeyyüz Kitapanesi, 1929.

39. Muallim Abdülbaki (Gölpınarlı), *Cumhuriyet Çocuğunun Din Dersleri* [İlk Mektep Beşinci Sınıf], 2.ed., İstanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, 2005 [1929-1930].[1252]

[1251] **Civic textbooks of this period that I could not reach are as follows:**

- Muallim Orhan Fuad (Köprülü?), *Musâhabât-ı Ahlâkiye ve Malûmât-i Vataniye - İlk Mekteblerin Dördüncü Sınıfına Mahsus*, İstanbul: İkdam Matbaası, 1924.
- Muallim Orhan Fuad (Köprülü?), *Musâhabât-ı Ahlâkiye ve Malûmât-i Vataniye - İlk Mekteblerin Beşinci Sınıfına Mahsus*, İstanbul: Marifet Matbaası, 1928.
- Muslihiddin Âdil (Taylan), *Cumhuriyet Çocuklarına Malûmât-ı Vataniye - İlk mekteb – Dördüncü Sınıf*, İstanbul: Gündoğdu ve Orhaniye Matbaaları, 1926-1928.
- Muslihiddin Âdil (Taylan), *Cumhuriyet Çocuklarına Malûmât-ı Vataniye - İlk mekteb – Beşinci Sınıf*, İstanbul: Orhaniye Matbaaları, 1926.

Sociology Textbook

40. Mehmet İzzet, *İçtimaiyat*, İstanbul: Devlet Matbaası, 1929 [1927].**[1253]**

[1252] **Religion textbooks of this period that I could not reach are as follows:**

- Ahmed Hilmi (Çağıran), *Türk Çocugunun Din Kitabı, 1. Cilt*, İstanbul: Orhaniye Matbaası, 1927.
- Ahmed Hilmi (Çağıran), *Türk Çocugunun Din Kitabı, 2. Cilt,* İstanbul: Orhaniye Matbaası, 1927.
- Ahmed Hilmi (Çağıran), *Türk Çocugunun Din Kitabı, 3. Cilt,* İstanbul: Orhaniye Matbaası, 1927.
- İzmirli İsmail Hakkı, *Din Dersleri*, İstanbul: Marifet Matbaası, 1925.
- Mehmet Ziya, *Hasenat*, İstanbul: Hilmi Kitaphanesi, 1926.
- Mehmet Ziya, *Siyer-i Nebi*, İstanbul: Hilmi Kitaphanesi, 1924.
- Yusuf Ziya (Yörükan), *Din Dersleri: Peygamberimiz*, İstanbul: Evkaf-ı İslamiyye Matbaası, 1926.
- Yusuf Ziya (Yörükan), *Din Dersleri: İman ve İbadet*, İstanbul: Kanaat Kitabhanesi, 1926.
- Yusuf Ziya (Yörükan), *İslam Dini, Üçüncü Sınıf İçin*, İstanbul: Amedi Matbaası, 1927.
- Yusuf Ziya (Yörükan), *İslam Dini, Dördüncü Sınıf İçin*, İstanbul: Letafet Matbaası, 1927.
- Yusuf Ziya (Yörükan), *İslam Dini, Beşinci Sınıf İçin*, İstanbul: Amedi Matbaası, 1927.

[1253] **Sociology textbooks of this period that I could not reach are as follows:**

- Gleyse and A. Hesse, *Terbiye ve Ahlaka Müteallik Tatbikatıyla İçtimaiyat Dersleri*, (trans.) Mehmet İzzet, İstanbul: Matbaa-i Amire, 1924.
- Ali Kami (Akyüz), *İçtimaiyat*, İstanbul: Marifet Matbaası, 1927.

APPENDIX B

ANALYZED TEXTBOOKS OF THE PERIOD BETWEEN 1931 and 1939[1254]

History Textbooks

1. *Ortamektep İçin Tarih I*, İstanbul: Devlet Basımevi, 1937 [1934].

2. *Ortamektep İçin Tarih II*, İstanbul: Devlet Matbaası, 1934.

3. *Ortamektep İçin Tarih III*, İstanbul: Devlet Matbaası, 1934.

4. *Tarih I: Kemalist Eğitimin Tarih Dersleri (1931-1941)* , 4.ed., İstanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, 2000 [1931].

5. *Tarih II: Kemalist Eğitimin Tarih Dersleri (1931-1941)*, 3.ed., İstanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, 2001 [1931].

6. *Tarih III*: *Kemalist Eğitimin Tarih Dersleri (1931-1941)*, 3.ed., İstanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, 2000, [1931].

7. *Tarih IV: Kemalist Eğitimin Tarih Dersleri (1931-1941)*, 3.ed., İstanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, 2000 [1931].

8. *Tarih: IV. Sınıf (İlkokul Kitapları)*, İstanbul: Devlet Basımevi, 1936.

9. *Tarih: V. Sınıf (İlkokul Kitapları)*, İstanbul: Devlet Basımevi, 1936.

Civics Textbooks

10. A. Âfetinan, *Medenî Bilgiler ve M. Kemal Atatürk'ün El Yazıları* , 3.ed., Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1998 [1931].

11. Celal Nuri (İleri), *Vatandaşlık (Yurt Bilgisi): İlk Mekteplerin 4üncü Sınıfları İçin*, İstanbul: İleri Kütüphanesi, 1931.

12. Celal Nuri (İleri), *Vatandaşlık (Yurt Bilgisi): İlk Mekteplerin 5inci Sınıfları İçin*, İstanbul: İleri Kütüphanesi, 1931.

13. Kazım Sevinç, *Türk Yavrularına Yurt Bilgisi – Sınıf: 4*, İstanbul: Ekspres Matbaası, 1931-1932,

14. Kazım Sevinç, *Türk Yavrularına Yurt Bilgisi – Sınıf: 5*, İstanbul: Ekspres Matbaası, 1931-32.

15. Mitat Sadullah (Sander), *Yeni Yurt Bilgisi Sınıf: 3*, İstanbul: Türk Kitapçılığı Şirketi, 1934-1935.

16. *Yurt Bilgisi (İlk Mektep Kitapları: IV. Sınıf)*, İstanbul: Türk Kitapçılığı Limited Şirketi, 1934.

[1254] All textbooks of this period have been analyzed in this study.

17. *Yurt Bilgisi (İlkmektep Kitapları: V. Sınıf),* İstanbul: Türk Kitapçılığı Limited Şirketi, 1934.

Sociology Textbook

18. Necmeddin Sadak, *Sosyoloji*, 4.ed., İstanbul: Maarif Matbaası, 1939 [1934].

APPENDIX C

ANALYZED TEXTBOOKS OF THE PERIOD BETWEEN 1939 and 1950[1255]

History Textbooks

1. Ali Haydar Taner, *Ortaokul İçin Tarih II*, İstanbul: Maarif Matbaası, 1940.

2. Arif Müfid Mansel, Cavid Baysun and Enver Ziya Karal, *İlk Çağ Tarihi: Birinci Sınıf, İstanbul: Maarif Matbaası*, 1942.

3. Arif Müfid Mansel, Cavid Baysun and Enver Ziya Karal, *Orta Çağ Tarihi: İkinci Sınıf, İstanbul: Maarif Matbaası*, 1943.

4. Arif Müfid Mansel, Cavid Baysun and Enver Ziya Karal, *Yeni ve Yakın Çağlar Tarihi: Üçüncü Sınıf, İstanbul: Maarif Matbaası*, 1942.

5. Enver Ziya Karal, *Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Tarihi (1918-1944)*, İstanbul: Milli Eğitim Basımevi, 1945.

6. Faik Reşit Unat and Kamil Su, *Tarih – IV. Sınıf*, İstanbul: Milli Eğitim Basımevi, 1948.

7. Faik Reşit Unat and Kamil Su, *Tarih – V. Sınıf*, İstanbul: Milli Eğitim Basımevi, 1948.

8. Faik Reşit Unat, *Ortaokul İçin Tarih I*, İstanbul: Maarif Matbaası, 1941.

9. Kamil Su and Kazım Nami Duru, *Ortaokul İçin Tarih III*, İstanbul: Milli Eğitim Basımevi, 1947.

10. Sadri Ertem and Kazım Nami Duru, *Ortaokul İçin Tarih III*, Ankara: Maarif Matbaası, 1941.

11. Şemsettin Günaltay, *Tarih I*, İstanbul: Maarif Matbaası, 1939.

Civics Textbooks

12. Bedia Ermat and Kemal Ermat, *Yurt Bilgisi Dersleri IV. Sınıf*, İstanbul: Milli Eğitim Basımevi, 1945.

13. Bedia Ermat and Kemal Ermat, *Yurt Bilgisi Dersleri V. Sınıf*, İstanbul: Milli Eğitim Basımevi, 1945.

14. Tarık Emin Rona, *Yurtbilgisi dersleri, IV. Sınıf*, Ankara: Maarif Vekilliği, 1941.

15. Tarık Emin Rona, *Yurtbilgisi dersleri, V. Sınıf*, Ankara: Maarif Vekilliği, 1941.

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FOREIGN LANGUAGES

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PUBLICATIONS

1. Babahan, Ali; "Evlilik, Aile ve Akrabalık," in *Sosyal Antropoloji*, (Ed.) Mustafa Talas, İstanbul: Lisans Yayıncılık, 2014, p. 191-219. (Book Chapter)

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HOBBIES

Music, Literature, Philosophy, History

APPENDICES E

TURKISH SUMMARY

Bu çalışmada erken Cumhuriyet dönemi Türkiyesi'nde örgün eğitimin sosyal bilimler alanında okutulan ders kitaplarının analizi yoluyla, resmî söylemde milliyetçilik ve din arasındaki ilişkileri araştırmaktayım. Bu alanda bugüne kadar gerçekleştirilmiş çalışmalarda yaygın kabul gören varsayım, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nin kuruluşunu takip eden süreçte laikliği kurumsallaştırmaya yönelik politikalarla birlikte, resmî söylemde seküler bir milliyetçiliğin öne çıktığı ve 1920'lerin ikinci yarısından itibaren gelişen bu eğilimin 1940'ların son yıllarına dek sürdüğü yönündeydi. Buna göre, spesifik olarak 1924-1947 yılları arasında egemen grupların milliyetçi söyleminde dinin büyük ölçüde dışlandığı vurgulanmaktaydı. Bu dönem tarih ve yurt bilgisi ders kitapları üzerine bugüne kadar yapılan çalışmalar da, bunu destekleyecek biçimde, bu kitaplara seküler milliyetçi bir söylemin egemen olduğunu iddia etmekteydiler.

Bu çalışmanın ardındaki temel motivasyon, yaklaşık yirmi beş yıla uzanan bu dönem boyunca resmî milliyetçi söylemin dine yaklaşımına dair tek bir paradigmanın geçerli olması iddiasının birçok gerekçeyle sorgulanabilir olduğu fikridir. Öncelikle, mevcut yaklaşım bu konuda aşırı bir genellemeciliğe giderek, herhangi bir resmî söylem içerisinde ortaya çıkabilecek muhtelif farklılıkları ve değişimleri görmezden gelmektedir. Bunun yanında, kısmen de olsa İslami bir ideolojiyle idare edilen İmparatorluk bakiyesi bir topluma tamamen dünyevî referanslarla tanımlanan yeni bir yönetim biçiminin empoze edilmesinden kaynaklanan muhtemel tepki ve karşı çıkışlar –ve bunun yönetime yansımaları- da göz ardı edilmektedir. Ayrıca, dönemin tüm egemenlerinin kariyerlerinin en başından sonuna dek seküler fikirleri savundukları varsayılacak olsa bile –ki bunun nadiren böyle olduğu söylenebilir-, değişen koşullar paralelinde ortaya çıkabilecek olası siyasi zigzaglar da dikkate alınmamaktadır.

Bu gerekçelerle, ben bu çalışmada, bir anlamda, ele alınan dönemde milliyetçilik ve din arasındaki ilişkiler temelinde siyasi söylemde ortaya çıkmış olabilecek

ideolojik/söylemsel kırılmaları tespit etmeye ve bunları gerekçeleriyle analiz etmeye çalıştım. Bunun için 1924-1950 yılları arasında ilkokul, ortaokul ve lise Tarih, Sosyoloji, Yurt Bilgisi ve Din derslerinde okutulan ders kitaplarını söylem analizini de içerecek biçimde, içerik analizi yaklaşımıyla inceledim. Yaptığım ön araştırma doğrultusunda, bu yıllar arasında bahsi geçen derslerde okutulduğunu saptadığım yaklaşık 110 kitaptan 77'sine ulaşarak incelememi gerçekleştirdim.

İncelememde temel olarak Van Dijk'in metinlerin (söylemsel) analizine dair önerdiği eleştirel yaklaşımdan yararlandım. Buna göre, o, ideolojilerin (yazılı ya da sözlü) dilsel ifadesi olarak tanımladığı söylemleri, herhangi bir toplumda egemen gruplar tarafından diğerleri üzerinde uygulanan iktidarın bir türü ve aracı olarak görmektedir. Buradaki amaç, Van Dijk'e göre, kitlelerin belirli biçimde düşünmesi ve davranışta bulunmasını sağlayacak bilişsel şablonların (yani ideolojilerin) yaygınlaştırılması ve benimsetilmesidir. Bunun için ise, günümüzde özellikle medya ve kitlesel eğitimin (ve dolayısıyla ders kitaplarının) etki ve güçlerinden yararlanılmaktadır. Bunların kontrol ve manipülasyonunda aktif rol sosyo-kültürel (simgesel) seçkinlere düşerken; Van Dijk'e göre, bu grup çoğunlukla siyasi, askeri ve ekonomik seçkinlere bağlı olarak çalıştığından, aslında onların emir ve kararlarına bağlı kalmaktadırlar.

Böyle bir çerçevede, Van Dijk söylem analizinin belirli bir toplumdaki hegemonik ilişkilerin makro analizinden başlaması gerektiğini belirtir. Bu ise, öncelikle egemen gruplarla öteki gruplar arasındaki iktidar ilişkilerinin incelenmesini; ve böylece, egemen grupların iktidarının ardındaki rasyonalitenin analizini gerektirir. Bu doğrultuda ben de çalışmamda analizimin ilk basamağı olarak, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nun son döneminden erken Cumhuriyet dönemine uzanan tarihi süreç içerisinde devlet rejiminde ortaya çıkan farklı siyasi yönelimler, bunlara yön veren egemen gruplar, bu grupların beslendiği ideolojik ve entelektüel kaynaklar ve bu dönemde din ve milliyetçiliğe yönelik olarak uygulanan politikaların ayrıntılı bir değerlendirmesine giriştim. Burada, modernleşme sürecinin bir getirisi olarak ortaya çıkan ve sadece İmparatorluk döneminde değil, Cumhuriyet döneminde de önde gelen iki grup olarak modernist gelenekçiler ile Batıcılar/modernistlere ve bunların bahsedilen alandaki görüş ve yaklaşımlarına yoğunlaşmaya çalıştım.

Bu açıdan, 19. yüzyılın ikinci yarısından itibaren güç kazanan bir grup olarak Yeni Osmanlılar'a kadar götürülebilecek olan ilk eğilimin, milliyetçiliğin esasen kültürel bir sorun olarak anlaşıldığı bu dönemde, milli kimliğin tanımlanmasında İslam'a Türklükle birlikte önemli bir rol atfettiğini söyleyebilirim. Böyle bir yönelim, bir yandan Batılı standartlarda liberal/anayasal bir rejimi desteklerken; diğer yandan ise, Türklüğü ve Müslümanlığı birbirinden ayrılmaz kimlik bileşenleri olarak tanımlayan bir görüşü temsil etmektedir. Dolayısıyla, bunun bir anlamda modern kurumlarla geleneksel kurumları bir şekilde sentezlemeye çalıştığı söylenebilir. Alkan ve Çetinsaya'nın çalışmalarında önerdikleri varsayıma da uygun biçimde, bu görüşün, Türkiye'de 1970'lerden itibaren Aydınlar Ocağı hareketiyle yaygınlaşacak olan Türk-İslam Sentezi fikrinin bir ön modeli olarak değerlendirilmesi mümkündür.

Bunun yanında, her iki dönemin diğer bir baskın grubu ise, Batıcılar ya da modernistler olarak tanımlanan ve Batıcı bir modernleşme görüşüne sıkı sıkıya bağlı kalan seçkinlerden oluşmaktadır. Bunlardan birçoğu kariyerlerinin başlangıcında dini siyasi söylemleri içerisinde nispeten öne çıkaran bireyler olsalar da; başta Fransız ve Alman materyalist ve pozisitivistleri olmak üzere, etkilendikleri düşünsel kaynakların da etkisiyle, zamanla dini siyasal ve kamusal yaşamın dışına itme yönünde bir eğilimi benimsemişlerdir. Bu çerçevede, 20. Yüzyılın hemen başlarından itibaren siyasallaşan milliyetçilik de, bu grup için özellikle dinin "olumsuz" etkilerinden kurtarılması gereken, seküler bir ideoloji ve hareket olarak anlaşılmıştır.

Hem dönemin değişen siyasi, askeri, ekonomik ve sosyo-kültürel koşulları, hem de egemen gruplar arasındaki bu ideolojik ayrışma dolayısıyla, özellikle 1908 sonrasında İttihat ve Terakki iktidarını takiben, politika düzeyinde dinî ve seküler milliyetçiliğin içiçe geçtiği ikili bir siyaset anlayışının hâkim olduğu söylenebilir. Alkan ve Doğan'ın dönemin ders kitapları üzerine araştırmalarında ise, Cumhuriyet dönemine kadar uzanan süreçte çeşitli Batılı temalarla birlikte din ve milliyetçiliğin içiçe geçtiği bir söylemin baskın olduğunu ortaya koymaktadır.

Türkiye'de Cumhuriyet'in kuruluşuyla birlikte ise, Batılılaşma temelinde Türk milliyetçiliği ve laiklik rejimin kurucu ideolojik ilkeleri olarak belirlenmiştir. Bu doğrultuda öncelikle geleneksel bir hanedanlığa dayanan saltanat rejiminin yerini,

Türk milleti olarak adlandırılan bir halka referansla tanımlanan milli bir devlet alır. Bu çerçevede bu dönem içerisinde Türklüğün zaman zaman kültür, ideal ve duygu ortaklığı üzerinden, kimi zaman siyasal aidiyet üzerinden, diğerlerine nazaran daha nadir olmakla birlikte bazen ise soy ortaklığı üzerinden tanımlandığını söyleyebiliriz. Dolayısıyla, Van Dijk'ın tüm ideolojilerin temel hedefi olduğunu belirttiği grup kimliğinin tanımlanması noktasında "biz" öznesinin, yani Türk'ün içeriği de kimi zaman kendisini Türk hissedenlerden oluşmak üzere daha geniş, kimi zamansa Türkçe konuşmak, hatta Türk soyundan gelmek gibi sübjektif kriterlere dayanarak, daha dar kapsamlı olmuştur.

Aynı dönemde rejimin önde gelen diğer bir ideolojik temeli olarak laikliğin öne çıktığı görülmektedir. Bu ilke her ne kadar basitçe "din ve devlet işlerinin birbirinden ayrılması" olarak tanımlansa da; uygulamada, buna dair bir belirsizliğin olduğunu söyleyebiliriz. Bu açıdan bir yandan siyasal ve toplumsal yaşamda dinin etkisini azaltmaya yönelik adımlar atılırken; diğer yandan gerek dinin devlet yönetimi gerekse de devletin din üzerinde etki kurması anlamına gelebilecek farklı politikalar uygulanabilmiştir.

Rejimin din politikaları konusundaki bu muğlaklığının bir uzantısı olarak, resmî milliyetçi ideolojinin dinle ilişkisinin de zigzaglar içerdiği söylenebilir. Gerçekten de, İttihat ve Terakki dönemine benzer biçimde, seküler milliyetçi söylemlerin yanı sıra, rejimin laik niteliği hakkında herhangi bir itiraz içermemekle birlikte, millî kimliğin tanımlanması ve dini göndermelerle desteklenmesi açısından İslam'a başvuran milliyetçi söylem örnekleriyle bu dönemde de karşılaşabilmek mümkündür.

Ben bunun temel nedenini, İttihat ve Terakki döneminin egemen grupları içinde mevcut bulunan ideolojik ayrışmanın erken Cumhuriyet döneminde de sürmüş olması olarak görüyorum. Dolayısıyla, her ne kadar mevcut akademik yazında bu dönemin elitlerini seküler milliyetçilik çatısı altında toplanmış homojen bir grup olarak tanımlama eğilimi olsa da; bu vesileyle, siyasal (ve askeri) ve simgesel seçkinler arasında özellikle dinin milli kimlik içindeki yerine yaklaşımları açısından ortaya çıkan ikiliğin sürdüğünü düşünüyorum. Dolayısıyla, dönemlik siyasi kaygı ve ihtiyaçlarla da paralel biçimde, Batıcılarla modernist gelenekçiler arasındaki siyasi

mücadele ve kimi zaman ittifaklar, erken Cumhuriyet dönemindeki politika süreçlerinde de belirleyicilik arz etmiştir.

Bu doğrultuda, egemen gruplar içerisinde varlığını sürdüren özellikle modernist gelenekçiler dolayısıyla İslam ve spesifik olarak onun Sünni yorumu, bu dönemin çok önemli bir kısmında da milliyetçi söylem içerisinde kendisine yer bulabilmiştir. Böylelikle, kültürü ve tarihi (dolayısıyla kimliği) Sünni Müslümanlıkla harmanlanmış bir Türklük üzerinden tanımlayan bu kesimin görüşleri de, taşıdığı ortaklıklar dolayısıyla, ileride Türk-İslam Sentezi olarak adlandırılacak paradigmanın tipik bir ifadesi olarak değerlendirilebilir. İslami bir rejim kurma kaygısı gütmediğinden, bunun laiklik politikalarıyla belli bir ölçüde zıtlaşmadığını eklemek gerekir. Belirttiğim gibi, erken Cumhuriyet dönemi siyasal rejiminin bu yönü üzerinde çok az çalışmanın durduğunu tekrar hatırlatmalıyım.

Çalışmada, erken Cumhuriyet döneminin siyasi rejimi ve bu dönemin egemen gruplarının ideolojik yönelimlerine dair genel bir değerlendirmenin ardından, söylem analizinin ikinci ayağı olarak, dönemin ders kitaplarının ayrıntılı analizine geçmekteyim. Bu konuda genel bir çerçeve olarak, 1924-1950 yılları arasını kapsayan bu dönemin, milliyetçilik ve din arasındaki söylemsel ilişkilerdeki ortaklık ve farklılıklar temelinde üç alt döneme ayrılabileceği iddiasını taşıyorum. Buna göre 1924-1931 yılları arasında okutulan ders kitaplarında din ve milliyetçiliğin iç içe geçtiği, Türk-İslam Senteziyle uyuşan bir söylemin egemen olduğu ortaya çıkmaktadır. Bunu takip eden 1931-1939 yıllarını kapsayan dönemde, ders kitaplarında resmi söylemde dinin yerini dünyevî referansların almasıyla birlikte seküler bir milliyetçilik anlayışı yaygınlaşmıştır. 1939-1950 yılları arasını içeren son dönemde ise, ilk dönemdeki söylemin geri geldiği ve dinin milli kimliğin ve milliyetçi söylemin tekrar merkezine oturduğu söylenebilir. Bu aşamada, bu alt dönemlere dair bulgularımı, bunların bu dönemdeki siyasi gelişmelerle ilişkisi bağlamında nasıl yorumladığıma geçebilirim.

Cumhuriyet'in kuruluşunu takip eden süreçte eğitim alanı açısından dikkat çekici bir nitelik olarak, devletin önceliğini yeni eğitim materyalleri geliştirmekten ziyade, eğitimi kitleselleştirmeye yönelik çabalara verdiği görülmektedir. Dolayısıyla, yeni rejimin ideolojik karakterinin yavaş yavaş şekillenmeye başladığı 1924-1931 yılları

arasını kapsayan ilk dönemde, devletin ders kitabı alanında henüz bir tekel kuramadığı, bunun yerine, tarih, yurt bilgisi, sosyoloji ve din (bilgisi) dersleri için özel yayınevlerince basılan çok sayıda kitabın bulunduğu görülmektedir. Bunu takip eden bir başka önemli husus, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nun son döneminde okutulan ders kitaplarının bu yayınevlerince çok az değişiklikle yeniden basılması olmuştur. Dolayısıyla, Van Dijk'in tabiriyle dönemin simgesel seçkinler grubunun bir kısmını oluşturan ders kitabı yazarlarının yaygın olarak İttihat ve Terakki dönemi ders kitaplarındaki ideolojik eğilimi sürdüren, Fuad Köprülü, Ahmet Refik (Altınay), Muallim Abdülbaki (Gölpınarlı), Tüccarzade İbrahim Hilmi (Çığıraçan) ve Ali Kami (Akyüz) gibi modernist gelenekçilik yönelimli kişilerden oluştuğu söylenebilir. Böyle bir yönelim, önceki dönemlerde de olduğu gibi, modernlikle (milliyetçilik, sekülerleşme) geleneği (dini) uzlaştırmaya yönelik bir eğilimi temsil eder. Bu ise, siyaset sahnesinde 1924 yılından itibaren etki alanını genişletecek olan laik milliyetçi bir söylem yerine, ders kitaplarına din ve milliyetçiliğin içiçe geçtiği bir söylemin hâkim olması sonucunu getirmiştir.

Bu çerçevede, dönemin ders kitaplarında milliyetçiliğin ve milli kimliğin tanımlanmasında İslamiyet'in öne çıkarılmasına ve Türklükle Müslümanlığın özdeşleştirilmesine dair çok sayıda tema ve örnekle karşılaşılmıştır. Öncelikle, başta din ve tarih ders kitapları olmak üzere yazarların tüm dinler içerisinde İslamiyet'e özel bir önem atfettikleri ve onu en üstün ve doğru din olarak kabul ettikleri görülür. Kimi kitaplar bu konuda görece tarafsız davranmaya çalışsa da, bunun yaygın eğilimi oluşturduğu rahatlıkla söylenebilir. Ders kitaplarında farklı dinlerin anlatılmasına ayrılmış kısımların niceliksel karşılaştırması da, İslamiyet'e bu açıdan bariz bir ayrıcalık yapıldığını ortaya koyar.

Bu dönemin ders kitaplarında milliyetçiliğin, milletin ve millî kimliğin tanımlanması açısından ise, Smith'in sınıflandırması çerçevesinde, kültürel milliyetçilik olarak adlandırılabilecek bir milliyetçilik tipinin baskın olduğu görülür. Bunun tipik özelliği, milletin, ırksal özellikler, soy birliği, ya da territoryal unsurlar yerine dil, duygu ve ideal ortaklığı gibi kültürel birliğe referans veren nitelikler üzerinden tanımlanmış olmasıdır. Dolayısıyla bunun sonraki dönemlerle karşılaştırıldığında, daha kapsayıcı bir milliyetçilik tipi olduğu tespitinde bulunulabilir. Böyle bir eğilimin, hem İmparatorluk geçmişinin yazarlar üzerindeki (ideolojik) etkisinin, hem

de yeni devletin kurulduğu süreçte geriye kalan nüfusu olabildiğince kapsayabilecek geniş spektrumlu bir milliyetçilik anlayışının uzantısı olduğunu tahmin etmek güç değildir.

Bununla birlikte, ders kitaplarında Türklüğün ve Türklüğün tanımlanmasına geçildiğinde, burada sayılmayan daha spesifik unsurların da işin içine girdiği görülür. Bu açıdan, henüz sonraki dönemlerdeki gibi sistematik biçimde yapılandırılmış olmasa da, Türklüğün tanımlanmasında belirli temaların öne çıktığı görülmektedir. Bunlardan ilki, Türklerin kadim bir topluluk olarak tanımlanması olmuştur. Henüz bu alanda yeterince bilgi toplanamasa da, bu dönemde, en azından Hunlar, Tukiular ve Uyguların Türk olduğu yönünde bir kabul geliştirilmiştir. Bu dönemin Türklerin ırksal özelliklerine dair de özel bir merak olduğu anlaşılmakla birlikte; kitaplarda Türklerin hangi ırka dahil oldukları konusunda bir ortaklık bulabilmek zordur. Kimisi Türkleri bağımsız bir ırk olarak tanımlarken; bir başkasında Türkler Turan ırkının bir kolu olarak kabul edilir. Yine de, ırk meselesinin bu dönemde Türklüğün tanımlanmasında önemli bir belirleyici olarak ele alındığını söylemek zordur. Bunun yerine, etnik köken/ soy ortaklığına yönelik göndermeler daha belirleyicidir. Bu açıdan, çeşitli kitaplarda örneğin Yeniçerleri Osmanlı sarayında küçük yaştan itibaren uğradıkları asilimilasyona rağmen Türk kabul etmeyen ifadelere rastlamak mümkündür.

Türklerin tanımlanmasına dair dikkat çeken bir başka husus, yine sonraki dönemlerdeki kadar sistematik olarak ifade edilmese de, Türklere çeşitli özsel sıfatlar yüklenmesiyle ilgilidir. Bu kapsamda, cesaret, fedakarlık, kuvvetlilik gibi sıfatların Türklerin doğuştan gelen vasıfları olduğu birçok kitapta tekrar edilir. Askerlik becerisi, sayılan diğer özelliklerden biridir. Bu anlamda uzun yıllar süren savaşlardan çıkan bir devletin böyle bir hususu vurgulaması anlaşılabilir. Kitaplarda, Türklerin bir diğer niteliği olarak uygar olmak sayılır. Yine de bunun sonraki dönemde geliştirilecek Türklerin uygarlığın kurucusu olduğu teziyle karşılaştırıldığında henüz embriyonik bir aşamada olduğu söylenebilir. Bu açıdan bu dönemin ders kitaplarında Türklerin birçok topluluk gibi tarihte büyük medeniyetlere imza attıklarını söylemekle yetinilir.

Milletin ve millî kimliğin önemli bir bileşeni olarak vatana yönelik vurgular da, dönemin ders kitapları arasında öne çıkmaktadır. İzleyen dönemlerde de tekrar edeceği gibi, Orta Asya Türkler'in ana yurdu olarak kabul edilirken; buradaki iklim ve toprak koşullarının bozulmasıyla bu topluluğun Anadolu'ya göç ettiği ve burayı vatan bildiği anlatılır. Anadolu'nun vatan toprağı olarak meşrulaştırılmasının üç ayağı olduğu söylenebilir. Bunlardan ilki, Anadolu'nun iklim, bitki örtüsü ve doğal kaynakları açısından Orta Asya'ya nazaran zenginliğine yönelik vurgularla sağlanır. İkinci bir yol, Anadolu'nun uzun zaman önce yapılan göçler ve savaşlar neticesinde Türkleştiğinin anlatılmasından oluşur. Yani zamanla Türkler bu topraklardaki en kalabalık halk haline gelerek, buranın sahibi olmuşlardır. Dolayısıyla bu topraklarda yaşayan diğer halklardan "misafirler" olarak bahsedilir. Bu sürecin son bir ayağı ise, bu toprakların savunulması için Kurtuluş Savaşı'nda dökülen kanların ve verilen canların sık sık hatırlatılmasıdır. Bu, bir anlamda, bu topraklara sahip kalmanın acı bir bedeli olarak görülür.

Dönemin ders kitaplarında Türk milliyetçiliğinin tarihsel gelişimiyle ilgili de bir belirsizlik vardır. Kimi kitaplarda bir "his" ya da "bilinç" olarak değerlendirilen milliyetçilik, tarihin en başından beri Türklerde mevcut bulunan bir vasıf olarak tanımlanır. Bazı ders kitapları ise, bunu Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nun son döneminde gelişen bir hareket olarak görmektedir. Onlara göre bunun ateşleyicisi gayrimüslim nüfus arasında yayılan diğer milliyetçi hareketler olmuştur.

Bu dönemin ders kitapları din ve milliyetçilik ilişkisi özelinde değerlendirildiğinde ise, neredeyse tarih ve din dersleri ağırlıklı olmak üzere kitapların çoğunda Türklük ve Müslümanlığın millî kimliğin kurucu ve ayrılmaz iki unsuru olarak görüldüğü tespitinde bulunulabilir. Bunu bütünleyen üçüncü bir unsur olarak ise özellikle din dersi kitapları göz önünde bulundurulduğunda Sünnilik öne çıkarılır. Bu kapsamda, Van Dijk'ın ideoloji şablonlarına dair belirttiği kimliğin kurucu bileşenlerinin tesisi açısından, "biz" açık biçimde "Sünni Müslüman Türk" olarak tanımlanmıştır. Burada dikkat çekici olan husus, milletin ve milli kimliğin formel tanımlarında dinin özel olarak sayılmamasıdır. Oysa ki, yazarlar Türklerden bahsederken çoğu zaman onların Müslümanlığı üzerinde de spesifik olarak durmaktadırlar. Bu doğrultuda farklı derslerin kitaplarında yer alan birçok ifadede, "hem Türk hem de Müslüman"

olmaktan duyulan gurur ifade edilir. Türklük ve Müslümanlık hem birarada hem de ayrı ayrı kullanıldıklarında, Van Dijk'in belirttiği gibi hep olumlu niteliklerle anılır.

Türklüğün ve Müslümanlığın özdeşleştirilmesine dair dönemin ders kitaplarından farklı örnekler verilebilir. Buna göre, sık rastlanılan bir eğilim, Türk ve Müslüman sözcüklerinin kimi zaman birbirlerinin yerine geçecek şekilde kullanılmasıdır. Bu açıdan Türklerle Hıristiyanları karşılaştıran çeşitli ifadelerle birçok kitapta karşılaşılabilmektedir. Aynı eğilimin bir diğer uzantısı, Türkler'in İslamiyet'e yönelik askeri, siyasi ve kültürel katkılarından övgüyle bahsedilmesi ve bunların ayrıntılarıyla anlatılmasıdır. Özellikle tarih ders kitaplarında, bu eğilim, Türk-İslam devletlerine İslam öncesi Türk tarihinden bariz biçimde daha çok yer almasıyla da desteklenir. Bu kapsamdaki bir başka yönelim ise, İslamiyet'in Türklere yönelik olumlu katkısı üzerinde durulmasıdır. Bu açıdan Müslümanlıktan Türkleri biraraya getirerek ortak biçimde hareket edebilmelerini sağlayan bir bağ olarak bahsedilir.

Türk-İslam tarihine yönelik bu vurguların tipik bir başka örneği ise, bir sonraki dönemden farklı olarak, kimi tarih ders kitaplarında Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'ndan ve hatta Selçuklulardan "biz" öznesiyle bahsedilmesidir. Bunda Türk-İslam tarihine yönelik bir ilginin yanı sıra, tarih ders kitabı yazarlarının Osmanlı geçmişinden gelen entelektüellerden oluşmasının da önemli bir payı olsa gerektir. Yine de, her üç dönemde de izlenecek bir tema olarak, padişahlar II. Abdülhamid ve Vahdettin'e yönelik açık bir olumsuzlamanın mevcut olduğu da eklenmelidir. Bu iki isim genellikle dönemlerini anlatan bütün ders kitaplarında zalim ve hain kişiler olarak anılmaktadırlar.

Aynı ideolojik perspektif içerisinde kimliğin "ötekisi" ise yine Türklük ve Müslümanlık biraraya getirilerek kurgulanır. Bunlardan birinci grubu gayrimüslimler, diğer grubu ise Türk olmayan Müslümanlar oluşturur. Özellikle tarih ders kitaplarındaki ifadeler üzerinden değerlendirildiğinde, ilk gruba yönelik olumsuz yaklaşım ötekine göre daha açıktır. Bu kapsamda bunlar, genellikle "dahili ve harici düşmanlar" kategorisinde değerlendirilmektedir. Bunlardan ilk grup, "hainlikleri", "düşmanlıkları" ve "canilikleri" pek sık vurgulanan Rumlar, Sırplar, Ermeniler ve Bulgarlardan oluşur. Bunların özellikle Kurtuluş Savaşı sırasında Müslüman Türkler'e yaptıkları kötülükler ayrıntılı biçimde sıralanır. Dikkat çekici

olan ise, bu olumsuz edimlerin bu halkların tümüne genellenmesidir. Başka bir ifadeyle, yapılanlar belirli kişilerin eylemleri olarak değil, tüm Rum halkının, Sırp halkının, vs. eylemleri olarak gösterilir. Bunu tamamlayacak biçimde bunlardan Türkiye topraklarında geriye kalanlar ise, misafir olarak betimlenirler. Gayrimüslimlerin diğer bir grubunu oluşturan Avrupalılar da, genellikle Osmanlı İmparatorluğu döneminden başlayarak Türk-Müslüman özneyle karşıtlık içerisinde resmedilir. Dolayısıyla tüm gayrimüslimlerin güvenilmez ve kötü niyetli kişiler olarak görüldükleri söylenebilir.

Dönemin ders kitaplarında Müslüman Türk öznenin ötekisini oluşturan bir diğer grup ise, Türkler dışında kalan Müslümanlardır. Bunlara yönelik kötülemeler ilk gruba göre daha nadir olsa da, özellikle Araplardan güvenilmez bir millet olarak bahsedildiği görülür.

Bu dönemin ders kitaplarında din ve milliyetçiliğin özdeşleştirilmesine dair son bir tema ise, din dilinin Türkçeleştirilmesine yönelik vurgulardan oluşur. Özellikle din dersi kitaplarında duaların ve ibadetlerin Türkçe yapılmasına özel bir önem verilmektedir. Bu, Araplara yönelik olumsuzlamayla birlikte düşünüldüğünde, Müslümanlığı Arap etkilerinden arındırarak millileştirmeye (Türkleşmeye) yönelik bir girişim olarak kabul edilebilir. Böyle bir yönelim, bu dönemde siyasi seçkinlerin laik politikalarına eşlik eden din dilinin Türkçeleştirmesi yönündeki eğilimleriyle de uyumludur.

Dönemin ders kitapları, Türklüğü İslamiyetle bir bütün olarak sunarken, bunu laikliğe aykırı bir edim olarak da görmezler. Gerçekten de din ve devlet işlerinin birbirinden ayrılması olarak görülen laiklik, bu dönemin ders kitaplarında genellikle olumlu bir ilke olarak kabul edilir ve milletin Müslüman kimliğiyle çelişen bir unsur olarak değerlendirilmez.

Çalışmada ders kitapları incelenen bir sonraki dönem, 1931-1939 yılları arasını kapsamaktadır. Kemalizm'in ilkelerinin ayrıntılı biçimde tanımlandığı bu dönemde, ders kitaplarına yansıyan resmî söylemin de öncekine nazaran daha sistematik ve homojen bir hale dönüştüğü söylenebilir. Bunda ders kitaplarının yazım ve basımının devlet tekeline alınması ve rejimin bu alana özel bir önem atfederek bu kitapları hazırlayacak resmî komisyonlar kurmasının etkisi büyüktür. Böylelikle her ders için

tek bir kitap yayınlandığından; bu dönemde önceki dönemin niceliksel ve niteliksel çeşitliliğinden eser kalmaz.

Dönemin ders kitabı yazarları göz önünde bulundurulduğunda, bu dönemin simgesel seçkinlerinin ağırlıklı olarak Batıcı olarak kabul edilen gruplardan oluştuğu görülür. Bunların çoğu, önceki ve sonraki dönemlerden farklı olarak, aynı zamanda siyasi bir kimliğe de sahip kişilerdir. Bu dönemde rejimin lideri Atatürk'ün de ders kitabı hazırlama işiyle bizzat ilgilendiği; hatta Afetinan imzalı Medeni Bilgiler ders kitabının büyük bir bölümünü ona kendisinin dikte ettirdiği bilinmektedir. Dolayısıyla, bu dönemde simgesel seçkinlerle siyasi seçkinlerin birbiriyle örtüştüğü; başka bir ifadeyle bunlar arasında açık bir ayrım yapabilmenin de güç olduğu söylenebilir.

Bunun bir uzantısı olarak, bu dönemde dine ve milliyetçiliğe yaklaşım açısından siyasetle eğitim arasında da kesin bir paralellik bulunmaktadır. Gerçekten de, Batıcı grubun ideolojik yönelimleri paralelinde Türk Tarih Tezi'nin devletin resmi tarih görüşü olarak yaygınlaştığı bu dönemde, ders kitaplarında da bu teze uygun biçimde millî kimliğin tanımlanmasında İslamiyet yerine dünyevi referansların daha belirleyici hale geldiği görülmektedir. Bu kapsamda genel bir tespit yapılacak olursa, dönemin ders kitaplarına bir yandan İslamiyet'i ve onunla ilintili kavramları dünyevileştirmeye ve dini bireysel/vicdani bir bağlılığa indirgemeye; diğer yandan ise, toplumsal bir bağ ve kimlik meselesi olarak Türklüğü her türlü İslami etkiden arındırmaya yönelik bir eğilimin hâkim olduğu söylenebilir. Bunun tamamlayıcısı bir adımı ise, din derslerinin bu dönemin hemen başında müfredattan çıkarılması olmuştur. Bu aşamada dönemin ders kitaplarının bu konudaki söylemine dair çeşitli örnekler vermek yerinde olacaktır.

Öncelikle ders kitaplarında tüm yaşamın bu dünyadan ibaret bir gerçeklik olarak açıklanması, dolayısıyla metafizik bir din ve tanrı anlayışının reddedilmesine şahit olunur. Bu doğrultuda tarih, yurt bilgisi ve sosyoloji ders kitaplarında, bunlara dair fikirlerin insanlığın sosyo-kültürel evriminin gelişimi sürecinde ortaya çıktığı anlatılır. Buna göre, yakın zamanlara kadar dinler insanların yaşamla ilgili tüm düşünce ve kanaatlerini belirlerken; günümüzde aklın ve bilimin gelişimiyle (en azından gerçekliğin bilinmesi/açıklanması açısından) artık bunlara gerek kalmadığı

ifade edilir. Böyle bir düşünce çizgisi içerisinde, aslında herşeyin bu dünya sahnesinde olup bittiği; dolayısıyla, illa yaratıcı bir neden aranacaksa, bunun metafizik bir tanrı değil, tabiat olduğu vurgulanır.

Bu görüşün bir uzantısı olarak, dinlerin anlatımında İslamiyet'in diğerleri nazarında öne çıkarıldığını düşündürecek çok belirgin ifadelerin bulunmadığı söylenebilir. Hatta din fikrinin dünyevileştirmesine paralel olarak, İslamiyet'in de aslında Muhammed peygamberin bir eseri olduğu vurgulanır. Yazarlara göre, o, toplumunun içinde bulunduğu yozlaşma ve karmaşaya bir yanıt olarak uzun bir muhakeme sürecine dalmış; ve bunun sonucunda, bir kurtuluş ve ilerleme umudu olarak İslamiyeti bulmuştur. Dolayısıyla, Muhammed'in de insanüstü biri olmadığı, özellikle ileri derecede askeri ve siyasi vasıflarla donatılmış olmakla birlikte; ilahi mesajı insanlara ileten bir peygamber olmadığı ifade edilir.

Dinin dünyevileştirilmeye ve sıradanlaştırılmaya çalışıldığı böyle bir düşünce çizgisi içerisinde, milliyetçilik tartışmasız biçimde resmî söylemin ve kimliğin yegane belirleyicisi haline gelmiştir. Bu kapsamda milletin tanımlanmasında, özellikle Atatürk'ün, kültürel unsurların yanı sıra, siyasi, teritoryal ve hatta etnik/soydaşlık unsurlarını da işin içine kattığı görülür. Buna uygun biçimde, dönemin milliyetçilik anlayışını belirleyen ve bir kısmı diğer dönemlerde de kullanılan üç tema, en sistematik biçimde bu dönemin ders kitaplarında ifade bulur. Bunlardan ilki, Türk milletinin eskiliğine yönelik vurgulardan oluşur. Bu vurgu temelinde, milliyetçilik her ne kadar modern bir ideoloji olarak değerlendirilse de; Türk milletinin tarihin en eski halkı olduğu belirtilir. Ben, böyle bir yönelimi, Smith'in etno-metodolojik kuramının erken bir örneği olarak gördüğümü belirtmeliyim. Gerçekten de, Smith'teki gibi bu dönemin yazarları da, -her ne kadar etnisite tabirini kullanmasalar da- Orta Asya Türkleriyle günümüz Türkleri arasında sistematik bir süreklilik ilişkisi olduğunu ifade ederler.

Türklüğün tanımlanmasındaki ikinci bir tema olarak Türklerin çeşitli özsel nitelikler üzerinden betimlenmesi de, önceki dönemden farklı olarak çok daha kapsamlı biçimde aktarılmaktadır. Bu anlamda, Türklere atfedilen olumlu vasıflar da hayli çeşitlenmiştir. Bunlar arasında, "büyüklük", "temizlik", "şefkatlilik" gibi nitelikler sayılabilir. Bunlar arasında en öne çıkanı ise, Türk Tarih Tezi'ne bağlı olarak

geliştirilen, Türklerin dünya üzerinde uygarlığın kurucusu oldukları fikridir. Gerçekten de, önceki dönemde görülmeyen biçimde Türklerin Orta Asya'dan başlayarak zamanla yayıldıkları geniş coğrafi saha içerisinde hangi uygarlıkları kurdukları; ve bunun insanlığın kültürel mirasına ne gibi kazanımlar getirdiği hayli sistematik ve kapsamlı bir şekilde anlatılır. Aynı bağlamda Türklerin askerliğe/savaşmaya yönelik becerileri, bu dönemde de sık sık vurgulanmıştır.

Türklere dair vurgulanan üçüncü bir özellik ise, önceki dönemin aksine ilk defa bu dönemde ortaya çıkar. Bu, Türklerin ırksal saflıkları (bozulmamışlıkları) ve üstünlüklerine dair anlatılardan oluşmaktadır. Buna göre tarih ders kitaplarında öncelikle Türklerin Batılılarla özdeşleştirilen "beyaz renkli" ve "geniş kafalı" (brakisefal) bir ırka mensup oldukları tespitinde bulunulur. Yazarlar bunu takiben dünya üzerindeki tüm ırklar içerisinde hâkim vasıflarını en çok koruyanların ve aklın (beynin) ve kültürün evrimi açısından en ileri topluluğun da Türkler olduğunu belirtirler. Buna kanıt olarak ise, tarihte önemli başarılara imza atmış çeşitli kişi ve toplulukların Türk soyundan gelmeleri gösterilmektedir. Böylece, Buda'dan Büyük İskender'e, Friglerden Gotlara birçok tarihi varlığın Türk kökenli olarak ifade edildiğini görürüz.

Özellikle ırksal saflık ve üstünlüğe yönelik göndermelerle birlikte düşünüldüğünde, bu dönemin milliyetçi söyleminin soyculuğu aşarak ırkçılığa yaklaştığı söylenebilir. Kuşkusuz, bunda 1930'lardan itibaren Batı dünyasında da yaygınlaşan ırkçı dalganın büyük bir etkisi bulunmaktadır. Özellikle Almanya (Hitler) ve İtalya (Mussolini) örneklerinin bunun en aşırı örneklerini oluşturduğunu; ve, bu dalganın bir ölçüde Türkiye'de de dönemin siyasi ve simgesel seçkinleri üzerinde belli bir etki bıraktığı tahmin edilebilir. Yine de, bahsedilen iki örnekle kıyaslandığında, en azından ders kitaplarına yansıyan bu söylemin, Türkler dışında kalan diğer ırkları ya da etnik grupları fiziksel anlamda da temizlemeye yönelik aşırı bir eğilimi olmadığının hakkı da teslim edilmelidir. Bu, daha ziyade, yeni rejimin yıllarca kendisini Batılılar karşısında daha aşağı bir konumda görmüş olan Türklere aşılamaya çalıştığı özgüvenin, dönemin siyasi tartışmaları içerisinde popüler bir konu olan ırk meselesi üzerinden bir kez daha yeniden üretilmesi çabasından başka bir şey değildir. Dolayısıyla, burada, ders kitapları özelinde ırkçılık kavramının Türklere yönelik ırksal bir övünç duygusu yaratmaktan ibaret olduğunun altı çizilmelidir.

Dinin bir referans kaynağı olma hükmünü kaybettiği bu dönemin ders kitaplarında milliyetçi söylemin bunun yerine üç varlığı öne çıkardığı söylenebilir. Bunlar, millet, devlet ve Atatürk'tür. Bu kapsamda millet ve devlet, birbiriyle ilişki içerisinde, vatandaşlar için kabul edilebilecek en yüksek otorite olarak gösterilir. Buna göre millet, Durkheim'ın "kollektif vicdan" kavramsallaştırmasına benzer biçimde, herşeye muktedir soyut bir kişilik olarak tanımlanır. Milletin yüceliğini ifade edebilmek üzere, özellikle Budizm ve Konfüçyus dinleri anlatılırken, onun bu dinlerin tanrılarıyla kıyaslanması hayli ilginçtir. Yazarlara göre vatandaşlar için günümüzde sığınılabilecek ve onları her türlü kötülükten koruyabilecek en yüce güç millettir. Yine de, millet soyut bir varlık olduğundan, bunun işlerini bir anlamda kendisinin cisimleşmiş (somutlaşmış) hali olarak devlet aracılığıyla gördüğü belirtilir. Yurt bilgisi ders kitaplarında devletin bu gücü milletin verdiği oylardan aldığı; dolayısıyla, devletin de en az millet kadar saygı ve bağlılığı hak ettiği vurgulanır.

Dönemin ders kitaplarında Atatürk'e yönelik yüceltmeler de, önceki ve sonraki dönemlerle kıyaslandığında, bariz biçimde yaygın ve nitelikleri itibarıyla dikkat çekicidir. Devletin tanımlanmasına benzer biçimde, Atatürk de, öncelikle milli kudretin temsilcisi, milletin somutlaşmış hali olarak resmedilir. Dolayısıyla, bu gücü üzerinde toplamış bir kişi olarak, çeşitli olağanüstü vasıflarla dolu bir kişiliktir. Bu vasıfların betimlenmesinde kullanılan, "güneş başlı varlık", "geleceği görebilen kişi", "durumların gerçek mana ve mahiyetlerini olduğu gibi görebilme becerili insan" gibi sıfatların insanüstü ve hatta metafizik göndermelerle süslü olduğu açıktır. Yine de, bunlarla herhangi bir din arasında açık bir ilişki kurulmadığı da belirtilmelidir. Buradaki amacın, onun kendine has ve özel bir varlık olduğunun anlatılması olduğu tahmin edilmektedir. Atatürk, dönemin ders kitaplarında, bu üstün konumunu başka hiçbir siyasi aktörle paylaşmamaktadır.

Dönemin ders kitaplarında açık ya da örtük biçimde "biz" öznesini oluşturan Türk milletinin "ötekileri" ise, bu dönemde dini aidiyetler üzerinden tanımlanmazlar. Bu gruba girdiği varsayılabilecek iki isim, her üç dönemde tekrar edeceği üzere, II. Abdülhamit ve Vahdettin'dir. Bununla birlikte, bu dönemde özellikle ilkine yönelik olumsuzlamayı ifade etmek üzere seçilen kavramlar ilginçtir. Bu isim için kullanılan "hain" ya da "despot" gibi sıfatlara her üç dönemde de rastlanırken; bu dönemde,

daha da ileri gidilerek, II. Abdülhamit'in "canavarlık", "şeytanlık" ve hatta "cehennem"le özdeşleştirildiği görülmektedir. Bu anlamda padişah, iyiliğin, güzelliğin ve her türlü olumlu özelliğin kendisinde toplandığı Atatürk'ün adeta anti tezi gibidir.

Dönemin ders kitaplarında olumsuz niteliklerle özdeşleştirilen ve dolayısıyla Türk milletinin "ötekisi"ni oluşturduğu iddia edilebilecek diğer unsurlar ise, "bağnazlık", "gericilik", ya da "cehalet" gibi olgularla ilintilendirilen dini kurum, kişi, olay ya da tutumlardır. Bu açıdan taassup fikrine, halifelik kurumuna ve İmparatorluğun ulema grubuna karşı ders kitaplarında açık bir olumsuzlama olduğu söylenebilir. Bunlar, özellikle akıl, bilim ve toplumun ilerlemesinin önde gelen düşmanları olarak tanımlanmışlardır.

Bu aşamada, çalışmamda incelediğim son dönem olan 1939-1950 yıllarını kapsayan döneme dair bulgularımın değerlendirilmesine geçebilirim. Öncelikle genel bir tespit olarak, bu dönemin Atatürk'ün ölümünün hemen ardından başladığını söyleyebilirim. Bunda, ders kitaplarının özellikle dinlerle ilgili olumsuz tutumunun belli bir toplumsal huzursuzluk yaratmış olmasının payı olduğu tahmin edilebilir. Buna paralel olarak, dönemin hemen başında ders kitaplarının yarışma usulüyle yazdırılmasına karar verilmesiyle birlikte, ders kitabı yazar grubunun da büyük ölçüde değiştiğini söyleyebiliriz. Böylece, incelenen alanlardaki tüm dersler için yeni kitaplar hazırlanmaya ve yayınlanmaya başlanır. Bu kapsamda yenileri basılan ilk kitaplar, bundan böyle evrim teorisinden hiç bahsedilmeyen lise *Tarih I* ve Atatürk'ün *Medeni Bilgiler*'inin yerine yayınlanan iki ciltlik *Yurt Bilgisi* ders kitapları olmuştur. Diğer dersler için hazırlanan yeni kitaplar da takip eden yıllarda öncekilerin yerine müfredata dâhil edilir.

Bu döneminin yazarlarının önceki dönemin aksine modernist gelenekçi eğilimli kişilerden oluştuğu söylenebilir. Bunlar, Bu ise ilk dönemdekiyle hemen hemen benzer bir söylemin, yani milliyetçilikle dini harmanlayan bir yönelimin ders kitaplarında tekrar baskın hale gelmesi anlamına gelir. Bu yazarlar içinde ikisinin, Şemsettin Günaltay ve Nurettin Topçu'nun İslamcı kimlikleriyle bilinen aydınlar olduğu da özellikle hatırlatılmalıdır. Dönemin sonlarına doğru, din derslerinin tekrar

müfredata eklenmesine yönelik çalışmalar kapsamında, bir de din dersi kitabı hazırlanmış; bu çalışma da bu dönemki incelememize dâhil edilmiştir.

Ders kitaplarında dine referansları da içeren bir söyleme geri dönülmüş olmasının dönemin siyasi koşulları açısından muhtelif sebepleri olabilir. Özellikle 1930'lardan itibaren siyaset sahnesine egemen olan katı laiklik yanlısı politikaların toplumda belirgin bir hoşnutsuzluk yarattığı zaten bilinmektedir. Buna ek olarak, II. Dünya Savaşı ve sonrası süreçte değişen uluslararası konjonktür içerisinde devletin söylemini genel olarak liberalleştirme gereği duymasını da sayabiliriz. Bununla birlikte kanımca esas ilgi çekici olan, bunun siyaset sahnesine yansımasının 1940'ların daha ziyade ikinci yarısında gerçekleşmesine rağmen; eğitim alanında çok daha erken bir dönemde görülmeye başlanmış olmasıdır. Dolayısıyla, siyasi seçkinler açısından çok daha sonra kabul görecek bir eğilim; kültürel seçkinler tarafından 1940'ların hemen başlarından itibaren ders kitapları aracılığıyla yaygınlaştırılmaya başlamıştır. Buna ek olarak, eğitim alanındaki bu dönüşümün Atatürk sonrası dönemin lideri İsmet İnönü tarafından onaylanmadan uygulanabilmesi mümkün olmadığından; onun da bu değişime olumlu yönde bir tepki verdiği anlaşılmaktadır. Özellikle bu hususa dayanarak, Türkiye'de muhafazakâr kesimlerce günümüzde dahi genellikle "din karşıtı" bir siyasi figür olarak anılan İnönü'ye dair bilinenlerin sorgulanmasını gerektirdiğini söylemeliyim. Bu kısımda, ders kitaplarının değişimiyle birlikte, din ve milliyetçilik ilişkileri açısından bu dönemin ders kitaplarının hâkim söyleminin değerlendirilmesine geçebilirim.

Değişimin tipik bir işareti, dönemin ders kitaplarında İslamiyet başta olmak üzere dinleri metafizik temelli olgular olarak kavramaya yönelik eğilimin geri gelmesi olmuştur. Bu bakımdan, dinlerin anlatımında semavî dinlere dair sempatik bir üslubun kullanıldığı söylenebilir. Benzeri biçimde Allah'a yaklaşım da, önceki dönemin aksine, onu ilahi bir kudret, yaratıcı olarak kabul eden eğilime geri döner. Bu açıdan dikkat çekici bir gelişme, ikinci dönemin ders kitaplarında sadece ismiyle anılan Muhammed'in, bundan böyle tekrar "Hz." yüceltmesiyle birlikte anılmaya başlanması olmuştur. Bu çerçevede, o İslam'ın yaratıcısı değil, ilahi bir kaynaktan aldığı vahyi insanlara tebliğ eden bir peygamber olarak tanımlanır. Aynı şekilde, onun ahlakı da, tüm insanların örnek alması gereken bir model olarak ifade edilir.

Diğer yandan, milletin ve milliyetçiliğin tanımlanması açısından, önceki dönemlerdeki ortak eğilimler büyük ölçüde sürdürülür. Bir örnek olarak, milletin tanımlanmasında hem sosyoloji hem de yurt bilgisi ders kitaplarında kültürel ve siyasal/teritoryal ortaklıkların yanı sıra (soy anlamında) ırk birliğinin de sayılmış olması verilebilir. Bununla birlikte, dönemin ders kitaplarında ırksal üstünlük ya da saflığa yönelik göndermelerin önceki dönemdekiyle kıyaslandığında hayli azaldığı da gözlerden kaçmamaktadır. Üstelik bu dönemde biyoloji ve antropoloji alanındaki çalışmaların ilerlemesiyle birlikte, ırkların da çeşitlendiği, kitaplarda temel olarak Alpenler, Akdenizliler ve Nordiklerden oluşan üç ayrı ırkın varlığının kabul edildiği görülür. Türkler, bunlar arasında Alpen grubuna dâhil olan bir topluluk olarak tanımlanmıştır.

Dönemin ders kitaplarında, yine, Türk milleti kadim, Türk milliyetçiliği modern bir olgu olarak kabul edilmektedir. Bu açıdan Türk Tarih Tezi'nin etkisini hala koruduğu ve tarihte yer almış çeşitli halkların Türk soylu olarak tanımlandığının altı çizilmelidir. Bununla birlikte, bu kapsamda ismi sayılan kişi ve toplulukların sayısı bu dönemde hayli azaltılmıştır. Aynı tezin bir uzantısı olarak, Türklerin birçok olumlu vasfın yanı sıra uygarlık kurucu niteliklerinin de vurgulanmaya devam edildiği görülür. Türklerin askerlik becerisi de, her dönemde olduğu bu dönemde de pek sık övülen niteliklerin başında gelir. Bunun bu dönemdeki özel anlamının, o tarihlerde Türkiye'nin yanı başında süren II. Dünya Savaşı bağlamında değerlendirilmesinin yerinde olacağını düşünmekteyim. Gerçekten de, Türkiye'yi ne şekilde etkileyeceği belli olmayan ve her an dâhil olunabilecek bu savaşın gölgesinde, savaşma becerisinin övülmesine yönelik göndermeler belki de en çok bu dönem için anlam arz eder.

Öte yandan, Türkiye'de milliyetçi söylemin kurucu öğeleri olarak milleti, devleti ve Atatürk'ü yüceltmeye yönelik ifadeler de bu dönemde hem niceliksel olarak azalır; hem de rasyonel boyutlara çekilerek, kutsallaştırıcı bir dilden kurtarılır. Bu dönemde, öncekilerden farklı olarak, İnönü'nün ve bir ölçüde CHP'nin de bunlara yakın bir konuma yükseltilerek tanımlandığı söylenebilir. Atatürk'ün ardından cumhurbaşkanlığına seçilen İnönü, bundan böyle kitaplarda "milli şef" sıfatıyla hem resimleriyle hem de hakkındaki övücü ifadelerle ders kitaplarında kendisine yer bulmaya başlamıştır.

Dönemin ders kitaplarının din ve milliyetçilik ilişkileri açısından değerlendirilmesine geçildiğinde, daha önce de belirtildiği gibi, bu dönemin söyleminde İslam'ın millî kimliğin tanımlanmasında tekrar öne çıktığı söylenebilir. Bu açıdan başvurulan temalar, ilk dönemkilerle aynıdır. Türklerin İslamiyet'e olumlu katkıları, Müslümanlığın Türklerin tabiatına en uygun din olduğu, ve Türklüğün ve Müslümanlığın birbirlerinden ayrılmaz kavramlar olarak görülmelerine dair ifade ve örnekler, bu dönemde de tekar eder. Aynı kapsamda, Türk-İslam devletlerine yönelik yüceltmeler, niceliksel olarak ilk dönemdekileri de aşmaktadır. Hatta üç dönem içerisinde, ilk defa bu dönemde Türkiye Cumhuriyeti, Büyük Selçuklu İmparatorluğundan günümüze uzanan bir devlet geleneğinin mirasçısı olarak tanımlanması dolayısıyla, Türk-İslam tarihi çerçevesinde bir yere oturtulmuş olur. Bunun dışında, Türklerin Müslümanlığın Sünnilik koluna bağlı olduklarının açık ifadesi de, ilk dönemdekine benzer bir eğilimle, Sünniliğin de Türk kimliğinin bir unsuru olarak görüldüğünü ortaya koyar.

Bu dönemin ders kitaplarında "Sünni Müslüman Türkler"den oluşan "biz"in "ötekisi" ise, yine ilk dönemdeki gibi, gayri Müslimlerdir. Bu anlamda gerek Türkiyeli gayrimüslimler gerekse de Avrupalı Hıristiyanlar genellikle çeşitli olumsuz vasıflarla özdeşleştirilmiş; ve bu vasıflar genellenerek adeta gayri Müslim olmakla özdeşleştirilmiştir.

Sonuç olarak, çalışma, ders kitaplarından yola çıkarak, mevcut yazında 1924-1950 yılları arasında devletin resmî söyleminde baskın olduğu kabul edilen seküler milliyetçiliğin, aslında sadece 1931-1939 yılları arasını kapsayan görece kısa bir süre içinde yaygın olduğunu ortaya koymaktadır. Batıcı seçkinlerin denetiminde hazırlanan ders kitaplarının okutulduğu bu dönemin haricinde kalan iki dönemde ise, (Sünni) İslam'ı millî kimliğin tanımlanmasında Türklükle özdeşleştiren, dinî milliyetçi bir yaklaşımın geçerli olduğu görülmekte; bu ise, bu dönemde modernist gelenekçi seçkinlerin etkinliğiyle açıklanmaktadır.

APPENDIX F

TEZ FOTOKOPİSİ İZİN FORMU

ENSTİTÜ

Fen Bilimleri Enstitüsü	☐
Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü	X
Uygulamalı Matematik Enstitüsü	☐
Enformatik Enstitüsü	☐
Deniz Bilimleri Enstitüsü	☐

YAZARIN

Soyadı : BABAHAN

Adı : ALİ

Bölümü : SOSYOLOJİ

TEZİN ADI (İngilizce) : NATIONALISM AND RELIGION IN THE TEXTBOOKS OF THE EARLY REPUBLICAN PERIOD IN TURKEY

TEZİN TÜRÜ : Yüksek Lisans ☐ Doktora X

1. Tezimin tamamından kaynak gösterilmek şartıyla fotokopi alınabilir. X

2. Tezimin içindekiler sayfası, özet, indeks sayfalarından ve/veya bir bölümünden kaynak gösterilmek şartıyla fotokopi alınabilir. ☐

3. Tezimden bir bir (1) yıl süreyle fotokopi alınamaz. ☐

TEZİN KÜTÜPHANEYE TESLİM TARİHİ: