

TURKISH SOCIOLOGY IN A SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE
PERSPECTIVE: THE DOUBLE-BIND OF SURVIVAL/IDENTITY

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ANIL MÜHÜR DAROĞLU

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Approval of the Graduate School of Social Sciences

Prof. Dr. Meliha Altunışık
Director

I certify that this thesis satisfies all the requirements as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

Prof. Dr. Ayşe Saktanber
Head of Department

This is to certify that we have read this thesis and that in our opinion it is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Ceylan Tokluođlu
Supervisor

Examining Committee Members

Prof. Dr. Elisabeth Özdalga (Bilkent, POLS)

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Ceylan Tokluođlu (METU, SOC)

Prof. Dr. Nur Betül Çelik (AU, JRN)

Assist. Prof. Dr. Selçuk Dursun (METU, HIST)

Assist. Prof. Dr. Çağatay Topal (METU, SOC)

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Name, Last name : Anıl Mühürdarođlu

Signature :

ABSTRACT

TURKISH SOCIOLOGY IN A SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE PERSPECTIVE: THE DOUBLE-BIND OF SURVIVAL/IDENTITY

Mühürdarođlu, Anıl

PhD., Department of Sociology

Supervisor: Assoc. Prof. Dr. Ceylan Tokluođlu

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Ottoman-Turkish modernization discourse is structured on the bases of a double-bind between survival and identity which had emerged as a result of the belief that a break had taken place in the Ottoman Empire in the unity between the methods of governing and the qualities with which Ottomans defined themselves. Debates on the disruption of this unity had been conducted in a period when linear conception of history became the predominant framework for understanding historical processes. As a result, categories of survival and identity were regarded as two dichotomous terms which were discussed with reference to other dichotomies like East and West or traditional and modern. Sociology became a popular field of knowledge in the late Ottoman and early republican period and employed by intellectuals with the intention of finding solutions to the problems which emanate from these dichotomies. Postwar Turkish sociology continued to deal with the same question. In this period, sociology in Turkey was divided into two groups as structure- and culture-oriented sociologies. The former tried to tackle the survival/identity double-bind by diminishing the category of identity into a dependent variable and formulated a scheme of modernization on the bases of a future-oriented and cosmopolitan identity. The latter preferred to connect the fate of the intention of preserving the traditional qualities of

the society to the success of the modernization process and turned the struggle for survival into a project for the restoration of cultural identity. This study will analyze these two schools which set the main course of modernization debates in Turkish sociology.

Keywords: Ottoman-Turkish modernization, national sociologies, uses of sociology, sociology of knowledge, discourse analysis

ÖZ

BİLGİ SOSYOLOJİSİ PERSPEKTİFİNDEN TÜRK SOSYOLOJİSİ: HAYATTA KALMA/KİMLİK ÇİFTE AÇMAZI

Mühürdaroğlu, Anıl

Doktora., Sosyoloji Bölümü

Tez Yöneticisi: Doç. Dr. Ceylan Tokluoğlu

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Osmanlı-Türk modernleşmesi söylemi, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda devlet yönetme yöntemleri ile Osmanlılar'ın kendilerini tanımlamakta kullandıkları nitelikler arasındaki birliktelikte meydana geldiğine inanılan bir kırılmadan dolayı, hayatta kalma ve kimlik arasındaki bir ikili açmaz üzerine yapılmıştır. Bu birliktelikteki kırılma ile ilgili tartışmalar, tarihsel süreçlerin anlaşılması konusunda çizgisel tarih anlayışının hakim olduğu bir dönemde yürütülmüştür. Bunun sonucu olarak, hayatta kalma ve kimlik kategorileri, Doğu-Batı veya geleneksel-modern gibi ikiliklere referansla karşıt terimler olarak ele alınmıştır. Sosyoloji geç Osmanlı ve erken cumhuriyet döneminde popüler bir bilgi alanı haline gelmiştir ve entellektüeller tarafından bu ikiliklerin doğurduğu sorunlara çözümler bulmak amacıyla kullanılmıştır. Savaş-sonrası Türk sosyolojisi aynı sorunla uğraşmaya devam etmiştir. Bu dönemde Türkiye'de sosyoloji yapı- ve kültür-yönelimli sosyolojiler olarak ikiye ayrılmıştır. Bunlardan birincisi, hayatta kalma/kimlik ikili karşıtlığını, kimlik kategorisini bir bağımlı değişkene indirgemek ve modernleşmeyi gelecek-yönelimli ve kozmopolit bir kimlik üzerine inşa etmek suretiyle aşmaya çalışmıştır. İkinci okul ise toplumun geleneksel niteliklerini koruma hedefinin kaderini modernleşme sürecinin başarısına bağlamayı tercih etmiş ve hayatta kalma

mücadelesini kültürel kimliğin ihyası projesi haline getirmiştir. Bu çalışma, Türk sosyolojisinde modernleşme tartışmalarının gidişatını belirleyen bu iki okulu analiz etmektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Osmanlı-Türk modernleşmesi, ulusal sosyolojiler, sosyolojinin kullanımları, bilgi sosyolojisi, söylem analizi

To My Wife

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CHAPTER I

1 INTRODUCTION

Durkheim argues that a science “can justify its existence only when it has for its subject matter an order of facts which the other sciences do not study” (Durkheim, 1964: 143-144). Although his will to study social facts “as things” contributed to the academic status of sociology, the controversial character of its object of knowledge and the willingness of other disciplines “to have their say in sociology” hindered sociology to have “the monopoly of the production of truth” about social world (Bourdieu, 2004:87). The specific character of the object of knowledge of sociology has long been discussed with reference to the possibility of producing ‘objective’, ‘neutral’, ‘value-free’ knowledge of society owing primarily to German tradition of social thought. Rather than comparing the epistemic value of the products of social and natural sciences, what is of interest for me here is the self-evaluative character of sociology which is a consequence of its constant struggle with its object of knowledge. Bourdieu explains this situation with the argument that sociology is an actor in the processes it describes (*ibid.*:88). This peculiarity of sociology of sociology makes it even trickier to conduct a sociological analysis of sociological knowledge production which is going to be the task of this study. It is also the reason why any sociology of sociology should clarify its location with reference to various approaches to intellectual history and sociology of knowledge.

Both conventional and radical accounts on the history of sociology refers to a strong relationship between the emergence of the categories of social thought and the immense transformation which took place in Europe where sociology had developed as a scientific discipline. Therefore, determining the type of interaction between sociology and the wider institutional sphere is vital for my investigation. Wittrock and his colleagues’ classification is an appropriate starting point for it displays the major concern of disciplinary investigation for determining the degree of autonomy

of sociology as a scientific field and its practitioners from wider context –a concern which can be described as one of the manifestations of the structure-agency dichotomy in the sociology of knowledge. Wittrock (*et al.*) offer “three basic models of explanation” for the relationship between the development of sociology and the transformation of social institutions. The first one is the “intellectual-institutional model” which focuses on “the consolidation and academic institutionalization of certain intellectual traditions (Wittrock *et al.*, 1991:63). The second model is the “functional-evolutionary perspective” which focuses on the relationship between social processes and the development of certain types of knowledge to be produced for meeting the functional requirements of these processes (*ibid.*:67). The third model they define is the “politico-institutional perspective” which focuses on the role of policy processes and eliminates the shortcomings of the previous model in terms of understanding the different course social science had followed in countries which went through similar processes (*ibid.*:69-71). Instead of these three models, Wittrock (*et al.*) offer the term ‘discourse structuration’ to define the relationship between the development of social science and political processes. Their main concern is to develop an approach which conceptualizes social science “as a reflexive approach and discursive effort” for understanding social institutions and assumes that the relationship between social science and social institutions has been changing in different periods (*ibid.*:76). This study will follow a similar path though with some important distinctions whose explanation requires some elaboration.

It is possible to say that the rather naïve depiction of disciplinary ‘advancements’ as the achievements of bright scientists who came up with ideas out of the blue has long been repudiated for such histories neglect the social conditioning of knowledge production. Defining sociology of knowledge as a “sociologically oriented history of ideas”, Mannheim argues that “epistemology is as intimately enmeshed in the social process as is the totality of our thinking” (Mannheim, 1966:69, 70). Being a product of the turmoil of interwar years, Mannheim’s sociology of knowledge was formulated as an altered version of ideological analysis¹. The rather interesting

¹ According to a now-classical study in the field, sociology of knowledge “derived its root proposition” from Marx: “that man’s consciousness is determined by his social being” (Berger and Luckmann, 1966:5). However, both Scheler’s earlier and more philosophical version and Mannheim’s

aspect of Mannheim's sociology of knowledge is his repudiation of 'philosophical relativism' which, he states, "denies the validity of any standards and of the existence of order in the world" and acknowledgement of 'relationism' which is based on the assumption that ideas "cannot be formulated absolutely, but only in terms of the perspective of a given situation" (*ibid.*:254)². This move was designed in order to develop a theory which can serve to distinguish between right and wrong in a given context without absolute categories but with a crucial mistake of neglecting to problematize how contextual factors determine the criteria of right and wrong.

The more politically-oriented classical sociology of knowledge could not develop as a rich sub-discipline in itself but paved the way for a literature known as social studies of science or shortly, science studies. As a well-known name in this field, Bloor played an important role in 1970s for rendering 'hard sciences' available for sociological scrutiny by repudiating the 'teleological vision of knowledge and rationality' which confines sociology of knowledge within the limits of the investigation of false beliefs (Bloor, 1991:9-10). Meanwhile, sociological analyses of knowledge production started to conduct research about their own domain. The increasing 'professionalization' of sociologists in the postwar United States and the active role they took in policy-making raised questions about the social backgrounds and ideological inclinations of sociologists (Crawford, 1971; also see the collection of essays in Reynolds and Reynolds, 1970). In the same decade, Bourdieu argued that the success of scientific bureaucracies in the US could present their victory as "the victory of science" by imposing a definition of science which corresponds to their knowledge production methods (Bourdieu, 1975:21). Bourdieu's attempt was a challenge to the distinction between internalist and externalist approaches to intellectual history which assumes that internalist analysis is the domain of epistemologists while externalist study of science is charged with the investigation of

more popular formulation of sociology of knowledge were criticized by Marxists (see the collection of essays in Meja and Stehr, 1990). More widely known repudiation of Mannheim's theory was expressed by the members of the Frankfurt School who criticized Mannheim's exclusion of the category of false consciousness and blamed him for "failing to see that the 'necessity' of ideological thought is itself produced by specific societal conditions" (Meja, 1975:65). For Durkheim's role in the development of the idea of sociology of knowledge, see Vogt, 1979.

² Stehr and Meja argue that Mannheim formulated his theory "as a means of ending intellectual and political divisions in society" and therefore, his repudiation of relativism was based on moral grounds rather than logical (Stehr and Meja, 1982:43).

the social conditions of knowledge production. The shortcomings of this distinction are revealed in Bachelard's and Canguilhem's historical epistemology which is a foundational element of the French tradition of epistemology whose later representatives were Althusser and Foucault. Although having important differences, the common themes which appeared in the studies of these four names provide important tools for a sociological analysis of knowledge production which I will conduct in this study.

Writing in the heydays of Vienna School positivism, Bachelard put forward his concept of epistemological obstacle which denotes the primary role of opinions and prejudices in the production of scientific knowledge (Bachelard, 2002:24-25). Although playing a crucial role in demystifying the belief in value-free scientist who produce knowledge based on observation without any mediation, Bachelard's primary concern in his early studies was to rid scientific mind of the notions which obstruct scientific thinking: "Nothing can be founded on opinion: we must start by destroying it. Opinion is the first obstacle that has to be surmounted" (*ibid.*:25)³. In addition, he had an evolutionist approach to history of science which he saw as a process of "rectification of errors" and "maturation" of scientific mind. Reason, for Bachelard "tends to fulfill itself" (Bachelard, 1968:27) and "develops toward growing complexity" (*ibid.*:23). However, he made two contributions for the study of scientific knowledge production which also had influenced the works of Canguilhem, Althusser and Foucault. His first contribution is his emphasis on the role of previously produced knowledge in scientific research. According to Bachelard, there is a gap between sensory and scientific knowledge: "Temperature is seen on a thermometer, one does not feel it" (*ibid.*:9). Scientific objects do not lend themselves to observation without mediation and instruments which are used for experimenting on these objects are actually materialized theories; in other words, both scientific objects and scientific instruments bear the mark of previous scientific work (Rheinberger, 2005:319-320; Castelao-Lawless, 1995:51):

³ It was only later that Bachelard had a more affirmative attitude towards human mind and imagination "as an essential aspect of psychic dynamism", rather than obstacle (McAllester Jones, 2002:11). He later argued that human beings' fascination for certain objects like fire, water and air engendered the prior, non-scientific speculations about these objects which had played central role "for our understanding and creation of ourselves as human beings" (Gutting, 2001:89).

... no experimental result should be proclaimed as an absolute, divorced from the various experiments which have furnished it... no affirmation of purity can be detached from its criterion of purity or from the history of the technique of purification (Bachelard, 1968:61).

This violation of the purity of the laboratory of the scientist was quite astonishing when it was expressed in 1930s and it opened the gate for questioning the innocence of every aspect of scientific knowledge production. Bachelard's attention to the normative aspect of scientific activity was shared by his colleague, Canguilhem who expanded the terrain which shaped these norms: "When Canguilhem spoke of socially produced norms, he referred to any society, as community of people, while Bachelard intended a scientific community" (Chimisso, 2003:320). This enlarged conception of the social finds one of its reflections in Bourdieu's concept of 'scientific field' which he defines as the place where the "political struggle for scientific domination" takes place and researchers' positions, scientific problems, the choice of areas of research, methods and the place of publication is determined (Bourdieu, 1975:21-22). However, this is not simply about the autonomy of the scientists or one way of looking at the structure-agency dichotomy. Bachelard's arguments on scientific objects and instruments invalidated the famous body-mind problem in a Spinozist fashion which was going to be inherited by his student, Althusser, in his theory of ideology where he repudiated the widely accepted definition of this concept as "the system of real relations which govern the existence of individuals" and defined it instead as "the imaginary relation of those individuals to the real relations in which they live" (Althusser, 1971:165). Inspired from Jacques Lacan's theory of the formation of the Ego, Althusser argued that individuals are appointed "always-already" as subjects before their birth in ideological configuration (*ibid.*:176). Althusser's conception of ideology is defined by Purvis and Hunt as the "sociological variant of ideology theory" which signifies an 'opening towards discourse' (Purvis and Hunt, 1993:481, 483). It was Canguilhem's student, Foucault, who put forward a complex theory of discourse.

The second important step which was taken by Bachelard was the introduction of the concept of ‘epistemological break’ or ‘rupture’. Bachelard’s history of science focuses on ‘cognitive discontinuities’ rather than piecemeal advancements in science and such a description of the history of science requires the analysis of the connection of products of knowledge with the epistemic terrain in which they are produced. For this reason, he offered what he called ‘recurrent history’ of science in which ‘epistemological value’ that is attached to past products of science can be continuously reassessed. This is the reason why his conception of epistemology is historical (Tiles, 1987:147-149). Following the same route, Canguilhem developed what he calls ‘normative history’ which is “a narrative constructed by assuming a norm that allows one to evaluate and judge past doctrines” (Chimisso, 2003:298). Chimisso mentions “the interest of French philosophers in intellectual history” and quotes from an earlier account according to which “history was the substitute of the experimental method in philosophy: in order to study the mind, we need to see it ‘at work’, and history represents the laboratory in which to carry out observations” (*ibid.*:305)⁴. This habit of converting ideational products into material objects or investigating them in their spaces of occurrence is followed by Althusser in his concept of ‘problematic’⁵ and Foucault in his endeavor to study discourse-objects in their positivity⁶.

These contributions provide useful tools to reconsider the structure-agency dichotomy which have always been a challenge for the sociology of knowledge. Here, Dreyfus and Rabinow’s well-known objection about Foucault’s earlier studies,

⁴ According to this tradition, which is traced back to Comte by Dews, the adequate investigation of knowledge can be conducted “if studied in this historical development, rather than considered as the product of an encounter between empirical reality and certain immutable faculties of the mind” (Dews, 1994:122).

⁵ For Althusser, science “can only pose problems on the terrain and within the horizon of a definite theoretical structure, its problematic, which constitutes its absolute and definite conditions of possibility, and hence the absolute determination of the forms in which all problems must be posed, at any given moment in science.” (Althusser, 1977:25)

⁶ Here, it is important to remind that Foucault distinguishes between his archeological method from Bachelard’s and Canguilhem’s position and offers a history in which “scientificity does not serve as a norm” (Foucault, 2002:210) and “the distinction between scientific and non-scientific forms of knowledge” is abandoned (Chimisso, 2003:300). This is an important move in terms of broadening the dimension of his object of analysis, that is, discourse.

whose method is defined by Foucault as ‘archeology’, is a relevant starting point. Focusing on the relationship between discursive and non-discursive practices which they believe is not explained in Foucault’s archeological studies, Dreyfus and Rabinow argue that by distancing himself from hermeneutics for which non-discursive practices set up “a horizon of intelligibility in which only certain discursive practices and their objects and subjects make sense” (Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1982:79) and conceptualizing discourse as an autonomous and rule-governed system, Foucault offers “the strange notion of regularities which regulate themselves” (*ibid.*:84). Similarly, Dews claims that Foucault fails in his attempt to rescue himself from formalization for his archeological studies display the “characteristic structuralist confusion between ‘conditions of possibility’ and the causes of an event” (Dews, 1994:128). Kennedy also touches upon the same point in his attempt to evaluate the relationship between Foucault’s archeological studies and the sociology of knowledge. Although praising Foucault for avoiding the vulgar reductionism of traditional sociology of knowledge and delineating “a place for social structure in the emergence of knowledge, without reducing knowledge to the economic, political and social interests of its holders”, he argues that “the absence of any theory of the relationship between discursive and non-discursive formations” makes it difficult to answer questions his enterprise produces (Kennedy, 1979:287).

These critiques emanate from the willingness to find material footing for explaining why discourse is structured in this shape but not otherwise. In this study, I will consider the formation of discourse as a process of structuration with the intention to eliminate the shortcomings of a structuralist framework in terms of explaining change in historical processes. My purpose is what Purvis and Hunt believe Laclau and Mouffe achieved in their ‘open’ conception of discursive formation, that is, to repudiate “the search for fixed grounds of knowledge or guarantees of meaning” and “totalizing notions of Ideology as *Weltanschauung*” (Purvis and Hunt, 1993:492). Laclau and Mouffe’s and Hall’s ‘articulation theory’ tries to break from Foucault’s conception of discourse whose structuralist character, they believe, avoids the investigation of the political struggles behind meaning attribution in discursive formations. Assuming the “impossibility of fixing ultimate meanings” (Laclau and

Mouffe, 1990:111), Laclau and Mouffe argue that “[a]ny discourse is constituted as an attempt to dominate the field of discursivity, to arrest the flow of differences, to construct a center” (*ibid.*:112). In a similar fashion, Hall defines the fight over attributing “new sets of meanings for an existing term or category, of dis-articulating it from its place in a signifying structure” as the site of ideological struggle (Hall, 1985:112).

The conceptualization of signification practices as sites of political struggles complies with my intention to analyze discourse structuration in a historical perspective. However, Foucault’s idea of ‘system of dispersion’, which he defines as a regularity “between objects, types of statement, concepts, or thematic choices” (Foucault, 2002:41), is still important for my thesis. Although signification practices bring about alternative meanings to these statements and concepts, there is a ‘rule of formation’ which functions as fixed references in discourse structuration and any articulations which take place within this process. It should be added that the very object of this study, which cannot be pictured as an isolated and autonomous field of discourse, requires an approach which evaluates discourse structuration with an emphasis on its relationship with wider historical processes. Here structuration of discourse is conceptualized as the piling up of successive instances of history in which the discursive formation of an instance also serves as a factor which shapes the conditions of production of knowledge along with social, economic and political processes⁷. This conceptualization requires an understanding of history as a product of many recursive histories none of which is the sole author. However, this argument does not repudiate the fact that what we see in history ‘at present’ predominates how we conduct this recursive analysis since history is “a practice undertaken in a particular present and for particular reasons linked to that present” (Dean, 1994:14).

⁷ Bachelard’s concept of ‘epistemological profile’ can be regarded as a first step towards what I intend to reach at here. Emphasizing the “plurality of meaning attached to one and the same concept” and the plurality of “philosophic culture” (Bachelard, 1968:21 and 35, resp.), Bachelard argues that scientists cannot act in accordance to a particular philosophical current for a designated concept; it is possible to analyze their epistemological profile. According to this, a scientist’s conceptualization of ‘mass’ might be based on different degrees of various epistemologies like naïve realism, positivist empiricism or dialectical rationalism (*ibid.*: 35-37). However, the history which I will write in this study is not an accumulative history as it is the case in Bachelard; it is not the history of the growth or maturation of rationality.

Introduction to the Problem

The purpose of this study is to analyze the production of sociological knowledge in Turkey on Ottoman-Turkish modernization. I am going to use this phrase (Ottoman-Turkish modernization) throughout this study referring mainly to the nineteenth and early twentieth century which witnessed a series of reforms which are discussed in the Ottoman historiography as the constituents of a modernization or ‘Westernization’ act. Although the events which took place throughout the decline of the Ottoman Empire had immense impact on many societies, my main concern is to focus on the formation of the discourse on this process with reference to how it was theorized and historicized in the context of the Turkish Republic⁸. Sociology in Turkey will be evaluated, in Foucauldian lexicon, as one of the ‘surfaces of emergence’ of Ottoman-Turkish modernization discourse in which discourse “finds a way of limiting its domain, of being what it is talking about, of giving it the status of an object –and therefore of making it manifest, nameable, and describable” (Foucault, 2002:46). Such an evaluation requires a critical reading of the history of Ottoman-Turkish modernization in which one should engage in a continuous “interrogation of what is held to be given, necessary, natural, or neutral” (Dean, 1994:20). Although the theoretical framework which will be employed here is largely based on Foucault’s work, there are certain points of this framework which should be reconsidered. Given the concern which was discussed above for conducting a recursive evaluation of history, I should primarily point that the formation of the Ottoman modernization discourse is a process of structuration which is not written single-handedly by an author or group of authors who shared similar worldviews. The problem in those analyses of Ottoman-Turkish modernization which picture a dominant discourse which had fallen down to the Ottoman land just like the monolith in the *2001: A Space Odyssey*, is their tendency to condemn all

⁸ This is not, as Quataert observes in the 1960s Ottoman historiography, to take Ottoman Empire and Turkey as “synonymous terms” (Quataert, 2003:134). I should rather say that I intentionally neglect, in Quataert words, “those Ottoman experiences that were not directly related to the formation of the Turkish Republic” (*ibid.*), since my study requires the analysis of how the structuration of modernization discourse have taken place via such a selective reading of Ottoman history from the perspective of the establishment of Turkey as a nation-state.

sorts of evaluations about the impact of the late Ottoman period on Turkey as constructs of elitist-modernizationist knowledge producers of the nation-state as if structuration of discourse suddenly started by republicans. Such analyses are no less reductionist than the sociological reductionism this study aims to avoid. My purpose is to investigate discourse structuration without closing the door for further historical investigations. I assume that historical processes and sociological conditions synchronically worked for structuring discourse. Events that took place and their impacts on society found their expression in discursive sphere and each instance of the structuration of discourse simultaneously prepared the conditions of the reception of 'real' processes in a particular way and molded them to form a particular historical narrative. In other words, rather than the above-mentioned problem of the relationship between discursive and non-discursive in Foucault's archeology, this study is much more concerned about emphasizing the relationship between discursive formation in different instances of history and employing a conception of discourse which is both structured and structuring. This does not, on the other hand, rule out the assumption that we can only look at the Ottoman-Turkish modernization discourse as the product of a single discourse structuration process which can only be defined with reference to this particular 'present' with particular reasons linked to this present.

The problem some scholars observe in Foucault's treatment to the relationship between discursive and non-discursive is related to the concern for the potential of Foucauldian archeology to turn into some sort of infinite regress. Dean argues that Foucault had distanced himself from "the seductive spiral of interpretation characteristic of hermeneutics" (Dean, 1994:15) from the very beginning and his archeology "is not yet another mode of interpretation rendering into discourse the unsaid" (*ibid.*:16). In this study, I will follow a similar path and describe the structuration of the sociological discourse on Ottoman-Turkish modernization in which there is a built-in 'rule of formation' which prepared the conditions of the possibility of the development of sociological literature in Turkey as it is and not something else, rather than interpreting the texts of sociological literature in Turkey to evaluate the contributions of individuals. This built-in rule will not be regarded as

a product of the inner mechanisms of an autonomously functioning discursive practice; it will be described with reference to the relationship between wider historical processes and the structuration of Ottoman-Turkish modernization discourse.

The conventional accounts on the Ottoman Empire's 'adventure of modernization' starts with decision-takers' realization of the military superiority of European powers which signaled the end of Ottomans' position as the central power holder in her region. Ottoman modernization reforms are depicted as the efforts to close the 'gap' between themselves and European societies and the intellectual debates of the nineteenth century were mainly about the factors which lie beneath Europeans' rapid advancements, on the one hand, and the 'good' and 'evil' aspects of the European way of life, on the other. The bureaucratic reforms are described as the centralization attempts which were the response of the empire against the spread of the idea of nationalism and the separation of nations which were under the rule of the Ottomans. Islam and Ottomanism were regarded as the two ideological tools for retaining the unity of the empire. Therefore, the Ottoman-Turkish modernization is written as the story of an empire which was striving for survival in a changing world, on the one hand, and one which had to face with the problem of defining an identity for herself in order to find her location in this new world and to construct a new society based on this identity. This story pictures the institutional reforms in the empire as failed attempts for modernization and the reason of this failure is explained with reference to the discordance between the steps Ottoman decision-takers had taken to reorganize existing institutions in order to increase the power of the state to endure the new conditions of existence and the traditional way of governing which made Ottomans what they were in the past.

The main thesis of this study is that Ottoman-Turkish modernization discourse is structured with a built-in double-bind between survival and identification which functioned for the formation of modernization discourse with reference to the East-West duality and its variations like Islam-Christianity, traditional-modern, and

village-city⁹. I believe that this double-bind have emerged as a result of the belief that a break had taken place in the Ottoman Empire in the unity between the methods of governing and social institutions¹⁰. In other words, there was supposedly a harmony between the qualities with which Ottomans defined themselves and the methods of governing which rendered the empire a sovereign power -a harmony which probably had never existed in any period of the empire¹¹ - and this harmony should be restored with reference to the changing conditions of survival and the new sources of identity. In a sense, the structuration of modernization discourse is shaped by the lack of stock of knowledge for understanding the ongoing processes without the underlying assumption of an assumed unity between these two categories. Debates on the disruption of this unity had been conducted in a period when linear conception of history became the predominant framework for understanding historical processes. As a result, political disputes over all kinds of reforms had been expressed as the struggle between old and new or traditional and modern. This is why, this double-bind found its expression as a source of anxiety whose ‘traumatic’ consequences has become one of the main themes of Ottoman-Turkish modernization discourse. This argument entails the assumption that the story which I told in the previous paragraph is not the product of a group who wrote it to ‘distort’ our understanding of history; it is a product of a process of structuration. My purpose is not to offer an alternative explanation for the underlying problems and limitations of the Ottoman-Turkish modernization attempts. I am rather interested in how this process went hand in hand with the structuration of modernization discourse. In that sense, contrary to conventional argument which points at an ‘essential’ duality

⁹ Here, the concept of double-bind is used as it was firstly introduced by Gregory Bateson (*et al.*) as “a situation in which no matter what a person does, he “can’t win”” (Bateson, et al., [1956]1987:205).

¹⁰ Here, I am referring to what Genç calls ‘traditionalism’ (*gelenekçilik*) which he defines as Ottomans’ primary purpose of maintaining the balance in social and economic relationships which was reached at in long periods of time (Genç, 2005:48). Genç argues that “not to do anything against the ancient ways” (“*kadimden olagelen aykırı iş yapılmaması*”) was the chief formula which had been used in decision-taking between sixteenth and eighteenth centuries and “that which is ancient” is defined as “the thing whose past no one remembers” (“*Kadim odur ki, onun öncesini kimse hatırlamaz*”) (*ibid.*:49).

¹¹ In his assessment of the seventeenth century Ottoman advice-for-kings literature, Abou-El-Haj argues that these works try hard to picture “a model characterized by a highly centralized authority dominating a virtually immobile society” which “never existed” in Ottoman history (Abou-El-Haj, 2005:33).

between the aspiration of Ottomans in terms of Westernization and their ‘Eastern’ origins or more detached evaluations which conceptualize dualistic thinking as an epistemological obstacle which limited bureaucrats’ and intellectuals’ horizon, I consider the East-West duality in Ottoman-Turkish modernization discourse as a product of the structuration of discourse in which the survival/identity double-bind functioned as a rule of formation. What I am doing here is not to introduce yet another duality since the two terms of the double-bind are products of different layers of discourse which do not function as a duality but function for producing dualities. This study will elaborate on the ‘emergence’ of Ottoman-Turkish modernization discourse in the Ottoman sociological literature at the beginning of the twentieth century and trace its implications for the postwar sociology of modernization in the republican period.

Resources and the Pathway

I will use certain tools of French tradition of epistemology to analyze the structuration of Ottoman-Turkish modernization discourse. The main purpose of using this tradition of thought is to overcome the reductionist tendency of the conventional sociological accounts on knowledge production. However, if it is necessary to coin a disciplinary identity, then I should say that my purpose is to conduct a research which belongs to the literature of sociology of knowledge, rather than discourse analysis. Foucauldian theory of discourse and the peculiar approach of Bachelard and Canguilhem to scientific objects and concepts will provide the opportunity to consider discursive field as a factor in structuring the conditions of production of knowledge along with other ‘social factors’. Here the key point is the assumption that these social factors can only be conceived with the mediation of existing discourse, which, however, does not change the fact that the field of discourse cannot comprise the entire reality and that historical contingencies have endless points of entry and power to change the entire fabric of discourse instantly. Contradiction between sociological and discursive analyses can be eliminated by acknowledging that discursive field is not ‘shaped’ by power, production or any other type of relationship which can be utilized for a ‘sociological’ analysis; instead,

discursive field determines the conditions within which these sociological phenomena interact with discourse. Following Purvis and Hunt, rather than a fascination with the slogan ‘everything is discursive’, I am focusing on “the much more interesting claim that all knowledge is located within discourse” (Purvis and Hunt, 1993:492). Laclau and Mouffe’s clarification might be useful to illustrate what I am trying to say:

The fact that every object is constituted as an object of discourse has nothing to do with whether there is a world external to thought, or with the realism/idealism opposition. An earthquake or the falling of a brick is an event that certainly exists, in the sense that it occurs here and now, independently of my will. But whether their specificity as objects is constructed in terms of ‘natural phenomena’ or ‘expressions of the wrath of God’, depends upon the structuring of a discursive field (Laclau and Mouffe, 1990:108).

My study requires certain assessments about the role historical developments had played in the structuration of Ottoman-Turkish modernization discourse. However, the intention of this study is not to pass any judgment on how modernization process had taken place in the Ottoman Empire or whether we can speak of any comprehensive modernization plan whatsoever in that period. The historical developments of the period are of interest for me only insofar as they functioned as reference points in the structuration of discourse. In that sense, I will keep a critical attitude towards the resources I will use from the literature of Ottoman and Turkish history. The intention of this critical attitude is to render available to reader the epistemic perimeters of the resources I will refer to, rather than questioning the validity of their arguments about specific events or a process.

This introductory chapter will be followed by a short history of the development of sociology in the West. This chapter focuses on the epistemological transformations which brought about the emergence of society as an object of knowledge. This process had taken place with the conceptual distinction between state and society

whose main impetus was to find alternative sources of legitimacy for the organization of everyday life on the bases of the pursuit of self-interest. The politico-institutional transformations which prepared the conditions for the establishment of nation-states went hand in hand with the emergence of this new unit of collectivity (i.e. society) whose very 'identity' found its reference in the idea of nationalism. The issue which will be addressed in this chapter will be important for my later assessments on the objectification of society in Ottoman-Turkish modernization discourse and how this object was employed in the idea of nationalism.

The initial phase of the structuration of Ottoman-Turkish modernization discourse on the bases of the survival/identity double-bind is discussed in the third chapter. The institutional reforms of the nineteenth century, which is generally regarded as the modernization period of the Ottoman Empire, will be discussed with reference to their impact on the structuration of discourse. The appearance of a relatively 'civil' sphere in the empire and the increasing visibility of intellectuals are regarded as significant developments for the appearance of the major themes of discussion which dominated the modernization-Westernization debates. As we will see, these developments went hand in hand with 'real' processes which oriented early twentieth century intellectuals to talk about a more consolidated 'nation' as a unit of collectivity. The last section elaborates the transformations in the epistemic terrain in terms of preparing the conditions of possibility for the emergence of a discourse on society which constructed its object of knowledge as an autonomous entity. The main intention of this section is to display the convergence of the process of the construction of society as an object and the development of the idea of nationalism by focusing on the process of discourse structuration and 'real' historical processes without falling into the pitfalls of the late Ottoman historiographies which evaluated the reforms of the period as the failed attempts for modernization or the preparatory steps of the establishment of Turkey as a nation-state.

The first steps for the utilization of sociological knowledge production by the turn of the century are elaborated in the fourth chapter. Here, I will explain how the major themes of the Western sociological discourse of the late nineteenth century had been

incorporated into the political struggle over the ‘scientific’ conceptualization of society both in the last years of the empire and the early republican period. The most well-known representatives of the struggle over the signification of the social in the sociological literature were Prince (*Prens*) Sabahattin and Ziya Gökalp. As we will see, the process of the structuration of the Ottoman-Turkish modernization discourse had almost washed away the alternative conceptualizations and brought Ziya Gökalp into the forefront as the chief figure of the early republican sociology and one of the main intellectual sources of inspiration of the official republican discourse whose main features will be discussed under the label of Kemalism.

The structuration of sociological discourse on modernization in the post-World War II period will be discussed in the fifth chapter with reference to two rival schools of sociology in Turkey which were the products of the political climate of the period. These schools, which offered two different pictures of Ottoman-Turkish modernization which are based on different formulations of the relationship between the anxieties of survival and identification, will be named as structure-oriented and culture-oriented sociologies. Linear-progressivist conception of change, the unidirectional relationship between economic development and modernization, and the conception of cultural sphere as passive, superstructural elements can be regarded as the defining features of the structure-oriented sociologies. Culture-oriented sociologies, on the other hand, tried to formulate an alternative means-ends relationship between economic development, scientific advancements and modernization and presented these processes as the necessary steps for restoring Turkish national culture. Although both schools had their own way of surpassing the double-bind of the sociology of modernization in Turkey, their uncritical employment of existing categories to ‘measure’ the level of development or ‘authenticate’ the cultural reference caused the reiteration of the old dualities and reproduced the double-bind they were trying to overcome. The structure-oriented school will be discussed with reference to Behice Boran and Mübeccel Kıray, while the names who will represent the culture-oriented school are Mümtaz Turhan and Erol Güngör. Apart from the considerable impact they had on their schools of thought, I believe that tracing the structuration of sociological discourse in a thirty-

year period can be achieved easier by focusing on the works of these scholars since there is a teacher-student relationship between both pairs.

CHAPTER II

2 THE RISE OF SOCIOLOGY IN THE WEST

Sociology as an academic discipline has a hardly more than a hundred years of history. The pre-disciplinary history of sociology, on the other hand, can be traced back to earlier periods. Even though there has never been consensus on the subject matter of sociology, a particular series of developments in the continental Europe had lead to the emergence of a particular conception of ‘society’ which ultimately called for a ‘science’ which will study this new object of knowledge. Polanyi identified this process as the ‘discovery of society’ which “was not subject to the laws of the state, but, on the contrary, subjected the state to its own laws” (Polanyi, 2001:116). In much resentment to the loss of the ancient Greek political consciousness, Arendt points to a similar development which brought about the conception of politics as merely a function of the social (Arendt, 1998:33). Emergence of this new concept in contradistinction to ‘state’ is a consequence of an alternative perspective which circumvents the question of the ‘nature of man’ which occupied the pre-nineteenth century political philosophy. In that sense, the ‘discovery of society’ or ‘the rise of the social’ marks a turning point in the ways of looking at human affairs. The second major dichotomy which appeared in this period was the one between the ‘individual’ and the ‘society’. The process of the maturation of the concept of society went hand in hand with the realization of the influence of social institutions on the individual and the futility of using a pre-established understanding of human nature as the starting point of a discussion on the pressing issues of the period.

The period when this transformation in the epistemic field had taken place is usually considered to be the end of the eighteenth century which can be regarded as both the peak point of the Enlightenment and the starting point of its downfall. Nisbet attributes the main role in the formation of sociology to the ‘two revolutions’ - namely the Industrial Revolution and the French Revolution- which demolished the

old order and engendered the need to understand the uncertainties of a new era which could not be comprehended with the epistemic repertoire of the Enlightenment, and points the influence of the leading critics of the Enlightenment like Edmund Burke, Hegel and Louis de Bonald on the pioneers of the so-called classical sociology (Nisbet, 1966: 21-44, 55). Contrary to the philosophers of the Enlightenment who replaced the ‘natural’ order with the institutional order of the traditional society which they regarded to be ‘irrational’, conservative philosophers embraced the latter, emphasized the priority of society over the individual and redefined society as an organic whole (ibid.: 12, Swingewood, 1991: 33-34).

In this chapter, the development of sociology in Western countries will be elaborated. The Western countries which will be studied are going to be France, Germany, Britain and the United States. The obvious reason of this choice is the fact that sociology was established and institutionalized primarily in these countries. While the fundamental epistemic transformation which brought about the idea of a science of society had taken place in Europe, the academic sociology as we know it today was established in the United States. In addition, although there are other countries where important step for the foundation of sociology had taken place, sociology in Turkey is almost entirely shaped by the currents of thought which originated in these four countries. Therefore, elaborating the process of the rise of sociology in these countries and specifying the development of their distinct national traditions will be beneficial for the forthcoming analysis in this study.

2.1 Social and Political Background of a Semantic Shift

Before the eighteenth century, the term ‘society’ had been used to refer to either the social circles with “courtly or sophisticated lifestyle” or “an organized group of people who gathered in connection with some common interest” (Heilbron, 1995: 86). Towards the end of the seventeenth century, apart from those earlier voluntaristic connotations of the term, a more abstract meaning which suggests the interdependence of human beings came to the fore. According to Baker, with this semantic shift the term undertook a new outlook which “oscillates between the twin

poles of freedom and necessity, between the voluntarism of the free contract, on the one hand, and the constraints of collective human existence on the other” (Baker, 1994:108). A similar shift can be observed in the use of the term ‘social’. Being used to signify ‘associated’ or ‘sociable’ on the one hand, and ‘civil’ on the other in the seventeenth century, the term ‘social’ started to be used “to define the relationship of man and society or the individual and society as a problem” in early nineteenth century (Williams, 1983:294). Montesquieu and Rousseau are the early representatives of the idea which grasped “the distinctiveness of the social and society as an organic whole” (Swingewood, 1998:23). Heilbron states that the term ‘social’ was firstly used as the adjective form of the term ‘society’ in French language by Rousseau (Heilbron, 1995: 88). However, it was Montesquieu who had a more direct influence on the development of sociology. His conceptualization of society “as a system around objective structures or elements” was adopted by the members of the Scottish Enlightenment who tried to develop a new conception of society which is different from the one in the contract theory (Swingewood, 1998: 23-24).

The first known printed use of the term ‘social science’ appeared in a pamphlet of abbé Sieyès in 1789. Considering that he preferred to use the term *la science de l’ordre social* in his later pamphlets instead of the initial term *la science sociale*, one might deduce the underlying intention of emphasizing the significance of the question of order. The term became popular among the members of the short-lived *Société de 1789* which was established by a group of reform-minded politicians and intellectuals to ensure the successful reconstruction of French Society after the Revolution (Wokler, 1998:44). Condorcet was one of the members of this group who contributed to the scientization of social theory with his advocacy for the development of statistics which was important for his idea of ‘social mathematics’. Some of the other members were the future idéologues like Cabanis and Destutt de Tracy whose orientation was towards life sciences rather than mathematics (Heilbron, 1995: 169, 173). However, romantics and conservatives like Burke, Hegel, Bonald and Maistre had been more influential in shaping the conceptual repertoire of the future discipline of sociology. As a consequence of their emphasis

on the “irrational factors in human conduct”, the concepts of ‘group’, ‘community’ and ‘nation’ gained currency at the expense of the cosmopolitanism of the Enlightenment (Zeitlin, 1968:36). The material processes which prepared this change in the ideational level can be summed up under two interrelated developments which contributed to each other: the centralization of power and the rise of the commercial society.

2.1.1 Centralization of Power and the Crystallization of Society

The period from the fifteenth century onwards had witnessed the centralization of state power in Europe which corresponds to or paves the way for the gradual increase in the money sector. According to Elias “as long as barter relationships predominated in society, the formation of a tightly centralized bureaucracy and a stable apparatus of government working primarily with peaceful means and directed constantly from the center, was scarcely possible” (Elias, 2000:205). On the other hand, in his evaluation of the so-called Financial Revolution and the creation of the “monied interest” towards the end of the seventeenth century, Pocock states that the stabilization of authority was the utmost priority for these processes to take place (Pocock, 1985:107-108). In short, these two major developments can be regarded as the two sides of the same token.

The centralization of power had brought the discussions on the formation and the legitimacy of the state into forefront. Although having important differences in their explanations and definitions, natural law theorists like Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau argued for a transition from a non- or pre-political to a political society with a contract. There was no agreement among contract theorists about whether the pre-political state of nature had a social character. However, they agreed on building their conceptual models on the basis of a dichotomy between the state of nature and the civil society. Here, it should be noted that the concept of ‘civil society’ was synonymous to ‘political society’ before the late eighteenth century. Contract theorists were primarily occupied with “civic or political living, and therefore with the establishment of government” (Berry, 2003:244). The civil character of society was the precondition of the establishment of a stable political order. Therefore,

conceptualization of society in contradistinction to the state was not an issue of discussion for the natural law tradition. The road to this dichotomous view was going to be opened by the Scottish moral philosophers who broke with the identification of civil society and political society in the eighteenth century (Strydom, 2000: 184).

The major step through that door was taken by Hegel who used the concept of civil society synonymous to the pre-political society and put forward a definition of state whose appearance does not mean the abolishment of this pre-political stage –an argument which mirrors Scottish moralist Adam Ferguson’s argument that “since society is natural, the state of nature is society itself” (Weinstein, 2009:95). In this formulation Hegel was influenced by the English economists “for whom”, Bobbio says, “economic relations constitute the fibre of pre-state society and where the distinction between pre-state and state is shown increasingly as a distinction between the sphere of economic relations and that of political institutions” (Bobbio, 1979:27). Elsewhere Bobbio elaborates how the already ambiguous definition of the state of nature in the natural law theory had prepared the conditions for the separation of the economic from the political sphere which is the mainstay of the bourgeoisie society. According to this, the emphasis on the individual in the natural law theory as the constitutive element of the state of nature and the depiction of this state as the ‘imaginary’ place where the ideals of liberty and equality are actualized provided the liberal tradition with the means for an idealized description of the mercantile society (Bobbio, 1993:11-12). Scottish thinkers of the eighteenth century played the leading role in the development of this liberal conception of society.

In order to understand this change in the epistemic field, it is necessary to mention the transformation of the conception of ‘law’. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the term ‘law’ was still used both in descriptive and prescriptive meanings. Although searching for natural laws (read ‘laws of nature’), principles and regularities was common among the secular thinkers of the period, the distinction between natural law which refers to the “normative rules based upon a priori reasoning as to the nature of man or society” and the natural science which refers to “empirically testable regularities” was not clear (Heilbron, 1995:98). Thinkers had

benefited from the ambiguity arising from defining natural law both as a divine establishment which was determined when the nature was first created and, at the same time, as the orders of a constantly intervening God (Maclean, 2008:43). The arguments about finding ‘the Newton of the moral world’ were among common themes of discussion in which Montesquieu was one of the candidates for this honor (Larrère, 2008: 249-250). This indicates the difficulties in this period in finding an epistemic ground upon which, theories and concepts can be established. Although there were other names like Hume, Smith and Rousseau who were regarded as the original discoverers of the laws of the moral world, the key contribution for breaking with the prescriptive conception of law in political theory had come from Montesquieu who “avoided ... speculative abstractions and instead investigated the origins and development of civil law and social institutions” (Dupré; 2004:154). Montesquieu’s rejection of the contract theory on the bases of the significance he attributed to long-lasting factors like history and geography was adopted by Scottish thinkers who, contrary to contract theorists, claimed that humans were social before they were rational which “means that it is wrong to explain human social living as the product of reason, that is, of a process of calculation” (Berry, 2003:243).

2.1.2 Commercial Society and the Question of Order

The separation of the establishment of the government from the autonomously functioning society in the liberal tradition brought about the question of order. As a branch of humanities which was dealing with the questions about human conduct, moral philosophy of the eighteenth century was equipped with the secular means to deal with this question. Contrary to its modern connotations, moral philosophy of this period “was much broader, embracing not only the whole of what we today classify as ‘philosophy’ but most of the subjects now included in a modern university’s divisions of social sciences and humanities” (Gordon, 1991:113). Scottish thinkers answered the question of order by combining moral with political philosophy. With a broader definition of utility and interest and a greater emphasis on the significance of interaction, convention, coordination and iteration between individuals for the maintenance of order, Hume developed an alternative conception

of political order which does not require Hobbes's 'all-powerful sovereign' (Hardin, 2007: 63, 107, 214). Smith followed this path and developed a broader conception of market which functions like the pre-modern institutions of social order: "Monetary exchange gradually had transformed itself from being a mere tool of convenient give-and-take into a complex symbolic system embodying forms of mutual recognition" (Kalyvas and Katznelson, 2008:41). His position represents the culmination of the liberal idea that the pursuit of self interest is not a threat for the equilibrium of society.

French thinkers had reached at a similar reasoning during this period via a different path. With the rise of absolutism during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, political and legal theory had gradually become a restricted field for independent study and was replaced by moral philosophy which extensively focused on practical theories of action (Heilbron, 1995: 68-69; Heilbron, 1998: 85-86). These theories weakened the idea that there is an anarchy of passions behind human behavior and this anarchy should be suppressed by religious doctrines or political order: "In defiance of church doctrines and the tradition of political theory (Machiavelli, Hobbes), a *société* had come into existence where people who solely followed their own interests and preferences nonetheless managed to live together in an orderly fashion" (Heilbron, 1995: 72). In the case of Scotland, the development of the conception of society which is freed from the state (i.e. liberal conception of society) can be regarded as a consequence of the solution of the economic and political problems towards the end of seventeenth century with the union with England at the beginning of the eighteenth century (Emerson, 2003:11-12). According to Oz-Salzberger, after forgoing their sovereignty voluntarily in a world of centralization of the state power, Scottish political discourse felt obliged to find new 'organizing concepts' other than the then widespread concepts like 'nation', 'monarchy' and 'republicanism' (Oz-Salzberger, 2003: 157-158). Heilbron argues that this new interest among Scottish thinkers was shared by their French counterparts who were more or less forced to study on non-political aspects of social life: "For very different reasons there was a great deal of interest in each of these two countries in non-

political phenomena, and there was a marked shift from politico-legal to economic and social theory” (Heilbron, 1995:106).

However, this epistemic shift did not break from the residues of the past moral order. Pocock states that the origins of the commercial ideology were shaped by the controversy on ‘virtue’ and ‘corruption’ between ‘landed’ and ‘monied interest’. This controversy was reflected by the contrasting meanings of the terms ‘patriot’ and ‘man of commerce’, ‘virtue’ and ‘politeness’ or ‘refinement’ (Pocock, 1985: 109, 114). The traces of this controversy can be observed in the writings of the harbinger of liberalism, Adam Smith, and the theorist of civil society, Adam Ferguson. In their description of Smith’s liberalism as a ‘displaced republicanism’, Kalyvas and Katznelson argues that the dialectic between self and other which is reflected in Smith’s concepts of ‘mutual recognition’ and ‘sympathy’ is utilized by Smith for transposing the mechanisms for binding society together, which were present in the ethical foundation of republicanism, into “a new set of institutional arrangements” which he formulated in his broad conceptualization of market (Kalyvas and Katznelson, 2008:30, 50). Adam Ferguson shared Smith’s concerns about the ethical foundations of the new commercial society. Along with John Millar, Ferguson was an early representative of the theory of social change whose mechanism is the conflict of interest. However, although his arguments about change is shaped by concepts like ‘spontaneous order’ and ‘progress’, Ferguson did not refrain from expressing his disapproval of radical change and the corrosive impacts of progress on civic virtue (Hill, 2009: 108-109)¹².

Although such anxieties were expressed in the eighteenth century, the social theory of this century retained the optimism of the Enlightenment for progress and rationalization. This optimism was going to disappear towards the end of the century. The growing centralization of the political power brought about the nation-states which gradually absorbed the functions of the intermediate groups, “thereby equalizing all citizens in principle yet isolating them in practice” (Dupré, 2004:158).

¹² A similar uneasiness appears in France in the debate between the ‘republicanism of the moderns’ and the ‘republicanism of the ancients’ and the “international debate over the nature of republicanism and the feasibility of a republic in modern condition, which began in 1770s” (Baker 2001, 38).

The process of the secularization of the discourse on politics and society throughout this period is a reflection of the concordant processes of the centralization of political power and the development of commercial society –a process at the end of which, the intermediary bodies (religion, family and guilds) which had been maintaining the social order gradually lost their power. The domination of the social sphere by the state reached at its culmination in French Jacobinism. Wokler argues that contrary to the case of England where the state preferred to stay indifferent to civil disorder arising from religious dissent and avoided the “imposition of a uniformitarian faith”, France followed a different path. As a result, Wokler argues, although the English Enlightenment undertook a political form by the eighteenth century, French Enlightenment remained radical for it was “disenfranchised from the prevalent institutions of both the state and the church” (Wokler, 2000:165). The key philosophe of the French Revolution, Rousseau, argued that the existence of the state is the precondition of the liberty of the individuals and that factions or partial associations obstructs general will in terms of expressing itself properly. The Jacobin hostility to intermediate groups triggered romantic and conservative reactions whose arguments directly or indirectly shaped the ‘science of society’ in the nineteenth century.

2.1.3 Putting the Name of it

The writings of conservative thinkers influenced the ideas of Saint-Simon and his assistant Comte who are usually regarded as the most influential names in the foundation of sociology as a discipline although it was the latter who coined the term. According to Wokler the post-Revolutionary science of society reached at a new stage in Saint-Simon “who put a case for a positive science of human nature and society which had as its aim the synthesis of the anatomy of Vicq-d’Azyr, the physiology of Bichat, the psychology of Cabanis and the philosophical history of Condorcet” (Wokler, 1998:47). Saint-Simon preferred to engage in this task within the boundaries of an existing science, namely physiology. The relationship between

his ideas and that of Comte's has been an issue of discussion.¹³ However, it is safe to say that it was August Comte who systematized these ideas and presented them in a conceptual scheme.

Comte introduced and elaborated this new 'science' in the last three volumes of his six volume work, *The Course in Positive Philosophy* which he wrote between 1830 and 1842 and in *A General View of Positivism* (1848). The purpose of his work was "to develop a sociological theory of thought and science"; to determine the relationship between physics, biology, and sociology; and "to establish ... the relative autonomy of sociology from physics and biology" (Elias, 1978:36). Towards the end of his life Comte developed his idea of religion of humanity which he elaborated in *System of Positive Polity* (1851-54). Although this work is usually neglected by most scholars for it is regarded as a departure from his original positivist sociology, it was this study in which Comte developed his approach to the central sociological issues like family, community and religion (Nisbet, 1943:162n). Comte used the term 'positive' in a polemical fashion against the 'negative' philosophy of the Enlightenment and the French Revolution (Zeitlin, 1968:70)¹⁴ and developed his sociology with the intention of reinstating into social thought the intermediate groups (Nisbet, 1943:161) which were dissolved in the state-individual dichotomy of the liberal conception of society. Pointing out the difficulty of distinguishing between his positive approach and the conservative approach to human relations, Nisbet argues that "by his veneration of science, Comte's work was the means of translating the conservative principles into a perspective more acceptable to later generations of social scientists" (Nisbet, 1952:173). Comte's prominent follower Emile Littré's arguments about the role of Comte's positive philosophy and sociology in the moderation of the republican ideology in the post-revolutionary France coincides with Nisbet's view. Although rejecting Comte's later

¹³ While some scholars believe that it was Saint-Simon who developed the major ideas which were going to be regarded as Comte's original contributions –most notably, positivism and a "new religion"- and Comte "ungraciously plagiarized" these ideas (e.g. Zeitlin, 1968:57, 58), some others compare his loose ideas with the systematic thinking of the well-educated Comte and argues that Saint-Simon would be a failed thinker unless he studied with Comte and even his earlier assistant Augustin Thierry (Collins and Makowsky, 1993:25; Heilbron, 1995:187).

¹⁴ The notion of 'positive' has two connotations for Comte: one the one hand, it refers to "knowledge certified by science", and on the other "it was the opposite of the "negative", that is, of the "critical" and "destructive" ideas of the French Revolution and the *philosophes*" (Gouldner, 1971:113-114).

ideas, Littré argued that Comte's sociology introduced a conception of 'sociologically impossible' which "drew limit to Utopian and arbitrary rationalist conceptions" (Eros, 1955:256).

Comte's and others' reference to conservative notions to understand society was surely not out of bigotry or naïve nostalgia:

The American and French revolutions strongly suggested to study what held human beings together, how they would organize their lives - individually, in "associations" or "social movements", and in the polity and the "nation" - and what kinds of regularities and orders could be expected, if people were permitted to do so on their own, without imposed restrictions (Wagner, 1998:244).

Sociology came to the scene as a candidate for answering these questions. However, it had to fight to gain disciplinary legitimacy among other social sciences during the nineteenth century. Elaborating on the diverse sources of social scientific knowledge in the literature on poverty first in England and later in Germany in the nineteenth century, Nowotny states that although this literature can be located within political economy, it also refers to diverse sources like political pamphlets, statistics and even medicine and hygiene. According to Nowotny, the reason of the unstructured, semi-literal, on the one hand, and semi-statistical form on the other, of social scientific knowledge of the period is not only the lack of institutionalized academic boundaries:

Rather, it was the specific state in which societal arrangements found themselves in a phase of profound uncertainty, when old guaranteeing concepts of orders and institutional arrangements had begun to crumble, making way for something which initially did not even have a name (Nowotny, 1991: 30).

To gain the upper hand in bringing clarity to this uncertainty, sociology had to compete firstly with literature which claimed its superiority in understanding society over the new science of society –a competition which, according to Lepenies, forced sociology to imitate natural sciences for academic reputation (Lepenies, 1992:7). On the other hand, already in the eighteenth century, constructing a social science (then, moral philosophy) with the “dispassionate and disinterested manner” of the natural scientists had become a source of anxiety (ibid.:8).¹⁵

2.2 Institutionalization of Sociology and National Traditions:

Some of the warnings of Wagner and Wittrock about the institutionalization of social sciences can be relevant starting point for understanding the distinct courses of development of sociology in particular national cases. According to this, (1) institutionalization of sociology does not necessarily mean ‘autonomization’; (2) it does not have to take place in ‘academic’ forms; and (3) institutionalization does not necessarily entail ‘stability’ (Wagner and Wittrock, 1991: 3-6).¹⁶ To these ones, two more points can be added. Firstly, (4) although the relationship between the national intellectual communities had great influence on the development and institutionalization of distinct types of sociological schools, the nationalist sentiments played a diverse role in the transfer of knowledge.¹⁷ Secondly, (5) the level of

¹⁵ Lepenies tries to describe the in-between position of sociology vis-à-vis natural sciences and literature by defining it as a ‘third culture’ whose destiny was in the hands of the struggle between the intellectual traditions of the Enlightenment and the counter-Enlightenment (Lepenies, 1992:7).

¹⁶ As we will see in the following chapters, history of sociology in Turkey confirms these arguments. Firstly, although sociology was institutionalized in Turkey quite early, its detachment from immediate political concerns took quite some time. In addition, non-academic spheres have always been quite influential in the popularization of sociology in Turkey. Lastly, history of sociology went through certain fluctuations like the diminishing significance of sociology in 1920s after its high popularity among intelligentsia in the first two decades of the century and the limited number of notable works in 1950s following the liquidation of some sociologists at Ankara University for involving in communist activities in 1948.

¹⁷ While sociology was regarded by some Germans as an “un-German” discipline for its “arrogant claim to knowledge and desire to effect change”, opponents of Durkheim from literary circles were crying for rescuing the new French university from becoming Germanized in the hands of Durkheim and his followers (Lepenies, 1992: 235 and 72, respectively).

institutionalization is not always and indicator of the rate of impact on other national intellectual communities.¹⁸

Another issue which should be specified here is the ‘types’ of sociological knowledge which are mentioned in this investigation. The ‘knowledge utilization’ discussions of the 1960s and 1970s focused on the disciplines like sociology and political science rather than “the successful discipline of economics” (Wagner, et. al, 1991: 5). These discussions brought about different classifications about the ‘uses of sociology’. For the purpose of this study, it is sufficient to distinguish between (1) the ‘engineering model’ which values the policy development capacity of sociology and use it to this end; (2) the ‘enlightenment model’ for which the fundamental role of sociological knowledge production is to develop a sociological understanding of the world and indirectly influence public opinion and policy makers; and (3) the ‘advocacy model’ which attributes an active role to the sociologist in shaping policy-making (see Abrams, 1985:183-185; Hirschon Weis, 1991:309-316 and Wittrock 1991:336-341). In each country the level of influence of different models varies greatly in the development of sociology and these differences also shaped the characteristic patterns of institutionalization.

In the case of the development of sociology in France, the process was mainly shaped outside of universities. The rise of absolutism in France brought about the need of new cultural centers which are independent from universities whose close ties with the church rendered them useless for the new intellectual regime. The establishment of academies as rivals to universities liberated intellectuals from the church doctrine but increased their dependence on the state at the same time (Heilbron, 1991:76-77). These institutions served for the utilization of science for government reforms towards the end of the eighteenth century. The insistence of

¹⁸ The obvious example is the great influence of the nineteenth century German intellectual life on the development of sociology even though sociology had not been institutionalized in Germany until the twentieth century. Durkheim went to Germany as a part of a program of scholarships for future French scholars to benefit from the modern German research universities which were the best places back then in providing the researchers with the best research facilities and opportunities, and he was heavily influenced by the organic conception of society the German romantic political economists were trying to develop for a positive science of ethics (Jones, 1994:41, 42). In addition, the famous Chicago School of sociology developed their theories largely on the bases of the assumptions of German scholars -most notably, Tönnies and Simmel- on modern societies.

Condorcet, who was a member of the Académie des Sciences (established in 1666), for the mathematization of social science with the use of statistics resulted in the establishment of a public bureau of statistics in 1801. Although this institution did not live long, similar institutions were established in the following years (Heilbron, 1995: 169-172). A more direct impact for the institutionalization of sociology in France was the establishment of the Institut de France in 1795 in which social sciences were firstly recognized institutionally by setting up of a separate class (ibid. 111). Associations and journals were also important for the institutionalization of sociology. Different positivist groups were active in these terms. After Comte's death his followers were divided into two groups: The first group embraced Comte's later additions to his positivist philosophy. This group gathered around the Société positiviste which was established by Comte in 1848 and was lead by Pierre Lafitte after Comte's death. This group supported the Third Republic which was established in 1870 with their journal *Revue occidentale* (1878-1914) (ibid. 255). The second group, which rejected the ideas of the later Comte, was lead by Emile Littré who founded the first 'sociological' society, Société de sociologie in 1872. Sociology became a subject in universities in France by 1870s "under the shelter of philosophy and the Faculté des lettres" –a relationship which explains the proximity of sociology to philosophy and literature (Wagner, 2004: 40). The absence of any names from positivist circles in the Faculty of Letters shows that these groups did not play any role in the institutionalization of sociology in universities (Heilbron, 1995:257). Durkheim is surely the key name in the academization of sociology. He started to give social science courses by the end of 1880s and became the first professor with a sociology chair in 1913.

Sociology had a quite more difficult path towards institutionalization in Germany. In the nineteenth century Germany, there was a widespread aversion against the word 'sociology' whose association with positivism had disqualified this new discipline in this country where scholarship was shaped by humanistic-philosophical tradition (Wagner, 1991: 221-222). The rigid distinction between natural and cultural sciences made it difficult for sociology to ascend among the strongly rooted history and

philosophy. Late unification of the country constituted the politico-historical side of the enmity against sociology.

A strong emphasis on the cultural unity and continuity of nations characterized almost all strands of German thought, and this was often combined with hostility towards any purely practical intervention in the material world on the basis of technical, empirical knowledge (Scott, 2006:18-19).

Therefore, the state-society distinction, which prepared the epistemic conditions of the development of sociology, triggered resistance in Germany towards this new branch of science (Lepenies, 1992:237)¹⁹. The studies on society were conducted in nineteenth century Germany without using the label sociology and they mostly tried to incorporate it into “state sciences” (Wagner, 1991: 222). The first institutionalization efforts had resulted in the establishment of the Association for Social Policy in 1872 to serve the newly-founded German nation-state (ibid.). Formed by “historically and empirically minded economists”, the Association conducted policy-oriented empirical researches though their products “left little lasting imprint on German scholarly life” (Wittrock, et. al, 1991: 34). The term sociology was reluctantly adopted by the beginning of the new century. Although being one of the main figures of sociology, Weber’s distance to the discipline reflects the problematic position of sociology in Germany. As the founding member of the German Society for Sociology which was established in 1909, he preferred the term ‘cultural sciences’ instead of ‘sociology’ and meant ‘political economy’ when he spoke of “our profession” (Wagner, 2004: 40-41, Lepenies, 1992:247). The first chair of sociology was established in Germany in 1919 at the University of Munich, the first member of which was, again, Weber who accepted this position shortly before his death (Wagner, 1991: 223).

¹⁹ Tönnies’ conditional acknowledgement of this distinction is an important indicator of this resistance: “In recent times there has been talk, in academic discussion, of ‘Society’ of a country as opposed to ‘the state’; and we shall make use of this conception here, though its meaning only becomes fully apparent in terms of a more deep-seated contrast with ‘Community’ of the common people” (Tönnies, [1887] 2001:19).

Institutionalization of sociology in England had taken place even slower than Germany. Drawing upon Weber's thesis on protestant ethic, Merton emphasizes a polarization in English intellectual life between Puritan academies and universities, which might have similarities with the division between secular academies and traditional universities in France. According to Merton, academies became the centers of scientific research whose concordance with 'the utilitarian principle' of the Puritan ethos rendered these institutions more attractive for scholars than universities who were still providing a classical education (Merton, 1970:119). However, the lively intellectual life in these academies did not bring about a strong sociological tradition to England. Among the industrialized countries whose social, political, and economic conditions provided the preliminary resources of the classical sociology, England is the one which probably was the least developed country in terms of disciplinary sociology. Although one of the founding themes of sociology -the problem of order- was elaborated by Hobbes and Locke, these thinkers were claimed by political theory and modern British sociology had started by liberal reformers Mill and Spencer whose standpoints were largely discredited by the modern sociology (Delanty, 2007:4609). The accordance between the more empirically-oriented scholarship of anthropology and political economy and the imperial interest of England in studying foreign geographies instead of domestic affairs secured the academic hegemony of these two disciplines during the formative years of sociology and even throughout the first half of the twentieth century (Encyclopedia of Sociology, Vol. 1, 2000:225): "Not for nothing is there a Royal Anthropological Institute but a British Sociological Association" (Bulmer, 1985:13).

On the other hand, Lepenies argues that the late institutionalization of sociology in Britain was due to the readiness of the administration to benefit from sociological knowledge. According to Lepenies, this readiness diminished the need for maintaining an institutional security for sociology and for this very reason, unlike the case in France or Germany, the producers of sociological knowledge did not meet with extensive resistance from literary circles since the latter did not regard sociology as a threat for their intellectual hegemony (Lepenies, 1992:154). Just like the case in Germany where the statistical data collection did not merge with a

sociological perspective in nineteenth century, British sociology could not find a place to grow in the long social survey tradition which was mostly flourished from within the political economy. The gap between statisticians and sociologists also slowed down the acknowledgement of sociology in Britain. The first efforts to bring together statistics and survey work took place in the interwar period (Bulmer, 1985:9). The slow process of ‘scientization’ and ‘academization’ of sociology opened the space for the development of amateur sociological movements like the one which was lead by Patrick Geddes who established the Sociological Society of London in 1903 with Victor Branford and published *The Sociological Review* which was the only sociological journal in Britain until 1950 (ibid. 10-11). The dominance of Oxford and Cambridge was the academic factor of the late recognition of sociology: “How could sociologists come into existence in Britain when in Oxford and Cambridge sociologists were looked upon as pariahs, as no better than Americans or Germans?” (Shils, 1985:168). Before 1950, sociology was represented academically in London School of Economics where a department was opened in 1903 and the social science department at Liverpool which was opened in 1909 (Bulmer, 1985:5; Halsey, 2004:48). As a result of this long neglect and the lack of academic interest, there is almost a century of gap between the establishment of The National Association for the Promotion of Social Science (1857) and the British Sociological Association (1951).

Although the towering figures of the discipline were from Europe, sociology was firmly institutionalized in journals, associations and university departments in the United States earlier than most European countries and retained its strong academic position and scientific status for a long time contrary to countries like France where sociology went through some sort of recession after its ‘classical’ period. The first sociology department was opened in Chicago University in 1892, followed by Columbia in 1893, “some twenty years before Durkheim succeeded in transforming a chair of education into a chair of sociology in Paris (Calhoun, 2007: 1). In addition, the *American Journal of Sociology*, which was the only professional journal of sociology until 1921, was founded in 1894. The institutionalization of sociology in the U.S. had taken place during the so-called ‘Gilded Age’ of the post-Civil War

period when the ideological conviction about the ‘exceptional’ situation of the U.S. which was going to lead Americans to “realize the liberal promise of modernity” was shaken by the social and political challenges of the rapid industrialization, immigration and urbanization by mid-1860s (Ross, 1991:48, 53; Manicas, 1991:46). During the 1870-1900 period, early American sociology accompanied with little criticism the “transition from laissez-faire to corporate capitalism” (Smith, 1970:68) and this process called for a new higher learning system which allows the use of science for progress. The university reforms in this period which was under the heavy influence of German research universities provided a fertile ground for the development of sociology along with other social and natural sciences. Modern university model taken from Germany brought about the secularization, specialization and professionalization of higher learning (Mills, 1966:41). The impact of German intellectual life was not only limited to the transfer of modern university system. Apart from the German scholars who taught in the US, a lot of American scholars acquired their PhD degrees from German universities (ibid.:71). The academic shelter for sociology was secured by economics departments which included sociology into their curriculums (Young, 2009:92). American Sociological Society (1905 –American Sociological Association after 1959) was established from within the American Economic Association.²⁰

Initiatives of the social reformists had a further impact on the development of sociology. The American Social Science Association (1865), which was modeled after the British National Association for the Promotion of Social Science, was a product of the efforts of non-academic people of various occupations (ministers, lawyers, educators, etc.) to develop ‘scientific’ understanding of social problems. Unlike its British antecedent, ASSA had less political influence and tried to produce useful knowledge for not only governmental initiatives, but also non-governmental action of private philanthropists (Calhoun, 2007:11-12). Jane Addams’s Hull House which was the most important example of the ‘settlement house movement’ of the

²⁰ The reason of this separation was the rise of ‘marginalism’ in economics. Although the group of economists who stood away from marginalism and who are known today as ‘institutional economists’ were derisively called as ‘sociologists’ (Manicas, 1991:62), two associations stood close till the World War II by coordinating their annual meetings and holding joint presidential addresses (Young, 2009:92).

late nineteenth century was established in Chicago and contributed to the development of a survey tradition in this city. Philanthropic projects which were fed by Christian sentiments in Hull House was an early example of social work. Many sociologists from Chicago University actively participated in Hull House projects (ibid.: 16-17).

The development and institutionalization of sociology went through ups and downs from the first time the term is used towards the end of the eighteenth century to the beginning of the twentieth century and this process has been written over and over again with different interpretations. Although contemporary text book histories of sociology start from the studies of the 'big three' -Marx, Durkheim, Weber-, only Durkheim regarded himself as a sociologist. The first accounts on the history of sociology which were written by the American contemporaries of Durkheim and Weber did not see these two names as giants and often did not include Marx to the history of sociology (Connell, 1997:1513). The heritage of these American sociologists was claimed by or repudiated for being obsolete among the members of, firstly, the Chicago, and secondly, the Columbia schools of sociology (Calhoun, 2007:9n). In addition, what is generally regarded as the 'classical' period of sociology (roughly between the last three decades of the nineteenth century and the World War I), had little influence on the further institutionalization and professionalization of sociology. Distinguishing between the 'classical' and the 'modern' sociology, Wagner argues that neither a common understanding on the definition of sociology, nor a sound institutional base for the discipline in European universities could be reached at in the classical period of sociology. According to Wagner, the reason of this failure is that while classical sociology had to deal primarily with classical liberalism, modern sociology circumvented it and constructed itself on a new understanding of the relation between the individual and the society which is compatible with the interventionist welfare state (Wagner, 1991:219-220).

The modern sociology which Wagner refers is a kind of sociology which has greater involvement in policy-making –an orientation which secured the institutional ground

and scientific status of sociology. American sociology is the most successful example in this sense. It would be safe to say that the discipline was almost entirely shaped by American sociology from 1920s until 1980s. It was, first, the Chicago School of urban sociology in the interwar period and then the Parsonian structural-functionalism which increased the ‘scientific’ status of sociology. In the first chapter of the famous book on ‘policy sciences’ he edited with Daniel Lerner, Harold Lasswell emphasizes the impact of the positive contributions of certain fields of social sciences like economics, psychology and statistics to the execution of the world War I on the support of the government for the institutionalization and funding of social sciences in US. Defining policy sciences as a new endeavor which “cuts across the existing specializations”, Lasswell tries to maintain the ‘legitimacy’ of this new field by arguing that the term ‘policy’ is free from the negative connotations of the term ‘politics’ (Lasswell, 1959 [1951]:3-4). The government support which started by 1920s provided the social scientists with the opportunity of “first-hand experience in the interaction between research and policy making” by taking part in presidential research committees and other governmental bodies (Wittrock, et. al, 1991:39). This process was escalated in the postwar period during which sociologists and other social scientists who were regarded as ‘experts’ of dealing with the social question had become public figures. As can be seen in the American case, institutionalization of sociology in the West has been very much related to its policy orientation and the utilization of knowledge it produced by the welfare state.

The interest of Ottoman intellectuals in sociology was mostly triggered by their acquaintance with French thought. Although arguments about sociology were expressed in the late nineteenth century, the utilization of sociology as a ‘scientific’ tool for formulating modernization reforms took place by the turn of the century. Unlike the importance of policy-oriented knowledge production for the institutionalization of sociology in the West, sociology became influential in the Ottoman Empire owing to its widespread use in the political debates of the period. In that sense, Çelebi is right when she defines the work of the chief intellectual figure of the period, Ziya Gökalp, as “polity-centered” sociology (Çelebi, 2002:256). As will be discussed in the following chapters, sociology largely retained this quality in

Turkey owing to the specific structuration of Ottoman-Turkish modernization discourse.

CHAPTER III

3 STRUCTURATION OF OTTOMAN-TURKISH MODERNIZATION DISCOURSE

Modernization can be regarded as the main reference point in the discussions on social, political and economic issues of Turkey. The deeply intertwined relationship between the demise of the Ottoman Empire and the establishment of Turkey as a nation-state provides the historical background of the structuration of the modernization discourse in a way which reconstructs the reform movements which took place in the empire as the steps which brought about the inevitable downfall of the empire and the establishment of Turkey. One might easily suggest that reform movements in the empire are pictured as failed attempts of modernization without taking into consideration the multi-faceted conflicts which lie beneath them in order to provide the epistemic justification of the steps which were taken in the republican period. However, it would be more appropriate to consider the Ottoman modernization discourse as the product of a process of structuration during which the reception of particular events and wider historical developments had contributed to the structuration of discourse in the way it did and not in another way.

The decline in the military power of the Ottoman Empire against European powers is widely considered as a traumatic experience which was exacerbated with the encounter of Ottoman travelers with the prosperity of the West which was brought about by economic development and technical advancements. There are forty known reports about the developments in Europe which were presented to the sublime porte (*Bab-ı Ali*) between 1720 and 1838 (Mardin, 2006a:161). Among these reports, one of the most important ones is the famous Paris notes of the Ottoman Ambassador to Paris Yirmisekiz Mehmet Çelebi which is usually regarded as an early example of a new way of looking at the West and the changing self-perception of the Ottoman

decision-takers²¹. This traumatic experience is described almost as the “first affirmations” of the scientific mind which cannot be destroyed with any “new experience and criticism” (Bachelard, 2002:50). The reorganization of the military, on the other hand, is defined as the first response of the Ottoman Empire to a long list of reforms which are regarded as the symptoms of the anxiety of survival²². Structuration of Ottoman-Turkish modernization with reference to this anxiety brought about another crisis which will be defined here as the anxiety of identification which had emerged due to the need for determining the place of Ottoman Empire in the changing order of things. According to Şirin, one of the indicators of the beginning of a new era in Ottoman’s relationship to Europeans is the assignment of experienced statesmen as a ambassadors. In previous periods, lower ranked officers were preferred as ambassadors to Europe as an expression of pride. Şirin argues that this new approach was a consequence of the military defeats of Ottomans against European powers which lead to the Treaty of Karlowitz (Şirin, 2006:156). A similar change is observed by Neumann in the sixth volume of Ahmet Cevdet’s monumental *Tarih-i Cevdet* which is composed of the history of Europe from antiquity to the French Revolution. According to Neumann, this was a turning point in the Ottoman historiography for it was the first time Ottomans regarded themselves as a part of world history (Neumann, 2000:31-32).

Although the history of late Ottoman Empire appears to be shaped by the struggle for survival in a changing world, on the one hand, and finding a place for herself, on the other, this appearance is a simplification of a complex process. However, this picture

²¹ Tanpınar compares the distanced attitude of Evliya Çelebi in his Vienna notes in his 1665 trip to the open admiration of Çelebi Mehmet in his 1721 Paris notes and argues, in a speculative fashion, that the reason of this difference is that the latter visited Europe after the treaties of Karlowitz and Passarowitz which damaged Ottoman “national consciousness” (Tanpınar, 1985:43-44).

²² According to Çetinsaya, until 1856 Ottomans had held the belief that the empire could reach at the European level of development in a short time (Çetinsaya, 2004:58). In line with this optimism, Ottomans did not refrain from making costly industrial investments especially in the field of military. On the other hand, the idea that the strength of a state cannot be measured by the wideness of her territories was initially expressed in this period (Mardin, 2006a: 203). This view runs counter to the traditional Ottoman expansionism which has its roots in the Islamic belief in Jihad and signals a shift towards new priorities for decision-makers. By 1860s the books and newspapers were going to spread the idea of hard work, productivity and the elimination of extravagancy which were regarded as the secrets of the development of Western world (Mardin, 1994:76). With these new arguments, the criteria of being a strong state gradually changed and started to refer more to modern means of power.

is not a construction of the knowledge producers of later periods; it is the end result, from our vantage point at present, of a cumulative discursive structuration process. This process located the reforms for establishing the institutional infrastructure for military and economic power under the category of modernization or Westernization and these efforts functioned as the indicators of an anxiety of survival. On the other hand, transformations in the political and institutional structure opened new surfaces of friction which produced a political discourse which formed its counter-arguments with reference to the detachment of decision-takers from existing values and norms and signaled to an anxiety of identity.

This style of debate can be traced back to the advice-for-kings (*nasihatname*) literature which conducts political criticism by comparing the existing state of affairs with a golden era (Neumann, 2000:87)²³. In that sense, the relationship between survival and identity in the discourse on state affairs has a long history in which this relationship had been defined with the assumption that the strength of the Ottoman Empire heavily relies on the abundance of decision-takers to traditional methods of governing and the protection of existing institutions - an idea which is defined by Genç as 'traditionalism' (Genç, 2005:48-49). In other words, the organization of state affairs and the protection of the qualities which were believed to be the defining features of Ottomans have common reference points²⁴. With changing power balances within and between European powers which brought about new conditions of survival and sources of identity, this assumed unity or cyclical relationship between survival and identity was shattered. Structuration of modernization discourse was shaped by the efforts to find answers for redefining the relationship between these two categories. However, Ottoman modernization has been an activity which is conducted for the state and by the state and retained this character throughout the establishment of the nation-state until 1960s (Yeğen, 2006:41n).

²³ Reminding the problems which emanate from the uncritical reading of the works in the advice-for-kings literature in the Ottoman historiography, Abou-El-Haj argues that these works were more like polemics or protests than calls for reform and that they were written for ideological purposes like defending the interests of a class or the author himself or for legitimizing the positions of certain people in decision-taking mechanism (Abou-El-Haj, 2005:25, 26).

²⁴ The perception of Ottoman identity in this way is not limited to the government circle. According to Ortaylı, before nineteenth century, being an Ottoman meant being a member of the government for the majority of common people (Ortaylı, 1999:77, 78).

State-centered modernization reforms did not coincide with the calls for finding non-state sources of identity which had become prerequisite in the age of nations and nationalisms. Although survival and identity are not contradictory in essence and function in different layers of discourse, the measurement of success of modernization reforms with reference to these anxieties brought about the conviction that conditions of survival and means of identification are in conflict. With the redefinition of historical processes on the basis of the linear conception of history which became widespread among Ottoman intelligentsia towards the late nineteenth century, this conflict is conceptualized as the conflict between old and new. This conviction produced the binary oppositions whose elimination has been regarded as the solution of the predicaments of the Ottoman-Turkish modernization. The role nineteenth-century reforms played in the structuration of modernization discourse in this way will be elaborated in the following section.

3.1 Reading the Nineteenth-Century Reforms

Emrence classifies the late Ottoman historiography under three headings as “modernization approaches”, “macro models” and “post-structural agendas” (Emrence, 2007). Modernization approaches are characterized with “taking the West as the causal element” which shaped late Ottoman history and defining the “ultimate trajectory of Ottoman and Turkish history” as “to reach the level of civilized western nations” by providing “a historically selective background for the emergence of Turkey” (*ibid.*:138-139)²⁵. Putting dependency school, social history and world-systems perspectives under the heading of macro models, Emrence states that the entry of the Ottoman Empire into the world economy is regarded by macro models as “the critical turning point in late Ottoman history” (*ibid.*:141)²⁶. Post-structural

²⁵ This current is still the predominant paradigm in Ottoman historiography. Modernization approaches are known for their emphasis on “intra-elite tension and center-periphery conflict” (Emrence, 2007:140). Both issues will be discussed in this study.

²⁶ For example, Keyder argues that these reforms resulted with the integration of the empire to the international trade system and Ottoman bureaucrats followed this road in order to protect their position as a “surplus-receiving class”. As the process of integration to “the inter-state system and the capitalist economy” went on, they had lesser and lesser space for movement: “By the end of the nineteenth century any freedom of action that the bureaucracy enjoyed was due to conflicts within world capitalism and rivalries internal to the inter-state system” (Keyder, 1987:29).

agendas, on the other hand, are based on the critique of state- and elite-centered explanations in order to open some space for local actors and histories (*ibid.*:143-145)²⁷.

This study does not offer an alternative Ottoman historiography. However, in order to conduct an analysis on the structuration of discourse, certain points should be clarified in terms of how I will approach to the developments of the period. In this study, I will try to refrain from pointing to important historical events as occurrences which started or ended other processes or serve as turning points. Instead, they will be regarded as reference points for the structuration of discourse. These events are not deemed important on the bases of their ‘real’ impact for which this study do not intend to make any evaluation. For me, their importance rests upon the role they played in the structuration of Ottoman-Turkish modernization discourse. In that sense, it is possible to mention two events which largely influenced the anxieties of survival and identification: The abolishment of the Janissary Corps in 1826 and the announcement of the Imperial Edict of Gülhane (Tanzimat Edict) in 1839. The former event has widely been regarded as a reference point for the arguments on the identity of the Ottoman state, while the latter is regarded as the most definitive reform movement in terms of the adaptation of Ottomans to the new conditions of survival.

Apart from being a part of the process of modernization of military force²⁸, the abolishment of Janissary Corps is usually regarded as an important turning point in the ideology of Ottomanism. In that sense, apart from and perhaps more important

²⁷ Criticizing the assumption of the “culturally determined “stasis” of the Ottoman society” and the absence of a middle class and civil society “that is supposed to explain this social stagnation” in Ottoman historiography (Kasaba, 1994:208), Kasaba defines three spheres which were beyond central government’s direct control as “trade and production”, “movements of people”, and “nationalist, religious and sectarian movements” (*ibid.*:209-210). On the bases of these arguments, Kasaba interprets administrative reforms as Ottoman bureaucrats’ realization of the changes which took place as a result of the integration of the empire with the international commerce which convinced them that “to survive, the Ottoman government would have to become part of these changes instead of attempting to reverse them” (*ibid.*:214). And throughout these processes, these three spheres which Kasaba calls “nonstate arena” was far from being passive recipients of the policies, they rather “constrained and shaped the power of the political authority in the Ottoman Empire” (*ibid.*:210).

²⁸ An earlier attempt was made during the reign of Selim III (1789-1807) by the establishment of a modern military (*Nizam-ı Cedid – New Order*) with the intention of diminishing the power of the Janissaries (Karal, 1940:24).

than its immediate impact on the state organization, the event had long-lasting influence on politico-ideological sphere due to the meaning which is ascribed to Janissaries in terms of Ottoman identity. Janissary Corps were known for their strong influence over the state, especially until sixteenth century, which was observed in several revolts leading to dethronement of sultans and served as the representatives of the institutional ‘corruption’ in the empire in Ottoman historiography. However, their abolishment is also defined as the beginning of a chain of events which increased the gap between the ruling elite and people. According to this, the event triggered a power vacuum in favor of bureaucrats in the administrative system which continued with the decreasing power of the Muslim scholar class, *ulema* (Kara, 2005:162-164). Another important aspect of the destruction of Janissaries is that it was the manifestation of “an official turning away from the guilds” for Janissaries were “the major organized armed defender of guild privilege in Ottoman society” (Quataert, 1992:215). With the escalation of the power of bureaucrats in the following period, the political discourse of the opposition movements became largely shaped by hatred towards an alleged bureaucratic domination. One of the early expressions of this idea can be found in Namık Kemal’s article *Hürriyet* where he argues that “Janissaries provided a countervailing force to the oppression of officials” (quoted in Mardin, 1988:32). Later social scientific views described the disbandment of Janissaries with reference to the legitimacy of the state. A well-known version of this argument is offered by Mardin who argues that Janissaries had an important function as an “intermediary body” in securing the “tacit contract” between the Sultan and his subjects. Mardin argues that Janissary revolts were manifestations of the demands of the “civilian population”: “After the elimination of the Janissaries in 1826, popular rebellion had no basis of power left with which to promote its demands” (*ibid.*: 31). Mardin’s position is in line with his famous center-periphery distinction which is based on the assumption that unlike Western societies where various “cross-cutting cleavages” “between state and church, between nation builders and localists, between owners and non-owners of the means of production” produced more flexible politics and “well articulated” nation-states, “the major

confrontation” in the Ottoman Empire “was unidimensional, always a clash between the center and the periphery” (Mardin, 1973:170)²⁹.

1839 Tanzimat Edict, on the other hand is a foundational element of the argument for the increasing dependency of the empire to the European powers. The economic dimension of the 1839 Edict was the promulgation of regulations whose main concern was to increase state revenue by the installment of a modern revenue and budget system. The most important reform was the abolishment of the farming out state-revenue system (*iltizam*) and the inception of a new tax collection system according to which “all state revenues were to be collected directly by and go into the Central Treasury and all state expenses were to be paid from and by the same Treasury” (İnalçık, 1973:102). This reform was an extension of similar attempts prior to the Edict and it was followed by other legal and administrative efforts which resulted in the Ottoman Land Code of 1858. Notwithstanding the economic dimensions of the Edict, the document itself was an important turning point for it declared, for the first time in the Ottoman history, the equality of people of all *millet*s living in the empire. The Edict is usually regarded as a concession given to Western powers, especially England, in return for their support to the Ottomans in their struggle against Mehmet Ali Paşa who wanted to establish an autonomous Egypt (Zürcher, 1995:80). The Rescript of 1856 is another step in the legal and administrative reforms which has been associated with the increasing dependency of Ottomans to European powers. These reforms had become the targets of many arguments which focus on the strain between the acts of bureaucrats in the name of survival and the identity crisis which was experienced by the descendants of a ‘great’ empire.

The urge for explaining the role of these reforms for the smooth functioning of history brings about the necessity to understand their contents and ‘real’ impacts on society which do not easily lend themselves to be available for the historian.

²⁹ Mardin later complained about the reception of his center-periphery thesis as a rigid framework though he stood behind it and argued that his thesis survived newer empirical findings (Mardin, 2004a:373). For various critical assessments of Mardin’s center-periphery thesis and its variants, see *Toplum ve Bilim*, Vol. 105, 2006.

Contemporary analyses do not easily rule these developments out as inconsistent decisions of a crumbling empire which stuck between two worlds and explain their vagueness as the evasive maneuvers of decision-takers to avoid radical changes. In his assessment of the Tanzimat Edict, Mardin states that the document was made-up of contradictory statements which on the one hand advises the revitalization of the preceding laws which had been neglected, while on the other, orders the development of new arrangements in the state (Mardin, 2006a:222). According to Koçak, the Edict's ambiguous and incomprehensible character, which makes it hardly the document of a 'modernization project', provided the bureaucrats with a large space for maneuver (Koçak, 2004:73). Similarly, in his assessments on the rule of Abdülhamid II, Deringil defines the politics of this period as 'fine tuning' which was a strategy for eliminating the legitimation crisis emerged both in national and international levels. According to this, while the reforms in spheres like education, military, transportation and agriculture display the 'formative' and 'creative' face of this period, Abdülhamid's reign also has a 'disruptive' character for it was marked by a demand for "conformity to a unilaterally proclaimed normative order" (Deringil, 1999:11). Understanding the discussions on the state mechanism in this period requires some elaboration on how the field of political discourse was structured. In order to do this, we have to look into the discussions among Ottoman intelligentsia who played an important role in how Ottoman historiography and later evaluations of modern Turkey conceptualized state, bureaucracy and modernization.

3.2 Locating the Intellectuals

Intelligentsia has always been a central issue of discussion in Ottoman-Turkish modernization discourse. The depiction of the changing way Western societies were perceived by Ottomans as a traumatic encounter reserved a special place for intellectuals whose access to the means of observing and experiencing Western way of life makes them suitable for the role of vanguards of modernization, while also rendering them more prone to the 'degenerative' impact of the West. The self-reflective character of the discussions on intelligentsia brought about the natural outcome of the convergence of the anxiety of identifying Ottoman Empire with the

effort for self-identification³⁰. In a way, it is possible to say that in addition to the double-bind within the Ottoman-Turkish modernization discourse, a second-order double bind was (and, maybe, still is) at work in terms of the difficulty Ottoman intellectuals had, in Elias's words, "of controlling their own strong feelings" in relation to Ottoman-Turkish modernization "and forming more detached concepts" about this process (Elias, 1956:231). This is why finding a place for the Ottoman Empire or, later on, Turkey in the world and laying bare the identity of society in terms of this position has been a crucial issue for knowledge producers who reflected their own aspirations to large segments of society as if they shared intellectuals' anxiety of identity.

The way Ottoman intellectuals approached to modernization is not only shaped by their own aspirations; the state-centered mentality was also largely responsible for the specific course of the structuration of modernization discourse:

The manner in which social actors deal with uncertainty points toward their approach to knowledge or cognitive structures, but it shows most clearly in the identities they form for themselves and, especially, in the social institutions they regard as the solution to the problem facing them (Strydom, 2000:186).

In the case of Ottomans who were accustomed to define themselves with reference to the Ottoman state, the weakening military force and the increasing lack of 'qualified' statesmanship were regarded as the sources of the problems the empire had faced with. Thus, eighteenth and nineteenth century reforms had focused on 'modernizing' the Ottoman military force and educating bureaucrats. Navy, medicine, military

³⁰ The psychological aspect of modernization, whose conceptualization took place on the bases of assumed dualities, has been widely discussed in terms of a split in the mind of the intellectual between two worlds. The most popular supporting evidences of this 'trauma' literature are the famous suicide of Beşir Fuad and the suicide attempt of Ziya Gökalp. One of the early examples of the discussions on this subject in the republican period is the 'patched soul' (*yamalı ruh*) debate around Halil Nimetullah's distinction between rational logic (*akıl mantığı*) and logic of conscience (*vicdan mantığı*) (For the explanation of this distinction and an early critique, see Mehmet İzzet, [1927]1989a and Mehmet İzzet, [1927]1989b). The theme of the 'traumatic' implications of modernization for the Turks who find themselves between their Eastern origins and Western aspirations was going to be popularized by the novels of Peyami Safa in the republican period.

sciences and engineering schools where foreign engineers had taught along with Ottoman madrasah teachers were established in this period (İhsanoğlu, 1992:348; Sarıkaya, 1997:51-54)³¹. Apart from military officers, education of civil officials became a central issue of concern in nineteenth century. Ottoman diplomats who speak European languages were mostly Greek minorities and they were expelled from their positions after the Greek rebellion in 1820s. The famous Translation Office (*Tercüme Odası*) where Ottoman civil officials was going to be employed and taught foreign languages, especially French, was established in 1821 and this institution was followed by the schools for the education of ‘committed’ civil officials (Heper, 1985:248). These institutions were going to produce some of the most important names of Ottoman modernization and serve as the points of entry for European social and political thought.

If institutional reforms constitute one aspect of the processes which engendered intellectuals as a category, the other is the expansion of the public sphere. The establishment of privately-owned newspapers in Turkish by the mid-nineteenth century was an important development which facilitated new opportunities for the conduction of debates on government reforms. Perhaps with a little exaggeration, Ülken interprets this development as the diffusion of Tanzimat from the ‘official’ circles into the public sphere (Ülken, 1940:757-758). This new sphere had important consequences for not only private actors but also bureaucrats and politicians. Neumann argues that almost all Tanzimat politicians took public opinion into consideration which, he argues, was a reflection of the transformation which took place in this period on their mentality (Neumann, 1998:69). The establishment of an official newspaper (*Takvim-i Vekayi*) in 1831 was an attempt to control and manipulate public opinion. Mardin informs us about the two objectives which the

³¹ Reforms in the education system are regarded as indicators of the centralization efforts of the state. For Findley, the most important aspect of educational reforms was “the transition from founding unique institutions to founding a generalized system of schools” (Findley, 1989:134). After the establishment of a temporary commission (*Meclis-i Maarif-i Muvakkat*) for the planning and the organization of the new central education system in 1845, a scientific research academy (*Encümen-i Daniş*) which was going to serve for preparing textbooks and translating scientific studies was founded in 1851. This institution was modeled after Académie Française. Following that, the Ministry of Education (*Maarif-i Umumiye Nezareti*) which was going to be responsible for all secular schools was established in 1857 (Sarıkaya, 1997:58-59). Reforms in educational institutions had continued throughout the reign of Abdülhamid II.

newspaper had set for itself and expressed in the prefatory article of the first issue: “first, articles in the journal were to be penned in a language understandable to all, and, second, citizens were thereby called to familiarize themselves with the new institutions of the reform movement that had begun in the 1830s” (Mardin, 2006c:128). The nascent Turkish journalism was going to provide for a new generation of intellectuals who were born around 1840 and “went back and forth between employment by the state and journalistic forays” a medium to propagate their ideas (Mardin, 1989:26). Newspapers and journals were accompanied by other mediums like professional and social organizations, secret societies, reading rooms and public libraries which served for production and circulation of ideas and “created the new cultural environment, the Ottoman “civil society”” (Göcek, 1996:118). As a result, an alternate vision of Ottoman society which “was not centered and legitimated around the office of the sultan” had developed (*ibid.*). The debates of the last quarter of the nineteenth century were going to take place around the possible forms of this new vision.

One important intellectual opposition which benefited from this new environment was the Young Ottomans. Young Ottomans who were generally regarded as the first Ottoman intellectual oppositional group are usually held responsible for adopting and popularizing ‘modern’ political ideas. They were composed of thinkers with different tendencies ranging from more ‘encyclopedist’ way of thought which reflects the Enlightenment belief in the ultimate victory of reason, to a more ‘critical’ or ‘modern reactionary’ attitude which criticizes the ‘apolitical’ position of the former group (Mardin, 1985b: 46-49; Mardin, 2006a:269-275). This movement paved the way for the development of alternative conceptualizations of social and political phenomena which does not locate sultan at the center. However, their influence was a rather unintended one. Most of the members of the Young Ottoman movement shared a similar intellectual background and career pattern with the Tanzimat bureaucrats and they could not break from the state-centered approach (Koçak, 2004:76-77). In that sense, the anxiety of survival in the form of the anxiety for ‘saving the state’ which shaped the bureaucrats’ way of thinking was also a foundational element of Young Ottoman opposition. The distinctive aspect of this movement was their role in

expressing the concerns for the changing identity of the empire. In that sense, they can be held responsible for referring to the anxieties of survival and identification as dichotomous terms in public sphere for the first time and taking the initial step towards the structuration of Ottoman-Turkish modernization discourse with reference to binary oppositions.

The main themes of their critique were going to shape the language of future political movements. To count some of the most important ones, there were the ideas (1) that the sources of these reforms were not Ottoman-Islamic culture; (2) that the reforms were executed with a top-to-bottom approach; (3) that they were the manifestation of the obedience of the Ottomans to European powers; (4) that the reforms had increased the wealth of non-Muslim millets and made Muslims poorer. Future debates turned certain figures of Tanzimat into some sort of embodiments of these arguments: The frontman of Tanzimat and the author of the Gülhane Edict Mustafa Reşit Paşa as the wannabe European elite; the British Ambassador Stratford Canning as the deceptive agent of the Western world; the two major statesmen of the era and the students of Reşit Paşa, Ali Paşa and Fuad Paşa as the Europeanized, infidel elites who crushed the so-called ‘citizens’ with the iron fist of the central, bureaucratic state.

3.3 Convergence of History and Discourse

As it was discussed before, it is customary for the Ottoman historiography in Turkey to picture late imperial period as the preparatory steps for the establishment of Turkey as a nation-state. Despite the apparent problems of such a teleological way of reading history, arguments about the relationship between governmental reforms which signal an effort for centralization and establishing the institutional foundations of nation-state provide us with the opportunity to understand how the structuration of Ottoman-Turkish modernization discourse manifested itself in sociological knowledge production. Here, the key point is the convergence of certain institutional reforms with the growing popularity of the idea of nationalism which found its

expression in the emerging sociological perspective whose object of knowledge started to crystallize on the bases of these discussions.

The discussions about the politico-ideological dimension of governmental reforms for centralization cannot be regarded as the constructs of Ottoman historiography which were written from within the perspective of nation building. In his influential 1904 article, Yusuf Akçura identified three alternative pathways for securing the future of the Ottoman Empire: Ottomanism, Islamism and Turkism³². Akçura's classification became widely used categories for problematizing the issue of unification which had become a significant problem for Ottomans in nineteenth century by the rising nationalist movements within their territories. Mardin locates this problem as the "absence ... of a unifying focus other than the person of the sultan in times of crisis" and argues that Ottomans tried to deal with the uncertainty of the era by trying to create an Islamic culture which, according to Mardin, was the first time they attempted to use "umma [*ümmet*] as a mobilizing agent of the "imagined community"" (Mardin, 2006c:125, 126, respectively). It is also argued that this emphasis on the Islamic culture had shifted towards an ideology of Ottomanism which Kushner defines as "the underlying spirit of the administrative and judicial reforms of the Tanzimat period" (Kushner, 1977:3). The period of Abdülhamid II is another widely discussed issue in terms of the political maneuvers for retaining the unity of the empire. According to Mardin, the ideology of Ottomanism lost its predominance in bureaucratic circles after the death of Ali Paşa in 1871 and the ascendancy of Abdülhamid II who utilized the increasing popularity of Islamist ideology in the state to create an Islamic front by using the institution of caliphate against European powers (Mardin, 1985a: 346-348)³³. Against the views

³² Under the influence of the conditions of the early twentieth century, Akçura repudiated Ottomanism which he defined as "an unnecessary exhaustion"; instead, Akçura offered Turkism as the most viable choice though he added that Islam can also be "an important element in the constitution of Turkish nation" if it goes through necessary adjustments which will make it compatible to nationalism (Akçura, [1904]2005:54, 59-60). In the following years, Ottomanism was going to lose its currency as a result of the convergence of nationalism and Westernization (Mert, 1994:58). On the other hand, nineteenth century reformists and thinkers were far away from ruling out the possibility of retaining the unity of the empire.

³³ It should be noted that Ottomanism did not lose its position as the main scope of political struggle throughout the following decades and functioned as the defining feature of how Ottoman intellectuals pictured society.

which emphasize the pan-Islamist ideology of the period, Deringil argues that the reforms in the education system which includes the purification of language were parts of a long-term plan for creating a ‘reliable’ population (Turks) (Deringil, 2007:93-94, 99)³⁴.

Language reforms constituted an important part of the discussions on the politico-ideological dimension of nineteenth-century reforms. Establishment of secular schools and other institutions for the transfer and circulation of Western knowledge brought about the need for and prepared the conditions of the cultivation of Ottoman script. For example, one of the main concerns of the Encümen-i Daniş was the codification of the Ottoman language and the preparation of a standard dictionary (Berkes, 1998:194). Karal states that removing the gap between the written and spoken language and the refinement of Turkish was regarded by Europeans as a requirement for Tanzimat to reach its aims (Karal, 1985: 314). Berkes argues that cultivation of Ottoman language was more in line with “the international character of the Tanzimat Ottomanism” than the cultivation of Turkish which took place half a century later (Berkes, 1998: 193-194). Language reform was also going to be a major concern of the Ottoman intellectuals throughout the second part of the nineteenth century. Furthermore, Turkish was declared as the official language of the empire with the 18th article of the 1876 Constitution³⁵. On the other hand, since the Islamic population of the Middle Eastern part of the empire was already disappointed with the inadequate support of İstanbul against the attacks of the ‘infidels’, a radical reform in language was regarded by the state to be hardly possible since it would

³⁴ Elsewhere, Deringil argues that in this period “Ottoman Empire hedged towards a ‘nationally imagined community’, as Ottoman identity assumed an increasingly Turkish character, even if this identity was packaged in universalist Islamic terms” (Deringil, 1999:11) (For the academic and non-academic controversy over the political events of the period of Abdülhamid II and dispute over the influences of the reforms in his period, see Çetinsaya, 2001 and Özbek, 2004). According to Ortaylı, with the demise of the *devşirme* system in the seventeenth century and the increasing power of local notables by the deterioration of *timar* system in the eighteenth century, the Anatolian Turkish culture had already become predominant in the state and the cultural life and the material bases of Turkish nationalism was prepared in this process (Ortaylı, 2006:59, 68-70).

³⁵ This was regarded as a requirement for deciding on the language which will be used in the parliament and it brought about additional problems because of the multiplicity of different dialects used in the parliament which accelerated the discussion about ordering Turkish language (Karal, 1985: 317).

destroy the linguistic link between almost two hundred million Muslims living in the world (Kushner, 1977:67-68).

Political opposition of the century did not have an unanimous standpoint against this situation which was wavering between different sources of identity and making it difficult for future analysts to define it. Although some intellectuals and politicians had stripped the term ‘millet’ off its religious content and used it in the sense of ‘nation’ (Mardin, 2006a: 214; Berkes, 1998:197-198), both decision-makers and their opponents refrained from discarding non-Muslim and non-Turkic components of the empire from their calculations. Namık Kemal is a key figure in these discussions. Being regarded as one of the most influential names in the development of Turkish nationalist thought, Namık Kemal used the terms like ‘fatherland’, ‘Ottoman’, ‘umma’, ‘nation’, and ‘Turk’ to define the focal point of national commitment though he used these terms with various connotations without attributing any specific meaning to them (Mardin, 2006a:363). His views reflect the importance the intellectuals of the period had attributed to Islam when he claims that the future of the empire is secure because Islam orders unity and it will prevent the “troubles” which emanate from the Laz, Albanian, Kurdish and Arabian ethnic identities³⁶(Namık Kemal, [1872]1997a:49). He also says, in an Ottomanist manner, that non-Muslim populations have legal rights which were “granted” by the state (*ibid.*). This does not, however, stop him from claiming that Ottomans owe what they have to the virtues of the Turks who he regards as his ancestors (Namık Kemal, [1872]1997b:57)³⁷.

In addition to the popularity of Namık Kemal, there were other developments which provided the foundations of the general conviction that the last quarter of the nineteenth century can be regarded as some sort of a proto-nationalist period. It is possible to speak of several causes of this conviction. Firstly, the discussions on the

³⁶ “... her türlü mevhumatına vücut vererek mevcudatı vehm içinde bırakmayı burhan-ı dirayet addeden bazı mutasalliflerin zannı gibi buralarda Lazlık, Arnavutluk, Kürtlük, Araplık devahisinin zuhuru muhal hükmündedir” (Namık Kemal, [1872]1997a:49).

³⁷ “İyice bilmeliyiz ki hala ecdadımız olan abalı kebeli Türklerin mevki gibi, ahlak gibi elimize geçen mirasları sayesinde yaşıyoruz” (Namık Kemal, [1872]1997b:57).

language reform which would serve for the Ottomanist ideology had immediately favored Turks for since there was no ‘Ottoman’ language, the one which will be reformed was going to be necessarily Turkish (Mardin, 2006b:272). Secondly, the discoveries of the European Orientalist literature on the pre-Islamic period of Turkish culture fostered an interest in cultural and racial identity of Turks and public attention to both Muslim and non-Muslim Turkish people living in Russian and Chinese territories (Kushner, 1977:9-10, 41-44). These tendencies were going to be flared up by the increasing popularity of racist theories in Europe in 1900s (Mardin, 2006b:275). Thirdly, nationalist Turkish intellectuals from these geographies started to get in contact with the Ottoman intelligentsia. Unlike their Ottoman contemporaries who hesitated to bring into forefront their ethnic identity, this group had actively participated to the nationalist movements against the Tsarist government (Arai, 2004:181). Lastly, by the turn of the century it was understood that political opposition would not be successful in surpassing the ethnic boundaries and that not only Muslims and non-Muslim nations in the empire had different expectations, but also were there “disparate images of motherland” among Muslims from different ethnic origins (Göcek, 1996:137). The shrinking territories of the empire was going to force Young Turks -who were going to shape the destiny of the empire during its downfall and the early republican period- to pay their attention to Anatolia and the ethnic group which they believed to be the owners of this geography.

3.4 Technologies of Social Reform

Abou-El-Haj criticizes the evaluation of socio-economic transformations in the Ottoman Empire only to the extent that they influenced the functioning of the state (Abou-El-Haj, 2005:10). This problem becomes clearer when we look into the transformations in intellectual sphere where it is quite difficult to find a well-established literature on a non-state arena. When we think about the impact of the Western currents of thought, we immediately think about the French Revolution and the idea of Enlightenment. Naturally, the points of entry of these ideas were ethnic

groups which were living under the rule of the Ottomans. Therefore, when we speak about the diffusion of ideas which emanated from these developments, we immediately find ourselves outside of our subject of investigation. Such occurrences can be linked to the structuration of Ottoman-Turkish modernization discourse only when they had an impact on those circles whose ideas were part of the late Ottoman modernization discourse.

Ottoman statesmen, on the other hand, were surely worried about the transformations which had been going hand in hand with those features of Western societies which they enviably observed. According to Mardin, the diffusion of the Enlightenment into the empire “did not stem from an acquaintance of the Ottoman literati with the ideas of the *Aufklärung*” until 1850; Enlightenment Europe was rather assessed as the inception of a new lifestyle which promises “comfort and well-being” (Mardin, 1989:17). A 1789 report on the French Revolution shows the initial suspicion of Ottomans (or, to put it more appropriately, Ottoman statesmen) towards the changes which were actually the consequences of the very development they wanted to trigger in the empire. The report focuses on the impact of Voltaire and Rousseau and expresses repugnance towards these thinkers with the claim that they deceived people with empty promises of ‘equality’ and ‘freedom’ for spreading their ‘materialist’ and ‘atheist’ ideas and disrupted the ‘order of the state’. According to Demir, this report documents the primary position of state and religion in the Ottoman intellect and the belief that in order to protect these domains, Ottomans should stay away from Enlightenment thought (Demir, 1999:28-29). The suspicion for the Revolution and the political ideals it ignited retained its influence throughout the Tanzimat period. The two important statesmen of the period, Ali and Fuad Paşa were against of constitution which they equated with freedom whose ultimate consequence was nationalism which was regarded as the major threat for the empire (Çetinsaya, 2004: 69-70).

The first endeavors to legitimize these political concepts blended them with Islamic forms of knowledge and traditional Ottoman institutions of government³⁸. For example, Namık Kemal tried to trace European parliamentarism in the tradition of ‘rule of consultation’ (*usül-i meşveret*) which requires consulting to notables before taking important political decisions (Mardin, 2006a: 152) and stood against the secularization of law (Mardin, 1989:29) even though he was a strong proponent of constitution. Although the first steps were hesitant, there were indicators of a major change in the reception of these ideas as a result of the diffusion of scientific thought which transformed the epistemic terrain upon which society and history was conceived.

The philosophical background of scientific thought in the Ottoman Empire was adopted from materialism whose direct sources were Auguste Comte’s positivist theory, Claude Bernard’s physiology, Charles Darwin’s theory of evolution and Ludwig Büchner’s biological materialism (Işın, 1985a:363). The educational institutions which were established in the nineteenth century had served as gateways for the diffusion of these theories³⁹. Materialism and positivism was going to be more influential during the second half of the century. It is known that some of the Ottoman thinkers had direct contacts with the heirs of Comtean positivism, Pierre Lafitte and Emile Littré. The positivist influence became so predominant among

³⁸ These institutions did not immediately influence the existing regime of knowledge. Petrosyan states that the measure of being ‘cultured’ in the reform period was still being competent in Arabic and Persian languages and having the knowledge of classical Islamic poetry and literature (Petrosyan, 1994:22). Neumann defines the Ottoman attitude towards knowledge as an ‘orthogenetic’ approach according to which each new element was inserted to the cognitive horizon by associating it to an already familiar element in the Ottoman intellect (Neumann, 2000:148). An indicator of this attitude was the preference of Arabic words for translating new scientific and philosophical concepts in the European texts. According to Demir, by using their traditional language of science and philosophy, Ottomans were trying to bridge what he calls “Philosophia Antiqua” with “Philosophia Nova” (Demir, 2007: 22-23). This attitude indicates that knowledge was regarded by Ottomans as something which can be broken down into compartments among which the necessary parts can be taken and the others left behind.

³⁹ The impressions of a foreign traveler Charles MacFarlane from his visit to the School of Medicine in 1840s show that the principles of scientific investigation were so deeply absorbed in this institution that Muslim students can even perform autopsies and the school library were full of materialist books including Baron d’Holbach’s *Système de la Nature* which MacFarlane defines as “the Atheist’s manual” (quoted in Berkes, 1998:118). This school was going to be the center of political opposition in the Young Turk movement. In line with their strong materialism, members of this movement located the dispute between science and religion as the main dimension of social conflict (Hanioglu: 1986: 46).

some Ottomans that the once president of the Committee of Union and Progress, Ahmet Rıza offered the name after the Comtean concepts of ‘order’ and ‘progress’ for this society (Korlaelçi, 2004:215).

Considering the important position of Comte in the history of sociology, it is not surprising to see his influence in the arrival of this new field of knowledge via his doctrines. Comte had sent letters to important statesmen around the world with the purpose of spreading his ‘system of positive religion’ (Korlaelçi, 1994:30). In the letter he sent to Reşit Paşa in 1853, Comte argues that the simpler belief structure and more practical statesmanship of Islam renders it more compatible to his positive system than Catholicism. Probably based on his law of three stages, Comte points that positive religion has to emerge in the West because of the existence of preparatory conditions. However, Comte argues, since it was not contaminated with mystical beliefs which functioned as mental and social inhibitors for the West, Islam will circumvent the ‘metaphysical’ phase and catch up with the West in its passage to positivism (Comte, 2004:481). Although this positive description of Islam was apparently a political maneuver for persuading Ottoman statesmen, similar theses which argues that some of the already-existing institutions of Islam renders it superior to West were used by Ottoman intellectuals in order to propagate their political ideas.

Işın argues that the privileged position of social sciences in positivism and the fact that it was primarily a movement from within sociology made it attractive to Ottoman thinkers who regarded positivism as a recipe for their short-term expectations (Işın, 1985b:354). However, the diffusion of positivism did not go hand in hand with the development of ‘sociological’ thought. It appears that the discipline of ‘sociology’ was firstly introduced to Turkish readers as late as 1885 by Beşir Fuad in his biography of Victor Hugo (Okay, 2008:135) and even though he defined Comte and Littré as the “masters” of the nineteenth century, Beşir Fuad did not mention sociology in his classification of sciences which was based on Comte’s and Spencer’s classifications (Korlaelçi, 1986:236-237). It is important to notice that Beşir Fuad preferred to trace the superiorities which Comte attributed to sociology in

the realist and naturalist literature of Emile Zola whose “theory of the experimental novel ... became the foundation of the claim to scientificity advanced by a certain kind of literature which understood itself as a finer kind of sociology” (Lepenies, 1992:7). Beşir Fuad used realism and naturalism interchangeably and defined it as a school which stands against exaggeration and aims to find and describe reality (Okay, 2008: 132). Against the romantic critics who despised the raw depiction of life in the naturalist novel, Beşir Fuad defended naturalism for he believed that full description of the reality of life is the primary step for correcting its faulty aspects just like the case of medicine where, diagnosis is the most important step towards curing the illness (*ibid.* 135-136, 155). Considering his critique of the romanticism of Namık Kemal (*ibid.* 129) and Namık Kemal’s obvious and long-lasting impact on the Ottoman-Turkish intellectual world, it is possible to say that the huge uncertainties of the period -which, according to Mardin, brought about the ‘politicization’ of intellectual products (Mardin, 2006a: 270)- did not allow space for this kind of a distanced attitude which Beşir Fuad appreciated in the naturalist novel and which was going to constitute one of the pillars of sociology as a ‘scientific’ discipline.

Gradual diffusion of the new technologies of changing society had naturally brought about the need for a new conception of change. Here, the important step was to face the contradiction between İbn-i Haldun’s cyclical conception of history which had a great impact on the Ottoman intellectual world and the Ottoman’s belief in the ‘perpetuity of the state’ (*devlet-i ebed müddet*). İbn-i Haldun’s theory of the development of the state is based on the passage from nomadic stage into civilization⁴⁰ in which the state emerges along with an urban-based society. However, this state starts to deteriorate after some point and it is taken over by another group which is in nomadic stage. This theory is based on the assumption that the strong cohesion of the nomadic group provides them with a sort of power (*asabiyet*) which is based on sharing the same blood and religious commitment. This power deteriorates with the process of urbanization and renders the state vulnerable

⁴⁰ The word İbn-i Haldun uses to define this stage is *ümran*. The word ‘civilization’ was firstly used in the second half of the seventeenth century which was four centuries later than İbn-i Haldun’s time and it was translated into Turkish as *medeniyet* in the nineteenth century. (For the meaning of the concept of *ümran* and its comparison with the concept of *civilization*, see Meriç, 2009:86).

to the attacks of new nomadic groups which have stronger *asabiyet* (Neumann, 2000:172). Although İbn-i Haldun's theory argues for the ultimate demise of states following the peak point of their strength, Ottomans did not refrain from advising reforms for reversing this process (Ortaylı, 2004:38). Ahmed Cevdet employs İbn-i Haldun's arguments to explain the loss of Ottoman military power but he separates the theory of the development stages of the state from the process of social development which are inseparable in İbn-i Haldun's theory. He discards the element of inevitability from İbn-i Haldun's historiography and claims that the downfall of a state can be stopped and reversed (Neumann, 2000: 177-179).

Towards the end of the nineteenth century, this in-between position was going to be left behind and the concept of 'development' (*terakki*) would be replaced with İbn-i Haldun's theory of stages (Mardin, 1985b:53). One of the representatives of the idea of history as a phenomenon which has a particular direction rather than merely random succession of events was a Young Turk, Mizancı Murat. According to Mardin, Mizancı Murat had adapted this conception of history from Guizot who had great influence on him in his youth (Mardin, 2006b: 85-86). Guizot's influence is meaningful since his Hegelian conception of history does not only argue for a direction of history, but also emphasize "the interaction of human agency and human thought": "So, by his manner of composing history, Guizot encouraged his readers to complete it consciously" (Parker, 1990:140). This conception was in line with the purposes of the Young Turk movement. In contrast to the Young Ottomans whose main concern was to influence the Sublime Porte and a small group of intellectuals who are acquainted with Western ideas, Young Turks tried to spread their ideas to a wider public and mobilize masses (Mardin, 2006b: 149-150). A conception of history which is already on their side and waiting to be realized by 'conscious' agents provided them an epistemic support which allowed Young Turks to maintain their pioneering position for changing society. However, they soon realized that their efforts did not have the impact they had anticipated on masses and shifted their attention to the dynamics of society (*ibid.* 150-152). Debates of the period on government, human nature and social life shows that Young Turks tried to understand and explain social phenomena and ideal statesmanship in a 'scientific'

manner (Hanioğlu, 1986:55-56, 71-72). The newly emerging scientific perspective went hand in hand with the belief that social issues should be monitored by a group of experts (Mardin, 2006b:169). Unlike the Young Ottomans who were trying to associate the concepts of ‘natural law’ and ‘laws of nature’ with a divine entity, Ahmet Rıza defined these concepts as objective phenomena and argued that since laws of nature can only be understood by experts, political issues also call for their experts to be taken care of (*ibid.* 185-186).

As an extension of the growing influence of scientific thought in the form of positivist and materialist philosophies and the gradual development of nationalism, a new discourse on society had emerged. In his series of letters he had written to Abdülhamid II in mid-1890s, Ahmet Rıza displays the basic features of this new discourse. Ahmet Rıza argues that “the reason of the formation of government is to serve for the prosperity and happiness of the people” (quoted in Korlaelçi, 1986:263). The political connotation of the state-society distinction embedded in Ahmet Rıza’s thought was an already popular idea for the Ottomans. Fénelon’s *Télémaque* was firstly translated into Turkish in 1862 though it is known to be read in French literature courses at the medical school during Mahmud II’s reign and “[i]ts popularity seems to have been due to the fact that the political theme of this famous utopian-political novel was the maxim, “Kings exist for the sake of their subjects and not subjects for the sake of kings” ...” (Berkes, 1998:199). Ahmet Rıza’s letter seems to be paraphrasing this maxim though this time, with an organic conceptualization of society. Here, the problems of the empire are not explained with reference to deviation from conventional statesmanship or Islamic doctrines; the reason is the failure in ‘putting a diagnosis’ to the symptoms of the patient, i.e., society which he defines as a ‘composite body’ (Korlaelçi, 1986:262). This argument was based on the distinction between state and society which was expressed by some members of the Young Ottoman movement. According to Mardin, the earliest conceptualization of society in the Ottoman social thought as an entity which is separate from the state can be seen in the writings of Şinasi (Mardin, 2004b:44). On the other hand, this separation was going to take place more extensively in the Young Turk period. For example, distinguishing between state and society and talking about

the interest of people ‘as if’ it is distinct from the interest of the state was severely condemned by Namık Kemal (Namık Kemal, [1872]1997c:138-139). In that sense, Ottomans were still away from acknowledging that the identity they had to construct should be based on and embraced by society which was emerging as a distinct entity.

With the reversed legitimization relationship between state and society and a redefined mechanism of change which attributed directionality to history, the structuration process of the Ottoman-Turkish modernization discourse had prepared the conditions of possibility of a sociological perspective which constructs its object of knowledge as an autonomous entity which is separate from the state⁴¹. Throughout the beginning of the twentieth century, Young Turks’ arguments had become more and more ‘sociological’. Arguments about ‘national culture’ were not anymore based on the critique of the deviation from Islamic path, as in the case of the Young Ottomans; Young Turks started to talk about the abstract concepts like the ‘soul’ or ‘essence of the nation’ without concrete religious references like Shari’a (Mardin, 2006b:120). Another example, which signals a secular redefinition of religion with reference to its function in society, is Abdullah Cevdet’s efforts for distinguishing between the religious and societal dimensions of Islam and attracting the attention of Muslims to the latter (Hanioglu, 1981: 131). With such debates there emerged the idea that the ‘spiritual’ element, which maintains the unity of society, is not only religion, but also culture which is independent from the former and society had gradually ascended to the level of divinity (Mardin, 2006b:282). In the following chapter, we will investigate how this sociological conception of society was employed in Ottoman-Turkish modernization discourse.

⁴¹ It should be noted that the state-society distinction I mentioned here does not mean that the Ottoman-Turkish modernization discourse was freed from state-centered way of looking at social phenomena. The anxiety of survival retained its position as a reference point in discourse structuration and sociological knowledge production maintained the language of the ‘reformist statesman’ for a long time in Turkey. What I am trying to say is that the epistemic terrain was structured in this period in a way which allows the construction of society as a distinct object of knowledge. In that sense, I am talking about a ‘strategic’ distinction, rather than an ‘essential’ one.

CHAPTER IV

4 SOCIOLOGICAL TURN IN THE OTTOMAN-TURKISH MODERNIZATION DISCOURSE

The crystallization of Turkish nationalism throughout the first two decades of the twentieth century had gone hand in hand with the development of a sociological reasoning which provided the debates on the Ottoman-Turkish modernization with a new set of concepts. The Young Ottoman critique of the institutional duality which was brought about by Tanzimat reforms had taken on a new appearance in which the attention was shifted from the faulty decisions of politicians to the social fabric. The question of how Ottoman society is constituted gained prominence in developing solutions for many contradictions of the previous critique of government reforms. The end result of focusing on the constitution of society was the construction of 'society' as an object of knowledge. The critical point of the sociological turn in Ottoman-Turkish modernization discourse was the will to deal with the anxiety of identity with reference to the societal sources of identity. This chapter will focus on the theoretical struggle over the signification of the social, which was one of the manifestations of the struggle over the polity, territorialization and ethnic configuration of what was left behind from the Ottoman Empire.

As it was the case in French social thought which had great intellectual influence on Ottomans, society had ascended to the throne as an object of knowledge which had limitless power to explain human affairs. This new analytical entity fostered further questions like the relationship between society and the individual and the constituent elements of societies. Investigations on these questions were shaped by political concerns of the turbulent political environment of the period. The society-individual dichotomy was in fact a question about elites and their capacity to change society. It is possible to say that individual is hardly problematized in the Ottoman sociological discussions and the occasional discussions about this category attributed negative meanings to it. Investigations on social institutions, on the other hand, provided

analytical tools for the structuration of Ottoman-Turkish modernization discourse on the bases of a history of failures which documents the examples illustrating insufficient rate of change. Sociological discussions on modernization were conducted with a theoretico-conceptual set which was largely provided by the evolutionary thought and the organicist sociology which were the predominant streams of thought in Europe during that period.

4.1 Sociology at the Turn of the Century

Darwin's theory of evolution had a worldwide impact in the second half of the nineteenth century. According to Crook, Darwinism had a "multivalent" character which made it useful for "political philosophies that ranged from aristocratic conservatism and laissez-faire individualism to reform liberalism, socialism, even revolutionary Marxism" (Crook, 1996:262). Sklair states that the reason of the adaptability of this theory to rival theories of society was that these theories were based on various theories of progress and "no one at this time was fully prepared to give up the idea of progress" (Sklair, 2005:62). In other words, to talk about Darwin and evolutionary theories was to talk about the idea of progress in one sense or another and the idea of progress was one of the main constituents of the nineteenth-century technology of knowledge production. In line with the existing technology, as a discipline which strives for finding a scientific basis for itself and which already has proximity to life sciences in its earlier formulations, sociology had become easily attached to Darwin's evolutionary biology.

The kind of social scientific discourse which is based on the application of Darwin's principles is generally defined as 'social Darwinism' though the meaning of the term and relationship of Darwin with the infamous ideas associated with this stream of thought has always been an issue of discussion. An earlier version of this stream was developed by Herbert Spencer who actually developed some Darwinian themes before Darwin himself. The problem with using Darwinian theory of evolution to explain social phenomena is the implications of the idea of the 'survival of the fittest' for the predominant social philosophy of the period. In epistemological sense,

Lamarckian elements which allow the analysis of “the constitutive role of cultural inheritance and social memory” were useful for sociological theories which emphasize collectivity (Gissis, 2002:73). In that sense, it is not surprising to see that Spencer’s conception of evolution comprises Lamarckian notion of ‘the inheritance of acquired characteristics’. Being influenced from Spencer’s evolutionism, French social thought had also used Lamarckian notions side-by-side with Darwin’s evolutionary theory. However, the early impact of Spencer had dissipated towards the end of the century. Being in pursuit of stability and willing to eliminate any space for propagating class struggle, republican ideology was dissonant with individualist assumptions of Spencer’s evolutionism and the supplement to the struggle-based conception of evolution was found in the solidarist philosophy which was regarded as a superior doctrine to both individualism and socialist collectivism (Clark, 1981: 1030-1031, 1035). Theories which emphasize cooperation and repudiate struggle as the prevailing characteristic of human societies were developed by names like Alfred Espinas and Henri Milne-Edwards and these ideas were popularized with slogans like “aid for life”, “union for life” or “cooperation for life” (*ibid.*: 1035). This stream had constituted the organic theories of society which distanced itself from social Darwinism though not necessarily dropping racialist tendencies or the belief in essential inequality in society (Barberis, 2003:56, 61). By mid-1880s, evolutionary theory in its social Darwinist form had shifted towards the realm of conservative discourse and was employed by Edmond Demolins’s *science sociale* group and Gustave Le Bon to criticize the state-aid programs and to propagate the idea of individualism which they regarded to be undermined in the solidarist ideology of republicanism (*ibid.*: 1036-1037).

As discussed above, Darwin’s texts comprise elements which satisfy opposing theories and political camps. Although appearing to be convinced about the overall non-collectivist character of the notions of natural selection and struggle for life, Weikart reminds Darwin’s arguments on “collective competition” where he emphasizes the advantages of “moral feelings”, “selfless cooperation” and “mutual assistance” for the struggle for existence (Weikart, 1998:21). These themes were highly adaptable to the social discourse of their period in which transition from

Enlightenment cosmopolitanism to modernist nationalism had almost been completed. No matter how Darwin was interpreted, some sort of evolutionist thought had dominated the Western intellectual sphere in nineteenth century. Talking about the French case, Gissis argues that French social discourse was almost entirely based on biological-evolutionary discourse and “the questions to ask are which evolutionary scheme “Darwinian or Lamarckian?” and whether the purpose was to legitimize a social order of inequality (social, racial, cultural) or to legitimize its reform, even revolution” (Gissis, 2002:82). Apart from the discussion around the inheritance of acquired characteristics, there was another problem with evolutionism and its rather cruel interpretation in its social Darwinist form: its immediate acknowledgement of laissez-faire individualism whose moral implications had already been a troubling issue in spite of the liberal replies to the critics. The concept of ‘degeneration’ had emerged as the reflection of moralist anxieties in the naturalist subset of social discourse.

4.2 Facing with the Idea of Evolution

Evolutionist-progressivist idea had already had its reflections in the Ottoman social discourse with the above-mentioned influx of positivism and materialism in the last quarter of the nineteenth century. As in the case of France, Ottomans also used Darwinian and Lamarckian theories of evolution side by side (Doğan, 2006:284-285). However, the distinct terrain of Ottoman social discourse which was structured by the survival/identity double-bind had absorbed evolutionist thought with concerns which were quite different from the case in the West. As it was the case for the reception of evolutionist thought in the West, moral concerns were an important aspect of this stream in Ottoman intellectual debates. On the other hand, the sources of these concerns were a bit different. Ottoman social discourse did not include the idea of a degenerative dynamic coming from within the society. Owing to the anxiety of identity, the source of degeneration which took place in the Ottoman social discourse was the Western way of living which, Ottomans believed, will spread along with formal-institutional Westernization movements. Here lies the double-trap Ottoman social discourse was struggling with at the turn of the century –a double-

trap which was a reflection of evolutionary discourse itself. On the one hand, no matter what should be its content, the idea of reform was widespread. Evolutionist theories had dictated that societies should change and adapt to the new situation in order to survive. This was an established argument by the turn of century. İbn-i Haldun's cyclical conception of history was already discarded as it was mentioned above. The remaining problem was to find the actors who will lead the way. No one was expecting to see any sort of transformation which would lead Ottoman society towards Westernization to happen from within. In other words, debates on evolution in Ottoman social discourse were inevitably based on certain assumptions about the actors who will serve as the vanguards of change. On the other hand, the acknowledgement of this situation would also mean the acknowledgement of the failure of the Ottoman Empire to survive in the evolutionist sense of the term.

The sociological turn in the Ottoman-Turkish modernization discourse signifies the analytical reiteration of the survival/identity double-bind and a shift of attention from political to social sphere to tackle with the dualities which were produced with reference to these two terms which do not have a dualistic relationship with each other in essence. It is possible to define two approaches within the early Ottoman sociological discourse which were subsets of a discursive whole, shaped by evolutionist-progressivist assumptions and concepts: the one which tried to solve the alleged problem of duality by evaluating the elements of identity which serve as obstacles in the struggle of the Ottomans to survive and other which preferred to carve out the those elements which would facilitate the evolution of society towards a modern state. Ideas of Prince (*Prens*) Sabahattin and the circle of *Ulum-i İktisadiye ve İctimaiye Mecmuası* will be inquired here as the representatives of these two approaches.

4.2.1 Society as an Obstacle for Change

Prince Sabahattin is usually identified with Ottoman liberal tradition of thought and defined as a pioneering name in empirical sociology. The main sources of inspiration for Prince Sabahattin's sociological views were Frédéric Le Play and Edmond

Demolins who were the leading names of the *science sociale* school. The distinction Le Play put forward between ‘sociology’ and *science sociale* was actually based on his critique of Comtean positivism with which sociology was strongly identified in his time (Nisbet, 1966:61). Contrary to Comtean sociology which he regards as abstract philosophical speculation “divorced from reality”, Le Play defined a social science which is in “contact with men and women in all their varied activities” (Périer, 1960:103). As a Catholic conservative, Le Play argues that “[f]ar from being a period of darkness, the Middle Ages was one of the great creative periods of the world” and “[f]eudalism was an exceptionally stable and orderly social system” (Nisbet, 1980:201). Le Play argues that historians should “study feudalism as it existed during the Middle Ages in France, and as it still exists in Russia, Poland, Turkey, Hungary and in the Denubian principalities” (*ibid.*). The conditions during the ancient regime which brought about the revolution was accidental and specific to France and by using the method of observation, one can investigate French society along with other cultures and understand the faulty aspects of the former (*ibid.*:201-203). The unit of analysis Le Play had chosen was family. On the bases of the immense amount of data he collected from fieldwork, he found a link between families and their environment and he argued that “a given type of family corresponds to a given type of society” (Périer, 1960:105). Edmond Demolins and his circle differs from Le Play on the grounds that “Le Play’s emphasis on the family unit for conservative purposes” conflicted with the individualism they defended (Clark, 1981:1036). Upon this individualist bases had Demolins constructed his argument that Anglo-Saxon countries more successfully prepare individuals for the struggle for life than do France where “old values and habits, now preserved by the republican credo of solidarity, promoted the subordination of the individual to the family and other social groups” (*ibid.*). This assumption brought about the distinction the *science sociale* circle proposed between ‘community type’ and ‘individualist type of societies’.

Following the critiques of *science sociale* circle, Prince Sabahattin argues that by approaching to spheres like law, economy and morality as the constituents of society, sociology misconstrues social phenomena. According to this, names like Spencer,

Trade, Durkheim and Le Bon follow this misleading “social philosophy” which is far from being scientific. ‘Sociological’ approach wrongly assumes that these spheres constitute the society, while, in reality, social constitution (*teşekkül-i ictima’i*) is the one which shape them. The reason behind the variation of these institutions in different societies is the differences in how these societies are constituted. Natural history became a “scientific” discipline by classifying its objects of knowledge and social science should follow the same path. Prince Sabahattin believes that the major accomplishment of the school which was represented by Le Play and Demolins is its efforts for classifying societies (Prens Sabahattin, [1918]1999:12-14). The distinction between community type (*tecemmü’i*) and individualist (*infiradi*) type of societies was a product of such an effort and he located this distinction at the center of his assessment of the Ottoman society.

As it was for Le Play and Demolins, social science was regarded by Prince Sabahattin as a tool which will provide knowledge for social reform. Similar to the case in *science sociale* circle who attacked French Revolution and its proponents by attacking to Comtean sociology which, they believe, represents the republican ideology, Prince Sabahattin’s critique of sociology (along with economics, psychology, philosophy and history) was actually a critique of Tanzimat reforms. He formulates his sociological approach as a social reform program and argues that Ottoman modernization movement was destined to fail because it was based on a misleading understanding about the relationship between social institutions and the constitution of societies. Promulgating new laws or changing the political regime from monarchy to constitutional system or even to republic would not make any difference because what is necessary is to change the way Ottoman society was constituted (*ibid.*:17). Building upon Demolins’s individualist approach, Prince Sabahattin conceptualizes society as the reflection of private sphere. In other words, unlike organicist conception which conceptualizes society as an entity which is not just the sum total of individuals, Prince Sabahattin employs an approach which is based on the idea that everything begins and ends at the individual scale. In line with this assumption, he states that reform in “public life” should start from the “private life”. By educating people for being individuals who can take initiative, reformists can increase the chance of Ottoman society to survive in natural selection which is

the main law of “natural development” (*ibid.*: 181-182). Here, he was re-expressing with new terms an older idea which was based on the assumption that Turks still carry the characteristics of their nomadic past and the only way of modernization is to get rid of the remnants of the past (Mardin, 1994:101). According to Prince Sabahattin, community type societies are also destined to deteriorate morally. If individuals do not consider themselves as their own central point of reference (*merkez-i istinad*), they would not stand against unjust conducts of others towards themselves and as a result their society would deteriorate morally (*ibid.*:22).⁴²

Although his arguments are based on methodological individualism which was not so popular among Ottoman intelligentsia, Prince Sabahattin did not dwell on individualism more than some superficial remarks on private enterprise. His main endeavor was to formulate a new identity whose components will facilitate the development of the capacity for fulfilling the requirements of the survival of the Ottoman society. In that sense, it would not be misleading to give him credit for taking the initial step for investigating societal sources of identity, which is the key question all sociological discussions on modernization purport to be engaged in. However, the clash between existing institutions and the whole new physiology which he offers for the Ottoman society does not appear to be a major concern for him. In that sense, Prince Sabahattin’s work does not address the questions regarding the sociological characteristics of the Ottoman society other than the claim that it is a community type of society. Neither his nor his supporters’ call for an empirical sociology seem to offer anything more than collecting data for confirming this initial argument.

The ‘sociological’ competence of Prince Sabahattin’s views and the relationship between his theoretical ideas and his political endeavors has always been an issue a discussion. For example, Kansu defines him as a conservative who, like Le Play and Demolins, was against the Enlightenment philosophy and the changes which were

⁴² It is highly probable that here, Prince Sabahattin is referring to Nietzsche’s ‘slave morality’. There are other Ottoman thinkers who wrote about Nietzschean notions which support evolutionist ideas during this period (see Doğan, 2006:270-275).

based on it (Kansu, 2004:164-165)⁴³. Mardin, on the other hand, argues that Prince Sabahattin had discarded the philosophical and religious roots of Le Play's thought and employed certain aspects of his sociological reasoning to develop a political program (Mardin, 2006b:301). No matter how his views are received, Prince Sabahattin's place in the Ottoman-Turkish modernization discourse is inevitably reserved with reference to his political activities⁴⁴. He was competing with Ahmet Rıza for the leadership of the Young Turk movement at the beginning of the century. Based on Demolins's schematic interpretation of Anglo-Saxon countries where he believed there was a strong relationship between individualism and decentralized type of government, Prince Sabahattin developed a political program which runs counter to Ahmet Rıza's centralism (Ramsaur, 1972:102, 111). The rivalry between the two names had escalated with the dispute over the involvement of foreign powers for an extensive state reform (Lewis, 1968:202). Ahmet Rıza's group, which opposed foreign involvement, dominated the Young Turk movement. The exclusion of Prince Sabahattin from the movement; the death sentence given to him for the accusations about his involvement in the 31 March Incident which forced him to escape to Europe; and his exile after the establishment of the republic according to the law which forbids the residence of the members of the Ottoman dynasty in Turkey made him a controversial name in the modernization discourse and his unwarranted identification with liberal thought and empirical sociology made him an important figure for some circles who criticize the predominance of Ziya Gökalp's views in Turkish sociology and its political implications in terms of his role in building the epistemic grounds for a society-centered rather than an individualist approach to the

⁴³ It should be noted that it is difficult to agree with Kansu considering the apparent link of Prince Sabahattin's views with the sociological discourse of his period which was based on evolutionist-progressivist assumptions and an unquestioned belief in science. In addition, even though he defined his theory in opposition to Comtean sociology, Le Play too shares with his rival the belief that it is possible to develop a truly "scientific" social science and this science will provide us with the knowledge which will serve as a prescription to tackle social ills and to formulate suitable social policies. In other words, Le Play's conservative motives do not rescue him from the epistemic terrain of his period. Same conviction can be seen in Prince Sabahattin. Commenting on the political debates of the period, he argues that once social issues are assessed by using *science sociale*, divisions between conservatives, liberals, democrats, socialists, reformists and nationalists will lose their relevance (Prens Sabahattin, [1918]1999:23).

⁴⁴ Some scholars like Cahit Tanyol and Cavit Orhan Tütengil claim that Prince Sabahattin's work as a social scientist is unjustly neglected because of his place in Ottoman-Turkish political history (Sezer, 1989:54).

organization of social life⁴⁵. On the other hand, his views about the involvement of foreign powers and decentralization touch upon the ‘red lines’ of the nation-state ideology and they have been the reasons of his popular characterization as a ‘traitor’ and ‘separationist’⁴⁶.

4.2.2 Society as the Source of Change

Published between 1908 and 1911, *Ulum-i İktisadiye ve İçtimaiye Mecmuası* (Journal of Social and Economic Sciences – hereafter UIİM) is the representative of liberal ideology in the Second Constitutional Period (Çavdar, 1992:141) and is described by Ülken as the first philosophically significant movement in the empire (Ülken, 2005:159) and. As it was the case for Prince Sabahattin, traces of Le Play School can also be observed in the texts of the UIİM circle though the journal was on the side of the centralist wing of the CUP which separated them with Prince Sabahattin (Doğan and Alkan, 2010:15). What lies beneath UIİM circle’s distance from Prince Sabahattin’s conceptualization of society is their intention of picturing Ottoman society in a way which brings into forefront its potential for change, rather than a society which has to go through a more extensive transformation before going through institutional reforms. The theoretical expression of the political difference between the UIİM circle and Sabahattin can be read in the location of the journal in the history of Ottoman social discourse. Although some of its writers were influenced by Spencer’s individualism, the journal represents a transition from methodological individualism to society-centered explanations of French organicism which will be more forcefully represented by Gökalp in the following decade -

⁴⁵ Prince Sabahattin’s name has been expressed as a reference by various political parties in different periods of history like the Peasants’ Party of Turkey (*Türkiye Köylü Partisi*) and Liberty Party (*Hürriyet Partisi*) in 1950s; Motherland Party (*Anavatan Partisi*) in 1980s and Justice and Development Party (*Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi*) in 2000s (Okan, 2006:172).

⁴⁶ The disruption of the Timar system and the conflict between the central state and local notables has been regarded as one of the main reasons of the Ottoman Empire in conventional historiography. The conflict between city and village has been one of the manifestations of the constructed duality in which village is associated with ‘East’, ‘tradition’ and ‘religion’ which stand as the second terms of the other variations of this duality in the Ottoman-Turkish modernization discourse. For an analysis of the discursive structuration of the tension between center and periphery from the late Ottoman Empire to the end of the single party period and its implications for the construction of the ethnic identity of the nation-state, see Yeğen, 2006:57-78.

according to Ülken, Bedi Nuri is the writer who represents this shift which paved the way for the idea of collective conscience (Ülken, 2005:170n). Doğan and Alkan point at three common views which were shared by the writers of the journal: (1) explaining political sphere with reference to society and the concept of social evolution; (2) advocating gradual change instead of sudden political transformation; and (3) defending elitist leadership (Doğan and Alkan, 2010:81). On the basis of this description, it is possible to say that UIİM had focused on two interrelated issues: society-individual dichotomy and social change.

The society-individual dichotomy was a challenging issue for the Ottoman social discourse since there were ambiguities in describing the agents and/or dynamics of change. The emerging tendency in this period was the late nineteenth century French organicism which was defined by Barberis as follows:

Society was not comparable with mechanisms made by man, whose parts worked together according to preconceived scheme. It was not a product of the human mind and imagination – nor was it a useful instrument in human hands, something humans could, in principle, do without and that they could always modify at will. Humans were not the authors of society (Barberis, 2003:56).

Barberis says that these sentences are based on the views of René Worms and Alfred Espinas (*ibid.*:68n) –two names who, according to Ülken, were the main sources of Bedi Nuri in his definition of ‘social ability’ (*kabiliyet-i içtimaiye*) (Ülken, 2005:168). Bedi Nuri represents the idea that individuals cannot be the objects of knowledge for explaining social phenomena; as organs which constitute the social organism their interaction brings about something which transcends their totality, “just like the difference of a synthesis from its chemical elements” (Bedi Nuri, quoted in *ibid.*). It was upon this organicist conception of society that he described the concept of social ability. According to this, humans along with other animals have an instinct which drives them to live together and their social ability increase in accordance with the increase in social relations. Level of solidarity and harmony

determines the level of social ability (Soyyer, 1996:80-82). Concept of social ability becomes a useful tool to tackle the age old problem of the relationship between order and progress. On the one hand, it provides Bedi Nuri with the opportunity to eliminate the inverse proportion conservative thought defines between morality and development –an effort which he shares with Prince Sabahattin. Bedi Nuri’s materialist conceptualization is based on the idea that morality appears in a later phase of social evolution and it becomes stronger as long as social relations keep developing; “[t]he spiritual and moral characteristics of societies reflect their level of evolution” (Doğan and Alkan, 2010:36). On the other hand, it serves as both the progenitor and the consequence of change. Higher the ability of a society, higher that society’s “elasticity” (*elastikiyet-i içtimaiye*), which is crucial for it determines a social organism’s ability to adapt to environmental conditions (Soyyer, 1996:82): “In short, first of all social ability is nothing but social elasticity” (Bedi Nuri, quoted in Doğan and Alkan, 2010:38).

The link between order and progress is not always drawn as smoothly as it is in Bedi Nuri. Anxiety towards sudden changes had been one of the main characteristics of the late Ottoman intelligentsia. The question of evolution, on the other hand, had its own intricacies and a political environment which is newly shaken down with a shift in the regime makes it even more complicated to formulate how Ottoman society can abide by the ‘law of nature’. “In the historical development of human societies, political institutions are ends rather than means”, says one of the founders of UİİM, Ahmet Şuayıp (quoted in Çavdar, 1992:147). Insisting on the persistence of social institutions, he argues that revolutions, new laws or regime changes cannot transform societies. Since social institutions are expressions of needs and sentiments of a society, they can be transformed only if these needs and sentiments had lost their validity (*ibid.*:148). Although having similarities to Prince Sabahattin’s objections towards ‘groundless’ political reforms, the difference Ahmet Şuayıp’s position is that he takes social institutions rather than individuals as its unit of analysis. Being the sociological expression of the question of duality, politically speaking, this argument serves as a safety valve for “uncontrolled” calls for change. For instance, following this line of thought, Rıza Tevfik argues that the concept of “freedom” does not have

an absolute definition; its meaning changes according to societies' level of development (Doğan and Alkan, 2010:99). As the sublime object of knowledge, society again stands as the supreme court for the decisions about the orientation of the lives of masses.

The evolutionist assumptions of the social discourse had to find another way to argue for the necessity of change since some pathways of change are blocked immediately when the ossified character of social institutions is acknowledged. As defenders and active participants of the newly established constitutional regime, writers of UIİM justified their position by claiming that revolution is legitimate if existing governments resist against change which had already taken place in society (*ibid.*:155). But there still was the problem of explaining why Ottoman society had developed to a degree that the only obstacle to reach at the following phase was the inexistence of a parliament. Bedi Nuri claims that ideas which “exceed society’s level of development” cannot emerge and even if they do, they would not find space for application; therefore at the background of every new idea there lies a social tendency (*ibid.*:34). He also states that calls for social change find their first expression in arts and literature and the pressure of change cannot be suppressed by censure (*ibid.*:34). These arguments were apparently referring to the age old clash between government and its critics. In a sense, UIİM writers justify their demand for radical transformations, which in fact was against their theoretical assumptions about societies, by the very existence of themselves and others who share their expectations. The most theoretically sound expression of why and how these expected transformations should take place was going to be provided by Ziya Gökalp who brought together the concerns for cultural degeneration with the rising Turkish nationalism.

4.3 Ziya Gökalp: An Attempt to Eliminate Duality

Being one of the most important ideologues of Turkish nationalism, Ziya Gökalp is also widely regarded as the first Ottoman-Turkish sociology scholar. Almost all inquiries on sociological discourse in Turkey start with Gökalp and they have good

reasons to do so. Gökalp was not only an influential name in the CUP, he also served in the republican assembly. Like most other members of the CUP, Atatürk was largely influenced from Gökalp's ideas and, as will be discussed later, he benefited from Gökalp while formulating the principles of his party which were also going to be the basic values to be secured by the constitution. Gökalp's argument on Ottoman-Turkish modernization was based on reconciling conflicting political camps of his period. This synthesis finds its most-well-known expression when he says "Turkish nation today belongs to Ural-Altai group of peoples, to the Islamic *ümme*t, and to Western internationality"⁴⁷ (Gökalp, [1913]1959:76). Gökalp wrote in a period in which important events like Balkan Wars had definitive impacts on the structuration of Ottoman-Turkish modernization discourse. Gökalp's intellectual itinerary, which was largely shaped by the political fluctuations and great wars, had led him from an Ottomanist perspective towards one which puts the formation of a nation-state as the main target⁴⁸. He condemned the cosmopolitanism of the Ottoman Empire and formulized a unifying, culturalist nationalism based on an organic conception of society which is the only legitimate reference point for individuals to express their opinions and wills. Against the question of the society-individual distinction, he offered the distinction between 'individual' and 'character' (*ferdiyet ve şahsiyet*). He defines individuality as the features which determine biological life. Character, on the other hand, is gained within the social life and it is this sociality which elevates human beings to higher levels than their position as mere individuals. For Gökalp, ideals are dead in a society where individualism prevails (Ülken,

⁴⁷ The source of this motto was Azerbaijani thinker Ali Bey Hüseyinzade who is regarded to be influential on Gökalp's interest in Turcology studies and Durkheimian sociology and who actually offered the triple formulation of "becoming Turkish, Islamic and European" ("*Türkleşmek, İslamlaşmak, Avrupalılaşmak*") (Tokluoğlu, 2012:124-125).

⁴⁸ Arguing that it is possible to see in Ziya Gökalp the conflict or, at least, tension between the intellectual who is trying to find Turkish nation and the Young Turk who is trying to maintain the territorial structure of the Ottoman state, Georgeon points that the Albanian (1912) and Hejaz (1916) revolts had rendered the idea of an Islamic solidarity against European imperialism quite suspicious and they had great impact on the emerging nationalist streams which shaped Gökalp's ideas (Georgeon, 2006:96). In addition, Gökalp's initial relationship with Turanism which demanded the unity of all Ural-Altai peoples was going to dissipate in favor of a rather local Turkism owing to political implications of the former ideology whose program requires the involvement of large populations who are settled in the territories of "big actors like Russia and Iran" (Tokluoğlu, 2012:121-122).

2005:327). In order to understand Gökalp's formulation of modernization, it is necessary to look into his famous distinction between culture and civilization.

4.3.1 *Kultur* and Civilization

Ülken argues that the clearest illustration of the dualist character of Tanzimat is Namık Kemal's argument for a selective Westernization which defends the adoption of technical advancements from the West while protecting the Islamic and Eastern identity of the empire. For Ülken, the culmination of this dualist thinking appears in Gökalp's treatment of the concepts of 'culture' (*kültür* or *hars*) and 'civilization' (*medeniyet*) (Ülken, 1940:762). However, it might be rather more convenient to define Gökalp's theory as an effort to restore the unity between the principles of the organization of society and the sources with which society identified herself. This is why he tried to define the concepts of culture and civilization as a complementary couple rather than dichotomous terms. The fact that he ended up with reproducing dualities is an effect of the specific structuration of Ottoman-Turkish modernization discourse. Theoretically speaking, Gökalp's program was no less demanding than that of Prince Sabahattin in terms of the social implications of the application of their formulations despite the fact that Gökalp's views were more comprehensive and thoroughly developed. However, Gökalp's sociology became the dominant formulation of modernization since he represents the victorious side in the political struggles of the period.

Civilization was already a buzzword among Ottoman intelligentsia in the late nineteenth century. Westernization debates had already been full of arguments on which aspects of Western 'civilization' should be taken and which of them would be deleterious. These debates naturally produced a distinction between 'material' and 'spiritual' aspects of civilization. One important aspect of these early uses of the concept is its reference to the earlier contributions of Islamic nations to current Western civilization (see Mardin, 2006a:225 and Şirin, 2006:273- 279). The reference to the Islamic origins of western civilization had two functions. One of them was to promote the idea that adopting some aspects of Western civilization

would not necessarily mean degeneration for it would just be taking back what originally belongs to Islamic civilization. The second one is to use this reference to criticize the reforms which distanced Ottomans from their Islamic roots. This multi-functionality increased the popularity of the concept and made it available for various political camps.

Gökalp's earlier accounts on the relationship between modernization and Western civilization carry the mark of a still-existing belief in saving Ottomans from demise. In an article which was written before Balkan Wars and the World War I which almost eradicated the hopes for maintaining the sovereignty of Ottomans, Gökalp argues for the creation of a "New Life" whose "economic, domestic, aesthetic, philosophical, moral, legal, and political values [will] born out of the soul of the Ottomans" (Gökalp, [1911]1959:59). The importance of this text is the argument that Ottomans should create their own civilization since "the foundations of European civilization are worn, sick, and rotten, [and] that they are destined to fall and disintegrate" (*ibid.*:60). This standpoint is radically different from his later formulations which locate Turks into the "Western civilization circle". However, his call for creating an Ottoman civilization is not based on securing the imperial position of the Ottomans. Gökalp was already convinced that the New life he proposes "is not a cosmopolitan but a national life" (*ibid.*:58). Here Gökalp is not clear about the ethnic composition of this new civilization. He apparently discards the "non-Muslim compatriots", i.e. "the Greeks, Armenians, and Bulgarians living among us" who "accepted the manners and habits of European civilization" (*ibid.*:59) from the future Ottoman 'nation' and offers the creation of a "genuine Turkish civilization" though he does not clarify what will happen to other Muslim nations of the empire.

Gökalp continued to focus on the concept of civilization in the following years. In a 1913 article Gökalp distinguishes between 'formal civilization' and 'civilization of the people' ('folk civilization'). This distinction was based on the widespread claim among Ottoman intelligentsia that the reason of the corruptions in the Ottoman social, administrative and legal systems was the influence of Persian, Arab and

Greek culture. This claim had been used with different motives by different ideological camps each of which referring to a different historical period as the ‘pure’ and ‘unspoiled’ one which should be taken as the model of the future Ottoman society. According to Gökalp, the gap between the formal civilization and the civilization of people had appeared as a consequence of the transfer of institutions from “foreign peoples” (i.e. Persians, Arabs, Greeks). The secret behind the success of the Ottomans in early periods was their avoidance of such influences. What brought the demise of the empire was the infiltration of foreign institutions. This was a reiteration of the belief that there was a time when the sources of Ottoman identity were the very factors which also secured the survival of the empire: “[T]he factors responsible for our rise should be sought in the folk civilization, and those factors responsible for our decline sought in our formal institutions” (Gökalp, [1913a]1959:90). Again in another article from the same year, he makes another distinction between ‘community civilization’ and ‘society civilization’. Unlike his 1911 dated “New Life” article, Gökalp does not entirely dismiss European civilization in this text and says that Muslims can accept the ‘civilization of society’ for it is common to humanity (Gökalp, [1913b]1959:102). This view is based on the assumption that “[s]cience, technology and industry are universal and common to all humanity as they are not the products of ‘community’ but of ‘society’” (*ibid.*). Here, Gökalp associates the ‘community’ aspect of European civilization with Christianity and argues that Ottomans will instead use a Turkish-Islamic civilization.

The distinction he made between formal and folk civilization was an extension of his populist ideas whose anti-elitist tone is inherited from the critique of office-holders in the late nineteenth century Ottoman intelligentsia. It is possible to say that this distinction was developed for political intentions unlike the other distinction he made between civilization of community and society which was more abstract. This second distinction was an early version of his distinction between culture and civilization. In order to understand the importance of the passage from these earlier versions to his famous culture-civilization couple, we should shortly look into their relationship in Western literature.

The concept of civilization has no less convoluted history in the West and its meaning is usually discussed with reference to the concept of 'culture' if not confused: "One Frenchman, for example, can say that America has a civilization but no culture, another that America has a culture but no civilization, and both mean exactly the same thing" (Bierstedt, 1966:483). Having been used since the second half of the eighteenth century, the concept of civilization had its origins in the idea of secular-progressive spirit of the Enlightenment along with "modernity, an achieved condition of refinement and order" and these very origins of the concept triggered a "romantic reaction" which produced alternative concepts "to express other kinds of human development and other criteria for human well-being, notably 'culture'" (Williams, 1983:58). This dichotomous relationship between the concepts of culture and civilization is most strongly expressed in German thought. According to Gouldner, the distinction Germans produced between culture and civilization was consonant with their distinction between human or cultural sciences and natural sciences (Gouldner, 1973:94). In other words, the concepts signify different spheres of knowledge. Elias' comparison between the English and French use of civilization and the German use of culture reveals this difference.

According to Elias, unlike the concept of civilization which serves for Britain and France to express their pride in their significance "for the progress of the West and of human kind", the same concept was used by Germans for useful things which are of second degree in terms of importance: "The word through which Germans interpret themselves, which more than any other express their pride in their achievements and their own being, is *Kultur*" (Elias, 2000:6). While the English and French use of civilization can refer to a wide range of fields like "political or economic, religious or technical, moral or social facts", the German concept of culture excludes "political, economic and social facts" and specifically refers to "intellectual, artistic and religious facts" (*ibid.*). One other important difference Elias mentions is the elimination of national differences in the English and French concept of civilization, in contrast to the strong emphasis on national differences in the German concept of culture (*ibid.*:7). According to Elias, the late unification of Germany and the already established imperial power of Britain and France explain this difference:

Whereas the concept of civilization has the function of giving expression to the continuously expansionist tendency of colonizing groups, the concept of *Kultur* mirrors the self-consciousness of a nation which had constantly to seek out and constitute its boundaries anew, in a political as well as spiritual sense, and again and again had to ask itself: “What really is our identity?” (*ibid.*).

Heyd claims that Tönnies’s community-society distinction might be an ‘indirect’ source of inspiration for Gökalp’s definition of culture and civilization (Heyd, 1950:67-68). His argument is an important case to discuss Gökalp’s modernization theory⁴⁹. A better interpretation, however, is offered by Parla who argues that Gökalp resembles Tönnies with respect to “culture” and Durkheim as regards “civilization” (Parla, 1985:134n). In other words, considering the above definitions, it is possible to say that the distinction Elias elaborates between English and French use of civilization and German use of culture is almost identical to Gökalp’s distinction of these two concepts. In line with what Elias says about the German use of the concept of culture, Gökalp expresses his keenness to use this concept to emphasize ‘differences’: “What Turkists mean when they say culture (*hars*) is neither the ‘culture’ of the French nor the ‘kultur’ of the German” (Gökalp, [1923] 2007:233). However, as an ardent defender of Westernization, he also has a positive attitude towards those advancements which he evaluates under the heading of civilization. Therefore, he tries to bridge these two concepts which were originated in different epistemic terrains and use them as complementary rather than dichotomous terms.

Heyd’s argument might have been correct if Gökalp’s conceptual scheme had stood as it was when he made the above-mentioned distinction between ‘community

⁴⁹ In his assessment on Heyd’s interpretation of Gökalp, Davison points that Heyd’s views are based on the assumption that Gökalp’s nationalism was opposed to Western European nationalism which was based on the rationalist, individualist and universalist approach of the Enlightenment. Davison argues that by focusing exclusively on Gökalp’s writings on Islam and excluding Gökalp’s theoretical writings, Heyd reached at misleading conclusions (Davison, 2006:152, 154). According to Davison, Heyd’s misleadingly selective reading of Gökalp reflects the increasing attention of social scientific literature to the role of Islam in modern Turkish politics and thought in late 1940s and early 1950s during which, many such studies were conducted (*ibid.*:155, 155n).

civilization’ and ‘society civilization’. In his early writings, Gökalp was much more occupied with emphasizing, or say, constructing the national characteristics or culturally distinctive features of Turkishness. Therefore ‘first terms’ of the dualities he used were much more emphasized. In addition, during the first part of 1910s, Gökalp’s views about the ‘community’ aspect of the so-called Ottoman civilization were ‘territorially’ less problematic. This was a matter of scale. Tönnies defines community as “[a]ll kinds of social co-existence that are familiar, comfortable and exclusive” in contrast to society which “means life in the public sphere, in the outside world” (Tönnies, [1887] 2001:18). Here, community is used in the sense of “immediacy or locality” which was the more widespread meaning of the concept in the context of the nineteenth century industrial societies (see William, 1983: 75). Tönnies also speaks about communities which are “inclusive of all mankind” like the church (Tönnies, [1887] 2001:19) and the great difference in the scale of inclusiveness of these two different connotations of the concept does not appear to be a problem for Tönnies and same thing can be said for Gökalp in his early writings.

However, this was not the case for his later views. In the context of World War I, there was a great conflict between these two scales of Ottoman-Turkish ‘community’. As a nationalist, he was trying to incite Turkish national consciousness, though the still existing connection of Ottomans with non-Turkic Islamic ethnic groups and the necessity to convince people that nationalism is not in conflict with Islam was creating problems in terms of specifying the community he was talking about. In his post-World War I writings, this was not regarded as much of a problem anymore. With a society which he regarded to be less problematic in terms of identification, Gökalp tried to eliminate the double-bind situation which he, as all other Ottoman intellectuals, diagnosed as a problem of duality, by defining two terms with the intention of avoiding a dichotomous relationship between the two⁵⁰.

⁵⁰ His intention can be observed in the revisions he made on the essays he wrote in 1912-1913 period which are brought together and published under the title of *Türkleşmek, İslamlaşmak, Muasırlaşmak* in 1918. In his collection of Gökalp’s essays, Berkes informs us that the fourth chapter of this book, which was titled as *Hars Zümresi, Medeniyet Zümresi* (Culture Group, Civilization Group) was originally published in 1913 with the title of *Cemaat ve Cemiyet* (Community and Society) and the concepts of community and society were changed as culture (*hars*) and civilization in the revised version of the text (see Gökalp, 1959:316-317n). This seemingly trivial lexical difference is actually

Now, Gökalp's intention was to formulate a conceptual couple which covers both religious-nationalist sentiments and the 'material' developments of Western countries. He was aware of the fact that social life cannot be simply divided into two compartments. He first defined eight spheres of social life as religious, moral, legal, contractual, aesthetic, economic, linguistic and scientific life and stated that the collection of these eight spheres of social life can be defined as both culture and civilization (Gökalp, [1923]2007:190). After defining the points of convergence, he then specified their differences. According to the most refined versions of Gökalp's distinction between the two concepts, (1) civilization is international while culture is national; (2) civilization can be transferred and imitated while this is not the case for culture; (3) a nation can change its civilization but it cannot change its culture; and (4) civilization is established by reason and method while culture is established by feelings and inspiration (*ibid.*: 190-195; Gökalp [1925] 2007:326-327).

Gökalp's effort to define culture and civilization as a complementary couple clearly contradicts with Heyd's argument about the relationship between Gökalp's treatment of these concepts and Tönnies's community-society distinction and also with Heyd's assumption that Gökalp's nationalism was shaped by the names like Herder, Fichte, Hegel, Nietzsche, Tönnies and Treitschke (Heyd, 1950:165). Tönnies's distinction between community and society is based on a different conception of 'threat' than that of Gökalp. According to Aron the set of relations which Durkheim happily sees in the 'organic solidarity' of modern industrial society triggers in Tönnies a major concern about "the disappearance of personal, emotional and spontaneous bonds, and the dominance of contractual relations, of an impersonal society and of competition" (Aron, 1964:112). Similarly, Parla points that "for Tönnies, who came from the organicist German tradition, the older form of social organization, *Gemeinschaft*, is the more "organic", the more "natural".⁵¹ In contrast, Durkheim, the heir of French Enlightenment, finds the modern form of solidarity the more "organic", the more

an indicator of his will to put forward a different conceptual set which will not be made up of dichotomous terms.

⁵¹ "Community means genuine, enduring life together, whereas Society is a transient and superficial thing. Thus *Gemeinschaft* must be understood as a living organism in its own right, while *Gesellschaft* is a mechanical aggregate and artifact" (Tönnies, [1887] 2001:19).

“progressive”” (Parla, 1985:134n). Gökalp is fully committed to Durkheim’s conception of mechanical-organic society distinction and he has even more reasons than Durkheim for not to share Tönnies’s concerns. It is safe to say that in his conception of modernization, the formation of nation-state, priority of national commitment over local ties, industrialization and urbanization are not regarded as negative developments⁵².

If Gökalp was trying to eliminate dualities, then why his formulation is based on, as Parla argues, the juxtaposition of the German conception of culture and French conception of civilization? The answer partly rests on the fact that these two concepts were not in a dichotomous relationship; they were products of different epistemic terrains and their signification is based on entirely different relationships with other related signifiers. More importantly, the structuration of Ottoman-Turkish modernization discourse was at a stage when the sources of identifying society were completely detached from the accepted criteria for survival. This detachment, however, was not acknowledged by the Ottoman intelligentsia. For this reason, every political attempt which was legitimized with reference to one of these two categories (survival and identity) was criticized by rival groups with reference to the other category. The more modernization programs tried to develop satisfying arguments about two categories which function in different layers of discourse, the more entangled the double-bind became, the more dualities were produced in due process. With the contribution of the linear conception of history which structured the conception of social change with reference to the ‘existence’ or ‘lack of’ a particular quality which facilitates Westernization, Ottoman-Turkish modernization discourse produced many dualities whose synthesis or elimination was regarded as the key for formulating the right prescription for modernization. Therefore, it is not surprising to

⁵² The conservative nationalist thought, which was going to be built upon the main framework of Gökalp’s nationalism inherited this attitude and this is what separates this stream from German romantic nationalism which had a tense relationship with industrialization, commercialization and nation-state (Taşkın, 2007:33-34). For example, years later, in his arguments about the debates on the negative impacts of technology and the theses on the downfall of the European civilization, Erol Güngör was going to say that people in Turkey do not have time to discuss about the problems which have not appeared yet (Güngör, [1980]2006:46).

see Gökalp saying that “Turkish revolutionism⁵³ cannot by any means accept conservatism with respect to questions of civilization. Turkism is conservative only on questions of culture” (Gökalp [1923]1959: 265).

4.3.2 Mechanisms or Politics of Change

Gökalp does not have a unified conception of change. Although using Durkheim’s theory of transition from mechanical to organic society in his theoretical assessments, he does not stick on this account all the time. It is possible to say that his political intentions and didactic language brings about contradictory conclusions about his theory of change. The first and foremost important aspect of his conception of change is the ambiguity in terms of the mechanism of change. In line with his culture-civilization distinction, Gökalp argues that Turks had been part of three different circles of civilization. According to this, while they were a part of the Far-East (*Aksa-yı Şark*) circle of civilization before converting to Islam, they became a member of Eastern civilization after their conversion. Since nineteenth century, they are trying to join the Western civilization circle. Here the traces of Comtean theory of three stages can be observed for Gökalp feels the necessity to put a further definition of the Western civilization and says that it is a ‘laic’ civilization (Gökalp, [1925] 2007:326). Elsewhere, he openly uses the concept of progress to define this process of change and defines the three stages Turks had gone through as the periods of tribal state (*kavmi devlet*), sultanic state (*sultani devlet*), and national state (*milli devlet*) (Gökalp, [1923]2007:204). The juxtaposition of laicism and nation-state formation is an important aspect of his theory of modernization. However, the passage from the second stage to the third has problems in terms of agency-structure dichotomy. Following Durkheim who suggests that urbanization and the ‘progress’ of social density goes side by side with the growing division of labor (Durkheim, [1893]1994:202-203), Gökalp compares Eastern and Western societies and argues

⁵³ Here, Berkes translates the term *inkılap* as ‘revolution’ and this translation is used untouched here although, following Parla, the term is translated as ‘transformation’ in this study. Although a more widely used translation of the term is ‘revolution’, Parla repudiates this translation on the grounds that the connotations of the term revolution does coincide neither the meaning of the term as Gökalp uses, nor the character of the reformist movements of both post-1908 and post-1923 periods (Parla, 1985:82-83). The controversy over this term is not limited to the choice of words in its translation. This issue will be addressed later.

that this parallel progress did not take place in the former and if Eastern societies want to survive, they have to go through a similar process (Gökalp, [1923]2007:207-208). Here, shifting from Eastern to Western civilization circle is defined as a necessity. The challenge for Gökalp is to reformulate modernization in a way which will both provide a proper prescription for future reforms and, at the same time, explain in what way these reforms will differ from the failed nineteenth-century modernization reforms of the Ottomans. Gökalp's solution is to argue that Turkish society is ripe for going through this process of change; it is just that they do not know it yet. The theoretical background of this argument is provided by social idealism (*içtimai mefkürecilik*).

One of the key points of Gökalp's sociology is his will to develop it in opposition to historical materialism. Social idealism is not only a theoretical choice for Gökalp, it is also politically functional. Gökalp takes the emergence of nationalist movements in the Ottoman Empire as an example and argues that such social processes start at the level of ideals and then gain a political, and lastly an economic character (*ibid.*:216). Choosing ideational sphere as the origin of the material processes which transforms societies is beneficial for two reasons. Firstly, it supports Gökalp's will to maintain the key role of culture and tradition in the process of change. Secondly, it serves as an answer to the objections about the inexistence of the material conditions necessary for change. Gökalp's assumptions about social change do not differ from Durkheim's theory. Change is a natural and inevitable feature of societies for both of them. Durkheim uses the analogy of growth to explain social change since he considers it as a natural process which is necessary for survival (Hinkle, 1976:339). In line with this analogy, change is facilitated with a mechanism which is inherent to society in Durkheim's theory; i.e. "social phenomena exist sui generis and ... the causes of social change reside within society itself ..." (*ibid.*:341). Gökalp agrees with Durkheim in term of the sui generis character of society. However, Gökalp was very much concerned about securing the primary role of ideals in explaining social change: "It is undeniable that the real factors in the evolution of humanity are ideals" (Gökalp [1911]1959:57). Here, his source of inspiration is Alfred Fouillée who tried to develop an idealistic philosophy without running counter to the evolutionism of

the late nineteenth-century French social discourse. Fouillée proposed the concept of ‘idea forces’ according to which, ideas tend to realize themselves. In this realization process, evolutionary mechanisms have key roles in the selection of the idea which will orient the organism. Fouillée says that “the principle of the struggle for existence and of selection ... is in my opinion as applicable to ideas as to individuals and living species...” (Fouillée, 1921:461-462). Gökalp utilized this concept and emphasized culture as the strongest elements of the intellect of society which will enable the proper installation of the elements of Western civilization. He always emphasized the creative and progressive capacity of traditions and regarded them as the source of change. In a 1913 article, he criticizes radicalism (*cezrilik*) and conservatism (*muhafazakarlık*) for they both neglect the inevitable evolution of societies and the creativity of traditions: “Both believe that *rule*, or convention, is something above time and space, that it exists by itself” (Gökalp, [1913c] 1959:93). In Gökalp’s conception of modernization, tradition functions as some sort of a backbone for the inevitable change that the Ottoman society was going through and it provides guidance for adapting to imported components of modern life properly: “Tradition is something growing and creating by itself, and, moreover, giving life to the borrowed innovations grafted on itself in such a way that the foreign elements do not dry out and become rotten, as happens in ordinary imitation” (*ibid.*:94)⁵⁴.

In terms of modernization, or more specifically, Westernization, the creativity and progressiveness of tradition is bound to a very specific form of consciousness. Gökalp’s analysis becomes more historical at this point and emphasizes the importance of national consciousness for ‘progress’ in this specific age of nations. What he calls ‘national ideal’ (*milli mefküre*) is something which have already been there, waiting as a latent potential which will shift from unconscious to conscious state in periods of social crisis (Gökalp, [1918] 2007:81). Only with national consciousness, can the new Turkish nation be a part of Western civilization. Here,

⁵⁴ The traces of German romantic conception of culture in Gökalp can be observed when we observe the affinity of his arguments to Herder’s conception of progress:

For progress, it was to have enduring effects, had to be a concomitant of social *growth*; it had to emerge, that is, out of a given social tradition. Without tradition, progress was like a plant without roots... tradition without progress was like a plant without water (Herder, quoted in Sklair, 2005:27).

the problem is not only the concern for the loss of cultural identity. Nationalism is not a life jacket which is necessary for the survival of Turkish society during the process of inevitable change; it is a condition of going through that change. Gökalp is very much convinced that periods of crisis will trigger nationalism because national ideal actually resides in collective representations (*ma'şeri tere'iler*) which had been lying dormant (Gökalp, [1923] 2007:213-214). In fact the proper verbs to use to define the process of the emergence of national ideal, in the sense that Gökalp defines it, might be 'unearthing' or 'carving out'. That is why Gökalp was so sure that periods of crisis will not trigger any other ideal like socialism, but nationalism (Gökalp, [1918] 2007:81). The real question here is who or what will 'unearth' this ideal?

According to Berkes, based on his faith in sociology "as the supreme positive science", Gökalp believed that the primary task of sociology is "to determine what Turkish people already possessed or lacked to be a modern nation" (Berkes, 1954:383). In fact, it was not just sociology's but many other disciplines' task to unearth the culture of Turks. Gökalp gave a program for extensive studies which will discover musical, linguistic, juridical, architectural, moral and Islamic history of Turks in more than one occasion and he surely was aware of the fact that these studies should be undertaken by elites (*güzipeler*). However, his understanding of proper modernization would not allow a one-sided picture of the process of change. Writing in 1923, Gökalp defines a mutual relationship between elites and common people (*avam*). According to this, the interaction between elites and common people will enable the former to bring civilization to the latter, on the one hand, and provide the elites with the opportunity to be educated on culture by common people which is the "living museum of national culture" (Gökalp, [1923] 2007:199). Here, *avam* is not only depicted as an object of knowledge from which experts can extract data on national culture. This interaction has a political function for Gökalp's populist political agenda. Therefore, he does not just expect elites to approach people as if they are approaching towards an unknown entity; he wants them to embrace people.

Gökalp was writing these lines with the assurance of the newly established nation-state. In other words, he no longer had to worry about explaining how the transition from empire to a nation-state will take place. As a result, he did not have to specify the mechanisms by which collective representations will signify nothing else but a nationalist ideology and the role of elites in that process. The establishment of the republic as a nation-state signifies the convergence of history and discourse which allowed Gökalp to follow the footsteps of the rather elusive Fouillée which was probably more preferable to the colder voice of Durkheim in a period of revolutionary excitement:

The genius is often the man who translates the aspirations of his age into ideas; at the sound of his voice a whole nation is moved. Great moral, religious, and social revolutions ensue when the sentiments, long restrained and scarcely conscious of their own existence, become formulated into ideas and words ... (Fouillée, 1921:464).

For Gökalp, for the case of Turkey this role was played by Atatürk who spread the ideals of a small group to the whole society, made it official and implemented it personally (Gökalp, [1923] 2007:214).

Like many others, Berkes criticizes Gökalp for conceptualizing civilization as an entity which is detached from society (see also Ağaoğlu, [1927]1972:11-12; Mehmet İzzet, [1923]1969:146-147 and Ülken, [1948]2008:10). Berkes observes the reflection of this problematic conceptualization in the controversies over the topics which should be discussed under the heading of culture and which should be regarded to be related to civilization during the republican reforms (Berkes, [1965]2007:95-96). Gökalp's naïve formulation could never provide clarification for such disputes. For Gökalp, politics of transformation (*inkılap*) has always been about finding a balance which he believed could invalidate the problem of duality. He offered a simple explanation for combining the sudden changes Ottoman society had been going through with the Durkheimian conception of social change which proposes a long-term process. According to this, all societies go through changes

which render collective conscience and social ideals obsolete. Throughout this ‘unconscious evolution’ (*şuursuz tekamül*), traditions might survive even if they are not needed anymore⁵⁵. The purpose of transformation is to get rid of these ‘non-living traditions’ (*cansız an’aneler*) and mobilize the entire energy of society to living ideals. By doing so, transformation will bring the unconscious evolution which takes place gradually to a conscious state with a sudden move. On the bases of this definition of transformation, Gökalp argues that all societies should have two political parties as transformists and traditionalists (*an’aneciler*). Transformists should stay away from trying to implement social ideals which do not have their imprints on collective conscience. Conversely, traditionalists should not try to preserve non-living traditions. Gökalp defines the extremist representatives of these political groups as radicals and reactionaries (*mürteci*) and argues that proper forms of transformism and traditionalism are liberalism and conservatism (Gökalp [1923]1977:19-22).

Gökalp’s efforts for distinguishing between the zones of culture and civilization in social life were intended to provide guidance for future reforms during which these two spheres can work together in harmony. Here, the important point is to see how Gökalp conceptualized transformation with respect to his culture-civilization couple. As I discussed before, his main purpose is to define a balanced process of modernization in which even sudden changes can be explained with long-term accumulations. He always emphasized the importance of the compatibility of the newly installed features of modern life to collective conscience for the success of reforms. His positive attitude towards the developments which he evaluates within the category of civilization aims to suppress the potential of a clash between modernization and tradition. However, his tendency to see the first term of his culture-civilization couple as a regulative domain for modernization ends up with a distinction which resembles Durkheim’s sacred-profane dichotomy.

⁵⁵ Gökalp uses the term residues (*arta kalanlar*) to define these traditions. Here, he is probably using Durkheim’s concept of ‘survivals’ which is based on an organicist conception of social institutions: “[A] fact can exist without being at all useful, either because it has never been adjusted to any vital end or because, after having been useful, it has lost all utility while continuing to exist by the inertia of habit alone” (Durkheim, 1964:91).

Emphasizing the social character of religion, Durkheim argues that “[r]eligious representations are collective representations that express collective realities” (Durkheim, 1995:9). According to Durkheim human beings have a double nature, the first one being their individual selves and the other which belongs to the social realm. In line with his general theoretical assumptions, he states that “the individual naturally transcends himself” as part of society (*ibid.*:16). Here, it is important to see that Durkheim’s sociological conceptualization brings about a broader definition of religion. Repudiating the widespread conception of religion which is generally a product of scientific thinking, Durkheim argues that religion is not about a domain which is outside of reason (*ibid.*:23-24). In order to elaborate his conception of religion, Durkheim defines two separate domains as ‘sacred’ and ‘profane’ between which he insistently argues that there is an absolute division (*ibid.*:36). He puts more emphasis on the sacred domain and proposes a definition of religion on its bases. According to this, religion is the product of the coordination of “a certain number of sacred things” which “form a system that has a certain coherence” (*ibid.*:38). However, sacred things in a society do not have to take part in the formation of religion. For example, some cults, myths or rites might survive even if the religious system they belong to have disappeared and even if there is a predominant religion which has a different system of coordination among sacred things. In such cases, these survivals can manifest themselves as ceremonies or festivals and continue to live as a part of folklore (*ibid.*:33-34, 39). In fact, Durkheim’s definition of sacred is so all-encompassing that it transcends the boundaries of religion and constitutes a wider domain which can be defined as culture.

Gökalp’s concern for emphasizing the central role of collective conscience in social life is based on his opinion that the essential feature of human life is sentiments; that intellectual life is grafted on these sentiments. Therefore, the intellectual and sentimental life of human beings should be compatible to each other. Otherwise, spiritually they would become ill (Gökalp, [1923] 2007:183). In line with the age-old fear of Ottoman intellectuals from the ‘contaminating’ impact of Westernization which structured the category of identity as a source of anxiety, Gökalp warns us against ‘excessive’ development in civilizational sphere for it might “degenerate”

national culture (Gökalp, [1923] 2007:196). This warning reveals that he does not actually have full confidence in his own conceptual couple which he tries hard to define as harmoniously working domains. The epistemological profile of the Ottoman intellectual still contains traditionalism which required the guidance of the tested and verified conventions and this expectation coincided with the circular relation Durkheim finds between religion and society: “If religion gave birth to all that is essential to the society, that is because the idea of society is the soul of religion” (Durkheim, 1995:421). The inherent concern for degeneration in the Ottoman Westernization discourse brings Gökalp’s culture-civilization distinction closer to Durkheim’s absolute distinction between sacred and profane. In that sense, it is never clear whether culture and civilization are “two opposed species of the same genus” or “as separate genera, as two worlds with nothing in common” (Durkheim, 1995:36). Therefore, it is possible to say that Davison is right when he repudiates those evaluations which argue that religion is pushed towards personal sphere in Gökalp and argues, instead that it stays as a fundamental component of Turkish national culture in Gökalp’s formulation (Davison, 2006:198). Gökalp has no other option because he was writing within the framework of a discourse whose one of the main regulative components is the problematization of identity and the culture-religion complex is the most viable choice for this category.

4.4 Nation-State and Sociology

Theoretically speaking, the conditions were convenient for the institutionalization of sociology by the establishment of the Turkish Republic. It was already a popular subject among Ottoman intellectuals and the two afore-mentioned questions for which sociology was set out to provide answers, that is, the question of “what held human beings together” (see Wagner, 1998:244) and the question of what are the sociologically possible limits of social reform (see Eros, 1955:256), were valid questions to be discussed in nation-building process. The history of sociology in Turkey tells us about the lectures Ziya Gökalp had given in the School of Union and Progress in Salonika during the years of 1910 and 1911 which were followed by the establishment of the Chair of Sociology in İstanbul University (*Darülfünun*) by 1914

(Coşkun, 1991:14). However, sociology's 'strong' start was actually one that is boosted by Ziya Gökalp's persona as an influential name in the politics of the period. Indeed, the impact of sociology was going to dissipate after Ziya Gökalp was sent into exile on Malta in 1919.

According to Emrence, one of the problems in the new studies on late Ottoman Empire which are based on post-colonialist approaches is their inability to distinguish between the "sociological imagination" of bureaucrats with reality and their attribution of "instrumental rationality and extensive capabilities" to the Ottoman state (Emrence, 2007:145). Same thing can be said for the evaluations about the mythical status of sociology in the early republican period. İlyasoğlu points to the similarity between the opening speech of Gerhard Kessler for Sociological Institution (*İçtimaiyat Enstitüsü*) in 1933 and another speech from a 1993 conference presented by Önal Sayın in terms of defining Turkish sociology by emphasizing its contributions to the establishment of the republic (İlyasoğlu, 2001:86-87). This 'proud' history is acknowledged without much examination by those accounts which have a more critical approach to the state-building period. The starting point of these critiques is the positivist character of the republican reforms. According to this, the relationship between 'order' and 'progress' was reversed in the republican period and contrary to Tanzimat reforms whose main purpose was to establish order by using progress, republican period brought into forefront the "will to civilization" (Kadioğlu, 1999:25, 27). Sociology had already had entered into Ottoman intellectual life as a means for producing instrumental knowledge for 'saving the state' and its primary fields of interest were related to state reforms (Arlı and Bulut, 2008:24). In that sense, sociology did not assume any conflict between society and state; rather it tried to constitute the technological frame of state's intervention to society (Aytaç, 2006:15). In line with their positivist convictions, republicans did not only employ sociological knowledge for social engineering, but they also installed sociological thought as a substitute for religion (Mert, 2001:202).

Although not being totally based on misleading assumptions, these arguments cannot provide a clear picture of the state of sociology in this period. Considering the

classification of the uses of sociology which was discussed before (see chapter 2), these interpretations appear to be pointing to the ‘engineering model’ of sociology. The typical example of the use of engineering model of sociology had taken place in the post-war United States. It is possible to speak of at least two conditions which are required for the employment of this model. Firstly, in order to use sociological knowledge for engineering society, apparently, there should be a common belief in the merits of sociological knowledge itself. American sociology owes its high status and ‘scientific’ legitimacy from which it benefited in the postwar period, to the contributions of social sciences (most importantly, economics) which “made conspicuous contributions” in the two world wars (see Lasswell, 1959:5). It is hardly possible to say that conditions for such widespread belief in social sciences had been prepared by the Ottoman intellectual and political history. Education of sociology had not covered field researches and had been limited to theoretical discussions until 1940s (Kıray, 1971:9). Prince Sabahattin’s calls for empirical sociology were dismissed by early republican sociological discourse and followers of this stream were belittled as ‘sheep counters’ (Çelebi, 2002:257). More importantly, the discursive construction of the new nation did not appear to be in need of the forms of knowledge which can be produced by sociology. From the very beginning, republican discourse tried to construct the newly-established nation-state as a unique case which cannot be compared with any other nation and whose constituents in various dimensions (ethnic and religious groups, social classes, etc.) were blended with each other and turned into a somewhat vague Turkish identity. Although the leading figure of the state-building process, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, was largely influenced from Gökalp’s sociology, his interest had gradually shifted towards physical anthropology by the second half of 1920s (Toprak, 2012:72-73) and this shift had a great impact in both the ideological construction of Turkish identity and the institutionalization of social sciences⁵⁶. In terms of survival/identity double-bind

⁵⁶ There was no sociology department in the Faculty of Languages, History and Geography (*Dil Tarih Coğrafya Fakültesi*) which was established in 1935 as a part of Ankara University. Sociology was added to the program of this faculty in 1939 within the Department of Philosophy (Toprak, 2012:74; Kasapoğlu, 1999:4). On the other hand, the republican government had never had a positive relationship with İstanbul University due to the distance of this institution to Ankara government during the War of Independence. They were criticized by Kemalist circle for not grasping the ongoing ‘revolution’ and was restructured with the 1933 university reform (Timur, 2000:226, 231).

the newly won War of Independence was not providing the best condition for ‘detached’ and ‘objective’ knowledge production which were regarded as the characteristics of any ‘scientific’ knowledge; survival was assumed to be secured in the battlefield. On the other hand, anthropology was accompanied by history and archeology in the production of instrumental knowledge and these two disciplines had assumed the role of providing the conceptual repertoire of state ideology for emphasizing ‘uniqueness’ and ‘homogeneity’; conducting research on what is sociologically possible or impossible could hardly give desirable results to decision-takers of the time for the construction of a Turkish identity.

Secondly, engineering model of sociology requires the predominance of a particular paradigm which will safeguard the ‘scientific’ character of the knowledge which will be taken as reference point in policy development. In the case of American sociology, Talcott Parson’s structural-functionalism assumed that role. However, in Turkish case, such dominance was experienced only in Gökalp’s sociology whose demise in 1924 was followed by a decline in sociology’s position in Turkish intellectual life⁵⁷. In fact, sociological thought started to diversify by the end of World War I and Gökalp’s sociology was attacked by various intellectual currents ranging from historical materialism to Bergsonian anti-positivism (Ülken, 2005:433-434). One can safely say that this diversification was a reflection of the realization of the dismantlement of the empire and the concerns for developing the theoretical foundations of the forthcoming society. Various schools of thought had been employed in the struggle over the signification of the defining concepts of the identity of the new society. In short, sociology’s contribution to the state-building process in the case of Turkey was more on the lexical level. If it is necessary to offer a classification, it would be more appropriate to identify Turkish sociology in this

⁵⁷ Considering the lack of institutional bases of social sciences in this period, it would hardly be surprising to see that personal histories can have important impacts on intellectual histories. What might be regarded as the new generation of Turkish sociologists had left little imprint on social thought in Turkey because of not only the political tendencies of the new republic, but also the personal tragedies of the two important representatives of this generation. Prince Sabahattin’s follower, Mehmet Ali Şevki’s mental troubles interrupted his studies to a great extent. Gökalp’s follower and critic, Mehmet İzzet died from leukemia in 1930 when he was only 39 years old. More importantly, none of these figures appear to have strong political engagements which would secure a higher status for these names in the history of sociology in Turkey, unlike their politically active and influential mentors.

period with reference to the ‘enlightenment model’ in which sociology is used for shaping public opinion and its direct influence had become feebler towards 1930s.

4.4.1 Conceptualizing the New Society

The period following the establishment of the nation-state was critical for the structuration of modernization discourse since mainstream intellectual currents of the period was competing for capturing the ‘soul’ of ‘Turkish revolution’ by identifying its ‘uniqueness’. It is possible to observe a rather critical stance towards the ‘coldness’ of ‘scientific’ approaches in this period. Belief in scientific laws and religious fatalism had become analogous and equally became objects of scorn⁵⁸. There was a political task at hand and few people were concerned about decorating their arguments with the means of social sciences. Erişirgil called for analyzing the factors of the revolution but he defined the product of this analysis as an ‘ideology’. (Erişirgil, [1927] 1981:187-188). He was concerned about maintaining social solidarity and without totally dismissing the possibility of using religion, he believed that revolution had to have an ideology to fill the “empty consciences” of individuals (Erişirgil [1928] 1981: 230-231). Although the idealism of the period inherited a lot from Gökalp, his Durkheimianism was equally regarded as overly deterministic in understanding the voluntary steps which were taken to achieve the revolution. Drawing upon the freedom-necessity dichotomy, Mehmet İzzet repudiated Gökalp’s limitation of ideals within the boundaries of collective conscience (Mehmet İzzet, [1927]1989c:118-119). He defended the idealism of revolutionism against evolutionism’s insistence on questioning the suitability of existing conditions before taking steps (Mehmet İzzet, [1927]1989d: 125). In fact, all modern societies require improvements, reformations. That is why society is an ideal (*ülkü*) rather than an event (*olay*); the source and product of voluntary action rather than data (Mehmet İzzet, [1923]1969:165-166).

⁵⁸ “A fatalist soul which is scared of the fist of a power outside and above nature is as opposite to the Turkish revolution as a materialist and determinist mentality which tries to transform humans into the flabby cogwheels of a machine” (Nusret Kemal, [1934] 1981: 261).

Stronger attempts to theorize the ‘Turkish revolution’ as a voluntary and creative act had come from a group of conservative intellectuals. Influenced from the popularity of Henri Bergson in the disillusioned Europe, a Bergsonian circle had emerged in 1910s and criticized the predominant positivism of the CUP and then, the new republican state (İrem, 2002:92-95). Bergson had an important influence on many intellectuals of the period, including Gökalp. On the other hand, the Bergsonian conservative stream is also known for its distance from sociology⁵⁹. This stream nourished conservative thought whose relation to the republicans constituted one of the main sources of tension in Turkish political life. However, contemporary interpretations of conservatism point to the affinity between Turkish conservative thought and the so-called ‘positivist’ republicanism. Although serving as a source of inspiration for a political front which criticizes the radical face of the republican modernization project, conservative thought was the product of the same process of the structuration of modernization discourse as republicanism, for it shared with the latter the ultimate purpose of modernization, the paternalist conception of state which they both believed to be necessary to this end, the intention of protecting (read, constructing) the essence of the authentic culture, and the organic conception of society (Öğün, 2006:545-547; Bora, 2009:71). In addition, conservatism had distanced itself from the Islamism of the period on the grounds that the latter was anti-nationalist and anti-modernist. In its attempt to define the moral order of the new nation, conservatives challenged Islamic orthodoxy by calling for the reinterpretation of Islamic doctrine by means of philosophy (İrem, 2002:98-100).

Conservatism’s critique of radical reforms brought it to an in-between position in the tension between top-to-bottom constructionism of the modernization project and cultural concerns. In response to this, conservative thought assumed a ‘diplomatic’ approach which had lead it toward alleviating potential conflicts between state and the civil society (Öğün, 2006:557). Mustafa Şekip Tunç represents this position with

⁵⁹ A well-known figure in the Bergsonian circle, Mustafa Şekip Tunç criticizes Durkheim and his follower, Gökalp, for downgrading social life to a chemical synthesis and advises sociologists for the humble task of preparing raw material for a comparative sociology of future (Ülken, 2005:378). In response to an answer from one of Gökalp’s students, Tunç repudiates the ‘scientificity’ of Durkheimian sociology because of the epistemological incompatibility of its key concept, collective conscience, to the epistemic structure of natural sciences; therefore, Tunç argues, Durkheimian sociology can only be regarded as social philosophy (*ibid.*:380).

his concept of ‘conscious conservatism’ (*şuurlu muhafazakarlık*) which he defines as a “double role” of maintaining ‘order’ throughout the ongoing ‘progress’ and conservation throughout the constant process of change (İrem, 1999:143). A second important name in this stream, İsmail Hakkı Baltacıoğlu shares similar concerns, though he attributes a negative meaning to the concept of conservatism. According to Baltacıoğlu, conservatives are those who are attached to non-living customs and folkways. He proposes the concept of ‘traditionalism’ (*ananecilik*) to define the will to protect those customs which survived throughout history (İrem, 1997:64)⁶⁰. Regardless of their approach to republican reforms, almost all advocates of modernization tried to benefit from the flexibility to choose the ‘proper’ traditions from the large storage of cultural heritage at will which was provided by various forms of this distinction.

A Marxist conception of Turkish modernization had difficulty to establish itself in early republican social thought. As a political movement, Marxism was already crippled by the assassination of the leading names of the Communist Party of Turkey only a year after the establishment of the party in 1920. During 1920s, the party kept its distance from the republicans though members of the party generally found the anti-imperialist tone of the emerging official discourse beneficial for the future of communist movement (Dervişoğlu, 2004:13-15). This attitude was inherited by another intellectual movement which had born from within the communist party. Known as the Kadro Movement, this new front had a much more affirmative approach to the republican ‘revolution’ and it claimed the role for theorizing the official ideology of the state which is named after Mustafa Kemal Atatürk as Kemalism. Retaining Marxian critique of bourgeois liberalism, Kadro Movement argues that Marxism falls short in theorizing national liberation movements. Being one of the leading figures of the movement, Şevket Süreyya Aydemir defines two dimensions of conflict as the one between social classes and the other between advanced industrial societies and colonial or semi-colonial countries. Aydemir attributes priority to the second dimension of conflict and argues that class conflicts in advanced countries cannot be solved as long as colonization exists (Aydemir,

⁶⁰ Here, Baltacıoğlu directly adapts Gökalp’s distinction between living and non-living traditions (Gökalp [1923] 1977:19-22).

[1932]1990:41-45). The Turkish national liberation movement Aydemir and others tried to theorize was going to construct an industrial society under the control of the state and “the power of the nation”. By this way, no space would be left for the emergence of social classes (*ibid.*:48-49). As it is the case for the conservative thought which was mentioned above, Kadro Movement had left its imprints on the political debates of the following decades. Although being supported by certain segments of the founding party of the republic (Republican People’s Party, hereafter RPP) at the beginning, this support had dissipated as a result of the pressures of liberal intellectuals and the active representatives of capitalist circles in RPP (Ertan, 2010:40)⁶¹.

The republican revolution had so forcefully established itself that almost all rival attempts to theorize the new pathway that Turkish modernization entered had to face with the official political discourse of the era. One common point of these attempts was their will to carve out the unique character of the new Turkish nation. Surely, the official discourse was not exempt from this tendency. The new republic had to define itself as a modern nation-state which had left behind the cosmopolitan empire whose attempts for modernization had failed because of her inability to surpass the dualities these very attempts had brought about. As opposed to this, the new republic was going to be built upon a unitary national ideal which provides the identity of the new society whose characteristics also serve for securing the survival of the new republic.

4.4.2 Kemalist Formulation of Modernization

Although the republican era tried hard to separate itself from the imperial past, Kemalist discourse was greatly influenced by the intellectual heritage of the late Ottoman period. The theme of ‘saving the state’, which was predominant among the Young Ottoman intellectual opposition and Young Turk politics, largely shaped the governing strategy in the nation-state period whose authoritarianism is characterized

⁶¹ Being disturbed from concepts like ‘semi-colony’ and ‘planned economy’ which were frequently used in the journal of the movement, *Kadro*, the general secretary of RPP (and the future prime minister) Recep Peker established a rival journal named as *Ülkü* for developing an alternative ideology of Kemalism (Uyar, 1997:183).

by the strong emphasis on the state as opposed to a weaker emphasis on the nation (Yeğen, 2006:98-99). RPP ruled the country in a single-party regime which lasted for more than two decades following the establishment of the republic except short-term attempts for a multi-party regime which started and ended under the control of Atatürk⁶². In that sense, Kemalism hegemonized the political sphere and “acted as a horizon in which all political struggles could recognize their condition of possibility” (Çelik, 2000:198). As a decisive instance in the structuration of modernization discourse, it is important to understand the relationship between Kemalism and the Ottoman intellectual heritage for which, according to Erik-Jan Zürcher, there is no better way than to look into the ‘six arrows’ (*altı ok*) - the essential elements of Kemalist political discourse which were adopted at RPP’s 1931 Congress and inserted into the Turkish Constitution in 1937 (Zürcher, 2005:14). These principles were republicanism (*cumhuriyetçilik*), nationalism (*milliyetçilik*), populism (*halkçılık*), transformism (*inkılapçılık*), laicism (*laiklik*), and statism (*devletçilik*). The principles of statism and transformism provide the executive aspect of establishing a strong state and the discretion to enlarge or limit the boundaries of state’s maneuvers according to the requirements of the situation. Populism and republicanism, on the other hand, are the means for legitimizing the steps which will be taken with reference to the first two principles. Lastly, the principles of nationalism and laicism serve for constructing the identity of the new nation.

Statism was the formula republicans had applied for rapidly establishing the economic conditions which would be suitable for the cultivation of the modern Turkish society. By nature, application of this principle requires a single command center. In a famous 1923 speech, Atatürk claims that existence of different political parties indicates the existence of different social classes. Based on Durkheim’s conception of division of labor which he learned from Gökalp, Atatürk argues that “since the interests of the members of different occupations depend on each other, it is not possible to divide them into classes; as a whole they are composed of nothing

⁶² Perhaps the most interesting case about this method of controlling political opposition is Atatürk’s idea of establishing a communist party with the membership of some “sensible” people. This attitude is popularized with the famous expression “If someone is going to act as a communist, it would again be us!” (*Komünistlik yapacaksa onu da biz yaparız!*) which is attributed to the once governor of Ankara, Nevzat Tandoğan (Toker, 1971:33-34).

but people” (quoted in Parla, 1991b:100). Köker evaluates this speech as an early expression of Atatürk’s will to establish a single-party regime (Köker, 2009:146). In other words, it was the expression of the discursive unity of party and nation. The unity of the party and the state, on the other hand, was not only attained in discursive sphere. The institutional attachment of RPP to the state mechanism was put into practice with a 1936 public mandate which declared that the party and the state were integrated. According to this, the general secretary of RPP was also the minister of the interior and the provincial chairmen of the party were also going to serve as governors. The process reached its culmination with the installment of the ‘six arrows’ of RPP to the Constitution in 1937 as the fundamental principles of the state (Koçak, 1989:115-116).

On the other hand the ideal of classless society, which was going to be the key argument of the solidarist foundation of the principle of populism was not regarded to be in conflict with state’s policies for promoting bourgeoisie⁶³. Both 1920s and 1930s were characterized by interventionist policies whose main purpose was to boost entrepreneurialism, though state more directly involved in industrialism in 1930s (Keser, 1933:122). The appearance of a capitalist group who benefited from monopolies and other favorable conditions which were prepared by state policies was not regarded by the official ideology as a threat for disturbing the unity of society as it was pictured in the principle of populism. The existence of the state and the party (which were regarded as one and the same thing) was the guarantee for the protection of this unity⁶⁴.

The principle of transformism was introduced with the claim of setting the standards of the limits of state’s involvement in organizing social life. The ambiguity of the term served this principle well in terms of fulfilling its function. Like many others in the Kemalist lexicon, the term ‘*inkılap*’ has its roots in Young Ottoman discourse

⁶³ These policies should not be regarded only as a reflection of the top-to-bottom approach of bureaucracy to shape a dormant society. According to Boratav, the rapid diffusion of capital holders into the administrative positions of the new regime played a role in the application of these interventionist policies (Boratav, 1977:42).

⁶⁴ According to Makal, state’s extensive intervention and control on economic life was one of the factors which diminished the need for corporatist practices (Makal, 2002:196).

and there had been discussions about whether 1908 Young Turk Revolution should be called as a revolution (*ihtilal*) or transformation (*inkılap*) (Dumont, 2004:15). As it was discussed before, the term ‘*inkılap*’ is not the proper translation of the term ‘revolution’ for the latter is used to define more extensive and sudden changes about which Ottomans had never have a positive opinion. However, the term ‘*inkılap*’ does not also mean ‘reform’ for it is used to define decisions which were taken to trigger comprehensive social changes rather than gradual advancements which were made in separate spheres (*ibid.*). In that sense, the principle of transformism repudiates an evolutionary conception of change; the transformation which Turkish society has to go through is quite extensive and it should take place in a short period of time (Köker, 2009:170). Gradual and evolutionary change was openly repudiated by the 1935 RPP Party Program in order to emphasize the radical character of the ongoing change (Parla, 1992:45). In that sense, transformism is the Kemalist interpretation of the top-to-bottom practice of reformation with bureaucratic means of the state, which had been the hallmark of the Ottoman-Turkish modernization (Yeğen, 2009:59).

The meaning of the principle of republicanism was no less ambiguous. The declaration of Turkey as a republic in October 29th, 1923 is officially regarded as the day the country is established as a nation-state. On the other hand, the meaning of republicanism as it is applied in Turkey has always been an issue of discussion. The concepts of ‘republic’ or ‘republicanism’ had clearer meanings in official discourse when they were used in a negative sense. The underlying motive of establishing a non-monarchic and non-theocratic regime can be found in the lineage of the founders of the nation-state. In short, republicanism had already been spreading among reformist intellectuals on the basis of negative descriptions in the imperial period even though it was not expressed by the majority as the ideal regime. In his assessment of Atatürk’s ‘Great Speech’ (*Nutuk*), Parla detects four meanings that Atatürk attaches to the concept of ‘republic’: (1) a way of governing opposite of monarchy; (2) a way of governing opposite of theocracy; (3) a regime which is based on popular sovereignty; and (4) a regime in which National Assembly is the ultimate authority (Parla, 1991a:138). The last two definitions indicates the significant symbolic role National Assembly has for the party-nation unity for it functions for

securing the representation of the popular will. In that sense, the functioning of republicanism should be evaluated with reference to its relation to the principle of populism.

As another concept which can be molded into different shapes, the principle of populism is one of the key elements of Kemalism. According to Köker, populism is the most important link between Kemalism and CUP along with positivism (Köker, 2009:136). Atatürk had already announced that he had an intention to establish a political party with the name ‘People’s Party’ before the end of the War of Independence. Tunçay points that the use of the term ‘people’ created disputes in the assembly for the widespread meaning of the term in that period implied oppressed classes and any reference to these classes were identified with socialism. In addition, the term was used in the name of one of the groups in the First Assembly and this group (*Halk Zümresi*) had apparent leftist tendencies (Tunçay, 2005:40). Similarly, Köker mentions the statements of some of the members of the First Assembly who used populism for class-based political arguments (Köker, 2009:140-142). According to Timur, the idea of populism had developed under the influence of the Russian Narodnik movement but it gained a new meaning in the debates on 1921 Constitution where, as one of many manifestations of the struggle between different classes for power, liberals and local notables employed this concept as a weapon against the “autocracy of the office-holders” for they were concerned about the fact that the leading names of the ongoing military and political struggle were mainly military officers and office-holders and that their leadership might lead to a CUP type of autocracy (Timur, 1993:29). This aspect of populism has its roots in Young Ottoman thought in which blaming office-holders for the unsuccessful outcomes of Tanzimat reforms was one of the main themes of their political criticism. The language of this critique was going to be transferred by Atatürk to the critique of intellectuals who do not appreciate republican reforms. Definition of populism as a principle against the autocracy of the office-holders was also closely related to the anti-elitism of Gökalp’s conception of populism (see Gökalp, [1923] 2007:199-201) and it was used effectively by Kemalism (see Tunçay, 2005:218-219). As we will see in the

following chapter, it was going to be used against the reforms his party had put into practice as well in the post World War II period.

Toprak points that Gökalp's definition of the concept is based on a combination of Durkheim's arguments on division of labor and traditional Ottoman guilds. Arguing that existence of social classes would instigate unbalance, Gökalp locates occupational groups which have their places in the division of labor as the defining units of different groups in society (Toprak, 1977:14). The idea of occupational groups were employed by some members of the First Assembly synonymous to socialism and these members offered a two-tiered national assembly, one being formed by democratic elections, and other being made up of the representatives of occupational groups (*ibid.*:16-17). There was an apparent relationship between these efforts and the concerns about the autocracy of office-holders. However, the 'leftist' use of populism had soon dissipated and the concept was taken over by Kemalist discourse with a greater emphasis on the solidarist aspect of its definition which rendered the concept useful for connecting it with the principle of republicanism and so, securing the party-nation unity. The democratic connotations of the concept had been pushed aside by dissolving populism within nationalism and republicanism. Tunçay argues that populism was not employed by Kemalism in democratic terms and it was limited within the boundaries of nationalism by locating the concept of nation instead of people which allowed republicans to use Rousseau's concepts in the forms of "national will" and "national sovereignty" (Tunçay, 2005:212). Similarly, Parla and Davison say that "[t]he idea that Turks constitute a "nation" closely relates to the idea that they constitute a "people". Kemalist discourse often employs the two interchangeably, such that the idea of popular rule overlaps with the idea of national sovereignty" (Parla and Davison, 2004:80). In other words, populism's relationship with republicanism is based on its identification with "national sovereignty". In this respect, Köker points that the principle of republicanism is the political dimension of populism (Köker, 2009:137).

The democratic connotations of populism were further erased in 1930s after the initial attempts for a multi-party regime. Toprak argues that as an extension of the

spread of authoritarianism in Europe, the Durkheimian occupational morality -which has an important place in Gökbalp's populism- left its place for national morality (*milli ahlak*) (Toprak, 1977:19). The strongly established single-party regime redefined populism with the slogan "for the people, despite the people". As one of the delegates expressed in 1931 Congress of RPP, republicans believed that revolutions do not have to be bottom-up as in the case of French Revolution, "sometimes they occur top-to-bottom" (quoted in Köker, 2009:148). The legitimacy of this slogan was established by the discursive unity of the leader, party, state and the nation which was attained by a specific adaptation of Gökbalp's solidarism. Toprak states that RPP'S principle of populism was mostly influenced by solidarism (Toprak, 1985:381). However, given the relationship of populism with nationalism and republicanism, it might be more appropriate to say that solidarism largely shaped the way Kemalist discourse conceptualized state and society. Crystallization of 'Turkish nation' in this unity and the suppression of unwanted connotations of populism were secured with the principles of nationalism and laicism.

The principle of nationalism was not only a means for defining a unifying element for the new nation-state. It also provided the republican reformists with a large domain which can be presented as the foundational elements of the new nation-state. Atatürk benefited from his status as the charismatic hero of the War of Independence for expressing his ideas and defending his future plans as if they were obviously the only pathway which should be followed. Parla argues that the "circular and tautological techniques of rhetoric" which Atatürk used very often served him to put a veil of objectivity over his opinions. By this way, he put forward his own descriptions of the present situation of Turkish society and the future which awaits it as objective facts and claimed that he was just taking the necessary steps which are prescribed by these facts (Parla, 1991a: 33, 37-38). With clear reference to Gökbalp's way of constructing Turkish nationalist ideology, Atatürk claimed that he saw the 'potential' of Turkish society: "I had to push our whole society to gradually carry out the great inclination for progress I sensed in the conscience and the future of the

nation which I kept in my conscience as a national secret (*milli sır*)” (quoted in *ibid.*:34).⁶⁵

Gökalp defined his age as the age of nations (*milliyet*) (Gökalp, [1913]1959:72). He also argued for a parallel relationship between the decline of the impact of religion and the rise of nationalism (Gökalp, [1923]2007:215). Kemalist ideology had inherited the inherent relationship between nationalism and secularization along with the tension Gökalp’s formulation tries to solve. However, the terms of this tension were transformed into something else. Mert states that contrary to the social dimension of religion in Gökalp’s nationalism, Kemalist nationalism makes a strict distinction between individual and social, private and public, and spiritual and material aspects of life. In the latter formulation, religion is defined with reference to the spiritual life of the individual (Mert, 1994:71). Based on the same argument, Yıldız argues that Kemalist nationalism is fundamentally different in the sense that it repudiates Gökalp’s culture-civilization distinction. According to Yıldız, Kemalism redefined the concept of culture by removing religion as a defining element and installing a non-Islamic past instead; and then this redefined conception of culture is equated with civilization (Yıldız, 2007:119, 119n, 157n).

The changing meaning of nationalism throughout the early republican period appears to support these evaluations. The members of the First National Assembly (1920-1923), including Atatürk, used the term *milliyetçilik* with strong references to its Islamic connotations during the period of the War of Independence (see Tunçay, 2005:22n). Throughout 1920s, these connotations tended to dissipate and gained a new outlook by 1930s as a result of the influence of the principle of laicism (Köker, 2009:151). Köker points how the secularization of the concept of nation took place in official discourse by assessing the 1931 and 1935 party programs of RPP. According to this, the 1931 program mentioned “the special qualities of Turkish society” without any definitions; these “special qualities” (*hususî seciyeler*) were clarified in 1935 program with reference to “language, culture and [national] ideal” (*ibid.*). Parla and Davison point that Atatürk had used concepts of ‘culture’, ‘ethnicity’, and ‘race’

⁶⁵ Here, Atatürk completes the leader-party-state-nation unity by connecting his existence with the fate of Turkish nation.

(*kültür, kavim, ırk*) interchangeably while talking about the “special qualities” of Turkish nation in his speeches (Parla and Davison, 2004:72)⁶⁶. Kemalism benefitted from this malleable conception of identity to secure national commitment of various groups. Gökalp’s culturalist conception of nationalism again provides Kemalism with the space for maneuver it needs: “Spirituality precedes materiality for human beings. Therefore, genealogy (*şecere*) is not a criterion for nationality; only criterion is to have a national cultivation (*terbiye*) and ideal (*mefkûre*)” (Gökalp, [1923]2007:184).

The employment of the terms culture, ethnicity and race points to an effort to reconstruct the nationalist discourse with a secular language and they correspond to the efforts for re-conceptualizing Turkishness in positive (scientific) terms which can be observed in archeological and anthropological studies of 1930s. Following Köker, one might say that by redefining the constitutive features of Turkish society, Kemalism tried to insert new means to define Turkish identity instead of the one with religious content (Köker, 2009:153). However, the effort of Kemalism to be an omnipresent ideology, which it inherited from Young Turk politics (Yeğen, 2006:101), requires other articulations in terms of identity formation. For example, Çağaptay argues that the concept of race signifies “ethnicity-through-language” in Kemalist lexicon and this had “opened up Turkishness to Jews, if they learned language”. On the other hand, he continues, Islam retained its pivotal role for defining Turkishness and “made it possible for the non-Turkish Muslims to become Turkish” (Çağaptay, 2006:157). In that sense, variation of the definition of Turkishness can also be regarded as a factor in the difficulties republicans experienced during the nation-building process: “One can conclude that the main reason why Turkish Nationalists were not successful in transforming particular, local, and regional subject positions into a common culture was their making use of diverse elements in inventing a Turkish national culture” (Tokluoğlu, 1995:210)⁶⁷.

⁶⁶ 1935 program includes a small dictionary of the new Turkish translations of the Ottoman words and the word ‘nation’ is translated as ‘ulus’ in this dictionary instead of the Islamic term ‘millet’ (for the dictionary, see Parla, 1992: 100-105).

⁶⁷ Ambiguous position of Kurds in official discourse displays the cognitive boundaries of Turkish nationalism in terms of categorizing the now age-old Kurdish problem. According to Yeğen, Kurdish problem was conceptualized by the official discourse as a religious-reactionary problem; a tribal

The same elasticity appears in the application of the principle of laicism. Many republican reforms which were conducted to realize the principle of laicism had been previously discussed by reformist Ottoman thinkers and put into practice by the Ottoman state (see Dumont, 2004:17-18; Mert, 1994: 69-88). The principle of laicism is defined in official discourse as the separation of political and religious affairs. However, this definition has always been an issue of discussion in terms of the extent of this 'separation'. For example, contrary to the argument for separation, Toprak argues that Kemalist laicism had rather "strengthened state authority and control over orthodox Sunni institutions and religious functionaries" (Toprak, 1988: 122). Following the same line of thought, Dumont states that republicans believed that religion was a rather strong asset to be given to private hands. Therefore, they did not allow independent religious institutions; instead they kept religious authority at their hand by establishing Directorate of Religious Affairs (*Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı*) which was responsible for almost everything about religion ranging from the control of mosques to the appointment of religious officials. In that sense, Dumont argues, Turkish state used a far greater authority on religious affairs than it was the case in the period of the sultan-caliphate (Dumont, 2004:18). In short, the arguments about the containment of religious life in private sphere did not find its expression in the institutional organization of religion. Substitution of nationalism with religion had been an idea which was overtly or covertly expressed in the early republican period (see Tunçay, 2005:222-224). However, neither the formal-institutional organization of social life, nor subtle politico-ideological maneuvers of the state indicates such a total denial of any relation to religion. Although Kemalist nationalism tried to construct a Turkish identity in secular terms, Islam retained its position as a defining element of Turkishness.

The six principle of Kemalism form a comprehensive framework for securing the party-state-nation unity which was an effort to tackle with the survival/identity

resistance against modernization; a movement which was provoked by other countries; or as a problem of economic integration and underdevelopment. The resistance of the official discourse to conceive the ethno-political character of Kurdish problem was a consequence of the specific 'discursive formation' whose main constituents were modernization-Westernization, centralization, nationalism and secularism (Yeğen, 2006:20, 107).

double-bind. In this framework, the state was going to lead the way for reforms which would prepare the necessary conditions for development and secure the future of the new republic. Decisions to this end were going to be taken by the National Assembly which was defined as the representative of the national will. By this way, the congruence between the mechanisms of governing and the defining characteristics of society was going to be ensured. The fragility of this unity was going to be realized when concrete channels for the participation of society to decision-making was opened. The following chapter will focus on the discursive structuration of the sociology of modernization in Turkey with reference to the new divisions of the era and the changing tendencies in the social scientific literature.

CHAPTER V

5 SOCIOLOGY IN THE POSTWAR TURKEY

In his historical 1947 speech to the Congress which marks the inception of Truman Doctrine, president of the United States, Harry Truman, linked international peace to the security of the US and as a result, “America assumed Great Britain’s role as keeper of the peace not only in the Near East but around the world” (Edwards, 1988-89:131). This speech was one of the important steps towards the so-called ‘Cold War’ which signifies a long period of polarization between the ‘Soviet Bloc’ and the ‘liberal’ ‘Western’ countries under the leadership of the US. The Truman Doctrine and the following Marshal Aids had largely shaped the political environment of Turkey and lead the way to the inception of multi-party system which unearthed the political conflicts which had been suppressed in the early republican period.

Political climate in Turkey had gone through an extensive transition during the World War II. With the departure of Atatürk in 1938 and the presentation of his brother in arms, İsmet İnönü as the “National Chief”, Turkey entered into a new phase which is usually pictured as a period of competition between republican bureaucrats and agrarian-commercial bourgeoisie. Reflections of this competition can be seen not only in the debates on various regulations and tax reforms, but also in more directly political attempts like the restructuring of party organization or the establishment of the Village Institutes (Oran, 1969:238-249; Timur, 1993, chapter 6; Koçak, 1989:125-134). The demands of the Soviet Russia from Turkey in the aftermath of the World War II provided the ideological means of the political disputes of the period⁶⁸. Conservative circles in RPP blamed leftist intellectuals for cooperating with Russians –a maneuver which served for both eliminating political rivals and gaining the support of the US against USSR by proving the former of the existence of a communist threat in Turkey (Demirel, 2009:416). On the other hand,

⁶⁸ For a journalistic account on the hectic diplomatic efforts of Turkish government to gain the support of the US against the USSR, see Toker (1971).

the distance of the left from both RPP and conservatives had increased during the war owing to rather positive attitude of these parties towards Nazi Germany which was an extension of their deep conviction for the existence of a ‘Russian threat’ (Ayvazoğlu, 2000:135). This political climate also provided convenient conditions for the growth of racist movements. Another important political front of the period was Anatolianism (*Anadoluculuk*). As a form of territorialist nationalism which tried to construct national identity with reference to Anatolian geography, after its initial phase in 1920s during which it did not have much impact on political life, Anatolianist movement gained a new breath in 1930s (Kılıç, 2007:123). The revival of the movement in this period was lead by a group of intellectuals who had their academic formations in Europe, returned to Turkey and took posts in universities and party administration by 1930s. These intellectuals started to criticize the cultural problems which they believed the republican revolution had created or could not solve (Çınar, 2013:208).

In a sense, the afore-mentioned competition between diverse intellectual currents in 1920s were carried to late 1930s with more rigid ideological boundaries and more direct influence on political arena thanks to the power vacuum in the post-1938 period. Although the problematic relationship between the anxiety of survival and identity was inherited by the intellectual circles of the early republican period, this relationship have entered into a new phase during the World War II. In sociological literature, two different schools were crystallized in this period. These schools are defined in this study as structure-oriented and culture-oriented sociologies. After elaborating predominant tendencies in the international sociological community, I am going to evaluate how these schools formulated the relationship between survival and self-identification.

5.1 Sociology of the Cold War Era

History of social sciences had taken a drastic turn by the Cold War. The competition between the USSR and the US in the rapid decolonization process in the Third World had its reflections on knowledge production. Although “the quest for a unifying

general theory” had been in the agenda for some time, “the need became more urgent with the ascendancy of Marxism-Leninism as a professedly universal theory” (Arnason, 2003:442). The end result of this quest for an alternative paradigm is the widespread promotion of the so-called ‘modernization school’ whose main assumptions are broadly defined by Latham as (1) a shared course of history from ‘traditional’ to ‘modern’ society; (2) integration of political, social and economic changes; (3) a linear path of development towards modern state; and (4) a belief in the development-triggering effect of the contact of “developing” societies “with the knowledge and resources of modern ones” (Latham, 2003:723). To this should be added the idea that “entrepreneurs are often drawn from deviant minorities, from those who are denied ‘normal’ channels of making their way in society”, which became a widely accepted view among modernization theorists in 1950s (Harrison, 2005:12).⁶⁹ In addition, modernization theory charged ‘modernizing elite’ “with the articulation of development goals and supervision of development strategies for their countries, and with the task of ‘nation-building’” (Bernstein, 1971:145).

The political polarization did not create an apparent clash within sociology, thanks to the divergence, Gouldner defines, between Marxism and academic sociology which reserved the seat of sociology in Western academic knowledge production. According to this, the stream which was established by Marx and Engels was followed by theorists of Russian revolution and then went through a renewal in the hands of Lukacs, Gramsci, and lastly the German critical theory, while the other side, which Gouldner defines as “Positivistic Sociology”, had followed the line from Comte and Durkheim towards English anthropology and ended up in Parsons’s theoretical synthesis (Gouldner, 1971:111-113). Bottomore states that despite his purpose of founding a science of society, Marx refrained from using the term ‘sociology’ owing to his negative views on Comte with whom the discipline was associated. Although there had been some attempts to link Marx with sociology at the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century, academic

⁶⁹ An example of this view can be seen in Lerner’s famous *The Passing of Traditional Society* where Lerner describes a ‘visionary’ grocer in Balgat of 1950s (back then, a village close to Ankara) who dreams about urban way of life and later remembered by his fellow villagers as a prophet who anticipated the changes which took place in five years of time (Lerner, [1958]1965: chapter 1).

sociology had lost its connection to Marxist debates in political movements and party organizations and sociology was officially labeled as “bourgeois ideology” by Stalinism (Bottomore, 1956:13, 29; Bottomore, 2002:537-538).⁷⁰ Marxian sociologies had to wait for some time before cracking Soviet orthodoxy and producing alternative pictures of the world instead of the one which was drawn by the postwar Parsonian sociology.

On the other side of the Cold War, as the leader of the ‘free world’, establishment of sociology as a ‘science’ was cherished in the US. Commenting on Theodore Abel’s optimistic views on Polish sociology in 1950, Znaniecki argues that Abel underestimated “the increasing pressure of political authorities to make Polish sociologists accept Marxism-Leninism as the one absolutely valid social theory” and adds with an ironic confidence that “[i]t is now obvious that sociology cannot be made subservient to practical ideals without losing its theoretic validity and, in the long run, its utility” (Znaniecki, 1950:218). Although the school of sociology with which he is associated was overshadowed by Parsonian sociology, Znaniecki defends that sociology was successfully established as an “objective science” in the US. Surely, this has more to do with the political climate of the period than the success of sociology “as an objective science”, unlike it was claimed by Znaniecki. Sociology was utilized to produce order-oriented explanations of social processes in domestic affairs and to write prescriptions for the ‘social’, ‘economic’ and ‘political’ development of peripheral countries whose well-being was important for the US. Sociologists like Daniel Lerner worked along with economists and political scientists like W. W. Rostow and Lucien Pye in researches which had wide sources of funding ranging from universities to private foundations and intelligence agencies in order to produce knowledge for the “security” of the US (Latham, 2003:729).

⁷⁰ Lenin locates sociology along with other systems of thought he labels as “reactionary” and expresses his distaste against the “emptiness” of the biological lexicon sociology uses (see Lenin, [1909]1972: chapter 6). The study in which Lenin expresses these critiques (*Materialism and Empirio-Criticism*) is one of the first Marxist works Behice Boran had read in her studies on Marxism (Atilgan, 2009:34). Boran was going to refer to the distinction in “the scientific studies of social phenomena” between “socialist systems” and “sociological systems”, latter of which she defined as the “pseudo-scientific ideology of the bourgeoisie” (Boran, 1947:313)

The predominant endeavor of the postwar American sociology, which shaped the sociological lexicon of the Capitalist Bloc, is to identify and investigate the 'structure' of society. Ruled out as a concept which is "at best, a dubious one" by the prominent name of American sociology in interwar period, Robert Ezra Park, in a text which was originally published in 1925 (Park, 1950:24), the concept of social structure became the buzzword of the postwar sociology. The employment of the concept by rival theories brought about a polysemic appearance to it. The main dispute of the period was between two schools of sociology which Dahrendorf defines as "integration theory of society" and "coercion theory of society". In this dispute, while the integration theory "conceives of social structure in terms of a functionally integrated system held in equilibrium by certain patterned and recurrent processes", the coercion theory "views social structure as a form of organization held together by force and constraint and reaching continuously beyond itself in the sense of producing within itself the forces that maintain it in an unending process of change" (Dahrendorf, 1959:159).

The integration theory's conception of social structure had dominated the period for it allows an order-oriented sociology which coincided with the intellectual expectations of the period. Known in general as structural functionalism, Abbott and Sparrow define this sociology as the "individual-collectivity model" which depicts "social world as a mass of atomic individuals located in a larger "system" or "collectivity"" (Abbott and Sparrow, 2007:297). Using the term "mass-society conception of society" to define the same school of sociology, Haney defines this school's main characteristic as a suspicion towards the inclinations of "alienated and, therefore, highly manipulable citizens" (Haney, 2008:69). According to Haney, the experience of fascism and Stalinism in 1930s convinced American social scientists that Ortega y Gasset was right when he drew connections between mass society, alienation and totalitarianism in his famous 1930 essay *The Revolt of the Masses* (*ibid.*:89). Without doubt, the most influential representative of the school of sociology which is based on an order-oriented conception of social structure is Talcott Parsons who defines social structure as "stable systems of social interaction" whose main focus is "the integration of the motivation of actors with the normative

cultural standards which integrate the action system” (Parsons, [1951]2005:23).⁷¹ A somewhat more concise conceptualization of social structure is expressed by Merton who defines its two phases as the first being “culturally defined goals, purposes and interests, held out as legitimate objectives for all or for diversely located members of the society”; and the second being the one which “defines, regulates and controls the acceptable modes of reaching out for these goals” (Merton, [1949]1967:132, 133, respectively).

Parsonian sociology was questioned by a group of sociologists who attributed a different role to sociology. Shaskolsky argues that the political background of the conception of sociology which was defended by these sociologists was shaped by the same problem to which they approached from a different angle. According to this, unlike structural functionalism whose main motive was to “soothe over the strains” of American society in order to improve its image as a leader, these critical sociologists preferred to reveal social conflicts (Shaskolsky, 1970:26-27). As a prominent name among these critical sociologists, Wright Mills also put the concept of social structure into forefront of his ‘sociological imagination’ which was set out to answer many questions among which the first one reads as “What is the structure of this particular society as a whole?” (Mills, [1959]2000:6). As opposed to its use as a framework from which individuals’ “deviation” is regarded as the failure of the individuals themselves, the concept of social structure is re-conceptualized by conflict theorists as a tool to investigate power relations and social inequality. The origins of this stream can be traced back to Marx who conceptualizes social structure “as a system of relations between class positions” (Bernardi, *et al.*, 2006:164).

⁷¹ Parsons’s conception of system owes a lot to the debates on cybernetics which he employed to formulate mechanisms which are patterning social behavior. Cybernetic theory describes mechanisms of ‘control’ which eliminate the tendency of machines toward disorganization (Wiener, [1950]1989:24-25). Stating that the main subject of interest of cybernetics as “ways of behaving”, Ashby argues that “cybernetics typically treats any given, particular machine by asking not “what individual act will it produce here and now?” but “what are all the possible behaviors that it can produce?” (Ashby, 1957:3) The seemingly endless possibilities which are opened up by these questions are contained within “functional imperatives” of the social machinery of Parsons which hinder the normal flow of entropy and maintains order. These functional imperatives are defined in Parsons’s AGIL (adaptation, goal attainment, integration, latency) scheme (see Parsons, [1961]1985:158-163).

The developments in terms of the institutionalization of sociology and the increasing number of scholars who were educated in social sciences for an academic career had changed the outlook of sociology in Turkey in 1940s. Contrary to the works of the late Ottoman or early republican period which were written by intellectuals who have less academically-oriented education and have closer ties with day-to-day politics, sociology gained a more 'scientific' or 'academic' outlook in this period. This change brought about a relatively different way of approaching to modernization. Scholars started to investigate the implications of the ongoing changes for society by conducting field studies. In addition, although some scholars continued to take part in political life, their involvement mostly took place via their membership to certain associations which were trying to influence politics without directly taking seats in the National Assembly. On the other hand, the predominant tendencies in social scientific literature did not provide social scientists in Turkey with alternative theoretical tools to conceptualize modernization with reference to micro scale processes in society. Society was generally regarded as a passive entity and modernization was still a state-related matter.

5.2 Redefining Survival-Identity Relationship

The postwar sociology of modernization in Turkey had to face with new tendencies in society with a set of concepts about whose meanings there had been a growing conflict as a result of the increasing polarization in the field of politics. Production of knowledge about social change was a challenge since parties involved agree on neither the conceptualization of change (reform, transformation, evolution, revolution) nor what really is changing (society, culture, religion). The conceptual ambiguity became all the more important because structure- and culture-oriented sociologies shared the same concern for economic development and the willingness to adopt certain institutions of Western societies which had long been regarded as the inevitable condition of survival. The problem mainly emerges from the difference of the content of the concept of social structure which has been employed by these two streams.

In her assessment of structure-oriented sociologists in Turkey, Başak mentions two conceptual distinctions in sociological literature which were employed in Turkish sociology as the first one being ‘material’ and ‘non-material culture’ and the second one being ‘social structure’ and ‘cultural structure’ (Başak, 2005:54-55). The first one belongs to William Ogburn who distinguishes between material features of culture which comprise everything a culture produces ranging from objects of everyday use to technological devices and non-material aspects like “knowledge, belief, morals, law and custom” (Ogburn, 1923:4). As it will be discussed later, Ogburn’s conception of change focuses on the maladjustment of changes in these two spheres. The second distinction Başak mentions is elaborated by Merton (among others) who starts his discussion with a description of the difference between Durkheim’s sociological conception of anomie and psychological definitions of the same concept and tries to show how these two conceptions can actually work together by elaborating on two other concepts, ‘social structure’ and ‘cultural structure’. Here, cultural structure is defined as the “organized set of normative values governing behavior which is common to members of a designated society or group”, while social structure is the “set of social relationships in which members of the society or group are variously implicated” (Merton, [1949]1967:162). In Merton’s definition, anomie appears when “cultural and social structure are maladjusted” (*ibid.*:163). However, Ogburn’s and Merton’s distinctions are not based on same assumptions and concerns. Ogburn is much more concerned about the capacity of non-material culture to adjust to the changes in material culture and his distinction is based on similar assumptions to that of the materialist distinction between base and superstructure. In that sense, if we try to find a conception of social structure in his theory, it would be based on the relationships which organize material culture. Merton’s distinction, on the other hand, has nothing to do with the relationship between base and superstructure. Social structure is pictured in Merton rather as a set of constraining conditions which allow actions which comply with cultural structure in some cases and obstruct such actions in others⁷².

⁷² “The social structure acts as a barrier or as an open door to the acting out of cultural mandates” (Merton, [1949]1967:162-163).

Ogburn's distinction is more widely used among structure-oriented sociologists in Turkey since it is much more compatible to the relationship between different segments of social life which have been regarded to be in conflict throughout the Ottoman-Turkish modernization movement. When they speak of 'structure', they mostly meant material relationships and the institutional setting which organize these relationships. Ogburn's distinction is also discussed at length in the writings of culture-oriented sociologists in Turkey owing to its resemblance to Gökalp's culture-civilization distinction⁷³, but their main concern is the kind of maladjustment which is described in Merton's conception of anomie. Therefore, when they speak of 'social structure', these social scientists usually refer to the institutional and moral setting which specifically functions for cultivating national identity⁷⁴. As a result, two different conceptions of social structure emerged which brought about two different ways of describing the underlying maladjustment which hinder modernization. These different descriptions served for different purposes in terms of formulating the relationship between anxieties of survival and identity. The maladjustment Ogburn defines was useful for structure-oriented sociologists who regarded identity as the product of superstructural elements of society and paid much more attention to investigate material conditions of survival in terms of different rates of change in different spheres of social life. Culture-oriented sociologists, on the other hand, focused more on the threat of maladjustment which is defined by Merton and tried to formulate their version of modernization in which steps which will be taken to meet the conditions of survival are in harmony with Turkish cultural identity whose restoration is the ultimate purpose of modernization. In the following section, structure-oriented theories will be elaborated on the bases of the sociologies of Behice Boran and Mübeccel Kıray, while the culture-oriented theories will be discussed with the analyses of the studies of Mümtaz Turhan and Erol Güngör.

⁷³ As one of the structure-oriented sociologists who employ Ogburn's distinction, Yasa repudiates any juxtaposition between Ogburn's material -non-material culture and Gökalp's civilization-culture couples (Yasa, 1970:10).

⁷⁴ This conception of social structure is employed in everyday conservative language to claim that certain characteristics of Western societies "do not comply with our social structure" – a definition of structure which has no meaning in materialist theorization of society and change.

5.2.1 Social Structure: Describing the ‘Basic Relations’

The structure-oriented evaluations of Turkish modernization were primarily produced by a group of young scholars who studied social sciences in the US and started their academic careers in the Sociology Chair in Ankara University which was established in 1939 as a section of the Department of Philosophy in the Faculty of Languages, History and Geography (hereafter, DTCTF) (Kasapoğlu, 1999:4; Çelebi, 2002:259). As a member of this chair, Behice Boran, Niyazi Berkes and Mediha Berkes had come together with the ethnologist Pertev Naili Boratav and social psychologist Muzaffer Şerif Başoğlu and formed what might be defined as the DTCTF Group which is more widely known for their place in Turkish political history than their academic contributions thanks to the famous 1948 Liquidation which ended the academic careers of the members of the group in Turkey for the allegations of involvement in communist activities. Members of this group continued their intellectual activities either outside of the university or in the universities of other countries.

The removal of the DTCTF Group from university was followed by a silent period for sociology in Turkey arguably because of the ‘potential’ trouble scholars saw in conducting field research in a period of rising anti-communism and the disinterest of state organizations in promoting such researches. Not only had the members of the DTCTF Group, but also their students had suffered from stigmatization⁷⁵. The situation started to change by 1960s which was a relatively flourishing period for social sciences in Turkey. Establishment of the State Planning Organization (*Devlet Planlama Teşkilatı* –hereafter, DPT) played an important role in the proliferation of sociological studies on development and social change –probably the most well-known research which was financed by DPT was Mübeccel Kıray’s study on Ereğli (1964).

⁷⁵ An experience of Mübeccel Kıray in the Ministry of Labor where she worked for a short time right after her graduation illustrates the situation in mid-1940s. Kıray tells that although she was told to conduct a field research on laborers, the minister himself withdrew the project on the grounds that her research might ‘provoke’ laborers (Kıray, 2001:80-81).

Behice Boran and her student, Mübeccel Kıray appear as the main figures of structure-oriented sociologists of the period. Although Boran's later involvement in active leftist politics and her relatively more direct reference to Marxist thought even in her earlier works have brought about a tendency among historians of Turkish sociology to distinguish between the two scholars and to locate Kıray within American structural-functionalist school, Boran's and Kıray's sociologies were shaped by common theoretical resources. Seeing the process of modernization in Turkey as a transition from feudalism to capitalism, both scholars employed the theoretico-conceptual tools of American sociology to develop a materialist conception of change which resulted in similar ways of dealing with the questions of survival and identity. For both scholars, cultural-religious sources of identity were of little concern and they usually were not regarded as obstacles for social change. Boran and Kıray were more concerned about the development of certain characteristics which they believed were the defining features of modern societies and the institutional structure which secures them. They aspire to a Turkish society which shares with developed societies a secular and cosmopolitan identity which they regard as the defining characteristics of modernity. In that sense, the future of the country could be secured by providing the necessary conditions of the development of those characteristics which were common among modern societies, rather than nation-specific cultural sources of identity. As will be discussed below, differences in their ideas were largely results of being the observers of different periods of social change in Turkey.

5.2.1.1 Behice Boran: Identity as a Dependent Variable

Behice Boran was one of the key figures of the DTCF Group and a well-known name in the history of Marxist politics in Turkey. Boran's academic career was terminated by the 1948 Liquidation in DTCF and following a rather silent period in 1950s, her intellectual activities were shaped by her active involvement in politics in 1960s. This study will focus on Boran's studies in pre-1948 period.

Most historians of Turkish sociology describe Boran, along with the other members of the DTCF Group, fundamentally as a representative of positivism. Setting aside

the questionable use of the term positivism in Ottoman-Turkish intellectual histories⁷⁶, this description could have been correct if they were referring to the belief in the existence of a single method of acquiring knowledge and the disregard for the unobservable, which constitute the foundational assumptions of certain positivist schools. In an article where she evaluates the discussions on sociology's distance from or affinity to natural sciences, Boran defends the ideas of "unity of reality" on the grounds that the cognitive process of knowledge acquisition is uniform for all scientific fields. In that sense, it is not surprising to see that she chooses Weber's thesis on Protestant Ethic as a counter-example. Her main concern is to show that social and cultural phenomena can be explained with reference to observable facts, i.e. material conditions:

The existence of values in human realm and the necessity to analyze these values do not require a method for social sciences which is different from the method of natural sciences... [A]cquiring knowledge about social values is not different from acquiring knowledge about other kinds of phenomena. Secondly, values which are taken as reference points for explaining human behaviors are actually the things which require explanation and they can be explained by getting detached from individuals and by analyzing the system of real relations in society, the structure of society (Boran, 1943a:72-73).

Although Boran's epistemological assumptions bring her close to positivism at the two points mentioned above, Boran tries to distinguish her sociology from positivism which she defines as a "well-worn-out" stand on the grounds that positivist sociology's faith in science as "the cure of all social ills" signifies that this stand overlooks the relationship between "the development of science in general and of social sciences in particular" and social change (Boran, 1947:317-319). According to

⁷⁶ During the 'revolt against positivism' in 1890s, critics used the term positivism interchangeably with "materialism", "mechanism", and "naturalism" –i.e. "philosophical doctrines that they regarded with equal disfavor" (Hughes, 2004:37-38). This habit was imitated by Ottoman intellectuals and it was later inherited by conservative circles of the republican period to criticize various positions in the debates on Ottoman-Turkish modernization which they believe undermine the primacy of culture in the explanation of social phenomena.

Boran, the development of social sciences is historically conditioned; it is “a dependent variable closely tied up with the changes in the basic institutional systems of society” (*ibid.*:319). The correspondence Boran saw between the level of development in social relations and the advancement of social sciences do not mean that her epistemic assumptions are anywhere near the views of perspectivist or constructionist approaches. Boran believes in the universality of social scientific knowledge and tries to produce knowledge about social issues “which are likely to happen in Turkey as well as America and China” (Boran, [1945]1992:7). The belief in the universality of scientific knowledge which she shares with other members of the DTCF Group was an important point of collision between these social scientists and conservative circles among whom the idea of ‘national science’ (*milli ilim*) was popular in early 1940s (Kaçmazoğlu, 1999:48; Kayalı, 1994:150). In fact, this belief appears to be quite important for Boran for she says that she almost dropped out of her postgraduate education in US because of the disappointment she felt about the inexistence of a consensus in sociology which she primarily sees as a reliable guide (Atılgan, 2009:33-34). Sociology’s role of guidance is even more important for rapidly changing societies in which “[p]ietism and atheism, political conservatism and radicalism, commitment to manners and customs and liberty exist side by side” (Boran, [1943]1999a:341). For Boran, sociology distinguishes between the values and institutions which are compatible with the course of development and the ones which obstruct change (*ibid.*:342). Therefore, she has in her mind a picture of sociology which is a positive science without any reservations. When she talks about the connection between the level of development of society and that of social sciences, she refers to the awareness of sociologists about the current situation of the society in which they live in; i.e. “their social co-ordinate system” (Boran, 1947:320).⁷⁷

It is possible to say that Boran’s belief in science is conditioned by the social and contextual awareness of the practitioner of science. Her belief in the superiority of

⁷⁷ Boran’s rigid belief in science and her emphasis on the utility of scientific knowledge manifests itself as a strong realism in her ideas on literature which can be observed in her critiques about the disconnection between the themes and characters of the novels of her period and the realities of the country (Boran, [1941]1999a).

Western civilization and Turkey's obligation to follow the almost mandatory pathway towards modernization is similarly conditional. According to Boran, there are three key values which have developed in Western world as a result of Renaissance. These values -which also signify the terms of survival and the criteria of the targeted identity of Turkish society- cherish the rights and liberties of humans, equality and the sovereignty of people, and scientific thinking. Although, Boran argues, these values should be the goals which Turkey should attain, it is not possible to say that they are fully developed in the West. For Boran, capitalism obstructs the full realization of these values since class conflicts narrow the rights and liberties of individuals (Boran, [1943]2010a:112-114)⁷⁸. In that sense, her confidence in pointing the social organization of Western societies does not emanate from the opinion that current situation of Western societies is the ultimate point of development; instead, she believes that Western societies provide a guidance towards a point where these values are fully realized –a point neither underdeveloped nor developed countries have reached. Naturally, the linear conception of history which shapes this view brings two distinctive features of Western societies into forefront as the main objects of investigation: urbanization and industrialization. These subjects found their echoes in Boran's work as inquiries about social change in rural areas, changing production techniques, the relationship between the degree of contacts of villages and cities and the rate of change.

Social change is conceptualized in Boran's work in an evolutionary scheme. Boran's arguments on evolution reflect her concern for maintaining the explanatory capacity and therewith the scientific legitimacy of sociology. In her assessments on the reasons of the diminishing popularity of evolutionism, she concedes that idea of evolution was used interchangeably with the idea of progress and the unidirectional conception of history brought about faulty conclusions about how societies change. According to Boran, sociologists started to refrain from offering broad and definitive

⁷⁸ Boran's critiques of humanism were overlooked by Kaçmazoğlu who tries to picture Boran (and other members of the DTCF Group) as the uncritical proponents of Renaissance humanism (see Kaçmazoğlu, 1999:48). Boran questions the logic behind using the stock of knowledge of a society who lived thousands of years ago and criticizes the distance of Renaissance humanists from common people in an article which was mentioned by Kaçmazoğlu for supporting his claims about Boran's commitment to humanism (see Boran, [1943]1999b:333-335).

arguments and for this reason, they prefer using the concepts of ‘social change’ and ‘social processes’ as supplements to the concept of evolution (Boran, 1943b:60). There are certain key differences between the concepts of change and evolution. “Evolution refers to a change, but not every kinds of change is evolutionary” (*ibid.*:61). Change signifies concrete processes of transition from one state into another; evolution, on the other hand, signifies ‘structural’ changes. In addition, unlike change, evolution is irrevocable. However, she proceeds, using the concept of change instead of evolution is not to solve but to circumvent a problem. Those who criticize evolutionism still use concepts like ‘primitive societies’ and ‘modern industrial societies’; these notions imply the implicit acceptance of the idea that there are certain changes which take place in a particular direction. Then, the question is whether certain spheres of human societies change in a particular direction or not; if there are such changes, then it is safe to speak about evolution. Boran’s answer to this question is affirmative. The foundations of her argument are of Marxian base-superstructure scheme. The clarity which was provided by this scheme is crucial for Boran who believes that the main question of sociology is to understand which spheres of social structure determine other spheres (Boran, [1945]1992:262-263).

According to Boran, the system of human relationships is made up of two subsystems. The first one is constituted by the direct relationships between humans. Family, state, religious institutions, arts and sports institutions are the examples for these types of relationships. The second one is constituted by those human relationships which emerge as a consequence of humans’ relationship with nature. Examples of such relationships are division of labor, property relationships, and production relationships (Boran, 1943b:62). These two subsystems of relationships constitute social structure which Boran defines as “a system of institutions” (Boran, [1945]1992:9-10) and the relationships between these two subsystems determine social change. However, there is a hierarchical relationship between these two systems. Humans’ relationship with nature and the relationships which emanate from these relationships constitute the foundations of human societies since they emerge as a consequence of the biological needs of humans like nutrition, shelter and sexuality and they exceed the boundaries of social reality:

Social structure is established on these biological foundations and varies within their possibilities. These needs always exist without any change since they are imperative -other needs which emanate from society added to them-, but the forms of their satisfaction (*tatmin şekilleri*) (production of food, types of shelter, family systems) change (Boran 1943b:62).

The use of ‘tools’ in humans’ relationship with nature provides material grounds for talking about the evolution of human societies. The technical advancements are objective, observable, comparable and measurable; they cannot be evaluated with reference to subjective value judgments. Developments in humans’ relationship with nature brought about the system of relationships between humans. Since humans’ relationship with nature is based on this technical factor whose unidirectional development is undeniable, it is then valid to talk about the evolution of humans’ relationship with nature. It is not, however, possible to say the same thing for the system of human relationships due to the lack of objective and measurable criteria for comparing phenomena like different family types or political organizations. Here, the important point is the relationship she sees between these two sets of relations. According to Boran, there must be a harmony between the principles which govern humans’ relationship with nature and that of inter-human relationships. Since the former relationships are based on science and rationality, so should be the case for the latter type of relations. This one-to-one correspondence does not necessarily mean a correlation between the levels of advancement of the two systems. The progress of humans’ relationship with nature is objective and measurable. However, there is no way to tell if “civilized” societies are more developed than “primitive” societies in ethical terms (Boran, [1941]1999b:305-307). “Only with reference to the stage of evolution of the community that they belong in terms of relationship with nature, can the level of development of these institutions be ranked” (Boran 1943b:63). This scheme indicates the primacy of meeting the conditions of survival in Boran’s sociology and the inclusion of the elements of identity only insofar as they interact with the former.

Boran's evolutionist perspective shapes her approach to social change in general and the processes which take place in rural areas in particular. Boran considers cities as the gateways of civilization. "Science, technique, art and manners (*terbiye*) of the West" are firstly adapted by cities and then they diffuse to other places (Boran, [1941]1999c:266). This conviction shapes her opinions about the problem of villages which was one of the key issues of discussion by late 1930s and early 1940s. Boran repudiates both altruistic attitudes and "utopian" schemes about villages (Boran, [1940]2010a:10). Here, the latter approach, which she defines as village romanticism (Boran, [1941]1999c:267), clearly points to the Village Institutes project which has been one of the key points of cleavage in the discussions on Turkish modernization. Boran criticizes utopian approaches for she argues that their ultimate consequence is to keep people dependent on land and to hinder rural-urban migration. Instead, she believes that villages should be considered as a part of wider social phenomena. The solution she offers is to change the organization of agricultural production and bring advanced production techniques, division of labor, and necessary conditions for producing high quality products. In short, in order to change villages, one should change the material conditions of production (*maddi hayat şeraiti*). These changes will not only increase wealth in villages; they will also bring about rational, intellectual peasants who are "freed" from "superstition and tradition" (Boran, [1940]2010a:12). In a follow-up article, she clarifies that changing the material conditions of production does not mean the renouncement of agricultural production. She states that villages exist regardless of the level of industrialization and their main function is agricultural production. What she means, she says, by bringing the conditions which are characteristic of cities to villages is to adjust the organization of production in urban and rural areas since the discrepancies in the conditions of these two spheres is the main obstacle for development (Boran, [1940]2010b:17). According to Boran, removing the discrepancies in terms of organization of production between urban and rural areas will also eradicate the differences in the lifestyles of urbanites and peasants. Cities and villages are two interconnected spheres of wider social organization. The "harmonious development" of cities and villages is going to remove the duality between these two spheres⁷⁹. Urbanites and

⁷⁹ The discordance between the rates of change in different spheres of society is a constant theme of

peasants are going to be working in different sections in the system of division of labor, but their technical and cultural levels will be equal (Boran, [1941]1999c:264, 267). This was Boran's solution to the survival/identity double-bind.

Boran's field research on two "types" of villages depicts how she put into practice her theoretical position. Choosing a group of villages which are located on plains and another group which are located on mountains, Boran tries to explain the difference in the rates of change in these two types of villages. Here, the important point is that conditions of production, which determine the rate of social change, are largely shaped by the geographical conditions of villages and their proximity to urban areas. According to this, the villages on plains have more fertile soil and they have more access to towns and cities. The soil of mountain villages, on the other hand, is less fertile and less favorable for agricultural production. In addition, these villages have lesser opportunities to get in contact with towns and cities. As a consequence, villages on plains became "open" societies. Division of labor is more developed in these villages where production takes place in capitalist intentions, i.e. villagers in these societies produce for the market rather than subsistence as opposed to the "closed" societies in mountain villages (Boran, [1945]1992:140-142). Boran observes other manifestations of the difference in the rate of social change taking place in these villages by comparing various spheres like family structure (*ibid.*:190), social stratification (*ibid.*:151) and secularization (*ibid.*:258) and tries to show that "open societies" of the villages on plains show modern characteristics as opposed to the closed societies" of mountain villages.

Boran's commitment to base-superstructure scheme in her explanations on the relationship between social change and secularization is quite important in terms of locating her position in the history of Turkish sociology of modernization in general and understanding how she pictures the relationship between survival and identity in particular. In line with the basic assumptions of modernization school, Boran states that religion has less influence on social matters in the villages located on plains than

Boran's work though this issue was going to be investigated by Kiray with certain improvements. As it will be discussed below, the source of this theme can be found in William Ogburn's concept of 'cultural lag'.

the mountain villages and the process of secularization will go on in further stages of development (*ibid.*). However, her almost intentional disinterest in culture and religion appears as a distinctive aspect of her sociology compared to later formulations of social change and development which bring into forefront a dichotomous relationship between the traditional and the modern.

It is possible to offer two explanations of her position. The first one is related to the somewhat simplistic conception of change in the immediate postwar social scientific literature. According to Bernstein, although development of poor countries was formulated on the bases of economic theories in the early phase of modernization school, “the inability of economic theory” to formulate social change became clear by early 1950s and other social scientific disciplines started to take part in the development literature to inquire “social conditions of economic growth” or “non-economic barriers to economic growth” (Bernstein, 1971:143). Such issues were not of concern for the explanation of social change for Boran who believes that studies which locates ‘culture’ at their center could not produce efficient results because of the vagueness of the concept (Boran, [1943]2010b:128). In that sense, Boran’s approach in her works in 1940s is closer to more simplistic explanations which offer a less bumpy journey towards modern society.

Boran’s disinterest in cultural sphere can also be explained with reference to the relative suppression of the political conflicts around secularization which was going to shape social scientific knowledge production in the following decades. Although Boran is usually put by historians of Turkish sociology into the same baggage of ‘secular’ sociologists whose formulation of modernization is regarded to be uniform, military coup which ended the ten years of Democrat Party rule in 1960 and the following political developments created a rupture in the conception of modernization among intellectuals. Atilgan informs us about the huge disappointment which was experienced among the critics of DP rule in early 1960s. The reason of their disappointment was the results of 1961 referendum which was held for the new constitution and the general elections which took place in the same year which showed that majority of the people were supporting the Justice Party

(*Adalet Partisi*) which was a continuation of DP (Atılgan, 2008:51). Constant recourse to religious sentiments in political arena and the positive responses of large segments of society to conservative politics contributed to the deeply-rooted belief of modernist intellectuals that Islam is one of the factors which hindered economic development in Ottoman-Turkish modernization. Boran's sociological works in 1940s, on the other hand, pay little attention to cultural factors; although she thinks they might increase the resistance of societies to change, Boran regards them only as second degree factors (Boran, [1943]1999d:325).⁸⁰

Boran's sociology presents a unique case in Turkish sociology; religion and culture had never been so apparently taken out of the equation in sociological explanations of Ottoman-Turkish modernization. This new approach redefines the problematic relationship between Ottoman-Turkish modernizers' anxiety of survival and identity. In Boran's sociology, questions related to cultural identity are divorced from those related to survival. Sources of identity are reformulated as dependent variables whose impact on survival is regarded to be negligible as long as the prescribed pathway of the development of material conditions of production is followed. According to this, preparing the conditions for the dissemination of modern techniques of production will bring about a new society whose means of self-identification will be provided by the accompanying institutions and lifestyle of modernity. In other words, improvements in the organization of production and the institutions whose functions are to regulate humans' relationship with nature are going to solve the problems related to identity. Debates of the following decades provided many reasons to social scientists for reconsidering this rather smooth passage to modern society.

⁸⁰ Priority of material conditions in Boran's work can also be observed in her assessments about the status of women in villages. Although observing that there are changes which are taking place in many spheres of social life, Boran argues that gender relationships are not affected by this process of modernization. Here, she argues, the position of women in Islam supports this situation but the main reason of the lower status of women is their exclusion from positions of control and management in production process. In other words, "the status of women in villages would change as they did in cities in case economic conditions change despite the influence of religion" (Boran, [1945]1992:203).

5.2.1.2 Mübeccel Kıray: Eliminating the Friction

Despite her rigorous endeavor to distance her sociological inquiries from the works of Boran or other members of the DTCF Group, it is possible to say that Mübeccel Kıray followed the footsteps of her teacher though with some hardly insignificant additions whose resources can be traced in the emerging tendencies in the sociology of 1960s⁸¹. The continuity between Boran's and Kıray's sociologies is usually overlooked due to the association of Kıray's work with American structural functionalist school which is the rival of Marxism in postwar sociology. Kıray owes this association to her argument which can shortly be called as the 'equilibrium assumption'. According to this, there is "a relative equilibrium" between the population, technology and resources and the social organization which emanates from their relationship in all societies (Kıray, [1969]1982a:119). This is also true for those societies which Kıray frequently defines as societies which are going through transition (*geçiş halindeki toplum*). "In other words, societies which are going through change are not fragmentary, disordered (*düzensiz*) societies. Unchanged, changing and changed aspects of them do again exist coherently and in an orderly relationship" (Kıray, [1964]1984:15). As we will discuss, the equilibrium assumption, which she resorts to when looking at all societies, results in certain inconsistencies for Kıray's sociology. However, it does not bring about a frozen picture of society with little or no concern for power relationships which has been the main source of criticism for structural functionalist approach –a critique which was also expressed by Kıray herself (Kıray, [1979]1982:50). Although certain aspects of her sociology bring her close to structural functionalism, Kıray's work was hardly

⁸¹ One of her students from 1960s says that Kıray had never mentioned her teacher, Behice Boran, in her lectures (Akşit, 2010:67). Akşit also says that though she never spoke about Karl Marx in her lectures -a point which is also confirmed by Kıray herself (Kıray,2001:62)-, her students believed that Marx had a great influence on her (ibid.:66-67). It is also difficult to see Boran's name in Kıray's works. In an earlier article, she does not mention 1948 Liquidation and discreetly says that studies of DTCF Group could not continue because of the turbulent period of change in Turkey (Kıray, [1971]2006:19). Kıray's fear of stigmatization appears to be quite extensive considering that although using it, she did not put Muzaffer Şerif's *An Outline of Social Psychology* in the bibliography of the first publication of her work on Ereğli which was published by DPT –the reference to this book was added to the later publications of this work (Kayalı, 1994:192, 196-197n)). She started to speak about the liquidation of DTCF and the continuity between the work of DTCF Group and their students - though without adding herself- in later periods of her career (Kıray, [1979]1982:47) and more openly embraced the legacy of DTCF and especially Boran only as late as 1990s (see Kıray, [1992]2006).

devoid of concern for internal frictions and mechanisms of change. In fact, these frictions and their consequences play key roles in her sociology.

In a conference speech, Kıray talks about a debate she had with a German journalist who argued that there are certain “core” values which stay unchanged in societies. Kıray’s counter-argument was that if societies are coherent entities -which she strongly believes they are-, then all aspects of societies can change. She even says that those core values that the German journalist refers to change in a short period of time like five years. Kıray also mentions Gökalp’s conception of a static national culture and argues that Atatürk did not agree with him. “And our generation saw, experienced and understood that everything changes” (Kıray, [1992]2006b:60). This anecdote tells a lot about her belief, which she shared with Boran, in the impact of structural changes within “basic relations” on values. However, her conception of change is rather more advanced than Boran’s owing both to the accumulated knowledge in sociology of modernization in her period and to new observations on social change.

Kıray’s conception of traditional society and her assumptions about the indices of modernization are in line with classical descriptions of modernization school:

The attitudes which show qualitative differences between modern societies and modernizing ones with feudal traditional bases are: taking initiative for a better future, and offering rational reasons for success and improvement of conditions of life instead of fatalism, resignation and submission to authority (Kıray, [1968]1982:93-94).

However, Kıray was writing in a period when assumptions of modernization school were going through scrutiny. It became clear that changes in economy do not automatically trigger changes in other spheres. Focusing on the replacement of the concept of ‘differentiation’ with the ‘specialization’ and ‘complexity’ in evolutionary approaches to modernization, Eisenstadt states that the growing autonomy of each sphere of social life with the process of differentiation brings about new problems in terms of regulating these spheres and the relationship between them for the broader

organization of society (Eisenstadt, 1964:377). In addition, spheres of social life in modernizing countries do not have to change simultaneously and with the same rate of change. Thus, conditions which give rise to differentiation in certain spheres do not necessarily bring with them the capacity to solve the new problems that these changes produce (*ibid.*:381, 384). Shift of attention to diverse institutional reactions to change fostered new inquiries about the mechanisms which obstruct social change. Contrary to the conventional schemes which conceptualized traditional and modern societies in dichotomous terms, these inquiries started to document instances which show that traditional structures can facilitate modernization (see Gusfield, 1967). As a keen follower of sociological literature, Kıray shares these concerns about the limits of looking only at social and cultural factors to find obstacles of development. Observing in her research on Çukurova the extent of changes in characteristics which are related to the above-mentioned indices of modernization in her formulation (“fatalism, resignation and passive contentment of the traditional feudal situation”), Kıray argues that “the values related to those aspects of social order which could constitute obstacles to development have changed in such a direction that it is impossible to consider them obstacles to development” (Kıray, [1968]1982:96). Focusing on the newly emerging stratification system, she concludes that “further development is obstructed not by unchanged values such as fatalism but by new configuration in society” (*ibid.*:101). Although variety of the rate of change in different spheres of social life is an idea which was expressed in Boran’s work, it was Kıray who focused on the implications of this discordance for further change⁸². In order to explain the difference of Kıray’s conception of change from that of Boran, we should look into her famous concept of “buffer mechanisms” (*tampon mekanizmalar*).

⁸² The sources of Kıray’s views can be traced back to Gordon Childe’s emphasis on the suppression of the groups or societies who were responsible for the changes in material conditions by the newly emerging groups or societies who benefited from these new conditions. One of the main reasons of the deceleration of change after the ‘Urban Revolution’ for Childe is the accumulation of wealth in the hands of the few. More importantly, although superstitious beliefs started to lose their influence by the advancements in the production techniques which ultimately brought about revolution, the newly emerging ruling classes obstructed further changes by using their power to exploit these weakening beliefs (Childe, [1936]1996:158-160). Kıray’s appreciation of Childe’s works is occasionally mentioned by her students (see Akşit et al., 2010:110; Nalbantoğlu, 2010:94).

Kıray defines buffer mechanisms in broad terms as “institutions, relationships, values and functions” which connects various spheres of life with each other, eliminate those elements “which are not part of the functional whole” and maintain the “relative equilibrium” of society during the process of change (Kıray, [1964]1984:17). Kıray’s field researches provide her with many examples of these mechanisms. One of these examples, which was explained by Kıray in many occasions, is based on the relationship between villagers and the merchant who lives in town. The determining feature of this relationship is that it is a “transaction and credit mechanism” (Kıray, [1968]1982:100). The merchant does not only play a role in the marketing of the products of the villagers. He lends money when they need and help them in all departments of everyday life ranging from finding a doctor or lawyer when needed to arranging weddings. This relationship is quite different from anonymous relationships which are typical of modern industrialized societies. This role, Kıray continues, was played by the agha in the feudal period and now it is assumed by the merchant. However, the role which was assumed by the merchant does not make him a part of the feudal structure. Just like any other merchant, his main intention is to maximize his profit. The merchant functions as a buffer mechanism because he alleviates villagers’ problems in terms of adjusting to the changing aspects of social life like the disappearance of face-to-face relationships and the dissemination of formalities in economic transactions (Kıray, [1964]1984:70-71). Kıray observes a similar example in her research on the changing social stratification in Çukurova as a result of the accumulation of land in the hands of few landlords. Here appears a new actor, the labor broker (*elci*), who facilitates the relationship between agricultural laborers and the landlord. Labor brokers provide many services like securing jobs, making advance payments and defending laborers’ rights when they had disputes with the landlord (Kıray, 1974:194). By this way, they fill the gaps of formal social security mechanisms and ease the tension which arises from the changing power relations. The key point is that no matter how much she appears to be concerned about finding examples which support her equilibrium assumption, Kıray’s interest in buffer mechanisms leads her to focus on the new problems these mechanisms trigger. For example, in the case of the merchant, she observes that the merchant obstructs further change and development by diminishing

the villagers' opportunities to save money and make investments to improve production or by resisting to the establishment of new credit and marketing mechanisms and welfare organizations (Kıray, [1969]1982b:112). Thus, Kıray reaches the conclusion that although these new intermediary forms "in certain conditions do encourage further development and change; in certain other conditions they do not" (*ibid.*:107).

According to Kongar, Kıray's buffer mechanisms are some sort of a synthesis of functionalism's assumption of continuous equilibrium and William Ogburn's concept of 'cultural lag' (Kongar, 2007:176). Ogburn's main concern is to investigate the problem of "adjustment" between different parts of culture which emanates from rapid social changes. His argument is based on two assumptions. The first one is that "various parts of modern culture are not changing at the same rate..." (Ogburn, 1923:200). The second assumption is that, although he tries hard to convince us that it is not "a universal dictum", he strongly believes that changes in the material conditions are largely responsible for the changes in non-material culture (*ibid.*:211). Those parts of culture which lag behind the changes in material conditions are named by Ogburn as 'adaptive culture'⁸³. Ogburn's concept of cultural lag is based on a particular relationship between material and non-material culture which is akin to Marx's base-superstructure distinction though with attributing much more priority to technical advancement which led to the critique of technological determinism (Kongar, 2007:172; Öksüz, 1974:138) –a problem which was questioned in the assessments about the works of both Boran (Atılğan, 2009: 121) and Kıray (Nalbantoğlu, 2010:94-95).

Although there are certain parallels between Ogburn's and Kıray's approach to social change, the latter's concern for carving out the intermediary mechanisms which protruded as a consequence of the discordance between institutional spheres distinguishes her from the more static approach of the former. Ogburn focuses more on ossified structures like traditions or vested interests of particular social classes to

⁸³ One can easily see a similar line of thought when Boran argues that although humans' relationship with nature is organized on the bases of rational principles, "irrational motives", opinions and beliefs are still influential in humans' relationships with each other (Boran, [1941]1999b:306-307).

find out the reasons of resistance to change in non-material culture (see Ogburn, 1923: Part Three and 256-265). In other words, remnants of past institutional structures are regarded as the decisive factors which obstruct change. For Kıray, these structures are more strongly shaped by production relationships and they can relatively easily adjust in accordance with the functional requirements of new mechanisms of production. In line with the new tendencies in the sociology of modernization in her period, Kıray's sensitivity to the movements in various layers of social structure brings about a more dynamic picture than the rather simplistic transition from traditional to modern society which was drawn by the earlier schemes of modernization theory.

The problem Kongar finds in Kıray's concept of buffer mechanisms is the reappearance of the shortcomings of the equilibrium assumption of structural-functionalism in terms of explaining social change in case this concept is used as an explanatory tool for a large-scale model of change. As opposed to this, Kongar argues, the concept of buffer mechanisms can be useful in middle range theories for it acknowledges the inevitability of change and the conflict which arises from the maladjustment between various elements of society (Kongar, 2007:177-178). However, a more important problem appears when we have a closer look into the buffer mechanisms and the function they fulfill. Kıray's writings on urbanization illustrate this problem quite clearly.

In line with her interest in the discordance between the rate of change in various layers of social system, Kıray's studies on urbanization focuses on the problems which emanate from the problem of absorption of rural population which lost its relationship with land and was forced to migrate to the city for non-agricultural employment opportunities –a problem whose main reason is the discordance between the rapid rate of change in agricultural production and the much slower reorganization of urban structure (Kıray, [1973]2003:91). Kıray particularly pays attention to the spatial manifestation of this problem of adjustment, that is, the so-called *gecekondu* phenomenon. The starting point of Kıray's observations resembles the explanations about *gecekondu* settlements which were put forward by her

teacher, Boran, as early as 1941 (Boran, [1941]1999d). Boran's definition of urbanization process in modern industrial societies is based on Chicago School's well-known scheme which explains spatial differentiation on the bases of a concentric model in which the expansion of the center decreases land rent in the immediate surroundings of the center (zone of transition) and provide economically accessible residential space for low-income groups. Boran's views are based on Ankara which went through a rapid urbanization process after it was declared as the capital city of the new nation-state in 1923. Since the urbanization of Ankara did not take place as a result of industrialization and commercialization as it was the case for Western cities, the process of the decline of land rent in the area which should serve as the zone of transition did not take place in the same pace. As a result, immigrant population could not find cheap residential space and was forced to take care of their housing problem themselves (*ibid.*:279-280).

Observing the same phenomenon almost thirty years later, Kıray similarly points that modern cities provide the newcomers (whose number is limited) with accommodation in transition zones which they can afford thanks to the well-paid jobs which was provided by a well-functioning urban economy. These areas function for assimilating these newcomers to the urban structure for a period of time until they accumulate enough wealth for moving to proper houses in organized residential areas (Kıray, [1970]2003:20). In underdeveloped and developing countries the size of rural population which was forced to move to the city is very large and the transformation of the reorganization of production and space in cities lags behind the rate of change in agricultural production. As a result, newcomers necessarily built their own shelter in the outskirts of the city and work in small service jobs which hinder their assimilation to urban way of life, leaving them somewhere in-between being an urbanite and a villager (*ibid.*:20-21). Unlike the classical formulation of Chicago School in which the deteriorated transition zones are inhabited by criminals and other social outcastes, *gecekondu* settlements are inhabited by "decent" (*mazbut*) laborers, low-income officers or small retailers and their families (Kıray, [1971]2003:13-14, 16). In addition, contrary to the prior intentions of the builders of *gecekondu* houses in previous periods, these settlements became almost permanent residences of their

inhibitors and also a permanent part of cities as a result of the commodification of *gecekondu* houses (Kıray, [1970]2003:23, 25).

Gecekondu phenomenon is described as a buffer mechanism whose long-term damages look like a bigger concern for Kıray when compared to its short-term benefits. However, the mechanisms or processes which produce the spaces accessible to newcomers of urban areas in developed countries (i.e. transition zones) are not products of a well-planned organization of space. Boran and Kıray employ a theory of urbanization which depicts spatial processes as naturally occurring exchanges and functional transformations and neglects the fact that these processes and the conflicts they trigger are actually responsible for the changes which are taking place in developed countries. Let alone the later observations in urbanization literature which show that transition zones are not temporary residences for low income groups in developed countries and the covert affirmation of the processes which reproduces social inequalities almost as a ‘functional necessity’ by Chicago School’s theory of urbanization, Kıray’s and Boran’s approach to *gecekondu* phenomenon forced them to call for policies to develop mechanisms whose functions are fulfilled by processes which, they believe, are taking place ‘naturally’ in developed countries. Although Kıray herself reminds that the problems and hypotheses which are scrutinized in American sociology -where she believes methodology is more developed than any other country- are different from the issues Turkish sociology has to deal with (Kıray, [1971]2006:20-21), her uncritical use of urbanization theory and linear conception of history which is embedded to the epistemic structure of the modernization school brings about this limited perspective on *gecekondu* phenomena which became the predominant explanation in urban sociology in Turkey for a long time. As I will discuss in the last section of this chapter, this attitude is an important indicator of how Boran and Kıray had approached to the anxieties of survival and identity.

The available conceptual set could not lead this line of thought to take another step and shift towards a new terrain in which the limits of dualistic thinking can be realized. Kıray’s observations about the enabling capacity of traditional forms of

relationship served only for acknowledging the passive, dependent position of superstructural relationships which was attributed to them by Boran. In fact, buffer mechanisms and her stress on the new power relations which emanated from them was an important step for approaching to modernization process with reference to various spheres of struggle rather than the clash between the traditional and the modern. However, the increasing political tension and the unchanged position of the Ottoman-Turkish modernization discourse as the conceptual resource of these debates obstructed the break from dualistic conceptualization of modernization. The old tension was reinterpreted as the power struggle between the ruling intellectuals (*yönetici aydın*) who possess administrative positions in state mechanism and the commercial and industrial bourgeoisie which is made up of large land owners and representatives of foreign capital (Kıray, [1969]1982a:129)⁸⁴. The important aspect of this new interpretation is that what stood against change is not anymore culture or religion itself but the way they are mobilized in the new class structure.

5.2.2 Cultural Structure: Changing the Diagnosis

The intellectual tradition which shaped culture-oriented formulations has emerged in the debates on the alternative visions of Turkish modernization which appeared in the first two decades of the republic. It has always been a difficult matter to identify the boundaries or programs of these visions due to their roots in the age-old ideological classifications which are based on the distinction between Islamist, nationalist and conservative politics in late Ottoman Empire. In order to overcome the limitations of this classification, Bora argues that these three streams are actually different manifestations of a general political category he simply defines as Turkish rightist politics. According to this, nationalism serves as the grammar of Turkish

⁸⁴ Kıray mentions the appearance of the messages about the “interests of the Anatolian businessman” in the election speeches. The politician Kıray mentions is Necmettin Erbakan (Kıray, [1969]1982a:132n) who was going to be one of the major figures in Turkish political history. Kıray is cautious about how to interpret the emerging situation: “Currently, how they [Anatolian businessman] will get into relationship with external industrial products, large industrial products and the circles who control them and what roles they will play in the changes in society is not clear and it worth further observation” (*ibid.*:128). The struggle between republican bureaucrats and agrarian-commercial bourgeoisie found its expression as the battle between ‘leftist’ and ‘rightist’ politics in the late 1960s and throughout 1970s.

right due to its capacity to adapt or construct concepts, images and their contents. Islamism, on the other hand, serves as the main source of values and rituals. Lastly, he describes conservatism rather vaguely as “a state of mind”, “style” (*üslup*) (Bora, 2009:8), or, as he adds later, “a way of thinking” or “a stance” (*duruş*) rather than a movement with a specific program (*ibid.*:71n). There have been different views which try to draw the boundaries of these three streams, like Akıncı’s effort to distinguish between Islamism and conservatism, or Mollaer’s attempt to define conservatism as an ideology⁸⁵. Although most of the difficulties in describing the boundaries of conservative thought in Turkey emanate from the habit of identifying critiques of republican modernism as reactionary, obscurantist efforts, the theme of the inevitability of change is emphasized in the writings of most conservative intellectuals who regarded modernization “as a matter of life and death” (Demirel, 2007:221-224). The focal point of conservative critique is the method of formulating and executing reforms for facilitating modernization.

Mümtaz Turhan and Erol Güngör were two influential representatives of the conservative critique of the radical modernization approach of republican reformists in the academia. They utilized conceptual tools of social sciences to give the sociological proofs of the impossibility of achieving modernization by following the existing approach of reformists who they called ‘transformist’ (*inkılapçı*) in a derogatory fashion. Rather than assuming an antagonistic standpoint, they tried to stay within Kemalist discourse and developed their arguments on the bases of a

⁸⁵ Akıncı’s distinction is based on the argument that Islamism ‘invented’ an Islamic essence which is offered as a prescription for problems related to economic development and democracy, while conservatism aspires for change which requires a much less extensive social engineering scheme (Akıncı, 2012:106-107). Mollaer, on the other hand, argues that conceptualizing conservatism as a mental stance rather than an ideology reduces it to a tool which is used to distinguish between progressivist or reactionary aspects of particular ideologies and allows the simplistic conception of conservatism as an anti-modern category (Mollaer, 2011:66). When he speaks of conservatism, Akıncı appears to rely specifically on ‘nationalist conservatism’ whose main source of reference is Anatolian Turks unlike the reference of Islamism to international Islamic community. However, as we shall see, it is difficult to verify Akıncı’s argument considering that, leaving aside the radical formulations of both streams -which share an even more excessively utopian willingness to reconstruct society-, nationalist conservatism could not develop a concrete Turkish national identity and resorted to constructionism just as it was the case for Islamism. Although his attempt to define conservatism as an ideology is a rather difficult task -if not unnecessary-, Mollaer’s objection to “amorphous” conceptualization of conservatism is based on a valid observation considering the role of this way of approaching to the subject for the reproduction of dualistic accounts on the modernization process in Turkey.

cultural nationalism which they offered as the key for a better understanding of other principles of Kemalism whose existing meanings, they claimed, had failed to close the distance between common people and reformist elites. In that sense, it is fair to identify them generally as nationalist conservatives. Turhan and Güngör engaged in the task of reformulating Turkish modernization by offering particular revisions of Ziya Gökalp's culture-civilization distinction upon which they tried to develop a non-materialist conception of change which, they believe, has a better answer to the question of the relationship between the anxieties of survival and self-identification than Gökalp. The little interest that structure-oriented sociologies had in the question of identity transferred the challenge of reconciling it with the question of survival to culture-oriented sociologies in the postwar period until the revival of the interest in the Ottoman past in late 1960s. As the belief in the power of social sciences in understanding and organizing social life had faded from the immediate postwar years towards late 1960s, Turhan's emphasis on the importance of science and scientific mentality throughout his writings in 1950s and the first half of 1960s left its place to doubts about the guidance of science in the writings of his student, Erol Güngör.

5.2.2.1 Mümtaz Turhan: Engineering the National Revival

Turhan's critique of the style of the execution of modernization in Turkey is based on his distinction between the 'imposed' or 'forced cultural change' (*mecburi kültür değişmesi*) and 'independent cultural change' (*serbest kültür değişmesi*). According to this, independent changes take place in a society as a result of contacts with other societies. Forced changes, on the other hand, are the ones which are imposed on society by a different society or a group which holds administrative power (Turhan, [1951]1969:61). The important point of this distinction is his juxtaposition of state-centered Westernization with forced cultural change (*ibid.*:269). However, as we will see, the modernization program Turhan offers is no less top-to-bottom in character than the one which was implemented by Ottomans and republican elites whom he holds responsible for imposing cultural change in the Ottoman-Turkish modernization process.

The major theme of Turhan's writings is the failure of intellectuals and decision takers of both Ottoman Empire and the Turkish Republic in understanding the underlying reasons of the superiority of Western civilization. According to Turhan, the repercussions of this failure can be observed in the reforms they pursuit for modernization. Therefore, he defines the main objective of Turkish modernist as to understand the key institutions which will enable "genuine Westernization" and to formulate the means of establishing them (Turhan, [1958]1974:48). He focuses on this theme, which was quite common in conservative circles, by utilizing the arguments of the acculturation literature and tries to elaborate the 'real' characteristics of the modern Western civilization which is responsible from her achievements.

The main features of his assessment of the modernization reforms of republicans can be detected in his arguments about the reasons of the decline of the Ottoman Empire. Turhan offers two reasons which comply with Gökalp's culture-civilization distinction. The first reason, whose source is again Gökalp, is the great distance that had emerged between the culture of Ottoman decision-takers and the culture of people. As a result, these two spheres could not interact with each other during the periods of creative intellectual and artistic movements (*ibid.*:43). The second reason is the loneliness of Ottoman Turks in the Islamic world in terms of contributing to the development of this circle of civilization (*ibid.*:44). These two reasons serve for, on the one hand, setting an example for republican elites who, Turhan believes, make the same mistake by being blind to cultural resources in their reforms and, on the other, proving that Gökalp's distinction between culture and civilization exists in practice and the interaction between different national cultures in Western civilization is the underlying mechanism which triggered social and economic development⁸⁶. Turkey can be a part of the configuration of Western civilization and the claims that this civilization is Christian in essence is denied by Turhan who gives Russia and Japan as counter-examples to this argument. According to this, Russians

⁸⁶ The sources of Turhan's arguments about the interaction between nations are Arnold Toynbee and Alfred Kroeber -two names Turhan occasionally mentions- who believe in the positive impact of the existence of nations for the creative activities of civilization (Simonton, 2003:101).

had struggled for developing their nations to the extent that other Christian nations did and Japan's successful development proves that religion is not a factor of or an obstacle to modernization (*ibid.*:23).

The risk that awaits decision-takers is to assume that the reforms in the republican period have secured the modernization movement and to believe that the only thing that is left is to protect the benefits of these reforms and work for the diffusion of them to the public (*ibid.*:12-13). If republicans prefer to stick to the existing reforms without revising them for the needs of the current developments, they would fall into the very same bigotry (*taassub*) they criticize in the first place. Turhan criticizes the stubborn attitude of republicans who deny any sort of alternative assessment of modernization process and blame these circles for confusing the means with ends (*ibid.*:16, 76)⁸⁷. He argues that republican reforms focused more on the life style of Western civilization which is not altogether something to criticize considering that every culture and civilization signify a style of living. However, bringing a life style without establishing the organizational setting of its production and consumption and the mentality behind it will not bring about the expected results (*ibid.*:16-17). Turhan's entire endeavor is based on the assumption that there are certain 'core' features of Western societies which are not the part and parcel of culture-originated identity of the West and whose emulation will trigger modernization. Understanding the 'true' nature of these core features is where Ottoman and republican reformists had failed. Although constantly referring to the failure of previous reformers, he does not offer a comprehensive description of these core features. The basic features of European civilization are science, technique -which is the application of science to practical life-, and the laws and liberties which secure human rights (*ibid.*:49, 55). The main characteristic which separates modern and traditional societies, on the other hand, is the formalization of knowledge which transforms the mechanisms of the transfer of knowledge from an activity which takes place in the interaction

⁸⁷ This had been a common theme that conservative intellectuals used quite often to criticize devoted Kemalists and Marxists between which they usually did not care for making a distinction. Peyami Safa is usually regarded as the writer who first defined the unquestioned commitment of republicans and Marxists as a kind of bigotry. For instance, in a 1938 essay, he mentions Andre Gide's complaints about the shallowness of youth whose "culture" starts and ends with Marxism and says that he also knows such people who looks into "the book" (*Communist Manifesto*) when they have to develop an argument about an issue (Safa, [1938]1971:78).

between father and son or master and apprentice to one which takes place in formal institutions of education (Turhan, 1965a:3-4). The problem, Turhan believes, begins when reformers in Turkey assumed that bringing 'material' products of Western civilization would be sufficient for modernization. Here, Turhan's arguments turn towards mechanisms of social change.

It is important to notice Turhan's preference to speak of 'cultural' change instead of 'social' change. This is not only a lexical preference, nor is it just a natural consequence of focusing too much on anthropological literature which, obviously, is the case for Turhan. Employment of the concept of culture as the main object of knowledge production should rather be regarded as an indicator of the epistemological foundations of Turhan's conception of change. Turhan's main target is the materialist explanations on social change. He tries to falsify these explanations with a specific attention to Ogburn's version which, as it was discussed above, had great impact on structure-oriented sociology of modernization in Turkey. According to Turhan, neither the idea that changes in material culture are prior to changes in non-material culture, nor the belief that non-material culture always resists to change is acceptable. Indeed, many scientific advancements which were theoretically developed could not be put into practice at first because of the limitations in material culture. Imagination, which is regarded as an element of non-material culture, is the main source of inventions. The industrial development, which formed the foundations of contemporary Western civilization, is the product of scientific advancements, not the progenitor of them (Turhan, [1951]1969:27-29). Elsewhere, he argues that despite repudiating the role of mental factors in social changes, even Marxists start their political movements by preparing public opinion for their purposes (Turhan, 1965b:117). All these arguments indicate the priority Turhan attributes to non-material, mental foundations of material changes. The relationship he tries to develop between mentality and culture is the key point which shows how he applied Gökalp's culture-civilization couple and reformulated the relationship between the anxieties of survival and identity.

For Turhan, the proper step for cultivating a genuine Western mentality with a strong commitment to scientific thought is to locate well-educated individuals to key positions which are pre-determined by a comprehensive plan. Turhan strongly believes in the role of few leading individuals in triggering social change⁸⁸. Based on the assumption that individuals can change more quickly than societies, he constantly advises reformists to send as many “capable” young people to Western countries as they can for their education (Turhan, [1958]1974:31-32, 110). In that sense, he criticizes mass education policies and argues that the determining factor in the diversity of nations -by which, he obviously means the difference in the level of development- is the capacities of their distinct intellectual classes rather than the education level of their common people⁸⁹ (*ibid.*:90). The literacy of laborers in a country is not as important as the existence of “first class scientists and experts” who work for decision-takers. The countries which have proper governments and which educated qualified intellectuals could develop and prosper no matter how illiterate their societies are (*ibid.*:79, 121). He claims that the belief in the necessity of mass education and the complaints about the high level of illiteracy are subterfuges which cover the incapacities of the elites and argues that it is “ridiculous and absurd” to hold common people responsible for the underdevelopment of a country (*ibid.*:89).

Despite being an insistent critic of republican reformists, Turhan shares their major concern for education which lead him towards drawing a no less rigid plan for the organization of this field. He proposes a system which determines the number of schools and universities, the number of students to be educated on specific professions and their distribution to these schools on the bases of the requirements of a comprehensive development plan. He even says that in order to maintain a high level of education in high schools, students should be admitted according to

⁸⁸ One of his observations in the field research he conducted in Erzurum-Kars region corresponds to this argument. According to this, in one of the villages he visited, a talented miller who moved to this village had an immense impact on village life because of his knowledge of repairing broken down agricultural tools and machines (Turhan, [1951]1969:141-142).

⁸⁹ Turhan’s views on education were preceded by one of the ministers of education during the last decade of the Ottoman Empire, Emrullah Efendi, who defended what is called the ‘theory of Tree of Heaven’ (*Tuba Ağacı Kuramı*) –an idea which was also defended by Ziya Gökalp. According to this, just like the Tree of Heaven which supposedly has its roots in the air and branches under the ground, reforms in education system should start at the university level (Timur, 2000:205, 207). The ironic elitism of this idea becomes quite conspicuous when Erol Güngör tries to defend Turhan’s argument by writing a long quotation from Platon’s *Phaedrus* dialogue (see Güngör, [1975]1976:216-217).

intelligence tests (*ibid.*:123). He also argues that democratic polities can fail to understand that the principle of equality of the right of education is maintained by providing education according to the capabilities of individuals rather than providing a uniform, “superficial” education to everyone without any distinction (*ibid.*:125-126). The organization of education in rural areas is also an important part of the plan he proposes. Here, he offers ‘divinity high schools’ (*ilahiyat liseleri*) which will work along with -not replace- the existing high schools which are training teachers (*öğretmen liseleri*). He describes the function of these schools as to educate students who will take an additional professional training for one or two years after high school and be located to villages to serve as teachers and religious functionaries at the same time. Students of these schools will be educated with a moderate religious mentality rather than a “one-sided” materialist view. He believes that this will eliminate the ‘rivalry between the teacher and the imam’ in villages and the problems caused by the distance between common people and intellectuals (*ibid.*:138-140).⁹⁰

Turhan believes that republican reformists are responsible for the antagonism between cultural convictions and modernization reforms. His arguments on modernization are based on the main assumption that culture and religion do not actually pose a threat for development. Emphasizing the binding role that anthropological and sociological literature attributes to religion for societies, Turhan claims that most ‘civilized’ nations are the ones which are most religious and reformists in Turkey should also benefit from religion’s capacity to bond people (*ibid.*:142). As it was the case for all conservative thinkers, Turhan is concerned about the destructive impacts of sudden changes. In that sense, he criticizes those who believe the Kemalist principle of transformism legitimizes the dismantlement of all kinds of institutions without inspecting their functions (Turhan, 1965b:32). Reckless conduction of reforms by resorting to administrative means of suppression only results in anomy (Turhan, 1965b:39). He also argues that Turkish people have

⁹⁰ Turhan says that teachers from particular religious sects can be located to villages which practice the same version of Islam. However, he also says that “since most of them are surely products of ignorance”, sectarian differences would not be a source of problem as they were in the past and be eliminated in time (Turhan, [1958]1974:140). Here, a ‘slip of tongue’ reveals his wish for a uniform Islamic identity which is not surprising considering the role he attributes to religion as a founding element of Turkish national consciousness.

never showed any resistance to “genuine steps for civilization” (*hakiki medeniyet hamleleri*) (Turhan, [1958]1974:22). Turhan redefines Gökalp’s culture-civilization couple with the terms of ‘measure’ (*ölçü*) and ‘value’ (*kıymet*) and argues that scientific thinking is based on measurement while assessments of facts is conducted with valuation. These two spheres are not in conflict since they satisfy different needs and they contribute to each other (Turhan, 1965b:128-132).

Although emphasizing the role of religion for keeping society as a whole, Turhan argues that religion is no longer a “collective” phenomenon; it has become totally individualized (Turhan, [1951]1969:112). He tries to explain his point by elaborating on the relationship between material and moral culture. According to this there is no single material, item or activity which is devoid of any spiritual meaning in non-Western (or specifically “non-European”, as he chooses to say here) civilizations and cultures. On the other hand, the relationship between material and moral culture has either disappeared entirely or diminished to a negligible level in Western civilization (Turhan, [1951]1969:364-365). The key factor which gives to Western societies their secular character is scientific thinking and its applications. In Western civilization “science, scientific attitude and mentality determine the relationship between social phenomena, the boundaries of reality and the field of possibilities” (*ibid.*: 374). Elsewhere, he equates secular mentality with the capacity of individuals “to adjust their beliefs and opinions with reference to scientific facts which are mirrors of reality” (Turhan, 1965b:51). The initial appearance of his conception of modernization as a repetition of the well known standpoint which demands that strategies of survival should be compatible with the elements of identity starts to take on a new shape at this point. As it was the case for Gökalp, the climactic point of Turhan’s conception of modernization is where he brings together the scientific mentality, which he holds dear and identifies with genuine Western civilization, and Turkish national identity for which he served actively⁹¹.

⁹¹ Turhan argues that it is relevant to speak of ‘advanced’ or ‘backward’ cultures only in terms of the technical capacity to solve problems related to material culture; religious, artistic or social spheres which are shaped by moral aspects, on the other hand, cannot be discussed on the bases of such terms (Turhan, [1951]1969:9-10; Turhan, 1965b:114-117) -again, an argument he shares with Boran (see Boran, [1941]1999b). However, this argument did not stop Turhan from claiming that there is no single country in the world where culture of people is as rich as it is in Turkey (Turhan, 1965b:42).

In line with his conviction that mental-ideational foundations are prior to processes in material culture, Turhan believes that ‘becoming a nation’ (*millet olmak*) is the key for modernization. He defines the entire history of Western civilization as the history of the emergence of national cultures and even argues that all activities in the fields like politics, jurisprudence, literature and history had actually been endeavors to establish national consciousness (Turhan, 1965b:12, 13). Being one of the main motifs of Gökalp’s modernization scheme, processing the features of Western civilization which will be adopted through the filter of national culture does not appear in Turhan’s writings. In other words, sources of identity do not function as the designated authority to apply to distinguish between the relevant and irrelevant aspects of Western material culture which will be utilized for Turkish modernization. The authority which Turhan assigns for taking these key decisions is social science, which is elevated to such a high status in Turhan’s formulation that there is no single field of social activity which cannot benefit from its guidance (Turhan, [1958]1974:53). The significance of the role of social science in the organization of social life becomes more critical for underdeveloped societies. The key for the successful management of cultural change in these societies is to locate people who understand the main features of both their own culture and the one whose certain features will be transferred for triggering modernization –just like the necessity to master both language in order to be a successful translator (Turhan, [1951]1969:331-332). The knowledge of specialists is also essential for eliminating the friction between vested interests and the civilization which is adopted, dealing with the problems caused by industrialization, urbanization and the new working life and establishing the institutional foundations of social welfare and other related services (Turhan, [1958]1974:31, 53-55).

Conservative thought is known for its distance towards ideologies on the grounds that they are rational constructs which engage in social engineering by using the trial-and-error method for human affairs –a method which conservatives believe is immoral (Öğün, 2006:562). Turhan shows similar tendencies in his evaluations on the Kemalist principle of statism when he argues that the dispute between liberalism

as it was understood in nineteenth century and Marxism has ended and there is an unanimous agreement on the boundaries of state intervention in modern societies. Here again, science is the chief guidance in securing the accumulation and redistribution of wealth (Turhan, 1965b:53). His concern for the ‘contamination’ of the efforts of organizing social life with politics brings forth a suspicion for the possible conflicts between the principle of transformism, which committed Kemalists strongly believe, and democracy. However, Turhan contradicts with himself when he proceeds his arguments on this issue by arguing that one of the necessary steps to take is to “prepare social structure for being compatible to democracy” (*ibid.*:48). This contradiction corresponds to the tension in conservative thought Demirel defines between ‘spontaneity’ and ‘constructionism’ (*kendiliğindencilik ve kuruculuk*). Demirel argues that this tension was resolved in favor of the latter owing to the limited time for allowing the development process to take place by itself (Demirel, 2007:230). To this should be added the covert disbelief in the capacity of the existing social structure -in the sense that the concept is used by culture-oriented social scientists- for cultivating scientific mentality. Turhan argues that the key to create an original culture which is not just an imitation and which will not trigger social disintegration (*inhilal*) is to synthesize the relevant features of Western civilization and the values of Turkish culture (Turhan, [1958]1974:27). However, the leading role in choosing the ingredients of this synthesis is given to science and as a result, elements of cultural identity became passive motifs rather than determining factors in the organization of social life. Indeed, the process of modernization is drawn by Turhan also as “a process of becoming a nation and attaining a national culture” (Turhan, 1965b:39). Although trying to secure the coexistence of scientific-technical thinking which is adopted from Western civilization and Turkish national culture, the unquestioned power that he attributes to science brings about a sort of secular mentality which can be far more radical than the rather shallow definition of secularism which defines it as ‘the separation of religious and state matters’. Turhan does not only expect from science to provide guidance in shaping changes in material culture, he also considers it as the main reference point in the restoration (i.e. construction) of Turkish identity.

5.2.2.2 Erol Güngör: Functional, Dysfunctional and Non-Functional

Being a student of Mümtaz Turhan, Erol Güngör resorted to almost exactly the same academic resources which were used by his teacher for developing his arguments about culture. Therefore, the primary conceptual set of the discussions in Güngör's work on the relationship between material and non-material aspects of social and cultural change are provided by William Ogburn, Robert MacIver, Frederic Bartlett and Ralph Linton. As a result, the major themes of Turhan's work like the repudiation of the determination of non-material aspects of society by material conditions, the criticism of the use of the concepts of 'advanced' (*ileri*) and 'backward' (*geri*) for assessing cultures, distinction between 'hard' and 'soft' features of culture and the compatibility of cultural structure of societies to the diffusion of material-technological elements of a dominant civilization re-appears in Güngör's writings with a similar line of reasoning. In addition, similar to the case for Turhan, Güngör employed Gökalp's populist critique of the distance of Ottoman-Turkish intelligentsia from common people which all three scholars regarded as one of the main factors which inhibit the formulation of a modernization strategy with solid foundations. In that sense, when he says that he tried to carry on the tradition he inherited from Gökalp and Turhan (Güngör, [1975]1976:20; Güngör, [1983]1993:213), he is not only paying tribute to these names. However, certain features of Gökalp's and Turhan's works were re-interpreted and overtly or covertly criticized by Güngör –a change in this stream of thought which can be evaluated as a consequence of the military coup in 1960 and the following political environment.

Güngör's arguments on function-based conception of culture might be a relevant starting point for elaborating the specificities of his position. Although occasionally mentioning the definition of culture as an entity which is made up of the solutions a society develops to the problems they faced with throughout a long duration of time (Güngör, [1975]1976:31, 35, 75), Güngör is highly critical of focusing on the function of the elements of culture. Speaking about social norms and values, he argues that humans do not adopt these elements automatically; they are connected to other elements of culture through which they gain their meaning (Güngör, [1980]2007:103). His main concern is to secure elements of culture which do not

have an apparent function against the formulations of cultural change via “a list of requirements”⁹². Here appears an important point which separates Güngör from both Gökalp and Turhan. The traces of Gökalp’s and his teacher’s belief in science can be seen when Güngör argues that cultural changes should be considered as a program which has certain priorities and that social sciences should provide guidance for such programs rather than the whims of political leaders (Güngör, [1975]1976:103). However, this habitual reference to the benefit of social sciences does not comply with his distrust against rationalistic attempts to regulate change. Although the inevitability of change is a common theme among conservative intellectuals, Güngör draws a somewhat more brutal picture of the diffusion of the elements of Western civilization. Pointing that trying to develop a censure mechanism to control this process would be a useless attempt, Güngör argues that “making decisions about what is good and what is bad” would inevitably require “undemocratic and unscientific” conducts. The only thing to do is to cultivate culture in order to secure its persistence throughout the process of change (Güngör, [1980]2007:46).

There are two aspects of Güngör’s thought which indicate the difference of his position from that of Turhan and they also display the distinctive features of conservative thought in post-1960s period. The first one is related to his contradictory attitude towards science. On the one hand, he dismisses attempts to regulate cultural change by any programmatic attempt to distinguish between useful and useless elements of the existing culture or the predominant Western civilization - attempts which his teacher, Turhan, holds dear- for the reason that they would be “unscientific”. On the other hand, what appears to be really bothering him is the employment of scientific reasoning for engineering the process of change: “The use of science to conduct reforms on customs and folkways would only lead to

⁹² Here Güngör’s position is a clear demonstration of his conception of sociology. His concern about function-based explanations -which, as we will see, is an extension of his concern for securing the validity of social phenomena which do not lend its function to observation- is completely opposite of Boran’s understanding of sociology which equates sociological understanding of a phenomenon with the explanation of its function in society (Boran, [1940]2010b:13). Functional explanation is an important step for reaching at the ultimate question of sociology which, as we saw above, is to understand which spheres of social structure determine other spheres (Boran, [1945]1992:262-263). With a much more ‘practical’ -if not superficial- understanding of social scientific explanation, Güngör, argues that his main endeavor is to find remedies to the problems which are observed in society, rather than explaining which parts of social phenomena determine other parts ([1982]1993:80).

catastrophe in society, it wouldn't bring any constructive solution" (*ibid.*:98). Güngör states that there is not enough number of sufficiently qualified social scientists to engage in the task of investigating the problems of culture and morality and "construct the national culture" in Turkey (Güngör, [1966]1993:23). Here, one might say that the military coup in 1960 and the following process of the preparation of a new constitution appear to have sharpened his suspicion towards intelligentsia which he inherited from Turhan⁹³. However, Güngör is not just making a distinction between 'right' and 'wrong' ways of doing science. Referring to the support of the Turkish academia to the preparation of the new constitution, Güngör argues that although it is known that intellectuals also took sides in political clashes during the Ottoman period, their actions would be within the boundaries of a common system of values which was shared by everyone from lowest to highest ranks (Güngör, [1980]1993:66)⁹⁴. This argument corresponds to Ottoman traditionalism in which the elements of the organization of state affairs were regarded as the very sources with which Ottomans identified themselves. It also shows that the reason of Güngör's reservations about using the guidance of social sciences in reform movements is not based only on his negative opinion about the social scientists in Turkey; he rather believes that there is a 'structural' problem in terms of the commitment of social scientists in Turkey to the cultural values of Turkish identity. Although he does not openly claim that commitment to cultural norms and values is the condition of scientificity, his arguments lead us to the conclusion that, unlike Turhan, Güngör does not want to give the key role of formulating modernization to science and scientific mentality.

⁹³ The 1960 military coup and the active role secular-Westernist academicians had taken in the preparation of the new constitution was regarded by nationalist-conservative intellectuals as a lesson which taught them they have a narrow impact on political arena. This realization led to the establishment of an intellectual organization, 'Society of Intellectuals' (*Aydınlar Ocağı*) (Alper and Göral, 2006:583). Erol Güngör was a member of the establishment committee of this organization which was going to have a great impact on politics in Turkey.

⁹⁴ Güngör was a leading figure in the endeavors for attributing a higher status to Ottoman past in nationalist movement (Taşkın, 2007:188). He repudiates Gökalp's distinction between Ottoman and Turkish culture (Güngör, [1975]1976: 81) and criticizes the descriptions of Turkish nationalism as a movement which emancipated Turks from Ottoman Empire on the grounds that the case of Turkey is distinct from countries which freed themselves from colonial or imperial powers as a result of the emergence of nationalist consciousness (*ibid.*:11, 16-17): "Turkey is not a new state just as the case of Weimar Germany" (Güngör, [1981]1983: 130).

Secondly, although emphasizing the unstoppable impact of Western civilization, by which he certainly means capitalism, on underdeveloped nations, Güngör does not show the slightest tendency to take a critical stance against it. Considering the heated political disputes during which Güngör produced his ideas, this rather pliant attitude towards cultural diffusion implies an effort on Güngör's side to eliminate any segment of idea which resembles the anti-capitalism of Marxists. Diffusion of capitalism is drawn by Güngör as a natural process with the help of the descriptive lexicon of anthropology. Unlike Turhan who puts forward lengthy plans for triggering economic development, Güngör almost never shows any sign of such concerns. He only focuses on 'unveiling' the 'real faces' of transformists and their successors, that is, Marxists as the ones who inhibit development, as if the long-awaited modernization would take place smoothly with the influx of capitalism unless these groups spoil the game. It was upon this view Güngör argues that the real defenders and actors of industrial development has been those who have a "local" character, by which he means people who are committed to their Turkish cultural identity – he also adds rather bluntly that these people do not have the mentality of transformists and the party they defend, RPP (Güngör, [1980]2007:42)⁹⁵. He also states that unlike Ottoman reformists who focused on the practical side of modernization, the republicans' main concern is to conduct reforms which only increase the resemblance of everyday life in Turkey to the one in Western societies. In line with the anti-ideological position of conservatism, Güngör argues that what distinguishes the groups who have a "local" character and contributed to modernization more than the Westernists is that the former have a "realist", "practical" and "pragmatic" approach rather than the latter whose main motives are based on ideological convictions (*ibid.*:42-43). This reversal is the nationalist conservative response to the anxieties of survival and identity which shaped the

⁹⁵ Güngör's argument corresponds to the close relationship between conservatism and liberalism which is not specific to the case of Turkey, thanks to conservatism's concern for private property and anti-socialist position (Aktaşlı, 2011:153). A famous version of this 'reversal thesis' was offered by İdris Küçükömer who located the political tradition starting from the Janissary-artisan-*ulema* circle up to the Democrat Party -the tradition which was regarded by secular-Westernist bureaucrats as the one which was responsible for backwardness and bigotry- to the 'left' side of the political spectrum against the so-called Westernist bureaucrats who actually inhibit modernization by suppressing the development of productive forces (Küçükömer, [1969]2007:72, 74). The leading names of the Democrat Party, Celal Bayar and Adnan Menderes, also gave statements where they argued that their party is leftist on certain aspects and rightist on some others (Demirel, 2009:417).

mindset of Ottoman intellectuals and modernization reforms since CUP. Unlike the transformists who could not surpass the dualistic formulation of modernization, nationalist conservatives claimed that one can simply observe real processes in society and realize that those elements which was regarded by transformists as the inhibitors of modernization were actually the facilitators of it.

The two aspects of Güngör's thought which are discussed above, that is, a disbelief in science as long as it stays detached from cultural commitments and confidence in economic development via liberalism as long as ideologically 'contaminated' plans, schemes and regulations do not stay in the way, are based on Güngör's reinterpretation of Gökalp's culture-civilization distinction. Evaluating the political fronts of Gökalp's period, Güngör argues that Islamists tried to limit the boundaries of the sphere of civilization by excluding the adoption of certain features of the West like jurisprudence. Westernists, on the other hand, confused these terms, focused on the sphere of culture as the key aspect of modernization and neglected issues related to modern science and technology (*ibid.*:13-14). For Güngör, problem starts from the original formulation of the distinction of these two terms by Gökalp. According to this, "Gökalp overlooks the continuity between culture and civilization and at some points he even regards them in a state of dialectical contradiction" (Güngör, [1975]1976:100). Güngör sees the ideal manifestation of the continuity between culture and civilization in the case of Western civilization where these two spheres are fully integrated to each other⁹⁶. Such unity between culture and civilization should be the main target of Turkish modernization (Güngör, [1980]2007:23). As a consequence of their failure to understand the culture-civilization distinction, republican reformists identified modernization with becoming European (*ibid.*:25).

Those who claim that the European culture and European civilization is inseparable inevitably think that Europe should be accepted and imitated as a totality... Of course European civilization and culture is inseparable; that is because these two spheres are fully integrated and connected to each other to constitute a powerful totality. Don't we also long for

⁹⁶ This argument is completely opposite of Turhan's belief in the rigid distinction between material and moral culture in Western civilization (Turhan, [1951]1969:364-365).

reaching at a similar culture-civilization totality? However, it does not mean that culture-civilization integration is maintained when those elements of civilization can only come together only with [the elements of] that culture. It means that culture-civilization integration is maintained in a particular way in Europe and that other styles of integration occur in other places (*ibid.*:23).

However, instead of scrutinizing how this alternative integration can take place, Güngör offers a perspective which locates national cultures at the center and defines them as particular appearances of the modern Western civilization (Güngör, [1975]1976:100-101). Similar to the case of earlier Islamists he explains, Güngör tends to constrict the content of the concept of civilization and argues that it is possible to replace it with the concept of technology (*ibid.*:115). In line with the central position he attributed to culture, Güngör argues that every nation has a specific style of adopting modern technology (Güngör, [1980]2007:25).

Leaving aside the questionable conception of civilization upon which this interpretation of the relationship between culture and civilization is based, Güngör's view could have been internally logical if only he did not say that "the classical argument for adopting knowledge and technique of Europe is sociologically wrong" (*ibid.*:22). Speaking about the case of Japan which was regarded by Ottoman-Turkish modernists as a demonstration of the possibility of transferring modern technology without spiritual (*manevi*) change, Güngör makes a rather clumsy 'clarification'. He argues that Japanese society also had to go through certain changes in their spiritual world though these changes took place in "social and cultural" (*sosyal ve kültürel*) sphere; not in "religious and moral" (*din ve ahlak*) sphere (*ibid.*). As a result, instead of two spheres as culture and civilization whose relationship still could not have been formulated, we now have three even more rigidly limited spheres as technology, socio-cultural sphere and religion. The picture becomes more complicated when we consider that isolating religion from socio-cultural sphere would only lead us to the conclusion that the former has no place else rather than the life of the individual which, ironically, could not have been achieved in Gökalp's formulation even though

there are certain indications that it was his purpose in the first place. Considering Güngör's apparent will to see cultural identity -by which he definitely means both socio-cultural and religious identity- as the frame of reference for all attempts to organize social life including the utilization of science and technology, he certainly would not like to be praised for such an achievement.

If the guidance of science, which was offered by Gökalp and Turhan, is denied by Güngör, then what is going to be the yardstick of change and how will the success or failure of change be assessed? As it is the case in his writings in general, Güngör prefers to focus on what went wrong until now, rather than proposing a solution. For Güngör, Turkish modernization had failed because of the "rationalist or positivist mentality" which was transferred from the West. According to Güngör, although Western world surpassed the problems of this mentality thanks to the development of social sciences, Turkish transformist intellectuals stood in that stage (Güngör, [1975]1976:37, 39). Here, the rather hesitant use of the terms 'rationalist' and 'positivist' reveals the epistemic ambiguity of Güngör's objection. He clarifies that he is using the term 'positivist' to define approaches which do not make distinction between the method of acquiring knowledge of natural and social phenomena. However, he also states that these approaches deny the validity of those phenomena which cannot be empirically proved (*ibid.*:38). This addition indicates his willingness to downgrade the 'scientific' attempts to eliminate the determining roles of cultural phenomena on the grounds that they do not have empirical validity. On the other hand, repudiation of empiricism does not coincide with his argument that transformists suffer from egocentrism which hinder their ability to distinguish between the things they have in their mind and the things in the real world (Güngör, [1980]2007:47). It also presents a divergence from the conservative tradition of thought which have taken sides with empiricism as opposed to rationalism due to its emphasis on the value of experience (Mollaer, 2011:65).⁹⁷

Turhan's emphasis on science as the main framework for social reforms is based on the assumption that material and non-material culture can function without

⁹⁷ "Being too old means being tested for so many times" (Güngör, [1980]2007:79).

interfering with each other and a ‘truly’ scientific thinking would even protect the spiritual side of social life for it would appreciate its vital role for the functioning of society. In that sense, he believed that scientific mentality is the main condition of survival and the rule of science would not endanger national identity. By ruling out the implications of the promotion of scientific mentality for other spheres of social life, Turhan magnifies the problems of the conventional wish for adopting the technological advancements of the West without disrupting the cultural foundations of society. In Güngör’s case, on the other hand, modernization process is pictured as a byproduct of an ongoing process of the diffusion of capitalism which will bring about the desired development unless the ideology-ridden policies of transformists interrupt the process. The anxiety of identification is much more emphasized and the terms of survival becomes integral parts of reaching at this goal. The problem appears when he fails to offer a concrete source of identity. What we see here is actually the magnified appearance of the internal contradiction of the original formulation of Gökalp which both asks for taking the observable sociological entity (Turkish nation) as the source of knowledge and the frame of reference for modernization reforms and hope for the construction of that very same entity as an end result of the process to which it should provide guidance in the first place. As it was the case in his reversal of the roles of transformists and conservatives in terms of facilitating modernization, Güngör’s attempt could not bring about a formulation which unveils the shortcomings of both his rivals and antecedents since he does not engage in a critical assessment of the categories of traditional and modern in the existing technology of knowledge production and resorts to the same dualities which had been used in Turkish sociological discourse.

5.3 Overview

Unlike culture-oriented sociologies, the question of defining, preserving or restoring the cultural identity of the Turkish society is of little interest for structure-oriented accounts. Although modernization and the ‘natural’ components of this process are regarded by both schools as the only pathway for Turkey to follow, structure-oriented school does not see any positive correlation between this process and

cultural sphere. Instead, as uncompromising modernists, Boran's and Kıray's works covertly propose a future-projected identity for Turkish society. Rather than dealing with the defining characteristics of society in the past which they believe will dissipate without much resistance unless new power relations obstruct the ongoing changes, they prefer to develop their theories on the bases of this future-projected identity which is loosely defined with reference to secular and cosmopolitan values which they believe characterize Western civilization. Therefore, they focus on those characteristics of society which can be compared and contrasted with other nations without any problems in terms of the incommensurability of the epistemic structure upon which knowledge is produced. The distinction Kıray makes between theory and technique of social sciences illustrates the relationship between the epistemological assumptions of Boran and Kıray and their conceptualization of Turkish modernization. In response to the problem of the employment of American sociology for understanding modernization processes in Turkey, Kıray argues that problems and hypotheses which are scrutinized in American sociology -where she believes methodology is more developed than any other country- are different from the issues Turkish sociology has to deal with (Kıray, [1971] 2006:20-21). In line with her belief in the possibility of producing universal social scientific knowledge, she states that the source of the problem is not techniques of social sciences; it is the social issues about which these techniques are used and the way these issues are conceptualized (*ibid.*:21). This assumption neglects the primary role theoretical concerns plays in the development of the techniques of social scientific knowledge production.⁹⁸ Later critiques of modernization school put forward convincing arguments and introduced incontestable examples which display that these supposedly universal methods and techniques fall short in grasping the contextual specificities in social scientific investigations.

The important point for me here is that although Boran and Kıray occasionally said that cultural values or tradition does not pose a threat to modernization and development, they did not conduct any critical assessments on the dichotomous

⁹⁸ Here, one might think about Bachelard's definition of scientific instruments as "reified theories" and his repudiation of the possibility of a rigid distinction between "what is strictly theoretical" and "what is a scientific instrument" (Castelao-Lawless, 1995:50).

categories of East and West which is embedded to the epistemic terrain upon which developed their arguments. Revealing the shortcomings of the dichotomous relationship between the traditional sources of identity and the necessary qualities for survival in the modernization discourse was not an issue of concern for structure-oriented sociologists. In that sense, Mert is right when she points at a contradiction in the historical materialist literature in Turkey whose assumptions about the relationship between base and superstructure more or less corresponds to what I call structure-oriented school in this study. According to Mert, although historical materialism conceptualizes religion as a passive superstructural element, those members of intelligentsia in Turkey who locate themselves into this school slip away from this conceptualization and consider Islam as a factor which determines social processes when they argue that Islam is the reason of the underdevelopment of Turkey (Mert, 2001:203).

As in the case for structure-oriented sociologies, culture-oriented accounts did not challenge the dualistic assumptions of the modernization discourse. Although the heritage of the sociology of Gökalp is largely responsible for this situation, there is an important difference in the way Gökalp's culture-civilization distinction is interpreted by the two scholars I evaluated in this study. In the case of Turhan, Gökalp's distinction is radicalized. According to Turhan, culture and civilization are completely separated in Europe where elements of culture are constricted to the individual sphere and all matters which concerns society are assessed with the distanced attitude of secular-scientific mentality. This does not, however, lead him towards a future-projected identity based on secular and cosmopolitan values as in the case of Boran and Kıray. For Turhan, adoption of this secular-scientific mentality is the key for restoring Turkish identity. This is the reason why Turhan repudiates the identification of European civilization with Christianity. Güngör, on the other hand, is not in favor of such rigid distinction between culture and civilization and is surely far away from longing for the secularization of the 'non-observable'. Contrary to Turhan, Güngör argues that the spheres of culture and civilization are fully integrated to each other in Europe in a particular way and Turkey should also find a way to

reach at such integration without losing the conventional sources of identity as the main reference points.

Turhan's scope of modernization gives a larger territory to the sphere of civilization and attributes the leading role in modernization to the secular-scientific mentality which he regards as the key factor in the development of Europe. He repudiates any dichotomous relationship between the sources of national identity and the goal of modernization. Turhan does not see secular approach in taking decisions about all spheres of life as a threat for the elements of identity which he puts into the safe box of individual sphere. Güngör, on the other hand, shares with Gökalp the intention to formulate culture and civilization as a harmoniously working couple which constitute the unity between the steps that are taken for securing the survival of the nation and the sources of Turkish identity. However, as it was the case in Gökalp, Güngör attributes the role of guidance to the cultural elements of Turkish identity in modernization reforms and tries to enable the smooth functioning of this process by diminishing the boundaries of the sphere which is regarded in Gökalp's framework as the reason of the superiority of Europe, that is, civilization, by equating it with technology. In that sense, he keeps the door open to the use of the elements of cultural identity as the source of legitimacy to the objections to rival formulations which are proposed as alternative survival schemes and henceforth, stays within the boundaries of the survival/identity double-bind. In short, both scholars suffer from shortcomings of the dualistic thinking which they inherited from Gökalp.

The postwar period was important for the 'scientific' status of the structuration of Ottoman-Turkish modernization discourse on the bases of the survival/identity double-bind. As opposed to the rather emotional interpretation of the processes which brought about the establishment of the nation-state and the following reforms, postwar social scientific literature introduced new concepts which enabled a more distanced evaluation of modernization in Turkey. Structure- and culture-oriented sociologies were two different efforts for evaluating modernization in Turkey which had always been the site for struggle over the identification of society. In that sense, the attitude of the members of these two schools to the new tendencies in

intelligentsia in 1960s is quite important. Nalbantoğlu points at the correspondence between the debates on Asiatic mode of production (hereafter, AMP) which was defended in the writings of Sencer Divitçioğlu, İdris Küçükömer and Kemal Tahir and Şerif Mardin's Weberian interpretation of Ottoman history (Nalbantoğlu, 2010:97). Mübeccel Kıray's critique of these two schools emanates from her rigid conception of scientificity. Kıray points that Weberian interpretations try to describe the specificities of the structure of Turkish society with reference to value and belief systems which they consider absolute and unchangeable (Kıray, [1969]1982a:116, 117). On the other hand, AMP thesis focuses on the way nature is exploited and surplus value is controlled, rather than value and belief systems, to describe the specific character of the Ottoman society (*ibid.*:117).⁹⁹ According to Kıray, the AMP thesis which was employed by French socialists to explain the lack of industrialization in the third world, gain significance in Turkey where "historical researches" which focus on "individual characteristics", that is, unique features of societies are more popular than sociological researches (*ibid.*:118). In line with her conception of science as the practice of producing comparable and universal knowledge, Kıray argues that accepting any of these two approaches, which entail the assumption that the principles of social change in Turkey do not resemble to the processes in any other society, would mean to abandon scientific knowledge (*ibid.*). AMP thesis is identified with the idealization of the Ottoman governing system owing to the popularization of this thesis in the idea of 'generous state' (*kerim devlet*) which was defended by the famous novelist Kemal Tahir.¹⁰⁰ This line of

⁹⁹ According to Nalbantoğlu, Kıray believed that AMP thesis was an ideological cover which was used by France to keep her control over Algeria, Tunisia and Senegal (Nalbantoğlu, 2010:97). In a similar fashion, she believed that the emphasis of American cultural anthropology on cultural specificities was conducive for American imperialism (*ibid.*). Although Nalbantoğlu does not give any names which Kıray mentioned as the representative of the latter stream, Mümtaz Turhan was obviously one of the names she had in mind considering the fact that Turhan developed his arguments on the bases of this literature.

¹⁰⁰ Although more scholarly works on AMP thesis do not overtly display this attitude, it is not possible to say that these works are impartial about the Ottoman history. For example, commenting on Karl Wittfogel's theory of hydraulic societies which is one of the main sources of AMP thesis, Divitçioğlu cannot hide his distaste against Wittfogel who used his theory to describe 'Oriental despotism' and says that Wittfogel's work is illustrative of how to come to wrong conclusions from correct arguments (Divitçioğlu, [1967]1981:18n). He also emphasizes that AMP is the key for an Asian society "to remain as a nation" since the strong state provides public services, suppresses the conflict between small communities and compensates for the lack of economic relationship between these communities

thought brought about a stream in Marxist movement in Turkey which is known as ‘localist socialism’ (*yerlici sosyalizm*). The interesting point is that although not refraining from using derogatory statements about this group as he does about other leftists, Erol G ng r states that localists represent the only group in socialist movement which is not entirely lost for national cause and they might be able to serve people in case they can learn the culture of their nation (G ng r, [1975]1976:52).

These efforts for carving out the specificities of society and how its specific character had emerged in history became influential in a period when political sphere was becoming more and more radicalized. This simultaneity is in line with the impact of the changing outlook of Kemalism on the structuration of modernization discourse in Turkey. According to Ye en, in response to the domination of DP over RPP in 1950s, Kemalism changed its comprehensive reform and construction program which it initiated in 1930s and started to define itself with less systematic ideas. In this new phase, Kemalism emphasized the idea of “Western-national-secular state-society” which represent more or less the least common denominator among all political parties of the period. In that sense it became difficult to talk about Kemalism (Ye en, 2009:65-66). Approaching to the issue from another angle,  elik argues that as a result of its role as the “signifier of ‘recognition’ in political sphere”, Kemalism had turned into an ‘empty signifier’: “The proliferation of articulations around a so-called Kemalist subject position eventually erased the dividing line between a possible Kemalist identity and its others” ( elik, 2000: 198). These evaluations point at the disappearance of Kemalism as the gravitational center of political sphere which resulted in a tendency towards the dislocation of the state from its position as the main subject of modernization. The relative increase in the democratic means in political sphere found its expression in the struggle over the signification of the social. In that sense, the renewed interest in 1960s in historical explanations about the Ottoman society and the traces of past in modern Turkey was not simply turning back to early republican efforts for finding out what makes Turkish society a unique nation; these were the initial steps to develop alternative explanations for Ottoman-

(*ibid.*:25). Furthermore, he gives reference to Marx to support his argument that as a unifying factor in AMP, state does not have to be despotic; it can also be democratic (*ibid.*:21).

Turkish modernization instead of the rather straightforward models of change which were developed with the theoretical tools of structural-functionalism or naïve culturalist schemes for economic development which were based on the theses of cultural anthropology.

CHAPTER VI

6 CONCLUSION

This study presents a particular reading of the Ottoman-Turkish modernization discourse whose main course of structuration had been shaped by a break from Ottoman traditionalism whose defining principle can be summarized with the motto “What makes us stronger is also what defines us”. This principle was based on the belief in the soundness of the organization of the Ottoman state and the mechanisms of governing. This belief had to go through a great challenge as a result of the changes in the international power structure. The response of the Ottoman decision-takers was to engage in a set of reformation movements which were going to be discussed under the title of Ottoman modernization. Since Ottomans regarded the state as the defining feature and the backbone of the imperial power, the organization of the state was the first thing to do in order to restore their power and secure the survival of the empire in a changing world. In line with the legacy of traditionalism, throughout this period of reformation, Ottomans sought to restore the unity between the way society is governed and the sources with which Ottomans defined themselves. In other words, the composition of the state they tried to build determined the way they characterized the Ottoman society they aspired.

However, times were changing. A civil sphere was emerging and the steps which were taken by decision-takers for the reformation of the empire also prepared the conditions for the development of new means for the expression of alternative formulations of modernization. Nevertheless, the emergence of this civil sphere did not trigger the search for alternative routes for modernization which mobilize the capacity of the social. The pathway which should be followed was still defined with the mediation of the organization of the state. The purpose of restoring the unity between the composition of the state and the sources of the Ottoman identity brought about a political struggle in which, opposing parties defended their own schemes by

blaming their rivals for drifting apart from their own identity. This form of political struggle structured Ottoman-Turkish modernization discourse on the bases of a double-bind between securing the conditions of survival by reforming the state and preserving the defining features of being Ottoman. With the growing impact of the linear-progressivist conception of history, elements of these two distinct categories were located on the same layer of discourse and reinterpreted as the opposite poles of a continuum which sways between the dichotomous categories of East and West.

Sociology, in the form of the late nineteenth century evolutionism and organicism, became one of the key discursive domains in the Ottoman Empire where the characteristics of the emerging civil sphere were increasingly discussed via the objectification of society as an entity which is distinct from the state at the beginning of the twentieth century. This distinction turned society into a field of contestation for signification on the bases of the debates over the physiological characteristics of society in terms of eligibility to procure the conditions of survival and the ethnic-national configuration of the crumbling empire. The ongoing political struggles went on in favor of those who defined Ottoman society in anti-cosmopolitan terms and the objectification of society as an object of knowledge went on hand in hand with the crystallization of Turkish nationalism which found its full expression after the establishment of Turkey as a republican nation-state. In the early republican period which was governed by a single-party regime, the domination of a national identity which emanates from the internal dynamics and existing aspirations of society was prevented with Kemalist principles which theorized the unity between the ruling party, state and nation by turning the ideas of popular sovereignty and general will into the rather hollow ideas of 'national will' and 'national sovereignty'. The unity between the principles of governing and sources of national identity was tried to be restored with a strong state-centered approach which diffused into all departments of everyday life. Although almost all political groups agreed on the necessity of conducting necessary reforms for preparing the conditions of economic development, which was regarded as the criteria of survival of the nation, republicans tried to suppress alternative schemes of reform by labeling them as obscurantism and reactionism, while opposing groups continued to defend their position by

emphasizing the destructive impacts of republicans' modernization reforms on the Turkish-Islamic identity of the society. The survival/identity double-bind maintained its position as the rule of formation of the structuration of modernization discourse owing to these ongoing struggles over the national identity of the new Turkish society.

As a result of the modest steps for the institutionalization of social scientific knowledge production and the involvement of academicians, who do not have a direct relationship with the state, in knowledge production, sociological accounts on Turkish modernization gained a more 'scientific' and 'academic' outlook and relatively detached interpretations of the modernization process were produced by 1940s. The growing polarization in the political sphere in the Cold War period and the strong challenge of Marxism in terms of scientificity also contributed to this change. Political polarization manifested itself in the intellectual sphere as the mutual claims of opposing parties about the lack of scientific validity of the modernization schemes of their rivals. Sociological literature was divided into two groups which I discussed in this study under the headings of structure- and culture-oriented sociologies. Struggle over the signification of the social took place between the future-projected identity of Turkish society which was assumed by the structure-oriented sociologies on the bases of secular and cosmopolitan values of the West and the Turkish-Islamic national identity which was redefined by culture-oriented sociologies as a yet to be fulfilled goal to be reached at via a milder modernization scheme.

The growing number of urban population which appeared as a potential for the mobilization of masses in the struggle between rightist and leftist politics had an important impact in the structuration of modernization discourse. Although claims about the structure and dynamics of society had been an important segment of the debates on modernization since late nineteenth century, active involvement of society in the formulations of modernization took place by 1960s. On the other hand, the state-centered conception of social change which was predominant in Turkey and the top-to-bottom and rational-comprehensive conception of social policy production

which was predominant in the postwar Western world, inhibited the diffusion of the calls for society-centered redefinition of modernization process in Turkish social scientific literature. These attempts in the field of politics were going to be suppressed by the military coup in 1980 which restored the predominant position of the state in the political sphere and prepared the conditions of lumping together various political demands under the label of popular will and popular sovereignty by putting pressure on civil society and diminishing the representative capacity of the assembly via certain changes in the regulations regarding the structure of political parties and election thresholds.

The course of the structuration of modernization discourse dramatically changed in the post-1980 period. Although the growth of non-state spheres in Turkey was abruptly suppressed by the 1980 military coup, changing conditions in world economy and the proliferation of the surfaces of political struggle made it more and more difficult to contain civil society within predefined boundaries. The challenges against the grand narratives of modernity and the claims about the diminishing significance of states as the key units which organize social life via comprehensive plans and programs called forth new conceptual tools in social scientific literature. Since early 1980s, critical inquiries about the absolute categories of modernist thought have been conducted in the reinterpretation of the modernization experience of Turkey. The validity of the dichotomous categories such as traditional and modern and East and West have increasingly been questioned in social scientific literature. During these inquiries, the widely shared convictions about the conditions of survival started to be questioned. Not only the 'paradigm of development', which was mainly a product of the postwar period, but also the entire idea of linear-progressive flow which is embedded to Western modernist tradition of thought started to lose their authority in our understanding of history and change. The question of identity, on the other hand, was extensively fragmented and the assumed coherence between individuals' beliefs is largely repudiated. This transformation had massive impact not only on Marxian views about the relationship between individuals' position in production relationships and the identity they assume, but also on culturalist perspectives whose broad and homogenizing national and religious categories failed

to satisfy the fragmentation of identities. These challenges against modernization can briefly be defined as the acknowledgement of the resistance of 'real' processes to lend themselves to observation and categorization. The arising questions about the validity of existing categories to understand the ongoing processes also triggered further questions about the extent of the 'contamination' of our understanding of the past with the theoretical and conceptual tools which were employed in historical investigations and even the validity of talking about any sort of contamination or distortion in our understanding of historical 'realities'.

Although the hasty remarks in 1980s about the end of modernity and all that it represents were later denied with good reason, it is beyond contestation that social sciences have been struggling to find footing upon which they can develop new theories to understand the new era. On the other hand, in the case of Turkey, the resistance of the political sphere to grasp these new challenges makes it more difficult for us to understand the new course of events. The increasing polarization in politics is becoming more and more detached from the multiplicity of political struggles which we can see from the under-representation of many demands in 'legitimate' fields of politics. In these circumstances, sociological discourse in Turkey kept resisting to benefit from new epistemic tools for reinterpreting social change. Although there have been formidable attempts to discuss modernization with reference to the multi-faceted struggles between alternative programs for change and various identities, the predominant way to look at the ongoing processes is still shaped by the rather simplistic schemes of structure- or culture-oriented sociologies of the postwar period. One might say that the immediacy of daily political conflicts keeps overrunning the attempts to eliminate the shortcomings of the existing modernization discourse.

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APPENDIX 1 CURRICULUM VITAE

PERSONAL INFORMATION

Surname, Name: Mühürdarođlu, Anıl
Date and Place of Birth: 31 December 1979, Ankara
Phone: +90-533-6203382
e-mail: anilmuhur@gmail.com

EDUCATION

02.2006 – 03.2014	Ph.D. on Sociology Middle East Technical University – Ankara/TURKEY
09.2002 – 12.2005	M.S. on Urban Political Planning and Local Gov. Middle East Technical University – Ankara/TURKEY
09.1998 – 0.6.2002	B.C.P. on Urban and Regional Planning Middle East Technical University – Ankara/TURKEY

WORK EXPERIENCE

03.2010 – Present	Trakya University
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LANGUAGE SKILLS

- English (Advanced)

ACADEMIC INTERESTS

- Methodology and Epistemology of Social Sciences
- Sociology of Knowledge
- Philosophy and History of Science
- French Philosophy
- Urban Sociology and Politics
- Human Geography

APPENDIX 2 TURKISH SUMMARY

Sosyolojinin akademik bir disipline olarak tarihi yüz yılın biraz üstünde olmakla birlikte toplum olgusunun bir bilgi nesnesi olarak ortaya çıkışının tarihi daha eskilere dayanır. Karl Polanyi'nin 'toplumun keşfi' olarak tanımladığı bu süreç, toplumun kendisini oluşturan bireylerden bağımsız olarak kendi işleyiş kuralları olan bir bilgi nesnesi haline gelişini anlatır. Bu süreçteki dönüm noktalarının, Robert Nisbet'in 'iki devrim' diye tanımladığı Endüstri Devrimi ve Fransız Devrimi olduğunu söylemek mümkündür. Eski düzeni sarsan bu önemli değişimler, toplumların düzeni ve toplumsal değişiminin gidişatı konularında kaygılar ve yeni bilgi alanlarına dair bir ihtiyaç doğurmuştur. Bu anlamda, sosyolojinin gelişiminde bilimsel düşüncedeki gelişmelerin beraberinde getirdiği yeni epistemik araçların yanı sıra bu değişim karşısında kaygı duyan muhafazakar düşünürlerin fikirlerinin de katkıları olduğunu söylemek mümkündür.

Bu yeni bilgi alanına dair ihtiyacı doğuran şartları doğuran süreçler on beşinci yüzyıldan itibaren Avrupa'da iktidarın merkezileşmesi yönündeki eğilimlerle başlamıştır. Bu süreçler paralel olarak burjuvazinin gelişmesi, devletten ayrı bir sivil alanın tanımlanması ve devletin meşruiyeti gibi konuları gündeme getirmiştir. Liberal düşüncenin gelişmesi ve devlet kontrolünün alanının daraldığı bir toplum tahayyülünün yaygınlaşması, kendine ait yasaları olan ve bu yasaların anlaşılması için kendine ait bir bilimsel alan olan bir bilgi nesnesi olarak toplum olgusunun gelişmesi yönündeki gelişmelere ön ayak olmuştur. Bu gelişmeleri takip eden süreçte farklı ulusal sosyolojilerin oluşumu, ortaya çıkan ulus-devletlerin devlet ve toplum arasındaki ilişkiye ve genel anlamda liberal düşünce geleneğine bakışlarındaki farklılıklar çerçevesinde ortaya çıkan bir sonuç olarak görülebilir.

Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda sosyolojinin ortaya çıkış koşulları daha farklıdır. Batıda meydana gelen ekonomik ve bilimsel gelişmenin askeri alanda meydana getirdiği güç dengesi değişimi ve bu değişimlerin Osmanlılar'da yarattığı endişe, Batı kaynaklı yeni düşünce biçimlerinin ve bilgi alanlarına olan ilginin artmasına neden olmuştur. Genel olarak Osmanlı-Türk modernleşmesi çerçevesinde tartışılan bu

süreç, on dokuzuncu yüzyılda en belirgin adımlarının atıldığı bir Batılılaşma serüveni olarak Osmanlı tarih yazımında yerini almıştır. Osmanlılar devleti imparatorluk gücünün tanımlayıcı olgusu ve belkemiği olarak tanımladığı için, güçlerini eski haline getirmek ve değişen dünyada imparatorluğun hayatta kalmasını garanti altına almak adına ilk olarak yapılması gereken şeyin devleti organize etmek olduğunu düşündüler. Bu bağlamda Osmanlılar Batılılaşma çerçevesi içerisinde öncelikli olarak askeri ve bürokratik düzenlemelere gitmiş, süreç içerisinde ordunun ve devletin yeniden yapılanmasında gerekli olacak personelin yetiştirilmesi için yeni yüksek öğretim kurumları kurmuştur.

Bu dönemde, Osmanlı-Türk modernleşme söyleminin yapılanması açısından en önemli etkilerde bulunan iki adımın 1826'da Yeniçeriliğin lağvı ve 1839'da Tanzimat Fermanı'nın ilanı olduğunu söylemek mümkündür. Yeniçeriler devlet içerisindeki etkilerini uzun zaman önce kaybetmiş olmakla birlikte ideolojik anlamları itibarıyla önemli bir kurum olarak görülmüştür. Yenileşme söylemi açısından Yeniçerilerin ortadan kaldırılması modernleşme açısından gerekli bir adım olarak görülmekteyken, Osmanlılık kimliğinin kaybı yönünde kaygılarını dile getiren çevrelerce Yeniçeriler bu kimliğin önemli bir unsuru olarak ele alınmış, ortadan kaldırılmaları yönündeki adımın imparatorluğa zarar verdiği iddia edilmiştir. Osmanlı'da vatandaşlık kavramının ilk defa yasal düzenlemelerde yer aldığı belge olarak görülen Tanzimat Fermanı ise, yine kimi çevrelerce Osmanlılar'ın Batılı güçlerin talepleri karşısında verdikleri bir taviz olarak ele alınmıştır.

Batı kaynaklı fikirlerin görece yaygınlaşması ve bu düşüncelerin dolaşıma girdiği sivil bir alanın ortaya çıkışını da beraberinde getiren bu kurumsal düzenlemeler, modernleşme sürecinin nasıl yürütüleceğine dair tartışmalara neden olmuş, Osmanlı'nın neden Batı karşısında gücünü kaybettiği ve bu gücü yeniden kazanması için hangi adımları atması gerektiğine dair siyasi ayrılıkla doğurmuştur. Bu dönemde ortaya çıkan ve Yeni Osmanlılar adıyla bilinen bir aydın hareketi, bürokratların modernleşme yönünde aldıkları kararları ve attıkları adımları Osmanlı'nın kendi kimliğini kaybetmesine neden olacağını ve bu hareketlerin imparatorluğu Batılı güçlerin eksenine sokacağını iddia etmişlerdir. Yöneticilerin eski devlet geleneğinde

uzaklaşması iddiası üzerine kurulu bu eleştiri biçiminin kökeni, eski nasihatname geleneğine dayanmaktadır. Ancak on dokuzuncu yüzyılın yeni düşünce ortamında bu eleştiri, farklı sonuçlar doğurmuştur.

Bu çalışma, tanımlayıcı ilkesi “bizi güçlü kılan şey aynı zamanda bizi tanımlayan şeydir” mottosuyla özetlenebilecek olan Osmanlı gelenekselciliğinden kopuşla ana yapılanma rotası şekillendirilmiş bulunan Osmanlı-Türk modernleşme söylemi özelinde bir okuma sunmaktadır. Gelenekselcilik ilkesi, Osmanlı devletinin örgütlülüğünün ve idare mekanizmalarının sağlamlığına duyulan inanca dayandırılmıştır ve uluslararası güç yapısındaki değişimin bir sonucu olarak bu inanç büyük bir sarsıntıya uğramıştır. Bu süreçte Osmanlı karar alıcıları, ileriki dönemlerde Osmanlı modernizasyonu başlığı altında tartışılacak olan bir dizi reform gerçekleştirecektir. Bu reformasyon süreci boyunca Osmanlılar, toplumun yönetiliş şekli ve Osmanlıların kendilerini üzerinden tanımladıkları kaynaklar arasındaki bütünlüğü eski güçlü haline getirmek için geleneksellik mirasıyla aynı doğrultuda çözümler aradılar. Bir başka deyişle, inşa etmeye uğraştıkları devlet düzeni, arzu ettikleri Osmanlı toplumunu tanımlayış yollarını belirledi.

Bu dönemde düşünsel anlamda meydana gelen önemli gelişme, Osmanlılar’ın tarihe bakışındaki değişiklikti. Kökeni İbn-i Haldun’a dayanan dairesel tarih algısı, yerini Batı kaynaklı düz-çizgisel ve gelişmeci tarih anlayışına bırakmış, bu yeni anlayış, imparatorluğun varlığını sürdürmesi için yeni koşullara uyum sağlaması gerektiği yönünde yaygın bir kanaatin ortaya çıkmasına neden olmuştur. Bu çalışmada Osmanlı’nın varlığını sürdürmesi yönündeki kaygılar ‘hayatta kalma’ (survival) kavramı çerçevesinde ele alınmıştır. Batılı düşünce biçimlerinin yaygınlaşmasıyla birlikte Osmanlı aydınları, modern çağın hayatta kalma koşullarını sağlamak için imparatorluğun bilimsel gelişmelerden faydalanmayı ve yeni ekonomik gelişme yöntemlerini takip etmeyi öğrenmesi gerektiğine giderek daha fazla inanmaya başlamışlardı.

Tarihin düz-çizgisel ilerlediği yönündeki anlayış karşısında Osmanlı’yı Osmanlı yapan niteliklerin kaybolması yönündeki iddialar, modernleşme söyleminin

şekillenmesinde belirleyici bir rol oynamıştır. Osmanlı devlet geleneği üzerine kurulu Osmanlılık anlayışı, modernleşme yönünde bürokratik ve kurumsal anlamda atılan adımların bu kimlikten uzaklaşma olarak kodlanmasına neden olmuş, hayatta kalma ve kimlik kategorileri, Osmanlı modernleşme söyleminin Doğu ile Batı veya geleneksel ve modern gibi karşıtlıklar üzerinden yapılanmasına neden olacak bir çifte açmazın terimleri haline gelmiştir. Bu şekilde yapılan modernleşme söylemi, süregelmekte olan değişimlere dair fikir üretkenlerin modernleşmenin temel sorununu bu ikilikleri aşmak olarak tanımlamalarına sebep olmuştur.

Düşünsel alandaki önemli değişim tarih anlayışındaki yeni eğilimler ise, toplumsal değişme açısından önemli olan gelişme ise sivil bir alan ortaya çıkmasıydı. İmparatorluğun ıslah edilmesi için karar alıcılarca atılan adımlar aynı zamanda modernleşmenin şekillendirilme alternatiflerinin ifadesi için yeni araçlar geliştirilmesine uygun koşulları da hazırladı. Bütün bunlara rağmen sivil alanın ortaya çıkışı, modernleşme için toplum kapasitesini harekete geçirecek alternatif rotalar aranmasını tetiklemedi. Takip edilmesi gereken rota hala devlet yapısının arabuluculuğu üzerinden tanımlanıyordu. Devlet düzeni ve Osmanlı kimliğinin kaynakları arasındaki bütünlüğü eski haline getirme amacı, muhalefet partilerinin, rakiplerinin kendi öz kimlikleriyle olan bağlarını yitirmelerini sağlamak adına onları suçlayarak kendi tasarımlarını savundukları siyasi bir mücadeleyi de beraberinde getirdi. Bu siyasi mücadele tarzı, Osmanlı-Türk modernleşme söylemini, devletin ıslah edilmesi yoluyla hayatta kalma koşullarının güvence altına alınması ve Osmanlılığı tanımlayan özelliklerin korunması arasında bırakan çifte açmaz temelinde yapılandırdı. Tarihin doğrusal-ilerici kavrayışının artan etkisiyle bu iki farklı kategori de aynı söylem katmanına yerleştirildi ve iki parçaya ayrılmış Doğu ve Batı kategorileri arasında sallanıp duran sürekliliğin karşıt kutupları olarak yeniden yorumlandı. Osmanlı'nın son döneminde sosyolojiye karşı doğan ilgi ile birlikte bu bilgi alanı, söz konusu ikilikleri aşmanın bilimsel bir yolu olarak görüldü.

On dokuzuncu yüzyılın sonlarında genel olarak evrimcilik ve organizmacılık çerçevesinde şekillenen sosyoloji, pozitivistimin ve materyalizmin aydınlar arasında tartışılmaya başlandığı Osmanlı'da yeni bir bilgi alanı olarak ele alınmaya

başlanmıştı. Toplumu devletten ayrı bir bilgi nesnesi olarak gören sosyolojinin bu yaklaşımı Osmanlı'da yirminci yüzyılın başında giderek tek olası çare haline gelen milliyetçilik düşüncesinin toplumu Türk kimliği üzerinden tanımlamasında araç olarak kullanılmıştır. Bu ayırım, toplumun hayatta kalma koşullarını temin etmeye uygunluğu ve parçalanmakta olan imparatorluğun etnik-ulusal yapısı açısından toplumun fizyolojisi üzerine yapılan tartışmalar temelinde bir tür anlamlandırma mücadelesi şeklinde vuku buldu. Burada Türk sosyolojisi açısından en çok dile getirilen ayırım, Prens Sabahattin'in ve Ziya Gökalp'in liderliğini yaptığı iki sosyoloji okulu arasındaki ayırımdı.

Prens Sabahattin Frederic Le Paly ve Edmond Demolins'in *science sociale* anlayışının bir takipçisiydi ve bu iki düşünürün Auguste Comte pozitivizmine yönelttiği eleştiri çerçevesinde dönemin hakim sosyoloji anlayışı karşısında gözleme dayanan bir sosyal bilim anlayışı savunmuştur. Bunu yanı sıra yine Demolins'in Anglo-Sakson ülkelere duyduğu hayranlık ve bu ülkelerdeki eğitim biçiminin bireyciliğin gelişmesini sağladığı yönündeki iddiasını kabul eden Prens Sabahattin, bu iddia çerçevesinde Osmanlı'yı cemaatçi bir toplum olarak tanımlamış ve bu durumun gelişme karşısında bir engel teşkil ettiğini savunmuştur. Prens Sabahattin'e göre Tanzimat reformları, toplumun nasıl teşekkül ettiği ile toplumu oluşturan kurumlar arasındaki ilişkiyi temel almadıkları için başarısız olmaya mahkumdu. Bunun aksine yapılması gereken toplumun teşekkülünü değiştirmek, yani cemaatçi toplum yapısından bireyci toplum yapısına geçmek gerekiyordu. Prens Sabahattin'e göre insanların inisiyatif alabilen bireyler olarak yetiştirilmesi, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nun hayatta kalmasını sağlamak açısından anahtar öneme sahipti. Dahası, cemaatçi toplumlar, kendilerini merkezi referans noktası alan bireylerin var olmamasından dolayı ahlaki olarak da çökmeye mahkumdu. Zira birey olamayan toplum üyelerinin kendilerine yapılan haksızlıklar karşısında direnç göstermeleri de mümkün değildi. Prens Sabahattin'in bu yaklaşımı, toplumu onu oluşturan bireylerin toplamından farklı bir olgu olarak gören organizmacı sosyoloji anlayışından farklı idi. Prens Sabahattin alternatif bir sosyoloji okulunun temsilcisi olmakla kalmamış, kendi argümanlarını savunan siyasi bir harekete de önderlik ederek Jön Türk hareketi içerisindeki merkezîyetçi kanadın karşısına adem-i merkezîyetçi kanadın önde gelen

bir ismi olarak siyasi tarihte yerini almıştır. Bu hareket zaman içerisinde merkezîyetçi kanat tarafından elimine edilmiş, Prens Sabahattin'in Osmanlı hanedanlığı üyesi olması nedeniyle cumhuriyetin kurulması sonrası yurt dışına sürülmesi ile birlikte temsil ettiği okul da Türk sosyolojisinde çeperde kalmış, Prens Sabahattin ismi, yüzeysel anlamda ampirik sosyolojinin, bireyciliğin ve liberalizmin erken bir temsilcisi olarak sosyoloji tarihine geçmiştir.

Prens Sabahattin'in aksine merkezîkanatta yer alan ve aynı zamanda Türk milliyetçiliğinin ideologu olarak tanımlanan Ziya Gökalp, ortaya koyduğu çalışmalarla Türkiye'de sosyoloji alanına uzun süre hakim olmuş, Gökalp'in modernleşme formülasyonu erken cumhuriyet dönemi resmi söylemini de önemli ölçüde belirlemiştir. Geleneksellik ve modernlik arasındaki ikiliğe sürekli vurgu yapan Osmanlı-Türk modernleşme söylemi içerisinde bu ikiliğe bir çözüm arayan Gökalp, Türklüğü, İslamı ve Batılılığı bir araya getirmeye çalışmış ve kendi modernleşme anlayışını kültür ve medeniyet kavramları arasında yaptığı ayrım üzerinden tarif etmeye çalışmıştır. Bu ayrıma göre (1) medeniyet uluslar arası bir kavramken, kültür ulusaldır; (2) medeniyet nakledilebilir ve taklit edilebilirken, kültür için bunu söylemek mümkün değildir; (3) bir millet medeniyetini değiştirebilir, ancak kültürünü değiştiremez; ve (4) medeniyet akıl ve yöntem üzerine kurulu olmakla birlikte kültür duygular ve hislere dayanır. Ziya Gökalp bu ayrım çerçevesinde hem 1910'larda giderek kuvvetlenen ve tarihsel – toplumsal şartlar çerçevesinde tek seçenek gibi ele alınmaya başlanan Türk milliyetçiliğini organik toplum ideali üzerine oturtacak temel bir değerler sistemi ile Osmanlılar'ın Batılılaşma özlemini bir araya getirmeye çalışmıştır.

Ziya Gökalp'in kültür – medeniyet ayrımı pek çok yazar tarafından eleştirilmiş, bu iki alanın birbirinden bu kadar kopuk tarifinin toplumsal gerçeklerle bağdaşmadığı sıklıkla vurgulanmıştır. Bu ayrımın şematik yapısı, Gökalp'in milliyetçilik anlayışı ve sekülerliği konusunu da tartışmalı konular haline getirmiştir. Kimi çevreler Gökalp'in din olgusunu özel hayat çerçevesinde tanımladığını söylemiş, hatta bazı muhafazakar düşünürler Gökalp'i dinsizlikle suçlamıştır. Bununla birlikte Durkheim sosyolojisini harfi harfine takip eden Gökalp, Durkheim'in kolektif şuur kavramını

sıklıkla vurgulamış, toplumun gidişatı yönünde atılacak adımların toplumun değerler sistemi ile çatışmaması gerektiği üzerinde sürekli durmuştur. Bu kavram Gökalp sosyolojisinde yalnızca toplumu bir arada tutan bir çimento vazifesi görmemiş, toplumun kendisini bulduğu güç durumlarda gerçekleştirdiği atılımların kaynağı olarak da tanımlanmıştır. Burada Gökalp, düşüncelerini dile getirdiği dönemlerdeki Balkan Savaşları ve Birinci Dünya Savaşı gibi çalkantılı olaylar karşısında toplumun ne yönde hareket etmesi gerektiği yönündeki siyasi – ideolojik beklentilerini de dile getirmektedir.

Prens Sabahattin'in ve Ziya Gökalp'in içerisinde bulunduğu siyasi hareketler arasındaki mücadeleler, Osmanlı toplumunu kozmopolitlik karşıtı koşullarla tanımlayan güçlerin lehine gelişti ve toplumun bir bilgi objesi olarak nesnelleştirilmesi de Türkiye'nin cumhuriyetçi bir ulus-devlet olarak kurulmasıyla tam ifadesini bulan Türk milliyetçiliğinin kristalleşmesiyle el ele devam etti. Tek parti rejiminin devam ettiği erken cumhuriyet döneminde; toplumun iç dinamiklerinden doğabilecek olan hareketler, Rousseaucu egemenlik ve umumi irade kavramlarını içeriği boşaltılmış olarak “milli irade” ve “ulusal egemenlik” fikirlerine çeviren tek parti dönemi resmi söylemi tarafından bastırıldı. İktidarın ilkeleri ve ulusal kimliğin kaynakları arasındaki uyum, günlük hayatın her aşamasına nüfuz eden güçlü bir devlet merkezli yaklaşım ile yeniden oluşturulmaya çalışıldı.

1920'li yıllar, aydınların ulus-devletin kurulması ile sonuçlanan büyük dönüşümü tanımlama çabalarına sahne oldu. Hem muhafazakarlığa yakın olan, hem de daha radikal modernleşmeci görüşe yakın olan çevreler, yeni cumhuriyetin ideolojisini oluşturma yönünde pek çok fikir ortaya attılar. Bergson düşüncesinden etkilenen kimi muhafazakar düşünürler, cumhuriyet devrimini toplumun kendi yaratıcı kapasitesiyle açıklamaya çalışırken, bir yandan da dönemin İslamcı hareketinden kendini uzak tutarak dinde reformcu bir tavır sergilemekteydi. Öte yandan da bazı solcu aydınlar cumhuriyet devrimini anti-emperyalist bir hareket olarak selamlıyor, Kemalizm kavramı çerçevesinde tartışılan resmi ideolojiyi bu devrimi Marksist devrim anlayışından farklı kılan nitelikler üzerinden tarif etmeye çalışıyordu.

Kemalizm kendi ideolojisini 1931 kongresinde kurucu parti olan Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi tüzüğünde yerini alan ve 'altı ok' diye bilinen cumhuriyetçilik, milliyetçilik, halkçılık, inkılapçılık, laiklik ve devletçilik ilkeleri üzerinden tanımladı. Her ne kadar bütün siyasi gruplar ulusun hayatta kalması için gerekli kriter olarak görülen ekonomik kalkınma için uygun koşulların hazırlanması adına gerekli reformların yapılmasının gerekli olduğu konusunda mutabakata varmış olsa da; muhalefet grupları cumhuriyetçilerin modernizasyon reformlarının toplumun Türk-İslam kimliği üzerinde yıkıcı etkileri olacağı vurgusunu yaparak kendi konumlarını savunmaya devam ederken cumhuriyetçiler alternatif reform tasarımlarını gericiilik ve irtica şeklinde yaftalayarak bastırmaya çalıştılar. Hayatta kalma/kimlik çifte açmazı, yeni Türk toplumunun ulusal kimliği üzerine devam eden bu mücadeleler sayesinde modernizasyon söyleminin yapılandırılmasının biçimleme kuralı olarak konumunu korumaya devam etti.

1920'ler ve 1930'larda sosyolojinin kurumsallaşması yönünde bir takım adımlar atılmakla birlikte Ziya Gökalp'in 1924'teki ölümü sonrasında sosyolojinin önemini belirgin ölçüde kaybettiği bir döneme girildi. Bu dönemde Türk kimliğinin inşası için tarih, arkeoloji ve antropoloji alanlarına daha fazla önem verilmesiyle birlikte sosyoloji kuramların anlatıldığı bir ders niteliğinde varlığını sürdürdü. Bununla birlikte 1930'larda genel anlamda sosyal bilimler alanında iki önemli gelişme oldu. Bunlardan bir tanesi, Nazi Almanya'sından kaçan bazı akademisyenlerin İstanbul ve Ankara'daki üniversitelerde çalışmaya başlaması oldu. Bu akademisyenler felsefe ve sosyoloji gibi alanların kurumsallaşması yönünde belirleyici adımların atılmasına ön ayak oldular. Türkiye'de sosyoloji tarihi açısından ikinci bir önemli bir kırılma, 1930'ların sonlarında Ankara Üniversitesi'nde Dil tarih Coğrafya Fakültesinde (DTCF) kurulan sosyoloji kürsüsünün kurulması idi. Amerika'da doktora çalışmalarını gerçekleştirmiş genç akademisyenlerin yer aldığı bu okul Türk sosyoloji literatürüne önemli isimler kazandırdı.

Kısaca denilebilir ki, sosyal bilimsel bilgi üretiminin kurumsallaştırılması için atılan mütevazı adımların ve devletle doğrudan ilişkisi olmayan akademisyenlerin sürece katılımının sonucu olarak, bilgi üretiminde, Türk modernizasyonu üzerine yapılan

sosyolojik tanımlar daha “bilimsel” ve “akademik” birer görünüm kazandı. Soğuk Savaş döneminde siyaset alanında artan kutuplaşma ve Marksizm’in bilimsellik anlamındaki güçlü mücadelesi de bu değişime katkıda bulundu. Siyasi kutuplaşma entelektüel alanda karşıt tarafların, rakiplerinin modernizasyon tasarımlarındaki bilimsel geçerlilik eksiklikleri hakkındaki karşılıklı iddiaları olarak kendini gösterdi. Sosyolojik literatür, bu çalışmada yapı- ve kültür-yönelimli olarak tanımlanan iki gruba ayrıldı. Savaş sonrası dönemde Türkiye’de sosyolojide modernleşme tartışmaları, Batının yapı-yönelimli sosyolojilerce savunulan, seküler ve kozmopolit değerler üzerine kurulu gelecek yönelimli toplumu kimliği anlayışı ile kültür-yönelimli sosyolojilerce savunulan, hala ulaşılamamış ve daha yumuşak modernizasyon tasarımlarıyla ulaşılabilecek bir hedef olarak yeniden tanımlanmış olan Türk-İslam ulusal kimliği anlayışı arasında sosyalin anlamlandırılması üzerine verilen mücadeleler üzerinden yürütüldü.

Yapı-yönelimli sosyolojinin önemli isimleri olarak bu çalışmada Behice Boran’ın ve öğrencisi Mübeccel Kıray’ın çalışmaları değerlendirilmiştir. Behice Boran Ankara Üniversitesi Dil Tarih Coğrafya Fakültesi’nde gelişen sosyoloji okulunun kurucu üyelerindendir ve bu isimlerin komünizmle ilişkilendirilmesi sonucu DTCF’de 1948 yılında meydana gelen tasfiye sonucunda kürsüsünden uzaklaşmış, bu dönem sonrasında gündeme 1960’lardaki sol hareketlerdeki aktif rolüyle gündeme gelmiştir. Bu çalışmada Boran’ın 1940’lardaki çalışmaları değerlendirme kapsamına alınmıştır. Boran, Türk sosyolojisinin bu çalışmada yapı-yönelimli olarak tanımlanan okulunun genel yargısına paralel olarak, sosyal ve kültürel olgulara dair gözlemlenebilir ve karşılaştırılabilir yargılara ulaşılabileceğine inanmış, sosyolojinin temel meselesini hangi toplumsal olguların diğer olgular üzerinde belirleyici etken olduğunun araştırılması olarak tanımlamıştır. Bu rolü çerçevesinde sosyoloji, özellikle hızla değişmekte olan toplumlarda hangi niteliklerin modernleşme ile uyumlu olduğun, hangilerinin bu değişime engel olduğunu belirleyecek olan bir bilgi alanıdır. Temel olarak Marksist altyapı – üstyapı anlayışı çerçevesinde üretim ilişkilerinin temel belirleyici olduğu bir modernleşme anlayışını savunan Boran, din ve ahlak gibi üstyapısal kurumların, üretim ilişkilerinin düzenlenmesine dair gerekli adımların atılması halinde modernleşmeye karşı direnmeyeceğini savunmuş, bu kurumları

genel olarak bir bağımlı değişken olarak ele almıştır. Osmanlı-Türk modernleşme söyleminin ikilikler üzerinden yapılanmasına neden olan hayatta kalma / kimlik çifte açmazı açısından Boran'ın sosyolojisine bakarsak, Boran'ın toplumsal süreçlerin temel belirleyicisi olan üretim ilişkilerinde düz-çizgisel ve gelişmeci tarih anlayışı çerçevesinde meydana gelecek olan değişimlerin beraberinde getireceği seküler ve kozmopolit bir kimlik anlayışına yakın olduğunu ve toplum olarak var olmanın tek koşulunun bu şartları sağlamak olduğuna inandığını söylemek mümkündür.

Mübeccel Kıray, hocası Behice Boran'ın 1940'larda yaptığı çalışmalara kaynaklık eden çalışmalardan farklı olarak, modernleşme okulunun bir takım kanaatlerinin değişmeye başladığı 1960'lar sosyal bilim literatüründen etkilendiğini söylemek mümkündür. Bu farklı kaynakların yanı sıra Kıray, Boran'ın önceki dönemlerde ilk adımlarını gözlemlediği değişimlerin aradan geçen yirmi yıllık süreçte aldığı halin tanıklığının da etkisiyle Boran'ın ulaştığından nispeten farklı sonuçlara yönelmiş, bununla birlikte hocasının çizdiği yolun çok fazla dışına çıkmamıştır. Geleneksel kurumların modernleşme sürecine karşıt etkenler olduğu yönündeki temel modernleşmeci yargıyı yanlışlayan gözlemlerin dile getirilmesi ve toplumsal değişim süreçlerinde meydana gelen ara kurumların da süreçlerin gidişatında önemli roller oynadığı yönündeki argümanların ortaya konması, bu yeni eğilimler arasında en önde gelenlerdir. Mübeccel Kıray sosyal bilimler literatüründeki bu yeni argümanlarla paralel olarak tampon mekanizmalar kavramını geliştirmiştir. Toplumların sürekli olarak değişmekte olmakla birlikte bu değişimler süresince görece bir dengeyi muhafaza ettikleri argümanı üzerinden geliştirdiği bu kavram, eski toplum düzeninde rol alan kimi kurumların ortadan kalktığı geçiş sürecinde bu kurumların işlevlerini yerine getiren ara kurumların ortaya çıktığı argümanına dayanır. Kıray yaptığı saha çalışmalarında bu tampon mekanizmaların çeşitli örneklerini gözlemlemiştir. Kıray, Hocası Behice Boran gibi geleneksel yapıların çok kısa sürede ortadan kalkabileceğine inanmış, bunları modernleşme önünde bir engel olarak görmemiştir. Kıray'ın çalışmalarını Boran'dan farklı kılan, bahsettiği tampon mekanizmaların modernleşme sürecine yaptığı katkılardan veya bu süreçler karşısına koyabileceği engellerden bahsetmesidir.

Kültür-yönelimli sosyolojinin önemli isimleri olarak bu çalışmada Mümtaz Turhan'ın ve öğrencisi Erol Güngör'ün çalışmaları değerlendirilmiştir. Mümtaz Turhan'ın modernleşme sürecine dair tahlili, karar vericilerin Batı ülkelerini üstün kılan temel niteliklere dair yanlış algılarının eleştirisi üzerine dayanır. Alternatif modernleşme programlarını ısrarla reddeden cumhuriyetçi aydınları eleştiren Turhan, muhafazakar düşünceden yaygın olarak dile getirilen argümanlara paralel olarak mevcut reformların hakiki manada modernleşmeyi doğurmayacak olan yüzeysel değişimler olduğunu iddia eder. Yapı-yönelimli sosyolojilerin maddi süreçlere yaptığı vurguyu eleştirerek zihniyet alanındaki değişimin toplumsal süreçlerde temel belirleyen olduğunu söyleyen Turhan, modernleşme için ilk atılması gereken adımın önemli mevkilerde görev alacak uzmanların belli bir plan ve program çerçevesinde seçilip yurt dışına eğitim amacıyla gönderilmesi olduğunu savunur. Bu düşünceye göre bu uzmanlar yurda döndüklerinde öngörülen adımlarda önemli adımların atılmasına ön ayak olacaklardır. Cumhuriyetçi aydınların tepeden inmece yaklaşımlarını sıklıkla eleştirmesine rağmen son derece kapsamlı eğitim ve sınai üretim planları öneren Turhan, bilimsel düşüncenin Batı ülkelerinde meydana gelen gelişmelerin temel itkisi olduğunu söyleyerek toplumsal yaşamın her alanının bilimsel bilgi çerçevesinde organize edilmesi gerektiğini savunur.

Mümtaz Turhan'ın öğrencisi olan Erol Güngör, Turhan'la benzer bir düşünsel çizgiyi takip etmekle birlikte hocasının bilimsel zihniyete yaptığı vurgunun aksine kültüre ve geleneğe daha başat bir rol vermeyi tercih etmiştir. Mümtaz Turhan'ın bilimsel düşünceyi toplumsal hayatın her yönünde söz sahibi kılmasına karşın, Erol Güngör sosyal bilimlerin kültür ve geleneğe dair değerlendirmelerde bulunmasının yolunu bu alanların işlevleri üzerinden tartışılmayacağını söyleyerek daha baştan kapatır. Bu mesafeli tavrı, kalkınma konusunda dönemin sosyal bilim temelli planlama anlayışından da uzak durmasını beraberinde getirir. Mümtaz Turhan'ın uzun ve kapsamlı eğitim ve üretim organizasyonu planlarının aksine Erol Güngör'ün kalkınma adına kapitalistleşme sürecinin yolunun açılmasına dair söylediklerinin ötesinde formüle ettiği herhangi bir rota yoktur ve bu yoldaki tek engeli kapitalizm karşıtı hareketler olarak gördüğünü söylemek mümkündür. Mümtaz Turhan gibi temel olarak cumhuriyetçi aydınları eleştirmesine rağmen Erol Güngör, 1960

darbesine akademi dünyasının verdiđi desteđin de etkisiyle bilimsel zihniyet meselesine belirgin bir kuşkuyla bakar. Bu tavrı Güngör'ü, muhafazakar düşünürlerin oluşturduđu bir tür alternatif aydın hareketi olan Aydınlar Ocađı'nda yer almaya sevk edecektir.

Sađ ve sol politikalar arasındaki mücadelede kitlelerin harekete geçirilmesi için bir potansiyel olarak görülen şehir nüfusu artışı, modernizasyon söyleminin yapılanması üzerinde önemli bir etki yarattı. Her ne kadar yapı ve dinamikler hakkındaki savlar on dokuzuncu yüzyılın sonlarından itibaren modernleşme üzerine yapılan tartışmalarda önemli bir bölüm teşkil ettiyse de toplumun modernizasyonun şekillendirilmesi faaliyetlerine faal katılımı 1960'ları buldu. Öte yandan Türkiye'de hüküm süren devlet merkezli sosyal deđişim kuramı ve savaş sonrası Batı toplumlarında hüküm süren tepeden inme ve rasyonel-kapsamlı sosyal politika üretimi yaklaşımı, modernleşme sürecinin Türk sosyal bilimsel literatürü içerisinde toplum merkezli olarak yeniden tasarlanması için yapılan çağrılarını yayılmasını engelledi. Siyaset alanındaki bu girişimler, 1980'de, devletin siyasi alandaki hakimiyetini eski haline getiren ve yönetmeliklerde siyasi partilerin yapıları ve seçim barajı konularında yaptıđı bazı deđişiklikler yoluyla sivil toplum üzerinde baskı yaratarak ve meclisin temsil etme kapasitesini azaltmak suretiyle farklı siyasi talepleri halk iradesi ve halk egemenliđi kavramları altında baskılamak için gereken koşulları hazırlayan askeri darbeye bastırılacaktı.

Öte yandan, uluslar arası sosyal bilim literatüründe modernleşme söyleminin rotası 1980 sonrası dönemde önemli ölçüde deđişti. Her ne kadar Türkiye'de devlet dışı alanların büyümesi 1980 askeri darbesiyle birdenbire baskı altına alındıysa da dünya ekonomisindeki koşulların deđişmesi ve siyasi mücadele yüzeylelerinin yayılması sivil toplumu önceden tanımlanmış sınırlar içerisinde hapsetmek her geçen gün daha zor hale gelmekteydi. Modernliğe dair üst anlatılara ve devletlerin, kapsamlı plan ve programlarla sosyal hayatı organize eden anahtar birimler olma anlamında önemlerinin azaldığına dair iddialara karşı verilen mücadeleler sosyal bilim literatüründe yeni kavramsal araçlar ortaya çıkardı. Modernist düşüncenin kesin kategorilere dair eleştirel sorgulamaları 1980'lerden beri Türkiye'deki modernleşme

deneyiminin yeniden yorumlanmasında da kullanılmaya başlandı. Geleneksel ve modern veya Doğu ve Batı gibi karşıt kategorilerin geçerlilikleri sosyal bilimsel literatürde her geçen gün daha çok sorgulanmaya başlandı. Bu araştırmalar esnasında hayatta kalma koşulları hakkında yaygın olarak paylaşılan görüşler sorgulanmaya başlandı. Sadece temelde savaş sonrası dönemin bir ürünü olan “gelişim paradigması” değil, modernist Batı düşünce geleneği içerisine oturtulmuş olan doğrusal-ilerlemeci anlayışın da tarih ve değişim kavramsallaştırmasındaki otoritesi sorgulanır hale geldi. Öte yandan kimlik meselesi parçalara ayrılmış durumdaydı ve bireylerin inançları arasında olduğu varsayılan uyumluluk geniş çapta reddediliyordu. Bu dönüşüm hem bireylerin üretim ilişkilerindeki konumları ve varsaydıkları kimlikleri arasındaki ilişkiye dair Marksist görüşler üzerinde, hem de kapsamlı ve homojenleştirici ulusal ve dini kategorileri kimliklerin parçalara ayrılmasını engellemede başarısız olan kültürcü perspektifler üzerinde çok büyük etki yarattı. Modernleşmeye karşı verilen bu mücadeleler özetle, kendilerini gözlem ve kategorileştirmeye açık olmak karşısında “gerçek” süreçlerin direncini kabul etmek şeklinde tanımlanabilir. Devam eden süreçleri anlamak adına mevcut kategorilerin geçerliliği hakkında ortaya atılan sorular da, tarih araştırmalarına dahil edilen teorik ve kavramsal araçlarla geçmiş anlayışımızın ne ölçüde “kirletildiği” hakkında ve hatta tarihi “gerçeklikler” algımızdaki her tür kirletme ve çarpıtma hakkında konuşmanın dahi ne ölçüde geçerli olduğu hakkında daha fazla sorunun ortaya çıkışını tetikledi.

1980’lerde modernitenin ve temsil ettiği her şeyin sonu hakkında aceleci biçimde yapılan yorumlar sonradan haklı olarak inkar edildiyse de sosyal bilimlerin yeni çağı anlamak adına üzerlerine yeni teoriler geliştirebilecekleri dayanaklar bulmak konusunda ciddi bir güçlük yaşamakta olduğu tartışılmaz bir gerçektir. Öte yandan Türkiye özelinde siyasi alanın bu yeni mücadeleleri kavrama konusunda gösterdiği direnç bizlerin süregelmekte olan gelişmeleri anlamamızı daha da güç hale getiriyor. Siyasette artan kutuplaşmanın gün geçtikçe siyasi mücadelelerin çok katlılığından uzaklaştığını dile getirilen çok sayıda talebin “meşru” siyasi sahada kendisini dile getirememesi ve yetersiz temsil edilmesinden dolayı gözlemlemek mümkün. Bu koşullar altında Türkiye’deki sosyolojik söylemler, sosyal değişimin yeniden

yorumlanması için yeni epistemik araçlardan faydalanmaya direnç göstermeye devam ediyor. Modernizasyonu alternatif deęişim programları ve çeşitli kimlikler arasındaki çok yönlü mücadelelerden hareketle tartışmaya yönelik değerli girişimlerde bulunulduysa da, devam eden süreçlere bakışta hakim olan yol, hala, savaş sonrası dönemin yapı- veya kültür - yönelimli sosyolojilerine ait daha basit tasarılarla şekillendiriliyor. Bu anlamda, günlük siyasi çatışmaların acilliğinin, mevcut modernleşme söylemindeki eksiklikleri ortadan kaldırma çabasının önüne geçmeye devam ettiğini söylemek mümkün.

TEZ FOTOKOPİSİ İZİN FORMU

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YAZARIN

Soyadı : Mühürdaroğlu
Adı : Anıl
Bölümü : Sosyoloji

TEZİN ADI (İngilizce) : TURKISH SOCIOLOGY IN A SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE PERSPECTIVE: THE DOUBLE-BIND OF SURVIVAL/IDENTITY

TEZİN TÜRÜ : Yüksek Lisans

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